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 THE 
 
 STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ITS OBJECT, SCOPE, AND METHOD
 
 PROBLEMS 
 
 or 
 
 LIFE AND MIND 
 
 ST 
 
 GEOEaE HENEY LEWES 
 
 PROBLEM THE FIRST 
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 ITS OBJECT, SCOPE, AND METHOD 
 
 BOSTON: 
 HOUGHTON, OSGOOD AND COMPANY. 
 
 Cde Etocrciic Press, €am6rilig:e. 
 
 1879.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 PAOB 
 
 THE OBJECT, 3 
 
 {The Relation of Psychology to Physiology), > . . 9 
 
 (5o(^y anci Mind), . 19 
 
 {Function and Faculty), 27 
 
 {Mechanism and Exjperience), ...... 29 
 
 . CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE MOTIVE, 39 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE POSITION OP THE SCIENCE, 47 
 
 {Objective and Subjective Laxvs), .... 50 
 
 ( Viewa of Comte, Mill, and Spencer), ...,•, 54 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SOCIAL FACTOR, 71 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND THE INTROSPECTIVE METHOD, . 82 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OP THE INTROSPECTIVE METHOD 90 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FREEDOM OP THE WILL, , , 101
 
 VUl CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 PAQB 
 OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS, . 112 
 
 (Animal Psychology), 118 
 
 {Differences of Animal and Human), 129 
 
 {The Moral Sense), 144 
 
 {History), 152 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 IHE GENERAL MIND, . 159 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 IHB MENTAL FORMS, .....»•. 171 
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS, 178 

 
 NOTICE. 
 
 The following Problem is published separately in 
 obedience to an implied wish of the Author, and has 
 been printed from his manuscript with no other 
 alterations than such as it is felt certain that he 
 would have sanctioned. 
 
 Another volume will appear in the autumn.
 
 PROBLEM I. 
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY; 
 
 ITS OBJECT, SCOPE, AND METHOD. 
 
 " $i/x'7S o^p ^iffiv d^fws X6701; Karavorjcai ofet twarhv etvai &vev rrjs toO SXov 
 t/tiaeus ; " 
 
 Plato : Phcedrus. 
 
 "Kaum giebt es eine Wissenschaft, iiber deren Standpvinkt und Entwick- 
 lungsstufe grossere Zweifel und Widerspriiche herrschen, als die Wissenschaft 
 der Seele. Wahrend den Einen die Psychologie langst ausgelebt, keiner erheb- 
 licben Weiterbildung mehr fiihig scheint, sind Andere der Meinung, dass sie 
 kaum erst in den Anfangen ihrer Entwicklung begriffen sei." 
 
 WuNDT : Vorlesungen iiber die Menschen und Thierseele, 
 1863, i. I.
 
 ft 
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOG' 
 
 CHAPTEK I. 
 
 THE OBJECT. 
 
 1. In every science we define the object and scope of 
 tlie search, the motive of the search, and the means 
 whereby the aim may be reached. The purpose of 
 the following pages is to set forth what it is we study 
 in Psychology, why we study it, and how we ought 
 to study it. 
 
 A glance at the literature of the subject discloses 
 the utmost discordance on these cardinal points. The 
 conceptions of the object and scope are different, and 
 lead to the adoption of antagonistic methods. On 
 the one side stands the ancient metempirical concep- 
 tion of a so-called Eational Psychology, with its 
 deductive method of ontological research. Its adhe- 
 rents, even when condescending to what they call 
 Empirical Psychology, so little regard the data of 
 Experience, that they quietly ignore the complex con- 
 ditions of the living organism, and treat mental facts 
 simply as the manifestations of a Psychical Principle, 
 at once unknowable and intimately known, a myste- 
 rious agent revealed to Consciousness. On the other 
 hand, there is an empirical school which professes to
 
 4 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 confine itself to tlie data of Experience, and to pursue 
 the inductive method : discountenancing Ontology, 
 and coquetting with Physiology. This school keeps 
 up the traditions of a Psychical Principle independent 
 of the organism, and of Introspection as the exclusive 
 method of research. Of late years there have arisen 
 writers who have tried to efi'ect a compromise : in- 
 voking physiological data for one class of facts, and 
 only invoking the Psychical Principle where physio- 
 logical data fell short. 
 
 The development of the science has been along 
 three lines : Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Condillac, 
 Hartley, and James Mill made imperishable contri- 
 butions to the introspective analysis of the phenomena 
 in their mental aspect. Cabanis, Gall, and recent 
 physiologists, have brought into prominence the phy- 
 sical aspect-, revealing many of the biological condi- 
 tions. Lotze, Wundt, Bain, Spencer, Taine, combine 
 and complete these efi"orts of subjective and objective 
 research, and have given the science a new impulse 
 by their thorough and constant recognition of the 
 twofold aspect of the phenomena. 
 
 2. And yet the constitution of the science has still 
 to be effected. The constitution of a science means, 
 l**, that circumscription of a class of phenomena 
 which, while marking its relations to other classes, 
 assigns it a distinctive position in the series of the 
 sciences ; 2°, that specijication of the object and 
 method of search which, when aided by fundamental 
 inductions established on experiment, enables all 
 future inquiries to converge towards a self-sustaining 
 and continuous development. In a science thus con- 
 stituted, the discovery of to-day enlarges without
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 5 
 
 overturning the conceptions of yesterday. Each 
 worker brings his hibours as a contribution to a com- 
 mon fund, not as an anarchical displacement of the 
 labours of predecessors. Henceforward there is 
 system, but no systems : schools and professors no 
 longer give their names -as authorities in place of 
 reasons. Astronomy, to take one example, is in con- 
 stant progress, but the progress is that of evolution, 
 not revolution ; and the doctrines taught are not 
 taught as Copernican, Newtonian, or Laplacian, but 
 as astronomical. Physics and Chemistry advance 
 with rapid strides to a fuller and more exact appre- 
 ciation of their respective phenomena. The same 
 may be said of Biology, but cannot be said of Psycho- 
 logy. We still hear of the Intuitional Psychology 
 and the Sensational School. We are referred to the 
 Psychology of Kant or Hegel, of Locke or Spencer, 
 as if the doctrines taught were still individual appre- 
 ciations of the facts on the guarantee of each author's 
 renown. 
 
 3. Nevertheless, while this is assuredly the present 
 state of the study, and one which is anomalous, the 
 materials exist whereby " a first approximation " to 
 the constitution of the science may be made. Neither 
 introspective analysis alone, nor objective observation 
 alone, nor even the union of the two, if confined to 
 the invest] oration of the individual mind and indivi- 
 dual organism, will suffice. Psychology investigates 
 the Human Mind, not an individual's thoughts and 
 feelings ; and has to consider it as the product of the 
 Human Organism not only in relation to the Cosmos, 
 but also in relation to Society. For man is distinc- 
 tively a social being ; his animal impulses are pro-
 
 6 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AltTD MIXD. 
 
 foundly modified by social influences, and his higher 
 faculties are evolved through social needs. By this 
 recognition of the social factor as the complement to 
 the biological factor, this recognition of the Mind as 
 an expression of organic and social conditions, the 
 first step is taken towards the constitution of our 
 science. 
 
 The credit of this conception is due to Auguste 
 Comte. Others before him had of course recognised 
 the fact that social conditions greatly influenced 
 mental evolution; the fact was transparent, but no 
 one had seized its full significance. Nor do I think 
 that even Comte saw more than its general range. 
 His abstention from analysis and detailed investiga- 
 tion kept him from specifying the mode of operation 
 of the social factor; and his '^cerebral theory," so 
 unsatisfactory in its method, and so fantastic in its 
 anatomy, could not supply what he left unspecified. 
 
 4. It is not enough to transfer the point of view 
 from the individual to the race, and to take the social 
 factor into account ; we must also frankly accept the 
 biological point of view, which regarding mental 
 functions as vital functions, and states of conscious- 
 ness as separable from states of the organism only in 
 our mode of apprehending them, sets aside the tradi- 
 tional conception of the Mind as an agent apart from 
 the organism. This premised, we may define the 
 object of our search somewhat thus : 
 
 Psychology is the analysis and classification of 
 the sentient functions and faculties, revealed 
 to observation and induction, completed by 
 the reduction of them to their conditions of 
 existence, biological and sociological.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 7 
 
 An organism when in action is only to be under- 
 stood, by understanding both it and the raediumyro??i 
 which it draws its materials, and on which it reacts. 
 Its conditions of existence are first the structural 
 mechanism, and, secondly, the medium in which it is 
 placed. When we know the part played by the 
 mechanism, and the part played by the medium, we 
 have gone as far as analysis can help us ; we have 
 scientifically explained the actions of the organism. 
 This, which is so obvious in reference to vital actions 
 that it is a physiological commonplace, is so little 
 understood in reference to the mental class of vital 
 actions that it may appear a psychological paradox, 
 and a paradox which no explanation can make accept- 
 able so long as the Mind is thought to be an entity 
 inhabitincc the orfjanism, usinec it as an instrument ; 
 and so long as Society is thought to be an artificial 
 product of man's mind, — in which case it cannot be 
 one of the conditions of mental evolution. 
 
 5. Leaving the justification of our definition to 
 subsequent pages, we are enabled by it to specify the 
 class of phenomena which form the object of our 
 study. Instead of defining it as *' The science of the 
 facts of Consciousness," which is at once ambiguous 
 and restricted, we propose, as more precise and com- 
 prehensive, " The science of the facts of Sentience.'\ 
 These terms have the advantage of at once ranging 
 the search under the general science of Life, and also 
 of rescuing many phenomena from the ambiguity 
 arising when these are unconscious.^' There are 
 
 * Sir W. Hamilton, treating of certain mental modifications, says — 
 " They are not in themselves revealed to consciousness ; but as certain 
 facts of consciousness necessarily suppose them to exist, and to exert an
 
 8 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 many writers who not only limit tlie science to the 
 facts of Consciousness (which forces them to extreme 
 vacillation in the use of this term), but also regard 
 Consciousness as absolutely sui generis, unallied with 
 all other facts, even the organic, so that the science 
 calls for an unique position, and a Method that is 
 unique. In this work the science will be regarded as 
 a branch of Biology, and its Method as that which is 
 pursued in the physical sciences. The broad distinc- 
 tion of objective and subjective aspects I fully admit, 
 but deny that this calls for any change in Method. 
 I admit the speciality of what are called spiritual 
 facts ; I admit that because of this speciality they can 
 never be explained by, or reduced to material facts, 
 whether we assume their difference to be that of 
 agents or only of aspects ; I further admit that no 
 deductions from what is known objectively of the 
 material mechanism will explain the phenomena of 
 sensibility, as states of consciousness, any more than 
 anatomical knowledge of an organ alone will enable 
 us to deduce its function. But for all this I must 
 reject the separation of Psychology from Biology so 
 long as I am unable to separate Mind from Life. 
 
 The relation of Mind to Life is so plain that no 
 one has ever doubted it, yet so obscure that no one 
 has been able to present a precise statement of their 
 points of identity and difference. We may define, 
 we cannot explain it. We can define it by analyti- 
 cally distinguishing certain functions as sentient from 
 other functions as nutrient; but in reality no such 
 
 influence in the mental processes, we are thus constrained to admit as 
 modifications of mind what are not in themselves phenomena of con- 
 sciousness." — Lectures on Metap/iysics, 1859, i. 348.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 9 
 
 separation is feasible. If we classify certain pheno- 
 mena as psychical, and others as vital, the artifice is 
 patent, since all psychical phenomena are vital, and 
 in all of them sensibility is a factor. This identity 
 admitted, there is still need to specify the difference 
 which leads us to mark off Psychology as a branch of 
 the general science of life. That science — Biology — 
 includes plants, animals, and man, with the respective 
 subdivisions, Phytology, Zoology, and Anthropology. 
 Each of these is again subdivided into Morphology, 
 the science of form, and Physiology, the science of 
 function. Now clearly it is neither with the struc- 
 ture of the organism, nor with its phases of evolution, 
 that Psychology is concerned, but solely with the 
 sentient functions and faculties of the organism. 
 And as on a first glance this would seem to be the 
 peculiar province of Physiology, the science of func- 
 tion, — the question may arise, Why not be content 
 with it, why admit a separate science ? There are 
 writers who explicitly maintain that Psychology is 
 only another name for the Physiology of the sentient 
 organism ; but to be consistent in this they have to 
 extend the conception of Physiology far beyond its 
 scientific acceptation. 
 
 THE RELATION OF PSYCHOLOGY TO PHYSIOLOGY. 
 
 6. This is a point of considerable importance, and 
 one on which there seems great vacillation of opinion, 
 not only among the various schools, but in the 
 writings of each author. I will endeavour to fix with 
 precision the conception which will guide my own 
 exposition.
 
 10 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 We see men and animals performing certain actions 
 in consequence of certain external influences ; and 
 other actions, the causation of which is hidden from 
 us, and assigned to internal influences. The resem- 
 blance of both classes of actions to those performed 
 by ourselves, irresistibly leads us to infer that in 
 them, as in us, the actions were stimulated and 
 guided by feelings. Sometimes we think only of the 
 movements which we see, and sometimes only of the 
 feelings which we infer. Accordingly, we may say 
 that we saw a man snatch up a stick and strike a 
 dog ; or that we knew the man was angry and 
 resolved to punish the dog. This twofold interpre- 
 tation of the same event we name its objective and 
 subjective aspect. A similar twofold aspect is pre- 
 sented in reflection on our own actions. We say 
 that we are both Body and Mind. We know that 
 we exist as objects, perceptible to our senses, and to 
 the senses of others ; and as subjects, percipient of 
 objects, and conscious of feelings. We live, feed, 
 and move. We feel, think, and will. The solidity, 
 form, colour, weight, and motions of the Body consti- 
 tute the objective, visible self (oparov). The sensa- 
 tions, ideas, and volitions constitute the subjective, 
 intelligible self (aetSeV). Thus opposed, there is the 
 broadest of all possible distinctions between Body 
 and Mind. It was appreciated by the earliest in- 
 quirers, who, naturally enough, concluded that the 
 inner self was the ruler, if not the fashioner of the 
 outer {to tov au,/j.aTo<i ap-xjoov) ; a conception which still 
 lingers in the fallacy of organs being created by 
 functions. Although modern science tends rather 
 to\\^ards the opposite extreme, in its pursuit of the
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 11 
 
 bodily conditions of mental functions, the broad 
 contrast between the objective and subjective aspects 
 remains unassailed. To many thinkers, indeed, the 
 contrast seems far more than that of aspects, it is 
 that of agents. They postulate a vital principle and 
 a psychical principle — a Body, the organism, as the 
 substance, or agent, of all the vital actions, and a 
 Soul, the subject, or agent, of all the mental phe- 
 nomena. The difference in the physical and mental 
 aspect is interpreted as implying a diflference in the 
 Vital Principle which stands for the one, and the 
 Psychical Principle which stands for the other. Yet 
 that these are merely two generalised expressions of 
 the observed phenomena, and that the different 
 actions are those of one and the same agent, are the 
 only conclusions which Experience warrants. They 
 are indeed conclusions which a philosophy claiming 
 another basis than experience rejects. What we 
 know is that the living organism has among its 
 manifestations the class called sentient ; and these 
 are known as sensible affections, i.e., the changes 
 excited by the contact of external causes, and assign- 
 able to visible organs of Sense ; and states of con- 
 sciousness, i.e., the changes of Feeling, excited by 
 internal causes, and not assignable to visible organs. 
 It is not known, nor is there any evidence to suggest, 
 that one of these classes is due to the activity of the 
 organism, the other to the activity of another agent. 
 The only agent known is the organism. That an 
 organism can feel and think is doubtless mysterious. 
 The fact that it does so is all we are concerned with, 
 and is neither more nor less mysterious than the fact 
 that the organism can live and move.
 
 12 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 7. Keeping within the lines of Experience, we may 
 be said to know the nature of the Soul, as we know 
 the nature of the Body. We know the separate 
 manifestations ; and we know the logical artifices 
 which condense the manifold phenomena in abstract 
 terms. Sir W. Hamilton taught that "in so far as 
 mind is the common name for the states of knowing, 
 willing, feeling, &c., of which we are conscious, it 
 is only a name for a certain series of connected 
 phenomena or qualities, and consequently expresses 
 only what is known." Surely that is enough ? Not 
 for the metaphysician ; for he adds : " but in so far 
 as it denotes that subject or substance in which the 
 phenomena of knowing, willing, feeling, &c., inhere 
 — something behind or under the phenomena — it 
 expresses what in itself, or in its absolute existence, 
 is unknown" {Lectures, i. 138). 
 
 If that something is unknown, on what grounds 
 can we pretend to say what it is or is not ? We 
 cannot lawfully say that it is not some mode of 
 existence of the organism. Waiving this, let us ask 
 what definite and verifiable conception is expressed 
 by " a something behind the phenomena"? It may 
 mean either the conditions of which the phenomena 
 are the functions, or jpre-conditions which were indis- 
 pensable to the existence of those conditions then 
 and there. Both of these are amenable to empirical 
 methods. Anvthino; more than these is a metem- 
 pirical figment, an unknown quantity to which no 
 function is assignable, and which consequently can 
 have no place in a scientific theory dealing only with 
 known functions. 
 
 Dismissing then the metempirical postulate of a
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 13 
 
 "sometliing behind or under the phenomena," which 
 is neither their conditions nor their pre-conditions, 
 we have the two abstractions substance and subject as 
 the " something " in which the observed phenomena 
 are said to " inhere." If the reader will strike out 
 the terms mind, feeling, knowing, and willing, from 
 Hamilton's passage, and replace them by motion as 
 the common name for changes of position in space, or 
 by vitality as the common name for the changes in an 
 organism, he will see that the substance or subject in 
 which qualities inhere is only the abstract expression 
 for the sums of such qualities. Mind as a subject is the 
 logical conception of the qualities grouped in a class; if 
 we translate it into a physiological conception, and seek 
 the agent of which all the phenomena are the actions, 
 we get the organism. We no more come upon the 
 evidence for a Psychical Principle which is not the 
 abstract expression of this orgauism, than we come 
 upon a Motor Principle behind the conditions of 
 movement, or a Vital Principle under the conditions 
 of organic change. 
 
 8. Thus, and thus only, is it permissible in a 
 scientific treatise to speak of Soul or Miud, as sub- 
 stance or subject. Our search for the conditions and 
 pre-conditions of the phenomena is therefore solely 
 directed to the organism in relation to the external 
 world and to the social world. Thus defined, the 
 place of Physiology is that of the organic conditions 
 of production ; the place of Psychology being that of 
 th<3 products. Physiology deals directly and chiefly 
 with the objective aspect of sentient facts, and their 
 relation to the visible organism ; Psychology with the 
 same facts in their subjective aspect as states of
 
 14 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 Feeling, not as organic changes. The physiologist 
 traces the sequence of stimulation through sensory 
 nerve, centre, motor nerve, and muscle. It is with 
 the mechanism that he is directly concerned, although 
 from first to last he has indirectly been occupied with 
 the changes in Feeling. Were it not for this implied 
 identity of molecular and sentient changes, the 
 sequences would have no more significance for him 
 than similar sequences in a machine. The psycho- 
 loofist has the same events before him, but reo-ards 
 them from a diff"erent standpoint. He is concerned 
 directly with feelings as such, and their relations to 
 other feelings — with the products, not with the con- 
 ditions of production. He must, indeed, imply the 
 co-existence of organic changes, because the feelings 
 are those of a living organism ; but so long as the 
 nature and succession of the phenomena in their sub- 
 jective aspect attract him, he need only tacitly imply 
 the co-existence of the objective. His concern is 
 with changes in feeling, with processes which are 
 conscious processes, or which have been and may 
 again be conscious. 
 
 This latter clause is of immense importance, and 
 points to the indispensable union of the j)hysiological 
 with the psychological investigation. For observe : 
 we can classify subjective facts while remaining 
 ignorant of their objective correlates ; as ordinary 
 men classify the cardinal facts of life while wholly 
 ignorant of Anatomy and Physiology. But if we 
 desire to know the subjective facts with accuracy 
 and fulness, it is obvious that we must learn 
 their objective conditions of production. A chemist 
 studies both thQ nature of the elementary substances
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 15 
 
 and the laws of tlieir combination ; having these 
 products before him, he analyses them in the search 
 for their conditions of production. Only thus can he 
 satisfy himself that he knows the products accurately. 
 But in seeking these conditions he is forced to pass 
 beyond the sphere of Chemistry proper : he has to 
 invoke the aid of Physics. The physiologist also has 
 to pass beyond the observation of functions, and 
 invoke the aid of Anatomy, Chemistry, and Physics. 
 In like manner, although the exclusive province of 
 the psychologist is that of the sentient changes as 
 products, the aid of Physiology is needed to supply 
 the conditions of production ; it alone can disclose 
 the operation of changes which escape subjective 
 appreciation. 
 
 To the physiologist there must appear a grave 
 misconception in the common declaration that " all 
 we know of a sensation is our consciousness of it." 
 This is a truism if sensation and consciousness are 
 equivalent terms, but such equivalence can only refer 
 to the subjective aspect of the phenomenon. Objec- 
 tively, as a vital fact, we know a sensation as a force 
 in the organism, a condition of movement, a com- 
 ponent in some conscious resultant, which, whether 
 itself consciously discriminated, or merely merged in 
 a conscious resultant, has the same vital, the same 
 psychical operation. And this force, this sensible 
 component, which lies outside the range of intro- 
 spection, may be proved experimentally to be in 
 actual operation ; and may even be experimentally 
 brought within the range of introspection. Thus, 
 much that is inexplicable when the study is limited 
 to the facts of consciousness on the method of Intro-
 
 16 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 spection, becomes explicable when extended to the 
 facts of Sentience on the wider method. 
 
 9. The contrast between the two studies is this : 
 the aspect which the physiologist brings prominently 
 forward is left in the background by the psychologist ; 
 and vice versd. For example : I have certain musical 
 sensations which I recognise as representing three 
 bars of the Ninth Symphony. If, as a physiologist, I 
 attempt an analysis of these sensations, I seek all the 
 successive objective conditions — aerial pulses of certain 
 amplitudes and rapidities, neural changes in the audi- 
 tory tract, and excitations of the Sensorium : the 
 result of all these being the musical sensations. But 
 if, as a psychologist, I attempt the analysis, it is not 
 to these objective conditions that they are referred. 
 These are presupposed; and instead of aerial pulses and 
 neural changes, I call up the experiences which have 
 assigned every note to its position in the scale, and to 
 every grouping of the notes its position in my mental 
 history. I re-cognise the notes and their intervals. I 
 also re-cognise the arrangement as that of Beethoven's 
 Ninth Symphony. ~ The eflfect of these sounds is far 
 from being the simple response of my auditory tract ; 
 it is blended with nascent feelings, dim associations, 
 and distinct images. The musical value of each note, 
 and the musical feeling of each group, the recognition, 
 and the revivals, have indeed their particular organic 
 conditions ; but these are too obscure for our obser- 
 vation, and were they transparent they would not be 
 regarded in a psychological exposition. 
 
 There is a physiology of the sentient organism, and 
 this is the theory of the sentient functions as the 
 direct activity of the organs. There is a psychology
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 17 
 
 of the sentient being, and tliis is tLe theory of the 
 Soul, its functions and acquired faculties, considered 
 less in reference to the organism than in reference to 
 Experience and Conduct. The physiologist presup- 
 poses that the psychical facts are known, his task 
 being to detect the physical factors. The psycho- 
 logist presupposes the physical factors, his task being 
 to exhibit the mutual relations of the psychical facts. 
 A theory of the organism and a theory of the soul 
 equally demand a combination of the objective and 
 subjective data. 
 
 Kant {Anthropologie, W. x. 115), with many other 
 writers, regards all physiological explanation of psy- 
 chical facts as idle speculation, " because we know 
 nothing of the brain-fibres and their action." If 
 Physiology were limited to brain-fibres and their 
 action, the objection would be valid, for our igno- 
 rance is undeniable. But Kant admits that uncon- 
 scious sensations and obscure perceptions form the 
 larger proportion of our mental states ; and as Sense, 
 on its receptive side at least, is unquestionably an 
 organic function, the exclusion of Physiology is 
 manifestly impossible. He thinks that Physiology, 
 though incapable of telling us what the action of 
 brain-fibres is, can tell us " what helps or obstructs 
 them ; " and he assigns it therefore the position of a 
 pragmatical Anthropology. One cannot say that in 
 this, or in psychological investigation, Kant's success 
 was such as to render his exclusion of Physiology 
 wisely imitable. 
 
 10. Sensations and ideas spring up in the mind as 
 flowers spring np in the fields. We see them only 
 when they have emerged. We watch their changes 
 
 VOL. IIL B
 
 18 PROBLEMS or LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 and disappearance. Science is prompted to seek out 
 the conditions of their appearance, their changes and 
 their disappearance. The search is for the most part 
 groping in darkness. We know that a seed placed 
 in suitable soil will throw out root and stem. We 
 can trace its development as it draws certain materials 
 from the soil and the atmosphere. But we know that 
 the seed itself is a product, and has its own special 
 determinism. The forms which the seed assumes 
 are partly peculiar to it and partly common to 
 myriads of others ; nay, some of its forms are common 
 to all plants whatever. Different seeds and different 
 soils yield different plants, but all have the same 
 fundamental substance and the same constituent 
 forms. A speculative botanist extracting these com- 
 mon forms may present them as a priori condi- 
 tions and call them Nature's innate ideas ; folio vvinor 
 thus in the track of speculative psychologists. The 
 psychologist admits that all knowledge arises in 
 experience, though not all out of it. The botanist 
 admits that all plants arise in earth or air, but not all 
 out of them. There are conditions and pre-conditions 
 of experience, as there are conditions and pre-condi- 
 tions of plant life. The first question to be solved is, 
 AVhat is the nature of these ? Is there an archetypal 
 plant existing somewhere and somehow behind the 
 phenomenal plants, a Soul or Spiritual Principle in- 
 dependent of the living organism ? or is there an 
 evolved product — seed — organism, which in a given 
 medium will continue its evolution into other pro- 
 ducts ? It is not less certain that before the eye can 
 enter on its function of seeing under the required 
 conditions, there are required pre-conditions of an
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY^ 19 
 
 optical mechanism and a sensorial mecLanism, than 
 that before the seed can enter on its development 
 there must be added to the conditions of soil, atmos- 
 phere, and temperature, the pre-conditions of ances- 
 tral adaptations which have formed protoplasm into 
 seed. 
 
 BODY AND MIND. 
 
 11. The fact of unconscious intellectual processes, 
 no less than of unconscious sensual and volitional 
 processes, carries two important consequences. First, 
 it disproves the notion that Psychology can be 
 limited to the facts of Consciousness ; for this would 
 exclude the greater part of our mental life, and would 
 imply that a judgment or a train of reasoning was 
 not a psychological fact when it passed unconsciously. 
 Secondly, it proves that Psychology, the science of 
 the products, cannot be divorced from Physiology, \ 
 the science of the conditions of production, without 
 excluding all the processes known to be physiological 
 and known to be unconscious. The two studies 
 represent the two aspects of the relation between 
 Body and Mind, aspects which are expressed in objec- 
 tive and subjective terms. Only when sentient 
 activities have become so developed that a conscious 
 Ego or Personality has emerged from them, which 
 establishes distinctions between one class of feelings 
 and another, can this famous contrast of object and ^ 
 subject arise. We learn to distinguish the different 
 parts of our organism and their different activities; 
 generalising and abstracting, we get the conception 
 of Body representing one group, and of Mind repre- 
 senting another.
 
 20 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 Once formed, these abstractions are personified, 
 considered apart, and speculation is then busy trying 
 to discover the link which unites them. For centuries 
 men have puzzled themselves with this question. If 
 we consider the genesis of the Mind as revealed to 
 observation and induction, we see that at first there 
 could be no such contrast of objective and subjective ; 
 and ^ven now there are numberless indications of a 
 mental activity only recognisable as a neural process, 
 hot at all as a conscious process. 
 
 12. Much of the obscurity arises from not dis- 
 tinguishing between Sentience, the activity of the 
 nQuro-mu«cular system, and Consciousness (in the 
 special sense of Eeflectiou), the particular Mode of 
 Sentience. Thus, we are commonly said to be 
 sensibly afiected by an impression, but not to have a 
 sensation unless we are conscious of this affection : a 
 simj)le activity of the sentient mechanism does not 
 suffice ; there must be a special addition to it from 
 some other mechanism — a reverberation from some 
 other source. In this view, Sensibility is not the 
 vital property o^ tissue, Sentience is not the function 
 of the neuro-muscular system, but is the activity of 
 the Ego, according to the spiritualists ; the function 
 of the brain, according to the physiologists. 
 
 In future pages I shall explain how both physio- 
 logically and psychologically it is we who feel, and 
 ,not any particular organ ; but that this ive means the 
 total sensibilities of the whole oro-anism. Meanwhile 
 I may remark, that we can only introduce the order- 
 liness of science into this question by regarding every 
 sensorial 'afi'ection as sentient, therefore psychical ; 
 and every such afi'ection as capable of rising into
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 21 
 
 conscious afifection when the conditions of relative 
 distinctness are present. The great mistake is trans- 
 formingf the antithesis of conscious and unconscious 
 into the equivalent of mental and physical. How 
 this arose, we know. Observation having detected 
 the mechanical conditions of numerous vital actions, 
 some of these sentient, Descartes argued that animals, 
 at least, were mere machines. All their actions, and 
 many of our own, were, he said, determined by purely 
 mechanical motors. In man there was a soul which 
 presided over the machinery, but in the animal 
 there was the machinery without the soul.^'" I tried 
 in my previous volume to show that this paradox, 
 which startled Europe and has been recently re- 
 vived, is true or false according to our interpre- 
 tation of its terms. It is true if it be understood 
 to say that animal actions, viewed solely in the 
 light of movements, must be rigorously dependent 
 on mechanical conditions ; for Mechanics is the^ 
 science of Movement. It is false if it be under- 
 stood to say that the animal actions are exclu- 
 sively phenomena of Movement, either as an ab- 
 stract aspect, or a* identical with the action ,'of 
 machinery ; for these actions are chemical and vital, 
 no less than mechanical, and their motors involve 
 the co-operation of conditions never found in ma- 
 chinery. ", 
 
 * " Descartes a donnd une definition metaphysique de I'ame et une 
 definition physique de la vie. Lame est le principe superieur qui se 
 nianifeste par la pensee, la vie n'est qu'un effet superieur des lois de 
 la mecanique. Le corps humain est une machine faite pour elle 
 nieme ; Tame s'y ajoute pour contempler en simple spectatrice ce qui_ 
 se passe dans le corps, mais elle n'intervient en rien dans le fonctionne- 
 ment vital." — Cladde Bernard, La Science Experimentale, 1878, 
 p. 15L
 
 22 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 13. The paradox of Descartes was useful in fixing 
 attention on tlie -operation of mechanical conditions, 
 which had been too little regarded ; but while it thus 
 gave definiteness to research, and enabled men to 
 understand spinal reflexes, it was injurious in its 
 tendency to substitute the principles of inorganic 
 machinery for the principles of organic mechanism. 
 Hence, when a large class of actions were found to be 
 effected in the absence of the brain, and were assigned 
 to the reflex mechanism of the spinal cord, it was 
 rashly concluded that such actions were due to purely 
 mechanical motors. Sentience was excluded, because 
 that was assigned to the brain exclusively. The next 
 step was to conclude that since these spinal reflexes 
 were often performed unconsciously, even when the 
 brain was present, they proved Consciousness not to 
 be indispensable ; and Consciousness and Sentience 
 being taken as equivalent, the final conclusion was 
 that the real motors of such actions were mechanical. 
 The spinal cord became the recognised apparatus for 
 the transmission of movement and the production of 
 muscular action, but not an apparatus for the produc- 
 tion of sentience. Because it was demonstrably the 
 one, it was denied to be the other. That it might be 
 botli was not considered. It acquired the title of 
 excito-motor apparatus ; the brain being the sensori- 
 motor apparatus. But I have seen no rational grounds 
 for the conclusion that one part of the central nervous 
 system is both a mechanical and a sentient apparatus, 
 while other parts similar in structure are only mecha- 
 nical. The doubt on this head became a certainty 
 when observation proved that not only had the cere- 
 brum a reflex activity of the same kind as the spinal
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 23 ' 
 
 cord, but that the cerebral reflexes were, like the 
 spinal, sometimes conscious, sometimes unconscious 
 states. Here it became clear that the antithesis be- 
 tween these two sentient states could not be the equi- 
 valent of the antithesis between sentient and mecha- 
 nical, in the sense of mental and physical ; both states 
 were mental in one aspect and physical in another ; 
 the conscious state was proved to be also mechanical, 
 the unconscious state was proved to be (in some cases 
 avowedly) mental. We had no grounds for degrading 
 any action of a sentient mechanism from the psychical 
 to the physical sphere, solely because it might pass 
 unconsciously, and often did so ; nor could we refuse 
 to admit the mechanical aspect of a mental state when 
 that state was a conscious state. Objectively the 
 vital organism is an apparatus for the transmission of 
 motions, molecular and molar. In this view all its 
 actions are mechanical. It is also an apparatus for 
 the composition and decomposition of substances. In 
 this view it ceases to be purely mechanical, and be- 
 longs to Chemistry. It is further an apparatus for 
 morphological evolution and dynamic consensus — the 
 special phenomena classed as vital. Thus, even on 
 the objective side, the organism is more than an 
 automaton ; it is a chemical laboratory and a vital 
 system. On the subjective side the neuro-muscular 
 system gives place to the soul ; its actions are feelings. 
 Here there can be no question either of Mechanics or 
 of Chemistry. The phenomena are no longer move- 
 ments and decompositions. They imply such, and 
 are referred to such, when their objective expressions 
 are employed ; as, on the other hand, all objective 
 facts are finally expressible in terms of Feeling — such
 
 n. 
 
 24 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND, 
 
 terms as movement and decomposition being symbols 
 of our sensible affections. 
 
 1 4. While, therefore, we emphasise the antithesis of 
 objective and subjective aspects, we must insist on 
 the organic state, and its corresponding meiital state, 
 as the antithetic terms for one and the same fact. 
 Their separation into two different fjxcts, and the con- 
 sequent search for the link connecting them, we must 
 dismiss as illusory. It is sustained by the popular, 
 but erroneous, view of the relation between cause and 
 effect, which assumes that one process or event (named 
 cause) calls into existence another process or event 
 (effect). This leads to the metaphysical puzzle of 
 -how one process can create another ? According to 
 the view expounded in Problems of Life and Mind 
 (vol. ii. Prob. v.), an effect is the causatum, the incor- 
 poration of the causes or co-operant conditions, not a , 
 new and distinct event. That is to say, all the co- 
 operant conditions which may severally be detected 
 are the cause when viewed apart from their combina- 
 tion ; these same conditions are the effect wh"en viewed 
 as a resultant. In consequence of this abstract mode 
 of considering them, any one condition is often 
 selected as the cause, and any one detail in the result 
 as the effect. But in reality there is nothing in the 
 effect which is not one of the conditions of its pro- 
 duction ; there is no new creation either of matter or 
 motion, only new combinations of matter and re- 
 directions of motion. 
 
 If this be so, the relation between cause and effect 
 is simply the relation between two modes of viewing 
 a certain event ; and this also is the relation between 
 organic state and mental state, when organic state is
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 25 
 
 regarded as the cause, and mental state as the effect. 
 The one does not really precede and call into existence 
 the other ; but the one is the objective expression, the N 
 other the subjective expression of the same fact. The 
 organic state is the condition viewed objectively, not 
 the, pre-condition. i 
 
 15. After this statement of the relation of Body 
 and Mind, I will add that Psychology is somewhat 
 less, and somewhat more, than the subjective theory 
 of the organism. It is less, because restricted to the 
 sentient phenomena, whereas Physiology embraces all 
 vital phenomena. It is more, because it includes 
 the relations of the organism to the Social Medium, 
 whereas Physiology is concerned only with the rela- 
 tions to the Cosmos ; and the many and profound 
 modifications which arise from Experience and His- 
 tory, educating the sentient organism to react in new 
 ways, are not accessible to physiological investigation. 
 In treating of the human soul, we have largely to ad- 
 mit the influences called spiritual. The reader under- 
 stands thal^ by this term I mean to express the results 
 of Experience, which have, indeed, corresponding 
 modifications in the material mechanism, but these 
 correspondences are so vaguely assignable that we do 
 well to leave them unnoticed. For example, we are 
 reading a somewhat illegible letter ; physiological pro- 
 cesses are of course in operation throughout, but no 
 physiologist would attempt to explain how it is that 
 we combine the hints of the several signs, and divine 
 the meaning of each word by its context. The psy- 
 chologist explains it by reference to the spiritual 
 store of acquired experiences ; the signs vaguely and 
 successively suggest words, — i.e., render nascent for-
 
 26 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 mer experiences ; but as one word after another is 
 suggested, tlie Mind perceives it to be incongruous 
 with the context, and rejects it, seeking another, till 
 finally one is suggested which, seeming congruous, is 
 adopted. Now, physiologically, i.e., considered as a 
 neural process, one word fits as well into the context 
 as another; or, to speak more accurately, there is 
 no such physiological process as would determine the 
 selection until the context of Experience has modified 
 the organism, and it is this which the term "spiritual" 
 indicates. There is here some influence in operation 
 which would very imperfectly be indicated by the 
 term material ; it is a psychological rather than a 
 physiological interpretation ; and although the term 
 spiritual was first used when men conceived the soul 
 to be a spirit, it may be still employed now we have 
 transformed that hypothesis. When some mental 
 anomaly cannot be assigned to a definite lesion of 
 the nervous system (neurosis), pathologists call it a 
 psychosis, as if it were a lesion of the unknown 
 psyche. In the same way the normal phenomena 
 which we cannot assign to definite physiological pro- 
 cess are called, by way of distinction, psychological. 
 This only means that our knowledge of the fact is not 
 completed by knowledge of the factor. 
 
 No physiological explanation of mental phenomena 
 can dispense with a constant reference to spiritual 
 conditions : present stimulations have to be completed 
 by past experiences. In the case of human beings, 
 the experiences are complicated by the operation of 
 social influences : it is through these that the hiojhest 
 powers are evolved. The conspicuous mental dif- 
 ferences between a Goethe and a Carib cannot be
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 27 
 
 assigned to differences in their organi-sms and functions, 
 but solely to tlieir developed faculties. The organism 
 of a Goethe in the social medium of the Carib would 
 constitute a very superior Carib, but not a wide-sweep- 
 ing intelligence with a sympathetic conscience. 
 
 FUNCTION AND FACULTY. 
 
 16. This leads me to suggest a more marked dis- 
 tinction between the terms function* and faculty than 
 is usual. By faculty is commonly understood the 
 power or aptitude of an agent to perform a certain 
 action or class of actions. It is thus synonymous 
 with function, whicli means the activity of an organ, 
 the uses of the instrument. I propose to detach 
 faculty from this general signification, limiting it to 
 the action or class of actions into which a function 
 may be diversified by the education of experience. 
 That is to say, let function stand for the native en- 
 dowment of the organ, and faculty for its acquired 
 va-riation of activity. The hand is an organ with the 
 function of Prehension. To grasp, pull, scratch, &c., 
 are its inherited powers. But the various modes of 
 manipulation — cutting, sewing, drawing, writing, 
 fencing, &c. — are faculties acquired by intelligent 
 direction and the combination of other organs. In- 
 stincts are functions. Emotions are functions. Sen- 
 sation and perception are functions. Logical com- 
 binations are functions. Some functions are simple, 
 others compound ; that is to say, some are performed 
 by single organs, as vision by the eye ; others by 
 groups of organs, as Instincts and Emotions. The 
 co-operation is fixed and invariable. It is otherwise
 
 28 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 with the co-operation of organs in faculties, and it is 
 because of this that the products are both optional 
 and variously modifiable. The function of Prehen- 
 sion becomes the varied faculties of Manipulation by 
 a variable co-operation of organs; the faculties of 
 drawing, of writing, of musical performance, &c., 
 demand the union of other and variable element*. 
 As in the scale of the animal development we find 
 an increasing complexity of organs compounded of 
 simple tissues, and of apparatus compounded of 
 organs, so we find faculties which are compounds of 
 simple functions, and faculties again compounded of 
 these. We say of a man that he has '^remarkable 
 faculty" when he is ready to adapt himself dex- 
 terously to a great variety of conditions, and to 
 acquire skill in new operations. 
 
 This distinction of the activities which are fixed 
 and functional, from those which are optional and 
 modifiable, not only directs attention to the educable 
 activities, but also points to the intervention of social 
 influences. Thus, confining ourselves, by way of 
 illustration, to the functions and faculties of the 
 hand, we see the irrationality of the old notion which 
 attributed man's superiority to his possession of this 
 organ. The ape has hands very like man's, and these 
 hands have the same functions ; but the ape's faculties 
 are not a fiftieth part of those performed by the hand 
 of man. The ape is dexterous, and learns to apply 
 his hands in various ways ; he might be taught to cut 
 and sew, as he has been taught to break an egg and 
 fire a pistol. But no teaching could make him write, 
 draw, play the piano, &c. Before writing would be 
 possible, he would have to acquire the faculty of
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 29 
 
 Lnngunge, and if this acquisition were possible to 
 him — which it is not — he would need the further 
 faculty of translating sounds into symbols.'"'' 
 
 Every function has its definite organ or group of 
 organs. It is their constant energy. Every faculty 
 has also its definite group of organs, but it is their 
 temporary synergy. Hence the irrationality of the 
 attempts to localise the various faculties in circum- 
 scribed regions of the cerebral convolutions. The 
 faculty of Language, for example, has recently been 
 localised in the third convolution of the left hemi- 
 sphere, in entire disregard of the complex of functions 
 which Language implies, and of the fact that Aphasia 
 may be due to a defect of Phonation, of Ideation, or 
 of Memory of sounds. 
 
 MECHANISM AND EXPEEIENCE. 
 
 17. It has already been intimated that Physiology 
 concerns itself directly with the sentient Mechanism, 
 tracing its operation in the production of those facts 
 
 * In answer to the notion put forward by Helvetius that man's in- 
 tellectual superiority over the horse was due to the fact of his having 
 flexible fingers in lien of an inflexible hoof, Bonnet well remarks that 
 Helvetius " n'avait pas consid^re qu'un animal quelconque est un 
 systeme particulier dont toutes les parties sont en rapport ou harmoni- 
 ques entre elles. Le cerveau du cheval r^pond a sa botte, comme le 
 cheval lui-nierae repond kid. place qu'il tient dans le systeme organique ; 
 si la botte venait a se convertir en doigts flexibles il n'en demeurerait 
 pas moins incapable de generaliser les sensations ; c'est que la botte sub- 
 sisterait dans le cerveau ; et si Ton voulait que le cerveau du cheval 
 Bubit un changement proportionnel k celui de ses pieds je dirais que ce 
 ne serait plus un cheval, mais un autre quadrupede, auquel il faudrait 
 imposer un nouveau num." — Palmgenisie Philosophique^ quoted by 
 Gall.
 
 30 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 of Sentience which it is the special province of Psy- 
 chology to investigate as facts of Experience. Let us 
 see how these terms express related and contrasted 
 phenomena. 
 
 Mechanism sometimes means the complex whole of 
 interdependent parts which constitute the organism, 
 and sometimes the particular group of interdependent 
 agencies constituting a special function. In the latter 
 sense we speak of the -respiratory - mechanism, the 
 locomotive - mechanism, the reflex - mechanism, &c. 
 Psychologists also sometimes speak of the mechanism 
 of thought or of volition ; they have here the inter- 
 dependence of certain psychical states in view, with 
 or without explicit reference to the corresponding 
 physical states. Both uses of the term are justifiable, 
 since what on the objective side is material combina- 
 tion is on the subjective side spiritual combination ; 
 mechanical and logical are here only two contrasted 
 aspects of one and the same fact. If we observe a 
 man withdraw his arm when pinched, all that we 
 observe is the mechanical sequence of objective 
 motions; and could we see the molecular olianges 
 in his nerves, centres, and muscles, we should still 
 see nothing but sequent motions. The man himself 
 (or we ideally picturing his internal changes) feels 
 the pinch, and Avills the movement of his arm ; the 
 sequence of sentient states involves the psychical 
 mechanism. 
 
 Understanding, then, that in these pages the term 
 mechanism will be used indifferently for the objective 
 or the subjective aspect of the organic conditions of 
 production, so far as these are known or definitely 
 imagined as fixities of structure and function, let us
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 31 
 
 now pass to the correlative Experience, wliicli will 
 often be employed in contrast. 
 
 18. A preliminary caution may not be needless. 
 The reader is familiar with the tendency to personify 
 every abstraction, erecting it into what S23inoza calls a 
 res completa. Owing to this, we are apt first to divest 
 an object or event of all the special conditions which 
 determine it and constitute its reality, and then to 
 endow this abstraction with a new reality, assigning 
 to it qualities not given in the original res. Hence 
 the popular separation of Sentience from the sentient 
 Mechanism, the Subject from the Object, the sentiens 
 from the sensum, and the erection of each separated 
 term into a res completa. Logically and analytically 
 the distinction is useful. But its danger lies in this, 
 that Sentience is easily conceived acting on and 
 directing its Mechanism, as Ave direct our instru- 
 ments. And it is worthy of remark, that many 
 writers who energetically discard the fallacy in some 
 forms retain it in others. They speak of the mechan- 
 ism, which is admitted to be normally set going by 
 the stimulus of a sensation or an idea, as capable of 
 also acting without such stimulation — by insentient 
 reflex — and also capable, when once set going, of 
 keeping up its action without sentient stimulation. 
 This, which has its plausibility in the confusion of the 
 whole complex of conditions with one antecedent 
 — whereby a single incidental force is made to stand 
 for a whole group of forces — would never have 
 gained acceptance but for the theoretic separation 
 of Sentience from the sentient Mechanism, and 
 the consequent assimilation of the organism to a 
 machine.
 
 32 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 19. Having this caution before us, and remember- 
 ing that all psychological processes are objectively 
 organic processes, we shall understand that the 
 mechanism of these processes may be expressed in 
 objective or subjective terms at will, sensorial changes 
 being equivalent to sentient changes. We now in- 
 quire what is meant by distinguishing between Expe- 
 rience and the Mechanism, so as to speak without 
 ambiguity of Experience directing the Mechanism. 
 The implication is that the one is to some extent 
 independent of the other, and that the latter alone is 
 dependent on structure. Neither of these implica- 
 tions is correct, but they roughly represent an 
 important distinction, namely, between a variable 
 progressive factor and an unvarying factor. The 
 Mechanism means the visible (or intelligible) fixed 
 structure with its corresponding fixity of functions. 
 Experience means the modifications and fluctuating 
 dispositions of structure, with the corresponding 
 variability and progressive development of faculties. 
 To a great extent the Mechanism is connate. Ex- 
 perience is acquired. The individual organism, 
 tliough modifiable, is not seen to acquire new organs, 
 only new aptitudes. Hence the constancy of type, 
 the fixity of functions. So long as the organs are 
 subjected to uniformities of stimulation, their action 
 is of course unvarying. Thus the nutritive and repro- 
 ductive organs present the constancy of machinery ; 
 once matured, their structure never sensibly alters. 
 It is otherwise with some fluctuating combinations 
 of the Sensorium. Subjected to varying stimulations, 
 and combinations of stimulation, it acquires new apti- 
 tudes, new modes of response ; and is incessantly
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 33 
 
 modified, if not in its elementary structure, at any 
 rate in the fluctuating disposition of its elements. It 
 thus forms, as it were, a spiritual mechnnism super- 
 added to the material mechanism. This is Experi- 
 ence on the subjective side, and is equivalent, on the 
 ohjective side, to a new central organ. Our principles 
 imply that it also represents a pliysiological modifi- 
 cation and a corresponding organic modification ; but 
 the precise nature of the organic modification is so 
 entirely hidden from our present means of detection 
 that we shall do well to abstain from all attempts 
 to specnfy the objective fact, content with our clear 
 apprehension of the subjective fact. Thus, for ex- 
 ample, while Physiology is utterly powerless to specify 
 structural and functional difi'erences between the 
 savage and the civilised man of the same race, Psy- 
 chology easily specifies wherein tlie spiritual organi- 
 sation of the two is markedly diff"erent. Tliere must, 
 indeed, be corresponding differences in their organ- 
 isms ; the residua of past feelings which constitute 
 the Experience of both are organic modifications ; 
 but what these are we cannot guess. No anatomist 
 could pretend to discern the difference between the 
 hand which executes a great variety of delicate 
 manipulations, and the hand which has acquired 
 none of these aptitudes ; but every one can recognise 
 the fact of the superiority, and can trace it to educa- 
 tion. No anatomist could trace the modification 
 which has taken place in the l.'rain of a child who, 
 having been painfully affected, remembers the pain 
 when the object which excited it is seen again. AVe 
 know that the child acts differently in consequence of 
 this experience ; but that is all we know. If we see 
 
 VOL. III. c
 
 34 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 a motli returning to the flame after it 1ms been burnt, 
 or tlie fisli returning to the bait after it has been 
 torn by the hook, we conclude that no such modifi- 
 cation has taken place, no registration of Experience 
 determines a control of the primary impulses. 
 
 These two illustrations show how the oroanism 
 reacts on stimulation according to its coamate con- 
 stitution, and also according to its acquired constitu- 
 tion, — by the Mechanism which it brings with it as a 
 heritage, and the Experience which has modified that 
 heritage. We have sensations and emotions because 
 the sentient mechanism is set in action ; when these 
 leave behind them traces in our constitution, so that 
 on any fresh excitation the past feelings are revivable, 
 we have experiences. If an object comes within the 
 range of Sense, we feel it, i.e., we react on the stimu- 
 lation in virtue of our native and acquired mechanism. 
 The lower animals probably never get beyond this 
 stage ; but the plasticity of the Sensorium in the 
 higher animals permits its permanent modification, 
 so that impressions are grouped, and these groups 
 are revivable by any one of the impressions, and 
 by internal excitation : — they feel again what they 
 formerly felt, and their perceptions of objects are 
 surrounded b}^ an atmosphere of quite remote feelings. 
 This is Experience — the psychological mechanism.* 
 
 21. The foregoing considerations have made evi- 
 dent that Physiology and Psychology are two modes 
 of apprehending the phenomena of the sentient or- 
 ganism, two distinct studies (what the Germans call 
 Disciplines), which, nevertheless, mutually imply each 
 
 * For further elucidation of fixity and variableness iu the organic 
 responses see 77te Ph>/sical Basis of Mind, p. 326 et seqq.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 35 
 
 otlier. The physiologist has sentient facts to ex- 
 plain, and is guided by them in his interpretations 
 of the organic processes. The psychologist, in like 
 manner, has always to presu[)pose the operation of 
 organic processes, since these are the conditions of 
 production of the facts he is classifying. Both 
 studies are very immature, and this immaturity is in 
 no slight measure owing to their separation ; one con- 
 sequence of the separation being that the physiologist 
 accepts at second-hand the itnperfect theories of some 
 psychological school, and tbe psychologist accepts at 
 second-hand the imperfect physiological theories of 
 the day. There can be no satisfactory theory of the 
 functions and faculties until a truer classification and 
 theory of the psychical phenomena has been estab- 
 lished ; nor can there be a satisfactory theory of 
 Mind until there has been a more risforous reduction 
 of mental processes to biological and sociological 
 conditions. 
 
 This position may be illustrated by Mental Patho- 
 loQfv, which has run a course parallel to that of Mental 
 Physiology. Hippocrates, a great observer, whose 
 vision was little blurred by mists of metaphysics, saw 
 in mental maladies abnormal brain-action ; and his 
 immediate successors sought in abnormal conditions 
 of the organism for the direct causation of all the 
 forms of insanity. But during the reign of theo- 
 logians and metaphj'sicians this scientific standpoint 
 was deserted, and mental maladies passed from the 
 hands of physicians into the hands of priests: exorcism 
 and prayers took the place of hygiene and prescrip- 
 tions. The theologian regarded insanity as demo- 
 niacal possession. The metaphysician regarded it as
 
 36 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 a spiritual perversion, and sometimes as a want of 
 harmony between the soul and its " instrument." 
 Neither doubted that the soul was one thiuo; and the 
 body another, and that the two were in all respects 
 absolutely dissimilar. Even so late as the present 
 centurv we have had the two antagonistic schools 
 of spiritualists and orgauicists, the one referring 
 insanity to disease of the soul, the other to disease 
 of the body. In Germany, Heinroth, long regarded 
 as the supreme authority, starting from the dogma 
 thnt the body was only the basis, but Reason 
 [Vernunft) the principle of human life, declared, 
 that all mental abnormities were due to the irrejiu- 
 larities of Reason, the instigations of Passion. In- 
 sanity thus became the symptom of Vice. "Inno- 
 cence is never insane, only guilt." The practical 
 absurdity of this theory has long been recognised. 
 No one now argues with a demented patient. No one 
 thinks of curine: mania with sermons. The existence 
 of a cerebral disease, which demands the physician's 
 care, is now the universal belief. Mental maladies 
 have taken their place beside bodily maladies, and 
 have become a subject of natural science, to be studied 
 on the same method as all other sciences. The obser- 
 vation of symjytoms directs the search into ccmses. 
 The abnormal function is referred to some abnormal 
 state of the organism. " The theory of mental mala- 
 dies," says the latest writer on this subject, "embraces 
 the modifications of the normal mental activity by 
 organic diseases." '"' 
 
 The parallel runs further. Just as the reaction of 
 the organicists against the spiritualists has led to an 
 
 * ScHiJLE : Handhuch tier Geisteshranhheiten^ 187 5
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 37 
 
 exclusive attention being fixed on one part of tlie 
 organism in neglect of the other parts, and the brain 
 made to do duty for the whole of the sentient 
 mechanism — an exclusiveness which has furtlier led 
 to the assignment of psychical functions to certain 
 nerve cells — so the alienists have followed this lead, 
 and, in Sj)ite of daily experience contradicting the 
 theory, have declared insanity to be brain disease and 
 nothing else. Even Scliule cannot rid himself of this 
 preconception, though both in his introduction and 
 in the body of his work he gives ample evidence tlmt - 
 its exclusiveness is unwarrantable. One j^oint which 
 he brings forward may be noticed here, becau se it 
 falls in so well with the views I advocate. " Mental 1 
 maladies " (he says, p. 3) " are cerebral diseases, but 
 they are more than tbis." The Tnore consists in con- 
 ceiving the patient, not simply as one suffering from 
 cerebral disease, but as a spiritual being, the product 
 of former generations, so that his ancestors must be 
 taken into account amono; the conditions of his 
 psychical symptoms. This recognition of the indi- 
 vidual as a product of his race, and consequently of 
 the individual abnormities as determined by ancestral 
 abnormities, is a true biological standpoint ; and only 
 needs to be completed by the sociological standpoint 
 which regards the individual mind as determined by 
 the General Mind (see § 118). 
 
 If the changed point of view which has caused 
 mental maladies to be studied as symptoms of organic 
 maladies is approved by the success of modern 
 medical treatment ; if — and no competent person 
 can have the slightest doubt on this point — our 
 understanding of mental maladies is only to be
 
 38 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 effected by this union of physiological interpretta- 
 tion with clinical observation, it is obvious that a 
 similar Method is the only one on which we can hope 
 to reach an explanation of the normal mental actious. 
 
 22. The task of the future is plain : Physiology ,^ 
 must trace for us the organic conditions of the 
 observed phenomena, explaining the sentient func- 
 tions by the sentient mechanism. It must study 
 man first as an animal. Psychology, receiving from 
 the hands of Physiology a theory of the mechanism, 
 must from Observation and History trace the 023era- 
 tion of this mechanism in the functions and faculties 
 which spring into existence through its adaptation to 
 the Cosmos and Societ3\ It must study man as a 
 social animah History discloses the stages of develop- 
 ment, from the simple emotions and conceptions of 
 rude barbaric social states to the ever-increasino^ 
 complexities of civilised states. It shows how an 
 organism, not appreciably changed as to its external 
 structure and essential mechanism, acquires in its 
 psychical functions a predominance of the human 
 over the animal characteristics, as sentiments are 
 evolved from emotions, impersonal impulses from 
 personal impulses, science from experience. The 
 animal basis is never forsaken ; the social super- 
 structure is never wholly deficient. From the first 
 hour of his existence man is a social unit : he lives in 
 society, is mentally developed by it and for it.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE MOTIVE. 
 
 23. This is a twofold craving, such as determines 
 every other study, a craving both specuLitive and 
 practical. As a speculative craving it is theological 
 and scientific. An undercurrent of theological im- 
 pulses may be discerned directing the inquiries even 
 when the avowed aim is not that of establishinof 
 or undermining theological conceptions ; and Mr. 
 Collier, in a valuable essay on the " Development of 
 Psychology,'" regards this theological impulse as one 
 of the two factors which have in all times operated 
 in the construction of the science. 
 
 24. The speculative motive is that of ascertaining 
 the relation of the sentient organism to the cosmical 
 and social conditions in which and throuoh which it 
 exists. The practical motive adds the further aim 
 of modifying our impulses and adjusting our actions 
 to these external conditions, or modifying these con- 
 ditions and adjusting them to our needs. The true 
 purpose of Knowledge is the regulation of our 
 Conduct. The end and aim of Life is Welfare — in 
 its most abstract expression. Every organism shrinks 
 from what is disturbinor and disao^reeable, and clinos. 
 
 * Westminster Review, No. cc.
 
 40 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIISTD. 
 
 to what is in harmony with it. Action is a neces- 
 sity ; all that is in our power is the direction of 
 activity, and this is momently guided hy neural 
 excitations, and by sensations which are pleasur- 
 able or painful. Taught by these, the individual 
 learns to direct his activities. Enlarging experi- 
 ence develops a iorecasting tendency, germinal in 
 animals and savnges, conspicuotis in the civilised 
 man. Looking beyond the immediate conditions 
 and feelings, this tendency prefigures images of 
 possible future conditions and feelings, whereby the 
 present action is restrained and adapted to the 
 anticipated circumstances. With such speculative 
 vision come vasjue nnd ao^itatinor imaocs of Invisible 
 Powers supposed to originate all visible changes. 
 These grasp the soul, and force it henceforward to 
 attend to them as the chief of all external con- 
 ditions. To them it is felt that action must be 
 adjusted. If they can be discovered, they may be 
 modified by prayer, sacrifices, or other means of 
 intercession, as chiefs and potentates are propitiated. 
 To be agreeable to them by flatteries, self-sacrifice, or 
 the sacrifice of others, will, it is hoped, soften their 
 severities, secure their favours. In this abject state 
 the majority of mankind still cowers. 
 
 25. But there are dawn-streaks of a brighter day. 
 Mental development has, in a small minority which 
 daily enlarges its circle, transformed these Invisible 
 Powers into visible Properties and intelligible Ee- 
 lations. Fear is replaced by the desire to know. 
 Experiment displaces intercession ; for reliance on 
 prayer is substituted obedience to ascertained laws. 
 The hope of modifying the Invisible by ceremonies
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 41 
 
 and sacrifices gives way to the hope of adapting the 
 properties of things to our needs ; and where this is 
 impracticahle the conviction teaches resignation and 
 the eflfort to adapt our impulses to agencies that are 
 inexorable. The scientific attitude is, therefore, one 
 of earnest endeavour combined with patient sub- 
 mission. It no more hopes to modify the ordi3r of 
 Nature by litanies and ceremonies, by flatteries and 
 self-reproaches, than it imitates those savages who 
 imagine they can lure the fish into their net by 
 shouting its praises across the river and vociferously 
 proclaiming the fish to be a mighty chief. 
 
 26. Man soon found that knowledge of the proper- 
 ties of things was not the only important object of 
 search. He a!so found that iiis own personal welfare 
 was not the only aim to which his activities should 
 be directed. Man is by his constitution forced to 
 live for others and in others. The welfare of his 
 family, his tribe, his nation, and at last the welfare 
 of Humanity at large, is felt or discerned to be inter- 
 woven with his own welfare. His life is part of a 
 social life, aided and thwarted by the needs and 
 deeds of fellow-men, which thus become external 
 conditions of his existence, on a par with cosmical 
 conditions, and must be studied with equal solici- 
 tude. Sf^ciety is far more modifiable than Nature ; 
 and its Euling Powers, namely. Passions, Sentiments, 
 and Ideas, may be modified both by direct appeals ' 
 and by indirect action on their generating causes. 
 Much of this modification takes place spontaneously 
 by the interaction of human impulses and the neces- 
 sary subjection to external fact. The conscious efforts 
 to the same end are embodied chiefly in two oreat
 
 42 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 Arts — the art of Educcation, whicli applies itself to 
 the indiv^idual, and the art of Government, which 
 applies itself to society. 
 
 27. We are thus conducted to the practical motive, 
 the importance of psychological science in the estab- 
 lishment of true principles of Education and Govern- 
 ment. As society develojDS, it shapes itself into 
 fixed Institutions of Religion, Law, Morality, Science, 
 and Art — the organs of Humanity with their social 
 functions. Each justifies itself, and requires no other 
 reason for its continuance than that it ministers to 
 individual needs and subserves a social end. When 
 instituted, Science has a social function, and pushes 
 its objects for its own sake, with only a remote 
 reference to any other end ; although, being a social 
 function, it must have social utility. In many of its 
 researches it may not bear on its face any other use- 
 fidness than that of furtherino: the welfare of the 
 Intellect ; but that usefulness is great, not indeed for 
 an individual considered apart from society, but for 
 society, of which Intellect is the servant. 
 
 28. The growth of Intellect out of Intelligence, 
 that is to say, the systematisation of experiences 
 under methodised symbols, we shall hereafter trace 
 as a purely social product. All cognition is primarily 
 emotion. We only see what iiiterests us. No phe- 
 nomenon is interesting until it is illuminated by 
 emotion, and we see, or foresee, its connection with 
 our feelings. Even so conspicuous an event as a 
 crash of thunder is to the child and the dos; an un- 
 observed event, because they have not learned to 
 associate with it any change in their own lives ; 
 whereas to the developed Intellect the remote events
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 43 
 
 of prehistoric ages or the possible constitution of the 
 stelkir universe are of thrilling interest, being in- 
 cluded in the wide sweep of contemplative emotion, 
 or satisfying a theoretic activity which has taken on 
 the intensity of a mental hunger. The impersonal 
 and indirect interest replaces the personal and direct 
 interest of the uncultivated mind. Facts which can 
 only have a very distant bearing on the lives of men, 
 and no conceivable influence on the present needs, 
 apart from the need of gratifying the Intellect, are 
 investigated with passionate patience. 
 
 29. Thus the desire to understand the operations 
 of the Mind has the same source as the desire to 
 understand the operations of Nature, whether these 
 are or are not recoonised as havins^ an immediate 
 practical bearing. The intellect, having reduced 
 external plienomena to some system of ideal con- 
 structions, endeavours to do the same for internal 
 phenomena. Cosmology terminates in Biology, and 
 Biology in turn terminates in Sociology. Philosophy 
 has thus all the materials for a conception of the 
 World, Man, and Society. 
 
 30. But, as was intimated just now, speculative 
 interest, although a sufficing, is not the only motive : 
 practical issues are at once desired and discerned. 
 The art of Education is to Psychology what Hygiene 
 and Medicine are to Physiology. Educators indeed 
 have rarely recognised this relation, but have pur- 
 sued their plans in an empirical and traditional in- 
 dependence, very similar to that which has directed 
 the teachers of Medicine, and from the same cause, 
 namely, the great imperfection of the sciences of 
 Psychology and Physiology. Hence teachers may
 
 44 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 dispute the suLordination of tbeir respective arts to 
 the scieiices. But the indisputable fact that Educa- 
 tion and Medicine have hitherto followed their own 
 empirical methods without much regard to the 
 sciences, arises partly from tbe difference between 
 practice and theory, art and science ; and partly from 
 the urgency of practical application, which cannot 
 await the final results of research, and their systema- 
 tisation in abstract principles. The child has to \jq 
 taught and the patient treated according to the 
 means at hand ; tutor and physician must be guided 
 by such light as he has ; he cannot wait until science 
 has disentangled from the mass of mingled prejudice, 
 precipitation, ignorance, and knowledge the true laws 
 of mental and bodily life. All this is true. Neverthe- 
 less, it is likewise true that both tutor and physician 
 have been guided by the psychological and pliysio- 
 logical conceptions current in their time, although 
 supplementing these with empirical observations and 
 traditional j^rejudices, and following the latter even 
 Avhen they were irreconcilable with the ascertained 
 laws of science. The absurd notions respecting the 
 nature of the mind, its simplicity, autonomy, inde- 
 pendence of the organism, and its equality in all men, 
 are clearly recognisable in the current j^ractices of 
 educators ; just as, formerly, absurd notions respect- 
 ing a vital principle, and the nature of the entity 
 named Disease, directed medical practice. 
 
 Once recognise that Education is an art which has 
 its scientific basis in Psychology, and the importance 
 of having a rational and verifiable basis, rather than 
 one that is unverifiable, becomes obvious. In pro- 
 portion, therefore, as Psychology acquires scientific
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 45 
 
 precision its influence on Education will become 
 beneficent, and thus also an improved riiysiology 
 will lead to a better art of Medicine, without, in either 
 case, removing the difficulties belonging to each prac- 
 tical application of abstract [)rinciples. A knowledge 
 of the way in which faculties are evolved, impressions 
 organised, moral and scientific intuitions formed, 
 habits established, and the structure no less than the 
 furniture of tlie mind receives its individual character 
 from the silent and incessant modifications of Expe- 
 rience, will make parents and teachers keenly alive 
 to the incalculable importance of tlie conditions under 
 which the early years of the child are passed. AVho- 
 ever has closely studied the evolution of the faculties 
 will see the folly and the wickedness of leaving 
 children to the care of ignorant servants and vulgar 
 companions at a period when impressions are most 
 indelible, — a period \\hen, as we know, the germs of 
 the future character are deposited. If out of the 
 same nursery, the same schoolroom, and what seems 
 the same environment, children of the same parents 
 are so markedly unlike in disposition, talents, tem- 
 pers, it has to be considered that the original diffe- 
 rences in their organisms give rise, even under the 
 same circumstances, to a difference in an important 
 element — the individual experiences. To gain some 
 glimpse of the way in which intuitions are esta- 
 blished and dispositions formed is the first task of 
 parent and teacher. 
 
 31. Although Government, as an art, belongs more 
 to Sociology than to Psychology, it Avill necessarily 
 derive great aid from the latter. For one thing, it 
 must take into account what have been the influences
 
 46 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 under wliicli the actual character of the nation has 
 been constituted, and what are the relations of that 
 character to theoretic reforms. Is this a truism ? 
 Then why has it been so persistently disregarded by 
 social theorists and reformers ? The idea of recon- 
 structing society otherwise than by a slow process of 
 moral and intellectual education, fitting the members 
 for the new institutions, is not less preposterous than 
 the idea of reconstructing a diseased organism other- 
 wise than by the slow processes of regimen and phy- 
 siological recuperation. A practical renovation of 
 society must be founded on the existing interests and 
 tendencies of its classes ; an abstract theory of possible 
 future society is a prophetic vision in which existing 
 facts are disres^arded or transformed. But for both 
 the practical and theoretic purposes a knowledge of 
 actual and possible human motives is required, and a 
 knowledge of psychological laws is as necessary here 
 as the knowledge of physical laws in any practical or 
 theoretic efforts to modify the external world. 
 
 32. Having thus stated what it is we study, and 
 why we study it, the final question how we ought to 
 study it remains, and this, being the most important 
 of the three questions, must have fidler treatment. 
 As a preliminary we must settle the position which 
 the science occupies in the series of sciences.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE POSITION OF THE SCIENCE. 
 
 33. Until quite recently, universal opinion assigned 
 Psycliology to the special group of Moral Sciences 
 which were held to be diametrically opposed to the 
 Physical Sciences, both in the matters treated of and 
 in the Methods of Inquiry, Tlie sciences of Human 
 Nature were supposed to have so little in common 
 with the sciences of Nature that their loiric and means 
 of verification were different. Men believed in the 
 co-existence of two independent orders of events, 
 having their common ground in a world beyond, 
 namely, the Suprasensible, — which as dogma was 
 claimed by Theology, and as science by Metaphysic. 
 God, Man, and Nature thus constituted three ob- 
 jects of knowledge, accessible through three different 
 avenues. 
 
 Physics, the study of Nature, slowly emancipated 
 itself from Theology and Metaphysics, and was suffered 
 to pursue its own Method. The Moral Sciences con- 
 tinued to form a class apart, even when they had 
 so far emancipated themselves as to disengage their 
 special object, the facts and laws of Human Nature. 
 This Avas followed by a recognition that Man, lieing a 
 part of Nature, ought to be studied on the Method
 
 48 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 wliicli alone bad proved successful in the study of 
 Nature. But even this recognitiou was restricted to 
 the bodily functions of man ; the old bias still asserted 
 itself with reo-ard to the mental functions. Without 
 
 O 
 
 boldly affirming tliat, as a thinking being, Man was 
 not a part of Nature, philosophers insisted tliat 
 Thouijht had nothino^ in common with Nature : differ- 
 ing sui generis, it could not be amenable to the same 
 canons. Tlie scholastic dofjma tliat Mind was ex- 
 clusively appropriated by the theologian, wliile the 
 Body, with all its sensible affections, was handed over 
 to the student of Nature,'"" although not explicitly 
 avowed, was implicitly accepted. 
 
 A change has been effected. Among advanced 
 thinkers it is now unhesitatingly tKlmitted that Mind 
 is a form or function of Life ; consequently that the 
 Method pursued in the investigation of vital pheno- 
 mena is the only one rationally to be pursued in 
 mental phenomena. There are differences in the ap- 
 pliances, and in the respective proportions of observa- 
 tion, experiment, and subjective interpretation ; but 
 for all sciences there is one common Logic, one com- 
 mon Method, and it is on this ground that the growth 
 of j^hysical science has fed and stimulated the growth 
 of ^psychological science. The importance of this ad- 
 mission is capital. 
 
 In an essay, already mentioned, on the development 
 of the science in England, Mr. Collier has well pointed 
 out how the progress of Psychology has been aided in 
 all its stages by advances in the physical sciences.t 
 
 * Aquinas : Summd Theologuc, i. qii. Ixxv. 
 
 f Westminster Hnv!eri\ No. cc. No notice is taken in this essay of 
 Cabanis, Gull, Hehuholtz, and Wuudt, whose labours would have sup- 
 plied good illuatrations.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 49 
 
 34. Science is the sjstcmatisation of our experi- 
 ences ; it is Common Sense metliodised and gene- 
 ralised. All that we have felt, or may feel, it ranges 
 under two aspects : the subjective and personal, the 
 ohjcctive and impersonal. Every event, every feeling, 
 has this twofold aspect, is indissolubly objective and 
 subjective, according to the mode of its apprehen- 
 sion. I have a sensation. This is known to be a state 
 of my bodily organism, when viewed objectively ; a 
 state of my mental activity, when viewed subjec- 
 tively. I may so far detach the feeling from my own 
 personality as to j^roject it outside of me, and regard 
 it as an object, a cause. I then say this sensation is 
 a flame, a colour, a form. But I may also detach the 
 feeling from its objective aspect, and regard it solely 
 as a change in my consciousness. By this artifice of 
 abstraction the indissoluble reality of a twofold aspect 
 is overlooked, and each being separately named, comes 
 to be regarded as an independent existence. We tli( n 
 cease to thiuk of objects as feelings. Keflection may 
 convince us that objects are groups of feelings, all 
 their qualities being known to us only through our 
 sensible appreciations, or our symbolical conceptions 
 of such ; but whenever we see or think of objects and 
 qualities, irresistibly we project them outside our 
 sphere of feeling, and believe them to be impersonal 
 existences, and their .qualities due to their nature, 
 not at all to ours. So also when we feel a sensation, 
 or think of one, we isolate it from its objective as^Dect, 
 its real cause, and believe it to be simply a move- 
 ment of our spiritual nature. 
 
 VOL. III.
 
 50 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE LAWS. 
 
 35. These abstractions are not only irresistible, 
 they are eminently serviceable. Founding on them, 
 we divide Science into laws of the Object and laws 
 of the Subject; or, in other words, laws of Nature 
 and laws of Human Nature. The first embraces Cos- 
 mology and Biology. Facts are observed, classified, 
 ranged in order of sequence and subordination. They 
 are explained when they are reduced to their fiictors, 
 their conditions of existence. They are summed up 
 in abstract formulae, the so-called laws of Nature; 
 which, we must remember, are neither sensible exis- 
 tences, nor descriptions of such, but ideal construc- 
 tions, representing the constant elements of the vari- 
 able combinations. 
 
 The second group embraces the laws of Human 
 Nature as laws of the Subject. Beginning with 
 Psychology and ending with Sociology, these pre- 
 suppose the objective laws, as the laws of Nature pre- 
 suppose the subjective laws. Biology is intermediate 
 between Cosmology and Sociology : on its objective 
 side it is a physical science, on its subjective side a 
 moral science. 
 
 36. These two contrasted groups are often thought 
 to be separated by an unbridgeable gulf, which no 
 dexterity of speculation can p9,ss. Viewing the phe- 
 nomena of Nature and Human Nature objectively, 
 we can, indeed, range tliem in an ascending series 
 from minerals to man, and from individual man to 
 society. All the modes of existence may thus be 
 graduated according to a scale of complexity. But no 
 sooner are these same phenomena viewed subjectively
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 51 
 
 — that is to say, no longer as modes or existences, 
 but as suh'i'ects or existents, — than a sudden break 
 seems to occur at that point in the scale where 
 Forces appear as Feelings. I mean, that between 
 the observed actions which embody forces, and the 
 actions which embody feelings, there is no objective 
 difference; tliey are both expressible in terms of 
 Matter and Motion. But interpreted subjectively, 
 there is a profound difference, resting on the j^resence 
 in the one of a factor — Sensibility — which has no 
 place in the other ; so that although there is an intel- 
 ligible expression of Matter and Motion in terms of 
 Feeling, there is no such intelligible expression of 
 Feeling in terms of Matter and Motion. 
 
 37. Admitting this, and emphasising the distinc- 
 tion between objective facts and subjective facts, we 
 nevertheless recognise that the observation, classifica- 
 tion, and explanation of both orders must proceed on 
 the same method. The laws of Human Nature are 
 discoverable in the same way as the laws of Nature. 
 Physicists have reduced all objective phenomena to 
 laws of Motion and one general conception of Force, 
 measuring all diversities by one standard. They pos- 
 tulate one Force having many Modes, and one Law of 
 Conservation eml)racing all these Modes. We cannot 
 know whether this conception accurately expresses 
 the reality of Nature ; enough that it expresses the 
 objective relations for us, and in a way which admits 
 of calculation. The unity assigned to the physical 
 forces is quantitative only — a standard of measure- 
 ment applied to the phenomena objectively — not a 
 qualitative expression of their nature as both objec- 
 tive and subjective. By a corresponding artifice all
 
 52 PROBLEMS OP LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 the subjective aspects of plienomena may be reduced 
 to Feeling ; and if we can establish general laws of 
 Feeling, they will pair off with the objective laws of 
 Force. 
 
 38. Such metaphysical considerations need not here 
 be developed. Our point is that the Logic of Science 
 remains unaltered whether the events be expressed in 
 objective or in subjective terms. A sensation or a 
 thought is alternately viewed as a physical change or 
 as a mental change. It is usually classed among sub- 
 jective facts, but this does not discharge it from the 
 objective world; it only specifies the aspect in which 
 we contemplate it. Consider this contrast : the law 
 of gravitation and the law of diffusion are undeniably 
 laws of the object, and are sharply contrasted with 
 the law of association, which is not less undeniably 
 a law of the subject. Every one will declare the first 
 to be laws of Matter, and the second a law of Mind. 
 Why ? Because in the one case our interest is so 
 directed to the objective relations that the subjective 
 aspect is left out of account, and the laws are pre- 
 sented as if independent of the mind which conceives 
 them — a view manifestly erroneous ; and in the other 
 case it is the subjective aspect which interests us ; we 
 think only of the associated feelings, and not of the 
 external facts they embody, not of the neural pro- 
 cesses which are their physical correlates. 
 
 Parenthetically we may note a double fallacy 
 arising from this isolation of one aspect from the 
 other. First, there is the conviction that the pheno- 
 mena, which are demonstrably the part products of 
 our Sensiljility, do nevertheless exist with all their 
 sensible qualities where no Sensibility is present to
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 53 
 
 co-operate with them. This fallacy has long been recog- 
 nised by philosophers, who have not, however, always 
 recognised the second fallacy, namely, that ideas can 
 associate, and one mental state produce another, in 
 the absence of organic states, solely by virtue of sub- 
 jective activity. This is equivalent to supposing one 
 motion to produce another by purely dynamic in- 
 fluence, in the absence of moving bodies and the con- 
 ditions of movement. Yet this fallacy we shall find 
 even Stuart Mill falling into {§ 42). 
 
 To return to the law of gravitation. Obviously it 
 might be regarded as a subjective law, and that of 
 association as an objective law, if our point of view 
 chanoed. The facts observed and classified are neces- 
 sarily perceptions in the observer, and the law whicli 
 formulates these observations is indubitably an ideal 
 construction which has no objective reality. Both 
 laws — that of gravitation and that of association — are 
 symbolical conceptions, and what they symbolise are 
 states of Feelino;. If we think of them in this lidit, 
 they are both psychological facts. If we think of 
 them objectively, the one is a mathematical the oiher 
 a physiological fact. 
 
 39. So much on the general question. Biology 
 presents it in a peculiar light, for here for the first 
 time the twofold aspect of phenomena becomes con- 
 spicuous, our interest in the subjective side — that 
 of Feeling — being as great as our interest in the ob- 
 jective side — that of Force. It takes its undeniable 
 place among the objective sciences, for although vital 
 phenomena are special, they are specialisations of the 
 general properties of Matter, and are expressible in 
 terms of Force. It also takes its place among the
 
 54 PEOBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 subjective sciences, since its phenomena include those 
 of Mind. In its evolution it passes from Vegetality 
 to Animality, and through Animality to Humanity. 
 With Animality a new factor, Sensibility, becomes 
 conspicuous. With Humanity another factor emerges 
 — Sociality. Although the facts of animal and hu- 
 man life, so far as they are objectively regarded, are 
 expressible in terms of Force, they are usually ex- 
 pressed in terms of Feeling ; and hence the long 
 debates respecting the true position of Psychology 
 amonof the sciences : some writers consider it a branch 
 of Biology, others detach it, and assign it a place by 
 itself. 
 
 My own opinions on this question have so often 
 fluctuated that I cannot be insensible to the difiicul- 
 ties it presents. I shall best make the reader ac- 
 quainted with my final decision by examining the 
 arguments of three thinkers with whose general prin- 
 ciples I am most in agreement. 
 
 THE VIEWS OF COMTE, MILL, AND SPENCER. 
 
 40. Because Auguste Comte contemptuously, and, 
 as I think, erroneously, rejected the Introspective 
 Method, and because he denied a place among the 
 fundamental sciences to a Psychology pursued on 
 that method, he has frequently, and with manifest 
 injustice, been accused of denying that there could be 
 any science of the moral and intellectual functions. 
 Assuredly he never thought of denying nor of under- 
 rating psychological facts, and the laws of such facts ; 
 what he asserted was that such facts were wholly 
 biological facts, and were to be investigated as such.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 55 
 
 No one has made this charge against Kant ; yet he 
 also denied that Psychology could be an independent 
 science. He referred its facts to a Transcendental 
 Logic, as Comte referred them to Biology ; when he 
 quitted this transcendental region, it was to refer the 
 facts to Anthropology. 
 
 I ao^ree with those who consider Comte wronoj in 
 his rejection of Introspection ; and liis error becomes 
 more conspicuous in his exposition of a cerebral 
 theory (Politique Positive, i. 675, et seqq.) founded 
 avowedly on subjective analysis, which is carried so 
 far that even the position of the imaginary " organs " 
 is not determined objectively. Apart from this, how- 
 ever, I think him justified in proclaiming that a 
 theory of the moral and intellectual functions can 
 only belong to a theory of the organism ; therefore 
 that Psychology is a branch of Biology. 
 
 41. Stuart Mill erred on the opposite side. Lay- 
 ing the chief emphasis on the subjective aspect, and 
 consequently on the Introspective Method, he was 
 thereby led to separate Psychology from Biology, not 
 as species from genus, but as two radically different 
 kinds. The existence of uniformities of succession 
 among states of mind, which could be ascertained by 
 observation and experiment, proved that a separate 
 science of such states was possible ; and he main- 
 tained that the only mode of studying these must 
 be Introspection, because, although sensations have 
 nervous states for their immediate antecedents, and it 
 is probable that all mental states have nervous states 
 preceding tliem, yet we are so imperfectly acquainted 
 with the characteristics of these nervous states that 
 "mental phenomena do not admit of being deduced
 
 56 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 from the physiological laws of our nervous organi- 
 sation " (Logic, 6th ed., ii. 432). 
 
 Had Mill been better acquainted with Physiology, 
 he would have known that many mental phenomena 
 have been deduced from, and many more illuminated 
 by, the laws of our nervous organisation ; and this, 
 indeed, must necessarily be the case if organic state 
 and mental state are but different aspects of one and 
 the same process. But Mill had no clear conception 
 of this. On the contrary, he adopted, and insisted on, 
 the common mistake of regarding the neural process 
 as the antecedent and originator of the mental process. 
 I have already characterised this as equivalent to 
 regarding the convex of a curve as the antecedent to 
 its concave. To disengage it from an ambiguity, we 
 may note that there are neural processes which may 
 be thus regarded ; for example, the process of retinal 
 stimulation, which is the first stage of a complex pro- 
 cess, the final stage of which is a visual sensation, 
 may be said to be the antecedent of the visual sensa- 
 tion, and it may be called into existence without 
 being completed by the final stage of sensorial reaction 
 called vision. But it is not this, nor such as this, 
 which is meant when a neural pr 'ss or organic state 
 is called the physical correlate of a mental state : not 
 this isolated stage, but the completed synthesis is the 
 cause, or group of conditions, of the mental product. 
 Any antecedent which is merely a pre-condition, or 
 an isolated condition, can only represent the cause by 
 an ellipsis. 
 
 42. But the point of view here indicated Mill had 
 apparently never taken. " All states of mind," he 
 says, " are immediately caused either by other states
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 57 
 
 of mind or by states of body." This distinction im- 
 plies that he imagined some mental states to exist 
 which were not at the same time states of body. Of 
 what then were they states ? He did not believe in 
 the existence of a spirit animating the body ; yet such 
 a belief would have given consistency to his views. 
 To reoard Mind as a function of the oro^anism, and 
 yet suppose that some mental functions had no or- 
 ganic conditions, was a strange incongruity. States 
 of mind are always caused by states of mind, and 
 these are states of body when viewed objectively. 
 He says, " When a state of mind is produced by a 
 state of mind, I call the law concerned in the case to 
 be a law of mind." Good : when the subjective 
 aspect of the process is considered, the law is psycho- 
 logical. But he adds, " When a state of mind is 
 produced directly by a state of body, the law is a law 
 of body, and belongs to physical science;" and here 
 there is a confusion. The production is always 
 directly a state of body ; but is a physiological law, 
 when viewed as a change in the organism, a psycho- 
 logical law when viewed as a change in feeling ? The 
 point of view is different in the two cases, the event 
 is the same. Take, for example, a melancholy mood : 
 it is a mental state, and its law psychological, when 
 considered subjectively, and its cause referred to dis- 
 appointed affection or a fall in the Funds ; the condi- 
 tions here are all psychological experiences in which 
 not a thouo-ht is oiven to the oro;anic conditions. But 
 this same mood is also a state of the organism, and 
 considered objectively it is a change in the secretions, 
 and an alteration of nervous level ; the sequences are
 
 58 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 in this case as exclusively physiological as in the 
 other they are psychological. 
 
 43. Thrown off the track by his misleading con- 
 ception, Mill, while declaring that all sensations 
 manifestly belong to the body, thought it an open 
 question whether other mental states were thus de- 
 pendent on neural states. Without positively affirm- 
 ing it, he said it was rational to assume that ideas — 
 unlike sensations — " might be recalled in virtue ol" 
 mental laws which are independent of material con- 
 ditions." I regret that my attention had not been 
 directed to this passage during the years when it was 
 my happiness to be in friendly intimacy with this 
 distinguished philosopher, so that, by questioning, I 
 might have ascertained all he really meant by a state- 
 ment which seems so very questionable. The only 
 interpretation by which it may be plausibly supported 
 seems this : we know that a perception gained origi- 
 nally through sensible affections may be reproduced 
 in the fainter form of an image when none of the 
 sense-organs are directly stimulated ; this reproduc- 
 tion is thus apparently independent of the neural 
 processes which produced it originally, and, being 
 thus regarded irrespective of such processes, is held 
 to be a psychological, not a physiological fact. But 
 observe : both the original production and the sub- 
 sequent reproduction are activities of the organism, 
 and imply organic states, known or uoknown. These 
 states are not precisely the same in the two cases, 
 neither are the mental facts — sensation and image — 
 precisely the same. We cannot fairly call the one 
 state bodily and the other mental, simply on the
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 59 
 
 ground that in the one case we can assign certain 
 definite conditions of stimulation of the sense-organs, 
 whereas in the other case we can only vaguely assign 
 certain changes in the Sensorium. The fact that we 
 can have coloured sensations internally excited years 
 after the eyes which originally excited the sensations 
 are destroyed, is evidence, indeed, that the Sensorium, 
 and not the eyes, is the seat of the sensations, but is 
 no evidence that the sensations are bodily states in 
 one case and mental states in the other. _^ 
 
 In a word, to speak of "mental laws independent 
 of material conditions" is legitimate on the part of a 
 spiritualist, but is hopeless confusion on the part of 
 any one who believes Mind to be a function of the 
 organism. It is true that the mental laws are often 
 known where the material conditions are unsuspected, 
 or are but hypothetically assigned ; and the scientific 
 principle that we are to explain the facts by reference 
 to known and not to unknown conditions determines 
 our frequent disregard of the physiological for the 
 psychological point of view. Another reason for 
 this procedure is that Physiology being occupied 
 with the Mechanism and its functions mainly in rela- 
 tion to external Nature, and Psychology mainly with 
 Experience and the faculties, which admit of more 
 intelligible expression in subjective terms, *' the ma- 
 terial conditions" are so constantly left out of sight, 
 because always presupposed, that ** mental laws" seem 
 to acquire an independence. 
 
 44. In Mr. Spencer's exposition we have quite other 
 arguments to meet. He has so luminously expounded 
 how Mind is evolved as one of the forms of Life, that 
 we might expect him to be, above all men, ready to
 
 60 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND, 
 
 admit that, in so far as mental functions are functions 
 of the nervous system, Psychology must be correlated 
 with the Physiology of that system, and in so far as 
 Mind is a function of the living organism, the science 
 of Mind must be a branch of the general science of 
 Life. Yet we find him admitting this only in a quali- 
 fied way. He detaches the functions of the nervous 
 system under the title of ^stho-Physiology, as form- 
 ing only the preparatory conditions of Psychology, 
 not properly belonging to it. *' So long as we state 
 facts of which all the terms lie within the organism, 
 our facts are morphological or physiological, and 
 in no degree psychological." This is in accord with 
 what we have previously laid down. Our difference 
 begins at the next step, where he concludes that a 
 change in the point of view alters the character of 
 the events, and that psychological facts cease to be 
 facts of the organism when they are viewed subjec- 
 tively. His definition of psychological is not the 
 subjective aspect of a process which objectively is 
 physiological, but " the relation between a neural pro- 
 cess and a feelinor when resjarded in connection with 
 some existence lying outside the organism." '"' 
 
 So great a thinker has clearly a right to introduce 
 a new definition, and carry out his exposition accord- 
 ingly. But readers who remain unconvinced may 
 be allowed to state why they cannot accept his defi- 
 
 * Spencer: Psychology/, i. 131,132. It may interest the reader 
 familiar with Mr. Spencer's work to note the coincidence between his 
 definition and that given by Carus in his Vergleichende Psychologie, 
 1866 ; because, wliile it is quite certain that Mr. Spencer's worlc ap- 
 peared first, there is no trace of Carus having seen it. He defines the 
 soul : " Eine in derselbeu als Empfindendes und Gegenwirkendes, bald . 
 leidend, bald tliatig sich bewei.sende Beziehung auf ein Aeusseres zum 
 Zweck ihrer eiiienen iniieru Ausbilduug und Entwicklung."
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 61 
 
 nitlon. I am unable to see the propriety of separating 
 (otherwise than as an analytical artifice) the facts of 
 Feeling from their organic conditions ; unable to see 
 why Psychology should be restricted to those facts of 
 Feeling which are explicitly recognised as in relation 
 to external objects. He has previously admitted that 
 neural process and sentient process are two aspects of 
 the same fact, but when he argues that it is impos- 
 sible to understand how the two are related, this 
 alleged impossibility is made to rest on the concep- 
 tion of a phenomenon being something apart from its 
 conditions, instead of its being (as I formerly tried 
 to prove) simply the synthesis or function of the con- 
 ditions. If we once admit that a change in Feeling 
 follows on and flows out of its organic process, as 
 one event follows another, and an explosion succeeds 
 the spark, then indeed the mystery of Feeling as 
 related to organic process presses on us with unique 
 impenetrability : such a transubstantiation is incon- 
 ceivable. But the alternation of objective and sub- 
 jective aspect, if it does not dissipate the mystery, at 
 least resolves it into the general background of dark- 
 ness w^hich for our vision surrounds all ultimate 
 facts. 
 
 45. The reader may have noticed that in the fore- 
 going paragraph the terms organic and neural are 
 used interchangeably. The reason of this will appear 
 in a subsequent place, where an explanation will be 
 given of how the nervous system, or the neuro- 
 muscular system, comes, in the short-hand of exposi- 
 tion, to be the representative of the sentient mechan- 
 ism. If we take the term " neural process " to stand 
 simply for the molecular change in nerve and centre,
 
 62 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 and not as representing a change in 'the whole sentient 
 organism, then indeed a neural process is the ante- 
 cedent to a feeling, the spark which precedes the 
 explosion ; and in this sense it is absurd to regard 
 neural and mental as convex and concave.* 
 
 46. There is another light also in which Mr. 
 Spencer's definition seems to me unacceptable. When 
 he says that every psychological proposition is neces- 
 sarily compounded of two propositions, of which one 
 concerns the object, and the other the subject, we 
 may reasonably answer that every proposition what- 
 ever implies both. He has foreseen the objection 
 which must spontaneously present itself to all read- 
 ers who have followed his exposition of Life as the 
 " continuous adjustment of inner relations to outer 
 relations," and who will therefore ask, wherein is the 
 difference in this respect between biological and psy- 
 chological phenomena ? His reply, that in Biology 
 the external phenomena are only tacitly or occasion- 
 ally recognised, in Psychology they are at every step 
 avowedly and distinctly recognised, is hardly an 
 accurate statement. True, that in Biology the atten- 
 tion is very often directed mainly to the organism, 
 with only a tacit implication of its relations to the 
 medium. But this is equally true in Psychology, 
 the attention being often occupied with the changes 
 
 * This felicitous image of the convex and concave, first employed by 
 Fechner for the objective and the subjective aspects, may have been 
 suggested by a passage in Aristotle which one very near and dear to 
 me has brought under my notice: — A^yerai 5^ nepl ai^r^y i'^^V^) • . . rb 
 p.kv AXoyov avTTJi dvai, rb bi X6701' ^x<"'. ravra d^ Trdrepov SiwpiffTaL Kuddwep ri 
 ToO ci.ip.aTos fxbpia Kal wav t6 p-eptarbv, 1) Tip \6-yi{i Suo icrlv dx'^P'fT'a irer^vKbra, 
 Kaddnrtp ev ttj Trept^epeii/, t6 KvpTov Ka.1 t6 koIXov, ovdiv dia<p^pei Trpbs rb vapbv. 
 
 —Nic. Eih. I. xiii. 9.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 63 
 
 in consciousness, and not with tbeir objective corre- 
 lates. His assertion that no psychological proposi- 
 tion is expressible without a distinct and avowed 
 recognition of objective relations does not seem to 
 me reconcilable with fact. Three examples may- 
 suffice : — 1°, Feelings experienced simultaneously 
 tend to revive each other ; 2°, Perceptions are con- 
 densed into conceptions by generalising what the 
 perceptions have in common ; 3°, Memories are re- 
 vivals of past experiences. Now, although it is true 
 that in these, as indeed in all orders of propositions, 
 there is an implication of external relations, can we 
 say that it is more distinctly and avowedly recognised 
 than food is recognised in a proposition respecting 
 digestion, or the atmosphere in a proposition respect- 
 ing respiration ? 
 
 47. Mr. Spencer sustains his position partly by a 
 novel limitation of the province of Psychology, and 
 partly by an insistance on the total lack of com- 
 munity between the phenomena of Consciousness and 
 the phenomena treated of in all other sciences. It is 
 true that, while not adopting the broadly marked 
 separation of objective and subjective aspect as what 
 determines a corresponding separation between phy- 
 siological and psychological questions, he is somewhat 
 vacillating in his language, even to the length of 
 defining the branch of the science which he calls 
 iEstho-Physiology, and which is said to furnish the 
 data of Psychology, as that which treats " of nervous 
 phenomena as phenomena of consciousness" But 
 letting this pass, all that he has expounded under the 
 head of ^stho-Physiology may be taken as the phy- 
 siology of the sentient organism, which, under its
 
 64 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 subjective aspect, is the classification of the facts of 
 Sentience ; and if the facts of Consciousness are not 
 to be included among the general laws of Feeling — • 
 an exclusion and limitation which I think render 
 Psychology hopeless as a science — then, indeed, the 
 physiology of the sentient organism will only be a 
 preparation for Psychology, and the latter science 
 may claim its place apart from Biology, no longer 
 being a science of any functions of the organism. 
 
 48. Among the many ideas which have occurred 
 to me in meditating on this cjuestion is the following : 
 A science might be constituted out of the facts of 
 Consciousness alone, wholly disregarding the objec- 
 tive aspect of such facts, and consequently their con- 
 ditions of existence. It would be an abstract science 
 of Feeling, to stand beside the abstract science of 
 Force — an jEsthesics parallel with Dynamics. The 
 general facts of Feelinof formulated in abstract laws 
 would then be disena;a2:ed from all concrete manifesta- 
 tions ; the organism and the medium would be left 
 out of account, as Matter and its Qualities are dis- 
 regarded in Dynamics. Physicists having reduced 
 Light, Heat, and Sound to vibrations, setting aside 
 all the special differences in the conditions, physiolo- 
 gists have imitated them, and reduced all sensations 
 and thoughts to cerebral vibrations — settino; aside all 
 the specific differences in the organic conditions. A 
 psychological Lngrange might arise who would reduce 
 all these vibrations to a single equation.'" Were such 
 
 * " Lagrange dans un ouvrage immortel s'est attache, en ranienant tout 
 au calciil et s'^levant au dessus des details et des faits, k remplacer les 
 ph^nom^nes par desformules qui les enveloppent et les cachent." — Beutrand. 
 (In the Appendix to vol. ii. of Problems of Life and Mind I have 
 treated of Lagrange's work in relation to Hegel.)
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 65 
 
 a science constructed it would assuredly be a power- 
 ful instrument ; but it would not be a Psychology — 
 it would be no theory of the soul — it would no more 
 expound the facts of Human Nature than Dynamics 
 expounds the facts of Nature. Therefore I had to 
 return from this hypothetical excursion to the posi- 
 tion that a theory of the soul was necessarily a part 
 of the-general theory of life ; and Psychology, in spite 
 of the dominantly subjective aspect of its phenomena, 
 must, for all students who reject the idea of the soul 
 as something independent of the organism, be a part 
 of Biology. That sentient phenomena belong to the 
 organism none dispute ; the only dispute is whether 
 psychical phenomena are special forms of Sentience. 
 Mr. Spencer agrees with biologists in regarding the 
 phenomena of Consciousness as subjective aspects of 
 certain organic phenomena — " such nervous changes 
 as are brought to the general centre of nervous con- 
 nections;" and since he would also admit that to 
 withdraw sensations, emotions, and volitions from 
 the group of animal functions would seriously trun- 
 cate the science of Life, leaving it only Nutrition, 
 Growth, and Eeproduction for its province, there 
 must be some very strong reasons which determine 
 his rejection of the conclusion, seemingly irresistible, 
 that Psychology must be a branch of Biology. What 
 are these reasons ? 
 
 49. One has already been debated. He separates 
 ^stho-Physiology, the science of the sentient organ- 
 ism, on the one hand, from the science of the nervous 
 system, and, on the other, from the science of Con- 
 sciousness. '' j^Estho-Physiology," he says, "has a 
 position that is entirely unique. It belongs neither 
 
 VOL. III. E
 
 66 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 to tlie objective world nor to the subjective world; 
 but, taking a term from each, occupies itself with the 
 correlation of the two." In the course of his ex|)osi- 
 tion he presents Psychology " as a specialised j)ai't of 
 Biology," but separated from it as Geology from 
 Astronomy, or Biology from Geology, by the conspi- 
 cuous presence of additional factors, which, however, 
 also make their appearance occasionally in Biology. 
 Now, since I too admit additional factors, and one — 
 the social — which he does not here enumerate, our 
 difference so far is not conspicuous^ nor is Mr. Spencer's 
 ground for his isolation of Psychology very clearly 
 marked. But it becomes evident in the following 
 passage : — " A far more radical distinction remains 
 to be drawn. While, under its objective aspect, Psy- 
 chology is to be classed as one of the concrete sciences 
 which successively decrease in scope as they increase 
 in speciality, under its subjective aspect Psychology 
 is a totally unique science, independent of and anti- 
 thetically opposed to all other sciences whatever. 
 The thouQ-hts and feeling's which constitute a con- 
 sciousness are absolutely inaccessible to any but the 
 possessor of that consciousness, form an existence 
 that has no place among the existences with which 
 the rest of the sciences deal" (p. 140). 
 
 50. The antithesis between objective and subjective 
 may serve to distinguish Physiology from Psychology, 
 but it does not mark out Psychology as totally opposed 
 to all other sciences, for the simple reason that tliey 
 likewise deal with phenomena having the twofold 
 aspect. The motions of the heavenly bodies, the 
 motions of minerals and gases, and the motions of 
 organic bodies, are objective aspects of our sensible
 
 THE STODY OF PSYCHOLOGY. C7 
 
 affections ; what we know of colours, forms, heat, 
 weight, motion, &c., is due to the action of the 
 Cosmos and reaction of our organism : we believe that 
 there is a Notself acting on the Self; but all we know 
 of this is what we feel. The feelings are distinguished 
 and classified ; some are referred to causes outside 
 the organism, others to causes inside the organism. 
 Tlius_ each fact and each feeling has necessarily two 
 aj£ects, one turned towards the Notself, the other 
 towards the Self. The fact is not a fact except in so 
 far as it is felt ; the feeling has always a reference to 
 its cause, external or internal. When, therefore, the 
 question is asked. Why must a phenomenon have two 
 aspects ? the answer is, Because it is the product of 
 two factors, an organism that feels, and an external 
 that is felt. 
 
 The psychologist, indeed, has to explain how it is 
 that one set of feelings rapidly assume the position of 
 objective signs, becoming less and less referred to the 
 feeler, more and more to the felt, as when the Jiame 
 is referred to the objective fire, itself a synthesis of 
 feelings, but the pain of a burn is referred to the 
 organism, and not to the fire. The psychologist has 
 to expound this by his theory of knowledge. In this 
 respect his science is unique ; for whereas the other 
 sciences are concerned with the classification of know- 
 ledge, his science treats of how we come by know- 
 ledge ; but since that also is a department of know- 
 ledge, it comes under the same canons of research as 
 all the others. Moreover, Psychology is not limited 
 to the theory of knowledge ; it is the ascertainment 
 and classification of the facts of Feeling, both in their 
 subjective and objective relations, and in this way
 
 68 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIXD. 
 
 also comes under the general conditions of science. 
 Hence we cannot separate Psychology from the other 
 sciences on the ground of its phenomena being feel- 
 ings, nor on the ground of the feelings being limited 
 to individual experience. All sciences deal with feel- 
 ings. Psychology alone deals Avith them in their sub- 
 jective aspect. It is not the presence of Conscious- 
 ness that marks off the phenomena as those of an 
 unique science, but the presence of a particular point 
 of view, a theoretic attention to the feelings as feel- 
 ings. The ordinary man feels as the psychologist 
 feels ; but he does not reflect on the peculiar nature 
 of these feelings as changes in his organism, does not 
 attempt to account for their production and succes- 
 sions. His consciousness no more suffices for a theory 
 of Consciousness than the perception of geometric 
 forms suffices for the construction of a science of 
 Geometry. Science begins when the facts are classi- 
 fied and systematised. And the psychologist classifies 
 and systematises the subjective aspects of Feeling, 
 irrespective of their objective aspects, as the geometer 
 isolates the relations of masfnitude from all other sen- 
 sible relations. 
 
 51. With regard to the second point, while it is 
 true, in one sense, that the thoughts and feelings of 
 others are inaccessible to us, in another sense it is in- 
 admissible. Psychology is in a bad way, if the philo- 
 sophers are to be trusted ; one school declaring that 
 each man can only Tcnow his own thoughts, and infer 
 the existence of other men's from certain appearances ; 
 while another school declares that he cannot really 
 know his own thoughts as they are, only as they 
 appear [Kant, Anthropologie, § 7). Now, granting
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 69 
 
 all that is claimed when it is said that the feelings of 
 others are inaccessible to us, this does not give Psy- 
 chology an unique position, for it is equally true of 
 the vital functions of others, and indeed of all that 
 belongs to the not-ourselves ; yet we know something 
 of them, and Biology and Cosmology are sciences. 
 And in another sense the feelings and thoughts of 
 others must be accessible to us, otherwise there could 
 be no science of Feeling, nor any communication from 
 others to ourselves of what they feel and think. It 
 is true that your subjective state can only be an ob- 
 jective fact to me, except in so far as I am able to 
 interpret the objective fact in its subjective aspect. 
 But this is true of all facts. I express my feelings 
 and thoughts in actions, gestures, and words. I ob- 
 serve other beings closely resembling me in all objec- 
 tive relations ; and observing these beings act, gesti- 
 culate, speak as I do, I conclude that they are moved 
 by similar feelings. It is of such conclusions that 
 knowledge is made. The distinction between Know- 
 ledge and Opinion is that, in the first case, the pre- 
 vision is founded on inferences that have been veri- 
 fied. We know something of an object when we 
 can, from past experience, foresee what its effects 
 will be, and not simply what they 7nay he under 
 changed circumstances. The psychologist interprets 
 certain visible facts as the signs of invisible feelings, 
 just as he knows that sugar is sweet and that dogs 
 bite. When a man is motionless and silent, we can- 
 not certainly know what is passing within him — there 
 are no visible signs to guide us. When an acid is 
 quietly lying beside an alkali we cannot know what 
 will be the effect of their combination unless past ex-
 
 70 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 perience enables us to foresee it. The statement that 
 "each individual is absolutely incapable of knowing 
 any feelings but his own" is acceptable only on a very 
 restricted definition of knowledge ; and on this defi- 
 nition we must declare that man is incapable of know- 
 ing anything except his present feelings. Exclude 
 Inference, and we do not know that sugar is sweet or 
 that doirs bite ; admit Inference, and we know that 
 other men beside ourselves have feelings of the same 
 nature as our own. 
 
 50. My object in this discussion has been to rein- 
 force the position that Psychology is a branch of Bio- 
 logy, having for its special province the analysis and 
 classification of the facts and laws of Sensibility viewed 
 in their subjective aspect. It embraces Animal and 
 Human Sensibility ; but partly because of the supreme 
 interest of the human .phenomena, and partly because 
 we can less easily understand the mental phenomena 
 of animals, Psychology must — for the present at least 
 — be restricted to those of human beings.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE SOCIAL FACTOR. 
 
 51. The first step towards the constitution of our 
 science has been the specification of its object and 
 scope, and the rehxtion it bears to all other sciences. 
 The next step must be to specify the Method and 
 register the fundamental inductions. 
 
 Biology furnishes both method and data in the 
 elucidation of the relations of the organism and the 
 external medium ; and so far as Animal Psychology 
 is concerned this is enough. But Human Psychology 
 has a wider reach, includes another important factor, 
 the influence of tjie social medium. This is not 
 simpl}^ an addition, like that of a new sense which is 
 the source of new modes of Feeling ; it is a factor 
 which permeates the whole composition of the mind. 
 All the problems become complicated by it. In rela- 
 tion to Nature, man is animal ; in relation to Culture, 
 he is social. As the ideal world rises above and trans- 
 forms the sensible world, so Culture transforms 
 Nature physically and morally, fashioning the forest 
 and the swamp into garden and meadow-lands, the 
 selfish savage into the sympathetic citizen. The 
 organism adjusts itself to the external medium ; it 
 creates, and is in turn modified by, the social medium 
 for Society is the product of human feelings, and its
 
 ^"2 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 existence is paiH passu developed with the feelings 
 which in turn it modifies and enlarges at each stage. 
 Obviously, then, our science must seek its data not 
 only in Biology but in Sociology; not only in the 
 animal functions of the organism, but in the faculties 
 developed under social develojDments. 
 
 52. This conception is novel. Formerly there was 
 but a vague appreciation of the relation between 
 Psychology and Physiology ; and even when the 
 advance of knowledge forced the admission of some 
 constant dependence of mental functions on bodily 
 functions, there was for the most part little precision 
 in the conception. Men knew that the mental func- 
 tions were conjoined with the organic activities, and 
 were in some way dependent on the external medium. 
 They knew also that the social conditions had some 
 influence ; but this knowledge found only fitful 
 application. Psychologists for the most part pursued 
 speculative inquiries ; they proceeded deductively 
 from certain imaginary principles, and troubled them- 
 selves little with induction and verification. The 
 abstract theory of Mind preceded all examination 
 of mental phenomena. Doctrine took the place of 
 Search. A similar procedure had been followed in 
 the study of Life, and still earlier in the study of the 
 Cosmos : unabashed by ignorance of Anatomy and 
 Physiology, undeterred by the absence of any in- 
 sight into physical laws, philosopliers constructed 
 theories of Life and the Cosmos, and soon presented 
 these theories as dogmas. Slowly the change came. 
 The futility of this philosophising is now a common- 
 place ; and all thinkers call upon inductive research 
 for the data which may be co-ordinated into doctrine.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 73 
 
 The manifest superiority of the new procedure is its 
 constant control of speculation by verification; hence its 
 step-by-step progression, slower but more assured than 
 that of the large and incoherent leaps of Metaphysic. 
 
 Psychology, if it is to take rank with the sciences, 
 must pursue their course. It cannot be too alert 
 against the tendency of accepting unverified infer- 
 ences, whether introspective or physiological. But 
 when thus alert, it may give free play to speculation. 
 The idea of submitting speculative inferences to objec- 
 tive verification slowly gained ground, as the convic- 
 tion grew that mental phenomena had a physiological 
 basis. This conviction had a severe struggle to go 
 through. The most accredited thinkers not only 
 detached Man from Nature, but the Mind from the 
 Organism ; they invented a Psyche as the source 
 of all mental phenomena, and endowed it with attri- 
 butes which were in all respects the opposite of 
 organic attributes. The metaphysical notions of im- 
 materiality, simplicity, spontaneity, &c.,had a certain 
 significance as abstract expressions of observed phe- 
 nomena ; unhappily they -were accepted as realities, 
 and were made the grounds of deduction, so that any 
 observations which seemed irreconcilable with one of 
 these abstractions were rejected or explained away. 
 
 53. Impatience at the futility of the speculative 
 method led to the first attempts of inductive analysis. 
 The facts revealed to Introspection were classified, 
 and some approximative interpretations were reached. 
 But still the fatal restriction of the science to the facts 
 of Introspection kept men from the study of the or- 
 ganism. The organs of Sense were too conspicuously 
 concerned in Sensation to be wholly ignored ; but
 
 74 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 while, on the one hand, the Physiology of the Senses 
 was very little understood, on the other hand men 
 were deterred from the search by alarm at Matei:ial- 
 ism. Nor was this alarm without its justification at 
 that time. The spontaneity and subjectivity of moral 
 and intellectual processes stood in marked contrast 
 with the mechanical and physical terms in which the 
 materialists expressed them. The revolt against 
 Materialism was not entirely the revolt of Sentiment, 
 though no doubt Sentiment has powerfully aided and 
 sustained it, giving momentum to the iutellectual 
 discernment of a contradiction, so that what reason 
 regarded as a defective conception, sentiment dreaded 
 as a moral degradation. Who that had ever looked 
 upon the pulpy mass of brain substance, and the 
 nervous cords connecting it with the orgaus, could 
 resist the shock of incredulity on heariug that all he 
 knew of passion, intellect, and will was nothing more 
 than molecular change in this pulpy mass ? Who 
 that had ever seen a nerve-cell could be patient on 
 being told that Thought was a property of such cells, 
 as G-ravitation was a property of Matter 1 
 
 54. Although it is tolerably certain that the 
 materialists did not mean all that they were said to 
 mean, and quite certain that they repudiated the 
 consequences forced upon their premisses by adver- 
 saries, they did fall into the error which besets ana- 
 lysis — that of substituting a part for the whole — and 
 did not discriminate the objective from the subjective 
 aspects of the phenomena. But they, and we with 
 them, rightfully insist on the fact that mental phe- 
 nomena are functions of the oro^anism ; and we are 
 no more called upon to explain ivhy this is so than
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 75 
 
 why masses gravitate and plants germinate : our 
 object is to discover the how and not the why. A 
 vast mass of inductions led to the conclusion that 
 psychical functions are not only functions of the living 
 oriranism, but that in the mechanism of these func- 
 tions the chief part is assigned to the neuro-muscular 
 system. If this be granted, there is no more difficulty 
 in understanding how the vital property of Sensibility 
 should be chiefly manifested by the nervous tissue than 
 in understanding how the vital property of Contractility 
 should be chiefly manifested by the muscular tissue. 
 
 But this is only a step. Looking at the brain, and 
 asking, How can this pulpy mass be credited with 
 Thought ? is looking at one part of a complex me- 
 chanism and wondering how it can be credited with 
 mechanical products. You must know the whole 
 mechanism before you can rightly interpret the action 
 of a part. You must understand the living organism 
 before you can interpret the function of the brain. 
 And more : in looking at the brain you contemplate 
 the mechanism on its objective side : it is a material 
 mass, and its actions are molecular changes. If you 
 ask. How can these material changes be feelings and 
 thoughts ? you are suddenly shifting from the objec- 
 tive to the subjective point of view. Dissect an eye 
 with the utmost accuracy, and you will never divine 
 in such dissection that it is capable of responding to 
 the stimulus of light. Contemplate an ovum, and you 
 will never divine that this microscopic cell is capable 
 of developing into a complex and gigantic animal. 
 Induction proves the eye to be the organ of sight 
 and the ovum to be the starting-point of an organism. 
 But we must know these facts before we can read
 
 76 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 them in our observations of eye and ovum. What 
 does this mean ? It means that the data which have 
 been studied apart must be reconstructed by a syn- 
 thesis before we reach an explanation. Our know- 
 ledge respecting the sentient mechanism is still 
 wretchedly imjDerfect, but, were it a hundredfold en- 
 larged, it would still be objectively nothing more 
 than watching a printing machine in operation, which 
 would disclose how the sheets of paper were laid on 
 the types and removed after the roller had passed 
 over them, but would tell us nothing of how the 
 types were set up, nor what was the significance of 
 the printed words. 
 
 55. From these considerations it appears that while 
 the subjective analysis of Introspection needs the 
 control of objective analysis, and Feeling must always 
 be regarded as a function of the Organism, there is 
 also the necessity of completing objective observa- 
 tion by subjective introspection, interpreting the facts 
 of the Orf>:anism in terms of Feelinoj. So lono^ as 
 mental processes were regarded as wholly distinct 
 from organic processes, the application of Physiology 
 to Psychology, or of psychological experiences to phy- 
 siological problems, could only be illusory. Modern 
 thought has revolutionised the question by its grasp 
 of the principle that mental state and organic state 
 are only two different aspects of one and the same 
 thing — distinct from each other in so far as they 
 are apprehended in different ways and expressed in 
 different terms. Thus illuminated, the two sciences 
 have a mutual instrumentality, and their respective 
 series of phenomena serve, like two versions of the 
 same original, to elucidate and amplify each other.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. H 
 
 56. A twofold advance has been made. Biologists 
 have ceased to isolate man from Nature, and they 
 have been followed by psychologists who have ceased 
 to isolate man from the animals. Observation has 
 revealed more and more of the fundamental similarity 
 in the structure and functions of man and animals. 
 Introspection could never have revealed this. And 
 now-a-days, instead of having to warn psychologists 
 against neglecting the data which are furnished by 
 observation of animals, there is need rather of a warn- 
 ing ngainst exaggerating their value. 
 
 57. The first great step in the right direction was 
 made by Cabanis when he endeavoured to point out 
 the invariable connection of moral phenomena with 
 
 .organic conditions. Imperfect as the attempt was, it 
 was a preparation for a more precise and comprehen- 
 sive view of the relation between functions and organs 
 — the basis of our science. Another great step was 
 taken by Gall in his search for the particular organs by 
 which particular functions were effected. His localisa- 
 tion of these organs in the cerebral convolutions was 
 indeed defective in principle, since it ignored the organ- 
 ism as a whole, and assigned to one part of a complex 
 arrangement the results due to many parts ; more- 
 over, his anatomical and physiological data were inac- 
 curate. Nevertheless his hypothesis was truly scien- 
 tific in character, and it gave an immense impulse to 
 research. He taught men to keep steadily in view 
 the constant relation between structure and function ; 
 he taught them the necessity of objective analysis ; 
 he taught them the futility of looking inwards, and 
 neglecting the vast mass of external observation 
 which animals and societies afi'orded ; he taught them
 
 78 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 where to seek the primary organic conditions — in 
 inherited structures and inherited aptitudes. 
 
 The effect of this teaching is conspicuous in modern 
 works, however little of his special system they may 
 rej^roduce. Indeed, we may now say that the biolo- 
 gical attitude has displaced the metaphysical: mental 
 phenomena are everywhere regarded as vital, and not 
 as having a source which is independent of the living 
 organism. 
 
 58. But there is a final step to be taken for the 
 constitution of the science. The biological concep- 
 tion is defective in so far as it treats only of the 
 individual organism, and only of the organism in its 
 relation to the external medium. For Animal Psy- 
 chology this would suffice ; for Human Psychology it 
 is manifestly insufficient. Man is a social animal 
 — the unit of a collective life — and to isolate him 
 from Society is almost as great a limitation of the 
 scope of Psychology, as to isolate him from Nature. 
 To seek the whole data of our science in neural pro- 
 cesses on the one hand, and revelations of Introspec- 
 tion on the other, is to leave inexplicable the many 
 and profound differences which distinguish man from 
 the animals ; and these differences can be shown to 
 depend on the operation of the Social Factor, which 
 transforms perceptions into conceptions, and sensa- 
 tions into sentiments. 
 
 It is this final conception of the science which it 
 will be my aim hereafter to expound. I have ah-eady 
 intimated that others * before me had been impressed 
 with the fact that social influences modified mental 
 
 * Notably Mr. Spencer. See the luminous exposition : Psychology ^ 
 ii. 521 et seq.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 79 
 
 phenomena ; indeed, the fact was too conspicuous to 
 be overlooked ; but I am not aware that any writer, 
 not even Comte, who expressly recognises it as a 
 psychological factor, had seen its vast reach or traced 
 its mode of operation. The influence of the external 
 medium was likewise too conspicuous in Physiology 
 to have been at any time entirely overlooked ; never- 
 theless a clear recognition of its mode of operation is 
 quite modern. The patent fact that Psychology was 
 by one school based on Introspection, by another on 
 Cerebral Physiology, and by the others on a com- 
 bination of these lines, proves how imperfectly the 
 Sociological basis was appreciated. 
 
 59. Let us suppose our knowledge of the organism 
 to be enormously extended, it would still be incom- 
 petent to furnish an explanation of moral sentiments 
 and intellectual conceptions, simply because these are 
 impersonal and social, arising out of social needs and 
 social conditions, involving, indeed, the organism and 
 its functions, but involving these in relation to ex- 
 periences only possible to the collective life. The 
 higher animals have structures closely resembling our 
 own ; they have sensations, emotions, perceptions, 
 judgments, volitions, generically like, though specifi- 
 cally different from, our own; but their experiences 
 are restricted to their personal needs, their emotions 
 are never developed into impersonal sentiments, their 
 loo^ic knows nothing of abstractions and the construe- 
 tion of abstractions in Science. Sentiment and 
 Science are beyond the range of Physiology, for they 
 are not interpretable by the Mechanism ; they are the 
 evolutions of Experience, and are acquired slowly 
 through the long periods of social evolution. Nay,
 
 80 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 many sentiments and conceptions are not possible 
 even to human beings until the social evolution has 
 brought them in its train. So far from their being 
 innate, they are utterly unknown to the vast majority 
 of mankind. 
 
 60. Driven thus to seek beyond the organism and 
 its inherited aptitudes for the origin of a large portion 
 of our mental life, we can find it only in the consti- 
 tution of the Social Organism of which we are the 
 units. We there find the impersonal experiences of 
 Tradition accumulating for each individual a fund of 
 Knowledge, an instrument of Power which magnifies 
 his existence. The experiences of many become the 
 guide of each ; they do not all perish with the indi- 
 vidual; much survives, takes form in opinion, precept, 
 and law, in prejudice and superstition. The feelings 
 of each are blended into a general consciousness, 
 which in turn reacts upon the individual conscious- 
 ness. And this mighty impersonality is at once the 
 product and the factor of social evolution. It rests 
 on the evolution of Language, as a means of symboli- 
 cal expression rising out of the animal function of 
 individual expression by the stimulus of collective 
 needs. Without Language, no Society having intel- 
 lectual and moral life ; without Society, no need of 
 Language. Without Language^^no Tradition ; with- 
 out Tradition no elaboration of the common arts and 
 skill which cherish and extend the simplest products 
 of the community ; and without Tradition, no Reli- 
 gion, no Science, no Art. 
 
 61. It is therefore to History and the observation 
 of man in social relations that we must look for data 
 which may supplement those of Introspection and
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 81 
 
 Physiology. The conditions of existence of mental 
 phenomena are not only biological but also sociolo- 
 gical studies. A serious investigation of these will 
 serve to remove most if not all of the difficulties 
 which make men cling to the spiritualist hypothesis, 
 because they are profoundly impressed with the in- 
 adequacy of the materialist hypothesis. There will, 
 of course, always remain mysteries enough, on any 
 explanation of the phenomena, but these will not 
 interfere with the scientific orderliness of verifiable 
 conceptions, and Psychology will take its rank among 
 the positive sciences, pursued on the same Method as 
 all the rest.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS AND THE INTEOSPECTIVE 
 METHOD. 
 
 62. Having stated the problem, we have now to in- 
 quire how its solution is to be pursued. The reader 
 will already have gathered that I range myself neither 
 on the side of those who proclaim Introspection the 
 only valid source of psychological knowledge, nor of 
 those who contemptuously dismiss it, and rely solely 
 on Observation of external appearances. The "de- 
 liverances of Consciousness" cannot furnish the solu- 
 tion of a problem which we have seen to be highly 
 complex, involving both biological and sociological 
 data. But while limiting the claims of Introspection, 
 we need not deny their validity. 
 
 Introspection is Observation, differing only in that 
 the phenomena observed are subjective states or 
 feelings, and not objective states or changes in the 
 Felt. We observe changes of Feeling, no less than 
 changes in the External ; and whatever place is 
 assigned to Observation in scientific method must, 
 on this ground, be assigned to Introspection. 
 
 63. A preliminary difficulty lies in the metaphor 
 of an '' internal eye," or " internal sense," co-ordinate 
 with the external senses.* The physiologist knows 
 
 * Kant divides the senses into external and internal, " The first is 
 tliat in which the body is affected by corporeal objects ; the second that
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 83 
 
 of no such organ. Nay, more, were sucli an organ 
 anatomically demonstrable, it would not suffice for 
 the observation of what passes in Consciousness ; the 
 simple reason being that no organ observes ; and Con- 
 sciousness is the state of the Sensorium, the attitude 
 of the sentient being alternately directed to each of 
 
 in -which it is ajfected throngh the mind." Here we have a complete 
 departure from every phy.-^iological conception of a sense : the mind 
 acting on the body to produce feeling — not in the mind, but in the 
 body ! " It is not," he adds, " the pure apperception, a consciousness of 
 what the man does, for this belongs to the faculty of Thought, but what 
 the man sjiffeis, in as far as he is affected by the play of his own thought." 
 — Anthropologie, § 13 and § 22. Corap. Kritik : Trans, ^sthetik, § 2, 
 where tlie inner sense is said to be the "special form under which the 
 intuition of inward changes is possible." A glance at the various 
 treatises shows how various and vague are the interpretations of this 
 inner sense. Snell {Empirische I'sycJiologie, 1802) defines the outer 
 senses as those which perceive objects in space ; the inner sense is that 
 which perceives what passes within us. The former have their definite 
 organs ; so must the latter have its organ, though we cannot define it, 
 p. 68. Daub {Anthropologie, p. 112) makes the inner sen?e the three- 
 fold sense of Time — past, present, and future ; and places it on a level 
 with the outer senses. Fries {Psychische Antliropologie, 1820) says 
 the inner sense is our susceptibility of being stimulated by mental 
 activity ; to it belongs the excitation of self-knowledge, consciousness, 
 and the emotions of grief and joy, p. 45. He expressly declares that by 
 outer and inner senses he does not signify bodily but spiritual organs, 
 BO that all the fundamental dispositions of the soul are called into 
 activity in the same way from the outer and inner senses, j). 46. 
 Beneke (Lehrhuch der Fsychologie, § 128) rejects the distinction alto- 
 gether. Fleming (Beitriige zur Phdosophie der Seele. 1830) identifies it 
 with the faculty of perception, and says it is sometimes synonymous 
 with intLdiigence, inner vision, and mind, i. 53. Vorlander (6V(tncZ- 
 linien einer organischen Wissenscliaft der Seele, 1841) holds that the inner 
 activities are perceived in the same way as tire outer, and therefore 
 require no special sense, which, rightly understood, is always a mediate 
 organ for the perception of what is not immediately given. I need not 
 multiply examples. The French and English psychologists usually 
 designate the inner sense by Consciousness. Cardaillac {tltudes 
 Elemeiitaires de Pliilosophie, 1830) limits it to the "sentiment de iios 
 facultes," i. 116. "Comment pourrions nous savoir que nous sentons 
 de mille manieres differentes si chaque sentiment, chaque idee, chaque 
 acte de la volonte ne luisait conscience de lui-meme ? " p. 118.
 
 84 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MINT). 
 
 the various sentient affections. An animal moves 
 before us, and we observe either its motions, its shape 
 and colour, or the effect (curiosity or fear) produced 
 in us. A distention of our intestines directs con- 
 sciousness either to the unpleasant sensation or to its 
 imaojined cause. 
 
 The psychologist may perhaps object that, by the 
 " internal eye," he means neither an organ nor a 
 mode of observation limited to the s^^here of Sense ; 
 but a mental function, which is that of observingf all 
 the changes and operations of Consciousness : " It is 
 tlie Mind itself reflecting on itself." Now, since we 
 are undeniably conscious of our mental states and 
 operations, and thus the ]\Iind does reflect on them, 
 the metaphor of an internal eye may be accepted ; all 
 that remains for us, then, is to recognise it for a 
 metaphor, and to explain, if we can, what are the 
 conditions it expresses. 
 
 It is an idle objection that because the eye cannot 
 see itself seeing, therefore the Mind cannot see itself 
 thinking. The eye does not see at all, except through 
 its co-operation with the Sensorium which greets the 
 prese^ited object. 
 
 " Nor doth fhe eye itself 
 (That most pure spirit of sense) behold itself, 
 Not going from itself ; but eye to eye opposed 
 Salutes each other with each other's form." * 
 
 64. Kant, Broussais, Comte, and others have re- 
 jected the claims of Introspection ; but on grounds 
 that are not tenable. Kant declared that Psychology 
 could not become a science of observation and experi- 
 ment. Had he lived to our day he would have seen 
 
 * Troilus and Crcssida, Act iii. sc. 3.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 85 
 
 it not only become experimental, but some of its 
 phenomena quantitatively determined, with as much 
 precision as vital phenomena admit. He said, and 
 truly, that the elements of inner observation cannot 
 really be isolated and recombined at will, after the 
 manner of physical or cliemical observation. All sub- 
 jective analysis is ideal only, and so far is greatly 
 inferior to objective analysis. We have no micro- 
 scope, balance, and reagent, to see what is too minute 
 for the unassisted eye, to measure what is quantita- 
 tive, to test what is compound in mental processes : 
 our closest observation is iiiteyyretation. This granted, 
 we reverse the medal, and see that in the certainty 
 of Feeling there is more than a compensation for 
 the exactness of objective analysis. Nay, even the 
 observations of external data have all to be inter- 
 preted, and their value wholly lies in the interpre- 
 tation. Kant's objection therefore only states a defect; 
 and his final objection, namely, that the thoughts and 
 feelings of others are inaccessible to us [Metapli. An- 
 faiigsgrilncle, preface), we have already argued to be 
 an error (§ 51). 
 
 65. Comte is equally absolute, and, like Kant, de- 
 clares internal observation to l)e impossible, because 
 during the process the state of the observer is changed. 
 ** There is an invincible necessity by which the human 
 mind is capable of observing directly all phenomena 
 except its own." How, then, in the name of Common 
 Sense, have we become aware of the existence of 
 mental phenomena ? It would have been more de- 
 fensible had Kant and Comte said that observation 
 of external phenomena was impossible because they 
 could only be observed through the internal changes
 
 86 PEOBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 which they produced. By a singularly unpliysio- 
 logical notion, Comte thinks it possible for man to 
 observe his passions, "because they have a distinct 
 seat from the observing faculties ! " but " as to ob- 
 serving the intellectual plienomena during their opera- 
 tion, that is manifestly impossible." Perhaps so ; but 
 why ? Because " the thinker cannot divide himself 
 into two, one reasoning and the other looking on" 
 {Philos. Positive, i. 35, 36). 
 
 To say that we observe our passions, is to say that 
 we are conscious of the feelings as they arise, and can 
 recall them. The same is true of our intellectual 
 states. The same is true of external phenomena. 
 Having observed a fact, we ideally retrace its stages ; 
 having been conscious of a mental change, we ideally 
 recall its antecedents. The movement we observe is 
 really effected before our observation is completed : it 
 was a series of successive positions in space ; we re- 
 travel through that series ideally, connecting the point 
 of arrival with the point of departure. It is because 
 we can recall these points that we know there has been 
 a movement. It is thus also with the movements of 
 thought. The part of pure observation, or direct he- 
 holding, is the same in both ; and in both it has to be 
 completed by reflection, indirect beholding, which re- 
 forms the particulars into a total. Comte would hardly 
 have urged his argument had he not been biassed by 
 the metaphor of the " internal eye," and by his con- 
 viction of the deplorable nonsense which this " internal 
 eye "revealed to his contemporaries ; elsewhere he has 
 clearly expressed the very principle I am advocating.* 
 
 * " Toutes nos speculations, ineme geomdtriques, s'y rapportent h, des 
 phSnomenes qui ne sauraient etre iram^diatement explores. On n'y
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 87 
 
 66. We are not to loosen our hold of the indis- 
 pensable instrument Introspection because it is 
 limited in its range. It may be only applicable to 
 subjective changes, and need the co-operation of 
 Observation, which is only ai)plicable to objective 
 changes ; both may be, are, indispensable, and both 
 have the same common ground in the sentient organ- 
 ism. TJie feelings externalised, and ideally connected 
 with an External Order or Not-self, constitute objec- 
 tive consciousness in the perception of things, facts, 
 events. The feelino^s no lone^cr externalised, but 
 ideally connected with the Inner Life or Self, consti- 
 tute subjective consciousness in the perception of 
 states, changes, results. The antithesis between facts 
 and feelings, Physis and JEsthesis, is logical and 
 necessary ; but it is a logical artifice, not a psychical 
 reality. Both modes of Feeling must be referred to 
 one and the same Sensorium ; their modality is due 
 to the modes of stimulation. The various stimula- 
 tions of the organs only become feelings in so far as 
 
 pent propreinent voir que des directions simultan^es ou successives, 
 d'apres lesquelles I'esprit doit construire la forme ou le mouvement que 
 Voeil rCapu emtrasser."— Comte: Politique Positive, i. 500. Precisely this 
 is the construction of a mental process. 
 
 As a specimen of the nonsense allnded to in the text, take the follow- 
 ing declaration from Victor Cousin, the most accredited of Comte's 
 contemporaries ; " La m^thode psychologique consiste a s'isoler de tout 
 autre monde que celui de la conscience, pour s'etahlir et s'orienter dans 
 celui-la, oh. toute est r^alite, mais oti la r^alitd est si diverse et si d(ili- 
 cate " {Fragments Philosophiques, preface). Although crassly ignorant 
 of every science. Cousin had no misgiving in magisterially formulating 
 the principles of scientific Method. He was quite at ease in speculation 
 because he had never undertaken the rude labour of research ; and he 
 addressed audiences equally at their ease, equally flattered at being 
 absolved from the drudgery of investigating facts, by the promise of a 
 more valid enlightenment from simply looking in upon what seemed 
 passing in their own minds.
 
 88 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 tliey call the Sensorium into operation. There all the 
 processes are blended, integrated, and in certain rela- 
 tive intensities become states of Consciousness ; in 
 lesser intensities, states of Subconsciousness ; and in 
 still lower degrees of relative intensity, states of Un- 
 consciousness. We distinguish Vision from Touch, 
 and both from Hearing, as modes of Sensibility, and 
 assign each mode to its special organ of excitation ; 
 but we do not suppose for each a different Sensorium. 
 In like manner we distinguish between the feelings 
 which arise from external stimuli and those which 
 arise from internal stimuli ; changes in us that are 
 referred to changes outside, and changes that are 
 referred to changes inside ; but it is only thus that 
 objective and subjective consciousness are distin- 
 guishable. The object or thing is a group of feel- 
 ings, occasioned in us, we believe, by a substance 
 which is part of the great whole — Nature. The per- 
 ception, as a subjective state, is a group of feelings, 
 occasioned, we believe, by another substance, which is 
 also a part of the great whole — Nature. Even those 
 philosophers who believe that the substance of the 
 Mind is not in any way allied to the substance of 
 objects, have still to admit that mental and physical 
 phenomeim are only accessible "to us through Feeling ; 
 the divisions, therefore, which we establish remain 
 from first to last divisions 'of feelings. 
 
 67. If this seems too subtle for practice, too meta- 
 physical for inductive science, we may fall back on 
 the plainest fact of experience, which assures us that 
 states of consciousness, whatever their origin, are 
 feelings capable of being ?'e-felt in the forms of images 
 and memories. Here is the answer to those who
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 89 
 
 puzzle themselves with the question, How can the 
 mind think itself thinking, or the eye see itself see- 
 ing ? and then declare that the mind cannot observe 
 its own operations. The fact is that the mind does 
 observe its operations — and precisely in the same way 
 that it observes any other operations. Because they 
 axe felt and re-felt under varying conditions, and are 
 capable of being discriminated, classified, generalised, 
 and experimentally modified, they are data for scien- 
 tific constructions. One example shall suflSce. We 
 are quite sure that we remember past events, and 
 can retrace their order of occurrence ; this is ah 
 operation ; but we are equally sure that we remember 
 having rememhered ; this is consciousness of the 
 operation. The operation having been performed 
 many times, and under very difi"erent conditions, it is 
 generalised and abstracted as a mental function, 
 Memory, having its peculiar laws. 
 
 •woStoSK^k
 
 CHArTER YI. 
 
 LIMITATIONS OF THE INTROSPECTIVE METHOD. 
 
 68. Having vindicated the claim of Introspection to 
 a place in scientific Method, an aid without which 
 all the facts of Observation would be as meaningless 
 as the words on a printed page to the eye of one in- 
 capable of interpreting the signs, we have now to in- 
 quire into tlie validity of the claim set up for it by cer- 
 tain psychologists, who hold it to be the only ej0ficient 
 instrument of research. On a first glance it seems 
 obvious that a science of the facts of Consciousness 
 can only be constructed from data directly revealed 
 in Consciousness. '' To understand the mind and its 
 operations we must look within, and watch those 
 operations in ourselves, they being necessarily un- 
 observable from without." Plausible as this appears, 
 it rests on the double error of restricting the science 
 to the facts of Consciousness, and to the observation 
 of processes in the individual mind. 
 
 69. I have already pointed out the ambiguity of 
 the' term Consciousness, which means both Sentience 
 in general and a particular Mode of Sentience. It 
 is the latter meaning which the term commonly 
 carries in psychological discussion, though not with- 
 out frequent use of the former. A great gain in 
 clearness would be to substitute the term Experience
 
 THE STQDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 91 
 
 whenever tlie subject-matter of Psycliology is treated 
 of. Consciousness in its usual acceptation is too 
 limited : it excludes many unconscious processes 
 "which are induhitably mental, and which, since Leib- 
 nitz directed attention to them, have been recognised 
 as essential to every theory of the soul. In 1846, 
 Cams boldly affirmed that " the key to unlock all the 
 problems of Consciousness is to be sought in the Un- 
 conscious." * The paradox loses its strangeness and 
 becomes luminous if we extricate it from the con- 
 tradictoriness of its terms, and translate it into the 
 expression of the constant and definite relation be- 
 tween function and organ, between mental and bodily 
 states. Thus translated, the formula will run some- 
 what in these terms : The key to unlock all the pro- 
 blems of mental activity is to be sought by studying 
 each strand of observation, organic facts and mental 
 experience, the Mechanism and its History. 
 
 We are thus made aware of the existence of pro- 
 cesses in the sentient organism which belong as such 
 to the psychological order, are facts of Sentience, and 
 yet are unconscious ; and because they are uncon- 
 scious, they lie outside the range of Introspection, to 
 fall within that of Observation and Inference. They 
 belong to objective science and must be studied 
 there, not in the personified negation, a mystic Un- 
 consciousness, t 
 
 * Repeated by him in the opening of his Vergleichende Psychologie, 
 1866. The idea has been worked out with great extravagance by 
 Hartmann in his Philosophie des Unbewussten. 
 
 t " II est jusqu'a present etabli que tout jugement conscient est 
 la conclusion d'une s^rie de jugements enfouis dans I'inconscience, et 
 qu'ainsi, pour leur etude, le sens intime ne pent nous 6tre d'aucun 
 secours. Les jugements inconscients appartiennent au pass^ de notre 
 individu, et comnie ce passe se perd k son tour dans celui de I'espfece
 
 92 PEOBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 70. Consciousness is too limited a term. Experi- 
 ence, on the contrary, is comprehensive of all sentient 
 facts. While there is a contradiction in speaking of 
 ''unconscious sensations," there is none in speaking 
 of " unconscious experiences ; " these take their place 
 among the mental modifications acquired through in- 
 dividual history. Experience has the further incal- 
 culable advantage of transcending the facts of indi- 
 vidual feeling and including those of the race ; so 
 that while we cannot be said to be conscious of what 
 passes in the mind of another, we can and do, through 
 Observation and Inference, and that sympathetic in- 
 ward movement which may be called mental conta- 
 gion, receive it as an element in our Experience ; and 
 the experiences of millions of men co-operate in the 
 determination of the thoughts and acts of the in- 
 dividual. 
 
 In view, therefore, of the ambiguity of the term 
 Consciousness, we may adopt that of Experience ; but 
 as it will be difficult to avoid altogether a term which 
 has obtained such wide circulation, some of its am- 
 biguity may be escaped by distinguishing between 
 objective consciousness and subjective consciousness, 
 to mark the mental operations which are mainly 
 directed to objects from the operations mainly directed 
 to the feelings. Objective consciousness would then_ 
 designate M^hat Leibnitz calls those ''perceptions dont 
 on ne s'aper9oit pas" — that is to say, the aptitude 
 of mind in which we are contemplating things or 
 events as such, and not as changes in us, or as feel- 
 nous voil^ conduit a recherclier les premisses d'un jngement actuel 
 dans les actes intellectuelles des premiers 6tres sensibles." — Delbceuf: 
 La Psychologie comme Science Naturelle, 1876, p. 77.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 93 
 
 ings. These external changes must be recognised as 
 no less truly in the sphere of Consciousness, since 
 they are only present to us as changes of Feeling.* 
 But their significance to us is attached to the Not- 
 ourselves. It is only when they are viewed from the 
 personal side that they become psychological facts. 
 The movements of the planets, the combinations of 
 gases, the structure and functions of organisms, are 
 objects of physical and biological science, and as such 
 lie outside the domain of Psychology. But these 
 may be studied from the subjective side, as feelings 
 and relations of feelings, how we know them, and 
 how they are related : they then become psychological 
 facts. The consciousness — experience — which in the 
 one case had an objective attitude, in the other case 
 has a subjective attitude. It was consciousness — 
 feeling — experience — in both cases. 
 
 71. Some reader here may ask : In what does the 
 study of objective consciousness, thus explained, differ 
 from Physiology ? Physiology and Psychology, I 
 repeat, though respectively concerned with the same 
 organic phenomena, are distinguished in that the 
 former treats primarily of the Mechanism whereby 
 the functions are effected, the other of the functions 
 themselves, and how they are related. The objective 
 facts of the Mechanism and its operations belong to 
 Psychology when viewed in relation to subjective 
 Experience, that is, when the material mechanism is 
 interpreted in terms of the mental mechanism. For 
 
 * This distinction has been employed bj' Professor Baix: "Are we 
 conscious in any shape when engaged exclusively upon the object 
 world ? It seems to me that we are, and I designate this the object- 
 consciousness, to distinguish it from the elements of the subject-con- 
 sciousness." — The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed. p. 546.
 
 94 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 example, a false perception may be interpreted by a 
 diseased condition of the organs : it is then a physio- 
 logical fact ; or it may be interpreted as an error of 
 judgment, the premisses not having their normal 
 position in the context of experience : it is then a 
 psychological fact. 
 
 Unconscious processes cannot, of course, fall within 
 the range of Introspection. They are, however, ob- 
 servable in their results, and iuterpretable by reflec- 
 tion. If we have formed a conclusion or performed 
 an action unconsciously, we may discover, on ana- 
 lysing it, that it could not have been performed with- 
 out the co-operation of sentient and logical processes 
 such as we recognise in conscious operations. Some 
 writers think that such actions belong to Physiology, 
 because they are unconscious, and are due to organic 
 states. They belong to Physiology or to Psychology, 
 according to the point of view from which they are 
 regarded. The events do not change their character 
 with our change of view. The organic state and the 
 sentient state are the same state under diiFerent 
 aspects. The proof that the unconscious events were 
 of the psychological order is twofold : first, that they 
 were processes in a sentient organism ; secondly, that 
 their genesis was from conscious processes. The same 
 proof is ready for the so-called " unconscious sensa- 
 tions." We are often quite unaware of the external 
 stimulus and the consequent stimulation, yet are 
 made aware of both by some after-effect. Fechner 
 says that opposite his bed there is the black fun- 
 nel of the iron stove conspicuous against the bright 
 wall, which is the first object visible when he opens 
 hi« eyes in the morning. Very often he does not see
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 95 
 
 this — that is to say, he has objective experience of 
 the fact, but is subjectively unconscious of it, i.e., he 
 is subjectively occupied with some other feeling ; yet 
 he sometimes notices that if accidentally he closes his 
 eyes he becomes aware of a vivid image of this funnel 
 (a negative image), which is clear proof that the 
 sensory stimulation produced its normal effect on the 
 organism, though this passed unconsciously when sub- 
 merged in the flood of stronger waves. 
 
 72. Helmholtz, after adducing examples of habitual 
 unconsciousness in normal sentient processes, which 
 may become conscious by attention properly directed, 
 remarks that we are wont to interpret sensations 
 mainly in their objective relations, as means of direct- 
 ing our actions and knowing the external order ; 
 their subjective aspects are mainly interesting in a 
 scientific view, and would greatly interfere with the 
 ordinary use of our senses were they attended to. 
 Hence it is that while we attain to an extraordinary 
 delicacy and certainty in objective observation, we 
 not only fail to attain this in subjective observation, 
 but acquire in a high degree the faculty of entirely 
 disregarding it."'" We have already admitted that 
 Introspection is scientifically defective, in that while 
 its disclosures are absolutely certain they are never 
 exact, and are alw^ays individual, never general. They 
 do not admit of being measured by sharply defined 
 standards of comparison ; they may be discriminated, 
 named, and classified ; they cannot be numbered, 
 measured, compared. They have no common mea- 
 sure, only a common nature. One feeling may be 
 more intense than another; it may be like another in 
 * Helmholtz : Physiol. Optih, 432.
 
 96 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 an indefinite degree ; we can never say "how much 
 more" nor " how like." There can be no equation, 
 except through the substitution of objective standards. 
 So that it is only by having recourse to Observation 
 that we can interpret the results of Introspection in 
 terms of exact science, as it is only by Introspection 
 that we can interpret the significance of Observation 
 by the context of experience. 
 
 73. We might disregard the want of exactness, and 
 point to the compensating condition of certainty, 
 were it not that Introspection, in its direct operation, 
 is limited to the states of the individual observer. 
 By looking inwards he can only see what passes in his 
 mind ; but Psychology is a science of the human 
 mind, not of any individual mind. No science can 
 be founded on single specimens : it formulates general 
 laws, not cases. The individual observer has his 
 idiosyncrasies, peculiarities belonging to his organism 
 and education ; these have to be eliminated or reduced 
 to law. If the sexual tendency is weak in him, and 
 the aptitude for abstract speculation strong, he will 
 greatly err in making himself the standard, and by it 
 interpreting the motives of others. If he has been 
 reared in a medium of high civilisation, he will find 
 in his mental structure organised judgments that seem 
 elementary principles, which, nevertheless, he may 
 learn to be entirely absent from the minds of men 
 reared in other times and countries ; what are intui- 
 tions for him are inconceivable to them.'"* An in- 
 
 * " Many conceptions," says Kant, " arise in our minds from some 
 obscure suggestion of experience, and. are developed to inference after 
 inference by a secret logic without any clear consciousness either of the 
 experience that suggests or the reason that develops them." Until 
 those beliefs that have grown up in the dark recesses of the soul have
 
 / 
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 97 
 
 quiry into the genesis of his sentiments and opinions 
 would assure him that his mind was the product of a 
 history ; and with this assurance he must conclude 
 that, since his history has not been precisely that of 
 other men, their minds cannot be precisely like his 
 own. His consciousness, therefore, cannot be the 
 standard ; it is only material for science in so far as 
 it is in general agreement with the consciousness of 
 fellow-men. By striking off what is individual in 
 each, we may get at a conception of what is common 
 to all.'" It is thus we learn approximately to esti- 
 mate the operation of motives and logical procedures, 
 not only in ourselves but in others. By including 
 various races of men aud various stages of culture, 
 supplementing these by zoological observations and 
 physiological inductions, we rectify in some measure 
 the deficiencies inherent in Introspection, and reach 
 the solid data for a general science. 
 
 74. I shall perhaps be told that no psychologist 
 ever doubted this — none ever proposed to formulate 
 the general laws from his own individual experiences. 
 But in that case the Introspective Method forfeits its 
 claim to be the exclusive Method of Psychology ; and 
 I further ask, In that case what becomes of the asser- 
 tion so constantly advanced, that the phenomena of 
 
 been "broncjht into the light of conscious reason we can have no confi- 
 dence in tlieir validity. And very often there is a certain reluctance to 
 Buch a critical operation, especially in the case of conceptions that have 
 grown with our growth, and become, as it were, an essential part of our 
 habits of thought. Hence it is that the profound philosopher so often 
 "becomes a sopliist to defend the illusions of his youth," — Cited by 
 Caird : Philosophy of Kant, p. 151. 
 
 * Except that idiosyncrasies throw the light of possibility over abnor- 
 mal workings of the organism, and may thus have a value analogous to 
 tliat of pathological cases. 
 
 VOL. III. y
 
 98 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AKD MIND. 
 
 Consciousness are limited to our inner sense, no man 
 being able to observe what passes in the mind of 
 /' another ? Of two things one : either the thoughts 
 ' and feelings of other men are inaccessible to us, in 
 which case Psychology is impossible ; or they are 
 accessible to us, in which case another Method must 
 be followed beside that of Introspection. 
 
 In § 5 1 we touched on the question of accessibility, 
 and saw that the feelings and thoughts of others were 
 accessible to us, precisely in the way that all which 
 is not ourselves is accessible ; their objective expres- 
 sion being interpreted by our feelings. It is certain 
 that I cannot have the feelings of another, since I 
 cannot he that other. But I can know that other, 
 and know that his feelings are like my own, as he is 
 like me. I am forced to pass out of my own subjec- 
 tive sphere whenever I regard the known not as feel- 
 ings but as objects ; yet all objects are interpreted as 
 feelings or signs of feelings. What is accessible to 
 me on the objective side is not its subjective aspect; 
 therefore I cannot know your feelings as subjective 
 facts, but I can know them objectively. I can ob- 
 serve the effect of certain stimuli on your senses, and 
 the effect of certain moral suggestions on your actions. 
 I see you reacting as I myself react ; I hear you speak- 
 ing as I myself speak, reasoning as I reason, loving 
 as I love, tremblino; as I tremble. In Literature and 
 Art there are expressed the thoughts and feelings 
 which I can interpret by my own. I am certain that 
 the truths of exact science are apprehended by you 
 as by me ; and I am as confident in my knowledge of 
 the laws of mental operation being the same in you 
 and in me as I am in my knowledge of the external
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 99 
 
 order. Kant implies this when he maintains that 
 " not only is inner experience produced in the same 
 way as outer experience," but also that " it is secon- 
 dary and dependent upon outer experience, so that we 
 can only have consciousness of our own inner states 
 as such, in contrast with and relation to a world of 
 external objects." * 
 
 75. If, then, it is indispensable that Psychology 
 should formulate the laws of the human mind, and 
 not simply classify the individual states, the feelings 
 and thoughts of others must be accessible ; and if 
 these are not accessible on their subjective side, 
 access must be sought on their objective side. We 
 must quit Introspection for Observation. We must 
 study the mind's operations in its expressions, as we 
 study electrical operations in their effects. We must 
 vary our observations of the actions of men and 
 animals by experiment, filling up the gaps of observa- 
 tion by hypothesis. When the facts are known, and 
 their conditions are known, so that experimentally 
 the facts are reproducible, the aim of research is 
 reached ; the, doctrine may then be constructed. 
 
 And this leads us to remark on the absolute in- 
 capacity of Introspection, even were its range co- 
 extensive with psychical phenomena. There is some- 
 thing naive in the idea that simply watching the 
 changes in Consciousness will reveal the complexities 
 of the phenomena and the laws of change, to say 
 nothing of the conditions which determine the plieno- 
 mena. No science can be constructed out of data 
 furnished by observation of the phenomena as they 
 pass. We observe results, and analyse these into 
 
 • Cairo, p. 287.
 
 100 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 their components ; we complete the visible order by 
 the invisible. Of what avail was the observation of 
 falling bodies ? Millions upon millions of observa- 
 tions under innumerable varieties of circumstance left 
 men blind to the essential and invariable conditions 
 of a fall, Newton imagined and then proved the 
 hypothesis that these conditions were — mass and 
 distance from the earth's centre: these two invari- 
 ables were expressed in the law of gravitation. From 
 that time, observation of falling bodies has been 
 fruitful and the fact intelligible.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. 
 
 7Q. And here, in order to exemplify the illusoriness 
 of the Introspective Method when pursued exclusively, 
 I am tempted into a slight digression. The advocates 
 of Free Will appeal to Introspection, and assert that 
 the verdict of Consciousness is unequivocally in favour 
 of this freedom. " Sir," said Johnson, in his charac- 
 teristic way, "we hiow the will is free, and there's 
 an end of the matter." 
 
 In certain relations the verdict of Consciousness, as 
 I have elsewhere said, is the highest, the ultimate 
 authority. No adverse proof can overturn my cer- 
 tainty that I feel this or think that. I feel a stinging 
 sensation in my foot. No certainty can be more ab- 
 solute. I think that an animal is stinging me. Again 
 it is an absolute certainty to me that such is my 
 thought. So far Consciousness has a simply direct 
 supremacy, and Introspection is but another name for 
 it. But the conditions or causes of my sensation arc 
 not given in my consciousness : my thought requires 
 to be tested by observation, and the supposed animal 
 being non-existent, analysis may have beforehand dis- 
 closed various causes of a stino^ine^ sensation, one of 
 which may agree with the conditions of my case. 
 
 Now, in relation to the freedom of the will, what
 
 102 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 does Consciousness actually tell us ? It tells us that 
 we choose ; that out of several contemplated courses 
 we make choice of one. But choosing, like a stinging 
 in the foot, is an experience which may be analy- 
 tically reduced, and its conditions tested by observa- 
 tion. That we are conscious of choosins; does not 
 prove that our exercise of choice is equivalent to 
 Free Will, when this term is used to signify that 
 mental actions can go on apart from the general 
 system of sequences. All the massive evidence to 
 be derived from human conduct, and from our prac- 
 tical interpretation of such conduct, points to the 
 conclusion that actions, sensations, emotions, and 
 thoughts are subject to causal determination no less 
 rigorously than the movements of the planets or 
 the fluctuations of the waves. Indeed, no modern 
 thinker of any worth would affirm that our volitions 
 are uncaused,— are freed from the inexorable subjec- 
 tion to conditions. The question is, What are the 
 conditions ? While admitting that the strongest 
 motives determine the actions, we all recognise that 
 our freedom consists in our power of choice among 
 conflicting motives, and it is this power which 
 endows a motive with its superior energy. We feel 
 that we are free to choose, and know that the rejected 
 motives might have been selected motives. Over and 
 above the particular motives, the individual volitions, 
 we are conscious of a Will, a Personality, which de- 
 termines these to be what they are. 
 
 77. No sooner do we quit the metaphysical for the 
 biological point of view, and regard Volition as a 
 function of the organism, than the asserted freedom 
 is seen to fall within the limits of determinism as a
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 103 
 
 particular case of the general law of causation. It is 
 Avith freedom as with chance. When we say some- 
 thing happens by chance, we do not mean that it had 
 no conditions ; we mean that tbe conditions are un- 
 foreseen, unknown, out of the regular order of appear- 
 ance. It is by such chance that one black ball is 
 grasped among many white balls ; but tlie hand 
 was moved in this particular direction by rigorous 
 conditions. Because we do not know what these 
 were, and because we know that, so far as general- 
 ised laws are concerned, other conditions might have 
 operated and other balls been chosen, we call the 
 selection an accident. The organism is a part of 
 Nature, and is swept along in the great current of 
 natural forces. But the organism is also a system of 
 forces, and this system has within itself the condi- 
 tions of its special actions ; just as our world is a 
 part of Nature, yet, being a system, its movements are 
 in some sense independent of the solar system. The 
 vessel which is swept onwards by the waves does not 
 determine the individual movement of the sailors. 
 Each sailor knows that he moves with the vessel, but 
 knows also tliat he is free to move to and fro on deck. 
 The voluntary actions are actions of the organism. 
 On the physical side no one can doubt that every 
 stage is rigorously determined by the co-operant con- 
 ditions ; the physical mechanism is, indeed, very im- 
 perfectly known, but we are quite sure that there is no 
 freedom (in the sense of indetermination) in its action. 
 On the mental side we have the subjective correlates 
 of these objective processes : every element in Sen- 
 tience is represented by a corresponding element in 
 cerebral re-arrangement, all chancres in Feelino- beino;
 
 104 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 neural tremors and groupings of tremors. To suppose 
 that when several conflicting motives arise there is 
 no corresponding struggle among neural groups, and 
 that when a choice is made there is no corresponding 
 neural arrangement, is to assume that Will is not the 
 function of the organism, but an independent entity. 
 
 78. Analysis of a voluntary action exhibits an in- 
 tention, an effort, and a motor result : three different 
 stages of Feeling, any one of which may exist sepa- 
 rately, or in other combinations. We may intend to 
 perform an act, but make no effort to realise the 
 intention, which then remains merely a cerebral 
 rehem^sal of the act ; we may make the effort, but 
 be unable to execute the act, or may arrest it when 
 begun. The organism, solicited by a variety of stimu- 
 lations which excite a variety of nascent impulses, 
 can only discharge in one motor effect at each mo- 
 ment, that one being the resultant of the composition 
 of forces. All these nascent impulses are unrealised, 
 although present as states of Sentience, more or less 
 conscious, and each is capable of becoming a motor 
 or motive under other combinations. In psycho- 
 logical language, the resultant is the chosen motive, 
 and is conditioned by three determinants, — 1°, The 
 nature of the stimulus ; 2°, The momentary state of 
 the mind ; 3°, The individuality of the person. 
 
 Now Consciousness, while revealing the fact of 
 hesitation and choice, tells us that out of several im- 
 pulst3S one has prevailed, but does not tell us that this 
 one prevailed owing to <?a;^ra- organic conditions ; and 
 if it seems to tell us that some other might have been 
 chosen, this illusion is explicable. While obeying the 
 prevailing imj^ulse, we are conscious and sub-conscious
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 105 
 
 of simultaneous solicitations in different directions ; 
 in recallinof the event, we recall some of the nascent 
 impulses which were in conflict ; and recalling thus 
 the rejected motives, we recognise in each a motive 
 which was formerly, and may again be, selected. This 
 reflection on our mental operations gives the con- 
 sciousness of variahilitij in impulse, and the persua- 
 sion that we could have chosen any one of those 
 rejected. But the persuasion, being interpreted, 
 means that under the given conditions an action 
 " might have been " difierently determined : — this 
 " might have been " is the imaginary displacement of 
 the actual conditions in favour of others. When it is 
 said, '* We might have chosen another motive had 
 we so willed," the meaning really is, that another 
 motive would have prevailed had it been stronger 
 at the moment ; and the sympathetic emotion, the 
 dread of wrongdoing, the vision of evil consequences, 
 or the ennobling resolve, would then have sufficed to 
 determine us. 
 
 79. The motor-impulse in a hungry dog, though 
 strong, is not strong enough to make him steal a bit 
 of meat, if at the same time he remembers the beat- 
 ings which similar indulgences have brought upon 
 him. The conflict between hunger and fear is decided 
 by the energy of his hunger or the vividness of his 
 revival of past beatings. Very often the strength 
 of the primary impulse is imperious. A fox wildly 
 running from the dogs has been known to step aside 
 to seize a duck on its path. Gall relates the case of 
 a robber stealing the silver snuff'-box of the priest to 
 whom he was making a dying confession, habitual im- 
 pulse blinding him to the futility of his theft. The
 
 106 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 educated man foresees remote consequences, and this 
 vision enters into tlie complex of his motives. The 
 state of choosing is, in physiological language, an un- 
 resolved reflex ; the choice is the resultant. 
 
 80. Owing to the complexity of the conditions, 
 there is a variability in human actions which renders 
 them difficult of prediction ; and Mr. Sully well 
 remarks that " to the majority of minds inability to 
 predict seems a mark of the absence of objective uni- 
 formity " (Sensation and Intuition, 1874, p. 131). 
 Even in our own case, it is often impossible to detect 
 what were the conditions which made one motive 
 dominant ; the more so because some of them lie in 
 the unconscious region. Spinoza thought that men 
 believe themselves to be free because they are con- 
 scious of their actions but ignorant of the causes. Yet 
 there is something more in it than this. For we are 
 ignorant of the causes which determine the particular 
 direction in the growth of leaves and limbs, the 
 colours and dispositions of animals, &c., yet we never 
 doubt that causes are in operation, and that for each 
 particular detail a particular determinant was needed. 
 What is this something more ? It is our conception of 
 a Personality, which is not limited to the momentary 
 feelings, and not exhausted in the individual act. 
 The mere feeling does not suffice. We are conscious 
 of certain operations of our organs, which we do not 
 assign to volitional impulses. In a voluntary act 
 there is the intervention of the ive : that is to say, 
 accompanying the feeling of the act itself there is a 
 vague feeling of the act as one manifestation of a 
 variously manifesting Self This conception of a 
 Self or Personality as superior to and directing each
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 107 
 
 particular manifestation is another aspect of the rela- 
 tion of Organism and organs. Once formed, it comes 
 to represent an abstract Will which dominates con- 
 crete volitions ; so that although each particular 
 volition is assigned to a motive, and is thus admitted 
 within the rigorous limits of determinism, the mo- 
 tives themselves are said to be under the powcp of 
 a Will which is not determined. This is tenable on 
 the understanding that a metaphysical abstraction 
 has no physical determinants, and that the antithesis 
 of mental and mechanical is something more than an 
 antithesis of aspects ; but it is not tenable when we 
 reduce the abstraction to its concretes in subjective 
 and objective terms, and view the Will as the gene- 
 ralised expression of all volitional impulses. 
 
 81. The biologist recognises the fact of delibera- 
 tion, choice, which Consciousness testifies ; recognises, 
 moreover, that each particular choice is determined 
 partly by the fixed conditions of the Mechanism, and 
 partly by the variable conditions of Experience ; there- 
 fore that moral causation is conspicuously different 
 from physical causation, though both are examples 
 of necessary sequence, both are incorporations of the 
 operant conditions. That we have, within certain 
 limits, a power of arresting and redirecting the action 
 of our organs or the current of our thoughts, — that 
 we can acquire such a mastery over these as to exe- 
 cute with ease actions which the motive Mechanism 
 was incompetent to perform, — that with such control 
 we can place ourselves under the tutelage of Expe- 
 rience, and so enlarge, and even alter, the primary 
 tendencies, till what was once the immediate reflex 
 of the Mechanism becomes abhorrent and is sup-
 
 108 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 pressed — all these facts of self-formation are as fully 
 recognised by the biologist as by the metaphysician ; 
 and the biologist conceives that they admit of an 
 intelligible explanation without recourse to extra- 
 oro:anic ao^ents. 
 
 82. So long as consciousness of freedom mea.ns 
 consciousness of deliberation, it simply means that 
 the sentient organism is capable of various simulta- 
 neous excitations. We are as "free" to perform one 
 action rather than another, as we are ** free " to think 
 one conclusion rather than another; that is to say, 
 each action, each thought, is possible under certain 
 conditions, and will be produced whenever these con- 
 ditions are untrammelled. Out of various ideas which 
 emerge at the moment, a conclusion is logically, in- 
 evitably reached. Opinion is "free" in the sense 
 that another conclusion would have been reached had 
 the premisses been different ; but opinion is not free 
 to reach another conclusion while the premisses re- 
 main unchanged. We are free to admit or to reject 
 a space of n dimensions ; no man is free to think what 
 he pleases of the square of the hypothenuse when the 
 geometrical demonstration has been followed. If 
 your conclusion differs from mine on any given point, 
 it is because the premisses have not the same signifi- 
 cance to you as to me. Our common freedom con- 
 sists in this possibility of the same symbols having 
 different significates, as our free will consists in the 
 possibility of the same sentient excitations having, 
 under different states of the organism, different resist- 
 ances. 
 
 ^^—'83. Volition is Desire realised. The state of feel- 
 ing which, prompting to action, is yet from some
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 109 
 
 cause, internal or external, unable to find its active 
 response, is the blind or confused stirring we call 
 Desire. If accompanied by a cerebral rehearsal of 
 the act, — which means a more or less clear apprecia- 
 tion of the means by which the act may be efi'ected, 
 — and if this rehearsal is succeeded by a motor 
 impulse, it is called Volition. We may desire the 
 unattainable, we do not will it. 
 
 No one supposes that our desires are free. Such 
 freedom as there is consists in the conflict of desires, 
 and the choice determined by the predominance of 
 the most urgent ; and this predominance is partly 
 due to the strength of the immediate stimulus, and 
 partly to the vision of possibilities and consequences 
 which the desire awakens. It is here that Desire 
 passes into Volition ; so that however powerful a 
 stimulus may be in exciting a desire, if it be con- 
 nected in Experience with painful consequences we 
 are thereby educated to resist the desire, or to avoid 
 incurring the stimulus which awakens it. Because 
 the Will is thus the abstract expression of the pro- 
 duct of Experience, it is educable, and becomes amen- 
 able to the Moral Law, as architecture is amenable to 
 mechanical laws, and as thinking is amenable to 
 knowledge. 
 
 84. The whole dispute has arisen from two specu- 
 lative mistakes : first, the personification of the ab- 
 straction Will as something apart from the total of 
 volitional impulses, and, therefore, removed from 
 their conditions ; secondly, the analytical artifice of 
 detaching a particular feeling from the comj)lex of 
 co-existent feelings, and supposing that this feeling
 
 110 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 has an unvarying value, whereas its value, as a 
 motive, is always relative. Because a man will 
 
 " Scorn delights and live laborious days " — 
 
 will endure the privations of hunger and the pains of - 
 cold and fatigue, that he may achieve some deed of 
 succour, some object of ambition, or some moun- 
 taineering feat, we do not suppose that he is insensible 
 to fatigue, cold, and hunger, or that he cannot enjoy 
 the rejected delights. Each of these motives will, 
 under other conditions, determine their appropriate 
 responses ; but under the vision of some prospective 
 end these impulses are suppressed. It is in this way 
 that our Personality intervenes to shape our conduct: 
 an abiding sense of our dignity, or of our duty, or a 
 loving devotion to another's welfare, suffices to re- 
 strain all the solicitations wbich are seen to be incon- 
 sistent with it, precisely as a vision of being beaten 
 restrains the hungry dog. It is thus, as Thomas h, 
 Kempis says, occasiones homineni fragilem nonfaciunt, 
 sed qualis sit, ostendunt. This is the only sense in 
 which we can say that the conscious Ego is the cause 
 of the determining motives. 
 
 85. In conclusion, let us note that the old dispute 
 about liberty and necessity is now-a-days resolved '' 
 /into a question of whether the Mind is a function of 
 the Organism, or an entity operating on and through 
 the Organism. By necessity may be understood 
 either, 1°, A rigorous invariableness of sequence, ii're- 
 spective of any variations in the conditions, or, 2°, An 
 invariableness in the conditions themselves : a clock- 
 work necessarily acts in only one way if it act at all.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. Ill 
 
 Now the testimony of Consciousness is invoked to 
 prove that such invariableness is not the case with 
 our actions, and that the Organism is to a great ex- 
 tent self-reguhxtively variable. Owing to the popular 
 misconception of the term Mechanism when applied 
 to organisms, there is the notion that if our actions 
 are mechanically determined they must have the 
 fixity of invariableness observed in machinery ; and 
 since Consciousness assures us that our actions are 
 not thus invariable, the conclusion reached is that 
 they cannot be mechanically determined. Our con- 
 sciousness tells us we are free, in the sense that 
 we have a range of motives surveyed by a Personality 
 which is the incorporation of our past experience, and 
 carries the prevision of alternative futures. It does 
 not tell us that our motives are unconditioned, nor 
 does Biology permit us to conclude that Conscious- 
 ness, Self, Personality, is unconditioned. The only 
 question therefore is. What are the conditions ? It 
 is the task of the psychologist to specify them.
 
 CHAPTEK VIII. 
 
 OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS. 
 
 86. It is thus clear that our Method, while availing 
 itself of the indispensable aid of subjective analysis, 
 has also to call upon objective analysis on a very ex- 
 tensive scale, since every mental fact is at once a state 
 of Feeling and a state of the Organism. While the 
 order and genesis of mental facts are not wholly laid 
 bare to Introspection, their significance is wholly hid- 
 den from Observation. The physiologist could not stir 
 a step in interpreting the facts of the sentient me- 
 chanism were he not incessantly translating them into 
 facts of Feeling. Without the illumination of Intro- 
 spection he could see nothing but molecular move- 
 ments in neural processes. Thus do subjective and 
 objective analysis go hand in hand. Each has its 
 advantages and limitations. The physiologist ob- 
 serves and classifies the activities of the organism, 
 assigning these grouped classes to particular systems 
 and organs, reducing thus the facts of function to 
 facts of structure. Havino; succeeded in reducinsc 
 particular functions to general functions, and func- 
 tions to properties of tissues, he attempts a synthetic 
 reconstruction in which the facts observed are seen to 
 be consequences of the factors. 
 
 The procedure of the psychologist is analogous, but
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 113 
 
 from another station. He studies the facts and laws 
 of Experience, to which the facts and laws of the 
 Mechanism are subordinate. He therefore begins 
 by observing and classifying the various forms of 
 Experience, reducing them to elementary Feelings, 
 and these again to their conditions, namely, the 
 organic activities and the cosmic and social environ- 
 ment. What Anatomy is to the physiologist, Physi- 
 ology is to the psychologist. If the former limited 
 his science to the observation of the salient activities 
 without reference to structure, he would conclude 
 that Eespiration, Digestion, Locomotion, Vocal Ex- 
 pression, Manipulation, &c., were due to so many in- 
 dependent principles, and would never suspect that 
 the Sentient Mechanism was involved in each of 
 these, no less than in Sensation, Emotion, and Thought. 
 If the psychologist limited his science to Introspec- 
 tion, he would conclude — as indeed psychologists have 
 concluded — that Sensation, Perception, Emotion, and 
 Volition are the independent activities of different 
 agents. Forced to find some common ground for 
 their dependence and unity, he would feign the pre- 
 sence of a Psychical Principle. This substitution 
 of one mystery for another is the metempirical at- 
 tempt to explain the unknown by the inconceivable ; 
 for, as Kant truly says, the Psychical Principle can- 
 not be made the object of positive thought, since we 
 have no data for it in our sensations, and we are thus 
 driven to call in the help of negatives to aid us in 
 thinking of that which is utterly different from all 
 that is sensible. Instead of seekino: in the orofanism 
 the conditions of organic activities, psychologists pre- 
 ferred the fictions of imagination, and referred psy- 
 VOL. III. H
 
 114 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 chical plienomena to an abstraction personified as the 
 Psycliical Principle. An ingenious thinker might as 
 well detach all the motor phenomena observed in 
 organisms — the walking, flying, swimming, dancing, 
 fencing, &c. — and erect these into a separate science. 
 To explain the observations he might invent a Motor 
 Principle, which would absolve him from all trouble- 
 some study of the motor-organs and their vital con- 
 ditions. His science would have the same value as 
 that of the metaphysical psychologist. 
 
 87. It will, perhaps, be thought needless now-a- 
 days to insist on the necessity of studying the organ- 
 ism, most recent works being conspicuously occupied 
 with nerve cells, fibres, and centres. There is even 
 danger of the reaction against the Introspective 
 Method being carried too far. A warning, therefore, 
 may fitly here be suggested. That warning is, not 
 to place reliance on the extremely immature know- 
 ledge of the structure and functions of the nervous 
 system which has hitherto been reached, but to accept 
 the statements of our text-books as provisional hypo- 
 theses, not as secure data for deduction. Much of 
 what passes for physiological explanation of psycho- 
 logical processes is simply the translation of those 
 processes in terms of hypothetical physiology. We 
 are indisputably certain of the facts of Feeling, even 
 when our subjective analysis of these into their factors 
 is open to question ; but no one who is competent to 
 speak on the matter would aflirm that our translation 
 of these into definite cerebral processes is at the best 
 more than a probability. In my previous volume, it 
 has been shown how very far we are from accurate 
 knowledge of nerve-tissue, and how contradictory and
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 115 
 
 chaotic are the attempts at localising particular func- 
 tions in 2:)articular portions of the nervous system. I 
 can never read without a smile the confident state- 
 ments which credit certain nerve- cells with the power 
 of transforming impressions into sensations, and other 
 cells with the power of transforming these sensations 
 into ideas — which assign Volition to one centre, Sensa- 
 tion to another, Perception to a third, and Emotion to 
 a fourth. As to the minute anatomy of the nervous 
 system, were it as exact as it is often supposed to be, 
 its value to the psychologist would be insignificant 
 compared with the more accessible observation of the 
 organic functions. Unless illuminated by a study 
 of the organism as a whole, investigation of nerve- 
 cells will throw no more light on Psychology than 
 investigating the molecular structure of iron rails will 
 explain the Kailway System. That a congested liver 
 w^ill influence the intellectual and emotional processes 
 is a demonstrable fact ; that a mental agitation wiU 
 arrest digestion and cause palpitation of the heart is 
 also demonstrable ; but that an impression on the 
 skin has to be transmitted to the optic thalamus be- 
 fore it becomes a sensation, and from thence to the 
 cerebral convolution before it becomes a perception, 
 is still very far from a demonstrable fact ; and the 
 parts played by cell and fibre in such transmission 
 and transformation are at present utterly imaginary. 
 For any one, therefore, to propose an explanation of 
 mental processes by adducing imaginary connections 
 between neural elements having imaginary proper- 
 ties, is to explain the imperfectly known by the 
 unknown. 
 
 88. I have given so much study to the minute
 
 116 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 anatomy of the nervous system, that I shall not be 
 suspected of indifference to its future value, or of 
 joining in the contemptuous rejection which animates 
 those who pronounce it materialistic — a rejection on 
 a par with Bacon's sneer at Copernicus and Goethe's 
 at Newton for their one-sided treatment of Astronomy 
 and Optics on mathematical methods. The union of 
 Physiology with Psychology is henceforward assured, 
 like the union of Algebra with Geometry, by which 
 both sciences have been enormously improved. 
 Lagrange well said that so long as Algebra and Geo- 
 metry were independently studied, their progress was 
 slow and their applications limited ; since their union 
 they have given each other support, and have moved 
 rapidly towards perfection. 
 
 89. In objective analysis we seek to complete and 
 verify the data of subjective analysis. It embraces 
 observation of men and animals, as organisms and 
 as units of a society. The facts presented by Zoology 
 and History have to be reduced to their conditions 
 in Physiology and Sociology. Until this reduction 
 is effected, our observations only disclose symptoms, 
 not causes. 
 
 A glance at the history of Medicine will illustrate 
 my meaning. The old pathologists — of Body and 
 of Mind — classified diseases, abnormal states of the 
 organism, according to the salient symptoms. They 
 vainly tried to cure the diseases by attacking the 
 symptoms. The method now followed is that of 
 classifying diseases, not according to symptoms, but 
 according to functional derangements ; and their 
 cure is sought in the removal of the conditions of 
 such derangements. The old plan was necessary so
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 117 
 
 long as men were very imperfectly acquainted witli 
 functions and organs. The symptoms were not only 
 what obtruded themselves on notice, they were all 
 tfiat could accurately be conceived ; they must always 
 be the first indications for research.* 
 
 Progress of observation disclosed that similar symp- 
 toms reappeared in very various combinations, so 
 that diseases manifestly due to various causes and 
 to derangements of widely different organs presented 
 many of the same salient appearances ; and thus, 
 when the treatment of symptoms was pursued, the 
 remedy which proved beneficial in one case proved 
 disastrous in another. The modern pathologist en- 
 deavours to assign the symptoms to organic disturb- 
 ances, direct or sympathetic. These disturbances may 
 be, l**, structural — a lesion of tissue or an alteration 
 oi its plasmode ; f 2°, functional — an excess or arrest 
 of normal activity of the organ by direct or indirect 
 excitation. When he has acquired definite knowledge 
 of normal and abnormal organic conditions, he has 
 acquired a corresponding knowledge of the diseases 
 in which certain symptoms appear ; and when he has 
 learned the means of modifying these conditions, 
 restoring the organ to its normal activity, he has 
 learned all that can be learned of cures. 
 
 * The mistake of accepting symptoms for causes is natural but un- 
 scientific. The gross errors it leads to may be seen in abundant 
 examples. Here is one : — There is no symptom of Insanity more con- 
 spicuous than Hallucination ; it is, nevertheless, occasionally observed 
 in people who are not in the slightest degree insane, and it is not always 
 observed in the insane. If a man believes that he is " possessed " by a 
 demon having entered into his body, he is said to be insane, and 
 generally is so ; yet hundreds of perfectly sane ignorant people have 
 believed themselves " bewitched " or that a malevolent stranger has cast 
 " the evil eye " on them, the effect of which will be their destruction. 
 
 t For an explanation of this see Physical Basis of Mind, p. 47.
 
 118 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 90. Psychology must be pursued on a similar 
 plau. Hitherto its classifications and its applications 
 to Education and Insanity have been too largely 
 founded on the consideration of symptoms instead of 
 the organic conditions. Naturally so ; the pedagogue 
 and the alienist had little else to direct them. The 
 salient manifestations they could note ; of the latent 
 causes they were ignorant. They could, therefore, 
 only teach and treat by rude empirical methods. A 
 change is happily gaining ground, at least among 
 instructed alienists, who now universally recognise 
 mental aberrations as dependent not on sin, not on 
 spiritual perversion, but on functional derangements 
 having organic causes. They no longer think of 
 curing Insanity by punishment or by sermons ; they 
 treat it as a malady. The pedagogue has not yet got 
 so far. The traditional conception of the Mind as 
 something different from the activities of the or- 
 ganism determines, implicitly or explicitly, his method 
 of Education. He tacitly assumes that all minds are 
 specifically, no less than generically, alike, and he 
 therefore teaches the same lessons in the same way 
 to all. 
 
 ANIMAL PSYCHOLOGY. 
 
 91. Once recognising the necessity of observing 
 the sentient activities of men and of animals, and of 
 interpreting these by reference to their organic con- 
 ditions, what more natural suo'srestion than that our 
 study should begin with animals ? The comparative 
 simplicity of their organisms and their manifestations 
 would seem to mark them as furnishino; the safest 
 prolegomena to Human Psychology. I have already
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 119 
 
 stated (in the preface to Problems of Life and Mind) 
 that ill 1860 I was led to collect materials with this 
 view, but that fuller consideration showed it to be 
 impracticable. To show why it was impracticable 
 will be an answer to my Russian critic, M. Wyrouboff, 
 who {La Philosophie Positive, 1874, p. 106) objects 
 to my " sin against scientific method" in not proceeding 
 from phenomena that are general and simple to those 
 that are special and complex ; I ought, he thinks, 
 to have made the exposition of the simpler cerebral 
 phenomena in animals precede that of the more com- 
 plex phenomena in man. This was my own opinion 
 till experience proved its mistake. I found myself 
 constantly thwarted by the fallacies of anthropomor- 
 phic interpretation. It was impossible, even approxi- 
 mately, to eliminate these before a clear outline of the 
 specially human elements was secured. For example, 
 we see bees at work, and see that they do not sting 
 the keeper, but sting any stranger who may interrupt 
 them ; our interpretation is that they kiiow their 
 keeper and are angry when disturbed. Seeing them 
 act as we act under analogous circumstances, we 
 interpret their actions as we interpret our own. Yet 
 to credit them with Knowledge and Emotion like our 
 own is manifestly erroneous when we compare the 
 conditions in the human Mechanism and Experience 
 which cannot be present in bees. If we say the bees 
 hiow the bee-keeper, we apply the human vocabulary 
 to insect organisms. In that vocabulary Knowledge 
 is the formula of Feeling. The bees, although they 
 no doubt have Feeling, have not the same sentient 
 mechanism, consequently have not the same Feeling 
 as we have, and assuredly have not the same formula.
 
 120 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 Grantinof, therefore, that the bees have sentient acti- 
 vities which may be called Knowledge and Anger, 
 it is certain that these must be very different from 
 such activities in ourselves ; and until we have gained 
 a clear insight into the special conditions which 
 operate in human activities, it is hopeless, even ap- 
 proximately, to estimate the nature of the activities 
 from which such special conditions are absent. There 
 is a general resemblance between the sensitiveness of 
 the bee and that of the man ; between the agitation, as a 
 symptom, of the thwarted bee and that of the thwarted 
 man; between the stinging of the thwarted bee and the 
 striking of the thwarted man : but the causes operat- 
 ing are not the same in each, the effects cannot be 
 the same ; and although we may speak of the agita- 
 tion of the bee, it is only anthropomorphism to speak 
 of its anger. If the bee is cut in two, its hinder 
 segment will sting as vigorpusly as before ; does this 
 hinder seo-ment feel anger ? That the semient is 
 sensitive, I admit, and this reflex stinging is the con- 
 sequence. But between sensitiveness and emotion — 
 between cerebral excitation and auger — the distance is 
 great.* 
 
 • It is this distance which is constantly overlooked. Thus in a 
 recent physiological work of repute the sensitiveness of the bee's seg- 
 ment is adduced in proof that "chaque segment paralt conserver pour 
 son propre conapte la faculte de sentir, de se mouvoir volontairement, 
 sciernment, et meme de sirriter. Chaque groupe ganglionnaire partiel 
 ainsi forme devient un centre partiel qui se suffit et possede les princi- 
 pales propri6tes etfacultes de I'ensemble. Que va dire la Metaphysique? 
 Une intelltyence qui se coupe h, coups de ciseaux ! " On reading this 
 passage a metaphysician would surely remark that nowhere are the 
 products of a whole to be found in any single part ; "the faculties" and 
 their generalised expression " intelligence" can no more belong to one 
 single organ, than Literature can belong to the steam-engine which 
 moves the printing-press.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 121 
 
 92. To attribute knowledge and emotion to bees is 
 either to speak in metaphors or to follow the classi- 
 fication by symptoms. And what is conspicuous in 
 this example is equally discernible in all interpreta- 
 tions of animal feelings. Anthropomorphism is in- 
 evitable so long as we follow symptoms and do not 
 penetrate to their causes. By such procedure the 
 uncultivated mind sees in all the changes of Nature 
 reflections of its own states ; the wdnds " howl " and 
 the rivulets "babble," the thunder "mutters" and 
 the planets " attract " each other. But when the 
 mind passes from symptoms to causes, it recognises 
 the irrationality of expecting the same effects to be 
 produced by causes that differ. The anatomical in- 
 vestigation which reveals the many and profound 
 differences between the human and animal oro-anisms, 
 is further emphasised by the psychological investiga- 
 tion which reveals the still greater differences in the 
 Experience of men and animals, so that in spite of 
 certain fundamental resemblances the mental states of 
 each are specifically unlike. 
 
 93. To make observations of animals really service- 
 able, it is necessary that we should eliminate all the 
 ascertainable differences, and leave standing only 
 those conditions Avhich animals and men have in 
 common. This of itself is an arduous task, and when 
 completed would need caution in application. We 
 must not express the results in other than general 
 terms ; we must not attempt precision of statement. 
 I mean, that if we attribute feelings to both, we must 
 not attribute feelings of the same complexity to both. 
 The anger of a bee or the foresight of a fox resembles 
 the anger and foresight of a man, much as the vision
 
 122 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 of a mollusc resembles the vision of a bird, or as the 
 mathematical faculty of a savage who cannot count 
 beyond five resembles that of an undergraduate who 
 can wield the Calculus. 
 
 94. It is clear that we should never rightly under- 
 stand vital phenomena were we to begin our study of 
 Life by contemplating its simplest manifestations in 
 the animal series ; we can only understand the Amoeba 
 and the Polype by a light reflected from the study of 
 Man. It is also clear that we shall never form even 
 an approximate idea of the mental states of Animals 
 until we have a theory of those of Man ; and such a 
 theory must be constructed, not out of a classification 
 of symptoms, but out of a reduction of symptoms to 
 their causes. 
 
 This does not seem to have been apprehended by 
 the various eminent writers who have attempted an 
 Animal Psychology. Their researches have been 
 further biassed by a secret desire to establish the 
 identity of animal and human nature — a desire con- 
 sequent on their reaction against the irrational efibrt 
 of theologians and metaphysicians to sever human 
 nature from all community with animal nature. In 
 opposition to the doctrine that animals were soulless 
 machines, they insisted so strongly on the intelligence 
 of animals that they overlooked the conspicuous dif- 
 ferences in the conditions and results. They com- 
 mitted no such oversight in regard to Physiology. 
 They knew that fish could not run, having no legs, 
 and that cats could not fly, having no wings ; and, to 
 be consequent, they should have known that animals 
 could not manifest certain psychical activities in the 
 absence of the requisite physiological and sociological
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 123 
 
 conditions. The animal without Language is as in- 
 capable of abstraction, and of what we specially desig- 
 nate Intellect, as, without wings, it is incapable of 
 flight. In a social medium which evokes sentiments 
 and ideas, the mental organism of man acquires 
 organs, capacities, which are impossible to the ani- 
 mal, and these modify the whole Experience of man. 
 This being the case, it is difficult for us to form even 
 an approximate estimate of the animal mind, because 
 we must interpret it by our own wherever we have 
 no clear vision of the conditions operating in each ; 
 and even when we can specify a difference, it is diffi- 
 cult to estimate the result — a notable illustration of 
 which is the impossibility of accurately realising 
 what is the mental result of congenital blindness or 
 deafness. 
 
 95. The great advances which have been made, 
 owing to the extensive studies of comparative Physi- 
 ology, naturally suggested that equivalent advances 
 might be made through studies of comparative Psy- 
 chology. The anatomist having traced a community 
 of plan in the composition of organisms, and the 
 physiologist having traced a corresponding commu- 
 nity of function, so that the animal series came to be 
 viewed as a graduated differentiation of simpler into 
 more complex forms, and the complex thus became 
 intelligible in the light of the simpler forms, the 
 psychologist readily concluded that since the mental 
 functions were organic functions, they also might 
 profitably be studied on the comparative method. 
 All those animals that possessed a nervous system 
 would necessarily present the sentient functions of
 
 124 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 that system ; the system in its simpler forms would 
 present the functions in simpler forms.* 
 
 96. This idea fascinated me, as it has fascinated 
 others. And I owe to it not a little of my scepticism 
 respecting the classic views of the brain as the exclu- 
 sive organ of feeling and intelligence ; for the com- 
 parative investigation, confirmed by experiment, left 
 no doubt that animals which had nothing to be called 
 a brain (except by an extravagant extension of the 
 term) did, nevertheless, manifest several of the func- 
 tions classed under sensibility and even intelligence, 
 which it was a mere evasion to call Instinct. But 
 although comparative studies were of great service 
 in enabling me to form a conception of the sentient 
 mechanism, they were absolutely misleading in rela- 
 tion to the conditions of Experience. The fallacies 
 of anthropomorphism were not to be escaped; and 
 the reason of this will explain why comparative 
 Psychology cannot be placed on the same footing 
 as comparative Physiology. The anatomist and 
 physiologist have the same means of investigation 
 and verification, both when studying the animal organ- 
 ism and when studying the human organism. The 
 issues and organs, the secretions and other active 
 manifestations, are objective facts which need no 
 subjective control or interpretation. That the 
 muscle of a dog, a horse, a rabbit, a frog, or a 
 
 * " Se la facolta psichica nei suoi element! eseenziali si attribuisce all' 
 uomo exclusivamente, il regno aiiimale si annienta, e 1' uomo stesso 
 rimane un enigma insolubile" — a just remark, but followed by this 
 ■which is questionable^" se soltanto a lui ed agli animali, quelle 
 vegetale rimane un mistero ancor piu inesplicabile." — Tito Vignoli : 
 JSaggio di Psicologia Comparata, 1877, p. 69. Whence his conclusion that 
 rightl)' to understand the mind of man we must also investigate the 
 mind of plants.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 125 
 
 fisli has the property of contractility ; that the 
 mucous membrane of a dog, horse, rabbit, or frog has 
 the property of secretion ; that animals move by 
 means of contracting muscles, and digest by means of 
 the secretions, are facts which admit of no doubt. It 
 is quite otherwise when the psychologist compares the 
 sentient phenomena presented by animals with those 
 presented by man. The external appearances may 
 be very similar, but what assurance has he that the 
 internal feelins^s are similar in each ? A doo^ fastens 
 on a rat ; the rat struggles and bites; the dog adjusts 
 his movements to every movement of his prey, 
 growls with fierce rage, eats and digests the flesh, 
 rejecting the indigestible hair, claws, &c. We inter- 
 pret the actions of the dog by our knowledge of 
 similar actions in ourselves. We suppose the dog to 
 have feelings like our own, and that these feelings 
 prompt and accompany his movements. And our 
 supposition is warranted by our knowledge of the 
 great resemblance between the organs and tissues 
 involved in these actions efi"ected by the dog and by 
 man. From the objective similarity of the effects we 
 conclude a subjective similarity in the causes, and 
 inversely from the similarity in the organic causes 
 we conclude a similarity in the subjective feelings. 
 So far all is clear. But now observe the polype 
 clutching a worm or waterflea, mastering its struggles, 
 drawing its victim into its inside, and then, having 
 extracted its assimilable juices, rejecting the indi- 
 gestible shell or skin. The actions, as objective facts, 
 are singularly like those of the dog mastering the rat ; 
 the results are similar. Shall we then conclude that 
 the polype felt very much as the dog felt ? Shall we
 
 126 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 here also conclude a similarity in the feelings to ex- 
 plain this similarity in the acts ? On proceeding to 
 verify this inference, we are forced to admit that it 
 was precipitate. From a certain objective similarity 
 we have inferred that the two cases were similar 
 tlirougliout. In this way a spectator observing the 
 actions of Vaucanson's mechanical duck to be very 
 similar to those of a living duck, would infer that, 
 together with this agreement in mechanical conditions, 
 there was also an agreement in the vital conditions : 
 he would suppose that Vaucanson's duck was alive 
 and had feelings. This inference he would rectify as 
 soon as he learned that the movements of Vaucanson's 
 duck were effected by springs and wheels, and not by 
 living muscles and nerves. A knowledge of the vital 
 conditions would enable him to see that the observed 
 similarity was limited to the mechanical aspects of 
 the two cases. And thus also, in the case of the 
 polype and the dog, a knowledge of the organic con- 
 ditions rectifies the inference from observation. The 
 conditions are conspicuously different in the two 
 cases. The structures of the dog and the polype have 
 only the most general resemblances ; their mechanisms 
 and experiences are so unlike that it is only by a vast 
 knowledge of details and a large theory of organic 
 evolution that we can bring them under one general 
 rubric. Nor does the difficulty cease here. Observe 
 a sensitive plant, the hairs of which an insect touches : 
 the insect is clutched, struggles vainly, is enfolded, 
 pressed down upon the leaf, which pours forth a 
 secretion, and the insect is digested, as the waterflea 
 and rat were digested, the indigestible materials being 
 rejected. Shall we here also recognise the presence
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 127 
 
 of feelings similar to tlie feelings in the dog and 
 in ourselves ? There are distinguished writers who 
 attribute a soul to the plant, no less than to the 
 animal. The hypothesis lies wholly beyond disproof, 
 because it lies wholly beyond proof. But I would 
 urge, that if we credit plant and polype with souls, 
 we are bound by every consideration to deny that 
 these souls are like our own, beyond that general like- 
 ness which may be detected between their organisms 
 and our own, when both are resolved into differenti- 
 ations of protoplasm. There is a theoretic advantage 
 in assigning Sensibility to all living organisms, and 
 thereby giving unity to our conceptions of organic 
 phenomena ; but while fully recognising this, we must 
 not overlook the conspicuous diversities of organic 
 phenomena, and the specific characters which result 
 from the differentiations of Sensibility under complex 
 conditions. Once clearly apprehend that every pheno- 
 menon is a function of its conditions, and you appre- 
 hend that the marked variation of the organic condi- 
 tions presented by the various animal structures must 
 produce marked dissimilarities in sentient phenomena. 
 A priori, then, we are certain that a plant or a polyjDe 
 cannot possibly feel like a dog or a man; and although 
 we may credit it with feeling, what the nature of that 
 feeling is must remain entirely inconceivable to us. 
 
 97. Here, and indeed throughout, we have only 
 tbe positive data of objective observation without the 
 control of subjective verification. How illusory may 
 be the subjective interpretation of animal actions is 
 apparent in the familiar fact that even men may and 
 do exhibit the same objective phenomena when the 
 internal states of feeling are different — they laugh
 
 128 PROBLEMS OP LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 and cry from central agitations which have nothing 
 ludicrous or pathetic ; they struggle and shriek when 
 feeling nothing whatever of the pain which normally 
 excites such actions. We know this is so, for they 
 inform us that it is so, and we have ourselves ex- 
 perienced it. But the animal cannot tell us the feel- 
 ings that underlie its manifestations ; and since we 
 have positive evidence, first, that the objective facts 
 are not always interpretable in the same terms of 
 feeling ; secondly, that every feeling is a function of 
 its sentient conditions, varying with these conditions, 
 who shall venture to say what may be the precise 
 mental state even of the highest ape ? Ilis me- 
 chanism is in many details unlike our mechanism ; 
 this of itself implies a dissimilarity in the sentient con- 
 ditions the range of which we cannot estimate. But 
 still greater is the difference between his Experience 
 and ours ; and the influence of that factor is quite 
 incalculable. 
 
 98. On these grounds we can only assign a very 
 subordinate place to Comparative Psychology. It has 
 its place, and furnishes objective analysis with im- 
 portant data ; and at times affords us a clue even 
 in subjective analysis. But it can only mislead re- 
 search if its limitations are ignored, and if we unre- 
 strainedly interpret animal actions in the light of 
 human consciousness. The psychology of animals 
 may be simpler than that of man, but it is assuredly 
 less intelligible. Now the effective procedure of in- 
 vestigation is not that of passing from the simple 
 phenomena to the complex, but from the more easily 
 accessible to the less easily accessible, — from the 
 better known to the less known. This principle
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 129 
 
 determines tlie selection of the physiological inves- 
 tigation of the Mechanism, in cases where the phe- 
 nomena are more easily accessible and the inductions 
 more easily verifiable, than through the analysis of 
 Experience ; and vice versa. 
 
 Our Method is, therefore, pari passu, objective 
 and subjective. Animal Psychology offers a vast 
 field for experiment and verification ; it is rich in 
 suggestion respecting the Functions, though of little 
 value respecting the Faculties ; it presents us with 
 certain analyses, so to speak, made without disturb- 
 ance of the organism ; but, assign what value to it 
 we may, it cannot take precedence of Human Psy- 
 chology, nor can its facts be intelligible until seen in 
 the light reflected from the human mind. 
 
 DIFFERENCES OF ANIMAL AND HUMAN. 
 
 99. The gi'eat Aristotle studied animal life with a 
 keen appreciation of the fundamental community and 
 specific diversity between men and animals. Sub- 
 sequently, theological dogmas arrested this line of 
 inquiry, and metaphysical dogmas consolidated the 
 prejudice. Descartes threw his great authority into 
 the scale, and started the idea that animals were 
 sentient machines without intelligence, because with- 
 out souls. In spirit and in conception this cele- 
 brated explanation of the animal phenomena was 
 vicious, but it seized one true and important aspect 
 in recognising the operation of mechanical principles, 
 and another in roughly marking the broad distinc- 
 tion between animal and human. Descartes fully ad- 
 mitted, what his successors quickly forgot, and what 
 
 VOL. III. I
 
 130 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 liis adversaries rarely appreciated, that the animal 
 mecbanism was a sentient mechanism. This at once 
 disposes of the absurd interpretation that animals are 
 machines, and, therefore, cannot feel. Although not 
 verifiable, the opinion is tenable that animals, if 
 sentient, have little or no consciousness of their 
 sentience. I mean, that their actions may have 
 a sentient mechanism, and yet never evolve the 
 secondary states of reflected sentience. It is neces- 
 sary that the animal should perceive objects : it is 
 not necessary that he should perceive his own per- 
 ceptions as objects. To hear a sound is to have a^ 
 sensation; to attend to its concomitant external object 
 is to perceive that object; but to attend to the mental 
 state of sound, or to the operation of perception, is IjU' 
 another and more com[)licated process. We have no 
 evidence that animals are capable of this ; and if w^e I 
 restrict Consciousness to such cases, we must deny I 
 consciousness to animals. - — * 
 
 The Jesuits Bonjean and Darmanson took up the 
 idea of Descartes in its most irrational aspect. The 
 former declared that all the animal manifestations 
 which looked like the operation of a spirit were in 
 truth the operation of Satan ; the latter [La Bete 
 Transformee en Machine, 1684) urged this dilemma: 
 If animals have feelings and passions, there is no 
 God ; and if the animal has a soul, it is mortal, and 
 our soul is mortal (Cakus : Vergleichende PsycJiologie, 
 18G6, p. 20). 
 
 100. It was not until the middle of the last century 
 that an earnest voice was raised in vindication of the 
 animal claims. The speaker was Reimarus, the friend 
 of Lessing. His work is still worth consulting, though
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 131 
 
 it is more concerned witli tlie instincts tlian with the 
 higher phenomena. At the same epoch, Georges Leroy 
 wrote an agreeable little book, enriched by the per- 
 sonal experience of a sportsman. Frederic Cuvier 
 followed in 1825 ; and in 1840 Scheitlin attempted a 
 complete survey. Recently we have had the valuable 
 observations and collections of Houzeau, Brehm, and 
 the great Darwin.""'' All these works are open to the 
 objections urged in §§ 96 and 97. I shall, however, 
 here confine my remarks to the last, and endeavour 
 in a running commentary to bring out the distinctive 
 position of Human Psychology. 
 
 ^101. No reader will suppose that in giving promi- 
 nence to the distinctively human phenomena I mean to 
 deny or underrate the community which exists be- 
 tween men and animals. On the principles of Evolu- 
 tion, we expect to find well-marked differences and 
 serial gradations. When we are tracing the serial 
 development, or taking a general survey of organic 
 phenomena, our attention is mainly fixed on the 
 resemblances ; when we are classifying and describ- 
 ing, our attention is mainly occupied by the diversi- 
 ties. For Mr. Darwin's purpose it was needful that he 
 should emphasise the position that " there is no funda- 
 mental difference between man and the higher animals 
 in tlieir mental faculties" (p. 35). For our purpose 
 it is needful to point out that, while there is no 
 
 * RsTMARUS : AUgemeine Betrachtungen ilher die Triebe der Thiere, 
 1760. Georges Leroy : Lettres Fhilosophiques sur l' Intelligence et la 
 Perfectihilite des Animaux, 1762. (It has been translated by Mrs. 
 Richard Congreve.) Scheitlin : Vers^ich einer volhtdndigen Thier- 
 seelenkunde, 2 vols., 1840. Houzeau : Ji'tudes sur les Facultes mentales 
 des Animaux, 2 vols., 1872. Brehm : Das Thierleben, last edition, 
 1877. Darwin: The Descent of Man.
 
 132 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 fimdamental difference in the functions of the two, 
 there is a manifest and fundamental difference in the 
 Q,\o\vQ,di faculties (according to the definitions of § 16): 
 men exhibiting some faculties of which animals have 
 not apparently even the rudiment. When Comte 
 affirms that there is nothing in Humanity, the germs 
 of which are absent from Animality, the assertion 
 requires qualification. Animals may be said to have 
 the germs of our moral and intellectual life in some- 
 what the same sense as serpents have the rudiments 
 of our limbs. If the biologist recognises the many 
 points of community in animal structures, the zooto- 
 mist has to insist on the points of diversity ; and he 
 will not admit that because limbs are vertebral ap- 
 pendages, therefore limbs exist wherever a vertebral 
 column exists. If the psychologist recognises in all 
 animals the fundamental facts of Sensibility, he must 
 still doubt whether all animals manifest the same 
 modes of Sensibility ; and on this ground he must 
 qualify the statement that because man possesses the 
 same senses as the lower animals his fundamental 
 intuitions must be the same : qualify it to the extent 
 that, in the first place, the senses are not the same, 
 but only more or less similar ; in the next place, that 
 we have no accurate means of ascertaining the deo^ree 
 of similarity ; and finally, that the intuitions are to 
 be referred to the Sensorium, not to the sense organs. 
 By way of example, consider the organs of scent in 
 man, wolf, and dog. They are constructed on the 
 same type, and are very similar in detail. Yet we 
 know that the wolf and dog are sensitive to impres- 
 sions inappreciable by man, and are utterly indifferent 
 to fragrancies which powerfully affect man. To these
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 133 
 
 animals the external world seems a continuum of 
 scents, as to man it is a continuum of sights. They 
 track their invisible prey by scent as we by sight. 
 They smell, as we see, the approaching or receding 
 prey. Sensations of smell have, therefore, a different 
 influence on their Sensorium, a different significance. 
 Pass now to the organ of sight. As an optical appa- 
 ratus it is very similar in dog and man ; but the 
 optical experiences of the two are so unlike, that it 
 is eminently doubtful whether the dog has any equi- 
 valent of the sensation of colours, over and above 
 their degrees of luminosity. This conclusion is made 
 probable by the evidence we have that even in man 
 the fine distinction of colours is a developed product. 
 Animals distinguish coloured objects by distinctions 
 of luminous impression, but it has yet to be proved 
 that they distinguish colours. All the observations 
 of naturalists respecting birds and insects being 
 attracted by colours demand reinvestigation. The 
 facts may be explained sometimes by differences in 
 the luminosity of the objects and sometimes by the 
 odours of the pigments.* 
 
 * There seems good evidence that some men born blind have been 
 able to distiiiguisb coloured objects by* scent (Goethe : Gesch. d. Farben- 
 lehre, W. xxxix. p. 355), and other men by touch. It is also certain 
 that Daltonians, who fail to distinguish scarlet from green, yet do not 
 confound objects thus coloured. How birds and insects discern objects 
 we do not know. Since this was written, a correspondent in Nature, 
 Oct. 18, 1877, p. 522, has recorded observations showing that it is the 
 scent and not the colour of plants which attracts insects. " A bee 
 settling on a scarlet geranium will not go from it to another species or 
 variety, but gives its attention to this particular variety only, irrespec- 
 tive of colour, whether scarlet, pink, or white, never going from a 
 scarlet geranium to another scarlet flower, even if in contact." Other 
 correspondents questioned this ; but I think they only showed that 
 insects could detect different degrees of brightness. The subject is very 
 obscure. It has been treated by Sir John Lubbock {Linnoean Society^s
 
 134 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 102. Without pushing this consideration further, 
 we may say, that granting a much closer resemblance 
 between the organs and functions of animals and men 
 than is demonstrable, we should still have to allow 
 for the conspicuous diflferences. And were the con- 
 nate Mechanisms identical, there would still remain 
 the immense diversity in the Experiences of the two ; 
 and it is these which determine the faculties of the 
 functions, and to a great extent the quality of the 
 feelings. Comte instructively observes that the men- 
 tal inferiority of animals has been much exaggerated 
 for want of distinguishing sufficiently between indi- 
 vidual capacities and social results. In descending 
 the series of organisms, we find the Experience and 
 the Mechanism becoming simpler and simpler, having 
 smaller range and less development, till, on reaching 
 the lower stages, we come upon organisms to which 
 the hypothesis of their being sentient machines is not 
 inapplicable. Moved only by the immediate stimuli, 
 and moved always in the same way, they are incap- 
 able of what we know as Experience : they feel and 
 they react ; they never learn through feeling to modify 
 their reaction and to anticipate a future result. Ob- 
 serve a snail, how perfectly its reactions resemble 
 those of a machine. Then pass upwards to the fish. 
 A fish feels the hook, and darts away, but, having 
 released itself from the irritation, returns again and 
 
 Journal, vols. xii. and xiii.) with his accustomed patience and in- 
 genuity ; but his observalions no more prove that insects have the 
 sensation of colour than simihir observations prove insects to have the 
 sensation of sound because they react on the stimulus of vibrations 
 ■which to us are heard as sounds. Insects cannot have sensations of 
 sound like those in us produced by vibrations : they have not an audi- 
 tory organ, much less the Sensorium of man.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 135 
 
 again to tlie bait, undeterred by any memory of past 
 feeling and a torn mouth. How different a dog 1 
 If he has been hurt in an attempt to gratify some 
 desire, he approaches the object with caution, perhaps 
 restrains his desire altogether by the fear of the recur- 
 rence of pain. The dog learns. The fish is incapable 
 of learning. Applied to fishes and animals of a lower 
 organisation, there is a certain truth in what Buffon, 
 following Descartes, says of all animals : " L'animal 
 est un etre purement materiel, qui ne pense ni ne 
 r^flechit, et qui cepcndant agit et semble se deter- 
 miner." The error begins when he adds : " Nous ne 
 pouvons pas douter que le principe de la determination 
 ne soit dans l'animal un effet purement mecanique et 
 absolument dependant de son organisation." Abso- 
 lutely dependent on organisation indeed, but therefore 
 not purely mechanical, since the organisation is not 
 purely mechanical ; and in so far as actions are depen- 
 dent on organisation, the actions of animals are not 
 of another order than those of man. The point of 
 departure is the Experience which arises with a more 
 complex organisation. 
 
 103. One important consequence of this more com- 
 plex Experience is the evolution of that principle of 
 Eeflection, generally called Consciousness, that Inner 
 Sense which Kant marks as the distinguishing attri- 
 bute of man when it makes its own affections objects 
 of thought (Werke, i. 17). In how far animals parti- 
 cipate in this power of reflecting on what passes in 
 themselves, reflecting on their own operations and 
 distinguishing the objective and subjective aspects of 
 the same, it is impossible to say ; but the probabilities 
 are all against their having more than the faintest
 
 136 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 rudiments of such experiences. And every psycho- 
 logist must be alive to the immense influence of the 
 power of Reflection, and the separation of Self from 
 Not-self, of objects from feelings. 
 
 104: Insistance on the manifold points of diversity 
 need not blind us to the manifold points of com- 
 munity. Animals and men are alike, though diffe- 
 rent, in structure ; they are alike, though different, 
 in functions. The senses, instincts, primary apti- 
 tudes are similar. The nutritive organs, the repro- 
 ductive organs, the sense organs, and the motor 
 organs are similar ; from whence it is rational to con- 
 clude a corresponding similarity in functions. That 
 animals feel, and combine their feelings according to 
 laws fundamentally the same as those which operate 
 in man, is scarcely to be gainsaid ; but not less cer- 
 tainly their feelings and the results of their combina- 
 tions of feelings are more or less diff"erent. They 
 cannot have precisely the samfe intuitions if the sen- 
 sible elements of such intuitions are dissimilar. If 
 animals have Logic, it is never the Logic of Signs, 
 which condense ideas in symbols ; it operates on 
 materials of an Experience which is special to each 
 organism, and is far more restricted in its range than 
 that of ma;i. Animals have egoistic impulses ; they 
 have scarcely any sympathetic altruistic impulses 
 beyond the sexual and parental. They manifest a 
 certain tenderness towards young and small animals 
 (probably a derivation of the parental instinct), but 
 this tenderness vanishes in the presence of any ego- 
 istic impulse. Mr. Darwin refers to Brehm's female 
 baboon, whose heart was so capacious that she not 
 only adopted young monkeys, but even stole young
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 137 
 
 dogs and cats, which she continually carried about. 
 Her kindness, however, did not go so far as to share 
 her food with her adopted offspring, at which Brehm 
 was surprised, as his monkeys always divided every- 
 thing quite fairly with their own young ones. Here 
 we see how the egoistic impulses dominate. In the 
 human mother we should find altruism raising the 
 maternal instinct into a maternal sentiment, through 
 the intellectual appreciation of the claims of the help- 
 less — her adopted child would be fed before herself 
 Again, this baboon was one day scratched by an 
 adopted kitten. " Greatly astonished, she examined 
 the kitten's feet, and without more ado bit off the 
 claws." This shows intelligence ; but it is not an in- 
 telligence which, profiting by experience, knows that, 
 the kitten's claws are useful to the kitten, and that 
 she could be taught not to scratch her adopted mother 
 w4th them. Language, which condenses the experi- 
 ence of others, and communicates results to tho'se 
 who have not personally experienced them, was 
 denied to the baboon ; she could only learn from 'her 
 own ' experience, Avhich was sipiply of the scratching 
 action of claws. 
 
 105. The animal tends its sick offspring ; 'the 
 savage mother tries to cure her sick child ; the civil- 
 ised man devotes laborious days to succour any one 
 that is sick, tending the wounded soldier of an alien 
 race, and passionately seeking for , methods of cure 
 that may be applied to all suffering. The law of 
 animal action is Individualism ; its motto is " Each 
 for himself against all." The ideal of human action 
 is Altruism ; its motto is " Each with others, all for 
 each." " To succour those who suffer," said Turgot,
 
 138 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 ''is the duty of all and the business of all." But in 
 enumerating the various splendours of Social Life we 
 must not overlook its dark shadows. The animal's 
 ignorance is at least free from the curse of supersti- 
 tion ; his happiness is not marred by the multitude of 
 misleading ideas which pervert man. The animal's sel- 
 fishness is at least free from the perversions of vanity, 
 and from the vices with which aberrant imagination 
 has degraded the passions of men. Human history 
 on its darker side is a frightful succession of cruelties 
 and debaucheries, such as find no parallel in the 
 history of animals. It is true that animals have 
 no virtues ; for Virtue is the suppression of our 
 egoistic impulses to promote the welfare of others ; 
 and animals are incapable of this conception. Their 
 instincts lead directly to actions, never to ideas. 
 Hence, while they share with man the sexual instinct, 
 they know nothing of Love. On the other hand, 
 while animals suff"er the contagion of Disease and the 
 contagion of Fear, man alone suffers the contagion of 
 Folly ; for him error is as catching as a disease. Lest 
 this should read like an unworthy sarcasm on human 
 nature, I will add : Man alone knows the contagion 
 of Enthusiasm, of Glory, of Virtue. If the animal is 
 less miserable because untormented by the unresting 
 search for happiness and ideal life, and unterrified by 
 superstitions, he is also less enviable, because un- 
 touched by spiritual desires — 
 
 " For who -would lose, 
 Thougli full of pain, this intellectual being, 
 These thoughts which wander through eternity?" 
 
 106. The objection may perhaps be urged that in 
 the foregoing remarks man is represented in his
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 139 
 
 developed state, after centuries of culture have modi- 
 fied his organism, not in the primitive nor even in 
 the savage state, and in so far the comparison with 
 the animal is unjust. But my object was to make 
 prominent the effect of the social factor, and to take 
 man in his developed state as the peculiar exemplar 
 of its power. The distinguishing character of Human 
 Psychology is, that to the three great factors Organ- 
 ism, External Medium, and Heredity, which it has in 
 common with Animal Psychology, it adds a fourth, 
 namely, relation to a Social Medium, with its product, 
 the General Mind (see next chapter). Even in con- 
 fining our comparative survey to the human race, we 
 see evidence enough how supremely important is this 
 social medium. The confio-uration of the savasre and 
 all his functions are indistinguishable from those of 
 the civilised man. The marked diversities between 
 the mental phenomena of the two result from the 
 more complex social relations and the consequent 
 enlargement of Experience. Note, further, that the 
 historical evidence of the evolution of sentiments and 
 faculties disproves both the metaphysical doctrine of 
 innate sentiments and ideas, and the phrenological 
 doctrine of sentiments and faculties having their 
 organs in cerebral configurations. 
 
 107. Although it is to Experience that Knowledge 
 must be referred, the Experience which has within it 
 the means of continuous evolution owes this to Lan- 
 guage, a faculty no brute has acquired. By it ex- 
 periences are registered, generalised, compared, and 
 condensed in formulas which serve for intellectual 
 money. By it the personal relations are raised into 
 impersonal conceptions : the moral life becomes the
 
 140 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 social life. The canimal, as I formerly said, lias 
 sympathy and is moved by sympathetic impulses, 
 but these are never altruistic ; the ends consciously 
 sought are never remote ends. Our moral life is feel- 
 ing for others, working for others, quite irrespective 
 of any personal good beyond the satisfaction of this 
 social impulse. Enlightened by the intuition of our 
 common weakness, we share ideally the universal 
 sorrows. Enjoyment, more and more expanded with 
 the possibilities of interchange, becomes another name 
 for communion. 
 
 108. By gaining some insight into the operation 
 of the social factor through the instrumentality of 
 Language we are enabled to state approximately what 
 mental phenomena can not be found in animals. But, 
 owing to the interfusion of this with the other factors, 
 and the modifications of Feelings which result, the 
 mere abstracting of the social medium does not leave 
 us standing face to face with the animal Feeling. If 
 it enables us to affirm what feelings the animals cannot 
 have, it does not enable us to understand how far 
 those which they have resemble our own ; and this 
 inability is very sensible in the case of emotions of 
 the complex order. " All animals feel wonder,'^ says 
 Mr. Darwin, " and many exhibit curiosity. '' How far 
 the feelings so named are like our own is not clear. 
 We observe the attention of animals fixed on certain 
 events, and we observe them agitated by certain 
 impressions. Brehm and Mr. Darwin record how 
 " monkeys, moved by their dread of snakes, could not 
 resist lifting up the lid of the box in which the snakes 
 were, and peeping at their enemies." This is so like 
 the action of children, and monkeys have organ- 
 
 1
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 141 
 
 isms so like tliose of children, that we must infer 
 a certain community in their mental states. Again, 
 that animals reason — that is to say, combine expe- 
 riences, form judgments, inferences — is now seldom 
 disputed by competent observers. "It is a significant 
 fact that the more the habits of any particular animal 
 are studied by a naturalist, the more he attributes to 
 reason and the less to unlearnt instincts." Eeugger 
 gives two good illustrations : When first he offered 
 his monkeys eggs, they smashed them, and thus lost 
 much of the contents ; afterwards, they gently hit 
 one end against some hard body, and picked off the 
 bits of shell with their fingers. Lumps of sugar 
 were often given them wrapped up in paper ; and he 
 sometimes put a live wasp in the paper, so that hastily 
 unfolding it, they got stung ; after this had once hap- 
 pened, they always first held the packet to their ears 
 to detect any movement within. In these examples 
 there is the manifest result of experience ; but many 
 of the lower animals — say, reptiles and fishes — would 
 continue all their lives unmodified by such loss of 
 food and such pain in its acquisition. I have seen a 
 monkey to whom a nut was given, failing to crack it 
 with his teeth, return it to the giver. If this was not 
 reasoning, one knows not what deserves the name. 
 Yet, although the logical process in this case is iden- 
 tical with the logical process manifest in the highest 
 reaches of reason, it is distinguishable as the Logic of 
 Feeling, not the Logic of Signs. In comparing the 
 possibilities of the ape with those of mankind, we 
 must remember that in the idea "ape " are to be in- 
 cluded all the circumstances of ape-life, under which 
 we may be as calmly assured as Sydney Smith said
 
 142 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 he was, tliat tlie blue-faced baboon will never become 
 our rival in Philosopby, Science, and the Arts. The 
 vision of man's achievement, say, in the explora- 
 tion and theory of the heavens, in the conception of 
 chemical proportions, in the interpretation of ancient 
 records and strict calculation of remote phenomena, 
 and in the wondrous ideal web of religion and poetry 
 that has wrought into one grand emotional force the 
 ages past, present, and to come — all this, side by side 
 with the image of the highest baboon-life, presents 
 an incongruity preposterous enough to justify the 
 scorn with which comprehensive minds have turned 
 away from the hypothesis which seeks for an explana- 
 tion of human Intellect in the functions of the or- 
 ganism common to man and animals, without the 
 addition of some other agency. 
 
 109. It is this other agency which the psychologist 
 has to detect. Mr. Darwin, resuming his remarks, 
 says : "It has, I think, now been shown that man 
 and the higher animals have some few instincts in 
 common. All have the same senses, intuitions, and 
 sensations " — (for same read similar) — " similar pas- 
 sions, affections, emotions, even the more complex 
 ones : they feel wonder and curiosity ; they possess 
 the same faculties of imitation, attention, memory, 
 imagination, and reason, though in very different 
 degrees. Nevertheless, many authors have insisted 
 that man is separated through his mental faculties 
 by an impassable barrier from all the lower animals " 
 (p. 48). 
 
 With these authors I agree. I hold, indeed, that 
 the mental /acuities of man are developed out of 
 Tuental functions which animals share with man ; but
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 143 
 
 these faculties, when developed, constitute as broad a 
 line of demarcation, a barrier as impassable, as that 
 between the vertebrate and invertebrate structure. 
 The moral and higher intellectual faculties of man can 
 no more be explained by reference to the animal func- 
 tions alone than the flight of birds can be explained 
 by the creeping of reptiles, though both are reducible 
 to mechanical and physiological principles. Just as 
 birds have wings, man has Language. The wings 
 give the bird its peculiar aptitude for aerial locomo- 
 tion. Language enables man's intelligence and pas- 
 sions to acquire their peculiar characters of Intellect 
 and Sentiment. And Language is a social product 
 of a quite peculiar kind. It does not depend on the 
 structure of the vocal organs alone, for some birds 
 can articulate and imitate even our words ; but no 
 bird uses such articulations as expressions of ideas. 
 It does not depend on the existence of a society, 
 for bees and ants live in societies ; and many animals 
 live together in groups. In the so-called animal 
 societies, there is apparently nothing beyond an 
 afifgregation of individuals, with some division of 
 employments ; there is no subordination nor co-ordina- 
 tio!i — only co-operation ; no powers invested in indi- 
 viduals and classes ; no command and obedience ; no 
 relinquishment of personal claims ; above all, they 
 have developed nothing like the Family as the social 
 unit, and Tradition as the social experience. " The 
 mental powers in some early progenitor of man must," 
 Mr. Darwin remarks, " have been more highly de- 
 veloped than in any existing ape, before even the 
 most imperfect form of speech could have come into 
 use ; but we may confidently believe that the con-
 
 144 PEOBLEMS OP LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 tinued use and advancement of this power would 
 have reacted on the mind by enabling it and encour- 
 aging it to carry on long trains of thought." Yet 
 why should the ape desire to carry on long trains of 
 thouglit ? Here lies the problem. As a matter of 
 organisation, the man happens to have a development 
 of the articulating faculty which is denied to the ape, 
 who has less than the magpie or parrot, though he is 
 more intelligent. And as a matter of function merely, 
 the articulation of the savage is equal to that of the 
 philosopher; yet the savage has by no means so great 
 an intellectual and moral superiority over the ape as 
 the highly cultured modern has over the savage. It 
 is in the action and reaction of the social medium on 
 the organism that we must seek the causes of this 
 superiority. 
 
 THE MORAL SENSE. 
 
 110. AAHiat is conspicuous in the case of Intellect 
 may also be discerned in Conscience. Both are social 
 products. The hereditary transmission of organised 
 tendencies, together with the distinction between 
 functions and faculties, enables us to reconcile the 
 h priori intuitional with the experiential theory. 
 If we admit the intelligence of animals to be a rudi- 
 mentary intellect, we may admit the emotions of 
 animals to be a rudimentary moral sense. In 
 the self-repressing effort induced by the sexual and 
 parental instincts in birds and intelligent mammals,' 
 and in their capability of attachment apart from the 
 direct physical link, we may recognise the same germs 
 as those which in man the social life has developed
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 145 
 
 into devoted aflfection, passionate sympathy, and self- 
 denying forethought. 
 
 111. We train our domestic animals, as we train 
 our children, to do this and avoid that, by expressions 
 of approbation and disapprobation, which represent 
 caresses and blows ; and so far we find them im- 
 pressible and educable by the moral instrumentality 
 which, in its gradual action on men, has incorporated 
 itself as custom, law, and public opinion. But if we 
 take the term Moral Sense to mean the power of dis- 
 cerning right and wrong, this is as impossible to an 
 animal as the power of discerning arithmetical pro- 
 portions, though here, too, the animal may show a 
 rudimentary power in the regulation of its action by 
 feelings of difference, "as if" it counted. Even in 
 man this moral sense cannot properly be said to be 
 connate otherwise than as a musical sense is connate : 
 it no more brings with it conceptions of what is right, 
 ivha.t wrong, than the musical aptitude brings with it 
 a symphony of Beethoven. What it carries are cer- 
 tain organised predispositions that spontaneously or 
 docilely issue in the beneficent forms of action which 
 the experience of society has classed as right. But 
 in the less endowed specimens of our race, even within 
 the reach of culture, the response to the moral de- 
 mands of society, whether in the shape of doctrine or 
 of institutions, is little more than the conflict of op- 
 posing appetites, the check imposed by egoistic dread- 
 on egoistic desire. It is a great progress beyond this 
 brute dread of the stick when the love of approbation 
 attains the ideal force which renders social rule or 
 custom and the respect of fellow-men an habitually 
 felt restraint and guidance. Even within this limit 
 
 VOL. in. K
 
 146 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 we see the human sentience attaining a mark utterly 
 beyond the reach of our most intelligent inarticulate 
 companion, the dog. But the moral dispositions of 
 men have manifold roots, and a great deal of " right" 
 action is sure to be done by very simple beings from 
 healthy imjxilse, under the guidance of fact, without 
 the idea of an uplifted rod ; just as all over the world 
 men have fed themselves on life-sustaining aliment 
 and not on poison, and have devised suitable imple- 
 ments of labour. And it is to this primitive feeling 
 and gradual varied discernment of what is congruous 
 with well-being, what in the ancient phrase is " ac- 
 cording to nature," that we must refer the beginning 
 of those social rules to which approbation and disap- 
 probation, law and its sanctions, are limbs or appen- 
 dices. It is true that, from the first, superstition 
 mingles its monstrous misguidance with the trust- 
 worthy teachings of perception and practice, and the 
 growing mental and active range gives room not only 
 for the expansion of real and ideal good, but also for 
 the perversions of vanity, the love of domination, and 
 all forms of selfish greed ; so that the social rule or 
 public opinion of every age, and even in the most 
 civilised communities, has given its potent smile and 
 frown to orders of action so mixed that what some- 
 where or at some time has been enforced as " right," 
 lias elsewhere or at another time been held abhorrent. 
 And this observation leads us to the striking anti- 
 thesis presented in the progress of mankind ; namely, 
 that the Moral Sense, which, in the first instance, was 
 moulded under the influence of an external approba- 
 tion and disapprobation, comes at last, in the select 
 members of a given generation, to incorporate itself as
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 147 
 
 protest and resistance, as the renunciation of imme- 
 diate sympathy for the sake of a foreseen general 
 good, as moral defiance of material force, and every 
 form of martyrdom. 
 
 111*. It is at this point that we may fitly look 
 backward and see liow short a way the consideration 
 of animal life alone will take us in the appreciation of 
 the moral life of mankind, which is wrought out of 
 innumerable closely interwoven threads of feeling and 
 knowing. Nevertheless, such reduction of the sym- 
 pathetic or moral life to its primary manifestations is 
 not merely useful, it is indispensable to a true analy- 
 sis and natural history of morals. Without it a wise 
 estimate of the parts played by impulse, cognition, 
 and habit, in determining human conduct, is hardly 
 possible. In the pointer dog we observe the efiiect of 
 trained impulse ; a native tendency restrained and 
 fashioned to a specific variety of action by external 
 influence or the presentation of motive. The same 
 order of elements developed under human conditions 
 issues in a Regulative Intuition — a Moral Sense which 
 is a discrimination of right conduct associated with a 
 more or less direct disj^osition to accordant practice. 
 The proportions in which conscious judgment and 
 immediate impulse are thus combined vary so widely 
 in the long result of inheritance and training that we 
 have, on the one side, an immediate outleap of heroic 
 generosity or self- condemnatory justice as a sort of 
 moral reflex, and on the other a dire struggle between 
 discerned duty, or the altruistic estimate of conse- 
 quences, and the strong promptings of egoistic desire. 
 It is only by duly estimating this necessary co-opera- 
 tion of the impulsive and the perceptive, the emotional
 
 148 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 and tlie intellectual in the develoj^ment of morality, 
 that we can understand the aberrations of human 
 teaching and practice, or the reactions of beneficent 
 sympathy which in the history of communities are 
 seen to defy and correct them. 
 
 112. The abstractions Eight and Wrong become, in 
 the course of social education, a centre round which 
 emotions immediately group themselves, as quickly 
 as steel filings round a magnet : they are the signal 
 for an attitude of preparation without any conception 
 of specific acts to which they summon. And, again, 
 in a lower order of minds, they never acquire any 
 efficient significance other than " what is approved 
 and what disapproved," " what is punished and what 
 rewarded." Hence we see the members even of 
 civilised communities determined by what is called 
 religious or moral teaching as variously as the habits 
 of difierent orders of animals are determined. " If," 
 says Mr. Darwin, " to take an extreme case, men were 
 reared under precisely the same conditions as hive- 
 bees, there could hardly be a doubt that our unmarried 
 females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred 
 duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive 
 to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think 
 of interfering" (p. 73). To make the comparison 
 luminous, we must shade our eyes from the impossi- 
 bility of human organisms being subjected to precisely 
 the same conditions as hive-bees. And we need not 
 look beyond the human sphere to see the preposterous 
 and maleficent courses which may be taught and 
 practised under the form of Eight, either as an ex- 
 pression of Divine Will, or as a means of securing 
 some ultimate deliverance from evil. But dominating
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 149 
 
 all other influences lias been the Social Sanction, 
 the approbation or disapprobation through which the 
 opinion of society penetrates the life of its members, 
 from the hearth to the court of justice, from the game 
 of chance with which they amuse their idleness to 
 the field of battle where they face death. A glance 
 at any social state will show the triumph of this force 
 when it comes into collision even with consecrated 
 beliefs, spiritual terrors, and care for the loving and 
 beloved. Take the case of duelling. A man might 
 see clearly enough that the practice was, in point of 
 utility, absurd, was attended with cruel consequences, 
 and was a direct violation of his religious principles ; 
 but the immediate terror of social contempt for what 
 was branded as cowardice overpowered the fear of 
 death and of the Divine wrath, the pleadings of the 
 family and the thunders of the Church. The one 
 power that has succeeded in suppressing it is the 
 reversal of the social disapprobation. " If the force 
 of custom simple and separate be great," says Bacon, 
 "the force of custom copulate, and conjoined, and 
 collegiate is far greater ; for then example teacheth, 
 company comforteth, emulation quickeneth, glory 
 raiseth." 
 
 Here we see the differences that may be covered 
 by an identity of names, though the identity may 
 be significant of a true kindred. We may say that 
 we educate our dogs in a medium of approbation and 
 disapprobation, and we may give the same name to 
 that blending of coercion and sympathy which has 
 educated man to produce poems that thrill the life of 
 successive ages, and science that embraces more and
 
 150 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 more of the invisible and brings it within the range 
 of demonstration. 
 
 The progressive changes underlying the term 
 " moral " may be illustrated by the conception of 
 Remorse. A dog running away and hiding himself 
 after a conscious misdemeanour, and not to be brought 
 back by coaxing, having more fear of the stick than 
 belief in forgiveness, is not a very inadequate com- 
 parison for that stage of human remorse which con- 
 sists in the misdoer's mere terror of the vengeance 
 he has incurred from supernal powers. To the moral 
 sense in this lower stage there is but a faint and 
 confused impression of what constitutes the wrong of 
 wrongdoing ; forgiveness is contemplated as a heal- 
 all. But in a mind where the educated tracing of 
 hurtful consequences to others is associated with a 
 sympathetic imagination of their sujffering, Remorse 
 has no relation to an external source of punishment 
 for the wrong committed : it is the agonised sense, 
 the contrite contemplation, of the wound inflicted on 
 another. Wordsworth has depicted a remorse of this 
 kind — 
 
 " Feebly must they have felt 
 Who, in old time, attired with snakes and whips 
 The vengeful Furies. Beautiful regards 
 Were turned on me — the face of her I loved j 
 The wife and mother, pitifully fixing 
 Tender reproaches, insupportable ! " 
 
 The sanction which was once the outside whip has 
 become the inward sympathetic pang. 
 
 113. But in the intermediate stages also, which 
 are more comparable to the manifestations of animals, 
 at the same time that the dread is directed to an
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 151 
 
 external vengeance of gods or men, we see the moral 
 education of our race proceeding, in the more and 
 more rational classification of actions as right or 
 wrong, towards the final identification of the Divine 
 Will with the highest ascertainable duty to mankind, 
 and in the continual elevation of public opinion 
 towards the highest mark of Feeling informed by 
 Knowledge. 
 
 The diff'erent strands of human experience which 
 combine to create moral sentiment act in various 
 proportion on individual minds, and hence it happens 
 that some formulas of ideal motive which have an 
 intense reality for one mind have little force for 
 another, though the moral level may be in both 
 cases equally high. Kant's fine phrase — "Man re- 
 fuses to violate in his own person the dignity of 
 humanity " — may represent an abiding efficient re- 
 sponse in the consciousness of a given person, the 
 moral keynote, as we may say, to which his other 
 sentiments are adjusted. His discernment and choice 
 of the Right are braced by an intense scorn of the 
 Wrong, which he habitually represents to himself 
 in its wider relations. 
 
 114. Thus while man, in his moral beginnings, has 
 a marked kinship with the animals, whose life, like 
 his ow^n, is regulated by desires and intelligence, he 
 stands apart in the attainment of moral conceptions 
 and of organised ethical tendencies, which are correctly 
 callod moral intuitions. These latter form a justi- 
 fication for the a 'priori intuitional doctrine ; but its 
 explanation lies in the principles of experience. We 
 have intuitions of Right and Wrong in so far as we 
 have intuitions of certain consequences ; but these
 
 152 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 must have been learned in our own experience or 
 transmitted from the experience of others. Some 
 writers who are disposed to exaggerate the action of 
 Heredity believe that certain specific experiences of 
 social utility in the race become organised in descen- 
 dants, and are thus transmitted as instincts. With 
 the demonstrated wonders of heredity before us, it is 
 rash to fix limits to the specific determinations it 
 may include ; but the evidence in this direction is 
 obscured by the indubitable transmission through 
 language and other social institutions. 
 
 HISTORY. 
 
 114*. We need not prolong this survey of the 
 difi'erences between Animal and Human Psychology : 
 its outcome is, that although the observation of ani- 
 mals may yield us valuable material, it must be used 
 with great circumspection, and only as suggestion for 
 experimental analysis, never as premisses for conclu- 
 sions reaching beyond. The objective data of Psycho- 
 logy are furnished by Zoology and History ; the laws 
 by Physiology and Sociology. Observation will not 
 suffice. Introspection will not suffice. Analysis and 
 Verification by Synthesis are necessary. Experiment is 
 necessary. Disease has been happily termed an " Ex- 
 periment instituted by Nature," since the disturbance 
 of one organ by exaggerating or diminishing its action 
 renders more conspicuous the part that organ plays 
 in the general activity. We may also term History 
 an experiment instituted by Society, since it presents 
 conspicuous variations of mental reactions under 
 varying social conditions, and exhibits on a large
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 153 
 
 scale the evoliitiou of sentience and conceptions from 
 germs of emotional and intellectual experiences. 
 History unrolls the palimpsest of mental evolution. 
 Under the conspicuous characters of Science and Con- 
 science may be read the fainter characters of more 
 primitive states ; under Sentiments, the primitive 
 Affections ; under Morality, the social needs transform- 
 ing primitive personal desires into impersonal aims, so 
 that the stranger is no longer an enemy {hostis), but 
 a fellow-worker and fellow-sufferer. History shows 
 how individual experiences become general possessions, 
 and individual labours become wealth ; how facts be- 
 come Science, and industries Commerce. The shift- 
 ing panorama of History presents a continuous 
 evolution, a fuller and more luminous tradition, an 
 iutenser consciousness of a wider life. 
 
 115. Because Psychology is interpreted through 
 Sociology, and Experience acquires its development 
 mainly through social influences, we must always 
 take History into account. It shares with Society 
 the distinctive character of progress. It is for ever 
 germinating, for ever evolving. The physiologist re- 
 cognises the same organs and functions in the savage 
 and the civilized, in Greek, Hindoo, old German, 
 or modern European ; but not the same thoughts and 
 sentiments. The brain of a cultivated Englishman 
 of our day, compared with the brain of a Greek of 
 the age of Pericles, would not present any appreciable 
 diflferences, yet the differences between the moral and 
 intellectual activities of the two would be many and 
 vast. These are not to be assigned to the organism 
 and its functions. The co-ordination of sensory pro- 
 cesses in the brain of the Greek was doubtless as
 
 154 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 perfect as that in the brain of the Englishman ; but 
 the quahty of the moral feelings and the range of 
 conceptions, so far as we could test them objectively, 
 would be very different. The Englishman has been 
 nourished on the products of the centuries ; his feel- 
 ings and thoughts have taken form under conditions 
 unknown to the Greek, so that what would have 
 delighted the one is anguish to the other. The sight 
 of a w^ounded foreigner, which agitates the English- 
 man, and prompts him by its very imagination to 
 undertake hardships and danger in the effort to relieve 
 the sufferer, would have excited no more emotion in a 
 Greek than the sight of an injured dog. A proposi- 
 tion to send money, food, clothing, and medical aid 
 to the relief of the wounded Cretans would have 
 made the Agora ring with shouts of derisive laughter. 
 And a treatise on algebra which is mastered by a 
 schoolboy would have been like a wizard's scroll to 
 Pythagoras or Hipparchus. Aristotle, with all his 
 knowledge and aptitudes, would be as a child in 
 Liebig's laboratory. So great has been the evolu- 
 tion of moral sentiments and scientific conceptions. 
 
 Thus, while the laws of the sentient functions must 
 be studied in Physiology, the laws of the sentient 
 faculties, especially the moral and intellectual facul- 
 ties, must be studied in History. The true logic of 
 Science is only made apparent in the history of 
 Science. If we follow the development of thought 
 on the large scale of Plistory, we see how the mind 
 acquires new powers and possibilities with new con- 
 ceptions. We see also how it passes from particular 
 concrete facts to general facts and abstractions ; we 
 see it dcscendino: from the heip^hts of abstraction to
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 155 
 
 the discovery of particulars. In otlier words, we ob- 
 serve a natural mode of mental operation, to which we 
 affix the term Induction, and another mode to which 
 we affix the term Deduction. These formulated, we 
 have entered on the eternal possession of two logical 
 laws. Had we not the historical evidence assuring 
 us that these laws were unsuspected for thousands 
 of years, although, of course, in operation from the 
 earliest ages, we should imagine them to have been 
 familiar to every reflecting mind. And so with other 
 mental laws. History discloses how the mind passes 
 from wonderment at the miraculous to the discern- 
 ment of order, from sorcery to science (a passage 
 formulated by Comte as the law of the three stages), 
 how the mind begins with a vague conception of 
 universal Animism, or the presence of a separate Will 
 in each object, with consequent belief in the capri- 
 ciousness of events, leaving the imagination free to 
 picture the past and the future in any combinations 
 it pleases ; how this belief gradually becomes troubled 
 by doubts, as experience presses on man the convic- 
 tion that events are causally and not casually deter- 
 mined, till at length the law of Causality is conceived, 
 and the order of events is recognised as inexorable. 
 Henceforth familiarity with exact descriptions and 
 demonstrations creates a habit of mind which renders 
 miracles inconceivable, and caprice in the succession 
 of events absurd. All our experiences and all our 
 explanations are now dominated by a steady faith in 
 a fixed order, and our efforts are directed towards the 
 ascertainment of what that order is. To the mind thus 
 organised, the fluctuating belief in accident and caprice, 
 which our ancestors held, is as the babble of infants.
 
 156 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 Not only in Science is the marcli of mind thus 
 conspicuously illustrated : a similar evolution may be 
 traced in Art. New sensibilities are developed, and 
 Nature is full of new symbols. There are harmonies, 
 both rhythmic and moral, in the poetry of Goethe 
 and Wordsworth w^hich would have been discords 
 and dark riddles to Sophocles or to Dante. A fugue 
 by Bach, or a symphony by Beethoven, would have 
 been little better than a noisy chaos to Pericles. In 
 the developments of Industry and the Mechanical 
 Arts, the mind has acquired not only new powers, but 
 the equivalents of new senses. 
 
 If it is evident that the individual mind has been 
 in constant evolution, still more evident is the fact 
 that the general mind, or what we call the " culture 
 of the age," is an historical growth. " Before our 
 eyes a world of reason is slowly constituting itself 
 in the history of culture ; and we who live now enter 
 upon the inheritance which past ages have laid up 
 for us. There is, however, a fundamental difference 
 between the way in which these results look to us 
 now and the way in which they originally organised 
 themselves. The child who begins to learn a language 
 finds the members of it all, as it were, upon one level : 
 adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and verbs confront 
 him with the same authority and rank. This appear- 
 ance is deceptive ; it may easily suggest that the 
 words are not members in an organism in and out of 
 which they have developed. We can go back to a 
 point when there was little or no distinction between 
 elements ; when language was narrower in its range, 
 and not, as now, developed, into an endless host of
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 157 
 
 points. The same allusion lias to be overcome in the 
 case of thought." ^^ 
 
 116. Thus the psychologist must include Psy- 
 chogeny in his investigations, as the physiologist in- 
 cludes Embryogeny. History shows how the human 
 mind, which, at the dawn of civilisation, was a lyre of 
 three chords, became in the progress of civilisation a 
 lyre of seven chords ; and by consequence the pre- 
 tension of the Introspective Method is inadmissible 
 as regards the genesis of mind. But we need not 
 therefore accept Mr. Green's verdict that " the obser- 
 vation by the mind of its own genesis is the crown- 
 ing absurdity of speculation ; for there is nothing to 
 observe unless the observer puts his own developed 
 consciousness in the place of the undeveloped con- 
 sciousness he is observing." t The difficulty here 
 suggested applies only to the Introspective Method. 
 Objective analysis will enable the psychologist to 
 observe the evolutions of mind, as it enables the 
 physiologist to observe the evolutions of the embryo. 
 The one carries with him the standard of a developed 
 consciousness, to which all the observed stages tend, 
 as the other carries with him the standard of an adult 
 organism, to which all the prior stages tend. Objec- 
 tive analysis further furnishes us with an answer to the 
 difficulty which many regard as insuperable, namely, 
 that mind cannot be explained as a function of the 
 material organism, because "to go beyond the intelli- 
 gence to explain the intelligence is to cut away the 
 ground on which we ourselves are standing." To this 
 
 * Wallace : The Logic of Hegel, 1874, p. Ixxxiv. 
 + Green : Introduction to Hume, § 9, as cited by Caird, op. cit.
 
 158 PROBLEMS OP LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 the answer is : that the mind can be exphiined as 
 a function of the material organism is- proved by the 
 fact that it is so exphiined ; and the objection urged 
 against such explanation would equally apply to all 
 theories of cosmical phenomena, since we can only 
 know these through subjective states, only express 
 them in terms of Feeling. We observe Life as a 
 function of the organism, varying with all the varia- 
 tions of the organism ; and, having this clear concep- 
 tion of the function, we are at ease respecting any of 
 its unknown quantities. So with mind. We observe 
 it as a function, and we observe its variations under 
 varying social conditions. Having thus a clear con- 
 ception of the organism and of social influences, we 
 have all the requisite data for an explanation of its 
 development, in the only sense according to which 
 explanation is accessible to us.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 THE GENERAL MIND. 
 
 117. The remarks which closed the preceding chapter 
 prepare the consideration of a factor, which, although 
 always implied in theoretic discussion of psycholo- 
 gical questions, is rarely conceived with distinctness. 
 I allude to the experience of the race in its influence 
 on the experience of the individual ; that is to say, 
 the direction impressed by the General Mind on the 
 feelings and opinions of particular minds. This in- 
 fluence is implied in the familiar use of such terms as 
 the Mind, Common Sense, Collective Consciousness, 
 Thouglit {Das DenJcen), Reason, Spirit of the Age, 
 &c. Obviously these terms indicate something over 
 and above the individual mind, transcending its limi- 
 tations and correcting its infirmities. Obviously also 
 the existence of such a factor calls upon something 
 beyond Introspection, since we cannot pretend by 
 Introspection to a direct observation of phenomena 
 which lie outside our individual experience. 
 
 The object of search is the human mind, not a mind. 
 Psychology has to explain not my thought nor yours, 
 not my modes of reaction nor yours, except in so far 
 as these are exemplifications of the normal reactions 
 of an ideal mind. Science formulates general laws 
 and abstract conceptions ; not particular facts and
 
 160 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 idiosyncras ies. From the fleeting changes of the 
 individual it extricates a group of characters which 
 these changes have in common ; from the multitu- 
 dinous diversities of individual organisms it extri- 
 cates a group of characters common to all. It finds 
 the sentient organism reacting differently in infancy, 
 in maturity, and in old age ; differently from year 
 to year, day to day, hour to hour. But amid these 
 changes there are characters which do not change ; 
 and the total of these is condensed in the abstract 
 conception. Mind. 
 
 118. The combination of the individual and the 
 general leads to this result. While the mental func- 
 tions are functions of the individual organism, the 
 product, Mind, is more than an individual product. 
 Like its great instrument. Language, it is at once 
 individual and social. Each man speaks in virtue of 
 the functions of vocal expression, but also in virtue of 
 the social need of communication. The words spoken 
 are not his creation, yet he, too, must appropriate 
 them by what may be called a creative process before 
 he can understand them. What his tribe speaks he 
 repeats ; but he does not simply echo their words, he 
 rethinks them. In the same way he adopts their 
 experiences when he assimilates them to his own. He 
 only feels their emotions when his soul is moved like 
 theirs ; he cannot think their thoughts so long as his 
 experiences refuse to be condensed in their symbols. 
 But because he has a similar vocal function, and a 
 similar verbal store, he can reproduce and understand 
 their novel combinations of speech ; and because he 
 has similar experiences he can understand their novel 
 combinations of thought, adopting both into his own
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 161 
 
 and getting liis range of fellowship enlarged. Besides 
 the circle of sensations, appetites, and volitions directly- 
 related to his personal needs, each man has a wider 
 circle of sentiments and ideas connecting his personal 
 needs with the needs of his fellow-men, and embracing 
 past and future. These constitute a large part of his 
 system of tli ought. 
 
 119. Language belongs essentially to the community 
 by whom and for whom it is called into existence. In 
 like manner Thought belongs essentially to Humanity. 
 As every spoken word presupposes an intelligent 
 hearer, so every conception implies an impersonal 
 Reason representing relations that are essentially im- 
 personal. A solitary man would feel, and think, and 
 will ; but he would no more fashion his feelings, 
 thoughts, and volitions into conceptions which are 
 the formulas of his knowledge than he would articu- 
 late them in words. 
 
 Further, the experiences of each individual come 
 and go ; they correct, enlarge, destroy one another, 
 leaving behind them a certain residual store, which, 
 condensed in intuiti'ons and formulated in principles, 
 direct and modify all future experiences. The sum 
 of these is designated as the individual mind, A 
 similar process evolves the General Mind — the resi- 
 dual store of experiences common to all. By means 
 of Language the individual shares in the general fund, 
 which thus becomes for him an impersonal objective 
 influence. To it each appeals. We all assimilate 
 some of its material, and help to increase its store. 
 Not only do we find ourselves confronting Nature, 
 to whose order we must conform, but confronting 
 Society, whose laws we must obey. We have to 
 
 VOL. in. L
 
 162 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 learn what Nature is and does, what our fellow- men 
 think and will, and unless we learn aright and act in 
 conformity, we are inexorably punished. 
 
 120. While calling attention to the General Mind, 
 it may not be superfluous to warn some readers 
 ao-ainst a metaphysical fallacy. The abstraction Mind, 
 once extricated from the concrete facts of Sentience, 
 is by logical necessity immaterial, simple, one ; for it 
 is a symbol like Virtue, Cause, Number, &c. As a 
 symbol, it has concrete realities for its significates; 
 but this does not suffice for those who, having per- 
 sonified the abstraction, accept it as a res completa, 
 which may be studied apart from its significates. 
 Not only has this mistake been committed with 
 respect to the individual mind — which has in con- 
 sequence been studied apart from the organism — but 
 also, though less frequently, with regard to the 
 General Mind, which has been detached from the 
 individuals, not merely as an abstraction, but as a 
 res completa; and thus the World-process has been 
 assigned to a Soul of the World. 
 
 We have not here to discuss such metaphysical 
 questions. For our present purpose, it is enough to 
 recognise that there are men, and there is Humanity: 
 there are minds, and besides the individual minds 
 there is the Human Mind. With the individual 
 point of view we must always combine the general. 
 Thus, we may note the deficiencies and peculiarities 
 of various minds, and such observations may greatly 
 facilitate our analysis ; but they are noted as excep- 
 tions, they are excluded from the General Mind ; just 
 as errors, though logically arrived at, are excluded 
 from Logic. If we rise from particular facts to
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 1G3 
 
 general facts, when once the generalities have been 
 reached, we apply them to all particulars, to note in 
 how far they accord with the generalities. Only 
 when this application is congruous, and the new par- 
 ticular is brought under the general head, do we con- 
 sider it explained. If the new fact is inconsistent 
 with general experience, we seek its conditions in 
 some exceptional details. For example, the general 
 fact that mutton is excellent food for man causes us 
 unhesitatingly to conclude that the first hungry man 
 we have to feed may safely be fed with mutton ; but 
 it sometimes occurs that the hungry man is one to 
 whom mutton is a poison. We must not ignore or 
 reject such experiences ; we must seek the points of 
 difference in the organic conditions ; and these, when 
 found, will form a new generality. Thus also with 
 mental differences. We feel in ourselves and ob- 
 serve in others certain sequences of sensation and 
 thought, which we detach as uniformities (laws) 
 of Sensibility and Logic. Extending our researches 
 over various races and epochs, we come upon seeming 
 contradictions to these uniformities. We then con- 
 clude that men do not always feel alike under like 
 external circumstances.* They may be deficient in 
 
 * " La lecture des ouvrages ecrits k Fetranger sur les maladies ner- 
 veuses m'a souvent fait songer k certaines 6tudes de pathologie com- 
 parative, qui s'appliqueraient a rechercher curieusement les alterations 
 que les types uiorbides de cette classe peuvent eprouver, sans rien 
 perdre cependant de leur autonomie, suivantles climats, les nationalites, 
 les races, &c. Le plus souvent on n'aurait k relever, dans une etude de 
 ce genre, que des nuances delicates ; mais la deviation peut aller parfois 
 jusqu'sL s'accuser par des modifications plus ou moins profondes, alors 
 mSnie qu'il s'agit seulement de pays limitrophes et places sous des lati- 
 tudes tres-comparables. Ainsi — pour ne citer qu'un exemple que j'avais 
 encore tout dernierement sous les yeux, et c'est 1^ un sujet que je me 
 reserve de developper quelque jour, — la nevrose hysterique, eu Angle-
 
 164 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 certain sensibilities, so that they will react differently 
 under stimuli. They may be deficient in certain ex- 
 periences, so that they are unaffected by what pro- 
 foundly agitates others. Noting these exceptions, we 
 seek their conditions, and these when found are 
 erected into new uniformities. And out of all the 
 uniformities there is formed a conception of the 
 Human Mind. 
 
 121. Our search for the conditions, whether general 
 or special, is biological or sociological. And, since men 
 differ more in their social relations than in their physi- 
 ological relations, it is in the former that we should 
 first seek the explanation of intellectual and moral 
 differences not obviously assignable to differences of 
 structure. It is here also we must seek for many 
 uniformities. Men living always in groups co-operate 
 like the organs in an organism. Their actions have 
 a common impulse and a common end. Their desires 
 and opinions bear the common stamp of an imper- 
 sonal direction. Much of their life is common to all. 
 The roads, market-places and temples, are for each 
 and all. The experiences, the dogmas, and the 
 doctrines are for each and all. Customs arise, and 
 are formulated in laws, the restraint of all. The 
 customs, born of the circumstances, immanent in the 
 
 terre, difFfere assur^ment de ce qxi'elle est en France, par des traits symp- 
 tomatiques souvent tres-accentues. L'heinianesthesie totale, entre 
 autres particularites dignes d'etre relevees, et aussi le grand mal hystero- 
 6pileptique, ces phenomenes qui dans I'espfece sont, on pent le dire, 
 vulgaires chez nous, ne s'observent que trfes-rarement de I'autre cote du 
 d6troit, tandis que les contractures permanentes des membres et bien 
 d'autres symptomes du mSnie ordre, designds quelquefois par nos voisins 
 sous le nom A' hysteric locale, y sont au contraire chose commune." — 
 Charcot : Preface to the translation of EosenthaVs Diseases of the 
 Nervous System.
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. 165 
 
 social conditions, are consciously extricated and pre- 
 scribed as the rules of life ; each new generation is 
 born in this social medium, and has to adapt itself to 
 the established forms. Society, though constituted 
 by individuals, has a powerful reaction on every 
 individual. " In the infancy of nations," said Mon- 
 tesquieu, "man forms the state ; in their maturity the 
 state forms the man." It is thus also with the collec- 
 tive Experience of the race fashioning the Experience 
 of the individual. It makes a man accept what he 
 cannot understand, and obey what he does not believe. 
 His thoughts are only partly his own ; they are also 
 the thoughts of others. His actions are guided by 
 the will of others ; even in rebellion he has them in 
 his mind. His standard is outside. That is true 
 which all men affirm, and no experience contradicts : 
 consensus gentium. If a man cannot see this truth, he 
 is pronounced to be an anomaly or a madman. If he 
 does not feel what all feel, he is thrown out of account, 
 except in the reckoning of abnormities. 
 
 122. Individual experiences being limited and 
 individual spontaneity feeble, we are strengthened 
 and enriched by assimilating the experiences of others. 
 A nation, a tribe, a sect is the medium of the indi- 
 vidual mind, as a sea, a river, or a pond is the medium 
 of a fish : through this it touches the outlying world, 
 and is touched by it ; but the direct motions of its 
 activity are within this circle. The nation affects the 
 sect, the sect the individual. Not that the individual 
 is passive, he is only directed ; he, too, reacts on the 
 sect and nation, helping to create the social life of 
 which he partakes. The laws of Human Nature con- 
 stitute a Social Mechanism analogous to that indi-
 
 166 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 vidual Mechanism -whicli is modified by Experience. 
 Civilisation is the accumulation of experiences ; and 
 since it is this accumulated wealth which is the tradi- 
 tion of the race, we may say with Comte that the 
 Past more and more dominates the Present, precisely 
 as in the individual case it is the registered experi- 
 ences w^hich more and more determine the feelings 
 and opinions. 
 
 123. Human Knowledge is pre-eminently distin- 
 guished from Animal Knowledge by this collective 
 experience. I have never in my own person experi- 
 enced the effects of a poison, but I have made the 
 experience of others my own, have taken it up into 
 my system of knowledge, and I act upon it with con- 
 fidence. I have never seen the Ganges, nor measured 
 the earth's diameter ; but these enter into my world 
 of experience, and regulate my conduct, with the 
 same certainty as my direct experience of the Trent 
 or the acreage of my property. What I have 
 directly experienced by sensible contact forms but a 
 small part of my mental wealth ; and even that part 
 has been largely determined by the experience of 
 others. The consolidations of convergent thought in 
 Social Forms, scientific theories, works of Art, and, 
 above all, Language, are incessantly acting on me. 
 Ideas are forces : the existence of one determines our 
 reception of others. Each novel impression has to be 
 assimilated by the existing mass of residual impres- 
 sions ; each new conclusion has to be affiliated on the 
 old, dovetailed into the rest, made congruent with the 
 system of thought. In the great total of collective 
 Experience, — as in that of the individual, — absurd 
 perversions and wild fancies take their place beside
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 167 
 
 exact correspondences of feeling and fact, and truths 
 that are unshakable ; it is a shifting mass of truth 
 and error, for ever becoming more and more sifted 
 and organised into permanent structures of germina- 
 ting fertility or of fossilised barrenness. Our mental 
 furniture shows the htic a hrac of prejudice beside 
 the fashion of the hour ; our oj)inions are made up of 
 shadowy associations, imperfect memories, echoes of 
 other men's voices, mingling with the reactions of our 
 own sensibility. Thus it is that a mass of incoherent 
 and unreasoned premisses are brought to bear on the 
 evidence for any new opinion, as for any novel fact : 
 this is the unrecognised standard by which the con- 
 clusion is determined. The most rational of men 
 mingles with premisses logically assignable obscure 
 premisses of which he can give no account. It is only 
 in the exact sciences that conclusions are clearly 
 reasoned out. The student comes to Mathematics 
 unperverted, in so far as he brings with him no un- 
 mathematical preconceptions liable to disturb the 
 demonstrations. Each step in advance is seen to be 
 merely the writing out of what has been already 
 demonstrated or intuited, added to the novel data 
 which may also be intuited or demonstrated ; there is 
 neither vagueness nor oscillation in the premisses, 
 there can, therefore, be none in the conclusion. Not so 
 in the Moral Sciences or in the judgment of ordinary 
 affairs. Here the evidence is complicated, uncertain ; 
 the premisses lie partly amid obscure experiences of 
 the past, and partly in judgments taken up by hear- 
 say or precipitation, and fixed in tendencies by long 
 familiarity. So that the inquirer, who has in all 
 sincerity examined the evidence proffered for the new
 
 168 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 opinion, seeking far and wide for the data, has, in 
 fact, been throughout interpreting this evidence by 
 the standard of his formed conviction. If he began 
 his search with a belief in the miraculous, he readily 
 assimilated all the details which confirmed that belief, 
 rejecting the rest as incongruous with his knowledge. 
 If he bes^an with a conviction that miracles are in- 
 credible, no amount of evidence will shake him; he 
 will simply regard the evidence as imperfect. A deep 
 longing for some direct proof of existence after death 
 has made hundreds of people accept the grossest im- 
 postures of "Spiritualism," impostures which contra- 
 dicted the most massive experiences of the race, and 
 which had nothing to support them save this emotional 
 credulity acting where direct knowledge was wholly 
 absent. Because men did not know how the appear- 
 ances were produced, — the means of knowledge being 
 carefully withheld, — they willingly accepted the ex- 
 planation which suited their preconceptions, disregard- 
 ing the incongruous and often degrading circumstances 
 which would otherwise have repelled their belief. 
 And that this is so may be readily proved. For in 
 the absence of all positive knowledge how the tables 
 were moved, or the lights and flowers were produced, 
 there could be no ground for concluding that these 
 eff'ects were produced by spirits. What data have we 
 for supposing that spirits are thus occupied ? All 
 would reject the hypothesis that the agent was an 
 invisible dragon, not because they know more about 
 spirits than about dragons, but because the idea of 
 the dragon is incongruous with their preconception 
 and with their desire. 
 
 124. Conceptions once assimilated by the General
 
 THE STUDY Or PSYCHOLOGY. 169 
 
 Mind become " necessities of thought " for the indivi- 
 dual, just as Eailways, once established, become neces- 
 sities of transport. The rules of Arithmetic were late 
 in mental evolution, and are still inconceivable by the 
 bulk of mankind ; but having been formulated and 
 incorporated in the General Mind, they are easily 
 learned by infants, and by philosophers declared to be 
 " necessities of thought." The doctrine of evolution 
 is becoming such a " necessity of thought ; " only a 
 few years ago some of its present advocates were 
 among its bitter opponents. The idea of Progress was 
 no more suspected by our ancestors than the exist- 
 ence of Magnetism. From the speculations of the few 
 it has passed into the commonplaces of the many. 
 
 That conceptions once incorporated in the General 
 Mind become forces which coerce the individual is 
 conspicuous in the terrible effects due to the idea of 
 " saving souls." This monstrous fiction of speculative 
 logic scattered the amassed wealth of Grecian and 
 Moorish culture, repressed for centuries the search 
 after truth, made Doubt a sin, and placed the inves- 
 tigation of Nature on a par with magical incantation. 
 Nor did it end here. It embittered and embitters in 
 many ways the lives of those whom it professed to 
 save, and did its best to make Hell a reality in this 
 world for those who ventured to doubt its reality in 
 another. Happily the power of conceptions is not 
 limited to disastrous errors, but extends to beneficent 
 truths. If irrational conceptions have made man 
 miserable and kept him ignorant, rational conceptions 
 have made him less miserable and more wise. Our 
 pressing need to understand the facts of this universe 
 in which we live has forced us to encourage the pur-
 
 170 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 suit of truth. New and larger conceptions of man's 
 nature and destiny have been evolved. These, slowly 
 altering the structure of the General Mind, alter the 
 Social Forms which express it, and both react on the 
 individual. 
 
 Parenthetically, let us note the vast change in the 
 conceptions of the world and of man which have issued 
 from the discoveries of Copernicus and Cuvier, by sub- 
 stituting Evolution for Creation. And to the study 
 of the History of the World has succeeded the History 
 of Mind. Every little detail which tells of the mental 
 condition of ancestral races is now of priceless value. 
 Formerly men dug up ruined cities and opened ancient 
 tombs in the search for golden ornaments or works of 
 art. Now they dig with greater eagerness for flints 
 and the rude implements of prehistoric races, because 
 these throw light on the evolution of Mind.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 THE MENTAL FORMS. 
 
 125. The recognition of Collective Experience com- 
 bining with inherited tendencies in the formation of 
 Experience for the individual, will perhaps be inter- 
 preted by Kant's admirers as an illustration of his 
 doctrine of Mental Forms, or a priori constituents of 
 the mind. Kant taught that all knowledge arises in 
 individual experience, but not all out of it. There are 
 other factors, and these are transcendental and a 
 priori; not drawn from experience, since they are its 
 necessary conditions, and therefore precede it ; not 
 dependent on the organism, nor reducible to sensible 
 terms, but constituents of mind before mind comes 
 in contact with Nature ; and it is this contact of 
 mind with Nature which is experience. 
 
 Kant's primary purpose was not to expound a 
 psychological doctrine, but a metaphysical theory of 
 knowledge. He wished to fix the limitations of in- 
 quiry by assigning the limits of possible knowledge. 
 So little psychological investigation does he attempt, 
 and that little so imperfectly, that even when dealing 
 with the sensible data, it is not to Feeling as such, nor 
 to its evolution, that he refers, but simply to its rela- 
 tion to Knowing. He starts with the developed pro- 
 ducts, and never pauses to investigate their produc- 
 tion — physiological or psychological. He takes the
 
 172 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 mind of the adult and cultivated classes. Therein 
 he recognises certain modes of acting which deter- 
 mine the possible actions, as the anatomist recog- 
 nises certain forms of structure which determine 
 bodily functions. These Forms of Intuition and 
 these Rules of Reasoning shape our experiences and 
 determine our knowledge as inexorable conditions : 
 we can no more think in contradiction to them than 
 a solution can crystallise into angles that are round. 
 
 126. Here, as in so many cases, we see the conse- 
 quence of operating on abstractions without a clear 
 and abiding sense of the concretes they symbolise. 
 Mind apart from Nature is one of these ; Experience 
 is another. The first is a metempirical figment when 
 it is not a logical abstraction. The second, when 
 reduced to its concretes, is the total of certain classes 
 of phenomena manifested by a living organism : it 
 involves, therefore, on the one hand, a sentient mechan- 
 ism having certain modes of reaction, and, on the other, 
 an external medium having certain modes of stimula- 
 tion. The experiences of this organism are the modifi- 
 cations it undergoes. These are o^eneralised in the ab- 
 stract term Experience. That all phenomena have their 
 conditions is a truism ; but the conditions are really im- 
 manent in, and only theoretically prior to, the results. 
 There are not conditions existing apart, and results 
 called into existence by them ; but the conditions, 
 ideally separated as components, find their expression 
 in the resultant. "We may ideally separate the or- 
 ganism and its inherited modes of reaction from one 
 and all of the particular stimulations on which it 
 reacts, and in this sense regard the reacting organism 
 as a condition of the reaction, and the reaction as a
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 173 
 
 condition of the resulting sensation or movement. 
 We know what we are doing by such distinctions. 
 But to suppose that the experiences which are results 
 of stimulation and reaction have any other compo- 
 nents than these is a grave error ; and to detacli 
 Experience from the Organism is merely an artifice 
 of exposition ; while to detach from the Organism its 
 modes of reaction, erecting these into Mental Forms 
 which have no physical basis, is what science cannot 
 accept, even as an artifice. 
 
 127. No physiologist will deny that the organism 
 has an inherited structure which causes it to react 
 in particular ways, and that this structure has been 
 determined by ancestral modifications ; that is to say, 
 ancestral modes of reaction help to fashion the indi- 
 vidual modes of reaction, and the stored-up wealth of 
 collective experience enriches the experience of suc- 
 ceeding generations. It is in so far the condition of 
 possible experience for the individual that without it 
 his reactions would have been diflferent. Kant first 
 separates Experience from the concrete facts of which 
 it is the abstract expression, detaches it fr^m the 
 organism and the modes of reaction which belong to 
 the inherited structure, and then argues that without 
 the modes of reaction such as Space and Time repre- 
 sent, no experience is possible. Findiug that these 
 general Forms of Sensibility cannot be given in in- 
 dividual sensations which presuppose them, he argues 
 that they cannot belong to the sensations, nor to the 
 sentient mechanism, er^o they must be a 'priori con- 
 stituents of Mind. 
 
 128. This doctrine has exercised a strange fascina- 
 tion over men's minds, and I cannot let it pass unchal-
 
 174 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 lenged. The psychologist is as well entitled to pos- 
 tulate Laws of Thought — or Mental Forms — as the 
 Physicist to postulate Laws of Motion and Laws of 
 Nature. But both should know what it is they are 
 postulating, and why they do it. So little do the 
 generality of men know this, that they interpret these 
 abstract expressions as the conditions and determi- 
 nants of the concrete phenomena from which the 
 expressions are abstracted. On this interpretation 
 Laws pre-exist ; the movements and other phenomena 
 issue from them. There are thus not only the move- 
 ments, but Laws of Motion superadded to all the 
 conditions of movement. Thus crudely stated, the 
 fallacy is obvious. From the infinitely varying con- 
 ditions we extricate certain constants, and to these we 
 affix a mathematical expression. The parabola de- 
 scribed in the course of a cannon-ball, the eclipse 
 of the planetary orbit, the curve of a wave, &c., are 
 mathematical expressions : it is absurd to personify 
 these as motor agencies. In like manner, from the 
 varieties of Feeling we extricate certain constant 
 appearances which we call Laws of Sensibility, Forms 
 of Thought, Logical Eules. These we describe and 
 classify, as we describe and classify the planes of 
 cleavage of crystals. But to suppose that these laws 
 have an a 'priori independence, and render our feel- 
 ings and knowledge possible, is equivalent to the 
 supposition of planes of cleavage floating about in the 
 Cosmos, and when descending upon certain solutions 
 fashioning them into crystals. 
 
 ] 29. It has been thought a great achievement of 
 Kant to have separated the Form of Knowledge from 
 the Matter of Knowledge, and to have made the first
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 175 
 
 tbe a priori condition of both Knowledge and Ex- 
 perience. I see nothing in it but the common error 
 of confounding logical with real distinctions, and the 
 revival of the Aristotelian doctrine of Form and Mat- 
 ter which the advance of science had pushed aside. 
 To me it is significant that Kant nowhere raises the 
 question whether animals have likewise these Mental 
 Forms as a priori conditions of their experiences and 
 cognitions. If he denied the existence of these forms, 
 he must have implicitly denied that animals had 
 experiences of space and time relations. This being 
 too absurd a notion for us to attribute to him, we 
 have no alternative but to assume that he endowed 
 animals with the forms. On this supposition we 
 should have to inquire whether he held that animals 
 had minds independent of their organisms, or minds 
 that were but the activity of the organisms? On 
 the latter alternative his notion of the universality 
 of these forms receives a rude shock ; for if the in- 
 tuitions of space and time are the activities of the 
 organism, they must differ in animals and men in 
 accordance with differences of structure. Hence w^hile 
 animals of a much simpler structure than ours would 
 only intuite space of two dimensions, a structure 
 more complex than ours w^ould intuite a space of 
 four, five, or n dimensions — a conclusion which the 
 Imaginary Geometry of Lobatschewsky, Eiemann, 
 and Helmlioltz show^s to be acceptable. 
 
 But Kant carefully avoids risking his position by 
 a reference to organic structure. He eliminates all 
 concrete conditions. He will not even admit ances- 
 tral influences. His forms are pure abstractions, and 
 he declines to predicate anything of them except their
 
 176 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 ^-priority and universality. He finds tlie forms as 
 facts, and rejects all attempts to reduce them to their 
 factors. It was open to him to regard Mind as a 
 function of the organism, and the Mental Forms as 
 the peculiar modes of reaction organised in ancestral 
 modifications. He rejects this. He will not even 
 admit innate ideas.* 
 
 130. Observation has shown that we do not bring 
 on our entrance into the world definite intuitions of 
 space, nor do our first sensible impressions call forth 
 such intuitions ; they are slowly formed. To answer 
 this by saying that we bring with us the abstract 
 form of Space, which renders possible the evolution of 
 concrete space experiences, is to place the general 
 conception before the particulars it generalises. Ap- 
 plied to our motor-intuitions the fallacy is obvious. 
 No one, seeino- that we do not at birth brino[ definite 
 intuitions directing the movements of our limbs, will 
 assert that we bring with us a Form of movement 
 which is anything more than an abstract expression 
 for all the motor conditions actually present in the 
 organism. The theory of Experience demands that a 
 mechanism be ready to respond to stimuli ; and the 
 theory of the Mechanism demands that an experience 
 
 * Yet much of hia argumentation implies something very like it. 
 For a striking example, consider his explanation of the cries and struggles 
 of the new-born infant. These, he says, are expressions not of pain 
 but of rage — " rage because the infant wishes to move, yet feels its inca- 
 pacity as a restriction wkerehi/ it is deprived of its freedom" {Anthropo- 
 logie, p. 323, note). Hegel transcends this. He sees in the infant's 
 squalls and struggles "the revelation of man's higher nature." By 
 euch activity the infant manifests himself as " penetrated by the con- 
 viction of his right to claim the satisfaction of his needs from the outer 
 world, and that the independence of this outer world vanishes in the pre- 
 sence of mail, sinks into servile insignificance. Hence the impetuous, 
 imperious tone" {Encyklopcedie, W. vii. 93).
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 177 
 
 of some kind should have come into being with the 
 stimulation. Unless we brought with us a mechanism 
 so constituted as to be capable of space-feelings, no 
 contact with external objects would excite them. 
 But it is a mistake to detach this capability, personify 
 it, and call it the Pure Form of space-feelings, ante- 
 rior to and independent of the stimuli and the me- 
 chanism which condition such feelinns. 
 
 131. In conclusion, we may adopt Kant's phrase 
 that " all Knowledge has its rise in Experience, but 
 not all out of Experience," if we abstract Experience 
 from the sentient mechanism with its inherited modes 
 of reaction, or if we consider only that to be Experi- 
 ence wliich the individual himself has sensibly reacted 
 on. The last chapter showed how it is the great 
 human privilege to assimilate the experiences of 
 others. Our feelings are products of our personal 
 stimulations, and of the residua of ancestral stimula- 
 tions. Our knowledge is the product of our own 
 experiences, and of the stored-up experiences of our 
 fellows. The individual savai^e has no knowledge of 
 the Law of Causality ; there can be no capability of 
 conceiving it until experiences have evolved it, and it 
 has taken its place in the collective thought of the 
 race. The sava«je cannot be made to think that there 
 can be no variation in an event when there is no 
 variation in its conditions. The necessity of causal 
 sequence is inconceivable to him, because his expe- 
 riences seem to contradict it. But that which he can- 
 not be made to think becomes in time so oro;anised 
 in the General Mind as an axiom which it is impos- 
 . sible to doubt, that philosophers are found who pro- 
 claim it a fundamental and cl priori Law of the Mind.. 
 
 VOL. III. M
 
 CHAPTER XL 
 
 ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 
 
 132. Understanding that Method demands the co- 
 operation of Introspection with Observation for the 
 collection and collation of data, we have further to 
 specify the range and the limitation proper to the 
 artifice of Analysis. Taking our stand on the posi- 
 tion that whatever is knowable must lie within the 
 range of Experience, we regard every expression which 
 cannot be reduced to lower terms as an ultimate of 
 Speculation ; and this even should there be a suspicion 
 that possibly at some future day it may also be re- 
 ducible to lower terms. Force is an ultimate. Sen- 
 sibility is an ultimate. We cannot reduce either of 
 these to lower terms : we can only say they are what 
 they signify. But Experience is not an ultimate, for 
 it can — ideally — be analysed into components. Nor is 
 Consciousness an ultimate, if understood as a special 
 Mode of Sensibility. 
 
 The psychologist therefore will no more ask, What 
 is Sensibility ? than the physicist asks, What is Elec- 
 tricity? Describing what Electricity doeSf the phy- 
 sicist tells us what it is: its manifestations he can 
 classify and formulate in laws. The psychologist 
 must be equally reserved. Recording the focts, he 
 will seek their ascertainable conditions by observation
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 179 
 
 and experiment, but not seek these " in the field be- 
 hind phenomena." To get at the conditions he must 
 employ the artifice of analysis, he must do as the 
 child spontaneously does with every object which 
 comes within its grasp, namely, endeavour to pull it 
 to pieces "to see what it is made of." But this pro- 
 cedure needs correction. The mind is not made oi 
 separable pieces. Each piece has significance only in 
 its relation to the others. 
 
 133. Even in physical research the analysis which 
 decomposes a total into several components must 
 alw\ays be followed by a synthesis w^hich reconstructs 
 the whole, and thus, restoring all the suppressed con- 
 ditions, reuniting what provisionally was separated, 
 views the parts in the light reflected from the whole. 
 No fact is explained by the enumeration or exhibition 
 of its factors as isolated elements ; only by these in 
 their combination and mutual dependence. Comte 
 was guilty of an oversight when he defined the 
 chemist's problem to be that of " determining the 
 properties of compounds by the properties of their 
 components," for this is impossible. The properties 
 of water could never be determined by enumerating 
 the projDcrties of oxygen and hydrogen ; no salt is 
 discernible in its acid, nor in its base. The properties 
 of compounds must be observed in the reactions ot 
 the compounds. We may resolve these compounds 
 into their components, but these are then new totals, 
 and have forfeited all their qualities as components, 
 the oxygen being no longer watery. Only by recon- 
 structing these, restoring the elements w^hich analysis 
 has dissipated, can we get the water. We have taken 
 it to pieces, but unless we know all the pieces, and
 
 180 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 the way these are arranged, we cannot see the whole 
 in the parts. 
 
 Still greater is the difficulty in psychological , re- 
 search. Here observation is always that of resultants, 
 never of components. Real analysis, such as that of 
 the chemist, is impossible. The components have no 
 observable existence : they are only inferred. I mean, 
 that a feeling cannot be taken to pieces like a salt, 
 these pieces separately studied, first isolated, next in 
 combination. All the stages of a process must -be 
 completed before the feeling emerges. In no one stage' 
 is it a feeling. The separation, therefore, of the stages, 
 the analysis of the feeling into its elements, is ideal 
 only. Moreover, each of these ideal elements has a 
 history. The elements of an inorganic object, the 
 moments of a dynamic process, are unchangeable — 
 that is to say, the oxygen torn from rust, from water, 
 or from an animal tissue, reappears with unaltered and 
 unalterable characters after every fresh combination. 
 Not so the elements of a feeling ; the very tissues 
 which are its physical basis are in incessant change. 
 
 134. Organic functions, we must often insist, are 
 unlike the functions of machines, which result from 
 combinations of elements that have no natural and 
 indestructible connection. The orscanism is evolved : 
 one part emerges from another, all parts are interde- 
 pendent. The functions of the organism are merely 
 specialisations of the properties coffimotn to all its 
 parts. Hence it is that Sensibility and its Modes, 
 being among the many specialisations of vitality, can- 
 not be likened to steam, or any other external motor ; 
 nor can Experience be likened to any complex of parts
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 181 
 
 put together : it is no mosaic of different elements ; it 
 is a living, developing, manifold unity. 
 
 But, recognising this, we are still compelled to treat 
 it as if the parts were separable. Thus it is we speak 
 of impressions as if they were events apart from sen- 
 sations, and sensations as if they had an isolated 
 existence apart from the sensorial disturbances called 
 emotions and cognitions. An impression may be con- 
 sidered apart as one stage in a complex process ; a 
 sensation as another stage ; a perception as a third. 
 But in reality, to understand an impression as a psy- 
 chical phenomenon, it must be seen in its relations 
 to an ultimate sensorial reaction. Nor can any sen- 
 sation come into existence without involvinsj the 
 fundai^ental functions we analytically ascribe to 
 Thought. Hence the radical confusion of the doctrine 
 that Thought is transformed Sensation ; which is the 
 analogue of the still deeper and more widely spread 
 confusion that Sensation is the transubstantiation of 
 a physical movement. 
 
 135. Had the Sensational School paid more atten- 
 tion to Biology, it might have rectified its hypothesis 
 so far as to present all mental phenomena in the light 
 of Modes of a common Sensibility. It would then 
 have welcomed tlie aid of Analysis, but recognised its 
 artifice. It would not have overlooked the relation 
 of organ to organism, of part to the whole ; nor have 
 fallen into the error of treating the organism as a 
 mosaic, or assemblage of organs, built up bit by bit, 
 acting bit by bit ; an error the consequence of which 
 is seen in the conception of the JMiud as an assemblage 
 of impressions, a mosaic of experiences. Biology tells
 
 182 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 US that tte oreranism, tliou^^h differentiated into orfjans, 
 always is a total Avliicli acts through its parts : each 
 oro-an derives its si<2;nificance from its connections with 
 the others ; none has a function irrespective of the rest. 
 And so of mind. The notion of a tabula rasa, on 
 which the Senses inscribe their impressions, is un- 
 hiological. A percipient organism must exist before 
 impressions can become perceptions. In Condillac's 
 celebrated illustration of the statue which would per- 
 ceive the odour of a rose (he says it would he this 
 odour) there is the suppressed premiss of an organism 
 adapted to the perception. In the absence of such a 
 percipient factor, the statue can no more lawfully be 
 imagined as smelling the rose than it could be ima- 
 gined as digesting beef. 
 
 136. The reader will doubtless be so little disposed 
 to question these remarks that he may complain of 
 their being urged upon him. Yet, however cordially 
 he may assent to them, he will, on inquiry, find that 
 no error is more common than that which they sig- 
 nalise. Facts are constantly confounded with one or 
 more of their isolated factors, effects assigned to one 
 out of a group of conditions, premisses suppressed and 
 never restored, and organs credited with the perform- 
 ance of actions in -which they only j^lay a subordinate 
 part. In subsequent pages we shall frequently have 
 to point this out. 
 
 When once we have made clear to ourselves the 
 nature of the aid derived from Analysis, we may employ 
 the artifice in confidence. Ideally we decompose the 
 organism into its organs, the mind into its functions 
 and faculties ; and these again we decompose into their 
 components : physical, physiological, psychological.
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 183 
 
 "We study the stimuli, tlie meclianisra, and tlie ex- 
 perience ; that is, the external medium in its action 
 on the organism, the reaction of the organism, and 
 the feeling which is the subjective asj^ect of that 
 reaction. The organism, although a system of forces 
 having its motor within (§ 77), is in connection with 
 external forces, and is primarily set in action by them. 
 For example, the motion of the air disturbs the equi- 
 librium of the auditory apparatus which has its own 
 special mode of reaction, and this in turn disturbs 
 the general centre or Sensorium. These three ideally 
 separable stages of one neural process may be studied 
 separately, although all three are necessary elements, 
 any one of which varying will cause a corresponding 
 variation in the final result. AVithout the pulses of 
 air, no sound ; without the apparatus disturbed, no 
 Bound ; without the Sensorium, no sound. 
 
 137. Strictly speaking, the foregoing statement is 
 true only of the original and normal production of 
 Sensations. It needs qualification when we take into 
 account the subsequent reactions of the already modi- 
 fied Sensorium. Here we find Experience as a factor. 
 By it sensations may be reproduced mthout the co- 
 operation of some of the original conditions of pro- 
 duction. We have, then, " subjective sensations " 
 due to other stimuli than those of the sense-organ, 
 revivals of residua left by the action of the sense- 
 organ. 
 
 137*. But not now to dwell on this point, let us 
 note the scientific advantage of studying the physical 
 stage of the process, the data of which are measurable 
 and admit of easy demonstration. The psychological 
 stage has no such advantages, but, as has been said.
 
 184 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 compensates exactness by certainty ; if we can never 
 know a feeling quantitatively, we know it qualita- 
 tively with unrivalled certainty. By this exactness 
 on the one hand, and this certainty on the other, it 
 has been found possible to introduce quantitative 
 relations between stimuli and sensations, and a new 
 branch of science, called Psychophysics, has arisen. 
 With regard to the intermediate or physiological 
 stage, there is at present no such exactness, no such 
 certainty. What takes place in the nervous system 
 under stimulation and reaction is neither demonstrable 
 to Sense nor discernible by Intuition ; it is, and will 
 long remain, mere guesswork. This may seem a hard 
 sentence to those who have been relying on the 
 hypothesis of vibrations, wave-movements, chemical 
 or electrical processes, cell-functions, seats of sensa- 
 tion, seats of emotion, seats of volition, and seats of 
 thought. But it is a sentence which will be confirmed 
 by every one who has seriously investigated the 
 evidence of such hypotheses. All that has gained 
 currency on this subject the student will do well to 
 accept as provisional imagery which may assist ex- 
 position, not as data from which conclusions may be 
 drawn. The hypotheses are not terms of knowledge, 
 but terms to fill our gaps in knowledge. The mathe- 
 matical precision of Optics and Acoustics is confined 
 to the physical stages of the seeing and hearing pro- 
 cesses ; where the physical passes into the physio- 
 logical the process escapes observation. Between 
 the physical and the psychological moments we know 
 there intervenes a neural moment, a change in the 
 sensory tract ; but what that change is we do not 
 know. We know, however, that it is not a process
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 185 
 
 wliich can be identified with tlie physical process : 
 its movements cannot be the same as the movements 
 of the external stimulus. The physicist splits a beam 
 of light by a prism and measures the different wave- 
 lengths of its constituent colours ; each of these wave- 
 lengths represents different degrees of stimulation. 
 Hence the conclusion that each colour is the product 
 of each wave-length. We learn that the effect of 450 
 billions of impacts in a second is the sensation of red; 
 of 589 billions, tlie sensation of green ; of 790 billions, 
 the sensation of violet. This seems quite satisfactory 
 until we learn that althounjli such vibrations orimn- 
 ate such sensations, it is through some intermediate 
 agency which does not vibrate in these ways, but 
 which is capable of effecting the sensations by vibra- 
 tions that are demonstrably different. And in two 
 examples this is conspicuous. First, in the fact that 
 violet, which has 790 billions, according to the scale 
 of the spectrum, is producible also by the blending of 
 red and blue, that is, of 450 and 589 billions ; and 
 white, which contains all the colours of the spectrum, 
 is producible by combinations of greenish blue with 
 scarlet red, or of greenish yellow with violet, or of 
 yellow with ultramarine. Note especially that the 
 wdiites thus variously produced are indistinguishable 
 as feelings, but are physically distinguishable by their 
 different reactions — the photographic plate on which 
 falls a white light composed of red and greenish blue 
 yields a black reaction, whereas under the yellowish- 
 green and violet combination it is very bright. 
 Objects illuminated by these different whites take on 
 very unlike colours. The second example to which 
 allusion was made is the fact of subjective colours.
 
 186 PROBLEMS OF LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 138. Further, a sensation does not accurately cor- 
 respond with the physical stimulus except through 
 the j)hysiological intermediates, for the colour of an 
 object is found to vary with the portion of the retina 
 on which it falls : the geranium flower, which is scarlet 
 at the central portion, is at the periphery indistinguish- 
 able from its green leaves. As with colour so with 
 form ; a subjective transformation takes place. The 
 optical image of a house, formed on a camera obscura 
 or on the retina, is not the mental image : the optical 
 image is excessively minute, is inverted, and has 
 only two dimensions, whereas the mental image is 
 large, erect, and has three dimensions. 
 
 We thus see that savants who rely on the physical 
 analysis without adding the analysis demanded by 
 Psychology fall into the opposite error of that fallen 
 into by Goethe, when, relying exclusively on the psy- 
 chological, he combated Newton's physical hypothesis. 
 Both analyses are required. And let us remember 
 that in the attempt to connect these two through 
 the molecular changes in the nervous system we are 
 thrown upon what is very imperfectly known. Be- 
 tween the structure of the eye or ear and the sensa- 
 tion of sight or sound there is a demonstrable con- 
 nection, every minute variation in structure being 
 accompanied by some variation in feeling : the one 
 is, therefore, rightly regarded as a function of the 
 other. Between these organs and the central nervous 
 system there is likewise a demonstrable connection, 
 any interruption of which brings an interruption in 
 the functional operation. So far Physiology reaches ; 
 but there its grasp relaxes. Between the structure of 
 the brain, or any other portion of the central system,
 
 THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY. 187 
 
 and the sensations, perceptions, ideas wliicli are its 
 activities, no such connection is discernible. I mean, 
 that we know of no variation in cerebral structure 
 which uniformly corresponds with a variation in 
 feeling. Possibly, at some future day, there may be 
 discovered precise relations between central structure 
 and mental functions, analogous to those now known 
 between the structure of the eye and the function of 
 vision. But that day seems distant. All that Phy- 
 siology can at present assure us of is, that Mind is a 
 function of the organism ; consequently that certain 
 changes in the organism correspond with changes in 
 the mental states. 
 
 139. Herein lies the necessity of a constant study 
 of the organism as a directly available object of obser- 
 vation and experiment. In proportion as this study 
 becomes minute and exact, the facts discerned by Intro- 
 spection become intelligible and explicable. Not only 
 so, but with this knowledge we acquire the power of 
 intervention. To know that the integrity of the eye's 
 structure is essential to normal vision, and that certain 
 defects in crystalline lens, vitreous humour, optic tract 
 or brain, bring with them defects in vision, puts us 
 on the track of a remedy for such defects, which we 
 correct by glasses of a particular curvature or drugs 
 of a particular efficacy. ^^ 
 
 140. Analysis, then, is a potent and indispensable 
 instrument ; but its right use must be understood. 
 AVe laugh at the man mentioned by Hierocles who 
 presented a brick as a specimen of his house ; but 
 
 * The use of proper spectacles has also been the remedy of obscure 
 nervous disorders never before suspected to have any relation to visual 
 defects.
 
 188 PROBLEMS OP LIFE AND MIND. 
 
 our lau2:liter does not drive us from the same naivete 
 in taking a part for the whole, isolating an organ from 
 the organism, and the organism from its medium. 
 Having once accepted such errors, we need not be 
 surprised if they are extended, and if particular cells 
 in the brain are made the seats of thought. In read- 
 ing certain physiological statements respecting the 
 localisation of mental functions, I have asked myself 
 whether this premature physiological topography will 
 not, by-^nd-by, localise the seat of Life in the heart, 
 Sensibility in the pericardium, and Motility in its 
 muscular tissue ? * 
 
 One final remark. Psychological Analysis has for 
 object not only the adult mind with its acquired apti- 
 tudes, but also the stages of evolution through which 
 that mind has passed. These two points of view are 
 sometimes confused ; and these well-marked differ- 
 ences in the phenomena are sought to be obliterated 
 by showing how they emerged from a common ground. 
 An illustration will make this plain. To the physio- 
 logist no two functions have better marked distinc- 
 tions than Breathing and Swimming ; nothing but 
 
 * As a specimen of the purely fanciful hypotheses, consider this pro- 
 pounded by Jager in his Handbxich der Zoologie, 1877, ii. 339: '-The 
 cells of the cerebral cortex are the seats of Sensation, because they are 
 many ; but the seat of Consciousness is the neuroglia, because that lies 
 between the cells, and is one undifferentiated substance !" As another 
 specimen of the purely fanciful, with a strange confusion of physio- 
 logical and psychological terms, consider this proposition laid down 
 in the Rapport sur le Concours de 1868, presented to the Academy of 
 Medicine : " Nous admettons trois grands centres superposes Fun k 
 I'autre, places suivant une progression d6croissante. Audessus de tout, 
 le Moi; puis au dessous, les Instincts avec les facultes du second ordre; 
 ensuite la Moelle." Psychologists reading such passages may be excused 
 if they turn away with impatience from the aid offered them by 
 physiologists.
 
 THE STUDY OP PSYCHOLOGY. ^ 189 
 
 confusion could result from speaking of the one in 
 terms of the other. To the morphologist who is^not, 
 dealing with the established functions, but with their 
 evolution, it is of great interest to trace in the Crus- 
 tacea the modification of the respiratory organs into 
 swimming organs, and to show how in the Infusoria 
 the same organs are employed for both functions. 
 In like manner, it is a gross confusion to speak of 
 Sensation and Thought, Instinct and Intelligence, 
 Voluntary and Involuntary actions, as if these terms 
 did not rej)reseut phenomena markedly distinct ; but 
 from the standpoint of genesis it is needful to show 
 that all are Modes of Sensibility, and therefore all 
 fundamentally the same. 
 
 THE END.
 
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