SEVEN WEEKS' WAR 
 
THE 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR 
 
 ITS ANTECEDENTS AND ITS INCIDENTS 
 
 H. M. HOZIER, F.C.S., F.G.S., 
 
 {BASED UPON LETTERS REPRINTED BY PERMISSION FROM "THE TIMES."] 
 
 " Unaque hora, quaclringentorum annorum opus quibus 
 Alba steterat excidio ac minis dedit." — Livy. 
 
 SECOND EDITION 
 WITH NEW PREFACE AND MAPS 
 
 SLontfon anil Ncfo Horfc: 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 1871. 
 
 [The Right of Translation is Reserved.} 
 
H7 
 
 LONDON : 
 iKADBURY, EVANS, AND CO., PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS. 
 
 HEN" ~ 3TEFHESJI 
 
<*c 
 
 TO 
 
 COLONEL EDWARD BRUCE HAMLEY, 
 
 ROYAL ARTILLERY, 
 
 LATELY PROFESSOR OF MILITARY HISTORY, STRATEGY, AND 
 TACTICS AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, 
 
 NOW COMMANDANT OF THE STAFF COLLEGE, 
 
 THIS FAINT ATTEMPT TO CHRONICLE THE EVENTS 
 OF THE GERMAN WAR OF 1 866 IS 
 
 gtbieateir 
 
 A FORMER PUPIL. 
 
 9375 
 
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 
 
 The only claim to consideration that the following pages 
 can present is that for the most part they are the product of a 
 personal eye-witness of some of the most interesting incidents 
 of a war which, for rapidity and decisive results, may claim an 
 almost unrivalled position in history. 
 
 The Author has attempted to ascertain and to advance facts. 
 His object has been impartiality, his aim truth. Criticism 
 from one so feebly competent to criticise would have been 
 entitled to no respect, and has therefore been avoided. A 
 few observations occasionally introduced are the results not of 
 original thought so much as of communication with some 
 whose positive abilities and experience entitle their opinions 
 to be attentively weighed. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 PREFATORY CHAPTER XV 
 
 BOOK I. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FRUITLESSNESS OF THE GASTEIN CONVENTION . . . . 1 4 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR l8 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PRUSSIA'S MOTION FOR REFORM OF GERMANIC CONFEDERATION . 30 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN 32 
 
 BOOK II. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN 40 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 FINAL RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA ... 44 
 
COXTEXTS. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY . 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 BREAK-UP OF THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION . . . . 46 
 
 BOOK III. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA . 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA 93 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 WAR STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING STATES OF GERMANY . . IOO 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 WAR STRENGTH OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY 107 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELUDE OF THE WAR 112 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER IlS 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HESSE-CASSEL 122 
 
CONTENTS. xi 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR 134 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS . . 145 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ACTION OF G1TSCHIN 
 
 [80 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS . 1 89 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT AND CENTRAL COLUMNS OF THE ARMY 
 
 OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS .... I97 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA . . 207 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ . .221 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ 230 
 
xii CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 DEFENCE OF SILESIA 266 
 
 BOOK VIII. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE GERMAN WAR . 268 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE 283 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE 302 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE 313 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA BY THE SECOND RESERVED CORPS 324 
 
 BOOK IX. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRATZ TO BRUNN . . . 33O 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 TOBITSCHAU 368 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 FURTHER ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES FROM BRUNN TO 
 
 THE DANUBE 379 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 xin 
 
 THE TRUCE 
 
 PAGE 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 411 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES 467 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION . . . 473 
 
 BOOK X. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE WAR IN ITALY 476 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 NAVAL OPERATIONS . 490 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 PEACE BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA 498 
 
 APPENDIX T 499 
 
 APPENDIX II. 505 
 
 APPENDIX III 506 
 
 APPENDIX IV. 519 
 
 APPENDIX V 520 
 
LIST OF MAPS. 
 
 OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE MAINE . . To face page I 
 
 OPERATIONS FROM KONIGGRATZ .... To face page 330 
 
 MAPS. 
 
 The main features of the campaign of 1866 can be easily 
 traced in any ordinary maps of Bohemia, Saxony or Moravia. 
 Those who wish to study the details of the war, will find the 
 maps published by the Prussian Staff at Berlin, in 1868, most 
 lucid and serviceable. They are to be found in any large 
 military library, and can be consulted at the Royal United 
 Service Institution. 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 The results of the war of 1866 in Germany were the 
 aggrandizement of Prussia, the formation of new Confedera- 
 tions and the disappearance of Austria as a Germanic power. 
 To the eight provinces of which Prussia consisted in the spring 
 of 1866 were added Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Hanover, Schleswig- 
 Holstein and Lauenburg. These were incorporated in the 
 Prussian kingdom and raised its population to about 23,500,000. 
 
 At the same time arose under the leadership of Prussia the 
 new North German Confederation, the harbinger of an united 
 German Empire. It was sixty years almost to a day when the 
 treaty of Prague was signed in 1866, since the Emperor 
 Francis II. had announced to the Diet his resignation of the 
 Imperial Crown. By that act, due to the victories of Napoleon 
 I. over Germans, the oldest political institution in the world was 
 extinguished, for this Empire was that which the nephew of 
 Julius won for himself from the powers of the East at the 
 battle of Actium, and which had preserved almost unaltered 
 through eighteen centuries of time and through the greatest 
 changes in extent, in power, and in character, a title and pre- 
 tensions from which all meaning had long since departed.* 
 On the fall of Napoleon I. this Empire was to a certain extent 
 reconstituted by the treaty of Vienna as a Confederation of 
 thirty-nine States. This Confederacy was extinguished in the 
 war of 1866, and the treaty of Prague established the Con- 
 federation of the North German States, and led to the reestab- 
 
 * Bryce, Holy Roman Empire. 
 
xvi PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 lishment of the Germanic Empire on a purer, more natural, 
 and more homogeneous basis than it had ever possessed from 
 the days of the Caesars. The treaty of Prague, however, was 
 but the stepping-stone, not the key-stone of German Unity. 
 North Germany numbering twenty-one States was indeed linked 
 by that treaty into a close connection with Prussia, who held 
 the undivided leadership, the command of the German armies, 
 and the power of peace and war north of the Maine. South 
 Germany did not hold itself together. Austria stood aloof, 
 and appeared resolved henceforth to meddle no more in 
 German affairs. Bavaria, Wiirtemburg, and Baden remained 
 almost independent of each other, but each, on its own footing, 
 concluded important treaties with Prussia. By that between 
 Prussia and Bavaria, concluded on the 22nd August, 1866, these 
 two powers mutually guaranteed the integrity of their respective 
 territories with all the military forces at their disposal; and it 
 was also established, that in case of war the King of Prussia 
 should have the command-in-chief of the Bavarian army. The 
 treaties between Prussia, Baden, and Wiirtemburg, were of the 
 same tenour ; they provided a strict military alliance and 
 submission of the armies in time of war to the King of 
 Prussia. 
 
 In Northern Germany, in the spring of 1867, a representative 
 assembly elected by universal suffrage at the rate of one 
 member for every 100,000 of the population, met at Berlin in 
 February, and by the 16th April, had discussed and adopted a 
 constitutional charter by which the whole of the States of 
 North Germany were definitively united into a federal body. 
 This charter, entitled the Constitution of the North German 
 Confederation, consists of fifteen chapters, comprising seventy- 
 nine articles, with a preamble declaring that the Governments 
 of the States enumerated, formed themselves into a perpetual 
 Confederation for the protection of the territory and institutions 
 of the union, and for the guardianship of the welfare of the 
 German people. The twenty-one States incorporated in this 
 Confederation were, Prussia, Saxony, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xvli 
 
 Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Saxe -Weimar, 
 Saxe-Meiningen, Anhalt, Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, Saxe-Altenburg, 
 Waldeck, Lippe-Detmold, Reuss-Schleiz, Reuss-Greiz, Schwarz- 
 burg-Sondershausen, Schwarzburg-Rudolstadt, Schaumburg- 
 Lippe, Hamburg, Liibeck, and Bremen. The executive power 
 of the Confederation was vested in the Sovereign of Prussia : 
 this ruler also, as the Lord President, managed the diplomatic 
 intercourse of the Confederation with foreign powers ; was the 
 Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, and had the 
 prerogative of nominating Ambassadors, of declaring war, and 
 of concluding peace. It was his duty to enforce the obser- 
 vance of federal laws, and to compel negligent or disobedient 
 members to fulfil their federal obligations, and to appoint all 
 officers and civil functionaries. The contributions of the 
 various States to the cost of the general administration of the 
 Confederation, was regulated in proportion to the numbers of 
 their population. The King of Prussia had also to appoint a 
 Chancellor of the Confederation who should preside over the 
 Federal Council. The Chancellor selected was naturally the 
 Count von Bismarck. 
 
 By the terms of the Constitution of the North German Con- 
 federation, the legislative power of the Union was vested in 
 two representative bodies. One of these bodies is elected by 
 the Governments of the Confederate States, and is termed the 
 Bundesrath, the other is elected by the population, and is termed 
 the Reichstag. In the Bundesrath sit deputies from the 
 Governments of each State of the Confederation ; the repre- 
 sentative of Prussia has seventeen votes, that of Saxony four, 
 and those from Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Brunswick two each. 
 Besides smaller German estates and the three free-towns with 
 one vote each. All together forty-two votes. The Reichstag 
 is elected by universal suffrage for the term of three years and 
 meets in annual session. To the Reichstag belongs the initia- 
 tive of legislative acts ; it is independent of the Bundesrath, 
 but the members of the latter have the privilege of being present 
 at its sittings to expose the views of their respective Governments. 
 
rviii PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 On account of the representations of the Emperor of the 
 French, Saxony was not, on the conclusion of the war of 1866, 
 so completely absorbed into the North German Confederation 
 as her more northern neighbours. The King of Saxony, 
 although a member of the Union, still retained the power of 
 nominating officers, civil and military, in his kingdom, and the 
 Saxon Army was not merged in that of the Confederation. 
 It was, however, to be held under the supreme orders of the 
 King of Prussia in case of war. 
 
 The conclusion of the war in 1866, and the treaty of Prague, 
 were due in a great measure to the Emperor of the French, 
 whose offer to mediate between the contending Powers, Austria 
 hastily accepted, probably erroneously, as Count Bismarck had 
 already made proposals for direct negotiations, in which no 
 mention of the payment of a war indemnity was made. France 
 was, however, only too eager to mediate ; for French diplo- 
 matists for decades previous to 1870 held the creed, that the 
 privilege of France was to arrange, and mould, to her own 
 advantage, the domestic commotions of Germany. Prussia 
 could not without folly at the close of a victorious campaign, 
 risk all its glorious results by throwing down the gauntlet to 
 France, and raising up on the Rhine a new army of enemies, 
 while unfriendly divisions were still frowning on the banks of 
 the Danube and the Maine. She was perforce obliged to 
 consent to French mediation, and French mediation was not 
 disinterested. It was the aim and object of France to oppose 
 the unity of Germany, and to prevent the rise of a great and united 
 nation on her own border. For this reason she stipulated for the 
 semi-independence of Saxony, and caused a clause to be 
 inserted in the treaty of Prague by which Prussia consented 
 to cede to Denmark the northern portion of Schleswig. Austria, 
 who at the time of the negotiation of the treaty of Prague was 
 but the mouth-piece of France, stipulated when she retired 
 from the German Confederacy, that the remaining Southern 
 States should be formed into a Southern Confederacy. It was 
 thus hoped to prevent the ultimate fusion of the Southern 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xix 
 
 States with Northern Germany and Prussia, and to establish a 
 power in Germany which jealousy of Prussia and the bitter- 
 ness of defeat, might in an European conflict range upon the 
 side of Prussia's enemies. But the man who guided the foreign 
 policy of Prussia was competent to foil the diplomatists of 
 France. Confident of the difficulties which would defer the 
 formation of the Southern Confederation, he assented to the 
 Austro-French proposal, organized the Northern Confederation, 
 which speedily acquired strength and consistency, and con- 
 cluded between each of the Southern States individually, 
 offensive and defensive alliances with Prussia. France, really 
 by an attitude of desire to interfere in the internal arrangement 
 of Germany, facilitated the conclusion of these treaties ; and 
 the fact that on the 6th August, 1866, she demanded the 
 fortress of Mainz from Prussia under threat of war, though 
 known but to a few men, had doubtless an important effect. 
 The cession of the fortress was refused, and when it was seen 
 that Prussia was resolute the threat was not carried out, but 
 an excuse made, which averred that the demand was wrung 
 from the Emperor when labouring under illness. The French 
 army was then far from prepared for war, as it was not 
 thoroughly completed with men, nor armed with a breech- 
 loading weapon ; and France failed to obtain after the war of 
 1866, territorial concessions from Germany, as signally as 
 when before that war she proffered to declare against Austria, 
 and attack her with 300,000 men, provided that Prussia would 
 cede territory on the left bank of the Rhine. 
 
 While after the campaign of 1866 the North German Con- 
 federation almost daily increased in power and united senti- 
 ment, no progress was made in the formation of a Southern 
 Bund. The States lying south of the Maine were too equal 
 in size and resources. None was clearly preeminent, and to 
 none would the others consent to accord preeminence. An 
 attempt was made at a conference held at Nordlingen in 1868, 
 to form an agreement among the Southern States as to a very 
 minor question, — the management of the federal fortresses of 
 
 b 2 
 
xx PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 the South : yet even on this subject there was no concord, and 
 the conference separated with the sole result of showing that 
 it was almost impossible on any point to establish an harmo- 
 nious understanding between the States of Southern Germany. 
 At first, however, the relations between these States and Prussia 
 were not quite satisfactory, for there were political parties who 
 feared the preponderance of Prussia, and the probable absorp- 
 tion of the Southern States, but the attitude of France gradu- 
 ally forced the clear-sighted patriotism of the South to regard 
 Prussia with friendly eyes, and the deep-seated desire of 
 German unity swayed all except a few selfish and protectionist 
 • factions. Austria at first seemed inclined to harbour a desire 
 of vengeance for the defeat of 1866, and to look upon France 
 as a probable future ally. But the publication of the fact that 
 France had been willing to declare against her at the outbreak 
 of the German war, did much to modify that feeling, and to 
 turn her population, as well as her Government, to the neces- 
 sary task of internal, financial, and military reorganization. 
 The Prussian victories in 1866 were at the time looked upon 
 in France with jealousy and disfavour. The crowning triumph 
 of Koniggratz was regarded by the exciteable population of 
 that Empire as a direct step towards German unity, the aggran- 
 dizement of Prussia, and consequently as a menace to the 
 ascendancy and control which for years the French had tacitly 
 claimed in the internal affairs of Germany. In 1866 the 
 claims of France to German territory were withdrawn; but in 
 1867 they were renewed in a form which, although less sum- 
 mary, still for a short time, threatened to disturb the peace of 
 Europe. By the treaty of Vienna in 18 15, the Grand Duchy 
 of Luxemburg was given to the King of the Belgians, but at 
 the same time was included in the Germanic Confederation. 
 On the separation of Belgium from the Netherlands, it was 
 arranged by the treaty of London that Eastern Luxemburg and 
 Limburg, to which the federal obligations of Western Luxem- 
 burg were transferred, should be handed over to the King of 
 the Netherlands, while the King of the Belgians received full 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxi 
 
 sovereignty over the western portion of Luxemburg. The 
 King of the Netherlands refused to accede to this treaty, but 
 after the French siege of Antwerp, Austria and Prussia, in 
 behalf of the Germanic Confederation, enforced the provisions 
 of the treaty, and the eastern portion of Luxemburg was 
 formally included in the Confederation. The town of Luxem- 
 burg was a most important fortress of Germany towards France, 
 and from 1815 to 1867 was garrisoned by a Prussian garrison. 
 In 1867, the King of Holland, Sovereign of Luxemburg, who 
 had been excluded from the North German Confederation 
 on its formation in 1866, made overtures for the sale of the 
 fortress and territory to France. To these the Emperor 
 Napoleon lent a willing ear. The arrangement soon became 
 publicly known, and war between France and Prussia for the 
 moment seemed imminent. The public feeling of Germany 
 was allowed to become excited, although, had the leaders of 
 Prussia desired, it is almost certain, that at the beginning of 
 the complication, they could have yielded Luxemburg to France 
 without being forced into war by the pressure of public opinion. 
 Such was not, however, their desire ; war with France was the 
 readiest mode of completing German unity ; and although 
 Count von Bismark did not push forward such a war, he did 
 not shrink from taking up the gauntlet if it were thrown down 
 to him. He accordingly refused to abandon the defence of a 
 fortress which had been confided to the guardianship of Prussia 
 for half a century, and which was really situated on German 
 ground, although not formally included in the North German 
 Confederation. Some day the real history of the exclusion of 
 Luxemburg from that Confederation in 1866 may be known. 
 
 On the other hand, the Emperor of the French having once 
 expressed his readiness to purchase Luxemburg, could not 
 withdraw, at the mere dictate of Prussia, without grievously 
 wounding the sensitive pride of the French people, and 
 raising into a storm the national jealousy of Prussia, which 
 had been hardly concealed since the battle of Koniggratz. 
 Thus rulers seemed about to be forced into a war, which 
 
xxii PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 neither desired, by the populations over which they ruled ; 
 and this fact may well be considered by that hysterical school 
 of politicians which maintains that wars are the work of rulers, 
 and that in Republican institutions lies the best guarantee of 
 enduring peace. To ward off the danger of war a conference 
 was arranged. It was proposed by the King of Holland, 
 sanctioned by the neutral Powers, and met in London under 
 the presidency of Lord Stanley, who was then the Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs. As the result of its deliberations the duchy 
 was declared neutral, and its neutrality guaranteed by all the 
 Powers represented at the conference. Prussia withdrew her 
 garrison from the fortress, and the fortifications were to be 
 demolished. The concessions on the part of Prussia were not 
 very material, as the fortifications had been erected prior to 
 the introduction of rifled ordnance, and the great strength of 
 the fortress lies in its natural position. Still war was for the 
 moment averted, and many men believed that all difficulties 
 were arranged between these two powers, that Austria was 
 crippled, Russia unprepared, and that a lasting peace was 
 really about to dawn upon Europe. 
 
 Those who looked below the surface could, however, per- 
 ceive that France was but brooding over the insult which she 
 chose to conceive had been offered to her, by the fact that 
 Germany had shaken off her leading-strings, and that Germans 
 chose to manage their own affairs without foreign interference. 
 Those could also see that, in the apparent calm, not only was 
 France pushing forward armaments and military organization, 
 but that Prussian administrators were quietly taking all neces- 
 sary precautions in case of war, and studiously followed move 
 with move. The war, which had been for long foreseen by 
 these, broke out indeed suddenly, and surprised the world at 
 large ; but a few men in England had carefully watched how, 
 in the spring of 1870, French agents were engaged in all our 
 southern markets buying corn and forage. The excuses given 
 for enormous purchases of this description were, that the sea- 
 son had been so dry in France that no harvest was expected ; 
 
PREFATORY CHArTER. xxiii 
 
 but this excuse was transparent, for had forage been so very 
 scarce in France, French dealers would not have cared, simul- 
 taneously with an enormous rise in the price of forage, to have 
 largely exported horses to France. At the same time, too, a 
 flotilla was secretly collected in the northern French ports 
 capable of transporting 40,000 men and 12,000 horses. These 
 things were, perhaps, known to and noticed by Prussian 
 agents, but the British Government, against which the arrange- 
 ments might have been equally directed, remained in a happy 
 ignorance of any danger of war, and on the outbreak of 
 hostilities, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his place in Par- 
 liament, stated that a few hours previously the British Foreign 
 Office believed that there was not a cloud on the political 
 horizon of Europe. Yet still, many Utopian Englishmen, in 
 the face of these facts, contentedly argue that no preparations 
 for the invasion of our country could be made without the 
 Government being fully aware of them. 
 
 During the years between the treaty of Prague and the out- 
 break of war with France, the Prussian military organization 
 had been extended to the troops of all the Northern States. 
 The Prussian army, which fought in 1866, was increased by 
 three corps d'armee. Of these the 9th was that of Schleswig- 
 Holstein, the 10th that of Hanover, the nth that of Hesse. 
 The Grand Ducal Hessian, or 25th division, was placed in 
 intimate connection with the last corps, while the semi-inde- 
 pendent army of the kingdom of Saxony formed the 12th 
 corps of the Confederation. The broad principles of the 
 Prussian organization, as far as regarded infantry, were proved 
 so satisfactory in 1866, that they were extended after the Austrian 
 war without alteration to the new corps d'armee. In the organi- 
 zation of the cavalry, however, which was largely increased, the 
 experience of 1866 dictated the necessity of a vital change. 
 Hitherto the Prussian regiments of cavalry had always con- 
 sisted of four squadrons in time of peace ; on the outbreak 
 of war the four squadrons took the field, and a depot was 
 formed to supply the necessary reinforcements of men and 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 horses. This system was found decidedly faulty during the 
 Austrian war, and after the treaty of Prague the Prussian 
 regiments were increased to five squadrons, of which four 
 take the field, and one remains as a depot to supply im- 
 mediately the quick necessities of horses and men. To this 
 change, and to the large increase of cavalry, is due, in no 
 slight degree, the wonderful successes of the Prussian armies in 
 1870—71; for, as the Emperor of the French himself stated, 
 the Prussian cavalry formed an impenetrable screen, through 
 which it was impossible for the enemy to discover the move- 
 ments of the main armies, while every movement of the French 
 armies was accurately and faithfully reported by the now 
 famous Uhlans to the Prussian head-quarters. In the im- 
 portant arm artillery, the Prussians, directly after the cam- 
 paign of 1866, laid aside all muzzle-loading guns and adopted 
 for their whole field-artillery breech-loading steel -pieces made 
 on Krupp's system. Towards the end of 1869 some breech- 
 loading bronze guns were turned out, took part in the subse- 
 quent war, and were so satisfactory that it is probable the 
 whole field-artillery will be armed with bronze guns. The 
 system of Prussian Intendantur, which had given such excellent 
 earnest of efficiency in 1866, was naturally extended to the 
 newly-formed corps d'armee. The Intendantur of Prussia 
 must be clearly distinguished from the Intendance of France ; 
 the names are similar, but the systems are almost reverse : the 
 Prussian system was proved excellent in two great wars, the 
 French was paralysed under the first pressure of active sendee. 
 It is fortunate that our country has adopted much more the 
 Prussian than the French system of supply in the lately 
 established department of Control. 
 
 When the French Empire was threatened with war on 
 account of the Luxemburg question in 1867, the nominal 
 strength of the army was 600,000 men ; but it was found that 
 it would have been impossible, after providing for depots and 
 necessary detachments, to place much more than 150,000 men 
 in line of battle. It was evident that the military system re- 
 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxv 
 
 quired reorganization, and in 1868 the system of reorganization 
 elaborated by Marshal Niel became law. By this new system, 
 which was, as its predecessor, based upon conscription, the 
 forces of the empire were divided into three classes ; the active 
 army, the reserve, and the National Guard. The service under 
 the colours was fixed at five years, after which the soldier was 
 to enter the reserve for four years more. Young men who 
 were not drawn for the active army were to serve four years in 
 the reserve and five in the National Guard. This system was 
 inferior to the Prussian, because part of the reserve were not 
 trained at all in the regular army, and the service in the ranks 
 being five years instead of three, a smaller force of trained men 
 could be annually passed into the reserve. Another distinction 
 of great importance existed between the two military systems. 
 In Prussia no man required for military service could purchase 
 a substitute ; in France any one liable to military service, by 
 payment to the State of a sum of 2500 francs, was exempted, 
 and the State undertook with the money so paid to replace him 
 by another soldier. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
 fund thus created was judiciously administered, and it is be- 
 lieved that the real strength of the French battalions was con- 
 siderably inferior to the paper strength on the outbreak of the 
 war. Nor was the system as laid down literally carried out, 
 for it was objectionable to the people, and in such an excite- 
 able and feverish population, it was not advisable to train the 
 National Guard to a perfect knowledge of weapons and drill. 
 The result was, that although the reorganization of 1868 theo- 
 retically placed more than 800,000 combatants at the disposal 
 of the Emperor, and raised the military forces of France to 
 more than 1,200,000* men, the army fit to take the field at 
 the commencement of the war mustered barely 400,000 
 soldiers. Of these 40,000 were at Cherbourg, preparing to 
 embark on the flotilla which had been collected at the northern 
 ports; 5,000 were at Rome, 10,000 in Algeria, 35,000 in 
 
 * Active Army, 400,000 men ; Reserve, 430,000 men; National Guard, 
 408,000 men. 
 
xxvi PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 Paris and at Chalons, 10,000 at Lyons, and about 30,000 at 
 Marseilles, Toulouse, Rochefort, L'Orient, Bordeaux, Toulon, 
 and in hospital. The force which could be sent towards the 
 Rhine mustered thus barely 270,000 men. It was divided into 
 eight corps and the Guards. 
 
 Against it there were ready to take the field on the German 
 side, as soon as the rapid mobilization of the army was com- 
 pleted, the twelve corps of the North German Confederation, 
 mustering at least 360,000 men, and the armies of Bavaria, 
 Wiirtemburg, Darmstadt, and Baden, which were under the 
 supreme command of the King of Prussia in virtue of the 
 separate treaties concluded after the campaign of 1866, 
 raised the field forces of that sovereign to over 500,000 com- 
 batants. These were well sustained by an effective and 
 organized system of depots and reserves, administered by an 
 elastic and proved machinery, and handled by abstemious and 
 well-trained officers. An iron discipline knit the Prussian 
 soldiery together, previous victories gave entire confidence in 
 the leaders, and a high sense of duty and self-denial pervaded 
 the ranks. 
 
 In the French army, on the other hand, there was much 
 enthusiasm and great gallantry, but discipline had been 
 allowed to lapse, the luxurious ideas which a rapid increase 
 of wealth had fostered, pervaded some portion of the officers, 
 while many of the others, raised from the ranks, were wanting 
 in the high military education which alone gives to a leader the 
 confidence of his followers, or fits him for the rapid decision 
 and quick judgment that are every hour necessary in war. In 
 armament the i French troops were superior to the Prussians, 
 for they were provided with the Chassepot rifle, which, with 
 the common advantage of being a breech-loading arm, was 
 superior in range and accuracy to the needle-gun. The latter 
 had been early adopted by the Prussian government, which 
 had been averse to incur the inconveniencies of a change of 
 armament, except to secure a very clearly-defined advantage, 
 and had apparently underrated the excellence of the Chassepot. 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxvii 
 
 Still the French advantage in this respect was more than com- 
 pensated for by the hurried and excited manner in which the 
 French troops, on more than one occasion, handled their 
 weapons. On the other hand the Prussian soldier was more 
 suitably equipped for European war than the French. Dis- 
 carding the cumbrous equipment necessary for the formation 
 of camps, or the refinements of cooking, the Prussian troops 
 were willing to trust during a campaign to the shelter which 
 villages nearly always afforded in Western Europe, or, in case 
 of necessity, to bivouac in the open air, while a small mess-tin 
 carried by each soldier sufficed for his culinary wants. The 
 French soldier, on the contrary, was weighed down with tcntes 
 d\ibri, heavy cooking apparatus, and an enormous kit. These 
 were generally useless, frequently lost, always encumbrances ; 
 but an army accustomed to African or tropical war clings per- 
 tinaciously to the idea of canvas covering, fails to realize the 
 different conditions under which campaigns must be conducted 
 in Europe, and shudders at the idea of an exposure in war to 
 which every true sportsman will willingly consent for pleasure. 
 The French army was heavily equipped on the experience of 
 Africa, China, and Mexico, and it suffered heavily from this 
 cause among others in France. 
 
 The actual declaration of war showed that, nevertheless, the 
 men who administered the army and directed the policy of the 
 Empire, were of opinion that not only were the French forces 
 able to cope with the Prussian in the field, but that they could 
 be more rapidly placed upon the theatre of war. 
 
 In September, 1868, an insurrection broke out in the kingdom 
 of Spain, which, joined by General Prim and Marshal Serrano, 
 quickly developed into a revolution. At the end of that month 
 Queen Isabella fled from the country to Biarritz. At the be- 
 ginning of October Marshal Serrano entered Madrid at the 
 head of the revolutionary army, and a Provisional Government 
 was established, and General Prim named commander-in-chief 
 of the army. The Provisional Government, in concert with 
 the national representatives, decided that a constitutional 
 
xxviii PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 monarchy should be the future form of Spanish government ; 
 but there was some difficulty in finding any man eligible to 
 become King of Spain who would accept the position, and, 
 till such a man could be found, Marshal Serrano was elected 
 Regent of the Kingdom, with General Prim as his Prime 
 Minister. Several proposed monarchs had been named, but 
 the throne remained vacant till, in the summer of 1870, Gene- 
 ral Prim, in the name of the Spanish Ministry, offered the 
 Crown to the amiable and accomplished Prince Leopold of 
 Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, eldest son of the reigning Prince 
 of Hohenzollern, who had in 1849 surrendered his sovereign 
 rights to the King of Prussia. This Prince, who had married 
 in 1 86 1 the sister of the King of Portugal, was in his thirty- 
 sixth year, and a Roman Catholic by religion. He accepted 
 the offer of the Crown, subject to the approval of the Cortes, 
 which was certain. The news of this acceptance was published 
 in Paris on the 5 th July, and the greatest excitement arose, as 
 the nomination of Prince Leopold was there held to be the 
 handiwork of Count von Bismarck, who contemplated to create 
 in Spain a Prussian dependency which should threaten France 
 from the south of the Pyrenees. French ministers declared in the 
 Chambers that France could not tolerate such a result to nego- 
 tiations which they said had been kept secret from the Emperor 
 of the French, and seemed by their expressions to have already 
 made up their minds to war. It may be correctly true that 
 the negotiations with Prince Leopold were not officially notified 
 by the Spanish Government to the Emperor Napoleon ; but it 
 is known that the French ambassador at Madrid had known of 
 the probable election of this Prince for many months, and that 
 the surprise which the French Government professed on the 
 arrival of the official intimation was at the least disingenuous, 
 or due to the neglect of their own agent. The public mind in 
 Paris, which had been secretly for a long time eager for war 
 with Prussia, was only too glad to seize upon the Hohenzollern 
 question and to urge the Imperial Government to hostilities ; 
 but the King of Prussia would not involve Europe in war for 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxix 
 
 the sake of a family question ; and by his influence, it is said, 
 as head of the Hohenzollern family, and through the inter- 
 vention of England, the candidature of Prince Leopold for the 
 Spanish Crown was withdrawn, first by the Prince's father, and 
 afterwards by himself. The danger of war seemed averted ; 
 but the desire for war ran high at Paris, and M. Benedetti, the 
 French ambassador at Berlin, was directed to wait upon the 
 King of Prussia, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him a 
 pledge that his Majesty would never at any future time accede 
 to the candidature of the Prince. This the King refused to 
 give, as he naturally reserved to himself freedom of action 
 under future circumstances. The French ambassador being 
 desirous of a further interview, the King sent an aide-de-camp 
 to tell him that he could add nothing to what he had already 
 said, and for further discussion referred him to Count von 
 Bismarck. M. Benedetti naturally telegraphed the result of 
 this interview to his own Government. By the French Govern- 
 ment the result of this interview was seized upon as an insult 
 offered by the King of Prussia to the French ambassador, 
 although the ambassador was ignorant himself of any insult. 
 The news was published in Paris, and the war excitement rose 
 to frenzy. The King of Prussia, on the other hand, tele- 
 graphed to Count von Bismarck the account of the interview 
 at Ems, who seemed quite ready to accept the French chal- 
 lenge, for he viewed the action of M. Benedetti as an insult to 
 the King of Prussia; as such it was announced in Berlin. The 
 mind of Germany was deeply incensed. * 
 
 The interview at Ems took place on the 13th July. On the 
 morning of the 14th a cabinet council was held at St. Cloud 
 under the presidency of the Emperor, and the two Chambers 
 expected a communication. None was however made; but 
 on the 15th July a declaration was made in the Corps Le'gis- 
 latif and Senate simultaneously of war against Prussia, which 
 was rapturously applauded in both houses. 
 
 * The Franco-Prussian War, edited by Captain H. M. Hozier, where 
 full details of these various incidents will be found. 
 
xxx PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 The same day the King of Prussia travelling from Ems was 
 met by the Crown Prince at Brandenburg. They travelled 
 together to Berlin, where they were met at the railway station 
 by Herr von Thile, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
 Affairs, with the telegraphed account of the speech made that 
 day by M. Olivier, the French Prime Minister, in the Cham- 
 bers at Paris. The King, on reading the telegram, issued 
 orders to General von Roon and General von Moltke, who 
 had also come to receive his Majesty, that the whole army of 
 the North German Confederation should be at once mobilized. 
 These officers drove direct from the station to their offices, 
 and that night orders for mobilization were telegraphed to 
 every part of the country. From the frontiers of Belgium to 
 the Vistula, from the Baltic to the mountains of Silesia, that 
 night the summons was sent out, and early next day the 
 reserve and Landwehr men of Prussia were swarming to join 
 their ranks. At the same time continuous trains of troops 
 were hurrying towards Lorraine and Alsatia from all parts of 
 France ; troops were being conveyed from Algeria, and within 
 a few days the French army, available to take the field, was in 
 the vicinity of Metz and Strasburg. 
 
 The French Government at the outbreak of the campaign 
 had apparently hopes that some of the States of South Ger- 
 many would separate from Prussia and join with France in the 
 war. These hopes were speedily disappointed, for the whole 
 of the German Powers rallied round Prussia, and so perfect was 
 the machinery of mobilization and the railway transport of 
 troops, that in twenty days more than 500,000 men were 
 close down to the French frontier, and ready to advance to 
 battle. The 7th and 8th corps were already on the frontier in 
 a little more than ten days, and the 3rd corps was fully 
 equipped, completed, and ready to move in eight days. 
 
 During the twenty days which the German armies required 
 to mobilize the French lost all advantage which the hasty 
 declaration of war ought to have given. The army, instead of 
 having been ready before the declaration of war, was unpre- 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxi 
 
 pared to advance, and instead of dashing boldly into Germany, 
 disturbing the mobilization of the various corps, and, perhaps, 
 subduing the South before the North could come to its aid, 
 lay inactive on the frontier, with detachments scattered from 
 Thionville and Sierk to Belfort, with strong reserves at Metz. 
 Had the war between France and Germany taken place before 
 the events of 1866, their remissness might have not cost the 
 French so dear ; but the consolidation of the North German 
 Confederation and the command-in-chief of the other German 
 armies, which was vested in the King of Prussia, allowed the 
 mobilization of the whole German armies to be immediately 
 undertaken without any of the diplomatic negotiations which 
 would have been necessary before 1866. 
 
 In the first week of July the German armies concentrated. 
 On the right was General Steinmetz with the 1st Army in the 
 direction of Birkenfeld: this army was composed of the 1st, 
 7th, and 8th Prussian corps. In the centre was Prince Fre- 
 derick Charles with the 2nd Army, composed of the 2nd, 3rd, 
 4th, 9th, 10th corps, and the corps of the Prussian Guards, in 
 the neighbourhood of Kaiserslautern. This Prince had also 
 under his command the 12th, or Saxon corps. On the left 
 was the Crown Prince with the two Bavarian corps, the Wiir- 
 temburg division, the Baden division, and the 5th and nth 
 Prussian corps in the neighbourhood of Speyer. The 6th 
 corps was also moving up from Silesia to join the 3rd Army. 
 It showed excellent taste and tact on the part of the advisers 
 of the King of Prussia to counsel the Commander-in-Chief of 
 the whole German forces to place the amiable, popular, and 
 competent Crown Prince in command of the army in which 
 the South German troops were enrolled. 
 
 The Prussian plan of the campaign was that the three 
 armies should advance simultaneously in a south-easterly 
 direction ; the Crown Prince marching to the east of the 
 Vosges mountains, the other two armies to the west of them. 
 If the French army concentrated to hold the Vosges against 
 the Crown Prince, the 1st and 2nd Armies would threaten its 
 
xxxii PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 position in flank and rear; if, on the other hand, it concen- 
 trated against the ist and 2nd Armies, the Crown Prince, 
 bearing to his right, and pushing through the Vosges, would 
 in his turn threaten his flank and rear. As the Crown Prince 
 was to be engaged in a difficult and mountainous country, his 
 army was accompanied only by one cavalry division in addition 
 to the regiments of cavalry attached to infantry divisions. The 
 other divisions of cavalry were attached to Prince Frederic 
 Charles and General Steinmetz. 
 
 On the 3rd July, the general Prussian advance commenced. 
 On the 4th, the French corps which occupied St. Avoid, a 
 small town on the road from Metz to the frontier line of the 
 Saar at Saarbriick, made a movement towards the latter place. 
 The Emperor and the Prince Imperial were present, and the 
 French soldiery thought that the advance had at last really 
 begun, and that they were upon the high road to Berlin. The 
 movement was not, however, pushed ; the supplies and pro- 
 visions necessary for a campaign were not yet even collected in 
 the rear of the army, and no proper system of issuing them to the 
 troops, if the latter advanced, was yet in working order; 
 the most necessary articles of field equipment were in some 
 cases wanting, for the centralized system of military adminis- 
 tration, which was the bane of the French army, prevented 
 any rapid distribution of stores at the outbreak of a war. The 
 French corps which advanced from St. Avoid did not even 
 cross the frontier in force, but confined itself to throwing some 
 shells into the town of Saarbriick, and occupying the strong 
 position of the heights of Spicheren, in front of Forbach. 
 
 Meanwhile, the German troops were swiftly, though silently, 
 drawing down to the frontier, and in the early morning of the 
 6th the Crown Prince had massed his forces which he had 
 marched from Landau by way of Schweighofen behind the 
 dark woods that lie north of Weissenburg. Thence, soon 
 after daybreak, he sprang upon the unsuspecting troops of 
 General Douay, which formed the advanced guard of the 
 corps of Marshal Macmahon, and drove them back with great 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxiii 
 
 loss on the main body at Worth. The same day the right division 
 of the army of Prince Frederick Charles, who advanced by 
 Homburg and Zweibriicken, together with the left division of 
 General Steinmetz, stormed the heights of Spicheren, and 
 drove the French occupants of that position in full retreat 
 towards Metz. 
 
 On the 8th July, the Crown Prince, having marched by way 
 of Sulz sous Forets, came upon Marshal Macmahon at Worth, 
 and after a severe battle there, in which the French leader 
 showed great tactical resource, overthrew him completely, and 
 the marshal retreated in great disorder on Nancy. 
 
 The battle of Worth virtually decided the campaign. The 
 heir to the crown of Prussia there tore from the brows of the 
 French army those laurels which a too credulous world had too 
 uncritically accorded to it, and proved beyond doubt, that the 
 army of France, however much animated with enthusiasm and 
 gallantry, was unable to withstand the stern onset of the 
 soldiery of Germany, directed with judgment and conducted 
 with skill. 
 
 Three days after the battle of Worth, the general advance of 
 the German armies was continued. General Steinmetz moved 
 by St. Avoid, Prince Frederick Charles by w 7 ay of Saar Union, 
 and the Crown Prince by Merzweiler, Ingweiler, and Saarburg. 
 At this place the right of the army of the Crown Prince united 
 with the left of that of Prince Frederick Charles, and the 
 strategical junction of the German armies on French soil was 
 assured. 
 
 General Steinmetz then moved upon Metz, Prince Frederick 
 Charles on Pont-a-Mousson, and the Crown Prince on Nancy. 
 On the 14th, General Steinmetz came up with the French rear- 
 guard at Courcelles, and after a sharp action at that place 
 forced it to seek shelter under the guns and within the out- 
 works of the fortress of Metz. At the same time, Prince 
 Frederick Charles threw bridges over the Moselle at Pont-a- 
 Mousson, Noveant, and Corny. 
 
 On the 15 th, he crossed the Moselle, and, with the heads oi 
 
xxx iv PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 the 3rd (Alvensleben) and 10th (Voigt Rhetz) corps, occupied 
 Gorze and Nove'ant. 
 
 On the 1 6th, the Crown Prince reached Nancy, and halted 
 there, having detached a force to invest and besiege the fortress 
 of Strasburg.* General Steinmetz was in front of Metz, on the 
 eastern side. Marshal Bazaine, who commanded the whole 
 French army which had been assembled, partly by design, 
 partly by force of circumstance, within the forts of Metz, de- 
 signed to move from that fortress with all his available strength 
 towards Chalons. It was believed in the German camp that the 
 French retreat had commenced on the previous day, and that 
 some of the French army had already got beyond the striking dis- 
 tance of Prince Frederick Charles. On the morning of the 1 6th, 
 however, when the head of the 3rd Prussian corps debouched 
 from the defile of Gorze on the elevated plateau, which to the 
 west of Metz rises above the valley of the Moselle, with the in- 
 tention of pursuing or attacking in flank the retreating French, it 
 found the whole of Marshal Bazaine's army marching in retreat 
 from Metz towards Vionville, and that the heads of its columns 
 had not yet reached that place. General Stulpnagel, who com- 
 manded the leading Prussian division, immediately engaged 
 the army of Marshal Bazaine ; he was supported by the 6th 
 division, which was following him, and these two divisions 
 checked the whole French army, until Prince Frederick 
 Charles brought up the 10th corps to their aid. The Prince 
 threw the 10th corps across the road by which the French 
 sought to retreat, and all through the long summer day a 
 terrific battle was fought near Vionville. The French leader 
 made one desperate attempt after another to break through ; 
 but the Prussian soldiers, though suffering frightful loss, sternly 
 stood their ground, and at nightfall the Germans still held the 
 road from Metz to Mars-la-Tour, and the French marshal was 
 forced to fall back on Gravelotte. The remaining corps of 
 Prince Frederick Charles were too far to the south to allow of 
 
 * The Baden Division, 
 
 and the division of Landwehr of the Guard. 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxv 
 
 their taking part in the battle of the 16th; but two German 
 corps, with two divisions of cavalry, which were aided late in 
 the evening by one division from General Steinmetz, held their 
 ground against the 180,000 men that were marching under 
 Marshal Bazaine. 
 
 On the 17th, the whole of the army of Prince Frederick 
 Charles came up, and the bulk of the army of Steinmetz. The 
 German troops took up a position extending from the head 
 of the Gorze defile to St. Marie aux Chenes, and the King 
 of Prussia arrived upon the field. Marshal Bazaine, after 
 falling back on Gravelotte on the 16th, took up a strong 
 position there, which on the 17th he partly entrenched. Here 
 on the 1 8th he was attacked by the German army, and after a 
 bloody battle was wholly cut off from the northern road to 
 Verdun, and driven into Metz. 
 
 The army of Prince Frederick Charles, under whose orders 
 General Steinmetz was now placed, immediately invested the 
 fortress and the army within it ; and in spite of bad weather, 
 sickness, hardship, and numerous sorties, prevented the enemy 
 from breaking out until the fortress and army capitulated on 
 the 28th October. 
 
 After the battle of Worth, the disorganized remains of the 
 French troops which had been there defeated retreated in 
 confusion to Chalons. Here they were reorganized as rapidly 
 as possible by Marshal Macmahon, and were reinforced by all 
 the levies which could be hurried up to their aid. The Em- 
 peror in person, after leaving Metz, also retired to Chalons by 
 way of Verdun. Counsel was then taken in the French camp, 
 and it seems to have been decided that for military reasons 
 the army should retreat upon Paris. But political circum- 
 stances would not permit the adoption of this course. On the 
 departure of the Emperor Napoleon for the war, the Empress 
 had been nominated Regent, and after the first disasters of the 
 campaign a cabinet had been formed, of which Count de Palikao 
 was president. This cabinet did not venture to allow the Em- 
 peror to return to Paris except as victorious \ for popular feeling 
 
 c 2 
 
xxx vi PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 was running high, and a revolution might at any moment be 
 provoked. It was, therefore, underpressure of political circum- 
 stances, determined that the army at Chalons should make a 
 movement by way of Rheims, Me'zieres, and Sedan, with the 
 object of reaching Metz by way of Thionville, and of aiding 
 the escape of Marshal Bazaine from the toils cast around him 
 by Prince Frederick Charles. With many raw troops, and an 
 improvised transport, this was a desperate cast ; but the tardi- 
 ness of French movements was not then appreciated, the 
 rapidity of Prussian marching not yet thoroughly recognized, 
 and the stake to be won by success possibly justified the 
 hazard of the venture. 
 
 On the other side, as soon as the army of Marshal Bazaine 
 was securely invested in Metz by the army of Prince Frederick 
 Charles, the Crown Prince advanced in pursuit of Macmahon 
 towards Chalons, from Nancy, by way of Vaucoureurs and 
 Ligny. Avoiding the fortress of Toul, he left a force to 
 besiege it. When the Crown Prince reached Ligny, the King 
 arrived at Bar-le-Duc. Here it was ascertained by the advanced 
 cavalry of the Crown Prince, chiefly through the medium of 
 captured letters, that Marshal Macmahon was making a move- 
 ment from Chalons and Rheims, to gain the northern .line ot 
 railway by Mezieres and Sedan in order to relieve Marshal 
 Bazaine. 
 
 The direction of march which had been ordered for St. 
 Dizier was immediately altered, and the Crown Prince began 
 to move by St. Meneliould and Grand Pre on Sedan, with the 
 view of there falling upon the flank of the marching columns of 
 the French marshal. 
 
 When Metz was invested, the 2nd, 4th. 5th, and 6th divi- 
 sions of cavalry were detached from the army of Prince Fre- 
 derick Charles, and attached to that of the Crown Prince. Now 
 the Guards, the Saxon corps, and the 4th corps were also 
 detached from the 2nd army, and formed into a fourth army, 
 which was placed under the command of the Crown Prince on 
 Saxony, and ordered to move from Metz by way of Verdun 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxvii 
 
 on Sedan, in order to head the French columns and check 
 their advance into Lorraine. 
 
 These movements brought on the battle of Sedan. On the 
 30th of August the Crown Prince of Saxony, moving down 
 the right bank of the Meuse, surprised the French at Mouzon 
 and drove them back ; for the French army, instead of making 
 forced marches of about twenty miles a day, on account of 
 want of discipline among the new levies and the failure of 
 transport arrangements, was only able to make about six. On 
 the same day the Crown Prince also engaged the heads of 
 Marshal Macmahon's columns at Beaumont and Donchery, 
 and drove them in. 
 
 The French retired upon Sedan, and took up a position 
 resting on that fortress, with their front upon the Meuse, and 
 their flanks refused towards the Belgian frontier. It was anti- 
 cipated in the German camp that they might possibly retreat 
 into Belgian territory. Accordingly, Count von Bismarck sent 
 a communication to the Belgian government to say, that if the 
 French crossed the frontier and were not disarmed, the German 
 troops would be forced to follow ; but the Belgian army had 
 been already placed on a war footing, and with detachments 
 was watching the frontier. These disarmed and made prisoner 
 any isolated bodies which either purposely or accidentally 
 entered armed upon Belgian soil. 
 
 On the 1 st September the armies of the Crown Princes of 
 Prussia and Saxony attacked, under the eyes of the King of 
 Prussia, the position which the French had taken up at Sedan. 
 The army of the Crown Prince of Saxony, crossing the Meuse 
 by bridges which it threw during the previous night, extended 
 its right towards the Belgian frontier, and drove in the French 
 left. The Bavarian corps of the army of the Crown Prince 
 of Prussia assailed the French centre at Bazeilles, while the 
 Crown Prince, pushing the 5th and nth corps across the Meuse 
 lower down the stream, not only drove in the French right, but 
 extended his own flank so far as to touch the flank of the 
 Guards who formed the right of the Saxon battle, surrounded 
 
xxxviii PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 the French completely, and entirely cut off their retreat from 
 Belgium. At the very commencement of the battle Marshal 
 Macmahon was severely wounded, and the command devolved 
 upon General Wimpfen, who had only just arrived on the 
 theatre of war. All day the battle raged, the French fought 
 gallantly — even desperately ; but, pressed upon by the better- 
 disciplined legions of Germany, they were pushed closer and 
 closer to the ramparts of Sedan, while their adversaries gained 
 a firm footing on all the heights which command and overlook 
 the basin in which the fortress is situated. At last, hemmed in, 
 surrounded, and exposed to the commanding fire of a numerous 
 and superior artillery, no resource was left to the French army 
 but capitulation. A general of the Emperor's staff was sent 
 to the King of Prussia to propose terms for the army, and at 
 the same time the Emperor wrote a letter to the King, and 
 proposed to surrender his sword. The terms announced were 
 the unconditional surrender of the army and the fortress ; but 
 the officers were allowed to retain their swords, and to give their 
 parole not to serve against Germany during the war. These 
 terms were agreed to next day, and the whole French army 
 was marched prisoner to Germany. 
 
 On the 2nd September the Emperor had an interview with 
 the King of Prussia and the Crown Prince, after which he went 
 by way of Belgium to the chateau of Wilhelmshohe, near 
 Cassel, where he remained a prisoner on parole until the ter- 
 mination of the war. 
 
 After the halt of a few days, necessary for the completion of 
 arrangements at Sedan, the armies of the Crown Princes, that 
 of Prussia on the left and of Saxony on the right, marched for 
 Paris by way of Attigny, Reims, Montmirail, and Coulom- 
 miers. There was no French army worthy of mention now in 
 the field. Bazaine was invested with the bulk of the army of 
 the Rhine in Metz; the Emperor and Macmahon were prisoners 
 on the road to Germany. The few troops who escaped from 
 the general catastrophe at Sedan, or had been on the way to 
 reinforce Marshal Macmahon, were hurried back to Paris to 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xxxix 
 
 man the defences of the capital, which the cabinet had already 
 taken vigorous measures to provision. 
 
 As soon as the news of the capture of the Emperor and his 
 army became known at Paris, revolution broke out. It might 
 have been more prudent had the French nation deferred a 
 change of government which must necessarily delay the pro- 
 gress of public business. It was not so. The change was 
 made in the very face of the enemy. M. Gambetta and M. 
 Jules Favre proclaimed the Republic in the Gorps Legislatif. 
 The excited population, as if eager to drown the sense of 
 national calamity in the storm of domestic politics, shouted 
 rapturous applause. The imperial government was dissolved : 
 the members of the cabinet fled the country, and the Empress, 
 hastily escaping from the palace of the Tuileries into which the 
 mob broke, reached a sea-port, and was conveyed to England 
 in the yacht of an English private gentleman. 
 
 As there was no foe in the field to encounter, the German 
 armies marched straight upon the capital. At Coulommiers 
 they separated, that of the Crown Prince of Saxony moving 
 towards the north-east of Paris, that of the Prince of Prussia 
 towards the south-west. The latter approached Versailles on 
 the 19th September, encountered the garrison of the city that 
 day at the strengthened posts of Villejuif, Chatillon, Plessis- 
 Piquet, and Clamart, and after a tolerably sharp action drove 
 it under the forts which surround the enceinte. 
 
 The 3rd and 4th armies then invested Paris, and encircled 
 the city of luxury and light within a band of iron and of fire, 
 which was not relaxed until the forts and guns of the defenders 
 were surrendered to Prussian custody. 
 
 On the instalment of the Republic in Paris, M. Gambetta was 
 appointed Minister of War, and General Trochu Governor of 
 the city. Every exertion was made to raise armies to resist 
 the invader, and if possible to drive him from French soil, and 
 the republican leaders were not lacking in energy. A large 
 force was raised within the city, which at the termination of 
 the siege mustered over 350,000 combatants. Conscripts were 
 
xl PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 raised, arms and ammunition imported from abroad, clothing 
 and stores purchased, and an army rapidly collected in the 
 south-west, which obtained the name of the Army of the Loire. 
 On the 1 9th of October the army in Paris was so far equipped 
 and organised that General Trochu attempted to make a sortie 
 and sally out of Paris ; but the troops of the Crown Prince 
 drove him back, and the siege continued. The Prussians at 
 first did not attempt any active operations, but were content 
 with strongly entrenching themselves, and trusting to hunger 
 to enforce the capitulation of the place. 
 
 Early in November the French Army of the Loire had 
 gained some consistency, and on the 9th of that month its van- 
 guard drove the Bavarians, who had been sent to observe it, out 
 of the city of Orleans. These fell back and took up a 
 position in the vicinity of Toury ; but had General d'Aurelles 
 de Paladine, who commanded the French army, been in a posi- 
 tion to immediately follow up his success, he might have raised 
 the siege of Paris, as the Crown Prince would have had to call 
 his troops together in order to oppose a French advance from 
 the south. But the troops of the French general were too 
 raw, and he was forced to wait in Orleans, where he threw up 
 strong intrenchments, to organize them. He thus lost his 
 opportunity. 
 
 Towards the end of October Metz capitulated, and the 
 army of Marshal Bazaine was made prisoner. The army of 
 Prince Frederick Charles was thus released for active service 
 in the field. His army was divided: the 1st, 7th, and 8th 
 corps were placed under the command of General Manteuffel, 
 and sent to the north of France to repulse and break up 
 French troops, which were being raised under cover of the 
 various fortresses. Prince Frederick Charles himself, with the 
 3rd, 9th, and 10th corps, moved rapidly from Metz by way of 
 Fontainebleau towards Toury, and, joining the Duke of Meck- 
 lenburg, who commanded at that place, formed a screen 
 between the Prussian armies round Paris and the Army of the 
 Loire. 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xli 
 
 At first Prince Frederick Charles was retained in observa- 
 tion ; but the King decided towards the end of November that 
 he should assume the offensive and advance upon Orleans. 
 At the same time the French leaders came to a similar deter- 
 mination. M. Gambetta ordered General d'Aurelles de Pala- 
 dine, who had now collected an army of 180,000 men, to 
 advance upon Paris, and at the same time the garrison of Paris 
 made a vigorous sortie towards the south. This sortie, which 
 was at first partially successful, was subsequently repulsed with 
 great loss, and all hopes of communicating with the Army of 
 the Loire from Paris had to be abandoned. The failure of 
 this sortie was not, however, known to General de Paladine ; 
 on the contrary, he believed that the Paris garrison had burst 
 through the investing line, and he hastened to its assistance. 
 On the 28th November he moved a considerable force from 
 his right flank on the village of Beaune-la-Rolande, where he 
 fell upon the left flank of Prince Frederick Charles. The 
 Hanoverians, who formed the garrison of Beaune, were for 
 some time severely pressed, and at one period almost sur- 
 rounded. They held firm, however, in the town, and repeated 
 efforts on the part of the French storming-columns failed to 
 carry the houses. In the afternoon Prince Frederick Charles 
 himself came up with the 3rd corps to their aid ; the French 
 assailants of the town were taken in flank and reverse, and 
 although they were commanded by General Bourbaki, were 
 driven off with loss. 
 
 After his failure to penetrate the Prussian position at Beaune- 
 la-Rolande, General de Paladine transferred the bulk of his 
 army during the next few days to his left flank, and attempted, 
 on the 1 st December to advance by the main road from 
 Orleans to Paris by way of Toury. A little to the north of 
 Arthenay his advanced guard fell in with the corps of the Duke 
 of Mecklenburg, and a severe action took place. Prince Fre- 
 derick Charles also moved in this direction, and the whole 
 forces of the two armies became engaged in front of Orleans. 
 The French were everywhere pressed back, their entrench- 
 
x PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 ments were stormed with the loss of many guns, and, after 
 several days' righting, Orleans was occupied by the Prussians 
 on the 4th December. 
 
 The broken army of General de Paladine retired partly to 
 the south and partly down the Loire. The columns which 
 followed the latter route were under the command of General 
 Chanzy, who stood to fight, and sustained for three days 
 severe conflicts round Beaugency. He then retired towards 
 Le Mans : the army of the Loire was dispersed, and, the 
 covering army of Prince Frederick Charles took up a position 
 around Orleans. 
 
 While these events were taking place on the south-west of 
 Paris, Prussian generals on the other hand occupied Amiens, 
 and had repulsed the French troops in that direction. The 
 sieges of fortresses in Alsace were being prosecuted, and many 
 had surrendered. Prussian forces were also pushed towards 
 Dijon to watch some hostile masses which were gathering in 
 that direction. 
 
 The investment of Paris was steadily maintained, and pre- 
 parations made for more active measures. Batteries were dug 
 and armed, ammunition and ordnance brought up, and at the 
 end of December a bombardment of the forts and city com- 
 menced. 
 
 Shortly afterwards the French armies of the provinces made 
 another and a final attempt to relieve the metropolis. General 
 Chanzy advanced from Le Mans, at the same time as General 
 Bourbaki, moving rapidly towards the fortress of Belfort in 
 Upper Alsatia, which was being besieged by a Prussian con- 
 tingent, appeared to desire to raise the siege of that place, and 
 then to strike against the great line of the Prussian communi- 
 cations with Germany. 
 
 At the same time as General Chanzy advanced from Le 
 Mans, Prince Frederick Charles moved from Orleans with the 
 intention of attacking him at Le Mans. The heads of the two 
 annies, moving in opposite directions, came into collision 
 accidentally at Vendome. The French were defeated, and 
 
PREFATORY CHAPTER. xliii 
 
 were pushed back, fighting hard, however, as they retreated. 
 After five days, however, of constant battle, they were pushed 
 through Le Mans, and that important strategical point captured 
 with large supplies of food, arms, ammunition, rolling-stock, 
 artillery, and many prisoners. 
 
 The battle of Le Mans decided the fate of Paris. Provisions 
 had already been getting very short, and the bombardment, 
 although it did not appear to do much damage to the works, 
 harassed the garrison. It was perceived that assistance from 
 without could no longer be hoped for ; for Bourbaki had been 
 headed towards Belfort and defeated by General Werder, and 
 General Manteuffel hurried across France to fall upon his flank. 
 The greater part of the army of General Bourbaki was driven 
 across the Swiss frontier and disarmed, after having suffered 
 many privations and hardships. One more sortie was indeed 
 made by the garrison of Paris, but more apparently with the 
 idea of demonstrating the inutility of further resistance than 
 with any serious ideas of success. On the 27th January an 
 armistice was agreed to, which was prolonged in February, and 
 ultimately led to the peace signed between Prussia and France 
 at Frankfort in May, 187 1. 
 
 A short time before the conclusion of hostilities a most 
 important event in the history of the world took place at 
 Versailles. The battle of Sedan was the corner-stone of Ger- 
 man unity. After that victory diplomatic negotiations were 
 entered into between the Southern States and Prussia, which 
 resulted in the entrance of the former into the North-German 
 Confederation. But it was necessary for the solidity and 
 stability of this augmented fabric, that some guide and supe- 
 rior should be raised who should stand before the world as the 
 avowed and recognised head of the amalgamated German nation. 
 Who could be so fit to sustain so august a post as the warrior- 
 king — the Commander-in-Chief of the German forces, who had 
 led those forces from victory to victory over the enemy of Ger- 
 man unity ? and where could his inauguration to the restored 
 and emblazoned dignity of Emperor of Germany be so well 
 
xliv PREFATORY CHAPTER. 
 
 conducted as in the palace associated with the memory of the 
 rape of Strasburg and the commencement of a settled French 
 interference in Germany ? 
 
 On the 21st January, 187 1, King William of Prussia was 
 proclaimed Emperor of Germany in the palace of Versailles, 
 amid the cheers of the assembled German chieftains, and 
 within the sound of the guns engaged in the bombardment of 
 Paris. 
 
 This event was hailed throughout Germany as of equal im- 
 portance with the result of the war, and well it might be, for it 
 was the most certain guarantee of the future independence of 
 Germany. It is possible that France may again rise to a high 
 military position ; the enthusiasm and gallantry of her soldiery 
 may again carry her colours to her old frontier; she may become 
 more powerful in arms than her late rival, and may even tear 
 from Germany the left bank of the Rhine. This may be pos- 
 sible ; but it is impossible that she ever again will be able to 
 exert that ascendancy and interference in the internal affairs of 
 the country which was more galling to the proud Germanic 
 people than loss of provinces or disastrous defeats. From that 
 the declaration of the Empire of United Germany has saved 
 Germany for ever, and that declaration could not have been 
 made in 187 1 but for the war which occurred in 1866. 
 
SKETCH OF THE 
 
 operation: 
 
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 ARMTqftbeMAU 
 
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 Ltndrn & Grrno 
 
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 BOOK I. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 " Who cares with foemen when we deal, 
 If craft or courage guide the steel ? " — CONINGTON. 
 
 Although the animosity between Prussia and Austria which 
 led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1866 had been the gradual 
 growth of many years, the immediate causes of collision were 
 the consequences of the war waged by Germany against Den- 
 mark in 1864. The results of this contest were embodied in 
 the Treaty of Vienna of that year, by which King Christian of 
 Denmark surrendered all his rights to the Elbe duchies of 
 Schleswig and Holstein, and the duchy of Lauenburg, in favour 
 of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of Prussia.* 
 
 The Danish war had been undertaken in the first instance 
 by the Germanic Confederation, in consequence of a decree of 
 Federal execution against the King of Denmark as Duke of 
 Holstein, and, in virtue of that duchy, a prince and member of 
 the Confederation. The Diet which passed this decree had 
 intended that the execution should be carried out by amalga- 
 mated detachments of such troops of all the States included in 
 the Confederation as might be determined by the Diet. Some 
 of these troops actually marched into Holstein. But the occu- 
 pation of the Elbe duchies by troops of the Confederation, and 
 the consequent establishment of these districts as an inde- 
 
 * For translation of Treaty of Vienna of 30th October, 1864, see 
 Appendix I. 
 
2 'SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book I. 
 
 pendent State, would not have suited the political purposes of 
 Prussia. The object of this Power was not so much to free 
 .Holstein from the dominion of the Dane as to secure the 
 1 harbour of Kiel for the new fleet which was to be formed in 
 order to carry the black eagle of Brandenburg into a forward 
 place among the naval ensigns of the world : but the Diet was 
 determined to carry out the execution ; and, if the troops of 
 the Federal powers were once allowed to declare Schleswig- 
 Holstein independent, the subjection of the duchies to the 
 domination of Prussia would require a display of force and a 
 violation of public opinion for which Count Bismark did not 
 at that time consider himself strong enough. To annex an 
 independent community, established under the auspices of the 
 Diet, with a popular and chosen prince, would have roused all 
 Germany. The policy of the Cabinet of Berlin demanded that 
 Schleswig-Holstein should not become independent yet. 
 
 Prussia was not, however, sufficiently confident in her strength 
 to set aside at this time, with her own hand alone, the decrees 
 of the Diet. To have done so would have raised a storm 
 against which she had no reason to suppose that she could 
 successfully bear up. England was excited, and the warlike 
 people of that country eager to rush to arms in the cause of the 
 father of the young Princess of Wales. France was discon- 
 tented with the insolence of the English Cabinet, but might 
 have accepted a balm for her wounded pride in a free permis- 
 sion to push her frontier up to the Rhine. Austria would have 
 i opposed the aggrandizement of Prussia, and all Germany would 
 have at that time supported the great Power of the South in the 
 battle for the liberation of Holstein from the supremacy of the 
 Hohenzollerns as eagerly as from that of the House of Den- 
 mark. The independence of Holstein, which could not be 
 opposed by open force, had to be thwarted by stratagem. 
 Prussia sought the alliance of Austria with a proposal that 
 those two great Powers should constitute themselves the 
 executors of the Federal decree, and put aside the troops of 
 the minor States. Austria agreed, and rues at this hour the 
 signature of that convention. Yet she had much cause of 
 excuse. To allow Prussia to step forward alone as the 
 champion of German national feeling would have been for 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 3 
 
 Austria to resign for ever the supremacy of Germany into the 
 hands of her rival. Old traditions, chivalrous feeling, and 
 inherited memories, caused Austrians to look upon their Em- 
 peror as the head of Germany, the modern representative of 
 the elected tenant of the Holy Roman Empire's crown and 
 sceptre. Prussia was rapidly approaching to that supremacy with 
 gigantic strides. Austria was already reduced to the position 
 of being the advocate of German division and of small States, 
 purely because amalgamation and union would have drawn the 
 scattered particles not towards herself, but within the boundaries 
 of her northern neighbour. To permit Prussia to act alone in 
 the matter of the Elbe duchies would have been to see her 
 certainly obtain an important territorial aggrandizement, and 
 also to lose the opportunity of creating another independent 
 minor German State, which, if not a source of strength to 
 Austria, might be a slight obstacle in the path of Prussia. 
 
 The war against Denmark was undertaken. The Danes, 
 terribly inferior in numbers, organization, equipment, arma- 
 ment, and wealth, after a most gallant resistance, lost their last 
 strongholds ; while a Western Power, which had certainly by 
 insinuations, if not by facts or words, encouraged the Cabinet 
 of Copenhagen into the delusion that other soldiers than Danes 
 would be opposed to the German invaders of Schleswig, calmly 
 looked on, and sacrificed in a few weeks the reputation which, 
 fortuitously won on the plains of Belgium, had lived through 
 half a century. The Danish war terminated in the treaty 
 signed at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, and the duchies 
 of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were handed over to the 
 sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. 
 
 At this time the troops of Hanover and Saxony, which had 
 been ordered by the Diet to carry out the decree of Federal 
 execution against the King of Denmark, were in Holstein. The 
 next step in the policy of the great German Powers was to rid 
 the Duchies of their presence. On the 29th November, 1864, 
 Austria and Prussia laid the treaty of peace with Denmark 
 before the Germanic Diet, and proposed that, since the decree 
 of Federal execution had been carried out, the presence of the 
 Hanoverians and Saxons was no longer necessary in the duchies, 
 and that both the troops and Civil Commissioners of these 
 
 B 2 
 
4 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. '[Book I. 
 
 States should be required to vacate their position. This motion 
 was opposed by the representative of Bavaria, and was negatived 
 by a majority of one vote. On the 30th November, however, 
 the representative of Prussia announced in the Diet that the 
 claims of the Prince of Augustenburg to the duchies would be 
 settled by treaties between Austria and Prussia, and that these 
 two Powers would enter into negotiations with the pretender 
 on the subject, but that, in the meantime, the Saxons and 
 Hanoverians must retire from the disputed ground, and that 
 notes had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to Dresden and 
 Hanover, to demand the withdrawal of the contingents of those 
 States. The representative of Hanover declared that his 
 government was ready to withdraw its troops : the deputy of 
 Saxony appealed to the decision of the Diet. On the 5th 
 December, 1864, the Diet passed the motion proposed by 
 Austria and Prussia, in opposition to a protest from the 
 Bavarian representative. In consequence the troops and Civil 
 Commissioners of Hanover and Saxony were recalled from the 
 duchies by their respective Courts, and Austria and Prussia 
 took upon themselves the military and civil administration of 
 Schleswig-Holstein. . 
 
 Prussia stationed in the duchies six regiments of infantry, 
 two of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. Austria left 
 there only the brigade Kalik, which was composed of two 
 regiments of infantry, one battalion of rifles, two squadrons of 
 cavalry, and one battery of artillery.* 
 
 The Austrian Government appointed Herr Von Lederer as 
 Civil Commissioner, who was shortly afterwards recalled to 
 Vienna, and replaced by Herr Von Hahlhuber. The Prussian 
 Civil Commissioner was Herr Von Zedlitz. The Hanoverian 
 and Saxon Commissioners gave over the government of the 
 duchies to the Commissioners of the great Powers on the 5th 
 of December, who immediately entered upon their duties, and 
 established the seat of government at Schleswig. The expulsion 
 of the Civil Commissioners of the minor States, from the Elbe 
 duchies was the last act of the Schleswig-Holstein drama in 
 
 * The strength of the forces left would thus amount to about 12,000 
 Prussians and 5" 200 Austrians, as troops left here were maintained on a 
 peace establishment. 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. 
 
 which Austria co-operated with Prussia. From this time shel 
 drew near again to the smaller States, which were now em- 
 bittered against Prussia. 
 
 The administration of the duchies by the great Powers was 
 openly announced as only a temporary measure, and was re- 
 garded in this light by the whole world. Austria wished to give 
 up what she considered only a temporary trusteeship as soon as 
 possible, and proposed to place the Duke of Augustenburg pro- 
 visionally at the head of the duchies, while the rival claims of 
 the Houses of Augustenburg and Oldenburg to permanent 
 occupation should be investigated. In Prussia, however, mean- 
 while the lust for increase of territory had been developed. It 
 was discovered that the House of Brandenburg had itself claims 
 to succession. In a despatch of the 13th December, Count 
 Bismark informed the Austrian Cabinet that Prussia could not 
 accept the proposal to place the Prince of Augustenburg at the 
 head of the duchies ; and that such an act would forestall the 
 claims of other pretendants, and would be viewed with disfavour 
 by the Courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia ; that an I 
 annexation of the duchies to Prussia could not indeed be carried 
 out without the concurrence of Austria, but that such a step 
 would be very advantageous to the interests of Germany in 
 general, and would not be antagonistic to those of Austria in 
 particular; while Prussia's geographical position made it her 
 special duty to insure the duchies against the recurrence of 
 revolutionary disturbances. In this despatch the Cabinet of 
 Berlin also proposed that in furtherance of this scheme the 
 military organization of the duchies should be assimilated to 
 that of Prussia, and that their maritime population should be 
 made available for recruiting the Prussian marines and navy. 
 
 By a despatch of the 21st December Count Mensdorf, the 
 Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered the above des- 
 patch from Berlin, and said that Austria had undertaken the 
 solution of the question in the interests of Germany j that the 
 Austrian Cabinet was upon as friendly a footing with the Courts 
 of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia, as was that of Prussia ; 
 that Hanover made no definite claims, but only expressed ideas 
 of doing so \ that the Austrian Cabinet would also investigate 
 the claims of Oldenburg ; but that Russia had lately declared 
 
6 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book I. 
 
 that she would accept as authoritative only the decision of the 
 Germanic Confederation on the question of succession ; that if 
 Prussia had wished to advance claims to the inheritance of the 
 duchies, she ought to have done so before she made the de- 
 claration of the 28th May, in common with Austria, at the 
 Conference in London in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg. 
 As had already been remarked in Berlin through Count Karolyi,* 
 ^Austria could agree to an incorporation of the duchies in Prussia 
 only as an equivalent for an increase of her own German terri- 
 tory ; that if Count Bismark spoke of the obligations of his own 
 country, the Austrian Cabinet might say the same of itself; that 
 Austrian blood had not been spilt to destroy the balance of 
 power of the two great German States by a one-sided aggran- 
 dizement of Prussia. The despatch, in conclusion, let the 
 Prussian Government understand that it ought to place no 
 difficulties in the way of the rapid solution of this important 
 question. 
 
 The Austrian Government was now in error. This despatch 
 demonstrated that the avowed champion of the smaller States 
 was about to betray their cause for the sake of individual ad- 
 vantage, and threw a trump card into the hand of Count 
 Bismark. By some means this despatch was communicated to 
 an Austrian newspaper, the Prcsse, and appeared openly in 
 public print. The Vienna police failed to discover from what 
 sources the editor of the Presse had been supplied with a copy 
 of the official document, but strong suspicions have ever since 
 prevailed that the publication was due to Prussian agency, 
 which had acted with the object of shaking the confidence of 
 the minor States in the leading Power. In effect, several of the 
 representatives of the smaller States sought from Count Mens- 
 dorf a declaration of what portion of territory the Austrian 
 Government had in view in making the demand for an equi- 
 valent^ During the winter several addresses were got up by 
 Prussian partisans in the duchies, with the object of soliciting 
 the Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to agree to the incorporation 
 of the duchies with the kingdom of Prussia. These were 
 
 * Austrian Ambassador at Berlin. 
 
 + It is now supposed that the equivalent Austria wished to obtain was 
 the county of Glatz, in Prussian Silesia. 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 7 
 
 strongly negatived by protests directed to the Prussian House 
 of Commons, and were generally considered to be due more to 
 the electioneering tactics of Prussian agents than to any popular 
 desire for annexation. Such of the late parliamentary repre- 
 sentatives of the duchies as could meet together energetically 
 protested against the addresses as exponents of the national 
 will, but no means were taken for gauging the true desires of 
 the population. No parliamentary estates were assembled to 
 act as the mouth-piece of the influential and educated classes ; 
 no popular vote was allowed to declare the wishes of the people. 
 Either step might have shown that the standard of Prussia was 
 waving over a nation which aspired to hoisting the flag of inde- 
 pendence. 
 
 Prussia, unable without a public violation of decency to 
 monopolise the Elbe duchies, appeared in the early spring of 
 1865 desirous to lay aside the idea of annexation, and, instead, 
 to pave the way for the accession of a prince to the govern- 
 ment of the country, who might be a feudatory at least of the 
 Court of Berlin. On the 21st of February, 1865, a despatch 
 was sent by the Prussian Ministry to the Cabinet of Vienna, 
 which professed to propose the measures which the Prussian 
 Cabinet desired to see carried out in the duchies for the security 
 of the interests of Prussia and of Germany, as well as what 
 restraints should be placed upon the future sovereign of Schles- 
 wig-Holstein, both in his own and the general interest. The 
 substance of this despatch was,* that Prussia desired the 
 following guarantees from the new State of Schleswig-Holstein, 
 which was about to be established. 
 
 i. That this State should conclude a perpetual offensive and 
 defensive alliance with Prussia, by which Prussia would gua- 
 rantee the protection and defence of the duchies against every 
 hostile attack, while the whole naval and military power of the 
 duchies should form an integral portion of the Prussian fleet 
 and army. 
 
 2. The Prussian fleet — reinforced in the manner mentioned 
 in Article 1 — is to be entitled to the right of freely circulating 
 and being stationed in all Schleswig-Holstein waters ; and the 
 Prussian Government is to have the control on the Schleswig- 
 
 * For literal translation of this despatch see Appendix II. B. 
 
8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book T. 
 
 Holstein coasts of pilot dues, tonnage-dues, and lighthouse- 
 dues. 
 
 3. Schleswig-Holstein is to pay Prussia a tribute, which is to 
 be settled on an equitable basis, for the support of its army and 
 navy, of which Prussia will undertake the whole administration. 
 The Prussian Government will contract for the transport of 
 war material, &c, with the Schleswig-Holstein railways, on the 
 same terms as it does at present with the private* railway 
 companies of Prussia. 
 
 4. The fortresses of the duchies are to be regulated according 
 to agreement between the Prussian and ducal Governments, 
 and, according to the requirements of the former, for general 
 military purposes. 
 
 5. The duties of the new sovereign of Schleswig-Holstein 
 with regard to the German Confederation remain the same as 
 those of the former for Holstein. Prussia will find the Holstein 
 Federal contingent out of parts of her army which do not form 
 her own contingent. 
 
 6. Rendsburg, in accordance with the wishes of all con- 
 cerned, is to be declared a Federal fortress. Until that is done, 
 it is to be occupied by Prussia. 
 
 7. Inasmuch as Prussia takes upon herself the duties of the 
 military and maritime protection of the duchies, she requires 
 that certain territories should be given up to her for the cost of 
 fortifications, with full rights of sovereignty over them. The 
 territories required would be at least — 
 
 a. Sonderburg, with as much territory on both banks of the 
 Sound of Alsen as may be necessary for a naval harbour at 
 Hjorupshaff, and the security of the same. 
 
 b. The territory necessary for the security of the harbour of 
 Kiel, near the fort of Friedericsort. 
 
 c. Territories at both mouths of the proposed North Sea 
 and Baltic Canal, and, besides, the right of free navigation 
 along this canal. 
 
 d. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter into the Zollverein,f and the 
 
 * Railways not in the hands of the Government. 
 
 f The Zollverein, or General Customs Union, was entered into by most 
 of the German States under the guidance of Prussia. The object of this 
 union was to free the trade of Germany from the restrictions under which it 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 9 
 
 administration of the railways and telegraphs of the duchies is 
 to be amalgamated with that of Prussia. 
 
 These propositions showed that the Government of Prussia 
 was determined to attempt to establish Prussian supremacy in 
 the Elbe duchies. The aims of the Cabinet of Berlin were 
 clear to the Austrian Government; and Count Mensdorf, in 
 the name of the latter, by a despatch of the 5th March, 1865, 
 informed Count Bismark that a Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, 
 under such restrictions as would be entailed by an acceptance 
 of the Prussian proposals, could not enter the Confederation of 
 German princes on terms of equality, and with the power of a 
 free vote in the' Diet ; that the Prussian propositions were cal- 
 culated to forward the special interests of Prussia alone, but 
 that Austria and the whole Germanic Confederation had a 
 claim to the disposition of Schleswig-Holstein. Austria in the 
 same despatch, however, declared herself willing to concede 
 to Prussia the right of occupation of Kiel harbour, and 
 would agree to Rendsburg being declared a Federal fortress, to 
 the commencement of a North Sea and Baltic Canal, and to the 
 entrance of Schleswig-Holstein into the Zollverein. Further, 
 Austria would not go \ and she declared that treaties to settle 
 the details of the above concessions could be entered into with 
 profit only after the question of the sovereignty of the duchies 
 was decided. Austria also expressed a wish to terminate 
 negotiations from which there could be little hope that an 
 agreement would result. 
 
 Prussia and Austria had both spoken out their designs. That 
 i of Prussia was now manifestly the annexation of Schleswig- 
 i Holstein, that of Austria to thwart, hinder, and prevent the 
 
 lay from the conflicting interests and custom-house regulations of so many 
 independent States. By the Zollverein Treaty, which was re-established 
 ! on the 1st January, 1854, tolls or customs were collected once for all at the 
 common frontier of the united States, and the produce divided among them 
 ! in equitable proportions. The Zollverein included Prussia, and all the 
 minor German States except Holstein, Lauenburg, and the principality of 
 I Lichtenstein. Austria was not included in the Zollverein, but became con- 
 : nected with it in 1853 by a commercial treaty with Prussia, by which both 
 1 sides contracted to do nothing to prevent the free circulation of articles of 
 I trade in their respective territories, or the transit of any article of mer- 
 chandise, except tobacco, salt, gunpowder, playing-cards, and almanacs ; 
 the principal of these exceptions, tobacco, being a Government monopoly 
 . in Austria, and not in the other States. 
 
io SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 execution of Prussia's intention. Austria wished to carry out 
 the project of establishing the duchies as a separate German 
 State, under an independent prince, and thus to fulfil the object 
 with which the German war against Denmark had been under- 
 taken, and to satisfy the unanimous sympathy of Germany 
 evoked for that war. This was doubly Austria's interest, in 
 order to both impede the aggrandizement of her rival, and to 
 raise up another small State, a fresh unit of German nationality, 
 a fresh obstacle to the German unity which she had found could 
 not be effected under her own supremacy. But the question 
 of the Elbe duchies could not have been laid to rest in this 
 condition, even if Austria and Prussia had both earnestly 
 desired such a consummation. The whole Germanic people 
 was nervously interested in its solution. In April, 1865, a 
 motion brought forward in the Diet at Frankfort by the re- 
 presentatives of Bavaria, Saxony, and Hesse Darmstadt, which 
 proposed that Holstein should be given over to the Prince of 
 Augustenburg, was accepted by the majority.* This vote could, 
 under the circumstances, have no practical result, but it showed 
 that the current of feeling of the small States was setting 
 strongly against the threatened preponderance of Prussia, and 
 made Prussia feel that henceforth her policy must be antago- 
 nistic to, and subversive of, the dynasties of the minor Germanic 
 States. 
 
 Another element of discord had been in existence ever since 
 Austria and Prussia had undertaken the joint government of 
 the duchies, but it was not till the summer of 1865 that the 
 quarrels between the Commissioners of the two Powers be- 
 came so frequent and so stormy that they threatened to lead 
 to a German war, through which the results of the conflict of 
 1866 might have been anticipated by a year. The Austrian 
 Hahlhuber and the Prussian Zedlitz, engaged in a joint 
 government, and primed by their own Cabinets to support 
 diametrically opposite lines of policy, could not fail often and 
 seriously to disagree. The Austrian wished to encourage the 
 expression of popular feeling in the duchies, and to support 
 
 * This motion was brought forward on the 27th March, by Barons Von 
 der Pfordten, Beust, and Dalwigk, the representatives of Bavaria, Saxony, 
 and Hesse Darmstadt. 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. n 
 
 the manifestation of popular sympathy for the Prince of 
 Augustenburg : the Prussian desired to repress all expressions 
 of political feeling, except such as emanated from the partisans 
 of incorporation with Prussia. These difficulties in the ad- 
 ministration of the German provinces at the mouth of the Elbe 
 were reflected in the society of Vienna and Berlin. Feelings 
 rose high, and an appeal to arms seemed more than probable, 
 when Prussia deemed it prudent to re- open negotiations with 
 Austria. The celebrated personal meeting of the sovereigns 
 of the two countries was arranged. The Emperor Francis 
 Joseph and King William met at the little town of Gastein, on 
 the banks of the Achen, about forty miles south of Salzburg, 
 and from their interview originated the Convention of Gastein, 
 which was concluded on the 14th, ratified on the 20th August, 
 1865. 
 
 This convention consisted of the following heads : 
 
 1. Both Powers, Prussia and Austria, reserved to themselves 
 the common sovereignty over the duchies Schleswig and 
 Holstein, but Austria takes upon herself the provisional ad- 
 ministration of Holstein, Prussia takes upon herself that of 
 Schleswig. 
 
 2. Prussia and Austria will propose that a German fleet 
 should be established, and Kiel declared a Federal harbour. 
 Until the resolutions of the Germanic Confederation are carried 
 out the navies of Prussia and Austria are to use the harbour of 
 Kiel ; but Prussia is to have the command in that harbour, to 
 regulate the police there, and to acquire all territorial rights 
 necessary for the security of this harbour. 
 
 3. Austria and Prussia will propose at Frankfort* that Rends- 
 burg be declared a Federal fortress ; until Rendsburg is recog- 
 nised as a Federal fortress, it will be occupied by Austria and 
 Prussia in common. 
 
 4. As long as the division of the administration of Schleswig 
 and Holstein between Austria and Prussia endures, Prussia is 
 to retain two high roads through Holstein, one from Liibeck to 
 Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg. 
 
 5. Prussia, on her side, takes upon herself the care of a tele- 
 
 * The Parliament of the Germanic Confederation assembled at Frankfort. 
 
12 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 graphic communication and postal line to Kiel and to Rends- 
 burg, and also the construction of a direct railway from Liibeck 
 by Kiel through Holstein. without raising claims to sovereign 
 rights over the line. 
 
 6. Schleswig-Holstein is to enter the Zollverein. 
 
 7. The construction of the North Sea and Baltic Canal, 
 with the results naturally accruing therefrom, is given over to 
 Prussia. 
 
 8. With reference to the financial arrangements established 
 by the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th October, 1864, all remains 
 as of old. Only the duchy of Lauenburg is to pay no share in 
 the expenses of the war, and the tributes of Schleswig and 
 Holstein are to be divided in proportion to the amount of their 
 populations. 
 
 9. The Emperor of Austria gives up the duchy of Lauenburg, 
 with all rights as gained by the treaty of Vienna, to the King of 
 Prussia, who will pay for this 2,500,000 Danish dollars in the 
 Prussian silver currency, four weeks after the ratification of this 
 Convention. 
 
 Thus by the Convention of Gastein the administration of the 
 duchies was territorially divided between Prussia and Austria : 
 Prussia obtained certain proprietary and administrative rights 
 of great importance in Holstein ; and, what is most notable, 
 Austria sold her rights to the duchy of Lauenburg, which she 
 had acquired by conquest in common with Prussia, and thus 
 tacitly recognised the validity of the Austro-Prussian conquest 
 of the Danish duchies, and of the right of either Power to dis- 
 pose of the conquest as it might desire, were the concurrence of 
 the other obtained. 
 / The Convention of Gastein was opposed on many sides. 
 The princes of the small Thuringian states of Weimar, Meinin- 
 gen, and Coburg protested against the clause by which Lauen- 
 burg was ceded to Prussia. The national party in Germany 
 expressed loud disapprobation of the severance of Schleswig 
 from Holstein. The French and English Ministers for Foreign 
 Affairs in confidential notes expressed unfavourable opinions of 
 the Convention. The Prussian House of Commons was loud 
 in its censure of the Convention, and of the Government which 
 by concluding it menaced a heavy demand from the Prussian 
 
Chap. I.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 13 
 
 finances for the purchase of Lauenburg. The King ot Prussia, 
 however, paid for the ceded rights of Austria over the duchy 
 out of his own private purse ; the protestations of foreigners 
 were disregarded ; and, on the 15th September, Lauenburg was 
 occupied by the Prussians. 
 
 In the few succeeding days the Prussian troops, except those 
 whose retention in that duchy had been specially agreed to, 
 withdrew from Holstein into Schleswig and Lauenburg. The 
 Austrian force which had been in the two duchies concentrated 
 itself in Holstein, under the command of General Gablenz, who 
 was made Governor of Holstein b> the Emperor Francis 
 Joseph. General Gablenz retained Herr Von Hahlhuber as 
 Civil Commissioner, but after a short time the latter was 
 replaced by Herr Von Hofman. 
 
 The King of Prussia nominated General Von Manteuffel as 
 Governor of Schleswig, to whom Herr Von Zedlitz was attached 
 as Civil Commissioner. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 FRUITLESSNESS OF THE GASTEIN CONVENTION. 
 
 The Convention of Gastein silenced that portion of the German 
 Press which had, during the summer of 1865, openly anticipated 
 a rupture between Prussia and Austria, and had indulged in 
 calculations as to which side Bavaria, Saxony, Hesse, and 
 Hanover would be forced to espouse. It seemed that civil war 
 between divisions of the Germanic people would be avoided ; 
 and for a time the two great Powers of Central Europe, by 
 acting cordially in common, led many men to believe that com- 
 munity of interests and unity of policy was secured between 
 them. Thus, when the Diet assembled at Frankfort declared 
 against the Convention of Gastein, the Governments of Austria 
 and Prussia alike sent warning notes to the Frankfort Senate. 
 Again, when in November, 1865, the representatives of Bavaria, 
 Saxony, and Hesse brought a motion before the Diet which 
 proposed that Austria and Prussia should now call an assembly 
 of the estates of Schleswig and Holstein, which might partici- 
 pate in the solution of the question of the duchies, Austria and 
 Prussia alike protested against this motion. Still, those who 
 looked forward into the future foresaw that there were latent 
 circumstances which foretold an approaching dissolution of the 
 cordiality of the great Powers. One of these circumstances was 
 the rising amity between Prussia and Italy ; but more impor- 
 tant was the jealousy for supremacy in Germany which the 
 present position of affairs in the duchies was only too well cal- 
 culated to rouse to action. 
 
 Prussia published, in the beginning of October, 1865, the 
 opinion of the law officers of the Crown with respect to the 
 question of the duchies. This opinion was practically that all 
 
Chap. II.] THE G A STEIN CONVENTION. 15 
 
 rights over the duchies originated in the Treaty of Vienna of 
 the 30th October, 1864, and that all rightful claims of the 
 House of Augustenburg to the crown of these provinces would 
 have been annulled by this treaty, even if such claim had 
 ever existed; but that, in fact, no rightful claim ever had 
 existed. 
 
 The Austrian administration in Holstein, notwithstanding 
 this publication, allowed the rights of the Prince of Augusten- 
 burg to be continually treated of by the press, and at public 
 assemblies, as a matter on which no doubt could be entertained, 
 and suffered considerable agitation to take place in favour of 
 his rights. The Prussian administration in Schleswig, on the 
 other hand, allowed it to be understood that all such agitation 
 would be regarded as treasonable, since it was calculated to 
 thwart the aims of the temporary sovereign. 
 
 Nor was the Prussian Government disposed to look on 
 calmly while the duchy of Holstein was permitted the right of 
 free opinion and free discussion, the tide of which invariably 
 seemed to set against the idea of incorporation with Prussia. 
 On the 30th January, 1866, Count Bismark despatched a note 
 to Vienna, in which he pointed out to the Austrian Cabinet 
 how the conduct of its administration in Holstein must infal- 
 libly complicate the general relations between the two Govern- 
 ments. This note was hardly despatched when a monster 
 meeting of the Schleswig- Holstein Unions* at Altona gave the 
 Prussian Minister occasion to despatch a second, which is of 
 peculiar interest. 
 
 In this note Count Bismark recalled to mind the happy days 
 of Gastein and Salzburg, and expressed his belief, that Austria 
 would be united with Prussia, not only in a conviction of the 
 necessity of withstanding revolutionary ideas, but also in the 
 plan of the campaign against such ideas ; that affairs were now 
 assuming a very serious aspect ; that the bearing of the Govern- 
 ment of Holstein must be regarded as directly aggressive ; and 
 that the Austrian Government ought not to carry on against 
 Prussia in the provinces the same agitation which it had united 
 with the Prussian to quell at Frankfort. The note went on to 
 say that the Convention of Gastein had treated of the adminis- 
 
 * Vereine. 
 
1 6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 tration of the two duchies as only a provisional measure; but 
 that Prussia had the right to advance that Austria, during the 
 epoch of the provisional government, should maintain in Hol- 
 stein the status quo in which she had received the province, in 
 the same manner as Prussia felt herself bound to preserve this 
 status in Schleswig. The Prussian Government requested the 
 Austrian to ponder upon the matter, and then to negotiate. 
 Were a negative or evasive answer returned, Prussia would be 
 forced to adopt the conviction that Austria, prompted by a 
 traditional antagonism, no longer wished to act harmoniously 
 in union with her. This conviction would be painful, but 
 Prussia must finally see her way clearly. If it were made im- 
 possible for her to act in concert with Austria, she must obtain 
 full freedom for her own policy in order to contract closer 
 alliances in other directions for the advancement of her own 
 immediate interests. 
 
 The negative and evasive answer was returned in a note 
 from Count Mensdorf, on the 9th of February, in which this 
 Minister, in the name of Austria, declined the responsibility 
 for the national assemblies, because the duchies were only 
 under a provisional government. The Count added, that 
 Austria was well aware she did not occupy Holstein as an 
 acquisition, but that so long as the provisional government 
 might last, she considered herself perfectly free in the adminis- 
 tration of the duchy, and could admit no control from any 
 quarter. 
 
 This despatch from Vienna was the first step towards the 
 development in a crisis of the political circumstances which 
 \ now followed rapidly, one after the other. Austria saw in the 
 / Prussian declaration a hidden threat of war, and an open 
 reference to an intended alliance with her mortal foe, Italy, 
 and believed that she was threatened with an imminent and 
 simultaneous attack on both her northern and southern 
 frontiers. This belief was strengthened by the apparent fact, 
 that a council was held at Berlin, on the 28th of February, 
 under the presidency of the King, to which the chief of the 
 staff of the army, General Von Moltke, and the military 
 Governor of Schleswig, General Von Manteuffel, were sum- 
 moned. Austria accorded no faith to the most pacific assur- 
 
Chap. II.] THE GASTEIN CONVENTION. 17 
 
 ances on the part of Prussia that these fears were groundless. 
 Nor was her confidence in the peaceful intentions of her rival 
 established by the denial of a rumour which had gained public 
 credence, and which asserted that the question discussed at 
 this council had been whether, under the aspect of political 
 circumstances, Prussia ought to prepare herself for the war 
 which might be the result of their development \ nor by the 
 assertion that no preparations for war of any kind had been 
 made in Prussia. Austria, anxious at the same time for her 
 position in Germany and Italy, full of mistrust and anger 
 against Prussia, badly directed and counselled, perhaps also 
 instigated by the embittered enemies of Prussia in Germany, 
 began early in the month of March her preparations not only 
 for a war, but also for a struggle of which the intended object 
 was to support the Germanic Confederation against Prussia. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 COMMENCEMENT OF THE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 
 
 Open antagonism between Prussia and Austria was declared 
 by the exchange of notes which was mentioned towards the 
 end of the last chapter. 
 
 Prussia had acquired full freedom for her own policy by the 
 Austrian answer to her declaration of the 26th of January, and 
 men in Germany looked around anxiously to see what use 
 Count Bismark would make of this liberty. For a time the 
 wary Minister gave no signal of what he was about to do. 
 Many expected that, face to face with the strong military power 
 of Austria, and with the sentiment of all Germany hostile to 
 ] him, he would be obliged to treat with Vienna. 
 
 The solution of a conflict between different States depends 
 ultimately always upon strength. Prussia, therefore, naturally 
 desired to reinforce her strength, and to replace the alliance 
 which had been broken by some new alliance. 
 
 But where to turn for the new alliance ? In Germany there 
 was no hope of finding friends among the Governments, for 
 these were all interested in the maintenance of small States, 
 -and naturally antagonistic to national community. Nor were 
 the people of Germany at this time at all disposed to regard 
 Count Bismark as their champion, or accept him as the leader 
 of a national party. The late quarrels between the Prussian 
 Minister and the Prussian Commons, the press prosecutions in 
 Prussian territory instigated by the Government over which he 
 presided, the conservative tendencies of his views on taxation, 
 marked him out more as the enemy than the harbinger of a 
 free national unity. The people of Germany were at this time 
 
Chap III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 19 
 
 no allies of the counsellor of the head of the House of Hohen- 
 zollern. 
 
 As no alliance could be found in Germany, the Prussian 
 Minister looked abroad, and there saw, in the south-western 
 frontier of the territories of the Kaiser, a natural ally to join 
 hand-in-hand with Prussia against Austria. This was the 
 newly formed, hardly consolidated kingdom of Italy. This 
 ally could boast no long list of victories borne on the banners 
 of its soldiery, its traditions did not reach seven years back, its 
 army was composed of raw levies ; but its people were feverish, 
 eager, and covetous to gain Venetia, and to inflict a blow upon 
 the detested Austrian. 
 
 Before the conclusion of the Convention of Gastein, in the 
 middle of the year 1865, when at that time a rupture of the 
 alliance between Austria and Prussia appeared possible, the 
 latter power had drawn near to the young kingdom of Italy, 
 and had entered into negotiations for the conclusion of a 
 commercial treaty between the Zollverein and that kingdom. 
 The larger number of the minor States which belong to the 
 Zollverein* had not yet recognised the kingdom of Italy, and 
 their rulers had no desire now to do so, for the recognition of 
 a sole sovereign of the united peninsula would be tantamount 
 to a recognition of the advantage of the concentration of the 
 small States which had, previously to 1859, been independent 
 portions of Italy, and of the superfluous character of their 
 reigning dynasties. On the other side, Italy would not enter 
 into negotiations with a Confederation of which most of the 
 component States still denied her title-deeds of kingdom. 
 Prussia stepped in as mediator. Italy was happy to be recog- 
 nised. The small States of the Zollverein were forced into 
 agreement with the proposals of Prussia. Count Bismark 
 threatened to dissolve the Zollverein. The mere threat drove 
 a probe into the mercantile classes of all Germany; the 
 interests of the monied aristocracy was brought to bear on the 
 Governments; and on the 31st December, 1865, a commercial 
 treaty between the newly recognised kingdom of Italy and the 
 Zollverein was signed. 
 
 * See p. 8. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 When the prospect of a war between Prussia and Austria 
 arose in the spring of 1866, came Italy's opportunity to com- 
 plete the work which had been commenced at Magenta, to 
 secure and unite to herself the only province which, still under 
 the rule of the foreigner, prevented her from being free from the 
 Alps to the Adriatic. Italy naturally drew as close to Prussia 
 as she possibly could. Austria requires a long time to mobilize 
 her army, and had begun her preparations for war in the middle 
 of February. Public attention was directed to them by a 
 
 .council of war held at Vienna on the 10th March, to which 
 Feldzeugmeister Benedek was summoned from Verona. At 
 this council the party in favour of war was strongly predomi- 
 nant ; and decided that Austria was strong enough to take the 
 field against Prussia and Italy at the same time, provided that 
 measures were taken to isolate Prussia in Germany, and to 
 draw the States of the Confederation to the Austrian side. At 
 this council too high an estimate appears to have been formed 
 of the strength of Austria, and far too low a calculation made 
 of the powers of Prussia ; for the opinion of the council seems 
 to have been that Austria could only emerge from such a war as 
 a decisive victor. Italy was so detested, that all Austrians wished 
 for an Italian war; and, with justice, among the Austrian 
 
 1 soldiery a proud contempt was entertained for the Italian army. 
 It was considerd that Prussia, weakened by an internal political 
 conflict, could not unite her contending parties in a common 
 
 'foreign policy. Nor was a high opinion entertained of her 
 military resources and organization. The professional papers 
 and periodicals of Austria ingeniously demonstrated that 
 Prussia, however hardly pressed, could not place her normal 
 irmy on a complete war-footing, because trained men would 
 )e wanting. The writers of these articles calculated that the 
 Jattalions of infantry could only be brought into the field with 
 a muster-roll of eight hundred men ; no consideration was paid 
 to the Landwehr, — in fact, doubts were in some cases thrown 
 upon the existence of Landwehr soldiers at all, and those who 
 believed in their existence entertained no doubts of their certain 
 disloyalty. It was also calculated that the Prussian army would 
 have to make such strong detachments for the garrisons of 
 fortresses that a very small force would be left for operations 
 
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 21 
 
 in the field. These false calculations, the first step and perhaps 
 the most certain to the bitter defeat which ensued, were due to 
 defective information, and to the absence from the War Office 
 of Vienna of those detailed accounts of foreign military statis- 
 tics, deprived of which any country that undertakes a military 
 measure of any kind necessarily gropes in the dark. To isolate 
 Prussia from Germany, and to entangle her in a strife against 
 overwhelming numbers, the plan of Austria was to draw the 
 Germanic Confederation into a decisive action against Prussia, " 
 in order that the Confederation might be implicated in the 
 question in dispute between Austria and Prussia concerning 
 Schleswig-Holstein. Austria was certain of gaining, by the vote 
 of the minor States, a majority in the Germanic Diet against 
 the aims and objects of Prussia. If Prussia bowed to the 
 decision of this majority, her position of power in the Con- 
 federation would for a long time be shaken, but if she refused 
 to accept this decision, then would arise a favourable opportu- 
 nity to declare Federal execution against Prussia, and to crush 
 her with the whole forces of the Confederation. 
 
 After this council of war, the Austrian preparations were 
 secretly pushed forward. The fortresses, especially Cracow, 
 were strengthened and prepared for defence, and the troops in 
 Bohemia were reinforced. These armaments and military 
 movements excited the attention of Prussia. Questions were 
 asked : Austria answered that the population of Bohemia had 
 broken out in riots against the Jews, and that the Imperial 
 Government was necessarily obliged to send troops into the 
 disturbed districts for the protection of its Jewish subjects. 
 The Prussians averred that, by a singular coincidence, the care 
 and protection of the Jewish subjects drew the troops sus- 
 piciously close to the frontier, while the Jews chiefly resided in 
 Prague, the capital and almost the central point of the province 
 of Bohemia. 
 
 The Austrian army in a mobilization, before the war of 1866,* 
 had to be increased from the 269,000 men, whom it mustered 
 
 * The Austrian army, in consequence of the disastrous results of the 
 campaign of 1866, has been reorganized. The text alludes to the former 
 organization of the army. 
 
22 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 on a peace footing, to 620,000. It therefore required the 
 recall of over 350,000 men on furlough, or soldiers of reserve, 
 to complete its strength. This increase of force could only 
 conveniently be made in the recruiting districts of each regi- 
 ment, because the men who were called in for each regiment 
 must be clothed and armed by the fourth battalion, which was 
 always stationed in time of peace as a weak depot in the 
 recruiting district. In March, 1866, the quarters of many 
 regiments of the Austrian army were changed, so as to bring 
 the battalions into the vicinity of their recruiting depots ; and 
 several regiments from Italy, Gallicia, and Hungary, which 
 could conveniently receive their full complement of men only 
 in Bohemia, Moravia, or Austrian Silesia, were moved into 
 those provinces. By these means the Austrian forces in 
 Bohemia were, by the end of March, reinforced by about 
 twenty battalions of infantry and several regiments of cavalry, 
 which were, however, to avoid suspicion, still retained upon a 
 peace footing ; while the purchase of horses, and the comple- 
 tion of fourth battalions to full strength, commenced in various 
 parts of the Imperial dominions. 
 
 At the same time the Austrian Government took steps to 
 strengthen the fortresses in Italy, and to protect, in case of 
 war, the coasts of Istria and Dalmatia. In the same month an 
 extraordinary but very secret military activity commenced in 
 Wurtemberg and Saxony. All ideas of armament were officially 
 denied by Austria, but the Prussian agents did not fail to 
 observe their existence. The King of Prussia had already 
 taken action, and issued a decree by which the authors of any 
 attempts to subvert his own authority or that of the Emperor 
 of Austria in the Elbe duchies, were threatened with imprison- 
 ment. This decree was published by General Von ManteufTel 
 in the duchy of Schleswigon the 13th March, and gave occasion 
 for the Austrian Ambassador at the Court of Berlin to ask 
 Count Bismark, on the 16th March, whether Prussia seriously 
 intended to break the Convention of Gastein. Count Bismark 
 answered No, and added that he could make no further answer 
 by word of mouth, as oral conversations were easily liable to 
 be misunderstood, and that, if the Austrian Ambassador desired 
 any further information on the subject, it would be better that 
 
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 23 
 
 he should put his interrogations in writing. This was not, 
 however, done. 
 
 Directly after the council of war at Vienna, on the 10th 
 March, Austria had taken steps to array the minor States 
 against Prussia, and to secure their co-operation. In a circular 
 despatch of the 16th March, the States of the Germanic Con- 
 federation which were inclined towards Austria were warned 
 of the warlike attitude of Prussia, and were cautioned to take 
 heed to the armament of their contingents and to their com- 
 pletion to war strength, since Austria had an intention to soon 
 bring before the Germanic Diet a motion for the mobilization 
 of the Federal army. 
 
 The movement of troops in Bohemia daily excited the appre- 
 hensions of Prussia. There still rankled in that country, the 
 memory of 1850, when she, unprepared, suddenly found herself 
 opposed to Austria fully armed, and was forced to submit to 
 the terms dictated to her at Olmiitz. Count Bismark had,? 
 however, provided that no such fate should befall her in 
 1866. 
 
 Although he knew well the position in which he stood with 
 regard to the minor States, he considered it advisable to force 
 from them a declaration of their policy. In a despatch of the 
 24th March he declared that, on account of the armaments of 
 Austria, Prussia was also at last obliged to take measures for 
 the protection of Silesia; for, although Austria at present 
 spoke in peaceful terms, it was to be feared that these would 
 alter as soon as her preparations for war were completed. 
 Prussia, he added, could not, however, remain content with 
 measures calculated for her momentary safety alone ; she must 
 look into the future, and seek there guarantees for that security 
 which she had in vain anticipated from her alliance with 
 Austria. Prussia, of course, under these circumstances, looked 
 in the first place towards the other German States ; but her 
 perception ever became clearer that the Germanic Confedera- 
 tion in its present form did not fulfil its aim, not even did it do 
 so when Austria and Prussia were united, much less would it 
 when these two Powers were disunited. If Prussia now were 
 attacked by Austria, she could not expect the support of the 
 Germanic Confederation : she could only rely upon the good- 
 
24 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 will of the single States which had promised her their help 
 without reference to the bonds of the Confederation. In this 
 despatch, therefore, Prussia wished to ask with what feelings 
 she was regarded by individual States ; and, that she might 
 prove their sincerity towards her, she would in any case desire 
 a reform of the political and military constitution of the Con- 
 federation. 
 
 (This despatch of Count Bismark, which was really only a 
 question to the minor States of how they would act in case of a 
 war between Prussia and Austria, was answered by their re- 
 spective Governments in almost identical terms. With one 
 accord they pointed to the Eleventh Article of the Charter of 
 Constitution of the Germanic Confederation, by which all 
 States members of the Confederation bound themselves never 
 ^ to make war against each other, but to bring their differences 
 before the Germanic Diet, which was to be the mediator and 
 arbiter between the disputants. How worthless any such 
 article can be to restrain physical by moral force was never 
 more clearly demonstrated than in the late struggle, when the 
 Germanic Confederation was shivered to pieces in the shock of 
 battle of its contending members. 
 
 Prussia now saw it was time to make her preparations for 
 war. Austria had earlier begun to arm, but the more elastic 
 military organization of Prussia, the constant attention — sprung 
 from the knowledge of her statesmen that, sooner or later, a 
 German war would take place — which had for many years been 
 devoted to her army, more than compensated for the start of a 
 few weeks which Austria had gained. 
 
 By decrees of the 27 th and 29th of March the first arma- 
 ments were ordered in the provinces most exposed to attack 
 from Austria. The battalions of the five divisions which garri- 
 soned the provinces contingent with the Austrian and Saxon 
 frontiers were placed on the highest peace footing, but not yet 
 increased to war strength. Five brigades of field artillery were, 
 however, fully completed ; and the armament of the fortresses of 
 Glatz, Cosel, Neisze, Torgau, "Wittemberg, Spandau, and Mag- 
 deburg commenced. Prussia, confident in the rapidity with 
 which her whole army could be mobilized, was able to limit 
 herself to these purely defensive augmentations, which entailed 
 
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 25 
 
 an increase of only about 20,000 men to the army always 
 maintained in time of peace. She deferred till the last neces- 
 sary moment the raising of the army to war strength, in order 
 as long as possible to leave the men, who must be called into 
 the ranks, to their trades, professions, and labours. Of this 
 increase of the army no secret was made; the decree which 
 ordered it was openly published and commented upon in the 
 daily press. 
 
 On the 31st March, Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, announced to the Cabinet of Berlin that all 
 movements of troops in Bohemia had really taken place only 
 in consequence of the riots against the Jews, and that the 
 Emperor Francis Joseph had never contemplated an attack on 
 Prussia. 
 
 On the 6th April Prussia announced in answer that she had 
 not been the first to arm, and that now she only had taken 
 defensive measures. The Austrian Government replied on the 
 following day that no overwhelming concentration of troops had 
 taken place in Bohemia, in fact nothing to approach what the 
 Austrian organization could place in the field if a great war 
 were in prospect ; that no extraordinary purchase of horses had 
 been made, and that the number of men who had been on 
 furlough recalled to the ranks was not worthy of mention ; that 
 any discussion as to priority of armament was rendered super- 
 fluous by the declaration of the Emperor, that he had never 
 contemplated an attack on Prussia; that the Cabinet of Vienna 
 desired only a similar declaration on the part of King William ; 
 and that, since no preparation for war had been made in 
 Austria, it was only necessary that Prussia should repeal the 
 armaments which had been decreed at the end of March. 
 
 On the 15th April, Count Bismark sent a note to Vienna, in 
 which, without argument, he assumed that Austria had armed, 
 and had commenced to arm before Prussia, and expressed his 
 opinion that Austria should be the first to commence to disarm. 
 
 On the 1 8th Count Mensdorf replied, and promised that 
 Austria would move the troops quartered in Bohemia from 
 those positions in which Prussia had considered that they were 
 intended for an attack upon Silesia. 
 
 Count Bismark, on the 21st April, remarked in reply that, on 
 
26 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book I. 
 
 authentic news being received of the disarming of Austria, 
 Prussia would follow step by step in the same course. Scarcely, 
 however, had Austria named the 25th of April as the termina- 
 tion of all military proceedings which might be supposed to be 
 intended against Prussia, than the promise of disarmament was 
 stultified by the announcement that, although Austria would 
 disarm in Bohemia, she was compelled to take decisive measures 
 for the defence of Venetia against Italy. 
 
 Prussian partisans argue that the armament of Venetia was 
 an equal threat against Prussia as the armament of Bohemia, 
 but this was not necessarily the case. Six hundred thousand 
 Austrian soldiers south of the Danube would require as long a 
 time to be moved to Saxony as would suffice to mobilize the 
 whole Prussian army. But Prussia was allied with Italy, and 
 although she chose to fancy that Austrian troops in the Tyrol 
 might be intended to act upon the Elbe, in reality she saw in 
 them the means given to Austria to crush an army allied to 
 Prussia, after the defeat of which Austria might turn her undis- 
 tracted forces against her German enemies. 
 
 There is no doubt that Italy had already armed, and was 
 fully prepared to take advantage of the opportunity of a war 
 between Prussia and Austria to attack Venetia. The open 
 threat that Venetia would be assailed at the first favourable 
 moment would alone have been ground sufficient for Austria 
 to declare war against Italy, and to sweep away an army which 
 was avowedly maintained only to strike her in the hour of 
 trouble. On the 22nd April the soldiers of reserve and men 
 on furlough were called up for the regiments in Venetia, and 
 measures were taken to prepare for the field an army to act 
 against the Italians. 
 
 These steps called forth a despatch from Count Bismark, in 
 which Prussia took her new ally under her protectorate, and 
 demanded that Austria should not only disarm in Bohemia and 
 Moravia, but also in Venetia. To this Austria did not consent, 
 and Prussia made an advance in her armaments. This was 
 accelerated by the discovery that some of the minor States were 
 secretly treating at Bamberg, which aroused the suspicion that 
 a coalition was being formed against Prussia. On the 24th 
 April, the infantry of five Prussian corps d'armee, as well as the 
 
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 27 
 
 whole of the cavalry and artillery, were increased to war strength, 
 but as yet were not mobilized.* 
 
 On the 26th April, Austria again reverted to the Schleswig- 
 Holstein question, and proposed to submit the definitive deci- 
 sion of this question to the Germanic Confederation, and to 
 hand over the duchies to the Prince of Augustenburg. Both 
 these propositions were declined by Prussia on the 7th May, 
 when Count Bismark remarked that the competency of the 
 Confederation to decide in these international questions could 
 not be recognised, and that the whole question could be most 
 simply and easily settled by coming to an understanding with 
 Austria, for the reform of the Constitution of the Confederation 
 by the speedy assembly of a German Parliament, as had already 
 been proposed by Prussia on the 9th April, t 
 
 Matters were daily approaching a crisis, and Prussia was de- 
 termined to be ready for the conflict which would probably 
 soon break out. The King of Prussia, on the 4th May, had 
 already ordered the five corps d'armee, which had been aug- 
 mented to war strength, to be mobilized ; and ordered the 
 soldiers of reserve of the other J four corps d'arme'e to be called 
 in, so as to place these also upon a war strength. On the 7th 
 May, these four corps also received orders to be mobilized ; so 
 that now the whole of the war army, as provided for by the 
 regulations of the Prussian service, were called under arms. 
 The mobilization was effected with wonderful rapidity and pre- 
 cision. At the end of fourteen days, the 490,000 men who 
 formed the strength of this army stood on parade, armed, 
 clothed, equipped with all necessities for a campaign, and fully 
 provided with the necessary transport trains, provision and am- 
 munition columns, as well as field hospitals. The rapidity with 
 which these trains were provided might almost be accepted as 
 proof that, for several years, Prussia had foreseen that her policy 
 would not, for any great length of time, conduct her along the 
 paths of peace. 
 
 * The term mobilization is applied to the administrative acts which sup- 
 ply a collection of soldiers with the transport, commissariat, &c, which 
 render them fit to be moved into and act in the field. 
 
 f See page 30. 
 
 J See Military Organization, p. 61. 
 
iS SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 On the 19th May, the concentration of the Prussian army 
 might have commenced, and actually by the end of May the 
 troops had taken up their positions in the frontier provinces, a 
 triumph for the Prussian machinery of mobilization. The rapi- 
 dity with which this army was called together, equipped, and 
 transported to its positions on the frontier cannot be too highly 
 admired, especially when it is considered that more than 
 250,000 of the soldiers had been suddenly called in from the 
 reserve and Landwehr. Prussian authors, with complacency, 
 point to the army collected upon the frontier at the very begin- 
 ning of June, and indignantly demand how Europe can suppose 
 that Prussia incited the war, when, if she wished to make an 
 attack upon Austria, she could have done so at this moment 
 with such a great advantage. For, although the Austrian arma- 
 ments had been commenced ten weeks earlier than the Prus- 
 sians, they were still in a very backward state, and the Austrian 
 army was still far from ready to open the campaign. But was 
 Prussia really so moderate as her advocates would have the 
 world believe ? "Was it desire of peace or fear of failure which 
 stayed her hand, and held her marshalled corps on the north of 
 the mountain frontier of Bohemia ? -It may have been both, 
 but the results of the war show that the latter entered into the 
 calculations of those who planned the Prussian strategy. The 
 army was ready, and might have attacked Austria, but it would 
 in its advance have exposed its communications to the assault of 
 the minor States, and, until forces were prepared to quell these, 
 the main army could not assume the offensive. This appears* 
 to have been the probable cause why the troops were not at! 
 once concentrated, and pushed immediately into Bohemia. 
 
 As it was, at the very beginning the Prussian army confined-} 
 itself to taking up defensive positions to cover the provinces 
 most exposed to attack, especially towards Bohemia. Thel 
 Austrian Army of the North had commenced its concentration 
 in Bohemia on the 13th May, and Feldzeugmeister* Benedek: 
 had there taken over the command-in-chief of it on the 18th. 
 The 1 st, 5th, and 6th Prussian corps d'armeet were posted inl 
 Silesia, the 2d and 3d corps in Lusatia, and the 4th corps rounc'j 
 
 * General of Artillery. t See p. 53. 
 
Chap. III.] PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 29 
 
 Erfurt. The Guards corps was still left at Berlin, and the 7th 
 and 8th corps were retained in Westphalia and the Rhine pro- 
 vinces respectively. 
 
 Several of the minor States — such as Bavaria, Hesse Darm- 
 stadt, and Nassau — had also ordered their armies, and their 
 contingents of Federal troops, to be mobilized during the month 
 of May ; others — as Saxony, Electoral Hesse, Wurtemburg, and 
 Hanover — had commenced the augmentation of the military 
 peace establishments by the recall of men on furlough, or 
 soldiers of the reserve. 
 
 Italy had early in the year commenced preparations for an 
 attack against Venetia as soon as war might break out between 
 Austria and Prussia. At the beginning of May the Italian 
 armaments assumed a more definite form; and, in order to 
 enlist more closely national feeling in the probable struggle, on 
 the 8th of that month a decree was published at Florence for 
 the formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under 
 the immediate command of General Garibaldi. All party con- 
 tests, all political animosities, in Italy were silenced. The whole 
 nation drew together for a common assault upon its traditional 
 enemy when he should be encumbered by the heavy pressure 
 of Prussia upon his northern frontier. The crowds of volun- 
 teers that flocked to Garibaldi's standard were so great that, at 
 the end of May, the number of battalions had to be doubled. 
 On this Austria raised a compulsory loan in Venetia of twelve 
 million gulden, which so embittered and excited Italian feelino- 
 that it seemed doubtful whether King Victor Emanuel would 
 be able to keep his people in hand, or prevent excitable indi- 
 viduals from precipitating a contest for which the moment had 
 not yet arrived. 
 
 Thus the nations were making ready for war, each, with its 
 hand on its sword, moving heavy masses of troops to convenient 
 positions near the frontiers of its probable antagonist. Before 
 detailing the positions these masses assumed, or attempting to 
 show how they were guided into the shock of battle, it is neces- 
 sary to cast a glance over the diplomatic sparring which pre- 
 ceded the military conflict. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Prussia's motion for reform of Germanic confederation. 
 
 As was referred to in a previous chapter, Prussia brought for- 
 ward, on the 9th April, in the Germanic Diet a motion for the 
 reform of the Confederation. The essence of this motion con- 
 sisted in a desire that a German Parliament should be assembled 
 by means of universal and direct suffrage, in order to introduce 
 that unity into the central power which naturally must be 
 wanting to the Diet, — an assembly of delegates of the various 
 States, who acted in accordance with the instructions of their 
 Cabinets. Prussia desired that the day for the assembly of this 
 Parliament should be at once fixed ; and declared that when 
 this point was settled she would bring forward special motions. 
 She wished also to employ the time which must intervene before 
 the assembly of this Parliament in taking measures to secure 
 the accord of the other Governments to the measures which she 
 would bring forward. 
 
 The Prussian motion was not very agreeable to the other 
 Governments ; but it would not have been prudent to reject it 
 altogether. The constitution of the Administrative Assembly 
 of the Germanic Confederation was notoriously and avowedly 
 imperfect, and few men in Germany, either among sovereigns 
 or subjects, would not -have rejoiced in its reform and re- 
 organization. But very few Germans desired that the ideas of 
 this reform, and the projects for its completion, should emanate 
 from Prussia, and still less from Count Bismark. 
 
 The Diet, on the 21st April, decided that the motion should 
 be referred to a specially-chosen Committee. And on the 26th 
 this Committee was elected. 
 
 The object of many of the German Governments was now 
 
Chap. IV.] SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 31 
 
 to put off indefinitely the calling together of the Parliament. 
 Count Bismark, in a despatch of the 27th, recognised that this 
 was the aim of many, and expressed his opinion that the step 
 the Diet had already taken in referring the motion to a Com- 
 mittee could hardly have any other result than to postpone a 
 solution of the question until the Greek Kalends. He said 
 that at this time growing animosities required the completion 
 of the work of reform ; and that on this work depended the 
 maintenance of peace, and the dissolution of the uneasiness 
 which at present penetrated all minds. 
 
 On the nth May the President of the Prussian Cabinet 
 communicated confidentially to the Committee of the Diet the 
 ground-plan of the changes which he considered ought to be 
 made in the constitution of the Confederation. These were : 
 the completion of the central power by means of a German 
 Parliament, extension of the legislative competency of the new 
 central power, removal of all restrictions on trade and com- 
 merce of every sort which then separated the Germanic States 
 from one another, the organization of a common system for the 
 guardianship of German trade abroad, the foundation of a 
 German navy, an improved establishment of the German land- 
 forces, so that their general efficiency might be improved, while 
 the expenses of individual States might be diminished. These 
 proposals were, doubtless, good and worthy of regard ; but 
 there were too many interests which would be affected by their 
 adoption to allow such measures to be immediately accepted 
 by the Diet. Long time would have been required to pass a 
 motion entailing such great alterations through the Diet ; and 
 the demand of Count Bismark for a speedy reform of the 
 constitution of the Confederation, far from removing, aggravated 
 the chances of war. While the steps for the reform of the 
 Federal Constitution dragged slowly along, the preparations for 
 war were rapidly developed, and, a few days after the despatch 
 of Count Bismark's confidential communication to the Com- 
 mittee of the Diet, the decree was issued for the mobilization 
 of the whole Prussian army.* 
 
 * Riistow, Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschlanc 1 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIX. 
 
 " Oh what a tangled web we weave, 
 When first we venture to deceive. " 
 
 It was after Prussia proposed a reform of the Federal Con- 
 stitution that Austria re-opened the Schleswig-Holstein ques- 
 tion, after a long silence had been maintained on that subject 
 between the two great Powers.* 
 
 On the 26th April, Count Mensdorf sent a despatch to 
 Count Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, the contents 
 of which were to be communicated to Count Bismark, which 
 earnestly pressed Prussia again to turn her attention to the 
 matter of the Elbe duchies. This despatch was naturally not 
 agreeable to the Prussian Government, for in it Austria assumed 
 that Schleswig-Holstein should be given over to the Prince of 
 Augustenburg, which solution of the question would have been 
 the most unfavourable of all to the interests and intentions of 
 Prussia. In a letter of the 1st May, Count Bismark expressed 
 anew his views on the question to Baron Werther, the Prussian 
 Ambassador at Vienna, and endorsed the contents of this letter 
 by a note of the 7th May, in which he expressed the strong 
 desire of Prussia to hold fast to the Treaty of Vienna and the 
 Convention of Gastein, by which the introduction of any third 
 party, as for instance of the Germanic Confederation, into the 
 government of Schleswig-Holstein was prohibited. Count 
 Bismark further declared that Prussia had no intention to re- 
 nounce the rights she had acquired over Schleswig-Holstein to 
 a third party without consideration for her own interests, or for 
 those of Germany in general : but that she was always ready 
 
 * See p. 15. 
 
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF G A STEIN 33 
 
 to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would 
 renounce the question of the rights to the duchies of the Elbe 
 which she had acquired by the Treaty of Vienna. In con- 
 clusion, the Prussian Minister added the wish that Austria 
 might act in harmony with Prussia in the question of the 
 reform of the Federal Constitution. 
 
 For the first time in the diplomatic proceedings Prussia had 
 new openly repudiated the idea that her hold upon Schleswig 
 was temporary or provisional. She now insisted upon the 
 right of conquest to that duchy, as sealed by the Peace of 
 Vienna of October, 1864. 
 
 To this despatch Austria returned no answer. The din of 
 armaments on all sides rose every day more loudly. All Ger- 
 many, Austria, and Italy were hurrying on their harness, and 
 rapidly becoming great camps ; and men foresaw that almost 
 any attempt to secure peace would probably only precipitate a 
 conflict. 
 
 Austria had, on the 4th May, entirely broken off negotiations 
 with Prussia on the subject of disarmament* Count Mensdorf 
 had declared that it was superfluous to argue the question of 
 priority of argument ; that it was impossible for Austria to 
 disarm in Venetia, on account of the agitation in Italy ; and 
 that Austria, by preparing to resist an attack on her south- 
 eastern frontier, was protecting not only her own individual 
 interests, but those of all Germany, and that no German State 
 should look askance at preparations made in such a cause. 
 
 The Government of Saxony was much disturbed by the 
 Prussian interrogation as to why that country was arming, and 
 the concomitant demand that these armaments should cease. 
 Fearful of an attack, Saxony, on the 5 th May, proposed a 
 motion in the Frankfort Diet, the object of which was that the 
 Diet should promptly decree, with reference to the proceedings 
 of the Prussian Government, that the internal peace of the 
 Confederation was to be preserved. 
 
 On the introduction of this motion, the Prussian representa- 
 tive declared that Prussia had no intention to attack Saxony, 
 and that all the armament which had taken place in his 
 
 * See p. 27. 
 
34 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 country had only been prompted by purely defensive considera- 
 tions. 
 
 Nevertheless, on the 9th May, the Diet passed the Saxon 
 motion by a majority of ten over five votes. 
 
 The middle States, at the head of which stood Bavaria, under 
 this threatening aspect of affairs, earnestly desired to effect a 
 compromise. They felt that, since Prussia had not been the 
 only State to arm, it would be unfair if she only were required 
 to declare the object of her armament. They therefore pro- 
 posed a motion in the Diet to the effect that all Governments 
 which had armed should be required to state their reasons for 
 having done so. This motion was passed on the 24th May, 
 and on the 1st June the statements were to have been received. 
 
 The 1 st June was an important landmark in the development 
 of the diplomatic crisis ; but, before reviewing its incidents, it 
 is necessary to glance at external influences which were exerted 
 in the vain, and perhaps only apparent, endeavour to preserve 
 peace in Germany. While in Italy the whole population were 
 clamorous for war ; while Prussia, the author and originator of 
 the whole disturbance, by her disregard of the rights of the 
 Prince in whose nominal cause she had taken up arms in 1864, 
 was pointing out her increased battalions as purely a defensive 
 police for the security of her territory ; and while the war party 
 in Austria, eager to wipe out on the Mincio the memory of 
 Solferino, and proudly confident of the power of the military 
 empire to sweep away with one hand the feverish soldiery of 
 Victor Emanuel, while with the other it shattered the legions of 
 Prussia, urged the Cabinet of Vienna not to yield an item : Russia 
 and England, led and accompanied by France, entered upon the 
 diplomatic theatre. These three great Powers made a common 
 attempt to avert the war by despatching, on the 28th May, 
 almost identical notes to Austria, Prussia, Italy, and the 
 Germanic Confederation. In these notes it was proposed that 
 the five great Powers should join in a Conference, at which the 
 Germanic Confederation should also be represented, in order 
 to settle by treaty the three main questions which menaced the 
 peace of Europe. These questions were that of the Elbe 
 duchies, of the tranquillity of Italy, and of the reform of the 
 Eederal Constitution of Germany. 
 
Chap V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF GASTEIN. 35 
 
 The possibility of peace being maintained by these means 
 was from the beginning extremely doubtful : even in the event 
 of all the parties interested consenting to submit their causes to 
 this European jury. Almost the utmost that could be expected 
 from a Conference would be that the points of dispute might 
 be denned, and in this manner that the theatre of war might be 
 limited. 
 
 On the 29th May, Prussia accepted the proposal for the Con- 
 ference. Italy followed this example ; also the Germanic Con- 
 federation. Of what validity these acceptances were, may 
 however be calculated from the fact that at the time of the 
 acceptance the Confederation informed its representative, Herr 
 Von der Pfordten, that the project had already practically fallen 
 to the ground.* 
 
 Austria was only willing to join the Conference on condition 
 that no territorial alterations should be there discussed. This 
 proviso was absolutely necessary for Austria. If territorial 
 changes were to be discussed, few could doubt but that a pro- 
 posal would be made for the cession of Venetia to Italy, and of 
 the Elbe duchies to Prussia. If these cessions took place, 
 Austria would lose as much without a blow, in her own dimi- 
 nution and the aggrandizement of her German rival, as could at 
 that time have been anticipated from the most disastrous issue 
 of the imminent war. It does not appear that it was any desire 
 of war on the part of Austria which made her couple her ex- 
 pressions of readiness to join the Conference with this condi- 
 tion, which appears on the contrary to have been advanced from 
 a perhaps too honest desire to meet the wishes of the great 
 Powers. 
 
 To this communication of Austria the mediating Powers 
 replied that, in their opinion, the disputant Governments should 
 be allowed full freedom for the discussion, and if possible for 
 the solution, of every relevant question at the Conference. 
 
 Thus matters stood on the 1st June, the day appointed by 
 the Federal Decree of the 24th May as that on which the 
 German Powers were to make their declarations concerning 
 their armaments. 
 
 * Rustow, Der Krieg von 1866 in Deutschland und Italien. 
 
 D 2 
 
36 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 The Diet was assembled at Frankfort. The Austrian repre- 
 sentative rose, and declared that Austria could look back with a 
 calm conscience on her steady endeavours to preserve an unity 
 with Prussia in the question of the Elbe duchies. The Emperor 
 Francis Joseph had conceded the uttermost tittle that the dig- 
 nity of Austria and the rights of the Germanic Confederation 
 would allow. Prussia had made unjust proposals, and had ex- 
 pressed the intention of prosecuting and carrying out these pro- 
 posals by force. As Prussia had threatened, after the peace of 
 Vienna, to compel the Federal troops to evacuate Holstein, so 
 she had also threatened Austria concerning the question of the 
 duchies with force, and had relied on the support of foreign 
 opponents of the Imperial State. At the time of the Convention 
 of Gastein Prussia had renewed this attempt, because Austria 
 would not consent to administer Schleswig-Holstein according 
 to the policy of annexation. Threatened on two sides, Austria 
 had been compelled to place herself in an attitude of defence. 
 The preparations against Italy might rest unchallenged at 
 Frankfort. Austria would recall her troops that had been raised 
 against Prussia, provided that the latter did not intend to make 
 an attack on Austrian territory, or on any State allied to 
 Austria, and would give security against the recurrence of the 
 danger of war. This security would depend for Germany, as 
 for Austria, on the fact that in Germany not force, but treaties 
 and right ruled, and that Prussia also, although an European 
 Power, should respect the peace and the decrees of the Con- 
 federation, and further that the Schleswig-Holstein question 
 should be settled, not for the interest of an individual claimant, 
 but according to the rights of those provinces and Federal rule. 
 On the 24th August, 1865, Austria and Pnissiahad promised to 
 communicate to the Confederation the result of their negotia- 
 tions in reference to Schleswig-Holstein. Austria now was ful- 
 filling this promise. That she must now declare that all her 
 endeavours to obtain a solution of the question of the duchies 
 which would be agreeable to the Confederation had been of no 
 avail, and that now, in the first place, Austria yielded up every- 
 thing further on this point to the decree of the Confederation, 
 and in the second place had already ordered her Commissioner 
 in Holstein to assemble the Estates of that duchy in order to 
 
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF G A STEIN. 37 
 
 obtain an expression of the wishes of the people as to their 
 future fate. 
 
 Austria thus attempted to undo what she had assisted in 
 doing by the Treaty of Vienna and the convention of Gastein. 
 But, in order to make restitution for her disregard of right in 
 these two agreements, she was now obliged to break the Con- 
 vention of Gastein, in handing over to the Confederation, which 
 she had declared incompetent in this international question, the 
 decision of the future fate of the duchies. Her second step, by 
 which she ordered her Commissioner, Field Marshal Gablenz, 
 to convene the Holstein Estates, was also, if not an actual 
 breach of the Convention, a virtual one, because by the Con- 
 vention, although the administration of the duchies was divided, 
 the rights of the two sovereigns to the common supremacy were 
 still as much extant as ever.* 
 
 After the Austrian declaration, the representative of Prussia 
 at the Diet rose, and said that the mobilization of the Prussian 
 army had only taken place in consequence of the Austrian 
 armaments ; only if these armaments were annulled, and if at 
 the same time the other Germanic States which were allied 
 with Austria restored amicable relations between themselves 
 and Prussia, could Prussia herself disarm. On these condi- 
 tions she would disarm immediately. Prussia had only taken 
 defensive measures. If the Germanic Confederation was not 
 in a position to give Prussia guarantees for the maintenance of 
 peace, if the members of the Confederation resisted those 
 reforms of the Federal Constitution which were universally 
 recognised as necessary, the Prussian Government must accept 
 the conclusion that the Confederation did not attain its object, 
 and could not fulfil the most important of its aims, and that 
 with regard to further Federal revolutions, Prussia would act on 
 this conviction. 
 
 The Prussian representative further defended his Govern- 
 ment against the Austrian conception of the circumstances con- 
 nected with the Schleswig-Holstein question, and advanced in 
 support of his assertion the many declarations which Prussia 
 had made with reference to this question. 
 
 * See page II. 
 
38 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I. 
 
 The speeches of the two representatives of the great German 
 Powers were the main events of the assembly of the Diet of the 
 Germanic Confederation at Frankfort on the ist June, 1866. 
 The reports of these speeches were immediately telegraphed to 
 every town in Germany, and caused great excitement. Men 
 foresaw that a war would result by the shock of which the 
 political circumstances and peculiar constitution of the Father- 
 land would be shaken to their very foundations ; but no one 
 almost supposed the outbreak of war to be so near. It was 
 believed that Austria was much superior as a military Power, 
 certainly at the outbreak of a war, to Prussia, but she was not 
 yet ready, and it could not be supposed that she would urge 
 matters on till her preparations were complete. Nor did sage 
 men, who, wondering by what fatuous madness Count Bismark 
 was driving his Government into a one-sided struggle, looked 
 impartially upon the course of events, ever imagine that Prus- 
 sian temerity would be wild enough to anticipate the necessity 
 of defence through bearding a more than respected adversary 
 by commencing the attack. 
 
 Count Bismark saw, however, in the steps that Austria had 
 lately taken, in her summons to the Holstein Estates, and in 
 the publication of her intentions with regard to the Elbe 
 duchies, the final severence of the Cabinet of Vienna from his 
 policy. No longer could Austria be persuaded to stand beside 
 him in a common slight against, or oppression of, the body of 
 /the Germanic Confederation. Austria had resumed her posi- 
 tion as the champion of the individuality of small States. The 
 spoilers had ultimately quarrelled over the allotment of their 
 prey. The Convention of Gastein was broken through and 
 trampled upon. 
 
 Against the breach of this Convention, Count Bismark sent 
 a protest to Vienna; but, in anticipation of the answer he 
 would receive to this protest, signed on the 4th June a despatch 
 to the Prussian plenipotentiaries at foreign Courts. This 
 despatch accused Austria of giving provocation to war; and 
 attributed to the Austrian Government the intention of recruit- 
 ing its finances by forced contributions from Prussia, or by an 
 honourable bankruptcy. 
 
 Count Bismark at the same time took a step more likely to 
 
Chap. V.] BREACH OF CONVENTION OF G 'A STEIN 39 
 
 be productive of important results than either protests or pro- 
 tocols. The concentration of the Prussian army was resumed. 
 The corps d'armee of the Guard was sent to Silesia, the eighth 
 corps d'armee and one division of the seventh corps were for- 
 warded by railway from the banks of the Rhine to the neigh- 
 bourhood of Halle.* In Berlin a reserve corps d'armee was 
 formed of the four regiments of the Landwehr of the Guard, 
 and of four other Landwehr regiments, while all available artil- 
 lery and cavalry was drawn together, organised, and mobilized 
 as quickly as possible. 
 
 * How it came that Prussia was able to leave the frontier of the Rhine 
 totally undefended during the campaign, when it was evident from the sub- 
 sequent demand made by France that the Government of the Tuileries had 
 a jealous eye upon Rheinland, has remained one of the mysteries of the 
 war. The explanation as far as yet can be discovered appears to be as 
 follows: — In 1865 Count Bismark paid a visit to the Emperor of the 
 French at Biarritz, and there hinted broadly that in case France would 
 stand aloof, and allow Prussia to work her way in Germany, compensation 
 might be given. for France's tranquillity by the cession of the Rhine pro- 
 vinces. The Emperor, who expected, like every one else, that the con- 
 test would be, if not favourable to Austria, certainly long and doubtful, 
 anticipated that at a certain stage he would be able to step upon the theatre 
 of war, and demand, from whichever side he espoused, the possession of 
 the Rhine provinces of Prussia. He gave no distinct assurance to Count 
 Bismark of neutrality, but the Count left Biarritz with a tolerable certainty 
 that France would not interfere, at least at the commencement of a war, and 
 without giving any distinct promise to the Emperor of territorial compen- 
 sation. When the campaign terminated as abruptly as it did, the Emperor 
 of the French wished to claim the price of his neutrality, but Prussia was 
 then in a condition to enter on a campaign with France, whose armies were 
 not armed with breech-loaders, and refused to entertain any ideas of terri- 
 torial cession. 
 
BOOK II. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN, 
 
 " The good old rule sufhceth me, 
 The stern and simple plan — 
 Let those take who have the power, 
 And let those keep who can." 
 
 Notwithstanding the protests of Count Bismark, the 
 Austrian Civil Commissioner of Holstein, General Von Gablenz, 
 issued a decree on the 5th June, 1866, by which the Estates of 
 Holstein w r ere summoned to meet on the nth of that month at 
 Itzehoe. It was, however, known at Berlin (on the same day 
 as that on which the despatch to the plenipotentiaries of 
 Prussia at foreign Courts was signed) that Austria was about to 
 bring forward a motion in the Diet for Federal execution 
 against Prussia. Accordingly, on the 6th June, Prussia pub- 
 lished a more special protest against the assembly of the Hol- 
 stein Estates, as well as a declaration that Prussia would con- 
 sider such an encroachment on the Convention of Gastein as a 
 direct breach of that agreement, and that in consequence not 
 only was the Convention a dead letter, but that the common 
 occupation and administration of the duchies must be resumed 
 as before that Convention. Orders were accordingly despatched 
 from Berlin to General Manteuffel, the Prussian Commissioner 
 in Schleswig, that as soon as General Gablenz summoned the 
 Holstein Estates to meet, he should enter Holstein with his 
 Prussian troops in order to again resume the common adminis- 
 tration of the two duchies. Orders were given to General 
 
Chap. I.] FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICI IN IIOLSTEIN. 4 r 
 
 Manteuffel to avoid any conflict with the Austrian troops ; and 
 to assure General Gablenz that the inruption of Prussian troops 
 into the duchy over which he was appointed to represent the 
 Austrian Emperor, was undertaken quite in a friendly spirit. 
 General Manteuffel accordingly informed General Gablenz 
 beforehand of his intention of invading Holstein, and issued 
 this proclamation to the people of the duchy of Schleswig : — 
 
 "Gottorp, June 7. 
 "Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig, — 
 
 " Since my assumption of office here I have always acted towards you 
 with frankness. Never have I had any reason to repent of that course, and 
 I now address myself to you again with the same frankness. The rights of 
 sovereignty which His Majesty my King and master has over the duchy of 
 Holstein have been endangered by proceedings with which you are all 
 acquainted. The most sacred interests of your country are placed in 
 jeopardy, for never have the Estates of either of the duchies been called 
 together except in view of an assembly of the general representation of an 
 undivided Schleswig-Holstein. I am charged by His Majesty the King 
 with the protection of those menaced rights, and for that reason I have to- 
 day ordered the entry of troops into Holstein, as I have announced to the 
 Imperial Governor of the duchy of Holstein that this military measure has 
 only a purely defensive character. 
 
 " Inhabitants of the Duchy of Schleswig, — I have learnt to know and 
 to esteem the spirit of order and legality with which you are animated, and 
 I now give you a proof of this esteem. At this moment Schleswig is being 
 almost denuded of troops. You will prove that the attitude which you 
 have hitherto maintained has not been induced by fear, but by the loyalty 
 of your character. But you, too, in your turn have learnt to know me, and 
 you know that I am faithfully and heartily devoted to the interests of this 
 country. You will with confidence accept my word. No doubt of the 
 power or of the will of Prussia could find root in your minds. Let us have 
 faith in each other. 
 
 " The Governor of the duchy of Schleswig, 
 
 " E. MANTEUFFEL, 
 ' ' Lieutenant- General, 
 " Aide-de-camp to His Majesty the King of Prussia." 
 
 General Gablenz did not wait for the inruption at Kiel, 
 where his head-quarters had hitherto been, but suddenly left 
 that town, and concentrated the whole of his forces, which 
 consisted of the infantry brigade of Kalik and one regiment 
 of dragoons, at Altona. The Government of Holstein and 
 the Prince of Augustenburg followed him quickly. 
 
 On the morning of the 8th June the Prussian troops 
 
42 SEVEN WEEKS 1 WAR. [Book II. 
 
 crossed the Eider, without paying any attention to a protest 
 launched against their proceedings by General Gablenz, and 
 moved slowly southwards. General Manteuffel had under his 
 command in Schleswig two brigades of infantry and one 
 brigade of cavalry, and he crossed the frontier of Holstein 
 with all his disposable force. Austria was naturally unwilling 
 to resume the common administration of the two duchies as it 
 had existed previous to the Convention of Gastein, and accord- 
 ingly, by order of his Government, General Gablenz concen- 
 trated his troops in the south-western corner of the duchy. 
 General Manteuffel, who had marched into Holstein on the 
 8th June, on the nth prevented the assembly of the Holstein 
 Estates at Itzhoe by taking military possession of that town, 
 closing the House of Assembly, and placing a guard over the 
 door with fixed bayonets. General Gablenz, assailed by far 
 superior numbers, and unable to be of any more use in Hol- 
 stein, on the night between the nth and the 12th June with- 
 drew his troops to Hamburg, and thence despatched them by 
 railway through Hanover, Cassel, and Frankfort to the Austrian 
 army of the north in Bohemia. From this bloodless conflict in 
 Holstein arose the first Prussian victory, gained by the know- 
 ledge of the great rule of war, which teaches that to reap 
 success great numbers must be hurled upon the decisive point, 
 and that in order that these superior numbers may be forth- 
 coming, rapidity of concentration, organization, and locomo- 
 tion of troops are vitally required. This bloodless victory, 
 and the consequent evacuation of Holstein by the Austrians, 
 had an important effect on the subsequent incidents of the 
 war. The abandonment of Holstein added only five bat- 
 talions of infantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery 
 of artillery to the Austrian army in the field ; while the same 
 event left the whole of the Prussian division of General Man- 
 teuffel — which consisted of twelve battalions of infantry, eight 
 squadrons of cavalry, and six batteries of artillery — free and at 
 the disposition of the Prussians for the further prosecution of 
 operations. 
 
 The assembly of the Holstein Estates, and the delivery ot 
 the opinion of the southern Elbe duchy with regard to its 
 future fate, was prevented by the inroad of the Prussians. Th? 
 
Chap. I.] FIRST BLOODLESS CONFLICT IN HOLSTEIN. 43 
 
 Prince of Augustenburg departed from the province. The 
 Prussian Government appointed Herr Von Scheel-Plessen as 
 Supreme President of Schleswig-Holstein. Supreme President 
 is the title of the highest civil administrator of a Prussian 
 province. Scheel-Plessen entered upon the duties of his new 
 office on the nth June; while the non-consulted duchies 
 looked on sulkily upon the Prussian assertions of right. The 
 duchies came under Prussian rule when Scheel-Plessen as- 
 sumed his office. This was all very arbitrary, forcible, and 
 dependent upon main strength, but the Prussian virtual an- 
 nexation of Schleswig-Holstein had one good effect. It 
 settled the question of the Elbe duchies; and, as far as 
 the Seven Weeks' War is concerned, neither reader nor author 
 will be again troubled with the intricate problem of the true 
 rights of succession to " Schleswig-Holstein sea-surrounded." 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 FINAL RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 
 
 On the nth June, 1866, an Extraordinary Assembly of the 
 Diet was summoned. 
 
 The representative of Austria advanced the proposition at 
 this sitting, that Prussia had broken the Convention of 
 Gastein, and threatened the peace of the Germanic Con- 
 federation, by marching her troops into Holstein. He 
 proposed in consequence for the restoration of peace, that 
 the whole of the army of the Confederation, with the excep 
 tion of the three corps d'armee* which, by the Federal Con- 
 stitution, Prussia was bound to put into the field, should be 
 mobilized in such form of principal, contingents, and reserves 
 within fourteen days, that the troops should be able then to 
 march within fourteen hours, t That care was to be taken for 
 depot contingents, and that the appointment of a commander- 
 in-chief was to take place as soon as the decree was passed ; 
 and that the supervision of all these matters was to be given 
 over to the Diet, which was to act in concert with the military 
 commissioner of the Germanic Confederation. 
 
 The representative of Prussia at the Diet declared that he 
 was not authorized to make any statement upon the motion 
 which had been brought forward, the purport of which was 
 entirely new to him. 
 
 The Austrian representative, who filled the post of President 
 of the Diet, urged an immediate decree in favour of the mo- 
 
 * The 4th, 5th, and 6th corps d'armee of the Federal army. 
 
 t Could a British army be mobilized and be placed in such a state within 
 fourteen days as to be able to march in twenty-four-hours ? Yet this 
 rapidity of mobilization was not sufficient to oppose the Prussian or- 
 ganization. 
 
Chap. II.] RUPTURE BETWEEN PRUSSIA AND AUSTRIA. 45 
 
 tion ; and the Assembly, although the representative of Meck- 
 lenburg brought to notice, that even on the most unimportant 
 questions, when for instance only the disbursement of one 
 hundred gulden* was under consideration, three sittings were 
 required, one for the introduction of the motion, one for the 
 discussion, and one for the final vote, the majority of the Diet 
 decreed that the final vote on the Austrian motion should be 
 taken on the 14th June. Whoever recalls to mind the many 
 pears which the Diet consumed ere it passed the vote of 
 Federal execution against Denmark, can hardly doubt that the 
 deeds of Prussia had been replete with some peculiar enormity 
 in the eyes of the princes of the small states to arouse so 
 enthusiastic a zeal in such an usually torpid body as the 
 Germanic Diet. 
 
 * Equal to about 10/. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 BREAK-UP OF THE GERMANIC CONFEDERATION. 
 
 " Destruction hangs o'er yon devoted wall, 
 And nodding Ilion waits th' impending fall." 
 
 Pope. 
 
 " The history of mankind informs us that a single power is very seldom 
 broken by a confederacy." — Johnson. 
 
 Before the 14th June arrived, Count Bismark sent a definite 
 and final project to the Governments of the various States 
 which were members of the Germanic Confederation. The 
 first article of this project of reform expressed " That the 
 territory of the Confederation was to consist of those States 
 which had hitherto been included in the Confederation, with 
 the exception of the dominions of the Emperor of Austria, 
 and of the King of the Netherlands." While, then, Austria 
 wished to enlist the Governments of the Germanic Confedera- 
 tion in war against Prussia, Prussia desired to exclude Austria 
 from the Confederation. As for the Government of the 
 Netherlands, it had wished for nothing more for a long time 
 than to be allowed to withdraw from the Confederation its two 
 duchies which were included within that political league.* 
 
 The next article treated of the Parliament, the common con- 
 cerns of Germany, and of the privileges of the new Confedera- 
 tion. The German war navy, with a common German budget, 
 with the Federal harbour of Kiel and of the Bay of the Jahde, 
 were proposed to be placed under the supreme command of 
 Prussia, while the land forces of the new Confederation were 
 to be divided into two Federal armies, an army of the north, 
 
 * The duchies of Luxembourg and Limburg. 
 
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION. 47 
 
 and an army of the south. The King of Prussia was to be 
 commander-in-chief of the northern army, the King of Bavaria 
 that of the southern, both in peace and war. In peace the 
 commander-in-chief of either army was to superintend the 
 efficient organization and administration of his own army ; and, 
 in urgent cases, he was to be able to call out his army within 
 the boundaries of his own part of the Federal territory, condi- 
 tionally with the subsequent approval of the Confederation. 
 For each of the two Federal armies there was to be a common 
 budget. The administration of either army was to be con- 
 ducted under the superintendence of the commander-in-chief, 
 and to either army the States included in its portion of the 
 Federal territory were each to contribute their proportionate 
 quota of soldiers. Each Government was to pay the expenses 
 of its own contingent of the Federal army. All expenses of 
 the military budget were to fall on the military chest of that 
 army to which the budget was specially applied. The relations 
 of the new Confederation with the empire of Austria were to 
 be settled by special treaties. 
 
 These were the principal points of the project of reform 
 proposed by Count Bismark on the 10th June. This project 
 surprised the majority of the German States in a very un- 
 pleasant manner. The 14th June arrived, the day for the final 
 vote in the Diet upon the Austrian motion. 
 
 The representative of Prussia in the Diet protested against 
 the motion being entertained, and declared that both in form 
 and substance the motion was subversive of the ideas of the 
 Confederation. 
 
 The votes were, however, taken, and the Austrian represen- 
 tative carried his motion by a majority of nine over six votes. 
 
 The details of the voting were as follows : — 
 
 For the Austrian motion there voted, — 
 The first Curia, Austria. 
 The third, Bavaria. 
 The fourth, Saxony. 
 The fifth, Hanover. 
 The sixth, Wurtemburg. 
 The eighth, Electoral Hesse (Hesse-Cassel). 
 The ninth, Hesse-Darmstadt. 
 
4 S SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book II. 
 
 The sixteenth (Lichtenstein, Waldech, the two Reusze, 
 
 Lippe, Lippe-Schaunburg, Hesse-Homburg). 
 Of the thirteenth Curia (Brunswick and Nassau), Nassau. 
 Of the twelfth Curia (Saxe Weimar, Saxe Altenburg, Saxe 
 
 Coburg, and Saxe Meiningen), Saxe Meiningen. 
 Of the seventeenth Curia (the four free towns, Hamburg, 
 Lubeck, Bremen, and Frankfort), Frankfort. 
 Against the Austrian motion there voted, — 
 The seventh Curia, Baden. 
 The eleventh Curia, Luxembourg and Limburg (belonging 
 
 to the Netherlands). 
 The twelfth Curia, with the exception of Saxe Meiningen. 
 Of the thirteenth Curia, Brunswick. 
 The fourteenth Curia, the two Mecklenburghs. 
 The fifteenth Curia, Oldenburg, Anhalt, and the two 
 
 Schwurzburgs. 
 The seventeenth Curia, with the exception of Frankfort. 
 In this voting, Prussia did not give a voice, as her represen- 
 tative had protested against any entertainment of the motion, 
 and did not vote : and the tenth Curia, Holstein Lauenburg, 
 had no representative. The vote of the thirteenth Curia was 
 cancelled, because Brunswick voted against Nassau, and thus 
 there was no majority in this Curia. 
 
 Thus the results were that the 7th, nth, 12th, 14th, 15th, 
 and 17th Curias, therefore six Curiae, voted against Austria; 
 the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, and 9th, besides the representative 
 of Austria himself, for the Austrian motion. The vote of the 
 1 6th Curia was recorded in favour of the motion, but, as 
 appeared afterwards, accidentally. Each of the seven small 
 States which composed this Curia had an equal voice within 
 the Curia, and the vote of the Curia was that of the majority 
 of the component members. On the 14th June, the represen- 
 tative of this Curia who voted in the Diet, and who was the 
 delegate of Schaunburg-Lippe, declared that Lippe-Detwold, 
 Waldeck, and Reusz of the younger line, therefore three- 
 sevenths of the total, wished to vote against the Austrian 
 motion ; that he had not received full instructions from his own 
 Government, and must, consequently, give the vote of the 
 Curia for the Austrian motion. As soon as this was known, 
 
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION. 49 
 
 however, the Government of Schaunburg-Lippe notified to the 
 Prussian Government that it had also intended to vote against 
 the Austrian motion, and thus disowned the act of its own 
 delegate. It was then too late, for the vote had been given, 
 and the motion passed. But had the Government of Schaun- 
 burg-Lippe been a little more careful in sending definite 
 instructions to its representative, and had Prussia voted, the 
 Austrian motion would have been thrown out by a majority of 
 eight over seven votes, and the event which plunged Central 
 Europe into immediate war might have been certainly post- 
 poned, possibly evaded. On such tiny circumstances do the 
 destinies of nations hang. 
 
 As the votes were actually recorded, the Austrian motion was 
 carried by a majority of nine over six voices. 
 
 After the Austrian representative, the president of the Diet, 
 had declared the result of the voting, nine votes for Austria 
 against six, the Prussian representative stated that it was now 
 his duty to publish to the Diet the resolutions of Prussia. The 
 Austrian motion was in itself a negation of the Federal Consti- 
 tution, and must necessarily be regarded by Prussia as a breach 
 of the community of the Confederation. The Federal Con- 
 stitution recognised Federal execution against members of the 
 Confederation only in particular cases, which were clearly 
 defined. These cases were entirely neglected in the Austrian 
 motion. The position which Austria had assumed with regard 
 to Holstein came in no manner under the protection of Federal 
 treaties. On this account Prussia had refused in any way to 
 take action on the Austrian motion, and not taken any precau- 
 tions to oppose the Austrian intention. According to the ideas 
 of Prussia, the Diet would not have for a moment listened to 
 the Austrian proposals, but would have cast out the motion 
 without any second thought upon the matter. Since the Diet 
 had, however, acted in a manner so contrary to all expectation ; 
 since Austria had been actually arming for three months, and 
 had called the other members of the Confederation to her aid, 
 and since hereby the Act of Confederation, the chief object of 
 which was to secure the internal tranquillity of Germany, was 
 entirely invalidated, Prussia must consider the rupture of the 
 Germanic Confederation as completed, and must view that 
 
 E 
 
50 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. TBook II. 
 
 Confederation as dissolved and abrogated. Prussia did not, 
 however, despise the national necessities for which that Con- 
 federation was instituted, nor did she wish to unsettle the unity 
 of the Germanic nationality; therefore she wished to declare 
 herself ready and desirous to form a new Confederation with 
 those States which might be willing to unite with her in a 
 Federal union on the basis of the reform proposed for the 
 Confederation on the ioth June. In conclusion, the Prussian 
 delegate asserted the claims of his Government to a share of 
 all rights which sprang from the former Constitution, and, 
 having protested against the disbursement of any Federal 
 moneys without the consent of Prussia, quitted the as- 
 sembly. 
 
 The Germanic Confederation, established in 1815, was broken 
 up at this moment. The declaration of internal war had vir- 
 tually been proclaimed among its members. 
 
 The first action of Prussia in consequence of the decree of 
 the Diet of the 14th June, was to send a summons to the three 
 States the territories of which lay within or close to the Prussian 
 provinces, and which had voted against Prussia on the 14th 
 June. These States were Hanover, Saxony, and the Electorate 
 of Hesse. This summons required that the Governments of 
 these States should immediately reduce their troops to the 
 peace establishment, which had existed on the 1st March, and 
 should agree to join the new Prussian Federation on the basis 
 of the reform proposed on the ioth June. If these Govern- 
 ments declared, within twelve hours, their agreement to these 
 demands, Prussia undertook to guarantee their sovereign rights 
 within the boundaries of the proposed Federation ; otherwise, 
 Prussia announced her intention to declare war. 
 
 The three Governments hesitated, and made no reply. On 
 the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war against 
 these three countries. No formal declaration of war was made 
 against Austria, but at a later date the intention to commence 
 hostilities was communicated to the Austrian outposts. 
 
 On the 17th June, the Austrian war manifesto was published; 
 on the 1 8th, the Prussian ; on the 20th, Italy, who had entered 
 into an offensive and defensive alliance with Prussia, declared 
 war against Austria and Bavaria. Diplomacy had now done 
 
Chap. III.] BREAK-UP OF THE CONFEDERATION. 51 
 
 its work, and the conflict was removed from the field of politics 
 to the theatre of war. 
 
 Subjoined, for facility of reference, is a tabular list of the 
 principal features of the political prologue. 
 
 October 20th, 1864. Treaty of Vienna. 
 
 August 14th, 1865. Convention of Gastein. 
 
 March 12th, 1866. First preparations of Austria for war in 
 Bohemia and Moravia. 
 
 March 30th, 1866. First preparations of Prussia. 
 
 April, 1866. Negotiations concerning these armaments. 
 
 April 23rd, 1866. Great armament of Austria in Venetia. 
 
 April 26th, 1866. Proposal of Austria to submit the ques- 
 tions in dispute to the Diet. 
 
 May 7th, 1866. Declaration of Prussia of the Diet to decide 
 in international questions, and suggestion of the desirability of 
 the reform of the Confederation. 
 
 Until May 28th, 1866. Armaments in all Germany and 
 Italy. 
 
 May 28th, 1866. Proposal of a Conference by the three 
 great non-Germanic European Powers. 
 
 May 29th, 1866. Prussian acceptance of this proposal. 
 
 June 1st, 1866. Austrian acceptance under conditions which 
 render the Conference impossible. 
 
 June 1st, 1866. Submission of Schleswig-Holstein question 
 to the Diet 
 
 June $th, 1866. Summons by General Gablenz for assembly 
 of Holstein Estates. 
 
 June 10th, 1866. Prussian proposal for the reform of the 
 Federal Constitution. 
 
 June 11th, 1866. Austrian motion for the decree of Federal 
 execution against Prussia. 
 
 June 14th, 1866. Acceptance of the Austrian motion by the 
 Diet. 
 
 June i$th, 1866. Declaration of war by Prussia against 
 Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Saxony. 
 
 June 20th, 1866. Declaration of war by Italy against Austria 
 and Bavaria. 
 
BOOK Illr 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA.t 
 
 Before it is possible to enter upon a review of the military 
 operations of the war, it is necessary to glance at the organiza- 
 tion, administration, and numbers of the forces which were at 
 the disposal of the belligerent Powers. The question of the 
 numerical strength of an army in the field is always an 
 extremely difficult one. Before a campaign, sometimes the 
 demands of strategy require that the strength of troops should 
 be exaggerated, sometimes the contrary. The casualties of 
 every skirmish, the sickness incident to every day's march and 
 every night's exposure, reduces the number of soldiers under 
 arms. Hazy distinctions between combatants and non-com- 
 batants, different modes of reckoning, the exclusion or inclusion 
 of artillery and administrative services in returns, the non- 
 completion of battalions up to their normal strength, all throw 
 great difficulties in the way of gaining an accurate appreciation 
 of the number of men engaged on either side in particular 
 actions. It appears, therefore, advisable to sketch here the 
 organization and regulated normal strength of the armies 
 engaged in the war, and to attempt, at necessary points in the 
 
 * It may be a relief to the general and not professional reader to be made 
 aware that an omission to read this Book, which is almost entirely techni- 
 cal, will not interrupt the continuity of the narrative. 
 
 + In the prefatory chapter to the second edition, will be found a sketch of 
 the changes made in the Prussian military system between the termination of 
 the campaign of 1866 and the commencement of the late war with France. 
 

 Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 53 
 
 narrative, to calculate and compute from the most trustworthy 
 authorities the actual numbers present on particular occasions. 
 
 The kingdom of Prussia before the war of 1866 had, with an 
 area of about 127,350 square miles, a population of over nine- 
 teen million souls. The yearly revenues, according to the 
 latest budgets, amounted to about 21,600,000/., and the 
 expenditure of the Government was always confined within 
 its income. The National Debt in 1864 amounted to about 
 42,000,000/. The State chest in 1862 contained, from the 
 surplus of estimated over actual annual expenditure, and from 
 some other minor sources, a sum of about 2,500,000/. The 
 financial economy of Prussia is superior to that of any nation 
 in Europe. The army has lately cost in time of peace about 
 6,300,000/. annually, the navy about 6,450,000/. 
 
 The Prussian army which took the field in the war of 1866 
 consisted of eight corps d'arme'e of troops of the Line, and of 
 the corps d'arme'e of the Guard. Each corps d'arme'e is 
 organized with the intention of being a perfectly complete 
 little army of itself, so that without inconvenience it can be 
 detached from the main army at any time. Each corps d'arme'e 
 of the Line in time of war consists of two divisions of infantry, 
 one division of cavalry, sixteen batteries of artillery, and a 
 military train. Each division of infantry is composed of two 
 brigades, each of which has two regiments, and, as each 
 regiment contains three battalions, in a division of infantry 
 there are twelve battalions ; to every infantry division is also 
 attached one regiment of cavalry, of four squadrons, and one 
 division of artillery, of four batteries, making the total strength 
 of the force under the command of every infantry divisional 
 General twelve battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries. 
 
 A cavalry division consisted of two brigades, each containing 
 two regiments, and, as every regiment had four squadrons, the 
 division contained sixteen squadrons ; it had also two batteries 
 of horse artillery attached to it. 
 
 The reserve of artillery consisted of one division of field 
 artillery, which formed four batteries, and of two batteries of 
 horse artillery, besides an artillery train for the supply of 
 ammunition. 
 
 This gives the strength of a corps d'arme'e as twenty-four 
 
54 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 battalions of infantry, twenty-four squadrons 01 cavalry, and 
 sixteen batteries of artillery. Besides this, however, each corps 
 has one battalion of rifles and one battalion of engineers, 
 besides an engineer train for the transport of materials for 
 making bridges, and a large military train, which carries food, 
 hospitals, medicines, fuel for cooking, bakeries, and all the 
 other necessaries of not only life, but of the life of an army, 
 the members of which require not only the same feeding, 
 clothing, and warming as other members of the human race, 
 but who will not be denied bullets, powder, shot and shells, 
 saddlery for their horses, and who from the nature of their life 
 are more liable to require medicines, bandages, splints, and all 
 hospital accessories than other men. 
 
 If we do not consider the train when we are calculating the 
 number of combatants who actually fall in, in the line of battle, 
 every battalion may be considered to consist of 1,002 men. 
 Thus the force of infantry and engineers in a corps d'armee 
 numbers over 26,000, and on account of men absent through 
 sickness may in round numbers be calculated at this figure. 
 Each squadron of cavalry may be calculated at 140 mounted 
 men, which makes the whole cavalry force about 3,300 men. 
 Each division of four batteries of horse artillery brings into the 
 field 590 actual combatants, and each of field artillery the 
 same, so that the whole artillery force of a corps d'arme'e is 
 about 2,350 men. The actual number of combatants with a 
 corps d'arme'e is in this way seen to be 31,650 men, which may 
 be stated in broad numbers at 31,000. The Guard corps 
 d'armee differs chiefly from the Line corps in having one 
 additional rifle battalion, one additional Fusilier regiment, and 
 two additional cavalry regiments, which increase its strength 
 by about 5,150 actual combatants; the total number of com- 
 batants in this corps may be safely assumed as 36,000 men, in 
 round numbers.* 
 
 If we turn, however, to the list furnished by the military 
 authorities, we find that the army was said to consist of 
 335,000 men, with 106,500 horses, of which only about 70,000 
 
 * This paragraph is still correct, except that the squadron now always 
 musters 150 mounted men. 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 55 
 
 belonged to the cavalry and artillery, and that it was accom- 
 panied by a waggon train of 8,950 carriages, of which only 
 3,500 belonging to the artillery performed any service on the 
 field of battle. 
 
 What has then become of these 55,000 men, 36,500 horses, 
 and 5,450 carriages which form the difference between the 
 returns we find of an army on paper and the actual number of 
 men engaged on the field of battle ? This difference represents 
 the moving power of the combatant branches ; it is this differ- 
 ence that feeds the warriors when they are well, that tends 
 them when wounded, and nurses them when struck down with 
 disease. Nor are these the only duties of the non-combatant 
 branches. An army on a campaign is a little world of itself, 
 and has all the requirements of ordinary men moving about 
 the world, besides having an enemy in its neighbourhood, who 
 attempts to oppose its progress in every way possible. When 
 the line of march leads to a river, over which there is either no 
 bridge or where the bridge has been destroyed, a bridge must 
 be immediately laid down, and, accordingly, a bridge train is 
 necessarily always present with the army. When a camp is 
 pitched, field bakeries have to be immediately established to 
 feed the troops ; field telegraphs and field post-offices must be 
 established for the rapid transmission of intelligence. A large 
 staff must be provided for, which is the mainspring that sets all 
 the works in motion. And these are only ordinary wants, such 
 as any large picnic party on the same scale would require. 
 When we consider that 200 rounds of ammunition can easily 
 be fired away by each gun in a general action, that every 
 infantry soldier canon the same occasion dispose of 120 rounds 
 of ball cartridge, and that this must be all replaced imme- 
 diately ; that all this requires an enormous number of carriages, 
 with horses and drivers ; that outside of the line of battle there 
 must be medical men, their assistants, and nurses ; that within 
 it and under fire there must be ambulance waggons, and men 
 with stretchers to bear the wounded to them ; and that forty 
 per cent, of the infantry alone in every year's campaign are 
 carried to the rear, we may understand how the large difference 
 between the number of actual fighting men and of men borne 
 upon paper is accounted for. 
 
5 6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 We have seen that each corps d'armee may be safely 
 estimated at 30,000 combatants, and that of the Guard at 
 36,000, without taking into consideration those large artillery 
 and engineer trains which would be requisite were the army to 
 undertake the siege of any considerable fortress. It only 
 remains now to consider whether this strength may always be 
 reckoned upon as constant ; and it appears that this may be 
 done in consequence of the admirable system of Prussian 
 organization. By this system, as soon as a corps d'armee is 
 put on a war footing, there is a depot battalion formed for 
 each regiment, a depot company for each battalion of rifles, a 
 depot squadron for each cavalry regiment,* a depot division 
 for the artillery of each corps d'armee, a depot company for 
 each engineer battalion, and a depot for the military train. 
 These depots remain in their barracks, and supply all 
 vacancies made in the ranks of the corps to which they belong. 
 Nor is it at all difficult for them to do so, because in con- 
 sequence of the system of recruiting pursued in this. country 
 these depots do not consist entirely of raw recruits, but partly 
 of men who have served for some time in the army, and who 
 have, after leaving the regular ranks, been annually put 
 through a course of training. 
 
 In Prussia, with the exception of clergymen and a few 
 others, every man in the year in which he becomes twenty 
 years old is liable to military service for five years, three of 
 which he spends in the regular army and two in the reserve. On 
 completion of this service he is placed in the first levy of the 
 Landvvehr for seven years, and afterwards in the second levy 
 of the Landwehr for seven years more. When it is necessary 
 to raise the regular army to a war footing, the reserve is first 
 draughted into the ranks, then the first levy of the Landvvehr, 
 and afterwards, if necessary, the second levy.t If the Land- 
 wehr is exhausted the Landsturm is called out, and in this 
 case every man between sixteen and fifty is liable for service. _ 
 Each corps d'armee of the Line in time of peace is 
 
 * The dep6t squadron for each regiment of cavalry is now maintained in 
 "t AfteTiSo^ the distinction between the two levies of Landwehr ceased. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 57 
 
 quartered in one of the eight provinces of the kingdom ; its 
 recruits are obtained from that province, and its Landwehr are 
 the men in the province who have served five years and who 
 have been dismissed from actual service, but are subjected to 
 an annual course of training. The provinces to which the 
 different corps d'armee in 1866 belonged were:— 1, Prussia 
 Proper; 2, Pomerania; 3, Brandenburg; 4, Prussian Saxony; 
 « Posen; 6, Silesia; 7, Westphalia; 8, Rhine Provinces. 
 The Guards are recruited from men of a certain stature from 
 all the provinces, and the Landwehr of the Guard consists of 
 the men who have formerly served in it 
 
 Prussia after the successes of Frederick the Great, was 
 content to suppose that the military organization which had 
 served her so well in the Seven Years' War was perfect, and 
 required little or no modification to enable it to continue supe- 
 rior to that of other European Powers; but while she reposed 
 complacently on the laurels of Rossbach and Leuthen, mili- 
 tary science had rushed forwards, and she was rudely roused 
 from her repose by the crushing defeat of Jena. Under 
 enormous difficulties, and with the greatest secrecy, a new 
 organization was then introduced into the Prussian army. 
 The terms of peace dictated by Napoleon after the Jena 
 campaign allowed the Prussian army to consist of only 
 42 000 men, but no stipulation was made as to how long these 
 men should serve. In order to secure the means of striking 
 for independence on the first favourable opportunity, General 
 Scharnhorst introduced the Krumper system, by which a 
 certain number of soldiers were always allowed to go home on 
 furlough after a few months' service, and recruits were brought 
 into the ranks in their place. Those drilled were m their turn 
 sent away on furlough and other recruits brought in for tram- 
 in- By means of this system at the beginning of 18 13 not 
 only could the existing regiments be filled up to proper war 
 strength, but fifty-one new battalions were raised from pre- 
 pared soldiers. This force, however, was totally insufficient 
 for the great struggle against Napoleon ; so m February, 1813, 
 volunteer Jager detachments were formed which mustered 
 together about 10,000 men, and in March the raising of a 
 Landwehr was decreed, which in five months after the signa- 
 
58 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 ture of the decree was able to take part in the war with a 
 strength of 120,000 men. Thus in August, 1813, Prussia 
 possessed an army of 250,000 men, of whom 170,000 men 
 were ready to take the field, while the remaining 80,000 
 formed reserve and depot troops and supplied garrisons. This 
 army fought in the war of independence, and formed the first 
 nucleus of the existing military organization of the kingdom, — 
 an organization which, dating from a terrible misfortune, the 
 bitter experience of which has never been forgotten, has since 
 been constanly tended, improved, and reformed, and with careful 
 progress been brought to such a high pitch of excellence that 
 in 1866 it enabled the Prussian troops to march and conquer 
 with an almost miraculous rapidity, to eclipse in a few days the 
 glories of the Seven Years' War, to efface the memory of Jena 
 by thundering on the attention of the startled world the 
 suddenly decisive victory of Sadowa, and to spring over the 
 ashes of Chlum into very possibly the foremost place among 
 the armies of the world.* 
 
 After Prussia had regained her position as a great Power it 
 was necessary that she should have an army of a strength 
 similar to that of the armies of other great Powers, and there- 
 fore with a muster-roll of about half a million of men. At this 
 time the other great Powers kept the greater part of their 
 soldiery in peace, as in war, in the ranks, and only allowed a 
 few trained veterans, who together amounted to about one- 
 fourth of the total strength of the army, to be absent on 
 furlough. But Prussia was then the smallest of the great 
 Powers, and had neither such a large population nor revenue 
 as the others. Thus, she had, in the first place, not sufficient 
 men ; in the second place, not enough money to maintain an 
 anny on a similar system, and could in peace keep together 
 only a much smaller portion of her soldiery than her possible 
 enemies could. This portion of her army was organised on 
 the following system : — The country was required every year 
 to grant 40,000 recruits, each of whom served for three years 
 under the standards and for two years in the reserve ; so the 
 
 * The events of 1870 — 71, have not belied this paragraph, written in 
 1S67. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 59 
 
 standing army amounted to 120,000 men, and by calling in 
 the reserves could be raised immediately to 200,000 men. 
 But, to complete the requisite number of 500,000 soldiers, 
 300,000 more were necessary, and in time of peace the 
 kingdom could afford to maintain only very small depots for 
 these additional troops. The war of independence had shown 
 that the Landwehr system, by which men were allowed to 
 retire from service, but still remained liable to be called up for 
 duty, was capable of effecting good service, and in case of 
 need of supplying the men who could not be kept in time of 
 peace in the regular army. Therefore this system was retained, 
 and by the decree of the 3rd of September, 1814, the Prussian 
 army was organized definitively on the Landwehr system. By 
 this system every Prussian capable of bearing arms was with- 
 out exception liable to military duty, and to serve from his 
 20th to his 23rd year in the standing army, from his 23rd to 
 25th in the reserve, from his 25th to 32nd in the first levy of the 
 Landwehr, and from his 32nd to 39th in the second levy. The 
 Landsturm was to consist of all men capable of bearing arms 
 between seventeen and forty-nine years of age who did not 
 belong either to the standing army or to the Landwehr. From 
 the Landwehr battalions and squadrons were raised which 
 formed Landwehr regiments, and these were united for annual 
 exercise or service in brigades and divisions with regiments of 
 the Line. Landwehr men who had belonged to J ager bat- 
 talions, to the artillery, or to the engineer service, were not 
 formed into separate corps ; but in case of being called up 
 were to return into the ranks of the regiments in which they 
 had formerly served. 
 
 By this system, with an annual supply of 40,000 recruits, 
 Prussia was enabled to hold in readiness for war an army 
 which consisted of three distinct parts. 
 
 1. The standing army of 120,000 men, raised in war by the 
 recall of the reserves to 200,000 men, and with Landwehr- 
 Jagers, artillerymen, and pioneers, to 220,000 men. 
 
 2. The first levy of the Landwehr, including only infantry 
 and cavalry, of which, in peace, only small depots, numbering 
 together about 3,000 men, were maintained, but which, on the 
 mobilization of the army for war, supplied considerably over 
 
60 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 150,000 men, even allowing liberally for deaths, sickness, 
 emigration, and other causes of reduction. 
 
 The standing army and the first levy, after detaching 30,000 
 men to strengthen the garrisons of fortresses, formed together 
 the field army of 340,000 men, and besides, from their surplus 
 men and recruits, could leave at home a force of depot troops 
 amounting to about 50,000 men. 
 
 3. The second levy of the Landwehr, from which no 
 exercise or training was required in time of peace, but which 
 in war was called upon to furnish 110,000 soldiers, who, 
 with the 30,000 above mentioned from the standing army and 
 first levy, garrisoned the fortresses of the country, and could, 
 in case of urgent necessity, be supported by the Landsturm. 
 
 From these three sources — 1, the field army; 2, depot 
 troops, formed by the standing army and first lew of the 
 Landwehr; 3, garrison troops, formed by the surplus of the 
 first levy, the second levy of Landwehr, and in case of need 
 from the Landsturm — Prussia could for war raise 530,000 men, 
 of whom in time of peace hardly one-fourth were present with 
 the standards. The standing army during the time that this 
 organization remained intact consisted of forty-five infantry 
 regiments, ten light infantry battalions, thirty-eight cavalry 
 regiments, nine artillery regiments, and nine divisions of engi- 
 neers. 
 
 The great advantage of this system was that in peace it 
 necessitated but a small expense, and required but few men to 
 keep up an army which on the outbreak of war could be raised 
 quickly to a large force. As it was arranged after the War of 
 Independence it endured without alteration during the reigns 
 of Frederick William III. and Frederick William IV. 
 
 But in the campaigns which the Prussian army undertook in 
 1848 and 1S49, and again when the army was mobilized in 
 1850 and 1859, the disadvantages of an organization so entirely 
 based upon the Landwehr system became apparent in a high 
 legree. 
 
 The energetic spirit with which the Prussian people rushed 
 to arms against Napoleon I. can only, under very peculiar 
 circumstances, agitate a whole nation, and make every indi- 
 vidual willing and anxious to sacrifice his personal comfort 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 61 
 
 and convenience in order to respond to the call of his Govern- 
 ment, and serve with alacrity in the ranks of the army. Such 
 circumstances seldom occur, and are due either to the insup- 
 portable weight of a foreign domination — as was the case in 
 Prussia from 1807-12 — or to some strong patriotic stimulus 
 such as has knitted the people of the same country together 
 during the late campaign ; but this spirit is seldom found at 
 the outbreak of an ordinary war, engaged in for ordinary poli- 
 tical reasons. 
 
 It was found on the mobilization in 1848 that a great por- 
 tion of the Landwehr soldiers obeyed only unwillingly the call 
 to arms, because it interfered with their private occupations; 
 that they sometimes, weaned by long ease from military ideas, 
 showed a want of discipline, and that, thinking more for their 
 wives and families than for their duty to the State, they did not 
 always acquit themselves properly in action. Besides, there 
 was this disadvantage that the Landwehr — therefore, about half 
 of the field army, newly embodied— prevented the divisions 
 from being immediately prepared to take the field, a delay 
 which is terribly prejudicial to an army in these times, when 
 troops are forwarded to the theatre of war by the rapid means 
 of railway transport. The officers and non-commissioned 
 officers of the Landwehr were also little used to their duties, 
 and at the very moment of mobilization a great number of 
 them were necessarily transferred to the Line, and others 
 brought from the regular army to supply their places. These 
 numerous alterations of their leaders at such an important time 
 were alone sufficient to impair materially the efficiency of the 
 troops. 
 
 Besides these disadvantages, the existing system had brought 
 about a great injustice in the distribution of military service, as 
 in 18 1 5 only 40,000 recruits were yearly called for to support 
 the standing army of 140,000 men, while in the meantime the 
 population had increased from 10,000,000 to 18,000,000; so 
 that about one-third of the lads who should proportionately 
 have entered the service were entirely free of duty, and those 
 who did enter were liable to be recalled to the ranks for a 
 longer period of their life than was really necessary; for if, 
 instead of 40,000 recruits, 63,000 were, as easily could be, 
 
62 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 called up every year, men, instead of being liable to be put into 
 the standing army on the outbreak of war for twelve years 
 (from twenty to thirty-two), need only be liable for seven years 
 (from twenty to twenty-seven). In direct ratio with the in- 
 crease of population the national revenues had also increased 
 from 50,000,000 to 93,000,000 thalers, and so admitted of an 
 increase of the standing army and of the military expenses. 
 
 There were thus three grounds for a reform in the Landwehr 
 system, and therefore King William I., while still Regent, in- 
 troduced in 1859 and i860 a re-organization of the army, which 
 up to 1865 formed a bone of contention between the Prussian 
 Ministry and the Radical party in the Lower House, but the 
 success of which in the war of 1866 completely silenced, if not 
 thoroughly convinced, even its tax-paying opponents of its 
 wonderful excellence and elasticity. By this re-organization of 
 1859, as it is usually called, the first levy of the Landwehr was 
 no longer, as a rule, to be sent into the field ; and to attain 
 this object the standing army, including the reserves, was to 
 be increased by as many men as the first levy of the Landwehr 
 formerly provided — in fact, to be nearly doubled. The time 
 of service in the Landwehr was diminished by two years, and 
 that in the reserve in return to be lengthened by two years. 
 The Landwehr still remaining in two levies, but composed only 
 of men from twenty-seven to thirty-eight years old, was, as a 
 rule, with its first levy alone to perform the duty which had 
 hitherto been performed by the second levy, — namely, to gar- 
 rison the fortresses. In case of necessity the Government still, 
 however, retained the power of calling up the second levy to 
 aid in this duty. 
 
 By this organization a recruit who joined the Prussian ser- 
 vice served for three years (from nineteen to twenty-two) * in 
 the regular army; for five years (from twenty-two to twenty- 
 seven) in the reserve ; and for eleven years (from twenty-seven 
 to thirty-eight) was liable to be called up for duty as a Land- 
 wehr man. 
 
 By this re-organization the total war strength of the field 
 
 * From the 1st January of the year in which he became twenty years 
 old. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 63 
 
 army was slightly increased, and its efficiency most materially 
 improved ; the war strength of the depot troops was, on ac- 
 count of the necessity of great rapidity in modern warfare, more 
 than doubled ; that of the garrison troops was improved, and 
 could now, by calling up the second levy, be made twice as 
 great as it was formerly. These reforms also allowed the 
 standing army to be increased by thirty-six regiments of in- 
 fantry, nine battalions for the fusilier regiments, ten cavalry 
 regiments, and five divisions of garrison artillery. Sufficient 
 time had not yet elapsed on the outbreak of the Austrian war 
 for this re-organization to be thoroughly carried out, and still 
 eight of the ten cavalry regiments had not been formed, and 
 their place was supplied during that campaign by twelve Land- 
 wehr cavalry regiments, and as yet only one of the divisions of 
 garrison artillery had been formed. 
 
 During the campaign of 1866 the elasticity of this organiza- 
 tion was clearly manifested. In a wonderfully short time the 
 large armies which fought at Koniggratz were placed on a war 
 footing, and brought about 260,000 combatants into the very 
 field of battle, besides the necessary detachments which must 
 be made by a large army to cover communications, mask fort- 
 resses, and so on ; but the detachments made from the Prus- 
 sian army were very small compared to those which would 
 have to be separated from an army organized on a different 
 system ; for as the field army advanced the depot troops moved 
 up in rear, and formed both depots and reserves for the first 
 line, while some of the garrison troops of Landwehr came up 
 from Prussia, and formed the garrisons of Saxony, Prague, 
 Pardubitz, and all the other points on the lines of communica- 
 tion. At the same time General Miilbe's corps, formed for the 
 most part of reserve and depot soldiers, pushed up to Briinn, 
 and was hastening to take its place in the first line, when its 
 march was stopped by the conclusion of the long armistice. 
 
 While the armies of Prince Frederick Charles, the Crown 
 Prince, and General Herwarth were being supported in Bo- 
 hemia, Moravia, and Saxony, General Falkenstein, with a 
 number of Line regiments and a force of Landwehr, was driv- 
 ing the war forwards to the Main ; and the Prince of Mecklen- 
 burg, with the second reserve corps, was pushing on against 
 
64 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 Bavaria. Nor was Prussian territory left without its garrisons : 
 Landwehr battalions were in Kosel, Neisse, Berlin, Torgau, 
 Magdeburg, Konigsberg, and all the other garrison towns of 
 the country, while under their shelter recruits were being 
 drilled, and more Landwehr embodied to march forward into 
 the conquered countries. The armies which were on the 
 Marchfeld in front of Lundenburg and in Bavaria did not 
 form a thin front line, which, once broken or turned, would 
 have been driven back even to the Elbe ; their rear was guarded 
 and supported by large forces of strong and firm battalions, 
 lately embodied, but from their nature quickly trained, and 
 composed of well-grown old soldiers who were thirsting to be 
 sent against the enemy, and on whose well-knit frames disease 
 or the hardships of war could make little impression. 
 
 Though the part of the Prussian organization which refers 
 to the recruiting of the army and to the filling up of the ranks 
 in case of war has had a great deal to do with the success of 
 the Austrian campaign, on account of the facility and rapidity 
 with which by its means the army could be mobilized and 
 brought upon a war footing, the portion of the Prussian 
 organization which relates to the combination of the recruits 
 so obtained in pliable bodies, which can be easily handled, 
 easily moved, yet formed in such due proportions of the different 
 amis as to be capable of independent action, did not fail to 
 be appreciated most fully by those who, with its assistance, 
 gained such tremendous results. This portion of the military 
 organization of the Prussian army is so simple that almost 
 every man in the ranks can understand it. Jealous of expense 
 in time of peace, it allows for a wide expansion, without 
 hurry and without confusion, on the outbreak of war. It pro- 
 vides for, at the same time, the broadest questions and the 
 most minute details, and is so clearly laid down and so pre- 
 cisely defined, yet at the same time admits of so much 
 elasticity, that the Prussian officers can find no words strong 
 enough to express their praise of it. 
 
 England, in fact, in 1866, hardly wakened up to realize that 
 the Prussian army then was very different from that which at 
 the beginning of this century was destroyed on the fatal day 
 of Jena, or that then it only resembled the army which 
 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 65 
 
 marched so well to our aid at Waterloo, in patriotic feeling 
 and in the rudiments of its organization. Prussia seems now 
 about to spring into the position she held one hundred years 
 ago, when Frederick had made her the first military Power 
 in the world, and England was introducing her military system 
 into the germs of the army which marched through the Penin- 
 sula, and at Waterloo shattered the legions which Bliicher 
 annihilated. Would that England now would take some hints 
 for the organization of her army from the victors of Konig- 
 gratz, and would adopt the experience which has been won on 
 the plains of Bohemia, before military progress is forced 
 upon her by a disaster more fatal, perhaps, than that of 
 Klostersevern ! * 
 
 In peace everything is always kept ready for the mobiliza- 
 tion of the army, every officer and every official knows during 
 peace what will be his post and what will be his duty the 
 moment the decree for the mobilization is issued, and the 
 moment that decree is flashed by telegraph to the most 
 distant stations every one sets about his necessary duty without 
 requiring any further orders or any explanations. 
 
 W T hen a war is imminent the Government decrees the 
 mobilization of the whole army, or of such a portion as may 
 be deemed necessary. In preparing for the Austrian cam- 
 paign, the whole field army and the first levy of Landwehr 
 were mobilized before the invasion of Saxony. A part of the 
 second Landwehr levy was also mobilized immediately the 
 troops of Prince Frederick Charles stepped across the Saxon 
 frontier ; and on the day of the great battle near Koniggratz, 
 without any exertion, Prussia had over 600,000 men under 
 arms. Every commanding general mobilizes his own corps 
 d'armee; the " Intendantur " the whole of the branches of the 
 administrative services ; the commandants of those fortresses 
 which are ordered to be placed in a state of defence take 
 their own measures for strengthening the fortifications and for 
 obtaining from the artillery depots the guns necessary for the 
 armament of their parapets. All orders are sent by telegraph, 
 
 * It is hardly necessary to notice that since this was written in 1 86 7, 
 England has made a great advance in military improvement. 
 
 F 
 
66 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 or, where telegraphic communication does not exist, by 
 mounted orderlies. The mobilization of the whole army is 
 soon complete in every branch ; the infantry is ready in a 
 fortnight from the time the decree is signed. 
 
 The process of the mobilization may be classed under the 
 following five heads : — I, The filling in of the field troops to 
 their war strength ; 2, the formation of depot troops ; 3, the 
 formation of garrison troops and the arming of the fortresses ; 
 4, the mobilization of the field administration ; 5, the forma- 
 tion of the head-quarter staffs, &c, who are to remain in the 
 different districts to supply the places of those who march to 
 the seat of war. 
 
 The completion of the rank and file of the field troops 
 to war strength was effected by drawing in some of the reserve 
 soldiers, who supply half the total war strength of the in- 
 fantry, one-third of that of the artillery, and one twenty-fifth 
 of that of the cavalry. The cavalry has, of course, on 
 account of being maintained in such force during peace, a 
 superabundance of reserve soldiers available on a mobiliza- 
 tion ; these, after the men required for the cavalry itself have 
 been drawn from them, are handed over to the artillery and 
 military train, so that these services thus obtain many valuable 
 soldiers, well accustomed to mounted duties. The reserve 
 soldiers who are to be enrolled have orders sent to them 
 through the commanding officer of the Landwehr of the 
 district in which they live, who can avail himself of the ser- 
 vices of the provincial and parochial civil authorities to 
 facilitate the delivery of these orders. The men are, imme- 
 diately on the receipt of their orders, required to proceed to 
 the head-quarters of the Landwehr of the district, where they 
 are received, medically inspected, and forwarded to their regi- 
 ment, by an officer and some non-commissioned officers of the 
 regiment which draws its recruits from the district. Officers 
 who are required to fill up vacancies in the regular army in a 
 mobilization are obtained by promoting some of the senior 
 non-commissioned officers. Landwehr officers obtain their 
 commissions much in the same way as do military officers in 
 England, but no Landwehr officer can be promoted to the 
 rank of captain unless he has been attached to a regular 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 67 
 
 regiment for two months' duty ; and no Landwehr officer can 
 be a field officer unless he has before served for some con- 
 siderable time in the regular army. Many of the officers 
 of the Landwehr are officers still on the strength of the 
 regular army, who are detached to the Landwehr on its 
 mobilization. 
 
 On a mobilization, the whole army required in 1866 about 
 88,000 horses more than it had in time of peace ; in order to 
 obtain these quickly the Government has the power, if it 
 cannot buy them readily from regular dealers, to take a certain 
 number from every district, paying for them a price which is 
 fixed by a mixed commission of military officers and of persons 
 appointed by the civil authorities of the district. 
 
 Each regiment of field artillery forms nine ammunition 
 columns, in each of which are waggons to carry reserve am- 
 munition for infantry, cavalry, and artillery, in the proportions 
 in which experience has shown that ammunition is usually 
 required. In the field these ammunition waggons follow 
 directly in rear of the field army, but are kept entirely sepa- 
 rate from the field batteries, the officers of which are justly 
 supposed to have enough to do in action in superintending 
 their own guns, without being hampered with the supply of 
 cartridges to the cavalry and infantry. 
 
 Every battalion of engineers forms a column of waggons 
 which carries tools for intrenching purposes, and also a heavy 
 pontoon train and a light field bridge train for which all is kept 
 ready during peace. If a portion of the army is mobilized 
 merely for practice, or goes into camp for great manoeuvres, as 
 is done nearly every summer during peace, one, or perhaps 
 two or three, engineer battalions make their trains mobile, in 
 order to practise the men and to accustom them to the use of 
 the materiel. Arms and ammunition which are required to 
 complete the war strength of regiments are supplied from the 
 artillery depots. Officers are allowed soldier servants on a 
 more liberal scale than in the English army, but no officers' 
 servants are mustered in the company ; they form, with all the 
 non-combatant men of each battalion of infantry, the train 
 which is attached to every battalion : this consists of the 
 officers' servants and the drivers of the regimental waggons ; 
 
 F 2 
 
68 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 every one else borne on the muster-roll draws a trigger in 
 action, so that the muster-rolls actually show the number of 
 rank and file who are present, and do not include any of the 
 followers, who often never come up into the line of battle at 
 all. On service the captain of every company is mounted, 
 and is required to have two horses, to aid in the purchase 
 of which he is allowed a certain sum of money by the 
 State. 
 
 The strength cf an ordinary battalion on active service is 
 one field-officer, four captains, four first lieutenants, nine second 
 lieutenants, one surgeon, one assistant-surgeon, one paymaster, 
 one quarter-master, 1002 non-commissioned officers and privates. 
 The train attached to this battalion is, besides officers' ser- 
 vants, the drivers of the ammunition waggon, which has six 
 horses ; of the Montirung Wagon, which carries the pay- 
 master's books, money chest, and a certain amount of material 
 for the repair of arms and clothing, and is drawn by four 
 horses ; a hospital cart with two horses, an officers' baggage 
 waggon with four horses, and men to lead four pack-horses, 
 each of which carries on a pack-saddle the books of one 
 company. 
 
 The baggage of a cavalry regiment en service consists of 
 one medicine cart with two horses, one field forge with two 
 horses, four squadron waggons, each with two horses, one 
 officers' baggage waggon, with four horses ; the total strength 
 of a cavalry regiment being 23 officers 659 men, of whom 
 600 fall in in the ranks, 713 horses, and seven carriages. 
 
 The nine ammunition columns which are formed by each 
 artillery regiment for the supply of ammunition to the artillery 
 and infantry of the corps d'arme'e to which the regiment 
 belongs are divided into two divisions, one of which consists 
 of five columns, and has a* strength of two officers, 175 men, 
 174 horses, and 25 waggons; the second, consisting of four 
 columns, has two officers, 173 men, 170 horses, and 24 wag- 
 gons. This division is made to facilitate the despatch of the 
 two divisions separately to the ammunition depot to have the 
 waggons refilled after their first supply of cartridges has been 
 exhausted, or to allow one division to be detached with each 
 infantry division, in case of the corps d'arme'e being divided, 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 69 
 
 as was the case in this war with the third and fourth corps, in 
 which case four columns can conveniently be attached to each 
 infantry division, and one column to the cavalry division of the 
 corps. 
 
 The reserve ammunition park from which these ammunition 
 columns are replenished, is also divided into two divisions, 
 each of which has a strength of nine officers, 195 men, 264 
 carriages, and is further subdivided into eight columns of 33 
 waggons each. It is brought into the theatre of war either by 
 railway or water carriage, or by means of horses hired in the 
 country where the war is being conducted. It generally is one 
 or two days' march in rear of the army. In the campaign of 
 1866 on the day of the great battle, the ammunition reserve 
 park of the army of Prince Frederick Charles was at Turnau, 
 to which place it had been brought by railway. 
 
 A siege train for attacking fortresses is not generally or- 
 ganized at the beginning of a war, unless the general plan of 
 the campaign should be likely to lead the army into a country 
 where fortresses exist, which could not be either neglected or 
 masked, and which must be reduced. If a siege train is 
 organized, it is formed with especial reference to the fortresses 
 against which it is to act, and follows the army in the same 
 manner as the reserve ammunition park. At the beginning of 
 the 1866 campaign the Prussians had no siege train with the 
 army, but directly the battle of Sadowa had been won a siege 
 train was organized, perhaps to be employed against the for- 
 tresses on the Elbe, though such small places scarcely merited 
 such an attention from so large an army, perhaps for an attack 
 on Olmiitz. When the fortifications of Floridsdorf were found 
 looming in front of the advance on Vienna, the siege train was 
 ordered up to be ready for the attack of the Austrian works 
 covering the Danube, but it was halted as soon as the four 
 weeks' armistice was agreed upon. The want of siege trains 
 was, however, felt. The garrison of Theresienstadt, a fortress 
 which had been totally neglected, sallied out and broke the 
 railway bridge on the line of communication between Prague 
 and Turnau. Had their communication been thus broken 
 during the active campaign, and not during the armistice, it 
 must have seriously inconvenienced the Prussians. Had 
 
70 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 Theresienstadt been masked, the sally of the garrison would 
 have been probably prevented; but had it been properly 
 besieged, the garrison would have been kept within their 
 works, and the direct line of railway between Prague and 
 Dresden would have been at the service of the Prussian army 
 for almost its entire length. 
 
 It is thus that the Prussian army is formed in peace, that its 
 field forces can be made ready to march in a few days in case 
 of war, and that the troops in the field are supplied with the 
 powder and shot which give them the means of fighting. But, 
 Tart de vaincre est perdu sans Part de subsister. An organiza- 
 tion of even more importance lies still behind — the organization 
 of the means of supplying the warriors with food when in 
 health, with medicine and hospitals when diseased or wounded, 
 and for filling up the gaps which are opened in the ranks by 
 battle or pestilence ; an organization which has always been 
 found to be more difficult and to require more delicate 
 handling than even strategical combinations, or the arraying 
 of troops for battle. 
 
 The Prussian army could in 1866 enter the field with 
 342,000 men in its ranks ; but, as is well known, no army, 
 nor any collection of men, can maintain its normal strength for 
 a single day ; in such a host, even of young healthy men, ordi- 
 nary illness would immediately cause a few absentees from 
 duty, much more so do the marches, the hardships, and the 
 fatigues to which a soldier is exposed on active service before 
 the first shot is fired. Then as soon as an action takes place, 
 a single day adds a long list to the hospital roll, and the even- 
 ing sees in the ranks many gaps which in the morning were 
 filled by strong soldiers, who are now lying torn and mangled 
 or dead on the field of battle. The dead are gone for ever; 
 they are so much power lost out of the hand of the general ; 
 nor can an army wait till the wounded are cured and are again 
 able to draw a trigger "or to wield a sabre. Means must be 
 taken to supply the deficiencies as quickly as possible, and to 
 restore to the commander of the army the missing force which 
 has been expended in moving his own army through the first 
 steps of the campaign, or in resisting the motion of his ad- 
 versary. What is the amount of such deficiencies may be 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 71 
 
 estimated from Prussian statistics, which have been compiled 
 with great care, and from the experience of many campaigns ; 
 these state officially that at the end of a year's war forty per 
 cent, of the infantry of the field army, twenty per cent, of the 
 cavalry, artillery, and engineers, and twelve per cent, of the 
 military train would have been lost to the service, and have had 
 to be supplied anew. 
 
 It is for the formation of these supplies of men, and for for- 
 warding them to the active army, that depots are intended. 
 The depots of the Prussian army are formed as soon as the 
 mobilization takes place, and it is ordered that one half of the 
 men of each depot should be soldiers of the reserve, who, 
 already acquainted with their drill, can be sent up to the front 
 on the first call • the other half of each depot consists of recruits 
 who are raised in the ordinary way, and of all the men of the 
 regiments belonging to the field army which have not been per- 
 fectly drilled by the time their regiment marches to the seat of 
 war. The officers of the depots are either officers who are 
 detached from the regular army for this duty, or are officers 
 who have been previously wounded, and who cannot bear active 
 service, but can perform the easier duties of the depot, besides 
 young officers, who are being trained to their duty before join- 
 ing their regiments. 
 
 Between the re-organization of 1859 and the war of 1866, 
 the number of depot troops kept up during a war was quite 
 doubled ; formerly every two infantry regiments had one depot 
 battalion, and every two cavalry regiments one depot squadron. 
 When the army was re-organized, it was foreseen that this 
 amount of depot troops would never be sufficient in case of a 
 war of any duration or severity, so by the new regulations each 
 infantry regiment had one depot battalion of 18 officers and 
 1,002 men; each rifle battalion, a depot company of 4 officers 
 and 201 men; each cavalry regiment, a depot squadron of 5 
 officers, 200 men, and 212 horses; each field artillery regi- 
 ment (96 guns), a depot division of one horse artillery battery, 
 and three field batteries, each of four guns, with 14 officers, 556 
 men, and 189 horses; every engineer battalion, one depot com- 
 pany of 4 officers and 202 men ; every train battalion, a depot 
 division of two companies, which muster together 12 officers, 
 
72 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 502 men, and 213 horses. All this was required to feed the 
 army in the field with supplies of men to take the places of 
 those who pass from the regimental muster roll into the lists of 
 killed, died in hospital, or disabled ; for those who are only 
 slightly wounded return to their duty either in the depot or at 
 once to their battalions, as is most convenient from the situa- 
 tion of the hospital in which they have been. 
 
 As a rule, four weeks after the field army has marched, the 
 first supply of men is forwarded from the depots to the batta- 
 lions in the field. This first supply consists of one-eighth of the 
 calculated yearly loss which has been given above. On the first 
 day of every succeeding month a fresh supply is forwarded. 
 Each of these later supplies is one-twelfth of the total calculated 
 yearly loss. If a very bloody battle is fought, special supplies 
 are sent at once to make up the losses of the troops that have 
 been engaged. 
 
 The troops in depot are provided with all articles of equip- 
 ment with which they should take the field. When a detach- 
 ment is to be sent to the front, all who belong to one corps 
 d'arme'e are assembled together ; the infantiy soldiers are 
 formed into companies of 200 men each for the march, the 
 cavalry into squadrons of about 100 horsemen, and are taken 
 under the charge of officers to the field army, thus bringing to 
 the front with them the necessary reserves of horses. The 
 places in the depots of those who have marched away are filled 
 up by recruiting. 
 
 An army, though of great strength and well provided with 
 supplies of men, cannot always be sure of taking the initiative, 
 and by an offensive campaign driving the war into an enemy's 
 country. There is no doubt that an offensive campaign is 
 much better for a country and much more likely to achieve 
 success than a defensive one : it was much better for the 
 Prussians in 1866 to cover Berlin in Bohemia than in Bran- 
 denburg, in 1870 in Alsatia than in Rhineland ; General 
 Benedek would have preferred to cover Vienna indirectly by 
 an attack on Prussian Silesia rather than in a defensive posi- 
 tion at Koniggratz; Napoleon justly saw that the proper point 
 to defend Paris in 181 5 was not on the Marne, but in Belgium. 
 But political reasons or want of preparation often force an army 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 73 
 
 to be unable to assume the offensive, and with the loss of the 
 initiative make a present to the enemy of the first great advan- 
 tage in the war. In this case the theatre of war is carried into 
 its own territory, when an army requires fortresses to protect its 
 arsenals, dockyards, and its capital, to cover important strate- 
 gical points, or to afford a place where, in case of defeat or 
 disaster, it may be re-organized under the shelter of fortifica- 
 tions and heavy artillery. It was well seen in the war of 1866 
 that small fortresses do not delay the progress in the field of a 
 large invading army, which can afford to spare detachments to 
 prevent their garrisons from making sallies. Josephstadt and 
 Koniggratz did not delay the Prussian armies for a day, 
 though they are both strong places, and would possibly have 
 stood a long siege ; but they were both masked by detach- 
 ments, the loss of which from the line of battle was hardly felt 
 by the main body, and, though no trenches were opened and 
 no guns mounted against them, the great line of the Prussian 
 communications passed in safety within a few miles of their 
 paralysed garrisons.* It was also demonstrated by that war 
 that fortifications which inclose a town of any size are compa- 
 ratively useless, unless the defensive works are so far in front 
 of the houses as to preclude the possibility of the bombardment 
 of the city. Towns are now so rich, both in population and 
 wealth, that few Governments would dare to expose their sub- 
 jects to the loss of property and risk to life which a bombard- 
 ment must entail. Prague, though surrounded by ramparts, 
 struck the Austrian colours without firing a shot, because the 
 Prussian guns would at the same time have played upon the 
 defenders of the parapets, the unprotected citizens, and the rich 
 storehouses of its merchants. The Spielberg at Briinn, if it 
 stood alone, might make a strong resistance to the passage of 
 an invader, but the white flag of truce waving from its flagstaff, 
 instead of the war standard of Austria, greeted the Prussian 
 vanguard, because the Emperor could not have borne to hear 
 that its spires, its palaces, and large manufactories had crumbled 
 to the ground under Mecklenburg's artillery. But it would be 
 
 * In the same manner, in 1870, even Strasburg, Phalsburg, Bitche, 
 Toul, and Belfort did not, although besieged, delay the progress of the 
 invaders. 
 
74 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 rash to jump to the conclusion that fortresses, and even forti- 
 fied towns, are no longer of use in war. Fortresses are useful 
 as supports to the flanks of an army : if Benedek had lain along 
 the river from Josephstadt to Koniggratz, the junction of the 
 two Prussian princes would have been long delayed, perhaps 
 prevented. The guns of Koniggratz materially checked the 
 pursuit of the Austrian legions defeated at Sadowa. What 
 Olmiitz did to save the army of the north from a total disorga- 
 nization, and to allow General Benedek, under its cover, to 
 make his preparations for the masterly move by which he 
 carried it to Vienna, is well known. Whenever a capital is 
 distinctly the objective point of an invader, as would be the 
 case if an enemy's army were ever to be allowed to land on the 
 shores of our own England, strong works round the city, but so 
 far in advance of the houses as would prevent their being 
 reached by the besieger's shells, become a necessity, between 
 and behind which the defender's army, if worsted in a battle, 
 might be restored, and wait until the attacking troops had 
 shattered themselves against the intrenchments. And though 
 the earthworks at Floridsdorf had little to do with the sudden 
 cessation of hostilities, there can be no doubt that if Vienna 
 had been properly fortified on every side Austria might, with a 
 very fair chance, have struck another blow before she suffered 
 herself to be excluded from the Confederation of the German 
 people.* 
 
 As long as fortresses exist they require garrisons, but the 
 troops which are formed in Prussia on the breaking out of a 
 war are not intended, in case of an offensive campaign, only to 
 hang listlessly over the parapets of fortified places. When an 
 army pushes forward into a foreign country, it leaves behind it 
 long lines of road or railway over which pass the supplies of 
 food, clothing, medicines, and stores, which are vitally import- 
 ant to the existence of an army. With an unfriendly population, 
 and an enemy's cavalry ready always to seize an opportunity of 
 breaking in upon these lines of communication, of charging 
 down upon convoys, and destroying or burning their contents, 
 
 * The fortifications of Paris allowed time in 1S70-71 for three separate 
 attempts to raise the siege of the capital. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 75 
 
 and of thus deranging seriously what might be called the 
 household economy of the army, it is necessary, especially on 
 lines of railway, that strong garrisons should be maintained at 
 particular points, and that patrols should be furnished for 
 nearly the whole line. Towns have to be occupied in rear of 
 the front line, depots of stores have to be guarded and pro- 
 tected, convoys have to be escorted, telegraph lines watched, 
 the fortifications which may fall garrisoned. To detach troops 
 for the performance of all these duties dribbles away the 
 strength of an army : if the Prussian armies which crossed the 
 frontier into Bohemia and Moravia had been obliged to make 
 all these detachments, how many fighting men would have 
 mustered on the Marchfeld ? Very few. If these armies had 
 waited till troops were formed at home after the course of the 
 campaign had been seen, how long would it have required to 
 march to the Rossbach ? Probably the advanced guard would 
 have still been upon the Elbe when it was actually on the 
 Danube. To provide for these duties, and to allow the main 
 armies to push forward in almost unimpaired strength, Prussia 
 forms on the mobilization of the field army her so-called 
 garrison troops.* 
 
 In the formation of these garrison troops, there is a draw- 
 back from the general excellence of the Prussian military 
 organization, which arises from the Landwehr system. The 
 men of the first levy of the Landwehr form, when alone called 
 out, as many battalions as do the united levies when nearly the 
 whole of the second levy is also called out. In both cases 
 there are 116 battalions, which consist each of 402 men of the 
 first levy, and are only filled up to their full strength of 1,000 
 men by men of the second levy. On account of this arrange- 
 ment, if only the men of the first levy are required, a large 
 number of weak battalions are formed, which are more 
 expensive and more difficult to handle than would be a 
 smaller number of full battalions. It would appear much 
 simpler to have a certain number of battalions composed 
 entirely of men of the first levy, and the rest entirely of men 
 
 * These were even more necessary in France, where the bitterly hostile 
 feeling of the inhabitants and the Franc-Tireur organization required con- 
 stant watching. 
 
76 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 of the second levy ; but in Prussia this simplicity cannot be 
 obtained because it is considered advisable to have a Landwehr 
 battalion for every recruiting district, and only to enrol the men 
 of the district in their own battalion. If, however, treble the 
 population which inhabits one of the present recruiting districts 
 were included in one district, it would be quite easy to have 
 three battalions of Landwehr for each district, one completely 
 composed of men of the first levy, the second of the first men 
 of the second, and the third of the later men of the second levy, 
 who now complete the battalions up to their full strength.* 
 
 In some respects, which are easily seen, the Prussian Land- 
 wehr resembles the British Militia, but there are two vital 
 differences between our organization and that of Prussia. The 
 first is, that in England when a militia regiment is formed it is 
 made up of men who are not old soldiers, and consequently, if 
 the regiment is for some years disembodied, all its late recruits 
 know nothing of their work except what they can pick up in 
 the short period of annual training ; so that in course of time, 
 if a regiment remains for many years without being embodied, 
 the mass of the ranks contain men who from want of training 
 are unqualified to step on the very outbreak of a war into the 
 line of battle. In the second place, the Landwehr of the first 
 levy is as much an attendant and concomitant of an army in 
 the field as the park of reserve artillery, and it is this which 
 makes the Landwehr so valuable, because it thus takes up the 
 duties which otherwise would have to be performed by detach- 
 ments from the active army. If the Prussian armies in the 
 Austrian campaign had been obliged to leave detachments in 
 Leipsic, Dresden, Prague, Pardubitz, and along the railway 
 from Gorlitz to Briinn, besides troops in Hanover, Hesse, and 
 on the lines of communications of the armies which were 
 fighting against the Bavarians, how many troops would have 
 formed the first lines of battle either on the Danube, or in the 
 theatre of war near the Main ? It is probable that the number 
 of Landwehr men employed on foreign soil, in Saxony, and in 
 guarding and garrisoning the rear of the armies which were 
 concentrated between the Thaya and the Danube, would be 
 
 * This has to a certain extent been improved since 1S66. 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 77 
 
 under-estimated at 103,000, exclusive of the corps of the regular 
 army which was watching Olmiitz. If this estimate be at all 
 correct, the armies which were collecting, together 225,000 
 regular troops, for the attack upon Vienna, would, unless they 
 had had these Landwehr behind them, have been reduced to 
 under 125,000 men. In fact, an English army under the 
 same circumstances would have been shorn of almost half its 
 strength. 
 
 When a Prussian army with its unimpaired strength is pre- 
 paring to fight a battle in an enemy's country, when supplies of 
 men are already coming up in anticipation of the losses which 
 the action will cause, and when its lines of communication are 
 guarded and secured by the garrison troops in its rear, it 
 musters an enormous number of soldiers, who must every day 
 be provided with food, without which a man can neither fight, 
 march, nor live ; and not only must it provide for itself alone, but 
 also for the prisoners of the enemy who may fall into its hands, 
 — not only food, but hospitals, medicines, and attendants for 
 the sick, surgeries, assistants, and appliances for the wounded, 
 and the means of conveying both sick arid wounded from the 
 places where they fall helpless to convenient spots where they 
 may be tended and healed at a safe distance from the danger 
 of battle, or of being taken in case of a sudden advance of the 
 enemy. It is extremely difficult from mere figures to realize 
 what a gigantic undertaking it was to supply even food alone 
 to the armies which fought in the Austrian campaign — more 
 difficult still to appreciate the difficulties in the late campaign 
 in France. The difficulties of such a task may be conceived if 
 we remember that the front line of the Prussian armies in front 
 of Vienna mustered nine times the number of British troops 
 with which Lord Raglan invaded the Crimea ; that close behind 
 this line lay General Miilbe's reserve corps, and a corps of the 
 Army of Silesia, which was watching Olmiitz, and that these 
 two corps alone were stronger by 4,000 men than all the 
 British, German, and Spanish troops that fought at Talavera; 
 that behind them again was a large mass of Landwehr ; that 
 during the siege of Sebastopol the British army was stationary, 
 and had the great advantage of sea transport to within a few 
 miles of its camps, while in the late campaigns the Prussian 
 
78 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 army had been moving forward at an enormously rapid rate, 
 and that the men to be fed in the front line alone numbered 
 about 250,000 in Austria* — a population as large as that of 
 the twelfth part of London. It would be a bold man who 
 would undertake to supply the twelfth part of the whole 
 population of London with to-morrow's food — a bolder still 
 who would undertake the task if this portion of the population 
 were about to move bodily to-morrow morning down to Rich- 
 mond, and would require to have the meat for their dinner 
 delivered to them the moment they arrived there, and who, 
 without railway transport, agreed to keep the same crowd daily 
 provided with food until moving at the same rate they arrived 
 at Plymouth; and yet a general has to do much more than 
 this in giving food to his men, — he has, besides the ordinary 
 difficulties of such a task, to calculate upon bad roads, weary 
 horses, breaking waggons, the attacks of an enemy's cavalry ; 
 he has not only to get the food to the troops, but in many cases 
 he has to provide it in the first place; he has to keep his 
 magazines constantly stocked, to increase the amount of 
 transport in exact proportion as his troops advance ; to feed 
 not only the fighting men, but all the men who are employed 
 in carrying provisions to the combatants, to find hay and corn 
 for all the horses of the cavalry and for the horses of the 
 transport waggons, and to arrange beforehand so that every 
 man and horse shall halt for the night in close proximity to a 
 large supply of good water. This is not the lightest nor the 
 least of a general's duties. It was the proud boast of England's 
 great soldier that "many could lead troops, he could feed 
 them." When the enemy is in front, and any moment may 
 bring on an action, a general has little time to turn his mind to 
 the organization of a system of supply. Then he must sift 
 intelligence, weigh infonnation, divine his adversary's intentions 
 almost before they are formed, prepare a parry for every blow, 
 and speed a thrust into any opening joint of his antagonist's 
 harness. The means of supplying troops ought to be given 
 ready into the hands of. a general; they should be all arranged 
 and organised beforehand, so that he has but to see that they 
 are properly administered and made use of. 
 
 * In France, towards the end of the siege of Paris, over 500,000. 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 79 
 
 The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field, 
 exclusive of the waggons of each battalion, the artillery and 
 engineer trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided 
 under two heads, both of which are under the control of the 
 Intendantur. The first but smaller portion is kept for the use 
 of the Commissariat branch, and is usually retained solely for 
 the supply of food to men. The second portion carries the 
 medicines and hospital necessaries for the sick and wounded, 
 together with the means of carrying disabled men, food for 
 horses, stores to supply magazines, and all materiel except 
 munitions of war and regimental equipment. 
 
 The first portion for use of the Commissariat branch consists 
 in the first place of a certain amount of waggons, which are in 
 time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and imme- 
 diately on the mobilization of the army are provided with 
 horses and drivers from the military train, who are entirely 
 under the control of the Intendant-General. Each army has 
 an army intendant ; each corps has with its head-quarters an 
 army intendant, and an Intendantur officer is attached to each 
 division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants, 
 form the first links of the chain by which a General draws food 
 to his troops. The provision columns of each corps d'armee, 
 which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilized, 
 consist of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers, 
 98 men, 161 horses, and 32 waggons. If the corps d'arme'e is 
 broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns 
 accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and 
 the reserve artillery. The 160 waggons which form these 
 columns carry three days' provisions for every man in the 
 corps d'armee ; as soon as the waggons which carry the first 
 day's supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in 
 rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to 
 supply the fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the 
 other waggons will have been emptied. As it is easier to carry 
 flour than bread in these waggons, each corps d'armee is 
 accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of 1 officer and 
 118 men, 27 horses, and 5 waggons, which are distributed 
 among the troops as may be most convenient; and as the 
 horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have 
 
80 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 very hard work, a depot of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers, 
 accompanies each corps d'armee. These provision columns 
 thus carry three days' provisions, but in a country where 
 supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way 
 of collecting food ; their duty is simply to bring provisions from 
 the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry 
 them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army 
 advances these magazines must advance also, and that means 
 must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collec- 
 tion of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of 
 transport; this transport is obtained by hiring waggons and 
 carts at home in the country where the war is being carried on, 
 or in the countries near it. Waggons hired in the country are 
 also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and 
 artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision 
 columns only carry food for the men. 
 
 When the army of Prince Frederick Charles advanced from 
 Saxony, it made its first marches as if in a totally desert country 
 as far as the supply of provisions was concerned, because the 
 Prussian Generals knew it was quite possible that the Austrians 
 might, in order to retard their progress, lay waste the country. 
 Immense magazines were accordingly collected at Gorlitz and 
 in Saxony, which, as the army advanced, were brought forward 
 by railway and by long trains of country waggons to places 
 where they could be conveniently reached by the provision 
 waggons and forage carts. These magazines were constantly 
 replenished both by food and forage brought by railway from 
 the interior of Prussia, or by requisitions levied on Saxony and 
 Bohemia of food and forage, for which the Commissariat paid 
 by cheques which the fortune of war afterwards allowed to be 
 defrayed from the war contributions paid by the Austrian and 
 Saxon Governments. Had the fate of arms been different, ot 
 course Saxony and Austria would have provided that these 
 cheques should be honoured by the Berlin Exchequer. When 
 it was found that the country was not laid waste, the provision 
 waggons in some cases were filled in the neighbourhood of the 
 troops by requisitions, but this was found not to be so good a 
 plan as to send them back to magazines where the provisions 
 were collected ready for them, because the time taken up in 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 81 
 
 gathering together driblets of food and forage from each village, 
 and the great distances over which waggons had to move, im- 
 posed an enormous amount of work on both the men and horses. 
 Although the requisition system was very useful, it was only 
 regarded as an auxiliary means of supply, for the armies moved 
 prepared every day to' find that the country in front Of them 
 might be devastated, and Prussia and Saxony were always 
 looked upon as the real sources of supplies; and this was 
 absolutely necessary, because it would have been impossible to 
 feed such a large force as the Prussian armies presented by 
 requisitions alone, for requisitions cannot conveniently be made 
 at great distances from the direct line of communications, and 
 in a very short time the quarter of a million of men who were 
 in the front line alone would have eaten up everything in the 
 country around them if they had been dependent on that tract 
 of country only for supplies. Then, even if the troops could 
 have got food from more distant places, the villagers and 
 country people would have starved ; but it is the interest of a 
 general to make his requisitions so that they do not drive the 
 inhabitants to destitution, for terrible sickness always follows 
 in the train of want, and, if pestilence breaks out among the 
 people of the country, it is certain immediately to appear in 
 the ranks of the invading army.* 
 
 The trains which accompany the medical department of a 
 corps d'armee into the field consist of three heavy hospital 
 trains, each of which has 14 surgeons, 114 men, 69 horses, and 
 n waggons, and twelve light divisional hospital trains, each 
 with 13 surgeons, 74 men, 56 horses, and 11 waggons. Each 
 light train carries medicines, materials, instruments, and ambu- 
 lances for 200 sick. Each corps d'armee has, besides, three 
 detachments of sick-bearers, who, on the day of battle, are 
 divided among the troops ; each battalion has also sixteen men 
 appointed as assistant sick-bearers, who, with the regular sick- 
 bearers, carry the wounded to the rear ; no other man is ever 
 allowed to quit the ranks under fire. When a man is struck, he 
 is taken immediately a short distance out of fire to where the 
 
 * In the campaign in France, the system ot requisitions was ultimately 
 abandoned. Stores which were wanted were purchased, and the cost re- 
 covered by money contributions levied on the occupied towns and districts. 
 
 G 
 
82 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 battalion surgeons are waiting ; they hastily bind up his wound, 
 he is then placed in an ambulance waggon and carried to the 
 light divisional field hospital, which is kept out of fire about a 
 couple of miles in the rear. The surgeons here perform any 
 necessary operation that is absolutely required, but men are 
 only kept here until a sufficient number arrive to fill a large 
 ambulance waggon, which, as soon as filled, is sent off to the 
 heavy hospital trains which are established in the villages in the 
 rear. At the beginning of the battle of Sadowa the regimental 
 surgeons were occupied in every sheltered nook of ground 
 on the hill of Dub, the divisional hospitals were behind that 
 hill and in Milowitz, the heavy hospitals were in and about 
 Horitz. When the Austrians retreated and the Prussian troops 
 advanced, the divisional hospitals followed ; and, before the 
 Austrian guns had ceased firing, were established in Sadowa, 
 Chlum, and Lipa, and all the other villages in the field whither 
 the indefatigable sick-bearers were rapidly bringing in both 
 Austrian and Prussian wounded. 
 
 When the field army, the depot and garrison troops, and the 
 provisional and medical department trains have been mobilized, 
 the Prussian army is fit to take the field. The necessary com- 
 mandants and staffs of the districts where the depot troops are 
 stationed are composed either of officers detached from the 
 regular army or of invalid officers. When the army takes the 
 field, its movements must be directed not only so as to pursue 
 the original plan of the campaign, but also so as to keep pace 
 with the enemy's combinations, and the movements of its dif- 
 ferent parts must be guided by orders from the directing general. 
 
 The above is a sketch of the general system on which the 
 Prussian army is normally organized. How such an army is 
 worked in the field, how its resources are made available, and 
 how it achieves the objects for which it has been mobilized, 
 must depend in a great measure upon the skill of the General 
 to whose direction it is entrusted. What an army so organized 
 can effect when its motions are guided by a skilful hand, the 
 rapid victories of the late campaign have shown. When the 
 field army enters on the theatre of war, the organizer and ad- 
 ministrator has done with it ; his province is then to take care 
 that its recruits are forthcoming and its supplies are ready 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 83 
 
 when required. But when an army is handed over to the 
 general who is to use it, he has a right to expect that when he re- 
 ceives his divisions he shall also receive the means of manoeuvr- 
 ing them ; and when he assumes the command of his corps he 
 shall be provided with every appliance which can help him to 
 move them in the combination and unison without which dif- 
 ferent bodies of troops are not an army, but a series of scattered 
 detachments, which must be easily defeated in detail, or in 
 isolation taken prisoners by an active and energetic enemy. 
 After the plan of a campaign has been once decided upon, the 
 means by which a general moves his troops into positions 
 where they may act most advantageously, and from which they 
 may strike the heavy blows that will gain a speedy and profit- 
 able peace — for a peace is the ultimate object of all wars — may 
 be classed under the heads of Information, Intelligence, and 
 the Transmission of Orders. Information of the enemy's pre- 
 parations, of the number of troops he can put into the field, — 
 how those troops will be armed, organized, and administered, — 
 should be obtained by the Government of the country to which 
 the army belongs, and communicated to the general when he 
 takes the command of the army. 
 
 To acquire this information concerning foreign armies during 
 peace every country in Europe devotes a special department of 
 its War Office, which is ever busy collecting and compiling sta- 
 tistics of every foreign army, because, however friendly the 
 relations of any two countries may be, it can never be known 
 how long they may remain so. As soon as hostilities are immi- 
 nent, a War Office has little chance of obtaining much informa- 
 tion from inside the lines of the probable enemy; then the 
 duty of collecting information devolves upon the general him- 
 self, who must, by every means he can avail himself of, dis- 
 cover, as far as possible, every position and intention of his 
 adversary's troops. For this purpose, during war, spies are 
 generally employed. Spies have a dangerous task, and not an 
 honourable one; consequently, except in very rare and extreme 
 cases, officers will not accept the invidious duty, and it is often 
 extremely difficult to find persons who will consent to act as 
 spies sufficiently conversant with military matters to make their 
 information worth having. Money is the great means of obtain^- 
 
 g 2 
 
84 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 ing good spies ; needy adventurers and unscrupulous men will, 
 if well paid, do the work, and, for the sake of a sufficient sum, 
 run the risk of the certain death which awaits them if dis- 
 covered in disguise within the hostile outposts. Even if it 
 were accurately known how the Prussian information was de- 
 rived from within the Austrian lines during the 1866 campaign, 
 it would be too delicate a subject to enter upon ; but it may be 
 stated here, though such a statement is hardly necessary, that 
 all the absurd rumours circulated at the beginning of the cam- 
 paign, which implied that Austrian officers were guilty of the 
 hideous crime of betraying the movements of their army to the 
 enemy, were utterly without foundation, and were cruel libels 
 against brave men who, however unfortunate in the result of 
 the war, won the admiration of every rank in the Prussian 
 army by their gallantry, chivalrous bearing, and courage, not 
 only on the field of battle, but in all the trying incidents to 
 which a disastrous campaign gives rise. It is not proper even 
 to express a guess as to how information was collected, but the 
 Austrians dealt out death with no sparing hand among suspected 
 persons found within their lines, so probably they had cause to 
 imagine that there were spies in the midst of their troops. 
 
 The infonnation collected from spies is not, in most cases, 
 completely trustworthy. In the first place, the men who 
 undertake this duty are nearly always mercenary wretches, who 
 will sell friend and foe alike as best suits their own interests ; 
 in the second place, spies are seldom sufficiently acquainted 
 with military matters not to exaggerate movements cf slight 
 importance, and miss observing vital combinations. To test 
 the accuracy of their reports intelligence is collected by means 
 of reconnoitring officers, who, either alone or attended by a 
 few troopers, get as close as they can to the enemy's posts ; 
 observe as far as possible, without the use of disguise and in 
 full uniform, the positions of his troops ; and, when discovered 
 and pursued by his patrols, fight or ride to bring their intel- 
 ligence safe home to their own outposts. Intelligence is also 
 culled by every vedette and every advanced sentinel, but the 
 reconnoitring officer is the main source. To reconnoitre well 
 requires not only a brave but a very able officer, with a quick 
 eye, a ready memory, and a great knowledge of the indications 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 85 
 
 which tell the presence of hostile troops, and allow an estimate 
 to be formed of the force in which they are. Two Prussian 
 officers of the staff of Prince Frederick Charles, the afternoon 
 before the battle of Koniggratz, boldly approached the 
 Austrian lines, observed the positions of the Austrian 
 troops, and, though both pursued and assaulted by cavalry, 
 got safe home, and brought to their General certain 
 intelligence which allowed him to frame the combinations 
 that resulted in the morrow's victory. When the reconnoitring 
 officer regains the shelter of his own outposts, he must either 
 personally bring or by some means send his intelligence as 
 quickly as possible to head-quarters. The plan usually pursued 
 in European armies has been for the officer himself to ride quickly 
 to his General, and to be the first bearer of his intelligence. 
 
 When a General receives intelligence, he has to weigh it, 
 consider it, and often strike the balance between conflicting 
 information. He has then to move his own divisions in ac- 
 cordance with his deductions, and must send word to any 
 co-operating force of what he has heard, and what he is about 
 to do. Undoubtedly, the quickest way for a reconnoitring 
 officer to despatch his reports to his General, and for the 
 General to communicate with his own divisions and with his 
 colleagues, would be by electric telegraph; but it would be 
 almost impossible for a reconnoitring officer to communicate 
 with head-quarters by electricity. Reconnoitring expeditions 
 are made so suddenly and so uncertainly that, quick as the 
 Prussian field telegraph is laid down, this means of communi- 
 cation is hardly available with the outposts. Nor is the 
 electric telegraph easily used to communicate with every 
 division ; it might be so used, but its application would 
 require a number of extra waggons to be attached to every 
 division, and would bring a confusing number of lines into the 
 office of the chief of the staff. During the late campaign 
 orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted 
 officers, who were attached to head-quarters for this special 
 purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked 
 troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed 
 into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a 
 certain number attached to every General. These troopers 
 
$6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 form the General's escort, and act as orderlies to carry unim- 
 portant messages. When an officer is sent with an important 
 order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case 
 of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to 
 yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in 
 case of his being killed, to carry the order themselves to its 
 destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands 
 of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken. 
 During the campaign the communications between head- 
 quarters and divisions were kept up by means of mounted 
 officers ; but communications between the head-quarters of 
 each army and the King were maintained by means of the 
 field-telegraph. For this purpose a field-telegraph division is 
 attached to the head-quarters of each army. It consists of 
 three officers, one hundred and thirty-seven men, seventy- 
 three horses, and ten waggons. Two of the waggons contain 
 batteries and instruments, and are fitted up as operating 
 rooms; the other eight waggons each contain the wires and 
 means of putting them up over five miles of country ; thus 
 each division can, with its own materials, form telegraphic 
 communication over forty miles. These forty miles are, how- 
 ever, seldom all required, for the lines of the communications 
 of armies usually run along railways, and as far as possible the 
 permanent wires are repaired by the men of the division, and 
 made use of for the telegraphic communication of the army. 
 Each division carries with it five miles of insulated wire for the 
 purpose of laying through rivers or lakes if these should come 
 in the way of the line. The wires are coiled inside each 
 waggon on rollers, from which they can be uncoiled as the 
 waggon moves along, or in bad ground the roller can be 
 transferred to a stretcher, which is carried between two men. 
 The poles are exceedingly light, and about ten feet high, so 
 that where the wire crosses roads it may pass clear over the 
 heads of mounted men. As it is equally culpable in war to 
 prevent communication by unfair means within the lines of an 
 army as it is to seek to obtain the same in disguise between 
 the enemy's sentries, any enemy not in uniform, or any one in 
 the enemy's pay who is detected cutting the telegraph wire, is 
 regarded as a spy, and treated accordingly. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 87 
 
 During the war of 1866 this organization had not been 
 entirely introduced into the Prussian army, and the arrange- 
 ments for the prosecution of the war consequently slightly 
 differed from those which would have been made if time had 
 allowed the regulated organization to have been thoroughly 
 introduced into the service. 
 
 It may be convenient to subjoin here a summary statement, 
 compiled carefully from the best authorities, of the organization 
 and strength of the Prussian army, which was employed for the 
 various purposes of the war. 
 
 Every Prussian who was twenty years old entered the army 
 as a soldier without distinction of rank or wealth. Time of 
 service was with the colours three years, in the reserve five 
 years, and in the Landwehr eleven years. 
 
 1.— INFANTRY. 
 
 a. Guard. — 4 Regiments of Foot Guards 
 
 of three battalions each = 12 batts. = 12,024 men 
 4 Regiments of Grenadiers of 
 
 the Guard . . . — 12 ,, = 12,024 ,, 
 
 1 Regiment of Fusiliers . — • 3 ,, = 3,°o6 ,, 
 
 9 Regiments of the Guard = 27 batts. = 27,054 men 
 
 b. Line. — 52 Regiments of Infantry (13 — 
 
 32 and 41 — 72) of three 
 
 battalions, each . . — 156 batts. = I56,3i2men 
 
 12 Regiments of Grenadiers 
 
 (i— 12). . . . = 36 ,, = 36,072 ,, 
 8 Regiments of Fusiliers 
 
 (33—40) . . . * 24 „ = 24,048 „ 
 
 72 Regiments of the Line . . = 216 batts. = 216,432 men 
 
 c. Riflemen and Light Troops— 
 
 1 Batt. of Jagers of the 
 
 Guard . . . . = I batt. = 1,002 men 
 
 I Batt. Schiitzen . . . = I ,, = 1,002 „ 
 
 8 ,, Jagers of the Line = 8 ,, = 8,016 ,, 
 
 10 ,, of Riflemen . . = 10 „ = 10,020 men 
 
 The total Infantry ' . . = 253 batts. = 253,506 men 
 
 The armament of the Infantry regiments was the needle-gun 
 with the ordinary bayonet ; that of the Fusilier regiments the 
 fusilier musket, which only differed from the ordinary needle- 
 
8S 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 gun in being rather shorter and lighter ; that of the Jagers the 
 needle-rifle with sword-bayonet. 
 
 2.— CAVALRY. 
 
 a. GUARD — I Regiment of Garde du 
 
 Corps of four squad- 
 rons .... 
 
 1 Regiment of Cuiras- 
 
 siers . . . 
 3 Regiments of Uhlans 
 
 2 Regiments of Dragoons 
 I Regiment of Hussars . 
 
 $ Regiments pf Cavalry 
 of the Guard 
 
 b. LINE. — 8 Regiments of Cuirassiers 
 
 12 Regiments of Uhlans . 
 
 12 Regiments of Hussars 
 (of which eight had 4 
 squadrons, and four 
 had 5 . . . 
 8 Regiments of Dragoons 
 (of which four had 4, 
 and four had 5 squa- 
 drons) 
 
 4 squad. 
 
 = 
 
 600 horsemen 
 
 4 M 
 
 12 ,, 
 
 = 
 
 600 ,, 
 1,800 
 
 3 „ 
 
 4 „ 
 
 = 
 
 1,200 ,, 
 
 600 ,, 
 
 32 squad. 
 
 4,800 horsemen 
 
 32 squad. 
 48 „ 
 
 = 
 
 4,800 horsemen 
 7,200 
 
 = 52 „ = 7,800 
 
 = 36 „ = 5,400 
 
 40 Regiments of Cavalry of 
 
 the Line . . . = 168 squad. = 25,200 horsemen 
 Total of Cavalry . . = 200 squad. = 30,000 horsemen 
 
 The armament of the Cuirassier regiments was cuirass, 
 helmet, sabre, and pistol ; that of Uhlans, lance, sword, and 
 pistol ; of Dragoons and Hussars, sword and needle-carbine. 
 Cuirassiers and Uhlans were heavy, Dragoons and Hussars 
 light cavalry. The horses were all of Prussian breed, mostly 
 from good English sires and grandsires. 
 
 3.— ARTILLERY. 
 
 I. — 1 Brigade of Artillery of the Guard, three divisions of 
 
 field batteries, of which each consists of four 
 
 batteries of 6 guns * ..... 
 
 I Division of Horse Artillery of the Guard, consisting 
 
 of six batteries of 4 guns each . . . 
 
 Total Field Artillery of the Guard 
 
 72 guns 
 
 24 „ 
 96 guns 
 
 Of these 4 batteries were armed with the rifled 6-pounder gun. 
 
 4 5 j >> j> 4 » 
 
 4 ,, ,, smooth 12 ,, 
 
:hap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 
 
 2. — 8 Brigades of Artillery of the Line = 144 batteries . 
 
 S 
 
 Total of Field Artillery 162 batteries 
 2 Divisions of Garrison Artillery called out 
 batteries ..... 
 
 4.— SPECIAL TROOPS. 
 
 1 Battalion of Pioneers of the Guard . . . . 
 
 8 „ „ Line 
 
 9 Battalions of Pioneers = 36 companies . . . 
 
 5.— MILITARY TRAIN. 
 I Battalion of Military Train of the Guard of two 
 
 = 
 
 76S 
 864 
 
 guns 
 guns 
 
 = 
 
 96 
 
 » 
 
 = 
 
 1,002 
 
 8,016 
 
 men 
 
 5> 
 
 = 
 
 9,018 
 
 men 
 
 companies . 
 8 Battalions of Military Train of the Line 
 
 Total Military Train , 
 
 DEPOT TROOPS. 
 
 = 1,226 men 
 = 9,So8 „ 
 
 11,034 men 
 
 Each regiment of Infantry on being mobilized formed a 
 depot battalion, each regiment of Cavalry a depot squadron, 
 each Jager battalion a depot company, each brigade of Ar- 
 tillery a depot division, each battalion of Pioneers a depot 
 company : — 
 
 81 depot battalions of Infantry .... 
 
 10 ,, companies of J agers . 
 
 48 ,, squadrons ...... 
 
 9 ,, divisions of Artillery (228 guns) 
 
 9 ,, companies of pioneers . 
 
 Total of Depot troops . 
 
 Thus the strength of the Prussian regular army at the com- 
 mencement of the campaign was — 
 
 = 81,162 
 
 men 
 
 = 2,500 
 
 5» 
 
 = 7,200 
 
 J> 
 
 = 7.400 
 
 5 J 
 
 = 2,250 
 
 J> 
 
 = 100,512 
 
 men 
 
 Infantry .... 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Artillery .... 
 
 Pioneers 
 
 Train .... 
 
 Non-combatants with regi 
 
 ments, &c. 
 Depot troops . 
 Officers .... 
 
 253.504 men 
 
 30,000 ,, 
 
 35/100 ,, with S64 guns 
 
 9,018 ,, 
 
 11,034 >> 
 
 18,000 ,, 
 
 100,512 ,, with 228 gims 
 [3,000 
 
 Total about 473,600 men, with 100,000 horses and 1,092 guns. 
 
90 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 The Landwehr, the first levy of which formed the troops 
 of reserve supports, and for garrison duties in support of the 
 regular army, and consisted of men between twenty-eight and 
 thirty-two years of age, was organized as follows : — 
 
 Infantry. — 4 Regiments of Landwehr of 
 the Guard, each of three 
 battalions . . . 
 
 32 Regiments of Landwehr 
 battalions, each of three 
 and eight independent 
 battalions 
 
 Ii6batt. = 118,900 men 
 
 At first the majority of the battalions were formed 500 
 strong, and at a later period raised only to the strength of 800 
 men by calling up some of the second levy of the Landwehr, 
 so that the actual strength of the Landwehr did not reach 
 118,900 men. Of these one hundred and sixteen battalions, 
 twenty-four were amalgamated together in the first reserve 
 corps d'armee ; the remainder were used as garrisons for for- 
 tresses and for the maintenance of occupied territories. 
 
 The Cavalry of the first levy of the Landwehr consisted of 
 twelve regiments : — 
 
 I Heavy Cavalry Regiment of 4 
 
 squadrons = 4 squad. = 600 horsemen 
 
 5 Regiments of Uhlans . . = 20 ,, = 3,000 ,, 
 
 1 Regiment of Dragoons . . . = 4 ,, = 600 ,, 
 
 5 Regiments of Hussars . . = 20 ,, = 3,000 ,, 
 
 7,200 
 
 During the course of the war seven more regi- 
 ments of four squadrons each were formed = 4,200 
 
 Total Landwehr Cavalry . . =11,400 ,, 
 
 The remainder of the Landwehr of the second levy, after 
 the battalions above mentioned had been filled up to Avar 
 strength, was only called out in special cases, and by par- 
 ticular orders. The men were then either sent to increase the 
 strength of the battalions under arms, or could be formed in 
 independent regiments, which could consist of one hundred 
 and sixteen battalions of Infantry, and one hundred and forty- 
 four squadrons of Cavalry. 
 
 The regiment of Infantry consisted of three battalions, each 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF PRUSSIA. 
 
 9i 
 
 of four companies. Each company consisted of two divisions. 
 The formation for parade was in three ranks ; in action the 
 third rank men of the whole battalion acted as skirmishers, or 
 three of each company formed a third two-rank deep division 
 of the company. 
 
 Each squadron of Cavalry was formed of four divisions; 
 the formation was always in double rank. 
 
 The Prussian fleet, which till within the last few years has 
 never aspired to any very distinguished place amongst those of 
 the great maritime Powers, consisted at the beginning of the 
 war of eight screw corvettes, namely — 
 
 The Arcona 
 Gazelle . 
 Vincta 
 Nymph . 
 Augusta 
 Victoria 
 Hertha 
 Medusa 
 
 28 guns, 
 
 400 horse-power 
 
 • 28 „ 
 
 400 ,, 
 
 • 28 „ 
 
 400 ,, 
 
 • 17 „ 
 
 200 ,, 
 
 ■ 14 „ 
 
 400 ,, 
 
 • 14 „ 
 
 400 ,, 
 
 • 28 „ 
 
 400 ,, 
 
 • 17 „ 
 
 200 ,, 
 
 of also eight gunboats of the first-class, each of which had 
 three guns, and was of 80 horse-power ; of fifteen gunboats of 
 the second class, each of which mounted two guns, and 
 was of 60 horse-power; of also four steam despatch-boats, 
 namely — 
 
 The Eagle 
 Loreley . 
 Grief . 
 Grille . 
 
 4 guns, 300 horse-power 
 
 2 „ 120 
 
 2 ,, 50 
 
 2 „ 160 
 
 of also two paddle-wheel steamers — 
 
 Arminius 
 Cheops . 
 
 4 guns, 300 horse- power 
 
 Thus the whole steam-fleet mustered altogether only 245 
 guns. 
 
 Of sailing-vessels Prussia possessed the frigates Gcpin, 48 
 guns; Thetis, 36; and the Niobe, 26: the brigs Rover ; 16 
 guns; Mosquito, 16; He/a, 6: the schooners litis and 
 Leopaj-dj and the guard-ship Barbarossa, of 9 guns, as well 
 
92 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 as thirty-four sloops of 2 guns each, and four yawls of 1 gun 
 each. 
 
 The personnel of the fleet was formed of a ship's comple- 
 ment division of 1,882 men, among whom are included 
 officers, officials, and boys; of a dockyard division of 589 
 men; and of the marines (infantry and artillery), who num- 
 bered 952 men. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 
 
 Since its last war the Government of Austria has decided 
 upon a total re-organization of its army. It is therefore only 
 necessary here to show as briefly as possible the organization 
 of the Austrian army as it existed at the beginning of the 
 campaign, more with a view to deduce therefrom the actual 
 umber engaged, than to take any special notice of a system 
 which the most bitter experience has proved to be grievously 
 faulty.* 
 
 The Empire of Austria had at the beginning of the war an 
 |area of about 294,000 square miles, and a population of about 
 35,000,000 inhabitants, of many nationalities, such as German, 
 lave, Magyar, and Czech. Its annual receipts amounted to 
 1148,850,000/., its annual expenditure to almost 52,100,000/., so 
 that every year there was a considerable deficit. To the 
 army and navy 11,700,000/. were annually devoted. The 
 national debt amounted in April 1864 to 309,600,000/., and 
 must since that time have increased by at least 20,000,000/. 
 
 The Austrian army consisted of — 
 
 80 Infantry regiments of the Line (1 — 80) 
 I Imperial regiment .... 
 
 32 Battalions of Feldjagers (1 — 32) . 
 
 14 Border Infantry regiments I — 14) . 
 (Grenz Infanterie-regimenter) 
 I Border Infantry battalion (Titler) . 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 * The new organization of the Austrian army since 1866, has been 
 hown in some able letters which have appeared at intervals in the Times 
 during the last three years. 
 
94 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book III. 
 
 12 Cuirass regiments (i — 12) . 
 2 Regiments of Dragoons (i — 2^ 
 
 14 Regiments of Hussars (1— 14) 
 
 13 Regiments of Uhlans (1 — 13) 
 
 12 Regiments of Artillery (1 — 12) 
 
 1 Regiment of Coast Artillery . 
 
 2 Regiments of Engineers 
 6 Battalions of Pioneers . 
 
 10 Sanitaiy companies . 
 48 Transport squadrons 
 
 Besides other Administration troo; 
 and departments. 
 
 10 Regiments of Gens-d'armes 
 A military police corps . 
 The Tyrolean Provincial corps . 
 Againsal Provincial Rifle battalions 
 Volunteer Companies of Shai-p 
 shooters and Landsturm . 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Special Troop?. 
 
 Troops of 
 Administration. 
 
 Troops for Pro- 
 vincial Defence. 
 
 Each regiment of Infantry of the Line consisted in peace of 
 four battalions and a depot. The fourth battalion to which 
 the depot was attached remained in peace in the district to 
 which the regiment belonged, and served as a depot battalion, 
 while the three first battalions were, as a rule, quartered in a 
 totally different province than that from which their recruits 
 were drawn. In time of war the depot was formed into a 
 depot division, and the fourth battalion was sent into some 
 fortress as a garrison battalion, while the three first battalions 
 were sent into the field to join the army of manoeuvre. 
 
 Each battalion mustered, or ought to have mustered, in war, 
 1,018 combatants, divided among six companies. Every two 
 companies formed the so-called division : each company con- 
 sisted of two sub-divisions. 
 
 The Imperial regiment of Jagers had in war six battalions 
 and one depot battalion. Each battalion mustered in six 
 companies 1,011 combatants, as did also each battalion of 
 Feldjagers. 
 
 The whole of the duty of the Military Borderers was 
 divided into three portions. The first levy formed the regular 
 border infantry regiments and the Titler battalion : the second, 
 the armed population, was only formed for service in its 
 
Chap. II.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 95 
 
 own particular province, and consisted of, in all, 22,000 
 men. The third levy was only specially called upon in 
 cases of urgent necessity, and formed a force of about 28,000 
 
 en. 
 
 In war, each regiment of the Military Borderers of the first 
 levy consisted of three battalions, each of six companies. The 
 first eight regiments formed, at the outbreak of a war, one 
 'battalion of four companies as a depot ; three others formed 
 an independent division for the same purpose. Of these 
 leven regiments three battalions could be put into the field in 
 war ; of the remaining three of the fourteen border regi- 
 jments two battalions could only be put in the field \ the 
 iTitler battalion sent one battalion into the field, so that 
 forty battalions of Military Borderers were with the field 
 army. 
 
 For the defence of fortresses there were left, after the army 
 >f operation took the field, eighty-four battalions of infantry 
 egiments, and eleven Border battalions, in all about 100,000 
 men. 
 
 The Tyrolean Provincial corps, as well as the Border troops 
 >vhich did not join the army, were retained in their own par- 
 icular provinces. 
 
 The principal weapon of the Infantry of the Line and of 
 the Border regiments was a rifled musket on Lorenz's system, 
 with a bayonet. The Jagers had a rather shorter musket, the 
 
 I rifling of which had a slightly sharper twist than that of the 
 Line. 
 
 Cavalry. — The cuirass regiments, which were originally 
 Cuirassiers, but had previously to the war of 1866 laid aside 
 the cuirass, formed the whole of the heavy cavalry. Each 
 cuirass regiment, with the exception of the eighth, the old 
 Dampier Cuirassiers (which, on account of privilege derived 
 as early as 1619, had never been reduced, and still contained 
 six squadrons), consisted of five squadrons. Every light 
 cavalry regiment consisted of six squadrons. At the out- 
 break of the war each regiment of cavalry left one of its squad- 
 rons as a depot squadron at home. The squadron contained 
 one hundred and forty-nine mounted men. The whole cavalry 
 mustered 29,000 sabres. 
 
9 6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 Artillery. — The field artillery consisted of twelve regiments, 
 of which nine were formed to accompany the corps d'arme'e 
 of infantry ; the remaining three were intended to form the 
 army artillery of reserve, and to be attached to the cavalry 
 of reserve. 
 
 The regiment of coast-artillery was divided into four bat- 
 talions, of which the first and second battalion had in war 
 each five active companies, two mountain batteries of eight 
 guns, and one depot company. The third and fourth 
 battalions each had six active companies and one depot 
 company. 
 
 The heavy batteries of the field artillery were armed with 
 muzzle-loading rifled 8-pounder guns ; the light with muzzle- 
 loading rifled 4-pounder guns; the mountain batteries with 
 rifled 3 -pound ers. Garrison artillery of the latest pattern con- 
 sisted of rifled breach-loading guns, 6-, 12-, 24-, and 48-poun- 
 ders; but there are still many smooth-bored guns and howitzers 
 in the armaments of the fortresses. 
 
 An Austrian corps d'arme'e, as a rule, consisted of four 
 brigades of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry (one attached 
 to each infantry brigade), four 4-pounder field batteries (one 
 attached to each infantry brigade), a reserve artillery, two com- 
 panies of engineers, and two companies of pioneers, with four 
 bridge-trains, besides administrative services. To an army 
 which would be formed by the amalgamation of several of 
 these corps d'arme'e, would be attached several brigades of 
 light cavalry, each of which consisted of two regiments g 
 therefore ten squadrons, and one 4-pounder battery of horse 
 artillery, some divisions of reserve cavalry, an army reserve of 
 artillery, a reserve of engineers, and all necessary adminis- 
 trative services. 
 
 Recruiting. — In each year in Austria from 80,000 tc 
 85,000 recruits were called into the army. The time oi 
 service was ten years, of which the last two were spent ii 
 the reserve. 
 
 In the Infantry the recruit was kept from one to three 
 years with the colours, in the Cavalry seven or eight years.j 
 in the Engineers and Artillery three years : he was, after hi< j 
 period of actual presence with his corps expired, dismissed: 
 
Chap. II.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 97 
 
 to his home on furlough, and called out annually for military 
 exercise till he had accomplished eight years' service, when he 
 was transferred to the reserve. 
 
 In case of war the men on furlough were called in to fill up 
 the ranks of the army of operation, the men of the reserve to 
 join the depot and garrison corps. 
 
 The tactical unit in the Infantry was the division of two 
 companies, in the Cavalry the squadron, in the Artillery the 
 battery of eight guns. It was laid down as a rule by the Aus- 
 trian regulations, that in action every division of troops was to 
 retain a dependent reserve. 
 
 The Austrian army was divided according to nationalities, 
 thus— 
 
 German. Poles. Hungarian. Italian. Siebenblirger. Borderers. Mixed. 
 
 Infantry . 23 regts. 13 23 7 7 7 
 
 pagers . 27 batts. 4322 — 
 
 Cavalry. 12 regts. 13 II — I 3 1 
 
 Artillery — regts. I — — — — 12 
 
 Subjoined is a summary, calculated from the best available 
 authorities, of the Austrian troops available for the army of 
 operation at the commencement of the war : — 
 
 1.— INFANTRY. 
 
 a. Line. — 80 Regiments of three battalions of three companies. 
 
 Peace Strength. War Strength. 
 
 I Battalion = 470 = 1,018 
 
 80 Regiments = 240 batts. = 244,480 combatants 
 
 b. JAGERS. — One Imperial Jager regiment of six battalions of six com- 
 
 panies, and thirty-two Feldjager battalions of six companies. 
 I Eattalion = 627 = 1,01 1 combatants 
 
 38 Battalions = 38,420 ,, 
 
 c. Borderers.— -Eleven Regiments of three battalions, three of two batta- 
 
 lions, and one independent battalion. 
 I Battalion = 956 combatants 
 
 40 Battalions = 38,240 ,, 
 
 2.— CAVALRY. 
 
 12 Cuirass regiments of four squadrons . . = 7> r 4 2 
 
 I extra squadron . . . = 149 
 
 2 Regiments of Dragoons of five squadrons . = 1,490 
 
 14 ,, Hussars of five squadrons . . = 10,430 
 
 13 ,, Uhlans of five squadrons of 114 
 
 horsemen . . . . = 7>4 10 
 
 26,621 
 H 
 
98 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 3.— ARTILLERY. 
 
 Twelve regiments of Artillery and one regiment of coast 
 artillery. Of these twelve regiments, the nine which accom- 
 panied the corps d'armee of Infantry each consisted of — 
 
 6 4-pounder field-batteries of four and eight guns . = 40 guns * 
 
 2 8-pounder field-batteries of eight guns . . . = 16 ,, 
 
 2 4-pounder horse artillery batteries of eight guns = 16 ,, 
 
 I rocket battery of eight guns . . . . . = 8 ,, 
 
 \ ££. i com P anie3 - i - 
 
 1 Regiment = 12 batteries . . . = 8S ,, 
 9 Regiments = 108 batteries . . = 792 ,, 
 
 The three regiments which were attached to the reserve and 
 cavalry divisions consisted of — 
 
 4 8-pounder field-batteries of eight guns . . . = 32 guns 
 
 5 4-pounder horse artillei-y batteries (one of four, four 
 
 of eight guns) = 40 ,, 
 
 4 Fortress I com P anies •••••• = J ,. 
 
 1 Regiment = 10 batteries . . . = 76 „ 
 
 3 Regiments = 30 batteries . . = 228 ,, 
 1 regiment of coast artillery = 2 batteries of eight 
 
 guns = 16 „ 
 
 Total number of guns . . . 1,036 
 
 4.— SPECIAL TROOPS. 
 
 2 Regiments of Engineers . . . . = 6, 1 72 men 
 
 6 Battalions of Pioneers . . . . = 5,022 ,, 
 
 11,194 
 
 Total strength of available combatants in the army of opera- 
 tion : — 
 
 Infantry ..... 321,140 
 
 Cavalry . .... 26,621 
 
 Artillery. .... 24,601, with 1^036 guns 
 
 Special troops . . . . 11,194 
 
 3 8 3>55 6 , with 1,036 guns 
 
 * Two 4-pounder field batteries have in peace only four guns, which in 
 war are combined into one battery of eight guns. 
 
Chap. II.] THE WAR STRENGTH OF AUSTRIA. 99 
 
 Austrian Navy. — Austria had done more for her navy within 
 the few years which immediately preceded the war, than would 
 have been anticipated from the small extent of her sea-coast, 
 and her little interest in European commerce. The Austrian 
 navy mustered twenty-eight screw-vessels, namely — 
 
 1 line-of-battle ship, 
 5 frigates, 
 
 7 armour-plated frigates, 
 
 2 corvettes, 
 
 7 second-class gunboats, 
 
 3 third-class gunboats, 
 3 schooners, 
 
 12 paddle-wheel steamers, 
 
 besides sixteen sailing-vessels, of which two were frigates, three 
 corvettes, three brigs. The above formed the Austrian fleet of 
 seagoing vessels ; but for the navigation of interior waters, and 
 for the defence of the coast, there were ten screw-steamers, 
 sixteen paddle-wheel steamers, and thirty-five guardships. 
 
 The steam fleet of seagoing ships numbered forty vessels, 
 which carried 651 guns, amounted to 11,475 horse-power, and 
 were manned by 7,772 men. 
 
 The sailing fleet of seagoing vessels, which was only practi- 
 cally valuable for purposes of transport, consisted of eighteen 
 vessels, with 225 guns, and 1,804 men - 
 
 The twenty-six vessels on the inner waters had together 72 
 guns, 1,511 horse-power, and 961 sailors; while the thirty-five 
 guardships mounted 115 guns, and bore 1,060 sailors. 
 
 H 2 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 WAR STRENGTH OF THE REMAINING STATES OF GERMANY. 
 
 Bavaria. — Population, 4,700,000; area, 34,750 square miles; 
 revenue, 4,700,000/. ; national debt, 34,300,000/. In Bavaria 
 the time of military service was six years. It was allowed to 
 find substitutes for military service. The time of actual pre- 
 sence with the colours is twelve months in the first year, eight 
 in the second, three in the third, and fourteen days in the 
 fourth. Except for this time, the soldier was sent home on 
 furlough.* 
 
 The army consisted of — 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 16 Regiments of three battalions of six companies, 
 
 1 battalion = 1,95° m en 
 
 8 Battalions of lagers = 668 „ 
 
 Total . . 50, 76S men 
 
 armed with Podewil's muskets and sword-bayonet, j" 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 3 Regiments of Cuirassiers ) 
 
 6 Regiments of Light horse £• I regt. of 4 squadrons = 591 horsemen 
 
 3 Regiments of Uhlans ) 
 
 12 Regiments . . = 7,620 horsemen 
 
 Cuirassiers armed with iron cuirass and helmet, straight sword, 
 and pistol; the other regiments with bent sabre and pistol; 
 Uhlans with lances. 
 
 * This organization was modified after the war of 1866, and will pro- 
 bably be even more modified in consequence of that of 1870 — 71. 
 t In 1S70, partly armed with the Werder rifle. 
 
Chap. III.] WAR STRENGTH OF REMAINING STATES. 101 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 Four Regiments, of which — 
 No. I. and II. each 2 6-pounder batteries of 4 guns = 16 guns 
 3 12-pounder batteries of 4 guns = 24 ,, 
 
 III. Horse Artillery, with 4 12-pounder batteries 
 
 of 6 guns = 24 ,, 
 
 IV. 2 6-pounder batteries of eight guns . . = 16 ,, 
 2 12-pounder batteries of eight guns . . . = 16 ,, 
 
 Total 96 „ 
 
 The 6-pounders were rifled on the Prussian system; the 12- 
 pounders were smooth-bore. 
 
 Engineers. — One regiment of eight companies, 1,380 men. 
 
 The army had divisions, brigades, regiments, and battalions. 
 Tactical units were the company in two ranks, the squadron, 
 and the battery. The formation for battle of the Bavarian in- 
 fantry battalion was four Fusilier companies in line, and the 
 two light companies in column in rear of the wings. 
 
 Saxony. — Area, 6,775 square miles; population, 2,225,000; 
 
 revenue, 2,100,000/.; debt, 9,600,000/. The time of service 
 
 in Saxony was six years in the Line and two years in the 
 
 reserve. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 16 Battalions of four companies, I battalion = 983 men 
 4 Battalions of Jagers of 4 companies, 1 bat. = 999 „ 
 Total . . 19,752 men 
 
 armed with Podewil's muskets and sword-bayonet. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 1 Guard regiment j f fiye s d , regime nt = 802 men 
 
 3 Line regiments ) u & 
 
 Total . . 3,217 men. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 I Regiment of field-batteries, with 22 6-pounder 
 
 rifled guns = 22 guns 
 
 6 rifled 12-pounder batteries . . . = 36 „ 
 
 I Horse Artillery regiment of 2 batteries of 6 guns = 12 ,, 
 
 Total . . . . 70 „ 
 
 SPECIAL TROOPS. 
 One company of Engineers and two of Pioneers. 
 
102 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 The army was divided into two divisions, each of which had 
 two brigades. One brigade consisted of two regiments and 
 one battalion of Jagers. Besides these divisions, there was a 
 cavalry division of two brigades, each of two regiments, and 
 a corps of artillery ; the infantry fought in three ranks, with 
 a reserve formation out of the third rank in rear of the 
 wings. 
 
 Hesse-Cassel. — Area, 4,350 square miles; population, 740,000; 
 revenue, 500,000/. ; debt, 1,400,000/. 
 
 Military service was universal, and for a period of ten years, 
 of which five years were spent in the Line and first levy of 
 reserve, five in the second levy. The time of actual pre- 
 sence with the standards varied from twenty-one to thirty-four 
 months. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 2 Brigades of 2 regiments of 2 batts. of 4 companies = 879 men 
 
 1 Jager battalion ....... = 619 ,, 
 
 I Schiitzen . . . . . . = 387 ,, 
 
 Total . . 8,614 men 
 
 armed with the Prussian needle-gun. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 Garde du corps (sword and pistol) . . = 264 horsemen 
 2 Regiments of Hussars (sword and carbine) = 521 ,, 
 Total . . 1,306 horsemen 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 I rifled 6-pounder battery . 6 guns 
 
 I smooth 6-pounder battery . 6 ,, 
 
 \ smooth 12-pounder battery . 4 ,, 
 
 I Horse Artillery 6-pounder . 6 ,, 
 
 Total . . . 22 ,, 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 1 company of Pioneers. 
 
 Hanover. — Area, 17,450 square miles; population, 1,890,000; 
 income, 3,750,000/.; debt, 7,200,000/. 
 
Chap. III.] WAR STRENGTH OF REMAINING STATES. 103 
 
 Recruiting conducted by conscription : time of service seven 
 years, in the cavalry ten years. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 Two divisions, each of two brigades, each, of two regiments and one 
 light battalion = 8 regiments, and four light battalions = 18,000 men. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 2 Cuirassier regiments . . = 1,000 horsemen 
 4 Dragoon ,, . . . = 1,000 ,, 
 
 2 Hussar ,, . . = 1,000 ,, 
 
 Total . . . 3,000 „ 
 
 ARTILLERY— 50 guns. 
 
 Wurtemburg. — Area, 8,875 sq. miles; population, 1,720,000; 
 revenue, 1,500,000/. ; debt, 7,500,000/. 
 
 The contingent of Wurtemburg formed the first division of 
 the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation. 
 
 Recruiting conducted by conscription, but substitutes allowed. 
 Time of service twelve years, six of which were passed in the 
 Line, six in the Landwehr. Time of actual presence with the 
 standards about eighteen months. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 I Division of 2 brigades of 4 regiments, each 
 of 2 battalions (4 companies) 
 16 Battalions (1 battalion = 851 men) . . . — 13,616 men 
 2 Battalions of Jagers ( I battalion = 849 men) = 1,698 „ 
 
 Total 15,314 
 
 armed with Podewil's musket. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 I Erigade of 4 regiments, each in 4 squadrons 
 I Regiment = 714 to 880 horsemen 
 Total . . .3,271 
 
 of which one regiment acts as a depot. 
 
104 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 ( 2 Horse Artillery 4-pounder batteries of 8 guns =16 guns 
 Re • 1 ^2 light field 6-pounder batteries of 8 guns =16 „ 
 
 £> * "~ J 2 heavy field 1 2 -pounder batteries of 6 guns = 12 ,, 
 
 ( 3 siege batteries . . . . . ....,, 
 
 Total 44 ,, 
 
 EXGIXEERS. 
 210 men on a war footing. 
 
 Baden. — Area, 6,950 square miles; population, 1,400,000; 
 revenue, 1,700,000/. ; debt, 10,800,000/. 
 
 The contingent formed the second division of the eighth 
 corps of the army of the Germanic Confederation. 
 
 IXFAXTRY. 
 
 5 Regiments of two battalion; 
 
 2 Fusilier Battalions. . . \ = 10,745 men 
 
 I Battalion of J age rs 
 
 armed with Podewil's musket. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 3 Regiments of Dragoons, each of 4 squadrons = 2, 100 horsemen. 
 
 ARTILLERY— *8 
 
 guns. 
 
 Hesse-Darmstadt. — Area, 3,800 square miles; population, 
 860,000 ; revenue, 950,000/. ; debt, 2,000,000/. 
 
 The army of Hesse-Darmstadt formed the third division of 
 the eighth corps of the Germanic Confederation. 
 
 IXFAXTRY. 
 
 Two brigades, each of two regiments, each of two battalions, each in five 
 companies. 
 
 8 Battalions (1 battalion = 831 men) . . = 6,648 men 
 I Battalion of J agers = 594 „ 
 
 Total 7,242 „ 
 
 armed with Podewil's musket. 
 
Chap. III.] WAR STRENGTH OF REMAINING STATES. 105 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 I Brigade of 2 regiments. 
 
 I Regiment .....= 648 horsemen. 
 
 Total . . . 1,296 horsemen. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 I Horse Artillery battery, with four smooth and 
 
 2 rifled 6-pounder guns . . . = 6 guns 
 
 3 Field-batteries of 6 guns . . . = 1 8 ,, 
 (One 12 -pounder battery, one rifled 6 -pair 
 
 one smooth 6-pounder battery) ... — 
 
 Total 24 „ 
 
 ENGINEERS— I company. 
 
 Nassau. — Area, 2,137 square miles; population, 460,000 
 inhabitants. 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 1 Brigade of 2 regiments, each of 2 battalions. 
 I Battalion = 1,033 men. 
 
 4 Battalions = 4, 132 men 
 
 1 Battalion of Jagers — S09 „ 
 
 Total 4,94i 11 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 I rifled 6-pounder battery of 8 guns . . = 8 guns 
 
 I smooth-bore battery = 8 ,, 
 
 Total . . . . . 16 „ 
 
 The contingents of the other minor states are so small that 
 it would be tedious to enter into their composition in detail. 
 The military of those which voted for the Austrian motion on 
 the 14th June in the Diet were : — 
 
 Saxe-Meiningen .... 2,000 men 
 
 Reusz Grez 400 ,, 
 
 Frankfort-on-Maine . . . 1,000 ,, 
 
 Total 3,400 „ 
 
106 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 Of those which voted against the Austrian motion : — 
 
 The Saxon Duchies 
 
 Mecklenburg 
 
 Oldenburg 
 
 Liibeck, Bremen, Hamburg 
 
 Anhalt .... 
 
 The two Lippes . 
 
 "Waldech 
 
 Reusz-Schleiz 
 
 The two Schwarzburgs . 
 
 7,500 men 
 
 7,500 
 
 55 
 
 3,600 
 
 5 > 
 
 2,000 
 
 j» 
 
 1,200 
 
 
 800 
 
 
 700 
 1,800 
 
 
 Total 
 
 28, 600 
 
 Brunswick, Lemburg, and Luxembourg also voted against 
 Austria, but the two former put no contingents in the field ; 
 the contingent of the last took so much time in its mobiliza- 
 tion that it was not ready for employment until very nearly the 
 conclusion of peace. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 WAR STRENGTH OF THE KINGDOM OF ITALY.* 
 
 The kingdom of Italy, had with an area of 116,750 square 
 miles a population of about 21,775,000 inhabitants. Since the 
 formation of this monarchy, in i860, its finances had never 
 been in anything but the most unsatisfactory condition. 
 Large armies and fleets had been maintained at a ruinous 
 expense, and have both proved their incapacity to accomplish 
 the purposes for which they were intended ; large numbers of 
 useless officials, who did no public work worthy of the name, 
 and served as impediments more than as facilities to the 
 transaction of business, were suffered to live idly on the 
 (resources of the State. In the year 1864 the revenue of the 
 icountry amounted to 27,000,000/., the expenditure of the 
 [Government to nearly 37,000,000/., and since that year this 
 (annual deficit had remained about constant. 
 
 In the year 1864 9,280,000/. were spent upon the army, and 
 2,500,000/. upon the navy. 
 
 The Italian army, according to the latest organization 
 previous to 1866, consisted of: — 
 
 INFANTRY. 
 
 8 Regiments of Grenadiers (Nos. I — 8). 
 72 Regiments of Infantry of the Line (Nos. I — 72). 
 5 Regiments of Bersaglieri (Nos. 1 — 5). 
 
 The regiments of Grenadiers and of the Line differed only 
 in some slight details of clothing from each other. A regiment 
 
 * The kingdom of Italy is at present engaged in the reorganization of its 
 military forces, so that this chapter must be regarded solely as a record of 
 the past. 
 
io8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 of either consisted of the regimental staff, four battalions, and 
 a depot* 
 
 Each battalion consisted of four companies, and each on a I 
 war footing mustered four officers and 149 men. Thus the 
 effective strength of each regiment amounted to, with the staff, 
 81 officers and 2,453 men, or altogether 2,534 men; and the 
 eighty regiments of Grenadiers and of the Line amounted in all 
 to 202,720 combatants. 
 
 The depots remained at home to find and drill recruits, and 
 then forward them to the troops in the field. Each depot 
 consisted of 14 officers and 61 men. 
 
 Every regiment of Bersaglieri consisted of a staff, eight field 
 battalions, each of four companies and a depot division. The 
 companies of the Bersaglieri were of the same strength as 
 those of the Line. Thus the effective strength for war of each 
 regiment of Bersaglieri amounted to 152 officers and 4,872 
 men, or altogether to 5,024 men. The five regiments there- 
 fore would afford 25,120 combatants. 
 
 The Bersaglieri were armed with short rifles and sword 
 bayonets : the rest of the infantry with Minie rifles and 
 ordinary bayonets. 
 
 CAVALRY. 
 
 4 Regiments of Cavalry of the Line (heavy). 
 7 Regiments of Lancers. 
 7 Regiments of Light horse. 
 I Regiment of Guides. 
 
 With the exception of the regiment of Guides, all the 
 regiments of Cavalry had six field squadrons and a depot 
 squadron. 
 
 Each squadron on a war footing mustered 5 officers, 145 
 men, 112 horses. The regimental staff consisted of 11 
 officers, 7 men, and 18 horses. The regiment therefore 
 numbered 41 officers, 877 men, and 738 horses. A regiment 
 might accordingly be considered to bring about 700 sabres 
 into the field. 
 
 This would give for the effective force on a war footing of 
 the eighteen regiments (exclusive of the Guides) 12,600 sabres. 
 
 * According to the organization of 1865. 
 
Chap. IV.] WAR STRENGTH OF ITALY. 109 
 
 The depot of a regiment consisted of 14 officers and 59 men. 
 The regiment of Guides, which was chiefly intended to furnish 
 orderlies for general officers, consisted of seven squadrons, and 
 had altogether 60 officers, 1,074 men, and 858 horses. The 
 heavy Cavalry as well as the Lancers carried the lance. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 1 Regiment of Pontoniers, who, in the Italian service as in the 
 
 French, are included among the Artillery. 
 3 Regiments of Garrison Artillery, Nos. 2, 3, 4. 
 
 5 Regiments of Field Artillery, Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. 
 
 6 Companies of Artificers. 
 
 The regiment of Pontoniers had nine companies on a war 
 footing; each regiment of Field Artillery had sixteen field- 
 batteries and two depot batteries ; each regiment of Garrison 
 Artillery had sixteen companies and two depot companies. 
 Two batteries of the fifth regiment were Horse Artillery 
 batteries. Except these, the Italian army possessed no horse 
 artillery. From the five field regiments there could be placed 
 in the field eighty field-batteries, each of six guns, forming a 
 total artillery force of four hundred and eighty guns. 
 
 These guns were all rifled, and were divided into batteries 
 of 8-pounders or 16-pounders. 
 
 ENGINEERS. 
 
 Two regiments of Sappers. Each regiment on a war foot- 
 ing had eighteen field companies and two depot companies. 
 
 MILITARY TRAIN. 
 
 Three regiments. Each regiment had on a war footing 
 eight companies and one depot company. Each of the field 
 companies mustered 8 officers, 330 men, and 420 horses. 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE TROOPS 
 
 were divided into seven companies, which contained all the 
 hospital attendants and commissariat soldiers. 
 
no SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book III. 
 
 The total strength of the Italian army in the field was 
 
 thus : — 
 
 Infantry 202,720 
 
 Bersaglieri 25,120, with 4S0 guns 
 
 Cavalry I3>°°° 
 
 Organization. — In time of war the army was divided into 
 divisions. Each division consisted as a general rule, of : — 
 
 2 Brigades of Infantry, each of two regiments ; 
 
 2 Battalions of Bersaglieri ; 
 
 I Regiment of Light Cavalry ; 
 
 3 Batteries of Artillery (two 8-pounder batteries and one 
 
 16-pounder battery) ; 
 I Company of Sappers. 
 
 Such a division would quite bring into the field a force of 1 
 10,000 Infantry and 700 Cavalry, with 18 guns. 
 
 Several such divisions, generally three or four, were amal- 
 gamated into a corps d'armee, for which a special reserve was 
 then formed. This reserve consisted of one battalion of 
 Bersaglieri, four squadrons of Cavalry, and a 16-pounder 
 battery for each division, which were deducted from the 
 strength of the division. A company of Sappers, and a com- 
 pany of Pioneers with a bridge train to throw a bridge over 
 three hundred yards, was added to a corps d'armee. 
 
 An army was formed by the conjunction of several corps 
 d'armee, and had an additional force of reserve Artillery and 
 Engineers, with a pontoon train capable of constructing a 
 bridge six hundred yards long. A division of reserve Cavalry 
 was formed out of the four Heavy Cavalry regiments, which 
 were divided into two brigades, and of the two Horse 
 Artillery batteries of the service. 
 
 Recruiting. — The recruiting of the Italian army was con- 
 ducted by conscription ; substitutes were, however, allowed. 
 About 50,000 recruits were levied annually before the war. 
 These were divided into two portions proportionately to the 
 vacancies in the ranks. The recruits of the first portion 
 served for eleven years, of which the first five were spent 
 under the standards ; those of the second portion were called 
 out and then dismissed, but were liable to military service for 
 a period of five years. 
 
Chap. IV.] WAR STRENGTH OF ITALY. in 
 
 Besides the regular army, a National Guard existed in Italy. 
 This was of the character of a burgher guard, and existed for 
 the most part only upon paper. It was intended, however, 
 after 1866, to form, in case of war, a mobilized National 
 Guard of 220 battalions, mustering about 110,000 men, to act 
 as garrison troops. 
 
 There existed also a corps of Carabineers who did the duty 
 of a gendarmerie, and numbered over 20,000 men, but these 
 would rarely be ever available against an external enemy, as to 
 them were entrusted all the police duties of the Peninsula. 
 
 At the beginning of the war the Italian forces were 
 strengthened by the formation of volunteer corps to serve 
 under General Garibaldi; of these there were forty-two bat- 
 talions. As with all irregular troops, it was extremely difficult 
 to discover what number these corps mustered, but they may 
 apparently be safely calculated as 35,000 men, 
 
 Italian Fleet. — The Italian fleet consisted of : — 
 
 1 screw line-of-battle ship ; 
 
 13 screw frigates ; 
 
 7 steam frigates of the second class, of which six were iron-clad ; 
 
 2 sailing frigates of the second class ; 
 
 8 steam corvettes of the first rank, of which two were iron-clad ; 
 2 sailing corvettes of the first rank ; 
 
 1 7 corvettes of the second and third rank ; 
 
 14 smaller vessels ; 
 8 screw gunboats ; 
 
 25 transport vessels. 
 
 The number of guns mounted on these vessels amounted to 
 1,524; the number of men employed in them was 14,000 
 officers, seamen, and engineers. 
 
 The Infantry of the Marine consisted of two regiments or- 
 ganized on the same principles as those of the Infantry of the 
 Line, and clothed and armed in the same manner as the 
 Bersaglieri. 
 
BOOK IV. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 
 
 The Germanic Confederation possessed five Federal fort- 
 resses, originally raised to protect Germany against an invasion 
 from France. These were Mainz, Luxembourg, Landau, 
 Rastadt, and Ulm. At the end of May the garrisons of Mainz 
 and Rastadt, in accordance with the constitution of the Con- 
 federation, were composed of a mixed force of Austrian and 
 Prussian and some other Federal troops. When it became 
 evident that war was likely to break out between the great 
 German Powers, Bavaria proposed in the Diet on the ist June, 
 that the Prussian and Austrian garrisons should be withdrawn 
 from these fortresses, as well as from the free town of Frank- 
 fort, which was occupied in a similar manner, and that the 
 guardianship of these places should be handed over partly to 
 the troops of the States in which these places were situated, 
 partly to the reserve division of the Federal army. 
 
 To prevent the bloodshed which would have in case of war 
 ensued between the soldiers of these mixed garrisons, the 
 motion was unanimously accepted. It was determined that 
 Mainz should be held for the Confederation by troops of 
 Bavaria, Saxe Weimar, Saxe Meiningen, Anhalt, Schwarzburg, 
 and the two Lippes ; Rastadt by those of Baden, Saxe Alten- 
 burg, Coburg Gotha, Waldech, and Reusz ; and that a Bavarian 
 division should remain in Frankfort. 
 
 The Prussian and Austrian troops were, in accordance with 
 this resolution, withdrawn from the fortresses of the Confede- 
 ration. The Prussians were assembled under the command of 
 
Chap. I.] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 113 
 
 General Von Beyer at Wetzlar. The Austrians were' attached 
 to the 8th Federal corps, which was placed under the command 
 of Prince Alexander of Hesse, ari Austrian general who had 
 gained distinction at the battle of Montebello in 1859. 
 
 On the 14th June, when Prussia declared the Germanic Con- 
 federation dissolved, war became inevitable. Prussia had at 
 this time concentrated her main armies on the frontiers of 
 Saxony and in Silesia. In rear of these lay the hostile States of 
 Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, the troops of which might either 
 act against the communications of the Prussian armies, or by 
 withdrawing south of the Maine uhite with the Bavarians and 
 Austrians, and swell the armies of these two Powers with their 
 contingents. In front of the right wing of the Prussian main 
 line lay the hostile kingdom of Saxony, which if left unoccu- 
 pied would have formed a convenient ground for the debouch'e 
 from the Bohemian mountains of the Austrian columns, covered 
 by the Saxon army. In order to prevent the forces of the two 
 former States from causing annoyance to the rear of her armies, 
 and to seize the initiative in Saxony, Prussia took most rapid 
 measures. 
 
 The decree against Prussia had been passed at Frankfort on 
 the 14th June. 
 
 A telegraphic summons was despatched to the three States of 
 Saxony, Hesse-Cassel, and Hanover, which demanded that they 
 should immediately reduce their armies to the peace establish- 
 ment which had existed on the 1st March, and should agree to 
 the Prussian project of the 10th June for the reform of the 
 Germanic Confederation. If the three States agreed to this 
 demand, Prussia would undertake to guarantee to them their 
 sovereign rights \ if they did not within twelve hours consent to 
 do so, war would be declared. 
 
 The Governments of these States did not reply. Prussia 
 declared war against them on the evening of the 15th June, and 
 on the 1 6th Prussian troops invaded their territories. 
 
 Position of Prussian Troops at the End of the First 
 Fortnight of June. — Prussia had commenced her prepara- 
 tions for war on the 27 th March, when five divisions had been 
 placed on a war footing, five brigades of artillery been strength- 
 ened, and the fortresses in Silesia and the province of Saxony 
 
ii 4 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 armed. The mobilization of the whole army had been decreed 
 on the 7th May, and on the 19th of that month the concentra- 
 tion of troops in Silesia, Lusatia, and Thuringia had begun. 
 On the 1 st June the corps d'armee of the Guard had been sent 
 to Silesia, and the 8th corps and 14th division despatched to 
 Halle : a reserve corps was at the same time formed at Berlin. 
 The main Prussian armies were composed of three principal 
 sections : — 
 
 1 st. The First Army, under the command of Frederick 
 Charles, which consisted of the 2nd corps d'armee (Pomeranian), 
 3rd (Brandenburg), 4th (Saxony), and of a cavalry corps formed 
 of fifteen regiments. It lay round Heyerswerda and Gorlitz. 
 
 2nd. The Second Army, under the command of the Crown 
 Prince of Prussia, which consisted of the Guard corps, the 1st 
 corps (Prussia), the 2nd (Poland), the 6th (Silesia), and of a 
 cavalry corps of seven regiments. It lay in Silesia. 
 
 3rd. The Army of the Elbe, under the command of General 
 Herwarth von Bittenfeld, which consisted of the 8th corps 
 (Rheinland), and the 14th division of the 7 th corps (West- 
 phalia), as well as a cavalry corps of three regiments. 
 
 In rear of these was the reserve corps in Berlin, under the 
 command of General Miilbe, which consisted of two divisions 
 of Landwehr and six regiments of Landwehr cavalry. A third 
 division of Landwehr was also in course of formation at Berlin. 
 
 By the 15th June Prussia had prepared troops for the inva- 
 sion of Saxony, Hanover, and Cassel. The First Army and the 
 Army of the Elbe, which was stationed round Halle and 
 Torgau, were designed to act against Saxony. Hesse-Cassel 
 and Hanover were to be invaded by the then separated divi- 
 sions, which after the occupation of these States were united 
 under the command of General Vogel von Falckenstein, and 
 on the 1st July named the Army of the Maine. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th June, the troops destined to act 
 against Hanover consisted of the division which General von 
 Manteuffel had mobilized in Schleswig, and with which he had 
 invaded Holstein. After the Austrians quitted the latter duchy 
 this" division had been concentrated at Harburg, where it was 
 supported by a flotilla of Prussian gunboats on the Lower Elbe 
 and on the coast of the North Sea. A second division was also 
 
Chap. I.] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 115 
 
 collected for the same purpose under General von Falckenstein, 
 near the fortress of Minden, in that portion of the Prussian 
 province of Westphalia which projected into the southern 
 boundary of the kingdom of Hanover. The greatest part of 
 this division was formed by the 13th division, one division of 
 the Westphalian corps d'armee. The Prussian garrisons which 
 had been withdrawn from the Federal fortresses were united 
 with some other detachments, and formed into a division under 
 General Beyer, which numbered 17,000 men. It was posted at 
 Wetzlar, in the Prussian enclave, that was surrounded by the 
 territories of Hesse-Cassel and Nassau. 
 
 Positions of the Austrian Army at the End of the 
 First Fortnight of June. — Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek, 
 the hero of San Martino, assumed the Supreme command of 
 the Austrian Army of the North on the 18th May, and spread 
 the seven corps d'arme'e and five divisions of cavalry, of which 
 it was composed, between Cracow and the Elbe, along the 
 lines of railway which run through most parts of the Austrian 
 provinces. These seven corps were : — 
 
 The 1 st, under the command of Count Clam Gallas, which 
 was posted at Prague. 
 
 The 2nd, under Count Thun Hohenstadt, at Olmiitz. 
 
 The 3rd, under the Archduke Ernst, at Briirm. 
 
 The 4th, under Count Festetics, at Teschen. 
 
 The 6th, under Baron Ramming, at Olmiitz. 
 
 The 8th, under the Archduke Leopold, at Briinn. 
 
 The 10th, under Count Huyn, afterwards under Count 
 Gablenz, with only nine battalions, at Bomisch Triibau. 
 
 The cavalry divisions attached to this army were : — 
 
 The 1st light cavalry division (Baron Edelsheim), consisting 
 of six regiments and three batteries of horse artillery. 
 
 The 2nd light cavalry division (Prince Thurn and Taxis), 
 four regiments and two batteries. 
 
 1st reserve division of cavalry (Prince Schleswig-Holstein), 
 six regiments and two batteries. 
 
 2nd reserve division of cavalry (Von Zajtsek), six regiments 
 and two batteries. 
 
 3rd reserve division of cavalry (Count Coudenhove), six regi- 
 ments and two batteries. 
 
 1 2 
 
n6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 Positions of the Austrian Army of the South. — The 
 Austrian army of the South consisted of three corps d'arme'e, and 
 was under the command of the Archduke Albrecht. One of 
 these held Eastern Venetia and Istria, while the other two were 
 posted in the renowned Quadrilateral formed by the fortresses 
 of Peschiera and Mantua on the Mincio, and Verona and 
 Legnano on the Adige. 
 
 The third corps d'arme'e, under the Archduke Ernst, served as 
 a general reserve, which might be either directed against Italy, or 
 sent into Bohemia, as circumstances required. 
 
 Positions of the Italian Army. — The Italian army was 
 divided into four corps d'arme'e. The first of these, under 
 Giovanni Durando, was stationed in the middle of June at 
 Lodi. It consisted of four divisions, and was intended to act 
 upon the Lake of Garda and the Upper Mincio. The second 
 of these divisions, under Cuchiari, was at Cremona. It con- 
 sisted of three divisions, and was designed to act upon the 
 Lower Mincio, and against Mantua. The third, under Delia 
 Rocca, was posted in rear of the two former on both sides of 
 the Po, with its head-quarters at Placenza. It contained four 
 divisions. The fourth, under Cialdini, consisted of five divi- 
 sions, and had its head-quarters at Bologna, where it was 
 intended to operate on the Lower Po and Lower Adige. 
 
 The campaign on the Mincio did not commence quite so 
 soon as hostilities in Germany. It is necessary, in order to 
 preserve the clearness of the narrative, to disregard the Italian 
 campaign until the course of events in Germany has been 
 tolerably developed. It is sufficient here to mention that Italy 
 declared war against Austria on the 20th June. 
 
 Army of Saxony. — The army of Saxony had been mobilized, 
 and was by the end of the first fortnight of June ready to take 
 the field. It was distributed through the kingdom of Saxony, 
 with its main body in Dresden and Pirna. 
 
 Army of Hanover.— The army of Hanover was totally 
 unprepared for war, and was, for the most part peaceably 
 garrisoned in the neighbourhood of the town of Hanover. 
 
 Army of Bavaria. — The Bavarian army was concentrated, 
 in the middle of June, between Bamberg and WUrzberg, under 
 Prince Charles of Bavaria, in three divisions of infantry, one 
 
Chap. L] PRELUDE OF THE WAR. 117 
 
 reserve brigade of infantry, one corps of reserve cavalry, 
 containing eight regiments and two batteries, one corps of 
 reserve artillery of ten batteries. 
 
 Eighth Federal Corps. — The eighth corps of the Federal 
 army was formed at Frankfort, but not with great alacrity. 
 The Government of Baden was by no means eager to put its 
 troops into the field against Prussia, but was obliged to do so 
 for fear of the duchy being overrun by its powerful neighbours 
 in case of refusal to do so. When this corps was formed, it 
 occupied Frankfort, and was placed under the command of 
 Prince Alexander of Hesse. The troops which composed it 
 were : — 
 
 Those of Wiirtemburg, 14,000 men and 42 guns. 
 
 Those of Baden, 12,000 men and 38 guns. 
 
 The troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, 10,000 men and 24 guns. 
 
 The Nassau brigade, 5,000 men. 
 
 An Austrian division, formed from the garrisons which had 
 withdrawn from the Federal fortresses, and mustered 12,000 
 men. 
 
 The total strength of this corps was in round numbers fifty- 
 three thousand infantry, thirty-three squadrons, and one hundred 
 and fourteen guns.. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER. 
 
 On the evening of the 15th June, Prussia declared war against 
 Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony. The two former States, 
 unless their armies were quickly disabled, could hinder 
 effectually the Prussian communications between Berlin and 
 the Rhenish provinces. An Austrian occupation of Saxony 
 would have much facilitated operations against the open 
 province of Brandenburgh and against Berlin, while it would 
 have seriously impeded a Prussian advance into Bohemia. 
 Against these States, then, it was necessary, that Prussia should 
 act with immediate energy, in order, if possible, to disarm, 
 certainly to occupy, them before she could turn her attention 
 against her principal enemy Austria, and the States allied 
 thereto. By excellent combinations punctually carried out this 
 result was obtained. In the course of a few days three of the 
 most important middle States of Germany were completely 
 overrun by Prussian troops : and their sovereigns driven from 
 their capitals and countries as if by a thunderbolt. 
 
 The Prussian invasion of Hanover and Hesse-Cassel was 
 effected by combined movements from different points far 
 apart : the enterprise was accordingly attended with consider- 
 able difficulty. It was very undesirable to weaken the main 
 Prussian armies on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia by the 
 smallest detachments. Orders were accordingly sent to General 
 Falckenstein, who was in Westphalia, to invade these States 
 with both his divisions, and to occupy them. Goben's division 
 was to be directed from Minden on Hanover, to which town 
 that of General Manteuffel from Harburg was also to march. 
 Beyer's division was ordered at the same time to invade Hesse- 
 
Chap. II. ] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER. 119 
 
 Cassel from Wetzlar. The Hanoverian army was not yet 
 mobilized, that of Cassel was but a weak contingent, so that it 
 was calculated that it would be quite possible, with these three 
 Prussian divisions, to bring superior numbers to bear upon any 
 decisive point. It was however necessary, in order to carry 
 out these combinations, to withdraw all the troops from 
 Holstein, where demonstrations in favour of the Prince of 
 Augustenburg might cause trouble. In order to insure tran- 
 quillity in that duchy, several Landwehr battalions were 
 despatched to Altona and Lauenburg, as soon as the invasion 
 of Hanover was resolved upon. Wetzlar was evacuated, but 
 the 8th Federal corps at Frankfort was not yet sufficiently 
 organized to cause any apprehension, as for several days it 
 would be unable to make a movement forward. 
 
 The rapid progress of affairs and the Prussian declaration of 
 war on the 15th had caused great excitement in Hanover. 
 When the Austrian troops, round which the army of Hanover 
 might have rallied, had been withdrawn from Holstein, all idea 
 of defending the capital of that kingdom had been given up ; 
 and on war being declared, it was determined to save the army 
 by a movement towards the south, where it might unite with 
 the Bavarians. This movement was made on the night of the 
 15th, chiefly by railway to Gottingen, but with such hurry that 
 many important articles of equipment were forgotten : such 
 were the reserve ammunition and the field dispensaries. On 
 the morning of the 16th, King George of Hanover followed his 
 troops and collected them round Gottingen. General Falcken- 
 stein broke up from Minden at daybreak on the 16th, and on 
 the 17th, at five o'clock in the afternoon, the first Prussian 
 troops, after two forced marches, entered the town of Hanover. 
 The railways from Hanover northwards towards Liineburg, 
 eastwards to Brunswick, and westwards to Minden, as well as 
 the line behind the retreating army of King George, had been 
 broken up by the Hanoverians. The main body of the division 
 of General Manteuffel had a long portion of railway to restore, 
 and was obliged to wait the resumption of transport along the 
 line, so that it did not reach Liineburg until the evening of the 
 1 8th. 
 
 Here two battalions of the 25 th regiment were placed on 
 
120 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 the railway, and pushed up to the capital : the remainder of 
 the division reached the town on the next evening. 
 
 \Wi. — The government of the country was immediately 
 taken under Prussian superintendence, and no opposition 
 could be made by a population which was surprised, and 
 totally unfit to defend itself, as its members were untrained to 
 the use of arms. 
 
 At the same time the Prussian navy had commenced opera- 
 tions. A battalion of the 25th regiment was, at ten o'clock 
 on the evening of the 17th June, placed on board of the two 
 transport vessels, Loreley and Cyclops, which belonged to the 
 Prussian squadron on the Lower Elbe, and on a private 
 steamer which belonged to a merchant of Harburg. The 
 vessel steamed down the Elbe, and, at one o'clock on the 
 morning of the iSth, arrived at Twietenfelt. Here the bat- 
 talion was disembarked, and immediately moved against the 
 small fortress of Stade. 
 
 At its head marched a detachment of seamen from the 
 transport fleet, who were destined to act as pioneers. About 
 three o'clock in the morning, the small column reached the 
 neighbourhood of Stade. It was observed by a Hanoverian 
 cavalry outpost, which immediately galloped back to alarm the 
 unsuspecting garrison. The Prussians pursued as quickly as 
 they could ; but when they reached the place, the gates were 
 already closed. 
 
 The sailor-pioneers rushed forward to the gate, and smote upon 
 it heavily with their axes. After a few vigorous blows it gave 
 way a little. The axes were more vigorously plied, and in a 
 few minutes the door fell with a crash across the roadway. 
 Over the obstacle the Prussian infantry dashed into the town, 
 and were received by shots directed from a few of the garrison 
 who had located themselves in some of the houses. These 
 shots did little execution, and the Prussians pushed on towards 
 the market-place. Here some forming detachments of Hano- 
 verians opened fire upon them, and a slight skirmish ensued. 
 This was terminated by the commandant of the place, who, 
 finding his men outnumbered, and in immediate danger of 
 being surrounded and captured, ordered them to cease firing, 
 and demanded a parley. This was granted by the Prussian 
 
Chap. II.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HANOVER. 121 
 
 commander ; in a few minutes terms of capitulation were 
 agreed upon, and Stade by the fortune of war ceased to be a 
 fortress of the King of Hanover. 
 
 On the 19th June, Fort William and the batteries on the 
 Weser, which were evacuated on the appearance of the Prus- 
 sian flotilla, were occupied ; and two days later, in a similar 
 manner, Emden and the coast batteries on the Ems fell 
 into the hands of the invaders. Thus on the 22nd June, 
 the Prussians were in possession of the whole of Hanover 
 with the single exception of the southern enclave of Got- 
 tingen. 
 
 In consequence of these vigorous and energetic measures, 
 all the Hanoverian provisions of weapons and ammunition for 
 the war fell into the hands of the Prussians, as well as the 
 whole field equipment for the army in the way of waggons and 
 materiel. These gains amounted to sixty cannon, ten thousand 
 new rifled small arms, eight hundred waggons, and a large 
 quantity of gunpowder. These losses were of great detriment 
 to the Hanoverian cause, and gave into the hands of Prussia 
 instruments of offence which her generals knew full well how 
 to turn to account. 
 
 The Hanoverian army halted at Gottingen, — paralysed, it 
 was unable to move, and had to be organized. Had it been 
 in a fit state of preparation for war, it might on the 16th or 
 1 7th have reached Cassel, and by the Cassel and Bebra rail- 
 way effected a retreat in safety to the south. As it was, how- 
 ever, on account of the tardy measures and want of foresight 
 of the Hanoverian Ministry, the brave soldiery of which it 
 was composed were forced, after a display of great gallantry, 
 valour, and devotion, to succumb to a catastrophe which will 
 be treated of in another portion of this history. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HESSE-CASSEL. 
 
 The Electoral Prince of Hesse-Cassel was fortunate enough 
 to save his army from falling into the hands of the enemy, but 
 could not prevent the invasion of his country. The troops of 
 Cassel, on the receipt of the Prussian declaration of war, imme- 
 diately prepared to retire from Cassel. towards the Maine. On 
 the 1 6th the retreat was commenced; and that day, chiefly by 
 means of the railway, they reached the neighbourhood of Fukla. 
 This movement could not be prevented by the Prussians, for 
 the nearest Prussian troops were those at Wetzlar, and the 
 railway between Cassel and Marburg had been broken up. On 
 the 19th June the army of Hesse-Cassel reached Hanau, and 
 secured its communication with the eighth corps of the Federal 
 army at Frankfort. 
 
 The territory of Hesse-Cassel did not, however, escape an 
 invasion. On the night of the 15th June, General Beyer con- 
 centrated his troops, which numbered 17,000 combatants, on 
 the frontier of Hesse-Cassel at Gieszen, and began his march 
 into Hessian territory on the morning of the 16th at two o'clock. 
 At Gieszen he published a proclamation, in which he announced 
 to the people that Prussia had been obliged to declare war 
 against the Elector, but that the war was only to be carried on 
 against the Government, not against the country, which, on the 
 contrary, was about to behold the dawn of better days and more 
 fortunate circumstances. 
 
 On the 16th Beyer's advanced guard reached Marburg. The 
 Prussian pushed through this town, and during the next two 
 days urged his troops by forced marches towards Cassel. He 
 sent a detachment to his right against the railway which leads 
 
Chap. III.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF HESSE-CASSEI. 123 
 
 rom Cassel by Bebra to Hersfeld and Eisenach, and broke up 
 he line at Melsungen. His object in this was to prevent the 
 retreat to the south of any Hessian troops which might still be 
 n the north of the electorate. He was, however, too late to 
 attain this object, as Cassel had been cleared of its garrison on 
 the night of the 16th, and it was already at Hanau. 
 
 On the evening and during the night of the 19th the Prussian 
 troops passed into Cassel, the capital of the electorate, which is 
 about eighty miles, or five long ordinary marches, from Wetzlar. 
 The Elector had not gone away with his troops, but had re- 
 mained at his castle of Wilhelmshohe, which was long renowned 
 for the orgies held there by Jerome, King of Westphalia. On 
 the night of the 22nd the Prussian envoy, General von Roder, 
 made fresh propositions to him. Of these the principal was 
 that the Elector should agree to the Prussian project for the 
 reform of the Germanic Confederation. The latter did not, 
 however, feel able to comply with the Prussian demands, and 
 on the 22 nd was taken as a State prisoner to the Prussian 
 fortress of Stettin on the Oder, where a portion of the old 
 castle of the Dukes of Pomerania was given up to him as a 
 residence. Shortly afterwards cholera broke out at Stettin, and 
 permission was given him to go to Konigsberg, in East Prussia; 
 of this permission, however, he made no use. Hesse-Cassel 
 was now in the power of the Prussians. A more important 
 result of the invasion was that the Prussian General Beyer was 
 established in the rear of the Hanoverian army at Gottingen, 
 which, without preparation, commissariat, military train, or 
 reserve ammunition, was thus exposed to attack by a force 
 nearly as large as its own, in its flank if it attempted to move 
 southwards, in its rear if it turned to bay and faced its pursuers 
 from the north. The Hanoverian army was already practically 
 disarmed, paralysed, and prisoners. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 
 
 The troops designed for the invasion of Saxony were the '. 
 army of the Elbe and the First Army. The former was to 
 advance from the north, the latter from the east. On thej 
 evening of the 15th June, when the Saxon Government had 
 rejected the Prussian ultimatum, and received the declaration 
 of war, the retreat of the Saxon army commenced, in order to 
 gain Bohemia by way of Bodenbach, and there to unite with 
 the Austrians. The funds from the treasury and the royal plate! 
 had already been packed up, and the waggons in which they 
 had been placed accompanied the army. 
 
 Means were also adopted to impede as much as possible the 
 advance of the Prussian troops. Saxon pioneers were set to 
 work upon the railways which lead from the frontier upon; 
 Dresden. Of such railways there are two, that which follows 
 the valley of the Elbe and joins the Leipsic line at Rieza and 1 
 that which from Gorlitz leads by Bautzen upon the capital of 
 Saxony. At nightfall the Saxon pioneers commenced their 
 work, but in the dark, and under constant apprehension of being* 
 broken in upon by the Prussian advanced guards, they made' 
 but little progress. The rails were taken up, but were neither' 
 carried away, nor twisted, nor broken so as not to be again 
 immediately available. At eleven o'clock at night the wooden 
 bridge which carries the railway branches to Leipsic and 
 Chemnitz across the Elbe, near Rieza, was set on fire by means 
 of petroleum. Its destruction was not accomplished, for only' 
 two piers were burnt, and the whole bridge was again made! 
 passable within a few days. 
 
 While the work of destruction went slowly on in Saxony that 
 
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAX OX Y. 125 
 
 night, heavy masses of Prussian troops were drawing together, 
 and closing down to the very frontier line of that kingdom. 
 Between Gorlitz and the border on the west, Prince Frederick 
 Charles marshalled three strong corps d'arme'e. On the north 
 General Herwarth von Bittenfeld divided his force into three 
 columns, which were to advance by Strehla, Dahlen, and 
 Wurzen, on the left bank of the Elbe. During the few dark 
 hours of the short summer night, the last preparations for the 
 invasion were made. The main bodies were collected together 
 about midnight, and the soldiers piled amis to rest and wait for 
 dawn. Few slept ; a dull and heavy murmur continually rose 
 from the crowded columns, and told the subdued but deep 
 excitement which pervaded the hearts of the men; and this 
 excitement was not without a cause, for the soldiers thought 
 that the Austrian was in Dresden, and that there would be a 
 battle on the morrow. At last the first faint streaks of dawn 
 appeared ; the troops eagerly fell into their ranks, and before 
 the sun had risen the advanced guards were pushing briskly 
 over Saxon ground. 
 
 The pioneers engaged upon the railway fled before the in- 
 vaders' columns, fortunate to avoid being taken. Bittenfeld, 
 from the north, reached Rieza about nine o'clock, and occupied 
 that town in force. Two pontoon bridges were thrown across 
 the Elbe below the town, a portion of the troops crossed, and 
 marched on to Grossenhain, while the rest were directed up the 
 left bank of the river, towards Meissen. ^ Hardly had Bitten- 
 feld's troops established themselves in Rieza, when a detach- 
 ment of the field railway corps came up, who immediately 
 commenced the restoration of the lines which had been re- 
 moved, while pioneers were set to repair the burnt portions of 
 the bridge. 
 
 In the meantime, the columns of the First Army were ad- 
 vancing in Lusatia. A detachment entered the town of Lobau, 
 which was found without any garrison. The railway bridge 
 here was not blown up, though it had been mined. The lines 
 were, however, torn up, and laid in confusion on the way ; but 
 the Prussians employed the country people immediately to 
 restore the railway. Bautzen was also occupied. Here the 
 line had again been torn up, but was quickly repaired. But 
 
126 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles moved cautiously, for the passes of 
 Reichenberg and Gabel were on his left. To cover his com- 
 munication with Gorlitz, and to shield his left flank, he pushed 
 a strong detachment along the Zittau road to a point a little 
 beyond Ostritz. 
 
 On the 17th a detachment was thrown out on the right to 
 feel Bittenfeld's left, and the Prince pushed troops to Bisschofs- 
 werda, on the Dresden road, while Bittenfeld's advanced guard 
 occupied Meissen. On the iSth a simultaneous advance was 
 made on the capital. The advancing columns met with no 
 opposition, and that afternoon the Prussian colours were hoisted 
 over Dresden. 
 
 The Prussian outposts were then pushed forward without 
 encountering any opposition up to the frontier of Bohemia. 
 Leipzic and Chemnitz were occupied, and the line of railway 
 between Leipzic and Plauen, as well as that between Dresden 
 and Chemnitz, secured by Prussian troops. On the 20th June 
 the whole of Saxony was in the undisturbed possession of the 
 troops of Prince Frederick Charles and of Herwarth, except 
 where the Saxon standard floated above the virgin fortress of 
 Konigstein. 
 
 At the time of the inruption into Saxony, Prince Frederick 
 Charles of Prussia issued this address to the inhabitants : — 
 
 " His Majesty the King of Prussia, my most gracious master, having been 
 compelled to declare war against the King of Saxony, a portion of tire troops 
 under my command have to-day crossed the frontier between Prussian and 
 Saxon Lusatia. 
 
 " We are not at war with the people and country of Saxony, but only 
 with the Government, which by its inveterate hostility has forced us to take 
 up arms. 
 
 ' ' Private property will be everywhere respected by my troops, who are 
 also directed to protect every peaceful citizen from injury. 
 
 " I intreat you to repose confidence in our intentions, and to be assured 
 that my soldiers, by strict discipline and good fellowship, will alleviate the 
 hardships of war as much as possible. Provisions will never be exacted 
 without a due receipt for them. 
 
 " FREDERICK CHARLES, General of Cavalry. 
 
 "Head Quarters, Gorlitz, June 16, 1866." 
 
 The administration of the country was undertaken by Royal 
 Commissioners ; but the Saxon officials and organs of adminis- 
 tration were retained. A kindly feeling soon sprang up between 
 
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 127 
 
 the soldiery and the inhabitants, although there were occasional 
 disturbances with the officials, chiefly with regard to the war 
 contributions of fuel and forage which the country was required 
 to furnish. The excellent discipline of the Prussian soldiery 
 showed itself conspicuously in Saxony. The fears and pre- 
 judices of the inhabitants subsided more and more every hour, 
 and the Prussians within a few days regarded themselves and 
 were regarded as if in a friendly country. 
 
 At this time, as a security against the chances of an Austrian 
 attack, and as a support for further operations, the reserve corps 
 of General Miilbe was ordered up from Berlin to Dresden. 
 The positions of the armies about to be engaged in hostilities 
 were, on 20th June, after the occupation of Saxony, as shown 
 in the subjoined sketch : — 
 
 g*m 
 
 BAVARIA 
 
 3 \ 
 
 fi 
 
 \MORAGgg[VIA 
 
 Slotting. 
 
 
 KM.ConBiir. 
 
 POSITION OF TROOPS ON 20TH JUNE. 
 
 The Prussian dash into Saxony was a great military success. 
 It gave Prince Frederick Charles the advantage of being able 
 to attack the Austrians on a narrow front, if they should issue 
 from the passes of the mountains, instead of being obliged to 
 fight them on their own terms in an open country, as would 
 
128 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 have been the case had they been allowed to occupy this 
 kingdom. At that moment the Prussian patrols and pickets 
 were pushed close up to the Austrian frontier, the issue of the 
 narrow defile which the Elbe cleaves in the Iron Mountains 
 was secured, the Saxon troops had retired into Bohemia, and 
 without pulling a trigger the Prussian army had, by the rapid 
 action of its chief, gained as great advantages as could have 
 been looked for from a victorious battle in this part of the 
 theatre of war. There was only one point in Saxony where 
 Saxon troops were still found, and where the Saxon standard 
 was still hoisted. The little fortress of Konigstein, situated on 
 an isolated sandstone cliff on the left bank of the Elbe, about 
 nine miles from the Austrian frontier, was still occupied by a 
 Saxon garrison. Inaccessible, from the steepness of the rock 
 on which it stands, and at a considerable distance from the 
 surrounding heights, this fortress has never been reduced. 
 From the hill of Lilienstein, which stands on the opposite side 
 of the river, and has a command over the fortress of more than 
 150 feet, Napoleon attempted to bombard Konigstein, but his 
 artillery was not heavy enough to send shot over the 3.000 
 yards which separate the summit of the two hills. With their 
 rifled cannon the Prussian artillery could now easily, from the 
 hill of Lilienstein or from that of Paffenstein on the opposite 
 side, have engaged the guns of the fort on equal terms ; but 
 the Prussian commander did not deem it worth while to drag 
 artillery to the top of these steep hills in order to force the 
 capitulation of the small garrison of 1,200 men, who, in the 
 event of Saxony remaining in his possession, must fall into his 
 hands* and, in case of his being obliged to retire, could add so 
 little to the force of his enemies. Konigstein, guarded by its 
 escarpments and impossibility of approach, was still allowed to 
 retain its reputation for impregnability. 
 
 In most of the villages and hamlets of Saxony, certainly in 
 all those which lay on roads leading to the frontier, Prussian 
 soldiers were billeted ; cavalry and artillery horses filled the 
 farmsteadings of the border farmers, aiid field guns and artillery 
 carriages were parked on many a village green. But the Saxons 
 had no complaints to make, and, as far as could be judged from 
 appearances, seemed highly to approve the occupation of their 
 
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OP SAXONY. 129 
 
 country by the Prussian army. The Saxon peasantry and the 
 soldiers were on the most friendly terms, and a stranger who 
 did not know the Prussian uniform, in passing through the 
 villages, would have supposed that the troops were quartered 
 among the people of their own country. As soon as the 
 Prussian vanguards crossed the frontier, Prince Frederick 
 Charles issued a most stringent order, in which he insisted 
 upon the troops showing every respect for private property and 
 for the comfort of the inhabitants. This order was strictly 
 strictly observed both by officers and men. The kind-hearted 
 soldiers brought with them none of those horrors which too often 
 follow in the train of an army which occupies a strange country. 
 On the contrary, had it not been for the swords and bayonets 
 of patrols which glittered in the sun along every road, the scene 
 was one of perfect peace. In some places the men were help- 
 ing the peasantry to carry the hay harvest, in others they might 
 be seen working in the cottage gardens, and nearly always 
 were spending money in the village shops ; the bare-legged 
 country urchins got taken up for rides on the cavalry or 
 artillery horses as they went to be watered, or were invited, 
 I half afraid, to peep into the muzzle of a rifled gun ; only when, 
 with the contempt bred by the familiarity, some too adventurous 
 youngster tried to introduce a handful of cornflowers into the 
 mouth of a piece of ordnance, was he warned off the precincts 
 of the battery by the reluctant sentry.* 
 
 The Prussian military authorities took care to make the in- 
 conveniences of the existing state of affairs sit as lightly as 
 possible on the inhabitants of the country in which the troops 
 where quartered. Passenger traffic on the railways of Saxony 
 was soon resumed, except where the broken bridge of Rieza 
 caused a gap. Telegraphic messages were received at the 
 bureaux, and were certainly and regularly delivered. 
 
 The successful occupation of the kingdom of Saxony gave 
 the Prussian leader also great moral, material, and strategical 
 advantages. His adversaries had seen the energy and vigour 
 Iwith which the Prussian blows were delivered. Two armies 
 were established on hostile territory, which facilitated the supply 
 
 * It must be remembered that this was a war of Germans against 
 Germans. 
 
i 3 o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 of pro-visions to these large masses of troops. The theatre of 
 war for the armies was also transferred to foreign soil. But the 
 main advantages were gained in reference to the whole theatre 
 of the war throughout Germany. The wide semicircle in which 
 the Prussian army had been spread along the Saxon and 
 Bohemian frontiers, was much contracted by the advances of 
 Prince Frederick Charles and Herwarth. The communication 
 between the individual armies was much facilitated by the pos- 
 session of the Saxon railways, and an invasion of Bohemia was 
 rendered possible, because the frontier passes of the mountains 
 were secured ; while in the case of its being necessary to act on 
 the defensive, the Erz-Gebirge and the Lusatian hills afforded 
 much superior military positions to any along the quite open 
 frontier between Saxony and Prussia. 
 
 The invasion of Saxony brought immediately conditions of 
 open war between Prussia and Austria. Saxony appealed to 
 the Diet at Frankfort, from which Prussia and several other 
 States had since 14th June withdrawn their representatives. 
 The remaining members of the Diet decreed, on the 1 6th June, 
 that Austria and Bavaria should give aid against Prussia ; not 
 only to Saxony, but also to Hanover and Hesse-Cassel. Austria 
 declared herself ready to devote all her military forces to the 
 support of the States which had been invaded by Prussian 
 troops. This declaration was regarded by Prussia as an open 
 and official announcement of a declaration of war. That 
 Austria also intended it to be such was shown by the publi- 
 cation, on the 17th June, of this war manifesto of the 
 Emperor : — 
 
 "TO MY PEOPLES. 
 
 " While engaged in a work of peace, which was undertaken for the pur- 
 pose of laying the foundation for a Constitution which should augment the 
 unity and power of the empire, and at the same time secure to my several 
 countries and peoples free internal development, my duties as a Sovereign 
 have obliged me to place my whole army under arms. 
 
 " On the frontiers of my empire, in the south and in the north, stand the 
 armies of two enemies who have allied with the intention of breaking the 
 power of Austria as a great European State. 
 
 " To neither of those enemies have I given cause for war. I call on an 
 Omniscient God to bear witness that I have always considered it my first, 
 my most sacred duty, to do all in my power to secure for my peoples the 
 blessings of peace. 
 
 "One of the hostile Powers requires no excuse. Having a longing to 
 
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 131 
 
 deprive me of parts of my empire, a favourable opportunity is for him a 
 sufficient cause for going to war. 
 
 " Allied with the Prussian troops, which are now up in arms against us, 
 a part of my faithful and valorous army two years ago went to the shores of 
 the North Sea. I entered into an alliance with Prussia for the purpose of 
 upholding rights secured by treaties, to protect an imperilled German race, 
 to confine within the narrowest possible limits an unavoidable war, and by 
 means of an intimate connexion of the two central European Powers— whose 
 principal duty it is to maintain the peace of Europe — to obtain a lasting 
 guarantee for the peace of my empire, of Germany, and of Europe. 
 
 " Conquests I have never sought for. Unselfish in my alliance with 
 Prussia, I did not, in the Vienna Treaty of Peace, seek to obtain any ad- 
 vantage for myself. Austria is not to blame for the series of unfortunate 
 complications which could not have arisen had Prussia been equally disin- 
 terested and equally mindful of her Federal duties. Those complications 
 were brought about for the furtherance of selfish purposes, and, con- 
 sequently, could not be done away with by my Government in a peace- 
 ful way. 
 
 "The state of affairs became more and more serious. 
 
 "Even when it was notorious that the two hostile States were making 
 preparations for war, and that there was an understanding which could only 
 be based on an intention to make in common an attack on my empire, I, 
 being mindful of my duties as a Sovereign, remained in a state of profound 
 peace, as I was willing to make all those concessions which were compatible 
 with the welfare and honour of my peoples. But when I saw that further 
 delay would not only render it difficult to ward off the intended blow, 
 but also imperil the safety of the monarchy, I was obliged to resolve on 
 making those heavy sacrifices which are inseparable from preparations 
 for war. 
 
 " The assurances given by my Government of my love of peace, and the 
 repeated declarations which were made of my readiness to disarm at the 
 same time with Prussia, were replied to by propositions which could not be 
 accepted without sacrificing the honour and safety of the monarchy. 
 Prussia not only insisted on complete disarmament in the northern pro- 
 vinces of the empire, but also in those parts of it which touch on Italy, 
 where a hostile army was standing, for whose love of peace no guarantee 
 could either be given or offered. 
 
 "The negotiations with Prussia in respect to the Elbe duchies clearly 
 proved that a settlement of the question in a way compatible with the dignity 
 . of Austria, and with the rights and interests of Germany and the duchies, 
 i could not be brought about, as Prussia was violent and intent on conquest. 
 The negotiations were therefore broken off, the whole affair was referred to 
 the Bund, and at the same time the legal representatives of Holstein were 
 convoked. 
 
 "The danger of war induced the three powers— France, England, and 
 Russia — to invite my Government to participate in General Conferences, 
 the object of which was to be [sein sollte) the maintenance of peace. My 
 Government, in accordance with my views, and, if possible, to secure the 
 blessing of peace for my peoples, did not refuse to share in the Conferences, 
 but made their acceptance dependent on the confirmation of the supposition 
 that the public law of Europe and the existing treaties were to form the 
 basis of the attempt at mediation, and that the powers represented would 
 not seek to uphold special interests which could only be prejudicial to the 
 balance of power in Europe and to the rights of Austria. The fact that the 
 
i 3 2 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IV. 
 
 proof that the Conferences could not have led to the maintenance of 
 peace. 
 
 " The recent events clearly prove that Prussia substitutes open violence 
 for right and justice. 
 
 " The rights and the honour of Austria, the rights and the honour of the 
 whole German nation, are no longer a barrier against the inordinate ambi- 
 tion of Prussia. Prussian troops have entered Holstein ; the Estates con- 
 voked by the Imperial Stadtholder have been violently dissolved ; the 
 Government of Holstein, which the Treaty of Vienna gives to Austria and 
 Prussia in common, has been claimed for Prussia alone ; and the 
 Austrian garrison has been obliged to give way to a force ten times as 
 strong as itself. 
 
 " When the German Bund, which saw in the measure no infraction of 
 the Federal laws, accepted the Austrian proposition to 'mobilize' the 
 Federal troops, Prussia, who prides herself on being the defender of the 
 interests of Germany, resolved to complete the work she had begun. 
 Violently severing the tie which unites the German races, Prussia announced 
 her secession from the Bund, required from the German Governments the 
 acceptance of a so-called project of Reform, which in reality is a division of 
 Germany, and now she employs military force against those Sovereigns who 
 have faithfully discharged their Federal duties. 
 
 "The most pernicious of wars, a war of Germans against Germans, has 
 become inevitable, and I now summon before the tribunal of history, before 
 the tribunal of an eternal and all-powerful God, those persons who have 
 brought it about, and make them responsible for the misfortunes which may 
 fall on individuals, families, districts, and countries. 
 
 " I begin the war with confidence, arising from the knowledge that my 
 cause is a just one, and with the consciousness of the power which is pos- 
 sessed by a great empire when the Prince and the people have one and the 
 same thought— that the rights of their country must be stedfastly upheld. 
 My heart beats high at the sight of my gallant and well-appointed army — 
 the bulwark against which the force of the enemies of Austria will be broken 
 — and of my faithful peoples, who are full of loyal confidence and self devo- 
 tion. The pure fire of patriotic enthusiasm burns with equal strength and 
 steadiness in all parts of my vast empire. Joyfully do the furlough men and 
 reserves take their places in the ranks of the army ; numerous volunteers 
 present themselves ; the whole of the able-bodied population of the countries 
 which are most exposed are preparing to take the field, and everything that 
 can possibly be done to assist the army and provide for its necessities is 
 willingly done. All the inhabitants of my kingdoms and countries have one 
 and the same feeling — the feeling that they belong to one and the same { 
 nation, that unity gives strength, and that a gross violation of justice has 
 been committed. 
 
 " It is doubly painful to me that the settlement of the questions relative 
 to the internal constitution of the Empire has not yet made so much pro- 
 gress that I, at this important moment, can assemble around my throne 
 the representatives of all my peoples. Although I am now deprived of 
 this support, my duty as a Sovereign has become clearer, and my reso- I 
 lution stronger, that for all future time my empire shall have the bene- 
 fit of it. 
 
 " We shall not be alone in the struggle which is about to take place. 
 The Princes and peoples of Germany know that their liberty and indepen- 
 dence are menaced by a Power which listens but to the dictates of egotism, ; 
 and is under the influence of an ungovernable craving after aggrandizement, 
 
Chap. IV.] PRUSSIAN OCCUPATION OF SAXONY. 133 
 
 power, and integrity of the whole of the German Fatherland. We and ou- 
 German brethren have taken up arms in defence of the most precious rights 
 of nations. We have been forced so to do, and we neither can nor will dis.i 
 arm until the internal development of my empire and of the German States 
 which are allied with it has been secured, and also their power and influence 
 in Europe. 
 
 " My hopes are not based on unity of purpose, on power alone, I confide 
 in an almighty and just God, whom my house from its very foundations has 
 faithfully served, a God who never forsakes those who righteously put their 
 trust in Him. To Him I pray for assistance and success, and I call on my 
 peoples to join me in that prayer. 
 
 " Given in my residence and metropolis of Vienna, on this 17th of June, 
 1866. 
 
 "FRANCIS JOSEPH (m.p.)." 
 
 On the same day the following general order was also issued 
 to the Austrian Army of the North by Feldzeugmeister 
 Benedek : — 
 
 "Head Quarters, Olmutz. 
 
 " Soldiers, — We are on the eve of grave and sanguinary events. As in 
 1859, you are collected in great numbers around our flag. Soldiers, we 
 have now to repair in the eyes of the world the faults of that period ; 
 we have to punish an arrogant and faithless enemy. I have the full and 
 entire conviction that you are aware of and are worthy of this mission. 
 Have also confidence in me, and be assured that on my part I will exert my 
 best efforts to bring this campaign to a speedy and glorious termination. 
 We are now faced by inimical forces, composed partly of troops of the Line 
 and partly of Landwehr. The first comprises young men not accustomed 
 to privations and fatigues, and who have never yet made an important cam- 
 paign ; the latter is composed of doubtful and dissatisfied elements, which, 
 rather than fight against us, would prefer the downfall of their Government. 
 In consequence of a long course of years of peace, the enemy does not pos- 
 sess a single general who has had an opportunity of learning his duties on 
 the field of battle. Veterans of the Mincio and of Palestro, I hope that 
 with tried leaders you will not allow the slightest advantage to such an adver- 
 sary. On the day of battle the infantry will adopt its lightest campaign 
 accoutrement, and will leave behind their knapsacks and camping material, 
 in order that they may be able to throw themselves with rapidity and 
 promptitude upon the heavily-laden enemy. Each soldier will receive his 
 flask filled with wine and water, and a ration of bread and meat easily to 
 be carried. The officers will discontinue the use of their wide scarves, and 
 all the useless insignia of their ranks, which but renders them too distin- 
 guishable in action. Every man, without distinction of name or position, 
 shall be promoted whenever he shall distinguish himself on the field of 
 battle. The bands will place themselves in rear of the front of the 
 respective positions, and will play heroic pieces for the warlike dance. 
 The enemy has for some time vaunted the excellence of their fire-arms, 
 but, soldiers, I do not think that will be of much avail to them. We 
 will give them no time, but we will attack them with the bayonet and 
 with crossed muskets. When, with God's help, we shall have beaten 
 and compelled to retreat our enemies, we will pursue them without in- 
 termission, and you shall then find repose upon the enemy's soil, and 
 those compensations which a glorious and victorious army has a right 
 to demand " 
 
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136 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 the central provinces of Prussia. The upper basin is in general 
 ill cultivated, and little has been done to develop its resources. 
 It possesses, however, forests, considerable iron mines, and 
 breeds horses which are valuable in war. Its roads, except one 
 or two main chaussees, are few, mountainous, and bad ; but it is 
 a country easily defensible, for its forests, mountains, and rivers 
 present at every point obstacles to an invading army. The 
 lower basin of this river is, on the other hand, a country of 
 plains, marshes, and small lakes : not very fertile, but well 
 cultivated, thickly populated, and opened up by a multitude of 
 roads. The Elbe, entering it from a close defile between the 
 mountains of Northern Bohemia, runs through its whole length, 
 passing by the fortress of Konigstein, Dresden, the capital of 
 Saxony, and the fortified town of Wittenberg. This river, 
 within Prussian territory, supported by the fortresses of Torgau 
 and Magdeburg, forms a strong line of defence against an army 
 advancing on Berlin from the west, but one which can easily 
 be turned from Bohemia. 
 
 The basin of the Oder, bounded on the south by the moun- 
 tains which overhang Braunau, Glatz, and Troppau, contains 
 on the upper course of the river the province of Prussian 
 Silesia. The river itself forms an angle near Breslau, which 
 allows of its being used as a line of defence for the eastern 
 districts of the kingdom of Prussia against an attack from either 
 the south or west. This line is supported by the fortresses of 
 Glogau, Kiistrin, and Stettin. The country through which the 
 Oder flows is in general flat, marshy, and woody; the land is 
 fertile only in pasture, but is well cultivated, and inhabited by 
 an active and industrious population. 
 
 The basin of the Weser, in which lies the western portion of 
 the kingdom of Hanover, is bounded on the south by the 
 mountains of the Thuringian Forest and the Hartz, and is in 
 getieral sandy and covered with thickets ; its principal riches 
 are flocks and herds. The Danube, the southernmost of the 
 four rivers which were introduced into the theatre of war in 
 Central Germany, runs through a plain which lies on the south 
 side of the Bohemian and Moravian mountains. 
 
 Starting from the confluence of the Main with the Rhine at 
 Mayence, following upwards the valley of the former river, 
 
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 137 
 
 skirting the southern slopes of the Thuringian Forest, passing 
 along the summits of the Erz-Gebirge, the Riesen-Gebirge, and 
 the mountains of Moravia, and terminating at the southernmost 
 point of Upper Silesia, runs the line which geographically 
 divides Northern from Southern Germany. This line now 
 divided from one another the territories occupied by the troops 
 of the two great parties into which the Germanic Confederation 
 was rapidly splitting. By the sudden razzia made by her troops 
 into Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, and by surrounding 
 the Hanoverian troops, Prussia secured free communication 
 between her Rhenish provinces and Berlin, disarmed the hostile 
 forces in her rear, and divided the whole of Germany into two 
 distinct areas for military operations. 
 
 These northern and southern areas, separated by the central 
 geographical line of Germany, were now in the possession of 
 the troops of the northern and southern antagonists respectively. 
 
 The Prussian occupation of Saxony had also the effect of 
 separating the troops of the southern league quartered on the 
 east of the line of the Saale from those assembled on the west, 
 and divided Germany into an eastern and western theatre 
 of war. 
 
 On the western theatre the Prussian troops which had in- 
 vaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were ranged against the 
 Hanoverians, the Bavarians, the troops of Cassel, and those of 
 the eighth Federal corps. 
 
 On the eastern theatre the main armies of Prussia were 
 drawn up against that of Austria with its Saxon allies, where 
 they occupied positions in Saxony and Silesia on the one side, 
 on Bohemia and Moravia on the other. Between Bohemia 
 and Saxony lie the chains of the Iron and Giant Mountains ; 
 between Moravia and Silesia, a part of the Giant chain, the 
 mountains of Schweidnitz, and the Sudetic hills. These moun- 
 tains as a rule are steep towards Prussia, and slope more 
 gently towards Bohemia. They consist of several parallel 
 ridges, and are of very unequal heights, sometimes falling as 
 low as a thousand feet, sometimes, raising their peaks high 
 into the air, they tower over spurs themselves fifteen hundred 
 feet high. On the west of Bohemia the Fichtel Mountains 
 divide the passes which lead from North Germany into Bohemia 
 
133 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book V. 
 
 from those which by the sources of the Saale lead in the 
 neighbourhood of Hof and Eger into Bavaria. This fact added 
 to the importance and to the value of the Prussian occupation 
 of Saxony, for the presence of the troops of Prince Frederick 
 Charles in that kingdom, if it did not entirely prevent, certainly 
 
 , J\lx%n L'MS. 
 Lines of Gaamvaiufim, 
 
 threw great difficulties in the way of a junction between the 
 Austrians and Bavarians, and placed the Prussians in about 
 the advantageous position of having broken the line of the 
 armies of the South German States. 
 
 The south-western frontier of Bohemia is formed by the hills 
 of the Bohemian Forest ; the south-eastern by the mountains of 
 Moravia. The eastern theatre of operations lay between the 
 mountains which separate Bohemia and Moravia from Saxony 
 and Prussia and the Danube. 
 
 In this theatre two main lines of railway exist, and show the 
 lines along which the troops on either side would draw together, 
 
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 139 
 
 in order to repel an offensive movement of the enemy. The 
 northern line is that which runs from Oderberg, by Oppeln, 
 Brieg, Breslau, and Gorlitz to Dresden and Leipzic ; the 
 outhern is that which leads from Prerau by Olmiitz and Par- 
 dubitz to Prague. These lines at three points are joined to 
 each other by lines from Dresden to Prague, from Lobau to 
 Tiirnau, and from Oderberg to Prerau. 
 
 Within Bohemia lies the important quadrilateral of railways 
 between Prague, Tiirnau, Josephstadt, and Pardubitz, from 
 which lines lead to Leipzic, Dresden, Berlin, Gorlitz, Breslau, 
 Cracow, Vienna, Pilsen, Nuremberg, and Regensburg, and 
 which, in consequence, forms a highly advantageous position 
 for the concentration of troops. 
 
 The fortresses enclosed in this theatre are, on the Austrian 
 side, Cracow on the Vistula, Olmiitz on the March, Joseph- 
 stadt and Koniggratz on the Upper Elbe, Prague on the 
 Moldau, and Theresienstadt on the Eger. On the Prussian 
 side are Kosel on the Oder, Neisse on the Neisse, Glatz, 
 SSchweidnitz, and Torgau, on the Elbe. From Schweidnitz, 
 which is of little importance as a fortress, to Torgau, the 
 distance is about one hundred and fifty miles. 
 
 After the Prussian occupation of Saxony, the main armies of 
 ithe two great Powers were separated by the mountains along 
 ■which run the northern frontier lines of Bohemia and Moravia. 
 iThe Prussian army consisted of three principal parts, which all 
 jreceived orders from the King as commander-in-chief of all 
 ithe forces, and numbered, inclusive of the reserve corps of 
 [General Miilbe in Dresden, about 280,000 combatants, with 
 1900 guns. 
 
 The Austrian army, on the south of the mountains, mustered 
 about 245,000 combatants, with 600 guns, to which was added 
 ithe Saxon army, that had retired into Bohemia, with a force of 
 125,000 combatants, and 60 guns. 
 
 Plan of Operations. — The Austrian army was not in such 
 la forward state of preparation for taking the field as the Prus- 
 sian. Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek had not apparently 
 ^anticipated such extreme rapidity and energy of movement as 
 was exhibited by the Prussians, and had before the outbreak of 
 
i 4 o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 hostilities announced his intention of assuming the offensive, 
 and of invading Prussian territory, when he had given most 
 humane and praiseworthy directions to his own troops for their 
 behaviour in the enemy's country. An Austrian invasion of 
 Prussia may be effected by either of two routes : the first leads 
 over the Lusatian mountains to Bautzen and Gorlitz to Berlin ; 
 the second by the valley of the Oder into Silesia. An offensive 
 movement by the first route would have given the Austrians 
 the advantage of seizing Saxony, and of covering the passage 
 of the Bavarians by the passes of the Saale to Wittenberg, 
 where the whole of the invading army might have been united. 
 The other route did not offer these advantages, and in it lay as 
 obstacles the Prussian fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, and Kosel. 
 
 The rapid invasion of Saxony by Prussia, and the consequent 
 retreat of the Saxons, appears to have determined the Austrian 
 commander to relinquish any attempt of crossing the moun- 
 tains into that kingdom. His army was concentrated round 
 Briinn and Olmiitz ; he could not draw it together in time to 
 seize the passes into Saxony ; and he appears to have then 
 determined to act upon the defensive, and to hold one portion 
 of the Prussian troops in check, while he threw himself with 
 strong force on the others issuing from the mountain passes, in 
 order to crush them in detail. To secure a favourable position 
 for this operation, he concentrated his army towards Joseph- 
 stadt. He sent one corps d'armee with the Saxon troops to 
 cover the issues of the passes from Saxony, there to check the 
 armies of Prince Frederick Charles. With his forces from 
 Josephstadt he intended to hold the Crown Prince in issuing 
 from the mountains, and to reinforce Clam Gallas to crush 
 Prince Frederick Charles at Gitschin. On the 19th June the 
 Austrian movements with this aim commenced : that day the 
 head-quarters of Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek were movec 
 from Olmiitz to Bohmisch Triiban, and on the 23rd June his 
 army occupied the following positions : — 
 
 The 1 st corps, the Saxons, the brigade Kalik, and the is 
 light cavalry division, were posted under the supreme commanc 
 of Count Clam Gallas, amounting altogether to nine brigades 
 with 60,000 men, on the left bank of the Iser, between Weiss 
 wasser, Miinchengratz, and Tiirnau, in order here to check th< 
 
Chap. I.] 
 
 THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 
 
 141 
 
 enemy advancing from the north-west. The 4th and 8th corps, 
 and 1 st division of reserve cavalry, were at Josephstadt ; the 
 10th and 6th corps were pushed forward to the Silesian frontier 
 on the north-east of Josephstadt ; the 3rd corps and the 2nd and 
 3rd divisions of reserve cavalry were held in reserve north of 
 Pardubitz ; the 2nd corps and the 2nd light cavalry division 
 formed the extreme right of the Austrian line at Bohmisch 
 
 9 
 
 1C.3C. <£<? 
 
 tR.CD 
 
 
 4^ 
 
 Bokm.Triibiia 
 
 Triiban. By this disposition of his troops, Feldzeugmeister 
 Benedek held a force much superior to that of the Crown 
 Prince, immediately opposite to the denies leading to Silesia, 
 and covered the ground on which all the roads from Saxony 
 and lower Silesia unite together in Bohemia, so that he actually 
 stood in front of the point where the armies of Prince Frederick 
 Charles and of the Crown Prince must unite. 
 
 Prussian Plan of Operations. — How and why Prussia 
 assumed the offensive in Saxony has been already seen. To 
 increase the advantages gained by the possession of this king- 
 dom, it was extremely desirable to push forward into Bohemia, 
 and thus diminish, by a concentration forwards, the extent of 
 the arc covered by the different armies. Political and financial 
 reasons also required a speedy termination of the war. It was 
 determined in the Prussian councils to assume the offensive. 
 
 An invasion of the Austrian dominions from the positions of 
 the Prussian armies could be effected in two ways : by the first 
 the armies could cross the north-eastern and north-western 
 frontiers of Bohemia, and be directed to unite in the north of 
 
i 4 2 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 Bohemia. By the second plan the Elbe Army and the First 
 Army could have been ordered to cross the frontier, and to 
 move on Prague, while the Second made an offensive move- 
 ment against Olmiitz. The latter plan was considered too 
 dangerous ; by its prosecution the communications between the 
 two armies would have been entirely broken ; and if Benedek 
 had ignored the Second Army he could have fallen with much 
 superior forces on Prince Frederick Charles, and overthrown 
 him, when the distance from Olmiitz to Vienna would not have 
 been less than that from Josephstadt to Berlin. The first plan 
 was accordingly adopted ; and in order to carry it out, it was 
 determined that the Army of the Elbe, acting as the extreme 
 right wing of the Prussian advance, should move from Dres- 
 den by Neustadt, and over the mountains by the passes of 
 Schluckenau or Gabel. The First Army, which formed the 
 centre of the invading forces, was to move with the cavalry 
 corps from Zittau, Gorlitz, and Lobau, by the passes ofKrottau 
 Friedland and Neustadtl or Reichenberg. The Second Army, 
 as the left wing, was to move from Landshut and the county 
 of Glatz through the passes near Schatzlar or Trautenau, and 
 through the pass of Nachod or Skalitz. 
 
 The First Army and the Army of the Elbe were to unite 
 near the Iser, and to gain together the left bank of that river 
 towards Gitschin. The Second was to gain the right bank of 
 the Elbe. When these points were gained, the two armies 
 would be in close communication, and could act in conjunction 
 along the line of railway leading by Pardubitz and Briinn to 
 Vienna. 
 
 The distance from Schluckenau to the county of Glatz, along 
 which the Prussian front extended, is about one hundred miles. 
 The Army of the Elbe and the First Army, which were to 
 move through passes only about thirty or thirty-five miles 
 distant from each other, could unite on the Iser in four 
 marches, and immediately assail the enemy with four and a 
 half corps d'armee, if the Austrians attempted to make an 
 offensive movement towards Silesia. The circumstances of the 
 country, and the strategical situation, threw more difficulties in 
 the way of the Second Army during its defiling through the 
 mountains, and there was considerable danger that it might be 
 
Chap. I.] THEATRE OF GERMAN WAR. 143 
 
 attacked while still isolated. On this account the Army of 
 Silesia was made stronger by one corps d'armee than the First 
 Army, and was to commence its movements four days later, so 
 as to allow the Austrian attention to have been distracted by 
 the presence of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia, and to 
 permit of the complete junction of the First Army and of the 
 Army of the Elbe on the Iser. 
 
 To hold the Austrian commander as long as possible in un- 
 certainty as to the points at which the army of the Crown 
 Prince was about to break into Bohemia, and, if possible, to 
 make him remove his guards from the passes by which the 
 descent was really to be effected, a false demonstration was 
 made by the Second Army. This army had been concentrated 
 round Landshut and Waldenburg, but on the 15 th June, the 
 
 rown Prince, leaving only one corps d'armee in its original 
 osition, moved two of his remaining three corps thirty miles 
 o the south-east, and there placed them in position near Neisse, 
 ent at the same time the Guards to Brieg, and shifted his own 
 ead-quarters to the fortress of Neisse, in order to make the 
 
 ustrians believe that the Army of Silesia intended to await 
 ttack in a defensive position near the fortress, or to break out 
 outh wards from that point upon Olmiitz. 
 
 The possession of Saxony and of the passes over the Iron 
 
 ountains, enabled the defence of that kingdom to be en- 
 
 sted to the single reserve corps of General Miilbe. In case, 
 however, that Austrian raids might be made into Saxony, or to 
 oppose the Bavarians in case they might attempt by way of 
 Hof into that country, fortifications were thrown up round 
 Dresden. 
 
 On the left wing of the Prussian base of operations, Lower 
 and Middle Silesia were covered from an Austrian attack by the 
 lature of the Prussian offensive movement as well as by the 
 brtresses of Glatz and Neisse. That portion of Silesia, how- 
 ever, above Oppeln, which penetrates into Austrian territory, 
 was exposed to hostile attacks from Oderberg and from Galicia. 
 In order not to weaken the armies of operations by detaching 
 troops to protect this portion of the province, new and peculiar 
 means were adopted. Two scouting parties were formed which 
 were to support each other ; and in case of formidable attack, 
 
144 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 to withdraw into the fortress of Kosel. One of these was 
 under General Knoblesdorf, and consisted of three battalions 
 of infantry, some battalions of Landwehr, a regiment of cavalry 
 of the Line, and one battery. Its head-quarters were at 
 Ratibor. The other consisted of Landwehr only, and mustered 
 six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of 
 Jagers, and one battery. It was commanded by Count Stol- 
 berg, and stationed at Nicolai. These parties were not only 
 intended to watch the frontier and oppose an irruption by the 
 Austrians, but were also to annoy the enemy beyond the fron- 
 tier, and to break up his railway communications. As a con- 
 sequence of these arrangements, a lively war of detachments 
 was soon developed along the Upper Silesian frontier, the 
 details of which afford many interesting records of personal 
 adventure, and the results of which demonstrated that the 
 Prussian possesses in rapidity, subtlety, and endurance, all the 
 qualities necessary for the accidents of petty warfare. Each 
 detachment protected well its own position of the frontier, and 
 only at a few points did the enemy succeed in effecting 
 momentary sallies : they kept the Austrian troops in Western 
 Galicia in check, and did considerable damage to their enemy. 
 In one instance they destroyed the railway from Oswiecin to 
 Oderberg so thoroughly, that the communication from Cracow 
 to Bohemia as well as to Vienna was completely broken. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 On the 23rd June the Army of the Elbe and the First Army 
 were to cross the Bohemian frontier. When it is considered 
 that not only the concentration and advance of the troops had 
 to be arranged after the occupation of Saxony, but also the 
 supply of provisions and ammunition, the establishment of 
 hospitals, and the bringing up of reserves, it seems wonderful 
 that these two armies could have been ready in so few days to 
 take the field. 
 
 The southern boundary of Saxon Lusatia runs forward for a 
 distance of about fifteen English miles within the general line 
 of the Bohemian frontier of Austria. In the salient angle of 
 Saxony formed by this peculiar tracing of the border line stands 
 within Saxon territory the frontier town of Zittau. This town 
 covers the issue of the passes which lead from Reichenberg and 
 Friedland in Bohemia, through the mountains into Lusatia, 
 and commands the railway which by the pass of Reichenberg 
 runs from Tiirnau to Bautzen. About six miles to the north- 
 east of Zittau and about seventeen south-west of Gorlitz the 
 village of Hirschfeld is situated ou the Neisse, at a point where 
 this river receives a small affluent called the Kipper. To this 
 village the head-quarters of the First Army were moved on the 
 22nd June. Directly to the south were clearly seen the bold 
 swelling masses of the Bohemian mountains, which here rise 
 higher than in any part of the chain except where the Schnee- 
 koppe looms over the passes which lead into Silesia. The 
 break in the mountain line which shows the defile through 
 which passes the road to Reichenberg could be distinctly seen 
 from here. Many eyes were often turned towards the gap in 
 
146 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 the clear relief of the hills against the sky, and many sought to 
 know whether Prince Frederick Charles had come south to 
 force that pass, or expected the Austrians to issue from it. But 
 those who had that day marched along the seventeen miles of 
 dusty road from Gorlitz could have little doubt with what 
 object the First Army had advanced; the amount of transport 
 which stretched in almost a continuous line for twelve miles of 
 the way, told clearly that it was attached to an army destined 
 for more than the mere defence of a frontier. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles on the 22nd broke up his quarters 
 at Gorlitz, drew the First Army together, and launched it by 
 the two roads which lead through Zittau and Seidenberg re- 
 spectively, towards the Austrian frontier. The head-quarter 
 staff left Gorlitz about three in the afternoon, and pushed along 
 a road crowded with marching troops and military carriages to 
 Hirschfeld. The road from Gorlitz to that place was covered 
 with an almost unbroken stream of infantry regiments, batteries 
 of artillery, cavalry detachments, military carriages, and a long 
 line of country waggons as supplementary transport, while the 
 thick cloud of dust, which rose about a mile and a half to the 
 left, showed that an equally strong column was pushing forward 
 by the Seidenberg road. The heat was great, and the dust, 
 rising in dense clouds from beneath the feet of the men and 
 horses, or wheels of the carriages, hung heavily upon the march- 
 ing columns ; but the men stepped out cheerily, for they were 
 anxious to advance, and they did not seem to suffer from 
 fatigue. The regiments marched in with drums and fifes play- 
 ing, ranks closed up, no stragglers, and the men keeping step 
 so well that, but for the dust on their clothes and appointments, 
 they might have been imagined to be going for instead of 
 returning from a march. 
 
 The chaussee leading from Gorlitz to Zittau is broad enough 
 to allow four carriages to pass. The march was excellently 
 arranged ; there was no confusion, and no halts had to be made 
 except those which were necessary to allow the men to rest. 
 The carriages of the military train were scrupulously kept to 
 one side of the road, so as to leave the rest clear for the troops. 
 Its own baggage marched in the rear of each battalion, but it 
 was not much ; only one waggon with the reserve ammunition, 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 147 
 
 a cart for the officers' baggage, three or four packhorses to 
 cany the paymaster's books, and the doctors' medicine carts. 
 The soldiers marched strongly ; their faces were . lit up with 
 excitement, for they knew that every pace brought them 
 nearer to the enemy, and they longed for battle. The country 
 people on the road or working by the wayside exchanged kind 
 words with the men, and expressed many good wishes for their 
 success, and did so with sincerity, for the Prussian soldiers who 
 had been billeted in the Saxon hamlets had made themselves 
 great favourites with the villagers. 
 
 Never was a march better conducted. The standing crops 
 which fringed the road for almost its entire length were in no 
 single place either trampled down or passed through. The 
 road was crowded and dusty, but the men never left it, and, 
 if there was a halt where corn grew by the wayside, no soldier 
 went further from the line of march than to sit on the narrow 
 fringe of grass which separates the chanssee from the cultivated 
 ground, and in no case were the field, intruded upon. The staff 
 officers, too, with a wise provision for the comfort of the troops, 
 and with a careful regard for the farmers, had arranged that 
 halts of long duration should be made by alternate regiments 
 at places where the hay had been cut and carried home, and 
 the short grass could, without itself suffering any harm, afford 
 relief to the heated feet of the soldiers. 
 
 The road about a mile south of Gorlitz descends a steep hill, 
 formed by the spur of the Landeskrone, which runs down to 
 the edge of the Neisse, and on which the town of Gorlitz is 
 built. It then runs along the valley as far as Ostritz ; on the 
 right are wide unenclosed fields covered with rich crops, which 
 terminate on the low line of hills that fringes the valley towards 
 the west ; on the left runs the slow stream of the Neisse, 
 shrouded in willows ; beyond the river a chain of gentle ele- 
 vations separates its valley from that formed by the Rolte 
 rivulet, up which runs the road from Gorlitz by Seidenberg to 
 Friedland. A mile south of Ostritz a chain of hills, standing 
 directly across the road, forms a defile through which the river 
 winds with a narrowed stream, the road bends to the right, and 
 goes over a hill thickly covered with fir-trees, but soon descends 
 again, and at Hirschfeld reioins the course of the river. Two 
 
148 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 good military positions for an army retreating on Gorlitz are 
 afforded on this road — that behind Hirschfeld, where in front 
 of the hill a rivulet crosses the way ; and a second where, in 
 front of Gorlitz, the road dips down into the valley. 
 
 The Prussian troops were on the night of the 22nd in force 
 in Zittau and Seidenberg, and the troops were placed along the 
 road which connects those two towns. Head-quarters were 
 established in a very picturesque, but not over-clean, Saxon 
 village. Prince Frederick Charles and his staff occupied the 
 village inn ; the square in front, half market-place, half green, 
 was crowded with the carriages of the military train. Soldiers 
 were billeted in every cottage, and chargers stood in every 
 stable. The little hamlet was a continual scene of busy tur- 
 moil ; horses were being attended to, arms were being cleaned, 
 and the men were making ready for to-morrow's march ; while 
 now and then a distant trumpet on the left told that the even- 
 ing watches were being set by the troops that lay towards the 
 frontier. 
 
 The resources of this little village Avere sorely taxed by the 
 sudden inroad of hungry men ; the common room of the inn 
 was filled with a multitude of soldiers hungry with a long day's 
 march. Each man bought a large piece of bread and a junk 
 of meat, and retiring to a side table, or bench, cut it up with 
 his pocket-knife, and made a hearty meal. The regimental 
 officers fared no better than their men. The campaign had 
 already begun, and a great deal of the outward distinctions of 
 ranks had been, as is always the case, shaken off, but the real 
 discipline was unimpaired. 
 
 The health of the army was excellent ; the sick only averaged 
 2 J per cent., which would be a remarkably small number even 
 in a period of profound peace. The sanitary arrangements 
 were so good that there seemed to be every chance of this 
 small proportion of illness being maintained. 
 
 The surgeons, hospital attendants, and sick-bearers wore on 
 their left arm a white band with a red cross, as a mark of their 
 profession and their neutrality. 
 
 No declaration of war against Austria was made by Prussia ; 
 but on the morning of the 23rd, at daybreak, Prince Frederick 
 Charles sent one of his aides-de-camp, Major von Rauch, to 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 149 
 
 announce to the commander of the nearest Austrian post that 
 he in the course of the day intended to pass the Bohemian 
 frontier. Von Rauch, as is usual in such cases, accompanied 
 by a trumpeter, whom he caused constantly to sound, and 
 himself waving a white handkerchief, fell in with one of the 
 Austrian patrols, which was furnished by Radetzky's hussars. 
 The patrol fired on the staff officer, fortunately without effect ; 
 he boldly rode up to it, and on explaining the object of his 
 visit, was conducted blindfold to the commandant of the ad- 
 vanced post, which was Reichenberg ; this officer, of course, 
 apologized for the mistake which his patrol had made, and 
 the aide-de-camp, after a long and early ride, was escorted back 
 to within a short distance of the Saxon frontier, where he soon 
 met the advancing columns of his own army. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles, late on the night of the 22nd, issued 
 the following General Order to the First Army : — 
 
 " Head Quarters, Gorlitz, June 22. 
 
 "Soldiers! — Austria, faithless and regardless of treaties, has for some 
 time, without declaring war, not respected the Prussian frontier in Upper 
 Silesia. I therefore, likewise, without a declaration of war, might have 
 passed the frontier of Bohemia. I have not done so. I have caused a 
 public declaration to be sent, and now we enter the territory of the enemy 
 in order to defend our own country. 
 
 "Let our undertaking rest with God. Let us leave our affairs in the 
 hands of Him who rules the hearts of men, who decides the fate of nations, 
 and the issue of battles. As it stands written in Holy Writ — 'Let your 
 hearts beat to God, and your hands on the enemy. ' 
 
 "In this war are concerned — you know it — the maintenance of Prussia's 
 most sacred rights, and the very existence of our dear native land. Her 
 enemies have declared their intention to dismember and to destroy her. 
 Shall the streams of blood which your fathers and mine poured out under 
 Frederick the Great, in the War of Independence, and which we ourselves 
 latterlyshed at Diippel and Alsen, have been spilt in vain ? Never ! We will 
 maintain Prussia as she is, and by victories make her stronger and mightier. 
 We would be worthy of our fathers. 
 
 " We rely on the God of our fathers, who will be mighty in us, and will 
 bless the arms of Prussia. 
 
 "So, forward with our old battle cry, ' With God for King and 
 Fatherland ! Long live the King ! ' 
 
 "FREDERICK CHARLES, General of Cavalry." 
 
 On the morning of the 23rd the Prussian armies crossed the 
 frontier of the Austrian territories. General Herwarth von 
 Bittenfeld, with the Army of the Elbe, marched by the high 
 
150 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 road from Schluckenau to Rumburg. Prince Frederick Charles, 
 with the 4th corps d'arme'e, followed by the 2nd corps, and the 
 cavalry corps, advanced along the road and railway leading 
 from Zittau to Reichenberg, while the 3rd corps moved from 
 Seidenberg and Marklissa over the passes of Schonwald and 
 Neustadtl on Friedland. 
 
 The troops were early under arms, and fell into their ranks a 
 little after daybreak, under a steady downfall of drizzling rain. 
 They had to march many miles from their billets to the places 
 where they were to form columns for the advance, but they 
 stepped out well over the slippery grass and sloppy roads, and 
 were all ranged in proper order close to the Austrian frontier, 
 but still on Saxon ground, a little after 7. At 6 the Com- 
 mander-in-chief left his last night's quarters at Hirschfeld, and 
 by the Zittau road reached the frontier a little before 8. The 
 frontier is marked on the road by a tollhouse, in front of which 
 a long bar supplies the place of a gate. This bar balances near 
 its end furthest from the tollhouse on a pivot, and, by means 
 of a weight at the end of its shorter arm, can be raised almost 
 perpendicularly upwards when the road is to be left open for a 
 free passage. On this bar are painted the alternate black and 
 gold stripes which are the distinctive colours of Austria. The 
 bar was raised that day, but not quite in a vertical position ; 
 high enough to allow a man on horseback to ride under it, it 
 still sloped over the road. It was here that Prince Frederick 
 Charles took up his position to watch his troops march over 
 the border. He had hardly arrived there before he gave the 
 necessary orders, and in a few moments the Uhlans, who 
 formed the advanced guard of the regiments that marched by 
 this line, were over the frontier. Then followed the infantry. 
 As the leading ranks of each battalion arrived at the first point 
 on the road from which they caught sight of the Austrian 
 colours that showed the frontier, they raised a cheer, which 
 was quickly caught up by those in the rear, and was repeated 
 again and again till, when the men came up to the tollhouse 
 and saw their soldier Prince standing on the border line, it 
 swelled into a roar of rapturous delight, which only ceased to 
 be replaced by a martial song that was caught up by each 
 battalion as it poured into Bohemia. Their chief himself stood 
 
Chap. II. ] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 151 
 
 by the roadside calm and collected; but he gazed proudly on 
 the passing sections, and well he might, for never did an army 
 cross an enemy's frontier better equipped, better cared for, or 
 with a higher courage than that which marched out of Saxony 
 that day. Ever and anon he would call from a passing bat- 
 talion some officer or soldier who had before served under him, 
 and with a kindly inquiry or cheerful word, won a heart, for 
 soldiers love officers who take an interest in them. Everywhere 
 the Prince was greeted by the troops with loud cries of joy; as 
 he rode along the way by which the regiments were marching 
 they cheered him continuously. At one point his reception was 
 peculiarly remarkable. A Pomeranian regiment (the 2nd), 
 which had served under him when he was a divisional general, 
 had piled its arms for a halt, and the men were lying down by 
 the side of the road to rest. Suddenly the word was passed 
 among them that the Prince was coming; with one accord 
 they sprang as if by magic to their feet, made two long lines 
 along the road through which he might pass, and gave him such 
 a cheer as only old soldiers can. 
 
 The concentration of the troops and the advance into 
 Bohemia were most excellently managed. This same army 
 had exactly a week before entered Saxony, prepared to fight in 
 that country ; within that time Saxony had been entirely occu- 
 pied, and within six days the majority of the troops were again 
 concentrated, and began their march into Austria. The advance 
 was conducted in this way : — The troops the previous night 
 were concentrated on the frontier; on the morning of the 23rd, 
 on the right, Herwarth von Bittenfeld pushed forward two 
 columns from Dresden by Schluckenau and Rumburg ; Prince 
 Frederick Charles advanced from Saxony ; his troops marched 
 in five columns; the column on the right followed the high 
 road from Zittau ; the right centre column marched along the 
 railway lying to the left of that road; the centre column 
 followed a road to the left of the railway. The left centre 
 column marched by the Seidenberg road, and the left column 
 by the Marklissa road east of this highway. Thus on a broad 
 front, and by several roads all within a distance which would 
 allow the different corps to concentrate in a very few hours, 
 the army moved to the front well in hand and without incon- 
 
152 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book V. 
 
 venience to the troops. The march within Austrian territory 
 was distinguished by the same regard for private property that 
 was so scrupulously observed in Saxony. The Austrian villagers 
 at first looked on the irruption of the army of the northern 
 Germans half in fear, half in curiosity, but soon they came to 
 be on speaking terms with the soldiers, and then were quickly 
 seen supplying them with drinking water and doing them other 
 good services. 
 
 The Castle of Grafenstein, in which the head quarters were 
 fixed on the night of the 23rd, is the property of Count Clam 
 Gallas, who commanded the first Austrian corps in Bohemia a 
 it is beautifully situated on the top of a hill, covered with thick 
 foliage, which rises abruptly from the low ground of the valley 
 of the Neisse. The Count had not left much furniture for the 
 use of his unexpected guests, as nearly all the moveables were 
 sent away some time before to Vienna, but a stock of mattresses 
 were found in the house which the sen-ants good-naturedly lent 
 to the temporary occupants, and a Prince of Prussia and his 
 staff were accommodated in the rooms of an officer who was 
 waiting to fight a battle with their army beyond the mountains. 
 Two of Radetzky's hussars were taken prisoners ; they were 
 out with a patrol and came into collision with a patrol ot the 
 Prussian regiment of Magdeburg hussars ; in the skirmish the 
 horses of these two Austrians were shot, and the men were 
 taken. They were the first prisoners of the war. The rapid 
 concentration of the Prussian army produced some feats in 
 marching, which were quite extraordinary for troops who had 
 only just taken the field. The 5th Pomeranian hussars 
 marched three days successively for long distances, and on 
 the 22nd made fifty English miles; they were again on the 
 line of march on the 24th, with horses in excellent condition, 
 and the men looking as if they had only just turned out of 
 barracks. 
 
 The Prussians were now on the northern slopes of the 
 mountains, and one day's march would, without opposition, 
 take them through the passes. The highest hills were now so 
 close that with a glass the stems of the fir-trees which clothed 
 them could be easily distinguished. The road to Reichenberg 
 lay straight and open before them. The march of the 23rd 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 153 
 
 was different from that of the preceding day ; it was a march 
 which showed that the enemy might be found in front. The 
 heavy baggage and reserve commissariat transport was all a 
 day's march in rear ; the only carriages which were present in 
 the column of route were the guns and waggons of the artil- 
 lery, the hospital carriages, and the few waggons which are 
 necessary to regiments when actually about to fight. 
 
 The advanced posts, on the evening of the 23rd, were pushed 
 forwards about seven miles; there were vigilant patrols and 
 pickets out, and all was provided for against a surprise. These 
 precautions are of course always necessary with an army in the 
 field ; in the present case their utility was not put to the test, 
 for the Austrians were not in force in the neighbourhood. 
 
 Count Clam Gallas, to whom the Austrian commander had 
 entrusted the guidance of the Austrian and Saxon troops on 
 the Iser, had only pushed patrols of light cavalry up to and 
 beyond Reichenberg. Several skirmishes took place between 
 them and the Prussian hussars, dragoons, and lancers, who 
 formed the advanced scouts in front of each column, in which 
 the Austrian cavalry was generally outnumbered and obliged to 
 retire. 
 
 It rained steadily all the night of the 23rd, and the morning 
 brought no improvement in the weather, but the troops were in 
 high spirits, and appeared to care nothing for the wet. On the 
 24th the army of Prince Frederick Charles marched by three 
 roads : the left column by way of Eisniedel on Reichenberg ; 
 the centre by Kratzkau on the same town ; while General von 
 Bittenfeld came from the mountains, and moved upon Gabel. 
 Some of the regiments halted at Reichenberg, and were billeted 
 in the town for the night; others were pushed through and 
 took up positions in front. Many battalions had to bivouac 
 that evening ; but, although the ground was moist and damp 
 from incessant rain, the weather was warm, and the troops did 
 not take much harm from their first night in the open. The 
 army was now drawn together and concentrated round Reich- 
 enberg ; for General von Bittenfeld at Gabel was only twelve 
 miles to the right. On the night of the 24th, the Prussian 
 advanced posts near Kratzkau could see the light of the 
 Austrian bivouac fires, and the next morning the Magdeburg 
 
154 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 hussars who cleared the way for the army had a skirmish with 
 some of Radetzky's Austrian hussars. Shots were exchanged, 
 two of the Prussians were wounded and five of the Austrians \ 
 were wounded, with two killed. A combat was expected at 
 Reichenberg. Three Austrian cavalry regiments, Lichtenstein's 
 hussars, Radetzky's hussars, and the hussars of the regiment of 
 Hesse-Cassel, were known to be in front of the Prussian 
 advance, and it was anticipated that in the fine strategical posi- 
 tion of Reichenberg the Austrians might stand to fight ; for this 
 town covers the junction of roads which leads over the moun- 
 tains by Gabel, Grottau, Friedland, and from Hirschberg. But 
 the Austrian cavalry retired through the town, and it was 
 occupied about ten o'clock by the Prussian advanced guard ; 
 and Prince Frederick Charles, without a blow, gained the 
 south side of the mountains, and commanded the issues of the 
 passes. 
 
 The march of the 24th, although over a hill country, was not 
 over a severe road, for the summit of the mountain chain dips 
 so deeply into the gorge which forms the defile of Reichenberg, 
 that the road through the pass both ascends and descends with 
 a moderate gradient ; on either side of the way the mountains 
 rise high, but not steep, for the whole character of this range is 
 more rounded and swelling than bold and sharp. As the army 
 passed between the hills in the early morning, the tops were 
 shrouded in a dense mist, which occasionally lifted high enough 
 to show the lower parts of the dense fir woods which clothe 
 the upper mountain sides, but never to afford a glimpse of their 
 summits. The rain fell heavily and without ceasing; it battered 
 down the grain which grew in the fields by the wayside, and 
 filled the mountain watercourses with rushing mud-coloured 
 streams ; there was no wind to give it a slanting direction, and 
 it came straight down on the men's helmets, only to roll off in 
 large drops upon their backs and shoulders, but it did not seem i 
 to depress the spirits of the troops ; they stepped along cheerily, 
 marching as well as they did the first day they left their garri- 
 sons, and many of the soldiers said that they preferred the wet 
 weather to heat. All along the line of march the commander 
 of the army was loudly cheered. 
 
 When Prince Frederick Charles reached the market-place of 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 15 5 
 
 Reichenberg, he halted to await the arrival of the troops who 
 had marched by the Friedland road. The town looked dull, 
 for as it was Sunday the shops were all shut, and at first the 
 Bohemians seemed inclined to remain in their houses ; but the 
 bands of the marching regiments roused their curiosity, and they 
 soon collected and lined the street in dense crowds to see the 
 troops go by. The soldiers who had arrived early and had been 
 dismissed from their ranks joined in the crowd, and a common 
 language soon made them great friends with the townspeople. 
 Many tales are told of the dreadful devastation to which a 
 country is subjected by the plunderers of an invading army. 
 So far as the Prussian army had yet advanced into Bohemia the 
 soldiers had treated the Austrians with the greatest kindness ; 
 is in the British service, everything that a soldier wished to buy 
 must be scrupulously paid for, and there seemed to be no desire 
 among the men that it should be otherwise ; in fact, the troops 
 were much more plundered than plunderers, for the cigar mer- 
 hants and public-house keepers were driving a most prosperous 
 trade, and took very good care that they themselves did not 
 suffer, for the soldiers were unaccustomed to Austrian currency, 
 imd had to pay an equivalent of Prussian coin. 
 
 Reichenberg was, on the morning of the 24th, occupied by the 
 Prussians about ten o'clock. Before evening nearly the whole 
 irmy, attended by artillery and waggons, marched through the 
 narrow winding streets of a town which to these artificial disad- 
 vantages for free locomotion adds the natural one of being built 
 upon a steep hill ; still there was no confusion in the marching 
 columns, and, although the troops had to move by different 
 streets and were sometimes obliged to march in and out of the 
 own by country lanes and narrow paths, no column took a 
 false direction or made an unnecessary halt ; yet the Quarter- 
 naster-General von Stiilpnagel had only a few minutes allowed 
 lim in which he could arrange his plans. 
 
 The column which had marched by the Friedland route was 
 Drought through the market-place and past the Commander-in- 
 :hief. This corps was composed of men of the province of 
 Brandenburg ; they were taller than the average of the Prussian 
 nfantry, but were not so thick and stout, and did not look so 
 strong as the sturdy Pomeranians ; but they had intelligent 
 
156 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 faces, and could readily be seen to be, as they were, men of an 
 education superior to that which is usually found in the ranks. 
 The regiment of the late King led ; the men bore his cypher on 
 their shoulder cords, instead of a number. The whole corps 
 marched magnificently. After a wet day and a long journey 
 they came up the hill of Reichenberg with ranks closed up, 
 with as perfect a step as on a holiday parade, and went swing- 
 ing along as if they could not know fatigue ; yet they were 
 heavily encumbered, for every man carried his knapsack, the 
 weight of which tells severely against a soldier's marching, and 
 might, in a country where transport is plentiful, be carried for 
 him. After the late King's regiment came the 64th, Prince 
 Frederick Charles's own : the faces of the soldiers showed that 
 they recognised their colonel, and they went past him without 
 cheering, for in the town the men marched as on parade, but 
 with that appearance which is more pleasing to a soldier than 
 any acclamations. 
 
 The head-quarters were established in the Schloss or Castle 
 of Reichenberg, another of the properties of Count Clam Gallas, 
 who thus twice became the involuntary host of Prince Frederick 
 Charles. Here a curious scene was afforded : the castle stands 
 on a hill, overlooks the picturesque town, and commands a 
 beautiful view of the plains and mountains beyond it. The 
 side of this hill below the castle was covered with carefully- 
 tended turf, and luxuriant shrubberies. The place seemed ontyl 
 fit to be the quiet home of a country gentleman, but up and, 
 down its gravelled avenue chargers were being led ready sad-j 
 died for the aides-de-camp, who were waiting to carry out the 
 evening orders ; military train horses were being led to water.) 
 soldiers, in stable dress, were hurrying about, mounted dragoons!; 
 were in attendance as orderlies, and near the door of the castld 
 stood the horse of the officer of Uhlans, who had brought ir 
 the last report from the outposts. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 24th, the Thuringian regiment 0. 
 Uhlans, who are much the same as lancers, took up outpos 
 duty, and one squadron of them had a skirmish with some oj 
 Radetzky's hussars. The hussars were led by a staff officer 
 who came too near the Prussian infantry picket, and the deadl] 1 
 needle-gun shot the first officer who fell a victim to this war 
 
:hap, II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. i 57 
 
 The hussars and Uhlans mutually charged each other, and in 
 :he melee which ensued, two Prussian officers and seventeen 
 men were wounded. The Austrian loss was not ascertained. 
 
 The possession of Reichenberg allowed Prince Frederick 
 Charles to open railway communication with the Silesian and 
 Saxon lines, which was of great importance in the supply of the 
 mny's necessities. The railway from Reichenberg to Zittau 
 was almost immediately restored, for to each Prussian army was 
 ittached a corps of pioneers, architects, and railway officials, 
 who followed the advancing army, laid down the lines torn up 
 by the enemy, and rapidly reorganized the working of the line 
 "or the purposes of military transport. 
 
 Two other excellent institutions of the Prussian army were 
 quickly established, and put in working order at every halting- 
 place ; they were the Field Telegraph and the Field Post-office. 
 A.s soon as it was determined where head-quarters were to be 
 xed for the night, the field telegraph division started off to the 
 nearest permanent telegraph station where the line could be 
 fixed in working order ; from this starting point they carried a 
 ingle line along the side of the shortest road to the head- 
 quarter house, and generally by the time the chief of the staff 
 arrived at his quarters he found his telegraph ready, by which 
 he could get information or send his orders. The field post- 
 office was established also at head-quarters, but had branch 
 offices at the head-quarters of each corps d'armee ; it carried 
 the private letters of soldiers and officers, as well as official 
 despatches, and sent out a mail nearly daily. This was a 
 greater convenience than the field telegraph, but the latter was 
 one of the neatest appliances of modern science to the art of 
 war which it is possible to conceive. The whole of its ap- 
 paratus was carried in some light waggons ; one contained the 
 batteries and needles, and was used as a small room in which 
 the telegraphist worked ; the other waggons carried the poles 
 and wires, with the implements for putting them up. The 
 wires were coiled round revolving discs, which were fitted in 
 the waggon, so that the wire could be passed as the waggon 
 went along, or the disc could be transferred to a stretcher car- 
 ried between two men, so that it might be laid off the road in 
 places where it was desirable to cut off corners. The detach- 
 
158 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 ment who laid the lines were all instructed in repairing damage 
 done to the permanent wires. When it is remembered that on 
 the morning of the 23rd the Austrians were close up to the 
 frontier, and that at midday the Castle of Grafenstein, five miles 
 from the nearest permanent station, was in direct telegraphic 
 communication with Berlin, some idea can be formed of the 
 advantages which this apparatus gives to an army in the field. 
 
 The head-quarters of the First Army halted at Reichenberg 
 on the 25th, to allow the cavalry that came by the Friedland 
 road which had covered the march of the column to come in. 
 During the day the outposts were pushed forward, but the 
 Austrians were not felt. 
 
 Count Clam Gallas had drawn his army together on the 
 south of the line of Iser, round Miinchengratz. The Poschacher 
 brigade, supported by the light cavalry, was posted as his 
 advanced guard on the northern side of the river, and was 
 pushed forward along the road to Reichenberg. This was the 
 same Austrian brigade which had in Schleswig, in 1864, on 
 account of the sturdy manner in which it stormed and oc- 
 cupied the Konigsberg, gained the name of the " iron 
 brigade." It was now destined to commence the contest 
 against its former allies in the 
 
 COMBAT OF LIEBENAU. 
 
 The Austrian brigade occupied the hills south of the village 
 of Liebenau, about half way between Reichenberg and Tiirnau, 
 and had pushed detachments into the village itself. 
 
 The road from Reichenberg to Tiirnau crosses a range of 
 hills which separates the valley of the Upper Neisse from the 
 country beyond, and drops down from this range by some 
 sharp zigzags to the valley in which lies the village of Liebenau. 
 
 This village is built on the banks of a stream which forms a 
 defile through a second range of hills lying between Liebenau 
 and Tiirnau. This rivulet, in the part of its course above the 
 village of Liebenau, runs at right angles to the defile, and forms 
 a valley between the two hills which lie north of Liebenau 
 towards Reichenberg, and those which lie to the south towards 
 Tiirnau. The railway from Liebenau to Tiirnau passes through 
 
Chap. II. ] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 159 
 
 the defile formed by the stream which runs through the village ; 
 but the road turns to the left and ascends the southern range, 
 passing near the top between a steep cutting through rocks. 
 This cutting is about 100 yards in length, and here the road is 
 only about 30 feet wide. The hills are on their side covered 
 with thick plantations of fir trees ; but when the traveller 
 leaving Liebenau has by the road gained the summit of the 
 range which lies south of the village, he finds before him a wild 
 plateau extending for about two miles in the direction of 
 Tiirnau. This plateau was this morning covered with high- 
 standing crops of wheat and barley, already whitening for the 
 harvest. The road runs through the corn-fields, and at the end 
 of the plateau drops down by a gentle slope into the valley ot 
 the Iser. From the brow of this slope Tiirnau can be seen 
 ying on the river towards the left front. The Schloss of 
 Sichrow, standing on the very edge of the Liebenau defile, is 
 directly on the right, and the view to the front is bounded by 
 ;he fir-clad and fantastically rocky hills which form the southern 
 boundary of the valley of the Iser, while on the left the church 
 f Gentschowitz stands raised on a knoll above the general 
 lain, and looking down upon the orchards and cottages of the 
 ttle hamlet which clusters round its foot. 
 
 Between the bottom of the slope which falls from this flat 
 olain into the valley and the Iser, and about half way between 
 :he foot of the hill and the river itself, there runs a low range 
 3f hills, having an elevation considerably inferior to that of the 
 Dlateau. On this lower range, immediately surrounded by 
 orchards, but in the midst of a wide-stretching corn land, lies 
 :he village of Kositz. 
 
 On the evening of the 25 th the Prussian advanced posts 
 -vere pushed forward to the tops of the range of hills which 
 Dound the valley of Liebenau on the north. The next morn- 
 ng General von Home, who with the 8th division held the 
 utposts, had advanced early to occupy Liebenau. As his 
 idvanced guard entered the village, the Austrian rear-guard 
 vere discovered tearing up the pavement, in order to form a 
 )arricade across the narrow street through which the high road 
 uns. On the approach of the advanced guard they retired to 
 he hill over which the road to Tiirnau passes south of the 
 
160 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 village. Here the Austrians took up position ; their artil- 
 lery, placed on the brow of the hill, looked down upon the 
 village of Liebenau, which Home had just occupied, and their 
 cavalry covered the guns. But they were not in force. They 
 had little infantry, and their main strength appeared to be only 
 four regiments of cavalry, with two batteries of horse artillery. 
 Home's division passed through the village, and began to 
 ascend the hill, while General von Hann came down to 
 Liebenau with the Prussian cavalry, and the field artillery took 
 up a position on the hills which bound the Liebenau valley on 
 the north. Thus the guns of the Austrians were on the 
 southern, those of the Prussians on the northern range, which 
 form the valley of Liebenau ; the valley between them is about 
 600 yards wide, and there seemed to be an opportunity for a 
 smart combat. Down in Liebanau, between the opposed 
 batteries, were the wings of Home's divisions, and columns 
 were already issuing from the village, making their way along 
 both the railway and the chanssee, while the skirmishers werej 
 getting among the short spruce firs that clothe the hill beside 
 the road. 
 
 A little before nine o'clock Prince Frederick Charles and his 
 staff came upon the hill where the artillery was placed. It was 
 almost exactly the same hour when a flash of fire, with a heavy 
 puff of white smoke on the Austrian hill, showed that their 
 artillery had opened, and a rifle shell came whistling over the 
 heads of Home's division. The Prussian artillery answered, 
 and for a few minutes the hills echoed with the noise of their 
 rapid discharges ; while the smoke, drifting but slowly on the 
 lazy breeze, hid from sight the opposite guns, though the quick 
 reports and the whistling of the shells told that they were not 
 idle. But the Prussian guns were too numerous, Home's 
 division was pushing up the hill, and the Austrian artillery had 
 to retire. Then the Prussian cavalry pushed forward by the 
 road, and in a short time, eight fine cavalry regiments were 
 formed on the northern edge of the plateau. The Thuringian 
 "Uhlans, the Uhlans of the Prince of Hohenlohe, and the'] 
 dragoons of the Prince of Mecklenburg were extended to the ' 
 left, while the Brandenburg hussars of Ziethen, conspicuous by 8 
 their red uniform, were nearer the road. On the right of the 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 161 
 
 cavalry was the horse artillery, and Prince Frederick Charles, 
 himself a cavalry officer, was in the front. 
 
 The retreat of the Austrians could be traced by the broad 
 paths trampled down in the corn, and every now and then they 
 halted, their artillery came into action, and two or three rounds 
 were fired at the forming lines. When Prince Frederick Charles 
 had completed his dispositions he ordered the advance, and the 
 troops pressed forward. The cavalry and artillery moved on 
 the plateau, while Home's infantry, on the right, made for the 
 Schloss of Sichrow and the woods around it. The cavalry 
 pushed on quickly, and the guns moved well with it, but every 
 now and then halted and came into action. The Austrians, 
 inferior in numbers and already retiring, could not hope to 
 stand against the force thus displayed, and they drew quickly 
 over the plateau, making for the hills of Kositz. Three regi- 
 ments of cavalry were launched after them, and went dashing 
 through the corn, but did not reach the retiring troops before 
 the latter had quitted the plateau, and then the woods and 
 broken ground on the side of the slopes impeded their progress. 
 As soon as the Austrians gained the Kositz hills their artillery 
 opened, and poured shells briskly into the advancing lines, but 
 the gliding motion of the advancing troops and the undulating 
 ground deceived their aim, for only about twenty casualties 
 occurred. When the Prussian guns gained the southern brow 
 of the plateau, they opened on the Austrian batteries \ a smart 
 cannonade ensued, but the Austrians were ultimately silenced. 
 Yet they did well, for they made good their retreat ; but had 
 not the Prussian horse been detained by having to pass through 
 
 e narrow street of Liebenau, the field artillery which that day 
 
 ed into the Prussian ranks would probably have gone as a 
 
 ophy to Berlin. 
 
 It is evident that the Austrian commander had not calcu- 
 ated on the rapid advance of General von Home. His 
 
 ispositions for the defence of the Liebenau position were 
 
 complete ; the street of Liebenau was not rendered imprac- 
 :icable, for the workmen were disturbed by the Prussian ad- 
 vance guard, and in the cutting which the road leading from 
 :he village passes through at the top of the hill leading on to 
 :he plateau, although the trees which stood by the wayside had 
 
i6z SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 been cut down, they were not formed into abattis, nor was the 
 cutting blocked by waggons or any barricade. The Austrians 
 retreated across the Iser, and broke the bridge of Tiirnau, but 
 the Prussians after the combat occupied that town with Home's 
 division, while the main body of the army bivouacked on the 
 plateau, and one division occupied Gablenz, which lies five 
 miles to the north-east. 
 
 On the same day the 14th division, which belonged to the 
 Army of the Elbe, occupied Bohmisch Aicha, and assured free 
 communication between Prince Frederick Charles and General 
 Herwarth von Bittenfeld. 
 
 The plateau that looks down on Liebenau was sadly changed 
 in the course of the day. The corn was trampled down by the 
 feet of horses and the wheels of artillery; dead horses lay 
 dotted here and there over the plain, while large holes in the 
 ground showed where shells had struck and burst. But these 
 marks were not frequent, for the Austrian shells often pene- 
 trated into the earth without bursting, and several were dug out 
 by the soldiers in the afternoon. Nor was the practice of their 
 artillery good. The Ziethen hussars, whose red uniforms drew 
 their fire, were at one time exposed to a heavy cannonade; 
 but though above fifty shells struck the ground around them, 
 not one fell among their ranks, nor at that time had they a man 
 touched. 
 
 The result of the combat of Liebenau was not over-valued in 
 the Prussian army ; the officers on that side did not despise 
 their enemy, and they fully recognised the fact that it was to 
 superior numbers that the Austrians yielded. They had great 
 confidence in their chief and in the needle-gun and their rifled 
 cannon, but they had no vain assurance. They knew that 
 the Austrian army was a good one, and they determined to 
 omit nothing that their skill or science could suggest to let 
 their troops meet it on the best of terms. 
 
 The Austrians retired to Podoll in order to hold that im- 
 portant point, where not only the road to Miinchengratz but 
 also the railway between Tiirnau, Kralup, and Prague crosses 
 the Iser. 
 
 General Home, after the action of Liebenau, pushed forward 
 to the Iser and occupied Tiirnau, the junction of the railway 
 
Chap. II. ] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 163 
 
 from Reichenberg with that to Prague. After a bridge of 
 pontoons had been thrown across the river here in order to 
 replace the one broken by the Austrians, he determined to 
 occupy the bridges of Podoll five miles below Tiirnau. The 
 movement by which he effected this brought on the 
 
 ACTION OF PODOLL. 
 
 The railway and high road which lead down the valley of 
 the Iser from Tiirnau to Miinchengratz run for a distance of 
 about five miles from the former town on the north side of the 
 river, but on reaching the village of Podoll cross to the south 
 bank by two bridges, which are about 200 yards distant from 
 each other, that of the railway being on the right, and that by 
 which the road crosses on the left of a person, looking towards 
 Miinchengratz. The railway bridge is constructed of iron ; 
 that which carries the road across the stream is made of wood, 
 and lies on a level with the causeway, which is raised on an 
 embankment about ten feet above the flat meadows lying 
 alongside it. The Iser is at Podoll near upon 100 yards wide, 
 and runs with a deep but fast stream between steep banks, 
 which only rise about four feet above the level of the water. 
 iBy the side of the road and on the banks of the stream grow 
 large willow-trees, planted at equal distances from each other, 
 and at about ten yards apart. Three roads lead from the 
 : tjplateau of Sichrow to the high road that runs down the valley 
 of the Iser. That on the east, a country road, which leaves 
 ;the plateau near the Schloss of Sichrow and joins the highway 
 aear the village of Swierzin, almost at an equal distance between 
 Tiirnau and Podoll ; in the centre the chaussk from Liebenau 
 strikes into the high road halfway between Swierzin and 
 Iurnau, and the road from Gentschowitz on the west joins it 
 :lose to this town. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 26th, Prince Frederick Charles threw 
 \ light pontoon bridge over the river a little below the broken 
 )ridge of Tiirnau, and occupied the town with a small force 
 without opposition. Part of Home's division marched at the 
 ame time by the country road on the east, occupied the 
 illage of Swierzin, and pushed its advanced guard towards 
 
1 64 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 Podoll. The troops directed on this point consisted of two 
 companies of the 4th Jager battalion, the 2nd and fusilier 
 battalions of the 31st regiment, and the 1st battalion of the 
 71st. The Jagers, who were leading, got to within three- 
 quarters of a mile of Podoll-bridge before they came into 
 collision with Austrian outposts, but here they found the 
 enemy, and a sharp action ensued, for the Austrians had six 
 battalions in the village, and meant to hold the place and cover 
 the passage of the river. 
 
 It was about 8 o'clock, and the dusk of the evening was 
 rapidly closing in, when the Jagers first felt their enemy. On 
 the right-hand side of the road, about half a mile before the 
 bridge, stands the first house of the village. It is a large square 
 farm-house, with windows without glass, but with heavy gratings. 
 The Austrians had occupied it in force, and their outlying 
 pickets, as they retired before the advancing Prussians, formed 
 line across the road beside it. As soon as the Jagers came 
 within sight the garrison of the farmhouse and the formed-up 
 pickets opened a bitter fire upon them. From the grated win- 
 dows and from the line of soldiers in the road there came one 
 rapid volley, which told severely on the Prussian riflemen, but 
 these went quickly to work, and had fired about three times 
 before the Austrians, armed only with muzzle-loading rifles, 
 were able to reply. Then the noise of musketry rose high, 
 occasionally swelling into a heavy roar, but sometimes falling 
 off so that the ear could distinguish the separate reports. But 
 this did not last. Major von Hagen, commanding the 2nd 
 battalion of the 31st, which was following the Jagers on the 
 first sound of the firing, had put his troops into double quick 
 time, and was soon up to reinforce the riflemen. It was now 
 nearly dark, and the flashes of the rifles, the reports of the 
 shots, and the shouts of the combatants were almost the only 
 indications of the positions of the troops ; yet it could be seen | 
 that the rapid fire of the needle-gun was telling on the Austrian 
 line in the road, and the advancing cheers of the Prussians 
 showing that they were gaining ground. Then while the 
 exchange of shots was still proceeding rapidly between the 
 window-gratings of the farm-house and the Prussian firing 
 parties, who had extended into a cornfield on the risrht of the 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 165 
 
 highway, there was a sudden pause in the firing on the road, 
 for the Jagers, supported by the 31st, had made a dash, and 
 were bearing the Austrians back beyond the farm-house to 
 where the cottages of the village closed on each side of the 
 road, and where the defenders had hastily thrown some hewn 
 down willow-trees as a barricade across the way. 
 
 Then the tumult of the fight increased. Darkness had com- 
 pletely closed in, and the moon had not yet risen ; the Prussians 
 pressed up to the barricade, the Austrians stoutly stood their 
 ground behind it, and, three paces distant, assailants and de- 
 fenders poured their fire into each other's breasts. Little could 
 be seen, though the flashes of the discharges cast a fitful light 
 over the surging masses ; but in the pauses of the firing the 
 voices of the officers were heard encouraging their men, and 
 half-stifled shrieks or gurgling cries told that the bullets were 
 truly aimed. This was too severe to endure. The Prussians, 
 firing much more quickly, and in the narrow street, where 
 neither side could show their whole strength, not feeling the 
 inferiority of numbers, succeeded in tearing away the barricade, 
 and slowly pressed their adversaries back along the village 
 street. Yet the Austrians fought bravely, and their plans for 
 the defence of the houses had been skilfully though hastily 
 made ; from every window muskets flashed out fire, and sent 
 bullets into the thick ranks of the advancing Prussians, while on 
 each balcony behind a wooden barricade Jagers crouched to 
 take their deadly aim ; but in the street the soldiers, huddled 
 together and encumbered with clumsy ramrods, were unable to 
 load with ease, and could return no adequate fire to that of the 
 Prussians, while these, from the advantage of a better arm, 
 poured their quick volleys into an almost defenceless 
 crowd. 
 
 As the battle in the street was pushed inch by inch towards 
 the Iser, the Austrians, in every house which the foremost 
 ranks of the Prussians passed, were cut off from their retreat, 
 and were sooner or later made prisoners, for the houses of the 
 village do not join on to each other, but are detached by spaces 
 of a few yards, and there is no communication from one house 
 to the other except by the open street. The whole of the 
 Prussian force was now up, and extending between the houses 
 
166 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 which the first combatants had passed by, cut off the escape of 
 their garrisons, and exchanged shots with the defenders. 
 
 With shrieks and shouts, amid the crashing of broken win- 
 dows, the heavy sounds of falling beams, and the perpetual 
 rattle of the fire-arms, the battle was heavily pressed down the 
 narrow street, and about half-past eleven the moon came up 
 clear and full to show the Austrian rearmost ranks turning 
 viciously to bar the Prussians from the bridge. The moonlight, 
 reflected in the stream, told the assailants that they were near 
 the object of their labour, and showed the Austrians that now 
 or never the enemy must be hurled back. Both sides threw 
 out skirmishers along the river bank, and the moon gave them 
 light to direct their aim across the stream ; while on the first 
 plank of the bridge the Austrians turned to bay, and the Prus- 
 sians pausing some short paces from them, the combatants 
 gazed at each other for a few moments. Then they began a 
 fiercer fight than ever. The discharges were more frequent, 
 and in the narrower way the bullets told with more severe effect 
 Herr von Drygalski, leading the fusilier battalion of the 31st, 
 a lieutenant-colonel of only two days' standing, went down with 
 two bullets in his forehead, and a captain at his side was shot 
 in both legs ; many men fell, and the grey horse of a Prussian 
 field-officer, with a ball in his heart, fell heavily against the 
 wall, kicking amid the ranks; but he was soon quieted for 
 ever, and at that moment men regarded but little such wounds 
 as could be inflicted by an iron-shod hoof, even in the agonies 
 of death. The Austrians stood gallantly, and made an attempt 
 to set fire to the bridge ; but the difference of their armament 
 again told upon them here ; and it is said that, galled by their 
 hard fortune, they charged with the bayonet, but that the 
 Prussians also took kindly to the steel, and this charge caused 
 no change in the fortune of the fight : certain it is that the 
 defenders were ultimately obliged to retire across the bridge. 
 
 While this combat was proceeding slowly along the street, 
 another fight was carried on upon the railway almost with an 
 equal progress, and with an almost similar result. A party of 
 the Austrians fell back from the point where shots were first 
 exchanged, and where the railway crosses the road, along 
 the line. They were pushed by some Prussian detachments, 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 167 
 
 but neither side was here in strong force, and the principal 
 fighting was done upon the road; but here, too, the needle- 
 gun showed its advantage over the old-fashioned weapons of 
 the Austrians, for the latter fell in the proportion of six to one 
 Prussian. The railway bridge was not broken, but the lines 
 were torn up by the retiring troops, and the line was not pas- 
 sable by trains. The Prussians pushed over both bridges after 
 the retreating Austrians ; the latter threw a strong detachment 
 into a large unfinished house, which stood by the chaussee, 
 about a quarter of a mile beyond tire bridge, and again made a 
 stand, but not of long duration ; they had lost many killed, 
 wounded, and prisoners ; many of their officers were dead or 
 taken ; but they stood till they could gather in all the strag- 
 glers who had escaped from the houses of the village, and, 
 harassed by the pursuing Prussians, drew off sullenly by the 
 main road to Miinchengratz. Thus terminated a contest which, 
 fought upon both sides with the greatest vigour and determi- 
 nation, yet resulted in a clear victory for the Prussians ; for, 
 when the last dropping shots ceased, about four o'clock in the 
 morning, there were no Austrian solders within three miles of 
 Podoll-bridge except the wounded and the taken. There was 
 no artillery engaged on either side ; it was purely an infantry 
 action, and the Prussians derived in it great advantage from 
 the superiority of their arms over that of their opponents, not 
 only in the rapidity, but in the direction of their fire, for a man 
 with an arm on the nipple of which he has to place a cap, 
 naturally raises the muzzle in the air, and in the hurry and 
 excitement of action often forgets to lower it, and only sends 
 his bullet over the heads of the opposite ranks, while the 
 soldier armed with a breech-loading musket keeps his muzzle 
 down, and if in haste he fires it off without raising the butt to 
 his shoulder, his shot still takes effect, though often low, and a 
 proof of this is that very many of the Austrian prisoners were 
 wounded in the legs. 
 
 The road to Podoll was next morning crowded with hospital 
 waggons and ambulance cars bringing in the wounded ; every 
 cottage in the way was converted into a temporary hospital, 
 and the little village of Swierzin was entirely filled with stricken 
 men. The sick-bearers, one of the most useful corps which 
 
1 68 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 any arm} 7 possesses, were at work from the very beginning of 
 the action. As the combatants passed on these noble-minded 
 men, regardless of the bullets and careless of personal danger, 
 removed with equal hand both friend and enemy who were left 
 writhing on the road, and carried them carefully to the rear, 
 where the medical officers made no distinction in their care for 
 both Austrian and Prussian. Not only was it those whose 
 special duty is the care of the wounded who alone were doing 
 their best to ease the sufferings of those who had suffered in 
 the combat ; soldiers not on duty might be seen carrying water 
 for prisoners of both sides alike, and gladly affording any com- 
 fort which it was in their power to give to those who overnight 
 had been firing against their own hearts ! Nor is this wonder- 
 ful ; for after the flush of the battle was over, and the din of 
 the musketry had died away, the men of the Prussian army 
 could not forget that one common language linked them to 
 their adversaries, and that, after all, it was probably German 
 blood which, flowing from an Austrian breast, trickled over the 
 white livery of the House of Hapsburg. 
 
 In the village the utmost disorder gave evidence of the se- 
 verity of the contest. Austrian knapsacks, shakos, clothes, 
 and arms were scattered about in wild confusion. Dead horses 
 }ay in the ditches by the roadside. White coats and cloaks, 
 which had been thrown off in the hurry of the fight, lay scat- 
 tered along the road ; the trees which had formed the Austrian 
 barricade were still on the side of the street, and many held a 
 bullet. The cottages had been ransacked of their furniture, 
 and their beams and roof-trees had been torn down to form 
 defences for the doors and windows; while along the street 
 and upon the banks of the river lay objects which in the dis- 
 tance look like bundles of untidy uniform, but which on nearer 
 approach were seen to be the bodies of slain soldiers. Some- 
 times they lay in groups of twos or threes, twisted together as 
 if they had gripped one another in their mortal agony, and 
 sometimes single figures lay on their backs, staring with livid 
 countenance and half-closed hazy eyes, straight up against the 
 hot morning sun. The dark-blue uniform with red facings of 
 Prussia, and the white with light-blue of Austria, laid side by 
 side, but the numbers of the latter much preponderated, and 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. i6g 
 
 on one part of the railway three Prussian corpses opposite 
 nineteen Austrian formed a grisly trophy of the superiority of 
 the needle-gun. 
 
 Close on 500 unwounded Austrian prisoners were next 
 morning marched up to head-quarters, and the Austrian loss 
 in killed and wounded was very considerable. The Prussians 
 lost two officers dead, and seven or eight wounded. The 
 medical officers officially reported that the proportion of 
 wounded Austrians to wounded Prussians was as five to one. 
 Thus the needle-gun told both on the battle-field and in the 
 hospital. 
 
 On the 27th the head-quarters of the First Army halted at 
 the Castle of Sichrow. There had been no skirmishing ; but 
 white smoke curling up from beyond some fir woods beside the 
 Iser told that the bridge of Mohelnitz, about five miles below 
 Podoll, which the Austrians had set on fire to obstruct pursuit, 
 was burning steadily. 
 
 The results of the actions of Liebenau and Podoll were, that 
 two of the important passages of the Iser, those of Tiirnau and 
 Podoll, fell into the hands of the First Prussian Army. That 
 of Miinchengratz still was in the hands of the Austrians, but 
 was soon also to be seized from their grasp. The Army of the 
 Elbe had advanced on the 23rd by Schluckenau, and on the 
 26th the fourteenth division, under the command of General 
 Miindter, had been pushed to Bomisch Aicha in order to feel 
 Prince Frederick Charles's right. 
 
 Count Clam Gallas had only opposed a few hussar regi- 
 ments to the advance of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, so 
 that this general met with no serious opposition in issuing 
 from the mountains. On the 27 th, the day after the night 
 action of Podoll, his eighth corps, which was advancing from 
 Gabel by Niemes, in the direction of Miinchengratz, first fell 
 in with any serious hostile force. The Prussian advanced guard, 
 consisting of two squadrons and two battalions of Scholer's 
 brigade, which, followed by the whole 8th corps, was on the 
 march from Hayda, pushed forward on a reconnaissance as far 
 as Hiihnerwasser. 
 
 The Austrians, bound only to furnish intelligence, and 
 ordered not to engage seriously, retreated, after a slight 
 
170 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 skirmish to Munchengratz, and evacuated the right bank of thc- 
 Iser, thus permitting a full communication to be openec 
 between the Army of the Elbe and that of Prince Frederic! 
 Charles. The two armies were able on the following day tc 
 advance in concert, so as to take possession of the whole line 
 of the Iser. 
 
 Count Clam Gallas, after the skirmish at Hiihnerwasser 
 withdrew the greater part of his force to the left bank of the 
 Iser, occupied Munchengratz in force, and made preparation; 
 for the destruction of the bridge over the river on the west o: 
 the town. The Prussian plan to seize that place brough 
 on the 
 
 ACTION OF MUNCHENGRATZ. 
 
 On the 27th Prince Frederick Charles halted in the positio: 
 of Sichrow, and made his dispositions for his further advance 
 The seventh division had occupied Tiirnau, where the engi 
 neers had quickly thrown a pontoon bridge over the Iser, 
 replace the permanent one, which had been burnt by th 
 retiring Austrian cavalry. The eighth division, under Gene 
 Home, occupied the village and bridge of Podoll ; the sixtr 
 division, under General Manstein, moved forward to thc- 
 support of Home. The main body of the army was on th( 
 plateau of Sichrow, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld 
 after a sharp skirmish, in which he took many prisoners 
 seized Hiihnerwasser. 
 
 The road and railway which lead from Tiirnau to Jum 
 Bunzlau cross the Iser near together at the village of Podoll' 
 and run beside each other on the southern side of the river tc 
 a point about three miles below Munchengratz ; about i 
 quarter of a mile below Podoll the hills which form the 
 plateau of Sichrow, turning southwards, come close to the 
 northern bank of the Iser, and form a chain of heights whicl 
 descend with a steep slope to the water's edge. The hill: 
 which form the southern boundary of the valley of the Ise 
 rise to a height of about 500 feet in the Muskey Berg, which 
 running parallel to the road for a mile of its length from it 
 extremity nearest Podoll, then trends southwards and strike 
 the road from Munchengratz to Unter Bautzen at the villagt 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 
 
 171 
 
 of Bossin. The Muskey Berg presents towards the river on 
 its upper part a rocky, precipitous front ; below this the debris 
 fallen from the rocks has accumulated and formed a slope, 
 
 which, although steep, would, were it not for the precipice 
 above, be still practicable for light infantry. This lower slope 
 is covered with a dense forest of fir trees ; the summit of the 
 hill is in general a flat plateau, clothed with greensward, but 
 near the edge of the precipice fir trees are thickly planted, 
 and form a belt along the summit, with an average breadth of 
 100 paces, while, conspicuous near the place where the hill 
 line turns towards Bossin, stands a high solitary cone rising 
 100 feet above the plateau, bare of trees, but covered with 
 green grass. Opposite this high cone of the Muskey Berg, 
 and close to the river, but still on the southern bank, lies the 
 isolated hill of the Kaczowberg. It is considerably lower than 
 the Muskey Berg range, and is not wooded. Its length is 
 about 500 yards, and its longitudinal direction is at right 
 angles to that of the stream. The distance between the 
 
172 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 summits of the Muskey Berg and the Kaczowberg is about 
 two miles, and through the valley between these two hills run 
 the road and railway from Podoll to Miinchengratz. Between 
 these hills the valley is a dead flat plain. It was at the time of 
 the action richly cultivated, intersected by rows of fruit trees, 
 and covered with wheat, barley, clover, and potato patches. 
 No hedges divided the different farms, but brooks and ditches 
 made the ground very difficult for the action of cavalry. Look- 
 ing from the bridge of Podoll along the valley towards Miin- 
 chengratz, the Muskey Berg lies to the left front, the Kaczow- 
 berg to the right front ; between them are seen in the distance 
 the Schloss and spires of the town, but further view is stopped 
 by a low range of elevations, topped by dwarf plantations, 
 which lie between the roads from Miinchengratz to Fiirsten- 
 briick, and from Miinchengratz to Jung Bunzlau, and runs 
 from the village of Bossin to that of Wessely. 
 
 The Austrians had thrown up a redoubt and a battery for 
 eight guns on the Kaczowberg; the latter would have enfi- 
 laded the Podoll road, but no guns were in it, for the Prussian 
 advance had been rapid, and there was not time to arm the 
 work. Still, it was expected that the enemy would stand here, 
 and the Prussian commander advanced prepared to fight He 
 intended to strike for no meagre victory. He formed a plan 
 by which to capture the whole opposing force; but, though 
 skilfully designed and punctually executed, his adversary did 
 not stand quite long enough to allow of its complete develop- 
 ment, for the Austrian commander sacrificed his position and 
 the town of Miinchengratz, after a sharp combat, but without 
 a regular battle. 
 
 The Prussian leader calculated that if he made a demonstra- 
 tion of a careless march towards Miinchengratz by the high 
 road and railway, the Austrians who might be on the Muskey 
 Berg would lie there quiet till the heads of his columns had 
 passed their position, in order that their artillery might take 
 the marching troops in reverse, and that he might himself in 
 the meantime turn their position. By the same bait he also 
 hoped to hold his adversaries on the Kaczowberg until their 
 retreat was cut off. To effect this double object the 7th 
 division was to move from Tiirnau by a road on the south side 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 173 
 
 of the Iser, which at the village of Wschen crosses the road 
 
 from Podoll to Sobotka, at Zdiar. It was then to take the 
 
 Austrians on the Muskey Berg in rear, for this hill slopes 
 
 gently on its reverse side towards a rivulet which forms the 
 
 little lake of Zdiar. The division was afterwards to push on 
 
 over the hill and strike the road from Miinchengratz to Fiir- 
 
 . stenbriick, between the village of Bossin and the former place. 
 
 On the right bank of the river General Herwarth was to 
 
 advance from Hiihnerwasser on Miinchengratz, cross the Iser, 
 
 , and occupy the town, throwing out at the same time the 
 
 i fourteenth division to his left, which by Mohelnitz and Lauke- 
 
 \ witz should take in reverse the defenders of the Kaczowberg. 
 
 The divisions of Home and Manstein were to push down 
 
 : the main road from Podoll, while strong reserves closed 
 
 i down to Podoll. A division of infantry was to cross at 
 
 Hubelow and attack the Kaczowberg in front, while a division 
 
 i of cavalry kept the communications open between the divisions 
 
 on the right bank of the river. A strong division of cavalry 
 
 was also sent from Tiirnau to scour the country towards Jicin, 
 
 in the direction of Josephstadt. 
 
 About eight o'clock on the morning of the 28th, Prince 
 . Frederick Charles, with General von Voigt-Rhetz, his chief of 
 j the staff, and General Stiilpnagel, his Quartermaster-General, 
 ! came down to the bridge of Podoll, and almost immediately 
 the Jagers, who formed the advance guard of Home's division, 
 . crossed the bridge, but not before an opening cannonade in 
 ; the direction of Miinchengratz told that Bittenfeld was already 
 engaged. On a hill upon the northern bank there was a con- 
 venient spot from which to see the whole theatre of the 
 combat, and here the Prussian staff went to watch the course 
 of the action. 
 
 There was not a cloud upon the sky, and the sun poured down 
 a tremendous heat ; thick clouds of dust rose from the columns 
 on the road, but this line was only followed by the artillery, the 
 ! train, and the main body of the regiment. As the Jagers 
 passed the bridge they threw out skirmishers to the right and 
 left, who went in a long wavy line pushing through the stand- 
 ing corn. The cavalry scouts clustered thickly on the flanks 
 of the skirmishers, and horsemen in more solid formation 
 
174 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 followed in their rear. It was a fine sight ; the long line of 
 rifles extending almost across the valley, felt carefully through 
 the crops. The Uhlans, with their tall lances and fantastic 
 pennants, hovered about the flank, and the heavy masses on 
 the road pushed on steadily behind the centre of the light troops. 
 But attention was called towards Miinchengratz, where the 
 progress of Bittenfeld's attack could be traced by the puffs of 
 white smoke which rose from the discharges of the artillery. 
 The Prussian cannonade was seen to be slowly advancing, and 
 that of the Austrian to be retiring, while a heavy cloud of black 
 smoke rising close beside the town showed that the Austrians i 
 had retired from the right bank of the river and had burnt the 
 bridge. For a short time the fight was stationary, but in about 
 a quarter of an hour a bright flash of flame and a much heavier 
 smoke rising from the Austrian line told that an ammunition 
 waggon had exploded. Their battery then ceased firing, and 
 rapidly retired, while a quick advance of the Prussian can- 
 nonade showed that Bittenfeld's pioneers had quickly thrown 
 their bridge, and that his corps was across the Iser. But the 
 Austrians did not go far, for in a short time they were again 
 in action in the direction of the Jung Bunzlau road, and one 
 battery was drawing off towards Fiirstenbriick. It then seemed 
 that Bittenfeld had halted ; the cannonade ceased in this direc- 
 tion. The view of the Muskey Berg from the position occupied 
 by the staff is extremely beautiful, but it was not the sandstone 
 cliffs of the opposite mountain, nor even the advancing 
 Prussians in the plain, that General Voigt-Rhetz, the chief of 
 Prince Frederick Charles's staff, was so carefully scanning with 
 his glass, — he saw a group on the highest point of the cone of 
 the Muskey Berg which looked like a general's staff, and he 
 smiled quietly as he saw his adversaries getting entangled in 
 the toils which had been so carefully woven for them. The 
 heads of the Prussian columns were some way past the hill, 
 and were pushing steadily towards Miinchengratz, when the 
 well-known puff of smoke rising from the dark firs on the 
 Muskey Berg plateau showed that the Austrians had opened 
 fire upon them. The battery on the hill did not appear to be 
 of more than four guns, and at first they fired slowly, nor did 
 they do much execution. Their shells, projected from so great 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 175 
 
 a height, went straight into the ground, and did not ricochet 
 among the troops ; but they were well aimed, and in most 
 cases burst at the proper moment, and every now and then a 
 man went down. As soon as the Austrian guns opened fire 
 the troops in the road were turned into the fields, and moved 
 on in open order ; the train waggons were also hurried on to 
 the softer ground, and halted separately where best concealed. 
 Four Prussian batteries quickly opened fire, but the Austrian 
 guns stood high, and the height of the hill deceived their aim ; 
 at first their shells fell short, but soon they got the range ; still 
 the fir-trees and rocks protected the Austrian gunners, and the 
 batteries in the plain seemed to do little execution. 
 
 Orders were soon sent to them to cease firing, for the enemy's 
 iguns did not much harass the marching troops, and other 
 means were taken for clearing the hill. A squadron of Uhlans 
 was directed to pass close along the foot of the Muskey Berg, 
 so that the guns on the plateau could not be depressed suffi- 
 ciently to hurt them, and were to gain a steep path which leads 
 to the summit between the highest point and Bossin, while an 
 infantry brigade was to support the movement ; but before this 
 plan could be carried into execution the seventh division was 
 heard engaged on the reverse side, and the Austrian battery 
 quickly limbered up and retired. The guns were not inter- 
 cepted by the seventh division, but here General Franzecky 
 made 600 prisoners from the infantry which was on the hill to 
 support the battery. While the seventh division was still 
 engaged behind the Muskey Berg, four Austrian guns appeared 
 on the summit of the hill, between Bossin and Wessely, and 
 opened fire against the Prussian columns, who were now again 
 idvancing over the plain. But Franzecky was pushing towards 
 "hem, and his artillery threatened to enfilade them, so that they 
 ioon had to retire. The seventh division then struck the road 
 Detween Munchengratz and Bossin, and attacked the latter 
 tillage. Bittenfeld had already pushed towards it from Miin- 
 phengratz, and supported this attack. The first round of 
 Franzecky's artillery set fire to a house, which began to burn 
 iercely, and the flames were soon communicated to the next, 
 or most of the cottages in this country are built of wood, 
 vhich, dried in the hot summer sun, readily takes fire. After 
 
1 76 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 
 
 a sharp skirmish the Austrians were driven from the village and 
 retired in the direction of Fiirstenbriick, and they left here 200 
 prisoners, and General Herwarth von Bittenfeld had already- 
 captured 200. The Austrian soldiers who had been taken 
 chiefly belonged to Italian regiments, and showed no disposi- 
 tion to fight ; twenty-five of them in one mass laid down their 
 arms to Lieutenant von Biilow, who, being one of Prince 
 Frederick Charles's aides-de-camp, was returning from deliver- 
 ing an order, and saw these men separated from their regiment. 
 He collected about half-a-dozen train soldiers and rode up to 
 them, when they surrendered without offering any resistance. 
 
 The Austrians made no attempt to hold the Kaczowberg. i 
 The only points they attempted to defend were the Muskey 
 Berg, Miinchengratz, and the village of Bossin. They lost at 
 least a thousand prisoners, and about three hundred killed and 
 wounded. 
 
 With the occupation of the village of Bossin ended the J 
 combat of Miinchengratz, in which by a series of strategical 
 movements, with little fighting, and slight loss — for the Prus- 
 sian killed, wounded, and missing did not number too— 
 Prince Frederick Charles gained about twelve miles of country, ;i 
 and took 1,000 prisoners, turned the strong position of the 
 Kaczowberg, and effected his secure junction with the corps 
 of General Bittenfeld. 
 
 The head-quarters of the Army of the Elbe and of the 
 First Army were established at Miinchengratz. The majority 
 of the inhabitants had fled from the town ; the army had 
 outmarched its provision trains, and there was nothing to be; ^ 
 bought in the place. On account of actual necessity the 
 soldiers were allowed to take what eatables they could find in 
 the place, but little had been left, for the Austrian army was 
 there the night before, and their commissariat appears to have 
 been as miserably corrupt as it was in the Italian campaign. 
 The prisoners reported that they had had nothing to eat for 
 two days, arid begged for a morsel of bread ; but the Prussian 
 army was hard set itself for provisions, and there was but 
 little to give away. Nor were the Austrian hospital arrange- 
 ments such as they ought to have been. Twenty-six wounded 
 men were found here when the Prussians marched in, lying in 
 
 t 
 
Chai\ II.] PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 177 
 
 a. cottage on a floor covered with blood, un tended, with their 
 wounds undressed, and saying that they had had no nourish- 
 ment for forty-eight hours ; no surgeon had remained with 
 them, nor was their condition reported to the Prussian com- 
 nander ; fortunately they were discovered accidentally by a 
 Prussian staff officer. Hospital necessaries were scarce, but 
 Prussian medical men were sent to attend them, and applica- 
 tion was made to the magistracy of Miinchengratz to supply 
 dnen with which to dress their wounds. These are reported 
 '.o have refused to assist in alleviating the sufferings of their 
 ellow-countrymen, who were shot down in defending the very 
 )assage to their own town, till Count Stohlberg, a Prussian 
 fficer of Cuirassiers, roused by their barbarity, drew his sword 
 >n the Burgomaster, and threatened him with death unless the 
 rants of the wounded men were attended to, when the 
 tecessary materials came forth. The Prussian troops were 
 ery weary. They had marched and fought that day (the 
 8th) over a long distance and in a heavy country. There 
 'as little water away from the river, and the soldiers had 
 nffered much from thirst; but they marched nobly. Few 
 tragglers were ever seen, except those who had fallen fainting 
 ut of the ranks, and were lying half stupified by the roadside ; 
 ut none lay long without succour, for the Krankentrciger, or 
 ck-bearers, hovered with their water-bottles round the flanks 
 rid in the rear of the marching as well as of the fighting 
 attalions, and gave a willing aid to all that needed it. 
 The army of Prince Frederick Charles was now concen- 
 ated round Miinchengratz ; two divisions were near or in 
 'ossin : a large force covered the left at Zehrow and south of 
 ' iirnau, and threw its outposts towards Sobotka. The force 
 [ . front of Prince Frederick Charles was the Austrian first 
 [ )rps d'armee, the brigade Kalik, which had lately returned 
 lorn Holstein, and the cavalry division of General Edelsheim. 
 
 these the Saxon army was joined, and the whole allied 
 ;*. rce was under the command ot Prince Albert, Crown Prince 
 I' Saxony. 
 
 I By the actions of Liebenau, Hiihnerwasser, Podoll, and 
 
 1 iinchengratz, the whole line of the Iser was won by the 
 russians, and a great strategical advantage gained. The 
 
i 7 8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 distance from the Second Army which had on the 27th com- 
 menced its advance from Silesia, was still, however, great; for 
 from thirty to thirty-five miles lay between the left wing of 
 Prince Frederick Charles and the extreme right wing of the 
 Crown Prince : difficulties still existed which had to be over- 
 come before the junction of the two armies could be effected. 
 Count Clam Gallas, on being driven from the line of the Iser, j 
 retired to Gitschin, and there took up a defensive position.) 
 Before tracing the means which Prince Frederick Charles | 
 adopted to dislodge him from this point, it is desirable to castj 
 a glance over the preceding actions. 
 
 The actions of Liebenau and Hiihnerwasser were fought by 
 the Austrians merely as reconnaissances, and may be passed; 
 over in silence. But why did Count Clam Gallas neglect to 
 defend Tiirnau at all, and hold Podoll with only a single; 
 brigade? It was undoubtedly his object to hold the line of 
 the Iser and to there check his enemy for as long a time as ; 
 possible. Miinchengratz is, at the most, but twelve miles' 
 distant from Tiirnau ; he had 60.000 men at his disposal, and) 
 could therefore have well held the whole line had he throwr 
 up the necessary intrenchments. It seems, however, that the: 
 Austrian general committed the great error of despising his! 
 enemy. Had he ranged part of his army on the plateau 
 south of Tiirnau and Podoll, broken the bridges at these: 
 places, and thrown up earthworks to impede the passage o:i 
 the river, and at the same time collected the other part or hi*! 
 force at Miinchengratz, and there made similar defensive pre! 
 parations, the line of the Iser might, indeed, still have beer 
 forced by the Prussians, but only by the employment of ther 
 whole strength ; and, probably, only after the lapse of ; 
 considerable amount of time. Had it been forced, th< 
 Austrian retreat from both points to Sobotka would havi 
 been secure. Had it not, the Prussians would have beer 
 compelled to seek for a passage further to the north a 
 Eisenbrod or Semil, and to have made a flank march in ; 
 country which in that direction is broken into ravines an<; 
 hollows by the spurs of the Giant Mountains. It might b 
 urged against such dispositions that by breaking the bridge 
 Count Clam Gallas would have deprived himself of all chanc 
 
Chap. II. J PASSAGE OF THE FIRST ARMY. 179 
 
 of assuming the offensive in case of a favourable opportunity. 
 His duty and object, however, was not to crush but to detain 
 Prince Frederick Charles : the defeat of the Prussian First 
 Army was to have been effected by the arrival of Feldzeug- 
 meister Benedek himself with overwhelming forces, before or 
 after having disposed of the Crown Prince. 
 
 The Austrian position on the Muskey Berg was tactically 
 strong, but strategically weak. By the surrender of Tiirnau, 
 Count Clam Gallas exposed the right flank of that position, 
 and allowed his retreat to Gitschin to be threatened. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 ACTION OF GITSCHIN. 
 
 The fourth Prussian corps, consisting of the seventh and 
 eighth divisions, had been sharply engaged at Podoll and! 
 Miinchengratz, and was allowed to halt at the latter place on: 
 the 29th June. That evening it marched as the reserve of the; 
 First Army, which moved from the Iser towards Gitschin byj 
 three roads — the left from Tiirnau by Rowensko, the centre! 
 from Podoll by Sobotka, the right from Miinchengratz byj 
 Ober Bautzen on Sobotka, while the Army of the Elbe moved! 
 on the right wing of the First Army by Unter Bautzen andj 
 Libau. 
 
 On the evening of the 28th, the fifth division was pushed 
 forward from Tiirnau as far as Rowensko, on the road to, 
 Gitschin, where it halted for the night, with the sixth division 
 a short distance in rear of it. The same evening the third- 
 division, with the fourth in rear, was pushed to Zehrow, on the 
 road from Podoll to Sobotka ; and its advanced guard, con-; 
 sistiiig of the 14th regiment and two companies of the second 
 Jager battalion, in the course of the night occupied the defile 
 of Podkost, after a sharp skirmish. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 29th, the fifth division broke up 
 from Rowensko at two o'clock, and advanced towards Gitschin 
 The third division, which had a longer march before it, lef 
 Zehrow for the same place at mid-day. 
 
 The distance from Tiirnau to Gitschin is about fifteen miles 
 from Miinchengratz to the same town about twenty miles; anc 
 Podoll to Podkost about six miles. 
 
 Four roads lead from the town of Gitschin, almost toward:; j 
 the four points of the compass ; that of the north to Tiirnau 1 
 
Chap. III.] ACTION OF CITSCWX. 1S1 
 
 of the west to Sobotka, of the south to Kosteltz, and of the 
 east, but bending southwards, to Horitz. From the Kosteltz 
 road to the Tiirnau road runs, about three miles' distance from 
 Gitschin, a semicircular range of steep broken hills ; on their 
 slopes and summits spruce and silver firs grow in thick woods 
 which occasionally reach down into the cultivated ground. 
 Here and there upon these hills are patches of corn or clover 
 land, while at various intervals there are little villages, which 
 generally consist of ten or twelve large wooden cottages 
 separated from each other, and standing in orchards. Near 
 the foot of the range of hills the ground is much broken up 
 by shallow ravines and gullies. 
 
 The Austrian first corps and the Saxons held an excellent 
 position along this range of hills, the right flank of which 
 rested on Eisenstadt, and the left on the Anna Berg, a pro- 
 minent elevation on the south side of the Sobotka road. In 
 the centre were the heights of Brada, which had been strength- 
 ened. The reserve was drawn up between these hills and the 
 town of Gitschin. 
 
 Where the road from Sobotka passes through the hills they 
 
 dip down so as to form a narrow pass, and the fir forests on 
 
 each side run down close to the road. On the Sobotka side 
 
 ;of the woods there is a ravine about ioo feet deep, but with 
 
 banks not so steep but that the road can descend and ascend 
 
 them in a direct line. A quarter of a mile from this ravine, 
 
 and nearer Gitschin, the road drops again into a similar 
 
 hollow, but here the forest has retired from the side of the 
 
 tkaussee, and the ground is covered with standing crops, among 
 
 which fruit trees are thickly studded. At about the same 
 
 distance further on towards the town, a third break in the 
 
 ground causes another sharp undulation of the roadway. On 
 
 he Gitschin side of this hollow ground, partly on the bank, 
 
 nut more on the brow of the slope, and on the more level 
 
 country beyond, stands the little village of Lochow, forming 
 
 i clump of houses with low walls, but having high thatched 
 
 oofs, which just rise above the tops of the orchard trees that 
 
 :luster closely among and around the cottages. A quarter of 
 
 . mile beyond the village lies the last break in the ground, for 
 
 •eyond this a flat plain stretches to the little river which, 
 
1 82 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 passing the town of Gitschin on its Lochow side, falls into the 
 Iser near Tiirnau. This last ravine is rather deeper and wider ! 
 than the others ; at the bottom there is a rivulet, which the i 
 road, after descending the Lochow bank, crosses by a low 
 stone bridge, and then runs straight up the opposite side of the i 
 nullah, as it might be termed in Indian phrase, to gain the j 
 level plain. 
 
 The 2nd corps of General von Schmitt, which marched from 
 the neighbourhood of Podoll, struck at Sobotka the road from 
 Munchengratz to Gitschin. General von Schmitt there changed: 
 the direction of his march to the left, and advanced towards; 
 Gitschin. He moved with his two divisions at some distance! 
 apart ; that of General von Werder, or the 3rd division, led; 
 the way. Von Werder's advanced guard consisted of the 2nd : 
 battalion of Jagers and the 3rd battalion of the 42nd regiment; 
 In the rear of these followed the three battalions of ther 
 regiment of the late King of Prussia (the 2nd), the two 
 remaining battalions of the 42nd, and one battalion of the' 
 14th regiment, with one six-pounder and two four-poundeii 
 field batteries. 
 
 A strong Austrian force held the wood behind the firsl 
 ravine, with its sharp-shooters behind the trunks of the fir-trees 
 with the view of compensating for the inferiority of their rifle 
 to the Prussian needle-gun. Behind each marksman twc 
 soldiers were placed, whose only duty was to load their rifle, 
 and hand them to the picked men to whom the firing waj 
 entrusted. The Austrian artillery was placed behind the wood, 
 so that it could bring a cross-fire on the opening in fron 
 through which the chaussee passes, and strike heavily on th ( ji 
 Sobotka bank of the ravine and the open country beyond. A 
 the Prussian advanced guard approached the ravine, th 
 Austrian batteries opened fire upon them, and the marksme 
 from behind the trees also soon commenced a biting fire. Th 
 Jagers and the men of the 42nd quickly spread out as ski 
 mishers, and, regardless of the withering fire to which the. 
 themselves were exposed, showered bullets from their quickl 
 loaded arms against the defenders of the wood, while some <• il 
 their artillery, quickly brought into action, tried to silence tljd 
 Austrian guns. But the fight was unequal, the sharpshoote 
 
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCHIN. 1S3 
 
 behind the trees could rarely be seen, and the fire of the 
 Prussians did not tell much upon their concealed enemies; 
 nor were their guns in sufficient force to engage successfully 
 the more numerous Austrian pieces. The Jagers from among 
 the trees were aiming well ; the men of the 42nd were falling 
 fast, and it seemed that the defenders would be able to hold 
 the wood. But the rest of the Prussian division was coming 
 up ; more artillery was already in action ; and the Austrian 
 
 , gunners began to fire with less effect. The regiment of the 
 King of Prussia soon arrived. The Prussian soldiers, unable 
 to make much impression with their fire on the riflemen in the 
 trees, were already anxious to come to close quarters, and then 
 General von Werder sent his men forward to take the woods 
 with the bayonet. They were carried, but not without loss, 
 for the Austrians retired from tree to tree, and only when 
 
 . pressed beyond the last skirt of the wood retired under cover 
 of their guns and reserves to take up a position on the further 
 brow of the next ravine. The musketry fire recommenced. 
 The opponents stood on either bank of the hollow, and poured 
 volley after volley into each other's ranks, while the artillery, 
 from positions on the flanks of both lines, sent their shells 
 truly among their adversary's infantry. But here the needle- 
 gun had more success, for the Austrians stood up clear against 
 the sky, and soon the white uniforms began to go down 
 quickly. No troops so ill-armed could have stood before the 
 murderous fire which the Prussians directed against the opposite 
 line. The Austrians did all that men could do ; but, after 
 losing fearfully, were obliged to fall back, and take up their 
 third position in the village of Lochow, and on the Anna Berg. 
 The 42nd regiment and the second Jager battalion were sent 
 against the Anna Berg, while the 2nd and the 14th attacked the 
 village. 
 
 It was now about seven o'clock in the evening ; the combat 
 had already lasted almost two hours, but here it was renewed 
 more fiercely than ever. The Prussians, encouraged by their 
 success — brave soldiers and bravely led — eagerly came to the 
 attack. With hearts as big, and with officers as devoted, the 
 Austrians stood with a desperate calmness to receive them. On 
 both sides the fighting was hard; but at any distance the 
 
184 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. i 
 
 Austrian rifle had no chance against the needle-gun, and at ! 
 close quarters the boyish soldiers of the Kaiser could not cope 
 with the broad-shouldered men of Pomerania, who form the! 
 corps d'arme'e, one division of which was here engaged. Yet 
 for three-quarters of an hour the little village of Lochow was 
 held, and the continuous rattle of the rifles and the heavy- 
 cannonade of the guns remaining almost stationary told the 
 determination of the assault and the stoutness of the defence. 
 But the Austrian s were slowly forced from house to house and 
 from orchard to orchard, and had to retreat to their last 
 vantage ground on the top of the Gitschin bank of the fourth, 
 ravine. 
 
 And here both sides re-engaged in the fight with the utmost 
 fury. The defenders felt that this was their last standing point, 
 and on its maintenance depended the possession of Gitschin; 
 the assailants knew that success here would almost certainly; 
 bring them to the object of all their exertions. The Prussian; 
 line soon formed on the top of the opposite bank to that held; 
 by the Austrians, and then began to fire rapidly against the] 
 brow where the Austrians stood. The latter returned the fireJ 
 but from necessity more slowly; still their guns smote tha 
 Prussian troops heavily, and the shells bursting in front of the 
 assailants' line, caused many casualties. But the Pomeranians 
 were highly excited, and it is said that a heavy mass of the: 
 Prussians dashed down the road and rushed up the opposite 
 slope with their rifles at the charge. A fierce struggle ensued. 
 The strong men of Pomerania pressed hard against theii 
 lighter opponents, and pushed them beyond the brow of the ; 
 slope on to the level plain ; yet the lithe and active Austrians' 
 fought hard, and strove to drive their bayonets into the faces* 
 of their taller antagonists; but strength and weight told, foi 
 their more powerful adversaries urged them back foot by foot 
 till a gap was clearly opened in the defenders' line. The 
 musketry bullets had also told sharply on the Saxons and 
 Austrians, and they were obliged to retire. They drew of 
 across the plain towards Gitschin, but not in rout ; slowly anc 
 sullenly the Saxon rear-guard drew back, suffering awful loss id - 
 the open plain, where the needle-gun had a fair range ; bu* 
 they fought for every yard of ground, ever turning to senc 
 
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCHIN. 185 
 
 among the advancing Prussians shots which were often truly 
 aimed, but which formed no sufficient return for the showers of 
 bullets which were rained upon themselves. For long the 
 plain was the scene of the advancing combat, and it was not 
 until near midnight that General von Werder occupied Gitschin. 
 In the town the Austrians did not stand; they held some 
 houses at the entrance for a short time, but these were carried, 
 and then they retired rapidly towards the south. In their 
 haste they left their hospitals, and here, as in Lochow, Von 
 Werder's division took a large number of prisoners. 
 
 But this was not the only combat that evening. On the 
 
 northern side of Gitschin the Austrian position extended 
 
 beyond the Tiirnau road, to cover the town against the 
 
 Prussians advancing from the direction of Tiirnau. The range 
 
 of hills which runs round the north-western side of Gitschin 
 
 drops with a steep slope down to the Tiirnau road, near the 
 
 village of Brada, and sends out a much lower prolongation of 
 
 I the range which runs at right angles to the direction of the 
 
 j road, and beyond it, as far as the river that passes by Gitschin 
 
 i and joins the Iser near Tiirnau. Over this lower spur the road 
 
 runs, and on its summit lies on the Prussian right of the road, 
 
 \ and close to it, the village of Podultz; while further to the 
 
 j right and on the top of the high hills is the village of Brada, 
 
 \ standing about 300 yards further southwards than Podultz. 
 
 The 5 th division, under General Tiimpling, on the afternoon 
 
 of the 29th, advanced from Rowensko, and about half-past four 
 
 o'clock came within 2,000 yards of the village of Podultz. His 
 
 division consisted of the 8th, 12th, 18th, and 48th regiments, 
 
 with four batteries of artillery. As the Prussians advanced 
 
 they saw the village of Podultz close to the road, and on their 
 
 right, standing on the top of the gentle ascent by which the 
 
 road rises to the top of the lower spur, on the other side of the 
 
 road, and about three hundred yards from it nearer to the 
 
 advancing division by two hundred yards than Podultz, the 
 
 village of Diletz lying in the plain ; while high on their right 
 
 they could see the chimneys of Brada above the thick fir wood 
 
 which, lying on the hill side, in front of that village, runs down 
 
 nearly to Podultz, and trace by the different colour of the 
 
 foliage the ground occupied by its orchards. 
 
i86 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book V. 
 
 The three villages and the fir wood were held by Austrian 
 and Saxon troops, supported by seven batteries of artillery, 
 which were placed both on the spur and on Brada hill, while 
 behind the spur were hidden three of Austria's finest cavalry 
 regiments — the hussars of Radetzky, of Lichtenstein, and of the 
 Austrian regiment of the King of Prussia. In front of the 
 village of Brada and of the fir wood an abattis was constructed j 
 which ran down the steep slope nearly as far as Podultz. As 
 soon as the Prussians came within range the Austrian batteries i 
 opened upon them ; the Prussian guns replied, and under the j 
 cover of their artillery the columns advanced to the attack of! 
 the position. The 8th and 48th regiments advanced against the i 
 village of Diletz, which was garrisoned by the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and' 
 4th Saxon battalions, and where, as the prisoners reported, the- 
 Crown Prince of Saxony himself took part in the fight. The : 
 Fusilier battalion of the 48th engaged the garrison of the! 
 village, while the rest of the regiment with the 8th turned 1 
 towards Eisenstadt, but were sharply attacked by an Austrian 1 
 column, and driven back to Zames. Both columns were' 
 exposed to a very hot fire. After a severe struggle both 
 villages were carried, though that of Podultz, set on fire by a' 
 shell, was burning when the Prussians occupied it. Then! 
 General Edelsheim, who commanded the Austrian cavalry, 
 with a desperate valour attacked the burning village, but the 
 horses would not face the flames, and the Prussian infantry, 
 from behind the blazing houses fired on the disordered squad-' 
 rons and killed many troopers. After taking Podultz the 12th 
 and 1 8th regiments pushed past Brada, leaving it to their right,: 
 and made for the Lochow road, in order to cut off the retreat, 
 of the Austrian s, who were retiring from Lochow on Gitschin.. 
 The Austrian cavalry charged the advancing Prussians, but the 
 latter received them without forming square, and the horsemen 
 recoiled broken by their steady fire. The Austrian troops irjl 
 Brada and the Saxons and Austrians in Diletz were quite 
 separated by the capture of the village of Podultz, and thd 
 former were almost entirely taken ; the latter were cut off fron, 
 retreat in large numbers, for Von Werder was pressing toward:j 
 Gitschin, the roads were crowded, and the little river forme< 
 on the right of the broken allies a wide extent of marshy ground 
 
Chap. III.] ACTION OF GITSCHIN. 187 
 
 which it was almost impossible to cross. The loss of the 
 Saxons between Diletz and Gitschin was tremendous ; they 
 fell thickly, and the ground was covered with corpses. The 
 Prussians suffered much, but they fought most bravely, and, 
 with only four regiments and half as many guns as their 
 opponents, carried a very strong position held by a much 
 superior force; for the Prussians had in the field but 16,000 
 men, and the allied strength in the first line was estimated at 
 30,000. Under a crushing fire they advanced to the attack 
 of Podultz and Diletz, and the vacancies in the muster-roll show 
 how fearfully they suffered; but every man who fell on the 
 Prussian side was trebly avenged, and a long broad track of 
 fallen enemies marked the line of march of the four regiments 
 who fought near Diletz. But though the Austrian position was 
 strong, it was badly occupied. The troops on the hill of Brada 
 seem to have been so enclosed in their defensive works that 
 they could make no counter attack on the Prussian columns 
 engaged at Podultz, nor could they attack in flank the 12 th 
 and 1 8th regiments as they passed. Many officers fell on both 
 sides. General Tiimpling, who commanded the Prussian 
 division, was wounded, fortunately not severely. 
 
 The field of Diletz was thickly strewn with killed and 
 wounded. Here the Prussians lay more thickly than at 
 Lochow, for the more numerous artillery of the defenders 
 ploughed with terrible effect through the dense columns of the 
 assailants as they advanced to the attack. But between Diletz 
 and Gitschin the ground was covered with broken arms, knap- 
 sacks, shakos, and fallen men, who were mostly either Saxons 
 or Austrian s, for here the needle-gun was more used than 
 artillery. 
 
 The Prussians took about 7,000 prisoners in the two combats, 
 many officers, and the Austrian loss in killed and wounded was 
 about 3,000, so that the actions of that evening withdrew 
 10,000 soldiers from under the Austrian colours. 
 
 The Prussian head-quarters were moved to Gitschin. The 
 town had been almost entirely deserted by the inhabitants, the 
 streets were filled with military carriages and marching troops, 
 while a Prussian garrison bivouacked under the colonnade 
 which runs all round the market-place. 
 
188 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book V. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 30th, the strategic object of the 
 movements of the two Prussian armies was achieved, for com- 
 munications were opened in Bohemia between Prince Frederick 
 Charles and the Crown Prince. A regiment of dragoons sent 
 from Gitschin that day to feel for the Second Army found the 
 advanced troops of the Crown Prince at Arnau, and sent back 
 intelligence that he had secured the passages of the Upper 
 Elbe at Arnau and Koniginhof. The Ziethen regiment of 
 hussars in the front defeated an Austrian regiment, and cap- 
 tured a convoy of about fifty waggons on the same day. 
 
 Count Clam Gallas sent to Benedek to announce the defeat 
 of his force at Gitschin, his incapability of any longer holding 
 the First Prussian Army in check, and that he was retreating 
 hastily on Koniggratz. This report reached the Austrian com- 
 mander-in-chief early on the morning of the 30th, and had an 
 important effect on the dispositions which he was making 
 against the army of the Crown Prince. It is now necessary 
 to trace the course by which the Second Army gained the posi- 
 tion in which its outposts were found by the cavalry of Prince 
 Frederick Charles on the 30th June. 
 
 
BOOK VI. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 The First Army and the Army of the Elbe, united under the 
 command of Prince Frederick Charles, on the 30th June, 
 opened communication in Bohemia with the Second Army, 
 which had marched through the mountains from Prussian 
 Silesia, under the command of the Crown Prince of Prussia. 
 It is necessary now to follow the steps by which the Crown 
 Prince brought his army successfully through the passes of the 
 Sudetic Hills. 
 
 The Crown Prince had been appointed Commander-in-chief 
 of the Second Army on the 19th May, and on the 2nd June was 
 also named Military Governor of Prussian Silesia. On the 4th 
 June he moved his head-quarters from Berlin to that province. 
 The Second Army consisted of the corps of the Guards, and the 
 first, fifth, and sixth corps d'arme'e of the Line. 
 
 When the Crown Prince assumed the command in Silesia, he 
 fixed his head-quarters at the Castle of Fiirstenstein. At 
 this time the fifth corps lay round Landshut, the sixth round 
 Waldenburg, the cavalry division round Striegau, and the first 
 corps, which was on the line of march from Gorlitz, was moving 
 to Hirschberg and Schonau. The independent corps, under 
 General Knobelsdorf and Count Stolberg,* had pushed detach- 
 ments close up to the Austrian frontier. The fortresses ofGlatz, 
 Neisse, Cosel, and Glogau were armed, and new fortifications 
 were thrown up round Schweidnitz. 
 
 * See page 144. 
 
190 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 As has been already noticed, the Army of Silesia in the 
 course of the second week of June, in order to deceive the 
 Austrian commander, and to secure the safety of Prussian ; 
 Silesia against a hostile invasion, took up a defensive position, : 
 on the ioth of that month, near the fortress of Neisse, behind: 
 the line of the river of that name. At the same time the corps ; 
 of the Guards joined the Second Army from Berlin, and was 
 posted at Brieg, but left one division to watch the passes of the' 
 mountains on the west of the county of Glatz, and to keep- 
 open the communications with the First Army, which was near 
 Gorlitz.* 
 
 At this time six of the Austrian corps which Feldzeugmeister| 
 Benedek held at his disposal were posted in Austrian Silesia 
 and in Moravia. Political events developed themselves rapidly.; 
 The decree of the Diet, the declaration of war by Prussia! 
 against Saxony, and the irruption of General Henvarth von. 
 Bittenfeld and of Prince Frederick Charles into that country,] 
 followed each other in quick succession. The Saxon armyl 
 retired into Bohemia, and the Austrian troops began moving; 
 towards Josephstadt. 
 
 On the evening of the 19th of June, the Crown Prince re- 
 ceived orders from the King, through General von Moltke, the] 
 chief of the staff of the army, to leave only one corps on tha 
 Neisse, to move the first corps to Landshut, and to station thej 
 two other corps in such positions that they might be ready,' 
 either in conjunction with the first corps, to move into Bo- 
 hemia, in order to effect a junction with the First Army, or, I 
 it were necessary, to be equally ready to strengthen the corps, 
 on the Neisse. 
 
 As the Austrian troops kept moving into Bohemia, it became 
 hourly more probable that the Prussian Second Army would be, i 
 required to cross the mountains into that province. In order tc 
 lead the Austrian staff to believe that this movement was not 
 contemplated, the sixth corps was drawn entirely to the left 
 bank of the Neisse, and received orders that it should, immedi-. 
 ately on the outbreak of hostilities, make a strong demonstra- 
 tion against the Austrian frontier in that direction. Officers 
 
 * See p. 124. 
 
Chap. I.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 191 
 
 were at the same time sent to prepare quarters for all the corps 
 on the right bank of the Oder, as if a general movement in that 
 direction was intended. 
 
 On the evening of the 20th June, a further order came from 
 the King, which directed the Crown Prince to send intimation 
 in writing to the commanders of the several Austrian outposts, 
 that Prussia considered Austria's bearing at Frankfort as a 
 virtual declaration of war. 
 
 As soon as the existence of war between the two great 
 Powers was actually recognised, the Crown Prince issued the 
 following general order to his troops : — 
 
 " Neisse, 20th June. 
 
 "Soldiers of the Second Army !— You have heard the words of 
 
 our King and Commander-in-chief ! The attempts of his Majesty to 
 
 preserve peace to our country have proved fruitless. With a heavy heart, 
 
 but with strong confidence in the spirit and valour of his army, the King 
 
 has determined to do battle for the honour and independence of Prussia, 
 
 and for a new organization of Germany on a powerful basis. I, placed by 
 
 the grace and confidence of my royal father at your head, am proud, as the 
 
 first servant of our King, to risk with you my blood and property for the 
 
 most sacred rights of our native country. Soldiers ! for the first time for 
 
 fifty years a worthy foeman is opposed to our army. Confident in your 
 
 prowess, and in our excellent and proved arms, it behoves us to conquer 
 
 ' the same enemy as our greatest King defeated with a small army. And 
 
 ; now, forward with the old Prussian battle-cry — 'With God, for King and 
 
 ; Fatherland.' 
 
 (Signed) "FRIEDERICH WILHELM." 
 
 On the 22nd of June the Crown Prince received from the 
 iKing the order to prepare to assume the offensive in Bohemia, 
 in order to join the First Army in the direction of Gitschin. 
 
 This order had been anticipated by the Crown Prince. On 
 the previous day he had sent a letter by post, to request per- 
 mission from the King to move towards his right. At the same 
 time he expressed a wish to be allowed to send the sixth corps, 
 which had been ordered to remain near Neisse, into the county 
 of Glatz. By this disposition the sixth corps would both be 
 available for the defence of its native province, Silesia, and, if 
 necessary, could more easily be joined to the main army than 
 rom its previous position. 
 
 On the 23rd June the Crown Prince received by telegraph 
 
 permission to move the sivtli rnrnc as hp HpsirpH PT^ hzr\ 
 
192 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 however, on the 22nd, already acted before receiving this per-| 
 mission. That day he sent the sixth corps from Neisse in the 
 direction of Olmiitz. This corps crossed the Austrian frontier, 
 and moved through the highland border districts of Friedberg, 
 Freywalde, and Zuchmantel, while the soldiers everywhere 1 
 spread the news that they formed the advanced guard of the: 
 entire army of the Crown Prince. Some slight skirmishes : 
 between the advanced guards and some Austrian hussars, 
 ensued without much damage to either side. In consequence! 
 of this demonstration, however, Feldzeugmeister Benedek held! 
 the second and third Austrian corps between Hohenmauth andj 
 Bomisch Triibau in such a position that they could not bej 
 opposed to the Prussian columns at the point where the latter! 
 really crossed the frontier. On this day, the 22nd June, the); 
 head-quarters of the Crown Prince remained at Neisse ; the 
 fifth corps was in the neighbourhood of Ottmachau ; the corps! 
 of the Guards was drawn together round Miinsterberg ; the 
 first corps was at Landshut, the sixth corps, as already stated,! 
 over the Austrian frontier, and engaged in its demonstration 
 against Austrian Silesia. 
 
 The Second Army was now moved into positions which 
 would facilitate its irruption into Bohemia; and on the 25th 
 June, its one hundred and twenty-five thousand warriors were, 
 posted, so that the first corps was at Schomberg, the Guards ai 
 Schlegel, the fifth corps between Glatz and Reinerz, the firsi 
 brigade of the sixth corps at Glatz, and the remainder of the 
 sixth corps at Patschkau, the cavalry division at Waldenburg 
 On the same day the Crown Prince changed his head-quarter: 
 from Neisse by way of Camenz to Eckersdorf. 
 
 The staff of the Crown Prince knew that the Austrian firs, 
 corps and the army of Saxony were engaged against Prina 
 Frederick Charles, and that the second Austrian corps ha( 
 pushed forward towards the county of Glatz. It was, therefore 
 correctly argued, that only four Austrian corps could be opposes 
 to the Prussians in issuing from the mountains ; but even unde 
 these circumstances the march of the Army of Silesia througl 
 the passes was exposed to great difficulties, and to considerabl 
 danger. 
 
 The county of Glatz forms a salient bastion of hills in th 
 
Chap. I.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 193 
 
 highland frontier between Prussian Silesia and Bohemia. 
 From Glatz four great roads lead into the Imperial dominions : 
 the first on the north-west by Wiinschelburg to Braunau, the 
 second on the west by Reinerz to Nachod and Josephstadt, 
 the third on the south by Mittelwalde to Gabel and Wilden- 
 schwert, the fourth on the south-east by Wilhelmsthal to 
 Altstadt. On the east of the county of Glatz, a road runs 
 from Neisse by Ziegenhals and Wiirbenthal in the direction of 
 Olmiitz, and on the west of the county a road runs from 
 Landshut by Liebau to Trautenau and Josephstadt. The 
 passage of the frontier by the Second Army had necessarily 
 to be effected by one of the six frontier passes. The strategical 
 intention of effecting a junction as soon as possible in Bohemia 
 with the First Army, determined the selection of the three 
 roads to Trautenau, Braunau, and Nachod, the directions of 
 which also afforded to the Army of Silesia the advantage of 
 being able to make its advance in three columns, which could 
 afford to each other mutual assistance in case of any one being 
 attacked by the enemy. 
 
 The roads on either flank were good. That by Reinerz and 
 Nachod led through a defile five miles in length, and it was 
 only beyond Nachod that troops who marched through it 
 could deploy. The pass to Braunau in the centre had the 
 'advantage that the Bohemian frontier at this point advanced 
 for a space of twenty miles. In consequence of this geogra- 
 phical configuration it was the least liable to be blocked or 
 broken up by the enemy, and the troops that marched by it 
 were the least likely to be impeded in their formation after 
 debouching. They would consequently be available to sup- 
 port either of the flank columns in case of opposition being 
 made to their issue from the mountains. After passing the 
 mountains, the junction of the Army of Silesia with that of 
 Prince Frederick Charles could only be effected by a flank 
 uove to the right. In order to facilitate this subsequent 
 novement, the plan of the passage of the army of the Crown 
 Prince was determined as follows : — The right wing, which 
 consisted of the first corps, was to move, followed by the 
 :avalry division, from Landshut by Liebau on Trautenau. 
 The fifth corps on the left was to occupy the pass of Nachod. 
 
i 9 4 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Cook VI. 
 
 The corps of the Guards in the centre was to move by me 
 intermediate road from Wiinschelburg on Braunau, in order to 
 act as a reserve to either of the flank corps, or if necessary to! 
 occupy the pass of Eypel. The sixth corps was to remain for 
 a short time on the south of the fortress of Neisse, but as soon ' 
 as possible was to be withdrawn from this position and to bei 
 advanced to Reinerz to support the fifth corps. The pro- 
 tection of Upper Silesia was handed over to the detachments 
 under Count Stolberg and General Knobelsdorf. After passing; 
 the mountains the whole army was to make a wheel to its left, 
 pivoted on Nachod and Skalitz, to seize the railway fromj 
 Josephstadt to Tiirnau, and along that line gain its junction' 
 with the First Army. 
 
 To carry out the preliminaries of this plan, on the evening of 
 the 26th June the first Prussian corps was stationed at Landshut 
 with its advanced guard at Liebau. The guards occupied!- 
 Miinsterberg with advanced posts at Frankenstein and Silber- 
 berg. The fifth corps was at Ottmachau with its advanced 
 guard at Lewin. The main body of the sixth corps was nearj: 
 Zuchmantel. 
 
 The Austrian commander thought that he had secured the 
 left wing of his whole army by the first Austrian corps and the 
 Saxons under Count Clam Gallas, and on the 26th June held 
 his remaining forces in the following positions : — The tenth: 
 Austrian corps was at Pilnikau, the fourth at Koniginhof, the 
 sixth moved that day from Opocna to Skalitz, the eighth was v , 
 in the rear of Josephstadt, the second further south in reserve, 
 and the third round Bomisch Triibau. 
 
 It is naturally difficult to say what was the intention of 
 Feldzeugmeister Benedek : if, however, he had the idea of at 
 any time assuming the offensive, he ought to have with might 
 and main attacked the heads of the Prussian columns with 
 overwhelming masses as they issued from the mountains. He 
 was bound at any cost to prevent the passage of the fifth; 
 corps, which was the pivot of the Prussian army, and on the> 
 same terms to defeat the first corps and the Guards before 
 they could reach the line of the Aupa. It must have been on^ 
 the defeat of the army of the Crown Prince that he depended 
 to be able to assume the offensive with superior numbers 
 
Chap. I.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 195 
 
 against the First Prussian Army and the Army of the 
 Elbe. 
 
 Early in the afternoon of the 26th of June, the first 
 Prussian corps was concentrated near Liebau, the corps 
 of the Guards round Wiinschelburg, and the fifth corps at 
 Lewin. 
 
 That evening the heads of the columns of the Guards pushed 
 
 across the frontier at Tunschendorf and Johannisberg, under 
 
 the direction of the Crown Prince in person. The troops 
 
 cheered loudly as they stepped upon Austrian ground. Some 
 
 1 detachments of the third regiment of Uhlans of the Guard 
 
 1 had a little beyond the frontier a skirmish with some of the 
 
 Austrian Windischgratz dragoons and Mexican Uhlans, in 
 
 \ which the Prussians had the advantage. Certainly Austrian 
 
 j prisoners and captured horses were brought into the Prussian 
 
 ! head-quarters, and the cavalry of the Second Army acquired 
 
 , the idea that it was fully equal if not superior to the horsemen 
 
 I opposed to it. The Guards bivouacked that night between 
 
 : Politz and Braunau. 
 
 On the left wing, the fifth corps the same evening was 
 
 : pushed forward towards the frontier in the direction of Nachod. 
 
 I The bridge over the little river Metau, which forms here the 
 
 i boundary line, had been broken ; and as the Prussian scouts 
 
 : approached the river, two Austrian vedettes with two infantry 
 
 , sentries could be made out hidden behind some willow-trees 
 
 I at the Bohemian end of the bridge. These were dislodged by 
 
 I a few Prussian Jagers, who forded the river and pushed on in 
 
 ■ pursuit. At a toll-house about four hundred yards further on 
 
 they were checked by the fire of two Austrian field-guns, and 
 
 ;were driven back to the river, where the Prussian pioneers 
 
 were already engaged in the repair of the broken bridge. Two 
 
 Prussian guns were quickly brought up, and after a few shots 
 
 : being exchanged the Austrian pieces withdrew, with their 
 
 escort of two squadrons of cavalry and about ninety foot 
 
 ! soldiers. General Lowenfeld, who commanded the leading 
 
 division of the fifth Prussian corps, sent his Jagers in pursuit, 
 
 jand secured without opposition the town of Nachod, and the 
 
 ! strong castle which about three-quarters of a mile from the 
 
 Metau covers the issue of the pass, and could have been easily 
 
 o 2 
 
196 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 held, by a handful of determined men, for at least two days 
 against the whole Prussian army. 
 
 After these preliminary movements on the 26th, on the 27th 
 commenced the series of brilliant operations by which the 
 army of the Crown Prince wrestled its way through the 
 mountains. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 PASSAGE OF THE RIGHT AND CENTRAL COLUMNS OF THE 
 ARMY OF SILESIA THROUGH THE MOUNTAINS. 
 
 The first corps, which formed the right column of the army 
 of the Crown Prince, was under the command of General von 
 Bonin. This officer ordered his advanced guard to advance 
 I from Liebau at four o'clock on the morning of the 27th, and to 
 follow the road by Golden-Oels to Trautenau. At the latter 
 town it was to halt until the main body arrived at Parschnitz 
 in the road between Schomberg and Albendorf, then it was to 
 move forward upon Arnau. The reserves of infantry and 
 of artillery were to follow the advanced guard, the reserve of 
 cavalry the main body. 
 
 The march commenced. Hostile dragoons were descried in 
 front of the heads of the columns, but did not yet attack. The 
 main body first came up to the advanced guard, which had 
 halted at Parschnitz at eight o'clock, about ten, when the 
 latter was ordered to move forward, and soon commenced 
 
 THE FIRST ACTION OF TRAUTENAU. 
 
 The town of Trautenau lies on the river Aupa, in a basin 
 almost surrounded by mountains : by the river the ground is 
 wet and marshy, on the hill-sides it is rough and broken, so 
 that it is nowhere particularly favourable for the action of 
 cavalry or artillery. 
 
 The great heat made the Prussian troops suffer much from 
 
 tigue and thirst on their march, and they were weary when 
 
 ey reached the town of Trautenau. But the Austrians were 
 
 in the town, and General von Bonin was forced to attack them, 
 
 as his road to ioin the Crown Prince, who was with the left 
 
198 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 column, led through Trautenau. The head of the advanced 
 guard broke down the barricade on the bridge over the Aupa. 
 The infantry fight soon began in the streets, and the Austrians 
 were pushed back gradually from house to house. But the 
 Austrians reinforced their troops, and then maintained their 
 position, till the Prussians, calling up more battalions, again 
 got a little the better of the combat. Both sides suffered 
 heavily, and the Prussians gained ground but slowly, for from 
 every house and from every corner hidden marksmen poured 
 bullets into the ranks of the battalions that tried to push along 
 the streets. When all the Prussian reinforcements had arrived, 
 a general attack was made, and the Austrians were pushed out 
 of the houses into the open country beyond. The Prussians 
 pursued and followed step by step their slowly-retreating 
 enemies. Beyond the town one of Austria's most celebrated 
 cavalry regiments, the Windischgratz dragoons, stood waiting 
 to sweep the Prussian battalions from the open ground if they 
 issued from the shelter of the houses. These dragoons have 
 long held a high reputation, and, for a record ot brave deeds 
 done by the regiment, alone in the Austrian army wear no 
 moustache. The Prussian infantry could not advance, and it 
 seemed that the houses of Trautenau had been won in vain. 
 But assistance was at hand. The ist regiment of the Prussian 
 dragoons came trotting along the main street, deployed into, 
 line almost as they debouched from the town, and with their 
 horses well in hand, and their sword-points low, bore in a 
 steady canter straight down upon the Austrian cavalry ; these 
 did not wait inactive to receive the attack, but rushed forward 
 to meet their foes ; no shots were exchanged, not a saddle was 
 emptied till the close. When within a few yards of each other, 
 both sides raised a cheer, and, welcoming the hug of battle, 
 the two lines rushed upon each other. Horse pressed against 
 horse, knee against knee, swords went up quick and came 
 down heavily on head-piece or on shoulder, points were given 
 and received, blows quickly parried were returned with lightning 
 speed ; here an Austrian was borne to the ground, there a 
 Prussian was sent reeling from his seat, and for a few minutes 
 the mass of combatants swayed slowly backwards and forwards. 
 
 P>nt tVipn as if (inmp miohi-v shell harl bnrsf nmon.o- them, the 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 199 
 
 Austrian soldiers flew scattered from the melee, and the Prus- 
 sians riding hard after them drove them from the field, but 
 themselves being under the fire of small arms suffered a heavy- 
 loss. 
 
 The Austrian infantry, which consisted of Mondel's brigade 
 of the tenth Austrian corps, formed on a hill called the Capel- 
 lenberg, which afforded a strong position beyond the town. 
 This hill could only be scaled by the assailant infantry with 
 great difficulty. Notwithstanding the unfavourable nature of 
 the ground, and the strong resistance of the defenders, the 
 right wing of the Prussian advanced guard under Colonel 
 Koblinski, which consisted of two battalions of the 41st regi- 
 ment and a company of Jagers, gained the Capellenberg be- 
 tween twelve and one o'clock. The Austrians retired a short 
 distance. The Prussian commander ordered eight battalions 
 to advance from Parschnitz, cross the Aupa, and attack the 
 right flank of the Austrian position. These battalions had 
 great difficulties to encounter : the wooded hills close to the 
 Aupa could only be traversed in extended order, and as soon 
 as the open ground was gained they suffered much from some 
 hostile skirmishers concealed in the standing corn. 
 
 Notwithstanding these disadvantageous circumstances, they 
 gained ground. About three o'clock the advanced guard seized 
 the village of Hohenbruck, south of Trautenau, and the brigade 
 on the left wing occupied the heights on the west of the road 
 from Trautenau to Rognitz. It was now three o'clock, the 
 Austrians had retired, and General von Bonin considered that 
 the action was over. 
 
 The retreat of the Austrians had, however, been but a 
 tactical manoeuvre, and for once in the history of war a tactical 
 retreat resulted in an advantage to the general who had made 
 it, though even in this case the gain was only of a temporary 
 nature. About half-past three o'clock the action began again. 
 General Gablenz, who commanded the tenth Austrian corps, 
 had advanced from Pilnikau with his whole force, and at that 
 hour made a heavy attack on the Prussian • troops, who were 
 already weary with a hot march and a lengthened combat. 
 General Gablenz directed some of his battalions against the 
 Prussian front, and with others made a movement against 
 
200 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 General Bonin's left flank. At half-past four o'clock the Aus- 
 trians recovered Hohenbruck, and at five the Prussian troops 
 commenced their retreat. 
 
 In order to cover this movement General Barnekow, with 
 the 43rd Prussian regiment, occupied the commanding hills 
 and plantations which lie on the north of the Capellenberg, 
 supported by the 3rd regiment of Grenadiers, which was posted 
 on the hills lying further back. The 43rd stopped the Aus- 
 trian pursuit, though with great loss to its own strength, for an 
 hour and a half, but they had to be withdrawn a little after six 
 o'clock. The grenadiers again brought the Austrians up, and 
 stayed their advance until all the Prussian troops had gained 
 an unpursued retreat. 
 
 General von Bonin had intended to hold the line of the 
 Aupa on the north of Trautenau, but General Gablenz pressed 
 upon him, and he was forced to continue his retreat to the 
 same position as he had occupied on the morning of the day 
 of the action, keeping his rear-guard at Golden-Oels, about 
 three miles from Trautenau. 
 
 The cavalry division of the army, which was to have fol- 
 lowed the first corps through the mountains as soon as the 
 defile was cleared, remained at Schomberg. 
 
 The first Prussian corps lost in this action, in killed and 
 wounded, sixty-three officers and twelve hundred and fourteen 
 men ; the Austrian tenth corps, according to Austrian returns, 
 lost one hundred and ninety-six officers and five thousand five 
 hundred and thirty-six men ; a terrible disparity in numbers ! 
 The Austrian infantry, with a muzzle-loading arm, had indeed' 
 gained a victory over an enemy equipped with a breech-loading 
 weapon, but at such a sacrifice as made success almost as costly 
 as defeat. 
 
 General Gablenz did not pursue beyond Trautenau. He 
 kept his advanced guard there for the night, and bivouacked 
 at Neu-Rognitz. His corps was considerably shaken by its 
 victory, of which it was soon to be deprived by the fortune of 
 war. 
 
 The corps of the Guards had crossed the Bohemian frontier 
 at Steinethal on the evening of the 26th, and had pushed 
 forward the second division by Braunau, as far as Weckelsdorf. 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 201 
 
 On the 27th June this corps was to move in a south-westerly 
 direction, in order to open the communication between the 
 first corps, which was advancing against Trautenau on the 
 right, and the fifth corps at Nachod on the left. At mid-day 
 the first division of the Guards was to march on Eypel. At 
 Qualitch, the general commanding this division hearing the 
 heavy firing at Trautenau halted, and sent an offer of assistance 
 to General von Bonin. Then the Prussian infantry of the 
 first corps, advancing on the road beyond Trautenau, were 
 everywhere pressing the Austrians back, when a staff-officer 
 came up to the commander of the first corps, and told him 
 that the Prussian Guard was ready to come to his assistance. 
 General von Bonin thought his victory already secure, and 
 declined the proffered aid. For another four hours he did not 
 want it, for the Prussians kept advancing slowly, steadily, 
 pressing the Austrians back, but at four o'clock large reinforce- 
 ments of artillery came up upon the Austrian side, and General 
 , von Bonin ordered his retreat. 
 
 The first division of the Guard corps, ignorant of the failure 
 
 of the first corps at Trautenau, continued its march, and in •he 
 
 evening reached the neighbourhood of Eypel, on the Aupa, 
 
 :while the second division moved to Kosteletz, about five miles 
 
 -to the south-east of that place. The reserve artillery and heavy 
 
 ■cavalry were still one day's march in rear. The Prince of 
 
 Wiirtemburg, who commanded the Guards, received in the 
 
 ^night intelligence from the Crown Prince, and instructions to 
 
 move to its relief — of the result of the action at Trautenau, 
 
 and he immediately gave orders that at daybreak the next 
 
 morning his corps should cross the Aupa, attack the corps of 
 
 General Gablenz, and thus disengage the first Prussian corps, 
 
 iind restore the broken communication with General von 
 
 Bonin. According to the disposition of the Prince of Wiirtem- 
 
 )urg, the first division of the Prussian Guard was to advance 
 
 )y Eypel, in a westerly direction, and the second division to 
 
 nove from Kosteletz to Eypel, to serve as a support to the 
 
 irst division. The first division, under General Hiller, defiled 
 
 >ver the Aupa at Eypel on the 28th June, at five in the morn- 
 
 ng, and threw out cavalry patrols in the direction of both 
 
 Trautenau and Koniginhof. These patrols discovered that 
 
202 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 General Gablenz was bivouacked with the main body of his 
 corps at Neu-Rognitz, about two miles south of Trautenau, 
 and that he held the latter town with a strong advanced guard. 
 His position was therefore pointed northward against the first i 
 Prussian corps, and his right flank was now threatened by the ! 
 advance of the Guards from Eypel. The Prussian patrols also| 
 discovered that the baggage of the corps of General Gablenz \ 
 was drawing off towards Koniginhof, but was still five miles 
 distant from that town. Under these favourable strategical; 
 conditions, the first division of the Guards received orders, 
 immediately to advance by Standenz, to attack the enemy in; 
 the direction of Koniginhof, while the second division, as ai 
 reserve, was advanced beyond the defile of Eypel. At the' 
 same time two battalions of the Franz Grenadiers were sent; 
 forward towards the north-west against Trautenau, in order to} 
 cover the right wing of the advance. These dispositions led: 
 to the 
 
 ACTION OF SOOR. 
 
 General Gablenz desired to change his front to the right, ir 
 consequence of finding his right wing thus threatened. Tc 
 cover this evolution he ranged his whole artillery, covered b) 
 Knobel's brigade, on the hills between Neu-Rognitz anc 
 Burgersdorf. In this he succeeded, and extended his righ" 
 wing to Prausnitz, where he gave his hand to FleischhackerV 
 brigade of the fourth Austrian corps, which had been sent t( 
 his assistance. The advance of the two Prussian grenadie 
 battalions against Alt-Rognitz threatened, however, to cut ol 
 from him the brigade which he had posted in Trautenau. 
 
 The Prussian advanced guard, under Colonel Kessel, whicl 
 consisted of four battalions of the Fusiliers, one company c, 
 the jagers of the Guard, two companies of the pioneers of th 
 Guard, the fourth squadron of the hussars of the Guard, am 
 one 4-pounder battery, came upon the Austrian position befor' 
 the whole of General Gablenz's guns were formed. It was 
 however, received by a hot fire from twenty-four pieces, whic 
 had already .taken up their position. The single Prussia :i 
 battery engaged these guns with considerable rashness, whil l 
 
Chap. II.] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 203 
 
 the infantry attacked the plantations west of Standenz, and 
 drove the Austrian position slightly in. 
 
 Soon the guns of General Gablenz were all in position, and 
 
 sixty-four pieces opened a withering fire on the six Prussian 
 
 guns, which, however, held their ground, though with great 
 
 loss. While the Fusiliers and the Jagers of the advanced 
 
 guard sought to gain some ground, some of the battalions of 
 
 the Prussian main body, under General Alvensleben, came up, 
 
 and hurried into the action wherever they were most required. 
 
 ; Next arrived the first and second battalions of the Fusiliers, 
 
 1 and the second company of the Jagers of the Guard, who 
 
 . moved in the direction of Burgersdorf and Alt-Rognitz. After 
 
 ; these followed the second regiment of Grenadiers, and with 
 
 them came a very welcome field-battery, which immediately 
 
 i opened fire to support the only Prussian battery as yet in 
 
 action. Burgersdorf and the plantations near it were now 
 
 captured by the Prussians, and at that moment the rest of the 
 
 Prussian infantry and the remainder of the artillery came into 
 
 play. The action then became general. The Prussian infantry 
 
 advanced, and stormed the rising ground on which the Austrian 
 
 ■ battalions stood, but at an awful sacrifice ; men fell every 
 moment, and officers went down so quickly that hardly a 
 
 ■ company reached the summit commanded by its captain. But 
 :the Guards pressed on, and the Austrians had to retire from 
 
 position to position, while the Prussians advanced steadily, 
 urging them backwards. The Austrian corps of Gablenz was 
 then defeated, for the troops could not rally under the fire of 
 the needle-gun, and every battalion which retreated was routed. 
 The two Prussian battalions which had been detached 
 towards Trautenau to cover the right wing had been during 
 this time heavily engaged. As they moved towards Trautenau, 
 some columns were seen advancing towards them. It was 
 uncertain at first whether these were some of the troops of the 
 first Prussian corps, or some of the Austrians from Trautenau. 
 The doubt was soon dispelled. As they approached, it became 
 •clear that, while three of the Austrian brigades of the corps of 
 General Gablenz were resisting the front of the Prussian attack, 
 the remaining brigade, that of Grivicics, had been ordered 
 to sally from Trautenau against the Prussian right wing, and 
 
204 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 to it the advancing columns belonged — a movement which, 
 but for the precautions of the Prince of Wurtemburg, would 
 have had an important influence on the action. The two 
 Prussian battalions withstood the attack of this brigade with 
 the greatest courage. The greater part of the officers and 
 one-third of the soldiers of these battalions were laid on the 
 field, either dead or dying, but they held their ground until'; 
 the second division of the Guards, which had been held in; 
 reserve, could hurry up to their assistance. This division 
 coming up, drove the brigade of Grivicics back into Trautenau, 
 cut it off from the main body of Gablenz's corps, stormed the 
 town, and captured there a stand of colours and over three! 
 thousand prisoners. 
 
 General Gablenz withdrew the rest of his corps along the 
 road to Koniginhof. The Prussians were too much fatigued; 
 to pursue in force : and the Austrian brigade of Fleischhacker, 
 which belonged to the fourth corps, was allowed to pass the; 
 night at Soor unmolested as a rear-guard, while the first division, 
 of the Prussian Guards bivouacked opposite to it at Burgers- 1 
 dorf. The next morning this brigade also retired at daybreak 
 towards Koniginhof. The Guards had but eleven hundred men': 
 in killed and wounded in this action. The Austrians left I 
 behind them five thousand prisoners, three standards, and ten< 
 guns. 
 
 By the successful issue of this action the communication ' 
 with the first corps which had been broken on the 27th by its 
 failure at Trautenau, was completely re-established. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th, the Crown Prince caused the 
 first corps, which had been defeated at Trautenau on the 27th,' 
 to march past before him through that town, where the victory' 
 of the Guards on the 28th had opened a free passage 
 for it. 
 
 The Guards on the 29th moved from Burgersdorf and Trau- 
 tenau, on Koniginhof and Rettendorf. Early in the morning 
 of that day, one of the regiments in issuing from Burgersdorf 
 had a skirmish with some detachments of scattered Austrians 
 who had been cut off from their corps, and passed the night in 
 the woods. 
 
 As the advanced guard of the first division of the Guards 
 
Chap. II. ] PASSAGE OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 205 
 
 approached Koniginhof, it again fell in with the army, and a 
 combat ensued which terminated in the 
 
 CAPTURE OF KONIGINHOF. 
 
 The advanced guard of the first division of the Guards, con- 
 sisting of four battalions of Fusiliers, two companies of Jagers, 
 and two field batteries, broke up from Burgersdorf at mid-day 
 on the 29th, and were ordered to advance and occupy the 
 town of Koniginhof. The brigade of Fleischhacker, which 
 belonged to the fourth Austrian corps, was posted as garrison 
 of the place, and had drawn up several infantry columns, 
 covered by skirmishers, in the corn-fields on the north of the 
 I town. The Prussian riflemen quickly engaged them : the slow 
 I shots of the muzzle-loading arms did little execution against 
 J the rapid discharges of the needle-gun, and these advanced 
 : columns were soon driven to seek shelter in flight. The 
 i defence of the houses was entrusted to the Austrian regiment 
 ;. of Coranini, and here took place a hot contest, for this gallant 
 j corps defended each yard of every street, and each window of 
 every house. The Fusiliers of the Prussian Guards pressed on, 
 j overthrew their opponents in the streets, and, dashing past the 
 jloopholed houses, occupied the bridge over the Elbe. The 
 ; majority of the defenders were still in the town, and were com- 
 ■ pletely surrounded. Nothing was left to them but to lay down 
 • t their arms. The Prussians here captured four hundred prisoners 
 \ and two standards. 
 
 The weak remnant of the Coranini regiment retreated to 
 ,Miletin, The Prussian Guards were concentrated in the 
 neighbourhood of Koniginhof, and the first Prussian corps 
 advanced to Pilnikau. 
 
 Feldzeugmeister Benedek had in the meantime drawn the 
 second Austrian corps to the vicinity of Josephstadt. It 
 arrived, however, too late to aid in a defence of the line of the 
 Elbe at Koniginhof. That important point for the passage of 
 the river was already in the possession of the Prussian Guards, 
 when, on the 30th June, Count Thurn appeared with his corps 
 on the heights south of the Elbe, at Koniginhof. This Austrian 
 general could do nothing more than open an ineffectual can- 
 nonade against the Prussian corps of the Guards, on the 30th 
 
206 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 June. That day one division of the latter corps bivouacked 
 near Gradlitz, on the left bank of the Elbe, about two miles! 
 out of Koniginhof, and the same day the first Prussian corps 
 advanced to Arnau, on the river, about seven miles to the ; 
 north of the same place. 
 
 It is now necessary to trace the passage of the left column oi 
 the Crown Prince's army through the mountains, and to show; 
 how, on the 30th June, it was able to effect a junction with the 
 right and central columns on the banks of the Elbe. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA. 
 
 To the fifth Prussian corps, which formed the head of the 
 left column of the army of the Crown Prince, and which he 
 himself most closely directed, was the most difficult task given. 
 Only one narrow road leads from the county of Glatz to 
 Nachod, which beyond the Bohemian frontier runs in a winding 
 course near the town of Nachod, through a difficult defile. A 
 corps d'armee, with all its trains and baggage advancing by 
 one road, forms a column of march twenty miles long. If 
 only the combatants themselves and the most necessary train, 
 such as ammunition columns and field hospitals, form the 
 columns, it still will stretch over ten miles ; so that if the head 
 of the column is attacked as it issues from a defile where the 
 troops cannot move off the road, the rearmost battalion will 
 not be able to support the most advanced until four hours have 
 passed. 
 
 In order to ensure the safe issue from the mountain passes, 
 the advanced guard of the fifth corps, under General von 
 Lowenfeld, was pushed forward as far as Nachod on the even- 
 ing of the 26th June. The Austrians held the defile with a 
 very weak force, and did not stand obstinately in the Castle of 
 Nachod, so that the Prussian advanced guard occupied that 
 strong post with very slight opposition. General Ramming, 
 who had been posted with the sixth Austrian corps and a 
 portion of the first division of reserve cavalry at Opocna, about 
 ten miles to the south of Nachod, marched on the 26th towards 
 Skalitz, by order of Feldzeugmeister Benedek. He was in- 
 tended next day to fall upon the head of the Prussian fifth 
 corps as it issued from the pass, and drive it back into the 
 
208 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI 
 
 defile. At the same time the eighth Austrian corps under the 
 command of the Archduke Leopold was posted on the railway- 
 to Josephstadt, in order to act as a reserve to General Ram- 
 ming. The next day the advanced guard of the Prussian fifth 
 corps brought on the 
 
 ACTION OF NACHOD. 
 
 On the 27th, the same day that the first corps was defeated at 
 Trautenau, as the advanced guard of the fifth Prussian corps 
 d'armee was, about ten o'clock in the morning, moving out of 1 
 Nachod towards Skalitz, in order to take up a position covering j 
 the strategical point where the roads to Josephstadt and Neustadti 
 branch, its patrols observed heavy Austrian columns advancing! 
 by the road from Neustadt, and two Austrian cuirass regiments; 
 drew up across the road to bar the way against the Prussian in-ji 
 fan try. These were supported by two Austrian infantry brigades,; 
 while a third stood in the rear as a reserve. The Prussians were] 
 then in a dangerous position, for the road through the defile of- 
 Nachod behind them was choked with the carriages of the! J 
 artillery, and only a few battalions and two squadrons had, 
 gained the open ground. General von Lowenfeld, who com- 
 manded the advanced guard, threw his infantry into a wood: : 
 which was beside the road, where, protected by the trees to a 
 certain extent from the shells of the Austrian guns, they main-: 
 tained their position until their artillery had cleared the defile 
 At the same time the small body of Prussian cavalry who were a 
 with the infantry charged straight down the road against theij; 
 centre of the line of the cuirass regiments. The Austrians 
 numbered eight times as many sabres as the Prussians, and 
 their cavalry bore the highest reputation in Europe. All 
 expected to see the Prussians hurled back, broken and de- « 
 stroyed, by their collision with the Austrian line, but the resull; I 
 was far different ; the Prussian squadrons thundered down the 
 road, and seemed merely by the speed at which they wercM 
 galloping to cut clean through the centre of the line 0.' 
 Cuirassiers ; but, though they were thus successful in theu 
 first onslaught, they were quickly assailed in flank and rear b) 
 overwhelming numbers, and with difficulty escaped withou 
 being cut to pieces. Many, however, managed to shake them 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 209 
 
 selves free from the melee, and, galloping back, rallied under 
 the protection of the fire of their infantry in the wood ; but the 
 Austrians pressed forward, and they had to retire ; and it 
 seemed that the issue of the defile would be lost, for Austrian 
 infantry were quickly coming up, and were preparing to attack 
 the wood held by the Prussians. At the first intelligence of 
 the advance of the enemy the Crown Prince in person hurried 
 up to the front. Then upon Lowenfeld's battalions depended 
 not only the safe passage of the fifth corps through the defile, 
 but also the preservation of the whole of the artillery, for so 
 crowded with carriages was the road that, had the Austrians 
 pressed on, every gun and waggon must have fallen into their 
 hands. But the infantry proved worthy of the trust placed in 
 them, and nothing availed to dislodge them from the trees, 
 though the shells went whistling in quick succession through 
 the trunks, and the splinters carried away the branches above 
 the heads of the soldiers, and tore up the turf beneath their 
 feet. 
 
 The Crown Prince was in Nachod when the firing com- 
 menced, but he pushed his way with difficulty through the 
 crowded defile, and came to his advanced guard in order him- 
 self to be with his soldiers in their time of trial. Behind him 
 followed as quickly as possible the battalions of the main body 
 of the corps, and the guns of the artillery were also pushed for- 
 > ward ; but the road was long and crowded, and both regiments 
 'and guns made their way with difficulty. In the meantime 
 .'the Austrians pressed hard upon the little band in the wood, 
 and seemed as though they would pass it by, and close the 
 defile with their columns. But before they could do so the 
 •battalions of the main body gained the end of the defile, and 
 the Prussian guns began to come quickly forward, for waggons 
 and all encumbrances had been pushed off the road into the 
 ditches to facilitate the free passage of the troops going into 
 action. The newly-arrived troops reinforced those in the wood, 
 and the artillery replied to the Austrian batteries ; but at noon 
 he battle was still stationary, and the Prussians had not advanced 
 heir position since the beginning of the fight, for the Austrian 
 :avalry stood prepared to charge the Prussian infantry if it 
 ttempted to move forward on the open ground. The Crown 
 
210 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 Prince knew that on breaking that cavalry line depended the 
 passage of the fifth corps into Bohemia, and he sent against 
 it the eighth Prussian regiment of dragoons, and the first 
 Uhlan regiment It was an exciting moment. The Prussians, 
 nerved by the importance of the issue of their charge, and with ' 
 the eyes of their infantry upon them, sprang forward readily : > 
 the Austrian horsemen, proud of their high renown, and eager j 
 to wipe out the memory of the former skirmish, also bounded 
 forward as soon as they saw the Prussians approaching. The | 
 two lines met about half way, for one moment formed a tangled ; 
 struggling crowd, and then the Prussian Uhlans, with their I 
 lance-points low and heads bent down, were seen pursuing.: 
 The most famous cavalry in Europe had been overthrown. 
 
 Before and during this charge both divisions of the fifth 
 Prussian corps had cleared the defile, and scarcely had then 
 effect of the cavalry charge been seen than General Steinmetz,! 
 who commanded the whole corps, determined to assume thejj 
 offensive. Then, in rear of their cavalry, the Prussian infantry; 
 and artillery dashed forward. Some of the battalions turning; 
 aside, inarched against the village of Wisokow, already in flames' 
 from a Prussian shell, with their bayonets at the charge. Amon^l 
 the burning houses the Austrians waited for them : a sharp i 
 struggle ensued, but the village was carried, and the Austrian: 
 were driven out of it. 
 
 In the meantime the Austrian heavy horsemen had rallied' 
 and again returned to the charge. This time they advances - 
 with skill as well as courage, and bore down on the flank of thi I 
 Uhlans ; but their approach was seen, and before they reachei I 
 the Prussian line it had quickly changed its front, and met th 
 advancing squadrons face to face. Again the Austrians re 
 coiled, but now without a chance of rallying; they were broke!* 
 and scattered, and the Uhlans, spreading out in pursuit, wer 
 dashing in small knots over the plain after them, and capturejH 
 two guns from their horse artillery. This cavalry charge d< 
 cided the fortune of the day, and the Austrians retired, presse;* 
 by the Prussian infantry. General Steinmetz, who commanded 
 the fifth corps, which was here engaged, led forward all hi 
 troops, leaving only three battalions of the royal regiment i g 
 reserve, and pushed the enemy back. But his men, after a lor 1 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF TILE LEFT COLUMN. 211 
 
 march and a severe action, were too fatigued to pursue in mass, 
 
 so the)' were halted, and the cavalry and one or two battalions 
 
 alone followed up the pursuit ; but they did well, for they 
 
 brought back 2,000 prisoners and three guns, besides the two 
 
 taken by the Uhlans ; and these were not the only trophies, for 
 
 three sets of infantry colours were taken by the Prussians, and 
 
 ! the standards of the Austrian cuirassiers fell into the hands of 
 
 I the Uhlans. The Crown Prince thanked General Steinmetz on 
 
 I the field in the name of the King for the victory, and well the 
 
 general and his troops merited the compliment, for all the 
 
 1 first part of the action was fought with twenty-two battalions 
 
 i against twenty-nine, and with an inferior force of cavalry and 
 
 ; artillery. 
 
 This victory cost the Prussians a loss of nine hundred men 
 . killed and wounded ; among the latter were the two generals, 
 Von Ollech and Von Wunck. The fifth Prussian corps, not- 
 withstanding that on the 27 th it had marched over fifteen miles 
 ] J through a narrow defile, and been engaged in action for eight 
 hours, was still so strong and so confident that General Stein- 
 j t metz resolved to resume the attack the ensuing day without loss 
 of time. 
 
 ; General Ramming, who had deservedly the reputation of 
 being one of the most able and talented generals of the Impe- 
 rial army, after having engaged the Prussians at Nachod, with 
 lis whole force retreated to Skalitz on the evening of the 27th. 
 Dn arriving at that place he sent a despatch to the head- 
 ;uarters of the army, in which he requested that the eighth 
 .Vustrian corps, which was posted at Josephstadt, might be 
 .Uowed to assist him with two brigades. Feldzeugmeister 
 jenedek thereupon ordered that the eighth corps should 
 clvance to Skalitz, and be prepared to engage in the first 
 ne, while that of General Ramming should form its reserve. 
 loth corps were placed under the command of the Archduke 
 -eopold. One brigade of the Prussian sixth corps, which was 
 ) follow the fifth corps through the defile of Nachod, had 
 ached Nachod on the evening of the 27th, and was ready 
 lat day to advance with General Steinmetz. General Stein- 
 etz determined to advance. At the same time the Austrian 
 meral replaced the sixth corps by the eighth corps at Skalitz, 
 
212 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 in order to oppose the Prussians and drive them back. Hence 
 arose the 
 
 ACTION OF SKALITZ. 
 
 The Austrians were soon forced to quit all hopes of the offen- 
 sive, and to assume the defensive energetically in front of 
 Skalitz, on the road and railway, which are flanked on the 
 north and south by two woods. The country was entirely un- 
 favourable for the action of cavalry. Either side brought up as i 
 much force as possible. The battle swayed hither and thither, 
 but ultimately the superior strength and armament of the Prus- 
 sian soldier told against his weaker antagonist. 
 
 On the north of the railway the 37th and 58th Prussian regi- 
 ments and 4th dragoons with three batteries advanced ; whilei 
 on the south the King's own regiment, though exposed to a 
 terrible fire of artillery, gained the wood on the south of the; 
 town, and here succeeded in sustaining the assaults of fan 
 superior numbers, until the 6th, 46th, and 52nd and 47th regi-. 
 ments could come up to its aid, and join with it in an attack or 
 Skalitz. 
 
 This attack was made about 3 p.m. On the north side of the 
 town the 6th and 52nd regiments advanced, and along th(, 
 high road the 7th, 37th, 58th, and 47th regiments. 
 
 The Austrian position was forced, and the Archduke Leopok \ 
 compelled to fall back to a strong position behind the Aupa' 
 where he intended to hold his ground, supported by his nume 
 rous artillery. This position was however also carried by th 
 Prussians, who there took many prisoners, and by it they gcrme* . 
 the command of the defile of the Aupa. 
 
 General Steinmetz, by this victory, captured four thousand 
 prisoners, eight guns, and several stands of colours. On th 
 day, the 28th, depended whether the Army of Silesia woul .■;■ 
 effect its issue from the mountains, or fail in the attempt. Tl 
 corps of the Guards was engaged at Trautenau, the fifth cor} j J 
 at Skalitz. The Crown Prince, in person, could not be preseiH 
 at either action. He was obliged to choose a position betweti* 
 the two, whence he could proceed to any point where his prfl 
 sence might be necessary. He accordingly posted himself on . 
 hill near Kosteletz, where the heavy cavalry of the Guard t0( : 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 213 
 
 up its position on coming through the hills, and where it was 
 joined at a later period of the day by the reserve artillery of the 
 Guard. The time passed heavily on that hill of Kosteletz. 
 The thunder of cannon rose ever louder from Skalitz on the 
 south, and from the direction of Trautenau on the north. With 
 anxious ears the Commander-in-chief and his staff listened to 
 the progress of the cannonade, and with eager eyes scanned 
 the positions of the eddying clouds of white smoke which rose 
 from the engaged artillery. It was the intention of the Crown 
 Prince, if an unfavourable report of the progress of the action 
 on either side was brought to him, to repair to that point, and 
 in person to encourage his pressed troops. But every orderly 
 officer, every aide-de-camp, brought the intelligence that the 
 battles in both places were going well for the Prussians. 
 
 At last, between three and four o'clock, the Commander-in- 
 chief received the positive report from General Steinmetz that 
 he had stormed Skalitz, and driven back two of the enemy's 
 ! corps. No longer had the Crown Prince to give a thought to 
 I this side. He immediately started for Eypel, in order to be 
 present at the action in which the Guards were engaged. At 
 this place the news reached him that the Guard had also victo- 
 riously achieved its task, and not only had forced the defile 
 from Eypel, but had also opened the pass from Trautenau. 
 Here, then, were the three issues from the mountains, the 
 .defiles of Trautenau, Eypel, and Nachod, popularly called the 
 t gates of Bohemia, in the secure possession of the Second Prus- 
 isian Army, and the junction of the hitherto separated corps 
 almost certain to be effected on the following day. To accom- 
 plish the junction of his united army with that of Prince 
 Frederick Charles, the Crown Prince ordered the advance the 
 aext morning to be made as far as the Elbe. 
 
 The quarters of the Crown Prince on the night of the 28th 
 vere fixed at Eypel, where he heard for the first time that the 
 irst corps had only returned on the 27th from Trautenau to 
 heir former bivouac, and were fit to advance again on the 29th, 
 laving halted there on the 28th. The report of General von 
 3onin had not before reached head -quarters, and all that was 
 eard of the first corps was that it had not assisted the Guards 
 p the action of the 28th. 
 
214 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 The Crown Prince immediately ordered General von Bonin 
 to advance at daybreak on the 29th, from Trautenau to Pil- 
 nikau. 
 
 On the 29th June, General Steinmetz, with the fifth and 
 sixth corps, was to advance from Skalitz in a westerly direction, 
 towards Koniginhof, as far as Gradlitz, in order to approach 
 the other corps of the Crown Prince, so that the whole Army of J 
 Silesia might be united on the Elbe before commencing general] 
 operations in concert with the First Army. Fresh forces of thej 
 enemy opposed this march, and took post in a situation which 
 caused the 
 
 ACTION OF SCHWEINSCHADEL. 
 
 The Austrian troops, which here opposed the advance of thi 
 Prussian fifth corps, were those of the fourth corps, under th( 
 command of General Festetics, whom Feldzeugmeister Benedel 
 had sent forward from Jaromirz, after he had withdrawn the 6tl ) 
 and the 8th corps. Of this corps there were present only threi | 
 brigades, for one brigade had been detached to Koniginhoi 
 where on the same day it was engaged in an action against tli 
 leading battalions of the Prussian Guard, as has been alreadjrJ 
 noticed. General Steinmetz attacked, and after an action I 
 three hours, which consisted of little more than a cannonadefl 
 the Austrians were driven back, and retreated under the gujB 
 of the fortress of Josephstadt, which opened hotly upon the a<|| 
 vancing Prussians. General Festetics made his retreat in gool 
 time, in order not to sutler a loss similar to that which ha| 
 befallen the other Austrian corps which had been engaged 
 Trautenau and Skalitz. Early as he retired, however, he lo| 
 eight hundred prisoners. 
 
 General Steinmetz, after pushing the retreating Austria^ 
 close up to Josephstadt, did not venture to press further 
 this direction, as by pursuing such a course he would ha 1 , 
 been exposed to be cut off and isolated from the other corps 
 the Crown Prince. He detached, accordingly, one brigade, 
 observe the garrison of Josephstadt, and moved the remaindj 
 of his corps to Gradlitz, about two miles east of Koniginhof, 
 order to concentrate with the rest of the Army of Silesia. I 
 arrived there on the night of the 29th June, and took up 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 215 
 
 position near the division of the Guards, which was already 
 
 (stationed there. 
 The sixth Prussian corps, which followed the fifth corps by 
 the defile of Nachod, from the county of Glatz, had only sent 
 forward one brigade to aid the corps of General Steinmetz in 
 the actions of the 28th and 29th June. It reached Gradlitz, 
 however, late on the 30th June, so that now three corps of the 
 Army of Silesia were concentrated in the vicinity of Koniginhof. 
 The first corps had reached Arnau, where there is also a bridge 
 over the Elbe, about seven miles to the north of Koniginhof 
 Thus the army of the Crown Prince, four days after its inroad 
 into Bohemia, had successfully united its divided columns of 
 
 , advance, and had made itself master of the line of the Elbe 
 from Arnau to near Josephstadt. Four Austrian corps had 
 been repulsed, three of which were decidedly defeated, and 
 had lost ten thousand prisoners, twenty guns, five colours, and 
 two standards to the Crown Prince. 
 
 On the 30th of June a cavalry regiment, sent out from 
 Gitschin by Prince Frederick Charles, fell in with the outposts 
 of the corps of the Crown Prince at Arnau. Communi- 
 cations between the two main armies were now established 
 in Bohemia, and their secure junction almost certain. For the 
 sake of simplicity, it may be here advisable to give briefly a 
 general sketch of the steps taken each day by the two armies 
 
 ■\ from the time of their crossing the Austrian frontier to bring 
 about their common concentration. 
 
 SUMMARY OF THE ADVANCE OF THE THREE PRUSSIAN ARMIES 
 INTO BOHEMIA FOR CONCENTRATION. 
 
 On the 23rd June, the army of Prince Frederick Charles 
 advanced in three columns from Zittau, Gorlitz, and Laubau, 
 towards Reichenberg. 
 
 The same day the Army of the Elbe advanced from 
 Saxony. 
 
 On the 24th, Prince Frederick Charles occupied Reichen- 
 berg, and concentrated his three columns, which had passed 
 through the mountains. 
 
 On the 26th, the advanced sruard of the fifth corps (Army of 
 
216 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI.. 
 
 Silesia) seized Nachod in the evening, and the Guards crossed 
 the frontier of Bohemia by the Wiinschelburg road. 
 
 The same evening Prince Frederick Charles secured the 
 passage of the Iser at Tiirnau and Podoll, and the Army of the 
 Elbe occupied Hayda and Bohmisch Aicha. 
 
 On the 27th, the first corps of the Crown Prince's army 
 seized Trautenau, but was defeated and driven back by 
 General Gablenz. 
 
 The fifth corps of the Crown Prince's army defeated General 
 Ramming in the action of Nachod. 
 
 The Army of the Elbe, after a skirmish, occupied Hiihner- 
 wasser. 
 
 On the 28th, the Army of the Elbe and Prince Frederick 
 Charles defeated the corps of Count Clam Gallas at Miinchen- 
 gratz, and secured the line of the Iser. 
 
 The Guards, under the Crown Prince, defeated General 
 Gablenz at Soor, and cleared the issue from the Trautenau 
 defile for the first corps. 
 
 The fifth corps defeated the Archduke Leopold at Skalitz. 
 
 On the 29th, the Guard corps stormed Koniginhof; and the 
 fifth Prussian corps drove General Festetics from Schwein- 
 schadel. The Crown Prince concentrated his army on the left 
 bank of the Elbe. 
 
 The army of Prince Frederick Charles that night stormed 
 Gitschin. 
 
 On the 30th, communications were opened between the i 
 army of Prince Frederick Charles round Gitschin and the first i 
 corps of the army of the Crown Prince at Arnau. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 For some reason, political or military, Benedek did not 
 assume the offensive. He threw this advantage into the handsi 
 of his adversaries. It is supposed that political causes and- 1 ! 
 the request of the Germanic Confederation prevented the' 
 Austrian general from taking this line of action, and carrying! 1 
 the war into Saxony. 
 
 After having determined to fight on the defensive, he in-j, 
 tended to check one portion of his enemy's armies with a 
 
Chap III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 217 
 
 detachment, while with superior forces he threw himself upon 
 the other. The lines of operation of the Prussian armies, con- 
 vergent from separate bases, gave him a favourable opportunity 
 to reap successful results from such a course. He could either 
 send a detachment to hold Prince Frederick Charles while he 
 assailed the Crown Prince, or could hold the latter while with 
 , the mass of his army he threw himself upon the former. To 
 hold the Crown Prince, however, while he attacked Frederick 
 Charles was much more hazardous than to adopt the alternate 
 line. The Crown Prince, if he beat the detachment left to 
 ibar his way, could sweep down upon the Austrian communi- 
 cations with Vienna ere Benedek had laid his grasp upon the 
 First Prussian Army. If this had been his intention, he 
 should have held the Castle of Nachod and the passes at 
 iTrautenau and Eypel. If, on the other hand, he intended to 
 delay Frederick Charles, the line of the Iser should have been 
 tenaciously held between Tiirnau and Miinchengratz. None 
 of these things were done. Inferior forces of the Austrians 
 jwere exposed at almost all points to superior forces of the 
 Prussians ; while the masses, which cast at the proper 
 moment to either side would have turned the scale, oscillated 
 vaguely backwards and forwards under vacillatory or contra- 
 dictory orders. 
 
 On the evening of the 26th June Benedek knew that the 
 Crown Prince was on the frontier, and that Prince Frederick 
 Charles was close to the Iser. His corps at this time were 
 Rationed, the tenth at Pilnikau, the fourth at Koniginhof, the 
 iiixth near Skalitz, while of the three others, two were south of 
 iosephstadt and one as far off as Bohmisch Triibau. On the 
 :27th, after Tiirnau on the Iser had been evacuated without a 
 )low by Clam Gallas, and the passage of that stream at Podoll 
 tormed by Frederick Charles, Benedek appears to have made 
 
 10 
 
 movement to support with his reserves his corps at Nachod 
 |>r Trautenau against the Crown Prince, or to send reinforce- 
 aents to Clam Gallas. 
 
 . On the 28th, the Crown Prince determined to retrieve the 
 lisfortune of his right on the previous day, by energetically 
 packing the position of the Austrian corps; while at the 
 ;ime time the fifth corps, supported by the sixth, should move 
 
218 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 against Skalitz. Benedek had had only two corps engaged on 
 the previous day. One of these had been defeated at Nachod. 
 and driven back to Skalitz, but had by no means been routed. 
 
 The other had well held its own and had repulsed its, 
 assailants. As yet the Austrian commander had lost nothing 
 so important that he might not hope, by vigorous action on; 
 the 28th, to gain a decided success, and with one blow to turni 
 the fortune of the campaign, and the destiny of Austria. 
 
 The first Prussian corps was not on the morning of the 28th! 
 sufficiently recovered from its repulse on the previous clay to' 
 engage at all. The fifth corps was able to engage, but was; 
 supported only by one brigade of the sixth, because the threej 
 remaining brigades of that corps were still in the defile through* 
 the mountains. 
 
 Thus, the Crown Prince had only the two divisions of the; 
 Guard corps, the fifth corps, and one brigade of the sixth 
 corps ready to go into action on the morning of the 28th,—!. 
 in all about 67,000 men. 
 
 General Benedek ought to have known on the 27th by dayji 
 break, that he had nothing to fear in the direction of Olmiitzj 
 for the demonstration of the sixth Prussian corps made in thaj: 
 direction on the previous day had been withdrawn. He coukji 
 therefore on the 27th have moved the third corps from Boh, 
 misch Triibau to Josephstadt that day, and would then hav< 
 had six corps, about 150,000 men, ready to push into actioi' 
 energetically on the morning of the 2Sth, and with them t<| 
 drive the Crown Prince back into the defiles. This grea^fl 
 opportunity, however, was missed. The sixth Austrian corpj 
 at Skalitz was indeed reinforced by the eighth ; but the tentljl 
 corps was left without reinforcements at Trautenau, so thai|| 
 although he had a force at hand double that of his advei^ 
 sary, on the morning of the 28th only three corps, abou.H 
 70,000 men, were placed in position to come under fire. 
 
 It is natural to inquire why Benedek did not employ on th 
 28th the three corps which did not come into action that da)' 1 
 The reason, as far as can be gathered, appears to be, tha 
 Benedek made the vital error of attempting to check th 
 Crown Prince when he was already past the defiles, and in 
 position to threaten the Austrian communications, with 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE OF THE LEFT COLUMN. 219 
 
 detachment, while he directed his principal blow against 
 Prince Frederick Charles. At this time the distance between 
 the two Prussian armies was about forty miles. They were 
 too far separated to afford each other mutual assistance. The 
 distance from Benedek's headquarters* to the Iser was nearly 
 fifty miles ; that from the same place to Skalitz, about eight 
 miles ; to Trautenau about twenty. At the two latter places 
 the Crown Prince was thrusting against the Austrian detach- 
 ments. The Prussian Second Army was thus at less than 
 half the distance from the mass of Benedek's troops than was 
 the First Army. It was also in a more favourable position to 
 sweep down on a vital point of Benedek's line of communica- 
 tion with Vienna than was the First. Clearly every exertion 
 should have been made to crush the Crown Prince on the 
 28th. The Feldzeugmeister, however, designed to hold the 
 Crown Prince by three corps while he made his great attempt 
 I against Prince Frederick Charles. Orders were sent to the 
 commanders of the corps at Trautenau and Skalitz, not to 
 compromise themselves in a serious action, but to retreat 
 .slowly, if pressed by superior numbers. These orders were 
 ■ neglected. If they had been observed, it is doubtful whether 
 the Crown Prince would not have pushed them back, and con- 
 icentrated his army on the Austrian communications, before 
 ;Benedek had time to strike down Prince Frederick Charles, 
 'and return with his main force to support his troops in front 
 of the Second Army. The result of the neglect of the orders 
 of the Commander-in-Chief was, however, that the three 
 ! Austrian corps engaged on the 28th near Josephstadt were 
 'severely mutilated for further operations. Intending to sup- 
 port Clam Gallas and the Saxons before he knew of the 
 unfortunate issue of the combats of Nachod and Skalitz, 
 Benedek instructed them to stand firm at Gitschin ; and 
 promised to support them with his third corps on the 29th, 
 'and ultimately with other corps. This despatch was received 
 ■at the Saxon head-quarters about mid-day on the 29th. The 
 Saxons and Clam Gallas took up a strong position to fight at 
 Gitschin. When they were already engaged, and had com- 
 
 
 Josephstadt. 
 
220 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VI. 
 
 promised themselves in a serious action with the leading 
 divisions of Prince Frederick Charles, a second despatch ar- 
 rived from Benedek. This had been written after the results 
 of Trautenau and Skalitz on the 28th were known to him. In 
 it he ordered the Crown Prince of Saxony to fall back slowly 
 before Prince Frederick Charles, while he himself collected 
 his forces on the heights above Koniginhof to oppose the 
 Second Army. By the crushing defeat at Gitschin, the left 
 flank of this position was laid open to the Prussian First 
 Army, and the Austrian commander was reduced to make 
 fresh dispositions, unable any longer to prevent the junction 
 of the two Prussian armies on the ground upon which at the 
 outbreak of hostilities he himself stood. Thus, by a neglect 
 to strike boldly on his nearest adversary, Benedek sacrificed 
 all the advantages which he had possessed from a central 
 situation, and the separate lines of operation of his antagonists. 
 To the superior armament of the Prussians a degree of im- 
 portance has rather hastily been awarded, which seems not to 
 be wholly merited. The needle-gun came into action under 
 certainly favourable circumstances. At Podoll the Prussians 
 armed with breech-loaders fired upon the troops of Clam 
 Gallas while the latter were crowded together in the narrow 
 street of a village. At Nachod the soldiers of Steinmetz fired 
 from the cover of a wood upon their Austrian assailants in the 
 open. In both cases the rapid discharges told fearfully upon 
 the men who were armed with the more slowly loaded 
 weapons. The consequence was that the Prussians gained a 
 great moral victory at the very beginning. They found con- 
 fidence, their opponents lost heart. Yet in the subsequent 
 operations the difference of armament had little physical 
 effect. Superior strategical capabilities, superior organization, 
 and greater activity seemed to have been more powerful in 
 gaining the junction of the Prussian armies than superior 
 armament. Yet the Prussian leaders hazarded much by their 
 two convergent lines of operation. The result is but another 
 proof of the old maxim that " in war he is the victor who 
 makes the fewest errors/' 
 
BOOK VII. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OPERATIONS PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRA.TZ. 
 
 After his unsuccessful attempts at Soor and Skalitz on the 
 28th, to prevent the issue of the columns of the Crown Prince 
 from the mountains, Feldzeugmeister Benedek determined to 
 take up a strong position on the right bank of the Upper 
 Elbe, in order to prevent the passage of that river by the 
 Army of Silesia. 
 
 The Elbe, which runs in a course nearly directly from 
 north to south between Josephstadt and Koniggratz, forms 
 almost a right angle at the former fortress. Its upper course 
 above that place lies from north-west to east. Parallel to the 
 stream, and about one mile from it, a chain of hills thickly 
 wooded with fir-trees rises with a steep ascent, and forms the 
 southern bank of the valley. About half-way up the hillside 
 runs the railway which leads from Josephstadt to Tiirnau. It 
 ■ was along these heights that the Austrian commander designed 
 ;to draw up his troops, in such a manner as to bar the 
 passage of the Upper Elbe against the Crown Prince, and 
 to command the bridges of Arnau, Koniginhof, and Schurz. 
 
 The right wing of the troops under the immediate command 
 of Benedek rested on the fortress of Josephstadt, and his 
 (position extended along the heights towards Daubrowitz, while 
 ;his extreme left was formed and covered by the first corps and 
 the Saxons under Count Clam Gallas at Gitschin. In Konig- 
 inhof he left one brigade, and at Schweinschadel three brigades 
 jof his fourth corps, in order to check the advance of the 
 
222 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 Crown Prince while he was making his dispositions. These 
 troops were, as has been already said, driven in by the Prus- 
 sians on the 29th, when they retired and formed a portion of 
 the new Austrian line near Josephstadt. 
 
 On the night of the 29th Prince Frederick Charles stormed 
 Gitschin, and defeated Count Clam Gallas, who retired in 
 disorder towards Koniggratz. The loss of Gitschin exposed 
 the left flank of Benedek's intended position. As soon as he 
 heard the news of Count Clam Gallas's failure on the morning 
 of the 30th, he was obliged to make new arrangements to 
 oppose the advance of the enemy towards Vienna. 
 
 Of his eight corps, five — namely, the first corps, the Saxons, 
 the sixth, eighth, and tenth — had been decidedly beaten, and 
 had suffered great loss both in men and morale. The fourth 
 corps had also been under fire and suffered, though to a much 
 less serious extent. Two corps only remained to the Austrian 
 commander which were thoroughly intact. He had no hope 
 of any supports, reserves, or reinforcements. His left flank 
 was exposed, and no course remained open to him except to 
 retire before he was cut off from his line of communication i 
 with Vienna, and to accept battle from his adversary in a chosen ; 
 and prepared position. The Austrian army had suffered a loss : 1 
 of about forty thousand men since the opening of the campaign 
 in its attempts to prevent the junction of the Prussian armies. . 1 
 Notwithstanding this, its bravery and power of endurance' 
 were still great. High hopes were entertained that Benedek's 
 generalship would retrieve all previous failures by a decisive;- 
 victory. 
 
 The Austrian commander felt himself unequal to assume the! 
 offensive. He was forced to seek a defensive position, and 
 could choose one in either of two entirely distinct manners. 
 If he desired a purely defensive position he might withdraw! 
 behind the Elbe, and take up the line of that river between! 
 the fortresses of Josephstadt and Koniggratz ; or, what would 
 perhaps have been better, he might have concentrated his army' 
 behind the Adler, between Koniggratz and Hohenbruck. 
 Here his left flank would have been secured by the fortress, 1 
 his right by the Adler, and he would have covered a safe 
 retreat and source of supply in the railway between Pardubitz 
 
Chap. L] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 223 
 
 and Bohmisch Triibau. On the other side he might choose a 
 defensive position, where he would still retain the power of 
 assuming the offensive. This appears to have been his object. 
 He hoped in a great battle to repair the misfortunes of the 
 last few days, and then on his side to advance as an assailant 
 Whether he would have done better to have taken up an 
 entirely defensive position until the confidence of his army was 
 i restored is a question which few could decide. He has been 
 I blamed for not doing so, but in war success is generally 
 I regarded as the sole criterion of merit. Fortune declared 
 against Benedek. He did not reap success. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 30th June, he issued orders for the 
 [whole army to retire towards Koniggratz, and to concentrate 
 iin front of that fortress. This retreat along crowded country 
 (roads was attended with considerable difficulty, and it was not 
 •till the night of the 2nd July that his whole force was assembled 
 (in front of Koniggratz, where it took up a position between 
 ithat town and the little river Bistritz. 
 
 On the Prussian side four divisions of the First Army, and 
 part of that of General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, had not yet 
 been under fire. Of the Second Army three brigades had not 
 las yet pulled a trigger. The first corps had had time to recruit 
 (itself after its defeat at Trautenau, and the remainder of the 
 troops were flushed with victory, high of courage, and eager 
 for battle. In order to complete effectually the junction 
 between the army of the Crown Prince, which on the 30th 
 jf une had concentrated on the left of the Upper Elbe, with that 
 bf Prince Frederick Charles, which, with the Army of the Elbe 
 is its right wing, was halted that day round Gitschin, the 
 Second Army would require to make a wheel to its left, pivoted 
 )n Gradlitz. To carry out this movement, on the 1st July the 
 irst corps, which formed the right wing of the Army of Silesia, 
 jidvanced from Arnau to Ober Prausnitz, and threw its ad- 
 vanced guard forward to Zelejow on the road to Miletin. The 
 :avalry division took post at Neustadtl. The first division of 
 he Guards occupied Koniginhof, while its advanced guard 
 >.eized the plateau of Daubrowitz, on the bank of the Elbe. 
 Hie second division of the Guards, the reserve artillery, and 
 jhe heavy cavalry of the Guard halted at Rettendorf, while the 
 
224 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. i 
 
 fifth and sixth corps concentrated round Gradlitz. The head-, 
 quarters of the Crown Prince were in Koniginhof. The 
 Prussian generals thought that Feldzeugmeister Benedek would 
 accept battle on the left bank of the Elbe, with his flanks 
 resting on the fortresses of Josephstadt and Koniggratz, which: 
 lie ten miles apart along the river, and with his front covered 
 by the stream ; or that, if he did not do so, he would cross the 
 Elbe at Pardubitz, and take up a position there behind the ; 
 river. 
 
 Under this idea two and a half Prussian corps were held on 
 the left bank of the Elbe both to observe the fortress of 
 Josephstadt and to be prepared vigorously to oppose anyJ 
 attack made from behind the cover of that fortress against the 
 line of communication of the Crown Prince with Silesia. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles, on the ist July, pushed forward 
 from Gitschin. The Army of the Elbe formed his right wing, 
 and occupied Smidar and Hoch Wessely. The sixth division.; 
 with the fifth in its rear, occupied Miletin ; the seventh and; : 
 eighth, Horitz; the third and fourth, with the cavalry corps 
 and the reserve artillery corps, were bivouacked along the road* i 
 from Gitschin to Horitz. The head-quarters of the Prince 
 were at Kammenitz. 
 
 The small chateau and village of Kammenitz lie on the 
 northern slope of an isolated hill, which stands on the left-hanc 
 side of the road from Gitschin to Horitz, about half-way be' 
 tween the two towns. The head-quarters of Prince Frederic! p. 
 Charles were moved here on the evening of the ist July fronJ 
 Gitschin. 
 
 From the hill south of the village of Kammenitz a widei 
 view could be obtained of the undulating plain which, richh I 
 cultivated and studded with villages and fir-woods, stretche: > 
 southwards for nearly thirty miles. Near to Kammenitz, th«;| 
 smoke of the bivouac fires and the glitter of the sunlight or I 
 the piled arms marked the position of the Prussian troops, bu j 
 no Austrian outposts could be made out During the marcl 
 of that day a sudden thunderstorm came on, and the rain fel 5 
 heavily for an hour; the road, crowded with thousands o 
 waggons and military carriages, ran into ruts under the exces 
 sive transport, and the convoys of Austrian wounded, who ha< v 
 
Chap. I.] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. ±2% 
 
 been perforce deserted by their retreating friends, jolted paim 
 fully along towards the hospitals which had been established at 
 Gitschin. The maimed soldiers suffered much, for every time 
 the waggons rocked some wound was opened afresh, or some 
 bandage came undone, but they bore it patiently, and their 
 guardians did all they could to alleviate their sufferings. The 
 different coloured facings of the wounded told that many 
 Austrian regiments had been engaged in the late combats, for 
 the uniforms of the different infantry regiments could be distin- 
 guished, besides those of hussars and riflemen. 
 
 On the night of the 1st the main body of the First Army 
 
 lay between Kammenitz and Horitz. General von Bittenfeld 
 
 had occupied Smidar on the right flank, and Jung Bunzlau* was 
 
 also occupied in the same direction. The head of the columns 
 
 of the Second Army had crossed the Upper Elbe, asd the 
 
 : whole Prussian force was free for operations in Bohemia, for 
 
 ! the Hanoverians had laid down their arms near Erfurth, and 
 
 i there were now no hostile troops in Northern Germany. t 
 
 The inhabitants of the towns had mostly fled on the approach 
 i of the Prussian army, but the country villagers, unable to afford 
 jto pay for transport, had been obliged to remain in their 
 houses. Nor did they suffer by doing so, for the Prussian 
 (soldiers behaved well, and there was no plundering where the 
 ; inhabitants remained. In the towns where there was no one 
 jto sell, the commissariat was obliged to take the necessaries of 
 (life, for the marches had been long, the roads had been 
 Icrowded with troops, and the provision trains had not always 
 been able to keep up with the army. But the soldiers never 
 jused force to supply their wants. Forage for the horses was 
 itaken from the barns of the large landed proprietors, who had 
 (deserted their castles and chateaux ; but the men paid for what 
 ;they had from the peasantry : unable to speak the Bohemian 
 language, they by signs made their wants understood, and the 
 peasantry, as far as lay in their power, supplied them readily, 
 for none were found so ignorant as not to appreciate Prussian 
 fcoin. The villagers were invariably kindly treated \ no 
 
 * On the railway between Miinchengriitz and Prague, 
 f See post, 
 
226 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VU, 
 
 cottages had been ransacked, their poultry yards had been 
 respected, their cattle had not been taken away from them, 
 and, though the women of this province are beautiful, no 
 Bohemian girl had cause to rue the invasion of her country. 
 Yet the inhabitants of a land where a war is carried on must 
 always suffer ; troops must move through the standing corn, 
 cavalry and artillery must trample down the crops ; hamlets 
 must be occupied, defended, and assaulted, and a shell, in- 
 tended to fall among fighting men, must often unintentionally 
 set fire to a cottage, which, blazing fiercely, communicates the 
 flames to others, and thus a whole hamlet is often destroyed. 
 Then the ejected cottagers have little hope of anything but 
 starvation, for a vast army with its many hundred thousand 
 mouths eats up everything in the country, and can spare little 
 after its own necessities are supplied to give away in charity. 
 The proprietors of the burnt houses sometimes wandered about 
 the fields dejected and desponding, sometimes stood staring 
 vacantly at the cinders and charred timbers which marked the 
 place where a few days ago stood their homes ; the little money 
 that was given to them by kind-hearted officers might keep off 
 the pangs of hunger for a short time, but was no compensation 
 for the heavy losses they had sustained, for often their cottage 
 and their cowhouse and a little field was all their wealth, and 
 since these were gone and their crop destroyed, they had 
 nothing. The young men even in the country districts had 
 nearly all fled south, frightened by a report that the Prussians 
 would make them join the ranks; for this report there was 
 never a foundation, for no recruits had been demanded or 
 received in the countries occupied by the armies. 
 
 Brilliant success had attended the skilful plans laid for the 
 prosecution of this campaign by the Prussian leaders. The 
 army of Prince Frederick Charles had fought five severe 
 combats without a reverse, and had secured a favourable posi- 
 tion in which to fight a great battle. The Crown Prince fought 
 severe actions on the 27th, 28th, and 29th, and had now 
 secured his junction with Prince Frederick Charles, bringing 
 with him as trophies of his victories 15,000 prisoners, 24 
 captured guns, six stands of colours, and two standards. 
 
 The places where there had been fighting did not longretair 
 
 I 
 
Chap. L] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. 227 
 
 the more ghastly signs of the combat ; the wounded were 
 always removed as quickly as the krankeiitrager could work, 
 and though broken boughs, burnt houses, and down-trodden 
 corn marked for a few days the places where the hostile troops 
 had been engaged, the broken arms and castaway knapsacks 
 were- soon removed, and the graves dotted among the fields, 
 each with a wooden cross at the head, alone told the spots 
 where soldiers had fallen. And these, too, soon disappeared, 
 for the sun and the rain rapidly diminished the mounds of 
 newly-turned earth, and it will soon be impossible to distinguish 
 the positions of the graves from the other parts of the fields. 
 But this will matter little to those who sleep below. The 
 wounded merited greater commiseration. The hospital re- 
 sources of the Prussian army had been tasked to the utmost, 
 for more wounded prisoners had been taken than could have 
 been anticipated. Every available house and the churches in 
 Gitschin had been converted into hospitals, but still there was 
 more room required ; nor would the few remaining inhabitants 
 help to assist the wounded Austrian soldiers ; in vain did the 
 Prussian staff entreat, imprecate, and threaten ; the towns- 
 people who were still at Gitschin would not even carry some of 
 the coffee which they had in abundance to give to the wounded, 
 and these from the scarcity of provisions in the army fared 
 badly. As the news spread abroad in the country that the 
 Prussians did not pillage and murder, the people began to 
 return to their houses, but they all appeared to be totally 
 callous to the sufferings of their fellow-countrymen. The 
 Austrian medical men and hospital attendants who were 
 i captured at Gitschin worked hard, and were aided powerfully 
 I by the Prussian officers, but they had few materials with which 
 to supply the wants of so many; and though none went 
 ■ totally unprovided for, and none were entirely neglected, a 
 little trouble on the part of the inhabitants would have tended 
 (materially to the comfort and cure of many. 
 
 The inhabitants pleaded as an excuse that the Austrian 
 .soldiery had treated them badly, and had pillaged ; but this 
 did not seem true, for the houses bore no signs of having been 
 3lundered, and if plundering had been allowed in the Austrian 
 army the prisoners would not have had to complain of want of 
 
22S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 food. Railway traffic was already opened to Miinchengratz, 
 but the army had now left the line of railway, many miles of 
 road separating it from the nearest station ; and in those miles 
 of road lay the difficulty of supplying the troops with pro- 
 visions. The railway trains easily brought enough to any 
 station, but at this time the roads were required for the march- 
 ing columns, and everything had to give way for the passage of 
 the troops. 
 
 The army carried no tents ; sometimes at night the soldiers 
 were billeted in villages, but more often slept in the open air. 
 As soon as a regiment arrived at the place where it was to pass 
 the night, the rifles were piled four together resting against each 
 other, and the knapsacks were taken off and laid on the ground 
 beside them. The men quickly lighted their fires and began 
 cooking their rations ; a couple of stones or a few bricks formed 
 their field stoves, and their whole cooking apparatus consisted 
 of the one tin can which they carry with them. This serves 
 for both boiling the water for coffee and for making their meat 
 into a thick soup, which they seem to prefer to roasted food. 
 As soon as it got dark each man lay down to sleep wrapped in 
 his cloak with his knapsack for a pillow, and the muffled figures 
 lay as regularly in the bivouac as they stood in the ranks on 
 parade. The officers lay separate in groups of two or three, 
 and in rear of the battalion the horses were picketed and 
 champed at their bits uneasily all night long, and seldom « 
 seemed to lie down. When a village was occupied a rush was 
 made to secure mattresses, but these were only used by the s 
 luxurious. The men, as a rule, appeared to prefer straw, and I 
 if they could get plenty of it were quite content to sleep in the \ 
 open air. General and staff officers usually contrived to get | 
 into houses, and then there was a heavy drain on the sleeping t 
 accommodation of the establishment. One had a pillow, j 
 another a mattress, a third a couple of blankets, and beds were 
 made on the floor on the most advanced shake-down principles, 
 but all slept soundly, for the day's work was long and tiring, 
 and the march generally begun at early morning. The pro- 
 prietors of most of the large houses had not only left them, but 
 had taken most of their furniture with them, so that the tem- 
 porary occupants were entirely dependent on what little had 
 
Chap. I.] PRECEDING THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 229 
 
 been left behind, and had to make it up by by borrowing from 
 the nearest cottages. 
 
 On the 30th June the King left Berlin, and on the afternoon 
 of the 1 st July arrived at Gitschin, where in person he assumed 
 the supreme command of the three Prussian armies in Bohemia. 
 It was decided by him that the troops should halt on the 2nd 
 July, to recover from the great fatigues they had lately under- 
 gone. 
 
 A council of war was ordered to assemble at Gitschin, to 
 which Prince Frederick Charles and the Crown Prince were 
 summoned. It was decided that on the 3rd the First Army 
 should send a reconnaissance towards Koniggratz, that the 
 Second should send a strong detachment towards Josephstadt, 
 and if possible cut that fortress off from communication with 
 the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek ; while the remainder of 
 the troops halted in their actual positions. 
 
 These plans were, however, entirely altered within a few 
 hours. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 
 
 When Prince Frederick Charles left Kammenitz on the 
 morning of Monday, the 2nd July, to attend the council of 
 Avar summoned by the King to meet at Gitschin, he sent out 
 two officers to reconnoitre beyond Horitz ; both fell in with 
 Austrian troops, and had to fight and ride hard to bring their 
 information home safely. Major Von Ungar, who went in the 
 direction of Koniggratz, escorted by a few dragoons, came 
 upon a large force of Austrian cavalry and Jagers before he got 
 to the little river Bistritz, over which the road from Horitz to 
 Koniggratz crosses, about half way between those two towns. 
 A squadron of cavalry made an immediate dash to catch him, 
 and he and his dragoons had to ride for their lives ; the 
 Austria ns pursued, and those best mounted came up to the 
 Prussians, but not in sufficient numbers to stop them, and 
 after a running skirmish, in which Von Ungar received a lance 
 thrust in the side which carried away most of his coat, but 
 hardly grazed the skin, this reconnoitring party safely gained 
 the outposts of their own army. More on the Prussian right 
 the other reconnoitring officer also found the Austrians in force, 
 and was obliged to retire rapidly. From the reports of these 
 officers, and from other information which Prince Frederick 
 Charles received at Kammenitz on his return from the council 
 of war held at Gitschin, he inferred that the Austrian com- 
 mander had the intention of advancing the next day from the 
 Bistritz, with the object of attacking the First Prussian Army 
 with superior force, before its junction with that of the Crown 
 Prince was practically effected. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles, in order to secure a favourable 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 231 
 
 position in which to accept this probable attack, resolved 
 immediately to move his army forward beyond Horitz, and 
 sent orders to General Von Bittenfeld to advance with the 
 army of the Elbe to- Neu Bidsow, and be prepared thence to 
 fall upon the left wing of the Austrian column of advance, while 
 he himself assailed its leading divisions. At the same time he 
 sent Lieutenant Von Normand with a letter to the Crown 
 Prince, asking him to push forward in the morning from 
 Miletin with one corps, and attack the right flank of the 
 Austrians while he himself engaged them in front. There was 
 some fear that the Austrian cavalry patrols and detachments 
 which were prowling about would intercept the aide-de-camp 
 and stop the letter, but Von Normand succeeded in avoiding 
 them, and got safely to the Crown Prince's head-quarters at 
 one o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, and rejoined Prince 
 Frederick Charles at four to report the success of his mission, 
 and to bring to the leader of the First Army an assurance of 
 the co-operation of the Second. Had this aide-de-camp been 
 taken prisoner or killed on his way to Miletin, his loss would 
 have probably influenced the whole campaign, for on that letter 
 depended in a great measure the issue of the battle. 
 
 The commander of the First Army sent at the same time his 
 chief of the staff, General Von Voigt Rhetz, to acquaint the 
 King at Gitschin with the steps he was prepared to take, and 
 to solicit his approval of them. The King expressed his 
 entire approbation of the plan of Prince Frederick Charles, 
 and sent an officer of his own staff to order the Crown Prince 
 to advance in the morning against the Austrian right, not with 
 one corps alone, but with all his available forces. An officer of 
 the King's staff was also sent to General Herwarth von Bitten- 
 feld, with an endorsement of the order already signed by Prince 
 Frederick Charles. 
 
 Long before midnight the troops were all in motion, and at 
 half-past one in the morning the general staff left Kammenitz. 
 The moon occasionally shone out brightly, but was generally 
 hidden behind clouds, and then could be distinctly seen the 
 decaying bivouac fires in the places which had been occupied 
 by the troops along the road. These fires looked like large 
 will-o'-the-wisps as their flames flickered about in the wind, and 
 
232 SEVEN WEEK'S' WAR. [Cook VII. 
 
 stretched for many a mile, for there were 100,000 soldiers with 
 the First Army alone, and the bivouacs of so great a force 
 spread over a wide extent of country. Day gradually began to 
 break, but with the first symptoms of dawn a drizzling rain 
 came on, which lasted until late in the afternoon. The wind 
 increased and blew coldly upon the soldiers, for they were 
 short of both sleep and food, while frequent gusts bore down 
 to the ground the water-laden corn in the wide fields alongside 
 the way. 
 
 The main road from Horitz to Koniggratz sinks into a deep 
 hollow near the village of Milowitz. On the side of this 
 hollow furthest from Horitz, is placed near the road the village 
 of that name, and on the left of the road, on the same bank, 
 stands a thick fir wood. A little after midnight the army of 
 Prince Frederick Charles was entirely concealed in this hollow, 
 ready to issue from its ambush and attack the Austrians if they 
 should advance.* Soon after dawn, a person standing between 
 the village of Milowitz and the further hill of Dub could see no 
 armed men, except a few Prussian vedettes posted along the 
 Dub ridge, whose lances stood in relief above the summit, 
 against the murky sky. A few dismounted officers were 
 standing below a fruit-tree in front of Milowitz, with their 
 horses held by some orderlies behind them. These were 
 Prince Frederick Charles and his staff. All was still, except 
 when the neigh of a horse, or a loud word of command as the 
 last divisions formed, rose mysteriously from the hollow of 
 Milowitz. 
 
 Until nearly four o'clock the army remained concealed. 
 No Austrian scouts came pricking over the hill of Dub, no 
 enemy's skirmishers were detected in the corn by the side of 
 the high road. Prince Frederick Charles began to fear that the 
 Austrian commander meant to slip away from the encounter, 
 and to steal behind the Elbe, where his right flank would 
 be covered by Josephstadt, from the assault of the army of 
 Silesia. 
 
 * The eighth division and cavalry, with the fifth and sixth divisions in 
 rear, were on the left of the road, while the third and fourth divisions 
 were behind the villages of Bristau and Stracow respectively, in the same 
 hollow. 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 233 
 
 To hold the Austrian army in front of the Elbe was abso- 
 lutely necessary for the success of the Prussian plans, and 
 Prince Frederick Charles resolved, with his own army alone, to 
 : engage the whole of Benedek's forces, and clinging to the 
 I Austrian commander, to hold him on the Bistritz until the 
 ! Prussian flank attacks could be developed. A few short words 
 j passed from the commander of the First Army to the chief 
 !of his staff; a few aides-de-camp, mounting silently, rode 
 i quietly away; and, as it were by the utterance of a magician's 
 I spell, one hundred thousand Prussian warriors springing into 
 Isight as if from the bowels of the armed earth, swept over the 
 isouthern edge of the Milowitz ravine, towards the hill of Dub. 
 The head of the eighth division was on the main road to 
 ;K6niggratz, while the third and fourth divisions spread through 
 .the corn lands on its right. The fifth and sixth divisions fol- 
 lowed the eighth in reserve. A brigade of cavalry served on 
 the left of the eighth division to connect the main army with 
 ;he seventh division under Franzecky, which had been sent 
 straight from Miletin to Cerekwitz, in order to cover the left 
 ■lank of the First Army. 
 
 I About four o'clock in the morning of the 3rd July, the army 
 
 >egan to advance, and marched slowly up the gentle hill which 
 
 • leads from Milowitz to the village of Dub, two miles nearer 
 
 Koniggratz. The corn lay heavy and tangled from the rain, 
 
 ipon the ground ; the skirmishers pushed through it' nimbly, 
 
 )ut the battalions which followed behind in crowded columns 
 
 oiled heavily through the down-beaten crops, and the artillery 
 
 jiorses had to strain hard on their traces to get the wheels of 
 
 he gun-carriages through the sticky soil. At six the whole 
 
 rmy was close up to Dub, but it was not allowed to go upon 
 
 re summit of the slope, for the ridge on which Dub stands had 
 
 idden all its motions, and the Austrians could see nothing of 
 
 ie troops collected behind the crest. Perhaps they thought 
 
 lat no Prussians were near them, except ordinary advanced 
 
 osts ; for the cavalry vedettes which had been pushed forward 
 
 ms far over night remained on the top of the ridge, as if nothing 
 
 ere going on behind them. 
 
 From the top of the slight elevation on which the village of 
 'ub stands, the ground slopes gently down to the river Bistritz, 
 
234 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 which the road crosses at the village of Sadowa, a mile and a 
 quarter from Dub. From Sadowa the ground again rises 
 beyond the Bistritz,and to the little village ofChlum, conspicuous 
 by its church tower standing at the top of the gentle hill, a 
 mile and a half beyond Sadowa. A person standing that morn- 
 ing on the top of the ridge saw Sadowa below him, built of 
 wooden cottages, surrounded by orchards, and could distinguish 
 among its houses several water-mills, but these were not at work, 
 for all the inhabitants of the village had been sent away, and a 
 white coat here and there among the cottages was not a pea- 
 sant's blouse, but was the uniform of an Austrian soldier; tliree 
 quarters of a mile down the Bistritz a big red-brick house, with 
 a high brick chimney near it, looked like a manufactory, and < 
 some large wooden buildings alongside it were unmistakeabMj 
 warehouses ; close to these a few wooden cottages, probably 
 meant for the workmen employed at the manufactory, completed 
 the village of Dohalitz. 
 
 A little more than three quarters of a mile still further down, 
 the Bistritz stood the village of Mokrovous, — like most Bohe-. 
 mian country villages, built of pine-wood cottages enclustered; 
 in orchard trees. The Chateau of Dohalicka stands midway: 
 between Dohalitz and Mokrovous, on a knoll overhanging the' 
 river. Behind Dohalitz, and between that village and the high- 
 road which runs through Sadowa, there lies a large thick wood i 
 many of the trees had been cut down about ten feet above thii* 
 ground, and the cut down branches had been twisted togethe- 
 between the standing trunks of the trees which were nearest t< 
 the river, to make an entrance into the wood from the fronJ 
 extremely difficult. On the open slope between Dohalitz an<]l 
 Dohalicka along the ground there seemed to run a dark dotte M 
 line of stumpy bushes, but the telescope showed that these werjlj 
 guns, and that this battery alone contained about sixty piece:B 
 Four miles down the Bistritz, from Sadowa could be seen thfl 
 house-tops of Nechanitz, above which rose the dark nr-woocjiM 
 that clustered round the Castle of Hradek. Looking to trfl 
 left, up the course of the Bistritz, the ground was open betwedM 
 the orchards of Sadowa and the trees which grow rour' | 
 Benatek, a little village about two miles above Sadowa, exce 
 where, midway between these villages, a broad belt of nr-woo*i 
 
hap. II.] BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. 235 
 
 ins for three-quarters of a mile. Above and beyond these 
 llages and woods on the course of the river, the spire of Chlum 
 as seen ; below it a few houses, gardens, and patches of fir- 
 ood ; and a little to the left, rather down the hill, the cottages 
 f the hamlet of Cistowes, and on the side of the main road 
 le orchards, and the house-tops of Lipa. 
 On the extreme left, at the foot of the hills, lay the larger 
 llage of Horenowes, above which stood on the bare plateau 
 hat appeared to be a large single tree."' 
 
 The air was thick and hazy, the rain came down steadily, 
 
 nd the wind blew bitterly cold, while the infantry and artillery 
 
 ere waiting behind the brow of the hill near Dub. At seven 
 
 clock Prince Frederick Charles pushed forward some of his 
 
 avalry and horse artillery. They moved down the slope 
 
 pwards the Bistritz at a gentle trot, slipping about on the 
 
 I jreasy ground, but keeping most beautiful lines; the lance flags 
 
 If the Uhlans, wet with the rain, flapping heavily against the 
 
 . caves. At the bottom of the hill the trumpets sounded, and in 
 
 aaking their movements to gain the bridge the squadrons began 
 
 wheeling and hovering about the side of the river, as if they 
 
 'ourted the fire of the enemy. Then the Austrian guns opened 
 
 jpon them from a battery placed in a field near the village at 
 
 "hich the main road crosses the Bistritz, and the battle of 
 
 loniggratz began. 
 
 j Feldzeugmeister Benedek had drawn up the Austrian army 
 ' accept battle in this position seen from the Dub hill. His 
 entre lay in front of Chlum, where the hills attain their greatest 
 'eight ; in his front was the marshy stream of the Bistritz. 
 batteries had been thrown up in some positions favourable for 
 ringing a heavy artillery fire to bear against his assailants, and 
 :ie ranges of different distances from these batteries marked by 
 |oles and barked trees. Little was spared to bring the artillery, 
 ie best arm of the Austrian service, into action with every 
 dvantage.t The villages were also barricaded and prepared 
 
 * The supposed solitary tree was in reality two trees, but was taken to be 
 ie by both Prussian armies, and from the fortress of Koniggratz. 
 ■ t The great loss of Austrian guns was due to the horses and limbers being 
 !nt under cover of the hill out of fire. When the Prussians advanced only 
 ie lightest guns could be saved, and nearly one third of the Austrian pieces 
 agaged fell into the hands of the victors. 
 
236 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 with abattis for infantry defence, but not sufficiently. The right 
 flank of the Austrian position was covered to a certain extent 
 by the Trotina brook, which flows through a deep marshy 
 ravine into the Elbe, but little had been done by the engineer 
 to aid in opposing the passage of this naturally strong feature. 
 The left wing was supported by the wood and castle of Hradek. 
 while the left centre was strengthened by possession of the : 
 villages of Problus and Prim. Feldzeugmeister Benedek hac 
 formed his army in the following order of battle : — 
 
 The Saxons on the left wing held Problus, with an advancer 
 guard in Nechanitz ; in rear of them stood the eighth corps_ 
 the first light cavalry division, and the second division of reservd 
 cavalry at Prim. 
 
 In the centre, the tenth corps was posted round Langenhoi: 
 the third corps round Cistowes, and the fourth corps at Mas; 
 lowed, with a detachment in Benatek. 
 
 On the right wing, the second corps and the second division 
 of light cavalry were at Sendrasctz, while on the extreme rigb' 
 flank the Schwarz-gclb brigade held the Trotina. 
 
 As reserves, the first corps was posted on the left of the maij 
 road near Rosnitz, the sixth corps on the right of the road 
 the south of Rosberitz ; in rear of these were the first and thir 
 divisions of reserve cavalry. 
 
 The first shot was fired about half-past seven. The Prussia' 
 horse artillery, close down to the river, replied to the Austria, 
 guns, but neither side fired heavily, and for half an hour tH 
 cannonade consisted of but little more than single shots. At 
 quarter before eight the King of Prussia arrived on the fiel 
 and very soon after the horse artillery were reinforced by oth 
 field batteries, and the Prussian gunners began firing their she . 
 quickly into the Austrian position. As soon as the Prussian fi 
 actively commenced Austrian guns seemed to appear, as if " 
 magic, in every point of the position; from every road, from eve' 
 village, from the orchard of Mokrovous, on the Prussian right, • 
 the orchard of Benatek, on their left, came flashes of fire a • 
 whizzing rifle shells, which, bursting with a sharp crack, st: 
 their splinters rattling among the guns, gunners, carriages, ail- 
 horses, often killing a man or horse, sometimes dismounting 
 gun, but always ploughing up the earth, and scattering the ml 
 
;iiap. II. ] BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. 237 
 
 n the men's faces. But the Austrians did not confine them- 
 elves to firing on the artillery alone, for they threw their shells 
 ip the slope opposite to them towards Dub, and one shell 
 :ame slap into a squadron of Uhlans, who were close beside 
 he King ; burying itself with a heavy thud in the ground, it 
 plew up columns of mud some twenty feet in the air, and, 
 )ursting a moment after, reduced the squadron by four files. 
 
 As soon as the cannonade in front became serious, the guns 
 !)f the seventh division began to bombard the village of 
 Senatek, on the Austrian right. The Austrians returned shot 
 or shot, and neither side either gained or lost ground. In the 
 :entre, too, the battle was very even ; the Prussians pushed 
 jattery after battery into the action, and kept up a tremendous 
 ; ire on the Austrian guns, but these returned it, and sometimes 
 Lvith interest, for the Austrian artillery officers knew their 
 ground, and every shell fell true ; many officers and men fell, 
 ,ind many horses were killed or wounded. More Kranken- 
 pagers were sent down to the batteries, and always returned 
 Dairying on stretchers men whose wounds had been hastily 
 jound up under fire, but who seemed to be too much stunned 
 :o suffer much from pain. 
 
 Gradually the Prussian cannonade appeared to get stronger, 
 and the Austrian batteries between Dohalitz and Dohalicka 
 (retired higher up the hill, but the guns at Mokrovous still stood 
 last, and the Prussians had not yet crossed the Bistritz ; many 
 guns were now turned on Mokrovous, and at ten o'clock the 
 battery there was also obliged to retire a little. 
 
 While this cannonade had been going on, some of the in- 
 fantry had been moved down towards the river, where they took 
 shelter from the fire under a convenient undulation of ground. 
 
 The eighth division came down on the left-hand side of the 
 causeway, and, under the cover of the rising in the ground, 
 iformed its columns for the attack of the village of Sadowa ; 
 while the third and fourth divisions, on the right-hand side of 
 pe road prepared to storm Dohalitz and Mokrovous. A little 
 before their preparations were complete the village of Benatek, 
 on the Austrians' right, caught fire, and the seventh division 
 made a dash to secure it, but the Austrians were not driven out 
 by the flames, and here for the first time in the battle was there 
 
238 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 hand-to-hand lighting. The 27th regiment led the attack, and 
 rushed into the orchards of the village ; the burning houses 
 s ^parated the combatants ; they poured volley after volley at 
 each other through the flames ; but the Prussians found means 
 to get round the burning houses, and, taking the defenders in; 
 reverse, forced them to retire with the loss of many prisoners. 
 
 It was ten o'clock when Prince Frederick Charles sent' 
 General Stiilpnagel to order the attack on Sadowa, Dohalitz,' 
 and Mokrovous. The columns advanced covered by skir-j 
 mishers, and reached the river bank without much loss, but' 
 from there they had to fight every inch of their way. The 
 Austrian infantry held the bridges and villages in force, ancf; 
 Bred fast upon them as they approached. The Prussians coulo, 
 advance but slowly along the narrow ways and against the; 
 defences of the houses, and the volleys sweeping through tht 
 ranks seemed to tear the soldiers down. The Prussians fired i 
 much more quickly than their opponents, but they could no,': 
 see to take their aim ; the houses, trees, and smoke from th< ! 
 Austrian discharges shrouded the villages. Sheltered by these' 
 the Austrian Jagers fired blindly where they could tell by heai< I 
 ing that the attacking columns were, and the shots told tremera 1 
 dously on the Prussians in their close formations ; but th 
 latter improved their positions, although slowly, and by dint c i 
 sheer courage and perseverance, for they lost men at every yar.| 
 of their advance, and in some places almost paved the wa; j 
 with wounded. Then, to help the infantry, the Prussia 
 artillery turned its fire, regardless of the enemy's batteries, c 
 the villages, and made tremendous havoc among the houseB 
 Mokrovous and Dohalitz both caught fire, and the shells ft 
 quickly and with fearful effect among the defenders of tl 
 flaming hamlets ; the Austrian guns also played upon tl 
 attacking infantry, but at this time these were sheltered fro 
 their fire by the houses and trees between. 
 
 In and around the villages the fighting continued for near 
 an hour; then the Austrian infantry, who had been theii - 
 driven out by a rush of the Prussians, retired, but only a litt 
 way up the slope into a line with their batteries. The wo< 
 above Sadowa was strongly held, and that between Sadowa ai 
 Benatek, teeming with riflemen, stood to bar the way of tit] 
 
:HAP. II.] BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. 239 
 
 seventh division. But General Franzecky, who commanded 
 his division, was not to be easily stopped, and he sent his 
 nfantry at the wood, and turned his artillery on the Austrian 
 patteries. The seventh division began firing into the trees, but 
 bund they could not make any impression, for the defenders 
 vere concealed, and musketry fire was useless against them, 
 ranzecky let them go, and they dashed in with the bayonet. 
 The Austrians would not retire, but waited for the struggle, 
 md in the wood above Benatek was fought out one of the 
 iercest combats which the war has seen. But the wood was 
 :arried. The Austrian line of advanced posts was now driven 
 n on the Bistritz, but its commander had formed his main 
 ine of battle a little higher up the hill, round Lipa, still hold- 
 ng the wood which lies above Sadowa. 
 
 Then the Prussian artillery was sent across the Bistritz, and 
 3egan to fire upon the new Austrian position. At the same 
 ime the smoke of General Herwarth's advance was gradually 
 ;een moving towards the Austrian left. He had at Nechanitz 
 bund the brigade of Saxon troops which formed the advanced 
 
 t ront of the corps at Problus, with some Austrian cavalry, and 
 ivas driving them towards Problus and Prim, himself following 
 
 t [n such a direction that it appeared he would turn the Austrian 
 eft flank. But the Austrian commander seemed determined 
 fo hold his position, and heavy masses of infantry and cavalry 
 :ould be seen on the upper part of the slope. 
 
 By eleven o'clock the eighth division of the Prussian infantry 
 had taken the village of Sadowa, the fourth that of Dohalitz, 
 }md the third that of Dohalicka. The eighth division was now 
 lent against the wood, which, above these places, runs along 
 [he side of the Sadowa and Lipa road, while the third and 
 ourth divisions attempted to bear the battle up the hill towards 
 Lipa, and to attack the left flank of the wood. The Prussians 
 idvanced against the nearest trees, but did not at first make 
 nuch impression, for the Austrians being here again concealed, 
 he fire of the needle-gun did not tell, and a whole battery 
 )laced at the far end of the wood fired through the trees, and 
 old on their ranks with awful effect. But the assailants fought 
 )n, at last broke down the obstacles at the entrance, and then 
 lashed in. The fighting continued from tree to tree, and the 
 
240 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII 
 
 Austrians made many a rush to recover the lost position of tin 
 wood, but in this close fighting their boyish troops went dowi 
 easily before the the strong men of the eighth division ; bu 
 when the defenders drew back a little, and their artillery playet 
 into the trees, the Prussians suffered fearfully, and about hall 
 way up in the wood the fight became stationary. 
 
 For two hours more it continued so ; in vain Home, wh 
 commanded the eighth division, strove to push along the roa 
 or through the trees to storm the battery beyond. The fir 
 was too terrible, and his men became gradually exhausted. 
 
 A few minutes after the Prussians had occupied the village 
 along the Bistritz, Feldzeugmeister Benedek was informed til 
 the sixth Prussian corps belonging to the army of the Crow 
 Prince was threatening his right flank. He sent orders th; 
 this attack should be checked or detained, and appears to hal 
 calculated that the Crown Prince could be held in check unt 
 he had time to inflict a severe blow upon the army of Princ 
 Frederick Charles. With this aim he made his preparatidj 
 for a counter-attack between Problus and Lipa, which was 
 be made as soon as his artillery had shaken the Prussian lii 
 sufficiently. Sixty-four guns were stationed between Lipa ar 
 Streselitz to fire on the third and fourth Prussian division, ar 
 some of the reserves of cavalry and infantry were moved up 
 positions favourable for making the counter-attack. 
 
 At this time the Austrian artillery were making splend 
 practice, and about one o'clock, the whole battle line of 
 Prussians could gain no more ground, and w T as obliged to fig 
 hard to retain the position it had won. At one time it seem- 
 as if it would be lost, for guns had been dismounted by t 
 Austrian fire, and in the wooded ground the needle-gun had : 
 fair field, and the infantry fight was very equal. 
 
 Then Prince Frederick Charles sent the fifth and so 
 divisions forward. They laid down their helmets and knapsac 
 on the ground, and advanced to the river. The King w 
 now near to the Bistritz, and the troops cheered him loudly 
 they marched into the battle. They went over the Sadc 
 bridge, disappeared into the wood, and soon the increasj 
 noise of the musketry told they had begun to fight; but tl 
 Austrian gunners sent salvo after salvo among them, and tfa| 
 
Cuap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 241 
 
 did not push the battle forwards more than a few hundred 
 yards, for they fell back themselves, and they could not reach 
 the enemy. Not only did the fragments of the shells fly about 
 among them, scattering death and awful gashes among their 
 ranks, but the portions of the trees, torn by the artillery fire, 
 flew thickly about, huge ragged splinters that caused even more 
 frightful wounds. 
 
 Herwarth, too, was checked upon the right. The smoke of 
 his musketry and artillery, which had hitherto been pushing 
 forward steadily, stood still. 
 
 He had marched with his three divisions from Smidar to 
 Nechanitz, and had made himself master of this village at the 
 same time as the divisions of Prince Frederick Charles had 
 occupied the hamlets further up the Bistritz. The Saxon 
 artillery withdrew to the heights by Problus and Prim, and to 
 an intrenchment beside the Hradek wood. Then here also 
 the battle came to a standstill. It required a long time to 
 bring the artillery over the Bistritz, for the Saxons had broken 
 the bridge at Nechanitz, no ford could be found, and the banks 
 of the river were too marshy to allow of the guns being dragged 
 through the stream. 
 
 About one o'clock Herwarth's pioneers had repaired the 
 bridge, and his artillery had been brought across the river. He 
 then directed the fourteenth division, commanded by General 
 Minister, against Problus through Lubno as his left wing. In 
 his centre he sent the fifteenth division, under General Canstein, 
 against Prim, while the sixteenth division, under General Etzel, 
 made a wide sweep to the right, in order to turn the left of the 
 Austrian position at the Castle of Hradek. Problus and Prim 
 were strengthened with barricades and abattis. The Saxons 
 and the eighth Austrian corps fought nobly. A hot battle 
 ensued here, which lasted till past three o'clock. 
 
 Affairs did not apparently go more favourably for the 
 Prussians in the centre. The whole of the First Army was 
 severely engaged, with the exception of eight batteries of 
 artillery and the cavalry which was still held in reserve. The 
 reserve artillery of Prince Frederick Charles was sent a little 
 distance up the Bistritz, in order to bring a fire against the 
 flank of the Sadowa wood, to search out the defenders, and if 
 
 R 
 
242 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 possible to dismount the guns in the batteries in front of Lipa. 
 But, notwithstanding, the Austrians clung obstinately to the 
 trees. 
 
 Franzecky's men, cut to pieces, could not be sent forward to 
 attack the Sadowa wood, for they would have exposed them- 
 selves to be taken in rear by the artillery on the right of the 
 Austrian line formed in front of Lipa. The First Army 
 was certainly checked in its advance. The Prussian com- 
 manders began to look anxiously to the left for the coming of 
 the Crown Prince. Some Austrian guns near Lipa were seen 
 to be firing towards the Prussian left, and it was hoped they 
 might be directed against the advanced guard of the Second 
 Army, but at three o'clock there were no signs of Prussian 
 columns advancing against Lipa. The generals became mani- 
 festly uneasy, and they drew Home's division out of the 
 vSadowa wood. Cavalry was also formed up, so that it would 
 be available either for the pursuit of the Austrians, or for re- 
 tarding their pursuit. 
 
 When Prince Frederick Charles sent the night before the 
 battle to request the co-operation of the Crown Prince, the 
 latter sent back an answer that he would be on the field at two 
 o'clock. More than faithful to his promise, he was there with 
 two corps at half-past twelve, and his artillery was engaged 
 with the batteries on the Austrian right at that hour. But the 
 fire from the Austrian batteries was so terrible that he could ; 
 not attack with his infantry till something had been done 
 towards silencing the enemy's guns. The generals directing . 
 the first attack could see nothing of the Crown Prince's in- 
 fantry, as they were hidden in the undulations of the ground. ,t 
 The aide-de-camp despatched from the Second Army to tell the 
 King that the Crown Prince was engaged had to make a long 
 detour, and did not reach the generals directing the front attack 
 till late in the afternoon. Hence arose great uneasiness in the 
 front, for from the direction of the Austrian guns they might 
 have been firing against the seventh division, which formed the , 
 left of the front attack, and as nothing could be seen of the 
 Crown Prince's troops it began to be feared that he had been 
 stopped by some accident. As time went on anxiety increased, 
 for it was felt that the Austrian position was too strong to be 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 243 
 
 taken by a front attack alone. Glasses were anxiously directed 
 to the left, but the day being wet there was no dust to show 
 ! where columns marched, and nothing could be seen to indicate 
 the advance of the Second Army against the Austrian right. 
 The King himself gazed stedfastly through his glass, looking in 
 vain through the misty air. No glimpse could be caught of 
 Prussian riflemen on the slope to the left of Lipa, and no bat- 
 talions could be seen ; the guns also were out of sight, for they 
 were on the reverse side of the Lipa ridge, or were hidden from 
 1 the position of the staff by the wood that runs from Benatek 
 up the slope towards Lipa. 
 
 The anxiety of the Prussian generals at Sadowa was, how- 
 ever, groundless. While they were still unaware that the Crown 
 I Prince was upon the field of battle, some of his soldiers were 
 already in the very heart of the Austrians' position, and holding 
 ;their ground against repeated attempts by superior numbers to 
 dislodge them. 
 
 Advance of the Crown Prince. — On receiving the request' 
 
 from Prince Frederick Charles to move against the Austrians' 
 
 right, and the subsequent order from the King to the same 
 
 effect, the Crown Prince issued orders to the troops to march 
 
 early on the 3rd July. His orders were not sent out till 
 
 nearly five in the morning, but before seven the heads of his 
 
 columns had begun to move. On his left wing the sixth corps 
 
 crossed the Elbe above Jaromir, and marched in two columns 
 
 towards the Trotinka. The twelfth division, under General 
 
 Proudzinsky, which moved down the Elbe close to the river, 
 
 was fired upon by the fortress of Josephstadt, and had to leave 
 
 one brigade to observe the garrison of that place. On the 
 
 "ight wing the first corps, followed by the cavalry division, was 
 
 ordered to march in two columns by Zabres and Grosz-Trotin 
 
 Grosz-Burglitz. In the centre, the corps of the Guards was 
 
 move from Koniginhof on Jericek and Lhota. The fifth 
 
 :orps was to follow the sixth corps as a reserve, and to march 
 
 wo hours later from the Elbe to Choteborek. All baggage 
 
 md train were to be left behind. 
 
 : The Crown Prince knew nothing of the Austrian position. 
 Vhere he should find the Austrian flank, in what force, and 
 iow defended, were questions which he and his chief of the 
 
 R 2 
 
244 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 staff could only answer on the actual field of battle, and on the 
 spur of the moment. The rain had already fallen heavily for 
 some time when the Second Army commenced its march. The 
 Crown Prince witnessed the passage of the Elbe at Koniginhof 
 by a portion of the Guards, and then hastened forward with his 
 staff to place himself at the head of the column. The steep 
 roads leading up the high bank of the valley of the Elbe to the 
 plateau of Daubrowitz, slippery and heavy with the rain, tried 
 severely the strength of both men and horses. 
 
 Directly after passing Daubrowitz the Commander-in-chief of 
 the Second Army saw from smoke arising from a cannonade, 
 and from burning houses in the direction of Sadowa, that the 
 First Army was already engaged. The wind was blowing 
 towards the battle, so that he could not hear the cannonade, 
 and could not tell in which direction it was moving. He 
 directed the head of his column upon Choteborek. The view 
 extended with every step forward, and it soon became apparent 
 that a great battle was being waged. At a quarter-past eleven 
 the Crown Prince had reached the chain of hills to the west of 
 Choteborek with the first division of the corps of the Guards ; 
 close behind him. In front of Choteborek the ground formed 
 a low trough about two miles wide, in which there were many 
 soft and marshy places. Beyond this trough lay the hill of 
 Horenowes, conspicuous with its single tree, and at its foot the 
 village of that name. Beyond this hill the view was shut out,, 
 but on its western side the eye could range clearly down the;j 
 valley of the Bistritz, where it was easy to distinguish the situa- 
 tions of the antagonistic lines of battle by the smoke of a great: 
 number of batteries in action, and by the flames of several 
 burning villages. It could be seen that the seventh division. 
 which formed the left wing of the First Army, was fighting an \ 
 unequal battle in front of Benatek, and was already in need o:<| 
 support. 
 
 Towards Grosz-Biirglitz and Welchow, where the two wing: 
 of the Second Army were to debouch, heavy woods shut ou. 
 the view. It was certain, however, that if these two corps, ii 
 execution of the orders which had been given them, ha< 
 reached those places, the further march of the Second Arm; 
 would conduct it against the right flank and partly into th 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 245 
 
 rear of the enemy's position. Already the army of the Crown 
 Prince occupied a similar position with regard to the First 
 Army, as that of Bliicher to the British line on the day of 
 Waterloo. 
 
 The Crown Prince despatched officers to ascertain the real 
 positions of the first and sixth corps. Hardly had they left his 
 side when a report came in from General Von Mutius with the 
 intelligence that the sixth corps had already reached Welchow, 
 and in consequence of the heavy cannonade he had ordered it 
 to push on in the direction of the firing. It was this advance 
 which, reported to Benedek, was his first intimation of the 
 I advent of the Crown Prince, and which he ordered to be held 
 in check by his second corps. Fortune had ordained that the 
 j sixth corps should have been casually prepared to advance, 
 because, in consequence of the order which it had received to 
 make a reconnaissance against Josephstadt, it had already 
 ■crossed the Elbe when the second order for an advance beyond 
 Josephstadt reached it. 
 
 In a short time the fifth corps was also reported by General 
 |Steinmetz to be approaching Choteborek. No news had come 
 !in from the first corps, but it was known that on account of its 
 longer march its arrival could hardly yet be expected. 
 
 The Crown Prince determined, with the first division of the 
 Guards, which he held available, to seize the hill of Horenowes. 
 jln order to do so, he was obliged to advance across the marshy 
 hollow, where his troops would be exposed, without any cover, 
 to the fire of the Austrian guns, which would have plenty of 
 jtime to collect on the hill in large quantities while the Prussians 
 were traversing the low ground. To save his men as much as 
 possible, the regiments were ordered to spread out and to 
 march singly on the Horenowes hill, where their chief pointed 
 out the conspicuous trees as their goal. 
 
 It was a remarkable circumstance that the columns of the 
 Guards could descry no Austrian patrols or outposts to oppose 
 their path. One battery of artillery alone could be seen upon 
 the Horenowes hill. It was clear that the advance of the 
 Guards would turn the line of Austrian guns, which, posted 
 between Horenowes and Maslowed, were playing on Franzecky, 
 and would take some pressure off his struggling division. As 
 
246 SEVEN WEEKS'- WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 the Guards advanced, these guns were seen to change theii 
 position, and at half-past eleven forty Austrian pieces were 
 ranged beside the single tree, to fire against the advancing 
 columns of the Second Army. At ten minutes to twelve the 
 first shell was discharged from these batteries against the 
 Prussian Guards. 
 
 The advanced guard of the first division of the Prussiar 
 Guards, under General Alvensleben, had bivouacked the pre 
 vious night at Daubrowitz. It had pushed on in the morninjj 
 by Burglitz and Zizelowes, and had debouched from the lattel 
 place in the direction of Horenowes, at a quarter-past eleveri 
 A quarter of an hour later, five 4-pounder batteries of thl 
 Guard opened fire against an Austrian battery, and compelle? 
 it to quit its position between Horenowes and Benatek. H 
 6 -pounder Prussian battery at the same time opened upon tbi 
 Austrian artillery, which was beginning to form on the east < ; 
 Horenowes, while the infantry advanced by Wrchwitz, for tti 
 attack of that village. The other troops of the division followe; 
 up this attack by way of Jericek. 
 
 The second division of the Guard had lain the previo'J 
 night at Rettendorf, considerably in rear of the first divisio. : 
 Its march had been consequently delayed, and the reser 
 artillery of the Guard corps, as well as the heavy cavalry of t 
 Guard, arrived at the scene of action before this division. I ; 
 direction was by Choteborek to Lhota. 
 
 At eleven o'clock the reserve artillery of the Guard vX 
 marching on the left rear of the first division. The groul 
 heavy with rain, and the high corn which wound itself roul 
 the wheels of the guns, tired the horses excessively. In frrl 
 of Jericek, six batteries opened fire, to signal by their noisei 
 the First Army that the Crown Prince was near at hand, If 
 this salvo was not distinguished by the staff of Prince Frederk 
 Charles amidst the general din of battle, and, as the range m 
 very great, little harm was done to the Austrians by it. 
 
 By the time that General Alvensleben advanced aga'Jt 
 Horenowes, the sixth corps had, on the left, commenced H 
 assault against Racicz. Of this corps, one brigade of *e 
 twelfth division, consisting of six battalions, four squadnS, 
 and two batteries, under General Proudzynski, led the wa} >y 
 
Chap. II. ] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 247 
 
 Roznow and Nesnasow. When the eleventh division, con- 
 sisting of twelve battalions, eight squadrons, and four batteries, 
 under General Zastrow, reached Welchow, the former had only- 
 encountered a few detachments of Austrian cavalry. General 
 Mutius then ordered it to keep the enemy in sight, and in its 
 further advance to communicate with the eleventh division, 
 which he directed against the heights of Horenowes. A report 
 was now brought to that general that it was urgently desirable 
 that lie should send some artillery as quickly as possible to 
 support Franzecky's division. Four batteries immediately 
 pushed forward at a trot, covered by the 4th regiment of hussars, 
 crossed the Trotinka at Luzan, and at half-past eleven opened 
 upon the Austrian artillery stationed on the east of Horenowes. 
 The two brigades of the eleventh division in the meantime 
 advanced in echelon, left in front, and supported by the 8th 
 Dragoons crossed the Trotinka with great difficulty to the 
 south-east of Luzan, and advanced under a heavy artillery fire 
 to the attack of Racicz. 
 
 The twelfth division directed its march against Smiritz 
 by Roznow, while a squadron of its cavalry regiment, 
 which had been pushed forward in the direction of Smiritz, 
 reported that there were Austrian regiments of cavalry in 
 its front. 
 
 On the approach of the first division of the Guard to Horen- 
 owes, and of the eleventh division to Racicz, and when both 
 wings of the position of their artillery began to be threatened, 
 the Austrians commenced evacuating their position, and had 
 entirely withdrawn from it by one o'clock. By the same hour 
 the villages of Horenowes and Racicz fell into the hands of 
 their assailants, after short contests. The greater portion of 
 the troops which had garrisoned these places retired in the 
 direction of Sendrasitz, while the first division of the Guard 
 pressed forward to the trees on the east of Horenowes, and the 
 eleventh division pressed upon the retreating Austrians on the 
 south of Racicz. 
 
 The small resistance which the army of the Crown Prince 
 here met with appears to be due to the fact that when General 
 Franzecky carried the village of Benatek, the Austrian fourth 
 corps moved forward to oppose him, drove the battle back, and 
 
248 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 remained engaged with his division in the Maslowed wood. 
 The Austrian second corps was thus alone exposed to 
 the onset of the whole of the Crown Prince's army, and 
 was pushed back by its attack to Sendrasitz. These two 
 Austrian movements caused a gap in Benedek's line of 
 battle, through which the Prussian Guards penetrating, seized 
 Chlum, the key of his position, and turned the fortune of 
 the day. 
 
 On the advance of the Prussian Guards to Horenowes some 
 Austrian battalions took up a position on the hill east of 
 Maslowed. The Guards immediately marched against this 
 hill, and carried it without meeting with any serious resistance. 
 The village of Maslowed, which lay to their right, was evacu- 
 ated, and half a company of Prussian riflemen occupied it 
 without drawing a trigger. The sixth corps in the meantime 
 engaged the main body of the second Austrian corps, which 
 had furnished the garrisons for Horenowes and Racicz, at 
 Trotina, Sendrasitz, and Nedelitz, and finally forced it to with- 
 draw across the Elbe at Lochenitz. By this contest, which was 
 of quite an independent nature, the left wing of the Prussian 
 Guard was covered while it took the direction of the village of 
 Chlum, guided by the church tower, which forms the highest 
 landmark in the field. In this way the Prussian Guard marched 
 a distance of about two thousand paces along the rear of the posi- 
 tion of the fourth Austrian corps, which was now being pushed 
 back by Franzecky in the Maslowed wood. An Austrian brigade 
 showed itself between Maslowed and Lipa, the Prussian ad- 
 vanced guard formed up to its own right and attacked it ; : 
 while the main body, under Colonel Von Obernitz, pushed on) 
 to Chlum, and the fusilier regiment, under Colonel Von KesseM 
 threw itself into Rosberitz. 
 
 The first Prussians who arrived in Chlum saw on the reverse 
 side of the hill, between themselves and the fortress of Konig- 
 gratz, the whole of the Austrian reserves, mustering about 40,00c 
 men. Between them and their comrades of the First Arm)' 
 were the Austrian corps engaged near Lipa, and in the Sadowa 
 wood. Twelve battalions of the Prussian Guards was the' 
 whole force at hand to hold the key of the battle against th< 
 whole reserve of the enemy. 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 249 
 
 A fierce battle soon began round Rosberitz and Chlum, 
 which were seized by the Prussian Guard at a quarter before 
 (three o'clock. At five minutes before three an aide-de-camp 
 reported to Feldzeugmeister Benedek, who was between 
 Chlum and Lipa, that the Prussians had occupied the former 
 village. The Austrian commander could not credit this 
 unexpected intelligence, and hastened himself in person to 
 ascertain its truth. On approaching Chlum he was received 
 by a withering volley, which told with severe effect upon 
 I his staff, and convinced him of the veracity of the report. 
 I He immediately hastened to send up some reserves to retake 
 the place. 
 
 About three o'clock the Army of the Elbe carried Problus, 
 and Feldzeugmeister Benedek was obliged to send two brigades 
 : of the nearest Austrian corps, the first, to reinforce his front 
 while he directed one brigade against Chlum, and one against 
 Problus. At the same time the Saxon artillery of the reserve, 
 which was on the further side of the highway from Rosberitz, 
 opened with terrible effect on the Prussians in that village, 
 and prepared the way for an attack by the sixth Austrian 
 corps. 
 
 The position of the Prussian Guard became every moment 
 more critical. The few battalions in Rosberitz could not hold 
 their ground, and were driven out of the village, having lost 
 among other officers Prince Anton of Hohenzollern. The 
 reserve artillery of the Prussian Guard under the Prince of 
 Hohenlohe laboured up to the aid of the battalions in Chlum, 
 and, coming into action, smote heavily upon the thick masses 
 iof the Austrian reserves which were preparing to attack the 
 houses. Three times they attacked, twice they almost reached 
 the orchard and churchyard, but were received at a few paces 
 distance by such a volley from the needle-guns that nearly the 
 whole of the attacking force was either killed or wounded. By 
 the time of the third attack the advanced guard of the reserve 
 division of the Prussian Guard had come up to the support of 
 the battalions who were already in occupation. The third 
 attack was repulsed, and at the same moment the battle was 
 won. The first Prussian corps and the fifth corps, with the 
 cavalry of the Second Army, was pressing up towards Chlum 
 
250 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 and Rosberitz, bringing a reserve of 50,000 fresh soldiers into 
 the heart of Benedek's position ; while the main body of the 
 second division of the Guards dashed against the wood of 
 Lipa, and the batteries of Chlum. 
 
 As yet the Prussian generals at Sadowa were in ignorance of 
 the progress of the Crown Prince, for his other divisions were 
 on the reverse side of the hill of Chlum, and the attack of the 
 second division of the Guard could alone be seen from thej 
 front. First a swarm of black dots stealing across the fields} 
 showed the advance of the skirmishers, and the Austrian* 
 sharpshooters, who had been lying among the corn, could) 
 be seen running before them to gain the shelter of theiil 
 own lines ; close behind the skirmishers followed the heav);i 
 columns of infantry, looking like small black squares gliding 
 along the sides of the hill. The Austrian guns played sharph 
 on them, but they pushed forward without wavering till withii. 
 a short distance of the batteries ; then a few rapid volleys 
 musketry sent up a cloud of smoke, which, hanging heavily if 
 the misty air, shut out the view; but the sudden silence of thj 
 Austrian guns told that the Prussians had closed, and that thi 
 batteries had been stormed. The ground leading up to ther ( 
 was steep, and the gunners sent round after round into th 
 storming columns, till the leading ranks were close to th 
 muzzles of the guns; the riflemen who were ensconced i;j 
 intrenchments beside the batteries, to defend them, sent bitin, 
 volleys into their assailants; but, caring nought for the fire <j*ii 
 the infantry or the steepness of the ground, the Prussians dashe 
 straight at the guns, and both gunners and sharpshooters had i . 
 turn and fly. Then the deadly needle-gun opened its fire cjl 
 the fugitives, and with such precision that the ground w 
 covered with dead or wounded Austrians lying thick togethc 
 In one place forty corpses lay on less than an acre of groun 
 and the wounded appeared to be to the dead as three to one.B 
 
 The Austrian defeat was now inevitable. As soon as i\i 
 Crown Prince sent his infantry against the Lipa wood, t' 
 First Army sprang forward, and, with loud cheers and drui;; 
 beating, went dashing up the hill. The Sadowa road *ft 
 cleared as if by magic, and the battalions went straight again 
 the Austrian batteries. No heed was given to take the guns 1 
 
!Chap. II.] BATTLE OF K0N1GGRATZ. 251 
 
 I flank; the soldiers felt certain of victory, and sought it by the 
 (shortest road. Though disordered by the broken ground, and 
 [out of breath with the rapid ascent, so quickly did they advance 
 
 that the Austrian gunners had no time to limber up, but were 
 \ forced to desert their pieces and seek safety for themselves and 
 r their horses in flight. Most of the guns which had been placed 
 fin batteries were taken, but those which acted as field artillery, 
 'admirably handled, were quickly withdrawn, and were already 
 I fast forming on a further ridge by Rosnitz to cover the retreat 
 
 of the infantry. 
 
 The Prussians paused but a few moments among the taken 
 
 guns and then rushed on in pursuit. The summit of the ridge 
 iwas quickly gained, and there before them they saw the whole 
 f hollow ground between them and Rosnitz filled with running 
 I white uniforms. The victorious battalions commenced a rapid 
 '' fire upon them, and men dropped quickly from the flying ranks, 
 ! rolling over and over as they fell on the sloping ground. The 
 
 sixth corps, which the Crown Prince had directed more against 
 1 the Austrian rear, caught the fugitives in flank, and raked the 
 ! running ranks with their fire. The Prussian artillery was also 
 ! quickly up, unlimbered, and came into action on the summit of 
 'the ridge, and sent its shells bursting with a horrible precision 
 i among the heads of the flying soldiers. And yet the Austrians 
 ' kept their formation, and never let their retreat become a rout. 
 t Such a retreat under such circumstances is as creditable to the 
 
 valour of the Austrian soldiers as a battle won. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry, unable to leave the road till it got to 
 
 nearly the top of the hill, on account of the woods by the side 
 
 of the way, was not up till the Austrian infantry had got half 
 > way across the hollow which separates Chlum from the further 
 
 ridge of Rosnitz, and there the Austrian batteries had taken up 
 
 their position and began to play upon the pursuing troops. 
 : Then, for a few minutes, Prince Frederick Charles, who was 
 1 leading the hussars and dragoons, had to leave them to make 
 \ his general dispositions for attacking the new position taken up 
 ' by the Austrian artillery, and the cavalry immediately got out 
 
 of hand. By single squadrons, by single troops, and even only 
 ! in knots of a few horsemen, they rushed with wild impetuosity 
 
 at different points of the retreating infantry ; but the Austrian 
 
252 SEVEN' WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 guns sent shells rapidly among them, and the infantry, though 
 running, still kept its formation, and turned, when they came 
 too close, to stand and deliver volleys which emptied many a 
 saddle. Nor were the Austrian cavalry off the field, though 
 they could not face the tremendous fire of the Prussians to 
 charge and cover the retreat of their infantry; but when 
 attacked by the enemy's cavalry, and when thus the guns 
 could not fire upon them, they fought hard, and sacrificed them- 
 selves to cover the retreat. Then, as the squadrons of the 3rd 
 regiment of Prussian dragoons were rushing forward to charge 
 some battalions firing near the village of Wsester, an Austrian 
 cuirass brigade, led by an Englishman in the Austrian service 
 of the name of Beales, charged them in flank. They drove the 
 Prussians back, and, smiting them heavily with their ponderous 
 swords, nearly destroyed the dragoons ; but Hohenlohe's Prus- 
 sian Uhlans, seeing their comrades worsted, charged with their 
 lances couched against the Austrians' flank, and compelled 
 them to retire. Pressed hard by the lancers they fell back, 
 fighting hard, but then Ziethen's hussars charged them in the 
 rear. A fierce combat ensued ; the Austrian horsemen struck 
 strongly about them, fighting for their lives ; but the lancers 
 drove their lances into their horses, while the hussars, light and 
 active, closed in upon them, and only ten Austrians are re- 
 ported to have escaped unwounded from the melte. Beales 
 himself was borne wounded to the ground. But the Austrian' 
 artillery was not long able to hold its new position ; the fire of 
 the Prussian guns and the dispositions which were being made; 
 to attack it compelled it to retire. It then drew off slowly, but* 
 on every successive ridge came into action, and fired against' 
 the pursuers to check them, and gain for its own infantry time' 
 for retreat. Some Prussian horse artillery and cavalry followed 
 it, and till after nightfall the pursuit went thundering toward? J 
 the Elbe, and drew the fire of the heavy guns of the fortress 
 The Austrian cavalry retired to Pardubitz, and the remainde 
 of the army by seven or eight bridges, thrown across the rive' 
 between that place and Koniggratz, got beyond the stream b; ( 
 night without severe loss. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry slowly followed in pursuit along bot 
 roads. The wounded who were lying on the ground shrieke 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 253 
 
 with fear when they saw the cavalry galloping down towards 
 them, but Prince Frederick Charles took care that they should 
 be avoided, and at one time checked the pursuit in order to 
 move his squadrons around, and not go through, a patch of 
 standing corn, where many wounded Austrians had taken 
 refuge. These, when they saw the lancers coming, thought 
 jthey were going to be massacred, and cried piteously, waving 
 jwhite handkerchiefs as a sign of truce ; but they had no cause 
 to fear. Large numbers of prisoners were taken, for the 
 pursuit was continued to the Elbe, and it was not till nine 
 jo'clock that all firing had ceased, though the main body of 
 the army halted about seven. As the Princes returned, the 
 battalions cheered them for their victory; but they left the 
 pursuit of their enemies and the cheers of their own victorious 
 itroops to look after the hospital accommodation provided for 
 ithe wounded. These lay in immense numbers in the field ; 
 jthe dead too laid thick, but all they required was done on the 
 morrow. Every cottage in the neighbourhood that had not 
 been burnt was full of wounded. Austrians and Prussians lay 
 jside by side, but the Krankentrager were still out, and all were 
 'not collected till late the next morning. Conspicuous in the 
 hospitals, working diligently in their voluntary labour, were the 
 'Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. This Order of Knighthood, 
 'renewed lately for the succour of the weak and suffering, had 
 isent here a large hospital establishment, under the direction of 
 Count Theodore Stolberg. From the voluntary contributions 
 'of the knights, hospitals were maintained in the nearest towns 
 |and in the field, all necessary hospital stores were carried, by 
 the Order, and means of transport accompanied the army, 
 hospital nurses were provided, and by their aid many wounded 
 were carefully attended to who could not have been looked 
 after by the ordinary arrangements. 
 
 The battle of Koniggratz was a great victory for the Prus- 
 sians, though its full advantages were not known by them until 
 ;the following day. One hundred and seventy-four guns, twenty 
 thousand prisoners, and eleven standards, fell into the hands of 
 the conquerors; the total loss of the Austrian army by the 
 disaster of the 3rd July amounted to almost forty thousand 
 men, while that of the Prussians was not ten thousand. The 
 
254 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 morale of the Austrian army was destroyed, and their infantry 
 found that in open column they could not stand against the 
 better-armed Prussians. The Austrians had hoped to be able 
 to close with the bayonet, and so amend the effects of the fire 
 of the needle-gun ; but the idea of the superiority in the use of 
 the bayonet in which the Austrian army prided itself, is one of 
 those vanities which are common to every nation, and this war 
 proved that at close quarters the stronger men of Prussia in- 
 variably overcame the lighter and smaller Austrians. The 
 Austrian and Saxon troops engaged amounted to about two 
 hundred thousand men, with six hundred guns.* The Prussian 
 army in the field mustered in round numbers two hundred and i 
 sixty thousand combatants, with eight hundred and sixteen ! 
 guns, but of them the fifth corps, one brigade of the sixth 
 corps, and all but the advanced guard of the first corps, in all 
 about sixty thousand men, never fired a shot. Thus the number; 
 of casualties were about one thirteenth of the number of men 
 actually engaged, f 
 
 The highest proportionate loss of the Prussian army fell upon' 
 Franzecky's division, which lost two thousand out of a little j 
 over fourteen thousand men. The greatest loss on the Austrian' 
 side was incurred by the troops who attempted to retake Chlum, ; 
 and by those who had to retire out of the Lipa and Sadowa 
 woods after the Crown Prince had developed his attack. The 
 artillery on both sides appeared to fail in causing such numerous, 
 casualties as might have been anticipated from so large a number 
 of rifled guns. Nor did the infantry fire tell except at close M 
 quarters. Whether this was due to the inferior shooting power 
 of the needle-gun or to the practical disadvantage of aiming 
 under fire seems to be uncertain. 
 
 The number of cartridges fired by the Prussian army in th<B 
 battle barely exceeded one per man on the ground. Hardh 
 
 * This estimate of the Austrian force is based on an able letter writtei 
 from Olmiitz after the battle by the special correspondent of the Times, v. 
 which that writer states that Benedek had then collected one hundred ami 
 sixty thousand of the defeated army at Olmiitz. This with the Austrian los 
 would give the above figure. 
 
 f The following list of the proportion of casualties to combatants, i 
 some of the most famous battles of the last two centuries, is extracted fror; 
 a careful essay written for the professional papers of the Royal Engineers b 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Cooke, R.E. : 
 
Chap. II.] 
 
 BATTLE OF KOXIGGRATZ. 
 
 255 
 
 'ame of Battle, 
 
 Year. 
 
 I709 
 
 1745 
 1757 
 1757 
 1757 
 1757 
 1753 
 1758 
 1800 
 1S05 
 1806 
 
 1807 
 1807 
 1809 
 1809 
 l8l2 
 l8l2 
 
 I8I3 
 
 1S13 
 
 1815 
 
 1859 
 
 1859 
 
 Numbers. 
 
 On each side. 
 
 70,000 P. 
 
 70, OOO A. 
 
 \ 64,000 P. 
 
 I 74, 000 A. 
 
 22,000 P. I 
 
 55,oooA. \ 
 j 25,000 P. ) 
 ( 60,000 A. ( 
 
 36,000 P. 
 
 80, 000 A. 
 
 32,000 P. 
 
 50,000 R. 
 
 50, 000 A. 
 
 30,000 P. 
 
 28, 127 F. 
 
 3o,85oA. 
 
 \ 90,000 F. 
 
 i8o,oooR.&A 
 
 100,000 F. 
 
 ioo, 000 P. 
 
 85,000 F. 
 75, 000 R. 
 j 80, 000 F. ) 
 j 50, 000 R. \ 
 j 52,000 E.&S. 
 I 50,000 F. 
 150,000 F. ) 
 130,000 A. ) 
 
 125,000 F. 
 125,000 R. 
 
 j 150,000 F. ) 
 I 280,000 Allies \ 
 j 70,000 E. &c 
 \ 27,000 F. 
 \ 67,600 E. &c 
 I 68,900 F. 
 
 48, 090 F. &S 
 
 61,640 A. 
 
 i35,2 34 F.&S. 
 
 163,124 A. 
 
 Total. 
 
 I So, OOO 
 
 140,000 
 138,000 
 77,000 
 85,000 
 
 1 1 6, coo* 
 
 82,000 
 
 80,000 
 
 58,977t 
 
 1 70, 000 J 
 
 200,000; 
 
 160,000 
 130,000 
 102,000 
 2S0, oco 
 90,000 
 250,000 
 430, 000 
 
 97,000 
 136,500 
 109,730 
 298,35s 5 
 
 Killed and Wounded. 
 
 Number. 
 
 18,250 Alii 
 
 5,000 
 
 9,000 
 
 16,000 
 
 8,000 
 
 500 
 
 2,800 
 
 5,000 
 
 6,286 
 
 5,000 
 
 6,574 
 
 U085 
 
 2i,53i 
 
 5,000 
 
 7,000 
 
 7,000 
 
 6,800 
 
 12,000 ) 
 
 11,000 \ 
 
 14,000 ) 
 
 20,000 \ 
 
 j 30,050 
 
 j 25,000 
 
 10,000 ) 
 
 17,000 \ 
 
 5,928 
 
 7,200 
 
 24,000 
 
 \ 8,000 E. 
 I 22,800 F. 
 
 80,000 
 
 \ 50,000 ^r 
 
 \ not known. 
 10,000 
 
 14,000 
 
 not known. 
 
 4,000 
 
 5,700 
 
 14,415 
 
 Proportion 
 to total 
 Forces. 
 
 10 
 1 to 1 
 
 7 
 i 
 f 
 
 21,000 Austrian prisoners missing. 
 19,000 Austrian prisoners. 
 
 t 1,000 French and 3,000 Austrian prisoners. 
 
 § 20,000 Prussian prisoners. || Includes missing. 
 

 256 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 any soldier fired so many as ninety, and few more than sixty.* 
 The average number of rounds fired by the artillery of Prince 
 Frederick Charles's army, was forty-two per gun, and no gun oi 
 that army fired more than eighty rounds. In the artillery o) 
 the Guard, the thirteen batteries engaged fired one thousand 
 seven hundred and eighty-seven rounds, being an average 01 
 twenty-three per gun • one battery fired eighty-one rounds peij 
 gun. 
 
 On the evening of the battle, an officer of the Ziethen hussars 
 who were forward in the pursuit, rode as far as the gates 
 Koniggratz, and, finding there were no sentries outside, rode in 
 the guard, immediately on seeing him in his Prussian uniform 
 turned out and seized him, when, with a ready presence, h« 
 declared he had come to demand the capitulation of the fortress 
 He was conducted to the commandant, and made the sam 
 demand to him, adding that the town would be bombarded : 
 not surrendered within an hour ; the commandant, unconsciou 
 that he was not dealing with a legitimate messenger, courteous! 
 refused to capitulate ; but the hussar was conducted out of thjj 
 town, passed through the guard at the entrance, and got 01 
 safely without being made a prisoner. 
 
 That night the Prussian army bivouacked on the field, wheilj 
 the main body remained the next day in order to allow tri 
 troops time to rest after their great fatigues. 
 
 The appearance of the field of battle the next mornirjj 
 showed the severity of the fight. The wounded had all hem 
 removed, but few of the dead had been buried, for the numb! 
 of wounded was so great that every man who could be span] 
 from duty was required to look after them. All night long til 
 Krankentrager had been at work, and had been assisted by J 
 large number of soldiers. Every village near the field of batll 
 had all its standing houses converted into hospitals, and all tl 
 surgeons in the army had been busy all night long. In tl 
 woods and m the broken ground the bodies of Austrians a:l 
 Prussians were tolerably equal in number, generally lying I 
 groups of four or five of either nation together, marking Of 
 
 * At the battle of Borodino, one of the most sanguinary contests *) 
 record (see preceding page), the French are said to have fired i,400,<J 
 cartridges, which would be at the rate of about 10 per man. 
 
Our. IT.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 257 
 
 spot where a shell had burst ; but in the open ground and down 
 
 the reverse side of the Chlum hill the Austrians lay terribly 
 
 thick, and hardly a Prussian uniform was to be seen. Wherever 
 
 ,the Austrians fought unprotected by cover, and wherever the 
 
 Prussian riflemen, armed with needle-guns, could see their 
 
 enemies, the disproportion of the dead became immediately 
 
 apparent. The corn was trodden down all over the field as flat 
 
 is if it was straw laid on a stable floor, and the ground was 
 
 ploughed up and dug into holes with shells. 
 
 ! On the top of the hill of Chlum, and near the village, stood 
 
 |i large number of the captured guns, with all their waggons and 
 
 carriages beside them, and on the slope away from Sadowa the 
 
 est were placed under the charge of the corps of the Guard. 
 
 [Everywhere about the field, fatigue parties were digging large 
 
 ; [renches in which the Austrian and Prussian killed were laid 
 
 iide by side, clothed in their uniforms. No other tombstone 
 
 Iras put to mark each grave than a plain wooden cross, on 
 
 irhich was written the number of each regiment that lay below. 
 
 .. The officers were placed in single graves near the men. But 
 
 kere and there a few were seen silently carrying some comrade 
 
 d a more retired spot. On one part of the field a Prussian 
 
 ^neral with his staff was burying his son, who had fallen in the 
 
 . ,ttack on the Austrian right. Close by, the wife of a private 
 
 oldier who had found her husband's body on the field had had 
 
 ; buried by some soldiers, had hung some oak branches on the 
 
 ttle wooden cross at the head, and was sitting on the freshly- 
 
 irned earth, sobbing her heart out, with his shattered helmet 
 
 1 her lap. She had followed his regiment, in order to be near 
 
 lihj from the beginning of the campaign, through all the long 
 
 kirches the army had made. 
 
 The less severely wounded were moved to Horitz, from 
 ich, on the approach of the Prussians, the inhabitants had 
 irly all fled. The vacated houses were converted into hos- 
 tals, and at nearly every window and every door men were 
 mging about listlessly, with heads or arms bound up, with a 
 ilf stupefied look, as if they had not yet recovered from the 
 inning effects of the blow which had disabled them. Many 
 ^re Austrians, and prisoners of war ; but the greatest liberty 
 emed to be accorded to them, for they were allowed to 
 
25S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 wander about the streets, and to mix freely with the Prussian 
 soldiers. 
 
 Long columns of unwounded prisoners were being marched 
 continually through the town on their way to the rear. The 
 Austrians looked dejected and unhappy, yet marched stolidly 
 and silently along ; but the prisoners from the Italian regiments 
 laughed and talked cheerily, and on them their imprisonment 
 sat lightly. 
 
 Here and there an Austrian officer, prisoner on parole, 
 strolled moodily about, stopping every now and then to return 
 the courteous salutations of the Prussian officers who passed by. 
 To ease the anxiety of their friends at home, they wrote letters . 
 to announce that they were not killed, but taken, and these; 
 were sent with a flag of truce to the Austrian lines. The.' 
 greatest courtesy and kindness were shown by the Prussian: 
 officers to their unfortunate prisoners, and every attempt was; 
 made to make them feel their position as little as possible.: 
 Several Austrian officers wounded mortally on the field re- 
 quested Prussian officers to send their last message to then 
 families, requests which it is needless to say were readily com 
 plied with. 
 
 Field-Marshal Gablenz came to Horitz the day after the] 
 battle from the Austrian head -quarters, to ask for an armistio 
 as a preliminary to peace. It was impossible that Prussia couL^ 
 grant an armistice at this moment, when the Austrian army wa 
 still in the field, and any pause in the operations of the can' 
 paign would be used to collect troops from the Italian frontid o 
 and from the distant provinces of the empire in order to oppo? 
 the Prussian armies. Nor could peace be concluded by Pruss 
 without the concurrence of Italy, for a treaty existed betweeB 
 the Cabinets of Berlin and Florence, by which neither coil 
 make peace without the sanction of the other. 
 
 The Field-Marshal accordingly returned to his own lin 
 without obtaining any result from his mission. 
 
 The actual junction of the two armies of the Crown Prin 
 and of Prince Frederick Charles was effected on the battle-fie' 
 of Kdniggratz, and the Austrians had now lost the chance thj\. 
 had of falling upon each army separately. 
 
 As the consequence of the defeat of Koniggratz, Austria 1 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF K0N1GGRATZ. 259 
 
 the 4th July ceded Venetia to the Emperor of the French, who 
 was nominally to hold the province, although it was virtually 
 then, and practically in the following October, given to the 
 kingdom of Italy. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS ON THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 
 
 The details of a great battle are, as a general rule, less per- 
 fectly known the more closely the time at which they are 
 criticised approaches to the date of the action. While the men 
 are still living on whom disclosures would draw an inconvenient 
 censure, the government of a country which has suffered a 
 ! great reverse in war is naturally unwilling to gratify the curiosity 
 of the world by the publication of information which can 
 (only be certainly found in its own official archives. Without 
 [such information it is impossible to make any observations on 
 pe causes or conduct of incidents in war with an assured cer- 
 tainty. It is necessary to attempt to lift the veil which shrouds 
 jsuch events during the lifetimes of the principal actors with 
 ;only a hesitating and a faltering touch, and to acknowledge 
 that any conclusions based upon a crude knowledge of facts are 
 Enunciated with diffidence. If correct they are fortuitous, if 
 incorrect their fallacies will be exposed by future information. 
 
 The position taken up by Feldzeugmeister Benedek in front 
 bf Koniggratz has been severely criticised. It does not, how- 
 fever, appear that the river in his rear was any disadvantage to 
 'him, although his army was defeated, and had its flank turned 
 by a strong force. The Austrian commander took the pre- 
 caution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges 
 p river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the 
 retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges 
 ;>vere broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit 
 Special as well as general conditions also came into play. The 
 pursuing Prussians could not approach with impunity the heads 
 of the Austrian bridges. The heavy guns of the fortress scoured 
 pe banks of the river both up and down stream, and, with 
 superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover 
 he passage of the Austrians. The position was otherwise 
 tcknowledged on all sides to be a good one, carefully chosen ; 
 
200 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 and though the villages were not completely barricaded and 
 loopholed, this omission was probably due to the extreme 
 rapidity of the movements of Prince Frederick Charles. A 
 great disadvantage was the fact that the presence of two oppo- 
 nent armies acting from divergent bases against the Austrian 
 position caused, as all such conditions always must cause, 
 Feldzeugmeister Benedek to fight with his army drawn along 
 two sides of an angle. One side was from Prim to Mas! owed, 
 the other from Maslowed to Lochenitz. By such a formation; 
 a defeat or even a repulse of either wing must necessarily allow,' 
 the successful enemy to penetrate into the rear of the otheiv 
 Or a success and advance of one or both wings must leave aj 
 gap at the salient angle. 
 
 Two questions have attracted more notice with reference to 
 the battle than others. These are, first — Why did Benedel<! 
 allow the Crown Prince to come down so heavily upon hi: ! ' 
 right flank ? and secondly, How did the first division of th<' 
 Prussian Guard manage to get into Chlum unobserved? Th«' 
 answer to the first question appears to be that the Austriaif 
 general was deceived as to the position of the Crown Prince, j 
 On the 30th June he knew that the Crown Prince was on th' 
 Elbe, because from the heights above Koniginhof the Prussian 
 were that day cannonaded by an Austrian battery. Betwee: 
 the 30th and the 2nd, the Crown Prince pushed troops acros! 
 the river at Arnau and Koniginhof, and directed the heads cj I 
 their columns towards Miletin. On the afternoon of the 2nc 
 two of Prince Frederick Charles's divisions occupied Miletir 
 Late on the night of the 2nd, one of these divisions of Princ 
 Frederick Charles's army was ordered to move to Milowit 
 while the other moved to Cerekwitz. It seems probable th; 
 these movements were reported to Benedek by his spies, biB 
 erroneously. It would appear that he was told that the ma 
 body of the Crown Prince's army had joined Frederick Charl 
 at Miletin, and that the mass of the united armies on the nig 
 of the 2nd was moving towards its own right to make a co, 
 centrated attack against Benedek's left near Xechanitz, wi 
 the object of driving in his left, and of cutting him off fro, 
 
 * This theory is entirely based on hypothesis, and must be accepted 01 
 for what it is worth. 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 261 
 
 Pardubitz and the railway to Vienna. The spies would not 
 I fail to notice that some of the Crown Prince's troops were still 
 |at Koniginhof, and near Gradlitz. Their presence there would 
 [be accounted for by the supposition that they were left to watch 
 Josephstadt, to hold the line of the Elbe, and prevent a raid 
 .against the Crown Prince's line of communication with Silesia 
 until he had changed that line for the one by which Frederick 
 i Charles communicated with Saxony. This ideal cause of the 
 Austrian conduct on the 3rd July appears to be borne out by 
 jthe following general order which, as it is said, Benedek issued 
 jlate on the night of the 2nd : so late that it only reached his 
 second corps on the Trottina at four o'clock on the morning of 
 the day of the battle. This order would seem to have been 
 ^dictated when the Feldzeugmeister heard that the Prussians 
 [were moving to their own right from Miletin. It was as follows : — 
 " The Saxon corps will occupy the heights of Popowitz and 
 Tresowitz, the left wing slightly refused and covered by its own 
 cavalry. To the left of this corps and somewhat to the rear, 
 [the first light cavalry division will take post, on the extreme 
 left flank of Problus and Prim. On the right of the Saxons the 
 tenth corps will take its position ; on the right of the tenth the 
 third will occupy the heights of Chlum and Lipa. The eighth 
 corps will serve as immediate support to the Saxons. The 
 troops not named above are only to hold themselves in readi- 
 ness while the attack is confined to the left wing. Should the 
 lostile attack assume greater dimensions, the whole army will 
 3e formed in order of battle. 
 
 " The fourth corps will then move up on the right of the 
 hird to the heights between Chlum and Nedelitz ; and on the 
 extreme right flank next to the fourth the second will take post. 
 ' The second light cavalry division will take post in rear of 
 S T edelitz, and there remain in readiness. The sixth corps will 
 ake post on the heights near Wsetar ; the first near Rosnitz. 
 3oth these corps will be in concentrated formation. The first 
 ind third cavalry divisions will take post at Sweti. In the 
 went of a general attack the first and sixth corps, the five 
 :avalry divisions, and the reserve artillery of the army, which 
 vill be posted in rear of the first and sixth corps, are to serve 
 is the reserve of the army. 
 
262 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 "The retreat, if necessary, will be made by the high road to 
 Hohenmauth, without disturbing the fortress of Koniggratz. 
 
 " The second and fourth corps must at once cause pontoon 
 bridges to be thrown across the Elbe. The second corps will 
 throw two between Lochenitz and Predmeritz. The first corps 
 will also throw a bridge." 
 
 As a digression it may be noticed in passing that these 
 bridges mentioned in this order were ready by mid-day. The 
 organization of the Austrian army cannot have been so very 
 bad as some are now fain to suppose. 
 
 By the general tenor of this order, it appears that the Feld- ' 
 zeugmeister fully expected to be attacked on his left, for much 
 the same reason as Wellington at AVaterloo fully expected to be . ; 
 assailed on his right. The part of the order which relates to; 
 the fourth and second corps shows that he contemplated the 
 possibility of an attack on his right ; but not from a very large' 
 force. Probably the reports of the spies induced him to believe' 
 that the first corps and the Guards at least of the army of the, 
 Crown Prince had joined Prince Frederick Charles, and that; 
 only two corps, or sixty thousand men, were at the most on the; 
 Elbe. He knew that the two main bodies of these latter twcj 
 corps must defile over the river, and march fifteen miles ove: 
 very bad roads and an extremely difficult country, before the? 
 could feel his right. In the meantime he might have disposed o 
 the adversaries in his front. The conduct of the Austrian genera! 
 during the action seems also to confirm this. Had he knowi 
 that at ten o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent only four divj 
 sions across the Bistritz, he would hardly have failed to be: 
 down upon them with greatly superior numbers, and crus;;> 
 them at once, before the arrival of their assistants. From th 
 time of the attack on Benatek until the arrival of the Crow 
 Prince, Franzecky was exposed across the Bistritz, separated 1 
 a wide interval from Home's division in the Sadowa woo 
 The country favourable for the action of cavalry. Franzecl 
 had with him only one regiment of hussars. The Prussi: 
 reserve cavalry could not have crossed the stream, on accou 
 of its marshy banks, to his assistance. Twenty thousai 
 Austrian horsemen were at Benedek's command. He held the 
 inactive. Yet the hero of San Martino was not the man torn; 
 
; Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 263 
 
 to strike a blow if he thought he could do so with safety. He 
 must have imagined Franzecky much stronger than he really 
 was. Probably the Austrian staff imagined that the Crown 
 Prince's corps, which here joined Frederick Charles, were the 
 assailants of Benatek. If there is any ground for the above 
 supposition, how much must the conclusion reflect upon the 
 .Austrian system of reconnaissances and patrols. From the 
 [ high bank above Koniginhof, a staff officer lying hidden in the 
 fir-wood could, almost with the naked eye, have counted every 
 Prussian gun, every Prussian soldier that the Crown Prince 
 moved towards Miletin. The eyes of the Austrian army on 
 j more than one occasion during the campaign failed. Their 
 . patrol system was very much inferior to that of the Prussians. 
 Its inferiority seems to have been due to the want of military 
 ! education among the officers to whom patrols were entrusted. 
 In the Prussian army special officers of high intelligence were 
 . always chosen to reconnoitre. Properly so, for the task is no 
 ; easy one. An eye unskilled, or a mind untutored, can see 
 I little, where a tried observer detects important movements. A 
 ; line of country, or a few led horses, will tell the officer who is 
 i accustomed to such duty more than heavy columns or trains of 
 ; artillery will disclose to the unthinking novice. The Prussian 
 j system never failed, never allowed a surprise. The Austrians 
 ; were repeatedly surprised, and taken unprepared. Yet the out- 
 most system of the latter during the Italian war of 1859 merited 
 ■ the praise of the Emperor of the French, and was by him pointed 
 out to his own army as a model of superiority.* The military 
 development of Prussia had not yet been fully appreciated. 
 
 Another fact which may aid to corroborate the theory ad- 
 vanced above, is the telegram in which Feldzeugmeister 
 Benedek first announced to Vienna the loss of the battle. In 
 this he said that some of the enemy's troops, under cover of the 
 mist, established themselves on his flank, and so caused the 
 defeat. Probably at that time he thought that the troops 
 that got into Chlum were a detachment from those engaged at 
 Benatek. If the Austrian general had suspected any attack 
 from the direction of Koniginhof, he would surely have watched 
 
 * General Order of the Emperor after the Battle of Solferjno, 
 
264 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book VII. 
 
 the country in that direction with his cavalry, but the troops of 
 the Crown Prince did not fall in with a single patrol till they 
 actually came into collision with the Austrian line of 
 battle. 
 
 How the Prussian Guards were allowed to get into Chlum 
 appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum Church tower 
 the whole country can be clearly seen as far as the top of the 
 high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even 
 through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally 
 supposed, could have easily seen any movements of troops as 
 far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite j 
 distinctly Herwarth's attack at Hradek, and, except during occa- 
 sional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surround-' 
 ing country except where the configuration of the ground or the! 
 heavy smoke overcame the sight. From the top of Chlum; 
 Church there was a clear view over all the neighbouring hills,! 
 and the top of the spire generally stood out clear over the! 
 heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the; 
 combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill from Benatek tc 
 Nechanitz. So little apprehensive, however, was Benedek oil 
 an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower 
 and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any vieil 
 towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and house; 
 of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of th< 
 advance of the Guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes' 
 and passed through Maslowed. From that village, withou 
 opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line 
 apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlun 
 and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps to whom th 
 defence of the ground between Maslowed and Nedelitz was er 
 trusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Franzeck 
 in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing fo:« 
 wards towards Benatek quitted their proper ground. A shoi 
 time afterwards the second Austrian corps was defeated by th 
 Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards its bridge c 
 Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retre; 
 of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, throug- 
 which the Prussian Guards marched unmolested, and without 
 shot seized the key of the position. Once installed they coul 
 
Chap. II.] BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ. 265 
 
 not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the 
 Austrians. 
 
 The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed. The men 
 Iwere fatigued, and night was coming on. The Austrian cavalry 
 was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Prussian cavalry 
 jof the First Army had suffered severely. The Elbe lay between 
 the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The 
 [victory, although fortuitously decisive, was not improved to such 
 advantage as it might have been. 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 DEFENCE OF SILESIA. 
 
 Before proceeding to review the events which have in the; 
 meantime been taking place in the western theatre of war, it is 
 requisite to cast a glance upon the operations of the two 
 Prussian corps which had been left to guard the province ol, 
 Silesia. On the concentration of the Austrian army ir 
 Bohemia, a corps of 6,000 men, under General Trentinaglia. 
 had been left at Cracow. Two Prussian independent corps' 
 had, as was already noticed, been stationed at Ratibor anc 
 Nicolai, to shield south-eastern Silesia, against a probabk' 
 attack from this corps. The former was commanded b] 
 General Knobelsdorf, and consisted of the 62nd regiment 
 infantry, the 2nd regiment of Uhlans, a few battalions 
 Landwehr, and one battery. The latter, under General Coim 
 Stolberg, was formed of Landwehr alone, and mustered si> 
 battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jagerf' 
 and one battery. 
 
 The corps of Knobelsdorf was to defend the Moravia* 
 frontier, that of Stolberg the Gallician ; and both, in case ch 
 attack by overwhelming numbers, were to fall back under th 
 protection of the fortress of Kosel. 
 
 On the 2 1 st June, Stolberg's corps obtained its first in 
 portant although bloodless success. That day it marche 
 rapidly, many of the men being conveyed in waggons 1 
 Pruchna, blew up the railway viaduct there, and so destroys, 
 the communication between General Trentinaglia and the ma:, 
 Austrian army. 
 
 On the 24th and 26th June, as well as on the intermedia 
 days, several Austrian parties made demonstrations of crossii 
 
i Chap III.] DEFENCE OF SILESIA. 267 
 
 the frontier near Oswiecin. Large bodies of troops appeared 
 to be in the act of concentration at that place, and General 
 Stolberg determined to assure himself of the actual strength of 
 the Austrians there by a reconnaissance in force. 
 
 To aid this, General Knobelsdorf sent a part of his troops to 
 Myslowitz, to cover the rear of Stolberg's corps while it 
 marched on Oswiecin. 
 
 At the latter place, General Stolberg found a considerably 
 superior force of the enemy. He seized the buildings of the 
 railway station, placed them hastily in a state of defence, and 
 determined by making a long halt here to force the Austrians to 
 develop their full force. 
 
 After he had achieved this object, General Stolberg retired 
 to his position near Nicolai. The detachment at Myslowitz 
 had at the same time to sustain an action there, and fulfilled 
 I completely its purpose of holding the enemy back from 
 Oswiecin. 
 
 On the 30th June, Stolberg's detachment was so weakened 
 by the withdrawal of his Landwehr battalions, which were 
 called up in order to aid in the formation of a fourth battalion 
 to every regiment, that it could no longer hold its own against 
 the superior Austrian force near Myslowitz. It retired accord- 
 ingly nearer to Ratibor, in the direction of Plesz, and undertook 
 from here, in connexion with General Knobelsdorf, expeditions 
 into Moravia against Teschen, Biala, and Skotchau, annoyed the 
 Austrians considerably, and made the inhabitants of Moravia 
 regard the war with aversion. 
 
BOOK VIII. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATRE OF THE GERMAN WAR. I 
 
 As has been already shown in a preceding chapter,* the! 
 Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Casselj 
 occupied on the 19th June the following positions : — The' 
 divisions of General Goeben and General Manteuftel were in; 
 the town of Hanover, and that of General Beyer in Cassel. 0i ; 
 the allies of Austria the Hanoverian army was at Gottingen ■ 
 the Bavarian in the neighbourhood of Wiirzburg and Bamberg 
 the eighth Federal corps in the vicinity of Frankfort. The lattei 
 consisted of the troops ofWurtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt 
 Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel, to which an Austrian division wa: 
 added. We have seen under what disadvantages the Hanoveriai 
 army left Hanover, and commenced its southward march. It 
 formation and preparations began only at Gottingen, and the; 
 were necessarily conducted under every untoward circumstance 
 The soldiers of the reserve, and those who had been absent oi 
 furlough, nobly responded to the call of their King, and mad' 
 their way through the country which was in Prussian posse." 
 sion, and sometimes even through the lines of the enemy, t 
 join the ranks at Gottingen. By their firm determination ti 
 reach their regiments they afforded an earnest of the gallantr 
 and courage which they afterwards displayed upon the field < 
 battle. By the arrival of these men, the army at Gottingej 
 mustered about twenty thousand combatants, with fifty guns. 
 
 Southern Germany expected great deeds of the Bavaris' 
 
 * See page 118. 
 
■ Chap. I.] WESTEEX THEATRE OF WAR. 269 
 
 army. It might have thrown serious difficulties in the way of 
 the Prussian successes, had not an uncertainty and vacillation 
 . ; pervaded all its operations. Prince Charles of Bavaria, the 
 Commander-in-Chief, under whose orders the eighth Federal 
 ; Corps was also afterwards placed, seems to have conducted his 
 campaign without a definite strategical object, and without 
 1 energy in its prosecution. Against him in command of the 
 : Prussian Army of the Maine* was a general gifted with prudence 
 ; and clear foresight, who pursued his aim with an iron vigour. 
 The Bavarian is a smart soldier in time of peace, and conducts 
 , himself well in battle : but the ranks of Bavaria do not contain 
 such intelligence as do those of Prussia, for men drawn for 
 military service are allowed to provide substitutes, so that only 
 ; the poorer and less educated classes of society furnish recruits 
 Tor the army. 
 
 The eighth Federal corps did not assemble either with zeal 
 'or rapidity. The troops of the Grand Duke of Baden not 
 'only came very late to the place of concentration, but when 
 actually in the field were handled in a manner which gave rise 
 to grave suspicions of the affection of their government for the 
 South-German cause. The kernel of this miscellaneous corps 
 was formed by an Austrian division composed of the troops 
 i which had been withdrawn from the fortresses of Rastadt, 
 'Mayence, and Frankfort. Even if the princes of the small 
 : states which furnished their contingents to the eighth corps had 
 :made clear to themselves the end or object of the war which 
 'they had undertaken, their reasons for the quarrel had not 
 penetrated the lower ranks of their armies. The troops had no 
 -idea, no knowledge, of the causes for which they were to shed 
 ■their blood, and markedly in this respect contrasted with the 
 j Prussian soldiery, which held that the honour, integrity, and 
 even existence of its fatherland was in jeopardy. 
 
 The Federal troops did not fail in bravery, but no enthusiasm 
 thrilled through their ranks. Individual bodies were doubtless 
 animated by a high courage, and in many cases displayed a 
 heroic devotion to their leaders and their princes. But the 
 
 * This name was only given on the 1st of July to the Prussian divisions 
 amalgamated together under the command of General Vogel von Falcken- 
 stein. 
 
2;o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 mass did not work evenly ; a want of harmony existed among 
 its heterogeneous units, which, in combination with the clouded 
 plans of its chiefs, facilitated the task of General von Falcken- 
 stein. There was also dissension in the councils of the leaders. 
 Prince Alexander not only habitually disagreed with his supe- 
 rior, Prince Charles, and so originated causes of disaster \ but 
 himself was often engaged in paltry squabbles with the 
 lieutenants who commanded the different contingents. 
 
 CATASTROPHE OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY. 
 
 The Hanoverian army had marched from its capital almost; 
 totally unprepared to undertake a campaign. It stood in direi 
 need of several days' rest in order to be organized, and toj 
 allow time for the formation of a transport train, as well as foi : 
 the clothing and armament of the soldiers of reserve who had; 
 been recalled to the ranks, and for the horsing of part of the 
 artillery. On this account it was forced to halt until the 2otrj 
 June at Gottingen, and the favourable moment for its unmo- 
 lested march to unite with the troops of Bavaria was alio wee 
 to slip away. 
 
 On the 1 9th June, by the successful occupation of Cassel tr; 
 Prussian troops, the ultimate retreat of the Hanoverians wa 
 first endangered. On the same day the Prussian General voi 
 Falckenstein set out from Hanover with Goebems division ii 
 pursuit of them. The Hanoverian army had gained a start 
 almost seventy miles on General von Falckenstein, which wa 
 of the more importance, inasmuch as the latter could not mak; 
 use of the railroads, which had been torn up and broken. 
 
 The King of Hanover determined to move in a soutr 1 
 easterly direction, and to attempt to reach Bavaria by passin 
 through Prussian territory on the road which leads by Heiliger 
 stadt and Langensalza, and then by Gotha or Eisenach, or t 
 unite with the Bavarians in the neighbourhood of Fulda. Th 
 roads in this direction through the mountains of the Thuringia 
 Forest are very convenient, and by no means difficult. Ha 
 the march been pushed on with certainty and rapidity, theijl. 
 seems to have been no reason why it should not have bee 
 successful in its issue. The portion of the Prussian provinc 
 
:hap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 271 
 
 pf Saxony through which the line of march lay from Heiligen- 
 ttadt to Langensalza was entirely denuded of Prussian troops. 
 The only force to oppose the progress of the retreating army 
 bn this road was the contingent of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, at 
 Gotha. This consisted, however, of only two battalions. It 
 seems, therefore, that the direction proposed for their route 
 offered considerable chances of success, if on the one side the 
 Hanoverians had forced their marches, and on the other the 
 jBavarians had pushed forward by Coburg in strength, in order 
 Ito effect a junction with their threatened allies. But neither 
 the Hanoverian nor Bavarian leaders acted energetically. 
 
 The Prussian staff, on the contrary, took most prompt 
 measures to cut off the Hanoverian retreat, and to occupy the 
 principal points on their line of march with troops. The Duke 
 jof Coburg had declared openly and decidedly on the side of 
 Prussia, and his troops were in consequence at the service of 
 the Prussian Government. On the 20th June, Colonel von 
 Fabeck, the commandant of the Coburg contingent, received a 
 telegraphic order from Berlin to post himself with his two 
 battalions at Eisenach, because it was expected that the 
 Hanoverians would there first attempt to break through. Three 
 battalions of Landwehr, one squadron of Landwehr cavalry, and 
 ;a battery of four guns, were sent from the garrison of Erfurt to 
 ireinforce him. A battalion of the fourth regiment of the 
 Prussian Guard, which had reached Leipsic on the 19th, was 
 ■also despatched to his aid, a detachment of which, on the 20th, 
 rendered the railway tunnel near Eisenach, impassable. 
 
 At the same time General Beyer, pushing forwards from 
 Cassel towards Eisenach, occupied the passages of the river 
 Werra, between Allendorf and that place. 
 
 The idea of uniting with the Bavarians, by moving from 
 Heiligenstadt by Eschewege and Fulda, was under these cir- 
 cumstances, given up by the King of Hanover. On the 20th 
 of June such is said to have been his intention, and on that 
 .day he moved his advanced guard from Gottingen to Heiligen- 
 stadt. On the 21st he ordered his whole army to move upon 
 .Gotha, and crossed the Prussian frontier with his troops, after 
 taking leave of his people by means of a proclamation, in 
 which he mournfully expressed his hope soon to return vie- 
 
2 " 2 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII 
 
 torious at the head of his army, to the land which he was thei 
 temporarily forced to quit. 
 
 General Arentschild, on entering Prussian territory nea 
 Heiligenstadt, issued a proclamation in which he disavowed 
 any intention of treating the country in a hostile manner, an<! 
 declared that he only desired to be allowed to march through 
 without interruption. The Hanoverian army, dependent foi 
 its subsistence upon requisitions, moved but slowly. On M 
 22nd it occupied Miihlhausen, and on the 23rd Grosz-Gotterr, 
 From this place advanced guards were pushed forward on th| 
 one side towards Erfurt, on the other to the railway betwee:' 
 Eisenach and Gotha. The latter found that this line wa; 
 already occupied by the Prussians. On the 24th the Hanc 
 verian army reached Langensalza. 
 
 In the meantime Colonel Fabeck, the commander of th 
 Coburg contingent, quitting his position at Eisenach, aj 
 preached Gotha, and occupied the road by which the Ham' 
 verians might have broken through in this direction. A secon! 
 squadron of Landwehr cavalry and a depot battalion were ser; 
 from Erfurt to reinforce him ; and a second battalion of th. 
 fourth regiment of the infantry of the Prussian Guard wr 
 hurried up from Berlin. One battalion of this regiment o< 
 cupied Weimar, and the other Eisenach. 
 
 On the 24th June, the force opposed to the Hanoverians J 
 Gotha consisted only of six weak battalions, two squadron 
 and four guns. There can hardly be any question but that, 
 the King of Hanover had marched rapidly on Gotha that da. 
 Colonel von Fabeck would have been quite unable to hold hi 
 position. But the Hanoverian leaders failed to take advantas 
 of this last opportunity. The King rejected a proposal mac' 
 by Colonel von Fabeck, that his army should capitulate ; b 
 applied to the Duke of Coburg, and asked him to act' as 
 mediator with the Prussian Government. The Hanoveriar 
 desired a free passage to Bavaria, and were in return willing 
 pledge themselves to take no share in the war in Germai 
 during six months. The Duke of Coburg insisted that th' 
 time should be extended to a year, to which the Hanoveriaii 
 assented, and the Duke telegraphed a report of the negotiatio:! 
 to Berlin. 
 
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 273 
 
 Had the Hanoverians obtained these terms, their intention 
 was to move into Italy, and there to act on the Austrian side 
 against the Italians, — a course of action which would have 
 recalled to memory the past times in which the Electors of 
 Hanover sent so many of their subjects to combat in the cause 
 of the republic of Venice. 
 
 The King of Prussia, immediately on the receipt of the tele- 
 gram of the Duke of Coburg, despatched his Adjutant-General, 
 General von Alvensleben, to Gotha, to treat with the King of 
 'Hanover. In the meantime an armistice was agreed upon, 
 which was to expire on the morning of the 25th. This ar- 
 nistice was violated, doubtlessly by some misunderstanding, 
 pa the night of the 24th, by the Hanoverians, who advanced 
 the Gotha and Eisenach railway, and broke up the line near 
 j?rotestadt. General von Alvensleben sent a proposal from 
 Gotha to the King of Hanover that he should capitulate. To 
 his no answer was returned ; but the King expressed a wish 
 rhat General von Alvensleben should repair to his camp, in 
 f)rder to treat with him. This wish was complied with early on 
 the 25th, when an extension of the armistice was agreed upon, 
 .nd General von Alvensleben hurried back to Berlin for further 
 nstructions. It was not at this time the interest of the Prussians 
 push matters to extremities. Their troops were widely 
 ■cattered, and the small force at Gotha was unequal to engage 
 jhe Hanoverian army with any chance of success. The 
 lanoverians seem to have been ignorant of how small a body 
 (lone barred the way to Bavaria, and to have hoped that time 
 •light be afforded for aid to reach them. On the night of the 
 ,4th a messenger was sent to the Bavarian head-quarters at 
 ■Jamberg to report the situation of the Hanoverian army, and 
 ) solicit speedy assistance. To this request Prince Charles 
 'ily replied that an army of nineteen thousand men ought to 
 ;e able to cut its way through. In consequence of this opinion 
 nly one Bavarian brigade of light cavalry was advanced on 
 pe 25th of June to Meiningen, in the valley of the Werra, 
 .tile a few Bavarian detachments were pushed forward along 
 ie high road as far as Vacha. 
 
 This procedure of Prince Charles of Bavaria was alone suffi- 
 ient to condemn him as a general. He held his army inactive, 
 
 T 
 
SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 ** by a bold advance, not only ^ h Ij^Jg-jj 
 
 thousond of k» ri"~r > ™ e "' °* L„ „,„,d to his m- 
 
 5s. £'5i=KS :S oS.^p.o ft. J 
 SSLS oift '«» p°~ " ",r r «*. « ft«i 
 
 ,nd Hal e On the same evening the Prussian troops at Go- 
 , reinforced by two battalions of the 2 oth regiment 
 Tandwefand a dlpot battalion from the garrison of Mag. 
 buTg General Flies" immediately assumed the command : 
 Prussian and Coburg troops at Gotha, and pushed his ad a, 1 
 IZi "hat evening" to Warza, half-way between Gotha I 
 
 ^EZt*. Place the Hanoverian army lay. The opportu, , 
 
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 275 
 
 of forcing its way into Bavaria, while the two battalions of 
 Coburg were alone at Gotha, had been lost. By the morning 
 of the 26th, forty-two thousand Prussians were placed on the 
 south, west, and north, within a day's march of its position, and 
 all hopes of escape into Bavaria, or of aid from its southern 
 allies, appeared to be vain. 
 
 On the 26th the armistice expired at ten o'clock in the 
 morning, but the Prussian Commander-in-chief did not imme- 
 diately commence hostilities. His dispositions were not yet 
 perfected. That day the Hanoverian army drew more closely 
 together, either with the object of accepting battle, or, as some 
 ; say, with the intention of moving by Tennstedt, and endeavour- 
 ing to join the Bavarians by a circuitous route. 
 
 That evening the Hanoverians took up a position between 
 \ the villages of Thamsbriick, Merxleben, and the town of Lan- 
 gensalza. None of these places were well suited for defence, 
 !and no artificial fortifications were thrown up on the southern 
 side of the position, where General Flies lay. On the northern 
 side a few insignificant earthworks and one battery were erected, 
 to guard the rear and right flank of the army against the Prus- 
 sian corps under General Manteuffel, which lay in the direction 
 of Miihlhausen. The soldiers were weary with marching and 
 privations, but eager to join battle with the Prussians, who of 
 late years had spoken in a disparaging and patronising tone of 
 the Hanoverian army, which, since the battle of Langensalza, 
 has been exchanged for one of high respect and admiration. 
 There had been a false alarm in the Hanoverian lines of an 
 advance by the enemy in the night between the 26th and 27th 
 June; but an attack was not expected on the 27th. This day 
 had been appointed by Royal command to be observed as a 
 solemn day of fast and humiliation throughout Prussia, and the 
 Hanoverian leaders appear to have imagined that on this 
 account the Prussian generals would not attack. In this they 
 were deceived, for before evening there had been fought the 
 bloody 
 
 BATTLE OF LANGENSALZA. 
 
 The Prussian troops on the morning of the 27th occupied 
 the following positions : — The division of General Manteuffel 
 
 t 2 
 
276 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 was at Miihlhausen; that of General Beyer at Eisenach; that 
 of General Goeben had one of its brigades, that of General 
 Wrangel, pushed forwards towards the north-west of Langen- 
 salza, and the other brigade, that of General Kummer, at 
 Gotha • while the corps of General Flies was concentrated on 
 the south of Langensalza, at Warza. General Flies, who com- 
 manded five battalions of infantry of the Prussian line, one 
 depot battalion, two battalions of the Duke of Saxe-Coburg- 
 Gotha and five battalions of Landwehr, with three squadrons, 
 in all 'about twelve thousand men,* with twenty-two guns, 
 advanced from Warza, and attacked the Hanoverian position 
 on that forenoon. General Flies has been censured by mili- 
 tary critics for making this attack so early, while, as_ will be 
 seen in the sequel, his colleagues were still too far distant^ 
 render him assistance during the action which he thus precipi- 
 tated He has not, however, failed to find defenders of the 
 course he pursued. It has been urged that the object of hr 
 attack was to hold the Hanoverian army on the Unstrut, an 
 if this were his only object he was successful. Hanovena 
 sources of information, however, hardly allude to the supposi 
 tion that King George was about to move to Tennstedt ; and 
 unless General Flies had strong reasons for believing that hi 
 adversary meditated the immediate execution of such a move 
 ment he was hardly justified in exposing himself to an unne 
 cessary chance of disaster. It has also been said that Genera 
 Manteuffel on the north was to fire two cannon as a signal t(. 
 General Flies that he was ready to attack, and that the Hano : 
 verians, having discovered this arrangement, gave the signal aj 
 an early hour from their own batteries. The Hanoverians. 
 
 * 3 Battalions, nth Regiment j (hOQQ per Batta lion) . . 5> 000 
 2 " Saxe Coburg-Gotha (900 per Battalion) . i,Soo 
 
 Depot Battalion 71st Regiment (400 per Battalion) . . 4°° 
 2 Battalions, 20th Landwehr Regiment j ,. t ^ 
 
 2 „ 32nd „ „ W800 per Battalion) 4,000 
 
 I Battalion, 27th „ ) 
 
 3 Squadrons (150 horsemen each) . . . • • 4o 
 
 11,650 
 
 ^ ... 600 
 Gunners 
 
 12,250 
 
CHAP. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 277 
 
 however, assert that their artillery only fired its first shot after 
 General Flies's infantry attack had been well developed. 
 
 The position occupied by the Hanoverian army on the 
 
 morning of the 27th lay along the sloping side of the line of 
 
 ', hills which rises from the left bank of the river Unstrut. The 
 
 right wing and centre rested on the villages of Thamsbriick 
 
 ■ and Merxleben ; the left wing between the villages of Nagel- 
 1 stadt and Merxleben. The third brigade (Von Biilow) formed 
 ; the right wing ; the fourth brigade (Von Bothmer) the left ; 
 
 while in the centre was posted the first brigade {Von de 
 Knesebeck), which at the beginning of the action was held in 
 I rear of the general line. The village of Merxleben, and the 
 ground in front of it, was occupied by the second brigade (De 
 Vaux), which had its outposts pushed as far as Henningsleben, 
 along the road to Warza. The artillery and cavalry of the 
 
 ■ reserve were posted behind Merxleben, near the road to Sund- 
 hausen, where the scanty depots of ammunition and stores 
 were established. The front of the position was covered by 
 the river, which with its steep banks impeded at first the Prus- 
 sian attack, but afterwards was an obstacle to the offensive 
 
 advance and counter-attack of the Hanoverians. 
 
 At about nine o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the two 
 Coburg battalions which formed the advanced guard of General 
 Flies's column reached Henningsleben, and attacked the Hano- 
 verian outposts there. These withdrew to Langensalza, occa- 
 sionally checking their pursuers by the fire of their skirmishers. 
 One Hanoverian battalion remained for a short time in Lan- 
 gensalza, but then the whole Hanoverian troops, which had 
 been pushed along the Gotha road, withdrew across the Unstrut 
 to Merxleben, and the Prussians occupied Langensalza before 
 ten o'clock. 
 
 General Flies then made his arrangements for an attack on 
 the main Hanoverian position. His artillery was very inferior 
 numerically to that of the enemy, so he relied chiefly on his 
 infantry fire. He sent a small column to make a feint against 
 Thamsbriick, while he advanced two regiments of infantry 
 against Merxleben, and detached a column of Landwehr to his 
 right, in order to outflank, if possible, and turn the Hano- 
 verian left. 
 
278 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 On the Hanoverian side the first gun was fired between ten 
 and eleven, from a battery of rifled 6-pounders attached to the 
 second brigade, and posted on the left of Merxleben. The 
 first brigade was immediately pushed forward to the support of 
 the second brigade, and took up its position on the right of 
 that village. 
 
 By a singular error, the Hanoverians failed to hold a wood 
 and bathing-establishment close to the river, on the right bank, 
 opposite Merxleben. Into these the Prussian regiments advanc-l 
 ing against the village threw themselves. Sheltered by the 
 cover, they opened a biting musketry fire against the Hanoi 
 verian gunners and troops near the village, which lasted till the 5 
 end of the battle, caused great loss in the Hanoverian ranks., 
 and made an issue from the village and a passage of the bridge! 
 most difficult and dangerous. The first gun-shot of the Hano; 
 verians was quickly followed by others, and in a few minute;; 
 the whole of the Prussian and the greater part of the Hanoveriar 
 pieces were engaged, when the roar of the guns, the explosion 
 of bursting shells, and the rapid crackling of small arms, rosq 
 loud in the rough harmony of war. 
 
 The Prussian column on the right pressed forward againsl 
 the Hanoverians' left, seemed to be bearing against their line c; 
 retreat, and threatened to turn their flank. The Hanoveria:; 
 leader seized the opportunity, and resolved to attack with vigou 
 the wide-spread Prussian line. 
 
 The first brigade in the centre, with the third brigade on ills 
 right wing, advanced at mid-day from Merxleben. The fourt 
 brigade on the left wing moved forward at the same time again: 
 the Prussian right, but here the banks of the river were steepe' 
 and the time occupied in descending and ascending the bank 
 as well as in wading through the stream, prevented more of th 
 brigade than one battalion of rifles from at first taking a sha: 
 in the onset. The rest of the Hanoverian troops, howeve 
 supported by their artillery, pressed steadily forward, and bo 
 down upon the Prussians, who retreated. Many prisoners we' 
 taken, but not without severe loss to the assailants, wl 
 soon occupied the wood and bathing-establishment beside tii 
 river. 
 
 The Prussians then drew off from every point, and a favoi 
 
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 27; 
 
 able opportunity occurred for a vigorous pursuit. But the dis- 
 advantage of a river in front of a position now became apparent. 
 ; The cavalry could not ford the stream, nor approach it closely, 
 \ on account of the boggy nature of its banks, and had to depend 
 I upon the bridges at Thamsbriick, Merxleben, and Nagelstadt. 
 The Duke of Cambridge's regiment of dragoons issued from the 
 ; latter village, and dashed forward quickly, but unsupported, 
 against the Prussian line of retreat, and took several prisoners. 
 As soon as the heavy cavalry of the reserve had threaded its 
 way across the bridge of Merxleben, it also rushed upon the 
 .retreating Prussians. Two squares were broken by it, and 
 many prisoners made, while Captain von Einein, with his 
 squadron of cuirassiers, captured a Prussian battery. But the 
 horsemen of Hanover suffered fearfully from the deadly rapidity 
 iof the needle-gun, and Von Einein fell in the midst of his cap- 
 tured cannon. 
 
 The cavalry pursued the Prussians as far as Henningsleben, 
 jbut a further pursuit, or an advance of the infantry even so far, 
 ;was impossible, on account of the fatigue of both men and 
 horses, and the scarcity of provisions and ammunition. 
 I About five o'clock the pursuit terminated, and the Hano- 
 verians, masters of the field of battle, posted their outlying 
 pickets on the south of Langensalza. 
 
 The total loss of the Hanoverians in killed and wounded 
 was one thousand three hundred and ninety two. The 
 Prussians lost nine hundred and twelve prisoners, and probably 
 about the same number as their enemies in killed and wounded. 
 It is said that the Hanoverian infantry engaged did not number 
 more than ten thousand men, because the recruits were sent to 
 the rear, and during the day one thousand men were employed 
 in throwing up earthworks. The Hanoverian cavalry consisted 
 bf twenty-four squadrons, of which eighteen certainly took part 
 in the pursuit, and must have mustered at least nineteen 
 hundred sabres. The artillery in action on that side consisted 
 bf forty-two guns. The Prussian force, as has been shown 
 before, numbered about twelve thousand combatants, with 
 twenty-two guns. It is extremely questionable how far General 
 Flies was justified under these circumstances in precipitating 
 an action. 
 
280 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 The battle of Langensalza was of little avail to the gallant 
 army which had won it. The troops of Hanover were now 
 too intricately involved in the meshes of Falckenstein's 
 strategy. 
 
 This general, on the 28th, closed in his divisions, and drew 
 them tightly round the beleaguered Hanoverians, who, by the 
 action of Langensalza, had repulsed but not cut through their 
 assailants. The division of General Manteuffel and the brigade 
 
 POSITIONS ON THE MORNING OF THE 29TH. 
 
 Brigade Wr angel 
 JZ) \Bolhtedt) 
 
 (Rotlien-Heilingen) 
 
 T nstrul R. 
 
 D 
 
 n Flics 
 
 [Warza) 
 Div. Beyer 
 \Haynd) 
 
 a 
 
 Kummers Brigade to Weimar 
 
 {Gotha) 
 
 of General Wrangel were pushed into the Hanoverian rear, ar' 
 took up positions at Alt-Gottern, Rothen-Heiligen, and Bo; 
 stedt. The division of General Beyer was advanced fro' 
 Eisenach to Hayna. General Flies was at Warza, and t 
 brigade of General Kummer at Gotha was held ready to mo 
 
Chap. I.] WESTERN THEATRE OF WAR. 2S1 
 
 by railway to Weimar, in order to head King George, in case 
 he should march to the eastward on the left bank of the 
 Unstrut. Forty thousand hostile combatants were knitted 
 round the unfortunate monarch and his starving but devoted 
 1 troops. 
 
 When these positions of the Prussians were reported to the 
 King, he determined to avoid a holocaust of his soldiery. An 
 action could hardly have been successful ; it must have been 
 desperate. The terms of capitulation which had been formerly 
 proposed by Prussia, were agreed to on the evening of the 29th. 
 Arms, carriages, and military stores were handed over to the 
 Prussians : the Hanoverian soldiers were dismissed to their 
 homes : the officers were allowed to retain their horses and 
 their swords, on condition of not again serving against Prussia 
 during the war. The King himself and the Crown Prince 
 were allowed to depart whither they pleased, except within the 
 boundaries of Hanover. 
 
 Political errors, and the supineness of Prince Charles of 
 Bavaria, had at one stroke of the pen made a whole army 
 .captive, and blotted out from the roll of independent states 
 one of the most renowned of continental principalities. 
 
 This disaster of the Hanoverian army was due in a less 
 degree to the uncertain action of its leaders than to the 
 improvidence of its administrators, and the blindness of the 
 political guardians of its country. Still there is no doubt 
 that, on the days preceding the 25th June, the army of King 
 George could easily have forced its way through the small 
 knot of its enemies at Gotha, and have secured a safe re- 
 treat, provided only that it had been directed to march 
 boldly forward. Its subsequent conduct at Langensalza com- 
 pels us to believe that its organization at this time must 
 : have been sufficiently advanced to allow it to take this course. 
 For the reasons that it did not do so its military directors 
 must be responsible. 
 
 Yet, whoever is to blame for the calamitous results of its 
 '■ expiring campaign, none can regard, without a feeling of 
 .sympathy and emotion, the last struggles of a proud and 
 high-minded soldiery, who bore up ineffectually for days 
 , against privation, hardship, and superior numbers ; who even 
 
282 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 hoped against hope ; who rallied round their king in the hour 
 of his misfortune, and strove to carry him, by the pressure 
 of their bayonets, through the clustering bands of hostile com- 
 batants. Hanoverians may well look with a mournful satis- 
 faction on Langensalza. British soldiers may justly feel a 
 generous pride in the last campaign of an army which mingled 
 its blood with that of their ancestors on the battle-fields of 
 Spain and Belgium, and not unworthily rank the name of the 
 battle which closes the last page of Hanoverian history with 
 Salamanca, Talavera, Quatre Bras, and Waterloo. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 
 
 
 When Prussia determined upon war, she resolved to throw 
 herself with her main force upon Austria, since that Power was 
 the leader and backbone of the coalition against her. With the 
 intention of crushing the Austrian army in Bohemia and 
 Moravia, the whole of the regular corps d'armee of the Prussian 
 service were directed upon those countries. Westphalia and 
 the Rhenish provinces were denuded of their regular troops, 
 which were marched to the Austrian frontier. To protect the 
 western provinces of Prussia from the allies of Austria, to over- 
 run Hanover and Hesse-Cassel, and then to act against the 
 allies of Austria in the south-west of Germany, was the task 
 entrusted to General Vogel von Falckenstein. He was pro- 
 vided with an army hastily collected together from the Elbe 
 duchies, and from the garrisons of the neighbouring 
 fortresses. 
 
 With this army, General von Falckenstein had to be pre- 
 pared to take the field against the Bavarians and the seventh 
 corps of the late Germanic Confederation. Previous to en- 
 gaging with these adversaries, he was forced to occupy Hanover 
 and Hesse-Cassel, and to pursue and disarm the Hanoverian 
 troops. These preliminaries cost the Prussian general the loss 
 of fourteen days of valuable time, and allowed the eighth 
 Federal corps to assemble its heterogeneous constituents, and 
 organize them round Frankfort. There can be no doubt but 
 that if, on the 1 8th or 1 9th June, General Falckenstein had 
 been able to concentrate his divisions near Wetzlar, and to 
 have marched immediately upon Frankfort, he would have 
 entirely prevented the collection of the troops of Baden, Wur- 
 
284 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. | 
 
 temberg, and Hesse, and have annihilated in detail their \ 
 separated divisions. 
 
 On the other hand, fortune favoured Falckenstein, inasmuch 
 as that during this fortnight the main armies of his opponents 
 remained inactive, and, with the exception of some petty' 
 demonstrations, began to develop no energy until quite the end, 
 of June, when he himself, after the capitulation of the Hano 
 verians, was free to turn his unrestricted attention to them, and 
 had concentrated his whole army at Gotha and Eisenach. 
 
 The army thus assembled under General von Falckensteir 
 consisted of three divisions. These were the division o- 
 Lieutenant-General von Goeben, which consisted of the 13th 
 53rd, 15th and 55th regiments of infantry, with the 8th regi' 
 ment of hussars, and 4th regiment of cuirassiers. It musterer 
 in all, at this time, about thirteen thousand men, with twenty 
 four guns, and was divided into two brigades, one commander 
 by General Kummer, the other by General Wrangel. On 
 division was the division of General von Beyer, which ha«; 
 been formed from the garrisons of the Federal fortresses c 
 Mayence, Rastadt, Luxemburg, and Frankfort-on-Maine, anj 
 consisted of the 19th, 20th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 39th and 7ot 
 regiments of infantry, with the 9th regiment of hussars, — altq 
 gether twenty-one thousand five hundred men, with forty-tw 
 guns. Another the division of General von ManteurTel, whic 
 had formerly garrisoned the duchy of Schleswig; it consists 
 of the 25th, 36th, nth, and 59th regiments of infantry, and tl 
 5th and 9th dragoons, — in all thirteen thousand men, wii 
 thirty guns. The command of this division was shortly afte 
 wards given to General von Flies. To the Army of the Mail 
 were also attached two battalions of the duchy of Saxe-Cobui 
 one of Oldenburg, and one of Lippe-Detmold, which nm 
 bered together about two thousand five hundred combatan I 
 General von Falckenstein had thus under his orders as neaij 
 as possible fifty thousand men, with ninety-six guns.* T 
 battalions of Landwehr and the depot troops which had foug': 
 
 * Later five fourth battalions, a newly-raised rifle battalion, and th ; 
 newly-raised Landwehr cavalry regiments, as well as the Oldenburg- H ■• 
 seatic brigade, consisting of seven battalions, six squadrons, and two batter: ; , 
 reinforced this army. 
 
:hap. TI.J CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 2S5 
 
 it Langensalza were not retained with the army, but were dis- 
 missed to rejoin the garrisons of those fortresses from which 
 they had been taken. 
 
 Opposed to the Prussian Army of the Maine stood, after the 
 capitulation of the Hanoverians, the seventh and eighth corps 
 ,of the Germanic Confederation. The seventh Federal corps 
 consisted of the army of Bavaria, which was under the com- 
 mand of Prince Charles of Bavaria, who was also Commander- 
 in-chief of the two corps. The Bavarian army was divided 
 into three divisions, each of which consisted of two brigades. 
 A brigade was formed of two regiments of infantry of the Line, 
 each of three battalions ; a battalion of light infantry, a regi- 
 ment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery. There was also a 
 reserve brigade of infantry, which consisted of five Line regi- 
 ments and two battalions of rifles. The reserve cavalry con- 
 sisted of six regiments, the reserve artillery of two batteries. 
 The first division was under the command of General Stephan, 
 the second under General Feder, the third under General 
 Zoller. The infantry of the reserve was commanded by 
 General Hartmann, the cavalry by a prince of the House of 
 Thurn and Taxis. The whole army numbered over fifty 
 jthousand sabres and bayonets, with one hundred and thirty-six 
 £uns.* The chief of the staff of Prince Charles was General 
 yon der Tann, who was a tried commander of a division. 
 
 The Bavarian army in the middle of June was posted along 
 the northern frontier of its own kingdom in positions intended 
 to cover that country from an invasion from the north or east, 
 ilts head-quarters were at Bamberg, its extreme right wing at 
 Hof, and its extreme left wing near the confluence of the 
 
 * Each battalion of the Line mustered on paper 950 men ; each rifle 
 jattalion 668 ; and each regiment of cavalry 591 horsemen. This would 
 ^ive a total of 58,036 combatants ; but from this number several deductions 
 lave to be made for sickness and incomplete battalions. The number 
 stated in the text has been carefully compiled from the comparison of many 
 jvuthorities. Theoretically, Bavaria possessed a large force of Landwehr ; but 
 ;is the cadres of the Landwehr battalions were not maintained in peace, and 
 10 arrangements made for their clothing or armament in case of the out- 
 break of a war, these auxiliary troops never paraded during the earlier 
 operations of the war, except upon paper ; and only once during the whole 
 )f the campaign, near Bayreuth, did a detachment of these troops take a 
 )art in any action. 
 
286 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 Franconian Saale with the Maine, between Schweinfurt and 
 Gemiinden. 
 
 The eighth Federal corps, under the command of Prince 
 Alexander of Hesse, consisted of the Federal contingents of 
 Wiirtemberg, Baden, Hesse, and a combined division ; which 
 included the Austrian auxiliary brigade and the troops of 
 Nassau. The whole corps mustered forty-nine thousand eight '■ 
 hundred sabres and bayonets, with one hundred and thirty-four: 
 guns.* Prince Alexander assumed the command of this corps' 
 
 * The Order of Battle of this eighth Federal corps was : — 
 1st (Wiirtemberg) Division. — Lieutenant-General von Hardegg. 
 
 1st Infantry Brigade (1st and 5th Regiments and 3rd Jager Battalion). 
 
 — Major-General von Baumbach. 
 2nd Infantry Brigade (2nd and 7th Regiments and 3rd Jager Battalion). 
 
 — Major-General von Fischer. 
 3rd Infantry Brigade (3rd and 8th Regiments and 1st Jager Battalion).; 
 
 — Major-General Hegelmeier. 
 Cavalry Brigade (1st, 3rd, and 4th Regiments). — Major- Genera.'' 
 
 Count von Scheler. 
 Artillery, Six Batteries of Eight Guns. 
 2nd (Baden) Division. — Prince William of Baden. 
 
 Infantry. — Commander, Lieutenant-General Waag. 
 1st Brigade (Grenadier and 5th Regiments and a Jager Battalion). 
 
 Major- General von la Roche. 
 2nd Brigade (2nd and 3rd Regiments and Fusilier Battalion). - 
 
 Colonel von Neubronn. 
 Cavalry, 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Dragoons. 
 Artillery, Five Batteries of Six Guns. 
 3rd (Hesse-Darmstadt) Divison. — Lieutenant-General von Perglas. 
 
 1st Brigade(ist and 2nd Regiments and one Jager Company). — Major 
 
 General Frey. 
 2nd Brigade (3rd and 4th Regiments and one Jager Company). — Majoi 
 
 General von Stockhausen. 
 A Battalion of Sharpshooters was attached to the Division. 
 Cavalry Brigade (two Regiments of Light Horse). — Prince Louis c, 
 
 Hesse. # 
 
 Artillery, Four Batteries of Six Guns. 
 4U1 (Combined) Division. — Lieutenant-Field-Marshal Count Neipperg. 
 Austrian Brigade.— Major-General Hohn. 
 
 Three Battalions of the 16th Infantry Regiment (Italians). 
 One Battalion of the 49th ,, ,, 
 
 One ,, ,, 21st „ 
 
 One ,, ,, 74-th » „ 
 
 The 35th Jager Battalion. 
 Two Batteries of Eight Guns. 
 Nassau Brigade (1st and 2nd Regiments and a Jager Battalion).- 
 
 Major-General Roth. 
 Artillery, two Batteries of Eight Guns. 
 To this division were attached two squadrons of the Hussars of Hes£ 
 Cassel. 
 
Phap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 2S7 
 
 >n the 1 8th June, and established his head -quarters at Dann- 
 ;tadt. 
 
 The Elector of Hesse-Cassel had sent his troops to the south 
 lis soon as the Prussians invaded his territory. By a decree of 
 he Diet of the 22nd June, they were placed under the orders 
 >f the commander of the eighth Federal corps. On account 
 )f their rapid retreat from Cassel, their preparations for war 
 ivere interrupted, and little could as yet be expected from them 
 n the open held. On the 29th June, when Prince Alexander 
 •eceived orders for an advance of his corps, he directed the 
 Hesse-Cassel contingent, on this account, to retire to Mainz, 
 .here to cover the Rhine, and the country in the immediate 
 vicinity of that fortress. Two squadrons of hussars alone he 
 i - etained as the divisional cavalry of his fourth division. These, 
 is well as the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt, were ready for 
 iction. The troops of Wiirtemberg and Baden still wanted 
 dme ; those of Baden particularly : for their duchy entered 
 only unwillingly into the war against Prussia. Wiirtemberg 
 lad sent an infantry brigade, a regiment of cavalry, and two 
 catteries on the 17th June, to Frankfort. These were intended 
 unite with the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt already assembling 
 here, and to form a guard for the Rump Diet which still held 
 ts sittings at that town. 
 
 The next Wiirtemberg brigade joined the corps only on the 
 :>8th June, the last brigade on the 5th July. On the 17th June 
 he Government called up its furlough and reserve soldiers, and 
 organized its division. The first Baden brigade reached Frank- 
 fort on the 25th June, where the Austrian brigade had arrived 
 mly a few days before. The rest of the troops and the trans- 
 port trains did not come in till the 8th July. The 9th July can 
 )e considered to have been the first day on which the eighth 
 7 ederal corps was first ready to take the field. While these 
 ninor Governments were still assembling their small contin- 
 gents, the troops of Prussia had long been in possession of 
 Saxony and Hesse, had caused the surrender of the Hanoverian 
 ;irmy, and already inflicted a crushing defeat on the main forces 
 :>f Austria. 
 
 The Bavarian army lay along the Maine, with its first division 
 owards Hof, its fourth towards Gemiinden. The Bavarian 
 
 I 
 
288 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 Government was anxious to make an advance upon Berlin, by 
 way of Hof ; but the general strategical movements of all the 
 allies of Austria were, in virtue of a convention concluded 
 between Austria and Bavaria on the 14th June, directed from 
 Vienna. The directing genius decided against any offensive 
 movement in a north-easterly direction : and insisted strongl) 
 on a junction of the Bavarian and eighth Federal corps betweer 
 Wurzburg and Frankfort, in order to then move against th(| 
 Prussian provinces, on the north-west. The aim of Austria wa;i 
 to compel Prussia to detach strong bodies from her troops 
 engaged with Benedek, and so to weaken her main army. Th< 
 Bavarian and eighth corps when united were to have the nam<' 
 of the West German Federal Army. 
 
 On the 21st June, Prince Charles of Bavaria heard that thd 
 Hanoverians had moved from Gottingen. On the 23rd hi 
 knew certainly that they had marched to Miihlhausen an; 
 Langensalza. On the 25th for the first time he made anj 
 movement of importance. On that day the Bavarian armywaj 
 set in motion towards the north. That evening the advance! 
 guard of the first cavalry brigade entered Meiningen : the mail 
 body reached that town in the night between the 26th anj 
 27th. Communications with the Hanoverians had been cut of-! 
 and Prince Charles, uncertain of their exact position, on th 
 28th had ordered his columns to move towards Fulda. New 
 reached him, however, of the commencement of the battle <| 
 Langensalza, and, changing the direction of his march, 1"' 
 moved towards Gotha. The same evening a despatch arrive 1 
 from Vienna which urged a rapid advance of the Bavarian' 
 Forced marches were ordered, and the troops, to raise the> 
 enthusiasm, received double pay for the first two days. On tl 
 29th, the first division, followed by the second, reached H 
 burghausen ; the fourth, followed by the third, pushed par 
 Meiningen. It was only when the advanced guards had reach* 
 Zella, in the Thuringian Forest, that they received counts 
 orders : for Count Ingelheim, the Austrian ambassador at tl 1 
 court of King George, had arrived with the intelligence th 
 the Hanoverians had laid down their arms. Thus the force 
 marching of two days had been lost, and the Bavarian army h«" 
 commenced its campaign without result or glory, on account 
 

 Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN O.V THE MAINE. 2S 
 
 too tardy an assumption of the initiative. On the 2 oth rt,» 
 rdemen and hght horsemen who formed the ad vancel gu^ 
 of the first division reached Schleusingen ; on the 20th the 
 mam column entered that place. The forced marches o he 
 29th and 30th had fatigued the croons Th„ ,-„ t 
 sion of orders and couLr-orfJ Z weS dfaVT' 
 saw that all their exertions were J2LS by^e^ 
 mauds or by changes in the direction of the Kne o marl 
 Before the commencement of actual war their confidence in 
 he lr leaders had waned, for the men saw no grounds for the 
 fatigues laid upon them. The capitulation of the Hanoverians 
 
 Sj^TL Z^T^ ^g* » *" 
 unite with the eighth Federa, corps b "afith nw t^eft 
 along the roads which lead by Giessen to Hiinfeld and bv 
 HUdern to Fulda. The success of this movements however 
 
 srs Lf be afterwards -.^^sudden^tr: 
 
 ■ The eighth Federal corps had, hy the 27th June assembled 
 ; about 39 , O00 me ith eighty s .7 ce JJ* ^rnMed 
 
 berg brigade, another cavalry regiment, and two more batt "s 
 were expected to come in on the following day, it centered 
 M strong enough to assume the offensive: and tl e folW n 1 
 :orders were issued for the 28th T..n«> • tL Z lol ' on ™g 
 
 •Darmstadt were to form the aLS^rd SCbS 
 of infantry, two rifled 6-pounder batteries, a regiment of cavofrv 
 k a bridge train. The first and fourth divCtfformed d^ 
 .Main body : each consisted of two brigades of infant™ Iht 
 kt division had three batteries of artille r and a St of 
 
 ; S c ; d to i ; the r nd had ^***J%X£ 
 
 a sa° s attLned V Th 7 ' ^ ^ SqUadr °" S ° f Hesse-Casse 
 nissas attached, j?he reserve consisted of five battalions of 
 be Bavarian bngade of La Roche, six regiments of cavalry, and 
 
 * 1st Division, 5,200 Infantry, with 1,100 Cavalry and 16 Guns 
 " 4o °° " 240 „ 6 
 
 4th ■■ I2 .°°° ,. 1000 g " 
 
290 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 thirty-four guns, of which sixteen were rifled. The advanced 
 guard on the 29th June took up a position around Friedberg, 
 about eighteen miles north of Frankfort, with its right on the 
 river Nidda. On the 30th the Commander-in-chief broke up 
 his head-quarters at Frankfort, and ordered a general advance. 
 He intended to move upon Alsfeld, a town which, on the 
 Schwalen, still in the territory of Hesse-Darmstadt, lies close to 
 the frontier of Hesse-Cassel. Prince Alexander considered 
 himself secure from any attack on his left flank by Prussian 
 detachments from the Rhine provinces, because of the troops 
 of Hesse-Cassel in Mainz. The division of Baden on the 1st 
 July occupied Giessen, and paid a short visit to the Prussian 
 town of Wetzlar, and on the 2nd July Prince Alexander held a 
 position from Giessen eastwards to Griinberg, on the road to 
 Alsfeld. 
 
 Here he received a despatch from Prince Charles of Bavaria, 
 which had been sent from Meiningen on the evening of the 30th 
 June. This altered the direction of the march of the eighth' 
 Federal corps. 
 
 It does not appear clear whether Prince Alexander, in hisj 
 design of an advance to Alsfeld, was acting in compliance with 
 an order from Prince Charles of Bavaria, or whether on his own ; 
 responsibility he moved forward to cover the territory of Hesse- 
 Cassel from invasion. The direction of the movement shows, 
 however, that he who ordered it, be he who he may, was singu- 
 larly ill-furnished with intelligence of his enemy's movements.' 
 By making for Alsfeld Prince Alexander not only would have; 
 exposed his right flank and his line of communication to the 
 head of Falckenstein's columns, but would have increased the, 
 difficulties of his junction with Prince Charles. As it was, at. 
 the time that Prince Charles sent to change the line of marcrj 
 of the eighth corps, these difficulties were already formidable 
 enough. An interval of between eighty and ninety miles sepa 
 rated the two bodies : and not only did the valley of the Fuldz 
 as well as that of the Werra intervene, but rugged hills rosti 
 between them, such as the Vogels-Berg and the Hohe Rhon. 
 It did not need such a keen general as Falckenstein to perceiv<| 
 the advantages he would derive if he drove the Prussian arnrj 
 as a mighty wedge between these separated corps, and hurle< 
 
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 291 
 
 himself with full force on the nearest ere the other could arrive 
 ! to its assistance. In his own immediate command Prince 
 Charles showed vacillation and uncertainty. He did not strive 
 with all energy to liberate the Hanoverians, and unite them 
 with his own force. Nor when he found himself too late to 
 achieve this object did he take rapid measures for a concentra- 
 tion with the eighth corps. On the contrary, instead of making 
 towards his left, he drew away to his right, apparently with the 
 object of crossing another difficult mountain country, the Thu- 
 ' ringian forest, and placing that obstacle also between himself 
 i and his allies, while he left the valley of the Werra open to his 
 1 antagonist as a groove down which to drive the wedge that 
 should separate the Bavarians entirely from Prince Alexander. 
 
 On the evening of the 30th June he for the first time appears 
 ■ to have decided upon a concentrative movement. He then 
 i issued orders that both corps should seek to unite at Fulda. 
 I To accomplish this, the Bavarians were to move in a westerly, 
 (the Federals in an easterly, direction. The latter began to 
 move with this object on the 3rd July. Prince Alexander 
 i moved with his first and third division that day to Ulrichstein, 
 ' a small town on the northern issues of the Vogels-Berg. With 
 ! his second division he occupied Giessen and Wetzlar to secure 
 I his line of communication with Frankfort, and sent his fourth 
 ; division to Friedberg. His cavalry was sent out to scour the 
 i country towards Alsfeld and Marburg. He evidently expected 
 :■ his enemy by the railway from Marburg, and took these pre- 
 cautions to cover his flank march. On the 4th July head- 
 ; quarters remained inactive at Ulrichstein, and some patrols 
 . alone pushed forward. Here again was a lack of energy and 
 clear-sightedness. Portions of any army which are separated, 
 and desire to concentrate in the presence of an enemy, should 
 exert all their powers to do so, and not waste a single hour, far 
 • less halt on the second day of the march. 
 
 How false these news were became soon apparent. On the 
 
 '■ 4th July news came to the head-quarters of Prince Alexander, 
 
 ! that strong Prussian columns were moving on Fulda from 
 
 Hiinfeld and Gerza, towns which lie between the Werra and 
 
 the Fulda, An advance of the eighth corps prepared for 
 
 battle, and with all precautions, was ordered for the next day. 
 
 u 2 
 
292 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 During this, however, the Prussian and Bavarian troops had 
 come into contact. 
 
 General Falckenstein had, after the capitulation of the Hano- 
 verians on the 29th of June, concentrated on the 1st July his 
 three divisions at Eisenach. To this united corps was given 
 the name of the Army of the Maine. On the 2nd July, 
 Falckenstein took the main road which leads from Eisenach by 
 Fulda to Frankfort, and reached Marksahl that day. His inten- 
 tion was to press the Bavarians eastwards. These occupied a 
 position at that time with their main body near Meiningen, on 
 the west of the Werra. Two divisions were posted on that river, 
 near Schmalkalden, to cover the passage of that stream against 
 a Prussian corps which was expected from Erfurt. The cavalry 
 was intended to open communications with the eighth corps in 
 the direction of Fulda. 
 
 On the night of the 2nd July, the same night that the troops 
 of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia were moving towards 
 the • field of Koniggratz, a Bavarian reconnoitring party fell in 
 with one of Falckenstein' s patrols. On the 3rd July the Prus- 
 sian reconnoitring officers brought in reports that the Bavarians 
 were in force round Wiesenthal, on the river Felde. It was 
 clear to Falckenstein that this position was held by the heads 
 of the Bavarian columns which were moving to unite with the 
 eighth corps. The Prussian general could not afford to permit 
 the enemy to lie in a position so close and threatening to the 
 left flank of his advance. He ordered General Goeben to push 
 them back on the following morning, by forming to his left, and 
 attacking the villages on the Felde in front, while General 
 ManteurTel's division should move up the stream, and assail 
 them on the right flank. The third division, that of General 
 Beyer, was in the meantime to push its march towards Fulda. 
 
 ACTION OF WIESENTHAL. 
 
 The Bavarian general, on the 3rd of July, having obtained 
 information of the vicinity of the Prussians, concentrated his 
 army. That evening he occupied the villages of Wiesenthal, 
 Neidhartshausen, Zella, and Diedorf, with considerable strength. 
 His main body bivouacked round Rossdorf, and in rear of that 
 village. 
 
 f : 
 
Chap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 293 
 
 At five o'clock in the morning of the 4th July, General 
 Goeben sent Wrangel's brigade against Wiesenthal, and Kum- 
 mer's against Neidhartshausen. The latter village, as well as 
 the neighbouring heights, were found strongly occupied by the 
 enemy. They were carried only after a long and hard battle, 
 the scene of which was marked by numbers of Prussians killed 
 and wounded. Towards noon the Bavarian detachments which 
 had been driven from Neidhartshausen and Zella received rein- 
 forcements. Prince Charles determined to hold Diedorf. He 
 ordered a brigade to advance beyond this village, and take up 
 a position on the hills on the further side. The Prussians 
 opened a heavy fire of artillery and small arms from Zella upon 
 the advancing Bavarians. Under this fire the latter could 
 not gain ground, and no change in the positions of the 
 combatants took place at this point, until the termination of 
 the action. 
 
 In the meantime a severe combat had been fought at Wie- 
 senthal. At the same time that General Kummer left Derm- 
 bach, he detached two battalions to his left, which were to 
 occupy the defile of Lindenau, while Wrangel's brigade ad- 
 vanced against Wiesenthal. Wrangel's advanced guard con- 
 sisted of a squadron of cavalry and a battalion of infantry, 
 which moved along the road in column of companies. Hardly 
 had it reached the high ground in front of the village, when it 
 was sharply assailed by a well-directed fire of bullets and shot. 
 The heavy rain prevented the men from seeing clearly what 
 was in their front, but they pressed on, and the enemy was 
 pushed back into the barricaded village, and up the hills on its 
 southern side. Before the Prussian advanced guard reached 
 Wiesenthal the rain cleared up. The Bavarians could be seen 
 hurrying to evacuate the place, and taking up a position with 
 four battalions, a battery, and several squadrons at the foot of 
 the Nebelsberg. The Prussian battalion from Lindenau had 
 arrived on the south flank of Wiesenthal. Another battalion 
 came up with that of the advanced guard, and the Prussians 
 occupied the village. The Prussian artillery also arrived, and 
 came into action with great effect against a Bavarian battery 
 posted on the south-west of Wiesenthal. At the same time the 
 needle-gun told severely on the Bavarian battalions at the foot 
 
294 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 of the Nebelsberg. Three of these retired into the woods 
 which cover the summit of that hill, while the fourth took post 
 behind the rising ground. Swarms of Prussian skirmishers 
 swept swiftly across the plain in front, and made themselves 
 masters of the edge of the wood. But the Bavarians held fast 
 to the trees inside, and would not be ousted. Two fresh 
 batteries of Bavarian artillery, and several new battalions, were 
 seen hurrying up from Rossdorf. At this moment it was sup- 
 posed that Manteuffel's cannonade was heard opening in the 
 direction of Nornshausen. This was in truth but the echo of 
 the engaged artillery. But the Prussian columns hurried 
 forward, and dashed with the bayonet against the wood-crested 
 hill. The Bavarians awaited the charge, and their riflemen 
 made serious impressions upon the advancing masses. But the 
 men of Westphalia rushed on. After a short, sharp struggle, 
 the hill was carried ; and the Bavarians fled down the reverse 
 slope, leaving hundreds of corpses, grisly sacrifices to the 
 needle-gun, to mark the line of their flight. General Goeben 
 had achieved his object. He halted his troops, and prepan 
 to rejoin Falckenstein. Leaving a rear-guard of one battalion,; 
 three squadrons, and a battery to cover his movement, and the 
 removal of the killed and wounded, he withdrew his two bri- 
 gades to Dermbach. The Bavarian march to unite with tl 
 eighth corps had been checked, and Falckenstein had lodgec 
 his leading column securely between the separated portions oi' 
 his adversary's army. The Bavarians in the night, finding their 
 road barred, retired, to seek a junction with Prince Alexander 
 by some other route. They did not, however, move over the 
 western spurs of the Hohe Rhon, in the direction of Briickenau ' 
 whence they might have stretched a hand to Prince Alexander 
 who on the night between the 5th and 6th July was only seven 
 miles from Fulda. They preferred to move by the woods 01 
 the eastern side of the mountains towards the Franconian SaaL 
 and Kissingen. Thus they made a movement which separate* 
 them from their allies, instead of bringing the two corps clos' 
 together. Prince Alexander had sent an officer to the Bavarian 
 camp. He was present on the 4th July at the action of Wit; 
 senthal, and returned to the head-quarters of the eighth Feden 
 corps with a report of the failure of the Bavarians. On th 
 
Chap. II. ] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 295 
 
 receipt of this intelligence, Prince Alexander appears to have 
 abandoned all hope of effecting a junction with Prince Charles 
 north of the Maine. He faced about, and moved back to 
 Frankfort, a town which, until its subsequent occupation by the 
 Prussians, appears always to have had a singular attraction for 
 the eighth Federal corps. 
 
 On the 4th July, the same day that General Goeben pressed 
 the Bavarians back at Wiesenthal, the leading division of 
 Falckenstein's army had a singular skirmish in the direction of 
 Hiinfeld. As General Beyer, who commanded the Prussian 
 advanced guard, approached that town, he found two squadrons 
 of Bavarian cavalry in front of him. Two guns accompanied 
 these squadrons, which opened fire on the advancing Prussians. 
 The weather was wet, and a clammy mist held the smoke of 
 the cannon, so that it hung like a weighty cloud over the 
 mouths of the pieces. A Prussian battery opened in reply. 
 The first shot so surprised the Bavarians, who had not anti- 
 cipated that there was artillery with the advanced guard, 
 that the cuirassiers turned about, and sought safety in a wild 
 flight. They left one of their guns, which in their haste had 
 not time to be limbered up. Beyer pressed forward, and found 
 Hiinfeld evacuated by the enemy. Indeed it is said that these 
 cuirassiers, who had been pushed forward by Prince Alexander 
 to open communications with Prince Charles, were so dismayed 
 by one well-aimed cannon-shot, that many of them did not 
 draw rein till they reached Wurzburg. 
 
 Prince Alexander withdrew towards Frankfort. Falckenstein 
 pushed forward on the 6th ; he occupied Fulda with Beyer's 
 division, while Goeben and ManteufTel encamped on the north 
 towards Hiinfeld. The object of the Prussian advance was 
 obtained. On the 5th July the Bavarians and the eighth 
 Federal corps were separated from each other by only thirty 
 miles ; on the 7th seventy miles lay between them. 
 
 Prince Alexander left the Wiirtemberg division to hold the 
 passes of the Vogels-Berg towards Giessen. The Bavarians, 
 after the action of Wiesenthal, drew back and took up a 
 position in the neighbourhood of Kissingen, on the Franconian 
 Saale. 
 
 General Falckenstein, on the 7th, united his whole army at 
 
296 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 Fulda. He had the choice of attacking either of his separated 
 enemies. To pursue the eighth Federal corps by Giessen, 
 would probably allow it to unite with the Bavarians by moving 
 up the Maine. To advance directly upon Frankfort with the 
 Bavarians on the Saale in his flank and rear, and with the 
 defiles of Gelnhausen, occupied by the eighth corps, in his 
 front, would be extremely hazardous. 
 
 Prince Charles was also considered the more formidable an- 
 tagonist, and the one upon whom it was the more necessary to 
 inflict a heavy blow. 
 
 On the 8th July General Falckenstein commenced his march 
 from Fulda. He did not turn towards Gelnhausen, as was 
 expected in the Bavarian camp, but moved against the position 
 of Prince Charles. On the 9th the Prussian army reached 
 Briickenau, and orders were given for a flank march to the left, 
 over the Hohe Rhon, against the Bavarians on the Saale. 
 Beyer's division moved as the right wing along the road to 
 Hammelburg ; Goeben advanced in the centre towards Kis- 
 singen ; and ManteurTel on the left upon Waldaschach. On 
 the morning of the 10th July, at nine o'clock, Beyer's division, 
 which had received very doubtful intelligence of the presence 
 of the Bavarians in Hammelburg, began its march towards that 
 town. About eleven the head of the advanced guard fell in 
 with the first patrols of the enemy's cavalry in front of Unter 
 Erthal, a small village on the road from Briickenau, about two 
 miles south of Hammelburg. These retired on the Prussian 
 advance, but unmasked a rifled battery, posted beyond the 
 houses. A Prussian field-battery quickly unlimbered and came 
 into action. Under cover of its fire an infantry regiment made 
 a dash at the bridge by which the road from Briickenau crosses 
 the Thulba stream. The bridge was not seriously defended, 
 and after a short cannonade the Bavarians drew back to 
 Hammelburg. At mid-day three Prussian batteries topped the 
 Hobels Berg, and after a few rounds from the guns the infantry 
 rushed down with loud cheers to carry the houses. This was, 
 however, not an easy task. The Bavarian General Zoller held 
 the town with something over three thousand men ; he de- 
 termined to bar the passage of the Saale. The odds were too 
 unequal. The Prussians numbered about fifteen thousand men. 
 
CHAP. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 297 
 
 Vet the Bavarians clung with a high courage to the houses, and 
 opened a biting fire of small arms on the assailants. Their 
 irtillery, too, supported well the infantry defence. 
 
 Two Prussian infantry regiments threw out skirmishers, and 
 ittempted to put down the fire of the Bavarian riflemen. But 
 :hese were protected by the cover of the houses ; and the 
 lefenders' artillery from the hill of Saalch splintered its shells 
 imong the ranks of the Prussian sharpshooters. The fight did 
 jiot gain ground for about an hour. After that interval two 
 nore Prussian regiments and two additional batteries came 
 nto play. Heavily the Prussian pieces threw their metal upon 
 I he Bavarian guns at Saalch. The fire of the latter grew 
 veaker and weaker. They were rapidly being silenced by 
 superior force. Some houses, kindled by the Prussian shells, 
 jit the same time caught fire, and the town began to burn 
 iercely in three places. Still the Bavarians clung to the bridge, 
 aid stood their ground, careless equally of the flames and of 
 he heavy cannonade. Beyer sent forward his Jagers to storm 
 he place. No longer could the defenders endure the assault. 
 |rhe quick bullets of the needle-gun rained in showers among 
 he burning buildings, scattering fire and death among the 
 arrison. The defence had to be abandoned; and the 
 Bavarians, pursued by salvos of artillery, drew off to the south- 
 last, and the Prussians gained the passage of the Saale at 
 lammelburg. 
 
 On the same day as General Beyer fought the action of 
 lammelburg on the right, Falckenstein's central column was 
 eavily engaged with the main body of the Bavarians at the 
 elebrated bathing-place of Kissingen. On the 5th July eighty 
 bavarian troopers, flying from Hiinfeld, passed in hot haste 
 irough the town. The visitors and the inhabitants were much 
 larmed, but the Burgomaster quieted them by a promise that 
 e would give twenty-four hours' warning if the place was in 
 anger of being attacked by the Prussians. This assurance had 
 lore weight, because even on the 8th July Bavarian staff- 
 fficers sauntered about the Kurgarten as quietly as if in a 
 me of the most profound peace. Some of the troops which 
 ad been quartered in Kissingen and its neighbourhood were 
 n the 9th sent to Hammelburg. All appeared still, and yet 
 
298 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 the inhabitants of the neighbouring villages were already flying 
 from their homes to avoid the Prussians. The Bavarian in- 
 telligence department does not appear to have been well 
 managed. By mid-day on the 9th it was too late for the 
 Burgomaster to give his warning that the Prussians were al- 
 ready near. The Bavarians concentrated about twenty thousand 
 men, and took up their position. The visitors and inhabitants 
 could not now retire, and had to remain to be the involuntary 
 witnesses of an action. Those who lived in the Hotel S; 
 which lies on the right bank of the Saale, were allowed to move 
 into the less exposed part of the town. None were permitted' 
 to quit the place for fear of their conveying intelligence of the; 
 Bavarian dispositions to the enemy. The wooden bridge overi 
 the Saale, as well as the two iron ones, were destroyed, but olj 
 one iron one in front of the Alten Berg the supports were left 
 It was through the assistance of these that the Prussians gained^ 
 the first passage of the river ; for they knew the localities well; 
 as many of their staff-officers had frequently visited the fashioni 
 able watering-place of Kissingen. The stone bridge wa:: 
 barricaded hastily as well as possible, and its approach proj 
 tected by two 12-pounder guns. Five battalions, with twelv«| 
 guns, held the town itself. The Bavarians had chosen a veri 
 strong position ; they held the houses next to the bridge as welj| 
 as the bank of the Saale beyond the bridge. Their artiller 
 was posted on the Stadt Berg, but not on the important Finste 
 Berg. A batter}- on the latter hill would have prevented th- 
 Prussians from gaining the passage of the river from the Alte 
 Berg. Behind the village of Haussen guns were also in. pos^ 
 tion. All the bridges outside of Kissingen were destroyed 
 and all points favourable for defence occupied by infantr 
 General Zoller commanded the Bavarians. 
 
 On the 10th July, at early morning, Prussian hussars a; 
 peared. Columns were soon afterwards descried on the roac 
 towards Klaushof and Garitz on the west of Kissingen ; and 
 battery came into position on a hill between Garitz and tl 
 river. At half-past seven in the morning, the Bavarian gm 
 near Winkels and the two 12-pounders at the bridge open* 
 on the leading Prussian columns, which consisted of Genei 
 Rummer's brigade. Rummer's artillery replied, and in a she 
 
hap. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 299 
 
 Ue the rattle of musketry, mingling with the heavier booming 
 \i the guns, told that he was sharply engaged. 
 I The main body of Goeben's division had- in the meantime 
 bached Schlimhoff. Here it received orders to detach three 
 attalions by Poppenroth and Klaushof, who were to attack 
 riedericshall under the command of Colonel Goltz. When 
 General Wrangel's brigade approached Kissingen, it received 
 rders to advance on the right wing of Kummer's brigade, to 
 size the Alten Berg, and if possible, by extending to its right, 
 p outflank the Bavarian position. A squadron was sent at the 
 ame time to reconnoitre the ground beyond Garitz. A bat- 
 alion was despatched as an advanced guard against the Alten 
 jlerg ; and a battery of artillery came into action on the 
 .orthern spur of that hill. The Alten Berg was quickly cleared 
 jtt Bavarian riflemen by the Prussian Jagers. A company 
 aider Captain von Busche was then sent against the bridge on 
 tie south of Kissingen, which the Bavarians had partially de- 
 coyed, but where the piers had been left standing. Tables, 
 arms, and timber were seized from some neighbouring houses, 
 ind with secrecy and rapidity the broken bridge was so far 
 ^stored that before mid-day men could cross it in single file. 
 fon Busche led his company over the stream, and then directed 
 .is men against a road on the further side, from the cover of 
 'hich the enemy's marksmen annoyed them considerably. This 
 •ompany was followed by a second, and as quickly as possible 
 whole battalion was thrown across the stream. The battalion 
 ained the wood on the south-east of Kissingen ; here a column 
 ;as formed, and under cover of many skirmishers advanced 
 gainst the town. More men were pushed across the repaired 
 iridge, and soon two and a half Prussian battalions were en- 
 aged in a street fight among the houses. The remaining 
 ortion of Wrangel's brigade was at this time directed in 
 apport of Kummer against the principal bridge. Infantry 
 nd artillery fire caused the Prussians severe losses, but 
 ley pushed on towards the barricade. Their artillery out- 
 umbered that of the defending force, and, protected by it, the 
 attalions carried the bridge. 
 
 1 The army of Bavaria boasted to have had at that time a 
 undred and twenty-six cannon. Of these only twelve came 
 
SEVEX WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 into action at Kissingen, five at Hammelburg. The rest were 
 uselessly scattered along the bank of the Saale, between these 
 two places. 
 
 The passage of the stream by the Prussians decided the 
 action. They secured the Finster Berg and the Bodenlaube. 
 with the old castle of that name, and pushed forward with loud 
 cheers into the heart of the town. Here the Bavarian light 
 infantry fought hard, and, suffering heavy sacrifices themselves, 
 inflicted grievous loss on the Prussians. The Kurgarten, held 
 by three hundred riflemen, were stormed three times b) 
 Wrangel's men without success. It was carried on the fourtr 
 assault. A young lieutenant, who commanded the Bavarians 
 with the whole of his men, refused quarter, and died in the 
 place they had held so well. At a little after three the whol 
 town was carried. 
 
 The Bavarians did not yet renounce the combat. Th 
 corps which retreated from Kissingen took up a position or 
 the hill east of the town, and renewed the battle. Wrangel' 
 brigade received orders to clear the hills south of the roac 
 which leads to Nudlingen, of the enemy. This was to b< 
 effected by the fusilier battalion and the second battalion o 
 the 55th regiment. The first battalion of the same regimen 
 cleared the way, and, extended as skirmishers, advanced alonj 
 the road. The other troops followed in reserve. The Bava 
 rians had taken up a position on both sides of the road, am 
 greeted the Prussians with an artillery fire from the Sinn Berg 
 They fought well, and not till seven o'clock did Wrang€ 
 occupy Wink els. The Bavarians were supposed to be .retiring 
 and Wrangel's troops were about to bivouac, when a repoi 
 came in from the 19th, which had occupied the outposts, th 
 the Bavarians were advancing in force. Two battalions of th 
 55th, a 12-pounder battery, and a squadron of hussars, wer 
 immediately sent to reinforce the outlying troops, while tw 
 companies of the 55th were sent into the hills on the right t 
 menace the left flank of the enemy's advance. The battel 
 and squadron advanced at a trot. General Wrangel in pers 
 went to the outposts, and was receiving the reports from t 
 commanding officer of the 19th, when some rifle bullets can 
 from the southern hill into the closed columns of the regimer 
 
I'HAP. II.] CAMPAIGN ON THE MAINE. 301 
 
 Khe Bavarians, under Prince Charles himself, had come down 
 Idth nine fresh battalions of their first division. They had 
 Leized the hills which lie on- the north of the road, and were 
 i ressing rapidly forward under the cover of their artillery. 
 ! -"he Prussian cavalry and battery, as well as the 1 9th regi- 
 lient, were pushed back. The 55th, coming up, threw them- 
 Iblves into a hollow road, and, under the protection of their 
 l|re, the retreat was for a time checked. Prince Charles urged 
 Ijn, however, superior forces, and those, too, had to retire. 
 [I The Prussians now took up a position on the heights south- 
 last of Winkels, where two batteries came into play. The 
 tbtreating battalions halted here, and the fight stood still. One 
 Battalion of the 19th regiment and two companies of the 
 I bldiers of Lippe were sent by Wrangel into the hills on the 
 Ijorth of the road, while the second battalion of the 55th was 
 ) lushed up there on its southern side. As soon as these flanking 
 -oops had gained their positions, the whole brigade advanced 
 1 double-quick time, with drums beating. The charge suc- 
 eeded, though the loss was great. The Bavarians were driven 
 J lack. The Prussians regained their former position, and 
 rince Charles relinquished his attack. 
 
 : The Prussian left column, which was formed by ManteurTel's 
 
 ■ivision, on the 10th July also secured the passage at Waldas- 
 
 hach, about five miles above Kissingen, and at Haussen. 
 
 t neither place did the Bavarians make any obstinate stand. 
 
 • The Bavarians appear to have been surprised on the Saale. 
 
 he Prussian march, previous to the battle of Kissingen, was 
 
 ) rapid that they did not expect an attack till the following 
 
 ay. In consequence, their whole force was not concentrated 
 
 1 the river. The troops which held Kissingen and Hammel- 
 
 jurg were unsupported, while those which should have acted 
 
 5 their reserves were too far distant to be of any service. The 
 
 tter, on the other hand, arrived so late that their comrades 
 
 " id already been defeated, and they themselves, instead of 
 
 :ting as reinforcements, met with only a similar fate to those 
 
 •st engaged. The Bavarian staff were unprepared. They 
 
 id no maps of the country, except one which the chief of the 
 
 aff, General von der Tann, borrowed from a native of one of 
 
 e small towns near the field. 
 
CHAPTER III, 
 
 THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 
 
 When Prince Alexander of Hesse turned to retreat on the! 
 5th July, he might still, by a rapid march along the road whichj 
 leads from Lauterbach to Briickenau, have made an attemj 
 to unite with the Bavarians before they were attacked ■ 
 Kissingen by the Prussians. This course he appears, howevei 
 to have considered too hazardous. He retired to Frankfoi 
 and on the 9th July concentrated his troops round that town} 
 His first division was at Frankfort; the second in some village: 1 
 north of the town, on the river Nidda ; the third division aj 
 Bergen, and the fourth at Bockenheim. The reserved cavali 
 was towards Friedberg ; the reserve artillery across the rivei 
 in Offenbach. The two banks of the Maine were connecte< 
 by a bridge, which leads from Frankfort to Offenbach. 
 
 Frequent alarms made it evident how little stedfast conf 
 dence pervaded the Federal corps of Prince Alexander. Th 
 news of the victory won by the Prussians at Koniggratz w£ 
 widely circulated through the ranks by the Frankfort journal: 
 Every moment reports were rife that Prussian columns wei 
 advancing towards Frankfort from Wetzlar, or Giessen ; an, 
 once an officer, by spreading the alarm, caused a whole divisio; 
 to lose its night's rest, and to take up a position in order (j 
 battle. 
 
 At this time the eighth Federal corps was not practically 
 to take the field. Such confusion reigned in the fortress 
 Mainz, that whole regiments marched into the town and toe; 
 up quarters on their own account, without any report beir. 
 made to the commandant. Newly appointed officers, surgeon 
 and hospital assistants, had to seek for their regiments witho 
 
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 303 
 
 ibeing able to obtain accurate intelligence of their whereabouts 
 from any one. No firm union existed between the different 
 divisions of the eighth corps. The corps had not been con- 
 centrated for twenty-four years, and the divisions were totally 
 different in uniform, administration, and organization. The 
 hussars of Hesse-Cassel were dressed and accoutred so simi- 
 larly to Prussian cavalry, that the Austrians fired upon them at 
 jAschaffenburg. The small arms were of different calibres. 
 The four field batteries of the third division were equipped on 
 four different systems. 
 
 The day after the victory of Kissingen, General Falcken stein 
 •could turn his attention against this heterogeneous mass without 
 near of any assault on his rear by the Bavarians. The latter 
 (retired in such haste, after the battle of Kissingen, towards the 
 [Maine, that Manteuffel's division, which was sent in pursuit, 
 tcould not feel them. On the nth July, General Falckenstein 
 .'ordered Beyer's division to march by way of Hammelburg and 
 •Gelnhausen on Hanau. This it accomplished, without, as was 
 ! anticipated, falling in with the Wiirtemberg division at Geln- 
 ihausen. The latter only held this place till the 14th July, and 
 then retired in great haste, without throwing any obstacle in 
 'the way of the advancing Prussians, either by breaking the 
 ibridges, or by any other means. The division of General 
 IGoeben was directed at the same time through the defile of the 
 iSpessart upon Aschaffenburg. Here the passes were not held 
 inor barricaded. Notwithstanding the presence in this district 
 i of large numbers of foresters, no abattis or entanglements were 
 iplaced across the road. None of the almost unassailable 
 •heights were occupied, either to prevent the direct progress of 
 the Prussians, or to threaten their line of march in flank. The 
 •railway which was still serviceable was not used to convey the 
 small number of riflemen and guns, which at Gemiinden, as at 
 many other points, would have thrown great difficulty in 
 Goeben's way. Manteuffel's division followed Goeben's, and 
 scoured the country in the direction of Wiirzburg. 
 
 Between Gemiinden and Aschaffenburg, the river Maine 
 makes a deep bend to the south. Into the bow thus formed, 
 the mountainous region of the Spessart protrudes, through 
 which the road and railway lead directly westward from Ge- 
 
304 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 miinden to the latter town. On the 13th July, the leading 
 brigade of Goeben's division, that of Wrangel, was approaching 
 Hayn, when a report came in from the squadron of hussars, 
 which was clearing the way, that some of the enemy's cavalry 
 and infantry were advancing towards that place from Laufach, 
 a station on the railroad nearer to Frankfort than Hayn. It was 
 soon discovered that these were troops of Hesse-Darmstadt 
 The fusilier battalion of the 55th regiment was pushed forward 
 to gain the top of the defile, up which the brigade was then 
 moving. It advanced in columns of companies and, without 
 difficulty, pushed back two hostile battalions which it en- 
 countered. The village of Laufach was taken, and the rail- 
 way station occupied, while three battalions and a squadron 
 were sent forward to seize a cutting beyond the station, and 
 to relieve the fusiliers. The relief had not been fully carried 
 out when the enemy, with eight or nine battalions and two 
 batteries assumed the offensive. The assailants mustered 
 about eight thousand men. The battalion ot the 55 th threw 
 itself into a churchyard surrounded by walls, and placed 
 itself on the defensive. The village of Frohnhofen in front 
 was occupied by three companies, supported by six com- 
 panies posted on the hills on the right, and seven on those 
 on the left of the railway. The remaining troops of th< 
 brigade took up a position in front of the station, as 
 reserve. The enemy attacked all points ; so that, by degrees, 
 nine companies had to be sent up to Frohnhofen. The most 
 severe attack was made on the right wing. General Wrange 
 was obliged to send his two remaining battalions and a batte: 
 to this point. All his available troops were now engaged, an 
 the fight for some time was very even. At last, however, al 
 the assaults of the Hessians were repulsed, and a counte: 
 attack made by three battalions and a squadron supported by 
 the fire of a 12-pounder battery had great success. The Hes 
 sians drew off from all points towards Aschaffenburg, and lefl 
 more than one hundred prisoners, as well as the greater portio: 
 of five hundred killed and wounded, in the hands of the victors. 
 The latter also captured the majority of the knapsacks of thei 
 assailants, who had taken them off at the beginning of the 
 action, and on retreating left them lying on the ground. The 
 
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 305 
 
 advantage of the needle-gun in a defensive position, was well 
 demonstrated at LaufaCh. Whole ranks of corpses of its 
 enemies lay in front of the position, and until early morning 
 wounded men were found. On the Prussian side the loss was 
 very small, in all hardly twenty men, and one officer. 
 
 The Commander-in-chief of the eighth corps was this day 
 uncertain whether he should defend Frankfort. His troops 
 were in scattered positions, and instead of a large concentrated 
 mass of troops, only small detachments were pushed out to 
 meet the enemy. The division sent in haste to Frohnhofen, 
 only brought one of its four field batteries into action, and 
 used only one or two squadrons of its whole cavalry to attack 
 the Prussians. The two brigades of infantry came in haste 
 without rations, and after one another under fire. There was 
 no Commander-in-chief, the leader of each brigade acted for 
 himself, and led his troops by the most direct road against the 
 enemy with great valour, but with little judgment. The blame 
 for all these errors is apparently due to General von Perglas, 
 the commander of the Darmstadt division, who allowed his 
 troops to advance in closed masses unprotected by artillery 
 against a wood in which the Prussians, well covered, had firmly 
 planted themselves. The advantages of ground, disposition, 
 and leading were all on the side of the Prussians, who gained 
 their success, although very weary from a long march, without 
 any exertions worthy of mention. They had quickly, but so 
 skilfully availed themselves of each local advantage and cover 
 for the defence of their line by infantry and artillery fire, that 
 all the reckless braveiy of the Hessians had no other result 
 than to inflict upon themselves very severe losses. Among 
 these were a regimental commander, a major of the staff, and 
 thirty killed or wounded company officers. After the action of 
 the 13th July, Wrangel's brigade bivouacked at Laufach, with a 
 strong advanced post of three battalions round Frohnhofen. 
 
 On the 14th, at seven in the morning, the further march on 
 Aschaffenburg was to commence. The care of the enemy's 
 wounded on the previous day, the collection of scattered arms, 
 and waiting for the return of the patrols which had been sent 
 out at dawn, delayed the start for half an hour. The reports 
 of the latter told that the enemy was retreating from Hosbach. 
 
 x 
 
306 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 A squadron of hussars was sent forward to occupy that village. 
 The infantry of Wrangel's brigade followed along the main road 
 with flankers pushed out far on the right and left. On the hill 
 of Weiberhofen, Wrangel's brigade fell in with that of General 
 Kummer, which had moved by a route on the south of the 
 railway. A report soon was brought in that the enemy was 
 advancing strong detachments from Hosbach. Colonel von 
 der Goltz, the commander of the vanguard, was immediately 
 ordered to take up a position on the heights south of the main 
 road, under cover of which the brigade formed for battle in the 
 valley. General Kummer was ordered with his brigade to move 
 along the railway towards Aschaffenburg. General Goeben 
 was in command of the two united brigades. The advance 
 guard had hardly formed when a further report announced that 
 the enemy was drawing back. General Goeben then ordered 
 a general advance. He moved Wrangel's brigade along the 
 road, Rummer's on the railway embankment; at the same 
 time he drew a hussar and cuirassier regiment from the reserve, 
 and covered his right flank by moving them through the open 
 fields on the south of the road. Hosbach was found unoccu- 
 pied by the enemy, as was also Goldbach. On the further sid 
 of the latter village the infantry fire opened. The 15 th an 
 55th Prussian regiments pushed forward to the wooded ban 
 of the Laufach stream. The Federal troops here consisted 0: 
 the Austrian division under General Count Neipperg, formed 
 of troops which had originally garrisoned Mainz, Rastadt, and; 
 Frankfort. There were also some of the Hesse-Darmstad 
 troops here. The infantry fire of the Federal soldiers caused 
 the Prussians little loss ; but an Austrian battery, posted on a 
 hill south of Aschaffenburg, and admirably served, annoyed 
 them much. The Prussian artillery could find no favourable 
 position from which to attack this battery with clear advantage., 
 and the Austrian guns for some time had the best of the' 
 action. At last three battalions of the 15th Prussian regimen' 
 were pushed along the stream nearer to the village of Daurm. 
 and made themselves masters of a hill on which stood a towe:< 
 surrounded by a wall. Protected by this, the infantry succeeded 
 by its musketry fire in forcing the enemy's artillery to retire. Th< 
 advance of some Federal cavalry was also stopped by the sarm 
 
Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 307 
 
 means before the squadrons could attack. As soon as the Aus- 
 trian battery drew back, a general advance was made against 
 AschafTenburg, which is surrounded with a high wall that 
 offered the Austrian s cover, and a convenient opportunity for 
 defence. The Prussian artillery coming into action on the top 
 of a hill soon showed itself superior to that of the Austrians. 
 After long firing in the environs of the town, and the gardens 
 which lay in front of the walls, the Prussians advanced to 
 storm, and although they were received with repeated salvos, 
 forced their enemy out of his strong position without suffering 
 very severe loss. At the railway station there was a sharp 
 combat, but at no other point was the resistance very deter- 
 mined. The town of AschafTenburg has only two gates. In 
 consequence, as the retreating Austrians were hurrying towards 
 the bridge over the Maine a block occurred. The Prussians 
 pushing forward, entered the city with the rearmost ranks of 
 the enemy, and made two thousand prisoners. These were for 
 the most part Italians, who defended themselves without much 
 energy. General Goeben occupied the bridge by which the 
 railway to Darmstadt crosses the Maine, with three battalions, 
 two squadrons, and a battery. These pushed reconnaissances 
 towards Frankfort. The rest of his troops he cantonned in the 
 town of AschafTenburg. 
 
 The losses of the Prussians in the capture of the town were 
 not severe. Those of the Federal troops were considerable ; 
 as there were many killed and wounded, besides the large 
 number of prisoners. A large quantity of material of war fell 
 also into the hands of the conquerors. A regiment of hussars 
 of Hesse- Cassel, which Prince Alexander had attached to his 
 Austrian division, lost five officers and one hundred and eight 
 non-commissioned officers and men, in its attempt to cover 
 the retreat of the infantry through the streets. 
 
 While General Goeben advanced towards AschafTenburg, and 
 gained there the passage of the Maine, General Beyer's division 
 pushed towards Frankfort, by way of Gelnhausen. The easily 
 defensible passage of the Kinzig, near this town, was found 
 unoccupied by the Federal troops, and on the 17th, Beyer 
 reached the neighbourhood of Hanau without ever having seen 
 an enemy. 
 
 x 2 
 
". 
 
 308 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 During the action of Aschaffenburg, Prince Alexander, 
 instead of supporting his Austrian division, which was engaged 
 there, remained with the mass of his troops inactive at Seiligen- 
 stadt Yet he could by vigorous action have been much 
 superior in numbers to Goeben at the former town, have saved 
 the passage of the river, and perhaps pushing Goeben and 
 Manteuffel backwards, by bearing on their right, have urged 
 them into the bend of the Maine, and severed them from 
 Beyer and their line of communication with the north. This 
 page of the history of the campaign of the leader of the Federal 
 corps is but a repetition of the perpetual tale of opportunities 
 lost and advantages neglected. The advantage of positions 
 was always on the side of the Federal corps, yet these advan- 
 tages were sacrificed, always with loss to the Federal side, to 
 which the casualties in the Prussian ranks by no means corre- ; 
 sponded. The lives of soldiers were to all appearance trifled 
 away and wasted, by strategical ignorance and absence of 
 energy on the part of their leader. 
 
 The immediate result of the victorious advance of the Prus- 
 sian army of the Maine was the evacuation of Frankfort and 
 the line of the Maine, by the eighth Federal corps, and its 
 occupation by the Prussians. On the 16th July, General 
 Falckenstein entered the town at the head of Goeben' s division, 
 and was able to report to the King that all the lands north of 
 the Maine were in Prussian possession. General Falckenstein 
 had within fourteen days defeated two armies, of which each 
 was as strong as his own, in two great, and several minor 
 actions ; and, in a country by no means very advantageous for 
 the offensive, had manoeuvred so as to separate his two adver- 
 saries, who on the 5th July were within thirty miles of each 
 other, by a distance of sixty miles. 
 
 The following is a summary of the operations north of the 
 Maine : — 
 
 Bavarians. — From the 15th to 25th June, halted near 
 Schweinfurt. In the meantime the Hanoverians were sur- 
 rounded, and obliged to capitulate. 
 
 On the 25th June they made various movements, with the 
 object of effecting a junction with the eighth Federal corps. 
 
 On the 12th July they again returned to Schweinfurt, after 
 

 Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 309 
 
 having been pushed away from their allies by Falckenstein, at 
 Wiesenthal and Kissingen. 
 
 The Eighth Federal Corps. — From the 15th June to the 12th 
 July occupied strategical positions round Frankfort. 
 
 On the 5th July it made a partial march on Fulda. Some 
 of its cavalry fell in with some Prussian patrols, and it retreated 
 rapidly to the Maine. 
 
 On the 13th and 14th July the actions of Laufach and 
 Aschaffenburg were fought, while Prince Alexander lay at 
 Seiligenstadt. 
 
 On the 14th July Prince Alexander concentrated rearwards, 
 on the south of the Maine. 
 
 On the 13th July, when the Prussians reached Laufach, not 
 more than thirty miles from Frankfort, the residuary members 
 of the mutilated Germanic Diet retired from the ancient city 
 on the Maine, where of old the rulers of the Holy Roman 
 Empire were elected and crowned. Their business had, since 
 the outbreak of hostilities, been chiefly confined to making 
 protests against Prussia. The days when the Confederation 
 could enforce its decrees were, however, past, and the Diet had 
 found a very different patient of Federal execution from the 
 Dane. Its protests were now all spent shot. A few of the 
 deputies, however, still held together, and styled themselves, in 
 diplomatic language, the Diet and Confederation of Germany. 
 
 These, on the 13th July, quitted Frankfort with the docu- 
 ments from the Archives of the Bund, and journeyed to 
 Augsburg, where the black, red and gold flag of the Germanic 
 Confederation was hoisted over the inn of the sign of the Three 
 Moors. 
 
 The last Bavarian battalion left Frankfort on the 14th, and 
 the head-quarters of the eighth Federal corps were established 
 that night at Dieburg, a station on the railway between 
 Aschaffenburg and Darmstadt. 
 
 On the 15 th, Prince Alexander drew near to the south, and 
 concentrated his corps on the Odenwald. This day his light 
 cavalry opened communications with Prince Charles's corps at 
 Wiirzburg, by the left bank of the Maine, and the road through 
 Moltenberg and Werbek. 
 
 On the 15th, the Senate of Frankfort published a proclama- 
 
310 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 tion to the inhabitants, in which it was announced that the Diet 
 which usually held its sittings in the free city, had temporarily 
 withdrawn ; that the city would act as an open town, and that 
 there appeared to be no danger of any injury to the lives or 
 property of any of the inhabitants. The construction of earth- 
 works, which had been commenced by the "Federal troops, was 
 abandoned, and all was prepared for the advent of the Prussian 
 conquerors. At Darmstadt the Russian flag was hoisted on the 
 palace of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt, who in person 
 started for Munich. 
 
 YVrangel's brigade, after the capture of Aschaffenburg, was 
 pushed forward by forced marches to Hanau. About five 
 o'clock on the evening of the 16th July, the first Prussians 
 arrived near Frankfort, brought in a train from Aschaffenburg. 
 They got out of the carriages a short distance from the city 
 gates, and took up a position on the Hanau road. This ad- 
 vanced guard consisted of a regiment of cuirassiers and a 
 regiment of hussars. At seven a patrol of the hussars, led by 
 an officer, halted before the city gate. In another quarter of 
 an hour the head of the vanguard, consisting of one squadron 
 of cuirassiers and the remaining hussars, passed in. The popu- 
 lace were for the most part sullenly silent. A few insulting 
 cries to the Prussians were occasionally heard from some of the 
 windows, but the soldiers took no notice of them. In a few 
 minutes the Generals Vogel von Falckenstein, Goeben, Wran- 
 gel, and Tresckow, surrounded by the officers of the staff, rode 
 in at the head of the main body. The bands of the regiments 
 played Prussian national airs. Before ten o'clock the whole 
 line of march had entered. The telegraph and post-offices 
 were occupied. The railway station was garrisoned, and guards 
 established over all the principal buildings. The free town of 
 Frankfort was virtually annexed to the Prussian monarchy. 
 
 On the 17th July, the remainder of Falckenstein's troops 
 entered the town, and some troops were pushed forwards south': 
 of the city, who captured a Hessian bridge train. 
 
 General Vogel von Falckenstein established his head-quarter.' 
 in Frankfort, and published a proclamation in which he an' 
 nounced that he had assumed temporarily the government 0; 
 the duchy of Nassau, the town and territory of Frankfort, anc 
 

 Chap. III.] THE ACTIONS ON THE MAINE. 311 
 
 the portions of Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt, which his troops 
 had occupied. The civil functionaries of these districts were 
 retained in their posts, but were directed to receive no order 
 except from the Prussian Commander-in-chief. Several of the 
 Frankfort papers which had always been distinguished for strong 
 anti-Prussian feeling were suppressed. The eleven armed 
 unions * which had existed in the city, were abolished ; and the 
 functions of the senate and college of burghers established by 
 a general order. Six millions of gulden t were demanded from 
 the town as a war contribution, and after much grumbling paid 
 by the citizens. When, afterwards, on the 20th July, a second 
 additional contribution of twenty millions of gulden J was de- 
 manded, an universal cry of indignation and horror was raised. 
 In the meantime, General von Roeder had been appointed 
 Governor of the town, to whom the Burgomaster represented, 
 on the 23rd July, that the town had already furnished six 
 millions of gulden, and about two millions of rations, and re- 
 quested to appeal against the subsequent contribution to the 
 King of Prussia. So much did this misfortune of his city weigh 
 on the Burgomaster that the same night he committed suicide. 
 The town sent a deputation to Berlin which treated so effectually, 
 and was so powerfully supported by the opinions of the foreign 
 press, that the contribution was not insisted upon by the King. 
 Frankfort shortly afterwards was united definitely to Prussia, 
 when the first contribution of six millions was not actually 
 returned to the citizens, but was retained by the Government 
 to be expended in public works for the benefit of the city. 
 
 General Falckenstein, at Frankfort, issued the following 
 general order to his troops : — 
 
 " Soldiers of the Army of the Maine ! — On the 14th of this 
 month at Aschaffenburg, we have fulfilled the second portion of our task. 
 On that day the right bank of the Maine, as far as our arms reached, was 
 cleared of the enemy. Before we advance to new deeds, it behoves me 
 to express to you all my recognition of the manner in which you have made 
 the numerous exertions necessary for our success. Yet it is not that alone 
 which I have to praise. It is your valour, and the energy with which, in 
 six great and several smaller actions, you have hurled yourselves upon the 
 enemy, knitted victory to your banners, and made thousands of your adver- 
 saries prisoners. You defeated the Bavarians in two brilliant engagements 
 at Wiesenthal, and Zella on the 4th of this month, crossed the Rhon moun- 
 
 * Vereine. + £600,000. % £2,000,000. 
 
312 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 tains in order again to spring upon the Bavarian Army at the four different 
 points of Hammelburg, Kissinger), Hausen, and Waldaschach : everywhere 
 you were victorious. So soon as the third day after the bloody storming of 
 Kissingen, the same division had crossed to the Spessart to engage the 
 eighth Federal corps. The victory of the thirteenth division over the divi- 
 sion of Darmstadt at Laufach, and the capture of Aschaffenburg from the 
 united Federal and Austrian troops on the 14th, were the earnings of its 
 bravery and its toils. On the 16th Frankfort was occupied by it. I must 
 express to this division my special thanks. Fortunate to be generally at 
 the head of the corps, and so the first to come into collision with the enemy, 
 it showed itself as worthy of this honourable post, as did the intelligence 
 and energy of its leader to take advantage of his opportunities. 
 
 " Head-Quarters, 
 Frankfort, 14th July, 1866. 
 
 "VON FALCKEXSTEIN, 
 
 Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
 
 of Jhe Maine." 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 
 
 The day that General von Falckenstein published his 
 general order to the troops, the Army of the Maine lost its 
 commander. The difficult state of affairs in Bohemia, caused 
 by the animosities of political parties, which, till the Prussian 
 invasion, had been kept down by the strong hand of the 
 Austrian Government, had, on the removal of that pressure, 
 sprung forth into full life. The importance of the communica- 
 tions of the main Prussian armies with the provinces of Saxony 
 and Silesia, which were threatened by the three fortresses of 
 Theresienstadt, Josephstadt, and Koniggratz, led the King of 
 Prussia to appoint General Falckenstein as military Governor- 
 General of that province. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Manteuffel assumed the command 
 of the Army of the Maine in Falckenstein's place. The divi- 
 sion which General Manteuffel had commanded was placed 
 under General Flies. On the 18th July Wiesbaden was occu- 
 pied by the Prussians ; and on the 20th Kummer's brigade was 
 pushed southwards as an advanced guard and entered Darm- 
 stadt, but the main body of the army halted at Frankfort until 
 the 2 1 st. While he waited at Frankfort General Manteuffel 
 received reinforcements. These consisted of three battalions, 
 three squadrons, and two batteries of Oldenburg, two battalions 
 of Hamburg, one of Liibeck, one of Waldeck, which was de- 
 tached to watch the fortress of Mainz, one of Bremen, one of 
 Schwarzburg-Sonderhausen. Besides these contingents of the 
 allies of Prussia, he also received five fourth battalions of 
 Prussian troops, which remained as the garrison of Frankfort, 
 the ninth Jager battalion, and three reserve regiments of Land- 
 
3H SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 wehr cavalry, — in all fifteen battalions, twelve squadrons, and 
 twelve guns, which mustered over twelve thousand combatants. 
 Of these, five thousand men were left to hold the line of the 
 Maine at Frankfort, Hanau, and Aschaffenburg. The re- 
 mainder raised the active army to a strength of sixty thousand 
 combatants. 
 
 At the same time a second reserve corps was formed at 
 Leipsic and placed under the command of the Grand Duke of 
 Mecklenburg-Schwerin. It consisted of the division of Meck- 
 lenburg-Schwerin, which numbered four battalions of infantry, 
 one battalion of Jagers, four squadrons, and two 6-pounder 
 batteries, and of a combined Prussian division, which was placed 
 under the command of General Home, who had formerly com- 
 manded the eighth division of the army of Prince Frederick 
 Charles. Home's combined division consisted of the fourth 
 regiment of the Prussian Guard, the fourth battalions of five 
 regiments of the line, two battalions of Anhalt, two regiments 
 of Landwehr cavalry, and eight batteries. This second reserve 
 corps mustered in all about twenty-three thousand combatants. 
 It was intended to enter Bavaria by way of Hof, and either to 
 act against the rear of the united Bavarian and Federal corps, 
 while engaged with General Manteuffel, or to force the Bavarian 
 army to form front towards the east, and prevent Prince Charles 
 of Bavaria from acting in concert with Prince Alexander against 
 Manteuffel. 
 
 By the 21st July, the railway from Frankfort to Cassel had 
 been repaired by the railway detachment of the Army of the | 
 Maine, and was available throughout its whole length, not only ■ 
 for military transport, but also for private traffic. On that day, t 
 the main body of the Army of the Maine quitted Frankfort, 
 and moved towards the south. Beyer's division at the same j 
 time advanced from Hanau by Aschaffenburg to the south.; 
 The Bavarians had not occupied the road from Wiirzburg to 
 the passage of the Maine at Heidenfeld. The eighth Federal! 
 corps was reported to be in retreat through the Odenwald, by' 
 Hochst and Moltenberg. Further information told that the 
 Bavarians were concentrated, and in position near Wiirzburg.' 
 It then appeared probable that part of the eighth Federal corps! 
 intended to hold the defiles of the Odenwald, and the line ofl 
 
Chap IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE 
 
 the Neckar, while the remainder of its troops joined the 
 Bavarians near the Tauber. To take advantage of two roads, 
 in order to move quickly, and if possible to press upon Prince 
 Alexander before he was firmly linked with the Bavarians, and 
 to shield his right flank against any detachments lurking in the 
 Odenwald, General Manteuffel moved Goeben's division by 
 Darmstadt on Konieg, while Flies and Beyer pushed up the 
 valley of the Maine by Wurth. At the same time he sent a 
 strong reconnaissance up the right bank of the river against 
 Heidenfeld. Frankfort and Aschaffenburg were firmly oc- 
 cupied. 
 
 On the 23rd July, the Army of the Maine occupied a posi- 
 tion near Moltenberg and Amorbach. Along its whole front 
 it could firmly feel the eighth Federal corps. It was found 
 that the enemy was in force on the Tauber, and that his 
 advanced posts were pushed over the river as far as Hundheim. 
 On the 24th two actions took place on the Tauber, an affluent 
 of the Maine, which falls into the latter stream below 
 Wertheim. General Manteuffel moved against the Tauber in 
 three columns. On the left Flies's division advanced on 
 Wertheim. The two columns on the right were under 
 General Goeben. Of these, that on the left consisted of the 
 Oldenberg brigade and the battalion of Bremen, which moved 
 upon Werbach against the division of Baden. That on the 
 right, consisting of the remaining troops of Goeben's division, 
 with Wrangel's brigade in front, marched on Tauberbischofs- 
 heim. Beyer's division was moved on Dermbach as the 
 reserve. At Tauberbischofsheim the Wurtemberg division, 
 under General Hardegg was posted, to hold the place itself, 
 and then issue from the valley on the road towards Wiirzburg, 
 in case of an attack by the Prussians. The artillery fire of the 
 advanced guard brigade of Goeben's divisions caused great 
 loss among the defenders, and soon forced them to retire from 
 the village. General Hardegg withdrew his troops, but en- 
 deavoured to hold the Prussians in the houses, and to prevent 
 the advance of their batteries. By blowing up the bridge over 
 the Tauber, he for a time prevented the progress of the 
 Prussian artillery. After a hot combat, which lasted three 
 hours, the Wurtembergers were relieved by the fourth division 
 
3i6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 of the eighth Federal corps. The action increased in fury, 
 but ultimately the Prussians gained the passage of the Tauber 
 at Bischofsheim, and pushed their outposts a short distance 
 along the road to Wiirzburg. 
 
 The action at Werbach afforded the brigade composed of 
 the Oldenburgers and the battalion of Bremen, its first oppor- 
 tunity to display its efficiency. As soon as the Prussian ad- 
 vanced guard, which attacked Bischofsheim, met with oppo- 
 sition, this brigade was pushed against Werbach. The enemy 
 evacuated Hochhausen, which lies on the left bank of the 
 river, without firing a shot, but set himself stolidly to oppose 
 the passage of the stream at Werbach. The attacking troops 
 had marched for twelve hours on the 23rd July, and on the 
 24th had been moving from five o'clock in the morning until 
 two in the afternoon. They found their opponents in a good 
 position, from which they themselves were exposed to a heavy 
 cannonade. The Oldenburg artillery opened, and with such 
 a good effect, that it soon got the fire of the opposite batteries 
 under. These did not make good practice : the loss they 
 inflicted was most trivial. The infantry, which had been 
 hidden behind some rising ground, and in a wood, then ad- 
 vanced to the attack of the village of Werbach, threading their 
 way through the intricate vineyards which clothed the slope 
 down to the Tauber. After a short time spent in skirmishing, 
 the Oldenburgers rushed to the assault, part forcing their way 
 over the barricades, part wading through the water of the 
 stream, which rose breast high against them. Their losses 
 were heavy, but their rush successful. They carried the 
 houses, and drove the defenders clean through the village, and 
 themselves covered by the houses, commenced a murderous 
 fire on the retreating columns. The combat at Werbach not 
 only secured to General Manteuffel the passage of the stream 
 at that point, but had a more important result. The division 
 of Baden retreated so far after its failure here, that the position 
 in which the Federal corps had determined to fight on the 
 Tauber on the following day had to be evacuated. 
 
 At Wertheim, General Flies forced back the Hessians, whom 
 he found posted there, and secured the passage of the Tauber 
 at this point also. 
 
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 317 
 
 The commander of the eighth Federal corps, when he per- 
 ceived that he could no longer hold the line of the Tauber, fell 
 : back to Gerscheim, a village half way between Tauberbischofs- 
 jheim and Wurzburg, and about seven miles from either place. 
 Here he -determined, on some wooded heights, to await the 
 Prussians. In the meantime the Bavarian army, following the 
 road from Wurzburg to Aschaffenburg, closed towards the 
 eighth corps, and taking post on the north at Helmstadt, 
 and Utingen, formed with it a long line of battle, in rear of 
 which lay Wurzburg and the Maine. 
 
 General Manteuffel was obliged to attack the allied corps in 
 this position, although they were numerically much superior to 
 him. He formed the intention of strengthening his right, and 
 pivoting himself on Wertheim, to act with vigour against the 
 allied left. He hoped thus to push his adversaries off the 
 road to Wurzburg, and to force them into the elbow which 
 the Maine forms north of that place. There cut off from their 
 communications, and with the river in their rear, they would 
 have had almost no resource except that of capitulating. 
 
 On the 25th, the Prussian Commander-in-chief drew forward 
 Beyer's division, which had hitherto remained in reserve in 
 ' rear of his left wing, and placed it between those of Goeben 
 '. and Flies. The Army of the Maine now formed a line of 
 battle about ten miles long, but only Goeben and Beyer were 
 to attack on the 25th. Flies was to hold himself at Wertheim 
 as the pivot of the army. Goeben was to attack the eighth 
 Federal corps ; Beyer the Bavarians. General Kummer's 
 brigade, on the 25th, marched as the advanced guard of 
 Goeben's division. When that officer had passed a wood lying 
 a short distance in front of Gerscheim, he made out the enemy 
 — Wiirtembergers, Nassauers, and Austrians drawn up on the 
 north of the road in order of battle. Their superiority in 
 artillery was very considerable ; they had eight batteries, six 
 regiments of cavalry, and about seventy thousand infantry, 
 while Kummer had only six battalions, four squadrons, and 
 two batteries. Wrangel's brigade had marched towards the 
 right, in order to act against the enemy's left flank. The 
 Oldenburg brigade, with the reserve, were behind, but at so 
 great a distance that their arrival on the ground could not be 
 
 
3i8 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 calculated upon for an hour. Nevertheless General Kummer 
 determined at once to attack. His two batteries came into 
 position, some infantry occupied the wood beside him, the 
 rest of the foot soldiers and the cavalry formed in order of 
 battle, and his artillery opened fire. The enemy replied from 
 forty pieces, and after a cannonade which lasted three-quarters 
 of an hour, compelled the Prussian guns to retire. Prince 
 Alexander of Hesse immediately sent some infantry against 
 the wood, but the Prussians held the trees firmly, and from the 
 cover slaughtered their assailants with their quickly-loaded' 
 arm. At this time the Oldenburg brigade and the reserves! 
 came up, and Wrangel was seen advancing against the enemy's I 
 left. The artillery fire of the allies told little on the Prussia 
 troops, and caused but slight loss in proportion to the number! 
 of guns engaged. Wrangel's appearance on his left, anc 
 Rummer's steady hold of the wood, made the enemy begh 
 slowly to retire. The Oldenburg artillery joined to Rummer's 
 two batteries, fired heavily upon their slowly retreatii 
 columns. The allied batteries, halting at every favourabl 
 spot, came into action, and it was not till nightfall that t\ 
 cannonade ceased. By that time the Prussians had occupie 
 and passed beyond Gerscheim. On the same day, Beyer ac 
 vanced against the Bavarians, who were in position nee 
 Helmstadt, by way of Bottingheim and Neubrunn. In fron 
 of Bottingheim he fell in with some cavalry patrols. A, 
 Neubrunn some infantry made its appearance. This was th 
 advanced guard of the Bavarian main body, which was aboui 
 to advance against YVerbach. This infantry Beyer attacked 
 sharply, and drove back towards Helmstadt. In rear d 
 Neubrunn the retiring Bavarians were reinforced, and halted i- 
 a swelling plateau, much dotted over with plantations. Th 
 battle now began in earnest. The Prussian advance 
 guard moving towards Madelhofen found an unoccupie 
 plantation on the Bavarian left. Pivoted on this it wheeled u 
 to its left, and moved against Helmstadt. At the same tirri 
 Beyers main body moved straight upon that village. Tr 
 Bavarians could not maintain themselves in that place, b 1 
 their artillery, which drew oft" towards Utingen, took up 
 position beyond Helmstadt, from which their guns rained 
 
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 319 
 
 hot fire of shells upon the heads of the Prussian columns. 
 The Prussian artillery, covered by numerous skirmishers in the 
 plantations, engaged the Bavarian guns. About three hours 
 after the beginning of the fight the enemy's artillery drew off to 
 ; Utingen, and so left the road to Madelhofen, the most direct 
 1 route to Wiirzburg open to Beyer's left wing. The Prussian 
 1 division then made a concentrated attack against a wood near 
 Madelhofen, under cover of which heavy masses of Bavarian 
 infantry were preparing for an attack towards Neubrunn. At 
 I the same time, Beyer's two regiments of cavalry dashed against 
 [the Bavarian horse, which in front of the wood were covering 
 ithe formation. A severe hand to hand combat took place. 
 The Bavarian horsemen were finally, however, overcome, and 
 'forced to quit the field. While the cavalry were engaged, 
 [some of the Prussian infantry pushed the Bavarian battalions 
 ;back to Waldbrunn. The whole of Beyer's division then 
 I moved against the plantations near Madelhofen and 
 i Waldbrunn, but the enemy drew off so quickly that Beyer con- 
 • eluded the action had terminated, and ordered his troops to 
 bivouac. 
 
 It was not so, however. Hardly had the Prussian regiments 
 
 ■ taken up their positions for the night, than an attack opened 
 
 ; upon their left rear in the direction of Helmstadt. A part of 
 
 ; the Bavarian army had, unperceived, advanced in this direction 
 
 from Utingen, and now opened a second action with a heavy 
 
 cannonade. Beyer quickly changed his front left back, forming 
 
 , a reserve of the two regiments which had previously been upon 
 
 1 his right. His artillery, as soon as it had taken up its new 
 
 position, opened fire against the line of Bavarian guns, which 
 
 iwas continually pushing more and more in the direction of 
 
 Neubrunn, in order to outflank the Prussian position. This 
 
 fire, however, did little towards silencing the Bavarian batteries. 
 
 The Prussian reserve, which had a long distance to travel, was 
 
 far from the left wing. Every moment the attack of the 
 
 enemy's infantry might be expected. Matters seemed very 
 
 critical. But the Bavarians did not attack. After a time his 
 
 reserve reached Beyer's left. He then ordered a general 
 
 advance, which was successful. Prince Charles of Bavaria was 
 
 forced back to Roszbrunn, where he halted. General Beyer 
 
 
320 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 bivouacked near Helmstadt. Goeben's division halted for the 
 night on the road between Gerscheim and Wiirzburg, with its 
 outposts at Kist. When Prince Charles's attack against Beyer, 
 near Helmstadt, was developed, General Flies moved forward 
 from Wertheim to support Beyer. He did not arrive on the : 
 field before the termination of the battle, but he took a position 
 for the night at Utingen, and patrolled towards Roszbrunn. 
 
 This action cost the Prussians about three hundred and 
 fifty officers and men, who were placed hors de combat. The; 
 Bavarians lost seventeen officers and two hundred and thirty-' 
 nine men killed and wounded, besides three hundred and' 
 sixty-three prisoners, who for the most part were wounded. 
 
 Prince Alexander, on the evening of the 25 th, withdrew Yi\i 
 corps to Wiirzburg, and took up a position under shelter of the 
 fortress. Prince Charles appears to have received no informa 
 tion of this retreat, for on the morning of the 26th, he not onh 
 held his position at Roszbrunn, where his rear and hi:: 
 communication with Wiirzburg were already threatened b; 
 Goeben, but he also advanced against Utingen to attack Flies! 
 He must in so doing have believed that the eighth Federa- 
 corps still covered his left, and held the road from Tauber 
 bischofsheim to Wiirzburg. 
 
 As soon as the Bavarian attack on Flies was announced bl 
 their cannonade, Beyer detached some of his regiments to ac 
 against Prince Charles's flank. This attack, supported vigoroush 
 by a simultaneous advance of Flies against his front, forced th 
 Bavarian commander to retire ; not, however, without inflictin 
 very severe injury on the Prussians. 
 
 Goeben, on the 26th, pushed his advanced guard towarcjif 
 W T iirzburg, and soon discovered by his patrols that Princ 
 Charles, after leaving only a few light troops in front of tr 
 town, and a strong garrison in the houses on the left bank \ 
 the river, had drawn the mass of his troops across the Main 
 and posted them in the town on the right bank, and in tlja 
 citadel. 
 
 On the 28th, the Bavarian and the eighth Federal corjl 
 concentrated, and took up a position at Rottendorf, a villa/; 
 which lies in the angle of the Maine, five miles east of Win 
 burg. General Manteuffel that day drew his whole arn 
 
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MA EYE. 321 
 
 together in front of Wiirzburg, with Goeben's division in 
 advance, so that Kummer's brigade was opposite Marienberg, 
 Wrangel's on its right, and the Oldenburg contingent on its 
 left. Kummer pushed his skirmishers close up to Marienberg, 
 and with them forced the enemy to quit some earthworks which 
 they had begun to throw up. The whole artillery of the army 
 of the Maine was then posted on the right and left of the road, 
 and opened a cannonade on the houses, to which the enemy's 
 guns actively replied. The arsenal and the castle of Marien- 
 berg were set on flames, after which the batteries ceased firing. 
 The day after that cannonade a flag of truce was sent from the 
 Bavarians to General Manteuffel, who announced that an 
 armistice had been concluded between the King of Prussia 
 and the Bavarian Government. The cessation of hostilities 
 rescued the allied army from a very precarious position in the 
 elbow of the Maine, where it was all but cut off from the 
 territories which it had been intended to defend. 
 
 General Manteuffel had gained a free scope for action ove/ 
 the whole of Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Baden, because the 
 river Maine was placed between those countries and the troops 
 of Prince Charles. This general, to defend those countries, 
 would have required to cross a swift river in face of a strong 
 and already victorious enemy, no easy task for an army which 
 had already lost confidence in its leader. 
 
 OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 The most interesting manoeuvre of the Prussian Army of the 
 
 Maine, after it had occupied Frankfort, w r as the movement by 
 
 which General Manteuffel advanced against the Tauber. The 
 
 J army marched southwards in the formation A. As soon as 
 
 certain information was received that the enemy was on the 
 
 Tauber, the division wheeled to the left, and stood opposed to 
 
 the enemy in the formation B. The right wing (2), Flies' 
 
 'division, had then Goeben's division (1) as a reserve, and could 
 
 I with great strength urge the enemy back towards the Maine, 
 
 : while Beyer's division at Wertheim prevented him from pushing 
 
 ( out in that direction. As long as General Manteuffel could 
 
 prevent the allies from marching up the Tauber he held an 
 
 advantage over them, for the second reserve corps was coming 
 
 Y 
 
322 
 
 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. 
 
 [Book VIII. 
 
 down to Niimberg against their rear. If the enemy did move 
 up the Tauber in spite of his dispositions, General Manteuffel, 
 by wheeling division C to the right, restored the order of 
 march, in which he had advanced from Frankfort, for further 
 operations. 
 
 ^ 
 
 It is difficult to perceive with what object Prince Charles 
 after the action on the Tauber, withdrew in the direction of 
 "Wiirzburg, and afterwards took up a position in the bend of the 
 Maine. He could hardly have wished here to fight a pitched 
 battle, while General Manteuffel on one side of him, and t 
 second Prussian reserve corps on the other, were not separated 
 by more than sixty miles, and when he left the initiative of 
 attack in the hands of his adversaries. Nor could he have the 
 intention of conveying his troops by railway by way of Bam- 
 berg, Niirnberg, and Regensburg to Vienna. His road in that 
 direction was threatened, and before he could have moved hall 
 his army, the remainder would have been waylaid by the second 
 reserve corps. 
 
 The strength of the Bavarian and eighth Federal corps., 
 which mustered together at least one hundred thousand men! 
 was frittered away in isolated conflicts, instead of being con- 
 centrated for a great battle. Such conflicts could have had nc ; 
 
Chap. IV.] THE CAMPAIGN SOUTH OF THE MAINE. 323 
 
 important result, even if they had been successful. On the 
 Tauber, the eighth corps fought alone, unsupported by the 
 Bavarians. On the 25th, the whole right wing of the Bavarians 
 came under fire, only in the evening, for the first time ; and 
 there was no harmony of either conduct or action between the 
 Bavarians and the troops of the eighth corps. On the 26th, 
 Prince Charles made an offensive movement without any 
 support from Prince Alexander, and apparently without any 
 idea that the latter had withdrawn to Wurzburg. 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA BY 'THE SECOND RESERVE CORPS ' 
 
 On the 18th July the Grand Duke Frederick Franz of Meek 
 lenburg-Schwerin assumed the command of the second Prussia 
 reserve corps at Leipsic. On the same day he ordered this 
 corps to move upon Hof, in Bavaria. On the 23rd, the third 
 battalion of the fourth regiment of the Guard crossed tru 
 Bavarian frontier, and captured a detachment of sixty-nvt 
 Bavarian infantry. This battalion was pushed by forced marche:' 
 from Leipsic to Werdau, thence by railway to Plauen. At th< 
 latter place waggons were raised by requisition from the count 
 people, and the battalion conveyed in them by night to withir' 
 two miles of Hof. Two companies rushed into the towi 
 while the others, making a circuitous march, sought to gain tl 
 exit on the further side, and thus to surround and capture th< 
 whole of the Bavarian garrison. The greater part of thes( 
 however, made their escape by a railway train which happens 
 to be ready, and an outlying detachment of sixty-five noi 
 commissioned officers and men were alone taken prisoners. 
 
 On the 24th July, the head-quarters of the Grand Duke c, 
 Mecklenburg reached Hof. Here he published a proclamatioi 
 to the inhabitants of Upper Franconia, in which he informo 
 them that his invasion of their country was only directe< 
 against their Government, and that private property and 
 interests would be perfectly respected by his troops. In cor: 
 sequence, he was able to draw from the inhabitants the mean, 
 of supplying his men with rations. 
 
 The head of the Prussian advanced guard reached on tibj 
 28th, the provincial capital Baireuth. The Bavarian garriso 
 of this town had been withdrawn by telegraphic orders fror: 
 
Chap. V.] OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA. 325 
 
 Munich : and wisely so. Its numbers were far too small to 
 have fought an action with any chance of success, and any 
 resistance against the invaders could only have served to 
 imperil the lives and property of the inhabitants. Niirnberg 
 had also, from fear of the fate with which it was threatened, 
 solicited the Bavarian Government to allow it to be declared 
 an open town. 
 
 On the 29th July, the Grand Duke in person reached 
 Baireuth, and there reviewed his troops. Bavaria, which had 
 always aspired to a special consideration in the Germanic 
 Confederation, because she claimed to be the leader of the 
 Middle States, displayed no military force at all proportionate 
 to her pretensions. No force worthy the name opposed this 
 invasion of Franconia. One only of four brigades of reserve 
 which were in course of formation, but, as yet, were hardly 
 clothed in uniform, badly equipped and miserably organized, 
 had been despatched from Munich towards the Saxon frontier. 
 For any efficient protection of the country it was much too 
 weak, and the Landwehr, which had so much been vaunted by 
 the Bavarian press, as a strong defensive organization, barely 
 existed upon paper, and was practically of no account. The 
 second reserve corps advanced unmolested, as if in time of 
 profound peace, and was received by the people always with 
 friendship, sometimes with tokens of lively sympathy. The 
 Bavarian brigade of reserve retired to Kemnath. A false tele- 
 graphic despatch, which announced that an armistice had been 
 concluded between Prussia and Bavaria, led the reserve battalion 
 of the regiment of the Bavarian guard to again advance, on the 
 28th, towards Baireuth. This advance was made without any 
 precaution. As soon as it approached near the town it was 
 told by the Prussian officer who commanded the advanced 
 guard of the second reserve corps that the intelligence of an 
 armistice was unfounded. It did not, however, by a forced 
 march, attempt to withdraw itself beyond the reach of danger, 
 but retired to St. Johann's, barely three miles from Baireuth, 
 and there calmly took up its quarters for the night. As could 
 hardly otherwise happen, it was there fallen upon, and fled 
 during the night to Seidenburg, and on the 29th to Seibotten- 
 reuth. Here it was overtaken by the fusilier battalion of the 
 
326 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 4th regiment of the Prussian Guard, which, in company with 
 some Mecklenburg cavalry and Jagers, had been despatched 
 from Baireuth in pursuit, and was totally routed. Of the nine 
 hundred and fifty men, of whom the battalion had been com- 
 posed, hardly five hundred succeeded in escaping from their 
 pursuers, and, by the sacrifice of their knapsacks and many of 
 their arms, gaining a railway station between Seibottenreuth and 
 Niirnberg. This was the only opportunity which the second 
 reserve corps had of being engaged. 
 
 On the 31st July, the Prussian advanced guard moving 
 forwards occupied the ancient city of Niirnberg, from which 
 the dynasty of the Hohenzollerns was originally transferred to 
 Brandenburg. On the first August, the main body reached the 
 same place. Here the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg was only 
 separated from Wiirzburg by a distance of sixty miles, and 
 could insure his junction with General Manteuffel without any 
 danger from the eighth Federal corps or the Bavarian army. 
 Other reinforcements were also on the way to General 
 Manteuftel, for on the 27th July the first Prussian reserve 
 corps had been despatched from Bohemia, by way of Pilsen, 
 into Bavaria, and had already occupied Weiden and Waldsassen. 
 The armistice, however, which commenced on the 2nd of 
 August, and which had been granted by Manteuftel, on the 
 30th July, to Prince Alexander and Prince Charles, put an end 
 to all further operations, and, in all probability, prevented both! 
 the army and the capital of Bavaria from falling into the hands 
 of the Prussians. 
 
 1 
 
 1 
 
 The Prussian troops were everywhere victoriously pressing 
 forward, and every day their enemies were more paralysed, and 
 daily the total disruption of the Germanic Confederation 
 became more complete. 
 
 On the 28th July, Baden received a new Ministry, whid 
 declared that, after the 31st July, the grand duchy would nc 
 longer consider itself as belonging to the late Confederation 
 The grand ducal representative at the spectral phantom of th« 
 Diet was recalled, and the fortress of Rastadt was declared t<! 
 belong to the Baden Government. The troops of Weimar 
 which formed its garrison, were dismissed to their homes. 
 
 On the 1 st August, Heidelberg and Mannheim, Ludwighofer 
 
Chap. V.] OCCUPATION OF FRANCONIA. 327 
 
 Mergentheim, and Erlangen, were occupied by Prussian detach- 
 ments. The South-German Governments lost all hope, and 
 sought by negotiations for an armistice. Lines of demarcation 
 between the armies were agreed upon, and the war on the 
 western theatre was finally put an end to by settled conventions. 
 
 Bavaria at first gained merely a purely military suspension ot 
 hostilities, but Herr von der Pfordten, who had been despatched 
 to the King of Prussia at Nikolsburg,* by the Bavarian Govern- 
 ment, obtained one for three weeks, which was to date from the 
 28th July. Within that time peace was concluded at Berlin. 
 
 Before the definite conclusion of the armistice, the Prussian 
 troops had occupied the Bavarian territory at three points, they 
 had also crossed the frontiers of Baden and of Wiirtemberg. 
 Darmstadt had long held a Prussian garrison. Wiirzburg, as 
 one of the conditions of the suspension of hostilities, received 
 a Prussian corps of four thousand men on the 2nd August ; 
 the fortress on the Marienberg alone remained in the hands of 
 the Bavarians. On the 1st August, General von Manteuffel, 
 at Wiirzburg, concluded an armistice with General von 
 Hardegg, for Wiirtemberg ; on the same day he also concluded 
 one for Hesse-Darmstadt, and on the 3rd a plenipotentiary 
 from Baden came to Wiirzburg, and there obtained one from 
 Manteuffel for the Grand Duchy. The head-quarters of the 
 Army of the Maine were established at Wiirzburg during the 
 truce, where they remained until the 22nd August. 
 
 The King of Prussia despatched, on the 1st August, the 
 following telegram to the Army of the Maine, through General 
 Manteuffel : 
 
 "I charge you to express to the troops of the Army of the Maine my 
 entire satisfaction with their valour and behaviour. I thank the generals, 
 the officers, and all the soldiery. With me the armies in Bohemia, Mora- 
 via, and Austria send to their Prussian and German comrades greeting and 
 good- will." 
 
 At the same time the order of " Pour le Me'rite " was sent 
 by the King, with an autograph letter to the Grand Duke of 
 Mecklenburg. 
 
 L t>* 
 
 * See page 400. 
 
328 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book VIII. 
 
 The end of the struggle was notified by General von Man- 
 teuffel to his army, in the following general order : — 
 
 "Head Quarters, Wurzburg, 
 "August 2nd, 1866. 
 
 " Soldiers of the Army of the Maine ! — By the victories of the 
 arms of Prussia, the enemy has been compelled to seek for an armistice. 
 His Majesty the King has granted it. I do not speak to you of the hard- 
 ships which you have cheerfully suffered, nor of the bravery with which you 
 have everywhere fought. But I recall to your memory the days of actions 
 and the results of your victories. After that, under your skilful and 
 esteemed leader, General von Falckenstein, you had seized Hanover, Hesse- 
 Cassel, and all the broad territories as far as Frankfort-on-the- Maine ; had 
 compelled the Hanoverian army to capitulate ; had defeated the Bavarians 
 on the 14th July at Zella and Weisenthal, on the 10th July at Hammelburg, 
 Kissingen, Friedericshall, Hausen, and Waldaschach ; on the 1 rth July 
 the troops of Hesse-Darmstadt at Oerlenbach ; on the 13th these again at 
 Laufach, and on the 14th the Austrians at Aschaffenburg, you made your 
 victorious entry into Frankfort. After a short rest, again you sought the 
 foe ; on the 23rd you defeated the troops of Baden at Hundheim ; on the 
 24th, the Austrian, Wurtemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Nassau division at 
 Tauberbischofsheim, and the troops of Baden at Werbach ; on the 25th, 
 the whole concentrated eighth Federal Corps at Gerscheim, and the Bava- 
 rians at Helmstadt, the latter on the 26th, also at Roszbriinn ; and to-day, 
 after twenty victorous greater or minor combats, have entered Wurzburg as 
 conquerors. The result of those victories is that not only the countries 
 north of the Maine have been won, but that the power of your arms has 
 smitten heavily on Hesse-Darmstadt, and deep into Baden and "Wurtem- 
 berg, and has freed a portion of our land, which could not be directly 
 protected by our army from the presence of an enemy. The Wtirtem- 
 bergers had occupied Hohenzollern, and had driven away our officials. 
 They must now quit that principality ;* the black and white flag waves again 
 over the town of Hohenzollern. I must express my thanks to the generals, 
 commanders, officers, and to all the rank and file. I also thank the military 
 surgeons for their unremitting and self-sacrificing care of the wounded, both 
 under fire and in the hospital, as well as to the non-combatant departments 
 for their successful administration of the army's supplies. Soldiers of the 
 Army of the Maine ! I know that you are thankful to God, and I expect 
 that during the armistice your recognised manliness and careful behaviour 
 towards the inhabitants of the country will be worthy of the Prussian 
 name." 
 
 The relics of the Diet quickly approached dissolution. On 
 the 1 st of August the small knot of diplomatists which at the 
 hotel of the Three Moors, at Augsburg, still assumed the 
 functions of that august body, were deserted by the ambas- 
 sadors of England, France, Spain and Belgium ; while the 
 Russian representative remained at Augsburg only on account 
 
 * The principalities of Hohenzollern. 
 
Chap. V.] OCCUPATION OF FRANC ONI A. 329 
 
 of illness. The sitting of the 4th August acknowledged the 
 end of the last shadow of the Germanic Confederation. Prince 
 Charles of Bavaria reported the conclusion of an armistice 
 with Prussia by the governments of Austria, Bavaria, Wiirtem- 
 berg, and the Grand Duchy of Hesse; and reported at the 
 same time, that he resigned the command-in-chief of the 
 western Federal army, which had been bestowed on him by 
 the decree of the Diet of the 27th June. 
 
 Brunswick had very tardily placed its troops on a war 
 footing, but by the beginning of August they were attached 
 to the second Prussian reserve corps. That State a short 
 time previously declared its withdrawal from the Confedera- 
 tion. 
 
 The remaining members of the Diet annulled the protests 
 which had been made against Prussia, and decreed that no 
 obstacle should be offered to the North-German troops in the 
 Federal fortresses in retiring to their homes. 
 
 On the 28th July, the troops ot Saxe-Meiningen had already 
 been permitted by the Governor of Mainz to leave that 
 fortress, which, in virtue of the subsequent treaties of peace, 
 was occupied by and given over entirely to Prussia on the 
 26th August. 
 
 This decree was the last act of the Diet of the Germanic 
 Confederation, which was constructed after the fall of the 
 first French Empire. By it, it practically published its own 
 death warrant. 
 
 
BOOK IX. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRATZ TO BRUNN. 
 
 Feldzeugmeister von Benedek had headed in person the 
 troops with which he attempted to retake Chlum after the 
 Prussian Guards had possessed themselves of that village, and 
 so turned the scale of the battle of Koniggratz. After his 
 three attacks on the burning houses and the garrisoned church- 
 yard had been repulsed, he saw that all was lost, and himself 
 in vain attempted to find a soldier's grave on the field of 
 battle, and with his blood to wash out the memory of his 
 misfortune. The rapid advance of the whole Prussian army | 
 forced the Austrians speedily to retreat. During the night of; 
 the 3rd of July, in great disorder, having but half of its 
 artillery, with its staff separated and scattered, the defeated 
 army pushed across the crowded bridges over the Elbe, and 
 wearily dragged itself in the direction of Hohenmanth. Bene- 
 dek himself retreated to Holitz, on the road to this place, and| 
 there on the morning of the 4th, made the best arrangement 
 he could for the safety of his troops. Their losses in men, 
 material, and guns rendered it impossible for him to think of 
 any new dispositions until they were thoroughly re-organized. 
 To carry out such a re-organization he must seek a place of 
 shelter, and the cover he desired was to be found under the 1 
 guns, and behind the intrenchments of Olmiitz. With the 
 exception of the tenth corps, which had suffered most severely, 
 and which he therefore despatched by railway directly to Vienna. 
 
BOOK IX. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 PRUSSIAN ADVANCE FROM KONIGGRATZ TO BRUNN. 
 
 Feldzeugmeister von Benedek had headed in person the 
 troops with which he attempted to retake Chlum after the 
 Prussian Guards had possessed themselves of that village, and 
 so turned the scale of the battle of Koniggratz. After his 
 three attacks on the burning houses and the garrisoned church- 
 yard had been repulsed, he saw that all was lost, and himself 
 in vain attempted to find a soldier's grave on the field of 
 battle, and with his blood to wash out the memory of his 
 misfortune. The rapid advance of the whole Prussian array 
 forced the Austrians speedily to retreat. During the night of 
 the 3rd of July, in great disorder, having but half of its 
 artillery, with its staff separated and scattered, the defeated 
 army pushed across the crowded bridges over the Elbe, and 
 wearily dragged itself in the direction of Hohenmanth. Bene- 
 dek himself retreated to Holitz, on the road to this place, and 
 there on the morning of the 4th, made the best arrangement 
 he could for the safety of his troops. Their losses in men, 
 material, and guns rendered it impossible for him to think of 
 any new dispositions until they were thoroughly re-organized. 
 To carry out such a re-organization he must seek a place of 
 shelter, and the cover he desired was to be found under the 
 guns, and behind the intrenchments of Olmiitz. With the 
 exception of the tenth corps, which had suffered most severely, 
 and which he therefore despatched by railway directly to Vienna, 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 331 
 
 he ordered the remainder of his army to move on the intrenched 
 : camp at Olmiitz, while he left his first light cavalry division to 
 watch the road from Pardubitz to Iglau, and his second to 
 i delay the enemy, if possible, on that from Pardubitz to Briinn. 
 
 On the 4th July he also sent Field Marshal Gablenz, one of 
 the most able of the Austrian generals, to the Prussian head- 
 quarters, in order to treat for a suspension of hostilities, as a 
 preliminary to the conclusion of peace. This was a new 
 proof of the desperate condition of the Austrian army. 
 Gablenz reported himself on the 4th July at mid-day, at the 
 outposts of the Crown Prince's army, and received permission 
 to go to the King's head-quarters. He was blindfolded in 
 passing through the army, as is the custom of war, and accom- 
 panied by a Prussian officer, was conducted to Horitz. When 
 he reached that town the King was absent, as he had gone 
 to visit his troops on the field of battle. General Gablenz 
 was taken to meet him, and fell in with the King between 
 Sadowa and Chlum, who at first took him for a wounded 
 Austrian general, and was about to condole with him, but 
 being informed of his mission, ordered the bandage to be 
 removed, and requested the Austrian general to return with 
 him to Horitz. Here Gablenz expressed Benedek's desire of 
 an armistice, but no truce could be granted, for Prussia and 
 Italy were mutually bound to agree to no suspension of hos- 
 tilities without a common agreement. General Gablenz re- 
 turned unsuccessful to the Austrian head-quarters. 
 
 Equally unsuccessfully did the Austrian Government endea- 
 vour to make a separate peace with Italy. It determined, 
 however, to leave only garrisons in the fortresses of the 
 Venetian quadrilateral, and to transfer all the remaining troops 
 of the Army of the South from the Mincio to the Danube, to 
 shield its capital against its northern enemy. 
 
 The Prussian army the night of the battle of Koniggratz, 
 bivouacked on the field. The following afternoon it began to 
 move forward, to seize the passages over the Elbe. The 
 Second Army on the left was directed upon Pardubitz. It 
 left behind it the sixth corps d'armee to watch the fortresses 
 of Josephstadt and Koniggratz. No siege against these places 
 was undertaken. Yet the town of Koniggratz was nearly 
 
332 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 destroyed. On the 5th July, the day after the Prussian armies 
 had marched from the vicinity of the fortress, the commander 
 of the troops left to mask the place, opened a cannonade on 
 the town from some of the Austrian guns, which had been 
 captured in the battle. The shells burst among the dry houses, 
 and the place would soon have been in flames had not a gun 
 from one of the bastions opened with singular effect upon 
 the Prussian gunners and compelled them to withdraw. 
 
 The army of Prince Frederick Charles, and that of Herwa: 
 were both directed upon Przelautsch. At the same time tin 
 division of Landwehr of the Guard, which had followed in 
 rear of the main armies, was despatched to Prague, the capit; 
 of Bohemia. The Austrian garrison did not attempt to defem 
 this town, and the Imperial lieutenant transferred the seat 0] 
 the government of the province to Pilsen. The Prussia] 
 soldiery here found a very welcome booty in twenty-sevei 
 millions of cigars, which, as tobacco in Austria is a govern- 
 ment monopoly, w r ere confiscated for the benefit of the Prui 
 sian troops. On the 8th July, this division reached the 
 ancient town on the Moldau, and hoisted the Prussian flag 
 upon- the Hradschin, the palace of the kings of Bohemia, 
 On the nth, General Miilbe took the command of the place, 
 having moved the first Prussian reserve corps from Saxony 
 into Bohemia. 
 
 The first division of the Landwehr of the Line remained in 
 Saxony, to which later a newly-formed second division w; 
 added. The detachments made from the Prussian mai: 
 armies for masking fortresses, and escorts of prisoners, as we] 
 as the losses in battle and from sickness, were replaced by a 
 portion of eighty-one new battalions, which had been latel; 
 formed out of the troops left at the regimental depots. Th< 
 first line armies, when they moved from the Elbe, were of thi 
 same, or rather superior, strength to those which ten da; 
 before had crossed the Bohemian frontier. 
 
 In consequence of the battle of Koniggratz, Feldzeugmeist< 
 Benedek resigned the command of the Austrian Army of th 
 North, and the Archduke Albrecht, the victor of Custozza, w; 
 appointed to the supreme command of tire whole army. Until 
 its arrival on the Danube, however, Benedek commanded the 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 333 
 
 Army of the North. Count Clam Gallas had been ordered to 
 
 j give up his command after Gitschin, and the chief of the staft, 
 
 Field Marshal Baron Henikstein, had, before the 3rd July, 
 
 been ordered to cede his post to Major-General Paumgarten, 
 
 ■ who had hitherto commanded in Gallicia. The latter reached 
 the army the evening before the battle of Koniggratz, but did 
 not interfere with the dispositions of his predecessor. 
 
 One feeling alone existed in the army of Benedek. He 
 possessed the admiration of his officers, and the love of his 
 men. This affection towards him only increased in the hour 
 
 ■ of his misfortune in the camp. But the populace of Vienna 
 blindly raged against him, and failing to perceive the negli- 
 gence and errors of the ministers and administrators who had 
 sent the army into the field in its unprepared condition, in- 
 veighed in unmeasured terms against the unfortunate general 
 who had commanded it. 
 
 On the evening of the 4th July, the armies broke up from 
 the bivouac they had occupied near the field of battle of 
 Koniggratz, and advanced towards the Elbe. 
 
 On the 5th, they crossed the river; the First Army, under 
 Prince Frederick Charles, at Przelautsch ; the Second, under 
 the Crown Prince, at Pardubitz. The march was began the 
 previous evening. After going a short way the troops halted 
 for the night, and slept by the side of the road. Early on the 
 morning of the 5th they again set forward, and reached the 
 Elbe late in the afternoon. The villages along the road had 
 been mostly deserted, for the inhabitants had fled south with 
 the retreating Austrian army. The houses looked desolate, 
 with their doors and windows wide open, and shutters flapping 
 mournfully in the wind, while there still remained in the street 
 in front vestiges of the hasty packing up of such articles as 
 could be carried away. A stray dog or two were seen here 
 and there, which still stood on the threshold and barked at 
 the soldiers as they marched by ; but even these were rare, and 
 often the poultry had invaded the dwelling rooms, and were 
 roosting among the furniture. For twenty-five miles the army 
 marched through a luxuriantly fertile country, but almost en- 
 tirely deserted ; sometimes one or two peasants stood by the 
 side of the road staring vacantly at the passing troops, or a 
 
334 SEVEA T WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 few women might be found in a village who, half frightened by 
 the sight of the soldiers, supplied them with the drinking water 
 which they everywhere requested. But the people had no 
 cause to fear; they would have done better to remain, for 
 some of the troops had to be billeted in the houses along the 
 road, and when the inhabitants were not present, the soldiers 
 took what they required, and there was no one to receive pay- 
 ment for what they consumed. The children did not seem so 
 timid ; they were present along the roads in large numbers, for 
 the cherries were just ripening, and they took advantage of the 
 panic among their elders to make a raid on the trees which 
 grew in long strips by the side of the way. With them the 
 soldiers soon became great friends. The boys ran along the 
 battalions with their caps full of the fruit, and got coppers in 
 exchange for handfuls of it ; the sellers, exulting in the pockets- 
 ful of coin they soon collected, seemed to have no scruples as 
 to whose property it rightfully was, but laughed with delight at 
 this unexpected result of the war. 
 
 But for the most part the country in front of the army was 
 still and silent. No church clocks sounded, for their guardians 
 had fled. There was no one to wind them up, and the hands 
 stood motionless on the dials. No horses neighed, for they 
 had all been taken to carry away the flying inhabitants, or per- 
 haps to aid in dragging off the retreating Austrian guns. The 
 flowers before the wayside shrines of the Madonna were dried 
 up and withered, for the votaries who were wont to renew them 
 had fled, fearful of the invading army. The cattle had been 
 driven away, and the pastures were vacant. Broad belts of 
 corn, trodden flat to the ground, showed the lines along which 
 the Austrian battalions had hurried, and here and there lay a 
 knapsack or ammunition pouch which some fatigued fugitive 
 had cast away as an impediment to his flight. 
 
 But where the army marched all was bustle and noise ; the 
 infantry tramped monotonously along the roads, while the 
 cavalry spread in bending lines through the fields, and behind 
 the combatants toiled long trains of waggons, which carried the 
 stores of this large army. Along every road and every lane j 
 foot soldiers marched, and cavalry occupied the intervals be- 
 tween the heads of the columns — all pointing southwards, 
 
Chap. I.J ADVANCE TO BRVNN. 335 
 
 .itowards the Elbe. For miles on either side could be seen the 
 clouds of dust raised by the marching troops ; in some places 
 tit rose from trees and woods, in others from among houses, 
 or from the hard straight roads leading through the wide corn 
 [land, where the hot July sun poured its rays straight down 
 ljupon the soldiers' heads and made them suffer much from heat 
 ,and thirst. 
 
 As the foremost troops neared the Elbe all ears listened 
 ; eagerly for the sound of cannon, for it was thought that if the 
 Austrians could bring their troops under fire again they would 
 oppose the passage of the river, and whether they did so or 
 not would be accepted as a criterion of how much they had 
 i suffered by the defeat at Koniggratz. The heads of the columns 
 ; steadily advanced nearer and nearer to the line of willows 
 iwhich marked the course of the stream. No cannon sounded, 
 ino rifle even was discharged, and it seemed that the advanced 
 iguard must have passed unopposed. At last the news came 
 iback that the passage was secured, and that there were no signs 
 ,of the enemy on the opposite bank. Soon the troops closed 
 down to the river and filed across the wooden bridge which, 
 with four arches, spans the muddy stream ; and the black and 
 yellow stripes on its parapets were the only visible signs that 
 ;the Prussian army was in the dominions of the Emperor of 
 Austria. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles occupied Przelautsch about six on 
 the evening of the 5th, and almost at the same time the Crown 
 t'Prince entered Pardubitz. The line of the Elbe was now 
 ,secured as a basis for future operations, and the Austrian rail- 
 way communication between Vienna and Prague was cut. At 
 the laiter town there were said to be only four Austrian bat- 
 talions, and it was expected to be evacuated by them and 
 occupied by the Prussians within a few days. 
 
 As was the case. Then, notwithstanding the fortresses of 
 Konigstein in Saxony, and Josephstadt, Koniggratz, and The- 
 resienstadt in Bohemia, the Prussian armies, after making some 
 necessary repairs, obtained railway communication from Pardu- 
 bitz and Przelautsch by way of Prague and Reichenberg with 
 their own country, which was of great importance to them in 
 their further advance. 
 
336 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 The towns of Przelautsch and Pardubitz were entirely filled 
 with Prussian soldiers. On every door was written in chalk the 
 name of the regiment and company to which the house was 
 allotted, and the number of men which it was to accommodate. 
 The numbers appeared enormous for the size of the house, fifty 
 or sixty men were sometimes billeted in a small house with four 
 rooms, but the soldiers managed well enough so long as they 
 could get straw to lie upon; but here there was a great scarcity 
 of that, and the men had to sleep as they could, on the floors 
 or in the gardens. The greatest difficulty prevailed in getting 
 any accommodation for horses ; all the stables were occupied 
 by the horses of generals, and inferior officers would fain have 
 had sheds, cowhouses, or any place with a cover, for the 
 weather looked lowering, and it seemed that it would probably 
 rain, but all the sheds were occupied by the troops, and most 
 of the horses had to spend the night in the streets. 
 
 But there were advantages here which compensated for more 
 than a little overcrowding. Large Austrian stores of bread, 
 beer, and cigars had been found, and the soldiers were d< 
 lighted to think that they would again have their rations 
 tobacco served out to them, which they had not had since the 
 left Saxony ; for to a German soldier tobacco is almost 
 necessary as meat, but transport had not been found f< 
 tobacco with the army, as there had been lately a difficulty i: 
 bringing up even food. 
 
 The head-quarters of the armies halted on the 6th July in thi 
 same position as they took up the previous evening. The Fir: 
 Army at Przelautsch. The Crown Prince with the Secon 
 Army was at Pardubitz, whither the King himself went th 
 same evening. Detachments were pushed along the railway 
 towards Prague. On the morning of the 6th, an advance 
 guard was pushed out to feel the country south of the Elbe. I 
 consisted of light cavalry, horse artillery, and some infantry. 
 The Weissenfels hussars led the way, followed by the huss 
 of Ziethen, and the 3rd dragoons, whose squadrons were ve 
 weak, for their ranks had been terribly thinned by the battle o: 
 Koniggratz. As soon as the columns got out of the town th 
 hussars spread themselves out over the fields by the side of th 
 road, and studded the country with horsemen. Some wen 
 

 Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 337 
 
 pushing through the corn, others galloped forward to gain 
 every piece of rising ground, and from the summit to scan the 
 country beyond. Every wood was carefully beaten, and every 
 village inspected by the nimble horsemen before the main body 
 approached, for Austrian marksmen might be lurking among the 
 trees, or cavalry might lie in ambush behind the houses. But 
 no signs of an enemy could be found ; and, although at every 
 moment they expected to hear the sharp crack of a rifle and the 
 puff of blue smoke which would tell that an outlying post had 
 been disturbed, they pursued their way unmolested, and it was 
 evident that the Austrians had retreated far south or east. 
 
 But, though the head-quarters halted at Przelautsch and Par- 
 dubitz, the 6th was a busy day there. All the sickly and weak 
 were draughted out of the ranks, and were sentenced to be left 
 Ibehind — a sure sign that long and severe marches were ex- 
 pected, and that it was intended that the army should move 
 ifree of all possible encumbrance. In vain did those who were 
 selected to be left behind protest that they were the strongest 
 men in the regiment, and call upon their comrades to bear 
 witness to their marching powers. The doctors were good- 
 naturedly obdurate, and the men selected had to bear the dis- 
 appointment of not going forward with the army, being solaced 
 with the assurance that they should rejoin as soon as possible. 
 Those destined to be left behind were far from numerous — 
 indeed, their number was surprisingly small, for the army had 
 oeen making long marches and bivouacking out nearly every 
 light in most changeable weather. 
 
 '• Although the Austrians had been obliged to leave the rail- 
 way, they had taken care to make it of as little use as possible 
 :o its subsequent possessors. All the engines and carriages had 
 )een sent away, and until Prague was occupied none could be 
 orought by the Prussians to supply their place. So the line 
 >tood idle, and the station had a desolate look, made only more 
 •emarkable by the one or two officials of the indefatigable tele- 
 graph corps, who had occupied one of the rooms, and were at 
 :heir work there early that morning flashing despatches and 
 "eports to the King's staff, and receiving rapid answers which 
 vere to direct the marches of the troops. 
 
 A number of Austrian baggage waggons had after Konig- 
 
33$ SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX, 
 
 grata fallen into the hands of the conquerors, and. after being 
 employed in helping to carry the wounded from the field on the 
 6th, joined in the long lines of carriages which followed the 
 Prussian armies. They were easily distinguished in the line of 
 march by their light yellow colour, which contrasted strongly 
 with the dark blue with which all the Prussian military carriages 
 are painted. Every hour showed how much more severely the 
 Austrians had felt their defeat at Koniggratz than was at first 
 supposed in the Prussian army. The unopposed passage of the,' 
 Elbe, the mission of Marshal Gablenz, the abandonment of the! 
 country south of Przelautsch, were successive proofs of the com- 
 pleteness of the Prussian victory. The morale of the army hadj J 
 now risen high, and the soldiers were convinced that the Aus-B 
 trian troops could not stand against them — a feeling which wasil 
 no contemptible augury of future victories. But, though thel, 
 soldiers were confident in themselves, their arms, and theiijl 
 leaders, their confidence never stepped beyond just bounds :!■ 
 they were tender and kind to the wounded and prisoners, notjl 
 only by attending to their wants, but by showing them much; fa 
 consideration, and never exulting over the victory in their pre 
 sence, which could hardly be expected from men serving in the 
 ranks. But the Prussian system of recruiting enlists in the 
 army as privates men of high education and refined feelings 
 and these easily influence their comrades, who are naturall} 
 warm-hearted, to act kindly and charitably to the unfortunate. 
 
 On the 7th July the Prussian armies advanced from tht- 
 Elbe. The Crown Prince moved from Pardubitz along tin 
 railway towards Brandeis, with the object of pushing toward 
 Olmiitz. Prince Frederick Charles, leaning slightly in th< 
 same direction, made for the road which leads from Pardubit 
 by Chrudim to Briinn. On the 7th he reached Hermanmestet2 
 The army of the Elbe marched on the road which leads froi: 
 Przelautsch to Iglau and Znaym. 
 
 The march of the 7 th was very different from that of the 5tl 
 The panic among the country people caused by the defeat ( 
 the Austrians at the battle of Koniggratz did not extend int ( 
 the country lying south of the Elbe, and here the inhabitant, 
 had not left their houses. All was busy and full of life, peasam 
 were working in the fields, women and children were abundai 
 
 I 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN 
 
 339 
 
 in the villages, and the soldiers, who seemed to be supplied 
 (plentifully with money by their friends at home, for their 
 
 pay 
 
 - ^ -j -— ™ "'^"^ «c iiuinc, lor rn 
 
 ;is small, bought eggs, butter, milk, and poultry as they passed 
 along, but m many cases they had little return for their money 
 for eggs are difficult to carry in crowded ranks, and butter s 
 inclined to melt when stowed away in a knapsack, so thai 
 many found when they reached the halting place that their 
 prudence in providing themselves with eatables was vain, and 
 hat they were disappointed of the luxuries they had meant to 
 snjoy with their mid-day meal. 
 The march was little on the high road, but chiefly by country 
 
 nh ;°7- sr r? r er f with short > cris p ^l, v L jz 
 
 mils suns in the hollows by little streams, and through villages 
 
 ,nTof Fn^T ^ eenS C u Vered Wkh geeSeand d " cks remi "^d 
 me of England From the top of every rise the country before 
 he army could be seen stretching away in a wide rolling plain, 
 •nd bounded by the dark blue line of mountains which, Airty 
 piles distant, separates Bohemia from Moravia. The corn 
 ■•as rapidly ripening; but the day was cool, yet without rain, 
 id the troops, marching easily, did not care to avail them- 
 
 *Eh ,/,"' ate u al0 " g the r ° ad ' Which was abundant, and 
 h ch would have been so grateful on many former marches. 
 I He town of Hermanmestetz is thoroughly Bohemian: few 
 f even the better class of inhabitants could speak German 
 he signboards of the shops and inns were written only in 
 
 . her'no' f h T " ^"T ^ ™ k ^^ the "* 
 ther north. As soon as the troops marched in and were 
 
 .missed from their parades, a rush was made at the shops 
 
 fe tTr de i in at the doors and u p to the «»*S 
 
 "mg loudly for tobacco and cigars. These were not to be 
 id in any quantity, but coffee was plentiful at first, though the 
 nole in the town was soon bought. Then arose difficulties 
 
 out money, for the soldiers did not yet thoroughly under- 
 go. th e Austrian coinage, and the shopkeepers tried to take 
 ■e utmost advantage of their ignorance ; but the men protested 
 my against flagrant cases of imposition, and, amid a great 
 
 ■ L°iIvT e - and ,!, 0Ud talki "S' the b -S-^ -ere concluded 
 • nerally considerably to the advantage of the dealer 
 
 fcvery taproom was filled by an importunate crowd eager for 
 
 Z 2 
 
34° SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 food, beer, and wine; knapsacks were piled on the benches, 
 rifles stood thickly in the corners, and their owners pressed 
 round the bar, each trying by dint of noise to secure the 
 services of the landlord for himself. But though they were 
 hungry and thirsty, the soldiers w r ere always good-humoured. 
 Differences of opinion often arose as to the comparative value 
 of kreutzers and silber groschen ; but when the dispute ran 
 high the landlord called in the assistance of his wife, and then 
 almost invariably the soldier had to retire worsted from tJH 
 contest, exposing discontentedly to his comrades the small', 
 handful of little coins he had received in change for a dollar.;] 
 As soon as it became dark all noise ceased and all bustle was 
 stilled. The men disappeared to go to sleep. Some lay in the 
 houses on straw, others in sheds, many in the gardens, for the'j 
 house accommodation was not sufficient for them, and man) 
 seemed wisely to prefer the summer air to a crowded room, 
 Thus the town, before so noisy, grew perfectly still, and nc 
 sound was heard except the monotonous step of a sentry ( 
 the uneasy neigh of some restive horse ; but the arms pile 
 with the bayonets fixed, beside each house, with the knapsac 
 laid close to the butts packed and ready to be instantly take: 
 up, told that the soldiers were ready, and that the least alarr; 
 would fill the streets with armed men ready to inarch. 
 
 The King came to Pardubitz on the morning of the 7th, hel 
 a meeting of the principal generals, and probably the fut 
 plan of the campaign was then discussed. It was still ui^ 
 certain whether the two armies were making for the line < 
 railway which runs by Briinn to Vienna, or whether they wei 
 moving towards Olmiitz. 
 
 The King remained on the 8th at Pardubitz, where it w. 
 determined that the Second Army should move against Olmii 
 with the first corps d'armee and the cavalry corps leadir 
 This advanced guard was if possible to feel the enemy, ai; 
 discover what amount of his army Benedek still held in t 
 intrenched camp and what troops he had sent to the south, 
 serious attack on the fortress was not, however, contemplated 
 Any retreat of the Second Army, which might become nec-If 
 sarv, was to be made, not in the direction of the First Arn, 
 but on the county of Glatz, with which the Second Army n<n 
 
Chip. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 341 
 
 formed a line of communication. The First and Second 
 Armies, on the 8th, moved forwards in a south-easterly direc- 
 tion ; the Crown Prince, with the Second Army, marched that 
 morning in the direction of Marisch Triibau, and halted for the 
 night somewhere short of that town. The First Army, under 
 Prince Frederick Charles, was that evening scattered round 
 Chrast; the 8th division, under General Home, was in the 
 town itself, the main body along the road towards Marisch 
 ^Triibau ; the 7th was a little to the south at Zumberg ; the 6th 
 !at Kamenitz, a village still further to the south; and the 
 I cavalry, marching by roads more to the southwards still, covered 
 [the right flank of the army. General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, 
 with his corps, was moving on Iglau. Eight battalions had 
 been detached to Prague, and that town was occupied on the 
 i morning of this day, the 8th. 
 
 Marshal Gablenz passed through the outposts again the 
 isame morning, and went to Pardubitz to see the King, as a 
 ■commissioner from the Austrian Government, to treat for a 
 [suspension of hostilities. He was received by General von 
 iMoltke, but his proposals could not be entertained, and his 
 !second mission was equally unsuccessful as his first. He 
 [submitted that a suspension of hostilities should be concluded, 
 which should last for at least eight weeks and for at most eight 
 jmonths; that during this truce the troops of both nations 
 jshould retain their actual positions, and a girdle of two miles in 
 .width between the outposts be observed as neutral ground. In 
 return the Austrian commissioner proposed that the fortresses 
 ■of Josephstadt and Koniggratz should be handed over to the 
 ; Prussians, but without their garrisons and math-id of war. It 
 pas not in the interest of the Prussian army after a hardly won 
 
 victory, and, in its favourable circumstances, to grant such an 
 .armistice, especially as it appeared certain that Austria did not 
 twish to definitely conclude a peace, but only to gain time to 
 (bring up her Army of the South from Italy. The passage of 
 
 Marshal Gablenz through the divisions led to many reports of 
 
 the speedy termination of the war, which were more or less 
 
 credited. 
 
 In the meantime, amid rumours of probable peace, the army 
 I still continued its steady advance, and its march was conducted 
 
342 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 with the same precautions and the same circumspection as if 
 the campaign was only beginning, and as if an unbroken enemy 
 was in front, ready to take advantage of the slightest error. 
 Advanced guards were sent forward, who carefully felt the way 
 for the marching columns, sending scouts to the top of every 
 rise, who, standing out sharp against the sky, peered into the 
 distance ; riflemen moved in dotted lines through the fields at 
 an even pace with the troops marching on the road, and trod 
 through the corn as carefully as if they were sportsmen beating 
 a covert, or, slipping into a thicket, now appeared, now dis- 
 appeared in the foliage much like hounds drawing for a fox. 
 The troops on the road pushed along as steadily and perse 
 veringly as on the first day they entered Saxony. The infantry, 
 with their trousers turned up and boots often drawn on outside 
 them, trudged along merrily, and seemed little to feel the 
 heavy yellow cowskin knapsacks and mess tins for cooking 
 which they carried on their backs. Their helmets had suffered 
 in the campaign more than any other part of their equipment ; 
 many had lost the spike on the top, carried away by a bullet or 
 the splinter of a shell at the battle of Koniggratz. Some 
 looked as if they had been knocked off in the hurry of action, 
 and had been marched over heavily by the ranks behind. The 
 belts showed a want of pipeclay, and the boots had lost all 
 traces of blacking ; but the barrels of the rifles and the blades 
 of the bayonets were all bright and clean, and shone out cold 
 and gray against the dark blue uniforms. The artillery horses, 
 a little thin, and with rather prominent ribs, from hard work 
 and scarce forage, stepped briskly out, and almost without 
 stretching their traces the straight, steel-barrelled guns rolled 
 along behind them, looking on the road a mere plaything to be 
 drawn by six horses ; but when the ground was heavy from 
 falling rain, as on the morning before Koniggratz, it needed 
 nearly all the strength of the team to get a gun over the fields 
 uphill, and then horses were often wanting, for their bodies, 
 larger than those of men, were more liable to be struck by 
 shells or bullets, and many were killed or badly wounded as 
 soon as a battery went under fire. After the great battle, the 
 positions that had been occupied by the field batteries on either 
 side could be traced by the numbers of dead horses lying where 
 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 343 
 
 the limbers and waggons had stood. Often twenty or thirty- 
 lay dead in a line near together along the front of the battery, 
 and others limped about near them, and though always moving 
 jnever tried to go away from their dead companions. They, 
 itoo, were soon stretched upon the ground, for the Kranken- 
 itrager, looking for the sick, mercifully placed a carbine behind 
 jthe ear of every wounded animal, and quickly put it out of 
 'pain. The mass of the cavalry scoured the country to the 
 bouth of the main army, keeping watch and ward over its right 
 pank, but here and there a few turned up in the line of march, 
 generally a detachment of some troopers guarding waggons. 
 These detachments were of all kinds of horsemen, — cuirassiers 
 With their white flannel coats braced tightly in by the cuirass, 
 find with heavy-looking high jack-boots, were followed quickly 
 [by some few men of the Ziethen hussars, with short crimson 
 jackets, or by some of the Weimar light cavalry, with their 
 light blue and silver uniforms looking none the worse for 
 1 (exposure, while every column was headed by Uhlans, the 
 black and white flags of whose lances waved with an almost 
 funereal aspect above their smart caps and gay red or yellow 
 facings. 
 
 The army marched in several columns, and from every rise 
 could be seen the different lines creeping like long blue ser- 
 oents over the country. Dipping into hollows, twisting through 
 Villages, twining among trees, appearing and disappearing 
 through woods and thickets, they stretched for many a long 
 mile from front to rear. Always looking steadily ahead, they 
 rushed on with the men's faces against the sun, and seemed to 
 be bending towards the fortress of Olmiitz, under the walls of 
 which the Austrians were reported to have an intrenched 
 :amp, where there were said to be over 100,000 fighting men, 
 vim 400 pieces of artillery ensconced in fortifications. Col- 
 ected here, the Austrian troops, it was said, meant to bar the 
 road southwards from the Prussians ; if these passed on dis- 
 regarding them, to issue out, and, seizing the communications 
 of the army, cut off from it all its supplies of ammunition and 
 bod from the north. 
 
 : Again, on the 8th, the line of March lay through a country 
 ich and abundant in supplies, and from which the natives had 
 

 344 SEVEN J VEER'S' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 not fled away ; and again the columns moved through country 
 lanes, in some places shadowed in by fruit trees, in others 
 leading over breezy uplands where the limestone rocks cropped 
 up close to the surface of the ground, and left but a scanty 
 soil to nourish the short grass which grew thick upon it. Here j 
 and there the rocks cropped out of the ground and rose up 
 some twenty feet high, forming grotesquely-shaped natural 
 grottoes, round which clumps of tall silver fir clustered, and 
 at the foot of the trees, spread in great profusion, wild roses, 
 sweetbriar, foxglove, and nightshade. All the farm-houses and 
 cottages were built of brick, thickly coated with clean white 
 plaster, and in the smallest hamlet there was always a church 
 with a steeple surmounted by the large globe-like top, often 
 gilt, which seems peculiar to Sclavonic countries. No wooden 
 cottages were to be seen here, for the people are richer than 
 those north of the Elbe, and the army left behind it, when it 
 crossed that river, the pine-wood huts, so many of which had 
 been lately destroyed by the flames kindled by the fire of the 
 artillery. The houses, both outside and inside, were beauti- 
 fully clean ; the furniture was of plain deal, without paint, 
 scoured to a whiteness which is unknown in Northern Boh 
 mia ; the brass handles of the drawers and the steel and iron 
 round the fire-places shone- bright from much polishing, and 
 reflected back distorted images of the soldiers, who, in their 
 dusty clothes and heavy boots, dirty from marching, looked 
 much out of place in the houses in which they were billeted, 
 The inhabitants sighed sadly over the war, for their crops had 
 been injured ; soldiers of both armies had been billeted in 
 their houses, for the Austrians retreated through this part of 
 the country two days before ; and some of them had sons or 
 brothers in the Austrian service. But there was no ill-will 
 between them and the Prussian soldiers. Indeed, the lattei 
 were always so good-natured that it would have been difficult 
 even for churls to quarrel with them, and such the natives oi 
 the valley of the Elbe are not. They would have preferred 
 peace to war ; they suffered deeply in having their houses 
 turned into barracks, their corn-fields into bivouacs, theii 
 barns and outhouses into stables for war horses ; but they did 
 not blame the soldiers for injuries for the cause of which the 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUXX. 345 
 
 Batter were as innocent as the inhabitants themselves; they 
 [gave the men what they could ; nor did the villagers and 
 [peasants attempt to impose upon the soldiers, though the town 
 [shopkeepers, more keenly alive to their own interests, gene- 
 -allv managed to make a profit out of the difference of the 
 Prussian and Austrian coinage. 
 
 The head-quarters of the First Army were on the night of 
 ftp 8th established in a monastery at Chrast. The priests 
 Lvere still there, but gave up the greater part of the house to 
 ,[Prince Frederick Charles and his staff. Military waggons and 
 fcrses were picketed inside the usually quiet monastery close ; 
 (soldier servants went whistling up and down the corridors and 
 pmong the cells, saddle-bags and valises were bundled upstairs, 
 land the monastery would soon have been very like a barrack 
 iwere it not that the priests kept flitting about, good-naturedly 
 proffering food and drink to both officers and soldiers ; for, 
 ■though they looked on both as the enemies of their 
 (country, and, perhaps, even of their Church, they knew 
 •that the army had marched far and fast, and they practised 
 ithat charity which should be the connecting link among all 
 Christian creeds. 
 
 From the church close by the monastery, as a centre, the 
 (little town spreads out, its white houses glistening brightly in 
 the sun, along four streets, almost at right angles to each 
 other. Between and behind the houses lay little gardens, in 
 iwhich grew most English greenhouse flowers; vines were 
 .trained in trellis-work against the walls, and beyond the 
 fields stretched away, covered with heavy crops ripening for 
 [harvest ; and between the cornfields lay long belts of gaudy- 
 Icoloured poppies, which are cultivated in this country in great 
 quantities. The church* bell sounding slowly, probably for 
 vespers, for the day was Sunday, and a few women, with 
 shawls in Bohemian fashion thrown over their bare heads, 
 (disappearing into the church door, and just seen within 
 crossing themselves with the holy water, would have made 
 the whole scene one of perfect peace; but the piles of 
 bayonets by every door, the perpetual soldiers bustling along 
 jthe streets, the cantonniers who had established their itinerant 
 Istalls close outside the church door, and were squabbling with 
 
346 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 ; 
 
 
 soldiers over the value of black cigars or schnapps, told that 
 this smiling little town was ■ the head-quarters of an army 
 which had just marched from a battle-field, and was pressing I 
 forward again to force its enemy to battle ; for the policy of 
 the Prussian army was now to cling to the heels of the 
 retreating Austrians and to force them to fight before they had 
 time to re-organize their forces. On the 9th July the whole 
 force was again moved towards the south-east. That night 
 the King's head-quarters were at Hohenmauth ; the head- 
 quarters of Prince Frederick Charles, commanding the centre, 
 were at the village of Reichenberg, about twenty-five miles 
 south-east of Pardubitz. The Crown Prince, with the head- 
 quarters of the Second Army, halted for the night at Leito- 
 mischl, one march to the east of the First Army; and the 
 Army of the Elbe was pursuing its way, at an even pace with 
 the two others, under General von Bittenfeld, along the road 
 which leads to Iglau. No intelligence had yet been received 
 of the occupation of Prague, although it was considered cer- 
 tain that Prussian troops must have occupied that town 
 Tidings of the capital of Bohemia being actually possessed 
 were eagerly looked for, not only by those who took a stra- 
 tegical interest in the campaign, but by all who wished to 
 receive private supplies from Berlin ; for till the railway com 
 munication was established parcels could hardly be expected 
 to arrive ; and tobacco and cigars, which rank in Germany 
 almost on a par with food, were very scarce, and a fresh 
 supply was eagerly desired. This day's was a short march, 
 but the most unpleasant one which the army had yet had. A 
 drizzling rain fell in the early morning, and a cold wind was 
 blowing, which drove their wet clothes against the soldiers' 
 bodies, and made them shiver even as they marched ; but 
 towards mid-day the rain ceased, and the sun burst through 
 the clouds, so that the men got dry ; but heavy rain again fell 
 in the afternoon, and the bivouac at night was moist and 
 uncomfortable. Again this day the country was found fertile, 
 and the inhabitants still in their houses ; all received kindly 
 the soldiers who came into the cottages along the line of 
 march to buy food or tobacco, and some even expressed a 
 desire to become Prussians, stating as a reason that they 
 
:hap. L] ADVAXCE TO BRUNN. 347 
 
 should pay less taxes than under the Austrian rule ; but 
 vhether this wish was sincere, or only elicited by the presence 
 )f the Prussian troops and from a desire of flattering their 
 lational pride, is open to question. 
 
 ' At this time Feldzeugmeister Benedek was working hard to 
 reorganize the relics of the Austrian Army of the North at 
 Jlmiitz. Although over sixty years old, he displayed a 
 capacity for labour, both in the saddle and at the desk, which 
 vould have shamed many a younger man. He was at this 
 ime ordered to despatch the mass of his army by rail to 
 j/ienna, where it was to be united to the Austrian army from 
 Italy, under the command of the Archduke Albrecht* 
 . Count Mensdorf was despatched from Vienna directly, after 
 he defeat at Koniggratz, to the head-quarters of the Army of 
 he North, in order there to inquire into the circumstances of 
 jhat disaster. The consequences of his mission were that a 
 jnilitary commission was later assembled at Weiner Neustadt, 
 i>efore which Count Clam Gallas and Generals Henikstein, 
 vrismanics, and Benedek himself were summoned to appear. 
 | General von John was appointed Chief of the Staff to the 
 \rchduke Albrecht. The Austrian Government wished, by 
 ^ringing up its Army of the South, to oppose a force to the 
 .dvance of the Prussians, but the troops from Italy did not 
 rrive quickly enough. It was only on the 12th July that 
 he first detachment of nine thousand men arrived at Vienna. 
 
 From the time of the battle of Koniggratz, the Prussian 
 j.rmies had lost all traces of the Austrians until the 8th July, 
 |vhen some of the Crown Prince's advanced troops fell in with 
 in outpost of the enemy before Zwittau, near the junction of 
 he two branches of rail which lead from Olmiitz and Briinn to 
 Bohmisch Triibau. After a slight skirmish the Austrians fell 
 lack, and on the 9th the Crown Prince occupied Mahrisch 
 Triibau and Zwittau, two towns of Moravia. That evening the 
 irst corps d'armee halted at Zwittau, the Guards at Wilden- 
 chwert, the fifth corps at Landskron. 
 
 . The first intelligence which the Prussians received of the 
 etreat of the Austrian army had made it appear probable that 
 
 ; * Letters from the correspondents of the Times with the Austrian army. 
 
34S SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 Benedek had withdrawn the greater portion of it to Briinn, on 
 the direct line to Vienna. Now the whole of his movements 
 were cleared up. An Austrian field post happened to be 
 captured in front of Mahrisch Triibau, and many interesting 
 private letters found in it, which established the demoralized 
 condition of Benedek's army, as well as a copy of the orders of 
 that general for the marches of his corps, and the movements 
 of his administrative services. It was thus discovered that 
 only the tenth Austrian corps and the heavy cavalry of the 
 Prince of Schleswig-Holstein had been sent to Briinn, and 
 that the rest of the Army of the North was seeking shelter 
 under the guns of Olmiitz until it should be in a fit condition 
 to attack the Prussians. A few days later the Austrian cavalry 
 retaliated, and captured a Prussian field post, in which a; 
 despatch was found that gave them some valuable information 
 with regard to the Prussian movements. 
 
 On the ioth July, the King of Prussia moved his head 
 quarters to Zwittau. This day it was known to the Prussians 
 that the Austrian Army of the South had commenced its 
 journey to Vienna from Olmiitz by railway. The transport ol 
 this army was conducted as quickly as possible, and betweer 
 the 7 th and the 13th Benedek despatched three corps — thei 
 3rd, 4th, and 6th — to the capital.* When it was ascertained 
 that the Austrian army was moving to the south, the march 0: 
 the Crown Prince was directed towards Prerau, that he migh' 
 there cut the railway communication between Olmiitz and Vienna 
 
 On the ioth, a long march of twenty-five miles brought th( 
 head-quarters of the First Army to the little town of Neustadt 
 which lies about fifty miles to the northwest of Briinn. It wa. 
 a wet morning ; the clouds hung low, and a drizzling rair 
 made the soft country road deep for the infantry and heavy fo 
 the artillery and baggage waggons, for this day the army die 
 not move on one of the main chaussecs, but by one of th« 
 lesser roads which lead through the highland country dividing 
 Bohemia from Moravia. As the road ascended, the scener 
 
 * On no point is there so much popular misunderstanding as on th 
 transport of troops by rail in war. The experience of the German cam 
 paign proves that 10,000 men, equipped for the field, is the most tha 
 can be safely calculated upon to be moved per day on a single railway. 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 349 
 
 became more and more bleak and cold ; the corn was in the 
 lilgher parts quite short and green, and in some places not in 
 ear ; cultivation was only on patches of ground, and where the 
 '■land was not tilled the grass grew short and bare. Cold, hard- 
 looking rocks projected everywhere from the soil ; the surface 
 bf the ground was thickly strewn with large stones, among 
 jwhich a few stunted larch-trees looked as though they had to 
 Struggle hard to obtain soil sufficient for even their roots. 
 Above the road on the hill-sides grow dense forests of spruce 
 land silver fir, the tops of which were for the most part shrouded 
 lin a thick mist. The dwellings along the line of march were 
 in keeping with the aspect of the country — low, dirty, and 
 [untidy, without any gardens, and, generally standing alone on 
 the bleak hill-side, they seemed fitting habitations for the 
 isqualid and starved-looking inhabitants who lounged in their 
 doorways, watching with a lazy curiosity the soldiers marching 
 on the road. The men, thin and with sharply-drawn features, 
 seemed to have no work to do, but leant lazily against the 
 doorposts smoking long black pipes ; the women, with feet 
 bare and garments scanty, shivered beside them, holding 
 in their arms a dirty infant, or combing out their tangled 
 hair. 
 
 The foot-soldiers trudged sullenly along; the march was 
 long for them, and the road bad, but they kept up a good pace 
 the whole way, and there were no stragglers. But they had 
 had enough of wet, though, in defiance of the rain, they 
 marched with their cloaks rolled up, mainly to keep them dry 
 for the night bivouac, and longed for dry weather or a harder 
 road. The horses of the artillery laboured heavily, but got the 
 guns and ponderous waggons, weighty with ammunition and 
 corn-sacks full of forage piled up on them, up the quickly- 
 recurring bits of steep ascent in the road. At every sharp rise 
 the drivers flogged and spurred, the gunners pushed behind, 
 and, though the horses stumbled and often nearly fell,, and the 
 traces were stretched so tight that they looked as if they must 
 break, no accident occurred, and every artillery carriage arrived 
 safely, at its destination. The baggage-waggons did not fare 
 so well. Less strongly horsed and not so well driven, they all 
 dropped far behind the troops, and a few remained stranded 
 
350 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 on the side of the way with a broken axle-tree or a shivered 
 wheel. 
 
 Near the little town of Swratka the frontier of Moravia was 
 passed, but the road that descends from it still ran along the 
 hill country of the frontier, and only came down into a valley 
 near Neustadt to rise again at the beginning of the morrow's 
 march. Within Moravia the country, though perhaps even 
 less fertile, was more pleasing. All pretence of cultivation had 
 been given up, for trees grew down close to the road, and 
 where there was not wood the ground was wet and marshy, 
 and showed no signs of ever having been drained ; and the 
 horses of the cavalry who scouted in front of the columns 
 floundered along, sinking in it above their fetlocks. 
 
 The monotony of the march was relieved by a spirited 
 cavalry skirmish in the little town of Saar, which is about six : 
 miles to the west of Neustadt. On the previous night thei 
 Austrian hussars of the regiment of Hesse-Cassel held Saar. 
 The Prussian cavalry was to proceed on the ioth to Gammy, 
 about a mile in front of Saar, and the 9th regiment of Uhlans 
 formed its advanced guard on the march. The Austrians 
 intended to march the same day to the rear towards Briinn, 
 and the hussars were actually assembling for parade previous 
 to the march when the first patrols of the Prussian Uhlans came 
 rattling into the town. The Austrians were collecting together 
 from all the different houses and farmyards; mounted men, 
 filing out of barns and strawhouses, were riding slowly to- 
 wards their rendezvous in the market-place ; men who had 
 not yet mounted were leading their horses, strolling carelessly 
 alongside them, when, by some fault of their sentinels, they were 
 surprised by the Prussians. The Uhlans were much inferior 
 in number at first, but their supports were coming up behind 
 them, and this disadvantage was compensated for by the 
 Austrians being taken unawares. The Uhlans quickly ad- 
 vanced, but did not charge before one Austrian squadron had 
 time to form, and only while most of the men of the remaining 
 divisions were quickly falling into their ranks, though some 
 were cut off from the rendezvous by the Prussians advancing 
 beyond the doors from which they were issuing, and were 
 afterwards made prisoners. 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUXX. 351 
 
 In the market-place an exciting contest at once began. The 
 celebrated cavalry of Austria were attacked by the rather de- 
 preciated horsemen of Prussia, and the lance, the " queen of 
 weapons," as its admirers love to term it, was being engaged in 
 eal battle against the sword. The first Prussian soldiers who 
 ode into the town were very few in number, and they could 
 iot attack before some more came up. This delay of a few 
 ninutes gave the hussars a short time to hurry together from 
 |he other parts of the town, and by the time the Uhlans 
 eceived their reinforcements the Austrians were nearly formed. 
 I As soon as their supports came up the lancers formed a line 
 [cross the street, advanced a few yards at a walk, then trotted 
 lor a short distance, their horses' feet pattering on the stones, 
 he men's swords jingling, their accoutrements rattling, and 
 lieir lances borne upright, with the black and white flags 
 I treaming over their heads; but when near the opening into 
 he broader street, which is called the Market-place, a short, 
 (harp word of command, a quick, stern note from the trumpet, 
 the lance-points came down and were sticking out in front of 
 • he horses' shoulders, the horses broke into a steady gallop, and 
 he lance-flags fluttered rapidly from the motion through the 
 ;.ir, as the horsemen, with bridle-hands low and bodies bent 
 : I'onvard, lightly gripped the staves, and drove the points 
 [tiaight to the front. 
 
 I But when the Prussians began to gallop, the Austrians were 
 ; klso in motion. With a looser formation and a greater speed 
 {hey came on, their blue pelisses, trimmed with fur and em- 
 broidered with yellow, flowing freely from their left shoulders, 
 •eaving their sword-arms disencumbered. Their heads, well 
 !ip, carried the single eagle's feather in every cap straight in the 
 ir ; their swords were raised, bright and sharp, ready to strike, 
 ls their wiry little horses, pressed tight by the knees of the 
 iders, came bounding along, and dashed against the Prussian 
 anks as if they would leap over the points of the lances. The 
 Jhlans swayed heavily under the shock of the collision ; but 
 ecovering again, pressed on, though only at a walk. In front 
 )f them were mounted men, striking with their swords, parryino- 
 he lance-thrusts, but unable to reach the lancer ; but the 
 ;round was also covered with men and horses, struggling 
 
352 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 together to rise ; loose horses were galloping away ; dis- 
 mounted hussars in their blue uniforms and long boots were 
 hurrying off to try to catch their chargers or to avoid the lance- 
 points. The Uhlan line appeared unbroken, but the hussars 
 were almost dispersed. They had dashed up against the firmer 
 Prussian ranks, and they had recoiled, shivered, scattered, and 
 broken as a wave is broken that dashes against a cliff. In the 
 few moments that the ranks were locked together, it seems 
 that the horsemen were so closely jammed against each other 
 that lance or sword was hardly used. The hussars escaped the 
 points in rushing in, but their speed took them so close to the. 
 lancers' breasts that they had not even room to use their 
 swords. Then the Prussians, stouter and taller men, mounted 
 on heavier horses, mostly bred from English sires, pressed hard 
 on the light frames and the smaller horses of the hussars, and 
 by mere weight and physical strength bore them back, andj 
 forced them from their seats to the ground ; or sometimes, sc 
 rude was the shock, sent horse and man bounding backwards, 
 to come down with a clatter on the pavement. 
 
 The few Austrians who remained mounted fought for a shor; 
 time to stop the Prussian advance, but they could make no im 
 pression on the lancers. Wherever a hussar made a dash 
 close three points bristled couched against his chest or 
 horse's breast, for the Austrians were now in inferior numb 
 in the streets to the Prussians, and the narrowness of the wa] 
 would not allow them to retire for their reserves to charge. S( 
 the Prussians pressed steadily forward in an invulnerable line 
 and the Austrians, impotent to stop them, had to fall bad 
 before them. Before they had gone far through the town, fight 
 ing this irregular combat more Prussian cavalry came up behin< 
 the Uhlans, and the Austrians began to draw off. The lancer 
 pushed after them, but the hussars got away, and at the end c 
 the town the pursuit ceased. One officer and twenty-two nor 
 commissioned officers and privates taken prisoners, with nearl 
 forty captured horses, fell into the hands of the Uhlans, as th 
 trophies of this skirmish. Some of the prisoners were wounded 
 a few hussars killed, and two or three Prussians were left dea 
 upon the ground. 
 
 One or two of the privates taken prisoners were German; 
 
 : 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUiVN. 353 
 
 but by far the greater number were Hungarians — smart, soldier- 
 like looking fellows, of a wiry build ; they looked the very per- 
 fection of light horsemen, but were no match in a melee for the 
 tall, strong cavalry soldiers of Prussia, who seemed with one 
 hand to be able to wring them from their saddles, and hurl them 
 to the ground. 
 
 The inhabitants of Neustadt reported that there was an 
 Austrian cavalry division of four regiments at Ostrau, a village 
 about six miles south of Saar, and it seemed clear from the 
 reports of the prisoners that there was a strong cavalry force in 
 front of the advancing Prussians. On the 10th July five hun- 
 dred Italians, deserters from the Austrian service, surrendered 
 themselves to General von Bittenfeld, the commander of the 
 Army of the Elbe, and volunteered to serve during the war in 
 the Prussian army ; but the King had no need of foreign troops, 
 and very naturally declined the proffered services of men who 
 had been faithless to one cause, and ordered that they should 
 be sent to Italy, where they might perhaps have an opportunity 
 of proving their patriotism on the Mincio. 
 
 The same day all the Saxon prisoners who had been taken 
 , during the campaign were released and sent to their homes, on 
 condition of taking an oath not to serve against Prussia during 
 the war. They all took the oath, and went to Saxony ; but 
 ' many seemed to quit their prisons with regret, for they had no 
 money, and they feared that there would be no work to be 
 found in their own country; but this fear ought not to have 
 been well-grounded, for the harvest in Saxony was close at 
 lhand, and the crops there had not been trampled down by 
 battles or bivouacs. 
 
 The weather on the nth was better than that of the previous 
 day. The sun shone out warm, and lighted up the dark groves 
 of fir-wood which hung above the road, and shining on the 
 trunks of the silver firs relieved the monotonous dark green of 
 the foliage. The road was very hilly, and in some places bad, 
 but it was drying quickly under the influence of the sun, and 
 the soldiers marched cheerfully, careless of the depressing 
 weather which had lately been the rule. The way still lay 
 through the Moravian highlands, but the increased heat of the 
 sun, the presence of oak and ash among the firs, the yellower 
 
 A A 
 
354 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 crops and more abundant grass showed that the army was gra- 
 dually working down towards the valley of the Schwarzawa : 
 but the country did not become more plain, nor did the millets 
 tumble down alongside the road in less frequent miniature 
 cataracts ; on the contrary, the ground was more broken up in 
 hills and valleys. The former were not high, nor did they run 
 in any chain, or in any order ; sometimes they rose as huge, 
 isolated, rounded masses, the tops of which were shrouded in 
 fir plantations, while abutting mica rocks projecting from their 
 sides reflected brightly the rays of the sun ; sometimes they ran 
 in tortuous ridges, breaking suddenly into a steep ravine, to 
 allow the passage of a watercourse ; or throwing up some huge 
 masses of rock which, sparkling in the sunlight, contrasted 
 strongly with the dark leaves of the surrounding trees, seemed 
 to form natural castles to defend the road. In such a country 
 a few riflemen might have delayed seriously the march of the 
 army, but the advanced guard had patrolled the paths through 
 all the woods, had sent scouts to the top of every hill, had 
 looked down into every ravine, and, though the Austrian 
 cavalry was known to be between them and Briinn, they 
 marched on to Tischnowitz without finding an Austrian Jager, 
 or meeting with any opposition to their progress. 
 
 Fifteen miles from Neustadt, where it had halted the night 
 before, the Head-quarter Staff turned aside from the road, fol- 
 lowed a rough country lane for two miles, and then plunged by 
 a rugged, winding path into a deep ravine formed by one of 
 the feeders of the Schwarzawa. On the side of the ravine over 
 which the path led through a thick wood, perched high on a 
 prominent rock, and rising above fir-trees, stood the old Schloss 
 of Bernstein, where it had been considered advisable to fix 
 head-quarters for the night. The battlements and loop-holed 
 walls of the old castle strongly lighted up by the sun, the steep 
 ravine below sunk in shade, the helmets of the escort, the line 
 of armed and mounted men, fonned a scene which savoured 
 more of romance than of modern war. 
 
 The Prince Frederick Charles and his staff turned down th 
 twisting path, crossed the river by a wooden bridge close to a 
 water-mill, and, by a more easy ascent on the other side, gained 
 the gate, which still bore the marks of where a portcullis had 
 
:hap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 355 
 
 neen. But in the yard within every-day life was rudely recalled. 
 The spare horses of the officers had already arrived, and in- 
 lignant grooms were anathematising fiercely because they could 
 ijet no stabling for their charges ; the steep road forbade the 
 j.pproach of the forage waggons, and neither hay nor corn 
 jyere to be found in the antiquated building. The appearance 
 If the Commander-in-Chief for a few moments hushed the 
 lamour, but when he rode on each aggrieved domestic made a 
 lush at his master, and loudly poured forth the tale of his 
 jorrows. A compromise was effected, for hay and corn had 
 keen provided at a farmhouse near at hand ; and when the 
 fervants were assured that the horses should have food, they 
 [|ore with resignation that they must be all night without cover. 
 But attention was soon called away from both the scenery 
 d the horses by the arrival of an Uhlan officer from the 
 vanced guard, who rode up the yard at a gallop, and, 
 mping off his horse before the Commander-in-Chief, with his 
 nd to his forehead, delivered a hurried report. 
 The advanced guard had found the enemy's cavalry in strong 
 rce at Tischnowitz, and the Duke of Mecklenburg had sent 
 m to Prince Frederick Charles to report the fact and receive 
 orders. The orders were soon written, and Major von 
 pprivi, a staff-officer, who has a high reputation in this army, 
 as entrusted to deliver them to the commander of the 
 A I Ivanced guard. 
 
 owll Major Capprivi's horse was tired with a long march, and 
 ,e j f schnowitz lay fifteen miles off, but he had no choice but to 
 rry the order, and in a few minutes he was ready to start. 
 ith him went three officers, who had been employed as aides- 
 amp at head- quarters, but whose regiments were in the 
 vanced guard, and who went to join them for the action 
 nich was expected. Revolvers were inspected, and the 
 : ■ |iming carefully looked to, for Austrian patrols were expected 
 be on the road, and it was just possible that the little band 
 ht have to ride for their lives. But they started in high 
 rits, for the excitement of probable battle nerved them, and 
 hours of a sharp trot brought them to Tischnowitz. 
 ere, in a small town on the banks of the Schwarzawa, the 
 strian cavalry had taken up their position. The road leading 
 
356 SEVEN WEEKS 1 WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 to the town goes straight along the valley, and keeping a direct 
 course is obliged some three or four times to cross by wooden 
 bridges the channel of the stream, which is here about fifty 
 feet wide. When the Duke of Mecklenburg, with the advanced 
 guard, was approaching Tischnowitz, he perceived that the 
 enemy was in the town, and in strong force of cavalry with 
 artillery in the plain beyond, where he occupied a position 
 which could not be turned by cavalry on account of the rugged 
 nature of the hills on either flank. But the Austrians, besides 
 the horsemen in the town and on the far side, had thrown out 
 three squadrons in the direction of Tischnowitz, of which the 
 centre one was in the road and between the bridges, and the 
 right and left were thrown into the corn-fields on either side. 
 The Prussian troopers, few in number, who formed the advance 
 of the advanced guard, had ridden forward toward the bridges, 
 and had almost begun to cross the first before they perceived 
 the hostile cavalry. Then they found that both their flanks 
 were exposed to attack, and that the squadron in the road in, 
 front of them was getting ready to charge. The Prussian 
 advanced guard was from the 2nd regiment of dragoons of the 
 Guard ; the Austrian squadrons were lancers, and it seemec 
 that the skirmish of the previous day between sword and lance 
 would be repeated with the weapons in opposite hands. 
 
 But the lieutenant commanding the small Prussian advancec 
 guard, seeing that he was too weak to force his way, anc*. 
 fearing to be surrounded and cut off, retreated a short distanc< 
 to where a slight rise in the ground gave him a certain ad van 
 tage of position, and there drawing up his little force awaite* 
 an attack, but with no intention of meeting it with the sword 
 While his men were yet retiring, they were unbuckling thei' 
 carbines, and before they had turned to stand, their quickl) 
 loaded arms, constructed on the same principle as the needle 
 gun, were ready to fire. And not too soon, for the Austrian 
 had begun to advance quickly, and were defiling over th 
 bridge, prepared to form line and charge, when a sudden voile' 
 from the Prussian carbines made them pull up sharp, ha 
 surprised, half frightened to find that a carbine could be of ar 
 use, except to make noise or smoke, in the hands of a mounte 
 man. But the Prussians did not wait to observe the discor 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 357 
 
 (iture of their enemies ; their officer only noticed that they were 
 1 too strong force to be allowed to get near his much smaller 
 and, and again he retreated a little distance ; and so quick 
 were the dragoons with their loading that their carbines were 
 ilmost ready to fire again before they turned to retire. The 
 Austrians again formed to charge, and again before they had 
 ettled into their stride a rapid volley stopped their career. 
 
 ain the Prussians retired, and again faced about ready to 
 ire another volley. Again the Austrians came on, and again 
 e fire of the dragoons stopped them short ; but this was the 
 ast time, for the whole of the first squadron of the dragoons 
 ere now up, and had formed line beside the few who had 
 itherto prevented the advance of the lancers. 
 
 Then the dragoons advanced to charge, and the Austrians, 
 lad to exchange the chance of close quarters for the fire of 
 he carbines, came forward to meet them. Both sides advanced 
 .teadily : the lancers, with their spears in rest, came on in an 
 ..pparently impenetrable line ; but the dragoons, with their 
 :word-points to the front and their horses well in hand, bore 
 teadily down upon them, in the last few yards let their horses 
 0, and dashed in through the points of the lances. Their 
 ommander, Major von Shack, went down, grievously wounded, 
 ;ut his men thought of his fall only to avenge it, and rushed 
 1 so close to the lancers that their spears were useless, smiting 
 lem heavily with their keen bright swords. A few moments 
 nly the melee lasted ; then the lancers, turning, flew towards 
 ae town. The dragoons pursued, but their officer kept them 
 r ell in hand^ and they did not lose their order. When the 
 :reet was gained the lancers turned again, the swordsmen 
 Hindered down upon them, and by sheer weight and strength 
 f blows bore them backwards along the street. The fight was 
 >ng and hard. The men, too close together to use their 
 eapons, grappled with one another; the horses, frightened 
 rid enraged, snorted, plunged, reared, and struck out. But 
 le Prussians had superior weight and strength, and pressed 
 leir antagonists back along the streets to a wider space in the 
 mtre of the town, where a high image of the Madonna, 
 irved in stone, looked down upon the fray. Here an Austrian 
 Oficer, hurled from his saddle by a tall Prussian dragoon, had 
 
358 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 his brains dashed out against the foot of the monument, and 
 another Austrian, bent backwards over the cantle of his saddle, 
 had his spine broken by the strength of his assailant. The 
 light Austrian men and horses had no chance in this close con- 
 flict, and soon they were obliged to turn, and fled down the 
 street to where their supports were drawn up behind the town. 
 Here there was a strong force of Austrian cavalry, and a 
 battery of horse artillery was placed so as to sweep the road. 
 But the cavalry drew off without waiting for an attack, and the 
 artillery retired without firing a shot ; which can only be 
 accounted for by believing, as the country people said, that 
 there was no ammunition with the guns. The Prussian 
 supports came up and pushed two miles beyond the town, but 
 the Austrians had drawn off too quickly to again allow an 
 engagement; and the outposts were placed here for the night. 
 Then the Duke of Mecklenburg made his arrangements for his 
 advance to Briinn the next morning ; and when he had given a 
 general sketch of his plans, Major von Capprivi and Captain 
 von Bergmann, the staff officer attached to the advanced 
 guard, retired to a back room in the small country inn of 
 Tischnowitz, and, by the light of a single tallow candle, 
 discussed till late into the night, and sketched upon their maps, 
 the details of the occupation of the capital of M oravia. 
 
 The march was ordered for four o'clock in the morning, for 
 it was expected that the Austrian cavalry would defend the 
 approach to the town, and it was intended to surprise them' 
 before they had made their dispositions. It was after midnight 
 that the two staff officers threw themselves on some trusses of 
 straw to catch a few short hours of sleep before the commence 
 ment of an operation which might perhaps have been one of 
 the most decisive of the campaign, for the plans were skilfull) 
 laid, and it seemed that if the Austrians attempted to stand in 
 front of the town a great part of their cavalry would have beer 
 captured. All that the staff appeared to fear was that the 
 cavalry would draw off through the town before daylight, anc 
 too early for the dispositions for their capture to be earned ou 
 — for the infantry who were required to invest the further sid< 
 of Briinn had marched far in the day, and were too tired to b< 
 sent forward before daybreak. 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 359 
 
 At three o'clock on the morning of the 12th July, the 
 soldiers of the advanced guard of the First Prussian Army 
 jwere roused from their billets, and began making their prepara- 
 tions for the march. Horses were saddled ; the cloaks in 
 i which the men had been sleeping were rolled up and buckled 
 on the pommels, girths and bridle reins carefully inspected, and 
 jthe troopers, before they mounted, drew their hands along the 
 edges of their swords to test the sharpness of their weapons. 
 The officers looked to the loading of their revolvers, and 
 : buckled their pistols round their waists, so that they might be 
 ; ; easily got at in case of need ; and it was expected that they 
 would be required, for three divisions of Austrian cavalry were 
 reported to be between the small town where the advanced 
 tjguard halted the previous night and Briinn, and the Duke of 
 ;Mecklenburg had only three cavalry regiments with him. 
 i At a quarter before four, before the sun was up, the troops 
 began marching out of Tischnowitz, and in three-quarters of an 
 iour formed up before the little village of Hradschau, which 
 :he most advanced outposts had occupied during the former 
 light. Here the Duke of Mecklenburg called his principal 
 officers round him, and told them that he expected to find 
 :hree divisions of the enemy's cavalry, forming together a force 
 of twelve regiments, in front of him ; but that his orders were 
 !:o occupy Briinn if possible, and that he intended to advance 
 immediately. The troops were then formed in the order in 
 .vhich they were to move behind a ridge of rising ground, over 
 vhich the Briinn road rises and falls, about a quarter of a mile 
 beyond Hradschau. The 2nd dragoons of the Guard led; 
 hey were followed by the Ziethen Hussars and a battery of 
 lorse artillery ; then came a battalion of Jagers, followed by 
 he rest of the infantry and artillery, and a regiment of lancers 
 :losed the rear. 
 
 As soon as the formation was complete, the dragoons sent 
 >ut their scouts, and in a few minutes the top of the ridge was 
 tudded with mounted men who showed out clear against the 
 norning sky. Every horseman carried his carbine in his right 
 land, ready to fire ; but the staff listened in vain for the sharp 
 '.rack which would tell that the enemy was in sight ; and the 
 couts, after peering forward for a few moments, dipped down 
 
360 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 behind the ridge, and were hidden. Then the dragoons ad- 
 vanced along the road. When their leading troops gained the 
 top of the ascent they spread out right and left, and pushed 
 across the fields that lay on either side of the way. The 
 hussars, in column of troops, followed along the highway, 
 raising a cloud of dust which almost hid them, and from its 
 midst rose the steady patter of horses' feet and the jingle of 
 steel which mark the march of cavalry. The guns rumbled 
 behind, with rammers and sponges ready for action, and limber- 
 boxes, unlocked, each closely followed by its mounted gunners, 
 prepared to spring down and twist the muzzle round towards 
 the front. Carefully beating through the corn, and covering 
 every piece of rising ground, the dragoons steadily advanced ; 
 but no sign of an enemy was seen, and the advanced scouts 
 reached the village of Tschepen without finding traces of even 
 a last night's bivouac. 
 
 Here the road ran through a narrow defile, with high banks 
 covered with plantations, and the houses of the village standing 
 across the pass would have formed a strong position for the 
 Austrians to hold. On approaching the village the cavalry was 
 halted, and the riflemen were sent for to beat through the wood 
 and push in among the houses. The halt was not long, for in 
 a few minutes the Jagers came up quickly with a long swinging 
 stride, passed by the cavalry, and burst like a pack of hounds 
 into the village and up the sides of the slopes. Now and then; 
 a dark green uniform appeared among the trees only to dis- 
 appear again ; and here and there among the houses the sun-j 
 light glancing back from a rifle barrel, ever further advanced,! 
 showed that the skirmishers were working forward, but the] 
 sound of no shot came back, and it was clear that the village; 
 was deserted. The cavalry and guns then moved on, and filed, 
 along the narrow street ; but the Jagers were still kept in front,! 
 for the defile did not end till the village of Gurein was passed.' 
 The dragoons then spread out again, and went peeping in- 
 quisitively into every hollow, ferreting out the inhabitants oti 
 the cottages to give information, and stopping every peasant 
 who seemed to be in too pressing a hurry to get away in the 
 direction in which the Austrian cavalry was supposed to lie. 
 
 The country people asserted with one accord that the Aus 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 361 
 
 trians had retired through Briinn the night before or early that 
 morning, and there were no troops in front of the town ; that 
 a few dragoons and lancers had bivouacked the previous even- 
 ing just outside Briinn, but had passed through at daybreak, 
 and were already far on the road to Vienna. 
 
 The road ran over successive ridges, each of which would 
 have been an advantageous standing-point for the Austrians 
 had they meant to oppose the Prussian advance into the town. 
 As position after position was covered by the scouts without 
 finding the enemy, and as the stories of the country people 
 were always the same, the staff began to believe that the 
 Austrian cavalry had really retired, and that their troops would 
 seize the place without opposition. The road from Tischno- 
 witz strikes the high road from Zwittau to Briinn about six 
 miles before reaching the latter town, and when this point was 
 passed it seemed almost sure that the way was clear, and that 
 the Austrians had drawn off; and here this assurance received 
 a further confirmation, for at this point a dragoon came in 
 bringing with him two travellers, who had in the morning left 
 Briinn for Zwittau, and had been stopped on their way by the 
 foremost Prussian patrol. Glad to exchange their information 
 for permission to proceed on their journey, they willingly told 
 that the town was deserted by troops, and that all the Austrians 
 had retired early in the morning. 
 
 But the march was continued, notwithstanding these reports, 
 with even greater precaution; the scouts were as alert as 
 before, and the main body moved through the corn land by 
 the side of the road, prepared to form line of battle. About 
 eight o'clock the leading troops ascended a gentle slope, 
 from the top of which the capital of Moravia could be seen 
 lying four miles before them. Here a halt was called, and the 
 staff-officers went forward a little way to reconnoitre. 
 
 The sun shone brightly on the spires of the churches and 
 on the roofs of the houses, but no swords or spear-heads 
 glittered in its light ; and on the fort of the Spielberg, on the 
 western side of the town, no guns could be seen, and no 
 sentinels stood upon the ramparts. White flags of truce were 
 flying from every steeple and from every tower, and, instead of 
 the Austrian colours, a white sheet waved from the flagstaff of 
 
362 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 the fort. It was evident that the town had surrendered. In 
 a few minutes a deputation from the magistracy arrived to 
 announce officially that the town was deserted by the Austrian 
 troops, and praying that it might not be given up to pillage. 
 The Duke of Mecklenburg willingly promised that the pro- 
 pertv of the inhabitants should be secure to them, for there 
 had been no intention to allow plundering. 
 
 Then, after an hour s halt, the troops again advanced, and 
 soon got between two lines of villas which stand outside the 
 town on each side of the road. The scouts came cantering 
 in, and, drawing together on the road, formed an advanced 
 guard, behind which the Duke of Mecklenburg and his staff 
 rode. Before the actual town was reached, a deputation — the 
 burgomaster and magistrates — were seen coming to meet the 
 troops in cabs with white flags flying from them, and each 
 with a broad band of white round his arm. As soon as they 
 saw the staff they sprang out of their carriages, and, with hats 
 in hand, came forward bowing, with many prayers for the 
 preservation of their city from pillage. They had much 
 wealth in the city, and they feared for their property. 
 
 The Prussian commander answered them courteously, but 
 told them that his men had marched early and had no pro- 
 visions, and that, therefore, he should be much obliged to 
 them to furnish dinner for 8,000 soldiers, and forage for 2,500 
 horses. The magistrates started back to the town to procure 
 the rations. 
 
 When the deputation was dismissed the troops again ad- 
 vanced. The line of spectators became thicker along the side 
 of the road, crowds of inhabitants along the side of the way 
 courted the smiles of the soldiers, white flags hung from every 
 window, and the inmates of many houses, with a mockery of 
 enthusiasm, had hung out green boughs and wreaths of leaves 
 to welcome the invaders of their country. 
 
 The dragoons were sent on in advance, and went clattering 
 through the town to occupy the bridges on the further side ; 
 Jagers swung swiftly forward to seize the railway station, the 
 post-office, and the telegraph bureau ; and the rest of the 
 infantry marched in with music playing, seized the Spielberg, 
 and took possession of the capital of Moravia 
 
Chap. L] ADVANCE TO BKUNN. 363 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles came in late in the afternoon at 
 the head of General Manstein's division. When he reached 
 the Platz he halted, and drew on one side to see his men 
 march past him. The soldiers had been on the road since two 
 o'clock in the morning, but the regiments marched as if they 
 had not come two miles. With steady tramp and all in step, 
 with unbroken ranks and battalions undiminished by stragglers, 
 they marched into the town. Dusty and worn boots alone 
 showed that they had come across Bohemia, fought a great 
 battle, and had been marching lately over twenty-five miles a 
 day ; for they had halted outside to brush their clothes, and 
 they came in with cloaks well folded, knapsacks as well put on, 
 and arms as clean, as if they had been in garrison at home. 
 The 60th, a regiment renowned for its marching, well sustained 
 its reputation; the men, shoulder to shoulder, close as if linked 
 together, moved forward like a solid wall, and notwithstanding 
 their fatigue, for they had come over thirty miles, stepped in 
 such perfect cadence from front to rear of the regiment that 
 only one footfall was heard upon the pavement. The 24th, 
 tall men and well-built, came along with heads well up and 
 rifles carried as if they could not know fatigue, and were quite 
 unaware that they bore a heavy knapsack on their shoulders. 
 The other regiments also marched bravely, and their chief 
 looked that day as proud of his troops as when he stood 
 among them victorious on the summit of the Sadowa hill ; 
 and well he might, for the Prussian army had given proof of 
 an endurance of fatigue and of a power of marching which 
 have rarely been equalled in the annals of war; for the 
 marches had not been made by small detachments or over 
 open ground, but by large masses, along deep and heavy 
 roads, encumbered with artillery and crowded with car- 
 riages. 
 
 The head-quarters of the First Army halted at Briinn on the 
 13th July. The troops had marched their shoes off their feet, 
 and no repairs could be made during the late rapid marches ; 
 the horses of the cavalry wanted rest and shoeing, the sad- 
 dlery required looking to, reserves of ammunition had to be 
 brought up, and it was necessary to establish depots and hos- 
 pitals. The advanced guard was, however, pushing on that 
 
364 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 morning to Medritz, about six miles beyond the town, on the 
 road to Vienna. All day long the remaining troops of the 
 First Army were marching in. Regiment after regiment, with 
 band playing and drums beating, tramped steadily along the 
 pavement, drawing behind its long line of glittering bayonets 
 the heavy waggons which carry reserve cartridges and hospital 
 stores, and always follow close in rear of the battalions. The 
 townspeople had quite recovered from the panic caused by the 
 approach of the Prussians. All the shops were open, the 
 manufactories were at work, the market-place was studded with 
 country women who sat among the piled arms or on the poles 
 of the artillery carriages, making up nosegays or selling fruit, 
 for which there was a great demand among the soldiers. These, 
 for many days, had tasted little but black bread and commis- 
 sariat meat, carried straight to the camp cooking-fire from the 
 newly-killed ox; for, in order to save transport, the bullocks 
 for food were marched in rear of the regiments, and on arriving 
 at the halting-place were killed, to be immediately cooked and 
 eaten. But here the men had good food, for the magistracy 
 was held responsible that they should be supplied with their 
 rations. 
 
 Every hotel, every restaurant, every cafe, was crowded with 
 officers, who, having laid aside their dusty marching clothes, 
 were dressed in uniforms as bright as would be worn in 
 Berlin ; but unshaven beards, close-cropped hair, and the 
 absence of epaulettes, showed that they were still on a 
 campaign. 
 
 Soldiers with cleaned and pipe-clayed belt, well-brushed 
 coats, and smart white trousers, which had been carried, by 
 some wonderful means, unsullied in the recesses of their 
 knapsacks, crowded the streets, filled the beershops, and drove 
 bargains with the proprietors of the tobacco and pipe stalls. 
 
 The lower class of inhabitants mixed freely among the sol- 
 diers, and under their guidance inspected, half timidly, half 
 curiously, the wonderful needle-gun of which they had heard 
 so much, and numbers of which, piled four together, were 
 standing in long lines in the market-place. 
 
 Newspapers containing Imperial decrees dated from Vienna 
 were freely hawked about the street. One of these told 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUJSTN, 365 
 
 officially that Field Marshal the Archduke Albrecht had been 
 appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole Austrian army, 
 with Field Marshal von John as his Chief of the Staff; and 
 another, that Austria was about to open a loan of 200,000,000 
 guldens. Cabs pushed about the town, through the crowded 
 streets, conveying impatient staff officers, who had to find 
 quarters for some general, or billets for some regiment which 
 was just arriving — no easy task, for nearly the whole infantry 
 of the First Army was in Briinn, and though the magistracy, 
 anxious to please the Prussians, crowded the men upon the 
 householders, accommodation was scarce. Every house had 
 twenty or twenty-five soldiers quartered upon it, but they did 
 not give the inmates much trouble, for a couple of rooms with 
 a few trusses of straw, and the use of the kitchen fire to cook 
 their food, was all they wanted ; and they did not stay much 
 in their billets, but wandered about the town or sat in the 
 beerhouses smoking with quiet enjoyment the long wooden 
 pipes which, from want of tobacco, had been useless for some 
 time past, but which had seldom been forgotten or left behind 
 on the line of march, while some wrote long letters to their 
 friends at home, and sent off to wives or mothers in Prussia 
 all that they could save from their small pay. 
 
 The King arrived that afternoon, and established his head- 
 quarters in the town-hall. With him came Count Bismark and 
 the Minister of War. Few people had collected to see him 
 enter the town, and the populace made no demonstration of 
 any kind ; the magistrates received him with politeness, each 
 with the white and red badge of neutrality bound broad round 
 the left arm. 
 
 Many rumours of an armistice were flying about, for M. 
 Benedetti, the French Ambassador at Berlin, was there, and it 
 was known that the Emperor of the French was bringing his 
 influence to bear upon the Prussian Court in favour of peace. 
 Count Bismark was for some time closeted with the Ambas- 
 sador in an upper room of the town-hall, where, undisturbed 
 by the hum which rose from the crowded streets, they were 
 supposed to be discussing the conditions of an armistice. The 
 latest Austrian newspapers said that the Kaiser had deter- 
 mined that no attempt should be made to defend the capital 
 
366 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 itself, for it was thought better to let the town be occupied 
 peaceably by an enemy than be exposed to the possibility of 
 a bombardment. But though at this time it might have been 
 intended that the Austrian troops should abandon Vienna, 
 preparations were being made to continue the war. The army 
 from the Italian frontier was being brought up towards the 
 Danube, to add 120,000 men to the troops at present round 
 the capital. 
 
 While the army halted here, reserve troops were being ad- 
 vanced into Bohemia to secure the communications with 
 Saxony, and to keep order in rear of the armies, where the 
 peasantry, having possessed themselves with weapons from the 
 fields of battle, had begun to plunder convoys and to attack 
 small escorts or patrols. The first reserve corps occupied 
 Bohemia. Prague and Pardubitz were garrisoned in force, 
 and the second reserve corps had been organized at Leipzig to 
 act against the flank of the Bavarians. General von Falcken- 
 stein was named Prussian Commandant ot Bohemia, and 
 General ManteurTel took his place in the command of the 
 Army of the Maine. 
 
 But many considered that all these precautions were useless, 
 and that the army would never move south of Briinn. 
 The visit of the French Ambassador, quickly reported from 
 billet to billet, fell as a cold chill on the enthusiasm of the 
 troops, for they longed to go to Vienna, and conclude the 
 campaign by an entrance into the capital. But they also 
 wished for the end of the war, and longed for home, so they 
 hated the idea of delay, and anticipated with disgust an 
 armistice, by the conditions of which the army might be re- 
 tained at Briinn for a considerable time. A flag of truce was 
 sent that day to the Austrian advanced guard, which lay 
 beyond Medritz, and the staff officer who went with it carried 
 a letter to be given to the Austrian Commander-in-Chief. The 
 contents of the letter were known only in the King's head- 
 quarters, but popular rumour did not fail to assert that the flag 
 of truce carried with it a despatch to open negotiations which 
 would conclude a peace. 
 
 The railway communication with Saxony was all but restored, 
 and was actually opened on the 15th. 
 
Chap. I.] ADVANCE TO BRUNN. 367 
 
 When Prague was occupied by the Prussian troops on the 
 8th, thirty locomotive engines and some thousand railway 
 carriages were found at the railway station, and with this 
 supply of rolling stock the railway was soon opened for mili- 
 tary purposes between Prague and Briinn. A broken bridge 
 between Miinchengratz and Jung-Bunzlau required several 
 days for its repair, and still prevented communication with 
 Berlin, but as soon as this viaduct was restored the army was 
 able to receive supplies by the route of Tiirnau, Prague, and 
 Pardubitz. The line was long, because the shorter route 
 through Josephstadt and Koniggratz was closed by those for- 
 tresses, and the guns of Theresienstadt prevented the line 
 to Dresden from being used; but communication by it re- 
 quired much less time than by the rough roads over which the 
 convoys had hitherto to travel, and as soon as it was open 
 supplies arrived much more quickly than while they were 
 carried for many long miles over rough hill roads, along which 
 the waggons jolted slowly and painfully. 
 
 The Army of the Elbe, after the battle of Koniggratz, 
 formed the right wing of the general advance of the Prussians 
 from Przelautsch and Pardubitz. It followed the most direct 
 road southwards, and on the 10th July reached Iglau, and 
 there crossed the boundary line between Bohemia and Moravia. 
 'Here it found detachments of General Edelsheim's cavalry in 
 its front, but they retired without making any resistance to its 
 advance. The capture of the imperial manufactory of cigars 
 at Iglau supplied Herwarth's soldiers with plentiful rations of 
 tobacco, the want of which is so much missed by German 
 troops. In the neighbourhood of Iglau Herwarth captured 
 ne hundred transport waggons. He then moved forwards in 
 
 e direction of Znaym. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 TOBITSCHAU. 
 
 When the Archduke Albrecht assumed the command of al 
 the Austrian troops in the field, he could not retain Benedek' 
 army in Olmiitz, unless -he consented to sacrifice Vienna with 
 out a blow, for it was not strong enough to delay the advano 
 of the Prussians by acting against their flank and communi 
 cations. He might have determined to occupy the line of th 
 March with the Army of the North and the troops from Italy 
 but he had not time to take up a strong position here befor 
 the Prussians would be upon him. The line of this river wa 
 also badly suited for a defensive position, as an army lyin 
 along it would have had a range of mountains, that of th 
 Lower Carpathians, in its rear. An occupation of the line c 
 the YVaag, with his left wing supported on Komorn, his centr 
 at Leopoldstadt, and his Army of the North posted along th 
 hills on the left bank of that river, which entirely comman 
 the plain on the right bank, while his Army of the South hel 
 the Danube near Vienna, would have afforded the Archduk 
 many advantages. The Prussians could not have advance 
 against Vienna without exposing their flanks and commun 
 cations to the Army of the North, nor could they have movei 
 against this army without placing themselves in unfavourabl 
 circumstances. They would have been obliged to cross th' 
 March and the Lower Carpathians, to fight a battle where thei 
 would have had a river and a line of hills in front of them, f^ 
 chain of mountains and a river in their rear. It appear, 
 however, that the Archduke feared that the Prussians, t 
 seizing the passes of the Carpathians, might have neutralize 
 the action of his Army of the North, and have pushed o : 
 
Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU. 369 
 
 against the capital, for he determined take up the line of the 
 Danube from Krems to Pressburg, with his centre resting on 
 the fortifications of Florisdorf, in front of Vienna. Yet a 
 battle lost here would have yielded up all Hungary to his 
 enemy, and have placed Austria entirely at the mercy of 
 Prussia. Benedek was ordered to send his army from Olmiitz 
 to Vienna, and by the 14th July he had despatched his third, 
 fourth, and sixth corps by railway to the capital. On the 15th, 
 while more of his troops were actually upon the line, the 
 railway communication between Olmiitz and Vienna was cut 
 near Lundenburg, by the cavalry of the advanced guard of 
 Prince Charles, which had been pushed forward from Briinn.* 
 Benedek could send no more troops by rail ; he resolved, with 
 the first, second, and eighth corps, which still remained at 
 Olmiitz, to march by road to the Danube. One brigade of the 
 eighth corps, followed by a large proportion of artillery, moved 
 
 f by way of Tobitschau and Kremser, on the right bank of the 
 
 1:: J March. The main body, accompanied by Benedek in person, 
 
 moved on the left bank of the March, by way of Prerau ; while 
 
 \ a garrison of twenty-five thousand men was left in Olmiitz. 
 This movement of the Austrian general brought on the 
 iW 
 
 ACTION OF TOBITSCHAU. 
 
 The army of the Crown Prince, after leaving Pardubitz, was 
 directed, as has been already seen, in the direction of Olmiitz. 
 ;• j On the 14th July, the advanced guard of the first corps 
 d'arme'e reached Prossnitz, about twelve miles to the southward 
 of Olmiitz. This advanced guard consisted of General 
 Buddenbrock's brigade, which had been reinforced by some 
 additional artillery, and was accompanied by the first regiment 
 of hussars. Near Prossnitz some detachments of hostile 
 cavalry made their appearance, advancing from Wrahartz. 
 . These were Saxon dragoons, which, after a slight skirmish, the 
 Prussian hussars drove back to Kralitz and Biskupitz, on the 
 river Blatta. On the 12th the Crown Prince determined to 
 leave only one corps to mask Olmiitz and the Austrian 
 
 * See page 384. 
 
 B B 
 
37o SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 entrenched camp. With his other corps he resolved to lean 
 towards his right, and keep open his communications with 
 Prince Frederick Charles. On this day the Guards were at 
 Konitz, the fifth corps at Plumenau. Orders were issued that 
 on the 15 th the cavalry reserve by way of Plin, and the first 
 corps from Prossnitz, should make an attack on Prerau, and 
 there cut the railway between Olmiitz and Lundenburg. Thusi 
 on the 15th, while the main body of the Crown Prince's army 
 was moving southwards by Urtschitz and Ottaslawitz, General 
 Malotki's brigade of the first corps, consisting of six battalions 
 and a 4-pounder battery, was at daybreak to march to the east 
 of Plumenau, to seize Tobitschau and Traubeck, thus toi 
 secure the passages over the Blatta, the March, and the] 
 Beczwa, and to hold them until General Hartman's division of| 
 reserve cavalry could reach Prerau, destroy the railway 
 and return. From Plumenau, by way of Prossnitz, to) 
 Hrubschitz is ten miles. Malotki reached the heights ofj 
 Hrubschitz soon after six o'clock in the morning. From this 
 position he could see a part of the road from Olmiitz to Tobit- 
 schau, and on it a heavy Austrian column moving towards the 
 latter place. This was Rothkirch's brigade, in rear of whichj 
 Benedek, either ignorant of the proximity of the Prussians, oij 
 anxious to have a strong force of artillery to cover his lef 
 flank, had caused a considerable portion of his artillery train tcl 
 march.* At this time the Prussians were ignorant of whs 
 Austrian force still remained at Olmiitz, although it was calcuj 
 lated, as was afterwards proved correctly, that forty thousancj 
 men could have been moved to Vienna before the railway w£ 
 broken. 
 
 The Austrian troops in front of Malotki, under Rothkirch\ 
 command, consisted of the 25th Hungarian regiment, the 7tl 
 Hungarian regiment, and one Jager battalion : in all, sevei 
 battalions, which were accompanied by a squadron of Uhlan 
 and three field batteries. 
 
 * The accounts of the object with which Rothkirch's brigade moved alon 
 this road are varied. Some say that he was intended to occupy a positio] 
 on the rivers which unite near Tobitschau, in order to cover the march d 
 the main body. Others that Benedek moved him along this route ignorar 
 that the Crown Prince was so close at hand, and committed the artiller 
 train on it because of its being the better road. 
 
Chap. II. ] TOBITSCHAU. 371 
 
 1st 
 
 ioo 
 
 .a 
 
 :i 
 
 Malotki deployed his brigade on the east of Hrubschitz to- 
 wards Wiklitzer Hof and Klopotowitz, with the 44th regiment in 
 the first line, the 4th in the second, and posted his artillery on 
 the left flank of his infantry, just south of Klopotowitz. 
 
 The Austrian general brought up twenty-four guns to the 
 hills between the Blatta and the March, and smote with them 
 I™ upon the Prussian flank. 
 
 These guns were engaged, but at much disadvantage, by the 
 Prussian battery which was attached to Malotki's brigade. 
 After a short time, however, General Hartman's division of 
 Prussian cavalry arrived on the ground, and reinforced 
 Malotki's guns with two batteries of horse artillery, which took 
 up a position more to the north, and gradually advancing to 
 the Blatta, in about an hour's time succeeded in somewhat 
 silencing the Austrian pieces. 
 
 Already, before the artillery on either side had opened fire, 
 the 44th regiment, which formed the first line of Malotki's in- 
 "'"" I fantry, began to advance. The fusilier battalion of this regiment 
 moved against Wiklitzer Hof, the second battalion on its left 
 towards Klopotowitz, and the third battalion between the two 
 others. Without coming into collision with the enemy, these 
 battalions gained the western bank of the Blatta. The river 
 was so deep and broad in consequence of the late heavy rain 
 that it could only be crossed at Wiklitzer Hof, where there 
 were two bridges. Had the enemy occupied these passages, 
 the advance of the brigade would have been exceedingly 
 difficult, perhaps prevented altogether. The fusilier battalion of 
 the 44th, which first passed the stream, came on the further side 
 upon two Austrian companies, which had been thrown out to 
 cover Rothkirch's right flank. These, on account of some undu- 
 lations in the ground, had as yet seen nothing of the Prussian 
 advance. They now threw themselves into a small plantation 
 which lay on the south of Tobitschau, and a musketry fight com- 
 menced between them and the fusiliers, during which the first 
 and second battalions of the 44th deployed to the left of 
 the fusiliers. Each battalion threw two companies forward in 
 skirmishing order, and retained its two others as reserves in 
 close column of companies. The 4th regiment, which formed 
 Malotki's second line, crossed the stream after the 44th, with 
 
 b b 2 
 
 hiird 
 
372 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 its fusilier battalion leading. Two companies of this battalion 
 were directed to occupy Tobitschau, seize the passage over the 
 March, and to bear upon the Austrian left flank. The rest of 
 the regiment followed the first line. 
 
 The main body of the brigade then made an attack against 
 the plantation, but was received with such a heavy fire of 
 artillery and musketry that it reeled under the iron storm. It 
 paused a few moments to steady itself, then, covered by 
 skirmishers, sprang forwards upon the trees. The Austrians, 
 against overpowering numbers, stood their ground with won- 
 derful determination, and it was not till bayonets had been 
 crossed, that they quitted the cover. The Prussians halted to 
 rally at the further edge of the wood, while the Austrians drew 
 slowly back along the road towards Olmiitz, but lined the 
 ditches in the fields by the wayside with sharpshooters. 
 
 All the Austrian battalions had meanwhile formed, and; 
 Rothkirch advanced them for a counter-attack, by which he 
 hoped to recover the wood, and drive the Prussians again over! 
 the Blatta. The Prussians aw T aited their approach till theyj 
 came within one hundred yards of the trees. Then the needle 
 gun opened with its deadly rapidity, and with rapid and per- 
 petual volleys broke down the heads of the assailant columns. 
 The Austrian battalions were crushed beneath the greeting) 
 and in partial confusion drew back. The Prussians rallied,* 
 and followed them as they retired to some open ground neaij 
 the village of Wierowan, beside the road to Olmiitz. 
 
 During the whole of this combat, the Austrian artillery hac 
 played upon the Prussian left flank. General Malotki directed 
 two hundred of the 4th regiment to attack the guns in skirj 
 mishing order. The biting fire of the sharpshooters, couplec 
 with the salvoes of the Prussian batteries on the west of the 
 Blatta, forced the enemy's pieces to withdraw to a more con; 
 venient distance, and Malotki could make his preparations fo: 
 a further advance. 
 
 In the meantime, Hartman's cavalry had not been idle. A- 
 the same time as Malotki advanced, on his left flank a Prussiar 
 detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kehler, who commander 
 the 1 st Royal hussars, was pushed forward from Prossnitz, b; 1 
 way of Wrahowitz, towards the village of Dub on the March 
 
Chap. II.] T0B1TSCHAU. 373 
 
 This detachment consisted of the 1st Royal hussars, a 4- 
 pounder battery, and one battalion of the 5th Prussian regiment 
 of the Line. East of Wrahowitz, it fell in with the Austrian 
 flanking parties. As these were apparently in much superior 
 force, it retired behind the Wallowa, and from the right bank 
 of this stream its artillery opened a fire which at least detained 
 some of the Austrian artillery accompanying Rothkirch's brigade 
 in this direction. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th July, after Malotki's brigade 
 had marched on Wiklitzer Hof, Hartman's cavalry division of 
 three brigades took post near and behind it, about Klopotowitz 
 and Biskupitz. Hartman's three brigades were, the light 
 brigade of Landwehr cavalry, consisting of the 2nd regiment 
 of Landwehr hussars and the 1st regiment of Landwehr 
 Uhlans, a light brigade of the Line, consisting of the 2nd 
 Royal hussars and the 10th Uhlans, and a heavy, or cuirassier 
 brigade, consisting of the 1st and 5th regiments of cuirassiers. 
 
 As Malotki pressed upon the Austrian brigade, and it began 
 to retire from the direction of Tobitschau towards Wierowan, 
 Hartman, in order to harass its retreat, formed the design of 
 passing his cuirassier brigade, which formed his extreme left, 
 over the Blatta, and with it acting against the Austrian right 
 flank. Some officers sent to reconnoitre found that the bridge 
 over the river near Biskupitz was neither held nor had been 
 destroyed by the enemy. 
 
 When the 5th cuirassiers had crossed the bridge and had 
 gained the further bank, it perceived the Austrian artillery train 
 on the road between Olmiitz and Tobitschau, which, on 
 account of the action going on near the latter place, had been 
 halted north of Rakodau, and appeared to be without any 
 escort. 
 
 Colonel Bredow, who commanded the 5 th cuirassiers, sought 
 permission from General Hartman to attack the artillery train. 
 This permission was accorded to him, not, however, till the 
 Austrian artillery had noticed the Prussian cavalry. The 
 gunners unlimbered, and opened upon the horsemen with 
 shell, but at a long range, for they saw not the 5th cuirassiers, 
 who were on their own side the stream, but the 1st, who were 
 still near Biskupitz. 
 
374 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 Bredow, under cover of some undulating ground, formed his 
 regiment in echelon of squadrons, for the attack of the guns. 
 The first squadron he kept towards his right to cover the flank 
 of his attack from any Austrian cavalry which might lie in that 
 direction, the second and fourth squadrons he directed full 
 against the front of the batter}', and supported the second with 
 the third as a reserve. 
 
 The squadrons moved forward in perfect lines, slowly and 
 steadily at first, seeming to glide over the field, gradually 
 increasing their pace, regardless of the tremendous fire directed 
 upon them, which emptied some saddles. When within a few 
 hundred paces of the battery they broke into a steady gallop, 
 which increased in rapidity at every stride that brought the 
 horses nearer to the Austrian line. All the time of their 
 advance the gunners poured round after round into them, 
 striving with desperate energy to sweep them away before they 
 could gain the mouths of the cannons. Rapid flashes of flame 
 breaking from the mouths of the guns accompanied the dis- 
 charge of the shells, which were being blurted forth with a 
 nervous haste through the thick clouds of smoke that hung 
 heavily before the muzzles. The flank squadrons, bending a 
 little away from their comrades, made for either end of the 
 line of guns, in expectation of finding there some supporting 
 cavalry. The two centre ones went straight as an arrow against 
 the guns themselves, and hurled themselves through the 
 intervals between them upon the gunners. Then the firing 
 ceased in a moment, and the smoke began to drift slowly 
 away, but all noise was not hushed ; shrieks from men cut 
 down by the broad blades of the cuirassiers, cries for quarter, 
 the rapid tramp of snorting and excited horses, the rattle of 
 steel, shouts, cheers, and imprecations from the excited com- 
 batants, rose up to heaven in a wild medley, along with the 
 prayers which were being offered up by another armed host not 
 many miles distant at Briinn, where on this Sunday the army 
 of Prince Frederick Charles was engaged in a solemn thanks- 
 giving for their hitherto victorious career. Eighteen guns, 
 seven waggons, and one hundred and sixty-eight horses, with 
 one hundred and seventy prisoners, fell into the hands of the 
 Prussian force — a noble prize to be won by a single regiment 
 
Chap. II. ] TOBITSCHAU. 375 
 
 It lost only twelve men and eight horses, for the swelling 
 ground and rapid motion of the gliding squadrons baulked the 
 aim of the gunners, who mostly pointed their pieces too high, 
 and sent their shells over the heads of the charging horsemen. 
 Of the eighteen captured guns seventeen were conveyed to 
 Prossnitz. One was too much disabled to be moved. 
 
 While the Prussian cuirassiers were engaged in drawing the 
 captured guns to a safe place, a squadron of hostile cavalry 
 deployed from Nenakowitz. Colonel Bredow placed himself 
 at the head of his first squadron, and charged to cover the 
 retreat of his regiment's spoils. This squadron dashed with a 
 heavy surge upon the hostile ranks. The lighter Austrian 
 horsemen, borne down and scattered by their ponderous shock, 
 broke in wild confusion, could not rally, and were driven far 
 beyond Nenakowitz. 
 
 The Austrian infantry still held Wierowan, and was thus in 
 rear and flank of the cuirassiers, who, under the fire of musketry, 
 could not hold their position on the plateau in front of 
 the Blatta, and were obliged for a time to retire towards 
 Klopotowitz. 
 
 The village of Wierowan was, however, soon carried by the 
 Prussian infantry, as well as that of Rakodau, which lay behind 
 it. Both places were occupied, and one of the Prussian 
 batteries crossing the Blatta opened upon the retreating 
 Austrians, who drew off towards Dub. About mid-day the 
 combat terminated at this point. But while this action had 
 been going on northwards of Tobitschau, the Prussians had 
 reaped other successes in the direction of Traubeck. The two 
 fusilier companies of the 4th regiment, which soon after the 
 commencement of the action had been directed upon Tobit- 
 schau, at that place fell in with three Austrian companies. 
 These they drove out of the town, after a short though sharp 
 engagement, and captured from them several prisoners. Another 
 battalion and the two remaining companies of their own 
 battalion were then sent by Malotki to support the Prussian 
 advance in this direction. They advanced towards Traubeck, 
 and occupied that place without any serious opposition, 
 although some stray detachments of the Austrians were in its 
 immediate vicinity. Under the cover of the garrison of Trau- 
 
376 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 beck, a detachment of Hartman's cavalry advanced against 
 Prerau. This detachment consisted of three squadrons of the 
 second Royal hussars, the regiment of Landwehr hussars, a 
 squadron of Polish Uhlans, and a battery of horse artillery, 
 and was accompanied by a company of fusiliers, who were 
 quickly mounted on some waggons near at hand. Before 
 Hartman could develop his attack towards Prerau, an Austrian 
 column was seen advancing from Olmiitz towards Dub. It 
 consisted of six battalions, a battery, and some squadrons. 
 These had been despatched by the commandant of the fortress 
 to support Rothkirch's brigade in the neighbourhood of Tobit- 
 schau. At the same time as these Austrian reinforcements 
 approached the scene of action, Prussian supports were also 
 coming up. General von Bonin, who commanded the first. 
 Prussian corps d'armee, and had ordered Malotki's advance, at 
 the commencement of the engagement, not knowing in what 
 strength the Austrians were, had sent his aides-de-camp to 
 order the remaining brigades of his corps to move on Tobit- 
 schau. The commanders of these brigades, hearing the 
 cannonade, had of their own accord moved in the direction of 
 the sound, and the advanced guard, formed of Barnekow's 
 brigade, which mustered six battalions and a battery, had 
 already reached Biskupitz when the Austrian reinforcements 
 from Olmiitz came into sight. Biskupitz lies about a mile to 
 the west of Wierowan. The rifled battery of Barnekow's 
 brigade immediately came into action, and fired against the 
 right flank of the Austrian advance. At the same time a 
 battery for which Bonin had sent came up, and, joining the 
 battery Malotki had previously with him, took up a position on 
 the west of the main road. The Austrian guns advanced to 
 Dub, and there near the church came into action to cover the 
 deployment of their infantry. But the quick handling of the 
 Prussian guns and the advance of Barnekow were too formid- 
 able for the sallying troops, and they, without engaging with 
 Malotki, retired again to the fortress. 
 
 About five o'clock in the afternoon General Hartman, with ; 
 his detachment of cavalry, approached Prerau. He found a 
 good ford through the Beczwa near Wichowitz, and passed the 
 stream by means of it, leaving his company of fusiliers to 
 
WB 
 
 Chap. II.] TOBITSCHAU. 377 
 
 jsecure the passage. With his horsemen he passed on towards 
 pluhonitz and Roketnitz. As soon as he had crossed the 
 railway he discovered an Austrian battalion on the west of 
 pluhonitz, and other detachments of hostile infantry could be 
 made out partially concealed in the ripe corn. General Hart- 
 man deployed his cavalry. In the first line he placed the 
 Landwehr hussars and the squadron of Uhlans with the battery 
 Dn their left flank, covered by the fourth squadron of Royal 
 hussars. The second and third squadrons of the latter regiment 
 formed his second line. As soon as the battery had shaken 
 the detachments of Austrian infantry, Hartman attacked them. 
 In vain the Austrians attempted to form company squares ; the 
 horsemen were too quick for them, got among them before 
 their formation was complete, and made a large number of 
 prisoners, but however without very severe loss to themselves. 
 
 During this attack a large number of Austrian baggage 
 waggons were hurrying along the road from Roketnitz towards 
 Prerau. Hartman sent his three leading squadrons, under 
 Colonel Glasenapp, against the road to cut off the baggage 
 trains, and sent away his prisoners with an escort to Tobitschau. 
 The drivers of the baggage waggons, perceiving the threatened 
 
 il attack, began to overturn the carts in the ditches alongside 
 the way. In the meantime some Austrian artillery had come 
 into action on the hills north of Roketnitz, which told with 
 ffect on the Prussian troops. At the same time five squadrons 
 of an Austrian cuirass regiment appeared on the left flank of 
 the Prussians, while five squadrons of Austrian hussars also 
 
 : dashed into the field to protect Feldzeugmeister von Benedek, 
 ho with his staff had been mixed up with the escort of the 
 baggage train, and had been personally engaged in the melee 
 with the Prussian cavalry. 
 
 Colonel Glasenapp tried to retire, but the Austrian Haller 
 hussars came down upon him, and he was forced to turn to 
 face them. The attack on both sides could only, on account 
 of the standing corn, be made at a trot. The hand-to-hand 
 combat which ensued endured for some ten minutes. Man 
 pressed against man — horse against horse ; swords and revolvers 
 were freely used, Glasenapp himself went down, and many of 
 his troopers beside him were borne to earth. At last the relics 
 
 
378 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of his squadrons shook themselves free from the rough embrace 
 of their assailants, and managed to gain a retreat. As far as 
 possible in the time they could spare they broke the railway 
 and the telegraph ; and then, recrossing the Beczwa, took up a 
 position on its western bank. The Austrian cavalry did not 
 pursue. Benedek, threatened on his right flank by the approach 
 of the Crown Prince's army, pushed by forced marches towards 
 Vienna, and Rothkirch's brigade, which had been engaged at 
 Tobitschau, retreated by Kohe, and followed him along the 
 Prerau road. When the Austrian general reached Hradschin 
 he heard that the railway at Lundenburg had been cut by 
 Prince Frederick Charles. He then crossed the Carpathians, 
 and by a flank march down the valley of the Waag, gained 
 Pressburg by way of Tyrnau. Here, on the 21st July, he 
 placed the leading divisions of his army in direct communica- 
 tion with that of the Archduke Albrecht, which was round 
 Vienna. 
 
 On the 17th the army of the Crown Prince occupied Prerau, 
 which by that time was entirely deserted by the Austrians 
 This was the result of the action of Tobitschau, which cost the 
 Austrians about five hundred killed and wounded, five hundred 
 prisoners, and seventeen guns ; the Prussians about three 
 hundred killed, wounded, and missing. 
 
 The army of the Crown Prince, after the action of Tobit- 
 schau, left the fifth corps d'arme'e to watch Olmiitz, and moved 
 in two columns upon Briinn, which place it reached on the 
 19th July. 
 
k 1 
 
 gedi 
 
 dschi 
 
 Hi 
 
 URTHER ADVANCE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES FROM BRUNN 
 TO THE DANUBE. 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 While the Crown Prince had moved in the direction of 
 
 : 5 rerau, Prince Frederick Charles had occupied Briinn on the 
 
 2th July. Here the First Army halted on the 15th. 
 
 All the 14th the possibilities and probabilities of an armistice 
 
 |.nd of a subsequent peace were discussed warmly by the 
 
 en officers and soldiers of the Prussian army at Briinn. In every 
 
 estaurant and in every taproom, over bottles of champagne or 
 
 iagons of beer, amid the light blue smoke of cigars and the 
 
 lark clouds of strong tobacco, there was only this one subject 
 
 in if conversation. All kinds of theories were broached ; knots 
 
 f officers discussed it quietly in the hotels and in their quarters, 
 
 jrowds of soldiers in the streets stopped every orderly to 
 
 uestion him as to his knowledge of passing events, or collected 
 
 ound some comrade supposed to have good information, to 
 
 tear him dilate upon the intentions of the Emperor of the 
 
 rench, or the private views of the Kaiser. But those who 
 
 eally knew what was to happen preserved a profound silence, 
 
 nd nothing was authentically known beyond the precincts of 
 
 he headquarter-house, and there only to a very few. 
 
 In the meantime the advanced guard was ordered to march 
 
 rward the next morning as far as Moschau, twenty miles 
 
 m Briinn, on the road to Vienna, and the greater part of the 
 
 roops who were at Briinn that night were at the same time to 
 
 nove in that direction. But the King remained in the 
 
 oravian capital, and the headquarters of Prince Frederick 
 
 arles also halted there another day. The town was still 
 
 onged by a multitude of Prussian soldiers, who wandered 
 
380 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX, 
 
 about idly, looking into the shop windows, or trying to read 
 the notices placarded on the walls in the Moravian dialect. 
 Prussian sentries were mounted on the main guard, and looked 
 out of place by the side of the sentry boxes and door posts^ 
 painted with the black and gold colours of Austria. In front 
 of the Rathhaus, where the King was lodged, a Prussian guard :: 
 and numerous sentries had taken the place of the civil watcfy 
 who usually stand at the gate of the meeting-house of the 
 Town Council. In front, in the Platz, artillery carriages werej 
 closely parked, and were surrounded by the piled arms of a 
 regiment which, billeted in the houses round, had here its place $ 
 for assembly. Thick crowds of the inhabitants, with soldiers 
 sprinkled among them, stood to listen to the music of a; 
 regimental band which, standing between the gate of the! 
 Rathhaus and the guns, was playing Prussian airs. Country 
 women with bright coloured handkerchiefs over their heads.; - 
 and dressed in highly tinted muslins, wandered about the 
 crowd, selling from their baskets gingerbread and sweetmeats 
 to the people and the soldiers equally. The theatre was 
 crowded with uniforms, knots of officers were smoking at ever) 
 hotel door, and the whole town was alive with a lazy activity t 
 except where the closed railway station looked down upon the 
 bare line and its deserted warehouses. There were sentinels • 
 now upon the Spielberg, and Prussian colours floated from it:: 
 flagstaff. Numbers of soldiers were leaning against the parapet:* 
 talking with earnestness, for they were deep in discussion o 
 the probabilities of peace, and questioned every one who cam<i 
 into the fort as to the latest news, half afraid to hear that ai 
 armistice was already concluded, and that they would neve 
 see the capital of Austria. Nor were the privates alone ill 
 pleased with the prospect of so speedy a peace ; the officer 
 wished for the glory of marching into Vienna, and of endmj 
 the campaign by the occupation of the enemy's capital ; higJ 
 and low seemed to think that this would only be the jus- 
 reward of their hard work ; and while the younger ones onl 
 looked forward to the excitement of entering a large town, ani 
 hoped for a little more fighting and higher promotion, thos 
 who had planned and carried out the strategy of the campaig 
 regarded, the visit of M. Benedetti to head-quarters much in th 
 
Ihap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 381 
 
 ame light as that in which a skilful chess-player about to 
 heck-mate his adversary's king would view the intrusion of an 
 >fficious stranger, who suddenly stopped the game by sweeping 
 :; he men off the board and putting them into his pocket. 
 
 The order for the march of the troops on the following 
 2 norning gave rise to hopes that a further advance was actually 
 : iecided upon. 
 
 By the evening of the 14th it was known that the negotia- 
 ions for an armistice had failed. The Prussians sent to the 
 Vustrians the conditions on which they would agree to a 
 ;essation of hostilities, and at the same time stated that no 
 ilteration in the terms would be permitted. One of these 
 : ;onditions was that the Prussian army should occupy the line 
 ; : 5f the Thaya, and consequently have possession of the railway 
 station at Lundenburg. The Austrians sent back a proposal 
 : that an armistice should be granted for three days, and during 
 : this time that the Prussian army should remain in its actual 
 position. As the acceptance of this proposal would have 
 allowed time for the Austrian army at Olmiitz to be withdrawn 
 ; to the neighbourhood of Vienna, and to be placed across the 
 i line of march of the Prussians towards the capital, it seemed 
 clear that the intention of the Austrians was not to conclude 
 ;: peace, but only to gain time for the concentration of their 
 ■ troops. Negotiations were in consequence broken off, and the 
 march southward was ordered to be continued. 
 All was again activity and excitement in the Prussian army ; 
 : the whole of the troops who were at Briinn on the 14th, with 
 the exception of one division, marched out on the morning of 
 the 15th, and pushed forwards towards Thaya. The men, re- 
 freshed by their halt, equipped anew with supplies of the articles 
 which had been worn out or lost during the late marches and 
 actions, went forth in high spirits, for they thought that now 
 they were certain to reach Vienna. They had no doubt of the 
 
 I result of a battle, if one should have to be fought on the way to 
 the Austrian capital, and their fears that peace might be con- 
 cluded had been allayed by the news of the failure of the nego- 
 tiations; for it was known early on the 15 th, that the armistice 
 had not been agreed to, and the intelligence spread quickly 
 from company to company, and from regiment to regiment. 
 
3S2 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. J 
 
 General von Moltke retired to his quarters, and was closeted 1 
 with his maps, making new plans for the further progress of thef 
 campaign, and for the occupation of Vienna. This skilfulj 
 strategist, who had been the chief director of the movements! 
 by which the three Prussian armies, starting from different] 
 points, were collected at the necessary hour on the field ofj 
 Koniggratz, never, except at that battle, appeared in the front] 
 of the armies. Some distance in the rear, sitting calmly at hisl 
 desk, he traced on the map the course of his troops, and, byl 
 means of the field telegraph, flashed his orders to the different] 
 generals in more immediate command, with such skill and fore-] 
 sight that not a movement failed, and every combination wasl 
 made at exactly the right moment. A quick, light-blue eye, aj 
 high forehead, and a well-set figure, mark him an intellectual] 
 and energetic man, but though quick in action he is so prudent! 
 in discourse and so guarded in his speech, that from this quality 
 and his wide knowledge of European languages he is known in - 
 the Pnissian army as the man who is silent in seven tongues. 
 Careful and laborious, he worked out with his own hand, and 
 himself calculated, almost every detail of the operations in 
 which he took Europe by surprise from the lightning rapidity 
 of his strokes and the tremendous consequences of his disposi- 
 tions, before which the Austrian army withered away almost 
 before it was gathered together, and which have won for him 
 from his countrymen the title of the first strategist in Europe. 
 
 But though General von .Moltke in so short a time deservedly 
 obtained such a high reputation in Prussia, the soldiers and ■ 
 officers of the two armies thought almost as highly of the 
 Princes who have carried out so ably the plans which were 
 formed by the Chief of the Royal Staff. Prince Frederick*) 
 Charles, with all the dash and fire of a cavalry officer, can 
 equally well lead his squadrons to pursue the broken enemy, 1 
 and direct with patience his infantry and artillery in an attac 
 against a firm and steady line ; but his qualities as a general do 
 not shine out more in the exciting duties of the battle-field the 
 they do in the more tedious and laborious work which is I 
 necessary for the comfort of his soldiers in quarters or on the 
 line of march. He has a singular power of making his troops I 
 care little for fatigue and hardship ; on the line of march he is 
 
EaTOf 
 
 sew 
 
 Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 383 
 
 always with them, and often, from his knowledge of how to deal 
 with his men, can, by a few happy words, close np the strag- 
 gling ranks of a weary battalion, and send the men forward 
 cheering loudly. In the bivouac, often in person, he inspected 
 
 k the rations and heard the applications of the men for favours or 
 indulgences, and few applied in vain to their Commander-in- 
 ichief. He had both the confidence and love of his troops, who 
 regarded him as a skilful leader and a powerful friend. 
 
 The Crown Prince, by a series of victories in three succes- 
 sive days, established his title to be considered a general. In 
 the Second Army he was looked upon with the same affection 
 and confidence as Prince Frederick Charles is in the First. By 
 the men of Silesia he was particularly beloved ; for he, as a 
 colonel, commanded a regiment at Breslau, and became well 
 
 . known then to the whole province. Careless of trouble, ever 
 anxious for the welfare of his troops, he visited, personally, 
 'llets and hospitals, and took the most kindly interest in every 
 
 .. individual soldier. But in the hour of need he did not spare his 
 troops, for his affection for them sprang from a sense of duty 
 and from no mere desire of popularity. The march from 
 Miletin to Koniggratz, and the attack on the Austrian right in 
 that battle which crushed Marshal Benedek's army and shook 
 the Austrian dynasty, say more for his energy in action than 
 could be written in any words. 
 
 With such leaders and so well led, with a better arm than 
 their enemies, with every mechanical contrivance which modern 
 iscience could suggest adapted to aid the operations of the army, 
 
 . it is little wonder that the stout-hearted and long-enduring 
 "russian soldiers proved victorious on every occasion on which 
 they went into action. 
 
 The head-quarters of the First Army were ordered to move 
 forward on the 16th, to Pawlowitz, a small village twenty-five 
 miles from Briinn. The advanced guard, on the 15th, moved 
 upon Moschau ; the whole of the army, except one division, 
 which stayed another day here to guard the King's head- 
 quarters, marched to the vicinity of Medritz, and the campaign 
 already recommenced with energy. 
 
 M. Benedetti, unsuccessful in his attempt to procure an 
 armistice through the mediation of France, left the Prussian 
 
384 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 head-quarters on the afternoon of the 15th. He was accom- 
 panied by Count Cohered o, an Austrian officer, who had come 
 in with a flag of truce, and a Prussian staff-officer went with him 
 to take him through the outposts, for he went to Vienna. 
 
 The Prussians had now quite got their blood up; in the army it 
 was regarded as an established fact that the conditions proposed 
 by Austria for an armistice were intended only to gain time to! 
 move the army of Feldzeugmeister Benedek from Olmiitz to 
 the south, and their national feelings were wounded by the idea 
 that the Austrians should imagine that they could be so easily 
 duped. On the afternoon of the 15th, the patrols of the cavalry 
 of the Prussian advanced guard pushed forward as far as the 
 railway station of Goding, which lies on the line that leads from r 
 Olmiitz to Lundenburg. When the leading horsemen came in 
 sight of the railway they could distinguish two trains, one close 
 behind the other, with engines puffing and snorting violently, 
 as if drawing a heavy load, steaming slowly in the direction : 
 of Lundenburg. There could be little doubt that in the: 
 trains were portions of the Austrian army from Olmiitz, which 1 
 were on the way to Vienna. To prevent any more troops fromj 1 " 
 being taken south by this line, it was immediately resolved tol 
 break up the line. Some troopers dismounted, a few pickaxes* 
 spades, and axes were found in the neighbouring cottages, anw 
 the men on foot quickly set to work, while the others held* 
 their horses. There was no Austrian cavalry to guard the line* • 
 no infantry picket in the station-house, and the demolition olg- 
 the line by which alone General Benedek could hope to reunite 
 his army to protect the capital of the empire began without an; 
 opposition. Blows fell heavily on the rails and on the sleepers. 
 the rails were wrenched out of their places, thrown upon om 
 side, and in a few minutes the line was useless for railwa) 
 traffic. The work was hardly completed when another trair 
 came in sight, but before it came up to where the rails wen j 
 taken away the engine-driver saw the Prussian cavalry, reversec 
 his engine, and the train drew up short, and after a moment's 
 pause began to back slowly in the direction from which 
 came. 
 
 The great problem now for the Prussian staff was to discovei 
 how much of their northern army the Austrians had been abk 
 
Chap. III. J ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 385 
 
 to move to Vienna, and how many troops were still in the camp 
 before Olmiitz. From the experience of this war many facts 
 have been ascertained relative to the railway transport of troops 
 which were now useful in assisting this calculation. When the 
 Prussians were concentrating their army for the invasion of 
 Saxony they found that it required 100 trains to move a corps 
 d'armee of 30,000 combatants with all its train and baggage, 
 .and that it was rarely possible to despatch more than twelve 
 I trains a day — so that it required nearly ten days for the move- 
 ment of a corps. The Austrians, during the concentration of 
 their army, despatched fifteen trains a day ; but at that time 
 they are supposed to have moved with baggage and train com- 
 plete. On such a pressing occasion as the present, they pro- 
 Ibably might let the troops move with almost no baggage and 
 (little train, and might have managed to despatch twenty trains 
 per day, for they had most of the rolling stock which used to 
 (run upon the line between Vienna and Tiirnau by Josephstadt, 
 land on this calculation 40,000 men could be moved in about 
 px days. This calculation was subsequently found to be 
 correct. 
 
 [ Another fact concerning railway transport dictated by com- 
 jpon sense has been fully confirmed by the experience of the 
 German war. Railways in an enemy's country have been proved 
 .. :o be of no use for the transport of the troops of the invader 
 iuring his advance ; the army acting on the defensive always 
 Dreaks them up, and they cannot be repaired quickly enough 
 :o allow of troops being moved by them. But for the carriage 
 : )f provisions and stores they are invaluable.* The more 
 niickly an advancing army can lay down the rails the more 
 niickly can it move forward, and the more free are its motions, 
 or the line of railway is the great artery which leading from the 
 eart supplies the extremities of the army with means of life and 
 .ction. In laying down the broken lines the band of workmen 
 vho accompany the Prussian army were singularly rapid and 
 uccessful, but quick as they were they were not yet quick 
 •nought, for the army transport was conducted by road for 
 ome days, even after Prague was occupied, and no enemy on 
 
 * This has been amply verified by the late campaign in France. 
 * c c 
 
3S6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 the line stopped the passage of convoys. A broken bridge,, 
 even though the breach was but only a few yards wide, caused 
 a dead stoppage in the locomotion, and the time required to 
 shift stores from a train on one side of the impediment to that 
 on the other was very great. An engineer who would find 
 means of constructing rapidly field bridges which would bear 
 the weight of a railway train, would cause an advance in the 
 art of war. The road transport of the Prussian army was very 
 well organized, but long distances, rapid marches, hilly roads,. 
 and accidents, were too much in some cases for even its powers. 
 With each army corps there were five provision columns, in 
 every column there were thirty-two waggons, each drawn by five j 
 horses, some spare horses being also supplied to the column to 
 replace animals which may fall lame or get galled by the saddle 
 or collar. These five columns were under the control of the 
 Intendantur, and were never used for any other purpose than 
 the supply of food for the soldiers ; the forage for the horses 
 was carried in waggons hired in the country where the war was 
 being carried on, which were also placed under the control of 
 the Commissariat. 
 
 Stores of clothing and arms were carried as much as possible 
 by railway, and were brought to the army from the nearest 
 practicable railway station by trains of waggons, which were 
 also under the control of the Intendant-General ; but each bat- 
 talion carried with it, besides a medicine cart, a waggon for 
 spare ammunition, and an officers' baggage waggon, a waggon 
 which held materials for the repair of clothes and shoes, and 
 which were thus always present with the troops, so that the old 
 proverb that "a stitch in time saves nine" might be, as far as 
 possible, acted upon. 
 
 For the transport of ammunition the commanding officer oJ 
 artillery was entirely responsible; and it was conducted by 
 means of trains of waggons, which were under his sole control. 
 There were nine ammunition trains with each corps d'armee. 
 Each train consisted of thirty-three waggons, and was individuallj 
 organized so as to carry ammunition for infantry, cavalry 
 4-pounder, 6-pounder, and 12-pounder guns. 
 
 A long, hot march, over a road covered deep with dust 
 which rose in thick stifling clouds from under the horses' feet 
 
3hap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 3S7 
 
 md deposited gritty particles in every pore of the skin, brought 
 :he head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles to Pawlowitz, 
 -vhich is about six miles south-west of the town of Auspitz, and 
 ibout twelve north-east of the railway junction at Lundenburg. 
 This day the army entered a country where the low, rounded 
 hills were covered with vineyards, and from which, as a con se- 
 ntence, trees had almost disappeared. Down by the courses 
 )f the streams there were a few pollard willows dotted along 
 he narrow belts of sward which fringed the banks, and some 
 
 -• 
 
 
 lumps of fir-trees could be made out, stuck like black patches 
 
 .gainst the blue sides of the Pollauer-Gebirge, which stands up 
 ligh above the surrounding country ; but everywhere else 
 tothing could be seen except, on the lower ground nearer 
 
 • he water-courses, long stretches of unbroken corn-land, backed 
 m either side by the undulating mounds rather than hills on 
 vhich the vines twined round their poles, planted in straight 
 nes with a monotonous regularity. The aspect of the little 
 wn showed its proximity to the Hungarian frontier. The 
 len, dressed in white trousers gathered tight in below the 
 nees, and contained by a long black boot, with their black 
 ickets trimmed with a bright edging and braided almost like a 
 
 ... ussar's pelisse, and with their low broad-brimmed black hat, 
 3und which a red riband was bound with the ends hanging 
 own, looked rather like stage peasants, and had little resem- 
 lance to the heavy bloused vine-dressers that are seen on the 
 i anks of the Rhine. The women, with their short bright- 
 oloured skirts, white bodices, and handkerchiefs for the head, 
 pt up the theatrical appearance of the population. The 
 ouses were low and small, and not nearly so large as the 
 .able which, without exception, was an adjunct to every 
 
 tthe 
 
 On the night of the 16th the First Army had its advanced 
 jard at Lundenburg, and the Duke of Mecklenburg, who 
 nnmanded it, threw some detachments across the Thaya by 
 eans of a pontoon bridge, for the Austrians had destroyed all 
 ie bridges which led across the river. General Manstein also 
 .rew a pontoon bridge near Wisternitz, and led the sixth divi- 
 on across at that point, and two other divisions crossed the 
 ream a little higher up. The cavalry was at Feldsburg ; and 
 
:.. 
 
 388 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 the eighth division was atGoding, on the line to Olmiitz. The 
 rest of the army was round Pawlowitz. 
 
 On the 15th July, the same day that Prince Frederick 
 Charles pushed forward his troops from Brimn and with his 
 advanced guard cut the railway from Olmiitz to Vienna, near 
 Lundenburg, and that the Crown Prince's cavalry after the 
 action o c Tobitschau cut the same railway near Prerau, Heft 
 warth, with the Army of the Elbe, occupied Znaym, and secured 
 there the passage of the Thaya, the boundary between Moravia 
 and the Crown lands of Austria. 
 
 On the 1 6th, Herwarth was to have pushed his left wing 
 down the Thaya, to assist in cutting the railway. As its ad-j 
 vanced guard approached the road from Nikolsburg to Vienna.! 
 it received intelligence that Prince Frederick Charles had: 
 already secured the railway, and that Man stein's division oa 
 his army was moving along that road. Herwarth, on th(' 
 receipt of this intelligence, drew his left back to the ZnayrrS 
 road, and pursued his way along it towards the Danube. Aj 
 Jetzelsdorf the advanced guard of Herwarth's centre, whiclj 
 had been pushed along this road, fell in with the Austria^ 
 cavalry of Wallis's brigade. A slight skirmish took place: 
 between Wallis's horsemen and the first Prussian light cavalrj 
 division, after which Wallis drew his troops off, and the Prus] 
 sians occupied Hollabrun, thirty miles south of Vienna. EtzeF, 
 division was at the same time directed in a south-wester! 
 direction on Krems, where the Austrians, on its approach 
 blew up the bridge over the Danube. On the 20th July, Hei 
 warth's outposts were pushed forward to Stockerau, withii 
 fifteen miles of Vienna. From the hills near Weikersdorf, th 
 advanced guard first saw the Imperial city, which could be di 
 tinguished easily from afar off by the tall spire of the Cathedra 
 of St. Stephen, and the tower of the Castle of Schonbrunr 
 glittering in the sloping rays of the evening sun. In th 
 foreground, on the Marchfeld, lay the famous villages ( 
 Wagram, Aspern, and Eszling, in the midst of rich corn-Ian 
 and fields of bright poppies, which from the distance looke 
 like pieces of dazzling mosaic let into a golden pavemen 
 fringed by the silver band of the Danube studded with emeral 
 islets. Near the stream were the swelling undulations of th 
 
 C 
 
 
:hap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 389 
 
 3isamberg, and beyond the river were seen the purple high- 
 ands of Austria, with the heavy masses of the Wiener Wald, 
 vhile the dark blue Carpathians bounded the prospect towards 
 Hungary. Such a view was a fitting reward for Koniggratz. No 
 Russian army, not even that of the Great Frederick, had ever 
 azed upon the same. 
 
 Late on the night of the 16th, it was ascertained that the 
 Austrians had sent forty trains from Olmiitz to the neighbour- 
 ood of Vienna before the railroad between those towns was 
 iroken up by the Prussian cavalry on the 15 th. The last six 
 rains were known to have been filled with Saxon troops. It 
 'as tolerably certain that all the trains contained infantry only, 
 nd that the proper complement of cavalry and artillery to 
 ccompany these foot soldiers had in all probability marched 
 
 road. This being the case, every train was estimated to 
 ave carried 1,000 men, so that the Austrian army round 
 ienna had been reinforced by 34,000 Austrian and 6,000 
 axon infantry, and very likely also by some cavalry and 
 rtillery. 
 
 Under these circumstances the head-quarters of the First 
 Lrmy were on the morning of the 17 th moved forward to the 
 nportant railway junction of Lundenburg; the cavalry was 
 stained for the morning at Feldsberg ; the Army of the Elbe 
 nd some portions of the First Army were on the right flank, 
 nd the advanced guard was pushed forward a short distance 
 1 the road to Vienna. But at the same time the eighth 
 vision, which had been detached to the left bank of the 
 larch, marched by way of Coding, and occupied Holitsch. 
 rom that point this detachment was held able either to 
 ombine with the rest of the army in a movement upon 
 ienna, or to be pushed forward further into Hungary as an 
 dvanced portion of the First Army ; for the previous night in- 
 wmation was received by Prince Frederick Charles which 
 lowed that the Austrians had been moving troops from the 
 Duntry round Vienna towards Pesth, and it was possible that 
 ie regiments taken from Olmiitz might have been also sent 
 lto Hungary by Preszburg, in order there to concentrate an 
 rmy for future operations. If the Austrians had concen- 
 
 ated in Hungary, it is probable that Prince Frederick Charles 
 
ko 
 
 390 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 would have been sent across the Carpathians to act against 
 them there. 
 
 The 17th was a fearfully hot, burning summer day, not a bit 
 of shade was to be found on the road by which the army 
 marched, except where sometimes the way ran close by the 
 side of the Thaya, and a few pollard willows which fringed 
 the edges afforded a Moment's relief from the scorching rays of 
 the sun, but not from the dust which rose in a thick, heavy 
 cloud from the soft deep powder on the road ever}- time a man 
 stepped on it, or a horse, restive from the attacks of innu- 
 merable flies, stamped savagely upon the ground. The bright, 
 thick groves of poplars, intermingled with oak, springing from 
 beautifully soft and velvety turf which fringed the further bank 
 of the river, tantalized the troops by their proximity. 
 
 At Lundenburg the midday sun was pouring down on the 
 wide, unpaved, dusty streets, and glaring while houses. Von 
 Tiimpling's division lay here that day, and the soldiers wandered 
 about slowly, seeking for anything to drink, or for shade from 
 the rays of the sun. Every house was a billet, and the atmos- 
 phere of the close, small rooms was stifling, while the sun 
 poured hotly in through the small windows, and made the 
 insides of the houses almost as hot and more disagreeable than 
 the open. Several of the houses had no roofs, the thatch bore 
 signs of having been recently torn off, and was thrown away to 
 some distance ; the bare timbers stood out against the cloud 
 less sky, and some rough, rugged openings made in the walls, 
 which looked as if an unskilful mason had been trying t 
 break down the walls, were in reality loop-holes ; for in thi 
 evening of the 15th the Austrians held Lundenburg, and meani 
 to fight to keep it. 
 
 Here that day were collected Mondel's infantry brigade 
 consisting of the 12th battalion of Jagers, the 10th regiment 
 foot (Mazuchelli's), and the 24th regiment of foot (Duke 
 Parma's), with some artillery and some of the cavalry 
 General Edelsheim's division. They had orders to hold th 
 town to the last extremity, and they began to make some 0". 
 the houses into temporary fortresses. The inhabitants, afraic 
 of coming involuntarily under fire, mostly fled, and left thei 
 town, expecting never to return and see its houses standing 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 391 
 
 but before the preparations for defence were concluded the 
 Prussian cavalry had broken up the line at Goding, and the 
 railway junction of Lundenburg had lost its military value. 
 [Before, however, the Austrians evacuated the town, Lieutenant 
 von Radowitz, who had been sent by Prince Frederick Charles 
 to take M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador, as far as the 
 Austrian outposts, arrived with the Minister at Lundenburg. 
 The Austrians would not allow the Prussian officer to return 
 at once to his head -quarters, for fear that he might carry back 
 with him intelligence that the place was being given up, but 
 thought it necessary that he should follow the Ambassador to 
 Weibendorf ; so he was put into the railway and taken to that 
 station. As soon as he arrived there he got leave to return, 
 but, only able to come by road and in a country waggon, he 
 iid not reach Pawlowitz, the head-quarters of Prince Frederick 
 Charles, till the evening of the 16th. So far the Austrians 
 were successful, for they managed to detain the staff-officer ; 
 but long before his arrival at Pawlowitz, Prince Frederick 
 Charles knew of the evacuation of Lundenburg ; and the staff- 
 Dfficer, by being taken south among the Austrian troops, saw a 
 *reat deal which could never have been known at the Prussian 
 lead-quarters, had he not been forced to make his involuntary 
 railway journey in the direction of Vienna. 
 
 General von Manstein had occupied Nikolsburg with his 
 livision, after crossing the muddy Thaya by a pontoon bridge, 
 vhich he had to throw across the stream to replace one that 
 lad been destroyed by the retreating [Austrians. It was 
 inticipated that the boggy banks and unsound sides of the 
 iver would cause a good deal of difficulty in throwing the 
 I bridge ; but if there were difficulties Manstein overcame them, 
 |md said nothing about them. But this is no proof that his 
 passage, although unopposed by the enemy, was an easy one, 
 is he was renowned in the army for a quiet determination 
 pombined with a high daring, and gave many proofs of both as 
 j.vell in the war with Denmark as in the Bohemian campaign. 
 . A short halt in the hot, bare town of Lundenburg, and then 
 :he inarch was continued to Feldsberg, through the beautifully 
 vooded park of the Prince of Lichtenstein. The cavalry corps 
 noved forward in the evening, and there were no troops in 
 
392 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 
 | 
 
 Feldsberg-on the evening of the 17th, except the head-quarter 
 staff, for whom the Prince's large castle afforded plenty of 
 accommodation, and a few battalions who were billeted in the 
 town for the night. The little town nestles round the foot of 
 the castle in a dip in the ground, beyond it to the south rises a 
 gentle rounded elevation, and beyond that lay nothing but flat 
 plains as far as the Danube. 
 
 Nothing, on the evening of the 17th, was known of the 
 direction of the morrow's inarch ; at nine o'clock at night, no 
 orders had yet come from the King, and it was all uncertain 
 whether the First Army was to move on Florisdorf or Hungary. 
 There was a general impression that there would be fighting 
 in a few days. The troops looked forward to the possibility of 
 meeting the enemy with the most perfect confidence of success, 
 and they had every reason to do so on account of both their 
 generals and their arms. It cannot, however, be denied that : 
 the army had a most difficult, and perhaps even dangerous, 
 operation before it if it meant to go to Vienna, had the 
 Austrian s held fast by Florisdorf and the Bisamberg. The 
 passage of a river is always a dangerous undertaking, and as 
 the Austrian army from Italy was in Vienna, and garrisoned 
 the intrenchments in front of the Danube, while a strong force 
 of troops brought from Hungary, whither Benedek was also 
 hurrying, was at Preszburg, the Prussian generals had a piece of 
 work before them difficult of execution. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th the sun shone bright and warm 
 on the Schloss and town of Feldsberg. The day seemed 
 likely to be as hot as the previous, and consequently the march 
 was ordered for the evening. But about two o'clock a sudden ' 
 change occurred in the weather. The sky became in a few 
 moments covered with clouds, and an extraordinary darkness 
 set in. Up to windward a thick, dense black cloud could be 
 seen bearing dowm steadily towards the castle ; but not on the 
 sky alone, for like a great volume of heavy smoke it seemed 
 rising from the earth, and filled the air for miles. Nearer and 
 nearer it came. When it got within a quarter of a mile a 
 sudden tempest of wind, which seemed bearing this cloud be- 
 hind it, burst upon the place. The trees swayed about, rocked 
 by the strong continuous gust, branches were torn off, sheaves 
 
 L . 
 
 Pi- 
 
:hap III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 393 
 
 )f corn were torn up, and taken through the air, the Indian corn 
 ind standing crops in the fields were swept down almost level 
 vith the ground, and the heavy cloud of dust, which looked in 
 he distance like smoke, was driven about by the wind and 
 vhirled up and down in a most fantastic manner. For a few 
 ninutes only this tornado lasted, and then was followed by a 
 :remendous downpour of rain, which fell for about half an 
 jiour ; but so dry and parched was the ground that though the 
 rater came down in torrents it was sucked in in a moment, 
 nd when the rain ceased not a puddle stood upon the surface 
 f the thirsty earth. 
 
 But the rain laid the dust, and the march was more agreeable 
 :han it had been for some days past. The way lay down 
 he valley of the March, which divides the Crown lands of 
 \ustria from Hungary. Flat wide-stretching plains lay on the 
 right, in parts covered with standing barley or Indian corn ; in 
 )arts black and bleak where the soil had already been turned 
 lp and prepared to take the seed for the second crop ; and 
 ppere and there, where the corn had been cut, the sheaves, 
 Which had been carried hither and thither by the afternoon's 
 itempest, were strewn about in confusion. On the left the 
 Isluggish March twisted about in many channels through 
 pumerous marshy islets, on which short willows grew densely 
 springing up from sedgy ground, which is covered with beds of 
 'tall bulrushes or tangled water plants. Further on the left the 
 [blue ridge of the Carpathians stood out against the sombre 
 jsky, lighted up here and there by some rays from the watery 
 isun, which, sinking rapidly, had before going down lighted up 
 in the west one small portion of the cloudy sky. 
 
 The road lay close along the railway, upon which the officials 
 ;of the field telegraph division, the principal instrument of the 
 i success of the campaign, were riding, carefully inspecting the 
 wires. Every post was looked at, every joint inspected with a 
 1 careful scrutiny ; but as long as the diligent inspectors could be 
 'seen, no break was found which called for the assistance of 
 their workmen, who followed alongside with their waggons 
 ; filled with tools and materials to repair a flaw, and that night 
 J telegraphic communication was open between Prince Frederick 
 Charles at Hohenau and the King at Nikolsburg. And it was 
 
n 
 
 n 
 
 394 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 required, for the approach to the Danube required new combi- 
 nations, and again the whole forces of the field were about to 
 be removed in unison by orders flashed from the head-quarters 
 of the King. 
 
 When the staff reached Radensburg, a little village about 
 two miles from Hohenau, a Vienna droschky was seen draw: 
 up on one side of the road, with two gentlemen in plain 
 clothes and wideawake hats standing beside it, chatting quietly! 
 with a group of Prussian officers who had their billets in a road- 
 side public-house. A little flag beside the coachmen showed 
 that the travellers who had come by the carriage were engaged 
 in some neutral duty, and a footman dressed in livery, with a 
 broad lace band round his cap, who stood with the handle of 
 the carnage door in his hand, showed by his dress that he was 
 the servant of some high official. A nearer approach showed 
 that the travellers were M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador 
 at Berlin, and his secretary, who had gone to Vienna after thS 
 unsuccessful attempts to procure an armistice at Briinn, and 
 were now on their way back to the King's head-quarters, which 
 had been established on the 17th at Nikolsburg, in the old 
 castle of Prince Dietrichstein. The King of Prussia during 
 his stay here slept in the same room which Napoleon had 
 occupied in 1805 after the battle of Austerlitz, and before his 
 entry into Vienna on the 9th December. 
 
 Prince Frederick Charles dismounted from his horse, and in 
 the middle of the road held a long conversation with the 
 Ambassador. Perhaps they were discussing on that rainy 
 evening, in the middle of the country road, questions which 
 might affect the destinies of Europe — perhaps they were only 
 having a friendly chat. Numbers of suppositions were broached 
 by the officers of the staff, but no one except the two who 
 engaged in that conversation know what passed, for all others 
 drew out of ear-shot as soon as the Ambassador approached 
 the Prince. 
 
 The officers of the staff were not so delighted to see the 
 bearer of news which might possibly lead to an armistice as 
 they would have been to receive him if he had come in a 
 private capacity, for they feared that negotiations might stop 
 the campaign before it found its just conclusion in the occupa- 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 395 
 
 don of Vienna, and with the feelings of true soldiers they had 
 little sympathy with the diplomacy which might arrest the pro- 
 gress of their armies. 
 
 The marches of the 18th were short, for the armies were 
 [drawing together, perhaps for the attack of the Austrian 
 intrenched position at Florisdorf, perhaps to force the passage 
 of the Danube at some other point, and the army had to move 
 slowly in order to give General Herwarth time to close towards 
 it from the right, and to let the Army of Silesia come up into 
 line. On the 19th Prince Frederick Charles's head-quarters 
 were established at Duernkruth ; his advanced guard, with part 
 of the seventh division, that afternoon reached and occupied 
 the railway junction at Ganserndorf, where the lines of Presz- 
 burg and Vienna unite. Another portion of the seventh 
 division occupied the passage of the March at Marchegg. The 
 cavalry corps under the command of Prince Albrecht was 
 round the little town of Anger, about five miles north of 
 Ganserndorf. The light infantry division was across the March, 
 and on the road which leads from Holitsch down the left bank 
 of that river billeted in and about St. Johann and Malarzka, 
 while the rest of the army was clustered round the head-quarters 
 of its Commander-in-chief. 
 
 The Crown Prince in person this day reached Brunn, but his 
 army was pushing rapidly forward, and the Guards had already 
 arrived at Lundenburg ; he had left a force to mask Olmiitz, 
 but the garrison of that place was not watched by this detach- 
 ment alone, for Knobelsdorf's troops from Silesia were being 
 pushed on to aid in preventing the occupants of the great 
 fortress of Moravia from making any demonstration against the 
 Prussian line of communications. 
 
 It was quite evident from the movements of the Prussian 
 troops that some great operation was meditated, and it was but 
 natural to suppose that the present combinations were being 
 made with the design of striking a heavy blow against the 
 capital of the Austrian empire. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry was being collected together into one 
 mass, and when united formed an enormous number of sabres, 
 of which it was expected that some use would be made within 
 the next few days \ for from Ganserndorf to the Danube 
 
3/} SEVEN WEEKS' WAR [Book IX. 
 
 stretches the wide flat plain of the Marchfeld, on which the 
 Austrian cavalry might have a fair field for action, and where 
 it might strive to regain the world-wide reputation which was so 
 rudely shaken by the charges of the Prussian squadrons in the 
 earlier parts of the war. The Austrians had, in retreating, 
 destroyed the bridges across the March, in order to prevent 
 communication between the Prussian columns which might 
 advance on either bank of the stream. That of Anger had 
 been burnt, and a few charred piles peeping above the water 
 were all that showed where the bridge stood ; but the Prussian 
 engineers had already replaced it by another bridge, made out 
 of such materials as came readily to hand, and had thrown 
 another, supported upon trestles, at Duernkruth, so that by 
 these means infantry and artillery could cross from one side of 
 the river to the other, and many fords had been found of which 
 the cavalry could make use. 
 
 On the morning of the 1 9th, Count Hasler, an officer of the 
 staff, rode forward beyond the outposts on the northern bank 
 of the Danube to destroy the telegraph which communicates 
 between Vienna and Preszburg, At Ganserndorf he found two 
 cuirassiers, who formed his working party, and picked up a 
 hatchet near a roadside house, which formed the whole of the 
 tools required. When the point at which the wires were to be 
 broken was reached, the chief difficulty of the undertaking was 
 found, for the lines ran along the tops of a succession of bare 
 slippery poles, up which it was very difficult to climb. Several 
 attempts were made to ascend up the pole, but just as the piece 
 of bent iron which supported the porcelain knob round which 
 the lowest wire was turned for a support was reached, arms and 
 legs gave way and the man came sliding down the dry polished 
 wood. At last one of the cuirassiers, making use of his 
 comrade's shoulders as a starting point, began on better terms 
 than before, and got his hand upon the bent iron ; then to haul 
 himself up to the top was comparatively easy,- and as he had 
 got the hatchet between his teeth he began to deliver some 
 smart, quick blows upon the uppermost wire. A few strokes 
 severed it, and the two portions of the broken line, parting 
 from each other, came surging down to the ground. The same 
 process was repeated with the others, and in a few minutes, all 
 
IChap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 397 
 
 ■the wires being broken, the man threw his hatchet to the 
 ■ ground, saying, " There, they won't be able now to telegraph 
 from Vienna to Preszburg," and came sliding down the post. 
 There was no need to break up the railway, for the Austrians 
 •had already blown up the bridge over the March ; and if they 
 had not, the Prussian advanced guard had arrived at Gansern- 
 dorf, and their outposts were pushed in advance of the railway 
 junction. 
 
 Rumours of peace were flying about the camp all the 1 9th ; 
 •jsome people asserted that a three days' armistice had been 
 agreed upon, and that this was the reason that the marches 
 I were so short, but that M. Benedetti had terms to propose 
 ifrom the Kaiser. Nothing certain with regard to a cessation 
 ■of hostilities was yet decided upon, and the shortness of the 
 i marches can be accounted for by the necessity of allowing 
 'time for the Army of the Elbe to make its lateral movement, 
 *and for that of the Crown Prince to come up close to the First 
 (Army. 
 
 In the army, at this time, no one except those in high 
 command had any idea of whither the next advance would 
 lead : some supposed that the whole Prussian force was to be 
 dashed against the parapets and heavily-armed embrasures of 
 Florisdorf; others that a sudden raid was to be made by a 
 large force into Hungary to beat up the quarters of the Kaiser 
 at Pesth, whither the Imperial family had retired from Vienna. 
 But all feared the results of M. Benedetti's mission, and were 
 much afraid that diplomacy would stand in the way of an entry 
 into the capital of Austria, and would deprive the army of what 
 they considered would be only a just and fitting termination to 
 their rapid but glorious campaign. 
 
 A welcome capture had been made by the Commissariat of 
 the First Army by the occupation of Goding, the place near 
 which the cavalry of the advanced guard broke up the railway 
 between Olmiitz and Lundenburg on the 15th. Immense 
 magazines of Austrian stores had been found there, and among 
 other valuable commodities about 50,000/. worth of cigars, 
 intended for issue to the Austrian troops, which were confiscated 
 for the use of the Prussians, and, in consequence, the soldiers 
 received liberal supplies. They were most grateful, for in the 
 
59S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX, 
 
 
 German armies tobacco is considered almost necessary to 
 existence, and in importance as a ration ranks only second to 
 bread or meat. 
 
 Head-quarters were established on the 19th at Duernkruth, 
 in a small white Schloss, which afforded the most limited 
 accommodation even for the small number of officers who 
 comprised the head-quarter staff. Few, very few, indeed, had 
 beds ; colonels and subalterns lay side by side on mattresses 
 or trusses of straw upon the floor; a few specially favoured 
 had sofas. Among these was Count Stolberg, the President of 
 the Prussian House of Lords, who was with the army as a 
 Knight of St. John of Jerusalem. But all were very cheerful 
 and happy, and would have been perfectly well pleased with 
 everything, except that the younger officers expressed loud 
 wishes that M. Benedetti was anywhere except in the King's I 
 head-quarters, for they feared that his presence meant peace, 
 and they wanted more fighting, more promotion, and more 
 glory, and were extremely anxious to march into Vienna. 
 And, although their elders did not express their opinions, it 
 was tolerably evident that in their eyes also the prospect of an 
 immediate peace was looked upon as anything but a blessing. \ 
 On the further side of the March, which lay about half a mile j 
 from the head- quarter Schloss, wide pasture lands, dotted with 
 clumps of willow-trees, stretched over a flat plain, which was 
 raised but a few feet above the level of the water in the river 
 towards the Carpathian Mountains, that rise about fifteen miles 
 to the east. This plain was covered with droves of horses, 
 pigs, and large white cattle, with broad outstretched horns 
 about as large as those of buffaloes. These droves were tended 
 by boys, clad some in proper Hungarian costume, but more 
 frequently in a white flannel cloak, which, hanging from their 
 shoulders down to their ankles, formed their only covering. 
 But, wild though the country might be, the Prussian generals 
 viewed it with favour, for it was generally clear and open, and 
 would be a fair field for their needle-guns and rifle artillery. 
 Over this plain, on the left bank of the March, the eighth 
 Prussian division scoured the whole country between the stream 
 and the mountains. 
 
 But it did not seem probable that these weapons would be 
 
 
 *:-: 
 
 
Hap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 399 
 
 squired till tile Prussians advanced on Vienna. No Austrians 
 r ere reported in front of the outposts, and it appeared that the 
 Lrchduke Albrecht intended to wait in his works at Florisdorf 
 ntil the Prussians either attacked him there, or attempted the 
 assage of the Danube at some other point In the meantime, 
 'hile the needle-gun was not in active use, its merits formed an 
 ndless topic of conversation in the army. Of course, its success 
 .ad made it a great favourite, and the Prussians, both men and 
 officers, considered the victories which were won at Gitschin 
 nd Podoll by its means to have established its claim to be re- 
 ;arded as the best weapon in existence. It has certainly been 
 nost satisfactorily proved that the zundnadel-getuehr is better 
 han the Austrian muzzle-loader, but we had a pretty good idea 
 >efore this war took place that any breech-loader would be a 
 >etter arm for infantry than any muzzle-loader ; and though the 
 jreat slaughter of the Austrians in the actions of this campaign 
 >rought the fact more forcibly before our notice, nothing has 
 >een elicited in the late war to prove that the needle-gun is 
 letter or even equal to many breech-loading rifles that have 
 leen invented more lately. The success of the needle-gun has 
 established the superiority of the breech-loading over the 
 nuzzle-loading principle ; but there are many breech-loaders 
 setter adapted for all the purposes of warfare than the needle- 
 Bh, and any nation which may arm its troops with a servile 
 mitation of the Prussian arm may probably find that the next 
 European war will show the trouble to have been in vain, and 
 ;he expenses of the armament thrown away.* 
 
 Many attempts were made on the afternoon of the 19th to 
 >ee the Stephanenthurm of Vienna, but the tower could not be 
 seen ; for, although the country is in general flat, many swelling 
 indications of ground lay between Duernkruth and the capital, 
 vhich impeded the view. Even from the railway embankment 
 it Ganserndorf it could not be made out, for a rising ground 
 covered with corn lay directly between the village and the city, 
 and a man standing on the embankment was not raised high 
 enough to see over the swell. Nor could a glimpse be caught 
 
 k In 1870-71 the chassepot was universally acknowledged to be a better 
 weapon than the needle-gun. 
 
4 oo SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of the position of Florisdorf, or even of the Bisamberg, whichi jfr 
 was also reported to be intrenched, and defended by heavy -. 
 artillery. The Prussian advance had been so rapid that it was t 
 almost impossible to realise that the army was within thirty -. 
 miles of the Austrian capital, and the troops of the First Army ; 
 would have been glad of some visible proof which would assurej $. 
 them of its proximity ; but as yet they could have none, and 
 many thought that perhaps the first palpable proof of their 
 near approach to Vienna might be the reports of the Austrian < 
 guns, which were to dispute the passage of the Danube. 
 
 On the evening of the 21st July the Cabinet of Vienna - 
 
 expressed itself willing to enter upon a suspension of hostilities r 
 
 for live days, on the basis of the Prussian proposals, and on 
 
 the evening of the 22nd an armistice for that time was agreed f. 
 
 upon at Xikolsburg. It came into effect at noon on the 22nd, : 
 
 and was to expire at mid-day on the following Friday, the 
 
 27th. But an action was fought on the morning of the 22nd,| 
 
 by the seventh and eighth divisions, who moved at daybre 
 
 that day on Preszburg, by the left bank of the March. Tht 
 
 eighth division had moved down the left bank of that riveijs 
 
 from Goding by way of St. Johann and Malaczka in Hungary,!. 
 
 and on the 21st had neared Stampfen. On the 21st the seventh \\ 
 
 division crossed the March, at Marchegg, under General Fran-] 
 
 zecky, who was placed in command of all the troops on the 
 
 left bank of the stream. Prince Frederick Charles knew tha 
 
 on the 22nd General Benedek would throw his leading divisions) 
 
 over the Danube at Preszburg. If then he could seize that 
 
 place, the remainder of the Feldzeugmeister's troops wouk 
 
 have to make a detour by Komorn before arriving at Vienna. 
 
 The Commander-in-chief of the First Army, not being aware 
 
 that any decision had been arrived at relative to the suspension' 
 
 of hostilities, on hearing on the night of the 21st that the 
 
 Austrians were in position to bar the way near the village oJ. 
 
 Bystenitz, was forced to order General Franzecky to attack 
 
 them, and so a combat was commenced. 
 
 On the evening of the 21st the seventh and eighth divisions.' 
 under the orders of General Franzecky, were bivouacked on 
 the road which leads down the left side of the March from 
 Goding to Preszburg, and occupied a position on that roadji 
 
 ith 
 
 lat 
 ns 
 at 
 Id 
 
 a. 
 
 
hap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 401 
 
 :etween the villages of Stampfen and Bystenitz, with their 
 [Ivanced guard pushed forward a little in front of the latter 
 fllage. The Quartermaster-General of the First Army, General 
 felpnagel, attended by Count Hasler, of the general staff, had 
 tat afternoon been making a reconnaissance of the Austrian 
 bsitions on the north of the Danube, and arrived in the 
 Veiling at the bivouacs of Franzecky's divisions. It was soon 
 i>und that the Austrians held the village of Blumenau, which 
 Ss on the same road, about five miles nearer Preszburg, in 
 rong force ; and as it was extremely desirable to secure the 
 jiwn of Preszburg as quickly as possible, Count Hasler was 
 fispatched to Ebenthal to request Prince Frederick Charles's 
 Amission for an attack to be made on Blumenau. The 
 laff-omcer reached head-quarters towards midnight. At this 
 me Prince Frederick Charles was ignorant that an armistice 
 jould be agreed to, and he sent back the desired permission. 
 ;' little after midnight Count Hasler left the head-quarters of 
 le First Army at Ebenthal, and started on his return journey, 
 iirrying this important order, on which so much might depend. 
 Ihirty miles of bad road lay between Ebenthal and Bystenitz ; 
 Le night was very dark, there was no moon, and clouds shut 
 {it even the dim light which the stars might have afforded ; 
 jit the staff-officer pushed his horse resolutely over the March 
 jy the repaired bridge at Anger, along twisting country lanes, 
 list wide ditches and morasses, reached Bystenitz safely at the 
 frst streaks of dawn, and communicated the Prince's message 
 f> General Franzecky. Franzecky at once made his disposi- 
 jons for attack. At the same time Prince Frederick Charles 
 j:nt orders to General Hann to support Franzecky with his 
 ^vision of cavalry. 
 
 The road from Bystenitz to Blumenau, which is a distance 
 | r about five English miles, runs close below the extreme 
 esterly spurs of the Lower Carpathians, which rise high on 
 le left of a traveller journeying from the former to the latter 
 ace. The ground on the right until the road strikes the 
 ;.ilway from Ganserndorf to Preszburg is flat and level. The 
 ountains on the left are broken by steep and rough ravines, 
 3wn which run little rivulets, making their way with perpetual 
 iscades towards the March or the Danube; between the 
 
 D D 
 
402 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 courses of these rivulets the spurs of the mountains swell out 
 in bluff undulations into the plain through which runs the 5 
 river March. The ground on the mountain sides is every- 
 where rough and broken, large stones are scattered over it, and^ 
 in many places jagged lumps of rock start out of the soil and) 
 form natural fortresses to oppose the passage of troops up the 1 
 hills. A dense forest of oak and pine trees, which, from being ; 
 untended, have grown close together, and intertwined theii- 
 branches so as to form a network of dark-green foliage, through 1 
 which a man can hardly penetrate, grows upon the sides of tb 
 ravines and the less steep spurs of the mountains, and runs up 
 the sides of the hills all the way from Bystenitz to Preszbu: 
 The roads through the wood are few and at long distano 
 apart ; none are practicable for any troops except foot soldi 
 and only for these when moving with a very narrow front. 
 Blumenau the road leads to the left, and runs straight 
 Preszburg through a defile in the hills, being crossed near 
 this village by the railway which leads from Ganserndo: 
 to Preszburg, and which, after crossing the road, runs alon 
 the left-hand side of the latter through the same defile. 0: ; 
 the side of the road and railway opposite to Blumenau, an»j 
 about three-quarters of a mile to the right, lies the little village 
 of Kaltenbrun, situated on rough, broken hills called thJ I 
 Theben-Berger, which are thickly clothed with fir woods, an' 
 fill up the whole triangle enclosed between the railway, th! .. 
 March, and the Danube. About three miles from Blumenar 
 nearer Preszburg, the road and railway, side by side, pass ov<*&: 
 a little rivulet which supplies the stream to turn the wheels « 
 two watermills — one situated upon each side of the way; abo^t' 
 these mills on the left-hand side rises a portion of hill rath 
 higher than the surrounding spurs and less thickly covert 
 with forest, called the Gamsen-Berg; a footpath which leav 
 the high road at Bystenitz leads up the mountain side to a 
 left of the road, and after a steep and rugged ascent descen 
 equally roughly, and again joins the main road behind tl 
 watermills coming down be§ide the Gamsen-Berg. 
 
 The Austrian position was shrouded by the woods and 1 
 the broken ground, but a reconnaissance, made with consid 
 able difficulty, showed that they were in great force. Th 
 
 
|iap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 403 
 
 tre held the villages of Blumenau and Kaltenbrun and the 
 Dimd between, the left was in the fir woods on the Theben- 
 rger stretching toward the March. Their right extended 
 |>m the village of Blumenau about half a mile up the lower 
 lurs of the Carpathians. The position was strong and formid- 
 lle, the ground was extremely favourable to the defenders, 
 Id gave no open field for the play of the needle-gun ; but 
 ianzecky not only determined to carry the position, but also 
 I d the bold design of cutting off from Preszburg and capturing 
 fe greater part of the defending force and all their artillery, 
 Id in all human probability he would have done so had not 
 fc good fortune of Austria brought the combat to a premature 
 ose. 
 
 j>General Bose was directed to take two regiments, the 21st 
 Id 71st, each of three battalions, making a total force of 
 Ider 5,000 men — for these regiments had had their ranks 
 lamed by the war — by the mountain path leading from Bys- 
 liitz, and gain the rear of the enemy near the Gamsen-Berg, 
 I as to cut off their retreat to Preszburg, while Franzecky him- 
 fslf determined, with the remainder of his troops, to attack the 
 !j»sition in front. About half-past four in the morning Bose's 
 ien began their march, and, disappearing into the wood to the 
 tt, began their ascent of the difficult mountain path. Their 
 *<|iy was long and rugged, so that time had to be allowed them 
 t gain the Gamsen-Berg, and it was not till after six that Fran- 
 icky gave the signal for the advance of the troops on the main 
 xad. 
 
 Then the advance guard began to move briskly forward, and 
 te rest of the little army followed in battle array. Skirmishers 
 Jished forward through the fields on the left, pushing up close 
 \ the wood on the mountain side ; their supports moved in 
 Mall clumps here and there behind them ; a larger body 
 Jirched along the road, and behind them, spread out right 
 id left, came the heavy columns of the infantry and the broad- 
 bnted batteries of guns. On the right of the road a squadron 
 i the 10th hussars glided with the cheery noise of clinking 
 :bres and ringing steel over the meadows and flat stubble 
 1 Id, pushing forwards to feel their way — scouts, who, carbine in 
 • nd, spread, a thin curtain of horsemen, before the main body. 
 
 D d 2 
 

 404 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book I> 
 
 Scarcely had the troops begun to move when the morning si 
 burst brightly from the clouds over the Carpathians, and fe 
 upon the bright swords of the cavalry, the glittering bayone 
 and rifles of the infantry, and even managed to draw a twin 
 ling reflection from the darkly-browned steel of the artille 
 guns. The Prussian soldiers greeted it with joy, for tht 
 frames were chilled with their night's bivouac, and they march 
 in the full confidence that before it set it would have light 
 them to another victory. Slowly and steadily the colum 
 moved ; the men were very silent, for they all felt that st< 
 subdued excitement which always appears to pervade eve 
 breast when a battle is close at hand ; and the sound of t 
 measured tread of the battalions, and the heavy rumble of 
 guns, rose into the air almost unbroken. The advanced gua 
 consisting of the 72nd regiment, approached to within thil 
 thousand paces of the point where the railway, marked byi 
 long line of spectral telegraph posts, could be seen closing in 
 the road from the right, and where the dark green fir-wol 
 behind it showed that there was the Austrian position ; but! 
 signs of the enemy could be seen, except two squadrons If 
 lancers, one considerably in rear of the other, which stol 
 on the level ground to the right of the road in front of the il- 
 way, motionless as statues, with the pennons of their lanfe 
 faintly fluttering in the breeze. Then suddenly the well-kncii 
 cloud of white smoke, which shows where a gun has been fifl, 
 rose from the raised ground between Blumenau and Kali \ 
 brun, and a whizzing whistling shell rushed through the 
 over the heads of the hussars on the right of the road. I 
 Prussian guns came quickly into action, and opened on I 
 spot where the cloud of smoke had risen, and where, in a v 
 moments, repeated flashes of fire and many more clouds f j 
 heavy hanging smoke announced that a strong Austrian bat y 
 had its post. While the artillery fight was going on, the ( 
 green hussars on the right began to move quickly forward, 
 rushed in full career against the foremost squadron of Aust n 
 lancers. These did not stand motionless now. Slowly at 
 and then more quickly, they began to advance against 
 hussars ; and when the two squadrons came within a w 
 hundred yards of each other, both urged their h( is 
 
;hap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 405 
 
 o their utmost speed, and with a mighty clatter dashed 
 og ether. 
 
 The rough embrace lasted but for a moment ; then the 
 ancers scattered and fled, for the hussars were stronger and 
 )etter mounted, and their mere weight smashed the lancers' 
 anks. These pursued a short distance, capturing several pri- 
 on ers ; but they could not follow far, for the other squadron 
 )f lancers looked threatening, and the hussars had no reserves 
 lear at hand. The cavalry combat, though so short, was severe ; 
 nany men were down on both sides, and Major von Hymen, 
 •.ommanding the hussars, had the whole side of his face laid 
 >pen, but refused to quit the field, and commanded his squadron 
 hroughout the day. 
 
 In the meantime the cannonade increased in the centre, more 
 Prussian guns were brought into action, and more Austrian 
 • bieces were firing between Blumenau and Kaltenbrun ; and at 
 bight o'clock, when the action had lasted about an hour, forty 
 Austrian and thirty-six Prussian guns were pounding against 
 ;ach other. Casualties began to increase ; one Prussian bat- 
 tery in particular was rapidly being unhorsed, for the Austrians 
 j.vere making good practice, and their shells were generally 
 J>ursting at the proper moment. 
 
 Half an hour later an officer arrived from Prince Frederick 
 Charles to announce that an armistice was agreed upon, and 
 hat it was to commence at mid-day ; but Franzecky could not 
 "stop the fight, for Bose was with his brigade committed in the 
 fountains, and if the grand front attack ceased he would pro- 
 3ably before noon be captured. But no infantry was sent for- 
 ward, and the combat was confined to artillery fire alone for 
 "Jmore than two hours. 
 
 Then Franzecky, fearing for Bose, determined to attack the 
 i Austrian position with energy, and made his dispositions for a 
 general advance. General Gordon, with four battalions, was 
 prdered to move by a mountain path, which, leaving the road 
 laear where the artillery was at present, runs lower down the 
 lulls than the way taken by Bose, and comes out on the road 
 jagain near Blumenau ; when he felt the Austrian right, he was 
 .Jto attack it with vigour and occupy the village of Blumenau. 
 J At the same time, two battalions were sent against the fir- 
 
406 SEVEN WEEK'S WAR. [Book IX ; 
 
 woods near Kaltenbrun to attack the Austrian left, and, 
 possible, to seize that village, while the main body and th 
 artillery were to move straight against the front. 
 
 The guns were limbered up ; the two battalions bega: 
 moving over the plain towards the wood of Kaltenbrun 
 Gordon was already on the hill-side, and the main bod 
 advanced for about one thousand paces, when the guns, agai 
 unlimbered, came into action, and renewed their fire on tb : i 
 Austrian batteries. About eleven o'clock the two battaliorj 
 came within easy distance of the wood near Kaltenbrun, ar 
 were received by a biting fire from the Austrian sharpshoote 
 among the trees, while to the rear of the guns between Bl 
 menau and Kaltenbrun they could see heavy masses of infan 
 ready to resist the front attack. The Prussian battalio 
 immediately opened out and began to fire against the infant 
 in the wood ; but the trees hid their antagonists, and they d 
 not seem to cause much diminution of the fire from the fore 
 
 In the meantime a message came from Bose to say that 
 had debouched on the Gamsen-Berg, and had there met t 
 celebrated Austrian Schwarz and Gelh brigade. A severe fig 
 took place here ; the Austrians poured volley after volley 
 the head of Bose's column as it attempted to come out of t 
 trees, and so tangled was the jungle that the Prussian mar] 
 men could hardly force through it in order to spread out 
 either side and open fire against the Austrians. But after 
 time they succeeded in penetrating through the thick truri 
 and interwoven branches, and the Prussians debouched at 
 deployed on the Gamsen-Berg. Still the fight went on, II 
 the Austrians were driven back step by step, and at last Bel 
 seized the water-mills and planted his brigade across the rcl 
 and railway to Preszburg, sending a messenger to Genef 
 Franzecky to say that the enemy's retreat was cut off, and til 
 now the front attack might be pressed hard. It was the recel 
 of this message that caused Franzecky to order the genetl 
 advance, but before the combat could be finished the laui| 
 that he would have gained by the capture of the enemy, whh 
 would have certainly been the result of his skilful disposition 
 were snatched from his grasp. 
 
 Time was getting on ; and before the front attack *h 
 
pAP. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 407 
 
 leveloped, the sun, standing high up in the heavens and 
 jlirectly south, showed that mid-day had arrived. In a few 
 ninutes an Austrian officer came out from the Blumenau posi- 
 ion with a flag of truce, and advanced towards the Prussian 
 ines. He was met by a Prussian officer, to whom he reported 
 .hat an armistice had been agreed upon, to date from mid-day, 
 md that it was already past the hour. In a few minutes the 
 signal to cease firing was sounded along the Prussian ranks, 
 md the combat was broken off. The sudden silence was 
 ;urious and abrupt ; there were none of the dropping shots or 
 single occasional reports in which a cannonade generally dies 
 away ; in a moment the roar of the artillery and the patter of 
 small arms ceased, and a curious hum of conversation rose 
 ifrom the astonished soldiers. 
 
 At first the Austrians would not believe that their retreat was 
 cut off, and that they had been in such imminent danger of 
 being captured, for no report had been sent up from the rear, 
 and they still thought that they commanded the road to Presz- 
 burg. But they were soon convinced that they were really 
 surrounded, when, on sending back, it was found that Prussian 
 troops were drawn up across the only line of retreat for their 
 artillery. 
 
 The Austrians lost in the combat between five hundred and 
 six hundred men, of whom one hundred were taken prisoners, 
 and over three hundred were wounded. The Prussian loss 
 was reported only one hundred killed and wounded. 
 
 To speculate on what would have been is generally unprofit- 
 able, especially so in war ; but as the Austrians fully acknow- 
 ledge that they were only saved by a lucky fortune from a 
 terrible disaster, it may not be too much for impartial observers 
 to believe that the action was virtually gained by the Prussians, 
 and that if it had continued all the Austrian artillery must have 
 been taken, and probably the greater part of their infantry 
 captured ; for there is no road except the one occupied by 
 Bose by which the guns could have been withdrawn from Blu- 
 menau ; and though there is a rough country lane by which 
 men on foot could from Kaltenbrun reach the banks of the 
 Danube, it is extremely doubtful if the Prussians would not 
 have been in Preszburg before the Austrian infantry could 
 
408 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX 
 
 have gained that line by this roundabout route, and then theL 
 capture was certain. 
 
 The number of men engaged on each side was about equs 
 The Prussians had two divisions, which together consisted o| 
 twenty-five battalions, in the field, with forty-eight guns, bu 
 twelve of these were always in reserve. The Austrians had thd 
 i st, 2nd, and 4th brigades of their second corps d'arme'e am 
 Mendel's brigade of the tenth corps engaged, and had for 
 guns. 
 
 Had this action been allowed to proceed, and had it beei 
 a victory for the Prussians, it would have been won, not by th<| 
 needle-gun so much as by the brilliant dispositions made bj 
 General Franzecky for turning his enemy's right flank. Thij 
 was confessed by an Austrian officer, who, talking to a Prussic 
 officer after the armistice was declared, said, " Your needle 
 gun may be a terrible weapon, and we know by experience ho^ 
 well it shoots; but it has not been so bad for us as yoi 
 generals, who have a most diabolical power of manoeuvring." 
 Directly the action was over, General Stiilpnagel and Coui 
 Hasler rode into Preszburg to settle with the commandant 
 that place the line of demarcation which should be observe^ 
 by the troops during the armistice. The Prussian troops wei 
 all in front of the line that was agreed upon, and ought, accorc 
 ing to the strict letter of the law, to have withdrawn at once 
 but it was late in the day when the line was fixed. Th 
 Austrian officer consented that for the night the Prussians shoulu 
 remain where they were, and retire to their new ground in tl 
 morning. 
 
 Then occurred a curious scene. The men of Bose's Prussia 
 brigade, who had been planted across the Preszburg road, an 
 a few hours before had been standing ready, rifle in hand, tjj 
 fire upon the retreating Austrian battalions, were surrounde 
 by groups of those very Austrian soldiers whom they had bee' 
 waiting to destroy. The men of the two nations mingle 
 together, exchanged tobacco, drank out of each other's flask;; 
 talked and laughed over the war in groups equally compose 
 of blue and white uniforms, cooked their rations at the samij 
 fires, and that night Austrian and Prussian battalions lay dow!j 
 bivouacked close together, without fear and in perfect security 
 
Chap. III.] ADVANCE TO THE DANUBE. 409 
 
 On the morrow all along the line of the front of the Prussian 
 army the divisions took up the positions they were to occupy 
 during the temporary peace. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 22nd, commissioners from the 
 I Austrian and Prussian armies had a meeting at a small village 
 between Ganserndorf and the Danube, in order to decide upon 
 a line which should, during the armistice, form the boundary 
 between the troops of the two nations. The Prussian commis- 
 sioners were General von Podbielsky, of the King's head- 
 quarter staff, and Major von Capprivi, of the staff of Prince 
 Frederick Charles; their colleagues from the Austrian camp 
 were General von John and some of his assistants in the 
 Austrian head-quarter staff. After some hours of consultation 
 the line of demarcation was decided upon. It started on the 
 Prussian right at Krems, on the Danube ; followed the north 
 bank of the river down as far as Stockerau ; from that town 
 ran up the curve of the Gollsbach rivulet to the neighbourhood 
 of Fellabrun; then, by taking a line to the village of Weinsteig, 
 it struck the Rossbach rivulet close to that village, followed this 
 stream as far as Leopoldsdorf, then ran along the road between 
 that village and Lasse, and was then drawn along an imaginary 
 straight line to the railway bridge over the March, near March- 
 egg. On the left side of the March a straight line from the 
 railway bridge carried it to the village of Bistritz, whence it 
 followed the eastern edge of the Fahren Wald till it struck the 
 main road from Skalitz to Tyrnau. It was further agreed that 
 commanders of detachments and of troops left to mask fort- 
 resses should decide with the commanders of the troops 
 opposite to them upon the lines of demarcation to be observed 
 in the vicinity of their own commands. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry corps, under the command of Prince 
 
 Albrecht, was pushed forward to the line of the Roszbach, and 
 
 had its head- quarters in the neighbourhood of Deutsch Wagram, 
 
 whence the fortifications of Florisdorf could be seen, but their 
 
 , details could not be made out. 
 
 While the action of Blumenau was actually being fought, 
 General Degenfeld and Count Karolyi, the former Austrian 
 Ambassador at Berlin, crossed the space between the outposts 
 on the other side of the March, and went to the King's head- 
 
 
410 SEVEN - WEEKS' WAR. ' [Book IX. 
 
 quarters, empowered by the Austrian Government to conclude 
 a treaty of peace. 
 
 At the time of the suspension of hostilities, the Prussian 
 armies on the Marchfeld and between Vienna and Briinn 
 consisted of the three corps of Prince Frederick Charles, the 
 cavalry corps of Prince Albrecht, three divisions under General 
 Herwarth, and three and a half corps under the Crown Prince. 
 These formed a force of about two hundred and sixty-five 
 thousand combatants. Behind these lay the first reserve corps 
 under General Miilbe at Briinn, half a corps from the Crown 
 Prince's army in front of Olmiitz, and near the same fortress 
 Knobelsdorf's corps, forming together an additional force of 
 about fifty-five thousand men. The corps of Knobelsdorf had 
 occupied the Austrian town of Troppau on the 9th July, and 
 had then been pushed forward to observe Olmiitz and garrison : 
 the line of railway to Briinn. Count Stolberg was left in 
 Silesia with about ten thousand men to watch the Austrian 
 detachments in Gallicia. The division of Landwehr of the 
 Guard was in Prague. Detachments of Landwehr held Saxony 
 and garrisoned the capital and fortresses of Prussia. 
 
 On the western theatre of war, Manteuffel had sixty thousand 
 men in the field. The Grand Duke of Mecklenburg had about 
 twenty-five thousand. Five thousand men held Frankfort and 
 Hanau, and Landwehr garrisoned Nassau, Hesse-Cassel, an 
 Hanover. In all, Prussia had at the lowest computation five 
 hundred and twenty thousand fighting men in the field — a 
 stupendous force to be supplied by a country which with its 
 allies did not possess a population of twenty million inhabitants 
 Besides these, there were depot and garrison troops retained i 
 the provinces, which numbered at least one hundred thousand 
 additional soldiers. 
 
 jr. 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE TRUCE. 
 
 During the armistice of five days, the Prussian troops 
 remained in the Marchfeld. 
 
 On the morning of the 23rd, the troops who had been the 
 previous day engaged in the combat of Blumenau marched 
 back to their positions on their own side of the line of demar- 
 cation which was to be observed by the Prussians during the 
 armistice. Between this line and that up to which the Austrian 
 outposts were pushed forward extended a narrow belt of neutral 
 ground, on which the soldiers of either side were forbidden to 
 tread, and where the labourers were cutting the corn and 
 carrying in the harvest as peaceably and diligently as if there 
 was no enemy in their country, and no Prussian vedettes were 
 posted along the course of the Roszbach. The troops, not 
 ungrateful for a little idleness after their hard work, lay billeted 
 in the villages between Ebenthal and the line of demarcation, 
 knapsacks were unpacked, and their motley contents laid out 
 on the banks by the roadside to be dried and aired in the sun. 
 The artillery ammunition went under a careful inspection; 
 groups of soldier-tailors sitting together under the trees patched 
 up holes made in uniforms either by the wear and tear of the 
 campaign, or by the too near approach of a bullet or the 
 splinter of a shell. Everywhere through the cantonments there 
 was a listless, idle air of careless comfort and rest, such as can 
 only be thoroughly appreciated by those who have been 
 marching and fighting for weeks past under a burning sun or 
 heavy soaking rain ; except where the sentinel paced up and 
 down before some cottage improvised into a guardhouse, where 
 the regimental colours were deposited, or where the vedette 
 
412 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 sat mounted, with pistol in hand, peering as carefully towards 
 Florisdorf and the Danube as if there were no truce agreed 
 upon, and as if he expected every moment to have to give the 
 signal of the approach of the enemy's columns. No one who 
 bore any look of being a spy was allowed to pass either out of 
 the lines or into them, and so suspicious were the sentries that 
 the country people going out to or returning from work had to 
 give satisfactory accounts of themselves before they were 
 allowed to pass. The Austrians were equally careful on their 
 side, so that no communication could take place with Vienna ; 
 and the Stephanenthurm, which looked down on the city where 
 so many would like to go if only for an hour, only tantalized 
 those who could see it from the line of outposts, and drew forth 
 many exclamations of impatience from those who fretted and 
 fumed at being tied down to the flat plain of the Marchfeld, 
 in the very sight of the capital, where many little luxuries which 
 were greatly missed and wanted in the army could so easily 
 have been purchased. 
 
 In the meantime the military authorities were not idle in 
 their preparations for the continuance of the campaign, in case 
 the diplomatists, who were working in mysterious silence at 
 Nikolsburg, should fail to come to terms upon the conditions 
 of peace. The railway was crowded with trains all the way 
 from Gorlitz to Lundenburg, which were bringing up reserves, 
 heavy guns, stores, pontoons, and all the other materials which 
 would be required for the passage of the Danube. The armis- 
 tice had not done the Prussians much harm, even if the war 
 should have broken out afresh, except by stopping the action 
 of Blumenau, for they would probably have had to pause in 
 the middle of active operations to await the arrival of their siege 
 guns and their bridge material, even if there had been no 
 suspension of hostilities ; and the five days which gave rest to 
 the battalions in the front of the army also afforded time to get 
 forward the immense train of boats, pontoons, and planks 
 which the engineers would have required if they had been , 
 called upon to throw bridges across the broad, rapid stream 
 which flows between the Marchfeld and Vienna, although the i 
 Danube is not so difficult to cross as most rivers with an 
 equal amount of water, for it is broken up into many channels, 
 
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 413 
 
 enclosing numerous islands which much aid the construction 
 of a bridge. 
 
 Now in the different billets many stories were related of 
 individual prowess and personal bravery during the campaign. 
 There was not a battalion or a squadron which had not its 
 special hero, about whom some particular anecdote was re- 
 corded ; no two opinions were stated concerning the organiza- 
 tion and equipment of the different branches of the army 
 from those who have had the most practical proofs of the 
 working of them, by being dependent upon them in the real 
 work of war. There were no grumblers ; and though the staff 
 officers, who observed carefully every incident of the cam- 
 paign, with a view to profit by its experience for further im- 
 provement and for further progress, had noted many things 
 which were changed or adopted as soon as peace gave time 
 and opportunity, the regimental officers were well content 
 with everything, and were ready to stand or fall by their con- 
 viction that the Prussian army was the most smoothly-worked 
 piece of machinery in the whole world. It was curious to find 
 from those who had taken part in the cavalry fighting that the 
 epaulette, which has of late been discarded in many armies as 
 a useless incumbrance, had again risen into high favour. 
 None of the Prussian cavalry wore their epaulettes on service 
 except the Uhlans, but some officers of these regiments spoke 
 most highly of the good service the little plates of shoulder 
 armour had done in warding off sword cuts. The cuirass, too, 
 proved more useful in close encounter than most people would 
 have given it credit for, and was in more than one case the 
 instrument of saving a man's life, and yet the Prussian cuiras 
 ses are thin, ill made, and ill fitted in comparison with those 
 of the British Household Cavalry. Still, there was a strong 
 party against this defensive armour, for many in the army held 
 that its use does not repay the extra weight it puts upon the 
 horse, but this party was for the present silenced by the great 
 success which the 5 th regiment of cuirassiers, attached to the 
 Crown Prince's army, had lately been in the combat near 
 Tobitschau, where it took seventeen guns. 
 
 The needle-gun was of course an immense favourite, and the 
 Prussian officers justly held that an army provided with a 
 
414 SEVEX WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 |l 
 
 
 muzzle-loading arm can never hope to stand up to their troops 
 in the shock of open battle; but their conclusion that the 
 needle-gun is the best possible breech-loader was founded on 
 nothing more than the fact that it is superior to a muzzle- 
 loading rifle, and they advanced no good grounds for sup- 
 posing that no breech-loader has been invented since the 
 introduction of the needle-gun into the Prussian service, which 
 can be superior to the arm that did such fearful execution 
 in the Austrian ranks at Podoll, and in the actions before 
 Gitschin. 
 
 The Prussians entered upon the campaign with their horse 
 artillery armed with smooth-bore 12-pounder guns. They 
 had long before the armistice bitterly repented this error, and 
 will take care to remedy it before they are embroiled in another 
 war. The whole of their field artillery is to be armed with 
 steel breech-loading rifled guns constructed on Krupp's system 
 — good ordnance doubtless, but the Prussian guns did not 
 appear in action to make such good practice as the Armstrong 
 guns did in China, when the English gunners were still un- 
 accustomed to them, and as yet looked upon all breech-loading 
 ordnance with considerable suspicion.* 
 
 The Prussians on the 24th commenced massing troops 
 towards the left of their position, with the view of being able 
 to make an immediate dash on Preszburg on the afternoon 
 of the 27th, if peace should not be concluded during the time 
 that the armistice lasted ; but most in camp looked upon this 
 concentration as a needless precaution, for it was considered 
 that peace was perfectly certain. But neither the staff nor the 
 outposts were prevented by this feeling of certainty from using 
 all precautions from being taken unawares; the railway still 
 teemed with trains loaded heavily with troops and stores. 
 
 No news could be obtained of how the negotiations were 
 going on at Nikolsburg, for the diplomatists preserved the 
 correct diplomatic silence, and took care that the profanum 
 vulgus should gain no clue either to the progress or probable 
 result of the discussions held at their mysterious meetings. 
 
 * In 1870-71, a portion of the Prussian field artillery was armed with 
 bronze breech-loading guns, and probably in future all the guns for the 
 field artillery will be made of bronze. 
 
lltAP. IV.] THE TRUCE. 415 
 
 humours, of course, were rife, and all of them prophesied 
 teace; some went so far as to assert that the treaty would 
 Actually be signed on Thursday, the 26th; but how far such 
 Reports were to be trusted could not be established, as popular 
 bpinion was now swayed about in the most extraordinary way. 
 rhe sudden glance of a Minister, or the wearied look of a 
 plenipotentiary, was interpreted according to the inclination of 
 Ihe observer, and had some deep meaning attached to it, pos- 
 jsibly very remote from what it might really signify. 
 
 Nothing was doing at head-quarters, so a party of officers of 
 the staff was made to visit the outposts, partly for the sake of 
 liomething to do, partly in hopes of being able to catch some 
 glimpses of the fortifications round Florisdorf, which are rapidly 
 becoming famous. A ride of fifteen miles over the flat, wide- 
 spreading Marchfeld, carpeted with meadows, clover-fields, and 
 broad belts of stubble, from which most of the corn had been 
 Removed, past dark woods of fir and lighter copses of dark oak, 
 |;ook them to Wagram. More than once some one exclaimed, 
 <;' What a beautiful battle-field for cavalry ! " as they rode for 
 (miles over ground unbroken by fences or brooks, and in which 
 [the only obstacles to the free gallop of horses were a few small 
 iitches, and here and there a tiny bank. 
 
 The village of Wagram, celebrated by the battle won here by 
 j:he first Napoleon, contains a chapel where are collected many 
 pf the arms that were found on the field after that great fight. 
 ■ strange feeling of awe comes upon one when brought face to 
 [jface with these truest monuments of the great conflict waged 
 jlhere by the mighty dead ; and the loud talk and laughter of 
 ■careless soldiers fresh from a field of battle, and reckless of how 
 soon they might march to another, were hushed, not more by 
 the sanctity of the place than by an almost involuntary reve- 
 rence for the visible memorials of the great battle and of the 
 warriors who fell in it. But disappointment has also its place 
 in the mind ; for how clumsy, how old-fashioned, according to 
 :our ideas, look those old flint muskets and heavy swords with 
 which but a few years back the fate of Europe was decided ! 
 Could the question fail ? Shall we to our successors in the next 
 generation appear to have known so little of what science has 
 in such a short time developed, and to have been so ignorant 
 
4i 6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of mechanical appliances, which, when once unfolded, appeal 
 so simple and so palpable? And another thought came intc t 
 every mind, which struck home to the heart ; for it told that in £ 
 a few short years those who had fought at Koniggratz and sur-' :: 
 vived the long summer day's slaughter on the Sadowa mT - : 
 would individually be equally lost to memory as those who fell 
 at Wagram — their names mostly unknown, their private deeds 
 unrecorded by any historian. 
 
 About two hundred yards south of the village of Wagram lies 
 the watercourse of the Roszbach rivulet. This world-knew 
 brook is about ten feet wide and fifteen feet deep. With sharp 
 sides cut almost straight down, and the earth thrown up or fc 
 either bank to form dykes which prevent its winter floods fronj ki 
 inundating the surrounding country, it looks more like a huge 
 artificial drain than like a natural rivulet. Along its banks £ 
 grow rows of pollard willows, closely planted together, whicr. 
 formed a grateful shade from the burning July sun. The roac 
 which leads to Florisdorf crosses the brook by a slight wooder : 
 bridge which could be destroyed in a few minutes by the 
 pioneers of a single battalion. On the Wagram side of the 
 bridge were two vedettes from Hohenlohe's fine regiment o 
 Uhlans, crouching for shade under the willow-trees, but steadilj t 
 gazing out towards Florisdorf, though not an Austrian vedettt i: 
 could be seen, for they were all hidden by trees. 
 
 But, though no enemy was in sight, a view was there which 
 well repaid the long ride, and which even the soldiers, accus I 
 tomed as they had been to marching through fine scenery, wen 
 admiring to each other. On the right lay the rounded hill o 
 the Bisamberg, studded with vineyards, corn-fields, and woods 
 among which vain search with glasses was made to discover am 
 signs of the hostile batteries. Beyond the Bisamberg could b< 
 seen the narrow gorge from which the Danube issues, anc 
 further still the rough rugged recess of the hills above Klostei 
 neuberg, rising steeply up from the waters edge, with thei 
 summits capped with heavy masses of dark green foliage, anc 
 their sides sprinkled over with fir-trees. A little to the left 
 and at the foot of the hills, the city of Vienna lay sparkling id 
 the sun ; the tops of the steeples and the roofs of the house: 
 glittered in the bright flood of light, but not too powerfully, fo: 
 
:hap. IV. J THE TRUCE. 417 
 
 he air between Wagram and the town seemed converted by 
 
 he heat into a heavy transparent ether, which spread a halo 
 
 bund the city. In the foreground, a little to the left, a high 
 
 :hurch spire, surrounded by tall poplar-trees, showed the situa- 
 
 ion of the village of Florisdorf ; but no intrenchments could 
 
 )e seen, no working parties could be discovered ; they were all 
 
 ridden by a long gentle wave of the ground, which would not 
 
 lave been noticed except because it excluded from the view. 
 
 Mr away on the left front spread the Marchfeld, beyond 
 
 vhich could be seen the dim blue line of hills which gird the 
 
 galley south of the Danube, while directly to the left the dark 
 
 Carpathians towered up to the sky, and the gap between the 
 
 rheben-Berger and the main ridge showed where the road ran 
 
 }o Preszburg, and pointed, out the situation of the village of 
 
 l31umenau, the scene of the combat of the 22nd. 
 
 ( After a long and fruitless search among the poplar-trees for 
 
 By signs of intrenchments, during which heaps of earth were 
 
 tainted out as redoubts, which may have been or may not, the 
 
 Officers turned to ride down the Roszbach. The brook was 
 
 Llmost entirely dry ; here and there for a few yards a thin 
 
 iheet of water a few inches deep covered the soft muddy 
 
 ;>ottom, and gave a refuge to flocks of mud-bedaubed ducks, 
 
 mt in general the mud which forms the sole of the watercourse 
 
 ay exposed to the sun, and was dried and broken into cracks 
 
 nd fissures, which ran into each other, forming a tracery not 
 
 .nlike hieroglyphic writing. All along the brook were constant 
 
 edettes, all hidden in the willows on the bank, which the 
 
 :onditions of the armistice had declared to be for the present 
 
 Prussian ground. The sound of horses' feet coming along 
 
 Irew the sentries out of their ambush far enough to let them 
 
 >e seen, but as soon they saw the uniforms of the Prussian 
 
 taff-officers they resumed their steady stare to the front, retiring 
 
 ato the shade, and let the officers pass them as if they were 
 
 ot aware of our existence ; for outlying sentinels pay no 
 
 ompliments in the presence of the enemy. 
 
 The Prussian armies were by the 25th drawn close together, 
 nd, concentrated in one huge mass, lay like a crouching lion, 
 eady to spring upon the Danube, should the negotiations for 
 ieace fail, and the orders for an advance be flashed by tele- 
 
 E E 
 
f 
 
 418 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 graph from Nikolsburg to the different commanders. The 
 First Army, under Prince Frederick Charles, was close up to 
 the Roszbach and the line of demarcation, with a strong corps 
 on the left bank of the March to guard its flank or form its- 
 advanced guard as might be required, in case the signal should 
 be given to move forward. General Henvarth, with the Army 
 of the Elbe, was on the right, perhaps with the object of 
 crossing the river at a lower point of its course. The Crown 
 Prince was in rear of the first, ready to move in any direction 
 which occasion might require. 
 
 On the 27th, at mid-day, the armistice would expire, and, in 
 case that it should not be prolonged, or preliminaries of peace 
 were not agreed upon by that hour, the Prussian troops were; 
 on the 26th held in readiness to march at the shortest notice 
 If an advance had been made, there can be no doubt, from the 
 positions of the different divisions, that the great attack against B 
 the line of the Danube would have been made towards Presz - : 
 burg ; probably, at the same time, a demonstration might havi 
 been made towards the Prussian right, and a false attad 
 directed on Florisdorf, in order to retain the garrison in thei 
 fortifications. The action of the 22nd, which at the momen 
 of certain victory for the Prussians was interrupted by th« 
 armistice, had shown the Austrians where the chief attacl 
 could be made, and the Prussians thought that by the 27th th 
 position of Blumenau would in all likelihood have been artj 
 ficially strengthened, and the road by which Bose advance 
 and gained the rear of the villages would certainly be watche 
 on a future occasion. Yet, though there could be no hope c 
 succeeding so suddenly as on the 22nd in gaining the comman 
 of the defile which leads to Preszburg, and though there wa 
 no chance, as would probably have been the case if th 
 previous Sunday's action had continued, of driving the enem 
 so quickly through the town as to prevent him from destroyin 
 the bridge, the advantages to be gained from attempting to pas 
 the Danube at Preszburg were so great, that an attempt woul 
 probably have been made to force the defile and to secure thr 
 town. The fortifications of Florisdorf, a part of which coul 
 be seen from the church-tower of Wagram, shut out the accefj 
 to such a broad piece of the river bank that very differei 
 
 
m 
 Ait 
 
 ■:0 
 
 
 Chap. IV.] TBE TRUCE. 419 
 
 measures had to be taken for securing the passage than would 
 have been most expedient, if no intrenchments had covered the 
 
 x approach across the flat plain from Wagram and Aspern. The 
 portion of the works which could be seen through the clear air 
 from the church spire embraced four redoubts on the Bisam- 
 berg hill, and three on the flat ground between the Bisamberg 
 and Florisdorf; there was also another work on the hill to 
 
 01 guard the left flank of the position, which lying more towards 
 the river could not be seen from Wagram. 
 
 The Prussian cavalry had gained much from the rest afforded 
 by the armistice ; fatigued by long marches through the Mo- 
 ravian highlands, and stinted for forage, it had a sufficiently 
 long period of repose when the army halted at Briinn to restore 
 it to the splendid condition in which it entered upon the 
 
 ; : campaign; but the long rest in the Marchfeld had done it an 
 
 r immensity of good, though even here forage had not been 
 
 ;v, plentiful. Notwithstanding small rations, the horses had 
 profited by their rest, for time had been given to replace their 
 
 ■K worn-out shoes, and to afford relief to chafed backs caused by 
 the late long marches. The troopers were in high spirits, for 
 jthey had overcome the famed Austrian cavalry in several 
 encounters, and now claimed a higher reputation than that 
 •which for several years past had been accorded to their 
 antagonists. The failures of the Austrian cavalry in their 
 
 r encounters with the stronger and better-mounted horsemen of 
 Prussia had not so much astonished the thinking officers of this 
 
 \ army as had the singularly little use which General Benedek 
 had made of his light horse. Although operations had been 
 1 ^conducted in its own country, where every infonnation con- 
 cerning the Prussian movements could have been readily 
 obtained from the inhabitants, the Austrian cavalry had made 
 no raids against the flank or rear of the advancing army, had 
 jcut off no ammunition or provision trains, had broken up no 
 railway communication behind the marching columns, had 
 destroyed no telegraph lines between the front and the base of 
 supplies, had made no sudden or night attacks against the 
 outposts so as to make the weary infantry stand to their arms 
 and lose their night's rest, and, instead of hovering round the 
 front and flanks to irritate and annoy the pickets, had been 
 
 
 sell 
 I 
 
I- 
 
 z 
 
 n 
 
 Z: 
 
 420 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 rarely seen or fallen in with except when it had been marched 
 down upon and beaten up by the Prussian advanced guards. 
 
 Yet the Prussian cavalry had in many cases lost severely in 
 the campaign, especially the 3rd regiment of Dragoons. This 
 regiment suffered fearfully from its rough hustle with the 
 Austrian cuirassiers at Koniggratz, and now mustered but half 
 the men and horses with which it entered upon the campaign. 
 More than half the officers and quite half the men who followed 
 across the Bohemian frontier the standard which has been 
 cherished in their regiment since the year 1704 are now lying 
 under the earth of Lipa, or were in the hospitals of Tiirnau 
 and Gorlitz, for this was the regiment which dashed against 
 the heavy mass of cuirass horsemen who sacrificed themselves 
 to cover the retreat of the Austrian battalions, and it supported 
 its character for dashing courage at a tremendous cost. Very 
 many of both the officers and men who were not now in the \ 
 ranks were victims to terrible sword cuts, which, coming down 
 upon the shoulder, cut clean through the shoulder-blade, and 
 often deep down into the body— awful memorials of the strength 
 of arm of the Austrian horsemen. Much did the officers of 
 this regiment complain of the absence of epaulettes, which 
 they estimated would, by defending the shoulder, have saved 
 half the men they had left behind them — a complaint which 
 was to some extent borne out by the fact that the ultimate \ 
 overthrow of the cuirass regiments of Austria was due to the 
 arrival of some of Hohenlohe's Uhlans, who took them in 
 flank. Then, though the heavy horsemen turned upon Hohen- f 
 lohe's men, their swords were shivered upon the brass plates * 
 which lay upon the shoulders of the Uhlans, for these, unlike 
 the rank and file of the rest of the Prussian cavalry, carried 
 epaulettes, and though the blows were aimed at the head, the 
 smaller object was nearly always missed, and the sharp edge 
 descended only to be dinted or broken upon the protected j 
 shoulder, while the Uhlans, with their lances held short in j 
 hand, searched out with their spear-heads unguarded portions * 
 of their antagonists' bodies, or, dealing heavy blows with the 
 butt ends of their staves, pressed through the thick ranks of the 
 heavy horsemen, marking their track with great heaps of dead, 
 dying, or wounded. On the evening of the 26th, there was 
 
 
Phap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 421 
 
 still no definite news from Nikolsburg, but every rumour which 
 arrived from head-quarters pointed more and more to peace ; 
 still the army was held in readiness to move, and the officiers 
 yPordonnatice, or "gallopers" as they would be termed in the 
 vernacular of Aldershot, were ordered to be prepared to start 
 with orders to the different divisions at three in the morning. 
 
 The preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon at Nikols- 
 burg on the evening of the 26th, and the war was certainly at 
 in end as far as Austria and the North German States were 
 concerned. Late on the night of the 26th, a courier arrived 
 rom the King's head-quarters at Nikolsburg, bringing a letter 
 from General von Moltke to Prince Frederick Charles, which 
 rave no details and no information as to the conditions of the 
 |!>eace, but said simply that a glorious peace had been arranged. 
 The news spread in a moment, and suddenly all was changed. 
 [n the evening information was being obtained about the 
 trength of the Austrian position at Florisdorf, the preparations 
 o guard the defile which leads to Preszburg, the nature of the 
 bridges over the Danube, or the chance of Edelsheim's cavalry 
 oming forward to break a lance in the Marchfeld. On the 
 morning of the 27th, these things were held of no account; no 
 Dne would have cared to hear accurately where every battalion 
 md every gun was posted in the Austrian lines ; the number 
 Df Edelsheim's sabres and of the Archduke Albrecht's corps 
 were alike disregarded ; no one would have cared to hear how 
 many of the regiments from Italy were actually in Vienna, and 
 the intrenchments of Florisdorf were considered a matter of 
 history. These who the previous night seemed to have no 
 :hought but of battle, promotion, and an entry into Vienna, 
 :ould speak on the 27th of nothing but home, and hardly 
 ihought of anything except their speedy return to Prussia. 
 Now and then a faint discussion arose on the subject of the 
 :onditions of peace, but so little was known in the army, 
 nd so many reports were flying about, that these soon sub- 
 sided, and gave place to conversations about home and home 
 riends. 
 
 Though peace had been actually decided upon, no one con- 
 nected with the army was able to go across the two miles of 
 leutral ground which separate the Prussian from the Austrian 
 
422 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 outposts, so that there was almost no communication with 
 Vienna. 
 
 The great desire of marching into the Austrian capital had 
 melted away under the genial influence of certain peace, and 
 there had sprung up instead a feeling of satisfaction that it was 
 not necessary to humiliate Austria so far ; for of a sudden all 
 the affection for their old comrades of the Danish war, which 
 had lain latent in the hearts of the Prussian soldiers during the 
 campaign, had again burst forth into life, and there were pre- 
 valent in this army almost a kindly pity for the misfortunes of : - 
 those who but on the yesterday were regarded as deadly ene- 
 mies. The soft, stout hearts of the Prussians were easily turned' 
 from anger to sympathy, as was so often shown by their tender 
 treatment of the Austrian wounded. During the armistice 
 there was a feeling of suspicion that the Austrian diplomatists *■■ 
 would be shifty, and break off the negotiations as soon as theii 
 troops were concentrated. This feeling, combined with 
 desire of mere glory, made the armistice very unpopular ; bul 
 now that it had been proved that the Austrians were reall) 
 honest, and that peace was really to be concluded, the memory 
 of all the old grudges was obliterated, and had been replaced b 
 a rapidly increasing feeling of friendship. If an Austrian office: 
 had now come into the Prussian lines he would have beer: 
 received by the officers with the same open-hearted hospitality - 
 which they show to their own comrades ; the day before h< 
 would have been treated with the most polite courtesy. 
 
 The troops were in excellent condition, both as to healtJ 
 and spirits, and quite prepared to march back to the frontie 
 at the same rate as they advanced. 
 
 On the evening of the 26th the preliminaries of peace"" wer 
 signed at Nikolsburg between Prussia and Austria; the term 
 which were agreed to were — that Austria should go out of th 
 Germanic Confederation, should pay a contribution toward 
 Prussia's expenses in the late war, and should offer no oppc 
 sition to the steps which Prussia might take with regard t 
 Northern Germany: these steps were, to annex Hanove 
 Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and the portion of Hesse-Darmstadt whic 
 
 * See page 449. 
 
(I 
 
 ies on the north bank of the Maine ; to secure the reversion 
 I Brunswick on the death of the present Duke, who has no 
 ildren, to force Saxony to enter into the new North German 
 onfederation headed by Prussia, and to hold the entire mili- 
 ary and diplomatic leadership in that Confederation. The 
 var contribution to be paid by Austria was fixed at 40,000,000 
 fhalers, of which 15,000,000 were to be paid up, 15,000,000 
 vere credited to Austria for the Schleswig-Holstein expenses, 
 - 5,000,000 for the support of the Prussian armies in Bohemia 
 nd Moravia, and 5,000,000 were to be paid at a future date to 
 )e afterwards settled. The Prussian armies were on the 2nd 
 )f August to retire to the north of the Thaya, but were to 
 
 hap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 423 
 
 >ccupy Bohemia and Moravia till the signature of the final 
 eaty of peace, and to hold Austrian Silesia until the war con- 
 ribution was paid. 
 
 To allow time for the preparation and determination of the 
 lefinitive treaty of peace, an armistice for five weeks was 
 concluded, to commence on the 2nd August, to which day the 
 ive days' suspension of hostilities was extended. The conven- 
 ion for the armistice determined as follows : — 
 
 That the line of demarcation during the armistice should 
 am from Eyer by Pilsen, Neuhaus, Zlabings to the Thaya : 
 hen follow the course of that stream to its junction with the 
 March, along the March to Napajedl, and in a straight line 
 om Napajedl to Oderberg, on the Prussian frontier. 
 
 Round each of the Austrian fortresses lying within the terri- 
 ories occupied by the Prussians a space was to be left, in 
 )rder that the fortress might draw provisions therefrom. Round 
 31miitz this space was to be ten miles, round Josephstadt, 
 Theresienstadt, and Koniggratz five miles. 
 
 The Prussians were to have the free use of all land and 
 vater communications within the ground occupied by their 
 irmies, and to have the right of transport by the railway from 
 ~ erau to Bohmisch-Triibau, which runs past the fortress of 
 31miitz. 
 
 The Austrian troops were not to advance from their actual 
 positions until the Prussian troops were entirely beyond the 
 Thaya. 
 
 The sick, who were left by the Prussians with doctors and 
 
424 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 attendants in their actual positions, were to be supplied by the] 
 Austrian Government, and no impediment was to be made to> 
 their removal to their homes as soon as possible by the 
 Prussian Government. 
 
 The Prussian troops were to be rationed from the territories 
 occupied. No money contributions were to be raised. 
 
 Negotiations were to be opened at Prague for the definitive 
 conclusion of peace. 
 
 By some unfortunate misunderstanding, the garrison oj 
 Theresienstadt on the 28th July, although peace was agreec 
 upon on the 26th, sallied from their fortress, destroyed the 
 railway bridge near Kralup, north of Prague, broke the teld 
 graph wires near the same spot, and captured two Prussian 
 officers, two officials, and fifty soldiers. When the comman 
 dant of Theresienstadt directed this sally, he was unaware thai 
 the preliminaries of peace had been agreed to ; but his in 
 opportune vigour caused a great deal of inconvenience to tru see: 
 Prussian army, for the destruction of the bridge broke the lin« i) 
 of communication with Tiirnau, w T hich was a large depot a 
 stores. During the armistice, too, some Austrian hussars 
 unconscious of the existence of a truce, made an attack on 
 park of reserve artillery at Znaym, and did some damage, for 
 on account of the conclusion of the armistice, the guards hac h 
 not taken precautions against a surprise. 
 
 On the evening of the 27th, preliminaries of peace wer< 
 also agreed upon with Bavaria. The Bavarian Ambassadoi 
 Herr von der Pfordten, had been for some days at Nikolsburj - 
 unable to obtain an audience of Count Bismark, and only i) 
 the afternoon of the 27th secured a few moments' conversatioi 
 with the Prussian Prime Minister. The terms of peace wer- 
 quickly stated : the cession of all Bavarian territory north c 
 the Maine to Prussia, and the payment of a war contributior. 
 The Bavarian demurred, pleaded he had no instructions t 
 give up territory, and wished to enter into diplomatic negotia 
 tions in a more orthodox manner, for to the Ambassado. 
 trained in the rules of his art it seemed almost sacrilege to tur 
 over provinces in a meeting of only some moments' duration 
 and to scratch out frontier lines with one or two dashing stroke 
 of a hurried pen ; but the plenipotentiaries of Prussia, Coun 
 

 Chap. IV.} THE TRUCE. 42$ 
 
 Bismark and General von Moltke, would listen to no proposi- 
 tions and hear no objections, they required an immediate 
 issent ; the representative of the Court of Munich did not feel 
 justified in agreeing to such conditions, the meeting abruptly 
 terminated, and orders were telegraphed to General Manteuffel 
 to press the war in Bavaria. News came in from that country 
 of Prussian successes ; the Armies of the Elbe, of Prince 
 Frederick Charles, and of the Crown Prince were ready to 
 lurry off detachments to the theatre of war south of the Maine, 
 the cause of the decaying Bund was evidently hopeless, every 
 day of indecision must heighten the war contribution ; so in 
 the evening the Bavarian Ambassador was fain to declare his 
 agreement to the terms dictated. Orders were then tele- 
 graphed to General Manteuffel to arrest the progress of his 
 army, and preliminaries for a peace were signed. 
 
 On the 27th, after the preliminary treaty with Austria had 
 been signed, the King, much to the satisfaction of the officers 
 at Nikolsburg, who in this case certainly represented the pub- 
 lic opinion of the whole army, conferred on General von 
 Moltke the Order of the Black Eagle, the highest of the 
 decorations of Prussia, not more as a sign of approval of the 
 skill with which the General had carried through the negotiations, 
 than of the strategy he had displayed in the conduct of the 
 campaign. 
 
 The army was delighted with the terms of the peace ; all 
 the hardship, all the danger of the campaign were quite for- 
 gotten — all desire of war and regret that peace had been made 
 so soon had utterly vanished, giving way to feelings of con- 
 gratulation and happiness, because few men really thought 
 that the dreams of a United Germany and of a common 
 Fatherland for the whole Teutonic race were now visionary 
 speculations, but were results which must follow sooner or later 
 from this campaign. Count Bismark was immensely popular 
 in the army ;• he was regarded as the author and origin of this 
 success, so rapid, so complete, that no Prussian dared to hope 
 for half such a triumph when the troops dashed into Saxony 
 nearly seven weeks before. 
 
 A review was ordered in the Marchfeld for the 31st, but 
 only of the main body of the First Army and of the cavalry 
 
 Kl 
 
426 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR, [Book IX. v 
 
 
 corps. The Second Army and the Army of the Elbe were 
 already preparing to march back over the Thaya, and as sooriij 
 as the roads were clear the army of Prince Frederick Charles 
 was to follow. The greater part of the Crown Prince's army, 
 was to hold Austrian Silesia and Moravia, while the First 
 Army and the Army of the Elbe occupied Bohemia. There 
 was one dark shadow cast over the troops, although it was 
 almost disregarded amid the universal joy caused by the 
 glorious terms of peace which had been obtained. The 
 cholera had broken out in the camp, several men and officers 
 were already down with it, and great fears were entertained 
 that the hot weather might cause it to increase. The cases at 
 first were not very numerous, but they were not confined to ;: 
 one particular regiment, or one particular locality, which 
 makes it appear as though the disease were lurking all through | 
 the lines, ready to burst forth everywhere if a day hotter than; 
 usual or a slight failure of good water should occur. The 
 medical men, however, spoke confidently of their power to 
 keep the pestilence under, and it was hoped that when the ■ 
 troops turned their faces homewards they might shake it off by; . 
 change of quarters, and suffer no more when well away from 
 the flat land which borders on the Danube. But it pursued 
 them as they moved, and during the whole of the remaining 
 time which the Prussian army remained on Austrian territory 
 it suffered much from disease. 
 
 By the 29th the Prussian army began to withdraw from the 
 duchy of Austria; the Crown- Prince's army was already 
 moving back towards Austrian Silesia, passing through Mo- 
 ravia. The second corps d'armee of the First Army had 
 commenced its movement towards Prague, and the rest of the 
 First Army was also to begin its retrograde march on the 1st 
 August, after it had been reviewed by the King in the March- 
 feld on the 31st July. General Miilbe, who had come with 
 his reserve corps from Prague to Briinn before the preli- 
 minaries of peace were agreed upon, was retracing his steps. 
 It could not be expected that the return march would be 
 nearly so rapid as that of the advance. There was no enemy 
 now in the front to be turned or hurriedly pushed back, so 
 the troops moved by easy stages until they reached the posi- 
 

 Ihap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 427 
 
 ions they had to occupy till the treaty of peace was finally 
 
 igned. 
 
 The troops were not at all sorry to be called upon to march 
 
 ain ; they had had more than enough rest after the quick 
 
 harches of the advance, and began now to find time hang 
 
 ather heavy on their hands. Even smoking gets tiresome 
 
 dien it has been indulged in for almost a week continuously 
 
 without the interruption of parades or inspections. Helmet 
 
 ops had been polished and repolished, needle-guns had had 
 
 heir complicated mechanism taken to pieces, cleaned, and 
 
 mt together again, swords and bayonets had been burnished 
 
 >ver and over again, accoutrements and appointments had 
 
 )een inspected closely and more closely, almost in the hope 
 
 )f finding some rent or hole which might have to be repaired, 
 
 ill for the sake of something to do. But all the occupation 
 
 vhich their accoutrements could afford to the men had been 
 
 exhausted, and now they were reduced to strolling about list- 
 
 essly, or hanging over the fences which surround the gardens 
 
 :>f the cottages where they were billeted, sucking gravely at 
 
 :heir long wooden pipes. Now and then a soldier might be 
 
 een starting off to cut Indian corn for the cow of the villager 
 
 an whom he was billeted, but he was seldom allowed to enjoy 
 
 ilone his temporary occupation ; a group of comrades, eager 
 
 for employment, joined him, and in consequence the basket, 
 
 the filling of which might have given one man work for a 
 
 couple of hours, was crammed full in a few minutes by the 
 
 thick group of voluntary labourers. The village children 
 
 alone were perfectly satisfied with the existing state of affairs ; 
 
 they, unlike their elders, had no misgivings about heavy taxes 
 
 which they would be required to pay for the expenses of the 
 
 ^Austrian army or the war contribution to Prussia ; unlike the 
 
 soldiers, they were not far away from friends and homes, to 
 
 whom, now that the legitimate work of the campaign was over, 
 
 these were eager to return ; careless of to-morrow, they were 
 
 only delighted to have so many playfellows, for the great 
 
 strong men, who had been but the other day pursuing the 
 
 iflying Austrian battalions from Koniggratz, were now content 
 
 to let the children beat them, pull their hair, or sometimes 
 
 run about with their newly cleaned swords trailing in the dust, 
 
428 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. * 
 
 and were well pleased aftenvards to instruct the urchins in the 
 arts of converting a lump of deal into a boat, or a stick o) 
 sycamore wood into a whistle. 
 
 A little after nine o'clock on the morning of the 31st July.! • 
 1866, the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th infantry divisions and the s: 
 cavalry corps of the First Prussian Army were drawn up or :: 
 the Marchfeld, within fifteen miles of Vienna, to be reviewed 
 by the King of Prussia. The troops were formed in four lines 
 facing towards the south, where, through the haze which always : 
 on a warm day overhangs a large city, could be indistinctl) 
 seen the tall Stephanenthurm that marked the situation of the " 
 Austrian capital; their left rested close to the village 0: 
 Ganserndorf, whence the lines stretched for a distance of 
 mile and a half over a slightly undulated plain, from which the 
 crops had already been removed, in the direction of Auersthal 
 but did not extend so far as that village. The two front line* 
 were formed of heavy battalions of infantry, each clumpec 
 together in close columns of companies, standing out a darl 
 blue square against the yellow stubble ; a hundred yard* 
 behind the battalion stood a long line of the cavalry corpj 
 under the command of Prince Albrecht, forming, with the 
 cavalry regiments attached to the infantry, a force of close; 
 upon to, 000 sabres and lances. On the right stood the heavj 
 brigade of General Pfuel, consisting of the two cuirassie; 
 regiments of the Emperor of Russia and of the Duke 
 Coburg, tall strong men, mounted on massive horses, wit! 
 their yellow helmets and armour glittering in the hot sunshine 
 like burnished gold ; next on the left stood Rheinhaben'i 
 brigade formed from cavalry of the Guard, one regiment 
 dragoons in light blue uniforms with red facings, and shining 
 black japanned helmets ; and two of Uhlans, the black anc 
 white flags of whose lances formed a strong contrast to the 
 bright red facings and lancer caps over which they waved. 
 Next to the Guard brigade was drawn up the brigade of Duke 
 William of Mecklenburg, which had formed the advancec 
 guard of the First Army since it crossed the Elbe at Przelautsch. 
 and which did such tremendous havoc among the Austriar. 
 cuirassiers at the end of the battle of Koniggratz. The' 
 regiments in this brigade are the red hussars of Ziethen, the: 
 

 *ap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 429 
 
 'iint lebrated yellow Uhlans commanded by Prince Hohenlohe, 
 
 stick id the 2nd dragoons of the Guard, one of whose squadrons 
 
 de down the Austrian lancers at Tischnowitz. In the next 
 
 '■>: Iti igade stood the thinned squadrons of the 3rd dragoons, who 
 
 I st more than half their numbers at the great battle, side by 
 
 ~ up ( le with the light blue and silver clad Thuringian hussars, 
 
 mien 10 also suffered much in the same charge as the 3rd 
 
 :riiai agoons. The left of the cavalry brigade was formed by 
 
 ■ ilwa pltz's heavy brigade, the Queen's own cuirassiers, and the 
 
 .-let h Uhlans, the regiment in whose hands the lance asserted its 
 
 soft premacy over the sword in the cavalry combat at Saar. In 
 
 vibge e fourth line, some two hundred yards in the rear of the 
 
 - e of |.valry, were drawn up the ambulance waggons, ammunition 
 
 il iggons, field telegraph division, a long line of light blue 
 
 vr xriages with companies of side bearers, and engineers 
 
 r ii ire and there between them, while on the left lay the 
 
 -up itteries of the reserve artillery. Between the batteries 
 
 :: ] di ' infantry and the long line of horsemen stood the field 
 
 ; ni itteries attached to the infantry divisions, each division in a 
 
 ■vco! osed column of four batteries, with a cavalry regiment 
 
 di t ;side it. 
 
 !' do About half-past nine Prince Frederick Charles galloped on 
 
 the ground and took the command of the whole force. The 
 
 ■jinssi ^ops were not quite formed up when he arrived, and in a 
 
 ,; ort time they had all taken up their positions. Officers were 
 
 -. :5i i nt to look out for the approach of the King, and the cavalry 
 
 ;: nj smounted and stood beside their horses, the infantry piled their 
 
 1 ms and rested beside them to await his arrival. In about 
 
 it tlf an hour an officer who had been acting as scout towards 
 
 e right was seen coming at full gallop towards the Prince, but 
 
 :c l;2 e purport of his message was understood — he had no need to 
 
 >:W t :liver it. Before he had reached the Commander-in-chief the 
 
 0, arp words of command calling the battalions and squadrons 
 
 •• pi " attention " were passing quickly along the line, and in two 
 
 ; : " three minutes the troopers were in their saddles, the com- 
 
 inies were reformed, the gunners sprang to their posts beside 
 
 eir guns, and the whole army stood silent and motionless ; 
 
 ' e bayonets bristled stiff among the serried ranks of the 
 
 fantry, the lance-staves and swords formed a perfect un- 
 
430 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 bending line along the whole cavalry division, the troopers sal 
 as still as statues, for the horses had been perfectly quieted by <:. 
 the campaign, and the only moving things among the wide i 
 spread hosts were the standards of the infantry, and the 
 pennons of the Uhlans. 
 
 A little knot of horsemen appeared over the brow of a gentle : 
 undulation, and came quickly towards the centre of the line ; i jj-v 
 tall man with grey hair and moustache, in the uniform of i £- 
 general officer, rode in front. When he came nearly opposifc j 
 the centre of the army, the sword-point of Prince Frederic! p : 
 Charles was lowered quickly towards the ground. At thi £- 
 signal every officer's sword went down, with a rapid clatte it' 
 every musket came to the " present," the lance-staves and glit - 
 tering sword-blades of the cavalry stood straight up at th :: , 
 " carry," while every band struck up the Prussian nationa ; : 
 hymn to salute the King. He bowed down to his horse' • 
 neck to return not only the salute, but the loud cheer whic : 
 went up from the ordered crowd, and which drowned the musi j 
 almost as soon as it began to sound. For a few minutes thi • 
 lasted, and then it died away, giving place to the last few note - 
 of the bands. All was again silent. The King moved to th 
 right of the foremost line, and rode along it, stopping here an . 
 there to speak to soldiers who had specially distinguishe. E 
 themselves, or to shake hands with the commanding officer 
 Even* battalion cheered him as he walked along its front, pausin ■ _ 
 to address to each a few words of praise for some partialis 
 action during the campaign. Along the second line, th 
 cavalry, and the carriages in the rear he also rode, before r - 
 took up his position for the army to march past him. 
 
 The first troops that went by were those of the fifth division 
 commanded by General Tiimpling, who fought and won, froi 
 a superior Austrian force strongly posted, the action of Brad 
 near Gitschin. The whole of the Prussian infantry had we 
 proved during the war its power of marching long distances 
 bad roads and in unfavourable weather, and that day tr 
 battalions who were reviewed on the Marchfeld amply demoi; 
 strated that this power can co-exist with the most beautifj 
 exactness of parade movements. With a long swinging stric; 
 the men passed by, keeping perfect line, and stepping togeth«'i 
 
hap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 431 
 
 such exact time that they could not have done better if, 
 stead of campaigning and bivouacking, they had spent the 
 list two months at marching drill. In the centre of each 
 attalion was carried the standard, often riddled with bullet- 
 oles, sometimes so torn away that only a few patches of 
 ittered silk were left hanging on the bare pole. In the fifth 
 ivision were the 8th, 12th, 18th, and 48th regiments, all 
 elow their proper strength, for the losses at Gitschin had not 
 et been replaced, as the reinforcements which were coming 
 p were stopped as soon as peace was agreed upon. After the 
 afantry came the 3rd regiment of Uhlans, which was attached 
 this division. The perfect marching of the foot soldiers 
 eemed to be contagious, for the squadrons moved in such even 
 nes that as they passed the horseman on the flank utterly hid 
 11 the rest from view. Then came the batteries, two abreast, 
 
 : lark and business-like, with the guns uncovered, and the 
 ammers ready, as if pressing forward into action. 
 
 The sixth division, under General Manstein, followed the 
 ifth, in the same order; it consisted of the 24th, 64th, 60th, 
 ,nd 35 th regiments, all marching with the same steady step, 
 nd in equally perfect lines as those who had gone before them. 
 Veil they looked and well they went ; stout, broad-shouldered 
 nen, well grown in years, with thick beards and moustaches, 
 vho swung along quickly, without a thought about the heavy 
 ellow knapsack which hung upon their backs. After them 
 followed a dark-green battalion of Jagers, linked shoulder to 
 ihoulder in four wall-like lines, marching as if they were 
 ilways in this close formation, though really they have been 
 lsed in nothing but skirmishing order during the war. The 
 :avalry of this division, the well-known black dragoons of 
 (Brandenburg, with their light-blue tunics and dark velvet collars, 
 rom which they get . their name, formed a bright contrast in 
 :olour to the dark-green riflemen, but moved with unwavering 
 quadrons, which showed perfectly trained horses and skilled 
 lorsemen. 
 
 Franzecky's division came next, the heroes of Benatek and 
 Df the attack against the Austrian right on the Bistriz, where 
 
 ' :hey left so many of their comrades. Behind this general 
 narched the 26th, 66th, 67th, and 97th regiments, the last 
 
t- 
 
 432 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 showing by its diminished front the severity of the fire to which 
 it was so long exposed in the hardly-contested wood abovejfc 
 Benatek, and the sharp fighting of a later date near Blumenau. 
 With this division passed the dark-green and gold Magdeburg 
 hussars, one squadron of which made the successful charge 
 against the Austrian Uhlans in front of Kaltenbrun. 
 
 The last infantry regiment which marched past was the 8th, 
 formerly commanded by General Home, but, since that generally 
 had gone to take the command of the whole of the infantry of 
 the first reserve corps, under General Schoeler. It was a z 
 brigade of this division which fought by night the first infantry 
 combat of the campaign in the narrow street of Podoll, where 4 
 it suffered severely. This division also stormed the village of r _ 
 Sadowa on the morning of the 3rd of July, and spent the J]' 
 greater part of the day in the wood above, exposed to both 
 artillery and musketry fire. The companies looked weak, for 
 their ranks had been thinned by much fighting ; but the men 
 who had come through it went past their King with a proudf : 
 bearing, more like fresh troops going upon service than like men 
 who had just finished a campaign. All looked splendid, all 
 called forth admiration, and a loud murmur of delight went up 
 from the groups of officers behind the King as the tall Jagers ]■■ 
 of Magdeburg passed in unbending line before them. These * 
 men, recruited from the Hartz mountains, and bred up to a 
 forest life, are the very beau ideal of light infantry soldiers ; tall, 
 muscular, and wiry, quick of sight, and rare marksmen. They* 
 are so cool under fire and so certain of their aim, that it is 
 asserted that, like the English archer of old, the Magdeburg 
 Jager carries a foeman's life in every bullet in his cartouche. 
 When the infantry had passed away, the cavalry in a long 
 column of squadrons filed before the King, and in the column 
 was seen every class of cavalry soldier which exists in the 
 Prussian service : heavy, broad-shouldered cuirassiers, clothed 
 in white uniforms, with high black boots, mounted on tall. 
 strong horses, which tramped along under the weight of their 
 armour-clad riders, raising clouds of dust, which half obscured j 
 the dazzling reflection of the sun from the helmets and cuirasses 
 tall and lithe Uhlans, carrying with an easy balance their long 
 lances, of which the bannered points rose in an even line above :•. 
 
 k 
 
:hap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 433 
 
 heir heads ; light dragoons — for in this service all the dragoons 
 
 re light cavalry, armed with sword and carbine ; and lighter 
 
 till, bright-coloured, rakish-looking hussars, active little men, 
 
 n strong, short-legged horses, decked out with gaudy trap- 
 
 ings, which gave them an almost Oriental appearance. In 
 
 bar of the cavalry the reserve artillery rolled slowly past, 
 
 allowed by the hospital trains, now empty, and with the 
 
 itretchers, which used to be carried by the Krankentragers, 
 
 low folded up and strapped upon the carriages ; but ugly red 
 
 Ijiains upon the curtains of the ambulance waggons showed 
 
 : lat all had been lately used. Last of all came the very useful 
 
 eld telegraph detachment, nine carriages, carrying means for 
 
 ying down instantly and for using thirty miles of wire. When 
 
 1 had passed, the King called the commanding officers round 
 
 im, and said :- 
 
 :ii 
 
 v Gentlemen, — I cannot speak to all the soldiers under your command 
 they are too many ; but to you, for all, I must express my thanks tor the 
 induct and behaviour of this army during the campaign, which your exer- 
 ns have brought to such a glorious conclusion. I shall not enter into the 
 , ;tails of the gallant conduct of your troops at the battle of Koniggratz, 
 here for hours you stood under the whole artillery fire of the Austrian 
 my, and resisted successfully all the attempts of the enemy to crush you, 
 id thus break the centre of the line of our battle. I cannot speak as I 
 ]"n3 ould wish of Sichrow, Munchengratz, Pod oil, and Gitschin. I can but 
 nbrace my nephew, your commander, as the representative of you all. I 
 n but tell you that I thank you, and that your King and your Fatherland 
 1 that you have nobly done your duty. I am sure there is nothing I 
 u iuld say which could be more pleasing to Prussian soldiers.' 
 
 Y.s! Loud cheers greeted the conclusion of this speech, when the 
 ing turned his horse, and rode away. 
 
 On the morning of the 31st, Prince Charles, the father of 
 irince Frederick Charles and Prince Adalbert, received the 
 rder of Merit from the King, the same Order as the Crown 
 rince received on the battle-field of Koniggratz. General von 
 oigt-Rhetz was appointed Governor of Hanover, and many 
 her officers and soldiers received military honours. Prince 
 rederick Charles received nothing, for there was nothing left 
 give him ; he had already won every decoration which it was 
 the power of the monarch to bestow ; but he was well cou- 
 nted, for the troops under his command had won a reputa- 
 
 F F 
 
 
* 
 
 
 : 
 
 
 434 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX; 
 
 tion, not only for courage, discipline, and endurance, but also 
 for tenderness to their wounded enemies and for a kindly con- 
 sideration for the peaceful inhabitants of the conquered coun- 
 tries, which must endure as long as history lives. The King's 
 speech closed the last scene of the war of 1866. 
 
 The King started for Berlin immediately, and the troops of 
 the First Army, who were reviewed on the 31st, began their 
 northward march the following morning. During the occupa- 
 tion of the Austrian provinces the head-quarters of Prince 
 Frederick Charles were ordered to be established at Prague, 
 and his army to lie between that city and the Thaya, with the 1 ' 
 Army of the Elbe on its west and the Second Army on its 
 north and east. On the morning of the first of August, the 
 last of the Prussian troops broke up from their positions on the f 
 Marchfeld, and began to retrace their steps towards the north* 
 There was no need now to advance prepared to form up for 
 battle, no scouts were required to steal along in front of the 
 columns, skirmishers were not required to beat through the 7 
 woods and search the villages alongside of the line of march, 
 the staff-officers did not need to ride forward to gaze anxiously 
 through their field-glasses for indications of an enemy, so the c: 
 troops were allowed to march easily and carelessly along, ancf -'■ 
 as far as possible the marches were arranged so that the infantry? 
 might move by separate roads from the cavalry and artillery, 
 and press forward at their own pace, unincommoded by horse- 
 men or waggons. Though only two-thirds of the First Army :; 
 remained to be reviewed by the King on the 31st, and the rest V: 
 were already several marches before them, it was wonderful tc 
 see what an extent of country was occupied by the same troops 
 when moving which two days before were clumped together or 
 the small strip of ground near Ganserndorf. Along every road 
 and every lane poured long columns : here battalions of in 
 fantry, formed of soldiers swinging along carelessly in loos« 
 formation and with open ranks, generally singing in loud chorus 
 the Prussian equivalent to " Home, sweet home," " Meir' 
 schones Heimath's Land;" there, long glittering lines 
 cuirassiers twisted and twined between willow-trees and vinef 
 yards, standing out with their burnished armour bright an 
 clear against the green foliage of the copses or thickly-plantec 
 
 to 
 
I'hap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 435 
 
 ines ; further off the march of a regiment of Uhlans could be 
 . letected by the tall spears and fluttering pennons which rose 
 ove a swelling piece of ground or a plantation of dwarfed 
 ak ; while a heavy, rumbling noise, toned down by distance, 
 .irough which rose faintly the voices of the singing soldiers, 
 aid that the batteries were moving along the main road to 
 likolsburg. Every village was teeming with soldiers, who 
 ere quartered in every house ; but, though the inhabitants 
 ere often inconvenienced by having to find the requisite 
 ccommodation for the men, they were very friendly, though 
 , ley did not scruple openly to say they were extremely glad it 
 'as the last time they would be obliged to be the involuntary 
 osts of the multitudes of foreigners who, however agreeable 
 nd friendly, still took up a great deal of room. The villages 
 f this part of the country had a harder time than those of 
 tohemia and Moravia, inasmuch as for many days the whole 
 f the Prussian armies had been concentrated between Nikols- 
 urg and the Roszbach, but by some wonderful means every 
 illage now had plenty of food and wine to sell to hungry and 
 .lirsty officers and soldiers — a marvellous fact, for they had 
 een long shut out from Vienna, whence the inhabitants said 
 hey drew all their usual supplies ; but as this was a good wine 
 ountry, and poultry and eggs do not generally come out of 
 apital cities, it is just possible that these statements might 
 iave been advanced as an excuse for the high prices by means 
 »f which they were doing their best to wring from the pockets 
 >f the passing Prussians a set-off against the heavy taxes they 
 xpected to be levied by the Austrian Government to pay the 
 xpenses of the war. Still, the villagers and the soldiers were 
 >n excellent terms ; and as the troops were parading on the 
 st, to march away, there was a good deal of hand-shaking and 
 |oud protestations of mutual esteem and good-will. The inha- 
 lants made no complaints against the troops, and had no 
 ;rounds to make any. The soldiers spoke well of their enter- 
 ainers, though there was a theory in the ranks that the won- 
 lerful abundance of wine was only a direct consequence of the 
 .dmirable supply of water which the valley of the March boasts, 
 nd some of the men could detail graphically the different 
 ' .Tadations of colour, from purple to very light red, which their 
 
 T? T7 -"> 
 
 :etr« 
 
s: 
 
 ■r. 
 
 p 
 
 436 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 daily beverage underwent during the period of the Prussian 
 occupation of the district. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 1st, the head-quarters of the First 
 Army were all ready to march in the direction of Iglau, en 
 route for Prague, where they were to be established until the Z 
 conclusion of peace, or until such an apparently improbable 
 event should occur as the expiration of the armistice without 
 the conclusion of a treaty. When all was ready, horses 
 saddled, saddle-bags packed, and every preparation had been 
 made to evacuate Ebenthal, a telegram arrived ordering 
 Prince Frederick Charles to march to Lundenburg, and thence 
 to proceed by rail with some of his troops to the capital 
 of Bohemia. The field post-office and some of the baggage 
 had already moved off and were well on their way to a village 
 named Peirawerth, which would have been the first halting- 
 place had the original route been adhered to. It was useless 
 to recall them, so orders were sent to them to move to Zister- 
 dorf, where the staff joined them on the morning of the 2nd, 
 after a short march over the undulating country which lies 
 between the March and the great highway from Nikolsburg to 
 Vienna. The land was now bare of its corn crops, for the 
 harvest was already nearly over, and stretched away in a rolling 
 plain of bare stubble land, broken here and there by bright! 
 green patches of vineyard, which contrasted refreshingly with 
 the monotonous yellow, or by clumps of pollard willows or 
 stunted oaks, which cluster round the little water-courses in 
 the holloAvs. A miserable little town at the best of times, off 
 the main road, hot, white and dusty, Zisterdorf that day looked r- 
 worse than usual ; it had been for some time occupied by 
 troops, who had left untidy souvenirs of the encampments of 
 horses in the market-place and streets in the shape of remnants 
 of down-trodden straw and fodder. Every house had been 
 more or less tenanted by soldiers, and the traces of their visit 
 were still extant in the crushed bundles of straw which formed 
 their sleeping-places, and now lay in most of the rooms disre- 
 garded by the dirty inhabitants, and afforded a copious supply 
 of waifs and strays to be carried by the feet of every one who 
 went out of the house along the passages and into the unpaved 
 street, where the marks of the numerous waggons which had 
 
dte 
 
 hap. IV.] THE TRUCE, 437 
 
 assed through the town were preserved in deep rough ruts 
 ink far into the mud, which had since been hardened by the 
 eat of the sun. But men who were turning homewards from 
 le end of a successful campaign faced cheerfully even the 
 irty rooms and straw-covered floors of this worst class of 
 •erman village ; so the staff-officers did not grumble, but made 
 p their minds to it, and looked forward to Prague as a happy 
 aven, where clean beds would at last be found.* 
 A march of twenty-five miles brought the head-quarters of 
 le First Army on the 3rd August to the village of Eisgrub, 
 here they were established in the chateau of Prince Lichten- 
 ein, said to be the most beautiful country-seat in the terri- 
 ries of the Kaiser. The chateau inside consisted of long 
 ^ries of wide halls, high corridors, and magnificent rooms, 
 scorated and adorned with oak carving of rare workmanship, 
 id precious suits of ancient armour, where stood furniture of 
 quisite finish and taste, and the walls of which were hung 
 ith glorious old pictures recording the noble deeds done by 
 e house of Lichtenstein. Outside stretched away into the 
 r distance long vistas of pleasure-grounds, the green turf of 
 hich was thickly studded with clumps of full-grown cedars, 
 lip-trees, and coppice-beech, grouped among other more 
 
 * It may not be uninteresting for any one who happens to have that rare 
 2ce of property, a good map of this part of the country, to see how the 
 fferent divisions of this army were billeted, as it serves as an example of 
 e manner in which divisions have been quartered during the advance, and 
 ows what extent of country each body of troops occupies in its nightly 
 larters when moving. The fifth infantry division occupied Laab, Hof- 
 
 , Ruhhof, Rothenseehof, Neudorf, Neusiedl, Hanitthal, Reiselbrechts- 
 >rf, Wiilzershofen. The sixth division was in Gross Teijar, Erdberg, 
 lein, Grillowitz, Waltrowitz, Klein Olkowitz, Zulb, Klietemanns, Raissen- 
 •iick, Josewitz, Isefeld, Malberg, Zwingendorf, Derhhof, Carlhof; the 
 venth division, in Guttenfeld, Bartelsbriinn, Schafferhof, Stuttenhof, 
 
 rau, Wildendiirnbach, Poltenhof, Ruffersdorf, Kirchstatden, Zabern, 
 alkenstein, Pugsbriinn, Stutzenhofen, Gutenbriinn, Offenthal, Schwen- 
 irth; the eighth division, in Nikolsburg, Voitelsbrunn, Drasenhofen, 
 unstkirchen, Steinabrun, Garrenthal, Haithof, Feldsberg, Eisgrub, 
 eudek, Pilgram, Evrett, Mitlowitz. The reserve artillery was parked 
 
 Grussbach, Neuhof, Sihoenau, Grafendorf, Auschanhof, Trollersdorf, 
 eusiedl, Pardorf, Illemnitz, Bergen, Dannowitz, Weistenitz, Gulden- 
 rth. It may be seen from this what an extent of country even a small 
 )rtion of this army required, for the above list does not include the 
 larters of the cavalry corps, but of only four infantry divisions, with their 
 serve artillery. 
 
438 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 ieip : 
 fan':' 
 
 12: 
 
 bottle. 
 
 
 common but not less beautiful trees, with so high a skill that 
 all trace of art was concealed, and Nature was courted so 
 skilfully as to be outrivalled. The river Thaya, which flows 
 through the grounds, was by hidden means constrained to form 
 wide lakes or narrow winding creeks of dark blue water, which 
 in some places washed with a tiny wave raised by the gentle 
 summer breeze against sloping banks of emerald turf, sometimes 
 lay calm and still under the shelter of the woods, reflecting the 
 light green weeping willows which overshadowed it, and floated 
 their lowest leaves upon the surface. Where the trees did not 
 occupy the ground, bright beds of carefully-tended flowers, 
 jets of water springing from quaintly constructed fountains, 
 orange-trees loaded with bright yellow fruit, flowering shrubs 
 covered with full blossoms, and bushes of nearly full-blown \ 
 roses of every shade and hue, threw just the proper amount of c 
 life into the picture to prevent it from being melancholy, and 
 make it sublime. Never had it been more admired than on 
 this day. Men who had come over down-trodden corn-fields, ."' 
 destroyed villages, woods cut away for palisades or abattis, and 
 trees torn down and shivered by tempests of shells, required 
 no knowledge of landscape gardening, no wisdom in architec- 
 ture, to make them heartfelt admirers of the peaceful prospect 
 here; they saw its beauty, and felt it. Prince Lichtenstein 
 himself could not have been more satisfied than his unknown 
 guests that his property lay where no skirmish had to be 
 fought, no defence made in his chateau, and no attack directed 
 against it. 
 
 The head-quarters of the Crown Prince had been here for 
 twelve days before the place was occupied by Prince Frederick 
 Charles, but no traces had been left of the former tenants; 
 either in the house itself or the adjoining grounds. Troops 
 had been in and around Eisgrub for more than a fortnight, ye! 
 no trees had been broken, no grass cut up by horses' feet, ncj 
 flower-beds trampled down ; all the servants and inhabitants; 
 with two exceptions, were well pleased with the Prussians, anc 
 were perfectly satisfied that the soldiers they had been tolc 
 were little better than barbarians were very easy-going quie 
 sort of people after all. The two exceptions were the chie 
 butler and the head gamekeeper. The former had a grea 
 
 
:hap. IV.] THE TRUCE 439 
 
 grievance — the whole of the wine in the cellar of Feldsberg, a 
 neighbouring property which also belongs to the Lichtenstein 
 
 ) family, had been " required" by the Prussian commissariat. It 
 was in vain to urge that some of it had been thirty years in 
 bottle, that it would not bear carriage, or even that the key of 
 the cellar had been lost. The commissariat officers would take 
 no denial ; if keys were not forthcoming, doors could be broken 
 open ; as for the not standing carriage, the troops would take 
 
 , their chance of that, and probably the great age of the wine 
 would compensate for any deterioration it might undergo by 
 shaking. Finding all excuses unavailing, the unwilling func- 
 tionary had to yield up his keys, and in silent agony to see 
 what he had watched with an almost fatherly care for many 
 years, and had been intended for the consumption of far more 
 delicate connoisseurs, carried out of the cellars by working 
 parties of soldiers, stowed away in rough provision waggons, 
 and carted off to be served out as rations to Prussian troops. 
 What comfort was it to him that he was assured the wine would 
 be paid for when the war was over ? No money could buy 
 such vintages again, and even if it could, the present generation 
 :ould barely hope to drink it. 
 
 The second complainant, the gamekeeper, was more in- 
 dignant than sorrowful ; it appeared that a number of soldiers 
 belonging to some regiment of the Second Army quartered near 
 Eisgrub organized a battue on their own account, and with 
 their needle-guns succeeded in killing a large number of the 
 deer which were in the park. " But/' as he said triumphantly, 
 "we forwarded a complaint to the Crown Prince himself." This 
 step, by the tone in which it was announced, seems to be sup- 
 posed to have resulted in some terrible punishment being 
 inflicted on the nefarious sportsmen who expended Prussian 
 Government ammunition on unoffending stags, instead of 
 against the enemies of their country \ but what was actually 
 the fate of these violators of the game laws, or whether, as the 
 gamekeeper evidently thinks, the Commander-in-chief of the 
 Second Army carried out some such penalty against the delin- 
 quents as those which were enacted by the laws of William the 
 Conqueror against similar offenders, has not been recorded. It 
 is certain that a body of military police remained as watchers 
 
44° SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of the deer park during the rest of the time that the Army of 
 Silesia was here, and that after the appeal to its commander no 
 zundnadd-gewehr prevented the deer from roaming about in 
 undisturbed safety. 
 
 On the 2nd August the King's head-quarters moved to 
 Prague ; the next day he went to Berlin, whither he was 
 accompanied by the Crown Prince, to be present at the open- 
 ing of the Prussian Chambers. The troops of the First Army 
 were about Eisgrub that night, the next day most of them 
 crossed the Thaya. The head-quarters of Prince Frederick 
 Charles left Lundenburg on the morning of the 4th, and by 
 that evening every Prussian soldier was out of the Crown lands 
 of Austria. There was great reason to rejoice that the army 
 was now free to move its position, and was not tied down by 
 the necessities of war to the Duchy of Austria, for cholera had 
 within the last few days broken out among the inhabitants with 
 great violence. In Lundenburg the people were said to be 
 dying at the rate of ten an hour; this appeared to be the 
 exaggerated report of the frightened inhabitants, but there is 
 no doubt that the pestilence was very prevalent, and was 
 causing much mortality among the country people. The 
 Prussian troops had suffered, but not to a very great extent, 
 and more cases had been cured than had proved fatal. It was 
 hoped that change of quarters, rest, and plenty of food would 
 soon free the troops of the disease ; but it was feared that it 
 would rage among the natives, who had little to eat, and could 
 hope for little from the vintage, for the late frost in this spring 
 nipped the early vines, and almost ruined the crop of grapes. 
 
 On the morning of the 5th August, at four o'clock, the head- 
 quarters of the First Prussian Army broke up from Eisgrub, by 
 a short march reached Lundenburg station, and thence by 
 railway to Prague, where Prince Frederick Charles remained 
 until peace was definitely signed, and no possibility remained 
 of his army being required again for the present. Although 
 only one battalion of Jagers formed the escort of the train 
 which brought the Prince and his staff, yet the number of 
 carriages required to convey the whole of the heads of depart 
 ments who moved with head-quarters, their servants and horses 
 was very great ; and on account of the numerous curves in the 
 

 : 
 
 
 •::: 
 
 Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 44i 
 
 -Tnyi line, the long train was only able to jolt so slowly along that, 
 although it left Lundenburg at half-past six in the morning, it 
 did not arrive at Prague till midnight. Slow and tedious as 
 the journey was, and much as at the time the impatient officers 
 grumbled, they had good cause to be grateful for the tardiness 
 with which it was driven, for the next morning intelligence was 
 received which told that a train, following a few hours after, in 
 \~ trying to go faster, met with a terrible accident. On account 
 of the great amount of military traffic on the line, which had 
 lately formed the artery of communication and supplies for the 
 three united Prussian armies, railway carriages had been 
 brought from Saxony and even Prussia to supply the necessary 
 transport. These carriages for the most part ran on three 
 pairs of wheels, instead of on two, as do those which in time of 
 peace run along this line, and which for the most part the 
 Austrian s drew back with them when they retreated. The 
 Saxon carriages, built for straighter lines and gentler curves, 
 were very liable on such a line as that which from Briinn twists 
 and winds up the valley to Prerau to run off the rails. It was 
 thus that the accident occurred. One of the six-wheeled car- 
 riages flew off the rails, turned over, and formed a barricade, 
 against which and each other the twelve succeeding ones were 
 shivered. Five men were killed, and eight were seriously hurt ; 
 many horses suffered, and seven belonging to the King were 
 killed. This unfortunate accident affords a moral, inasmuch 
 that it shows that not only must the permanent way be entire 
 and safe, but the rolling stock used must be suited to the par- 
 ticular line, if railways are required to afford in time of war not 
 only powerful but also rapid means of transport. 
 
 The railway journey was from the front to far in the rear of 
 the great Prussian armies. At Lundenburg, and for some 
 distance north, all the roads which could be seen from the line 
 were swarming with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, winding 
 slowly along in a northerly direction ; further on were reserve 
 store trains, ammunition columns, heavy artillery, and all the 
 numerous waggons which must follow in the rear of a great 
 host of fighting men ; at Briinn was a garrison of Mulbe's re- 
 serve corps, the soldiers of which crowded the station to catch 
 a glimpse of the Commander-in-chief of the First Army ; here, 
 
 I 
 
 
442 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 too, were the officers of the staff of the Crown Prince, who 
 were waiting here till they received definite orders as to their 
 further journey from their commander, who had been hurried 
 to Berlin to take part in the opening of the Chambers. Further 
 north, beside roads and near villages, could be seen dark blue 
 heavy waggons, packed in regular order, which formed the rear- 
 most line of the reserve artillery and ammunition trains, and 
 further north still the stations and towns were garrisoned by 
 regiments of Landwehr. 
 
 Nothing could be more striking to Englishmen, who had 
 long been accustomed to hear the Prussian army described as a 
 sort of hurried levy of untrained militiamen, than the appear- 
 ance of these troops. Fine and strong as were the men who 
 fought in the foremost ranks during the campaign, Prussia had 
 in reserve behind them troops formed of soldiers equally tall, 
 equally strong, older and better grown, in these Landwehr 
 levies. Most of the privates are men of good situation in life, 
 for, after completing their terms of service in the Line, they go 
 into business or professions, and generally have secured com- 
 fortable incomes ; but at the call of their country they quit 
 their affairs, and return to serve in the ranks, and bring with 
 them to their soldier's duty an education and intelligence which 
 can be found in the armies of no other country in Europe ; 
 nor, as can be seen from the garrison of this place, have they 
 in private life forgotten one item of their former military train- 
 ing. They are grand troops, the very beau ideal of a soldiery I 
 and they are well led, for their officers, nearly all of noble 
 birth, are men who have formerly served in the army, and who 
 in time of peace live upon their estates in the same districts as 
 the soldiers they command in war are drawn from ; so that 
 these Landwehr levies unite with their superior education and 
 intelligence a chivalrous affection for their chief, such as cha- 
 racterised the privates of the bands who fought so gallantly for 
 the House of Stuart. 
 
 The Landwehr soon began to move back into Prussia, and 
 were disbanded to return to their homes ; their places were 
 taken by the troops of the armies, which had been engaged in 
 the field, and which occupied the greater part of Bohemia and 
 Moravia until the conclusion of the definite treaty of peace. 
 
Chap. IV.] 
 
 THE TRUCE. 
 
 443 
 
 The city of Prague was not visibly affected by the presence 
 of a Prussian garrison. The shops were ail open ; trade went 
 on even more briskly than usual, for the Landwehr officers 
 were generally rich, and spent their money freely ; but it must 
 have taken the citizens some time to recover from the officers 
 and soldiers of the garrison the money they had to contribute 
 for the expenses of the occupation of their town by the 
 Prussians. 
 
 Prince Albrecht, the commander of the cavalry corps, 
 reached Prague on the ioth of August, but he did not bring his 
 troops with him, for they had been scattered through the 
 country to facilitate the supply of the large amount of pro- 
 visions and forage which so many horsemen daily required. 
 The infantry of the armies of Prince Frederick Charles, the 
 Crown Prince, and the Army of the Elbe, were also scattered 
 through Bohemia and Moravia in small divisions, which took 
 up the positions they held until the plenipotentiaries who were 
 assembling at Prague had affixed their signatures to the 
 definitive treaty of peace. 
 
 Some of the infantry corps of the Guard were stationed at 
 Prague for a few days, but only as a temporary measure. 
 
 On the ioth August a brigade of cavalry of the Guard 
 corps marched through the town on their way to the north, for 
 the whole of this corps was to be scattered among the villages 
 between Prague and Theresienstadt. This brigade consisted 
 of the garde du corps, the cuirassiers of the Guard, and a bat- 
 tery of the horse artillery of the Guard; it was the heavy 
 brigade of the Guard cavalry, and corresponds in the Prussian 
 service to our Household cavalry. The garde du corps were 
 dressed in the same way as our cuirassiers ; their men, though 
 not so tall as the soldiers of the Life-guards, looked as if they 
 rode heavier upon their horses, for they carried, even upon 
 active service, the long black boot, and were encumbered with 
 an enormous kit. Their uniform was white, their cuirasses and 
 helmets of a burnished golden colour ; the men looked strong, 
 solid, and healthy; the horses were thin, but in wonderful con- 
 dition, considering that they had within seven weeks marched 
 from Prussian Silesia to the banks of the Danube and back to 
 Prague. The Guard cuirassiers, who followed, were dressed 
 
444 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 in the same manner as the garde du corps, except that they had 
 blue facings instead of scarlet, and wore the ordinary cavalry 
 overall. The long squadrons of bright bay horses looked ex- 
 ceedingly well, and even the most prejudiced advocate of light 
 cavalry, and nothing but light cavalry, if he had that day seen 
 Prince Albrecht's heavy horsemen returning from their cam- 
 paign, must have owned that the days in which heavy cavalry 
 are of use in war are not yet numbered. The experience of 
 this campaign has taught that needle-guns and rifled artillery 
 have no more driven cavalry, and even very heavy cavalry, 
 from the field of battle than they have from the theatre of war; 
 but it has been found that, in the shock of closing squadrons, 
 small men and light horses must go down before the powerful 
 onset of stouter assailants. The Prussians found that, in future, 
 cavalry must be formed and equipped so as to allow strong 
 troopers to be brought into the field ; but strong troopers ride 
 heavily, and heavy loads tell fearfully on horses on the line of 
 march ; so, to secure power in the charge with rapidity of move- 
 ment, the dead weight which cavalry horses now carry must be 
 reduced almost to nothing, and the horse must be required to 
 bear little more than the rider, his amis, his cloak, and a light 
 saddle. Valises will have to be carried in waggons in rear of 
 the regiments, or left at some convenient place whence they 
 can be forwarded to the front by railway or water transport 
 when the army halts. In this war the Prussian cavalry gained 
 a glorious and unexpected reputation from its conduct in the 
 field ; but its horses suffered much from marching, especially 
 in crossing the highland country which lies on the frontiers of 
 Bohemia and Moravia. The cavalry felt the effects of the 
 rapid movements more than the infantry; yet the Prussian 
 foot-soldier marched under almost every disadvantage which 
 dress could inflict. His helmet was horrible, both as to com- 
 fort and appearance, his clothes were uncomfortable, the 
 trousers without gaiters hung clammily against the calf on a 
 rainy day, or collected inside them a layer of mud which 
 rubbed uneasily against the ankle. The inconvenience of the 
 dress was shown whenever a battalion started to march ; the 
 first thing the soldier did was to divest himself of his helmet, 
 and sling it from his waist-belt, where it dangled uncomfortably 
 
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 445 
 
 against his legs ; he unbuttoned his coat, and after a few days' 
 experience scarcely ever omitted to stuff the lower parts of his 
 trousers into his boots, which thus afforded a gaiter with the 
 advantage of requiring neither buttons nor straps, as do those 
 in use in most armies. Prussian officers themselves acknow- 
 ledged that the dress of their army could not be compared 
 to that of the Austrians either for efficiency or appearance. It 
 only shows what splendid stuff the Prussian troops are made 
 of when they performed such prodigies of marching as marked 
 their victorious course under these disadvantages, and also 
 weighed down by their heavy knapsacks, which, although of a 
 better construction than those of most armies, were hardly 
 required, and though present were seldom looked into in the 
 actual campaign. Railways and improved roads have made 
 great alterations in the necessities of a warrior, both by short- 
 ening the duration of campaigns and facilitating transport. 
 Europe will never again see any decently-organized army 
 waiting many weeks for the arrival of a siege train, for the 
 carriage of which all available transport is required, so that 
 from want of means of sending stores forward the troops in 
 the front are shivering in tattered clothes and suffering pain- 
 fully from unbooted feet. Soldiers need no longer be weighed 
 down by heavy loads upon their backs, held back from their 
 real use- -marching and fighting — to be converted into beasts 
 of burden. A. spare shirt, a change of shoes, and a pot 
 of grease, is about all that a foot-soldier need carry with him, 
 besides his arms, ammunition, and some food. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th, the greater part of the first 
 division of the infantry of the Guard marched into the town, 
 and marched past before Prince Frederick Charles. Some of 
 the division had arrived a few days before, but only that day 
 made their formal entrance with their comrades, who early 
 that morning reached the suburbs. In an open space about a 
 mile and a half without the ramparts the whole of the troops 
 who were to march in were assembled about eight o'clock, and 
 a little after began moving towards the Ross Thor. There 
 they filed through the gate, halted at the top of the market- 
 place for a few moments to form their columns, passed before 
 the Prince, and disappeared into the narrow winding streets 
 
446 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 beyond, some to take up billets for a few days in the town, 
 others to pass through and move to their positions in the vil- 
 lages further north. The scarlet and gold squadrons of the 
 Guard hussars led the way, the most smartly-equipped regiment 
 in the Prussian service, whose officers wear the Hessian boot, 
 the true leg-dress of the cavalry soldier. Behind them came 
 the first infantry regiment of the Guard, with their white facings 
 and silver ornaments ; this is the celebrated regiment of Pots- 
 dam grenadiers, to fill the ranks of which with enormous men 
 Frederick William I. culled giants out of every country in 
 Europe, and made every Prussian Embassy, from London to 
 Vienna, a recruiting-office. The men are not quite so tall now 
 as those handed down to Frederick the Great ; but still they 
 worthily support the title of grenadiers, for no private in the 
 battalions was less than six feet high, and the stature of the 
 greater part exceeded that figure. The companies were weak, 
 for many of the tall soldiers who marched with their eagles 
 from Prussia sleep at Chlum beside the chief who led them 
 forth, General Hiller ; many were in hospital with wounds, and 
 not a few had been left behind on account of sickness ; for the 
 cholera had been among those who passed through the action 
 of Trautenau and came scatheless out of the battle of Konig- 
 gratz. Then came the fusiliers of the Guard, not quite so big 
 as those who had gone before, but on the average taller men 
 than the English Footguards. Behind these marched the dark 
 green sections of the Jagers of the Guard, whose recruits are 
 picked from all the foresters and gamekeepers of Prussia — 
 marksmen of unerring aim, skirmishers of high intelligence, 
 who know full well how to avail themselves of every stump and 
 hillock, and how, lurking behind shelter, themselves in safety, 
 with every bullet to bring down an enemy. 
 
 A gap of some hundred yards separated the Jagers from the 
 second brigade, first in which came the 2nd regiment, men and 
 officers marching in forage caps. There was not a helmet to 
 be seen in their ranks, for on going into action at Trautenau 
 this regiment to a man threw away their heavy helmets, and 
 thus rid themselves for the campaign of a cumbrous head-dress 
 in a manner which did not draw forth such unqualified approval 
 from the military authorities as did their conduct on the line of 
 
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 447 
 
 march or under fire. Behind the foot soldiers came the artil- 
 lery of the division, followed by the provision columns and 
 ambulance waggons, whose fine-drawn horses told of many a 
 heavy pull over the rugged roads of Bohemia and Moravia. 
 
 The parade marching of the infantry of the Prussian Guard 
 has been renowned ever since its recruits were so harshly drilled 
 by the stern soldier who first formed it. Since that time great 
 alterations have been made both in the tactics and treatment 
 of the men ; the Prussian grenadiers no longer move in the 
 field in the stiff unbending formation which regarded soldiers 
 only as machines. But while the Prussians have lately adopted 
 a system of manoeuvres for field service which unites immense 
 elasticity with great rapidity of movement, they have not failed 
 to observe that the foundation of all tactical pliability lies in 
 previous solidity and precision ; that troops who cannot move 
 well on parade rarely can be of much use in service, and that 
 before infantry soldiers can dash about as skirmishers they must 
 be able to move accurately in more solid formation. This was 
 well shown by the Guards who marched into Prague on the 
 17th August. As the battalions passed the Prince not a line 
 wavered, not an opening was seen between the shoulders of 
 the men; solid and compact, the companies swept rapidly 
 along in lines as even as if they had been ruled, while 
 every foot fell in measured cadence to describe a step of equal 
 length. 
 
 The 1 8th was the birthday of the Emperor of Austria. Not- 
 withstanding the presence of the Prussian garrison, it was 
 celebrated with all due honours by the civil guard of the town. 
 Early in the morning the town guards paraded, and marched 
 through the street with sprigs of oak leaf in their hats, music 
 playing, and swords drawn, while numbers of Prussian soldiers 
 off duty crowded the foot pavements to gaze at them, and 
 Prussian guards turned out to present arms to the Austrian 
 standard of the ancient city of Prague, which was carried in 
 their midst. After the civil guard had marched through the 
 principal streets, the fire engines followed, decked with flags 
 and preceded by a band. The Prussian authorities made no 
 objection to the celebration of the day; in fact, they encou- 
 raged it, for they made a point of allowing everything to go on 
 
448 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 in the Austrian towns they occupied as if no foreign troops 
 were present, and no Prussian sentries stood upon the ramparts 
 or occupied the guard houses. In consequence there was good 
 feeling between the soldiers and the townspeople, between 
 whom there arose many personal friendships, though the latter 
 did not scruple, even openly, to say that, though they found 
 the Prussians much more pleasant than they could have ex- 
 pected any enemies to be, they would not be sorry when their 
 visit was over, and Prague was again garrisoned by the white 
 uniforms of the Kaiser. 
 
 On the 19th, some more of the Guard corps marched into 
 the town, while those that arrived two days before marched out 
 to the north to occupy positions nearer Theresienstadt, and to 
 make room for the new arrivals. The troops that came in 
 were the yellow Uhlans of the Guard and the Elizabeth regi- 
 ment. The infantry arrived very dusty, for they had a long 
 march in the morning ; but they went through the streets up to 
 the Pulver Thurm, near which Prince Frederick Charles was 
 waiting to receive them, with the same even front and steady 
 tramp as the grenadiers who came in two days before, and 
 swept past the Commander-in-chief of the First Army in the 
 unwavering lines which always characterize a Prussian parade. 
 The men of this regiment, destined for lighter duties, were not 
 so tall or stout as those of the first brigade, but they were still 
 large men, with great depth and breadth of chest, and, though 
 dusty, looked anything but tired from the hot march. The 
 cavalry, like all lancers, looked smart, and, except that the 
 horses were thinner than when they left Berlin, and that some 
 of the squadron did not show their proper strength, exhibited 
 small signs of having just come off a campaign. The people 
 of Prague were so much accustomed now to the perpetual 
 arrival of troops that few generally collected to see a regiment 
 march in, but on this day, as the troops arrived just as mass 
 was over and the congregations were pouring out of the 
 churches, a considerable crowd stopped to gaze upon the 
 Prussian guardsmen, who marched along between the thronged 
 pavements, overtopping like giants the staring Bohemians. 
 Some Austrian officers who were prisoners on parole, several 
 having their arms in slings, on account of wounds received at 
 
.:: 
 
 (Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 449 
 
 JMunchengratz or Sadowa, could not conceal their admiration 
 of the Prussian troops. For a time they gazed silently ; but as 
 company after company swept along, their countenances 
 brightened up, and as the last battalion came they could no 
 longer refrain from expressing in words their surprise and 
 wonder that soldiers could be so perfectly trained within a 
 period of three years' service. Fine as the men were who 
 marched into Prague, many held that they did not come up to 
 the Landwehr levies. The latter are older men and better 
 filled out, and their ranks contain those whose education has 
 been supplemented by application to trades or professions ; and 
 Landwehr men are not men who have been hastily recruited 
 and rawly trained, they have all served for three years in the 
 regular ranks, they are all true soldiers, and soldiers of such a 
 sort as every general and every statesman would wish to see 
 available for the service of his country. 
 
 The definitive treaty of peace was signed between Austria 
 and Prussia at the Blue Star Hotel at Prague, on the 23rd 
 August Austria was represented by Baron Brenner, Prussia 
 by Baron Werther, as Count Bismarck had gone to Berlin at 
 the same time as the King, to be present at the opening of the 
 Chambers on the 5th August. 
 
 The treaty of peace definitively signed, was as follows : — 
 
 " In the name of the Holy and Indivisible Trinity. 
 
 " His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of 
 Austria, animated by a desire of restoring the blessings of peace to their 
 dominions, have resolved to convert the Preliminaries signed at Nikolsburg 
 on the 26th of July, 1866, into a definitive Treaty of Peace. 
 
 " To this end their Majesties have appointed their plenipotentiaries as 
 follows:— 
 
 * His Majesty the King of Prussia : — 
 
 ' His Kammerherr, Effective Privy Councillor and Plenipotentiary, 
 Charles Baron von Werther, Grand Cross of the Royal Prussian Order 
 Df the Red Eagle with Oakdeaves, and of the Imperial Austrian Order of 
 Leopold; and, 
 
 "' His Majesty the Emperor of Austria : — 
 
 ' His Effective Privy Councillor and Kammerherr, Ambassador Extra- 
 Drdinary and Plenipotentiary, Adoiph Marie Baron von Brenner Tilsach, of 
 .he Imperial Austrian Order of Leopold, and Knight of the Royal Prussian 
 Drder of the Red Eagle, First Class, &c. 
 
 " Who have met in Conference at Prague, and having exchanged their 
 Dowers, drawn up in good and proper form, have agreed to the following- 
 articles : 
 
 "Article i. — For the future there shall be lasting peace and friendship 
 
45° SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 between His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of 
 Austria, as well as between their heirs and descendants, their States and 
 subjects. 
 
 "Article 2. — That the 6th Article of the Preliminaries of Peace signed 
 at Nikolsburg on the 26th of July of this year may be carried out ; and in- 
 asmuch as His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by his authorised emis- 
 sary to His Majesty the King of Prussia, officially declared at Nikolsburg on 
 the 29th of the same month of July, qtien ce qui concerne le Gouvernement 
 de PEmpereur la Venise est acquise a P Italie pour lui etre remise a, la paix, 
 His Majesty the Emperor of Austria on his part conforms to this declaration, 
 and gives his consent to the union of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom with 
 the Kingdom of Italy, without imposing any other condition than the liqui- 
 dation of those debts which have been acknowledged charges on the terri- 
 tories now resigned, in conformity with the Treaty of Zurich. 
 
 "Article 3. — The prisoners of war shall be at once released on both 
 sides. 
 
 " Article 4. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria recognises the dis- 
 solution of the late German Bund, and gives his consent to a new formation 
 of Germany, in which the Imperial State of Austria shall take no part. 
 Moreover, His Majesty promises to recognise the closer Federal relations 
 which Flis Majesty the King of Prussia is about to establish north of the 
 line of the Maine, and also agrees that the German States to the south 
 of this line shall form an union, the national connection of which with 
 the Northern Confederacy is reserved for a more defined agreement be- 
 tween both parties, and which is to maintain an international independent 
 existence. 
 
 "Article 5. — His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to His 
 Majesty the King of Prussia all the rights he acquired under the Peace of 
 Vienna on the 30th of October, 1864, to the Duchies of Holstein and 
 Schleswig, with the understanding that the people of the northern district 
 of Schleswig, if, by free vote they express a wish to be united to Denmark, 
 shall be ceded to Denmark accordingly. 
 
 "Article 6. — At the desire of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, 
 His Majesty the King of Prussia declares himself willing, on the approach- 
 ing changes in Germany, to allow the territory of the Kingdom of Saxony 
 to remain within its present limits, reserving to himself the right of settling 
 in a separate Treaty of Peace with the King of Saxony the share to be con- 
 tributed by Saxony towards the expenses of the war, and the position hence- 
 forth to be held by *he Kingdom of Saxony within the North German Con- 
 federation. On the other hand, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria 
 promises to recognise the changes about to be made in North Germany by 
 His Majesty the King of Prussia, territorial changes included. 
 
 "Article 7. — In order to settle the property of the late Bund a Com- 
 mission shall meet at Frankfort-on-the-Maine within, at most, six weeks 
 after the ratification of the present Treaty, at which all formal claims and 
 demands upon the German Bund are to be made, and to be liquidated 
 within six months. Prussia and Austria will be represented in this Com- ?■ 
 mission, and all the States belonging to the late Bund are allowed the same 
 privilege. 
 
 "Article 8. — Austria is at liberty to take from the forts of the late 
 Bund ail that belongs to the Empire, and from the moveable property of the 
 Bund the proportionate share of Austria, or otherwise to dispose thereof. 
 This provision extends to all the moveable property of the Bund. 
 
 "Article 9. — The civil officers, servants and pensioners of the Bund 
 
 f 
 
 s-- 
 
 
 
Chap. IV.] 
 
 THE TRUCE. 
 
 45i 
 
 will receive the pensions already accorded in due proportion, but the Royal 
 Prussian Government undertakes to manage the pensions and allowances 
 hitherto paid from the Treasury of the Bund to the officer^ of the late 
 Schleswig-Holstein army and their families. 
 
 "Article 10. — The allowance of the pensions granted by the Imperial 
 Austrian Government in Holstein is agreed upon. The sum of 449,500 
 dollars Danish in 4 per cent. Danish bonds now lodged in the hands 
 of the Imperial Austrian Government, and belonging to the Holstein 
 Treasury, will be repaid immediately after the ratification of this Treaty. 
 No adherent of the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, and no subject 
 of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, is 
 to be prosecuted, troubled, or in any way molested in his person or his 
 property on account of his political position during recent events and the 
 recent war. 
 
 " Article ii. — In order to defray a portion of the expenses incurred by 
 Prussia on account of the war, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria pro- 
 mises to pay to His Majesty the King of Prussia the sum of 40,000,000 
 Prussian dollars. From this sum, however, the amount of the costs of war 
 which, by virtue of the 12th Article of the before-mentioned Treaty of 
 Vienna of the 30th of October, 1864, His Majesty the Emperor claims irom 
 the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, and which are valued at 15,000,000 
 Prussian dollars, together with 5,000,000 Prussian dollars as an equivalent 
 for the free maintenance of the Prussian army in the Austrian States which 
 it occupied till the conclusion of the peace, is to be deducted, so that only 
 20,000,000 Prussian dollars remain to be paid. Of this sum half is to be 
 paid on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, the other half three 
 weeks afterwards. 
 
 Article 12. — The evacuation of the Austrian territories now occupied 
 by the Royal Prussian troops will be completed within three weeks after the 
 exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty. From the day of such exchange 
 the Prussian General Governments will confine their operations to purely 
 I military matters. The details with respect to the manner in which this 
 \ evacuation is to be effected are settled in a separate protocol, which forms 
 Ian appendix to this Treaty. 
 
 Article 13. — All treaties and agreements made by the high contract- 
 ing parties before the war are hereby revived in full force, so far as they are 
 inot invalidated by the dissolution of the German Bund. More especially 
 ithe General Convention between the States of the German Confederation on 
 tthe 10th of February, 1 83 1, together with more recent resolutions thereto 
 ippertaining, will remain in full force as between Prussia and Austria. The 
 Imperial Austrian Government declares, however, that the Coinage T reaty 
 of the 24th of February, 1857, is deprived of its chief value for Austria by 
 (the dissolution of the German Bund, and the Royal Prussian Government 
 .declares itself ready to join with Austria and the other interested parties in 
 the negotiations that may arise on the abolition of this Treaty. The high 
 contracting parties likewise agree that as soon as possible they will enter 
 into negotiations for a revision of the Commercial Treaty of the nth of 
 April, 1865, with a view to a further alleviation of burdens on both sides. 
 In the meanwhile, the said Treaty is restored to its full force, with this pro- 
 "sion, that both the high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right 
 o cancel it after six months 1 notice. 
 
 G G 2 
 
45 2 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 " Article 14. — The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged 
 at Prague within a week, or, if possible, within a shorter period. 
 " In witness whereof, &c. 
 
 "WERTHER. 
 " BRENNER. 
 "Prague, August 2$rd, 1866." 
 
 The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged on the 29th 
 August at Prague. 
 
 On the 28th, Prince Frederick Charles broke up his head- 
 quarters at Prague, and the whole of the Prussian troops who 
 had been lying in Bohemia and Moravia during the progress of 
 the negotiations for peace between Prussia and Austria com- 
 menced their march back towards the Prussian frontier. The 
 men were not sorry to leave Bohemia, for the cholera had been 
 among them during their stay in that country, and many had 
 fallen victims to it. 
 
 On the evening of the 26th, General von Lengsfeld, the 
 commander of the artillery of the First Army, was carried off 
 after two days' illness — the third Prussian general who had 
 died from cholera since the commencement of the armistice. 
 
 As a consequence of the exchange of the ratifications of 
 peace, the Prussian troops began to vacate Austrian territory, 
 and by the 18th of August there was not a spiked helmet or a 
 needle-gun in Bohemia or Moravia. The Guards, the third, 
 fifth, and sixth corps d'armee marched by road ; the other 
 corps were moved by railway. The first corps moved by Oder- 
 berg, the second by Gorlitz, the fourth from Briinn by Prague, 
 the eighth by Niirnberg and Aschaffenburg, the fourteenth 
 division by Gera and Cassel to Hanover, the second reserve 
 corps by Hof. The Army of the Maine held its position until I 
 peace was concluded with Hesse-Darmstadt. 
 
 A Prussian garrison had already occupied Mayence, the keys 
 of the fortress having been handed over by the Bavarians, who 
 were in garrison there, as soon as peace was concluded between 
 Prussia and Bavaria.* What right Bavaria had to deliver up 
 the fortress, which her troops avowedly only held as represen- 
 tatives of the forces of the Bund, no one can tell ; but as no 
 German Power was in a position to remonstrate, and as France, 
 
 * See page 467. 
 
 ;:•. 
 
 

 
 '■ 
 
 Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 453 
 
 who was more concerned than any other European Power in 
 the fate of Mayence, appeared to consent, though not quite 
 tacitly, to the arrangement, the Prussian colours waved without 
 molestation over the fortifications which guard the mouth of 
 the valley of the Maine.* 
 
 On the 27 th the unwounded prisoners who had been cap- 
 tured during the campaign were exchanged at Oderberg. The 
 Prussians liberated 523 Austrian officers and 35,036 non-com- 
 missioned officers and men ; but this was not the total muster- 
 roll of the Austrian prisoners who fell into the hands of the 
 enemy, for 13,000 wounded who could not yet be removed still 
 remained in Prussian hospitals. Austria gave back about 450 
 Prussian unwounded non-commissioned officers and men, and 
 about 120 wounded were unable to be moved. There were 
 also seven Prussian officers liberated. On the same day about 
 5,000 prisoners, who had been taken from the Bavarian and 
 Hesse-Cassel troops, were released. 
 
 Count Bismark, who was formerly a major of cuirassiers 
 was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel ; but this pro- 
 motion was not his reward for the part he has taken in late 
 events; it occurred only in the natural order of things. The 
 head-quarters of Prince Frederick Charles moved by rail to the 
 Prussian capital. 
 
 Berlin was very empty : the usual garrison and the crowds of 
 officers who generally fill the streets were all away with the 
 army. Over many doors were painted up the red crosses which 
 marked that within subscriptions were received for the military 
 hospitals and wounded. At the doors of the public offices, and 
 at those of several shops and hotels, little padlock-boxes painted 
 with the black and white stripes of the Prussian colours, and 
 labelled " Fur die Verwundete," invited the alms of those who 
 loitered or who passed by. Here and there a convalescent 
 soldier was seen, with his hand bandaged up or his arm in a 
 I sling. Preparations were, however, being made for the 
 triumphal entry of the army, when the lamentations of the 
 maimed and the wailings of widows and orphan children were 
 to be drowned in the clash of military bands, and the applause 
 
 * On the 6th August, France demanded Mayence from Prussia, but 
 afterwards withdrew the demand. 
 
454 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of the crowd. Would not the money that this festival cost 
 have been better expended on the families of those who died, 
 and on the men who had been rendered unable to work for 
 their livelihood, in fighting the battles which had given so much 
 glory and so many broad miles to Prussia ? Military pensions 
 were very low. Widows with helpless children and disabled 
 men who could labour no longer for bread could hardly regard 
 one day's acclamations from an excited populace as a compen- 
 sation for a life-long misery. 
 
 In the first sitting of the Special Committee of the Prussian 
 House of Deputies on the loan demanded, which was held on 
 the 29th August, the total cost of the war was stated by 
 Government to amount to 88,000,000 thalers. The single 
 items w r ere as follows : — 1. Mobilization of eleven corps 
 d'armee at 42,000 men each, 25,500,000 thalers. 2. Current 
 expenditure of the war till the end of August, 33,800,000 
 thalers. 3. Demobilization of the troops, 1,700,000 thalers. 
 4. Re-supplying the depots of arms and clothing after the war, 
 27,000,000 thalers. To the total of 88,000,000 resulting from 
 the above must be added 20,000,000 to defray the cost of 
 keeping the army on a war footing till January 1, 1867. The 
 liabilities incurred mostly remained to be liquidated, having 
 hitherto been met only by 20,000,000 of cash .taken from the 
 reserve fund, 4,343,000 thalers obtained by the sale of railway 
 stock, and some 12,000 thalers of surplus moneys from the 
 finance administration of 1865. Large quantities of victuals 
 and other stores were furnished by Prussian and foreign 
 subjects, but the former, though legally obliged to contribute 
 gratis horses, corn, &c while the war lasted, had to be paid 
 within a year of its close. The amount of this and other debts 
 contracted by the Government for railway transport, &c. was 
 not specially mentioned in the reports published. About one- 
 half of the costs were covered by the sums exacted from the 
 defeated States, estimated at a total of 45,143,000 thalers. 
 Surely the Prussian successes have been cheaply acquired, if 
 about 43,000,000 thalers, with 20,000,000 more to insure the 
 maintenance of peace during the next three months, were all 
 that had to be actually invested. To pay off debts and 
 replenish the Exchequer, a loan of 60,000,000 thalers was 
 
I Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 455 
 
 |j demanded by the Government. The Ministers also asked to 
 I be empowered to sell some 30,000,000 thalers' worth of rail- 
 I way shares belonging to lines hitherto in part the property of 
 I Government, but lately disposed of for the above-mentioned 
 I sum. Of the money thus realized 27,500,000 thalers were to 
 I be added to the reserve fund to raise it to the normal height 
 \ of 40,000,000 thalers, while the remainder was to be employed 
 I on two iron-plated vessels, which were being constructed and 
 I already partly paid for. Another interesting item of future 
 I expenditure occasioned by the war was formed by the con- 
 Itemplated purchase of one more iron-plated vessel for 
 12,800,000 thalers, and the strengthening of fortresses at a cost 
 I of 3,500,000 thalers. To meet these sums the Finance 
 I Minister had 4,000,000 thalers, the contribution levied on 
 ■ Frankfort, in hand, and hoped to realize 2,557,000 thalers 
 I more from the sale of horses on the demobilization of the 
 I army. 
 
 On the 20th and 21st September, the Prussian fetes, to cele- 
 brate the return of the army, took place at Berlin. All the 
 evening of the 19th and till late in the dark hours of the 
 morning of the 20th workmen were busy by torchlight finishing 
 the preparations for the festival, and at sunrise on the 20th the 
 whole of Berlin was decked in holiday garb. From every 
 spire, steeple, and dome, from the heavy tower of the Cathedral 
 and rounded cupola of the Royal Schloss, from every housetop 
 and balcony, waived or fluttered a thick, rustling crowd of 
 banners, streamers, and gonfalons. In most of the side streets 
 lines stretched from house to house across the way supported 
 flags, which swayed backward and forwards above the heads of 
 the restless, ever-moving crowd which thronged the avenues 
 leading to the Linden, while in the Linden itself every house 
 was decorated with festoons of evergreen and laurel, and 
 showed prominently from some balcony or window the black 
 and white colours of Prussia, often coupled with the crimson 
 and white of the town of Berlin, which, fluttering in the light 
 breeze and the bright sunlight, gave an appearance of intense 
 lightness and life to the heavy masses of building which fringe 
 the street. In the centre, where between the two paved 
 carriage-roads the avenue of the lindens runs from the Branden- 
 
456 SEVEN WEEKS WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 burg Gate to the open space in front of the Royal Palace, the 
 captured guns were ranged in double line below the trees, with 
 their muzzles pointed inwards towards each other, but with a 
 wide space of some fifteen yards' interval between them, 
 through which the troops that were to make their triumphal 
 entry were to pass. Round the bright yellow barrels of the 
 brass ordnance were wreathed garlands of green leaves, which 
 were in many cases prolonged so as to cover the spokes of the 
 wheels or the yellow-painted trails. In line with the guns and 
 the intervals between them were erected trophies, some repre- 
 senting golden cannon grouped together in artistic confusion, 
 others swords, bayonets, helmets, and muskets, but all bearing 
 groups of the special flags of the different provinces of the 
 kingdom, surmounted by a black and white banner, which 
 carried in its centre the double eagle of Prussia. From lamp- 
 post to lamp-post, themselves hidden in masses of foliage, from 
 trophy to trophy, stretched garlands of evergreens, so that 
 from the top of the avenue near the Brandenburg Gate to the 
 equestrian statue of Frederick the Great, opposite the Palace, 
 one long wreath of laurel fringed the way by which the home- 
 returning warriors were to advance to the open space in front 
 of Bluchers statue, where they were to march past the King. 
 The Brandenburg Gate itself was converted into a temporary 
 arch of triumph. On its summit stood a line of flagstaffs, 
 from which waved long standards that floated heavily even in 
 the brisk breeze above the head of the bronze figure of Victory - 
 which adorned the summit, while on either face heavy drape- 
 ries of bright-coloured bunting hid beneath their well-arranged 
 folds the stonework and the preparations for the evening's 
 illuminations. Before daylight people began to assemble in 
 the street, and to take up places from which the march of the 
 troops could be advantageously seen, and by nine o'clock a 
 double line of spectators fringed the Linden Avenue, while the 
 pavement of the street, which, being a little higher, gave an 
 advantageous position, was thickly crowded. Most of the 
 windows were well filled, but the number of lookers-on was 
 not so great as might have been expected, and neither the 
 streets nor the houses were so thickly occupied as were those 
 in London on the entrance of the Princess of Wales before her 
 
 I: 
 
Ki Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 457 
 
 ftW 
 
 licl 
 
 of tin 
 
 . :,: 
 rcpn 
 
 marriage. Still, the number of people that collected to see 
 the entrance was very large, and large tribunes which had been 
 erected in the Pariser Platz, just within the Brandenburg Gate, 
 were thickly crowded with ladies. 
 
 A little before eleven, the hour arranged for the troops to 
 enter the town, the King left the Palace, and, followed by his 
 staff, rode up the avenue towards the Brandenburg Gate, 
 outside of which he was to meet the troops. He was enthu- 
 siastically greeted, and a loud swell of shouts of welcome traced 
 his path till he disappeared through the gate. The Queen and 
 
 lsion the Crown Princess, with the Royal children, followed in a 
 
 ariij carriage, and met with a similar reception from the people, and 
 in other carriages, which were equally cheered, the Queen 
 Dowager, the Princess Frederick Charles, and the Princess of 
 
 ■nip the Netherlands, who all drove out to the place where the 
 soldiers assembled before their entrance into the town. Out- 
 side the gate the King was received by the troops with due 
 honours and some ringing cheers, which had hardly died away 
 
 he; before he had passed along the line, quickly followed by the 
 : carriages which contained the ladies of the Court, and then 
 took up his post in front of the troops. The line of march 
 was rapidly formed, and the head of the column began moving 
 towards the Brandenburg Gate, while the Royal carriages 
 turned and drove quickly back again down to the Linden 
 Avenue, where their occupants were again loudly greeted, so 
 that the ladies might from the windows of the Crown Prince's 
 palace witness the parade in front of Bliicher's statue. 
 
 A few minutes after the carriages had passed down, the head 
 of the triumphal column began to wind in at the gate, led by 
 Field Marshal Count Wrangel, behind whom came a large 
 mass of staff-officers and the military attaches to the various 
 Embassies. After a short interval rode General von Roon, 
 the Minister of War, and General von Moltke, the Chief of 
 the Staff of the King. The greeting accorded to these two, 
 the organizer and the director of the movements of the army, 
 was loud and long, as also that to the two Generals who 
 immediately followed them, Von Voigt-Rhetz and Blumenthal, 
 
 (who had been the Chiefs of the Staff of the First and Second 
 Armies during the campaign. Behind these generals came 
 
 trofl 
 E 
 
 tors 
 
 ■:;! 
 
 1 
 irap 
 
45§ SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 their adjutants, assistants, and aides-de-camp, and the whole 
 of the staff-officers of the two armies. There was then a pause, 
 and an interval of some hundreds of yards in the column, for 
 the King had halted inside the gate to receive an address from 
 the magistracy of the town, and it was some minutes before he 
 himself appeared. But when he came, and close behind him 
 the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles were seen 
 riding side by side, the enthusiasm of the people rose high. 
 Hats were taken off and waived in the air, handkerchiefs 
 fluttered from every window, and the cheering went up from 
 the crowded street, and was echoed by the houses with that 
 mighty roar which rises from a great multitude when its heart 
 is touched. Behind the Commanders-in-Chief of the First and 
 Second Armies rode Prince Charles, the commander of the 
 whole artillery, Prince Albrecht, the leader of the cavalry 
 crops of the First Army, Prince Alexander, and Prince 
 Adalbert. 
 
 The troops followed, preceded by a small detachment carry- 
 ing the standards taken in the war, which were borne this day 
 through Berlin by the men who had taken them in battle. 
 Close behind came the Potsdam regiment of Guards, with the 
 Prince of Wiirtemberg at its head, but the usual fine marching 
 of this splendid regiment was spoilt by the narrowness of w r ay 
 along which it moved, and by the anxiety of the soldiers to 
 exchange greetings with their friends in the crowd, a lack of 
 discipline which to-day was excused. Nor did the big men of 
 this regiment present the same imposing appearance as usual, 
 for most spectators saw them from windows raised above the 
 street, the result of which was to give even these large men a 
 dwarfed appearance, and it was only by comparing them with 
 the lines of people through whom they passed that one could 
 actually realize their true stature. Behind these followed the 
 3rd infantry regiment of the Guard. These two regiments 
 formed the first brigade of the Guard, and were commanded by 
 General Alvensleben. The second brigade consisted of the 
 fusiliers of the Guard and of the 2nd infantry regiment. The 
 latter marched into Berlin without helmets, for the cumbersome 
 head-dresses of which they undertook to relieve themselves at 
 the action of Trautenau had not yet been replaced ; but the 
 
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 459 
 
 people cheered them enthusiastically, for they were the heroes 
 of Rosberitz, and the regiment which left so many of its soldiers 
 round the spot where General Hiller fell. 
 
 The next brigade was composed of the Jagers of the Guard 
 — riflemen recruited from all the foresters and gamekeepers of 
 Prussia, renowned marksmen, who had done much hard duty 
 during the campaign, and reaped their reward in the loud 
 applause of the people of Berlin — and of a battalion of the 
 Guard of the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg. The entrance of 
 this battalion was a compliment on the part of the Prussian 
 Government to Mecklenburg in return for the loyal manner in 
 which that State stood by Prussia before and during the war, 
 and the people ratified the compliment by the loud greeting 
 they gave to these troops as they passed down the Linden by 
 bursts of cheering, which were renewed again and again. 
 
 After the infantry came the scarlet and gold regiment of 
 hussars of the Guard, followed by small detachments which 
 epresented the 1 2th light blue and silver Weissenfels hussars, 
 who suffered so severely at Koniggratz, the 3rd dragoons, who 
 were nearly cut to pieces by their rough melee with the Austrian 
 cuirass brigade at the same battle, and the Magdeburg hussars, 
 who cleared the way for the Prussian infantry at Blumenau ; 
 after these the artillery, in a long column, which marched with 
 two guns abreast, decorated with flowers and garlands. As 
 the troops came out of the Linden Avenue and entered the 
 wide, open space in front of the Palace, they formed upon a 
 broader front, and marched past the King, who took his place 
 in front of the statue of Bliicher, with his staff around him, 
 when by an accidental but curious coincidence General Moltke 
 is placed below the statue of Gneisenau, the Chief of the Staff 
 in the War of Independence. Here the whole of the force 
 passed before the Sovereign, and then filed across the bridge 
 Dver the Spree, and their glittering bayonets and shining helmet 
 spikes disappeared into the streets beyond, still cheered by the 
 :rowds in the street and houses until the last were lost sight of. 
 By one o'clock the whole of the troops had passed, and the 
 people quickly separated to go to their homes, for every citizen 
 )f Berlin entertained a detachment of the men who made their 
 ■try — the rich larger, the poorer smaller numbers, but all some. 
 
460 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 A fall of rain during the night of the 20th laid the dust, which 
 the previous day blew unpleasantly about the streets. A cloudy 
 morning allowed the people who took up their places early to 
 see the entry of the second portion of the troops who marched 
 publicly into the town to pass the hours of waiting without 
 being incommoded by the glare which the day before was ] :~ 
 dazzling to the eyes, and after a time became almost painful jj" 
 Those who had wished to obtain good places from which to see I ■'■ 
 the troops pass did not this morning take up their positions so [ : 
 very early as they did the day before, since it was found that ; 
 the crowd was not so great as might have been expected, and 
 many discovered that they had taken a needless precaution by 
 being in the Linden before daybreak. The consequence was r 
 that the people were more animated, since they were not already 
 weary before the proceedings commenced. The enthusiasm 
 was greater, the cheering was louder, and there was generally 
 an appearance of more vivacity, enjoyment, and relish on the 
 part of both the populace and the soldiery. 
 
 The arrangements and general decorations were much the 
 same as on the previous day. The ground between the Bran- 
 denburg Gate and the Schloss, or old Palace of Berlin, which 
 is now not inhabited by the Sovereign, but used for official and 
 state occasions, was divided into four portions. The first was 
 the Pariser Platz, which lies just inside the Brandenburg Gate, 
 and was used as the place of the formal greeting of the King 
 by the magistracy and a detachment of fifty-five young ladies, 
 who presented an address in poetry. The second portion was 
 the Linden Avenue, in the centre of the Linden Street, down 
 which the troops marched, and which in the Berlin triumph 
 played the same part as the Via Sacra in those of Ancient 
 Rome. The third portion was the open space which extends 
 from the statue of Frederick the Great to the bridge over the 
 Spree, in which the troops marched past the King : and the 
 fourth was the open place and garden in front of the Schloss, 
 which was used for the celebration of the Te Dcuni, which this 
 afternoon was sung after the last of the troops had marched 
 past. On each side of the Pariser Platz tribunes were raised 
 for spectators, which were entirely draped with the red and 
 white colours of the town of Berlin. Behind these, numerous 
 
am 
 
 Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 461 
 
 masts were raised, which bore gonfalons of the black and white 
 
 i Prussian colours, with silver-coloured shields deviced with the 
 agle of Prussia or the bear of Berlin. On either side of the 
 entrance to the Linden Avenue from the Pariser Platz tall 
 
 ■ trophies were erected, which bore groups of alternate Prussian 
 and Berlin flags, raised above pedestals formed of gilt cannon. 
 
 ;•; Along either side of the Linden Avenue were raised on 
 ri toa pedestals, hidden in masses of garlands of laurels and oak 
 :on^ [eaves, gilt bronze figures of Victory, each of which bore upon 
 a. shield with azure ground the name and date of one of the 
 
 L v actions of the war, inscribed in golden letters ; round these 
 shields were bronze borders, on the top of which was placed 
 the Prussian eagle, while above the head of the figure drooped 
 the national flag, supported on either side by the more cheerful 
 
 1 colours of the metropolis. The height from the ground to the 
 top of the flagstaff over each figure was thirty-two feet. The 
 names of the battles inscribed on these shields were: — June 26, 
 Liebenau, Tiirnau, Podoll ; June 27, Nachod ; June 27, Lang- 
 nsalza; June 27, Oswiecin; June 27, Hiinerwasser ; June 28, 
 Miinchengratz ; June 28, Soor; June 28, Trautenau ; June 28, 
 jSkalitz; June 29, Gitschin ; June 29, Koniginhof; June 29, 
 [aromier, Schweinschadel ; July 3, Koniggratz ■ July 4, Derm- 
 jbach; July 5, Hunfeld ; July 5, Zell ; July 10, Waldaschach, 
 jHausen; July 10, Hammelburg, Friedericshall ; July 10, Kis- 
 singen ; July 13, Laufach ; July 14, AschafTenburg ; July 1^ 
 Tobitschau; July 22, Blumenau ; July 23, Hof; July 24, 
 Lauber-Bischofsheim ; July 24, Werbach, Hochhausen; July 
 25, Neubrunn, Helmstadt; July 25, Gerchshein ; July 26, 
 Roszbrunn; July 28, Wiirzburg; July 28, Baireuth. 
 
 In the alternate spaces between these figures stood on each 
 side of the avenue square pedestals ten feet high, each crowned 
 with a gilt eagle with wings outspread. On the sides of these 
 pedestals were inscribed, as a memorial of the manner in which 
 Berlin heard of the successes of the army, the telegrams re- 
 vived from the seat of war which told of each victory. In the 
 space of each of these pedestals and the trophies on either side 
 bearing the names of the battles were placed two candelabra, 
 each ten feet high, formed of a bronze stalk, standing on a 
 triangular pedestal swathed with laurel wreaths, and terminating 
 
462 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 at the summit in a gilt basin, which was used in the illumina- 
 tion for burning coloured lights. All these trophies, pedestals, 
 and candelabra were connected together by festoons of green 
 foliage, which drooped down so as almost to kiss the bright 
 barrels of the captured guns, which were placed between the 
 works of art, and were themselves wreathed with garlands. 
 Two hundred and eight guns, one hundred and four on each 
 side, stood in the Linden Avenue, with their muzzles still 
 begrimed with powder, in a line with the pedestals and figures, 
 and their trails just inside the lines of linden trees which give 
 the name to the street More cannon might have been exhi- 
 bited as spoils of the war, for many more were taken; but it 
 was resolved that only those which were captured in open 
 battle should be here, and those which were seized in arsenals 
 or fortified places that fell into the hands of the victors were 
 not brought out for this festival. Only at the places where 
 cross streets cut the Linden Avenue were these festoons inter-, 
 rupted. At the four corners of each crossing four tall obelisks 
 were raised on triangular bases, which were wound round with 
 spirals of foliage and decorated with the flags of the provinces 
 and allies of Prussia, while from the top of each the national 
 standard floated fifty feet above the ground. On each corner 
 of the triangular pedestal was placed a golden eagle, and dia- 
 gonally from obelisk to obelisk festoons were stretched, from 
 which hung shields carrying the arms of Prussia and Berlin on 
 either side. 
 
 From the end of the Linden Avenue to the bridge over the 
 river the open space was left clear for the marching past of the 
 troops, but tall masts were raised on either side, from the sum- 
 mits of which long streamers fluttered, and festoons were led 
 from one to the other. On either parapet of the bridge four 
 marble statues of Victory were placed, behind which hung flags 
 and draper}-, supported by masts raised from rafts anchored in 
 the river. 
 
 The large square in front of the Schloss beyond the bridge 
 was surrounded with black and white painted poles, each of 
 which carried the Hohenzollern shield, surmounted by a banner. 
 In the centre was placed the altar for the public Tc Deum. A 
 square pedestal, four feet high and forty-eight feet long, sup- 
 
ported at each corner a figure of the Angel of Peace, with a 
 palm branch in her hand, and in the centre of each side a 
 statue of Victory distributing laurel crowns, while between the 
 figures flights of low and easy steps, covered with rich carpet- 
 ing, were placed for the officiating priests. Further steps led 
 from the pedestals to the altar-place, which was raised seven 
 feet higher, and, surrounded by golden candelabra, supported 
 the altar, draped in velvet, above which stood the golden cross, 
 heavy with mouldings of exquisite workmanship. 
 
 Behind the altar, between it and the heavy pile of the dome- 
 topped Schloss, rose a towering statue of Borussia, the classical 
 cognomen of Prussia. With eagle-crowned helmet on her 
 head, the sceptre with the iron cross grasped in her left hand, 
 and her right stretching forth the crown of victory, the figure 
 was placed there as a token to signify that their country con- 
 sidered that her warriors had done well. On either side stood 
 tall trophies of drooped flags and intermingled arms, the 
 pedestals of which bore the names of the most glorious deeds 
 of Prussian arms in the last two centuries. Emblazoned in 
 letters of gold beside Koniggratz, Kissingen, and Skalitz, were 
 Fehrbellin, 1675; Stralsund, 1678; Hohenfriedberg, 1745; 
 Prague, 1757; Rossbach, 1757 ; Leuthen, 1757; Zorndorf, 
 1758; Leipzig, 1813 ; Paris, 1814; Belle-Alliance, 1815. On 
 either side these trophies were ranged figures of the Electors 
 of Brandenburg and Kings of Prussia ; under each was written 
 his motto, war-cry, or favourite expression, with the date of his 
 accession and death. Some of the most striking of these were 
 those of Albrecht Achilles, 1470 — 1486, " Nowhere is it more 
 glorious to die than on the field of battle ;" of Friederich 
 Wilhelm, 1640— 1688, " Mit Gott;" and Friederich Wilhelm 
 III., 1797 — 1840, " My time in trouble, my hope in God." 
 
 A few minutes before eleven, the King, at the head of his 
 Staff, and closely followed by the Crown Prince and Prince 
 Frederick Charles, passed quickly up the Linden towards the 
 Brandenburg Gate. A long, rolling cheer marked his approach, 
 which swelled into a louder and louder shout as he came 
 nearer; from every window handkerchiefs were waved and 
 Prussian colours fluttered, while in the street below every head 
 was uncovered, and the exultant people, with all the strength 
 
 I 
 
 
 
464 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 of their hundred thousand voices, roared out their greeting to 
 their Sovereign. The King stopped for a few minutes in the 
 Pariser Platz, and spoke to the wounded, who, still not re- 
 covered sufficiently to march in the ranks, were seated in front 
 of the tribunes on either side, then went through the Branden- 
 burg Gate, to place himself at the head of the troops and lead 
 them into the town. The carriages of the ladies of the Royal 
 family followed soon after, and met with an equally enthusiastic 
 reception as the King himself, both as they went up toward the 
 Brandenburg Gate and on their return after a short inspection 
 of the troops outside the town. Soon the Count Wrangel, who 
 again led the column, came down the avenue, and was greeted 
 very warmly. After him the King's staff followed in the same 
 order as before, last of whom rode side by side the triumvirate 
 to whom so much of Prussia's success was due — Bismarck, 
 Roon, and Moltke, to-day all three generals, for the Prime 
 Minister was promoted to that rank the previous day. A con- 
 siderable space separated the staff from the King himself, for 
 he had to hear again to-day the address of the magistracy which 
 he had already received on the former day, and to listen to the 
 poetical welcome delivered by the chief of the detachment of 
 fifty-one young ladies. When he came he was welcomed as 
 loudly, or even more so, than before, more loudly than the day 
 before, for the people were less fatigued by waiting, and were 
 not annoyed by the dust which blew about among them yester- 
 day. From the time the King came down the avenue with the 
 Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles close behind him 
 one incessant shout was maintained until the whole of the 
 troops had passed, which sometimes rose very loud, sometimes 
 slightly fell, but never died away entirely. 
 
 The troops which marched in this day were the brigades of 
 the Guards which did not come in before, and some detach- 
 ments as representatives of Line regiments. All were greeted 
 loudly, especially the 2nd dragoons of the Guard, who defeated 
 the Austrian cavalry at Tischnowitz. To those, however, who 
 had seen the same troops in the field, or directly after the 
 campaign, their appearance was disappointing. The soldiers 
 marched carelessly, and did not preserve either the even for- 
 mation or the measured swinging stride which distinguishes 
 
Chap. IV.] THE TRUCE. 465 
 
 the Prussian infantry on its usual parades. The day seemed 
 to be regarded only as a holiday and festival, and much more 
 attention was paid to friends in the houses, or alongside the 
 avenue, than to the maintenance of that perfect order in the 
 ranks which is generally so rigidly observed. 
 
 After the troops had marched by the King, a portion of 
 them were formed up in the square in front of the Schloss 
 around the altar. The King, the Prince, the staff, and the 
 generals came to the same place, and in the name of the army 
 and nation yielded up their hearts in thanksgiving to Heaven, 
 while hundreds of priests burst forth into the noblest of all 
 songs of praise to the Lord of Hosts and the God of Vic- 
 tories. 
 
 On the evening of the 21st, the King assembled twelve 
 hundred of the generals and principal officers who had served 
 in the campaign at dinner in the Schloss. In the later part of 
 the evening the town was illuminated. Directly after dark the 
 whole city was lighted up. The Schloss was surrounded by 
 rows of lamps, which stood out bright against the heavy and 
 indistinct background of the massive building, while circlets of 
 coloured lights, high up in the dome, seemed as if suspended 
 in the air without support. Opposite the Schloss bright blue 
 i lights burnt, and, raised high upon lofty poles, glistened like 
 iistars of dazzling brightness above the Museum. These cast a 
 ■fitful and almost mysterious glow upon the restless crowds, who, 
 ' notwithstanding the rain, which began to fall early in the after- 
 Kjnoon, thronged every street, and clustered in thick swarms 
 around the fountain in front of the Museum, where gas jets, 
 jintroduced among the pipes, from which the water played, 
 jglistened through the sparkling cascade. Every house was 
 illuminated. On public buildings and in many private resi- 
 dences were fiery copies of the national arms, or names of 
 victories inscribed inflame. Down the Linden Avenue and 
 round the statue of Frederick the Great large basins raised on 
 bronze stalks contained blazing flambeaux, which blew about 
 wildly in the breeze. In many places words of webome to 
 jthe returning soldiers or mottoes recording victory were 
 traced in lamps, which burnt with coloured flames, but no- 
 where was to be seen a single signal of congratulation for 
 
 H H 
 
466 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 the return of peace. Every fiery inscription, every device of 
 flame, told the fierce joy of the people for victory and conquest, 
 and to the minds of many men foreboded that thirst for further 
 war and for military glory was taking a strong seat in the heart 
 of Prussia. Where the exterior of the houses was not decked 
 with lamps, or where burning gas did not trace the outlines of 
 the national eagle or the names of victories, inside of the 
 windows were fringes of candles. Everywhere there was light. 
 No window was dark, no house not illuminated, except where 
 the Austrian or some of the neutral Embassies broke, by a gap 
 of darkness, the brilliant aspect of a lighted street. There 
 were few carriages. The people moved through the city a 
 restless, feverish crowd, from which rose a loud continuous 
 hum of approbation and of triumph, that here and there swelled 
 into a cheer before the residence of a Minister or the Palace of 
 the King. 
 
 A long list of promotions and military advancements was 
 published that day, and it was also notified that a cross of 
 bronze cast from the metal of the captured cannon was to be 
 given to every officer and soldier who had passed through the 
 campaign. 
 
 An amnesty, dated the 20th June, was published the same 
 morning, which remitted any punishments not yet completed, 
 or any fines which had been decreed by courts of justice 
 against persons convicted of offences under the 87th to 93rd 
 paragraphs of the statute-book inclusive, and under the 97th 
 to 103rd, or under the law for the control of the press. 
 
 In the evening special performances were given in all the 
 theatres in honour of the triumphant termination of the war. 
 Prologues were delivered which detailed the glorious deeds of 
 the army, and the plays, which were written for the occasion, 
 dwelt upon the actions and personal adventures of the late 
 campaign, and recalled the memories of the concluding wars 
 of the first French Empire. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES. 
 
 On the 2nd August, armistices between Prussia and Bavaria, 
 Baden, Wurtemberg, and Hesse-Darmstadt, were established, 
 which were to endure until the 22nd August The terms of 
 these armistices were similar to those made with Austria ; by 
 them stipulations were also made for the delivery of the fortress 
 of Mainz to the Prussians, and for the unimpeded departure 
 of the South-German contingents from the other Federal 
 fortresses. 
 
 By the 22nd August, peace was definitely concluded between 
 Prussia and the Governments of all those countries except that 
 of Darmstadt. 
 
 The treaty of peace with Bavaria was signed at Berlin on the 
 22nd of August, by Count Bismarck and Herr von Savigny 
 for Prussia, by Herr von der Pfordten and Count Bray Stein- 
 burg for Bavaria. By it Bavaria agreed to pay Prussia thirty 
 million gulden as a war contribution in three instalments, the 
 last instalment to be paid within six months of the exchange of 
 the ratifications ; to abolish the shipping dues on the Rhine 
 and Maine ; and to give up the telegraph stations on the north 
 of the Maine to Prussia. The ratifications were exchanged 
 within twelve days. 
 
 Peace with Wurtemburg was concluded at Berlin on the 
 13th August, The text of this treaty was as follows : — 
 
 " Their Majesties the King of Wurtemberg and the King of Prussia, 
 actuated by the desire of securing to their subjects the blessings of peace, 
 have determined to come to an agreement as to the clauses of a Treaty of 
 Peace to be concluded between them. For this purpose their Majesties 
 have appointed as plenipotentiaries — The King of Wurtemberg, his Minister 
 for Foreign Affairs, Baron Karl von Varnbuler, Grand Cross, &c. ; and his 
 
 H H 2 
 
46S SEVEN WEEKS 1 WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 War Minister, Lieutenant-General Oscar von Hardegg, Grand Cross, &c. ; 
 and the King of Prussia, his President of the Council and Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs, Count Otto von Bismarck -Schbnhausen, Knight of the 
 Black Eagle, &c, and his Privy Counsillor, Chamberlain and Ambassador 
 Karl Friedrich von Savigny, Grand Cross, &c. These plenipotentiaries 
 having exchanged powers and found them sufficient, have agreed upon the 
 following clauses : — 
 
 " I. Peace and friendship shall henceforth subsist for ever between His 
 Majesty the King of Wurtemberg and His Majesty the King of Prussia, 
 their heirs and successors, their States and subjects. 
 
 " 2. His Majesty the King of Wurtemberg engages to pay His Majesty 
 the King of Prussia the sum of 8,000,000 fl. within two months, towards 
 covering part of the costs incurred by Prussia in the war. By payment of 
 this sum the King of Wurtemberg fulfils the compensation obligations un- 
 dertaken by him in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the armistice convention, signed 
 August 1, 1866, at Eisingen and Wurtzburg. 
 
 "3. As pledge for the payment of this sum the King of "Wurtemberg 
 will deposit 34 and 4 per cent. Wurtemberg State bonds to the amount of 
 the sum to be guaranteed. The bonds to be deposited will be calculated at 
 the quotations of the day, and the guarantee sum wall be increased by 10 per 
 cent, accordingly. 
 
 "4. His Majesty the King of Wurtemberg retains the right of paying the 
 above-mentioned compensation in part, or wholly at an earlier date, at a 
 discount of 5 per cent, per annum. 
 
 "5. Immediately after the guarantee being given, .in accordance with 
 Article 3, or after payment of the war contribution has been made, the King 
 of Prussia will withdraw his troops from Wurtemberg territory. The pro- 
 visionment of the troops during their withdrawal shall be according to the 
 hitherto existing Federal dietary scale. 
 
 ' ' 6. The apportionment of Federal property belonging to the former 
 Germanic Confederation is reserved for a special agreement. 
 
 "7. The high contracting parties will enter into negotiations for the 
 settlement of the Zollverein relations immediately after the conclusion of 
 peace. In the mean time the Zollverein Union Treaty of May 16, 1855, 
 and the conventions connected therewith, which have been rendered inope- 
 rative by the outbreak of the war, shall again come into operation from the 
 day the ratifications of this present treaty are exchanged, with the under- 
 standing that it remains reserved to either of the high contracting parties to 
 allow them to lapse after a notification of six months. 
 
 " 8. Immediately after the restoration of peace in Germany the high con- 
 tracting parties will cause the assembly of Commissioners to agree upon 
 bases calculated to further passenger and goods' traffic upon the railways as 
 greatly as possible, especially to regulate the relations of competition in a 
 suitable manner and to oppose the efforts of individual companies disadvan- 
 tageous to the public interests of traffic. While the high contracting parties 
 are agreed that the establishment of every new railway line conducive to the 
 public advantage is to be permitted and supported as fully as possible, they 
 will also have the principles demanded in this respect by the general interests 
 laid down by the aforesaid Commissioners. 
 
 "9. His Majesty the King of Wurtemberg recognises the arrangements 
 made by the preliminary treaty concluded between Prussia and Austria at 
 Nikolsburg on the 20th of July, 1866, and acceeded thereto upon his part 
 also, so far as they affect the future of Germany. 
 
 " 10. The ratification of this present treaty shall take place at latest by 
 
Chap. V.] PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAX STATES. 469 
 
 the 21st of August of this year. In token whereof the above-named pleni- 
 potentiaries have executed the same this day in duizdicate, and appended 
 their signatures and seals. 
 
 " Done at Berlin this 13th of August, 1S66. 
 
 " VARNBULER, " HARDEGG. 
 
 " VON BISMARCK, " SAVIGNY." 
 
 Peace with Baden was concluded at Berlin on the 17th 
 August. The first, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth articles 
 were the same as those of the treaty with Wiirtemberg ; the 
 tenth and eleventh the same as the ninth and tenth of that 
 with Wiirtemberg. By the second, third, and fourth articles, 
 Baden agreed to pay Prussia six million gulden within two 
 months, as a war contribution. By the ninth article, Baden 
 agreed to abolish the shipping dues on the Rhine. 
 
 Peace with Hesse-Darmstadt was only concluded on the 3rd 
 September, to which day the armistice was extended. The 
 text of this treaty was, exclusive of the prologue, as follows : — 
 
 " I. Peace and friendship shall exist between the Grand Duke of Hesse, 
 and on the Rhine, &c, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, their heirs 
 and successors, for eternal time. 
 
 "2. The Grand Duke of Hesse engages to pay to the King of Prussia 
 within two months the sum of 3,000,000 florins, to cover a part of the ex- 
 penses caused to Prussia by the war. By the payment of this sum the Grand 
 Duke is released from his obligation to pay the war contribution which he 
 undertook by the Treaty of Armistice on the 1st of August, 1S66. 
 
 " 3. The Grand Duke provides guarantees for the payment of this money 
 by depositing bonds of the Grand Ducal Loan, when the 4 per cent, bonds 
 will be accepted at So and the 3 per cent, at 70. 
 
 " 4. The Grand Duke has the right to pay the above contribution either 
 in whole or in part at an earlier date, and if he does so will be allowed a 
 discount at the rate of 5 per cent, per annum. 
 
 " 5. Immediately after the deposit of the guarantees mentioned in 
 Article 3, the King of Prussia will withdraw his troops from the Grand 
 Ducal territory. The supplying of the troops in their return march 
 will be conducted in accordance with the supply regulations of the late 
 Bund. 
 
 " 6. The regulations for the disposal of common property which belonged 
 to the late Bund are reserved for special agreement. 
 
 "7. The high - contracting powers will enter into negotiations directly 
 after the conclusion of peace for the reform of the Zollverein Treaty. In 
 the meantime the Zollverein Treaty of the i6thof May, 1865, and the agree- 
 ments connected with it, will come again into force on the day of the ex- 
 change of the ratifications of the present treaty. Each party reserves the 
 right to annul the same after six months' notice. 
 
 " 8. All other treaties and stipulations concluded between the high con- 
 tracting Powers previous to the war come again into force. 
 
 " 9. The high contracting powers will, immediately after the establish- 
 
470 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 ment of peace in Germany, cause Commissioners to meet, in order to esta- 
 blish rules to facilitate as much as possible the railway transport of pas- 
 sengers and goods between the two States, and to oppose the pernicious 
 effects of individual administration in favour of common interests ; and as 
 the high contracting powers are agreed that the establishment of a new 
 railway communication based on their common interests should be allowed, 
 and, as far as possible, furthered, they will cause the plans thereof to be 
 settled by the above-mentioned commissioners. 
 
 " 10. The Grand Ducal Government declares itself agreed to the conven- 
 tions which Prussia has made with the princely House of Taxis for the 
 abolition of the Thurn and Taxis postal monopoly. In consequence the 
 whole postal administration of the Grand Duchy of Hesse is to be given 
 over to Prussia. 
 
 "n. The Grand Ducal Government binds itself to allow no other than 
 a Prussian telegraph station in Mayence. In like manner the Grand 
 Ducal Government cedes to Prussia unlimited power to construct and to 
 use telegraph lines and telegraph stations in the other districts of the Grand 
 Duchy. 
 
 "12. The Grand Ducal Government will completely discontinue to levy 
 navigation tolls on the Rhine, and also navigation dues (Tariff B in the 
 Convention of the 31st of March, 1831), as also dues for lading (Supplemen- 
 tary Articles to the Convention of the 31st of March, 183 1), from the 
 day on which the same measure shall be adopted by the other German 
 States on the banks of the Rhine. The high contracting parties under- 
 take to do the same with regard to the still existing navigation tolls on 
 the Maine. 
 
 "13. The Grand Duke of Hesse recognises the Definitions of the Pre- 
 liminary Treaty concluded between Prussia and Austria at Nikolsburg, on 
 the 26th July, 1866, and also on his part enters into the same as far as the 
 future of Germany is concerned. 
 
 " 14. His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Hesse cedes to the King 
 of Prussia with all rights of sovereignty and dominion — (1) the country of 
 Hesse-Homburg, inclusive of the district of Meisenheim, but exclusive of 
 the two demesnes Hotensleben and Oebisfelde belonging to Homburg, 
 which lie in the Prussian province of Saxony. (2) The following portions 
 of territory which belong to the province of Oberhessen : — (i.) the district 
 of Biedonkofp ; (ii. ) the district of Vohl, including the enclaves Eimelrod 
 Horinghausen ; (iii.) the north-western part of the district of Giessen, which 
 includes Frankenbach, Krumbach, Konigsburg, Fellingshausen, Biber, 
 Haina, Rodheim, Waldgirmes, Nauheim, and Hermannstein, with the 
 ground within their landmarks ; (iv. ) the district of Rodelheim ; (v.) the 
 part of the district of Nieder-Urfel which is under the Grand Ducal 
 Sovereignty. 
 
 " 15. The Grand Duke of Hesse enters into the North German Confede- 
 ration on the basis of the reform project of the 10th June, 1866, with all 
 his territory lying north of the Maine, while he binds himself to cause the 
 elections to Parliament to be in proportion to the numbers of the popula- 
 tion. The Grand Ducal contingent from the territory separated in conse- 
 quence of this and belonging to the Northern Confederation passes under 
 the supreme command of the King of Prussia. 
 
 "15. The King of Prussia cedes to the Grand Duke of Hesse, in lieu of 
 the territorial cessions in the province of Oberhessen the following districts, 
 with all rights of sovereignty and dominion — 
 
Chap. V.] PEACE WITH THE SOUTH-GERMAN STATES. 471 
 
 "(I.) The formerly Hesse-Cassel district Katzenberg, with, the places 
 Ohmes, Wolkenrode, Ruhlkirchen, Leibelsdorf. 
 
 "(IT.) The formerly Hesse-Cassel district Nauheim, with all rights of 
 property, the bath establishments and salt works in Nauheim, as well as the 
 places Dorheim, Nauheim, Schwalheim, and Rodchen. 
 
 "(III.) The district of Reichelsheim which lies to the east of the above, 
 and formerly belonged to Nassau, with the places Reichelsheim and Dor- 
 nassenheim. 
 
 ' ' (iv. ) The enclave of Trais on the Lunda, which formerly belonged to 
 Hesse-Cassel. 
 
 "(V.) The woodland demesne formerly belonging to Hesse-Cassel 
 which lies between the Grand Ducal districts of Altenstadt and Bonstadt. 
 
 " (vi. ) The districts of Dortelweil and Nieder-Erlenbach, which formerly 
 belonged to Frankfort. 
 
 "(vn.) The district of Massenheim, which formerly belonged to Hesse 
 Cassel. 
 
 " (vill.) The district of Haarheim, which formerly belonged to Nassau. 
 
 "(IX.) The portion of the |district of Mittel-Griindau, of about 1,700 
 acres, which formerly belonged to Hesse-Cassel. 
 
 " These districts enter into the province of Oberhessen. In the next 
 place, the district of Rumpenheim, which formerly belonged to Hesse- 
 Cassel, lying on the left bank of the Maine, is Ceded to the Grand Duke, 
 with all rights. The descriptions of the boundaiy lines lie over. 
 
 "16. Agreements between the contracting Powers with reference to the 
 archives, officials, military stores, &c, of the ceded districts will be con- 
 cluded by special commissioners. 
 
 "17. The books, manuscripts, and other articles which were in the 
 library of the Cathedral of Cologne previously to the year I794 5 an( i are 
 now in the Grand Ducal museum and library, are to be handed over to the 
 King of Prussia that they may be restored to Cologne, to which the different 
 volumes and articles belong. There shall be one Commissioner of either 
 side, who in case of dispute are to choose £ach an impartial referee, to whom 
 the case shall be referred. 
 
 "18. The Grand Ducal Government agrees to prolong the present con- 
 tract between a number of bathing-house proprietors in the town of Kreuz- 
 nach and the Grand Ducal salt work of Karl Theodor Hulle, for the supply 
 of lixivium and salt water at the present rate, until the Prussian Government 
 shall find itself able to acquire this salt work. 
 
 " The Grand Ducal Government will also lay down pipes for the supply 
 of this to Kreuznach. 
 
 " 19. The ratification of the present Treaty shall take place at the latest 
 on the 15th of September. 
 
 (Signed) "DALWIGK "BISMARCK. 
 
 "HOFMAN "SAVIGNY. " 
 
 A supplementary convention with reference to Articles 14 
 and 15 was to the following purpose : — 
 
 "1. Prussia enters into all rights hitherto possessed by the Hessian 
 Government in the ceded districts, and pays pensions in the hitherto 
 existing way. Officials and servants are guaranteed to be allowed to 
 remain in their present situations if they will enter the Prussian service ; if 
 
472 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 they, however, return to the Hessian within three months after the close of 
 this treaty, they ai'e to be paid up to the time of their return by the Hessian 
 Government. The same rule applies to the districts ceded to Hesse which 
 formerly belonged to Nassau and Cassel. Soldiers who are of the rank of 
 officers in the ceded districts shall be sent to their homes ; and their time of 
 service in the Hessian army will be reckoned as if in the Prussian service. 
 Officers and military officials ranking as officers are to be allowed to choose 
 into which service they will enter. 
 
 "2. The Commissioners chosen by Article 1 6 of the Treaty will settle all 
 matters of detail which are connected with the present negotiations. 
 
 "3. All the inhabitants of the ceded districts are to be allowed full 
 freedom to settle in whichever country they choose for a year after the 
 exchange of the ratifications. 
 
 "4. In the cession of the country of Hesse-Homburg, the pictures, 
 library, and such things in the Ducal Castle are not included, as likewise 
 the orangery. These all remain the private property of the Grand Ducal 
 House. 
 
 "5. At the same time as the Prussian troops withdraw, the civil officers 
 in the lands at present occupied will cease to act, and the Grand Ducal 
 officials will return to their duty. 
 
 "6. It is understood that the same regulations for the post and telegraph 
 services as are to come into force in the province of Oberhessen, from its 
 being included in the Bund, are by this Treaty to be extended to the pro- 
 vinces of Stachenburg and Rheinhessen, which are south of the Maine. 
 
 " 7. All prisoners of war are to be exchanged in eight days after the rati- 
 fication of this Treaty. 
 
 " 8. In reference to the right of garrisoning Mayence, which is to remain 
 to Prussia, the same arrangements are to hold good between the Prussian 
 garrison and the territorial Government as did between the former garrison 
 of Bund troops and the territorial Government. 
 
 " 9. All telegraphic offices in Mayence must be entirely in the hands of 
 the Prussian Government. The railway telegraphs will not be disturbed 
 unless in cases of absolute necessity for the security of the fortress. 
 
 " 10. The Grand Ducal Government is ready to surrender the direction 
 of the administration of the Main-Weser Railway from the Hesse-Cassel 
 frontier to Giessen into the hands of the Prussian Government, provided 
 that the latter will give to the former a yearly account of its receipts. 
 
 " 11. If the Prussian Government wishes to send troops returning from 
 Bohemia or Bavaria by the Schwandorf to Wtirzburg line, the Grand Ducal 
 Government will transport them, and will be paid for the same by the Prus- 
 sian Government. 
 
 "12. No subject of the Grand Duke or of the King of Prussia is to be 
 annoyed or disturbed in person or property on account of his conduct during 
 the time of the war. 
 
 "13. In reference to Article 18 of the Treaty, it is understood that this 
 article only holds good till the year 1892, if the said saltwork is not acquired 
 by Prussia before that year. 
 
 " 14. The ratifications of this convention are to be exchanged at the same 
 time and place as those of the above Treaty. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 FORMATION OF THE NORTH-GERMAN CONFEDERATION. 
 
 After the war the Prussian Government determined to 
 annex the territories of Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, and 
 the free town of Frankfort. On the 17th August, Count 
 Bismarck introduced a bill into the Prussian House of Deputies 
 for this annexation, which was carried by two hundred and 
 seventy-three votes, in a house of three hundred members ; and 
 these territories became provinces of the Prussian monarchy. 
 By the treaties with Austria, made before and after the war, 
 Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenberg were also united to 
 Prussia. The area of Prussia, which before the war was 
 127,350 square miles was increased to 160,000. Her popula- 
 tion was raised from 19,000,000 to 23,000,000 inhabitants. 
 
 In August the Governments of Prussia, Mecklenburg- 
 Schwerin, Mecklenburg -Strelitz, Saxe -Weimar, Oldenburg, 
 Brunswick, Sachsen-Altenburg, Sachsen-Coburg-Gotha, Anhalt, 
 Schwarzburg - Sondershausen, Schwarzburg - Rodolstadt, Wal- 
 deck, Reusz (of the younger line), Schaumburg-Lippe, Lippe, 
 Liibeck, Bremen, and Hamburg, concluded an offensive and 
 defensive treaty for the maintenance of the independence and 
 integrity as well as of the internal and external security of their 
 States, and undertook a common defence of their territory, 
 which they guaranteed by this treaty. 
 
 "2. The aims of the Confederation shall be definitely laid down by a 
 Confederate Constitution on the basis of the Prussian outlines of the 10th ot 
 June, 1866, with the co-operation of a common Parliament which is to be 
 called together. 
 
 " 3. All existing treaties and agreements between the Confederates are to 
 remain in full force, as far as they are not expressly modified by the present 
 Federation. 
 
474 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book IX. 
 
 " 4. The troops of the Confederates are to be under the supreme command 
 of the King of Prussia. The duties during war will be arranged by special 
 settlements. 
 
 " 5. The Confederate Governments will appoint votes to be taken on the 
 basis of the elective law of the Empire of April 12, 1849, for deputies to 
 the Parliament, and will call the latter together in common with Prussia. 
 They shall also send Plenipotentiaries to Berlin, in order to settle the Bill 
 of Confederation in accordance with the outlines of the 10th of June, 
 1 866, which is to be laid before the Parliament for its consideration and 
 approval. 
 
 "6. The duration of this agreement is until the formation of the new 
 Confederation, and is settled for one year if the new Confederation is not 
 concluded before the expiration of a year. 
 
 " 7. The above Treaty of agreement shall be ratified and the ratifications 
 exchanged as soon as possible, at the latest within three weeks of the date 
 of its conclusion, at Berlin. " 
 
 The only States north of the Maine which, on the conclusion 
 of this treaty, were not united to Prussia in the North-German 
 confederacy, were Reusz (of the older line), Saxe-Meiningen, 
 and the Kingdom of Saxony. The Regent, Princess Caroline 
 of Reusz, soon, however, concluded the same treaty with 
 Prussia. 
 
 On the 20th September, Duke Bernhard of Saxe-Meiningen, 
 who did not approve of the new order of things, abdicated, 
 and the new Duke, George, declared himself ready to enter the 
 Confederation. 
 
 After a long delay, peace was finally concluded between 
 Prussia and Saxony, on the 21st of October. By this treaty, 
 Saxony entered the North-German Confederation. The Saxon 
 troops were to form an integral portion of the North-German 
 army, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia. 
 Saxony was to pay a war contribution of ten millions of thalers,* 
 in three instalments \ the last instalment was to be paid on the 
 30th April, 1867 j one million, however, was to be remitted, in 
 consideration of Saxony giving up to Prussia so much of the 
 railway between Gbrlitz and Dresden as ran on Prussian 
 ground. A direct railway was to be constructed from Leipsic 
 to Zeitz. All the Saxon telegraphs were to be given up to 
 Prussia. The salt monopoly in Saxony was to be abolished. 
 The fortress of Konigstein was to be given over to Prussia; 
 Dresden was to be held by a garrison half Prussian half Saxon, 
 
 * £1,500,000. 
 
Chap. VI,] NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION. 475 
 
 the latter not to muster more than three thousand men. The 
 commandant was to be appointed by the King of Prussia, the 
 second in command by the King of Saxony. 
 
 The conclusion of the treaty of peace with Saxony was 
 virtually the last act in the formation of the North-German 
 Confederacy, The Parliament had afterwards to agree formally 
 to the settlement of the Confederation, as it did in the early 
 months of 1867, but practically, Northern Germany was united 
 into one confederate power under the sceptre of the House of 
 Hohenzollern by the end of October, 1866. 
 
BOOK X. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 THE WAR IN ITALY. 
 
 When Prussia declared that she regarded the Austrian pro- 
 ceedings at Frankfort as a declaration of war, King Victor 
 Emmanuel, in consequence of his alliance with the Govern- 
 ment of Berlin, declared war against Austria. On the 20th 
 of June, General La Marmora, the chief of the Staff of the 
 Italian army, sent an intimation to the commandant of Mantua 
 that hostilities would commence on the 23rd. The Archduke 
 Albrecht accepted the intimation, and made ready for action. 
 
 The theatre of war* in which the troops of Italy and those 
 of the Austrian Army of the South were about to engage has 
 formed one of the ordinary battle-fields of Europe. Its com- 
 munications with Vienna lay along two lines. The railway 
 which from the capital by way of Trieste runs through Goerz, 
 Udine, Treviso, and Padua to Verona, connects Vienna with 
 the Quadrilateral : and the line by Salzburg, Innsbriich, 
 Botzen, and Roveredo, although not completed between 
 Innsbriich and Botzen, afforded a subsidiary line for the supply 
 of troops camped under the protection of the fortresses. The 
 Quadrilateral itself consisted of the strongly intrenched camp 
 of Verona, on the Adige, the smaller and less important 
 fortress of Legnano, on the same river, the lately strengthened 
 fortifications of Peschiera at the issue of the Mincio from the 
 
 * This theatre of war has been so frequently and so lately the scene of 
 memorable campaigns, and so many good maps of it exist, that it is thought 
 unnecessary to supply one. 
 
Chap. 1. 1 THE WAR IX ITALY. 477 
 
 I Lago di Garda, and the fortress of Mantua, which lies further 
 I down the Mincio, with its citadel and Fort St. George on the 
 | left bank, and its minor works on the right banks of the 
 ■ stream. The fortified Borgo Forte supports the line of the 
 i Mincio in front of the confluence of that river with the Po, 
 < while Venice, with many adjacent forts, protected the rear of 
 | the Quadrilateral towards the sea. 
 
 The Italians, in acting against the Quadrilateral with their 
 army concentrated, could either advance across the Mincio and 
 rush headlong against its parapets and embrasures, or, by 
 advancing from the Lower Po, push towards Padua to cut the 
 main line of communication with Vienna. General La Marmora 
 had a very difficult problem to solve, and was not fortunate in 
 the conditions he introduced into its solution. His information 
 as to the Austrian designs was manifestly exceedingly faulty, 
 while that of the Archduke Albrecht was excellent. The Italian 
 general was bound to assume the offensive, for political reasons. 
 Neglecting a plan for his campaign which had been forwarded 
 from Berlin,* he adopted one which, as is believed, had been 
 determined upon in case of the prosecution of the war of 1859, 
 by a mixed council of French and Italian officers. The main 
 attack was to be made against the Mincio and the Adige by 
 the principal army, under the personal command of King 
 Victor Emmanuel. Each corps of this army was reinforced by 
 one division, so as to consist of four divisions. These corps 
 were the first corps of General Durando, consisting of the 
 divisions of Cerale, Pianelli, Sirtori, and Brignone ; the second 
 corps, under Cucchiari, consisting of the divisions of Angioletti, 
 Longoni, Cosenz, and Nunziante ; the third corps, under Delia 
 Rocca, consisting of the divisions of Cugia, Govone, Bixio, and 
 the Crown Prince Humbert. If, as has been before observed, 
 each division may be reckoned at twelve thousand men, with 
 eighteen guns, the whole army, including the division of reserve 
 
 * The plan of campaign forwarded from Berlin is supposed to have been 
 the product of General von Moltke, and to have been as follows :— A corps 
 of Italians of about one hundred thousand men was to cross the Lower l'o 
 to the east of the Mincio, and take up a strong position between Mantua and 
 Legnano, and by their presence hold the Austrian army within the Quadri- 
 lateral, while the remainder of the Italian army, by aid of the fleet, disem- 
 barked in the neighbourhood of Trieste, and pushed directly upon Vienna. 
 
4/S SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 cavalry, mustered about one hundred and forty-six thousand 
 men, with two hundred and twenty-eight guns. The Italian 
 staff from its information concluded that the Archduke Albrecht 
 would await an attack behind the Adige, and determined to 
 cross the Mincio, and occupy within the Quadrilateral the 
 ground not held by the Austrians. ^fter taking up this position, 
 and so separating the fortresses from one another, the main 
 army was to give a hand across the Adige to General Cialdini, 
 who with his corps was to cross the Lower Po from the direction 
 of Ferrara. General Garibaldi, with his volunteers, was to 
 support the movement on the left by attacks on the passes 
 which lead from Northern Lombardy into the Tyrol. On the 
 day immediately succeeding the declaration of war, the main 
 body of the King's army was moved towards the Mincio. On 
 the 22nd June, the day before hostilities were to commence, 
 the head-quarters of the first corps were at Cavriana, those of 
 the third at Gazzoldo, those of the second at Castelluccio. On 
 the night between the 22nd and 23rd, the King in person 
 moved to Goito. 
 
 The passage of the Mincio was intended to take place at 
 seven o'clock on the morning of the 23rd, by the division of 
 reserve cavalry, the whole of the third corps, and Cerale's, 
 Sirtori's, and Brignone's divisions of the first corps, — altogether 
 about eighty-seven thousand combatants, with one hundred and 
 thirty-eight guns. To cover this advance, Pianelli's division of 
 the first corps was to remain on the right bank of the Mincio, 
 and watch the garrison at Peschiera. Cosenz's division of the 
 second corps and one brigade of Nunziante's division were 
 detached towards Mantua ; the other brigade of Nunziante's 
 division was posted on the right bank of the Po, to keep 
 open the communications with Cialdini, and to observe 
 Borgoforte. 
 
 Angioletti's and Longoni's divisions of the second corps 
 were to remain near Castelluccio, and if they received no 
 further orders, to cross the Mincio on the 24th and support the 
 other two corps, which on that day were to be in position 
 between the Mincio and the Adige. 
 
 On the morning of the 23rd the passage of the Mincio by 
 the Italians commenced. Cerale's division crossed at Monzam- 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR IN ITALY. 479 
 
 bano, Sirtori's at Borghetto and Valeggio, and Brignone's at 
 Molino di Volta, between Volta and Pozzolo. The reserve 
 division of cavalry passed at Goito, and was followed by the 
 four divisions of the third corps. The two divisions of Bixio 
 and of Prince Humbert were pushed to Belvedere and Rover- 
 bella, the divisions of Govone and Cugia encamped near 
 Pozzolo and Massimbona. The three divisions of the first 
 corps bivouacked near the points where they had crossed the 
 stream on the left bank of the Mincio. 
 
 The reserve cavalry pushed patrols to Villafranca, which fell 
 in with a few weak detachments of Austrian cavalry, but no 
 other signs of the enemy were perceived. 
 
 A coronet of heights lies on the south side of the Lago di 
 Garda, upon the left bank of the Mincio, which, on the south, 
 between Valeggio and Somma Campagna, sinks into the plain 
 of Villafranca, on the east, between Somma Campagna and 
 Santa Giustina, drops towards Verona and the valley of the 
 A.dige. Since the very slight nature of the enemy's detach- 
 ments discovered by the cavalry confirmed the Italian head- 
 quarter staff in the idea that the Archduke Albrecht did not 
 intend to hold the ground between the Mincio and the Adige, 
 but to await an attack behind the latter stream, it was resolved 
 to occupy these hills, and, on the 24th, to take up a position 
 on the heights between Valeggio, Castelnovo, and Somma 
 Campagna. 
 
 The orders issued for the Italian advance of the 24th June 
 were, that the first corps should leave the division of Pianelli 
 on the right bank of the Mincio, and should move the head- 
 quarters of its main body to Castelnovo. There Cerale's 
 division was to assume a position facing towards Peschiera, 
 while those of Sirtori and Brignone at Santa Giustina and Sona 
 should form front towards Pastrengo and Verona. The line 
 taken up by the first corps was to be prolonged through 
 Somma Campagna and Villafranca by the third corps, and to 
 Quaderni and Mozzecane by the division of the reserve 
 cavalry. The divisions of Angioletti and Longoni were to 
 cross the Mincio at Goito, and take post at Marmirolo and 
 Reverbella, as reserves. Orders were also issued that a field 
 bridge was to be thrown at Torre di Goito, above Goito, and 
 
480 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 that the field-bridge at Molino di Volta, as well as the perma- 
 nent bridges at Monzambano, Borghetto, and Goito, should be 
 covered by bridge-heads. 
 
 Confident of his information, and without scouring the 
 country with his cavalry, General La Marmora ordered the 
 advance of the 24th to be made only according to the ordinary 
 habit of route marching. The troops did not breakfast before 
 starting, proper rations were not served out to them, and the 
 provision trains followed the columns. No preparation appears 
 to have been made for combat. Scouts do not seem to have 
 been sent out to observe the roads from the fortresses, and the 
 soldiers of the infantry were loaded with their knapsacks under 
 the broiling sun of Italian midsummer. This negligence and 
 temerity met with its just reward. 
 
 The Archduke Albrecht had as field troops under his 
 command, the fifth Austrian corps d'arme'e, led by Prince 
 Liechtenstein, the seventh corps, under Field Marshal Maroicic 
 di Madonna del Monte, the ninth corps, under General 
 Hartung, and a division of reserve infantry formed out of 
 fourth and border battalions under General Rodich. After 
 a short time Rodich replaced Prince Liechtenstein in the 
 command of the fifth corps, and General Rupprecht received 
 the command of the reserve division. 
 
 As soon as the Prussians entered Holstein, the Austrian 
 commander in Italy concentrated his troops between Pastrengo 
 and San Bonifacio," so that they could be united with facility 
 on either bank of the Adige, in case of necessity for action. 
 After deductions for necessary detachments, the Archduke had 
 three brigades of each corps, and a strong brigade of the 
 reserve division ready for battle. His force was thus ten 
 brigades, mustering about sixty thousand combatants, which 
 the cavalry raised to sixty-two thousand five hundred. To 
 these, two hundred and seventy guns were attached. 
 
 At the time that Italy declared war, the reserve division was 
 posted at Pastrengo as the right Austrian wing, the seventh 
 corps at San Bonifacio as the left wing, the fifth and ninth 
 corps were concentrated at Verona. A few brigades were 
 
 * A station on the railway between Verona and Vicenza, and about mid- 
 way between those towns. 
 
Chap. L] THE WAR IN ITALY. 4S1 
 
 pushed forwards towards the line of the Lower Po, to watch 
 Cialdini. A light cavalry brigade, pushed forward towards 
 the Mincio to watch the army of King Victor Emmanuel, 
 received orders, in case the latter crossed that river, to fall back, 
 without committing itself to any serious action, by way of 
 Villafranca. 
 
 This brigade of cavalry withdrew on the 22nd, as soon as 
 the Italians seriously showed that they intended to cross the 
 Mincio, to Villafranca. On the 23rd, when the Italians crossed 
 it, they withdrew further, with no more resistance than the 
 exchange of a few cannon shots near Dossobuono, and that 
 evening took post under the forts of Verona. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 23rd, a staff-officer, who had been 
 sent to Somma Campagna, reported to the Archduke Albrecht 
 that the heights near that place were not yet occupied by the 
 Italians, but that heavy clouds of dust could be seen to the 
 south moving towards the Adige. 
 
 Archduke Albrecht, who had before thought that the Italians 
 after crossing the Mincio, would move directly upon Isola della 
 Scala to join Cialdini on the Lower Po, was confirmed in his 
 I idea by this report from Somma Campagna. He concluded 
 that King Victor Emmanuel was moving, by way of Isola, to 
 Albaredo on the Adige, there to throw a bridge and cross that 
 river. From Goito to Albaredo the distance is over thirty 
 miles. The Archduke calculated that the Italians could not 
 [reach Albaredo before the evening of the 24th, and that, as 
 they must then throw a bridge, they could only with difficulty 
 commence the passage of the Adige on the morning of the 
 25th. The Archduke calculated that on the 23rd he could 
 occupy the heights by Sona and Somma Campagna, and 
 could, on the morning of the 24th, attack with strong force the 
 Italian flank near Villafranca, while his reserves could at the 
 same time be at Castel d'Azzano. 
 
 Acting with this idea, on the afternoon of the 23rd, the 
 Archduke removed one brigade of his reserve division to 
 Sandra, whence it pushed detachments towards Castelnovo- 
 The fifth corps, under General Rodich, was at the same time 
 to move to Sona, and send its advanced guard to Zerbare in 
 the direction of Custozza and Valeggio. The ninth corps, 
 
4S2 SEVEX WEEKS' WAR. [Book X: 
 
 which had to make a march of fifteen miles from San Boni- 
 facio, could only reach Verona on the evening of the 23rd, and 
 was therefore ordered to be held as the reserve. The cavalry- 
 attached to the different corps d'armee was formed into an 
 independent cavalry brigade, so that the Archduke now had 
 two brigades of that arm. On the night between the 23rd and 
 24th, the Austrian head-quarters were moved to San Massimo, 
 and orders were issued that on the 24th, at early morning, the 
 line between Sandra, Santa Giustina, Sona, and Somma Cam 
 pagna should be occupied, and that then a wheel to the left 
 should be made on Somma Campagna, as a pivot, which would 
 bring the troops on a line from Castelnovo by San Giorgio and 
 Zerbare to Somma Campagna. This movement was to be 
 covered by the two cavalry brigades, which were to advance 
 by Ganfardine and Dossobuono towards Custozza and Villa- 
 franca. 
 
 The dispositions on both sides thus rendered a collision be- 
 tween the two armies imminent, and brought on the 
 
 BATTLE OF CUSTOZZA. 
 
 In the night between the 23rd and 24th, a heavy fall of rain 
 took place, which laid the dust, and made the air cool on the 
 following day. 
 
 At three o'clock in the morning of the 24th, the sixth 
 Austrian corps moved on Somma Campagna, the fifth corps, 
 leaving a detachment in Sona, moved on San Giorgio; the 
 reserve division from Sandra, on Castelnovo. The advanced 
 guards of all three corps were pushed further forward, and the 
 cavalry brigades spread themselves in the plain, on the left of' 
 the ninth corps. These advanced guards fell in with those of 
 the divisions of King Victor Emmanuel, which were moving in 
 the opposite direction, first with those of the reserve cavalryf 
 division and that of Prince Humbert, which were moving from; 
 Villafranca on Dossobuono and Ganfardine, then on that of 
 Bixio, which followed on the left of Prince Humbert, as well- 
 as on that of Cugia's division, which was moving on Staffalo,' 
 and which was supported by the divisions of Govone and Brig- 
 none. The above-named Italian divisions were engaged on] 
 
Chap. I ] THE WAR IN ITAL Y. 483 
 
 the eastern bank of the Tione. On the western bank of that 
 stream the advanced guard of Cerale's division fell in with the 
 Austrian reserve division near Alzarea, and under the pressure 
 of superior force was compelled to retire to Oliosi, where Cerale 
 made a determined stand. The Archduke Albrecht reinforced 
 his reserve division by Piret's brigade of the fifth corps, from 
 the eastern side of the Tione, while Moring and Bauer's brigade 
 of the same corps advanced against San Rocco di Palazzuolo. 
 The communication between his fifth and ninth corps was 
 secured by the advanced guard of the seventh corps, which 
 was marching from Sona by Zerbare. After a hot fight, in 
 which great bravery was displayed by both sides, Oliosi caught 
 fire, and Cerale was forced to retreat about one o'clock, to 
 Monte Vento. Cerale himself was wounded, and General 
 Villarey, the commander of one of his brigades, was killed. 
 At Monte Vento, Sirtori's division, which had advanced from 
 Valeggio to Santa Lucia, on the Tione, covered the right wing 
 of Cerale's troops, yet without effect, for the Austrians stormed 
 Monte Vento and drove out Cerale, who was forced to retreat 
 ion Valeggio. He was not, however, pursued. General Pia- 
 [nelli, who had been left on the right bank of the Mincio, near 
 Monzambano, hearing that Cerale was hard pressed at Oliosi, 
 on his own responsibility led one brigade of his division across 
 the river, and threatened the right flank of the Austrian ad- 
 vance against Monte Vento. 
 
 As soon as Monte Vento was evacuated by the Italians, 
 Bauer's and Moring's brigades advanced against Sirtori, at 
 Santa Lucia. The Italian general quitted his position here 
 because he was not supported on his left, and retreated about 
 (three o'clock to Valeggio. The Austrian reserve division had 
 Sin the meantime advanced against Salionze and Monzambano. 
 -By this hour the left wing of the Italian army had been com- 
 pletely driven from the field, but the battle still was maintained 
 ion the eastern bank of the Tione. In this part of the field 
 the Austrian ninth corps had received orders to halt near 
 Somma Campagna, when Cugia, about eight o'clock, advanced 
 by way of Madonna della Croce. General Hartung occupied 
 Berettara and Casa del Sole in force. He soon received orders 
 I to advance on Custozza, when he fell in with Cugia's division, 
 
 1 1 2 
 
 ::■; 
 
484 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book X. 
 
 which was supported on the right by that of Prince Humbert. 
 The latter was exposed to frequent attacks of the Austrian 
 cavalry, and was often obliged to throw its battalions into 
 square, in one of which the Prince himself found shelter from 
 the enemy's horsemen. 
 
 On Cugia's left Brignone was engaged. The latter division 
 was led into action by General La Marmora himself. At 
 Monte Godio it was attacked by the Austrian brigade of 
 Sardier, supported by two other brigades of the seventh 
 Austrian corps. Shortly after mid-day, and after two com- 
 manders of his brigades, Gozzani and Prince Amadeus, had 
 been wounded, Brignone was forced to retreat to Custozza. 
 Govone's division was pushed forward in his place. 
 
 After Cerale had been driven from Monte Vento, and Sirtori 
 had retired from Santa Lucia, the seventh Austrian corps, sup- 
 ported by the left brigade of the fifth corps, which had now 
 nothing before it, pressed hard on Govone at Bagolino, and 
 took this place from him. Cugia, now outflanked on his left, 
 was forced to quit Madonna della Croce, and at five o'clock 
 the retreat of the Italian army was general. Slowly the third 
 corps retired beyond Custozza, with its left wing on Prabiano, 
 its right on Villafranca. It was not till seven o'clock in the 
 evening that the Austrians occupied the heights of Custozza. 
 Bixio's division and the reserve cavalry covered the retreat 
 across the plain, where some detachments of the second corps 
 also came into action. 
 
 The two divisions of Angioletti and Longoni, of the second 
 corps, were to have marched from Castelluccio early on the 
 24th, and crossing the Mincio at Goito, have moved on Villa- 
 franca, where they could easily have arrived by ten o'clock in 
 the morning. They did not, however, march at daybreak, and 
 when General La Marmora, who during the action, for some 
 unexplained reason, instead of sending a staff-officer rode tc 
 Goito to send these troops forward, he found there, betweer 
 three and four o'clock, only a weak advanced guard of those 
 divisions. This was sent forward towards Villafranca, and tool 
 a slight part in covering the retreat, but the main body of th( 
 second corps had not moved from Castelluccio. 
 
 The Italian retreat was made, without any orders from th< 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR IN ITALY. 4S5 
 
 Commander-in-chief, by order of the commanders of divisions. 
 Pianelli's division, after repelling a sally against it by the garri- 
 son of Peschiera, retired on Monzambano, Cerale's and Sirtori's 
 on Valeggio, Brignone's on Molino di Volta. Of the third 
 corps Govone and Cugia retired to Valeggio, Prince Humbert 
 and Bixio to Goito. The first corps recrossed the river on the 
 afternoon and evening of the 24th; the third corps and the 
 cavalry in the night The third corps rallied at Volta, the 
 cavalry between Goito and Cerlango. The bridge of Valeggio 
 was destroyed. 
 
 The army of King Victor Emmanuel was withdrawn behind 
 the Oglio. Cialdini, who, on the news of the battle of Custozza, 
 did not cross the Lower Po, moved towards his left, and posted 
 his troops near Mirandola and Modena, so as to be in close 
 communication with the army of the King. 
 
 The Austrians lost nine hundred and sixty killed, three thou- 
 sand six hundred and ninety wounded, and nearly one thousand 
 prisoners, who w r ere for the most part captured by Pianelli. 
 The Italians lost seven hundred and twenty killed, three thou- 
 sand one hundred and twelve wounded, and four thousand 
 three hundred and fifteen missing. 
 
 A pause in the operations was necessary to allow the Italian 
 army time to recover from the disaster of Custozza. On the 
 30th, detachments of the Austrian cavalry crossed the Mincio, 
 and pushed as far as the Chiese, but the Archduke Albrecht 
 had no intention or design of invading Lombardy. 
 
 The volunteers under General Garibaldi amounted to about 
 six thousand men. They were divided upon three lines. The 
 main body was collected by the 20th June, in front of Rocc.x 
 d'Ans, a small detachment was placed near Edolo, on the road 
 which leads through the pass of the Monte Tonale into the 
 Tyrol, another detachment near Bormio on the road which 
 leads over the Stelvio. 
 
 On the 22nd June, Garibaldi's main body crossed the frontier 
 near Storo, but found the population of the Tyrol entirely op- 
 posed to them, and staunchly loyal to the House of Hapsburg. 
 On the 25th, a sharp combat took place at the frontier bridge 
 of Cassarobach, in which the Italians were worsted. They 
 retired towards Bogolino. Near this town they were attacked 
 
4S6 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 by an Austrian detachment on the 3rd July, and again suffered 
 a reverse. In this engagement General Garibaldi was wounded. 
 
 The Austrians crossed the frontier by the Tonal and Stelvio 
 roads with small detachments, and several skirmishes took place 
 in these directions between the 23rd June and 3rd July. 
 
 As soon as after the battle of Koniggratz Venetia was offered 
 by the Government of Vienna to the Emperor of the French, 
 the fifth and ninth Austrian corps were withdrawn from Italy, 
 and forwarded to the Danube. There then remained in Venetia, 
 besides the garrisons of the fortress, only one Austrian corps, 
 and in the Tyrol a weak detachment under General Kuhn. 
 
 The Italian army rested for a space after the battle of Cus- 
 tozza, but an advance was rendered necessary by the alliance 
 with Prussia. The disaster of Custozza had caused both the 
 country and the army to lose confidence in La Marmora. The 
 command-in-chief was given to General Cialdini, who was 
 ordered to cross the Lower Po, and push troops against the 
 Tyrol and into Eastern Venetia. 
 
 On the evening of the 7th July, Cialdini, leaving a division 
 to watch Borgoforte, and another near Ferrara, concentrated 
 seven divisions near Carbonara and Felonica, and that evening 
 threw some detachments of light troops across the Po at Massa. 
 On the night of the 8th, three bridges of boats were thrown 
 across the stream at Carbanarola, Sermide, and Felonica, and 
 on the 9th the army crossed at these points, covered from any 
 attack by the marshes which in this direction lie between the 
 Po and the Adige. After having passed the Po under cover 
 of this natural obstacle, Cialdini made a flank march to his 
 right, gained the high road which leads from Ferrara by 
 Rovigo to Padua, and opened his communication with Ferrara 
 by military bridges thrown across the river to replace the road 
 and railway bridges which, on the night of the 9th, the 
 Austrians blew up, as well as the works of Rovigo. On the 
 10th Cialdini's head-quarters arrived at Rovigo, and on the 
 14th, after securing the passage of the Adige at Monselice, his 
 advanced guard occupied Padua. 
 
 The division which Cialdini left under Nunziante, in front of 
 Borgoforte, besieged that place. The batteries were armed by 
 the 1 6th and opened on the 17th. On the night of the 18th, 
 
^ 
 fi 
 
 Chap. L] THE WAR IN ITALY. 487 
 
 the place was evacuated by the Austrian garrison, which retired 
 to Mantua, and was occupied by the Italians, who captured 
 there seventy guns, and magazines of all kinds. 
 
 As the progress of events in the north pointed to the con- 
 clusion of an armistice, the terms of which would compel, in 
 all probability, the troops on both sides to remain in their 
 actual positions, the Italians determined to gain as much 
 I ground as possible before diplomacy might cause their army to 
 halt. 
 
 Cialdini, on the 19th, had with him about seventy thousand 
 men, and an expeditionary force to reinforce him was being 
 prepared, which would bring into the field about seventy 
 thousand additional combatants. The Austrian troops in 
 Italy which could take the field mustered little over thirty 
 thousand men. That day, the Italian general commenced his 
 advance from Padua. To Vicenza, which on the 15th had 
 been entered by a weak advanced detachment, one division 
 was sent ; the remainder of the army moved to the left bank of 
 the Brenta. The right wing marched to Mestre, to cut Venice 
 off on the land side, while the fleet, as was intended, should 
 attack it from the sea. The centre was directed along the 
 railway which leads by Treviso and Udine to the Isonzo ; the 
 left wing was to act against the Tyrol. The reserve, which 
 was being brought rapidly forward, was to hold the line of the 
 Adige. Medici's division was to move on Primolano and 
 through the Sugana valley upon Trent, while Garibaldi, with 
 his volunteers, was to act from the west against the same 
 place. 
 
 As Cialdini advanced, the Austrian field troops under General 
 Maroicic withdrew from the Quadrilateral, and retired gradually 
 behind the Piave, the Livenza, the Tagliamento, and finally, 
 behind the Isonzo. On the 22nd, they evacuated Udine, 
 which, on the 24th, was occupied by the Italians, with two 
 corps. No resistance was made by the Austrians until the 
 Italian advanced guard, on the 25 th, passed beyond Palmanovo, 
 when a sharp skirmish took place with the Austrian rear-guard. 
 As a truce had, however, been concluded on the 25th, it led to 
 no results. In the meantime, Cialdini had pushed detachments 
 by Schio towards Roveredo and by Belluno, as far as Avronzo, 
 
4SS SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 on his left, while on his right his troops were close up to 
 Venice and Chioggia. A truce was agreed upon on the 22nd, 
 which was extended from week to week, until on the 12th 
 August an armistice was concluded. The line of the Indrio 
 was fixed as the line of demarcation between the troops on 
 either side. 
 
 As soon as the armistice between Prussia and Austria had 
 been agreed to upon the 22nd July, the Austrian troops which 
 had been transferred from Venetia to the Danube were sent 
 back to the Isonzo, but on account of the subsequent peace 
 were not called upon to act. 
 
 In the meantime operations had been carried on against the 
 Soutiiern Tyrol. On the 20th July, Medici received orders at 
 Vigo dArzere to push through the Val Sugana upon Trent. 
 He reached Bassano' on the 21st, with about twelve thousand 
 men and eighteen guns : the same evening he pushed his 
 advanced guard to Carpano. Hence he detached a regiment 
 to his right and one to his left to turn the works which the 
 Austrians had thrown up at Primolano, to cover the junction of 
 the roads to Feltre and Trent. On the 22nd, with his main 
 body he marched against these works, which the Austrians 
 evacuated as soon as they heard of their being threatened to be 
 turned. On the 23rd, Medici found the bridge over the 
 Strigno barricaded, but not defended, and, after a slight 
 opposition, that evening entered Borgo. On the 24th he 
 pushed his advanced guards to Pergine and Vigolo. That day 
 General Kuhn telegraphed to Verona for reinforcements, and 
 on the 25 th received from that place about eight thousand 
 men. With them and the four thousand he had near Trent, he 
 determined to fall upon M edici, and push him back. 
 
 On the 25th a slight combat took place between some of 
 Kuhn's outposts and the Italian advanced guard near Sorda; 
 but nothing further occurred on account of the receipt of the 
 intelligence of the conclusion of the armistice. Garibaldi had 
 made some movements from the west against the Tyrol, but 
 without great success. On the 14th, after crossing the frontier, 
 he fixed his head-quarters at Storo. On the 19th he captured 
 the small fort of Ampola. The Austrians made several attacks 
 against the Italian volunteers, who tried to secure the roads 
 
Chap. I.] THE WAR IN ITALY. . 489 
 
 leading through the mountains. This irregular warfare led to 
 no great successes on either side. Though Garibaldi attempted 
 to gain as much ground as possible, he did not occupy much 
 at the time of the conclusion of the armistice. By that date 
 he held the valley of the Chiese for a length of only ten miles 
 from the Italian frontier, and in the Val di Conzei, one of his 
 regiments was advanced two miles to the north of Riva. On 
 the pass over Monte Tonale the Italians were repulsed by an 
 Austrian detachment, and never effected a lodgment beyond 
 the frontier. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 NAVAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 Of the Italian fleet great things were expected. The long 
 coast-line of Italy, and the mercantile habits of the natives of 
 many of her sea-board towns, had for a long succession of years 
 been calculated to foster seamen, and to lay the foundation for 
 an efficient navy. The result of the war caused bitter disap- 
 pointment to the Italian people. 
 
 The Italian fleet was assembled at Tarento in the middle of 
 May, and the command of it given to Admiral Persano. He 
 divided it into three squadrons. The first squadron, under 
 the immediate command of Persano himself, consisted of the 
 iron-clad vessels Re d'ltalia, Re di Portagallo, San Martino, 
 Ancona, Maria Pia, Castelfidardo, and ArTondatore ; a flotilla 
 of five gunboats was attached to this active squadron. The 
 second, or auxiliary squadron, was formed of unplated vessels. 
 In it were the frigates Maria Adelaide, Duca di Genova, 
 Vittorio Emanuele, Gaeta, Principe Umberto, Carlo Alberto, 
 Garibaldi, and the corvettes Clotilda, Etna, San Giovanni, and 
 Guiscardo. The third squadron consisted of three battering 
 vessels and two gunboats ; and the transport squadron in- 
 cluded fifteen vessels, which could convey in all about twenty 
 thousand men across the Adriatic. 
 
 On the declaration of war the fleets sailed from Tarento to 
 Ancona, and cast anchor there on the 25th of June. 
 
 Here Persano heard of the disaster of Custozza, and re- 
 solved to wait until the new plan for the operations of the land 
 army had been decided upon, leaving one vessel, the Esplo- 
 ratore, to cruise outside of the harbour. 
 
 On the 27th the Austrian fleet, under the command of 
 
Chap. II. ] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 491 
 
 Admiral Tegethoff, appeared in front of Ancona. Some shots 
 were exchanged between the Exploratore and the leading 
 Austrian vessel, the Elisabeth, but no further engagement took 
 place, for, before Persano could weigh anchor and come out to 
 fight, the Austrian fleet retired. 
 
 For a length of time Persano remained inactive in Ancona. 
 When Cialdini advanced into Venetia, he was, however, 
 ordered to act, and he determined to attack Lissa. 
 
 The island of Lissa lies in the Adriatic, some thirty miles 
 south of Spalato. Between it and the main land lie the islands 
 of Lesina, Brazza, and Solta. Between Lissa and Lesina 
 there is a strait of a breadth of about fifteen miles. In Lissa 
 there are two ports, those of San Giorgio and of Comisa. 
 
 On the 1 6th July Persano weighed from Ancona. The fleet 
 which accompanied him consisted of twenty-eight vessels, of 
 which eleven were iron-plated, four were screw-frigates, two 
 paddle-wheel corvettes, one a screw corvette, four despatch- 
 boats, four gunboats, one hospital ship, and one store ship. 
 The frigate Garibaldi remained at Ancona on account of ne- 
 cessary repairs. Messages were sent to all vessels at Tarento 
 or Brindisi to sail towards Lissa, especially to the ram, the 
 AfTondatore. 
 
 On the evening of the 17th, Persano issued orders that 
 Admiral Vacca, with three iron-clad vessels and a corvette, 
 should bombard Comisa; that the main force, consisting of 
 eight iron-clads, a corvette, and despatch-boat, should assail 
 San Giorgio ; and that Admiral Albini, with four wooden 
 frigates and a despatch-boat, should effect a landing at the port 
 of Manego on the south side of the island, in rear of the works 
 of San Giorgio. Two vessels were to cruise on the north and 
 east of Lissa during these operations, in order to give timely 
 warning of the approach of the Austrian fleet. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th, Vacca began to bombard the 
 works of Comisa. He soon found, however, that his guns 
 could not attain sufficient elevation to do much damage. He 
 gave up the attack, and sailed for Port Manego. Albini at 
 
 I Manego, for similar reasons as Vacca, could not effect a land- 
 ; ing, and Vacca sailed to join Persano. The latter had begun 
 to bombard San Giorgio at eleven in the morning ; by three 
 
 L o' 
 
492 SEVEN WEEKS" WAR. [Book X. 
 
 o'clock, when Yacca arrived, he had blown up two magazines, 
 and silenced several of the Austrian batteries. He could not, 
 however, succeed in sending his ships into the harbour, and 
 the prosecution of the attack was postponed till the next day. 
 
 On the evening of the iSth the whole of Persano's fleet was 
 assembled in front of San Giorgio, and in the night it was 
 joined by the ram Affondatore and three wooden vessels. 
 That evening Persano heard that the Austrian fleet was leaving 
 Fasana to attack him. He calculated, however, that it could 
 not approach Lissa before nightfall on the 19th, and deter- 
 mined to make a second attack upon the island on that day, 
 and issued in consequence the following orders : — 
 
 Albini, with the squadron of wooden ships and the gun- 
 boats, was to attempt a landing at Port Carobert, south of San 
 Giorgio. The ironclads, Terribile and Varese, were to bom- 
 bard Comisa, in order to prevent the garrison there from rein- 
 forcing that of San Giorgio. The floating battery, the For- 
 midabile, was to enter the harbour of San Giorgio, and silence 
 the batteries inside. Vacca, with the Principe de Carignano, 
 Castelfidardo, and Ancona, was to support the Formidabile; 
 the Re di Portagallo and the Palestro were to bombard the 
 outside batteries ; while Persano himself, with the Re d'ltalia, 
 the San Martino, and the Maria Pia, were to prevent opposition 
 being offered to Albini's landing. 
 
 The attack was postponed from hour to hour in case Teget- 
 hoff might arrive; but when, in the afternoon, the cruisers 
 signalled that no smoke was to be made out on the horizon, 
 the attack began. 
 
 The Formidabile entered the harbour, and, taking post 
 four hundred yards distant from the Austrian batteries at the 
 extreme end, opened fire. A battery on the northern side told 
 severely upon her, and Persano ordered the Affondatore to open 
 upon this battery through the mouth of the harbour. This was 
 done, but without much effect. 
 
 Vacca formed his three ironclads in single line, steamed 
 into the harbour, and opened on the batteries inside ; but 
 he could not efficiently support the Formidabile, both because 
 she herself covered the Austrian batteries, and on account 
 of the difficulty of manoeuvring in the narrow space within 
 
Chap. II.] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 493 
 
 the harbour, which is only about one hundred fathoms 
 wide. 
 
 He was soon forced to quit the harbour, and was followed 
 by the Formidabile, which had lost sixty men, and suffered 
 considerably. The latter was sent the same evening to An- 
 cona for repairs. 
 
 The landing was equally unsuccessful. The wind blew 
 fresh from the south-east, and the boats could with difficulty 
 approach the beach on account of the surf. 
 
 On the night of the 19th, the ironclads were assembled in 
 order of battle outside of the harbour of San Giorgio. Early 
 the next morning the Piemonte joined Persano, who had now 
 in all, thirty-four vessels under his command. On the 20th 
 at daybreak the weather was stormy ; yet Persano ordered 
 another attempt to land. The ironclads, Terribile and 
 Varese, bombarded Comisa. Albini and Sandri, with the 
 wooden vessels and the gunboats, supported the landing at 
 Port Carobert. The Re di Portagallo and the Castelfidardo 
 were engaged in some repairs to their machinery ; the ironclads 
 remained under steam in front of San Giorgio, awaiting 
 orders. 
 
 The surf ran so high that the landing could not be 
 effected, and it was about to be abandoned, when one of the 
 cruisers bore hastily down through the rainy mist, and sig- 
 nalled that the enemy was approaching from the north. Teget- 
 horT with the Austrian fleet was at hand, to raise the attack 
 upon the island. 
 
 BATTLE OF LISSA. 
 
 On the 17th July, Admiral Tegethoff at Fasana heard by 
 telegram of the Italian fleet being near Lissa. He concluded 
 that its appearance there was but a demonstration to draw him 
 away from the coast of Istria. On the 19th, however, fresh tele- 
 grams assured him that the attack on the island was serious. He 
 determined to proceed there. His fleet was in three divisions. 
 The first division, consisting of the ironclads Archduke Fer- 
 dinand Max, Hapsburg, Kaiser Max, Don Juan d'Austria, 
 Prince Eugene, Salamander, and Drache, was under the im- 
 
494 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 mediate command of Tegethoff. The second division, con- 
 sisting of the large wooden vessels Kaiser Novara, Prince 
 Schwarzenberg, Count Radetzky, Adria, Danube, and Arch- 
 duke Frederick, was led by Commodore Petz. The third 
 division consisted of the smaller wooden vessels, Hum, Dal- 
 mat, Reka, Seahound, Streiter, Velebich, and Wall. Each 
 division of the fleet consisted thus of seven vessels. To it 
 four despatch boats were attached, the Kaiserin Elisabeth, 
 Andreas Hofer, Stadini, and Greif. Tegethoff had with 
 him thus twenty-five vessels, mounting about five hundred 
 guns. 
 
 The Austrian admiral left the roads of Fasana about mid- 
 day on the 19th of June. On the morning of the 20th his 
 despatch boats reported a vessel of the enemy in sight. The 
 wind was blowing strong from the north-west. At first 
 Tegethoff steered a course from the north-west to south- 
 east, parallel to the Istrian coast, but off Zirona and Solta he 
 altered his course to one directly from north to south. 
 
 Persano, as soon as he heard of the Austrian approach, 
 ordered his vessels to form line of battle. The Terribile and 
 Varese were in front of Comisa, so that he had only ten iron- 
 clads. The Italian wooden vessels never came into action at 
 all, except by firing some long-range shots. 
 
 About nine o'clock the Italian ironclads, formed in single 
 line, were steering almost from west-south-west to east-north- 
 east in three divisions. The first division consisted of the 
 Maria Pia, the Varese, which arrived about this time, and the 
 Re di Portagallo ; it was under the command of Ribotty. 
 The second group consisted of the San Martino, Palestro, 
 Affondatore, and Persano's flag-ship, the Re d'ltalia. The 
 third group, under the command of Vacca, consisted of the 
 Ancona, the Castelfidardo, and Principe di Carignano. The 
 Maria Pia was at the head of the column \ the Carignano was 
 the sternmost vessel. When the Austrian fleet came nearer, 
 Persano signalled each ship to go about, so that the 
 Carignano led, and the column took a course from west to 
 east. 
 
 Persano, at the same time, moved in person from the Re 
 d'ltalia to the Affondatore, which he ordered to take up a 
 
Chap. II.] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 
 
 495 
 
 position on the flank of the column furthest from the Austrian 
 attack. When Admiral Tegethoff could clearly make out the 
 Italian fleet, it was steering from west to east. He bore down 
 upon it in the following order : — His twenty-one vessels were 
 arranged in three divisions of seven ships each. The first 
 division consisted of ironclads ; the two other divisions of 
 wooden vessels. The line of ironclads led, with the admiral's 
 flag-ship slightly in advance, from which the other vessels, 
 falling a little astern, formed a wedge-like order. The seven 
 heaviest wooden vessels followed the ironclads, and were 
 themselves followed by the lighter vessels in a similar for- 
 mation. 
 
 Tegethoff bore down upon the gap between Vacca's three 
 vessels and the central Italian group, and drove his own flag- 
 ship, the Ferdinand Max, straight upon the Re d'ltalia, which 
 he rammed several times, and sank. Only a small portion of 
 the crew were saved. The Palestro attempted to aid the 
 Re d'ltalia, but Tegethoff turning upon her, ruined her steer- 
 ing apparatus. At the same time she was attacked by other 
 ironclads, and quickly caught fire. She fell away before the 
 wind ; the fire could not be got under, and with all her ship's 
 company, except sixteen men, she blew up. Thus of the 
 Italian central division two vessels were lost, while the Affon- 
 datore remained inactive, apart from the battle. The third 
 vessel of this division, attacked by the seven Austrian iron- 
 clads, as well as by three wooden vessels, was severely handled, 
 and forced to retreat. 
 
 The Italian division under Vacca had, with a north-easterly 
 course, sailed along the flank of the Austrian ironclads as they 
 advanced, and exchanged some broadsides with them. When 
 his leading ship, the Carignano, was clear of Tegethoff's iron- 
 clads, Vacca ordered a change of direction, and brought his 
 three vessels in line between the second and third Austrian 
 divisions. His fire told severely on both, especially on the 
 Kaiser, the flagship of the Austrian second division. 
 
 The Italian division under Ribotty, when it saw the central 
 division engaged, altering its course, moved against the Austrian 
 wooden ships, and thus brought them between two fires. 
 Ribotty fiercely attacked the Kaiser, commanded by Commodore 
 
496 SEVEN WEEKS' WAR. [Book X. 
 
 Petz. Petz, using his wooden vessel as a ram, ran with full 
 steam against the Re di Portagallo, and lay then alongside of 
 her. At the same time he was attacked by the Maria Pia, and 
 his vessel suffered fearfully. 
 
 Tegethoff, by this time, had disposed of the Italian central 
 division, and he brought his ironclads back to aid his wooden 
 vessels. Under their protection the Kaiser got away, and was 
 taken to Lissa. A close and fierce battle began now between 
 the whole of the Austrian vessels and the six Italian ironclads, 
 during which the Italian wooden squadron and the Affondatore 
 looked on from the distance. The smoke was so thick that 
 either side could with difficulty tell their own vessels ; and soon 
 the necessity of hauling off was felt. 
 
 Tegethoff signalled to his fleet to form in three columns, 
 with a north-easterly course ; the ironclads formed the northern- 
 most line, nearest to the Italians. By this manoeuvre the 
 Austrian fleet was brought in front of the strait between Lissa 
 and Lesina. Vacca, under the impression that Persano had 
 gone down in the Re dTtalia, ordered the Italian ironclads to 
 assemble, and with them in a single line steered slowly towards 
 the west, waiting for the Palestro. She soon blew up. It was 
 now about two o'clock, and the action had lasted about four 
 hours. At this time Persano, with the Affondatore, joined 
 Vacca's squadron, placed her at the head of the line, and 
 ordered the other vessels to follow her movements. These 
 movements appear to have consisted in no more than a steady 
 pursuit of a westerly course to the harbour of Ancona. By 
 the battle of Lissa the Italians lost two ironclads, the Re 
 dTtalia and the Palestro. The Affondatore sunk at Ancona, 
 after reaching harbour. For three days the Italian people 
 were led to believe that a victory had been won at Lissa. 
 The mortification of the defeat which then became known 
 was thereby increased. Persano w r as summoned before the 
 Senate, and was deprived of all command in the Italian 
 navy. 
 
 One remark appears patent, even to those who are quite 
 unskilled in naval matters, that in this sea-fight TegethorT 
 led his fleet, Persano only directed his. Another, that the 
 Italian admiral, with superior forces at his command, 
 
Chap. II.] NAVAL OPERATIONS. 497 
 
 allowed an inferior force of his own vessels to be attacked 
 and defeated at the decisive moment by a smaller force of his 
 adversary. 
 
 On the 21st, the Austrian admiral returned, without a missing 
 vessel, to the roads of Fasana. 
 
 K K 
 
CHAPTER III. 
 
 PEACE BETWEEN ITALY AND AUSTRIA. 
 
 The armistice concluded between Austria and Italy was to 
 last from mid-day on the 13th August to the 9th September. 
 
 In the meantime, negotiations for peace were opened at 
 Vienna ; and on the 3rd October a definite treaty was signed. 
 By it Austria recognised the kingdom of Italy, and the cession 
 to it of Venetia by the Emperor of the French. The ratifica- 
 tions were exchanged as soon as possible. The Austrian 
 Commissioner-General, Moring, formally gave over Venetia to 
 the French Commissioner, General Lebceuf, when a plebiscite 
 took place. The annexation to the kingdom of Victor 
 Emmanuel was almost unanimously voted by the people of 
 Venetia, and Italy became one great country, united under the 
 sceptre of the House of Piedmont, and free of any foreign 
 dominion, from the Alps to the Adriatic. 
 
APPENDIX I. 
 
 Peace concluded at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, between 
 Austria (Emperor Francis Joseph I.) and Prussia 
 (King William I.) on the one side, and Denmark (King 
 Christian IX.) on the other. 
 
 Introduction.— In the name of the Most Holy and Inseparable 
 Trinity, His Majesty the King of Prussia, His Majesty the Emperor ot 
 Austria, and His Majesty the King of Denmark, are decided to convert 
 the Preliminaries signed on the 1st August into a definitive Treaty of Peace. 
 
 To this end are named as Plenipotentiaries, Baron Charles von Werther, 
 authorised Minister at the Austrian Court, &c. , and Mr. Louis von Balen, 
 present Privy Councillor, by His Majesty the King of Prussia ; Bernhard, 
 Count von Rechberg, Knight of the Golden Fleece (until 27th October, 
 Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs), and Baron Adolph von Brenner 
 Felsech, Ambassador Extraordinary to the Danish Coui't, by His Majesty 
 the Emperor of Austria ; Mr. Quaade, Minister without Portfolio, &c, 
 and Mr. Theodor von Kaufmann, Colonel in the General Staff, &c, by His 
 Majesty the King of Denmark. These met together at the Vienna Confer- 
 ence, and having exchanged their powers of action, and proved them in due 
 order, are agreed on the following articles: — 
 
 Article i. — May peace and friendship exist from this time forth 
 between their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and 
 the King of Denmark, and between their heirs and successors, their states 
 and subjects. 
 
 Article 2. — All stipulations and agreements which existed between the 
 contracting Powers before the war shall again come into force, in so far 
 as they have not become annulled or modified by the sense of the present 
 treaty. 
 
 Article 3. — His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up all rights in 
 the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg, in favour of their 
 Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and binds him- 
 self to acknowledge any arrangements relative to these duchies which their 
 aforenamed Majesties may make. 
 
 Article 4. — The abdication of the duchy of Schles wig includes all those 
 islands belonging to it, as well as the territory situate on the continent. To 
 facilitate the determination of boundary, and to avoid the inconveniences 
 which arise from the position of the Jutland territories, which are circum- 
 scribed with those of Schleswig, His Majesty the King of Denmark gives up 
 to their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria those 
 
 K K 2 
 
500 APPENDIX I. 
 
 Jutland possessions lying south of the southern boundary of the Ribe 
 district, as well as the Jutland territory of Mogel-Tondern, the Island ot 
 Amrum, the Jutland share of the Tohr, Sylb, and Roms Isles. In exchange, 
 their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria concede an 
 equivalent portion of Schleswig, which includes territories serving to secure 
 the connexion of the above-mentioned district of Ribe, with the remainder 
 of lutland, and mark the boundary between Jutland and Schleswig, on the 
 Koldnig side, which portion shall be separated from the duchy of Schles- 
 wig, and incorporated with the kingdom of Denmark. 
 
 Article 5. — The new boundary between the kingdom of Denmark and 
 the duchy of Schleswig will proceed from the centre of the mouth of the 
 Bay of Heilsminde, on the little belt, and after passing this bay, will follow 
 the present southern limits of the Heyl, Weystrup, and Taps parishes, as 
 far as the course of the river, which is on the south of Geylbjerg and 
 Bronore. It will then follow the course of this river from its mouth in the 
 Fovs Aa, the extent of the southern limits of the parishes of Peddis and 
 Vandrup, and the west boundary of the latter, as far as Konge Aa, to 
 the north of Holte. From this point the valley of Konge Aa will represent 
 the limits as far as the eastern boundary of the parish of Hjort-Lund. From 
 this point the boundary line will follow this east limit and its prolongation, 
 as far as the jutting angle to the north of the valley of Abbekjar, and lastly 
 the eastern boundary of the village, on to Gyels Aa. From there the east 
 boundary of Seem parish, and the south borders of the Seem, Ribe, and 
 Wester- Wedstedt parishes, will represent the new limits, which will run in 
 the North Sea, at equal distance between the islands of Mano and Romo. 
 In consequence of this new determination of boundary, the common title to 
 rights and possessions, as well those which relate to the secular as the eccle- 
 siastical, and which till now have existed on the islands and in the various 
 parishes of the district, will be declared null. Therefore the new sovereign 
 powers will have full right in every relation to the territories separated by 
 the new boundaries. 
 
 Article 6. — An international commission, composed of the representa- 
 tives of these high contracting Powers, will, immediately after the exchange 
 of the ratifications of the present treaty, be authorised to undertake the 
 drawing of the new boundaries, according to the stipulations of the above 
 article. This commission will also have to divide the restoration expenses 
 for the new high road from Ribe to Tondern, even to the extension of the 
 mutual territories through which it runs. Lastly, the same commission will 
 lead the Presidentship in the division of the institutions and capitals which 
 till this time belonged in common to the districts or parishes now severed 
 by the new boundaries. 
 
 Article 7. — The arrangements of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Articles of 
 the Treaty of the 3rd May, 181 5, between Austria and Russia, which re- 
 presents an essential part of the arrangements relating to mixed possessors, 
 to the rights which these may exert, and neighbourly relations, with regard 
 to the possessions separated by the boundary line, will find their application 
 to the possessors, as well as to the possessions, which are to be found in 
 Schleswig as in Jutland, in the cases given in the above-mentioned arrange- 
 ments. 
 
 Article 8. — To arrive at a just division of the Danish monarchy's public 
 debt, according to the proportion of the population in the kingdom and 
 duchies concerned, and at the same time to ameliorate the insuperable diffi- 
 culties which a detailed liquidation of the mutual claims and pretensions 
 would call forth, the high contracting Powers have fixed the debt of the 
 
APPENDIX I. 501 
 
 Danish monarchy with which the duchies will be burdened at the round sum 
 of 20,000,000 thalers (Danish currency). 
 
 Article 9. — The share of the public debt to the Danish monarchy, 
 which according to the above Article is to fall on the duchies, shall, under 
 the guarantee of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor ot 
 Austria, reckon as to the debt of the above-mentioned duchies to the 
 kingdom of Denmark, after the expiration of a year, or earlier if it be pos- 
 sible, from the time of the definitive organization of the duchies. For the 
 payment of this debt the duchies can avail themselves, wholly or in part, 
 of one or other of the following means: — I. Payment in silver currency, 
 75 thalers (Prussian) equal to 100 thalers (Danish) ; 2. Payment to the 
 Danish Treasury, by indissoluble bonds at 4 per cent, on the internal debt 
 of the Danish monarchy; 3. Payment to the Danish Treasury, in new 
 Treasury bonds, given out by the duchies, and the value of which shall be 
 determined in Prussian thalers (30 to the pound), or in Hamburg marks. 
 These will be liquidated by a half-yearly annuity of 5 per cent, upon the 
 original amount of the debt, of which 2 per cent, represents the interest ad- 
 judged to the debt for each term, while the rest will serve to pay it off. 
 The above-mentioned payment of the half-yearly annuity will be made 
 through the public coffers of the duchies, or through the bankers of Berlin 
 and Hamburg. The bonds named under 2 and 3 will be accepted by the 
 Danish Treasury at their nominal value. 
 
 Article 10. — Up to the time when the duchies definitively receive the 
 sum, which according to the 8th Article of the present Treaty is that which 
 the Danish monarchy has to pay as its share of the mutual debt, they will 
 pay 2 per cent, on the settled sum, that is 580,000 thalers, Danish currency. 
 This payment will be so effected that the interest and the account settle- 
 ment of the Danish debt, which to the present has been assigned to the 
 public offices of the duchies, shall, as before, be paid by them. These pay- 
 ments will be made every half year, and in case they do not reach the 
 above-mentioned sums, the duchies will pay off the remainder in cash to the 
 Danish Finance Administration ; if the reverse, the overplus is to be like- 
 wise repaid to them in cash. The liquidation will take place between Den- 
 mark and the highest managing authorities of the duchies, commissioned for 
 the purpose, according to the stipulated manner of the present list, or even 
 quarterly, if it be considered necessary on both sides. The first settlement 
 shall be for the especial purpose of arranging the interest and account 
 payment of the Danish monarchy, which were made after the 2nd December, 
 1863. 
 
 Article ii. — The sums which represent the so-called Holstein-Plousche 
 equivalent, the remainder of the compensation for the former possessions of 
 the Duke of Augustenburg, including the debt of precedence with which it 
 is burdened, and the Government bonds of Schleswig and Holstein, shall 
 fall exclusively to the duchies. 
 
 Article 12. — The Governments of Prussia and Austria will repay them- 
 selves the expenses of the war through the duchies. 
 
 Article 13.— His Majesty the King of Denmark binds himself, imme- 
 diately after the ratification of the present treaty, to give up, with their 
 freights, all the merchant ships of Prussia, Austria, and Germany, which 
 have been taken during the war, also the cargoes belonging to Prussian, 
 Austrian, or German subjects, which have been taken from neutral vessels ; 
 lastly, all vessels which Denmark had taken with a warlike design from the 
 abdicated duchies. These objects shall be given back in the same condi- 
 tion in which they really are up to the time of restoration. In case the 
 
502 APPENDIX I. 
 
 objects to be returned no longer exist, the worth shall be given in restitution ; 
 and should the value have considerably diminished since their seizure, the 
 owner shall receive a proportionate remuneration. It is also acknowledged 
 as binding to make amends to the owners and crews of the ships, and to the 
 owners of the cargoes, for all outlay and direct loss which are proved to 
 have fallen on them through the seizure of the vessels ; also for the port 
 duties, quarantine duties, law expenses, costs of maintenance, and expenses 
 of sending back the ships and crews. Concerning the vessels which cannot 
 be restored, the value of these at the time of seizure will be accepted as re- 
 muneration. Concerning the average freights, or those objects which exist 
 no more, the indemnification will be fixed according to the value which 
 they would have borne at the place of their destination, at the time when 
 the vessel would have reached it, according to probable calculation. Their 
 Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria will also give up 
 the merchant ships which have been taken by their troops and men-of-war, 
 with their freights, as far as these are the properties of private individuals. If 
 the restoration cannot be made in naturd, the indemnification will be settled 
 according to the above-mentioned principles. At the same time their 
 Majesties bind themselves to bring to a settlement the sum total of the war 
 contributions which were received in advance by their troops in Jutland. 
 This sum will be deducted from the indemnification which was to be paid 
 by Denmark, according to the principles of the present act. Their Majesties 
 the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, and the King of Denmark, 
 will name a special commission to fix the sum total of the indemnifications. 
 This commission will assemble at Copenhagen, at latest six weeks after the 
 ratification of the present Treaty, and will endeavour to complete their task 
 in three months. If at the end of this term they have arrived at no under- 
 standing about the claims brought before them, those which are not yet 
 arranged shall be submitted to a court of separation (Schneide). To this 
 end their Majesties the King of Prussia, the Emperor of Austria, and the 
 King of Denmark, will agree on the choice of a judge (of separation ?). The 
 indemnifications will be paid, at latest, one month after their definitive 
 appointment. 
 
 Article 14. — The Danish Government remains burdened with all sums 
 which are paid through the subjects of the duchies, communities, public in- 
 stitutions, and corporations, to the Danish pay offices, as cautions, deposits, 
 and consignments. Moreover shall be restored to the duchies — I. The 
 deposit fixed for the payment of the Holstein Bank certificates ; 2. The 
 funds appointed for the prison building ; 3. The fire insurance funds ; 4. 
 The Savings' Bank ; 5. The capital proceeding from legacies belonging to 
 the parishes or public institutions of the duchies; 6. Bank reserves from the 
 special receipts of the duchies, which were bond fde'm. the public coffers, at 
 the commencement of the Germanic execution and occupation of these 
 lands. An international commission shall be authorized to liquidate the 
 amount of the above-mentioned sums, deducting the expenses which the 
 special administration required. The collection of antiquities at Flens- 
 burg, relating to the history of Schleswig, and which during the late 
 occurrences have been for the most part dispersed, shall, by the assistance 
 of the Danish Government, be again gathered together. Likewise shall 
 those Danish subjects, communities, public institutions, and corporations 
 which have paid sums of money into the public coffers of the duchies, as 
 cautions, deposits, or consignments, be most promptly satisfied by the new 
 Government. 
 
 Article 15. — The pensions which depend on the special budgets, be it 
 
APPENDIX I. 503 
 
 ol the kingdom of Denmark or of the duchies, shall in future be paid by the 
 country concerned, and the holders of them shall be free to choose their 
 domicile, either in the kingdom or in the duchies. All other pensions, civil 
 as well as military (including the pensions of the functionaries of the -civil 
 list of His late Majesty King Frederick VII., of His late Royal Highness 
 Prince Ferdinand, of Her late Royal Highness the Margravine Charlotte 
 of Hesse, nee Princess of Denmark), and the pensions which till now have 
 been paid through the Privy Pui'se, will be divided between the kingdom 
 and duchies, according to the proportion of their population. To this end, 
 a list of all these pensions will soon after be drawn up, the value of the life 
 rents converted into capital, and all the pensioners invited to declare 
 whether in future they desire to receive their pensions in the kingdom or 
 the duchies. Should it happen that, in consequence of this declaration, 
 the proportion between the two parts, that is, between that which falls to 
 the duchies and that which remains as a charge on the kingdom, should 
 not be according to the proportionate population, the difference shall be 
 equalized by the parties concerned. The pensions which are assigned to 
 the General Widows' Pay-office, and the Pension-fund of the subordinate 
 military, will for the future, as formerly, be paid as far as the funds reach. 
 As regards the additional sums which the State will have to advance to 
 these funds, the duchies will be charged with a share, according to the pro- 
 portion of their population. The share of the Income and Life Insurance 
 Institution, founded at Copenhagen in 1848, which the individual rights 
 belonging to the duchies have attained, they shall expressly retain. An 
 international commission, composed of representatives of both sides, shall 
 assemble at Copenhagen, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications 
 of the present Treaty, and regulate singly the stipulations of this article. 
 
 Article 16. — The Royal Government of Denmark undertakes the pay- 
 ment of the following royal annuities : Her Majesty the Dowager Queen 
 Caroline Amelia ; Her Royal Highness the Hereditary Princess Caroline ; 
 Her Royal Highness the Duchess Wilhelmina von Glucksburg ; Her 
 Serene Highness the Princess Caroline Charlotte Marianne of Mecklen- 
 burg-Strelitz ; Her Serene Highness the Dowager Duchess Louise Caroline 
 von Glucksburg ; His Highness the Prince of Hesse ; and their Serene 
 Highnesses the Princesses Charlotte Victoria, and Amelia of Schleswig- 
 Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. The share of these payments which 
 according to the proportion of the population falls to the duchies will be 
 repaid to the Danish Government by the administration of the duchies. 
 The selected commissioners mentioned in the preceding article will also be 
 charged to fix the arrangements for the performance of the present article. 
 
 Article 17. — The new Government of the duchies undertakes the 
 rights and obligations of all contracts and objects of public interest (es- 
 pecially those which concern the abdicated country) which have been con- 
 cluded, conformable to the law of the administration of His Majesty the 
 King of Denmark. It is, of course, understood that all obligations resulting 
 from contracts which the Danish Government had concluded, in reference 
 to the war and the Germanic execution, are not included in the preceding 
 determinations. The new Government of the duchies will respect every 
 right or title of individuals or civilians, legally acquired in the duchies. 
 In case of dispute, the Lav/ Courts will find their matters under this 
 category. 
 
 Article 18. — The native subjects of the relinquished countries serving 
 in the Danish army or navy have the right to be immediately exempted 
 from military service, and to return to their homes. It is understood that 
 
504 APPENDIX I. 
 
 those among them who remain in the service of His Majesty the King of 
 Denmark need, not therefore be in fear, either in reference to their persons 
 or their estates. The same rights and guarantees will be mutually assured 
 to the civil functionaries born in Denmark or the duchies, and who have 
 the intention either to give up or retain the offices they hold, either in 
 Denmark or the duchies. 
 
 Article 19. — The subjects domiciled in the countries relinquished 
 under the present Treaty have, during an interval of six years (reckoned 
 from the day of the exchange of the ratifications), by means of a preliminary 
 declaration before the authorized jurisdiction, full and entire freedom to 
 carry out their moveable possessions free from all tax, and to retire with 
 their families into the states of His Danish Majesty, in which case they will 
 retain the quality of Danish subjects. At the same time they are permitted 
 to keep their estates in the abdicated countries. The same freedom is also 
 mutually allowed to Danish subjects and individuals born in the duchies, 
 who are established in the states of His Majesty the King of Denmark. 
 The subjects who make use of these arrangements need suffer no inquietude, 
 either for their persons or with reference to the properties situate in both 
 states, on account of their choice of either one side or the other. The 
 above-mentioned respite of six years is also available to those belonging 
 either to the kingdom of Denmark or to the ceded country, who are staying 
 out of the territories of the King of Denmark, or of the duchies at the time 
 of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The nearest 
 Danish Embassy, or any high provincial jurisdiction of the kingdom or the 
 duchies, will receive their declaration. The naturalization in the kingdom 
 of Denmark, as in the duchies, belongs to any individual who has possessed 
 it up to the time of the ratification of this Treaty. 
 
 Article 20. — The titles of possession, the acts of administration and 
 civil justice, which relate to the ceded countries, and which are in the 
 archives of the kingdom of Denmark, shall be surrendered to the 
 Commissioners of the new Government of the duchies as soon as 
 possible. All those divisions of the archives at Copenhagen, which be- 
 longed to the ceded country, and which were taken from their archives, 
 shall be given up. The Danish Government and the new Government ot 
 the duchies mutually bind themselves to divide all documents and manu- 
 scripts which bear reference to the common concerns of Denmark and the 
 duchies, on the demand of the high administrative jurisdiction. The trade 
 and navigation of Denmark and the ceded duchies shall enjoy the rights and 
 privileges of the most favoured nations, and indeed, until a special Treaty 
 settles the conditions, the exemptions and facilities relating to the transit 
 duty, which, according to Article 2 of the Treaty of the 14th May, 1857, 
 is allowed to the goods which are conveyed on the highways and canals 
 which unite, or will unite, the North Sea and the East Sea, will find their 
 application to all goods which the kingdom or the duchies convey, what- 
 ever mode of communication it be. 
 
 Article 21. — The evacuation of Jutland by the allied troops will be 
 accomplished in as short a time as possible, at latest in the course of three 
 weeks after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty. The 
 extra arrangements concerning the evacuation are fixed in a Protocol ap- 
 pended to the present Treaty. 
 
 Article 22. — And to contribute all in their power to the tranquillity 
 of every mind, the high contracting Powers declare and promise that no 
 person who is compromised on the occasion of the late events, because of 
 his position and political opinions, shall be at all persecuted, molested, or 
 
APPEXDIX II. 505 
 
 alarmed, either in his person or with reference to his possessions, whatever 
 be his rank or situation. 
 
 Article 23. — The present Treaty will be ratified, and the ratifications 
 will be exchanged in Vienna, within three weeks, or sooner. In witness 
 whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed it with their arms. 
 
 Passed at Vienna the 30th October, in the Year of Grace 1864. 
 
 Werther. 
 Balen. 
 Rechberg. 
 Brenner. 
 
 Quaade. 
 Kaufmann. 
 
 [Here follows, as Appendix, a Protocol, which decides the manner in 
 which the evacuation of Jutland shall take place within three weeks. Then 
 also a second Protocol of the same 30th October, which says : "Immediately 
 after the exchange of the ratifications of the above-mentioned Treaties, His 
 Majesty the King of Denmark will issue proclamations to the inhabitants of 
 the ceded countries, to notify the change which has taken place in their 
 situation and to release them from their oath of fidelity."] 
 
 APPENDIX II. 
 
 1865. February 21. — Prussian Despatch to the Austrian Ministry, pro- 
 nouncing the conditions the fulfilment of which is demanded by the Prus- 
 sian Cabinet in the duchies of Schleswig Holstein, for the safe position of 
 the German interests. There are six Articles. 
 
 1st. — Lasting and indissoluble defensive and offensive alliance of the 
 duchies with Prussia. To make this feasible, Prussia binds herself to give 
 pi-otection and defence to the duchies against all attacks, in return the 
 future Duke will place the whole defensive power of the duchies at the 
 disposition of the King of Prussia, to apply it in the army and navy to the 
 protection and interest of both countries. The whole military disposition 
 of the duchies shall be placed on Prussian footing. It shall be yielded to 
 the Prussian Government, to appoint the quarters of the duchy troops, 
 either in Prussia, or the duchies ; the troops shall take the oath of alle- 
 giance to the King. The same principles apply to the navy. 
 
 2nd. — The Federal obligation of the sovereign of the duchies remains 
 unaltered. He will organise his Federal contingent from the Holstein- 
 Prussian troops not belonging to the Prussian Federal contingent. 
 
 3rd. — Rendsburg shall be a Federal Fortress, and remain occupied by 
 the Prussians as hitherto. 
 
 4th. — On behalf of the protection of the duchies, the following territories, 
 with full sovereignty, shall be resigned : (a) The town of Sonderburg, with 
 corresponding dominions, on both sides of the Alsen Sound, (b) The 
 fortress of Friedricksort, with corresponding dominions, for the protection 
 of Kiel, (c) The ground necessary for the establishment of fortifications at 
 the mouths of the canal joining the East and North Seas. Prussia demands 
 that the levelling of the canal, the guidance of the structure, and the 
 supreme direction, shall be given up to her. 
 
506 APPENDIX 111. 
 
 5th. — The duchies, with their entire dominions, shall assent to the Prus- 
 sian tariff system (Prussian tariff union). 
 
 6th. — The postal and telegraph affairs of the duchies shall be united with 
 those of Prussia. The surrender of the duchies to the future sovereign will 
 follow on the fixing and performance of the above conditions. Be they not 
 executed, Prussia will again enter on the rights appertaining to her from 
 the Peace of Vienna, and will reserve to herself the monetary winding up 
 (Geltevtdmachnjig) of her other appertaining pretensions with regard to the 
 duchies. 
 
 The Austrian Cabinet answered this despatch on the 5th March. It 
 declared that each one of the Prussian demands contradicted either the 
 Federal law, or the independence of the new Federal state. The Austrian 
 Minister, Count Mensdorff, had however, directly from the beginning set 
 up the principle in regard to constituting the duchies, that the new Federal 
 state should be independent, and that the regulation of its future relations 
 to Prussia should take place within the limits of the Federal legislation. 
 As soon as these two demands shall be fulfilled, Austria will willingly agree 
 to those arrangements, which Prussia may judge necessary for the preserva- 
 tion of her interests in the formation of the new state. 
 
 APPENDIX III. 
 
 ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief His Majesty the King. 
 
 Chief of the Staff General von Moltke. 
 
 Inspector-General of Artillery . . Lieutenant- General von Hindersin. 
 Inspector-General of Engineers . ,, von Wasserchleben. 
 
 FIRST ARMY. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief H. R. H. Prince Frederick Charles, 
 
 General of Cavalry. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-General von Voigts-Rhetz. 
 
 Quartermaster-General .... Major-General von Stulpnagel. 
 Commandant of Artillery ... ,, von Lengsfeld. 
 
 „ Pioneers ... ,, von Keiser. 
 
 SECOND CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Lieutenant-General von Schmidt. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Major-General von Kamecke. 
 
 Commandant of Artillery ... ,, Hurrelbrink. 
 
 ,, Pioneers . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Leuthaus. 
 
 Commandant of 3rd Division . . Lieutenant-General von Werder, 
 
 ,, 5th Brigade . . Major- General von Januschowsky 
 
 (2nd and 42nd Regiments). 
 ,, 6th Brigade . . Major-General von Winterfeld (14th 
 
 and 54th Regiments). 
 Blucher's Hussars, No. 5. 
 
 
APPENDIX III. 507 
 
 Commandant of 4th Division . . Lieutenant- General von Herwarth. 
 
 ,, 7th Brigade . . Major-General von Schlaberndorf (9th 
 
 and 49th Regiments). 
 ,, 8th Brigade . . Major-General von Hanneken (21st 
 
 and 6 1 st Regiments). 
 Pomeranian Uhlans, No. 4. 
 2nd Jager Battalion. 
 
 THIRD CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding . . . . None. 
 
 Commandant of 5th Division . Lieutenant-General von Tiimpling. 
 
 „ 9th Brigade . Major-General von Schimmelman (8th 
 
 and 48th Regiments). 
 ,, 1 Oth Brigade . Major-General von Kaminsky (12th 
 
 and 1 8th Regiments). 
 1st Brandenburg Uhlans, No. 3. 
 
 Commandant of 6th Division . Lieutenant-General von Manstein. 
 
 ,, nth Brigade . Major-General von Gusdorf (35th and 
 
 60th Regiments). 
 ,, 1 2th Brigade . Major- General von Kotze (24th and 
 
 64th Regiments). 
 Brandenburg Dragoons, No. 2. 
 3rd Jager Battalion. 
 
 FOURTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding . . . None. 
 
 Commandant of 7th Division . Lieutenant-General von Franzecky. 
 
 ,, 13th Brigade . Major-General von Schwarzhoff (26th 
 
 and 66th Regiments). 
 „ 14th Brigade . Major-General von Gordon (27th and 
 
 67th Regiments). 
 Magdeburg Hussars, No 10. 
 
 Commandant of 8th Division . Lieutenant-General von Home. 
 
 ,, 15th Brigade . Major-General von Bose (31st and 71st 
 
 Regiments). 
 „ 1 6th Brigade . Colonel von Schmidt (72nd and 4th 
 
 Jager Battalions). 
 Thuringian Uhlans' No. 6. 
 
 CAVALRY CORPS OF THE FIRST ARMY. 
 
 H.R.H. Prince Albrecht, General of Cavalry. 
 Commandant of 1st Cavalry Division. — Major-General von Alvensleben, 
 
 Commandant of 1st Heavy Brigade. — Major-General H.R.H 
 
 Prince Albrecht. 
 
 Garde de Corps. 
 
 Cuirassiers of the Guard. 
 
 Commandant of 2nd Heavy Brigade.— Major-General von Pfuel. 
 [Brandenburg Cuirassiers, No. 6. 
 Magdeburg Cuirassiers, No. 7. 
 
508 APPEXDIX III. 
 
 Commandant of Light Brigade. — Major-General von Rheinbaben. 
 1st Dragoons of the Guard. 
 1st Uhlans ,, „ 
 
 2nd ,, ., ,, 
 
 Commandant of 2nd Cavalry Divi- 
 sion ..... Major-General Hann von Weyhern. 
 Commandant of 2nd Light Brigade ,, Duke William of 
 
 Mecklenberg. 
 2nd Dragoons of the Guard. 
 Brandenburg Hussars, No. 3. 
 2nd Brandenburg Uhlans, No. 1 1. 
 
 Commandant of 3rd Light Brigade. — Major-General von Groeben. 
 Neumark Dragoons, No. 3. 
 Thuringian Hussars, No. 12. 
 
 Commandant of 3rd Heavy Brigade.— Major-General von Der Goltz. 
 
 Queen's Own Cuirassiers, No. 2. 
 
 Second Pomeranian Uhlans, No. 9. 
 
 SECOND ARMY. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief 
 Chief of the Staff 
 Quartermaster-General 
 Commandant of Artillery 
 Engineers 
 
 H. R. H. the Crown Prince. 
 
 Major-General von Blumenthal. 
 ,, von Stosch. 
 
 ,, von Jacobi, 
 
 ,, von Schweinitz. 
 
 FIRST CORPS DARMEE. 
 
 General von Bonin. 
 
 Chief of Staff . 
 Commandant of Artillery 
 ., Engineers 
 
 Commandant of 1st Division 
 1st Brigade 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel von Borries. 
 Colonel Knotke. 
 Lieutenant Colonel Weber. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Groszman. 
 Major-General von Pape (ist and 41st 
 Regiments). 
 ,, 2nd Brigade . Major-General von Barnekow (3rd and 
 
 43rd Regiments). 
 Lithuanian Dragoons, No. I. 
 
 Commandant of 2nd Division . Lieutenant-General von Clausewitz. 
 ,, 3rd Brigade . Major-General von Malotki (4th and 
 
 44th Regiments). 
 ,, 4th Brigade . Major-General von Buddenbrock (5th 
 
 and 45th Regiments, 
 ist Royal Hussars, No. 1. 
 1st Jager Battalion. 
 
 Commandant of Reserve Brigade of Cavalry of First Corps. — Colonel 
 
 von Bredow. 
 
 East Prussian Cuirassiers, No. 3. 
 
 East Prussian Uhlans, No. 8. 
 
 ■Lithuanian Uhlans, No. 12. 
 
APPENDIX III. 
 
 509 
 
 FIFTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding 
 Chief of the Staff _ . 
 Commandant of Artillery 
 
 ,, Engineers . 
 
 Commandant of 9th Division 
 „ 17th Brigade 
 
 General von Steinmetz. 
 Colonel von Wittich. 
 ,, von Karwel. 
 von Kleist. 
 
 Major-General von Lowenfeld. 
 Major-General von Ollech (37th and 
 58th Regiments). 
 
 „ 18th Brigade . Major-General von Horn (7th Regt.). 
 
 1st Silesian Dragoons, No. 4. 
 
 Commandant of loth Divison . Major-General von Kirchbach. 
 
 ,, 19th Brigade . ,, von Tiedeman (6th and 
 
 46th Regiments). 
 „ 20th Brigade . Colonel von Wittig (47th and 52nd 
 
 Regiments). 
 2nd Royal Hussars, No. 2. 
 5th Jager Battalion. 
 
 SIXTH CORPS DARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding 
 Chief of the Staff. _ . 
 Commandant of Artillery. 
 
 ,, Engineers . 
 
 Commandant of 1 ith Division 
 „ 2 1 st Brigade 
 
 General von Mutius. 
 Colonel von Sperling. 
 Major-General von Herkt. 
 Colonel Schulz. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Zastrow. 
 Major-General von Hahnenfeld (loth 
 and 50th Regiments). 
 „ 22nd Brigade . Colonel von Hoffman (38th and 51st 
 
 Regiments). 
 2nd Silesian Dragoons, No. 8. 
 Commandant of 12th Division . Lieutenant-General von Prodzinsky. 
 
 „ 24th Brigade . Colonel von Krauach (22nd and 23rd 
 
 Regiments). 
 2nd Silesian Hussars, No. 6. 
 6th Jager Battalion. 
 N.B. — Two infantry regiments of the 12th Division were detached, the 
 63rd to garrison Neisse, the 62nd to the command of General von Knobels- 
 dorf, who protected Silesia at Ratibor, and to whom the Silesian Uhlans 
 were attached. 
 
 GUARD CORPS. 
 
 General Commanding . . . 
 Chief of the Staff 
 Commandant of Artillery . . 
 
 ,, Engineers . 
 
 Commandant of 1st Division of the 
 
 Guard 
 
 Commandant of 1st Brigade 
 
 Prince August of Wlirtemberg. 
 Colonel von Dannenberg. 
 Major-General von Colomier. 
 Colonel Bichler. 
 
 Lieut. -General Hiller von Gattringen. 
 Colonel von Obernitz (1st and 3rd 
 Guards). 
 
510 APPENDIX III. 
 
 Commandant of 2nd Brigade . Major-General von Alvensleben (2nd 
 
 Guards and Guard Fusiliers). 
 Hussars of the Guard. 
 Jagers of the Guard. 
 
 2nd Division of the Guard. 
 
 Commandant of 3rd Brigade . Major-General von Budritzki (Grena- 
 
 diers of Kaiser Alexander, and 3rd 
 Grenadiers of the Guard. 
 ,, 4th Brigade . Major-General von Loen (Grenadiers 
 
 of Kaiser Franz, and 4th Grenadiers 
 of the Guard). 
 3rd Uhlans of the Guard. 
 Sharpshooter Battalion of the Guard. 
 
 N.B. — The 4th Regiment of the Guard was retained at Berlin, and sent 
 later to the Second Reserve Corps. 
 
 RESERVE CAVALRY OF THE SECOND ARMY. 
 
 Divisional Commander . . Major-General von Hartmann. 
 
 Commandant of 9th C. Brigade . Major-General von Witzleben (West 
 
 Prussian Cuirassiers, No. 5, Polish 
 Uhlans, No. 10). 
 ,, 1 Oth C. Brigade . Major-General von Schoen (West 
 
 Prussian Uhlans, No. 1). 
 ,, I ith C. Brigade . Major-General von Verstell (Silesian 
 
 Cuirassiers, No. 1, Silesian Hussars, 
 No. 4). 
 „ I2th C. Brigade . Major-General von Kalkreuth. 
 
 2nd Landwehr Hussars. 
 1st Landwehr Uhlans. 
 
 ARMY OF THE ELBE. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief . . . General von Hervvarth. 
 
 Chief of the Staff . . . Colonel von Schlotheim. 
 
 Commandant of Artillery . . , , von Rozynski. 
 
 ,, Engineers . . Lieutenant-Colonel von Forell. 
 
 Commandant of 14th Division . Lieutenant-General von Miinster. 
 
 ,, 27th Brigade . Major-General von Schwarzkoppen 
 
 (16 and 56th Regiments). 
 „ 28th ,, . Major-General von Hiller (17th and 
 
 57th Regiments). 
 Westphalian Dragoons, No. 7. 
 
 Commandant of 15th Division . Lieutenant-General von Canstein. 
 
 ,, 29th Brigade . Colonel von Stiickradt (40th and 65th 
 
 Regiments). 
 ,, 30th Brigade . Colonel von Clasenapp (28th and 68th 
 
 Regiments). 
 Royal Hussars, No. 7. 
 
APPENDIX III. 511 
 
 Commandant of 16th Division . Lieutenant-General von Etzel. 
 
 ,, 31st Brigade . Major-General von Scholer (29th and 
 
 69th Regiments). 
 „ 32nd ,, . (31st and Sthjager Battalion). 
 
 2nd Westphalian Hussars, No. 11. 
 
 RESERVE CAVALRY. 
 
 Rhenish Cuirassiers, No. 8. 
 
 Rhenish Uhlans, No. 7. 
 
 Westphalian Uhlans, No. 5. 
 
 FIRST RESERVE CORPS. 
 
 Lieutenant-General von Miilbe. 
 
 Landwehr Division of the Gua?'d. — General von Bentheim. 
 
 1st Brigade of Guard Landwehr (1st and 2nd Guard Landwehr 
 
 Regiments). 
 
 2nd Brigade of Guard Landwehr (1st and 2nd Guard Grenadier 
 
 Landwehr Regiments). 
 
 1st Landwehr Division. — General Rosenberg. 
 
 1st Landwehr Brigade (9th and 21st Landwehr Regiments). 
 2nd ,, „ (13th and 15th ,, ,, ). 
 
 2nd Landwehr Division. 
 
 1st Landwehr Brigade (2nd and 12th Landwehr Regiments). 
 2nd ,, „ (24th and 31st ,, „ ). 
 
 Landzvehr Cavalry Division. — Major-General Dohna. 
 
 6th Landwehr Cavalry Regiment. 
 
 I Battery. 
 
 ARMY OF THE MAINE. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief . . . General Vogel von Falckenstein. 
 Chief of the Staff . . . Colonel von Kraatz-Koschlau. 
 A. i^th Division. — Lieutenant-General von Goeben. 
 
 Commandant of 25th Brigade . Major-General von Kummer (13th and 
 
 53rd Regiments). 
 ,, 26th ,, . Major-General von Wrangel (15th and 
 
 55 th Regiments). 
 Westphalian Cuirassiers, No. 4. 
 1st Westphalian Hussars, No. 8. 
 
 B. Combined Division. — Major-General von Beyer. 
 19th, 20th, 30th, 32nd, 34th, 39th, and 70th Regiments. 
 
 N.B. — The 30th and 70th were detached to garrison Hesse-Cassel. 
 
 2nd Rhenish Hussars, No. 9. 
 
 C. Combined Division (for?nerly in Holstein). 
 Lieutenant-General von Manteuffel. 
 Commandant of 1st Com. Brigade Major-General von Freyhold (25th 
 
 and 36th Regiments). 
 ,, 2nd ,, ,, (nth and 59th Regiments^. 
 
512 APPENDIX III. 
 
 Commandant of Cavalry Brigade . Major-General von Flies (Rhenish 
 
 Dragoons, No. 9, Magdeburg 
 
 Dragoons, No. 6). 
 
 Two Battalions of Coburg-Gotha. 
 
 One Battalion of Lippe. 
 
 Five Fourth Battalions. 
 
 9th Jager Battalion. 
 
 Three newly-raised Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry. 
 
 Oldenburg, Hanseatic Brigade (nine Battalions, three Squadrons, two 
 
 Batteries). 
 
 SECOND RESERVE CORPS. 
 
 Commander-in-Chief. — His Royal Highness the Duke of 
 
 Mecklenburg- Schwerin. 
 
 a. Mecklenberg Division (five battalions, four Squadrons, two Batteries). 
 
 b. Combined Prussian Division (sixteen Battalions). 
 
 c. Two Anhalt Battalions. 
 
 Two Reserve Regiments of Landwehr Cavalry. 
 
 Eight Batteries. 
 
 ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN ARMY 
 OF THE NORTH. 
 
 General-in-Chief . . . . Feldzeugmeister Ritter von Benedek. 
 Chief of the Staff .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal von Henik- 
 
 stein. 
 Director of Artillery . . . Lieutenant Field- Marshal Archduke 
 
 William. 
 ,, Engineers . . . Colonel von Pidoll. 
 
 FIRST CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding . . . General of Cavalry, Count Clara 
 
 Gallas. 
 
 Assistant General Count Gondrecourt. 
 
 Chief of the Staff . . . . Colonel von Litzelhofen. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Poschacher. 
 
 1 8th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 30th Infantry Regiment (Martini). 
 
 34th Infantry (King William of Prussia). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Count Leiningen. 
 
 32nd Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 33rd Infantry Regiment (Giulay). 
 
 38th Infantry Regiment (Haugwitz). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Piret. 
 
 29th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 1 8th Infantry Regiment (Constantin). 
 
 45th „ „ (Sigismund). 
 
APPENDIX III. 515 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major- General Ringelsheim. 
 
 26th Jager Battalion. 
 
 42nd Infantry Regiment (Hanover). 
 
 73rd Infantry Regiment (Mensdorf). 
 
 To each Brigade one squadron of the Nikolaus Regiment of Hussars 
 
 (No. 2), and one 4-pounder Field Battery, were attached. 
 
 N.B. — To the Corps were besides attached one Sanitary Company, two 
 Field Ambulances, five Companies of Pioneers, four Companies of Engi- 
 neers, two 4-pounder and two 8-pounder Field Batteries, one 4-pounder 
 and one 8-pounder Horse Artillery Battery, and a Rocket Battery. 
 
 second coRrs d'armee. 
 
 General Commanding . . . Lieutenant Field-Marshal Count 
 
 Thun- Hohenstadt. 
 Assistant ..... Major-General von Philippovicb 
 Chief of the Staff . . . . Colonel von Dopfner. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Thorn. 
 
 2nd Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 40th Infantry Regiment (Roszbach). 
 
 69th ,, ,, (Jellachich). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Henriquez. 
 9th Field Jager Battalion. 
 14th Infantry Regiment (Hesse). 
 27 th ,, „ (Belgium). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General' von Saffrau. 
 nth Field Jager Battalion. 
 64th Infantry Regiment (Saxe- Weimar). 
 80th ,, „ (Holstein). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Prince Wurtemberg. 
 20th Field Jager Battalion. 
 47th Infantry Regiment (Hartung). 
 57th ,, ,, (Mecklenburg). 
 
 To each Brigade one squadron of the Imperial Uhlans (No. 6), and one 
 4-pounder Field Battery, were attached. 
 
 To the Corps were attached the same as to the First Corps. 
 
 THIRD CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal Archduke 
 
 Ernst. 
 
 Assistant Major-General von Baumgarten. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Colonel Baron Catty. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major General Kalik. 
 22nd Field Jager Battalion. 
 35th Infantry Regiment (Khevenhuller). 
 72nd ,, ,, (Ramming). 
 
 N.B. — This Brigade, which had garrisoned Holstein on the outbreak of 
 hostilities, was attached to the First Corps d'Armee. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Appiano. 
 4th Field Jager Battalion. 
 46th Infantry Regiment (Meiningen). 
 62nd ,, ,, (Archduke Henry). 
 
 1. 1. 
 
5 M APPENDIX HI. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Benedek. 
 1st Field Jager Battalion. 
 52nd Infantry Regiment (Archduke Franz Karl). 
 78th Infantry Regiment (Sokcsevics). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Kirchsberg. 
 
 3rd Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 44th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Albrecht). 
 
 49th Infantry Regiment (Hesz). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Prohaszka. 
 13th Border Infantry Regiment. 
 Four Battalions of the 55th Regiment. 
 56th 
 
 To each Brigade were attached one squadron of the Lichtenstein Uhlansf 
 (Xo. 9) and one 4-pounder Field Battery. 
 To the Corps were attached the same as to the First Corps. 
 
 FOURTH CORPS DARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal Count 
 
 Festetics. 
 
 Assistant Major-General von Mollinary. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Colonel von Gbrz. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Kopal. 
 
 27th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 1 2th Infantry Regiment (Archduke William). 
 
 26th Infantry Regiment (Michael). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fleischhacker. 
 13th Field Jager Battalion. 
 6th Infantry Regiment (Coronini). 
 61st ,, ,, (Prince of Russia). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Poekh. 
 
 8th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 37th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Joseph^. 
 
 51st Infantry Regiment (Archduke Charles Ferdinand). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Archduke Joseph. 
 
 30th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 67th Infantry Regiment (Schmerling). 
 
 68th ,, ,, (Steininger). 
 
 To each Brigade one squadron of the 7th Hussars and one 4-pounder 
 
 Field Battery were attached. 
 
 To the Corps the same were attached as to the First Corps. 
 
 SIXTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field-Marshal Baron 
 
 Ramming. 
 
 Assistant Major-General von Kochmeister. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Colonel Frolich. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel von Waldstatten. 
 6th Field Jager Battalion. 
 nth Infantry Regiment (Hartmann). 
 - sjrgth ,, ,, (Frank), 
 
APPENDIX Iff. 5*5 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Hertwegh. 
 
 25th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 41st Infantry Regiment (Kellner). 
 
 56th ,, ,, (Gorizutti). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Rosenweig. 
 17th Field Jager Battalion. 
 4th Infantry Regiment (Deutschmeister). 
 55th ,, ,, (Bianchi). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Jonak. 
 
 14th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 20th Infantry Regiment (Prussia). 
 
 60th ,, „ (Wasa). 
 
 To each Brigade one squadron of the 10th Uhlans and one 4-pounder 
 Field Battery were attached. 
 
 Besides were attached to the Corps one Sanitary Company, two Field 
 Ambulances, one battalion of Engineers, one battalion of Pioneers, two 
 4-pounder and two 8-pounder Field Batteries, two 8-pounder batteries of 
 Horse Artillery, and a Rocket Battery. 
 
 EIGHTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Archduke Leopold. 
 
 Assistant Major- General Weber. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Lieutenant-Colonel von Majnone. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fragner. 
 5th Field Jager Battalion. 
 15th Infantry Regiment (Nassau). 
 77th ,, ,, (Archduke of Tuscany). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General von Docteur. 
 31st Field Jager Battalion. 
 8th Infantry Regiment (Archduke Louis). 
 74th ,, „ (Nobili). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — General Count Rothkirk. 
 25th Infantry Regiment (Mamula). 
 71st ,, ,, (Leopold of Tuscany 1. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Brandenstein. 
 24th Field Jager Battalion. 
 2 1st Infantry Regiment (Reischach). 
 23rd ,, ,, (Este). 
 
 To each Brigade one squadron of the Archduke Charles's Uhlans (No. 3) 
 and one 4-pounder Battery were attached. 
 
 Besides were attached to the Corps the same as to the First Corps. 
 
 TENTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 General Commanding .... Lieutenant Field -Marshal von Gablenz. 
 
 Assistant Baron Roller. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Colonel Bourgignone. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade.— Colonel Mondel. 
 1 2th Field Jager Battalion, 
 loth Infantry Regiment (Mazuchelli). 
 24th ,, ,, (Parma). 
 

 5T6 APPENDIX III. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade.— Colonel Grivicics. 
 l6th Field Jiiger Battalion. 
 2nd Infantry Regiment (Alexander). 
 23rd ,, „ (Airoldi). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General von Knebel. 
 28th Field Jager Battalion. 
 1st Infantry Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph). 
 3rd ,, ,, (Archduke Charles). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major- General Wimpffen. 
 13th Infantry Regiment (Bamberg). 
 58th „ ,, (Archduke Stephen^. 
 
 To each Brigade were attached one squadron of the 1st Uhlans and one 
 4-pounder Field Battery. 
 
 The same were attached to the Corps as to the First Corps, except that 
 this Corps had only one 4-pounder Field Battery. 
 
 First Light Cavalry Division. — Major-General Baron Edelsheim. 
 
 Chief of Staff. — Major Waldestatten. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Appel. 
 
 2nd Dragoons (Windischgratz). 
 
 9th Hussars (Liechtenstein). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel "Wallis. 
 1st Dragoons (Savoy). 
 ioth Hussars (King of Prussia). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Fratricievics. 
 5th Hussars (Radetzky). 
 8th ,, (Hesse-Cassel). 
 
 C 
 Second Light Cavalry Division. — Major-General Prince Thurn and Taxis. 
 
 Chief of the Staff. — Colonel Rodakovszky. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Bellegarde. 
 4th Hussars (Eseh). 
 I2th ,, (Haller). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Colonel Westphalen. 
 6th Hussars (Wurtemberg). 
 nth „ (Palffy). 
 
 First Resn-ve Division of Cavalry. — Lieutenant Field-Marshal Prince 
 Schleswig-Holstein. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major General Prince Solms. 
 4th Cuirass Regiment (Ferdinand). 
 6th ,, „ (Hesse). 
 
 8th Uhlans (Emperor Max.). 
 
APPENDIX HI. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Schindlocker. 
 9th Cuirass Regiment (Stadion). 
 nth Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph). 
 4th Uhlans ( ,, ,, ). 
 
 Second Reserve Division of Cavalry. — Major General von Zajtsek. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Borberg. 
 3rd Cuirass Regiment (Saxony). 
 7th ,, ,, (Brunswick). 
 
 2nd Uhlans (Schwarzenberg). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — General Count Soltyk. 
 1st Cuirass Regiment (Emperor Francis Joseph). 
 5th Cuirass Regiment (Nicolas). 
 5th Uhlans (Walmoden). 
 
 77/ / rd Reserve Division of Cavalry. — Major-General Count Coudenhove. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Prince Windischgratz. 
 2nd Cuirass Regiment (Wrangel). 
 8th ,, ,, (Prince of Prussia). 
 
 7th Uhlans (Archduke Charles Louis). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Mengen. 
 10th Cuirass Regiment (Bavaria). 
 1 2th ,, ,, (Horvath). 
 
 nth Uhlans (Alexander). 
 
 To each Cavalry Brigade was attached one battery of Horse Artillery. 
 
 IMPERIAL AUSTRIAN ARMY OF THE SOUTH. 
 
 General-in-Chief Field-Marshal Archduke Albrecht. 
 
 Chief of the Staff Major-General von John. 
 
 FIFTH CORPS D'ARMEE. 
 
 Major-General Rodich. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Daun. 
 19th Field Jager Battalion. 
 38th Infantry Regiment (Benedek). 
 70th „ ,, (Also-Szopor). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Moring. 
 2 1st Field Jager Battalion. 
 53rd Infantry Regiment (Archduke Leopold Louis). 
 54th ,, ,, (Grueber). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade.— Major-General Piret. 
 5th Imperial Jager Battalion. 
 50th Infantry Regiment (Baden). 
 75th ,, ,, (Crenneville). 
 
IS A FPU XI) IX III. 
 
 SEVENTH CORPS DARMEE. 
 
 Lieutenant Field-Marshal Marivici di Madonna del Monte. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Emmerich von Thurn and 
 
 Taxis. 
 
 7th Field Jager Battalion. 
 
 29th Infantry Regiment (Thun). 
 
 43rd ,, ,, (Alemann). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Scudier. 
 10th Field Jager Battalion. 
 19th Infantry Regiment (Crown Prince Rudolf). 
 48th ,, ,, (Archduke Ernest Charles). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Hammerstein. 
 4th Imperial Jager Battalion. 
 66th Infantry Regiment (Grand Duke of Tuscany). 
 76th ,, ,, (Paumgarten). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — 
 
 6th Imperial Jager Battalion, 
 nth Infantry Regiment (Crown Prince of Saxony). 
 59th „ ,, (Archduke Rainer). 
 
 NINTH CORPS D'ARMisE. 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Weckbecher. 
 23rd Field Jager Battalion. 
 63rd Infantry Regiment (Netherlands). 
 65th ,, ,, (Archduke Louis Victor). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Appiano. 
 15th Field Jager Battalion. 
 5th Infantry Regiment (Wetzlar). 
 7th ,, ,, (Maroicic). 
 
 Commandant of Brigade. — Major-General Gaal. 
 
 3rd Imperial Jager Battalion. 
 31st Infantry Regiment (Mecklenburg-Strelitz). 
 39th „ „ (Don Miguel). 
 
 Besides these, to the Army of the South were attached the 1st and 2nd 
 Imperial Jager Battalions, and the 17th Hohenlohe), 22nd (Wimpffen), 
 36th (Degenfeld) Infantry Regiments. 
 
 The Cavalry consisted of the 12th and 13th Uhlans, and the 1st, 3rd, 
 nth, and 14th Hussars, the Artillery of the 5th and 7th Regiments. 
 
 N.B. — The Border Regiments garrisoned the fortresses and the 
 Littorale. 
 
APPENDIX IV. 
 
 PRELIMINARIES OF PEACE AGREED UPON BETWEEN 
 THE TWO GREAT BELLIGERENT POWERS. 
 
 " Their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, after 
 declaring that they are animated by a desire to restore to their peoples the 
 blessings of peace, appoint as their Plenipotentiaries — 
 
 " His Apostolic Majesty— Count Karolyi and Baron de Brenner; and 
 the King of Prussia — Count Bismarck, who have agreed upon the followhv 
 points : — 
 
 "The integrity of the Austrian monarchy, with the exception of Venetia, 
 shall be maintained. 
 
 "The King of Prussia shall withdraw his troops from the Austrian terri- 
 tory as soon as a peace shall have been signed. 
 
 "The Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution of the Germanic 
 Confederation as it heretofore existed, and accepts the new organization of 
 Germany without the participation of Austria ; he undertakes to recognise 
 the closer Federal relations {die engern Bimdesbande) which the King of 
 Prussia shall establish to the north of the line of the Maine ; he also accepts 
 the formation by the States of the South of a separate Confederation, and 
 that the national connexion with the North shall be reserved for future 
 arrangement between the two Confederations. 
 
 " His Apostolic Majesty transfers to the King of Prussia all the rights 
 which he had acquired by the Treaty of Vienna of the 30th of October 
 over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, with the reservation that the 
 population of Northern Schleswig, if they should express such a desire by 
 a free vote, should be re-united to Denmark. 
 
 "The war indemnity is fixed at forty million thalers. From this sum 
 fifteen millions shall be deducted as the equivalent of the amount which the 
 Emperor of Austria, by virtue of the Treaty of 1864, would still be entitled 
 to claim from the Elbe Duchies, and five millions as the equivalent of the 
 provisioning of the Prussian troops which still continue to occupy the 
 Austrian provinces until the conclusion of peace. There will, therefore, 
 remain a sum of twenty million thalers to be paid in specie. 
 
 " The King of Prussia, at the request of Austria, consents to allow the 
 kingdom of Saxony to retain its present territorial limits, but he reserves to 
 himself the power of settling, by a special treaty to be concluded with the 
 King of Saxony, the question of the war indemnities as well as the future 
 position which Saxony shall hold in the Northern Confederation. 
 
 "The Emperor of Austria will recognise the new territorial arrange- 
 ments effected by the King of Prussia in the north of Germany, and also 
 any territorial changes which he may complete. 
 
 "The King of Prussia engages to obtain the adhesion of his ally of Italy 
 to the preliminaries of peace and to the armistice as soon as the Emperor 
 of the French shall have declared that the kingdom of Venetia is at the dis- 
 position of the King of Italy. 
 
520 APPEXD1X V. 
 
 " The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, after the exchange of 
 ratifications of the present preliminaries has been completed, shall appoint 
 Plenipotentiaries, who shall meet at a place to be hereafter selected, in 
 order to conclude a peace upon the bases of the present preliminary con- 
 vention, and to negotiate upon questions of detail. 
 
 " For these purposes, after having agreed upon the present preliminaries, 
 the high contracting parties shall conclude this armistice between the 
 Austrian and Saxon military forces on the one part, and the Prussian 
 military forces on the other part. 
 
 " The conditions of this armistice shall be settled immediately. 
 
 " The armistice shall commence from August 2nd, and the present sus- 
 pension of arms shall be prolonged until that date. 
 
 "There shall also be concluded at the present state of the negotiations 
 an armistice with Bavaria, and General Baron de Manteuffel shall be 
 required to conclude armistices, to commence also from the date of August 
 2nd, upon the bases of the military status quo, with Baden, Wurtemberg, 
 and Hesse-Darmstadt, as soon as these states shall require." 
 
 APPENDIX V. 
 
 Mich was said and written at the time of the armistice on the state of 1 
 the Prussian hospitals. While the head -quarters of the fine army lay at 
 Prague, the utter stagnation of affairs and a favourable opportunity induced 
 the author to pay a visit to the line by which the Crown Prince advanced 
 with the Second Army from Silesia to the battle of Koniggratz. The 
 train glided without stopping past the station of Koniggratz, which is a 
 short distance from the advanced works of the fortress, and where a guard 
 of the Austrian garrison were standing beside their piled arms, past Joseph-, 
 stadt, close under the guns of the bastions, and between the main body of 
 the place and an outwork on which an Austrian sentry was pacing along 
 the rampart, and Austrian soldiers were lying listlessly beside the big guns 
 looming out of the embrasures. The line of railway was itself, by the condi- 
 tions of the armistice, available for Prussian transport, but no Prussian was 
 allowed to get out of the train either at Josephstadt or Koniggratz, nor did 
 the trains stop at either place unless some one unconnected with the 
 Prussian army wished to be put down or to get in, in which case a momen- 
 tary halt was made at the station. On arriving at Kdniginhof, we found 
 a large number of hospital tents filled with men who had been wounded at 
 Xachod, Skalitz, or the great battle. Prussian and Austrian soldiers lay 
 side by side, all under the care of Prussian surgeons, but tended and nursed 
 by a large number of Prussian ladies, and by many sisters of charity. Many 
 of the Austrian soldiers were Poles, many Italians who spoke no German, 
 but relied upon the Prussian ladies to act as interpreters between them and 
 the surgeons. Many of the men were on the road to rapid recovery, and 
 were able to talk cheerfully and smoke, while with a piece of green bough 
 they brushed away the flies which in this warm climate clustered thickly in 
 the hospital tent, and tried to fix themselves upon the healing wounds. In 
 one tent lay two or three who were considered hopeless cases ; one poor 
 fellow, an Austrian artilleryman, who had lost both legs, lay upon his 
 mattrass, moving his head feebly with a restless motion. " He must die,!' 
 
APPENDIX V. 521 
 
 whispered the surgeon; " he cannot get over it." But going forward he 
 stooped over the much- suffering man, patted his forehead, and spoke some 
 words of consolation to him. As the doctor turned to leave the bedside, 
 the man, who seemed to derive some hope from his presence, began to moan 
 feebly, but a lady who was sitting near him came over to him. smoothed 
 his pillow, and by a few kind words quieted him, and induced him to try to 
 go to sleep. The sufferer, with a child's obedience, closed his eyes, while 
 his nurse sat down by his bed-head, ready to frighten away any fly that 
 might threaten to disturb the fitful slumbers of the patient. 
 
 In another tent were a number of convalescents, with bright eyes, very 
 different from those which, dull and hazy, betokened more dangerous cases. 
 Here Baroness Seydlitz was serving out plentiful partions of cigars and 
 tobacco, which were eagerly accepted by the men who were still unable to 
 leave their beds, and whose thinned white hands told how much pain and 
 illness can be caused even by the tiny bullets of the needle-gun. This 
 noble lady had two sons in the Prussian army, both of whom had 
 served during the campaign. At the beginning of the war she was made 
 superintendent of one of the many companies of Prussian ladies who formed 
 themselves into charitable bands for nursing the wounded, and was now 
 with her division of benefactresses stationed in the hospital tents of Ko- 
 niginhof. Fortunately, her sons had passed unscathed through the actions ; 
 but if every wounded soldier who came under her care had been her own 
 child she could not have shown more solicitude for them than she did. The 
 Prussian wounded had made us acquainted with their love and estimation 
 for her before we found her in the hospital tent, and every Sclave, Pole, or 
 Italian- Austrian, when asked who had given him any little luxury which 
 we saw by his bed-head, knew enough German to answer, ** Die gute Fran 
 von Seydlitz.'''' 
 
 General von Lbwenfeld, who was passing through Tvoniginhof on his way 
 to review the battle-field of Nachod, where he with six battalions repulsed 
 the fierce attacks of the Austrians until his supports arrived, was visiting 
 the hospitals, and with a wonderful power, not only of language but dialect, 
 was talking kindly to every patient Many of the Austrians who were 
 lying in the shaded tents of Kdniginhdf had fallen under his own guns or 
 the deadly fire of his own infantry at Nachod or Skalitz, but they bore no ill- 
 will to the Prussian generak The Prussian Krankentragers, Prussian sur- 
 geons, and Prussian ladies had removed any animosity which they might at 
 first not unnaturally have felt to not only an enemy but a conqueror. All 
 were asked how long they had lain on the field of battle ; some four hours, 
 some ten, some said thirty-six ; one now merry Austrian boy, about 
 eighteen years old, told us that he had been wounded in the Maslowed 
 "Wood during the battle of Koniggratz, and had lain there lost and 
 hidden in the trees, and suffering fearfully from thirst and hunger, until 
 found at the end of three days by some Prussian soldiers. An amputated 
 foot showed that he had been badly wounded, but it is probable that suffering 
 exaggerated to his mind the length of time lie lay upon the ground, for 
 the woods were searched by the Prussian Krankentragers the day after 
 the battle, though it is quite possible that in such thick foliage a wounded 
 man may have lain long undetected, and perhaps been missed altogether. 
 No one who did not see the country in which the battles of the war were 
 fought would realize the enormous exertions made by the Prussian Krank- 
 entriigers to bring in wounded men. It must be remembered that every 
 piece of rising ground was covered with thick wood or high standing corn ; 
 
 M M 
 
$22 APPENDIX V. 
 
 that down by the watercourses the long grass and the bulrushes rose 
 tall in all their summer luxuriance. The wounded invariably, if possible, 
 crawled under cover after Kbniggratz, and sought by the brooks for water 
 to quench their thirst, or in the trees and crops for shelter ; the Krank- 
 entragers had to beat carefully over every yard of ground which lies 
 between Horonovvitz and Nechanitz, between the Bistritz and the Elbe — a 
 space of nearly forty-five square miles, over which they had to search for and 
 carry to the ambulances many thousands of wounded men, Austrians and 
 Prussians alike ; and there are but 1,900 of these men with the whole 
 Prussian armies. 
 
 The usual answer to the question, " Who first relieved you after the 
 battle ? " was that a Prussian soldier had given the speaker something to 
 drink out of his water-bottle directly after the action had ceased, and 
 that, after some time, two Prussian soldiers with a stretcher had lifted 
 him up and carried him to the divisional hospital. A drive down the 
 valley of the Elbe towards the mountains brought us to the Castle of 
 Nachod, which lies at the entrance of the Nachod Pass, and about half 
 a mile nearer to the main ridge than the hill upon which the action 
 was fought. From every large country house waved the white flag with 
 its red cross, which showed that the building was being used as a hospital, 
 and that under its roofw r ounded men were being coaxed slowly to recovery. 
 The Castle of Nachod, itself standing on a high spur of the mountain 
 chain, and overlooking most beautiful scenery, was occupied by 800 
 wounded, under the voluntary superintendence of the Prince of Salm- 
 Horstmar, who had left his beautiful property of Rheingraf to work for 
 charity in the hospitals of wounded soldiers. Long lines of beds stretched 
 on both sides of the oak banqueting halls and the tapestried chambers of 
 the castle — beds occupied by suffering but patient men ; Prussian ladies in 
 black dresses were gliding about, noiselessly carrying medicines or medical 
 comforts to their grateful patients ; Sisters of Mercy were sitting by the 
 bedsides reading to the listening occupant, or propping up a feverish head 
 on a snowy white pillow ; while in the corridors outside noble ladies, both 
 in the dresses of the Prussian lady volunteers and in those of Sisters of 
 Mercy, were preparing food for the sick, or tearing up linen and sorting 
 cotton wool to assist the surgeons. Most of the patients were doing 
 wonderfully well. The fine mountain air and the tender care of the nurses 
 had a cheering effect upon them, which led them on to recovery. 
 
 Many officers were in separate rooms, most of them Austrians, brave 
 men who, undaunted even by pain, expressed their opinion that their 
 defeat was due to the needle-gun alone, and showed no want of desire to 
 fight the war over again with equal arms. All, fortunately, so nearly well 
 that a few weeks more restored them to their regiments. 
 
 There were still tenants of the Castle hospital at Nachod and of the tents 
 of Koniginhof long after peace had been signed, and after the Prussian 
 armies had marched out of Bohemia ; but it was quite wonderful how many 
 of the men who were wounded at Nachod and Skalitz had already been 
 dismissed from hospital. After the action of Nachod, 3,000 wounded were 
 brought into the castle and town of Nachod alone, besides many who were 
 withdrawn by the retreating Austrians to Skalitz and Koniginhof, and 
 afterwards fell into the hands of the Prussians. Of the 3,000 brought to 
 Nachod, 800 still remained ; but the rest had been sent away as convalescent, 
 for but few had died, defeating the cares of their nurses. The soldiers still 
 in hospital could not find words to express their gratitude to the ladies, 
 
APPEXDIX V. 523 
 
 both Catholic and Protestant, who had been their constant attendants night 
 and day, since they were lifted from the stretchers of the Krankentragers 
 into their beds in the hospitals. Many of the recoveries must also be 
 attributed to their care, for they, as all women by a bed of sickness, had a 
 power to soothe suffering men which no surgeons or professional hospital 
 attendants ever seemed to attain to. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 BRADBURY, EVANS, AND CO., PRINTERS, WHITEFRIARS. 
 
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