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BERKELEY
JBRARY
JNIVERSITY OF
CALIfORNU
/
^
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC.
BY THE SAME AUTHOR,
ELEMENTS OF RHETORIC.
Crown Octaro.
Reprinted from the SeveTith {Octa/vo) Edition,
ELEMENTS
OF
LOGIC.
9^1
RICHARD WHATELY, D.D.
ARCHBISBUP OJf DUBLIN,
KEPRINTED FllOM THE NINTH (oCTAVO) EDITION.
LONDON :
JOHN W. PAEKER AND SON, WEST STRAND.
1857.
18 £7
ADVERTISEMENT.
In the present edition, a few insertions, and alterations of expression,
in some places, have been introduced. In this and in the preceding
edition, several passages have been transferred from the places they
formerly occupied, to others which appeared more suitable. And a brief,
but, I trust, clear exposure has been added (in Introd. § i, and B. IV.
Ch. I. § 1, 2) of the untenable character of some objections which have
been of late years revived, in a somewhat new form, against the utility
of Science generally, — against the syllogistic theory, — and against the
explanations given in this treatise, of reasoning from Induction.
These answers (and also additional remarks on some of the same points,
in § 4 of the Introduction to the " Memeiits of Rhetoric") have been
before the Public now some years ; and as no attempt at a reply has
been made, even in subsequent editions of the very works containing the
objections, a strong presumption is thus afforded of the soundness of my
views.
The reader is to observe that the angular [brackets] denote that the
word so enclosed is equivalent in meaning to that which precedes it.
955
CONTENTS.
PAGE
DEDICATION v
PREFACE viiitoxxii
INTRODUCTION 1
BOOK I.
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE 15
BOOK II.
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM 86
Chap. I. — Of the Operations of the Mind, and of Terms .... ib.
Chap, II. — Of Propositions . . . . c 41
Chap. III. — Of Arguments 51
Chap. IV.— Supplement to Chap. Ill 64
Chap. V. — Supplement to Chap. 1 80
BOOK III.
OF FALLACIES 101
BOOK IV.
DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING . . .150
Chap I.— Of Induction 151
Chap. II.— On the discovery of Trath 156
Chap. III.— Of Inference and Proof 173
Chap. IV.— Of Verbal and Real Questions 177
Chap, v.— OfRealism 182
APPENDIX.
No. I. — On certain Terms which are peculiarly liable to be used
ambiguously ... 191
No. II. — Miscellaneous Examples for the Exercise of Learners . . . 240
No. III.— Example of Analysis 252
INDEX 263
TO
IUCtHT reverend EDWARD COPLESTON, D.D
LORD BISHOP OF LLANDAFF,
&c. &c.
My Dear Lord,
To enumerate the advantages I have derived from your instructions,
both in regular lectures and in private conversation, would be needless to
those acquainted with the parties, and to the Public, uninteresting. My
object at present is simply to acknowledge how greatly I am indebted to
you in respect of the present Work; not merely as having originally
imparted to me the principles of the Science, but also as having contri-
buted remarks, explanations, and illustrations, relative to the most
important points, to so great an amount that I can hardly consider myself
as the Author of more than half of such portions of the treatise as are
not borrowed from former publications. I could have wished, indeed, to
acknowledge this more explicitly, by marking with some note of distinc-
tion those parts which are least my own. But 1 found it could not
be done. In most instances there is somethhig belonging to each of us ;
and -even in those parts where your share is the largest, it would not be
fair that you should be made responsible for any thing that is not entirely
your own. Nor is it possible, in the case of a Science, to remember
distinctly how far one has been, in each mstance, indebted to the
suggestions of another. Information, as to matters of fact, may easily
be referred in the mind to the person from whom we have derived it : but
scientific truths, when thoroughly embraced, become much more a part
of the mind, as it were ; since they rest, not on the authority of the
instructor, but on reasoning from data, wliich we ourselves furnish;'
they are scions engrafted on the stems previously rooted in our own soil ;
and wc arc apt to confound them with its indigenous productions.
1 Sec B. IV. Ch. II. 5 '
VI DEDICA.TION.
You youi'self also, I have reason to believe, have forgotten the greater
part of the assistance you have afforded in the course of conversations on
the subject; as I have found, more than once, that ideas which I
distinctly remembered to have received from you, have not been recog-
nized by you when read or repeated. As far, however, as I can recollect,
though there is no part of the following pages in which I have not, more
or less, received valuable suggestions from you, I believe you have
contributed less to the Analytical Outline, and to the Treatise on Fal-
lacies, and more, to the subjoined Dissertation, than to the rest of the
Work.
I take this opportunity of pubhcly declaring, that as, on the one hand,
you are not responsible for any thing contained in this Work, so, on the
other hand, should you ever favour the world with a publication of your
own on the subject, the coincidence which will doubtless be found m it
with many things here brought forward as my own, is not to be regarded
as any indication of plagiarism, at least on your side.
Believe me to be.
My dear Lord,
Your obUged and affectionate
Pupil and Friend,
RICHARD WHATELY.
PREFACE.
The following Treatise contains the substance of the Article " Logic*'
in the Encyclopoedia Metropolitana. It was suggested to me that a
separate publication of it might prove acceptable, not only to some who
are not subscribers to that work, but also to several who are ; but wht..
for convenience of reference, would prefer a more portable volume. In
fact a number of individuals had actually formed a design (prevented
only by this publication) of joining together to have the article reprinted
for their own private use.
I accordingly revised it, and made such additions, chiefly in the form
of Notes, as I thought likely to increase its utility.
When applied to to contribute the Article, I asked and obtained
permission from Dr. Copleston (now Bishop of LlandaiF) to make use of
manuscripts compiled in great measure from what I had heard from him
in conversations on the subject, or which he had read to me from his
common-place book, interspersed with observations of my own. These
manuscripts I had drawn up and was in the habit of employing, for the
use of my own pupils.
In throwing them into a form suitable for the Encyclopaedia, and in
subsequently enlarging the Article into the present volume, I have taken
without scruple whatever appeared most valuable from the works of
former writers ; especially the concise, but in general accurate, treatise
of Aldrich. But while I acknowledge my obligations to my predecessors,
of whose labours I have largely availed myself, I do not profess to be
altogether satisfied with any of the treatises that have yet appeared ; nor
have I accordingly judged it any unreasonable presumption to point out
what seem to me the errors they contain. Indeed, whatever deference an
Author may profess for the authority of those who have preceded him,
the very circumstance of his publishing a work on the same subject,
proves that he thinks theirs open to improvement. In censuring, how-
ever, as I have had occasion to do, several of the doctrines and explana-
tions of logical writers, and of Aldrich in particular, I wish it to be
understood that this is not from my having formed a low estimate of the
merits of the Compendium drawn up by the Author just mentioned^ but.
Viu PREFACE.
on the contrary, from its popularity, (it being the one commonly used at
Oxford) — from the impossibility of noticing particularly all the points
in which we agree, — and from the consideration that errors are the
more carefully to be pointed out in proportion to the authority by which
they are sanctioned.
■ I have to acknowledge assistance received from several friends who
have at various times suggested remarks and alterations. But I cannot
aA^oid particularizing the Rev. J. Newman, Fellow of Oriel College, who
aciuaily composed a considerable portion of the work as it now stands,
from manuscripts not designed for publication, and who is the original
author of several pages. Some valuable illustrations of the importance
of attending to the ambiguity of the terms used in Political Economy,
were furnished by the kindness of my friend and former pupil, Mr. Senior,
of Magdalen College, and now Master in Chancery, who preceded me in
the office of Professor of Political Economy at Oxford, and afterwards
was appointed to the same at King's College, London. They are printed
in the Appendix. But the friend to whom it is inscribed has contributed
far more, and that, iu the most important parts, than all others together ;
so much, indeed, that, though there is in the treatise nothing of his which
has not undergone such expansion or modification as leaves me solely
responsible for the whole, there is not a little of which I cannot fairly
claim to be the Author.
Each successive edition has been revised with the utmost care. But
though the work has undergone not only the close examination of myself
and several friends, but the severer scrutiny of determined opponents, I
am happy to find that no material errors have been detected, nor any
considerable alterations found necessary.
On the utility of Logic many writers have said much in which I cannot
coincide, and which has tended to bring the study into unmerited disre-
pute. By representing Logic as furnishing the sole instrument for the
discovery of truth in all subjects, and as teaching the use of the intellec-
tual facuUies in general, they raised expectations which could not be
realised, and which naturally led to a re-action. The whole system,
whose unfounded pretensions had been thus blazoned forth, came to be
commonly regarded as utterly futile and empty : like several of our most
valuable medicines, which, when first introduced, were proclaimed, each,
as a panacea, infallible in the most opposite disorders ; and which con-
sequently, in many instances, fell for a time into total disuse ; though,
after a long interval, they were established in their just estimation, and
emi;loyed conformably to their real properties.
rKEFACE. IX
In one of Lord Dudley's (lately published) letters to Bishop Copleston,
?»f the date of 1814, he adduces a presumption against the study of
Logic, that it was sedulously cultivated during the dark periods in which
the intellectual powers of mankind seemed nearly paralyzed, — when no
discoveries were made, and when various errors were wide-spread and
deep-rooted : and that when the mental activity of the world revived, and
philosophical inquiry flourished and bore its fruits, logical studies fell into
decay and contempt. And this I have introduced in the ** Elements of
Rhetoric," (Part IL Ch. IIL § 2,) among other examples of st, presump-
tion not in itself unreasonable, but capable of being rebutted by a counter-
presumption. When any study has been unduly or unwisely cultivated
to the neglect of others, and has even been intruded into their province,
there is a presumption that a re-action^ will ensue, and an equally
excessive contempt, or dread, or disgust, succeed. And in the present
instance, the mistaken and absurd cultivation of Logic during Ages ot
great intellectual darkness, might have been expected to produce, in a
subsequent age of comparative light, an association in men's minds, of
Logic, with the idea of apathetic ignorance, prejudice, and adherence to
error; so that the legitimate uses, and just value of the science (suppos-
ing it to have any) would be likely to be scornfully overlooked. Our
ancestors having neglected to raise fresh crops of corn, and contented
themselves with vainly threshing over and over the same straw and
winnowing the same chaff, it might have been anticipated that their
descendants would, for a time, regard the very operations of threshing
and winnowing with contempt, and would attempt to grmd corn, straw,
and chaff all together.
The revival of a study which had for a long time been regarded as an
obsolete absurdity, would probably have appeared to many persons, thirty
years ago, as an undertaking far more difficult than the introduction of
some new study ; — as resembling rather the attempt to restore life to one
of the antediluvian fossil-plants, than the rearing of a young seedling into
a tree.
It is a curious circumstance that the very person to wham the letter
just alluded to was addressed should have lived to witness so great a
change of public opinion brought about (in a great degree through his
own instrumentality^) within the short interval- — indeed within a small
portion of the interval — between the writing of that letter and its publi-
cation, that the whole ground of the presumption alluded to has been
completely cut away. During that interval, the treatise which was with
* See " Charge," 1843. 2 See Dedication.
X PREFACE.
his aid composed, and by his permission inserted in tlie Encyclopaedia,
attracted so much attention as to occasion its separate publication, in a
volume which has been frequently reprinted, not only in England, but in
the United States of America ; where it is in use, I believe, in every one
of their Colleges. Add to which, the frequent allusions (compared with
what could have been met with twenty or thirty years ago) to the subject
of Logic, by writers on various subjects. And moreover several other
treatises on the subject, either original works or abridgments, have been
making their appearance with continually increased frequency of late
years. Some ihdeed of these have little or nothing in common with the
present work except the title. But even that very circumstance is so far
encouraging, as indicating that the Tiame of this science instead of exciting,
as formerly, an almost universal prejudice, is considered as likely to prove
a recommendation. Certainly Lord Dudley, were he now living, would
not speak of the general neglect and contempt of Logic ; though every
branch of Science, Philosophy, and Literature, have flourished during
the interval.
To explain fully the utility of Logic is what can be done only in the
course of an explanation of the system itself. One preliminary observa-
tion only (for the original suggestion of which I am indebted to the same
friend to whom this work is inscribed) it may be worth while to offer
in this place. If it were inquired what is to be regarded as the most
appropriate intellectual occupation of MAN, as man, what would be the
answer? The Statesman is engaged with political affairs; the Soldier
with military ; the Mathematician, with the properties of numbers and
magnitudes ; the Merchant, with commercial concerns, ka. ; but in what
are all and each of these employed? — employed, I mean, as men; for
tliere are many modes of exercise of the faculties, mental as well as
bodily, which are in great measure common to us with the lower animals.
Evidently, in Reasoning. They are all occupied in deducing, well or 111,
Conclusions from Premises; each, concerning the subject of his own
particular business. If, therefore, it be found that the process going on
daily, in each of so many different minds, is, in any respect, the samet
and if the principles on which it is conducted can be reduced to a regular
system, and if rules can be deduced from that system, for the better
conducting of the process, then, it can hardly be denied that such a
system and such rules must be especially worthy the attention, — not of
the members of this or that profession merely, but — of every one who is
desirous of possessing a cultivated mind. To understand the theory of
that which is the appropriate intellectual occupation of Man in general,
and to learn to do that well, which every one will and mu^ do, whether
PREFACE. ad
well or ill, may siirely he cousidered as an essential part of a liberal
education.
Even supposing that no practical improvement in argumentation resulted
from the study of Logic, it would not by any means follow that it is
unworthy of attention. The pursuit of knowledge on curious and interest-
ing subjects, for its own sake, is usually reckoned no misemployment of
time ; and is considered as, incidentally, if not directly, useful to the
individual, by the exercise thus afforded to the mental faculties. All
who study Mathematics are not training themselves to become Surveyors
or Mechanics ; some knowledge of Anatomy and Chemistry is even
expected in a man liberally educated, though without any view to his
practising Surgery or Medicine. And the investigation of a process
which is peculiarly autl universally the occupation of Man, considered as
Man, can hardly be reckoned a less philosophical pursuit than those just
instanced.
It has usually been assumed, however, in the case of the present
subject, that a theory which does not tend to the improvement of practice
is utterly unworthy of regard ; and then, it is contended that Logic has
no such tendency, on the plea that men may and do reason correctly
%vithout it: an objection which would equally apply in the case of Gram-
mar, Music, Chemistry, Mechanics, «fcc., in all of which systems the
practice must have existed previously to the theory.
But many who allow the use of systematic principles in other things,
are accustomed to cry up Common-Sense as the sufficient and only safe
guide in Reasoning. Now by Common-Sense is meant, I apprehend,
(when the term is used with any distinct meaning,) an exercise of the
judgment unaided by any Art or system of rules : such an exercise as we
must necessarily employ in numberless cases of daily occurrence ; in
which, having no established principles to guide us, — ^no line of procedure,
as it were, distinctly chalked out, — we must needs act on the best
extemporaneous conjectures we can form. He who is eminently skilful
in doing this, is said to possess a superior degree of Common-Sense. But
that Common-Sense is only our second-best guide — that the rules of Art,
if judiciously framed, are always desirable when they can be had, is an
assertion, for the truth of which I may appeal to the testimony of man-
kind in general ; which is so much the more valuable, inasmuch as it
may be accounted the testimony of adversaries. For the generality have
a strong predilection in favour of Common-Sense, except in those points
in which they, respectively, possess the knowledge of a system of rules :
but in these points they deride any one who trusts to unaided Common-
Sense. A Sailor e.g. Tfillj perhaps, despise the pretensions of medical
xii PREFACE.
men, and prefer treating a disease by C ommon- Sense : but he would
ridicule the proposal of navigating a ship bv Common-Sense, without
regard to the maxims of nautical art. A Physician, again, will perhaps
contemn Systems of Political-Economy,^ of Logic, or Metaphysics, and
insist on the superior wisdom of trusting to Common-Sense in such
matters ; but he would never approve of trusting to Common-Sense in
the treatment of diseases. Neither, again, would the Architect recom-
mend a reliance on Common-Sense alone, in building, nor the Musician, in
music, to the neglect of those systems of rules, which, in their respective
arts, have been deduced from scientific reasoning aided by experience.
And the induction might be extended to every department of practice.
Since, therefore, each gives the preference to unassisted Common-Sense
only in those cases where he himself has nothing else to trust to, and
invariably resorts to the rules of art, wherever he possesses the knowledge
of them, it is plain that mankind universally bear their testimony, though
unconsciously and often unwillingly, to the preferableness of systematic
knowledge to conjectural judgments.
There is, however, abundant room for the employment of Common-
Sense in the application of the system. To bring arguments, out of the
form in which they are expressed in conversation and in books, into the
regular logical shape, must be, of course, the business of Common-Sense,
aided by practice ; for such arguments are, by supposition, not as yet
within the province of Science; else they would not be irregular, but
would be already strict syllogisms. To exercise the learner in this
operation, I have subjoined in the Appendix, some examples, both of
insulated arguments, and (in the later editions) of the analysis of argu-
mentative works. It should be added, however, that a large portion of
what is usually introduced into Logical treatises, relative to the finding
of Arguments, — the different kinds of them, <fcc., I have referred to the
head of JRketoric, and treated of in a work on the Elements of that Art.
It Avas doubtless from a strong and deliberate conviction of the advan-
tages, direct and indirect, accruing from an acquaintance with Logic,
that the University of Oxford, when re-modelling their system, not
only retained that branch of study, regardless of the clamours of many
of the half-learned, but even assigned a prominent place to it, by making
it an indispensable part of the Examination for the first Degree. This
last circumstance, however, I am convinced, has, in a great degree, pro-
duced an effect opposite to what was designed. It has contributed to
8 See Senior's Introductory Lecture on Political Economy, p. 28.
PREFACE. XlU
lower instead of exalting, tlie estimation of the study ; and to withhold
from it the earnest attention of many who might have applied to it with
profit. I am not so weak as to imagine that any System can ensure
great proficiency in any pursuit whatever, either in all students, or in a
very large proportion of them: "we sow many seeds to obtain a few
flowers:" hut it might have been expected (and doubtless was expected)
that a majority at least of successful candidates would derive some benefit
worth mentioning from their logical pursuits ; and that a considerable
proportion of the distinguished candidates would prove respectable, if not
eminent logicians. Such expectations I do not censure as unreasonable,
or such as I might not have formed myself, had I been called upon to
judge at that period when our experience was all to come. Subsequently,
however, experience has shown that those expectations have been very
inadequately realized. The truth is, that a very small proportion, even
of distinguished students, ever become proficients in Logic ; and that by
far the greater part pass through the University without knowing any
thing at all of the subject. I do not mean that they have not learned by
rote a string of technical terms ; but that they understand absolutely
nothing whatever of the principles of the science.
I am aware that some injudicious friends of Oxford will censure the
frankness of this avowal. I have only to reply that such is the truth ;
and that I think too well of, and know far too well, the University in
which I have been employed in various academical occupations above a
quarter of a century, to apprehend danger to her reputation from declar-
ing the exact truth. With all its defects, and no human institution is
perfect, the University would stand, I am convinced, higher in public
estimation than it does, were the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
in all points respecting it, more fully known. But the scanty and partial
success of the measures employed to promote logical studies is the conse-
quence, I apprehend, of the universality of the requisition. That which
must be done by every one, will, of course, often be done but indiiferently ;
and when the belief is once fully established, which it certainly has long
been, that any thing which is indispensable to a testimonial, has little or
nothing to do with the attainment of honours,* the lowest standard sotya
becomes the established one in the minds of the greater number ; ami
provided that standard be once reached, so as to secure the candidate
from rejection, a greater or less proficiency in any such branch of study
is regarded as a matter of indifference, as far as any views of academical
distinction are concerned.
* In the last-framed Examination-statute that proficiency in Looric is to have weight
fin express declaration has been inserted, in the assignment of honours.
XiV PREFACE.
Divinity Is one of these branches, and to this also most of what has
been said concerning Logic might be considered as equally applicable;
but, In fact, there are several Important differences between the two
cases. In the first place, most of the students who are designed for the
Church, and many who are not, have a value for theological knowledge,
independently of the requisition of the schools ; and on that ground do
not confine their views to the lowest admissible degree of proficiency:
whereas this can be said of very few In the case of Logic. And more-
over, such as design to become candidates for holy Orders, know that
another examination in Theology awaits them. But a consideration,
which is still more to the present purpose, is, that Theology, not being
a Science, admits of infinite degrees of proficiency, from that which is
within the reach of a child, up to the highest that is attainable by the
most exalted genius ; every one of which degrees is inestimably valuable
as far as it goes. If any one understands tolerably the Church-catechism,
or even half of it, he knows something of divinity, and that something Is
incalculably preferable to nothing. But it is not so with a Science:
one who does not understand the principles of Euclid's demonstrations,
whatever number of questions and answers he may have learnt by rot«,
knows absolutely nothing of Geometry: unless he attain this point all
his labour is utterly lost ; worse than lost, perhaps, if he Is led to believe
that he has learned something of Mathematics, when, in truth, he has
not. And the same Is the case with Logic, or any other Science. It
does not admit of such various degrees, as a knowledge of religion. Of
course I am far from supposing that all who understand any thing,
much or little, of a certain Science, stand on the same level; but I
mean, what is surely undeniable, that one who does not embrace the
fundamental principles, of a Science, whatever he may have taken on
authority, and learned by rote, knows, properly speaking, nothing of that
science. And such, I have no hesitation in saying, is the case with a
considerable proportion even of those candidates who obtain testimonials,
including many who gain distinction. There are some persons (probably
not so many as one in ten, of such as have in other respects tolerable
abilities,) who are physically incapable of the degree of steady abstrac-
tion requisite for really embracing the principles of Logic or of any other
Science, whatever pains may be taken by themselves or their teachers.
But there is a much greater number to whom this is a great difficult]/,
though not an impossibility ; and who having, of course, a strong dis-
inclination to such a study, look naturally to the very lowest admissible
standard. And the example of such examinations in Logic as must be
expected in the case of men of these descriptions, tends, in combination
PREFACE. XV
witli popular prejudice, to degrade the study altogether in the minds of
the generality.
It was from these considerations, perhaps, that it was proposed, a few
years ago, to leave the study of Logic altogether to the option of the
candidates ; but the suggestion was rejected; the majority appearing to
think (in which opinion I most fully coincide) that, so strongly has the
tide of popular opinion set against the study, the result would have been,
within a few years, an almost universal neglect of that science. Matters^
were accordingly left, at that time, in respect of this point, on their
former footing ; which I am convinced, was far preferable to the pro-
posed alteration.
But a middle course between these two was suggested, which I was
persuaded would be infinitely preferable to either ; a persuasion which
I had long entertained, and which is confirmed by every day's obser-
vations and reflections ; of which, few persons, I believe, have bestowed
more on this subject. Let the study of Logic, it was urged, be made
optioned to tJwse who are merely candidates for a degree, but indis-
pensable to the attainment of academical Iwnours ; and the consequence
would be, that it would speedily begin and progressively continue, to
rise in estimation and to be studied with real profit. The examination
might then, it was urged, without any hardship, be made a strict one ;
since no one could complain that a certain moderate degree of sciertific
ability, and a resolution to apply to a certain prescribed study, should
be the conditions of obtaining distinction. The far greater part would
still study Logic ; since there would be (as before) but few who would
be willing to exclude themselves from the possibility of obtaining dis-
tinction; but it would be studied with a very different mind, when
ennobled, as it were, by being made part of the passport to University
honours, and when a proficiency in it came to be regarded generally as an
honourable distinction. And in proportion as the number increased of
those who really understood the science, the number, it was contended,
would increase of such as would value it on higher and better grounds.
It would in time come to be better known and better appreciated by all
the well-informed part of society : and lectures in Logic at the University
would then, perhaps, no longer consist exclusively of an explanation of
the mere elements. This would be necessary indeed for beginners ; but
to the more advanced students, the tutors would no more think of
lecturing in the bare rudiments, than of lecturing in the Latin or Greek
Grammar; but, in the same manner as they exercise their pupils in
Grammar, by reading with them Latin and Greek authors with continual
reference to grammar-rules, so, they would exercise them in Logic by
xvi PREFACE.
reading some argumentative work, requiring an analysis of it on logical
principles.
These effects could not indeed, it was acknowledged, be expected to
show themselves j^z^% till after a considerable lapse of time ; but that the
change would begin to appear, (and that very decidedly,) within three or
four years, was confidently anticipated.
To this it was replied, that it was most desirable that no one should
be allowed to obtain the Degree of B.A. without a knoAvledge of Logic.
This answer carries a plausible appearance to those unacquainted with tho
actual state of the University ; though in fact it is totally irrelevant. For
it goes on the supposition, that hitherto this object has been accomplished ;
— that every one who passes his examination does possess a knowledge
of Logic; which is notoriously not the fact, nor ever can be, without
some important change in some part of our system. The question there-
fore is, not, as the above objection would seem to imply, whether a real,
profitable knowledge of Logic shall be strictly required of every candidate
for a Degree, (for this in fact never has been done,) but whether, in the
attempt to accomplish this by requiring the form of a logical examination
from every candidate without exception, we shall continue to degrade the
science, and to let this part of the examination be regarded as a mere
form, by many who might otherwise have studied Logic in earnest, and
with advantage: — whether the great majority of candidates, and those
too of a more promising description, shall lose a real and important
benefit, through the attempt, (which, after all, experience has proved to
be a vain attempt,) to comprehend in this benefit a very small number,
and of the least promising.
Something of an approach to the proposed alteration, was introduced
into the Examination-statute passed in 1830; in which, permission Is
granted to such as are candidates merely for a testimonial, to substitute
for Logic a portion of Euchd. I fear, however, that little or nothing
will be gained by this ; unless indeed the Examiners resolve to make the
examinations in Logic far stricter than those in EucHd. For since every
one who Is capable of really understanding EucHd must be also capable
of Logic, the alteration does not meet the case of those whose inaptitude
for Science is Invincible ; and these are the very description of men whoso
(so called) logical-examinations tend to depress the science. Those few
who really are physically incapable of scientific reasoning, and the far
greater number who fancy themselves so, or who at least will rather run
a risk than surmount their aversion, and set themselves to study in
earnest,— all these will be likely, when the alternative Is proposed, to
prefer Logic to Euclid; because in the latter, it is hardly possible, «,fc
PREFACE. xvii
least not near so easy as In Logic, to present the semblance of prepara-
tion by learning questions and answers by rote : — in the cant phrase of
undergraduates, by getting crammed. Experience has proved this, in
the case of the Responsion-examinations, where the alternative of Logic
or Euclid has always been proposed to the candidates ; of whom those
most averse to Science, or incapable of it, are almost always found to
prefer Logic.
The determination may indeed be formed, and acted on from hence-
forth, that all who do in reaUty know nothing, properly speaking, of any
Science, shall be rejected: all I know is, that this has never been the
case hitherto.
Still, it is a satisfaction to me, that attention has been called to the
evil in question, and an experimental measure adopted for its abatement.
A confident hope is thus afforded, that in the event (which I much fear)
of the failure of the experiment, some other more effectual measure may
be resorted to.^
I am sensible that many may object, that this is not the proper place
for such remarks as the foregoing : what has the Public at large, they
may say, to do Avith the statutes of the University of Oxford? To this
it might fairly be replied, that not only all who think of sending their
sons or other near relatives to Oxford, but all likewise who are placed
under the ministry of such as have been educated there, are indirectly
concerned, to a certain degree, in the system there pursued. But the
consideration which had the chief share in inducing me to say what I
have, is, that the vindication of Logic from the prevailing disregard and
contempt under which it labours, would have been altogether incomplete
without it. For let it be remembered that the science is judged of by
the Public in this country, in a very great degree, from the specimens
displayed, and the reports made, by those whom Oxford sends forth.
Every one, on looking into the University- Calendar or Statute-Book,
feels himself justified in assuming, that whoever has graduated at Oxford
must be a Logician : not, indeed, necessarily, a first-rate Logician ; but
such as to satisfy the public examiners that he has a competent know-
ledge of the science. Now, if a very large proportion of these persons
neither are, nor think themselves at all benefited by their (so called)
logical education, and if many of them treat the study with contempt,
and represent it as a mere tissue of obsolete and empty jargon, which it
is a mere waste of time to attend to, let any one judge what conclusions
« Since this was written, the experiment higher classes, hcenty-five presented Euclid
has been tried. In the first Examination- for their examination, and one hu7idre4t
list under the new Statute, (Easter, 1831,) of Logic !
125 candidates who did not aspire to the
XVIU PREFACE.
respecting the utility of tlie study, and the wisdom of the University in
upholding it, are likely to be the result.
That prejudices so deeply-rooted as those I have alluded to, and sup-
ported by the authority of such eminent names, especially that of Locke,
and (as is commonly, though not very correctly supposed) Bacon, should
be overthrown at once by the present treatise, I am not so sanguine as to
expect ; but if I have been successful in refuting some of the most popu-
lar objections, and explaining some principles which are in general ill-
understood, it may be hoped that just notions on the subject may continue
(as they have begun) to gain ground more and more.
It may be permitted me to mention, that as I have addressed myself
to various classes of students, from the most uninstructed tyro, to the
furthest-advanced Logician, and have touched accordingly both on the
most elementary principles, and on some of the most remote deductions
from them, it must be expected that readers of each class will find some
parts not well calculated for them. Some explanations will appear to the
one too simple and puerile ; and for another class, some of the disquisitions
will be at first too abstruse. If to each description some portions are found
interesting, it is as much as I can expect.
With regard to the style, I have considered perspicuity not only, as it
always must be, the first point, but as one of such paramount importance
in such a subject, as to justify the neglect of all others. Prolixity of
explanation, — homeliness in illustration, — and baldness of expression, I
have regarded as blemishes not worth thinking of, when any thing was
to be gained in respect of clearness. To some of my readers a temporary
difficulty may occasionally occur from the use of some technical terms
different, or differently applied, from what they have been accustomed
to.® They must consider, however, that the attempt to conform in this
point to the usage of every logical writer, would have been, on account of
their variations from each other, utterly hopeless. I have endeavoured,
in the terms employed, to make no wanton innovations, but to conform
generally to established usage, except when there is some very strong
objection to it ; — where usage is divided, to prefer what may appear in
each case the most convenient term ; and, above all, to explain distinctly
the sense in which each is employed in the present work.
If any should complain of my not having given a history of aU the
senses in which each technical term has been used by each writer from
its first introduction, and a review of the works of each, I can only reply
that my design was not to write a Logical Archajology, or a Commentary
« See Book II. Chap. I. § 1.
PREFACE. XIX
on the works of former Logicians, but an elementary introduction to the
science. And few, I suppose, woidd consider a treatise, for instance,
on Agriculture, as incomplete, which should leave untouched the questions
of, who was the inventor of the plough, — what successive alterations
tliat implement has imdergone, — and from what region wheat was first
introduced.
And if again any should complain of the omission of such metaphysical
disquisitions on the laws of thought, and the constitution of the human
mind generally, as they have been accustomed to include under the
head of Logic, my answer must be, that that term has been employed
by me in a different sense ; for reasons which I have stated in several
parts of this treatise, and especially in Book IV. Chap. III. ; and that
I am therefore only to be censured, at the utmost, as not having under-
taken a work of a different kind, and on a different subject.
I would not, on the other hand, be understood as complaining of those
who have used the word Logic in a more extended sense, or as under-
rating the value of their works. Only, the reader should be cautioned
against the mistake — ^much commoner, I believe, than is generally
thought — of confounding the extension of the application of a name, with
the enlargement of the boundaries of a science.
It is proper hoAvever to mention that the first Part of the ** Elements
of Rhetoric" contains a discussion of such points as many writers have
treated of under the department of Logic.
The technical language employed in this treatise, is, throughout, with
the exception of a very few cases, where some departure from ancient
usage appeared indispensable, that of the older works on the subject.
Some degree of prejudice perhaps might have been, in the outset,
avoided, and a far greater appearance of originality produced, by adopting
novel forms of expression. There are also many writers who have found
fault Avith the established technical language, as cumbrous and perplex-
ing. I have always found however that the phraseology they adopt in
its stead consists of far more tedious circumlocution than that which
they censure ; while it is often less clear and less correct.
It should be observed however that all technical language (as weU as
al^ rules of art) must be expected to present, at first, a difficulty for the
learner to surmount; though in the end, it will greatly facihtate his
procedure. But with this view it is necessary that such language and
rules should be not only distinctly understood, but also learnt, and
remembered as familiarly as the Alphabet, and employed constantly, and
with scrupulous exactness. Otherwise technical language wiU prove an
encumbrance instead of an advantage ; just as a suit of clothes would be.
XX PREFACE.
if instead of putting them on and wearing them, one should carry them
about in his hands.
Of the correctness of the fundamental doctrines maintained in the
work, I may be allowed to feel some confidence ; not so much from the
length of time that I have been more or less occupied with it, — enjoying
at the same time the advantage of frequent suggestions and corrections
from several judicious friends, — as from the nature of the subject. In
•works of taste, an author cannot be sure that the judgment of the Public
•will coincide with his own ; and if he fail to give pleasure, he fails of his sole
or most appropriate object. But in the case of truths which admit of
scientific demonstration, it is possible to arrive by reasoning at as full an
assurance of the justness of the conclusions established, as the imperfection
of the human faculties will admit ; and experience, accompanied with atten-
tive observation, and with repeated trials of various methods, may enable
one long accustomed to tuition, to ascertain with considerable certainty
•what explanations are the best comprehended. Many parts of the detail,
however, may probably be open to objections ; but if, (as experience now
authorizes me the more confidently to hope) no errors are discovered,
which materially affect the substantial utility of the work, but only such
as detract from the credit of the author, the object will have been
attained which I ought to have had principally in view.
No credit, I am aware, is given to an author's own disclaimer of
personal motives, and profession of exclusive regard for public utility ;
since even sincerity cannot, on this point, secure him from deceiving
himself; but it may be allowable to observe, that one whose object was
the increase of his reputation as a writer, could hardly have chosen a
subject less suitable for his purpose than the present. At the time of
the first publication the study was neither popular, nor, apparently,
likely soon to become so. Ignorance, fortified by prejudice, opposed
its reception, even in the minds of those who are considered as both
candid and well-informed. And as, on the one hand, a large class
of modern philosophers might be expected to raise a clamour against
*' obsolete prejudices ;" *' bigoted devotion to the decrees of Aristotle ;"
** confining the human mind in the trammels of the Schoolmen," &c., so,
on the other hand, all such as really are thus bigoted to every thing that
has been long established, merely because it has been long established,
were likely to exclaim against the presumption of an author, who pre-
sumes to depart in several points from the track of his predecessors.
There is another circumstance, also, which tends materially to dimin-
ish the credit of a writer on this and some other kindred subjects.
We can make no discoveries of striking novelties: the senses of our
PREFACE. XXI
readers are not struck, as with the retuni of a Comet which had been
foretold, or the extinction of a taper in carbonic-acid gas : the materials
we work upon are common and familiar to all, and, therefore, supposed
to be well understood by all. And not only is any one's deficiency in
the use of these materials, such as is generally unfelt by himself, but
when it is removed by satisfactory explanations — when the notions,
which had been perplexed and entangled, are cleared up by the introduc-
tion of a few simple and apparently obvious principles, he will generally
forget that any explanation at all was needed, and consider all that has
been said as mere truisms, which even a child could supply to himself.
Such is the nature of the fundamental principles of a science — they are
so fully implied in the most evident and well-known truths, that the
moment they are fully embraced, it becomes a difficulty to conceive that
we could ever have been not aware of them. And hence, the more
simple, clear, and obvious any principle is rendered, the more likely is
its exposition to elicit those common remarks, " of course ! of course ! "
"no one could CA'cr doubt that;" "this is all very true, but there is
nothing new brought to light ; — nothing that was not familiar to every
one," " there needs no ghost to tell us that." I am convinced that a
verbose, mystical, and partially obscure way of writing on such a
subject, is the most likely to catch the attention of the multitude. The
generality verify the observation of Tacitus, ** omne ignotum pro miri-
fico:" and when any thing is made very plain to them, are apt to fancy
that they knew it already ; so that the explanations of scientific truths are
likely, for a considerable time at least, to be, by most men, underrated
the more, the more perfectly they accomplish their object.
A very slow progress, therefore, towards popularity (far slower indeed
than has in fact taken place) is the utmost that I expected for such a
treatise as I have endeavoured to make the present. I felt myself
bound, however, not only as a member of Society, but more especially as
a Minister of the Gospel, to use my endeavours towards promoting an
object which to me appears highly important, and (what is much more)
whose importance was appreciated by very few besides. The cause of
Truth universally, and not least, of religious Truth, is benefited by every
thing that tends to promote sound reasoning, and faciHtate the detection
of fallacy. The adversaries of our Faith would, I am convinced, have
been on many occasions more satisfactorily answered, and would have
had fewer openings for cavil, had a thorough acquaintance with Logic
been a more common qualification than it is. In lending my endeavours,
therefore, whether with greater or less success, towards this object, I
trust that I am neither uselessly nor unsuitably employed.
XXli PREFACE.
Those who are engaged in, or designed for the Sacred Ministry, and
all others who are sensible that the cause of true religion is not a con-
cern of the Ministry alone, should remember that this is no time to
forego any of the advantages which that cause may derive from an
active and judicious cultivation of the faculties. Among the enemies of
Christianity in the present day, are included, if I mistake not, a very
diiferent description of persons from those who were chiefly to be met with
a century, or even half a century ago: what were called "men of wit
and pleasure about town;" — ignorant, shallow, flippant declaimers, or
dull and powerless pretenders to Philosophy. Among the enemies of
the Gospel now, are to be found men not only of learning and ingenuity,
but of cultivated argumentative powers, and not unversed in the principles
of Logic. If the advocates of our religion think proper to disregard this
help, they will find, on careful inquiry, that their opponents do not.
And let them not trust too carelessly to the strength of their cause.
Truth will, indeed, prevail, where all other points are nearly equal ; but
it may suffer a temporary discomfiture, if hasty assumptions, unsound
arguments, and vague and empty declamation, occupy the place of a
train of close, accurate, and luminous reasoning.
It is not, however, solely, or chiefly, for polemical purposes, that the
cultivation of the reasoning-faculty is desirable; in persuading, in
investigating, in learning, or teaching, in all the multitude of cases in
which it is our object to arrive at just conclusions, or to lead others to
them, it is most important. A knowledge of logical rules wiU not
indeed supply the want of other knowledge ; nor was it ever proposed, by
any one who really understood this science, to substitute it for any other :
but it is no less true that no other can be substituted for this ; that it is
valuable in every branch of study ; and that it enables us to use to the
greatest advantage the knowledge we possess. It is to be hoped, therefore,
that those Academical Bodies, who have been wise enough to retain this
science, will, instead of being persuaded to abandon it, give their attoi-
tion rather to its improvement and more effectual cultivation.
It may be needful here to mention that there are some passages in the
last and in the present edition of this work (especially in the part relat-
ing to Induction) inserted in answer to certain objections which many of
my Eeaders may have never seen or heard of, even though having in
their hands the very book in ihejirst edition of which those objections
appeared. For in a subsequent edition of that book, those objections
(doubtless, from their having been fully answered, and found untenable)
were silently suppressed : and hence, I might, but for this notice, appear
to some of my readers to be combating a shadow.
ELEMENTS OF LOGIC
LOGIC.
INTRODUCTION.
? ] . Logic, in the most extensive sense in which it has been thought Definition
Cidvisahle to employ the name, may be considered as the Science, ° ^^^^'
and also as the Art, of Reasoning. It investigates the principles
on which argumentation is conducted, and furnishes such rules as
may be derived from those principles, for guarding against erroneous
deductions. Its most appropriate office, however, is that of insti-
tuting an analysis of the process of the mind in Reasoning ; and in
this point of view it is, as I have said, strictly a Science : while,
considered in reference to the practical rules above-mentioned, it
may be called the Art of Reasoning. For it is to be remembered,
that as a science is conversant about speculative knowledge only, and
art is the application of knowledge to practice, hence, Logic (as well
as any other system of knowledge) becomes, when applied to prac-
tice, an art ; while confined to the theory of reasoning, it is strictly
a science : and it is as such that it occupies the higher place in point
of dignity, since it professes to develop some of the most interesting
and curious intellectual phenomena.^
Considering how early Logic attracted the attention of philoso- Prevailing
phers, it may appear surprising that so little progress should have l^specUng
been made, as is confessedly the case, in developing its principles, J-'Osic-
and perfecting the detail of the system ; and this circumstance has
been brought forward as a proof of the barrenness and futility of the
study. But a similar argument might have been urged with no less
plausibility, at a period not very remote, against the study of
Natural Philosophy ; and, very recently, against that of Chemistry.
No science can be expected to make any considerable progress,
which is not cultivated on right principles. Whatever may be the
inherent vigour of the plant, it will neither be flourishing nor fruit-
ful till it meet with a suitable soil and culture : and in no case is
the remark more applicable than in the present ; the greatest mis-
takes having always prevailed respecting the nature of Logic ; and
its province having in consequence been extended by many writers
to subjects with which it has no proper connexion. Indeed, with
the exception perhaps of Aristotle, (who is himself, however, not
^ It is surely strange, therefore, to find distinct dissertation to prove that ii \%
*n a treatise on Logic, (Aldrich's,) a an Art, aud ko^ a Science!
2 INTRODUCTION. [§1.
entirely exempt from the errors in question,) hardly a writer on
Logic can be mentioned who has clearly perceived, and steadily
kept in view throughout, its real nature and object. Before his
time, no distinction was drawn between the science of which we are
speaking, and that which is now usually called Metaphysics ; a cir-
cumstance which alone shows how small was the progress made in
earlier times. Indeed, those who first turned their attention to the
subject, hardly thought of inquiring into the process of Reasoning
itself, but confined themselves almost entirely to certain preliminary
points, the discussion of which is (if logically considered) subordinate
to that of the main inquiry.
History of To givo cven a very condensed account of the lives and works of
disti'nct ^^^ ^^^ principal writers on Logic, — of the technical terms introduced
from the l^y each, and the senses in which each employed them, — and of the
the science, improvements or corruptions that were from time to time introduced,
— in short, to write the History and Antiquities of Logical Science,
— would be foreign to my present design. Such a work, if under-
taken by a competent writer, would be, though not of a popular
character, yet highly interesting and instructive to a limited class of
students. But the extensive research which would form one indis-
pensable qualification for such a task, would be only one out of
many, even less common, qualifications, without which such a work
would be worse than useless. The author should be one thoroughly
on his guard against the common error of confounding together, or
leading his readers to confound, an intimate acquaintance with many
hoohs on a given subject, and a clear insight into the subject itself.
With ability and industry for investigating a multitude of minute
particulars, he should possess the power of rightly estimating each
according to its intrinsic importance, and not (as is very commonly
done,) according to the degree of laborious research it may have cost
him, or the rarity of the knowledge he may in any case have
acquired. And he should be careful, while recording the opinions
and expressions of various authors on points of science, to guard
both himself and his readers against the mistake of taking any thing
on authority, that ought to be evinced by scientific reasoning ; or of
regarding each technical term as having a sort of prescriptive right
to retain for ever the meaning attached to it by those who first
introduced it. In no subject, in short, is it more important for an
author to be free from all tinge of antiquarian pedantry.
But if I felt myself as fully competent to the task of writing such
a history of Logic as I have alluded to, as I am conscious of not
being so, I should still decidedly prefer keeping such a work alto-
gether distinct from a treatise on the science ; because the combina-
tion of the two in a single volume would render it the more difiicult
to avoid the blending of them confusedly together ; and also because,
VQ such a plan, the distinction could not be so easily preserved
between Logic, in the sense in which I am here using that title, and
5 2.] INTRODUCTION. 3
various metaphysical disquisitions to wliicli several writers have
given the same name.
For these reasons I have thought it hest to take only a shght and
rapid glance of the series of logical writers down to the present day,
and of the general tendency of their labours.
§ 2. Zeno the Eleatic, whom most accounts represent as the earliest Early
systematic writer on the subject of Logic, or, as it was then called, Jogh}?**"
Dialectics, divided his work into three parts: the first of which
(upon Consequences) is censured by Socrates [Plato, Parmen.] for
obscurity and confusion. In his second part, however, he furnished
that interrogatory method of disputation [e^arrta/;,] which Socrates
adopted, and which has since borne his name. The third part of
his work was devoted to what may not be improperly termed the
art of wrangling [s^/o-t/^i),] which supplied the disputant with a col-
lection of sophistical questions, so contrived, that the concession of
some point that seemed unavoidable, immediately mvolved some
glaring absurdity. This, if it is to be esteemed as at all falling
within the province of Logic, is certainly not to be regarded (as
some have ignorantly or heedlessly represented it) as its principal or
proper business. The Greek philosophers generally have unfortu-
nately devoted too much attention to it ; but we must beware of
falling into the vulgar error of supposing the ancients to have
regarded as a serious and intrinsically important study, that which
in fact they considered as an ingenious recreation. The disputants
diverted themselves in their leisure hours by making trial of their
own and their adversary's acuteness, in the endeavour mutually to
perplex each other with subtle fallacies ; much in the same way as
men amuse themselves with propounding and guessing riddles, or
with the game of chess ; to each of which diversions the sportive
disputations of the ancients bore much resemblance. They were
closely analogous to the wrestling and other exercises of the gym-
nasium ; these last being reckoned conducive to bodily vigour and
activity, as the former were to habits of intellectual acuteness ; but
the immediate object in each was a sportive, not a serious contest;
though, doubtless, fashion and emulation often occasioned an undue
importance to be attached to success in each.
Zeno, then, is hardly to be regarded as any further a logician Zeno.
than as to what respects his erotetic method of disputation ; a course
of argument constructed on this principle being properly an hypo-
thetical Sorites, which may easily be reduced into a series of
syllogisms.
To Zeno succeeded Euclid of Megara, and Antisthenes ; both Euclid and
pupils of Socrates. The former of these prosecuted the subject ol
tlie third part of his predecessor's treatise, and is said to have been
the author of many of the fallacies attributed to the Stoical school.
Of the writings of the latter nothing certain is known; if, however,-
we suppose the above-mentioned sect to be his disciples in this stuly^
INTRODUCTION.
CJi
and to have retained his principles, he certainly took a more correct
view of the subject than Euclid. The Stoics divided all >£xr«, —
every thing that could be said, — into three classes; 1st, the Simple
Term ; 2d, the Proposition ; 3d, the Syllogism ; viz. the hypothe-
tical ; for they seem to have had little notion of a more rigorous
analysis of argument than into that familiar form.
Archytas. We must not here omit to notice the merits of Archytas, to whom
we are indebted (as he himself probably was, in a great degree,
to older writers) for the doctrines of the Categories. He, however,
(as well as the other writers on the subject,) appears to have had no
distinct view of the proper object and just limits of the science of
Logic ; but to have blended with it metaphysical discussions not
strictly connected with it, and to have dwelt on the investigation of
the nature of Terms and Propositions, without maintaining a con-
stant reference to the principles of Reasoning ; to which all the rest
should be made subservient.
Aristoy^ * The state, then, in which Aristotle found the science, (if, indeed,
it can properly be said to have existed at all before his time,)
appears to have been nearly this : the division into Simple Terms,
Propositions, and Syllogisms, had been slightly sketched out ; the
doctrine of the Categories, and perhaps that of the Opposition of
Propositions, had been laid down ; and, as some believe, the ana-
lysis of Species into Genus and Differentia had been introduced by
Socrates. These, at best, were rather the materials of the system,
than the system itself; the foundation of which indeed he distinctly
claims the merit of having laid, and which remains fundamentally
the same as he left it.
It has been remarked, that the logical system is one of those few
theories which have been begun and completed by the same indivi-
dual. The history of its discovery, as far as the main principles
of the science are concerned, properly commences and ends with
Aristotle ; and this may perhaps in part account for the subsequent
perversions of it. The brevity and simplicity of its fundamental
truths (to which point indeed all real science is perpetually tending,)
has probably led many to suppose that something much more com-
plex, abstruse, and mysterious, remained to be discovered. The
vanity, too, by which all men are prompted unduly to magnify their
cwn pursuits, has led unpliilosophical minds, not in this case alone,
but in many others, to extend the boundaries of their respective
scieifces, not by the patient development and just application of the
principles of those sciences, but by wandering into irrelevant sub-
jects. The mystical employment of numbers by Pythagoras, in
matters utterly foreign to arithmetic, is perhaps the earliest instance
of the kind. A more curious and important one is the degeneracy of
Astronomy into judicial Astrology ; but none is more striking than
the misapplication of Logic, by those who have treated of it as
**trie Art of rightly employing the Rational Faculties," or who
\
5 3.] INTRODUCTION. 5
have intruded it into the province of Natural Philosophy, and
regarded the Syllogism as an engine for the investigation of nature ;
while they overlooked the extensive field that was before them within
the legitimate limits of the science ; and perceived not the importance
and difficulty of the task, of completing and properly filling up the
masterly sketch before them.
The writings of Aristotle were not only for the most part abso-
lutely lost to the world for about two centuries, but seem to have
been but little studied for a long time after their recovery. An art,
however, of Logic, derived from the principles traditionally preserved
by his disciples, seems to have been generally known, and to have
been employed by Cicero in his philosophical works; but the pursuit
of the science seems to have been abandoned for a long time. As
early in the Christian era as the second and third centuries, the
Peripatetic doctrines experienced a considerable revival; and we
meet wuth the names of Galen, Ammonius, (who seems to have Gaien.
taken the lead among the commentators on Aristotle,) Alexander of Akxande"!'
Aphrodisias, and Porphyry, as logicians ; but it is not till the close Porphyry,
of the fifth century, or the beginning of the sixth, that Aristotle's
logical works were translated into Latin by the celebrated Boethius.^Bocthius.
Not one of these seems to have made any considerable advances in
developing the theory of reasoning. Of the labours of Galen (who
added the insignificant fourth Figure to the three recognised by
Aristotle) little is known ; and Porphyry's principal work is merely
on the predicahles. We have little of the science till the revival of
learning among the Arabians, by whom Aristotle's treatises on this
as well as on other subjects, were eagerly studied.
I 3. Passing by the names of some Byzantine writers of no great Schoolmen,
importance, Ave come to the times of the Schoolmen ; whose waste
of ingenuity, and frivolous subtlety of disputation, have been often
made the subject of complaints, into the justice of which it is unne-
cessary here fully to inquire. It may be sufficient to observe, that
their fault did not lie in their diligent study of Logic, and the high
value they set upon it, but in their utterly mistaking the true nature
and object of the science ; and by the attempt to employ it for the
purpose of physical discoveries, involving every subject in a mist of
words, to the exclusion of sound philosophical investigation.^ Their
errors may serve to account for the strong terms in which Bacon Bacon,
sometimes appears to censure logical pursuits ; but that this censure
was intended to bear against the extravagant perversions, not the
legitimate cultivation, of the science, may be proved from his own
observations on the subject, in his Advancement of Learning. " Had
Bacon lived in the present day, I am inclined to think he would
have made his chief complaint against unmethodized inquiry and
2 Born about A. D. 475, and died about ty. Dr. Hampden's Bampton Lectures
A.D. 524. furnish the best view that has, perhaps,
* 01 the character of the School-dirzm- ever appeared.
.6 INTRODUCTION. [§ 3.
illogical reasoning. Certainly lie would not have complained of
Dialectics as corrupting Philosophy. To guard now against the
evils prevalent in his time, would be to fortify a town against bat-
tering-rams, instead of against cannon."*
Locke. His moderation, however, was not imitated in other quarters.
Even Locke confounds in one sweeping censure the Aristotelic
theory, with the absurd misapplications and perversions of it in
later years. His objection to the science, as unserviceable in the
discovery of truth, (which has of late been often repeated,) while it
holds good in reference to many (misnamed) logicians, indicates
that, with regard to the true nature of the science itself, he had
no clearer notions than they have, of the just limits of logical
science, as confined to the theory of Reasoning ; and of the distinct
character of that operation from the observations and experiments
which are essential to the study of Nature.
For instance, in chap. xvii. ** on Reason," (which, by the way,
he perpetually confounds with Reasoning^) he says, in § 4, "If
syllogisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason
and means of knowledge, it will follow, that before Aristotle there
was not one man that did or could know any thing by reason ; and
that since the invention of syllogisms there is not one in ten
thousand that doth. But God has not been so sparing to men to
make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to
make them rational, i.e. those few of them that he could get so to
examine the grounds of syllogisms, as to see that in above three-
score ways that three propositions may be laid together, there are
but fourteen wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right,"
&c. *' God has been more bountiful to mankind than so: He has
given them a mind that can reason without being instructed in
methods of syllogizing," (kc. All this is not at all less absurd
than if any one, on being told of the discoveries of modern chemists
respecting caloric, and on hearing described the process by which
it is conducted through a boiler into the water, which it converts
into a gas of sufficient elasticity to overcome the pressure of the
atmosphere, <kc., should reply, " If all this were so, it would follow
that before the time of these chemists no one ever did or could make
any liquor boil."
He presently after inserts an encomium upon Aristotle, in which
be is equally unfortunate ; he praises him for the " invention of syl-
logisms:" to which he certainly had no more claim than Linnseus to
the creation of plants and animals; or Harvey, to the praise of
having made the blood circulate; or Lavoisier, to that of having
formed the atmosphere we breathe. And the utility of this invention
consist!*, according to him, in the great service done against *' those
who were not ashamed to deny any thing :" a service which never
* Tel. Econ. Lect. ix. p. 237.
1 3.] INTRODUCTION. 7
could have been performed, had syllogisms heen an invention or
discovery of Aristotle's ; for what sophist could ever have consented
to restrict himself to one particular kind of arguments^ dictated hy
his opponent?
In an ordinary, obscure, and trifling wTiter, all this confusion of
thought and common-place declamation might as well have been left
unnoticed ; but it is due to the general ability and to tlie celebrity of
such an author as Locke, that errors of this kind should be exposed.
An error apparently diiferent, but substantially the same, pervades Watts,
the treatises of Watts, and some other modern writers on the subject.
Perceiving the inadequacy of the syllogistic theory to the vast
purposes to which others had attempted to apply it, he still craved
after the attainment of some equally comprehensive and all-powerful
system ; which he accordingly attempted to construct under the
title of The right use of Reason, — which was to be a method of
invigorating and properly directing all the powers of the mind: —
a most magnificent object indeed, but one which not only does not
fall under the province of Logic, but cannot be accomplished by
any one science or system that can even be conceived to exist. The
attempt to comprehend so wide a field. Is no extension of science,
but a mere verbal generalization, which leads only to vague and
barren declamation.
It is not perhaps much to be wondered at, that in still later times
several ingenious writers, forming their notions of the science itself
from professed masters in it, such as have just been alluded to, and
judging of its value from their failures, should have treated the
Aristotelic system with so much reprobation and scorn.
The vague aspirations of some of these writers after a *' true" — Extravagant
"rational" — "philosophical system of Logic," which, year after ^^^p^^^^*'""*
year, and generation after generation, is talked of, and hoped for, writers,
and almost promised, but which is acknowledged to have never yet
existed,^ may recall to one's mind the gorgeous visions which floated
before the Imagination of the Alchemists, of the Philosopher's Stone,
and the Universal Medicine ; and which made them regard Avith
impatience and with scorn the humble labours of existing Metallurgy
and Pharmacy. I believe that in respect of the present subject,
the views I am alluding to arise in great measure from men's not
perceiving that Language,^ of some kind or other, is (as will be
more fully shown hereafter) an indispensable instrument of all
Reasoning that properly deserves the name. And hence it is that
fi I have even seen a complaint origination of naore philosophical sys-
niade, that the introduction of some tems.
sr.ch perfect system has been pre- * Hobbes, who has very clearly pointed
vented by the application of the this out, has unhappily* diminished the
term Logic to that which is commonly benefit tiiat might have been derived
so called. We do not find, however, from much that he has written, by the
that the application of the names of prejudice he has raised against himself
Astronomy and Cliemistry to the stu- througli his exceptionable doctrines ic
dies formerly so called, prevented the Morals, Politics, and Religion.
8 INTRODUCTION. [§ 4.
Tendency to 0116 may find siicli Writers as I allude to speaking disdainfully of
Realism. <j rules applicable merely to reasoning in words;" — representing
Language as serviceable only " in conveying arguments to another;"
and even as "limiting the play of our faculties;" and again as
*' rendering the mental perception of all abstract truths obscure and
confused, in so far as the rude symbol of each idea is taken in the
stead of the idea itself;" with other such expressions, emanating
from that which is in truth the ancient and still prevalent doctrine of
*' Realism."
Incorrect The Syllogistic theory has usually been considered by these
nature o^he ^^j^^^°^'® ^^ professing to furnish a peculiar method of reasoning,
science. instead of a method of analyzing that mental process which must
invariably take place in all correct reasoning ; and accordingly they
have contrasted the ordinary mode of reasoning with the syllogistic,
and have brought forward with an air of triumph the argumentative
skill of many who never learned the system ; a mistake no less
gross than if any one should regard Grammar as a peculiar Lan-
guage, and should contend against its utility, on the ground that
many speak correctly who never studied the principles of grammar.
For Logic, which is, as it were, the Grammar of Reasoning, does
not bring forward the regular Syllogism as a distinct mode of argu-
mentation, designed to be substituted for any other mode ;'^ but as
the form to which all correct reasoning may be ultimately reduced :
and which, consequently, serves the purpose (when we are employ-
ing Logic as an art) of a test to try the validity of any argument ;
in the same manner as by chemical analysis we develop and submit
to a distinct examination the elements of which any compound body
is composed, and are thus enabled to detect any latent sophistication
and impurity.
I 4. Many misconceptions not very dissimilar to those of Locke,
which continue to prevail, more or less, in the present day, will be
hereafter noticed, as far as is needful, in appropriate places. In this
Litroduction it would be unsuitable to advert to them except very
briefly, and that, only with a view to caution the learner, unused to
these studies, against being disheartened in the outset, by hearing,
generally, that objections have been raised against the leading prin-
ciples of the science, by writers of considerable repute ; objections
wh'ch he will hardly suppose to be, in so great a degree as they
really are, either founded on mistake, or unimportant, and turning,
in reality, on mere verbal questions.
J" Strange as it may seem, there are The "not" might naturally have been
some, (I suspect not afew,) who even go regarded as a misprint, but that thecon-
a step further, and consider Logic as text shows that such was the reviewer's
something oji>poA'ed to riglit reasoning. I real meaning.
have seen a Review of a work, which the On seeing such a passage written in the
Reviewer characterised as tiie produc- 19th century, who can wonder that in the
tion of an able Logician, and which he Middle Ages, Grammar (" Crramarye")
there/ore concluded was likely to have was i-egarded as a kind of magical arti
intiuence with such as will not reason I
1 4.] INTRODUCTION. 9
For instance, some, he may be told, have maintained that men
reason, — or that they may reason, — from a single premiss, without any
other being either expressed or understood ; — that men may, and do,
reason from one individual case to another, without the intervention
of any general [universal] proposition, whether stated or implied;
— that the inferences from Induction are not drawn by any process
that is, in substance, Syllogistic ; — that the conclusion of a Syllogism
is not really inferred from the Premises; — that a Syllogism is
nothing but a kind of trap for ensnaring the incautious ; and that
it necessarily involves the fallacy of " begging the question;" with
other such formidably-sounding objections ; which, when simply
spoken of as being afloat, and as maintained by able men, are
likely to be supposed far more powerful than they will be found on
a closer examination.
Of those who speak of a single premiss being sufficient to warrant
a conclusion, some, it will be found, were confining their thoughts
to such flat and puerile examples as Logical writers are too apt to
employ exclusively; as " Socrates is a man; therefore he is a living
creature, &c. ;" in which the conclusion had been already stated in
the one premiss, to any one who does but understand the meaning
of the words; *' living-creature" being a part of what is signified
in the very term *' Man." But in such an instance as this; '* He
has swallowed a cup of laurel-water, therefore he has taken poison,"
the inference is one which no one could draw who should be igno-
rant — as every body was, less than a century ago, (though using the
word in the same sense as now, to signify a "liquor distilled from
laurel leaves,") that this liquor is poisonous.
Others again, when they speak of reasoning from one individual
instance to another, without any universal premiss, mean sometimes,
that no such premiss is expressed, (which is the case oftener than
not) and that perhaps even the reasoner himself, if possessed of no
great command of language, might be at a loss to state it correctly.®
And indeed it continually happens that even long trains of reason-
ing will flash through the mind with such rapidity that the process
8 It may be added, that in inward soli- or "trapezium," &c. ; or he may " figure
tary reasoning, many, and perhaps most to himsell'" a man raising a weight by
persons, but especially those not much means of a pole, and may use this con-
accustomed to read or speak concerning ception as a general sign, in place of the
the subjects that occupy their thoughts, term " lever;" and the terms themselves
make use, partly, of signs that are not he may be unacquainted with; in which
arbitrary and conventional, but which case he will be at a loss to impart dis-
consist of mental conceptions oi'mdxxidwaX tinctly to others his own reasonings; and
objects; taken, each, as a i-epresentative in the attempt, will often express liimself
of a Class. £.(?. A person practically (as one may frequently observe in practi-
conversant with mechanical operations, cal men unused to reading and speaking)
but not with discussions of them in words, not only indistinctly, but even erroneous-
may form a conception of— in colloquial ly. See below, § 5. Hence, partly, may
Ehrase, "figure to himself" — a certain have arisen the belief in those supposed
eld or room, with whose shape he is *' abstract ideas" which will be hereafter
familiar, and may employ this in his alluded to, and in the possibility of reason-
inward trains of thought, as a Sign, to ing without the use of any Signs at all.
•^present, for instance, " parallelogram"
iO INTRODUCTION. [§ 4.
is performed unconsciously, or at least leaves no trace in the
memory, any more than the motions of the muscles of the throat
and mouth in speaking, or the judgments hy which we decide as to
the distances of visible objects:^ so that a conclusion may be supposed
to be seized by intuition, which in reality is the result of rapid
inference.
Some, again, appear to include under the title of *' reasoning"
every case in which a person believes one thing in consequence of
his believing another thing; however far he may be from having
any good grounds to warrant the inference: and they accordingly
include those processes which take place in the minds of infants
and of brutes; which are apt to associate with the appearance of an
object before them the remembered impression of son thing that
formerly accompanied it. Such a process is alluded to in the
familiar proverbs that *' A burnt child dreads the fire;" or as it is
expressed in another form, " The scalded cat fears cold water;" or
again in the Hebrew proverb, " He who has been bitten by a serpent
is afraid of a rope. " Most logical writers, however, have confined the
name of " reasoning" to valid argument; which cannot exist without
a universal premiss, implied, if not expressed. For whenever there
are not two premises which, taken jointly, do imply, and virtually
assert, the conclusion, — the alleged premiss or premises being such
that a person may without inconsistency believe them true and yet
not believe the conclusion, — then, we have what Logicians have
been accustomed to call an apparent, but not real argument.
Some, however, have denied that the conclusion is inferred from
the universal premiss. But then, they acknowledge that the truth
of that premiss is an indispensable condition of such inference: an
admission which would satisfy most*Logicians. For if any botanical
physiologist, for instance, were to deny that the branches of a tree
derive nourishment from the roots, saying that the branches are
nourished by the juices of the earth, but admitting that the roots
are an indispensable condition, and that if they are destroyed, the
branches will wither, this would not be reckoned as substantially
any new doctrine. And so also if any one choose to maintain that
the conclusion is drawn from the one premiss, by, or through, the
other premiss, this would be accounted merely a needless and unim-
portant innovation in phraseology.
So also when inferences from induction are spoken of as not being
— or not necessarily being — substantially Syllogistic, the learner
might at first sight be startled and perplexed, till he found it at
the same time admitted that we have to decide, in each case of
Induction, the question, whether the instances adduced be " suffi-
cient" to warrant the inference; — whether it be ** allowable" to
draw the conclusion. And the decision of this question in tho
» The distance of an obiect having supposed to be directly perceived by the
been, till a comparatively late period, eye.
I
8 5.] INTRODUCTION. 11
affirmative, — i.e. the decision that the procedure is not a mere
random guess, — is, if expressed in words, tlievery premiss necessary
to complete the Syllogism. (See B. IV. Ch. I. § 1.)
So also it will be seen that the alleged entrapping character of a
Syllogism, merely amounts to this; that whoever perceives the
validity of an argument, has no mode of escape from the " snare"
(so called) except by the way he entered, viz. the premises. He has
only the alternative of allowing one of them to be false, or else, the
conclusion to be true. And it is a matter of daily occurrence, that
a man is undeceived as to some principle he had incautiously
admitted, by perceiving what it would lead to.
8 5. Complaints have also been made that Logfic leaves untouched Complaints
the greatest difficulties, and those which are the sources of the chief Logic,
errors in reasoning; mz. the ambiguity or indistinctness of Terms,
and the doubts respecting the degrees of evidence in various Proposi-
tions: an objection which is not to be removed by any such attempt
as that of Watts to lay down ** rules for forming clear ideas," and,
for "guiding the judgment;" but by replying that no art is to be
censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and
indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a
system of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full
meaning or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, —
certainty or uncertainty, — of every proposition, thus superseding all
other studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect, or even to
imagine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this, is
as if one should object to the science of Optics for not giving sight
to the blind ; or as if (like the man of whom Warburton tells a story
in his Div. Leg.) one should complain of a reading-glass for being
of no service to a person who had never learned to read.
In fact, the difficulties and errors above alluded to are not in the
process of Reasoning itself, (which alone is the appropriate province
of Logic,) but in the subject-matter about which it is employed.
This process will have been correctly conducted if it have conformed
to the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of any error
creeping in betiveen the principles assumed, and the conclusions we
deduce from them. But still that conclusion may be false, if the
principles we start from are so ; and the known falsity of a conclusion
will often serve (as has been above remarked) to correct a mistake
made in the outset. In like manner, no arithmetical skill will secure
a correct result to a calculation, unless the data are correct from
which we calculate; nor does any one on that account undervalue
Arithmetic; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no better
foundation.
There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect between the
two sciences. All Numbers (which are the subject of Arithmetic)
must be numbers of some things, whether coins, persons, measures,
or any thing else; but to introduce into the science any notice of
12 INTRODUCTION. [J 5.
the things respecting which calculations are made, would be evi-
dently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character: we
proceed therefore with arbitrary signs, representing numbers in the
abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a
regularly-constructed argument, equally well, though arbitrary
symbols may have been substituted for the Terms; and, consequently,
without any regard to the things signified by those Terms. And
the possibility of doing this (though the employment of such arbi-
trary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers who
understood not only Arithmetic but Algebra,) is a proof of the
strictly scientific character of the system. But many professed
logical writers, not attending to the circumstances which have been
just mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various branches
of knowledge; disquisitions which must evidently be as boundless as
human knowledge itself, since there is no subject on which Reason-
ing is not employed, and to which, consequently, Logic may not
be applied. The error lies in regarding every thing as the proper
province of Logic to which it is applicable}^
Many, however, who do not fall altogether into that error, yet
censure any logical treatise which, like the present, professes to be
wholly conversant about Language; and speak of the science as
treating, properly, of the comparison of '* abstract Ideas,'' of which,
Language, they say, merely supplies the names. It may be
Bufiicient at present to reply, that, supposing there really exist in
the mind — or in some minds — certain " abstract ideas," by means
of which a train of reasoning may be carried on independently of
Common-terms [or Signs of any kind,] — for this is the real point
at issue — and that a system of. Logic may be devised, having
reference to such reasoning, — supposing this, — still, as I profess
not to know any thing of these *' abstract ideas," or of any " Uni-
versals" except Signs, or to be conscious of any such reasoning-
process, I at least must confine myself to the attempt to teach the
only Logic I do pretend to understand. Many, again, who speak
slightingly of Logic altogether, on the ground of its being *' con-
versant only about words,'' entertain fundamentally the same views
as the above; that is, they take for granted that Reasoning may be
carried on altogether independently of Language; which they regard
(as was above remarked) merely as a means of communicating it to
others. And a Science or Art which they suppose to be confined to
this office, they accordingly rank very low.
Such a view I believe to be very prevalent. The majority of
men would probably say, if asked, that the use of Language is
peculiar to Man ; and that its office is to express to one another
our thoughts and feelings. But neither of these is strictly true.
W A similar error is complained of by we find specimens in the arguments of
Aristotle, as having taken place with several ot the interlocutors in Cic, de
respect to Rhetoric; of which, indeed, Oratore.
1 6.] INTRODUCTION. 13
Brutes do possess in some degree the power of being taught to
understand what is said to them, and some of them even to utter
sounds expressive of what is passing within them. But they all
seem to be incapable of another, very important use of language,
which does characterize Man; viz. the employment of " Common-
terms" ('* general-terms") formed by Abstraction, as instruments
of thought; by which alone a train of Beasoning may be carried on.
And accordingly, a Deaf-mute^ before he has been taught a
Language, — either the Finger-language, or Reading, — cannot carry
on a train of Reasoning, any more than a Brute. He differs indeed
from a Brute in possessing the mental capability of employing
Language; but he can no more make use of that capability till he
is in possession of some System of arbitrary general-signs, than a
person born blind from Cataract can make use of his capacity of
Seeing, till the Cataract is removed.
Hence, it will be found by any one who will question a Deaf-
mute who has been taught Language after having grown up, that
no such thing as a train of Reasoning had ever passed through his
mmd before he was taught.
If indeed we did reason by means of those ** abstract ideas*'
which some persons talk of, and if the Language we use served
merely to communicate with other men, then, a person woidd be
able to reason who had no knowledge of any arbitrary Signs. But
there are no grounds for believing that this is possible; nor con-
sequently, that ** abstract ideas" (in that sense of the word) have
any existence at all."
§ 6. From what has been said, it will be evident that there is
hardly any subject to which it is so difficult to introduce the student
in a clear and satisfactory manner, as the one we are now engaged
in. In any other branch of knowledge, the reader, if he have any
11 There have been some very interest- in the case of Laura Bridgeman) see the
ing accounts published, by travellers in operation : nor, in general, can it be
America, and by persons residing there, heard; though some few persons have a
of a girl named Laura Bridgeman, who habit of occasionally audibly talking to
lias been, from birth, not only Deaf-and- themselves; or as it is called, *' thinking
Dumb, but also Blind. She lias however aloud." But the Signs we commonly use
been taught the finger-language, and in silent reflection are merely mental cow-
even to read what is printed in raised ceptions, usually of uttered words : and
characters, and also to write. these, doubtless, are such as could be
The remarkable circumstance in refer- hardly at all understood by another, even
ence to the present subject, is, that when If uttered audibly. For we usually think
she is alone, her fingers are generally in a kind of short-hand, (if one may use
observed to be movi?ig, though the signs the expression,) like the notes one some-
are so slight and imperfect that others times takes down on paper to help the
cannot make out what she is thinking of. memory, which consist of a word or two.
But if they inquire of her, she will tell —or even a letter,— to suggest a whole
them. sentence; so that such notes would be
It seems that, having once learnt the unintelligible to any one else.
use of Signs, she finds the necessity of It has been observed also that this girl,
them as slu Instrument of thought, when when asleep, and doubtless dreaming, has
thinking of any thing beyond mere indi- her fingers frequently in motion: beiriif
vidual objects of sense. in fact talking in her sleep. See above*
And doubtless every one else does the { 4.
same ; though in our case, no one can (c&
,K
INTRODUCTION.
[8 0,
DifflcuUy
attending
abstract
pursuits.
previous acquaintance with tlie subject, will usually be so far the
better prepared for comprehending the exposition of the principles;
or if he be entirely a stranger to it, will at least come to the study
with a mind unbiassed, and free from prejudices and misconceptions:
whereas, in the present case, it cannot but happen, that many who
have given some attention to logical pursuits (or what are usually
considered as such) will have rather been bewildered by fundament-
ally erroneous views, than prepared, by the acquisition of just
principles, for ulterior progress; and that not a few who pretend
not to any acquaintance whatever with the science, will yet have
imbibed either such prejudices against it, or such false notions
respecting its nature, as cannot but prove obstacles in their study
of it.
There is, however, a difficulty which exists more or less in all
abstract pursuits; though it is perhaps more felt in this, and often
occasions it to be rejected by beginners as dry and tedious; viz. the
difficulty of perceiving to what ultimate end — to what practical or
interesting application — the abstract principles lead, which are first
laid before the student; so that he will often have to work his way
patiently through the most laborious part of the system, before he
can gain any clear idea of the drift and intention of it.
This complaint has often been made by chemical students; who
are wearied with descriptions of Oxygen, Hydrogen, and other
invisible Elements, before they have any knowledge respecting such
bodies as commonly present themselves to the senses. And accord-
ingly some teachers of chemistry obviate in a great degree this
Analytical objection, by adopting the analytical instead of the synthetical mode
synthetical ^^ proccdure, whcu they are first introducing the subject to begin-
' " ners; i.e. instead of synthetically enumerating the elementary
substances, — proceeding next to the simplest combinations of these,
— and concluding with those more complex substances which are of
the most common occurrence, they begin by analyzing these last,
and resolving them step by step into their simple elements; thus at
once presenting the subject in an interesting point of view, and
clearly setting forth the object of it. The synthetical fonn of
teaching is indeed sufficiently interesting to one who has made
considerable progress in any study; and being more concise, regular,
and systematic, is the form in which our knowledge naturally
arranges itself in the mind, and is retained by the memory; but
the analytical is the more interesting, easy, and natural kind of
introduction; as being the form in which the first invention or dis*
covery of any kind of system must originally have taken place.
It may be advisable, therefore, to begin by giving a slight sketch,
in this form, of the logical system, before we enter regularly upon
the details of it. The reader will thus be presented with a kind ot
imaginary history of the course of inquiry by which that system
may be conceived to have occurred to a philosophical mind.
procedure.
BOOK I.
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE SCIENCE.
In every instance in which we reason, in the strict sense of the
word, i.e, make use of arguments, (I mean real, i.e. valid arguments,)
whether for the sake of refuting an adversary, or of conveying
instruction, or of satisfying our own minds on any point, whatever
may be the subject we are engaged on, a certain process takes
place in the mind which is one and the same in all cases, provided
it be correctly conducted.
Of course it cannot be supposed that every one is even conscious
of this process in his own mind ; much less, is competent to explain
the principles on which it proceeds. This indeed is, and cannot
but be, the case with every other process respecting which any
system has been formed ; the practice not only may exist indepen-
dently of the theory, but must have preceded the theory. There
must have been Language before a system of Grammar could
be devised ; and musical compositions, previous to the Science of
Music. This, by the way, wiU serve to expose the futility of the
popular objection against Logic, that men may reason very well
who know nothing of it. The parallel instances adduced, show that
such an objection might be applied in many other cases, where its
absurdity would be obvious; and that there is no ground for deciding
thence, either that the system has no tendency to improve practice,
or that even if it had not, it might not still be a dignified and
interesting pursuit.
One of the chief impediments to the attainment of a just view of Reasoning
the nature and object of Logic, is the not fully understanding, or^fmulfrinall
not sufficiently keeping in mind, the sameness of the reasoning- subjects,
process in all cases. If, as the ordinary mode of speaking would
seem to indicate, Mathematical reasoning, and Theological, and
Metaphysical, and Political, <fcc., were essentially different from
each other, i.e. different hinds of reasoning, it would follow, that
supposing there could be at all any such science as we have
described Logic, there must be so many different species, or at
least different branches, of Logic. And such is perhaps the most
prevailing notion. Nor is this much to be wondered at : since it is
evident to all, that some men converse and write, in an argumenta-
16 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book I.
live way very justly on one subject, and very erroneously on
another; in which again others excel, who fail in the former. This
error may be at once illustrated and removed, by considering the
parallel instance of Arithmetic ; in which every one is aware that
the process of a calculation is not affected by the nature of the
objects, whose numbers are before us: but that {e.g.) the multipli-
cation of a number is the very same operation, whether it be a
number of men, of miles, or of pounds; though nevertheless persons
may perhaps be found who are accurate in the results of their calcu-
lations relative to natural philosophy, and incorrect in those of
political economy, from their different degrees of skill in the subjects
of these two sciences ; not surely because there are different arts
of Arithmetic applicable to each of these respectively.
Others again, who are aware that the simple systenl of Logic
may be applied to all subjects whatever, are yet disposed to view it
as a peculiar method of reasoning, and not, as it is, a method of
unfolding and analyzing our reasoning: whence many have been
led {e.g. the author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric) to talk of com-
paring Syllogistic-reasoning with Moral-reasoning; taking it for
granted that it is possible to reason correctly without reasoning
logically; which is, in fact, as great a blunder as if any one were
to mistake grammar for a peculiar language, and to suppose it
possible to speak correctly without speaking grammatically. They
have in short considered Logic as an art of reasoning; whereas (so
far as it is an art) it is the art of reasoning; the logician's object
being, not to lay down principles by which one may reason, but, by
which all must reason, even though they are not distinctly aware of
them: — to lay down rules, not which may be followed with advantage,
but which cannot possibly be departed from in sound reasoning.
These misapprehensions and objections being such as lie on the
very threshold of the subject, it would have been hardly possible,
without noticing them, to convey any just notion of the nature and
design of the logical system.
§2.
Origin of Supposing it then to have been perceived that the operation of
^**^^'' Reasoning is in all cases the same, the analysis of that operation
could not fail to strike the mind as an interesting matter of inquiry.
And moreover, since (apparent) arguments which are unsound and
inconclusive, are so often employed, either from error or design;
and since even those who are not misled by these fallacies, are so
often at a loss to detect and expose them in a manner satisfactory
to others, or even to themselves ; it could not but appear desirable
to lay down some general rules of reasoning apphcable to all cases ;
by which a person might be enabled the more readily and clearly
to state the grounds of his own conviction, or of his objection to the
arguments of an opponent ; instead of arguing at random, without
{ 2.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 17
any fixed and acknowleged principles to guide his procedure. Such
rules would he analogous to those of Arithmetic, which ohviate the
tediousness and uncertainty of calculations in the head ; wherein,
after much labour, different persons might arrive at difi"erent results,
without any of them being able distinctly to point out the error of
the rest. A system of such rules, it is obvious, must, instead of
deserving to be called the ** art of wrangling," be more justly
characterised as the ** art of cutting short wrangling," by bringing
the parties to issue at once, if not to agreement, and thus saving a
waste of ingenuity.
In pursuing the supposed investigation, it will be found that Analysis of
every Conclusion is deduced, in reality, from two other propositions;**^^"'""*
(thence called Premises;) for though one of these may be, and
commonly is, suppressed, it must nevertheless be understood as
admitted; as may easily be made evident by supposing the denial
of the suppressed premiss; which will at once invalidate the argu-
ment; e.g. if any one, from perceiving that "the world exhibits
marks of design," infers that "it must have had an intelligent
author," though he may not be aware in his own mind of the
existence of any other premiss, he will readily understand, if it be
denied that " whatever exhibits marks of design must have had an
intelligent author," that the affirmative of that proposition is
necessary to the validity of the argument.^ Or again, if any one on
meeting with " an animal which has horns on the head" infers that
*' it is a ruminant," he will easily perceive that this would be no
argument to any one who should not be aware of the general fact
that " all horned animals ruminate."
An argument thus stated regularly and at full length is called a Syllogltm.
Syllogism ; which therefore is evidently not a peculiar kind of
argument, but only a peculiar form of expression, in which every
argument may be stated.^
When one of the premises is suppressed, (which for brevity's
sake it usually is,) the argument is called an Enth ymeme., And ^^
1 Some choose to call this proposition deed it be a writer in the Edinburgh
not apremisshutmerely a,condition. This Review, (in 1839,) who in deprecating
however is, substantially, (as has been and deriding all attempts to adduce evi-
formerly remarked) just what Logicians dences of the truth of Christianity, as
mean. Whoever has any good ground useless, and even dangerous, for the mass
for believing his inference to be a just of mankind, (a discovery, by the way,
one, must believe this condition to exist. which its first promulgators were not
2 Some writers, and Locke among enlightened enough to make) gives as a
others, who profess to despise what they reason, that " the Gospel has been the
call " syllogistic reasoning," distinctly stay of countless millions who never
admit — as Locke does,e..igr. in ch. xvii. that framed a syllogism." And very probable
*'aW right reasoning may be reduced to it is, that Nicodemus for instance, and
the form of Syllogism:" (which is admit- those who deputed him, when he said
ting the utmost that I conceive any Lo- " we know that thou art a teacher sent
gicianmaintains)only, there are, he says, from God; for no man can do these
other and better " ways of reasoning':" miracles that thou doest except God be
that is, as he proceeds to explain, people with him," though he spoke grammati-
do not always, or usually, eccpress their cally and reasoned conclusively, may
reasoning in ». syllogistic form; as if any have never heard of syllogisms, or eTen
one had ever doubted ^/joi/ Except in- of nouns and verbs.
18
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
[Book I.
/
KMscn.
Proof and
cause
^
it may be worth while to remark, that when the argument i3
in this state, the objections of an opponent are (or rather appear to
be) of two kinds ; viz. either objections to the assertion itself, or
objections to its force as an argument. E.G. In one of the above
instances, an atheist may be conceived either denying^ that the
world does exhibit marks of design, or denying* that it follows from
thence that it had an intelligent author. Now it is important to
keep in mind that the only difference in the two cases is, that in
the one, the expressed premiss is denied, in the other the suppressed;
for the force as an argument of either premiss depends on the other
premiss: if both be admitted, the conclusion legitimately connected
with them cannot be denied.
It is evidently immaterial to the argument whether the Conclusion
be placed first or last; but it may be proper to remark, that a
Premiss placed after its Conclusion is called the Reason^ of it, and
is introduced by one of those conjunctions which are called causal;
viz. *' since," "because," <fcc. which may indeed be employed to
designate a Premiss, whether it came first or last. The illative
conjunctions, "therefore," &c. designate the Conclusion.
It is a circumstance which often occasions error and perplexity,
that both these classes of conjunctions have also another significa-
tion, being employed to denote, respectively. Cause and Effect, as
well as Premiss and Conclusion: e.g. If I say, " this ground is rich,
because the trees on it are flourishing," or " the trees are flourish-
ing, and therefore the soil must be rich,' I employ these conjunctions
to denote the connexion of Premiss and Conclusion; for it is plain
that the luxuriance of the trees is not the cause of the soil's fertility,
but only the cause of my knowing it. If again I say, " the trees
flourish, because the ground is rich," or " the ground is rich, and
tlierefore the trees flourish," I am using the very same conjunctions
to denote the connexion of cause and effect; for in this case, the
luxuriance of the trees, being evident to the eye, would hardly need
to be proved^ but might need to be accounted for.
There are, however, many cases in which the Cause is employed
to prove the existence of its Efl"ect ; especially in arguments relat-
ing to future events; as e.g. when from favourable weather any one
argues that the crops are likely to be abundant;* the cause and the
reason, in that case, coincide. And this contributes to their being
fio often confounded together in other cases.
§3.
In an argument, such as the examples above given, it is, as has
"been said, impossible for any one, who admits both Premises, to
avoid admitting the conclusion.
3 As the ancient atheists did.
* As the modem atheists do.
^ The Major-premiss is often called the Principle: and the word Jieason is
Mi
confined to the Mmor
« See Appendix, No. I. art. Reason
See also Rhetoric, Part I. ch. 2, § ii.
i i] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 19
A man may perhaps deny, or doubt, and require proof, that all
animals that are horned do ruminate. Nay, it is conceivable that
he may even not clearly understand what " ruminanf means; but
still it will be not the less clear to him, that, supposing these
Premises granted, the Conclusion must be admitted.
And even if you suppose a case where one or both of the Premises
shall be manifestly false and absurd, this will not alter the conclu"
siveness of the Reasoning; though the conclusion 'tself may perhaps
be absurd also. For instance, '* All the Ape-tribe are originally
descended from Reptiles or Insects: Mankind are of the Ape-tribe;
therefore Mankind are originally descended from Reptiles or Insects:'*
here, every one ^ would perceive the falsity of all three of these
propositions. But it is not the less true that the conclusion follows
from those premises, and that if they were true, it would be true
also.
But there will be frequently an apparent connexion of Premises Apparent
with a Conclusion which does not in reahty follow from them, "'^"'"*^"***
though to the inattentive or unskilful, the argument may appear
to be valid. And there are many other cases in which a doubt may
exist whether the argument be vahd or not: i.e. whether it be
possible or not to admit the Premises, and yet deny the Conclu-
sion. It is of the highest importance, therefore, to lay down some
regular form to which every valid argument may be reduced, and
to devise a rule which shall show the validity of every argument in
that form, and consequently the unsoundness of any apparent
argument which cannot be reduced to it. E. G. If such an argument
as this be proposed, " every rational agent is accountable; brutes
are not rational agents; therefore they are not accountable:" or
again, '* all wise legislators suit their laws to the genius of their
nation; Solon did this; therefore he was a wise legislator:" there
are some, perhaps, who would not perceive any fallacy in such
arguments, especially if enveloped in a cloud of words; and still
more, when the conclusion is true, or (which comes to the same
point) if they are disposed to believe it: and others might perceive
indeed, but might be at a loss to explain, the fallacy. Now these
(apparent) arguments exactly correspond, respectively, with the
following, the absurdity of the conclusions from which is manifest:
"every horse is an animal; sheep are not horses; therefore they
are not animals;" and, *' all vegetables grow; an animal grows;
therefore it is a vegetable." These last examples, I have said,
correspond exactly (considered as arguments) with the former; the
question respecting the validity of an Argument, being, not whether
the conclusion be true, but whether it follows from the premises
adduced.
This mode of exposing a fallacy, by bringing forward a similar
' Except certain French Naturalists.
20
ANALYTICAL OUTLINE.
[Book I.
Analysis
of an
albumen t
An
Argument
may be
understood
though its
Terms are
not.
one whose conclusion is obviously absurd, is often, and very advan-
tageously resorted to in addressing those who are ignorant of
Logical rules; ^ but to lay down such rules, and employ them as a
test, is evidently a safer and more compendious, as well as a more
philosophical mode of proceeding. To attain these, it would plainly
be necessary to analyze some clear and valid arguments, and to
observe in what their conclusiveness consists.
Let us then examine and analyze such an example as one of those
first given: for instance, ** Ev-ery animal that has horns on the
head is ruminant; the Elk has horns on the head; therefore the
Elk is ruminant." It will easily be seen that the Vcilidity [or
** conclusiveness," or " soundness"] of the Argument does not at
all depend on our conviction of the truth of either of the Premises;
or even on our understanding the meaning of them. For if we
substitute for one of the things we are speaking about, some
unmeaning Symbol, (such as a letter of the alphabet,) which may
stand for any thing that may be agreed on, the Reasoning remains
the same.
For instance, suppose we say, (instead of ** animal that has
horns on the head,") '* Every X is ruminant; the Elk is X; there-
fore the Elk is ruminant;" the Argument is equally valid.
And again, instead of the word "ruminant," let us put the
letter **Y:" then the argument " Every X is Y; the Elk is X;
therefore the Elk is Y;" would be a valid argument as before.
And the same would be the case if you were to put '* Z" for
"the Elk:" for the syllogism ''Every X is Y; Z is X; therefore
Z is Y," is completely valid, whatever you suppose the Symbols X,
Y, and Z to stand for.
Any one may try the experiment by substituting for X, Y, and
Z, respectively, any words he pleases; and he will find that, if he
does but preserve the same form of expression, it will be impossible
to admit the truth of the Premises, without admitting also the
truth of the Conclusion.
And it is worth observing here, that nothing is so likely to lead
to that — very common, though seemingly strange — error, of sup-
posing ourselves to understand distinctly what in reality we under-
stand but very imperfectly, or not at all, as the want of attention
to what has been just explained.
A man reads — or even writes — many pages perhaps, of an
argumentative work, in which one or more of the terms employed
8 An exposure of some of Hume's falla-
cies in hi3 " Essay on Miracles" and
elsewhere, was attempted, on this plan,
a few years ago, in a pamphlet (published
anonymously, as the nature of the argu-
ment required, but which I see no reason
against acknowledging) entitled " His-
toric Doubts relative to Napoleon Buon-
aparte;" in which it was shown that the
existence of that extraordinary person
could not, on Hume's principles, be re-
ceived as a well authenticated fact; since
it rests on evidence less strong than that
■which supports the Scripture-histories.
For a clear development of the mode
in which this last evidence operates on
most minds, see " Hinds on Inspiration,"
pp. 30-46.
1 3.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 21
convey notliing distinct to his mind: and yet lie is liable to overlook
this circumstance, from finding that he clearly understands the
Arguments. He may be said, in one sense, to understand what he
is reading; because he can perfectly follow the train of Reasoning,
itself. But this, perhaps, he might equally well do, if he were to
substitute for one of the words employed, X, or Z, or any other
such unknown Symbol; as in the examples above. But a man will
often confound together, the understanding of the Arguments, in
themselves, and the understanding of the words employed, and of
the nature of the things those words denote.
It appears then, that valid Reasoning, when regularly expressed,
has its validity [or conclusiveness] made evident from the mere
form of the expression itself, independently of any regard to the
sense of the words.
In examining this form, in such an example as that just given,
you will observe that in the first Premise (" X is Y,") it is assumed
universally of the Class of things (whatever it may be) which " X'*
denotes, that ** Y" may be affirmed of them: and in the other
Premise, (" Z is X,") that '* Z" (whatever it may stand for) ia
referred to that Class, as comprehended in it. Now it is evident
that whatever is said of the whole of a Class, may be said of any
thing that is comprehended [or "included," or "contained,"] in
that Class: so that we are thus authorized to say (in the conclusion)
that "Z"is"Y."
Thus also, in the example first given, having assumed universally,
of the Class of ** Things which exhibit marks of design," that they
"had an intelligent maker," and then, in the other Premise,
having referred "The world" to that Class, we conclude that it
may be asserted of "The world" that "it had an intelligent
maker."
And the process is the same when any thing is denied of a whole
Class. We are equally authorized to deny the same, of whatever
is comprehended under that Class. For instance, if I say, " No
liar is deserving of trust; this man is a liar; therefore he is not
deserving of trust;" I here deny " deserving of trust," of the whole
Class denoted by the word " liar;" and then I refer " this man" to
that Class; whence it follows that "deserving of trust" may be
denied of him.
This argument also wiU be as manifestly valid, if (as in the for-
mer case) you substitute for the words which have a known meaning,
any undetermined Symbols, such as letters of the alphabet. " No
X is Y; Z is X; therefore Z is not Y," is as perfect a syllogism as
the other with the affirmative conclusion.
And here it is to be observed, that by " Class'* is meant through- Meaning of
out this treatise, not merely a " Head" or "general description" cias*.
to which several things are actually referred, but one to which an
indefinite number of things might conceivably be referred; viz. as
4f|^Ji|||J|!ll^
22 ANAT.YTICAL OUTLINE. [Book 1.
many as (in the colloquial phrase) may " answer to the description.''*
E. G. One may conceive that when the first-created man existed
alone, some superhuman Beings may have contemplated him not
merely as an individual bearing the proper-name of Adam, but also,
by Abstraction, simply, as possessing those attributes which wo
call collectively ** humanity" ["human-nature;"] and may have
applied to him a name, — such as *' Man" — implying those attributes,
[that description] and which would consequently suit equally well
any of his descendants.
When then any thing is said to be ** referred to such and such
a Class'* this is to be understood either of an actual, or what may
be called a potential Class: i.e. the word Class is used whether there
actually exist, or not, several things to which the description will
apply. For it is evident, that, in any case, we refer something to
a certain Class in consequence of that thing's possessing certain
attributes, and not, vice versa. And this being kept in mind, there
is a convenience in employing the word " Class" instead of intro-
ducing circumlocution by always speaking of " description."
It will be found, then, on examination, that all valid arguments
whatever may be easily reduced to such a form as that of the
foregoing syllogisms; and that consequently the principle on which
they are constructed is the UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLE of
Reasoning. So elliptical, indeed, is the ordinary mode of expression,
even of those who are considered as prolix writers, — i.e. so much
is implied and left to be understood in the course of argument, in
comparison of what is actually stated, (most men being impatient,
even to excess, of any appearance of unnecessary and tedious
formality of statement,) that a single sentence will often be found,
though perhaps considered as a single argument, to contain, com-
pressed into a short compass, a chain of several distinct arguments.
But if each of these be fully developed, and the whole of what
the author intended to imply be stated expressly, it will be found
that all the steps even of the longest and most complex train of
reasoning may be reduced into the above form.^
Meanfng of It is a mistake (which might appear scarcely worthy of notice,
re^nfng. had not so many, even esteemed writers, fallen into it) to imagine
that Aristotle and other logicians meant to propose that this prohx
form of unfolding arguments should universally supersede, in
argumentative discourses, the common forms of expression; and
that, ** to reason logically," means, to state all arguments at full
length in the syllogistic form; and Aristotle has even been charged
with inconsistency for not doing so. It has been said that '* in his
Treatises of Ethics, Politics., &c. he argues like a rational creature,
and never attempts to bring his own system into practice. "^*^ As
• One of the ancients is reported^ to it appears that the reverse of this com«
have compared Logic to the closed fist, parison would be more correct.
Mtd Rhetoric to the open haud. To me ^^ Lord Kaiues.
1 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 23
well might a chemist be charged with inconsistency for making use of
any of the compound substances that are commonly employed, without
previously analyzing and resolving them into their simple elements;
as well might it be imagined that, ** to speak grammatically,'*
means, to parse %\qyj sentence we utter. The chemist (to pursue
the illustration) keeps by him his tests and his method of analysis,
to be employed when any substance is offered to his notice, the
composition of which has not been ascertained, or in which adultera-
tion is suspected. Novr' a fallacy may aptly be compared to some
adulterated compound; " it consists of an ingenious mixture of truth
*' and falsehood, so entangled, — so intimately blended, — that the
** falsehood is (in the chemical phrase) held in solution: one drop of
" sound logic is that test which immediately disunites them, makes
*' the Foreign substance visible, and precipitates it to the bottom. "^^
But to resume the investigation of the principles of Reasoning: Aristotle's
the Maxim resulting from the examination of a syllogism in the ''^'""^
foregoing form, and of the application of which, every valid argu-
ment is in reahty an instance, is, " that whatever is predicated
[i.e. affirmed or denied) universally, of any Class of things, may be
predicated, in like manner, [viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing
comprehended in that Class." This is the principle, commonly
called the dictum de omni et nullo, for the indication of which we
are indebted to Aristotle, and which is the keystone of his whole
logical system.
It is remarkable that some, otherwise judicious writers, should
have been so carried away by their zeal against that philosopher, as
to speak with scorn and ridicule of this principle, on account of its
obviousness and simplicity; though they would probably perceive at
once, in any other case, that it is the greatest triumph of philosophy
to refer many, and seemingly very various, phenomena to one, or a
very few simple principles; and that the more simple and evident
such a principle is, provided it be truly applicable to all the cases
in question, the greater is its value and scientific beauty. If, indeed,
any principle be regarded as not thus applicable, that is an objection
to it of a difi'erent kind. Such an objection against Aristotle's
Dictum, no one has ever attempted to establish by any kind of proof;
but it has often been taken for granted; it being (as has been stated)
very commonly supposed, without examination, that the syllogism is
a distinct kind of argument, and that the rules of it accordingly do
not apply, nor were intended to apply to all reasoning whatever.
Dr. Campbell ^^ endeavours, under this misapprehension, with some
11 This excellent illustration is cited production, great reach of thought, as
from a passage in an anonymous pamphlet, well as knowledge of his subject.
*' An Examination of Kett's Logic."
The author displays, though in a hasty 12 " Philosophy of Rhetoric.'*
24: ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book I.
ingenuity, and not without an air of plausibility, to show that every
syllogism must be futile and worthless, because the Premises vir-
tually assert the Conclusion: little dreaming, of course, that his
objections, however specious, lie against the process of reasoning
itself, universally; and will, therefore, of course, apply to those very
arguments which he is himself adducing. He should have been
reminded of the story of the woodman, who had mounted a tree,
and was so earnestly employed in lopping the boughs, that he
imconsclously cut off the bough on which he was standing.
It is still more extraordinary to find other eminent authors ■''
adopting, expressly, the very same objections, and yet distinctly
admitting the possibility of reducing every course of argument to
a series of syllogisms.
Mistake One of these writers brings an objection against the Dictum of
thl^meinfng Arlstotle, whlch It may be worth while to notice briefly, for the
of the ° sake of setting in a clearer light the real character and object of
that Principle. Its apphcation being, as has been seen, to a
regular and conclusive Syllogism, he supposes it Intended to prove
and make evident the conclusiveness of such a syllogism; and
remarks how unphilosophical it is to attempt giving a demonstration
of a demonstration. And certainly the charge would be just, if we
could imagine the logician's object to be, to increase the certainty
of a conclusion which we are supposed to have already arrived at
by the clearest possible mode of proof. But it is very strange that
such an idea should ever have occurred to one who had even the
slightest tincture of Natural philosophy: for it might as well be
imagined that a natural philosopher's or a chemist's design is to
strengthen the testimony of our senses by a, priori reasoning, and
to convince us that a stone when thrown will fall to the ground, and
that gunpowder will explode when fired ; because they show that
according to their principles those phenomena must take place as
they do. But it would be reckoned a mark of the grossest ignorance
and stupidity not to be aware that their object is not to prove the
existence of an individual phenomenon, which our eyes have
witnessed, but (as the phrase is) to account for it: i.e. to show
according to what principle it takes place; — to refer, in short, the
individual case to a general law of nature. The object of Aristotle's
Dictum is precisely analogous; he had, doubtless, no thought of
adding to the force of any individual syllogism; his design was to
point out the general principle on which that process is conducted
which takes place in each syllogism. And as the Laws^* of nature
(as they are called) are in reality merely genera' ized facts, of which
all the phenomena coming under them are particular instances; so,
the proof drawn from Aristotle's Dictum is not a distinct demon-
stration brought to confirm another demonstration, but is merely a
^ AsDugald Stewart: Philosophy, vol. ii.: and Locke, vol. ii. ch. 17, f 4,
1* Appendix, No. 1, art. Law.
? 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 25
generalized and abstract statement of all demonstration whatever;
and is, therefore, in fact, the very demonstration which {mutatis
mutandis) accommodated to the various subject-matters, is actually
employed in each particular case.
In order to trace more distinctly the different steps of the Jst\?emeilt'
abstracting process, by which any particular argument may be of argument
brought into the most general form, we may first take a syllogism abstract.
[i.e. an argument stated accurately and at full length), such as the
example formerly given, " whatever exhibits marks of design, &c.,"
and then somewhat generalize the expression, by substituting (as in
algebra) arbitrary unmeaning symbols for the significant terms that
were originally used; the syllogism will then stand thus; ** every
B is A; C is B; therefore C is A." The reasoning, when thus
stated, is no less evidently valid, whatever terms. A, B, and C,
respectively, may be supposed to stand for. Such terms may
indeed be inserted as to make all or some of the assertions /aZse;
but it will still be no less impossible for any one who admits the
truth of the premises, in an argument thus constructed, to deny
the conclusion; and this it is that constitutes the conclusiveness of
an argument.
Viewing then the syllogism thus expressed, it appears clearly,
that " A stands for any thing whatever that is afiirmed of a certain
entire Class," {viz. of every B,) "which class comprehends or
contains in it something else,'' viz. C, (of which B is, in the second
premiss, affirmed) ; and that, consequently, the first term (A) is, in
the conclusion, predicated of the third C.
Now to assert the validity of this process, now before us, is to
state the very Dictum we are treating of, with hardly even a verbal
alteration: viz.:
1. Any thing whatever, predicated of a whole class,
2. Under which class something else is contained,
3. May be predicated of that which is so contained.
The three members into which the Maxim is here distributed,
correspond to the three propositions of the Syllogism to which they
are intended respectively to apply. ^^
The advantage of substituting for the terms in a regular syllogism, Utility of
arbitrary unmeaning symbols, such as letters of the alphabet, is crnt*'*^"* *
much the same as in Geometry: the Reasoning itself is then con- ^y^^^o^*
sidered, by itself, clearly, and without any risk of our being misled
by the truth or falsity of the conclusion; which is, in fact, accidental
and variable; the essential point being, as far as tbe argument is con-
cerned, the connection between the premises and the conclusion. We
are thus enabled to embrace the general principle of all reasoning,
and to perceive its applicabihty to an indefinite number of individual
cases. That Aristotle, therefore, should have been accused of
w See Book IV. Ch. m. § 1.
26 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book I.
making use of these symbols for the purpose of darJcening his
demonstrations, and that too by persons not unacquainted with
Geometry and Algebra, is truly astonishing. If a geometer, instead
of designating the four angles of a square by four letters, were to
call them north, south, east, and west, he would not render the
demonstration of a theorem the easier; and the learner would be
much more likely to be perplexed in the application of it.
It belongs then exclusively to a Syllogism, properly so called
{i.e. a valid argument, so stated that its conclusiveness is evident
from the mere form of the expression), that if letters, or any other
unmeaning symbols, be substituted for the several terms, the
validity of the argument shall still be evident. Whenever this is
not the case, the supposed argument is either unsound and sophis-
tical, or else may be reduced (without any alteration of its meaning)
into the syllogistic form; in which form, the test just mentioned
may be applied to it.
chTr^acter Some persons have remarked of the ** Dictum" (meaning it as a
of the disparagement) that it is merely a somewhat circuitous explanation
ic um. ^y ^ji^f jg meant by a Class. It is, in truth, just such an explana-
tion of this as is needful to the student, and which must be kept
before his mind in reasoning. For we should recollect that
not only every Class [the Sign of which is a *' Common-term"]
comprehends under it an indefinite number of individuals, — and
often of other Classes, — differing in many respects from each other,
but also most of those individuals and classes may be referred,
each, to an indefinite number of classes according as we choose to
abstract this point or that, from each.
Now to remind one on each occasion, that so and so is referable
to such and such a Class, and that the class which happens to be
before us comprehends such and such things, — this is precisely all
that is ever accomplished by Reasoning.
For one may plainly perceive, on looking at any of the examples
above, that when we assert both the Premises taken in conjunction,
we have, virtually, implied the Conclusion. Else, indeed, it would
not be impossible (as it is) for any one to deny the Conclusion, wha
admits both Premises.^^
unsound" '^^ What is called an unsound or fallacious argument {i.e. an apparent
arguments, argument, which is, in reality, none) cannot, of course, be reduced
into this form; bst when stated in the form most nearly approaching
to this that is possible, its fallaciousness becomes more evident,
from its nonconformity to the foregoing rule: e.g. ** whoever is
capable of deliberate crime is responsible; an infant is not capable
18 Hence, some have considered it as a Since, however, a Syllogism is not a
disparagementtoa Syllogism (which they certain distinct kind of argument, but
imagine to be one kind of Argument) that any argument whatever, stated in a regur
you can gain no new truth from it; the lar form, tlie complaint, such as it is, Tiea
Conclusions it establishes being in fact against Reasoning altogether. In B. iv.
known already, by every one who bos cu. 2, this point is more fully explained,
admitted the Premises.
1 4.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 27
of deliberate crime; tlierefore, an infant is not responsible," (see
§ 3): here the term " responsible" is affirmed universallj of " those
capable of deliberate crime;" it might, therefore, according to
Aristotle's Dictum, have been affirmed of any thing contained mider
that class; but, in the instance before us, nothing is mentioned as
contained under that class; only, the term " infant" is excluded
from that class; and though what is affirmed of a whole class may
be affirmed of any thing that is contained under it, there is no
ground for supposing that it may be denied of whatever is not so
contained; for it is evidently possible that it may be applicable to a
whole class and to something else besides. To say, e.g. that all
trees are vegetables, does not imply that nothing else is a vegetable;
nor, when it is said, that '* all who are capable of deliberate crime
are responsible," does this imply, that *' no others are responsible;"
for though this may be very true, it has not been asserted in the
premiss before us; and in the analysis of an argument, we are to
discard all consideration of what might be asserted; contemplating
only what actually is laid down in the premises. It is evident,
therefore, that such an apparent argument as the above does not
comply with the rule laid down, nor can be so stated as to comply
with it; and is consequently invalid.
Again, in this instance, "food is necessary to life; com is food;
therefore, corn is necessary to life:" the term "necessary to life"
is affirmed of food, but not universally; for it is not said of every
hind of food: the meaning of the assertion being manifestly that
*' some food is necessary to life;" so that, expressed in symbols, the
apparent argument might stand thus; " Some X is Y; Z is X;
therefore Z is Y." Here again, therefore, the rule has not been
complied with, since that which has been predicated, [affiraied or
denied] not of the whole, but of a part only of a certain class,
cannot be, on that ground, predicated of whatever is contained
under that class.
There is an argument against miracles by the well-known Mr.
Hume, which has perplexed many persons, and which exactly corres-
ponds to the above. It may be stated thus : " Testimony is a kind
of evidence more likely to be false, than a miracle to be true;"
(or, as it may be expressed in other words, we have more reason
to expect that a witness should lie, than that a miracle should
occur) '* the evidence on which the Christian miracles are believed,
is testimony; therefore the evidence on which the Christian miracles
are believed is more likely to be false than a miracle to be true."
Here it is evident that what is spoken of in the first of these
Premises, is, "some testimony;" not "all testimony," [or any
whatever,'] and by " a witness" we understand " some witness, " not,
*' every witness:" so that this apparent argument has exactly the
B^me fault as the one above. ^^
15' See Appendix II. Example No. 26.
28 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book I.
§5.
The fallacy in these last cases is, what is usually described in
logical language as consisting in the *' non-distribution of the
middle term:" i.e. its not being employed to denote all the objects
to which it is applicable. In order to understand this phrase, it is
necessary to observe that a Proposition being an expression in
which one thing is said, i.e. affirmed or denied of another, [e.g.
*' A is B,") both that of which something is said, and that which is
said of it {i.e. both A and B), are called '* terms;" from their being
(in their nature) the extremes or boundaries of the Proposition: and
there are, of course, two, and but two, terms in a proposition (though
it may so happen that either of them may consist either of one
Distribution word, or of Several); and a term is said to be " distributed," when
erms. -^ j^ taken universally, so as to stand for every thing it is capable
of being applied to; and consequently "undistributed," when it
stands for a portion only of the things signified by it: thus, " all
food," or every kind of food, are expressions which imply the
distribution of the term "food;" "some food" would imply its
non-distribution. And it is also to be observed that the term of
which, in one premiss, something is affirmed or denied, and to
which, in the other premiss, something else is referred as contained
in it, is called the " middle" term in the syllogism, as standing
between the other two {viz. the two terms of the conclusion), and
being the medium of proof. Now it is plain, that if in each premiss
a part only of this middle-term is employed, i.e. if it be not at all
distributed, no conclusion can be drawn. Hence, if, in the example
formerly adduced, it had been merely stated that " something" (not
" whatever/' or " everything'') " which exhibits marks of design is
the work of an intelligent author," it would not have followed, from
the world's exhibiting marks of design, that that is the work of
an intelligent author.
It is to be observed, also, that the words "all" and "every,"
which mark the distribution of a term, and " some," which marks
its non-distribution, are not always expressed: they are frequently
understood, and left to be supplied by the context; e.g. "food is
necessary;" viz. "some food;" "man is mortal;" w^. "every man.' ^
Propositfons Propositions thus expressed are called by logicians "indefinite,'^
because it is left undetermined by the form of the expression whether
the " subject " (the term of which something is affirmed or denied
being called the " subject " of the proposition, and that which is
said of it, the " predicate ") be distributed or not. Nevertheless it
is plain that in every proposition the Subject either is, or is not,
meant to be distributed; though it be not declared whether it is or
not. Consequently, every proposition, whether expressed indefinitely
or not, must be understood as either " universal " or "particular;'*
those being called Universal in which the predicate is said of the
and quality
of
propositions
^6.1 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 29
whole of the subject (or, in other words, where the subject is distri-
buted); and those, Particular, in which it is said only of a part of
the subject: e.g. **A11 men are sinful," is universal; "some men
are sinful," particular. And this division of propositions is, in
logical language, said to be according to their ** quantity. ^^
But the distribution or non-distribution of the predicate is entirely Quantity
independent of the quantity of the proposition; nor are the signs
*'all" and "some" ever affixed to the predicate; because its
distribution depends upon, and is indicated by, the ''quality'' of the
proposition; i.e. its being affirmative or negative; it being a uni-
versal rule, that the predicate of a negative proposition is distribu-
ted, and of an affirmative, undistributed. The reason of this may
easily be understood, by considering that a term which stands for a
whole Class may be applied to {i.e. affirmed of) any thing that is
comprehended under that class, though the term of which it is thus
affirmed may be of much narrower extent than that other, and may,
therefore, be far from coinciding with the whole of it. Thus it may
be said with truth, that *' the Negroes are uncivilized," though the
term uncivilized be of much wider extent than " Negroes," compre-
hending, besides them, Hottentots, &c.; so that it would not be
allowable to assert, that '' all who are uncivilized are Negroes;"
it is evident, therefore, that it is a part only of the term "uncivi-
lized " that has been affirmed of " Negroes;" and the same reason-
ing applies to every affirmative proposition; for though it may so
happen that the subject and predicate coincide; i.e. are of equal
extent, as, e.g. "all men are rational animals;" "all equilateral
triangles are equiangular;" (it being equally true, that "all rational
animals are men," and that "all equiangular triangles are equi-
lateral;) yet this is not implied by the form of the expression; since
it would be no less true, that " all men are rational animals, " even
if there were other rational animals besides Man.
It is plain, therefore, that if any part of the predicate is appli-
cable to the subject, it may be affirmed, and, of course, cannot be
denied, of that subject; and consequently, when the predicate is
denied of the subject, this implies that no part of that predicate is
applicable to that subject; i.e. that the whole of the predicate is
denied of the subject; for to say, e.g. that "no beasts of prey
ruminate," implies that beasts of prey are excluded from the whole
class of ruminant animals, and consequently that "no ruminant
animals are beasts of prey." And hence esults the above-mentioned
rule, that the distribution of the predicate is implied in negative
propositions, and its non-distribution, in affirmatives.
The learner may perhaps be startled at being told that the Non-
predicate of an affirmative is never distributed; especially as Aldrich qJ-^*^?"*'*^
has admitted that accidentally this mm/ take place: as in such a Predicate in
proposition as "all equilateral triangles are equiangular; but this
is not accurate; he might have said that in such a proposition as
30 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book I.
tlie above tlie predicate is distributable, but not that it is actually
distributed: i.e. it so happens that "all equiangular triangles oro
equilateral;" but this is not implied in the previous assertion; and
the point to be considered is, not what might be said with truth, but
what actually has been said. And accordingly mathematicians give
distinct demonstrations of the above two propositions.
If it happen to be my object to assert that the Predicate as well
as the Subject of a certain affirmative proposition is to be understood
as distributed — and if I say, for instance, " all equilateral triangles,
and no others, are equiangular," — I am asserting, in reality, not
one proposition, merely, but two. And this is the case whenever
the proposition I state is understood (whether from the meaning of the
words employed, or from the general drift of the discourse) to imply
that the whole of the Predicate is meant to be affirmed of the
Subject.
Thus, if I say of one number — suppose 100 — that it is the Square
of another, as 10, then, this is understood by every one, from his
knowledge of the nature of numbers, to imply, what are, in reality,
the two propositions, that 100 is "the Square of 10," and also that
*' the Square of 10 is 100." So also, if I say that " Romulus was
the first king of Rome," this implies, from the peculiar signifcor-
tion of the words, that '* the first king of Rome was Romulus."
Terms thus related to each other are called in technical language,
"convertible" [or *' equivalent "] terms. But then, you are to
observe that when you not only affirm one term of another, but also
affirm (or imply) that these are " convertible " terms, you are making
not merely one assertion, but two.
i^'stribution It is to be remembered, then, that it is not sufficient for the middle
terms. term to occur in a Universal-proposition; since if that proposition
be an affirmative, and the middle-term be the predicate of it, it will
not be distributed; e.g. if in the example formerly given, it had been
merely asserted, that " all the works of an intelligent author show
marks of design," and that ** the universe shows marks of design,'*
nothing could have been proved; since, though both these proposi-
tions are universal, the middle-term is made the predicate in each,
and both are affirmative; and accordingly, the rule of Aristotle is
not here complied with, since the term '* work of an intelligent
author," which is to be proved applicable to "the universe," would '=
not have been affirmed of the middle-term ("what shows marks of
design") under which "universe" is contained; but the middle-
term, on the contrary, would have been affirmed of it.
If, however, one of the premises be negative, the middle-term
may then be made the predicate of that, and will thus, according to
the above remark, be distributed; e.g. "no ruminant animals are
predacious; the lion is predacious; therefore the lion is not ruminant:'*
this is a valid syllogism; and the middle -term (predacious) is
distributed by being made the predicate of a negative proposition.
1 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 31
The form, indeed, of the syllogism is not that prescribed by the
Dictum, but it may easily be reduced to that form, by stating the
first proposition thus: **no predacious animals are ruminant;" which
is manifestly implied (as was above remarked) in the assertion that
**no ruminant animals are predacious." The syllogism will thus
appear in the form to which the Dictum applies.
It is not every argument, indeed, that can be reduced to this The DJctnm
form by so short and simple an alteration as in the case before us: applicable^
a longer and more complex process wiU often be required; and rules
will hereafter be laid down to facilitate this process in certain cases:
but there is no sound argument but what can be reduced into this
form, without at all departing from the real meaning and drift of it;
and the form will be found (though more prolix than is needed for
ordinary use) the most perspicuous in which an argument can be
exhibited.
All Reasoning whatever, then, rests on the one simple Principle
laid down by Aristotle, that "what is predicated, either affirmatively
or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like
manner {i.e. affirmatively or negatively) of any thing contained
under that term." So that when our object is to prove any proposi-
tion, i.e. to show that one tenn may rightly be affirmed or denied of
another, the process which really takes place in our minds is, that
we refer that term (of which the other is to be thus predicated) to
some class ^® [i.e. middle term) of which that other may be affirmed,
or denied, as the case may be.
Whatever the subject-matter of an argument may be, the Reason-
ing itself, considered by itself, is in every case the same process;
and if the writers against Logic had kept this in mind, they would
have been cautious of expressing their contempt of what they call
*' syllogistic reasoning," which is in truth a/^ reasoning; and instead •
of ridiculing Aristotle's Principle for its obviousness and simplicity,
would have perceived that these are, in fact, its highest praise: the
easiest, shortest, and most evident theory, provided it answer the
purpose of explanation, being ever the best.
§ 6.
If we conceive an inquirer to have reached, in his Investigation of
the theory of Reasoning, the point to which we have now arrived, a
question which would be likely next to engage his attention, is that
of Predication; i.e. since in reasoning we are to find a middle-term
which may be predicated affirmatively of the Subject in question, we
are led to inquire what terms may be affirmed, and what denied, of
what others.
It is evident that a proper-name, or any other term which denotes Common H
but a single individual, as "Caesar," "the Thames," "the Con- ?eS^
W That is, either an actual^ or a potential class. See above, § 3.
E
32 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book L
queror of Pompey," **tliis river " (hence called in Logic a ** Singular-
term") cannot be affirmed of any thing besides that individual, and
may therefore be denied of any thing else; we may say, "this
river is the Thames," or ** Caesar was the conqueror of Pompey;'*
but we cannot say of any thing else that it is the Thames, &c.
On the other hand, those terms which are called " Common,^ ^ as
denoting anyone individual of a whole class, as "river," "con-
queror," may of course be affirmed of any, or all that belong to that
class: [of anything answering to a certain description] as, "the
Thames is a river;" "the Rhine and the Danube are rivers."
Common-terms, therefore, are called " predicables " {vis.ajirma-
tively-'pYedicahle), from their capability of being affirmed of others:
a Singular-term, on the contrary, may be the Subject of a proposi-
tion, but never the Predicate, unless it be of a negative proposition;
(as e.g. the first-born of Isaac was not Jacob;) or, unless the Subject
and Predicate be only two expressions for the same individual
object; as in some of the above instances.
Abstraction The process by which the mind arrives at the notions expressed
^eneraiiza- ^J ^hcse " common " (or in popular language, " general ") terms, is
iion. properly called "Generalization;" though it is usually (and truly)
said to be the business of abstraction; for Generalization is one of
the purposes to which Abstraction is applied. When we draw of,
and contemplate separately any part of an object presented to the
mind disregarding the rest of it, we are said to abstract that part.
Thus, a person might, when a rose was before his eyes or mind,
make the scent a distinct object of attention, laying aside all thought
of the colour, form, &c.; and thus, even though it were the only
rose he had ever met with, he would be employing the faculty of
Abstraction; but if, in contemplating several objects, and finding
« that they agree in certain points, we abstract the circumstances of
agreement, disregarding the differences, and give to all and each of
these objects a name applicable to them in respect of this agreement,
i.e. a common name, as "rose," — or again, if we give a name to
some attribute wherein they agree, as "fragrance " or "redness,'*
we are then said to generalize. Abstraction, therefore, does not
necessarily imply Generalization, though Generalization implies
Abstraction.
Much needless difficulty has been raised respecting the results of
this process; many having contended, and perhaps more having
taken for granted, that there must be some really-existing thing,^^
corresponding to each of those " general " [or " common "] terms,
and of which such term is the name, standing for and representing
it: e.g. that as there is a really existing Being corresponding to the
proper name, "iEtna," and signified by it, so, the common- term,
** mountain," must also have some one really existing thing corre-
IJ* See the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Cliap. V,
§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 33
spondiug to it; and of course distinct from eacH Individual mountain
(since the term is not Singular but Common), yet existing in each,
since the term is applicable to each of them. *' When many different
men," it is said, " are at the same time thinking or speaking about
a 'mountain,' i.e. not any particular one, but ' a mountain, generally,'
their minds must be all employed on something; which must also be
one thing, and not several, and yet cannot be any one individual.'*
And hence a vast train of mystical disquisitions about Ideas, &c.
has arisen, which are at best nugatory, and tend to obscure our view
of the process wliich actually takes place in the mind.
The fact is, the notion expressed by a Common-term is merely an ^°*jj" p^^y
inadequate [incomplete] notion of an Individual; and from the very commou
circumstance of its inadequacy, it will apply equally well to any one ^^^'^'^
of an indefinite number of individuals of the same description; —
to any one, in short, possessing the attribute or attributes that have
been abstracted, and which are designated by that Common-term.
E. G. If I omit the mention and the consideration of every circum-
stance which distinguishes ^tna from any other mountain, I then
form a notion (expressed by the Common-term ** Mountain ") which
inadequately designates ^tna {i.e. which does not imply any of its
peculiarities, nor its numerical singleness), and is equally applicable
to any one of several other individuals.
Generalization, it is plain, may be indefinitely extended by a
further abstraction applied to common-terms: e.g. as by abstraction
from the term Socrates we obtain the common-term '* Philosopher;'*
so, from "philosopher," by a similar process, we arrive at the
more general-term " man;" from " man" we advance to ** animal,"
<kc. And so also you may advance from any " ten" objects before
you, (for instance, the fingers; from which doubtless arose the
custom of reckoning by tens) to the general-term, — the number ,
"ten;" and thence again, to the more general-term, "number;"
and ultimately to the term " quantity."^
We are thus enabled, not only to separate, and consider singly DiflFerent
one part of an object presented to the mind, but also to fix arbi- from the
trarily upon whatever part we please, according as may suit the same object,
purpose we happen to have in view. £1. G. Any Individual person
to whom we may direct our attention, may be considered either in
a political point of view, and accordingly referred to the class of
Merchant, Farmer, Lawyer, <fc;c. as the case may be; or physio-
20 The employment of this faculty at all diferences between them, and regard
pleasure has been regarded, and perhaps them simply as units. And accordingly,
•with good reason, as the characteristic the Savage Tribes (who are less removed
distinction of the human mind from that than we are from the Brutes) are re-
ef the Brutes. Accordingly, even the marked for a great deficiency in their
most intelligent Brutes seem incapable of notions of number. Few of them can
forming any distinct notion of number: count beyond ten, or twenty; and some
to do which evidently depends on Abstrac- of the rudest Savages have no words to
tion. For, in order to coM7i< any objects, express any numbers beyond five. SeeDr,
you must withdraw jour thoughts from Taylor's *' Natural-history of Society."
34 ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. [Book L
logically, as Negro, or White-man; or theologically, as Pagan,
Mahometan, Christian, &c.; or geographically, as Em^opean,
American, <fec. And so, in respect of any thing else that may be
the subject of our reasoning: we arbitrarily fix upon and abstract
. that point which is essential to the purpose in hand; so that the
Bame object may be referred to various different classes, according
to the occasion. Not, of course, that we are allowed to refer any
thing to a class to which it does not really belong; which would be
pretending to abstract from it something that was no part of it ; but
that we arbitrarily fix on any part of it which we choose to abstract
from the rest.
It is important to notice this, because men are often disposed to
consider each object as really and properly belonging to some one
<;lass alone ;^^ from their having been accustomed, in the course of
their OAvn pursuits, to consider, in one point of view only, things
which may with equal propriety be considered in other points of
view also: i.e. referred to various Classes, (or predicates.) And
this is that which chiefly constitutes what is called narrowness-of-
Different mind. B. G. A mere botanist might be astonished at hearing such
cirstfitica- plants as Clover and Lucerne included, in the language of a farmer,
*ifa under the term *' grasses," which he has been accustomed to limit
to a tribe of plants widely different in all botanical characteristics;
and the mere farmer might be no less surprised to find the trouble-
some *' weed," (as he has been accustomed to call it,) known by
the name of Couch-grass, and which he has been used to class with
nettles and thistles, to which it has no botanical affinity, ranked by
the botanist as a species of Wheat, ( Triticum Repens.) And yet
neither of these classifications is in itself erroneous or irrational;
though it would be absurd, in a botanical treatise, to class plants
, according to their agricultural use; or, in an agricultural treatise,
according to the structure of their flowers. So also, a Diamond
would be classed by a jeweller along with the ruby, emerald, kc,
as a precious stone : while the chemist classes it, along with plum-
bago and coal, as one of the forms of carbon.
The utility of these considerations, with a view to the present
subject, will be readily estimated, by recurring to the account which
has been already given of the process of Reasoning; the analysis
of which shows that it consists in refen-ing the term we are speaking
of to some class, ri^^. a middle tersf., which term again is referred
to, or excluded from (as the caei ^ay be) another class, viz. the
term which we wish to affirm or deny of the Subject of the Con-
clusion. So that the quality of our reasoning in any case must
depend on our being able correctly, clearly, and promptly, to abstract
from the Subject in question that which may furnish a Middle- term
suitable to the occasion,
B See the subjoined Dissertation, Book lY. Chap. Y.
§ 6.] ANALYTICAL OUTLINE. 35
The Imperfect and irregular sketcli whicli has here been attempted, utility of th«
of the logical system, may suffice (even though some parts of it fornJ"*^
should not be at once fully imderstood by those who are entirely
strangers to the study) to point out the general drift and purpose
of the science, and to render the details of it both more interesting
and more intelligible. The Analytical form, which has here been
adopted, is, generally speaking, better suited for introducing any
science in the plainest and most interesting form; though the Syn-
thetical, which will henceforth be employed, is the more regular, and
the more compendious form for storing it up in the memory.
It is to be observed, however, that technical terms and rules will
be rather an encumbrance than a help, unless we take care not
only to understand them thoroughly, but also to learn them so
perfectly that they may be as readily and as correctly employed as
the names of the most familiar objects around us.
But if any one will take the trouble to do this once for all, ho
will find that in the end much trouble will have been saved. For,
the explanations given of such technical-terms and general rules,
when thoroughly learnt, once, will save the necessity of going
through nearly the same explanation, over and over again on each
separate occasion.
In short, the advantage of technical-terms is just like what we
derive from the use of any other Common-terms. When, for
instance, we have once accurately learnt the definition of a ** Circle,'*
or have had iully described to us what sort of creature an
** Elephant" is, to say " I drew a Circle," or, ** I saw an
Elephant," would be sufficiently intelligible, without any need of
giving the description or definition at full length, over and over
again, on every separate occasion*
BOOK IL
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
CiiAP. I. — Of ike Operations of the Mind and of Terms.
§1.
Simple- p.p.
Operations There are three operations [or states] of the mind wliicli are
of the Mind, inimecllately concerned in Argument; which are called by logical
writers — 1st. Simple-apprehension; 2d. Judgment; 3d. Discourse
or Reasoning.^
1st. Simple-apprehension they define to be that act or condition
of the mind in which it receives a notion of any object ; and
which is analogous to the perception of the senses. It is either
Incomplex or Complex:^ Incomplex-apprehension is of one object,
or of several without any relation being perceived between them, as
of **a man," "a horse," "cards:" Complex, is of several with
such a relation, as of '* a man on horseback," *' a pack of cards."
2d. Judgment is the comparing together in the mind two of the
notions [or ideas] which are the objects of Apprehension, whether
complex or incomplex, and pronouncing that they agree or disagree
with each other: [or that one of them belongs or does not belong to
the other.] Judgment, therefore, is either affirmative or negative.
3d. Reasoning [or "discourse"] is the act of proceeding from
certain Judgments to another founded upon them, [or the result of
them.]
§2.
Language. Language afibrds the signs by which these operations of the
mind are not only expressed, and communicated to others, but even,
for the most part, carried on by ourselves. The notion obtained in
The opening of a treatise with a state-
ment respecting- the operations of the
mind universally, tends to foster the
prevaiHng error (from which probably
the minds of the writers were not exempt)
of supposing that Logic professes to teach
"the use of the mental faculties in gen-
eral ;" the " right use of reason," accord-
ing to Watts.
2 With respect to the technical terms
employed in this work, see the Preface.
Judgment
Discourse.
1 Logical writers have in general begun
by laying down that there are, in all,
three operations of the mind: (in univer'
sum tres) an assertion by no means incori-
trovertible, and which, if admitted, is
nothing to the present purpose. Our
business is with argumentation, expressed
in words, and the "operations of the mind
implied in that ; what others there may
be, or whether any, are irrelevant ques-
tions.
Chap. I, § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 37
an act of appreliension, is called, "v^'llen expressed in language, a
teiin; an act oi judgment is expressed by a proposition; an act of
reasoning, by an argument; (which, when regularly expressed, is a
syllogism;) as e.g.
*' Every dispensation of Providence is beneficial;
Afflictions are dispensations of Providence,
Therefore they are beneficial:"
is a Syllogism; the act of reasoning being indicated by the word
** therefore.'' It consists of three propositions, each of which has
(necessarily) U\o terms, as "beneficial," "dispensations of Provi-
dence," &LC.
In introducing the mention of language previously to the definition
of Logic, I have departed from established practice, in order that it
may be clearly understood, that Logic is entirely conversant about
language. If any process of reasoning can take place, in the mind,
without any employment of language, orally or mentally, (a meta-
physical question which I shall not here discuss) such a process
does not come within the province of the science here treated of.'
This truth, most writers on the subject, if indeed they were fully
aware of it themselves, have certainly not taken due care to impress
on their readers.
Language is employed for various purposes. It is the province Purposes
of the historian, for instance, to convey information by means of La^nsua^e is
language, — of the poet, to aff"ord a certain kind of gratification, — employed,
of the orator, to persuade, <kc. kc. ; while it belongs to the argu-
mentative writer or speaker, as such, to convince the understanding.
And as Grammar is conversant about language universally, for
whatever purpose it is employed, so, it is only so far as it is
employed for this last purpose, viz. that of reasoning, that it falls
under the cognizance of Logic.
And whereas, in reasoning, terms are liable to be indistinct, {i.e. Terms,
without any clear, determinate meaning,) propositions to be/a?se, syUogUmT*"
and arguments inconclusive. Logic undertakes directly and com-
pletely to guard against this last defect, and, incidentally, and in a
certain degree, against the others, as far as can be done by the
proper use of language. It is, therefore, (when regarded as an
art) *' the Art of employing language properly for the purpose of
Reasoning ; and of distinguishing what is properly and truly an
Argument from spurious imitations of it." The importance of such
a study no one can rightly estimate who has not long and attentively
considered how much our thoughts are influenced by expressions,
and how much error, perplexity, and labour are occasioned by a
faulty use of language ; and many who are not unaware of that,
have yet failed to observe that " signs'' (such as Language supplies)
are an indispensable instrument of all Reasoning, strictly so called.
St See Introduction, { &
38
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
[Book II.
Degree and
manner in
■which the
several
defects are
to be
guarded
against.
AnaTysTP of
Syllogism
»nd I'loposl
tioo.
In reference however to the ahove-mentloned defects, two impor-
tant distinctions are to be observed. 1 st, It is to be remembered
that that which is, really, a Term, may be indistinctly apprehended
by the person employing it, or by his hearer ; and so also, a
Proposition which is false, is not the less a real Proposition: but,
on the other hand, any expression or statement which does not
really prove any thing, is not, really, an Argument at all, though it
may be brought forward and passed off as such.
2dly, It is to be remembered that (as it is evident from what has
been formerly said) no rules can be devised that will equally guard
against all three of the above-mentioned defects.
To arrive at a distinct apprehension of every thing that may be
expressed by any Term whatever, and again, to ascertain the truth
or falsity of every conceivable Proposition, is manifestly beyond the
reach of any system of rules. But on the other hand, it is possible
to exhibit any pretended Argument whatever in such a form as to
be able to pronounce decisively on its validity or its fallaciousness.
So that the last of the three defects alluded to (though not, the
two former) may be directly and completely obviated by the applica-
tion of suitable rules. But the other two defects can be guarded
against (as will presently be shown) only indirectly, and to a certain
degree.
In other words, rules may be framed that will enable us to decide,
what is, or is not, really a " Term," — really, a ** Proposition" — or
really, an "Argument:" and to do this, is to guard completely
against the defect of inconclusiveness ; since nothing that is incon-
clusive, is, really, an "Argument;" though that maybe really a
** Term" of which you do not distinctly apprehend the meaning;
and that which is really a " Proposition,'' may be 2^. false Proposi-
tion.
A Syllogism being, as aforesaid, resolvable into three Proposi-
tions, and each Proposition containing two Terms ; of these terms,
that which is spoken of is called the subject; that which is said of
it, the predicate; and these two are called the terms [or extremes]
because, logically, the Subject is placed first, and the Predicate
last;'^ and, in the middle, the Copula, which indicates the act of
Judgment, as by it the Predicate is affirmed or denied of the
Subject. The Copula must be either is or is not; which expressions
indicate simply that you affirm or deny the Predicate, of the Subject.
The substantive-verb is the only verb recognised by Logic ; inasmuch
as all others are compound; being resolvable, by means of the verb,
** to be," and a participle or adjective: e.g. "the Romans con-
quered:" the word conquered is both copula and predicate, being
equivalent to " were (Cop.) victorious " (Pred.)
It is proper to observe, that the Copula, as such, has no relation
4 In Greek and in Latin, very often, predicate is, actiially,))ut first: as "great
unu, not unirequentiy, in English, tlie is Diana of tiie Ephesians."
Chap. I. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 39
to time; but expresses merely the agreement or disagreement of two
given terms : hence, if any other tense of the substantive-verb
besides the present, is used, it is either understood as the same in
sense, (the difference of tense being regarded as a matter of gram-
matical propriety only;) or else, if the circumstance of time really
do modify the sense of the whole proposition, so as to make the use
of that tense an essential, then, this circumstance is to be regarded
as a part of one of the terms: *' at that time,'' or some such expres-
sion, being understood: as "this man was honest;" i.e. "he is
one formerly-honest." In such cases, an emphasis, accompanied
with a peculiar tone, is usually laid on the substantive-verb.^
Sometimes the substantive-verb is both Copula and Predicate;
i.e. where existence ojAj \& predicated: e.g. Deus est, "there is a
God." "One of Jacob's sons is not." And observe, that the
Copula, merely as such, does not imply real existence: e.g. "a
faultless man is a Being feigned by the Stoics, and which one must
not expect to meet with."
§3.
It is evident that a Term may consist either of one Word or of
several ; and that it is not every word that is categorematic, i.e. Cafegore.
capable of being employed by itself as a Term. Adverbs, Preposi- "^^^^'^
tions, kc. and also Nouns in any other case besides the nominative,
are syncategorematic, i.e. can only form part of a term. A nomi- f^^at?^^"*
native Noun may be by itself a terra. A Verb (all except the
substantive-verb used as the copula) is a mixed word, being resolv- Mixed,
able into the Copula and Predicate, to which it is equivalent ; and,
indeed, is often so resolved in the mere rendering out of one language
into another; as ^' ipse adest," "he is present."
It is to be observed, however, that under "verb," we do not infinitive*,
include the Infinitive, which is properly a Noun-substantive, nor the
Participle, which is a Noun-adjective. They are verbals ; being
related to their respective verbs in respect of the things they signify:
but not verbs, inasmuch as they differ entirely in their mode of
signification. It is worth observing, that an Infinitive (though it
often comes last in the sentence) is never the predicate^ except when
another Infinitive is the Subject : e.g.
subj, pred.
"I hope to succeed*" i.e. "to succeed is what I hope." "Not
to advance is to fall back."
It is to be observed, also, that in English there are two infinitives,
one in ^'ing,'' the same in sound and spelling as the Participle-
* Strange to say, there are persons who greater strength ! What can be the
thus understand our Lord's declaration morai sentiments of those who can believe
to Pilate : " my kingdom is not of this such to have been the secret sense of the
world;" viz. ^''noio;" meaning (secretly) words of a divine messentjer who is to b3
that it was to become so hereafter, our model of truth and oi" all virtue 1
when his followers should have attained
40 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
present; from wliich, however, it should he carefully distinguished;
e.g. "rising early is healthful," and " it is healthful to rise early,"
are equivalent.
Grammarians have produced much needless perplexity hy speaking
oi i\iQ jparticiple in *' ing/' hemg employed so and so; when it is
manifest that that very employment of the word constitutes it, to all
intents and purposes, an infinitive and not a participle.
The advantage of the infinitive in ing, is, that it may he used either
in the nominative or in any ohlique case; not (as some suppose) that
it necessarily implies a A«6zi ; e.^. "Seeing is helieving:" "there
is glory in dying for one's country:" " a habit of observing," &c.
If I say "he is riding," and again "riding is pleasant," in the
fonner sentence "riding " is an Adjective, and is the Predicate; in
the latter it is a Substantive and is the Subject; the sentence being
equivalent to "it is pleasant to ride."
In this, and in many other cases, the English word IT serves as
a representative of the Subject when that is put last: e.g.
pred. subj.
•* It is to be hoped that we shall succeed."
An adjective (including participles) cannot, by itself, be made the
Subject of a proposition; but is often employed as a Predicate: as
** Crassus was rich;" though some choose to consider some sub-
stantive as understood in every such case, {e.g. rich man) and con.
sequently do not reckon adjectives among Simple-terms; [i.e. words
which are capable, singly, of being employed as terms.] This,
however, is a question of no practical consequence; but I have
thought it best to adhere to Aristotle's mode of statement. (See
his Categ.)
s'mpTe. Of Simple-terms, then, (which are what the first part of Logic
treats of) there are many divisions; of which, however, one will be
sufficient for the present purpose ; viz. into singular and common:
because, though any term whatever may be a subject, none but a
common term can be affirmatively predicated of several others. A
isinguiar and Singular-term stands for one individual, as "Csesar," "the
^rma'^"' Thames:" these, it is plain, cannot be said [predicated] affirmatively,
of any thing but those individuals respectively. A Common-term is
one that may stand for any of an indefinite number of individuals,
which are called its signijicates : i.e. can be applied to any of them,
as comprehending them in its single signijication ; as "man,'*
"river," "great."
The learner who has gone through the Analytical Outline, will
now be enabled to proceed to the Second and Third Chapters either
with or without the study of the remainder of what is usually placed
in the First Chapter, but which I have subjoined as a Supplement.
See Chap. V,
terms.
proposi-
tions.
Chap. II. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 41
Chap. II. — Of Propositions.
§1-
The second part of Logic treats of the Proposition ; which is,
** Judgment expressed in words."
A Proposition is defined logically ^* a Sentence indicative^" [or Jefi"'t'o.no<'
''asserting"] i.e. which ''•affirms or denies.''^ It is this that dis- '^°^^''^'^""'
tinguishes a Proposition from a Question, a Command, &c.
Logical Writers are accustomed to add, in explanation of this
definition, that a " Proposition" must not he ambiguous; inasmuch
as that which has more than one meaning, is in reality not one, hut
several propositions. And they also add that it must not he imper-
fect or ungrammatical; which is only saying that any comhination
of words that does not really form a " Sentence" cannot he a
" Proposition;" though one may perhaps conjecture from it what it
was that the speaker meant to assert.
Propositions considered merely as Sentences, are distinguished Categorical
into " Categorical" and " Hypothetical." hypothetical
The Categorical asserts simply that the Predicate does, or does
not, apply to the Subject: as " The world had an intelligent
maker:" " Man is not capable of raising himself, unassisted, from
the savage to the civilized state." The Hypothetical [called by
some writers, " Compound"] makes its assertion under a Condition,
or with an Alternative; as *' If the world is not the work of chance,
it must have had an intelligent maker:" "Either mankind are
capable of rising into civilization unassisted, or the first beginning
of civilization must have come from above."
The former of these two last examples is of that kind called
"Conditional-propositions;"^ the ''condition* being denoted by
"if," or some such word. The latter example is of the kind
called "Disjunctive;" the alternative being denoted by "either"
and "or."
The division of Propositions into Categorical and H\^othetical,
is, as has been said, a division of them considered merely as
Sentences; for a like distinction might be extended to other kinds
of Sentences also. Thus, " Are men capable of raising themselves
to civilization?" "Go and study books of travels," are what
might be called categorical sentences, though not propositions. " If
man is incapable of civilizing himself, whence came the first begin-
ning of civihzation ?" might be considered as a conditional question:
and " Either admit the conclusion, or refute the argument," as a
disjunctive command.
6 " Sentence " being, in logical Ian- T Or " hypothetical," according to
giiage, the Genus, and " indicative " the those writers who use the word " com-
" Differentia," [or distinguishing-qua- pound" where we have used " hypothcti-
lity.] See Ch. V. § 6. cal."
42 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book IL
Categorical propositions are subdivided into the pure, wliieh asserts
simply [purely] that the subject does or does not agree with the
predicate, and the modal, which expresses in what mode [or
manner] it agrees; e.g. "An intemperate man will be sickly;'*
*' Brutus killed Caesar;" tire pure. "An intemperate man will
probably be sickly;" "Brutus killed Csesar justly;" are modal.
At present we speak only of pure categorical propositions.
Substance The above division of Propositions (into Categorical and Hypo-
Proposition, thetical) is called in the phraseology of Logical writers, a " division
of them according to their substance;'' i.e. considered simply as
sentences.
The " characteristic-5'Ma7%" [Differentia] of a Proposition being
its "asserting,'' — i.e. "affirming or denying" something, hence
Quality. Propositions are divided, according to their " Quality," into " affir-
mative" and " negative." The division of them again, into " true"
and " false," is also called a division according to their " quality;"
namely, the " quality of the Matter:" (as it has relation to the
subject-matter one is treating of) while the other kind of quality
(a proposition's being affirmative or negative) is " the quality of the
expression."
The " quality of the matter" is considered (in relation to our
present inquiries) as accidental, and the " quality of the expression'*
as essential. For though the truth or falsity of a proposition — for
instance, in Natural-history, is the most essential point in reference
to Natural-history, and of a mathematical proposition, in reference
to Mathematics, and so in other cases, — this is merely accidental
in reference to an inquiry (such as the present) only as to forms of
expression. In reference to that, the essential difference is that
between affirmation and negation.
And here it should be remarked by the way, that as, on the one
hand, every Proposition must be either true or false, so, on the •
other hand, nothing else can be, strictly speaking, either true or
false. In colloquial language however, " true" and " false" are
often more loosely applied; as when men speak of the " true cause"
of any thing; meaning, " the real cause;" — the " true heir," that
is, the rightful heir; — a "false prophet," — that is, a pretended
prophet, or one who utters falsehoods; — a " true" or " false"
argument; meaning a valid, [real] or an apparent-argument; — a
man "true," or "false" to his friend; i.e. faithful or unfaithful, (kc.
A Proposition, it is to be observed, is Affirmative or Negative,
According to its Copula; i.e. according as the Predicate is affirmed
or denied of the Subject. Thus, " Not to advance, is to fall back,"
is affirmative: " No miser is truly rich" [or "a miser is not truly
rich"] is a negative. "A few of the sailors were saved," is an
affirmative; " Few of the sailors were saved," is properly a nega-
tive; for it would be understood that you were speaking of " most
of the sailors," and denying that they were saved,
Chap. II. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 43
Another division® of propositions is according to tlieir quantity QiAntlty.
[or extent.] If tlie Predicate is said of the whole of the Subject,
the proposition is Universal: if of part of it only, the proposition is
Particular (or partial:) e.g. "Britain is an island;" "all tyrants
are miserable;" "no miser is rich;" are C/Jiz'uersa/ propositions, and
their subjects are therefore said to be distributed; being understood
to stand, each, for the whole of its Significates: but, " some islands
are fertile;" "all tyrants are not assassinated;" are Particular,
and their subjects, consequently, not distributed, being taken to
stand for a part only of their Significates.
As every proposition must be either Affirmative or Negative, and
must also be either universal or particular, we reckon, in all, four
kinds of pure categorical propositions, [i.e. considered as to their
quantity and quality both;) viz. Universal Affirmative, whose symbol
(used for brevity) is A ; Universal Negative, E; Particular Affirm-
ative, /; Particular Negative, 0.
§2.
When the subject of a proposition is a Common-term, the uni-
versal signs (" all, no, every") are used to indicate that it is
distributed, (the proposition being consequently then universal;) the
particular signs (" some, <fec.") the contrary. Should there be no
sign at all to the common term, the quantity of the proposition
(which is called an Indefinite proposition) is ascertained by the
matter; i.e. the nature of the connexion between the extremes:
which is either Necessary, Impossible, or Contingent. In necessary
and in impossible Matter, an Indefinite is understood as a universal: indef nite.
e.g. " birds have wings;" i.e. all: " birds are not quadrupeds;" i.e.
none: in contingent matter, {i.e. where the terms partly [sometimes]
agree, and partly not) an Indefinite is understood as a Particular;
e.g. "food is necessary to life;" i.e. some food; " birds sing;" i.e. some
do; "birds are not carnivorous;" i.e. some are not, or, all are not.
It is very perplexing to the learner, and needlessly so, to reckon
indefinites as one class of propositions in respect of quantity.^ They
must be either universal or particular, though it is not declared
which. The person, indeed, Avho utters the indefinite proposition,
may be mistaken as to this point, and may mean to speak imiver-
Bally in a case where the proposition is not imiversally true. And
the hearer may be in doubt which was meant, or ought to be meant;
but the speaker must mean either the one or the other.
Of course the determination of a question relating to the " mat-
ter," i.e. when we are authorized to use the universal, and when,
the particular sign, — when, an affirmative, and when a negative, — >
is what cannot be determined by Logic,
« See Chap. V. § 3.
9 Such a mode of classification resembles that of some grammarians, who, among
tlie Genders, enumerate the doubtful genderl
44 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
Singular As for Singular propositions, {viz. those whose subject is either a
tiS!^^' proper name, or a common term with a singular sign) they are
reckoned as Universals, (see Book IV. Ch. lY. § 2.) because in
them we speak of the whole of the subject; e.g. when we say,
** Brutus was a Roman," we mean the whole of Brutus. This is
the general rule ; but some Singular-propositions may fairly be
reckoned particular; i.e. when some qualifying word is inserted,
which indicates that you are not speaking of the whole of the sub-
ject; e.g. "Caesar was not wiholly a, tyrant;" **this man is occa-
sionally intemperate;" " non omnis moriar."
It is not meant that these may not be, and that, the most natur-
ally, accounted Universals; but it is only by viewing them in the
other light, that we can regularly state the Contradictory to a
Singular proposition. Strictly speaking, when we regard such pro-
positions as admitting of a variation in Quantity, they are not
properly considered as Singular; the subject being, e.g. not Ccesar,
but the parts of his character.
Distribution It is evident that the subject is distributed in every universal
erms. proposition, an(\. never in si, particular : (that being the very differ-
ence between universal and particular propositions:) but the distri-
bution 01^ non-distribution of the predicate, depends (not on the
quantity, but) on the quality, of the proposition; for, if anj part of
the predicate agrees with the Subject, it must be affirmed and not
denied of the Subject ; therefore, for an Affirmative-proposition to
be true, it is sufficient that some part of the predicate agrees with
the Subject ; and (for the same reason) for a Negative to be true,
it is necessary that the whole of the predicate should disagree with
the Subject: e.g. it is true that "learning is useful" though the
whole of the term *' useful" does not agree with the term *' learn-
ing" (for many things are useful besides learning;) but " no vice is
useful," would be false if any part of the term "useful" agreed
with the term " vice;" i.e. if you could find any one useful thing
which was a vice.
And this holds good equally whether the negative proposition be
** universal" or "particular." For to say that " Some X is not
Y" (or — which is the same in sense — that " All X is not Y") is to
imply that there is no part of the term " Y" [no part of the Class
which '«Y" stands /or] that is applicable to the whole without
exception, of the term " X;" — in short, that there is some part of
the term " X " to which " Y" is wholly inapplicable.
Thus, if I say, " some of the men found on that island are not
Bailors of the ship that was wrecked there," or, in other words,
** the men found on that island are not, all of them, sailors of the
ship, &c." I imply that the term " sailors, cfcc." is wholly inap-
plicable to some of the "men on the island;" though it might
perhaps be applicable to others of them.
Again, if I say " some coin is made of silver," and " some coin
Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 45
is not made of silver," (or in other words, that "all coin is not
made of silver") in the former of these propositions I imply, that in
some portion (at least) of the Class of " things made of silver," is
found [or comprehended] "some coin:" in the latter proposition I
imply that there is " some coin" which is contained in no portion of
the Class of " things made of silver;" or (in other words) which is
excluded from the whole of that Class. So that the term " made of
silver" is distributed in this latter proposition, and not, in the former.
The two practical rules then to be observed respecting distribution,
are,
1st, All universal propositions (and no particular) distribute the
subject.
2. All negative (and no affirmative) the predicate.'"
It may happen indeed, that the whole of the predicate in an
affirmative may agree with the subject; e.g. it is equally true, that
"all men are rational animals;" and "all rational animals are
men;" but this is merely accidental, and is not at all implied in the
form of expression, which alone is regarded in Logic. '^
Of Opposition.
§3.
Two propositions are said to be opposed to each other, when,
having the same Subject and Predicate, they differ, in quantity, or
quality, or hoth}^ It is evident, that with any given subject and
predicate, you may state four distinct propositions, viz. A, E, I,
and 0; any two of which are said to be opposed;^^ hence there are
four different kinds of opposition, viz. 1st, the two universals (A
10 Hence, it is matter of common re- " All his measures are wise." And niira-
mark, that it is difficult to prove a Nega- berless such examples are to be found,
tive. At first sight this appears very But it will very often happen that
obvious, from the circumstance that a there shall be negative propositions much
Negative has one more Term distributed more easily established than certain
than the corresponding Afhrmative. But Affirmative ones on the same subject,
then, again, a difRculty may be lelt in E.G. That "The cause of animal-heat is
accounting for this, inasmuch as any not respiration," is said to have been
Negative may be expressed (as we shall established by experiments; hut what the
see presently) as an Affirmative, and cause is remains doubtful. See Note to
vice versd. The proposition, e.g. that Chap. III. § 5.
such a one is not in the Town," might ^ When, however, a Singular Term is
\»e expressed by the use of an equivalent the Predicate, it must, of course, be co-
term, " he is absent from the Town." extensive with the Subject; as " Romu-
The fact is, however, that in every lus was the founder of Rome." In this
case where the observation as to the and also in some other cases (see B. I.
difficulty of proving a Negative holds § 5.) we judge, not from the/orm of the
good, it will be foundthat the proposition eccpression, but from the signification of
in question is contrasted with one which the terms, that they are " equivalent"
has really a term the less, distributed; or [_'"'' convertible''^] terms.
a term of less extensive sense. E.G. It is i' For Opposition of Terms, see Chap,
easier to prove that a man has proposed V.
wise measures, than that he has never i' In ordinary language however, and
proposed an unwise measure, fn fact, in some logical treatises, propositions
the one would be to prove that *' Some of which do not differ in Quality (viz. Sub'
his measures are wise;" the other, that alterns) are not reckoned as " opposed."
A6
SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM.
[Book II.
Contraries, and E) are called contraries to each other; 2d, the two particular,
Subcon-
traries.
Subalterns.
Contradic-
tories.
(I and 0) subcontraries ; 3d, A and I, or E and 0, subalterns;
A and 0, or E and I, contradictories.
As it is evident, that the truth or falsity of any proposition (its
quantity and quality being known) must depend on the matter of it,
■we must hear in mind, that, *' in necessary matter, all affirmatives
are true, and negatives false; in impossible matter, vice versa; in
contingent matter, all univer sals, false, and particulars true;'' e.g.
*' all islands (or some islands) are surrounded by water," must he
true, because the matter is necessary: to say, ** no islands, or some
— not, (fcc." would have been false: again, *' some islands are
fertile;" "some are not fertile," are both true, because it is Con-
tingent Matter: put " alV or "no" instead of *' some,'' and the
propositions will be false.
Hence it will be evident, that Contraries will be both false in
Contingent matter, but never both true: Subcontraries, both true in
Contingent matter, but never both false: Contradictories, always one
true and the other false, &c. with other observations, which will be
immediately made on viewing the scheme; in which the four pro-
positions are denoted by their symbols, the different kinds of matter
by the initials, n, i, c, and the truth or falsity of each proposition
[Every X is Y]
n. V.
i. f.
c.f.
n. V.
i. f.
C. Y.
[No X is Y]
[Some X is Y]
[Some X is not Y]
Chap. II. § 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 47
in each matter, by the letter v. for {verum) true, f. for (/ahum)
false.
You may substitute for the unmeaning Symbols X, Y, (which
stand for the Terms of the above Propositions) whatever significant
Terms you will; and on their meaning, of course, will depend the
truth or falsity of each proposition.
For instance, Naturalists have observed that "animals having
horns on the head are universally ruminant;" that, of " carnivorous
animals " none are ruminant; and that, of "animals with hoofs,"
some are ruminant, and some, not. Let us take then instead of
** X," " animals with horns on the head," and for " Y," " rumin-
ant:" here, the real connexion of the Terms in respect of their
meaning — which Connexion is called the " matter " of a proposition
— is such that the Predicate may be affirmed universally of the
Subject; and of course the affirmatives (whether Universal or Par-
ticular) will be true, and the "negatives " false. In this case the
"matter" is technically called "necessary;" inasmuch as we
cannot avoid believing the Predicate to be applicable to the Subject.
Again, let "X" represent " carnivorous -animal," and " Y '*
"ruminant:" this is a case of what is called "impossible matter;**
{i.e. where we cannot possibly conceive the Predicate to be applicable
to the Subject) being just the reverse of the foregoing; and, of
course, both the Affii'matives will here be false, and both Negatives
true.
And lastly, as an instance of what is called "contingent matter,"
— i.e. where the Predicate can neither be affirmed universally, nor
denied universally, of the Subject, take "hoofed-animal" for "X"
and " ruminant " for " Y;" and of course the Universals will both
be false, and the Particulars, true: that is, it is equally true that
"some hoofed-animals are ruminant," and that " some are not."
By a careful study of the above Scheme, bearing in mind and
applying the rule concerning matter, the learner will easily elicit all
the maxims relating to " Opposition;" as that, in the Subalterns,
the truth of the Particular (which is called the subaltemate) follows
from the truth of the Universal {subaltemans), and the falsity of
the Universal from the falsity of the Particular: that Subalterns
differ in quantity alone; Contraries, and also Subcontraries, in quality
alone; Contradictories, in both: and hence, that if any proposition
is known to be true, we infer that its Contradictory is false; if false,
its Contradictory true, &c.
" Contradictory-opposition " is the kind most frequently alluded Belief aud
to, because (as is evident from what has been just said) to deny, — coincide,
or to disbelieve, — a proposition, is to assert, or to believe, its Con-
tradictory; and of course, to assent to, or mxxintain a proposition, is
to reject its Contradictory. Belief therefore, and Disbelief, are not
two different states of the mind, but the same, only considered in
reference to two Contradictory propositions. And consequently,
F
48 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
Credulity and Incredulity are not opposite habits, but the same; in
reference to some class of propositions, and to their contradictories.
For instance, he who is the most incredulous respecting a certain
person's guilt, is, in other words, the most ready to beheve him not
guilty; he who is the most credulous^* as to certain works being
within the reach of Magic, is the most incredulous [or "slow of
heart to believe "] that they are not within the reach of Magic; and
so, in all cases.
The reverse of believing this or that individual proposition, is, no
doubt, to disbelieve that same proposition: but the reverse of belief
generally, is (not disbelief; since that implies belief; but) doubt}^
Of course the learner must remember, as above observed, that the
determination of the "matter" is out of the province of Logic.
The rules of Opposition merely pronounce on the truth or falsity of
each proposition, given, the " matter."
Of Conversion.
§4.
A proposition is said to be converted when its Terms are transposed;
%.e. when the Subject is made the Predicate, and the Predicate the
Subject. When nothing more is done, this is called simple conversion,
riative ^^ No conversion is employed for any logical purpose, unless it be
illative ;^^ i.e. when the truth of the converse is implied by the truth
of the Exposita, (or proposition given;) e.g.
, 1* As the Jews, in the time of Jesus, in neither pronounce that the plaintiff Aas a
respect of his works. just title to the property he claims, nor
15 And there may even be cases in as^ain that he has «o^ a just title, nor yet,
which doubt itself may amount to the that there is no sufficient evidence to show
most extravagant credulity. For instance, Avhether his title is just or not; but we
if any one should " doubt whether there disregard the whole question.
is any such Country as Egypt," he Hence we may perceive that "private-
would be in fact believing this most in- Judg7nent," the riffht, and the d7itp of
credible proposition ; that ''''it is possible which have long been warmly debated,
for many thousands of persons, uncon- is a thing ujiavoidable, in any matter
nected with each other, to have agreed, concerning which one takes an interest,
for successive Ages, in bearing witness For if a man resolves that he will impli-
to the existence of a fictitious Country, citly receive, e.g. in Religious points, ail
without being detected, contradicted, or the decisions of a certam Pastor, Church,
suspected." or Party, he has, in so doing, performed
All this, though self-evident, is, in one act of private-judgment, which in-
practice, frequently lost sight of: the eludes all the rest; just as if a man,
more, on account of our emplo;^ing, in distrusting his own skill in the manage-
reference to the Christian Religion, the ment of property, should make over his
•words ^Believer and C7wbeliever ; " whole estate to trustees ; in doing which
whence, unthinking persons are led to he Ms exercised an act of ownership; for
take for granted that the rejection of whichact, generally, and for the choice
■ ■ - .- - .. . .^^ .
conversion.
Christianity implies a less easy belief of such and such particular trustees, he
aan its reception. is responsible. (See Essj
The only way to be safe from credulity Kingdom of Christ, § 2(j.)
on a given subject, is, either to examine i* The reader must not suppose from
carefully and dispassionately, and decide the use of the word "illative," that this
according to the evidence, or else to conversion is a process of reasoninn: it is
withdraw your thoughts from it alto- in fact only stating the same Judgment
cetlier. E.G. In some legal trial which in another form,
does not concern or interest us, we
CiiAP. 11. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 49
*' Xo virtuous man is a rebel, tlierefore
No rebel is a virtuous man."
**iSro Christian is an astronomer, therefore
No astronomer is a Christian." ^^
** Some boasters are cowards, therefore
Some cowards are boasters."
The " conversion " of such a proposition as this, " No one [is
happy who] is anxious for change," would be effected by altering
the arrangement of the words in brackets, into "who is happy."
Strictly speaking, that is not a real "conversion," — but only an
*' apparent conversion " — which is not "illative." For, (as has been
above said) there is not a mere transposition of the terms, but a
new term introduced, when a term which was undistributed in the
"exposita," is distributed [taken universally] in the Converse.
But as it is usual, in common discourse, to speak of "an unsound
argument," — meaning "an apparent-avgwoi^iii, which is in reality
not an argument," so, in this case also, it is common to say, for
instance, that "Euclid proves first that all equilateral triangles are
equiangular, and afterwards he proves the Converse, that all
equiangular triangles are equilateral:" or again, to say, " It is true
that all money is wealth; but I deny the Converse, (in reality, the
apparent-coiiXQY&o) that all wealth is money."
Conversion then, strictly so called, — that is, " illative-conversion,"
— can only take place when no term is distributed in the Converse,
which was undistributed in the "Exposita."
Hence, since E [Universal-negative] distributes both terms, and
I, [Particular-affirmative] neither, these may both be simply-con-
verted illatively; as in the examples above. But as A does not
distribute the Predicate, its simple-conversion would not be illative;
{e.g. from "all birds are animals," you cannot infer that "all
animals are birds,") as there would be a term distributed in the
Converse, which was not before. We must therefore limit its
quantity from universal to particular, and the Conversion will be
illative: {e.g. "some animals are birds;") this might be fairly named
conversion by limitation; but is commonly called " Conversion per Conversion
accidens." E may thus be converted also. But in 0, whether the P^accidens.
quantity be changed or not, there will still be a term (the predicate
of the converse) distributed, which was not before: you can therefore
only convert it illatively, by changing the quality; i.e. considering the
negative as attached to the predicate instead of to the copula, and
thus regarding It as I. One of the terms will then not be the same Cor.traposl-
as before; but the proposition will be equipollent {i.e. convey the ^^""^
17 When Galileo's persecutors endeav- the same may be said of some opponents
cured to bi-inir about tlie former of these, of Geology at the present day.
they forgot that it implied the latter. And
50 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
same meaning); e.g. *'some who possess wealtli are not happy:"
you may consider ''not-happy'' as the predicate, instead of "happy ;'^
the proposition will then be I, and of course may be simply con-
verted; " some who are not happy possess wealth: " or, (as such a
proposition is often expressed) "one may possess wealth without
being happy." ■'^ This may be named conversion by negation; or as
it is commonly called, by contraposition}^
A may also be fairly converted in this way, e.g.
** Every poet is a man of genius; therefore
He who is not a man of genius is not a poet:"
(or, *' None but a man of genius can be a poet:"
or, *' A man of genius alone can be a poet:"
or, *' One cannot be a poet without being a man of genius.'*)
For (since it is the same thing to affirm some attribute of the sub-
ject, or to deny the absence of that attribute) the original proposition
[Exposita] is precisely equipollent to this.
subj. pred.
" No poet is not-a-man-of-genius;"
which, being E, may of course be simply converted. Thus, in one
of these three ways, every proposition may be illatively converted:
viz. E. /, Simply; A, 0, by Negation; A, E, — Limitation.
Convertible Note, that as it was remarked that, in some affirmatives, the
whole of the Predicate does actually agree with the Subject, so,
■Ambiguity 18 It is worth remarking by the way, that it is as much out of our power to
of the words ^^^^ j^ gy^h examples as the above, the conceive a virtuous man who should be a
^|may. words, "may," "can," " cannot," &c. traitor, as to conceive "a Square with
must, &c. Y^g^yQ no reference (as they sometimes unequal sides;" that is, a square vvhich is
have) to power, as exercised by an agent; not a square. The expression therefore
but merely to the distribution or non-dis- is merely a way of stating the Universal-
trihution of Terms: or to the confidence proposition [E] " No virtuous man be-
or doubtfulness we feel respecting some trays his Country."
supposition. iSo again, to say, "a weary traveller in
To say, for instance, that " a man who the deserts of Arabia must eagerly drink
has the plague may recover," does not when he comes to a Spring," does not
mean that " it is in Yns power to recover mean that he is compelled to drink, but
if he chooses;" but it is only a form that I cannot avoid believing that he
of stating a particular-proposition: [I] will ; — that there is no doubt in my mind,
namely, that ''''Some who have the plague In these and many other such instances,
recover." And again to say, " there 7nay the words "may," "must," "can,"
be a bed of coal in this district," means "impossible," &c. have reference, not to
merely " The existence of a bed of coal power or absence of power in an agent,
in this district— is— a thing which I can- but only to universality or absence of
not confidently deny or affirm." universality in the eocpression; or, to
So also to say " a virtuous man cannot doubt or absence of doubt in our own
betray his Country" [or "it is «wposii6;e mind, respecting what is asserted. See
that a virtuous man should betray, &c."] Appendix, No. J, Art. May.
does not mean that he lacks the porcer, lojvjo mention is made by Aldrich of
(for there is no virtue in not doin^ what this kind of conversion; but it has been
is out of one's power) but merely that thought advisable to insert it, as being
" not betraying one's country " forms an in frequent use, and also as being em-
essentiid part of the notion conveyed by ployed in this treatise for the direct
the term " virtuous." We mean in short reduction of Baroko and IJokardo.
Chap. III. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 51
when this is the case, A heing converted simply, the Converse will
be true: but still, as its truth does not follow from that of the
original proposition ["exposita"] the Conversion is not illative.
Many propositions in mathematics are of this description: e.g,
** All equilateral triangles are equiangular;" and
"All equiangular triangles are equilateral."
Though both these propositions are true, the one does not follow
from the other; and mathematicians accordingly give a distinct
proof of each.
As the simple converse of A can then only be true when the sub-
ject and predicate are exactly equivalent (or, as they are called,
convertible terms); and as this must always be the case in a just
definition, so the correctness of a definition may be tried by this
test. E.G. *' A good government is tliat which has the happiness
of the governed for its object;" if this be a right definition it will
follow that " a government which has the happiness of the governed
for its object is a good one." But to assert a proposition, and to
add, or imply, that it is a just definition, is to make, not one asser-
tion, but two.
Chap. III. — Of Arguments.
§1.
The third operation of the mind, viz. reasoning, [or "discourse"]
expressed in words, is argument; and an argument stated at full
length, and in its regular form, is called a syllogism. The third
part of liOgic therefore treats of the syllogism. Every Argument^ syiiogismv
consists of two parts; that which is proved; and that hy means of
which it is proved. The former is called, before it is proved, the
question; ichen proved, the conclusion, [or inference;] that which is
used to prove it, if stated last (as is often done mcomrnon discourse,)
is called the reason, and is introduced by " because,'' or some other
causal conjunction; e.g. " Caesar deserved death, because he was a
tyrant, and all tyrants deserve death." If the Conclusion be stated
last (which is the strict logical form, to which all Reasoning may
be reduced) then, that which is employed to prove it is called the
premises,'^ and the Conclusion is then introduced by some illative
conjunction, as "therefore," e.g.
20 I mean, in the strict technical sense; conclusion is established by the Argu-
for in popular use the word Argument is ment:^^ i.e. Premises.— See Appendix,
often employed to denote the latter ot No. I. Art. Arrjume/d.
these two parts alone: e.g. "This is an 21 Both the premises tosrether are some-
Arguvient to prove so and so;" "this times called the a«toede«^
52 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
** All tyrants deserve death :
Cresar was a tyrant;
tJierefore lie deserved death. "^
Definition of Since, then, an argument is an expression in which "from some-
Arguuient. ^/^^'^^^ i^^^ down and granted as true [i.e. the Premises) something
else {i.e. the Conclusion) beyond this must he admitted to he true, as
following necessarily \resulting^ from the other ;'^ and since Logic
is wholly concerned in the use of language, it follows that a Syllo-
gism (which is an argument stated in a regular logical form) must
Definition of be "an argument so expressed, that the conclusiveness of it is
Syllogism, jjianifest from the mere force of the expression,'' i.e. without con-
sidering the meaning of the terms: e.g. in this Syllogism, "Every
Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X:" the Conclusion is inevitable,
whatever terms X, Y, and Z respectively are understood to stand
for. And to this form all legitimate Arguments may ultimately be
brought.
One circumstance which has misled some persons into the notion
that there may be Reasoning that is not, substantially, syllogistic, is
Necessary _ this; that in a Syllogism we see the Conclusion following certainly
conclusions^ \_^^ nccessarily] from the Premises; and again, in any apparent-syllo-
gism which on examination is found to be (as we have seen in some
of the examples) not a real one [not " valid"] the Conclusion does
not follow at all; and the whole is a mere deception. And yet we
often hear of Arguments which have some weight, and yet are not
quite decisive; — of Conclusions which are rendered prohahle, but
not absolutely certain, &c. And hence some are apt to imagine
that the conclusiveness of an Argument admits of degrees; and that
sometimes a conclusion may, probably and partially, — though not
certainly and completely, — follow from its Premises.
This mistake arises from men's forgetting that the Premises
themselves will very often be doubtful; and then, the Conclusion also
will be doubtful.
As was shown formerly, one or both of the Premises of a perfectly
_ 22 It may be observed tbat the defini- not always, employs the term "syllogism"
tion here given of an argument, is in the in the very sense to which I have confined
common treatises of Logic laid down as it: viz. to denote an argument stated in
the definition of a syllogism; a word regular logical form; as e.g. in a part of
which I have confined to a more restricted his work (omitted in the late editions) in
X sense. There cannot evidently be any which he is objecting to a certain pre-
argument, whether regularly or irregu- tended syllogism in the work of another
larly expressed, to wliich tlie definition writer, he says, " valet certear^/M^new/M/w;
given by Aldrich, for instance, would syllogismus tamen est falsissinms," &c.
not apply; so that he appears to employ Now (waiving the exception that might
"syllogism" as synonymous with" argu- be taken at this use ot ^'' falsissimus,"
ment." But besides that it is clearer and nothing being, strictly, true or false, but
more convenient, when we have these a, proposition) \t is x)\a\n that he limits the
two words at hand, to employ them in word "syllogism" to the sense in which
the two senses respectively which we it is here defined, and is conseciuently
■want to express, the truth is, that in so inconsistent with his own definition of
doinjj I have actually conformed to it.
Aldnch's practice: for he generally, if
Chap. III. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUJVI. 53
valid Syllogism may be utterly false and absm-d: and then, the
Conclusion, though inevitably, following from them, may be either
true or false, we cannot tell which. And if one or both of the
Premises be merely probable, we can infer from them only a pro-
hahle Conclusion; though the conclusiveness, — that is, the connexion
between the Premises and the Conclusion — is perfectly certain.
For instance, assuming that *' every month has 30 days" (which
is palpably false) then, from the minor-premise that " April is a
month," it follows (which happens to be true) that " April has 30
days:" and from the minor premiss that ** February is a month,'*
it follows that " February has 30 days;" which is false. In each
case the conclusiveness of the Argument is the same; but in every
case, when we have ascertained the falsity of one of the Premises,
we know nothing (as far as that argument is concerned) of the truth
or falsity of the Conclusion.
When however we are satisfied of the falsity of some Conclusion,
■we may, of course, be sure that (at least) one of the Premises is
false; since if they had both been true, the Conclusion would have
been true.
And this — which is called the *' indirect'^ mode of proof — is often
employed (even in Mathematics) for establishing what we maintain:
that is, we prove the falsity of some Proposition (in other words,
the timth of its contradictory) by showing that if assumed as a
Premiss, along with another Premiss known to be true, it leads to a
Conclusion manifestly false. For though, from a false assumption,
either falsehood or truth may follow, from a true assumption, truth
only can follow.
§2.
The Rule or Maxim (commonly called " dictum de omni et nullo*^) Aristotle's
by which Aristotle explains the validity of the above Argument ^^'^^"'"*
(every Y is X, Z is Y, therefore Z is X), is this: whatever is predi-
cated of a term distributed, whether affirmatively or negatively, may
he predicated in like manner of every thing contained under it. Thus,
in the examples above, X is predicated of Y distributed, and Z is
contained imder Y {i.e. is its Subject;) therefore X is predicated of Z:
so " all tyrants," &c. (§1.) This rule may be ultimately apphed
to all arguments; (and their validity ultimately rests on their con-
formity thereto) but it cannot be directly and immediately applied to
all even of pure categorical syllogisms ; for ' the sake of brevity,
therefore, some other Axioms are commonly applied in practice, to
avoid the occasional tediousness of reducing all syllogisms to that
form in which Aristotle's dictum is apphcable.^^
23 Instead of following the usual ar- applies to only one of them, I have pur-
mneement, in laying down first the sued what appears a simpler and more
Canons wliieh apply to all the figures of philosophical arrangement, and more
categorical syllogisms, and then going likely to impress on the learner's mind a
back to the dictum of Aristotle" which just view of the science: viz. 1st, to give
54 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
Canons of We will speak first of pure categorical syllogisms; and the
syllogisms.' Axioms or Canons by which their validity is to be explained: viz.
first, if two terms agree with one and the same third, they agree with
each other: secondly, if one term agrees and another disagrees with
one and the same third, these two disagree with each otJier. On the
former of these Canons rests the validity of affirmative conclusions;
on the latter, of negative; for no categorical syllogism can be faulty
which does not violate these Canons; none correct which does:
hence on these two Canons are built the rules or cautions which are
to be observed with respect to syllogisms, for the purpose of ascer-
taining whether those Canons have been strictly observed or not.
1st. Every syllogism has three, and only three terms: viz. the
middle-term, and the two terms (or extremes, as they are commonly
called) of the Conclusion [or Question]. Of these, 1st, the subject
of the Conclusion is called the m,inor-term; 2d, its predicate, the
major-term; and 3d, the middle-term, (called by the older logicians
** Argumentum,") is that with which each of them is separately
compared, in order to judge of their agreement or disagreement
with each other. If therefore there were two middle-terms, the
extremes {or terms of conclusion) not being both compared to the
same, could not be conclusively compared to each other.
2d. Every syllogism has three, and only three propositions; viz.
1st, the major-premiss (in which the major term is compared with
the middle:) 2d, the minor-premiss (in which the minor-term is
compared with the middle;) and 3d, the Conclusion, in which the
Minor-term is compared with the Major.^
3d. Note, that if the middle-term is ambiguous, there are in reality
two middle-terms, in sense, though but one in sound. An ambiguous
MidcUe-term is either an equivocal term used in different senses in
the two premises : [e.g.
** Light is contrary to darkness;
Feathers are light; therefore
Feathers are contrary to darkness:")
or a term not distributed: for as it is then used to stand for a part
only of its significates, it may happen that one of the Extremes may
have been compared with one part of it, and the other with another
part of it ; e.g.
the rule (Aristotle's Dictum) which ap- every kind of argument which is of a
plies to the most clearly and regularly-con- syllogistic character, and accordingly,
structed argument, the Syllogism in the directly cognizable by the rules of Logic,
first Figure, to which all reasoning may being enumerated in natural order,
be reduced: then, the canons applicable 24 Jn some logical treatises the Major
to a.\\ caiegoricals ; then, those belonging premiss is called simply '''' Propositio-^*
to the hppot helicals ; and lastly, to treat and the Minor '■'■ AssumpHo." In ordi-
of the Sorites; which is improperly nary discourse, the word " Principle" ia
placed by Aldrich before the hypotheti- often used to denote the Major-premiss,
cals. By this plan the province of strict and " Reason," the Minor.
Logic is extended as tar as it can be;
Chap. III. § 2.] ^ SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 55
*' White Is a colour,
Black is a colour; therefore
Black is white." Again,
** Some animals are beasts.
Some animals are birds; therefore
Some birds are beasts." •*
The middle-term therefore must he distributed once, at least, in the
premises; {i.e. by being the Subject of an Universal, or Predicate
of a Negative, Chap. II. § 2,) and once is sufficient; since if one
extreme has been compared to a part of the middle-term, and
another to the whole of it, they must have been both compared to
the same.
4th. iVb term must he distributed in the conclusion which was not
distributed in one of the premises ; for that (which is called an illicit
process, either of the Major or the Minor term) would be to employ
the whole of a term in the Conclusion, when you had employed only
a part of it in the Premiss; and thus, in reality, to introduce a
fourth term : e.g.
** All quadrupeds are animals,
A bird is not a quadruped; therefore
It is not an animal." — Illicit process of the major.
Again, ** What is related in the Talmud is unworthy of credit:
Miraculous stories are related in the Talmud; therefore Miraculous
stories are unworthy of credit." If this conclusion be taken as A,
there will be an "illicit process of the Minor-term;" (since every one
would understand the Minor-premiss as particular) but a particular
conclusion may fairly be inferred. In the case of an iUicit-process
of the Major, oil the contrary, the premises do not warrant any
conclusion at all.
5th, From negative premises you can infer nothing. For in them
the Middle is pronounced to disagree with both extremes; not, to
agree with both; or, to agree with one, and disagree with the
other; therefore they cannot be compared together; e.g.
" A fish is not a quadruped;"
" A bird is not a quadruped," proves nothing.
6th. If one premiss he negative, the conclusion' must he negative;
for in that premiss the middle-term is pronounced to disagree with
one of the Extremes, and in the other pvemiss (which of course is
affirmative by the preceding rule) to agree wuth the other extreme;
therefore the Extremes disagreeing with each other, the Conclusion
is negative. In the same manner it may be shown, that to prove a
negative conclusion one of the Premises must be a negative.
5Q SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
^^By these six rules all categorical Syllogisms are to be tried;
and from tliem it will be eviderxt; 1st, that nothing can he proved
from two particular Premises ; (since you will then have either the
middle Term undistributed, or an illicit process. For if each premiss
were I, there would be no distribution of any term at all: and if
the premises were I and 0, as
*' Some animals are sagacious;
Some beasts are not sagacious :
Some beasts are not animals."
there would be but one term — the predicate of — distributed ; and
supposing that one to be the Middle, then, the conclusion (being of
course negative, by rule 6th) would have its predicate, — the Major-
term — distributed, which was undistributed in the premiss. And,
for the same reason, 2dly, that if one of the Premises be particular,
the Conclusion must be particular ; e.g.
** All who fight bravely deserve reward ;
Some soldiers fight bravely;" you can only infer that
** Some soldiers deserve reward:"
for to infer a universal Conclusion would be an " illicit-process of
the Minor." But from two universal Premises you cannot always
infer a imiversal Conclusion; e.g.
" All gold is precious;
All gold is a mineral ; therefore
Some mineral is precious."
And even when we can infer a imiversal, we are always at liberty
to infer a particular; since what is predicated of all may of course be
predicated of some.^*
Of Moods.
§3.
When we designate the three propositions of a syllogism In their
order, according to their respective ** Quantity" and *' Quality"
25 Others have given twelve rules, which of the Logical-writers summed up the
I found might more conveniently be foregoing rules, were,
reduced to six. No syllogism can be " Distribus Medium, nee quartus ter-
faulty which violates none of these six minus adsit ;^'
rules. It is much less perplexing to a ** Vtraqtie nee prcemissa negans, nee
learner not to lay down as a distinct rule, parficularis ;"
that, e.g. against particular premises: ** Sedetur partem Conclusiodderiorem;''''
which is properly a resM^^ of the foregoing; {i.e. the Particular being regarded
since a syllogism with two particular as inferior to the Universal ; and
premises would offend against either It. the Negative, to the Affirmative)
3. or R. 4. " Et non distribuat nisi cum Prcemissa^
^ The memorial-lines in which some negetve."
Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 57
(indicated by tlieir symhols) we are said to determine the mood of the
syllogism. E.G. The example just above, "all gold, &e." is in
tiie Mood A, A, I.
As there are four kinds of propositions, and three propositions in
each syllogism, all the possible ways of combining these four, (A,
E, I, 0,) by threes, are sixty-four. For, any one of these four may
be the major-premiss; each of these four majors may have four
different minors ; and of these sixteen pairs of premises, each may
have four different conclusions. 4x4 (= 16) X 4 = 64. This
is a mere arithmetical calculation of the Moods, without any regard
to the logical rules ; for many of these Moods are inadmissible in
practice, from violating some of those rules ; e.g. the Mood E, E,
E, must be rejected as having negative premises; I, 0, 0, for
particular premises; and many others for the same faults ; to which
must be added I, E, 0, for an "illicit-process of the major," in
every Figure ; since the Conclusion, being negative, would distribute
the Major-term, while the Major-premiss, being I, would distribute
no term. By examination then of all, it will be found that, of the
sixty-four there remain but eleven Moods which can be used in a
legitimate syllogism, viz. A, A, A, A, A, I, A, E, E, A, E, 0,
A, I, I, A, 0, 0, E, A, E, E, A, 0, E, I, 0, I, A, I, 0, A, 0.
Of Figure,
§4.
The Figure of a syllogism consists in the situation of the Middle-
term with respect to the Extremes of the Conclusion, \i.e. the major
and minor term. ] When the Middle-term is made the subject of the
major premiss, and the predicate of the minor, that is called the first
Figure; which is far the most natural and clear of all, as to this
alone Aristotle's dictum may be at once applied. In the Second-
Figure the Middle-term is the predicate of both premises: in the
Third, the subject of both: in the Fourth, the predicate of the Major
premiss, and the subject of the Minor. This Figure is the most
awkward and unnatural of all, being the very reverse of the first.
Note, that the proper order"^ is to place the Major premiss ^r5^
and the Minor second; but this does not constitute the Major and
Minor premises ; for that premiss (wherever placed) is the Major,
which contains the major te^-m. and the Minor, the minor (v. R. 2.
§ 2.)
Each of the allowable moods mentioned above will not be allowable
in every Figure ; since it may violate some of the foregoing rules, in
27 Proper, i.e. in a Treatise on Logic or intelligent, fall into the strange misap-
in a logical analysis ; not, necessarily in prehension alluded to. The proper col-
ordinary discourse. This remark may location of plants in a botanical herba-
appear superfluous, but that I have rium, and in a flower-garden, and again,
known a writer, generally acute a^d on a farm, would be widely different.
58 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
one Figure, thoiigli not in another: e.g. I, A, I, is an allowable
mood in the third Figure ; but in the first it would have an undis-
tributed middle.^^ So A, E, E, would in the first Figure have an
illicit process of the major., but is allowable in the second ; and
A, A, A, which in the first Figure is allowable, would in the third
have an illicit process of the minor: all which maj be ascertained by
trying the different Moods in each figure, as per scheme.
Let X represent the Major term, Z the Minor, Y the Middle.
1st Fig.
2d Fig.
3d Fig.
4th Fig.
Y, X,
X,Y,
Y, X,
X, Y,
Z, Y,
Z, Y,
Y, Z,
Y, Z,
Z, X,
Z, X,
z,x,
Z, X.
The Terms alone being here stated, the quantity and quality of
each Proposition (and consequently the Mood of the whole Syllo-
gism) is left to be filled up : {i.e. between Y and X, we may place
either a negative or affirmative Copula : and we may prefix either a
universal or particular sign to Y.) By applying the Moods then to
each Figure, it will be found that each figure will admit six Moods
only, as not violating the rules against undistributed middle, and
against illicit process: and of the Moods so admitted, several (though
valid) are useless, as having a particular Conclusion, when a uni-
versal might liave been drawn; e.g. A, A, I, in the first Figure,
*' All human creatures are entitled to liberty;
All slaves are human creatures; therefore
i^ome slaves are entitled to liberty."
Of the twenty-four Moods, then, (six in each Figure,) five are
for this reason neglected: for the remaining nineteen, logicians
have devised names to distinguish both the Mood itself, and the
Figure in which it is found; since when one Mood {i.e. one in itself,
without regard to Figure) occurs in two diff'erent Figures, (as E,
A, E, in the first and second) the mere letters denoting the mood
would not inform us concerning ih^ figure. In these names, then,
the three vowels denote the propositions of which the Syllogism is
composed: the consonants (besides their other uses, of which
hereafter) serve to keep in mind the Figure of the Syllogism.
p. -^ jbArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, fErlOque
°* * ( prions.
2* E.G. Some restraint is salutary: all restraint is unpleasant: something
T I A
unpleasant is salutary. Again : Some herbs are fit for food : nightshade is an
I
herb: some nightshade is fit for food.
Chap. III. § 4.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 59
T.. o (cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, fEsfInO, bArOkO/'
Ei£?. 2. ■< \ ' ' '
ftertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtlsI, fEl-
Fig. 3. \ AptOn, bOkArdO/" fErlsO, babet :
I quarta insuper addit.
^. . jbrAmAntIp, cAmEnEs, dImArlS;, fEsA-
^^' \ PO, frEsIsOn.
By a careful study of these mnemonic lines (which must he
committed to memory) you will perceive that A can only he proved
in the First-Figure, in which also every other proposition may he
proved; that the Second proves only negatives: the Third only
particulars: that the First-Figure requires the major-premiss to he
universal, and the minor, affirmative, <fec.; with many other such
observations, which will readily he made, (on trial of several
Syllogisms, in different Moods) and the reasons for which will be
found in the foregoing rules. E.G. To show why the Second-Figure
has only Negative Conclusions, we have only to consider that in it
the middle-term being the predicate in both premises, would not he
distributed unless one premiss were negative; (Chap. II. § 2.) there-
fore the Conclusion must be negative also, by Chap. III. § 2, Rule
6. One Mood in each figure may suffice in this place by way of
example :
First, Barbara, viz. (bAr.) ''Every Y is X; (bA) every Z is Y;
therefore (rA) every Z is X:" e.g. let the major-term (which is
represented by X) be ** one who possesses all virtue;" the minor-
term (Z) " every man who possesses one virtue;" and the middle-
term (Y) " every one who possesses prudence;" and you will have
the celebrated argument of Aristotle, Eth. sixth hook, to prove that
the virtues are inseparable; mz.
** He who possesses prudence, possesses all virtue;
He who possesses one virtue, must possess prudence; therefore
He who possesses one, possesses all."
Second, Camestres, (cAm) ** every X is Y; (Es) no Z is Y;
(trEs) no Z is X," Let the major-term (X) be " true philosophers,"
the minor (Z) " the Epicureans;" the middle (Y) " reckoning virtue
a good in itself;" and this will he part of the reasoning of Cicero,
Off. book first and third, against the Epicureans.
Third, Darapti, viz. [dA) " Every Y is X; {rAp) every Y is Z;
therefore {tl) some Z is X:" e.g.
2» Or, Fakoro, see § 7. 30 Or, Dokamo, see S 7.
60 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
** Prudence has for its object the benefit of individuals; but
prudence is a virtue: therefore some virtue has for its object
the benefit of the individual,"
is part of Adam Smith's reasoning [Moral Sentiments) against
Hutcheson and others, who placed all virtue in benevolence.
Fourth, Camenes, viz. (cAm) " every X is Y ; (En) no Y is Z;
therefore (Es) no Z is X:" e.g.
** Whatever is expedient, is conformable to nature ;
Whatever is conformable to nature, is not hurtful to society ;
therefore
What is hurtful to society is never expedient;"
is part of Cicero's argument in Off. Lib. iii. ; but it is an inverted
and clumsy way of stating what would much more naturally fall into
the First-Figure ; for if you examine the Propositions of a Syllogism
in the Fourth-Figure, beginning at the Conclusion, you will see that
as the major term is predicated of the minor, so is the minor of the
middle, and that again of the major ; so that the major appears to
be merely predicated of itself. Hence the five Moods in this Figure
are seldom or never used ; some one of the fourteen (moods with
names) in the first three Figures, being the forms into which all
arguments may most readily be thrown : but of these, the four in
the First-Figure are the clearest and most natural; as to them
Aristotle's Dictum will immediately apply.
With respect to the use of the first three Figures (for the Fourth
is never employed but by an accidental awkwardness of expression)
it may be remarked, that the First is that into which an argument
will be found to fall the most naturally, except in the following
Use of the cases : — First, When we have to disprove something that has been
Figura' maintained, or is likely to be believed, our arguments will usually
be found to take most conveniently the form of the Second-Figure :
viz. we prove that the thing we are speaking of cannot belong to
STich a Class, either because it has something of which that Class
is destitute, (Cesare) or because it wants what belongs to the whole
(rf that Class ; (Camestres) e.g. " No impostor would have warned
his followers (as Jesus did) of the persecutions they would have to
submit to;" and again, "An enthusiast would have expatiated
(which Jesus and his followers did not) on the particulars of a future
state."
The same observations will apply, mutatis m.utandis, when a
Particular Conclusion is sought ; as in Festino and Baroko.
^ The arguments used in the process called the " Abscissio Infiniti,"
will in general be the most easily referred to this Figure. (See
Chap. V. § 1. subsection 6.) The phrase was applied by some
logical writers to a scries of arguments used in any inquiry in which
we go on excluding, one by one, certain suppositions, or certain
CiiAP. III. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 61
classes of things, from that whose real nature we are seeking to
ascertain.
Thus, certain symptoms, suppose, exclude *' small-pox ;'^ that is,
prove this not to he the patient's disorder ; other symptoms, suppose,
exclude ** Scarlatina,'' <fec., and so one may proceed hy gradually
narrowing the range of possible suppositions. Hence, the Second-
Figure might be called the " exclusive ' Figure.
The Third-Figure is, of course, the one employed when the Use of the
Middle-Term is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a Figure.
Subject. • This is also the form into which most arguments will
naturally fall that are used to establish an objection (Enstasis of
Aristotle) to an opponent's Premiss, when his argument is such as
to require that premiss to be Universal. It might be called, there-
fore, the " E astatic'' Figure. E. G. If any one contends that *' this or
that doctrine ought not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained
or comprehended," his suppressed major-premiss may be refuted by
the argument that ** the connexion of the Body and Soul cannot be
explained or comprehended." Thus again you might prove by the
example of a certain individual, ^^ the contradictory of a Proposition
(which would seem to most persons a very probable conjecture) that
a deaf and dumb person, born blind, cannot be taught language.
A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be
exhibited in this form.
As it is on the Dictum above-mentioned that all Reasoning ulti- ReductJonof
mately depends, so, all arguments may be in one way or other ^ "Sisms.
brought into some one of the four Moods in the First-Figure : and a
Syllogism is, in that case, said to be reduced: [i.e. to tlie first-figure.)
These four are called the perfect moods, and all the rest imperfect.
Ostensive Reduction.
§5.
In reducing a Syllogism, we are not, of course, allowed to intro-
duce any new Term or Proposition, having nothing granted but the
truth of the Premises ; but these Premises are allowed to be illatively
converted (because the truth of any Proposition implies that of its
illative Converse) or transposed: by taking advantage of this liberty,
where there is need, we deduce (in Figure 1st,) from the Premises
originally given, either the very same Conclusion as the original one,
or another from which the original Conclusion follows by illative
Conversion. JS.G. Darapti,
" All wits are dreaded ;
All wits are admired ;
Some who are admired are dreaded,'*
't Laura Bridgeman, alluded to above.
62 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
is reduced into Darii, hj converting "by limitation" (per accldens]
the minor Premiss.
** All wits are dreaded ;
Some who are admired are wits ; therefore
Some who are admired are dreaded."
And Camestres, — e.g.
** All true philosophers account virtue a good in itself;
The advocates of pleasure do not account, &,c.
Therefore they are not true philosophers,"
is reduced to Celarent, by simply converting the Minor, and then
transposing the Premises.
** Those who account virtue a good in itself, are not advocates
of pleasure ;
All true philosophers account virtue, <fec. : therefore
No true philosophers are advocates of pleasure."
This Conclusion may be illatwely converted into the original one.
So, Bar oho \^^ e.g.
Reduction ** Every true patriot is a friend to religion;
con^ersion'^ Some great statesmen are not friends to religion ;
by negation. Some great statesmen are not true patriots,"
to Ferio, by converting the major hy negatioUf [''contraposition,"]
Tide Chap II. § 4.
** He who is not a friend to religion, is not a true patriot ;
Some great statesmen," <fcc.
and the rest of the Syllogism remains the same; only that the
minor Premiss must be considered as affirmative, because you take
*' not-a-friend-to-religion," as the middle term. In the same
manner Bokardo^ to Darii; e.g.
**Some slaves are not discontented;
All slaves are wronged; therefore
Some who are wronged are not discontented/*
Convert the major ** by negation " (** contraposition ") and then
transpose them ; the Conclusion will be the converse hy negation of
the original one^ which therefore may be inferred from it; e.g.
*2 Or Fakoro, considered i.e. as Festino. 33 Qr Dokamo, considered i.e. as Di?a-
See note at the end of this chapter. mis. See note at the end of this chapter.
Chap. III. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 63
"All slaves are wronged;
Some who are not discontented are slaves;
Some who are not discontented are wronged."
In these ways (by what is called Ostensive Eeduction^ because
you prove, in the first figure, either the very same Conclusion as
before, or one ichich implies it) all the imperfect Moods may be
reduced to the four perfect ones. But there is also another way,
called Indirect-reduction, or
Beductio ad impossihile.
§6.
By which we prove (in the First-Figure) not, directly, that the
original Conclusion is true, but that it cannot he false; i.e. that an
absurdity would follow from the supposition of its being false; e.g.
"All true patriots are friends to religion;
Some great statesmen are not friends to religion;
Some great statesmen are not true patriots:"
if this Conclusion be not true, its contradictory must be true; via,
"All great statesmen are true patriots:"
let this then be assumed, in the place of the minor Premiss of the
original Syllogism, and a false conclusion will be proved; e.g.
bAr, "All true patriots are friends to religion;
bA, All great statesmen are true patriots;
rA, All great statesmen are friends to religion:^
for as this Conclusion is the Contradictory of the original minor
Premiss, it must be false, since the Premises are always supposed
to be granted; therefore one of the Premises (by which it has been
correctly proved) must be false also; but the major Premiss (being
one of those originally granted) is true; therefore the falsity must
be in the minor Premiss; which is the contradictory of the original-
Conclusion; therefore the original-Conclusion must be true. This
is the indirect mode of Reasoning. (See Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. II.
§!•)
§7.
This kind of Reduction is seldom employed but for Baroho and
Boli'ardo, which are thus reduced by those who confine tliemselvos
to simple Conversion, and Conversion by limitation, (per accidens;)
G
64 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
siprnification and tliGj framed the names of their Moods, with a view to point out
ottheMoods^ the manner in which each is to he reduced; viz. B, C, D, F, which
are the initial letters of all the Moods, indicate to which Mood of
the first-figure {Barbara, Celarent^ Darii, and Ferio) each of the
others is to be reduced : m indicates that the Premises are to be
transposed; s and p, that the Proposition denoted by the vowel
immediately preceding, is to be converted; s, simply, p, per accidens,
[by limitation:] thus, in Camestres, (see example,) the C indicates
that it must be reduced to Celarent; the two ss, that the minor
Premiss and Conclusion must be converted simply; the m, that the
Premises must be transposed. The P, in the mood Bramantip,
denotes that the Premises warrant a Universal-conclusion in place
of a Particular. The /, though of course it cannot be illatively
converted per accidens, viz.: so as to become A, yet is thus converted
in the Conclusion, because as soon as the Premises are transposed
(as denoted by m,) it appears that a Universal Conclusion follows
from them.
K (which indicates the reduction ad impossibile) is a sign that the
Proposition, denoted by the vowel immediately before it, must be
left out, and the contradictory of the Conclusion substituted; viz.
for the minor Premiss in Baroho and the major in Bokardo. But
it has been already shown (§ 5) that the Conversion by "contra-
position," [by "negation"] will enable us to reduce these two
Moods, ostensively.^
Chap. IV.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. III.
Of Modal Syllogisms^ and of all Arguments besides regular and
pure- Categorical Syllogisms.
Of Modals.
§1.
Hitherto we have treated of pure categorical Propositions, and
the Syllogisms composed of such. A pure categorical proposition
is styled by some logicians a proposition " de inesse,'' from its
asserting simply that the Predicate is or is not (in our conception)
contained in the Subject; as " John killed Thomas." A modal
proposition asserts that the predicate is or is not contained in the
«*'* If any one should choose that the version by negation ; and then the names
names of these moods should indicate would be, by a slight change, faAroro and
this, he might malie K the index of con- Dokamo.
Chap. IV. § 1.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 65
Subject in a certain mode, or manner; as, "accidentally,"
♦'wilfiillv," etc.
A Modal proposition may be stated as a pure one, by attacJiing
the mode to one of the Terms: and the Proposition will in all respects
fall under the foregoing rules; e.g. ** John killed Thomas luilfuUi/
and maliciovslif;'' here the Mode is to be regarded as part of the
Predicate. " It is probable that all knowledge is useful;" "pro-
bably useful " is here the Predicate. But when the Mode is only
used to express the necessary, contingent, or impossible connexion
of the Terms, it may as well be attached to the Subject: e.g. "man
is necessarVy mortal;" is the same as "all men are mortal:"
"injustice is in no case expedient," corresponds to "no injustice is
expedient:" and "this man is occas2owa% intemperate," has the
force of a particular: (vide Chap. II. § 2. note.) It is thus, and
thus only, that two singular Propositions may be contradictories;
e.g. "this man is never intemperate," will be the contradictory of
the foregoing. Indeed every sign (of universality or particularity)
may be considered as a Mode.
Since, however, in all IVfodal Propositions, you assert that the
dictum {i.e. the assertion itself) and the Mode, agree together, or
disagree, so, in some cases, this may be the most convenient way
of stating a Modal, purely:
subj. cop. pred. subject
e.g. " It is impossible that all men should be virtuous."
sub. cop.
Such is a proposition of the Apostle Paul's: "This is a
prep. subject.
faithful saying, <fec. that Jesus Christ came into the world to
subj.
save sinners."^ In these cases one of your Terms (the subject) is
itself an entire Proposition.
In English the word IN is often used in expressing one proposi-
tion combined with another in such a manner as to make the two,
one proposition: e.g. "You will have a formidable opponent to
encounter in the Emperor:" this involves two propositions; 1st,
" You will have to encounter the Emperor;" 2d, " He will prove a
formidable opponent:" this last is implied by the word in, which
denotes (agreeably to the expression of Logicians mentioned above
when they speak of a proposition " de inesse") that that Predicate
is contained in that Subject.
It may be proper to remark in this place, that we may often ^^^J^J^^^^^Xf,
meet with a Proposition whose drift and force 'will be very dif- '^"""^' "
«5 See Rhetoric, Part III. Ch. II. § 2.
rropositioTJ
66 SYNTHETICAL COIVIPENDIUM. ' [Book IT.
ferent, according as we regard tliis or that as its Predicate.^' Indeed,
properly speaking, it may be considered as several different Pro-
positions, each indeed implying the truth of all the rest, but each
having a distinct Predicate; the division of the sentence being
varied in each case ; and the variations marked, either by the
collocation of the words, the intonation of the voice, or by the
designation of the emphatic words, \_rAz.: the Predicate,] as scored
1 2
under, or printed in italics, E.G. "The Organon of Bacon was
3 4 5 6
not designed to supersede the Organon of Aristotle:" this might be
regarded as, at least", six different propositions : if the word num-
bered (1) were in italics, it would leave us iit liberty to suppose that
Bacon might have designed to supersede by some work of his, the
Organon of Aristotle; but not by his own Organon; if No. 2 were
in italics, we should understand the author to be contending, that
whether or no any other author had composed an Organon with such
a design. Bacon at least did not: if No. 3, then, we should under-
stand him to maintain that whether Bacon's Organon does or does
not supersede Aristotle's, no such design at least was entertained :
and so with the rest. Each of these is a distinct Proposition; and
though each of them implies the truth of all the rest, (as may easily
be seen by examining the example given) one of tliem may be, in
one case, and another, in another, the one which it is important to
insist on.
We should consider in each case what Question it is that is
proposed, and what answer to it would, in the instance before us,
be the most opposite or contrasted to the one to be examined. E. G.
** You will find this doctrine in Bacon," may be contrasted, either
with, '* You will find in Bacon a diferent doctrine," or with, " You
will find this doctrine in a different author."
Emphatic And observe, that when a proposition is contrasted with one
which has a diferent predicate, the Predicate is the emphatic word;
as "this man is a murderer;'' i.e. not one who has slain another
accidentally, or in self-defence: " this man is a murderer," with the
Copula for the emphatic word, stands opposed to " he is not a
murderer;" a proposition with the same terms, but a different
Copula. "»^
8<5 On the logical analysis of propositions den : and the answer is " Thou shalt not
Mr. Greenlaw has founded a very ingeni- steal;'' " ThoushaltnotcommitaciMZ^eri/,"
ous, and as it appears to me, correct and &c.
useful gi-aminatical theory, of the use of The connexion between Lo.aic and
the Latin Subjundive. His work is well correct delivery is further pointed out in
worth the notice of Students ot Logic as Rhet. App. 1.
well as of Latinity. Strictly speaking, the two cases I have
37 Thus if any one reads (as many are mentioned coincide; for when the " is"
aptto(lo)"Thoushaltwo< steal, "—"Thou or the "not" is emphatic, it becomes
shalt not commit adiiiti-ry," he implies properly the Predicate; viz. "the state-
the qiK'stion to be, whether we are coin- ment of this man's being a murderer, is
iii;u!(W>d to steal or to forbear: but the fnte," or " is/aise."
Quystion really is, whai things are forbid-
Chap. IV. § 2.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 67
It will often happen tliat several of the Propositions which are
thus stated in a single sentence, may require, each, to he distinctly
stated and proved : e.g. the Advocate may have to prove, first tlie
fact, that *' John killed Thomas;" and then, the character of the
act, that *' the kiHing- was wilful and mahcious." See Praxis, at
the end of the vol. See also Elements of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. III.
§5.
Of Hypothetkals.
§2.
A Hypothetical^ Proposition is defined to be ttco or more cafe-
goricals muted hy a Copula [conjunction]: and the diff'ercnt kinds
of Hypothetical Propositions are named from their respective
conjunctions; mz. conditional, disjunctive, causal, (fee.
When a liypothetical conclusion is inferred from a hypothetical
Premiss, so that the force of the Reasoning does not turn on the
hypothesis, then the Hypothesis (as in Modals) must be considered
as part of one of the Terms; so that the Reasoning will be, in
effect, categorical: e.g.
predicate.
" Every conqueror is either a hero or a villain:
Csesar Avas a conqueror; therefore
predicate.
He was either a hero or a villain.'^
*' Whatever comes from God is entitled to reverence;
subject.
If the Scriptures are not wholly false, they must come from God ;
If they are not wholly false, they are entitled to reverence."
But when the Reasoning itself rests on the hypothesis (in which
way a categorical Conclusion may be drawn from a hypothetical
Premiss,) this is what is called a hypotJietical Syllogism; and rules
have been devised for ascertaining the validity of such Arguments
at once, without bringing them into the categorical form. (And
note, that in these Syllogisms, the hypothetical Premiss is called
the major, and the categorical one the minor.) They are of two
kinds, conditional and disjunctive.
38 Compound, according to some writew.
68 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
Of Conditionals,
§3.
A Conditional^ Proposition has in it an illative force; i.e. it
contains two, and only two categorical Propositions, whereof one
results from the other [or follows from it,] e.g.
antecedent.
" If the Scriptures are not wholly false,
consequent.
they are entitled to respect."
That from which the other results is called the Antecedent; that
which results from it, the Consequent [consequens ;) and the con-
nexion between the two (expressed by the word "if'*) the Conse-
quence [consequentia.)
The natural order is, that the Antecedent should come before the
Consequent; but this is frequently reversed : e.g. "The husband-
man is well off if he knows his own advantages." (Virg. Geor.)
Every Conditional-proposition maybe considered as an Universal-
affirmative, whether the members of which it consists be Universal
or Particular, Negative or Affirmative. And the truth or falsity
of a Conditional-Proposition depends entirely on tlic consequence:
eg> "if Logic is useless, it deserves to be neglected;" here both
Antecedent and Consequent are false: yet the whole Proposition is
true; i.e. it is true that the Consequent /o/Zoits from the Antecedent.
•' If Cromwell was an Englishman, he was an usurper," is just the
reverse case: for though it is true that " Cromwell was an English-
man," and also that " he was an usurper," yet it is not true that
the latter of these Propositions depends on the former ; the whole
Proposition, therefore, is false, (or at least absurd, — see next
section) though both Antecedent and Consequent are true.
It is to be observed, however, that a false, or at least nugatory,
Conditional-Proposition of this kind, r>iz.: in which each member is
a true categorical, — is such, that, though itself absurd, no false
conclusion can be drawn from it ; as may be seen from the instance
just given.
A Conditional Proposition, in short, may be considered as an
assertion of the validity of a certain Argument ; since to assert that
an argument is valid, is to assert that the Conclusion necessarily
results from the Premises, whether those Premises be true or not.
The meaning, then, of a Conditional Proposition, — which is, that
the antecedent being granted^ the consequent is granted, may be con-
so Called Hypothetical by those writers who use the word Comi^ound to denote
wliat I have called Hypothetical.
Chap. IV. 5 3.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 69
sidered in two points of view: first, '* if the Antecedent he true, the
Consequent must be true ;" hence the first rule ; the antecedent being
granted, the consequent may he inferred: secondly, '* if the Antecedent
were true, the Consequent would be true;" hence the second rule;
the consequent heing denied, the antecedent may he denied; for the
Antecedent must in tkat case be false ; since if it were true, the
consequent (which is granted to be false) would be true also. E.G.
'* If this man has a fever, he is not fit to travel ;" here if you grant
the antecedent, the first rule applies, and you infer the truth of the
Consequent ; " he has a fever ; therefore he is not fit to travel." If Constructive
A is B, C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is D ; and this is called a destructive.
covs'ructive Conditional Syllogism. But if you deny the consequent
(i.e. grant its contradictory) the second rule applies, and you infer
the contradictory of the antecedent; " he is fit to travel; therefore
he has not a fever;" this is the destructive Conditional Syllogism.
If A is B, C is D; C is not D, therefore A is not B. Again, " If
the crops are not bad, corn must be cheap," for a major; then,
** but the crops are not bad, therefore corn must be cheap," is
Constructive. " Corn is not cheap, therefore the crops are bad,"
is Destructive. " If every increase of population is desirable, some
misery is desirable; but no misery is desirable; therefore some
increase of population is not desirable," is Destructive.
But if you affirm the consequent or deny the antecedent^ you can
infer nothing ; for the same Consequent may follow from other
Antecedents: e.g. in the example above, a man may be unfit to
travel from other disorders besides a fever ; therefore it does not
follow, from his being unfit to travel, that he has a fever ; or (for
the same reason) from his not having a fever, that he is not unfit to
travel.
And it is to be observed that these fallacies correspond respec- Fallacies in
tively with those mentioned in treating of Categorical Syllogisms, and In '
The assertion of the Consequent, and inferring thence the truth of JoTj^!*^^*^*^*^
the Antecedent, answers to the fallacy of ''undistributed-Middle," correspond.
or to that of ** negative-premises." JE.G. *' He who has a fever is
unfit to travel;" (or, ** is not fit to travel.") . " This man is unfit"
(or, " is not fit") " to travel; therefore he has a fever." The fallacy
again of denying the Antecedent, and thence inferring the Contra-
dictory of the Consequent, corresponds either to that of negative-
premises, or to " iUicit-process of the Major," or that of introducing,
palpably, *' more than three terms." E.G. *' He who has a fever
is unfit to travel; this man has not a fever," ka.^^
There are, then, two, and only two, kinds of Conditional Syllo-
gisms ; the constructive, founded on the first rule, and answering to
dit-ect Reasoning ; and the destructive, on the second, answering to
indirect; being in fact a mode of throwing the indirect form of
40 Virtually, all these fallacies do really amount to the introduction of a fourth term.
See § 2. Ch. III.
70 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
reasoning into the direct: e.g. If C be not the centre of the circle,
some other point must be ; which is impossible : therefore C is the
centre. (Euclid, B. III. Pr. 1.)
Conversion ^nd note, that a Conditional Proposition maj (like the categorical
tiouuis.'" A) be converted by negation; i.e. you may take the contradictory of
the conseqiicfit, as an antecedent, and the contradictory of the antece-
dent, as a consequent: e.g. " If this man is fit to travel, he has not
a fever." By this conversion of the major Premiss, a Constructive
Syllogism may be reduced to a Destructive, and vice versa. (See
§ 6. Ch. III.)
0/ Disjunctives.
§4.
A Disjunctive Proposition is one that consists of two or more
categoricals, connected by the conjunctions ** either" and " or," the
force of which is, to state an alternative; i.e. to imply that some one
of the categoricals thus connected must be true: e.g. "either A is
B, or C is D" will not be a true proposition unless one of the two
members of it be true.
On the other hand, one of the members may be true, and yet
they may have no such natural connexion together as to warrant
their being proposed as an alternative ; as " either Britain is an
island, or a triangle is a square." Such a proposition would rather
be called nugatory and absurd, than false ; since no false conclusion
could be deduced from it ; as was remarked in the last section con-
cerning such a Conditional as this might be reduced to: e.g. *' If
Britain is not an island," &c. Such propositions are often collo-
quially uttered in a kind of jest.
If, therefore, one or more of these categoricals be denied [i.e.
granted to be false) you may infer that the remaining one, or (if
several) some one of the remaining ones, is true. B.G. " Either the
world is eternal, or the work of chance, or the work of an intelli-
gent Being; it is not eternal, nor the work of chance, therefore it is
the work of an intelligent Being." *' It is either spring, summer,
autumn, or winter ; but it is neither spring nor summer ; therefore
it is either autumn or winter." Either A is B, or C is D ; but A
is not B, therefore C is D.
Observe, that in these examples (as well as in most others) it is
implied not only that one of the members (the categorical Proposi-
tions) must be true, but that only one can be true ; so that, in such
cases, if one or more members be affirmed, the rest may be denied;
Exclusive [the members may then be called exclusive:] e.g. "It is summer,
di^unctives. ^}^(.j.gfQj.e it is neither spring, autumn, nor winter;" '* either A is B,
or C is D ; but A is B, therefore C is not D." But this is by no
means universally the case ; e.g. " Virtue tends to procure us either
the esteem of mankind, or the favour of God:" here both members
always
affirmatiire.
Chap. IV. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 71
are true, and consequently from one being affirmed we are not
authorized to deny the other. Of course we are left to conjecture
in each case, from the context, whether it is meant to be implied
that the members are or are not *' exclusive."
It is evident that a disjunctive Syllogism may easily be reduced nisjunctivei
to a conditional, by taking as an Antecedent the contradictory of one eonditionaL
or more of the members : e.g. if it is not spring or summer, it is
either autumn or winter, &c.
It is to be observed of Hypothetical [compound] Propositions, Hypotheti-
whether Conditional or Disjunctive, that they are always affirmative: propositions
i.e. it is always affirmed, not denied, that the connexion between the
several categorical members, denoted, respectively, by the conjunc-
tions employed, does exist. Accordingly, the contradiction of any
hypothetical proposition is not made by a hypothetical. If I assert
that " if A is B, C is D," you might deny that, by saying " it does
not follow that if A is B, C must be D;" or in some such expression.
So the contradiction of this, "either A is B or C is D," would be
"h J two categorical negatives; "neither is A, B, nor is C, D:" or,
it is possible that neither A is B, nor C, D. The conjunctions
"neither" and "nor," it should be observed, do not correspond in
their nature with "either " and "or;" since these last are disjunc-
tive, which the others are not.
The Dilemma,
§5,
is a complex hind of Conditional Syllogism. The account usually
given of the Dilemma in Logical treatises is singularly perplexed
and unscientific. And it is remarkable that all the rules they
usually give respecting it, and the faults against which they caution
us, relate exclusively to the Subject-matter: as if one were to lay
down as rules respecting a Syllogism in Barbara, "1st. Care must
be taken that the major Premiss be true: 2dly. that the minor
Premiss be true !" *.
Most, if not all, writers on this point either omit to tell us whether
the Dilemma is a kind of conditional, or of disjunctive argument;
or else refer it to the latter class, on account of its having one
disjunctive Premiss ; though it clearly belongs to the class of Con-
ditionals.
1st. If you have in the major Premiss several antecedents all with
the same consequent, then, these Antecedents, being (in the minor)
disjunctively granted [i.e. it being granted that some one of them is
true,) the one common consequent may be inferred, (as in the case of
a simple Constructive Syllogism:) e.g. if A is B, C is D; and if X
is Y, C is D; but either A is B, or X is Y: therefore C is D. "If
the blest in heaven have no desires, they will be perfectly content :
Diiemiuas.
72 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
SO they will, if their desires are fully gratified; but either they will
have no desires, or have them fully gratified ; therefore they will be
cKAictive P^^'^^^% content." Note, in this case, the two Conditionals which
Dilemma, make up the major Premiss may be united into one Proposition by
means of the word ''whether:'' e.g. ** whether the blest, &c. have
no desires, or have their desires gratified, they will be content."
?o ™tJuctive '^^' ^^* ^^ *^^^ several antecedents have each a different consequent.
Dilemma, then the Antecedents, being, as before, disjunctively granted, you
can only disjunctively infer the consequents: e.g. if A is B, C is D;
and if X is Y, E is F; but either A is B, or X is Y; therefore
either C is D, or E is F. ** If iEschines joined in the pubhc
rejoicings, he is inconsistent; if he did not, he is unpatriotic: but
he either joined, or not: therefore he is either inconsistent or
unpatriotic."*^ This case, as well as the foregoing, is evidently
constructive,
tha^"aTln*\ In the Destructive form, whether you have one Antecedent with
properly Several Consequents, or several Antecedents, either with one, or
' with several Consequents; in all these cases, if you deny the whole of
the Consequent, or Consequents, you may in the conclusion deny the
whole of the Antecedent or Antecedents : e.g. " If the world were eter-
nal, the most useful arts, such as printing, &c. would be of unknown
antiquity: and on the same supposition, there would be records long
prior to the Mosaic; and likewise the sea and land, in all parts of
the globe, might be expected to maintain the same relative situa-
tions now as formerly : but none of these is the fact : therefore the
world is not eternal." Again, " If the world existed from eternity,
there would be records prior to the Mosaic; and if it were produced
by chance, it would not bear marks of design : there are no records
prior to the Mosaic: and the world does bear marks of design:
therefore it neither existed from eternity, nor is the work of chance."
These are sometimes called Dilemmas, but hardly differ from simple
conditional Syllogisms; two or more being expressed together.
Nor is the case different if you have one antecedent with several
consequents, which consequents you disjunctively deny; for that
comes to the same thing as wholly denying^them ; since if they be
not all true, the one antecedent must equally fall to the ground ; and
the Syllogism will be equally simple: e.g. ** If we admit the popular
objections against Political Economy, we must admit that it tends
to an excessive increase of wealth; and also, that it tends to
impoverishment: but it cannot do both of these; {i.e. either not the
one, or, not the other) therefore we cannot admit the popular
objections," &c.; which is evidently a simple Destructive.
The true Dilemma is, "a conditional Syllogism with several*^
antecedents in the major ^ and a disjunctive minor;'* hence,
<i DemosL For the Crotvn. to speak of "the horns of a dilemma;"
42 Tlie name Dilemma implies precisely but it is evident there may be either two
two antecedents ; and hence it is common or more.
Chap. IV. § 5.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 73
od. That is most properly called a destructive Dilemma, which destructive
, ,,., , '. ^ ^ - ,. . . . Ti • . Dilemma.
has (hke the constructive ones) a msjunctwe minor Jrremiss; i.e.
when joii have several Antecedents with each a different Consequent;
which consequents (instead of wholly denying them, as in the case
lately mentioned) you disjunctively/ denj; and thence, in the Conclu-
bion, deny disjunctively the Antecedents: e.g. if A is B, C is D;
and if X is Y, E is F: but either C is not D, or E is not F; there-
fore, either A is not B, or X is not Y. "If this man were wise, he
would not speak irreverently of Scripture in jest; and if he were
good, he would not do so in earnest; but he does it, either in jest,
or earnest; therefore he is either not wise, or not good." Or again,
you may have a Dilemma partly constructive and partly destructive:
as the above example would be, if you were to convert one of the
conditionals, (see § 3.) into "if C is not D, A is not B:" for the
Minor-Premiss would then assert that either the Antecedent of one
of the Conditionals is true, or the Consequent of the other, false.
Every Dilemma may be reduced into two or more simple Condi- Resolution
tional-Syllogisms : e.g. " If -/Eschines joined, &c. he is inconsistent; Dilemma,
he did join, &;c. therefore he is inconsistent;" and again, "If
-^schines did not join, &lc. he is unpatriotic; he did not, &C. there-
fore he is unpatriotic." Now an opponent might deny either of the
minor Premises in the above Syllogisms, but he could not deny both;
and therefore he must admit one or the other of the Conclusions;
for, when a Dilemma is employed, it is supposed that some one of
the Antecedents must be true (or, in the destructive kind, some one
of the Consequents false), but that we cannot tell which of them is
so; and this is the reason why the argument is stated in the form
of a Dilemma.
Sometimes it may happen that both antecedents may be true, and
that we may be aware of this; and yet there may be an advantage
in stating (either separately or conjointly) both arguments, even
when each proves the same conclusion, so as not to derive any
additional confirmation from the other; — still, I say, it may some-
times be advisable to state both, because, of two propositions equally
true, one man may deny or be ignorant of the one, while he admits
the other; and another man, vice versa.
From what has been said, it may easily be seen that all Dilemmas
are in fact conditional Syllogisms ; and that Disjunctive Syllogisms
may also be reduced to the form of Conditionals ; but as it has been
remarked, that all Reasoning whatever may ultimately be brought
to the one test of Aristotle's " Dictum," it remains to show how a
Conditional Syllogism may be thrown into such a form, that that
test vrill at once apply to it ; and this is called the
74 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. LBook II.
Beduction of Ilypotlieticah^^
§6.
For tills purpose we must consider every Conditional Proposition
as a Universal-affirmative categorical Proposition, of wiiich the
Terms are entire Propositions, mz. the antecedent answering to the
Subject, and the consequent to the Predicate. E. G. The Proposi-
tion "• if A is B, X is Y" may be considered as amounting to this ;
** The case [or supposition] of A being B, is a case of X being Y."
And then, to say (as in the Minor-premiss and the Conclusion, of a
constructive-conditional syllogism) " A is B ; and therefore X is Y,"
is equivalent to saying " the present [or the existing] case is a case
of A being B : therefore this is a case of X being Y." Again,
to say, '* if Louis is a good king, France is likely to prosper," is
equivalent to saying, ** The case of Louis being a good king, is a
case of France being likely to prosper :" and if it be granted as a
minor Premiss to the Conditional Syllogism, that *' Louis is a good
king ;" that is equivalent to saying, " the present case is the case
of Louis being a good king ;" from which you will draw a conclusion
in Barbara, {viz. " the present case is a case of France being
likely to prosper,") exactly equivalent to the original Conclusion
of the Conditional Syllogism : viz. " France is likely to prosper."
As the Constructive Conditional may thus be reduced to Barbara,
so may the Destructive, in like manner, to Celarent: e.g. *' If the
Stoics are right, pain is no evil : but pain is an evil ; therefore the
Stoics are not right;" is equivalent to — "The case of the Stoics
being right, is the case of pain being no evil ; the present case is
43 Aldrich has stated, somewhat rashly, have not each the same subject, (as in the
that Aristotle utterly despised Hypothe- very example he gives, "If A is B, C is
tical Syllogisms, and thence made no D,") he gives no rule for reducing such
mention of them. We cannot, however, a Syllogism as has a Pi-emiss of this kind ;
considering how large a portion of his and indeed leads us to suppose that it is
works is lost, draw any conclusion from to be rejected as invalid, though be has
the mere absence of a treatise on this just before demonstrated its validity,
branch, in the portion which has come And this is likely to have been one
down to us. among the various causes which occasion
Aldrich observes, that no hypothetical many learners to regard the whole system
argument is valid which cannot be re- of Logic as a string of idle reveries, having
duced to a categorical form ; and this is nothing true, substantial, or practically
evidently agreeable to what has been said useful in it; but of the same ciiaracter
at the beginning of Chap. III.; but then with the dreams of Alchymy, Demon-
he has unfortunately omitted to teach us ology. and judicial-Astrology. Such a
how to reduce Hypotheticals to this form ; mistake is surely the less inexcusable in
except in the case where the Antecedent a learner, when his master first demon-
and Consequent chance to have each the strates the validity of a certain argument,
same Subject; m which case, he tells us and then tells him that after all it is good
to take the minor Premiss and Conclu- for nothing; (prorsus repudiandian.)
sion as an Enthymeme, and fill that up In the late editions of Aldrich's Logic,
categorically ; e.g. "If Cajsar wasatyrant, all that he says of the reduction of I lypo-
he deserved death; he was a tyrant, there- theticals is omitted; which certainly
fore he deserved death;" which may easily would have been an improvement, if
be reduced to a categorical form, by more correct one had been substituted;
taking as a major Premiss, "all tyrants
deserve death." But when (as is often
the case) the Antecedent and Consequent
taking as a major Premiss, "all tyrants but as it is, there is a complete hiatus in
deserve death." But when (as is often the system.
Chap. IY. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 75
not the case of pain being no evil ; therefore the present ease is not
the case of the Stoics being right." This is Camestres, which, of
course, is easily reduced to Celarent. Or, if you will, all Conditional
Syllogisms may be reduced to Barbara, by considering them all as
Constructive; which maybe done, as mentioned above, by "con-
verting by negation" [contraposition] the major Premiss. (See § 3.)
The reduction of Hypotheticals may always be effected in the Abridged
manner above stated ; but as it produces a circuitous awkwardness reduction ot
of expression, a more convenient form may in some cases be c^g"*^^*^^'
substituted. E. G. In the example above, it may be convenient to
take " true" for one of the Terms : " that pain is no evil is not true ;
that pain is no evil is asserted by the Stoics ; therefore something
asserted by the Stoics is not true." Sometimes again it may be
better to unfold the argument into two Syllogisms : e.g. in a former
example; first, Louis is a good king ; the governor of France is Louis;
therefore the governor of France is a good king." And then, second,
" every country governed by a good king is likely to prosper," <fec.
A Dilemma may of course (see § 5,) be reduced into two or more
categorical Syllogisms.
When the Antecedent and Consequent of a Conditional have each
the same Subject, you may sometimes reduce the Conditional by
merely substituting a categorical Major-Premiss for the conditional
one : e.g. instead of " if Ciusar was a tyrant, he deserved death ; he
"Nvas a tyrant, therefore he deserved death ;" you may put for a
major, "all tyrants deserve death;" ka. But it is of no great
consequence, whether Hypotheticals are reduced in the most neat
and concise manner or not ; since it is not intended that they should
be reduced to Categoricals, in ordinary practice, as the readiest way
of trying their validity, (their own rules being quite sufficient for
that purpose;) but only that we should he able, if required, to
subject any argument whatever to the test of Aristotle's Dictum, in
order to show that all reasoning turns upon one simple principle.
Of Enthymeme, Sorites, Sc.
§7.
There are various abridged forms of Argument which may be
easily expanded into regular Syllogisms; such as, 1st. The Enthy- Enthymema
meme,** which is a Syllogism with one Premiss suppressed. As all
the Terms will be found in the remaining Premiss and Conclusion,
it will be easy to fill up the Syllogism by supplying the Premiss
that is wanting, whether Major or Minor : e.g. " Caesar was a
tyrant; therefore he deserved death." "A free nation must be
happy ; therefore the English are happy."
_ 44 The word Knthymeme is employed in Rhet. B. I. See Elements of JRhetoric,
m a dilierent sense from this, by Aristotle, Part I. Ch. II. § 2.
76 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
Tills Is tlie ordinary form of speaking and writing. It Is evident
that Entliymemes may be filled up hypothetlcally.
It Is to be observed, that the Enthymeme is not strictly syllo-
gistic; i.e. its conclusiveness is not apparent from the mere form of
expression, tiU the suppressed Premiss shall have been, either
actually or mentally supplied. The expressed Premiss may be true,
and yet the Conclusion false.
The Sorites, on the other hand, is strictly Syllogistic ; as may be
seen by the examples". If the Premises stated be true, the conclu-
sion must be true. For,
2d. When you have a string of Syllogisms, In the first figure,
in which the Conclusion of each is made the Premiss of the next,
till you arrive at the main or ultimate Conclusion of all, you may
Sorites, sometimes state these briefly. In the form called Sorites; in which
the Predicate of the first proposition Is made the Subject of the next ;
and so on, to any length, till finally the Predicate of the last of the
Premiseslspredicated(lnthe Conclusion) of the Subject of the first: e.g.
A (either every A, or some A) is B, every B is C, every C is D, every
D is E ; therefore A is E ; or else *' no D is E ; therefore A Is not
E." *' The English are a brare people ; a brave people are free ;
a free people are happy, therefore the Enghsh are happy." A
Sorites, then, has as many Middle-terms as there are intermediate
Propositions between the first and the last ; and consequently, it
may be drawn out into as many separate Syllogisms ; of which the
first will have, for Its major Premiss, the second, and for its minor^
the first, of the Propositions of the Sorites ; as may be seen by the
example. The reader will perceive also by examination of that
example, and by framing others, that the first proposition in the
Sorites is the only minor premiss that is expressed ; when the
whole is resolved into distinct syllogisms, each conclusion becomes
the minor premiss of the succeeding syllogism. Hence, in a Sorites,
ihQ first proposition, and that alone, of all the premises, may be
particular ; because in the first Figure the minor may be particular,
but not the major ; (see Chap. III. § 4.) and all the other proposi-
tions, prior to the conclusion, are major premises. It is also
evident that there may be, in a Sorites, one, and only one, negative
premiss, xiiz. the last : for if any of the others were negative, the
result would be that one of the Syllogisms of the Sorites would have
a negative minor premiss ; which is (in the 1st Fig.) incompatible
with correctness. See Chap. III. § 4.
Am.ncation To the Sorltes the ** Dictum" formerly treated of may be applied,
Dicfum to with one small addition, which is self-evident. " Whatever is
the Sorites, affirmed or denied of a whole Class, may be affirmed or denied of
whatever Is comprehended In [any Class that is wholly compre-
hended in] that Class. This sentence, omitting the portion enclosed
in brackets, you will recognise as the ** Dictum" originally laid
down : and the words in brackets supply that extension of it which
Chaf. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 77
makes it applicable to a ** Sorites," of whatever lengtli; since il
is manifest that that clause might be enlarged as far as you will,
into ** a Class that is wliolly comprehended in a Class, which again
is wholly comprehended in another Class," &c.
A string of Conditional Syllogisms^ may in hke manner be J^r[P?JJl^*'g"
abridged into a Sorites; e.g. if A is B, C is D; if C is D, E is F; ""^
if E IS F, G is H; but A is B, therefore G is H. "If the Scrip-
tures are the Avord of God, it is important that they should be well
explained; if it is important, kc. they deserve to be diligently
Btudied; if they deserve, &c. an order of men should be set aside
for that purpose; but the Scriptures are the word, <fec.; therefore an
order of men should be set aside for the purpose, &c." In a
destructive Sorites, you, of course, go back from the denial of the
last consequent to the denial of the first antecedent: ** G is not H;
therefore A is not B."
The foregoing are all the forms in which Reasoning can be
exhibited syllogistically ; i.e. so that its validity shall be manifest
from the mere form of expression.
Those who have spoken of Induction or of Example, as a distinct ^"jf^'J^^'jQ"*
kind of Argument in a Logical point of view, have fallen into the
common error of confounding Logical with Bhetorical distinctions,
and have wandered from their subject as much as a writer on the
orders of Architecture would do who should introduce the distinc-
tion between buildings of brick and of marble. Logic takes no
cognizance of Induction, for instance, or of a priori reasoning, &c.,
as distinct Forms of argument; for when thrown into the syllogistic
form, and when letters of the alphabet are substituted for tlie
Terms (and it is thus that an Argument is properly to be brought
under the cognizance of Logic), there is no distinction between
them. E.G. "A Property which belongs to the ox, sheep, deer,
goat, and antelope, belongs to all horned animals; rumination
belongs to these; therefore to all." This, which is an inductive
argument, is evidently a Syllogism in Barbara. The essence of
an inductive argument, as well as of the other kinds which are
distinguished from it, consists not in the form of the Argument,
but in the relation which the Subject-matter of the Premises bears
to that of the Conclusion. **
3d. There are various other abbreviations commonly used, which Abbrevia-
are so obvious as hardly to call for explanation : as where one of
the Premises of a Syllogism is itself the Conclusion of an Enthy-
** Hence it is evident how injudicious Nothing probably has tended more to
an arrangement has been adopted by foster the prevailing error of considering
former writers on Logic, wlio have Syllogism as a particular kind of argti-
treated of the Sorites and Enthynieme merit, than the inaccuracy just noticed;
before they entered on the subject of which appears in all or most of the logical
llvpotheticals. works extant. See Dissertation on the
*6 Hee Rhetoric, Parti. Ch. II. 5 6. Province of Reasoning, Ch. 1,
78 SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. [Book II.
meme, wlilcli is expressed at the same time : e.g. " All useful studies
deserve encouragement; Logic is sucli {since it helps us to reason
accurately;) therefore it deserves encouragement;" here the Minor-
premiss is what is called an Enthymematic sentence.^''
elsihxT^' "^"^ ^* ^^^^ ^^ added, that such a sentence will sometimes he in
arguuients, the form, not of a Proposition, but of an Exclanriation, — a Question^
— or a Command; and yet will he such as readily to suggest to the
mind a proposition.
For instance, in some of the examples lately given, one might
say (in place of one of the Propositions) " Choose which you will of
these two suppositions;" or " Who can doubt that so and so
follows?"
The message to Pilate from his wife*^ furnishes an instance of a
single word {''just'') suggesting a Major-premiss, while the Con-
clusion is stated in the form of an exhortation: " Have thou nothing
to do with that just man." And the succeeding sentence must
have been designed to convey a hint of Arguments for the Proof of
each of the Premises on which that Conclusion rested.
And here it may be observed that the usual practice of selecting
for examples, in Logical treatises, such arguments as hardly even
an ignorant clown, or a child, would need to state at full length,
and which the slightest hint would sufficiently suggest to any one,
has contributed to the prevailing mistake of supposing that Syllo-
gisms, universally, are mere trifling; the fact, that all arguments
Things are, substantially, syllogistic, being overlooked. It is worth remark-
proof"to one ing however in this place, that the further any one advances, in
SeTideiu intellectual cultivation, generally, or in any particular department,
to another, he will have less and less need, (not, of argumentation altogether,
but) of such arguments as are needful for a beginner. To this
last, many propositions may need to be proved at full length, which,
to one further advanced, require only to have the proofs hinted at,
and which to one still more advanced need merely to be stated as
propositions, or, ultimately, not even that; being sufficiently sug-
gested to the mind by the mere mention of one of the terms. And
hence the proverbial expression, that " a word is enough to the wise."
Equivalents. It is evident that you may, for brevity, substitute for any term
an equivalent: as in an example above, *' if' for '* Logic;" *' such,"
for "a useful study," (fee. The doctrine of Conversion, laid down
in the Second Chapter, furnishes many equivalent propositions,
since each is equivalent to its illative Converse. The division of
nouns also (for which see Chap. V.) supplies many equivalents; e.g.
if A is the genus of B, B must be a species of A: if A is the cause
of B, B must be the efect of A, <kc.
4th. And many Syllogisms, which at first sight appear faulty,
*7 The antecedent in that Minor-premiss «.«. that which makes it Enthymematic)
is oalicd l»v .Arisiotle tlie Prusylloyism.
<8 Matt, xxvii. IS.
Chap. IV. § 7.] SYNTHETICAL COMPENDIUM. 79
will often be found, on examination, to contain correct reasoning, Syllogisms
and consequently, to be reducible to a regular form ; e.g. when you \Svt&S
have, apparently, negative Premises, it may happen, that by con-
sidering one of them as affirmative, (see Chap. II. § 4,) the Syllo-
gism will be regular: e.g. "no man is happy who is not secure:
no tyrant is secure; therefore no tyrant is happy," is a Syllogism
in Celarent. If this experiment be tried on a Syllogism which has
really negative Premises, the only eifect will be to change that
fault into another: viz. an excess of Terms, or (which is substantially
the same) an undistributed Middle; e.g. " an enslaved people is not
happy; the English are not enslaved ; therefore they are happy:"
if ** enslaved" be regarded as one of the Terms, and " not enslaved"
as another, there will manifestly be four. Hence one may see how
very little difference there is in reality between the different faults
which are enumerated.
Sometimes there will appear to be too many terms; and yet there
will be no fault in the Reasoning, only an irregularity in the expres-
sion : e.g. *' no irrational agent could produce a work which manifests
design; the universe is a work which manifests design; therefore
no irrational agent could have produced the universe." Strictly
speaking, this Syllogism has five terms; but if you look to the
meaning, you will see, that in the first Premiss (considering it as a
part of this argument) it is not, properly, "an irrational agent" that
you are speaking of, and of Avhich you predicate that it could not
produce a work manifesting design; but rather it is this "work,"
<fec. of which you are speaking, and of which it is predicated that it
could not be produced by an irrational agent; if, then, you state the
Propositions in that form, the Syllogism will be perfectly regular.
(See above, § 1.)
Thus, such a Syllogism as this, " every true patriot is disinter-
ested ; few men are disinterested ; therefore few men are true
patriots ;" might appear at first sight to be in the second Figure, and
faulty; whereas it is Barbara, with the Premises transposed: for you
do not really predicate of "few men," that they are "disinterested,"
but of " disinterested persons,'' that they are " few." Again, "none
but candid men are good reasoners; few infidels are candid; few infi-
dels are good reasoners. ' ' In this it will be most convenient to consider
the Major-premiss as being, " all good reasoners are candid," (which
of course is precisely equipollent to its illative converse by negation;)
and the Minor-premiss and Conclusion may in like manner be fairly
expressed thus — "most infidels are not candid; therefore most
infidels are not good reasoners:" which is a regular Syllogism
in Camcstres.^ Or, if you would state it in the first Figure,
*o The reader is to observe that the term is a si^n of distribution; it is merely a
ejnployed as the Subject of the Minor- compendious expression lor " the greater
premiss, and of the conclusion, is " most- part of."
infidels: "he is not to suppose that "most"
H
80 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [Book II
thus: "those who are not candid [or imcandid] are not good
reasoners: most infidels are not candid; most infidels are not good
reasoners."
Chap. V.
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I,
[This Supplement may Be studied either before or after the preceding three Chapters.}
§1-
^nivocai, The usual divisions of nouns into univocal, equivocal, and analogous^
Analogous. ^^^ into nouns of the Jirst and second intention, are not, strictly
speaking, divisions of words, hut divisions of the manner of employ^
ing them; the same word may he employed either univocally,
equivocally, or analogously; either in the First-intention, or in the
Second. The ordinary logical treatises often occasion great per-
plexity to the learner, hy not noticing this circumstance, hut rather
leading him to suppose the contrary. (See Book III. § 8.) Some of
those other divisions of nouns, whi(ih are the most commonly in use,
though not appropriately and exclusively helonging to the Logical
system, — i.e. to the theory of reasoning, — it may he worth while
briefly to notice in this place.
Let it he ohserved, then, that a term expresses the view we take
of an ohject. And its heing viewed as an ohject, i.e. as one, or
again as several, depends on our arbitrary choice ; e.g. we may
consider a "troop of cavalry" as one ohject; or we may make any
single "horse with its rider," or any " separate man" or horse, or
any limb of either, the subject of our thoughts.
Singularand 1. When then any one object is considered according to its actual
Sms!**" existence, as numerically one, the name denoting it is called Singular;
as, "this tree," the "city of London," &c. When it is con-
sidered as to its nature and character only, as heing of such a
description as might equally apply to other single objects, the
inadequate or incomplete view (see B. L § 3, and § 6,) thus taken
of an individual, is expressed by a Common-term; as "tree," "city,"
** minister-of-state."
Absolute 2. When any object is considered as a part of a whole, viewed in
lieiativa. reference to the whole or to another part, of a more complex object
of thought, the name expressing this view is called Relative: and to
Kelative-term is o-p^osed Absolute ; as denoting an object considered as
a whole, and without reference to any thing of which it is a part, or to
any other part distinguished from it. Thus, " Father," and "Son,"
** Rider," "Commander," <kc. are Relatives; being regarded, each as
Chap. V. 5 1.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 81
a part of the complex objects, Father-and-Son, <tc.; the same object
designated absolutely, Avould be termed a Man, Living-Being, <tc.
Nouns are Correlative to each other, which denote objects related Correlative,
to each other, and viewed as to that relation. Thus, though a King
is a ruler of men, "King" and "Man" are not correlative, but
"King" and Subject, are.
3. When there are two views which cannot be taken of one single Compatihie
object at the same time, the terms expressing these views are said
to be Opposite, or Inconsistent [repugnantia]; as, "black," and
"white;" when both may be taken of the same object at the same
time, they are called Consistent, or Compatible [convenientia]; as
** white," and "cold." Relative terms are Opposite, only when
applied with reference to the same Subject : as, one may be both
Master and Servant; but not at the same time to the same person.
4. When the notion derived from the view taken of any object, is Concrete
expressed with a reference to, or as in conjunction with, the object ^"'^^ ^^'
that furnished the notion, it is expressed by a Concrete term ; as,
"foolish," or "fool;" when without any such reference, by an
Abstract^ term, as "folly."
5. When a term applied to some object is such as to imply in its AttributJv©
signification some "attribute'' belonging to that object, such a terna trve^TnT**"
is called by some of the early logical writers " Connotative ;^' but Absolute or
would perhaps be more conveniently called " Attributive.^' It uaive.°°""^
"connotes," i.e. "notes along with" the object [or implies] some-
thing considered as inherent therein: as " The capital of France;"
"The founder of Rome." The founding of Rome, is, by that
appellation, "attributed" to the person to whom it is applied.
A term which merely denotes an object without implying any
attribute of that object, is called "Absolute'' or "Non-connotative;" as
"Paris;" "Romulus." The last terms denote respectively the
same objects as the two former; but do not, like them, connote
[imply in their signification] any attribute of those individuals.
Every Concrete-common-term is "attributive," [connotative]
whether in the adjective ^^ or substantive form; as "Man," "human,"
"triangle," "triangular," "saint," "holy:" for, "man" e.g. or
"human," are appellations denoting, not the attribute itself which
we call "human-nature," but a Being to which such a term is
applied in reference to, and by virtue of, its possessing that attribute.
An Abstract-common-term, being the name of an Attribute-itself —
as "hiunan-nature," "triangularity," "holiness," — is "Absolute"
[non-connotative] except where there is an attribute of an attribute
impUed in the term ; as the term " fear " e.g. may be considered a3
*" It is unfortunate that some ^Titers essential difference in reference to the
have introduced the fashion of calling a^i present subject. Indeed, in Greeli and
" Common terms" ^6s/rrtc^-ternis. in Latin it often happens that a word
^i Some logical writers confine the may be reckoned either adjective or
word to adjectives; but there seems no substantive; as*'stultus;" "hospes.'*
82 • SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [Book II.
implying some hope of escape ; without wliicli the apprehension of
evil would he called *' despair."
It is to be observed that many a term is employed — and to a
certain degree, correctly employed, i.e. not m^5applied — by persons
who do not clearly and fully take in its signification ; — who do not
know, or do not bring before their minds, exactly what is implied
[connoted] by it. E. G. A child learns to apply the term " money "
to the bits of metal he sees pass from hand to hand, long before he
has any clear notion (which some never fully attain) of what it is
that constitutes "money," and is zV/pZiec? [connoted] by the term.
So also it is conceivable that a person might, under certain circum-
stances, know perfectly what individuals are Aldermen, Senators,
&c. while he had but a very vague and imperfect notion of the
Office which such a term implies. And such a familiarity as this
with any term, (together with one's being able to comprehend
processes of reasoning in which it occurs) tends to conceal from men
their imperfect apprehension of its signification, and thus often leads
to confusion of thought, and error. (See B. IV. Ch. IV. § 2.)
Positive, 6. A term which denotes a certain view of an object as being
^riva ive actually taken of it, is called Positive: as "speech,'' "a man
negative. sjpeaking :" a term denoting that this view might conceivably be
taken of the object, but is not, is Privative; as " dumhness," a "man
silent,'' &c.^^ That which denotes that such a notion is not and
could not be formed of the object, is called Negative; as, " a dumb
statue," a "lifeless carcase," &c.
Many negative-terms which are such in sense only, have led to
confusion of thought, from their real character being imperfectly
perceived. E.G. "Liberty," which is a purely negative term,
denoting merely " absence of restraint," is sometimes confounded
with " Power." ^^
It is to be observed that the same term may be regarded either
as Positive, or as Privative or Negative, according to the quality or
character which we are referring to in our minds: thus, of "happy"
and "miserable," we may regard the former as Positive, and the
latter (imhappy) as Privative ; or vice versa; according as we are
thinking of enjoyment or of suffering.
7. A Privative or Negative term is also called Indefinite [infini-
*2 Many Privative epithets are such " every man is a living creature; nothing
that by a little in^jenuity the application dead is a living creature; therefore no
of them may be represented as an absurd- man is dead !"
ity. Thus, Wallis's remark (introduced ^3 An extension of a man's power (as
in this treatise) that a jest is generally a Tucker has observed in his ''Light of
mock-fallacy, i.e. a fallacy not designed Nature") may be the means of diminish-
to deceive, but so palpable as only to ing his "liberty;" as the liberty of a
furnish amusement, might be speciously helpless paralytic is not abridged by
condemned as involving a contradiction: locking the door of his room; though it
for " the design to deceive,''^ it might be would be, if he were to recover the use of
said, " is essential to a fallacy." In the his limbs. See a notice of the word
sauie way it might be argued that it is "aperture" in § 5. Essay 1. 1st Series,
absurd to speak of "a dead man;" e^.
Chap. V. § 2.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 83
turn] in respect of its not defining and marking out an object ; in Definite and
contradistinction to this, the Positive term is called Definite [finitum] ^" ^ ""®'
because it does thus define or mark out. Thus, " organized Being,"
or " Csesar," are called Definite, as marking out, and limiting our
view to, one particular class of Beings, or one single person ;
"unorganized," or "not-Csesar," are called Indefinite, as not
restricting our view to any class, or individual, hut only excluding
one, and leaving it undetermined, what other individual the thing so
spoken of may he, or what other class it may belong to.
It is to be observed, that the most perfect opposition between terms Contradio
exists between any two which differ only in respectively wanting JJfpo^^itioa
and having the particle not (either expressly, or in sense) attached of terms.
to them; as, *' organized," and "not-organized;" "corporeal," and
"incorporeal." For not only is it impossible for both these views
to be taken at once of the same thing, but also, it is impossible but
that one or other should be applicable to every object ; as there is
nothing that can be both, so there is nothing that can be neither.
Every thing that can be even conceived, must be either " Csesar,"
or "not-Csesar;" — either "corporeal," or "incorporeal." And
in this way a complete twofold division may be made of any
subject, being certain (as the expression is) to exhaust it. And
the repetition of this process, so as to carry on a subdivision as far
as there is occasion, is thence called by Logicians " abscissio
infiniti;" i.e. the repeated cutting ofi' of that which the object to be
examined is not; e.g. "1. This disorder either is, or is not, a
dropsy; and for this or that reason, it is not; 2. Any other disease
either is, or is not, gout ; this is not ; then, 3. It either is, or is
not, consumption, &;c." This procedure is very common in Aris-
totle's works. (See B. II. Ch. III. § 4.)
Such terms may be said to be in Contradictory-opposition to each
other.
On the other hand, Contrary terms, i.e. those which, coming Contrary
under some one class, are the most diff'erent of all that belong to ^^^^
that class, as "wise" and "foolish" both denoting mental habits, are
opposed, but in a difierent manner: for though both cannot be
applied to the same object, there may be other objects to which
ne?//ier can be applied: nothing can be at once both "wise" and
"foolish;" but a stone cannot be either.
§2.
The notions expressed by Common-terms, we are enabled (as hr.s
been remarked in the Analytical Outline) to form, by the faculty of
abstraction: for by it, in contemplating any object (or objects,) we
can attend exclusively to some particular circumstances belonging
to it, [some certain parts of its nature as it were,] and quite with-
hold our attention from the rest. When, therefore, we are thus Generaiiza.
contemplating several individuals which resemble each other in some *^°"*
^avt of their nature, we can (by attending to that part alone, and not
84
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
[Book II.
to those points wlierein tliey differ) assign them one common name,
which will express or stand for them merely as far as they all agree;
and which, of course, will he applicable to all or any of them;
(which process is called generalization) and each of these names is
called a common-term, from its belonging to them all alike; or a
Predicabies. predicahle, because it may be predicated-affirmatively of them, or
of any of them. (See B. I. § 3.)
Generalization (as has been remarked) implies Abstraction ; but
it is not the same thing ; for there may be abstraction without
generalization. When we are speaking of an Individual, it is
usually an abstract notion that we form ; e.g. suppose we are
speaking of the present King of France ; he must actually he either
at Paris or elsewhere ; sitting, standing, or in some other posture ;
and in such and such a dress, kc. Yet many of these circumstances,
(which are separable Accidents,^* and consequently) which are
regarded as non-essential to the individual, are quite disregarded by
us ; and we abstract from them what we consider as essential ; thus
forming an abstract notion of the Individual. Yet there is here no
generalization.
§3.
The following is the account usually given in logical treatises of
the different kinds [heads] of Predicabies ; but it cannot be admitted
without some considerable modifications, explanations and correc-
tions, which will be subjoined.
Whatever Term can be affirmed of several things, must express
Species. either their whole essence, which is called the Species ; or a part of
Genus, their essence {viz. either the material part, which is called the Genus,
Ditferentia. or the formal and distinguishing part, which is called Diferentia, or
in common discourse, characteristic) or something joined to the
essence; whether necessarily {i.e. to the whole species, or, in other
words, universally, to every individual of it), which is called a
Froperty. Property: or contingently {i.e. to some individuals only of the
Accident, species), which is an Accident.
Every predicable expresses either
The 7vhole essence
of its subject :
viz.: Species.
universal
but not
peculiar
or part of its
essence
I
/' \
Genus — Difference.
Property
[peculiar
out not
universal]**
w See § 6.
universal
and pe-
<!uhar
or something
joined to its
essence.
v
Accident
r -^
inseparable— separable.
w See below,
Chap. V. § 3.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 85
Of tliese predicables, genus and species are commonly said, in
the language of logicians, to be predicated in quid; (ri) i.e. to
answer to the question, '* what ?" as, " what is Csesar ?" Answer,
** a man ;" ** what is a man ?" Answer, " an animal ;" Difference,
in '* quale quid;'' {-ttoiov n) Property and Accident in quale [ttoIov.)
It is evident from what has been said, that the Genus and Genus and
Difference put together make up the Species. ^.6r. ** Rational " eSra'
and *' animal" constitute " man ;" so that, in reality, the Species different*
contains the Genus [i.e. implies it;] and when the Genus is called senses.
a whole, and is said to contain the Species, this is only a metaphorical
expression, signifying that it comprehends the Species in its own
more extensive signification. If for instance I predicate the term
"animal" of an individual man, as Alexander, I speak truth
indeed, but only such a portion of the truth that I might equally
predicate the same term of his horse Bucephalus. If I predicate
the terms " Man" and ** Horse" of Alexander and of Bucephalus
respectively, I use a more full and complete expression for each
than the term "animal;" and this last is accordingly the more
extensive., as it contains, [or, more properly speaking, comprehends]
and may be applied to, several different Species; viz.: "bird,"
"beast," "fish," &c.
In the same manner the name of a species is a more extensive [i.e.
comprehensive] but less fall and complete term than that of an
individual [viz. a Singular-term ;) since the Species may be predi-
cated of each of these.
" The impression produced on the mind by a Singular Term,
may be compared to the distinct view taken in by the eye, of any
object (suppose some particular man) near at hand, in a clear light,
which enables us to distinguish the features of the individual: in
a fainter light, or rather further off, we merely perceive that the
object is a man: this corresponds with the idea conveyed by the
name of the Species : yet farther off, or in a still feebler light, we
can distinguish merely some living object; and at length, merely
some object ; these views corresponding respectively with the terms
denoting the Genera, less or more remote. "^^
Hence it is plain that when , logicians speak of "Species" as
"expressing the whole essence of its subjects," this is not strictly
correct, unless we understand by the " whole essence" the " whole
that any commow-term can express;" — the "nearest approach to
the whole essence of the individual that any term (not synonymous
with the Subject) can denote." No predicate can express, strictly,
the whole essence of its Subject, unless it be merely another name,
of the very same import, and co-extensive with it; as " Csesar was
the conqueror of Pompey."
But when logicians speak of Species as a " whole," this is,
«e Rhet. Part III. Chap. II. 5 1.
8G
^SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
[Book II.
Suhaltern
genus and
gpecies.
Hiffhest
Genus and
lowest
Species.
Specific
Difference
and
Property.
Generic
Ditierence
and
Property.
properly, in reference to the Genus and the Difference ; each of
which denotes a " part" of that Species which we constitute hy
joining those two together. But then, it should be remembered
that a Species is not a predicahle in respect of its Genus and
Difference (since it cannot be predicated of them) but only in respect
of the Individuals, or lower Species, of which it can be predicated.
A Species then, it is plain, when predicated of Individuals,
stands in the same relation to them, as the Genus to the Species ;
and when predicated of other (lower) Species, it is then, in respect
of these, a Genus, while it is a Species in respect of a higher
Genus; as "quadruped," which is a species of "animal," is a
Genus in respect of " horse ;" which latter again may be predicated
of Bucephalus and of other individuals. Such a term is called
a subaltern Species or Genus ; being each, in respect of different
other terms, respectively.
A Genus that is not considered as a species of any thing, is called
summum (the highest) Genus ; a Species that is not considered as a
genus of any thing, — i.e. is regarded as containing under it only
individuals, — is called infima (the lowest) Species.
When I say of a Magnet, that it is "a kind of iron-ore,^^ that is
called its proximum-gQim%, because it is the closest [or lowest]
genus that is predicated of it: " mineral" is its more remote genus.
When I say that the Differentia of a magnet is its " attracting
iron,'' and that its Property is ^'polarity,'' these are called
respectively a Specific Difference and Property ; because magnet is
(I have supposed) an infima species [i.e. only a species.]
When I say that the Differentia of iron ore is its "containing
iron,'' and its Property, *' being attracted by the magnet," these
are called respectively, a generic Difference and Property, because
" iron-ore" is a subaltern Species or Genus; being both the genus
of magnet, and a species of mineral.
It should be observed here, that when logicians speak of Property
and Accident as predicables expressing, not the Essence, or part
of the Essence of a subject, but something united to the Essence,
this must be understood as having reference not to the nature of
things as they are in themselves, but to our conceptions of them.
*' Polarity" for instance is as much a part of the real nature of the
substance we call "Magnet," as its "attraction of iron;" and
again, a certain shape, colour, or specific gravity, as much belongs
in reality to those magnets which are of that description, as either
polarity, or attraction. But our modes of conceiving, and of
expressing our conceptions, have reference to the relations in which
objects stand to our own minds ; and are influenced in each instance
by the particular end we have in view. That, accordingly, is
accounted a part of the Essence of any thing, which is essential td
Chap. V. § 4.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 87
the notion of it formed in our minds. Thus, if we have annexed such
a notion to the term, Man, that ** rationality" stands prominent
in our minds, in distinguishing Man from other Animals, we call
this, the " Difference," and a part of the " Essence" of the term
Man; though *' risibility" be an attribute which does not less really
belong to Man. So, the primary and prominent distinction in our
minds of a Triangle from other plane rectilineal Figures, is its
having three sides ; though the equality of its three angles to two
right angles, be, in reality, no less essential to a triangle. But
that this last is the fact, is demonstrated to the learner not till
long after he is supposed to have become familiar with thp notion
of a Triangle.
Hence, in different sciences or arts, different attributes are fixed
on, as essentially characterising each species, according as this or
that is the most important in reference to the matter we are engaged
in. In Navigation, for instance, the polarity of the ]\Iagnet is the
essential quality ; since if there could be any other substance which
could possess this, without attracting iron, it would answer the same
purpose : but to those manufacturers who employ Magnets for the
purpose of more expeditiously picking up small bits of iron, and
for shielding their faces from the noxious steel-dust, in the grind-
ing of needles, the attracting power of the Magnet is the essential
point.
Under the head of Property, logicians have enumerated, as may
be seen in the preceding table, not only such as are strictly called
Properties, as belonging each to the whole Species of which it is
predicated, and to that alone, but also, such as belong to the whole
Species, and to others besides ; in other words. Properties which
are universal, but not peculiar; as ** to breathe air" belongs to every
man; but not to man alone ; and it is, therefore, strictly speaking,
not so much a Property of the Species " man," as of the higher,
{i.e. more comprehensive,) Species, which is the Genus of that, viz,
of "land-animal." And it is this that logicians mean by ^e/imc-
property.
Other Properties, as some logicians call them, are peculiar to a Pecniiar
species, but do not belong to the whole of it ; e.g. man alone can be ^*'*'^'^'^"**
a poet, but it is not every man that is so. These, however, are
more commonly and more properly reckoned as accidents.
Some have also added a fourth kind of Property ; viz. that which
is pecuhar to a Species, and belongs to every Individual of it, but
not at every time. But this is, in fact, a contradiction ; since what-
ever does not always belong to a Species, does not belong to it
universally. It is through the ambiguity of words that they have
fallen into this confusion of thought; e.g. the example commonly
given is, *'homini canescere;" *'to become grey" being, they say,
(though it is not) peculiar to man, and belonging to every individual,
t^ugh not always, but only in old age, (fee. Now, if by " canescere"
88 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [Book II.
be meant tlie very state of becoming grey, this manifestly does not
belong to every man : if again it be meant to signify the liability to
become grey at some time or other, this does belong always to man.
And the same in other instances. Indeed the very Proprium fixed
on by Aldrich, "risibility," is nearly parallel to the above. Man
is ** always capable of laughing;'' but he is not *' capable of laughing
always.'"
Accidents That is most properly called an "Accident," which may be
separa le ^i^gent or present, the essence of the Species continuing the same ;
inseparable, ^s, for a man to be " walking,'' or a ** native of Paris." Of these
two examples, the former is what logicians call a separable Accident,
because it may be separated from the individual: {e.g. he may sit
down;) the latter is an inseparable Accident, being not separable
from the individual, {i.e. he who is a native of Paris can never be
otherwise;) "from the individual," I say, because every accideiit
must be separable from the species, else it would be a property. ^"^
This seems to me a clearer and more correct description of the
two kinds of Accident than the one given by Aldrich ; vi%. that a
Separable-Accident may be actually separated, and an Inseparable,
only in thought, " ut Mantuanum esse, a Virgilio." For surely " to
be the author of the ^Eneid" was another Inseparable- Accident of
the same individual; "to be a Roman citizen" another; and "to
live in the days of Augustus" another; now can we in thougM
separate all these things from the essence of that individual .<* To
do so would be to form the idea of a different individual. We can
indeed conceive a man, and one who might chance to bear the name
of Virgil, without any of these Accidents ; but then it would plainly
not be the same man. But Virgil, whether sitting or standing, <fcc.
we regard as the same man; the abstract notion which we have
formed of that individual being unaltered by the absence or presence
of these separable accidents. (See above, § 2.)
Predicabies Let it here be observed, that both the general name " Predicable, "
SiedL^^^*^ and each of the classes of Predicabies, {vi%. Genus, Species, &c.)
are relative; i.e. we cannot say whaJt predicable any term is, or
whether it is any at all, unless it be specified of what it is to be
predicated: e.g. the term "red" would be considered a genus, m
relation to the terms " pink," " scarlet," <fec. : it might be regarded
as the differentia, in relation to "red rose;" — as a property of
"blood," — as an accident of "a house," &c. And in all cases
accordingly, the Diff'erences or Properties of any lower species will
be Accidents in reference to the class they come under. E.G,
«7 In the Portuguese language there are "estar" furnishes the copula when the
two words, " ser" and " estar, both an- predicate is a separable-accident, and
swering to the English "to be;" and *' ser" in a^i of^er cases. E.G." Estar '\n
foreigners, I have been told, are often Inghilterra" is "to be in England;"
much perplexed about the proper use of " Ser Inglez" is " to be an Englishman ;"
each. I soon found, however, that the *' Qu^m e?" " who is he ?" " Quern es^a
rule is a logical one, easily remembersd : la r ' '' who is there r' &c.
Chap. V. § 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 89
** malleability" is an ** accident" in reference to the term "metal;"
but it is a "property" of gold and most other metals ; as the absence
of it, — ^brittleness, — is of Antimony and Arsenic, and several others,
formerly called Semimetals.
And universally, it is to be steadily kept in mind, that no A common.
*' common-terms" have, as the names of Individuals [" singular- rfame'of one
teiins"] have, any real thing existing in nature corresponding to"^^*^^"S'
each of them,^® but that each of them is merely a sign denoting a
certain inadequate notion which our minds have formed of an
Individual, and which, consequently, not including the notion of
"individuality" \iiumericcd-\m\tj^ nor any thing wherein that indi-
vidual differs from certain others, is applicable equally well to all,
or any of them. Thus " man" denotes no real thing (as the sect of
the Realists maintained) distinct from each individual, but merely
any man, viewed inadequately, i.e. so as to omit, and abstract from,
all that is peculiar to each individual ; by which means the term
becomes applicable alike to any one of several individuals, or (in the
plural) to several together.
The unity [s-mgleriess] or sameness of what is denoted by a common- unity of a
term, does not, as in the case of a singular-term, consist in the object S^beiongs
itself being (in the primary sense) one and the same,^^ but in the fo *f^^^^j^'[™
oneness of the Sign itself ; which is like a Stamp (for marking bales
of goods, or cattle,) that impresses on each a similar mark; called,
thence, in the secondary sense, one and the same mark. And just
such a stamp, to the mind, is a Common-term ; which being, itself,
one, conveys to each of an indefinite number of minds an impression
precisely similar, and thence called — in the transferred sense, one
and the same Idea.
And we arbitrarily fix on the circumstance which we in each
instance choose to abstract and consider separately, disregarding all
the rest ; so that the same individual may thus be referred to any of
several different Species, and the same Species, to several Genera,
as suits our purpose. Thus, it suits the Farmer's purpose to class Different
his cattle with his ploughs, carts, and other possessions, under the dasslfica-
name of "stoc^;" the Naturalist, suitably to Azs purpose, classes *^°"'
them as *^ quadrupeds,'" which term would include wolves, deer,
&c., which to the farmer would be a most improper classification:
the Commissary, again, would class them with corn, cheese, fish,
&c., as ''provision;'' that which is most essential in one view, being
subordinate in another.
§5.
An hulividuol is so called because it is incapable of logical Division,
Division; which is a metaphorical expression, to signify " the
53 TflSe T/, as Aristotle expresses it ; though he has been represented aa the
ch-impion of the opposite opinion : vide Catag. o. 3.
«•> See Book IV. Chap. V. § 2. and Append. Art. " Same."
90 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [Book II.
distinct [i.e. separate] enumeration of several things signified by
one common name."
This operation is directly opposite to generalization, (which is
performed by means of " Abstraction ;") for as, in that, you lay
aside the differences by which several tilings are distinguished, so as
to call them all by one common name, so, in Division, you add on
the Differences, so as to enumerate them by their several distinct
names. Thus, " mineral" is said to be divided into " stones,
metals," &c.; and metals again into " gold, iron," (fee; and these
are called the Parts [or members] of the division.
Loiricai "Division," in its primary sense, means separating from each
metapiiori- otlicr (either actually, or in enumeration) the parts of which some
^^n^-i° really-existing single object consists : as when you divide " an
animal" (that is, any single animal) into its several members ; or
again, into its "bones, muscles, nerves, blood-vessels," &c. And
so, with any single Vegetable, &c.
Now, each of the parts into which you thus "physically" (as it
is called) divide " an animal," is strictly and properly a " part,"
and is really less than the whole : for you could not say of a bone,
for instance, or of a limb, that it is " an Animal."
But when you " divide" — in the secondary sense of the word (or,
as it is called, " metaphysically") — " Animal," that is, the Genus
** Animal," into Beast, Bird, Fish, Reptile, Insect, &c. each of the
parts [or " members"] is metaphorically called a " part," and is, in
another sense, more than the whole [the Genus] that is thus
divided. For you may say of a Beast or Bird that it is an " Animal ; ' '
and the term " Beast" implies not only the term " Animal," but
something more besides; namely, whatever "Difference" chara/i'
terizes " Beast," and separates it from " Bird," " Fish," &c.
And so also any Singular-term [denoting one individual] implies
not only the whole of what is understood by the Species it belongs
to, but also more : namely, whatever distinguishes that single object
from others of the same Species : as " London" implies all that is
denoted by the term " City," and also all that distinguishes that
individual-city.
The " parts" ["members"] in that figurative sense with which
we are now occupied, are each of them less than the wJiole, in another
sense ; that is, of less comjDreliensive signification. Thus, the
Singular-term " Romulus" embracing only an individual-king, is
less extensive than the Species "King;" and that, again, less
extensive than the Genus " Magistrate," &c.
An " /^dividual" then is so called from its being incapable of
being (in this figurative sense) divided.
And though the two senses of the word " Division" are easily
distinguishable when explained, it is so commonly employed in each
sense, that through inattention, confusion often ensues.
We speak as famiharly of the " division" of Mankind into the
Chap. V. § 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 91
several races of *' Europeans, Tartars, Hindoos, Negroes," <fec. as
of the *' division" of the Earth into " Europe, Asia, Africa," (fee.
though *' the Earth" [or "the World"] is a Singular-term, and
denotes what we call one individual. And it is plain we could not
say of Europe, for instance, or of Asia, that it is " a World." But
we can predicate " Man" of every individual European, Hindoo, &,c.
And here observe that there is a common colloquial incorrectness
(increasing the liability to confusion) in the use of the word
" division," in each of these cases, to denote one of the ^' parts,'' into
which the whole is divided. Thus you will sometimes hear a
person speak of Europe as one " division" of the Earth ; or of such
and such a " division" of an Army : meaning ''portion." And so
again a person will sometimes speak of " animals that belong to the
feline division of the Carnivora" [flesh-eating-animals] meaning, that
portion of the Class " Carnivora."
It is usual when a long and complex course of Division is to be Schemes of
stated to draw it out, for the sake of clearness and brevity, in a *^*^***'^
form like that of a genealogical " Tree.-^^ And by carefully
examining any specimen of such a " Tree" (going over it repeatedly,
and comparing each portion of it with the explanations above given)
you will be able perfectly to fix in your mind the technical terms
we have been explaining.
Take for instance as a " Summum-genus" the mathematical-term
" Plane-superiicial-figure"
Mixed Figure Rectilinear Curvilinear
(of Rect. and Curv.) Figure Figure
I I
Triangle; Quadrilateral, <fec. Circle; Ellipse, <fec.
Such a ** Tree of division" the Student may easily fill up for
himself. And the employment of such a form will be found
exceedingly useful in obtaining clear views in any study you are
engaged in.
For instance, in the one we have been now occupied with,
take for a Summum-Genus, ''Expression;" {i.e. " expression-in-
language" of any sucn :nental-operatio:i as those formerly noticed)
you may then exhibit, thus, the divisio-:- and subdivision of —
«» See the Division of Fallacies, Book III. 3 4,
92
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
IBOOK II.
rt
'S)"
^
<^ fcJD
1
^ '3
'So
G'^ to
•-< CO i-
n3
•2
'S o
CO -M
^ J3
J2
CO <« a
c
p-( «
^'•^
Ph
CUAP. V. 5 5.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 93
The rules orclmarily given for Division are three : 1st. each of the Ordinary
Parts, or any of them short of all, must contain less (i.e. have a dSon!
narrower signification) than the thing divided. 2d. All the Parts
together must be exactly equal to the thing divided ; therefore we
must be careful to ascertain that the summum genus may be predi-
cated of every term placed under it, and of nothing else. 3d. The
Parts or Members must be opjJOsecl [contradistinguished] i.e. must
not be contained in one another: e.g. if you were to divide "book"
into "poetical, historical, folio, quarto, french, latin," <fcc. the
members would be contained in each other; for a french book may
be a quarto, or octavo, and a quarto, french, english, <fec. &:c. You
must be careful, therefore, to keep in mind the principle of division
with which you set out: e.g. whether you begin dividing books
according to their matter, their language, or their size, <fec. all these
being so many cross-divisions. And when any thing is capable (as c^ross-
in the above instance) of being divided in several different ways, we
are not to reckon one of these as the true, or real, or rigJd one,
without specifying what the object is which we have in view: for one
mode of dividing may be the most suitable for one purpose, and
another for another : as e.g. one of the above modes of dividing books
would be the most suitable to a bookbinder ; another in a philoso-
phical, and the other in a philological view.
It is a useful practical rule, whenever you find a discussion of any
subject very perplexing, and seemingly confused, to examine whether
some " Cross-division" has not crept in unobserved. For this is
very apt to take place; (though of course such a glaiing instance as
that in th(i above example could not occur in practice) and there is
no more fruitful source of indistinctness and confusion of thought.
When you have occasion to divide any thing in several different
ways, — that is, " on several principles-of-division" — you should take
care to state distinctly how many divisions you are making, and on
what principle each proceeds.
For instance, in the "Tree" above given, it is stated, that
"Propositions" are divided in different ways, " according to' ^ this
and that, &lc. And thus the perplexity of Cross-division is avoided.
Two other rules in addition to those above given, are needful to Additional
be kept in mind : viz. 4thly, A Division should not be *' arbitrary;'" ^^^^^^^
that is, its ]\Iembers should be distinguished from each other by
"Differences" either expressed or readily understood; instead of
being set apart from each other at random, or without any sufficient
ground. For instance, if any one should divide "coins" into "gold-
coins," " silver," and " copper," the ground of this distinction woidd
be intelligible : but if he should, in proceeding to subdivide silver-
coin, distinguish as two branches, on the one side, " shillings," and
on the other "all silver-coins except shillings," this would be an
arbitrary Division.
5thly, A Division should be clearly arranged as to its Members :
94 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. [Book II.
that is, there should be as much subdivision as the occasion may
require; and not a mere catalogue of the " lowest-species," omitting
intermediate classes ['' suhaltern"'\ between these and the "highest-
genus :" nor again an intermixture of the *' subaltern," and "lowest-
species," so as to have, in any two branches of the division. Species
contradistinguished and placed opposite, of which the one ought
naturally to be placed higher up [nearer the " Summum"] and the
other, lower down in the Tree.
For instance, to divide "plane-figure" at once, into "equilateral-
triangles, squares, circles, ellipses," &c., or again " vegetable," into
**Elms, pear-trees, turnips, mushrooms," <kc., or again to divide
"Animal" into "Birds, Fishes, Reptiles, Horses, Lions," &c. would
be a transgression of this rule.
And observe that, (as has been formerly remarked) although such
glaidng cases as are given by way of examples could not occur in
practice, errors precisely corresponding to them, may, and often do
occur; and produce much confusion of thought and error.
§6.
Denfinition. Definition is another metaphorical word, which literally signifies,
"laying down a boundary;" and is used in Logic to signify "an
expression which explains any term, so as to separate it from every
thing else," as a boundary separates fields.
Essential In reference to the several modes adopted for furnishing such
accidental explanation. Logicians distinguish [divide] Definitions into essential
definitions. ^^^ accidental. They call that an " es5e72^Z(2Z-definition" which states
what are regarded as the " constituent parts of the essence" of that
which is to be defined; and an acac?e?2/aZ-definition" \^oy Description^
one which lays down what are regarded as "circumstances belonging
to it;" viz. Properties or Accidents; such as causes, effects, <fec.
Accidents in the narrowest sense, (as defined above, § 3) cannot,
it is plain, be employed in a Description [accidental-definition] of
any Species ; since no Accident (in that sense) can belong to the
whole of a Species, nor consequently furnish an adequate .Definition
thereof.
DefinitioTi of Jn the "description" of an individual, on the contrary, we employ,
iOQlVluUfilS V 1. »/ '
not Pro2oerties, (which as they do belong to the whole of a Species,
cannot serve to distinguish one individual of that Species from
another) but Accidents — generally, inseparable-accidents — in con-
junction with the Species: as " Philip was a king of Macedon, who
subdued Greece;" "Britain is an Island, situated so and so," &e.
Physical The Essential-definition again is divided mio 2^hysical [natural]
dSfinUionl &m\ logicol [metaphysical] definition: the physical-definition being
made by an enumeration of such parts as are actually separable, —
such as are the hull, masts, &c. of a "Ship;" — the root, trunk,
Chap. V. § 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 95
brandies, barL:, 6lc. of a "Tree;" the Subject, Predicate, and
Copula of a " Proposition."
The *' Zo^/caZ-definition " consists of the *' Genus " and " Differ-
ence ;" which are called by some writers the *' metaphysical " [ideal]
parts ; as being not two real parts into which an imiivklual-ohject
can (as in the former case) be actually divided, but only different
views taken [notions formed] of a class of objects, by one mind.
Geniis.
E.G. "A Proposition " would be defined, logically, *'a sentence
Difference. G.
affirming-or-denying : " A "Magnet" "an Iron-ore having attrac-
D.
tion for iron ;" a " Square," a " Rectangle " [right-angled parallelo-
D.
gram] having equal sides.
Definitions again have been divided by Logicians into the Nominal
Nominal, w^hich explains merely the meaning of tlie term defined ; ^^ definition*.
and Real, which explains the nature of the tiling signified by that
term.
This division is evidently according to the object designed to he
effected by each Definition: the former division, on the other hand
—into Accidental, Physical, and Logical — being a division according
,to the means employed by each to effect its object. These therefore
are evidently two "cross-divisions;"^^ a circumstance which has
been generally overlooked by Logical writers, who have thus intro-
duced confusion and perplexity.
And here the question may naturally occur to the reader, whether
there be properly any distinction between nominal and reaZ-definition ;
— whether the meaning of a Common-term, and the nature of the
thing signified by it, are not one and the same ; since the object of
our thoughts when we employ a Common-term, is — not any such
" abstract idea" as some talk of, but — the Term itselfi, regarded as
a Sign ka. as was formerly explained.
And in truth there are many cases in which there does exist this
exact coincidence between the meaning of the term and the nature
of the thing ; so that the same definition which would be rightly
styled "nominal,'' as explaining nothing beyond the exact meaning
of the term, might also be considered as entitled to be called a
•ii Aldrich, having given as an instance work his is almost entirely abridged)
of a Nominal Definition the absurd one expressly says the contrary. Be this as
of " homo, qui ex humo," has led some it may, however, it is plain that the ety-
to conclude that the Nominal definition mology of a term has nothing to do wi.h
must be founded on the eti/molony; or at any logical consideration of it. bee § 3,
• least that such was his meaning. But Book III.
that it was not, is sufficiently plam from <^ See preceding §.
the circumstance that Wallis (.from whose
96
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
[Hooi; rr.
Technical
terms.
Logic is
concerned
with
Nominal
definitions
alone.
'* real-definition," as implying every attribute that can belong to the
thing signified. Such are all definitions of mathematical and
logical terms, and other technical terms of Science. There cannot
e.g. be any property of a "Circle," or a ** Square," that is not
implied in the definitions of those terms. Some of these properties
may not indeed at once occur to a beginner in Mathematics ; and
others, not even to one somewhat further advanced: but they must
all be implied in the definitions: and it would be reckoned an
impropriety to add e.g. to the definition of a Square that it is bisected
by its diagonal: because though this might not at once occur to a
beginner, and needs to be demonstrated, it is demonstrated yr07?^ the
definition: to speak of "a Square divided by its diagonal into
unequal parts," would be absurd, — unmeaning, — inconceivable.
And the same, with other mathematical terms.
But it is otherwise with terms of a difi'erent character, which are
the names of actually existing substances. There may be attributes
of the thing signified that are not at all implied in the signification
of the term. E.G. The term ** laurel- water " is used by us in the
same sense as by our ancestors, to signify ** a liquor distilled from
laurel-leaves;" though the poisonous quality of it was unknown a
century ago. And so also many discoveries have been made, and
others probably will be made, respecting several metals, heavenly-
bodies, &c. though the words "iron," "gold," "star," are
employed in the same sense as formerly ; — a sense which does not
imply the properties that have been discovered.
And any Definition which goes beyond a "nominal-definition,"
i.e. which explains any thing more of the nature of the thing than
is implied in the name, may be regarded, strictly speaking, as, so
far, a "real-definition."
The very word " Definition" however is not usually employed in
this sense; but rather, *^ Description.''^
Logic is concerned with ^ommci^-definition alone ; with a view to
guard against ambiguity in the use of terms. ^^
To ascertain fully the various properties of animals and vegetables,
belongs to Physiology ; — of metals, earths, &c. to Chemistry ; and
so, with other things.
It is to be observed that the word " Definition " is sometimes used
to denote the wlwle sentence, in which the term defined is conjoined
with the explanation given of it ; as when we say, * ' a triangle is a
three-sided figure : " sometimes it is used to signify merely thai which
gives the explanation; as when we say "three-sided figure" is the
c?e/^i^io7i of " triangle."
«3 And for this purpose it will often
happen that a dpHnition will be sufficient
in reference to tlie ejiisting occasion, even
thouf^h it may fall short of expressing all
that is implied by the term. See Book
III. § lU.
We should however carefully guard
against the common mistake, of supposing
that any one who applies a term correctly
in several instances, must of course
understand fully its signitication.
CiiAP. V. § 6.1 SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 97
In the former case, the sentence has the form of a Proposition;
hut what it is that such a proposition asserts, is not always imphed
in the mere expression, hut is left to he collected from the supposed
intention of the speaker.
Real existerice is not necessarily implied: e.g. "A Phoenix is a Real
"bird fahled to live a thousand years," &c. implies merely that this not asserted
is the meaning in which the word Phoenix has been used ; not that definition,
any such bird ever did or could exist.
Sometimes again it is not implied even that the universal, or the
ordinary, sense of the term is such as corresponds to the definition
given ; hut merely that such is the sense in which the author intends
to employ it.
And in this case, the definition is sometimes stated in the imper- imperative
alive instead of the indicative form ; as is frequently done in the definitions*
works of Aristotle, who is accustomed thus to waive, in some cases,
all questions as to the ordinary employment of a term by others ;
Baying "Xei so and so be taken to signify this or that."
In mathematical and other scientific definitions, whether expressed
in the form of Propositions, or in the Imperative (or, as it might be
called. Postulate) form, it is understood to be implied that the
definition involves no self-contradiction, — .no absurdity ; but that the
thing denoted by the term defined — whether believed actually to
exist or not^ — is conceivable, and may, not irrationally, be made a
subject of thought. B.G. Though a "mathematical-line" cannot
be conceived to be actually drawn on paper, — though nothing could
be exhibited to the senses as having length and 7io breadth, every
one can make the distance e.g. between two towns, a separate subject
of his thoughts, having his mind wholly withdrawn from the width
of the road.
A mathematical Definition accordingly may be considered as
involving a Postulate; and it would be very easy to express any of
them in the form of Postulates. E.G. " Let a plane-figure
bounded by a curve-line everywhere equidistant from a certain point
within it, be called a Circle ;" this would be understood to imply
that such a figure is conceivable, and that the writer intended to
employ that term to signify such a figure ; which is precisely all
that is meant to be asserted in the Definition of a Circle.
The Rules or Cautions usually laid down by Logical writers for K"^es fop
framing a Definition, are very obvious : viz. 1st. The definition must
be adequate; i.e. neither too extensive nor too narrow for the thing
defined ; e.g. to define " fish," *' an animal that lives in the water,"
would be too extensive, because many insects, <fcc. live in the water ;
to define it, "an animal that has an air-bladder," would be too
narrow; because many fish are without any. Or again, if in a
definition of " Money" you should specify its being "made of metal,"
that would be too narrow, as excluding the shells used as money in
some parts of Africa : if again you define it as an " article of value
m
SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I.
[Book f I.
Arbitrary
exceptions.
Tantology.
given in exchange for something else," that would be too midey as
it would include things exchanged by barter; as when a shoemaker
who wants coals, makes an exchange with a collier who wants shoes.
And observe, that such a defect in a Definition cannot be remedied
by making an arbitrary exception; (such as was alluded to above,
§ 5) as if for instance (and it is an instance which actually occurred)
a person should give such a definition of " Capital" as should include
(which he did not mean to do) " Land;" and should then propose
to remedy this by defining " Capital," any " property of such and
Buch a description, except Land."
, 2d. The Definition must be in itself plainer than the thing
defined, else it would not exp)lain it: I say, ** in itself," [i.e.
generally) because, to some particular person, the term defined may
happen to be even more familiar and better understood, than the
language of the Definition.
And this rule may be considered as including that which is
usually given by Logicians as a third rule ; viz. that a Definition
should be couched in a convenient number of appropriate words (if
such can be found suitable for the purpose) : since figurative words
(which are opposed to appropriate) are apt to produce ambiguity or
indistinctness ; too great brevity may occasion obscurity; and too
great prolixity, confusion. But this perhaps is rather an admoni-
tion with respect to Style, than a strictly logical rule ; nor can we
accordingly determine with precision, in each case, whether it has
been complied with or not ; there is no drawing the line between
** too long" and " too concise," &c. Nor would a definition
unnecessarily prolix be censured a^ incorrect, but as inelegant,
inconvenient, &,c.
If however, a definition be chargeable with Tautology, (which is a
distinct fault from prolixity or verbosity) it may justly be called incor-
rect, though without oft'ending against the first two rules. Tautology
consistij 3n inserting too much, not in mere words, but in sense;
yet not so as too much to narrow the definition (in opposition to
Rule 1.) by excluding some things which belong to the class of the
thing defined ; but only, so as to state something which has been
already implied. Thus, to define a Parallelogram " a four-sided
figure whose opposite sides are parallel and equal,'' would be
tautological ; because, though it is true that such a figure, and such
alone, is a parallelogram, the equality of the sides is implied in their
being parallel, and may be proved from it. Now the insertion of
the words ** and equal," leaves, and indeed leads, a reader to suppose
that there may be a four-sided figure whose opposite sides are
parallel but not equal. Though therefore such a definition asserts
nothing false, it leads to a supposition of what is false ; and conse-
quently is to be regarded as an incorrect definition.
The inference just mentioned, — viz. : that you implied that a quad-
rangle might have its opposite sides parallel, andnot equal, — would
Ghaf. v. 5 6.] SUPPLEMENT TO CHAP. I. 99
"be drawn from such a definition, according to the principle of
*' exceptio probat regulam," an exception proves a rule.^ The force
of the maxim (which is not properly confined to the case of an
exception, strictly so called) is this; that "the mention of any
circumstance introduced into the statement either of a definition, or
of a precept, law, remark, kc. is to he presumed necessary to be
inserted; so that the precept, ha. would not hold good if this
circumstance were absent." In short, the word " only,'' or some
such expression, is supposed to be understood. If e.g. it be laid
down that he who breaks into an empty house shall receive a certain
punishment, it would be inferred that this punishment would not be
incurred by breaking into an occupied house : if it were told us that
some celestial phenomenon could not be seen hy the naked eye, it
■would be inferred tbat it would or might be visible through a tele-
scope : if we are told that we are not to teach doctrines unwarranted
by Scripture, and which were not held hy the early Fathers, this would
usually be understood to imply that any doctrine they did hold,
might be taught, on their authority, even though not scriptural :^
&c.
And much is often inferred in this manner, which was by no
means in the Author's mind ; from his having inaccurately inserted
what chanced to be present to his thoughts. Thus, he who says
that it is a crime for people to violate the property of a humane
Landlord who lives among them, may perhaps not mean to imply
that it is no crime to violate the property of an absentee-landlord,
or of one who is not humane : but he leaves an opening for being so
understood. Thus again in saying that " an animal which breathes
through gills and is scaly, is a fish," though nothing false is
asserted, a presumption is afi'orded that you mean to give a defini-
tion such as would be too narroiv; in violation of Rule 1.
And Tautology, as above described, is sure to mislead any one
who interprets what is said, conformably to the maxim that " an
exception proves a rule."
5* Thus it has been inferred, — and not peal on behalf of Church Government."
without reason, — that the occasional Hoiilston and Co.
Forms of Prayer and Thanksf^ivings ^'> '* The maxim of ' abundans cautela
which are put forth from time to time nocet nemini' is by no means a safe one
under the authority of" Orders in Coun- if applied without'limitation. Itissome-
cil," are illegal, and at variance with the times imprudent (and some of our
"Act of Uniformity;" inasmuch as in Divines have, I think, committed this
that Act (prefixed to our Prayer-books) imprudence) to attempt to 'make assur-
not only is conformity to the Book ance doubly sure' by brinp-ing forward
of Common-prayer enjoined, and no confirmatory reasons, which, though in
authority to make alteiations or addi- themselves perlectly fair, may be inter-
tions to the service recognised, but there preted unfairly, by'representing tlieai as
is an Exception, which, it is maintained, an acknowledged indispensable founda-
provesthe rule : the King in Council being tion ;— by assuming for instance, that an
expressly authorized to insert and alter appeal to such and such of the ancient
from time to time the " names of such of Fathers or Councils, in confirmation of
the Royal-family as are to be prayed some doctrine or practice, is to be under-
for :" which plainly implies that no other stood as an admission that it would fall to
alterations made by that authority were the ground if not so confirmed."— iCiw^jf-
contempiated as allowable. See "Ap- do/«o/C%ns<, Essay II. § 23, note.
100 SUPPLEMENi TO CHAP. I. [Book II.
Acr-identai It often happens that one or more of the above rules is violated
stlnc^* through men's proneness to introduce into their definitions, along
mistaken for -with, or instead of, essential circumstances, such as are in the strict
sense, accidental. I mean, that the notion they attach to each
term, and the explanation they would give of it, shall embrace some
circumstances, generally, hut not always, connected with the thing
they are speaking of ; and which might, accordingly, (by the strict
account of an " Accident") be ** absent or present, the essential
character of the subject remaining the same." A definition framed
from such circumstances, though of course incorrect, and likely at
some time or other to mislead us, will not unfrequently obtain recep-
tion, from its answering the purpose of a correct one, at a particular
time and place.
** For instance, the Latin word Iferidies, to denote the soutfiern
quarter, is etymologically suitable (and so would a definition founded
on that etymology) in our hemisphere; while in the other, it would
be found just the reverse. Or if any one should define the North
Pole, that which is * inclined towards the sun,' this would, /or half
the year, answer the purpose of a correct definition ; and would be
the opposite of the truth for the other half.
" Such glaring instances as these, which are never likely to
occur in practice, serve best perhaps to illustrate the character of
such mistakes as do occur. A specimen of that introduction of
accidental circumstances which I have been describing, may be
found, I think, in the language of a great number of writers,
respecting Wealth and Value ; who have usually made Labour an
essential ingredient in their definitions. Now it is true, it so
happens, by the appointment of Providence, that valuable articles
are in almost all instances obtained by Labour ; but still, this is an
accidental, not an essential circumstance. If the aerolites which
occasionally fall, were diamonds and pearls, and if these articles
could be obtained in no other way, but were casually picked up,
to the same amount as is now obtained by digging and diving, they
would be of precisely the same value as now. In this, as in many
other points in Political Economy, men are prone to confound cause
and effect. It is not that pearls fetch a high price because men
have dived for them; but on the contrary, men dive for them
because they fetch a high price. "^
W Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. pj). 251—253.
BOOK III.
OF FALLACIES.
Introduction,
Although sundry instances of Fallacies have been from time to
time noticed in the foregoing Books, it will be worth while to devote
a more particular attention to the subject.
By a Fallacy is commonly understood, ** any unsound mode of ^.?|!"\*'^'*
• 1 • if ^ J 1 • X- J X 1 <*^ Fallacy,
argumg, winch appears to demand our conviction, and to be
decisive of the question in hand, when in fairness it is not." Con-
sidering the ready detection and clear exposure of Fallacies to be
both more extensively important, and also more difficult, than
many are aware of, I propose to take a Logical view of the subject ;
referring the different Fallacies to the most convenient heads, and
giving a scientific analysis of the procedure which takes place in each.
After all, indeed, in the practical detection of each individual
Fallacy, much must depend on natural and acquired acuteness ;
nor can any rules be given, the mere learning of which will enable
us to apply them with mechanical certainty and readiness : but still
we shall find that to take correct general views of the subject, and
to be familiarized with scientific discussions of it, will tend, above
all things, to engeiider such a haUt of mind^ as will best fit us for
practice.
Indeed the case is the same with respect to Logic in general.
Scarcely any one would, in ordinary practice, state to himself
either his own or another's reasoning, in Syllogisms in Barbara at
full length ; yet a familiarity with Logical principles tends very
much (as all feel, who are really well acquainted with them) to
beget a habit of clear and sound reasoning. The truth is, in this,
as in many other things, there are processes going on in the mind
(when we are practising any thing quite familiar to us) with such
rapidity as to leave no trace in the memory ; and we often apply
principles which did not, as far as we are conscious, even occur to
us at the time.
It would be foreign, however, to the present purpose, to investi- J"ngu"™*J*
gate fully the manner in which certain studies operate in remotely former
producing certain effects on the mind : it is sufficient to establish the ^"^^^"^
fad, that habits of scientific analysis (besides the intrinsic beauty
aud dignity of such studies) lead to practical advantage. It is oa
102 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
Logical principles therefore that I propose to discuss the subject of
Fallacies ; and it may, indeed, seem to have been unnecessary to
make any apology for so doing, after what has been formerly said,
generally, in defence of Logic ; but that the generality of Logical
writers have usually followed so opposite a plan. Whenever they
have to treat of any thing that is beyond the mere elements of
Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles they
have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and have
recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language ; such as
would be the best suited indeed to an exoterical discourse, but seems
strangely incongruous in a professed Logical treatise. What should
we think of a Geometrical writer, who, after having gone through
tne Elements, with strict definitions and demonstrations, should,
on proceeding to Mechanics, totally lay aside all reference to
scientific principles, — all use of technical terms, — and treat of the-
subject in undefined terms, and with probable and popular argu-
ments ? It would be thought strange, if even a Botanist, when
addressing those whom he had been instructing in the principles
and the terms of his system, should totally lay these aside when
he came to describe plants, and should adopt the language of the
vulgar. Surely it affords but too much plausibility to the cavils of
those who scoff at Logic altogether, that the very writers who
profess to teach it should never themselves make any application
of, or reference to, its principles, on those very occasions, when,
and when only, such application and reference are to be expected.
If the principles of any system are well laid down, — if its technical
language is judiciously framed, — then, surely, those principles and
that language will afford (for those who have once thoroughly
learned them) the best, the most clear, simple, and concise method
of treating any subject connected with that system. Yet even
winters generally acute, in treating of the Dilemma and of the
Fallacies, have very much forgotten the Logician, and assumed a
loose and rhetorical style of writing, without making any application
of the principles they had formerly laid down, but, on the contrary,
sometimes departing widely from them.^
The most experienced teachers, when addressing those who are
familiar with the elementary principles of Logic, think it requisite,
not indeed to lead them, on each occasion, through the whole detail
of those principles, when the process is quite obvious, but always
to put them on the road, as it were, to those principles, that they
may plainly see their own way to the end, and take a scientific
1 Aldrich (and the same may be said of dictione," and "extra dictionem,") he
several other writers) is far more con- observes of one or two of these last, that
fused in his discussion of Fallacies than in they are not properly called Fallacies, as
any other part of his treatise; of which not being Syllogisms faulty in form;
this one instance may serve: after having (Syllogisimi forma peccantes:") as if any
distinguished Fallacies into those in the one, that was such, could be " Fallacia
ewpressiotit and those in the matter (" in extra dictionem."
Intro.] OF FALLACIES. 103
riew of tlie siiLject: in the same manner as matliematlcal writers
avoid indeed the occasional tediousness of going all through a very
simple demonstration, which the learner, if he will, may easily
supply ; hut yet always speak in strict mathematical language, and
with reference to mathematical principles, though they do not
always state them at full length. I would not profess, therefore,
any more than they do, to write (on subjects connected with the
science) in a language intelligible to those who are ignorant of its
first rudiments. To do so, indeed, would imply that one was not
taking a scientific view of the subject, nor availing one's-self of the
principles that had been established, and the accm-ate and concise
technical language that had been framed.
The rules already given enable us to develop the principles on Mistakes as
which all reasoning is conducted, whatever be the Subject-matter of Logic
of it, and to ascertain the validity or fallaciousness of any apparent
argument, as far as the form of expression is concerned ; that being
alone the proper province of Logic.
But it is evident that we may nevertheless remain liable to be
deceived or perplexed in Argument by the assumption oi false or
doubtful Premises, or by the employment of indistinct or ambiguous
Terms; and, accordingly, many Logical writers, wishing to make
their systems appear as perfect as possible, have undertaken to
give rules " for attaining clear ideas," and for "guiding the judg-
ment;" and fancying or professing themselves successful in this,
have consistently enough denominated Logic, the " Art of using
the Reason;" which in truth it would be, and would nearly super-
sede all other studies, if it could of itself ascertain the meaning of
every Term, and the truth or falsity of every Proposition; in the
same manner as it actually can, the validity of every Argument,
And they have been led into this, partly by the consideration that
Logic is concerned about the *' three Operations" of the mind —
simple Apprehension, Judgment, and Reasoning; not observing
that it is not equally concerned about all : the last Operation being
alone its appropriate province ; and the rest being treated of only
in reference to that.
The contempt justly due to such pretensions has most unjustly Discredit
fallen on the Science itself; much in the same manner as Chemistry uporf Logic
was brought into disrepute among the unthinking, by the extravagant
pretensions of the Alchymists. And those Logical writers have
been censured, not (as they should have been) for making such
professions, but for not fulfilling them. It has been objected,
especially, that the rules of Logic leave us still at a loss as to the
most important and difficult point in reasoning ; viz. the ascertaining
the sense of the terms employed, and removing their ambiguity:
a complaint resembling that made (according to a story told by
Warburton,^ and before alluded to) by a man who found fault
2 In his Div. Leg.
104 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
with all the reading-glasses presented to him by the shopkeeper ;
the fact being that he had never learnt to read. In the present
case, the complaint is the more unreasonable, inasmuch as there
neither is, nor ever can 2^osslUy he, any such system devised as
will effect the proposed object of clearing up the ambiguity of
Terms. It is, however, no small advantage, that the rules of
Logic, though they cannot, alone, ascertain and clear up ambiguity
in any Term, yet do point out in which Term of an argument it is
to be sought for : directing our attention to the 7niddle-Term, as
the one on the ambiguity of which a Fallacy is likely to be built.
It will be useful, however, to class and describe the different
kinds of ambiguity which are to be met with ; and also the various
ways in which the insertion of false, or, at least, unduly assumed.
Premises, is most likely to elude observation. And though the
remarks which will be offered on these points may not be considered
as strictly forming a part of Logic, they cannot be thought out of
place, when it is considered how essentially they are connected
with the application of it.
§1.
Division of The division of Fallacies into those in the words (IN DICTIONE,)
FaUacies. ^^^ ^^^^^ .^ ^^^ MATTER (EXTRA DICTIONEM) has not been,
by any writers hitherto, grounded on any distinct principle: at
least, not on any that they have themselves adhered to. The
confounding together, however, of these two classes is highly
detrimental to all clear notions concerning Logic ; being obviously
allied to the prevailing erroneous views which make Logic the art
of employing the intellectual faculties in general, having the discovery
of truth for its object, and all kinds of knowledge for its proper
subject-matter ; with all that train of vague and groundless specu-
lations which have led to such interminable confusion and mistakes,
and afforded a pretext for such clamorous censures.
It is important, therefore, that rules should be given for a
division of Fallacies into Logical and Non-logical, on such a prin-
ciple as shall keep clear of all this indistinctness and perplexity.
If any one should object, that the division about to be adopted
is in some degree arbitrary, placing under the one head. Fallacies
which many might be disposed to place under the other, let him
consider not only the indistinctness of all former divisions, but the
utter impossibility of framing any that shall be completely secure
from the objection urged, in a case where men have formed such
various and vague notions from the very want of some clear prin-
ciple of division. Nay, from the elliptical form in which all reasoning
is usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved and oblique form
in which Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course
be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary choice, not only
to which genus each kind of fallacy should be referred, but even to
i 2.1 OF FALLACIES. 105
which kind to refer any one individuat Fallacy. For, since, in any indetermi-
Argument, one Premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens, character of
in the case of a Fallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative ^^'ai^acies.
of supplying either a Premiss which is not true, or else, one which
does not prove the Conclusion. E.G. If a man expatiates on the
distress of the country, and thence argues that the government is
tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume either that " every
distressed country is under a tyranny," which is a manifest false-
hood, or, merely that " every country under a tyranny is distressed,"
which, however true, proves nothing, the Middle-term heing
undistributed. Now, in the former case, the Fallacy would he
referred to the head of *' extra dictionem ;" in the latter to that of
"in dictione." Which are we to suppose the speaker meant us .
to understand ? Surely just whichever each of his hearers might
happen to prefer : some might assent to the false Premiss ; others,
allow the unsound Syllogism ; to the Sophist himself it is indif-
ferent, as long as they can hut he brought to admit the Conclusion.
Without pretending, then, to conform to every one's mode of
speaking on the subject, or to lay down rules which shall be in
themselves (without any call for labour or skill in the person who
employs them) readily applicable to, and decisive on, each individual
case, I shall propose a division which is at least perfectly clear in its
main principle, and coincides, perhaps, as nearly as possible, with
the established notions of Logicians on the subject.
§_2.
In every Fallacy, the Conclusion either does, or does n/^t follow Lo?!cai
from the Premises. Where the Conclusion does not follow from the '^' *"^'*
Premises, it is manifest that the fault is in the Beasoning, and in
that alone; these, therefore, we call Logical Fallacies,* as being
properly, violations of those rules of Reasoning wliich it is the
province of Logic to lay down.
Of these, however, one kind are more purely Logical, as exhibiting
their fallaciousness by the bare form of the expression, without any
regard to the meaning of the Terms: to which class belong: 1st.
Undistributed Middle; 2d. Illicit Process; 3d. Negative Premises, or
Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Premiss, and vice versa: to
which may be added 4th. those which have palpably {i.e. expressed)
more than three Terms.
The other kind may be most properly called semi-logical; viz. all Semi-Loei-
the cases of ambiguous middle-Term except its non-distribution: for ^^
though in such cases the conclusion does not follow, and though the
rules of Logic show that it does not, as soon as the ambiguity of the
middle-Term is ascertahied, yet the discovery and ascertainment of
this ambiguity requires attention to the soise of tlie Term, and
3 In the samfe manner as we call that a criminal court in which crimes are judged.
106
OP FALLACIES.
[Book III.
ramiliarity
■with a term
distinct
from clear
apprehen-
sion of its
meaning.
Material
Fallacies.
knowledge of the Subject-matter; so that here, Logic teaches us
not Jioiv to find the Fallacy, but only where to search for it, and on
what principles to condemn it.
Accordingly it has been made a subject of bitter complaint against
Logic, that it presupposes the most difficult point to be already
accomphshed, viz. the sense of the Terms to be ascertained. A
similar objection might be urged against every other art in existence;
e.g. against Agriculture, that all the precepts for tlie cultivation of
land presuppose the possession of a farm ; or against Perspective, that
its rules are useless to a blhid man. The objection is indeed peculiarly
absurd when urged against Logic, because the object which it is
blamed for not accomplishing cannot possibly be within the province of
any ojie art whatever. Is it indeed possible or conceivable that there
should be any method, science, or system, that should enable one to
know the full and exact meaning of every term in existence? The
utmost that can be done is to give some general rules that may assist
us in this work; which is done in the first two chapters of Book IL*
Nothing perhaps tends more to conceal from men their imperfect
conception of the meaning of a term, than the circumstance of their
being able fully to comprehend a process of reasoning in wliich it is
involved, M^ithout attaching any distinct meaning at all to that term;
as is evident when X Y Z are used to stand for Terms, in a regular
Syllogism. Thus a man may be familiarized wdth a term, and never
find himself at a loss from not comprehending it ; from which he
will be very likely to infer that he does comprehend it, when perhaps
he does not, but employs it vaguely and incorrectly; which leads to
fallacious Reasoning and confusion. It must be owned, however,
that many Logical writers have, in great measure, brought on them-
selves the reproach in question, by calling Logic '* the right use of
Reason," laying down *' rules for gaining clear ideas," and such-like
d'hu^aviix, as Aristotle calls it; [Jxliet. Book I. Chap. II.)
§3.
The remaining class [viz. where the Conclusion does follow from
the Premises) may be called the Material, or Non-logical Fallacies : of
these there are two kinds ;^ 1st. when the Premises are such as ought
not to have been assumed; 2d. when the conclusion is not the one
required, but irrelevant; which Fallacy is commonly called 'Hgnoratio
denchi,'' because your Argument is not the **elenchus " [i.e. proof
of the contradictory) of your opponent's assertion, which it should be;
but proves, instead of that, some other proposition resembling it.
* The very author of the object" on
says, " This (the comprehension of the
meaning of g:eneral lerms) is a study
which every individual must carry on for
himself; and of which no rules of Logic
(how useful soever they may he in direct-
ing our labours) can supersede the neces-
sity." D. Stewart, Phil. Vol. II. Chap.
II. s. 2.
« For it is manifest that the fault, if
there be any, must be either 1st. in the
Premises, or 2dly. in the Conclusion^ or
3dly. in the Connexion between them.
5 4.] OF FALLACIES. 107
Hence, since Logic defines what Contradiction is, some may choose
rather to range this with the Logical Fallacies, as it seems, so far,
to come mider the jurisdiction of that Art. Nevertheless, it is per-
haps better to adhere to the original division, both on account of its
clearness, and also because few would be inclined to apply to the
Fallacy in question the accusation of being inconclusive, and conse-
quently "illogical" reasoning; besides which, it seems an artificial
and circuitous way of speaking, to suppose in all cases an opponent
and a contradiction; the simple statement of the matter being this, —
I am required, by the circumstances of the case, (no matter why) to
prove a certain Conclusion ; I prove, not that, but one which is
likely to be mistaken for it;^in this lies the Fallacy.
It might be desirable therefore to lay aside the name of "ignoratio If^^^^y^*^
elenchi,'^ but that it is so generally adopted as to require some
mention to be made of it. The other kind of Fallacies in the Matter
will comprehend (as far as the vague and obscure language of
Logical writers will allow us to conjecture) the fallacy of ''nx)n causa Non causa
pro causa,'' and that of " petitio jyrincijm.'' Of these, the former is ^^° causa.
by them distinguished into " a non vera pro vera,'' and " a non tali
pro tali;'^ this last would appear to mean arguing from a case nx)t
parallel as if it were so; which, in Logical language, is, having the
suppressed Premiss false; for it is in that the parallelism is affirmed;
and the '' non vera pro vera" will in like manner signify the expressed
Premiss being false; so that this Fallacy will turn out to be, in plain
terms, neither more nor less than falsity (or unfair assumption) of a
Premiss.
The remaining kind, " petitio prindpii," ["begging the question,"] Begging the
takes place when one of the Premises (whether true or false) is either ^"^^ ^^"*
plainly equivalent to the conclusion, or depends on that for its own
reception. I have said " one of the Premises," because in all correct
reasoning the two Premises taken together must imply and virtually
assert the conclusion. It is not possible, however, to draw a precise
line, generally, between this Fallacy and fair argument; since, to
one person, that might be fair reasoning, which would be, to another,
"begging the question;" inasmuch as, to the one, the Premiss
might be more evident than the Conclusion; while, by the other, it
would not be admitted, except as a consequence of the admission of
the conclusion. The most plausible form of this Fallacy is arguing Arguing ia
in a circle; and the greater the circle the harder to detect.
§4.
There is no Fallacy that may not properly be included under
some of the foregoing heads : those which in the Logical treatises
are separately enumerated, and contradistinguished from these,
"being in reality instances of them, and therefore more properly
enumerated in the subdivision thereof; as in the scheme annexed: —
108
OF FALLACIES.
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§5.
On each of the Fallacies which have heen thus enumerated and
distinguished, I propose to offer some more particular remarks ; hut
hefore I proceed to this, it will he proper to premise two general
ohservations, 1st. on the importance, and 2d. the difficulty, of detect-
ing and describing Fallacies. Both have heen already shghtly
alluded to ; hut it is requisite that they should here he somewhat
more fully and distinctly set forth.
1st. It seems hy most persons to he taken for granted that a J^.^gTectin*
Fallacy is to he dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded Fallacies.
hy a skilful sophist ; or, if they allow that a man may with honest
intentions slide into one unconsciously, in the heat of argument, still
they seem to suppose that where there is no dispute, there is no
cause to dread Fallacy ; whereas there is much danger, even in what
may he called solitary reasoning, of sliding unawares into some
Fallacy, hy which one may he so far deceived as even to act upon
the conclusion thus obtained. By "solitary reasoning" I mean the
case in which one is not seeking for arguments to prove a given
question, hut labouring to elicit from one's previous stock of know-
ledge some useful inference.^
To select one from innumerable examples that might he cited, influence of
and of which some more will occur in the subsequent part of this thought*.
essay; it is not improbable that many indiiferent sermons have heen
produced by the ambiguity of the word *' plain.'' A young divine
perceives the truth of the maxim, that **for the lower orders one's
language cannot be too plain:'' [i.e. clear and perspicuous, so as
to require no learning nor ingenuity to understand it,) and when he
proceeds to practice, the word "plain" indistinctly flits before him,
as it were, and often checks him in the use of ornamerds of style,
such as metaphor, epithet, antithesis, (kc, which are opposed to
** plainness" in a totally different sense of the word; being by no
means necessarily adverse to perspicuity, but rather, in many cases,
conducive to it ; as may be seen in several of the clearest of our
Lord's discourses, which are the very ones that are the most richly
adorned with figurative language. So far indeed is an ornamented
style from being unfit for the vulgar, that they are pleased with it
even in excess. Yet the desire to be "plain," combined with that
dim and confused notion which the ambiguity of the word produces
in such as do not separate in their minds, and set before themselves,
the two meanings, often causes them to write in a dry and bald style,
which has no advantage in point of perspicuity, and is least of all
suited to the taste of the vulgar. The above instance is not drawn
from mere conjecture, but from actual experience of the fact.
Another instance of the strong influence of words on our ideas may
'^ See the diapter on " inferring and proving," (Book IV. Ch. III.) in the Disser-
tation on tiie Province of Reasoning.
110 OF FALLACIES. [Book lU.
be adduced from a widely different subject : most persons feel a certain
degree of surprise on first bearing of tlie result of some late experi-
ments of tbe Agricultural-Chemists, by which they have ascertained
that universally what are called heavy soils are specifically th©
lightest ; and vice versa. Whence this surprise ? for no one ever
distinctly believed the established names to be used in the literal and
primary sense, in consequence of the respective soils having been
weighed together ; indeed it is obvious on a moment's reflection that
tenacious day-soils (as w^ell as muddy roads) are figuratively called
heavy, from the difficulty of ploughing, or passing over them, which
produces an effect like that of bearing or dragging a heavy weight ;
yet still the terms "light" and "heavy," though used figuratively,
have most undoubtedly introduced into men's minds something of
the ideas expressed by them in their primitive sense. The same
words, when applied to articles of diet, have produced important
errors ; many supposing some article of food to be light of digestion
from its being specifically light. So true is the ingenious observation
of Hobbes, that " words are the counters of wise men, and the
money of fools."
" Men imagine," says Bacon, *' that their minds have the command
of Language ; but it often happens that Language bears rule over
their mind." Some of the weak and absurd arguments which are
often urged against Suicide may be traced to the influence of words
on thoughts. When a Christian moralist is called on for a direct
Scnpturol precept against suicide, instead of replying that the Bible
is not meant for a complete code of laws, but for a system of motives
dindi principles, the answer frequently given is, "thou shalt do no
murder ;^^ and it is assumed in the arguments drawn from Reason,
as well as in those from Revelation, that Suicide is a species of
Murder ; vijZ. because it is called Belf-murder; and thus, deluded by
a name, many are led to rest on an unsound argument ; which, like
all other fallacies, does more harm than good, in the end, to the
cause of truth. Suicide, if any one considers the nature and not
the name of it, evidently wants the most essential characteristic of
murder, viz. the hurt and injury done to one's neighbour, in depriving
him of life, as well as to others by the insecurity they are in conse-
quence liable to feel. And since no one can, strictly speaking, do
injustice to himself, he cannot, in the literal and primary acceptation
of the words, be said either to rob or to murder himself. He who
deserts the post to which he is appointed by his great Master, and
presumptuously cuts short the state of probation graciously allowed
him for " working out his salvation," (whether by action or by patieni
endurance,) is guilty indeed of a grievous sin, but of one not tlie
least analogous in its character to murder. It impHes no inliumanity.
It is much more closely allied to the sin of wasting life in indolence,
or in trifling pursuits, — that life which is bestowed as a seed-time
for the harveat of immortality. What is called in familiar phrase,
§5.3 OF FALLACIES. Ill
"killing time," is, in truth, an approach, as far as it goes, to the
destruction of one's own life : for *' Time is the stuff life is made of."
" Time destroyed
Is suicide, where more than blood is spilt."— Young J
More especially deserving of attention is the influence of Analogical Errors
Terms in leading men into erroneous notions in Theology ; where the the^u"se of'
most important terms are analogical ; and yet they are continually Jerm^^^*^*^
employed in Reasoning, Avithout due attention (oftener through want
of caution than by unfair design) to their analogical nature ; and
most of the errors into which theologians have fallen may he traced,
in part, to this cause. ^
In speaking of the importance of refuting Fallacies, (under which Twofold
name I include, as will be seen, any false assumption employed as a any faLe
Premiss) this consideration ought not to be overlooked ; that an assumption,
unsound Principle, which has been employed to establish some
mischievously false Conclusion, does not at once become harmless,
and too insignificant to be worth refuting, as soon as that Conclusion
is given up, and the false Principle is no longer employed for that
particular use. It may equally well lead to some other no less mis-
chievous result. ** A false premiss, according as it is combined with
this, or with that, true one, wdll lead to two different false conclusions.
Thus, if the principle be admitted, that any important religious
errors ought to be forcibly suppressed, this may lead either to per-
secution on the one side, or to latitudinarian indifference on the other.
Some may be led to justify the suppression of heresies by the civil
sword ; and others, whose feelings revolt at such a procedure, and
who see persecution reprobated and discountenanced by those around
themj may be led by the same principle to regard religious errors
as of little or no importance, and all religious persuasions as equally
acceptable in the sight of God."*
It ought however to be observed on the other hand, that such Over-
effects are often attributed to some fallacy as it does not in fact pro- the effect uf
duce. It shall have been perhaps triumphantly urged, and repeated faiS,cie8.
again and again, and referred to by many as irrefragable ; and yet
shall have never convinced any one ; but have been merely assented to
by those already convinced. To many persons any two well-sounding
phrases, which have a few words the same, and are in some manner
connected with the same subject, will serve for Premiss and Conclu-
sion : and when we hear a man profess to derive conviction from
7 It is surely wiser and safer to confine thing that can be urged ; to snatch up the
ourselves to such arguments as will bear first weapon that comes to hand; ("furor
the test of a close examination, than to arma mmistrat;") without waiting to
resort to such as may indeed at the first consider what is TRUE,
glance be more specious and appear 8 gee the notes to Ch, V. § 1 of theDia-
stronger, but which, when exposed, will sertation subjoined,
toooftenleaveamanadupetotne fallacies 5> See Essays, 3d Series, Ch. Y. { 2.
on the opposite side. But it is especially p. 228.
the error of controversialists to urge every
112 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
such arguments, we are naturally disposed to regard his case as
hopeless. But it will often happen that in reality his reasoning
faculties shall have been totally dormant ; and equally so perhaps
in another case, where he gives his assent to a process of sound
reasoning, leading to a conclusion which he has already admitted.
*' The puerile fallacies which you may sometimes hear a man
adduce on some subjects, are perhaps in reality no more his own
than the sound arguments he employs on others ; he may have
given an indolent unthinking acquiescence to each ; and if he can be
excited to exertion of thought, he may be very capable of dis-
tinguishing the sound from the unsound." ^°
Thus much, as to the extensive practical influence of Fallacies,
and the consequent high importance of detecting and exposing them.
§6.
DiflRcuity of 2dly. The second remark is, that while sound reasoning is ever
FaiSef. the more readily admitted, the more clearly it is perceived to be
such, Fallacy, on the contrary, being rejected as soon as perceived,
will, of course, be the more likely to obtain reception, the more it
is obscured and disguised by obliquity and complexity of expression.
It is thus that it is the most likely either to slip accidentally from
the careless reasoner, or to be brought forward deliberately by the
Sophist. Not that he ever wishes this obscurity and complexity to
be perceived ; on the contrary, it is for his purpose that the expres-
sion should appear as clear and simple as possible, while in reality
it is the most tangled net he can contrive.
Fallacies Thus, whercas it is usual to express our reasoning elliptically, so
eiiipilcai ^ that a Premiss (or even two or three entire steps in a course of
language, argument) which may be readily supplied, as being perfectly
obvious, shall be left to be understood, the Sophist in like manner
suppresses what is not obvious, but is in reality the weakest part of
the argument : and uses every other contrivance to withdraw our
attention (his art closely resembling the juggler's) from the quarter
where the fallacy lies. Hence the uncertainty before mentioned,
to which class any individual Fallacy is to be referred : and hence it
is that the difficulty of detecting and exposing Fallacy, is so much
greater than that of comprehending and developing a process of
sound argument. It is like the detection and apprehension of a
criminal in spite of all his arts of concealment and disguise ; when
this is accomplished, and he is brought to trial with all the evidence
of his guilt produced, his conviction and punishment are easy ; and
this is precisely the case with those Fallacies which are given as
examples in Logical treatises ; they are in fact already detected, by
being stated in a plain and regular form, and are, as it Averc, only
brought up to receive sentence. Or again, fallacious reasoning may
» Pol. Econ. Lect. I. p. 15
5 6] OF FALLACIES. 113
be compared to a perplexed and entangled mass of accounts, which
it requires much sagacity and close attention to clear up, and
display in a regular and intelligible form ; though when this is once
accomplished, the whole appears so perfectly simple, that the
unthinking are apt to imdervalue the skill and pains which have
been employed upon it.
Moreover, it should be remembered, that a very long discussion ^o^^^^'f^^^
is one of the most effectual veils of Fallacy. Sophistry, like poison, lengthy
is at once detected, and nauseated, when presented to us in a con- ^^"^"^^^o"*
centrated form ; but a Fallacy which when stated barely, in a few
sentences, would not deceive a child, may deceive half the world, if
diluted in a quarto volume. For, as in a calculation, one single
figure incorrectly stated will enable us to arrive at any result what-
ever, though every other figure, and the whole of the operations, be
correct, so, a single false assumption in any process of reasoning,
though every other be true, will enable us to draw what conclusion
we please ; and the greater the number of true assumptions, the
more likely it is that the false one will pass unnoticed. But when you
single out one step in the course of the reasoning, and exhibit it as
a Syllogism with one Premiss true and the other false, the sophistry
is easily perceived. I have seen a long argument to prove that the
potato is not a cheap article of food ; in which there was an
elaborate, and perhaps correct, calculation of the produce per acre,
of potatoes, and of wheat, — the quantity lost in bran — expense of
grinding, dressing, kc, and an assumption slipped in, as it were
incidentally, that a given quantity of potatoes contains hut one-tenih
part ofnvirUive matter equal to bread: from all which (and there is
probably but one groundless assertion in the whole) a most trium-
phant result was deduced."
To use another illustration ; it is true in a course of argument, as
in Mechanics, that "nothing is stronger than its weakest part;"
and consequently a chain which has ons faulty link will break ; but
though the number of the sound links adds nothing to the strength
of the chain, it adds much to the chance oi the faulty one's escaping
observation. In such cases as I have been alluding to, one may
often hear it observed that " there is a great deal of truth in what
such a one has said:" i.e. perhaps it is all true, except one essential '.
point.
To speak, therefore, of all the Fallacies that have ever been Error of
enumerated as too glaring and obvious to need even being men- au'rafiacies
tioned, because the simple instances given in logical treatises, and detectloru °*
11 This, however, gained the undoubt- unblushing assertors of falsehood seem to
iiig assent of a Review by no means have a race of easy believers provided on
friendly to the author, and usually noted purpose for their use : men \vho will not
more for scepticism than for ready indeed believe the best established truths
assent! "All things," says an apocry- of religion, but are ready to believe any
phal writer, "are double, one against thing else,
another, and nothing is made in vain :"
114 OF FALLACIES. [Book IH.
there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected
form, are such as would (in that form) deceive no one ; — this,
surely, shows extreme weakness, or else unfairness. It may
readily he allowed, indeed, that to detect individual Fallacies, and
bring them under the general rules, is a harder task than to lay
down those general rules ; hut this does not prove that the latter
office is trifling or useless, or that it does not essentially conduce to
the performance of the other. There may be more ingenuity shown
in detecting and arresting a malefactor, and convicting him of the
fact, than in laying down a law for the trial and punishment of such
persons ; hut the latter office, i.e. that of a legislator, is surely
neither unnecessary nor trifling.
It should he added that a close observation and Logical analysis
of Fallacious arguments, as it tends (according to what has been
already said) to form a habit of mind well suited for the practical
detection of Fallacies ; so, for that very reason, it will make us
the more careful in making allowance for them : i.e. to bear in
mind how much men in general are liable to be influenced by them.
£J. G.Arefuled argument ought to go for nothing, (except where there is
some ground for assuming that no stronger one could be adduced :)^^
but in fact it will generally prove detrimental to the cause, from the
Fallacy which wiU be presently explained. Now, no one is more
likely to be practically aware of this, and to take precautions
accordingly, than he who is most versed in the whole theory of
Fallacies ; for the best Logician is the least likely to calculate on
men in general being such.
§7.
0/ Fallacies inform,
enough perhaps has already been said in the preceding Compendium :
and it has been remarked above, that it is often left to our choice
to refer an individual Fallacy to this head or to another.
It may be worth observing, however, that to the present class
we may the most conveniently refer those Fallacies, so common in
practice, of supposing the Conclusion false, because the Premiss is
false, or because the Argument is unsound ; and of inferring the
truth of the Premiss from that of the Conclusion. E.G. If any
one argues for the existence of a God, from its being universally
believed, a man might perhaps be able to refute the argument by
producing an instance of some nation destitute of such belief; the
argument ought then (as has been observed above) io go for nothing:
but many would go further, and think that this refutation had
disproved the existence of a God; in which they would be guilty
>» See Essay II. on Kingdom of Christ, § 22, note.
§8.] OF FALLACIES. 115
of an illicit process of the Major-term: viz. *' whatever is univer-
sally believed must be true ; the existence of a God is not univer-
sally believed; therefore it is not true." Others again, from being
convinced of the truth of the Conclusion, would infer that of the
Premises ; which would amount to the Fallacy of an undistributed
Middle: viz. "what is universally believed is true; the existence
of a God is true; therefore it is universally believed. " Or, these
Fallacies might be stated in the hypothetical form ; since the one
evidently proceeds from the denial of the Antecedent to the denial
of the Consequent; and the other from the establishing of the
Consequent to the inferring of the Antecedent ; which two Fallacies
will usually be found to correspond respectively with those of Illicit
process of the major, and Undistributed Middle.
Fallacies of this class are very much kept out of sight, being ''*^<?a^ ,
seldom perceived even by those who employ them ; but of their practically
practical importance there can be no doubt, since it is notorious ^^etnmeniai.
that a weak argument is always, in practice, detrimental; and that
there is no absurdity so gross which men will not readily admit, if
it appears to lead to a conclusion of which they are already con-
vinced. Even a candid and sensible writer is not unlikely to be,
by this means, misled, when he is seeking for arguments to support
a conclusion which he has long been fully convinced of himself;
i.e. he will often use such arguments as would never have convinced
himself, and are not likely to convince others, but rather (by the
operation of the converse Fallacy) to confirm in their dissent those
w4io before disagreed with him.
It is best therefore to endeavour to put yourself in the place of
an o^jponent to your own arguments, and consider whether you could
not find some objection to them. The applause of one's own party
is a very unsafe ground for judging of the real force of an argumen-
tative work, and consequently of its real utility. To satisfy those
'who were doubting, and to convince those who were opposed, are
much better tests ; ^^ but these persons are seldom very loud in their
applause, or very forward in bearing their testimony.
Of Ambiguous Middle,
That case in which the Middle is undistributed belongs of course
to the preceding head ; the fault being perfectly manifest from tlio
mere form of the expression: in that case the Extremes are com-
pared with two parts of the same term ; but in the Fallacy which
has been called semi-logical, (which we are now to speak of) the
13 The strongest, perhaps, of all exter- who nevertheless resolve not to admit the
nal indications of the strength of an argu- conclusion. iSee Appendix ; Art. Person,
nient, is, the implied admission of those last clause.
116 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
Extremes are compared with two different terms, the Middle being
used in two different senses in the two Premises.^*
And here it may be remarked, that when the argument is brought
into the form of a regular Syllogism, the contrast between these two
senses will usually appear very striking, from the two Premises
h&mg placed together; and hence the scorn with which many have
treated the very mention of the Fallacy of Equivocation, deriving
their only notion of it from the exposure of it in Logical treatises ;
whereas, in practice it is common for the two Premises to be placed
very far apart, and discussed in different parts of the discourse ; by
which means the inattentive hearer overlooks any ambiguity that
may exist in the Middle-term. Hence the advantage of Logical
habits, in fixing our attention strongly and steadily on the impoHant
terms of an argument.
And here it should be observed, that when we mean to charge
any argument with the fault of " equivocal-middle," it is not enough
to say that the Middle-term is a word or phrase which admits of
more than one meaning ; (for there are few that do not) but we
must show, that in order for each premiss to be admitted, the Term
in question must be understood in one sense (pointing out what that
sense is) in one of the premises, and in another sense, in the other.
Importance And if anyone speaks contemptuously of "over exactness" in
disUncUons. fixing the precise sense in which some term is used, — of attending
to minute and subtle distinctions, <fec. we may reply that these minute
distinctions are exactly those which call for careful attention ; since
it is only through the neglect of these that Fallacies ever escape
detection.
For, a very glaring and palpable equivocation could never mislead
any one. To argue that *' feathers dispel darkness, because they
are light j^^ or that " this man is agreeable, because he is riding, and
riding is agreeable," is an equivocation which could never be
employed but in jest. And yet however slight in any case may be
the distinction between the two senses of a Middle-term in the two
premises, the apparent-argument will be equally inconclusive;
though its fallaciousness will be more likely to escape notice.
Even so, it is for want of attention to minute points, that houses
are robbed, or set on fire. Burglars do not in general come and
batter down the front- door: but climb in at some window whose
fastenings have been neglected. And an incendiary, or a careless
servant, does not kindle a tar-barrel in the middle of a room, but
leaves a lighted turf, or a candle snuff, in the thatch, or in a heap of
shavings.
In many cases, it is a good maxim, to " take care of little things,
and great ones will take care of themselves."
One case, which may be regarded as coming under the head of
1^ For some instances of important ambiguities, see Appendix.
5 8.] OF FALLACIES. 117
Ambii^uous middle, is, (what I believe loo-ical writers mean by Paronymous
*' words
*' Fallada Figurce Dictionis,'') the Fallacy built on the grammatical
structure of language, from men's usually taking far granted that
loaronymous [or conjugate] words — i.e. those belonging to each
other, as the substantive, adjective, verb, &c., of the same root,
have a precisely correspondent meaning ; which is by no means
universally the case. Such a fallacy could not indeed be even
exhibited in strict Logical form, which would preclude even the
attempt at it, since it has two middle terms in sound as well as
sense. But nothing is more common in practice than to vary con-
tinually the terms employed, with a view to grammatical convenience ;
nor is there any thing unfair in such a practice, as long as the
??2mmn^ is preserved unaltered : e.g. *' murder should be punished
with death; this man is a murderer; therefore he deserves to die,'*
<fcc. <fcc. Here we proceed on the assumption (in this case just) that
to commit murder and to be a murderer, — to deserve death and to be
one who ought to die, are, respectively, equivalent expressions : and
it would frequently prove a heavy inconvenience to be debarred this
kind of liberty ; but the abuse of it gives rise to the Fallacy in
question: e.g. ''projectors are unfit to be trusted; this man has
formed a. project, therefore he is unfit to be trusted :"^^ here the
Sophist proceeds on the hypothesis that he who forms o. project must
be a pvjedor: whereas the bad sense that commonly attaches to
the latter word, is not at all implied in the former.
This Fallacy may often be considered as lying not in the Middle,
but in one of the terms of the Conclusion ; so that the Conclusion
drawn shall not be, in reality, at all warranted by the Premises,
though it will appear to be so, by means of the grammatical affinity
of the words : e.g. " to be acquainted with the guilty is a, pi^esump-
tion of guilt ; this man is so acquainted ; therefore we may pi^esimie
that he is guilty:" this argument proceeds on the supposition of an
exact correspondence between '' p)resume'' and "j^j7'e5wmj9i/cm,'*
which, hoAvever, does not really exist; for "presumption" is com-
monly used to express a kind of slight suspicion; whereas " to
presume" amounts to act.ucd belief.
The above remark will apply to some other cases of ambiguity of
term ; viz. the Conclusion will often contain a term, which (though
not, as here, difi"erent in expression from the corresponding one in
the Premiss, yet) is liohle to be understood in a sense different from
what it bears to the Premiss ; though, of course, such a Fallacy is
less common, because less likely to deceive, in those cases than in
this; where the term used in the Conclusion, though professing to
correspond with one in the Premiss, is not the very same in expres-
sion, and therefore is more ceHain to convey a different sense ; which
is what the Sophist wishes.
15 Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations: Usury,
118 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
There are innumerable instances of a non-correspondence in
paronymous words, similar to that above instanced ; as between art
and artful, dedgn and designing, faith and faithful, (fee. ; and the
more slight the variation of meaning, the more likely is the Fallacy
to be successful ; for when the words have become so widely
removed in sense as "pity" and "pitiful," every one would per-
ceive such a Fallacy, nor could it be employed but in jest.
This Fallacy cannot in practice be refuted, (except when you are
addressing regular logicians,) by stating merely the impossibility of
reducing such an argument to the strict logical form. You must
find some ^vay of pointing out the non-correspondence of the terms
in question; e.g. with respect to the example above, it might be
remarked, that we speak of strong or faint " presumption," but we
use no such expression in conjunction with the verb " presume,"
because the word itself imjolies strength.
No fallacy is more common in controversy than the present ; since
in this way the Sophist will often be able to misinterpret the pro-
positions which his opponent admits or maintains, and so employ
them against him. Thus in the examples just given, it is natural
to conceive one of the Sophist's Premises to have been borrowed
from his opponent. ^^
Etymology. The present Fallacy is nearly allied to, or rather perhaps may be
regarded as a branch of that founded on etymology; viz. when a
term is used at one time, in its customary, and at another, in its
etymological sense. Perhaps no example of this can be found that
is more extensively and mischievously employed than in the case of
the word representative: assuming that its right meaning must cor-
respond exactly with the strict and original sense of the verb,
** represent," the Sophist persuades the multitude, that a member bf
the House of Commons is bound to be guided in all points by the
opinion of liis constituents : and, in short, to be merely their spokes-
man: whereas law, and custom, which in this case may be considered
as fixing the meaning of the Term, require no such thing, but enjoin
the representative to act according to the best of his own judgment,
and on his own responsibility.
Home Tooke has furnished a whole magazine of such weapons for
any Sophist who may need them ; and has furnished some specimens
of the employment of them. He contends, that it is idle to speak of
eternal or immutable " Tritth," because the word is derived from
to '* trow," i.e. believe. He might on as good grounds have censured
the absurdity of speaking of sending a letter by the ''post,'' because
a post, in its primary sense, is a pillar; or have insisted that
** Sycophant" can never mean any thing but '* Fig-shewer."
1* Perhaps a dictionary of such paro- be nearly as useful as one of synonyms;
nymous [conjugate! words as do not i.e. properly speaking, of psaudo-syno-
reguiarly correspond in meaning, would nyms.
I
tO-Z OF FALLACIES. 119
§9.
It IS to he observed, that to the head of Amhiguous middle should Fallacy of
he referred what is called " Fallacia plwium LUerrogationum," tioas^.^^^'
which may be named, simply, *' the Fallacy of Interrogation ; " viz.
the Fallacy of asking several questions which appear to he but one ;
so that whatever one answer is given, being of course applicable to
one only of the implied questions, may be interpreted as applied to
the other : the refutation is, of course, to reply separately to each
question, i.e. to detect the ambiguity.
I have said, several " questions which appear to he hut one^^' for
else there is no Fallacy; such an example, therefore, as "estne homo
animal et lapis ?" which Aldrich gives, is foreign to the matter in
hand ; for there is nothing unfair in asking two distinct questions
(any more than m asserting two distinct propositions) distinctly and
avoioedly.
This Fallacy may be referred, as has been said, to the head of
Ambiguous middle. In all Reasoning it is very common to state
one of the Premises in form of a, question, and when that is admitted,
or supposed to be admitted, then to fill up the rest : if then one of
the Terms of that question be ambiguous, whichever sense the
opponent replies to, the Sophist assumes the other sense of the Term
in the remaining Premiss. It is therefore very common to state an
equivocal argument, in form of a question so worded, that there shall
be little doubt which reply will be given ; but if there he such doubt,
the Sophist must have two Fallacies of equivocation ready ; e. g.
the question *' whether any thing vicious is expedient," discussed in
Cic. Off. Book III. (where, by-the-by, he seems not a little per-
plexed with it himself) is of the character in question, from the
ambiguity of the word, '' expedient y'' which means sometimes,
*' conducive to temporal prosperity," sometimes " conducive to the
greatest good:" wljichever answer therefore was given, the Sophist
might have a Fallacy of equivocation founded on this term ; viz. if
the answer be in the negative, his argument. Logically developed,
will stand thus, — "what is vicious is not expedient; whatever
conduces to the acquisition of wealth and aggrandizement is
expedient ; therefore it cannot be vicious : " if in the affirmative, then
thus, — "whatever is expedient is desirable; something vicious is
expedient, therefore desirable.""
Again, a witness was once asked by a Parliamentary Committee
(in 1832) whether he knew " how long the practice had ceased in
Ireland of dividing the tithes into four portions, one for the poor,"
&c. This resembles the hackneyed instance of asking a man
17 Much of the declamation by which pedient" were in opposition) might be
popular assemblies are often misled, silenced by asking the simple question,
against what is called, without any dis- " Do you then admit that the course yoa
tinct meaning, the " doctrine of expedi- recommend is iwexpedientf
ency," (as if the "rigiit" and the "ex-
120 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
** whether he had left o^heating his father." [See Vol. of Charges
and Tracts, p. 379.] King Charles II. 's celebrated inquiry — of
the Royal Society (noticed below, § 14) may be referred to this
head. He asked the cause why a dead fish does not (though a live
fish does) add to the weight of a vessel of water. This implies tioo
questions ; the first of w^hich many of the philosophers for a time
overlooked: viz. 1st. is it a. facf? 2dly, if it be a fact, what can
cause \iV^
Distribution This kind of Fallacy is frequently employed in a such a manner,
drstributioa ^^^^^ ^^6 uncertainty shall be, not about the meaning, but the extent
of a Term, i.e. whether it is distributed or not: e.g. "did A B in
this case act from such and such a motive?" which may imply either,
*' was it his sole motive?" or " was it one of his motives?" in the
former case the term ["that-which-actuated-A B"] is distributed ;
in the latter, not : now if he acted from a mixture of motives, which-
ever answer you give, may be misrepresented, and your conclusion
thus disproved.
Again, those who dispute the right of a State to enforce the pro-
fession of a certain religion, have been met by the question, "has a
State a right to enforce Laws?" If we answer in the negative, we
may be interpreted as denying that any laws can rightfully be
enforced ; which would of course go to destroy the very existence of
a Political-community : if, in the affirmative, we may be interpreted
as sanctioning the enforcement of any laws whatever that the Legis-
lature may see fit to enact: whether enjoining men to adore a
Crucifix, or to trample on it; — to reverence Christ, or Mahomet,
ha. The ambiguity of the question lies in "Laws;" understood
either as " same laws," or, as " any laws withovi exception.' '^^
§ 10.
Intrinsic and In some cases of ambiguous Middle, the Term in question may
equivoca!^ be Considered as having in itself, from its own equivocal nature, two
tiona significations; (which apparently constitutes the '' Fallacia equivo-
cationis'' of Logical writers;) others again have a Middle-term
which is ambiguous from the context, i.e. from what is understood
in conjunction with it. This division will be found useful, though
it is impossible to draw the line accurately in it.
The dliptical character of ordinary discourse causes many Terms
to become practically ambiguous, which yet are not themselves
employed in different senses, but with diff'erent ajiplications, which
are understood. Thus, " The Faith" would be used by a Christian
writer to denote the Christian Faith, and by a Mussulman, the
Mahometan ; yet the word Faith, has not in these cases, of it
two diflferent significations. So UtuktoI, " elect," or
sometimes applied to such as are "chosen," to certsdn pnrlvUeges
18 See Historic Doubts relative to Na- ^^ See " Essays on the Kingdom of
poleon. Christ." Note A to Essay 1.
510.] OF FALLACIES. 121
and advantages; (as the Israelites were, tliongh " tliey were over-
thrown in the wilderness" for their disobedience; and as all
Christians are frequently called in the New Testament) sometimes
again to those who are ** chosen," as fit to receive a final reward^
having made a right use of those advantages ; as when our Lord
says, " many are called, but few chosen."
What Logicians have mentioned under the title of ** Fallacia Amphibolla.
amphiboliae" is referable to this last class; though in real practice
it is not very likely to occur. An amphibolous sentence is one that
is capable of two meanings, not from the double sense of any of the
words, but from its admitting of a double construction: as in the
instance Aldrich gives, which is untranslatable; " quod tangitur a
Socrate, illud sentit;" where *' illud " may be taken either as the
nominative or accusative. So also the celebrated response of the
oracle ; " Aio te, ^acida, Romanes vincere posse:" " Pyrrhus the
Eomans shall, I say, subdue:" which closely resembles (as Shak-.
speare remarks) the witch-prophecy, "The Duke yet lives that
Henry siiall depose." This effect is produced by what the French
call "construction louche," a squinting construction; i.e. where
some word or words may be referred either to the former or latter
clause of the sentence ; of which an instance occurs in the rubric
prefixed to the service for the 30th January. ** If this day shall
happen to be Sunday [this form of prayer shall be used] and the
fast kept the next day following:" the clause in brackets may
belong either to the former or the latter part of the sentence. In
the Nicene Creed, the words, " by whom all things were made," are
grammatically referable either to the Father or the Son. And in
the 2d Commandment, the clause ** of them that hate me," is a
genitive governed either by "children," or by "generation:" the
latter being indicated by the ordinary mode of punctuation and of
reading; which totally changes the real sense. ^ The following
clause of a sentence from a newspaper, is a curious specimen of
Amphibolia: — "For protecting and upholding such electors as
refused, contrary to their desires and consciences, to vote for Messrs.
A and B, regardless of threats, and unmindful of intimidation."
There are various ways in which words come to have two Accidental
meanings: _ ^ ^ Zt''^'
1st. By accident; [i.e. when there is no perceptible connexion
betAveen the two meanings) as ^' light'' signifies both the contrary
to "heavy" and the contrary to "dark." Thus, such Proper-
names as John or Thomas, kc. which happen to belong to several
difi'erent persons, are ambiguous, because they have a difi'erent
signification in each case where they are applied. Words which fall
under this first head are what are the most strictly called equivocal,
20 See Rhetoric, Appendix.
122
OF FALLACIES.
[Book IIL
First and
second
intention.
Kesen^-
biance and
Analogy.
2dly. There are several terms in the use of which it is necessary
to notice the distinction between first and second intention.^^ The
"first-intention" of a Term, (according to the usual acceptation of
this phrase) is a certain vague and general signification of it, as
opposed to one more precise and limited, which it hears in some
particular art, science, or system, and which is called its *' second-
intention." Thus, among farmers, in some parts, the word "beast"
is applied particularly and especially to the ox kind : and "bird,"
in the language of many sportsmen, is in like manner appropriated
to the partridge : the common and general acceptation (which every
one is well acquainted with) of each of those two words, is the First-
intention of each ; the other, its Second-intention.
For some remarks on the Second-intention of the word " Species,"
when applied to organized beings, {viz. as denoting those plants or
animals, which it is conceived may have descended from a common
stock), see the subjoined Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. V. § 1.
It is evident that a Term may have several Second-intentions,
according to the several systems into which it is introduced, and
of which it is one of the technical Terms: thus "line" signifies,
in the Art-military, a certain form of drawing up ships or troops :
in Geography, a certain division of the earth ; to the fisherman, a
string to catch fish, &c. &c.; all which are so many distinct
Second-intentions, in each of which there is a certain signification
" of extension in length" which constitutes the First-intention, and
w^hich corresponds pretty nearly with the employment of the Term
in Mathematics.
In a few instances the Second-intention, or philosophical employ-
ment of a Term, is more extensive than the First-intention, or
popular use: thus " affection" is limited in popular use to " love ;"
"charity," to "almsgiving;" "flower," to those flowers which
have conspicuous petals ; and fruit, to such as are eatable.
It will sometimes happen, that a term shall be employed always
in some one or other of its second intentions ; and never, strictly
in the first, though that first intention is a part of its signification
in each case. It is evident, that the utmost care is requisite to
avoid confounding together, either the first and second intentions,
or the difi*erent second intentions with each other.
3dly. When two or more things are connected by resemblance or
analogy, they will frequently have the same name. Thus a " blade
of grass," and the contrivance in building called a *' dove-taU/'
21 I am aware that there exists another
opinion as to the meaning of the pimise
*' second intention ;" and that Aldrich is
understood by some persons to mean (as
indeed his expression may very well be
understood to miply) that eAxri/ predicable
must necessarily be employed in the
Second-intention. I do not undertake to
combat the doctrine alluded to, because
I must confess that, aftei- the most patient
attention devoted to the explanations
given of it, I have never been able to
comprehend what it is that is meant by
it. It is one, however, which, whether
sound or unsound, appears not to be con-
nected with any Losjical processes, and
therefore may be safely passed by on the
present occasion.
§ 10.] OF FALLACIES. 123
are so called from tlieir resemblance to the blade^ of a sword, and
the tail of a real dove. But two things may he connected hy
analogy t though they have in themselves no resemblance : for analogy
is the resemhlance of ratios (or relations:) thus, as a. sweet taste
gratifies the palate, so does a sweet sound gratify the ear; and
hence the same word *' sweet" is applied to hoth, though no flavour
can resemhle a sound in itself. So, the leg of a table does not
resemhle that of an animal ; nor the foot of a mountain that of an
animal ; but the leg answers the same 2:)urpose to the table, as the leg
of an animal to that animal ; the foot of a mountain has the same situ-
ation relatively to the mountain, as the foot of an animal to the animal.
This analogy therefore may be expressed like a mathematical analogy
(or proportion) ; "leg : animal : : supporting-stick : table."
The words pertaining to 3Iincl may in general be traced up, as
borrowed (which no doubt they all were, originally) by Analogy,
from those pertaining to 3f otter: though in many cases the primary
sense has become obsolete.
Thus, " edify"^ in its primary sense of "build up"^* is disused,
and the origin of it often forgotten; although the substantive
*' edifice" remains in common use, in a corresponding sense.
When however we speak of "weighing" the reasons on both
sides, — of "seeing," or "feeling" the force of an argument, —
"imprinting" any thing on the memory, <fec. we are aware of these
words being used analogically.
In all these cases (of this 3d head) one of the meanings of the Primary and
"Word is called by Logicians proper, i.e. original or primary; the senses."^
other improper, secondary, or transferred : thus, sweet is originally
and properly applied to toMes; secondarily and improperly {i.e. by
analogy) to sounds : thus also, dove-tail is applied secondarily (though
not by analogy, but by direct resemblance) to the contrivance in
building so called.
When the secondary meaning of a word is founded on some
fanciful analogy, and especially when it is introduced for orna-
ment's sake, we call this a metaphor; as when we speak of " a
ship's ploughing the deep;" the turning up of the surface being
essential indeed to the plough, but accidental only, to the ship.
But if the analogy be a more important and essential one, and
especially if we have no other word to express our meaning but this
transferred one, we then call it merely an analogous word (though
the metaphor is analogous also) e.g. one would hardly call it meta-
phorical OY figurative language to speak of the "leg of a table," or
" mouth of a river." ^
22 Unless, indeed, the primary applica- 23 See 1 Peter ii. 5.
tion of the Term be to the leaf of grass, 24 gee Johnson's Dictionary.
and the secondary to cutting instruments, 25 gee Bp. Copleston's account of An-
which is perhaps more probable: but the alogy in the notes to his " Four Discour-
question is unimportant in the present ses."
case.
124 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
There are two kinds of error, each very common — wliicli lead to
confusion of thought in our use of analogical words :
i. The error of supposing the things themselves to be similar, from
their having similar relations to other things.
ii. The still commoner error of supposing the Analogy to extend
further than it does ; [or, to be more complete than it really is ;] from
not considering in what the Analogy in each case consists.
For instance, the " Servants'' that we read of in the Bible, and in
other translations of ancient books, are so called by Analogy to
servants among us : and that Analogy consists in the offices which
a ** servant" performs, in waiting on his master, and doing his bid-
ding. It is in this respect that the one description of "servant"
"corresponds" ["answers"] to the other. And hence some per-
sons have been led to apply all tlmt is said in Scripture respecting
]\Iasters and Servants, to these times, and this Country : forgetting
that the Analogy is not complete, and extends no further than the
point above-mentioned. For the ancient " servants" (except when
expressly spoken of as /m^ec^-servants) were Slaves; a part of the
Master's possessions.
Connexion 4thly. Several things may be called by the same name (though
place, &c. they have no connexion of resemblance or analogy) from being con-
nected hy vicinity of time or place; under which head will come the
connexion of cause and efect, or of part and whole, &c. ; and the
transference of words in this way from the primary to a secondary
meaning, is what Grammarians call Metonymy. Thus, a door
signifies both an opening in the wall (more strictly called the door-
way) and a board which closes it ; which are things neither similar
nor analogous. When I say, "the rose smells sweet;" and "I
smell the rose ;" the word " smell" has two meanings: in the latter
sentence, I am speaking of a certain sensation in my own mind ; in
the former, of a certain quality in the flower, which produces that
sensation, but which of course cannot in the least resemble it ; and
here the word smell is applied with equal propriety to both. On this
ambiguity have been founded the striking paradoxes of those who
have maintained that there is no heat in fire, no cold in ice, &c.
The sensations of heat, cold, &lc. can of course only belong to a
Sentient Being. Thus again the word "certainty," denotes either,
primarily, the state of our own mind when we are free from doubt,
or secondarily, the character of the event about which we feel certain.
[See Appendix, No. I.] Thus, we speak of Homer, for "the
■works of Homer;" and this is a secondary or transferred meaning:
and so it is when we say, " a good shot," for a good marksman: but
the word "s^oi" has two other meanings, which are both equally
proper ; viz. the thing put into a gun in order to be discharged from
it, and the act of discharging it.
Thus " learning'' signifies either the act of acquiring knowledge,
or the knowledge itself; e.g. " he neglects his learning ;" " Johnson
510.] OF FALLACIES. 125
was a man of learning." *' Possess'lon'^ is ambiguous in the same
manner; and a multitude of others. A remarkable and most
important instance is the ambiguity of such words as '* samey^^
''one,'' he. (See the Articles on those words in Appendix, and
also Book IV. Chap. V. § 1 and 2.)
Much confusion often arises from ambiguity of this kind, when
unperceived ; nor is there any point in which the copiousness and
consequent precision of the Greek language is more to be admired
than in its distinct terms for expressing an act, and the result of
that act; e.g. -Trpx^ig, "the doing of any thing;" -Trpotyfioc, the
" thing done;" so, loats and oupov — Ajjt//;? and Ay^^^a, &c.
It will very often happen, that two of the meanings of a word
will have no connexion with one another, but will each have some
connexion with the third. Thus, ** martyr" originally signified a
witness; thence it was applied to those who suffered in bearing
testimony to Christianity ; and thence again it is often applied to
*' sufferers" in general: the first and third significations are not
the least connected. Thus "joosi" signifies originally a pillar,
{postimi, from j^ono) then, a distance marked out by posts ; and
then, the carriages, messengers, &,c. that travelled over this
distance. Thus '* Clerk," originally one in Holy Orders, came to
be used as it is at present, from the " Clergy" having been, during
the dark Ages, almost the only persons who could read.
It would puzzle any one, proceeding on mere conjecture, to make
out how the word " premises" should have come to signify " a
building."
Ambiguities of this kind belong practically to the first head:
there being no perceived connexion between the different senses.
Another source of practical ambiguity (as has been just observed) Elliptical
** is, that, in respect of any subject concerning wliich the generality *^^s"*JJ®-
of men are accustomed to speak much and familiarly in their con-
versation relative to that, they usually introduce elliptical expres-
sions ; very clearly understood in the outset, but whose elliptical
character comes, in time, to be so far lost sight of, that confusion
of language, and thence, of thought, is sometimes the result. Thus,
the expression of a person's possessing a fortune of £10,000 is an
elliptical phrase : meaning, at full length, that all his property if
sold would exchange for that sum of money. And in ninety-nine
instances out of a hundred, no error or confusion of thought arises
from this language ; but there is no doubt that it mainly contributed
to introduce and foster the notion that Wealth consists especially of
gold and silver (these being used to measure and express its amount) ;
and that the sure way to enrich a country is to promote the impor-
tation, and prevent the export of the precious metals ; with all the
other absurdities of what is commonly called * the mercantile
System.' So also we speak commonly of * the example of such a
one's pimishment serving to deter others from crime.' And usually,
^upppiww I ■ . iiiiiiiiii«um.jL
126 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
no misapprelienslon results from this, wliich is, in truth, an elliptical
expression. But sometimes sophistical reasoners take advantage
of it, and men who are not clear-headed are led into confusion of
thought. Strictly speaking, what deters a man from crime in such
cases as those alluded to, is, the apprehension of himself suffering
punishment. That apprehension may be excited by the example of
another's being punished; or it may be excited without that
example, if punishment be denounced, and there is good reason to
expect that the threat will not be an empty one. And on the other
hand, the example of others' suifering punishment does not deter
anyone, if \i fail to excite this apprehension for himself; if for
instance he consider himself as an exempt person, as is the case
with a despot in barbarian countries, or with a madman who expects
to be acquitted on the plea of insanity.
"Again, when a man complains of being * out of worlc — is
* looking out for employment,' — and hopes for subsistence by labour,
this is elliptical language, well enough understood in general.
We know that what man lives on, is food; and that he who is
said to be looking out for work, is in want of food and other
necessaries, which he hopes to procure in exchange for his labour,
and has no hope of obtaining without it. But there is no doubt
that this elliptical language has contributed to lead those who were
not attentive to the character of the expression, to regard every
thing as beneficial to the labouring classes yfhich. furnishes employ-
9nent, i.e. gives trouble ; even though no consequent increase should
take place in the Country, of the food and other commodities
destined for their support." ^^ A snow-drift which obstructs a road,
and a vein of valuable ore, may conceivably each furnish employ-
ment for an equal number of labourers.
The remedy for ambiguity is a Definition of the Term which is
suspected of being used in two senses ; viz. a Nominal, not
necessarily a Real Definition : as was remarked in Book II. Chap. V.
Pefinition It is important to observe that the very circumstance which in
noedei °^ any case " makes a definition the more necessary, is apt to lead to
the omission of it : for when any terms are employed that are not
familiarly introduced into ordinary discourse, such as ' parallelo-
gram,' or 'sphere,' or * tangent,' * pencil of rays,' or 'refraction,*
— 'oxygen,' or 'alkali,' — the learner is ready to inquire, and the
writer to anticipate the inquiry, what is meant by this or that term ?
And though in such cases it is undoubtedly a correct procedure to
answer this inquiry by a definition, yet of the two cases, a definition
is even more necessary in the other, where it is not so likely to be
called for ; — where the word, not being new to the student, but
familiar to his ear, from its employment in every-day discourse, is
liable to the ambiguity which is almost always the result. For in
38 Pol. Econ. Lect. IX.
§ 10.] OF FALLACIES. 127
respect of words tliat sound something new and strange, tliougli it
is, as I have said, much better to define them in the outset, yet
even Avithout this, the student would gradually collect their meaning-
pretty correctly, as he proceeded in his study of any treatise ; from
having nothing to mislead him, — nothing from which to form his
notions at all, except the manner in which the terms were employed
in the work itself that is before him. And the very desire he had
felt of a definition would lead him in this way to form one, and
generally a sufficiently correct one, for himself.
** It is otherwise with terms to which we are familiarly accus-
tomed. Of these, the student does not usually crave definitions,
from supposing, for that reason, that he understands them well
enough : though perhaps (without suspecting it) he has in reality
been accustomed to hear them employed in various senses, and to
attach but a vague and inaccurate notion to them. If you speak to
an uninstructed hearer, of any thing that is spherical, or circular, or
cylindrical, he will probably beg for an explanation of your meaning ;
but if 3''ou tell him of any thing that is round, it will not strike him
that any explanation is needed : though he has been accustomed to
employ the word, indiscriminately, in all the senses denoted by the
other three." ^^
But here it may be proper to remark,* that for the avoiding of DeflniHons,
Fallacy, or of Verbal-controversy, it is only requisite that the term be exacted,
should be employed uniformly in the same sense, as far as the exist-
ing question is concerned. Thus, two persons might, in discussing
the question whether Augustus was a great man, have some such
difi*erence in their acceptation of the epithet "great," as would be
non-essential to that question ; e.g. one of them might understand
by it nothing more than eminent intellectual and moral qualities;
while the other might conceive it to imply the performance of
splendid actions: this abstract difference of meaning would not pro-
duce any disagreement in the existing question, because both those
circumstances are united in the case of Augustus ; but if one (and
not the other) of the parties understood the epithet " great" to imply
pure patriotism, — generosity of character, &lc., then there would
be a disagreement as to the application of the Term, even between
those who might think alike of Augustus's character, as wanting in
those qualities.^ Definition, the specific for ambiguity, is to be
employed, and demanded, with a view to this principle ; it is sufficient
on each occasion to define a Term as far as regards the question in
hand.
If, for example, we were remonstrating with any one for quitting
the church of which he was a member, wantonly, and not from
strong and deliberate conscientious conviction, but from motives of
taste or fancy, and he were to reply by asking, how do you define a
a? Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. 28 See Book II. Ch. V. § 6.
28 See Book IV. Ch. IV. § 1.
128 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
Churcli ? tlie demand would be quite irrelevant, unless lie meant to
deny that tlie Community he quits is a Church. But if we were to
insist on designating any one religious-community on earth to which
we might belong, as the universal or Catholic Church, — in demand-
ing from all Christians submission to its ordinances and decisions,
and denouncing all who should not belong to it, as being out of the
pale of Christ's Church, then indeed we might fairly be called on to
give a definition, and one which should be consistent with facts.^
§11;
Of those cases where the ambiguity arises fivm the context, there
are several species ; some of which Logicians have enumerated, but
have neglected to refer them, in the first place, to one common class
{viz. the one under which they are here placed;) and have even
arranged some under the head of Fallacies ** in dictione," and others
under that of ** extra dictionem.""
Pttiiacy of We may consider, as the first of these species, the Fallacy of
Composition " Division" and that of "Composition," taken together; since in
each of these the Middle-term is used in one Premiss collectively,
in the other, distrihutively : if the former of these is the major
Premiss, and the latter, the minor, this is called the "Fallacy of
Division ;" the Term which is first taken collectively being after-
wards divided ; and vice versa. The ordinary examples are such as
these ; ** All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles:
A B C is an angle of a triangle ; therefore A B C is equal to two
right angles." " Five is one number ; three and two are five : there-
fore three and two are one number;" or, "three and two are two
numbers, five is three and two, therefore five is two numbers:" it is
manifest that the Middle-term, three and two (in this last example)
is ambiguous, signifying, in the major Premiss, " taken distinctly ; "
in the minor, "taken together:" and so of the rest.
To this head may be referred the common Fallacy of over-rating,
where each premiss of an argument is otAj probable, the probability
of the conclusion ; which, in that case, is less than that of the less
probable of the premises.^^ For, suppose the probabiHty of one of
these to be ^q, and of the other /g (each more likely than not) the
probability of the conclusion will be only -/g^g or a little more than
so See Appendix, Article " Truth." persons whose trade it is, in which calcu-
81 See below, § 14. Some persons pro- lations of this nature are made, in the
fess contempt for all such calculations, on pui-chase of contingent reversions, depend-
the ground that we cannot be quite sure ing, sometimes, on ajrreat varietj' of risks,
of the exact degree of probability of each which can only be conjecturally estimat-
premiss. And this is true; but this una- ed; and in Insurances, not only against
voidable uncertainty is no reason why we ordinary risks (the calculations of which
should not guard against an additional are to be drawn from Statistical- tables)
source of uncertainty which can be avoid- but also against every variety and degree
ed. It is some advantage to have no wore oi eo'traordinari/ risk; the arac^ amount
doubt as to the degree of probability of of which, no one can confidently pro-
the Conclusion, than we have respecting nounce upon. But the calculations are
that of the premises. based on the best estimate that can be
And in tact there are Offices, kept by formed.
5 11.] OF FALLACIES. 129
f ; which is less than an even chance.* This Fallacy may be most
easily stated as a conditional ; a form in which any Fallacy of
ambiguous middle may easily be exhibited. B.G. *' If it is more
likely than not, that these premises are true : {i.e. that they are
both true) it is more likely than not, that the conclusion is true :
but it is more likely than not that the premises are true : [i.e. that
each of them is so) therefore it is more likely than not that the
conclusion is true." Here, a term in the antecedent, viz. — "that
the premises are more likely than not to be true" — is taken jointly
in the Major, and dividedly in the Minor.
To the same class we may refer the Fallacy by which men have
sometimes been led to admit, or pretend to admit, the doctrine of
Necessity; e.g. "he who necessarily goes or stays {i.e. in reality,
* who necessarily goes, or who necessarily stays ') is not a free agent ;
you must necessarily go or stay {i.e. * you must necessarily take the
alternative '), therefore you are not a free agent." Such also is the
Fallacy which probably operates on most adventurers in lotteries ;
e.g. "the gaining of a high prize is no uncommon occurrence; and
what is no uncommon occurrence may reasonably be expected:
therefore the gaining of a high prize may reasonably be expected;"
the Conclusion, when applied to the individual (as in practice it is),
must be understood in the sense of " reasonably expected by a
certain individual;'' therefore for the Major-Premiss to be true, the
middle-Term must be miderstood to mean, "no micommon occur-
rence to some one particular person;" whereas for the Minor
(which has been placed first) to be true, you must understand it of
"no uncommon occurrence to some one or other;'' and thus you will
have the Fallacy of Composition.
There is no Fallacy more common, or more likely to deceive, than
the one now before us. The form in which it is most usually
employed, is to establish some truth, separately, concerning each
dngle member of a certain class, and thence to infer the same of the
whole collectively. Thus, some infidels have laboured to prove
concerning some one of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been
the result of an accidental conjuncture of natural circumstances ;
next, they endeavour to prove the same concerning another; and so
on ; and thence infer that all of them occurring as a series might
have been so. They might argue in like manner, that because it is
not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one out of a hundred
throws, therefore it is no more improbable that one may throw sixes
& hundred times running.
^ It will often happen that when two objects are incompotihle, though Thauma-
either of them, separately, may be attained, the incompatibility is fauScy.
disguised by a rapid and frequent transition from the one to the
other alternately. E.G. You may prove that £100 would accom-
plish this object ; and then, that it would accomplish that: and then,
you recur to the former ; and back agam : till at length a notion is
* See Postscript.
130 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
generated of the possibility of accomplishing both hy this £100.
*' Two distinct objects may, by being dexterously presented, again
and again in quick succession, to the mind of a cursory reader, be
so associated together in his tlwughts, as to be conceived capable,
when in fact they are not, of being actually combined in practice.
The fallacious belief thus induced bears a striking resemblance to
the optical illusion effected by that ingenious and philosophical toy
called the Thaumatrope ; in which two objects painted on opposite
sides of a card, — for instance a man, and a horse, — a bird, and a
cage, — are, by a quick rotatory motion, made to impress the eye in
combination, so as to form one picture, of the man on the horse's
back, the bird in the cage, &c. As soon as the card is allowed to
remain at rest, the figures, of ^ourse, appear as they really are,
V separate and on opposite sides. A mental illusion closely analogous
J v^ *^ *^^^' ^^ produced, when by a rapid and repeated transition from
1 J J^^^ subject to another alternately, the mind is deluded into an idea
If J^ 'bf the actual combination of things that are really incompatible.^)
kvF ly^^The chief part of the defence which various writers have advanced"
' *^ X in favour of the system of Penal-Colonies, consists, in truth, of a
• sort of intellectual Thaumatrope. The prosperity of the Colony, and
. the rqoression of crime, are, by a sort of rapid whirl, presented to
the mind as combined in one picture. A very moderate degree of
calm and fixed attention soon shows that the two objects are painted
on opposite sides of the card."^^
Ambiguity The Fallacy of Division may often be considered as turning on
^AiL"*""^ the ambiguity of the word *' all;" which may easily be dispelled by
substituting for it the word "each" or "every," where that is
its signification; e.g. "all these trees make a thick shade," is
ambiguous ; meaning, either, " every one of them," or, " all
together."
This is a Fallacy with which men are extremely apt to deceive
themselves: for when a multitude of particulars are presented to
the mind, many are too weak or too indolent to take a compre-
hensive view of them ; but confine their attention to each single
point, by turns ; and then decide, infer, and act, accordingly ; e.g,
the imprudent spendthrift, finding that he is able to afford this,
or that, or the other expense, forgets that aU of them together will
ruin him.
To the same head may be reduced that fallacious reasoning by
which men vindicate themselves to their own conscience and to
others, for the neglect of those undefined duties, which, though
indispensable, and therefore not left to our choice whether we will
practise them or not, are left to our discretion as to the mode, and
the particular occasions, of practising them ; e.g. " I am not bound
to contribute to this charity in particular ; nor to that ; nor to the
^ Remarks on Transportation, pp. 25> 26.
§ 12.] OF FALLACIES. 131
other:" the loradicdl conckision which they draw, is, that all
charity may be dispensed with.
As men are apt to forget that any two circumstances (not natm'ally
connected) are more rarely to be met with combined than separate,
though they be not at all incompatible; so also they are apt to
imagine, from finding that they are rarely combined, that there is
an incompatibility ; e.g. if the chances are ten to one against a man's
possessing strong reasoning powers, and ten to one against exquisite
taste, the chances against the combination of the two (supposing
them neither connected nor opposed) will be a hundred to one.
Many, therefore, from finding them so rarely united, will infer that
they are "in some measure incompatible ; which Fallacy may easily
be exposed in the form of Undistributed middle : " qualities
unfriendly to each other are rarely combined ; excellence in the
reasoning powers, and in taste, are rarely combined ; therefore they
are qualities unfriendly to each other.
§ 12.
The other kind of ambiguity arising from the context, and which Faiiacfa
is the last case of Ambiguous middle that I shall notice, is the
**fallacia accidentis: " together with its converse, "fallacia a dido
secundum quid ad didum simpliciter; " in each of which the Middle-
Term is used, in one Premiss to signify something considered simply,
in itself, and as to its essence ; and in the other Premiss, so as to , ,^
imply that its Accidents are taken into account with it : as in the y-*-^ ■ '^
well-known example, " what is bought in the^ market is eaten; raw
meat is bought in the market; therefore raw meat is eaten."
Here the Middle has understood in conjunction with it, in the Major-
Premiss, " <X5 to its substance merely: " in the Minor, '' as to its con-
dition and circumstances.''
To this head, perhaps, as well as to any, may be referred the
Fallacies which are frequently%unded on the occasional, partial,
and temporary variations in the acceptation of some Term, arising
from circumstances of person, time, and place, which will occasion
something to be understood in conjunction with it beyond its strict
literal signification.) JS.G. The word "loyalty," which properly
denotes attachment to lawful government, — whether of a king,
president, senate, <kc., according to the respective institutions of
each nation, — has often been used to signify exclusively, attachment
to regal authority ; and that, even when carried beyond the boundaries
0^ law. So, "reformer" has sometimes been limited to the pro-
testant reformers of religion; sometimes, to the advocates of some
particular parliamentary reform, &c. And whenever any phrase of
this kind has become a kind of watch-word or gathering-cry of a
party, the employment of it would commonly imply certain senti-
ments not literally expressed by the words. To assume therefore
that one is friendly or unfriendly to " Loyalty " or to " Reform "
132 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
in one sense, because lie has declared himself friendly or nnfriendlj
to it in another sense, when implying and connected with such and
such other sentiments, is a Fallacy, such as may fairly be referred
to the present head.
§13.
On the non-logical (or material) Fallacies : and first, of ** begging
the question; " Fetitio Principii.
Begging the The indistinct and unphilosophical account which has been given
ques ion. ^^ Logical writers of the Fallacy of " non causa,'' and that of
'' petitio pnncipii,'' makes it very difficult to ascertain wherein they
conceived them to differ, and Avhat they understood to be the
distinctive character of each. I shall not therefore undertake to
conform exactly to their language, but merely to express myself
distinctly, without departing more than is necessary for that purpose,
from established usage.
Let the name then of "petitio principii" {begging tJie question)
be confined to those cases in which one of the Premises either is
manifestly the same in sense with the Conclusion, or is actually
proved from it, or is such as the persons you are addressing ^^ are
not likely to know, or to admit, except as an inference from the
Conclusion : as, e.g. if any one should infer the authenticity of a
certain history, from its recording such and such facts, the reality of
which rests on the evidence of that history.
All other cases in which a Premiss (whether the expressed or the
suppressed one) has no sufficient claim to be admitted, I shall
designate as the *' Fallacy of undue assumption of a Premiss."
Let it however be observed, that in such cases (apparently) as
this, we must not too hastily pronounce the argument fallacious ;
for it may be perfectly fair at the commencement of an argument to
assume a Premiss that is not more evident than the Conclusion, or
is even ever so paradoxical, provided you proceed to prove fairly that
Premiss ; and in like manner it is both usual and fair to begin by
deducing your Conclusion from a Premiss exactly equivalent to it ;
which is merely throwing the proposition in question into the form
in which it will be most conveniently proved.
Argufng In Arguinf^ in a Circle, however, must necessarily be unfair ; though
it frequently is practised undesignedly; e.g. some Mechanicians
attempt to prove, (what they ought to have laid down as a probable
but doubtful hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates
equally; "why?" because those bodies which contain more par-
ticles ever gravitate more strongly, i.e. are heavier: "but (it may
be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky;'"
**no, but still they contain more particles, though more closely
83 For of two propositions, the one may be the more evident to some, and the
other, to otliers.
\ Circle.
§13.] OF FALLACIES. 133
condensed;" ** liow do you know that?" ""because tliey are
heavier;" "how does that prove it?" "hecause all particles of
matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the
heavier must needs have the more of them in the same space."
Of course the narrower the Circle, the less likely it is to escape
the detection, either of the reasoner himself, (for men often deceive
themselves in this way) or of his hearers. When there is a long
circuit of many intervening propositions hefore you come hack to the
original Conclusion, it will often not he perceived that the arguments
really do proceed in a "Circle :" just as when any one is advancing
in a straight line (as we are accustomed to call it) along a plain on
this Earth's surface, it escapes our notice that we are really moving
along the circumference of a Circle, (since the earth is a glohe) and
that if we could go on without interruption in the same line, we
should at length arrive at the very spot we set out from. But this
we readily perceive, when Ave are walking round a small hill.
For instance, if any one argues that you ought to submit to the
guidance of himself, or his leader, or his party, &c., because these
maintain what is right ; and then argues that what is so maintained
is right, because it is maintained by persons whom you ought to
submit to ; and that these are, himself and his party ; or again, if
any one maintains that so and so must be a thing morally wrong,
because it is prohibited in the moral portion of the Mosaic-law, and
then, that the prohibition of it does form a part of the moral (not
the ceremonial, or the civil) portion of that Law, because it is a thing
morally ivrong, — either of these would be too narrow a Circle to
escape detection, unless several intermediate steps were interposed.
And if the form of expression of each proposition be varied every
time it recurs, — the sense of it remaining the same, — this will
greatly aid the deception.
Of course, the way to expose the Fallacy, is to reverse this pro-
cedure: to narrow the Circle, by cutting off the intermediate steps;
and to exhibit the same proposition, — when it comes round the second
time, — in the same words.
Obliquity and disguise being of course most important to the ObHqn'ty ot
success of the petitio prlneipii as well as of other Fallacies, the ^^p'"**'*"^*''*'
Sophist will in general either have recourse to the " Circle," or ^
else not venture to state distinctly his assumption of the point in ^L^
question, but will rather assert some other proposition which implies \J^.*-- (j^
it;^ thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does stolen ^ ^J^
goods) the point in question, at the very moment when he is taking \h^
It for granted. Hence the frequent union of this Fallacy with V
*• ignoratio elenchi:" [vide § 15.] The English language is perhaps
8* Gibbon affords the most remarkable position. His way of writing reminds
instances of this kind of style. That one of those pei-sons who never dare look
which he really means to speak of, is you full in the face,
hardly ever made the Subject of his Pro-
134 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
the more suitable for the Fallacy of petitio p^incipii, from its being
formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synony-
mous expressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no
connexion in etymology; so that a Sophist may bring forward a
proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason
for it, the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin ;
e.g. "to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must
always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State ; for it is highly
conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual
should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his senti-
ments."
§u.
Undue The next head is, the falsity, or, at least, undue assumption, of
assump I n. ^ Pj-gj^iigg ^h^t is not equivalent to, or dependent on, the Conclusion ;
which, as has been before said, seems to correspond nearly with
the meaning of Logicians, when they speak of " non causa pro
causa.^^ This name indeed would seem to imply a much narrower
class: there being one species of arguments which are from cause
to effect; in which, of course, two things are necessary; 1st, the
sufficiency of the cause ; 2d, its establishment ; these are the two
Premises ; if therefore the former be unduly assumed, we are
arguing from that which is not a sufficient cause as if it were so :
e.g. as if one should contend from such a man's having been unjust
or cruel, that he will certainly be visited with some heavy temporal
judgment, and come to an untimely end. In this instance the
Sophist, from having assumed, in the Premiss, the (granted) exist-
ence of a pretended cause, infers, in the Conclusion, the existence
of the pretended effect, which we have supposed to be the Question.
Or vice versa, the pretended eifect may be employed to establish
the cause ; e.g. infemng sinfulness from temporal calamity. But
when both the pretended cause and effect are granted, i.e. granted
to eodst, then the Sophist will infer something from their pretended
conneodon; i.e. he will assume as a Premiss, that *' of these two
admitted facts, the one is the cause of the other:" as Whitfield
attributed his being overtaken by a hail-storm to his having not
preached at the last town ; or as the opponents of the Reformation
assumed that it was the cause of the troubles which took place at
that period, and thence inferred that it was an evil,
giprnputfor Many are the cases in which a Sign (see Bhet. Part I.) from
^*^ which one might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for
the Cause of it : (as if one should suppose the falling of the mer-
cury to be a cause of rain ; of which it certainly is an indication)
whereas the fact will often be the very reverse. U.G. A great deal
of money in a country is a pretty sure proof of its wealth ; and
thence has been often regarded as the cause of it ; whereas in truth
it is an effect. The same, with a numerous and increasing popula-
114.] OF FALLACIES. 135
tlon. Again, The labour bestowed on any commodity has often
been represented as the cause of its vahie ; though every one would
call a fine pearl an article of value, even though he should meet
with it accidentally in eating an oyster. Pearls are indeed gen-
erally obtained by laborious diving : but they do not fetch a high
price from that cause; but on the contrary men dive for them
because they fetch a high price. ^ So also exposure to want and
hardship in youth, has been regarded as a cause of the hardy con-
stitution of those men and brutes which have been brought up in
barren countries of uncongenial climate. Yet the most experienced
cattle-breeders know that animals are, cceterls paribus, the more
hardy for having been well fed and sheltered in youth ; but early
hardships, by destroying all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the
survivors ; which is the cause, not the effect, of their having lived
through such a training. So, loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle,
and firing it, does not give it strength; though it proves, if it
escape, that it wa^ strong.
In like manner, nothing is more common than to hear a person Appeal to
state confidently, as from his own experience, that such and such a Ixpedeuca.
patient was cured by this or that medicine : whereas all that he
absolutely knows, is that he took the medicine, and that he recovered.
Similar is the procedure of many who are no theorists forsooth,
but have found by experience that the diffusion of education dis-
qualifies the lower classes for humble toil. They have perhaps
experienced really a deterioration in this last respect ; and having a
dislike to education, they shut their eyes to the increase of pauperism ;
i.e. of the habit of depending on parish-pay, rather than on inde-
pendent exertions ; which, to any unprejudiced eye would seem the
most natural mode of explaining the relaxation of those exertions.
But such men require us, on the ground that they are practical men,
to adopt the results of their experience ; i.e. to acquiesce in their
crude guesses as to cause and effect, (like that of the rustic who
made Tenterden-steeple the cause of Goodwin Sands,) precisely
because they are no^. accustomed to reason.
I believe we may* refer to the same head the apprehensions so Hurtful
often entertained, that a change, however small, and however in attr^biued
itself harmless, is necessarily a dangerous thing, as tending to ones^^""^*^^*
2^roduce extensive and hurtful innovations. Many instances may be
found of small alterations being followed by great and mischievous
ones ; ^^ but I doubt whether all history can furnish an instance of
the greater innovation having been, properly speaking, caused by the
lesser. Of course the first change will always precede the second ;
and many mischievous innovations have taken place ; but these may
all I think be referred to a mistaken effort to obtain some good, or get
rid of some evil ; not to the love of innovation for its own sake. The
35 Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 253. ^ " Post hoc ; ergo, propter hoc."
136
OF FALLACIES.
[Book III.
Cause and
reason
confounded
together.
Indirect
tusumption.
mass of mankind are, in tlie serious concerns of life, wedded to what
is established and customary ; and when they make rash changes,
this may often he explained hy the too long postponement of the
requisite changes; which allows (as in the case of the Reformation)
evils to reach an intolerable height, before any remedy is thought of.
And even then, the remedy is often so violently resisted by many,
as to drive others into dangerous extremes. And when this occurs,
we are triumphantly told that experience shows what mischievous
excesses are caused by once beginning to innovate. *' I told you that
if once you began to repair your house, you would have to pull it all
down." " Yes ; but you told me wrong ; for if I had begun sooner,
the replacing of a few tiles might have sufficed. The mischief was,
not in taking down the first stone, but in letting it stand too long."
Such an argument as any of these might strictly be called * ' non
causa pro causa ;'^ but it is not probable that the Logical writers
intended any such limitation (which indeed would be wholly unne-
cessary and impertinent,) but rather that they were confounding
together cause and reason; the sequence of Conclusion from Premises
being perpetually mistaken for that of effect from physical cause.^'^
It may be better, therefore, to drop the name which tends to per-
petuate this confusion, and simply to state (when such is the case)
that the premiss is ** unduly assumed;" i.e. without being either
self-evident, or satisfactorily proved.
The contrivances by which men may deceive themselves or others,
in assuming Premises unduly, so that that undue assumption shrill
not be perceived, (for it is in this the Fallacy consists) are of course
infinite. Sometimes (as was before observed) the doubtful Premiss
is suppressed, as if it were too evident to need being proved, or even
stated, and as if the whole question turned on the establishment of
the other premiss. Thus Home Tooke proves, by an immense
induction, that all particles were originally nouns or verbs; and
thence concludes, that in reality they are so still, and that the ordi-
nary division of the parts of speech is absurd ; keeping out of sight,
as self-evident, the other premiss, which is absolutely false ; viz.
that the meaning and force of a word, now, and for ever, must be
that which it, or its root, originally bore.
Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an unfounded asser-
tion, by being confidently told, that it is so evident, that it would
argue great weakness to doubt it. In general, however, the more
skilful Sophist will avoid a direct assertion of what he means unduly
to assume ; because that might direct the reader's attention to the
consideration of the question whether it be true or not ♦, since that
which is indisputable does not so often need to be asserted. It
succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the proposition, as some-
thing curious and remarkable; just as the Royal Society were
W See Appendix, No. I. article Reason.
511.] OF FALLACIES. 137
imposed on hj being asked to account for the fact tliat a vessel of
•water received no addition to its weight by a dead fish put into it;
while they were seeking for the cause, they forgot to ascertain the
fact; and thus admitted without suspicion a mere fiction. Thus
an eminent Scotch writer,^ instead of asseHing that the " advocates
of Logic have been worsted and driven from the field in every
controversy," (an assertion which, if made, would have been the
more readily ascertained to be perfectly groundless,) merely
observes, that " it is a circumstance not a little remarkable.^*
Again, any one who is decrying all appeal to evidence in behalf
of Christianity, (see Appendix III. Note) will hardly venture to assert
flainly that such was the practice of the Apostles, and that they
called on men to believe what they preached, without any reason
for believing. Thai would present too glaring a contrast to the
truth. He will succeed better by merely dwelling on the earnest
demand of *' faith" made by the Apostles ; trusting that the inadver-
tent reader will forget that the hasis on which this demand was
made to rest, was, the evidence of miracles and prophecies ; and
will thus be led to infer that we are to imitate the Apostles by a
procedure Avhich is in fact the opposite of theirs.
One of the many contrivances employed for this purpose, is what Fallacy of
may be called the "Fallacy ai references;'' which is particularly
common in popular theological works. It is of course a circum-
stance which adds great weight to any assertion, that it shall seem
to be supported by many passages of Scripture, or of the Fathers
and other ancient writers, whose works are not in many people's
hands. Now when a writer can find few or none of these, that
distinctly and decidedly favour his opinion, he may at least find
many which may be conceived capable of being so understood, or
which, in some way or other, remotely relate to the subject ; but if
these texts were inserted at length, it would be at once perceived
■\ how little they bear on the question ; the usual artifice therefore is,
J to give merely re/^rgwces. to them ; trusting that nineteen out of
twenty readers will never take the trouble of turning to the
passages, but, taking for granted that they afford, each, some
• 'degree of confirmation to what is maintained, will be overa wed by
seeing every^ assertion supported, as they suppose, by five or sTx
Scnjptm*e-Fextv— asmaiiy from tlic Fathers, &c. '"* ■"
Great force is often added to the employment In a declamatory
work, of the fallacy now before us, by bitterly reproaching or
deriding an opponent, as denying some sacred truth, or some
evident axiom ; assuming, that is, that he denies the true premiss,
and keeping out of sight the one on which the question really turns.
E.G. A declaimer who is maintaining some doctrine as being taught
in Scripture, may impute to his opponents a contempt for the
SB Dugald Stewart.
138 OF FALLACIES. [Book IIL
authority of Scripture, and reproach them for impiety ; when the
question really is, whether the doctrine he scriptural or not.
Combina- Frequently the Fallacy of irrelevant-conclusion [ignoratio elencM]
Fallacy with Is Called In to the aid of this ; i.e. the Premiss is assumed on the
the follow- gj.Qund of another proposition, somewhat like it, having heen proved.
Thus, in arguing by example, <fcc. the parallelism of two cases is
often assumed from their being in some respects alike, though per-
haps they differ in the very point which is essential to the argument.
JiJ.G. From the circumstance that some men of humble station, who
have been well educated, are apt to think themselves above low
drudgery, it is argued, that universal education of. the lower orders
would beget general idleness : this argument rests, of course, on the
assumption of parallelism in the two cases, viz. the past and the
future ; whereas there is a circumstance that is absolutely essential,
in which they differ ; for when education is universal, it must ceasel
to be a distinction; which is probably the very circumstance that
renders men too proud for their ^vork.
Again, parallels have been drawn by Hume, (in his Essay on
Miracles) and by Christian writers, between the miracles recorded
in the New Testament, and those in the Legends of pretended
Saints ; which last were received just as counterfeit coin is, from its
resemblance to genuine.
This very same Fallacy is often resorted to on the opposite side :
an attempt is made to invalidate some argument from Example, by
pointing out a diference between the two cases : though they agree
in every thing that is essential to the question.
ot^^Tob^w" It should be added that we may often be deceived, not only by
lities. admitting a premiss which is absolutely unsupported, but also, by
attributing to one which really is probable, a greater degree ot
probability than rightly belongs to it. And this effect will often be
produced by our omitting to calculate the probability in each succes-
sive step of a long chain of argument, and being, in each, (see §11,)
deceived by the fallacy of Division. Each premiss successively
introduced, may have, as was above explained, an excess of chances
in its favour, and yet the ultimate conclusion may have a great
preponderance against it; e.g. "All Y is (probably) X: all Z is
(probably) Y: therefore Z is (probably) X:" now suppose the
truth of the major premiss to be more probable than not ; in other
words, that the chances for it are more than ^ ; say f ; and for the
truth of the minor, let the chances be greater still ; say | : then by
multiplying together the numerators, and also the denominators of
these two fractions, fX|, we obtain, /y, as indicating the degree of
probability of the conclusion ; which is less than -} ; i.e. the con-
clusion is less likely to be true than not. F.G. ^* The reports this
author heard are (probably) true ; this (something which he records)
is a report which (probably) he heard; therefore it is true;" sup-
pose, first, The majority of the reports he heard, — as 4 out of 7,
Conciusioiw
i J5.] OF FALLACIES. 139
(or 12 of 21,) — to be true ; and, next, That he generally, — as twice
m three times, — (or 8 in 12,) — repeats faithfully what he heard;
it follows that of 21 of his reports, only 8 are true.
Of course, the results are proportionahly striking when there is a
long series of arguments of this description. And yet weak and
thoughtless reasoners are often influenced by hearing a great deal
urged, — a great number of probabilities brought forward, — in sup-
port of some conclusion ; i.e. a long chain, of which each successive
link is w^eaker than the foregoing ; instead of (what they mistake
it for) a cumulation of arguments, each, separately, proving the
certainty or probability, of the same conclusion.^^
Lastly, it may be here remarked, conformably with what has
been formerly said, that it wall often be left to your choice whether
to refer this or that fallacious argument to the present head, or that
of Ambiguous-Middle ; *' if the middle term is here used in this
sense, there is an ambiguity; if in tJiat sense, the proposition is
false."
§15.
The last kind of Fallacy to be noticed is that of Irrelevant-Con- Jf;^eiey»nt
elusion, commonly called ignoratio elenchi. °'"'
Various kinds of propositions are, according to the occasion,
substituted for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes the
Particular for the Universal ; sometimes a proposition with different
Terms : and various are the contrivances employed to effect and to
conceal this substitution, and to make the Conclusion which the
*> The converse fallacy is treated of buted to him by some one likely to be
below in § 18. pretty well-informed: let the probability
When there really are several distinct of the Conclusion, as deduced from one
and independent arguments, not incom- of these arguments by itself, be supposed
patible, and not connected, each separ- | ^nd, in the other case f ; then the op-
ately provmg the probability ot the same . ' , , .,• • -n v. i.- i
conclusion, we compute, from our esti- ^^^'^^ probabihties will be, respectively,
mate of the degree of probability of each, -f and t; which multiplied together give
the joint [cumulafivel force of them, by |2 ^ ^^^ probability against the Con-
the same sort ot calculation as the above, ^.jusion ; i.e. the chance that the work
only reversed: viz. as, in the ca^e oi two ^lay noi be his, notwithstanding those
probable premises the conclusion is not i-easons for believing that it is: and con-
estabhslied except on the supposition ot sequently the probability in favour of
their being both true, so, in the case of ^, \ ^ , • -n i. 23 , « -
two (and the like holds good with any that Conclusion will be ^5; or nearly *.•
number) distinct and independent indi- Observe however that, in some cases,
cations of the truth of some proposition, a perfectly distinct argument arises from
unless both of them fail, the proposition the combination of certain circumstances,
must be true: we therefore multiply which have, each separately, no force at
together the fractions indicating the pro- all, or very little, towards estabhshing a
bability of /ai7z«-e of each,— the chances conclusion which yet may be inferred,
o^atV/sMt;— and the result being the total perhaps with a moral certainty, from
chances against the establishment of the that combination, when those circum-
conclusion by these arguments, this stances are such that the chances are very
fraction being deducted from unity, the great against their accidental concur-
remainder gives the probability for it. rence. jB.O.When two or more pei-sons,
E.G. A certain book is conjectured to be undeserving of credit, coincide (where
by such and such an author, partly, 1st. collusion would be impossible) in a full
from its resemblance in style to his known and circumstantial detail of some trans-
works, partly (2dly) from its being attri- action. (See Rhet. Part. I. Ch. H. § 4.)
• See Postscript.
HO
OF FALLACIES.
[Book III.
Combina-
tion of this
Fallacy
with the
foregoing.
Sophist lias drawn, answer, practically, tlie same purpose as the one
he ought to have estabhshed. I say, " practically the same pur-
pose," because it will very often happen that some emotion will be
excited — some sentiment impressed on the mind — (by a dexterous
employment of this Fallacy) such as shall bring men into the
disposition requisite for your purpose, though they may not have
assented to, or even stated distinctly in their own minds, the pro-
jposition which it was your business to establish.^ Thus if a Sophist
has to defend one who has been guilty of some serious offence,
which he wishes to extenuate, though he is unable distinctly to
prove that it is not such, yet if he can succeed mmaJcing the audience
laugh at some casual matter, he has gained practically tha same
point.
So also if any one has pointed out the extenuating circumstances
in some particular case of offence, so as to show that it differs
widely from the generality of the same class, the Sophist, if he
find himself unable to disprove these circumstances, may do away
the force of them, by simply referring the action to that very class,
which no one can deny that it belongs to, and the very name of
w^hich will excite a feeling of disgust sufficient to counteract the
extenuation ; e.g. let it be a case of peculation ; and that many
mitigating circumstances have been brought forward which cannot
be denied, the sophistical opponent will repl}^ *' Well, but after
all, the man is a rogue, and there is an end of it;" now in reality
this was (by hypothesis) never the question ; and the mere assertion
of what was never denied, ougld not, in fairness, to be regarded as
decisive; but practically, the odiousness of the word, arising in
great measure from the association of those very circumstances which
belong to most of the class, but which we have supposed to be absent
in this particular instance, excites precisely that feeling of disgust,
which in effect destroys the force of the defence. In like manner
we may refer to this head, all cases of improper appeals to the pas-
sions, and every thing else which is mentioned by Aristotle as
extraneous to the matter in hand {l^a rov 'Trpu.yfiurog.)
In all these cases, as has been before observed, if the fallacy we
are now treating of be employed for the apparent establishment,
not of the ultimate Conclusion, but (as it very commonly happens)
of a Premiss, {i.e. if the Premiss required be assumed on the ground
that some proposition resembling it has been proved) then there will
be a combination of this Fallacy with the last mentioned.
For instance, instead of proving that ** this Prisoner has com-
mitted an atrocious fraud," you prove that ** the fraud he is accused
of is atrocious:" instead of proving (as in the well-known tale of
Cyrus and the two coats) that " the taller boy had a right to force
the other boy to exchange coats with him," you prove that **the
« See Rhetoric, Part II.
5 lo.l OF FALLACIES. 141
exchange m'OuW have been advantageous to both:" Instead of prov-
ing mat '• a man has not a right to educate his children or to dispose
of lAs* property, in the way he thinks best,'' you show that the way in
which he educates his children, or disposes of his property is not
really the best: instead of proving that *' the poor ought to be
reheved in this Avay rather than in that," you prove that " the poor
ought to be relieved:'' instead of proving that " an irrational-agent
— whether a brute or a madman — can never be deterred from any act
by apprehension of punishment," (as for instance, a dog, from sheep-
biting, by fear of being beaten) you prove that '* the beating of one
dog does not operate as an example to other dogs," &,g. and then
you proceed to assume as premises, conclusions different from what
have really been established.
A good instance of the employment and exposure of this Fallacy
occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon and Diodotus con-
cerning the Mitylenseans : the former (over and above his appeal to
the angry passions of his audience) urges the justice of putting the
revolters to death ; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to
the purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting m judgment, but
in deliberation; of which the proper end is expedie'ticy. And to
prove that they had a right to put them to death, did not prove this
to be an advisoLle step.
It is evident, that ignoi^aiio elenchi may be employed as well for This fallacy
the apparent refutation of your opponent's proposition, as for the ?efutatior.
apparent establishment of your own ; for it is substantially the same
thing, to prove what was not denied, or to disprove what was not
asserted. The latter practice is not less common ; and it is more
offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront, in
attributing to a person opinions, &c. which he perhaps holds in
abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, on
the ground of general expediency, a particular instance of resistance
to Government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may
gravely maintain, that "we ought not to do evil that good may
come:" a proposition which of course had never been denied; the
point in dispute being " whether resistance in this particular case
were doing evil or not." Or again, by way of disproving the
assertion of the " 7igM of private-judgment in religion," one may
hear a grave argument to prove that "it is impossible every one
can be right in his judgment." In these examples, it is to be
remarked, (as well as in some given just above,) that the Fallacy of
petitlo principli is combined with that of ignoratio elenchi ; which is
a very common and often successful practice ; viz. the Sophist proves,
or disproves, not the proposition which is really in question, but one
which is so dependent on it as to proceed on the supposition that it
is already decided, and can admit of no doubt ; by this means his
** assumption of the point in question" is so indirect and oblique,
that it may easily escape notice ; and he thus estabhshes, practi-
142
OF FALLACIES.
[Book III,
tuiii ad
houunem,
Technical
analysis or
personal
argument,
cally, his Conclusion, at tlie very moment he is witlidrawivg y'.ur
attention from it to another question. E.G. An advocate will prove,
and dwell on the high criminality of a certain act, and the propriety
of severely punishing it; assuming (instead of proving) the commission.
There are certain kinds of argument recounted and named hy
Logical writers, which we should by no means universally call
Fallacies ; but which luhen unfairly used, and so far as they are
fallacious, may very well be referred to the present head ; such as
the " argumentumad hominem,'' ["or personal argument,"] " argil-
mentum ad verecundiam/' " argumentum ad populum," &c. all of
them regarded as contradistinguished from '' argumentum ad rem ;'^
or, according to others (meaning probably the very same thing)
*' ad judicium.'' These have all been described in the lax and
popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically: the
" argumentum ad hominem,'' they say, *' is addressed to the peculiar
circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the
individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not
bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the ' argumen-
tum ad rem' does:" in like manner, the ''argumentum ad verecun-
diam" is described as an appeal to our reverence for some respected
authority, some venerable institution, &c. and the ''argumentum ad
popidum," as an appeal to the prejudices, passions, <fec. of the
multitude ; and so of the rest. Along with these is usually enumer-
ated "argumentum ad ignoraniiam," which is here omitted, as
being evidently nothing more than the employment of some kind of
Fallacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as are likely
to be deceived by it.
It appears then (to speak rather more technically) that in the
"argumentum ad hominem" the conclusion which actually is
established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but
relative and particular; viz, not that " such and such is the fact,"
but that *' this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his princi-
ples of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation,"
<fec.*^ Such a conclusion it is often both allowable and necessary
*1 The "argumentum ad hominem"
■will often have the etiect of shifting the
burden of proof, not unjustly, to the
adversary. (See Rhet. Part. I. Chap. IIL
§ 2.) A common instance is the defence,
certainly the readiest and most concise,
frequently urged by the Sportsman, when
accused of barbarity in sacrificing unof-
fending hares or trout to his amusement:
he replies, as he may safely do, to most
of his assailants, " why do you feed on the
flesh of the harmless sheep and ox?" and
that this answer presses hard, is mani-
fested by its being usually opposed by a
palpable falsehood; viz. that the animals
■winch are killed for food are sacrificed to
our necessities; though not only men caw,
but a large proportion (probably a great
majority) ot the human race actually do,
subsist in health and vigour without
flesh-diet; and the earth would support
a much greater human population were
such a practice universal.
When shamed out of this argument
they sometimes urge that the brute crea-
tion would overrun the earth, if we did
not kill them for food; an argument,
which, if it were valid at all, would not
justify their feeding on Jish; though, if
fairly followed up, it ^row^rf justify Swift's
proposal for keeping down the excessive
l)opulation of Ireland. The true reason,
i-iz. that they eat flesh for the gratification'
of the palate, and have a inste for tlie
pleasures of the table, though not for tbo
sports of the field, is one jvhich they do
not like to assign.
116.1 OP FALLACIES. 143
to establish, m order to silence those who will not yield to fair
general argument; or to convince those whose weakness and
prejudices would not allow them to assign to it its due weight. It
is thus that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the
Jews; as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath, which is
paralleled by the authorized practice of drawing out a beast that has
fallen into a pit. All this, as we have said, is perfectly fair,
provided it be done plainly, and avowedly; but if you attempt to
substitute this partial and relative Conclusion for a more general one
— if you triumph as having established your proposition absolutely
and universally, from having established it, in reality, only as far aa
it relates to your opponent, then you are guilty of a Fallacy of the
kind which we are now treating of: your Conclusion is not in reality
that which was, by your own account, proposed to be proved. The
fallaciousness depends upon the deceit, or attempt to deceive. The
same observations will apply to " argumentum ad verecundiam,^*
and the rest.
It is very common to employ an ambiguous Term for the purpose Ambiguous
of introducing the Fallacy of irrelevant conclusion: i.e. when y mi employed in
cannot prove your proposition in the sense in which it was main- this Fallacy,
tained, to prove it in some other sense; e.g. those who contend
against the efficacy oi faith, usually employ that word in their argu-
ments in the sense of mere helief, unaccompanied with any moral or
practical result, but considered as a mere intellectual process ; and
when they have thus proved their conclusion, they oppose it to one
in which the word is used in a widely different sense.*^
§16.
The Fallacy of ** irrelevant-conclusion" [ignoratio elenchi] is sh-fting
nowhere more common than in protracted controversy, when one of ^'®""
the parties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his position,
shifts his ground as covertly as possible to another, instead of
honestly giving up the point. An instance occurs in an attack made
*2"When the occasion or object in on liberty, rights of man, &c. or on social-
question is not such as calls for, or as is order, justice, the constitution, law, re-
likely to excite in those particular readers ligion, &c. will gradually lead the hearers
or hearei-s, the emotions required, it is a to take for granted, without proof, that
common Rhetorical artifice to turn their the measure proposed will lead to these
attention to some object which icill call evils, or to these advantages; and it will
forth these feelings; and when they are in consequence become the object of
too much excited to be capable of judging groundless abhorrence or admiration,
calmly, it will not be difficult to turn For the very utterance of such words as
their rassions, once roused, in the direc- have a multitude of what may be called
tion required, and to make them view stimulating ideas associated with them,
the case before them in a very different will operate like a charm on the minds,
light. When the metal is heated it may especially of the ignorant and unthinking,
easily be moulded into the desired form, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will
Thus vehement indignation against some effectually blind their judgment; so that
crime, may be directed against a person a string of vague abuse or panegyric will
who has not been proved guilty of it; and often have the effect of a train of sound
vague declamations against corruption. Argument."— iS/tetortc, PartII.Chap.il.
oppression, &c. or against the mischiefs § 6.
of anarchy; with high-tiown panegyrics
144
OF FALLACIES.
[Book III.
Fallacy of
combating
the two
Premises
Rlternately.
Fallacy of
Objections.
on the system pursued at one of our Universities. The ohjectors,
finding themselves unable to maintain their charge of the preseQit
neglect {viz. in the year 1810) of Mathematics in that place, (to
which neglect they attributed the "late general decline'' in those
studies) shifted their ground, and contended that that University
"was never famous for Mathematicians:" which not only does not
establish, but absolutely overthrows, their own original assertion;
for if it never succeeded in those pursuits, it could not have caused
their late decline.
A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy especially ;
viz. that of combating both your opponent's Premises alternately, and
shifting the attack from the one to the other, without waiting to
have either of them decided upon before you quit it. '* And besides^ ' '
is an expression one may often hear from a disputant who is pro-
ceeding to a fresh argument, when he cannot establish, and yet wiU
not abandon, his first.
It has been remarked above, that one class of the propositions
that may be, in this Fallacy, substituted for the one required, is
the particular for the universal : similar to this, is the substitution
of a conditional with a universal antecedent, for one with a particular
antecedent ; which will usually be the harder to prove : e.g. you are
called on, suppose, to prove that "if any {i.e. some) private
interests are hurt by a proposed measure, it is inexpedient;" and
you pretend to have done so by showing that "if all private
interests are hurt by it, it must be inexpedient." Nearly akin to
this is the very common case of proving something to be possible
when it ought to have been proved highly probable ; or pnvbable,
when it ought to have been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the
very same, proving it to be not necessary, when it should have been
proved not probable; or improbable, when it should have been
proved impossible. Aristotle {in Rhet. Book II.) complains of this
last branch of the Fallacy, as giving an undue advantage to the
respondent ; many a guilty person owes his acquittal to this ; the
jury considering that the evidence brought does not demonstrate the
complete impossibility of his being innocent ; though perhaps the
chances are innumerable against it.
§17.
Similar to this case is that which may be called the Fallacy of
objections : i.e. showing that there are objections against some plan,
theory, or system, and thence inferring that it should be rejected ;
when that which ougU to have been proved is, that there are more^
or stronger objections, against the receiving than the rejecting of it.
This is the main, and almost universal Fallacy of anti-christians ;
and is that of which a young Christian should be first and principally
warned.** They find numerous "objections" against various parts
^ See Note at the end of Appendix, No. III.
5 17.] OF FALLACIES. lio
of Scripture ; to some of which no satisfactory answer can be given :
and the incautious hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on
these, to forget that there are infinitely more, and stronger objec-
tions against the supposition that the Christian Religion is of human
origin ; and that where we cannot answer all objections, we are
bound in reason and in candour to adopt the hypothesis which
labours under the least. That the case is as I have stated, I am
authorized to assume, from this circumstance ; that no complete and
consistent account has ever been given of the manner in which the
Christian Beligion, sujjposing it a human contrivance, could have
arisen and prevailed as it did. And yet this may obviously be
demanded with the utmost fairness, of thQse who deny its divine
origin. The Religion exists : that is the phenomenon ; those who
will not allow it to have come from God, are bound to solve the
phenomenon on some other hypothesis less open to objections.
They are not indeed called on to prove that it actually did arise
in this or that way ; but to suggest (consistently with acknowledged
facts) some probable way in which it may have arisen, reconcileable
with all the circumstances of the case. That infidels have never
done this, though they have had 1 800 years to try, amounts to a
confession that no such hypothesis can be devised, which will not
be open to greater objections than lie against Christianity.'**
The Fallacy of Objections is also the stronghold of bigoted anti- Reforms are
innovators, who oppose all reforms and alterations indiscriminately ; ob/eaions.
for there never was, or will be, any plan executed or proposed,
against which strong and even unanswerable objections may not be
urged ; so that unless the opposite objections be set in the balance
on the other side, we can never advance a step. B.G. The defenders
of the Transportation-system — a system which, as an eminent writer
has observed, was *' begun in defiance of all Reason, and persevered
in, in defiance of all Experience " — are accustomed to ask *' what
kind of Secondary-punishment would you substitute?" and if any
one is suggested, they adduce the objections, and difficulties, real
and apparent, to which it is exposed ; if another is proposed, they
proceed in the same manner ; and so on, without end. For of all
the other plans of Secondary-punishment that have ever been tried,
or imagined, the best must be open to S077ie objections, though the
very vjorst is much less objectionable than Transportation.*^ *' There
are objections," said Dr. Johnson, "against a plenum, and objec"
tions against a vacuum; but one of them must be true."
The very same Fallacy indeed is employed (as has been said) on
the other side, by those who are for overthrowing whatever is
established as soon as they can prove an objection agamst it ; witli-
4* In an " Essay on the Omissions of our only trtie witnesses, but supematurally
Sacred Writers," I have pointed out inspired.
some circumstances which no one has ^5 See Letters to Eiarl Grey on Trani^
ever attempted to account for on any portation.
supposition of their being other than, not
■Wb
146
OF FALLACIES.
[Book Tir,
Fallacy of
proving a
part of the
question.
Art of
framing a
lieply.
out considering whether more and weightier objections may not lie
against their own schemes ; but their opponents have this decided
advantage over them, that they can urge with great plausibiHty,
** we do not call upon you to reject at once whatever is objected to,
but merely to suspend your judgment, and not come to a decision as
long as there are reasons on both sides:" now since there always
will be reasons on both sides, this non-decision is practically the very
same thing as a decision in favour of the existing state of things.
*'Not to resolve, is to resolve."*^ The delay of trial becomes
ecjuivalent to an acquittal}^
§18.
Another form of ignoroiio elenchi, which is also rather the more
serviceable on the side of the respondent, is, to prove or disprove
some part of that which is required, and dwell on tlmt, suppressing
all the rest.
Thus, if a University is charged with cultivating only the mere
elements of Mathematics, and in reply a list of the books studied
there is produced, should even any one of those books be not
elementary, the charge is in fairness refuted ; but the Sophist may
then earnestly contend that some of those books are elementary ; and
thus keep out of sight the real question, viz. whether they are all so.*^
So, also, one may maintain (with perfect truth) that mere intellec-
tual ability — the reasoning powers alone — are insufficient for the
attainment of truth in religious questions ; (see Appendix III. Note)
and may thence proceed to assume (as if it were the same proposi-
tion) that all employment of reasoning — all intellectual cultivation —
are perfectly useless on such questions, and are to be discarded as
foreign from the subject.
This is the great art of the answerer of a book ; suppose the main
positions in any work to be irrefragable, it will be strange if some
ilkistration of them, or some subordinate part, in short, will not
admit of a plausible objection ; the opponent then joins issue on one
of these incidental questions, and comes forward with "a Reply" to
such and such a work. And such a *' Reply" is still easier and
more plausible, when it happens — as it often will — that a real and
satisfactory refutation can be found of some one, or more, of several
arguments, each, singly, proving completely the same conclusion ; (as
many a theorem of Euclid admits of several different demonstrations ;)
or an answer to one or more of several objections, each, separately,
decisive against a certain scheme or theory ; though it is evident on
reflection, that if the rest, or any one of them, remain unrefuted and
Elexity of doubt and the danger of delay,
I
** Bacon.
*T How happy it is for mankind that in but also from the pain of regret: since vve
manyof the most momentous concerns of acquiesce much more cheerfully in that
life tneir decision is generally formed for which is unavoidable,
them by external circumstances; which ^ " Reply to calumnies of Edinburgh
thus saves them not only from the per- Review agamst Oxford," 1810.
§ 19.] OF FALLACIES. 147
unanswerable, the conclusion is established, ar^d stands as firm as if
the answerer had urged nothing.
He who thus replies to the arguments urged, is in the condition
of a commander defending all the practicable breaches in a forti-
fication, except one. This kind of partial " reply" is properly-
available only in a case where each of the arguments does not go to
establish the certainty, but only the probability, of the conclusion.
Then indeed, the conclusion resting not wholly on the force of any
one of the arguments, but on the combination of them, is propor-
tionably weakened by the refutation of any of them. The fallacy
I am now speaking of consists in the confounding of the preceding-
case either with this latter, or with the case formerly noticed [§14]
of a chain of arguments, each proving, not, the same conclusion,
but a premiss of the succeeding.
Hence the danger of ever advancing more than can be well Danger of
maintained, since the refutation of that will often quash the whole, too much.
The Quakers would perhaps before now have succeeded in doing
away our superfluous and irreverent oaths, if they had not, besides
many valid and strong arguments, adduced so many that are weak
and easily refuted. Thus also, a guilty person may often escape
by having too much laid to his charge ; so he may also, by having
too much evidence against him, i.e. some that is not in itself satis-
factory. Accordingly, a prisoner may sometimes obtain acquittal
by showing that one of the witnesses against him is an infamous
informer and spy ; though perhaps if that part of the evidence had
been omitted, the rest would have been sufficient for conviction.
Cases of this nature might very well be referred also to the
Fallacy formerly mentioned, of inferring the Falsity of the Con-
clusion from the Falsity of a Premiss ; which indeed is very closely
allied to the present Fallacy: the real question is, " whether or not
this Conclusion ought, to be admitted;'' the Sophist confines himself to
the question, '* whether or not it is established by this particular argu-
ment;'' leaving it to be inferred by the audience, if he has carried
his point as to the latter question, that the former is thereby decided ;
which is then, and then only, a correct inference, when there is good
reason for believing that other and better arguments would liavo
been adduced, if there had been any. (See above, at the end of § 6.)
§19.
It will readily be perceived that nothing is less conducive to the suppressed
success of the Fallacy in question, than to state clearly, in the
outset, either the proposition you are about to prove, or that which
you ought to prove. It answers best to begin with the Premises,
and to introduce a pretty long chain of argument before you arrive
at the Conclusion. The careless hearer takes for granted, at the
beginning, that this chain will lead to the Conclusion required ; and
by the time you are come to the end, he is ready to take for granted
148 OF FALLACIES. [Book III.
that the Conclusion which you draw is the one required ; his idea of
the question having gradually hecome indistinct. This Fallacy is
greatly aided by the common practice of suppressing the Conclusion
and leaving it to be supplied by the hearer ; who is of course less
likely to perceive whether it be really that *' which was to be
proved," than if it were distinctly stated. The practice therefore
is at best suspicious ; and it Is better in general to avoid it, and to
give and require a distinct statement of the Conclusion intended.
The Fallacy now before us is, perhaps, the most common form of
that confusion of thought to which those are liable who have been
irregularly and unskilfully educated ; — who have collected perhaps a
considerable amount of knowledge, without arrangement, and with-
out cultivation of logical habits ; — who have learned (as I have
heard it expressed) a good many answers without the questions. Most
of the erroneous views in Morals, and in other subjects, which prevail
among such persons, may be exhibited in the form of " Fallacies
of Irrelevant-conclusion."^^ B.G. The well-known wrong decision
-'especting the two boys and their coats, for which Cyrus was
punished by his preceptor, was a mistake of the real question : which
was, not, " which codii fitted each boy the best," but " who had the
right to ^is^o^Q of them." And similar cases to this occur every
day. An exact parallel is to be found In the questions relative to
the imposition of restrictions or other penalties on those of a different
creed from our own. They are usually argued as if the point to be
decided were " which religion is the better," or, " whether the
differences between them are Important ; ' ' instead of being, ' ' whether
one man has a right to compel others to profess his religion," or,
*' whether the professors of the true Faith have a right to monopolize
secular power and civil privileges." Or again (to put the same
principles into another form) the questions "whether it be allowable
for a Christian to fight in defending himself from oppression and
outrage,"*-* and "whether a Christian magistrate may employ
physical coercion and Inflict secular punishment on evil-doers," —
these, are perpetually confounded with the questions "whether
Christians are allowed to fight as such; i.e. to fight for their
Religion, against those who corrupt or reject the Faith;" and,
*® *' The Fallacy consists in confound- the uninterrupted existence of suck a dass
ing tosrether the unbroken Apostolical of men as christian Miiiisters. You teach
succession of a christian Ministry, general- me,— a man might say,— that my salvation
/y, and the same succession in an unbrok- depends on the possession by you— iho.
en line, of this or that individual Minister, particular Pastor under whom I am
if. :)^ if if i(. :)(. Ifeach man's christian hope placed— of a certain qualification; and
is made to rest on his receiving the chns- when I ask for the proof that you possess
tian Ordinances at the hands of a Minister it, you prove to me that it is possessed
to whom the sacramental virtue" [of generally^ by a certain class of persons of
ordination] " that gives efficacy to those whom you are one, and probably by a
ordinances, has been transmitted in un- large majority of them!"— Om the King-
broken succession from hand to hand, dowi o/C/im^ Essay II. § 30.
every thing must depend on ^Aa^par^zcu- ^^ See Essay 1st, on the Kingdom of
lar Minister : and /«s claim is by no means Christ,
established n:om our merely establishing
I
§ 20.] OF FALLACIES. 149
*'wlietlier a Christian magistrate may employ coercion on hehcdf of
Christianity, and inflict punishment on Heretics as evil-doers. ^^
Again, such propositions as the following, one may often hear,
sophistically or negligently, confounded together: **The Apostles
held religious assemblies on the first day of the week," with " They
transferred the Sabbath from the seventh day to the first :"^^ "A Jew,
Maliometan, or Roman Catholic, is not the most eligible person to
hold Office in a Protestant-christian country," with " Such persons
ought not to he legally eligible:" "The Apostles establislied such
and such a form of government in the Churches they founded," with
" They designed this form to he binding on all Christians as an
ordinance for ever," ka.^^
§20.
Before we dismiss the subject of Fallacies, it may not be improper Jests,
to mention the just and ingenious remark, that Jests are mock-
Fallacies ; i.e. Fallacies so palpable as not to be likely to deceive any
one, but yet bearing just that resemblance of Argument which is cal-
culated to amuse by the contrast ; in the same manner that a parody
does, by the contrast of its levity w^ith the serious production which
it imitates. There is indeed something laughable even in Fallacies
which are intended for serious conviction, Avhen they are thoroughly
exposed.^
There are several different kinds of joke and raillery, which will
be found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy. The
Pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is evidently, in most
instances, a mock-argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the
Middle-Term : and others in like manner will be found to correspond
to the respective Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious argument.
It is probable indeed that all jests, sports, or games, {•Tretihtoii)
properly so called, will be found, on examination, to be imitative of
serious transactions ; as of War, or Commerce.^ But to enter
fully into this subject would be unsuitable to the present occasion.
I shall subjoin some general remarks on the legitimate province
of Reasoning, and on its connexion with Inductive philosophy, and
with Rhetoric ; on which points much misapprehension has pre-
vailed, tending to throw obscurity over the design and use of the
Science under consideration.
A treatise on what are called the *' laws of evidence " — the
diff'erent hinds, strictly speaking, of arguments — and the occasions
for which they are respectively suited, &;c., which is what some
would expect in a Logical Work, wiU be found in the 1st part of
the " Elements of Rhetoric."
^1 See Essays on the Dangers, &c. Notes ^ See Wallis's Logic, and also Rhet-
E. and F. orio, Part I. Ch. III. § 7, p. 131.
52 See Thoughts on the Sabbath. 55 gee some excellent remarks on
53 See Kingdom of Christ, Essay II. " Imitation," in Dr. A. Smith's posthu-
§ 0. mo us Essays, <
BOOK IV.
DISSERTATION ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING^
Logic being concerned witli the theory of Reasoning, it is
evidently necessary, in order to take a correct view of this Science,
that all misapprehensions should be removed relative to the occa-
sions on which the Reasoning-process is employed, — the pm'poses it
has in view, — and the limits within which it is confined.
Simple and obvious as such questions may appear to those who
have not thought much on the subject, they will appear on further
consideration to be involved in much perplexity and obscurity, from
the vague and inaccurate language of many popular writers. To
the confused and incorrect notions that prevail respecting the
Reasoning-process may be traced most of the common mistakes
respecting the Science of Logic, and much of the unsound and
unphilosophical argumentation which is so often to be met with in
the Avorks of ingenious writers.
These errors have been incidentally adverted to in the foregoing
part of this work ; but it may be desirable, before we dismiss the
subject, to oifer on these points some further remarks, which could
not have been there introduced without too great an interruption to
the development of the system. Little or nothing indeed remains to
be said that is not implied in the principles which have been already
laid down ; but the results and applications of those principles are
liable in many instances to be overlooked, if not distinctly pointed
out. These supplementary observations will neither require, nor
admit of, so systematic an arrangement as has hitherto been aimed
at ; since they will be such as are suggested principally by the
objections and mistakes of those who have misunderstood, partially
or entirely, the nature of the Logical system.
Let it be observed, however, that as I am not writing a review or
commentary on any logical works, but an introduction to the
science, I shall not deem it necessary to point out in all cases the
agreement or disagreement between other writers and myself, in
respect of the views maintained, or the terms employed, by each.
I
Chap. I. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 15^
Chap. I. — Of Induction.
§1.
Much has been said by some writers of the superiority of the Mistai^eof
Inductive to the Syllogistic method of seeking truth ; as if the two induction to
stood opposed to each other ; and of the advantage of substituting Syllogism,
the Organon of Bacon for that of Aristotle, he. which indicates a
total misconception of the nature of both. There is, however, the
more excuse for the confusion of thought which prevails on this
subject, because eminent Logical writers have treated, or at least
have appeared to treat, of Induction as a kind of Argument
distinct from the Syllogism ; which if it were, it certainly might be
contrasted with the Syllogism: or rather, the whole Syllogistic
theory would fall to the ground, since one of the very first principles
it establishes, is that all Reasoning, on whatever subject, is one and
the same process, which may be clearly exhibited in the form of
Syllogisms. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that this was
the deliberate meaning of those writers ; though it must be admitted
that they have countenanced the error in question, by their inaccu-
rate expressions.
This inaccuracy seems chiefly to have arisen from a vagueness in Tj^vo senses
the use of the word Induction ; which is sometimes employed to induction,
designate the process of i7ivestigation and of collecting facts ; some-
times, the deducing of an inference /rom those facts. The former
of these processes {viz. that of observation and experiment) is
undoubtedly distinct from that which takes place in the Syllogism ;
but then it is not a process of argumentation; the latter again is an
argumentative process ; but then it is, like all other arguments,
capable of being Syllogistically expressed. And hence Induction
has come to be regarded as a distinct kind of argument from the
Syllogism. This Fallacy cannot be more concisely or clearly
stated, than in the technical form with which we may now presume
our readers to be familiar.
" Induction is distinct from Syllogism :
Induction is a process of Reasoning;" therefore
** There is a process of Reasoning distinct from Syllogism."
Here " Induction," which is the Middle-Tenn, is used in different
senses in the two Premises.
Induction, so far forth as it is an argument, may, of course, be
stated Syllogistically : but so far forth as it is a process of inquiry
with a view to obtain tliQ Premises of that argument, it is, of course,
out of the province of Logic: and the latter is the original and
strict sense of the word. Induction means properly, not the infer-
ring of the conclusion, but the bringing in, one by one, of instances,
152
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Induction
bearing on the point in question, till a sufficient number lias been
collected. The ambiguity, therefore, above alluded to, and which
has led to much confusion, would be best avoided by saying that
Proper sense we do not, strictly speaking, reason hy Induction, but reason /rom
Induction : i.e. from our observations on one, or on several Indi-
viduals, {ix, Tciv Kocff iKuarou) we draw a Conclusion respecting the
Class (to Kudo'hov) they come under: or, in like manner, from
several Species, to the Genus which comprehends them : — in logical
language, what we have predicated of certain singnlar-teims, we
proceed to predicate of a common-term which comprehends them ;
. — or proceed in the same manner from Species to Genus. U.G.
•* The Earth moves round the Sun in an elliptical orbit; so does
Mercury ; and Venus ; and Mars, &c. : therefore a Planet (the
common-term comprehending these singulars) moves round," <fc;c.
** Philip was reckless of human life; so was Alexander; and J.
Csesar ; and Augustus, <kc. : therefore this is the general character
of a Conqueror.'"
Now it appears as if the most obvious and simplest way of fiUing
up such enthymemes as these, expressed as they are, would be, in
the third figure ; having of course a particular Conclusion: —
Inductive
Argument
expressed in
a Sjyllogism,
*' Earth, Mercury, Venus, &c. move, &c.
Mi. These are planets ; therefore
Some planets move, &c."
!n the first
figure.
Perfect-
luduction.
But when we argue from Induction we generally mean to infer more
than a particular conclusion ; and accordingly most logical writers
present to us the argument in the form of a syllogism in Barbara;
inserting, of course, a different minor premiss from the foregoing,
viz. : the simple converse of it. And if I am allowed to assume,
not merely that "Mercury, Venus, and whatever others I may have
named, are Planets," but also, that "All Planets are these" — that
these are the wlwle of the individuals comprehended under the Term
Planet — I am, no doubt, authorized to draw a universal conclusion.
But such an assumption would, in a very great majority of cases
where Induction is employed, amount to a palpable falsehood, if
understood literally. For it is but seldom that we find an instance
of what Logicians call a " perfect-induction ;" viz. where there is a
complete enumeration of all the individuals, respecting which we
assert collectively what we had before asserted separately; as "John
is in England ; and so is Thomas ; and so is William ; and all the
sons of such-a-one are John, Thomas, and William ; therefore all
his sons are in England." Such cases, I say, seldom occur; and
still more rarely can such an Induction (which Bacon characterizes
as *'res puerilis''^) — shice it docs not lead the mind from what
1 It may very well happen too, that (as no connexion, except accidentally, with
in the example above) a certain circinn- the Class itself, as such; i.e. with the de-
stance may, in fact, belong to eacli indivi- scription ot it, and that which constitutes
dual of a certain clabs, and yet way have it a Class. (See Appen. II. Ex. 118.)
Chap. I. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 153
is better-known to what is less-known — serve any important pur-
pose.
But in such Inductions as are commonly employed, tlie assump-
tion of such a minor-premiss as in the above example, would be, as
I have said, strictly speaking, a false assumption. And accordingly
those logicians w^ho state an argument from Induction in the above
form, mean, I apprehend, that it is to be understood with a certain
latitude; i.e. that, in such propositions as "all planets are Mercury,
Venus, <fcc.," or '* all Conquerors are Philip, Alexander, and
Csesar," they mean (by a kind of logical fiction) to denote that
*' all Conquerors are adequately represented by Philip, Alexander,
&c." — that these individual persons or cases are a sufficient sampUi
in respect of the matter in question, of the Class they belong to.
I think it clearer, therefore, to state simply and precisely what it The Major
is that we do mean to assert. And in doing this, we shall find that suppressed,
the expressed premiss of the enthymeme, — viz. : that which contains
the statement respecting the individuals — is the Minor; and that it
is the Major that is suppressed, as being in all cases substantially
the same: viz. that what belongs to the individual or individuals
we have examined, belongs (certainly, or probably, as the case may
be) to the whole class under which they come. E.G. From finding on
examination of several sheep, that they each ruminate, we conclude
that the same is the case with the whole Species of sheep : and from
finding on examination of the sheep, ox, deer, and other animals
deficient in upper cutting-teeth, that they each ruminate, we con-
clude (with more or less certainty) that quadrupeds thus deficient
are ruminants : the hearer readily supplying, in sense, the suppressed
major premiss ; viz. that *' what belongs to the individual sheep we
have examined, is likely to belong to the whole species ;" he.
Whether that which is properly called Induction {viz. the inquiry
respecting the several individuals or species) be sufficiently ample,
i.e. takes in a sufficient number of individual, or of specific cases, —
whether the character of those cases has been correctly ascertained
— and how far the individuals we have examined are likely to
resemble, in this or that circumstance, the rest of the class, &c. &c.,
are points that require indeed great judgment and caution ; but this
judgment and caution are not to be aided by Logic ; because they
are, in reality, employed in deciding whether or not it is fair and
allowable to lay down your Premises; i.e. whether you are authorized
or not, to assert, that "what is true of the individuals you have
examined, is true of the whole class:" and that this or that is true
of those individuals. Now, the rules of Logic have nothing to do
with the truth or falsity of the Premises ; except, of course, when
they are the conclusions of former arguments ; but merely teach
us to decide, not, whether the Premises are fairly laid down,
but whether the Conclusion follows fairly from the Premises or
not.
154 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
Necessity of It has however been urged that what are described as the Major-
Ma"^!"^ * premises in drawing inferences from Inductions, are resolvable ulti-
Premiss. matelj into an assertion of the " Uniformity of the laws of Nature,"
or some equivalent proposition ; and that this is, itself, obtained by
Induction; whence it is concluded that there must be at least one
Induction — and that, the one on which all others depend — incapable
of being exhibited in a Syllogistic form.
But it is evident, and is universally admitted, that in every case
where an inference is drawn from Induction (unless that name is to
be given to a mere random guess without any grounds at all) we
must form a judgment that the instance or instances adduced are
*' sufficient to authorize the Conclusion;" — that it is '^ allowable'' to
take these instances as a sample warranting an inference respecting
the whole Class. Now the expression of this judgment in words, is
the very Major-premiss alluded to. To acknowledge this, therefore,
is to acknowledge that all reasoning from Induction vMTwut exception
does admit of being exhibited in a syllogistic form ; and consequently
that to speak of one Induction that does not admit of it, is a contra-
diction.
Whether the belief in the constancy of Nature's laws, — a belief
of which no one can divest himself — be intuitive and a part of the
constitution of the human mind, as some eminent metaphysicians
hold, or acquired, and in what way acquired, is a question foreign to
our present purpose. For that, it is sufficient to have pointed out
that the necessity of assuming a universal Major-premiss, expressed
or understood, in order to draw any legitimate inference from
Induction, is virtually acknowledged even by those who endeavour
to dispute it.
§2.
Assumption Whether then the Premiss may fairly be assumed, or not, is a
\n ^^""^^^^ point which cannot be decided without a competent knowledge of
inductioa {\^q nature of the subject. E.G. In most branches of Natural-philo-
sophy, in which the circumstances that in any case affect the result,
are usually far more clearly ascertained than in human affairs, a
single instance is usually accounted a sufficient Induction; e.g.
having once ascertained that an individual magnet will attract iron,
we are authorized to conclude that this property is universal. In
Meteorology, however, and some other branches of Natural-philo-
sophy, in which less advancement has been made, a much more
copious Induction would be required. And in respect of the affairs
of human life, an inference from a single instance would hardly ever
be deemed allowable.
But it is worth remarking, that in all cases alike, of reasoning
from Induction, the greater or less degree of confidence we feel is
always proportioned to the belief of our having more or less com-
pletely ascertained all the drcwnstances that bear upon the question.
I
Chap. I. § 2.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 155
All men practically acknowledge this to liolcl good in all cases alike,
physical or moral, by invariably attributing any failure in their
anticipations in any case, to some ignorance or miscalculation
respecting some circumstances connected with the case. (See
Append. 1. Art. "Impossible.")
In some subjects, however, there will usually be more of these
circumstances difficult to be accurately ascertained, than in others ;
and the degree of certainty belonging to the Major-premiss, will
vary accordingly. But universally, the degree of evidence for any
proposition we set out with as a Premiss (whether the expressed or
the suppressed one) is not to be learned from mere Logic, nor indeed
from any one distinct Science ; but is the province of whatever
Science furnishes the subject-matter of your argument. None but
a Politician can judge rightly of the degree of evidence of a proposi-
tion in Politics ; a Naturalist, in Natural History, «tc.
E.G. From examination of many horned animals, as sheep, cows, investigo-
«fec., a Naturalist finds that they have cloven feet; now his skill as
a Naturalist is to be shown in judging whether these animals are
likely to resemble in the form of their feet all other horned animals ;
and it is the exercise of this judgment, together with the examina-
tion of individuals, that constitutes what is usually meant by the
Inductive process; which is that by which we gain, what are properly,
new truths; and which is not connected with Logic; being not what
is strictly called Beasoning, but Investigation. But when this major
Premiss is granted him, and is combined with the minor, viz. that
the animals he has examined have cloven feet, then he draws the
Condus:ion logically ; viz. that "the feet of all horned animals are
cloven."^ Again, if from several times meeting with ill-luck on a
Friday, any one concluded that Friday, universally, is an unlucky
day, one would object to his Induction; and yet it would not be, as
an argument, illogical; since the Conclusion follows fairly, if you
grant his implied Premiss ; viz. that the events which happened on
those particular Fridays are such as must happen, or are especially
likely to happen, on all Fridays: but we should object to his laying
dovm this Premiss ; and therefore should justly say that his Induc-
tion is faulty, though his argument is correct.
And here it may be remarked, that the ordinary rule for fair Thenr^re
argument, viz. that m an Enthymeme the suppressed Premiss should premiss
be always the one of whose truth legist doubt can exist, is not observed suppressed
in Induction : for the Premiss which is usually the more doubtful of induction,
the two, is, in this case, the major; it being in many cases not quite
certain that the individuals, respecting w^hich some point has been
ascertained, are to be fairly regarded as a sample of the whole class :
and yet the major-Premiss is seldom expressed; for the reason just
2 I have selected an Instance in which ever been assigned that could have led na
Induction is the oiilv ground we have to to conjecture this curious fact d priori,
rest on ; no reason, that I know of, having
156 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IY.
given, that it is easily understood ; as being {mutatis mutandis) tlie
same in every Induction.
What has been said of Induction will equally apply to Example ;
■which differs from it only in having a singular, instead of a general,
conclusion; and that, from a single case. E.G. In one of the
instances above, if the conclusion had been drawn, not respecting
conquerors in general, but respecting this or that conqueror, that he
was not likely to be careful of human life, each of the cases adduced
to prove this would have been called an Example. (See JElements
of Rhetoric, Part I. Ch. II. § 6.)
Some have maintained that in employing an Example we proceed
at once from one individual case to another, without the intervention
of any universal premiss. But whether we are fairly authorized or
not to draw an inference from any example, must depend on what is
called the parallelism of the two cases; i.e., their being likely to
agree in respect of the point in question : and the assertion, in
words, of this parallelism, is a universal proposition. He who has
in his mind this proposition, has virtually asserted such a major-
premiss as I have been speaking of: and he who has it not, if he
should be right in the inference itself that he draws, is, confessedly,
right only by chance.
From what has been said in this, and in the preceding section,
it will be seen, I trust, how untenable are the objections which
have of late years been urged, with an air of triumpli, against the
above explanations of the process of reasoning from Induction and
Example. Those objections, though having, at the first glance,
an air of philosophical ingenuity, are found, on a closer examination,
utterly unmeaning and self- destructive ; since they imply a com-
plete admission, though in different words, of the very principle
objected to.
Chap. II. — On the Discovery of Truth.
§1-
Whether it is by a process of Reasoning that New Truths are
brought to light, is a question which seems to be decided in the
negative by what has been already said; though many eminent
writers seem to have taken for granted the affirmative. It is,
perhaps, in a great measure, a dispute concerning the use of words ;
but it is not, for that reason, either uninteresting or unimportant;
since an inaccurrate use of language may often, in matters of Science,
lead to confusion of thought, and to erroneous conclusions. And, in
the present instance, much of the undeserved contempt which has
been bestowed on the Logical system may be traced to this source.
Chap. II. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 157
For when any one has laid down, that " Reasoning is important in
the discovery of Truth," and that " Logic is of no service in the
discovery of Truth," (each of which propositions is true in a certain
sense of the terms employed, hut not in the same sense,) he is
naturally led to conclude that there are processes of Reasoning to
which the Syllogistic theory does not apply; and, of course, to
misconceive altogether the nature of the Science.
In maintaining the negative side of the above question, three Different
things are to he premised: Jirst, that it is not contended that dis- ^o^rds^^*^®
coveries of any kind of truth beyond what actually falls under the " ^j^.?^^^^!'
senses, can be made (or at least are usually made) without Reasoning ; as appiied'to
only, that Reasoning is not the whole of the process, nor the whole ^^^^^^
of that which is important therein ; secondly, that reasoning shall
be taken in the sense, not of every exercise of the Reason, but of
Argumentation, in which Ave have all along used it, and in which it
has been defined by all the Logical writers, viz,: "from certain
granted propositions to infer another proposition as the consequence
of them:" thirdly, that by a "New Truth," be understood, some-
thing neither expressly nor virtually asserted before, — not imphed
[involved] in any thing already known.
To prove then, this point demonstratively, becomes, on these
data, perfectly easy ; for since all Reasoning (in the sense above
defined) may be resolved into Syllogisms; and since even the
objectors to Logic make it a subject of complaint, that in a Syllo-
gism the Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion, it follows at
once that no New Truth (as above defined) can be elicited by any
process of Reasoning.
It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly-celebrated author of
the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and many others, have objected to the
Syllogism altogether, as necessarily involving a petitio principii ; an
objection which, of course, he would not have been disposed to
bring forward, had he perceived that, whether well or ill-founded,
it lies against all arguments wJiotever. Had he been aware that a
Syllogism is no distinct kind of argument otherwise than in form,
but is, in fact, any argument whatever,* stated regularly and at
full length, he would have obtained a more correct view of the
object of all Reasoning ; which is merely to expand and unfold the
assertions wrapt up, as it were, and implied in those with which
we set out, and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge the
full force of that which he has admitted ; — to contemplate it in
various points of view ; — to admit in one shape what he has already
admitted in another, — and to give up and disallow whatever is
inconsistent with it.
Nor is it always a very easy task to bring before the mind the
several bearings, — the various applications, — of even any one pro-
» Which Dugald Stewart admits, though he adopts Campbell's objection.
158 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
Develop. posltlon. A common Term compreliends an indefinite — sometimes
meaning of ^ verj great — number of individuals, and often of Classes ; and
a term. these, often, in some respects, widely differing from eacli other :
and no one can be, on each occasion of his employing sucli a Term,
attending to and fixing his mind on each of the Individuals, or even
of the Species, so comprehended. It is to be remembered, too, that
both Division and Generalization are in a great degree arbitrary ;
i.e. that we may both divide the same genus on several different
principles, and may refer the same individuals or species to several
difierent classes, according to the nature of the discourse and drift
of the argument; each of which classes will furnish a distinct
Middle-Term for an argument, according to the question. E.G. If
we wished to prove that " a horse feels," (to adopt an ill-chosen
example from the above writer,) we might refer it to the genus
** animal;" to prove that " it has only a single stomach," to the
genus of "non-ruminants;" to prove that it is "likely to degen-
erate in a very cold climate," we should class it with " original
productions of a hot climate," &c. &lc. Now, each of these, and
numberless others to which the same thing might be referred, are
implied by the very term, "horse;" yet it cannot be expected that
they can all be at once present to the mind whenever that term is
uttered. Much less, when, instead of such a Term as that, we are
employing Terms of a very abstract and, perhaps, complex signifi-
cation,* as "government, justice," &c.
When then we say " Every Y is Z, and X is Y," there may be
an indefinite, and perhaps a great number of other terms of which
** Z" might be affirmed; but we fix our minds on one, viz. " Y;"
of which again an indefinite number of other predicates besides " Z'*
might be affirmed ; and then again out of an indefinite number of
things of which " Y" might be affirmed, we fix on " X ;" thus bring-
ing before the mind, — where it is needful to express both premises,
— what must in every case be assumed, — whether stated in words,
or understood — in order to draw the Conclusion. And usually this
process has to be repeated for the proof of one or both of the premises ;
and perhaps again, for the premises by which they are proved ; &c.
But one cause which has led the above-mentioned writers into
their error, is, their selecting examples (such as, it must be owned,
are abundant in Logical treatises) in which the Conclusion is merely
a portion of what one of the Premises by itself has already implied
Fvii in the very signification of the term that is taken as its Subject, so
of sekSng^ plainly as to be present to the mind of every one who utters it : as,
triflintr in the abovo example, the very term " horse" implies [" connotes"]
fcxampes. «» animal" to every one who utters those words and understands
their meaning.^ And hence it is that some writers not destitute of
4 On this point there are some valuable remarks in the Philosophy of Rhetorio
itself. Book IV. Chap. VII.
* See Book II. Chap. V. § L
CiiAP. II. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 159
intelligence have been led to imagine that in Reasoning we draAV a
Conclusion from a single Premiss.
But suppose, instead of such an example as Campbell, &c. fix on,
Tve take that of the inference drawn by some Naturalist respecting
a fossil-animal, which he concludes to be a " ruminant" from its
having horns on the skull. The labourers perhaps Avho dug up the
remains, may be ignorant that *' all horned animals are ruminant;"
and a naturalist again who is not on the spot, and has heard but
an imperfect account of the skeleton, may be ignorant that " this
animal was horned." Now neither of these parties could arrive at
the conclusion that "it Avas a ruminant." But when the two
premises are combined, they do, jointly imply and virtually assert
the conclusion ; though, separately, neither of them does so.
And hence a Syllogism has been represented (even by those who Syiiofrism
acknowledge that all sound Reasoning may be exhibited in that as^a saart.
form) as a contrivance for ensnaring men in a trap from which they
cannot afterwards escape. But a man can escape admitting the
truth of a conclusion: he may perceive its falsity; and may thus be
taught the falsity of one of the Premises. But in a case where
neither of these alternatives is necessary — where, after admitting
the whole of what is assumed to be certain or probable, you are left
free to admit or deny what is inferred, and have no more knowledge
of its certainty or of its probability than you had before, — this, every
one would perceive to be no real, but only an ajyparent argument.
But, as I have said, the flat truisms commonly given as examples
by logical writers, have led those who have not carefully analysed
the reasoning-process generally, into the notion that a Syllogism ia
necessarily of that trifling character. He who has asserted that
the two items of a certain account are 3 and 2, has virtually asserted
that the sum-total is 5: and of this few would need even to be reminded:
but it is equally certain that he who has stated the items when they
amount to some hundreds, has virtually asserted that the sum-total
is so and so ; and yet the readiest accountant requires, in this case,
some time to bring these items together before his mind.
A Subject concerning which something is to be proved, is referred,
as has been above remarked, to this or to that Class, according
to what it is that is to be proved.
The Categories^ or Predicaments, which Aristotle and other Logi- Catcirones.
cal writers have treated of, being certain general-heads or summa
genera, to one or more of which every Term may be referred, serve
6 The Cateprories enumerated by Aris- certainly is but a very crude one) ha?
totle, are ciio-!*, {ri(rov,^^c7ov, trpia-n. Toy, been by some writers enlarged, as it is
trin, xua-Bxi, ixi'", ■ronlv, ^uTxitvi which evident may easilv be done by subdividing
are usually rendered, as adequately as, some of the heads ; and by others cur-
perhaps, they can be in our language, tailed, as it is no less evident that all may
Substance, Quantity, Quality, Relation, ultimately be referred to the two heads (if
Place, Time, Situation, Possession, Ac- Substance, and Attribute, or (in the lan-
tion, Suflering. The Catalogue (which guage of some Logicians) Accident,
160 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IY.
the purpose of marking out certain tracks, as it were, which are
to he pursued in searching for middle Terms, in each argument
respectively ; it heing essential that we should generalize on a right
' principle, with a view to the question hefore us ; or, in other words,
that w^e should ahstract that portion of any object presented to the
mind, which is important to the argument in hand. There are
expressions in common use which have a reference to this caution :
such as, " this is a question, not as to the nature of the object, but
the magnitude of it :" " this is a question of time, or o^ place,'' &c.
i.e. " the subject must be referred to this or to that Category."
With respect to the meaning of the Terms in question, ''Dis-
covery," and "New Truth;" it matters not whether we confine
ourselves to the narrowest sense, or admit the widest, provided we
Two binds do but distinguish. There certainly are two kinds of " New Truth"
o iscovery, ^^^ ^^ ,, Discovery," if we take those words in the widest sense in
which they are ever used. First, such Truths as were, before they
were discovered, absolutely unknown, being not implied by any thing
we previously knew, though we might perhaps suspect them as
probable. Such are all matters of fact strictly so called, when first
made known to one who had not any such previous knowledge, as
would enable him to ascertain them a priori; i.e. by Reasoning; as
if we inform a man that we have a colony in New-South- Wales ; or
that the earth is at such a distance from the sun ; or that platina is
heavier than gold. The communication of this kind of knowledge
Information, is most usually, and most strictly, called information. We gain it
from observation, and from testimony. No mere internal workings
of our own minds (except when the mind itself is the very object to
be observed), or mere discussions in words, will make a fact known
to us ; though there is great room for sagacity in judging what
testimony to admit, and in the forming of conjectures that may lead
to profitable observation, and to experiments with a view to it.
Instruction. The Other class of Discoveries is of a very diff'erent nature. That
which may be elicited by Reasoning, and consequently is implied in
that which we already know, we assent to on that ground, and not
from observation or testimony. To take a Geometrical truth upon
trust, or to attempt to ascertain it by observation, would betray a
total ignorance of the nature of the, Science. In the longest demon-
stration, the Mathematical teacher seems only to lead us to make
use of our own stores, and point out to us how much we had already
admitted ; and, in the case of many Ethical propositions, we assent
a^ first hearing, though perhaps we had never heard or thought of
the proposition before. So also do we readily assent to the testimony
of a respectable man who tells us that our troops have gained a
victory ; but how diff'erent is the nature of the assent in the two
cases. In the latter we are disposed to thank the man for his
iiformation, as being such as no wisdom or learning would have
enabled us to ascertain; in the former, we usually exclaim ^^very
Chap. II. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 161
trueV^ **tliat is a valuable and just remark; tliat never s^j'wcyt me
before!" implying at once our practical ignorance of it, and also
our consciousness that we possess, in what we already know, the
means to ascertain the truth of it ; that we have a right, in short, to
bear our testimony to its truth.
To all practical purposes, indeed, a Truth of this description may
be as completely unknown to a man as the other ; but as soon as it
is set before him, and the argument by which it is connected with
his previous notions is made clear to him, he recognizes it as some-
thing conformable to, and contained in, his former belief.
It is not improbable that Plato's doctrine of Reminiscence arose Plato's
from a hasty extension of what he had observed in this class, to all ^"'^'
acquisition of knowledge whatever. His Theory of ideas served to
confound together matters of fact respecting the nature of things,
(which may be perfectly new to us) with propositions relating to our
oiun notions, and modes of thought ; (or to speak, perhaps, more
correctly, our own arbitrary Signs) which propositions must be con-
tained and implied in those very complex notions themselves ; and
whose truth is a conformity, not to the nature of things, but to our
own h^'pothesis. Such are all propositions in pure Mathematics,
and many in Ethics, viz. those wliicli involve no assertion as to real
matters of fact. It has been rightly remarked,^ that Mathematical
propositions are not properh^ true or false, in the same sense as any
proposition respecting real fact is so called. And hence, the truth
(such as it is) of such propositions is necessary and eternal ; since it
amounts only to a conformity with tlie hypothesis we set out with.
The proposition, that "the belief in a future state, combined with a
complete devotion to the present life, is not consistent with the
character of prudence," would be not at all the less true if a future
state were a chimera, and prudence a quality which was nowhere
met with ; nor would the truth of the Mathematician's conclusion be
shaken, that " circles are to each other as the squares of their
diameters," should it be found that there never had been a circle,
or a square, conformable to the definition, in reruni natuTce.
And accordingly an able man may, by patient Reasoning, attain
any amount of mathematical truths ; because these are all implied
in the Definitions. But no degree of labour and ability, would give
him the knowledge, by ^^ Reasoning'' alone, of what has taken
place in some foreign country ; nor would enable him to know, if he
had never seen, or heard of, the experiments, what would become
of a spoonful of salt, or a spoonful of chalk, if put into water, or
what would be the appearance of a ray of light when passed through
a prism.
Hence the futility of the attempt of Clarke, and others, to \l^l\^^^
mathematical sense) the exist
Dugald Stewart's Philosophy, Vol. II,
demonsirate (in the mathematical sense) the existence of a Deity. sSie*.
162 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
This can only be (apparent!}^) done by covertly assuming in the
Premises the very point to be proved. No raatter of fact csiu be
mathematically demonstrated ; though it may be proved in such a
manner as to leave no doubt on the mind. U.G. I have no more
doubt that I met such and such a man, in this or that place, yester-
day, than that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles :
but the kind of certainty I have of these two truths is widely dif-
ferent ; to say, that I did not meet the man, would be false indeed,
but it would not be any thing inconceivable, self -contradictory, and
absurd; but it would be so, to deny the equality of the angles of a
triangle to two right angles.
Information It is of the utmost importance to distinguish these two kinds of
instruction, Discovery of Truth. In relation to the former, as I have said, the
dutinct. word " i? formation^* is most strictly applied; the communication
of the latter is more properly called " instruction.^^ I speak of the
usual practice ; for it would be going too far to pretend that writers
are uniform and consistent in the use of these, or of any other
term. We say that the Historian gives us infoi^mcdion respecting
past times ; the Traveller, respecting foreign countries : on the
other hand, the Mathematician gives instruction in the principles of
his Science ; the Moralist instructs us in our duties, he. However,
let the words be used as they may, the things are evidently different,
and ought to be distinguished. It is a question comparatively
unimportant, whether the term *' Discovery " shall or shall not be
extended to the eliciting of those Truths, which, being implied in
our previous knowledge, may be established by mere strict Reason-
ing.
Similar verbal questions, indeed, might be raised respecting many
other cases : e.g. one has forgetten [i.e. cannot recollect) the name
of some person or place ; perhaps we even try to think of it, but in
vain : at last some one reminds us, and we instantly recognize it as
the one we wanted to recollect : it may be asked, was this in our
mind, or not ? The answer is, that in one sense it was, and in
another sense, it was not. Or, again, suppose there is a vein of
metal on a man's estate, which he does not know of; is it part of
his possessions or not ? and when he finds it out and works it, does
he then acquire a new possession or not ? Certainly not, in the
same sense as if he has a fresh estate bequeathed to him, which he
had formerly no right to ; but to all practical purposes it is a new
possession. This case, indeed, may serve as an illustration of the
one we have been considering ; and in all these cases, if the real
distinction be understood, the verbal question will not be of much
consequence.
To use one more illustration. Reasoning has been aptly compared
ib the piling together blocks of stone ; on each of which, as on a
pedestal, a man can raise himself a small, and but a small height
above the plain ; but which, when skilfully built up, will form a
Chap. II. § 2.] OX THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 163
fliglit of steps, wliicli will raise liim to a great elevation. Now (to
pursue this analogy) when the materials are all ready to the builder's
hand, the blocks ready dug and brought, his work resembles one of
the two kinds of Discovery just mentioned, viz. that to which we
have assigned the name of instruction: but if his materials are to be
entirely, or in part, provided by himself, — if he himself is forced to
dig fre'^sh blocks from the quarry, — this corresponds to the other
kind of Discovery.^
§2.
• I have hitherto spoken of the employment of Argument in the ^^^^^^^^^.jgg^
establishment of those hypothetical Truths (as they may be called)
which relate only to our own abstract notions. It is not, however,
meant to be insinuated that there is no room for Reasoning in the
estabhshment of a matter of fact : but the other class of Truths
have first been treated of, because, in discussing subjects of that
kind, the process of Reasoning is always the principal, and often
the only thing to be attended to, if we are but certain and clear as
to the meaning of the terms ; whereas, when assertions respecting
recti existence are introduced, we have the additional and more
important business of ascertaining and keeping in mind the degree
of evidence for those facts ; since, otherwise, our Conclusions could
not be relied on, however accurate our Reasoning.* But, undoubt-
edly, we may by Reasoning arrive at knowledge concerning matters
of fact, ?/ we hfiXQ facts to set out with as data; only that it will very
often happen that, " from certain facts," as Campbell remarks, "we
draw only probable Conclusions;" because the other Premiss intro-
duced (which he overlooked) is only probable. And the maxim of
Mechanics holds good in argimients ; that " nothing is stronger than
its weakest part." He observed that in such an instance, for
example, as the one lately given, we infer from the ceiiainty that
such and such tyrannies have been short-lived, the probability that
others will be so ; and he did not consider that there is an under-
stood Premiss which is essential to the argument; [viz. that **all
tyrannies will resemble those we have already observed") which
being only of a probable character, must attach the same degree
8 "The fundamental differences be- produced on his eye by mixine: the colours
tween these two great branches of human yellow and blue,' results which can be
knowledge, as w ell as their consequences, learnt only from experience,
cannot perhaps be more strikingly iilus- " Thus then the extremes of human
trated than in the following familiar knowledge may be considered as founded
exposition by a celebrated writer. 'A on the one hand ])urely upon reason, and
clever man,' says Sir J. Herschel, 'shut on the other purely upon sense. Now, a
up alone and allowed all unlimited time, very large portiort of our knowledge, and
might reason out for himself all the truths what in fact may be considered as, the
of mathematics, by proceeding from those most important jjart of it, lies between
simple notions of space and number of these two extremes, and results from a
which he cannot divest himself without union or mixture of them, that is to say,
ceasing to think J but he would never tell consists of the application of rational
by any effort ot reasoning what would principles to the phenomena presented by
become of a lump of sugar, if iumiersed the objects of nature." — Prout^s Bridge-
in water, or what impression would be water Treatise, p. 2.
164 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
of uncertainty to the Conclusion. And the douhtfulness is multi-
2)lied, if both Premises are uncertain. For since it is only on the
supposition of both Premises being true, that we can calculate on
the truth of the Conclusion, we must state in fractional numbers the
chances of each Premiss being true, and then multiply these
together, to judge of the degree of evidence of the Conclusion.^
An individual fact is not unfrequently elicited by skilfully com-
bining, and reasoning from, those already known ; of which many
curious cases occur in the detection of criminals by officers of justice,
and by Barristers, who acquire by practice such dexterity in that
particular department, as to draw sometimes the right conclusion
from data, which might be in the possession of others, without being
General applied to the same use. But in all cases of the inferring of a
^tra Wished general law from Induction, that conclusion (as has been formerly
^y^^asoning remarked) is ultimatdy established by Reasoning. E.G. Bakewell,
Induction, the Celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a great number of indi-
vidual beasts, a tendency to fatten readily ; and in a great number
of others, the absence of this constitution: in every individual of the
former description, he observed a certain peculiar make, though they
differed widely in size, colour, &c. Those of the latter description
differed no less in various points, but agreed in being of a different
make from the others : these facts were his data ; from which,
combining them* with the general principle, that Nature is steady
and uniform in her proceedings, he logically drew the conclusion
that beasts of the specified make have universally a peculiar tendency
to fattening. But then his principal merit consisted in making the
observations, and in so combining them as to ohstract'iYom. each of
a multitude of cases, differing widely in many respects, the circum-
stances in which they all agreed ; and also in conjecturing skilfully
how far those circumstances were likely to be found in the whole
class. The making of such observations, and still more the com-
bination, abstraction, and judgment employed,^*^ are what men
commonly mean (as was above observed) when they speak of Induc-
tion; and these operations are certainly distinct from Reasoning.^^
The same observations will apply to numberless other cases ; as, for
instance, to the Discovery of the law of '^ vis inertice," and the
other principles of Natural-philosophy.
It may be remarked here, that even the most extensive observa-
tions of facts will often be worse than useless to those who are
deficient in the power of discriminating and selecting. Their know-
ledge, whether much or little, is like food to a body whose digestive
system is so much impaired as to be incapable of separating the
nutritious portions. To attempt to remedy the defect of minds thus
constituted " by imparting to them additional knowledge, — to confer
the advantage of wider experience on those who have not the power
9 See Book III. § 14. w See Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. pp. 229-239.
" See Book I. § 1. Note.
Chap. II. § 3.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 1G5
of profiting by experience, — is to attempt enlarging the prospect of
a short-sighted man by bringing him to the top of a hill."^'
But to what class, it may be asked, should be referred the Dis-
coveries we have been speaking of ? All would agree in calling them,
when first ascertained, " New Truths," in the strictest sense of the
word, which would seem to imply their belonging to the class which
may be called by w^ay of distinction, ** Physical Discoveries:'' and
yet their being ultimately established by Reasoning, would seem,
according to the foregoing rule, to refer them to the other class,
viz. W'hat may be called " iyC>(7/caZ Discoveries;" since whatever is Logical
estabhshed by Reasoning must have been contained and virtually ^^''^^"®*
asserted in the Premises. In answer to this, I would say, that they
certainly do belong to the latter class, relcdively to a person who is
in 2^ossession of tfie data: but to him Avho is not, they are New
Truths of the other class. For it is to be remembered, that the
words ** Discovery" and "New Truths" are necessarily relative.
There may be a proposition which is to one person completel}'" A-?io?/;?z;
to another {viz. one to whom it has never occurred, though he is in
possession of all the data from which it may be proved) it will be
(when he comes to perceive it, by a process of instruction) what we
have called a Logical Discovery: to a third {viz. one who is ignorant
of these data) it will be absolutely iinkrtown, and will have been,
when made known to him, a perfectly and properly New Truth, —
a piece of information, — a Physical Discovery, as we have called it.^^
To the Philosopher, therefore, who arrives at the Discovery by
reasoning from his observations, and from established principles
combined with them, the Discovery is of the former class ; to the
multitude, probably of tlie latter; as tliey will have been most
likely not possessed of all his data.
§ 3.
It follows from what has been said, that in pure Mathematics, ciiaracter of
and in such Ethical propositions as we were lately speaking of, we truths,
do not allow the possibility of any but a Logical Discovery : i.e. no
proposition of that class can be true, which was not implied in the
Definitions and Axioms we set out with, which are the first prin-
ciples. For since the propositions do not profess to state any fact,
the only truth they can possess, consists in conformity to the
original principles. To one, therefore, wdio knows these principles,
such propositions are Truths already implied ; since they may be
M Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 236. fully convinced of any thing that is not
1' It may be worth while in this place true, he is mistaken in supposing himself
to define what is properly to be called to know it; lastly, if two persons are each
Knoioledge: it implies three things; 1st, fully confident, one that the moon is in-
firm belief, 2dly, oi what is true, 3dly, on habited, and the other that it is not,
sufficient (jrounds. If any one, e.Q. is in (though one of these opinions must be
do^ibt respecting one of Eu(riid's demon- true) neither of them could properly be
strations, he cannot be said to kno^v the said to knoiv the truth, since he cannot
proposition proved by it; if, again, he is have sufficient j^rot/ of it.
166 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
developed to him by Reasoning, if he is not defective in the dis-
cursive faculty ; and again, to one who does not understand those
principles [i.e. is not master of the Definitions) such propositions
are, so far unmeaning. On the other hand, propositions relating
to matters of fact, may he, indeed, implied in what he already knew ;
(as he who knows the climate of the Alps, the Andes, &c. <kc. has
virtually admitted the general fact, that '* the tops of mountains are
comparatively cold ") hut as these possess an absolute and physical
Truth, they may also be absolutely *' new," their Truth not being
implied in the mere terms of the jjropositions. The truth or falsity
of any proposition concerning a triangle, is implied by the meaning
of that and of the other Geometrical terms ; whereas, though one
may understand (in the ordinary sense of that word) the full mean-
ing of the terms ** planet," and " inhabited," and of all the other
terms in the language, he cannot thence derive any certainty that
the planets are, or are not, inhabited.
As I have elsewhere observed, *' Every branch of study, which
can at all claim the character of a science (in the widest accepta-
tion,) requires two things: 1. A correct ascertainment of the data
from which we are to reason ; and, 2. Correctness in the process of
deducing conclusions from them. But these two processes, though
both are in every case indispensable, are, in different cases,
extremely different in their relative difficulty and amount ; — in the
space, if I may so speak, which they occupy in each branch of
study. In pure Mathematics, for instance, we set out from arbi-
trary Definitions, and Postulates, readily comprehended, which are
the principles from which, by the help of Axioms hardly needing
even to be stated, our reasonings proceed. No facts whatever
require to be ascertained ; no process of induction to be carried on ;
the reasoning-process is nearly every thing. In Geology, (to take
an instance of an opposite kind) the most extensive information is
requisite ; and though sound reasoning is called for in making use
of the knowledge acquired, it is well known what erroneous systems
have been devised, by powerful reasoners, who have satisfied them-
selves too soon with observations not sufficiently accurate and
extensive.
*' Various branches of Natural-philosophy occupy, in this respect,
various intermediate places. The two processes which I have
endeavoured to describe, under the titles of * Physical investiga-
tion' and ' Logical investigation,' will, in different cases, differ very
much in their relative importance and difficulty. The science of
Optics, for instance, furnishes an example of one approaching very
near to pure mathematics ; since, though the foundation of it con-
sists in facts ascertained by experiment, these are fewer and more
easily ascertained than those pertaining to other branches of
Natural-philosophy. A very small number •of principles, compre-
hensible even without being verified by the senses, being assumed,
Chap. II. § 4.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 167
the deductions from them are so extensive, that, as is well known,
a blind mathematician, who had no remembrance of seeing, gave an
approved course of lectures on the subject. In the applicoJiony
however, of this science to the explanation of many of the curious
natural phenomena that occur, a most extensive and exact
knowledge of facts is called for.
" In the case of Political-Economy, that the facts on which the
science is founded are few, and simple, and within the range of
every one's observation, would, I think, never have been doubted,
but for the error of confoundinor toarether the theoretical and the
practical branches of it ; — the science of what is properly called
Political-Economy, — and the practical emijloyment of it. The
theory supphes principles, which we may afterwards apply practically
to an indefinite number of various cases ; and in order to make this
application correctly, of course an accurate knowledge of the
circumstances of each case is indispensable. But it should be
remembered that the same may be said even with respect to
Geometry. As soon as we come to the practical branch of it, and
apply it in actual measurements, a minute attention to facts is
requisite for an accurate result. And in each practical question in
Political-Economy that may arise, we must be prepared to ascertain,
and allow for, various disturbing causes, which may more or less
modify the results obtained from our general principles ; just as, in
Mechanics, when we come to practice, we must take into account
the thickness, and Aveight, and the degrees of flexibility, of ropes
and levers.
" The facts then which it may be necessary to ascertain for the
practical decision of any single case that may arise, are, of course,
in Political-Economy (as in respect of the application of the
principles of any science), indefinite in number, and sometimes
difiicult to collect ; the facts on which the general principles of the
science are founded, come within the range of every one's experi-
ence.""
§4-
When it is asked, then, whether such great Discoveries, as have Ambipufty
been made in Natural-philosophy, were accomplished, or can be Reasoning,
accomplished, by Reasoning '? the inquirer should be reminded, that
the question is ambiguous. It may be answered in the aflSrmative,
if by " Reasoning" is meant to be included the assumption of
Premises. To the right performance of that work, is requisite, not
only, in many cases, the ascertainment of facts, and of the degree
of evidence for doubtful propositions, (in which, observation and
experiment will often be indispensable,) but also a skilful selection
and combination of known facts and principles; such as implies,
14 Polit. Econ. Lect. IX. p. 225.
168 ox THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
amongst otTier things, the exercise of that powerful abstraction
which seizes the common circumstances — the point of agreement —
in a number of, otherwise, dissimilar individuals ; and it is in this
that the greatest genius is shown. But if " Reasoning" be under-
stood in the limited sense in which it is usually defined, then we
must answer in the negative; and reply that such Discoveries
are made by means of Reasoning combined with other operations.
In the process I have been speaking of, there is much Reasoning
throughout; and thence the whole has been carelessly called a
** process of Reasoning."
It is not, indeed, any just ground of complaint that the word
Reasoning is iised in two senses; but that the two senses are per-
petually c&nf winded together: and hence it is that some Logical
writers fancied that Reasoning [viz. that which Logic treats of)
was the method of discovering Truth; and that so many other
writers have accordingly complained of Logic for not accomplishing
that end; urging that "Syllogism" [i.e. Reasoning; though they
overlooked the coincidence) never established any thing that is,
strictly speaking, unknoiun to him who has granted the Premises :
and proposing the introduction of a certain '* rational Logic" to
accomplish this purpose; i.e. to direct the mind in the process of
investigation. Supposing that some such system could be devised —
that it could even be brought into a scientific form, (which he must
be more sanguine than scientific who expects,) — that it were of the
greatest conceivable utility, — and tliat it should be allowed to bear
the name of ** Logic" (since it would not be worth while to contend
about a name) still it would not, as these writers seem to suppose,
have the same object proposed with the Aristotelian Logic; or be
in any respect a rival to that system. A plough may be a much
more ingenious and valuable instrument than ajlail; but it never
can be substituted for it.
New truths Those Discoveries of general laws of Nature, <fec. of which we
hl?different have been speaking, being of that character which we have described
different ^^ *^^ name of " Logical Discoveries," to him who is in possession
j>ersons. of all the Premises from which they are deduced; but being, to the
multitude^ who are unacquainted with many of those Premises)
strictly " New Truths," hence it is, that men in general give to
the general facts, and to them, most peculiarly, the name of Dis-
coveries; for to themselves they are such, in the strictest sense ; the
Premises from which they were inferred being not only originally
unknown to them, but frequently remaining unknown to the voy
last. E.G. The general conclusion concerning cattle, which Bake-
well made known, is what most Agriculturists (and many others
also) are acquainted with ; but the JPremises he set out with, viz.
the facts respecting this, that, and the other, individual ox, (the
ascertainment of which facts was his first Discovery,) these are
what few know, or care to know, with any exact particularity.
Chap. II. § 4.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASON'ING. 169
And it may be added, tliat these discoveries of particular facts, obseryation
wliicli are tlie immediate result of observation, are, in themselves, experiment
uninteresting and insignificant, till they are comhined so as to lead
to a grand general result. Those who on each occasion watched
the motions, and registered the times of occupation, of Jupiter's
satellites, little thought, perhaps, tliemselves, what important
results they Avere preparing the way for.^^ So that there is an
additional cause which has confined the term Discovery to these
grand general conclusions ; and, as was just observed, they are, to
the generality of men, perfectly New Truths in the strictest sense
of the word; not being implied in any previous knowledge they
possessed. Very often it will happen, indeed, that the conclusion
thus drawn will amount only to a probable conjecture; which con-
jecture will dictate to the inquirer such an experiment, or course of
experiments, as will fully establish the fact. Thus Sir H. Davy,
from finding that the flame of hydrogen gas was not communicated
through a long slender tube, conjectured that a shorter but still
slenderer tube would answer the same purpose ; this led him to try
the experiments, in which, by continually shortening the tube, and
at the same time lessening its bore, he arrived at last at the wire-
gauze of his safety-lamp.
It is to be observed also, that whatever credit is conveyed by the
word " Discovery," to him who is regarded as the author of it, is
well deserved by those who skilfully select and combine known
Truths {especially such as have been long and generally known) so
as to elicit important, and hitherto unthought-of, conclusions.
Theirs is the master-mind: — xo-^iTtKroutic'^^ (p^ovmi;: whereas men of
very inferior powers may sometimes, by immediate observation,
discover perfectly new facts, empirically ; and thus be of service in
furnishing materials to the others ; to whom they stand in the same
relation (to recur to a former illustration) as the brickmaker or
stonequarrier to the architect. It is peculiarly creditable to Adam
Smith, and to ]\Ialthus, that the data from which they drew such
important Conclusions had been in every one's hands for centuries.
As for Mathematical Discoveries, they (as we have before said)
must always be of the description to which we have given the name
of " Logical Discoveries; " since to him who properly comprehends
the meaning of the Mathematical terms (and to no other are the
Truths themselves, properly speaking, intelligible) those results are
implied in his previous knowledge, since they are logically deducible
therefrom. It is not, however, meant to be implied, that Mathema-
tical Discoveries are effected by pure Reasoning, and by that singly.
For though there is not here, as in Physics, any exercise of judg-
ment as to the degree of evidence of the Premises, nor any experi-
ments and observations, yet there is the same call for skill in the
15 Hence, Bacon m-^ci as to pursue Truth, without always requiring to perceive
its practical application.
170
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING,
[Book IV.
Jperations
connected
with
Reasoning.
MatTiemati-
cal and
other
Keasoning.
selection and combination of tlie Premises in such a manner as shall
be best calculated to lead to a new, — that is, unperceived and
unthought-of — C onclusion .
In following, indeed, and talcing in a demonstration, nothing is
called for but pure Reasoning ; but the assumption of Premises is
not a part of Reasoning, in the strict and technical sense of that
term. Accordingly, there are many who can follow a Mathematical
demonstration, or any other train of argument, who would not
succeed well in framing one of their own.^*
§5.
For both kinds of Discovery then, the Logical, as well as the
Physical, certain operations are requisite, beyond those which can
fairly be comprehended under the strict sense of the word " Rea-
soning." In the Logical, is required a skilful selection and combina-
tion of known Truths: in the Physical, we must employ, in addition
(generally speaking) to that process, observation and experiment.
It will generally happen, that in the study of nature, and, univer-
sally, in all that relates to matters of fact, both kinds of investigation
will be united: i.e. some of the facts or principles you reason from
as Premises, must be ascertained by observation; or, as in the case
of the safety-lamp, the ultimate Conclusion will need confirmation
from experience ; so that both Physical and Logical Discovery
will take place in the course of the same process. We need not,
therefore, wonder, that the two are so perpetually confounded. In
Mathematics, on the other hand, and in great part of the discus-
sions relating to Ethics and Jurisprudence, there being no room for
any Physical Discovery whatever, we have only to make a skilful
use of the propositions in cm* possession, to arrive at every attainable
result.
The investigation, however, of the latter class of subjects differs
in other points also from that of the former. For, setting aside the
circumstance of our having, in these, no question as to facts, — no
room for observation, — there is also a considerable difference in
what may be called, in both instances, the process of Logical inves-
tigation; the Premises on which we proceed being of so different a
nature in the two cases.
To take the example of Mathematics, the Definitions, which are
the principles of our Reasoning, are very few, and the Axioms still
fewer ; and both are, for the most part, laid down, and placed before
the student in the outset; the introduction of a new Definition or
Axiom, being of comparatively rare occurrence, at wide intervals,
and with a formal statement ; besides which, there is no room for
doubt concerning either. On the other hand, in all Reasonings
which regard matters of fact, we introduce almost at every step,
JO Hence, the Student niust not confine ment, if he will truly become a Mathe-
himself to this passive kind of employ- matician.
Chap. ir. §5.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONINa. 171
fresh and fresh propositions (to a very great number) which had nofc
been elicited in the course of our Reasoning, but are taken for
granted; viz. facts, and Laws of Nature, which are here the
principles of our Reasoning, and maxims, or " elements of belief,"
which answer to the axioms in Mathematics. If, at the opening of
a Treatise, for example, on Chemistry, on Agriculture, on Political-
Economy, &c. the author should make, as in Mathematics, a formal
statement of all the propositions he intended to assume as granted,
throughout the whole work, both he and his readers would be
astonished at the number; and, of these, many would be only
probable, and there would be much room for dcubt as to the degree
of probability, and for judgment in ascertaining that degree.
Moreover, Mathematical axioms are always employed precisely
in the same simple form; e.g. the axiom that " the things equal to
the same are equal to one another," is cited, whenever there is need,
in those very words ; whereas the maxims employed in the other
class of subjects, admit of, and require, continual modifications in
the application of them. E.G. " The stability of the laws of Nature,'*
which is our constant assumption in inquiries relating to Natural-
philosophy, appears in many different shapes, and in some of them
does not possess the same complete certainty as in others ; e.g. when,
from having always observed a certain sheep ruminating, we infer,
that this individual sheep will continue to ruminate, we assume that
" the property which has hitherto belonged to this sheep will remain
unchanged;" when we infer the same property of all sheep, we
assume that **the property which belongs to this individual belongs
to the whole species;" if, on comparing sheep with some other
kinds of horned animals, ^'^ and finding that all agree in ruminating,
we infer that " all horned animals ruminate," we assume that " the
whole of a genus or class are likely to agree in any point wherein
many species of that genus agree :" or in other words, " that if one
of two properties, kc. has often been found accompanied by another,
and never without it, the former will be universally accompanied by
the latter:" now all these are merely diiferent forms of the maxim,
that "nature is uniform in her operations," which, it is evident,
varies in expression in almost every different case where it is applied,
and the application of which admits of every degree of evidence,
from perfect moral certainty, to mere conjecture. ^^
The same may be said of an infinite number of principles and
maxims appropriated to, and employed in, each particular branch of
study. Hence, all such reasonings are, in comparison of Mathe-
matics, very complex; requiring so much more than that does,
beyond the process of merely deducing the conclusion logically from
the premises : so that it is no wonder that the longest Mathematical
17 Fix. havin<? horns on the skull. What ture, as well as in situation, from what
are called tlie horns of the Rhinoceros are properly called horns,
ai'e quite different in origin, and in struc- is gge Append. Art. " impossible.'*
172
OiN THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Mathema-
tics useful
as an intro-
ductory
praxis of
ilecisoning.
Fallacious
disparage-
ment of
reasoning.
Proper office
ot candour.
demonstration sliould be so miicli more easily constructed and
understood, than a much shorter train of just reasoning concerning
real facts. The former has been aptly compared to a long and steep,
but even and regular, flight of steps, which tries the breath, and the
strength, and the perseverance only ; while the latter resembles a
short, but rugged and uneven, ascent up a precipice, which requires
a quick eye, agile limbs, and a firm step ; and in which we have to
tread now on this side, now on that — ever considering, as we proceed,
whether this or that projection, will afford room for our foot, or
whether some loose stone may not slide from under us. There are
probably as many steps of pure reasoning in one of the longer of
Euclid's demonstrations, as in the whole of an argumentative treatise
on some other subject, occupying perhaps a considerable volume.
It may be observed here that Mathematical Reasoning, as it
calls for no exercise of judgment respecting probabilities, is the
best kind of introductory exercise ; and, from the same cause, is
apt, when too exclusively pursued, to make men incorrect moral-
reasoners.
As for those Ethical and Legal Reasonings which were lately
mentioned as in some respects resembling those of Mathematics,
[viz. such as keep clear of all assertions respecting facts) they have
this difl*erence; that not only men are not so completely agreed
respecting the maxims and principles of Ethics and Law, but the
meaning also of each Term cannot be absolutely, and for ever, fixed
by an arbitrary definition ; on the contrary, a great part of our
labour consists in distinguishing accurately the various senses in
which men employ each Term, — ascertaining which is the most
proper, — and taking care to avoid confounding them together.-^^
It may be worth while to add in this place that as a candid
disposition, — a hearty desire to judge fairly, and to attain truth, —
are evidently necessary with a view to give fair play to the reasoning-
powers, in subjects where we are liable to a bias from interest or
feelings, so, a fallacious perversion of this maxim finds a place in
the minds of some persons : who accordingly speak disparagingly of
all exercise of the reasoning-faculty in moral and religious subjects ;
declaiming on the insufficiency of mere intellectual power for the
attainment of truth in such matters, — on the necessity of appealing
to the heart rather than to the head, &lc.^ and then leading their
readers or themselves to the Conclusion that the less we reason on
such subjects the safer we are.
But the proper office of candour is to pre^Mre the mind not for the
rejection of all evidence, but for the right reception of evidence ; —
not, to be a substitute for reasons, but to enable us fairly to weigh
the reasons on both sides. Such persons as I am alluding to are in
fact saying that since just weights alone, without a just balance,
1* See Appendix on Ambiguous Terms.
''<' See Appendix III.
Chap. III. § 1.1 ON THE PROTINCE OF REASONING. 173
will avail nothing, therefore we have only to take care of the scales,
and let the weights take care of themselves.
This kind of tone is of course most especially to he found in such
writers as consider it expedient to inculcate on the mass of mankind
what — there is reason to suspect — they do not themselves fully
helieve, and which they apprehend is the more likely to he rejected
the more it is investigated.'^
Chap. III. --Of Inference and Proof.
§1-
Since it appears, from what has heen said, that universally a man
must possess something else hesides the Reasoning-faculty, in order
TO apply that faculty properly to his own purpose, whatever that
purpose may be; it may he inquired whether some theory could not
he made out, respecting those ''other operailons'^ and " intellectual
processes, distinct from Reasoning, which it is necessary for us
sometimes to employ in the investigation of truth ;"-^ and whether
rules could not he laid down for conducting them.
Something has, indeed, been done in this way by more than one DifiFerent
writer ; and more might probably be accomplished by one who should of ^ *^**'''"*
fully comprehend and carefully bear in mind the principles of Logic, Reasoning,
properly so called ; but it would hardly be possible to build up any
thing like a regular Science respecting these matters, such as Logic
is wdth respect to the theory of Reasoning. It may be useful,
however, to observe, that these ''other operations'' of which we
have been speaking, and which are preparatory to the exercise of
Reasoning, are of two hinds, according to the nature of the end
proposed ; for Reasoning comprehends Inferring and Proving; which
are not two different things, but the same thing regarded in two
different points of view: like the road from London to York, and the
road from York to London. He who infers,^ proves ; and he who
proves, infers; but the word "infer" fixes the mind j^rs^ on the
Premiss and then on the Conclusion; the word "prove," on the
contrary, leads the mind from the Conclusion to the Premiss.
Hence, the substantives derived from these words respectively, are
often used to express that which, on each occasion, is Ixist in the
mind ; Inference being often used to signify the Conclusion, {i.e.
Proposition inferred,) and Proof, the Premiss. We say, also, " How-
do joupi^ove that ?" and " What do you infer from that? " which
sentences would not be so properly expressed if we were to transpose
21 See Powell's " Tradition Unveiled." 23 i mean, of course, when the word is
82 D Stewart. understood to imoly correct Inference.
174
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Investigator
and
Advocate.
Questions
concerning
Predicate,
and
concerning
Copula.
those verts. One might, therefore, define Proving, "the assigning
of a reason [or argument] for the support of a given proposition:"
and Inferring, "the deduction of a Conckision from given Premises."
In the one case our Conclusion is given (i.e. set before us as the
Question) and we have to seek for arguments; in the other, our
Premises are given, and we have to seek for a Conchision: i.e. to
put together our own propositions, and try what will follow from
them ; or, to speak more Logically, in the one case, we seek to refer
the Subject of which we would predicate something, to a class'^ to
which that Predicate will (affirmativel}^ or negatively) ap2:ily; in the
other, we seek to find comprehended, in the Subject of vMch loe have
predicated something, some other term to which that Predicate had
not been before applied.^ Each of these is a definition of Beasoning.
To i'tifer, then, is the business of the Philosojyher; to prove, of
the Advocate; the former, from the great mass of known and
admitted truths, wishes to elicit any valuable additional truth
whatever, that has been hitherto unperceived ; and perhaps, without
knowing, with certainty, what will be the terms of his Conclusion.
Thus the Mathematician, e.g. seeks to ascertain what is the ratio of
circles to each other, or what is the line whose square will be equal
to a given circle. The Advocate, on the other hand, has a Pro-
position put before him, which he is to maintain as well as he can.
His business, therefore, is to find middle-terms (which is the inventio
of Cicero); the Philosopher's to combine and select known facts
or principles, suitably, for gaining from them Conclusions which,
though implied in the Premises, were before unperceived : in other
words, for making *' Logical Discoveries."
It may be added that all questions may be considered as falling
under two classes; viz. " What shall be predicated of a certain
Subject ;" and, " Wliich Copida, affirmative or negative, shall
connect a certain Subject and Predicate." We inquire, in short,
either 1st, " What is A ?" or, 2d, " Is A, B, or is it not ?" The
former class of questions belongs to the Philosopher ; the latter to
the Advocate. [See Pfiet. Appendix G. p. 387.)
The distinction between these two classes of questions is perhaps
best illustrated by reference to some case in which our decision of
each of the questions involved in some assertion, is controverted, by
different parties. PJ.G. Paul says, that the apostles preached
*' Christ crucified ; to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the
Greeks, foolishness:" that Jesus, who had suffered an ignominious
death, was the Messiah, the Saviour of the World, was a doctrine
M Observe, that " Class" is used, here
and elsewhere, for either an actual, or
what may be called a potential, Class:
see Book I. § 3.
25 *' Proving" may be comoared to the
act of putting aimy any article into the
proper receptacle of goods ot that descrip-
tion; "inferring," to that of brinyiny out
the article when needed.
Chap. III. § 3.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 175
opposed both by Jews and Gentiles: though on different grounds,
according to their respective prejudices: the Jews who "required
a Sign," {i.e. the coming of the Messiah in the clouds to establish
a splendid temporal kingdom) were "offended" — "scandalized"
— at the doctrine of a siifering Messiah; the Greeks who " sought
after philosophical Wisdom" {i.e. the mode of themselves exalting
their own nature, without any divine aid) ridiculed the idea of a
Heavenly Saviour altogether ; which the Jews admitted. In logical
language, the Gentiles could not comprehend the Predicate; the
Jews, denied the Copula.
It may be added, that in modern phraseology, the operations of ^'^"f^f^a^'-j
corresponding prejudices are denoted, respectively, by the words nonsense. '
"paradox" (a "stumbling-block") and "nonsense;" ("foolish-
ness;") which are often used, the one, by him who has been accus-
tomed to hold an opposite opinion to what is asserted, the other, by
him who has formed no opinion on the subject. The writer who
proves an unwelcome truth, is censured as paradoxical; he who
brings to hght i£!iih&-Unknovm or unthought-of, as nonsensical.
§3.
Such are the respective preparatory processes in these two Different
branches of study, the philosophical, and the rhetorical. They are mind
widely different ; they arise from, and generate, very different habits with tSe
of mind ; and require a very different kind of training and precept, processes.
It is evident that the business of the Advocate and that of the
Judge, are, in this point, opposed ; the one being, to find argu-
ments for the support of his client's cause ; the other, to ascertain
the truth. And hence it is, that those who have excelled the most
in the former department, sometimes manifest a deficiency in the
latter, though the subject-matter, in which they are conversant,
remains the same. The Pleader, or Controversialist, or, in short,
the R-hetorician in general, who is, in his own province, the most
skilful, may be but ill-fitted for philosophical-investigation, even
where there is no observation wanted : — when the facts are all ready
ascertained for him. And again, the ablest Philosopher may make
an indifferent disputant ; especially, since the arguments which have
led him to the conclusion, and have, with him, the most weight,
may not, perhaps, be the most powerful in controversy.
The commoner fault, however, by far, is to forget the Philosopher
or Theologian, and to assume the Advocate, improperly. It is
therefore of great use to dwell on the distinction between these
two branches. As for the bare process of Reasoning, tJmt is the
same in both cases ; but the preparatory processes which are
requisite, in order to emj^loy Reasoning profitably, these, we see,
branch off" into two distinct channels. In each of these, undoubtedly,
useful rules may be laid down ; but they should not be confounded
together. Bacon has chosen the department of Philosophy ; giving
176
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Philoso-
Ihical
nquiry.
Rhetorical
luquirj.
rules in his Organon, not only for the conduct of experiments to
ascertain new facts, but also for the selection and combination of
known facts and principles, with a view of obtaining valuable
Irtferences ; and it is probable that a system of such rules is what
some writers mean (if they have any distinct meaning) by their
proposed " Logic."
In the other department, precepts have been given by Aristotle
and other Rhetorical writers, as a part of their plan.^^ How far
these precepts are to be considered as belonging to the present
system, — whether " Method" is to be regarded as a paH of Logic,
— ^whether the Matter of Logic {i.e. genera maxims, axioms, or
common-places) is to be included in the system, — whether Bacon's
is properly to be reckoned a kind of Logic ; all these are merely
verbal questions, relating to the extension, not of the Science, but
of the name. The bare process of Reasoning, i.e. deducing a Con-
clusion from Premises, must ever remain a distinct operation from
the assumption of Premises ; however useful the rules may be that
have been given, or may be given, for conducting this latter process,
and others connected with it ; and however properly such rules may
be subjoined to the precepts of that system to which the name of
Logic is applied in the narrowest sense. Such rules as I now allude
to may be of eminent service ; but they must always be, as I have
before observed, comparatively vague and general, and incapable of
being built up into a regular demonstrative theory like that of the
Syllogism ; to which theory they bear much the same relation as
the principles and rules of Poetical and Rhetorical criticism to those
of Grammar ; or those of Practical Mechanics, to strict Geometry.
I find no fault with the extension of a Term ; but I would suggest a
caution against confounding together, by means of a common name,
things essentially different ; and above all, I would deprecate the
sophistry of striving to depreciate what is called *' the school-Logic,"
by perpetually contrasting it with systems with which it has nothing
in common but the name, and whose object is essentially difi'ereut.
§4-
Aristotle's It is remarkable that writers, whose expressions tend to confound
wjdBacon's. together, by means of a common name, two branches of study which
have nothing else in common (as if they were two different plans for
attaining one and the same object,) have themselves complained of
one of the effects of this confusion, viz. the introduction, early in the
career of Academical Education, of a course of Logic; under which
name, they observe, ** men now^^ universally comprehend the works
26 I have attempted the same in Part I.
of Elements of Rhetoric ; although,
(through some inadvertency) I have
found myself mentioned along with
some other writers, as having declared
that the thing is impossible. If I ever
had made such an assertion, I should
probably have been the first person that
ever undertook to accomplish an acknow
ledped impossibility.
^7 i.e. In the Scotch universities.
Chap. IV. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 177
of Locke, Bacon, &c." which, (as is justly remarked) are unfit foe
beginners. Now this would not have happened, if men had always
kept in mind the meaning or meanings of each name they used.
And it may he added, that, however justly the word Logic may
be thus extended, we have no ground for applying to the Aristo-
telian Logic the remarks above quoted respecting the Baconian;
which the ambiguity of the word, if not carefully kept in view,
might lead us to do. Grant that Bacon's w^ork is a part of Logic ;
it no more follows, from the unfitness of that for learners, that the
Elements of the Theory of Reasoning should be withheld from them,
than it follows that the elements of Euclid, and common Arithmetic,
are unfit for boys, because Newton s Principia, which also bears the
title of Mathematical, is above their grasp. Of two branches of
study which bear the same name, or even of two parts of the same
branch, the one may be suitable to the commencement, the other to
the close of the Academical career.
At whatever period of that career it may be proper to introduce
the study of such as are usually called Metaphysical writers, it may
be safely asserted, that those who have had the most experience in
the business of giving instruction in Logic properly so called, as well
as in other branches of knowledge, prefer and generally pursue the
plan of letting their pupils enter on that study, next in order after
the Elements of Mathematics.
Chap. IV. — 0/ Verbal and Real Questions.
§1-
The ingenious author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric, and other
writers, having maintained, or rather assumed, that Logic is appli-
cable to Verbal controversy alone, there may be an advantage
(though it has been my aim throughout to show the application of
it to all Reasoning) in pointing out the diff'erence between Verbal
and Real Questions, and the probable origin of Campbell's mistake.
For to trace any error to its source, will often throw more light on
the subject in hand than can be obtained if we rest satisfied with
merely detecting and refuting it.
Every Question that can arise, is in fact a Question whether a
certain Predicate is or is not applicable to a certain Subject, or,
whnt Predicate is applicable ; '^ and whatever other account may be
given by any writer, of the nature of any matter of doubt or debate,
will be found ultimately to resolve itself into this. But sometimes
» See Chap. III. 5 2.
178 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
Difference tlie Questlon turns on the meaning and extent of the terms employed :
verbafand a Sometimes, on the things signified by them. If it be made to appear,
'^^^^ . therefore, that the opposite sides of a certain Question may be held
by persons not differing in their opinion of the matter in hand, then,
that question may be pronounced Verbal; as depending on the
different senses in which they respectively employ the terms. If,
on the contrary, it appears that they employ the Terms in the same
sense, but still differ as to the application of one of them to the
other, then it may be pronounced that the Question is real ; — that
they differ as to the opinions they hold of the things in Question.
If, for instance, (to recur to an example formerly given. Book
III. § 10.) two persons contend whether Augustus deserved to be
called a "great man," then, if it appeared that the one included,
under the term "great," disinterested ^aim^zsm, and on that ground
excluded Augustus from the class, as wanting in that quality ; and
that the other also gave him no credit for that quality, but under-
stood no more by the term " great," than high intellectual qualities,
energy of character, and brilliant actions, it would follow that the
parties did not differ in opinion except as to the use of a Term, and
that the Question was Verbal.
If, again, it appeared that the one did give Augustus credit for
such patriotism as the other denied him, both of them including that
idea in the term great, then, the Question would be Real. Either
kind of Question, it is plain, is to be argued according to Logical
principles; but i\\Q middle-terms employed would he different; and
for this reason, among others, it is important to distinguish Verbal
from Real controversy. In the former case, e.g. it might be urged
(with truth) that the common use of the expression "great and
good" proves that the idea of good is not implied in the ordinary
sense of the word great ; an argument which could have, of course,
no place in deciding the other Question.^
§2.
Verbal It is by no means to be supposed that all Verbal Questions are
SSkenfor trifling and frivolous. It is often of the highest importance to settle
Real. correctly the meaning of a word, either according to ordinary use,
or according to the meaning of any particular writer or class of men.
But when Verbal Questions are mistaken for Real, much confusion
of thought and unprofitable wrangling, — what is usually designated
Logomachy, as Logomachy — will be generally the result. Nor is it always so
easy and simple a task, as might at first sight appear, to distinguish
them from each other. For, several objects to which one common
name is applied, will often have many points of difference ; and yet
that name may perhaps be applied to them all [univocally] in the
same sense, and may be fairly regarded as the Genus they come
w See Book III. the latter part of § 10.
Chap. IV. § 2.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 179
under, if it appear that they all agree in what is designated by that
name, and that the differences between them are in points not
essential to the character of that genus. A cow and a horse differ
in many respects, but agree in all that is implied by the term
"quadruped," which is therefore applicable to both in the same
sense. ^ So also the houses of the ancients differed in many respects
from ours, and their ships still more ; yet no one would contend that
the terms " house " and " ship," as applied to both, are ambiguous,
or that oiKQs might not fairly be rendered house, and uavg ship;
because the essential characteristic of a house is, not its being of
this or that form or materials, but its being a dwelling for men ;
these therefore would be called two different kiiuls of houses ; and
consequently the term "house" Avould be applied to each, without
any equivocation, [univocally] in the same sense: and so in the
other instances.
On the other hand, two or more things may bear the same name,
and may also have a resemblance in many points, nay, and may
from that resemblance have come to bear the same name, and yet
if the circumstance which is essential to each be wanting in the
other, the term may be pronounced ambiguous. E.G. The word
" Plantain " is the name of a common herb in Europe, and of au
Indian fruit-tree : both are vegetables; yet the term is ambiguous,
because it does not denote them so far forth as they agree.
Again, the word "Priest" is applied to the Ministers of the
Jewish and of the Pagan religions, and also to those of the Chris-
tian ; and doubtless the term has been so transferred in consequence
of their being both ministers (in some sort) of religion. ^^ Nor
would every difference that might be found between the Priests of
different religions constitute the term ambiguous, provided such
differences were non-essential to the idea suggested by the word
Priest; as e.g. the Jewish Priest served the true God, and the
Pagan, false Gods ; this is a most important difference, but does
not constitute the term ambiguous, because neither of these cir-
cumstances is implied and suggested by tlie term 'Itoivg-, which
accordhigly was applied both to Jewish and Pagan Priests. But
the term 'liotvg does seem to have implied the office of offering
sacrifice, — atoning for the sins of the people, — and acting as
mediator between Man and the object of his worship. And accord-
ingly that term is' never applied to any one under the Christian
30 Yet the charge of equivocation is leadina: him by not expressly mentioning
sometimes unjustly brought against a the Species; saying, "I could not know
writer in consequence of a gratuitous that he meant Camels." Hedid?zo^mean
assumption of our own. An Eastern Camels, in particular; he meant, as he
writer, e.^. may be speaking of " beasts of said, "beasts of burden:" and Camels
burden;" and the reader may chance to are such, as well as Horees and Mules,
have the idea occur to his mind of Hoi-ses He is not accountable for your supposi-
and Mules ; he thence takes for granted tions.
that these were meant; and if it after- 3i See Discourse on "the Christian
wards come out that it was Camels, he Priesthood," appended to the Bampton
perhaps complains of the writer for mis- Lectures.
180 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
system, except to the ONE great Mediator. The Christian
ministers not having that office which was imphed as essential in
the term 'Is^sv;, [sacerdos] were never called bj that name, but by
that of 'TTQsa/ivrs^os.^^ It may be concluded, therefore, that the
term Priest is ambiguous, as corresponding to the terms 'U^svg and
-Tr^saiivrsQos respectively, notwithstanding that there are points in
which these two agree. These therefore should be reckoned, not
two different kinds of Priests, but Priests in two different senses;
since (to adopt the phraseology of Aristotle) the definition of them,
so far forth as they are Priests, would be different.
Real ^ A " real " question again is liable to be mistaken for a ** verbal,"
misuken for when different persons who are in fact using a term in the same
verbal sense, are supposed to be using it in different senses ; sometimes,
from its being erroneously taken for granted that what commonly
belongs to the thing spoken of must be implied in the common accep-
tation of the name of that thing : — as e.g. if any one should con-
clude, from the ordinary kinds of wood being lighter than water,
that the ordinary sense of the term " wood " implies floating in
water: sometimes again, from its being rashly inferred from two
persons having a difference of opinion respecting some thing, that
they each denote that opinion in their use respectively, of the term
which expresses that thing : as e.g. if two persons differing in opinion
as to the question of episcopacy, should be considered as differing
in their use of the word " Episcopalian," and implying by it, the
one a rigid and the other a wrong foim of Church-government ;
whereas the word itself does not express or imply [connote] either
the one or the other, but simply " an adherent to an episcopal form
of government. " They both mean the same thing; their difference
of opinion being, whether that thing be right or wrong.
Different And most especially is ambiguity likely to be erroneously attri-
ofaterm^do buted to some term, when different persons who employ it in reahty
ambiguity ^^ *^^^ Same sense, are accustomed to apply it differently, according
to circumstances, and thus to associate it habitually in their minds
with different things. U.G. " Patriotism " is apj^lied by each in
reference to his own country; but the word itself has the same
signification with each; just as the word "Father;" though it is
likely to recall to the mind of each a different individual. So also
the term *' true-believer," which is applied by Mahometans to a
believer in the Koran, would be considered by Christians as more
applicable to a believer in the Gospel ; but it would not be correct
to say that " the one party means by this term, so and so, and the
other, something different: " for they do not attach different senses
to the word " true," or to the word '* believe ; " they differ only in
their persuasions of what is true, and ought to be believed.
I have noticed some instances of the above kinds of mistake in
82 From which our word Priest is de- never translated " Priest " in our version
rived, but which (it is remarkable) is of the Scriptures, but "Elder."
Chap. IV. § 2.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 181
the Appendix to the third Series of Essays ; and also in the Intro-
duction to " Political Economy," from which I will here cite a
passage.
" In speaking of exchanges, I did not mean to limit myself to
voluntary exchanges ; — those in which the whole transaction takes
place with the full consent of hoth parties to all the terms of it.
Most exchanges, indeed, are of this character ; but the case of
taxation, — the revenue levied from the subject in return for the
protection afforded by the sovereign, constitutes a remarkable excep-
tion ; the payment being compulsory, and not adjusted by agreement
with the payer. Still, whether in any case it he fairly and reason-
ably adjusted, or the contrary, it is not the less an exchange. And
it is worth remarking, that it is just so far forth as it is an exchange,
— so far forth as protection, whether adequate or not, is afforded
in exchange for this payment, that the payment itself comes under
the cognizance of this science. There is nothing else that distin-
guishes taxation from avowed robbery.
** Though the generality of exchanges are voluntary, this cir-
cumstance is not essential to an exchange: since otherwise the
very expression * voluntary exchange, ' would be tautological and
improper. But it is a common logical error to suppose that what
usually belongs to the thing, is implied by the usual sense of the
word. Although most noblemen possess large estates, the word
* nobleman' does not imply the possession of a large estate. Although
most birds can fly, the ordinary use of the term * bird' does not
imply this ; since the penguin and the ostrich are always admitted
to be birds. And though, in a great majority of cases, wealth is
acquired by labour, the ordinary use of the word ' wealth' does not
include this circumstance, since every one would call a pearl an
article of wealth, even though a man should chance to meet with it
in eating an oyster."
It is evidently of much importance to keep in mind the above
distinctions, in order to avoid, on the one hand, stigmatizing, as
Verbal controversies, what in reality are not such, merely because
the Question turns (as every question must) on the applicability of a
certain Predicate to a certain Subject ; or, on the other hand, falling
into the opposite error of mistaking words for things, and judging
of men's agreement or disagreement in opinion in every case, merely
from their agreement or disagreement in the terms employed.
182
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Chap. Y .—Of Eealism.
Technical
sense of
Species
when
applied to
organized
£eing&
§1-
Nothing has a greater tendency to lead to the mistake just
noticed, and thus to produce undetected Verbal Questions and
fruitless Logomachy, than the prevalence of the notion of the
Realists,^ that Genus and Species are some real Things, existing
independently of our conceptions and expressions ; and that, as in
the case of Singular-terms, there is some real individual correspond-
ing to each, so, in Common-terms also, there is some Thing corre-
sponding to each ; which is the object of our thoughts when we
employ any such term.^
There is one circumstance which ought to be noticed, as having
probably contributed not a little to foster this error : I mean, the
peculiar technical sense of the word ** Species" when applied to
organized Beings.
It has been laid down in the course of this work, that when several
individuals are observed to resemble each other in some point, a
common name may be assigned to them indicating [implying, or
** connoting "^^] that point, — applying to all or any of them so far
forth as respects that common attribute, — and distinguishing them
from all others; as, e.g. the several individual buildings, which,
however different in other respects, agree in being constructed for
men's dwelling, are called by the common name of '* House:" and
it was added, that as we select at pleasure the circumstance that we
choose to abstract, we may thus refer the same Individual to any
one of several different Species, and again, the same Species, to one
Genus or to another, according as it suits our purpose ; whence it
seems plainly to follow that Genus and Species are no real things
existing independent of our thoughts, but are creatures of our own
minds.
Yet in the case of Species of organized Beings, it seems at first
sight as if this rule did not hold good ; but that the Species to which
each individual belongs, could not be in any degree arbitrarily fixed
S3 It is well known what a furious con-
troversy long existed in all the univer-
sities of Europe between the sects of the
Realists and the Nominalists ; the heat ot
which was allayed by the Reformation,
which withdrew men's attention to a.
more important question.
34 A doctrine commonly, buj; falsely
attributed to Aristotle, who expressly
contradicts it. He calls individuals
*' primary substances" (^Tparxt olateci) ;
Genus and Species " secondary," as not
denoting (t«^6 t/) a " really -existing
thing." Tl-i(r» Si o'j(ri(x, loxu rohi n a-r./xat'
itiiv, 'Esri i^iv ovv tuv tr^tiiTiuy tlaiSv u,v»iJi^
fter^YjTYiTiiv XXI ctXyfiU Itrnv, 'crt t«Si ti eryi/u,ef
hii' otn/^ov yot,o xeti i¥ oipiOjU-M to i'/iXevutvef
itrriv. 'E^i hi ruv hivripuv oiffiSJv, <1>AINETAI
f^iv ofjcoiut TtK erx*}/^ecTi r^i ^pecrviyepiocs roSt ri
e-rjju.ecivii)/, erctv ii^y;, cttdpaivoi, r, 'Cuov' OT
MHN TE AAH0E2- iXXa /axXXov HOION
TI (rr,fz,xini. X. r. X. Aristotle, Caleg. § 3.
See Appendix, Art. " Same." There is
however a continual danger of sliding
into Realism inadvertenUy, unless one is
continually on the watch against it: of
which Aristotle as well as many other
writers not deliberately holding the doc-
trine, furnish instances.
^ See 13ook II. Chap. V. § 1.
Chap. V. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 183
by us, but must be sometliing real, unalterable, and independent of
our thoughts. Caesar or Socrates, for instance, it may be said,
must belong — different as they may be — to the Species Man, and
can belong to no other ; and the like, with any individual Brute, or
Plant : e.g. a horned and a hornless sheep every naturalist would
regard as belonging to the same Species.
On the other hand, if any one utters such a proposition as " this
apple-tree is a codlin ;" — " this dog is a spaniel ;" — '* Argus was a
mastiff," to what head of Predicables would such a Predicate be
referred ? Surely our logical principles would lead us to answer,
that it is the ^loecies; since it could hardly be called an Accident,
and is manifestly no other Predicable. And yet every Naturalist
would at once pronounce that Mastiff is no distinct Species, but
only a variety of the Species Dog. This, however, does not satisfy
our inquiry as to the head of Predicables to which it is to be referred.
It should seem at first sight as if one needed, in the case of organized
Beings, an additional head of predicables to be called "Variety"
or **Race."
The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the consideration of
the peculiar technical sense [or *' second intention"] of the word
"Species" when applied to organized Beings: in which case it is specie^
always applied (when we are speaking strictly, as naturalists) to guished by
such individuals as are supposed to be descended from a common ^J^*^*^^^**
stock, or which might have so descended ; viz. which resemble one variety,
another (to use M. Cuvier's expression) as much as those of the
same stock do. Now this being a point on which all (not merely
Naturalists) are agreed, and since it is a fact, (whether an ascer- Questions of
tained fact or not) that certain individuals are, or are not, thus qu^esUons o/
connected, it follows, that every question whether a certain individual »rrange-
Animal or Plant belongs to a certain Species or not, is a question
not of mere arrangement, but of fact. But in the case of questions
respecting Genus, it is otherwise. If, e.g. two Naturalists differed,
in the one placing (as Linnasus) all the Species of Bee under one
Genus, which the other subdivided (as later writers have done) into
several genera, it would be evident that there was no question of
fact debated between them, and that it was only to be considered
which was the more convenient arrangement. If, on the other hand,
it were disputed whether the African and the Asiatic Elephant are
distinct Species, or merely Varieties, it would be equally manifest
that the question is one of fact ; since both would allow that if they
are descended (or might have descended) from the same stock, they
are of the same Species ; and if otherwise, of two : this is the fact,
which they endeavour to ascertain, by such indications as are to be
found.
For it is 'to be further observed, that this fact being one which
can seldom be directly known, the consequence is, that the marks by
which any Species of Animal or Plant is known, are not the very
]84
ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING.
[Book IV.
Mark by
•which a
Species is
known not
always the
DiU'erentia.
A-rbipuity
of the words
*' dame,'*
**Oiie."&c.
Differentia wliicli constitutes that Species. Now, in the case of
tiiiorganized Beings, these two coincide ; the marks by which a
Diamond, e.g. is distinguished from other minerals, heing the very
Differentia that constitutes the Species Diamond. And the same is
the case in the Genera even of organized Beings: the Linnsean
Genus "fehs," e.g. (when considered as a Species, i.e. as falhng
under some more comprehensive Class) is distinguished from others
under the same Order, by those very marks which constitute its
Differentia. But in the *' Infimse Species" (according to the view
of a Naturalist) of plants and animals, this, as has been said, is not
the case ; since here the Differentia which constitutes each Species
includes in it a circumstance which cannot often be directly ascer-
tained [viz. the being sprung from the same stock), but which we
conjecture, from certain circumstances of resemblance ; so that the
marks by which a Species is known, are not in truth the whole of
the Differentia itself, but indications of the existence of that
Differentia ; viz. indications of descent from a common stock.
There are a few, and but a few, other Species to which the same
observations will in a great degree apply: I mean in which the
Differentia which constitutes the Species, and the marh by which the
Species is known, are not the same : e.g. " Murder:" the Differentia
of which is that it be committed "with malice aforethought;" this
cannot be directly ascertained ; and therefore we distinguish murder
from any other homicide by circumstances of preparation, &c.,
which are not in reality the Differentia, but indications of the
Differentia ; i.e. grounds for concluding that the malice did exist.
Hence it is that Species, in the case of organized Beings, and also
in a few other cases, have the appearance of being some real things,
independent of our thoughts and language. And hence, naturally
enough, the same notions have been often extended to the Genera
also, and to Species of other things: so that men have a notion that
each individual of every description truly belongs to some one Species
and no other : and each Species, in like manner, to some one Genus ;
whether we happen to be right or not in the ones to which we refer
them.
Few, if any indeed, in the present day avow and maintain this
doctrine: but those who are not especially on their guard, are
perpetually sliding into it unawares.
Nothing so much conduces to the error of Realism as the trans-
ferred and secondary use of the words **same,"^^ "one and the
same," "identical," &c. when it is not clearly perceived and care-
fully borne in mind, that they are employed in a secondary sense,
and that, more frequently even than in the primary.
Suppose e.g. a thousand persons are thinking of the Sun: it is
evident it is one and the same individual object on whith all these
so See Appendix, No. I. Art. " Same."
Chap. V. § 1.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 185
minds are employed. So far all is clear. But suppose all these
persons are thinking of a Triangle ;— not any individual triangle, but
Triangle in general ; — and considering, perhaps, the equality of ita
angles to two right angles : it would seem as if, in this case also,
their minds were all employed on " one and the same" object: and
this object of their thoughts, it may be said, cannot be the mere
word Triangle, but that which is meant by it : nor again, can it be
every thing that the word will apply to : for they are not thinking
of triangles, but of one thing. Those who do not maintain that this
*' one thing" has an existence independent of the human mind, are
in general content to tell us, by way of explanation, that the object
of their thoughts is the abstract " idea" of a triangle f an explana-
tion which satisfies, or at least silences many ; though it may be
doubted whether they very clearly understand what sort of a thing an
" idea" is; which may thus exist in a thousand different minds at
once, and yet be *' one and the same.*'
The fact is, that " unity" and " sameness" are in such cases
employed, not in the primary sense, but, to denote perfect similarity.
When we say that ten thousand different persons have all '* one and
the same" Idea in their minds, or, are all of " one and the same"
Opinion, we mean no more than that they are all thinking exactly
alike. When we say that they are all in the ** same" posture, we
mean that they are iiM placed alike: and so also they are said all
to have the " same" disease, when they are all diseased alike.
One instance of the confusion of thought and endless logomachy Logomachy
which may spring from inattention to this ambiguity of the words from this
*' same," (fcc. is afforded by the controversy arising out of a sermon aJ^biguity.
of Dr. King (Archbishop of Dublin), published about a century ago.
He remarked (without expressing himself perhaps with so much
guarded precision as the vehemence of his opponents rendered
needful) that " the attributes of the Deity [mz. Wisdom, Justice,
kc.) are not to be regarded as the same with those human qualities
which bear the same names, but are called so by resemblance and
analogy only." For this he was decried hy Bishop Berkeley and a
host of other objectors, down to the present time, as an Atheist, or
little better. *' If the divine attributes," they urged, "are not
precisely the same in kind (though superior in degree) with the
human qualities which bear the same name, w^e cannot imitate the
Deity as the Scriptures require ; — we cannot know on what prin-
ciples we shall be judged: — we cannot be sure that God exists at
all;" with a great deal more to the same purpose; all of which
would have been perceived to be perfectly idle, had the authors but
recollected to ascertain the meaning of the principal word employed.
For, 1st, when any two persons (or other objects) are said to
have the ** same'' quality, accident, &c. what we predicate of them
37 Conceptualists is a name sometimes tion (if it can be called an explanation);
applied to those who adopt this explana- to which class Locke is referred.
186 ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. [Book IV.
Sameness is evidently a certain resemblance, and nothing else. One man e.g.
res" nfbiance does not feel another s sickness ; but they are said to have the
aiid analogy, a same" disease, (not in the sense in which two men may he killed
by the same cannon-ball, but) if they are precisely similar in respect
of their ailments : and so also they are said to have the same com-
plexion, if the hue and texture of their skins be alike. 2dly, Such
qualities as are entirely relative, which consist in the relation borne
by the subject to certain other things, — in these, it is manifest, the
only resemblance that can exist, is, resemblance of relations, i.e.
ANALOGY. Courage, e.g. consists in the relation in which one
stands^ towards dangers ; Temperance or Intemperance, — towards
bodily pleasures, &c. When it is said, therefore, of two courageous
men, that they have both the same quality, the only meaning this
expression can have, is, that they are, so far, completely analogous
in their characters ; — having similar ratios to certain similar objects.
In short, as in all qualities, sameness can mean only strict resem-
blance, so, in those which are of a relative nature, resemblance can
mean only analogy. Thus it appears, that Avhat Dr. King has been
flo vehemently censured for asserting respecting the Deity, is literally
true even with respect to men themselves ; viz. that it is only by
Analogy that two persons can be said to possess the same virtue, or
other such quality. 3dly, But what he means, is, plainly, that this
analogy is far less exact and complete in the case of a comparison
between the Deity and his creatures than between one man and
another ; which surely no one would venture to deny. But the
doctrine against which the attacks have been directed, is self-evi-
dent, the moment we consider the meaning of the term employed.^^ •
In the Introduction and Notes to the last edition of Archbishop ■■
King's Discourse, I have considered the matters in debate more
fully; but this slight notice of them has been introduced in this
place, as closely connected with the present subject.
§2.
Origin The Origin of this secondary sense of the words, " same," ** one,"
ambiguity ** identical," (fee. (an attention to which would clear away an incalcu-
ot^'same," lable mass of confused Reasoning and Logomachy,) is easily to be
traced to the use of Language and of other signs, for the purposes of
reasoning and of mutual communication. If any one utters the " one
single" word "triangle," and gives "one single" definition of it,
each of the persons who hears him forms a certain notion in his own
mind, not differing in any respect from that of each of the rest.
They are said therefore to have all "one and the same" notion,
because, resulting from, and corresponding with, (that which is, in
the primary sense) "one and the same" expression; and there is
38 Ey tS ixttv irus rpii, Arist. ' principles, in the Notes to his " Four
^ See J)r. Copleston's excellent Ana- Discourses."
lysis and Defence of Archbishop King's
Chap. V. § 2.] ON THE PROVINCE OF REASONING. 187
said to be " one single" idea of every triangle (considered merely as
a triangle) because one single name or definition is equally applicable
to each. In like manner, all the coins struck by tiie same single
die, are said to have *'one and the same" impression, merely
because the (numerically) "one" description which suits one of
these coins will equally suit any other that is exactly like it. The
expression accordingly which has only of late begun to prevail,
*' such and such things are of the same description,'' is perhaps the
most philosophical that can be employed.
It is not intended to recommend the disuse of the words ** same,"
*' identical," (kc. in this transferred sense; which, if it were
desirable, w^ould be utterly impracticable; but merely, a steady
attention to the ambiguity thus introduced, and watchfulness against
the errors thence arising. " It is with words as with inoney.
Those who know the value of it best are not therefore the least
liberal. We may lend readily and largely ; and though this be
done quietly and without ostentation, there is no harm in keeping
an exact account in our private memorandum-book of the sums, the
persons, and the occasions on which they were lent. It may be,
we shall want them again for our own use ; or they may be employed
by the borrower for a wrong purpose ; or they may have been so
long in his possession that he begins to look upon them as his
own. In either of which cases it is allowable, and even right, to
call them in."*^
The difficulties and perplexities which have involved the questions
respecting personal-identity, among others, may be traced principally
to the neglect of this caution. I mean that many waiters have
sought an explanation of the primary sense of identity [viz. personal)
by looking to the secondary. Any grown man, e.g. is, in the primary
sense the same person he was when a child : this sameness is, I
conceive, a simple notion, which it is vain to attempt explaining by
any other more simple ; but when philosophers seek to gain a clearer
notion of it by looking to the cases in which sameness is predicated
in another sense, viz. similarity, such as exists between several
individuals denoted by a common name, (as when we say that there
are growing on Lebanon some of the same trees with which the
Temple was built ; meaning, cedars of that species) this is surely as
idle as if we were to attempt explaining the primary sense, e.g. of
"rage" as it exists in the human mind, by directing our attention
to the " rage" of the sea. Whatever personal identity does consist
in, it is plain that it has no necessary connexion w^ith similarity ;
since every one would be ready to say, " When I WAS a child I
thought as a child, — I spake as a child, — I understood as a child ;
but when I became a man, I put away childish things."
But a full consideration of this question would be unsuitable to
tlie subject of the present work.
40 " Logic Vindicated." Oxford, 1809.
APPENDIX.
APPENDIX.
No. I.
ON CERTAIN TERMS WHICH ARE PECULIARLY LIABLE TO BE
USED AMBIGUOUSLY.
LIST OF WORDS EXPLAINED IN THE FOLLOWING APPENDIX,
Identical. — Sec One,
xxvii,
. Sincerity,
8ame.
Sincere.
xi. Impossibility,
xii. Indifference.
xxviii,
. Tendency.
Therefore,-
xiii. Law.
See Why.
xiv. May.
xxix,
. Truth.
XV. Necessary.
XXX
. Why.
xvi. Old.
A\ hence.
xvii. One.
See Why.
xviii. Pay.
xix. Person.
Value.
XX. Possible.
AVealth.
xxi. Preach.
Labour.
xxii. Priest.
Capital.
xxiii. Reason,
Rent.
xxiv. Rej?eneratio£i.
Wajres.
XXV. Same.
Protits.
xxvi. Sin.
i. Argument.
ii. Authority.
Can.— 5'ee May, Mtist.
Capable. — See Possi-
ble, Impossible,
Necessary,
iii. Case.
Cause.— .See Reason,
Why.
iv. Certain.
V. Church,
vi. Election,
vii. Expect. ^
riii. Experience. A
Falsehood.— -See Truth.
ix. God.
X. Gospel.
Hence.— .S'ee Reason,
Why.
It has appeared to me desirable to illustrate the importance of
attending to the ambiguity of terms, by a greater number of
instances than could have been com-eniently either inserted in the
context or introduced in a note, without too much interrupting the
course of the dissertation on Fallacies.
I have purposely selected instances from various subjects, and
some, from the most important ; being convinced that the disregard
and contempt with which logical studies are usually treated, may
be traced, in part, to a notion, that the science is incapable of use-
ful application to any matters of real importance, and is merely
calculated to afford an exercise of ingenuity on insignificant
truisms; — syllogisms to prove that a horse is an animal, and dis-
tinctions of the different senses of ** canis " or of " gallus ; " — a
mistake which is likely to derive some countenance (however un-
fairly) from the exclusive employment of such trifling exemplifications.
The words and phrases which may be employed as ambiguous
Middle-terms are of course imiamerable : but it may be, in several
P
192 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Afp.I.
respects, of service to tlie learner, to explain the ambiguity of a few
of those most frequently occurring in the most important discussions,
and whose double meaning has been the most frequently overlooked ;
and this, not by enterino; into an examination of oil the senses in
which each term is ever employed, but of those only which are the
most liable to be confounded together.
It is worth observing, that the words whose ambiguity is the
most frequently overlooked, and is productive of the greatest
amount of confusion of thought and fallacy, are among the com-
monest, and are those of whose meaning the generality consider
there is the least room to doubt. ^ It is indeed from those very
circumstances that the danger arises ; words in very common use
are both the most liable, from the looseness of ordinary discourse,
to slide from one sense into another, and also the least likely to
have that ambiguity suspected. Familiar acquairdance is per-
petually mistaken for accurate knowledge.^
It may be necessary here to remark, that inaccuracy not unfre-
quently occurs in the employment of the very phrase, " such an
author uses such a word in this, or that sense," or ''means so and
so, by this word." We should not use these expressions (as some
have inadvertently done) in reference, necessarily, to the notion
which may exist, in the author's mind, of the object in question ; —
his belief or opinion respecting the thing he is speaking of; — for the
notions conveyed to others by the word, may often (even according
to the writer's own expectation) fall short of this. He may be
convinced, e.g. that " the moon has no atmospl^re," or that " the
Spartans were brave;" but he cannot suppose that the terms
*' moon " or "Spartan" imply [connote] any such thing.^ xSior
again, should we regard the sense in which they understand him, as
necessarily his sense, (though it is theirs) of the word employed ;
since they may mistake his meaning: but we must consider what
sense it is likely he ex]Dected and intended to convey, to those to
whom he addressed himself. And a judicious writer will always
expect each word to be understood, as nearly as the context
will allow, in the sense, or in one of the senses, which use has
established; except so far as he may have given some different
explanation. But there are many who, from various causes, fre-
quently fail of conveying the sense they design. And it may be
added, that there are, it is to be feared, some persons in these days
who design to convey different senses by the same expression, to
different men ; — to the ordinary reader, and to the initiated ; —
reserving to themselves a back-door for evasion when charged with
any false teaching, by pleading that they have been misunderstood
** in consequence of the reader's not being aware of the peculiar
sense in which they use words!"
1 See Book Tir. § 10. s See Note to last Essay, 3d Series; an4»
« See Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. also 13ook IV. Ch. IV. i'Z.
Apr. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 193
It is but fair perliaps to add this warning to my readers ; tliat one
\^'lio takes pains to ascertain and explain the sense of the words
employed in any discussion, whatever care he may use to show that
what he is inquiring after, is, the received sense, is yet almost sure
to he charged, by the inaccurate, and the sophistical, with attempt-
ing to introduce some new sense of the words in question, in order
to serve a purpose.
i. ARGUMENT, in the strict logical sense, has been defined in Argument
the foregoing treatise ; (Compendium, Book II. Ch. III. § 1:) in
that sense it includes (as is there remarked) the Conclusion as well
iis the Premises : and thus it is, that we say a Syllogism consists of
'hree propositions ; viz. the Conclusion which is proved, as well as
those by which it is proved. Argumentum is also used by many
logical writers to denote the middle term.
But in ordinary discourse. Argument is very often used for the
Premises alone, in contradistinction to the Conclusion; e.g. "the
Conclusion which this Argument is intended to establish is so and
30."
It is also sometimes employed to denote what is, strictly speaking,
a, course or series of such arguments ; when a certain Conclusion is
3stabUshed by Premises, which are themselves, in the same disser-
tation, proved by other propositions, and perhaps those again, by
others ; the whole of this dissertation is often called an Argument
to prove the ultimate conclusion designed to be established ; though
in fact it is a train of Arguments. It is in this sense, e.g. that we
5peak of " Warburton's Argument to prove the divine legation of
^Ioses," <fec.
Sometimes also the word is used to denote what may be properly
called a Disputation; i.e. tico trains of Argument, opposed to each
other : as when we say that A and B had a long Argument on such
and such a subject; and that A had the best of the Argument.
Doubtless the use of the word in this sense has contributed to foster
the notion entertained by many, that Logic is the "art of wrang-
ling," that it makes men contentious, kc: they have heard that
it is employed about Arguments; and hastily conclude that it is
confined to cases where there is oi^positlon and contest.
It may be worth mentioning in this place, that the various forms
if stating an Argument are sometimes spoken of as difereiit kinds
)f Argument: as when we speak of a Categorical or Hypothetical
?lrgument, or of one in the first or some other figure; though
ivery logician knows that the same individual Argument may be
tated in various figures, <fec.
This, no doubt, has contributed to the error of those who speak of
he Syllogism as a pecuhar kind of Argument; and of "Syllogistic
leasoning," as a distinct mode of Reasoning, instead of being only
. certain ybrm of expressing any argument.
194 AMBIGUOUS TEKMIS. lApi'. i
Argument For an account of the different hinds of argument, properly s(
called, the reader is referred to the *' Elements of Rhetoric."
Authority. ii. AUTHORITY. — This word is sometimes employed In iti
primary sense, when we refer to any one's example, testimony, o]
judgment: as when, e.g. we speak of correcting a reading in som(
book, on the Authority of an ancient MS. — giving a statement o
some fact, on the Authority of such and such historians, &c.
In this sense the word ans^^ers pretty nearly to the Latir
** Auctoritas." It is a claim to deference.
Sometimes again it is employed as equivalent to "Potestas,'
Power: as when we speak of the Authority of a Magistrate, &c
This is a claim to obedience. It is in the former sense that it is usee
in our 20th Article ; which speaks of the Church having power tc
decree rites and ceremonies, and *' authority" in controversies o:
Faith.
Many instances may be found in which writers have unconsciously
slid from one sense of the word to another, so as to blend confusedly
in their minds the two ideas. In no case perhaps has this more
frequently happened than when we are speaking of the Authority
of the Church : in which the ambiguity of the latter word (see the
Article Church) comes in aid of that of the former. The Authority)
(in the primary sense) of the CathoHc, i.e. Universal Church, at an3
particular period, is often appealed to, in support of this or thai
doctrine or practice: and it is, justly, supposed that the opinion o:
the great mass of the Christian World affords ^presumption (thougl:
only a presumption) in favour of the correctness of any interpretatior
of Scripture, or the expediency, at the time, of any ceremony, regu-
lation, &c.
But it is to be observed that the *' authority," in this sense, oi
any Church or other Commmunit}^, is not that of the Body, as such,
but of the individuals composing it. The presumption raised is tc
be measured by the numbers, knowledge, judgment, and honesty ol
those individuals, considered as individual persons, and not in theii
corporate capacity.
On the other hand, each particular Church has Authority in the
other sense, viz. Power, over its own members, (as long as thej
choose to remain members) to enforce any thing not contrary tc
God's word.* But the Catholic or Universal Church, not being one
religious Community on earth, can have no *' authority" in the sense
of Power; since it is notorious there never was a time when the
power of the Pope, of a Council, or of any other human Governors,
over all Christians, was in fact admitted, whatever arguments may
be urged to prove its claim to be admitted.
Authority again in the sense of Auctoritas (claim to deference]
* See Essay on the Dangers to Christian Faith, &c. Note A.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 195
may have every degree of weiglit, from absolute infallibility, (sueli Authority.
as, in religious matters, Cliristians attribute to the Scriptures) down
to the faintest presumption. On the other hand, " authority" in the
sense of " legitimate jpoiver' does not admit of degrees. One person
may indeed possess a greater extent of power than another : but in
each particular instance, he either has a rightful claim to obedience
or he has none. See Hawkins on Tradition. Hinds's History of
the Early Progress of Christianity, Vol. II. p. 99. Hinds on Inspb^
ration. Errors of Bomanism, Chap. IV. Essay on the Omission of
Creeds, (tc. in the New Testament. And Essay II. on the Kingdom
of Christ.
QA-^.—See " May," «* Must." Can.
CAPABLE. — See "Possible," ** Impossible," and ** Neces- capable
SARY."
iii. CASE. — Sometimes Grammarians use this word to signify Case,
(which is its strict sense) a certain "variation in the writing and
utterance of a Noun, denoting the relation in which it stands to some
other part of the sentence ;" sometimes to denote that relation itself:
whether indicated by tke termination, or by a preposition, or by its
collocation ; and there is hardly any writer on the subject who does
not occasionally employ the term in each sense, without explaining
the ambiguity. Much confusion and frivolous debate has hence
resulted. Whoever would see a specimen of this, may find it in the
Port Royal Greek Grammar ; in which the Authors insist on giving
the Greek language an Ablative case, with the same termination,
however, as the Dative: (though, by the way, they had better have
fixed on the Genitive; which oftener answers to the Latin Ablative)
urging, and with great truth, that if a distinct termination be
necessary to constitute a case, many Latin Nouns will be without
an Ablative, some without a Genitive or without a Dative, and all
Neuters without an Accusative. And they add, that since it is
possible, in every instance, to render into Greek the Latin Ablative,
consequently there must be an Ablative in Greek.^ If they had
known and recollected that in the language of Lapland, there are,
as we are told, thirteen Cases, they would have hesitated to use an
argument which would prove that there must therefore be thirteen
Cases in Greek and Latin also ! All this confusion might have been
avoided, if it had but been observed that the word "Case" is used
in two senses. See Book III. § 10. §§ 4.
CAUSE.— /See " Reason," and " Why." , Caaa*
5 It is in the same way that some of the Moods into three ; Subjunctive, Potential,
Latin- Grammarians have made one of the and Optative.
106
AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
[Apf. I.
Certain. iv. CERTAIN". — This is a word whose ambiguity, together with
that of many others of kindred signification (as "may," "can,"
"must," "possible," &c.) has occasioned infinite perplexity in
discussions on some of the most important subjects ; such as the
freedom of human actions, the divine foreknowledge, &c.
In its primary sense, it is applied (according to its etymology from
cerno) to the state of a person's mind ; denoting any one's full and
complete conviction; and, generally, though not always, implying
that there is sufiicient ground for such conviction. It was thence
easily transferred metonymically to the truths or events, respecting
which this conviction is rationally entertained. And " Uncertain"
(as well as the substantives and adverbs derived from these adjec-
tives) follows the same rule. Thus we say, "it is certain that a
battle has been fought:" "it is certain that the moon will be full
on such a day:" "it is uncertain whether such a one is alive or
dead:" "it is uncertain whether it will rain to-morroAv:" meaning,
in these and in all other cases, that we are certain or uncertain
respectively ; not indicating any difierence in the character of the
events themselves, except in reference to our knowledge respecting
them ; for the same thing may be, at the same time, both certain
and uncertain, to different individuals ; e.g. the life or death at a
particular time, of any one, is certain to his friends on the spot ;
uncertain or contingent, to those at a distance.
From not attending to this circumstance, the words "uncertain"
and " contingent " (which is employed nearly in the same sense as
uncertain in its secondary meaning) have been considered by many
writers^ as denoting some quality in the things themselves; and
have thus become involved in endless confusion. " Contingent" is
indeed applied to events only, not to persons: but it denotes no
quality in the events themselves ; only, as has been said, the rela-
tion in which they stand to a person who has no complete knowledge
respecting them. It is from overlooking this principle, obvious as
it is when once distinctly stated, that Chance or Fortune has come
to be regarded as a real agent, and to have been, by the ancients,
personified as a Goddess, and represented by statues.
Church. V. CHURCH is sometimes employed to signify the Church, i.e,
the Universal or Catholic Church, — comprehending in it all Chris-
tians ; who are " Members one of another," and who compose the
« Among others, Archbishop King, in
his Discourse on Predestination, has
ialien into tliis error ; as is explained in
the Notes and the Appendix to my edition
of that work.
It may be requisite to mention m this
place, that I have been represented as
coinciding with him as to tlie point in
question, in a note to Mr. Davision's
work on Propliecy; through a misjtake,
which the author candidly acknowledged,
and promised to rectify. His mistake
arose trom his having (as he himself in-
formed me) spoken from conjecture only,
without having read my publication.
Unfortunately the error was allowed to
remain uncorrected tor several years after
it had been pointed out: in tact, till the
Avhole of the edition containing the mis-
statement had been sold oS,
Apf. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 197
Body, of wlilch Christ is the Head ; which, collectively taken, has cimrfth
no visible supreme Head or earthly governor, either individual, or
council; and which is one, only in reference to its One invisible
Governor and Paraclete, the Spirit of Christ, dwelling in It, — to the
one common faith and character, which ought to be found In all
Christians, — and the common principles on which all Christian
societies should be constituted. See Hinds's History of the Rise of
Christianity, and Bernard's Church and Synagogue, an abridged
translation from Vitringa.
Sometimes again it is employed to signify a Church ; i.e. any one
Society, constituted on these general principles ; having governors
on earth, and existing as a Community possessing a certain power
over its own members ; in which sense we read of the '* Seven
Churches in Asia," — of Paul's having "the care of all the Churches,"
&c. To apply to some one of these communities, from its being
confessedly a Church, all that is said, in Scripture or elsewhere, of
the Church-universal [or Catholic] is a fallacy, which, though very
glaring, has misled many. (See the Art. Truth; and also Essay
11. on the " Kingdom of Christ.'')
Moreover, the word "Church" (like several others denoting
Communities) sometimes denotes the Body itself, as such, and some-
times the individual members of it, as individuals. This distinction,
which is an important one, has been noticed above, under the Art.
Authority.
The " Church" is also sometimes used to denote the Clergy, as
distinguished from the Laity; as, when we speak of any one's being
educated for the Church, meaning, "for the Ministry." Some
would perhaps add, that it is in this sense we speak of the endow-
ments of the Church ; since the immediate emolument of these is
received by clergymen. But if it be considered that they receive it
in the capacity of 2^uhlic instructors and spiritual Pastors, these
endowments may fairly be regarded as belonging, in a certain sense,
to the whole Body, for whose benefit they are, in this way, calculated ;
in the same manner as we consider, e.g. the endowment of a pro-
fessorship in a university, as a benefaction, not to the professors
alone, but to the university at large.
vi. ELECTION. — This is one of the terms which is often to all Election,
practical purposes ambiguous, when not employed, strictly speaking,
in two different senses, but with different applications, according to
that which is understood in conjunction with it. See Book III.
§ 10. See also Essays on some of tJie DiMculties, &;c. Essay III.
"On Election."
vii. EXPECT. — This word is liable to an ambiguity, which may Expect.
sometimes lead, in conjunction with other causes, to a practical bad
effect. It is sometimes used in the sense of " anticipate" — " calcu-
198 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. LApp. I.
Expect, late on," Sac. (Ix-jr/^^-y) in short "consider &s probable;'^ sometimes
for ** require or demand as reasonable," — "consider as right,"
Thus, I may fairly *' expect" (a|/S) that one who has received
kindness from me, should protect me in distress ; yet I may have
reason to expect {iT^'Tri^nv) that he will not. *' England expects
every man to do his duty;" but it would be chimerical to expect,
i.e. anticipate, a universal performance of duty. Hence, when men
of great revenues, whether civil or ecclesiastical, live in the splendour
and sensuality of Sardanapalus, they are apt to plead that this is
expected of them; which may be perhaps sometimes true, in the
sense that such conduct is anticipated as probable ; not true, as
implying that it is required or approved. Thus also, because it
would be romantic to expect {i.e. calculate upon) in public men a
primary attention to the public good, or in men in general an
adherence to the rule of doing as you would be done by, m^mj are
apt to flatter themselves that they cannot reasonably be expected
{i.e. fairly called upon) to act on such principles. What may
reasonably be expected (in one sense of the word) must be, precisely
the practice of the majority ; since it is the majority of instances
that constitutes |9ro6(x6^7^^?/.• what may reasonably be expected (in
the other sense) is something much beyond the practice of the
generality; as long at least as it shall be true that " narrow is the
way that leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it."
Experience. viii. EXPERIENCE.^ — This word, in its strict sense, applies
to what has occurred within a person's own knowledge. Experience,
in this sense, of course, relates to the past alone. Thus it is that a
man knows by Experience what sufferings he has undergone in
some disease ; or, what height the tide reached at a certain time
and place.
More frequently the word is used to denote that Judgment which
is derived from Experience in the primary sense, by reasoning from
that, in combination with other data. Thus, a man may assert, on
the ground of experience, that he was cured of a disorder by such
a medicine — that that medicine is, generally, beneficial in that
disorder; that the tide may always be expected, under such cir-
cumstances, to rise to such a height. Strictly speaking, none of
these can be known hy Experience, but are conclusions derived
from Experience. It is in this sense only that Experience can
be applied to the future, or, which comes to the same thing, to
any general fact ; as e.g. when it is said that we know by Experience
that water exposed to a certain temperature will freeze.
** Men are so formed as (often unconsciously) to reason, whether
well or ill, on the phenomena they observe, and to mix up their
I See Elements of Rhetoric, Book I.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 199
inferences witli tlieir statements of those phenomena, so as in fact Experieno^
to theorize (however scantily and crudely) without knowing it.
If you will he at the pains carefully to analyze the simplest descrip-
tions you hear of any transaction or state of things, you will find,
that the process which almost invariably takes place is, in logical
language, this ; that each individual has in his mind certain major-
premises or principles, relative to the subject in question; that
observation of what actually presents itself to the senses, supplies
minor-'premises ; and that the statement given (and which is reported
as a thing experienced) consists in fact of the condu&lons drawn
from the combinations of those premises.
" Hence it is that several different men, who have all had equal,
or even the very same, experience, i.e. have been witnesses or agents
in the same transactions, will often be found to resemble so many
different men looking at the same book: one perhaps, though he
distinctly sees black marks on white paper, has never learned his
letters ; another can read, but is a stranger to the language in which
the book is written ; another has an acquaintance with the language,
but understands it imperfectly ; another is familiar with the lan-
guage, but is a stranger to the subject of the book, and wants power,
or previous instruction to enable him fully to take in the author's
drift; while another again perfectly comprehends the whole.
"The object that strikes the eye is to all of those persons the
same ; the difference of the impressions produced on the mind ot
each is referable to the differences in their minds.
*' And this explains the fact, that we find so much discrepancy in
the results of what are called Experience and Common-sense, as
contra-distinguished from theory. In former times men knew by
experience, that the earth stands still, and the sun rises and sets.
Common-sense taught them that there could be no antipodes, since
men could not stand with their heads downwards, like flies on the
ceiling. Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could
not become solid. And (to come to the consideration of himian
affairs) the experience and common-sense of one of the most obser-
vant and intelligent of historians, Tacitus, convinced him, that for a
mixed government to be so framed, as to combine the elements of
Royalty, Aristocracy, and Democracy, must be next to impossible,
and that if such a one could be framed, it must inevitably be very
speedily dissolved."*
There are again two different applications of the word {see Book
III. § 10), which, when not carefully distinguished, lead in practice
to the same confusion as the employment of it in two senses ; "jiz.
we sometimes understand our own personal Experience ; sometimes,
general Experience. Hume has availed himself of this (practical)
ambiguity, in his Essay on Miracles; in which he observes, that wo
• Pol. Econ. Lect. III.
^00' AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. L
Experience, have Experience of the frequent falsity of Testimony, but that the
occurrence of a Miracle is contrary to our Experience, and is conse-
quently what no testimony ought to be allowed to" estabhsh. Now
had he explained wliose Experience he meant, the argument would
have come to nothing: if he means, the Experience of mankind
universally, i.e. that a Miracle has never come, under the Experience
of any one, this is palpably begging the question : if he means the
Experience of each individual who has never himself w^itnessed a
Miracle, this would establish a rule [viz. that we are to believe
nothing of which we have not ourselves experienced the like) which
it would argue insanity to act upon. Not only w^as the King of
Bantam justified (as Hume himself admits) in listening to no evidence
for the existence of Ice, but no one would he authorized on this
piinciple to expect his own death. His Experience informs him,
directly, only that others have died. Every disease under which he
kim,self may have laboured, his Experience must have told him has
not terminated fatally ; if he is to judge strictly of the future by the
past, according to this rule, what should hinder him from expecting
the like of all future diseases ?
Some have never been struck with this consequence of Hume's
principles ; and some have even failed to perceive it when pointed
out : but if the reader thinks it worth his while to consult the author,
he will see that his principles, according to his own account of them,
are such as I have stated.
Perhaps however he meant, if indeed he had any distinct meanings
something intermediate between universal and individual experi-
ence ; viz. the Experience of the generality, as to what is common
and of ordinary occurrence ; in which sense the maxim will only
amount to this, that false Testimony is a thing of common occur-
rence, and that Miracles are not. An obvious truth, indeed; but
too general to authorize, of itself, a conclusion in any particular case.
In any other individual question, as to the admissibility of evidence,
it would be reckoned absurd to consider merely the average chances
for the truth of Testimony in the abstract, without inquiring ivhat the
Testimony is, in the particidar instance before us. As if, e.g. any
one had maintained that no testimony could establish Columbus's
accomit of the discovery of America, because it is more common
for travellers to lie, than for new Continents to be discovered.*
Such a procedure involves a manifest ignoratio elenchi ; the two
propositions brought forward as opposed, being by no means incom-
patible: Experience tells us that "a destructive hurricane is not
a common occurrence:" certain persons tell us that "a destructive
hurricane occurred in the West Indies, at such a time;" there is
(as Dr. Campbell has pointed out) no opposition between these two
assertions,
9 See *' Historic Doul^ts relative to Napbleon Buonaparte.*'
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 201
It is to be observed by the way, tbat there is yet an additional Experienoc
ambiguity in the eiUire jihrase "contrary to experience;" in one
sense, a miracle, or any other event, may be called contrary to the
experience of any one who has never witnessed the like ; as the
freezing of water was to that of the King of Bantam ; in another
and stricter sense, that only is contrary to a man's experience, which
he knows by experience not to be true ; as if one should be told of
an infallible remedy for some disorder, he having seen it administered
without eifect. No testimony can establish what is, in this latter
sense, contrary to experience. We need not wonder that ordinary
minds should be bewildered by a sophistical employment of such a
mass of ambiguities.
Such reasonings as these are accounted ingenious and profound,
on account of the subject on which they are employed ; if applied to
the ordinary affairs of life, they would be deemed unworthy of
serious notice.
The reader is not to suppose that the refutation of Hume's Essay
on Miracles was my object in this Article. That might have been
sufficiently accomplished, in the way of a "reductio ad absurdum,"
by mere reference to the case of the King of Bantam adduced by
the author himself. But this celebrated Essay, though it has often
perhaps contributed to the amusement of an anti-christian sophist at
the expense of those unable to expose its fallacy, never probably
made one convert. The author himself seems plainly to have meant
it as a specimen of his ingenuity in arguing on a given hypothesis ;
for he disputes against miracles as contrary to the Course of Nature ;
whereas, according to him, there is no such thing as a Course of
Nature ; his scepticism extends to the whole external world ; — to
every thing, except the ideas or impressions on the mind of the
individual ; so that a miracle which is believed, has, in that circum-
stance alone, on his principles, as much reality as any thing can have.
But my object has been to point out, by the use of this example,
the fallacies and blunders which may result from inattention to the
ambiguity of the word Experience: and this cannot be done by a
mere indirect argument ; which refutes indeed, but does not explain,
an error.
FALSEHOOD and FALSITY.— /See " Truth." Falsehood.
Falsity.
ix. GOD. — The Greek and Latin words which we translate God.
** God" having been applied by the Heathen to the highest objects
of their ivorship, were, naturally, employed by Jews and Christians
to denote the object of their oion worship. But the Heathen were
far from regarding any of these supposed Beings as eternal, or as
the Maker and Governor of the Universe. They regarded them as
the same kind of Beings with the Fairies, Demons, Nixes, Bogles,
Genii, &lc., which in various parts of the world are still feared, and
202 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
GotU in some places propitiated by offerings and other marks of reverence ;
and which in fact are the very Gods (though no longer called by that
title) which our Pagan forefathers worshipped ; and a superstitious
dread of which survived the introduction of the belief in a supreme
Creator. But Christians and also Mahometans (whose creed Is a
corrupted offset of Christianity) imply [connote] by the term *' God"
the supreme Author and Governor of the Universe : as is plain from
this ; that any one who should deny the existence of any such Being,
w^ould be universally considered as an Atheist; i.e. as maintaining
that there h no " God." And he would be not the less reckoned
an Atheist, even though he should believe (which is conceivable)
that there do exist Beings superior in power to Man, such as
Fairies, &c.
The Heathen therefore, for the most part, come under this
description. They did not believe in any God in our sense of the
word. And accordingly the Apostle Paul expressly designates them
as Atheists, ["without God"] oikoi.
The more any one studies the ancient Classical writers, the more
in error he will be respecting their notions, if he is not attentive to
the difference between the meanings they attached to certain terms
and those which we, now, attach to corresponding terms. The
present Is one instance: and another is, " immortahty of the soul."
See Essay I. 1st Series.
Gospel. X. GOSPEL. — This is Instanced as one of the words which is
practically ambiguous, from its different applications, even though
not employed (as it sometimes is) In different senses.
Conformably to its etymological meaning of " Good-tidings," it is
used to signify (and that especially and exclusively) the welcome
intelligence of Salvation to man, as preached by our Lord and his
followers. But it was afterwards transitively applied to each of the
four histories of our Lord's life, published by those who are called
the Evangelists. And the term Is often used to express collectively
the Gospel-c^ocirmes; i.e. the Instructions given men how to avail
themselves of the offer of salvation: and preaching the Gospel, Is
accordingly often used to include not only the proclaiming of the
good tidings, but the teaching of what is to be believed and done, in
consequence.^^ This ambiguity is one source of some important
theological errors : many supposing that Gospel truth is to be found
exclusively, or chiefly in the Gosiods; to the neglect of the other
Sacred Writings.
Again, since Jesus is said to have preached the " Gospel," and
the same is said of the Apostles, the conclusion is often hence drawn,
that the discourses of our Lord and the Apostolic Epistles must
exactly coincide ; and that in case of any apparent difference, the
W See Discourse I. appended to "Essays on the Dangers," &c. p. 2C4.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 203
former must be tlie standard, and the latter must be taken to bear Gospel
no other sense than what is implied by the other ; a notion which
leads inevitably and immediately to the neglect of the Apostolic
Epistles, when every thing they contain must be limited and modified
into a complete coincidence with our Lord's Discourses. Whereas
it is very conceivable, that though both might be in a certain sense
*' good tidings," yet, one may contain a much more full development
of the Christian scheme than the other. Which is confirmed by the
consideration, that the principal events on which the Religion is
founded (the atoning sacrifice and resurrection of Christ) had not
taken place, nor could be clearly declared by our Lord, when He
preached, saying, "the Kingdom of Heaven is cU, hand:'' not that it
was actually established; as it was, when his Apostles Avere sent
forth to preach to all nations. See Essays on the Difficulties^ <fcc.
Essay IL
HENCE.— ^ee '' Reason" and ** Why." Hence
IDENTICAL.— A^ee '* OxXe" and *' Same." identical.
xi. IMPOSSIBILITY. — According to the definition we may impossi-
choose to give of this word, it may be said either that there are '^^ ^'
three Species of it, or that it may be used in three different senses.
1st. What may be called 2i, mathematical impossibility, is that which
involves an absurdity and self-contradiction ; e.g. that two straight
lines should enclose a space, is not only impossible but incon-
ceivable, as it would be at variance with the definition of a straight
line. And it should be observed, that inability to accomplish any
thing which is, in this sense, impossible, implies no limitation of
power, and is compatible, even with omnipotence, in the fullest
sense of the word. If it be proposed, e.g. to construct a triangle
having one of its sides equal to the other two, or to find two num-
bers having the same ratio to each other as the side of a square
and its diameter, it is not from a defect of power that Ave are pre-
cluded from solving such a problem as these ; since in fact the
problem is in itself unmeaning and absurd : it is, in reality, nothing,
that is required to be done.
It is important to observe respecting an Impossibility of this
kind, that it is always susceptible of demonstrative proof. Not that
every such Impossibility has actually been proved such : or that we
can be certain it ever Avill be ; but that it must be i7i itself capable
of proof: — the materials of such proof — the data on which it may be
founded, — being (whether discovered or not) within the range of
our knowledge. This follows from the very character (as above
des«^-ribed)^^ of such truths as the mathematical: matliematical-
11 Book IV. Ch. II. § 1.
204 , AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [AiP. I.
impossi- impossibilities being of course included under that term. For, every
^ "' such trutli must be implied — however tedious and difficult may be
the task of eliciting it — in tlie Definitions we set out with, and
consequently in the Terms, which are the exact representatives of
those Definitions. JE.G. That any two sides of a Triangle are
greater than the third — in other words, that it is impossMe to
construct a triangle, one of whose sides shall be equal to the other
two — is a matter of easy and early demonstration. The incommen-
surability of the Side and the Diameter of a square, — in other
words, the impossibility of finding two numbers having to one
another the ratio of the Side to the Diameter, — is a truth which
was probably believed some time before a demonstration of it was
found: but it is no less implied in the definitions of " Straight line,"
" Square," <kc. In the case of the Circle again, the ratio of the
Diameter to the Circumference has been long sought by mathe-
maticians ; and no one has yet demonstrated, or perhaps ever
will, either, what their ratio is, or, on the other hand, that they are
incommensurable : but one or the other must be within the sphere
of mathematical demonstration.
When therefore any one says that perhaps so and so may he an
Impossibility in the mathematical sense, though we may never be
able to prove it such,^^ he is to keep in mind that at least such
proof is within the scojoe of inquiry, and that no increase of knoiu-
ledge, in the sense of " Information respecting facts, "^^ can bo
needed to furnish materials for the demonstration. Every such
Impossibility must be implied — though we may not perceive it, in
the terms employed ; in short, it must be properly a ' ' contradiction
in terms. ' '
2dly. What may be called a Physical Impossibility is something
at variance with the existing Laws of Nature, and which conse-
quently no Being, subject to those Laws, (as we are) can surmount;
but we can easily conceive a Being capable of bringing about Avhat
in the ordinary course of Nature is impossible. E.G. To multiply
five loaves into food for a multitude, or to walk on the surface of
the waves, are things physically impossible, but imply no contra-
diction ; on the contrary, we cannot but suppose that the Being,
if there be such an one, who created the Universe, is able to alter
at wall the properties of any of the substances it contains.^*
And an occurrence of this character, we call miraculous. Not
but that one person may perform without supernatural power what
is, to another, physically impossible ; as, e.g. a man may lift a great
weight, which it would be physically impossible for a child to raise ;
because it is contrary to the Laws of Nature that a muscle of this
12 See Bishop Copleston on Predestina- snbioined to the Life of Apolloniiis
tion. Tyanaeus, in the Eiicydopcediu Metro-
13 See Book IV. Chap. II. § 1. poUtana,
1* See an able disquisition on Miracles,
Afp. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 205
degree of strength should overcome a resistance which one of that impossi-
degree is equal to. But if any one perform what is beyond his own ^ ^*^
natural powers, or the natural powers of Man universally, he has
performed a miracle.
Much sophistry has been founded on the neglect of the distinction
between these two senses. It has even been contended, that no
evidence ought to induce a man of sense to admit that a miracle
has taken place, on the ground that it is a thing impossible ; in
other words, that it is a miracle ; for if it were not a thing impos-
sible to man, there would be no miracle in the case : so that
such an argument is palpably begging the question; but it has
often probably been admitted from an indistinct notion being sug-
gested of Impossibility in the first sense ; in which sense {viz. that
of self-contradiction) it is admitted that no evidence would justify
belief.
3dly. Moral Impossibility signifies only that high degree of im-
probability which leaves no room for doubt. In this sense we often
call a thing impossible, which implies no contradiction, or any
violation of the Laws of Nature, but which yet we are rationally
convinced will never occur, merely from the multitude of chances
against it ; as, e.g. that unloaded dice should turn up the same faces
one hundred times successively.^^ And in this sense, we cannot
accurately draw the line, so as to determine at what point the
improbability amounts to an Impossibility; and hence we often
have occasion to speak of this or that as almost impossible, though
not quite, <fcc. The other impossibilities do not admit of degrees
of approach. That a certain throw should recur two or three times
successively, we should not call very improbable ; the improbability
is increased at each successive step : but we cannot say exactly
when it becomes impossible ; though no one would scruple to call
one hundred such recurrences impossible.
In the same sense we often call things impossible which are
completely within the power of knov/n agents to bring about, but
which we are convinced they never will bring about. Thus, e.g.
that all the civilized people in the world should with one accord
forsake their habitations and wander about the world as savages,
every one would call an impossibility ; though it is plain they have
the power to do so, and that it depends on their choice which they
will do ; and moreover that there even have been instances of some
few persons doing so. In like manner, if Ave were told of a man's
having disgracefully fled from his post, whom we knew to be pos-
sessed of the most undaunted courage, we should without scruple
(and with good reason, supposing the idea formed of his character
to be a just one) pronounce this an Impossibility ; meaning, that
there is sufficient ground for being fully convinced that the thing
15 And yet why should they not ? since any given 100 throws. See Rhet. Part L
the chances are the very same against Ch. II. 5 4.
206 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
Impossi- could never talie place ; not from any idea of lils not having poicer
*''^^'^' and liberty to fly if he would ; for our certainty is built on the very
circumstance of his being free to act as he will, together with his
, being of such a disposition as never to have the will to act disgrace-
fully. If, again, a man were bound hand and foot, it would be, in
the other sense, impossible for him to fly ; viz. out of his ]30wer.
"Capable" has a corresponding ambiguity. E.G. We speak of
this or that man being "capable" or "incapable" of a cowardly
act, in a different sense from that in which we speak of him as
** capable " or " incapable " of writing a fine poem.
^ The performance of any thing that is morally impossible to a mere
man, is to be reckoned a miracle, as much as if the impossibility
were physical. E.G. It is morally impossible for poor Jewish fisher-
men to have framed such a scheme of ethical and religious doctrine
as the Gospel exhibits. It is morally impossible for a man to foretell
distant and improbable future events with the exactitude of many
of the prophecies in Scripture.
Much of the confusion of thought which has pervaded, and has
interminably protracted, the discussions respecting the long agitated
question of human freedom, has arisen from inattention to the
ambiguity which has been here noticed. If the Deity, it is said,
*' foresees exactly what I shall do on any occasion, it must be
impossible iov me to act otherwise;" and thence it is inferred that
man's actions cannot be free. The middle-term employed in such
an argument as this is "impossible," or "impossibility" employed
in two senses. lie to whom it is, in one sense, impossible, {viz.
physically) to act otherwise than he does, {i.e. who has it not in his
power) is not a free agent ; correct foreknowledge implies impossi-
bility (in another sense, viz. moral impossibility ; — the absence of
all room for doubt:) and the perplexity is aggravated by resorting,
for the purpose of explanation, to such words as "may," "can,"
''possible," "must," &c., all of which are aftected by a corres-
ponding ambiguity. ^^
It should be observed, that many things which are not usually
termed "mathematically" necessary or impossible, will at once
appear such, when stated, not abstractedly, but with all their actual
circumstances: e.g. that "Brutus stabbed Ca3sar," is a fact, the
denial of which, though a falsehood, would not be regarded as self-
contradictory (like the denial of the equality of two right angles) ;
because, abstractedly, we can conceive 13rutus acting otherwise : but
if we insert the circumstances (which of course really existed) of his
having complete power, liberty, and also a predominant will to do
60, then, the denial of the action amounts to a "mathematical"
W See Tucker's " Light of Nature," in tlie Notes and Appendix to an edition of
the Chapters on Providence, on Free- Archbishop King's Disco\irse on Predes-
will, and some others. 1 l)ave endeavoured tination, pubhshed at the end of tho
to condense and to simphty some of the
most valuable parts of uis reasonings in
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 207
impossibility, or self-contradiction ; for to act voluntarily against the irnpnssi«
dictates of a predominant will, implies an eifect without a cause. *^^''*
Of Future events, that Being, and no other, can have the same
knowledge as of the past, who is acquainted with all the causes,
remote or immediate, internal and external, on which each depends.
But every one is accustomed to anticipate future events, in human
affairs, as well as in the material world, in j^^^ojyortioii to his know-
ledge of the several circumstances connected with each; however
different m amount that knowledge may be, in reference to different
occurrences. And in both cases alike, we always attribute the
failure of any anticipation to our ignorance or mistake respecting
some of the circumstances. When, e.g. we fully expect, from our
supposed knowledge of some person's character, and of the circum-
stances he is placed in, that he will do something which, eventually,
he does not do, we at once and without hesitation conclude that we
were mistaJ:en either as to his character, or as to his situation, or
as to our acquaintance with human nature, generally ; and we are
accustomed to adduce any such failure as a proof of such mistake;
saying, " it is plain you icere mistaken in your estimate of that man's
character; for he has done so and so:" and this, as unhesitatingly
as we should attribute the non- occurrence of an eclipse we had pre-
dicted, not, to any change in the Laws of Nature, but to some error
in our calculations.
xii. INDIFFERENCE, in its application in respect of the Will indifforence-
and of the Judgment, is subject to an ambiguity which some of mj
readers may perhaps think hardly worth noticing ; the distinction
between uiMassed candour and impartiality, on the one side, and
carelessness, on the other, being so very obvious. But these two
things nevertheless have been, from their bearing the same name,
confounded together; or at least represented as inseparably con-
nected. I have known a person maintain, with some plausibility,
the inexpediency, with a view to the attainment of truth, of educating
people, or appointing teachers to instruct them, in any particular
systems or theories, of astronomy, medicine, religion, politics, <fec.,
on the ground, that a man must loisli to believe, and to find good
reasons for believing, the system in which he has been trained, and
which he has been engaged in teaching; and this wish must preju-
dice his understanding in favour of it, and consequently render him
an incompetent judge of truth. ^^
Now let any one consider whether such a doctrine as this could
have been even plausibly stated, but for the ambiguity of the word
Indifference, and others connected with it. For it would follow,
from such a prmciple, that no physician is to be trusted, who has
been instructed in a certain mode of treating any disorder, becau.so
17 See Essay T. Second Series.
Q
208 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
Iuut!/cren.'e. he miist wish to think the theory correct which he has learned : nay,
no physician should he trusted who is not utterly indifferent Avhether
his patient recovers or dies ; since else, he must wish to find reasons
for hoping favourahly from the mode of treatment pursued. No
plan for the henefit of the puhlic, proposed hy a philaiithropistf
should he listened to ; since such a man cannot but wish it may he
successful ; <fcc.
No doubt the judgment is often biassed by the inclinations ; but
it is possible, and it should be our endeavour, to guard against this
bias. If a scheme be proposed to any one for embarking his capital
m some speculation which promises great wealth, he will doubtless
wish to find that the expectations held out are well founded ; but
every one would call him very imprudent, if (as some do) he should
suffer this wish to bias his judgment, and should believe, on insuf-
ficient grounds, the fair promises held out to him. But we should
not think such imprudence an inevitable consequence of his desire
to increase his property. His wishes, we should say, were both
natural and wise ; but since they could not render the event more
probable, it was most unwise to allow them to influence his decision.
In like manner, a good man will indeed wish to find the evidence of
the Christian religion satisfactory ; but a wise man does not for that
reason take for granted that it is satisfactory ; but weighs the
evidence the more carefully on account of the importance of the
question.
It is curious to observe how fully aware of the operation of this
bias, and how utterly blind to it, the same persons will be, in oppo-
site cases. Such writers, e.g. as I have just alluded to, disparage
the judgment of those who have been accustomed to study and to
teach the Christian religion, and who derive hope and satisfaction
from it, on the ground that they must wish to find it true. And let
it be admitted that their authority shall go for nothing ; and that the
question shall be tried entirely by the reasons adduced. But then,
on the same principle, how strong must be the testimony of the
multitudes who admit the truth of Christianity, though it is to them
a source of uneasiness or of dismay ; — who have not adopted any
antinomian system to quiet their conscience while leading an unchris-
tian life ; but, when they hear of "righteousness, temperance, and
judgment to come, tremble," and try to dismiss such thoughts till
"a more convenient season." The case of these, who have every
reason to wish Christianity untrue, is passed by, by the very same
persons who are insisting on the influence of the opposite bias.
According to the homely but expressive proverb, they are '* deaf
on one ear."
And it may be added, that it is utterly a mistake to suppose that
the bias is always in favour of the conclusion wished for : it is often
in the contrary direction. The proverbial expression of ** too good
news to be true," bears witness to the existence of this feeling.
Arp. I.J AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 209
There is in some minds a tendency to unreasonable doubt in cases indifference,
where their wishes are strong ; — a morbid distrust of evidence which
they* are especially anxious to find conclusive; e.g. groundless fears
for the health or safety of an ardently-beloved child, will frequently
distress anxious parents.
Different temperaments (sometimes varying with the state of
health of each individual) lead towards these opposite miscalculations,
— the over-estimate or under-estimate of the reasons for a conclusion
we earnestly wish to find true.
Our aim should be to guard against both extremes, and to decide
according to the evidence; preserving the Indifi'erence of the Judg-
ment, even where the Will neither can, nor should be indifferent.
xiii. LAW is, etymologically, that which is "laid" down; and is Law.
used, in the most appropriate sense, to signify some general injunc-
tion, command, or regulation, addressed to certain Persons, who are
called upon to conform to it. It is in this sense that we speak of
*' the Law of Moses," " the Law of the Land," k.Q.
It is also used in a transferred sense, to denote the statement of
some general fad, the several individual instances of which exhibit a
conformity to that statement, analogous to the conduct of persons in
respect to a Law which they obey. It is in this sense that we speak
of " the Laws of Nature," when we say that " a seed in vegetating
directs the radicle downwards and the plumule upwards, in compli-
ance with a Law of Nature:" we only mean that such is universally
tliefact; and so, in other cases.
It is evident therefore that, in this sense, the conformity of indi-
vidual cases to the general rule is that which constitutes a Law of
Nature. If water should henceforth never become solid, at any
temperature, then the freezing of water Avould no longer be a Law
of Nature : wlipreas in the other sense, a Law is not the more or the
less a Law from the conformity or non-conformity of individuals to it :
if an Act of our Legislature were to be disobeyed and utterly disre-
garded by every one, it would not on that account be the less a Law.
This distinction may ajipear so obvious wdien plainly stated, as
hardly to need mention : yet writers of great note and ability have
confounded these two senses together : 1 need only mention Hooker
(in the opening of his great work) and Montesquieu : the latter of
whom declaims on the much stricter observance in the Universe of
the Laws of Nature, than in mankind, of the divine and human
Laws laid down for their conduct: not considering that, in the
former case, it is the observance that constitutes the Law.
xiv. MAY, and likewise MUST, and CAN, (as well as CANNOT) May.
are each used in two senses, which are very often confounded
together. They relate sometimes to Power, or Liberty, sometimes to
Contingency.
210 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
Ma.v When we say of one who has obtained a certain sum of money,
*' now he may jDurchase the field he was wishing for," we mean that
it is in his 2-ower; it is plain that he may, in the same sense, hoard
lip the money, or spend it on something else ; though perhaps we
are convinced, from our knowledge of his character and situation,
that he will not. When again we say, " it may rain to-morrow,"
or '* the vessel may have arrived in port," the expression does not
at all relate to power, hut merely to contingency: i.e. we mean, that
though we are not sure such an event will happen or has happened,
we are not sure of the reverse.
When, again, we say, *' this man, of so grateful a disposition,
must have eagerly embraced such an opportunity of requiting his
benefactor," or " one who approves of the slave trade 7nust be very
hard-hearted," we only mean to imply the absence of all doubt on
these points. The very notions of gratitude and of hard-heartedness
exclude the idea of compulsion, and of yielding to irresistible power.
But when we say that " all men must die," or that " a man must
go to prison who is dragged by force," we mean ''whether they
will or not" — that there is no poiuer to resist. So also, if we say
that a Being of perfect goodness " cannot'' act wrong, we do not
mean that it is out of his j^ower; since that would imply no goodness
of character ; but that there is sufficient reason for feeling sure that
He unll not. It is in a very different sense that we say of a man
fettered in a prison, that he " cannot'' escape : meaning, that though
he has the will, he wants the ability.
These words are commonly introduced, in questions connected
with Fatalism and the Freedom of human actions, to explain the
meaning of " necessary," " impossible," &c. ; and having them-
selves a corresponding ambiguity, they only tend to increase the
perplexity.
Chaos umpire sits.
And by deciding worse embroils the fray.**
Must MUST.— /^ee" May."
Necessary. xv. NECESSARY. — This word is used as the contrary to
•' impossible" in all its senses, and is of course liable to a corre-
sponding ambiguity. Thus it is " mathematically Necessary" that
two sides of a triangle should be greater than the third ; there is a
"physical Necessity" for the fall of a stone; and a "moral
Necessity" that Beings of such and such a character should act,
when left perfectly free, in such and such a manner; i.e. we are
sure they will act so ; though of course it is in their power to act
otherwise ; else there would be no moral agency.^^ This ambiguity
is employed sophistically to justify immoral conduct; since no one is
^ See the Article "Impossibility;" Note.
app.i.] ambiguous terms, 211
respondhle for any thing done under "necessity," — i.e. "physical Necessary,
necessity;" £^s when a man is dragged anywhere hy external force,
or falls down from heing too weak to stand ; and then the same
excuse is fallaciously extended to " moral necessity" also.
There are likewise numberless different apjMcations of the word
" necessity" (as well as of those derived from it) in which there is a
practical ambiguity, from the difference of the things understood in
conjunction ^\\i\i\l: e.g. ioo^ is " necessary ;" ws;. — to life ; great
wealth is "necessary" — to the gratification of a man of luxurious
habits ; the violation of moral duty is in many cases " necessary" —
for the attainment of certain worldly objects ; the renunciation of
such objects, and subjugation of the desires, is " necessary" — to the
attainment of the Gospel-promises, (kc. And thus it is that
" necessity" has come to be " the tyrant's plea;" for as no one is
at all responsible for what is a matter of physical necessity, — what
he has no power to avoid, — so, a degree of allowance is made for a
man's doing what he has power to avoid, when it appears to be the
less of two evils ; as e.g. when a man who is famishing takes the
first food he meets with, as " necessary" to support life, or throws
over goods in a storm, when it is " necessary" in order to save the
ship. But if the plea of necessity be admitted without inquiring ^br
what the act in question is necessary, any thing whatever may be
thus vindicated ; since no one commits any crime which is not, in his
view, " necessary" to the attainment of some supposed advantage
or gratification.
The confusion of thought is further increased by the employment
on improper occasions of the phrase " absolutely necessary ;" which,
strictly speaking, denotes a case in which there is no possible alter-
native. It is necessary /or a man's safety, that he should remain in
a house which he cannot quit without incurring danger; it is
absolutely [or simply) necessary that he should remain there, if he is
closely imprisoned in it.
I have* treated more fully on this fruitful source of sophistry in
the Appendix (No. I.) to King's "Discourse on Predestination."
In the course of it, I suggested (in the first edition) an etymology
of the word, which I have reason to think is not correct ; but it
should be observed, that this makes no difference in the reasoning,
which is not in any degree founded on that etymology ; nor have I,
tis some have represented, attempted to introduce any new or
inusual sense of the word, but have all along appealed to common
use, — the only right standard, — and merely pointed out the senses in
which each word lias actually been employed. See the introduction
to this Appendix.
xvi. OLD. — This word, in its strict and primary sense, denotes oii
the length of time that any object has existed ; and many are not
aware that they are accustomed to use it in any other. It is.
212 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Afp. I.
Old. however, very frequently employed instead of '* Ancient," to denote
distance of time. The same transition seems to have taken place, in
Latin. Horace says of Lucilius, who was one of the most ancient
Koman authors, but who did not live to he old: —
<in9.
-"quo fit ut omnis
Votiva pateat veluti descripta tabella
Vita Senis,"
The present is a remarkable instance of the influence of an ambi-
guous word over the thoughts even of those who are not ignorant
of the ambiguity, but are not carefully on the watch against its
effects; the impressions and ideas associated by habit with the
word when used in one sense, being always apt to obtrude them-
selves unawares when it is employed in another sense, and thus to
affect our reasonings. E.G. *'Old times," — '*the Old world," &lc.
are expressions in frequent use, and which, oftener than not, produce
imperceptibly the associated impression of the superior wisdom
resulting from experience, which, as a general rule, we attribute to
Old men. Yet no one is really ignorant that the world is older now
than ever it was; and that the instruction to be derived from
observations on the past (which is the advantage that Old persons
possess) must be greater, supposing other things equal, to every
successive generation ; and Bacon's remark to this purpose appears,
as soon as distinctly stated, a mere truism : yet few, perhaps, that
he made, are more important. There is always a tendency to appeal
■with the same kind of deference, to the authority of " Old times,"
as of aged men.
It should be kept in mind, however, that ancient customs, institu-
tions, &c., when they still exist, may be literally called Old; and
have this advantage attending them, that their effects may be esti-
mated from long experience ; whereas we cannot be sure, respecting
any recently-established Law or System, whether it may not produce
in time some effects which were not originally contemplated.^^
xvii. ONE — is sometimes employed to denote strict and proper
numerical Unity ; sometimes, close Resemblance ; — correspondence
with one single description. — See " Same."
' Facies non omnibus UNA,
Nee di versa tamen; qualem decet esse soroium."— Oy. Mei. h. ii.
It Is in the secondary or improper, not the primary and proper
sense of this word, that men are exhorted to '*be of one mind;" i.e.
to agree in their faith, — pursuits, — mutual affections, <fec. "The
Church" [viz. the Universal or Catholic Church] **is undoubtedly
one, and so is the Human Race one; but not as a Society. It was
10 See, however, the Article reprinted letter to Earl Grey on Secondary Punish-
from the London Review, in the first ments.
AlP. I.I AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 213
from the first composed of distinct Societies ; which were called one, One.
because formed on common principles. It is One Society only when
considered as to its future existence. The circumstance of its having
one common Head, Christ, one Spirit, one Father, are points of
unity, which no more make the Church One Society on earth, than
the circumstance of all men having the same Creator, and being
derived from the same Adam, renders the Human Race one
Family. "20
It is also in this sense that two guineas, e.g. struck from a wedge
of uniform fineness, are said to be " of one and the same form and
weight," and also *' of one and the same substance." In this
secondary or improper sense also, a child is said to be *' of one and
the same (bodily) substance witli its mother;" or, simply "of the
substance of its mother:" for these two pieces of money, and two
human Beings, are numerically distinct.
It is evidently most important to keep steadily in view, and to
explain on proper occasions, these diff"erent uses of the word ; lest
men should insensibly slide into error on the most important of all
subjects, by applying, in the secondary sense, expressions which
ought to be understood hi the primary and proper. — [See "Person. ")
Unity is, as might have been expected, liable to corresponding
ambiguities. E.G. Sometimes what the Apostles say concerning
" Unity of Spirit" — of Faith — &c. is transferred to Unity of Church-
Government.
xviii. PAY. — In the strict sense, a person is said to " pay," who ^"^
transfers to another what was once his own : in another sense " pay"
is used to denote the mere act of handing over what perhaps never
was one's own. In this latter sense a gentleman's steward or house-
keeper is said to pay the tradesmen their bills ; in the other sense,
it is the master who pays them.
It is in the secondary or improper sense that an executor is said
to pay legacies, — a landowner or farmer to pay tithes, &c., since
the money these hand over to another never was theirs. See " Evi-
dence," (in vol. of Tracts,) p. 339.
xix. PERSON, ^^ in its ordinary use at present, invariably implies Person,
a numerically distinct substance. Each man is one Person, and
can be but one. It has also a peculiar theological sense, in which
we speak of the "three Persons " of the blessed Trinity. It was
probably thus employed by our Divines as a literal, or perhaps
etymological, rendering of the Latin word "Persona." I am
inclined to think, however, from the language of Wallis (the Mathe-
matician and Logician) in the following extract, as well as from that
of some other of our older writers, that the English word Person
20 Encyclop. Metrop., p. 774.
21 Most of the following observations will apply to the word " Personality."
214 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. L
Person. was formerly not so strictly confined as now, to the sense It bears in
commo'u conversation among us.
*' That which makes these expressions " {viz. respecting the
Trinity) ** seem harsh to some of these men, is because they have
used themselves to fansie that notion only of the word Person,
according to which three men are accounted to be three persons, and
these three persons to be three men. But he may consider that
there is another notion of the word Person, and In common use too,
wherein the same man may be said to sustain divers persons, and
those persons to be the same man: that is, the same man as
sustaining divers capacities. As was said but now of Tully, Tres
Fersonas Unus sustineo; meam, adversarii, judicis. And then it
will seem no more harsh to say, The Three Persons, Father, Son,
and Holy Ghost, are one God, than to say, God the Creatour, God
tlie Redeemer, and God the Sanctifier, are one God it is
much the same thing whether of the two forms we use." — Letters
on the Trinity, p. 63.
" The Avord Person [persona) is originally a Latin word, and does
not properly signify a Man ; (so that another person must needs
imply another man) for then the word Homo would have served,
and they needed not have taken in the word Persona ; but rather,
one so circumstantiated. And the same Man, if considered in other
circumstances (considerably different) is reputed another person.
And that this is the true notion of the word Person, appears by
those noted phrases, personam induere, personam deiDonere, per^
sonam agere, and many the like, in approved Latin authours. Thus
the same man may at once sustain the Person, of a King and a
Father, if he be invested both with regal and pa/er?iaZ authority.
Kow because the King and the Father are for the most part not
only different persons but different men also, (and the like in other
cases) hence it comes to pass that another person is sometimes
supposed to imply another man; but not always, nor is that the
proper sense of the word. It is Englished in our dictionaries by
the stale, quality or condition whereby one man differs from another ;
and so, as the condition alters, the Person alters, though the man
be the same.
" The hinge of the controversy, is, that notion concerning the
three soraewlmts, which the Fathers (who first used it) did intend
to design by the name Person ; so that we are not from the word
Person to determine what was that Notion; but from that Notion
which they would express, to determine in what sense the word
Person is here used," &lc. &c. — Letter V. in answer to tlie Arian^s
Vindication.'^
22 Dr. WalHs's theolosical works, con- Ariatis and Socinians of that period. Of
siclering his general celebrity, are won- course he incurred the censure, not only
dert'ully little known. He seems to have of them, but of all who, though not pro-
b>ien, in his day, one of the ablest Defen- fessedly Arian, gave such an exposition
dtjra of the Church's doctrine, against the of their doctrine as amounts virtually to
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 215
What was precisely the notion which these Latin Fathers intended Person,
to convey, and how far it approached the classical signification of the
word *' Persona," it may not he easy to determine. But we must
presume that they did not intend to employ it in what is, now, the
ordinary sense of the word Person; hoth because " Persona" never,
I believe, bore that sense in pure Latinity, and also because it is
evident that, in that sense, " three divine Persons" would have
been exactly equivalent to "three Gods;" a meaning which the
orthodox always disavowed.
It is probable that they had nearly the same view with which
the Greek theologians adopted the word Hypostasis ; which seems
calculated to express ** that which stands under {i.e. is the Subject
of) Attributes." They meant, it may be presumed, to guard
against the suspicion of teaching, on the one hand, that there are
three Gods, or three Parts of the one God ; or, on the other hand, that
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are no more than three names,'-^ all,
of the same signification; and the}'' employed accordingly a term
which might serve to denote, that, (though divine Attributes belong
to all and each of these, yet) there are Attributes of each, respec-
tively, which are not so strictly applicable to either of the others, as
such ; as Avhen, for instance, the Son is called especially the
** Redeemer," and the Holy Spirit, the *' Comforter or Paraclete,"^
&c. The notion thus conveyed is indeed very faint., and imperfect ;
but is perhaps for that very reason, (considering what Man is, and
what God is,) the less likely to lead to error. One may convey to
a blind man a notion of seeing, correct as far as it goes, and
instructive to him, though very imperfect: if he form a more fvdl
and distinct notion of it, his ideas will inevitably be incorrect. — See
Essay VII. § 5, Second Series. ^^ .
It is perhaps to be regretted that our Divines, in rendering the
Latin "Persona," used the word Person, whose ordinary sense, in
the present day at least, differs in a most important point from the
theological sense, and yet is not so remote from it as to preclude
all mistake and perplexity. If " Hypostasis," or any other com-
pletely foreign term had been used instead, no idea at all would
Tri theism. I beg to be understood how- For some very important remarks on
ever as not demanding an imphcit defer- that si<,niification, see Hinds's History,
ence for his, or for any other human and also a Sermon on the Name Emmaii-
authority, however eminent. We are uel in the vol. I lately published,
taught to " call no man Master, on earth." 2i English readers are not usually aware
But the reference to Dr. Wallis may that the title of " Paraclete" is ever dis-
serve both to show the use of the word tinctly applied to Christ in Scripture, as it
in his days, and to correct the notion, is in IJohn ii. 1, because it is there trans-
should any have entertained it, that the lated "advocate" instead of "comforter."
views of the subject here taken are, in 25 Jt is worth observing, as a striking
our Church, any thing novel. instance of the little reliance to be placed
^ It is possible that some may have on etymology as a guide to the meanmg
used this expression in the very sense of a word, that " Hypostasis," "Substan-
r.ttachedby others to the word "Person;" tia," and " Understanding," so widely
Ifcd, in a great degree, by the peculiar ditferent in their sense, correspond iu their
significatiou of "Name" iu Scripture, etymology.
216 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
Person. have been conveyed except that of the explanation given ; and thus
the danger at least of being misled by a word, would have been
. avoided. ^^
Our Reformers however did not introduce the word into their
Catechism; though it has been (I must think, injudiciously)
employed in some popular expositions of the Catechism, without any
explanation, or even allusion to its being used in a peculiar sense.
As it is, the danger of being not merely not understood, but
msunderstood, should be guarded against most sedulously, by all
who wish not only to keep clear of error, but to inculcate important
truth ; by seldom or never employing this ambiguous word without
some explanation or caution. For if we employ, without any such
care, terms which we must be sensible are likely to mislead, at least
the unlearned and the unthinking, we cannot stand acquitted on the
plea of not having directly inculcated error.
I am persuaded that much heresy, and some infidelity, may be
traced in part to the neglect of this caution. It is not wonderful
that some should be led to renounce a doctrine, which, through the
ambiguity in question, may be represented to them as involving a
self-contradiction, or as leading to Tritheism ; — that others should
insensibly slide into this very error ; — or that many more (which I
know to be no uncommon case) should, for fear of that error,
deliberately, and on principle, keep the doctrine of the Trinity out
of their thoughts, as a point of speculative belief, to which they have
assented once for all, but which they find it dangerous to dwell on ;
though it is in fact the very Faith into which, ^^ by our Lord's
appointment, we are baptized.
Nor should those who do understand, or at least have once
understood, the ambiguity in question, rest satisfied that they are
thenceforward safe from all danger in that quarter. It should be
remembered that the thoughts are habitually influenced, through the
force of association, by the recurrence of the ordinary sense of any
word to the mind of those who are not especially on their guard
against it. See " Fallacies," § 5.
The correctness of a formal and deliberate Confession of Faith, is
not always, of itself, a sufficient safeguard against error in the
hahitual imjjressions on the mind. The Romanists flatter themselves
that they are safe from Idolatry, because they distinctly acknowledge
the truth, that "God only is to be served;'' viz. with "Latria;"
though they allow Adoration, ("hyperdulia" and "dulia") to the
Virgin and other Saints, — to Images, — and to Relics : to which it has
been justly replied, that supposing this distinction correct in itself,
it would be, in practice, nugatory ; since the mass of the people
2<5 1 wish it to be observed, that it is the circumstance is rather an advantage.— 5*65
ambUjuity of the word Person which Essay VI. (Second Series) § 4, Note.
renders it objectionable; not, its being 27 j,v to e»j,««, " /w/o the Name;" not
nowhere employed in Scripture in the in the Name." Matt, xxviii. 19.
technical sense of theologians; for this
Afp. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERJVIS. 217
must soon (as experience proves) lose sight of it entirely in their rersoa.
hahitual devotions.
Nor again is the habitual acknowledgment of One God, of itself a
sufficient safeguard ; since, from the additional ambiguities of *' One "
and "Unity," (noticed in a preceding Article) we may gradually
fall into the notion of a merely figurative Unity ; such as unity of
substance merely, (see a preceding Article) — Unity of purpose, —
concert of action, kc, such as 4s often denoted by the phrase " one
mind." See "Same," in this Appendix, and "Dissertation,"
Book IV. Ch.^V.
When, however, I speak of the necessity of explanations, the
reader is requested to keep in mind, that I mean, not explanations
of the nature of the Deity, but of our own use of words. On the one
hand we must not content ourselves with merely saying that the
whole subject is mysterious and must not be too nicely pried into ;
while we neglect to notice the distinction between divine revelations,
and human explanations of them; — between inquiries into the
mysteries of the divine nature, and into the mysteries arising from
tlie ambiguities of language, and of a language, too, adopted by
uninspired men. For, whatever Scripture declares, the Christian
is bound to receive implicitly, however unable to understand it : but
to claim an uninquiring assent to expressions of man's framing,
(however judiciously framed) without even an attempt to ascertain
their meaning, is to fall into one of the worst errors of the
Komanists.
On the other hand, to require explanations of what God is in
Himself, is to attempt what is beyond the reach of the human
faculties, and foreign from the apparent design of Scripture-revela-
tion ; which seems to be, chiefly, if not wholly, to declare to us, (at
least to insist on among the essential articles of faith,) with a view
to our practical benefit, and to the influenchig of our feelings and
conduct, not so much the intrinsic nature of the Deity, as, what He
is and does, relatively to us. Scripture teaches us (and our Church-
Catechism directs our attention to these points) to "believe in God,
who, as the Father, hath made us and all the world, — as the Son,
halh redeemed us and all mankind, — as the Holy Ghost, sanctifieth
us, and all the elect people of God.^ And this distinction is, as I
have said, pointed out in the very form of Baptism. Nothing,
indeed, can be more decidedly established by Scripture, — nothing-
more indistinctly explained (except as far as relates to us) than the
doctrine of the Trinity;^ nor are we perhaps capable, with oui*
present faculties, of comprehending it more fully.
In these matters, our inquiry, — at least our first inquiry, — should
23 Hawkin's Manual, p. 12. Word of God is to be rightly understood:
29 Compare together, for instance, such Luke i. 35, and John xiv. 9; John xiv.
passages as the following* for it is by 16,18,26, Matt, xxviii. 19, 20; John xvi.
cowjoanX^ Scripture with Scripture, no't 7, Colos. ii. 9; Phil. i. 19, 1 Cor. vi. 19;
by dwelling on insulated texts, that the Matt. x. 20, and John xiv. 23.
SIS AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
PerMn. always Tdg, what is revealed: nor, if any one refuses to adopt as an
article of faith, this or that exposition, should he be understood as
necessarily maintaining its falsity. For we are sure that there must
be many truths relative to the Deity, which we have no means of
ascertaining : nor does it follow that even every truth which can be
ascertained, must be a part of the essential faith of a Christian.
And as it is wise to reserve for mature age, such instructions as
are unsuitable to a puerile understanding, so, it seems the part of a
like wisdom, to abstain, during this our state of childhood, from
curious speculations on subjects in which even the ablest of human
minds can but " see by means of a glass, darkly," On these, the
Learned can have no advantage over others ; though we are apt to
forget that any mysterious point inscrutable to Man, as Man, — sur-
passing the utmost reach of human intellect, — must be such to the
learned and to the ignorant, to the wise and to the simple, alike ; —
that in utter darkness, the strongest sight, and the weakest, are on
a level. ** Sir, in these matters," (said one of the most eminent of
our Reformers, respecting another mysterious point,) " I am so
fearful, that I dare speak no further, yea almost none otherwise,
than as the Scripture doth as it were lead me by the hand.
And surely it is much better thus to consult Scripture, and take
it for a guide, than to resort to it merely for confirmations, containec^
in detached texts, of the several parts of some System of Theology,
which the student fixes on as reputed orthodox, and which is in
fact made the guide which he permits to '* lead him by the hand;"
while passages culled out from various parts of the Sacred Writings
in subserviency to such system, are formed into what may be called
an anagram of Scripture : and then, by reference to this system as
a standard, each doctrine or discourse is readily pronounced Ortho-
dox, or Socinian, or Arian, or Sabellian, or Nestorian, &c. ; and all
this, on the ground that the theological scheme which the student
has adopted, is supported by Scripture. The materials indeed are
the stones of the Temple ; but the building constructed with them is
a fabric of human contrivance. If instead of this, too common,
procedure, students w^ould fairly search the Scriptures with a view
not merely to defend their opinions, but to form them, — not merely
for arguments, but for truth, — keeping human expositions to their
own proper purposes [See Essay VI. First Series,] and not allowing
these to become, practically, a standard, — if, in short, they were as
honestly desirous to be on the side of Scripture, as they naturally
are to have Scripture on their side, how much sounder, as well as
more charitable, would their conclusions often be !
With presumptuous speculations, such as I have alluded to, many
theologians, even of those who lived near, and indeed during, the
Apostolical times, seem to have been alike chargeable, widely as
they differed in respect of the particular explanations adopted by
each:
Arr. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 219
" Unus utrique Person.
Error; sed variis illudit partibus."
And it is important to remember, — wliat "\ve are very liable to lose
sight of — the circumstance, that, not only there arose grievous errors
during the time of the Apostles, and consequently such -were likely
to exist in the times immediately following, but also that when these
insinred guides were removed, there was no longer the same
infallible authority to decide what was error. In the absence of
such a guide, some errors might be received as orthodox, and some
sound doctrines be condemned as heterodox.
The Gnostics^ introduced a theory of JEons, or successive emana-
tions from the divine *' Pleroma" or Fulness; one of whom was
Christ, and became incarnate in the man Jesus.^^ The Sabellians
are reported to have described Christ as bearing the same relation
to the Father, as the illuminating {(^ariariKoy) quality does to the
Sun; while the Holy Ghost corresponded to the warming quality
{doc'h'Trou) : or again, the Three as corresponding to the Body, Soul,
and Spirit, of a man ; or again, to Substance, — Thought or Reason,
— and Will or Action. The Arians again represented the Son and
the Holy Spirit, as created Beings, but with a certain imparted
divinity. The Nestorians and Eutychians gave opposite, but equally
fanciful and equally presumptuous explanations of the Incarnation,
«kc. (kc.
Nor were those who were accounted orthodox, altogether exempt
from the same fault of presumptuous speculation. "Who," says
Chrysostom, "was he to whom God said, Let us make man? who
but he the Son of God?" And Epiphanius, on the same
passage, says, " This is the language of God to his W^ord." Each
of these writers, it may be observed, in representing God (under
that title) as addressing Himself to the Son as to a distinct Being
previously to the birth of Jesus on earth, approaches very closely to
the Arian view. And Justin Martyr, in a similar tone, expressly
speaks of God as " One, not in nuraber, but in judgment or
designs. "^^ I will not say that such passages as these may not be
so interpreted as to exclude every form of tritheism ; but it is a
dangerous thing, to use (and that, not in the heat of declamation,
but in a professed exposition) language of such a nature that it is a
mere chance whether it may not lead into the most unscrlptural
errors. If the early writers had not been habitually very incautious
in this point, that could hardly have taken place which is recorded
respecting the council held at Rimini, (a.d. 360) in which a Confes-
30 Of these, and several other ancient intomany different sects, teaching various
heretics, we have no accounts but those modifications of the same absurdities. —
of their opponents; which however we See Buiion's Bam2)fon Lectures.
may presume to contain more or less of 32 Ourcs •y.ycecpi.ui os &ih, tm-ce *
approximation to what was usually main- 'fm roZ rk ^a-vra. -re y.act^nt <S)iov, u^iOyift
tained. X=}-«, aXA' a'j ynui/jc-/-,; no.
31 Tliese heretics appear to have split
220 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Afp. I.
Person. sion of Faitli was agreed upon, wliieli the Arlans soon after boasted
cf as sanctioning their doctrine, and "the Church," we are tokl,
" was astonished to find itself unexpectedly become Arian."^
The fact is, that numberless writers, both of those who were, and
who were not, accounted heretics, being displeased, and justly, with
one another's explanations of the mode of existence of the Deity,
instead of taking warning aright from the errors of their neighbours,
sought, each, the remedy, in some other explanation instead, con-
cerning matters unrevealed and inexplicable by man. They found
nothing to satisfy a metaphysical curiosity in the brief and indistinct^
though decisive, declarations of Scripture, that " God was in Christ,
s reconciling the Woild unto Himself;" — that "in Him dwelleth all
the Fulness of the Godhead, bodily ;" — that "it is God that Avorketli
in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure;" — that if we
"keep Christ's saying, He dwelleth in us, and we, in Him;" — that
" if any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his ;" — and
that " the Lord is the Spirit," hc.^ They wanted something more
full, and more philosophical, than all this ; and their theology
accordingly was "spoiled, through philosophy and vain deceit, after
the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the World, and not
after Christ." Hostile as they were to each other, the grand
mistake in principle was common to many in all parties.
And in later ages the Schoolmen kept up the same Spirit, and
even transmitted it to Protestants. "Theology teaches," (says a
passage in a Protestant work) "that there is in God, one Essence,
two Processions, three Persons, four Relations, five Notions, and
the CIrcumincession, which the Greeks call Perichoresls."
What follows is still more to my purpose ; but I cannot bring
myself to transcribe any further. " Who is this that darkeneth
counsel by words without knowledge? "
But the substance of great part of what I have been saying, has
been expressed in better language than mine, in a late work, which
displays no ordinary ability, — Mr. Douglas's Errors regai^ding
Mdigion.
" The radical mistake in all these systems, whether heretical or
orthodox, which have embroiled mankind in so many scandalous
disputes, and absurd and pernicious opinions, proceeds from the
disposition so natural in man of being wise above what is written.
They are not satisfied with believing a plain declaration of the
Saviour, * I and the Father are one. ' They undertake with the
utmost presumption and folly to explain in what manner the Father
and the Son are one ; but man might as well attempt to take
tij) the ocean in the hollow of his hand, as endeavour, by his
• 33 See Essay VI. (Second Series,) § 2, and also in John i. 21, our translators
^' ote h. ^ ^ ^ were apparently lookwig to some version
^ S4 Not, as in our version, *'/Aa^ Spirit;" in which an attempt is made to express
O i\ Kvfisf 'I'O !Tif:t*.'x« i<rr/». In this place, in Latin the.force of the Greek Articiu.
Arp. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 221
narrow understanding, to commprehend the manner of the Divine Person,
existence." .... P. 50.
*' Heresies, however, are not confined to the heterodox. While
the Arians and Semi-Arians were corrupting the truth hy every
subtilty of argument and ingenious perversion of terms, the
orthodox all the while were dogmatizing about the Divine nature
with a profusion of words which either had no meaning, or were
gross mistakes, or inapplicable metaphors when applied to the
infinite and spiritual existence of God. And not content with using
such arguments against the heretics as generally produced a new
heresy without refuting the former one, as soon as they obtained
the power, they expelled them from the Roman empire, and sent
them with all the zeal which persecution confers, and which the
orthodox, from their prosperity, had lost, to spread every variety
of error amongst the nations of the barbarians.
*' Orthodoxy was become a very nice afiuir, from the rigour of its
terms, and the perplexity of its creed, and very unlike the highway
for the simple, which the Gospel presents. A slip in a single
expression was enough to make a m.an a heretic. The use or
omission of a single word occasioned a new rent in Christianity.
Every heresy produced a new creed, and every creed a new heresy.
. . . , , Never does human folly and learned ignorance appear in
a more disgusting point of view than in these disputes of Christians
amongst themselves; nor does an}'^ study appear so well calculated
to foster infidelity *as the history of Christian sects, unless the
reader be guided by light from above, and carefully distinguish the
doctrines of the Bible from the miserable disputes of pretended
Christians." — P. 53.
To discuss this important subject more fully (or perhaps indeed
as fully as it has been here treated of) is hardly suitable to a
logical work ; and yet the importance of attending to the ambiguity
I have now been considering, cannot be duly appreciated, without
ofi'ering some remarks on the subject-matter with which that
ambiguity is connected ; and such remarks again, if scantily and
imperfectly developed, are open to cavil or mistake. I must take
the liberty therefore of referring the reader to such works, (in
addition to those already mentioned) both my own, and those of
others, as contain something of a fuller statement of the same
views. It may be added, that the views I have taken derive
confirmation, now that they have been so long before the public,
from the total absence (to the best of my knowledge) of all attempts
at refutation ; especially when considered in conjunction with the
strong objection to them which is felt by some. E.G. I have seen,
in an argumentative work, a warning given to the reader against
this very Article (by name) as containing very erroneous doctrine ; *
of which, however, no refutation at all is subjoined ; which one
cannot but suppose any writer would have done, who had ever
222 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Afp. iJ
Person. tliouglit of, or heard of, any, even plausible, arguments against the
doctrines censured. — See Essays, (First Series,) Essay II. § 4, and
Essays IV. and V.;— Second Series, Essay VI. § 2, p. 199; VII.
§ 3; and IX. § 1,— Third Series, Essay II. § 1. ArchibisJiop
King's /Sermon on Predestination, d'c, and Encychp. Metropol.
History, Chap. XXVII. p. 589, and Chap. XXXIV. p. 740.
Tosiibie. XX. POSSIBLE. — This word, like the others of kindred mean-
ing, relates sometimes to contingency, sometimes to power or liberty;
and these two senses are frequently confounded. In the first sense
we say, e.g. *' it is possible this patient may recover," not meaning,
that it depends on his choice; but that we are not sure whether the
event will not be such. In the other sense it is " possible" to the
best man to violate every rule of morality ; since if it were out of
his power to act so if he chose it, there would be no moral goodness
in the case ; though we are quite sure that such never will be his
choice. — See '* Impossible."
Preach. xxi. PREACH. — The word ** preach" has " so much slid from
its original sense ai proclaiming as a herald, as to obscure the sense
of every passage in which the preaching of the gospel, — [Kr,^vTTitv
TO ivxyyi'hiou,) — literally, 'proclaiming the good tidings,' occurs.
The sacred writers constantly preserve the disthiction between
* preaching' and 'teaching;' — 'announcing,' 'giving information
of an event ; ' and giving instruction to believers. And our trans-
lators have also, almost always, adhered to this distinction ; though
the word ' preach,' having in great measure acquired, in their time,
its secondary sense, there is one passage in which they inadvertently
so employ it. When the disciples were assembled at Troas, * to
break bread, Paul preached unto them, and as Paul was long preach-
ing, the young man Eutychus fell down from a window, and was
taken up dead :' the word lixXsyo.usvog should have been rendered 'dis-
coursing. ' To disciples, he did not, in the strict sense, 2^^^ecich. So
also it is not our business, in the strict sense, to ' preach the gospel,'
except to any who, from their tender years, or from neglected
education, have never had the glad tidings announced to them of
God's giving his Son for our salvation. Our ordinary occupation is not
to preach {kyiqCttsiu) but {lioxaKsiy) to teach men how to understand
the Scriptures, and to apply them to their lives." — Discourse
appended to '* Essays on the Dangers to Christian Faith.'' — Pp.
264, 2G5.
Priest. xxii. PRIEST.~^ee " Dissertation," Book IV. Ch. IV. § 2.
Etymologically, tjie word answers to Presbyter, i.e. Elder, in the
Christian Church, or Jewish Synagogue ;^ and is often appHed to
^' See Vitrin.^a on the Synagogue. The this valuable work, is an important addi-
abridged translation, by Mr. Bernard, of tion to our theological literature.
App. l.J AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 223
the second order of Clirlstian Ministers at tlie present day. But it Priest
is remarkable that it never occurs in this sense, in our translation of
the Scriptures: the word Tr^sa^vTsoog being always rendered by
Elder ; and its derivative, Priest, always given as the translation of
'Iggey?. This latter is an office assigned to none under the Gospel-
scheme, except the ONE great High Priest, of whom the Jewish
Priests were types, and who offered a sacrifice (that being the most
distinguishing office of a Priest in the sense of 'U^tvg) which is the
only one under the Gospel.
It is incalculable how much confusion has arisen from confounding
together the two senses of the word Priest, and thence, the two
offices themselves.
I have enlarged accordingly on this subject In a Sermon, delivered
before the University of Oxford, and subjoined to the last edition of
tlie Bampton Lectures. See also Essays, Third Series, Essay II.
xxlii. REASON. — This word is liable to many ambiguities, of Season,
which I propose to notice only a few of the most important. Some-
times it is used to signify all the intellectual powers collectively ; in
which sense it can hardly be said to be altogether denied to brutes ;
since several of what we reckon intellectual processes in the human
mind, are evidently such as some brutes are capable of.
Reason is, however, frequently employed to denote those intellec-
tual powers exclusively in which Man differs from brutes ; though
what these are no one has been able precisely to define. The
employment at will of the faculty of Abstraction seems to be
the principal ; that being, at least, principally concerned in the use
of Language. The Moral Faculty, or power of distinguishing right
from wrong, (which appears also to be closely connected with
Abstraction, without which it could not exist) Is one of which brutes
are destitute ; but then Dr. Paley and some other ethical writers
deny it to Man also. The description given by that author of our
discernment of good and bad conduct, {viz. as wholly dependent on
expectation of reward and punishment,) would In a great degree
apply to many of the brute-creation ; especially the more Intelligent
of domestic animals, as dogs and horses. It Is In this sense, how-
ever, that some writers speak of " Reason' as enabling us to judge
of virtue and vice ; not, as Dr. Campbell in his Philosophy of
Rhetoric has understood them, ic the sense of the power of argu-
mentation.
Reason, however. Is often used for the Faculty of carrying on the
** third operation" of the mind; viz. Reasoning, or Piatiocination.
And it is from inattention to this ambiguity, (which has been
repeatedly noticed In the course of the foregoing treatise,) that some
liave treated of Logic as the art of rightly employing the mental
faculties In general.
Reason Is also employed to signify the Premiss or Premises of an
224:
AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
[App. I.
Keasor. Argument; especially tlie Minor-Premiss ; and it is from Reason in
this sense tliat the word " Reasoning" is derived.
It is also very frequently used to signify a Cause ; as when we
say, in popular language, that the " Reason of an eclipse of the sun
is, that the moon is interposed between it and the earth." This
should be strictly called the cause. On the other hand, " Because"
{i.e. "by-Cause") is used to introduce either the Physical Cause or
the Logical proof: and "Therefore," "Hence," "Since," "Fol-
low," " Consequence," and many other kindred words, have a
corresponding ambiguity: e.g. "the ground is wet, because it has
rained;" or "it has rained, and hence the ground is wet;" this is
the assignment of the cause: again, "it has rained, because the
ground is wet;" "the ground is wet, and therefore it has rained:"
this is assigning the logical proof; the wetness of the ground is the
cause, not of the rain having fallen, but of our knowing that it has
fallen. And this probably it is that has led to the ambiguous use
in all languages of almost all the words relating to these two points.
It is an ambiguity which has produced incalculable confusion of
thought, and from which it is the harder to escape, on account of
its extending to those very forms of expression which are introduced
in order to clear it up.
What adds to the confusion is, that the Cause is often employed
as a Proof of the Effect :^^ as when we infer, from a great fall of
rain, that there is, or will be, a flood ; which is at once the physical
Effect, and the logical Conclusion. The case is just reversed, when
from a flood we infer that the rain has fallen.
The more attention any one bestows on this ambiguity, the more
extensive and important its results will appear. — /See Book I. § 2.
iSee also Rhetoric, Book I.
Regenera-
tion.
xxiv. REGENERATION.— This word is employed by some
Divines to signify the actual new life and character which ought to
distinguish the Christian ; by others, a release from a state of con-
demnation: — a reconciliation to God — adoption as his children, &c.,^'
which is a necessary preliminary to the entrance on such a state ;
(but which, unhappily, is not invariably followed by it:) and these
are, of course, as different things as a grain of seed sown, and " the
full corn in the ear."
Much controversy has taken place as to the time at which, and
the circumstances under which, " Regeneration " takes place ; the
greater part of which may be traced to this ambiguity.
'lamo.
XXV. SAME (as well as "One," "Identical," and other words
8« See Fallacies. " Non
causa." Book III. § 14
causa pro
27 " Baptism, wherein I teas
made a member of Christ, a child of God,
jind an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heu-
ven." . ..." A death unto sin, and a
new birth unto righteousness, &c." ....
We being regenerate, and made thy
children by adoption and grace," &o.
app.l] ambiguous terms. 225
derived from them) Is used frequently in a sense very different from Same,
its primary one ; (as applicable to a single object ;) viz. it is
employed to denote great similarity. When several objects are
undistinguishably alike, One single description will apply equally to
any of them ; and thence they are said to be all of one and the same
nature, appearance, (kc: as e.g. when we say, "this house is built
of th.e same stone with such another," we only mean that the stones
are undistinguishable in their qualities ; not that the one building was
pulled down, and the other constructed with the materials. Whereas
Sameness, in the primary sense, docs not even necessarily imply
Similarity; for if we say of any man that he is greatly altered
since such a time, we understand, and indeed imply by the very
expression, that he is 0)ie 2?erson, though different in several
qualities ; else it would not be he. It is worth observing also that
'* Same," in the secondary sense, admits, according to popular
usage, of degrees: we speak of two things being nearly the same,
but not entirely; personal identity does not admit of degrees.
Nothing, perhaps, has contributed more to the error of Realism
than inattention to this ambiguity. When several persons are said
to have One aiul the same opinion — thought — or idea, — many men,
overlooking the true simple statement of the case, which is, that
they are all thinking alike, look for something more abstruse and
mystical, and imagine there must be some One Thing, in the
primary sense, though not an individual, which is present at once
in the mind of each of these persons : and thence readily sprung
Plato's theory of Ideas ; each of which was, according to him, one
real, eternal object, existing entire and complete in each of the
individual objects that are known by one name. Hence, first in
poetical mythology, and ultimately, perhaps, in popular belief,
Fortune, Liberty, Prudence, (Minerva,) a Boundary, (Terminus,)
and even the Mildew of Corn, (Rubigo,) (fee, became personified,
deified, and represented by Statues ; somewhat according to tbe
process Avhich is described by Swift, in his humorous manner, in
speaking of Zeal, (in the Tale of a Tub,) "how from a notion it
became a word, and from thence, in a hot summer, ripened into a
tangible Substance." We find Seneca thinking it necessary gravely
to combat the position of some of his Stoical predecessors, "that
the Cardinal Virtues are Animals;" while the Hindoos of the
present day, from observing the similar symptoms which are known
by the name of Small-pox, and the communication of the like from
one patient to another, do not merely call it (as we do) one disease,
but beheve (if we may credit the accounts given) that the Small-pox
is a Goddess, who becomes incarnate in each infected patient. All
these absurdities are in fact but the extreme and ultimate point of
of Reahsm. — See Dissertation, Book IV. Chap. V.
xxvi. SIN, in its ordinary acceptation, means some actual Sin.
226 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Apr. I.
Sin. transgression, in thought, word, or deed, of the moral law, or of
a positive divine precept. It has also, what may be called, a
theological sense, in which it is used for that sinfulness or frailty,
— that liability, or proneness, to transgression, which all men
inherit from our first parents, and which is commonly denominated
"original" Sin;"^ in which sense we find such expressions as "in
Sin hath my Mother conceived me." The word seems also to be
still further transferred, to signify the state of condemnation itself
in which the children of Adam are "by nature born," in consequence
of this sinful tendency in them : (or, according to some divines, in
consequence of the very guilt of Adam's offence being actually
imputed to each individual of his posterity.^^) It must be in the
sense of a " state of condemnation," that our Church, in her office
for Infant Baptism, speaks of "remission of Sins," with reference to
a child, which is no moral agent: "following the innocency of
children," {i.e. of actual Sin) being mentioned within a few sentences.
And as it is plain that actual Sin cannot, in the former place, be
meant, so, neither can it be, in this place, msnis proneness to Sin:
since the baptismal office would not pray for, and hold out a
promise of "release'' and "remission'" of that (ppov/if^a aotpx,6g which,
according to the Article, "remains even in the regenerate."
Though all Theologians probably are aware of these distinctions,
yet much confusion of thought has resulted from their not being
always attended to.
Sincerity, xxvii. SINCERITY and SINCERE, have a tAvofold meaning of
great moral importance. Sincerity is often used to denote mere
"reality of conviction;" — that a man actually believes what he
professes to believe. Sometimes again it is used to denote " unbi-
assed conviction;" or at least an earnest endeavour to shake off all
prejudices, and all undue influence of wishes and passions on the
judgment, and to decide impartially.
It is in this latter sense that " sincerity" is justly regarded as so
commendable a quality, that many and great errors are reckoned
pardonable in proportion as a man has earnestly and sincerely
endeavoured to ascertain what is right and true : while he who has
not acted thus, bat has allowed himself to be biassed by self-interest
88 Of the d£gree of this depravity of our carelessness with which some are apt to
nature, various accounts are given ; some express themselves, as if this frailty were
representing it as amounting to a total introduced as a consequence of Adam's
loss of the moral faculty, or even, to a transgression; as if, supposing him not
preference of evil for its own sake ; others frail, he tcould have so transgressed,
making it to consist in a certain undue 391 must a§ain remind the reader that,
preponderance of the lower propensities I am inquirmg only into the senses in
over tlie nobler sentiments, &c. But these which each word hns, actually been used ;
seem to be not differonces as to the seiise not into the truth or falsity of each
of the word, (with which alone we are doctrine in question. On the present
here concerned) but as to the state of the question, see Essays on the DifficuUUs in
fact. St. PauVs Writings, Essay VI.
It is worth while to notice how ever the
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 227
or passion, deserves no credit for tlie " sincerity" [i.e. reality) of liis sinceriti'
conviction, even if it should happen to be in itself a right one.
It is a common mistake to suppose that the only influence of
interest, party spirit, or other improper motives is to induce men
to make professions contrary to their real conviction. But ** a
gift," as the Scriptures express it, *' blinds the eyes." Not only
the outward profession hut the real convictions of the judgment are
liable to be biassed by such motives. In fact " sincerity" in this
sense will usually be the last stage of depravity: as Aristotle has
remarked in respect of the character of the 'AfcoT^ctaro;, — the man
who from long indulgence in vice has so corrupted his principles as
to feel no disapprobation of it. It is notorious that liars often bring
themselves by continual repetition to ** credit their own lie."**
And universally any one who persists in what is wrong, and in
seeking excuses to justify it, will usually in time succeed in
deceiving himself into the belief that it is right,*^ and thus warping
his conscience.
Yet the credit due to the one kind of conscientious Sincerity is
often (partly through this ambiguity) bestowed on the other. But
it makes all the difference whether you pursue a certain course
because you judge it right, or judge it to be right because you pursue
it ; — whether you follow your conscience vji one follows a guide, or
as one follows the Jwrses in a carriage, while he himself guides theim
according to his wiU.
xxviii. TENDENCY. — " The doctrine, as mischievous as it Is, I Tendencj
conceive unfounded, that since there is a tendency in population to
increase faster than the means of subsistence, hence, the pressure
of population against subsistence may be expected to become greater
and greater in each successive generation, (unless new and extra-
ordinary remedies are resorted to,) and thus to produce a progressive
diminution of human welfare ; — this doctrine, which some maintain,
in defiance of the fact that all civilized countries have a greater
proportionate amount of wealth, (in other words, a smaller popula-
tion, in proportion to the means of subsistence) now, than formerly,
— ^may be traced chiefly to an undetected ambiguity in the word
* tendency, ' which forms a part of the middle term of the argument.
By a 'tendency' towards a certain result is sometimes meant, * the
existence of a cause which, if operating unimpeded, would produce
that result.' In this sense it maybe said, with truth, that the earth,
or any other body moving round a centre, has a tendency to fly oflT
at a tangent ; i.e. the centrifugal force operates in that direction,
though it is controlled by the centripetal ; or, again, that man has a
greater tendency to fall prostrate than to stand erect; i.e. the
attraction of gravitation and the position of the centre of gravity,
«a Shakespere— The Tempest. « See Epistle to Rom. ch. i.
228
AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
[Apf. I.
Tendency, are siicli that the least breath of air would overset him, hut for the
vokmtary exertion of muscular force : ami, again, that population
has a tendency to increase beyond subsistence ; i.e. there are in man
propensities, which, if unrestrained, lead to that result.
*' But sometimes, again, * a tendency towards a certain result' is
understood to mean * the existence of such a state of things that
that result may he exiJeded to take place. ' Now it is in these tioo
senses that the word is used, in the two premises of the argument
in question. But in this latter sense, the earth has a greater
tendency to remain in its orbit than to fly oiF from it ; man has a
greater tendency to stand erect than to fall prostrate ; and (as may
be proved by comparing a more barbarous with a more civilized
period in the history of any Country) in the progress of society,
subsistence has a tendency to increase at a greater rate than popu-
lation ; or at least with a continually diminishing infenoiiiy. In
this Country, for instance, much as our population has increased
within the last five centuries, it yet bears a far less ratio to subsis-
tence (though still a much greater than could be wished) than it did
five hundred years ago."^ But many of the writers I have alluded
to seem to have confounded " an excess of increase'' with " an
increase oiih.Q excess.'^
Therefore. THEREFORE.— fe " REASON," and '* Why."
■Jiuth. xxix. TRUTH, in the strict logical sense, applies to proposi-
tions, and to nothing else ; and consists in the conformity of the
declaration made to the actual state of the case ; agreeably to
Aldrich's definition of a " true" proposition — vera est, quas quod
res est dicit.
It would be an advantage if the word Trueness or Verity could
be introduced and employed in this sense, since the word Truth is
so often used to denote the " true" Proposition itself. " What I
tell you is the Truth; the Truth of what I say shall be proved;" the
term is here used in these two senses; mz., in the " concrete," and
in the " abstract" sense. *^ In like manner Falsehood is often
opposed to truth in both these senses; being commonly used to
signify the quality of a false proposition. But as we have the word
Fcdsity, which properly denotes this, I have thought it best, in a
scientific treatise, always to employ it for that purpose.
In its etymological sense. Truth signifies that which the speaker
"trows," or believes to be the fact. The etymology of the word
AAH0ES seems to be similar; denoting non-concealment. In this
sense it is opposed to a Lie; and may be called Moral, as the other
may Logical, Truth. A witness, therefore, may comjily with his
oath to speak the Truth, though it so happen that he is mistaken in
« Pol. Econ. Lect. IX. pp. 248-250.
«JeeBookII. Ch. V. § 1.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 229
some particular of liis evidence, provided he is fullj convinced that Truth
the thing is as he states it.
Truth is not unfrequently apphed, in loose and inaccurate lan-
guage, to argumerds ; where the proper expression would be "cor-
rectness," "conclusiveness," or "validity."
Truth, again, is often used in the sense of Reality, TO ON.
People speak of the Truth or Falsity oi facts; properly speaking,
they are either real ov fictitious: it is the statement that is " true "
or "false." The "true" cause of any thing, is a common expres-
sion; meaning "that which may with Truth be assigned as the
cause." The senses of Falsehood correspond.
"Truth" in this sense, of "reality," is also opposed to shadows
' — types — pictures, &c. Thus, " the Law was given by Moses, but
grace and 'truth' came by Jesus Christ:" for the Law had only a
** shadow of good things to come."
The present is an ambiguity of which advantage has been often
taken — through a deficiency either in candour or in clearness of
thought — in advocating the claims of the Romish Church ; the
ambiguity of the word Church (which see) lending its aid to the
fallacy. " Even the Protestants," they say, "dare not deny ours
to be a 'true Church;' now there can be but 'one true Church:' "
(which they support by those passages of Scripture which relate to
the collective Body of Christians in all those several Societies which
also are called in Scripture, Churches ;) " ours therefore must be the
true Cliurch; if you forsake us, you forsake the truth and the
Church, and consequently shut yourself out from the promises of the
Gospel." Those who are of a logical and accurate turn of mind
will easily perceive that the sense in which the Romish Church is
admitted by her opponents to be a true Church, is that of reality; —
it is a real, not a jjretencled Church; — it may be truly said to be a
Church. The sense in which the concession is sometimes made use
of, is that of a Church teaching true doctrines; which was never
conceded to the Church of Rome by Protestants ; who hold, that a
Church may err without ceasing to be a Church.
" The Church is one,^^ then, not, as consisting of One Society,
but because the various societies or Churches were then modelled,
and ought still to be so, on the same principles ; and because they
enjoy common privileges, — one Lord, one Spirit, one baptism.
Accordingly, the Holy Ghost, through his agents the Apostles, has
not left any detailed account of the formation of any Christian
society ; but He has very distinctly marked the great principles on
which all Avere to be founded, whatever distinctions may exist amongst
them. In short, the foundation of the Church by the Apostles was
not analogous to the work of Romulus or Solon ; it was not, properly,
the foundation of Christian societies which occupied them, but the
'■A See " One." *
230
AMBIGUOUS TERMS.
[App. I.
Truth. establishment of the principles on which Christians In all ages might
form societies for themselves.
** The above accomit is sufficiently established even by the mere
negative circumstance of the absence of all mention in the Sacred
Writings of any one Society on earth, having a Government and
officers of its own, and recognized as the Catholic or Universal
Church : especially when it is considered that the frequent mention
of the particular Churches at Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Corinth,
&c. — of the Seven Churches in Asia, — and of ' the care of all the
Churches' which Paul had founded, would have rendered unavoidable
the notice of the One Church (had there been any such) which bore
rule over all the rest, either as its subjects, or as provincial depart-
ments of it."^
Unffy. UNITY.— ^ee'' One."
vhence. WHENCE.— /^ce " Why," and " Reason."
Wljy? XXX. WHY? — As an Interrogative, this word Is employed In three
senses: viz. " By what proof?" (or Reason.) " From what Cause?"
"For what purpose?" This last is commonly called the "final
cause." E.G. *' Why Is this prisoner guilty of the crime ? " *' Why
does a stone fall to the earth?" " Why did you go to London?"
Much confusion has arisen from not distinguishing these different
inquiries. /See Reason.
Terms of
I'olitical
Economy.
N.B. As the words which follow are all of them connected
together in their significations, and as the explanations of their
ambiguities have been furnished by the kindness of the Professor of
Political Economy, it seemed advisable to place them by themselves,
and in the order in which they appeared to him most naturally to
arrange themselves.
The foundation of Political Economy being a few general proposi-
tions deduced from observation or from consciousness, and generally
admitted as soon as stated, it might have been expected that there
would be as little difference of opinion among Political-Economists
as among Mathematicians ; that, being agreed in their premises,
they could not differ in their conclusions, but through some error in
reasoning, so palpable as to be readily detected. And if they had
possessed a vocabulary of general terms as precisely defined as the
mathematical, this would probably have been the case. But as the
4* " Essays on the Dangers," &c. Note A, pp. 169, 17,
APP. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 231
terms of this Science are drawn from common discourse, and seldom Terms of
carefully defined by the Avriters who employ them, hardly one of Economy.
them has any settled and invariable meaning, and their ambiguities
are perpetually overlooked. The principal terms are only seven:
'viz. Value, Wealth, Labour, Capital, Rent, Wages, Profits.
1. VALUE. As value is the only relation with which Political Value
Economy is conversant, we might expect all Economists to be agreed
as to its meaning; There is no subject as to which they are less
agreed.
The popular, and far the most convenient, use of the word, is to
signify the capacity of being given and received in exchange. So
defined, it expresses a relation. The value of any one thing must
consist in the several quantities of all other things which can be
obtained in exchange for it, and never can remain fixed for au
instant. Most writers admit the propriety of this definition at the
outset, but they scarcely ever adhere to it.
Adam Smith defines Value to mean either the utility of a par-
ticular object, or the power of purchasing other goods which the
possession of that object conveys. The first he calls " Value in
use," the second '* Value in exchange." But he soon afterwards
says, that equal quantities of labour at all times and places are of
equal Value to the labourer, whatever may be the quantity of goods he
receives in return for them ; and that labour never varies in its own
Value. It is clear that he affixed, or thought he had affixed, some
other meaning to the word ; as the first of these propositions is contra-
dictory, and the second false, whichever of his two definitions we adopt.
Mr. Ricardo appears to set out by admitting Adam Smith's
definition of Value in exchange. But in the greater part of his
" Principles of Political Economy," he uses the word as synonymous
with Cost : and by this one ambiguity has rendered his great work
a long enigma.
Mr. Malthus*^ defines Value to be the power of purchasing. In
the very next page he distinguishes absolute from relative value, a
distinction contradictory to his definition of the term, as expressive
of a relation.
Mr. M'Culloch*^ distinguishes between real and exchangeable,
or relative value. And in his nomenclature, the exchangeable, or
relative, Value of a commodity, consists in its capacity of purchas-
ing; its real Value in the quantity of labour required for its pro-
duction or appropriation.
All these differences apj)ear to arise from a confusion of cause
and eff"ect. Having decided that commodities are Valuable in pro-
portion to the labour they have respectively cost, it was natural to
call that labour their Value.
^ " Measure of Value," p. 1.
*« " Priiicipieb of Poiiticul E
Economy," Pai't III. sect. 1,
232 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Apf. I.
Wealth. 2. WEALTH. Lord Lauderdale has defined Wealth to he *' all
that man desires." Mr. Malthus/^ "those material objects which
are necessary, useful, or agreeable." Adam Smith confines the
term to that portion of the results of land and labour which is
capable of being accumulated. The French Economists, to the
net product of land. Mr. M'Culloch*^ and M. Storch,^° to those
material products which have exchangeable value ; according to
Colonel Torrens^^ it consists of articles which possess utility, and
are produced by some portion of volmitary efi"ort." M. Say^^ divides
wealth into natural and social, and applies the latter term to
whatever is susceptible of exchange. It will be observed that
the principal diff"erence between these definitions consists in the
admission or rejection of the qualifications " exchangeable," and,
•' material." ^^
It were well if the ambiguities of this word had done no more
than puzzle philosophers. One of them gave birth to the mercantile
system. In common language, to grow rich is to get money; to
diminish in fortune is to lose money : a rich man is said to have a
great deal of money ; a poor man, very little : and the terms Wealth
and Money are in short employed as synonymous. In consequence
of these popular notions (to use the words of Adam Smith) all the
different nations of Europe have studied every means of accumu-
lating gold and silver in their respective countries. This they have
attempted by prohibiting the exportation of money, and by giving
bounties on the exportation, and imposing restrictions on the impor-
tation, of other commodities, in the hope of producing what has
been called a "favourable balance of trade;" that is, a trade in
which, the imports being always of less value than the exports, the
difference is paid in money. A conduct as wise as that of a trades-
man who should part with his goods only for money ; and instead
of employing their price in paying his workmen's wages, or replac-
ing his stock, should keep it for ever in his till. The attempt to
force such a trade has been as vain, as the trade, if it could have
been obtained, would have been mischievous. But the results have
been fraud, punishment, and poverty at home, and discord and war
without. It has made nations consider the Wealth of their cus-
tomers a source of loss instead of profit; and an advantageous
^ " Principles of Political Economy," any actual transfer from hand to hand of
p- 28. a material object. For instance, when
49 " Supplement to the Encyclopjedia the cojiyright of a book is sold to a book-
Britannica," "Vol. VI. p. 217. seller, the article transferred is not the
50 " Cours d'Economie Politique," mere paper covered with writing, but the
Tome I. p. 91. Paris edit. exclusive privilege of printing and pub-
51 " Production of Wealth," p. 1. lishing. It is plain, however, on a mo-
52 " Traite d'Economie Pol." Liv. II. ment's thought, that the transaction is as
Chap. II. real an excliange, as that which takes
53 •' In many cases, where an exchange place between the bookseller and his
really takes place, the fact is liable (till customers who buy copies of the work."
the attention is called to it) to be over- —Introd. to Pol. Econ.hQct. I.
looked, in consequence of our not seeing
Afp. I.l AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 233
market a curse instead of a blessing. By inducing them to refuse Wealth,
to profit by the peculiar advantages in climate, soil, or industry,
possessed by their neighbours, it has forced them in a great measure
to give up their own. It has for centuries done more, and perhaps
for centuries to come will do more, to retard the improvement of
Europe than all other causes put together.
3. LABOUR. — The word Labour signifies both the act of labour- Labour,
ing, and the result of that act. It is used in the first sense when
we talk of the wages of labour ; in the second when we talk of
accumulated labour. When used to express the act of labouring,
it may appear to have a precise sense, but it is still subject to
some ambiguity. Say's definition^* is " action suivie, dirigee vers un
but ;" Storch's,^"' " Taction des facultes humaines dirigee vers un but
utile." These definitions include a walk taken for the purposes of
health, and even the exertions of an agreeable converser.
The great defect of Adam Smith, and of our own economists in
general, is the want of definitions. There is, perhaps, no definition
01 Labour by any British Economist. If Adam Smith had framed
one, he would probably have struck out his celebrated distinction
between "productive" and "unproductive" labourers; for it is
difiicult to conceive any definition of Labour which will admit the
epithet " unproductive" to be applied to any of its subdivisions,
excepting that of misdirected labour. On the other hand, if Mr.
M'Culloch or Mr. Mill had defined Labour they Avould scarcely have
applied that term to the growth of a tree, or the improvement of
wine in a cellar.
4. CAPITAL. — This word, as might have been expected, from CapUaL
the complexity of the notions which it implies, has been used in
very difterent senses.
It is, as usual, undefined by Adam Smith. The general meaning
which he attached to it will however appear from his enumeration of
its species. He divides it^^ into Fixed and Circulating: including in
the first what the capitalist retains, in the second what he parts
with. Fixed Capital he subdivides into — 1. Machinery; 2. Shops
and other buildings used for trade or manufacture ; 3. Improve-
ments of Land ; 4. Knowledge and Skill. Circulating Capital he
subdivides into — 1. Money; 2. Provisions In the hands of the pro-
vision-venders ; 3. Unfinished materials of manufacture ; 4. Finished
work in the hands of the merchant or manufacturer ; such as furni-
ture in a cabinet-maker's shop, or trinkets in that of a jeweller.
The following is a hst of the definitions adopted by some of the
most eminent subsequent economists :
Ricardo^^ — " that part of the wealth of a country which is
« " Traite," &c. Tome II. p. 506. «7 " Principles of Political Economy,'*
« '• Cours," &c. Liv. I. Chap. IV. p. 89, 3d edit.
« Book II. Chap. 1
234* AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Afp. I.
Capital employed in production; consisting of food, clothing, tools, raw
materials, machinery, &c,, necessary to give effect to labour."
Malthus^*^ — '* that portion of the material possessions of a country
"which is destined to be employed with a view to profit."
Say^^ — "accumulation de valours soustraites a la consomption
improductive." Chap. III. ** Machinery, necessaries of the work-
man, materials."
Storch^ — " un fonds de richesses destine a la production ma-
terielle."
M'Culloch^^ — " that portion of the produce of industry which
can be made directly available to support human existence or facili-
tate production."
Mill*'^ — " something produced, for the purpose of being employed
as the mean towards a further production."
Torrens^^ — '* those things on which labour has been bestowed,
and which are destined, not for the immediate supply of our wants,
but to aid us in obtaining other articles of utility."
It is obvious that few of these definitions exactly coincide. Adam
Smith's (as implied in his use of the term; for he gives no formal
definition) excludes the necessaries of the labourer, when in his own
possession ; all the rest (and perhaps with better reason) admit them.
On the other hand, Adam Smith admits (and in that he seems to be
right) those things which are incapable of productive consumption,
provided they have not yet reached their consumers. All the other
definitions, except perhaps that of Mr. Malthus, which is ambiguous,
are subject to the inconsistency of affirming that a diamond, and the
gold in which it is to be set, are Capital while the jeweller keeps
them separate, but cease to be so when he has formed them into a
ring ; almost all of them, also, pointedly exclude knowledge and
skill. The most objectionable, perhaps, is that of Mr. M'CuUoch,
which, while it excludes all the finished contents of a jeweller's shop,
would include a racing stud.
Adam Smith, however, is far from being consistent in his use of
the word ; thus, in the beginning of his second book he states, that
all Capitals are destined for the maintenance of productive labour
only. It is difficult to see what labour is maintained by what is to
be unproductively consumed.
5. RENT. 6. WAGES. 7. PROFIT.
Avr*es, Adam Smith first divided revenue Into Rent, Wages, and Profit ;
i'roiit an(j i^Js division has been generally followed. The following defini-
tions will best show the degree of precision wdth which these three
terms have been employed.
«8 " Principles," &c. p. 293. ei " Principles," &c. p. 02.
«» " Traite," <Scc. Tome 11, p. 454. 62 " Elements," &c. p. 1!), ;3d edit.
60 ' Cours," &c. Liv. II. Chap. I. «3 " Production of Wealtli," p. ii.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 235
Adam Smith.
1. Rent. Wliat Is paid for tlie license to gather the produce of Rent,^
the land. — Book I. Chap. YI. Protiu'
2. Wages. The price of labour. — Book I. Chap. V.
3. Profit. The revenue derived from stock by the person who
manages or employ's it. — Book I. Chap. VI.
Say. {Traite cVEconomie Politique.) 4eme Edit.
1. Rent. Le profit resultant du service productif de la terre. —
Tome II. p. 169.
2. Wages. Le prix de I'achat d'un service productif industriei.
^Tome II. p. 503.
3. Profit. La portion de la valeur produite, retiree par le capi-
taliste. — Tome I. p. 71, subdivided into interet, profit industriei,
and profit capital.
Storch. {Cours d'Economie Politique.) Paris, 1823.
1. Rent. Le prix qu'on paye pour I'usage d'un fonds de terre.
—Tome I. p. 354.
2. Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 283.
3. Profit. The returns to capital are considered by Storch, under
the heads, rente de capital, and profit d'lentrepreneur. The first
he divides into loyer, the hire of fixed capital, and interet, that of
circulating capital. The second he considers as composed of, 1st,
remuneration for the use of capital ; 2d, assurance against risk ;
3d, remuneration for trouble. — Liv. III. Chap. II. VIII. XIII.
SiSMOXDi. [Nouveau Princq^es, (fee.)
1. Rent. La part de la rocolte annuelle du sol qui revlent au
proprietaire apres qu'il a acquitte les frais qui I'ont fait naitre ;
and he analyzes rent into, 1st, la compensation du travail de la
terre: 2d, le prix de monopole: 3d, la mieux valeur que le
proprietaire obtient par la comparaison d'une terre de nature
superieure a uiie terre inferieure: 4th, le revenu des capitaux
qu'il a fixes luimeme sur la terre, et ne pent plus en retirer. —
Tome I. p. 280.
2. Wages. Le prix du travail. — p. 91.
3. Profit. La valeur dont I'ouvrage acheve surpasse les
avances qui I'ont fait faire. L'avantage qui resulte des travaux
passes. Subdivided into interet and profit mercantile. — ^p. 94, 359.
Malthus. {Principles, kc.)
1 . Rent. That portion of the value of the whole produce of land
which remains to the owner after payment of all the out-goings
235 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [Apr. T.
Kent, of cultivation, including average profits on tlie capital employed.
PrS' "^^^^ excess of price above wages and profits. — p. 134.
2. Wages. The remuneration of the labourer for his personal
exertions. — p. 240.
3. Profit. The difference between the value of the advances
necessary to produce a commodity, and the value of the commodity
when produced. — p. 293.
• Mill. {Elements, kc.) 3d. Ed.
1. Rent. The difi^erence between the return made to the most
productive, and that which is made to the least productive portion
of capital employed on the land. — p. 33.
2. Wages. The price of the labourer's share of the commodity
produced. — p. 41.
3. Profit. The share of the joint produce of labour and stock
which is received by the owner of stock after replacing the capital
consumed. The portion of the whole annual produce which remains
after deducting rent and wages. Remuneration for hoarded labour.
—Chap. II. III.
ToRREXS. {Com Trade.) 3d Ed.
1. Rent. That part of the produce which is given to the land-
proprietor for the use of the soil. — p. 130.
2. Wages. The articles of wealth which the labourer receives in
exchange for his labour. — p. 83.
3. Profit. The excess of value which the finished work possesses
above the value of the material, implements, and subsistence
expended. The surplus remaining after the cost of production has
been replaced. — Production of Wealth, p. 53.
M'CuLLOCH. {Principles, &c.)
1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which is paid
by the farmer to the landlord for the use of the natural and inherent
powers of the soil. — p. 265.
2. Wages. The compensation paid to labourers in return for
their services. — Essay on Rate of Wages, p. 1.
3. Profit. The excess of the commodities produced by the
expenditure of a given quantity of capital, over that quantity of
capital. — Principles, p. 366.
RiCARDO. {Principles, &c.) 3d Ed.
1. Rent. That portion of the produce of the earth which is
paid to the landlord for the use of the original and indestructible
powers of the soil. — p. 53.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. 237
2. Wages. The labourer's proportion of tlie produce. — Chap. Y. Rfnt»
3. Profit. The capitalist's proportioB of the produce. — Chap. VI. proti*?
The first observation to be made on these definitions, is, that the
Rent of land, which is only a species of an extensive genus, is used as
a genus, and that its cognate species are either omitted, or included
under genera to which they do not properly belong. Wages and
Profits are of human creation: they imply a sacrifice of ease or
immediate enjo^^ment, and bear a ratio to that sacrifice which is
indicated by the common expressions of **the rate of wages," and
the "rate of profits:" a ratio which has a strong tendency to uni-
formity. But there is another and a very large source of revenue
which is not the creation of man, but of nature ; which owes its
origin, not to the will of its possessor, but to accident ; which implies
no sacrifice, has no tendency to uniformity, and to which the term
" rate" is seldom applied.
This revenue arises from the exclusive right to some instrument
of production, enabling the employment of a given amount of labour
or capital to be more than usually productive. The principal of
these instruments is land ; but all extraordinary powers of body or
mind, — all processes in manufacture which are protected by secrecy
or by law, — all peculiar advantages from situation or connexion, —
in short, every instrument of production which is not imiversally
accessible, afi"ords a revenue distinct in its origin from Wages or
Profits, and of which the Rent of land is only a species. In the
classification of revenues, either Rent ought to have been omitted
as a genus, and considered only as an anomalous interruption of the
general uniformity of wages and profits, or all the accidental sources
of revenue ought to have been included in one genus, of which the
Rent of land would have formed the principal species.
Another remark is, that almost all these definitions of Profit
include the wages of tlie labour of tlie Capitalist. The continental
Economists have in general been aware of this, and have pointed it
out in their analyses of the component parts of Profit. The British
Economists have seldom entered into this analysis, and the want
of it has been a great cause of obscurity.
On the other hand, much of what properly belongs to Profit and
Rent is generally included under Wages. Almost all Economists
consider the members of the liberal professions under the class of
labourers. The whole subsistence of such persons, observes Mr.
M'CuUoch,*^ is derived from Wages; and they are as evidently
labourers as if they handled the spade or the plough. But it should
be considered, that those who are engaged in any occupation requiring
more skill than that of a common husbandman, must have expended
capital, more or less, on the acquisition of their skill ; their educa-
0* " Principles," &c. p. 228.
238 AMBIGUOUS TERMS. [App. I.
Rfnt, tlon must have cost sometliing in every case, from that of the handi-
jTofil*' craft apprentice, to that of the legal or medical student ; and a Profit
on this outlay is of course looked for, as in other disbursements of
capital ; and the higher profit, in proportion to the risk ; viz. the
uncertaint}'- of a man's success in his business. Part, therefore,
and generally far the greater part, of Avhat has been reckoned the
wages of his labour ought more properly to be reckoned profits on
the capital expended in fitting him for that particular kind of labour.
And again, all the excess of gains acquired by one possessing
extraordinary talents, opportunities, or patronage (since these cor-
respond to the possession of land, — of a patent-right, — or other
monopoly, — of a secret, &,c.) may be more properly regarded as Rent
than as Wages.
Another most fruitful source of ambiguity arises from the use of
the word Wages, sometimes as expressing a quantity, sometimes as
expressing a proportion.
In ordinary language, Wages means the amount of some com-
mocUtif, generally of silver, given to the labourer in return for a
given exertion ; and they rise or fall, as that amount is increased or
diminished.
In the language of Mr. Ricardo, they usually mean the labourer's
2yroportion of what is produced, supposing that produce to be divided
between him and the Capitalist. In this sense they generally rise
as the whole produce is diminished ; though if the word be used in
the other sense, they generally fall. If Mr. Ricardo had constantly
i\sed the word "Wages," to express a, proportion, the only incon-
venience would have been the necessity of always translating this
expression into common language. But he is not consistent. When
he says,*^ that "whatever raises the Wages of labour lowers the
Profits of stock," he considers Wages as a proportion. When he
says,^^ that "high Wages encourage population;" he considers
wages as an amount. Even Mr. M'Culloch, who has clearly
explained the ambiguity, has not escaped it. He has even suffered
it to afi"ect his reasonings. In his valuable essay, " On the Rate of
Wages, "^^ he admits that "when Wages are high, the Capitalist
has to pay a larger share of the produce of industry to his labourers."
An admission utterly inconsistent with his general use of the word,
as expressing the amount of what the labourer receives, which, as
he has himself observed,^ may increase while his proportion
diminishes.
A few only have been noticed of the ambiguities which attach to
the seven terms that have been selected ; and these terms have been
fixed on, not as the most ambiguous, but as the most important, in
the political nomenclature. "Supply and Demand," "Productive
«-5 " Principles," &c., p. 312. 67 p. 161.
<W Ibid. p. 83. « P. 3Ud.
App. I.] AMBIGUOUS TERMS. _ 239
and Unproductive," "Overtrading," and very many others, botli Rent,
in political economy, and in other subjects, which are often used prSiat?
without any more explanation, or any more suspicion of their
requiring it, than the words "triangle " Or "twenty," are perhaps
even more liable to ambiguities than those above treated of. But it
is sufficient for the purpose of this Appendix to have noticed, by way
of specimens, a few of the most remarkable terms in several different
branches of knowledge, in order to show both the frequency of an
ambiguous uss of language, and the importance of clearing up such
ambiguity.
APPENDIX.
No. II.
MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES FOR THE EXERCISE OF LEARNEHS.
N.B. In such of tlie following Examples as are not in a syllogistic
form, it is intended that the student should practise the reduction
of them into that form; those of them, that is, in which the
reasoning is in itself sound : viz. where it is impossible to admit
the Premises and deny the Conclusion. Of such as are apparent
Syllogisms, the validity must be tried by logical rules, which
it may be advisable to apply in the following order: 1st.
Observe whether the argument be Categorical or Hypothetical ;
recollecting that an hypothetical Premiss does not necessarily
imply an hypothetical Syllogism, unless the reasoning turns
on the hypothesis. If this appear to be the case, the rules for
hypothetical Syllogisms must be applied. 2dly. If the argmnent
be categorical, count the terms. 3dly. If only three, observe
whether the Middle be distributed. 4thly. Observe whether the
Premises are both negative ; {i.e. really, and not in appearance
only,) and if one is, whether the Conclusion be negative also ; or
affirmative, if both Premises affirmative. 5thly. Observe what
terms are Distributed in the conclusion, and whether the same
are distributed in the Premises. 6thly. If the Syllogism is not a
Categorical in the first Figure, reduce it to that form.
1. No one is free who is enslaved by his appetites: a sensualist
in enslaved by his appetites : therefore a sensuaUst is not free.
2. None but Whites are civilized: the ancient Germans were
Whites : therefore they were civilized.
3. None but Whites are civilized : the Hindoos are not Whites :
therefore they are not civilized.
4. None but civilized people are Whites: the Gauls were Whites:
therefore they were civilized.
5. No one is rich who has not enough: no miser has enough:
therefore no miser is rich.
6. If penal laws against Papists were enforced, they would be
App. II.] EXAMPLES. 241
aggrieved : but penal laws against them are not enforced : therefore
the Papists are not aggrieved.
7. If all testimony to miracles is to he admitted, the popish
legends are to be believed: but the popish legends are not to
be believed : therefore no testimony to miracles is to be admitted.
8. If men are not likely to be influenced in the performance of a
known duty by taking an oath to perform it, the oaths commonly
administered are superfluous : if they are likely to be so influenced,
every one should be made to take an oath to behave rightly
throughout his life; but one or the other of these must be the case:
tlierefore either the oaths commonly administered are superfluous,
or every man should be made to take an oath to behave rightly
throughout his life.
9. The Scriptures must be admitted to be agreeable to truth ;
and the Church of England is conformable to the Scriptures ; A, B,
is a divine of the Church of England; and this opinion is in
accordance with his sentiments : therefore it must be presumed to
be true.
10. Enoch (according to the testimony of Scripture,) pleased
God ; but without faith it is impossible to please Him ; (for he that
Cometh to God must believe that He is, and that He is a rewarder
of them that diligently seek Him): therefore, <fcc.
11. "If Abraham were justified by works, then had he whereof
to glory [before God:] but not [any one can have whereof to glory] before
God:" therefore Abraham was not justified by works.
12. " He that is of God hearetli my words: ye therefore hear
them not, because ye are not of God."
13. Few treatises of science convey important truths, without any
intermixture of error, in a perspicuous and interesting form: and
therefore, though a treatise would deserve much attention which
should possess such excellence, it is plain that few treatises of science
do deserve much attention.
14. We are bound to set apart one day in seven for religious
duties, if the fourth commandment is obligatory on us : but we are
bound to set apart one day in seven for religious duties ; and hence
it appears that the fourth commandment is obligatory on us.
15. Abstinence from the eating of blood had reference to the
divine institution of sacrifices : one of the precepts delivered to Noah
was abstinence from the eating of blood ; therefore one of the pre-
cepts delivered to Noah contained the divine institution of sacrifices.
16. If expiatory sacrifices were divinely appointed before the
Mosaic law, they must have been expiatory, not of ceremonial sin
(which could not then exist), but of moral sin: if so, the Levitical
sacrifices must have had no less efficacy; and in that case, the
atonements under the Mosaic law would have "made the comers
thereunto perfect as pertaining to the conscience;" but this was not
the case : therefore, &C. [Davison on Prophecy.]
242 EXAMPLES. [App.II.
17. Tlie adoration of images is forbidden to Cliristians, if we
suppose the Mosaic law designed not for the Israehtes alone, hut for
all men: it was designed, however, for the Israelites alone, and not
for all men: therefore the adoration of images is not forbidden to
Christians.
18. A desire to gain by another's loss is a violation of the tenth
commandment: all gaming, therefore, since it imphes a desire to
profit at the expense of another, involves a breach of the tenth
commandment.
19. All the fish that the net enclosed were an indiscriminate
mixture of various kinds : those that were set aside and saved as
valuable, were fish that the net enclosed : therefore those that were
set aside, and saved as valuable, were an indiscriminate mixture of
various kinds.
20. All the elect are finally saved : such persons as are arbitrarily
separated from tlae rest of mankind by the divine decree are the
elect : therefore such persons as are arbitrarily separated from the
rest of mankind by the divine decree, are finally saved. [The oppo-
nents of this Conclusion generally deny the Minor Premiss and admit the Major; the
reverse would be the more sound and the more effectual objection.]
21. No one who lives with another on terms of confidence is
justified, on any pretence, in killing him : Brutus lived on terms of
confidence with Csesar: therefore he was not justified, on the pre-
tence he pleaded, in killing him.
22. He that destroys a man who usurps despotic power in a free
country deserves well of his countrymen : Brutus destroyed Csesar,
who usurped despotic power in Rome : therefore he deserved well of
the Romans.
23. If virtue is voluntary, vice is voluntary: virtue is voluntary:
therefore so is vice. [Aristh. Eth. B. Ill,]
24. A wise lawgiver must either recognise the rewards and
punishments of a future state, or must be able to appeal to an
extraordinary Providence, dispensing them regularly in this life;
Moses did not do the former: therefore he must have done the
latter. [Warburton.]
25. Nothing which is of less frequent occurrence than the falsity
of testimony can be fairly established by testimony : any extraordi-
nary and unusual fact is a thing of less frequent occurrence than the
falsity of testimony (that being very common) : therefore no extra-
ordinary and unusual fact can be fairly established by testimony.
26. Testimony is a kind of evidence which is very likely to be
false : the evidence on which- most men believe that there are pyra-
mids in Egypt is testimony: therefore the evidence on which most
men believe that there are pyramids in Egypt is very likely to be
false.
27. The religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans was a tissue
of extravagant fables and groundless superstitions, credited by the
App. II.] EXAMPLES. 243
vulgar and the weak, and maintained by the more enlightened, from
selfish or political views: the same was clearly the case with the
religion of the Egyptians : the same may be said of the Brahminical
worship of India, and the religion of Fo, professed by the Chinese :
the same, of the romantic mythological system of the Peruvians, of
the stern and bloody rites of the Mexicans, and those of the Britons
and of the Saxons: hence we may conclude that all systems of
religion, however varied in circumstances, agree in being supersti-
tions kept up among the vulgar, from interested or political views in
the more enlightened classes. [See Dissertation, Chap. I. § 2.]
28. No man can possess power to perform impossibilities; a
miracle is an impossibility : therefore no man can possess power to
perform a miracle. [See Appendix, Art. " Impossible."]
29. A, B, and C, D, are each of them equal to E, F : therefore
they are equal to each other.
30. Protection from punishment is plainly due to the innocent ;
therefore, as you maintain that this person ought not to be punished,
it appears that you are convinced of his innocence.
31. All the most bitter persecutions have been religious persecu-
tions : among the most bitter persecutions were those which occurred
in France during the revolution : tiierefore they must have been
religious persecutions.
32. He who cannot possibly act otherwise than he does, has
neither merit nor demerit in his action : a liberal and benevolent
man cannot possibly act otherwise than he does in relieving the
poor : therefore such a man has neither merit nor demerit in his
action. [See Appendix, Art. " Impossible."]
33. What happens every day is not improbable: some things
against which the chances are many thousands to one, happen every
day: therefore some things against which the chances are many
thousands to one, are not improbable.
34. The early and general assignment of the Epistle to the
Hebrews to Paul as its author, must have been either from its pro-
fessing to be his, and containing his name, or from its really being
his ; since, therefore, the former of these is not the fact, the Ep'istle
must be Paul's.
35. " With some of them God was not well pleased; for they
were overthrown in the wilderness."
36. A sensualist wishes to enjoy perpetual gratifications without
satiety: it is impossible to enjoy perpetual gratifications without
satiety: therefore it is impossible for a sensualist to obtain his
wish.
37. If Paley's system Is to be received, one who has no knowledge
of a future state has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice:
now one who has no means of distinguishing virtue and vice can
commit no sin: therefore, if Paley's system is to be received, one
who has no knowledge of a future state can commit no sin.
244 EXAMPLES. Upp. II.
38. The principles of justice are variable : the appointments of
nature are invariable : therefore the principles of justice are no
appointment of nature. [Arist. Eth. B. V.]
39. Every one desires happiness : virtue is happiness : therefore
every one desires virtue. [Arist. Eth. B. III.]
40. A story is not to be believed, the reporters of which give
contradictory accounts of it ; the story of the life and exploits of
Buonaparte is of this description : therefore it is not to be believed.
[See B. I. § 3.]
41. When the observance of the first day of the week as a
religious festival in commemoration of Christ's resurrection, was first
introduced, it must have been a novelty : when it was a novelty, it
must have attracted notice : when it attracted notice, it would lead
to inquiry respecting the truth of the resurrection : when it led to
this inquiry, it must have exposed the story as an imposture, sup-
posing it not attested by living witnesses : therefore, when the
observance of the first day of the week, &c., was first introduced, it
must have exposed as an imposture the story of the resurrection,
supposing it not attested by living witnesses.
42. All the miracles of Jesus would fill more books than the
world could contain: the things related by the Evangelists are the
miracles of Jesus: therefore the things related by the Evangelists
would fill more books than the world could contain.
43. If the prophecies of the Old Testament had been written
without knowledge of the events of the time of Christ, they could
not correspond with tliem exactly ; and if they had been forged by
Christians, they would not be preserved and acknowledged by the
Jews : they are preserved and acknowledged by the Jews, and they
correspond exactly with the events of the time of Christ : therefore
they were neither written without knowledge of those events, nor
were forged by Christians.
44. Of two evils the less is to be preferred : occasional turbulence,
therefore, being a less evil than rigid despotism, is to be preferred to it.
45. According to theologians, a man must possess faith in order
to be acceptable to the Deity : now he who believes all the fables of
the Hindoo mythology must possess faith: therefore such an one
must, according to theologians, be acceptable to the Deity.
46. If Abraham were justified, it must have been either by faith
or by works : now he was not justified by faith, (according to James,)
nor by works, (according to Paul): therefore Abraham was not
justified.
47. No evil should be allowed that good may come of it: all
punishment is an evil : therefore no punishment should be allowed
that good may come of it.
48. Repentance is a good thing : wicked men abound in
repentance [Arist. Eth. B. IX.] : therefore wicked men abound in what
is good.
App. II.] EXAMPLES. 245
49. A person Infected witli tlie plague will (probably) die [suppose
three in five of the infected die] : this man is (probably) infected wi^li the
plague [suppose it an even chance] : therefore he will (probably) die.
Query. "What is the amount of this probabiUty ? Again, suppose the probabiHty of
the major to be (instead of |) ^, and of the minor, (instead of 1,) to be |, Query.
What will be the probabihty of the Conclusion ?
50. It must be admitted, indeed, that a man who has been
accustomed to enjoy liberty cannot be happy in the condition of a
slave: many of the negroes, however, may be happy in the con-
dition of slaves, because they have never been accustomed to enjoy
liberty.
51. Wliatever is dictated by Nature is allowable: devotedness to
the pursuit of pleasure in youth, and to that of gain in old age, are
dictated by Nature [Arist. Rhet. B. II.] : therefore they are allowable.
o2. He is the greatest lover of any one who seeks that person's
greatest good : a virtuous man seeks the greatest good for himself:
therefore a virtuous man is the greatest lover of himself. [Arist. Eth.
B. IX.]
53. He who has a confirmed habit of any kind of action, exercises
no self-denial in the practice of that action: a good man has a
confirmed habit of Virtue : therefore he who exercises self-denial in
the practice of Virtue is not a good man. [Arist. Eth. B. II.]
54. That man is independent of the caprices of Fortune who
places his chief happiness in moral and intellectual excellence: a
true philosopher is independent of the caprices of Fortune : therefore
a true philosopher is one who places his chief happiness in moral
and intellectual excellence.
55. A system of government which extends to those actions that
are performed secretly, must be one which refers either to a
regular divine providence in this life, or to the rewards and
punishments of another world : every perfect system of government
must extend to those actions which are performed secretly: no
system of government therefore can be perfect, which does not
refer either to a regular divine providence in this life, or to the
rewards and punishments of another world. [Warburton's Divine
Legation.]
5Q. For those who are bent on cultivating their minds by diligent
study, the incitement of academical honours is unnecessary ; and it
is inefiectual, for the idle, and such as are indifi'erent to mental
improvement: therefore the incitement of academical honours is
either unnecessary or ineff"ectual.
57. He who is properly called an actor, does not endeavour to
make his hearers believe that the sentiments he expresses and the
feelings he exhibits, are really his own: a barrister does this:
therefore he is not properly to be called an actor.
5d>. He who bears arms at the command of the mao^Istrate does
246 EXAMPLES. [App.ir.
wliat is lawful for a Christian: the Swiss in the French service, and
the British in the American service, bore arms at the command the
magistrate : therefore they did what was lawful for a Christian.
59. If Lord Bacon is right, it is improper to stock a new colony
"with the refuse of Jails : hut this we must allow not to be improper,
if our method of colonizing New South Wales be a wise one ; if this
be wise, therefore, Lord Bacon is not right.
60. Logic is indeed worthy of being cultivated, if Aristotle is to
"be regarded as infallible: but he is not: Logic therefore is not
worthy of being cultivated.
61. All studies are useful which tend to advance a man in life, or
to increase national and private wealth : but the course of studies
pursued at Oxford has no such tendency : therefore it is not useful.
62. If the exhibition of criminals, publicly executed, tends to
heighten in others the dread of undergoing the same fate, it may be
expected that those soldiers who have seen the most service, should
have the most dread of death in battle ; but the reverse of this is
the case : therefore the former is not to be believed.
63. If the everlasting favour of God is not bestowed at random,
and on no principle at all, it must be bestowed either with respect
to men's persons, or with respect to their conduct: but " God is no
respecter of persons:" therefore his favour must be bestowed with
respect to men's conduct. [Sumner's Apostolical Preaching.]
64. If transportation is not felt as a severe punishment, it is in
itself ill-suited to the prevention of crime: if it is so felt, much of
its severity is wasted, from its taking place at too great a distance
to affect the feelings, or even come to the knowledge, of most of
those whom it is designed to deter ; but one or other of these must
be the case : therefore transportation is not calculated to answer the
purpose of preventing crime.
65. War is productive of evil: therefore peace is Hkely to be
productive of good.
66. Some objects of great beauty answer no other perceptible
purpose but to gratify the sight : many flowers have great beauty ;
and many of them accordingly answer no other purpose but to gratify
the sight.
67. A man who deliberately devotes himself to a life of sensuality
is deserving of strong reprobation: but those do not deliberately
devote themselves to a life of sensuality who are hurried into excess
by the impulse of the passions : such therefore as are hurried into
excess by the impulse of the passions are not deserving of strong
reprobation. [Arist. Eth. B. VII.]
68. It is a difficult task to restrain all inordinate desires: to
conform to the precepts of Scripture implies a restraint of aU
inordinate desires : therefore it is a difficult task to conform to the
precepts of Scripture.
^ 69. Any one who is candid will refrain from condemning a book
App. II.] EXAMPLES. 247
without reading it : some Reviewers do not refrain from this : there-
fore some Reviewers are not candid.
70. If any objection that can be urged would justify a change of
established laws, no laws could reasonably be maintained : but some
laws can reasonably be maintained: therefore no objection that can
be urged will justify a change of established laws.
71. If any complete theory could be framed, to explain the
establishment of Christianity by human causes, such a theory would
have been proposed before now ; but none such ever has been pro-
posed : therefore no such theory can be framed.
72. He who is content with what he has, is truly rich : a covetous
man is not content with what he has : no covetous man therefore is
truly rich.
73. A true prophecy coincides precisely with all the circumstances
of such an event as could not be conjectured by natural reason : this
is the case with the* prophecies of the Messiah contained in the Old
Testament: therefore these are true prophecies.
74. The connexion of soul and body cannot be comprehended or
explained ; but it must be believed : therefore something must be
believed which cannot be comprehended or explained.
75. Lias lies above Red Sandstone ; Red Sandstone lies above
Coal: therefore Lias lies above Coal.
76. Cloven feet being found universally in horned animals, we
may conclude that this fossil animal, since it appears to have had
cloven feet, was horned.
77. All that glitters is not gold: tinsel glitters: therefore it is
not gold.
78. A negro is a man : therefore he who murders a negro murders
a man.
79. Meat and drink are necessaries of life: the revenues of
Vitellius were spent on Meat and Drink : therefore the revenues of
Vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life.
80. Nothing is heavier than Platina: feathers are heavier than
nothing: therefore feathers are heavier than Platina.
81. The child of Themistocles governed his mother: she governed
her husband ; he governed Athens ; Athens, Greece ; and Greece,
the world : therefore the child of Themistocles governed the world.
82. He who calls you a man speaks truly : he who calls you a
fool, caUs you a man: therefore he who calls you a fool speaks
truly.
83. Warm countries alone produce wines: Spain is a warm
country : therefore Spain produces wines.
84. It is an intensely cold climate that is sufficient to freeze Quick-
silver : the climate of Siberia is sufficient to freeze Quicksilver : there-
fore the climate of Siberia is intensely cold.
85. Mistleto of the oak is a vegetable excrescence which is not a
plant; and every vegetable excrescence which is not a plant, is
248 EXAMPLES. [App. II.
possessed of magical virtues : therefore Mistleto of the oak is pos-
sessed of magical virtues.
SQ. If the hour-hand of a clock he any distance (suppose a foot)
before the mmute-hand, this last, though moving twelve times
faster, can never overtake the other ; for while the minute-hand is
moving over those twelve inches, the hour-hand will have moved
over one inch : so that they will then he an inch apart ; and while
the minute-hand is moving over that one inch, the hour-hand will
have moved over -^^ inch, so that it will still be a-head ; and again,
while the minute-hand is passing over that space of tV inch which
now divides them, the hour-hand will pass over ^l^ inch ; so that it
will still he a-head, though the distance between the two is dimin-
ished ; (kc. (kc. (fee, and thus it is plain we may go on for ever:
therefore the minute-hand can never overtake the hour-hand. [This
is one of the sophistical puzzles noticed by Aldrich (the moving bodies being Achillea
and a Tortoise;) but he is not happy in his attempt at a solution. He proposes to
remove the difficulty by demonstrating that, in a certain given time, Achilles would
overtake the Tortoise: as if any one had ever doubted that. The very problem pro-
posed is to surmount the difficulty of a seeming demonstration of a thing palpably
impossible; to show that it is palpably impossible, is no solution of the problem.
I have heard the present example adduced as a proof that the pretensions of Logic
are futile, since (it was said) the most perfect logical demonstration may lead from
true premises to an absurd conclusion. The revei-se is the truth; the example before
us furnishes a confirmation of the utility of an acquaintance with the syllogistic form:
in which form the pretended demonstration in question cannot possibly be exhibited. An
attempt to do so will evince the utter want of connexion between the premises and the
conclusion.]
87. Theft is a crime : theft was encouraged by the laws of Sparta :
therefore the laws of Sparta encouraged crime.
88. Every hen comes from an egg: every egg comes from a hen:
therefore every egg comes from an egg.
89. Jupiter was the son of Saturn : therefore the son of Jupiter
was the grandson of Saturn.
90. All cold is to be expelled by heat : this person's disorder is a
cold : therefore it is to be expelled by heat.
91. Wine is a stimulant: therefore in a case where stimulants
are hurtful, wine is hurtful.
92. Opium is a poison : but physicians advise some of their
patients to take opium: therefore physicians advise some of their
patients to take poison.
93. What we eat grew in the fields : loaves of bread are what we
eat: therefore loaves of bread grew in the fields.
94. Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with : (as Is shown by
the practice of the Brahmins and of some monks ;) and vegetable-
food may be entirely dispensed with (as is plain from the example
of the Esquimaux and others;) but all food consists of animal-food
and vegetable-food : therefore all food may be dispensed with.
95. No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it : a mining
speculation is no trifling business: therefore a mining speculation
will enrich those engaged in it.
96. He who is most hungry eats most: lie who eats least is most
app.ii.] examples. » 249
hungry : therefore he who eats least eats most. [See Aldrich's Com-
pendium: Fallacise: where this is rightly solved.]
97. Whatever body is in motion must move either in the place
where it is, or in a place where it is not : neither of these is possible :
therefore there is no such thing as motion. [In this instance, as well as
in the one lately noticed, Aldrich mistakes the character of the difficulty; which is,
not to prove the truth of that which is self-evident, but to explain an apparent
demonstration militating against that which nevertheless no one ever doubted. He
says in this case, ^'' solvitur ambulando ;" but (pace tanti viri) this is no solution at all,
but is the very thing which constitutes the difficulty in question; for it is precisely
because we know the possibility of motion, that a seeming proof of its impossibility
produces perplexity.— &e Introduction.] 5
98. All vegetables grow most in the increase of the moon : hair
is a vegetable: therefore hair grows most in the increase of the
moon.
99. Most of the studies pursued at Oxford conduce to the improve-
ment of the mind : all the works of the most celebrated ancients are
among the studies pursued at Oxford : therefore some of the works
of the most celebrated ancients conduce to the improvement of the
mind.
100. Some poisons are vegetable: no poisons are useful drugs:
therefore some useful drugs are not vegetable.
101. A theory will speedily be exploded, if false, which appeals
to the evidence of observation and experiment : Craniology appeals
to this evidence : therefore, if Craniology be a false theory, it will
speedily be exploded. [Let the probability of one of these premises be ip ; and
of the other 1 : Query. What is the probability of the conclusion, and which are
the terms ?] ^
102. Wilkes was a favourite with the populace; he who is a
favourite with the populace must understand how to manage them :
he who understands how to manage them, must be Avell acquainted
with their character: he who is well acquainted with their char-
acter, must hold them in contempt : therefore Wilkes must have held
the populace in contempt.
103. To discover whether man has any moral sense, he should be
viewed in that state in which all his faculties are most fully developed;
the civilized state is that in which all man's faculties are most fully
developed : therefore, to discover whether man has any moral sense,
he should be viewed in a civilized state.
104. Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, &c., have been
countenanced by public opinion in several countries : all the crimes
we know of are Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, &c. :
therefore, all the crimes we know of have been countenanced by
public opinion in several countries. [Paley's Moral Philosophy.]
105. No soldiers should be brought into the field who are not
well qualified to perform their part. None but veterans are well
qualified to perform their part. None but veterans should be
brought into the field.
106. A monopoly of the sugar-refining business is beneficial to
sugar-refiners : and of the corn-trade to corn-growers : and of the
250 EXAMPLES. [App. II.
silk -manufacture to silk- weavers, &lc. &c.; and tlius eacli class of
men are benefited by some restrictions. Now all these classes of
men make up the whole community : therefore a system of restric-
tions is beneficial to the community. [See Chap. III. § ii.]
107. There are two kinds of things which we ought not to fret
about : what we can help, and what we cannot. [To be stated as a
Dilemma.]
108. He who believes himself to be always in the right in his
opinion, lays claims to infallibility: you always believe yourself to
be in the right in your opinion : therefore you lay claim to infalli-
bility.
109. No part of mankind can ever have received divine instruction
in any of the arts of life: because the Israelites, who are said to
have had a revelation made to them of religion, did not know, in the
times of Solomon, that the circumference of a Circle differs from the
treble of the Diameter.
110. The Epistle attributed to Barnabas is not to be reckoned
among the writings of the Apostolic Fathers ; because, if genuine, it
is a part of Scripture, and, if spurious, it is the work of some forger
of a later age.
111. If the original civilization of Mankind was not the work of
a divine Instructor, some instance may be found of a nation of
Bavages having civihzed themselves. [Pol. Econ. Lect. V.]
112. The Law of Moses prohibited theft, murder, &lc. But that
Law is abolished: therefore theft, murder, <fec., are not prohibited.
113. Agriculture might have been invented by man, without a
superhuman instructor ; and so might the working of metals ; and
so might medicine; and so might navigation, &c.; and in short
there is no art of civilized life that can be pointed out, which might
not have been invented by the natural faculties of man. Therefore
the arts of civilized life might have been invented by man without
any superhuman instructor.^
114. All those must disapprove of inflicting punishment on this
woman who consider her as innocent: and as you disapprove of
inflicting punishment on her, it is to be presumed you think her
innocent.
115. If a State has a right to enforce laws, (and without this it
could not subsist) it must have a right to prescribe what the religion
of the People shall be. [See Book III. § 9.]
116. Everyman is bound in duty to aim at promoting the good —
generally, and in all respects — of Mankind: a Civil Magistrate (or
Legislator) is a man : therefore a Civil Magistrate is bound in duty
to aim at promoting the good generally and in all respects — of
Mankind. And hence it appears that, since true religion is one of
the greatest of goods, the Civil Magistrate is bound to enforce, by
. « See Polit. Econ. Lect. V. p. 123.
App. II.] EXAMPLES. 251
means of tlie power committed to him, the profession of a true
Religion, and to suppress heresy. [See Essay I. on the " Kingdom of Christ."]
117. The month of May has no *'i^" in its name ; nor has June,
July, or August : all the hottest months are May, June, July, and
August: therefore all the hottest months are without an "i2" in
their names. [See Book IV. Ch. I. § 1.]
118. This man may possibly be right in his peculiar religious
Creed; and the same may be said of that man: and of a third, and
a fourth, <fc;c. : therefore it is possible they may be all right.
119. When the Disciples were first called Christians, they must
have received the title either from Believers, or from Jewish
unbelievers, or from Pagans: but one of these suppositions is
impossible ; and another is negatived by the New Testament
records : therefore the remaining supposition is established.
APPENDIX.
No. III.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.
Some have expressed mucli contempt for tlie mode in wliicli
Logic is usually taught, and in whicli students are examined in it,
as comprising no more than a mere enumeration of technical rules,
and perhaps an application of them to the simplest examples,
exhibited in a form already syllogistic, or nearly so. That such a
description, if intended to be universal, is not correct, I am perfectly
certain; though, hitherto, the indiscriminate requisition of Logic
from all candidates for a degree, has confined both lectures and
examinations, in a greater degree than is desirable, to this elemen-
tary character.^ But the student who wishes to acquire, and to
show that he has acquired, not only the elementary rules, but a
facility of applying them in practice, should proceed from the study
of such examples as the foregoing, to exercise himself in analysing
logically, according to the rules here given, and somewhat in the
manner of the subjoined specimen, some of Euclid's demonstrations,
— various portions of Aristotle's works, — the opening of Warburton's
** Divine Legation," (which exhibits the arguments in a form very
nearly syllogistic) — several parts of Chillingworth's Defence of
Protestantism, — the concluding part of Paley's Horse Paulinae, —
Leslie's Method with the Deists, — various portions of A. Smith's
AVealth of Nations, — and other argumentative works on the most
dissimilar subjects. The latter part of § L Chap. V. of the Disser-
tation on the Province of Reasoning, will furnish a convenient
subject of a short analysis.
A student who should prepare himself, in this manner, in one or
more such books, and present himself for this kind of examination
in them, would furnish a good test for ascertaining his proficiency in
practical Logic.
As the rules of Logic apply to arguments only after they have
been exhibited at full length in the bare elementary form, it may be
useful to subjoin some remarks on the mode of analysing and
reducing to that form, any train of argument that may be presented
1 See Pi'eface.
App. III.} PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 253
to us: since this must in general be the first step taken in an
attempt to apply logical rules. ^
First then, of whatever length the reasoning may he, "whether
treatise, chapter, or paragraph, begin with the concluding assertion ;
— not necessarily the last sentence expressed, but the last point
established ; — and this, whether it be formally enunciated, or left to
be understood. Then, tracing the reasoning backwards, observe on.
what ground that assertion is made. The assertion will be your
Conclusion ; the ground on which it rests, your Premises. The
whole Syllogism thus obtained may be tried by the rules of Logic.
If no incorrectness appear in this syllogism, proceed to take the
premises separately, and pursue with each the same plan as with
the conclusion you first stated. A premiss must have been used as
such, either because it required no proof, or because it had been
proved. If it have not been proved, consider whether it be so
self-evident as to have needed no proof. If it have been proved,
you must regard it as a conclusion derived from other assertions
which are premises to it: so that the process with which you set
out will be repeated ; viz. to observe on what grounds the assertion
rests, to state these as premises, and to apply the proper rules to
the syllogism thus obtained. Having satisfied yourself of the cor-
rectness of this, proceed, as before, to state its premises, if needful,
as conclusions derived from other assertions. And thus the analysis
will go on (if the whole chain of argument be correct) till you arrive
at the premises with which the whole commences ; which of course
should be assertions requiring no proof ; or, if the chain be any where
faulty, the analysis will proceed till you come to some proposition,
either assumed as self-evident, though requiring proof, or incorrectly
deduced from other assertions.^
2 Thesedirections are, in substance, and very clear and convenient mode of ex-
nearly, in words, extracted from the hibiting the logical analysis of a course
Preface to Hinds's abridged Introduction of argument, to draw it out in the form
to Logic. of a Tree, or Logical Division; thus: —
s Many students probably will find it a
Ultimate Conclusion.]
Z is X,
proved by
YisX
proved
by
zuy;
proved by
AisY,
[suppose
admitted.]
ZisA,
proved by
the argument that
and by the
argument that
'b is X, Y is B
&c. &c.
•
Cis
&c
X.
Yisc;
&.Q.
254 PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. [Apr-. III.
It win often happen that the same assertion will have been proved
by many different arguments ; and then, the inquiry into the truth
of the premises will branch out accordingly. In mathematical or
other demonstrative reasoning, this will of course never take place,
since absolute certainty admits of no increase : and if, as is often
the case, the same truth admits of several different demonstrations,
we select the simplest and clearest, and discard the rest. But in
probable reasoning there is often a Cumulation of arguments, each
proving the same conclusion ; i.e. each proving it to be probable.
In such cases, therefore, you will have first to try each argument
separately; and should each of them establish the conclusion as in
some degree probable, you will then have to calculate the aggregate
probability.
In this calculation Logic only so far assists as it enables us to
place the several items of probability in the most convenient form.
As the degree of probability of each proposition that is originally
assumed, is a point to be determined by the reasoner's own sagacity
and experience as to the matter in hand, so, the degree of proba-
bility of each conclusion, (given, that of each of its premises,)* and
also the collective probability resulting from several different argu-
ments all tending to the same conclusion, is an arithmetical question.
But the assistance afforded by logical rules in clearly stating the
several items so as to prepare the way for the other operations, will
not be thought lightly of by any who have observed the confusion of
thought and the fallacy, which have often been introduced through
the want of such a statement.
Example of Analysis applied to the first part of Foley's Evidences,
The ultimate Conclusion, that "The Christian Religion came from
God" is made to rest (as far as *' the direct historical evidence" is
concerned) on these two premises; That "A Religion attested by
Miracles is from God;" and that *' The Christian Religion is so
attested."
Of these two premises, it should be remarked, the Minor seems to
have been admitted, while the Major was denied, by the unbelievers
of old : whereas at present the case is reversed.''
* See Fallacies, § 14, near the end. times assigned to the miracles, should bo
* It is clear from the fragments re- noticed as an important evidence; for, cre-
maining of the ancient arguments against dulous as men vvere in those days respect-
Christianity, and the allusions to them in ing magic, they would hardly have re-
Christian writers, and also from the Jew- sorted to this explanation, unless some,
ish accounts of the life of Jesus which are at least plausible, evidence for the mira-
still extant, (under the title of Toldoth cles had been adduced. And they could
•Jeschu) that the original opponents of not but be sensible that to prove (had that
Christianity admitted that miracles were been possible) the pretended miracles to
wrought, but denied that they proved the be imposttires, would have been the most
divine origin of the religion, and attri- decisive course ; since i'Aa^ would at once
buted them to Magic. This concession, have disproved the religion.
in persons living so much nearer to the
App. III.] PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 255
Paley's argument therefore goes to establlsli tlie Minor premiss,
about which alone, in these days, there is likely to be any question.
He states with this view, two propositions : viz.
Prop. I. — " That there is satisfactory evidence, that many, pro-
fessing to be original witnesses of the Christian miracles, passed their
lives in labours, dangers, and sufferings, voluntarily undergone in
attestation of the accounts which they delivered, and solely in con-
sequence of their belief of those accounts ; and that they also
submitted, from the same motives, to new rules of conduct."
Prop. II. — " That there is not satisfactory evidence, that persons
pretending to be original witnesses of any other similar miracles,
have acted in the same manner, in attestation of the accounts which
they delivered, and solely in consequence of their belief of the truth
of those accounts."
Of these two propositions, the latter, it will easily be perceived,
is the Major premiss, stated as the converse by Negation (Book II.
Chap. II. § 4) of a universal affirmative : the former proposition is the
Minor.
As a Syllogism in Barhara, therefore, the whole will stand thus :
** All miracles attested by such and such evidence, are worthy of
credit:" (by conversion, " none which are not worthy of credit are
BO attested.")
** The Christian miracles are attested by such and such evi-
dence:" Therefore *' they are worthy of credit."
The Minor premiss is first proved by being taken as several dis-
tinct ones, each of which is separately established. — See Book II.
Chap. IV. § 1.
I. It is proved that the first propagators of Christianity suffered ;
by showing,
1st. A 2'>Tiori, from the nature of the case, that they were likely
to suffer : [because they were preachers of a religion unexpected
and unwelcome: 1. to the Jews; and 2. to the Gentiles.^ ]
2d. From piv/ane testimony.
3d. From the testimony of Christian Writings. [And here comes
in the proof of one of the premises of this last argument ; viz.
the proof of the credibility, as to this point at least, of the
Christian Writings.]
These arguments are cumulative; i.e. each separately goes to
establish the probability of the one common conclusion, that ** the
first propagators of Christianity suffered."
By similar arguments it is shown that their suflferings were such
as they voluntarily exposed themselves to.
6 As Paul expresses it, "to the Jews, a stumUing-Uocle ; and to the Greeks,
foolishness.''* _,
256 PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. [App. III.
II. It is proved that " What they suffered for was a miraculous
story." by
1st. The nature of the case ; They could have had nothing but
miracles on which to rest the claims of the new religion.
2d. By allusions to miracles, particularly to the ResuiTcction,
both in Christian and in profane Writers, as the evidence on
which the religion rested.
The same course of argument goes to show that the miracles in
attestation of which they suffered were such as they professed to
have witnessed.
These arguments again are cumulative.
III. It is proved that ** The miracles thus attested are what we call
the Christian miracles:" in other words, that the story was, in
the main, that which we have now in the Christian Scriptures ; by
§ 1st. The nature of the case; viz. that it is improbable the
original story should have completely died away, and a sub-
stantially new one have occupied its place ;
§ 2d. by The incidental allusions of ancient writers, both Chris-
tian and profane, to accounts agreeing with those of our Scrip-
tures, as the ones then received ;
§ 3d. by The credibihty of our Historical Scriptures: This is
established by several distinct arguments, each separately
tending to show that these books were, from the earliest ages
of Christianity, well known and carefully preserved among
Christians: viz.
§ i. They were quoted by ancient Christian writers.
§ ii. with peculiar respect.
§ iii. Collected into a distinct volurae, and
§ iv, distinguished by appropriate names and titles of respect.
§ V. Publicly read and expounded, and
§ vi. had commentaries, &c. written on them :
§ vii. Were received by Christians of different sects ; he. &c.'
The latter part of the first main proposition, branches off into
two; viz. 1st., that the early Christians submitted to new rules of
conduct; 2d, that they did so, in consequence of their belief in
miracles wrought before them.
Each of these is established in various parts of the above courso
of argument, and by similar premises ; viz. the nature of the case,
— the accounts of heathen writers, — and the testimony of the Chris-
tian Scriptures, &c.
The Major premiss, that ** Miracles thus attested are worthy of
credit," (which must be combined with the former, in order to
' For some important remarks respect- persons, See " Hinds on Inspiration,"
ing the different ways in whicli this part pp. 30—46.
of the argument is presented to different
App. III.] PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 257
establish tlie conclusion, that " the Christian miracles are worthy
of credit,") is next to be established.
Previously to his entering on the second main proposition, (whic^
I have stated to be the Converse by negation of this Major premiss,)
he draws his conclusion (Ch. X. Part I.) from the Minor premiss, m
combination with the Major, resting that Major on
§ 1st. The a- priori improbability that a false story should have
been thus attested : viz.
** If it be so, the religion must be true.® These men could not
be deceivers. By only not bearing testimony, they might have
avoided all these suiferings, and have lived quietly. Would men in
such circumstances pretend to have seen wliat they never savr;
assert facts which they had no knowledge of; go about lying, to
teach virtue ; and, though not only convinced of Christ's being an
impostor, but having seen the success of his imposture in his cruci-
fixion, yet persist in carrying it on ; and so persist, as to bring upon
themselves, for nothing, and with a full knowledge of the conse-
quence, enmity, and hatred, danger and death? "
§ 2d. That no /aZse story of Miracles is likely to be so attested,
is again proved, from the premiss that " no false story of
miracles ever Jias been so attested;" and this premiss again is
proved in the form of a proposition which includes it ; viz. that
" No other miraculous story whatever is so attested."
§ This assertion again, bifurcates; viz. it is proved respecting the
several stories that are likely to be, or that have been adduced,
as parallel to the Christian, that either
1 §. They are not so attested; or
2 §. They are not properly miraculous; i.e. that admitting the
veracity of the narrator, it does not follow that any miracle
took place ; as in cases that may be explained hj false percqj-
lions,— -accidents, <i:c.
In this way the learner may proceed to analyze the rest of the
work, and to fill up the details of those parts of the argument which
I have but slightly touched upon.^
It will be observed that, to avoid unnecessary prolixity, I have in
most of the above syllogisms suppressed one premiss, which the
learner will be able easily to supply for himself. B.G. In the early
part of this analysis it will easily be seen, that the first of the series
of cumulative arguments to prove that the propagators of Christi-
anity did sufier, would at full length stand thus :
8 This is the tdtimate conclusion dedu- to admit the truth of the religion, if con-
ced from the premiss, that " it is attested vinced of the reality of the miracles. The
by real Miracles; which, in the present ancient Jews were not."
day, comes to the same thing: since those » See Note at the end of this Appendix,
for whom he is writing, are ready at once
25S PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. [App. III.
** Whoever propagated a religion unwelcome to the Jews and to
the Gentiles, was likely to suffer ;
The Apostles did this ;
Therefore they were likely to suffer," &c., <fec.
It is also to be observed, that the same proposition used in dif-
ferent syllogisms may require to be differently expressed by a sub-
stitution of some equivalent, in order to render the argument, in
each, formally correct. This of course is always allowable, pro-
vided great care is taken that the exact meaning be preserved : e.g.
if the proposition be, " The persons who attested the Christian
miracles underwent sufferings in attestation of them," I am autho-
rized to state the same assertion in a different form, thus, "The
Christian miracles are attested by men who suffered in attestation
of their reality," &c.
Great care, however, should be used to avoid being misled by the
substitution of one proposition for another, when the two are not
(though perhaps they sound so) really equivalent, so that the one
warrants the assumption of the other. — See Book III. § 3.
Lastly, the learner is referred to the Supplement to Chap. III.
§ 1, p. 97, where I have treated of the statement of a proposition as
several distinct ones, each implying all the rest, but differing in the
division of the Predicate from the Subject. Of this procedure the
above analysis affords an instance.
Note referred to at page 257.
When the Student considers that the foregoing is only one out of
many branches of evidence, all tending to the same point, and yet
that there have been intelligent men who have held out against them
all, he may be apt to suspect either that there must be some flaw in
these arguments, which he is unable to detect, or else that there must
be much stronger arguments on the other side than he has ever met
with.
To enter into a discussion of the various causes leading to
infidelity would be unsuitable to this occasion ; but I will notice one
as being more especially connected with the subject of this work,
and as being very generally overlooked. '^ In no other instance
perhaps," (says Dr. Hawkins, in his valuable Essay on Tradition)
*' besides that of Religion, do men commit the very illogical mistake^
of first canvass'lng all the objections against any particular system
wJwse pretensions to truth they would examine, before they consider
the direct arguments in its favour.'' (P. 82.) But why, it may be
asked, do they make such a mistake in this case ? An answer,
which I think would apply to a large proportion of such persons, is
this : because a man having been brought up in a Christian country,
App. III.] PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. 259
has lived perhaps among such as have been accustomed from their
infancy to take for granted the truth of their religion, and even to
regard an uninqidring assent as a mark of commendable /(Z«V/i; and
hence he has probably never even thought of proposing to himself
the question, — Why should I receive Christianity as a divine revela-
tion? Christianity being nothing neio to him, and the presumjytion
being in favour of it, while the burden of proof lies on its opponents,
he is not stimulated to seek reasons for believing it, till he finds it
controverted. And when it is controverted, — when an opponent
urges — How do you reconcile this, and that, and the other, with the
idea of a divine revelation? these objections strike by their novelty ^
by their being opposed to what is generally received. He is thus
excited to inquiry ; which he sets about — naturally enough, but very
unwisely — by seeking for answers to all these objections : and
fancies that unless they can all be satisfactorily solved, he ought not
to receive the religion. *' As if," (says the Author already cited)
** there could not be truth, and truth supported by irrefragable
arguments, and yet at the same time obnoxious to objections,
numerous, plausible, and by no means easy of solution. There are
objections (said Dr. Johnson) against a pfemwz, and objections against
avacuum; but one of them must be true." He adds, that ** sensible
men, really desirous of discovering the truth, will perceive that
reason directs them to examine first the argument in favour of that
side of the question, where the first presumption of truth appears.
And the presumption is manifestly in favour of that religious creed
already adopted by the country Their very earliest inquiry
therefore must be into the direct arguments for the authority of that
book on which their country rests its religion."
But reasonable as such a procedure is, there is, as I have said, a
strong temptation, and one which should be carefully guarded
against, to adopt the opposite course ; to attend first to the objec-
tions which are brought against what is established, and which, for
that very reason, rouse the mind from a state of apathy.
When Christianity was first preached, the state of things was
reversed. The presumption was against it, as being a novelty.
** Seeing that all these things cannot be spoken against, ye ought to
be quiet,' ^ was a sentiment which favoured an indolent acquiescence
in the old pagan worship. The stimulus of novelty was all on the
side of those who came to overthrow this, by a new religion. The
first inquiry of any one who at all attended to the subject, must have
been, not, — ** What are the objections to Christianity?" — but, *' On
what grounds do these men call on me to receive them as divine
messengers?" And the same appears to be the case with the
Polynesians among whom our Missionaries are labouring: they
begin by inquiring, ** Why should we receive this religion?" and
those of them accordingly who have embraced it, appear to be
Christians on much more rational and deliberate conviction than
260 PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. [App. IIL
many among us, even of those who, in general maturity of intellect
and civilization, are advanced considerably beyond those Islanders.
I am not depreciating the inestimable advantages of a religious
education ; but, pointing out the peculiar temptations which accom-
pany it. The Jews and Pagans had, in their early prejudices,
greater difficulties to surmount, than ours ; but they were ditHculties
of a different hind. — See Essays on the Dangers, &c., Disc. I. § 3;
and also Ehei. Part. I. Chap. III. § 1.
Apf. III.
PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS.
261
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262 PRAXIS OF LOGICAL ANALYSIS. [App. III.
might have done with much truth,) hut as a complete substitute for
them, a man's feeling of the suitahleness of the religion for his
wants; a suitahleness which douhtless many of the Mahometans
perceive in their own religion, and of the Hindoos in theirs. ^'^
The coincidence hetween writers of such different schools is very
striking, and affords matter for much reflection. They all agree in
representing the *' Faith " that is required of a Christian as wholly
independent of evidence, and as necessarily, or most properly, hased
on feelings such as attach Pagans to their superstitions. And they
all apparently calculate on the reader's heing totally ignorant of the
New Testament, of which almost every chapter convicts Jesus and
his followers of that ** timidity " in appealing to the evidence of
miracles and prophecies which is censured and derided. For, the
passages ahove cited from Scripture, even if multiplied many fold,
as might easily he done, would give hut a very inadequate view of
the case ; inasmuch as the general tenor of all the narrative, and all
the teaching, of the New Testament, presupposes evidence as the
original ground on which helief had heen all along demanded : the
unhelief which it ** denounces as sin" heing, not as those other
writers represent, the requiring of evidence, but — on the contrary^
' — the rejection of evidence.
The fallacy of representing all appeal to reason as useless in cases
where the *' argumentative faculty " is not alone sufficient — which
is like denying the utility of light, because it will not enable a man
to see, whose eyes are not in a state to perform their functions, —
has been already noticed. Book IV. Ch. II. § 5.
It may be a useful exercise for the learner to analyze some others
of this collection of fallacies, referring to Book I. § 2, to Book II.
Ch. II. § 3, and to Appendix I. Art. " Experience."
10 I have treated of this point in the See also Professor Powell's valuable work
*' liessons on Christian Evidences," " Tradition Unveiled.'*
under the head of "Internal Evidence."
263
POSTSCRIPT.
I HAVE lately discovered the existence of a misappreliension
which I had not anticipated, nor accordingly provided against,
but into which some persons appear to have — very strangely — ■
fallen, who are far from wanting in intelligence generally, or in
learning.
When I speak of expressing in the form of a fraction, the
probabilities in favour of the truth of some proposition, it has
been by some persons assumed — tacitly though not in express
w^ords — that the opposite fraction, — the remaining chances, — -
must express the probability of the propositions being false. Thus,
if certain witnesses depose to having seen A. B. in London at a
certain time ; and it is calculated that the result of their testimony
goes to establish a probability equal to ^, that he was there at
that time, it is assumed, without the smallest grounds, that this
amounts to a probability (equal to f ) of his having not been in London,
but elsewhere ; whereas in truth there is no tittle of evidence to
that effect. The |- only expresses the compatibility of his absence
from London with the existence of the testimony of those witnesses.
And even if it should come out tliat they were not only of doubtful
credit, but wholly unworthy of belief, and that their evidence ought
to be completely disregarded, still A. B. may have been in London
at the time, and it may be possible to find complete proof of it. A
refuted argument — as I have elsewhere remarked — tliough it ought
to go for nothing, is often, by the hasty and unthinking, mistaken
for a dis^rooi of the conclusion. And this, though when stated
distinctly, it appears a truism, is, in practice, perpetually overlooked.
Suppose a person to argue from certain deposits of organic
remains, and from some traditions he has met with, in favour of the
Noachian Deluge, and on examination it should appear that the
probability thus established amounts to only ^ 1 or less, how absurd
it would be to regard this as a proof that it is as likely as not, or
more likely than not, that no such Deluge ever occurred ! But an
elaborate and long calculation, quite correct, except only in being
based on a perfectly groundless supposition, which however is not
264 POSTSCEIPT.
expressly' stated but tacitly assumed, will often mislead the author
as well as his readers.
In some cases it is true, we do — reasonably — infer something
from the bringing forward of weak arguments, and no others, and the
producing exclusively of w^orthless testimony. But the inference is
drawn not from the arguments and the witnesses themselves, but
from the absence of others, when there is good reason to suppose
that better evidence would have been produced, had any existed.
If, e. g., a number of learned and ingenious scholars set them-
selves to find objections to some version of Scripture, and after
much time and labour, bring forward merely the feeblest cavils, this
affords a strong presumption that the version is a good one. But
this inference is drawn, not from the objections themselves, but
from the probability that such men would have found valid objec-
tions had it been open to any.
So also when a man of so much acuteness and research as Hume,
set himself to find in all history, parallels to the Scripture-miracles,
and produced (as Paley has pointed out) such only as are quite
different in all the essential points, it is justly inferred that no
parallels do exist ; but this is inferred not from the instances Hume
does adduce, but from our knowledge of his ability and learning, and
anti- Christian zeal; which render it morally certain that if there
had been any cases that were really to his purpose, he would have
found them.
But all such considerations are quite foreign (as an attentive
reader will have perceived) from the question I was treating of;
which was, the degree of probability conferred on a proposition by
such and such given arguments ; without assuming that other argu-
ments besides, do or do not exist, tending to the same result.
INDEX
PRINCIPAL TECHNICAL TERMS.
Absolute terms, b. ii. ch. v. § I.
Abstraction. — The act of "drawing off"
in thought, and attending to separ-
ately, some portion of an object pre-
sented to the mind, b. ii. ch. v. § 2.
Abstract terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Accident. — In its widest technical sense,
(equivalent to Attribute,) any thing
that is attributed to another, and can
only be conceived as belonging to
some substance (in which sense it is
opposed to " Substance ;") in its nar-
rower and more properly logical sense,
a Predicable which may be present or
absent, the essence of the Species
remaining the same, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Accidental Definition. — A definition
which assigns the Properties of a
Species, or the Accidents of an Indi-
vidual; it is otherwise called a
Description, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Affirmative — denotes the quality of a
Proposition which asserts the agree-
ment of the Predicate with the subject,
b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Amphibolia — a kind of ambiguity of
sentence, b. iil § 10.
Analogous. — A terra is so called whose
single signification applies with unequal
propriety to more than one object, b.
ii. ch. V. § 1, and b. iii. § 10.
Antecedent. — That part of a Conditional
Proposition on which the other
depends, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6.
Apprehension (simple.)— The operation of
the mind by which we mentally per-
ceive or form a notion of some object,
b. ii. ch. i. § 1.
Argument. — An expression in which,
from something laid down as granted,
something else is deduced, b. ii. ch. iii.
iir^i^a/^— division, faulty, b. ii. ch. v.
§ 5 ; definition, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Assertion— an affirmation or denial, b. ii.
ch. u. § I.
Attributive term, b. ii. ch. r. § 1.
Bacon — erroneously supposed to have
designed his Organon as a rival system
to that here treated of, Introd. § 3,
and b. iv. ch. iii. § 3.
Categories, b. iv. ch. ii. § 1.
Categorematic. — A word is so called which
may by itself be employed as a Term,
b. ii. ch. i. § 3. _
Categorical Proposition — is one which
affirms or denies a Predicate of a
Subject, absolutely, and without any
hypothesis, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Circle — fallacy of, b. iii. § 13.
Class — strictly speaking, a Class consists
of several things coming under a
common description, b. i. § 3.
Contraposition, see Negation.
Common term— is one which is applicable
in the same sense to more than one
individual object, b. i. § 6; b. ii. ch. i.
§ 3, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 6.
Compatible terms, b. ii. ch. v. § I.
Composition — Fallacy of, b. iii. § II.
Conclusion. — That Proposition which is
inferred from the Premises of an
Argument, b. ii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iii.
§1.
Concrete term, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Conditional Proposition — is one which
asserts the dependence of one cate-
gorical Proposition on another. A
conditional Syllogism is one in which
the reasoning" depends on such a Pro-
position, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6.
Connotative term, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Consequent. — ^That part of a conditional
Proposition which depends on the
other. (Consequens,) b. ii. ch. i\r.
§ 6, Note.
Consequence. — The connexion between
the Antecedent and Consequent of a
conditional Proposition. (Consequen-
tia,) b. ii. ch. iv. § 6, Note.
Constructive— dondXiiondX syllogism, b. ii,
ch. iv. § 3.
256
INDEX.
Contingent. — ^The Matter of a Proposi-
tion is so called when the terms of it
in part agree, and in part disagree, b.
ii. eh. ii. § 2.
Contradictory Propositions — are those
which, having the same terms, differ
both in Quantity and Quality, b. ii.
ch. iii. § 5.
Contrary Propositions — are two univer-
sals, affirmative and negative, with the
same terms, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3.
Contrary terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Converse, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Conversion of a Proposition — is the trans-
position of the terms, so that the
Subject is made the Predicate, and
vice versa, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Copula. — That part of a Proposition
which affirms or denies the Predicate
of the Subject : viz. is, or is not,
expressed or implied, b. ii. ch. i. § 2.
Cross-divisions, b. ii. ch. v. § 5 and 6.
Definite terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Definition. — An expression explanatory
of that which is defined, i.e. separated,
as by a boundary, from every thing
else, b. ii. ch. v. § 6 ; b. iii. § 10.
Description — An accidental Definition,
b. ii. ch. V. § 6.
Destructive — conditional Syllogism, b. ii.
ch. iv. § 3.
Deaf-mutes — incapable of a train of
reasoning, till they shall have learned
some kind oi general signs. Introd. § 5.
Dictum — " de omni et nullo ;" Aristotle's:
an abstract statement of an Argument,
generally, b. 1, § 4. Applicable to a
Sorites, b. ii. ch. iv. § 7.
Difference {Differentia) — The formal or
distinguishing part of the essence of a
Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Dilemma. — A complex kind of conditional
syllogism, having more than one
Antecedent in the Major Premiss, and
a disjunctive Minor, b. ii. ch. iv. § 5.
Discovery of Truth — two kinds of, b. iv.
ch. ii. § 1.
Discourse. — The third operation of the
mind. Reasoning, b. ii. ch. i. § 1.
Disjunctive Proposition — is one which
consists of two or more categoricals,
feo stated as to imply that some one of
them must be true. A syllogism is
called disjunctive, the reasoning of
which turns on such a proposition,
b. ii. ch. iv. § 4.
Distributed— \s applied to a Term that is
employed in its full extent, so as to
comprehend all its significates, — every
thing to which it is applicable, b. i. § 5,
and b. ii. ch. iii. § 2.
Division, logical — is the distinct enumer-
ation of several things signified by a
common name; and it is so called
metaphorically, from its being analo-
gous to the (real and properly-called)
division of a whole into its parts, b. ii.
ch. V. § 5.
Division. — Fallacy of, b. iii. § 11.
Drift of a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. § I.
Elliptical expressions — apt to lead to
ambiguity, b. iii. § 10.
Enstatic—'Fig^nre, the third Figure, so
called, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4.
Enihymeme — An argument having one
Premiss expressed, and the other
understood, b. ii. ch. iv. § 7.
Equivocal — A Term is defined to be
equivocal whose different significations
apply equally to several objects.
Strictly speaking, there is hardly a
word in any language which may not
be regarded, as in this sense, equivo-
cal ; but the title is usually applied
only in any case where a word is
employed equivocally; e.g. where the
Middle-term is used in different senses
in the two Premises; or where a
Proposition is liable to be understood
in various senses, according to the
various meanings of one of its terms,
b. iii. § 10.
Essential Definition — is one which
assigns, not the Properties or Acci-
dents of the thing defined, but what are
regarded as its essential parts, whether
physical or logical, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Evidence— of Christianity, App. No. III.
Example — use of, implies a universal
premiss, b. iv. ch. i. § 2, — is not what,
strictly speaking, deters, b. iii, § 10.
Exception, proof of a rule, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Exclusive — Figure, the second Figure, so
called, b. ii. ch. iii. § 4.
Extreme — The Subject and Predicate of
a Proposition are called its Extremes
or Terms, being, as it were, the two
boundaries, having the copula (in
regular order) placed between them.
In speaking of a syllogism, the word
is often understood to imply the ex-
tremes of the Conclusion, b. ii. ch. i. § 2.
Fallacy. — Any argument, or apparent
argument, which professes to be deci-
sive of the matter at issue, while in
reality it is not, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
INDEX.
267
False— m its strict sense, denotes the
quality of a Proposition wliich states
something not as it is, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Figure of a Syllogism — denotes the situ-
ation of its Middle-term in reference
to the Extremes of the Conclusion —
The Major and Minor Terms, b. ii.
ch. iii. § 4.
JForm— fallacies in, b. iii. §§ 1 and 7.
Generalization. — The act of comprehend-
ing under a common name several ob-
jects agx-eeing in some point which we
abstract from each of them, and which
that common name serves to indicate,
b. ii. ch. V. § 2.
Genws.— APredicable which is considered
as the material part of the Species of
which it is affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. § 3.
Sume. — Essay on Miracles, b. i. § 3,
Note; and Appendix I. Art. Experi-
ence. Coincidence with some Christian
writers, Appendix III.
Hi/pothetical Proposition — is one which
asserts not absolutely, but under an
hypothesis, indicated by a conjunction.
An hypothetical Syllogism is one of
which the reasoning depends on such
a proposition, b. ii. ch. iv. § 2.
Idea, — " abstract," (supposed) Introd.
§ 5, and b. iv. ch. v. §§ 1 and 2.
Illative Conversion — is that in which the
truth of the Converse follows from the
truth of the Exposita, or Proposition
given, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Impossible. — The Matter of a Proposition
is so called when the extremes alto-
gether disagree, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, —
Ambiguity of, Appendix II.
Indefinite Proposition— is one which has
for its Subject a Common-term without
any sign to indicate distribution or
non-distribution, b. ii. ch. ii. § 2.
Indefinite Terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Indirect reduction — of Syllogisms in the
last three Figures, b. ii. ch. iii. § 6.
Individual. — An object which is, in the
strict and primary sense, one, and
consequently cannot be logically divid-
ed; whence the name, b. ii. ch. v. § 5.
Induction. — A kind of argument which
infers, respecting a whole class, what
has been ascertained respecting one or
more individuals of that class, b. iv.
ch. i. § 1.
Infer. — To draw a conclusion from
granted premises, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1.
See Prove.
Infima Species — is that which is not
subdivided, except into individuals,
b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Information. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 1.
Ignoratia-elencJii — fallacy of, b. iii. §§15
—19.
Inseparable Accident — is that which
cannot be separated from the individual
it belongs to, though it may from the
Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Instruction. — b. iv. ch. ii. § 1.
Interrogation — fallacy of. b. iii. § 9.
Irrelevant-conclusion — fallacy of, b. ilL
§§ 15-19.
Judgment. — The second operation of the
mind, wherein we pronounce mentally
on the agreement and disagreement of
two of the notions obtained by simple
Apprehension, b. ii. ch. i. § 1.
Knowledge.— h. iv. ch. ii. § 2. Note.
Language — an indispensable instrument
for reasoning, Introd. § 5. Logic,
conversant about, b. ii. ch. i, § 2.
Limitation — See "Per Accidens."
Locke — notions of Syllogism, Introd. § 3.
Logical definition — is that which assigns
the Genus and Difference of the Spe-
cies defined, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Logomachy. — b. iv. ch. iv. § 12.
Major term of a Syllogism — is the Predi-
cate of the Conclusion. The Major
Premiss is the one which contains the
Major term. In Hypothetical Syllo-
gisms, the Hypothetical Premiss is
called the Major, b. it ch. iii. § 2, and
b. ii. ch. iv. § 2,
Matter of a proposition — the nature of
the connexion of its extreme, b. ii.
ch. ii. § 3. Fallacies in, b. iii. §§ 1 and
13.
Metaphor. — b. iii. § 10.
Metonymy. — b. iii. § 10.
Middle term of a categorical Syllogism-
is that with which the two extremes
of the conclusion are separately com-
pared, b. ii. ch. iii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. iii.
§4.
Minor term of a categorical Syllogism-
is the Subject of the conclusion. The
Minor Premiss is that which contains
the Minor term. In Hypothetical
Syllogisms, the Categorical Premiss is
called the IMinor, b. ii. ch. iii. § 2, and
b. ii. ch. iv. § 2.
Modal categorical proposition — is one
which asserts that the Predicate exists
in the Subject in a certain mode or
manner, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, and b. ii. ch.
iv. § 1.
2GS
INDEX.
Mood of a catcc^orical Syllogism — is the
designation of its three propositions,
in the order in which they stand,
according to their quantity and quality,
b. ii. cli. iii. § 4.
Necessary matter of a proposition — is
the essential or invariable agreement
of its terms, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3. — Neces-
sary, ambiguity of, Appendix, No. I.
Negation — conversion by (otherwise call-
ed conversion by contraposition,) b. ii.
ch. ii. § 4.
iV^^a^ii-e categorical proposition — is one
which 'asserts the disagreement of its
extremes, b. ii. ch. ii= § 1.
Negative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
New Truths — of two kinds, b. iv. ch. ii.
Nominal Definition — is one which ex-
plains only the meaning of the term
defined, and nothing more of the
nature of the thing signified by that
Term than is implied by the Term
itself to every one who understands
the meaning of it, b. ii. ch. v. § 6, and
b. iv. ch. ii. § 3.
Nominalism. — b. iv. ch. v. Introd. § 5,
and b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Objections — fallacy of, b. iii. § 17.
Operations of the mind — three laid down
by logical writers, b. ii. ch. 1. § 1.
Opposed.— Two propositions are said to
be opposed to each other, when,
having the same Subject and Predicate,
they differ either in quantity or quality,
or both, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3.
Opposition of terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Ostensive reduction — of Syllogisms in the
last three figures, b. ii ch. iii. § 5.
Paronymous loords, b, iii. § 8.
Part — logically. Species are called Parts
of the Genus they come under, and
individuals, parts of the Species ;
really, the Genus is a Part of the
Species, and the Species, of the Indi-
vidual, b. ii. ch. V. § 5.
Particular Proposition — is one in which
the Predicate is afiirmed or denied of
some part only of the subject, b. ii.
ch. ii. § 1.
Per Accidens. — Conversion of a proposi-
tion is so called when the Quantity is
changed, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Physical definition — is that which as-
signs the parts into which the thing
defined can be actually divided, b. ii.
ch. V. § 6.
Positive terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Postulate — a form in wliich a Definition
may be stated, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Predicaments, b. iv. ch.«ii. § 1.
Predicate of a Proposition — is that Term
which is affirmed or denied of tha
other, b. ii. ch. i. § 2.
Predicable. — A Term which can be affir*
matively predicated of several others,
b. ii. ch. v. § 2.
Premiss — A proposition employed to
establish a certain conclusion, b. ii,
ch. iii. § 1.
Privative terms, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Probable arguments, b. iii. §§ 11 and 14.
P?-o/?e?--na?Hes— ambiguity of, b. iii. § 10.
Property. — A Predicable which denotes
something essentially conjoined to the
essence of the Species, b. ii. ch. v. § 3.
Proposition. — A sentence which asserts,
i.e. affirms or denies, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Prove. — To adduce Premises Avhich
establish the truth of a certain conclu-
sion, b. iv. ch. iii. § 1.
Proximum Genus of any Species — is the
nearest [least remote] to which it
can be referred, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Pure categorical proposition — is one
which asserts simply that the Predicate
is, or is not, contained in the Subject,
b. ii. ch. ii. § 1, and b. ii. ch. iv. § 1.
Quality of a Proposition— is its affirming
or denying. This is the Quality of
the expression, which is, in Logic, the
essential circumstance. The Quality
of the matter is, its being true or false;
which is, in Logic, accidental, being
essential only in respect of the subject-
matter treated of, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Quantity of a Proposition — is the extent
in which its subject is taken; viz. to
stand for the whole, or for a part only
of its Significates, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Question. — That which is to be established
as a Conclusion, stated in an interro-
gative form, b. ii. ch. ii. § 4.
Real definition — is one which explains
the nature of the thinir defined beyond
what is necessarily understood by the
Term, b. ii. ch. v. § 6.
Realisnu — Introd. § 3. b. iv. ch. v.
Reasoning — General Signs necessary for,
Introd. § 5.
Reduction — of syllogisms in the last three
Figures, to the first, so as to fall under
the Dictum, b. ii. ch. iii. §§ 5 and 6,
—of hypothetical syllogisms to cate-
gorical, b. ii. ch. iv. § 6.
References — fallacy of, b. iii. § 14,
INDEX.
269
Refutation — of an argnment, liable to be
ftiUaciously used, b. iii. §^ 6 and 7.
Relative terms, b. ii. cb. v. § 1.
iSame. — Secondary use of tbe word, b. iv.
ch. V. § 1, and Append. No. L
/Seconc? intention of a term, b. iii. § 10.
Separable accident — is one wbich may be
separated from the individual, b. iii.
Introd.
Signijicate — ^The several things signified
by a common Term are its significates
(Significata), b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Signs — general, indispensable for reason-
ing, Introd. § 5.
Singular term is one which stands for
one individual. A Singular proposi-
tion is one which has for its subject
either a Singular term, or a common
term limited to one Individual by a
singular sign, e.g. "This," b. ii. ch. i.
§ 3 ; b. ii. ch. ii. § 2, and b. ii. ch. v.
§1.
Sorites. — A a abridged form of stating a
series of Syllogisms, of which the
Conclusion of each is a Premiss of the
succeeding, b. ii. ch. iv. § 7.
Species. — A predicable which is consid-
ered as expressing the whole essence
of the individuals of which it is
affirmed, b. ii. ch. v. § 3, — peculiar
sense of, in Natural History, b. iv.
ch. V. § 1.
■Stewart, Professor Dugald, his mistake
respecting Aristotle's ^^ Dictum" b. i.
§ 4 — instance of fallacy from, b. iii.
§14.
Subaltern Species and Genus — is that
which is both a Species of some higher
Genus, and a Genus in respect of the
Species into which it is divided. Sub-
altern opposition, is between a Uni-
versal and a Particular of tbe same j
Quality. Of these, the Universal is
the Subalternant, and the Particular
the Subalternate, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3, and
b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Subcontrary opposition — is between two
Particulars, the Affirmative and the
Negative, b. ii. ch. ii. § 3.
Subject of a pi'oposition — is that term of
which the other is affirmed or denied,
b. ii. ch ii. § 2.
Summum Genus — is that which is not
considered as a Species of any higher
Genus, b. ii. ch. v. § 4.
Syllogism. — An argument expressed in
strict logical form; viz. so that its
conclusiveness is manifest from the
structure of the expression alone,
without any regard to the meaning of
the Terms, b. ii. ch. iii. § J .
Syncategorematic words — are such as
cannot singly express a Term, but only
a part of a Term, b. ii. ch. i. § 3.
Term. — The Subject or Predicate of a
Proposition, b. ii. ch. i. § 2.
Tendency — ambiguity of. Appendix, No. I.
Thaumatrope, b. iii. § 11.
True Proposition — is one which states
what really is, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Truth new — two kinds of, b. iv. ch. ii.
2, and Appendix, No. I. '~~
Tucker — his Light of Nature, Append. I.
Art. xi.
Universal Proposition — is one whose
Predicate is affirmed or denied of the
whole of the Subject, b. ii. ch. ii. § 1.
Univocal. — A Common term is called
Univocal in respect of those things to
which it is applicable in the same
signification, b. ii. ch. v. § 1.
Wallis, Professor, his remark on jests,
b. iii. § 20.
Waii^ — his notion of Logic, lutrod. § 3.
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