B 3 T2M 370 mm. ELEMENTS MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. ABRIDGED AND DESIGNED AS A TEXT-BOOK ACADEMIES AND HIGH SCHOOLS. BY THOMAS C. UPHAM, PROFESSOR OF MENTAL iND MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN BOWDOIM COLLEQE. NEW YORK: HARPER & BROTHERS, PUBLISHERS 1854. B731 t ^ Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845. By Harper & Brothers, In the Clerk's Office of the Southern District of New York. PREFACE The Philosophy of the Mind has grown up, hke other sciences, from small beginnings. Many propositions, coming too, in many instances, from able writers, have been thrown aside ; truth has been sifted out from the mass of error, until at last a great number of important principles is ascertained. But while it is exceedingly necessary that our youth should be made acquainted with these principles, it is impossible that they should go through with all the complicated discussions which have been held in respect to them. Many of the books in which these discussions are contained have become ex- ceedingly rare ; and, if they were not so, no small num- ber of students, who are now in the course of as thorough an education as our country affords, would not be able to purchase them. And besides, by placing before the stu- dent a mass of crude and conflicting statements, his mind becomes perplexed. To be able to resolve such a mass into its elements, and to separate truth from error, implies an acquaintance with the laws of the intellect, and a de- gree of mental discipline, which he is not yet supposed to have acquired ; and hence, instead of obtaining much im- portant knowledge, he becomes distrustful of everything Now these evils, saying nothing of the loss of time at- tendant on such a course, are to be remedied in the same way as in other sciences. In other departments of learn- ing, ingenious men discuss points of difficulty ; conflicting arguments are accumulated, until the preponderance on one side is such that the question in debate is considered IV PREFACE. settled Others employ themselves in collecting facts, in classifying them, and in (Reducing general principles ; and when all this is done, the important truths of the science, collected from such a variety of sources, and suitably ar- ranged and expressed, are laid before the student, in or- der that he may become acquainted with them. And this is what is attempted, to some extent, to be done in the present work, which is an abridgment of a larger work on the S£inie subject. In the larger work, the principles of Eclecticism and Induction, which have just been referred to, are applied on a more extensive scale than in* the present. I have been obliged necessarily to exclude from the abridgment many interesting and striking illus- trations and facts, and some general philosophical views, which would have had a place if our limits had permit- ted. I indulge the hope, nevertheless, as the abridgment has been made with no small degree of care, that it will answer the purpose for which it is particularly designed ; viz., the assistance of those youth who need some knowl- edge of Mental Philosophy, but are not in a situation to prosecute the subject to any great extent. THOMAS C UPHAM JBowdom College, May, 1840. CONTENTS. DIVISION I. THE INTELLECT OR UNDERSTANDING. INTRLLKCTIVE OR INTELLECTUAL STATES OF THE MIND. P A R t I; INTELLECTUAL STATES OF EXTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER I. ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE IN GENERAL. Soctlom ftS* 1. The mind susceptible of a threefold division . . .17 2. The Intellect susceptible of a subordinate division . . . ib. 3. Of the connexion of the tnind with the material world . . 18 4. Our first knowledge in general of a material or external origin . 19 5. Shown further from what we notice in children . . . .20 6. Further proof of the beginnings of knowledge from external causes 21 7. The same subject further illustrated . ..... 22 8. Illustration from the case of James Mitchell .... 23 CHAPTER II. SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 9. Sensation a simple mental state originating in the senses . . 24 10. All sensation is properly and truly in the mind . . . .25 11. Sensations are not images or resemblances of objects . . . ib. 12. The connexion between the mental and physical change not ca- pable of explanation .26 13. Of the meaning and nature of perception . . . . .27 14. Perception makes us acquainted with a material world . . 27 15. Of the primary and secondary qualities of matter . . .28 16. Of the secondary qualities of matter 29 CHAPTER III. THE SENSES OF SMELL AND TASTE. 17. Nature and importance of the senses as a source of knowjedge . 30 18. Connexion of the brain with sensation and perception . 31 19. Order in which the senses are to be considered . . . .32 20. Of the sense and sensations of smell ib. 21. Of perceptions of smell in distinction from sensations . . . 33 22. Of the sense and the sensations of taste 34 CHAPTER IV. THE SENSE OP HEARING. •23. Organ of the sense of hearing .... . . 35 24, Varieties of the sensation of souna ...... 36 25. Manner in which we learn the place of sounds . . ' ^ A2 VI CONTENTS. CHAPTER V. THE SENSE OF TOUCH. ■wtloB ^^ 26. Of the sense of touch in general and its sensations . . 38 27. Idea of externality suggested in connexion with the touch . • ib. 28. Origin of the notion of extension, and of form or fig are . . 40 29. On the sensations of heat and cold 41 30. Of the sensations of hardness and softness 42 31. Of certain indefinite feelings sometimes ascribed to the touch . 44 32. Relation between the sensation and what is outwardly signified . 45 CHAPTER VI. THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 33. Of the organ of sight, and the uses or benefits of that sense . 46 ... ^^ . 48 . 49 . 50 . 51 . 52 . 53 . ib. . 54 . 55 34. Statement of the mode or process in visual perception 35. Of the origmal and acquired perceptions of sight 36. The idea of extension not originally from sight . 37. Of the knowledgecjf thefigure of bodies by the sight 38. illustration of the subject from the blind . . , 39. Measurements of magnitude by the eye 40. Of objects seen in a mist 41. 0{ the sun and moon when seen in the horizon . 42. 01 the estimation of distances by sight 43. Signs by means of which we estimate distance by sight 44. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects . 56 45. Of objects seen on the ocean, &c. 57 CHAPTER VII. HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 46. General view of the law of habit and of its applications ^ . 58 47. The law of habit applicable to the mind as well as the body . ib. 48. Of habit m relation in the smell 59 49 Of habit in relation to the taste 60 50. Of habit m rehilion to the hearing , . 62 61. Application of habit to the touch .64 52. Other striking instances of habits of touch 65 63. Habits considered in relation to the sight 66 54. Sensations may possess a relative, as well as positive increase of power 68 65. Of habits as modified by particular callings and arts . . .69 66. The law of habit considered in reference to the perception of the outlines and forms of objects 70 57. Notice of some facts which favour the above doctrine . . .71 68. Additional illustrations of Mr. Stewart's doctrine ,. , .72 CHAPTER Vni. CONCEPTIONS. 59 Meaning and characteristics of conceptions . 60. Of conceptions of objects of sight . ... 61. Of the influence of habit on our conceptions 62 Influence of habit on conceptions of sight 63 Of the subserviency of our conceptions to description 64 0( conceptions attended with a momentary belief 65. Conceptions which are joined with perceptions . 66. Conceptions a? connected with fictitious representations CONTENTS. Til CHAPTER IX. SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNE»S OF MENTAL STATES. Beeticn « P^ 67. Origin of the distinction of simple and complex . . . .83 68. Nature and characteristics of simple mental states . . . ib. 69. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition . . .84 70. Simple mental states representative of a reality . . . .85 71. Origm of complex notions, ami their relation to simple . . 86 72. Supposed comptexness without tlie antecedence of simple feelings 87 73. The precise sense in which coinplexness is to be understood . 88 74 lUustrations-of analysis as applied to the mind . . . .89 75. Complex notions of external origin 90 76. Of objects contemplated as wholes 91 CHAPTER X. ABSTRACTION. 77. Abstraction implied in the analysis of complex ideas . . .92 78. Instances of particular abstract ideas 93 79. Mental process in separating and abstracting them . . .94 80. General abstract notions the same with genera and species . 95 81. Process in classification, or the forming of genera and species . 96 82. Early classifications sometimes incorrect 97 83. Illustrations of our earliest classifications in. 84. Of the nature of general abstract ideas 98 85. The power of general abstraction yri connexion with numbers, &c. 99 86. Of general abstract truths or principles ib. 87. Of the speculations of philosophers and others .... 100 CHAPTER XI. OF ATTENTION. 88. Of the general nature of attention 101 89. Of different degrees of attention 102 90. Dependence of memory on attention 103 91. Of exercising attention in reading \04 92. Alleged inability to command the attention . . . . . 105 CHAPTER XII. DREAMING. •3. Definition of dreams and the prevalence of them 94. Connexion of dreams with our waking thoughts . 95. Dreams are often caused by our sensations 96. Explanation of the incoherency of dreams. 97. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams 98. Apparent reality of dreams. (1st cause) 99 Apparent reality of dreams. (2d cause) ^0. Of our estimate of time in dreaming lOl Explanation of the preceding statements (1st cause) 107 ib. 108 110 ib. Ill 112 113 114 PART II. INTELLECTUAL STATES OF INTERNAL ORIGIN. CHAPTER I. * INTERNAL ORIGIN §F KNOWLEDGE. 102. The soul has fountains of knowledge within 103. Declaration of Locke, that the soul has knowledge in itself 119 120 vm CONTENTS. 104. The beginning of knowledge is m the senses 105 There may also be internal accessions to knowledge . 106. Instances of notions which have an mtemal origin 107. Other instances of ideas which have an irfternai origin 120 121 122 ib C*I AFTER 11. ORIGINAL SOGGESTION. 108. Import of suggestioli, and its application in Reid and Stewart 123 109. Ideas of existence, mind, self-existence, and personal identity 124 110 Of the nature of rinity, and the origin of that notion . . .126 111. Nature of succession, and origin of the idea of succession . . 127 112. Origm of the notion of duration . 128 113. illustrations of the nature of duration ib. 114. Of time and its measurements, and of eternity .... 129 115. The idea of space not of external origin 130 116. The idea of space has its origin in suggestion . . . .131 117. Of the origin of the idea of power .132 118. Occasions of the origin of the idea of power . . . . ib. 119. Of the ideas of right and wrong . . . . . . .133 120. Origin of the ideas of moral merit and demerit .... 134 121. Of other elements of knowledge developed in suggestion . ,135 122. Suggestion a source of principles as well as of ideas . . . ib CHAPTER HI. CONSCIOUSNESS. 123. Consciousness^ the 2d source of internal knowledge; its nature . 136 124. Further remarils on the proper objects of consciousness .' .137 125. Consciousnes a ground or law of belief . . ,. . . 138 126. Instances of knowledge developed in consciousness . . . ib. CHAPTER IV RELATIVE SUGGESTION OR JUDGMENT. 127. Of the susceptibility of perceiving or feeling relations . 128. Occasions on which feelings of relation may arise 129. Of the use of correlative terms 130. Of relations of identity and diversity ..... 131. (II.) Relations of degree, and names expressive of them 132. (III.) Of relations of proportion 133. (IV.) Of relations of place or position 134 (v.) Of relations of time •. . 135. (VI.) Of ideas of possession 136. (VII.) Of relations of cause and effect 137. Of complex terms involving the relation of cause and effect 138. Connexion of relative suggestion with reasoning 140 141 142 ib. 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 l.'iO CHAPTER V. iTION. (l.) PRIMARY LAWS. 139 ReasN44D A)r considering this subject here 140. Meaning of association and illustrations 141. Of the general laws of association 142. Resemblance the first general law of association 143. Of resemblance in the effects produced 144. (/Oiitrast the second general or primary law 145. Contiguity the third general or primary law 146. Cause and effect the fourth primary law 151 ib. 152 153 154 155 157 158 CONTENTS It 1^ 159 160 161 162 163 ^64 CHAPTER VI. ASSOCIATION. (ll.) SECONDARY LAWS. 147. Secondary laws, and their connexion with the primary 148. Of the influence of lapse of time . 149. Secondary law of repetition or habit 150. Of the secondary law of coexistent emotion 151. Origmal difference m the mental constitution 152. T^ foregoing as applicable to the sensibiUties CHAPTER Vn. ^ MEMORY. 1.53. Remarks on the generalnature of memory 166 154. Of memory as a ground or law of belief 167 155. Of differences inthe strength of memory 168 156. Of circumstantial memory, or that species of memory which is based on the relations of contiguity in time and place . . 169. 157. Illustrations of specific or circumstantial memory . . . 170 158. Of philosophic memory, or that species of memory which is based on other relations than those of contiguity . . . .171 159. Illustrations of philosophic memory ....... 172 160. Of that species of memory called intentional recollection . . 173 161. Nature of intentional recollection 174 162. Instance illustrative of the preceding statements . . . .lb. 163. Marks of a good memory . . . . . • . • 175 164. Directions or rules for the improvement of the memory . . 177 165. Further directions for the improvement of the memory . .179 166. Of observance of the truth in connexion with memory . .180 CHAPTER VIII. DURATION OF MEMORY. 167. Restoration of thoughts and feelings supposed to be forgotten . 181 168. Mental action quickened by influence on the physical system . 183 169. Other instances of quickened mental action, and of a restoration of thoughts 184 170. Effect on the memory of a severe attack of fever . . . . ib. 171. Approval and illustrations of these views from Coleridge .185 172. Application of the principles of this chapter to education . . 187 173. Connexion of this doctrine with the final judgment and a future life . . , 189 CHAPTER IX. REASONING. 174. Reasoning a source of ideas and knowledge . . . .190 175.* Definition of reasoning, and of propositions 191 176. Process of the mind in all cases of reasoning . . 192 177. Illustration of the preceding statement • . . . . ".93 178. Grounds of the selection of propositions . . . • 194 179 Reasoning implies the existence of antecedent or assumed prepo- sitions 180 Further considerations on this subject 196 181. Of differences in the power of reasoning 197 182. Of habits of reasoning . . • . . ... . .198 183 Of reasoning in connexion wixh language or expression . .199 •84. Illustration of the foregoing section 200 195 CONTENTS. CHAPTER X. demonstrative: reasoning rkg. 185 Of the subjects of demonstrative reasoning . . 201 186. Use of detinitions and axioms in deinonslrative ret BC^JDg 202 187. The opposites of demonstrative reasonings absurd , 203 188 Demonstrations do not admit of different degrees of belief . 204 189. Oi the use of diagrams in demonstrations .... 205 CHAPTER XI. MORAL REASONING. 190. Of the subjects and importance of moral reasoning . . .206 191. Of the nature of moral certainty 207 192. Of reasoning from analogy . . 208 193 Of reasoning by induction 209 194. Of combined or accumulated arguments 210 CHAPTER XII. PRACTICAL DIRECTIONS IN REASONING. 195. Rules relating to the practice of reasoning 211 i96. Of being influenced in reasoning by a love of the truth . . ib 197. Care to be used in correctly statmg the subject of discussion . 212 198. Consider the kind of evidence applicable to the subject . . 213 199. Reiect the aid of false arguments or sophisms . . . . ib. 200. Fallacia equivocationis, or the use of equivocal terms and phrases 215 201. Of the sophism of estimating actions and character from the cir- cumstances of success merely 216 202. Of adherence to our opinions . 217 203. Eflects on the mind of debating for victory instead of truth . 218 CHAPTER XIII. IMAGINATION. 204. Imagination an intellectual rather than a sensitive process . . 219 205. The imagination closely r^^lated to the reasoning power . 220 206. Definition of the pow^er of imagination .... 221 207. Process of the mind in the creations of the imagination . • 222 208. Further remarks on the same subject .... . 223 209. Illustration from the v»?ritings of Dr. Reid . . . . . ib. 210. Grounds of the preference of one conception to another . 224 211. Illustration of the subject from Milton 22"^ 212. The creations of imagination not entirely voluntary . . . ib. 213. Illustration of the statements of the preceding section . . 227 214. On the utility of the faculty of the imagination . . . .228 21 5. Importance of the imagination in connexion with reasoning . '^29 CHAPTER XIV. DISORDEREB INTELLECTUAL ACTION. (l.) EXCITED CONCEPTIONS OR APPARITIONS. 216. Disordered intellectual action as connected with the body . '^ 231 217. Of excited conceptions and of apparitions in general . . . 232 218. Of the less permanent excited conceptions of sight . . . ib. 219. Of the less permament excited conceptions of sound . . .234 220. First cause of permanently vivid conceptions or apparitior.s. — Morbid sensibility of the reiina of the eye . . . .235 CONTENTS. XI 2iil. Second cause of permanently excited conceptions or apparitions. iNegUjct of periodical Uloud-letling 237 222. Methods o/ reliel adopted m this case 239 223. Third cause of excited conceptions. Attacks of fever . .240 224. Fourth cause of apparitions and other excited conceptions. In- flammation of the brain 241 225. Facts having relation to the fourth cause of excited conceptioLS . 242 Zlifi. Fifth cause of apparitions. Hysteria 243 CHAPTER XV. DISORDERED INTELLECTUAL ACTION. (II.) INSANITY. 227. Meaning of the term insanity ''244 228. Of disordered or alienated sensations .... .245 229. Of disordered or alienated ejcternal perception . . . .246 230. Disordered state or insanity of original suggestion . . . 247 231. L'nsoundiiesig or insanity ot consciousness 243 232. Insanity ot the judgment or relative suggestion . . . .249 233. Disordered or alienated association. Lightheadedness . . 250 234. Illustrations of this mental disorder 251 235. 01 partial insanity or alienation of the memory . . . . ib. 236. Of the power of reasoning in the partially insane .... 253 237. Instance ot the above form of insanity ol reasoning . . 254 238. Partial mental alienation by means of the imagination . .255 239. insanity or ahenation oi the power of belief . . . 256 DIVISION II. THE SENSIBILITIES. SENTIENT OR SENSITIVE STATES Of THE MIND.— SENTIMENTS INTRODUCTION. CLASSIFICATION OF THE SENSIBILITIES. 240. Reference to the general division of the whole mind . . . 261 241. The action of the sensibilities implies that of the intellect . . ib. 242. Division of the sensibilities into natural or pathematic, and moral 262 243. The moral and natural sensibilities have different objects . .263 244 The moral sensibilities higbeF in rank than the natural . . 264 245. 'l"he moral sensihililies wanting iti brutes ib. 246 Classification of the natural sensibilities ... .265 247. Classihcatiou of the moral sensiodities . ... 266 PART I. NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENSIBILITIES. NATURAL OR PATHEMATIC SENTIMENTS. CLASS I. BHOTIONS OR EMOTIVE STATES OF THE MIND. CHAPTER I. NATURE OF THE E.VI0TI0NS. 248. We have a knowledge of emotions by consciousness . . .269 249. The place of emotions, consideied in reference to other mental • acts ' . . .270 260. The character of emotions chants so as to comforni to that of perceptions 271 251. Emotions characterized by rapidity and variety .... 272 Xll CONTENTS. CHAPTER II. EMOTIONS OK BEAUTY. Section ftl» 25:ii. Characteristics of emotions of beauty . . . 273 253. Of what is meant by t)eauliful objects . . . . .274 254. Of the (Jistinrlion between beautilui and other obiects . .275 255 Grounds or occasions of emotions of beauty various . . .276 256. All objects not equally fitted to cause these emotions . . .277 257. A suscepHbihty of emotions of beauty an ultimate principle of our n»ental constitution . . . . . . . . . 278 258. Remarks on the beauty of forms. — The circle .... 279 259. Original or intrinsic beauty. — 'I'he circle 280 260. Of the beauty of straight and angular forms ib. 261. Of square, pyramidal, and triangular forms 281 262. Of the original or intrinsic beauty of colours . . . 283 263. Further illustrations of the original beauty of colours . . 284 264. Of sounds considered as a source of i»eauiy 286 265. Illustrations of the original beauty of sounds .... 287 266. Further instances of the original beauty of sounds . . .290 267. The permanency of musical power dependent on its being intrinsic ib. 268. Of motion as an element of beauty 291 269. Explanation of the beauty of motion from Kaimes . . . 292 CHAPTER III. ASSOCIATED BEAUTY. 270. Associated beauty implies an antecedent or intrinsic beauty . 293 271. Objects may become beautiful by association merely . . .294 272. Further illustrations of associated feelings 295 273. Instances of national associations , . 297 274. The sources of associated beauty coincident with those of human happiness 298 275. Summary of views in regard to the beautiful .... 29Q CHAPTER IV EMOTIONS OF SUBLIMITY. 276. Connexion between beauty and sublimity 300 277. The occasions of the emotions of sublimity various . . . 301 278. Great extent or expansion an occasion of sublimity . . .302 279. Great height an element or occasion of sublimity . . . ib. 280. Of depth in connexion with the sublime 303 281. Of colours in connexion with the sublime 304 282. Of sounds as furnishing an occasion of sublime emotions . . ib. 283. Of motion in connexion with the sublime 305 284. Indications of power accompanied by emotions of the sublime . 306 285. Of the original or primary sublimity of objects . . . 307 286 Considerations in proof of the original sublimity of objects . . ib. 287. Influence of association on emotions of subiunity . . .308 CHAPTER V. EMOTIONS OF THE LUDICR0U8 288. General nature of emo' Dns of the ludicrous 289. Occasions of emotions of the ludicrous 290. Of what is understood by wit 291. Of wit as it consists in burlesque or in debasing objects 292. Of wit when employed in aggrandizing objects . 293. Of the character and occasions of humour . 294. Of the practical utility of feehngs of the ludicrous ^09 310 311 ib. 312 313 314 COMTENTS. XUl CHAPTER VI. INSTANCES OP OTHER SIMPLE EMOTIONS. Pafft 295. Emotions of cheerfulness, joy, and gladness . . . 314 296. Kmotione of melancholy, sorrow, and grief . . . 315 297. Emotions of surprise, astonishment, and wonder . . . 316 298. Emotions of dissatisfaction, displeasure, and disgust . . ib. 299. Emotions of diffidence, modesty, and shame . . . 317 300. Emotions of regard, reverence, and adoration . . . . ib CLASS II. V' THE DESIRES. CHAPTER I. NATURE OP DESIRES. 301. Of the prevalence of desire in this department of the mind . 321 302. Th to the mind the idea of being considerably removed, al- though they are actually near to us. And the mind hn- mediately draws the conclusion, (so rapidly as to seem £ simple and original perception,) that the object having the same visible or apparent magnitude, and yet supposes" to be at a considerable distance, is greater than other ob - jects of the same class. So that it is chiefly the view o: the mind, a law or habit of the intellect^ which, in thj particular case, gives a fictitious expansion to bodies although it is possfcle that the result may in part be at tributed to a diiference in the refraction of the rays O: light, caused by their passing through a denser and les;- uniform medium than usual. 6 41. Of the sun and moon when seen in the horizon. These remarks naturally remind us of the well-knowr fact, that the sun and moon seem larger in the horizon than in the meridian. Three reasons may be given for this appearance; and perhaps ordinarily they are combined together. — ( 1.) The horizon may seem more distant than the zenith, m consequence of intervening objects. We measure the distance of objects in part by means of those that are scattered along beti^^een, and any expanse of surface, where there are no such intervening objects, ap- pears to us of less extent than it actuaUy is. Now if the rays of light form precisely the same image in the eye, E 2 54 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. but the source of them is supposed to be further off in the horizon than in the zenith, such have been our mental habits, that the object in the horizon will probably appear the largest. — (2.) Another reason of the enlarged ap- pearance of the sun and moonjn the horizon is, that the rays from them fall on the body of the atmosphere ob- liquely, and, of course, are reflected downward towards the beholder, and subtend a larger angle at his eye. Hence, as we always see objects in the direction of the ray just before it enters the eye, if we follow the rays back in the precise direction of their approach, they wdll present to the eye the outlines of a larger object as their source than they would if they had not been refracted • — Also, when the atmosphere is not clear, but masses of »ra- pour exist in it, the refraction is increased and the object proportionally enlarged. — (3.) The sun and mcjn ap- pear enlarged when other objects of considerable dimen- sions, but so distant as to subtend a very small inigle at the eye, are seen in the same direction or in the moment of passing their disk, such as distant trees in the hori- zon, or ships far off at sea. These objects, [hough small in the eye or in their visual appearance, arc yet, in con- sequence of our previous knowledge, enlarged in our conceptions of them. And this conceptive enlargement communicates itself, by a sort of mental illusion, to oth- er objects with which they seem to come in contact. ^ 42. Of the estimation of distances by sight. We are next led to the consideration of distances as made known and ascertained by the sight. By the dis- tance of objects, when we use the term in reference to ourselves, we mean the space which is interposed between those objects and our own position. It might be object- ed, that space interposed is only a synonymous expression for the thing to be defined. Nevertheless, no one can be supposed to be ignorant of what is meant. Even blind men have a notion of distance, and can measure it by the touch, or by walking forward until they meet the distant object. The perception of distance by the sight is an acquired and not an original perception ; although the latter was universally supposed to be the fact until comparatively a recent period THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 55 All o])jects in the first instance appear to touch the eye ; but our experience has corrected so many of the representations of the senses, before the period which we are yet able to retrace by the memory, that we cannot prove this by a reference to our own childhood and infan- cy. It appears, however, from the statement of the ra- ses of persons born blind on the sudden restoration of their sight. — " When he first saw," says Cheselden, the anatomist, when giving an account of a young man whom he had restored to sight by couching for the cataract, " he was so far from making any judgment about distance, that he thought all objects touched his eye, as he express- ed it, as what he felt did his skin ; and thought no ob- jects so agreeable as those which were smooth and regu- lar, although he could form no judgment of their shape, or guess what it w^as in any object that was pleasing 4o' him." This anatomist has further informed us, that he has brought to sight several others who had no remembrance of ever having seen ; and that they all gave the same ac- count of their learning to see, as they called it, as the young man already mentioned, although not in so many particulars ; and that they all had this in common, that, having never had occasion to move their eyes, they kne\^ not how to do it, and, at first, could not at all direct them to a particular object ; but in time they acquired that fac- ulty, though by slow degrees. ^ 43. Signs by means of which we estimate distance by sight. Blind persons, w^hen at first restored to sight, are un- able to estimate the distance of objects by that sense, but soon observing that certain changes in the visible appear- ance of bodies always accompany a change of distance, they fall upon a method of estimating distance by the vis- ible appearance. And it would no doubt be found, if it could be particularly examined into, that all mankind come to possess the power of estimating the distances of objecty by sight in the sam» way. When a body is re- moved from us and placed at a considerable distance, it becomes smaller in its visible appearance, its colours are less lively, and its outlines less distinct ; and we may ex- 56 THE SENSE OF SIGHT. pect to find various intermediate objects, more or fewer in number, corresponding with the increase of the dis- tance, showing themselves between the receding object and the spectator. And hence it is, that a certain visible appearance comes to be the sign of a certain distance. Historical and landscape painters are enabled to turn these facts to great account in their delineations. By means of dimness of colour, indistinctness of outline, and the partial interposition of other objects, they are enabled apparently to throw back to a very considerable distance from the eye those objects which they wish to appear re- mote. While other objects, that are intended to appear near, are painted vivid in colour, large in size, distinct in outline, and are separated from the eye of the spectator by few or no intermediate objects. ^ 44. Estimation of distance when unaided by intermediate objects. (1.) As we depend, in no small degree, upon interme- diate objects in forming our notions of distance, it results, that we are often much perplexed by the absence of such objects. Accordingly, we find that people frequently mis- take, when they attempt to estimate by the eye the length or width of unoccupied plains and marshes, generally making the extent less than it really is. For the same reason they misjudge of the width of a river, estimating its width at half or three quarters of a mile at the most, when it is perhaps not less than double that distance. The same holds true of other bodies of water ; and of all other things which are seen by us in a horizontal po- sition and under similar circumstances. (2.) We mistake in the same way also in estimating the height T)f steeples, and of other bodies that are per- pendicular, and not on a level with the eye, provided the height be considerable. As the upper parts of the steeple out-top the surrounding buildings, and there are no contiguous objects with which to compare it, any measurement taken by the eye must be inaccurate, but is generally less than the truth. (3) The fixed stars, when viewed by the eye, all ap- pear to be alike indefinitely and equally distant. Being scattered over the whole sky, tliey make every part of it THE SENSE OF SIGHT. 57 seem, liko tliemselves, at an indefinite and equal distance, and therefore contribute to give the whole sky the ap- pearance of the inside of a sphere. Moreover, the hori- zon seems to the eye to be further off than the zenith ; because between us and the former there lie many things, as fields, hills, and waters, which we know to occupy a great space ; whereas between us and the zenith there are no considerable things of known dimensions. And, therefore, the heavens appear like the segment of a sphere, and less than a hemisphere, in the centre of which we seem to stand. — And the wider our prospect is, the greater will the sphere appear to be, and the less the segment. ^45. Of objects seen on the ocean, &c. A vessel seen at sea by a person who is not accustom- ed to the ocean, appears much nearer than it actually is ; and on the same principles as already illustrated. In his previous observations of the objects at a distance, he has commonly neticed a number of intermediate objects, in- terposed between the distant body and himself. It is prob- ably the absence of such objects that chiefly causes the deception under which he labours in the present instance. In connexion with what has been said, we are led to make this further remark, that a change in the purity of the air will perplex in some measure those ideas of dis- tance which we receive from sight. Bishop Berkeley re- marks, while travelling in Italy and Sicily, he noticed that cities and palaces seen at a great distance appeared nearer to him by several miles than they actually were. The cause of this he very correctly supposed to be the purity of the Italian and Sicilian air, which gave to ob- jects at a distance a degree of brightness and distinct- ness which, in the less clear and pure atmosphere of his native country, could be observed only in those towns and separate edifices which were near. At home he had learned to estimate the distances of objects by their ap- 'pearance ; but his conclusions failed him when they came to be applied to objects in countries where the air was so much clearer. — And the same thing has been no- ticed by other travellers, who have been placed in the like circumstances. 68 HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. CHAPTER Vn. HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. ^ 46. General view of the law of habit and of its applications. There is an important law of the mental constitution known as the law of Habit, which may be described in general terms as follows : That the mental action acquires facility and strength from repetition or practice. The fact that the facility and the increase of strength, implied in HABIT, is owing to mere repetition, or what is more fre- quently termed practice, we learn, as w^e do other facts and principles in relation to the mind, from the observa- tion of men around us, and from our own personal expe- rience. And as it has hitherto been found impracticable to resolve it into any general fact or principle more ele- mentary, it may justly be regarded as something ultimate and essential in our nature. The term Habit, by the use of language, indicates the facility and strength acquired in the way which has been mentioned, including both the result and the manner of it. As the law of habit has reference to the whole mind of man, the application of the term which expresses it is, of course, veij extensive. We apply it to the dexterity of workmen in the different manual arts, to the rapidity of the accountant, to the coup d'oeil or eye-glance of the military engineer, to the tact and fluency of the extempo- raneous speaker, and in other like instances. — We apply it also in cases where the mere exercise of emotion and de- sire is concerned ; to the avaricious man's lovte of wealth, the ambitious man's passion for distinction, the wakeful suspiciwis of the jealous, and the confirmed and substan- tial benevolence of the philanthropist. ^ 47. The law of habit applicable to the mind as well ag, the body. It is remarkable, that the law under consideration holds good in res-oect to the body as well as the mind. In the mechanicaJ arts, and in all cases where there is a corpo- HABITS OF SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 59 rea. as well as mental eifort, the effect of practice will be found to extend to both. Not only the acts of the mincL^re quickened and strengthened, but all those mus- cles which are at such times employed, become stronger and more obedient to the will. Indeed, the submission of the muscular effort to the volition is oftentimes render- ed so prompt by habit, that we are unable distinctly to recollect any exercise of volition previous to the active or muscular exertion. It is habit which is the basis of those characteristic peculiarities that distinguish one man's handwriting from another's; it is habit which causes that peculiarity of attitude and motion so easily discoverable in most persons^ termed their gait ; it is habit also which has impressed on the muscles, immediately connected with the organs of speech, that fixed and pre- cise form of action, which, in different individuals, gives rise, in part at least, to characteristics of voice. The habit, in the cases just mentioned, is both bodily and men- tal, and has become so strong, that it is hardly possible to counteract it for any length of time. — The great law of Habit is applicable to all the leading divisions of our mental nature, the Intellect, the Sensibilities, and the Will ; and as we advance from one view of the mind to another, we shall have repeated occasion to notice its in- fluence. In the remainder of this chapter we shall limit our remarks to Habit, considered in connexion with the Sensations and Perceptions. ^ 4S. Of habit in relation to the smell. We shall consider the application of the principle ol Habit to the senses in the same order which has already been observed. In the first place, there are habits of Smell. — This sense, like the others, is susceptible of cul- tivation. As there are some persons whose power of distinguishing the difference of tw^o or more colours is feeble ; so there are some who are doubtful and perplex- ed in like manner in the discrimination f their nature, so far as can be expected on a subject, Cbe clearness of which depends more on a reference to 84 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS our own personal consciousness than on the teachings of others. Let it be noticed then, in the first place, that a simple idea cannot be separated into parts. — It is clearly im- plied in the very distinction between simplicity and com- plexity, considered in relation to the states of the mind, that there can be no such separation, no such division. It is emphatically true of our simple ideas and emotions, and of all other simple states of the mind, that they are one and indivisible. Whenever you can detect in them mOie than one element, they at once lose their character uf simplicity, and are to be regarded as complex, however they may have previously appeared. Inseparableness consequently is their striking characteristic ; and it may be added, that they are not only inseparable in them- selves, but are separate from everything else. There is nothing which can stand as a substitute for them where they are, or represent them where they are not ; they are independent unities, constituted exclusively by the mind itself, having a specific and positive character, but never theless known only in themselves. ^ 69. Simple mental states not susceptible of definition. Let it be observed, in the second place, that our simple notions cannot be defined. — This view of them follows necessarily from what has been said of their oneness and inseparableness, compared with what is universally un- derstood by defining. In respect to definitions, it is un- doubtedly true, that we sometimes use synonymous words, and call such use a definition ; but it is not properly such. In every legitimate definition, the idea which is to be de- fined is to be separated, as far as may be thought neces- sary, into its subordinate parts ; and these parts are to be presented to the mind for its examination, instead of the original notion into which they entered. This process must' be gone through in every instance of accurate de- fining ; this is the general and authorized view of defini- tion ; and it is not easy to see in what else it can well consist. But *his process will not apply to our simple thoughts and feelings, because, if there be any such thing as sim- r OF MENTAI. STATES. 85 pie mental states, they are characterized by inseparable- ness and oneness. And furthermore, if we define ideas by employing other ideas, we must count upon meeting dt last with such as shall be ultimate, and will reject all verbal explanation ; otherwise we can never come to an end in the process. — So that the simple mental affections are not only undefinable in themselves ; but if there were no such elementary states of mind, there could be no de- fining in any other case; it would be merely analysis upon analysis, a process without completion, and a labour without end ; leaving the subject in as much darkness as when the process was begun. When we speak of simple ideas and feelings, and a person, in consequence of our inabihty to define them, professes to be ignorant of the terms we use, we can fre- quently aid him in understanding them by a statement of the circumstances, as far as possible, under which the simple mental state exists. But having done this, we can merely refer him to his own senses and consciousness, as the only teachers from which he can expect to receive satisfaction. ^ 70. Simple mental states representative of a reality. A third mark or characteristic of simple mental states is, that they always stand for or represent a reality. — In other words, no simple idea is, in its own nature, de- lusive or fictitious, but always has something precisely corresponding to it. — It is not always so with complex ideas ; these, as Mr. Locke justly gives us to understand, are sometimes chilMerical. That is to say; the elements of which they are i^omposed are so brought together and combined as to lorm something, of which nature presents no corresponding reality. If, for instance, a person had an idea of a body, yellow, or of some other colour, malle- able, fixed ; possessing, in a word, all the qualities of iron or of gold, with this difference only, of its being lighter than water, it would be what Mr. Locke terms a chimer- ical idea ; because the combination of the elements here exists only in the human mind, and not ia nature ; the thing has no outward or objective reality. The words centaur, dragon, and hypogriff, which are the weli H 56 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS known names for imaginary beings possessing nu actual existence, are expressive of chimerial complex ideas. These ideas have nothing corresponding to them. But it is not so with the sijnple states of the mind. If it were otherwise, since in our inquiries after truth we naturally proceed from what is complex to what is simple, there would be no sure foundation of knowledge. Whenever, in our analysis of a subject, we arrive at truly simple ideas, we have firm footing ; there is no mistake, no de- lusion. Nature, always faithful to her own character, gives utterance to the truth alone. But man, in combi- ning together the elements which nature furnishes, does not always avoid mistakes. $71. Origin of complex notions, and their relation to simple. Our simple states of mind, which we have thus endeav- oured to explain, were probably first in origin. There are reasons for considering them as antecedent in point of time to our complex mental states, although in many cases it may not be easy to trace the progress of the mind from the one to the other. The complex notions of external material objects embrace the separate and simple notions of resistance, extension, hardness, colour, taste, and others. As these elementary perceptions evidently have their ori- gin in distinct and separate senses, it is but reasonable to suppose that they possess a simple, before they are com- bined together in a complex existence. Simple ideas, therefore, may justly be regarded as antecedent, in point of time, to those which are complex, and as laying the foundation of them. Hence we see that it is sufficiently near the truth, and that it is not improper, to speak of our complex ideas as derived from, or made up of, simple ideas. This is the well-known language of Mr. Locke on this subject ; and when we consider how much foundation there is for it in the constitution and operations of the human mind, there IS good reason for retaining it. — Although purely simple states of the mind are few in number, vast multitudes of a complex nature are formed from them. The ability which the mind possesses of originating complex thoughts and feelings from elementary ones, may be compared to OF MENTAL STATES. 87 our power of uniting together the letters of the alphabet in the formation of syllables and words. ^ 72. Supposed complexness without the antecedence of simple feelings. It is possible that some persons may object to the doc- trine proposed in the last section, that complex mental states are subsequent in point of time to those which are simple ; and may be inclined to adopt the opinion, that some, at least, of our complex notions are framed at once and immediately, whenever an occasion presents itself, and are not necessarily dependent on the prior existence of any other feelings. When the eye, for instance, opens on a wide and diversified landscape, they suppose the whole to be embraced in one complex mental state, the formation of which is not gradual and susceptible of measurement by time, but is truly instantaneous. When we direct our attention to objects of less extent, as a por- trait, a landscape, or historical painting, they imagine it to be still more evident, that the complexity of mind, cor- responding to the complexity of the object, is a result without any antecedent process. Without doubt, what has now been said is, in some instances, apparently the case ; but this appearance (for we cannot speak of it as anything more than such) is susceptible of an obvious ex- planation, without an abandonment of the general princi- ple which has been laid down. No one is ignorant that the mind often passes with exceeding rapidity along the successive objects of its contemplation. This rapidity may, in some cases, be so great, that no foundation will be laid for remembrance ; and of course, in such cases, the complex feehng has the appearance of being formed without the antecedence of other .simple feelings. Often the eye glances so rapidly over the distinct parts of the portrait, the historical painting, or even the wide land- scape, that we are utterly unable in our recollection to detect the successive steps of its progress. There natu- ^lly seems, therefore, to be but one view, instead of dis- tinct and successive glances of the mind from hill to hill, from forest to forest, and from one verdant spot to an- other, prior to the supposed one and instantaneous com- prehension of the whole. But there is much reason for tgO SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS saying that this oneness of comprehension is in seeming and appearance only, and not in fact. (See § 57, 58.) ^ 73. The precise sense in which coinplexness is to be understood. But while we distinctly assert the frequent complexness of the mental affections, it should be particularly kept in mind, that they are not to be regarded in the light of a material compound, where the parts, although it may sometimes appear to be otherwise, necessarily possess no higher unity than that of juxtaposition, and, of course, can be literally separated from each other, and then put together again. There is nothing of this kind ; neither putting together nor taking asunder, in this literal and material sense. — But if our thoughts and feelings are not made up of others, and are not complex in the material sense of the expressions, what then constitutes their com- plexness ? This inquiry gives occasion for the impor- tant remark, that complexness in relation to the mind is not literal, but virtual only. What we term a complex feeling is in itself truly simple, but at the same time it is equal to many others, and is complex only in that sense. Thought after thought, and emotion following emotion, passes through the mind ; and as they are called forth by the operation of the laws of association, many of them necessarily have relation to the same object. Then there follows a new state of mind, which is the result of those previous feelings, and is complex in the sense already ex- plained. That is to say, it is felt by us to possess a vir- tual equality to those separate antecedent thoughts and emotions. Our simple feelings are like streams coming from different mountains, but meeting and mingling to- gether at last in the common centre of some intermediate lake ; the tributary fountains are no longer separable ; but have disappeared, and become merged and confound- ed in the bosom of their common resting-place. Or they may be likened to the cents and dimes of the American coinage, tens and hundreds of which are represented by a single eagle ; and yet the eagle is not divided into a hundred or thousand parts, but has as much unity as the numerous pieces for which it stands. The language which expresses the composition and OF MENTAL STATES. S9 complexity of thought is, therefore, to be regarded as wholly metaphorical when applied to the mind, and is not to be taken in its literal meaning. We are under the necessity of employing in this case, as in others, language which has a material origin, but we shall not be led astray by it if we carefully attend to what has been said, and endeavour to aid our conception of it by a reference to our internal experience. <5 74. Illustrations of analysis as applied to the mind. The subject of the preceding section will be the better understood by the consideration of Analysis as applicable to the mind. As we do not combine literally, so we do not untie or separate Hterally ; as there is no literal complex- ness, so there is no literal resolution or analysis of it. Nevertheless, we have a meaning when we speak of analyzing our thoughts and feelings. And what is if? What are we to understand by the term analysis ? Although this subject is not without difficulty, both in the conception and in the expression of it, it is susceptible of some degree of illustration. — It will be remembered that 4;here may be an analysis of material bodies. The chemist analyzes when he takes a piece of glass, which appears to be one substance, and finds that it is not one, but is separable into silicious and alkaline matter. He takes other bodies, and separates them in like manner ; and whenever he does this, the process is rightly called analysis. Now we apply the same term to the mind ; but the thing expressed by it, the process gone through, is not the same. All we can say is, there is something like this. We do not resolve and separate a complex thought, as we do* a piece of glass or other material body, into its parts ; we are utterly unable to do it, if we should se- riously make the attempt ; every mental state is, in itself and in fact, simple and indivisible, and is complex only ^rtually. Complex notions are the results rather than the compounds of former feelitigs ; and though not liter- ally made up of parts, have the relation to them which any material whole has to the elements composing it: and in that particular sense may be said to comprehend H2 96 SIMPLICITY AND COMPLEXNESS or embrace the subordinate notions. Mental analysis ac- cordingly concerns merely this relation. We perform such an analysis when, by the aid of our reflection and consciousness, we are able to indicate those separate and subordinate feelings to which, in our conception of it, the complex mental state is virtually equal. The term government, for instance, when used in ref- erence to the mental perception of the thing thus named, expresses a complex state of the mind ; we may make this mental state, which is in fact only one, although it is virtually more than one, a subject of contemplation; and we are said to analyze it when we are able to indicate those separate and more elementary notions, without the existence and antecedence of which it could not have been formed by the mind. We do not literally take the complex state in pieces, but we designate other states of mind which, every one's knowledge of the origin of thought convinces him, must have preceded it, such as the ideas of power, right, obligation, command, and the rela- tive notions of superior and inferior. a- riation, continue when we are asleep. — Condorcet (a name famous in the history of France) told some one, that, while he was engaged in abstruse and profound cal- culations, he was frequently obliged to leave them in an unfinished state, in order to retire to rest, and that the re- maining steps and the conclusion of his calculations have more than once presented themselves in his dreams. — Franklin also has made the remark, that the bearings and results of political events, which had caused him much trouble while awake, were not unfrequently unfolded to him in dreaming. — Mr. Coleridge says, that, as he was once reading in the Pilgrimage of Purchas an account of the palace and garden of the Khan Kubla, he fell into a sleep, and in that situation composed an entire poem of not less than two hundred lines, some of which he after- ward committed to writing. The poem is entitled Kubla Khan, and begins as follows : " In Xanadu did Kubla Khan A stately pleasure-dome decree ; Where Alph, the sacred river, ran Through caverns measureless to man Down to a sunless sea." It is evident from such statements as these, which are confirmed by the experience of almost every person, that our dreams are fashioned from the materials of the thoughts and feelings which we have while awake ; in other words, they will, in a great degree, be merely the repetition of our customary and prevailing associations. So w^ell un- derstood is this, that President Edwards, who was no less distinguished as a mental philosopher than as a theolo gian, thought it a good practice to take particular notice of his dreams, in order to ascertain from them what his predominant inchnations were. ^ 95 Dreams are often caused by our sensations. But while we are to look for the materials of our dreams in thoughts which had previously existed, we DREAMING. 109 further find that they are not beyond the influence of those slight bodily sensations of which we are susceptible even in houre of sleep. These sensations, slight as they are, are the means of ifttroducing one set of associations rather than another. — Dugald Stewart relates an incident which may be considered an evidence of this, that a per son with whom he was acquainted had occasion, in con- sequence of an indisposition, to apply a bottle of hot water to his feet when he went to bed, and the consequence was, that he dreamed he was making a journey to the top of Mount JEtna., and that he found the heat of the ground almost insupportable. There was once a gentle- man in the English army who was so susceptible of audi- ble impressions while he was asleep, that his companions could make him dream of what they pleased. Once, in particular, they made him go through the whole process of a duel, from the preliminary arrangements to the firing of the pistol, which they put into his hand for that pur- pose, and wriich, when it exploded, waked him. A cause of dreams, closely allied to the above, is the variety of sensations which we experience from the stom- ach, viscera, &c. — Persons, for instance, who have been for a long time deprived of food, or have received it only in small quantities, hardly enough to preserve life, will be likely to have dreams in some way or other directly re- lating to their condition. Baron Trenck relates, that, being almost dead with hunger when confined in his dungeon, his dreams every night presented to him the well-filled and luxurious tables of Berlin, from which, as they were presented before him, he imagined he was about to relieve his hunger. " The night had far advan- ced," says Irving, speaking of the voyage of Mendez to Hispaniola, " but those whose turn it was to take repose were unable to sleep, from the intensity of their thirst ; or if they slept, it was to be tantalized with dreams of cool fountains and running brooks." • The state of health also has considerable influence, not only in producing dreams, but in giving them a particular character. The remark has been made by medical men, that acute diseases, particularly fevers, are often preceded and indicated by disagreeable and oppressive dreams. 110 DREAMING r ^ 96 Explanation of the incoherency of dreams (1st cause.; Tiiere is frequently much of Avildness, inconsistency, and contradiction in our dreams. The mind passes very rapidly from one object to another ; strange and singular incidents occur. If our dreams be truly the repetition of our waking thoughts, it may well be inquired, How this wildness and inconsistency happeh ? The explanation of this peculiarity resolves itself into two parts. — ^The first ground or cause of it is, that our dreams are not subjected, like our waking thoughts, to the control and regulation of surrounding objects. While we are awake, our trains of thought are kept uniform and coherent by the influence of such objects, which continu- ally remind us of our situation, character, and duties; and which keep in check any tendency to revery. But in sleep the senses are closed ; the soul is accordingly, in a great measure, excluded from the material world, and is thus deprived of the salutary regulating influence from that source. ^ 97. Second cause of the incoherency of dreams. In the second place, when we are asleep, our associate i trains of thought are no longer under the control of the WILL. We do not mean to say that the operations of the will are suspended at such times, and that volitions have no existence. On the contrary, there is suflScient evidence of the continuance of these mental acts, in some degree at least ; since volitions must have made a part of the original trains of thought which are repeated in dream- ing ; and furthermore, we are often as conscious of exer- cising or putting forth volitions when dreaming as of any other mental acts ; for instance, imagining, remembering, assenting, or reasoning. When we dream that we are attacked by an enemy sword in hand, but happen, as we suppose in our dreaming experiences, to be furnished in self-defence with an instrument of the same kind, we dream that we mill to exert it for our own safety and against our antagonist ; and we as truly in this case put forth the mental exercise which we term volition, as, in any other, we exercise remembrance, or imagine, or reason m our sleep. DREAMING 111 Admitting, however, that the will continues to act in sleep, it is quite evident that the volitions which are put forth by it have ceased to exercise their customary influ- ence in respect to our mental operations. Ordinarily we are able, by means of an act of the will, to fix our atten- tion upon some particular part of any general subject which has been suggested, or to transfer it to some other part of such subject, and thus to direct and to reflate the whole train of mental action. But the moment we are soundly asleep, this influence ceases, and hence, in connexion with the other cause already mentioned, arise the wildness, incoherency, and contradictions which exist. A person, while he is awake, has his thoughts under such government, and is able, by the direct and indirect influence of volitions, so to regulate them as generally to bring them in the end to some conclusion, which he fore- sees and wishes to arrive at. But in dreaming, as all di- recting and governing influence, both internal and exter- nal, is at an end, our thoughts and feelings seem to be driven forward, much like a ship at sea without a rudder, wherever it may happen. (J 98. Apparent reality of dreams. (1st cause.) When objects are presented to us in dreams, we look upon them as real ; and events, and combinations and se- ries of events appear the same. We feel the same inter- est and resort to the same expedients as in the perplexi- ties and enjoyments of real life. When persons are intro- duced as forming a part in the transactions of our dreams, we see them clearly in their living attitudes and stature ; we converse with them, and hear them speak, and be- hold them move, as if actually present. One reason of this greater vividness of our dreaming conceptions and of our firm belief in their reality seems to be this. The subjects upon which our thoughts are then employed, occupy the mind exclusively. We can form a clearer conception of an objec^wdth our eyes shut than we can with them open, as any one will be convinced on ma- king the experiment ; and the liveliness of the conception will increase in proportion as w^e can suspend the exer- cise of the other senses. In sound sleep, not only the 112 DREAMING. sight, but the other senses also, may be said to be closed ; and the attention is not continually diverted by the multi- tude of objects, which arrest the hearing and touch when we are awake. — It .is, therefore, a most natural supposi- tion, that our conceptions must at sucn times be extreme- ly vivid and distinct. 'At § 64 we particularly remarked upon conceptions, or those ideas w^hich w^e have of absent objects of perception, which possess this vividness of char- acter. And it there appeared that they might be attend- ed with a momentary belief even when we are awake. But as conceptions exist in the mind when we are asleep in a much higher degree distinct and vivid, what was in the former case a momentary, becomes in the latter a per- manent belief Hence everything has the appearance of reality ; and the mere thoughts of the mind are virtual- ly transformed into persons, and varieties of situation, and events, which are regarded by us in precisely the same light as the persons, and situations, and events of om every day's experience. <^ 99. Apparent reality of dreams. (2d cause ) A second circumstance w^hich goes to account for thr fact that our dreaming conceptions have the appearance* of reality is, that they are not susceptible of being con- trolled, either directly or indirectly, by mere volition. — We are so formed as almost invariably to associate reality with whatever objects of perception continue to produce in us the same effects. A hard or soft body, or any sub- stance of a particular colour, or taste, or smell, are alw^ays, when presented to our senses, followed by certain states of mind essentially the same; and we yield the most ready and firm belief in the existence of such objects. In a word, we are disposed, from our very constitution, to believe in the existence of objects of perception, the per- ceptions -of which do not depend on the will, but w^hich we find to be followed by certain states of the mind, w^hether we choose it or not. — But it is to be recollected that our dreaming thoughts are mere conceptions ; our senses being closed and shut up, and external objects not being presented to them. This is true. But if we con« elude in favour of the real existence of objects of percep- DREAMING. 113 tion, because they produce in us sensations independently of our volitions, it is but natural to suppose that we shall believe in the reality of our conceptions also whenever they are in like manner beyond our voluntary control. They are both merely states of the mind ; and if behef always attends our perceptions, wherever we find them to De independent of our choice, there is no reason why conceptions, which are ideas of absent objects of percep- tion, should not be attended with a like belief under the same circumstances. — And essentially the same circum- stances exist in dreaming ; that is, a train of conceptions arise in the mind, and we are not conscious at such times of being able to exercise any direction or control what- ever over them. They exist, whether we will or not ; and we regard them as real.