UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 
 AT LOS ANGELES
 
 LETTER 
 
 ADDRESSED TO 
 
 HIS MAJEST Y's 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL and SOLICITOR GENERAL; 
 
 IN WHICH 
 
 THE DOCTRINES LATELY MAINTAINED IN PARLIAMENT, 
 
 ON THE SUBJECT OP 
 
 VOLUNTARY SUBSCRIPTIONS, 
 
 ARE CONSIDERED. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 tklNTBD FOR J, DEBKETT, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOVSE, 
 PICCADILLY. 
 
 M,OCC,XCIV. 
 
 9082 6
 
 H3 
 
 A 
 
 LETTER 
 
 - 
 
 ATTORNEY AND SOLICITOR GENERAL. 
 
 GENTLEMEN, 
 
 WHEN the queftion which is the fubjecT: of 
 difcuflion in the following fheets was 
 ccftrft ftarted, I could not imagine that an oppor- 
 tunity would have been given to private indivi- 
 S duals to enter into any controverfy about it. 
 Its magnitude appeared to me in a peculiar man- 
 ner not only to entitle it to parliamentary invefti- 
 gation, but alfo to require a complete parlia- 
 mentary decifion. Had our Legiflators thought 
 proper' to decide this point even in a way that 
 might in future affect our liberties, as their act ; 
 I mould, probably, have felt it to be my prefent 
 duty, as an individual, to fubmit to this legitimate 
 3. expreffion of their will : but as it has been judged 
 expedient to leave this queftion ilill in fufpenfe, 
 ~~ I truft, that without deviating from that refpect 
 B which 
 
 300962
 
 which is always dire to the opinions of the Le- 
 giflature, I may be now permitted to enter at 
 large upon the difcuffion : and as I may alfo be 
 allowed fairly to conclude that their deliberation 
 has been influenced by the advice which you have 
 given, for it does not appear that any other emi- 
 nent legal characters m either houfe have given 
 to this meafure the fanction of their fentiments, 
 I know not to whom I can with equal propriety 
 addrefs the following pages, as to yourfelves ; to 
 you, Gentlemen, who, holding high and refpon- 
 fible fituations under the crown, have advanced 
 to fupport this queftion of Subfcriptions, as con- 
 fiftent with the fpirit of our conflitution, and 
 fanctioned by the practice of our laws. To you, 
 tinder fuch circumflances, no further apology for 
 a public comment on your conduct can be necef- 
 iary; and where the caufe is itfelf of the highefl 
 confHtutional importance, where the object of 
 animadveriion is nothing lefs than an open at- 
 terript to defend a violation of the fundamental 
 principles of conftitutional juftice, an effort to 
 expofe fophiflry, and to defend our liberties, re- 
 quires none with the public, though the execu- 
 tion may be not equal to the magnitude of the 
 fubject. 
 
 I cannot but feel the utmoft fatisfaction in con- 
 templating the characters, with whom it is my 
 fate at prefent to contend. The unimpeachable 
 
 integrity
 
 < 3 ) 
 
 integrity of private life, while it prefumes the 
 influence of fimilar principles in a public career, 
 excludes the fufpicion of perfonal attack; and, 
 at the fame time, that it affords an excufe for the 
 maintenance of erroneous doctrines upon the 
 ground of mifinformation, relieves the mind from 
 the painful tafk of making any odious charge. 
 With fuch characters, a fair diicuffion may be ex- 
 pected, andreafon and juftice may for once hope 
 to. triumph, through the means of candour, over 
 prejudice, ignorance, and felf-intereft. At the 
 fame time, though I am far from wifhing to de- 
 grade that profeflion for which I am myfelf de- 
 figned, and to which I {hall think it an honour 
 one day to belong, yet I cannot but lament, that 
 upon fuch great points of policy and conftitution, 
 the legiflature ihould yield fo much to the direc- 
 tion .of profeffional men ; for I muft confefs, 
 that upon the evidence of hiftory, my mind is 
 imprefTed with a ftrong conviction, that, generally 
 fpeaking, the lawyers are not the men mod 
 calculated to decide upon fuch queftions. They 
 have in all times been but too prone to derive 
 their political ideas from the fame confined fource 
 from whence they draw their legal notions. 
 They may hunt a queftion of law through the 
 feveral books of the profeiTion, but they muft 
 not attempt to reduce to the minute precifion, 
 and within the ftrict bounds of law precedents, 
 B 2 cafes
 
 ( 4 ) 
 
 cafes often times arifing cut of paffions, which 
 will fcarce admit of any reflraint at all. They 
 expect on all occafions to direct the prefent, after 
 the example of the paftj without making any 
 allowance for thofe changes of circumftance 
 which may poffibly have deftroyed all that ana- 
 logy upon which fuch arguments muft be 
 founded. They appear either to forget, or to 
 difregard, a diftinction of which I can never 
 lofe fight, between the conflitution and the law. 
 The firft laying down general principles appli- 
 cable to every emergency, and giving all that 
 latitude which the extremeft cafe can require, 
 confident with national fecurity ; the latter, im- 
 pofing rules for particular cafes, to which cafes 
 alone thofe rules can in fr.rict conftruction be ap- 
 plied. Inftead of arguing upon the great ground 
 of conftitutional principle, which is capable of 
 embracing every fubject, they refort to a too fre- 
 quently ftrained conftruction of law, and truft to 
 the afliflance of precedents for the fupport of 
 their tottering fabric. 
 
 In ordinary judicial queftions, whether civil 
 or criminal, which arife between man and man, 
 the law cannot be too finally obferved; an4 its 
 conftruction cannot be better afcertained, than 
 by the precedents of cafes which have been al- 
 ready decided by it. The perfection of civil liberty 
 depends upon the rule of conduct prefcribed for 
 
 each
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 each member of the community being exactly 
 defined ; and that general good order and happy 
 iecurity, which is the natural refult of well 
 defined law, amply compenfates for any tem- 
 porary or individual inconvenience which may 
 accidentally arife, out of what, in fome instances, 
 might be called an exceilive ieverity of reitric- 
 tion. But when the fubject of difcuffion is fome 
 political point, fome constitutional queftion, the 
 field of argument becomes more extenfive, the 
 rule of condud: is lefs defined, involves a greater 
 variety of circumftances, and confequently ren- 
 ders the means of decifion apparently more com- 
 plicated. The ftate of the times forms the moft 
 important part of the confideration of fuch que 
 tions, and of itfelf renders the application of 
 precedents in fuch cafes always difficult, often 
 times impoffible. It is eafy to calculate the 
 capacity of a man, and as eafy to guard againft 
 the evils his conduct may produce; and to pro- 
 portion the force of prevention to the gradation 
 of danger ; but national events, their caufes and 
 their confequences, being on fome occafions alike 
 incalculable by human forefight, are equally be- 
 yond the reach of the provifions of human 
 wifdom. Acting upon fuch a confcioufnefs of 
 human imperfection, the conflitution of Eng- 
 land regulates upon general principles what (hall 
 be the conduct obferved by its government, al- 
 lowing
 
 lowing to itfelf the exercife of mercy, when*. 
 ever the executive power fhall exceed the limits 
 of its authority upon the ground of notorious and 
 great necefllty. When the crown, upon reafon- 
 able grounds, exercifes any prerogative with which 
 it is not conflitutionally entrufted, the tendency 
 of a bill of indemnity is not to conflitute a pre- 
 cedent by legalizing the meafure, but, on the con- 
 trary, by granting a pardon to that particular 
 cafe, declares it by a neceffary implication to be 
 illegal, and confequently not fit to be drawn 
 forth as an example for the future. The truth 
 is, that in all thofe extreme cafes in which the 
 crown may without hazard to itfelf exercife an 
 extreme power, its j unification does not at all 
 depend upon the analogy of precedents. If the 
 neceffity of the times does not prefent a fufHcient 
 cxcufe of itfelf, the mere fimilarity of previous 
 cafes can avail but little. Who will dare to act 
 on precedents of tyranny ? Yet who will affirm, 
 that no fuch precedents are to be found in our 
 hiftory ? 
 
 On the prefent <>ccafion, however ftrong my 
 opinion may be again ft the meafure itfelf of 
 raifing money by fubfcription, it is not my in- 
 tention now either to queftion its policy, to ar- 
 raign the wifdom of the invention, or to difpute 
 its falutary tendency -, my object is infinitely more 
 important; it is to infifty that whatever may be 
 
 the
 
 ( 7 ) 
 
 the advantages to be derived from the adoption 
 of any plan, that plan muft, neverthelefs, be con- 
 fident with the fpirit of our conftitution, and tho 
 manner of its execution confonant to the mode 
 prefcribed by the flanding law of the land. In 
 the cafe now under confideration, I affirm, that 
 the conduct of the king's minifters has been un- 
 conftitutional and illegal. The queftton now is, 
 not what we ftiall pay; but on what authority 
 we (hall pay any thing ? The necefllty of fupply 
 is not contended ; but it is the fyftem by which 
 that fupply (hall be raifed, to which we object. 
 In fhort, it is the revival of the old queftion, 
 concerning which the contefl, and the iffue of that 
 conteft, muft be acknowledged to comprehend 
 the moft melancholy, though perhaps the moft 
 interefting period of Englim hiftory. It is 
 nothing lefs in point of fact, than an attempt 
 to raife money on the fubjecl: without the pre- 
 vious concurrence of the legiflature, conftitu- 
 tionally exprefled by an aift of parliament. It 
 is the firft ftep towards reviving the odious doc- 
 trine of extra-parliamentary taxation; an attempt 
 which no nece/fity can juftify. 
 
 I have obferved, that in feveral debates and 
 parliamentary converfations, which have lately 
 taken place relative to this fubjecl:, many broad 
 aflertions have been made, to which various qua- 
 lifications and proyifoes have been afterwards an- 
 nexed.
 
 ( 8 } 
 
 nexed. The difcuflion by others again has been 
 deprecated in toto, as involving an abftract quef- 
 tion, the deciiion of which could have no re-- 
 ference to the prefent point. I can difcover no 
 motive for fuch a conduct, but that which fprings 
 from an inclination to bewilder and perplex; by 
 which means the public may be liable to be 
 blinded as to the real queftion, and wholly lofe 
 fight of the great intereft which they have in its 
 final decifion : and there was the greater neceffity 
 for the exertion of every various artifice to effect 
 this, purpofe, becaufe it is impoffible to conceive 
 any queftion more fimple, or one which arifes 
 more naturally, out of a fact equally fimple and 
 inconteftible. The fact is, that the minifter of 
 the crown has in his minifterial capacity, with- 
 out the previous authority of parliament, iffued 
 letters to the lord lieutenants of different coun- 
 ties, calling upon them to folicit and to receive 
 the voluntary contributions of thofe perfons who 
 (hall be willing to fubfcribe, for the purpofe of 
 defraying the expences incident to an additional 
 fyftem of internal defence. The queftion which 
 arifes on this fact is, fimply, whether fuch let- 
 ters having been iffued without the previous au- 
 thority of parliament, have, or have not, been 
 iffued according to law ? That is, in order to 
 make the queftion yet more pointed, can the 
 crown, by any device, mweite fubjects to a volun- 
 tary
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 tary contribution towards defraying the expences 
 of the government, without previoufly obtaining 
 a parliamentary fandion ? It is conceived, that 
 no fuch device can at this time be pradlifed 
 without a grofs violation of the principles efta- 
 blilhed in our conititution, without an actual in- 
 fringement of an exlfting flatute, and without 
 being wholly unfupported by any precedent 
 whatever. 
 
 Precedents being in fact only the recital of pad 
 t ran factions, can derive no weight from any in- 
 triniic property in themfelves; their force de- 
 pends entirely upon the authority from whence 
 they proceed, and mud be wholly comparative. 
 In points of law, precedents which are founded 
 on the opinion of one judge, may often carry 
 far greater weight with them than thofe which 
 are built on the opinion of another. A pre- 
 cedent eftablimed by the decifion of a court 
 of juftice, is yet more conclufive j but every 
 other fpecies of precedent muft yield to the 
 irreflftible force of one eftablimed by an act of 
 parliament. Such is the nature of precedents 
 applying to points of law, and admitting of a 
 liability of deciiion, which in political questions 
 is utterly impracticable. The law is always the 
 fame, but the times are continually changing. 
 That which is law to day, unlefs overturned 
 by fome competent authority, muft alfo to- 
 C morrow
 
 ( '0 ) 
 
 morrow direct the conduct of thofe who are 
 fubjedt to it; but that which in policy is at 
 this moment ftrictly expedient, may, perhaps 
 in the next, become abfolutely improper. The 
 event of a battle, or an unexpected turn in a 
 negotiation, may produce circumftances uncal- 
 culated, and for which no provifion had been 
 made; bat, above all, a revolution in the opi- 
 nions and difpofitions of mankind, may fubvert 
 at once the whole political fcheme, or make ruin 
 the inevitable confequence of perfeverance. Per- 
 haps, if there ever was a period in hiftory com- 
 pleatly illuftrative of this pofition, it is the pre- 
 fent, when the ideas of men are preparing to 
 flow in new channels, and to direct their pur- 
 fuits to new objects ; when the human mind 
 appears for a moment to have fufpendcd it? 
 functions from a dread of flavery on the one 
 hand, and from the fear of anarchy on the 
 other ; it is as it were an awful crifis, big with 
 the fate of pofterity; a fort of chaos, awaiting 
 the hand of fome fkilful artift to mould it 
 into fhape, and to create the happinefs of man- 
 kind. At fuch a period, refinement in conduct 
 appears only the effect of infanity: to expect ul- 
 timately to delude men out of rational rights, is 
 a folly to be exceeded only by attempting it. 
 The deception, when the veil is drawn afide, is 
 calculated only to exafperate, and to Jix the 
 
 wavering
 
 ( II ) 
 
 wavering refolution. The only path to be pur- 
 fued, is that which plain common fenfe directs, 
 to harmonize and to conciliate. To feek for, and 
 to apply then to times which are without ex- 
 ample in hiltory, precedents in themfelves hof- 
 tile to liberty, and which have arifen in periods 
 unmarked by any extraordinary events, is tome* 
 thing worfe than ridiculous; and to expect at 
 fuch a moment to enforce unrefifted the doctrines 
 propofed to be eftabliflied, is an excefs of folly 
 which is only to be regretted from the confe- 
 quences it is finally calculated to produce among 
 the unoffending innocent multitude. But even 
 granting that every cafe which has been cited, is 
 a cafe in point, what has been your conduct on 
 this cccafion? You have been fighting the weak- 
 eft againft the ftrongeft point; you have been 
 upholding the force of a variety of precedents, 
 founded on mere opinions of judges, againft the 
 exprefs declaration of an act of parliament. Such 
 a conduct appears to me to amount to nothing 
 lefs than maintaining, that, .upon the authority 
 of judicial proceedings, the operation .of an act 
 of parliament may be fufpended . an( j that not 
 only a court of juftice, but any one of the 
 judges of that court, provided he has eiHbliflied 
 a high legal character, may aflume a power of 
 legiflation. To argue either the abfurdity, or 
 the rafhnefs of fucfr a doctrine, would be jto 
 C 2 infult
 
 infult the underftandings of the people. It is a 
 point which cannot be eftablimed, but by the 
 total fubverfion of the conftitution of this 
 country. 
 
 Confidering all precedents on conftitutional 
 queftions in the light I do; refering every thing 
 to principles, and not to examples j accommo- 
 dating thofe principles to the times ; and con- 
 ceiving every period to be entitled to make its 
 own example according to p elent exigency ; 
 I mould have fcarcely felt it incumbent on 
 me to animadvert, in any degree, upon thole 
 precedents which have been advanced, had 
 they been only Incidentally introduced into thofe 
 defences of adminiftration upon which the par- 
 liament appears to have founded its late decifion ; 
 but when I reflect that tbefe precedents do in 
 fact conftitute the whole foundation on which 
 thofe arguments have been raifed, the tendency 
 of which has been to weaken the authority of an 
 exifting aft of parliament ; I fhould reflect, that 
 I had been wanting in that juftice which is due 
 to the fubject, had I neglected the opportunity 
 of annihilating, in the firft inftance, the whole 
 ground of defence, by examining the applicability 
 of the precedents themfelves. 
 
 The firft name which appears in your catalogue 
 of authorities, is Lord Coke; and his opinion, as 
 collected from his I2th Report, if indeed it may 
 
 be
 
 be ranked as a precedent, is confidered as de- 
 ciJedly in favour of voluntary benevolences. 
 Allowing to thefe opinions all the authority of 
 law at the time when they were given, flill they 
 can have no force now, if the 13 C. 2. is not 
 repealed; but even waiving that acl, there is flill 
 fome ground for difputing the authority of Lord 
 Coke, to the extent required, and that ground 
 is furniihed by himfelf. I have here one obfer- 
 vation to introduce, which is, perhaps, of fome 
 importance to the public, as it may pofiibly ailift 
 them in forming a judgment on this fubject ; 
 r it is, that the 2th Report of Lord Coke is 
 wholly compofed from a collection of loofe 
 papers, and which, in many inflances, and par- 
 ticularly in the prefect, feem to have been in- 
 tended .merely as memorandums, probably prepa- 
 ratory to fome future defign. The utmoft extent 
 to which any opinion delivered in this report, can 
 be ftrained, confident with thofe contained in his 
 other works, is, that the king was not prohibited 
 by any ftatute, from receiving the voluntary fub- 
 fcription of a fingle individual. And what he 
 does aflert, he deduces as a confequence from the 
 flatute 1 1 Hen. 7. c. 10. It does not appear upon 
 a view of this ftatute, that any other inference 
 can be drawn from it, in favour of voluntary fub- 
 fcriptions, than what I have mentioned j and it 
 affords very ftrong evidence, that the crown had 
 
 no
 
 ( 14 ) 
 
 no means of compelling any payment, where the 
 demand originated from itfelf ; fince this aft is 
 intended to give him a power of forcing the pay- 
 ment of thofe fums which had been fubfcribed, 
 though not paid in, by the voluntary and free will 
 of his fubjeds; and the neceffity of fiich an ad, 
 (for we muft pre&ime no act to be paiTed with- 
 out fome neceffity) is conclufive, that he did not 
 poffefs even fuch an inferior prerogative, as that 
 of forcing a fubject to fulfil a voluntary pro^ 
 mife. 
 
 It is obfervable alfo, that the preamble to this 
 ftatute ftates, that " Divers of his Majefty's fub- 
 *' jecls had federally granted divers fyms of 
 c money of their free wills and benevolence*." 
 This word federally, if it has any meaning, muft 
 intend the fubfcriptions of individuals fingly, and 
 not ajfoclated together in bodies ; fuch as is the cafe 
 at prefentj and as it was in a cafe of the reign of 
 Ed. 3. on which I (hall hereafter enlarge; and in 
 Hating which cafe Lord Coke, in that which is 
 perhaps the moft perfect of all his works, Jiis 
 commentary on Magna Charta, contained in his 
 sd Inftitute, declares, that it was finally conceded 
 that " no fuch grants Jhould be mads but by parlia- 
 
 The next authority which you have adduced 
 
 * App. (R.) +2 Inft. 60. 
 
 a?
 
 ( '5 ) 
 
 as tending to legalize the prefent fyftem of ex* 
 citing voluntary contributions, is a parenthetical 
 opinion delivered by Lord Hardwicke, in pro- 
 nouncing fentence on the rebel peers, in 1746, 
 and which profefles to declare the fubfcriptions 
 of that time neither unconstitutional nor illegal. 
 It is to be obferved, that this opinion of Lord 
 Hardwicke was totally extrajudicial^ as it arofe 
 upon no point which was before him for deci- 
 fion ; it was given incidentally in the courfe of 
 an eulogy on the zeal and fpirit of the Englifh 
 people, when there could be no reafon to quarrel 
 with the mode of exertion, from the nature of 
 the cafe; and even if there had been, when few 
 perfons would have dared to find fault; but when 
 on the contrary there was rather a general ten- 
 dency to magnify into virtue, what in effect pro- 
 ceeded from neceffity. It was rather an opinion 
 which originated in the momentary enthufiafm of 
 the judge's mind, without being founded on any 
 convidion, the refult of deep and laborious re- 
 fledtion. It was given fra?rj the feat of juflice; 
 but it has no pretenfion to the weight of judicial 
 authority. Yet, even allowing to this opinion 
 all the force which ths authority of that great 
 lawyer can give to it, let us look a little into 
 the circumftances attending the meafure. Thefe 
 fubfcriptions were made with a view to encreafe 
 the Itrength of the kingdom, at a moment of 
 
 open,
 
 ( 16 ) 
 
 open, and at that time fuccefsful, rebellion, and 
 at a moment when the rebels were advancing by 
 hafty marches to the metropolis. It was at that 
 particular, punftum temporls belli, that period 
 which juftifies the fufpending the courfeof juftice, 
 which authorizes the temporary (hutting of the 
 courts of law, which legalizes every exertion of 
 every defcription, not merely by the authority of 
 conftitutional law, not by the power of an a<fl of 
 parliament, but by the paramount law of extreme 
 neceflity. Such was the cafe to which thofe 
 fubfcriptions were pointed, and to the legality of 
 which Lord Hardwicke adverted : but this maxim 
 can have no weight in any cafe (hort of that ex- 
 treme one, which gave rife to the queftion of 
 that day. In every cafe of urgency fhort of this, 
 the rule of conduct for the executive magiftrate 
 is diftin&ly laid down; in that which feems to 
 approach the neareft to fuch a cafe, namely, 
 when there is ground to apprehend an invafion, or 
 even when an infurfe&ion has adlually com- 
 menced, a certain %e is prefcribed to the fo- 
 vereign. In fuch aft Emergency he is permitted to 
 call out the militia j but even when he has done 
 that, he muft affemble the parliament within 
 fourteen days, that they may be enabled to judge 
 of the neceffity, and prevent the mifchief of the 
 meafure, if the neceffity does not exift. Upon 
 what principle of reafon then is it poffible that 
 
 the
 
 ( '7 ) 
 
 the crown can be permitted, in this prefent in- 
 fiance, to take any ftep towards raifing not only 
 men but money, without the confent of parlia- 
 ment, when in a cafe of at leaft equal emergency, 
 it is not allowed by the exprefs direction of a 
 ftatute to afTemble that force -which already cxifts, 
 without at the fame time convening the parlia- 
 ment, which may be immediately enabled to 
 fanclion the meafure by its approbation ? Upon 
 this precedent I have only to remark, that in my 
 humble opinion, the fituation of the country is 
 at prefent fo widely different from what it was at 
 the period alluded to by Lord Hardwicke, as to 
 deftroy all analogy between the circumftances of 
 the refpeclive times, and confequently to render 
 the application of one cafe as an example for the 
 other, utterly impracticable. But there is flill 
 another fundamental point which distinguishes 
 this precedent from the prefent cafe : in the firft, 
 the fubfcription was purely voluntary^ in the latter, 
 it has originated in a motion from the crown j and 
 this diftindion is alone furficient to overturn all 
 reafoning founded on the analogy of the two 
 cafes. 
 
 It is fingular, that pending the prefent queftioq, 
 this point mould have been accurately afcertained 
 by one of the zealous advocates of adminiftration, 
 who attempts to add the authority of Judge 
 f orfter, to thofe which have been already cited 
 D i
 
 in favour of this meafurc. He tells us " that 
 " on the nth of Oftober 1745, Sir Michael 
 " Forfter, then Recorder of Briftol, met at the 
 " Guildhall William Barnes, Efq. the then 
 " Mayor, the Aldermen, the other Members of 
 " the Corporation, and a very great number of 
 " the principal inhabitants, when a letter from 
 " his Grace the Duke of Newcaftle, then one of 
 *' his Majefty's Principal Secretaries of State, 
 " was . publicly read, authorizing the magijlrates 
 " (as from his Majefty) io call the city to arms, 
 " and to martial them into troops or companies 
 " at their dtjcretion, as alfo^r them to appoint 
 " proper officers to the refpedtive corps; which 
 " letter was no fooner read, than an aflbciation 
 *' was entered into for the fupport of the com- 
 " mon caufe, when the Mayor fubfcribed 
 " io,oool. in the name of the Chamber;" to 
 which it appears, that various other fubfcrip- 
 tions were added by other public bodies and 
 individuals, within the city of Briftol. 
 
 Had this perfon, who is, I take for granted, 
 accurate in his account of what was done in 
 1745 in his own city, been in any degree con- 
 verfant either with the constitution, or the law 
 of his country, he weuld have known that what 
 was done by the minifter of the crown at that 
 time, was f^rictly conftitutional and legal ; at 
 that inftant of open rebellion , it was the duty of 
 
 the
 
 ( '9 ) 
 
 the crown not to call upon the fubject for a 
 guinea to buy a mujket, but to require the attend- 
 ance of the fubject himfelf with a muiket upon 
 his moulder; and it fliould feem that this 
 diftinction was perfectly underftood by the 
 Duke of Newcaftle, who, it is well known, 
 atfted always with Lord Harwicke at his right 
 hand. He does not call upon the opulent city 
 of Briftol for a fubfcription, but he authorizes 
 the magijlrates to call the city to arms <> he calls 
 upon the inhabitants of Briftol to do that, 
 which on fuch an occafion every inhabitant of 
 the country is bound to do on a requifition 
 from the crown, and leaves to them to mar- 
 tial themfelves into troops at their own difcretion, 
 and to appoint their own officers* In confequence 
 of which legal requifition, the citizens of 
 Briftol raife among themfelves a fubfcription, 
 not to be applied to any purpofe at the will of 
 the crown, but in order to enable themfelves 
 to do that which they were all individually 
 bound to do, when required, viz. to attend in 
 perfon their fovereign, at a moment of adual 
 rebellion within the realm, for the defence of 
 their conftitution, their laws, their property, 
 their country, and their king. Such was the 
 fubfcription approved by Judge Forfter, and 
 fuch were thofe fubfcriptions to which Lord 
 Hardwicke adverted as being ftrictly legal, as 
 D 2 in
 
 in truth they were 5 though, even on that oc- 
 cation, there were perfons who felt fomething 
 like prophetic fear, leaft thefe innocent, nay 
 laudable efforts, mould ferve as future examples, 
 when a fimilar neceffity might not exift. The 
 true diftindtion is, that there are times in which 
 the crown has a right of itfclf to command the 
 perfonal attendance of all its fubje&s, but none 
 in which it can confthutionally accept \hsjubjti- 
 tution of their purfes. 
 
 With regard to the precedent of 1759, it ap- 
 pears upon the face of it, to have been a mer& 
 voluntary fubfcription for encreafing the levy 
 money already voted by parliament. Upon this I 
 need not at all expatiate; and the lefs, becaufe 
 in confidering this queftion in a conftitutional 
 light, I mall have occafion to ftate a cafe of the 
 fame kind. 
 
 The next in order is the precedent of 1778*.- 
 Early in that year (i6th of January) the city of 
 London ,- on the motion of fome of the prin- 
 cipal merchants, aflembled in common council 
 for the purpofe of confidering of the means of 
 raifing money among themfelves, in order to affift 
 in defraying the expences of the war, or to raife 
 new bodies of troops, A propofition to fuch 
 an effecT: was made; which, after having been 
 debated, was rejected. It would be highly in- 
 
 * Vide Annual Regifter. 
 
 decent 1
 
 { 2. ) 
 
 decent to pafs this period of the argument; 
 without doing that juftice to the confident and 
 conftitutional fpirit of the citizens of London, 
 which is fo eminently due to their uniform 
 zeal for the interefts of their country, and their 
 fteady attachment to conftitutional principles- It 
 is a fufficicnt encomium on that refpectable body 
 to fay of them, that on proper occaiions, and 
 when called upon in a proper manner, their 
 loyal exertions are not to be exceeded; but 
 whenever they feel the fummons to be a vio- 
 lation of the con dilution, no party clamour 
 Can prevent them from marking, by their con-! 
 duel, their difapprobation of the meafure. Irr 
 confequence of this difappointment, thofe who 
 had promoted the meafure agreed again to meet* 
 and accordingly did fo at the London Tavern, 
 from whence they published in the newfpapers 
 the following advertifemenr, dated January 17,- 
 
 " At a meeting of feveral merchants and others, 
 " friends to their King and Country, in order to 
 " fupport the conftitutional authority of Great 
 " Britain ever her rebellious colonies in America, 
 " it was unanimoufly refolved and agreed, that a 
 " voluntary fubfcription be opened fo:- the above 
 " purpofe, and that the money arifing therc- 
 *' from be applied, under the direction of a co:n^ 
 " mittee of the fubfcribeis, in raifing men for 
 
 his
 
 " his Majefty's fervice, in fuch manner as his 
 " Majefty in his wifdom ftall think fit." 
 
 And this was accompanied by offers from dif- 
 ferent perfons and places to raife corps of troops, 
 which offers were accepted by the crown with- 
 out even any fubfequent attempt to obtain the 
 fanction of the legiflature. 
 
 At the time of the abovementioned meeting 1 
 parliament was not fitting, but it met on the 
 2oth ; and the houfe of lords adjourned, after 
 hearing the titles of feveral papers read, to 
 the 23d of January. On that day the Earl 
 of Abingdon, immediately after the houfe 
 met, adverted to the circumftance, and gave 
 notice of his intention to move for the Judges 
 to be fummoned, which motion he accordingly 
 made on the 2/th ; and on the 4th of Fe- 
 bruary again brought the fubjecl: into dif- 
 cuffion, by moving two refolutions declaratory 
 of the illegality of fuch voluntary fubfcriptions. 
 In every debate which took place on thefe 
 feveral motions, Lord Gamden was particularly 
 decided in the fentiments he then gave, and 
 earneftly afferted the unconftitutional and il- 
 legal tendency of every meafure by which the 
 crown might obtain, without parliamentary 
 fandtion, the difpofal of fums of money raifed 
 without parliamentary authority. 
 
 On the 22d of January, being the 3d day 
 
 of
 
 of meeting after the adjournment, the fubjeft 
 was incidentally touched in converfation in the 
 houfe of commons ; and en the 4th of Fe- 
 bruary the affair of the fubfcriptions was 
 again introduced in the debate ; in both which 
 inftances Lord Amburton, then Mr. Dunning, 
 treated the meafure with the utmoft feve~ity, and 
 pointedly con iemned it as unconftitutional and 
 illegal j and on the ad of April a fpecific motion 
 was made by Mr. Wilkes, for leave to bring in 
 a bill to prevent iimilar practices. In this motion 
 he was mod ftrenuoufly fupported by Mr. Burke. 
 In this cafe alfo the crown does not appear to 
 have been the original promoter of the n-eafure, 
 though it certainly conceived itfelf juftificd in 
 accepting the voluntary offerings of its patriotic 
 fubjecls, a meafure decidely condemned by Lord 
 Camden an 1 Mr. Dunning. 
 
 The next and laft precedent to be examined, 
 is that of 1782; and, as it feems to be that 
 cafe on which administration appear to have 
 placed mofr. dependance for defending their 
 prefent meafure, it is moft necefTary to give it 
 a diftincT: and particular attention. This may be 
 accomplimed with the lefs difficulty, and to 
 greater advantage, inafmuch as the documents 
 relating to it are all in exigence, and no difpute 
 can arife from an inaccurate remembrance of the 
 
 fads
 
 facts relating to it. It is fomewhat fingular, 
 that thofe to whom the tafk of defence was 
 allotted, fhould, under a knowledge' of the no- 
 toriety of thefe circumftances, have ventured 
 to practice fuch an unexampled degree of 
 fophifrry as that which has been exerted on. 
 the prefent occafion ; a fophiftry which could 
 have no pretenfion to fuccefs, but that which 
 originated in its own incomprehenfible refine- 
 ment, and which could entertain no hope of 
 cfcaping detection, but through the indolent in- 
 attention, or too great confidence of thofe to whom 
 it was addreffed. It is fincereiy to be lamented, 
 that the effect which it has produced, Should 
 have created the necefftty of expofing it to the 
 public. 
 
 The firft documents to be confidered, are the 
 letters of the Secretary of State of that time 
 (Lord Shelburne), and the plan propofed. The 
 firft letter is a circular addrefs to the chief 
 magiftrates of the feveral great towns ; the fe- 
 cond is one to the Lord Lieutenants of the diffe-r 
 rent counties, enclofing that to the Mayors of 
 boroughs or cities ; and the third is a diftincl: 
 letter of a different defcription, addrefled to the 
 Lord Mayor of the city of London. Thefe feveral 
 letters were all accompanied by an inclofed plan, 
 which is the 4th of the four firft documents 
 
 which,
 
 which I propofe to examine. Upon the face 
 of the two firit of thefe letters* it appears, 
 that the fole object of adminiftration in fend- 
 ing them out, was to collect information as 
 to the moft effectual means by which the 
 energy of the country might at a critical period 
 be called forth. They were not fummonfes to 
 act, but fimply to deliberate upon the beft 
 mode of acting ; and the plan which accom- 
 panied them, could only be conlidered as fug- 
 getting hints upon which the letters them- 
 lelves called for improvement. The plan was 
 recommended to be taken into immediate confedera- 
 tion, and a report to be made of whatever ob- 
 fervations might occur for carrying it into exe- 
 cution. It was to be confidered as a propoji- 
 tion of a temporary plan, which being adopted 
 or improved, might tend to make a refpectable 
 addition to the national force at home; and the 
 obfervations which might arife were required 
 to be communicated, in order that they might 
 be fubmitted to the confideration of his majeftyj 
 while the plan itfelf can appear in no other light, 
 than as a collection of hints for the approval of 
 the counties, to be fubmitted, firft, to his Ma- 
 jefly, and afterwards to Parliament, before execu- 
 tion $ becaufe it is to be obferved, that the pro- 
 
 * App. A and B. 
 
 E pofal
 
 pofal is, that all expences Jhatt be paid by govern- 
 ment, but not by fubfcription. The troops fo 
 raifed, were to be fubjedt to military difci- 
 pline; and that in cafe of adhial fervice, and of 
 any perfonal dilability in confequence of fuch 
 fervice, the perfons fo difabled mould be en- 
 titled to the fame advantages with regular fol 
 diers, and the fame bounties extended to the 
 widows of fuch as might fall in the propofed 
 fervice, Thefe provilions could not by any 
 means have been carried into execution with- 
 out a previous parliamentary fandtion ; and that 
 fuch a fan&ion would have been required, had 
 the plans propofed been ultimately adopted in 
 toto by the king's minifters, may very fairly 
 be prefumed from the circumftance of an acl:, 
 viz. 22 Geo. III. c. having paiTed, to autho- 
 rize the execution of fo much of the plan 
 as it was thought expedient to adopt. 
 
 The letter to the Lord Mayor of London* 
 which is of a different complexion from thofe to 
 the counties and boroughs, as it goes beyond the 
 line of enquiry, and calls for a repetition of ex- 
 ertions which had on former occafions been fuc- 
 cefifully employed, is alfo an additional proof 
 that the minifter did not think himfelf juftified 
 in making fuch an application generally through- 
 
 (C.) 
 
 out
 
 out the kingdom ; for, knowing that the city of 
 London was permitted to have troops appro- 
 priate to itfelf, he calls upon the chief magiflrate 
 to take the moft effectual means to prepare thofe 
 troops for fervice, in cafe of any fudden neceffity; 
 and at the fame time requefts an opportunity of 
 conferring with the Lord Mayor as to any additional 
 exertion which the city of London may think proper 
 to adopt. This letter is evidently a letter of 
 fome thing more than confultation. It is a letter of 
 confultation, where it calls upon the city to advife 
 as to the beft means of doing that which 
 had not beenufuatfy done; but it is alfo a letter 
 of requifition, upon points in which the minifter 
 faw that he might conflitutionally require ; and it 
 is justifiable to infer from thence, that he made 
 no requifition any where elfe, becaufe he was 
 confcious that he had no right to make any. 
 Knowing that the city was in poileflion of legal 
 means of exertion, he calls upon it to carry thofe 
 means into execution; but feeling alfo that the 
 counties were in the lawful poflefiion of none but 
 what had been already called forth, he addrefles 
 them only in the way of advice, to confider what 
 would be the moll eligible mode of encreafing 
 their powers of defence. 
 
 It fhould feem from the conduit of thofe who 
 have lately fupported the minifter in his pro-^ 
 pofal of fubfcription?, that they were fully fen-. 
 E 2 fib
 
 fible that this was the only conclufion to be 
 drawn from the letters themfelves. No other fa- 
 tisfa&ory reafon can be given for that curious 
 artifice of fophiftry to which they had recourfe, 
 I mean the artifice of collecting the intent of thofe 
 letters, not from the plain expreffions of the 
 letters themfelves, which they were evidently 
 confcious would not bear the conftru&ion they 
 chofe to give them; but from the various anfwers 
 which were fent from the different quarters 
 whither the letters had been addrefled. In order 
 to illuftrate in the moll forcible manner the 
 ideas which have arifen in my mind on this fub- 
 jedr, I will beg leave to put a cafe, perfonally, 
 which every man may anfwer for himfelf. I 
 will fuppofe the cafe of two perfons, one of 
 whom fimply confults the other as to the beft 
 mode of relieving himfelf from a prefcnt ftate of 
 poverty, and that the perfon confulted hap- 
 pening to be of a profligate difpofition, recom- 
 mends the murdering and plundering of the firft 
 wealthy perfon he may chance to meet. It ap- 
 pears to me, that after the example of fuch fo- 
 phiftical reafoning, the unfortunate being to 
 whom fuch advice might be fo accidentally ad- 
 drefled, though he were filled with the utmoft 
 abhorrence for fuch crimes, might, upon an equal 
 foundation of reafon and juftice, be charged as a 
 robber and an affaffin, as the precedent of 1782 
 
 be
 
 ( 29 ) 
 
 be ftigmatized for foliciting fubfcn'ptions, becaufe 
 fome were proffered, in anfwers to letters which 
 contained not one fyllable referring to fuch con- 
 tributions. But, as if the injuftice of conclu- 
 iions drawn from fuch a fource was not fuffi- 
 ciently glaring, not only the collection of anfwers 
 was partially produced, but even the anfwers 
 which were brought forward vt&t partially quoted. 
 You, Gentlemen, who are diftinguimed orna- 
 ments of your profeffion, are not to be now told 
 for the firft time, that evidence, when mutilated 
 in any degree, carries no weight with it in a 
 court of jufticej but when that mutilation is evi- 
 dently the work of the parties themfelves, does 
 it ever fail to roufe the indignation of the court, 
 and to flamp with difgrace the man who has at- 
 tempted the deception ? God forbid that the 
 public mould meet with lefs juftjce than an in- 
 dividual ; they are at leaft entitled to equal at- 
 tention, and not to lefs rejpeff. But in regard to 
 the queftion, as it is affected by thefe anfwers, 
 it is at prefent highly favourable to the caufe cf 
 the people. The letters appear to have been 
 only letters of enquiry ; miniflers have affirmed 
 that they were letters of felicitation; and this 
 they infer from the tenour of particular parts of 
 felecJed anfwers. But when thole who make 
 fturdy aiTei'tions, at the fame time refuje to produce 
 what they call proofs, while they are known to 
 
 have
 
 ( 30 > 
 
 have the neceffary evidence, if any fuch evidence 
 really exiits, in, their own poffeffion, they afford 
 a complete prefumptive teftimony againft them- 
 felves, in favour of every perfon who contradicts 
 them, upon any appearance of foundation. 
 
 It has been afTerted on the other hand, by thofe 
 who conducted the meafure of 1782, that in thefe 
 anfwers, fome gave an account of what had been 
 done in former times, fome what had been lately 
 doing, fome what they propofed to doj in fhort, 
 fome giving one advice, forne another. Indeed 
 thofe exracts which have been produced have no 
 tendency to contradict this petition; on the con- 
 trary, they rather ftrengthen it. 
 
 Confcious, again it mould feem, that the 
 inferences drawn from thefe anjwers to the 
 letters, were directly contrary to thofe war- 
 ranted by the letters themfelves ; not content 
 with applying partial quotations and refuting 
 complete inveftigation, they expect to bolfler 
 up their argument by an affected concern, that 
 they are unable to confirm their aflertians by 
 the evidence of thofe replies which were pro- 
 bably written to fuch anfwers ; becaufe, fay 
 they, fuch replies are not now to be found in 
 the office*. Such an argument, it mutt be 
 confeffed, may, with great propriety, be ufe4 
 
 * App. (D.) 
 
 to?
 
 by the prefent administration, if we reflect 
 upon the little hefitation with which the Se- 
 cretary of State for the home department 
 throws upon his office the blame of a fup- 
 pofed inaccuracy^ as unprecedented as it is un- 
 accountable. It would certainly be very ex- 
 traordinary that no copy of thofe anfwers mould 
 be to be found in the office, if indeed any fuch 
 anfwers had been written, especially when it is 
 clear, that every, other paper relative to this trani- 
 aclion has been preferred with the greateil 
 exaclnefs. And if any fuch replies had been 
 written, admitting that the office copy might 
 have been mifiaid, it would be ftill more lin- 
 gular, that not one fhould have been traced and 
 produced from among the various dependents and 
 wide connexions of government, to fomeof whom 
 fuch replies mufl have been addrefTed. So that 
 we may, without any extra-ordinary exertion of 
 faith, give full credit to the minifter of that 
 period, who declared lately in his place, thai: 
 not one anf&fr was ever ^written: for what 
 flronger proof can exill, than fuch complete 
 iiience, to mew that this meafure could cn)y be 
 confidered by thofe who fee it on foot, to be the 
 beft means of obtaining information. If the 
 object of the minifters had really been fomething 
 more than mere enquiry, is it corfiftent with 
 common fenfe to fuppoie, that he would have 
 
 contented
 
 ( 3* ) 
 
 contented himfelf with thofe advantages to bd 
 derived from the fuggeftions or information 
 communicated to him, when it is evident, from 
 the anfwers in general, that the zeal of the 
 country was prepared for great and well in- 
 tended exertions ? Is it probable, that if fub- 
 fcriptions had been his object, he would have 
 hefitated to accept them with gratitude, when 
 the offer was not only actually made, but when 
 the offer fo made was alfo purely voluntary? 
 Is it likely that he would have neglected fo 
 fair an opportunity of encouraging the pa- 
 triotifm of others, by praifing the readinefs of 
 thofe who had fet fo laudable an example ? 
 Upon a review of thefe arguments, I do not 
 fee what further reafoning is requifite to pro- 
 duce a, clear convidion, not only that this 
 letter of Lord Shelburne was a mere letter of 
 enquiry, but that it was fo eonfidered by thofe 
 to whom it was addrefled, and confequently, in 
 every refpect utterly inapplicable as a prece^ 
 dent to confirm the propriety of the prefent 
 meafure. But as truth cannot be tried by too 
 many lefts, let us take another line : let us 
 fuppofe for a moment, that inflead of being a 
 plan to be adopted or approved, as the letter 
 Jays, that it was a plan already adopted; in 
 which cafe I do not defpair of being able tcr 
 (hew, that thefe two plans of 1782 and 1794 
 
 do
 
 t 33 ') 
 
 do not agree in any one point j ' buf, above all, 
 in the principal point which creates the prefent 
 queftion, vrz. that of fubfcriptions. 
 
 i ft. According to the plan of 1782*, tha 
 officers were to be appointed fiom among the 
 gentlemen of the neighbourhood, by commiffion 
 from the crown, or the lord lieutenant, but at 
 the recommendation of the chief magiftrate of the 
 town in which the corps mould be raifed. Ac- 
 cording to that of 1794* the officers are to re- 
 ceive their commiffions from the crown, without 
 any recommendation whatever* 
 
 2d. According to the plan of 1782, it was 
 intended that the officers fhould be poflefled 
 of fome certain qualification. According to that 
 of 1794, none is to be required. 
 
 3d. According to the plan of 1782, the times 
 of exercifing the men were to be fo fele&ed asnot 
 to interrupt their refpedtive labours. According 
 to that of 1794, thofe periods are to be fixed at 
 the mere will of the crown, by a warrant from 
 the king. 
 
 4th. The plan of 1782, abfolutety retrains the 
 employment of fuch corps, except in cafes of 
 actual invafion or rebellion ; that of 1794, per- 
 mits their being employed on fuch occafions, 
 without, forbidding fuch employment on any 
 other account. 
 
 * App. Ed. (F,) 
 
 F 5th*
 
 ( 34 ) 
 
 5th. The plan of 1782 throwt the whole 
 expence upon government j and by propofing no 
 other mode of fupply, creates the neceffity of a 
 previous application to parliament. That of 1 794, 
 by propojing a fubfcription *, while it charges 
 government with the expence, furnishes it alfo 
 with a pojfible means of defraying that expence in~ 
 dependent of parliament. 
 
 , You, Gentlemen, may perhaps argue, that 
 thefe are cobweb dijtintfions, as a noble Lord was 
 pleafed to call the difference between fubfcribing 
 a mufquet, and fubfcribing a guinea to buy a muf- 
 quet | or, as it was ftated to the Houfe of Com- 
 mons, between fubfcribing money and money's 
 worth. If tbofe diflinclions are but as accurate 
 and as powerful as that which constitutionally 
 exifls between the cafes fuppofed by the noble 
 Secretary of State, and thofe who fupported the 
 meafure in tjie Lower Houfe, I am confident I 
 /hall never have to blufli for the flimfey texture of 
 jny rcafonings. The fad is, that this cobweb 
 diftinclion conftitutes the true queftion of debate; 
 it" brings forward the main point of fubfcriptioni 
 it involves the caufe of all danger, the means of 
 extra parliamentary fupply j and although the 
 .people of England may fee no caufe of apprehen- 
 fion in a guinea fubfcriftion, the precedent, if un- 
 
 *A PP . (G.) 
 
 condemned,
 
 ( 35 ) 
 
 condemned, may be cited hereafter to fandtion 
 the fubfcription of a million of guineas. It is a 
 do&rine replete with the moft fatal confe- 
 quences. If the people fubmit, it muft produce 
 defpotifin j if they refift, it is but the harbinger 
 of anarchy. Let thofe who maintain fuch po- 
 fitions, look a little to the events which may fol- 
 low the attempt to eftablifh fuch doclrines, Whe- 
 ther the profpecl: prefents to their view their own 
 flavery, and that of their fellow citizens, or whe- 
 ther, in the diftant refiftance of a multitude en- 
 raged by repeated opprefiions, they furvey the 
 probable ruins of a pile, the pretended object of 
 enthufiaftic admiration, let them paufe a moment, 
 and confider what, in either of thefe events, will 
 be the reflections of their confciences. In fuch a 
 fituation they muft feel what they have them- 
 felves occafioned j and though the refentment of 
 an offended people fhould confign them to that 
 deftru&ion they intended for others, flill the 
 means of expiation would bear no proportion to 
 the magnitude of the crime. But let us, before 
 we drop this fubjed of the precedents, examine 
 a little this cobweb diftinction, and fee whether 
 in reality it will not bear a little more brufhing 
 than is neceflary to clear away moft other cob- 
 webs. The queftion which has been advanced, 
 and which the upright guardians of our freedom, 
 have fuffered to pafs uncontradi&ed, is, that 
 F a there
 
 ( 36 ) 
 
 there is in fubftance no difference between a con- 
 tribution of any given number of mufquets, and 
 one of a fum of money to purchafe a certain 
 quantity of arrpis. Very few words will be fuffi- 
 cient to point out the diftincftion, which is 
 nothing iefs than the diftiniftion between that 
 which is legal and conftitutional, and that which 
 is illegal and unconstitutional. It ought to be 
 remembered, that it is the fojfibility of evil which 
 conftitutes the^unconftitutional tendency of every 
 meafurej and therefore, until we can dernon- 
 flrate the ; pofiible evil which may arife from any 
 particular proportion, we are not authorized to 
 hold forth that propofition as hoftile io^ur con- 
 ftitution. I will put the cafe of accepting {hips 
 upon the fame footing with the acceptance of a 
 iland of arms. The noble Lord who has made 
 this queftion, will probably tell us, that an ac- 
 ceptance on the part of the crown, of a (hip of 
 war, from one of its fubje&s, can be productive 
 of no pofTiblc evil. We will readily grant this 
 aflertion to be true, fo long *as the king can get 
 neither men to man that Ihip, nor money to pay 
 thofe men, without the affiftance of parliament ; 
 but if the fubicription is a fum of money, though 
 the fubfcribers may have given it for a particular 
 purpofe, ftill if the crown is difpofed to appro- 
 priate it to any other, thofe who granted the 
 money, in this cafe, have no means of controul- 
 
 ing
 
 < -37 ) 
 
 Ing or preventing fuch a mifapplication. That 
 power of controul and prevention relides only 
 with the Parliament; and it is by poffeffing the 
 file power of fupplying the wants of the crown, 
 that they are enabled to exercife fuch an autho- 
 rity. Suppofe the cafe of a great armourer of- 
 fering as a voluntary prefent to the king, a fland 
 of ten thoufand arms. I am not aware of any 
 principle of the constitution which would be vio- 
 lated by the acceptance of thofe arms, for they 
 are perfectly harmlefs until they are put into 
 the hands of foldiers; and foldiers can be by 
 no means* constitutionally raifed without the le- 
 giflative fandion. The levying a body of men 
 without fuch fandlion, is illegal, becaufe thofe men 
 may be immediately, inflantaneoujly employed to 
 the moft dangerous and unconftitutional purpofe. 
 Upon the fame principle it is that money cannot 
 be raifed but by the fame authority. It is money 
 which gives the means of exertion.; and money 
 acquired independent of Parliament, prefents the 
 
 * Whenever any doubt has arifen refpe&ing the power of the 
 crown to raife, in time of war, a greater number of men than what 
 has been voted by Parliament, the arguments in favour of this prero- 
 gative have always been drawn from the fuppofedimpoffibility of making 
 />rpaying fuch levies without money > and a conceffion that no nioney can be 
 obtained without the affiftance of Parliament. This, if it were true, 
 tyould, on the, part of the conftitution, be nothing lefs than a mockery ^ 
 n infulting triumph over the weaknefs of the crown, by telling the 
 Jdng he may do what he pleafes, while it is previoufly fettled that he 
 can, in fad, do nothing. 
 
 300962 means
 
 ( 38 ) 
 
 means of exertion independent of the fame au- 
 thority. But the mere pofleffion of a ihip, or a 
 ftand of arms, cannot produce anyfuch effect; if 
 it could, at the clofe of every war, the (hips in- 
 flead of being laid up fhould be all burnt, and the 
 arms inftead of being carefully laid afide fhould 
 be all broken to pieces. 
 
 Let us now examine this queftion, as it is re- 
 ferrable to conftitutional principles. The confli- 
 tution of this country, in placing the purfe in the 
 hands of the commons, has two diftinft objects 
 in view. The firft is, to prevent the fubjeft 
 from being opprefTed by unnecefTary burthens; 
 the next is, to check the executive power in the 
 exercife of its prerogative of declaring war. 
 Whenever the commons pafs a bill of fupply, 
 they at the fame time, except in fome fpecific 
 cafes, determine alfo to what particular purpofes 
 the fums fo granted, mall be applied. Jealoufy 
 and diftruft are fo pointedly the chara&erftic fea- 
 tures of this principle, that my only aftonifh- 
 ment is, from whence the doubt can have arifen 
 as to the unconftitutional tendency of the mea- 
 fure ; for I am clear that no means can be in- 
 vented, by which the crown may attempt to 
 obtain money from the fubjedt without the 
 previous fandtion of parliament, which would 
 not dire&ly militate againft one or both of thefe 
 objeds. It is true, that that cannot be coniidered
 
 ( 39 ) 
 
 as a burthen which is fo far given voluntarily that 
 it maybe witholdenj and therefore granting for the 
 prefent thatthefe fubfcriptions are fiddly volunta- 
 ry, that every fubfcriber is confcious within himfelf 
 that he is ading under no compulfive influence, 
 the firft of thefe principles which I have mentioned, 
 viz. the prevention of oppreffion, does not im- 
 mediately appear to be invaded ; fince the only 
 definition of oppreffion with which I am ac- 
 quainted is, the being compelled to do fome- 
 thing, which by choice we mould otherwife 
 avoid; or the being prevented from doing that 
 which, were we matters of our own actions, 
 we mould wifh to do. This conceffion, which. 
 is merely temporary, I have made, becaufe I 
 c^n conceive cafes wherein the gift ftiali be 
 perfectly "voluntary. I do not intend by any means 
 to allow, that it is fo in this inftance; on the 
 contrary, I truft that I mail be able tp prove, 
 that the prefent cafe is attended by circum- 
 ilances which partake fo much of the nature 
 of compulsion, that it is even within the reach 
 of the firfl objecl: of our conftitution, which 
 retains the purfe in the power of the commons, 
 in order to prevent the fubjecl from being op- 
 prefled by unneceffary burthens i but I do poli- 
 tively afTert, that no cafe can arife in which a 
 voluntary fabfcription of any kind, and for any of 
 the purpofes of government, will not militate 
 
 again fl
 
 ( 40 ) 
 
 againft the right of the parliament to controut 
 the executive power, fo as to check it in the 
 exercife of its prerogative of declaring war. 
 
 It was a faying worthy of the character from 
 whom it came, our firfl Edward, that " that 
 ' which concerned all, fhould be agreed to 
 " by all.'* It is a maxim of the moft liberal' 
 defcription, and capable of the moft extenfive 
 application. That which concerns all, mould 
 be agreed to by all ; and how can fuch con- 
 fent be expreffed, but through the conftitu- 
 tional voice of the parliament 5 or, are there 
 any meafures of a public nature which the 
 crown can adopt, or any grants which can be 
 rnade, which do not immediately concern the 
 community at large? Had this queilion been 
 put to Lord Coke, he would probably have, 
 anfwered from his own writings , " The com- 
 ** monalty of England cannot grant but by par- 
 liament*." Whenever there exifts a general 
 difpofuion in the people to make liberal contri- 
 butions in favour of any particular meafure, 
 what means of exprefnng that difpofition can 
 they ufe fo confiftent with their own dignity, or 
 with that of the firft executive magiftrate, as 
 through the medium of their reprefentatives ? 
 Or, at what moment can taxes be impofed with 
 
 * 2 InO. 530. 
 
 left
 
 lefs odium, or with more efficacy ? The fyftem 
 of begging, is a difgrace to the crown from 
 whence it originates, and injurious to the public 
 caufe, as it tends to promote an imprerfion that 
 the great conftitutional fource of fupply, by par- 
 liamentary taxation, is nearly exhauiled. But, 
 fuppofing the facT: really to be, that the people 
 in general are well difpofed towards fuch vo- 
 luntary fubfcription, the crown can have no 
 ground for knowing that circumftance, but the 
 ground of prefumption ; becaufe the people 
 cannot collectively exprefs their fentiments ex- 
 cept through their reprefentatives ; and no in- 
 dividual can in his private capacity, and of his 
 own mere authority, conftitutionally perform 
 any aCt in which the intereft of the whole 
 community is in any degree concerned. It is 
 much oftener in our power to prevent in- 
 juries, than it is to repair them when com- 
 mitted -, and it is the great property of wifdom 
 to forefee difficulties, and by that means to be 
 enabled to prevent misfortune. Upon this prin- 
 ciple it is, that one of the chief objects of our 
 conflitution, has ever been in the firft inftance 
 to prevent the executive authority from obtain- 
 ing money without the confent of Parliament ; 
 becaufe, although it claims at the fame time the 
 right of controuling the difpofition of the money 
 which is granted, yet it is well aware that it has 
 no means of enforcing that claim, but by its 
 G power
 
 ( 4* ) 
 
 power of refufmg all future fupplies, in cafe that 
 claim is difallowed : and the real danger to the 
 constitution, or the real injury done to the peo- 
 ple, does not depend fo much on the temporary 
 privation of a fum of money, as it does upon the 
 manner in which the money is applied : for it is 
 eafy to conceive a beneficial appropriation of fums 
 obtained by unconstitutional means; in which 
 cafe, though the example may be pernicious, yet 
 the effect actually produced in practice, is for that 
 time advantageous. But if the King can legally 
 receive from certain of his fubjects voluntary 
 fubfcriptions, what mode can Parliament effec- 
 tually adopt to prevent any dangerous difpofition 
 of that money, fuppofing it to be the inclina- 
 tion of the crown to employ the produce of fuch 
 fubfcriptions in any manner injurious to the coun- 
 try, and contrary to the expreffed fentiments of 
 Parliament ? They may remonftrate, but if the 
 crown is obftinate, they cannot enforce that re- 
 monflrance ; they have parted with the means of 
 prevention ; they have given away that inefti- 
 mable barrier of the conftitution, which fecures 
 to the people a tranquillity, fuch as the ambition 
 of a fovereign cannot interrupt without their con- 
 nivance ; they have put arms into the hands of 
 the enemy, and they have no means of refinance 
 left but that of arming themfelves. 
 
 Suppofing this mode of application to be legal, 
 
 ftill
 
 ( 43 ) 
 
 {[ill the proof of the public approbation of 
 the meafure it is intended to promote, mufl 
 depend upon the univerfality of the fubfcrip- 
 tion j but it does not follow that the fuccefi 
 aimed at, will alfo depend upon the fame 
 circumftance : for it is eafy to fuppofe a cafe 
 where the private intereft of a combination of 
 wealthy individuals, when in unifon with the 
 wimes of the fovereign, (ha.ll call forth fuch 
 ilrenuous exertions as may enable the crown 
 Co effect its own purpofes, and to gratify the 
 views of fuch perfons at the expence of the 
 interefts of the reft of the community. I con- 
 ceive that the exiftence of fuch a pofiibility, 
 is fufficient to bring the cafe within the re- 
 flri&ive influence of our laws. Far be it 
 from me to infinuate, that fuch is the difpo- 
 fition of our prefent gracious fovereign j but 
 the hiflory of paft times teaches us, that we 
 have had fovereigns of a very different cha- 
 racter, and the hiitory of human nature gives 
 u? reafon to conjecture, that fuch difpofitions 
 may again fill the feat of royalty. Then will 
 it be that the pernicious conlequences of this 
 doctrine will be pradically felt, and pofterity 
 have to curfe that iervility, which could fa- 
 crifice the law of the land to gratify the ca- 
 price and ambition of a minifter. If the jea- 
 lous temper of the conftitution is ever to be 
 G 2 called
 
 ( 44 ) 
 
 called forth, it cannot be exerted at a more 
 proper moment than when a King, even the 
 beft, is attempting to obtain money from pri- 
 vate individuals without the previous confent 
 of Parliament, and without firfl communicating 
 to Parliament the object of its deftination. The 
 conftitution fuppofes, that where the views of 
 the executive magiftrate are laudable, the Par- 
 liament will join in promoting them ; but their 
 power would be very nugatory, if they were 
 not armed with a preventive authority. It 
 would be to but little purpofe to inveft them 
 with the power of judging of the laudability 
 of plans, if they had not alfo the means of 
 cruming the execution, in cafe they conceived 
 them to be injurious j and if we grant for an 
 inftant, that the King may find means confti- 
 tutionally to obtain money under any device 
 whatever, without the concurrence and affifl- 
 ance of Parliament, in that conceffion we de- 
 prive the Parliament of their preventive power, 
 and grant to the King the poffibUlty of doing 
 without any Parliament at all. 
 
 The great Algernon Sidney, in one of his di. 
 courfes on Government, fays, that " one of the 
 "*' reafons of importance to thofe nations who, 
 ' though they think fit to have Kings, yet de- 
 " fire to proferve their liberty, which obliges 
 " them to let limits to the power, glory, and 
 
 riches 

 
 ( 4S ) 
 
 " riches of their Kings is, that they can no 
 '* otherwife be kept within the rules of the 
 " lawj becaufe, adds he, fuch is the propen- 
 " (ity of mankind to corruption, that if he 
 " whofe intereft and will it is to corrupt them, 
 " be furnished with the means, he will never 
 *' fail to do it." Who can doubt the juflice 
 of this obfervation, or who doubts the defire 
 of an Engliftiman to preferve his liberty ? The 
 means of prefervation eftabliftied by our confti- 
 tution, are corre&ly Hated in the foregoing paf- 
 fage. The power of the crown is kept within 
 the limits of the law, by its riches being total/y 
 derived through, and wholly dependent on the will 
 of Parliament ; and its means of corruption are 
 completely cut off, fo long as the conftitution 
 uniformly oppofes every attempt at an extra- 
 parliamentary fupply : but the inftant that the 
 limits of the royal revenue are not dependent 
 on the will of Parliament, the inftant that the 
 means of corruption are placed within the 
 grafp of the crown, by its being enabled by 
 any device to obtain and to appropriate fums of 
 jnoney without a previous Parliamentary fanc- 
 tion, that inftant the liberty of the people muft 
 expire; or if it is kept alive, its exiftence muft 
 depend on exertions calculated to produce the 
 moft violent confequences. Thefe arguments 
 Are all applicable, I conceive, to a cafe yet 
 
 more
 
 ( 46 ) 
 
 more ftrongly favourable to the pretenfions of the 
 crown, than that particular cafe which has given 
 rife to the prefent difcuffion - y they are, I appre- 
 hend, declaratory of the incapacity of the crown, 
 even to receive any fubfcriptions which fhall have 
 been ftriclly and bona fide voluntarily offered by 
 the fubjedl. But in the prefent inflance the cafe 
 is infinitely ftronger againft the crown, becaufe 
 here the crown has been the Jirft mover j the 
 Aibfcriptions have been actually fet on foot under 
 the authority of a motion from the crown, without 
 any application or intimation, either previous or 
 iubfequent, to Parliament for their concurrence. 
 The diitindion which has been made in this 
 cafe, by fome diftinguilhed characters is, doubtlefs, 
 taken with infinite ingenuity -, and certainly the 
 circumftance of the meafure having originated in 
 a recommendation from the crown, creates a ftill 
 greater violation of the principles of the confti- 
 tutian, than if it were fimply the cafe of the 
 crown's receiving a fum of money raifed by a mere 
 voluntary fubfcription* where the plan had been 
 propofed by the fubfcribers themfelves, without 
 any intimation whatever from any other quarter. 
 That fuch receipt and appropriation is greatly 
 exaggerated by any attempt on the part of the 
 crown to promote the meafure, I have no doubt; 
 but I cannot for a moment allow, that even the 
 
 voluntary
 
 ( 47 ) 
 
 voluntary fubfcription, though infinitely lefs 
 likely to be productive of ferious inconvenience, 
 is not totally incompatible with the fpirit of our 
 conftitution ; becaufe it muft be granted, that any 
 means by which the crown is enabled to difpofe 
 of money independent of parliament, in the ex- 
 ercife of its dominion over England, is highly 
 fubverfive of the rights and liberties of the 
 people. 
 
 The pofleflion of riches is neceffarily attended 
 by power, and the criterion of defpotifm has ever 
 been regulated by the power of obtaining money. 
 Wherever that power is, there the fupreme au- 
 thority muft ultimately refide, becaufe the power 
 of railing money involves in it alfo that of dif- 
 pofing of the money when raifed; and whether 
 the fum be levied in the form of a tax under the 
 fanction of parliament, or by the perfuafion of 
 the fovereign under the name of a benevolence or 
 fubfcription, the influence to be derived from it 
 muft flow from the difpofal of it. There is in 
 this country but one body, to which the confti- 
 tution has entrufted an unlimited power, and 
 that is the fupreme legiflative aflembly of the 
 kingdom, compofed of the king, the lords fpi- 
 ritual and temporal, and the commons, or repre- 
 fentatives of the people. They, and they only, 
 when afTembled in their legiflative capacity, arc 
 
 poflcfled
 
 ( 48 ) 
 
 pofTefled of that undefined and abfolute authority, 
 which enables them to exclaim with effefl, 
 
 " Sic volo, fie jubeo, ftet pro ratione yoluntas." 
 
 The fpecial prerogatives or privileges which 
 have gradually annexed themfelves to thefe fepa- 
 rate orders, each in their refpective capacities, 
 are all reflricted by certain fundamental principles, 
 which cannot be violated without a manifefl in- 
 jury to the conftitution. By thefe principles it is 
 that thofe prerogatives of the crown which do 
 exift, are fo defined and limited as to be rendered 
 incapable of opprerTion $ and in conformity to 
 the fame principles it is, that others which the 
 ambition of princes might induce them to claim, 
 are not fufFered to exift at all. " Prerogative," 
 fays Mr. Locke, " is the difcretionary power of 
 " acting for the public good, where the pofitive 
 laws are filent." If then the conftitution was 
 abfolutely filent as to the moft advantageous 
 mode of raifing money, if indeed there was no 
 authority under the fanction of which the ap- 
 propriation of the money when raifed was to be 
 directed, we fhould in that cafe have fome rea- 
 fonable ground for prefuming that, becaufe it was 
 requifite for the well being of the flate, that 
 fums of money mould be regularly obtained for 
 the purpofes of government ; and becaufe no 
 fpecific mode, by which fuch fupplies fhould be 
 
 raifed,
 
 ( 49 ) 
 
 raifed, was marked out by the law, and no au- 
 thority eftablimed, by which the expenditure 
 fhould be regulated, therefore the apparent ne- 
 ceffity of fuch meafures naturally implied the 
 exiftence of a difcretionary power in the crown 
 for this purpofe. But, is the conftitution indeed 
 iilent on this head? Is our fyftem of fupply, in 
 fact, fo undefined as to give any colourable pre- 
 teniion for the exercife of this prerogative on any 
 f jch ground ? or rather let me afk, whether, in the 
 whole frame of our government, there is anyone 
 point which has been examined with fo much 
 attention, or decided upon with fo much jea- 
 loufy, as that particular article, the difpofal of 
 the public purfe ? Do not the commons 07 all 
 occaiions of fupply, claim, and is not their claim 
 invariably allowed, the fole arrangement on this 
 fubject ? Do they ever fufFer the interference of 
 the lords to have any effect ? Is there an amend- 
 ment which could be made by the lords, which 
 when returned to the commons, would not pro- 
 duce an inftantaneous rejection of the bill ? If the 
 commons, then, claim fuch an unlimited privi- 
 lege in fettling all modes of fupply, as not to 
 fufFer even an amendment by the lords to pafs 
 without rejecting the bill in toto, is it confiftjnt 
 with common fenfe, to fuppofe that conftitution 
 which grants to them fuch a prerogative, intends 
 to circumvent the whole plan of liberty, by 
 H allowing
 
 ( 5 ) 
 
 allowing to the crown, not only to devife means 
 of raifing a fupply, but alfo to direct the appro- 
 priation of it without a parliamentary fan6lion ? 
 To clofe this divifion of the queftion, I am con- 
 fident that it would be impoflible to ftate any one 
 point in our conftitution, in which the law, and 
 the reafons of that law, are fo clear, and in 
 which any interference on the part of the crown 
 would be fo juftiy odious, as in that which 
 relates to the medns of raifing money. 
 
 The next and lafl point which arifes in this 
 branch of my argument, as referring to the 
 principles of the conftitution, unconnected with 
 the actual practice on this fubjeft, and inde- 
 pendent of the law of the land, is, that it is im- 
 poffible for the crown constitutionally to move the 
 fubjed to a voluntary benevolence ; for this reafon, 
 that any recommendation from the crown, carries 
 with it an influence nearly approaching to com- 
 pulfion. And this particular part of the queftion 
 has its foundation in fomething, if poffible, even 
 flronger and more impreflive than any force which 
 reafoning alone can apply ; it is capable of a folu- 
 tion by an appeal to every man's own heart. 
 Let every one confult his own feelings, and then 
 declare how he mould chufe to refift in his own 
 proper perfon, any requeft which might be made 
 by the crown, however inconvenient the com- 
 pliance might be to his previous arrangements, 
 
 or
 
 or however inconfiftent with his ideas of that 
 conduct which ought to be obferved by the ex- 
 ecutive magiflrate, as prefcribed by the confli- 
 tution 3 and whether, in fact, he fhould not con- 
 fider fuch a requeft to him, in the fame light in 
 which Sir John Eliot appears to have viewed the 
 loans of Charles the Firft, when in his petition 
 from the Gate-houfe, where he had been con- 
 fined for not acceding to the requisition of a loan, 
 he ftiles all fuch requefts to the fubject, tacit and 
 implied commands ? 
 
 It is true that, in the prefent inftance, there 
 are no legal means by which any perfon can be 
 compelled to fubfcribe j but are there indeed no 
 other modes of compulfion by which any parti- 
 cular effect may be produced, fave thofe which 
 the law has provided? are there not means which 
 are contrary to law ? and are there not alfo means 
 which poffefs different mades of criminality (for 
 nothing can be illegal without being in fome 
 degree criminal) by involving different degrees of 
 compulfion? If there is any one circumftance at- 
 tending this requifition, calculated to counteract 
 the inclination of a man's mind as it is directed 
 by his reafon, fuch circumftance, whatever it 
 may be, amounts in its effect to a compulfion, and 
 furnifhes an additional ground for determining 
 that the meafure is directly invafive of the prin- 
 ciples of the conftitution. Let us trace this 
 H 2 queflion
 
 ( 5' ) 
 
 queftion by examples. I will fuppofe a body of 
 private individuals fpontaneoujly to alTemble toge- 
 ther, and to agree among themfelves to promote 
 a fubfcription, to be difpofed of under their im- 
 mediate infpection, for the augmentation of boun- 
 ties for the purpofe of facilitating the levy of a body 
 of troops which has been ordered to be raifed 
 by authority of parliament. Such an undertaking 
 would, I conceive, be ftrictly conftitutional and 
 legal, becaufe it originates with thofe, whofe opi- 
 nions or wimes cannot be fuppofed to carry with 
 them an influence capable of inducing any other 
 perfon to forego his own inclination, that is, to 
 adt under any degree of compulfion, not warranted 
 by law; and becaufe the object to be promoted, 
 has previoufly received the approbation of parlia- 
 ment. Befides, in a cafe of this fort, the poffibi- 
 lity of mifapplication to any dangerous extent, is 
 fo very remote, and the means of punimment and 
 redrefs are fo inftantaneous, that it is unneceflary 
 for the conftitution to exercife its preventive 
 power, and to forego the probability of a certain 
 advantage. I will fuppofe another cafe, where a 
 fubfcription mall be fet on foot by a fociety of 
 private individuals, for the purpofe of railing and 
 paying a body of troops, without the previous 
 fanction of Parliament. Such ameafure would cer- 
 tainly be highly unconftitutional and illegal, even 
 though the object of it ihould be in itfelf inno- 
 cent.
 
 ( S3 ) 
 
 cent. The violation of conftitutional principle 
 in fuch a meafure would not depend on the fact 
 of compulfion ; the meafure itfelf would, under 
 fuch circumftances, be nothing lefs than an af- 
 fumption, without the aflent of Parliament, on 
 the part of private perfons in their felf-created 
 capacity, of the exercife of one of the duties of 
 the executive magiftrate, in the exercife of which 
 duty thai magiftrate muft himfelf depend on the 
 will of Parliament for the means of its execution. 
 Now what is the cafe in the prefent inftance? 
 The crown unites itfelf to a body of individuals 
 for the purpofe of promoting fubfcriptions with- 
 out the previous fanction of Parliament; the pro- 
 duce of which fubfcriptions may afterwards be 
 applied, equally independent of the will of Par- 
 liament, to the raifing and paying of troops. Here 
 then is an inftance yet more unconstitutional 
 than the laft. Let us fee in what its greater un- 
 conftitutional tendency confjfts. It cannot be 
 becaufe it is calculated to give to the crown the 
 difpofal of a purfe uncontrouled by the legillature; 
 becaufe that fimple effect might be equally pro- 
 duced from the laft example; fince the purfe 
 might as eafily be laid at the king's feet, as its 
 contents expended in the collection and payment 
 of an armed force. The truth is, that the addi- 
 tional violation in this inflance, depends on the 
 addition of the royal influence, which, to every 
 
 periou
 
 ( 54 ) 
 
 perfon at all acquainted with the difpofition of 
 the human mind, muft be acknowledged at all 
 times to carry great weight with it, but to be 
 particularly calculated to produce an effect very 
 different from, or at leaft infinitely more extenfive 
 than that which would ariie from the inclina- 
 tion being left to flow in its own natural channel ; 
 at a time too, when the imaginations of man- 
 kind are heated by every kind of artifice, and 
 when thofe who can look on with an impartial 
 and difinterefted eye, cannot breathe even a figh 
 of oppoiition to any one meafure of government, 
 without incurring the odious jftigma of faffiions 
 republicans. 
 
 The relative duties between a king and his 
 people are, command and obedience : and the 
 fovereign ceafes to be a king when his fubjecls 
 ceafe to obey. In defpotic governments, the 
 command iffues directly from the fovereign; in a 
 free ftate it is controuled, not by the people, but 
 by an umpire chofen between the parties; and 
 this umpire is felecled, not becaufe the people, 
 if they think fit to exert it, have not the power 
 to prevent oppreffion, but becaufe that power is 
 likely to be exercifed with more discretion by a 
 body which, being raifed above the reft of the 
 people by the importance of its functions, and 
 by being confcious of its own confequence, is 
 thereby removed to a greater diilance from the 
 
 influence
 
 ( 55 ) 
 
 influence of thofe turbulent paffions, and often-* 
 times unreafonable prejudices, which fway the 
 conduct of every multitude, and at the fame time, 
 by being brought nearer to the level of the prince, 
 is placed further beyond the probability of being 
 dazzled by the luftre of royalty, and is by that 
 means rendered lefs likely to be perfuaded into the 
 adoption of meafures hoftile to the true interefts 
 and liberty of the people. Whenever the crown 
 fhall think fit to difclaim, in any degree, the fuper- 
 intendence of Parliament, the intervention of the 
 conftitutional medium of intercourfe between it- 
 felf and its fubjects, it muft not be furprifed if the 
 people mould follow the example, and take the 
 management of their own affairs into their own 
 hands. 
 
 Such I take to be the intent of our conftitu- 
 tion. The queftion then {imply is, whether the 
 crown, by any application to the people, other- 
 wife than through the medium of Parliament, is 
 not guilty of exerciiing an influence as inconfift- 
 ent with our maxims of government as any other 
 attempt would be whofe objed: was to exercife 
 an independent authority. The queftion here is 
 not, whether a man can refill the demand phy- 
 fically he certainly can; but the point is, whe- 
 ther a -iran, vvho, in his heart, difapproves of the 
 meafure, may not be inf* icnced by lame con- 
 fufed notions of apprehenfion, which (hall in- 
 duce
 
 ( 56 ) 
 
 duce him to act in contradiction to his inclina- 
 tion ? This is a queftion which every man mud 
 decide from his own feelings. Upon thefe feve- 
 ral grounds, and from a perfuafion that fuch 
 notions do exift, it is, that my mind has adopted 
 a complete conviction, that it is impoffible for the 
 crown to take any fteps without the previous 
 fan&ion of Parliament, towards exciting a vo- 
 luntary contribution, by private individuals, with- 
 out incurring, in fome degree, the guilt of 
 violating the fundamental principles of the 
 Englifli conftitution. 
 
 We now come to confider the merits of this 
 queftion as they depend upon the conftrudion of 
 the ftatute law of the land. 
 
 Whether the right of taxation can exift in the 
 crown, independent of Parliament, is a point 
 which has now been long and happily fettled. 
 The various unfuccefsful ftruggles on the part of 
 the executive power, to obtain this high badge of 
 authority, are every where extant in our hiftories; 
 and the final triumph of the people on every 
 occafion is teftihed by (blemn ratifications of their 
 unalienable rights by fucceffive parliaments. 
 But though the pofleffion of this power was 
 prevented, yet the crown ever retained an in- 
 clination to exercife it : and as we eafily trace 
 from the variety of ads relating to the fubjed, 
 the many devices to which the clergy referred, 
 
 in
 
 ( 57 ) 
 
 in order to elude the provifions of the flatutes of 
 mortmain; fo in regard to this fubjedt, *our 
 annals are replete with various inftances in which 
 the ingenuity of miniflers was exercifed with a 
 view to obtain money, without the neceffity of 
 reforting to Parliament. One among the many 
 inventions on this fubjedt, to which the fubtlety 
 of ftatefmen gave birth, was, that of benevo- 
 lences ; or, as they were fuppofed to be, volun- 
 tary contributions of the people towards amfting 
 the meafures of the government. It is the hiftory 
 of the progrefs, and the iffue of this invention, 
 which we have now to trace through the legal 
 records of this kingdom : and it is no fmall matter 
 of encouragement to me, to find, that in pur- 
 fuing this fubject, I mail have very little occafion 
 to deviate from that track in which the traveller 
 is directed by thofe great conftitutional land- 
 marks, the rolls and records of Parliament. 
 
 In the earlier periods of Englifh hiflory, when 
 the royal revenue was chiefly fupplied from the 
 profits of feudal fervices, we find continual ftrug- 
 gles between the king and his people; the one to 
 preferve and encreafe thofe exactions, to which 
 according to the purity of that fyftem the lord was 
 entitled, the other to deftroy, or to diminish 
 what was always oppreflive, but which, when 
 exercifed with any degree of rigour, became 
 intolerable. But at the fame time, as thefe exao 
 l tions,
 
 ( 58 ) 
 
 tlons, however fevere, were in general cfue of 
 right^ when the people prevailed in obtaining 
 fome remiffion of fuch bard&rps, the indulgence 
 is certainly to be considered as proceeding from 
 the fovercign,. whofe lawful prerogative k un~ 
 doubtedly then was, to exaft the payment of all 
 fuch aids as were incident to the feudal fyftem. 
 The feudal regulations being all calculated to 
 keep fociety together after the manner of one 
 great family, and having the means of defence 
 principally in view, have ever been characterized 
 by a military tendency; and having been en- 
 grafted in this country upon a fpirit among the 
 people already prone to- liberty and warfare, they 
 have, perhaps, greatly contributed towards en- 
 creafing that fpirit, which has ultimately triumphed 
 over the fyftem which cherifhed k. But as the 
 origin of feuds was in ks> nature military, fo it? 
 provisions never appear to have had in view the 
 poffible exigence of commerce. Accordingly, as 
 this great fource of public opulence, and confe- 
 quently vl public revenue, encreafed, there gre\ 
 tip with it a conteft between the crown and the 
 nation, as to the mode of apportioning what was 
 to be raifed from this new branch of wealth, for 
 the public fervicej the king infifting upon his 
 right of exaction, where no previous regulation 
 had fettled the fubject, and the people claiming 
 their privilege of confe&t, by the voiee of their 
 
 repre*
 
 ( 59 ) 
 
 reprefentatives. This point of exaction was early 
 given up by the crown; and Sir E. Coke in 
 fpeaking of the flatute de tallagio non concedendo* , 
 fays, that it was but the explanation of that 
 branch of Magna Charta relating to merchants, 
 which itfelf binds the king to exaEl no duties but 
 fuch as are due ofoldcuflom. Still however, ano- 
 ther queftion arofe, whether, although the king 
 could not exact but by authority of Parliament, 
 he might not accept of fuch additional duties as 
 the merchants themfelves mould voluntarily 
 conferi t to pay. Out of this difputed point, I ap- 
 prehend, the whole fyflem of benevolence has 
 arifen. We will now trace it through a long 
 feries of parliamentary proceedings, beginning 
 with the 25 of Ed. 1. 1 The three la/I chapters 
 ; of this ftatute contain, rft, a recital that the 
 people were apprehenlive that divers aids and 
 talks, which they had given of their own grant 
 and good will, (howfoever they ivere inade) might 
 turn to a bondage ; becaufe fuch taking by the 
 officers of the crown, might hereafter be found 
 upon the rolls, andly, An enacting claufe, that 
 no fuch aids, talks, or prifes, lhall be drawn into 
 cuftom on any account, or on any pretence what- 
 ever. S^ly, That for no bufinefs, mall fuch man- 
 jier of aids, talks, or prifes be taken, but by the 
 
 * 2 Inft, 59. t App. (H.)
 
 ( 60 ) 
 
 common a/Jent of tie realm; with a faving claufe of 
 fuch aids as were due by reaibn of tenure. 4thly, 
 The recital of a particular grievance, viz. a toll 
 of 405. for every fack of wool, which the fta- 
 tute calls a maletout, and which, according to 
 Sir E. Coke, is an exceffive, and in fome flatutes 
 means an unjuft exaction. And 5thly, an enacting 
 claufe, that no fuch toll {hall again be taken 
 without the common aflent and good will of the- 
 people, together with a faving claufe of fuch 
 cuftoms as had been before granted by the com* 
 monalty aforefaid. 
 
 It appears by Sir E. Coke's expofition of this 
 ftatute*, that the apprehenfions of the people 
 originated in an idea, that the aids which 
 they had granted for the defence of the country, 
 or for fome other internal purpofe, might pof- 
 fibly be drawn into an example, and exacted for 
 the fupport of the king in his wars out of the 
 realm, for which they at that time held them- 
 felves by no means bound. To remove fuch ap- 
 preheniions, parliament annihilates the poffibility 
 of applying the paft, by enacting, that fuch aids 
 fhall not be drawp into future examples; but in 
 order to fecure the effects of this provifion, it 
 goes one ftep further, and enacts, that for no bu- 
 Jmefs fliall fuch aids be taken, but by confent qf 
 
 * 2 InS. 528, 
 
 Parlia?
 
 Parliament; by that means fecuring to itfclf the 
 power of approving or condemning every meafure 
 before it can be undertaken by the crown. How 
 then can the doctrine of voluntary fubfcriptions, 
 which has a tendency to make the king inde- 
 pendent of Parliament, be fupported confident 
 with the object of this ftatute, which is to bring 
 the crown as much as poffible under the controul 
 of Parliament, by giving to the Commons not 
 only the guardianfhip of the purfe, but alfo a 
 right of previoufly deliberating upon the purpofes 
 for which the fupply is intended ? I confefs, it 
 feems to me, that the provifions of this act, and 
 the doctrines lately maintained, are fo incompa- 
 tible, that the one cannot iland but by the other's 
 fall. 
 
 The next object of this Parliament was to 
 remove an exifting grievance, viz. a toll of 405. 
 pn every fack of wool, which Sir E. Coke tells 
 us, had been impofed 'without the ajfent of Par- 
 liament , and which he defines to be an evil toll or 
 charge. We are not told how this charge was 
 impofed, whether by an abfolute effort of royal 
 authority, or by any other means, bearing an 
 appearance of free-will ; all we know is, that the 
 impofition, however it was made, was for that 
 time refigned by the crown, though it was forne 
 years afterwards refumed and defended, as we 
 {hall find, though finally wifbwt fuccefs, upon 
 
 the
 
 ( 62 ) 
 
 the ground of having ^ztn freely granted by the 
 merchants. 
 
 The next ftatute which I fhall cite as tending 
 to confirm the ideas I have ventured to offer 
 upon this fiibjecl, is that commonly known by 
 the name of the Statufutn de tallagw non conce* 
 dcndo, pafled in the 34 Ed. I.* This ftatute ap- 
 pears to hay.e been made in confequence of an 
 attempted breach of the 25th of this king, and 
 to be a confirmation of the incapacity created by 
 jhat ad in the crown to take any grants but by 
 authority of Parliament. The words of this 
 ftatute are, that nullum tallagium, &c.ponatur feu 
 levefur, the words being, as Sir E. Coke obferves 
 in the disjunctive, fo *' as if it be fet by the king, 
 " although it be not levied by him, but by a 
 f fubjedt, as it was in the cafes aforefaid, it is 
 '* within the purview of this ftatute *)-." I fub- 
 rnit to the judgment of my readers, whether this 
 disjunctive does not equally warrant the con- 
 flruction, that although the impofition be not fet 
 by the crown, yet if it is levied to its ufe, fuch 
 an impofition is equally within the purview of 
 fhia ftatute -, and if this conftrudion be right, the 
 rneafure of fubfcriptions, even where it does not 
 originate in a motion from the crown, being: ne^ 
 
 O O 
 
 verthelefs levied for the crown's ufe, is contrary 
 
 f App. fl.) f 2 Inft, 541. 
 
 ' A
 
 ( 63 1 
 
 to the intent of the 34th of Ed. I. This flatute 
 further repeats the prohibition againft taking the 
 maletoutof wool, on any occasion whatever. 
 
 The next which claims attention is the 14 Ed. 
 III. ftat. i.e. 21. * 
 
 By this flatute it appears, that certain aids were 
 due of old cuflom of certain commodities; that 
 the cuftom on wool had been particularly limited 
 by Parliament; that the Comrryons had intreated 
 the King that no more than fuch ufual or li- 
 mited cuftoms fhould ever be taken, and that 
 this prayer had beer* granted: and that any fur- 
 ther taking than what was fo fettled, fhould be 
 contrary to law y is evident from what immedi- 
 ately follows, where the King prayeth the Par- 
 liament, nevcrtbelefs, on account of his great oc- 
 cafions, that they would grant him for a fhort 
 time fome additional fupply from the articles 
 before-mentioned in the itatute. Upon due con- 
 federation of this requcft, the Parliament confen&- 
 to the King's demand, and grant him an addi- 
 tional cuftom of 405. on every fack of wool, 
 and alib an additional duty on fome other 
 articles; flipulating, at the fame time, that' the 
 grant ihould only continue in force for a period 
 ibmething fhort of two years. To thefe terms 
 the King accedes, and in the ufual form of art 
 
 , * A PP . (K4-
 
 aft of Parliament promifes, that after the time 
 fpecified, neither himfelf nor his heirs lhall 
 demand, aflefs, take, or Jitffer to be taken of any 
 EngliJJjman, more than the old cuftom efta- 
 blifhed by law. Upon this act Lord Coke ob- 
 ferves, that " the King granteth, that after the 
 " time mentioned, he, nor his heirs, would 
 " take any more than the old cuftom*." 
 Upon the words of this ftatute, and the com- 
 ment of Lord Coke, we may fairly be entitled 
 to conclude, that it was not only contrary to 
 law to ajk, but even to receive any thing, other- 
 wife than with the affent of the other branches 
 -of the legiflature. Let us lee how far this 
 conclusion is fupported by the fubfequent con- 
 duel: of Edward, and that of his Parliament. 
 It appears by the rolls of Parliament, that in 
 the i jth year of his reign-f-, which muft have 
 been a Jbort time fubfequent to the expiration, 
 of the period limited for the receipt of the 
 extraordinary aids of 405. on every fack of 
 wool, &c. Edward Jlill continued to receive 
 this additional duty as a voluntary gift from 
 the merchants. That the commons complained 
 of this receipt as contrary to the ftatute, which 
 granted only a duty of half a mark after a flated 
 time, and as contrary to their rights, who mufl 
 
 * 2 loft. 60. f App. (L.) 
 
 be
 
 ( 65 ) 
 
 be in the end the fufferers by fuch a voluntary 
 conceflion of the merchants, and therefore prayed 
 that the evil might be immediately remedied. 
 To this requeft the King gave an evafive anfwer, 
 by {rating, that this grant of the merchants could 
 iiot ultimately charge the Commons, as they had 
 tbemfelves fettled the faleable price of the feveral 
 commodities, and that it would not be in the 
 power of the merchants to encreafe the charge to 
 their cuftomers. Here for the prefent the matter 
 ended -, the Commons content with afTerting the 
 illegality; the King fatisfied to evade their de- 
 mand without abfolutely denying their right. 
 And this complaifance on either fide is not to 
 be wondered at, when we confider the high 
 character and popularity of the King, and the 
 infant ftate of parliamentary power as lodged 
 With the Commons. Upon the fame autho- 
 rity we find the Parliament again complaining, 
 in the 21 ft year of this fame King's reign*, of 
 his breach of the laws, by iffuing commiffions 
 under the great feal for obtaining money without 
 their previous grant -, and in the 25th-f~, the 
 Commons again take up the fubject of the 
 voluntary grant of the merchants. They repeat 
 the grievance arillng from the tax of 405. and 
 requeft that in future it may neither be de- 
 
 * App. (M.) t (N.) 
 
 JK. manded
 
 ( 66 ) 
 
 minded nor levied, and that no commiffions 
 fhould be iflued in confequence of fuch fingle 
 grants, except in full parliament ; and in confi- 
 deration of a compliance with this requifition, 
 they offer to legalize this fublidy for half a 
 year, or, perhaps, for a whole year, if the 
 King is really in fuch grear neceflity. To 
 this complaint the King pleads in excufe, the 
 continuance of that extreme necefiity which 
 firfl induced him to accept the offer j and this 
 appears to have been fo far fatisfa&ory to the 
 Parliament, that they confent to the continuance 
 of this impofition for two years longer. In 
 every one of thefe inftances we find the King 
 feeking fome pretence for obtaining money from 
 the fubject, without receiving it at the hands of 
 his Parliament, and reforting to fuch inventions 
 as bear, the greateft femblance of voluntary dona- 
 tions. Yet, even in all thefe inftances, his Par- 
 liament refufes to admit his pleas j and, though 
 the fublidy was generally granted upon the ground 
 of the crown's neceffity, yet ftill the precedent 
 was always oppofed, as it might ferve for an ex- 
 ample to after times. And in the 361)1 of 
 Edward HI. the commons again renew their 
 entreaties *, that in confederation of their libe- 
 rality to the King and their readinefs to relieve 
 
 his
 
 his neceffities, no extraordinary fubfidy fhall be 
 levied after the time limited by them, only the 
 ufual import of half a mark ; and that in future 
 no impofnion on wool can be granted by the 
 merchants, or any others, without the aflent of 
 the Parliament. The anfwer to this petition of 
 the commons is, " the King wills it," 
 
 This trania&ion feems for a time to have ftifled 
 all further attempts at voluntary donations. But 
 the triumph of Parliament appears to have only 
 given birth to another device; for the King, find- 
 ing it in vain to contend for the prerogative of 
 accepting gifts, had recourfe to the artifice of bor- 
 rowing of fuch of his fubjecls, as mould chufe 
 to lend him any furns his occafions might re*. 
 quire. It mould feem that fo long as the King 
 confined himfelf to accepting voluntary loans, 
 the jealoufy of Parliament was not excited,. 
 Probably, as they had originally grounded their 
 objections to the voluntary grants of the mer- 
 chants upon this principle, that fuch (Donations 
 would ultimately fall upon the people from the 
 additional charges which would be made in the 
 fale of the commodities, fo the fame reafon for 
 apprehenfion did not immediately occur where 
 the means of repayment were previoufly fixed. 
 Thofe nicer diftinclions winch have fince added 
 further limitations to regal prerogative, and 
 \yhich have ferved to augment the jealous dif- 
 K 2 pofuion
 
 ( 68 ) 
 
 pofition of the conftitution in regard to regal 
 encroachments, were then probably unknown j 
 their birth was coeval with the encreafe of our 
 wealth, their growth has been proportionate to 
 our progreffive importance in the fcale of nations. 
 But when any acquiefcence tin fuch voluntary 
 loans induced the King to advance one ftep 
 further, and to attempt at fubftantiating this 
 device into a matter of right, inftead of being 
 what it was at firft, entirely matter of favour; 
 when he proceeded to exercife compulfory 
 means in order to obtain loans from thofe 
 who, upon the firft requifition, endeavoured to 
 excufe themfelves; we find the commons in- 
 ftantly efpoufing the caufe of the opprefTed, 
 declaring all fuch attempts to be a fcandal to 
 the King, and againft the law of the /ana 7 , and 
 praying, that in future all perfons reafonably 
 excufing themfelves, might remain unmolefted. 
 This circumftance occurred early in the reign 
 of Richard II. and is proved upon the tefti- 
 mony of the rolls of the Parliament of the 2d of 
 that King*. 
 
 I cannot pafs this period without noticing 
 the fallacy of an aflertion made by Hume, in 
 his 5th volume, where he mentions the en- 
 croachments of Elizabeth upon the claims of 
 
 * App. (P.) 
 
 Parliament,
 
 ( 69 ) 
 
 Parliament to the exclusive privilege of grant- 
 ing money. He affirms in a note, that *' in the 
 '* fecond of Richard II. it was enadted, that in 
 ." loans, which the King {hall require of his 
 .'* fubjects upon letters of privy feal, fuch as 
 f s have reasonable excufe of not lending, may 
 ."' there be received without further fummons, 
 " travel, or grief. See Cotton's Abridg. p. 170. 
 ." By this law the King's prerogative of ex- 
 ." acting loans was ratified; and what ought to 
 " be deemed a reasonable excufe, was ftill left in 
 >' his own breaft to determine*." The hifto* 
 rian lays great ftrefs on the word reafonable^ as 
 implying a power in the crown to judge of the 
 reafonablenefs, and accordingly to accept or 
 rejed: the excufe. This miflake may eafily 
 be accounted for, without impeaching the 
 author's intentions. At the time when Hume 
 wrote, the records were not in print; and he 
 appears to have trufted to Cotton, who reje&s 
 in his abridgment the preamble of the peti- 
 tion, upon which the whole muft depend. 
 For, although the Commons in the enacting 
 part requeft the crown upon fuch occafions to 
 admit all reafonable excufes, yet, in the pre- 
 amble, they have previoufly declared, that all 
 fuch attempts at exadion are to the great 
 
 * Vide Hume, 460.
 
 ( 70 ) 
 
 damage and fear of the poor Commons, to the 
 Jcandal of the King, and againft the laiv of the 
 land. I cannot conceive, that had Mr. Hume 
 feen this record as it is now printed, he 
 would ever have cited it as a ratification of 
 the prerogative of exacting loans, lince it goes 
 the length of affirming, that all fuch exactions 
 are contrary to law; and, though it may after- 
 wards defire the crown to admit all reafonable 
 excufes, I mould fuppofe the crown would feel 
 fome difficulty in confidering any excufe as un- 
 reafonable in the teeth of fuch a declaration ; 
 and, after all, though the crown mould deem 
 the excufe unreasonable, ftiil it cannot enforce 
 the demand, without fcandalizing itfdf, and vio- 
 lating the law. 
 
 After this period, the attempts to raife money 
 by fuch means appear to have ceafed, and not to 
 have been renewed until the reign of Ed- 
 ward IV* : at leaft our hiftory~is either fijent 
 on the fubjetfl, or I have not been able to 
 difcover any tranfadlion of this nature until 
 the fecond year of this prince ; when, accord- 
 ing to Stowe's Chronicie-f-, he iflued letters 
 under the privy feal for the purpofe of ailc- 
 ing a contribution of this description, in order 
 
 * Vide Parliamentary Hiftory. t Stowe's Chronicle and 
 Hiftory of Cropland. 
 
 to
 
 to enable him to raife forces againft Henry VL 
 and which, this author adds, was liberally granted. 
 In or about the I7th year of this King, the hif- 
 tory of Croyland mentions, what is there ftiled 
 a new and unheard of impofition, called a bene- 
 volence, whereby every one might give what they 
 'would ', or rather what they would not ; and the 
 fame authority adds its teftimony to the libe- 
 rality which was manifefted in the large 
 amount of thefe fubfcriptions. Certainly the 
 author of this account was miftaken in his 
 idea, as to the novelty of this device. The 
 name might be perhaps then, for the firft 
 time, applied; but clearly the invention was 
 of a much earlier origin. This appears from 
 the records of Edward III. already cited: and 
 thofe contributions which were levied on the 
 3d of Edward IV. could not have been fanc- 
 tioned by Parliament ; becaufe, if the filence 
 of the rolls may be permitted to prove any 
 thing, it proves that no Parliament was holden 
 in that year. But, whatever might be the 
 liberality of the people in their contributions 
 upon thefe particular occaiions towards reliev- 
 inor the neceflities of Edward IV. the fnirit of 
 
 o J 
 
 fubfcription feems foon to have fubfided, and 
 the exaction itfelf to have grown into a fub- 
 jecl: of complaint. For a very few years fub- 
 fequent to this period, the device of bene- 
 volence
 
 ( 7* ) 
 
 Volences having been carried to an intolerable 
 extent, Richard III. in the firfl year, and almoft 
 one of the firft acts of his reign, found himfelf 
 under the neceffity of confenting to an aft of 
 Parliament*, expreffive of the various evils fo 
 which the people had been expofed, declaring the 
 illegality of all fuch inventions, particularly fpe- 
 cifying the invention of benevolences, and enact- 
 ing, that in future no Juch charges as have be- 
 fore been taken, mall be taken again, but that 
 tkey fhall be damned and adnulled for ever. 
 
 In thecourfe of thefe proceedings, no reference 
 feems to have been made to what paffed in former 
 reigns. The fyftem appears to have been taken 
 up as if nothing of the fort had ever occurred 
 before; and the fubjedl: of complaint to which a 
 remedy was to have been applied, feems on this 
 occafion to have been wholly confined to the 
 circumftance of exaction ; from whence an in- 
 ference may certainly be drawn that, at that time t 
 a mere voluntary donation was not confidered as 
 a grievance ; and this inference is perhaps fome- 
 what ftrengthened by the next ftatute which, ac- 
 cording to its order of fucceffion, 1 have to cite -\-. 
 This ftatute fets forth, that divers of his Majefly's 
 fubjecls had feverally granted divers fums of 
 money of their free- wills and benevolence $ it then 
 recites, that feveral of thefe fums <fo granted had 
 
 App. (Q,) f ii H. 7. c. 10. A PP . (R.) 
 
 not
 
 ( 73 ) 
 
 not been paid in; and afterwards proceeds to give 
 to the crown, the means of enforcing the pay- 
 ment of fuch promifed grants ; and provides, that 
 in cafe any of the perfons having made fuch 
 promife, (hall die before payment made, that in 
 fuch cafe the charge mall defcend upon the 
 executor of fuch perfon, but not upon his heir. 
 Yet allowing to this inference, in its fulleft extent, 
 all the force which it can collect, while uncon- 
 nected with any preceding circumftance, ft ill I 
 do not fee upon what principle it can be fuffered 
 to ftand, when referred back to the tranfactions 
 of the reign of Ed. III. which even now remain 
 uncontradicted and unrepealed. Until thofe 
 tran factions mail have been condemned by the 
 repeal of what was then agreed to, the ftatute of 
 Richard III. mufl be coniidered as declaring the 
 illegality of all exactions, without affecting, in any 
 degree, the queftion of voluntary benevolences, 
 as it then ftood upon the Parliamentary records 
 of the reign of Ed. III. and the ftatute of H. VII. 
 can only be held to legalize and enforce for that 
 time, what would otherwife have been illegal and 
 incapable of taking effect. 
 
 I (hall pafs by the tranfactions of the reigns of 
 Henry VIII. Mary, and Elizabeth, as being 
 periods of undlfguijed tyranny which will hardly 
 at this time be drawn forth as fit examples for the 
 minifters of the prefent day. The tyranny of 
 L Henry
 
 ( 74 ) 
 
 Henry VIII. being principally fupplied from the 
 fpoils of the church, his oppreffions were not of 
 a nature to be feverely felt by the people; and 
 the commons had not then reached that {lability 
 of privilege, which has fince enabled them to adt 
 as much in preventing poffible evils, as in re- 
 drefTing pofitive injuries. Mary, fortunately for 
 herfelf, died before the extravagance of her per- 
 fecutions had loufed the fpirits of her people to 
 alual refinance - t and the tyrannies of Elizabeth, 
 for tyrannical her reign undoubtedly was, being 
 directed by able ftatefmen, and generally calcu- 
 lated for the advantage of her fubjects, were not 
 likely, while in fuch hand?, to create much op- 
 pofition ; but when thefe fame principles came to 
 be put into practice by her fucceflbr, who united 
 to the prejudices of a foreigner, educated with 
 notions ftill more arbitrary than thofe of Eli- 
 zabeth, the difadvantages of a feeble underftand- 
 ing, no other confequences were to be expected 
 than thofe which followed the errors of James 
 the Firft. That prince, unequal to comprehend 
 the vaft defigns of his predecefTor's government, 
 faw no difference, or at lead thought that there 
 ought to be none, between the expenditure of 
 money for public benefit, and the wafte of it for 
 the fupply of private extravagance. He was not 
 aware of the encreafed opulence, the extended 
 confequence, and the maturer judgment of the 
 
 Englifti
 
 ( 75 ) 
 
 Englifh people. That which Elizabeth had 
 rendered palatable by her prudence, he thought 
 might be made fubfervient to his caprice; and 
 while he ftruggled for the porTcffion of arbitrary 
 power, his weak underflanding could not dif- 
 tinguim thofe infuperable barriers which mufc 
 finally flop the career of defpotifm. It is a me- 
 lancholy reflection to conlider, that Charles the 
 Firfr, with a clearer head and a better heart, fell 
 the victim of his father's principles, which had 
 been fo rivetted in him by habit and education, 
 as to give them all the force of prejudices, founded 
 on the beft motives, and directed to t'.e pureft 
 purpofes. Among the chief grievances which 
 excited commotions in the reign of James, the 
 loans and benevolences were the principal; yet 
 even through every tranfaction relative to thefe 
 fubjects, the utmoft precaution, compatible with 
 the exercife of any force at all, feems to have been 
 obferved in order to preferve as much as poffible 
 the femblance of free-will. Thofe who refufed 
 to contribute to the king's neceiTuies. were not at 
 firil: oftenfibly punifhed for fuch refufal, but were 
 chaftized by the filent puniftiment of being preffed 
 into the king's fervice in the wars ; and Mr. O. 
 St. John does not appear, according to Lord 
 Bacon's ftatement of his crime, to have been ac- 
 cufed for not lending money himfelf, but for 
 {laving flandered the King for attempting to raife 
 L 2 money
 
 money in fuch manner without the confent of 
 his Parliament. It is alfo to be obferved, that 
 Lord Bacon, who was then attorney general, refls 
 the principal part of his defence of the meafure 
 itfelf * which gave rife to Mr. St. John's ani- 
 madverfions, upon the circumftance of thofe bene^ 
 volences be ng purely voluntary* as having, among 
 other points of extenuation, or rather exculpa- 
 tion, been given in the firft inftance without any 
 motion from the crown; from whence (if I may 
 be allowed the fame privilege of inference fo co- 
 pioufly exercifed by the champions of this pre-> 
 rogative) I mould infer, that he me.ant tacitly to 
 acknowledge, that had fuch circumftances exifted, 
 the meafure would have been illegal. For when a 
 man argues that any particular cafe is no violation 
 of the law, becaufe it is unattended by feme particu- 
 lar circumjlance, it feems naturally to induce a 
 fuppofition, that the concurrence i fuch a circum- 
 itance would be fufficient to conflitute the 
 illegagility of the meafure; and thofe who read 
 the tranfadtions relative to this fubjeft, during 
 the reign of the unhappy Charles, will find a 
 difpofition in the arguments which were employed 
 in defence of thole who oppofed the lyftems of 
 that period, fimilar to that which characterizes 
 thole of the prefent. 7"he meafure of exaction, 
 
 * Vide Trial of Oliver St. John, State Trials, Vol. II. 
 
 however,,
 
 ( 77 ) 
 
 however, was certainly carried to a much greater 
 extent than has hitherto been attempted. We 
 have not yet had imprifonments; we have not 
 yet had the refractory part of the country com- 
 pelled to go to the wars; but we have had that 
 done which even Lord Bacon, when pleading for 
 the crown, did not attempt to fupport we have 
 had the crown moving the fubject to contributions; 
 exerting that influence which is attached to its 
 high fituation, in order to induce the fubject to 
 part with that money, which cannot conftitu- 
 tionally be appropriated to public purpofes, but 
 by the direction of Parliament. Let us reflect, 
 that from fmall beginnings, the mod important 
 confequences oftentimes follow. Let us call to 
 mind the trifling beginning, and the fatal end of 
 the meafures of that period, to which we are 
 now arrived. Let us in the prefent inftance, from, 
 paft mifconduct, draw leflbns of wifdom. for 
 future occafions; and by checking every effort 
 towards an unconftitutional extenfion of prero- 
 gative, prevent thofe misfortunes which no man 
 can at this moment forefee, and which, when 
 forefeen, no man may be able to prevent. Let us 
 call to minds the notable faying of Lord Coke*, 
 " That when any ancient law or cuflom of Par- 
 ff liament is broken, and the crown poffeffed of 
 
 2 Inft. 528. 
 
 a pro-
 
 ( 78 ) 
 
 < c a precedent, how difficult a thing it is to 
 " reftore the fubjecl agayi to his former freedom 
 ' and fafety." But above all, it behoves the 
 minifters of the crown to confider well the confe- 
 quences, before they advife the adoption of illegal 
 meafures, and thereby lay the feeds of a certain 
 refiftance : they mould recollect, that the unfor- 
 tunate Charles, by provoking a refiftance to 
 ufurped powers, led the way to the final invaficn 
 of his juft claims. 
 
 The petition of right in the third of this prince, 
 endeavoured to mark out the line of the king's 
 duty, by ftating a variety of oppreffions which 
 had been praclifed on the people by the crown^ 
 and claiming an exemption from all fimilar hard- 
 Ihips in future. Charles the Firft, in compli- 
 ance with the requefls contained in this remon- 
 ilrance, concurred in declaring all the grievances 
 therein complained of, to be contrary to law, 
 and in enacting that none fuch in future fhould 
 be pra&ifeil. Had this ill-fated monarch re- 
 folved to abide by the rule which he had himfelf 
 confented to eftablim ; had he been contented to 
 be guided by the fpirit of the acT:, inftead of 
 feeking for the means of evafion from the narrow 
 limits of literal expreffion; would he but have 
 recollected that he was a limited, not an abfolute 
 fovereign; that the kings of England hold their 
 crown, in fome decree, at the wil 1 , and entirely 
 
 for
 
 ( 79 ) 
 
 for the advantage of the people, not by a divine 
 right, originally and immediately proceeding from 
 God, and not with a view to furnifh them with 
 a power to be exerted for their fole pleafure, or 
 for their p?rticular ambition; had he bat confi- 
 dered that ihis limitation was created by his total 
 dependance on Parliamenty^ry///^^, and that he 
 could never exped to contend for any prerogative 
 of obtaining money, except through that chan- 
 nel, without at the fame time preparing himfelf 
 for the moft ferious and dangerous confequences ; 
 it is probable, that if fuch had been the tendency 
 of his fentiments, the more melancholy events of 
 his reign would not have occurred. When he 
 had confented, " that thereafter no man fhould 
 " be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, 
 " or benevolence, without common confent, by 
 " adl of parliament," the triumph of the legif- 
 lature over every attempt at the exercife of fuch 
 prerogatives was intended to have been decifive. 
 And in faft, fo it ought to have been held to be : 
 for the fcope of the petition of right, was to 
 declare every means of extra-parliamentary fupply 
 which had been adopted in preceding times, to be 
 illegal; and among thofe means muft be ranked 
 the fubfcriptions, for flandering which Mr. 
 Oliver St. John was fo feverely punimed in the 
 reign of James the Firft ; fubfcriptions which, 
 according to Sir Francis Bacon when pleading in 
 
 behalf
 
 behalf of the crown for that profecution*, were of 
 the leaft exceptionable nature, being purely vo- 
 luntary, exmero motu dinantis, no not fo much as 
 recommended in the firft inftance by the crown. 
 Bat the prejudices in which Charles had been 
 educated, and the opinions which he had im- 
 bibed as to the fanctity of regal authority, could 
 never admit fuch a liberality of conftrudtion : on 
 the contrary, they urged him forward, until at lafl 
 he not only aimed at the extenfion of prerogative, 
 by evading the fpirit, but adlually attempted to 
 eftablifh an abjolute authority, by violating the 
 letter of the law. cc Fortunately however, when 
 " the country emerged from the anarchy and 
 " mifery of the fcene which followed, the ex- 
 ' travagance of joy did not extinguifh a due 
 *' remembrance of the confKtution. One of the 
 " firft: ads after the Reftoration, was a grant of 
 " tonnage and poundage, with words which 
 " renewed a part of the former declarations 
 " againft taking by prerogative; for it anxioufly 
 " recited, that no rates can be impofed on mer- 
 " chandize imported or exported by fubjefts or 
 " aliens, but by common con fent in Parliament^" 
 The commons however, not fatisfied with the 
 
 * Vide Sir F. Bacon's Speech, State Trials, Vol. II. 
 i Vide Mr. Hargrave's Iiuroduftory Note to the cafe of Impofi- 
 tions, or Bates 's Cafe, in Vol. XI, of the State Trials, 
 
 extent
 
 extent of this provision, which might be 
 capable of a conflruction fimilar to that which 
 had been put upon former flatutes of the 
 fame defcription, and which might be here- 
 after pleaded as condemning only all compulfory 
 efforts of prerogative taxation, feems to have 
 been refolved to exclude all future poffibility 
 ofraifing money, without their previous confent, 
 by an aft for that particular purpofe; which, by 
 general words, might include every invention by 
 which fuch an object as the acquifition of money, 
 uncontrouled by Parliament, might be effected. 
 Accordingly, in the next year, being the 130. a.* 
 a ftatute is paffed, containing words declaratory 
 that fubfcriptions or " benevolences to the crown, 
 " though voluntary, cannot regularly be made 
 " out of Parliament." " This ftatute authorizes 
 " the king to iffue commiffions under the great 
 " feal, for receiving voluntary fubjcriptions for 
 " the fupply of his occafions 5 but limits corn - 
 " moners to aoo /. and peers to 4007. a piece 
 " and allb the time for fubfcribing ; and con- 
 f< eludes with declaring, that no commijfions or 
 " aids of this nature can be iffued out or levied but 
 " by authority of Parliament l -j-." I deem myfelf 
 
 * App. (S.) 
 
 f Vide Mr. Hargrave's Introdu^ory Note to the Trial of Mr. 
 Oliver St. John. 
 
 M fingu-,
 
 ( 82 ) 
 
 fingularly happy in having been able to convey 
 my own impreffions on this flatute in the words 
 of Mr. Hargrave j becaufe the fanction of fuch 
 an authority will remove from my conduct the 
 imputation of arrogance in contending with the 
 preftnt attorney and folicitor general, and be- 
 caufe his eminent character with the public, as 
 an upright and deeply-learned lawyer, will add 
 the weight of his reputation to thofe opinions, 
 which, as coming from one not only undiftin- 
 guifhed but unknown, would perhaps be thrown 
 afide unread, at all events unregarded. With 
 refpect to this conftruclion of this ftatute, I {hall 
 have occafion to add but a very few words. The 
 object, as has been already obferved, was to enable 
 the crown to iffue commiffions under the great 
 feal, for the purpofe of receiving certain aids 
 ariling from voluntary fubfcriptions, and at tfye 
 fame time to deftroy the poffibility of levying 
 fuch aids in future. In order to oppofe the ap- 
 plication of this flatute to the prefent queftion, 
 it has been afTerted, that its object was only to 
 prevent the receipt of fuch aids, through the 
 means of a commiffion under the great feal. 
 Unfortunately for this afTertion, in the prohibition 
 of the future practice of thefe means of fupply, 
 we find that fame disjunctive or intervening, 
 which was adverted to by Lord Coke in ex- 
 plaining the 34th of Edward I. the words of 
 
 the
 
 the i ^th Charles II. being, " that no com- 
 " miffions or aides of this nature, can be if- 
 " fued out or levied, but by authority of Par- 
 " liament;" that is, that no fuch commiffions 
 can be iflued, or aides levied but by fuch au- 
 thority : that is, according to Lord Coke's reafon- 
 ing upon, and, indeed, according to the natural 
 inference to be drawn from this disjunctive, even 
 though no fuch commiffions mould be iffued, 
 flill abfolutely no fuch aids, viz. voluntary fub- 
 fcriptions, can be levied. By means of this dis- 
 junctive, the commiffions and the aids are made 
 t<;o diftinct fubjects, entirely independent of each 
 other; and the provilions of the ftatute for pre- 
 venting either from being drawn into examples 
 for the future, muft be applied to each, without 
 any reference of one to the other. Had the con- 
 junctive and been ufed inftead of the disjunctive 
 or, then the conftruction might poffibly have 
 been applied in favour of the prefent meafures, 
 at lead the application might have been fup- 
 ported by fome mew of reafon ; but in con- 
 fequence of this disjunctive expreffion, the ob- 
 ject of which is to diflinguim and feparate, 
 fuch an explanation of the meaning of the act 
 is rendered impoffible. Upon this ftatute the 
 learned annotator in the (late trials obferves, 
 that it was " the aim of the act to condemn. 
 ?' benevolences by the folicitation of commif- 
 M 3 *
 
 ( 84 ) 
 
 <{ lions from the crown, and to fupply the 
 " defeat of the ftarute of Richard III. and the 
 " petition of right, both of which point at com- 
 " puifive benevolences. The inducement to 
 " fuch a declaration of the law probably was 
 " an idea, that a formal felicitation from the 
 " crown, muft neceflarily operate on the minds 
 " of thofe to whom it was addrefled, with an 
 tf influence almofl equal to compulfion. Thus 
 " at length it feems to be fettled by the legifla- 
 " ture, not only that compulfive benevolences 
 " are unlawful, but that all commiffions from the 
 " crown to folicit and receive voluntary gifts, are 
 " alfo unconftitutional*." 
 
 To conclude. I am fully fenfible that in the 
 doctrine which I have attempted to eftablim, I 
 have given a more extenfive conftruction to the 
 ilatute i jth of Charles II. than has been given 
 to it by Mr. Hargrave. I do not pretend to fay 
 that I am right; but even if I am, he is not 
 wrong. The only difference between us I be- 
 lieve to be, that I have been more bold, he more 
 cautious. Upon fuch fubje&s I may be per- 
 mitted to hazard opinions, becaufe I can have 
 only reafon and truth for my fupporters ; in him 
 caution is an abfolute duty, as he has alfo a re- 
 p utation which might miflead the world ; and an 
 
 * The introduftory Note to St. John's Cafe. 
 
 afiertton
 
 afTertion from him might pafs without examina- 
 tion, and be conlidered as law without enquiry. 
 At all events, however, upon the ftrength of thofe 
 arguments which I have myfelf advanced, to- 
 gether with the fanction of his authority, I may 
 be permitted to coniider the point on which I 
 ftarted as decided, namely, that the meafures 
 which have been purfued by the prefent admi- 
 niflration for the purpofe of railing fubfcriptions 
 fet on foot in confequence of an original motion 
 from the crown, are unconstitutional, illegal, and 
 unsupported by any precedent whatever ; that 
 confequently they are " grievances found out 
 " and proved*;" which, upon the authority of 
 Sir E. Coke, according to what he calls an ex- 
 cellent precedent, " mould be put down and 
 (t overthrown by authority of Parliament." 
 
 * 2 Inft. (530.) 
 
 I am, 
 
 Gentlemen, &c. 
 
 Lincoln's Inn. 
 
 APPENDIX.
 
 APPENDIX. 
 (A.) 
 
 CIRCULAR. 
 
 WHITEHALL, Maj ~ % 1782, 
 SIR* 
 
 AJLIS Majefty has commanded me to exprefs 
 his firm reliance upon the fpirit and loyalty 
 of his People, and his Royal confidence, that 
 during this feafon of difficulty, their utmoft en- 
 deavours will not be wanting to give unqueftion- 
 able proofs of their attachment and emulation 
 for his fervice. And forefeeing, that by wife, 
 flrenuous, and timely preparations, he may not 
 only difappoint or defeat any hoftile attempts, 
 but, by appearing ftrong and united at home, 
 he may be enabled to make the more power- 
 ful efforts for maintaining his honour and the 
 public interefts abroad, and thereby lay the 
 fureft foundation for a fafe, an honourable, and 
 a lafting peace ; apd as the populoufnefs of the 
 principal towns anc} cities of Great Britain natu- 
 rally offer the greateft facility ', as well for form- 
 i{jg into carps, as for learning the military ex- 
 
 ercife,
 
 ercife, 'without lofs of time, interruption of labour t 
 or any confiderable fatigue, his Majefty has com- 
 manded me to tranfmit to you the inclofed pro* 
 pofition, which has been fubmitted to his Ma- 
 jefty, as at leaft a temporary plan for augment- 
 ing the cfomeftic force of the nation ; which 
 being adopted or improved, according to the cir- 
 cumftance and fituation of the town of which 
 you are the chief magiftrate, may tend to the 
 immediate formation of a great and refpectable 
 addition to the national force at home, on the 
 moft natural and conftitutional principles. 
 
 For this purpofe I have his Majefty 's com- 
 mands, to fignify to you his defire and recom- 
 mendation, that you fhould take the fame into 
 immediate confederation ; and, after having confi- 
 dered, report to me whatever obfervations may 
 occur to you, for carrying into execution a plan, 
 the purpofe of which is, to give fecurity to your 
 own perfons and property, and to the general 
 defence of the kingdom. 
 
 I am, &c. 
 
 SHELBURNE. 
 
 To the Mayor or Chkf Magiftrate, &c. 
 
 CIRCULAR.
 
 ( 88 ) 
 (B.) 
 
 CIRCULAR. 
 
 WHITEHALL, J%. 7, ,782. 
 MY LORD, OR SIR, 
 
 I HAVE the honour, in obedience to theKing's 
 commands, to tranfmit to you a copy of a cir- 
 cular letter, which is to be addrefied to the cities 
 and principal towns in Great Britain. I am to 
 requeft, that your Lordfliip will take the con- 
 tents into your ferious confidcration, and report 
 to me your obferiiations thereupon, and particu- 
 larly whatever may occur to you of importance 
 with refpecl: to the cities or towns within your 
 county, that I may immediately Jubmit them to his 
 Majejly. 
 
 I am, 6cc. 
 
 SHELBURNE. 
 
 .'aiana arfj b) kcu- v'ji3oi 
 
 WHITEHALL, May 7, 1782, 
 MY LORD, 
 
 I HAVE the King's command toenclofeto your 
 Lordfhip a copy of a circular letter, which I 
 have written by his Majefty's command to the 
 principal cities and towns of Great Britain, in- 
 closing a propofal which has been fubmitted to 
 
 bit
 
 his Majefty, as at leaft a temporary plan for aug- 
 menting the domeftic force of the nation. And 
 as his Majefty is difpofed to indulge hopes of a 
 general exertion of all his faithful fubjedts, he is 
 led to encourage with particular confidence an 
 expedtation, that his faithful citizens of London 
 will fet a prevailing example of activity and zeal 
 on the prefent occafion ; keeping up that character 
 by which they have been fo eminently diftin- 
 guimed at many former periods, when their at- 
 tention to private convenience has given way to 
 their regard for public expediency, and they have 
 from their own body drawn out the moft formi- 
 dable forces, to guard their fovereign and protect 
 their country. 
 
 As the means and refources of the capital are 
 greater than the other cities and towns of the 
 kingdom to make eflential efforts, his Majefty 
 entertains no doubt of the readinefs of his faith^ 
 ful citizens, to {hew a degree of exertion propor- 
 tioned to the fuperiority of their interefls in the 
 fafety and welfare of the ftate. 
 
 I muft entreat your Lordfhip to make the 
 proper communication of this propofal; and I 
 mail embrace with great fatisfadtion the earlieft 
 opportunity you will afford me, of conferring 
 with you with reipecT: to the more conftant and 
 regular duty of thofe bodies of men whom you 
 N now
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 now only occafionally exercife, as well as to any 
 additional exertion which the eity of London may 
 think proper to adopt. 
 
 I am, 6cc. 
 
 SHELBURNE* 
 &ight Hon. the Lord Mayor, 
 of the Clfy of Ldiidori. 
 
 (D.) 
 
 COPY OF A CIRCULAR LETTER TO THE 
 LIEUTENANTS OF COUNTIES. 
 
 WHITEHALL, March 14, 1794. 
 MY LORD, OR SIR, 
 
 FINDING, from an official inaccuracy, that 
 copies of the plans which have been prepared 
 with a view to the augmenting the internal force 
 of this kingdom, have not been communicated to 
 you, I have the honour of incloling copies thereof 
 
 herewith, 
 
 I am, &c. 
 
 HENRY DUNJ>AS. 
 
 HEADS
 
 (E.) 
 HEADS OF A PLAN 
 
 RAISING CORPS IN THE SEVERAL PRINCIPAL TOWNS 
 IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1782. 
 
 r. The principal towns in Great Britain to fur- 
 nifh. one or more battalions each, or a certain 
 number of companies each, in proportion to 
 their fize and number of inhabitants. 
 
 2,. The officers to be appointed from among the 
 gentlemen of the neighbourhood, or the in- 
 habitants of the faid towns, either by com- 
 miflion from his Majefty, or from the lord 
 lieutenant of the county, upon the recom- 
 mendation of the chief magiftrate of the town 
 in which the corps are raifed. 
 
 3. They are to be poflefled of fome certain 
 eftate in land or money, in proportion to their 
 rank. 
 
 4. An adjutant or town mayor to be appointed 
 by his Majefty. 
 
 3. A proper number of ferjeants and corporals 
 from the army, to be appointed for the corps 
 in each town in proportion to their numbers. 
 
 . The faid ferjeants and corporals, as well 
 as the adjutant or town mayor, to be in the 
 Government's pay. 
 
 1$Z 7, The
 
 ( 9* ) 
 
 7 The men to exercife frequently, either in bat- 
 talion, or by companies, on Sundays and on all 
 holidays, and alfo after their work is over in 
 the evening. 
 
 8. Arms, accoutrements and ammunition, to be 
 furniftied at the expence of Government, if 
 required. 
 
 p. Proper magazines or ftorehoufes to be chofen 
 or erected in each town, for keeping the faid 
 arms. 
 
 10. The arms and accoutrements to be delivered 
 out at times of exercife only, and to be re- 
 turned into the (lores as foon as the exercife is 
 finimed. 
 
 11. The adjutant or town mayor to be always 
 prefent at exercife, and to fee that the men 
 afterwards march regularly and lodge their 
 arms in the florehoufes. 
 
 12. Proper penalties to be inflicted on fuch as 
 abfent themfelves from exercife, as alfo for dif- 
 obedience of orders, infolence to their officers, 
 or other diforderly behaviour. 
 
 13. The above corps not to be obliged on any 
 account, or by any authority whatever, to move 
 from their refpective towns, except in time of 
 actual invafion or rebellion. 
 
 14. His Majefty (hall then have power to order 
 the faid corps to march to any part of Great 
 Britain, as his fervice may require. 
 
 15. They
 
 ( 93 ) 
 
 15. They are on fuch occafions to act either fe- 
 parately, or in conjunction with his Majefty's 
 regular forces, and be under the command of 
 fuch general officers as his Majefty (hall think 
 proper to appoint. 
 
 1 6. Both officers and men to receive full pay as 
 his Majefty's other regiments of foot from the 
 day of their march, and as long as they mall 
 continue on fervice out of their towns'*. 
 
 17. They are to be fubjecl: to military difcipline, 
 in the fame manner as his Majefty's regular 
 forces, during the faid time of their being fo 
 called out, and receiving government's pay. 
 
 1 8. All officers who mould be difabled in actual 
 fervice, to be entitled to half pay ; and all non- 
 commiffioned officers and private men difabled, 
 to receive the benefit of Chelfea hofpital. 
 
 19. The widows of officers killed in the fervice 
 to have a penfion for life. 
 
 * Time of fervice to be named. 
 
 HEADS
 
 ( 94 ) 
 
 (FO f|:||^p^ 
 
 HEADS OF THE PLAN OF 1794, 
 
 COPY. 
 
 WHITEHALL, March 14, 1794^ 
 
 IN order to provide more completely for the 
 fecurity of the country againft any attempts 
 which may be made on the part of the enemy, 
 it may be expedient to adopt fome or all of the 
 following meafures. 
 
 1. To augment the militia by volunteer com- 
 panies, as was pradUfed in the laft war; or by 
 an additional number of volunteers, to be added 
 as privates to each company. 
 
 2. To form volunteer companies in particular 
 towns, efpecially in thofe fituated on or near 
 the fea coaft, for the purpofe of the local de- 
 fence of the particular places where they may 
 be raifed, according to the accompanying plan, 
 or fuch other as may, on application for that 
 pupofe, be approved of as beft adapted to the 
 circumilances of any particular town. 
 
 3. To raife volunteer troops of fencible cavalry, 
 confifting of not lefs than fifty, nor more than 
 eighty per tfoop, who will be to ferve only 
 during the war, and within the kingdom.
 
 ( 95 ) 
 
 The officers will have temporary rank only, 
 and will not be entitled to half pay. The 
 arms, accoutrements, and cloathing, will be 
 furnifhed by Government, but the levy money 
 for the men to be furnimed by the perfons 
 who undertake to raife fuch troops ; and the 
 horfes to be found by them, but to be paid for, 
 at a reafonable price by Government. 
 A perfon raifing two troops to have the tempo- 
 rary rank of major -, four troops that of lieute- 
 nant colonel j and fix troops that of colonel. 
 4. To form other bodies of cavalry within 
 particular counties or districts, to confift of 
 the gentlemen and yeomanry, or fuch per- 
 fons as they (hall bring forward, according 
 to the plans to be approved of by the king, 
 or by the lords lieutenants under the au- 
 thority from his Majefty ; and the officers 
 to receive temporary commiffions from his 
 Majefty; and the mufter rolls alfo to be 
 approved by his Majefty, .or by the lords 
 lieutenants, at periods to be fixed. No levy 
 money to be given ; and the horfes to be 
 furniihed by the gentry or yeomanry who 
 compofe the corps ; but the arms and 
 accoutrements to be fupplied at the expence 
 of -the public. Such corps to be exercifed 
 only at fuch times as (hall be fixed by war- 
 rant from his Majefty, or by the approbation 
 
 of
 
 ( 96 ) 
 
 of the lords lieutenants ; to be liable to be em- 
 bodied or called out of their counties by fpe- 
 cial directions from his Majefty, in cafe of 
 actual appearance of invafion ; and to be liable 
 to be embodied or called out of their counties 
 by fpecial directions from his Majefty, in cafe 
 of actual appearance of invafion ; and to be 
 liable to be called upon, by order from his 
 Majefty, or by the lord lieutenant or merifFof 
 the county, to act within the county, or in 
 the adjacent counties, for the fuppreffion of 
 riots and tumults. In either cafe, while 
 actually in fervice, they (hall receive pay as 
 cavalry, and be liable to the provifions of the 
 mutiny bill. 
 
 5. To enroll and appoint places of rendezvous 
 for a fufficient number of perfons in different 
 parimes and diftricls, particularly in places 
 near the fea coaft, to ferves as pioneers, or to 
 affift the regular force in any manner that may 
 be neceffary, on the flborteft notice, in cafes 
 of emergency. 
 
 GENERAL
 
 ( 97 ) 
 
 (G.) 
 
 GENERAL SUBSCRIPTION. 
 
 COPY. 
 
 WHITEHALL, March 14, 1794* 
 
 IT is naturally to be fuppofed, that gentlemen 
 of weight or property, in different parts of the 
 kingdom, will feparately ftand forward, in order 
 to carry into execution the feveral parts of the 
 plan for the fecurity of the country. But it 
 feems alfo defirable a general fubfcription mould 
 be opened, to be applied under the direction of 
 a committee, for the purpofe of affifting in 
 carrying into execution all or any of the meafures 
 therein fuggefled, as circumftances (hall appear 
 to require. 
 
 25 Ed* L Statute i* Chapters 5, 6, 7. 
 
 CHAP. 5. 
 
 t Ta/ks, and Prifes, granted to the Klng^ 
 jhall not be taken for a Cuftom* 
 
 " AND for fo much as divers people of our 
 
 realm are in fear, that the aids and talks which 
 
 they have given to us before-time towards 
 
 O " our
 
 ( 98 ) 
 
 " our wars and other bufinefs, of their owrt 
 " grant and good- will, (howfoever they were 
 " made) might turn to a bondage to them 
 " and their heirs, becaufe they might be at 
 " another time found in the rolls, and likewife 
 " for the prifes taken throughout the realm by 
 " our minifters in our name ; We have granted 
 " for us and our heirs, that we fliall not draw 
 " fuch aids, talks, nor prifes into a cuftom, for 
 ' any thing that hath been done heretofore, be 
 ' it by roll or any other precedent that may be 
 ** founden." 
 
 CHAP. 6. 
 
 The King or his Heirs will take no Aids, or Prtfes, 
 but by the Confent of the Realm, and for the 
 common Profit thereof. 
 
 " Moreover we have granted for us and out 
 " heirs, as well to archbimops, biftiops, abbots, 
 c priors, and other folk of holy church, as alfo 
 " to earls, barons, and to all the communalty of 
 Cf the land, that for no bufinefs from henceforth 
 '* we fliall take fuch manner of aids, taiks, nor 
 " prifes, but by the common aflent of the realm, 
 " and for the common profit thereof, faving the 
 " ancient aids and prifes due^andaccuftomed." 
 
 CHAP.
 
 ^ ( 99 ) 
 
 CHAP. 7. 
 
 A Rekafe of Toll taken by the King for Wool*, and 
 a Grant that he will not take the like without 
 common conjent and good will. 
 
 " And for fo much as the more part of the 
 
 * ( communalty of the realm find themfelves fore 
 " grieved with the maletolt of wools, that is to 
 " wit, a toll of forty millings for every fack 
 " of wooll, and have made petition to us to 
 " releafe the fame;" * We at their requefts have 
 
 * clearly releafed it, and have granted, that we 
 ' mall not take that or any other without their 
 ' common affent and good will, faving to 
 ' us and our heirs the cuftom ofwoolls, fkins 
 ' and leather, granted before the communalty 
 
 * aforefaid.' 
 
 Statutum de tallagio non concedendo. 
 Fadlum anno 34 Ed. i. flat. 4. 
 
 CHAPTER i. 
 
 The King or bis Heirs flail have no Tattage or Aid 
 without conjent of Parliament. 
 
 NO tallage or aid mall be taken or levied (pona-t 
 levetur) by us or our heirs in our realm* 
 the good will and aflent of archbiihops,, 
 Q &
 
 bifhors, ecrls, barons, knights, burgefles, and 
 other freemen of the land. 
 
 CHAPTER 3. 
 
 Nothing mall be taken of facks of wool by 
 colour of maletolt. 
 
 Nothing from henceforth fhall be taken of 
 facks of wool by colour or occafion of maletolt. 
 
 14 Ed. III. flat. i. c. 21. 
 
 ITEM, though the commons of the realm did 
 pray the King, that he would, by affent of 
 the Parliament, grant and eftablifh, that never 
 fhould be taken more cuftome of a facke of wolle 
 then halfe a mark, nor of leade nor tinne, lether 
 nor wolfelles but the old cuftome -, neverthelefs 
 the King prayeth the prelates carles barons and 
 all the commonaltie for the great bufinefs which 
 he hath now in hand, as they well know, that 
 they would grant to him fome aide upon the 
 wolles lether wolfelles and other merchandizes, to, 
 endure for a fmall feafon: whereupon deliberation 
 had, the faid prelates carles barons and commons 
 of his real me, hath granted to him forty (hil- 
 lings to be takfm of every facke of wooll, and, 
 forty (hillings of every three hundred wolfelles, 
 
 arid.
 
 and forty millings of every laft of lether and 
 other merchandifes that pafs beyond the fea after 
 the rate. And to begin at the feaft of Eafter in 
 the fourteenth yeere of his raigne, and to endure 
 till the feaft of Pentecoft then next following ; 
 and from that feaft till the feaft of Pentecoft then. 
 next following into a yerc. And for this grant 
 the King, by the affent of the prelates carles 
 barons and all other aflemtifed in Parliament, 
 hath granted, that from the feaft of Pentecoft 
 which cometh into one yeere, he nor his heires 
 {hall not demand, aflefle, nor take, norfuffer to be 
 taken, more cuftome of a facke of woolle of any 
 Englifhman, but halfe a marke onely. And 
 upon the wolfelles and lether the olde cuftome. 
 And the facke ought to conteine twenty-fix ftones, 
 and every ftone fourteen Pounds. 
 
 ROT. PARL, 17 ED. HI. No. 28. 
 
 ITEM, q la maletoute des leynes fe teigne a 
 demy mark come en temps de fes progenitours ad 
 efte ufez, &/> eftatut puis en vre temps grantee. Et 
 coment q les marchandz eient grantez par eux, 
 fanz aflent des communes, un fubiide XL S. de 
 chefcun fac de leyne outre la droiturele maletoute 
 tfe demy mark, voillez s'il vous pleft aver regard, 
 3 <l t^
 
 q tut eft en charge & a mefchief de voz conw 
 munes. Par qoi eel mefchief, fi vous pleft, ne 
 voillez foeffrir, mes foit amendez a ceil Parle- 
 ment : qar ce eft encontre refon, q la comune 
 de lour biens foient p marchandz chargez. 
 
 Refponjio L'entente de nre feign' le Roi n'eft 
 pas de charger les comunes p le fubfide q les 
 marchandz lui ont grarftfcz, -n'en poet eftre en- 
 tenduz en charge des communes, noement de- 
 licome les communes ont mys un certein pris fur 
 les leynes p my les counteez; lequel pris le Roi 
 voet q eftoife, & q dedeinz eel pris nulles leynes 
 foient achatees, fur forfaiture de meifmes les 
 leynes en les mayns des marchandz qi les iflint 
 achatent^ 
 
 ROT. PARL. 21, ED. III. No. 16; 
 
 ITEM, prie la commune, q lui pleife fovenir^ 
 coment au Parlement tenuz cy Tan de fon Regne 
 XVII, & al drein Parlement cy tenuz devant ore, 
 acordee & grante fut p nre dit feignr le Roi & fort 
 confeil, qe pur les grantz charges q la comune- 
 foeffre & porteannuelment, come desquinzifmes, 
 neofifmes, & leines, mes ne duiflent avoir currea 
 ne iffeu commiffion hors de la chauncellerie, come. 
 4e hohelcries, archeries, prifes dc.s vitailles, na
 
 auxmt commiffions d'eftendre les terres des cer- 
 teines gentz outre la fome de certeine value, ne 
 de autres charges lever du poeple fi eles ne feuflent 
 grantez en Parlement ; lefqueux ordinances font 
 de rien tenuz: Parquei le poeple eft tout enpoveri 
 5c anenti. De q nei ils prient a nre dit feignr le 
 Roi, q li plefe pitee prendre de fon people, & les 
 ordinances & graunts du Parliament fetz au people 
 affermer & tenir. Et q fi tieles commiffions 
 iflent fanz afTent du Parlement, q gentz de com- 
 mune q fe fentent grevez puiflent avoir brefs de 
 furfeer la dite ordeinance, & q le poeple ne (bit 
 tenuz a celes obeier. 
 
 RefpJnJio. 
 
 Si nule tiele impofition fu faite, ele fu faite p 
 gjande neceffite, 5c ce de 1'aiTent des prelatz, 
 contes, barons, & autres grantz, & afcuns des 
 comunes adonqs prefentz. Nientmeyns, nre 
 feignr le Roi ne voet q tiele impofition noun, 
 duement foit 'tretee en confequence - y einz voet q 
 les ordeinances dont cefte petition fait mention 
 foient bonement gardez. Et quant a les prifes 
 des vitailles, fauvee totefoiz la prerogative nre 
 feignr le Roi, fa volente eft, q gre foit fait a ceux 
 defqueux eles font 6c ferront iffint prifes. 
 
 ROT.
 
 (N.) 
 
 ROT. PAUL. 25 ED. III. No. 22. 
 
 ITEM fuppliont la dite commune, q come les 
 marchauntz eont grantez a nre feign* le Roi 
 XL. S. de fac de Leyne, laquele chofe chiet en 
 charge du poeple 6c nemy des marchauntz j q'il 
 plefe a nre dit feign* le Roi, pur relevement de 
 fon people, q les ditz XL S. ne feont mes de- 
 rnaundez ne leeves deforenavant. Et q com- 
 miffions ne foent faites fur tieles grantes fin- 
 gulers, s'il ne foit en plein Parlement. Et li 
 nul tiel grant foit fait hors du Parlement, foit 
 tenuz pur nul : Qar p caufe des ditz XL S. les 
 marchauntz achatent les Leynes p taunt le 
 meyns, & les vendont a chier. Et q touz 
 maners des marchauntz, ii bien povers come 
 riches, & fi bien des aliens dome des lige- 
 aunce nre feignr le Roi, forpris fes enemys, 
 eont fraunche poer de paffer ove lour march- 
 andifes, faunz eftre reflrent des marchauntz 
 q fe dient eftre marchauntz le Roi, ou p 
 altre quecumq finguler, paiaunt au Roi ce q 
 detent. Et en cas q il plefe a nre dit feignt 
 le Roi, en cefte fa grante neceffite, la fubfid' 
 de XL S. avant dit un di an ou un an avoir, 
 
 lui
 
 lui plefe a les Piers 6c Commune de la terre 
 fa volunte monftrer, en comfort de eaux. 
 
 Refponjio. For ce q le fubfid' fut grante a 
 nre feign' le Roi pur grante neceffite, laquele 
 uncore dure, & fe monftre plus grant de jour 
 en autre ; quele chofe monftre a les Grantz 
 & Communes a ceo Parlement aflemblez de p 
 nre feignr le Roi, les ditz feignrs & com- 
 munes de commune aflent ont grante a mefme 
 n're feign' le dit fubfid', a prendre de la fefte 
 de Seint Michel prefchein a venir tan q a la fin 
 de deux aunz prefcheins fuantz. 
 
 ROT. PARL. 36 ED. III. No. 26. 
 
 Item fupplie fa dit commune, q come en ceft' 
 prefent Parlement il les biede charger d'un grant 
 fubfide pur un temps ; quel ils font preftz & vo- 
 lentrifs granter, en confort de lui, eantz regarde 
 a la grande neceffite q lour eft monftre de pt. 
 fon confeil -, iffint & en manere tiele, q'apres le 
 dit terme rien ne foit pris ne demande de euz, 
 forfpris foulement 1'aunciene cuftume de demy 
 Marc : ne q ceft grant ore fait, ou q'ad efte fait 
 avant ces heures, ne foit treit en enfample ne 
 charge du dit commune en temps a venir. Et 
 q les raarchantz denifzeins puiifent pafler ove 
 P lour
 
 lour leines fi avant come les foreins faunz eftre 
 reftreint. Et q nul fubfide, n'autre charge, foit 
 rois ne grante fur les leines p les marchantz, ne 
 p nul autre deforeen avant faunz affent du Parle- 
 ment. 
 
 Refponfo* II plefl au Roi. 
 
 ROT. PARL. 2 RICH. II. No. 30, 
 
 Item remonftrent les coes, coment ore tarde, 
 puis la darrein confeil tenuz a Weftm', furent 
 mandez diverfes lettres de credence deflbuz le 
 prive feal, par certains chivalers & efquiers de la 
 courtc le roi,- es diverfes parties du Roialme, pur 
 faire chevance d'argent a 1'oeps le roi ; queHes 
 lettres avoient les eowes blankes, & les ditz cre- 
 denfours de lour aucloritee demefne efcriverent 
 les nouns des plufburs gentz fur les cowes dcs 
 lettres fuis dites & baillerent a eux les lettres, 
 affermantz q le roi les maunda a eux, & deman- 
 derent de eux grandes fommes tielles come lour 
 pieuft, & ceux qui fe excuferent de les paier 
 tielles fommes les manacerent fortement de p le 
 roi, 6c les comanderent de p le roi d'eftre devant 
 le confeil le roi, & aflignerent a eux jours a leur 
 volentee; a grande damage & affraye des ditz 
 povrea coes, ^ enfdandre du roi, & encontre la 
 
 loye
 
 kye de la terre. Par quoy fupplient les dites 
 coes, q'ordene foit, q coment q'il plefe au roi 
 d'envoier lettres pur apprompter argent en temps 
 a venir, 6c celui a qi la lettre vient excufe refon- 
 ablement du dit apprompt, q'il foit a ce receu, 
 fanz lui mettre au travail r ou lui grever par 
 ibmmons ou par autre manere. 
 . II pleft au Roi. 
 
 (Q-) 
 
 i RICH. III. CHAP. II. 
 
 The Subjects of this Realm (hall not be charged 
 by any Benevolence, &c. 
 
 " The King remembering how the Commons 
 " of this his realm, by new and unlawful in- 
 " ventions and inordinate covetife, againft the 
 " law of this realm, have been put to great 
 " thraldom and importable charges and ex- 
 " adions, and in efpecial by a new impofition 
 " called benevolence, whereby divers years the 
 " fubjecls and Commons of this land, againft 
 ' their wills and freedoms, have paid great 
 ' fums of money to their almoft utter de- 
 ftru<5lion : for divers and many worfhipful 
 ' men of this realm, by occafion thereof were 
 compelled by necedity to break up their 
 Pa " houfe.
 
 " houfeholds, and to live in great penury and 
 ' wretchednefs, their debts unpaid, and their 
 " children unpreferred -, and fuch memorials as 
 *' they had ordained to be done for the wealth 
 " of their fouls, were anentized and annulled, 
 " to the great difpleafure of God, and the de- 
 <( ftru&ion of this realm :" Therefore the King 
 will it to be ordained, by the advice and aflent of 
 of the Lords fpiritual and temporal and the 
 Commons in this prefent Parliament afiembled, 
 and by the authority of the fame, that his fub- 
 jeds, and the commonalty of this his realm, 
 from henceforth in no wife be charged by none 
 fuch charge, exaction, or impofition, called a 
 benevolence, nor by fuch like charge; and that 
 fuch exactions, called benevolences, before this 
 time taken, be taken for no example to make 
 fuch or any like charge of any of his faid fub- 
 jects of this realm hereafter, but it fhall be 
 damned and annulled for ever. 
 
 (R.) 
 ii HEN. VII. CAP. 10. 
 
 .-. - ' 
 
 Praicn the Commons in this prefent Parlia- 
 ment aflembled, that where divers and many of 
 your fubjeds feverally granted to your highnes 
 divers fummes of money, of their free wills and 
 
 bene-
 
 ficnevolencc, for the defence of this your realme, 
 toward the charge and great expences that your 
 JhighnefTe fufteined and bare for the faid defence, 
 as well in your faid voiage royall in the parts of 
 France beyond the fea, as on this fide, in for and 
 about the fame, which voiage your faid highnefie 
 tooke upon you in your mod royall perfon, to the 
 great jeorperdy and labour of the fame, as well 
 for the faid defence of this your faid real me, as 
 -for the furety, profite, weale and commoditie of 
 us all, your true liege men and fubjects inhabited 
 .in the fame, of which fummes of money divers 
 your faid fubjects full lovingly have made to you 
 true paiment according to their graunts, and other 
 many feveral fummes of money by divers of your 
 fubjects to you in that party granted as yet re- 
 maine not content ne paied, part whereof refteth 
 in the hands of the faid graunters, and part in 
 the hands of the faid commiffioners, collectors, 
 and receivers in that party afiigned for the levy, 
 .rering and keeping of the fame, which is not 
 onely to the damage, lofTe and hurt of your faid 
 highnes, bat alfo to the murmur, grudge, and 
 mifcontenting of fuch your faid fubjedts as have 
 made their faid paiments in that behalfe; where- 
 fore may it pleafe your faid highnes, by the ad- 
 vife and aflent of your Lords fpirituall and tem- 
 porall, and the Commons in this prefent Parlia- 
 ment aflembled, and by authoritie of the fame, 
 
 to -
 
 to ordaine, enaft and eftablifh, that proclamation 
 be made in every mire, towne, and hundred, 
 within this your realme, that every perfon and 
 perfons, which have not contented and paied the 
 fummes of money by them granted to your high- 
 nes for the caufes remembred, that fuch com- 
 miffioners, collectors, receivers, and other per* 
 fons deputed to receive the fame, doe make 
 paiment thereof within three moneths next after 
 the faid proclamation made, to the faid commif- 
 fioners, collectors, receivers, or other perfons that 
 hereafter (hall be thereunto deputed or affigned 
 by your highnefTe, and by your letters patents 
 under your great feale in likewife to be pro- 
 claimed. And that the faid commiflioners have 
 authentic and power to make proceffe to take 
 every fuch perfon or perfons as fo fhall make 
 default of pajment, by his body, and the fame to 
 commit to the common gaile, there to remaine 
 and abide without baile or mainprife, to the time 
 he hath paid his faid duties, or elfe find fufficient 
 furety for the paiement of the fame to the faid 
 commiflioners agreeable. And if any fuch perfon, 
 that hath not made paiment of this faid duty 
 graunted be deceafed, that then the goods and 
 cattels of him deceafed, being in the bands of bis 
 executors or adminiftrators not adminijired*. be- 
 charged and chargeable to the faid paiment* And 
 that the faid comzniffioners have like authoritie 
 
 aud
 
 ( "I ) 
 
 and power, to doe ordaine, and award procefle 
 for the levie of the fame, as the barons of the 
 King's exchequer doe and may doe for the King's 
 duties refling afore them of record in the faid 
 exchequer. And the faid commiffioners, col- 
 lectors, or receivors, afore this time thereunto 
 deputed, or that heereafter for and to the fame 
 ihall be deputed, having and taking the receite 
 of the fame your money, or any parcel thereof, 
 be feverally countable for the portions by them 
 feverally received, before your treafurer of your 
 warres that was by you affigned in your faid 
 voiage roiall, or any other perfon or perfons 
 that heereafter by your highneffe (hall be there- 
 unto deputed and affigned, of and for all fuch 
 fummes of money as they feverally have received, 
 or fhall receive, or that feverally mall come to 
 their hands, before fuch auditors as by your 
 highnes fhall be afiigned in that part. And if 
 any of the laid commiffioners, collectors, or re- 
 ceivors, come not to make their accounts at fuch 
 day and place as (hall be limited in your privie 
 feale to them directed in that party, that then 
 upon certificate of the delivery of the faid writs 
 or privie feales made by him, that the fame de- 
 livered upon his oath unto the chauncellor of 
 England for the time being, the faid chauncellor 
 for the fame time being hath authoritie and 
 power to make commifTions under your great 
 
 feale,
 
 fealej to certaine perfons by his difcretion to 
 be limited and choofen, to take the bodies of 
 the faid perfons that fo mall make default, and 
 them to commit to ward (unlefle then he make 
 before the faid treafurer, or comrniffioners, fuch 
 excufe as to them (hall feeme reafonable), there 
 to remaine till they have made their accounts of 
 and for the premifles, and fatisfied, contented* 
 and paied the duty by them due upon their faid 
 accounts, unto your faid treafurer of your Warres, 
 or to fuch other perfon or perfons to your ufe, as 
 your grace mail depute and affigne in that party 
 to receive the fame. And over this be it enacted 
 by the faid authoritie, that if any travers fortune 
 to be betweene the faid commimoners afore this 
 time affigned to receive the King's faid duties* 
 collectors, and the faid grantors, of and for pry- 
 ing and not paying, receiving or not receiving of 
 the faid fumme or fummes of money, or any part 
 thereof i that then if the faide grauntors fhevve 
 acquittance, writing, bill or billets, whereby it 
 may appeare afore the commiffioners hereafter 
 to be afligned, that the faid commiflioners or 
 collectors afore this time afligned in forme 
 rehearfed, have received the fumme or fummes 
 of money, or any part thereof, that (hall be in 
 travers, or that the faid grauntors offer to bring 
 two witnefles or mo, that will witnefle and tef- 
 tiiie the faid paimentj or that any grauntor or 
 
 grauntors
 
 grauntors denie the graunt of any fuch fumme 
 or fummes of money, or any part thereof of 
 them demaunded ; that thereupon the faid com- 
 miffioners heereafter to be affigned, have autho- 
 ritee and power to heare the whole matter, evi- 
 dence, writings, witnefTe, and proofes, concern- 
 ing the faid travers, and denying of the faid 
 graunts, and then to charge and difcharge 
 every of the faid perfons by their difcretions, 
 as they (hall feeme beft ; and the fame charge 
 or difcharge to bind and difcharge every of 
 the faid parties againft the King's highnes, 
 as if it were adjudged before the auditors 
 affigned by due originall in any of the King's 
 courts of record between party and party in 
 a&ions of account, or elfe that the King were 
 plaintifFe in the faid action of accoimt. Be 
 it alfo ordained by the faid authentic, that 
 the faid commiffioners heereafter to be af- 
 figned by the King's highnefle, mall, by their 
 difcretion upon their account and full paiment 
 made of all fummes of money by them re- 
 ceived or to be received by the collector or 
 receivers of the {aid fummes of benevolence, 
 allowe unto the faid receivers and colledors 
 fuch their reafonable cofts and rewards, as 
 they for the gathering of the faid fummes 
 have fuftained. 'Provided alway, that this acT: 
 fhall not extend to charge any heire of any 
 
 man
 
 ( "4 ) 
 
 man that hath afore time granted any fumme 
 of money by way of his benevolence. 
 
 (S.) 
 
 1 3 CHA. II. CH. 4. 
 
 We your Majefties moft loyal and obedient 
 fubjedts, the Lords and Commons in Parliament 
 aflembled, taking into confideration your Ma- 
 jefty's great and important occafions for a fpeedy 
 fupply of monies, which can noe waies be fo 
 reddyly raifed as by a free and voluntary prefent 
 to your Majefty from thofe who are able and 
 willing to aide your Majefty in this fuddaine 
 exigency, as a teftimony of their affections to 
 your Majefty, and in cafe of the poorer fort of 
 your fubjeds, doe therefore befeech your Ma- 
 jefty, that it may be enacted, and be it enaded 
 by the King's mod excellent Majefty, by and 
 with the advice and confent of the Lords and 
 Commons in this prefent Parliament affembled, 
 and by the authority of the fame, that your 
 Majefty may iiTue out fuch and fo many feverai 
 commiffions under your Majefty's great feal of 
 England into the feverai counties, cities, towns 
 corporate, and all other places in England and 
 Wales, and town of Berwick upon Tweed, di- 
 refted to fuch perfons as your Majefty mall think 
 fit, for the receiving of fuch fubfcriptions as your 
 
 Majefty's.
 
 ( "5 ) 
 
 Majefty's good fubjects {hall voluntarily offer for 
 fupply of your Majefty's preffing occaiions ; and, 
 likewife to iflue fuch other commiflions to fuch 
 other perfons as your Majefty [hall think fit, for 
 collecting and receiving the monies fo fubfcribed ; 
 the acquittances of which refpe&ive receivers, or 
 of any one of them, are immediately to be made 
 and given without any fee, upon payment made, 
 and (hall be an abfolute difcharge for the fum fo 
 fubfcribed , and in cafe fuch fubfcriptions {hall, 
 upon any occafion, be returned into the court of 
 exchequer, or any other place, the payment 
 thereof {hall be likewife returned together with 
 the fame. Provided that no procefs mall iiTue out 
 of the exchequer againft any perfon fo fubfcribing, 
 but within two years next after the paffing of 
 this aft. And for the better execution of the 
 faid fervice, the faid commiffioners of the coun- 
 ties, cities, towns corporate, and ail other places 
 aforefaid, refpe&ively mall, and are hereby en- 
 joined, with all convenient fpeed after the iffuing 
 out and receite of the faid refpective commiiTions, 
 to meet together at the moft ufual and common 
 place of meeting, within each of the faid coun- 
 ties, cities, towns corporate, and all other places j 
 and the faid commifiioners, or fo many of them 
 as mall be preient at the faid firft general meet- 
 ing, or the major part of them, may, by them, 
 by their confents and agreements, fever them- 
 felves into hundreds, rapes, wapentakes, wardes, 
 
 and
 
 and other places within their refpedive limitts, 
 in iuch manner and forme as to them mall feeme 
 expedient ; and mail likewife, from tyrne tcr 
 tyine, give notice of the refpe<ftive tymes and 
 places of their meetings, to the end that any 
 perfens, bodies politick, or corporate, may, 
 if they pleafe, refort to them, and make fuch 
 offers or prefent to your Majefty, as their own 
 hearts mall prompt them to. 
 
 Provided always, that no perfon, not being 
 a peere of this realme, (hall, in fueh offer 
 or prefent to your Majeftie, exceed the fume 
 of 200!. nor any peere of this realme the 
 fume of 400!. Provided alfo, that no com- 
 miffions to be iffued out by virtue of this 
 adt, mall be of force or continue as to the 
 receiving of any monies, or fubfcriptions fo- 
 monies, after the feaft of St. John t e Baptift, 
 which mall be in the year of our Lord one 
 thoufand fix hundred and fixty-tvvo. And be it 
 hereby declared, that no commiffions or aides of 
 this nature can be ifTued out, or levied, but by 
 authority of parliament ; and that this acl, and the 
 fupply hereby granted, mail not be drawne into 
 example for the tyme to come. 
 
 This flatute is recited in Pulton's flatutes. 
 Edit. an. 1661. There is alfo a copy in Debrett's 
 Parliamentary Regifter of 1778, Vol. io.-of that 
 feffion. 
 
 FINIS.
 
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