ILY !«!!!!! iiiiiiii iiiiiiii I* iillii' ■ ill jliiiillliil! 'T" la mm ■ijiiiiiv.i liiii iiiiiymii A SHORT HISTORY O F T H E EAST INDIA COMPANY: EXHIBITING A STATE OF THEIR AFFAIRS, ABROAD AND AT HOME, POLITICAL AND COMMERCIAL; The NATURE and MAGNITUDE of their COMMERCE, AND ITS RELATIVE CONNECTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND REVENUES OF INDIA; AND A Difcuflion on the Queftion of Right to the Conquered Territories in India ; ALSO Remarks on the Danger and Impolicy of Innovation, AND THE Praftical Means of enfuring all the good Effefts of a Free Trade to the Manufadturers of Great Britain and Ireland, B y MATTER OF REGULATION, WITHOUT DISTURBING THE ESTABLISHED SYSTEM. THE SECOND EDITION, WITH SOME ADDITIONS, TO WHICH IS ADDED, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE NEW ACT. RR. LONDON: PRINTED FOR JOHN SEWELL, CORNHILL, AND JOHN DEBRETT, PICCADILLY, 1793' 7745 1 ^3 O N T E N T S. INTRODUCTION. ^ — — — p. i CHAPTER I. T/je Origin of the Old and New Companies, with their Union. — 3 CHAPTER II. The Origin of the -2^ per Cent. Annuities transferrable at the India Houjey and the Funds chargeable with the Payment of them. — 7 CHAPTER III. Of the Forts, Fa5iories, and Territories in India, diflingtiifmig thofe which are the Property of the Company by Purchale, from thofe acquired by Con que ft. — — — — p CHAPTER IV. Expences ijicurred by the Company in the Indian Conquejls. — 13 CHAPTER V. The Rights permanent and temporary of the India Company, — 15 CONTENTS. CHAPTER VI. How far the appellation of a Chartered Monopoly is applicable to the Eajl India 'Trade. — — - — — P- ^7 C H x\ P T E R Vir. Plans formerly recommended for 'varying the Mode of conducting the Tirade to the Eaft Indies. — — — 20 CHAPTER VIII. The preferd State of the Trade of Foreign Countries with India and China. — — — — — 31 CHAPTER IX. J he Returns of the Company s Trade a?tterlor to their arrpiiring the Territories Abroad ; the Effect produced by the Acqulfitlon on their Exports and imports ; the prejent Amount oj their Debfs^ and their Claims upon the Public for an Indemnification of their Expences incurred In acquiring and prefervlng the conquered Provinces. CHAPTER X. The Nature and Extent of the Trade of the Company to India and China, ivith an Account oj the Shipping employed m It. 26 CHAPTER XI. Refpecling of the Profits derived by the Company from their Trade. 32 CONTENTS. CHAPTER XII. J concife Viezv of the Company s J fairs in their diJlinSl Capacities of Sovereigns and Merchants. — — — ' P- 3S CHAPTER XIII. Recapitulation of the prefe?ii State of our Trade with India and China, and the Rights oj the Eafl India Company. 1 he Nature and Grounds of the various Objecliofis expeSled to be made in Parliament, to the Co7itinuation of the Trade on its prcfent S)fem. Refec- tions on the hffeBs of Innovation. — — ^y CHAPTER XIV. Pradiical Means of fe curing to the Private Merchant and the Public,, the ultimate Benefits of Trade within the Company's frefent ex- clufive Limits, without endangering the Chain of our political Con- nexion with Itidia, or materially difurbing the pre jent Syfiem. 47 POSTSCRIPT. ______ 51 ADDITIONAL CHAP. XV. The Manner of obtaming Part of the Territories, and a Difcujfion of the Sluefiion at Law between the Crown and the Company, in rela- tion to their refpeSlivc Claims thereto. — — 5 j; Account of the Imports, from the Laft Indies and China, fold at the Company's Sales in the laf Four Tears, the Duties and Cufoms paid on the fame ; together with the Amount exported in each Tear, and of the Drawbacks allowed on Exportation. — 73, Abridgment of the Act for fettling the Government atid Trade of hidia, and for the Appropriation of the Territorial Revenues and Profits oflrade. — — — — — 75; INTRODUCTION. x\M0NGST the many fuperior advantages derived to the com- munity from a Government conftitutcd like that of Great Britain, the means which it affords, through the Liberty of the Prefs, for a free difcuflion and communication of fentiment on every national concern, and more particularly fuch as in their nature muft pafs the Ordeal of Parliament, is one of the firfl in utility and eminence. It is by communications of this nature alone, that pra6lical know- ledge and experience can be conveyed to the uninformed, and their benefits diffeminated and fecured to future generations. Hence the Senator is furniftied with information the mod to be relied on, be- caufe the mofl expofed to fcrutiny and expofition ; and, by com- paring and weighing in his clofet all facls, arguments, and opinions thus fubmitted to public view, with what he may collect from pri- vate quarters, he is enabled to form an impartial judgment, and to decide upon juft principles and intrinfic merits; and thus topics otherwife abftrufe and difficult become eafy and familiar. Under the influence of this impreffion, the Editor of thefe (heets, whofe ^particular fituation and line of life has, he conceives, afforded him the means of fctting in their true lights the Nature and State of our India and China Trade, in a way that may be ufeful, at a jundure when that very important and valuable branch of our Commerce is at the eve of undergoing the moft ferious invefligation, would have thought himfelf remifs in his duty as a good citizen, had he re- mained filcnt. A As ( 2 ) As the main obje6l of this Treatife is to furnilTi ufeful information relating to the Afiatic Trade, to fuch, as either by their avocations, or the want of better means, have been prevented from obtaining it elfevvhere, rather than with a defire to'enter the lifts with thofe already converfant on the fubjeft, and who may be difpofed to be- come difputants with refpe6l to the beft means for condu6ling it, we have thought it right to give a connected, but very brief, account of the Origin and Progrefs of the Trade, and the Hiftory of the Companies ere6lcd for carrying it on, previous to our entering into the confideration of the flate of it, as at prefent circumftanced. The favorable Reception of this Tra6l by the Public, under the former Edition, has induced the Editor to permit this fecond Edition to be printed. The Juftice of the opinion he had ventured to obtrude in the 3d Chapter, relative to the Claim of the Company to the exclufive Property and Revenue of the five Northern Circars, having been in fome degree queftioned by refpe6lable Chara6ters, in high official Situations, he has added a Seftion on that Subjedl, to fhew the Grounds on which that Opinion was formed. If it be a wrong one, he is open to Convidtion, and will not hefitate to ac- knowledge his Error. The Fa6ts he has ftated may at leaft lead to a further Elucidation of feveral particulars which, however impor- tant, are at prefent little known to the Community. CHAPTER ( 3 ) CHAPTER I. The Origin of the Old and New Eajl India Companies, with their Union. 1 HE paffage by Sea to the Peninfula of India, and the Eaftward part of the Continent of Afia, the prcfent feats of our Afiatic trade, was not difcovered till about the latter end of the 15th Century; and of the various attempts made from hence by individuals to open a Trade thither, none proved fuccefsful, until * Queen Elizabeth eftablifhed the firft Incorporated Company by the Name of The Lotidon Eajl India Company. After a long feries of Difafters and Loffes this Company obtained from the Country Powers, at a great expence, the Privilege of a limited Trade in certain parts of India and Perfia, and of making fmall Settlements or Houfes of Trade called FaElories, for the refidence of their Faftors and Servants. In thofe early times the -j- Charters of the Crown, and the Powers which they conveyed, were not thought to require Parliamentary Sandion ; nor was it until after the Reftoration of Charles II. that the Rights or Authorities derived under them, though refting on Prerogative alone, were fiill called in queftion. The Science of Navigation, and the true Principles of Foreign Trade, dur- ing the exiftence of thofe Charters, were but beginning to dawn upon us. At the time of their ceffation, we could be faid to be only in a flate of Commercial Infancy. We are therefore not to be furprized at finding, that by the in- terruptions of fpeculative Adventurers, called Interlopers, who had begun to refift the exclufive Claiins of the Old Company, derived by their Charters, on the ground of their wanting the Sanftion of Parliamentary Authority, and by occafional failures of inveflments of goods from abroad, and the not unfre- quent lofles of Ihips in their patiage, the Commerce of the Company was often chequered with difafters and difappointments. Notvvithftanding thefe viciffitudes and difcouragements, the Company, with many hard itruggles and heavy expences, formed by degrees various % Fadiories and Houfes of Trade both in India and Perfta ; and at length becoming more * The Charter was dated the 31ft December, 1600. Printed Afts and Charters, Part J, Page 3. if See Anderfon's Hiftory of Commerce. 1 Forts: Mazagom, Mahim, Syon, Syere, Warlee, Carwar, Angengo, Tellicheny, Calicutt, Fort St. George, Fort St. David, Vizagapatam, York Fort or Fort Malbro', Fort William, Bombay, and St. Helena. FaHories: Sural, Swally, Broach, Amadavad, Agra, Lucknow, Gombron, Shyraz, Ifpahaun, Chingu, Orixa, Cuddalore, Porto Novo, Pettipolee, Mctchlepatam, Madapollam, Indrapoiir, Tryamong, Sillebar, Tonqucen, BcUafore, CoiTimbuzar, Dacca, Houghley, Malda, Rajamaul, and Patna, with the Cuftoms of Trade, and a Rent of 3333/. 6^. 8rf, granted by the Sophy of Perfia. A 2 fuccefsful. ( 4 ) fuccefsful, their profperity began to excite that fort of envy in Individuals, which is too apt to refuk from the beneficial Commerce of Great Bodies. Various attempts were in confequence made to induce the Crown, and even Parliament itfelf, to interpofe and revoke the Charters of the Company ; feme on pretext that every man had an equal Right to trade in the Eajl as well as the IFeJi Indies, whilft others hoped to efiedt it on propofals of Terms of Advan- tage in point of Publick Finance, that they might themfelves be eredled into an excluiive Company, to the downfall of that which exifted. Such was the ftate of things in 1693, when the Company, by an accidental Failure in the Payment of a paltry Duty which had been impofed on their capital Stock, gave an opening to Government to determine their Charters : For, by the * Aft which impofed that duty, any default in payment, withia the time therein limited, rendered their Charters void: And though, in the fame year, the Crown, to obviate all doubts, revived their Powers and ex- clufive Privileges by a new Charter, the Company were obliged to fubmit to a eondition that their Capacity and Trading fliould in future be determinable on Three Tears Notice. The legal obftacle to the erefting a new Company being thus removed, an -}~ Aft was pafled in 1698 for borrowing Two Millions on a Loan at 8 per Cent, towards carrying on the War; and as an encouragement to Subfcribers, it was declared, that they fhould be incorporated by a Charter from the King into /z General Society, with liberty for each individual Member to trade to India and the other Limits of the Old Company's exclufive Charter; fo that the value of his Exports exceeded not his Share of this Loan or Capital j and that fuch of the Subfcribers as fhould choofe to convert their Subfcriptions into a joint Stock, fliould be at liberty to do fo, and be incorporated by a fcparate Charter by the name of " The EngUJI: Eajl India Company," with the privilege of trading with and to the amount of fuch joint Stock. All perfons but thofe incorporated, and fuch as they fhould licenfe, were prohibited from this Trade, except the Old Company, who had time given them to wind up their Com- mercial Afliiirs. The Aft referved a power to determine the Charters both of the General Society and the New Company after September 1711, on Repay- nient ef the Loan, and Three Tears Notice. The bulk of the Subfcribers having agreed to trade as a fcparate Company with a joint Stock, the Old Company, in whofe prejudice the two New Cor- porations were to be erefted, found means to become IVIembers jor a very large proportion of the Loan of Two IVIillions. With an interell thus acquired, they joined with the Englifli Company, and with the fuperior Knowledge of the Trade, which they had gained by experience over the other members, and poUeffcd as they were of Shipping, Stores, and Stock at home, and of the Settlements and Faftories neccffary to the Trade abroad, they obtained a de- cided influence in the general Courts of the New Company, and thus paved * Aft 4 and 5 Will, and Mary, ch. i j, f. ;o and u. t Aa 9 and 10 Will. 111. ch 44. the ( 5 ) tlie way to that Union which afterwards took place in 1702, and which, under the aiifpiccsof Lord 1'reafurer Godolphin, in 1708, was confirmed by Parliament. By the terms of this Union, the Warelioufes at home, and Shipping, and alfo all ike Settlements and FaBories of the Old Company in the Eajl Indies, Perjia, and China, includinj^ the IJlands of Bombay and St. Helena, wiih their Dependencies, and all their Rights and Privileges, however derived, became veiled in the United Company, except their Body Politic, which they fiirrendered to the Queen. The curious Reader willwifh to learn what became of the ^^wra/ Society, whole Members were individually authorized to trade, as far as the value of their Subfcriptions in Goods, exported from hence. All we can difcover of them is, that though they were adtually incorporated by the King's Charter, and were therefore legally authorized to fend fhips to India or China, it does not with cer- tainty appear that any one fhip was ever fitted out by them : and that the fupe- rior advantages of being concerned in the Trade to be carried on with a joint Stock were fo evident, that at the rime of the Union of the Two Companies, out of the whQle Loan of Two Millions*, only £ 7,000 then remained the property of The fepnrate Traders of the General Society, and that this fum alfo was foon abforbed in the United Company, whofe capital or trading Stock, by which their Dividend of Profits was to be governed, thereupon became fixed at Two Millions. Having thus briefly traced the general Hiflory of the two Companies to their perfeft Union, we fliall refer our Readers to the -{- Colleftion of Statutes, Charters, and Bye-laws of the India Company, lately printed and publifhed, for any further particulars they may defire on that part of the fubjedt, and clofe this Chapter, with a Ihort recital of the Afts of Parliament, by which the United Company have been continued in the exclufive Trade to the prefent time, and of what were the conditions of the compads made with the Public on thofe occafions. The firft enlargement of their term took place in 1708 %, when the United Company bargained with the Public to advance ;^. 1,200,000 as a loan, but without any intereft, (or, which operated as the fame thing, at a reduced intereft of 5 per cent, on the two loans conjointly), for an extenfion of their term in the exclufive Trade of fifteen years, and thus/Zw nominal trading capital^ on which the dividend was made, became advanced to £. 3,200,000. In 1712 II the Company petitioned Parliament, on the ground that the term which remained unexpired in their trade was too ihort to admit their rilking * Aft of 6 Anne, ch. 17. f. 7. t By Francis Russell, Efq. of the India Board, and printed by Eyre and Stbahan, His j Majefty's Printers. X A'a 6 Anne, ch. 17. 11 Commons Journals, 3 thi; ( 6 ) the further neceflary expences of regaining and fecuring the Pepper Trade, which had been engroffed by the Dutch, that their corporate capacity might be con- tinued, the' the debt due to them from the Public fhould be redeemed. In confequence of this petition -j-, an ad: paffed for repealing all former provlfoes and powers of determining their trade or incorporation, but with power for the Public to redeem the debt at any time after September 1733; and thus the United Company were fuppofed to have obtained a perpetidiy as well in the exdufive trade, as in all their chartered rights and capacities. They however fub- mitted themfelves in that refpeft to the pleafuie of Parliament in 1730, when an adlj; was paffed for continuing to them their exclufive trade 'till 1766, for which they gave the Public a premium of £. 200,000 without any return of either principal or intereft, and alfo agreed to a reduction of the rate of intereft to £. 4 per cent, on the debt of ;^. 3,200,000, and to accept of payment of the principal by inftalments of £. 500,000 at a time. In 1744 II they contrafted for, and obtained a further addition of fourteen years in the exclufive Trade, for which they lent to the Public one million at 3 per cent.; and in 1750 § they agreed to a further reduction of the rate of intereft on the former debt to 3 per cent. Thus grew the prefent debt of ^.4,200,000 from the Public to the United Company, carrying with it an annuity of £. 126,000. But the Company's capital or nominal fum, by which their dividends were governed, continued as before at ^.3,200,000, the million \aA lent having been raifed by their bonds, and therefore not added to their former capital. The laji renezval was made by contradt with the Public in 1781 *, when a further Term determinable in 1794 was granted in the exclufive Trade, on payment of ^T. 400,000 in difcharge of all claims on the Company by the Public, previous to ift March, 17S1. But it was provided by Parliament, That after payment of a yearly dividend of £. 8 per cent, to the holders of India ftock, the furplus of all the net proceeds of their trade and revenues fhould be applied, three fourths to the ufe of the Public, and the remaining fourth to the ufe of the Company, > The debts incurred by the Company in the wars fubfifting in India at and after that period, have hitherto prevented any fuch furplus from arifing, and therefore no participation of revenue hath taken place under this aft. On the contrary, the prcfflire of thofe debts, and the compulfory claufes of an adt of 1784, by which the Company are obliged to keep a flock of teas always in their warehoufes fuflicient for one year's confumption, have rendered it necef- fary for them to enlarge their aftual trading capital, by new fubfcriptions, to five millions, for which they had the fandion of Parliament granted them by two ads of the years 1786 and 1789. + Aft 10 Ann. ch. 28. J 3 G- 2- ch. 14. H Aft 17 G. a. ch. 17. % Ad 23 G. i. ch. 22. * Aa 21 G. 3. ch. 65. f. 9. Ill ( 7 ) In order to determine the exclufive Trade, it is neceflary that the Pub- lic fliould firft make provifion for the debt of j^. 4,200,000 which is flill due, partly to the Company and partly to the Annuitants. I'he nature of their refpedive intercfts in this debt we will endeavour to fliew in the fucceeding Chapter. CHAPTER II. The Origin of the 3 per Cent. Annuities transferrahle at the India Houfe, and the Funds chargeable zvith the Payment of them. W E have fhewn in the preceding chapter, the origin and progrefs of the Debt of ^.4,200,000 incurred by the Public to the Eaft India Company, and that in 1750 the interejl or annuity payable on it was reduced to the rate of 3 per cent, or £. 126,000 per annum. The fecurities pledged by the Public for tlie payment of the annuities were thefe : Certain Salt Duties and Stamp Duties were, in the firfl: inftance, made chargeable for the intereft oi £. 160,000 on the two firft loans of ;^. 3,200,000, and when in 1730, the intereft was reduced to ^T. 128,000, it was made a fpecific charge on the Aggregate Fund. The £. 30,000 per annum for the intereft of the One Million Loan was charged on certain Duties upon Spirits, and upon the Sinking Fund. The terms upon which the Company agreed, in 1750, to reduce the rate of their annuity to 3 per cent, were (as is fpecified in the adt for that purpofc) that they Ihould be permitted to raife jT. 4,200,000 by fale of annuities at the fame rate of intereft which the Public were to pay to the Company; and it was declared that the annuities fo fold fhould be paid half-yearly at the India Houfe (where the transfer books were to be kept and managed) out of the fame duties and revenues as flood chargeable with the payment of the intereft of the debt due by the Public to the Company, fubjeft neverthelefs to the like provifo of redemption by the Public zs the faid loans were fubjeCt or liable to. Under this power the Company fold * annuities to the amount of j{;. 2,992,440 : 5 J. carrying an intereft or dividend of 3 per cent, per ann. amounting to £'Sg,'j-j^ : 4^. which fums conftitute what are called Eaf India Annuities, the half-yearly payments of which are regularly made at the India Houfe, out of the annuity of/". 126,000 received by the Company at the Exche- quer, the remainder being dill the property of the Company. Some doubt having been entertained whether the Company's power to fell the remainder of thefe annuities continued in force under the acSt of 1750, they were 5 » Aa 26 G. 3. ch. 62, again C 8 ) again impowered to fell it by an aft of the year 1786, in which it was provided, that the purchafers thereof Ihould hold their annuities upon the like terms as the former purchafers ; and that what fhould be fo fold fliould be confolidated with the annuities formerly fold, and that the debt of ;^. 4,200,000, due by the Public to the Company, fliould be a collateral fecurity to the holders thereof, but fubjedl to redemption. The Company however have not availed themfelves of their power to alienate the remaining part of this annuity, amounting to £. 1,207,559 : 15 j. producing jT. 36,226 : 16 s. per ann. but ftill retain it in property ; and over and befides that income, they alfo receive from the Exchequer, by virtue of an asft * of 1751, £. 1687 per ann. for the receiving, paying, and managing, the amount for- merly fold to the annuitants, being in proportion to the allowances made to the Bank for the management of Bank Annuities. The India annuities are therefore part of the National Debt, charged upon public revenues alone, 2nd redeemable only by the Public; and being fo, provifion is made by the aft of 1786 " for redu^ion of the national debt," that when and as the annuities fliall be purchafed or paid off by the Comm'-Jjioners, the Direftors of the Eaji India Company Ihall permit Transfers thereof ro be miide in their books into the names of the Comniiffioners, fimilar to what is done at the Bank and South Sea Houfe, and the Bank are impowered to receive the annual dividends thereof for the ufe of the Public. By the Confolidition Adl -f- of 1787 the Annuity of £ 126,000 per ann. payable by the Public to the Company, (and out of which they pay the An- nuitants) is charged upon the Confolidated Fund. The India Annuity has been for feveral years at a price inferior to the annuities of an equal rate transferable at the Bank. This difference has been probably occafioned by the diftance of the place of its transfer from the Stock Exchange, and its fnall annual amount, preventing that frequency of its being brought to market, which is neccffirv to a quick demind, and where the magnitude of other redeemable annuities renders this of but little confideration. The ccnfequence has been, th it not a fmgle purchafe has been mide of the India Annuity by the Commifjloners for the reduttion of the National Debt, though, when brought in fmall fums (as it ufually is) to market, it has been generally fold at the rate of from 3 to 4 per cent, lefs tlian the Bank reduced Annuities, and perhaps the ge- neral knowledge that the CommiJJioners have made no purchate in it, may have eperated as an additional caufc in deprelling its price. It would be better if this annuity were confolidated with the Bank Annuities. The allowance of ;^. 1687 per ann. might be faved to the Public ; the value of the annuity would be improved in the hands of the Proprietors, and the * Aft i<^G. 2. ch. 56. t 2; iopoly, given on various occafions to the Eaft India Company's exclufive Trade, can be meant only to excite popular odium, and bring it into general difrepute. We have, in a former chapter, fhewn the origin of the two Eaft India Companies, and that the former held their exclufive trade by the voluntary grant of the Crown, founded folely on its prerogative, while the latter, or prefent Company, derive their rights by aftual purchafes from the Public, upon folemn compad:s authorized and confirmed by acts of Parliament. True it is, that King William granted a Charter of Incorpora- tion to the prefent Company : but it was a Charter conceived in the very terms of the agreement previoufly made with, and ratified by Parliament, and can therefore be confidered in no other light, than as an inftrument of invejlittire, ifTucd under the Great Seal of Great Britain, in compliance with the letter of the adt, in order to perpetuate the agreement, by inrollment (as aWCharters are, though Je Returns of the Company's Trade anterior to their acquiring the Territories Abroad; the Effect produced by the Acquifttion on their Exports and Imports; the prefent Amount of their Debts, and their Claims upon the Public for an Indemnification of their Expences incurred in acquiring and preferving the conquered Provinces. JxNTECEDENT to the year 1757, the fale amount of the Company's Im-- ports had rarely, if at any time, exceeded two millions in any one year. Their foreign inveftments were provided for by fales or barter of their exported goods and bullion, and by money lent them by their fervants in India on bills payable in London, which was the old method of remittance of money acquired in the Company's fcrvice. Thus we find the annual fales of the imports by the Com- pany for fixteen years next preceding 1757, amounted to about f.%,oc^c,,ooo on the average; and that, for the fame period, their exported goods and llores amounted annually, at their prime coft, to £. 238,000, and bullion, ;^. 690,000; and that they paid in difcharge of bills of exchange, ;f. 190,000. If during that period the prime colt of the goods imported exceeded the amount of thofe three fums, the difference mull have been paid by the profit on the fales of the goods exported, and by land rents and cuftoms arifmg at their principal fettlements. During the fucceeding ten years, it fliould feem that the revenues of the new acquifuions afforded no profit to the Company ; for though the produce of the fales of imports became incrcafed to the amount oi £. 2,150,000 annually on the average, and though the quantity of bullion exported was reduced to about ^T. 120,000 per ann. yet we find that the exports in goods and flores, and the money raifed upon bills of exchange, were increafed in a greater ratio, compared with the returns from abroad, the annual amount of each being as high as ^.430,000. From 1767 to 1777, the exports of bullion were about ;f. 110,000; of goods jT. 490,000, and the fums raifed on bills /. 458,000 per annum; and by the aid afforded from the revenues, the inveftments became fo increafed as to produce about £. 3,330,000 annually. From 1777 to 1784, the average fales of imports, notwithrtanding the war, fell off in the pro- portion only of about £. 200,000 annually ; the export in bullion was for that pe- riod very trifling ; but the goods and ftores exported were increafed to about half a millionj and the money raifed upon bills to about ^.761,000 yearly. For the ( 24 ) I'ne laft eight years, the (Ac amount of imports has been /. 4,768,242* aiinually on the medium ; 4:he amount paid for bullion ^T. 560,223, for goods and ftores exported £. 753,976 -j-, and for bills of exchange £. 1,258,870 per annum. During the laft 3 years the Sales have amounted to £. 5,094,535 ; the fums paid for bullion ;^. 464,046, for goods and ftores £. 952,027, and for bills £. 737,465 per annum on the average. The comparative profits of the Company's Trade were certainly more con- fiderable before they made their conquefts, in proportion to the amount of the capital employed, and the aggregate of the Sales of Imports, than at any time fince. '\Vhile their cargoes were lefs they were purchafed at more moderate prices abroad, and came to a more profitable market at home. But, by doubling the Inveftments in India, as in facft they have been, their prime coft, by the increafed demand, became enhanced, while their lale prices at home, by the increafed quantity brought into the market, became reduced. The Company had however no choice ; the furplus revenue in India could no otherwife be realized at home than through the medium of commerce; and although, on a itrift fcrutinv, it may probably be found, that many articles from Bengal have not produced in England the amount of their invoice prices and other charges upon them, fo that in the hands ot a private merchant, a lofs would have been fultalned, vet viewing the tranfadlion as affedting the community, it will be found that whatever inveftments were produced from the territorial revenue^ were a clear gain. With refpedl to the Coall Goods, and thofe from China, they have been chiefly purchafed or bartered for as in former times ; and by the influx of teas fince the Commutation a.&, through the medium of fair trade, -a, larger profit has been derived. The Territorial Revenue, including fubfidies and the income of the Com- pany's own property pofleired antecedently to the year 1756, may be reckoned at nearly /even million of Pounds Sterling per ann. But as the countries can only be governed and maintained, and the revenues coUefted, by keep- ing up a large ftanding military force, and fundry civil eftablifhments ; and as experience has proved it to be the bsft (Economy to allow libera! ftipends to the principal officers and fervants, to place them beyond the reach of tempta- tion to do amifs ; the net furplus, after providing for all civil and military charges, ajid paying the annual intereft of the fubfifting debt, does not exceed, ac- cording to a computation laid before the Houfe of Commons by the Court of Directors, the annual fum ot £. 1,200,000. Be its amount what it may, the Reader may be alFurcd that the fpecie of India has been fo ex- tautled, that no part of the furplus, whatever may be its amount, can be * Exclufive of fitles of privileged ami private trade, which on the fame averaj;c amounted • to /• 755.757 per ann. bcfutcs what has been finuggled. For the prefent ftate of the trade, in .other particulars, fee chap. lo. \ Exclufive of private trade cariicd out in thirty fliips, which at ;^. 25,000 each, make j^. 750,000 a year, bcfidcs illicit and tlandclliiic iradb by other ihljps. 3 brought C 25 ) brought in fpecie, nor can it be realized in England otherwiTe than through the medium of cargoes provided for the China or European markets. With refpedt to the debts of the Company, their amount in India appears to be about nine millions Jlerling, and there being available ajfets in India equal to the dilcharge ot fomething more than two millions, there eemains about y«'y^«. millions as a charge on the other aflets and future revenues. This debt was incurred by war, and flands wholly unconncfted with the Company's commerce. Their debts at home, beyond the value of affets applicable to their imme- diate difcharge, amount to upwards of four millions, of which ;r. 3, 200,000 is their {landing bonded debt, authorized by Afts of Parliament. We have already taken occafion to obferve, that the claim of the Public to the territories in India acquired by conqueft, is fubjeft not only to tlie out- ftanding demands of the Company's creditors, but alfo to an equitable claim by the Company themfclves. The juftice of that of the creditors manifefts itfelf too ftrongly to require any illuftration or argument, and will doubtlefs obtain from a Britifh Parliament, whenever it fhall exercife its wifdom in pro- viding any New Syftem for the future adminiftration of India, a fultable in- demnification. The claim of the Company appears alfo equally intitled to the regard and fupport of the Lcgiflature, fince it is clear and evident, that in confequence of the unavoidable expences they have been put to by the wars in India, their Capital Stock has been twice increafed by new fubfcrip- tions, as well as their Bond Debt, to enable them to carry on their Trade ; at the fame time their dividends have continued only at £. 8 per cent. Under fuch circumflances we can entertain no doubt but, from the candour and juftice of Parliament, the territorial revenues of India will be fo appro- pri5.ted, in any new arrangement that may be made, as to provide for the exifting debts abroad, and fome reafonable compenflition for fuch part of the debts at home as the Company (ball be able to make ajipear they have dif- burfed in acquiring and protedting the provinces, beyond what has been pro- duced to the Company from thofe revenues. D CHAP- ( 26 ) CHAPTER X. Thi Nature and Extent of the Trade of the Company to India and China, with an Account of the Shipping employed in it. EXPORTS. W E had nearly completed the account we intended to have given of the feveral fpecies, quantities, and values of the goods exported by the Company, when the Houfe of Commons relieved us from that labour, by ordering * the three very able and fatisfadfory Reports, lately made on the fubjedl to the Board of Commerce, by the Court of Diredors, to be printed, Thefe Reports have alfo, for their more extenfive promulgation, been again printed by order of the Company. We fliall therefore avail ouriclves of the authentic ac- counts they contain, by ftating a brief recital of their contents in general, but with a recommendation to our Readers to have recourfe to the Reports them- felves, as containing many matters, omitted by us, regarding the Trade of the Company at large, highly important to be known. From the firft of thefe Reports we callect thefe particulars; That the Bulk of the Exports confifls of, Camblets, cloth, and other woollens ; metals (particularly tin, lead, and copper) ; naval and military {lores ; and fdver in bullion. That the Company referve to themfelves the exclufive export of cloth, woollens, copper, bullion, and military ftores ; and alfo clocks, toys, and other articles ornamented with jewels. That other articles -j~ exported from hence, are chiefly purchafcd in India by Europeans for their own confumption, and are carried abroad in what is called * 3 J January i793- f A Lift of Articles exported \w Private Tr.itle. Anchors, Canvas, Copper, Ear iron, Cutlery, Drugs, Bulgia hides, Cards, Earthen ware, Brandy, Cordage, Furs, Beer, Cabinet \rare, Glals ware. Boots and flioes, Clocks, CJimpowdcr, Bra7,icr\', Cochineal, OlaCs beads, Biimin,' Carriages, CJinfcng, Block tin, Carpets, (irapnals, Cyder, Cloth cuttings. Gold thread, Clicrry brandy, Confeftionary, Gold lace, Habcrdallicry, ( ^7 ) called Private Trmk *, by the Commanders and officers of the Company's fliips. That befides what are exported by the Company, and the Private Traders, regularly regiflered, abundance of Britilli goods find their way to India, both by illicit Trade carried on diretftly from hence, and alfo by what is termed CLmdcJlinc trade, carried on from various parts of the continent of Europe in Britifli iliips, under foreign colours. That with a laudable zeal for the public good, by promoting the cxten- fion of exports of Britifli manufadlures, the Company have continued to export, both to India and China, large quantities, particularly of woollens, though the fale of them has not produced fufficient to repay the prime coft and all charges -j- : have repeatedly commanded their commercial Boards in India, io indent for as many as can be fold zvitbont an aclual lofs, making thefe com- mands in cffeA their Jlanding order: have greatly enlarged the privilege of their commanders and officers, in refpedt to export goods, making them freight-free ; and ufed, and continue to uic, every endeavour to open new channels for the introduftion of Britifh goods in various parts beyond the peninfula of India ; the refult of which, as far as can be yet known, is given in thefe Reports : And it may be fairly inferred, that the Company's warehoufes in Bengal, Kladras, and Bo/iihay, are always fupplied with more zcoollens than can be fold to a profit, from the circumftance of there having been great numbers HiiberJafliery, Plate glafs, Turncn-, Hnts, Perfumery, Tin ware, Ploficiy, Pickles, Pig lead. Hardware, Pruffian blue, Rod iron, Ironmongery, Prints, Tin plates, Lines nnd twine, Quick-iilver, Wine, Lead fl)ot, Rum, Wooden toys, INIillenery, Red lead, Window glafs, Mathematical, and mufical in- Remnants of Cloths, AVrought plate, anJ llruments, Snufl', White lead. Manchcfter goods, Sadlcry, Muftard, Steel, And to China, Orfidew, Sheet lead, Oil, Smalts, Skins, and furs, I'crry, Sword blades, Jcwellciy, toys, watches, fome Painter's colours, Stationary, woollens, and lilvcr. Plated ware, Ship-chandlery, * The Company may lawfully licence whom they pleafe to trade in the Eaft Indies. The ■officers and fubord'inates of their Ihips, being Tlirry in number for ever)- fliip, arc alhnyed the benefit of it, both in Export and Import, according to their dift'erent ranks or births. Tliis is called Privint Trmie, and what they pay tor this permiffion, and in lieu of freight, is called Cj-h- pany's Duties, and forms an article of t)ie Company's profits. The fervants abroad are alfq frequently permitted to remit home their fortunes in merchandize, for which they pay a freight to the Company. This latter Trade is dliHiiguiflied from the former bv the name oil'ri'y:leq^i' the3''u-ould {1111 remain an incorporated Company InpcrpeluUy, with tbe exclufive property and poffeffion of Cakutla, and Fort fVillicini, Madras and Fort St. George, Bombay, Bencoolcn, and St. Helena, ai^.d various other Settlements and landed Eftates in India, and alfo a right of trading thither, with a Joint Stock, together with all their repofitories and other conveniencies adapted to their commerce, and the prefervation of their merchantlize, both abroad and at home. The only privileges they can be conflitutionally deprived of, are thofe of trading to the exclufwn of others, and oi governing the cotintries, and colledting and appropriating the revenues of India. Whether, in the event of the file Trade being determined, individuals would be able to carry on a fuccelsful trade to India, if the Company were to debar them the ufe of their Ports and Futlories, may require a ferious confideratioa. The exports of the Company in woollens, metals, warlike (lores, and other goods, of the growth, produce, or manufatlure of Great Britain or Ireland, have gradually increafed fince 1757, from _£. 230,000 to 900,000 a year, and the private trade is computed at j^. 750,000 more, making together £. 1,650,000. Great exertions have been made, and are ftill making, to open new channels in the Eaftern Seas for a further increafe of exports of our manufadures. The imports have been extended in a greater proportion than the exports. Before the year 1757, the fales of imported goods produced only about jf. 2,000,000 a year ; and in 1767, not more than £. 2,300,000 a year including the duties on teas. During the iaft eight years the imports have amounted to nearly five millions a year, exclufively of thofe duties, befides Private Trade, which has produced £. 800,000 per ann. ; and this year the Company's fales are ellimated at * upwards of 5 I Millions, exclufively of all private and privileged Trade. The annual payment to Ihip owners, for freight and demorrage, have been extended in an equal proportion ; and on a yearly average for the lafl; four years, it has exceeded £. 800,000 a year, and other charges of merchandize paid to individuals have exceeded ;^. 360,000 a year. The grofs annual amount of cuftoms and excife on the goods imported by the Company's fliips, including the Private Trade, has exceeded ;^. 1,000,000 a year, and though probably £. 400,000, or £. 430,000 a year of that fum has been repaid in drawbacks and bounties, on the exports of goods, partly unmanufaftured and partly ma- nufadlurcd in England with the raw materials of India, it hath been amply repaid to the Community by the employment afforded to our own manufadiu- rers, by the gains made by exporters and dealers, by profits arifing from car- riage and agency, by the means to which the exports from hence of Afiatic merchandize have contributed, towards fecuring the general Balance of Trade in our favour; and, laftly, by the returns brought back of valuable articles of merchandize, liable to cuiloms and inland duties. * Printed Paper, N° 10, computes the fam to be received by fales between March 1793 and March 1794 at ,^.5,400,000. The fule amuuut cannot ihcrcfori; be eftimateJ at much fliort of 5 ^ Millions. The C 39 ) The Britifli fliipping employed at this time by the Company, exceeds 8r,ooo tons; the number of fliips is ninety-two; their whole complement in officers and fubordinates 2,760, and of feamen 9,200; of the latter, not lefs than 7,000 are in conftant employment. Each of thefe officers and fubordinates has a limited privilege of trading, both outward and homeward, according to their rank or birth in the fhip, and their number being added to the Proprietors of India Stock, (confining of more than 2,700 perfons) and to the fervants of the Company abroad, who have aifo indulgences of trading, the whole number of perfons, who participate direftly and immediately in the India and China Trade by the Company's fliips, may be fairly computed at 6,000 ; and whilH: this immenfe TracJe has been maintained and fupported at the fole rifk of the Company, whofe Members have received no other benefit, than moderate intereft for the capital employed, the Public have derived, in diredt revenue, and in various different fhapes, every other * fpccies of profit and advantage produced by it. The fuperior advantages refulting from the fyftem of regularity, eflablifhed for the conduft of the Company's Trade, over a looie precarious outfit, are alfo numerous. The demand for manufactured goods is regular and uniform affording conftant work to the hands employed in the making of them. Thofe, with whom the Company have dealings, are certain of liberal treatment, and pundlual payment. Tradefmen, artificers, and manufadurers, emulate for their cuflom. The number of families in London and its environs, whofe whole fupport is dependent on the Company's Trade, is great beyond concep- tion. Their mercantile eftablifhments in England and Abroad, though con- duced (if we except the article of freight) upon flrift rules of economy, are immenfe. The India Houfe, and their numerous warchoufes, are filled with perfons bred up to the bulinefs from their infancy ; and if they were to be deprived of it, the greater number, men of rcfpedlable charadlers and irre- proachable conduft, muft be reduced to want or dlftrefs. It would be almofl endlefs to enumerate the tradefmen, artificers, and others, who, by the means of this regular, and as it were, fixed trade, earn and obtain honcft livelihoods in building, rigging, and careening of Qiips, and furnilhing guns, anchors, * The Company's profits by a dividend of eight per cent, on a capital of five millions, is pei snn. ;f. 400,000 only. Paid to the merchants and fliip owners on an average of five years 800 00a Paid for charges of merchandize ditto ditto — 360,000 Paid for export goods fcnt abroad, including Private Trade — 1,650,000 Paid for cuftoms and excife on an average of four yeais — r,c6o,ooo Annual benefit to the nation — 3,870,000 Exclufively of the advantages derived by the raw materials of India manufaiftured in Great Fritain, snd the profits by exporting India and China merchandize. s timber. C 40 ) timber, iron, fails, cordage, and various otlier forts of implements and tackle ufed therein. ^Yell calculated, however, as the prefent fyfiem may appear, for fecuring a continuance of the advantages, we have endeavoured to delcribe, the Company, when they come to Parliament with their Propofals for an extenfion of theii term in the exclufive Trade, will probably iind thfmfelves furrounded by many opponents, and on various grounds. Merchants and fliip owners from different quarters, but more particulary from the Out-ports, may urge, that their cxclu- lion from a participation in the benelits of the Afiatic Trade, is repugnant to the fpirit of the Britifh conftitution, which declares, that the feas fliall be free and open to all; and that it is highly injurious to the commercial interefls of the reft of the Three Kingdoms, that this Trade fliould.be limited, in all its imports and exports, to the metropolis alone. Manufafturers of various de- Icriptions may think it for their intereft, to unite their fupport with the mer- chants, on thefe general and plaufible grounds, for an Open Trade. They may likewife, according to their different views of aggrandizement (in the event of the failure of their moll favourite plan) infill on the juflice and expediency, of laying the Company under various reftridiions and prohibitions. The cotton manufaiflurer may be anxious to deftroy all competition and rivalHiip to his trade, both at home and abroad, more particularly in the article of muflins ; to what extent he will claim or expect this indulgence, whether to the putting a Hop to the making of mullins in India, or only a prohibition againft their being worn in England, time will difcover. The woollen manufafturer may com- plain of the partiality, which he experiences (a partiality infeparable from an exclufive Trade), by the option it leaves in the conduftors of it, to deal with particular cuftomers to the cxclufion of others. The fliip owners may, on limilar grounds, revive their complaints, and urge the propriety of laying the Company under an obligation, to charter their fliips according to the loweft offers. And as the Company, like other exporters of woollen cloth, are in the habit of buying it, in an unfinifhed ftate, and employing prelfers and packers to perfedl it, the manufadturers of it may pofTibly think, that the Company ought to be reflricled, in that refpeft, in order to add to his profits, thofe of the packer and prelfer. The tin merchant, and miners in Cornwall (regardlefs of the fervices fo recently afforded them, through the medium and at the rifk of the India Company, whereby alone their diftrclfcs could be effedtually * relieved), may think it but a llnall and rcafonable facrifice, for the Company to make in their favour, to be laid under an obligation, to purchafe and export all the tin they may raifc, at fome fixed price, or in the alternative, that the fhips of indi- viduals may be liccnled to take it abroad, and barter it for teas and other China commodities. Other defcriptions of perfons, on fimilar grounds of profit and aggrandizement, may, in like manner, come forward, and urge pretenfions for * Alluding to the immcnfc export of Tin by the India Company to Chin;i at a time when moft of the miners, for want of emphnment, were in great ililh'cfs, and tlic rcpofitories of the tin mer- chants filled with tin without any profpcCt of their finding purchafcrs for it. Other C 41 ) other regulations or rcftridions, not yet forefeen. We know, by every clay's experience, tliat nothing is more cafy than to procure hands to Petitions, and when prtfcnted to Parliament, the petitioners have, one and all, a right to be heard, and have an equal claim to its patience, its candour, and its juflice; nor can any doubt be entertained, but their petitions, and the i)rdofs they fhall adduce, will have every confideration paid to them, that may be found due to their merit. On the grand point, that of opening the Trade altogether, we have as yet feen no fpecific well digefted plan offered to the public eye. It, however, can hardly be fuppofed, that even the moft zealous advocates for a new fj'flem, can be defnous of feeing the prefent mode of condufting the Trade determined, and the future Trade left to hdznrd and chance. A mealure more prcpoflcrous and abfurd, nor any fo fraught with ruin and mifchief to the general intcrefts of the empire, as affedting the /)o/;7/Vurcs little more than half the Cuftoms are returned in Drawbacks, and on fome olhers no Drawback is allowed. f We have before ftated, that b\' the Acls of 1781 and 1784, the Public are iutltlcd to three fourths ot the nett furplus by Trade, as well as Revenue. them C 48 ) them to frauds and perpetual controverfies ; might prove Injurious to the Com- merce itfelf, and might, perhaps, in the end be produftivc of fo many unfore- feen inionvcnie/uics as lo drive the Company to the expedient of building their own fliips. To preclude them from the power of doing fo, we are perfuaded can never be intended. And yet fomething mud be done, to put an end tn the improvident practice, which has but too long prevailed, through ihe powerful influence of what is called The Old Shtpping latereft, in the extravagant rates given for Freight, to an amount probably of £. 150,000 a year, if taken on a medium or annual average, from the end of the lafl war. The rejetfted offers at lower rates have been pubhflied, and the prices at which fhips can be afforded, equally adapted to the convenicncy and fafety of the Trade, both of India and China*, as thofe which the Company have taken up, are well known. No reafonable man w ill wifh to introduce new plans to the injury of the owners of fliips already built or employed. The Public, as well as the Company, being doubly intcrefted in the effeft to be produced by lowering the freight, it fliould feem expedient and ufeful, that fome of the members of the executive Govern- ment fliould be invefled with an appellant authority. Care being firft taken to fccure the owners of Ihips already engaged from lofles, we would recommend that the highelf price of Freight to and from India, and to and from China, diflinclly, which fhall in future be given by the Company, fhall be fixed by the new A&, as well for time of war as of peace, leaving to the Company a latitude and option of contra(5ting with any Ship Owners they plcafe, lb that they ex- ceed not thofe prices. Let all pcrfons be permitted to make their offers of fhips, upon previous notice of the number and tonnage wanted, to be given by the Company in the London Gazette; and let the Direftors be obliged to keep a -_Book of Orders for their Affairs of Skipping, diftinft from ali oiher bufinefs ; in which fliall be entered the fubfumce of every offer, and the caufcs for reje 1,500,000 per annum. C 53 ) CHAPTER XV. The ^uejlofi as letween the Crown and the Eajl-Tndia Company, in refpeB io the Pro- perty of the Town, Port, and DiJlriB of MafuUpatam, and alfo in rejped, to the northern Circars., on the Coajl of Coromandelt fiated and difcuffed. JL HE period of the compaft, made with the Public in 1781, whereby the Eaft-India Company were continued for a further time in their Exclufive Trade, as well as in the Government of the Countries acquired in India, being near its expiration. His Majefty's Minifters, with a view of continuing the prefent fyftem of Government and Adminiltration in India, have recently offered certain propofitions to the Company for that purpofe, and for making a new partition between the Public and the Company, of the net revenues of the Territories in India, as well of thofc acquired by conquelf, as of thofe which are the independent property of the Company, and alfo of the net furplus, arifing from the profits of the Company's trade. The reafonablenefs of this partition, upon the terms propofed, mufl depend in fome degree on the rateable proportion, which the Revenue of the conquered Territories bears to the Revenue produced by tbe Company's own proper Eilates in India. It therefore feems highly effential, if not abfolutely neceffary, that means fhould be ufed, to difcriminate betwixt the Revenues of the Public and thofe properly of the Company, antecedent to the eftablilhment of any fpecific appropriation ; for unlefs that is done, the Company mud: be adting altogether upon conje(5lure. The Territories and Revenues of India, may be properly clafled under three defcriptions. Firft, Thoie which the Company pofleflcd, prior to the year 1755, with refpeft to which their exclufive right has never been queftioned, nor can it be in any degree liable to impeachment: The extent of them is known to a certainty, and their income was fully invefi;igated by the Secret Com- mittee of the Houfe of Commons of the year 1772, as will appear upon reference to Third Rtpurt of that Committee, wherein their annual produce, for a feries of time, will be found amply detailed. Secondly, The Territories and Revenues ceded to the Company by the Mogul, the Nabob of Bengal, the Soubah of the Decan, and the Nabob of Arcot, by Grants and Treaties after the year 1755. Thefe confill chiefly of the Pergun- nahs at Calcutta, the ceded Lands fo called in Burdwan, Midnapour and Chit- tagong, the Town and Diftridl of Calcutta, the Town, Fortrefs, Port and Diftrict of Mafulipatam, the Five Northern Circars, and the Jagheer Lands at Madras. The property of thefe may be debated on diflind grounds, each having been acquired by the Company in confequence of the influence refuUing from their H Military < 54 ) ; Military Eflablifhments, and the valour and fuccefs of their arnns after that period. Laftly, The Provinces of Bengal and Bahar, and that part of Orifla which is terminated on the South by the Cattack Countries belonging to the Maratta States, the Diftriifb of Benares, and the Countries in the Carnatic, and on the Malabar Coaft, lately obtained by the Treaty vi'ith Tippoo Saib. Thefe are claimed on the part of the Public, as the property of the State, on a maxim of Law, that all Territories acquired by conquell: veft in the Crown. Although it fhould feem eflential to the Company, that their exclufive Claim to each of the debatable Diftrifts fhould be inveftigated and finally decided upon, we fliall, for the prefent, confine our inquiry to the merits of what relates only to the Town, Port, and Diftridts of Malulipatam, and to the Five Northern Circars. We have given thefe a preference, from a perfuafion that in point of Revenue, Extent and Situation, they will be found to be intrinfically of greater importance than any of the others with which they are clafTed ; and becaufe, by a full and minute invefligation and difcuflion of the merits, whereon the legal right to thefe Dirtridls feems to depend, it is not improbable, but fome rule or principle may be eftablifhed with regard to all, or fome of the others. The magnitude and importance of the queftion of Right between the Pubfc and the Company, whether as applicable abftracledly to the Revenues of the Circars, or as eltablifhing a precedent in Law for determining the Claims of the Company upon other Territories ah eady, or which may in future be ob- tained and held upon titles of a like fort, have induced us to think it more pru- dent to hazard the imputation of prolixity, in the Statement we are about to give, rather than by curtailing it of circumllances, which might otherwife have been deemed inapplicable, or not pertinent to the merits of the qiielHon, incur a charge of partiality or negligence. For the eafe of our Readers who may be defirous of applying the Law to the fafts, in the order of their detail, according to the R'ghts of the rcfpedlive Claimants, we propofe to arrange our Tradt after the following method : •Firfl, To ftate what we conceive to be the legal and acknowledged Rights of the Crown, by virtue of its known perogative, in fo far as they relate to the prefent fubjcct. Secondly, The power of the Crown to transfer its Rights to others. Thirdly, How far the Crown has transferred its Rights to the Ei(t-India Com- pany, or otherwife enabled them by Law to acquire, hold, defend and difpofc of Lands and Territories within the limits of their Trade. Fourthly, A fug- cindl narrative of the fadls and circumrtanccs which preceded or accompanied the acquifuion of Mafulipatam. Fifthly, A fimilar narrative in refpedf to the acquifition of the Circars. And laf^ly, VVe fhall conclude with fome remarks on the merits of the Qutflion in point of Law, 5 Trerogative ( 55 ) Prerogative Rights. AMONGST the numerous Rights appertainino; to the King's Prerogative, arifing to him " from the reafon of the Common Law," (as we find it aptly ex- prefTed in a great * authority) are thofe of making War and Peace ; an intereft in his Subjedts, and a Plight to their fervice ; the 'command of all fortrefles and places of (Irength ; fo that none but by the King's Licence can legally build, crc£l-, or fortify a caftle or other place of defence ; the fole Coinage of Money; the Property in all Mines of Gold or Silver wherefoever found; the crf-diing of Courts of Judicature ; a general Right of Sovereignty over the Lands of all his Subjcfts, and a Right to the abfolute Property, as well as Sovereignty over foreign Territories acquired by conqueft, whether it be by his own regular Forces, or by any of his Subjedfs not trained or fo employed, but afting on their own will ; or acquired by Grant or Treaty obtained by Influence of Arms, or even by any Treaty or Grant of Dominion made to any of his Subjefts by a foreign Potentate. It is alfo a Right coeval and inherent in the Prerogative of the Crown, to delegate to, and invefl: its Subjefts with fuch Powers and Rights as may be deemed necefTary to be exercifed for giving vigour and effedt to the protedlion and fecurity of the Empire, the Extenfion of its Dominions, and the enlargement of its Commerce. Neither the Power of Delegation, nor the Right of Granting, has ever, that we can difcover, been denied, or queftioned, or limited, where the known Laws of the Land have not been impugned or exceeded. It was under Delegations of this defcription, that many of our foreign Dominions were obtained i and it is under Grants, flowing from the Prerogative, that our Nobility and Gentry, at this day, de- rive their titles to their landed Property in the Three Kingdoms. The pro- prietary Diftridts of America, and the Lands in the Wefl: India Iflands were thus conveyed ; nor is the Crown debarred (that we know of) from alienating any of its foreign Territories, either in pofTeflion, or reverfion, or dependent on any expectancy or contingency. The Reflraining Afl of Queen Anne, and the Civil Lift Adt of His Majefty, are limited to the demefnes and hereditary Revenues of the Crown at home. Company's Rights, WITH refpedt to the Rights and Privileges of the United Company, it will be found that the Old Company, eredted and incorporated by Queen Eliza- beth, were legally feized of the Iflands of St. Helena and Bombay, and of fundry Forts, Fadlories and Settlements, and were alfo poflTeflfed, and in the exercife of extenfive Authorities and Privileges in India ; all which, on the Union of the two Companies in 1702, were transferred to the United Company. Their Union was ratified by Queen Anne, under the great Seal of England, and the * Staundf, Preiog. Reg. Plowden3i4. H 2 Rights - ( 56 ) Rights and Powers thus conveyed, together with thofe which had been granted to the New Company, have been repeatedly fanctioned by fiibfeqiient Afts of Parliament made on the feveral compadls between the Public and the Company, for the continuation of their Lxclufive Trade ; on which occafions, the Com- pany paid to the Public fuch pecuniary confiderations, as at the time were deemed adequate in value to the Rights and Immunities purchafcd, or agreed to be held and enjoyed by them. Amongft which are thefe that fullow : To be a Corporation or Body-politic, and to have perpetual fucceffion, with ability to hold and retain Lands and Tenements of any kind, nature, or qua- lity whatever, and again to fell, alien, or difpofe thereof ; to make Sectlements in India, without any limitation in their value and extent; to build Caftles, Forts, Fortifications, or other Places of Strength ; to appoint Governors and Commanders ; raife, train, and mufter Forces ; repel Wrongs and Injuries on their Property ; make Reprilals on their Invaders, or Difturbers of their Peace ; coin Money, and eredt Courts of Judicature. So * ample were the powers for enabling the Company to preferve Difcipline amongft their Military, that they were authorized in all their Settlements, in cafes of Rebellion, Mutiny or Se- dition, or refufing to ferve in War, flying to an Enemy, forfaking Colours or Enfigns, or other offences againft Law, Cuftom and Difcipline Military, to ufe and exercife all the Povvers of Captain General, And by one of the Charters ic was exprefsly declared, that thefe Powers and Iramunitits fhould extend to all Territories which the Company fhould at any time purchafe or acquire within the limits of their Trade ; and by another -|~ Charter it was granted, that the Company fhould have the fole Rule and Government of all Forts, Faftories and Plantations, already, or which fhould thereafter be fettled by or under them, and exercife Martial Law therein ; and by ;[' another, they are impowered to fit out Men of War in times of hoftility. In thefe Charters and Grants the Sovereignty of the Crown alone is refcrved. Under the Rights and Powers thus conveyed, the Company acquired by pur- chafe from the Moguls, or other of the Native Princes and States, fundry fpots of ground on the Peninlula of India, on which they ereded Fadlories and Houfes of Trade; and for the better defence of their property againfl the incurfion of banditti and cafual depredation, they had long anterior to the conqucfl: of Bengal, fortified the Ifland of Bombay, and their Fa~m the Rajah and the Zemindars, that were with Ford, to repair as his valfals to his ftandard ; and it was not without difficulty they were prevailed on to difregard the fum- nions. Some part of the French forces, after their defeat, had feparated from 4 thofe ( H ) thofe who took' refuge in Mafulipatam, and being formed into afmall army of ob- fervation, were encamped at no great dillance from the Soubah. Colonel Ford perceiving his danger, and in defpair of efcaping, planned the bold effort of ftorniing the fort, though with little cxpeftation of fuccefs ; To amufe the Soubah in the interval, he fent Mr. Johnftone to pay him his homage, which the Soubah took in kind part, and received him in his camp. On the place failing into the Colonel's hands, the Soubah advanced within 15 miles of the fort, and the Rajah and Zemindars not doubting but the Soubah intended to reduce ir, feparated from the Englifli and retired into the country; but Salabur, after fome conference with the commander of the French army of obfervation, agreed to receive Colonel Ford in his tent, and to grant him certain requefts, and to Iwear to the performance of them. This engagement has been treated as a grant, and erroneoufly confidered as the foundation of the Company's title to the Five Northern Circars. It may, however, admit of a doubt, whether aided as it was by the Soubah's oath for its obfervance, it had the efficacy of a grant or treaty. The power of the Soubah to make any grant of, or to alienate a part of the Soubahfliip, is in the fiift place very quefiionabie. Secondly, He had already granted the fame diftridis to the French. Thirdly, The Sunnuds promiied by it, and which by the Conftitutions of the Empire (admitting the power) would be a mere nullity, unlefs paffed under the Seal of State accompanied by a variety of ceremonies and regifterations, do nut appear to have been ever obtained. Fourthly, In military or feudal tenures, (and this at befl; could be confidered in no other light) a new inveftiture becomes ncceffary on every change of the fupreme power who makes it, fo, that in no event could the Sun- ruds have been valid beyond the life or removal of Salabut Jung. And laftly, therequeft extended only to a diftindl part of the Circars. The form in which the Soubah's engagement is printed by the Company, differs materially from, and is far more extenfive in refpeft to tlie territories defcribed in it, than what is given as the agreement by Mr. Orme ; his again far exceeds what the Madras Govern- ment, at the time, defcribed to be the extent of it, in their advices to Bengal of July 1759. The Company's printed copy contains a promife of Sunnuds, for giving to the Company the Circar of Mafulipatam with eight diftrids, and the Circar of Nizampatam, and the diftrids of Condavir and Wacalmanncr, in the fame manner as was done to the French. Mr. Orme defcribes the grant to be of the whole territory dependent on Mafulipatam, with eight diftrids and jurifdidion over the territory of Nizampatam, and the diftrids of Condavir and Wacalmanner, all which were to be held without the referve either of fine or military fervice. The Governor and Council of Madras, immediately after the communication to them by Colonel Ford of his interview with the Soubah, de- fcribe the grant to be no more than " of the port of Mafulipatam, with the " dependencies thereto belonging ;" recommending it to Lord Clive to obtain a confirmation of it from the Mogul, or at leaft a renewal of the Company's old Fir- maund for Divi Ifland, and their fadory in the town of Mafulipatam. What- I 2 ever ( 64 ) ever might be the extent, it is evident that the port, town, and citadel of Ma- fiilipatam were all that the Company retained. The Circars at large, were left in the Soubah's pofl'effion as their immediate fuperior, under a promife that Anunderauze fhould be continued in the management of the Chicacole Lircar, upon the terms which his anceftors had held it from the former Soubahs. Colo- nel Ford with the Engiilli forces were foon after withdrawn from the Circars, a very fmall number only being left in the garrifon j and fo far were the Com- pany from retaining the pofleffion of any thing beyond the port and town, and dependencies, that it appears that fo early as June 1760, Nizam Ally, who, in confequence ot his brother being drfertcd by the French, had aflumed the Soubahfhip, vifited the Circars, and was attended at Rajamundrum by Mr. Altrx- andcr, the Chief of Mafulipatam •, where he urgently requefted a body of the Cotnpany's troops to aft againft the Mahrattas ; offering to pay one lack of rupees monthly, and if they beat the Mahrattas, and diip./ffcfred them of the country belonging to him, he would then agree to give the Englilh the Circars of Rajahmundrum, Ellore, and Muftaphanagur ; and tha% on the propofal not being accepted, he had left thofe Circars under the management of HufTcin Ally, and had granted the Guntoor or Condavir Circar, in Jaghcer, to his bro- ther Bazatet Jung ; continuing Vizeram Rauze (fon of Anunde Rauze) in that of Cicacole ; and in a letter from Madras of April 1766, it is exprefsly faid, that after Colonel Ford had taken Mafulipatam, and put an end to th« authority of the French in the Decan, all the Five Circars were reftorcd to. the dominion of the Soubah. It is obfervable, that Salabut Jung's firft grant to the French was of Mafuli- patam only. Mr. Orme has given us the income of it, diftindly from that of the Circars. It was the only part of the country which the Company retained from 1759, till they obtained the grant of the Circars in 1765, From thefe cir- cumftances it is pretty evident, that Mafulipatam was conlidcred as a diflridl of itfelf from any of the Circars, or perhaps as forming a Sixth Circar. The other Five take their names from the capital of each. Condavir or Guntoor from the towns bearing thofe names. Ellore from that town, and lo of the reft. And hence it was that Huflcin Ally's authority over Ellore, as the ma- nager or renter thereof to the Soubah, might be perfcdlly compatible with the Company's enjoyment of Mafulipatam. From thefe fafts we think ourfelves warranted in the following conclufion (namely) that the diftintft diftridt of Mafulipatam, with the fortrels and port belonf^ins to it, were obtained by conq^test; and from the moment of the capture of the fort by Colonel Ford, they became vefted in full and intire pro- perty as well as fovereignty in the King; and at this day continue the eftate of the Crown, to be kept or granted as His Majefty may think fit. Should it be objcded that becaufe Mafulipatam had been held by the French as a fief of the Indian Empire, and that the cl^ange of hands could not alter the ( 65 ) the rights of the Mogol or his Soiibah, as the paramonnt lorcf^, v/e are ready to admit that the Kin^^, by his prerogative, mult of neceflity be the fumnun domi' mis fiipra omnes ovtr all territories heKi by l-im-, that lands in his poflcffiun are free from every tenure ; that he can neither be a joint tenant with another, nor hold of another. But witli this a imifllon, and though in faft the Suubah had taken no part in the hoililities between the Englidi and the French, yet we cm- ceive that the levying war in the Decan againft the French, they being feuda- tories of theSoubah, mull, to every legal intent, be held as levying war againft that power alfo; and that by the conqueft, the fovereignty as well as the loil became inftantly annexed to the Crown of England. If the French had them- fclves the fovereignty, the legal etreft would have been the fame. The fubfe- quent agreement by Col. Ford with Salabut Jung, could not change or vary the nature of the King's title to Mafulipatam once acquired, nor under the Charter of 17 1^7 could the Company reltore ir, becaufe they were rcftrained from ceding back any acquifitions belonging to the Europer.n dates. The treaty of Peace, in 1763, completely eftablifhed the right of the King; the French having thereby renounced all their acquifitions on the Coail except their Factories, which alone were reftored to them. The Acquijilkn of tf'f Ctrcars. THE new Soubah Nizam Ally, derived his right to the Government of the Decan under a grant from the iMogul ; he was prefled on all fides by the armies of the Mahratta States and of Hyder Ally, and was in the utmoft diflrefs both for money and fuccours. He appears from the firft commencement of his acceffion, to have anxioufly courted our alliance, as the furert means of furnifh- jng himfelf with protedtion againft the French, whom he both feared and had ofi'ended, and againft the ambitious views of his troublelome neighbours. We have already feen that he made his firft overtures to Mr. Alexander at Rajah- mundrum in 1760, immediately after he had depofed his brother. In 1761 he repeated them, with an earneft defire to be affifted with troops, and an offer of the Circars by way of fubfidy. At this period it would on many accounts have been defirable for the Company to have complied ; but the period was critical, and European forces could not be lafely fpared. In the mean time many of the Zemindars and Renters in the Circars, taking advantage of the weaknefs of the Soubah's Government, and the unfettled ftate of the Decan, had become re- fraftory, had with-held their tribute, and had bid defiance to the authority of HufTein Ally the Soubah's manager ; and to render the anarchy the more general, the more powerful of the Zemindars had waged war againft each other. Unable to fend affiftance from Hydrabad, the Nizam, in the autumn of 1762 deputed his Minifter Huffein Ally, to the Prefidency of Fort St. George, with grants or Junnuds for the Four Circars in the nature of a fubfidy, again repeating his requeft for a European force. The war with Spain had been juft commenced, and the expedition againft Manilla undertaken, fo tiiat the Madras Government were unable co comply. T hey, however, did not chcofe to hazard the giving the Soubah. offence^. ( 66 ) off-nce, by an abrupt reje(5\:ion of the Sonnuds, nor a pofitive refufal, fearing lie would admit the French again to their pofleffion of thole diftridts ; preficd by HufTein Ally to lend him a fmal! body of Native troops to fiipport his au- thority in the Circars, and perfiiaded that it was the general difpofnion of the Zemindars and Renters, to fubmit to any realonable propofals if fanftioned by the Company's authority, and that their name alone would go far in drawing them back to their allegiance, the Madras Government, with HuiTcin's confcnt, proceeded to publifb the Sunnuds in the Circars, and though no force was ufcd, the Zemindars and Renters came immediately in and fettled for their rents with Huflein Ally and the Company's civil officers. It appears however, that a fmall body of Sepoys was fent from Madras to Mafulipaiam, to have enforced obe- dience to the Sunnuds if it had been found necelTary. But the fubm.iHion of the Zemindars was fpontaneous and iinmediate, and it does not appear that thefe Native troops had occafion to flir from their place of landing. In the meantime the Soubah defpairing of our afTiflance, found means to ap- peafe, in fome degree, the Mahratta army. Full of refentment at the conduct of the Company, for their breach of the confidence he had repofed in them by the publication of the Sunnuds, without a compliance with the condition annexed to them, he meditated revenge both on the Company and on his own iVlinifler. The Madras Government therefore fubmitted to reftore both the Sunnuds and the country ; and as foon as the expences of the troops had been difcharged, they were withdrawn. The Nabob of Arcot interpofed his mediation with the Soubah for his forgivenels of Huflein Ally, who by dint of a large prelent lent for the purpofe to Huffcin by the Nabob, or advanced by the Company's fer- vants, was reinftated in his mailer's favor; and, recovering his former influence, he returned into the Circars, cloached with efficient powers for the Government of thofe diftrifts. No fooner had the Company withdrawn their fuccours, than the Zemindars and Renters again fell from their allegiance to the Nizam, who finding that no- thing but the Company's influence could keep his fubjects there in any degree of fubordination, now came forward with a direft requifuion for their affiftance, and an agreement being fettled for the fubfidy to be paid for their hire, wherein the charge of the garrifons of Mafulipatam and Vizagapatam was included, a body of torces with artillery was again fent from Madras upon that fcrvice, and they no fooner made their appearance, than all the Zemindars and Renters quiet'y fubmitted ; order was rellored, and Huffein Ally's authority was fully re-eftabliflied. The French had lately returned to their factories on the Coaft, and a general rumour prevailed that they were preparing to re-affijme their pofleffions of the Circars under the article in the treaty of Verfaillcs for mutual rcftor.ition * ; the Fiench miniflry having rcfufed, as it was faid, to admit the propolitions of the Duke of Bedford, relating to India into the final treaty. * The affairs of India had efcaped notice 'till fome time after the preliminaries were fip^ncd. Although ( 67 ) Altliough this report had no foundation in fafl, it neverthelefs, for the time, was believed, and gave great alarm to the Company's fervants ; who, well know- ing that if the French were to be re-en:abliflii.-d in their authority and influence in the Dccan, former contentions would inftantly be renewed, came to the refulu- tion in any event, of refifting any attempt that might be made for that purpofe. At the end of 1764, they opened a new negociation with the Soubah fur a grant of ihe Ci'cars, upon payment of a ftipulated fum annually. 'Ihey knev/ that he had hitherto realized but a trifling income from that part ofhis dominions, and they flat- tered thcmCelves that as the Zemindars had ever refifted his authority, while they had fliewn an anxious ditpofition to remain under the Company's proteiflion, the Soubah might be induced to yield to their application, at a rent inferior to what the Zemindars could afford, and were willing to pay to him. In their firft overtures they offered him five lacks of rupees for the firft year-, ten for the fecond •, and fifteen every year after. But fo great was their anxiety to feclude the French, that without waiting the event of their firH: offer, they fent a fecond meflenger with a new one, of a prompt payment of five lacks, and to give fifteen lacks per annum from the commencement. The Soubah flood for twenty lacks, which exceeding the authority given to treat upon, was rejedted ; whereupon the Nizam immediately granted a Sunnud of them to Huflcin Ally, at that or fome other large rent, as we have before obferved. The zeal of the Madras Govern- ment to obtain pofleffion of the Circars, kept pace only with the inflrucftions from the Direftors and the advice of Lord Clive. The difficulty was how to aff(?(5t it without a rupture. The Company had in 1762, 1763, 1764, and 1765, repeated their earneft wiflies to obtain them, but at the fame time deprecated new wars and trouble?, and in particular cautioned their fervants how they in- frafted the treaty of peace, even in the event of the FVench procuring a new grant of the Circars ; and in fome of their letters they expreffed their concur- rence to any agreement with the Nizam, though attended with an engagement to furnifh him with the forces he wanted, if weighty reafons or the neceffity of the cafe fhould require it. Lord Clive was in the mean time anxioufly contem- plating on the means of effedting the favorite plan he had formed^ of uniting. our poffeflions on the Coaft with thofe in Bengal. The reluftance of the Sou- bah to accept the Company as his tributaries on reafonable terms, with the ab- folute neceffity there appeared for fecluding the French, drove that able com- mander to folicit a grant from the Mogul, conveying to the Company the intire property of the Five Circars ; and in 1765 he obtained it. At the time of the grant reaching Madras, the troops we had lent to the Nizam were ftill in his pay and fcrvice in the Circars, and the Madras Government, with the concur- rence of Lord Clive, came to the decifive refolutionof availing themfelves in any event of the grant. Their forces were already on the fpot to maintain or en- force the claim. War however, was if poffible to be avoided ; treachery, chi- cane and bribery were fubftituted as the fafer inflruments. FJuffein Ally, the manager for the Soubah, was in the firfl inllance dealt with, and fuccefsfullv, tO' betray the interefts of his mafler, and for the promife of a Jagheer (which was actually fettled on him afterwards by the Company) and a promife of fupporc and. ( 68 ) ai^d protLv^ion, and alfo of being continued in his renterfhip. he agreed to aft with i!ie Company. A very fm.dl additional force to what was already there, was then fent into the Circars The Soo Native troops under Ibraham Beg the Soubah's military commander were, by the management of Huflein Ally, in- Jlfted into rhe Company's pay. Vizeram Rauze was alfo brought over by aflur- nnces of Icffening his rents, and having traitcroufly delivered up the Forts of Raj^hmundrum and Coffirn Cctah, which had been in his charge, he retired to his own Circar of C hicaccje. In the mean time a deputation was fent to Hy- diabad, again to ofFer terms of becoming tributaries for the Circars to the Sou- bah, who was as yet a ftranger to the grant cf the Mogul. The Fort of Condi- pilla was deemed a neceflary poffeffion to cover the principal pafs from Ellore to Hydrabad ; and, while the deputies were negociating with the Nizam, General Calliaud ieizcd upon it. This place is fituate between the mountains bordering on the Ellore diftrift, and was taken by florm ; four Sepoys being wounded upon the occafion. This was molf probably a devife concerted to create a panic in the Nizam ; for by the agreement then fubfifting, our troops were to have poffeffion of any of the Soubah's Forts as the means of fubjeding the inhabi- tants, and HufTein Ally was fole governor. So little was the refiltance at this Fort, that if there was any, it was deemed too trifling to be worthy of notice by the commanding officer in his letters of the time mentioning the capture of it. The Mogul's Sunnuds were now publiflied, and every Zemindar immediately ac- knowledged the Company as their fovereign. After a tlow and tedious negocia- tion ac Hydrabad, and by dint of money advanctd to the Soubah and prefents to his * minillers and officers, his own grant of the Circars was obtained for the Company at a rent or annual tribute or gift of nine lacks of rupees, and under an engagement to furniffi a body of forces when called upon ; and thus was the Company firmly eflablifhed in the poffiffion of the Circars, except of the Guntoor, for which they were to wait either the death of Bazalet Jung or his breach of faith, in either of which events the Company were to have the pof- feffion of that Circar alio-, and in the interval two lacks of the rent was to be abated. The Nizam referved to himfelf the diamond mines and the villages near them, and alfo the Kildarry and Jagheer of Condapilly. It had been agreed that our troops (hould join thofe of the Nizam and the Mahrattas, and proceed to the cnnqueff of Hyder Ally's dominions. The troops were accordingly fent, and they remained with him fome months ; but Hyder by a large bribe brought the Soubah over to his own purpofes, and our troops were in confequence withdrawn. Before they quitted the Nizam, a promife was obtained that the tribute (for fo it is called) of two lacks per annum for the Chicacole Circar fhould be relinquiflied ; and in July 1767, the Soubah gave a Sunnud for the remiflion of it. In Augul following the Nizam threw off the mafk, and openly joined Hyder's army at Bangalore ; from whence their * One lack was given to the chief minillcr, half a lack to the fccond, and prefents to the inferlorSt horfe ( 69 ) horfe made excurfions and ravaged the Carnatic as far as Arcot. In September^ Colonel Smith drove them from the Carnatic, and in December following, the Nizam feparated from Hyder Ally, and foon afterwards confirmed, by a new treaty the Mogul's grant of the Circars, and alio his own Sunnud for the remiflion of the tribute for Chicacole, referving the other tribute of five lacks, and two more for the Guntoor Circar, payable only when polfenion Ihould be had ; agreeing alfo to allow out of thofe tributes 25 lacks of rupees for the expence of the war. After the death of Bazalet Jung, Lord Cornwallls liquidated all accounts with the Nizam, and obtained pofleflSon of the Guntoor. The Company paid him a large balance for arrears, and entered into engagements for the regular paymenc of the whole annual tribute of feven lacks. In deciding the queftion of right to the foil and revenues of thefe Circars,^ •under the peculiar circumftances by which they were obtained, it is neceffary to have recourfe to firft principles ; for the right of fovereignty in the prefent cafe feems equally difputable with the right of loil. The reafon or principle whereoii a right attaches to a fovereign over conquered territories, bears a flrong analogy to the cafes of efcheats. By the operation of law, the legal eftate (as it is called) in the lands of a baftard or other perfon dying intefiate without heir, devolves upon the Sovereign, becaufe in the very nature of the cafe, the legal eftate can go no where elfe, and it mufl: be vefted fomewhcre. So of a conqueft, the former owners are driven out, and the legal ownerfhip muft, by the ne- ceflity of the thing, veft in him who has tlie right to the fervices of his fubjefts the conquerors ; and as is before fhewn, the Sovereign has a right to their fervice. In fuch a cafe, the legal property could otherwife exift in no one ; a fluftuating body being by Law incapable of taking an interefl in lands. On the other hand, if there be any thing intermediate that prevents the property palTing in a dire6l channel to the Crown, that circumflrance complcatly interrupts the operation of the principle we have defcribed. Tlius, if a baftard dies in- teftate, feized of a copyhold of inheritance, it fhall not go to the King, but to the Lord of the Manor ; and fo on an attaint of blood, if the convidl has pre- vioufiy transferred the legal intereft in his inheritance over to another the King is barred, and ftiall not take it by his prerogative. Thequeftion then becomes reduced to the fimple fad, whether at the time of, and anterior to the Company's taking poftefllon of the Circars, the legal eftate in the foil was in them. If it was, it remains fo ftill, and the term of conqueft in fo far as it has any relation to, or connedlion with the qucftion of right, is inapplicable to the fubjedt. Every force ufed however necelTary and juft, to help any lawful owner to his own, might equally be termed a conqueft. In viewing and comparing the cafe of the Circars with thofe of Mafulipatam and the final con- queft of Bengal, for the purpolc of difcoveiing the operation of law with refpeft to the proper4:y in the foil, the difference (and a very great one indeed it is) confifts in this, that in the former inftance the grant was antecedent to the poireftion; it. \y&% made by the lawful owner to a party (the Eaft-India Com- K P^ny) (■ 70 ) pany) capable and authorized by law to accept and hold the lands fo granted, whereby the legal eftate and title became transferred to the Company in thefirfl inftance, and they have done no adl whatever todiveft themfelves of it, but have obtained poireflion as they lawfully might, and have ever fince retained it. Whereas in the other cafes, the grant being made fubfequent to the conqueft, the law in- flantly caft the legal eftate by the conqueft upon the King -, and any grants made fubfequent to the King's title once acquired, though made by the conquered party and former owner to the real conqueror, are unavailable, and cannoc operate to diveft the King of what he had previoufly been invefted with. To raife a queftion at this day upon the efficacy of the Mogul's grant to the Company, would be abfurd and prepofterous, as ftriking at the very root of their titles to various parts of our poffefiions in India, and particularly to the fettlemenrs of the Company ; and becaufe if the grant be bad, it will not make a title in the King. With refpeft to the means ufed for obtaining the grant in queftion, it will be alfo nugatory to enter upon the enc^uiry, fince no part of the claim of the Public is founded upon an imputed forfeiture; and becaufe by the jurifpru- dence of England, the King muft fliew a legal title in himfelf to fupport his right; no equitable circumftances can avail him in fuch a cafe againft his fub' jefts. Befides which, if a fraud, however grofs and atrocious it may have been, were to be proved or admitted in refpedt to the means ufed to obtain the grant, it could give no right of refumption here, nor aflift the claim of the Crown or the Public. If by the enormity of the fraud, the grant could be vitiated and fet afide, the lands muft revert to the grantee upon whom the fraud was com- mitted. That the Company were capable, and muft fo continue 'till the law is altered, of acquiring landed property by grants from the country powers to an indefinite extent, is evident both in the letter and the fpirit of their Charter, and no man will be hardy enough to deny it, after the high legal authority we have before quoted at large in the Third Chapter upon that very point. Left what we have already faid fliould not be thought fufficient for fupport- ing the exclufive claim of the Company to the Circars ; and left the claim of the Public fhould be again brought forward as for a country obtained by con- queft, it may be right further to difcufs the fadt. That fraud and every fpecies of corruption, chicane and artifice, were prac- tifed to create fears and apprehenfions in the mind of the Soubah, as the means of influencing and bringing him into our views for effefling our purpofes ; and that we corrupted his minifters and commanders to gain them over to our interefts, will not be denied. Pradtices of a nature which would never have been admitted in the Councils of the Company's fervants, under other circum- ftances than the very peculiar ones which at that critical jundure exifted. But i, we C 71 ) we fee in this nothing like coitque/i. The forces we had in the Circars, except a very few that had been added for fliew more than actual fervice, to attend the publication of the Mogul's grant, were at that time in the pay and fervice of the Soubah himfclf, and we were in perfect amity with him. The bare aft of taking pofTeffion of the defencelefs Fort of Condapilly and the pafs, cannot furely be deemed a conqiieft of the Circars. It is much to be doubted, if that Fort is deemed a part of the Circars, nor does it clearly appear that it was garrifoned by the Soubah's forces. Ic may rather be prefumed to have been held by a Ze- mindar, as thofe Forts were which we obtained by corrupting Vizeram Raufe. But admitting it was the Soubah's, it will be found fituate at the extremity of the Circar of Ellore, between the hills, which form the north-weft boundary of it. As well might it be argued that by the capture of Breda, the French had accom- plifhed the conquefl: of the United Provinces, as that a country fix hundred miles in length on the lea coaft, was conquered by taking this hill fort, fituate at the Welkrn extremity of it. The Government of Fort St. George, the moment they knew of the Mogul's grant, had undoubtedly refolved to feize and keep the Circars upon many confiderations both political and commercial, and had concerted and taken their meafures to meet the event of the Nizam ultimately rejeding their propofals, or of his refilling their attempts to keep them by force. But both juftice and policy dictated the propriety of holding them as fiefs of the Empire under the Native Sovereigns, by a rent and military tenure, rather than to involve the country in a new war; and their plan fuc- ceeded. They purchafcd, of the Soubah, a confirmation of their polTeflion by a fine, a yearly rent or tribute, and an engagement to furnifli a body offerees when required. They afted upon this agreement by an adual fupply of troops immediately after, and they have paid the If ipulated rent. It may be faid, and perhaps truly fjid, that the Soubah's mind was influenced in making the grant more by panic and the fear of refentment if he fliould refufe, than by any advantages he could expedt to derive by his compliance. But the motives for his conduft can in no way be admitted to affecfl the decifion on the queftion of right, nor will they admit of proof j Itill lefs ought we to prefume that becaufe the Company's fervants purfued improper means to gain their point, thofe means failing, the conqueft ot the Circars muft of neceflity have followed ; as well might it be argued that though the grant was obtained, the Company in- ftead (jf being permitted to take the fruits of it, fliall be confidered as having done that, which they did not in fa£l dO; and which their ability to have done, mull: have depended altogether on the precarious events of war. With refped: to the treaty of 1768, whereby the Soubah in effecH: ratified the two former agreements ; nothing material appears to us to arife from it to alter the queftion of right, and therefore we forbear to enter into any difculTion of it. The Company's tenure and their poflelTions remained as before. It has been noticed that by conqueji, the fovereignty, as well as the foil, pafTes to the Crown. If the Law Officers in India had conceived that the Circars were held. ( 72 ) held in right of conqueft, they could have had no difficulty in advifing their conftituents to have obtained from the Crown a Charter of Juftice for thole parts of their poflefiions. The want of Courts of Judicature there, has long been a fubjeft of very ferious complaint. That none have been inftituted, can alone be afcribed to the circumftance of our not holding the Circars by right of con- quefl, but as Jagheerdars and tributaries to the Native Princes. The Law officers of the Company have given it as their opinion, that the fovereignty re- mains in the country powers, and that no Courts can be inftituted but by the authority of the iVIogul or his Soubah. If the fovereignty is not in the King, it muft follow that the property in the lands or revenues cannot be vefted in him ; and although the Crown cannot hold by the tenure of another, it is very confiftent for the Company to do fo, and in fafb they always have fo held from the time of their obtaining their firft Firmauns from the country powers. Upon the whole, we retain the opinion formerly given in the Third Chapter,* that in point of law the Crown or the Public have no claim againft the Com- pany in the northern Circars, and that they are held by the Company as Jag- heerdars to the Mogul, (a fpecies of military tenure, by which they are to fur- nifh a number of cavalry, determinable by the Emperor's books) paying at the fame time by voluntary compaft, a fixt tribute to the Soubah ©f the Decan, who is the nominal viceroy and reprefentative of the Mogul in thofe parts. How far fo large a territory may be necefTary for the purpofes of commerce, and in that refpeft proper to be kept by the Company, or for any political pur- pofes to be taken from them and placed in the Crown, it is not our province to determine. The Legiflature are the proper judges in that refpedt. All that we mean to contend is this, that the Circars never were conquered by the Eaft- India Company ; that their title to them is by grant, and that there is no law exiftino- by which they can be taken out of their hands, or by which they are liable to account for the revenues of them to the Public, otherwife than according to the terms and conditions of their exifting compadt for the continuance of their exclufive trade, by which a temporary participation has been eftablilhed of the Revenues of the Britifli Territories in India at large, of which Mafulipatam and the Circars form a part, with a mutual faving of Rights from being prejudiced by that partition. * Vide the opinions of ihe Company's Advocate General and Solicitor General at Fort St. .'fjeorgc, ^iven in July, 1783. As ACCOUNT of the Value of the Good., diaingmfi^ng ^'^^ P''"^'P^^' "^'^'p ^„^'"' °^,^^ of Eaft India Goods, clUniaccd at the lame Rate as the imports ; n ot 1 our 1 ears. Exports Value of Goods fold at the Company's Sales Total Value fold in the Four Years Medium Anual Value fold Ditto exported Years. Walk- ing Canes. Medium Annual Value remaining for Home Confumption £■ . 3,66fc 4.42^ 35,760 Medium Annual Value retained for Home Confumption, excluding the Duties 8,041 2,587 China Ware. 30," 24 3^,959 S4.5SC 45,201 177,83^ 44,45^ 12,68.1 3i,774 Coffee. Stuffs I^PP^""- digo. £. £. C- 29,720 t;5,438),5b9 14,928 163,0977,107 54,015 1 75,223^,564 47,919, 149, ''^'■^'3 5 I Red Sanders. 146,582 582,9473,611 16,682 36,645 145,7362,152 '4,5°3 22,142 100,4725,01 1 45,2643,141 12,278 25,i94>,i4i £• 4,847 3,441 2,279 10,567 2,641 812 1,829 1,829 Shel- lack. 4,152 609 1,296 6,059 1,514 3,365 Saltpetre. £• 100,067 87,041 85,692 160,913 433,713 108,428 5,434 102,994 F6,5i4 Value of Goods fold at the Company's Sales continued . - - - - Total Value fold in the Four Years Medium Annual Value fold Ditio exported Years, Mother of Pearl Shells £■ 3,323 2,322 Medium Annual Value remaining for Home Confumption^ Medium Annual Value retained for Home Confumption, ex-clufive of the Duties - - 5,645 1,411 720 691 57^ Silk. Bengal Raw. " £■ 289,271 302,991 321,882 318,440 1,232,584 308,146 46,620 261, 526 bilk. Cliin; Raw. £■ 235,5 217,7 236,1 14^,5 837,'- 233,883 209,il 14,-^ 195,^ 145,' Value of Eaft-India Goods exported Total Value exported in the Four Y'ears I\Tedium Annual Value exported „ Stuffs. P^PP^'di-o. £■ £■ 92,1 li, 402 95, 5^;, 280 125,17,365 89,c(- 401,85,047 io%4t,o I I Red Sanders 889 '37 2,076 148 3,^5° S12 Shel- lack. 6,787 3,078 3,271 326 13,462 3,3^5 Saltpetre. £■ 7,5:5 7,921 S>397 21,738 5,434 Value of Eaft-India Goods exported, commued Total Value exported in Four Years Years. Mother of Pearl Shells. £■ 1,792 897 194 2,883 hilk. Bengal Raw. ~~£- 65,481 55, '74 50,9' 3 14,913 bill Chi Ra ~? 3' 1 1 9 5 _2^tLl ^1 RECAPITULATION As ACCOUNT of the Value of the Goods, diainguidiing the principal Articles fold by the Kast India Compaxv in the lad Four Years, agreeablv to the Company's Sale Prices • andalfooflhe of Eaft India Goods, clliiiiatcd at tlic fame Rate as the Imports ; together with the Value, inclmlmg the Duties of that Part which remains for Home Conlumption taken upon a Medium of IMPORTS. ( 73 Value of the Four Years. Exports Years. \V;.lk- ing Cincs. ~~ I3,66i 4>4J5 9'* 35.76'^ China Ware. C- 39. '=4 38,959 S4 5!' 4S.*°' '77,831 44.455 3". 774 i6,6S2 Coffee. Pepper. Sago. Tea. Turme- ric. Miinulac- turcd Articles. Unmanu- lac'turcd Articles. Cowries. Dru^s. Beiija mill. Borax, refined and unrefined. Carde- moms. Callia Buds. CalTia Lignea. Camphirc unrefined. Myrrh. Quick- lilvcr. Rhubarb. Dye Siuffi. Indigo. Red Sanders. Shel- lack. Saltpetre. • 1789 Value of Goods fold at the Company's S.ilcs - ■ ^ ^ ' , 1792 29,720 14,928 S4.01! 47.9"9 95,438 l6;,C97 175,^-3 149,189 2,990 <'.994 7,330 5.;''3 I. 2,843,386 2.9'7.23S 2,985,070 3.047.<'93 1,993 4,198 if- 2,666 ■+,250 37,839 18,210 I- 19, '77 1,238 853 6,087 5.3 3" 8,919 8.718 5, 166 4.201 3.03? 296 3,42 = 3.440 £■ 4,377 '.943 2,24; '0,972 231 1,156 2,436 if. 16,285 4.4" 3>7>9 4.257 if. 8,148 if- 2,710 1,989 478 if- 17,982 4,983 1,126 '4,303 '5.584 988 if- 110,569 '37,'07 209,564 ■83.351 T7 3,44 ■ 2.279 C- 4.152 609 1,296 100,067 87,041 85,692 160,913 Total Value fold in the Four Years 146,582! 582,947 23,077 1 1,803,392 6,774 7=,973 21.986 2=,337 18,085 10,197 8,565 14,796 28,7.2 8,148 5,'07 38,394 16,572 640,61 1 10,567 6,059 433,713 Medium Anual Value fold Ditto exported - . - 8,04' 5.65- ^587 3'','4S ■4,503 ■45,736 100,472 5,769 2>9So,848 773 330.8=5 1,693 694 ■8,243 4,180 5.496 1,320 5,084 3.653 4.5 = > 9.874 2,549 96 2,141 2,275 3.699 2,64 = 7,'78 11,919 2,037 1,940 1,301 644 9.598 90. 8,691 7. '51 4. '43 6 162 160,15a 34.'" 1 2,641 812 ■■5'4 3.365 108,428 5-454 Medium Annual Value remaining for Home Confumption 22,142 ■2,278 45,264 25.'94 4,996; 2,620.023 799 '4,05s 4,176 1.43' - 2.453 - '.057 - 97 657 — 116,141 1,829 101,954 Medium Annual Value retained for Home Confuinption, excluding the Duties 3,900 2,288,104 605 8,741 2.997 978 - i.Sio - 95' - 86 3,0 - 126,141 .,829 — 86,5.4 1 M 1 ' R T S CON T I N U R n. Valje of Goods fold at the Company** Sales continued . . . . - Tulal Value fold in ihc Four Ve; .78., 1790 i;9i 1792 Medium Annual Value fold - - . . Dino exported • - - Medium Annual Value remaining for Home CunfunipfK Medium Annual Value retained for Home Confumption, c\clutivc of the Duties ■ , , . Mother of I'carl Shells, if- 3.323 1,322 5.645 1,411 720 691 billt. Bengal Raw. if- 289,271 302,991 321,882 318,440 '.232.584 308,146 46,620 261,526 233,883 bilk. China Ran. "7 235,506 '■7.735 236,179 '4^,547 837,967 209,491 14,480 '45.353 Cotton Wool. 267 2,9;6 '5, =35 ■S,4 ?8 4,619 25 629,949 8!S,S99 866,5^9 820,1 14 3.'55.47i 786,867 674,342 "4,S'> 77.877 MuQins. if- 793,166 1,208,384 -,80,729 840,879 3,623,158 905,789 516,240 359.549 294,831 £■■ 40.327 4S.5'6 35.783 ■S.=34 .36,860 34.215 7,606 26,607 21,810 Prohibited Goods. "T- 2 36,r',68 282,598 272,321 242,622 034,109 258,55-' 258,552 Mllcclla- neous .-irtielcs. 2',3'4 31,000 49,848 25,650 127,822 3'.9!S 10,73s Grand Total. I- t,6i4,64t 6,359.257 6,210,469 6,1 19, 111 24,303,488 6,075,871 2,114,378 3,96 ',494 X o T S. Years. W alk- iug Canes. China Ware, Coffee. Pepper. Sago. Tea. Furme- ric. iManutac- turcd Articles. Unmaiiu- faclured Articles. Cowries. UrUK!. Ecnja- miu. refined and unrefined. Carde- moins. Calha Buds. Calfia X-ignea. .Cainphire uurc tilled. Myrrh. (Juick- filvcr. Rhubatb. Dye StuSi. Indi^u. Red Sauders Shrl. lacil. Saltpetre. Value of Eaft-India Goods expoitcd - ■ 1 .-^^ L 1J92 if. 8,796 S.3°4 5,3"' 3.2'4 if- 12,721 '2,45-- 11,510 14,046 12,476 5,968 661 38,909 if. 92,115 95.5'7 125,129 69,c6.- if. 1,063 '5' 1,88. if- 342.3" 307,093 33.3,029 340,86s if- 1,256 '.54" 780 666 3,065 if- 4.791 309 '79 1 1,1 69 2.477 302 167 if- 10,432 4,962 8,131 'S.974 if- 6+ 3' 291 if- :;'5?^ 2,638 2,527 I- 2,699 3.;o4 ',96 3,'7' 16,567 ii,39» 8,895 ic,8io if- 6,096 1,666 7,762 if- 4-6 755 if- 4611 2,1 4t, 84- 144 C- 11,674 6,824 4,668 484 24,650 c- 3.<"2 4S,i«o 87,365 689 "'! 2,076 .48 C- 3.078 3.271 326 £■ 905 -.5'S 7.92' S.397 Total V4I0C exported in llie Four Years 22,63c t.657 50,739 12,684 58,014 '1,503 401,889 10^,271 3.0951 '.323. 30! 3,577 16,752 5,282 - 1,320 14,615 39.499 387 9,100 .0,57c 2,642 47,676 2,576 3,6ofc 136,047 S.'SO 8.2 13.462 21,738 Medium Annual Value expotlcd 773 3-0.82; 894 4,i8ft ■,653 9.874 06 2,17; 11,9 9 1,940 6*4 902 6,i4i 34, o. 1 3.365 5.434 EXPORTS C O N T I N U F. D. ^ aliie of Eaft-India Goods exported, commucd f '789 I 1790 I '79' v '792 Intal Value exported in Four Years Mother of I'carl Shells. if- '.792 897 '94 1,883 .-ilk. Bengal Raw. ~~£- 65,481 55.'74 50,913 >4.9'3 186,481 Silk. China Raw. f- 31,602 11,1:95 9.05' 5,595 S7,9'3 Cotion Wool. if- Callicoel. /■- 588, 786 650, 820 640,055 1 817, 710 2,69" 37' 6-4, 1J2 Nankeens. if- 596,814 478,940 .188,128 611,079 2,184,961 ^46,240 if- 6,647 8,26s 7,0 '7 8,49' 30.414 7,6 5h Prohibited (iuods. if- 23 ,668 281,593 272,321 242,622 .,034,209 H8,;C2 i Mileella- ncous Articka. ~7~~ 7,'oS 10.333 16,949 _8,550_ 4'.940 Grand Total. 7- ' 2.085.5S3 2,021,695 2,099, l&{ 2,25. ,07} 8,1S7,5'» RECAPITULATI 4 RECAPITULATION of the preceding Account. Medium Annual Amount of Eaft India Sales, including Duties paid by the Company and the Purchafers, viz. in Goods £. 5,015,180 ; in Dutics^T. 1,060,692 ; in all /. 6,075,872. The above Sum of ^.6,075,872 confifls of the following Articles, including the Duties. ift. Walking Canes, China Ware, Coffee, Pepper, Sago, Tea, Turmeric, manufaftured and unnianufadured Goods, and fundry fmall Articles £. 2,756,262 2dly. Drugs and Cowries - - ... •4)391 3dly. Indigo, Red Sanders, Saltpetre, Mother of Pearl Shells, Ben- gal and China Raw Silk, Cotton Wool, and fundry fniall Articles - 704,256 4thly. Callicoes, Muflins, and Nankeens ... . 500,683 Total Amount retained for Home Confumption, including the Duties ..... 3,975,591 Goods exported, including the Duties - - . 2,114,378 Total . . . . . . 6,089,970 Deduft the Amount of thofe Articles, the value of which on expor- tation exceeded the value fold, arifing from a greater quantity of thefe Articles having been on hand at the time the Account commenced, than at the period in which it terminated . 14,098 -6,075,872 RECAPITULATION, exdufive of the Duties. Medium Annual Amount of Eaft India Sales, exdufive of the Duties - ;f- 5,013,239 The above Sum of ,^. 5,013,239 confifls of the following Articles, exdufive of the Duties, ift. Walking Canes, China Ware, Coffee, Pepper, Sago, Tea, &c. as above - - - ... ;C- 2,370,027 2dly. Drugs and Couries - - - . 11,288 3dly. Indigo, Red Sanders, Saltpetre, Mother of Pearl Shells, &c. as above .... . 606,201 4thly. Callicoes amounting to j£- 77,877; Mudins £.294,831; and Nankeens ,r. 21,820 ; making in all ... 394,528 Total ..... 3,382,044 Dedud: the Amount of thofe Articles where the Export exceeds the Sale - ..... 14,098 Medium Annual Value of Goods retained for Home Confumption 3,367,946 Amount of Goods exported - . £.2,114,378 Dedud Drawbacks repaid to the Exporters - 433,601 1,680,777 Total ..... 5,048,723 The difference between the Value fold, exdufive of the Duties, and the Value, thus accounted for, amounting to £. 35,484, arifes from a variety of circumftances, a detail of which, in figures, would greatly tend to complicate the Account. RECAPITULATION of the preceding Account. Medium Annual Amount of Eaft India Sales, including Duties paid by the Compan the Purchafers, viz. in Goods £. 5,015,180 ; in Duties^. 1,060,692 ; in all £. 6,075 The above Sum of ,^.6,075,872 confifts of the following Articles, including the D ift. Walking Canes, China Ware, Coffee, Pepper, Sago, Tea, Turmeric, manufao and unmanufaclured Goods, and fundry fmall Articles ^. 2,756,262 zdly. Drugs and Cowries - - . - ■ 14539 1 3dly. Indigo, Red Sanders, Saltpetre, Mother of Pearl Shells, Ben- gal and China Raw Silk, Cotton Wool, and fundry fmall Articles - 704,256 4thly. Callicoes, Muflins, and Nankeens - - . . 500,683 Total Amount retained for Home Confumption, including the Duties .".'." ■ ' 3'975>592 Goods exported, including the Duties - - - 2,114,378 Total - - - - . - - 6,089,970 Dedudt the Amount of thofe Articles, the value of which on expor- tation exceeded the value fold, arifing from a greater quantity of thefe Articles having been on hand at the time the Account commenced, than at the period in which it terminated - 14,098 6,075, RECAPITULATION, exdufive of the Duties. Medium Annual Amount of Eaft India Sales, exclufive of the Duties - £>' St^^Z' The above Sum of £. 5,0 13,239 confifls of the following Articles, exclufive of the Duties, ift. Walking Canes, China W^are, Coffee, Pepper, Sago, Tea, &c. as above - - - ... jC- 2,370,027 2dly. Drugs and Couries - - - - 11,288 3dly. Indigo, Red Sanders, Saltpetre, Mother of Pearl Shells, &c. as above . - - - - 606,201 4thly. Callicoes amounting to £.. ^ 1,^11 i Muflins ^.294,831; and Nankeens ^T. 21,820 ; making in all ... 394,528 Total ... - - 3,382,044 Dedudt the Amount of thofe Articles where the Export exceeds the Sale - .... - 14,098 Medium Annual Value of Goods retained for H'^me Confumption 3,367,946 Amount of Goods exported - - ,^.2,114,378 Dedud Drawbacks repaid to the Exporters - 433,601 1,680,777 Total .... 5,048, The difference between the Value fold, exclufive of the. Duties, and the Value accomited for, amounting to £. 35,484, arifes from a variety of circumftances, a deta which, in figures, would greatly tend to complicate the Account. ( 15 ) An Abridgment of the Act for fettling the Govern- ment and Trade of India, and for the Appropriation of the Territorial Revenues and Profits of Trade. THE CONTROUL AT HOME. JL H E Acl provides for the continuation of the Board of Controul for the Affairs of India in all its parts, except, that inftead of the Secretary of State being the Prefident, the perfon firft named in the King's Commiffion is to be the Prefident ; and, inftead of the Com- miffion being limited to fix Privy Counfellors, the number is inde- finite, refting on the King's pleafure ; of which, however, the two principal Secretaries of State and the Chancellor of the Exche- quer are to be three : and His Majefty may, if he pleafes, add to the lift two Commiflioners, who are not of his Privy Council. By the former Adt, no falaries were given to the Commiflioners for India ; and thofe of their Secretary and other Officers were to be paid out of the Civil Lift. By the new Aft, the King may give £. 5,000 a year amongft fuch of the Commiffioners as he pleafes ; which, together with the falaries of the Secretary and Officers, and other expences of .the Board, are to be paid by the India Company, and not by the Civil Lift. The whole is not to exceed £. 16,000 a year, the Commiffioners Salaries included. Oaths are prefcribed for thj Commiffioners and their Officers. The office of a Commiffioner or Chief Secretary, is not to be Li deemed ( 76 ) deemed a new office, to difable their fitting in Parliament. The appointment of a Commiflioner not having a falary, or of a Chief Secretary (if a Member of the Houfe of Commons) is not to vacate his feat ; but the appointment of a Commiffioncr, with a falary, will vacate his feat. Three Commiffiohers hiuft be prefcnt to form a Board. The powers of the Board are, In fubftance, the fame as under former Afts of Parliament. They are to fuperfntend, direft and controul all adts, operations and concerns which relate to the Civil or Military Government and Revenues of India, fubjed to the reftridlions hereafter-mentioned. They and their Officers are to have accefs to the papers and records of the Company, and to be furniflied with copies or extrads of fuch of them as fhall be re- quired. They are alfo to be furniflied with Copies of all proceed- ings of General Courts and Courts of Dired:ors, within eight days; and with Copies of all difpatches from abroad, which relate to Matters of Government or Revenue, immediately after their arrival. No orders on thofe fubjefts are to be fent by the Company to India until approved by the Board, and when the Commiffioners vary or expunge any difpatches propofed by the DiredVors, they are to give their reafons ; and all difpatches are to be returned to theCourt of Diredtors in fourteen days. The Dircdlors may ftate their objedlions to any alterations, and the Commiffioners are to reconfider them, and if they interfere with what the Direftors may deem matters of Com- merce, the Diredtors may apply to the King in Council to determine betwixt them. But the Board are reftridted from the appointment of any of the Company's Servants. If the DiredVors, on being called upon to propofe difpatches, on any fubjedl relating to Government or Revenue, ffiall fail to do fo within fourteen days, the Board may originate their own difpatches on that fubjedt. The ( 77 ) The Board are not to authorize any encreafe of falaries, or any allowance or gratuity to be granted to perfons employed in the Company's "fervice, except the fame (hall be firfl, propofed by the Company, and their intention and reafons for fuch grant are to be certified to both Houfes of Parliament thirty days before the falary can commence. The Diredors are to appoint three of their members to be a Committee of Secrecy, through whom difpatches relating to Government, war, peace or treaties, may be fent to, and received from India. The Secret Committee, and the perfons they employ to tranfcribe fecret difpatches, are to be fworn to fecrecy. Orders of Direftors concerning the Government or Revenues of India, once approved by the Board, are not fubjecl to revocation by the General Court of Proprietors. THE GOVERNMENTS ABROAD. The prefent Forms of Goverment over the Prefidencies of Bengal, Fort St. George and Madras, are continued in all their effential parts. For Bengal, by a Governor General and three Members of Council. For each of the others, a Governor and three Members. Thefe latter, in refpcifh to treaties with the native Powers of India, levying war, making peace, collediino- and applying Revenues, levying and employing forces, or other matters of civil or military Government, are to be under the controul of the Government General of Bengal; and are, in all cafes whatever, to obey their orders, unlefs the Directors fljiall have lent to thofe fettlements any orders repugnant thereto, not known to the Government General ; of which, in that cafe, they are to give the Government General immediate advice. The Court of Diredors are to appoint to thefe feveral Govern- ments; namely, the GovernorGenerAl^ the two other Governors, L 2 and ( 7^ ; and the tlie Members of all the Councils; and likewise the Com- mander in Chief of all the forces, and the three provincial Com- raanders in Chief. None of the Commanders in Chief are, a" offi- cio, to be of the Council ; but they are not difqualified from being fo,, if the Diredlors fhall think fit to appoint them, and, when they are Members of the Council, they are to have precedence of the other Counfellors. The civil Members of Council are to be appointed from the Lift of Civil Servants, who have refided twelve years in the fervice in India. The Diredlors may appoint to- any of thofe offices- provifionally, but without falary, till the perfons appointed fliall a(5lually fucceed. in pofTeffion. Any vacancy of Governor General, or Governor, when no provifional fucceffor is on the fpot, is to be filled by the Senior of the civil Counfellors, till a fuccefloF Ihall arrive, and the vacant feat in Council, thereby occafioned, fliall be tem- porily fupplied from amongft the Senior Merchants at the nomina- tion of the adling Governor General, or Governor, if only one Counfellor fliall then remain. The Governor General and Governors may fupply vacancies in Council from the Lift of Senior Merchants, until fucccfTors, duly appoint ?d, fhall arrive to take their feats. In all thefe cafes, the falaries and allowances are to follow the af the concern, as to club their joint stock to supply the fund for carrying it on, or to guard the adventurers against the danger of untried experiments. • Down to the Revolution it was customary for the Eist India Company to pay annual jpresents, of very large fums, to the King and lo the lead iig mi. liters : the King had lOjOOOl. at least a year — a very large sum then. See Buiinlt, vol. ii. The revival of civilization, and the improvement of human society, in modern Europe, had been considerably advanced by the privileges granted to boroughs, and by the establishment of corporate bodies*. But unfortunately these associations, so useful in the progress of society from lawless violence to civil order, and from warlike pursuits to those of peaceable industry, have in the end become, in many instances, grievous restraints upon tlie natural liberty of mankind, and the free exercise of that labour which is their right, because it is the source of their subsistence. The erection of almost every branch of trade or labour into a privileged company fixed a deep root of oppressive mo- nopoly in the political body. The acquaintance men had with these associations, of the mischievous tendency of which they were not yet aware, naturally influenced their conduct in every thing connected with trade. The spirit which arranged the petty detail of handicraft occu- pations, infected the more enlarged enterprises of liberal commerce. Companies for foreign trade were considered as necessary as for the most trivial subdivisions of m.echanical employment. .1 " In longnm tanicn fevum Jlauseruiit, lio(lie(]uo maueiit vestigia ruris."' It is not surprising, therefore, to find that every branch of trade was engrossed by a company, sometimes regulated like a corporative asso- ciation, sometimes joint stock. The history of our commerce, from the reign of Henry Vll. to tlie present day, furnishes examples of several hundreds of these companies, happily now remembered no more. At one period, the Exeter Company of Merchant Adventurers had an exclusive charter to carry on the trade with France. There was a Southampton Company of the same description. The privileges of the Exeter Company were confirmed by an Act of Parliament so late as the 4th of James I. It was a monopoly against the rest of the inhabit- ants who were not free of the Company, and the reason given for it iu * Sec Robertson^ Ht mEj. &c, 8 the statute is, " the inconveniences thai had arisen from the e.vces- sive number of ignorant artificers, &c.-' who in that city took u\)oa them to " use the science, art, and mysterrj of merchandise^"^ This has been the language of all companies down to the present day. They pronounce it impossible that private individuals can understand the science^ art, and mystery of merchandise, or practise it with effect. Happily for this country, one of the grca^ advantages derived from the political struggles, which continued from the reign of James the First to the Restoration, Avas the exposure of the pernicious principles and dangerous tendency of monopolies. Those who con- tended for the freedom of the constitution were the advocates for the freedom of commerce. The discussions of those days, though not fully successful, or even perfectly enlightened, were of infinite utility*. The service is worth acknowledging, though, while we enjoy the benefit, we are apt to forget the source fi'om whence it flows. The most esteemed writers upon political economy have so clearly de- monstrated the establishment of joint stock companies to be injurious to the interest of commerce, that it may seem superfluous to insist upon the point ; yet there is such a disposition to solicit an exception, even where the principle is admitted, that the justice and wisdom of the law cannot be too much enforced. Dr. Smith hardly admits a case in which joint stock companies can be profitably employed in any undertaking that is not of routine. If they are useful for a banking establishment or an assurance company, or necessary in the imdcrtaking of a canal, or any work in Avhich private capital could not embark, there seems scarcely any other case in which they deserve to be tolerated-f. * In 1640, the House of Commons expelled several of Its members, for being concerned in jun- )wpolies znA projects, by which tlio industry of their follow citizens would have been depressed. -)• Sir Jaines Stuart says, that companies ajc good in tin- fun-igii viurkct, for preventing the 9 Indeed, the very principle of the human mind, which prompts men to the pursuit of commerce, seems to make it impossible that it can flourish under the management of a company. The feelings of the merchant have not changed since the days of Horace : — ■ " Impiger extrcmos curris mercator ad Indos Per mare pauperiem fugiens, per saxa, per ignes." Yet if the principle of trade be selfish, it is strong because it is sel- fish. No one, however, doubts that the pursuit of gain may be libe- ralized into an honourable employment. Its importance, at least, can- not be questioned. He who, for his own advantage, promotes the exchange of commodities between different countries, or different parts of the same country, is a benefactor of the human race, for he pro- motes that which is the parent of industry, and the source of enjoy- ment. But that active love of gain which inspires exertion, and which regulates its direction, is properly an individual sentiment. It cannot animate bodies, because in bodies there is no real moral per- sonality. Though, in the fiction of law, a corporation may be a person, it but faintly resembles the individual charactei-, and never does approach to it but mischievously. If such bodies were animated with the feelings of real persons, they w ould be too powerful : they would be Brobdignagians among the Liliputians. It would be impos- sible to live near them. They are only tolerable when they are tor- pid and impotent. Of all undertakings, in which men can engage in common, trade, too, is that for which perhaps an association of great numbers is least competition among citizens of the same state; and bad, because they prevent competition ia selling the commodity at home. These positions might justify a doubt of the weight of Sir J. Stuart's authority ; yet his argument is against companies. See his opinions at large, \ol. ii. p. 182, of his works. e 10 fitted. The inlerest is too dispersed, and the managers, if they have no interest distinct from that of the other members, neglect their duty. An undertaking, the object of Avhich is not gain, may succeed under a common management. Political associations, in Avhich a social feel- ing, an esprit de corps, may exist, can prosecute their ends success- fully ; but the love of gain is not a social sentiment. If gain then be the object, success is impossible, because the body never can be ani- mated by that which is an individual feeling, and if the undertaking be of imperial magnitude, v»'ho can expect success? How can it be imagined that they who discharge functions of a dignity and extent equal to those of the Roman senate in the height of its glory, shall descend to the paltry details of economy, in laying in investment-, or in the assortment of cargoes? How can it be expected that the agents of such a company, who rival the wealth and splendour of prime ministers and ambassadors, should submit to the detailed economy which governs the operations of a private merchant, and ensures their success ? A very ingenious Italian writer (Denina*) observes, that when the family of Medicis addicted themselves to political pursuits, their com- merce was ill-managed, and became dependent on their political power. One passage is curious :• — speaking of Tietro, father of Lorenzo de Medicis, he says, " The affairs of Peter were indeed at this time in such a situation, that he must have lost his mercantile credit had he lost the resource for supporting it in availing himself of the public mo- ney." Trade cannot consist with negligence, or dispense with the direct impulse of immediate interest. It is extremely well known that West India property rarely thrives under the management of agents : yet the trade of the East India Company, less under control and inspection, • Denina, Origine e Principio di Potenza della casa de' Medici. n is to thrive under the management of a tliousand irresponsible agents ! It seems, therefore, contrary to the nature of man that commerce should be well conducted by a joint stock company. It is notorious, that no joint stock company ever carried on trade, for any long period, with success. The possession of a mono{)oly may, indeed, support the affairs of such a company ; because it often enables them to impose whatever price they please on the commodities in which they deal. But their ^ery prosperity is, in such cases, at the expence of the country that permits their existence. They exact from their countrymen a monopoly price for their goods ; thev therefore impose a real tax on the community. They draw from the pockets of the consumer the exorbitant profits which enable them to trade advantageously, in spite of waste, prodigality, and neglio-ence. The wise and salutary maxim in commercial policy, Laisser faire seems to be the last which statesmen will acknowledge. The rage for governing is so powerful, and the conceit which ministers of state have in their superior wisdom so great, that they are excessively prone to regulate and guide that which succeeds best without guidance and direction. In other countries, as well as our own, colonial commerce and the commerce of India have been committed \o exclusive joint stock companies. The French government at one period consigned the West India trade in all its branches to an exclusive company : but after the si/steme reglementaire of Colbert had produced infinite loss and dis-appointment, the trade ta the Antilles was made free and the unparalleled prosperity of St. Domingo was the consequence *. • The French Council of Commerce, constituted about the year 1700, appears to have hud the most just and liberal views. In a very detailed report they condemn the conduct of all the Companies which then depressed the French colonies. They add " it is a most certain maxim that nothing but competition and liherty in trade can render commerce beneficial, and that alt monopolies, or traffic appropriated to cojnpanies exclusive of others arc inconceivably burdensome and pernicious to it." I wNsh that a certain Council of Commerce 1 could name, entertained such enlightened riews of trade. c 2 12 In France, too, the trade of India was, with occasional intervals of unsteady wisdom, committed to an exclusive company, and the history of the French East India Company, under which the trade was almost wholly extinguished, is a series of disasters and of disgrace. Even the Dutch, with all the sobriety and caution of their national character, have, like their neighbours, contributed to demonstrate the folly of joint stock companies, although the constitution of the Dutch East India Company was in many respects superior to that of similar establishments in other countries, particularly in the dis- tribution of the trade among their six principal ports. Although, too, its conduct was as free from the inevitable vices of such insti- tutions as any can ever expect to be, it had, even before the late con- quest by the French, expired, after a long period of hopeless decay, and the vain endeavours of the government, by loans, to support its credit and retrieve its prosperity. No institution of this sort indeed can have a durable success in the management of commerce, and if successful, by means of the monopoly, that success, as has been shown, is purchased at the ge- neral expence of the whole state. Such companies either mis- manage the trade, to the danger of losing it altogether, by the com- petition of foreigners, or, if successful as merchants, it is by the enormous prices the raonoply enables them to impose. It is difficult to say, then, whether such a monopoly is most mischievous in its prosperity or adversity. The monopoly which every European nation has established, in favour of its own subjects, with its foreign dominions, has, as Dr. Smith states, " sacrificed the interest of the colony to the supposed interest of the mother country. The monopoly of the colony trade therefore, like all the other mean and malignant expedients of the mer- cantile system, depresses the industry of all other countries, but 13 chiefly that of the colonies, without in the least increasing, but, on the contrary, diminishing that of the country in whose favour it is established." How much more mischievous must that monopoly be which is given to a company to the exclusion of all the other adventurers of the state! It depresses the industry and prosperity of the country with which the trade is carried on, and the industry of all the people of that country, who are dependent upon the monopoly for the supply of the articles in which it deals. Indeed Dr. Smith states this point so strongly that 1 must quote his words. " A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated upon the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, and that of a new book to its author. But, upon the expiration of the term, the monopoly ought certainly to determine; the forts and garrisons, if it was found necessary to establish any, to be taken into the hands of government, their value to be paid to the company, and the trade to be laid open to all the subjects of the state. By a perpetual monopoly, all the other subjects of the state are taxed very absurdly in two diffe- rent ways; first, by the high price of goods, which, in the case of a free trade, they could buy much cheaper; and secondly, by their total exclusion from a branch or business, which it might be both conve- nient and profitable for many of them to carry on. It is for the most worthless of all purposes, too, that they are taxed in this manner. It is merely to enable the company to support the negligence, profusion, and malversation of their own servants, whose disorderly conduct seldom allows the dividend of the company to exceed the ordinary rate of profit in trades which are altogether free, and very fre- quently makes it fall even a good deal short of that rate. Without a monopoly, however, a joint stock company, it would appear from experience, cannot long carry on any branch of foreign trade. To buy in one market, in order to sell, with profit, in another, when there 14 are many competitors in both; to watch over, not only the occasional variations in the demand, but the much greater and more frequent variations in the competitors, or in the supply which that demand is likely to get from other people, and to suit with dexterity and judg- ment both the quantity and quality of each assortment of goods to all these circumstances, is a species of warfare of which the operations are continually changing, and which can scarce ever be conducted success- fully without such an unremitting exertion of vigilance and attention, as cannot long be expected from the directors of a joint stock company. The East India Company, upon the redemption of their funds, and the expiration of their exclusive privilege, have a right, by act of parlia- ment, to continue a corporation with a joint stock, and to trade in their corporate capacity to the East Indies in common with the rest of their fellow subjects. But in this situation, the superior vigilance and at- tention of private adventurers would, in all probability, soon make them weary of the trade*." It is impossible to add any thing to arguments so invincible. Were I disposed to enter upon a discussion of the policy of the European states towards their colonies, it would throw much light on the mischie- vous effects of monopolies. The example of the errors into which thev have fallen is highly instructive, and affords the most practical illustra- tions of the true principles of commerce. The narrow monopolising spirit which has, with so few exceptions, governed the colonial interests of Spain and Portugal, is sufficient to account for the little comparative advantage those countries have derived from the large and fertile pro- vinces of South America. The less severe though jealous spirit of the Dutch, the more liberal though imperfect system of the French and English, afford striking examples of the effects of liberal policy, and the pernicious tendency of monopoly. They demonstrate, by indis- putable facts, how inseparably the prosperity of the colonies and the * Wealth of Nations, Vol. iii. p. 141. 15 mother country is connected with the freedom of trade, and how in- evitably the baleful influence of monopoly operates to retard the ad- vancement of both in wealth, population, and power*. I forbear, however, to go at large into the subject in a brief treatise of this kind, though the detail would afford tlic most decisive evidence of the ill eflccts of colonial monopoly, and particularly of the impolicy of ex- clusive companies. II. The English India Company was formed upon the principles which prevailed in the age in which it was established. It has, through a long career, however, maintained itself after the principles to which it owed its origin have become obsolete, and the alleged necessity for it has ceased. It cannot be uninteresting, therefore, to take a view of those princi- ples. The discussion does not involve merely a dry historical detail, but it will serve to make us intimately acquainted witii the maxims and opinions of the friends of the Company at the present day. A slight review of the rise and progress of the Company will be a sufficient answer to those who think that the patronage it has received from goA ern- ment is a clear proof of the policy of its establishment. This cursory review, with the reflections which the facts naturally suggest, will throw a great light upon the causes by which the Company have so long maintained their chartered monopoly against all opposition. It is not my intention to state chronologically the different renewals of the Company's Charter. I mean only to indicate the principal cir- cumstances attending such renewal, and the grounds on which it was supported and opposed. The connexion of matter is, perhaps, more important than the order of time. It is certain that the East India Company was very unpopular for * See the subject admirably treated in Brougham's Colonial Policy. 16 a very long period after its first establishment; and during the civil disturbances, between 1630 and 1650, is not much heard of. We know, however, that it durst not venture to assert its privileges, founded on royal charters, during some part of the above period. In the year 1681 the public appears to have been a good deal divided respecting the policy of the Company's establishment, and va- rious tracts were published by the adherents of the Company, and the advocates of a free trade. But the Company were put upon their defence before the privy council, in consequence of a complaint by the Levant Company. The latter, it is hardly necessary to observe, was one of those regulated companies which then existed, and exists now ; the greatest praise of which, according to Dr. Smith, is, that they have been perfectly useless and harmless. In their answer to the complaint of the Levant Company, and to the objections against their monopoly, in the year 1681, the Company defended themselves by an argument exceedingly curious and worth quoting. " It cannot be denied, by any reasonable man, (say they) that a joint stock is capable of a far greater extension, as to the number of traders and largeness of stock, than any regulated company can be; because noblemen, gentlemen, shopkeepers, widows, orphans, and all other subjects, may be traders, and employ their capital in a joint stock; whereas, in a regulated company, such as the Turkey Company is, none can be traders but such as they call legitimate or bred merchants." 2. " The consequence whereof is, that if the trade for India were laid open, (he adventurers would be fewer, by three quarters, than they are now, because those who have skill, would run To be at the head of a joint stock company, was to have the means of carrying on trade, not merely for the joint stock, but for their own private advan- tage. In fact, such was the division of stock, that out of six hundred shares, same individuals had sixty or eighty, and votes accordingly. These active members always being in the direction, they carried on a double traffick, trading on their own private account, and receiving dividends also on the amount of their stock ; advantages which the noblemen^ mdows, and orphans in the Company undoubtedly did not possess. The opposition to the renewal of the Charter of the Company, soon after the Revolution, very nearly proved successful, but by large bribes the Court of Directors contrived to buy off some of the principal pri- vate traders, who were merchants of eminence in London. This bribery was not confined to the rivals of the Company. The most shocking corruption of members of Parliament, and of the highest officers of state, was carried on. No less than 170,000/. was employed in bribing members and ministers. The following account of these villainous proceedings is so curious, that I cannot help extracting it :■ — a By the new subscrij)tion of 74 1,000/. which added 781 members to the Engli.-h East India Company, it might have bce-n imagined, that they had now efl'ectually secured themselves again^t the luture attacks of opponents. But, as this Comj)any liad expended vast sums of money 23 to courtiers^ members of parliament, and others, as well/or obtaining- the last three Charters, as in endeavouring to divide and buy off the in- terlopers ^ and more especially in endeavouring to obtain an act of parliament for their absolute legal establishment, their enemies found means to influence the House of Commons so far against them, as to enter upon a strict examination of their practices. In the course of the inquiry they discovered, that in the year 1693 alone, whilst Sir Thomas Cooke was governor, and Francis Tyssen, Esq. deputy governor, upwards of 80,000/. were expended for secret services by the former, and by Sir Basil Firebrass (lately brought from the interloping interest), which two last-named gentlemen, refusing to discover to whom the said secret service money was given, were, together with Mr. Charles Bates and Mr. James Craggs, committed to the Tower of London by the House of Commons in the year 1695. And although, in obedience to an act of parliament of this year, Sir Thomas Cooke made a discovery of many things to both houses of parliament, yet it did not give entire satisfac- tion, as may be more fully seen in a printed collection and supplement of the debates and proceedings of parliament of the years 1694 and 1695, upon the inquiries into the late briberies and corrupt practices, (quarto, 1695,) concerning which we shall just observe, that sundry si- nister arts, at that time used, were afterward practised on a similar occa- sion in the famous year 1720 ; such, for instance, as Sir Basil Firebrass's contracting with the East India Company to put (i. e. to oblige that com- pany to receive of him) 160,000/. India stock at 150 per cent, when the Charter should be granted, although their stock was then only at 100 per cent.: whereupon the Company paid him the difference, being 30,000/.; the disposal of which last sum Sir Basil Firebrass could never be brought to discover. Great sums were also paid out for the refusal of stock at cer- tain prices on the same supposition. Refusal of stock was a contract for hav- ing the option of demanding stock, at a fixed price ; as the put of stock was a contract by which, for a premium paid down, the contractor obliged himself to take a fixed quantity of a stock, at a future time, for a fixed 24 and higher price therein specified. These new-fangled or cant terms were first brought into use by this Company ; and in this way of stock- jobbing daily bargains were made for many succeeding years, so as to be since reduced to a kind of science ; but most eminently in the fa- mous year 1 720, and some years after, till all such time-contracts and bargains for stocks were made penal by act of parliament. Great sums were also laid out by the managers to answer the Company's contracts for sale of stock, &c. The House of Commons had also impeached the Duke of Leeds, then Lord President of tlie Council, on the said ac- count ; but the prorogation of the Parliament put an end to it. Some years after all this bustle was over, Sir Thomas Cooke had 12,000/. beslowed on him by the General Court of this Company, by uay of com- pensation/or his former siiffei'lngs on their account*.'^'' Such were the profligate and corrupt arts by which a great na- tional benefit was prevented, when the liberty settled by the Revolution ought to have confirmed to the country the full enjoy- ment both of its commercial and civil rights.- That it was solely for the private purposes of the Directors, and their jobbing connection, that so great a struggle was made to secure the privileges of the Company, no one can entertain a doubt. At the very moment when the Directors had corruptly expended I7i'^,000/. for the renewal of their Charter, and to purchase the protection of government, they were not able to make a dividend at all. When the contests between the projectors of a new, and the managers of the old Company, were renewed in 1698, the latter had not, according to Anderson, been able to make a dividend for " sundry preceding years f"." The Di- rectors, however, carrying on a beneficial monopoly for themselves, un- der the cover of that of the Company, were naturally unwilliig to abandon a job, and, though the great mass of their stockholders must • Anderson's History of Commerce. f Ibid. 25 have been sufferers, the managers contrived to pre>"ervc their own interest, by admitting their opponents of the new Company into the seheme of plunder. This scheme was ratified and sanctioned in 1702, and was carried into effect in 1708, under an award of Lord Godol- phin. Sut, notwithstanding the intrigues, the corruption and fraud by which the national interests were sacrificed to a corporation of jobbers, it was impossible to prevent the enterprise and the capital of the couri- try from attempting to acquire a share in the trade of India. In the year 1714, the Emperor established the Ostend East India Company. The ships, the commanders, the capital, with which this undertaking was carried on, were procured from England and Hollanr*. 1 he English and Dutch Companies remonstrated against the Ostend Com- pany, by the competilion of which, conducted by the skill of individuals in the spirit of a free trade, they would infallibly have been ruined. These remonstrances, as is well known, succeeded after a struggle of near twenty years. Before they finally prevailed, however, the two Companies obtained the most sanguinary laws against their fellow sub- ject!=, who should embark, under foreign auspices, in a trade from which they were excluded by the injustice and folly of their own country, hi Holland the penalty of death was enacted against such as should be concerned, in any manner, in the trade carried on from Ostend. The British Parliament was not so bloody ; but, by the 7 Geo. I. c. 20, very heavy penalties were inflicted upon those who should be guilty of trading to the East Indies under foreign commissions. So little able, too, Avas the Company to sustain the competition of the free trade at Ostend, that it was found necessary to protect their monopoly, by pro- hibiting the importation of tea from other parts of Euiope, thereby enabling them to extort from their fellow subjects whatever prices they could get for the commodity. But the penalties enacted against embarking in the trade to India, 26 in foreign bottoms, were ineffectual. It was necessary to increase th& code of severity, for the benefit of the Company's monopoly. By the 9 Geo. I. c. 26, not only were British subjects prohibited from being concerned in the Ostend Company, but " British subjects found in In*> dia, unless lawfully authorized, or within our East India Company's limits, are declared guilty of a high crime and misdemeanor, and liable to such corporal punishment or imprisonment, or for such times, as the court, where they shall be tried, shall think fit." Yet all these dis- graceful severities, for the protection of injustice and absurdity, were in- adequate to the end. The competition of the Ostend Company com- pelled the East India Company to reduce their dividend from eight to six per cent, and if the English and Dutch governments had not pre- vailed on the court of Vienna to abandon the Ostend Company, the Dutch and English monopolies must have died a natural death. It is not uninteresting to remark how nugatory, and yet how vexa- tious, penalties and prohibitions, in matters of commerce, are, when strongly opposed by the private interests of men. Capital, both Eng- lish and Dutch, nay, the individuals of those nations, could not be deterred from engaging in the India trade, under the protection of the Ostend Company. Let it be remembered, too, that if our own sub- jects are still to be excluded from the East India trade, the Ostend Company may be revived ; at any rate Ostend, or some other port, will be established to carry on Eastern commerce. It is not to be ex-^ pected now, however, that the Company will be rescued from the com- petition of a rival, as it was in 1729, when the abolition of the Ostend Company was procured. Those times are gone. We cannot expect to shield ourselves from the consequences of our own folly, by extorting fcuch concessions from our rivals or our enemies. The Company, however, had now obtained a complete victory over all direct opposition at home, and, though many still doubted the policy of the monopoly, the administration was induced to patronize the institu- I 27 lion ; and the money which the Company advanced for the renewal of their Charter was considered an important financial resource. In the year 1730, when their Charter was under consideration, the Company employed the following curious arguments : — " The Company at present employ a vast stock in trade, their sales amounting to about three millions yearly. And the customs accruing to the public are prodigiously great, and answer the appropriations made of them by Parliament, better than most other duties; they bringing in net money, clear of all drawbacks and debentures, three hundred thousand pounds yearly. Would it then be prudent in the legislature to let these customs fall, without a certainty of at least as much in the room of them ? The forts and factories at present cost the Company 300,000/. yearly ; and doubtless the government could not maintain them for so little. Those forts and other buildings are unquestionably the property of the Company, who actually purchased them of the old Company, and are of very great value. Who, then, shall set an equitable price on them ? What certainty have the go- vernment, when they are in their hands, that the proposed open trade will be always sufficient to maintain so vast an expence of customs and forts as 600,000/. yearly ? For, as every man is, by the proposed scheme, left at liberty (and will doubtless make use of it) to trade, or not to trade, thither, as it may suit his interest, it my happen that one year there may go fifty ships for India, and another year, perhaps, not five : and these being all separate traders, the government can have no certainty nor security from them, nor indeed from any other but an incorporated body, who have a great deal to lose, and who are able to bear the ill fortune of some particular years trading, without pre- sendy laying it aside. By the competition of the separate traders in India, for the sake of dispatch, the prices of goods there would be raised so high as at length not to be worth buying. And for the like reason, at home they would so undersell each other, till the goods would not be E 2 28 worth selling ; which was the case for the small time that ttie two Com- panies (the old and the new ones), and the separate traders, contended against each other ; whereby they all did very much hurt to the trade." On the other hand the following objections were urged : — *' That the government should take the support of the forts, factories, embassies, &c. in India, into their own hands, out of the large customs on the India trade, which should thenceforth remain free and open to all British subjects. For (say they) the more free and open that trade is, the more profitable it will be to the nation. And though it may be true that laying the East India trade open would lessen the profit of indivi- duals in that trade, by their striving to outdo and undersell one another, yet the gain to the nation would be vastly greater, as the emulous pri- vate adventurers, by thrusting themselves into new ports and countries in Arabia, Persia, India, China, &c. would undoubtedly occasion the exportation of much more of our manufactures and product than the Company can do. And, on the other hand, a joint stock company can never trade so frugally and advantageously, either for them- selves or for the nation, being in fact but one buyer and one sel- ler ; who, moreover, manage their trade with a pride and expenoe more becoming the state of kings than of merchants ; and their gover- nors and agents in India live like princes. They also expect to be fol- lowed by the markets, and therefore do not stir from their warehouses* Whereas, on the contrary, private traders would follow the markets, would push into every creek and corner, and would narrowly look into the conduct of their agents in India. I'hat the abolition of the present Company would moreover destroy the pernicious practice of stock-job- bing, so fatal to persons and families. That when almost all the mari- time nations of Europe are now running into this trade, which will doubtless diminish our own cotnmercc thither, it seems the most effectual means for driving them out of this trade to lay it open to all our people." 2& On this occasion also it was stated by the Company, that those who had petitioned (the merchants of London, Liverpool, and Bristol,) for an open trade "were not in the secret of the trade, and that if the Com- pany could not be prevailed upon to communicate their light?, the trade must be wholly lost to the nation." Upon the arguments employed by the Company on this occasion, Dr. Smith remarks,' — " In 1 730, when a proposal was made to Parliament for putting the trade under the management of a regulated company, and thereby laying it in some measure open, the East India Company, in oppo- sition to this proposal, represented, in very strong terms, what had been at this time the miserable effects, as they thought them, of this com- petition. In India, they said, it raised the price of goods so high that they were not worth the buying ; and in England, by over-stocking the market, it sunk their price so low, that no profit could be made by them. That by a more plentiful supply, to the great advantage and conveniency of the public, it must have reduced very much the price of India goods in the English market, cannot be well doubted ; but that it should have raised very much their price in the Indian mar- ket seems not very probable, as all the extraordinary demand which that competition could occasion must have been but as a drop of water in the immense ocean of Indian commerce. The increase of demand, besides though in the beginning it may sometimes raise the price of goods, never fails to lower it in the long run. It encourages production, and thereby increases the competition of the producers, who, in order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions of labour and new improvements of art, which might never otherwise have been thought of. The miserable effects of which the Company complained were, the cheapness of consumption and the encouragement given to production, precisely the two effects which it is the great business of political oeco- nomy to promote. The competition, however, of which they gave this doleful account, had not been aJlowed to be of long continuance." 30 The Company, however, procured the rejection of the propo:-al of an open trade, though recommended by the abilities and authority of Sir John Barnard, and many of the most eminent merchai.ts of London. Indeed, the objections against the Company's monopoly were urged with [a force of reasoning which we should think nothing could have resisted, except arguments similar to those employed in 1694 and 1702*. From this period, to the acquisition of the continental dominions, nothing deserving of remark relative to commerce occurred. From the cursory view we have taken, it seems evident that the trade might have been perfectly well carried on by individuals : we have seen that the Company never could sustain the competition of the interlopers, and that had the Ostend Company, or a free trade at that port, con- tinued, both the Dutch and the East India Companies must have been ruined. It is manifest, therefore, that a joint stock monopoly company, instead of being well qualified to carry on the trade of India, could not carry it on at all, without sanguinary and oppressive penalties against the competition of their fellow subjects, and without the means of sup- * Of these practices take the following additional illustration. " Reports were brought to the House of Commons of ek'ctioiis that had been scandalously purchased by some who were concerned in the new liast India Company. Instead of drinking and entertainments, by which elections were formerly managed, now a most scandalous practice was brought in of buying votes with so little decency, that the electors engaged themselves by subscriptions to choose a blank person, before they were trusted with the name of their candidate. The old East India Company had driven a course of corruption within doors, with so little shame tiiat the new Company intended to follow their example, but with this ditlerencc, that, whereas the former had bought the persons who were elected, they resolved to buy elections. Sir Edward Sey- mour, who had dealt in this conuption his whole life-time, and whom llie old Company was said to have bought before at a very high price, brought before the House of Commons the dis- covery of some of the practices of the new Company. The examining of these took up many days. In conclusion, the matter was so well proved, that several elections were declared void ; and some of the persont so chosen ivere for some time kept in prison, after they had been expelled the house." Tjndal, vol. XV. p. 79. 31 pressing the free competition of foreigners. But in addition to all these circumstances, the state of this country, tlie state of Europe, and tho state of India, has altered so much since the first establishment of the Company, that the arguments on which their monopoly was formerly justified, even had they been well-founded then, would now ap- pear supremely ridiculous. When the Company first was established, the Portuguese were, though indeed in considerable decline, in possession of the trade to India. To attempt opening a trade with a country then liltle known to us, under the disadvantages of a competition with the Portuguese, who had extensive and flourishing settlements on different parts of the coast of the peninsula, w^as an enterprise of great risk. I'he adventurers had to encounter, not merely the commercial rivalship, but the military force of the Portuguese in India. They had to encounter the oppo- sition of the Dutch afterwards upon the same principles, for it was the custom of those days to fight for trade as for a prize. Commerce was wholly militant, and the Indian seas were stained with the blood of the parties contending for that which is the offspring, and ought to be the bond, of peace. If any thing could justify a joint stock company, it seemed to be a state of things which rendered all private adventure impossible; but yet in a few years we have seen private traders labouring to establish them- selves, not only against the competition, and the hostility of other nations, but against those of their bitterest enemy, the English chai- tered Company. The smallest military protection from the govern- ment would have supplied all that was necessary to enable the private traders to manage the commerce of India with complete success. Those unfavourable circumstances are now at an end. The government of this country is both able and willing to protect its commerce in every quarter of the globe. Commerce may now lay aside the sword and become peaceful. The government will give it security, and if, on 32 extraordinary occasions, it must defend itself, it can do so without the aid of a monopoly. After the acquisition of the territorial dominions, a new sera in the history of tlie Company commenced, and this country became distracted with disputes about Indian affairs, as it had been at the end of the preceding century. Tlic disorders committed in India, and the distresses of the Company, brought their conduct before parliament, and scarcely any public question ever excited so much faction and di-r vision in the state. I purposely forbear from any discussion of the transactions between 1767 and 1785. Commerce seemed to be little in view. During that period, the Company was, at ditl'erent times, brought to the bar of the nation as a criminal and a delinquent. Though they escaped the forfeitures they had incurred, they were always dismiss- ed under strong, though inadequate, securities for their good behaviour. Thefr affairs, since 1785, have fallen into a form of more quiet and regular mismanagement. Their misconduct and their embarrassments, now excite less eclat. They seem, indeed, to have required a sort of prescriptive right to dilapidate the national resources and their own. Their affairs, too, are involved in a degree of obscurity, notwithstanding the parliamentary review to which they are annually subject, that few understand them, and almost all revolt from the attempt to learn. People indeed seem to wait quietly for that inevitable crash which will rouse attention, or, for some measure which, proposing to apply the national resources to the Company's aid, will display the juggle and the fraud of that institution to every man in the empire.^ — That period is very fast approaching. Leaving these things to their natural course, I now proceed to con- sider the present state of the trade with India. III. Previous to the Company's acquisition of the territorial * domi- * Before the war in 1757, the Company had, on the coast of Coromandel, Tort St. George, 53 nions during the seren years' war, their relations with India were purely conuiiercial. The trade was carried on with funds raised by the credit of the Company, and fed by the profits which were made. It appears that, upon the whole, notwithstanding the extravagance, the uegh'gence, and the ill management incident to a joint stock company, the trade being at last reduced nearly to a strict monopoly as to British subjects, and the foreign companies being still more mismanaged than our own, yielded a profit, and enabled the Company to pay a moderate dividend to the proprietors of stock. The trade with India was at that time carried on chiefly by exportation of bullion, the exports of English commodities being then more incons- siderable than at present. The Directors, in their Second Report on the Private Trade, say, " From the remotest times of which we have an account, down to our own days, the manufactures of India, fit for the European market, were set on foot by money imported into that coun- try." This certainly appears to have been the case ; but it proves the wTetched system of government in a country possessing great industry and resources. It proves that, with great means of producing capital, so baneful was the system of the government, that the accumulation of stock was prevented ; and the most abundant springs of wealth which nature, and industry, and art could furnish, were choaked up and destroyed. At this hour no steady, regular capital is employed in those articles of manufacture which come to Europe. Advances are still made by the agents of the Company, or by private merchants, to the native manufacturers, to enable them to furnish the articles in demand. It is perhaps impossible to fix upon any criterion which could more Madras, and Vizagapatam ; the settlements of Fort William and Calcutta on the Ganges. On the Malabar coast, Bombay. They had also the four northern Circars, the Jaghire lands, and Perguunahs, together with some other factories of less importance. Since 1757 the territorial acquisitious are of a magnitude hardly credible; but they unquestionably belong to the «rowu. P 34 strongly evince the miserable state of the people of India, who, indus- trious in a high degree, and distinguished for ingenuity in the finest manufactures of the loom, are yet so beggarly and poor, that they are supported by the precarious advances made by their employers. Capi- tal has never, among tliem, been steadily vested in the manufactures which Europe consumes. There are artificers, but no persons of capital to employ and direct their industry. Nothing can show more strongly the want of confidence which prevails, and the active oppression which prevents the natural union of capital and labour. This state of things reminds us of that barbarous situation of agriculture in some countries, where the mendicant farmer sows the ground with seed advanced by the landlord, and whose stock, and even instruments of labour, are his master's. When such things exist, we may be assured that there are radical vices in the constitution of the society and the character of the government. The new interest, which, as lords of the soil, the Company obtained in the prosperity of Hindustan, ought to have inspired them with more liberal views of traffick, and have led them to consider commerce, not merely as a source of wealth to themselves, but as the means of im- proving their territories. Their views, however, do not appear to have extended with their situation. The characters of sovereign and mer- chant have been strangely blended ; and, without being a beneficent sovereign, the Company has become a worse merchant than ever. The wars of India, the impolitic administration of the territories, the Com- pany's affairs often on the verge of bankruptcy, form the eventful his- tory of the period in which the monstrous junction of commerce and sovereignty has subsisted. Tn the character of sovereign of the soil, the East India Company ought to lament the miserable and depressed situation of their subjects. But as merchants, we find (hem jealous of the trade, which would im- prove the resources and encourage the industry of Hindustan. They S5 are blind (o the advantages to be derived from enlarging and im- proving the productive powers of their dominions, lest rival traders might interfere with the paltry profits of their own shop. The Company have at different times complained, that if competi- tion of British subjects existed, the trade would be ruinous to those who embarked in it. That is, they complain of that which it is the policy of every wise government to encourage. The wretched argument against competition, which, as has been stated. Dr. Smith treats with such merited scorn, occurs again in the Reports of the Directors, respecting the private trade. In the Second Report they make the fol- lowing remarks: " Thirdly, with regard to the competition which a great enlarge- ment of private trade may occasion in the India conmierce — That the law of every market should be a free permission to those who enter into it, to buy and sell, need not to be disputed ; but it is a question, not of commercial principle, but of the policy of states, whether their sub- jects shall be encouraged to enter into competition with each other at any particular foreign market. There can be no doubt that a great increase of demand and of purchases in India would enhance the cost of commodities there, and that a like increase of the quantities sold here, though this mart should be the largest, would, on the Avhole, lou-er tlie prices. The consequence from both branches of competition would therefore be evident and direct disadvantage to this counlrv, and disadvantage, not to be compensated, in this case, by the extent of the trade." The spirit displayed in this quotation, ought not to escape without censure. I do not insist upon the ignorance of the true principles of commerce which it betrays. We have seen what Dr. Smith thinks of such reasoning. But let it be remembered, that the people of India are our subjects. We exact the fruits of their toils, and surely we F 2 36 are bound to encourage the industry which supplies the ability to pay. But the Directors seem to be afraid lest their own subjects should derive any advantage from an increased demand for their produce. They would sacrifice the people of India entirely to the supposed in- terest of this country. They would sacrifice the grower wholly to the selfishness of the sovereign consumer. Can any thing, in the spirit of monopoly, be more flagrant and more odious than this? Let it be considered, too, that the state of the people of India seems particularly deser\'ing of encouragement and aid from every mercantile source. It is admitted by the Directors, that the Company's commerce was intended to be carried on chiefly by the tribute, though in fact there has been no clear surplus tribute. They tell us in their Reports that, besides the surples tribute, and the fortunes of British individuals, there is at this day " no capital in those territories applicable to an extension of their exports to Europe." They take it for granted, that there are no means of extending the connnerce of India upon any great scale, " consonant to the ideas held out of im- proving our possessions, but by capital transferred thither in bullion from this country.'''* They then decide peremptorily that it would not be good policy to employ British capital in • such enterprises. The worthy Directors do not seem to have been aware how pointed a condemnation they pass upon the India trade, such as it was car- ried on before the territorial acquisitions, nay, such as they are obliged now to carry it on themselves. They have just told us that it was supported by importations of bullion from Europe. Do they mean to say, however, that the trade was a bad one, because it was carried on by means of bullion exported? The trade that is carried on ■with bullion may be gainful, and to suppose the contrary, were to re- cognise as truths, the most exploded errors of the mercantile system. 37 At the worst it is only a: round-about trade of consumption. If the goods brought from India are sold in Europe at a price which fully replaces, with a profit, the stock, and pays the wages of the labour em- ployed in bringing them to market, there is no danger that the mer- chant shall want that supply of bullion, which is the instrument by which the trade is carried on. If the people of this country have a taste for the commodities of India, they must procure the means of indulging that taste by an increase in their own industry and produce. They are thus stimulated to exert themselves to procure equivalents for those things they wish to enjoy. We do not necessarily lose, therefore, upon the whole, by such a trade. On the other hand, if a great surplus of the goods imported from India be re-exported to foreign countries, the bullion is supplied to us by foreigners, to the infinite comfort of those miserable valetudinarians of commerce, who, like the man in the Spectator, are perpetually weighing the exports and imports of the country in their mechanical chair, and watching the changes of the balance of trade with such sickly anxiety. What may be the amount of the trade in the commodities of British India, or of what extension it is susceptible, it may not be easy to ascertain. The demand for those commodities we knoAv has been, and is, very great in Europe. We know that it is considerable in America and the West Indies, and there is every reason to belie\c that it is capable of being greatly extended, if not in the articles now considered tlie staples, at least in others. That it can be extended under the ma- nagement of the Company is not to be expected. The policy of employing British capital in the trade of India must depend solely upon the returns which the trade affords. If the trade is a lucrative one, there can be no reason for not employing capital in it as well as in any other. The Directors know perfectly well, that the employment of capital in a nation like this, where every part of commerce is well understood, must be regulated by the advantages 38 of the trade. If private capital would not of itself embark in the India trade, or ought not to engage in it, what is this but a confession that the trade of the East India Company has attracted capital from better application, and that the trade is a bad one? What is it, but to tell us, that the monopoly has withdrawn capital to a non-pro- ductive application from a productive? Every sixpence, therefore, which was employed in the Company's trade, while they were only traders, or which they now borrow to lay out in trade, is mis- employed, and the nation suffers accordingly. It is true that indivi- duals are not ruined, because the loss may be divided, but the nation loses upon the whole aggregate capital so employed, if that mass of capital do not produce the fair return which conmiercial capital, in its beneficial application, ought to afford. In as far as the capital employed in the East India trade produces less, it is wastcfuUy and unprofitably employed *. In their Reports upon the subject of the private trade, the Directors have given us their sentiments at large upon the sul)ject. They tell us, that if the productive powers of India are to be cultivated, capital must be exported from Europe. The truth is, if the Company themselves are to carry on tlie trade, they must export capital, for there is not only no surplus revenue, but there is a perpetually growing debt in India, and it surely would be much better to borrow at English than India interest. But if private traders did export capital, what, upon commercial principles, is the evil of that, if it returns with an adecjuate profit ? They say, too, that it must be withdrawn from other branches of trade nearer home. Is that at all necessary ? If the trade of this country, indeed, were like that of the Company, a trade in which the capital is wasted, not increased, there certainly would be no capital to be employed in a new branch of trade. But, when so nmch commercial capital is beneficially employed, there must be a perpetually accumulating excess springing out of that beneficial * Smith's Wealth of Nations. 39 employment, and applicable to new adventure. There is no ne- cessity, therefore, for impoverishing any other profitable branch of trade by the investment of capital in that of India. Lord Wellesley, upon this subject, is of an opinion directly con- trary to that of the Directors *. lie says, " If the capital of the merchants in India, and the remittance of the fortunes of individuals, should not afford funds sufficient for the conduct of the whole private export trade from India to Europe, no dangerous consequences would result from applying to this branch of commerce capital drawn di- rectly from the British empire in Europe." " Beneficial consequences, of the utmost importance, would certainly result to the British empire in India, from any considerable increase of its active capital, which is known not to bear a just proportion to the producti\ e powers of the country." Both for the authority, and the reasons of this opinion, it deserves a decided preference over that of the Directors. Mr. Dundas, now Lord Melville, however, has given an opinion in favour of the Directors on this point; and though in almost every thing else he is at variance with them, on the subject of the private trade, they quote this opinion with triumph. If it were even true, that, relatively to the Company's monopoly, it would be improper to encourage any employ- ment of British capital in India, because such employment would create that competition in India against the Company, of which they so bitterly complain; this, however, would form no argument against such an application of our capital to support an open, free, and profitable commerce. But, in whatever light it is viewed, the argument is founded on the most pitiful principles of mercantile monopoly. * Letter to tlie Court of Directors, 30th September, 1800. 40 If Britis^h ca})it;il were to be sent out to India, it would be sent out to increase the active capital which in that country is so much wanted. But perhaps there is none of the instruments of trade, which tends so much to fructify and improve both agriculture and manufactures, as adequate share of capital. Price is regulated by the combined circum- stances of effective demand and effecti\ e supply. But nothing contri- butes so much to supply as capital, Avhich by affording the materials of industry, by advancing to the manufacturer those materials, and that subsistence Avithout which his abilities would languish, and by pro- ducing the most convenient distributions of labour, tends to bring to market every commodity at the cheapest rate to the consumer. But what must be the surprise of the enlightened manufacturers of this country, when they are informed by Lord Melville, "that the manu- factures of the finer and more valuable fabrics of India have always been produced by advances from government, or individuals, for whose behoof those fabrics are manufactured ; and if the dealing with those manufacturers was to be laid open to the uncontrolled competition of every individual, the consequence would be a boundless scene of con- fusion and fraud, and ultimately the ruin of the manufacture." This statement is every way extraordinary. Is it then advantageous for the manufacturers of India, that the capital which supports their fabrics should be doled out, like an eleemosynary gift, at the pleasure of the government? Is it favourable to improvement in any fabric that the capital should be fluctuating and precarious, that the manufacture should depend upon such a beggarly system of occasional advances ? Is this a state of things in which cheapness of supply is likely to take place ? Was ever the picture of monopoly, grinding a country, depressing the industry of whole nations, exhibited in more striking colours ? The Company grudge their unhappy subjects the benefit of being encouraged by the competition of new purchasers. They would con- 41 demn Englishmen at home, to buy under tlie limited supply of tlicir monopoly, and they condemn the people of India, as far as possible, to depend on their exclusive demand. This system, however, is not less short-sighted than it is detestable. The first effects of competition, doubtless, may be as Dr. Smith has well observed in a passage already quoted, to enhance the price, but the second and the certain effect is to lower it. By exciting emulation in the producers, and by teaching eco- nomy and judicious distribution in the different stages of the work, the consumer is l)etter supplied, w hile the situation of the producer is like- wise improved. It is thus that, throughout this prosperous emjiire, wc see the interest of the consumer and the manufacturer conciliated. It is thus we see competition prevail, ftibrics improve, the manufacturers grow^ rich, and the public cheaply supplied. Capital, which facilitates and suggests judicious division of labour, is, perhap.^, one of the most active agents in effecting these happy results. The introduction of ca- pital into India, to fructify industry and encourage produce, ought to be eagerly desired by the Company, both in their character of merchants and of sovereigns. The advances Avhich they or others are obliged to make, clearly show that one of the most natural and necessary divisions of stock has not taken place in India. The Company is at once the mer- chant dealer in the commodity, and the manufacturer of it. They nmst therefore have tw o capitals ; one for supporting the manufacture, the other for circulating it when produced. But every one in the least acquainted with the nature of commerce, know^s that such an union of cha^ racters is not beneficial. It is very likely that the two capitals emploved by those who act in this double capacity, will not be so well managed as if each belonged to a separate interest, and were managed under a separate direction. In all countries where manufactures and commerce have made considerable progress, such a separation has taken place. It surely therefore must be important to bring India to that state. The Company, as a merchant dealing in the produce of India, has an inte- rest in that separation. They would be cheaper supplied, if there be truth in those great principles of trade, w hich Smith and others have G 42 proved to demonstration, and of which principle?, as well as of all ex- perience, the Company and their advocates must have fallen into the most perfect oblivion. But it is only British capital which the Company are unwilling to see employed in the trade with India. They tell us in the Third Report,, that the trade of foreigners with our dominions should be encouraged, because that trade, if bona fide^ introduces specie, of which India stands much in need. This argument would prove more than the Company intend. It would prove that for India at least, the bona fide trade of fo* reigners is beneficial, but that the trade of the Company cannot be so ; as the latter, were it not for the mal-administration which prevents a surplus of tribute^ would trade only to carry away that tribute, and not in any manner to promote the prosperity of their territories. But if the merchants of this country, by means of vested capital, knowledge of the trade, and economy in its prosecution, could supply foreign nations with India commodities as cheap as those nations could supply themselves, it is evident that the bullion derived from the trade with foreigners, and imported by our own subjects, would be just as beneficial to India as if it were imported in Porlugueze, Swedish or Danish ships. The question then comes to this — Could the mercliants of this country sup- ply other nations, and even partly those mentioned, as cheaply as they can themselves, or other nations ; for part of their trade, and almost all that of the Americans, is for the supply of different parts of Europe? If the question be answered in the affirmative, it is manifest that British merchants would then fructify India with specie precisely in the manner the trade of those foreigners now does. There is no occasion then, that foreigners should be invited to trade, if, by the fair encouragement of our own subjects, the commerce of India can be brought into an English channel. Thus, by pouring in capital into Bengal, and carrying bullion, tlie produce of their successful trade with other nation*, the industry of India Avould be encouraged, capital in that country would be increased, circulation, impeded by the enormous 43 quantity of the Company's paper, would be revived, and trade, oppressed by the high rate of interest, would be improved and ex- tended. But, besides the fabrics of the finer kind, there are various other pro- ductions in India which, by due encouragement, might be improved and enlarged. The article of indigo alone, Avhich is now imported to the / value of more than a million sterling, is but of late cultivation in India, and the rapid success it has obtained may fairly be ascribed to its being left to private adventure. The raising of sugar, were it not the policy to discourage it in favour of West India produce, might be carried to any extent. This could be demonstrated beyond contradiction ; but if the monopoly is to be reserved to the West India planters, whose inte- rests, at the present moment, seem peculiarly deserving of considera- tion, it is not necessary to discuss in detail a question in itself un- doubtedly very important. The extension of the British dominions in the Bombay Presidency, has afforded additional facilities for the supply of cotton, an article now so necessary to our domestic manufactures. To suppose that so bulky an article can be conveyed to Europe in the princely vessels of the Com- pany, at the enormous rate of freight Avhich they pay, or on the scale of royal extravagance, which distinguishes every branch of their commerce, is to tride with the subject. The thing is impossible. The Company know it full well ; and as a proof of their liberality, they make the offer of letting the Lancashire manufacturers supply themselves. In the Third Report*, they say, " The Company however have abandoned the importation (of cotton) in consequence of the loss which has been suslained^ but they are reachj to grant free permission to the mamifac' turers of Lancashire and elsewhere to send out ships^ and lo import for their own account on the usual regulations for private trade, pro- vided the ships to be employed are British built or India built." • See Asiatic Annual Register for 1802 ; State Papers, page 08. . G 2 44 This, to be sure, is wonderful condescension. It seems to be of the same species of facetious liberality with that recorded by Lord Bacon, in his Apothegms, of the scholar, who could not spare his bellows out of his chamber, but was ready to permit his neighbour to come and blow there as much as he pleased. The invitation, at any rate, is given only because it cannot be accepted. It may be very possible to get cotton from India, though it might not be wise in the manufacturers of Lancashire to divert their capital from its proper application, to that of merchant adventurers, in the import- ation of cotton. Their capital and their industry have occupation enough without this diversion. They have a right to expect that the India Company's monopoly shall not interfere with the fair supply of the market, in an article of the first necessity to their manufacture, particularly when the company formally announce, that " they have abandoned the importation." The fact is, that, were it not for the jealousy of the Company, cot- ton might now be, and might for years have been, imported in very large quantities. But to imagine that cotton, or any other article which must come here to a competition with the same article from other parts with which the trade is free, can be brought while the Company's bur- densome and oppressive system continues, is to be utterly ignorant of the nature of commerce. Were the whole trade of India open and free to be followed in all its branches, according to the demand of circum- stances, and the dictates of enlightened acquaintance with markets at home and abroad, there cannot be a doubt that great quantities of cot- ton would be im{)orted. But can it be expected that any set of mer- chants Avill accept the offer of the Directors for importing cotton solely ? In so bulky a commodity, freight constitutes a most essential charge ; but upon an assorted cargo, a bulky article, which of itself could hardly pay, might enter very usefully into the bill of lading. Do the Di- rectors offer to let ships go to Surat or Bombay, to bring home cotton, or any other commodities the freighters chuse to ship ; or do they 45 propose to allow them to export wha.t they please in their own way, and with an entire freedom from the burdensome formalities and restrictions of the Company's monopoly? Not at all. But it is not necessary to rely on mere speculation as to what might be done, if the trade were open, or if it were allowed to be carried on in the manner which British merchants would now carry it on, if the Company would but wave a monopoly which, as to this article at least, is prohibitory to others, not exercised beneficially, or even at all for them- selves. In the year 1799' — 1800, thirty-four thousand bales, each three hundred and ninety-two pounds weight, were imported into this country, in eleven thousand five hundred tons of shipping, belonging to the pri- vate traders ; and if the facilities for importing at a cheap rate were afforded, not only the quantity in demand would regularly be supplied, but the quality would be adapted to the English market. The cotton in India, it is calculated, can be raised by the grower at about three halfpence a pound, whereas, cotton, raised by the labour of slaves, cannot be raised at less than a shilling*. The difTercnce of freight, therefore, constitutes the difference of price. But if the Directors make the whole expence fall upon the homeward cargo, it is absurd to think that the article can pay. Sir Robert Peel, in a letter to the Court of Directors, dated November, 1797, accuses the Company of a positive breach of contract, in refusing themselves, and denying permission to others, to bring home cotton at a reasonable freight. He expressly states, that the discouragements to this great national object had caused a rise in the -price of collon of 100/. j)er cent. Such is the encouragement given by the Company to our domestic manufactures, by supplying them with raw materials! It is of the same kind with that mentioned by the merchants of Liverpool, in 1792, when they petitioned for laying open the trade. They assert, truly, that the Company did every thing in their power to * See Henchman's Obseryations, page 23. 46 ruin our cotton manufactory, on its first establishment, because it was likely to interfere with some of the articles of their monopoly. But the reason given by the Directors for discouraging the cotton trade, in the Second Report, is particularly deserving of attention. They say, " That the cotton of India cannot succeed; that the rate of freight is too high; that the cotton from the east is not the produce of British India, (since that time the cotton country has been annexed to the British dominions,) that enough is not raised in the Company's provinces for the employment of their manufacturers; that a large quantity is every year sent to China, as a means of providing the Company's investments of teas; that none has of late years been imported into Bengal by sea ; that by vast importations into this country, part may again be exported, and minister to the support of foreign manufac- tures, which affect our own." The abominable spirit of monopoly, which pervades this passage, ought not to escape without indignation and censure. It is the dread that some way or other their monopoly may be injured, which CAcr influences them; and that sentiment is in every instance as ignorant as it is odious. The fact is, that owing to circumstances, perfectly well known, Bengal now raises the supply itself, and it affords large quantities for exportation; such is the facility with which that happy soil lends itself to every sort of produce. But, perhaps, an exportation from Surat and Bombay would raise the price of cotton, to the prejudice of that part of the investment which goes in cotton to buy teas? Good God! and is the interest of India committed to such rulers? Is the interest of Englishmen dependant on such fellow- citizens? The Directors surely cannot be ignorant, tluvt in an article, the cultivation of which is unlimited, the supply will meet the de- mand; and that the increase of demand, by a natural and invariable law of free commerce, tends to reduce the price. Yet, u[)on the ma- lignant apprehension of a possible loss" to themselves in their invest- 47 ment for teas, the cultivation of an article, raised by people entitled to British protection in India, is to be sacrificed to the Company's mo- nopoly; and the manufacturers of this country are to be deprived of the raw material of a fabric of vast national importance. The Di- rectors are wonderfully alarmed for the interest of our manufacturers! Their charity, to be sure, begins at home. They begin with fears about their own investments to China, but they afterwards feel for our manufacturers, and anticipate their ruin, should cotton be so cheap in the port of London that they will not buy it ! It is not very probable, that the manufacturers of Lancashire will be very uneasy about Avhat may become of the cotton, of which they get the first offer, and the very importation of which will secure them a cheap and constant supply of the commodity. It is not my intention to go into a detailed consideration of the dif- ferent articles with which India is capable of supplying us; but I cannot help taking notice of one which is extremely itnportant to our home manufactures. I mean Silk ; and as the cotton fabrics of India are discouraged, for the protection of our OAvn, it is our duty to com- pensate India, by favouring the production of silk, in which the in- terests of both countries would coincide. At present, we are dependent chiefly upon France and Italy for the supply of this commodity, and the East India Company, with tlie means of affording the supply, have been at no pains to bring the article to that degree of perfection that "would enable it to compete with the produce of Italy and France. On the contrary, the Company have neglected the business entirely: Bengal silk has for some years been growing worse; and the only improving part of it is that which comes in the private and privileged trade. But to do. justice to this resource to which our silk manu- facturer is entitled to look, skill, and probably capital too, must be suffered to go to India, and must be directed by the zeal and intel- ligence of private interest. Were the enterprise and skill of indi- viduals suffered to engage freely in this supply, there is no doubt the 48 object would be ?oon obtained. Silk of the best quality might be procured from our eastern dominions; but, in order to suit the demands of the home manufacturers at a reasonable price, the silk ought to be organzined in India. A greater degree-of attention on the prepa- tion of it there must be bestowed ; and that cannot be expected from the Company and their agents. Were the silk organzined in India (that is imported here ready for the loom), we should be able to preserve a large share in that important manufacture, which now is very precarious, and gained as much, through the disorders which have prevailed in France for these last sixteen years, as from our own resources ax superiority. But till individuals are permitted fieely to engage in the supply of this article in every stage, the British manu- facturer will be dependent on our enemies, to whom we may pay more than two millions annually, for silk alone. Yet, with the re- medy in our power, this mass of national interest is sacrificed to the East India Company's monopoly! The Directors have uniformly asserted, that the trade with India, nei- ther as to import nor export, is capable of extension. They have claimed the praise of giving " full scope to the internal powers of their territory in agriculture and commerce.*" To state, however, that the sovereign of a country, of near fifty millions of people, wishes to have an exclusive mo- nopoly in the commerce of that country, of itself announces a preten- sion not very compatible with " giving full scope to the internal poieers of a country.'^'* There is something absolutely shocking in the union of the character of sovereign and monopolist merchant. That the same persons should at once exact the revenues of the sovereign, and seek to monopolize the commerce of the merchant, is the condemna- tion of the system. This rapacity of power, and this meanness of monopoly, compose, indeed, a nauseous and disgusting mixture. Is it in the nature of things, that the internal powers of the territory should be encouraged and developed, under a government which unites xharacters so irrcconcilcable with those objects? In the mechanical 49 routine of the Company's commercial operation.^, there is no room for the enterprise, the discernment, tlie invention, and the discovery which are the sure results of fair competition, and an active and enlightened emulous private interest. In the Company's trade, every thingis languid and formal. It is conducted by agents who, indeed, may perform their task with fidelity, but not with zeal. Every trans- action drawls on the lifeless routine of office; without spirit, Avithout energy. It is not consistent with the nature of man, that under such a system, the full development of any branch of commerce can be obtained. When we consider the enormous number of men now subject (o the British dominion in India, when we consider the immensely rich and populous empires which are included within the limits of the Com- pany's Charter, it will be difficult to persuade us, that the full com- mercial resources of those regions, almost equal in population to half the globe, have been explored and ascertained. And when we reflect on these things, it is impossible to contain our astonishment, that a natfon, boasting itself enlightened, and pursuing trade as one of its favourite objects, should have restrained its subjects from exploring these fertile regions of trade, and should have conferred the privilege upon a monopoly Company, which from its Acry nature must be disqualified either to draw the proper benefit from the branches we know, or to enlarge the sphere of intercourse by new discoveries. Indeed, it is very obvious, that in every respect the Company, since the territorial acquisition, are much less enterprising in com- merce than when they were merely merchants. Their voyages re- semble the dull regularity of the Spanish galleons, or register ships. It is observed, that when the Company were only merchants, they had upwards of eighty factories at different parts, from the Persian Gulph to China. There are not above four or five of them re- maining ; and the Company, in the sluggishness of a monopoly, H 50 pronounce that these four or five ai'e sufficient for the commerce of all India. It is verv probable that they who really are not merchants, they who can do nothing- tolerably but business of mere routine, would find any addition to their trade, addition to their loss. They do not wish for new branches of trade. They are contented with mismanaging what they choose to undertake, and excluding their fellow citizens from any competition with them. In the year 1792, previous to the renewal of the Company's Charter, the spirited, intelligent, and enterprising merchants of Liverpool were of opinion that most extensive fields of trade might be formed beyond the Cape of Good Hope. They knew that the chief access to the j)opulous empire of Persia is shut up by the Company's Charter 5 that the countries around the Red Sea ; that the innumerable islands and the populous empires of the East, can furnish valuable objects of trade, and would, if cultivated, present profitable markets to the infinite variety of our manufactures. It has been objected by the Company, that a trade with India never can be beneficial to the merchants of this country; because, from moral and religious causes, the consumption of British commodities in Hindostan must be greatly limited. They have even asserted that " the emergencies of Government, or a prudent sacrifice to popular prejudice, may at times have favoured the views of private adventurers; " but Ihey onltj bought al a high price^ from the -poverty of the stale or the venality of its members.^ permission to ruin themselves,'^'' We have seen in a preceding part of this inquiry who were the real parties, who " bought from the poverty of the slale^ or the venality of its members^'''' permission to ruin themselves. We have seen in 1094, the Company paying 170,000/. in bribing ministers of state, and mem- bers of parliament. We have seen their Directors committed to the Tower, and the whole nation animated Avith a conunon sentiment. 51 of indignation against them. At' a later period we have seen them carrying on a wholesale trade of corruption; bribing many boroughs, their practices detected, and tlieir members expelled and imprisoned. It was the Directors of the Company who bought from the " poverty of I he slate^ or the venalUy of Us members,'''^ a permission not to ruin themselves, (for they were sure of their OAvn job) but per- mission to deceive their subscribers with hopes of profit never realised ; to mismanage the commerce of India, and to strip their fellow citizens of the natural and almost indefeasible right to exercise their talents, their industry, their capital for their own advantage ; and, by an inseparable connection, for the advantage also of their country. But when we hear the Company, the sovereigns of India, constantly inidervaluing the commerce of that country, and see them inexorably obstinate in excluding from it all their fellow citizens, it is easy to discern their apprehensions of losing the monopoly. Yet what kind of sovereigns must they be who thus labour to narrow and restrict the commerce of their subjects? How despicable, how odious, that cha- racter of sovereignty so jealous of a commercial intercourse which an enlightened Government would cherish and invite? Their character indeed is uniform : " By a strange absurdity," says Dr. Smith, " they regard the character of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of merchant ; their mercantile habits lead them in this manner, almost ne- sarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary occa- sions, the little transitory profit of the monopolist to the great and per- manent revenue of the sovereign." But obstinate as the Directors are, in excluding their fellow citizens from all share in the India trade, even from that which they do not pre- tend to carry on themselves, they can persuade no man that their re- presentations of that trade are just. It certainly is true that, in propor- tion to the extent of the population, and the wealth of the British H 2 52' dominions in India, they do not furnish a considerable market for the produce and manufacturies of this country. But, allow- ing much for the religion, the habits, the immoveable customs, the permanent moral character of the Hindus, it still appears wonderful that the latter should have imbibed no taste, if not for the ca- pricious fashions, at least for the solid improvements, which their masters might be capable of furnishing them, in almost every thing connected with mechanical contrivance?. Mr. Orme informs us, that nothing can be more rude than the tools and implements with which the Hindus work. It is personal industry, and minute dexterity, that supplies among them that which among us is performed by well contrived tools and skilful machinery. Yet it is almost incredible, notwithstanding the adherence of those people to old customs, that they should not be capable of seeing the infinite superiority of European contrivances, for abridging or facilitating labour, and for executing every mechanical task. From the immense sums which India has furnished to the rapacity of its different conquerors, we know that great industry, great circulation, very considerable consumption, must exist among this people. They are, in a state of agriculture, of manufactures, and of refinement, a ery considerably advanced. The frequent devastation of war, the perpe- tual revolutions in government, and the long series of oppressive ad- ministration they have suffered, must have limited their productive powers, and deranged their industry. But under a steady protective government their powers of production, and their ability to consume, slwuld be increased. It seems almost certain that they might furnish a demand for many articles of English produce and manufacture, wliich. they do not now use. The infinite variety of our manufacturies in iron and steel, in gold and silver, in jewellery, in elegant furniture, in glass; particular kinds of woollens, might very well be adapted to the taste and the demand of Eastern luxury and magnificence. The Com-> pany deny tliis. They discourage the attempt, because they are not merchants. That they have made so little progress in introducing any thing English into their territories, capable of so much consumption, will 53 be considered by intelTigent men more as a proof of their unfitness or indisposition fcr pushing such active enterprises of commerce, than to the impossibility of succeeding in the object. Besides, there are other classes of people in India, not inconsiderable in point of numbers, and very considerable in point of wealth, particularly the Mahomcdans. Why should the Mahomedan be unwilling to adopt the elegance of European arts ? Why should they be averse to those manufac- tures which contribute to the comforts of life and to the embellish- ment of high condition? Other objects have been in view with the East India Company than to advance these purposes. Nothing has been done to facilitate the introduction of our manufactures, but every thing has been done systematically to discourage it. It could not be done by the Company, nor by any body else under the cumbrous regulations and the expensive detail to which all their traffic is subject. Our ma- nufactures have not had a trial. The interest of England, as a pro- ducing country, has never entered into the views of the Company at any time, far less since they became territorial sovereigns. The trade Avith India, and with the countries eastward of the Cape, has hitherto been depressed and confined by the influence of the mono- poly. No fair experiment has has been made, either what commodities those regions might add to the objects of commerce for European con- sumption, or what demand they are capable of affording for our own manufactures. It is believed, that many articles of the first necessity might be cultivated in our Indian territories. For instance, I am posi- tively assured, and indeed partly know the fact, that hemp*, of an ex- * The article alluded to is called Sunn, and i.-; to be found in the INIuLibai- provinces. It slightly diflers from European hemp, Lut can be applied with advantage to all the purposes for which hemp is used. Not long ago experiments were made in this country, to ascertain how far it could be employed to make ropes and canvass. The result was, that it was found capable of being wrought into both articles of a very supeiior quality. The Company and their servants, however, have given no facility to the proper cultivation of this article, and its introduction into this country. On the contrary, they have neglected or opposed this object; uot to mention the impossibility ef transporting such a commodity at their rate of freight. H celleiit quality and to any extent, might be raised in India, and might be brought to Europe for the supply of our military and commercial navy, were sufficient facilities allowed for importing it. It is probable that it can only be brought over, however, in a mixed cargo, as its bulk might render the transport of it as a single article too expensive, and it can never be done therefore till the trade is laid open or the mono- poly modified. Very little, however, has yet been attempted towards deriving such advantages from the territorial dominions, by encouraging their productive powers. Should the attempts of the British government to obtain a footing in Spanish America be successful, they will furnish additional reasons for rescuing the navigations of those seas from the present tyranny of the East India and South Sea Companies, and for opening the trade to India, for which the possession of South America would afford additional encouragement. It is no wonder that the manufactures of this country have seen with dissatisfaction the renewal of the Company's Charter. The prin- cipal trading towns have evinced the same disapprobation of so impo- litic a measure. The liberty of employing their talents, their industry, their capital, is one of the great objects which men expect to secure in a state of society, and to take that liberty from the many, to vest an exclusive privilege in a few, may indeed be consistent with legislative competence, but is hardly reconcileable to the great ends of govern- ment. No government has a right to interfere with those objects, unless when the paramount interests of the community dictate a modification or a suspension of them in favour of a system more generally beneficial. Unless, however, the establishment of such a monopoly, as that enjoyed There are some other productions similar to liemp and flax (o be found in India, capable of being wrought up into manufactures equal to the finest cambric. But these and a thousand improvcmcntB are stifled and overlaid by tlie dead weight of the Company and their mono- poly. 55 by the East India Company, be demonstrably advantageous to the na- tion at large, and not merely an expedient of administration, as it has almost always been, the regulation is not less unjust than impolitic, which restrains the natural course of industry, labour, and capital. IV. The commercial situation of the company itself will next deserve our attention. We have already seen, from the view of the Company's institution and progress, how unfit and incapable it is for the manage- ment of commerce. The Directors, however, tell us that the phrenzy of sharing in the trade to India, will ensnare unAyary persons, whose rage for adventure will be productive of their ruin before they are aware of their error. This is indeed a terrible denunciation, and, if it came from a discreet, prudent, and successful merchant, it would ha\ e weight, but we shall see, by and by, what sort of merchants the Company is. In one of their reports (and in a letter of Mr. Dundas) we are told that the public funds and the tribute constitute the trading capital with which the Company's commerce is carried on*. In the Third Heport, we find the Directors stating that this tribute, admitted in the First Report to be one part of their capital, was not applied to that object, because it did not exist. "It is true (say they) that in the year 1 793, there was a surplus of tribute in India of 1,1.59,000/. per annum, to be brought home through the medium of commerce, but that sum has been exhausted, either in establishments under the authority of the board of commissioners, or in political expences, neither of which were incurred by, or belong to the commerce of the Company." From the source of tribute it is acknow- ledged, then, that the Company have no aid at all. As to the fortunes of individuals, we find them complaining, as if a most grievous injury, that these funds are intercepted by the private * First Report of Select Committee on the India Trade. 56 traders. If they be so intercepted, there milst be some good reason for it. It is, however, the opinion of many, that these funds are in part vested in the Company's Indian paper. At present let us hear the complaint. " Individuals have not complained of the want of means to remit their fortunes to Europe, since the year 1 793. It is the Company who complain^ that it is the British merchants residing in India who are com- petitor for those funds, and who interce{)t a considerable portion which would otherwise flow into their treasury^ to enable the Company to purchase their own investment.'^'' This passage is worth notice for several reasons; but suffice it now to remark the light which it throws on the trading resources of the Com- pany. First, we fmd a tributewhich has not been realized, and, secondly, a remittance of fortunes which individuals are not well inclined to remit through the Company. Is it possible that any merchant can trade to advantage when his proper peculiar trading capital is thus fluctuating and precarious, beyond his own dispo'al and controul ? How then does the Company j)rocure its trading capital? By the sale of its outward car- goes almost always sold at a loss ; and by borroAving money at very high interest ; and in such cases their investment is sure to ])roducc, not a mercantile profit, but a positive loss ? As to the complaint, that the fortunes of individuals are intercepted, the truth is, tliat, whether these funds are obtained by private British traders or not, they never will seek the Company's treasury. They seek either the employment of other European traders, or that of the Ame- ricans, whose India trade has been raised into its present magnitude, by the oppressive monopoly of the Company, against the interest of British subjects^ That the trade of India is not a gaining one for the Company, is 57 ascertained l)y various facts, and by the opinions of the most competent judges. No trade can bear the extravagance of freight under which the Company import, and the heavy charges under which their cargoes must be collected in India, where nothing of the diligence and economy of private merchants is observed. They are said indeed to gain in the China trade, in which their sole gain arises from their oppressive monopoly at the expence of their countrymen. ■ ». The trade of the Company from India has been called a remittance trade, but be the name what it may, the mercantile charges, and profits of the trade, must be considered before we can ascertain whether they gain or not. As a merchant, the Company cannot gain, unless the money brought into their treasury, in the shape of tribute, is so laid out in India, as to afford a fair profit on the first cost, charges^ freight, insurance, &c. of the goods invested. If they do not realize the principal sum, with all the various charges, there is a mercantile loss. On the other hand, if the Company act as the banker remitter of the fortunes of individuals, unless the sum they receive in their treasury in India can be realized in Europe at the fair rate of exchange, they are losers on the principal sum brought into their treasury. They would diminish the amount of their own tribute in the one case • they would lose as bankers remitters in the other. But if it be manifest that the Company, as merchants and as bankers, lose on their transac- tions, why should they continue the trade ? It is demonstrable that whatever they lose might be gained to the nation. The tendency to trade between this country and India is powerful, nay, irresistible • when individuals are chased out of one channel, they find another. Does not this point out to us what is the course to follow, and what we ought to do ? That trade, which the company vainly and absurdly attempt to carry en, should be left to the enterprise of individuals. If there be any surplus tribute to be remitted, it will be realized in the specula- I 58 tions of individuals. The trade of the private merchant will bring it home cheaper 'ii the shape of merchandize than the Company can do, and will bring into the coffers of the sovereigns in England, be it the Companj', be it the government, every farthing of tribute which is to be received. The tribute, therefore, will be realized safer and more commodiously through the channel of private commerce, while it will fructify a gainful trade, instead of being diminished, as now, in a losing one. There is no reason that the Company should be a merchant for the re- mittance of tribute. It can be remitted through the channels of trade, and the mutual intercourse of nations. If the Company's revenues were paid in kind, there might be an apology for remitting them to a market in kind. But when they are realized, if realized at all, in money, and afterwards converted into commodities by the Co?npany-Sovereign, surely this process is the most unnatural and superfluous that can be conceived. We see that individuals of all nations endeavour to obtain this traffic : will not, then, the private merchants be very willing to pay the Company, in London, the amount of the sums which they receive from them in India ? and such is the expensive system of the Company's trade, that no rate of change could diminish the amount so much as the loss upon their mercantile enterprises. There appears no reason, therefore, to admit with some, that the Company ought to be merchants, even to the extent of the tribute they might have to remit. That remittance through trade can be made better by private mer- chants, and if the Company be unfit for commerce in any other way, they are unfit for it in this way. Nothing but necessity could justify their remitting their tribute in kind or in commodities. There is no necessity for it, and they lose by the adventure. As to the fortunes of individuals, of whicli they wish to be the re- mitters in goods, they lose on a ca[)ital which is not their own, but l)orrowcd, because they give bills in India to be paid in England, and the 59 funds, out of which alone they can be able fairly to pay, arc the returns on the commodities invested with the money, for which they so give bills. But, if the trade is a losing one, the trade of remittance for others is, a fortiori^ more losing than when they remit their own tri- bute. If, however, they borrow money at a very high rate of interest, (perhaps 12/. per cent.) in order to lay in an investment, on which it is notorious they do not, when the money is their own, gain a mer- cantile profit, it is clear that, in addition to all other loss, they lose this very high interest, which seems of itself to preclude profit, and they accumulate in India a debt, which preys not only upon them, but upon the commercial resources of that country. In England, our public debt is, in some measure, a facility for commerce; but in India, the necessities of the Company withdraw capital from be- neficial employments, and make it active only for the purposes of stock-jobbing, and the gains of brokerage ; as their debt is large beyond all proportion to the active commercial capital of their territories. It will be proper to consider, a little more in detail, the advantages which the Company derive from their commercial operations. The . rate of profit, indeed, or rather loss, at which the Company trade, is much disputed. In the year 1805, the accounts, containing the follow- ing statements, were laid before the House of Commons. In ten years, up to 1804 inclusive, the whole costs and charges on the India trade, separate from the China, are stated at 27,112,495/. Sale amount 31,467,287/. Balance 4,354,792/. In the same paper we find the following statement of the China trade: Cost and charges 25,964,342/. Sale amount 33,066,301/. Balance 7,101,959/. The difference between the amount of profit on the China trade, in the same number of years, and upon a quantity of sale, less by two mil- lions, is well worthy of attention. The cause of this difference has been repeatedly pointed out. The China trade is a close monopoly, for which the Company oblige the people of this countr)' to pay, in I 2 60 proportion to their demands, which are great, and to the supply of the article, which is limited. The Company, therefore, gain more on the one branch, tlian they can on the other ; and it surely requires little address to defraud a customer, who must buy, and has no choice of his market. But, upon their profits for ten years, as stated by themselves, it is, proper to make a few remarks. The whole balance of profits, including the charge and duty on the private trade; the amount of annuity at the bank; and a pretended profit on exports, amounting to 678,486/. ; is 13,779,577/. But, in fact, all these sums should be deducted, for as to profit on exports, no such thing exists; nor, indeed, any profit, if the account were dissected on mercantile principles. In the Reports, in 1792, it is admitted, that there was a loss on the India exports; and there is no reason to suppose there is a profit now. Take this account, however, as it is given: there are various payments, part of which are called political; but in the whole, including e^ery charge, and comparing the payments and profits, (including in the latter the articles men- tioned,) there is the following balance: — Total profits .€13,779,507 T'^ ■ A payments 1 2,797,796 Total surplus in ten years. . . . ^981,781 in this account there are many articles which are not commercial profits. Such are the [)rofits on private trade, amounting in ten years to 1,482,056/.; and the amount of annuity from government, in ten years, above .362,000/. Thus we have near two millions, which do not arise from trade ; and were not this included, there would be an excess in tlie payments of more tlian a million, instead of a surplus 61 of profit of 981,781/. It appears, likewise, by the papers laid before Parliament, that the profit on sales, in the year ending 1st March, 1805, was ^1,172,779 Charges 1,591,319 Leaving a deficiency of. ^418,540 And though several articles of a political nature, such as the charges for St. Helena, other charges on account of the territory, be de- ducted, there still remains a deficiency of 25,000/. by the admission of Mr. Grant, the late chairman*. But, the fairness of such de- ductions may be questioned, because the charges here, called territorial, are particularly connected with commerce, and not with the power of the sovereign. This statement, clearly proving a deficiency, is more- over liable to the remark already made: that the Indian charges are not fully brought forward; and the interest, not at all. It is clear, however, that three years India interest, on every transaction, (for that is the time it fills up,) should be charged, and it is needless to point out to merchants how that would afi'ect the result. The Company set out, in 1793, with the childish expectation of a surplus tribute of a million from the territorial revenue, as a trading capital. This was a bubble, not so bad in immediate effect, but as delusive in principle, as Mr. Law's Mississippi scheme, which was founded on India trade too. There was no such capital to trade withal. It was a delusion, if not a deception. The Company were obliged, therefore, to trade on a borrowed capital, under whatever name that borrowing was disguised. It was substantially borrowing, jf thev gave bills to private individuals remitting their fortunes. It "^ See Cobbett's Debates, vol. vii. page 1153. 62 ■was borrowing, more openly, if they created a floating debt in India, to furnish investments. The latter resource, in addition to the sale of exports, has been their only trading capital. One cannot help being astonished that any such scheme of setting a trading company afloat should have been listened to, but it did obtain approbation ; government even got the first 500,000/. [participation money, and got it for the first and last time. How could it be expected that so great a trade as that with India and China could be carried on, without a real bona fide capital ? The capital of the Company arising from the subscriptions was sunk and gone. They paid interest for it to their subscribers, but it was not ac- tive and productive in their aff"airs, as the borrowed capital of a private merchant, for which he pays interest, is. The project deserves no other name than that of a bubble. The intricacy of the accounts, indeed, the distance of the object, and various other circumstances, create a fog and mist, through which common people cannot see; but a bubble it is, with the loss on which the nation, the great patron of it, must finally be burdened. The Company themselves say, that their wars in India have absorbed their means of investments. If there is any sense in this apology, it serves to show, that governmenl and commerce form a bad association; and that government, like the lion, takes the lion's share, and leaves commerce to shift for itself. Every one knows that this is likely to happen always. It must be so; and unless commerce be placed on a different footing, it must be sacrificed to government. But the worst of the matter, even by the Company's own account, is, that the govern- ment, that is, the wars of India, have absorbed the surplus revenue^ that visionary capital, on which the whole superstrucJive of the act of 1 793 is built. Let any man, however, take the trouble to look over the accounts 65 annually submitted to -Parliament under the name of the India Budget and he will see good reason to dispute this plea; he will see that the' revenues of India, up to 1802-3, for ten years, were — ^94,756,281 The Charges 83,253,417 ^11,503,864 Being more than eleven millions above the actual charge. It is, however, a thing not to be disputed, that, in the year 1798, the revenue of India was about ^8,039,880 In the year 1806 * 15,600,000 Increase ^7,560,120 The debts of India, in the year 1796, were ^1 1,032,645 Debt in April, 1806, by computation 28,500,000 Increase j£17,467,355 Mr. Grant calculates that, on the 30th April 1806, the India debt, deducting the amount of sinking fund, would be thirty millions, and consequently the increase of debt near nineteen millions. This increase of debt would be nothing very formidable under good management, when compared with the increase of revenue. Even putting the whole increase of debt to the score of government and conquest, it is little more than two years purchase. Even that is injustice to the administration of India. But of the India debt, the * ]\Ir. Francis, in a speech in Parliament in 1805, says, the revenue is much under-rated at^ fifteen milhons. Mr. Francis is a great authority for that fact. 61 Company claim, and will get^ three or four millions *, for the conquest of Ceylon, for expeditions projected or executed to Batavia, the Moluccas, the capture of the Cape, Egypt, &c'\-. To this there is to be added, that the funds with which the Company laid in their investments, over and above the proceeds of their exports, were to be procured by borrowing, and that at India interest, and therefore have swelled the mass of debt. The precise amount, in which the debt in India has been created by the demands of commerce, could not be ascertained without the examination of a vast number of accounts, to which very few have access, and also without a cautious set-- tlement of the principles on which the computation is to be made. It is for want of settling this principle of computation that the superfluity of arithmetical statements, laid before the public, affords so little useful information or accurate inference. Some persons, extremely intelligent in India affairs, have asserted, aj)- parently on strong grounds, that a very large proportion of the. India debt arises from money borrowed at Indian interest, to purchase invest- ments. That this is the case, to a very considerable ..extent, is clear beyond contradiction. Lord Castlereagh, in the House of Couimons, last July, admitted that, of the increased debt since \T93, 8,09,*3,6.31/. was assignable to commerce ; but there cannot be a doub,t but much more belongs to that account. The investment, both for the .China and for the India trade, for many years past, has been laid in with money borrowed in India, and the accumulating interest on the debt there* composes a considerable pi oportion of the gross amount. Lord Welles- ley, so early as .lunc 1 798, states the fact beyond dispute, that investment ■was laid in with borrowed money. In a minute of that date, he says: * See the curious documents on this subject in the As. An. Reg. 1805. •}■ It is to bo observed that the CoinpaDy make government pay for all their acquisition, and even those on the peninsula. 6.5 " Tlie iavcstment, at once the most foxserful cause of our temporary distress, the main spring of the industry and opulence of the people com- mitted to our charge, and the active principle of the commercial interest of the Company, is more likely to be increased than to be diminished in any future year, and consequently the embarrassment of our finances must be progressive, if some means be not devised for aiding the resources of this presidency, Avhich must now be considered as the ge- neral treasury and bank of our Eastern empire, furnishing supplies for all our other possessions in India, as well as a large and increasing proportion of the capital employed in the trade to Europe and to China.^'' Here is a distinct warning given at the very commencement of Lord Wellesley's administration, of what was sure to happen, unless the Di- rectors took some means to procure capital from other sources. There was no surplus tribute. The fortunes of individuals, of which they speak so much, were probably in a considerable degree absorbed in the Indian floating paper. It was manifest, therefore, that either funds for investments Avere to be sent from Europe, or that they must be borrowed in India. The latter has been the case, for the Company have not sent funds from Europe to any considerable extent. It is undeniable, therefore, that all the dif- ference annually between the produce of outward sales, and the amount of the investment to China and to Europe, has been borrowed at India interest, and must have formed a very great proportion of the Indian debt, because the very interest of Indian debt adds so rapidly to the amount of the principal. What is the precise amount of the share, it may not be easy for an individual to fix. The subject ought to be referred to a select committee of the House of Commons, to investigate and state the result clearly. The public is deeply interested in the question, for all this accumulation of debt by a ruinous commerce defrauds the na- tion of the benefits of the participation, stipulated in the Act of 1793. K. 66 The Company ought to be restrained from pursuing a trafEck so mis- chievous to themselves and to the state. Much has been said of the increase of the Company's assets, as a set-off to their debt ; but many things are put into the stock by com- putation which cannot bear examination. The result upon the whole seems to be, that the Company have not means to pay their debts ; and if the debts in India, payable in Europe next year, are actually de- manded, there cannot be a doubt that the aid of government will be absolutely necessary. Such is the state of the Company's finances, that they were lately obliged to obtain from government a prolongation of the term for the payment of the tea duties now due ; a thing that in a private merchant must have ruined his credit. Indeed, by the Company's own statement in what is called the stock, by computation they assume a balance in their favour of 6,181,267/. but it is manifest that the sum due to the stockholders must be paid before they can state a bahmce in favour. That sum is not included ; but taking what the Company's capital actually cost (which is not dis- puted) at 7,780,000/. the balance against them is 1,598,733/. on their own showing. To balance that, they state nine millions worth, and up- wards, of fortifications, and other dead stock, which it is manifestly absurd to estimate at such an exchangeable value. Indeed, many of the items in that statement arc perfectly ridiculous. Nearly two mil- lions consist of household furniture, farming stock, pleasure boats, plate, and table-linen ; such a list as might be expected to com- pose the stock of a concern in Duke's Place. If the articles in- cluded in the assets were to be fairly estimated, and allowance made for bad debts, &c. there would be found a deficiency of above five millions. 'J'his, added to the amount of capital, would give a balance of deficit, even admitting the nine millions for buildings*. • See Gobbet's Debates, for July, 1800, 67 It has been stated that the debt in India, on the .'iOth April, 1806, was probably not less than thirty millions, at any rate above twenty-eight ; the interest, payable on that part bearing interest, would be considerably above two millions. Such has been tlie accumulation of the debt, by means of the Company borrowing to carry on a trade, which is a losing trade lo them in any circumstances, but when carried on with a capital borrowed at from eight to twelve per cent, abf'olutely ruinous. .sbaam The situation of the revenues in India, viewed as conn ectpd with government, may be considered flourishing, notwithstanding the debt ; but what man is sanguine enough to think that the Company ever can regularly draw commercial capital out of those dominions ? Neither ought it to be. The project of embarking the revenues of a govern- ment in traffick, which is the basis of the Act of 1 793, is the naost extraordinary imagination man ever indulged. Let the .state take upon itself the whole responsibility and management .Qf ^tll^ ci\;^^sjo- vernment, and give its subjects the right of trading to India. Thp productive powers of that country will then be promoted ;,tjj9, ti'^^f will be supported by capital, independent of political events, ,J^|ii,q[ if there be surplus revenue, it will come to England through natural channels, instead of that clumsey, ill-contrived vehi<^le Y>f if raitlaJKfirpr the monopoly trade of a joint stock company. , i It has sometimes been proposed, that the Indian debt should be transferred to Europe, and in some shape or other converted jnto stock here. This project, though undoubtedly calculated to alleviate the pressure, is liable to many very grave and serious objections. In a constitutional view it seems a matter of very doubtful policy to ccynsoli- date the existence of the Company still further, by giving it so formi- dable a mass of influence distinct from the government. The national debt is said to have owed its origin to a desire to identify the interest of multitudes with the new establishment at the Revolution. The fur- K 2 68 ther extension of any principle of influence or support, independent of the government, or, perhaps, different from that of the government, seems calculated to produce something of a similar effect, and to give the East India Company a more rooted and decisive hold of the com- munity, founded upon an interest, which may be altogether separate fi-om that of the nation at large. To create such a body of European debt, solely under the authority and responsibility of government, in the first instance, might be adviseable, as preparatory to the abolition of the Company; but if it is to be a Company's debt, and to create a new and more extensive body of adherents and dependents to it, without relation to the utility or inutility of the institution in other respects, it is a plan highly dangerous. The East India Com- pany, as an imperium in imperio^ are already too powerful, and per- haps too dangerous ; but will any wise minister, or reflecting man, choose to allow them to inlist recruits or dependents, to the number of subscribers requisite to fund in Europe twenty or thirty millions sterling of India debt; or augment their democracy at the India House by such an accession of new citizens ? Perhaps, too, it is worth while to consider what might be the effect to public credit, of so large a fund, under the auspices, and fluctuating with the fortunes of an institution like that of the East India Com- pany. The past management of that body gives no great security for better in future. It will be in vain to look to the Company's commerce for aid ; let the authors of such a proposal, be who they may, count solely on the wisdom and economy of the Company's Indian administration. If there be any solid security, it is solely the Indian territories. Let sober-thinking men consider Avhat may be the consequence to our funds at large, of the fluctuation that must inevitably arise in the Company's stock, if it is to vary with their commercial success, and their military entcr{)riscs. South Sea schemes and bubbles ought to have cured us of the insanity of grant- ing privileges and power to any Company, capable of shaking the 69 pillars of national credit. No man, who lores the constitution, and who respects the prerogative of the crown, will concur in a measure, so dangerous to the purity of the one, and the lawful authority of the other. If it be necessary to save the India Company from ruin, by trans- ferring the debt to Europe, the government ought to resume its rights; because, such a state of the Company, of itself, forfeits their Charter, and defeats the ends of their institution. The guarantee of government would, at all events, be necessary; but, in undertaking the ultimate risk, let us have a real security on the estate which is to pay the debt, and let us trust nothing to the bankrupt tenant, who has mortgaged our property, which he held only upon lease, and who has forfeited his rights, by the breach of every covenant into which he had entered. It is in vain to think, that tlie Company can retrieve their affairs in India, or alTord any security for the permanent interest which the public has in that estate. ' ^''^'^ ' V. Having now taken a general view of the Company's commerce, and the enormous debt they have contracted, in order to carry it on at a loss, it is necessary to call the attention of the public to the private trade; because, till something better is done, the encouragement of that trade seems the only expedient for securing to the country the . commerce of India. The encouragement of that trade is perfectly con- sistent with the Company's rights, and therefore it appears preferable to do so, rather than excite any clamour, by proposing to resume, before the expiry of the Charter, the privileges which the Company have used so little to the public advantage. It is not the purpose of this tract to advocate the claims of the private traders, or even to discuss them, except in so far as they serve to illustrate the larger principles on which I contend for the general rights of the subjects of this country to a share in that trade, from 70 which their capital, their talents, their industry, their enterprise, arc excluded by the Company's monopoly. The private traders have gone no further than propose compromises and temperaments, founded upon the entire recognition of the Company's monopoly. Perhaps, indeed, the private traders may not wish the trade of India to be laid open; and the folly of the Company, in irritating and oppressing a class, vrho would probably have joined with them in supporting the monopoly, is fortunate for the country. Private traders may have their particular narrow views, their false conceptions of advantage in a secondary and subordinate monopoly. In the present circumstances, however, they contend for nothing but that which it is the interest of the State and of the Company to grant. Nay, what they ask ought to be granted speedily, unless the trade of India is to be di- verted into foreign channels, from which it may be impossible to recal it, ■ Ho^q hap Mftta? t- At the time the Company's Charter was last renewed, a good deal of discussion took place, on the subject of laying open the trade, and, as before stated, several petitions were presented praying for that mea- sure. The proposal unhappily was overruled. It was thought necessary, however, to do something in favour of the public, and to adopt some modification of the monopoly. It seemed particularly to be felt on all sides as absolutely necessary to secure some channel, by which private individuals in India might, to a certain extent, be allowed to trade Avith this country*. A disease existed in the body politic, arising from obstructions, caused by the Company's monopoly; but the state doctors, though they perceived the mischief, either had not discovered the cause, or would not apply the proper remedy. Indeed, all the foolish and violent methods taken to force trade into particular channels, and exclude them from the • See Historical View of I'laus for tiie Government and Coniintrcc of India^ &c, page 582. 71 natural vessels of circulation, inevitably cause similar disorders. Men who possess the means of carrying on a trade, which the unreasonable will of the government attempts to force into one course, cannot be prevented from following the bent of their interest and the nature of things. It is in vain to complain of this. Whether called illicit trade, or smuggling, or interloping, it will continue as long as the temptation remains. What was called an illicit trade, existed in India long before the Act of 1793. The British settlers there found out that they could trade to Europe, Avith great advantage, in foreign bottoms, and they were assisted in these speculations by the funds, which individuals were remitting home, and for which the Company would not furnish bills but on the most disadvantageous terms. *t3^ After a good deal of negociation, it was at last settled and provided, by the Act of 1793, that 3000 tons of shipping in the Company's ships should be set apart for the private export and import trade, ac- cording to certain regulations specified. The restrictions of the law against the Company's servants, or others acting as factors for foreigners, or lending money to foreign Companies, or on bottomry of their ships, or assisting them with remittances by bills, was repealed *. This repeal is a sufficient censure of such prohibitions. The object of this recognition of the private trade was to render it unnecessary for British individuals to embark their capital in a trade carried on by foreigners, and to afford them the means to bring that trade to their own country. We cannot, however, praise much in the arrangement, except the in- tention it professed. The provisions for realizing it were not well * 33 Geo. Ill, cap. 52. 72 contrived. It is universally admitted that they have failed, and Lord Melville, the author of the act, has candidly acknowledged it. Indeed, the failure can excite no surprise. It was perfectly impossible that private traders, who carry on commerce for a mercantile profit, and who therefore must carry it on with economy, and in that course which seasons and markets require, could carry it on under the same disadvantages as the Company, who do nothing upon the principles of ordinary trade. To tie them to the Company's system, and prescribe the same circle of operations to both, was like chaining a living body to a dead carcase. Every man, in the slightest degree acquainted with commerce, knows, that nothing is more essential to it than that it should be entirely under the command of him who engages in it, to carry it on in the way he deems most advantageous. A merchant must have an opportunity to ascertain the state of markets, and to adapt the cargo he exports to the demands of the distant market ; and to calculate, on the other hand, what in return will be most suited to his home market. But to prevent, as much as possible, the uncertainty of such calculations (always uncertain) it is important that the 'time in which the M'hole operation is to be completed should be as short as possible. If, however, he is compelled to ship his goods on board of vessels which are not under his own direction, as to the time and course of the voyage, it is perfectly manifest that he ought to be wholly independent of mercantile profit, or he must be ruined. Indeed, nothing but a very strict monopoly can support that mode of doing business. It was the mode pursued in Spain, and under which, subject to the controul of the Casa de Contraccione, individuals were allowed to ship goods for South America in the privileged ports*. These ships at that time used to * BroughaiTij vol. i. 415. 73 sail once in three years. Our Company do not intcrpo?e quite so long an interval; but, it is undeniable that their voyages last much longer than the voyages of private ships would do; not to speak of the interruptions and deviations to which their ships are subject from the political character of the Company. It must be evident to every man, that nothing but a close monopoly could render a trade so carried on profitable ; and even if it were a gainful trade to (he Company, it would be for the interest of the nation to abolish such a monopoly, because in proportion to the trade being gainful must the nation itself be taxed in the price of the commodities consumed at home: or lose, inasmuch as the mono- poly, by causing high price, prevents re-exportation for the foreign supply. But individuals trading for profit cannot support these multiplied inconveniences. Their whole operation is i-endered uncertain, by the time consumed in it ; and also the quantity of capital, necessarily employed io it, is increased, from being so lo)ig tied up in one transaction. The ca}>ital is not replaced, and the profits realized, probably in less than three years. It is manifest, therefore, that a greater quantity of capital is occupied in circulating a smaller number of goods than need be employed ; the quantity of business done is lessened ; and the profits of the merchant are smaller, more distant, and uncertaiii.03 hns »p This will be evident from a few considerations. The extra ships, which sailed from Portsmouth on the 10th of August, 1805, are stated to have arrived at St. Helena, on their return to this country, about the middle of January, 1807; probably they are now arrived, being expected about the middle of April. Their cargoes will be sold in August or September ; so that, allowing nine months for the prompt or payment. L 74 the proceeds will not be realized by the merchant till November or December, 1807. Thus very nearly three years are necessary from the commencement of the transaction to its final close. It is evident to every practical mer- chant, that three capitals, at the least, are requisite to carry on the busi- ness ; — one in India, to provide the goods ; one to pay the bills drawn against them before they arrive (always the case) ; and another, sup- posing it a British capital, to remit to India for the succeeding year's investment before the preceding ones are realized. itnrii gOiuao- . ru.qiu^jj auj :j iv.i.,r.i_ rv. ; 311, jj:. 'This is the train of the Company's trade, and fully justifies the assertion that, it .requires three capitals: some indeed assert it is nearer four, ni bono -o! dor^ An t 3- ';:'. 'loorro'^ The waste and expence of this system will appear at once, by com- paring it with the course of the American trade to India.' T=1t"fe per- fectly well ascertained, that the Americans perform their voyage from the ports of their own country, and back again, in nine or ten monthsi " They come to Calcutta, take in their cargo, and sail again, sometimes^ in five and twenty days ; this is a fact well known. It is clear, however, that with the panic capital necessary tb cutty 6ft the Company's single voyage (or that of the private trader under the oppression of the Company's system) to the same extent, the Ame-' rican can perform two operations at least. Suppose that he gets credit at Calcutta, by giving a bill upon an opulent merchant in London, per- haps Baring and Company, payable in six months. He returns to America and realizes his profit there, or perhaps at Hamburgh or Amsterdam, in cash or good bills; and this fully enables him to meet the bill on London, for which he got his cargo at Calcutta. He is ready immediately to proceed on another voyage. Probably the second 75 time he goes to Bombay direct; to Mhich he carries Madeira wiin^, (6p any other articles that suit the market : he then takes in a cargo of cotton, and proceeds to China to take in tea, if he thinks that operation more advantageous than going to Calcutta, and renewing the fn>t transaction on which he has made a large profit. All this he shall do before the Company can once realize a single outward and homeward voyage to their own territories. The Americans, it is tEuesj have the advantage of peace insurance^] and other circumstances which press upon us in time of w'ar;- but is it not evident that the very system of the Company's trade secures them a much superior and more certain advantage over us, in the quantity of capital employed, the quickness of the return, the economy on the whole transaction, the cxpence of which is so much lessened by the shortness of the voyage and all the concomitant circumstances? It is absurd, therefore, to expect that the Company can contend withq the, Americans ; but how then stands the private trader, who shipsi(k»iel board the Company's vessels; has he any chance of trading to ad*tJ vantage? ' sinoo xedT a ci cuti f >;^iili vJaawJ ban 971} .'•' In the first place, he is obliged to apply for the tonnage he thinks he may require, long before it is really Avanted. After repeated applica- tions, he is left quite uncertain on board of what vessel liis goods mayn* be shipped, or when she will sail. Before the voyage begin, his risk ' commences as to almost every thing that constitutes the real adventure of a merchant. He ships to a country, as to the state of the markets, of which he cannot even make a conjecture at the time his cargo may arrive ; because the vessel may be detained, or may be obliged to deviate, or may be converted into a ship of war. In a word, the veaseVtin her voyage, is subject to none of those essential conditions which every merchant who ships goods would insert in his charter party. L 2 76 Let any merchant look back at the quickness and certainty of t\W- Americans, in all their Indian transactions, and then let him pronounce whether a trade, carried on in such a manner as ours, can thrive, unless it is supported by the advantage of a very close monopoly. The reservation of 3000 tons in the Company ships, for the benefit of the private trade, is one of the most extraordinary measures that ever was gravely proposed to a legislative assembly*. It carries its own condemnation with it. How it could even have been thought of is truly amazing. The Directors-f triumphantly inform us, that it never has been used by the private traders, and that the Company have lost 70 or 80,000/. by providing the tonnage. This is not surprising. It would indeed have been wonderful if sensible practical merchants had condescended to trade on such terms. Had the Company been carriers, going backward and forward, between London and Calcutta, with a power to charge what freight they pleased, this reservation on the part of others, to have a certain quantity of goods carried at a moderate rate, might have been prudent and proper, if the things carried had no reference to commerce, and if the provision had been merely a security against the overcharge for the carriage of a certain quantity of luggage. The owner of the goods in this case, like the passenger in a stage coach, would have paid the price, submitted to the inconvenience, and considered the matter no more. But a merchant, whose object is to bring his goods to market as cheap as he can, regularly, systematically, and in fifty successive instances, is compelled to look to the means he has of carrying his produce, as much as to the means of raising it. Indeed, it is just as important that he should have the means of sending the goods to * It is quite amusing to see in what flattering terms this project is opened in the ILstovic-al View already quoted. See page 580, et seq. t See their Three Reports. 77 market, as the means of providing them in the first instance. Then, what sort of a conveyance is that which this stipulation secures him? The law says, that the rate of freight is to be moderate. Very well. Granting it is moderate, how small a matter is that, compared with the other disadvantages! It is not said, that the freight in the extra ships is of itself extravagant ; and the fact is, the Company, against their will, and to remove one complaint, provided these ships, at a great. loss to themselves, charging much less to the shippers than they pay to the owner. But is the freight all? Suppose that a merchant pays 20/. 30/. or 40/. per ton, on a four-months voyage: if, on paying that tonnage, his goods are immediately brought to the market for which they are destined, is it not evident, that he may be more a gainer on the adventure, than if they were carried much cheaper, but did not reach the market till six or twelve months after he has them shipped, or ready for shipping? The freight is but one, though an important article. The interest of money, the uncertainty and inconvenience of every sort, when added to the account, may renderi' a particular mode of conveyance an absolute prohibition of the trade, independently of mere freight. l . oiq sA' What good roads are to the internal communications of a country, quick intercourse by sea is to the inhabitant of different countries.,; it, is no matter however that the road is good, if the journey is not per-(v formed with dispatch. The East India Company is an obstacle to our rapid intercourse with India, as bad as the most boisterous oce^n,, ,or the most impervious desert. o■^.■-^nT.■ Every man, acquainted with human affairs, must be sensible how much commercial intercourse is promoted by an easy, regjilar, and spcedv com- munication. To take a familiar illustration. It will be remembered bv many) that the trade between London and Leith, and indeed most 78 parts of Scotland, formerly resembled the phlegmatic dulness of the Company's voyages to India. They were rare, and took up six weeks or two months each time. Within a few years past, a system has been introduced, by which the ships perform the voyage with the quickness and regularity of a mail coach, not only to Leith, but every other sea port, and the beneficial effects to both parts of the island have been astonishing. This single improvement has annihilated the distance that divides the two countries, and has made the advantages of each common to both. The principle is the same when applied to larger transactions. Rapid intercourse abridges expcnce; augments capital, by facilitating the business it can perform; and renders, com- modities cheap, by promoting their circulation. The regulation, proposed in 1793 in favour of the private trade, must'^have proved nugatory, because it furnished the merchant with a channel of conveyance v»hich it was impossible for him to employ. S5(^ii a ^conveyance never could be used for a trade to be regularly catrhed on, paying its exp^nces on commercial prmciples. It was sobii* ^tb'iindj therefore, that the plan of providing tonnage on board^. thfe'^'^ompany's ships, for the private trade, could not answer the. end proposed. Indeed, Lord Melville, the author of the arrangement, frankly OAvns that it has failed. " Although,*" says he, " I proposed the measure, I should be uncandid if I did not fairly acknowledge, that experience has proved it to be inadequate to the purposes for which it was intended*." 3n.! Thfe Directors^ iri the First Report, say, " Nevertheless, after making these proper distinctions, your Committee are ready to alloic^ thai much uncerlainty^ in the limes of arrivals and departures of ships^ and in respect to procuring freight on them, with long deten- • Letttr to the Chairman, April 2, 1800, 79 Hon and circuitous routes^ may naturally and justly be a ground of objection with individuals, who are required to depend on them Jor freight* P But the admission, in the preceding Reports, that a remedy was necessary, appears abandoned in the Third Report. The whole private trade is there reprobated as mischievous, and treated as an invasion of the Company's monopoly. There is not a single passage which, allows it to be deserving of any encouragement. Indeed, the persons employed in it are treated with a licentiousness of invective, which could hardly have been expected in a document signed by eight Directors of the East India Company. The Directors, and particularly the authors of this libellous Report, consider it as the most intolerable presumption in any British subjects to desire to have the opportunity of employing their industry and their capital in the India trade; in which, be it remembered, all foreigners in amity with us are, freely permitted to engage. The private traders are represented as guilty of something little short of rebellion and treason, because , they presume to solicit permission to do that which the Company cannot and will not do. In this Report, indeed, such decisive and universal hostility to the private trade and private traders is avowed, that nothing could be looked for, but that the latter should in every way be thwarted and opposed. The Directors say, " they have too much reason to fear, that the exclusive trade, as regulated by the Act [of 1793, is not only neces- sary, but indispensable, as a resource to save the Company from destruction.'''^ From what has been already stated however, on the evidence of * First Report on Private Trade. D 80 their own accounts, it is demonstrated, that the more the Company trade on their present system, the more rapidly will^tjjieir Iqdian ' debt accumulate, the faster will their ruin advance*. It cannot be denied, that the Act of 1793 was intended as a facility to private trade; and the spirit of that Act requires, that the .■ fecility should be provided, though the letter of the law has been found not to accomplish its intention. The Act of 1793 appears to limit the amount of the Company's investments to one million, for such is the appropriation of a supposed surplus of tribute directed to be so • applied^ For want of such surplus, however, the Company is obliged \ to borrow; hence, as we have seen, their large India debt. gnlTrt Now, then, it is manifest, that there is a quantity of Indi^^. pro- duce, which the Company's capital, on this ^cale, would not have embraced. The Directors say, in the Third Report, that it is better that such surplus produce should be taken up by for^^guer^ . by the ^i Americans, than be brought to the port of London. One of their yni^ reasons for this avowedly is, that the private tradpr^ intercept the funds v'irff of British individuals in India, which othervyise would come jnto their '"' treasury, and supply the means of their investmeatf. ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ lo aohb9qxno5 orfl moil bj^^ gt^g-ftg vigy The Report says, that " the British merchants residing in India are competitors for those funds, which would otherwise flow into their treasuries, to enable the Company to purchase their own. investment." In a very few paragraphs after, it is stated, that " the iwivate trade already exceeds the extent of the Indian capitaly-r,^^n ^^ ^ ^^T considerable " British capital enters into the trade." It has already been shown, that there can no inconvenience arise -:rf .T • See antea. 81 from the employment of British capital in the trade. If such British capital were employed, must it not answer all those good purposes which the Directors think would flow from the encouragement of the bona fide trade of foreigners with British India? It is proper now to take notice of the complaint of the Directors, that the private traders intercept their funds, and reduce t^eni to the necessity of borrowing money with which to lay in their investments. ' It is indisputable that, ever since the year 1802, the Company have acted on the principles of the Third Report, throwing every obstacle in the way of the private trade. Have they by this conduct obtained any facilities for laying in their investments? or, by suppressing the private trade, have they increased their own ? The fact, on the contrary, is, that the foreign trade with India, par- ticularly that of the Americans, has continued to increaj^e rapidly. If there be any funds arising from private fortunes, to be invested in any shape, they either go into the Company's Indian paper, or they are tempted into the American service. But, be this as it may, the very effects which the Company complained of, from the competition of the private traders, meet them in the trade of foreigners. By the encouragement of the latter, the trade is carried to foreign channels. — This is all the difference. It is perfectly well known, that at all times a considerable portion of illicit trade was carried on, with the funds of British individuals, in foreign bottoms. That trade is no longer illicit. The act of 1793 completely legalizes it. The Americans and other foreigners, therefore, have derived all the benefit from that Act. The British residents in India may lawfully be the agents of foreigners. The consequence, under the present system, is obvious. Those British M 82 residents would pi'efer English connections. They would prefer sending their goods to the British market : but (hat is rendered impos- sible by the Company. They naturally, therefore, must be driven into the connection of the Americans, who can carry on the trade much more advantageously. The sole effect, therefore, of the repeal of the prohibitory regulations against illicit trade, enacted in so many laws*, has been to shut the trade against Great Britain, and to open it to fo- reigners. Is it to be endured, however, that foreigners should have the advantage of a free, open, lucrative commerce with British ter- ritories, in which native British merchants dare not engage, in order to bring it to the ports of their native country ? tl >no> Ot8,tOf bnf When the Americans first entered into this trade, they were sup- ported by British capital or credit ; and the houses in London that gave them the credit, and which now give it to them, are perfectly well known. The Americans, indeed, have now raised a large capital out of their profits. They take out silver for part of their investments ; but a very large share of the commerce they carry on is supported by bills on London ; which, after getting their cargoes upon them, from thq quickness of their operations, they are able to discharge from the proceeds beifore the bills fall due. .orfj ■o.mA) Indeed, tlie share which the Americans have obtained in the trade, is an evil which is growing daily, and it has risen through the impolicy of the government, and the Company cherishing this foreigner at the cxpence of Englishmen. But tlicy will one day repent this unnatural turn of their affections., ^^Ii]y^,Toitj w^jild4^ — The lieilgc-sparrow ie^ the cuekoo_sc» long, That she had'hei- jielxT bit ofJliy her young. nrrorV srsraotoll 9 * .See anlca. -. .' Y'h 83 Our present system of India trade has nourished a rival whidi threatens to destroy it. The number of American ships which entered the port of Calcutta alone, in the year 1800-1, was twenty-six ; in 1802-3, thirty-two; in 1803-4, twenty-seven ; in 1804-5, twenty-nine ; together with ten Por- tugueze, two Danish, and one Swede. The number in 1805-6 shows an increase, and it is to be observed, that the American ships, which at first were small, have now become much larger ; and that the increase' of tonnage is much greater than the number of ships. This is evident from the increased tonnage entered in the port of Calcutta, which in the year 1801-2, was 493 vessels, and 104,870 tons ; and in the year 1804-5, itwas581 vessels, and 147,176 tons. Dliring these years the trade of the Company has declined according to the unquestionable evidence of their sales. It is clear, therefore, that the foreign trade with British India has increased, while our own has fallen off. fft tf^f^sJBlt*, thdlf, B'5eonceire^£iiylfilHg'^ri!il)re^cffelfi%^^^^ and absurd, than for a nation to undertake the government and defence of a distant Empire ; the commerce of which (and that is the only thing those territories have yet afibrded) it thus gives, not merely by negligence, but by absolute choice, to other nations ? Among the fol- lies of states, fighting for commerce has been one ; but this is the first instance of a government absolutely restraining its own subjects from that commerce which it freely indulges to others I The people of this country, we suspect, however, will entertain dif- ferent notions of the policy of encouraging foreigners in a trade which it is in our power to bring to the ports of England. Is it proposed, then, to exclude foreigners from all share in the com- merce of India ? By no means. All that, with respect to this, and for the present, is required, is that the subjects of this country should M 2 QJ tr CO CO t-i >— ' <0 S4^ \ be enabled to carry on that trade which the Company do not carry on, and which their capital cannot embrace* , ^ >-r »- >-, ^4 O rO (Tli oc *" o *o r:< \!c *" The loss already sustained by the Company is very great. In the following years the amount of their India and China sales stands thus : — W9:. . .-r. , .!. . ^.:^8,345,673 ^,0 1800..^.5S.i«s 1/^ rt^ >■ *«^ ''■^>'' co^'1803-.-r^.., ' 1804. ~" iso5.g;^^jp... Of; a; fo .O t^ i-' C^ |.| ,7,359,676 i-^T,595,181 6,626,347 "~ 5,866,075 I 5,267,578 Thus it appears, that the sales of 1805 fall more than three millions below those of 1799-1800. The following ^ec^nt ofihie sales of the Company's piece goods, for the years mentioned in it, will prove, that not merely the amount, but the profit has declined, ^^ **^ Oj ^ r -5 • froa -«: -*<> «3 •^ '^i >~o H ^ ;?. r> o O o O «< C3 '^-, — — 0.1 CM "" prrrnfi, I ^'^ I •i -^ ';: ^ Oi CD — ' -— 05 Oi -T CO Oi lo i^ 'o o o — 1 -H OO O t^ lO !>. csj'cd 00 -^ •j — sv» ~ — CO ■T 00 T T CO •"> r^ r^ r\ r\ O -^ O 00 S^ Q^lf. ,??(' CO "^ rf Cj CO 00 ^^ _ 00 t^ . O *0 t^ Q, ^ CO -t* c- 3^ O O 00 — N. iO k^ CM O y: — < CO oQ 00 O CO —I (V, O^ l^ -1* CM^ ^ if^ _ ■-. _ O « CC 05' wj l-^ iC t^ I— CO •O CO t^ ■ r^ «-■ »^ '^ -T CM " 00 ov "n^- to O CV o « -f C6 <0 t^ Ci CO i^ r> r-i «^ rN ri CO CO o irj « -f O JQ CO l-^ CO »0 CO *0 CO »o rv #^ r\ o CO i-^- CN^ CO 00 M'te'-a -^:^ ^iy^ef^3%^qBii aUflT . I— I CM O t^ ^ <>J X t<5 ,— < ,-, _l f— I P-. orij wolsd , -^ t CO 00 O' »r5 — ' Sii Oi .O G»o oc ir: CO --i ,,• -, jrn o CO C5 n! o § ?2 ?i % ■- ^"^^^^ ^^^" l--«. lO "^ "^ lO "— I o o CO 00 O C>i CO o 05 O CM i>. »-0 Ci' CO -r CO — -M o r\ #^ r% ^1 C^ ^> t-. t^ CM ex O »1 CO rf CM c: Ci CO cr> CM CM C>? CO -H "S> 3 «^ JO so ao i-vi CO 10 Ti< ^O «0 00 CO CO O CO ^ -x ^^< % CM I--, cr- CM — '^ CO ^j Oj Oj O lO -^ CO ^ C35 1^ C^ — I T ^ ■T' b*. -r -^ so CO iO —I 00 ri* O © C5 — • ^>- e^ c> T' ^ r^ •^ '^ CO C5 O CNJ X O C5i O l^ CO t^ CO CN C3i -n — CO CO "^ CO "^ ^ c:::? o o o o o o t^ Oi -^ CO l>. CNJ u-j t^ CO "^ — * CO Ci X ^ »N ^ *^ CS CN *\ OJ CO X O O -^ CO CN< Oi ~r "^ C5 CM b«- >>. 1^ •ro -^ CM --< CO CO — > CMI 0 o o o o o o o 00 X X X X X X 86 The following will give us a view of the private trade :— o 00 ^adt 1? 38^3if "^ OC Oi 00 ■^ 5^ O •^ t>. 00 «"• »^ «^ oc -^ cc lO CM c^ OJ CM 10 CN» u^ N. ifj O CM Oi 05 r^ CC Oi — •-■ •■- rN r ^ X3 o -r O »o oj o; 9tjE7i7«£^ sri7 1B9 - T- ni£ CO O '" , ■ ® -, - ■ o eo o? ci "^ CO 00 cu eo cc — ^so'io'co'c^ oj'co"-^' ^ CO — < o --< c o 'O l^ 05 CO Oi o o t>. ^ O CO — "^ 00 <: -r CO CN) ex so c^ 'O -^ 0> CTi -r CO rp cc ^, 53 00 '-0 » ■ O ^T C^ ^, CO CM 1-, O -»??< 0& w^^v \ i CO Oi >f^ l^ 1^ -T O uo O »^ •- #^ i>. b- CO CO -^ CM -- _■ -~ ~— ~i I- CO "0 . rr 'O irj i^ i^ f- CO — 'O 3 Slj CM »n 00 t>- © 00 X CO 'T* »0 00 — — 00 CO r- «r #N ^^ —< — CM -T t^ 00 Ci K. N. O CO Iv. /fr>l tn Q, O o o w p Oh rt^is »?0, :0i o •^- \>^<. <0 CO O) r- o: cc cc OJ lO "0 -^ '— CO 0:1 -t CM C^ l^ — 'tr 00 CC t^ ^S «^ r^ r CO «r, -r- t^ CO cc O -T -^ OJ CO -Or O o .1-1 JA.1 ^dt ni bnjs o o "-• o -^ ;j c/j ^ Q i^ »o CO cr^ 05 t^ — 1^ 'o CO 1^ ^r-j 0» CO Oi f — 00 — CO 00 CO cc OC C X l^ •^ #^ J^ r — 00 1^ c o cc CO »n O; iiO -T — . OV ar^ :08r •IG^^■' aoooofi gnibso?^ ^ o — c c^^ 5^000 0: 00 00 00 CO —r »0 CO o o c o QC 00 00 00 05 »0 02 — o »f^ T* ■^ ;:::* sj C5 1-. CO -- ■2 g i^ ?o CO cS ^ :0 — CO -H ^-^ Tnu Ho nsllfit > jfiriiJ 9mil anijs:! ori.^ u if: 5 _ ^ 87 These documents are important in another view : they show, that in proportion as the private trade has been restricted, that of the Com- pany has suffered, and it is not therefore the success of the British private trade that hurts the Company, but the undue share the Ame- ricans have obtained in the India trade, by which the latter now supply our West India colonies with coarse piece goods, and the greatest part of Europe with the different products of India. In the year 1799^ — 1800, theamdunV df the Compahy's sale was 7,359,676/. The amount of private trade that year was, 2,336,980/. In the year 1801-2 the Company's was 6,626,347/. The private trade 2,304,725/. In the year 1803* there was a falling off in the Company's sale, below the amount ""b?^ i^e. J preceding yeat, by 170,000/. and in the amount of private trade of 970119/. In the year 1804-5, the Company's sales were less by 609,991/.; the private trade, however, was more than the preceding year by 229,115/. i §" ^ We see here that the private trade, after having^ by tl^ discou- ragement of the Company's regulations, expressed so cteafly in their manifesto of 1802 sunk from 2,304,728/. whichTt ^s in the year 1801-2, down to somewhat more than 1,300,000/. got up again by 200,000/. or more; but it has since declined still further, as the preceding accounts show. . .-^^ p "^ «?:}* $51 '-*'?? T t: ^: C' ■- - Let any man, however, look over these statement-, or the more ex- tended papers to which the reader is referred, and he must then see how much the trade of the Company, particularly in respect to India, has fallen off since 1801-2. It is above three millions value a year; and at the same time that of the private trade has declined a million. In all • See the Budget iu the Asiatic Annual Register for 1S04. ' In the statements of the Ac- counts of the Company, and in the India Budget, there are trifling differences in the figures, probably errors of the press, or transcribers. 88 ■:nl-, i- j.jn ^ ao^iaq js bbw -^anoJluSl muilliW ii8 ^it is said,' hoiv ever, that the war has shut thb markets of the con- tinent. This may be true to some extent, but it is not the cause of the falling off of the CompanY''s trade; and, be it ol)served, that the falling offis solely in articles of the India trade, for the China tradehas its consumption chiefly in the Brit sh dominions, and is not so greatly af- fected by the war. But, during the year of the greatest sales of the Com- pany, the years of 1799, 1800, we wet-e at wan, and with Bonaparte; and the interruption to our commerce, particularly in the subsequent year, existed in tlie north of Europe to their full extent. What, then, has caused the vast falling off? Evidently the sujjply of the Americans, who have got into the trade, certainly not for their own consumption, but as the carriers and suppliers of Europe. By this supply the British market for India articles is anticipated, and all the commercial ad- vantages we now might have from our Indian empire are sacrificed. The exclusive supply of ourselves with tea, indeed, remains (o the Company, and with this, were they allowed, the Americans would supply us much cheaper ; aaid they will supply , us in time of peace, . 'irJicther they are allowed ob not. sri) -.u j^ja'ii -id'i .utuown as ars^ni o;? oJ ^r-^ It is easy to see, therefore, the loss the nation sustains by the competi- tion we have enabled the Americans to make against us in the foreign market. Indeed, we must completely sacrifice the commerce of India, distinct from that of China, if the present system is allowed to continue. The Company, as their own accounts show, lose by it, and they must lose ; 4)ut individuals would gairu if they 'had fair play^ ^-i' jw^juhjjou ' -' -In November, 1801, Sir William Pulteney, a person as free from party ^irit, from fanciful theory, from the delusions of false representations, 'O-ki any man ever was, made amotion, in the House of Commons 'If Inspecting the pi-ivafetl-adel^ ban ^ooubo'iq luo lol 9t8Bt & bsiiupDB dhw j^nB»h3rnA arlT .bsjialiol a/Bri 9w aidj HA .sinBW nwo iiarij )/ijfi l^i^ifid^ finimportaflt to advert to the character of the mover, because '>ig1s> a pledge for the sobriety of the motion. To those who knew the man, his character must in a matter of this sort carry great autlwrity. Sir William Pulteney was a person of a mind turned to political dis- quisition, and fitted to comprehend the most abstruse theories ; which, however^ he had the patience to verify by the most minute practical > Uirtii^GStigationi Capable, therefore, of estimating the value of theories, ;n/il»i)i«!4stpeculiarly qualified to sift them, and to separate the plausible from the -real. 1 His judgment Avas never misled by his passions, nor did. his opinion ever precede inquiry. To find suoh a man make a motion in parliament in favour of the prrvate trade^ is of itself a proofthat there was nothing factious, nothing showy and unsubstantial, liiiBotbing delusive, in the proposition. ' lujou uiij m -.ut! The question he wished to have examined was not decided; for it 'ijmas the fashion of that day to decide nothing, and a vaiu and nominal -*'jB Ik'*)" ■• .'•'"■'' N *' i;ff>(i|f 'rol ^'nf'^rtv 90 promise was offered. There was no security for the execution of the compact, had it been favourable to the oppressed party, which it was not. But, in consequence of the complaints against the Com- pany, something was to be done, and the ministry stepped forward to give redress. No effectual security, however, was provided for the exe- cution of the arrangement, and the private traders got nothing by their complaint but the renewal of their ill usage, and the abusive scurrility of the Third Report. J bsoi^iaofig od ot n ■ What the private traders have chiefly contended for, is the liberty of' sending home their goods in India built shiptjniixi iicm liiw art ,no§^-w - lOiarjqoiq oiii oi loAJi^ sun , Theii- application for that object was entirely approved by Mr. Dun- das, by Lord Wellesley, nay by all the governors who have presided'- over the Company's affairs in India ; and Lord Wellesley has more thaft^ once been compelled to allow ships to be taken up i« India,' to ansiiH'eSf*^ the pressing exigencies of commerce. a39)o*.q sriT .laiBsb ari) ot -169 'lo' aborrt tfiluoiJiBq JS yd ^Edhibomtnoo iMt tnROm. si noUDSibiq •>iThe. Court of Directors, however, have shown a most decided hosS&J'^ tility to this measure, although they have been obliged, on some occa- ' sioas, to suffer India built ships to be taken up for bringing home' 'fcfelf^i^'* goes. The want of a proper mode of conveyance for the; tr^i^^'BiftfH^^ notorious, (for that it cannot be carried on in the Company's sh7ps,'bii''' the same system with i/ieu' trade, is demonstrated) it is matter of asto- nishment that the Directors did not perceive, that it was for the 'iMt^i*' rest of their own monopoly to allow that mode to be pursued. It fei^' tained the private merchants in the most complete dependence on the ^ Company, and gave them an additional interest in its continuance. '''^^ ^ The Directors contended, however, that to admit such ships would be to injure the rights of British built vessels ; and that, if a new clans' of ships was to be introduced into the trade, British ships should be ' preferred. 9t -With me, this dispute about India built slu'ps or British bui it ship> J^^of no importance, except in as far as tlie trade may: be carried on .clieaper in the one way than the other. Facility^ and chcaj)nc»s of con- ;v«yance/ are circumstances the most essential to commerce; but the thing carried piust. always be the principal object; the vehicle is onljj the sepcMid.r ^^he. carriage in every view is a charge upon the commo- ditj^Mic'it ought, therefore, to be as cheap as possible, unless the end is to be sacrificed to the means. The merchant, who sends goods ■between Manchester and London by the waggon, can consider nothing but the expcnce; and if there is a cheaper conveyance titan the .waggon, he will avail himself of it. The carriage enhances the price of his goods; and if he is compelled, in deference cither to the proprietors of a waggon or a canal, to use the vehicle of the one which is dearest, hggi^[taxedj or rather the public is taxed, for the advantage of such wa^ gpt^fPTHeaBaV proprietor. In general, water carriag-eis for; cheapness pre-** f^Tcd to land cai'riage^aflidf thCi cheaper w-ater. carriage is preferred to the dearer. The protection of the carrying trade, if by such protection is meant that commodities, by a particular mode of car- .riiig^rfa(r^fJt<3i Ji>e raised in price,ois,i in effect, laying a tax on one class oC^^e community to the benefit of the other, it discourages the Hiaiiufaeture or production of the thing carried; and it condemns the •consumer to. pay, in the price of the article, for the unnecessary cxpence 3 of, its carriage. The shipping trade of this country has, by the Act ofa K^vigationj ft monopoly, to the manifest prejudice of the labour and iadustryv^' i^reat Britain. Probably that law is pohtie; and wise ; butr u,nles6TBri|i^hp«hips carry cheaper than other ships, the law imposes a ' realitaJv OHnthe grower and consumer of all commodities liable to be so carriedj-fjif niJrfoa g)i m ^m&lai teaoH mbis hb, ^raarii 37j^§ bnti , '} Jt was for the pur|)ose of exciting jealousies in the minds of a most jealous , and irritable class of men, the British ship owners, that the Directors threw in this hint about British built vessels. } N 2 :q 92 But whether the ship owners of this country would have any right to complain of East India built ships being introduced into the India, or any other trade, may very well be doubted. East India ships, built by British merchants, are in no sense foreign ships. Where is the law that deprives them of the privileges which ships built in all British settlements and colonies possess? Nothing but the omission of a clause in Lord Hawkesbury's Act, with respect to certificate of registery, •can have raised any doubt on the subject. The dominions in India belong to the crown of Great Britain. British merchants, there, never cease ifo be the King's subjects ; and upon what pretence, therefore, India should be excluded from a benefit which all other colonies and settlements possess, is perfectly incomprehensible. '"^ m^H^tlife'^^^fti'^ttfei^^MBittes belonged to this country, it is '-wtll known that the building of ships for sale was a considerable branch t)f industry in that country. 'The ships were brought to England and "sold. In lact, it appears, from Mr. Chalmer's Political Eslimate^ that, ' lii' the; year' ITT'^, the'quantity of American built ships and tonnage 'i^'Me %a^e'df-feir eduhtr^^xvzts^ 223,489 tons. It ^wa^ never ^ctitisidered prejudicial to our interests, that we were enabled, by cheapness of ships, to carry our produce cheaper. On the contrary, nothing more contributes to encourage the industry, and to increase the ' wealth, of a country. It might perhaps be maintained, beyond contradiction, that it would be for the intcre-t of this country to encourage the building of ships in India, if by that means we could be enabled, through the cheapness of the vehicle, to diminish the price of the articles carried. In carry- ing more under the British flag, we should extend the nursery for British seamen, which the monopoly of British built ships at a dear rate evidently tends to destroy. In regard to saving our native oak, (with respect to a scarcity of which much apj)rehension has been enter- tained) perhaps the measure would be wise, pajrticularjy since the lo.s» of supply in American built ships has compelled us to consume our oak so much the more largely. This is a question not absolutely ne- cessary to be discussed here; but it is of great importance. It.Js worthy of remark, however, that, in 1772, such was the alarm respect- ing the consumption of timber, (though the resources of American built ships then existed) that the Company was by law * prohibited from building more ships in England, though they were permitted to build in India or tl^e colonies, or to hire ships built tJicre. It is very strapge, .then, to hear them exclaim againstj,thejj^jibympt^fg^s^^In|ia^^^^ ,:.?hips, as a dangerous ianovalion. .^j ^ ^„^^^ b^bofoxa ad fa/uo/fa fiibnl Certain it is, that the introduction of East India built ships would gfcause no loss whatever to the ship-builders of this country, because for j^^.this particular trade not a single ton would be built the jmore herjs, hy Kj^ontinuing to drive the trade of India into American and other foreign ^jphannels. On the contrary, every Indian ship that comes here fur- g^ishes employment to our shipwrights, which they Avould not have had. In one of the years, in which the East India built ships brought cargoes to London, the outlay in repairs, &c. was above 200,000/. the profit ,rQn which. was all so much gain to that class of men,- j ^ «•£"■*' *-''*^ -'"- '^'-' ° ■:■; e*qina To 2?9nq/59rio '(t sill 9gJS9'!0nT 01 bf_ >,,,f;^».,^^ o-:>-^- -^r'rr[> .'1 If then the East India built ships can be employed cheaply, , there is no reason whatever why they should not be employed. The Directors £,fj5pntend they neither can be built nor employed so cheap as. British j^jbujlt ships,*;; The merchants say they can; and, in a matter which con- adeems their own immediate interest, the jatter^^Hl Pfohably be con- ..sidered the best iudges. j^^Ti is to be remembered, too, that there may be a considerable recom- ,j mendation to the employment of India built ships, from the very na- * 12 Geo. III. cap. 54, 94 ture of the trade. India is admitted to be the great exporting country, and the quantities of the commodities it is capable of sending must depend upon circumstances which the merchant resident in India must best understantfr-'lf he find that he can lay in a cargo of cotton at Bombay, OT ^ mixed cargo at Madras or Calcutta, advantageously, he willdo TtJ'^l^he inconvenience of sending to Great Britain for a vei hide on which to export th« commodity, must be perceived by every person ; nor is it easy to see what pretence there can be for depressing, by such discouragements, the industry and produce of our own terri- tories in the East, and the enterprise of British subjects who are there settledi- -■-- -i^raq^-po -nr odi Ilfi ot gqiffa 9?offt -p '^l?Ki^&^^^6Wt)pseMirig btit ships taken up here to India is obvious, and has -be^h satisfactorily proved by the agents, in their observations o&the Eleven Propositions of the Directors*, in the beginning' of 1802. They shoAV cfekrly^th^t thie tonnage sent out may either be redundant or insufficient^ they show that, iii order to prosper, the private traders nrSfPbe permitted to send out their ships sit any time they judge con- vemerit, and that they ought not to be confined to the fixed and detei-- mined seasons, to which the Company confine themselves. A proposal more reasonable cannot be conceived. The idea of the Company condemning others to the absurd system they pursue is monstrous. No fair and legitimate trade can live under such a systeml ^ ^ ..noiJisioqo larf 1 i9w ^c^ri^ The merchants complain, too, that the Company endeavour to rcsiricr'^ and limit them as to the assortment of their own cargoes fri'lildia-^ir' regulation wliich, on the face of it, shows that it can be made'witlv nxr other view than to harass. What merchant is unacquainted with the importance of arranging and laying in his cargo? Surclj', of lill things on earth, a merchant may be safely indulged with this liberty, especially if he and his friends undertake to load the whole shipT -'lioArf Off llaih by* S^elhe prioted Papers. oii which their goods are to be carried. But it was the Company's purpose every way to embarrass and to create delay. Nothing can be better calculated to defeat the best concerted commercial plans, than- uncertainty as to the ship on which goods are sent, the time of.gailingy the making insurance incident to that system, which indeed was pre-, '^^59^^<^i%ffi5?5?f^;?A*c? ^^°'^^''^^.#.».A^ nam/, ao. ^i^m . . . . ' ^ - , ■ - - ■ ' -. ^. «^/-f jThe same principles of objection apply to all the proposals of the. Directors, either for building British ships, or hiring for eight voyage&j India built ships, on an inferior scale of equipment. The Direc- tors persist in exposing the merchants using those ships to all the in- conveniencies of protracted voyages, of deviatijons, of irregularity and' uncertainty in arrivals and departure, and indeed of every thing neccs-Tu sary to enable a merchant to trade, or authorize him to decide whcther-,y ia^^Uthe circumstances, (Oj^jtl^g^j;afg^Jig,pught to trade a^,i^y*^^ fiod-. xodt In a word, tlic Avholc efforts of the Company arc employG4'tO(m^ji nacle and fetter the private merchant, and to compel him to trade , under all the inconvcnieixcies to which their mode pfbutiiacss is subiect,.! mBqixioO edi Vy tMm od'V .bo-n', nn£0 afdeftopi'^- STom •' It IS not triie that the private traders particularly preferred the East India built, provided that, in the extra ships supplied by the CompaTiy^>l they were to have the same command over the vessel and her operations which every merchant secures by his charier parly with the owner of a ship, and that direction, as to the whole assortment of cargo, which is of But in fact the Directors never have complied with the terms of their own conciliatory proposition of 1801, as it was called. Their second proposition is — - " That the shipping to be thus annually employed diall be wholly * See the Proposals. 96 applied to the use of the private traders, and shall neither be destined or detained for any jwlitical or warlike services in India, but sail from thence directly for the port of London, at fixed periods, within the fair' weather season.'''* f- It has been proved how inadequate this system is at the best, and how contrary to the true principles of mercantile adventure. But the mer- chants of India take issue with the Directors on this point, and deny that this proposal, such as it is, has been faithfully executed. They now complain that ships provided for the private trade have neither sailed in the proper season, nor arrived at Calcutta at the time when it ^vas possible that they could be di-patched home again in the fair-weather reason. In the season of 1806, only two arrived in time; and in the year 1805, it was impossible to dispatch the ships from Cal- cutta till the month of June and July, by which they were dispersed over tlie bav, and exposed to every sort of danger. In fact, they had only to choose between the voyage at the bad season, with all its risks, or the immense loss of interest on the cost of goods provided, by postponing the voyage. It is a fact, that several of the extra ships, loaded at Cal- cutta in May 1806, did not sail from Bengal till September following. The inconveniences of such a system need only be stated : they cannot be exaggerated. This hostility of (he Directors to the private trade, and their encou- ragement of foreigners, can be ascribed to nothing but the worst spirit of commercial jealousy or malignity, for it is easy to demonstrate that the private trade is a source of great revenue to the Company. It is well known that the private trade pays a duty of three per cent, on the sale amount. In fact, this is perhaps the only clear source of rc- enue the Company have, though undoubtedly the whole three per cent, is not gain, nor is the charge considered as exorbitant. V 97 V*^ By the accounts laid before Parliament for ten years, up to 1801 in- s'clusive, it appears the Company had received, for charges and profit -'on private trade, 1,482,056/. being ncfirly 150,000/. per annum. But it appears, by the same authority, that, including all (he payments out of these commercial sources, the clear surplus in ten years is' oiily 981,781/. So that, had it pot been for this resource of the private --ftrade (included in the receipt), there \yould have been a large deficiency instead of a surplus. so considerable a, source of clear gam from the private trade ought ,. to induce the Company to encourage, instead of persecuting it ; and ■j^when it is known that the merchants only trade in such articles as the 'ifCompany do not choose to deal in, and particularly when they only trade ,' 3P piece goods ,^nd saltpetre by licence, the hostility Jfs the more ex- ..^traordinary* The goods brought home by the private trader do hot anticipate the Company's market. They are exposed at the Com- ofpany''s sale.'^ip.ndf ;do not ititearfere with the monopoly of the Com- ')f|>any, as to their sales of goods ; for the Company's goods anticipate 'artfeose of the private trade. It has been shown, too, that the -Ig^ears in which both the sales of the Company and of the private .gtrade were the greatest, the trade was most beneficial to both. Since the •oquantity of the private trade has been greatly diminished, the Company's have fallen off in amount, and still more in profit. In fact, both the Company and the private traders are driven out of the foreign market 'fiby tlie Americans, and the Company, in burdening the private trade tiwith such discouragement, cause a loss to the country of all the cus- toms, and to themselves of a proportion of the three per cent, on aU the sales of the private trade. In the year 1805, they lost the whole charges and profit on a million's sale of private goods. Their loss then, whether as warehousemen, or as government imposing a tax or toll, iS V erv considerable. Such however are the inconveniences arising from the present system, o 98 that, provided the Company would allow the private merchants to ship, load, &c. in their own way, as all other merchants do, they would pay yb//r, or even five per cent, to the Company, on the amount of their sales. If the Company would give up trade altogether, and con- tent themselves with such a duty, paid to them as sovereigns, besidesthe duties to the state, their affairs would be in a better situation. Had they done so sooner, they would not have loaded themselves with a debt in India of thirty millions, at ruinous interest, contracted in great parfe to carry on a losing trade. An objection has been urged to the employing of Lascars in Indizt built ships. But it is notorious that Lascars wouM only be employed when British sailors could not be obtained. Besides, does not every body know that, in time of war, Danes, Swedes, Germans of every tribe, navigate our ships. What objection, then, can there be to em- ploy Lascars ? The Company employ natives of India to fight their bat- tles ; can they object to let them be employed to navigate our ships ? But, in truth, the objection is too despicable for notice. The question, however, is so urgent, that it deserves the immediate attention of government. It is different from the great question of laying open the trade at the expiry of the Charter, and ought not to be a moment deferred. In time of peace, the evil will be more dangerous, for the trade, being fixed in the foreign channel, will not only supply foreigners independently of us, but will dispute with us our own supply. VI. I now proceed, therefore, to consider the share which fo- reigners now possess, or will acquire, in the trade, restricted to the Com- pany's monopoly, and the consequences of their competition, shou^ that exclusive Company be continued. The situation in which we stand with regard to our Indian posses- 99 fjion, even since the territorial acquisition, renders it extremely neces- sary to consider what may be the effect of the competition of other nations. We have conquered India by the valour and with the blood of our fellow citizens. It is maintained by the .^ame sacrifices against continual danger ; and surely we are entitled to every advantage which, without injury to others, we can derive from it. The relation, in which Great Britain stands with her possessions in the East Indies, is not that of a mother country with her colonies. The circumstances which led to our territorial acquisitions in Hindustan, the tenure on which some important parts of them were obtained and have been held, oblige us to consider that branch of our empire in a different light, if then the impolicy of our government shall determine to cramp the exertions, and to restrain the enterprise, of its own subjects in favour of a privileged Company, it cannot establish the same exclu- sion against other nations who have possessed, or have been struggling to obtain, a share in the commerce of the East. Our monopoly, there- fore, is AvhoUy against our fellow citizens at home ; only in part against our native Indian subjects abroad. Even, since Great Britain and the Company have become real sovereigns, they have not ventured to ex- clude the other nations of Europe from a participation in the commerce of India. The Directors, in the reports on the subject of the private trai'e, admit the right of other nations in amity with us to trade to India as unquestionable. Nay, not many years ago, when the trade was laid open to all the subjects of France, a French merchant at Calcutta re- fused to pay a duty of 4 per cent, demanded in that port, saying, that 2i was the sum paid under the Nabob of Bengal. The demand was not enforced. The Americans, though unable to plead any use or prescrip- tion, have, by Mr. Jay's treaty, been admitted to trade with the British settlements in India. The share then which foreigners can have in the trade of India is, whatever their capital can embrace, and the markets to which they have access require. If they can furnish other nation? o 2 100 cheaper than we can, they may engross the supply and the carrying trade for those nations. It is only against British subjects that the mo- nopoly of the Company is established ; it is established, therefore, in favour of other nations, for it affords them the incalculable advantage of entering into competition, not with the capital, the skill, the enterprise, of British merchants, but with the negligence and prodigality of a joint stock company. This is a consideration of the greatest importance. There have- been times in which the expensive and extravagant absurdity af joint stock companies for carrying on trade might perhaps have been indulged, if not with less injustice, at least with less mischief to the community. They might have been endured, when we had to sustain the competition of joint stock companies as prodigal, as wasteful, as ill qualified for the management of trade, as our own. The circulating stock of folly was so equally distributed, that sometimes the balance was in favour of England, of France, of Holland. The only formidable competition, that of a free trade, and of individual merchants being out of the question, the companies, at home and abroad, might perhaps have been left to rival each other in misconduct. But the case is jnow very different: America has started in the career, and will carry off the palm from all the competitors for the trade of India, who do not qualify themselves to run the race with her on equal terms. The Americans arc not oppressed by the delays, the uncertainty, the extravagance, disorder, and incapacity of a joint stock company. Nourished and supported in the outset by the British capi- tal, which the impolicy of our government and the blindness of the Company forced into their hands, or which the temptation of a lucra- tive traffick led them to borrow on any terms, they have now created, from their immense profits, a caj)ital adequate to carry on their in- creasing share of the trade. By the rapidity of their voyages, their skilful observance of times and seasons and markets, in the wise spirit JOl of mercantile economy, they far surpass all their competitors. The East India Company cannot support their rivalship. In time of war, which is represented as favourable to us*, it has been shown that the amount of sales has already sunk below that of 1799 — 1800, to the extent of four millions sterling. Still further reduction must we expect under the present system. The Americans are driving this country from the supply of the rest of Europe. In time of peace, more certainly they will supply all the markets of the continent with India commodities, unless other nations choose to avail themselves of the same liberty of trade which the Americans enjoy ; and unless we avail ourselves ©f the cheapest mode of carrying on the trade, in order to sustain the com- petition. Nay, the Americans, or other traders under the protection of foreign flags, will, by means of smuggling [from the (free ports on the continent, which are already projected, interfere with the supply of our home markets. The China trade is that on which the Company are supposed to be enabled to support the loss occasioned by their India trade, and the pro- fit of which recompences them for part of their other losses. But it is very important to consider that this branch of their trade is, of all others, the most precarious. It rests upon a close monopoly. The duties levied on their grand staple, teas, are perhaps, during Jt time of war, necessary and proper, but no government, which the people of this country can endure, will be able, when peace arrives, to protect the Company's monopoly, and the high duties — those two mighty causes of high price. Whole navies would be necessary to collect them, and the duties would be spent in the charges of levying them. The necessities of the state, and the possibility of levying duties, fre- * In the Third Report, the Directors say, " And as tl>e Indian trade to tlis River Thames must be considerably diminished in the event of [leace, whether that reduction fails on the Company or on private individuals, it must operate to lessen the means of employing those British ships that are already in the service." 102 quently form the on!y circumstances which regulate their amount. But the possibility of levying them imposes a limit much short perhaps of that at which financial avarice or legislative competence would stop. We may save ourselves the trouble of railing at the obstinate perverse- ness of mankind, but they will buy cheap, if they can, the articles they want, and they will sell their articles, if they can make a profit on them. Wherever, therefore, duties are so high as to tempt smuggling, smug- gling will be carried on. Every one knows the history of the Commuta- tion Act, and its happy effects both to the East India Company and to the revenue. But we are fast approaching to the state in which we shall require commutation acts for almost every commodity sold at the India House, as well as teas. A free port at Ostend or Flushing would baffle all our custom-house regulations, and put an end to our revenue. Our enemies and our rivals would set up the China and India trade against ,us, and will do it, as in di\\ former limes, with British capital. The monopoly of the Company and high duties cannot io//i be maintained ; perhaps both must be mitigated and modified. In as far as the monopoly of the Company tends, as it most unquestionably does tend, to render the supply of a commodity dearer than the price at which the article can be furnished by a free trade, in so much the danger of rivalship is increased ; and to preserve that mono_ poly, the government must sacrifice its share of the profit, viz. the duty, in order to give it to a useless, prodigal, and mischievous Company. If a certain duty is to be levied, the cheaper the commodity can be sup- plied, the greater is the duty government may touch. That cheap supply never can be afforded by the Company. That the different nations of the continent will endeavour to obtain a share of the India trade, when peace enables them to resume com- mercial pursuits, cannot he doubted ; and, instructed by the example and success of the Americans, they will not embarrass them elves with the expensive incumbrance of joint stock companies. All they have to 103 do is to declare the trade free to their subjects, and to make one or two of their most convenient havens free ports. Suppose Antwerp, or Flushing, or Dunkirk, were declared free ports for India produce, could the East India Company maintain a competition with the spirit, the ad- venture of a free trade, or could they prevent British capital engaging in such undertakings ? The following remarks upon this subject, from an official publication in 1793, entitled, " Historical View of Plans, &c." already alluded to, are very deserving of atten tion. " It is suggested that the 9th Geo. I. which established certain penalties against those concerned in the Ostend East India Compa- ny, shall be explained and amended. Though this Company was abolished by a treaty subsequent to that period, the trade has, of late years^ assumed a new and formidable aspect. It has been a practice with private adventurers in London to purchase old India ships : after giving them a thorough repair, the«e ships are sent to Ostend, and loaded Avith goods from Holland, the Austrian Nether- lands, and France, with a small quantity of British produce, such as the Company send out, but chiefly with military stores, to be disposed of to the country powers. On a British capital, in this manner, and with a British supra-cargo, though with a nominal foreign captain, and under a foreign flag, the vessels employed in this trade have resorted to India and to China. Such part of their exports as are Dutch, French, or German, as spirits, wines, &c. give advantages in the Indian markets to foreign nations, and check the Company in their sales of the same articles. Did their exports of British produce consist of British woollens, hardware, &c. only, there might be reason for encouraging them ; but as they chiefly consist of military and naval stores, to be disposed of among the native powers, allowing these ai'ticles to be fur- nished by Britain, the trade is only calculated to injure the British provinces in the ports in which these nominal foreigners, but really 104 British subject?, find protection*. Upon the return of the vessel from India or from China, under pretext of touchi g at Britain, one part of the import cargo is smuggled, and another part has been carried to Ostcnd, either to be disponed of in Flanders, German)^ and the north of France, or lo be kept in warehouses^ to be smuggled ; as part of a contraband cargo of European goods^ into Britain or Ireland^ or lo be sent to our American and Jf'est India dependencies^.'''' Agreeably to these views the Act of 1793 was framed. But has if removed the danger likely to arise from the causes above enumerated ? On the contrary, the pernicious system of the Company only affords a bounty to all such adventurers, by giving new advantages to the com- petition they will set up. What passed between 1714 and 17.30, while the Ostend Company existed]:, ought to instruct us what we are to expect in future. The relation in which the country stands with regard to its eastern possessions, therefore, is of the utmost importance in the preseit discus- siont It deserves the most serious consideration, whether this country can retain the trade at all, if it is still to be committed to the care and to the management of a joint stock monopoly company. It is to be con- sidered, too, that it is not merely the share of the trade of India neces- sary for our doniestic consumption which we have to guard. Some time ago we possessed a very large share of the supply which the rest of Europe requires. That share indeed is daily growing less, thanks to the encouragement given to the Americans, and the discouragement thrown in the way of private traders. But it is well known, and is proved by the custom-house books, that at least thr€c-fourths of the India • " It has of late been a practice with the owners of these ships^ to purcliase Frencii woollens at Abbeville, and Fri* ••^ ^iJ ji^iiiS^alt' 4^ objected also, that individuals do not possess sufficient capital *o carry on the trade of India (they include the China trade) with regu- larity and success ; and that, if they failed, the country would lose the trade, and government the duties. ^^^^ X^'ii&^^ x ' How justly we can expect to retain the frade, if the present system is continued, has already been considered. As to the capital requisite for carrying on the trade, it would be just as reasonable to include the surplus tribute as part of the capital, were the trade open, as i?^ it were to remain in the hands of the Company. But it is not very creditable to build a system on such an assumption. Q 2 116 'There '^k'ifet4'ho^e^ei^,''^irl^tlfis"dolkW>y^^ capital fully adequate td ^arry on the trade of India upon the most extended scale. Indeed, it was hardly to be expected that this objection would be urged at this time of day. Such is the facility with which capital can be found for any pronn'sing undertaking, that it should be our policy to afford every facility for its employment. The very exuberance of capital is an argu- ment for laying open the trade to India. Are we to be seriously told, as we are so frequently in the official work alluded to, and in the Com- pany's reports, that the merchants of Great Britain, who trade to every part of tlie globe, who engage in every branch of commerce, are unable, for want of capital or skill, to carry on this? ^^Afferliaving eni£nc?|)^ted commerce in every other quarter, and in every other direction, from the pupillage of government, and the restraints of companies and monopolies ; must we submit in this alone to th6se tutors and preceptors Avho, in ever;^ other have proved, not only useless, but mischievous ? Are the merchants of Great Britain less rich^ less discreet, less capable of procuring credit, or inspiring confidence, than the Americans who now trade so largely and successfully both to India and to China I If is impossible to hear such an objection \Jrged, without feeling a sort of national reflection cast on us by the Companyy who declare that our merchants would ruin themselves, that they cannot carry on the trade of India, that the aid of " Iheir lights,''^ their expe- rience, their talents, are necessary to preserve for the nation those branches of trade, the monopoly of which they usurp. -.(isuinieivog i)di HaufW ai aoii&nUt IJ! nsThe capital of this country is now so large, the enterprise of its mer- cTiants so great, their skill in every branch of commerce so extensive and so complete, that it is universally acknowledged they far excel the indi- viduals of every other countiy, in their capacities of successful com- mercial adventure. All the former objections against an open trade, that in the hands of individuals it would be unsteady and irregular and liucertain, arc arguments that deserve no attention, for they are con- ur trary to the experience furnished by every other branch of trade. ITie same arguments might be applied to any branch of trade. They were used in favour of (he Plymouth Company, and the London Merchant Adventurers Company, in regard to the trade of the North American colonies. They were employed in favour of the Royal African Company, till it was ruined. They were used in favour of the South Sea Company, which has not sent a ship to sea these fifty yearsit.naqo ^nivBi lo't insm "i'-' .•< jiij ill yiJflsup^it o'i ^^ii 97/ ^fi They would even prove too much. What reason is there to suppose that a successful trade will not be prosecuted by individual speculation, when we see capital and industry so promptly seeking new channels ? If the trade is lucrative for a company it must be more lucrative for in- dividuals. If it cannot be lucrative for individuals, it should not be fol- lowed. If it is lucrative only in a certain medium, that medium will soon be found. All branches of trade have so found their level. They have discovered, without the least assistance and interference of gover^? ment, the quantity of capital and industry they caji support ; and no other criterion can be applied. aid^q^o aaal ,Jo9ioaiI> saal ■in anBoiiSinA 9rit nfirii What is to hinder the British merchant, like the American, Uf go to India and lay in his investments which he will find provided by his cor- respondent ? Nay, must he not trade with superior advantages in a territory where the resident merchants and agents are his cauntryiuen 5, i nobsn 9ff* -^ :B3S909n sib eSJnsIfit liarfj ,9011911 HI Vadt rfaidw "^o yloaonorn odi ^obsiilo 8f^d:>nmd * It is impossible not to notice the disgracenil "Situation in which the government of this country was lately placed, when the South Sea Company started up to com- plain '•of an 'encioachmetit on their Charter. It Seeins''. that,: when Buenos Ayres was taken, people forgot it was within the South Sea Company's limits, though I believe the South Sea Whalers have licences from the South Sea House. The consequence was, that all insurances on sliips for the Jtio Plata were legally void. "It mi^'t te contendfed, perhaps, that by non user the South Sea Company's Charter was forfeited ; but if there can be a doubt on the case, an TVct of j^a^rliament should be passed, declaring the South Sea Company's exclusive privilege terminated. Those who have not traded for fifty years, forsooth, to assume the right to hinder their fellow citizens ! To be obliged to take a licence from ihcm, is a shameful badge of ten- vitude. 118 where his credit is known, his conespoudences fixed, and every facility of trade pre-arranged ? What is to prevent him from taking to Bom- bay, Madras, and Bengal, his outward cargo ; there lay in his invest- ment of cotton, or whatever else is requisite, in addition to his bullion, his camlets, &c. to obtain a cargo of tea at Canton ? All the objections against the fitness of individuals to carry on either the India or China trade are visionary and unfounded. vs^nfirfa arfj id baiofflo-Ki ad bli.tow iiSKuiati -i il*. ;;As to the objections of mere detail, such as the difficulty of collecting the duties, if the trade is spread over different ports, though they have been gravely stated, they are too trifling to be anxiously refuted, and they, have been in substance anticipated. It certainly has been the po- licy of some countries, to force their colony trade to one port, for the facility of collection of the duties, or for purposes less intelligible. Such an arrangement is perfectly unjustifiable in anyyview* It is not extraor- dinary that it was once adopted by Spain, the country of Europe which ha^ been the most illiberal and unwise in its commercial policy* towards its colonies, and which therefore has derived the least benefit Gc 1^. •' " Brougham, vol. i. 414.. 119 commerce, so widely difTused in extent, and so happily shared in its en- joyment, ought to secure us against the influence of these narrow views. It frequently has been urged too, that all the persons the Company employ, would be reduced to beggary, if the channel of trade were changed. But surely, if there is the least truth in the foregoing arguments, all kinds of industry would be promoted by the change; more people would be employed, more duties paid, more wealth ac- cumulated. It is pitiful argument ad miser icordiam^ therefore, to tell us of ruining and beggaring the unfortunate dependents of the Com- pany. The natfon will gain greatly; every source of industry, every division of labour, will be invigorated; very few, if any, individuals will suffer; and, in winding up the affairs of the Company, fair and liberal indemnification would be granted to those who had any claim, and, undoubtedly, every engagement of the Company, in provision for past services, &c. would be strictly and punctually fulfilled. This kind of appeal, however, (and it is seriously urged) might be made in favour of those, who thrive by public abuses, who lose by every im- provement in the collection of the revenue, who complain of the abridgment of labour, and the economy of retrenchment. If they were to prevail, no improvement could be introduced, because tliere are some men interested in the abuses, or in the imperfections^ whicli are established. i^iiynq svigniozs. n^ II. The political objections which hav^ been ilrged against laying open the trade, demand a diligetit and careful examination. It is upon these, after all, that the advocates of the Company are com- pelled to rest. To defend the Company, as an establishment useful to commerce, is a desperate task. It has been attempted, indeed, whenever the question has been argued on commercial grounds. But at last the friends of the monopoly have taken refuge in a political fitness or necessity. 120 In the preceding part of this inquiry, it seemed necessary to consider the importance of the trade very much at length, for, in reality, com- merce, and not direct revenue, has been the only thing hitherto gained. Great Britain has realized no tribute; and if the commerce of India has not been the advantage derived from our eastern terri- tories, we have gained nothing, except the fortunes which political and military adventurers may have brought home. Commerce, there- fore, is a consideration of the utmost importance; for the territory has hitherto only been accessary to the commerce ; and a commercial system ought to be established upon a different basis than that of territorial revenue. Finding, however, that the present system of Indian commerce will not bear a scrutiny on commercial principles, it is alleged, that trade and government are so blended that they cannot be separated, and that the defects of the commercial system must be endured for the sake of the political objects. It is often alleged that, upon the present footing, the Company's commercial navy is of a kind which, though ruinously expensive for trade, is capable of affording assistance, in case of emergency, to our fleets in the eastern seas, and of being a bulwark to the territories *. It would not be difficult to show, however, that this scheme of strengthening our defence in India is repugnant to every principle of economy. It would be far cheaper to keep a constant naval force for the defence of the vulnerable points, than to make the commercial navy serve for both. Whenever it happens that the Company's ships are diverted from their commercial purposes, the loss upon cargoes and commercial operations, thus suspended and rendered up.certain, is enor- * It ha=; been proposed, plausibly enough, to render tlie Lascars useful in the naval defence of our liulian territories. Tlicre can be no objection to teach tiicm our naval tactics, if we vcn-. ture to teach liie Sepnys tlic liuropcan discipline. moiis. In this way commerce is gaid to be subsidiary, to pov^rj^-bul, in realty, commerce is sacrificed, and {)olitical powc^ is cojis.uJted, by a very expensive and very inefficient expedients .^-i ^ • » Suppose, however, that if the trade were open, th^|^|K^pmployed |?v,'' individuals were to be of inferior equipmentj, and no,^ so convertible iuto^ men of war as the Company's large ships, would not the encouragemepl , given to our commerce and navigation furnish a nursery of seamen t}\at, would indemnify the government for keeping up a more regular and powerful naval force for the defence of India? ^Would not the nunil)or of sailors, who could be obtained upon an emergency either at home or ^ abroad, be a resource that would afford government the mean^ of giving the most eifectual protectios%^tO/^ur commerce and territories in t^c East?i tJiiris ridiculous to argue that any ships meant for commerce ought to be convertible into- men -of wai,> Merchant ships >hould be adapted to their purpo.?e, and to afford the cheapest niode of carriao;e. It is then that navigation flourishes, that seamen are formed, and thence military navies derive their strength and support. a'^riisqmoO Aff+ r^r.u^o't ♦^.^r---.~ -'- ' . - . ToTft-Uwftld. merchant ships therefoi-e, on the speculation th:!i ihey niav- bei.-wastteti as ships of war, is really to sacrifiq^ tJie ^neans by wliich a 511^ litarf jiaryife created. It is to ruin commerce, without promoting the, objects of war. Whenever navigation thrives (and it can only thrive by carrying tfeaply), government will easily, be .able to afford convoys, anditojdefend foreign settlement^. ,r J^very thing else is an incongruouis, mixtnreiof .things.inconipatible.^ ot laqfiarfa isl 9d bIr;ow il .^raonoas Y'/fin Icio'iomnroo odl oA.im o3 aEfii .etnroq sUJBisnlij^ srfjlo soaalob arfj STTorvitfcr^se and improve the commerce of India^is, then, to add to due navigation, and to create new means of defending every part of the empire. Petty local considerations ought t^u^^'^iRrM^uil/^iJfy^^fiMl^l extended views. 2. it has been urged also, that our ascendency "hi lii'dia,' whicli R 122 depends so much upon the opinion of the natives, would be en- dangered by the influx of adventurers, who would find their way to that country, and by the colonization which would ensue, were the trade laid open. This was not only urged in 1792 by the Company, but it has been repeated in the different reports on the private trade, as an argument against granting individuals any increased facilities for carrying on that trade, particularly in India built ships. As to the danger of adventurers flockingto India, and endangering the safety of our dominions there, either by embroiling us with the native powers, or in any other way, it is well known that while there existed upon the peninsula sovereign princes, who could boast of any thing like independence, it was considered desirable that English military adventurers should be preferred to those of any other nation, and a considerable number of these has been at different times in the service of Scindia and other powers. In the present circumstances, however, the system is utterly to prohibit any such adventurers being entertained by the native princes. It does not appear then, that laying open the trade would in any degree facilitate the introduction of such persons into India; for, however introduced, they would not be suffered to engage in any military service but our own. When they did so engage, it is admitted by Lord Wellesley that they had been encouraged to do it*. But if it were necessary to prevent such a supposed mischief, it might be done by preventing our own traders taking passengers, a thing that would be very easy. Were our own ships, and no others, to visit the ports of India, it would be easy to prevent any persons going there without a licence. While foreign nations have so large a share of the trade it is impossible. At present, any man may get * Papers respecting war with Mahrattasj As. An, Reg. for 1802. 123 to India on board a Dane or an American: the only check then, at present, exists in India. Laying open the trade would make no dif- ference. Whether the government in India were exercised through a Gover- nor General, appointed by the Company or by the Crown, any danger on this head might easily be prevented. Whatever useful and necessary powers are vested in the Company's governor and servants, to prevent such a danger, would surely remain vested in the King's govern- ment and administration. t, .-If, then, any adventurers were to go out, and attempt to embroil us, either with the native powers, or with our own subjects, they would instantly be amenableto a controul, which they surely would respect and fear fully as much as that of the Company. Were our Indian domi- nions placed under the power of the crown, and the controuling supre- macy of parliament, agreeably to fixed principles applicable to the pecu- liar state of India, a thousand anomalies would be avoided, which the pre- sent incongruous system produces. Numberless inconvcnicncies, w hich weakenlawful government, and require a distempered and unnatural vio- lence, would cease. The relation in which the country would stand to the native powers would be more clear and simple. If British adventurers chose now to go to India, and engage in the service of Holkar or Scindia, there is no law of England by which the governor of India can recall them. Lord Wellesley indeed did recall them, but he, as the Company's governor, had no right by law to do it; thougli the pro- priety of the invitation to quit the service of those powers no one can doubt. But it is most improper, and of very pernicious example, to delegate this, or any thing which belongs to the regalia of the sovereign, to a Company of merchants and their nominees; and such dangerous absurdities can only be prevented by lodging the authority directly in the crown and its responsible servants. If then any British adventurers chose to cuter the service of native powers, thev might be R 2 124 recalled by the King's prerogative, which it does not appear that they legally can be by any the highest of the Company's servants. 3. But a still greater apprehension of danger is expressed from coloni- zation within the bounds of our own territories, should the trade be laid open, or a greater facility of communication be allowed. At present it is well known that the Company are bound, by the ninety-sixth clause of the Act of 1793, to licence agents in India, and if they do not the Board of India Commissioners may compel them. It is supposed, however, that if the trade were laid open, an additional number of resident merchants in India would be the consequence, which it is supposed would lead to colonizalion. This point has been so ear- nestly insisted upon by the Company, in their different Reports, that T am compelled to examine it at some length. By colonization, the Directors no doubt mean that British subjects will be tempted to go to India as their permanent residence, and adopt it as their country. But if this be their meaning, they seem to apply the term colonization in a manner calculated to mislead. The relation which subsists between Great Britain and India, bears no resemblance whatever, and never can have any, to that of colonies and the mother country, either in ancient or modern times. The Greek colonies in Asia Minor, Italy, &c. appear to have been migrations, rendered necessary by an overflowing population at home, or sudden occasional sallies of adventurers in pursuit of fortune and con- quest. The Roman colonies were settlements of confiscated lands, formed by numerous bands of adventures to ease the excessive popula- tion of the city ; or they were founded on the spoliation of the peace- able proprietors, whose lands were assigned as the reward of the veteran troops of the republic. They were intended, in the later times of the empire, as a barrier to the state, upon its exposed frontiers. 125 The colonies of modern times are of a diflerent kind, and owe their origin to di/Terent circumstances. They have been the fruits of com- mercial enterprise, of domestic discontent, of religious fanaticism, or that rage for distant adventure Avhich so eminently distinguished the century that succeeded the discoveries of Columbus. The colonies of every European state on the continent of America, or in the West Indies, were strictly planUtlions^ as they are properly termed in our old English, nay, indeed, in the technical language of acts of parliament, and in our official style. They were settlements in waste lands, or in thinly inhabited districts. They v.erc formed, and they have flourisbed, upon the basis of agriculture ; and the colonists became in- separably attached to a new country, not merely by moral habitudes, but by interests which could not be transferred, and establishments which could not be abandoned. But is there any similitude between these cases and the colonization of India, of which we have heard so much ? What is the situation of In- dia? Is it inhabited by tribes of fishers, of hunters, or of shepherds? Is it possessed by savages, who are willing to cede the banks of their rivers for a present of rum,, and to sell their forests for beads and tovs ? Is there any room in India for those agricultural occupations in which the emigrants to America were forced to engage ? If such an employ- ment of industry rewards the undertaker with the plenty, the com- fort, and independence of rural life, surely it presents little to tempt the impatient avarice of transitory adventurers? Is the establishment of manufactures in Hindustan a pursuit in which the emigrants from Britain are likely to embark ? The apprehension of great numbers of Englishmen fixing their abode in India, so as to approach to the nature of a colony, is visionary and chimerical. India is more likely to resemble the form of a Roman pro- vince than a Roman or English colony. 126 The class of men who quit Britain for India are very different indeed from the settlers of New England or Virginia. They leave their coun- try in general through " that nece.^sity of owing a better fortune to their own exertions," which is the parent of so much useful enterprise. They are not the lowest members of the community. They have ge- nerally enjoyed the advantages of education, or at least they have lived in that society in which they have tasted the sweets of opulence or elegance, and to acquire the means of emulating that splendour they have wit- nessed is their motive in submitting to temporary exile. The de- sire of making a fortune, to be enjoyed in their own country, is most par- ticularly the object of all our Indian adventurers, military, civil, and commercial. Great indeed must be the change of circumstances, and of opinion, before our youth, the enterprising cadets of respectable or wealthy families, can be induced to forego the prospect of revisiting their native land. Ill success may dissipate their projects of ambition and their dreams of future greatness ; but the same ill success would equally defeat their projects of permanent establishment in a new coun- try. A solitary instance indeed may occur, of an adventurer attaining importance which he is unwilling to exchange, or of a merchant who outlives the memory of his early connections ; but from such instances (if there be such) can any one deduce the inference, that Hindustan would become the spot where the natives of Great Britain Avould fix themselves to perpetuate a name, an influence, and an authority ? Not only the political or commercial situation of India, but every moral cause, combines to dispel the strange apprehension of colonization. The state of agriculture, the advanced progress of manufactures, the abounding population of India, leave little or nothing for planlalion in any sense of the word; "but the religion of the natives, their moral cha- racter, renders a mixture of the races, beyond what arises from licentious indulgence, highly improbable. A community of sentiment and feeling cannot be expected to unite people of such opposite prejudices, man- 127 ncr?, and character, as the natives of Enghmd and of Hindustan. No ol)ject of ambition or pleasure can present itself to the mind of an Eng- lishman in India equal to those enjoyments he has left behind him, and to which he longs to return. The dull state and insipid magnificence of Cal- cutta can weigh little, in his estimate of happiness, against the active in- dependence and the real importance of an English gentleman. Little pro- bable is it that even the enervating influence of an Asiatic climate, the blandishments of Eastern luxurj-, or the easy and inelegant sensuality of Eastern manners, will attract to India, or retain in it, those men who have been taught to value other enjoyments, who have a relish for a higher society in the one sex, and more dignified intercourses with the other, than can be found in the country where they take up a tempo- rary residence. Notwithstanding all the faults, and even crimes, with which Englishmen in India have been charged, their hearts have always been fixed on home. They have never met with that celebrated herb, whose taste made the companions of Ulysses forget their country*. But from the class of which I am now speaking no colonization ever can take place. Wherever colonies, whether Greek, Roman or English, have been formed, the common people have been necessarily by far the most numerous class of adventurers. The emigrants to America from Great Britain were of a class the most dif- ferent which can be imagined from those who subject themselves to a temporary absence in India in pursuit of fortune. The ends, the occu- pation, the character, the nature of the pursuit, are totally dissimilar. Of the class which Lord Bacon enumerates as proper to found a planta- tion, there is hardly one that is in the least degree requisite in India, * Tm } o<7Ti! >,UTo7o tpayoi fifAujJsa xa«ro» Od. ix. V. OJ. Ulysses was obliged to have recourse to violent measures to prevent these gentlemen from colonization among the Lotophagi. He drove them to their ships much against their will, " xAaic/ra;, avayxij." The Governor General of India claims and exercises the same power to send back to Europe the British Lotophagi who wish to settle in that country. 128 or who is by any accident carried thither. The English who go to the East Indies, carry with them few of the inferior ranks but domestic servants, and comparatively few of these. Sailors are not a race of men likely to establish themselves on the coasts of the peninsula. How then is the colonization to take place ? The very idea is repugnant to all experience, and to the fixed order in which the human species is dif- fused. The European population in India must be transient and fluc- tuating. It cannot nmltiply by the ordinary process by which increase is produced. The habits of the individuals, the circumstances of their situation, the restraints and obstacles which their ambitious and money- making views impose upon them, must ever render the increase of Eu- ropean population in India very slow. The same restraints on marriage exist there as in old coimlries^ and in the most refuied communities. The facilities to population which new countries present are not to be found in India. The British population, therefore, must be kept up by new adventurers from home, in a degree, perhaps, beyond what could be wished, for the solidity and permanent defence, .of our Eastern empire. . „ As a proof of the extravagant opinions broached upon this subject,' il is sufficient to refer to the three Reports on the private trade, perform- ances that afford the most decisive evidence of the narrow views of the Directors, and their unfitness to govern an empire. There is to be found however, in a speech delivered in the House of Commons last .Tuly by a Director, so whimsical a statement of the perils of colonizafion that"! cannot help quoting it. Speaking of the danger likely to arise from encouraging the private trade^ this enlightened gentleman observes as follows: *' The svslcm would substitute in the Indian trade shins built in India for ships built in England ; teak ships for oak ; the Lascar, or Indian sailor, for the British tar; and the Ganges for the Thames. Tlie home of his (the Indian agent's) trade, is India; and it would soon 129 make India the house of thousands of artificers, agents, and adventurers of all descriptions. At every outpost and subordinate factory, there would be an European public, and in the space of sixty or seventy years the number of Europeans in India would exceed the number of British Americans in North America^ xshen that country declared its inde~ Itendence,'''' This is a specimen of what may be called John Bull logic, whicli rivals any thing ever produced of the same kind. The worthy Di- rector (Mr. Hudleston) seems very little acquainted indeed with the principles and the progress of population.. It is well known, that in the places he has mentioned, the population is kept up and increased by emigrants from other quarters, and not so much from their inde- pendent resources. It is in the agricultural districts of new countries where population rapidly increases. Dr. Franklin, a very profund and cautious observer, estimates, in his Thoughts on Population, afterwards incorporated in the Quebec pamphlet, that not above 80,000 persons, up to that time (1751), had emigrated to the American states from Great Britain. Allowing that the statement errs on the side of dimi- nution, still it is an approximation to the truth. The population of the American provinces grew out of their own resources, stimulated by the demand for hands occasioned by their agricultural advantages. Every thing in that new country contributed to the utmost vigour and de- vclopement of the principle of population. But in Hindustan every thing is hostile to it, at least to Europeans. All the facilities to British settlers in India, which the nature of things could afford, probably would not produce 70,000 in the seventy years, which are to give us three millions. The line of employment, tiie low rate of wages, must discourage labourers from Europe, even could they find their way and pay their passage. Besides, artificers are not a class on whom population most depends : the number of agen/s, brokers, clerks, &c. must be limited by the employment for them, and 130 never can multiply to a very great extent. Indeed, such persons would go to Calcutta, as an Englishman goes to Bourdeaux, Leghorn, or Cadiz, with a view of returning as soon as he could; and in such a population, transient or fixed, A^hat could there be dangerous? The dread of colonization, therefore, is wholly chimerical, supposing it were a thing to be dreaded. There is no room in India for that species of adventure to which the colonies of North America owed their origin. Hindustan presents even less temptation to a })ermanent re- sidence than the West Indies, because the capital in the former is never likely to be of so fixed and so immoveable a kind as that of the West India planter. In any circumstances therefore, even of the most un- bounded freedom of intercourse, there can be no danger that Englishmen will ever become the willing permanent inhabitants of our Indian posses- sions. The spirit of speculation in trade, as well as the hopes of military or civil preferment, will always draw a certain number. But the military and civil adventurers must, under every system of administration, be subject to the inspection and controul of the government; and there seems little danger indeed that, whether they seek other services or our own, they ever can amount to that number, or maintain that connec- tion, which could inspire dread or cause danger to the feeblest govern- ment. The extent of mercantile adventure must be limited by its object and its means. If the business should be over-stocked, the rage for emigration will soon cease; and men, who are led by necessity to seek new scenes for the exertion of their industry and talents, are much more likely to prefer other countries to the rich, but full peopled, terri- tories of the East. At any rate, the numerous class, those in whom, if I may so speak, the great force of the principle of population resides, never can direct their views towards India. The expence of the voyage, as well as the little demand for their industry and talents, must discourage them from looking to India, as the place where their fortune can be pushed. If the spirit of emigration exist among that class, America is likely, at least for a long time, to be the favourite resorts 131 Having said so much to show the improbability of the British popu- lation in India ever becoming very numerous, it v»ill not be necesj.ary to say a great deal of the dangers which are anticipated from colonization. These seem to T)e of a very opposite and contradictory nature. Either the European population is to become dangerous to the state, by pro- ducing a separation ; or our ascendency, which rests upon the opinion of the natives, will be brought into question by the vices and degrada- tion of our countrymen. It is hardly possible that both these events should be realized, and it would be extraordinary if either were to happen. The one seems to be the phantom of a sickly imagination, and presents something in its aspect alarming, did we not know that it is but a phantom. The other might be supposed to be the argument of a schoolboy, illustrating in his theme the effects of climate or of moral causes on the human character. By those who have studied the history of the world and the prin- ciples of human nature, it would not, perhaps, be considered too dogmatic an assertion, that no revolution can ever take place in British India, at all resembling, either in its causes or its prin- ciples, the separation of the American provinces from Great Bri- tain. The elements of the two societies are in every respect different. The separation of the American states from this country sprang from a strong and characteristic similarity of temper and feeling between the child and the parent. In both, an invincible hatred to every species of arbitrary power, a love of independence, a detestation of foreign subjec- tion or dependence, have been conspicuous. Admirable features these ! But the native spirit of the offspring tended to the family schism which ensued. An authority to tax the colonies was naturally claimed, and as naturally resisted. Theforasfamilialed^ emancipated progeny, disputed the patria potestas. The distance of the colonies, and their local inte- rests, made it impossible to govern them as England was gOAcrned. They s 2 132 required a separate code ; and that was the fiscal code, which, of all spe- cies of legislation, touches men most sensibly, and excites the greatest ir- ritation. When that code began to be applied (and it threatened a principle moi'e formidable than the actual application) the irource of sepa- ration became visible and tangible. The spirit of liberty was deeply laid in all the American provinces, and strongly animated their republican forms. The people felt their own strength. They availed themselves of a series of colonial measures, devised without policy and prosecuted without vigour. The separation ensued, but it was an event which judicious and profound observers had long predicted ; and though it might have been postponed, yet it may well be doubted whether it would have been possible long to maintain the ascendency of Great Britain over a country of vast extent, covered by an immense popula- tion of men, educated in the principles of liberty, under republican forms of government ; men too, whose commercial interests were daily growing into rivalship, if not with the true interest, yet with the invete- rate commercial prejudices of the metropolitan state. But the circumstances which rendered America difficult to govern do not exist in Hindustan. The circumstances which prepared the separation of America are totally inapplicable to the situation of British India. In the latter there is no spirit of republican freedom, impa- tient of controul or of dependence. The natives are passive so long as their prejudices of mere opinion are not violated. Mere oppression and mal-administration they will endure. The sovereign princes may be impatient of our controul, but that touches upon a question of external rather than internal policy. It is not among the people governed then, according to this view, that we have to apprehend a rebellioii, but rather among the agents of government that we have to fear a mutiny. But is tliis really a (error that can fall upon the mind of a firm and rational man : Perhaps it may be said, that the army itself, the great 133 instrument of government, may mutiny. That dissatisfaction, to an alarming extent, has prevailed among the Company's officers is un- questionable, aiul the very existence of such a mischief reflects full as much discredit on the sovereign of that army, the Company^ as upon the persons concerned. In that body, as composing a branch of the British army at large, no such sentiment ever coxild have existed ; for either the cause would not have been furnished, or the prevalence of a common feeling with the army at large, of which they formed a part, or reverence for the authority of a sovereign whom they could not despise, and tlie sense of danger in the attempt, must have rendered such an occurrence impossible. Perhaps, however, the danger from the instance alluded to was much less than was apprehended. Certain it is, that if the officers, whose notorious correspondences were, as to the form at least, so inconsistent Avith military discipline and subordination, had proceeded to extremities, they must have perished themselves in the ruin they would have occasioned. ,qt4i^l£'^n oJni ?,awoig But this incident, though it tends little to exalt our Ideas of the respect in which the Company is held as a sovereign, or even of their liberality to their servants, cannot in any degree support the argument, that danger is to be apprehended from colonization. The arrange- ments it produced have given the Indian officers additional motives to fix their views upon home. They never showed any tendency to fix themselves in India, nor is such a sentiment ever likely to influence them. Grievances, real or supposed, may lead them to complain or cabal, but their manners, their habits, are all averse from perma- nent settlement in India. Nothing can be more unlikely than that they should be seized with such rebellious views as to attempt an inde- pendent empire in Hindustan, nor could their views, if so desperate, be carried into execution, v.'hile the King's troops form so large a part of the effective force in our Eastern don»inions. But if such scandalous views could ever rje imputed by the Com- 134 pany themselves to the able and meritorious officers of their own army, what probability is there of such an influx of Europeans, or such an increase by population, as to produce either an inclination or an ability to dissolve the connection between England and India ? To the British subjects, unless indeed under the controul of the mono- poly government, what ground of dissatisfaction could ever be given? If the trade with their native country was free, would the merchants complain? It is now that this class are discontented, and with justice. Would the army be discontented? Would the civil servants of the govern- ment be discontented? What elements of discontent or separation could exist? Would the English population increasing, and as natives of that clim.ate degenerating, become hostile to the mother country, and ambitious of the frantic importance of establishing an English empire over Hindustan, independent of Great Britain, under all the dangers both of resistance from the natives and of attack from other European powers? A speculation so purely theoretical, so con- trary to any example or tendency of human affairs, never was broached. Countries have been conquered and subjected; India has been overrun by the Mahometans, who, after a successful invasion, established them- selves in the conquered territories, like the swarms from the Northern hive in different parts of Europe; conquerors have at various tini^s melted into the mass of the people they have subdued ; but the annals of the world present no example of a state of civil government, like that of British India, which by slow advances and gradual usurpation became rebellious as a state towards the parent protecting power, and yet remained perfectly distinct from the people over whom it set up an independent sovereignty. No moral or political causes are likely to produce such a disposition; no increase in the amount of Jinglish population is likely to afford either the temptation or •the means to such extravagant pretensions ; and reduced, iiulced, must be the power of Britain, if she could not soon punish the pride and presumption of a few rebellious citizens that should attempt so desperate a design. 135 A very few words will suffice, with regard to the degradation of the British inhabitants in India, through their increase and their perma- nent establishment, and the consequent overthrow of that opinion on which our power is founded. It has been shown that, though the trade were thrown open, and the most unbounded licence of emigration were allowed, the emigration of the numerous class never could tend to India. It has been shown, that the civil, the military, the com- mercial adventurers, would continue to have the same disposition, as now, to return home. It is possible indeed that, with the increased facility of commercial speculation, a greater number of individuals would find employment in India, but from the very nature of that employment they would not fix themselves there. The supposition, that idle useless adventurers would go to India, is contrary to all ex- perience. The nature of that country is too wxU known, to make it probable that any great influx of mere adventurers would take place. In proportion as the means of fair commercial enterprise were af- forded, Mould the respectable part of the English population be more numerous. Mixuig among the natives in the pursuit of their com- mercial objects, what danger could there be that they would expose their inferiority, or dissolve that charm of mysterious awe on which our empire rests ? '. il. i.i'Ji i J ill Perhaps it might be desired that the English population in India were more numerous than it is. Certainly the chain of authority in that country is slender enough. Never was so immense an empire maintained by so small a number of those, by whose agency, and for whose interest, near fifty millions of men are governed. If then the British population, particularly in certain commanding situations, could be increased, it would tend to secure our power against the danger of sudden combinations and unexpected rebellion. In the present cir- cumstances, however, it really appears more difficult to procure than to prevent a considerable and efficient English population being esta* 136 blished. Nor, if sufficient pronsion and encouragement could be wivcn in India for British settlers, would there be any danger (as some apprehend) that it would weaken the mother country by the drain of its population. A proper vent for population, that is, facility of obtaining provision and establishment for children, is the greatest promoter both of a numerous and of a comfortable population, because one of the greatest restraints to marriage which exists in cultivated society is thereby removed. I am almopt ashamed of ha>ing wasted so much time upon a point apparently so clear; and the only apology I can offer is, the inveteracy of the prejudices with regard to it which must be encountered. In all the Reports of the Court of Directors, the subject of colonization is treated as the strongest objection, not only to the laying open the connection with India generally, but to the indulgence of allowing the private trade to be carried on in India built ships. If this be indeed the greatest objection, there can be no doubt of the verdict of every impartial man. Never, indeed, was so weak an argument employed on so grave and important a subject. ,, , HI. I come now to consider the question of government, and how the laying open the trade would affect tlic system by which our Indian ter- ritories arc now administered. It must be agreed by c\ cry one that a government for British India must be suited to the character, manners, and prejudices of the natives. That is, whatever shape the political presiding power may assume, no alteration oiiglit to be made in the municipal institutions, no violence olfcred to the peculiar customs, no change attempted in the religious opinions or establishments of Hin- dustan. It was thus that the Romans left to the peofilc tlicy conquered the undisturbed enjoyment of their laws and their religion. The executive power was changed, tlie political relations of the state ^^s a bodv were altered, but in the institutions, which distinguish diilerent 157 nations, no forcible innovation was attempted. The exterior aspect, not the interior constitution, was changed. If in the progress of time the conquered people came more and more to resemble their con- querors, it was the result of imitation, not of force. It is thus that in India the British government ought to be modelled. It should leave every thing in the peculiar structure and frame of society as it is. The political character and direction of the state, as a body, or confederation of separate bodies, are to be changed, but nothing more. The Hindu, in private life, in his relationswith his neighbours, in the management of his property, in the exercise of religion, should feel no difference but that which results from a more paternal government and a more enlightened administration. Indeed, in the settlement of the present system these objects have feeen carefully considered. The judiciary and financial departments have been modelled upon the peculiar customs of the inhabitants. To introduce the laws of this country, or the forms of our free government, is impossible. The only part of the British constitution, from which the people of Hindustan can derive benefit, is the spirit of it, which considers the good of the subject as the end of government; and that responsibility of all authority, which is the security against abuse. These general principles are so universally admitted, that they re- tjuire no argument to support them. It never, however, can be wholly superfluous to impress the necessity of adhering to them as essential maxims in the government of India, and to keep in mind that a de- parture from them, in any instance, ought to be considered as an of- fence against the state, of the most dangerous nature. But keeping these objects in view, and enforcing them as far as possi- ble by positive law and precise instructions, there appears no reason to conclude that India would, in any respect, be worse governed if the T 138 Company, as an instrument employed by England for that service, were abolished. It does not appear that any violent change would take place in the government of India, though the Company, or the Direc- tors, as the board at home for directing that government, were to be deprived of all political authority. The East India Company, viewed in all its relations and all its parts, is certainly one of the most extraordinary institutions that ever existed in any age or nation. We have frequently seen companies possessed of con- siderable weight and property, but destitute of any direct political autho- rity, far less any sovereign power. The Collegia and Corpora of the Roman law are known to our own. They are the models on which mo- dern corporate bodies have been formed. A monopoly of different branches of trade has been often granted by the ignorance or the venality of governments ; but like the East India Company nothing was ever seen in human contrivance or politic institution. They have obtained from the King and Parliament of England, not only the monopoly of an immense commerce, but imperial and sovereign powers of the most unbounded extent. Crowns have been bought and sold ; but what can be compared with the majestic enterprise of a British Company farming out on leasehold the functions of empire over a territory as large as all Europe, and purchasing a right to dispose of the lives and happiness, the property and industry, of fifty millions of men ? A right of go- vernment, thus purchased, thus held by a company of merchants in the city of London, far surpasses the wildest vagaries of political specu- lation. Nothing surely, in the history of mankind, was ever more extraordinary than the relation in which an empire, at the distance of so many thousand miles from our shores, stands to the superior government, which hires it out for money like a tax or a toll. We are astonished at a band of ad- venturers daring to farm out from their sovereign the right of cxerci ing the functions of government over fifty millions of tiicir fellow creatures. 139 as a mere speculation of commerce ; managing, and working, and task- ing their wretched subjects through all the chain of their graduated ser- vitude, in order to obtain the funds for paying an annuity or dividend to five or six thousand English gentlemen and ladies ! To form an as- sociation for such purposes, and divide the gains, as if it were the pro- ceeds of a coal-mine, or a fishery, or a canal, is truly a singular pheno- menon. It is either imperial commerce indeed, or it is a perversion of the purposes; a systematic, regulated abuse of the sacred trust and duty of government, beyond the guilt of the most capricious tyranny. The folly and iniquity of this locatio-conductio of empire must strike the mind of every man who possesses either feeling or under- standing. It undoubtedly is something for doing which, if there be a legal competence, it implies a moral wrong so to exercise it. The government of our fellow creatures is a trust sacred beyond the most solemn conventions of man. It cannot devolve upon us, or be acquired, without bringing with it a relative obligation and an awful responsibility. We have no right to make a compromise with it, or to neglect the duties attached to the rank of sovereign, either for interest, ambition, or indolence. If it be true, as many have asserted, that there is no blacker page in the history of England than that of India, our national guilt, perhaps, arise? as much from permission as participation. But that is no apology. He who intrusts another with the power to do evil, far more he who sells that privilege, incurs a heavy load of blame, and ought to be answerable for the abuse of the trust he delegates. Attempts have been made at different times to remedy the evils which India has suffered, from being sold as a job to a company of sjjecu- lators. Almost from the first acquisition of the territories, the attention of Parliament has been directed to this object; and, after infinite contention, the Regulating Acts of 1784 and 1786, new-cast and T 2 140 amended in the Act of 1793, have made some advances towards a cor-- rectioii of the system. But the mischief is, that the evil is deeply inherent in the nature of the thing. The legislative remedy is practi- cally inefficient. We may acquit the British government of a wish to encourage the misconduct incident to the administration of India. Be it so, But is there any thing in the arrangement, as it now exists, that fulfils either the obligation of duty or the object of humanity ? The system of government for India ought to have two leading objects in view ; the protection and happiness of the people governed, and the prosperity and power of the paramount government at home. The- system, therefore, should be so framed as to secure both the subjects and the allies of this country in India from the arbitrary exercise of the authority with which the British resident government is invested. It should be so constituted as to secure the direct dependence and the perfect responsibility of India rulers in relation to the supreme controul of the British governments Perhaps never was a system more incongruous than the present. We have a delegated trust without an adequate security against the abuse. We have established in the East India Company a direct authority to administer, and we have established in a go\ernnient board a direct power to controul. We have set up jarring authorities which are irre* concilcable but through the usurpation of ministeral power, or the cor- ruption of ministerial influence. We enable the Court of Directors to appoint the chief governors of India, and the government retains the power to recall, or, in clfect, to annul the appointment. The Directors propose measures, and the Government has the power to alter and to amend. We, therefore, subject the governors of India to two masters ; serving only one, perhaps obeying neither. We make the Company the nominal sovereign. We give them authority to in- struct and command their servants, but their servants are aware that they have other masters to please, or to obey. By this complicated 141 system, either the Company is nothing, or the Government is nothing, and often both. The persons in authority, at the distance of so many thousand miles, are thus under no controul. They cannot respect the Court of Directors as masters. How can it be? Can noblemen of high rank, politicians and statesmen, receive, without a feeling of repugnance, commands from men in rank much below them, whose abilities they do not esteem, whose power to censure or punish they cannot dread? What is the consequence? An arbitrary system in India naturally ensues ; neither that of the Company which claims the right, nor of the governor who exerts the power, nor of the government that possesses the controul. The result is, that there is no system whatever dependent either on the constituent or on the lord paramount, or on the established su- perintending controul, to be found in the history, even the most recent, of our Indian empire. We find wars begun and ended without the least knowledge, concurrence, approbation, or censure of Parliament. This is a monstrous anomaly in our constitution, and may lead to the destruction of its very principles. It may not always be pos- sible to consult Parliament in the Avars of India ; but it is a most serious consideration that British subjects have, for now these fifty years, undertaken and prosecuted wars without the leave of that controuling body, to which our hereditary sovereign and his most pow- erful and most popular ministers are subject. We do not know the Jtcici of the war J we do not know the cause; we do not know the consequence; we do not know what British blood, what British wealth or honour, are engaged in the quarrel, till it is too late to recede or to remedy. The late extraordinary transactions in the Carnatic, in Oude, and in other places, have never been investigated. Perhaps the conduct of the British government of India was perfectly justifiable in these instances; but the government at home has never fully, or even formally,. 142 examined and passed judgment upon acts apparently very question- able both as to justice and policy. The policy or necessity of the wars with the Mahratta states have never yet been submitted to the decision of parliament. The conduct of the administration of India may have beenright;butwhat I complain of is, that it has been a conduct of mere discretion, subject to no efficient controul or real responsibility. It may have been highly unjustifiable, but whether right or wrong is matter of mere opinion, and no way settled by the judgment of that authority to whose decisions the people of this country are accustomed to submit. As matters now stand, transactions, national as to their extent and as to their consequences, wars in which the King's troops have been cut off by thousands, and the reputation of the British government has been loudly traduced throughout Europe, and compared to the licentious despotism of Buonaparte, have as yet received neither censure nor confirmation. Whether this be a system w'hich can last, or ought to last, may be submitted to the plain sense and unsophisticated judgment of the people of England. But it may be said, that the necessity of such political revolutions, and of such revolutionary wars, that to act without or against orders are circumstances incident to the distance of our Indian dominion, and to its situation. This may be questioned. It results from conflicting authority, or from none. Were the governors of India directly com- missioned by the government, and responsible to it, they would be compelled to act right at their peril. At present, they act under no superior; they get orders from the Directors which tliey despise; they know that, between the Board of Controul and the Directors, all unity of power is destroyed. They are not the servants of the King, whom they would not dare to disobey, but of the Company, whom tliey are ashamed to obcv. In the mean time, between the India House and the Board of Controul, it is impossible to decide whether a man acts by 143 the direction of one or the other, or according to the views of the one or the other. The whole system, therefore, is of a complexity which banishes unity of principle and consistency of object. No one knows what is obeyed or disobeyed, where opposite and different masters exist. Obedience is not enforced, when the one master is afraid of giving to the rival master a right of interference, should he insist on his particular mandate. No controul therefore exists, when the executive authority is thus stripped of its power to direct. No re- sponsibility exists for disobedience, when there is no regular command. There is no remedy for abu:e of trust, where the administrative su- periors are afraid of giving each other an advantage by preferring accusations, and when they are content to murmur but have not courage to correct*. The consequence is, that, without imputing blame to individuals, the system itself leads to disorder, and at last we see charges of malversation made, which only excite contention, without pro- mising amendment; and justice is pursued through channels so im- practicable, that thinking men must prefer the impunity of guilt ta retribution so obtained. Indeed, the attempt to correct the evils of a bad system by criminal severity, instead of preventing abuse by a wise regulation, ought to be resisted in every state. It is the worst species of tyranny, and it is of a kind that more than any other tends to injustice ; because they who must be conscious that, by their neglect of preventi\ e means, they are accomplices in the mischief that springs from the facility of trans- gression, are too apt to think that they exculpate themselves by severity of punishment, however irregular, inflicted on those who are accused of malversation. If such are the pernicious consequences of the present system of * It is very disgusting to see Directors, in the House of Commons, conniving at charr:- , >. :Hj7 aoinuftof^ ' Perhaps the reader may have perused the story of Alnaschar, the Persian glassman, as it is pleasantly related in No. 535y of the Spectator. Alnaschar was a very idle fellow ; but having bought a basket of ■ glass, he made so excellent an appropriation of his future profits in an act of imagination he passed on the subject, that having through enormous wealth, arrived at the honour of being son-in- law to the grand vizier, he ntost unfortunately was so elated, that in the midst of his reverie, giving the basket a kick, he broke the glass into a thousand pieces, and totally dissipated his fortune, and the splendid vision in which it existed. Government and the East India Company have not been much wiser in their dreams • See the act itself. 15d of wealth than Alnaschar, the Persian glassman. They have so ma* naged matters, that not one of their fine projects is realized. The pub- lic have obtained none of that profit they had stipulated to receive. Their visionary riches have perished, like the brittle fortune of Alnaschar. The act of 1793 remains a monument of the vanity of political cal- culations: yet this act was the work of men, who deride theorists, and call themselves practical politicians. After so many experiments, by v^hich wc have in rain attempted to render India an efficient aid to the government, from which it receives protection and defence; it is time that we should have some substantial indemnification. Hitherto the trade of India has been oppressed, the government has been ill administered, and Great Britain has never enjoyed the benefits stipulated for the sale of an invaluable privilege, and the cession of an immense empire. There are those indeed, who may think that the trade to India can be laid open, and the government continue lodged in the Com- pany, nearly as at present. That opinion may de&erve discussion, if it does not merit an experiment. It is not my business at present to enter into that subject. Perhaps though the reflections I have ventured to make upon the political branch of our Indian system, are bricf^ they may be thought too tedious for the purpose of this inquiry. My chief object has been to point out the defects and the im- policy of the commercial system. The removal of those restraints under which the trade now labours, seems alisolutely necessary to preserve to the state the benefits which it was the original object of our political acquisitions in India to secure. A considerable period, however, has yet to run, during which the Company will claim the right to mismanage the estate committed to them. It might perhaps be maintained, that having by their miscon- duct defeated the success of every stipulation in favour of the public, 159 they have forfeited their Charter. Sure I am, at least, that they have done much more to justify a resumption of it than the old Company, who in 1698 were declared to have forfeited theirs, by failing in the payment of certain duties. Upon this, however, I do not insist. I do not believe that any minister has virtue and courage enough to take a step so beneficial to the country. If, at the same time, measures be not adopted speedily, to counteract the pernicious effects of the monopoly, the trade of India will be irrevocably lost to Great Britain. This nation has incurred a vast expence in the conquest and in the defence of its Indian territories and commerce ; a large proportion of the British army is employed in India ; and in Indian wars British blood has been profusely shed. Hitherto the promised benefits have not been realized ; and if the same system is to be maintained, India, instead' of being a source of strength, will continue to produce a diver- sion of the pablio force. Instead of being a source of revenue, it will be an object of expence, and a cause of national decay. If then, our Indian empire is capable of yielding those advantages, which have been so often promised, wc should postpone as little as pos- sible the golden aera of their enjoyment. We are now in a situation, in which the public spirit and the public strength cannot be supported by empty or distant hopes. We ought to bring into action all our dis- posable resources ; and surely none can be more eligi!)le or less bur- densome to the people, than tjie wealth which springs from a judicious employment of our natural advantages, and the strength which arises from the encouragement of our industry, our commerce, and our- navigation»^ FINIS, C. Meicit-r and Co. 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