UC-NRLF 11 The Truth ^ About The ^ Schley Co^se By "NAUTICUS." PRICE, TWENTY-FIVE CENTS I THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SCHLEY CASE By 7NAUTICUS. T™ THE COLUMBIA PRESS Washington, D. C. Elm DEDICATED [Without permission] TO A REAL NAVAL HERO CAPT. CHARLES E. CLARK OF THE BATTLESHIP "OREGON." 255 THE TRUTH ABOUT THE SCHLEY CASE. BY NAUTICUS. To get at the truth about the Schley case we must divest ourselves of all preconceived, ideas and prejudices and study the facts with a clear mind. We must not approach this subject with a fixed idea that we are for or against Admiral Schley, or for< or against Admiral Sampson. It is necessary that we should take no sides whatever; that we should put ourselves in precisely the same frame of mind as if we were jurors in the box or judges on the bench. We must have no opin- ions till we have ascertained what the facts are; and we- must analyze those facts without fear or favor. There is one very important principle that must in fair- ness be borne in mind at the outset. This is that in our system of jurisprudence every man is adjudged innocent till proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof rests upon his accusers. He cannot be convicted upon mere hearsay. The proof must be convincing, satisfac- tory to common sense. Admiral Schley is entitled to the ad- vantage of this principle as much as if he were accused of an offense against the statute law in a criminal court. He is entitled to the benefit of every doubt. His long and ad- mirable career as a naval officer requires that any proof of his guilt shall be complete and overwhelming before any stain can rest upon him. This is true, notwithstanding the fact that he has not been formally accused or tried. As a matter of form, he has not been on trial at all. Certain reflections upon him hav- ing appeared in a published book, he asked the Navy De- partment to convene a court of inquiry composed of his brother officers. This court could not punish him. They could only present their findings, their opinion. Actually, however, he was on trial. His reputation as a naval officer was at stake. He had appealed to his brothers-in-arms for vindication, and they had the power to inflict the direst punishment, an adverse finding. To one member of the court as it was at first constituted he offered objections* which were sustained, and that member was excused from further service. With the remaining members of the court — Admiral Dewey and Kear Admirals Benham and Ram- say — Admiral Schley was satisfied. He recognized in them naval officers of long and distinguished careers, and men of high and just character. Into their hands he willingly committed his cause. This court was in session many weeks. It had before it all the records of the Navy Department that could throw any light upon the subject. It called a great number of witnesses. Naval officers were brought from all parts of the world. .Some of them testified against the applicant some of them in his favor, and the testimony of many was neutral. The Government paid all the expenses. What was it the court was instructed to inquire into? The Secretary of the Navy issued to the court what is called a precept. It was a statement of the matters which the court was charged with investigating. But the court was not limited to the matters set forth in the precept. It was authorized to go into any matters connected with what is known as the Santiago campaign and battle. As a matter of fact, the court did not shut out anything whatever, and did inquire into everything, with the single exception that it refused over and over again to go into anything involv- ing Admiral Sampson. The court categorically ruled that that officer's interests, were not involved — that it was in- quiring into Admiral Schley and not into Admiral Samp- son. It therefore refused to hear any testimony as to Ad- miral Sampson's conduct, save the orders which lie sent to Admiral Schley and which were received by thai officer, then a Commodore. It refused to hear testimony directiv or indirectly bearing upon the question as to who was in com- mand at the battle of Santiago. It refused an application of Admiral Sampson to be represented before the court by counsel. SCHLEY ACQUITTED OF COWARDICE. There is a common belief that Admiral Schley was on trial on the charge of having been guilty of cowardice. Technically this is not true. He was not charged with cowardice by any one of authority. There was nothing about cowardice in the precept. Even those naval officers who thought him guilty of certain sins of omission or com- mission did not charge him with cowardice. But he was virtually accused of cowardice in the book which brought on the court of inquiry, and therefore, so far as the public was concerned, this was one of the principal accusations against him. To the court, to the naval service, to profes- sional men, it was of but minor importance. Admiral Schley has been acquitted on that charge, if charge it can be called. He is acquitted by all three members of the court. No stain of physical or personal cowardice rests upon him. Indeed, there is historical authority for the statement that but one American officer was ever charged with cowardice in the face of the enemy, and he did not live to bear the burden of his shame. Naval officers are proverbially brave in battle. They get few chances to fight, and such chances they invariably embrace with eagerness. Before the court of inquiry was called no one whos.e opin- ion was worth a moment's consideration believed Admiral Schley had ever been guilty of personal or physical coward- ice. His character, his career, gave the lie to any such charge. If that question needed any settling, the court has settled it once for all. The author, with a large acquaint- ance among public men and naval officers, has yet to meet one who is not glad of this part of the verdict, glad that no such stain is to rest upon the fair escutcheon of the American Navy. In the public mind this was the first question. Was Ad- miral Schley to be convicted of cowardice? That disposed of, and disposed of rightly, the next question in the popular mind was, did Schley win the battle of Santiago? The court expressed no opinion, that not having been in any way a subject of its inquiry. Admiral Dewey, speaking for himself, has answered, "Yes." The public is inclined to agree with Admiral Dewey. To a great majority of the American people these are the only answers needed to all the questions raised about Schley's conduct: "He was not a coward, and he won the battle of Santiago." Everything else, in the eyes of the masses, is trivial and unimportant. All else is rubbish. Why trump up such matters as dispatches, coal supplies, obedience of orders, retrograde movements? What the people care for is the results. They love a fighter, and make a hero of the fight- ing man who wins. They will not have stones thrown at their hero. They will not have him dragged down. THE POPULAR VIEW AND THE NAVAL VIEW. But the popular view and the naval view are wholly dif- ferent things. To the public the battle is everything. Most people look upon a naval engagement much as they look upon a prize-fight. At first they see two men, and in the end only one man, the winner. The tableau of battle, with shot and shell flying, fills their eye. Their imagination is so wrought up by the dramatic that they wholly overlook such important considerations as the actual means by which the battle is won, as well as the conduct of the preliminary campaign which led to it. It is natural for the popular mind to single out one man and give him the glory. That is because the public is naturally a hero worshipper. It wants and will have a hero for every battle w T on. Usually its herd is one who has been under fire, as the public cannot see how a man can win a naval battle without actually be- ing in it any more than it can see how a man can win a prize fight without being one of the principals. Thus the public is likely to forget many important considerations, such as the planning and preparations, the disposition of ships, the days and perhaps weeks of maneuvering for the battle, the preliminary campaign which makes a battle possible, the blockade, the siege, the fidelity of responsible officers to orders and to duty, and, more's the pity, the thousands of men who handle guns and heave coal and stand by the en- gines, without whose zeal and skill no victory at all could be won. It is here that the naval view and the public view of what constitute success in the field take a wide divergence. Naval officers know that character and training are everything. They know that it is not a battle, but operations before a battle that try a naval man's mettle. They know that it is the easiest thing in the world to be brave in battle. They know, too, that in an engagement between squadrons or fleets, a number of ships on each side, any one man, even the commander-in-chief, is of relatively small importance after the battle has begun. The result is determined by the efficiency of many, beginning with the naval designers, the constructors, the ordnance bureau that provided the guns, and ending with the captains who control each individual ship, and their engineers and gunners. The superiority of one fleet over another is not on the bridge or in the con- ning tower, but in the gun turrets and in the engine rooms. BEFORE THE BATTLE, OR IN THE BATTLE. These differences between what ma3 r be called the pop- ular view and the service view have given rise to a great deal of confusion in the Schley case. The people will think of bo thing but the battle. Naval men want to know in what manner Schley did his duty and met his responsibilities be- fore the battle, while he was in independent command of the Flying Squadron. In their opinion he must stand or fall as an officer of approved merit by what he did or did not do then. The people say it does not matter what he did or did not do then — he "won the battle," and that is enough for them. But naval officers say it does matter a great deal — it matters everything in the world; that the manner in which a commander meets his responsibilities, well or ill, is what he is to be accorded praise or blame for, irrespective of the fact that he afterward happened to be in the battle and there to acquit himself well. They say that to acquit himself well in battle is the performance of every man in the Navy, each according to his station. It is what is ex- pected of every officer and man. The penalty of failure so to do is to be drubbed out of the service in disgrace. But good performance in battle cannot be held to excuse all previous derelictions. Otherwise there's an end to disci- pline, to organization, to development of a service of high morale in officers and men. If a spectacular success in battle is to eclipse and atone for a previous professional failure, they say a false standard is set up for our naval service, a standard which puts a premium on luck and showy bravery and places at a discount competency and 10 character and faithfulness to duty and to orders outside the realm of battle. In which court should Admiral Schley be tried — that of public opinion or one composed of his fellow-professionals r.f the service? The well-settled rule the world over is Unit military men and the military service are to have their uwi* standards of judgment. They have their own courts. The matters to be decided are technical, and civil courts an' deemed incompetent to handle them properly. The strong- est reason is that service matters should be kept out of poli- tics. Army and Navy men have nothing to do with politic* or public opinion. The code which rules them is not the civil code or the political code. For three years after the Spanish war the case of Admiral Schley was in the hands of the people, of public opinion, and the verdict was with him. He was a popular hero. But the moment he asked for a court of inquiry he appealed from public opinion and fell under the scrutiny of his professional brothers. As a professional man he asked for a professional judgment upon his conduct. A service man, he asked for the opinion of men of his service. That judgment has been rendered, and his friends have asked Congress for the vindication which his broth ers-in-arms denied him. Naval men resent thi& second appeal. They do not like to have a service matter taken into politics or the arena of public opinion for final adjudication. They say Schley asked for the judgment of his profession, was satisfied with the court as constituted, was given every opportunity to present his case, and is bound to accept the verdict. In their opinion there is no ap- peal. If there is to be appeal to Congress, or to public opinion, then a professional service of the highest^ class is taken into the field of politics, where it should not fie. An v such transfer of the court of last resort must be destructive of the service. Military officers are thus invited to appeal from their superiors to the politicians. The officer who has enough political support may defy his superiors. Besides, it is claimed the popular court is incompetent. It lacks the information and skill requisite to an intelligent judgment. If a physician is charged with malpractice his guilt or in nocence should be fixed by professional men, not by mass meetings and newspapers. If an electrician is charged with bungling an important job entrusted 1o his care lie must be tried by other electricians, by experts who know, not by 11 politicians and crowds of people who know nothing, of the technique of the art. SALIENT FEATURES OF THE CASE. Hence we reach these preliminary conclusions: 1. Admiral Schley appealed to a court of professional men, and was found guilty by that court. 2. He has virtually appealed from the professional court to the court of public opinion, and to Congress, which is a creature of public opinion; and this latter court is inclined to reverse the verdict of the professional tribunal and acquit him upon two grounds, as follows: A — That his alleged derelictions in the preliminary cam- paign were "of trifling consequence, not worthy of serious consideration; and — B — That he won the battle of Santiago, and by destroying the Spanish fleet atoned for any prevous shortcomings. In our search for the truth, we should, therefore, address our inquiries to two principal points, to-wit: 1. What was the character of Commodore Schley's dere- lictions while in independent command of the Flying Squadron? Were his offenses serious? 2. Did Schley "win the battle of Santiago?" Was he in "absolute command" during that engagement? And was the value of his services there so great that his previous shortcomings should be overlooked? Appeal having virtually been taken from the naval court to the court of public opinion, this review of the case is de- signed as an aid to the latter tribunal. Whether or not pub- lic opinion should have the last word is a debatable question. But there is no need of quarreling with fact. The public is settling the question for itself. Hence an effort is here made to present the facts in such a way that the public can use them, and use them intelligently, in making up its judgment. On the one hand there is recognition of the truth that the public cares little for technical details, for what is known as hair-splitting, for hypercriticism of an officer who enjoys a high reputation for gallantry and courage. On the other hand there is appreciation of the truth that the American people love justice above all things, that they love straightforwardness, devotion to duty, zeal in the country's service, energy and resoluteness in all those who lead our armies or fleets against a foe. The writer believes that with 12 the facts set clearly before them the American people have that rare sense known as common sense which will enable them to determine whether or not Admiral Schley has been justly dealt with by the court composed of his brother offi- cers. Everything set down in these pages is taken from official records or from well-authenticated sources, and care has been taken to exclude all statements or shades of state- ments about which there is anv reasonable doubt. WHY WAS SAMPSON PUT AHEAD OF SCHLEY? Commodore (now Admiral) Schley left Key West the morning of May 19, 1898, in command of the Flying Squad- ron, bound for Cienfuegos. For thirteen days Commodore Schley was at the head of this squadron, with no superior officer present. His operations during these thirteen days of independent command formed the greater part of the sub- ject of inquiry before the court. His conduct during this period was characterized by his superior in command. Ad- miral Sampson, as Reprehensible." The Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, declared that Schley's "unsteadiness in purpose and in push and in failure to obey orders did not meet the approval of the President (McKinley) and of the Department." The naval court of inquiry declared after full investigation that Schley's conduct of the campaign pre- vious to June 1, was "characterized by vacillation, dilatori- ness and lack of enterprise," and that certain representations made by Schley in excuse for his conduct were "inaccurate and misleading." In view of all these criticisms from such high authorities as the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy, the Commander-in-Chief, and the three distinguished admirals who composed the court of in- quiry, we are forced to admit that Schley's conduct while in independent command prior to June 1, was at least open to question; that it is under suspicion; that it was irregular; that it was not normal or what had been expected. That he failed in some important ways must be obvious, else there could not have been so much censure. Why did he fail to do that which he was expected to do? Why did he fall under this severe censure? Some explanation there must be. This explanation we must seek, and seek it not in 13 prejudice against Schley* nor yet in favoritism toward him, but from analysis of the facts. What an efficient, normal naval officer will do in a given emergency can be pretty well gauged by three considerations: (1) His orders; (2) the con- ditions with which he is surrounded; and (3) his character or temperament. It may facilitate our progress toward a just conclusion if we take up the third consideration first. Admiral Schley has now been in the naval service more than forty years. He is of course well known in that service. Men who have known him throughout his career, who have served with him aboard ship and ashore, are not likely to be altogether mistaken as to his character and qualities. There is substan- tial agreement among them. They agree that he is a man who makes many friends. Of a genial and companionable disposi- tion, he attracts and holds affections. No naval officer has been more popular than he. But it is agreed also that he has never been looked upon as one of the able and progres- sive officers. He was never a student. He has been classed as one of the old-style naval officers. The old type of naval officer, heritage of the days of wooden frigates, was a fighter and nothing more. The new type of naval man, who has come in with modern navies, is a student, a strategist, an executive, and a fighter, too. The latter knows that in mod ern naval service the truly successful officer must know something of all sciences. He must keep abreast of the times, make himself familiar with the ever-changing prog- ress in construction, armor, guns, tactics, organization, ma- chinery, electric appliances, and the thousand and one things which enter the realm of most of the arts and many of the sciences, and which make up the elements of modern naval practice aboard the highly-complicated fighting en- gines of this day and generation. Schley was never such a student. He made friends, but he did not acquire much knowledge. He was fond of society, of dancing, of novel reading, of the club. Sampson was essentially a student. He made few friends, having an unfortunate manner. But he commanded the respect and admiration even of men who did not like him personally. It has been one of the tradi- tions of the naval. service since the two men left Annapolis Academy that "Schley was a good fellow and but an indif- ferent officer, while Sampson was a good officer and not a good fellow." It is not unfair to Admiral Schley, and it is- 14 true, to say that while he was at the head of an important technical bureau in the Navy Department he was almost universally liked and almost universally voted an indiffer- ent executive. Sampson, on the other hand, was never pop- ular, but as chief of a like bureau he was recognized as a model executive, a student, an officer of progressive spirit and great ability. m'kINLEY AND ROOSEVELT CHOSE SAMrSON. When the Spanish war came on Schley was senior to Sampson on the naval list, but these considerations led to the selection of the latter for chief command. Theodore Roosevelt was then Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and he knew w*hy Sampson was put ahead of Schley. It was not because Sampson was popular, for he was not, while Schley was. It was not favoritism. It was simply natural selec- tion — an effort to secure the best man for. the work. The considerations just spoken of were not the only ones involved. Schley was thought by men who had known him all his life — men who were his personal friends and well- wishers — to lack many of those qualities which fit a man for supreme responsibilities. He was believed to lack stead- iness, moral stamina, decision of character, the ability to carry a heavy burden with wisdom, resoluteness and clear judgment. No one doubted his physical courage then any more than anyone doubts it now. The only question was as to what is known as moral courage. As the commander of a single ship, as an old-style fighting man, obeying the or- ders of another who carried the responsibility of securing results, he was believed to be the peer of any man in the service. If he had a fault it was likely to be in the direction of rashness. But he was not thought by President McKin- ley. Secretary Long, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, and the board of admirals who advised them in that critical hour, to be the man best fitted for command of a fleet, to assume supreme executive responsibilities. Hence Sampson was selected. Schley, true to his nature, which is one of kindliness and good feeling, bore no ill-will to anyone because he wjis made second instead of first in command. He was content. When he and Sampson met at Key AYest he assured the latter of his perfect loyalty. No one doubted then or doubts now his sincerity. It is not true that there had ever been ;iny quarrel between Sampson and 15 -Schley. They were good friends, as far as men of such totally different types could be friends, or anyone could b^ friendly with the cold, austere Sampson. Schley was assigned by Sampson to the command on the south coast of Cuba. It was a choice assignment. All their lives men of the naval service had been waiting and pray- ing for just such an opportunity as this which Sampson now gave Schley. Here was our first foreign naval war in nearly a century. Out there in the Caribbean was a formidable fleet of enemy's ships,- making for the coast of Cuba and per- haps for our own seaboard. Here was Schley, the junior commander, with the glorious privilege of going to meet them. Dozens of his fellow-officers would have given their ■right arms to be in his shoes. 'S THE CRUISE OF THE FLYING SQUADRON. Schley himself was well pleased when he sailed away with his Flying Squadron for the south coast of Cuba. He had the post of honor because it was the post of danger. It was a critical moment in the affairs of the nation, and he was the man of the hour. At last the American Navy was to justify the many millions the people had lavished upou it and the confidence they had placed in it. Great things were expected of Schley by the country and the Govern- ment, and the Navy Department had put under his com- mand a powerful squadron, the flower of the navy. The country waited with anxiety news of the discovery and de- struction of the Spanish fleet. Till this were done there could be no sense of security in any city along the Atlantic coast; no troops could be thrown into Cuba; prosecution of 1 He war against Spain depended upon the immediate success of our naval forces. Schley held the key to the situation. The first, the all-important thing to do was to find Cervera and smash or blockade him. It was a juncture demanding energetic action on the part of the American commander who had been entrusted with this responsibility. Not a day nor an hour was to be lost in carrying out his task. Schley's orders were to establish a blockade of Cienfuegos "with the least possible delay." It was believed Cervera was en route to that port. Sampson so believed; so did :Schley. Both knew the Spanish division had left Curacoa 16 on the 15th. Cienfuegos was the most natural, the most probable destination. From Curacoa to Cienfuegos it was six days' steaming at economical speed. That would bring the enemy to Cienfuegos about the- 21st. Schley left Key West the 19th, in the morn- ing. For him it was with reasonable expedition a run of 48 hours. Nothing more likely, therefore, than ar- rival of the enemy and of the Flying Squadron at Cienfuegos at about the same moment. With this fair prospect of an early engagement before him, the "Fighting Schley," sup- posed to be always eager for battle, steamed out of Key West, joyfully noting the parting signal of the Commander- in-Chief: "You are bound for Cienfuegos to bag the Span- iards." A few hours later, the same day, the Flying Squadron met and passed Capt. McCalla, in the Marblehead. Schley knew McCalla had just come from the port to which he (Schley) was bound, but he did not order McCalla to stop and come on board to give him whatever information he was in possession of. McCalla did not know whither Schley was bound, and under the regulations he signalled a request for permission to proceed, which was given 'him by the Commodore. As it turned out, McCalla did have informa- tion of value to Schley, but it was the latter's fault that he did not get it. Various explanations of this failure on Schley's part to secure the information McCalla had, were given before the court, but it is believed the true explana- tion is this: Schley knew McCalla had left Cienfuegos sev- eral days before Cervera could possibly have arrived there, and could therefore have no tidings of the enemy. It was news of the enemy Schley was now seeking — the enemy he was sent to find and to destroy. Hence he did not care to waste precious time inquiring into unimportant matters. THE GRIM REALITIES OF WAR. But next day Commodore Schley was apparently in a different mood. He was seeing things in a new light. Some- thing must have occurred to his mind during the silent watches of the night as he lay in his cabin thinking or" the task the Government had set him, and of the responsibility which had been placed upon him. On this day he was not in so much of a hurry. Now he wanted information, and was willing to take the time to get it. Meeting the Cincinnati, he 17 ordered Capt. Chester to board the flagship Brooklyn, and held the squadron an hour and a half for the interview. The evidence shows that Schley did not hope to learn any- thing from Chester concerning the whereabouts or movements of the enemy, or the situation at Cien- fuegos, because Chester had not been there, as Schley knew, and it was impossible that he could have any information of this character. The previous day Schley had failed to stop McCalla, who he knew had just come from Cienfuegos, and now he stopped Chester, who he knew had not been at Cienfuegos at all. These two facts, taken together and in connection with what followed, assume great significance. What was it Schley wanted to learn from Chester? The evidence was clear on this point. He wanted to learn where coal could be taken aboard his ships; where in this part of Cuba he could take coal from a collier. Here was the first of a long series of manifestations of the existence of a half-concealed something which may ex plain that which otherwise remains wholly inexplicable. Ordinarily an inquiry as to coaling possibilities would be regarded as commendable foresight. But consider this in- quiry at this time in connection with what occurred after- ward, and it is a psychological revelation. Note carefully the situation: After weeks of preparation the Flying Squadron had started on a campaign of unprecedented im- portance; it was outfitted for a long cruise; in all probability it was at that moment within 24 hours' steaming of the port it had been ordered to blockade, and where the enemy was expected to be. Before reaching his destination, before gain- ing any information of the foe he was sent to find, on the second day out from his base, with his bunkers virtually full of coal, and knowing that a collier was by this time on her way to join him at Cienfuegos, the commanding officer stopped to seek — what? Information concerning the possi- bilities of re-coaling. what was in schley's mind? What had come over the spirit of his dreams? That some change had occurred in his view of the situation is obvious enough. With the utmost friendliness to Schley, we must try to ascertain what was his attitude of mind. In our search for the truth we must try to put ourselves in his place, to feel the weight of the same responsibilities which 2 18 rested heavily upon him, to learn if we can why he did or did not do certain things. Beginning with this day and continu- ing as long as he was in independent command, he was -actuated by some motive, some thought, some idea, which led him to do things which he was not expected to do, to leave undone things which he was counted upon to do. Otherwise his course would not have been so abnormal as to' lead to the censure which was afterward passed upon him. If we can discover what this motive, this idea, this thought was, we may have a key to all of his conduct that proved to be a surprise and disappointment to his friends and to the Government. The difference between his mental attitude the first day out from Key West and his mental attitude the second day out is the first thing that attracts our attention. What was the cause of it? It could not have been discon- tent with his assignment, or fear that he had been sent off on a wild-goose chase to the south coast, while Sampson and Chadwick were bagging the game on the north coast, be- cause Schley himself testified that he expected to find the enemy at Cienfuegos. Knowing this expectation on his part, and taking into account his character, or supposed character, as a dashing, fighting officer, one would think that this chance to engage the foe at Cienfuegos, or to catch them somewhere on the south coast and give them batfle, would have filled him with delight; that he would have lost no time in getting to his destination and in gaining informa- tion as to the whereabouts of the enemy; that if they were not found there he would learn and report that fact as quickly as possible, and ask authority to go elsewhere in search of them. One would think, under the circumstances, that Schley's attitude would have been one of eagerness and his action one of energy; that if there were going to be any taking of chances, they would be found in the direction of getting at the foe, not in getting away from them. Had this proved to be the case the inquiry about coaling places which Schley made the second day out from his base would have had no significance whatever. PREVAILING APPREHENSION OF THE SPANISH FLEET. But such was not the case. And when we seek the expla- nation, we are offered a theory by Schley's naval associates. Their theory may be ill or well founded. It may be unjust to Schley, or it may throw light upon the situation. For the 19 «ake of a clearer understanding of the case, let us consider this theory. We do not need to adopt it, and we reserve the right to reject it. First, let us test it by the facts; let us see if the facts support it. In this way we may arrive at the truth; and the truth, whether for or against him, is what we seek. This naval theory, then, this theory which we are asked to consider as a working basis merely, is that the explana- tion of Commodore Schley's conduct is to be found in a condition which was not brought out before the court of inquiry, and which in the nature of things could not have been brought out there. It existed in Schley's mind, and it consisted of apprehension of the consequences of a meet- ing with the Spanish fleet. It was not personal or physical cowardice — that may be dismissed at once. Schley never lacked physical courage; he was not afraid for himself. His whole career refutes any such theory as that. But there are two sorts of courage — physical and moral. In some few individuals they are found in combination. In many indi- viduals, one, the latter, is lacking. Hence the theory has been advanced that within 30 hours after leaving Key West, and being forced to rely upon himself, to assume the full responsibility of command in a great crisis, Schley began to waver and to fear, to magnify dangers, to conjure up dis- aster. The naval service and every service contains such men — brave even to rashness physically, splendid command- ers when leaning upon a superior who carries the responsi- bility, but weak and irresolute when compelled to stand alone. What Schley now began to fear, the apprehension which entered his mind and grew as the cause of it be- came less and less distant, was that his squadron was over- matched by that of Cervera; that the result of a meeting between his ships and the four formidable cruisers of the enemy and the three dreaded destroyers might be disaster to the American force. capt. clark's fine moral courage. Whether or not this apprehension was founded in sound judgment and prudent consideration is not the question be- fore us. We are trying to test the accuracy of the theory. The question is, did the apprehension exist, and is it the true explanation of Schley's unexpected performance? We 20 know now that there was no basis for it in fact — that the Spanish division was greatly overrated, both in popular im- agination and in naval estimation. We also know that this apprehension did not exist in some other minds; that at least one commander, who was in a position far more critical than that which Schley found himself in, did not flinch a hair's breadth. About this time Capt. Clark in the Oregon was coming up the South American coast through the Car- ibbean Sea, in hourly expectation of meeting Cervera's ships. Clark was not afraid to meet them. In fact, he was rather anxious for the chance to engage them, single-handed. For days and nights the Oregon was kept cleared for action. And what was it Clark had decided to do in case the Ar- mada were encountered? He intended to turn and run away for the purpose of drawing the hostile fleet after him. He counted upon this ruse to tempt the enemy into a long stern chase; and then when the hostile ships were spread out in single file at some dstances apart, due to their differing speeds, the mighty Oregon was to be turned back on the trail, engaging first the leader and then the others, one by one. May 9, ten days before Schley left Key West with his Flying Squadron, Clark telegraphed from Bahia, Brazil, to Washington : "The Oregon could steam 14 knots for hours, and in a running fight might beat off and even cripple the Spanish fleet." In view of subsequent events there is little doubt that in case of a meeting this modest statement would have been made good, and that the Oregon, single-handed, would have proved able to take care of herself against the whole of Cervera's squadron. Commodore Schley did not know then what we know now as to the weakness of the Spanish ships and their gunnery. Neither did Capt. Clark. With this view of the qualities of the two men before us, the question comes naturally to the mind. What would Schley have done had he been in Clark's place? What would Clark have done now and later had he been in command of the Flying Squadron? THE "TERRIBLE SPANISH ARMADA." The theory is that Schley permitted his mind to be too- much affected by the many exaggerated reports which were in circulation as to the prowess of the Spanish division. It was said to be another terrible Spanish Armada. It was strong enough to sweep the seas. The destroyers alone might 21 be able to sink the wfhole American fleet. It is claimed Schley had begun to think of these things; that he had be- gun to feel the weight of the responsibility which rested upon him. It was indeed a serious responsibility, and it is not surprising that Commodore Schley felt the burden of it. For the first time in the history of the American Navy, mod- ern steel ships armed with high-power guns were to meet their equals in combat, and in the opinion of many officers the Spanish fleet was superior to the American in offensive and defensive power, especially with those much-talked-of and greatly dreaded destroyers thrown in on the Spanish side. Simultaneously with his appreciation of these grim realities came a change in Schley's view of the immediate future; and about this time was born his anxiety concern- ing the coal supply of his ships, before that had become a practical question. Schley went on to Cienfuegos — not with "the least possi- ble delay," but rather slowly, so slowly that the Iowa, which left Key West 30 hours after he did, arrived there only seven hours later. We must now inquire if at Cienfuegos Schley acted like a man who was anxious to find and engage the enemy. The evidence fully supports the finding of the court. He remained there 48 hours without making an earnest ef- fort to learn whether Cervera was there or not. He dis- played no energy of any sort. He disregarded signals which he saw on shore, and which must have conveyed some sug- gestion to his mind. He failed to take advantage of the in- formation given him by the McCalla memorandum as to the location of the friendly Cubans with whom McCalla had con- ferred, and who knew everything that was going on in the town. He neglected to send a boat ashore to gain informa- tion. All day the 22d, all day the 23d he did nothing. He took none of the obvious actions which a commander of zeal ^nd energy would have taken. His excuses are that he did not have the McCalla secret signals; but why did he not initiate communication on his own account, as McCalla had had to do in the first place? Again, the surf was too high for sending boats ashore; but he never tried it, and only saw the surf from a distance at sea. Once more, he thought the Spaniards were patrolling the coast, and he did not want to risk men by an attempt to land; but why could he not have sent in a gunboat to cover the landing? Who ever heard of war without some risks? And in this instance is it not 22 true that the importance of the information sought fully jus- tified the most aggressive and even hazardous means of ob- taining it? While off this same port a week earlier, McCalla had not only communicated with the insurgents on land, but had sent a launch to within a few yards of the shore to cut a cable, and the launch was fired on by the Spanish and several men killed or wounded. If this were worth doing for the sake of cutting a cable — and McCalla was praised for his energy — was not something like it worth doing for the sake of securing the all-important information as to whether or not the foe were in that port? It has been claimed in Schley's behalf that he did make an effort to learn if Cervera was in port by permitting the Brit- ish steamer Adula to go in under promise to come out the next day with information. The Adula did not come out. No one could expect that she would. The Spanish authori- ties of that port saw the the American squadron on blockade duty outside, hovering around an empty harbor. Cervera was not there, but as long as the Americans were wasting their time in this fruitless task the Spanish fleet was free to do as it liked, wherever it was. It was the proper part of the Spanish authorities in Cienfuegos to keep Schley there as long as possible. They must have laughed in their sleeves as they saw the great Yankee squadron lined up to such small purpose. Naturally, they would not permit the British ship to go out to give the American commander such valuable information. It must ever remain a matter of surprise to naval officers the world over that Schley could have relied upon such a device as this for gaining informa- tion of that importance to his Government — a device which was wholly under the control of the enemy. CONSTANT WORRYING ABOUT COAL. The truth appears to be that all this time Commodore Schley was laboring under that strange idea which we have already had reason to suspect had taken possession of his mind. That his mind was in an abnormal condition appears from everything he said and did, as well as from the things he failed to do. Just what this idea was soon develops with greater clearness. It was anxiety about coal and the prob- able need of a return to Key West. Whether or not appre- hension of the consequences of an engagement with the Spanish fleet gave rise to the anxiety about coal or an actual 23 shortage of coal gave rise to an apprehension as to the re- sults of an engagement, the reader will have to determine for himself as the evidence on these points is more carefully developed later on. But the fact is indisputable that this idea of a short coal supply and of the advisability of a return to Key West for new supplies occupied from first to last a prominent place in Schley's mind. It runs all through the story of the campaign. We get the first glimpse of it in his anxiety about coaling on the 20th, the day after he left the home port. We get our next glimpse of it in the early morn- ing of the 23d, when Lieut. Hood placed in Schley's hands important dispatches with which he had been sent in urgent haste from Havana. On reading these dispatches Schley turned to Hood and said: "Sampson wishes me to go to Santiago. J cannot do it." Hood told Schley that Sampson certainly expected him to get away at once, and that the information concerning the enemy's presence at Santiago was considered definite. But Schley explained why he was unable to do as he was ordered : "My ships all want coal." In other words, he was four days out from his base, his bunkers were nearly full of coal, a collier with four thousand tons aboard was at that moment in sight from his flag-ship; he was ordered to steam one day to the eastward to the point where the foe was officially reported to be, and hia answer is: "I cannot do it. My ships all want coal." A RELUCTANT START FOR SANTIAGO. On the morning of the 24th McCalla arrived in the Marble- head and at once ascertained that Cervera was not at Cien- fuegos. This he did by using the same information which Schley had had in his possession 24 hours. Up to this time- one of Schley's reasons for not going on to Santiago was that he was not satisfied Cervera was not at Cienfuegos. But now that he knew definitely the enemy was not there, and had information from his Government as to where the enemy was and orders to go there after him, Schley's first thought was not of an immediate start for the spot where he had reason to believe the foe were sure to be found. In the very interview in which McCalla reported Cervera was not at Cienfuegos Schley again complained of coaling difficulties, said ships could not be coaled at sea (in fact, one of his ships was at that moment taking coal from the collier), and was 24 in great doubt as to what he should do. He admitted his orders required him to go to Santiago, and McCalla, on read- ing these orders, said there was nothing to do but to obey them and go. But Schley was troubled about it. "If I re- turn to Key West I shall be court-martialed," he said to McCalla. Again that strange idea of going back to Key West. So troublesome was the problem whether he should obey orders and go after the enemy, one day's steaming to the eastward, or disobey orders and return to the naval base whence he had just come, two days to the northward, and be court-martialed for his pains, that he said to McCalla: "This is a matter I shall have to decide for myself. You may return to your ship." There is no need of rendering any harsh judgment upon Admiral Schley about this matter. The effort that is here being made is not to condemn him, but to ascertain why he adopted the course which he followed. That he was not in a frame of mind which made him eager to obey orders promptly, energetically, is apparent. Some rea- son for this must have existed, and he himself said on the stand, and in his official dispatches, that it was his anxiety about coal. The validity of this reason, the actual ground for this apprehension, which led to such unexpected conduct on his part, is obviously the point upon which the whole case turns. The question of the coal supply, and of the reasonableness of Commodore Schley's apprehensions concerning it, and actions under that apprehension, we must fully and fairly consider in the proper place, and for the present the reader is asked to re- serve judgment upon it. Still further evidence as to Schley's peculiar state of mind almost immediately comes to the surface. Though he had the day before said he could not go to Santiago, he now con- cluded to go. But still he was not consumed with eagerness. Though under orders to go to that port with all dispatch — orders which he had had in imperative form for 36 hours and in less urgent form for 50 hours — there was more hesitation. "I shall proceed tomorrow off Santiago," he telegraphed to the department. "I shall move eastward tomorrow," he wired Remey at Key West. Not to Santiago, but "off" that port, or simply "eastward" — significant words when considered in connection with subsequent events. Not today, but "tomorrow." Fortunately, he did actually get 25 away that evening. He went toward Santiago, but slowly, with obvious reluctance. Apparently he had no heart or en- thusiasm in this quest of the foe. He was undecided whether to go to Santiago or not. His dispatch of the 24th shows that he thought of going to the Mole or some other spot on the Haytien coast. One thing seems certain, and this is that he did not for one moment forget his alleged short coal supply and his favorite plan of action, the pro- posed return to Key West. The Flying Squadron steamed slowly eastward, making about seven knots. Schley says the smaller vessels delayed him; that he was responsible for the entire squadron, and could not leave any part of it behind, to overtake him a few hours later, because of the risk which they would incur of being captured by the enemy. Yet, when within 40 miles of Santiago, he ordered one of these small vessels, the Eagle, to go to Port Antonio alone, for coal, notwithstanding the appeal of her commander to be permitted to remain with the squadron, and notwithstanding that this threw her directly into the greatest danger of meeting the enemy in case Cer- vera's squadron should have been delayed in its approach to the Cuban coast. A QUICK RETREAT FROM SANTIAGO. Having arrived at length within about 25 miles of Santi- ago — too far to blockade, too far to prevent escape of the enemy or even their detection in thick weather or at night — Schley met the scouts. The shortness of his stay "off" San- tiago and his quick turn-about westward, form one of the strangest episodes of this strange campaign. Almost the first words Schley uttered to Sigsbee when that officer boarded the flag-ship were that he w r as going back to Key West — al- ways to Key West. Here was the commander of the squadron sent after the enemy, informed twice by his Government that the enemy was in Santiago, informed by Sigsbee that a collier from Curacoa, apparently intended for the foe, had a day or two before been captured while making in for that port; ordered twice over to blockade Santiago, lying now within two hours' steaming of that harbor, and yet almost in a twinkling he announced his intention to go back to Key West, 800 miles away. Schley's best friends have admitted that this start back for the home port was an error. Naval officers condemn it 26 as a blunder unparalleled in the history of the American*. Navy. They point out that it was not alone the conditions- as Schley claimed to find them that led him to start this, retreat ; he had previously decided that he did not want to* go on to Santiago at all. Before leaving Cienfuegos, and be- fore he knew Cervera was not at that port, he had said: "I cannot do it," to-wit, go on to Santiago. After learning Cer- vera was not there his first thought was of the impossibility of going to Santiago, of his inability to blockade, and of the- plan to go back to Key West; but he soon telegraphed the Government that he should go "off" Santiago, thence to the Mole, "to coal in smooth water." On arriving "off" Santiago he failed to get any positive information as to whether the enemy was or was not there. Hence his mission was unful- filled, his orders were unobeyed. He did receive, however,, strong circumstantial evidence that the enemy was there. He had now received for the second time dispatches from the Government to the effect that the enemy was in that port. He had positive orders to go there and blockade the foe. It would seem that a careful, zealous officer, able to- judge rationally the conditions by which he was surrounded and desirous of obeying his orders to the best of his ability,, would have said to himself, even if he doubted the accuracy of the Government's information : "I cannot disobey my or- ders without first making sure that the Navy Department is mistaken and the enemy are not there. Therefore I will take- the most energetic steps to learn the truth before starting for the home port to coal." But he did not do this. He declined to use a few hours of time in steaming up to Santiago harbor to make a personal investigation for him- self. He gave no consideration to the strong circumstantial evidence contained in the capture of the collier bound in for the Spanish fleet. He construed Sigsbee's statement that he had not seen the enemy into proof that the enemy was not there. He listened with what looks like credulous eagerness to the statements of the pilot Nunez, who thought the Spaniards were not there because he had never seen such large ships in the harbor! He failed to consult his fleet captains, men of experience and ability. He overlooked Sampson's order to sound fishermen and to try to get into- communication with the insurgents on shore. At the very moment he was conversing with Sigsbee as to the where- abouts of the enemy, the Flying Squadron was forming for the voyage back to Key West. 27 CONTROLLED BY A PRECONCEIVED IDEA. From this plain and unvarnished statement of facts it i» a reasonable supposition that at this critical juncture Schley's mind was governed far less by his orders and by the situation as he found it than by his preconceived idea that the wisest course for him would be to return to the home port as soon as possible. No other explanation can be made. As to whether the state of his coal supply, and the conditions of weather bearing upon the practicability of re-coaling were such as to justify this idea and the move- ment based upon it, is another question. That the idea was uppermost in his mind, that it controlled him, that it shut out such other considerations as his orders and the efforts which would naturally be expected of any squadron com- mander in such an emergency, that it led him to listen eagerly to everything he wanted to hear and to close his ears and his mind to everything else, is certain. He knew the Spanish ships were not at Cienfuegos. The next most prob- able place for them to be was at Santiago, where the Gov- ernment had advised him they were. If not at Santiago, where did Schley suppose they were? At Key West? The commander of the Flying Squadron forgot all about the plan which he himself had wired the Department 48 hours be- fore, to go to the Mole "to coal in smooth water." He was then distant from the Mole about 125 miles. To Key West it was 800 miles. Commodore Schley started neither for Santiago nor for the Mole, but at 8:30 o'clock on the evening of the 26th of May, then lying about 25 miles from the port which held the enemy, and to which he had been ordered with all dispatch, with coal enough in bunkers to have carried his fighting ships from more than one-half to all the way across the Atlantic Ocean, the sea then smooth and a collier full of coal lying alongside, signalled the Flying Squadron this most extraordinary order: "Destination Key West, via south coast of Cuba and Yucatan Channel, as soon as collier is ready; speed, nine knots." Commodore Schley not only started westward with his magnificent squadron, but he took with him all three of the scouts which had been stationed there. He took away from that port every one of the American ships — battleships, cruisers, scouts, dispatch boats, even the collier, partly dis- 28 abled, with four thousand tons of coal aboard — an old hulk good for nothing except to carry coal, and the coal in her worth only a few dollars at Key West, to which port she was now to be towed, but worth its weight in gold to the American people as an aid to the blockade and destruction of the Spanish fleet. For nearly 48 hours the gates of San- tiago were left unguarded and Cervera could have escaped with ease had he made the effort to do so. Steaming westward, Schley's progress was hampered by the accident to the collier which he was trying to tow all the way back to Key West. Had the collier been in good condition Schley would have been able to go much farther and it would have taken longer than till the next forenoon for Cotton to overtake him in the Harvard. Cotton might have missed the squadron altogether had the latter got well out to sea, and in that event Schley would doubtless have continued his voyage toward Key West, "speed nine knots," two knots faster, by the way, in running away from Santi- ago than he had made on his voyage from Cienfuegos to the port in which the enemy was lying. "it is to be regretted orders cannot be obeyed." The Harvard did overtake him the morning of the 27th. She delivered to Schley from the Government at Washing- ton the most urgent orders to go to Santiago, to blockade that port, to see to it that the enemy did not escape there- from without an engagement. Notwithstanding the positive character of these orders, Schley was not to be easily turned from the one purpose to which he had clung through all these days. For a week he had been trying to get back to Key West, and he did not propose to be baffled now by such a trifling thing as an order from his Government to go elsewhere after the foe. So he sat down and acknowledged receipt of orders and said to his Government that "it was to be regretted" he could not obey them for lack of coal and other reasons. In all the history of the American Navy, it is safe to say, no such dispatch was ever before written by the commander of a squadron to his Government. While the Naval Board and the sadly worried President of the United States were devising means of repairing the blunder of Schley's retreat from "off" Santiago, that officer continued to steam 25 miles farther to the westward on his ^way to Key West. When he had made about 50 miles alto- 29 gether, two causes brought about another change of plan. One was a slight change of the sea, which smoothed down from nearly calm to a dead calm, so that the impossibility of coaling could not be longer urged. The other was the pres- ence of a hard-headed officer, Capt. Cook, of the Brooklyn, who, it is well known, though he was too loyal to Schley to so testify before the court of inquiry, finally succeeded in convincing his superior officer that this sort of thing would never do and that he would have to go back to Santiago in accordance with his orders. So, in the afternoon of the 28th, reluctantly giving up his favorite plan, Schley proceeded to do that which the previous day he had telegraphed his Gov- ernment it was impossible for him to do, and turned his ships toward Santiago, arriving there at 8 o'clock in the evening of that day. At last the so-called Flying Squadron had been brought to its work; at last it was blockading the enemy. For four days and a half after the Government and the Commander- in-Chief had counted upon its being at this post of duty it had been pursuing a devious and uncertain course, back- ing and filling, and causing the Government the most intense anxiety. It was at last at Santiago, but it had consumed exactly 96 hours in making the run from Cienfuegos, which should have been made in 30 hours at economical steaming. WAS THE CENSURE JUSTIFIED? What we are trying to ascertain is whether or not Schley's conduct while in independent command of the Flying Squad- ron was such as to justify the censure of Admiral Sampson as "reprehensible," of Secretary Long, with the approval of President McKinley, as "lacking in steadiness and in push and in obedience to orders," and of the court of inquiry as "characterized by vacillation, dilatoriness and lack of en- terprise." Therefore, let us summarize the facts: 1. Important as it was to know as early as possible if Cervera was at Cienfuegos, Schley made no proper effort to learn. 2. He remained at Cienfuegos after receipt of orders to go to Santiago, pleading that he was not satisfied the en- emy were not at Cienfuegos. Still he made no proper efforts to learn if they were there. 3. Before learning that Cervera was not at Cienfuegos, he said he could not obey his orders and go to Santiago, be- cause of lack of coal. 30 4. The very moment he learned Cervera was not at Cien- f uegos he talked of going back to Key West. 5. For four days the Government had been awaiting definite information from Schley as to whether or not the enemy were at this port. On learning from McCalla this very important fact, Schley's first telegram to the Govern- ment began, not with the news about Cervera, but with this statement: "Coaling off Cienf uegos is uncertain." Then fol- low several sentences about coaling difficulties, including a request for more colliers, etc., and near the close of the dis- patch these words: "I have ascertained the Spanish fleet is not here. I will move eastward tomorrow. On account of want of coal I cannot blockade." The wording of this dispatch gives an insight to the condition of his mind. His anxiety about coal was much greater than his anxiety to learn the whereabouts of the enemy. The former filled the bulk of the dispatch; the latter, the fact which his Government had been seeking for four days, and which was the turning- point of 'the whole campaign against Spain, he mentioned in a manner that was quite incidental. 6. He moved eastward, slowly, detaining the Squadron for the Eagle (not a part of his fighting force) on the ground that he must keep his Squadron as a unit. Yet, on the 26th he sent the Eagle off alone, thus destroying the unity of his Squadron. When he sent her away, against the protest of her commander, the weather was moderating, the Eagle had ■enough coal for three days' steaming, and Santiago was only four or five hours distant. 7. Instead of obeying orders and going to Santiago, he stopped 25 miles off that port, and without receiving or mak- ing any effort to secure positive information, turned back for the home port, going neither to Santiago in compliance with his orders nor to the Mole, as he had previously inti- mated to the Government he would do. 8. The next day, while retreating from the presence of the enemy, he received more positive orders to go to Santi- ago, where the enemy was, but replied that he could not obey on account of lack of coal. He further replied that he could not go to any one of the near-by ports to coal, as the Government had suggested in the dispatch to which he was now replying, notwithstanding the fact that he had him- self proposed three days before to go to the Mole to "coal in smooth water," and that he was now within 125 miles of 31 the Mole, whereas when he proposed to go thither he was 440 miles away. 9. Despite the urgency of these orders, he started once more for Key West on the assumption that it was impossible for him to go to Santiago and blockade, and then, with the conditions practically unchanged, save that he had a little less coal, he decided to do that which he had said was im- possible, and go to Santiago and blockade. These are the facts upon which the court of inquiry based its findings. In making up its judgment upon those find- ings, the public must bear in mind that in the eyes of a pro- fessional court bravery in battle is not permitted to obscure a previous failure to meet and bear a responsibility and obey orders as a good naval officer should do. The best test is this: Suppose Schley had not taken part in the battle at all. Would, then, his conduct while in independent com- mand have been subjected to the just censure of his super- iors and the Government? Or, suppose an officer in inde- pendent command had performed every duty expected of him, and then when the battle came on had shown coward- ice in the face of the enemy. Would his previous good con- duct have excused his collapse in the supreme moment? Either method of judging shows clearly that the two things are distinct and apart; that a good naval officer is expected to do his duty and to obey orders both before and during a battle. He cannot fail in either and preserve his status; good conduct in one respect cannot excuse failure in the other. As everyone can understand, it is easy to be brave in battle, in the presence of one's fellow-officers or ship- mates; that such a thing as cowardice is almost unknown to all the navies of the world. The mettle of a naval officer, or of any other military commander, is best tested by the manner in which he bears his responsibilities, disposes his forces, obeys his orders, preserves discipline, retains the re- spect and confidence of his subordinates, meets conditions as they arise, and shows that he is master of himself, of his men, and of the situation. These are the qualities which make great officers; the lack of them great failures. THE QUESTION OF THE COAL SUPPLY. We come now to Admiral Schley's justification of his conduct. It is apparent that in any just and fair considera- 32 tion of the case almost everything depends upon the actual facts concerning the coal supply. Commodore Schley's anx- iety about coal began very early, as we have seen. We saw it first on the 20 th, the day after he left the home port for his cruise. The anxiety never left his mind. It continued from that day on till the 27th, when he sent his "regret can- not obey orders'' dispatch. Lack of coal, difficulty of re- coaling, need of more colliers, the imperative necessity of returning to Key West for new supplies, creep out con- stantly in his dispatches, in his conversations, in what he did, what he did not do, and what he thought of doing. As we have said, the truth about the coal supply is the turning point of the whole case. If the flying Squadron was ac- tually short of coal, if the difficulties of recoaling under the- conditions which existed were, real difficulties not to be sur- mounted, if, in short, Schley's assumptions and representa- tions concerning the coal supply were founded on facts, then his defense is valid. He must be acquitted by public- opinion, and the naval court must be reversed. Conversely, if his assumptions were false, if his representations were in error, if his actions and failures to act were predicated upon a groundless anxiety as to coal, his defense wholly fails. By this test he must stand or fall. Two views of the coal question are held, and they are dia- metrically opposite views, as follows : 1. The Schley view, that the coal supply was short, that the difficulties in the way of re-coaling were serious and not to be overcome, and that these together justified a prudent commander in the movements and representations for which Schley is responsible. 2. The anti-Schley view, that the coal supply of the fight- ing ships was ample, that there were no unusual or insur- mountable difficulties in the way of re-coaling them from a collier, that even if it had been impossible to re-coal from the collier (which it was not) he should still have attempted to obey orders and should have gone to a near-by port for recoaling instead of starting back to Key West; that his fear about coal and his movements and representations based thereon were never actual, real and sincere, but were excuses conjured up to justify a proposed return to Key West; and, finally, that the proposed return to Key West was not a product of the short coal supply, but a result of the fear which had taken possession of the Commodore that if he met the Spanish fleet he should be defeated. 33 r Which of these views is the correct one? So import-ant is the answer to this question that we ask the reader again to suspend judgment till he has learned the facts, and w r e beg him in justice to Admiral Schley to analyze these facts with the greatest care. The Flying Squadron left Key West May If), with bunkers virtually full. There had been ample time for preparation, and it was expected the cruise would be a long one. Before leading Sehley was informed that the collier Merrimac, with a great cargo of coal, would be sent immediately to join him at Cienfuegos, and she arrived there tin 1 day after he did. The Iowa, which was also sent after him, left Key West with her coal supply about one-eighth short of full capacity. AS TO HECOALIXG PROM THE COLLIER. On the 20th Schley began making inquiries as to where he might recoal. On the 23d, off Cienfuegos, Schley said lie could not go to Santiago, as ordered, on account of lack of coal and the impossibility of re-coaling. The court of inquiry unan- imously finds from the evidence that on that day "the Iowa, Castine and Dupont coaled at Cienfuegos from the collier Merrimac." On the 24th, still off Cienfuegos, and now knowing Cer- vera was not there, Schley said to MeCalla he could not go to Santiago on account of short coal supply and difficulty of coaling ships at sea, and thought of returning to Key West even if he were court-martialed for it. This day he tele- graphed the Government: "Coaling off Cienfuegos very uncertain. One collier not sufficient for the work; need two or more colliers. I will move eastward tomorrow. On ac- count of short coal supply cannot blockade'' (at Santiago). The court of inquiry unanimously finds from the records and evidence 'the Massachusetts and Castine coated this day. The Texas was ordered to coal, but the order was re- voked, as the Massachusetts was lying alongside the collier. The Texas asked permission to coal May 23d, and was re- fused by Commodore Schley, who ordered the Iowa to coal first and the Massachusetts second." May 25 the Flying Squadron was en route to ''off'' San- tiago. May 20, at 8:30 in the evening. Schley ordered the Squad- 34 ron to return to Key West, his reasons, as given by himself the next day, being short coal supply and impossibility of recoaling on account of bad weather. The court of inquiry unanimously finds from the evidence: /'The conditions of wind, weather and sea, from noon on May 26th to June 1st,- were favorable for taking coal from a collier at sea off San- tiago/' May 27th, Schley being then on his retreat toward Key West, received orders to go to Santiago, but replied that it was impossible; that he greatly regretted he could not obey orders; that he had been "absolutely unable to coal the Texas, Marblehead, Vixen and Brooklyn from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West," etc. On this day the court of inquiry unanimously finds conditions of wind, weather and sea favorable to coal- ing, as they had been since noon of the previous day, or eight hours and a half before the retreat was ordered, and 24 hours before this "regret cannot obey orders" dispatch was sent by Schley. It should be noted that all these facts about coal supply, etc., come not from the testimony, but from the official rec- ords and logs of the ships, made daily. When he sent his "regret cannot obey orders'- dispatch Schley was in his ninth day out from Key West. This was his sixth day on the Cuban coast. He had had a collier with him five days. Ships were actually coaled from this collier on three days, the 23d, 24th and 27th. The evidence shows ships could have been coaled the 20th, after noon, before the retreat to Key West was ordered. To show that the difficul- ties of re-coaling were not insurmountable, or even unusual, the court unanimously point out the days on which coaling was carried on up to the sending of the "cannot obey orders'' dispatch, and then call attention to what occurred immedi- ately afterward. Says the court : "The Texas and Marblehead coaled at sea off Santiago from colliers May 27 and 28; the Massaehusetts and Vixen on May 29; the Brooklyn and Iowa on May 30; the Brooklyn, Texas and Marble- head on May 31." In other words, irrespective of the amount of coal then ^n bunkers, new supplies were taken from the collier. Such supplies were taken on two days before the "cannot obey orders'' dispatch was written; they were taken the day the dispatch was written; they were taken each of the four fol- lowing days. THE AMOUNT OF COAL ON HAND. Now. what were the supplies on hand? The coal records of warships are always made up by the chief engineers at noen every day. Hence the coal Schley's ships had is not a matter of testimony, but of written, official records. Schley sent his /'cannot obey orders'' dispatch at noon, May 27. The court unanimously finds that — "The coal supply of the vessels of the Flying Squadron at noon on May 27 was sufficient to have enabled them to steam at 10 knots per hour—the Brooklyn for 11% days; Iowa, 7% days; Massachu- setts. 10 days; Texas, G% days; Marblehead, 3%. days; Vixen, ll^j day*." Commodore Schley was ordered to blockade Santiago. The Government had informed him it would send more coal to the Mole, a near-by port. He knew that as soon as the en- emy were found and blockaded in Santiago Sampson's fleet would be sent to reinforce him, and that this would require only four or five days. Schley sent word at noon, May 27, he could not obey orders and blockade on account of short coal supply. The court unanimously finds that at that time "The coal supply of the Flying Squadron was sufficient to have remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba: The Brooklyn, for 26 days; Iowa, 10 days; Massachusetts, 20 days; Texas, 10 days; Marblehead. 5 days; Vixen, 23 days. And then steam to Gonaives, Haiti, or to Cape Cruz, Cuba, to coal." The court further says: "At that date the Flying Squadron was accompanied by the collier Merrlmac, containing 4,350 tons of coal. The amount of coal required to completely fill the coal bunkers of all the vessels of the Flying Squadron on this same date was 2,750 tons." During the progress of the inquiry before the naval court, when these facts about the coal supply were brought for- ward with impressive forcef illness, the attorneys for Ad- miral Schley contended that the number of miles or days ships could steam at 10 knots per hour, and the number of days they could blockade with the coal they liad on hand, were not true tests; that it might have been necessary for Commodore Schley to chase the enemy at full speed; that after chasing and giving battle, he must have enough coal to get back home w r ith; and that a prudent commander would think of these things and take into consideration whether or not his coal supply was sufficient for such a purpose. No evidence was adduced to show that Commodore Schley thought of this contingency at the time he was off the Southern coast of Cuba. It lias never been shown that he did actually have this feature ui the case in mind. If he did have it in mind, he failed to suggest it, directly or indirectly, in any of his dispatches, reports, or conversations. The first anyone ever heard of the need of having on hand enough coal to chase the enemy was during the inquiry be- fore the court and after the coal records with their showing of steaming power and blockade strength had been brought forward by the Judge- Advocate. In fact, probably no one, previous to this moment in court, ever thought of such a thing as the possibility of being com- pelled to chase the enemy. There was no probability that such a chase should be required. If Cervera was not in San- tiago, then Schley was not likely to meet him, for Schley proposed to return at once to Key West. If the enemy were encountered anywhere near Key West, then all the advan- tage of coal would be with the American fleet, because so much nearer to home ports. If (as was the case) Cervera was in Santiago, all Schley had to do was to blockade the narrow gate to the port, and then the enemy could not es- cape without an immediate engagement. COAL ENOUGH TO CHASE THE ENEMY. Nevertheless, the afterthought of the possibility of having need of enough coal to chase the enemy was taken into ac- count by the court. Experts from the Bureau of Steam Engineering made calculations. They assumed the Flying Squadron at Santiago. They assumed that the Squadron would then have to chase the enemy away from Santiago and after an engagement return to Santiago, and from San- tiago steam to Key West for new coal supplies, thus cover- ing the most unfavorable possible contingency. The ques- tion was, with the coal supply Schley had on hand at mid- night, May 26 (after he had begun his retreat and just before he sent his "cannot obey orders'' dispatch), how far could he chase and still reserve enough fuel to return to Santiago and from Santiago to Key West? The answer of the experts accepted as correct by the counsel fot Admiral Schley, was as follows: Hours— could i wer with reseru' us st.*tee discreditable to Navy otherwise. All naval and military movements depend upon it. >-,...< May 29— Schley to Long: Enemy in port. I have not sufficient coal. Sampson's squadron might relieve this one to coal at Gonaives. May 29— Long to Schley: Hold on at all hazards. r^u This condensed record of the official dispatches of that period needs no comment. WAS IMPORTANT INFORMATION WITHHELD FROM COMMODORE SCHLEY? This was one of the theories of the defense — this and the ■alleged ambiguity of the orders sent to Schley. Probably a great majority of the American people believe to this day that there was a "conspiracy" among naval officers to •deprive Schley of important information ; that he was left to wander around on the South Coast of Cuba in a perfect maze of misunderstanding and doubt, and that it-is not surprising he made some mistakes. What are the facts? Early May 19, Schley parted from Sampson at Key West. That very morning Cervera had entered Santiago. The evening of that day a friendly telegraph operator in the cable office at Havana reported to Washington the news of Cervera's arrival. President McKinley knew of the report before he went to bed that night. Sampson was informed the next morning. But he was at that time unable to give full credence to the news, and so he wrote to Schley that day to continue the blockade of Cienfuegos for the present. "If later it shall appear that the Spanish are certainly at Santiago," he added, "we will blockade them there in force." Schley received this on the 22d. Meanwhile Sampson had 54 heard again from the friendly telegraph operator, and he had better, but not conclusive, reasons for trusting the information. So he wrote again under date of 21st, 3 a. m. r "Spanish squadron probably at Santiago. If you are satis- fied they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all dispatch, but cautiously, to Santiago." This Schley received on the morning of the 23d. During the 21st Sampson moved from Key West over to Havana, and in the afternoon, being now in possession of information which convinced him Cervera was indeed at Santiago, he prepared and sent by Hood in the Hawk, under orders to make all possible haste to Cien- fuegos, a dispatch to Schley which read: "It is thought the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 a. m., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago a. in., May 24. It is thought the Spanish Squadron will still be at Santiago, having some repairs to make and coal to take. * * * It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there. If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your direction as much as possible." This last was the order which Hood handed Schley and concerning which Schley said : "Sampson wants me to go to Santiago; I cannot do it." But in his defense before the court of inquiry Schley claimed this "reach you before 2 a. m." order was not an order at all, only a memorandum, a part of the preceding order, which required him to go to Santiago only after he was satisfied the enemy were not at Cienfuegos. He also claimed the orders were "ambiguous." These were the dispatches which he handed to McCalla to read after the latter had learned that the enemy were not at that port, and about which Schley remarked that if he w r ent on to Santiago he should have trouble with his coal supply, while if he returned to Key West he would be court- martialed. In his letter to the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs Schley claimed the letter of Sampson telling him to continue the blockade of Cienfuegos for the present "accom- panied" the order to go to Santiago, which, according to Schley, "confused the situation and threw grave doubts over the location of the Spanish fleet." As a matter of fact, the dispatches not only bore different dates, but arrived on dif- ferent days, which is quite a different thing from "accom- 55 panying" and "throwing grave doubt." Schley has claimed that he was justified in disregarding the Hood order and in proceeding under the "if you are satisfied" letter. Yet he knew the Hood dispatch had been written off Havana 12 hours later than the other, which was sent from Key West early in the morning and which of course was superseded by the later order. schley's information at cienfuegos. There can be no doubt, therefore, that Schley had all the information as to the location of the Spanish fleet that the Government was able to give him, all it was in possession of, Naturally the Government could not at that time disclose to Schley or anyone else the source of its information. Samp- son's "if you are satisfied they are not there" was a perfectly proper qualification. Schley left Key West early in the morning of the 19th. His orders were to proceed "with the least possible delay." To Cienfuegos it was 519.5 miles, a run of 48 hours at the moderate, economical speed of 11 knots. Therefore, Schley should have been at Cienfuegos the morning of the 21st, as Sampson and the Government supposed he would be. He actually arrived the morning of the 22d. Sampson did not dream that Schley would permit one day to pass without learning if the enemy were there. Yet on the 22d Schley did nothing. On the 23d he did noth- ing, except to permit the Adula to go in, though he received in the morning the memorandum as to where the insurg- ents could be found, at the same place McCalla found them next day. When Sampson wrote, "if you are satisfied they are not at Cienfuegos," he naturally supposed, as any other commander in the world would have supposed, that by this time Schley had satisfied himself. Sampson had the right to assume that Schley had done his duty and had learned the truth at Cienfuegos immediately upon arrival; that he would be able to leave the morning of the 23d and be at Santiago the forenoon of the 24th. It was not absence of information or orders from his superior that kept Schley at Cienfuegos till the evening of the 24th and prevented his arrival at Santiago before the evening of the 29th. While on the witness stand Admiral Schley testified that he really thought the Spaniards war the enemy's dash into Havana. Yet he now claims that at the time he made this 59 retreat and formed this brilliant strategic plan he had received definite information the enemy were not at San- tiago. Then why, without receiving any further informa- tion, without any new reason for believing Cervera was at Santiago, did he abandon his brilliant strategic plan and return to a port which he then believed to be empty? Which of these versions is the correct one? The one made on the spot, when he was so eager to return to Key West, or those made later as a defense when it was found the first one could not stand the test of the facts? Not all of them can stand, for they are in direct conflict. A RAILWAY PARALLEL TO THE SCHLEY CASE. True, Commodore Schley did finally find the enemy at Santiago, five and one-half days after he should have done so had his performance been that of an energetic officer, had his judgment not been clouded by that strange, preconceived idea that he must return to Key West. It has been claimed in his behalf that his final location of the enemy clears him of all blame; that he only started to disobey orders, but did not actually disobey them; that he must be judged by results, and he did go to Santiago and did secure the infor- mation the Government wanted. But successful war is not usually waged in that way. Nor is any other great opera- tion requiring organization, discipline, obedience to orders. It has been said by an eminent authority that all military operations are in fact based on industrial operations. The organization of a navy, for instance, is not unlike that of a great railroad. Both are highgrade services, requiring men of fine intelligence, good training, nerve, judgment, zeal, obedience. Let us therefore have a railway parallel to the Schley case. ^ A locomotive engineer starts from the end of a division under written orders to proceed with all dispatch, but cau- tiously, to a certain station, where he is to stop and pass another train. He has not much more than begun his run till he starts worrying about his coal supply. The tender- carries the usual quantity, but for some reason he fears it will not suffice and talks often about going back to the end of the division whence he has just come for more coal. This continues till he has nearly reached the station he was ordered to; it is, in fact, within sight, but he here concludes he cannot make it, reverses his engine, and starts backing 60 in the other direction. While making his retrograde move- ment he is signalled by a telegraph operator and handed an additional and more urgent order to go on to the station for which he had originally set out. In this order he is informed that if he must have more coal he can get it at the next station, and that it is not necessary for him to run all the way back to the end of the division. He replies that it is much to be regretted he cannot obey orders, earnestly as he has striven, and that he must continue his backward course. While the company's officials are in a state of alarm and the train dispatcher is frantically telegraphing up and down the line in an effort to correct the blunder, avert disaster and -set traffic going again, the engineer backs some further distance toward the home base. He then suddenly con- cludes to turn about once more and go on to his meeting- point after all. He does so, and it turns out that his coal supply was ample and that all the representations he had made concerning it in his dispatches to the company were "inaccurate and misleading." Having finally reached the end of his run, five and a half hours late, he sets up as his defense that he did in the end get to the point he had been ordered to go to, that he delivered his train without acci- dent, that he secured results, that he only started to disobey orders, but did not actually disobey them. -In view of the fact that by good luck and prompt action -on the part of the train dispatcher no disaster occurred on the line, it is true that the engineer cannot be prosecuted for manslaughter. But how long will he remain in the serv- ice of the company? WHO WON THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO? Commodore Schley's last day of independent command was May 31. He had found the enemy's fleet in Santiago, where the Government had for a week been trying to con- vince him it was. The Colon, the most powerful of the Span- ish ships, lay near the mouth of the harbor. She could have been destroyed had Commodore Schley made a vigorous assault. But not yet was he in fighting mood. He made a feint attack, firing for a few minutes at a range so long that it was perfectly safe for both the attacked and the assail- ants, and then withdrew. For this failure — this last failure 61 while feeling the oppressive weight of the responsibility too* great for him to bear with composure and good judgment — he has been censured by the court. It is a pleasure to hasten on to the blockade and to the battle — to the battle in which Commodore Schley was him- self again, in which he showed that he had recovered his self-possession and his gallantry, and in which he played a conspicuous and admirable part, a part so admirable, indeed, as to put in every American's mind the wisTi that he had dis- played the same good qualities during that wretched week of worrying and wobbling while he was in command of the Flying Squadron. Admiral Sampson arrived the morning of June 1, and of course assumed command. He immediately instituted a blockade which, as the distinguished author of the "History of the Naval War of 1812," now the President of the United States, has said, will long serve as a model to the naval com- manders of the world. It was Sampson who had to carry the load. It was Sampson who had to spend the sleepless nights and worried days, with all the details of a great exec- utive post, all the burden of responsibility resting on his shoulders. It was Sampson who had to co-operate with the army, guard the transports, think of everything. It wa« Sampson who drew the net so tight about Cervera that escape was impossible. It was Sampson who held the searchlights to the harbor mouth night after night in order to force Cervera to come out by day. It was Sampson who continued this tireless vigil day after day and night after night — Sampson aided by thousands of gallant officers and men who still regard him as their leader and commander. THE ENEMY'S BLUNDERS SCHLEY'S LUCK. At last Cervera came out. He came on a bright morning, not just betwen dusk and dark, as everyone had supposed he would come, and as every experienced naval officer in the world knows would have given him the best chances of suc- cess, because at that hour the light is worst for the lookouts and gunners of ships lying out in the clearer light of the open sea, and correspondingly better for those within the shadow under the land. On emerging he did not scatter his ships with courses from southeast to southwest, as he should have done in order to gain the best chance of escape for one or two of them. Having decided to keep his Squadron 62 together, he did not steer the wisest course, which would have been to the southeast, directly toward the American transports lying off Siboney, trying "to run among them and frighten and scatter them like a covey of partridges, and using them to blanket the fire of the" American warships. Cervera did none of the things that good generalship indi- cated he should do. If Cervera had come out at dusk, if he had scattered his ships, or if he had steered southeast instead of southwest and west, Schley would not now be a popular hero. Samp- son would have had opportunity to participate in his own battle. But Cervera did none of these things. He selected all the courses which, as it turned out, were worst for him- self and best for Schley. He came out in broad daylight at .a moment when Sampson chanced to be some miles away to the eastward on duty for his Government. He kept his ships together. He steered, not southeast, where he had the best chance, but southwest and west. Had he gone the other way the New York would have been in the thick of the fight. As it was, the Brooklyn was in it. That ship acquitted herself nobly. For the first time in this Whole campaign, Schley seized his opportunity, justifying the analysis of those who have known him all his life, that in independent command he is a failure, while as commander of a single ship while responsibility rests upon other shoulders he is a good officer. It is no derogation of him to. say the Brooklyn would have done just as well had he not been there. He was there. He played his part splendidly. And Sampson was off to the •eastward. Of all the strange dispensations of the fates, this was one of the strangest; the man who had shown something which history must regard as akin to moral collapse when placed in a position of responsibility while seeking the enemy was now, in the hour of battle with that enemy, given the post of honor in the thick of the fight ; the man who had carried bravely and devotedly all the responsibility, who had planned the siege and planned the battle, who had done his duty with energy and skill from first to last, was by a freak of the fates several miles away, too far to fire a shot. In the eyes of the masses it could not be his battle because he was not actually in it. If after his masterly siege, his bull- dog tenacity at Vicksburg, Grant had chanced to be at an extreme edge of the battlefield on the day of the final assault 03 and the surrender, one wonders if the honor of the victory would have gone to some subordinate who had proven in- competent in the earlier part of the campaign, but who had shown himself brave under fire that day. SCHLEY A DIVISION COMMANDER. The contention that Commodore Schley was "in absolute command" and "won the battle of Santiago" cannot endure for a moment the test of critical examination. All the facts, all the records, all the authoritative opinions (with the sin- gle exception of that of Admiral Dewey), are to the contrary. The Navy Department, the President of the United States, the Court of Claims reviewed by the Supreme Court, have all held that Sampson was in command. In fact, it is not at all a debatable question. There is not even room for a dif- ference of opinion. It is as well settled as that Napoleon won at Austerlitz or Grant at Vicksburg or Richmond. June 2, the day after his arrival at Santiago, Admiral Sampson issued the following: ORDER OF BATTLE. U. S. Flagship New York, 1st Rate, Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 2, 1898. The fleet oft* Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the oper- ations against that port and the Spanish -squadron, as follows: First Squadron (under the personal command of the commander- in-chief)— New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter. Second Squadron (Commodore Schley) — Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas. Marblehead, Vixen. Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the Commander- in-chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keep- ing about six miles from the Morro in the daytime and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well inshore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape the ships must close in and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battle ships. This organization of the fleet explains the whole matter, Sampson was Commander-in-Chief and Schley was in com- mand of the second, or western, Squadron. The blockading line was so long and the number of vessels engaged so large that this was a prudent disposition of the force. When the battle came on it ranged over a great area and swept in the direction of the Commodore's station, whose position 64 was identical with that of a brigadier-general operating under a major-general commanding on land. The naval brigadier had been assigned to the western end of the battle- field, while the Commander-in-Chief held the eastern end. No one could foresee which way the enemy would make his sortie. The enemy chose the westward course and this threw the Commodore's western division into the thick of the fight. From the eastern division powerful reinforcements came, the Oregon, the Iowa, the Indiana, the first named continu- ing in the chase till the end. The Commander-in-Chief, who was at the extreme eastern edge of the battlefield, came up with the reserves, assumed direction, received the final sur- render, and was thus present at the engagement and in "absolute command," though he did not participate in the actual fighting. "under your command." Three days after the battle Commodore Schley submitted his official report to Admiral Sampson, the Commander-in- Chief. It was in part as follows (italics by the author): North Atlantic Fleet, Second Squadron, U. S. Flagship Brooklyn, Guantananio Bay, Cuba. July 6. 1898. Sir: I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observa- tion during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898. At 9:35 a. m. Admiral Cervera, with the Infanta Maria Teresa, Vascaya, Oquendo, Cristobal Colon, and two torpedo boat destroyers, came out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the Iowa that the enemy was coming out, but his movement had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the Vixen, in the blockading line. Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movement inward by your squadron and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 yards until the Yiscaya was destroyed, about 10:50 a. m. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them. About twenty to twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two vessels, thought to be the Teresa and Oquendo, and since ver- ified as such, took .fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced to run on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship. 65 Other extracts from Commodore Schley's report follow: The Oregon, having proved vastly faster than the other battle- ships, she and the Brooklyn, together with the Texas and another vessel, which proved to be your flagship, continued westward In pursuit of the Colon. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as were also the Texas and the Vixen. A little later the Colon, which had struck to the Brooklyn and the Oregon, was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your com- mand. This report was signed by Schley as ''Commanding Second Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet. To the Commander-in- Chief, U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station." A week later Commodore Schley telegraphed the Secre- tary of the Navy : Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts have attrib- uted victory almost entirely to me. Victory was secured by the force under the command Commander-in-Chief North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the honor is due. [Signed] SCHLEY. As to the surrender of the Colon, at 1 :30 in the afternoon, Schley testified before the court that as Cook was going aboard to receive the formal surrender he asked what the terms should be. "Unconditional surrender," Schley says he replied. "Those are matters the Commander-in-Chief must arrange. We can only receive unconditional surren- der." Schley then described how he had been signalling the New York, and that when she came up a little later he turned the Colon over to the Commander-in-Chief. In all this Schley was accurate and strictly within the line of offi- cial propriety. He was simply the second in command, across whose designated part of the battlefield the engage- ment had swept. He had fought and pursued the enemy. But the Commander-in-Chief was on the battlefield. He came to the final scene and received the surrender. On his way he passed most of the other ships of the fleet and gave directions to them. The battle began under his orders and ended under his personal supervision. His was the respon- sibility. He was present to meet any contingencies that might arise. That he did not actually participate in the battle; that he was not under fire and had no opportunity to fire upon the foe, cuts no figure whatever. He was there, the recognized and responsible commander. It was his battle. 66 THE LINE OF BATTLE. When the Spanish ships came out of the harbor mouth the American fleet was arranged in the arc of a circle. The blockading station of the New York was near the eastern end of the arc; that of the Brooklyn near the extreme west- ern end. They were so placed by the Commander-in-Chief because these were the fastest ships of the fleet, and fast ships were wanted at the flanks. Between the station of the New York and the Brooklyn there was a distance of about seven miles. They were barely within direct signalling dis- tance of one another, though of course they could always communicate by having signals repeated by intermediate ships, a common practice. It has been said over and over again that the New York was "out of sight" and "hull down under the horizon" when the enemy appeared. Admiral Schley testified that after the alarm was sounded he looked for the New York, but could not see her. In this he was probably correct, as the flagship was distant between 15 and 16 miles from the Brooklyn. But the New York was hot "out of sight" from the decks of those ships lying to the eastward. The flagship had left her blockading station at 8:50 in the morning to carry the Commander-in-Chief to Siboney, where he had an engagement of importance with the military commander. The distance the New York ran in the 45 minutes which elapsed between her start at 8:50 and 9:35, when the enemy came out, has been plotted from her engine revolutions at seven and one-half miles. From the decks of the New York the Spanish ships were seen coming one after another out of the harbor, and as some of the American ships lay between the New York and the mouth of the harbor, of course the New York was visible from these American ships. Further, it was established before the court of claims that the flag- ship was within signaling distance of a part of the American fleet. The New York immediately turned and ran with all speed toward the enemy. In less than two hours all the Spanish ships, the Colon excepted, had been destroyed or run ashore. The Colon was the most formidable, as well as the fleetest of the enemy's ships, and ehe was still trying to escape. As long as she was afloat and had not surrendered the battle was not won. At 1:15 o'clock the Colon pulled down her flag, surrendered, and ran for the shore. This was the end of the battle. 67 Where were the American ships? The Brooklyn was about three miles from the Colon, the Oregon about three and one- quarter miles, the Texas about seven miles, the New York about ten miles, the Vixen about nine miles. These distances are approximate, but are not disputed as to their relative accuracy. All the other American ships were far in the rear; they had, in fact, stopped by order of the Commander- in-Chief to attend to the beached or sinking Spanish vessels, 20 to 30 miles to the eastward. Before the Colon surren- dered and brought the battle to an end, the New York was seven miles from the Brooklyn, and of course nearer all the other American ships. At that moment the New York could have signalled every other American vessel participating in the chase. Of the five American ships chasing the Colon, the Brooklyn was nearer than the New York to one — the Oregon ; the New York was nearer than the Brooklyn to the other two, the Texas and the Vixen SCHLEY CLAIMS HE WAS UNDER SAMPSON'S ORDERS. If there was at any time any doubt of the ability of the New York to signal orders to the remainder of the fleet, it was at the very beginning of the battle. But it is not dis- puted by anyone that the engagement began under Admiral Sampson's standing orders to "close in and attack in har- bor entrance." After the court of inquiry had rendered its verdict Admiral Schley filed at the Navy Department his bill of exceptions thereto. Replying to the verdict of the «ourt that the Brooklyn had erred in opening the engage- ment with her port battery, thus leading to the famous' loop, Admiral Schley, through his counsel, says: The evidence in the case clearly establishing the fact that in the execution of the standing order to "close in and attack in har- bor entrance," it was impossible for the Brooklyn to open the engagement except with her port battery. This standing order was that of Admiral Sampson, and all the ships, including the Brooklyn, immediately proceeded to obey it, as much as if the New York were present and that order were flying from the masthead of the flagships of the Commander-in-Chief. This is proof from an unlooked- for source that Sampson was in command, notwithstanding Admiral Dewey's dictum. How could Schley be in, Abso- lute command" and yet in defense of his tactics plead that he was obeying the standing orders of another? ¥> 68 If Schley had regarded himself as being "in absolute com- mand" he would have felt at liberty to disregard the orders previously issued by another officer. During the battle he did not regard himself as being "in absolute command" of the entire fleet, but only in command of the Second Squad- ron. He did not at any time attempt to exercise supreme command. He has not claimed, either in his reports or in his testimony, to have exercised any other influence upon the battle than that which he exerted as ranking officer aboard the Brooklyn. He did at one time hoist the signal, "Follow the flag," the flag of the division commander, as he had a perfect right to do, and Capt. Clark of the Oregon saw it, but testified that he was at that time doing his best to follow the Spanish ships. The Brooklyn did once signal to the Oregon to use her 13-inch guns, but the Oregon people did not see the signal, and Clark testified that he did not fire in response to any signals, but when, after conference with his officers, he thought the proper time had come. The. -character of the battle was such that the captains fought it. Neither the movements nor the firing of any other ship were controlled by the commander of the Second Squadron. All he did was to fight the Brooklyn, and fight her well. He, together with Captain Cook and the other officers of that ship, is entitled to just that share of the credit of "winning the battle of Santiago" that the Brook- lyn is entitled to — no more, no less. Even had some change occurred in the progress of the engagement requiring orders- from Commodore Schley to other ships, and he had issued those orders, still he would not have been "in absolute com- mand," but simply the naval brigadier or division com- mander taking charge of the forces in his part of the field. A COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF NEED NOT FIGHT. It is not necessary that a Commander-in-Chief shall: actually participate in a battle fought under his command. It is not necessary that he should fire guns with his own hands, or kill men, or be in danger of being killed himself. In land battles commanders habitually and purposely re- main outside the zone of fire, directing their troops by order- lies or field telegraphs. In naval battles commanders are usually under fire, but that is because they must be aboard a ship, and it is the ship rather than the commander that goes into action. If it were possible for the commander to- remain outside the field of engagement and still be able to effect communication, that would be preferable because of the better view and clearer judgment. In most naval engagements the strategy, the direction, the command in the broad sense, are exercised beforehand. After the fight starts it is necessarily a battle of individual ships almost entirely, and the work of the Commander-in- Chief is finished with his prevision, his plans, his instruc- tions. This is so because of the difficulty, amounting often to an impossibility, of signalling orders in the thick of the fight, surrounded by smoke and perhaps separated by many miles from the other ships of the command. Such is always the case in a running fight between squadrons or fleets like the engagement at Santiago. The speed of ships varies, and they meet with varied fortune or ill-fortune. They become scattered over the sea. Communication is virtually impos- sible, and the captain of each ship is thrown on his own resources. If an unexpected change occurs in the progress or order of a battle, if it is necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to issue new orders, and possible for him to do so, of course his presence is of great importance. At Santiago it hap- pened the Spaniards were so easily overcome that new orders were not needed, and the course was plain before the ship captains of the American fleet. The captains fought the battle under the general orders given them by the Com- mander. If, however, the engagement had turned out dif- ferently; if the Spanish ships had made a better showing and one or more of the American vessels had been put out of action; if some of Cervera's Squadron had made a flank movement and attempted to run South — in any of these con- tingencies the Commander-in-Chief was at hand aboard the New York to give new orders to meet new conditions. He was in better position to do this, had it been necessary, than Schley was aboard the Brooklyn, as that cruiser was far to the westward, gallantly pursuing the fastest of the enemy's ships. Had ill-fortune occurred to the Brooklyn and the equally gallant Oregon, the New York was there as a reserve ship, ready to take up the chase and make sure that the Colon should not escape. As it turned out, of course, no such new orders or new disposition of ships was needed. The battle was a captains' battle — and an engi- neers' and gunners' battle. After it had started no com- 70 manding officer had anything of importance to do with it. Every movement would have been precisely the same, the result precisely the same, if both Sampson and Schley had been in — Key West. But the commanding officer was Samp- son, present, in command, but not under fire. THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S OPINION. In February, 1899, Theodore Roosevelt, then Governor of New T York, formerly Assistant Secretary of the Navy, a naval student and author of 'high reputation, delivered an address on the occasion of the presentation of a sword of honor to Commodore Philip, one of the heroes of the San- tiago fight. Governor Roosevelt said: "When a Commander-in-Chief, afloat or ashore, has done the best possible with his forces, then rightly the chief credit belongs to him, and wise and patriotic students of the Santiago sea campaign gladly pay their homage first to Admiral Sampson. It was Admiral Sampson who initiated and carried on the extraordinary blockade, letting up even less by night than by day, that will stand as the example for all similar blockades in the future. It was owing to the closeness and admirable management of the system of night blockades which he introduced, that Cervera's fleet was forced to come out by daylight. In other words, it was the success of his system which insured to the splendid sea captains under him the chance to show their prowess to the utmost possible advantage. But the actual fight, although Admiral Sampson was present and in command, was a captains' fight, and in this actual fighting each captain did his work according to his own best judgment." The only military authority in the world that has declared Schley was "in absolute command" at the battle of San- tiago and entitled to the credit of that victory as such com- mander, is Admiral Dewey. It is true he is high authority. The American people have great respect and admiration for him. But even this fine sailor has shown since he came ashore that it is possible for him to make a slip. Admiral Dewey's individual opinion was in contravention of all the facts, all the records. If Admiral Sampson was not in "absolute command" at Santiago, then a Commander- in-Chief loses his command and passes it over to a subor- dinate whenever the actual fighting sweeps to a part of the field where the subordinate happens to be, and the acci- dents of battle do not chance to bring the Commander-in- Chief under fire. If this rule is sound half the battles of history will have to be accorded to other victors than those who now stand credited with them. If this rule is sound 71 a Colonel who deploys his regiment over a wide range of ground, loses his command if the companies which are un- der the Lieutenant-Colonel have a skirmish with the enemy which the Colonel does not happen to take part in. The Lieutenant-Colonel becomes Colonel. What becomes of the actual Colonel? ADMIRAL DEWEY'S STRANGE DICTUM. After the verdict of the court of inquiry was rendered Secretary Long, in the course of his official duty, approved the finding and commended the court for failing to pass upon the question of command at the battle. "Indeed," he said, "the court could not with propriety have adopted any other course." This was truly spoken. While the court had author- ity to go into the question of command, it refused to do so. It refused to hear testimony on that point. Admiral Dewey himself, as President of the court, ruled, not once, but repeatedly, that Sampson's interests were not involved. Despite these facts, despite the fact that Admiral Sampson's request to be represented before the court was twice denied, Admiral Dewey presumed to decide the question — and with the usual luck of this sailor ashore, decided it wrongly. The truth, of course, is that Admiral Dewey was com- pelled by the overwhelming evidence and his regard for his oath to join Admirals Benham and Kamsay in censuring Commodore Schley. But he wished to soften the blow. He wanted to say something that would make the crushing defeat easier to bear. The result was an act of kindness to Schley. But was it kind to Dewey's own reputation as a naval officer? Even a Dewey ought not attempt to change history, or put the greatest* possible injustice upon one brother officer, against whose record no word has ever been spoken, for the sake of "letting down easily" another officer whom Dewey himself has found it necessary to censure. Even "the Hero of Manila Bay" has not prestige enough to enable him to set up a spurious "Hero of Santiago." 72 HAS THERE BEEN A CONSPIRACY AGAINST SCHLEY? Probably a great majority of the American people sin- cerely believe there has been a "naval conspiracy'' to pull down Admiral Schley; that a "Navy Department clique" has persecuted him and done its best to manufacture a case against him. What are the facts? Public opinion was greatly wrought up over the Santiago battle. First, there was much popular enthusiasm over the crushing defeat of Spain. Second, having in view Dewey's recent triumph at Manila, the public mind instinctively sought to place the laurel wreath upon the brow of another naval hero. Third, it was about to crown Sampson, the Commander-in-Chief, when press dispatches came pouring in with statements that Sampson did not take part in the bat- tle and that it was Schley's victory. Fourth, the public rushed at once to the other extreme, indignantly resented what it deemed an effort on Sampson's part to steal glory which belonged to another, and lifted Schley upon a pedes- tal of popular favor. In these few days of patriotic excitement and popular emotionalism were laid the foundations of the now cele- brated naval controversy. Sampson was savagely condemned for the officiar dispatch in which he announced to the Government the result of the engagement: The fleet under my command offers the nation as a Fourth of July present the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the Cristobal Colon, had run ashore 75 miles west of Santiago and hauled down her colors. The Infanta, Maria Teresa, Oquendo and Viscaya were forced ashore, burned and blown up within 20 miles of Santiago. The Furor and Pluton were destroyed within four miles of the port. SAMPSON. This telegram was speedily denounced as an attempt to deceive the people into believing Sampson had won the vic- tory; and here were the press dispatches saying Schley was in the thick of the fight and Sampson was not in it at all! If there is anything the American people will not endure, it is the purloining of honors. Popular indignation against Sampson ran high. In the excitement of the hour, the nat- ural reaction of that moment, the public feeling centered around Schlev as the hero of Santiago. 73 TRUTH IS MIGHTY IT WILL PREVAIL. But it is now time to look squarely at the facts. If the pendulum of opinion swung too far, it is time for it to swing back to a balance of common sense. Sampson's telegram was correct. It was in good form. It was not an attempt to deceive anyone. The fleet was under his command. Probably the thought that anyone would wish to give Schley credit for being "in absolute command" never entered Sampson's mind at that time. What was wrong with his dispatch? It gave a simple statement of facts. To the criticism which has been offered that in it he gave no credit to Schley, it can be said that the same is true of Clark. He mentioned none of the gallant officers who had aided him to the victory. It is unusual for naval com- manders to mention names in their first telegraphic announcement of an engagement. The results are what are wanted first. Honorable mention of officers comes later, when all the facts are known and weighed. Excepting the Fourth of July reference in Sampson's telegram, it was just like Dewey's telegram announcing the victory at Manila; both gave results only; neither mentioned meritorious offi- cers. Dewey's telegram follows: Manila, May 1. Secretary of the Navy, Washington: The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: [Here list of ships.] I shall destroy Oavite arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured. Few men were slightly wounded. DEWEY. In his official detailed report of the battle Admiral Samp- son justly gave much credit to the Brooklyn and the offi- cers who had directed her movements. In response to a request from the Navy Department, Admiral Sampson made recommendations concerning pro- motions of the various officers engaged in the battle. "With regard to Commodore Schley," he said, "I much prefer that the Department should decide his case. I am unwilling to fully express my own opinion. His conduct when he first assumed command on the south coast of Cuba, I assume to be as well known to the Department as to myself. This reprehensible conduct I cannot separate from his subse- quent conduct, and for this reason I ask you to do him ample justice on this occasion." 74 The meaning of this was that the Coinniander-in-Chief turned the case of his Second Squadron commander over to the Department to deal with, accompanying it with a request for "ample justice" to that officer. President McKinley and the Navy Department took up the question of what to do with Schley. It was discussed very earnestly. Two parties appeared. One favored a court-martial. The other advocated a dropping of the whole matter and the promotion of Com- modore Schley to be Rear- Admiral. They argued that inas- much as the Government had failed to recall or court-mar- tial Schley at the time his offenses were committed, it should not do so now, after he had in part redeemed himself by his admirable conduct in the battle. President McKinley adopted this view and concluded to do Schley "ample jus- tice." SCHLEY WAS OFFICIALLY PARDONED. Consequently, in December, 1898, the President proposed to advance Sampson eight numbers and Schley six numbers. The Senate in secret session asked the Navy Department for information, and Secretary Long sent to the Senate y with the approval of President McKinley, a letter detailing the facts concerning Schley's conduct. Every statement made by Secretary Long in that letter has been borne out by the findings of the court of inquiry. In explanation of why Schley was recommended for promotion, notwithstand- ing his dereliction, Secretary Long said: The advancement of Commodore Schley was proposed in recogni- tion of his services as next in rank at the victory at Santiago. Where so much was achieved in this culminating battle and where his ship was such a conspicuous force in the fight, his conduct while in independent command prior to June 1, the record of which has been given above and which by reason of its unsteadiness in pur- pose and in push and failure to obey orders did not meet the approval of the President and the Department, was yet not per- mitted to stand in the way of his nomination for promotion to a higher grade for the part he took in the final triumph. What is known as the Sampson-Schley war immediately sprang into active life. The principals had little to do with it. The contention was carried on by their friends. It is within the knowledge of the author that both Sampson and Schley deprecated and tried to discourage the quarrel. But the controversy continued. Most of Sampson's friends were in the naval service; most of Schley's were newspaper 75 editors and writers and politicians. The service was with Sampson, the public with Schley, Men who knew all about the affair (more than has ever yet been published) were with Sampson. Men who knew little or nothing about it were with Schley. Naturally the latter were, and still are r in a great majority. Many people sincerely believe Admiral Schley has been "persecuted" by the Navy Department. This is another fiction. The Department did not recall or court-martial him at a time when there was ample justification for so doing. It strained to the utmost the quality of mercy and officially condoned his offenses and promoted him; and it was not the Department, but Schley himself, who asked to have the case reopened. The Department failed to court-martial Schley, as it might well have done, on a charge of "conduct unbecoming an officer" in the Hodgson matter. Hodgson sent to Schley two letters; in one he denied that a certain published colloquy had taken place; in the other (accompanying the first) he explained that his denial was only as to the published phraseology of the colloquy, while the substance of the colloquy as reported was correct. Schley gave out the denial for publication, and suppressed the explanation! For this he was censured by Admirals Dewey, Benham and Ramsay. His conduct in this affair indicated again those phases of his character which came so conspicuously to the front in his "inaccurate and misleading" statements about the coal supply, etc., in his contradiction of a dozen of his fellow-officers, or failing memory as to points which were unfavorable to himself, and in his skillful, though tardy, development of lines of defense which were never heard of till long after the event. There had never been a moment since May, 1898, when the "Schley balloon" could not have been punctured at one stroke by the Navy Department, so far as professional judgment of a professional man was concerned. Yet the Department failed to act. The "Schley balloon" is able to sail now only because it is supported by the air of public opinion, and public opinion lends its support because it knows neither the man nor the facts. Its impulses have been just and generous and patriotic, as the public impulses always are; but they were not grounded in truth or under- standing. Thus the public, honestly trying To do justice, was misled into working the greatest of injustices. 76 Instead of being "persecuted" by the Navy Department, Schley has been accorded unparalleled leniency. As Secre- tary Long said to President McKinley in July, 1899, "it may be that the Navy Department has made mistakes in this case, but if so, it certainly has not been in the direction of persecution. 77 As the controversy continued two main features natu- rally developed. One was the popularity of Admiral Schley. He had been made a national hero, second only to Dewey, and to say anything against him was to court oblo- quy. Many who took the popular view did so through that widely prevalent inclination to "go with the stream." The newspapers fouud their readers wanted only the Schley side, and they took good care to give them what they liked. "Hence the truth about the Santiago campaign and battle never reached the public. Tens of thousands of men who knew nothing whatever of the merits of the case went up and down the land hurrahing for Schley and damning Sampson and the Navy Department "ring." The controversy devel- oped into an American affaire Dreyfus, with quite as much emotionalism, irrationality, blindness, passion and ignorance on the part of a considerable share of the American people as the French ever displayed in their celebrated case. There was this difference, however: In France they were trying to convict an innocent man. With us the wave of prejudice and passion took another but less sinister form. With press and public arrayed on one side, with a majority of men in the naval service on the other, the former had all the advantage. They were not only in the majority, but they did all the talking. If anyone wished to write on the other side he could find no newspaper brave enough to print it. The majority had everything their own way. The people who did not know the truth vastly enjoyed them- selves and pleased and encouraged one another in their exchange of ignorant comment. Naval officers who knew the truth were compelled to maintain silence; they could not violate the regulations of their service. When Maclay wrote his history and showed himself a poor historian by substituting epithets for facts, he was at once pilloried. There arose a great hue and cry about a ■•"naval conspiracy" against Schley. An "odious ring," a 77 "bureau of fabrication," were at work to defame a gallant officer. To such length was this carried that Secretary Long, one of the most gentle and just men that ever lived, was denounced as everything that was unfair and despic- able. Sampson, even while dying of a broken heart because of the injustice that had been done him by the public, was daily lampooned and insulted. The people, or many of them, were convinced that such a conspiracy existed; that it was unprincipled and resourceful; that it would not hesitate to "doctor" or forge dispatches, or manufacture evidence. Probably President McKinley, who sided with Sampson, but was willing to forgive Schley, would have been similarly pil- loried had he lived. SCHLEY WISER THAN HIS ADVISERS. Admiral Schley did not want to call for a court of inquiry. He was content to let things stand as they were. Though his superior had called his conduct "reprehensible" and the Secretary of the Navy, with the approval of President McKinley had also condemned his "lack of steadiness," etc., Schley had not called for an inquiry. Officially, he had been forgiven, he had been promoted, he had been assigned to an honorable command on the South Atlantic station. He was about to retire, and he wanted to end his days in peace. Public opinion was with him; his place and fame were secure. He bore no ill-will to anyone; he was ready to for- give as he had been forgiven. He was willing Sampson should be Vice- Admiral with seniority over himself. In all of which he showed a better spirit, better sense than some of his champions. Admiral Schley had many admirers, and among them not a few who fell naturally under the category of "fool friends." They persuaded him against his will to ask for a court of his brother officers to pass upon his professional conduct. At last the naval men had a chance. Silent for three years, they could now speak. When the great majority of them went on the witness stand and testified against Schley the press again set up the cry of "conspiracy." But it was not against Schley these officers testified, but for the truth. They could only tell what they knew; and they were merci- lessly cross-examined by one of the most skillful lawyers in the country. They could not create facts; they could not make the coal records; they could not write the dispatches; 78 they could not alter distances or change the weather; they ^ould not imagine the logs of ships; they could not make or unmake or modify the record which Schley himself had left in official black and white. If Schley could not remem- ber what they remembered, or if he was forced in self-de- fense to contradict them one after the other, that was not their fault. If Schley's various excuses were in conflict with one another and with the facts found in the records which he himself had made, that was none of their doing. THE "CONSPIRACY" DELUSION. Was there a conspiracy? No; decidedly no, in the sense in which the word was used. But this much was true: A great majority of the officers who had served in the Cuban campaign knew the truth; they knew public passion and prejudice had run wild; they knew that the facts had never been brought out; they knew that a great injustice had been done; they knew that in its emotionalism the popular mind had made a hero of an officer who had shown professional and character failure while entrusted with a great responsi- bility; they knew that the laurel wreath had been taken from the faithful and skillful officer who had fairly earned it. Be- lieving this, these naval officers would have been less than manly had they not welcomed the opportunity to tell the truth and to contribute their share, small or great, to the undoing of a national wrong. If some of them were over- eager, who can blame them? This would be a sorry world if there were not men in it eager for truth and justice; men who chafe and fret while a wrong remains unrighted. Admiral Schley was censured by the unanimous vote of the court, but not on the testimony alone. Nor were all the witnesses against him. A considerable number from the Navy Department itself testified in his favor, and without prejudicing their status or prospects. Others tempered their testimony to do as little harm to Schley as possible. They held their places and the good-will of their superiors. The talk about a "conspiracy" has been idle, foolish, false. It was on a par with the hue and cry about "doctored dis- patches," simply because telegrams put in cipher, trans- mitted and re-translated into plain English showed slight verbal variations — a charge so baseless that Admiral Schley's attorneys repudiated it before the court. It was *>n a par with the mischievous silliness which led to the 79 intimation that because a score of officers testified to things which Admiral Schley failed to remember those officers were perjurers or prevaricators, while Schley was a saint who could do no wrong and whose memory, like everything else about him, was simply infallible. The finding of the court would have been the same had no witnesses been called. The logs of ships, the engine and coal records, the signal books, and above all, the official dispatches were enough without oral testimony. And the most convincing evidence of all was that found in the records made day by day under Commodore Schley's immediate supervision and the dispatches written by him. If there was a "conspiracy," then 550 of the 600 officers of all grades and corps who took part in the Santiago cam- paign were in it ; most of the other officers of the navy were in it; President McKinley, Secretary Long and the Navy Department were in it ; Admirals Dewey, Benham and Ram- say joined it; and President Roosevelt is wicked enough to add his great weight to it. In spite of a public opinion which is the more passionate because it has not been edu- cated on the facts, in spite of the threat of having a naval hero for a Presidential rival, with perhaps a military hero occupying second place on the ticket, he who was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the outbreak of the Spanish War knows where he stands. The President of the United States is, under the Consti- tution, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy. An offi- cer of one of these services has been disapproved of by his superiors and censured by a duly constituted and impartial court. If now the movement for "vindication" of this offi- cer shall be carried as an appeal from the service court back again to the court of public opinion, and Congress is weak enough to yield to the pressure of a popular sentiment which is entitled to no weight whatever in such a case, it should be careful to have a two-thirds vote in both houses. The Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of the United States will stand by discipline, by the court, by justice. Over his veto, if at all, will Congress thank or reward an officer who has been tried and found wanting. THE END. 14 DAY USE RETURN TO DESK FROM WHICH BORROWED LOAN DEPT. This book is due on the last date stamped below, or on the date to which renewed. Renewed books are subject to immediate recall. 25Apr59VF ■>»•• v. v -H «3rbb'-tfPM kE cd i p — — - — ^Jan*6t1 5 Cg RBCTD i-P DEC 20 £56 Jt&icfi&ji MAR 1 1966 8 9 LD 2lA-50m-9,'58 (6889sl0)476B General Library University of California Berkeley