Stack 
 
 TACK 
 
 6237
 
 THE 
 
 AFFAIRS OF SINDE, 
 
 BEING AN 
 
 ANALYSIS 
 
 OF TKE 
 
 PAPERS PRESENTED TO [PARLIAMENT AND 
 THE PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK: 
 
 wrra 
 
 AN EXPOSITION OF THE CONNECTION OF THE 
 BRITISH GOVERNMENT WITH THAT STATE. 
 
 BY 
 
 AN EAST INDIA PROPRIETOR. 
 
 " The hostilities which took place- during the past year in Sinde have led to the annexation 
 of a considerable portion of that country to the British [ usscssions in the East." 
 
 Her Majesty'* Speech, lit Feb. 1844. 
 
 LONDON : 
 SMITH, ELDER AND CO., CORNHILL. 
 
 1844.
 
 London : 
 
 Printed by STEWART and MI-KHAY, 
 0!d Bailey.
 
 Stack 
 Annex 
 
 oo 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 IN consequence of the adjournment of the discus- 
 sion at the India House on the very interesting 
 and highly important question of the affairs of Sinde, 
 the writer of this Analysis was prevented from sub- 
 mitting, as he had some intention of doing, his 
 sentiments upon the subject ; but the clear, able, 
 and eloquent speeches of the two Honourable 
 Proprietors who addressed the Court, forestalled much 
 of what he was prepared to urge, and must have made 
 a deep impression on the minds of all present : they 
 also tended to convey a correct notion of the unjust 
 treatment experienced by the Ameers of Sinde. 
 Considering, however, that there were many points 
 left unnoticed by these experienced and talented gen- 
 tlemen, and in order to a thorough understanding of 
 the matter by those who may not have leisure or in- 
 clination to wade through the ponderous volume of 
 parliamentary papers, it is now proposed to take a 
 review of them, in consecutive order, submitting such 
 comments and reflections as may be necessary towards 
 a full comprehension of the case. 
 
 The writer appears on this occasion with no pre- 
 tensions to eloquence, or literary talent ; but as a plain 
 man of business, who has devoted much time to the 
 
 A 2
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 study of political questions connected with India, and 
 with an anxious desire to see justice done to the 
 exiled Ameers. The Court of the India House is not 
 a fit arena for empty declamation, which has sometimes 
 been exhibited there by a few professed orators ; but 
 it is very suitable for the display of real practical 
 knowledge and sound argument, such as were exhibited 
 by the mover and seconder of the proposed resolution, 
 who delivered two of the most useful and well- 
 digested speeches that have been heard within these 
 walls for some time past. The Directors have 
 too many important subjects to engage their attention 
 connected with the administration of the mighty and 
 weighty affairs entrusted to their management in di- 
 recting the machinery of the great empire in the East, 
 now under their control, to admit of their time being 
 wasted in oratorical displays. The object of this Ana- 
 lysis is to give an unbiassed impression of the case, so 
 that a correct judgment may be formed on a question 
 of vital interest, not only to India, but to the British 
 nation. 
 
 The time has not yet arrived when India is to be a 
 toy to be played with at the caprice of every new 
 Governor-General with impunity. Members of the 
 Legislature do not exhibit that indifference to Indian 
 
 o 
 
 discussions which they were wont sometimes to do ; 
 nor do they retire from the House when the subject 
 of our Eastern empire is broached. These are now 
 matters of all-absorbing interest, and must necessarily 
 continue to be so. A succession of important changes 
 has been proceeding with a railway speed, during 
 the last few years, and the Directors are no longer 
 the representatives of a company of merchants, but
 
 PRKFACE. 
 
 legislators for, and arbiters of the destinies of 140 
 millions of human beings now under their sway. Their 
 powers, no doubt, unfortunately for the good government 
 of India, of late years have been much set at nought. 
 Their position is much altered ; but still they possess 
 great weight and influence if they choose to exercise 
 them, although the local governing authority is less 
 under their control than formerly. The decision on 
 the affairs of Sinde may have a material influence and 
 effect on other measures of their extensive government 
 in the East. 
 
 The volume now before us contains a lamentable 
 specimen of diplomacy, and a detail of the most sys- 
 tematic, unjustifiable, and impolitic aggression upon 
 an independent native State, which the annals of Bri- 
 tish connection with India afford an example of; 
 fruitful as historians allege that region to have been in 
 cases of minor injustice and encroachment, springing 
 from our eager desire for supremacy and extension of 
 territory. 
 
 The pacific negociations with Sinde appear to have 
 commenced in the year 1809. Tranquillity, friend- 
 ship, and mutual forbearance seem to have prevailed 
 between the British Government and the Ameers of 
 Sinde up to the year 1836, when Lord Auckland, 
 Governor-General of India, was unfortunately seized 
 with the apprehension that Russia and even Persia 
 had hostile designs against our possessions, and 
 
 that the former even meditated an invasion of India 
 
 a most preposterous anticipation ; and the poor 
 wretched outcast Shah Shoojah was eventually, after a 
 long exile from his dominions, borne in triumph to 
 Cabool, by the aid of British troops and a vast
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 expenditure of treasure which our finances could ill 
 spare. 
 
 The proceedings connected with the ill-fated and 
 disastrous expedition into Affghanistan brought us into 
 more immediate contact with Sinde ; and, in order to 
 carry into effect the ill-advised views of the Governor- 
 General in the restoration of the puppet, Shah 
 Shoojah, a course of arbitrary dictation was for some 
 time previous begun and pursued towards the Ameers 
 of Sinde, which could not fail to excite their disaf- 
 fection and distrust. It ended in the enforcement 
 upon the chiefs of harsh treaties, the involuntary 
 occupation of some of their most valuable possessions, 
 and the payment of a long-suspended tribute for- 
 merly yielded to the ruler of Cabool when Shah 
 Shoojah was in power but which tribute had, for 
 many years, ceased to be exacted or demanded. 
 
 At last, upon the return of the second expedition 
 from Cabool, Lord Ellenborough, urged on, unfor- 
 tunately, by the incessant reports of the political offi- 
 cers employed, of supposed intrigues by the Ameers, 
 was gradually led into angry discussion, and eventually 
 into the dictation, literally at the cannon's mouth, of a 
 treaty of so stringent and humiliating a character, that 
 these princes although they reluctantly acceded to 
 it, were unable (as they stated to the Envoy they 
 apprehended they would be) to control their warlike 
 subjects, the Beloochees, who, in a desperate effort to 
 rid themselves from what they considered intolerable 
 oppression, commenced hostilities, into which they had 
 been goaded by the arbitrary and dictatorial style of 
 General Napier's communications and proceedings. 
 Thus the friendship which, in the treaty of 1809,
 
 PREFACE. 7 
 
 and subsequent treaties, was stated to be eternal, was 
 brought to a final close in the year 1843, when the 
 capital of Lower Sinde was taken possession of by a 
 British force, after a hard-fought battle at Meanee, 
 and a scene of carnage and rapine of the most de- 
 plorable character, and the poor Ameers were plun- 
 dered of all they possessed, torn from their families, 
 and sent prisoners to Bombay. 
 
 Such is a brief summary of the case as exhibited in 
 this bulky volume, showing, as it does too clearly, the 
 British Government in a light far from favourable to 
 our national character, and calculated to excite the 
 fears and arouse the worst passions of other indepen- 
 dent and subsidiary States in that part of India, which, 
 appalled by such proceedings in Affghanistan and 
 Sinde, and alarmed for their own safety, may not 
 unreasonably be expected to regard the present 
 government of India with no very friendly feeling. 
 Hence, there is too much reason to believe that the 
 late disagreement with some of the more powerful 
 states to the northward, which has required the 
 assemblage of another large force, has, in a great 
 degree, been produced by the course of events con- 
 nected with the ill-judged operations alluded to ; in 
 which LordEllenborough has found himself embarrassed 
 by the proceedings of his predecessor. Far better 
 that we should reign in the affections of the people 
 under our sway, and with the good will and attachment 
 ,of the surrounding States, than by the terrors in- 
 spired by the collection of large armies, which must 
 entail a vast expense to the State. Although I am 
 free to admit the necessity of at once putting down, 
 by the most prompt and vigorous measures, any oppo-
 
 8 PREFACE. 
 
 sition to our power, provided always we have an honest 
 cause or claim to enforce. The principle of coercion 
 in such cases, must be allowed and assented to by all 
 acquainted with the nature of our possessions in India. 
 But, in the case now before us, we had not just or 
 reasonable grounds for such severity. 
 
 The innocence of the Ameers of Sinde of the 
 grave charges brought against them, on which the 
 harsh proceedings of the Governor-General were 
 founded, having been so triumphantly established by 
 the facts and reasoning so ably brought forward 
 by the mover and seconder of the Resolution at the 
 India House, and the testimony of Captain Eastwick, 
 who formerly held a high political office in both Upper 
 and Lower Sinde, who charged one of the principal 
 witnesses with having actually been in the pay of the 
 British Government, (though a confidential servant of 
 one of the Ameers,) and hence a traitor of the 
 deepest dye, renders it unnecessary to enter into any 
 very minute investigation on these points, although 
 they must necessarily be incidentally noticed. My 
 observations will rather be confined to showing, that 
 upon the evidence of the political officers employed, 
 and the expressed opinions and objects of both the 
 Governors-General, there was no just pretext for the 
 severe steps pursued, and that the final subjugation of 
 Sinde, and the dethronement of the principal Ameers, 
 was brought about as a natural consequence of the 
 heavy and unreasonable demands made upon them, 
 to effect purposes of our own first, in promoting the 
 wild scheme of restoring Shah Shoojah, and next, in 
 endeavouring to remove impediments in the way of 
 the free navigation of the river Indus, with a view to
 
 PREFACE. 9 
 
 the advancement of commercial enterprize : a chimera 
 which never can be realized to any degree commen- 
 surate with the expectations formed by the present 
 Governor- General or General Napier. The whole 
 commerce of these parts will not, for a long course of 
 years, if ever, be equal to the interest of the capital 
 already expended in the pursuit of so visionary a 
 scheme ; nor will the revenues of the country, if re- 
 tained in our possession, repay a tithe of the expense, 
 while pestilential disease is daily thinning the ranks 
 of our regiments, and destroying hundreds of our 
 brave soldiers. Indeed, Colonel Pottinger has long 
 ago declared, that the climate was quite unsuitable 
 for the residence of European troops. These con- 
 siderations should, therefore, be powerful incentives to 
 an early settlement of the question, and our extrication 
 from the embarrassments and difficulties and dangers 
 in which we have become involved.
 
 ANALYSIS. 
 
 THE first treaty with the AMEERS OF SINDE, dated 22nd 
 August, 1809, (page 1,)* provided that there should be 
 eternal friendship between the British Government and the 
 Government of Sinde. Here then, we treated with Sinde as 
 an independent state, on a footing of perfect equality, without 
 any reference whatever to its being, in any way, tributary to 
 Cabool or any other state; and we prevented the admission 
 of another European power, " the tribe of the French." At 
 that time, no apprehension was entertained of the two bug- 
 bears, Russia and Persia, which frightened Lord Auckland 
 from his propriety. 
 
 The next treaty, dated 9th November, 1820, (page 2), con- 
 tains a preamble that the British Government and the Govern- 
 ment of Sinde having in view to guard against the occurrence 
 of frontier disputes, and to strengthen the friendship already 
 subsisting between the two stales, Meer Ismael Shah was 
 invested with full power to treat with the Government of 
 Bombay, and it was agreed that there should be perpetual 
 friendship between the British Government and Meer Kur- 
 reem Ali and Meer Moorad Ali on the other; that mutual 
 intercourse by means of vakeels should always continue be- 
 tween the two governments ; that no European or American 
 should be permitted to settle in the dominion of Sinde, &,c. 
 
 We hear no more of Sinde till the 4th April, 1832, (page 
 
 * The pages refer to the number of the Proprietors' volume.
 
 12 
 
 2,) when a treaty of peace was concluded between the East 
 India Company and the State of Khyrpore, in which, as 
 usual, it is stipulated, 1st, that there shall be eternal friendship 
 between the two states; 2nd, that the two contracting; powers 
 mutually bind themselves, from generation to generation, never 
 to look with an eye of covetousness on the possessions of each 
 other; 3rd, that the British Government having requested 
 the use of the River Indus and the roads of Sinde, for the 
 merchants of Hindostan, &c., the Government of Khyrpore 
 agrees to grant the same within its own boundaries, on what- 
 ever terms may be settled with the Government of Hyderabad, 
 namely, Meer Moor ad Ali Khan Talpoor ; and -1th, that reason- 
 able duties should be fixed, and traders not to be liable to any 
 loss or hindrance in transacting their business. 
 
 A treaty was on the 20th April, 1832, (page 2,) concluded 
 with Meer Moorad Ali Khan, Ruler of Hyderabad in Sinde, 
 consisting of seven articles, the three first of which were to 
 the same effect as those in the Khyrpore, with the following 
 conditions attached to the last, namely, 
 
 1. That no person shall bring any description of military 
 stores by the above river Indus. 
 
 2. That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said 
 river. 
 
 3. That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in 
 Sinde, but shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped 
 to transact their business, shall return to India ; and mer- 
 chants visiting Sinde were to be provided with passports from 
 the British Government. Facilities were also to be afforded, 
 and a tariff or table of duties to be promulgated. 
 
 A supplementary treaty (page 3), between the East India 
 Company and the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde, which 
 was to be considered as virtually annulled on the fulfilment 
 of its stipulations, was concluded on 22nd April, 1832. 
 
 With reference to the fourth article of tine perpetual treaty, 
 that the Government of Hyderabad should furnish a statement 
 of duties, that British officers should examine the same, and if 
 too high, Meer Moorad Ali Khan reduce them ; and with 
 reference to the punishment and the suppression of the
 
 13 
 
 plunderers of Parkur, the Thale, &c., that the British, Sinde, 
 and Joudpore Governments should direct their joint and 
 simultaneous efforts to the above object. 
 
 A commercial treaty between the East India Company and 
 the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde was published by 
 proclamation on the 23rd of December, 1834 (page 4), by 
 order of the Governor-General in council. The first three 
 articles related to the tolls to be levied on boats on the In- 
 dus. A British agent (not being an European gentleman) 
 under the authority of Colonel Pottinger should reside at the 
 bunder or port at the mouth of the river where cargoes were 
 transferred, and the " British Government binds itself that 
 the said agent shall neither engage in trade, nor interfere in 
 any way with the fiscal or any other affairs of Sinde; and 
 by the 5th and last article all goods landed shall be subject 
 to the existing local duties as levied by the respective Govern- 
 ments within their own territories on the Indus." 
 
 Such were the subsisting political and commercial relations 
 between the British Government and Sinde up to the year 
 1836 (page 5), when upon Runjeet Sing applying to be 
 furnished with 50,000 stand of arms by the Indus, the 
 Governor-General took occasion to remind his Highness of 
 
 O 
 
 the peaceful nature of the objects for which the Indus had 
 been re-opened, and to make him acquainted with the senti- 
 ments entertained by the British Government of the aggres- 
 sive line of policy which he was pursuing towards his neigh- 
 bours. Colonel Pottinger was authorized to offer to the 
 Ameers of Sinde the protection of the British Government 
 against the Sikhs, they consenting to receive and pay the 
 expense of a body of British troops, to be stationed at their 
 capital. 
 
 The Governor-General admits, that although from the 
 long experience of Runjeet Sing's character, little apprehen- 
 sion was entertained of his persisting in the invasion of 
 Sinde ; still it was considered necessary to have a body of 
 troops in readiness, to act upon the requisition of Colonel 
 Pottinger. " It proved, however, as we expected," states 
 the despatch to the secret committee, " quite unnecessary to
 
 14 
 
 resort to hostilities." As soon as the Maharajah became 
 acquainted with the wishes of the British Government, he 
 gave orders to his officers to abstain from all hostilities on 
 the frontier; and his communications \\ere altogether cordial. 
 
 * O 
 
 Thus the ostensible object of our interference was gained. 
 The Governor-General seems to have been very considerate 
 in his offer of protection, although he admits the Maharajah's 
 attack on the Mazaree tribe was justified by the previous 
 insult offered to his dominions. Such was the first attempt 
 to establish British supremacy in Sinde. Such was the real 
 motive, though we afterwards pursued a much more aggres- 
 sive policy than Runjeet Sing (page 9). Colonel Pottinger 
 was instructed, in treating with the Ameers, to communicate 
 with them without reserve, in reference to the dangerous posi- 
 tion in which they stood, and to apprise them that it was 
 essential, not to their interest only, but to their very exist- 
 ence, that the ties by which they were connected with the 
 British Government should be strengthened. At the same 
 time the Governor-General sincerely desired that the exten- 
 sion of British influence should be effected by commercial and 
 peaceful objects alone. The Ameers do not appear to have 
 been in any such state of alarm, nor did they evince any 
 desire to avail themselves to the full extent of our disin- 
 terested aid. It would have been well if the Governor- 
 General had adhered to the resolution that he desired to 
 effect the extension of our influence in the direction of the 
 Indus by commercial and peaceful objects alone ; but, alas ! 
 subsequent proceedings demonstrate a lamentable departure 
 from so wise and just a resolve. Still it was expected that 
 in interfering for the protection of Sinde from imminent 
 danger, the British Government might derive some corre- 
 sponding advantages. No doubt this was a main object of their 
 interference. As the Maharajah had so readily abandoned 
 his projects there was no longer any occasion for British 
 troops, which Colonel Pottinger was urged to press on the 
 Ameers. 
 
 The result was, that a provisional agreement was entered 
 into (pages 12 to 31,) with Noor Mahomed Khan of Hydera-
 
 15 
 
 bad, for the residence of an agent in behalf of the British 
 Government, at Shikarpore, and for other objects of an 
 important nature. Colonel Pottinger was received with the 
 greatest cordiality and kindness as an old friend ; and as 
 the bearer of an overture very favourable to the Ameers, in 
 respect to the protection to be extended against Runjeet 
 Sing's warlike operations which the Colonel pledged to an 
 extent disallowed immediately afterwards by the Governor- 
 General. The offer (thus unconfirmed) was thesole inducement 
 which led the Ameers to assent to the other proposals of the 
 Envoy as the condition of such extended protection, a point 
 which shall be hereafter more fully adverted to. Notwith- 
 standing that offer, however, by the Envoy, one of the 
 most influential Ameers, MeerSobdar, had so little inclination 
 to treat with him, that he quitted Hyderabad, and upon 
 being taxed with his want of respect for the Envoy, said he 
 had not sent for him, (page 16, par. 20,) that he knew nothing 
 about him or his objects, that he did not want to have any 
 connection with the English, and that those who liked might 
 receive the Colonel and be civil to him. This was a most sig- 
 nificant hint, that the interference of the British Government 
 was neither required nor desired by that chief, who possessed 
 very considerable influence. 
 
 It is quite evident, from the foregoing undisguised expres- 
 sion of opinion, by one of the chiefs (afterwards, however, 
 much favoured, while Noor Mahomed Khan, who was more 
 friendly at the outset, was subsequently treated with the 
 utmost severity), whose aversion to communication with the 
 Envoy amounted to positive and undisguised rudeness, and 
 evinced the reverse of a cordial reception of the overtures 
 made by the British Government, that our intervention was 
 neither courted nor willingly acceded to by one of the most 
 influential Ameers. They had resources of their own, which, 
 united to the natural obstacles that intervened between their 
 possessions and those of Runjeet Sing, rendered them at least 
 easy with regard to their position with the Maharajah. And, it 
 is clear from the observation of Noor Mahomed Khan, that our 
 Envoy was regarded more as a suppliant for advantages for
 
 16 
 
 his own Government, than as a mediator of differences be- 
 tween Sinde and Lahore, or as the representative of a powerful 
 state, tendering disinterested support and protection against 
 the invasion or aggression of an ambitious neighbour ; and 
 such impression is manifest from the observation of Noor 
 Mahomed Khan, that the British Government could ask for 
 nothing that was reasonable (page 15, par. 16), to which that 
 of Sinde would not accede. 
 
 At last, Colonel Pottinger persuaded Noor Mahomed Khan 
 to agree to the terms proposed, (page 21, par. 38,) and that 
 chief promised religiously to abide by stipulations, that should 
 it be necessary to send an army to Sinde, he would pay what- 
 ever portion of the expense the Governor-General chose to 
 name; and that a British officer, though not explicitly sanctioned 
 by the commercial agreement, might come and go when he 
 liked, and do as he liked. And with due candour, he stated 
 that Shikarpore offered, in his opinion, vast commercial 
 advantages over either Tatta or Hyderabad for an agent ; that 
 the Governor-General must send a regiment or two; that 
 Roostum Khan of Shikarpore could and would do all we 
 wished relative to duties and customs ; and that he would 
 consult the Governor-General as to any steps of external 
 policy. Ameer Nusseer Khan expressed the same sentiments. 
 There was one point, however, on which the Envoy could not 
 prevail on the Ameers to agree, without restriction \ namely t the 
 right to cut wood on the banks of the river (page 23, par. 46). The 
 Envoy states, " Of the great advantages of the measures 
 pointed out in the 9th article, my personal observation, in all 
 my trips to Sinde, have fully satisfied me, that should steam 
 vessels be introduced on the river, or even with the ware- 
 housing system, much of the necessity for removing the 
 jungle will be done away. It was, however, as well to secure 
 the permission ; and the Ameers have only required that 
 their preserves (Shikargahs) shall not be molested. This is so 
 reasonable a request that I instantly acceded to it. In fact, 
 when I recollected that the only happy part of iheir High- 
 nesses' time is passed in their sporling excursions, in which they 
 seem for the time relieved from all the cares and annoy-
 
 17 
 
 ances of the capital, and to experience unalloyed enjoyment, I 
 felt I had not only no right to ask them to make a sacrifice 
 of the kind, but it would have been wrong to do so."* The 
 Envoy adds 
 
 " The people of the country are prohibited, at their peril, from 
 touching them (the Shikargahs) even for firewood. Indeed, the 
 Shikargahs are watched and prized with all the care and anxiety 
 that was ever bestowed on royal preserves in any part of Europe, 
 and which we still see shewn to game preserves in our own enlight- 
 ened country. We must, therefore, bear all these facts in mind, 
 before we can properly appreciate the Ameers' disposition to meet 
 our wishes on this hitherto ill-understood and apparently trifling 
 point." 
 
 Is it possible that General Napier could ever have seen this 
 opinion of one of the most able diplomatic officers of the 
 present age ? If not, he will have an opportunity of con- 
 trasting it with his own crude and arbitrary notions when the 
 blue book reaches him. 
 
 The Envoy says, (page 25, par. 50), he thinks that Sinde 
 would be a bad station for European troops fora permanency, 
 and there appeared to be no occasion to send any t/iere, as 
 Maharajah Runjeet Sing had agreed to retire within his own 
 frontier, (oh ! that that opinion had continued to be acted 
 on,) and he was right, as subsequent events have too fatally 
 proved. A hint is, for the first time, thrown out, (page 25, 
 par. 51), that the Ameers should, in part of their share of the 
 expense, cede to the British Government the free and untaxed 
 navigation of the Indus, for all boats passing up and down 
 under our passports. 
 
 * Let me here advert to Sir C. Napier's proceedings afterwards (page 
 397, par. 19). The gallant but indiscreet officer inquires, whether "to their 
 selfish policy and love of hunting, such general interests are to be sacrificed ? 
 I think not. The real interests of the Ameers demand that their peurile 
 pursuits and blind avaricious proceedings should be subjected to wholesome 
 control." What would the amiable and excellent consort of our gracious 
 Queen say to this doctrine ? His Royal Highness is as partial to hunting as 
 the Ameers of Sinde, and has well-stocked preserves. 
 
 B
 
 18 
 
 An awkward development now occurs, and the Envoy found 
 himself in a disagreeable predicament. In the secret memo- 
 randum, (page 27, par. 3,) amongst other stipulations, is the 
 following, which, indeed, was the chief inducement held out 
 to the Ameers of Sinde to grant the valuable privileges con- 
 ceded to the British Government, viz. : 
 
 " 3. That should Runjeet Sing refuse to withdraw his troops, or 
 to desist in his designs against Sinde, the British Government will 
 then take steps to extend its protection to Sinde, and that the 
 latter State will pay such portion of the expense as may be neces- 
 sary." 
 
 In entering into this stipulation, the Envoy is informed by 
 the Governor-General that he has exceeded his powers. The 
 letter, however, conveying this intimation, (referred to in the 
 Envoy's despatch of 31st January, 1837, and stated to be 
 dated 2nd of that month,) (page 28, par. 1,) does not appear. 
 The Envoy states that he had, in preceding communications, 
 borne testimony to the scrupulous manner in which Noor 
 Mahomed Khan and his colleagues in authority (including 
 the chief of Khyrpore) (page 29, par. 3), were acting up to 
 the engagement made with him, and he very emphatically 
 urges on his Lordship's notice, that hispromises clearly provided 
 for the removal of the Sikh troops from their territories, as a pre- 
 liminary step, on their binding themselves,for the British becoming 
 the medium of all future intercourse between the courts of Lahore 
 and Hyderabad (par. 4). And after anxiously and carefully 
 considering the instructions conveyed to him by the Governor- 
 General, his humble judgment did not lead him to the conclusion 
 that he had deviated from them in the promises above described , 
 and he trusted his Lordship in council would not be of a diffe- 
 rent opinion. Under this impression, he should defer acting 
 on the despatch under reply, (the missing one), until he re- 
 ceived further commands. Here then, was a very unpleasant 
 dilemma for the Envoy to be placed in. The Governor-Gene- 
 ral in council, however, (page 31, par. 2,) could not admit that 
 the original instructions contained anything which implied it 
 to be his wish or intention that the Envoy should pledge the 
 Government, in any case, for the immediate evacuation, as a
 
 19 
 
 preliminary step to further measures, of the Sinde territory 
 by the troops of Runjeet Sing. The object of his lordship's 
 interference, on that occasion, was to save the Ameers from 
 impending destruction, by the offer of mediation, and a tender 
 even of assistance 'was made in case of the progress of the 
 Sikh troops. But it was not the intention of the Governor- 
 General in council, that the immediate abandonment by the 
 Maharajah of the position actually held by him in the Mazaree 
 country, should be the necessary consequence of our interven- 
 tion, and still less did he contemplate that that measure 
 should be forced upon him, if he, at our request, arrested the 
 progress of his arms. This very question, concerning the 
 Mazaree country, was one of the main points in dispute be- 
 tween the Maharajah and the Ameers ; and if it had been 
 intended to decide it beforehand in favour of the Ameers, 
 there would have been obviously no advantage in entering 
 upon any plan of mediation. Runjeet Sing, however, was 
 a powerful independent chief, and had been a faithful and con- 
 sistent ally to us, but he had no reason to suppose we should 
 interfere to procure indemnification for the losses which he 
 might suffer from the Ameers or their dependents. Although, 
 therefore, it was the interest and just policy of the British 
 Government to dissuade him from the invasion of Sinde and 
 the annihilation of its political independence, still he 
 appeared to be undoubtedly warranted in his advance into 
 the Mazaree country (par. 5). If the offer of mediation 
 should be on both sides accepted, the Envoy was author- 
 ized to give the Ameers every assurance that a full and 
 impartial inquiry should be conducted on the spot by an 
 officer deputed on purpose, and that they should be prepared 
 to send an agent to aid in the inquiry on their part. The 
 Envoy was therefore directed to proceed to act upon the 
 instructions of the 2nd January (not in the blue book). If the 
 Ameers agreed to execute the agreement proposed for their 
 acceptance, measures would be taken for commencing an 
 investigation on the Mazaree frontier. If not, the relations of 
 all the parties concerned must then revert to what they were 
 before our late interposition in favour of the Ameers, and they 
 
 B 2
 
 20 
 
 would again be subjected to the state of anxiety and hazard 
 from which they had just been relieved (page 33, par. 9). In 
 conclusion, the Envoy was informed that " the employment of 
 any British armed force at Shikarpore is not thought desirable. 
 Nor, in any manner, ought the increasing intimacy with Sinde 
 be made the means of assuming a position, or adopting a tone 
 offensive to other powers." 
 
 Captain Burnes(p. 33, par. 6) having been deputed to and re- 
 ceived by Meer Roostum Khan, Ameer of Khyrpore, in a very 
 flattering manner, that chief seemed most anxious to conciliate 
 the friendship and favour of the British Government, and evinced 
 an anxious desire to enter into a new treaty with us, apart from 
 engagements with the Hyderabad branch of the family. This 
 wish Captain Burnes politely, but firmly, discouraged ; a repug- 
 nance on our part which was afterwards overcome. We found 
 Roostum Khan most useful. He was of great service to us ; 
 but General Napier destroyed the power of that chief, and 
 sided with his brother, Ali Moorad, the present chief in amity 
 with the English, who is now held in detestation by all his 
 kindred. 
 
 The Governor-General in council, in addressing the Secret 
 Committee on 27th Dec., 1 837 (p. 35, par. 4 & 5), adverts to the 
 altered tone of the Ameers, (could this be a matter of sui prise 
 after the failure of the Envoy to guarantee the only stipulation 
 worth their acceptance, as a return for all their conditional con- 
 cessions, and which stipulation he had promised ?), and states 
 that Government was greatly disappointed at the result of the 
 negociations which were in progress for the formation of the 
 proposed treaty with the Ameers of Sinde. The proposals made 
 by Noor Mahomed Khan were so different from what they had 
 been led to anticipate, (but under what circumstances?) and 
 so totally at variance with the spirit and form of the agreement 
 which Colonel Pottinger had been directed to propose, that he 
 addressed a letter to the Ameer, expressing his surprise at the 
 tone of his Highness's communication to the Governor-General, 
 which might be likely to give offence, and recommended its 
 transmission being suspended.* 
 
 * The letter, which must have been a very interesting one, as showing
 
 21 
 
 The Governor-General in council (p. 36, par. 16) therefore di- 
 rected the Envoy to state that,if the Ameers continued to manifest 
 so great an aversion to form a closer alliance with the only power 
 competent to render them efficient aid, the British Government 
 must refrain, on anyfuture occasion, from promotingtheir welfare 
 or securing their independence. From this it would appear, that 
 the Ameers had little desire for a more close connection on the 
 altered terms and conditions proposed by the Envoy, in oppo- 
 sition to his own judgment, after we had succeeded in diverting 
 Runjeet Sing from his avowed purpose; but still the Governor- 
 General required some concession, and, in short, it is quite 
 evident the Bengal Government was most solicitous to have an 
 excuse for exercising a more complete control over Sinde, in or- 
 der to promote its own ends, in effecting the restoration of Shah 
 Shoojah.for which measures were in progress, as shall presently 
 be shown. A flimsy veil is cast over the object; but the fact 
 is as clear as the sun at noon day. Lord Ellenborough draws 
 the veil aside afterwards, when he had an object to be gained, 
 and he says at once, at your peril refuse to comply with all we 
 require. There is no mincing of the matter. The penalty of 
 their refusal was to be the capture of the capital, and occupation 
 of the country ; and that penalty has been most fully exacted. 
 In the next communication to the Secret Committee, dated 
 21st Feb., 1838, (page 36, par. 2), the Governor-General in 
 council intimates that the negociations with the Ameers/or the 
 establishment of a British Resident at the capital of Sinde 
 were still pending. Noor Mahomed Khan affected to be sur- 
 prised at the observations made to him by Colonel Pottinger, 
 and requested the return of the letter he had addressed to the 
 Governor- General. In Noor Mahomed Khan's conference 
 with the native agent, he professed to be actuated by feelings 
 of friendship towards the British Government, and expressed 
 a wish for an adjustment of his differences with the Sikhs, 
 through our mediation; but he had great hesitation at this 
 period about i*eceiving a political agent at his capital. His 
 
 the sentiments of the Ameers, does not appear; and it was well observed 
 by Capt. Eastwick, that if the Ameers could produce their blue book, the 
 question would assume a very different aspect.
 
 22 
 
 Highness was therefore warned, that unless this point was con- 
 ceded, the British Government could not exert its influence 
 or use its good offices with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, for the 
 restoration of the Mazaree districts, and the abandonment of 
 his designs against Sinde. In the communication subse- 
 quently made by the principal Ameers to Colonel Pottiuger, a 
 desire to accede to our proposition for the reception of a Bri- 
 tish agent was distinctly expressed, and an intimation con- 
 veyed therein, that Runjeet Sing had left the question of the 
 restoration of the Mazaree districts, and the removal of the 
 Sikh garrison from Rojhan to the determination of the British 
 Government, 
 
 It became a matter of expediency, as I have before noticed, 
 to have a treaty with the Ameers of Sinde, prior to the pro- 
 mulgation of the Tripartite Treaty, arid in order to afford a 
 pretext for interference, so essential to the Governor-General's 
 other measures connected with the restoration of Shah Shoojah 
 in Affghanistan. The treaty with the Ameers was, therefore, 
 greatly reduced in its limits, and consisted of only two articles. 
 It was concluded on the 20th April, 1838, with Noor Maho- 
 med Khan and Meer Nusseer Mahomed Nusseer Khan, as 
 follows : (page 37,) 
 
 " Article I. In consideration of the long friendship which has 
 subsisted between the British Government and the Ameers of 
 Sinde, the Governor-General in Council engages to use his good 
 offices to adjust the present differences which are understood to 
 subsist between the Ameers of Sinde and Maharajah Runjeet 
 Sing, so that peace and friendship may be established between the 
 two States. 
 
 " Article II. In order to secure and improve the relations of 
 amity and peace which have so long subsisted between the Sinde 
 State and the British Government, it is agreed that an accredited 
 British minister shall reside at the Court of Hyderabad, and that 
 the Ameers of Sinde shall also be at liberty to depute a vakeel to 
 reside at the Court of the British Government," (what a gracious 
 condescension!) "and that the British minister shall be empowered 
 to change his ordinary place of residence as may from time to time 
 seem expedient, and be attended by such an escort as may be 
 deemed suitable by his Government."
 
 23 
 
 No provision is made for the occasional change of resi- 
 dence of the vakels of the Ameers, nor any escort of course, 
 at the Court of the British Government. Perhaps, that 
 of St. James', may, in due time, be favoured with the pre- 
 sence of a vakeel from the exiled Ameers, to sue for justice, 
 if the Honorable Court shall not succeed in inducing Her 
 Majesty's Ministers to restore these chiefs, or some of them, 
 before such an appeal can be urged. 
 
 I may here advert to the total absence of all communications 
 from Colonel Pottinger, respecting the actual conclusion of the 
 foregoing treaty, which is dated 20th April, 1838, while the 
 date of his last latter, in the printed series is the 31st January* 
 1837 ! This is a most extraordinary fact the despatches of 
 Colonel Pottinger, during that long interval, must have been 
 extremely important and interesting, and should have been 
 produced, in order to show how he contrived to extricate 
 himself from the embarrassments in which he was involved by 
 the rejection on the part of the Governor-General in Council, 
 of the principal stipulation in the agreement entered into 
 with Noor Mahomed Khan ; and it is but justice to the 
 Ameers, that their arguments should also have appeared. 
 Here is an interval of fifteen months, and the treaty appears 
 in the blue book unaccompanied by any communication from 
 Colonel Pottinger; the Governor-General in Council trans- 
 mitting a copy of it to the Secret Committee (page 37), with 
 a brief intimation of its conclusion. 
 
 Turning over the page, without any previous explanation, 
 (page 38) comes the celebrated Tripartite Treaty between the 
 British Government, Runjeet Sing and Shah Shoojah-ool- 
 Moolk, concluded at Lahore on the 26th June, 1838, just two 
 months after the date of the treaty concluded with the Ameers of 
 Sinde, and after long protracted negotiations of eighteen months' 
 duration. The Tripartite Treaty consists of eighteen articles, 
 only two of which, viz. the * 4th and 16th, relate to Sinde. 
 The last is as follows (page 40) : 
 
 " XVI. Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk agrees to relinquish, for him- 
 
 * On the subject of Shikarpore, the author adopts the words of Mr. 
 Sullivan, which came to hand while this work was going through the
 
 24 
 
 self, his heirs, and successors, all claims of supremacy, and arrears 
 of tribute, over the country now held by the Ameers of Sinde, 
 (which will continue to belong to the Ameers and their successors 
 in perpetuity,) on condition of the payment to him by the Ameers 
 of such a sum as may be determined, under the mediation of the 
 British Government, 15,00,000 of rupees of such payment being 
 made by him to Maharajah Runjeet Sing. On these payments 
 being completed, Article IV. of the treaty of 12th March, 1833, 
 will be considered cancelled, and the customary interchange of 
 letters and suitable presents between the Maharajah and the 
 Ameers of Sinde shall be maintained as heretofore." 
 
 And so this is the first fruits of our friendly intervention, but 
 not all that we required for ourselves, as will be seen presently. 
 Who gave the Governor-General a right to interfere between 
 
 press. That gentleman says, "But admitting, for the sake of argument, 
 that all the charges were completely proved, then, he would ask, did they 
 arise out of gratuitous hostility to the British Government ? The answer 
 must be, ' No ; they proceeded from our treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah 
 Shoojah, of June, 1838.' The fourth article of that treaty said, ' Regarding 
 Shikarpore, and the territory of Sinde lying on the right bank of the Indus, 
 the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, 
 in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the 
 British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.' That 
 article formed part and parcel of a treaty, which was concluded in 1833, 
 between Shah Shoojah and Runjeet Sing, to which the British Government 
 were not then parties, though they subsequently became so. What, then, 
 was the meaning of the article ? It meant that Shah Shoojah and Runjeet 
 Sing agreed to leave it to the British Government to determine what portion 
 of Shikarpore should be given to Runjeet Sing for his assistance in seating 
 Shah Shoojah upon the throne ; that the British Government, after it had 
 acceded to the treaty, would determine what part of Shikarpore should be- 
 long to Runjeet Sing, in the event of the Shah's success in his new attempt. 
 Thus was Shikarpore to be dealt with. It was a valuable possession of the 
 Ameers, which tkey had wrested from the Affghans in 1817. It had been 
 in their possession, with one short interval, and was the object of Runjeet 
 Sing's invasion in 1836. This article, as it stood, was one of unqualified 
 hostility against the Ameers ; but it was qualified by another article, namely, 
 the 16th. What, then, was the meaning of the two articles ttrken together? 
 The British Government undertook to exact from the friendly Ameers of 
 Sinde, large sums of money for the benefit of Shah Shoojah and Runjeet 
 Sing, upon the latter foregoing all further demands for tribute, and the for- 
 feiture of Shikarpore was to be the penalty for non-payment."
 
 25 
 
 Shah Shoojah and the Ameers? That exiled chief had not 
 been in a condition to require any tribute for a long course of 
 years. Such was the result of our kind and disinterested 
 interference, which was so reluctantly acceded to by the 
 Ameers. 
 
 Mr. Secretary Macnaghten, in transmitting copy of the 
 Tripartite Treaty (page 40) to the Resident in Sinde, conveys 
 the directions of the Governor-General of India for the 
 Ameers to be informed that in the opinion of the Governor- 
 General, a crisis had arrived at which it was essentially 
 requisite for the security of British India, that its real 
 friends should unequivocally manifest their attachment to 
 its interests, and that a combination of the powers to the 
 Westward, apparently having objects in view injurious to our 
 empire in the East, had compelled the Governor-General to 
 enter into a counter combination for the purpose of frustrating 
 those objects. Reference was made to the 16th article, 
 engaging to arbitrate the claim of Shah Shoojah, (now first 
 alluded to,) and it was stated that the Governor-General had 
 not yet determined the amount which the Ameers may be 
 fairly called upon to pay, and it should not, therefore, imme- 
 diately be named; but the minimum may certainly be taken 
 at 20 lacs of rupees. A precious friend and arbitrator ! 
 Shah Shoojah was a mere tool of the Governor-General. The 
 Ameers were to be assured that the disposition of the British 
 Goverment towards them was extremely favourable, and that 
 nothing could distress the Governor-General more than an 
 interruption of the good understanding which had hitherto 
 prevailed between his government and their Highnesses. At 
 the same time, it would be uncandid to conceal from their 
 Highnesses that his Lordship expected from them, as sincere 
 friends and near neighbours, some ostensible display, in the 
 present exigency, of their attachment to British interests, and 
 some concession on their part to the reasonable wishes of the 
 British Government and its allies. It was intimated that Shah 
 Shoojah-ool-Moolk would probably arrive, with his own army, 
 and the direct support of British troops, at Shikarpore, about 
 the middle of November, in progress to take possession of the
 
 26 
 
 throne of Afghanistan, and that temporary possession would 
 be taken of Shikarpore, and as much of the country adjacent 
 as might be required to afford a secure base for the intended 
 military operations. A threat was held out to induce the 
 Ameers to a speedy acquiescence in the demands of the 
 Governor-General, thus 
 
 Page 41. " His Lordship is further unwilling to contemplate 
 the contingency of offensive operations being undertaken against 
 the Ameers by the Shah, after he shall have established, by the 
 support of the British power, his authority in Affghanistan, for the 
 realization of what he may deem his just claims. But the Ameers 
 must be sensible, that if they should now deprive themselves of the 
 advantage of his Lordship's mediation, with a view to effect an 
 immediate favourable compromise, the British Government will be 
 precluded from offering opposition to any measures for the assertion 
 of those claims which the Shah may eventually determine to 
 adopt." 
 
 How very inconsistent ! The Governor-General presses on 
 the Ameers his mediation between them and Runjeet Sing on 
 a question of invaded territory, and gets permission to establish 
 a Residency. He professes the greatest friendship, obtains 
 their acquiescence to measures beneficial to the commerce of 
 the country, and he then turns round and acts as the agent of 
 a long-deposed useless chief of a far distant country, who was 
 utterly powerless and destitute of means but for our assis- 
 tance ; and that poor man's name is made use of to enforce a 
 large money payment for which there was no pretext but that 
 of expediency and need. This is not a creditable species of 
 diplomacy. 
 
 In order to provide (page 42) for the possible contingency of the 
 Ameers of Sinde having, in the interim, entered into engage- 
 ments with the Shah of Persia, Colonel Pottinger had full 
 authority to request the immediate advance of a British 
 force from the Bombay army, such as would suffice to take 
 possession of the capital of Sinde, and to declare all 
 friendly relations between his own Government and such 
 of the Ameers as might have been parties to the Persian 
 alliance, to have ceased. With any of the Ameers whose
 
 27 
 
 cause might be popular in p the country, and who might shew a 
 disposition to cultivate a British rather than a Persian alli- 
 ance, Colonel Pottinger was authorized to enter into such pro- 
 visional engagements, subsidiary or otherwise, as might be 
 most advantageous to his own Government, and best calcu- 
 lated to support the supremacy of the Ameer whose cause 
 might be espoused. This was a remarkable state of affairs 
 only three months after the conclusion of a treaty for the 
 admission of a British Resident. Mr. Secretary Macnaghten 
 closes as follows : 
 
 " His Lordship will only add, as a suggestion to aid your 
 opinion, on the subject, that the Ameers may fairly be supposed to 
 be wealthy, in consequence of the long suspension of the tribute 
 which was formerly paid to Cabool, and with reference to the 
 known fact, that during this interval they have not been engaged 
 in any extensive operations." 
 
 No; they were happy and contented till we proffered our 
 kindness. We restore a long-deposed chief, and revive his 
 antiquated claim. Can we wonder that the Ameers received our 
 advances with suspicion and distrust? In Aug. 1838, (page 43,) 
 it was reported by the native agent, that the four Ameers had 
 decided on writing to the King of Persia ; but Colonel Pot- 
 tinger did not ascribe any immediate political object to the 
 Ureeza, (copy of which was procured,*) and Noor Mahomed 
 Khan declared himself the warm and staunch ally of the 
 British Government. Col. Pottinger, however, in a letter to the 
 Secretary, dated 27th Aug., 1838, (page 46, par. 2,) states that he 
 had been induced to doubt the sincerity and good faith of Noor 
 Mahomed Khan, and he accuses him of deep duplicity, with 
 reference to his late correspondence with the Shah of Persia ; 
 and he also entertained considerable doubts as to the Ameers 
 acceding to the pecuniary proposal. In adverting to the 
 opposition that might be expected to the payment of tribute, 
 Colonel Pottinger observes : 
 
 " My recent dispatches (par. 4.) will have shown his Lordship, 
 
 * This is an important admission ; because charges of a grave nature 
 were afterwards founded on this letter to the Shah of Persia, and the Ameers 
 accused of treachery to the British Government.
 
 28 
 
 that should the popular ferment take such a turn, Noor Mahomed 
 Khan has in himself no power to withstand it, even supposing he 
 was cordially disposed to cling to us. Sobdar and his party will, 
 in all probability, even go so far as to declare, that the demand is 
 a breach of the late agreement, on the principle, that without 
 our assistance Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk had no means of exacting 
 one rea from them, consequently that the demand may be considered 
 our own." 
 
 This is a very broad hint, not to be misunderstood, and the 
 Envoy, with great naivete, adds : 
 
 " I do not, by pointing at this argument, mean for an instant to 
 uphold its correctness, but it is one just suited to the capacity and 
 feelings of the individuals with whom I have to negotiate, and 
 which I feel almost certain will be brought forward." 
 
 And in allusion to the difficulties he had to contend with, 
 and the altered tone of the Ameers, he states : 
 
 " Had our present connection existed some years, and our resi- 
 dent thereby had time, by constant kindly intercourse with the 
 chiefs and people, to have removed the strong and universal im- 
 pression that exists throughout Sinde, as to our grasping policy, 
 the case might have been widely djfferent ; but I enter on my new 
 duties without any thing to offer, and with a proposal that will 
 not only strengthen the above impressions (for many besides the 
 Sindees will believe at the outset that we arc making a mere use of 
 Shah Shoojah's name), but revive a claim to tribute which has long 
 been esteemed obsolete." 
 
 For these reasons, he considered it would be requisite to 
 take the precaution of requesting the Government of Bombay 
 to take early steps to prepare a force for eventual service in 
 Sinde in order, of course, to press our friendship on those 
 unruly Ameers, who were so blind to their own real interests. 
 Under the discouraging aspect of affairs, the Governor- 
 General was glad to make the most of the supposed in- 
 trigue with Persia. 
 
 His Lordship considered, (page 47 to 50,) that there was 
 no doubt the Ameers had addressed the letter to the Shah of 
 Persia, (never denied,) of which a translation had been sub-
 
 29 
 
 nutted by the Resident ; that the tender of allegiance at the 
 time when the opposition of the British Government to the 
 Shah's designs had long been avowed and notorious the hos- 
 tility to British interests which might be implied from Noor 
 Mahomed Khan's letter and his duplicity in making, at the 
 same moment, professions of submission to Persia, and of 
 close alliance with the British Government had forfeited for 
 him, on its part, all confidence and friendly consideration ; 
 which if it was proved that Meer Sobdar had continued faithful 
 to his engagements, the Resident was required to consider 
 whether that chief might not be placed at the head of the 
 administration of affairs in Sinde, under such conditions as 
 should secure in that country the ascendancy of British 
 influence. It was then intimated, that a British force of not 
 less than 5,000 men should be in readiness at Bombay, to be 
 sent to Shikarpore as a reinforcement of the army under Sir 
 Henry Fane. 
 
 It was accordingly determined to despatch (p. 43) that force 
 to occupy Shikarpore or such part of Sinde as might be deemed 
 eligible for facilitating operations beyond the Indus; and it 
 was intimated to the Resident, that not only those who had 
 shown a disposition to favour our adversaries, but those who 
 displayed an unwillingness to aid us in the just and necessary 
 undertaking in which we were engaged must be displaced, 
 and give way to others on whose friendship and co-operation 
 we might be able implicitly to rely. 
 
 The Resident in Sinde (page 55), in submitting to the 
 Ameers the expectation of the British Government that they 
 would pay the amount stated by the Tripartite Treaty, and 
 otherwise aid in the establishment of Shah Shoojah, informs 
 them that they must perfectly understand that the measures 
 described were not open to further consideration, but had 
 been finally resolved on ; and that any hesitation on their 
 part, or that of any other power, to comply with what was asked 
 of them, must be deemed to be a refusal, and immediate 
 steps taken to remedy it, which it was obvious could only be 
 done by calling in additional troops, which were all ready 
 both in the Bengal and Bombay territories.
 
 30 
 
 Noor Mahomed Khan admitted that he wrote a letterto Maho- 
 med Shah of Persia (page 58), but denied that his ureeza was 
 to the purport or effect supposed ; and Colonel Pottinger states 
 most decidedly, that the " degree of treachery of Noor Maho- 
 med Khan and his parti/ remains to be proved." 
 
 The Governor-General, nevertheless, expressed a hope that 
 if a better disposition had not been evinced by the Ameers, 
 the Resident had entered into a provisional engagement with 
 Meer Sobdar, or some other member of 'the family (page 59) who 
 might be disposed to enter cordially into our views, to the ex- 
 clusion of the Ameers who had shown an unwillingness to co- 
 operate with us ; and it was expected that the Resident had 
 called for the advance of the Bombay army. 
 
 The Resident's equanimity appears to have been much upset 
 by the conduct of some of the " mob screeching and yelling," 
 and pelting stones (page 60), on his return from an interview 
 with Meer Sobdar; but an ample apology was made. Noor 
 Mahomed Khan sent his son to say he was overwhelmed 
 with shame (page 63, par. 4) ; that he had punished all those 
 whom it could be discovered had any share or hand in the 
 outrage, and intended to turn them out of the city ; and 
 finally, that he was our devoted friend and ally, and his 
 country and resources were at our service. 
 
 A very important fact respecting the demand for tribute 
 (page 63), was now brought by the Resident to the notice 
 of the Governor-General. I give it in the Resident's own 
 words : 
 
 " The question of a money payment by the Ameers of Sinde to 
 Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, (par. 6,) is, in my humble opinion, 
 rendered very puzzling, by two releases written in the Koran, and 
 sealed and signed by His Majesty, which they have produced. 
 Their argument now is, that they are sure the Governor-General 
 of India does not intend to make them pay again for what they 
 have already bought and obtained in the most binding and solemn 
 form, a receipt in full. I have procured copies of the releases, 
 and will give them my early attention ; but in the meantime I 
 may respectfully observe, that the matter can only be properly 
 discussed and settled when the king and his ministers shall be on 
 the spot, to support and establish the royal claims."
 
 31 
 
 This certainly was a very puzzling question ; but as the 
 Resident at the same time stated (p. 7) 
 
 " With regard to the ability of the Ameers of Hyderabad to 
 pay, I have made such inquiries as lay in my power, without 
 exciting alarm or suspicion. The result is, that the highest 
 estimate of their treasures is one and a-half crores, the lowest 
 75 lacs. The revenue of all Sinde is reported to have fluctuated 
 between 40 and 50 lacs per annum for a great lapse of time : 
 when the mission was here in 1809, it was then believed to be 
 42 lacs ; and now it is said to be 50 : assuming the latter amount, 
 the Khyrpore share is 15 lacs for the Hyderabad family.* This is 
 subdivided into four portions of 6| lacs each, for which the Ameers 
 drew lots some time ago, and Noor Mahomed Khan gets an extra 
 lac and a-half for Durbar expences. Of the Khyrpore share, Meer 
 AH Moorad is stated to have one-half to himself, and Meers Roos- 
 tum Khan and Moobaruck the other moiety. No one here knows 
 any thing of the Meerpore financial affairs." 
 
 It was the Resident's opinion (and how could he expect 
 otherwise ?) that it would be foolish to hope for the cordial 
 co-operation or sincere friendship of the Ameers (page 9). He 
 thought it was shown that their government would join our 
 enemies to-morrow did it see they were stronger than we ; 
 and the assistance it was about to afford (if such it could be 
 called) was the fruit of its fears, and not its good-will. 
 
 Complaints continued to be made by the Resident against 
 Noor Mahomed Khan (page 64, par. 1), who had evinced the 
 same suspicious, unfriendly, and despicable conduct, and 
 who manifested a great opposition (par. 3) to the selection of 
 a spot for the Residency (par. 4) ; and with reference to the 
 proposed passage of the army at Sukkur, to whicb he was 
 averse ; and being shown a letter from Meer Roostum Khan, 
 of a friendly nature (par. 7), Noor Mahomed Khan insolently 
 and loudly observed, that " the Governor-General's orders 
 were not the decrees of the Almighty, and .could and should be 
 altered." 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes stated (page 66) that he* was most 
 peculiarly situated with the chief of Khyrpore (Meer Roos- 
 tum Khan), as he had none of the hostile feelings which Colonel 
 * Sic in orig.
 
 32 
 
 Pottinger represented to exist in Lower Sinde; and Sir Alex- 
 ander also stated he had received a communication from 
 Meer Roostum Khan, who had been informed by Noor 
 Mahomed Khan of Hyderabad, that "the English sought to 
 break their treaties." Such, no doubt, was the conviction of 
 the Ameers, and must be the impression of every impartial 
 reader of these papers. 
 
 Colonel Pottinger reported '(page 67) that Noor Mahomed 
 Khan still continued to send messages breathing nothing but 
 friendship and devotion ; but still the Colonel considered 
 he had some sinister plot in view, and was destitute of either 
 truth or shame. In fact, the Resident seemed to have im- 
 bibed a strong and unconquerable prejudice against Noor 
 Mahomed Khan, because that chief did not come into every 
 view proposed to him, however oppressive or arbitrary. All 
 dependence on the aid and good-will of Noor Mahomed Khan, 
 the principal Ameer (page 69), having been abandoned by 
 Colonel Pottinger, that officer determined immediately to 
 request the Bombay Government to despatch a force of not 
 less than 5,000 men to Sinde. 
 
 Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, however, continued to 
 manifest the most friendly feelings and entire submission 
 (page 72). 
 
 With reference to the money payment required of the 
 Ameers (par. 9), Sir A. Burnes mentioned that it was stated 
 the Khyrpore family were poor ; that Shah Shoojah had 
 excused their paying anything last time, and that his oaths on 
 the Koran, which they had, were as so much waste paper if' we 
 did not interfere ; and finally, it was but right to expect we 
 would reward them by friendly consideration. 
 
 Much correspondence from Sir Alexander Burnes follows 
 (pages 75 to 80), respecting the treaty with the Ameers of 
 Khyrpore. The proposal made by the Ameers of that State 
 was indicative of their opposition to the British Government 
 taking possession of any part of their country, which was 
 unquestionably the cause of their shyness. The draft treaty 
 (page 76) proposed by the Ameers of Khyrpore was as 
 follows :
 
 33 
 
 " The cause of writing this document is this, that I, Captain 
 Burnes, made a treaty on the part of the East India Company 
 with their Highnesses Meer Roostun Khan, the chief and ruler of 
 his own territories, Meer Moobaruck Khan, and Meer AH Moorad 
 Khan Talpoor, and concluded it in this manner : That generation 
 after generation, and descent after descent, as long as the glorious 
 sun, by the command of God, gives light to this world, the Go- 
 vernment of the East India Company will by no means and on no 
 account, either directly or indirectly, interfere with or claim the 
 territories enjoyed by the said Meers, nor will take possession of a 
 dam or drain of their country, and will never interfere in com- 
 manding or punishing in its revenue and political affairs." 
 
 " Justice, decision of cases, and all other important affairs of their 
 jurisdiction, will rest in their own hands. The friend of both 
 parties will be considered a friend, as the enemy on both sides will 
 be deemed an enemy." 
 
 In the second treaty (page 77) proposed by the Ameers, to 
 the same effect, it is added : 
 
 "If any from adjacent quarters should oppress the Meers of 
 Khyrpore, or covet them, the Government of the East India Com- 
 pany will protect and assist the Meers. Please God, no change, 
 even equal to the point of a hair, will take place in this arrange- 
 ment." 
 
 * 
 
 Copies and translations of the treaties (page 80) given to 
 the Ameers of Sinde by Shah Shoojah, having been forwarded 
 by the Resident (par. 2), that officer, in transmitting them to 
 the Governor-General, gave it as his opinion, that the release 
 granted to the Ameers contained 
 
 " A formal renunciation on behalf of the king of any sort of 
 claim or pretensions in Sinde and Shikarpore, and their dependen- 
 cies, and promises that none shall be made. How this is to be got 
 over I do not myself see, but I submit the documents, with every 
 deference, for the consideration and decision of the Governor- 
 General of India." 
 
 And he adds, 
 
 " From the inquiries (par. 3.) I have been able to make subse- 
 quently to that date, I have every reason to believe that the esti- 
 
 C
 
 34 
 
 mate I then formed of the revenue of Sinde was considerably over- 
 rated. I understand that the shares of each of the Hyderabad 
 Ameers have not exceeded five and a-half lacs of rupees for 
 several years, including every item, and above one-half of this was 
 received in kind, grain, ghee, coarse sugar, oil, forage, &c., and 
 transferred by their Highnesses to their dependent chiefs and fol- 
 lowers, who seldom receive above one-third of their salaries in 
 cash, the overplus in kind being exchanged, both by these latter 
 classes and the Ameers themselves, with merchants, for such foreign 
 productions as they may require." 
 
 Notwithstanding the assurance given by Fukkur Shah 
 (page 83, par. 15), that Noor Mahomed Khan had expressed 
 a great anxiety to meet all the Resident's wishes in every 
 way, by giving orders to collect grain, boats, and camels for 
 the Bombay troops, Colonel Pottinger had no confidence in 
 him; and he considered that Noor Mahomed Khan's con- 
 duct, in several instances, places that chief" at the mercy of his 
 Lordship the Governor-General." 
 
 The releases of Shah Shoojah in favour of the Ameers 
 produced (page 85), at once seemed to invalidate the claims 
 for a money payment so arbitrarily and unexpectedly intro- 
 duced into the Tripartite Treaty. The dread of this pre- 
 posterous and unjust demand being enforced, and the fears 
 of more being exacted, doubtless led to the opposition of the 
 Ameers to the establishment of a Residency, and rendered 
 them very naturally suspicious and distrustful. 
 
 A considerable difference of opinion seems to have existed 
 between Colonel Pottinger and Sir Alexander Burnes (page 
 89), in respect to the conduct of Meer Roostum Khan of 
 Khyrpore (so much commended by Sir Alexander) and the 
 terms of the treaty proposed ; the Colonel objecting to those 
 offered by the other political agent. The two doctors, in- 
 deed, appear to have differed on several points, but Colonel 
 Pottinger applied powerful stimulants to his patients. 
 
 The Governor-General, acting on the communication from 
 the Resident in Sinde, (page 91) resolves on a decided course, 
 and in a despatch to Colonel Pottinger of 24th Oct. 1838, 
 his Lordship hopes that the Resident's hesitation to order the
 
 35 
 
 advance of the British force had been removed by his letter 
 of 20th Sept. ; as the treachery of the Ameers had, in his 
 Lordship's opinion, been established by a variety of concurrent 
 circumstances. " Of their having written a slavish ureeza to 
 the Shah of Persia" (says the secretary) "you do not express 
 the slightest doubt," and the treatment of the self-styled 
 Persian prince at Hyderabad was an additional confirmation ; 
 while the insulting letter to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, coupled 
 with the distinct announcement made to the Resident and the 
 native agent, regarding opposition to the Shah, afforded 
 conclusive proof of the design of the Ameers to favour our 
 enemies. It was therefore determined (page 92) to establish a 
 British subsidiary force inLoiver Sinde, at the earliest practicable 
 moment. The secretary observes, 
 
 " Whether, therefore, the present Ameers are suffered to retain 
 power, an arrangement which his Lordship would now, in th 
 first instance, contemplate" (What, after all such imputed trea- 
 chery !) " or whether Meer Sobdar is raised to the Government 
 under our auspices, the reception of a subsidiary force must be 
 made a sine qua non of the new engagement." 
 
 In the P. S. it is again urged that not a moment's 
 delay should be allowed in effecting the advance of the 
 troops from Bombay. 
 
 " When the force shall have advaced into Sinde " (states Mr. 
 Secretary Macnaghten), " you may then disclose the willingness 
 of his Lordship still to respect the authority of the Ameers Noor 
 Mahomed Khan and Nusseer Mahomed, conditionally on the esta- 
 blishment of a subsidiary force, under such additional instructions 
 as may be conveyed to you ; but it is prudent that you should not 
 make premature allusion to that determination." 
 
 A very curious communication was made by Colonel Pot- 
 tinoer to Sir Alexander Burnes of an interview with Lalla 
 Suddanund, (page 94) who had formerly been vakeel at the 
 court of Runjeet Sing. The interview is thus described : 
 
 " He went on to ask, (par. 4,) in what I considered a very flip- 
 pant style, what could induce his Lordship the Governor-General 
 to revive the obsolete question of the Sinde tribute to the King of 
 Cabool ?' He said, ' It is a joke talking of it as a demand of the 
 
 c 2
 
 36 
 
 king's ; you have given him bread for the last five-and-twenty 
 years ; and any strength he has now, or may hereafter have, pro- 
 ceeds from you, so that the demand is literally yours.'" 
 
 A very natural observation, but the Colonel was much sur- 
 prised at his impertinent communication, and after pointing 
 out the exlraordinaiy kindness of the Governor-General, in 
 thinking as his Lordship had done, of the interests of the 
 Sinde Ameers, Lalla Suddanund was dismissed, that plain- 
 spoken man having expressed his surprise that so great a 
 man as the Colonel should report such trifles to the Governor- 
 General, as his doubts respecting certain correspondence in- 
 dicated. 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes, in a letter to Colonel Pottinger, 
 stated, 
 
 " With reference to the doubts, (Page 95 and 97,) which 
 arise from the documents given by Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, 
 it is proper to observe, that the reasons for Shikarpore being 
 given up are obvious, since that district never belonged to 
 Sinde during the monarchy, and was a subsequent addition. It 
 is also clear from these papers, that Shikarpore and Sinde are to 
 be held as formerly, and not interfered with ; the interpretation 
 of which evidently is, that the Ameers are not to be disturbed in 
 the government if they pay tribute. Had Shoojah meant anything 
 else he would have cancelled the Rukum of the former Timor." 
 
 Bravo, Sir Alexander, you were always ready to find an 
 excuse for any proceeding that might be agreeable or useful 
 lo the ruling authority, just as most young politicals of your 
 stamp, without experience and reflection upon the conse- 
 quences to the interests of the poor natives, or the national 
 honour, are too apt to lend themselves to any plan that may 
 happen to be popular with the supreme power at the moment; 
 but this mode of special pleading, successful enough in small 
 matters, will not do for India, at the present moment we 
 must deal with facts, not ingenious ratiocination. 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes also gives it as his opinion (page 96, 
 par. 3), that the documents which the Ameers of Sinde pos- 
 sess from Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, were u in his mind of 
 small value." Certainly so, if the Governor-General was de- 
 termined to disregard all justice, and to enforce the money 
 payment at all hazards.
 
 37 
 
 Great doubts seem now (Nov. 1838) to have been enter- 
 tained of the sincerity of Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, 
 (page 96) with whom Sir Alexander Burnes had been nego- 
 ciating, and whose conduct had been so favorably noticed 
 by that officer ; and Colonel Pottinger repeats his inten- 
 tion of revising the treaty with the chief when he should 
 have obtained satisfactory and unequivocal proof of his 
 having acted up to his professions, hut not till then. And 
 Colonel Pottinger expressed his concern, that Sir Alexander 
 Burnes should have entered into engagements and recorded 
 opinions from which he (the Colonel) felt obliged entirely to 
 dissent ! 
 
 The Governor-General, in reference to the negociations 
 (page 101) with Meer Roostum Khan, directed Sir Alexander 
 Burnes to state that 
 
 " As respects Bukkur, it would be required by this ' Govern- 
 ment as a depot for treasure and ammunition ' only during the 
 war ; and it will be advisable that this fact be carefully impressed 
 upon the Meers when reference is made to the question of our 
 occupancy of it." 
 
 The Resident in Sinde appeared to have taken a most un- 
 conquerable dislike to Noor Mahomed Khan (par. 8) who 
 " swore by the Almighty and the Koran, that he was ignorant 
 of every one of the instances of unfriendliness which were 
 pointed out," but the Colonel put no trust in him ; and again, 
 on a deputation reading a memorandum of from twelve to 
 twenty items, (page 104) containing an enumeration of the 
 various instances in which Noor Mahomed Khan had acceded 
 to his demands, the Colonel flatly contradicted many of their 
 assertions. On this occasion, there seems to have been too 
 much of what is known by the term gasconading very un- 
 becoming the dignity of a British Envoy, and quite foreign, 
 I am sure, to the wishes of the Directors of the East India 
 Company, who do not require nor approve of these adventi- 
 tious aids to support their authority or advance their interests. 
 The Resident said, 
 
 " That had the Ameer met us halfway, we should have been 
 obliged to him, (par. 7,) and felt sure of his friendship ; that had 
 the road not been given we should have taken it ; that the empire
 
 38 
 
 of Hindoostan was a gem of too great value to be trifled with ; that 
 the Governor-General was prepared at one moment, had it been 
 necessary, in support of our rights and honour, to yo to war with 
 Persia, Afghanistan, Nepaul and Burmah ; that had Herat 
 fallen, we should only have had the trouble of retaking it." 
 All this is in bad taste ; there was rather too much vaunting 
 
 f O 
 
 for a friend who ostensibly went to offer mediation and assist- 
 ance. The Colonel's temper appears to have been much ruffled 
 at times. 
 
 The memorandum submitted by Syed Ismael Shah on the 
 part of Noor Mahomed Khan, notwithstanding the con- 
 temptuous manner in which it was treated by Colonel Pot- 
 tinger, appears, in my humble judgment, to be a fair, 
 temperate and convincing statement in reply to the Resident's 
 manifold accusations against the unfortunate Ameers. It is 
 briefly as follows ; that notwithstanding former treaties to the 
 contrary, he had given British troops a passage through 
 Sinde, allowed boats to be hired, grain to be bought, and, 
 contrary to stipulations of former treaties, admitted a British 
 Resident, and granted a site for a residency. 
 
 In reply to the accusation respecting intrigues with Persia, 
 (page 107), the Ameer seems completely to exonerate himself 
 from the oft repeated charge ; and if the following does not 
 carry conviction to any unprejudiced mind, I do not know 
 what could possibly do so. He says, 
 
 " You are constantly alluding to the letter (par. 6) I gave to 
 Hajee Hoossein Ali Khan. I did so in the month of Seth, (June,) 
 during the hot weather, when I knew nothing of the differences 
 between the British Government and Mahomed Shah. English 
 ambassadors were always in Persia, and my ancestors were on 
 friendly terms with Futteh Ali Shah ; but to please the British 
 Government I neither sent letters of condolence on the former 
 Shah's death, nor of congratulation on Mahomed Shah's acces- 
 sion." 
 
 After some other extremely pertinent observations, the paper 
 of defence concludes in the following emphatic and apparently 
 truthful style : 
 
 " Your Moonshees have repeatedly told me (par. 13) I had 
 shown no sort of friendship for the British Government. This is
 
 39 
 
 most astonishing, for 1 have omitted no proof of my devotion. I 
 have even agreed to many points that were not in the former trea- 
 ties, out of regard to the dictates of friendship and dependency on 
 the word of that personage, which is like letters engraved on stone. 
 This I have done, even to the extent of allowing the British army 
 to pass within a coss of Hyderabad, although such concession is at 
 variance with all custom and the proper safety of the country. It 
 is written in all the treaties, that the alliance between the States 
 shall continue from generation to generation. I am most anxious 
 to preserve the friendship of the British Government ; you are able 
 to judge. How, then, can we be assured (when you assert what 
 you have done?)" " If you wish for friendship, (par. 14,) do not 
 bring forward these cavils and stories. Keep the alliance fully in 
 view." 
 
 Preparations were now (18th Nov. 1838), made for the 
 expected arrival of the troops from Bombay at the mouth of 
 the Indus (page 111); the officer in command being informed 
 that as they were to be landed with the concurrence of the 
 Sinde Government, they were to consider themselves in a 
 friendly country, and Lieutenant Eastwick was despatched to 
 Vikkur to assist in making the necessary arrangements for the 
 disembarkation of the force. 
 
 A long letter from Colonel Pottinger to the Governor- 
 General (page 112), refers to another memorandum submitted 
 by the Ameers, and some angry discussion, as usual, on the 
 part of the Resident, who, on this occasion, was extremely 
 arbitrary and dictatorial in the style of his replies, and scarcely 
 left an opening for amicable negociation or adjustment. In 
 fact, as the troops were expected, it evidently was not desired 
 to enter, at once, into friendly communication (in pursuance 
 of the direction of the Governor-General), for there were other 
 points to gain, and which there seemed no expectation of 
 attaining but by compulsion and working on the fears of the 
 Ameers by the presence of a large force. 
 
 Lord Auckland (page 113), through his secretary, dwells on 
 the treachery and enmity of the two principal Ameers of Sinde, 
 but 
 
 " His Lordship is not yet prepared to record a final opinion as 
 to the measures which may be necessary for our future security 
 against their machinations. Much will depend on the amount of
 
 40 
 
 evidence which may be attainable as to the extreme duplicity of 
 those Ameers in their intercourse with Persia, of which, although 
 there is no doubt in the mind of his Lordship, some difficulty may 
 be found in obtaining positive proof " " The Governor- 
 General is hardly disposed to concur entirely in the opinion you 
 have expressed, to the effect that the circumstances specified in the 
 21st par. of your letter, dated 25th ult., however clearly they show 
 the want of all honour and honesty in the character of Noor 
 Mahomed Khan, are such as to place that chief at our mercy." 
 
 Reference was again made to the probable elevation of Meer 
 Sobdar, if Noor Mahomed Khan should not agree to all the 
 terms required ; and it was recommended to form separate 
 treaties with all the Ameers (page 116), as the Governor- 
 General was of opinion that much of advantage may be 
 expectedyVom this subdivision of authority ; it was to be made 
 the chief object of any negociation into which the Resident 
 might be led, to stipulate for the free navigation of the Indus. 
 " It would, indeed, be incompatible" (says the secretary) " with 
 our position, as a subsidized power in Sinde, that the article in 
 the former treaty, guarding against the use of the Indus for the 
 transport of military stores or munitions of war, should remain in 
 force." 
 
 In reference to the estimate of the revenues having: been 
 
 O 
 
 overrated, as admitted by the Resident, he was informed that 
 the subsidy must ultimately be fixed with reference to the avail- 
 able means of the several Ameers. And pending the considera- 
 tion of the question as to the proposed demand for the cession 
 of Kurrachee, contributions should be required for the, at 
 least partial, payment of a subsidiary force in Lower Sinde. 
 The arguments in favour of the releases granted to the Ameers 
 of Sinde for tribute by Shah Shoojah are dismissed in the 
 most summary manner imaginable, as follows: 
 
 " The Governor-General refrains for the present from recording 
 any opinion relative to the releases which his Majesty Shah Shoojah 
 is stated to have executed. Admitting the documents produced to 
 be genuine, and that they imply a relinquishment of all claim to 
 tribute, still they would hardly appear to be applicable to present 
 circumstances ; and it is not conceivable that his Majesty should
 
 41 
 
 have foregone so valuable a claim without some equivalent, or that 
 some counterpart agreement should not have been taken, the non- 
 fulfilment of the terms of which may have rendered null and void 
 his Majesty's engagements. Whatever may be the real facts of 
 the case, the question is one which concerns the contending parties. 
 It will be for the Ameers of Sinde to consider whether it will not 
 be of the first importance to them to make such a final arrange- 
 ment with Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, as shall secure their being 
 guaranteed by the British Government, in the independence of their 
 country after his accession to power." 
 
 Precious independence, indeed, and splendid reasoning ! 
 The Ameers had nothing to fear from Shah Shoojah, and 
 required none of our guarantees on the subject. They had 
 discharges solemnly executed and recorded on the Koran, 
 and they would never have heard of any claim for tribute, 
 but for our officious intermeddling with their affairs. The 
 conclusion of his Lordship's argument is all of a piece : 
 
 " The Governor-General is of opinion, that it is not incumbent 
 on the British Government to enter into any formal investigation of 
 the plea adduced by the Ameers, though the arbitration of the 
 question might possibly be left to the Envoy and Minister at the 
 Court of Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, if his Majesty and the Ameers 
 should both be desirous of this mode of adjusting it." 
 
 What was this but a solemn mockery ? Arbitration by the 
 minister at the court of Shah Shoojah indeed! The very 
 party who penned these arguments, very probably the party 
 who suggested the preposterous claim ! The Ameers were 
 satisfied with the release, and required no arbitration in the 
 matter, and did not court our interference at all. They would 
 have been content to take ail the consequences of a refusal, 
 as far as Shah Shoojah was personally concerned; but they 
 were sorely afraid of the British Government, and their fears 
 were ingeniously wrought upon. 
 
 The Resident in Sinde (page 1 19, par. 3) still continued to 
 complain of Noor Mahomed Khan, and stated that the Go- 
 vernor-General must, he felt assured, be fatigued with the 
 barefaced falsehoods and unblushing assertions of the 
 "firm and devoted friendship ," in which that chief persisted
 
 42 
 
 with a degree of pertinacity such as was quite wonderful. 
 Nevertheless, Col. Pottinger admits that the Ameer had told 
 his moonshee that he and Nusseer Khan were ready to pay 
 down their portion of the sum to be given to Shah Shoojah 
 ool-Moolk ; and after the army had passed through Sinde, 
 he and the Resident would arrange for recovering the shares 
 of his brothers and relations, (par. 4,) and seizing their 
 possessions, if they did not agree. The Colonel stated to the 
 deputation in reply, that he was not authorized to interfere 
 on this point ; but he would refer any person the Ameers 
 chose to send ta the frontier with a letter, to Mr. Mac- 
 naghten, the British minister with the Shah. 
 
 Col. Pottinger was of opinion (par. 17.) that we should de- 
 mand from the Ameers of Sinde the cession of all the country 
 lying on the right bank of the Indus, agreeably to a plan speci- 
 fied ; by which arrangement (par. 18.) "the Ameers would be left, 
 with reduced incomes, it is true, in the enjoyment of the only 
 pursuits and pleasures which they seem to think of." (par. 19.) 
 The Resident has manifold and cogent reasons why the sub- 
 sidiary force should not be stationed at the capital, where 
 barbarism and prejudice would lead to continual disputes 
 without any counterbalancing advantage. After pointing 
 out the plan proposed, viz., to have a regiment of native 
 infantry and a company of artillery at Kurrachee, and the 
 rest of the troops at Tatta, the Resident observes, " With 
 these troops, and British agents residing at Hyderabad and 
 Khyrpore, / look on it that our perfect supremacy throughout 
 Sinde will be as fully established as though we had entirely 
 subjugated it, a measure which, for the reasons stated in 
 some of my former despatches, I could by no means recom- 
 mend." But, alas 1 what has been the final issue ? 
 
 The Bombay Government was informed, (page 122, par. 3.) 
 in reply to an enquiry as to the object of the force, by the 
 Resident in Sinde, that he had sent for the troops, under the 
 impression, which he still entertained, that it was the inten- 
 tion of the Governor-General that they should compel the 
 Ameers into acquiescence now to be prescribed to them. n 
 Exactly so ; no disguise about it.
 
 43 
 
 A significant intimation is given (page 124, par. 11.) by Sir 
 Alexander Burnes that he would not lose sight of the Gover- 
 nor-General's views on the subject of Bukkur ; but if Hydera- 
 bad became the station of a subsidiary force, and Bukkur 
 was demanded by us, men's eyes will only see that we have 
 seized Sinde, and make no distinction between friend and foe. 
 It was not military possession of Bukkur which frightened 
 the Ameers so much as our vicinity to their families." The 
 uncourteous, arbitrary conduct of Colonel Pottinger, in all 
 his communications at this time (Nov. 1838), with Noor Ma- 
 homed Khan, and his obstinate refusal of concession, and 
 disregard of friendly professions, must have been calculated 
 to rouse the feelings of the chiefs and people. They were 
 goaded in every possible way ; no regard being had to former 
 treaties. 
 
 At this stage, (page 125) Sir Alexander Burnes gives his 
 sentiments to the Governor-General as follows : 
 
 " Every succeeding event points to the policy of securing our- 
 selves on the Indus, and that too without delay. As it is pro- 
 tection of what we have, and not territorial aggrandizement, 
 that we seek for, my decided conviction is, that we should 
 take possession of no part of Sinde. The specious cession of 
 Shikarpore to us, in 1836, by the Ameers, showed how jea- 
 lously, and justly so, the ruler of the Punjaub viewed our pro- 
 ceedings; and if we lay claim to any of the Sinde territories, 
 unless as sites for cantonments and protection, we shall tarnish our 
 national honour throughout Asia, and lead to the belief that we 
 have advanced Shah Shoojah to increase our territories. The only 
 exception to this would be the demand for the port of Kurrachee, 
 which 1 long since suggested ; or, at all events, certain immunities 
 connected with it, so that our landing and trade be not molested. 
 One valid objection to the plan of cession brought forward by the 
 Resident, has struck me, that it will include a considerable portion 
 of the jagheers of a chief whom we wish to conciliate, Meer Sob- 
 dar Khan, and for which it would be difficult to give him a return 
 that did not cause civil commotion. It is, I think, further to be 
 maintained, that the Ameers of Sinde, though they have exhibited 
 hostile and rancorous feelings towards us, have been, as yet, guilty 
 of no act by which we could deprive them of their country. The 
 intention to injury is not tantamount to injury, and only justifies
 
 44 
 
 precautionary measures in self-defence, the first law of nature, 
 and the basis of our present policy West of the Indus that no 
 future injury may befal us a binding to keep the peace, as it is 
 called in civil life, in a fine and securities, which are precisely what 
 the Governor-General of India has prescribed, a subsidiary force of 
 5,000 or 6,000 men as a sine qua non, to be maintained by those 
 Ameers who have intrigued against us Noor Mahomed, Nusseer 
 Khan, and Meer Mahomed at Hyderabad, and Meer Moobaruck 
 Khan at Khyrpore ; a levy of ten lacs of rupees per annum on 
 these personages, will discharge our additional expenditure in the 
 onerous and important duty of protecting British India from the 
 West." 
 
 It will be observed, from the foregoing observations, that 
 the two reputed able diplomatists, Colonel Pottinger and Sir 
 Alexander Burnes, were again at issue. 
 
 It was in vian that Meer Noor Mahomed (page 126.) endea- 
 voured to make peace with Colonel Pottinger, or that he 
 assured him of his friendship and good-will towards the 
 British Government. All advances were met by rude repulses. 
 In fact, it seems evident that it was the Resident's object 
 to keep open the sources of complaint against the Ameers 
 in order to afford the Governor-General a pretext for enforcing 
 and carrying into effect precisely such measures as were 
 deemed necessary for accomplishing the objects connected 
 with the restoration of Shah Shoojah. Hence, when Noor 
 Mahomed, overcome with apprehension, evinced a desire that 
 the Resident should fix the amount to be paid to Shah Shoo- 
 jah, and made the most liberal proposals even on account of 
 the other Ameers, the Colonel met all his offers with the in- 
 timation that he could not interfere, (par. 3) as he, Noor Ma- 
 homed was perfectly aware that, could he persuade the Resi- 
 dent to meet his wishes on this one point, it would be vir- 
 tually an act of indemnity for all his other misdeeds. The 
 Resident stated 
 
 " I have held, however, but one language, and that is, I am pro- 
 hibited by his Lordship from interfering further with regard to the 
 money payment to the Shah ; that, with respect to all other mat- 
 ters, if the Governor-General is pleased to overlook them, it will be
 
 45 
 
 my duty to do the same ; but that I neither can, nor will, make 
 any promise." 
 
 No, the object was still to keep open the sore, and still to 
 have a grievance, so that he might dictate his own terms 
 in all respects. The Ameers were now laid prostrate in the 
 dust (par. 5). A moonshee was sent to Noor Mahomed 
 Khan to inform him that part of the troops had arrived : 
 that if grain was not sold to them, the general officers com- 
 manding would take it by force, paying its price, and would 
 make a signal example of Gholam Shah and all others who 
 might oppose the people disposing of their property to us. 
 This message led to the usual assurances of regret and de- 
 votion, and two confidential officers were hurried off to 
 Vikkur to see that all our wants were supplied. The Resi- 
 dent observed 
 
 " Sobdar Khan produced an alleged copy of a written agree- 
 ment, (par. 7,) which expressly states that all claims for money 
 paid (up to the hour it was written) to Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk 
 were cancelled, and that no demands should ever be made on that 
 account. I told the dewan I was aware that Sobdar had held his 
 territory only a short period ; but that I was no longer em- 
 powered to discuss that question, and that I thought his master 
 should send a vakeel to meet the Shah and Mr. Macnaghten." 
 
 The Resident also sent the moonshees to Noor Maho- 
 med Khan to repeat the impossibility of his interference, 
 that he could not receive a crore of rupees to settle the ques- 
 tion (par. 8), that the money was a very secondary consideration, 
 and that he might send a vakeel to the Governor-General. 
 
 " I added " (says the Colonel,) " that I had heard the purport 
 of his recent messages to the chiefs of Khyrpore through Jan 
 Khan, as well of his invitation to Lieutenant- Colonel Sir A lexander 
 Burnes to come to Hyderabad ; and that I was astonished, after 
 these proofs of his continued treachery and want of reliance in 
 or friendship for me, he ventured to ask my advice or opinion on 
 any subject whatever." 
 
 With whom then was the principal Ameer to communicate ? 
 A feeling of petty jealousy oozes out here, and thus the interests 
 of the public service are frequently sacrificed to personal sen- 
 sitiveness on points of no moment.
 
 46 
 
 The Colonel was again alarmed (par. 9) by a shot being fired 
 from the Ameer's tope-khana or arsenal, directly over his tent 
 and the flag-staff, and which fell about 300 yards in front of the 
 camp. Fortunately no mischief ensued, and the Ameers swore 
 they were utterly ignorant of the deed, and that they would 
 seize the perpetrators, cut off their beards, and hand them over 
 to the Resident, to despatch to Calcutta, to be there put to death 
 or confined for life. But the fact could not be established : 
 the commandant of artillery (an Armenian) denied it, and they 
 could not punish any person without proof. The Colonel was 
 fortunate in always having some cause of provocation. He 
 concluded his despatch by observing that (par. 11) prior to pro- 
 ceeding to Vikkur, he was to have an interview with the Ameers, 
 
 " At which, I understand, they mean to produce both the public 
 and secret memoranda, which I handed to them on my arrival, and 
 to challenge me to show in what part of the former they have 
 failed, as well as to prove the allegations made in the latter. It is 
 almost unnecessary to say that their arguments will have no effect 
 on me." 
 
 Of course not, it would have been quite derogatory. No, 
 the gallant officer was proof against any explanation, and 
 hence has got great credit as a diplomatic officer for carrying 
 his points. No reason, concession, argument, or submission 
 had any effect. An object was to be gained, no matter how. 
 
 The scheme for territorial possession for the puipose of 
 establishing British supremacy in Sinde, (page 129, par. 2,) 
 proposed by Colonel Pottinger, was disapproved by the Gov- 
 General, who was not disposed to entertain any proposition 
 having reference to such territorial possession in Sinde or any 
 adjacent territory. His Lordship observes (13th Dec. 1838), 
 
 " The propriety, and indeed the necessity, of a subsidiary 
 force in the territory of the Ameers, is for many reasons very 
 evident; but his Lordship is prepared rather to submit to pecuniary 
 sacrifice for the sake of a permanent political advantage in that 
 country, than to incur the risk of exciting the jealousy and dis- 
 trust of States hitherto either friendly or neutral, by a course 
 which might be construed by them as indicative of a desire for 
 selfish aggrandizement, rather than of a wish simply to secure the
 
 47 
 
 integrity of our present possessions by a course of proper precaution 
 beyond our immediate frontier." 
 
 This was a fair rebuke, and implied that the Resident's zeal 
 rather outrun his discretion ; and it is evident Lord Auckland 
 had begun to have a more clear perception of the proper line 
 of policy to be adopted. 
 
 Adverting to the disposition of the Ameers (par. 4) to make 
 a money payment to Shah Shoojah, it was intimated to the 
 Resident that 
 
 " The adjustment of this payment is an object of high and im* 
 mediate importance, if the Ameers should generally consent to it; 
 and for the accomplishment of such object his Lordship might be 
 willing even to sanction some reasonable abatement of the demands 
 of the British Government." 
 
 Now comes a letter, of date 13th Dec., 1838, (page 129, 
 par. I), from Sir Alexander Burnes, in great alarm, stating 
 that he hastened to lay before the Governor-General his rea- 
 sons for believing that all friendly relations had ceased, or 
 were about to cease, with the Hyderabad State ; but there is 
 really nothing of importance in the despatch, consisting of nine 
 paragraphs ; and the gallant but unfortunate knight seems to 
 have been prematurely and unnecessarily alarmed. The most 
 trifling incident appears to have been magnified into some 
 awful portending calamity, a friendly communication by the 
 Ameers with other persons construed into treachery of the 
 deepest dye, and no confidence placed in the assurances of the 
 poor rulers of Sinde. 
 
 There is a long and curious despatch from the Resident in 
 Sinde to the Governor-General, (page 130, par. 4,) which 
 demands especial notice. He complains that Noor Mahomed 
 Khan, in an interview prior to his leaving for Vikkur, began 
 with his usual effrontery to accuse the Colonel of unfriendliness, 
 and to ask, what had caused such a change in his feelings 
 towards him. The Ameers renewed their entreaties to fix the 
 amount to be paid to Shah Shoojah, but he declined doing so ; 
 the information received that Noor Mahomed Khan had 
 secretly ordered none to serve the British troops was correct. 
 The Resident stated that he could (par. 17,)
 
 48 
 
 " Indulge no hope of carrying the Governor-General's commands 
 into effect on the principle prescribed. My despatches subsequent 
 to that of the 2nd of November will have shown the abject stale 
 to which Noor Mahomed Khan has been reduced, by my refusal to 
 treat with him relative to the money payment to Shah Shoojah-ool- 
 Moolk ; but even when labouring under his worst apprehensions, it 
 will be observed that no such idea has apparently ever crossed his 
 mind, as that our ultimate plan was to station even a company of 
 sepoys in Sinde ; and the moment that intention is announced, I 
 think it will be the signal for a cordial coalition to oppose our ar- 
 rangements. It will have been further observed, that although 
 Sobdar has stood neutral in all the angry negociations, and has 
 announced his determination to do so, that declaration has inva- 
 riably been accompanied by the proviso that he is not to be dis- 
 turbed in his possessions. Neither he, nor any of the Ameers, has 
 expressed a heartfelt sentiment that bespeaks his or their admission 
 of the justice and necessity of the cause in which we have em- 
 barked ; and it is obvious to me that their sole object is to save 
 themselves, by doing as little as possible to further our views ; nor 
 do I believe that any one of them, or the whole collectively, would 
 willingly give 10,000 rupees at this instant to see the Governor- 
 General's measures perfected to the fullest extent of his Lordship's 
 desires." 
 
 " Even had I authority (par. 18.) to offer them our guarantee of 
 their territories individually, without their paying one farthing for 
 it, but stipulating that we were at our own expense to keep a force 
 in this province, I think they would reject the proposal ; and, 
 therefore, to expect that they will, without coercion, consent to 
 make the smallest pecuniary sacrifice, or agree to our having a 
 single regiment in their country, seems to me hopeless. They have 
 acted all along as though we had put their friendship and for- 
 bearance to the last test, by requiring a passage for our troops 
 through their country, and their recent anxiety to get me to fix 
 the sum they were to pay to the Shah, does not, I am satisfied, 
 spring from the sense they entertain of our friendly interposition, 
 but from a dread that his Majesty will, before he advances from 
 Shikarpore, compel them to less reasonable terms than we should 
 prescribe. I am quite convinced that, were they sure the King 
 would quit Sinde without enforcing any demand, they would run
 
 49 
 
 all future risk rather than come down with one rupee, and that it 
 is the present pressure that alone weighs with them." 
 
 His Lordship seemed to assume that the Hyderabad Ameers 
 would be inclined to listen to the proposal for their contri- 
 buting in part towards the expense of a subsidiary force, as 
 well as to its reception. But that was not the case, and if 
 any thing is asked for beyond what has already been de- 
 manded, we must lay our account to exact it. The Ameers 
 were not inclined to go to war, but it was only their dread of 
 the power and perseverance of the British Government, which 
 had made them succumb so much as they had done, and no 
 demand should be made at that period, which the British 
 Government was not resolved to exact. 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes, in a letter to Sir Willoughby Cotton, 
 (page 134) expresses his pleasure to hear that he was on his 
 way to join them. He also stated that 
 
 " The Ameers have ordered all their artillery to Hyderabad, and 
 the park lias started ; they also called out their troops, but they 
 await further orders. I do not see how Sir John Keane can pass 
 them without 'giving them a licking,' and I have great grounds 
 for thinking he will have to do so." 
 
 Colonel Pottinger addressed an angry letter to Sir A. 
 Burnes, complaining that the disclosure, by the latter officer, 
 of the Governor- General's plan regarding Lower Sinde would 
 be highly ill-advised and premature, for of course the news 
 would be forthwith conveyed to Hyderabad, and if it did not 
 cause the Ameers to break with us at once, it would at least 
 enable them to make preparations for the best resistance in 
 their power. 
 
 The Resident in Sinde states (page 137) 
 
 " It is my present intention to await the receipt of further in- 
 structions from the Governor-General of India, and should they 
 reach me before I am required to act, to do so on the principle laid 
 down in my despatch of the 23rd ultimo, with the view, under all 
 circumstances, of establishing our supremacy in Sinde. The 
 Ameers will still have the option of avoiding war by acceding to 
 our demands ; and if they refuse, I conceive we must settle this 
 
 D
 
 50 
 
 province to our entire satisfaction before we can move into AfF- 
 ghanistan." 
 
 Colonel Pottinger recommended that either the Company's 
 rupee, or one of equal standard, coined in Shah Shoojah-ool- 
 MoolJts name, should be proclaimed as a legal tender through- 
 out Sinde, and likewise that the Ameers should provide and 
 make over 5000 camels. There was no limit to the proposals 
 for exaction by the Colonel. No doubt, he thought he was 
 performing good service, and gratifying the Governor-General. 
 He was making a complete toy of Sinde, and reducing the 
 Ameers to the most abject state. 
 
 It was announced by Sir Alex. Burnes, (page 137) that he 
 had had a task of delicacy, difficulty, and even danger ; but 
 Meer Roostum Khan had shown in the day of trial, what he 
 professed at all times, that he was the sincere and devoted 
 friend of the British nation (page 138). Sir Alex, reported 
 the successful termination of his negociations with the Khyr- 
 pore State, ending in the cession of Bukkur on his Lordship's 
 (par. 1) own terms, in Northern Sinde, being henceforvjard 
 dependent on the British nation. The Meer was coerced into 
 the cession, for the Moonshee, as instructed by the Envoy, 
 (par. 8) replied to all the Meer's objections, that nothing but 
 the unqualified cession of the fortress of Bukkur, during the 
 late war, would satisfy me. He said it was the heart of his 
 country, his honour was centred in keeping it ; his family and 
 children could have no confidence if it .were given up, and 
 that if the Envoy came to Khyrpore, he could speak in person 
 to him on many things. To this the Moonshee had been 
 instructed to say that it was impossible till he signed the 
 treaty : the Envoy had asked a plain question, and wanted a 
 plain answer. The Meer stated, that if Lord Auckland did 
 not seize Kurrachee, or some other place from the Hyderabad 
 family, they, as their enemies, now triumphed, while he, as 
 our dearest friend, was thus depressed. If they were let off, 
 his only resource was to commit suicide. With this, and 
 saying " BismillaT (in the name of God}, he sealed the treaty. 
 Congratulations are offered " on this happy termination of 
 affairs in Northern Sinde."
 
 51 
 
 The first article of the treaty states that there shall be per- 
 petual friendship, (page 139) alliance, and unity of interests 
 between the Company and Meer Roostum Khan, as usual in 
 former treaties, and just so long as our politicals chose to 
 forbear asking something else. We profess friendship, while 
 plundering them of their dearest possessions. 
 
 The feelings under which the unfortunate Roostum Khan 
 ceded Bukkur, (page 142) are apparent from the observations 
 of Sir A. Burnes, in a subsequent despatch. The Meer said : 
 
 " That, in giving up Bukkur to the British, he had had to 
 encounter disgrace ; that his tribe and his family were alike opposed 
 to it ; but that he was an old man, with but a few years to live, and it 
 was to save his children and his tribe from ruin, that he had years 
 ago resolved on allying himself to us ; that other invaders of India 
 might be resisted, but if one of our armies was swept away, we 
 could send another, and that such power induced him alilce to 
 fear and rely upon us; that he was henceforward the submissive and 
 obedient servant of the British, and hoped I would avert all injury 
 befalling him, and tell him, without hesitation, what he could do to 
 please us. The answer to such a declaration was plain to give us 
 orders for supplies, and place all the country, as far as he could, 
 at our command; and he has done so, as far as he can." 
 
 What call you this but exaction? This wonderful stroke 
 of policy would afford the witty writer of Punch an excellent 
 hint for a sketch of a new way of converting an enemy into a 
 friend, or requesting a favour by putting a pistol to his face, 
 and demanding his purse. So much for Sir Alexander's per- 
 suasive eloquence. 
 
 There was no hesitation or reluctance on the part of the 
 Governor-General (page 145) availing himself of the fears of 
 the Ameers, which induced them to express a wish to have the 
 contribution fixed which they were to pay to Shah Shoojah, 
 unjust as that demand was, considering that there had been 
 such ample evidence afforded of releases having been granted, 
 and all claims on account of tribute long previously aban- 
 doned, and no inquiry or investigation of the proofs offered 
 by the Ameers having ever been made. His Lordship, in a 
 
 D 2
 
 52 
 
 letter to the Resident in Sinde, of date 31st Dec. 1838, 
 states 
 
 " It is very evident the Ameers are sensible of the advantages 
 which might accrue to them by satisfying the demands of Shah 
 Shoojah, and they may hope by doing so at once to conciliate the 
 British Government, to obtain pardon for their offences, and to 
 secure themselves from all future claim to tribute on the part of 
 his Majesty ; and the Governor-General would desire to have this 
 question speedily settled, especially with reference to the approach- 
 ing advance of the British troops into Afghanistan" 
 
 Considering that the principal Ameers of Sinde had, " by 
 their treacherous and hostile conduct, exposed themselves to 
 any act of retribution which the British Government may 
 determine," and other circumstances connected with the 
 advance of the troops into Affghanistan, which would induce 
 the Governor-General to abate much from his other claims, 
 however just, and however strong to enforce them; the Resi- 
 dent was authorized to apprise the Ameers that the Governor- 
 General would recommend to Shah Shoojah, his acceptance 
 of their offer in full of all demands, provided a sum on this 
 account was paid into the treasury, within a certain number 
 of days, to be fixed from the date of their offer, and such sum 
 should amount to thirty lacs ; but on no account can be reduced 
 so that the clear payment shall be less than 20 lacs. Bravo ! 
 my Lord, what call you this? This is working on their fears 
 with a vengeance, after all you had heard of releases, and the 
 emphatic and not-to-be-mistaken opinion of Colonel Pottinger. 
 What must neighbouring States think of such proceedings ? 
 Was it not provided that Runjeet Sing was to come in for a 
 share of the spoil ? But still much more was required from 
 the Ameers. 
 
 " Beyond the payment of this sum, you will consider facilities 
 heartily and actively given to the British force on its advance, as 
 the first means by which the principal Ameers may redeem any 
 portion of the favour which they have forfeited. But they will 
 understand at the same time, that such has been the character of 
 their measures, as to render it absolutely necessary that military 
 posts be occupied in their country for the safe maintenance of com-
 
 53 
 
 munication between the army and the sea, and for the easy return 
 of the British force, when all operations shall be concluded, to the 
 Presidency of Bombay ; and that by their proceedings during the 
 present expedition, will the ultimate conduct of the British Govern- 
 ment be regulated. They may be told that the flagrant offensive- 
 ness of their conduct has excited the resentment of the Governor- 
 General. His Lordship lias already stated to you his unwillingness 
 to entertain any proposition for territorial acquisition ; but, for 
 further measures, you will look, according to your previous instruc- 
 tions, to the relief uf the navigation of the Indus from all toll, the 
 maintenance of a British force and the separate independence of 
 each chief, as amongst those the consideration and accomplishment 
 of which are most to be desired" 
 
 What is this but rendering the money and resources of the 
 country completely at our command, as if it had been one of 
 our own provinces, in order to promote an object of policy 
 with which the Ameers had nothing to do ? It is, notwith- 
 standing all this, coolly added : 
 
 " It must be admitted that the terms which his Lordship is at 
 present willing to impose for the facile attainment of the main 
 object of our operations are quite inadequate to our just demands, 
 and that our ally Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk, may be especially dis- 
 satisfied with the low amount of commutation fixed, as regards his 
 
 ' O 
 
 claims of sovereignty." 
 
 After giving his discharge on the Koran, and eating British 
 salt 25 years. 
 
 If the letter attributed to Sir H. Pottinger, lately published, 
 (page 147,) is really the production of that distinguished officer, 
 the following passage in his letter to the Secretary to the Bom- 
 bay Government may fairly be placed in juxta-position,and will 
 be the best defence of Lord Ellenborough and General Napier's 
 policy, yet produced. He says (par. 4) : 
 
 " So far as it is possible to form an opinion on the information I 
 now possess, my idea is, that we must settle Sinde to our satisfac~ 
 tion, even should the Ameers force us to subjugate it, before we 
 look beyond it." 
 
 Is the gallant officer disappointed that he had not the merit 
 of doing what General Napier has since done, and missed 
 his share of the prize-money, after all his exertions to keep up
 
 54 
 
 bad blood with the Ameers ? I am inclined to think that the 
 present Governor-General may have, in no small degree, been 
 guided by the recorded policy of Sir H. Pottinger, as to the 
 effects of intimidation upon the Ameers ; and in pursuing it, 
 he is attacked by the very party who should have been the 
 last man in the world to have made such observations, if, in- 
 deed, it shall be found he is the writer of the letter ascribed 
 to him. 
 
 Lord Auckland gives the Resident in Sinde (page 148) 
 a sort of carte blanche to act as he and Sir John Keane may 
 deem best, with reference to the character of the affairs in 
 Siride being of a " shifty nature." His Lordship still harps 
 upon the indignities which the Ameers had offered, (for 
 which, whether guilty or not, they had done all in their power 
 to atone,) and significantly concludes that the Resident 
 might possibly find, though his Lordship earnestly hoped that 
 might not be the case, " an unsurmountable difficulty in pur- 
 suing measures of moderation" The meaning of this is quite 
 obvious, and requires no comment. 
 
 In a letter to Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, (p. 149,) 
 the Governor-General observes : 
 
 " The judicious mediation of your friend Sir A. Burnes, the 
 highly esteemed and able agent of my government, now with you, 
 has, by the blessing of God, brought about the establishing of our 
 mutual good understanding by treaty, on a fair and lasting basis. 
 The support afforded to you by the British Government will, I am 
 well assured, prove a source of future strength, and, if it be God's 
 will, of continued prosperity to your country." 
 
 Let the poor old exiled Ameer now declare what he thinks 
 of it. I marvel that Lord Auckland was not afraid to use the 
 name of the Almighty on such an occasion, for it is clear he 
 never had the slightest regard to the interests of the Ameer. 
 It was, therefore, using the name of God in vain, that just 
 and Omnipotent Being, who cannot be supposed to regard 
 such outrages and schemes of ambition with favour, and 
 whose awful and signal judgments afterwards were calculated 
 to make so deep an impression on more flinty hearts than 
 that of the Governor-General. Oh ! what a dreadful pouring
 
 55 
 
 out of blood like water ! what horrors, what suffering, what 
 distress, lamentation, and woe, have been produced by these 
 ill-advised measures ! May they be a lesson for the future, 
 and may the discussion at the India House and in Parliament 
 have a salutary effect, and prove a beacon for the time 
 to come against such unjust, such insane projects ! 
 
 The mention by Meer Roostum Khan of a previous written 
 agreement, in every instance, as to the temporary character 
 of the occasional occupation of Sinde by the English, was, in 
 his Lordship's view, calculated to convey the unpleasant idea 
 that the compact was concluded in a spirit on the one side or 
 the other, of jealousy or distrust, and therefore 
 
 " I have struck it out ; and in place of inserting a sentence 
 which casts a doubt on the sincerity of our intentions, I address 
 you this friendly letter, as a lasting assurance of the plain meau- 
 ing and purpose of the words of the separate article, namely, that 
 the British shall avail themselves of the fort of Bukkur, the cita- 
 del of their ally, the Meer of Khyrpore, only during actual war, 
 and periods of preparing for war, like the present. I trust that 
 this mode of re assuring your Highness will have the double effect 
 of setting your mind at ease, and of putting you in possession of a 
 written testimony of my intentions, such as may remain among 
 your records in pledge of the sincerity of the British Govern- 
 ment." 
 
 Have not subsequent events realized the worst apprehen- 
 sions of the Ameer ? and where is now our honesty and 
 good faith ? Let the blown-up ramparts of Emam Ghur tes- 
 tify. Let the Ameers now in exile declare what they think of 
 these pledges ! Shame ! shame upon us ! 
 
 A very important paper comes next in order, (page 151,) 
 being a letter of instructions from Col. Pottinger to his assistant, 
 Lieut. Eastwick, (dated 13th Jan., 1839,) on proceeding to 
 Hyderabad, with letters and a treaty, which they were required 
 .to execute. So successful had been the arbitrary dictation pur- 
 sued by the Resident, that amongst other communications, he 
 directs his assistant to 
 
 " Tell the Ameers that Sinde (par. 8) forms a natural and in- 
 tegral portion of Hindoos tan, that the supremacy of that empire
 
 56 
 
 has devolved on us, and that we cannot and will not allow any 
 other power to intermeddle ; that it thence follows, that they have 
 now no option left to them of binding their interests irrevocably 
 with ours, and that, if they neglect the opportunity, they may 
 deeply repent it when it is too late." 
 
 " Their jealous and suspicious feelings (par. 9) will probably 
 induce their Highnesses to ask, supposing they agree to our present 
 terms, what security they have for our not going further hereafter? 
 The reply to this query, or anything of the same tenour, is so ob- 
 vious, that I need hardly direct your attention to it. It is the 
 strong instance of our good faith, and wish to preserve our ami- 
 cable relations, as exemplified in the treaty you convey to them. 
 They cannot doubt our power to do as we like, and some of them, 
 at least, must feel that their acts deserve severe retributory mea- 
 sures; instead of which we tender them our renewed friendship 
 and protection on such moderate terms, and accompanied by so 
 many advantages, that their refusal of the former will show to the 
 world their resolution not to meet us half-way, and to oblige us to 
 take by force what we ask as friends and protectors." 
 
 This may be fine writing, and Anglo-Indian diplomacy; 
 but it is a very false and immoral argument. It was pre- 
 sumed the 19th article would "flatter and please the Ameers ; 
 but it is one which I consider a dead letter, as the presence 
 of troops in Sinde would be a bar and impediment to any 
 military operations." What paltry trickery, shamelessly 
 avowed ! 
 
 Many are the arguments suggested to be used by Lieut. 
 Eastwick in reply to the numerous objections which the 
 Resident expected the Ameers would very naturally urge 
 against the terms of the treaty, (page 156,) which consisted 
 of 23 articles. Colonel Pottinger, in his letter (page 136) to 
 Noor Mahomed Khan, expressly declared : 
 
 " Your Highness will likewise observe, that the arrangements 
 which have been made will interfere in no degree with the Shikar- 
 gahs, &c. of your Highness and the other Ameers, and that your 
 possessions are placed for ever under the guarantee of the British 
 Government." 
 
 The chief of Khyrpore (page 158) consented for ever to
 
 57 
 
 renounce all right of toll on the river Indus throughout his 
 territories, 16th January, 1839. 
 
 It was represented by Lieut. Eastvvick, (page 159,) that 
 " affairs at this capital (Hyderabad) have assumed decidedly 
 a hostile aspect, and that there is little chance of the present 
 negociation being brought to a favourable conclusion." 
 
 The Commander-in-chief (Sir H. Fane) urged a strong 
 demonstration (page 160) to be made towards Hyderabad, 
 24th January, 1839. 
 
 Sir John Keane reported to the Commander-in-chief, 
 (page 161,) that things were come to a crisis in Lower Sinde, 
 the gentlemen of the Residency having been obliged to 
 leave Hyderabad. The Ameers expressed great dissatisfac- 
 tion at many articles of the treaty, particularly the subsidiary 
 force, and Noor Mahomed Khan said, " Is this to be the 
 reward for allowing your troops a passage through our coun- 
 try ? " The whole country, in front and rear, was armed, 
 and under arms to exterminate the British force, if it could. 
 
 Lieutenant Eastwick gives a very interesting and perspicuous 
 detail of his proceedings, in a long report, (page 163,) a few 
 passages of which only may be noticed. That intelligent and 
 accomplished officer submits very candidly (par. 12) the strong 
 arguments of the Ameers, who, producing a box, from which 
 was taken all the treaties that had been entered into between 
 the British Government and Hyderabad, inquired, 
 
 " ' What is to become of all these ? ' I referred him to the first 
 article of the present treaty. ' Yes,' he said, ' here is another an- 
 noyance. Since the day that Sinde has been connected with the 
 English, there has always been something new ; your Government 
 is never satisfied : we are anxious for your friendship, but we can- 
 not be continually persecuted. We have given a road to yonr 
 troops, and now you wish to remain. This the Beloochees will 
 never suffer. But still we might even arrange this matter, were we 
 certain that we should not be harassed with other demands. There 
 is the payment to the King, why can we obtain no answer on this 
 point ? Four months have now elapsed since this question was 
 first discussed. Is this a proof of friendship? We have failed in 
 nothing; we have furnished camels, boats, grain; we have dis-
 
 58 
 
 tressed ourselves to supply your wants. We will send our ambas- 
 sador to the Governor-General to represent these things; you must 
 state them to Colonel Pottinger.' " 
 
 In reply to the forcible arguments of Lieutenant Eastvvick, 
 (who seems to have performed his duty admirably,) relative to 
 the advantages likely to accrue to the country by the conclu- 
 sion of the treaty, Noor Mahomed Khan said, 
 
 " All this may be true, but I do not understand how it concerns 
 us; what benefit do we derive from these changes? On the con- 
 trary, we shall suffer injury; our hunting preserves will be destroyed, 
 our enjoyments curtailed. You tell us that money will find its 
 way into our treasury ; it does not appear so ; our contractors 
 write to us that they are bankrupt, they have no means of fulfilling 
 their contracts ; boats, camels, all are absorbed by the English 
 troops ; trade is at a stand ; a pestilence has fallen on the land. 
 You have talked of the people; what are the people to us, poor or 
 rich ? what do we care, if they pay us our revenue ? You tell me 
 the country will flourish ; it is quite good enough for us, and not so 
 likely to tempt the cupidity of its neighbours. Hindoostan was. 
 rich, and that is the reason it is under your subjection. No, give 
 us our hunting preserves, and our own enjoyments free from inter- 
 ference, and that is all we require." 
 
 The gallant Envoy having stated the grounds for exempting 
 Meer Sobdar from contributing his share towards the payment 
 of the subsidiary force, and pleaded his poverty, Noor Maho- 
 med Khan said : 
 
 " ' Do not talk of friendship ; I alone have been the friend of the 
 English in the whole of Sinde.' I had also pleaded Sobdar's 
 poverty, having so lately succeeded in his hereditary rights. Upon 
 which Meer Mahomed remarked, ' AH the world is aware that I 
 have no money' (par. 24). Meer Nusseer Khan said in Sinde, in a 
 low voice, ' We are slain.' This 1 heard afterwards from the 
 native agent, who was sitting close to Meer Nusseer." 
 
 As nothing satisfactory could be gained by further discus- 
 sion, and there was reason to apprehend an attack upon the 
 Envoy and his party, (par. 35,) Lieutenant Eastwick prudently 
 decided on quitting Hyderabad. 
 
 An application was now made by Colonel Pottinger to the 
 naval commander-in-chief to take possession of Kurrachee,
 
 59 
 
 where all opposition must be put down, and the Resident 
 stated that, (par. 3) 
 
 " Whether the Ameers are unwilling, or unable, from the 
 violence of their soldiery, to treat with me, it matters little; and 
 should the latter be the fact, it is not to be forgotten that those 
 chiefs have placed themselves in this predicament by calling out 
 their army ; and referring to more recent instructions which I have 
 received from the Governor-General of India, I should not now 
 consider myself at liberty to ratify the treaty I have offered the 
 Ameers, without an additional stipulation, that such further penal- 
 ties shall be inflicted as the Governor-General may think Jit to 
 direct." 
 
 The Resident in Sinde, in a private letter to Mr. Colvin, pri- 
 vate secretary to the Governor-General, (page 172), dated 4tli 
 Feb., 1839, states he considered 
 
 " That our supremacy in Sinde is now finally and fully esta- 
 blished ; and I have sent word to the Ameers, and tell them per- 
 sonally, as well as give it them in writing, that the only chance of 
 their bad conduct being overlooked is total and humble obedience 
 to his Lordship's orders. Whilst I was writing the preceding sen- 
 tence, I have received news which greatly pleases me. The fort of 
 Kurrachee fired one or two guns* at the ' Wellesley,' when the 
 reserve went there. The admiral brought his broadside to bear on 
 it, and it is stated he has levelled it with the dust. I have sent to 
 the Ameers to say that if ' they shake their lip,' Sir John Keane shall 
 do so by Hyderabad, and I will insist on the removal of every per- 
 son in authority from Kurrachee who is now there, before I bring 
 away the reserve. This news has come by Nao Mull's people 
 mounted on express camels, but I hope there is no doubt of it. It 
 will teach these savayes to pay due respect to the British flag in 
 time to come." 
 
 Colonel Pottinger concludes by observing, that a " second 
 deputation has been with me, even more humble than the first, 
 and / equally plain spoken." Rather high-flown, but such is 
 the fashion no\v-a-days of some politicals, when backed by a 
 powerful force. There was a total absence of generosity in 
 this treatment of a reduced foe, no, rather persecuted friends ; 
 
 * Only one, as afterwards proved, and that without shot, merely as a 
 salute.
 
 60 
 
 but it will be hereafter seen that Colonel Pottinger had cause 
 to regret the harsh and unjust proceedings at Kurrachee. 
 
 The fate of Kurrachee not being then known, (6th February 
 1839, page 176), and the season for active operations in 
 Affghanistan rapidly coming on, Mr. Macnaghten, the Envoy 
 with Shah Shoojah, submitted to^the Resident his opinion, 
 
 ' If the door of reconciliation be still open, and you find any 
 difficulty in getting on, that we should be content with requiring 
 from the Ameers an agreement to the following effect : 
 
 " 1st. The payment of thirty lacs of rupees to Shah Shoojah-ool- 
 Moolk within six months, by instalments of five lacs of rupees per 
 mensem. 
 
 " '2nd. The free navigation of the Indus. 
 
 " 3rd. The admission of our Resident, as already agreed upon in 
 a former treaty. 
 
 "4th. Permission and facilities for our troops to pass through 
 the country, and to occupy such stations as we may think proper 
 on the frontier, pending military operations beyond the Indus. I 
 am utterly ignorant of the present state of your negociations ; nor 
 have I ever heard what demands you have made. There may be 
 serious objections to receding from demands once made ; but time 
 is every thing to us, and under certain contingencies we may have 
 only a choice of evils. You may have made a reference to the 
 Governor-General, and it is easy to say I have come from his Lord- 
 ship with powers to grant milder terms than you have imposed; 
 and I certainly think that those which 1 would impose are suffi- 
 ciently humiliating."* 
 
 The difficulties and embarrassments of the Governor-General 
 (page 178) in respect to the advance of the force into Affghan- 
 istan were considerably increased by the turn of affairs in Sinde, 
 and his Lordship intimated to Sir John Keane that 
 
 " Intelligence from Hyderabad, under date 23rd ultimo (Jan.), 
 has just reached me, as to the apparent show of decided hostility 
 on the part of the Ameers, including Meer Sobdar Khan, and I am 
 induced to conclude that circumstances may have, ere this, esta- 
 blished the British power as paramount in Sinde" 
 
 Sir John Keane was aware of his Lordship's objection to any 
 
 * No doubt of it, but Colonel Pottinger was not so easily satisfied. His 
 demands increased with the disposition of the Ameers to concession.
 
 61 
 
 acquisition of territory in Sinde, and it was important that British 
 troops should advance upon Candahar, without the impression 
 attending their progress, that they were employed to reduce 
 Afghanistan into the condition of a province of our Indian 
 empire ; but no specific declaration of our intention as regarded 
 our future connection with Sinde was then called for. Mean- 
 time, military occupation should be held of the country of the 
 Ameers, pending the final settlement of our relations with 
 Sinde, the revenue being collected and the government 
 administered, ad interim, by the native officers, under the 
 superintendence of the Resident. His Lordship said, 
 
 " It will not be difficult (par. 5) to quiet the anxieties of the 
 chiefs above named" (the Khan of Kelat, and the chiefs of other 
 petty States and tribes intermediate between Sinde and the Canda- 
 har territory), " or others similarly situated, by citing to them our 
 conduct when free to exercise our principles of conciliation; and 
 no better instance can be given than in the policy pursued towards 
 the Nawab of Bhuwalpore and the Meer of Khyrpore." 
 
 A communication was made by the Resident in Sinde (10th 
 February, 1839, page 179), to the Envoy with Shah Shoojah, 
 that ten lacs of rupees had been received from the Meers (on 
 account of his Majesty) who had sent a most submissive mes- 
 sage, arid were now our " humblest slaves;" and they begged 
 that the town of Larkhana, now in possession of our troops, 
 might be given up, to which the Resident was not aware of any 
 political objection. 
 
 It may here be noticed, that several despatches of Colonel 
 Pottinger, particularly referred to in his despatch (page 181), 
 to the secretary to the Governor-General, do not appear in the 
 present series : 1st, a letter of llth January on the subject 
 of the reserve being landed at Vikkur, instead of Kurrachee ; 
 and also one dated 19th and 3 1st Jan., and lastly of 1st Feb., 
 reporting acceptance of treaty, and other terms. The report of 
 the 13th Feb. 1839, is one of the most important in the volume, 
 being an account of the Resident's proceedings in enforcing the 
 treaty which he proposed (par. 8). The letter is altogether in 
 a very vaunting style. A deputation which waited on him 
 expressed their surprise at its tenor (par. 9), and made several
 
 62 
 
 applications to be ordered back to Hyderabad, as they declared 
 the Ameers neither would nor could come to any decision till 
 they returned. They went off clandestinely, and it was under- 
 stood, urged the Ameers to resist our demands. 
 
 An unpleasant affair, connected with the death of a Beloo- 
 chee, who had been smuggling spirits into the camp, now 
 occurred. The man had taken to his heels, sword in hand, 
 and in the graphic language of the Colonel, " a Sepoy of the 
 19th regiment infantry, standing sentry over one of the com- 
 mander-in-chief's store tents, seeing the Beloochee approaching 
 him, loaded his musket with praiseworthy alacrity, and shot 
 the Beloochee dead on the spot." . . "The Nawab and his col- 
 leagues talked very liy about the death of one of the Beloo- 
 chees, hinted he might have been taken alive," &c. ; and the 
 issue was that the Colonel's "plain speaking silenced them" 
 and when the news got to Hyderabad, the Ameers gave out 
 that the man who had been killed " was a dog, and richly 
 merited his fate." Of course, they were glad to say or do 
 anything, in order to have peace, and avert a worse calamity. 
 
 The Colonel still maintained the coercing or knock-me-down 
 system. He says : (par. 14.) 
 
 "I intimated to the Ameers on the 30th, through their deputa- 
 tion, the only terms I would accept. I warned them distinctly that 
 if a gun, and even a matchlock were fired, they should lose their 
 country. I made a marked distinction between Meer Sobdar Khan 
 and the other Ameers." 
 
 He adds 
 
 " On the 1st February, I reported to you the acceptance of the 
 treaty and my other terms by the Ameers. On the 4th of this 
 month the army arrived opposite Hyderabad. That afternoon I 
 received intelligence from Kurrachee, that his Excellency the Naval 
 Commander-in-Chief in Her Majesty's ship ' Wellesley,' had bat- 
 tered down the south face of the fort at the mouth of the harbour 
 of Kurrachee, in consequence of the authorities there refusing to let 
 the reserve force land. This intelligence afforded me the highest 
 degree of gratification, and I expressed what I felt on the occasion 
 in my letter of that evening to his Lordship's private secretary, of 
 which I now enclose a copy."
 
 63 
 
 The money was at last forthcoming, the poor Ameers 
 having great difficulty to make up the amount. The Resident 
 goes on 
 
 " The Ameers began to pay the money for Shah Shoojah-ool- 
 Moolk, on the 7th inst, and the first instalment of ten lacs was 
 completed by the evening of the 9th. Their Highnesses wanted 
 me to accept a quantity of silver plate, dishes, Sfc. #e., in part, 
 which I preremptorily refused. I have stipulated that the gold 
 and silver shall be received at the bazaar price of the day, and that 
 any difference for or against the Ameers shall be adjusted in the last 
 instalment. This ten lacs I have sent, under charge of Captain 
 Scott, to Mr. Macnaghten. I found it impossible to get it packed 
 and secured as I could have wished, for neither boxes, nor even a 
 few nails, could be had at this place, and I did not wish to retract 
 my intimation ' that the army should not pass Hyderabad till it 
 was in my hands.' " 
 
 Colonel Pottinger having now succeeded beyond his own 
 most sanguine expectations, in gaining all he chose to dictate, 
 assumes a very high tone towards the unfortunate Ameers, 
 fully as harsh indeed as any thing alleged against the present 
 Governor-General. He says 
 
 " During each of the days that the force was here, that is, from 
 the 4th to the 10th instant, I was tormented, amidst my more 
 important concerns, by almost hourly deputations and messages 
 from the Ameers. It would be idle to trouble his Lordship with 
 the nonsense they talked ; to all of which I held but one tone, and 
 that was the future total and unqualified submission of the Hyder- 
 abad rulers to the pleasure of the Governor-General, as the only 
 
 chance that remained of their forgiveness." " The 
 
 Ameers have not even sent me a message about it (Kurrachee) for 
 they know full well they have only our mercy and liberality to trust 
 
 to." "I trust that what I have done will be honoured 
 
 by the Governor-General's sanction ; I have endeavoured to do 
 what I believe coincided with his Lordship's wishes. Every man in 
 Sinde has seen that we had the country at our feet ; that our 
 armies were ready simultaneously to overwhelm all opposition ; and 
 (as I told the Ameers) to come from all quarters, ' like the. inunda- 
 tions of the Indus. 1 I hope and think what has been here effected 
 and seen, will have a great moral effect on his Lordship's designs
 
 64 
 
 and measures to the North- West; that it will also awe those who 
 may be inimical to us in India cannot be doubted. It has been 
 and will be, my study to inculcate this impression, and the world 
 will now acknowledge that if our power is great, our good faith and 
 forbearance are still more to be wondered at." 
 
 Gracious Powers above ! can the gallant officer be serious ? 
 But he continues : 
 
 " I beg distinctly to record that I anticipate no such event (par. 
 23) ; but if we are ever again obliged to exert our military strength 
 in Sinde, it must be carried to subjugating this country." 
 
 Can Lord Ellenborough or Sir C. Napier be so much blamed 
 after this ? It may not unreasonably be inferred that the suc- 
 cess of Colonel Pottinger's policy may have induced the 
 present Governor-General and the officer in command to pur- 
 sue the same course of coercion and intimidation, in the full 
 expectation that the Ameers would give way to our last de- 
 mands ; and after such observations as occurred in the des- 
 patch now quoted, it is impossible to conceive that Sir Henry 
 Pottinger could have written the letter lately ascribed to him ; 
 for nothing that I have ever read was more severe than the 
 Colonel's whole course of proceeding towards the Ameers of 
 Sinde. Lord Auckland and the gallant Sir Henry Pottinger 
 have the especial merit of all that has followed, for it was 
 their measures which have embarrassed the present Governor- 
 General, who might, nevertheless, certainly have extricated 
 himself and the Government from the dilemma and difficulty 
 in which the acts of his predecessor had placed him, with much 
 more tact and judgment than he has done. 
 
 The Governor-General, in adverting to the bombardment of 
 the port of Kurrachee, by H. M.S. Wellesley, (page 190,) and 
 the conquest achieved by British forces, in consequence of the 
 opposition of the officers of the Sinde Government, under 
 whose directions the first hostile shot, (may it please your 
 Lordship, the only gun, for there was no shot,) was fired 
 against the British armament, our position as the con- 
 querors of the town and fort, (what a brilliant victory for a 
 seventy-four !) would not in any way be affected by the tardy 
 compliance of the Ameers with the terms of the treaty ; and
 
 65 
 
 it was therefore proposed to keep Kurrachee as a British port. 
 What was the use of the Wellesley firing away so long, when 
 there was actually no resistance at all, unless for the sake of 
 practice, and to astonish the natives ? 
 
 Lieutenant Eastwick was justly commended (p. 193) by the 
 Governor-General for his firmness and ability in his negocia- 
 tions with the Ameers, although he was unavoidably forced to 
 leave. 
 
 The Resident in Sinde continues (page 194) to open the 
 eyes of the Ameers by communicating some very plain 
 truths, (par. 5.) 
 
 " I begged them all to look back, particularly to the important 
 events of the last six months, and reflect if they had the slightest 
 cause to question our fair dealing and desire to keep on good 
 terms with them. I said that they had themselves literally imposed 
 on us the necessity of dictating the arrangements provided for by 
 the late treaty, and that they must henceforward consider Sinde to 
 be (as it was in reality) a portion of Hindoostan, in which our posi- 
 tion made us paramount, and entitled us to act as we considered 
 best and fittest for the general good of the whole empire." 
 
 What a change has now come o'er the spirit of our 
 dream! What now becomes of the' early treaties, and the 
 stipulations upon the subject of not breaking the Tenth Com- 
 mandment by coveting their possessions ? 
 
 The finale of the Resident's long despatch is rather amusing 
 after all that had taken place : (par. 14) 
 
 " To conclude, I can only repeat my belief that the Ameers will 
 not swerve from their recent engagements ; that they understand 
 us better than they ever did before ; that they see the utter hope- 
 lessness of coping with us; that they are astonished at our for- 
 bearance ; that the good wishes of the great mass of the people 
 are already on our side ; that every day will extend this dispo- 
 sition amongst the chiefs and higher classes ; that we must study 
 the prejudices and soothe the feelings of those who may be said 
 to still stand aloof, and not expect them at once to adopt more 
 enlightened motives ; that our language should be invariably 
 candid and decided, but friendly ; and that as our policy is not to 
 quarrel with Sinde, we should not hastily take offence, but bear 
 with the views and faults of its semi- barbarous rulers and popu- 
 
 E
 
 66 
 
 lation, on whom our example and intercourse must in a few years 
 work a most salutary effect ; and who, it is to be recollected, 
 have for generations looked on us as a nation of foreigners, grasp- 
 ing at conquest, with one guide to our actions, that of might being 
 right." 
 
 And the Colonel's proceedings in Sinde were assuredly 
 eminently calculated to confirm this impression of our national 
 character throughout India in its whole length and breadth. 
 Yet a few days after this most edifying episode, he writes 
 that although the fort at the mouth of the Kurrachee (page 
 196) harbour might be applied to any purpose for which it 
 may be fitted, he thought that all our military supplies should 
 not, in course of time, come into Sinde by the mouth of the 
 Indus, but should be conveyed in suitable vessels direct from 
 Bombay to Vikkur. He observes 
 
 " It is superfluous, perhaps, for me to say, that I am not 
 alluding to the present moment, but to times to come. It is here, 
 however, possibly as well that I should look forward a little, in 
 order to call the attention to the views I entertain. It seems to 
 me that it would be better at once to take possession of Sinde 
 (or such parts of it as we require) by force, than to leave it 
 nominally with the Ameers, and yet deal with it as though it 
 were our own. The one line is explicit and dignified, and cannot 
 be misunderstood ; the other I conceive to be unbecoming our 
 power, and it must lead to constant heart-burnings and bickerings, 
 if not to a rupture of all friendly relations. There is no nation 
 with whom we have been brought into contact in Asia, towards 
 whom I deem it so highly necessary to be undeviatingly jftrm as 
 the Sindees. This has long been my recorded opinion, and every 
 hour convinces me of its being well grounded. I would, in fact, 
 at any instant, rather forego an immediate object, than lead them, 
 by any circumstance, to think that all our proceedings were not a 
 portion of one great system of policy, from which they alone 
 forced us to deviate. The good effect of such a principle on a 
 government and people, who may be said to be destitute of vera- 
 city or good faith, as well as of foresight, needs not to be enlarged 
 upon." 
 
 Surely, this a defence of the present Governor- General's
 
 67 
 
 system commenced ; so eloquently and forcibly advocated 
 and enforced by the prime agent of his predecessor. 
 
 The Governor-General complimented Col. Pottinger (p. 197) 
 on his patient perseverance in effecting the object of his mission. 
 
 " In spite of the wayward and perfidious spirit which influences 
 all the conduct of the Ameers, from the first communication to 
 them of the designs of the British Government, till the hour 
 when they were prevailed upon to accept the terms proffered by 
 you, you succeeded in avoiding a resort to compulsion, and in 
 obtaining an acquiescence in the just demands of their Govern- 
 ment by pacific negociation." . . . . " You, therefore, wisely and 
 considerately refrained from resenting, in the manner it de- 
 served, the hostile demonstration of the Ameers ; and with a 
 degree of temper and forbearance, which cannot too highly be 
 praised, allowed them still further time for reflection; for which 
 moderation on your part, their ultimate acceptance of your terms 
 must have afforded you the most gratifying reflections." .... 
 " You had not allowed the treacherous conduct on the part of the 
 Ameers, in their detected intrigues with the enemies of the British 
 Government, while they were professing to you their devotion 
 to our interests ; nor their insults to yourself, nor their treat- 
 ment of your assistant, to deter you from persevering in a 
 course of conciliation towards them ; and the Governor-General, 
 though he considers that by the conduct of their officers at Kurra- 
 chee, acting according to orders which they declared to have 
 come from the Ameers at Hyderabad, the Atneers have forfeited 
 all claim to the forbearance and generosity of the British Govern- 
 ment, is prepared to confirm the general tenour of the treaty 
 concluded by you." .... "The position, however, in which 
 the Ameers are placed by the occurrences at Kurrachee, is not one 
 from which they could claim or expect to obtain the restoration 
 of that place to their authority (par. 10); and his Lordship con- 
 siders that, while the occupation of the place is of much import- 
 ance to the British interests in Sinde, its retention as a conquest 
 will be a fitting punishment of the perfidious and hostile conduct 
 of the Ameers (par. 11)." .... " The possession of the harbour 
 and the fort of Kurrachee by the British Government, precludes 
 the necessity for negociating with the Ameers of Sinde the terms on 
 which we are to enter that port." 
 
 This was plain and decisive. We wanted an excuse to 
 
 E2
 
 68 
 
 take it, and we soon found one, and as we could not well do 
 without it, we have another pretext for retaining it, after the 
 Ameers had made all the other concessions required of them. 
 The Governor-General was determined not to let slip the 
 opportunity of keeping all he desired, and therefore most 
 unceremoniously expunged from Colonel Pottinger's treaty, the 
 13th, 14th, and 15th articles, having reference to Kurrachee. 
 And in returning it, the Resident was informed (par. 14) 
 
 " This being the case, it was out of his Lordship's power to 
 ratify the treaty as drawn out by you, and the impossibility of his 
 doing so has afforded an opportunity of introducing several minor 
 alterations in the revised treaty prepared under his Lordship's 
 directions, which have assimilated this engagement, in a manner 
 that appeared very expedient, with the engagements already exist- 
 ing between the British Government and princes of Hindoostan, of 
 station and rank similar to that of the Ameers" * 
 
 How could the Governor-General, with any conscience 
 write as follows? (par. 22) 
 
 " The provisions of the present engagement are so complete ; 
 they confer, for the first time, such signal advantages on the Ameers, 
 and so entire a change is effected by them in the political relations 
 of these chieftains, both with the British Government and all other 
 States, that no allusion to former treaties seems necessary in this 
 place ; notice will be taken of them in the conclusion. This treaty 
 should be regarded by the Ameers as a great charter, obtained 
 from the good will of the paramount power in Itidia,for the future 
 security of their independence and of their possessions, which they 
 will henceforth hold on condition of their fidelity and adherence to 
 their present engagements, by virtue of a deed granted to them by 
 the head of the British Government in India." 
 
 Let us see a parallel case to this in our transactions in 
 India ! but the consideration of his Lordship was wonderful 
 and beyond all precedent. In refeience to the strength of the 
 British force to be kept up in Sinde, which was specified by 
 the Resident, his Lordship had directed that the first words 
 of the article should be omitted, (par. 27) as they might 
 possibly be considered by the Ameers more offensive than 
 
 * You send an agent with full powers, and you strike out and add to the 
 treaty made by him, just what you please.
 
 69 
 
 leaving the number of our troops discretional with the 
 Governor-General, and their omission in no degree takes 
 away from the strength of the article." 
 
 We find another flourish of trumpets, in reference to the 
 12th article of the Resident's treaty, (par. 43) whereby the Bri- 
 tish Government was bound not to form any treaty, or enter 
 into any engagement, that could possibly affect the interests 
 of Sinde, without the concurrence of their Highnesses the 
 Ameers. It is remarked, 
 
 " The Governor-General (par. 44.) is not aware that, since the 
 British Government became the paramount authority in India, an 
 obligation so restrictive of its supreme power has ever been pro- 
 posed for its acceptance. In our treaties with the most powerful 
 princes of India, although we have required from them engage- 
 ments not to enter into treaties, or hold political correspondence, 
 with other States, without our knowledge or consent, it has not 
 been usual for those princes to demand, or for the British Govern- 
 ment to concede, any reciprocal engagements with respect to our 
 correspondence. Such a stipulation appears inconsistent with our 
 position, as exercising sovereign power over all India, and it would 
 be particularly unsuitable in a treaty which is intended to esta- 
 blish the supremacy of one party, and the position, as subordinate 
 allies, of the other party." 
 
 The same master-mind which dictated the foregoing senti- 
 ments, strove to extend our supremacy to Affghanistan also, 
 for whatever may now be said to the contrary, that was the 
 object. Have we sovereign power there now? We tried it, 
 and ingloriously failed in the attempt. Are we supreme in 
 Burmah, Nepaul, Sec., with which States we have had serious 
 differences ? We do not consult the wishes of the other 
 party. 
 
 The Governor-General makes no ceremony of rejecting 
 what was settled by his agent, and forcing new terms and 
 stipulations upon the Ameers just as it suited his fancy and 
 ever-changing views. After many objections it is inti- 
 mated, 
 
 " The Governor-General (par. 62.) trusts that the rejection of 
 the treaties sealed by the Ameers, and which are herewith returned 
 for the reasons which you will explain to them, and the substitu-
 
 70 
 
 tion of others in their place, are not likely, under the circumstances 
 of their situation, to produce any demur on their part to closing 
 with the terms now finally sanctioned by the Governor-General." 
 
 It was determined, upon the true Machevelian principle, to 
 divide and govern, that four tieaties, all word for word the 
 same, should be granted to each of the Ameers, and the 
 Governor-General observes, 
 
 " This course, it is presumed, (par. 63.) will prove satisfactory 
 to the Ameers ; and his Lordship has the rather been induced to 
 adopt it from a consideration that the submission, if not the sin- 
 cerity, of tho Ameers, since their concluding the treaties, has been 
 evinced in their payment of ten lacs of rupees, and from his Lord- 
 ship's desire that the arduous task of this negociation should be 
 concluded by you, to whom the Government is indebted for the 
 success with which it has been brought so near a conclusion, and 
 his Lordship fears that the state of your health will induce you, at 
 no very distant period, to resign your charge of the Residency of 
 Sinde. His Lordship regards it of importance, however, that you 
 should be empowered, without loss of time, to conclude this nego- 
 ciation by the exchange of the treaties, and trusts that these in- 
 structions will have reached Hyderabad before you have quitted 
 that place. It has been an object with the Governor-General, 
 throughout this negociation,* not to deal with the Ameers of Sinde 
 as a confederate body ; and their late conduct has strengthened 
 every argument in favour of treating with them singly, and allow- 
 ing their respective interests to become separate, as in the natural 
 course of events, must inevitably be the case. Our former at- 
 tempts to increase our influence with them as an united government, 
 with Noor Mahomed Khan at its head, have completely failed, and 
 we shall henceforth, under the operation of our present treaties, 
 find more strength in their differences, or at least from a want of 
 unity among them, than could be expected from an adherence to 
 our former course of policy." 
 
 * Lord Auckland seems to have entirely forgotten that his object, at one 
 time, was to deal with one chief, and pressed the Resident to negociate with 
 Meer Sobdar, who was, if found pliant, to be elevated to supreme authority 
 in the country ; and General Napier has reverted to the formerly-established 
 practice of dealing with one principal Ameer, and has upset the system 
 adopted by Lord Auckland, as fixed above.
 
 The Governor-General, in a letter to the four Ameers, 
 (page 209) winds up 
 
 " This engagement being finally concluded, and the future rela- 
 tions between your Highness and the British Government being 
 placed on a firm and lasting foundation, the past will be buried in 
 oblivion, and it will only remain with your Highness, by a steady 
 and faithful adherence to your present engagements, to secure for 
 yourself and your posterity the permanence of your possessions, 
 and the valuable friendship of the ruling power in India"* 
 
 In a despatch to the secret committee, (page 210) dated 
 13th March, 1839, the Governor-General dwells on the 
 great advantages obtained in Sinde. A slight notice will 
 suffice to show the spirit and feelings of his Lordship on the 
 question. After alluding to the letter to the King of Persia, 
 to which so much unnecessary importance seems to have been 
 attached, his Lordship refers to the other causes of offence 
 against the Ameers, especially the insult offered to Colonel 
 Pottinger before adverted to, when his person was exposed to 
 danger by the thowing of stones and ' other missiles by the 
 populace of Hyderabad, his Lordship states that " he deter- 
 mined, as the only course which seemed open to him,' so as 
 to avoid the slightest appearance of harshness or bad faith," 
 and at the same time to acquire the security which had be- 
 come indispensable, and for other reasons, to express his 
 willingness to maintain the authority of the existing principal 
 Ameers, " who had conceded the unopposed admission of 
 our troops into their territories on the condition of such a 
 British force being established, and, as far as possible, subsi- 
 dized in Sinde, as might suffice to fix beyond a doubt our mi- 
 litary and political ascendancy on that important frontier." 
 * * * * " Upon this occasion, Colonel Pottinger 
 (par. 13) throws out an ideaf which at once appeared to have 
 much to recommend it, of breaking up the confederacy of the 
 Hyderabad Ameers, and declaring each Ameer independent 
 
 * This has become a favourite phrase of late in India, 
 j- Many novel ideas arose during the progress of the negociation, all 
 tending to the perplexity and injury of the Ameers.
 
 72 
 
 in his own possessions, upon such an amount of contribution 
 as might in regard to each be thought equitable." 
 
 His Lordship further observes : " But fortunately it had 
 been soon seen that the Ameers were as pusillanimous* as 
 they had been false and outwardly arrogant." 
 
 Advantage was taken of the alleged misconduct of the 
 Ameers, and it was made a new stipulation that twenty-one 
 lacs of rupees should be paid on account of Shah Shoojah, 
 " and, in a word, the Ameer* were reduced to a state of abject 
 apprehension and submission." 
 
 A rather laughable account (par. 14), of the grand ex- 
 ploit of the " Wellesley" at Kurrachee. 
 
 " The landing of the troops being opposed, and a shot fired upon 
 them from a small fort, which is situated close to the harbour, the 
 ' Wellesley' opened her batteries, and in a very short time the 
 southern or sea-face of the fort, the wall of which, in part, sixteen 
 feet thick, was levelled with the ground. The troops, in the mean- 
 time, landed from the boats, and the garrison of the fort, which 
 consisted of a very small number of men, was immediately appre- 
 hended." 
 
 His Lordship then offers congratulations too long to quote, 
 and enlarges about our ''political and military ascendancy" 
 " the confederacy of the Ameers being virtually dissolved ;" 
 " Sinde being formally placed under British protection, and 
 brought within the circle of our Indian relations ;" the ob- 
 jects being obtained "without bloodshed" and the impression 
 diffused in all quarters of <f futility of resistance to our arms -^ 
 and his Lordship was especially anxious that " our measures 
 should bear the character of a just forbearance and modera- 
 tion^ His Lordship adds, 
 
 " To ourselves it is so desirable to have the military control of the 
 Indus, that it would have been highly expedient to introduce our 
 troops into Sinde, even were the whole cost to be paid from our own 
 
 * Was the force not enough to overawe them ? Were they expected to 
 fight against such odds ? What would have been said, if they had attempted 
 resistance ? They would have been accused of treachery, as of late. They 
 are not cowards, but have been shamefully oppressed, and overcome by 
 superior strength.
 
 73 
 
 treasuries. In fact, on the probable sxipposition that we shall not 
 permanently maintain a force of more than 2500 men in Sinde, the 
 arrangement would be, under any circumstances, inexpensive, as 
 being little else than an advance of our frontier stations from 
 
 o 
 
 those at present occupied by us in Cutch and Guzerat."* 
 
 Meer Moobaruck Khan, of Khyrpore, (page 214) whose 
 conduct was stated to have been such as not to require from 
 Shah Shoojah or the Britisli Government the same indul- 
 gence of exemption of tribute as Meer Roostum Khan, was to 
 be called upon for his quota of seven lacs of rupees. 
 
 Meer Shere Mahomed, of Meerpore, (page 251) who had 
 been rather opposed to the British Government, now (March, 
 1839) makes advances. He wrote to the Resident in 
 Sinde, 
 
 " ' You have long been my near neighbour, but you never before 
 asked a favour of me. I hope you will not hesitate in future ; and 
 you may always reckon on the satisfaction I shall feel in doing what 
 you require.' (par. 5). Little doubt remained in my mind, but that 
 this tone was a part of the altered feeling towards us which is 
 springing up ; and all question on it was removed by a verbal com- 
 munication made yesterday to my Moonshee by a Dewan of Meer 
 Shere Mahomed, whom he met at Sobdar Khan's levee, and who told 
 him that he had now witnessed our good faith and adherence to our 
 word, that he had been deceived about us, and that his desire was to 
 enter into a treaty with the British Govermnent."f 
 
 And the Colonel, with advertence to the chief's former 
 conduct, makes a very sensible excuse for him, that " if he 
 really believed that our troops had come into Sinde to con- 
 quer his possessions, we cannot blame him for making a show, 
 at least, of defending them. Then why not make the same 
 allowance for the Ameers of Hyderabad ? 
 
 It was understood (page 216) that Meer Roostum Khan of 
 Khyrpore, in consideration of his assistance and friendly con- 
 duct, was to be excused from the payment of his quota of the 
 tribute ; but Colonel Pottinger directed his assistant to give 
 
 * Was this policy sanctioned by the Court of Directors and the Govern- 
 ment ? If so, then Lord Ellenborough must be held blameless. 
 
 f How could the gallant Colonel console himself with such an assurance 
 as this the effect solely of terror and anxious apprehension ?
 
 that chief no hopes of its being excused, (par. 3,) "but 
 endeavour to remove the erroneous impression he seemed to 
 have imbibed, that it was a fine, whereas it was paying a 
 very small price for his future entire relief, under our guaran- 
 tee, from a serious demand" The Colonel intimated that he 
 had made the necessary communications to the Hyderabad 
 Government as to the troops that were to be left in Upper 
 Sinde. " Whatever," says he, " may be their real senti- 
 ments, they have expressed their wish that we will do what- 
 ever we like, and I really believe, now that they are satisfied 
 that we have no sinister charges against them, they care not 
 what we fix on."* 
 
 Lieut. Leckie, the assistant at Hyderabad, (page 218,) was 
 deputed by Colonel Pottinger with the revised treaties, which 
 differed so very considerably from the terms agreed on, and 
 they were to be enforced without admitting of any argumen- 
 tation ; for the assistant's instructions were : 
 
 " Should the Ameers (Par. 7.) show any disposition or wish to 
 enter into discussion with you, it will be your duty to distinctly state 
 to them, that neither you, nor any servant of the British Go- 
 vernment, can presume to discuss his Lordship's commands, which 
 have been issued after full consideration, and are to be considered 
 final." 
 
 And (page 218) to the Colonel's dear and long-tried friend, 
 Noor Mahomed Khan, the Resident addressed a letter, in- 
 forming him that his Lordship has been " so thoughtful and 
 kind as to vouchsafe four treaties, under his seal," &c., and in 
 terms of fond endearment, on the eve of departure, he thus 
 pathetically concludes " Continue to consider meyour warm 
 friend, and make me glad with happy accounts of your health 
 and welfare." 
 
 The Resident conveyed to Colonel Spiller, commanding at 
 Tatta, (page 220,) his opinions and directions respecting the 
 Shikargahs, or preserves, not being interfered with, and his 
 
 * This is just what the Ameers said afterwards, when entirely subdued. 
 Did not Colonel Pottinger assert that the Ameers had been reduced to entire 
 submission, and were now our humblest tlaves ? He was just on the eve of 
 departure; and, no doubt, desired to give the most favourable impression of 
 the state of affairs.
 
 75 
 
 observations do him credit. The quotation is rather long, but 
 it is of importance, in estimating the opinions of Sir Charles 
 Napier afterwards, which have excited so much dissatis- 
 faction. 
 
 " You are aware that the Ameers attach the highest value to the 
 shikargahs, or preserves for hunting, which are formed along the 
 bank of the river, and some of which extend to within seven or 
 eight miles of this place. Their Highnesses deemed them of so 
 much importance, that they wanted to introduce an article into the 
 treaty, expressly providing for their being held sacred ; but I told 
 them such a formal procedure was unnecessary. (Pars. 2, 3, 4.) 
 Both before I left Hyderabad, and since my arrival here, I have 
 had messages and letters on the same subject, and I therefore do 
 myself the honour to address you, with a view of begging that 
 you will take such steps as seem to you proper, to ensure a rigid 
 attention from all ranks and classes, to the promises I have made, 
 that the shikargahs shall in no degree be interfered with by our 
 troops or followers. However we may regret that the Ameers 
 should devote so large a portion of the very finest parts of their 
 country to such purposes, we must neither forget the severity of our 
 forest laws, when England was further advanced in the scale of civi- 
 lization than Sinde now is, nor the strict legislative enactments that 
 are in force, even at this time, on the subject of killing game. We 
 must also bear in mind that the shikargahs provide the only amuse- 
 ment the Ameers take any interest in, and of the depth of that 
 interest some notion will be formed, when I tell you that the pre- 
 serves are kept up at so great an expense, that it is said every deer 
 their Highnesses shoot in them costs 800 rupees. Besides this 
 well-known fact, their Highnesses did not hesitate to distinctly avow 
 to me, that they valued their shikargahs beyond their wives and 
 children, which shows that we cannot at all estimate their anxiety 
 respecting them." 
 
 Lieut. Leckie submits (page 221) some explanation respect- 
 ing the attack on Kurrachee. Meer Sobdar Khan assured 
 him that at the time H. M.'s ship "Wellesley" was fired 
 upon, he had only one man in the town, who collected his 
 share of the revenue, that he had been a warm friend, and did 
 not understand why he should be punished for the acts of 
 others. The omission of Kurrachee in the amended treaty had
 
 76 
 
 astonished their Highnesses the Ameers, (par. 6,) whose agent, 
 Syud Tukkee Shah, said, that a messenger from Court was 
 close to Kurrachee when the firing commenced, and who had 
 instructions to prevent any hostile proceedings ; and the single 
 gun that was fired was not shotted: that their Highnesses 
 considered it very hard that they should be severely dealt 
 with on account of errors of the soldiers. The Syud then 
 dwelt upon all the Ameers had done to comply with our 
 demands in allowing a Resident at their Court, having per- 
 mitted a passage for our troops through their country, given 
 up Tatta as a military station, &c. ; but the Lieutenant, in 
 answer to all these appeals, said, that if it was supposed the 
 treaty then in his possession, under the seal and sign manual 
 of the Governor-General of India, could be altered, they were 
 mistaken, as his Lordship's commands were to be considered 
 final, and with regard to Kurrachee a communication would be 
 received by each Ameer from the Governor-General, thus 
 not divulging his Lordship's determination respecting the 
 retention of Kurrachee till after the Ameers' assent to the 
 treaty. 
 
 Sir Alexander Burnes (page 224) writes to the Envoy with 
 Shah Shoojah, dated Kelat, 3rd April, 1839, that he had 
 come into possession (by intercepting letters) of the letters 
 relating to the intrigue carrying on between Candahar and 
 Sinde; but the letter of Noor Mahomed Khan to Sirdar 
 Kohendil, chief of Candahar, does not tend to attach any evil 
 designs to the principal Ameer. He says : 
 
 " You have informed me about your contracting friendship with 
 Mahomed Shah, king of Persia. You know that we have been long 
 the friends of the English, and lately a treaty of lasting friendship 
 has been concluded, which has strengthened the intimacy between 
 us ; however, every one knows best what is for his own good." 
 
 But Shere Mahomed Khan Talpoor's letter to Dost Ma- 
 homed Khan, if not a forgery, indicated dissatisfaction with 
 the English, which could scarcely be a matter of surprise, 
 and expressed a resolution to join and befriend the then chief 
 of Cabool. 
 
 There is a very good plain statement (page 225) of the
 
 77 
 
 Ameers' grievances contained in the native agent's communi- 
 cation, (7th April, 1839,) which throws further light on the 
 Kurrachee affair. He thus writes to the Resident in Sinde : 
 " Meer Sobdar Khan considered the intention of taking Kurra- 
 chee to be unworthy the friendship and honour of the British Go- 
 vernment; that he had never held intercourse with the King of 
 Persia, or any one else. The second time I saw the other Ameers, 
 they went over the same ground of argument. They observed, that 
 the Beloochee chiefs would say, that the treaty had been reduced 
 from twenty-three articles to fourteen, and might be so shortly to 
 seven ; that they (the Ameers) were helpless ; that they entreated, 
 first, that the cantonment might be fixed distant from Hyderabad ; 
 second, that the number of the troops might be defined ; third, that 
 the British Government might not interfere in the internal disputes ; 
 fourth, that the towns and cities might all be named in the treaty ; 
 and fifth, that three lacs of Hyderabad rupees might be fixed as the 
 amount they were to pay. They further asserted, that the only gun 
 fired at Kurrachee was the usual signal, nor had a single sword been 
 removed from the scabbard ; that the man who fired the signal gun 
 should be turned away ; that they could not pay three lacs as well 
 as give up Kurrachee, and retain the means of subsisting themselves ; 
 that they would fall in arrears ; that they had paid the tribute to 
 Cabool formerly in Hyderabad rupees; and that they begged Col. 
 Pottinger to settle every thing, so as to supersede the necessity of 
 sending vakeels." 
 
 The liability of Meer Moobarck Khan, second brother of 
 Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, (pages 228, 229, and 231,) to 
 contribute, like the Ameers of Hyderabad, to the immediate 
 payment of Shah Shoojah, in release of that prince's claim of 
 sovereignty over Khyrpore, having been overlooked, Lieut. 
 Eastwick, the able assistant to Colonel Pottinger, was in- 
 structed to negociate on the subject, and Sir Alexander 
 Burnes stated the chief was well able to pay a lac of rupees 
 annually towards the payment of the British force; and as he 
 was supposed to have some cash, he should be called to pay 
 down at once, " while we are strong in Sinde" the sum of 
 seven lacs of rupees ! 
 
 We now arrive at an important stage of these lamentable 
 proceedings. Colonel Pottinger had returned to Bhooj, and 
 had had time for reflection on all that had passed. He
 
 78 
 
 accordingly submits a very interesting and comprehensive 
 report, dated 6th July, 1839. 1 shall give his own words 
 (par. 8) relative to the Kurrachee affair : 
 
 " He, Syud Sadig Shah, repeated the denial that the gun ichich 
 was fired had a ball in it, and declared that if we could establish 
 that it had, the Ameers would not only resign all pretensions to 
 Kurrachee, hut would give us Hyderabad into the bargain" He 
 said, " Noor Mahomed Khan particularly desired me to remind you 
 that just two years ago (par. 7), you wrote to him, as a friend, to 
 allow the harbour of Kurrachee to be surveyed, declaring it to be an 
 object of curiosity, and also worthy of a great government like the 
 English. You have now sent an army, and attacked and taken it. 
 We know you to be powerful. You say you are just and moderate ; 
 now is the time to prove it, not only to Sinde, but to the whole 
 world." 
 
 Referring to the promise made by Colonel Pottinger, that 
 nothing would be demanded of Hyderabad but what was 
 reasonable and fair, he was asked, " Who is to be the judge 
 of what is fair and reasonable ?" Syed Tuppee said on be- 
 half of the Ameers 
 
 " If you leave it to us to decide, we will say that three lacs of Hy- 
 derabad rupees* is such, and to that payment the Ameers have already 
 agreed. On the latter topic (par. 0), I had no difficulty in replying 
 to him, but on the subject of Kurrachee, I confess that a number of 
 facts had come to knowledge which put it out of my power to com- 
 bat, to my own satisfaction, the arguments that were adduced; and 
 although I am not prepared to go to the extent of saying that I 
 lament what took place there, yet I do not hesitate to avow my 
 conviction, that it might have been advantageously avoided, and that 
 under all circumstances, it happily furnishes cause for thankfulness, 
 and gratification that no lives were sacrificed."* 
 
 The Colonel goes on to say (par. 1 1), that he had always 
 been aware it was usual to fire a gun from the fort at the mouth 
 of Kurachee harbour, when a square-rigged vessel came in sight 
 
 * Three lacs of Company's rupees (the coin in which the Governor- 
 General fixed the payment) are equal to four lacs of Hyderabad. 
 
 f The fort of Kurrachee was " levelled with the dust,'' by mistake ; yet Lord 
 Auckland was determined to make the imagined hostility a pretext for re- 
 taiping possession.
 
 79 
 
 or approached the place. This he had seen when he went 
 there in 1809, and it was done when H. M. S. Challenger 
 anchored off it in 1830.* The Ameers explained this to him 
 before he left Hyderabad, and further said, they had heard 
 that it was the custom at the lighthouse at Bombay. They 
 then likewise made the same assertion, as to there having 
 been no shot in the gun. The nephew of the Jam of the 
 Jokeyas, a chief whose claims to the Governor-General's 
 favourable notice had been previously submitted, was intro- 
 duced with ten or twelve of his people, and made the follow- 
 ing declaration to the Colonel (par. 12) : " I commanded in 
 the fort of Manooral the day your large ship battered it. I 
 and my men left our arms and accoutrements in the fort 
 when we made our escape, and you would do a great favour 
 and kindness if you would have them restored to us." The 
 Colonel promised compliance, but found that the " poor 
 men's property had been sold, and that they were told when 
 they applied for them, that no Sindees were henceforward to 
 be allowed to carry any kind of weapon." The Colonel also 
 ascertained that there was not a single ball in the fort that 
 would Jit any one of the guns, that the whole supply of gunpowder 
 amounted to six Kurrachee seers (six pounds), which was kept 
 in an earthen pot; that the garrison consisted of sixteen men, 
 many of whom had only a sword ; that so little did the men 
 anticipate what followed, that when the firing began, they 
 were all standing outside, looking at and admiring the Wel- 
 lesleu. 
 
 To such a pitch had the chiefs and people of Kurrachee 
 been reduced by the harsh measures adopted towards them, 
 that Colonel Pottinger makes the following pointed remarks 
 and complaint : 
 
 " The Governor of Kurrachee (par. 15.) (Allah Rukhia Jema- 
 dar) waited on me the day after I reached that place. He came 
 like a common menial, without arms or attendants ; and on my after- 
 wards inquiring the cause of this, I was informed that no one was 
 allowed to bring even a knife into the camp, or to enter or quit it 
 
 * This is a very candid statement of the gallant Colonel, and highly 
 honourable to him.
 
 80 
 
 after dark, though unarmed. / refrain from enlarging on the evil 
 and cruelty of degrading men of any class by such a system. It 
 seems to be calculated to excite disgust and hatred, in not only 
 those towards whom it is immediately practised, but in the breast 
 of any chief and man in the province, and to be equally impolitic 
 and dangerous. The Governor sent me word that he had never 
 entertained the smallest idea of opposing the landing of our 
 troops; that, after the firing from the ' VVellesley' commenced, 
 he received a peremptory order from the whole of the Ameers, not 
 on any pretence to do so, but to supply every thing that might 
 be procurable as far as possible." 
 
 And he added other satisfactory explanations, unnecessary 
 here to quote. 
 
 The following passage in Colonel Pottinger's despatch must, 
 however be given, (par. 18.) 
 
 "The native agent has several times reported, that their High- 
 nesses had made up their minds to be guided by my recommen- 
 dation, and put their seals to the treaties, leaving all future points 
 to the moderation and justice of his Lordship; but that their 
 relations and chiefs dissuaded them from taking this step until 
 they should obtain from me some kind of assurance that their 
 appeal would not be thrown aside. I by no means feel surprise 
 or irritation, either at the Ameers' procrastination, or at this 
 advice of the chiefs. It would be a miracle if they felt otherwise 
 than suspicious of our designs and motives ; and I humbly venture 
 to think that the Governor-General will see much in this despatch 
 and its accompaniments, to support the most respectful, but at 
 the same time, unqualified opinion, which I beg to record ' that 
 the agreement by which Kurrachee was ceded to us be abrogated ; 
 and that a supplemental treaty to that of fourteen articles should 
 be entered into, providing for our having free ingress and egress to 
 that port whenever we please, as well as for the payment by our 
 merchants of a moderate rate of duties on goods which they may 
 bring there; and for our maintaining, both now and hereafter, 
 such troops at that sea-port as the Governor-General of India 
 shall see fit to direct."* 
 
 * In penning these observations, Colonel Pottinger must have bitterly 
 regretted the terms in which he announced the capture of Kurrachee. He 
 gives the Governor-General a rebuke not to be misunderstood.
 
 81 
 
 At length the long-desired treaties, under the seals of the 
 four Ameers of Hyderabad, were received and forwarded by 
 Colonel Pottinger to the Governor-General, from Bhooj, 30th 
 July, 1839. He submitted his opinion on five points mooted 
 by the Ameers. 
 
 1. He thought that fixing the payment in Company's 
 rupees would press heavily on the Ameers (par. 6), especially 
 on such as had large and increasing families to provide for ; 
 and his former estimate of the revenues of Sinde was con- 
 siderably overrated (par. 8). 
 
 2. That he still retained the same opinion as to relinquish- 
 ing the claim to the seaport of Kurrachee (par. 9). 
 
 3. That the cantonment should not be near Hyderabad ; 
 and Tatta, where the camp then was, was the best site. 
 
 4. That the article of the treaty regarding the employment 
 of 3,000 Sinde troops was a dead letter, as they could be 
 turned to no earthly purpose, either in Sinde or elsewhere, 
 unless there was a change in the habits of the Beloochee 
 soldiery. 
 
 5. That the proposal of the Ameers to name the possessions 
 of- the Hyderabad government was an absurdity, and any- 
 thing the Ameers could desire was included in the term, 
 "actual possessions." 
 
 Mr. Ross Bell, Political Agent in Upper Sinde (page 245), 
 in transmitting a correspondence with Meer Ali Moorad (the 
 arch traitor now in power and amity with the British Govern- 
 ment in Sinde), and an engagement between that chief and 
 his brother, Meer Roostum Khan, brought to the notice of 
 the Governor-General, that he did not find Ali Moorad even 
 alluded to in any of the correspondence (par. 2) which for- 
 merly passed between Government and its Political Agents 
 relative to the treaties with the Sinde Ameers. He seemed 
 to have been overlooked, and as far as Mr. Ross could judge, 
 to have been kept purposely in the back ground. That he was 
 hostilely disposed towards us from the commencement there 
 was no doubt, but he now found himself alone, since the 
 Hyderabad Ameers signed the treaty, and he had seen that 
 what had been passing between him and Mahrab Khan was 
 
 F
 
 82 
 
 known, and therefore he came forward. Ali Moorad (par. 4.) is 
 the only one among the Ameers who has any character for 
 courage. He is a man of hasty and violent temper, and has 
 a strong body of Affghan mercenaries in his service ; it was 
 proposed, therefore, to postpone a final adjustment with that 
 chief till the cold weather, a suggestion which was approved 
 by the Governor-General (page 245). Meantime, Mr. Ross 
 was directed to submit a statement of the value and extent of 
 the different shares into which the principality of Khyrpore 
 was partitioned, and the footing, with respect to power and 
 dependence, on which the family stood to one another, &c. It 
 appears, however, that a separate treaty had been entered 
 into with Ali Moorad by Sir Alexander Burnes, and ratified on 
 the 13th January, 1839 (page 256); but the record in the 
 office of the Political Agent of Lower Sinde afforded no traces 
 of such an engagement (page 257). 
 
 The Governor-General in reply (2d Sept. 1839) to Colonel 
 Pottinger's opinions on the several points of reference by the 
 Ameers, (page 252) objects to the remission of any part of the 
 amount to be paid by these chiefs, viz., three lacs of rupees 
 per annum towards the payment of the subsidiary force, not- 
 withstanding their poverty. His Lordship observes, 
 
 " You are aware that, on a former occasion, the Ameers 
 themselves proffered, in lieu of protection and advantages, far 
 less complete and obvious than those which they gain under the 
 present treaties, the cession of Shikarpore, the value of which is 
 not supposed to be less than the amount of the money-payment 
 now required from them. This circumstance might be brought to 
 their notice, if they persist in urging you on this point; and, 
 though the British Government is far from desirous for territorial 
 occupation or aggrandizement, a proposition from the Ameers to 
 exchange the money-payment for such a cession of territory, might 
 possibly seem deserving of submission for the orders of the authori- 
 ties in England. 
 
 " The second point is, (par. 8.) ' That the claim of the British 
 Government to the sea-port of Kurrachee may be relinquished.' 
 The grounds on which this point is urged are, a denial of hostile 
 demonstrations before the bombardment of the fort, which formed 
 a principal argument for treating Kurrachee as a British conquest,
 
 83 
 
 and the embarrassment which the Ameers will feel for the loss of 
 the revenue of that port. 
 
 " The Governor-General (pars. 9 to 12.) would not call in ques- 
 tion the correctness of the reports from the naval commander-in- 
 chief, and therefore could not admit the denial of the Ameers of 
 hostile intentions ; adverting also to other circumstances which 
 had evinced their inimical spirit; and presuming no interference 
 in the collection of the revenue experienced from the presence 
 of the British military force, and that the civil government was 
 still in the hands of the Ameers ; his Lordship did not perceive a 
 necessity, at that time, for abrogating the agreement of the 3rd 
 Feb. 1839, and entering into a supplementary treaty on the subject 
 of Kurrachee. (Par. 15.) The British Government would retain 
 that position at the principal port of Sinde, which is indispensable, 
 without infringing any of those rights of independence which are 
 secured to the Ameers by the revised treaty. The wishes of the 
 Ameers respecting the cantonment being at a distance from Hyder- 
 abad, would be complied with. The reserve force would be stationed 
 probably at Sukkur, with inconsiderable detachments at Tatta and 
 Kurrachee, but the Resident would remain at the capital. There 
 was no probability of the 3,000 Sinde troops being ever required, 
 and any uneasiness on that head might be set at rest. It was not 
 expedient to specify the respective possessions of the Ameers, who 
 were no longer recognized collectively as the Government of 
 Hyderabad, we being now umpires of any dispute that may arise 
 between them. The Resident was reminded that the Ameers had 
 paid only the first instalment of the sum which they were to pay 
 for their release from the demands of the Ajfyhan monarch,* and 
 measures were to be taken for the realization of the balance, and 
 ' by the time that it is realized, and the Ameers who are parties to 
 the treaty with the British Government, will have become entitled 
 to claim a release from his Majesty's demands against them person- 
 ally, and on the territories held by them, the arrangements which 
 remain to be made with the Shah will probably have been con- 
 cluded.'" 
 
 Colonel Pottinger found that his previous estimate of the 
 
 * Where is the monarch now the wretched puppet in whose cause so 
 much blood has been shed and treasure expended, and misery brought upon 
 inoffensive native States ? This unfortunate Sinde affair is the result of the 
 insane project of restoring Shah Shoojah. 
 
 r 2
 
 84 
 
 revenues of Shikarpore and dependencies, (page 259, par. 6) 
 three and a-half lacs of rupees, was overrated, and that they 
 did not actually exceed two and a-half lacs. He suggested 
 that probably Noor Mahomed Khan might be induced to cede 
 Tatta on the same terms as proposed in regard to Shikarpore. 
 The Resident in Sinde communicates to the Governor- 
 General (13th Jan. 1840, page 263) another extraordinary 
 admission of error in respect to the extravagant estimate of 
 the revenues of some of the chiefs. He says 
 
 " I formerly reported (par. 6.) that the portion of Sinde held by 
 the Meerpore chiefs (of whom there are several) was roughly esti- 
 mated to be worth seven lacs of rupees a-year, but this was no 
 doubt very greatly over- rated ; and I have been assured, the total 
 of the money-collections do not average 50,000 rupees (half a lac) 
 per annum, the remainder being realized in kind, and apportioned 
 out to the numerous relations and dependents of the family, 
 amongst whom there is said to be much ill-will and division ; and 
 the constant strife which exists for power between Shere Mahomed 
 and his half-brothers, augments these evils." 
 
 Colonel Pottinger, in addressing Captain Outram, Political 
 Agent in Lower Sinde, (2">th Jan. 1840, page 264) adverts to 
 the circumstance that the question of the scale of port duties 
 and sea customs at Kurrachee was then before the Bombay 
 Government, and had probably been referred to the Governor- 
 General, and that the Ameers of Sinde were very anxious to 
 receive Shah Shoojah's release from any future demands, 
 either on account of tribute or Shikarpore; and as they had 
 punctually fulfilled their engagements, he thought the neces- 
 sary acquittance in the names of Noor Mahomed and Nusseer 
 Khan should be procured and delivered to them at an early 
 period. This is a very important admission, viz., that the full 
 amount fixed by the Governor-General had been exacted. 
 
 The late Resident in sending farewell letters to the Ameers 
 of Hyderabad, through Captain Outram, informs (page 265, 
 par. 3.) that officer that he had told them, if they would look 
 back to the whole course of his intercourse with them during: 
 
 o 
 
 the long period of fifteen years, and especially to the stirring 
 events of the last eighteen months, they will find that not the
 
 86 
 
 smallest deviation can be discovered in our promises and acts* 
 and as their sincere well-wisher, he took that last opportunity 
 to exhort them to be guided by Captain Outram's advice in all 
 matters, and to strictly fulfil the engagements into which they 
 had entered. 
 
 Captain Outram, who had been appointed as Political 
 Agent in Lower Sinde, to succeed Colonel Pottinger, arrived 
 at Hyderabad on the 24th Feb. 1840, (page 266) and was 
 received with extraordinary and marked cordiality and kind- 
 ness at the capital, and entertained during his route with the 
 utmost hospitality. Large quantities of sweetmeats and 
 provisions were sent to him by the Ameers on the morning 
 after his arrival. There was an evident joy at the change and 
 a desire to bow to the rising sun. Only two days after 
 Captain Outram's arrival, he communicated to the Governor- 
 General, (page 267) that a desire had been expressed by Noor 
 Mahomed Khan (who had received a good deal of practical 
 instruction from, and been taught some lessons in English 
 diplomacy by, Colonel Pottinger), to have a master to instruct 
 his son in the English language, which was recommended to 
 be complied with, as likely to enable them more perfectly to 
 comprehend and " appreciate our disinterested endeavours to 
 benefit them, from which the happiest effects would result." 
 There is rather a high-flown letter from the native ao-ent at 
 
 O . O 
 
 Hyderabad to Meer Shere Mahomed Khan of Meerpore, (page 
 273) who had expressed a wish to enter into a treaty with 
 Captain Outram, which the agent informed him was very 
 proper and necessary for his country, and advantageous in 
 many ways. The British Government would expect him to 
 contribute towards the expense the British ^Government was 
 put to in protecting Siude; but it was just and liberal and 
 would not expect him to pay so much as one of the Ameers 
 of Hyderabad, who were richer; and the native agent con- 
 cludes: " In your letter you mention that a treaty would be 
 advantageous to both Governments. Such language is un- 
 becoming the dignity of the British Government, thus to place 
 yourself on an equality. Do not again write in this style" 
 The assistant political agent in Upper Sinde (Lieutenant 
 * How could the gallant officer hare the assurance to write in this strain ?
 
 86 
 
 Postans, page 274) having reported the arrival of the indivi- 
 dual calling himself a Persian Prince (at Shikarpore), whom 
 the Hyderabad Government had expelled, Captain Outram 
 communicated the circumstance to Noor Mahomed and 
 Nusseer Khan, who expressed their gratification that such 
 steps had been taken to preserve their credit, and stated that 
 " such noxious vermin should be put to death." 
 
 The payment of transit duties appears from a report (15th 
 July, 1840, page 294) of the Political Agent in Sinde to have 
 been frequently evaded, and it is of consequence to notice this, 
 and to quote the opinion of Captain Outram as to the right of 
 the Ameers on this subject; because a misunderstanding of 
 the article of the treaty is afterwards made the ground of a 
 serious charge against the chiefs of Hyderabad. The pre- 
 sumed pass of a trader with a camel load of pepper, bound for 
 Sukkur, proved, on examination by the Ameer's custom offi- 
 cer, to be a letter written by one gentleman at Kurrachee to 
 another, and in this way the payment of the usual land transit 
 duties at Tatta, had been much evaded. It was, therefore, 
 our duty to prevent such frauds by every precaution in our 
 power, for, as Captain Outram observed, " The representative 
 of the Sinde Government has an undoubted right to see that 
 nothing but what is entitled by treaty to exemption from 
 inland transit duties, and that nothing beyond what is speci- 
 fied in the permits, should pass under their sanction." 
 
 The Governor-General announces to the secret committee 
 (16th Nov. 1840, page 298) that "it will be seen by Major 
 Outram's despatch of the 5th ult., that the conduct of the 
 Hyderabad Ameers' officers, and demeanour of the people, 
 towards our people, en route through Upper to Lower Sinde, 
 was most friendly." 
 
 An affecting detail is given by Major Outram of an inter- 
 view with the principal and much persecuted Ameer, Noor 
 Mahomed Khan, on his death-bed. 
 
 " So feeble and emaciated had the Ameer become, that this exer- 
 tion (juite exhausted him, and it was some minutes afterwards be- 
 fore he could speak; when, beckoning his brother Meer Nusseer 
 Khan, and youngest son Meer Hoossein Ali, to the bedside, he then
 
 87 
 
 took a hand of each and placed them in mine, saying, ' You are 
 their father and brother, you will protect them ;' to which I replied 
 in general but warm terms of personal friendship, but that I trusted 
 his Highness would long live to guide and support them. But this 
 the Ameer had evidently given up all hope of; and appeared to 
 regret that he had given Dr. Owen the trouble of coming so far, 
 though very grateful for the prompt manner in which hia wishes had 
 been attended to." 
 
 The poor chief expired on the 3rd December, 1840, (page 
 300,) and Major Outram lamented the loss of Noor Mahomed 
 Khan, both on public and private grounds. But I must quote 
 the major's own words. " Whatever that chief's secret 
 feelings towards the British may have been, certainly his acts 
 latterly were all most friendly, and I cannot but place faith 
 in almost the last words the dying chief uttered, solemnly 
 protesting the sincerity of his attachment to the British 
 Government, not only because, being perfectly aware that he 
 had but a. few hours to live and seeking nothing, he could have 
 had no motive for deception ; but also, because I had myself 
 always found his Highness most ready io forward our interests, 
 and least ready to welcome reports prejudicial to us, which, 
 during exciting times, were so industriously propagated, and 
 greedily devoured by those more inimical to us ;" and on the last 
 occasion when the Major visited the dying chief, Noor Ma- 
 homed Khan said, " My friendship for the British is known to 
 God. My conscience is clear before God." " The Ameer still 
 retained me in his feeble embrace for a few moments, and, after 
 taking some medicine from my hand, again embraced me as 
 if with the conviction that we could not meet again." The 
 Governor-General expressed his approval of the Major's con- 
 duct on the melancholy occasion, and " the sincere regret of 
 the British Government (page 306), at the loss of a chieftain 
 whose good sense had led him to appreciate the value of his 
 alliance to us, and whose example and influence appear to 
 have been, for some time past, exerted to maintain that alliance 
 in truth and sincerity." And this is the chief who was so 
 much harassed and persecuted by the former Resident. 
 
 The Political Agent in Lower Sinde (page 307), intimated
 
 88 
 
 to the Ameers that certain subjects of the Sinde Government 
 had taken upon themselves to forge his seal, and write letters 
 to the chief of Sinde in his name ; on the strength of these 
 letters, their authors had had jagbeers, &c., bestowed upon 
 them. 
 
 Mr. Ross now (page 310,) reported that application had 
 been made to Ameer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore and his bro- 
 thers, as representatives of the late Meer Moobaruck Khan, 
 for liquidating the claim of seven lacs of rupees outstanding 
 against the latter chief at his death, on account of Shah 
 Shoojah ; but Meer Roostum Khan stated that Sir Alexander 
 Burnes had promised the deceased and given him a written 
 document, which he showed in the original to the same effect, 
 that no demand should be made on him! Yet we find a letter 
 from the secretary to government to Sir Alexander Burnes, 
 (dated loth March, 1841,) to the follouing purport. 
 
 " I am directed by the Governor-General in Council to acknow- 
 ledge the receipt of your despatch of the 4th ult." (not in the blue 
 book)^ " submitting your remarks on the demands against Meer 
 Moobaruck's family, with documents shewing the groundlessness of 
 any claim set up by the heirs of his late Highness to exemption from 
 tins demand, which his Lordship in Council considers to be satifac- 
 tory." 
 
 How is it that a document of such importance as Sir A. 
 Burnes's explanation is omitted ? A copy of his engagement, 
 on which the Ameer claimed exemption, is given in the 
 volume (page 311). A hope was expressed by the Governor- 
 General that the Political Agent in Upper Sinde would take 
 an early opportunity of adjusting this question (page 320). 
 
 A treaty was entered into (June, 1841, page 326,) with 
 Meer Shere Mahomed Khan of Meerpcre, agreeing to pay 
 half a lac of rupees in part payment of the expense of the 
 British force stationed in Sinde (page 335), and that chief shall 
 remain sole ruler in his principality, and the jurisdiction of 
 the British Government shall not be introduced into his ter- 
 ritory. 
 
 The Governor-General conveys his approval of the proposal 
 of Meer Nusseer Khan (page 329), for the cession of his own
 
 89 
 
 share, and that of the late Ameer Noor Mahomed Khan, in the 
 revenues of Shikarpore, in part liquidation of their portion of tri- 
 bute payable to the BritishGovernment; the British Government 
 being willing to accept a perpetual lease of the Hyderabad 
 share of Shikarpore, paying annually for the same one-fifth 
 more than the average net income derived by the Ameers 
 Noor Mahomed Khan and Nusseer Khan during the last five 
 or ten years, or any other period for which the Political Agent 
 might have the means of striking an average. It appears 
 that the Ameers insisted upon retaining the nominal sove- 
 reignty of Shikarpore, which was acceded to by Major 
 Outram (vide letter, 21st August 1841, page 335,) who had 
 much difficulty in settling the average by which the annual 
 
 > / 
 
 revenue was to be determined (page 338). The proceedings 
 of Major Outram -are approved by the Governor-General, 
 20th September, 1841, (page 339). 
 
 Lieutenant Postans was directed to intercept letters of the 
 Lahore Vakeels (page 339), who had " established a correspon- 
 dence with the Ameers of Hyderabad all in the most open way 
 the Vakeels asking Leckie if they should receive his letters." 
 
 it 
 
 So states Major Outram, 10th January, 1842. Lieutenant Pos- 
 tans soon got two letters staled to be from Meer Nusseer Khan 
 to Sawun Mull ; that officer says, " The original letters must 
 either be sent on, so as not to excite suspicion, and bring the 
 parties further forward, or I must frame some stratagem to 
 account for their disappearance." This system was alto- 
 gether bad ; and it being known that letters were required to 
 serve a purpose, there was no difficulty in getting them pre- 
 pared to suit the object in view and to make mischief. There 
 is really, however, nothing of the least importance in the 
 letters; but Lieutenant Postans "could not help thinking 
 Nusseer is brooding mischief;" and Major Outram (page 340) 
 states that " the accompanying letter from Lieutenant Pos- 
 tans shows that the childish Meer Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad 
 is again intriguing with Sawun Mull, governor of Mooltan." 
 
 All supplies for the consumption of the troops at Kurrachee 
 (page 341), were declared by the Ameers free from duties. 
 
 There appears to have been some difficulty (page 341), in
 
 90 
 
 effecting the proposed arrangement respecting the cession of 
 the revenues of Shikarpore, before alluded to, as we find in a 
 letter from the Political Agent, of 2nd February, 1842, that 
 officer recommending that " the farm of Shikarpore should 
 on no account be relinquished," and he adds, 
 
 " My late letters have shown you that I have thought it politic to 
 permit the Ameers to submit, through me, a request to annul the 
 bargain, should they wish it, my object being to temporize for a time ; 
 never contemplating, however, that we should ultimately relinquish 
 the most advantageous possession we could acquire on the Indus." 
 
 Meer Nusseer Khan had assumed rather a high tone in his 
 communication with Lieutenant Leckie respecting the cession 
 of Shikarpore (page 342). He said, 
 
 " "What you have said is contrary to treaty. This officer (Suffur 
 Hubshee) is acting by my orders. If I choose to commit tyranny, 
 I may ; it has always been the custom in Sinde to make exactions, 
 to remunerate some, and take from others ; this custom I am not 
 willing to alter. Do you wish to break the treaty by interfering 
 with my authority ? Shikarpore is mine until Major Outram and 
 myself exchange treaties for its transfer. Who dares make a dis- 
 turbance in the place ? If they do it, it is my business. Pray do 
 not interfere with the treaty, which is like a wall or bund, which 
 lasts until compelled to give way by force of water.*' 
 
 And in reply to Lieutenant Leckie's arguments, the Ameer 
 said, " If you wish to break the treaty, you do so by this 
 message from Major Outram, which is contrary to the 2nd 
 article thereof, in which it states, that the British Govern- 
 ment shall not interfere with the subjects of Sinde ;" and 
 again, " when I give a thing, I never cavil about it as you 
 do ; and from what you have said, I begin to fear that you 
 are making excuses to gain some other end ;" and " 1 am ready 
 to abide by my treaty, and pay the tribute without any re- 
 ference to Calcutta. Do you want the tribute or the country 
 of Sinde?" 
 
 Major Outram did not, however, approve of his assistant's 
 communication to the Ameer (page 344), his object being 
 " not really to annul the bargain, but to temporize;" and 
 Lieutenant Leckie was reminded of the instructions given
 
 91 
 
 him, which were, "you will give the Ameers hopes of keeping 
 Shikarpore after all, which you should encourage any way 
 short of actual pledge, &,c., until the Governor-General can 
 decide what policy to pursue." This may be very clever and 
 cunning, but it is not a fair or creditable mode of conducting 
 negociations with other states. Such a course tended more 
 than anything else, to shake the confidence of the Ameers in 
 our integrity, good faith, and truth. The ever shifting policy 
 pursued towards them, and the incessant demands for some- 
 thing new, must have harassed them beyond endurance. 
 
 The old story of intrigue is again revived (page 346). 
 Major Outram having been disappointed in his views re- 
 specting Shikarpore, had again taken a prejudice against 
 Ameer Nusseer Khan, and he informed the Governor-General 
 (22nd February, 1842), that he should " have intrigues of the 
 more restless Ameers to expose hereafter, Meer Nusseer Khan 
 of Hyderabad particularly, who has been especially active of 
 late." 
 
 The decided line of policy is again resumed (page 347), as 
 the Governor-General was led to believe that Major Outram 
 " may have seen reason to doubt the fidelity of some one or more 
 of the Ameers of Sinde" (page 348). This was rather a vague 
 charge; and the Governor-General, in transmitting letters to 
 the Ameers, to be delivered at Major Outram's discretion, 
 emphatically declared, 
 
 " You will distinctly understand that the threat contained in this 
 letter is no idle threat, intended only to alarm, but a declaration of 
 the Governor-General's fixed determination to punish, cost what it 
 may, the first chief who may prove faithless, by the confiscation of 
 his dominions. But there must be clear proof of such faithlessness, 
 and it must not be provoked by the conduct of British agents pro- 
 ducing apprehensions in the mind of any chief, that the British 
 Government entertains designs inconsistent with his interest and 
 honour." 
 
 There is no mistaking the pointed observation of Lord 
 Ellenborough, who had no doubt studied the proceedings of 
 the former Resident, and it is to be regretted his Lordship did 
 not still more decidedly discourage the marked propensity of
 
 92 
 
 the Political Agent to magnify every trifling act of opposition 
 on the part of the Ameers, or unimportant communication 
 with other chiefs, into intrigues of the most criminal character 
 against the British Government. The present Governor- 
 General had a glorious opportunity of carrying into effect his 
 professed resolve to maintain peace and avoid extension of 
 complicated connections, by a thorough change in the system 
 pursued towards Sinde, and it is a pity he did not, as the first 
 act of his administration, effect an entire change in the officers 
 employed, who appear to have been great alarmists and far 
 too partial to listening to every whisper and idle tale against 
 the Ameers, by designing and discontented natives, or over- 
 zealous agents and despicable spies. 
 
 The new Governor-General in adverting (page 347) to his 
 circular letter to all the agents of the British Government at 
 all the courts of India, which would exhibit the principles of 
 justice and moderation by which he was resolved to regulate 
 his conduct, informed the Ameers of Sinde that he would 
 confide in their friendship, until he had proof in his hand of 
 their faithlessness ; but if he should obtain such proof, he 
 would not permit them longer to exercise a power they had 
 abused ; and he concluded by the following solemn decla- 
 ration : 
 
 " On the day on which you shall be faithless to the British Govern- 
 ment, sovereignty will have passed from you, your dominions icill be 
 given to others ; and in your destitution, all India will see that the 
 British Government will not pardon an Injury received from one It 
 believes to le Its friend." 
 
 We are in the next page (page 346) startled with the 
 opportune announcement, by Major Outrarn to the Governor- 
 General : 
 
 " I shall have it in my power shortly, / believe, to expose the 
 hostile intrigues of the Ameers, to such an extent as may be deemed 
 by his Lordship sufficient to authorize the dictation of his own terms 
 to the chiefs of Sinde, and to call for such measures as he deems 
 necessary to place British power on a secure footing in these 
 countries."* 
 
 * If intrigues had been developed, of so serious a nature as to warrant the
 
 93 
 
 Lord Ellenborough had wisely, and considerately for the 
 interests of the Company (page 349), resolved to reduce the 
 number of Political Agents and assistants, some of whom, if 
 they had nothing useful to engage their attention, were sure 
 to be evincing their zeal by collecting intelligence of no 
 moment and tiresome to peruse. It was high time, indeed, 
 to make a reduction, as it is stated by his Lordship that, 
 
 " The number of officers so employed in those countries altogether 
 new to our intervention, appears, at the commencement of last year, 
 to have equalled the number of salaried officers employed by the 
 Queens Government in Her Majesty's diplomatic service in all 
 Europe.'" 
 
 Now (22nd May, 1842), we come to a most important des- 
 patch (page 350), conveying the views proposed to be adopted 
 by the Governor-General towards Sinde. His Lordship stated 
 that although it would be his desire to confine our future 
 relations to the states on the left bank of the Indus, yet the 
 Ameers of Sinde and Khyrpore having dominions on both banks 
 of the river, and the British Government having recently 
 contracted engagements with the Khan of Kelat, he felt that 
 it would be necessary, at least until the affairs, of Afghanistan 
 should assume a more settled and satisfactory form, to retain a 
 position on the Indus, and to have the means of acting on 
 both banks. The continued occupation of Kurrachee was 
 contemplated, and his Lordship likewise contemplated the 
 continued occupation of the island of Bukkur, and the town 
 of Sukkur, as a sort of tele de point upon the right bank of the 
 In.-lus.* The Governor-General hoped that a large portion, 
 if not the whole, of the trade of Shikarpore might be trans- 
 ferred to Sukkur, if placed directly under our government. 
 In any future negociations, therefore, with the Ameers of 
 Khyrpore, the Political Agent would bear in mind the wish of 
 the Governor-General to possess the island of Bukkur and 
 town of Sukkur, with an ample arrondissement. 
 
 It was the Governor-General's desire to put an end,f 
 wherever it might be practicable, with any regard to our 
 
 infliction of so severe a penalty, why all this delay and hesitation in at once 
 communicating them ? 
 
 * This is at direct variance with former solemn assurances. 
 
 f This was another new plan. What right had we to tribute? We pro-
 
 94 
 
 financial interests, to the system whereby a native State 
 receives protection from us, in consideration of tribute to be 
 paid to the British Government. It was desirable to give 
 up any demand for tribute, in exchange for territory, or in 
 consideration for the abolition of duties burthensome to trade. 
 The Governor-General therefore considered it would be a de- 
 sirable arrangement, if such cessions of territory as might be 
 necessary to us at Kurrachee, Bukkur, and Sukkur were 
 made to us by the Ameers of Sinde and Khyrpore, and all 
 claims to tribute payable to to us by the Ameers, were, 
 after such cessions, to be cancelled, in consideration of the 
 establishment of the perpetual freedom of trade upon the 
 Indus, &c. The ultimate object was the establishment of 
 unrestricted trade between all the countries of the Indus, the 
 sea, and the Himalaya, and the total abolition of all internal 
 duties in that vast territory, compensation being made to the 
 native States by the payment to each of a portion of the 
 duties collected upon the frontier. This then was the com- 
 mencement of the discussion which ended in our taking pos- 
 session of the country. 
 
 The Governor- General makes a merit of offering to ex- 
 change tribute for territory. How did we become entitled to 
 tribute at all ? We demanded it, in the first instance, on 
 behalf of Shah Shoojah, and after gaining all we desired on 
 that chief's account, we imposed it by force on our own. 
 Shah Shoojah was now again powerless; and we had ceased 
 to have any connection with Affghanistan. The only pre- 
 tence we had for occupying Kurrachee, or any other place in 
 Sinde, was to afford a secure passage to our troops going to 
 and returning from Cabul. When that necessity ceased, we 
 should have withdrawn ; but the Governor-General, chose to 
 exact concessions which, at the outset, do not seem to have 
 been contemplated, and the only merit of which proceedings, 
 on the part of the present Governor- General is, that it was 
 at variance with the oft-repeated declared policy and as- 
 surances to the Ameers, by his predecessor. The solemn 
 
 fessed to protect Sinde; but we help ourselves and reduce our friends, for 
 whose interest we at first evinced so much consideration, to absolute sub- 
 jection.
 
 95 
 
 pledge given by Lord Auckland, adverted to in the early 
 stage of this Analysis, is set at nought. 
 
 Major Outram expressed his intention (page 351), to " lay 
 in such a train" as should enable Captain Brown to follow 
 up the inquiry respecting the late intrigues; and meantime, 
 he had deferred presenting the Governor- General's letters to 
 the Ameers, as " all of them being conscious that they were 
 already guilty, would, very probably, be driven by their 
 fears of the consequences so explicitly proclaimed to them, 
 to commit themselves further;" and he added, "all such 
 intrigues are suspended for the present, in consequence of our 
 late successes, and the re-establishment of our power; and 
 they are not likely to renew them so long as we are in such 
 power beyond the Indus." Still nothing tangible all vague 
 insinuation against the Ameers, who should have been al- 
 lowed an opportunity of replying to the Governor-General's 
 remonstrances when they might possibly have cleared them- 
 selves from the imputations of insidious enemies, or artful 
 spies and informers in the service and pay of the political 
 agents. 
 
 The infideliiy of Meer Nusseer Khan (page 370) and Meer 
 Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, seems to have been established 
 in the mind of the Governor-General, who approved of his 
 letters not being presented. His Lordship was anxious to 
 know if Meer Roostum Khan's territory lay convenient for 
 annexing a portion of it to that of the Khan of JBhawul- 
 pore, whose dominions his Lordship was desirous of increasing, 
 in reward for that chief's uniform fidelity, and that of his 
 ancestors. This indicated something like a determination to 
 be satisfied with the slender proof of Meer Roostum Khan's 
 intrigue, or whatever it may be called, and to inflict very 
 summary punishment. Here it may be noticed, that it was 
 afterwards clearly shown that Meer Roostum Khan had 
 nothing to do with the letter imputed to him, which was sent 
 by his " intriguing minister Futteh Mahomed Goree." 
 
 There is no end to new plans and proposals (page 373) by 
 the Political Agent, who in addressing the Secretary to the 
 Governor-General (21 June, 1842,) suggests that it would be
 
 96 
 
 necessary to show as a ground for requiring new arrange- 
 ments, that we had of late been exposed to the inimical in- 
 trigues of some of the Ameers, and the evidence already 
 submitted, even if deficient of legal proof , he considered, gave 
 sufficient data for suspecting that intrigues were in progress 
 to overthrow our power, and to authorize precautions for self- 
 preservation ; our military position being insecure, and our 
 communications liable to be cut off. These considerations 
 would, he thought, justify the dictation of our terms to the 
 Ameers, relinquishing all claims against them. Scarcely any 
 return would induce the Ameers to waive their prejudices 
 against making over Kurrachee, and allowing any infringement 
 on their shikargahs. The political Agent represented that 
 nothing could be more grating to the feelings of the Ameers 
 than any encroachment on their shikargahs (hunting pre- 
 serves), which the stipulation in the 5th article of the pro- 
 posed treaty* involved. He, however, after much argument 
 as to the necessity of having wood for steam-vessels, and the 
 facility of tracking boats on the banks of the river, submits 
 that their Highnesses' " selfish feelings" ought not to obstruct 
 a measure of such general public benefit, and virtually neces- 
 sary for the continuance of steam navigation on the Indus, 
 " which measure this may be the only opportunity for effect- 
 ing that may occur for years to come." Here Major Outrain 
 proposes a gross and flagrant breach of what he must have 
 been fully aware his predecessor had pledged, and the de- 
 mand for further cessions was in direct violation of the assur- 
 ance of Lord Auckland. 
 
 The draft treaty proposed by Major Outram (page 374) to 
 be forced on the Ameers, in order to carry into effect the 
 wishes of the Governor-General, is deserving of notice. Let 
 any one read the articles, aud say if they were not enough to 
 produce an outbreak. There was no end indeed to our ex- 
 actions. The first article stipulated for cession in perpetuity of 
 Bukkur and neighbouring small islets ; second, the cession of 
 Sukkur and some adjoining ground ; third, the town and 
 
 * Sir Henry Pottinger gave assurances that these should never be inter- 
 fered with.
 
 97 
 
 harbour of Kurrachee, with the ground occupied by the town 
 and cantonment ; fourth, all articles of commerce to have a 
 free passage between the sea at Kurrachee and the Indus at 
 Tatta; fifth, the British Government to be allowed to cut and 
 consume for steam navigation, wood growing within 100 
 cubits of the river, and to clear the bank of jungle for that 
 space, due precaution being adopted to prevent trespass be- 
 yond that limit ; sixth, no tolls to be levied on any boats 
 whatever, in transit, on the river Indus; seventh, the Ameers 
 to be released from all pecuniary obligations. Obligations 
 indeed ! how imposed ? We entreat permission to prevent 
 Runjeet Sing encroaching in a quarter of no real conse- 
 quence, namely, on the frontier, in the Mazaree and Rojan 
 country; we beg permission to pacify the chief of Lahore, 
 get a finger into Sinde, and soon intrude our whole body 
 force the Ameers to supply our troops exhaust their trea- 
 suries, fix a perpetual tribute to ourselves, and when it suits 
 our convenience or policy, demand a cession of some of the 
 most valuable portions of their territory! 
 
 The Ameers were, of course, averse to the demands, and 
 made a very sensible reply, 10th June, 1842 (page 376) : 
 
 " The customs of Hindoostan are different from the customs of 
 Beloocbistan ; every country has its own rules and customs ; but the 
 friendship that took place between the Ameers and the British Go- 
 vernment will increase daily, and the treaty, dated llth March, 
 1 839, which is written for the good of both governments, will ever 
 be binding, and to the different paragraphs therein we agree. The 
 justice of the British Government is well known to all the world, 
 and the word of the British is always true and correct. The same 
 treaty which is confirmed by the seal and signature of the British 
 Government is enouyli for us. The contents of the 5th paragraph 
 of the same treaty is, that the Ameers who are mentioned in that 
 are to remain rulers of this country, and that the English Govern- 
 ment will not interfere with their government. * The complaints of 
 the ryots against the Ameers will not be listened to by the British 
 Government.' It is hoped that the contents of this paragraph will 
 be acted up to by the British Government." 
 
 This is really a good expose. But the steam must be 
 kept up, and fresh grounds of complaint found, else how were 
 
 G
 
 98 
 
 the objects of the Governor-General to be attained ? and a 
 pliant and willing agent was found in the Political Agent, as 
 the long letter from Major Outram, (dated 26th June, 1842,) 
 and far too long to quote, (page 377,) sufficiently indicates. All 
 sorts of aggression and injustice are therein recommended ; and 
 the annotator cannot, with any satisfaction to his own mind, 
 make the attempt even to separate the chaff from the wheat 
 in this unfeeling production. Major Outram seems to have 
 considered that the Ameers were a set of puppets to be 
 handled and set forth, at his pleasure, just as we see dis- 
 played daily in the exhibitions in our streets of the celebrated 
 history of " Punch and Judy." That officer seems to have 
 racked his inventive genius to give a pretence for despoiling 
 the Ameers of their rights. 
 
 The Governor-General (page 380) made the following 
 candid announcement to the Secret Committee, 8th July, 
 1842: "The Ameers of Sinde have also made preparations 
 for liquidating the arrears of their tribute, and appear to have 
 desisted from the hostile intrigues in which there is reason to 
 believe they were till lately engaged."* 
 
 Cold water is thrown by the Governor-General (page 380) 
 on Major Outram's over-zealous proposals for a new treaty, 
 and it is deeply to be regretted that his Lordship did not 
 adhere to his first impressions, and that he permitted himself 
 to be forced, as it were, into a course of policy, so diame- 
 trically opposed to his expressed opinion prior to quitting 
 England. His Lordship did not see any necessity for press- 
 ing a negociation upon the Ameers precipitately, but, on the 
 contrary, " would rather desire to leave their minds, for the 
 present, in tranquillity" 
 
 " His Lordship does not consider that there would be any 
 necessity for taking a general power to cut wood within a 
 certain distance of the Indus. Such an arrangement can 
 hardly be necessary for the supply of our steamers, and would 
 be naturally very offensive to the Ameers." 
 
 The remainder of his Lordship's letter is altogether very 
 considerate and statesman-like, and it is only to be regretted 
 * Why, then, not let the poor harassed Ameers alone after this ?
 
 99 
 
 that he had some agents so wedded to certain opinions and 
 prejudices. These young politicals are ever suggesting ex- 
 tension of territory ; and Lord Ellenborough has suffered from 
 placing too much confidence in the agents he employed, 
 which led to his committing himself so far, that he found 
 it impossible to retrace his steps, and for mere consistency's 
 sake he was compelled to advance, or rather, he was pre- 
 vented from retreating. This may be gathered from the 
 observations of the Governor-General here and there in the 
 Blue-book ; for instance, we find, in a communication from 
 His Lordship, so late as 17th August, 1842, (page 382) the 
 following : 
 
 " The correspondence with Major Outram respecting the expe- 
 diency of entering into certain engagements with the Ameers of 
 Sinde, will show you that I had no intention, in my former instruc- 
 tions to that officer, to press on the Ameers of Sinde any hasty 
 change in our present relations with them, as any such measures that 
 may appear expedient had better remain for future consideration." 
 
 Sir Charles Napier was now (26th August, 18-12), sent to 
 assume command in Sinde and Beloochistan, (page 384,) 
 and to have authority over all political and civil officers, and 
 he was informed, that " if the Ameers, or any of them, should 
 act hostilely, or evince hostile designs against our army, it is 
 my (the Governor-General's) fixed resolution never to forgive 
 a breach of faith, and to exact a penalty which shall be a 
 warning to every chief in India."" 
 
 Major Outram was desired (page 385) to lay before Sir 
 C. Napier the state of our relations with the Ameers of 
 Hyderabad, and all the other chiefs in Sinde and Beloochistan. 
 The Governor-General (llth Sept. 1842) directed : 
 
 "You will explain to the Major- General the actual state of things, 
 showing him what has been done by the Ameers and chiefs in pur- 
 suance of the treaties, and placing before him, with judicial accu- 
 racy, the several acts whereby the Ameers or chiefs may have seemed 
 to have departed from the terms or spirit of their engagements, and 
 
 * Why all this apprehension, after the declaration to the Secret Com- 
 mittee of 8th July, that the Ameers were quite quiet ? 
 
 G 2
 
 o have evinced hostility or unfriendliness towards the Government 
 '* oi India." 
 
 There seems to be more and more cause for regret (page 
 386) that the Governor-General was so unfortunate in the 
 selection of his agents ; for his Lordship's desire to act justly 
 is manifest from many of his earlier communications. In 
 addressing Sir Charles Napier, and, in alluding to the ne- 
 cessity of punishing any Ameer or chief with whom we had 
 a treaty of alliance and friendship, for any hostile design 
 evinced against us, he emphatically said, he " would not pro- 
 ceed in this course without the most ample and convincing 
 evidence of the guilt of the person accused. The Governor- 
 General entirely relies upon your sense of justice, and is con- 
 vinced that whatever report you may make upon the subject, 
 after full investigation, will be suck as he may safely act 
 upon." 
 
 Reference may be had to Sir Charles Napier's letters 
 (No. 384, page 389, and No. 385, page 390) to show that 
 that officer was resolved to act with determination ; otherwise 
 they are scarcely worthy of notice. 
 
 A new treaty was still not lost sight of by the Governor- 
 General, (page 392,) who instructs Sir C. Napier that he was 
 authorized to treat with them for a revision of the treaty ; and 
 the Governor-General was willing to relieve them, upon just 
 and proper conditions, from the future payment of tribute to 
 the British Government. And with reference to the permis- 
 sion to cut wood, perhaps English coal would be the most 
 eligible mode of supply for our steamers ; but his Lordship 
 very properly added, " so much of prejudice, and of feeling 
 too, is attached by the Ameers to their shikargahs being 
 unmolested, that probably matters of much more importance 
 might be obtained from them more easily, than the permis- 
 sion to cut wood for the use of the steamers." 
 
 The Governor-General, (page 393,) believing the reports 
 against Ameer Nusseer Khan, states, that that chief must 
 either be compelled to observe the conditions of the treaty, 
 or be deprived of his territory ; and if he should be so wrong- 
 headed as to offer any resistance, his interest in Kurrachee,Tatta,
 
 101 
 
 Shikarpore, Sukkur, the purgunnahs adjoining the Bhawul- 
 pore country and Subzulkote, shall be immediately transferred 
 to the Khan of Bhavvulpore, and the whole property of 
 Ameer Nusseer Khan, of every description, forfeited to the 
 British Government, and such distribution of it made among 
 those who remained faithful, as should hold out a valuable 
 lesson to all the chiefs of India. 
 
 General Napier (page 394) loses no time in furnishing 
 abundant reasons and arguments for making a dash at the 
 possessions of the Ameers. His memorandum is a perfect 
 and most unique specimen of Machiavelism. The mere 
 sketch of a few passages is all that can be ventured upon in 
 this place. " It was not for him to consider how we came to 
 occupy Sinde. We are here by right of treaties, and there- 
 fore we stand on the same footing as the Ameers themselves ! 
 There had been no public protest* registered against the 
 treaties." "The English occupy Shikarpore, Bukkur, Suk- 
 kur, and Kurrachee, by treaties, which, if rigidly adhered to 
 by the Ameers, would render these princes more rich and 
 powerful, and their subjects more happy than they now are." 
 (Here the General is a little mistaken.) After five paragraphs 
 of what the gallant officer calls reasoning, he says: "If 
 this reasoning be correct, would it not be better to come to 
 the results at once ? I think it would be better, if it can be 
 done with honesty" 
 
 " Several Ameers have broken the treaty (par. 10) in the 
 various instances stated in the accompanying return of ' Com- 
 plaints' against them. I have maintained that we want 
 only a fair pretext to coerce the Ameers, and I think the 
 various acts recorded in the return give abundant reason to 
 take Kurrachee, Sukkur, Bukkur, Shikarpore, and Subzul- 
 cote," (and why not Hyderabad, General ?) " for our own, 
 obliging the Ameers to leave a trail way along both banks of 
 the Indus, and stipulate for a supply of icood ; but, at the 
 same time, remitting all tribute, and arrears of tribute, in 
 
 * No ; the poor Ameers had no notaries public in their country, unfor- 
 tunately for them nuisances though these gentry may be elsewhere, when 
 too numerous.
 
 102 
 
 favour of those Ameers whose conduct has been correct; and 
 finally, to enter into a fresh treaty with one of these princes 
 alone as chief, and answerable for the others." (Bravo, 
 General !) " I cannot think that such a procedure would be 
 either dishonourable or harsh; I am sure it would be humane. 
 The refractory Ameers break the treaty for the gratification 
 of their avaricious dispositions, and we punish that breach. 
 I can perceive no injustice in such proceeding." 
 
 Respecting the alleged breach of the treaty, (par. 17) 
 which has been so much animadverted upon, Sir C. Napier 
 says 
 
 "The Ameers say, that they did not understand Article XI. of the 
 treaty with Hyderabad, to prohibit the levying of tolls on their own 
 subjects. It seems that they urge in proof of their misconception, 
 that they resisted the signing of the treaty because of other articles 
 less important, yet never objected to Article XI. because they relied up- 
 on Article V. This may be, and I would willingly, if possible, sup- 
 pose that they really did conceive that the treaty gave them the right 
 of levying tolls on their own subjects; but my answer is, that they 
 have attempted to levy tolls on the boats of the Khan of Bhawul- 
 pore, &c." 
 
 So for that and other flagrant offences, you would punish 
 them in the severe manner proposed. Is this the way that 
 disputes of this kind are settled in Europe ? 
 
 The General ridicules the idea of letting the Ameers retain 
 their shikargahs, or hunting preserves, unmolested (par. 19) 
 
 *' To their selfish feelings and avarice," (says be) " and love of 
 bunting, are such great general interests to be sacrificed ? I think not. 
 The real interests of the Ameers themselves demand that their puerile 
 pursuits, and blind avaricious proceedings, should be subjected to a 
 wholesome control, which their breaches of treaties, and our power, 
 give us at this moment a lawful right to exercise, and the means of 
 peaceably enforcing." 
 
 The memorandum of the brave general is all of a piece. 
 He may fight well, and be able to command a force ; but he 
 was brought up in a school of diplomacy that Machiavel would 
 have done no discredit to, as head professor. Is this the 
 way that the States of India in amity with us are to be
 
 103 
 
 treated? If so, we don't deserve to retain our present footing- 
 long. 
 
 The attention of General Napier was drawn (page 400) by 
 Major Outram to the fact, 
 
 " That Colonel Pottinger's original treaty with the Lower Sinde 
 Ameers, of twenty-three articles, which was subscribed by them on 
 the approach of an army to Hyderabad, was not ratified by Lord 
 Auckland, who substituted the existing treaty of fourteen articles, 
 which, however, the Ameers demurred to accept, and were only in- 
 duced to ratify after much delay on learning our successes at Cabul, 
 and that our armies were on their return. The present treaty is 
 more stringent than the one they had previously agreed to, which 
 limited the number of British troops at any time to be located in 
 Sinde, and confined them to the occupation of Tatta alone. On your 
 third paragraph I have to remark that, by a separate article of the 
 treaty with Meer Roostum Khan, of Khyrpore, our occupation of 
 the fortress of Bukkur is pledged to be only temporary ' during the 
 existence of the war." 
 
 What do all Major Outram's complaints amount to, to jus- 
 tify such a new treaty as that proposed ? (page 400) 1st, A 
 letter addressed to Shere Sing of Lahore, supposed to have 
 been by Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, but only brought 
 home to Futteh Mahomed Ghoree; 2nd, compassing the flight 
 of a state prisoner, Syud Mahomed Shureef, of which Ghoree 
 was also accused, but of which, as subsequently appeared, he 
 was innocent ; 3d, placing in the stocks and maltreating the 
 servant of a British officer, by Syud Bahadoor Ali, agent of 
 Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore ; 4th, case of stoppage and 
 exaction of duties affecting British property, at Bhoong Bara 
 on the Indus, under authority of Meer Roostum Khan 
 though Major Outram reports (pages 402 to 416) that it did 
 not appear their Highnesses ever relinquished their right to 
 tax their own subjects ; 5th, seizing and confining British sub- 
 jects, who were released on demand, but no reparation afforded. 
 
 A long letter from the Political Agent in Lower Sinde, 
 (p. 416), dated llth May 1840, forms one of the enclosures in 
 Major Outram's communication to Sir C. Napier (p. 418,) and 
 presents rather a curious contrast with some of the Major's
 
 104 
 
 later productions. He therein contended that the Meerpore 
 Chief never agreed to exempt Sinde merchants from what they 
 had been accustomed to pay, and what in fact, was the principal 
 source of his revenue. The Ameers of Hyderabad considered 
 also that, by the terms of the treaty, they continued to possess 
 the same right. A similar right over their own subjects con- 
 tinued to be exercised by the Khyrpore and Bhawulpore chiefs, 
 and the Major says, (par. 7) 
 
 " It is with much diffidence, but from an imperative sense of duty, 
 that I now beg most respectfully and submissively to offer my opinion 
 on the subject. It appears to me very possible, that the Ameers 
 may have understood the llth and 12th articles of tlie new treaty 
 to be merely confirmatory of the former commercial treaties, and that 
 they really never did contemplate that those articles had any reference 
 to the subjects of Sinde, especially as tlie 5th article provides for the 
 ' absolute rule ' of the Ameers over their own subjects ; otherwise, I 
 do not think they would have omitted to protest against such an ar- 
 rangement, which deprives them of their principal source of revenue, 
 besides in a great measure undermining their authority over their own 
 subjects, when they so pertinaciously persisted in protesting against 
 other, and to them far less important, provisions of the new treaty."* 
 
 Major Outram therefore considered that, if the then Gover- 
 nor-General was determined to exact the enforcement of the 
 exemption on behalf of the subjects of Sinde, he was convinced 
 it would cause extreme discontent, much bickering, and fre- 
 quent disturbances, more than counterbalancing any advan- 
 tages that would accrue from granting the freedom of the 
 river to subjects of Sinde. And mark the conclusion 
 
 " In support of these views, which I consider myself bound in 
 duty to submit for the judgment of the Governor-General of India in 
 Council, I may be permitted to quote the words of the enlightened 
 statesman, Franklin, ' To me it seems that neither the obtaining nor 
 retaining of any trade, however valuable, is an object for which men 
 may justly spill each other's blood ; that the true and sure means of 
 extending commerce is the goodness and cheapness of commodities, 
 and that the profit of no trade can be equal to the expense of com- 
 pelling it and holding it ly fleets and armies.' " 
 
 * No doubt the Ameers understood the commercial treaty as above 
 described, when Major Outram was in better humour with them.
 
 105 
 
 Captain Mylne's memorandum and summary of charges 
 against the Ameers of Lower Sinde was forwarded to Sir C. 
 Napier, by Major Outram, who stated that it was but fair to 
 the Ameers to acquaint him, that in the toll discussions re- 
 ferred to, their Highnesses declared they always understood the 
 parties alluded to, for whom freedom of trade was claimed, 
 to be foreign traders, the treaty of 1836 alluded to being 
 expressly confined to such ! Adverting to the evil results 
 of a divided Government, all the Ameers having been de- 
 clared equal by Lord Auckland, Major Outram recommends 
 that Meer Mahomed should be elevated to the chieftain- 
 ship.* 
 
 The only observation in Captain Mylne's letter worthy of 
 notice (page 430,) is that, 
 
 " It is not to be supposed that the presence of a British force in 
 Sinde, the growing influence of the British Government in the 
 country, and the voice we hold in the Durbar, can be looked upon 
 otherwise than with feelings of jealousy by the Ameers. Their posi- 
 tion is becoming daily more humiliating as each vain evasion is un- 
 masked, and they are well aware that their subjects consider them as 
 being completely in the hands of the British." 
 
 An intercepted letter, and a treaty written in a Koran from 
 Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, and addressed to Meer 
 Nusseer Khan of Hyderabad, (page 462,) were forwarded, 
 30th October, 1842, to Sir C. Napier by Major Outram, who 
 stated that these documents were obtained through a party 
 interested in Meer Ali Moorad's* favour, and should be received 
 with suspicion, as that chief had made proposals some time 
 before, to the British Government to be elevated to the chief- 
 tainship of Upper Sinde, to the prejudice of his brother Meer 
 Roostum Khan. The Major nevertheless considered that the 
 documents had the appearance of being genuine, the second 
 enclosure, " received through a different channel, confirming 
 the fact of an interchange of Korans between Meer Roostum 
 Khan and Nusseer Khan ! " 
 
 The Governor- General, with reference to the supposed 
 infraction of the treaty by the Ameers of Upper and Lower 
 * This is the chief now in power, elevated by Sir C. Napier.
 
 106 
 
 Sinde (page 469) by Meer Roostum Khan, having addressed 
 Maharajah Shere Sing, and Futteh Mahomed Ghoree having 
 compassed the escape of Syud Mahomed, considers that these 
 were acts of hostility to the British Government, for which 
 Meer Roostum Khan was responsible. His Lordship then 
 points out to General Napier the several objects which he 
 desires to attain : 1st, The free introduction of all articles of 
 consumption into the British cantonments; 2d, a cession of 
 territory in exchange for tribute ; 3d, the coinage at the 
 expense of the British Government* of rupees of the same 
 value as those called Company's rupees, bearing on one side 
 whatever inscription the Ameers might desire, and on the other 
 side the Sovereign of England, this being with reference to 
 the intention of introducing an uniform currency in all India. 
 His Lordship adds, (par. 9) 
 
 " The exaction of a provision to this effect is but a lenient penalty 
 for the offences which the Ameers have committed, and to this I pro- 
 pose to add another, strongly recommended by you, a provision secu- 
 ring to us the right to cut wood upon both banks of the Indus for the 
 use of the steamers."^ 
 
 His Lordship afterwards intimates (par. 16-17) that he was 
 desirous of confining the acquisitions of territory to be made 
 by us to such as were necessary for the full protection of the 
 trade upon the Indus, and the military command of the river. 
 These objects would be accomplished by the possession of 
 Kurrachee, Tatta, Sukkur, Bukkur, and Roree, together with 
 such arrondissement as might be necessary for the secure and 
 convenient occupation of these places, and give ample room for 
 the extension of the town and cantonments. It might also, if 
 required, be advisable to insert in any revised treaty, provisions 
 not only securing the free use of Tatta, but likewise the free use 
 of the navigable creek between Kurrachee and Tatta, and also 
 of the road of that creek to Tatta. The ultimate object was 
 the entire freedom of internal trade throughout the whole ter- 
 
 * This was anew idea, and rather an extraordinary proposal to a so-called 
 independent State. 
 
 f A most oppressive provision. It had been previously stated, his 
 Lordship wished to have nothing to do with the left bank of the Indus.
 
 ritory between Hindoo Koosh, the Indus, and the sea, and his 
 Lordship only awaited the favourable opportunity for effecting 
 this purpose, and for introducing uniformity of currency within 
 the same limits. The conclusion exhibits the intention of 
 effecting very great changes indeed (par. 20) 
 
 " To these great benefits, to be enjoyed equally by 140 millions of 
 people, I desire ultimately to add the abolition of all tributes payable 
 by one State to another, and the substitution for such tributes of ces- 
 sions of territory, so made, by means of mutual exchanges, as to bring 
 together into masses the dominions of the several sovereigns and chiefs. 
 These various measures, which would impart to the people of India 
 the most considerable of the advantages derived from union under the 
 same empire, it may require much time to effect ; but it is desirable 
 that they should always be held in view as the ultimate object of our 
 policy, not inconsistent with the real independence of any state, and 
 conducive to the happiness of the subjects of all."* 
 
 The crisis had now arrived ; the pear was nearly ripe ; and 
 the Governor- General having made up his rnind on the 
 imputed guilt of the Ameers, on the very frivolous charges 
 so industriously collected and brought against them by the 
 host of political officers in Sinde, determined to inflict an 
 effectual punishment, by carrying into effect the measures 
 he had for some time been so solicitous about, namely, the 
 taking complete possession of valuable portions of their ter- 
 ritory, transmitted to Sir C. Napier, (4th November, 1842,) 
 the draft of a treaty to be imposed upon these chiefs, and the 
 gallant General was directed to nominate such officer as he 
 might consider most competent to discharge the duty of Com- 
 missioner, for negotiating the treaties with the Ameers of 
 Upper and Lower Sinde. 
 
 A note was addressed to the Ameers of Hyderabad (p. 472,) 
 adverting to the divers infractions without any specification there- 
 of, of the treaty by the Ameers, with the exception of Sobdar 
 Khan, and communicating the resolution to mark his sense of 
 their misconduct, and that the Governor-General had ein- 
 
 * What say the Honourable Court of Directors and the Board of Control 
 to this radical change ? Have they any voice in the matter, or can Lord 
 Ellenborough do just as he sees fit ?
 
 108 
 
 powered General Napier to require their consent to the several 
 provisions contained in the annexed draft of a treaty. The 
 Ameers were to be released from all obligation to pay tribute 
 after the 1st December, 1842, and they " would see in this 
 provision the regard which, notwithstanding their misconduct, 
 the Governor-General of India has not ceased to entertain for 
 the comfort and dignity of their Highnesses, and his sincere 
 attachment to peace." 
 
 A separate note was addressed (p. 473)toMeerNusseerKhan 
 of Hyderabad, stating that his hostile conduct, manifested in 
 addressing to Beebruck Boogtee a letter, having for its object 
 the inducing of that chief to engage in acts of hostility against 
 the British Government, and further a letter addressed by 
 Nusseer Khan to Sawun Mull, had induced the Governor- 
 General to empower Sir C.Napier to obtain the consent of Meer 
 Nusseer Khan to the proposed treaty ; and presuming that 
 that chief, after carrying into effect the provisions of the said 
 treaty, would be again admitted to the friendship of the 
 Governor- General, who would forget offences for which clear 
 atonement had been made.* 
 
 The treaty provided, 1st, That the Ameers should be re- 
 lieved from the payment of tribute ; 2nd, The Company's 
 rupee to be the coin legally current in the dominions of the 
 Ameers of Hyderabad, after 1st January, 1845. The British 
 Government will also coin for the Ameers, such number of 
 rupees as they may require, bearing the effigy on one side of 
 the Sovereign of England, and on the other such inscription 
 or device as the Ameers may prefer. The Ameers to re- 
 nounce the privilege of coining money. 3rd, The British 
 Government to have the right of felling wood for the use of 
 steamers, within one hundred yards of both banks of the 
 river ; but the British Government being unwilling to exer- 
 cise this right in a manner inconsistent or disagreeable to the 
 Ameers, will exercise it only under the direction of British 
 officers, and will refrain from all exercise of it so long 
 
 * It should not be overlooked, that no steps were ever taken to require 
 explanation from the Ameers of their guilt or innocence of the charges 
 brought against them !
 
 109 
 
 as the Ameers shall provide wood, to be paid for at such 
 places as may be named. 4th, Kurrachee and Tatta, with 
 such arrondissement as may be deemed necessary by Sir 
 C. Napier, to be ceded in perpetuity to the British Govern- 
 ment, also the right of free passage over the territories of the 
 Ameers between Kurrachee and Tatta, within such limits as 
 Sir C. Napier may determine, wherein the British Government 
 shall alone have jurisdiction. 5th, All the rights and interests 
 of the Ameers, or of any one of them, in Subzulcote, and in 
 all the territory intervening between the present frontier of 
 Bhawulpore and the town of Roree, are ceded in perpetuity 
 to his Highness the Nawab of Bhawulpore. 6th, To Meer 
 Sobdar Khan, the cession of territory producing half a lac of 
 annual revenue, such cession being in consideration of the 
 loss of revenue he will sustain by the transfer of Kurrachee. 
 7th, The Commissioner should decide what portion of territory 
 shall be ceded by the other Ameers to Sobdar Khan, in pur- 
 suance of the above article, &c. 
 
 We now come (page 474) to the manifesto issued to Meer 
 Roostum Khan and Meer Nusseer Khan of Khyrpore. No 
 charge whatever is made against the latter, or the other 
 Ameers of Upper Sinde, and yet upon the two charges about 
 to be noticed, the whole of these chiefs are punished to the 
 extent that will be shown, in adverting to the terms of the 
 treaty about to be enforced upon them. Is this justice? 
 Shame ! shame ! The note expresses the regret, that Meer 
 Roostum Khan, whose conduct in the early part of the Aff- 
 ghan war had been such as to merit the approbation of the 
 British Government, should have been led away by evil ad- 
 visers, &c. ; and the specific charges against him are, that he 
 wrote a letter to Maharajah Shere Sing;* and further, through 
 his minister, Futteh Mahomed Ghoree,that he compassed the 
 escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef Khan, a state prisoner, f 
 These were the offences which induced the Governor-General 
 to dictate a treaty upon the whole of the Ameers, as follows : 
 
 * It has been proved that Meer Roostum Khan knew nothing whatever of 
 that letter. 
 f It has also been shown that the Ameer had no cognizance of this affair.
 
 110 
 
 The first article of the treaty (page 475) is, that " the pergun- 
 nah of Bhoong Bhara, and the third part of the district of Sub- 
 zulcote, and the villages of Gotkee, Maladee, Chaonga, Da- 
 cloola, and Uzuzpore, and all the territories of the Ameers of 
 Khyrpore, or any of them intervening between the dominions 
 of his Highness the Nawab of Bhawulpore and the town 
 and district of Roree, are ceded in perpetuity to his Highness 
 the Nawab. 
 
 "2. The town of Sukkur, with such arrondissement as shall 
 be deemed necessary by Major-General Sir Charles Napier, 
 and the islands of Bukkur and the adjoining islets, and the 
 town of Roree, with such arrondissement as may be deemed 
 necessary by the General, are ceded in perpetuity to the Bri- 
 tish Government." 
 
 There were added provisions for the appropriation of the 
 surplus tribute to the Ameers who were called upon to make 
 cessions, a complicated arrangement also for exemption 
 from tolls on the Indus, coining, supply of wood, release 
 from tribute, &c., as specified in the Hyderabad treaty. 
 
 A willing and unscrupulous agent was found in Sir Charles 
 Napier. That officer reported to the Governor-General (5th 
 Nov. 1842, page 476) 
 
 " The Ameers have not committed any Covert act, and I only wait 
 till I hear from you, after your Lordship receives the long letter I 
 sent on the 25th ultimo, to draw out a fresh treaty, entering minute- 
 ly into the details of exchanging tribute for territory ; and if your 
 Lordship approves of this, I would submit it to the Ameers, at the 
 same time sparing no pains to convince them that neither injury nor 
 injustice is meditated, and that, by accepting the treaty, they will 
 become more rich and more secure in the possession of power than 
 they now are. If they refuse to listen to reason, and if they persist 
 in sacrificing every thing to their shikargahs or hunting grounds, 
 they must even have their way, and try the force of arms, at their 
 peril, if so they are resolved." 
 
 Mr. Clerk, Envoy to the Court of Lahore, (page 476) in 
 transmitting to the Secretary to the Governor-General (12th 
 Nov. 1842) translations of two letters sent to him by Major 
 Outram, purporting to be from Vizier Kurreem Khan and
 
 Ill 
 
 Meer Roostum Khan of Khyrpore to Maharajah Shere Sing, 
 and a note to Dewan Mull, states that he failed to trace the 
 cossids to their homes, as directed by Major Outram, and he 
 adds, " the authenticity of these letters is yet matter of some 
 doubt to me, as it was to Major Outram when sending them." 
 The opinion of the Political Agent in Lower Sinde (19th Dec. 
 1840) of Futteh Mahomed Ghoree, (page 305) the minister 
 of Meer Roostum Khan, should be here noticed, as that man 
 was the cause of the accusations against the Ameers. It is 
 stated that he was ever opposed to the alliance with the 
 British Government, and upon the agent remonstrating with 
 Meer Roostum Khan, that chief admitted he had many causes 
 of complaint against his minister, that the latter had been 
 his servant (originally a slave) from boyhood, and begged the 
 political agent to speak to him privately. Why then should 
 the whole of the Ameers of Upper Sinde suffer so grievously 
 for the acts of a servant who might have been punished or 
 dismissed, on the representation of the British Government, 
 and the justice of the case fully satisfied. But alas! it was 
 essential to have a pretext for the extension of territory, and 
 the other arrangements so earnestly desired by the Governor- 
 General. 
 
 The communications by the Governor-General to Sir Charles 
 Napier about this time, (Nov. 1842) evince no disposition to 
 relax in the demand made on the Ameers, nor to yield one 
 iota of the stern decree issued against them, but on the con- 
 trary, a fixed determination to enforce all that was required, 
 coute qui coute. From the reports received by his Lordship, 
 he hardly thought the General would be able to carry the 
 instructions into effect (page 483) ; and if a large force was 
 required, it should be sent. The designs of the Ameers ap- 
 peared, however, to be of a " defensive character only," but the 
 least sign of hesitation on our part would convert these defen- 
 sive preparations into measures of a hostile nature, and 
 " to yield the smallest point in negociation would have all 
 the effect of a defeat in the field." His Lordship therefore, 
 adhered to his original intention with respect to the Ameers. 
 If any of them committed an overt act of hostility, his pos-
 
 112 
 
 sessions should be altogether confiscated, and he be dependant 
 upon the charity of his own family for his future subsistence. 
 The example of punishment should produce an effect through- 
 out all India, calculated to deter any chief within its limits, 
 from encountering the just resentment of the British Govern- 
 ment, while the reward bestowed on our faithful ally, the Khan 
 of Bhawulpore, would tend to confirm all our allies in the 
 loyal observance of their engagements. 
 
 General Napier considered the charge against Meer Nusseer 
 Khan of Hyderabad, of writing a letter to Brebruck Boogtie 
 was proved by the seal. But the General's argument is unique 
 of its kind. The seal he procured did not correspond in size 
 and distance of the letters with the one on the letter, as he 
 found by measuring it with a pair of compasses, but in all 
 other respects they agreed ; so he was told by those who 
 understood Persian. But then the Ameers were stated to use 
 two seals, one on occasions of secrecy, and another on ordi- 
 nary occasions ; so that whether it was a forgery or not, the 
 Ameers were to suffer. There were doubts on Major Out- 
 ram's mind, of Meer Roostum Khan having addressed Maha- 
 rajah Shere Sing. If his minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree 
 wrote it, without his knowledge, and if the prince gave his 
 signet and power blindly to his minister, such folly was not to 
 excuse him from the consequences. The General considered 
 that Futteh Mahomed Ghoree had assisted in the escape of 
 Syud Mahomed Shureef, and if the Governor-General deemed 
 that the above was sufficient to act upon, Sir Charles Napier 
 would lose no time in proposing the draft of the new treaty to 
 the Ameers. " I am" (says he) " perfectly prepared, should 
 they resist, to act in a way which I imagine will bring them 
 to reason without bloodshed. Not but that I have troops 
 enough (and ready enough) to thrash them heartily if they resolve 
 to try their strength." 
 
 The General recommended the recal of Major Outram from 
 Bombay, to be employed as commissioner. Under what cir- 
 cumstances, and when the latter officer quitted his office in 
 Sinde, does not appear. 
 
 Preparations were made by General Napier for advancing
 
 113 
 
 to Hyderabad, (page 487) should the Ameers resolve to take 
 the field, and he had made up his mind to cross the Indus at 
 once, and march to the capital by land. 
 
 Next on this busy scene,comes an intrigue of MeerAli Moorad 
 Khan (p. 488), which ended in the overthrow of Meer Roostum 
 Khan, who had been the earliest and best friend of the 
 English in Upper Sinde, till he was charged with writing a 
 letter, of which he was utterly ignorant. The object of AH 
 Moorad was to secure the turban, and the communication 
 of General Napier tended to encourage his ambitious views. 
 It was hoped the Governor-General would approve of what 
 had been stated by the General, who says : 
 
 "It lays a train to arrive at a point which I think should be 
 urged, viz., that we should treat with one Ameer instead of a number 
 This will simplify our political dealings with these princes, and gradu- 
 ally reduce them to the class of rich noblemen ; and their chief will 
 be perfectly dependent on the Government of India, living, as he will 
 do, so close to this large station (Sukkur), and I have no doubt that 
 it will quickly be a large town." 
 
 The charge against Meer Nusseer Khan is not alluded to by 
 the Governor-General in his reply, (page 489) except that his 
 Lordship was prepared to abide by and support General 
 Napier's decision, but 
 
 " Undoubtedly, Meer Roostum Khan must be held responsible for 
 the acts of his minister Futteh Mahomed Ghoree. With respect to the 
 escape of Syud Mahomed Shureef, the evidence of Futteh Mahomed 
 Ghoree's having assisted in that escape seems to be as conclusive as 
 any evidence likely to be obtained upon any point connected with the 
 conduct of a native chief. If a Government were to wait, in every 
 case of suspected hostility, until it obtained such proof of the hostile 
 intention as would be sufficient to convict the person suspected in a 
 court of justice, it would, in most cases, expose itself at once to dis- 
 grace and disaster. It is necessary to proceed upon a strong pre- 
 sumption of intended hostility, where hesitation might seriously affect 
 great national interests. Your force being now collected, I am dis- 
 posed to think that no delay should take place in communicating to 
 the Ameers the ultimate decision of the British Government, with 
 respect to the revision of our engagements with them, which their 
 conduct has compelled us to demand." 
 
 H
 
 114 
 
 Sir Charles Napier still manifests the most zealous desire 
 to carry into effect the views of the Governor-General, (pages 
 491, 494, 498, 499, 503) and is not inclined to put any trust 
 in the assurances of the Ameers. The representations of Meer 
 Roostum Khan of Khyrpore, and Meer Nusseer Khan of Hy- 
 derabad, are really most affecting documents, (vide Nos. 446 
 and 447.) The latter, after alluding to the permission given 
 to Sir A. Burnes to travel through his dominions, which was 
 obtained by him, in opposition to the wish of the late Ali 
 Moorad Khan, stated that he (Nusseer Khan) and Meer Noor 
 Mahomed Khan had urged Sir H. Pottinger to come into the 
 country, and finally succeeded in introducing a British force; 
 they had cheerfully given up money for the construction of 
 the cantonments, and even consented to the payment of tri- 
 bute. He adds 
 
 " "We were then perfectly happy and contented ; but now the 
 arrival of your letter has caused us some surprise. I beg you to 
 recollect that every one in this world has his enemy, and it is very 
 possible that some designing person has forged these letters to the 
 Boogties and others. It is quite impossible that I should ever have 
 been guilty of a thing of this sort. Pray who are these individuals, 
 that I should take the trouble of writing to them ? God is my 
 witness, that up to this moment, I know not whether the name you 
 mention as belonging to the Boogties, is that of a man or a whole 
 tribe. I know them not. As to Sawun Mull, it is true that, in 
 accordance with Article VIII. of the new treaty, I have occasionally 
 corresponded in a friendly way with that person, but always, I 
 would observe, with the knowledge of the political agents of the 
 British Government. This correspondence lias never related to other 
 than trifling matters, and I court investigation into the charges pre- 
 ferred against me. It is impossible that you can have made these 
 allegations so seriously affecting me, without some kind of apparently 
 strong evidence ; and I trust that the matter may be sifted, and the 
 author of the falsehood brought to punishment. / know that the 
 kings of England never sanction injustice; still, if you think proper 
 to deal harshly with me, I shall submit and be silent. Even now I 
 am setting out to pay my respects to you." 
 
 All these appeals are just so much waste paper; the 
 General would not be pacified, and the Governor-General still
 
 115 
 
 confessed his apprehension (page 507), that until the Ameers 
 had felt the strength of our arms they would never abandon 
 the thought of hostility; and an offer was made (ISthDec. 
 1842) of additional troops, if required. The intelligence ob- 
 tained by Major Clibborn certainly indicated preparations 
 for resistance on the part of the Ameers (page 508), which 
 could scarcely, under the circumstances, be a matter of 
 surprise. 
 
 It has been the object of the writer, throughout this 
 analysis, to submit a fair statement of the whole case, 
 and to give both sides of the question, in the most im- 
 partial manner ; and he can with truth and sincerity declare 
 that he opened the volume now under review, with the firm 
 belief, and in the anxious expectation, of finding a complete 
 justification for the course pursued by the present Governor- 
 General, and he may add, the late Governor-General. Al- 
 though a conservative in politics, it was not his wish to 
 treat this as a party question, which, in point of fact, it is 
 not ; and he feels confident, that Her Majesy's present 
 advisers will evince, by their decision, that they know how 
 to discriminate between right and wrong, and that they 
 will not tolerate injustice, whether perpetrated by one of 
 their own adherents or opponents ; and as Meer Nusseer 
 Khan expressed a firm reliance that the kings of England 
 would never countenance such harsh proceedings as had been 
 adopted towards him : so, by the blessing of an all-wise Provi- 
 dence, it will, the author firmly trusts, be found that our 
 gracious Queen will equally repudiate, when the facts shall 
 come to her knowledge, proceedings so arbitrary and un- 
 called for, as those which have marked the progress of our 
 negociations with Sinde. 
 
 o 
 
 The author, therefore, feels himself bound to notice the 
 complaint preferred by Sir Charles Napier (under date 18th 
 Dec. 1842), that the Mails had been robbed near the town 
 (Sukkur) by Meer Roostum's people (page 509). The Gene- 
 ral says, 
 
 " The poor old fool is in the hands of his family. I have sent him 
 orders to disband his troops instantly. I suspect he has no power, 
 
 H 2
 
 and I must rule his band for him. The Beloochees are plundering all 
 between this and Shikarpore. This intelligence reached me this 
 morning. But these things must be expected where such wild and 
 unmanageable tribes of robbers are collected and form an army. I 
 hope soon to quiet them." 
 
 Here the reflection naturally presents itself, that if the 
 Governor-General had been more fortunate in the choice of 
 an agent, who would have endeavoured to soothe his Lord- 
 ship's feelings instead of urging him on, from anxiety, it 
 may be, for the display of military enterprise, and in the 
 expectation of glory and renown, and hope of plunder at 
 Hyderabad, all this calamity would have been averted ; but 
 the temptation seems to have been irresistible, which prompted 
 the General to use his utmost efforts to keep open the breach 
 and work on the feelings of the Governor-General. Oh ! 
 Lord Ellenborough, I pray you, be more cautious in the 
 selection of your agents in future. 
 
 A letter from General Napier (dated 20th Dec. 1842) 
 proves (page 520), beyond a doubt, that Meer Roostum Khan 
 had been the dupe of Ali Moorad, and was sacrificed after- 
 wards, as he truly observes, in consequence of following the 
 advice of the General, who in the most triumphant style 
 announces to the Governor-General what he considers a most 
 clever stroke of policy. He had completely upset Meer 
 Roostum Khan, our old ally and friend. Ali Moorad, the 
 most powerful of the Talpoor family, was secured in our 
 interest, by the promise of the turban ; and our future 
 policy was now simple, being merely to secure the ascen- 
 dancy of the chief Talpoor. Excellent ! General ; the 
 perusal of your despatch will amply repay the time devoted 
 to it, by those who desire to know how India is now to be 
 governed, when such men of decision and intiigue as you are 
 employed on diplomatic service, backed by well-disciplined 
 force. This is the commencement of a new era in India. God 
 grant that the controlling authorities may speedily see to 
 what an undesirable result such a course will lead, and with- 
 out unnecessary del.iy, suggest the retirement of the gallant 
 General from this kind of employment, for there can be no
 
 117 
 
 doubt of his merit in bis own profession. A P.S. is added, 
 to tbe effect that Meer Roostum Khan bad agreed to the 
 draft of the treaty. 
 
 The Governor-General still maintains a bold front, and is 
 resolved not to give way (page 511); and with reference to 
 the pathetic letters of Meer Roostum Khan and Meer Nus- 
 seer of Hyderabad, he says 
 
 " Nothing said or done by the Ameers will, in the least degree, alter 
 my general determination, as already announced to them by you. 
 The continued collection of troops by the Ameers is totally inconsis- 
 tent with their declaration of submission ; and I conclude that you 
 will have already insisted upon the dispersion of those troops, and 
 have enforced your requisition by a movement towards Khyrpore, 
 should it not at once have been obeyed." 
 
 His Lordship still expected resistance: (page 511) 
 
 " The divisions amongst the Ameers of Sinde, both at Hyderabad 
 and Khyrpore, will prevent any serious combination of their forces 
 against us in the field ; but forces were collected by these chiefs, be- 
 fore they had any intimation of our intention on the part of Govern- 
 ment to insist upon a revision of treaties ; and although at Khyrpore 
 they profess a readiness to acquiesce in the arrangements now pro- 
 posed to them, I have no very confident expectation that there will be 
 a final and satisfactory settlement before they have felt the weight of 
 our arms." 
 
 The conduct of Sir Charles Napier now becomes per- 
 fectly intolerable (page 511). Elated by his success in the 
 manoeuvre of effecting the elevation of Ali Moorad, and the 
 destruction of the family of our old ally Meer Roostum, the 
 gallant General fancies he has nothing to do but to make 
 and unmake chiefs at his pleasure. Accordingly, we find 
 him stating that Meer Ali Moorad being in possession of 
 Upper Sinde, his interests are identical with ours ; he con- 
 sidered Upper Sinde perfectly settled, and was of opinion 
 that Lower Sinde would always be troublesome, unless the 
 Ameers of Hyderabad, like those of Khyrpore, possessed a 
 chief like the one he had himself succeeded in establishing:. 
 
 o 
 
 " Perhaps your Lordship," says the General, " will favour 
 me with your commands on this subject, and whether you
 
 118 
 
 would authorise me to insist upon their choosing a chief, or 
 else separating, so that each may hold and be responsible for 
 his own possession, and for his own conduct." 
 
 The successful issue of the intrigue by Ali Moorad (page 5 12) 
 through General Napier, is approved of by the Governor- 
 General, who had no doubt that the establishment of heredi- 
 tary succession, in the direct male line, to the turban, would 
 materially conduce to the domestic peace of the Ameers, 
 and to the better government of their territories. His Lord- 
 ship concludes 
 
 " I shall, therefore, gladly see established the right of primogeniture 
 in the direct line, and this you may, if you should deem it advisable, 
 communicate to Meet All Moorad; and I have little doubt that, 
 once established in the possession of the turban, with our support, 
 lie will be able, with the concurrence of a majority of the family, to 
 establish the more natural and reasonable line of succession to the 
 turban, and clothe the measure with the forms of legality; but re- 
 cognizing, as I do, Meer AH Moorad as the successor to Meer Roos- 
 tum, according to the present custom, whereby the eldest son of 
 Meer Roostum is superseded, / could not at once recognise the eldest 
 son of Meer Alt Moorad as Ms successor, in contravention of the very 
 principle on which his father's rights arefounded."* 
 
 * I find the following under the head of intelligence from Sinde, of date 
 5th of August, 1843 : "Indeed, all our correspondents appear to think 
 that, so soon as the weather and the inundations will permit, an active cam- 
 paign will be opened, and that the policy pursued, if backed from home, 
 will be of the most active kind ; but we regret to see .that the course fol- 
 lowed at present augurs unfavourably for the future, entangled as we are 
 with an ally (?) who must naturally, from the disposition of the other chiefs 
 towards him, interfere with our views. Ali Moorad, after all that has been 
 done for him, will be in possession, we are told, of spoil to the amount of 
 eighteen lakhs a-year, in addition to his former income, said to be about ten 
 lakhs; and such is the reward a British Government bestows upon a man 
 who by his intrigues has betrayed his brothers and nephews, and a whole 
 host of blood relations, and aided strangers to bend the country to their 
 yoke. It is well for us that no reverse has given him the opportunity of 
 deceiving us. One of our correspondents emphatically says, ' Sinde 
 howls at this traitor, and cries out against our conduct to old Uoostum. 
 Even the Hindoos, who hated the Talpoors, exclaim against us ; for though 
 they suffered under their yoke, they pity their fate.' If our object was, as 
 given out, to free an enslaved people, we are doing so with a vengeance, in
 
 119 
 
 It was announced by General Napier (page 617), that Meer 
 Roostum Khan had decamped, but whether from fear of 
 being made prisoner by the General, or driven to this step by 
 his brother, Ali Moorad, was uncertain. Meer Roostum had 
 resigned his turban to Ali Moorad in the most formal manner, 
 writing his resignation in the Koran. The General thought 
 it better for Roostum Khan to keep the turban, and let Ali 
 act for him. It struck the General that Ali Moorad had 
 frightened the old man into the foolish step he had taken, on 
 purpose to make his possession of the turban more decisive ; 
 and to do this, he told him the General intended to make him 
 (Roostum) prisoner, Ali pretending to be his friend, and only 
 waiting for his opportunity to betray us. This is a very 
 sensible admission ; but why, afterwards, should we have 
 promoted such a scoundrel as Ali Moorad notoriously was 
 and is ? 
 
 The suggestion of General Napier (page 518) for promoting 
 one of the Ameers of Hyderabad to the chieftainship, does 
 not meet the approval of the Governor-General, unless he 
 had the power of compelling the other Ameers to act accord- 
 ing to his orders. Neither did his Lordship know whom to 
 select, if he had, indeed, the power of doing so. The 
 Governor-General was, therefore, not disposed to go further 
 than he had already done, in requiring a modification of the 
 treaty, and drawing what benefit he could from the divisions 
 amongst the Ameers, instead of endeavouring to derive a 
 new advantage from the union of authority in one hand. 
 
 A splendid manifesto is addressed (page 525) by Sir Charles 
 Napier, in the Bonapartean style, to Meer Ali Moorad, to the 
 effect that Meer Roostum Khan voluntarily went to his High- 
 ness's fortress of Dejee ; where he there publicly and formally 
 placed the turban on Ali Moorad's head ; and wrote in the 
 sacred Koran that he had given the turban to the Talpoor. 
 
 " When I heard those things, I asked permission to wait upon 
 the Ameer to speak with his Highness as to the new treaty, and 
 
 making them over to the hands of Ali Moorad, whilst we fear that the power 
 and riches we are bestowing upon him, when we might have taken them for 
 ourselves, will in the long run furnish weapons to be turned against the 
 Government."
 
 120 
 
 to hear from his own lips that he had given up public affairs to 
 your guidance. What was the course pursued by his Highness ? 
 He abandons your roof, he flies from me, he places himself at the 
 head of those Ameers who have been intriguing against the English, 
 and who, as you inform me, collected bands for the resistance to the 
 authority of the turban. This is strange conduct in the Ameer. 
 The only course for me to pursue is, to advise your Highness pub- 
 licly to proclaim to the Sindians that you are the legitimate chief 
 of the Talpoors, to caution the other Ameers to obey you as such, 
 and to dismiss their armed followers. If they refuse, I will disperse 
 them ly force. To these Ameers you will preserve their lands ; but 
 no force shall be held in Upper Sinde but by your Higlmess's 
 killed ar." 
 
 What says the Governor-General (page 526) of General 
 Napier's special favourite, Ali Moorad ? (Arid here the writer 
 cannot refrain from the expression of his deep regret that Lord 
 Ellenborough had not employed a more discreet agent, brave 
 as a lion as the veteran Napier may be.) His Lordship 
 declares 
 
 " / have no confidence in Ali Moorad. I believe he managed the 
 flight of Meer Roostum. I think Meer Sobdar must have been 
 forced into an apparent junction with the other chiefs of Hyderabad ; 
 
 and he will leave them as soon as he can." " It is my 
 
 impression that nothing but a severe blow will make the chiefs gene- 
 rally true to their engagements." 
 
 The Governor-General, however (page 528), afterwards ap- 
 proves of General Napier's letter to Ali Moorad. 
 
 General Napier (page 528) destroyed the fortress of Emaum 
 Ghur ; and as an excuse for this act, which was the commence- 
 ment of hostilities on either side, he says 
 
 " When I reflected that the existence of Emaum Ghur can only 
 serve to foster confidence in the Ameers of both Sindes when dis- 
 contented or rebellious, and will, sooner or later, force us to another 
 and more perilous march perhaps, I made up my mind to blow it 
 down. It belongs to Ali Moorad, who consents to its destruction ; 
 I have, therefore, undermined it. The vast quantity of powder 
 which we cannot remove, will be better destroyed. It is well stored 
 with grain, which I have distributed as rations." * 
 
 The gallant feat was again repeated (page 529) ; the demo- 
 
 * Who, then, first commenced hostilities? Was this not enough to rouse 
 the Ameers against us ?
 
 121 
 
 lition of Emaum Ghur was completed on the 15th of January, 
 1842, when thirty-four mines were sprung; the last, finishing 
 the whole of the powder found in the fortress, viz., about 
 20,000 Ibs. 
 
 Major Outram (page 530) was now (Jan. 15, 1843,) sent to 
 treat with the Ameers, to whom notice was given by General 
 Napier, that they should send vakeels with full powers ; and 
 that if any vakeel shall declare he had not full powers, he 
 should be excluded from the meeting, and the General would 
 enter the territories of such Ameer with the troops under his 
 orders, and take possession of them in the name of the British 
 Government. Such was the General's mode of negociating for 
 a new treaty. He reported (page 530) to the Governor-General 
 that he should not require a stronger force than that at his 
 command. 
 
 The approval (page 531) of the Governor-General of the 
 demolition of the fortress of Emaum Ghur is conveyed to 
 General Napier; and his Lordship entertained a hope that all 
 the arrangements, consequent upon the new treaties accepted 
 by the Ameers, would be carried into effect without blood- 
 shed, a result, on every account most desirable, which would 
 be mainly owing to the decision and enterprise with which 
 General Napier had been acting. 
 
 Again (page 532) his Lordship says 
 
 " I congratulate you on having destroyed Emaum Ghur, and 
 being well out of the desert." . . . . " You are quite right in fencing 
 their (the Ameers') procrastination. The hot season will soon be 
 upon us, and no time is to be lost in finishing the transaction, and 
 placing the troops in secure and healthy positions." 
 
 Symptoms (page 534) of relenting are now (Feb. 9, 1843,) 
 exhibited by the Governor-General, who, no doubt, if he had 
 been left to his own judgment, and not urged on by the 
 General and others, would have extricated himself with more 
 tact from the dilemma in which he was placed ; and would 
 have evinced more liberality towards the Ameers. His Lord- 
 ship observes 
 
 "The object of giving to the Nawab of Bhawulpore the country 
 between Bhoong Bhara and Roree, was to establish a communication
 
 122 
 
 between our territories on the Sutledj and Rorec, through a friendly 
 state, rather than to inflict any punishment on the Ameers of Khyr- 
 pore. The object of establishing this communication may probably be 
 effected without giving to the Nawab the whole of the pergunnahs 
 intervening between Bhoong Bhara and Roree. Enough will be done 
 if we secure a good military and commercial communication. If you 
 should be of opinion that the cession originally demanded presses 
 too heavily upon the Ameers, I shall be glad to receive any sugges- 
 tion you may wish to offer for its modification. All the Nawab of 
 Bhawulpore has lost should be restored to him. I do not know 
 whether he ever had any country to the south of Bhoong Bhara. 
 The restoration to the Nawab of all he has lost, would be felt every- 
 where to be a measure at once of generosity and of justice," 
 
 Major Outram's conference (page 534,) with the Ameers of 
 Sinde, on the 8th and 9th Feb. 1843, is, perhaps, the most 
 interesting document in the volume. The Ameers of Hyder- 
 abad producing former treaties, and Meer Nusseer Khan espe- 
 cially pointing to the one dated April, 1838, and signed by 
 Lord Auckland, which pledged his Lord ship never to covet any 
 portion of the Ameer's territory, or " one rea" of his property, 
 asked 
 
 " Why is it that you now make new demands ? Four years 
 have only passed since your Sirkar thus pledged that nothing more 
 should be required of us. We deny that we have infringed^ one 
 iota of the existing treaties. In what have we done so ? It was 
 written that treasonable letters had been sent to Beebruck Boogtee 
 and Sawun Mull. Why were those letters not produced ? Why 
 don't you give us an opportunity of disproving them ? We never 
 wrote them. You say the seals prove them. How easily seals are 
 forged, you yourself know, having required us to punish one of our 
 own subjects who forged yours, when you resided here two years 
 ago.' Meer Nusseer Khan said, solemnly, ' I deny that it was 
 written by my authority. Why was not the paper shewn to me ?' 
 The Ameers intimated, * If the army advances, our Beloochees will 
 not be restrained, and we shall be blamed for the consequences. 
 You little know how little under our control the Beloochees are. 
 If the army advances, they will plunder the whole country. We 
 deny the charges on which the new treaty is imposed, but still we 
 will subscribe it, and the Ameers of Upper Sinde will also subscribe 
 theirs, on one condition, t. e. that Meer Roostuiu Khan be restored
 
 123 
 
 to his rights. Why was he deposed ?' Meer Roostum Khan then 
 said, ' By the General's own direction I sought refuge with AH 
 Moorad, (here he produced the letter directing Meer Roostum to 
 place himself under Meer AH Moorad's protection, and to be guided 
 by his advice,) who placed me under restraint, and made use of my 
 seal, and compelled me to do as he thought proper. Would I resign 
 my birthright of my own free will ? I did not write that letter. 
 Anything 1 did was by AH Moorad's advice, whose advice I was 
 directed by the General to be guided by.' Meer Mahomed Khan of 
 Khyrpore said, ' What fault have I committed, and why has my 
 house been destroyed and my property been plundered ?' (Emaum 
 Ghur.) The Ameers at last ended by saying that they protested 
 against the charges on which the new treaty was required, as un- 
 founded, but that they would comply with the terms, provided I 
 advised them to do so, and that they might petition the Governor- 
 General with a view to represent the falsehood of the charges." 
 
 On the evening of the 12th Feb. 1843, Major Outram had 
 a long conference with the Ameers, when, after much discus- 
 sion, their seals were affixed to the draft of the new Treaty ; 
 but on returning home, after leaving the fort, Major Outram 
 and his companions had to pass through a dense crowd of 
 Beloochees, who gave unequivocal evidence of bad feeling in 
 their manner and expressions, but were kept from giving fur- 
 ther vent to their feelings by a strong escort of horse the 
 Ameers sent, under some of their most influential chiefs. 
 After getting clear of the crowd, Major Outram was informed 
 that one of the officers of his company had been struck with 
 a stone ; but the officer, in the darkness, did not see by 
 whom. The Ameers, however, were acquitted of all blame, 
 and no representation was deemed necessary. 
 
 Another conference, with a deputation from the Ameers, 
 took place on the 13th February (page 538). It was inti- 
 mated that the Ameers had lost all control over the Beloo- 
 chees, who were violent in supporting Meer Roostum Khan's 
 cause ; and the Ameers were anxious to dismiss the Be- 
 loochees, but as the Belooch Sirdars had sworn one and all to 
 uphold the rights of Meer Roostum Khan, the Ameers were 
 helpless. " At least," said the deputation, " give us some 
 pledge that justice shall be done, by which the Ameers may
 
 124 
 
 endeavour to allay the excitement of the people, and persuade 
 them to disperse we fear it will be impossible; but their 
 Highnesses will try once more, if you will authorize them to 
 hold out hopes of the ultimate restoration of their lands which 
 have been made over to Ali Moorad." The Commissioner 
 assured them that the General would give a favourable consi- 
 deration to their representation, but he could make no pledge. 
 At last the deputies said, " If you will not promise the resto- 
 ration of the lands Ali Moorad has taken, the Khyrpore 
 Ameers must fight for their bread. Why should we be an- 
 swerable ?" " The deputies said they would report what had 
 passed ; but that they had no hope of allaying the excitement 
 of the Beloochees unless I would authorize some more positive 
 assurance to the Upper Sinde Ameers, that, if any reply was 
 to be given, they would bring it that night ; otherwise, I was 
 to consider that their masters could do nothing further." 
 
 Preparations not to be mistaken, were now (13th February, 
 1840), in rapid progress for an outbreak (page 540), which 
 might reasonably have been anticipated : and General Napier 
 intercepted some letters which put him upon his guard, and 
 showed the duplicity, as he called it, of Mahomed Khan of 
 Hyderabad. It was plain, (he thought,) the Ameers wanted 
 the General to delay his march till the 9th, to get their people 
 together. 
 
 Three days after the Ameers had affixed their seals to the 
 draft treaty, viz. on 15th February, 1843, (page 541), an 
 attack was made by a large force on the Residency, which 
 was gallantly defended for some time by Major Outram and 
 his small party, who eventually effected their retreat on board 
 two steamers, fortunately a few hundred yards from the Resi- 
 dency ; and now the long-expected hostilities had commenced 
 in right earnest. 
 
 General Napier was at no great distance (page 543), and 
 advancing with his force with all haste, encountered a large 
 army of Beloochees and Sindeans at Meeanee, on the 18th 
 February, 1843, and gained a decided victory, after a long 
 and hard-fought battle. Three of the Ameers of Khyrpore 
 and three of Hyderabad, immediately went into camp and
 
 125 
 
 surrendered their swords as prisoners of war ; Hyderabad was 
 at the same time surrounded, and taken possession of on the 
 19th February. 
 
 The Governor-General (page 548), in announcing the splen- 
 did victory of General Napier to the Secret Committee, states 
 that that achievement had placed us in a more advantageous 
 position than his Lordship had endeavoured to secure by pacific 
 treaty. He observed, 
 
 " The war, which could not be for ever avoided, would have been 
 forced upon us at the most inconvenient time, and might have pro- 
 duced a serious diversion of our force when we most needed it. 
 Fortunately, the treachery of the Ameers, and the overweening con- 
 fidence and the reckless violence of the Beloochees, have brought on 
 a crisis at the period at which we could with least embarrassment 
 encounter it ; and the result has been, the most decisive victory 
 gained on the best fought field." ..." The firmness of the language 
 he" (General Napier,) " adopted, and the energy of his measures, 
 were best calcxilated to control a barbarous Durbar; and had the 
 Ameers been entirely masters over their own troops, it seems to be 
 doubtful, even now, whether he would not have effected his purpose, 
 and carried the treaty into execution without actual hostilities." 
 
 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS. 
 
 On closing the volume, of which the foregoing is an Ana- 
 lysis, the author cannot withhold the expression of his deep 
 regret that any representative of the British Government in 
 India, should have been capable of devising and carrying into 
 effect measures of such harshness and severity towards a 
 neighbouring friendly and independent state, with which we 
 had been so long on terms of amicable alliance, and which 
 was goaded by exactions beyond endurance. 
 
 We first of all obtained a fooling in Sinde in the year 
 1836, by offering our friendly mediation for the adjustment of 
 differences between that state and Runjeet Sing, the Ruler of 
 Lahore; we soon afterwards acted as agents of Shah Shoojah,
 
 126 
 
 the long exiled chief of Cabool, to enforce tribute to a large 
 amount. We then acquired a passage for our troops through 
 Sinde, and availed ourselves of all the resources of the country, 
 in boats, grain, and camels, &c., for our army proceeding to 
 Affghanistan. We obtained leave to establish a Residency 
 at the capital, imposed a subsidiary force and a tribute of 
 three lacs of rupees towards defraying the expenses ; took 
 possession of Kurrachee, Tatta, and other places, received a 
 cession of Shikarpore in lieu of tribute which the Ameers 
 were too poor to pay, and finally took possession of Bukkur, 
 Sukkur, and other places, and eventually of the capital; dis- 
 placed the Ameers in authority, despoiled them of all their 
 treasure and property, made prisoners of them, and now 
 virtually hold possession of the country, having set up a 
 treacherous chief (AH Moorad) as a puppet. 
 
 A course so impolitic and uncalled for, must have the effect 
 of tarnishing the name of the East India Company (heretofore 
 famed for acts of liberality), and attaching an indelible stigma 
 to the character of Britain in the remotest parts of the East. 
 And it is impossible not to feel deep sorrow that the blood of so 
 many of the gallant defenders of our country's honour has been 
 spilt in such an unworthy cause, and that such a vast num- 
 ber of brave officers and soldiers should have fallen victims to 
 the pestilential diseases incident to that climate and locality. 
 But an awful fate has attended our ambitious projects beyond 
 our natural limits. The hand writing is on the wall ; may 
 we take warning ere it is too late ! 
 
 The author had occasion, some two years ago, at the very 
 time the disasters were taking place in Affghanistan, to state 
 his opinion, in one of the leading journals, in reference to 
 China, Burmah, Affghanistan, 8tc., as follows; and he con- 
 siders his views are also very applicable to the present case of 
 Sinde : 
 
 " Why should we not observe towards those nations, as nearly as 
 circumstances will admit, the same policy as pursued towards Euro- 
 pean states with which we have been at war ? No doubt, as the 
 safety of all states depends upon the observance of the law of nations, 
 all acts done in systematical defiance of its principles, give a right of
 
 127 
 
 war to all other states against tho wrong doers ; and, therefore, while 
 we may be prompt to repel aggression, and to demand reparation for 
 insult or encroachments, we should be careful to manifest, by our 
 subsequent conduct, that we are not actuated by views of ambition 
 or conquest, and that we do not aim at universal empire in the East ; 
 but that all we seek is, to maintain our own rights, to resist aggres- 
 sion, and preserve the balance of power amongst the independent 
 rulers in that part of Asia, precisely upon the same principle as the 
 British Government has done as regards the states of Europe. I 
 venture to predict, that ere long the correct course in our dealings 
 with these semi-barbarous nations, as we call them, will be to revert 
 to the same principles, and to adopt towards them the same policy, aa 
 have been found, by the experience of ages, most suitable in our 
 negociations with those in a more advanced state of civilization ; and 
 we may be assured, that although temporary success may attend our 
 efforts, and we may, at great cost and sacrifice, bring them into sub- 
 jection, still, if our claims be not founded in strict justice, or are 
 adverse to what are considered the inherent and established right of 
 nations whether in Europe or Asia, we shall not succeed in im- 
 posing a yoke so galling to their pride. We should not take advan- 
 tage of the unguarded conduct of those native states, wantonly to 
 dispossess them of their territory or their rights, and thereby provoke 
 a continued enmity and a combination for our destruction ; even by 
 those with whom we have long been connected, and some of whom 
 are still far from being reconciled to their subjection." 
 
 This Sinde question is second in importance to none that 
 has been submitted to the consideration of the controlling 
 authorities of this country for a long time past. It involves 
 the character of two Governors-General, the welfare of India, 
 the prosperity and even safety of our vast East India posses- 
 sions, and the honour of the British nation. The secret springs 
 of action which have guided the machinery of administration 
 in political measures of great moment, have now been exhi- 
 bited to the observation of the world ; and it well becomes 
 those who possess the power of supervision, to ponder well on 
 the stirring events which have lately occurred on the north- 
 western frontier of India ; to devise a remedy for those 
 generally acknowledged evils which have marked our career 
 in that quarter ; and to grant redress to those chiefs who have
 
 128 
 
 innocently suffered by the unfortunate measures deemed ne- 
 cessary for upholding our supremacy in a quarter where no 
 apprehension should, in any rational mind, have been enter- 
 tained. This is not a party question at all, involving Whig or 
 Tory principles: neither of the great parties in the State can 
 always be responsible for the imprudent acts of the governors 
 of distant possessions. Men who may have established a 
 reputation for great ability and temper, may, when placed in 
 an important charge, by one single act of heedlessness or bad 
 policy, at once destroy their character for discretion, and 
 render them unfit longer to hold the reins of government : 
 just as an eminent lawyer, raised to a distinguished post in 
 the service of the administration, may, by the exhibition of a 
 warmth of temper, injure his reputation to such a degree, that 
 even the ministers cannot cast their mantle of defence over 
 him. As, in the case before us, both Governors-General are 
 to be blamed, the Government will have the less difficulty in 
 effecting a change. 
 
 When, at the late Court at the India House, the Author 
 looked around, and beheld such a large assembly of venerable 
 men, most of whom had spent the best of their days in the 
 East, and many of whom had gained honour and distinction 
 by services really beneficial to their country and the natives 
 of India ; when he considered the talent and experience of 
 Indian affairs, and kindly feelings of many whom he recog- 
 nised within and without the bar, he felt assured that the 
 subject on which he has been endeavouring, however feebly 
 and inadequately, to enlist public sympathy, would receive 
 due and attentive consideration; and that such justice as 
 could be rendered to the Ameers of Sinde would not be 
 denied. We all profess to believe in an omniscient, super- 
 intending Providence, in whose sight national must be as 
 hateful as individual injustice; and we acknowledge that the 
 Almighty will punish or reward according to our deserts. 
 The Directors of the East India Company have a heavy 
 responsibility, and the eyes of the public are upon them. 
 They are therefore entreated, by considerations of humanity 
 and justice, by a regard for the true interests of India and the
 
 129 
 
 opinions of surrounding states, not to lose any time in bringing 
 this question to a decision, by effecting the restoration of the 
 Ameers of Sinde to their possessions; on such conditions, as 
 a wise, safe, and equitable policy may dictate and so will our 
 power and authority be established on a firm basis, and 
 nations shall speak well of us, and our Government shall be 
 prosperous and blessed. 
 
 In mercy to our brave soldiers, European and Native, let 
 us not longer persevere in the attempt to retain, by the power 
 of the sword alone, a country which has proved so pesti- 
 lential; and thus keep open, as it were, a yawning grave for 
 multitudes of our gallant and devoted troops. Retain if 
 you will, our supremacy, by the establishment of one or 
 more Residencies, under a very few discreet and experienced 
 officers civil or military, who might guide and direct the 
 chiefs in power, whoever they may be ; stipulating for all 
 the privileges, political and commercial, that may be neces- 
 sary. The Ameers have now seen the futility of resistance 
 to our aims, whether our claims be just or otherwise. They 
 have gained experience by their misfortunes and their exile. 
 The tenour of all their appeals indicates that they may now 
 be converted into real friends and dutiful tributaries, or 
 even subjects. The continued heart-burnings of their rela- 
 tives and supporters in Sinde would speedily cease, and 
 tranquillity, confidence, and the march of improvement begin. 
 The certainty of punishment, in case of infraction of such 
 stringent engagements as might be imposed on them, would 
 keep the restored chiefs faithful and obedient to us, and our 
 finances be very much relieved.
 
 SUPPLEMENT. 
 
 WHILE the foregoing sheets were in the press, the additional 
 papers relative to Sinde, presented by Her Majesty's command 
 to both houses of Parliament, on the 1st February, were dis- 
 tributed to the East India Proprietors. 
 
 The contents of the supplementary volume confirm the 
 author in the correctness of all the opinions advanced in the 
 preceding pages. It is evident that Sir Charles Napier and 
 Major (now Colonel) Outram have been at issue upon several 
 very important points, and it is quite apparent that there 
 must have been much difference of opinion and recrimination 
 between those two principal actors in the affairs of Sinde. A 
 considerable space is devoted to the defence by General 
 Napier against the charges of the Ameers, the Bombay 
 papers, &c. The representations of the Ameers to the Bom- 
 bay Government, and the Court of Directors, likewise occupy 
 a large portion of the supplementary volume, which may not 
 inappropriately be termed these victims blue book, a desidera- 
 tum significantly alluded to by the gallant Proprietor, who 
 seconded the resolution at the India House. 
 
 The Governor-General, in a letter to Sir C. Napier, dated 
 28th Sept., 1842 (page 1), directing the General to hear all 
 that Major Outram and the Political Agents had to allege 
 against the Ameers of Hyderabad and Khyrpore, tending to 
 prove the intention, on the part of any of them to act hostilely 
 against the British army, states, with praiseworthy candour 
 and consideration, 
 
 " That they may have had hostile feelings, there can be no doubt. 
 It would be impossible to believe that they could entertain friendly 
 
 i 2
 
 132 
 
 feelings ; but we should not be justified in inflicting punishment on 
 the thoughts" 
 
 And in a subsequent despatch (8th October) his Lordship 
 states, that the assembling of men by the Khyrpore Ameers 
 was only for the settlement of a quarrel amongst themselves, 
 and had nothing in it of hostility to us. This is an impor- 
 tant admission indeed. 
 
 The following observation by Major Outram (page 12), 
 will at once come home to the apprehension of every man who 
 has been any time in India, as showing the necessity not 
 only of diplomatic officers employed, but even of the Governor- 
 General having some little knowledge of the customs and 
 prejudices of the Mahomedans, who form such a large por- 
 tion of the population of India. After adverting to the 
 inutility and mischief of appropriating Tatta, he points out 
 the inexpediency of impressing the Queen's image on the 
 coins of Sinde, one of the provisions of the new treaty. He 
 states truly, that " the Mahomedan religion prohibits the use 
 of such emblems ;" so that article is tantamount to prohibiting 
 the privilege of coining to the rulers of Sinde altogether. 
 Either the article should be altered to that effect (i. e. depriv- 
 ing the Ameers of the right of coining), or should be modified 
 to an English inscription on one side, (to which there could 
 be no objection on the score of religion,) and Persian by the 
 Ameers on the other ; but General Napier in his reply, states 
 there will be no necessity for concession, as the coins will be 
 the Queen's. The question naturally arises, was General 
 Napier ever in India before ? He might have done very well 
 to command a force ; but as an Indian diplomatist of the 
 present day, he was as unfit a man as could have been selected, 
 and in point of temper, was totally disqualified for the office 
 in which he was employed. The style and tenor of his 
 communications, whether to the Ameers, or the Governor- 
 General, in denying charges or commenting on the conduct of 
 that most respectable and brave officer, Major Outram, betray 
 an irritability which leaves an unfavourable impression of 
 the discretion and judgment of the gallant General. 
 
 Major Outram, in submitting a memorandum (page 13),
 
 upon the objections to the occupation of Tatta, from its un- 
 healthy state, the cost of maintaining it, the heart-burnings 
 of the Ameers, and other points, sums up with one forcible 
 argument, viz. 
 
 " The objectionable grasping appearance which thus seizing on 
 Tatta, the ostensible, though not really so, principal support of the 
 state, where no necessity can be shown for its occupation ; as in the 
 case of Sukkur and Kurrachee, the sites of our cantonments." 
 
 The trickery of Meer Ali Moorad in entrapping his brother 
 and our old and faithful ally, Meer Roostum Khan of Khyr- 
 pore, has already been exposed. Major Outram, in a letter 
 to Sir C. Napier, 22nd Jan. 1843 (page 16), states 
 
 " My misgivings as to Meer Roostum have proved well founded. 
 He has fallen into the snare Ali Moorad laid for him ; and, instead 
 of marching to join me here, has gone off, I am informed, to consult 
 with the other fugitive Ameers, who are somewhere near Kohera, 
 
 between Dingee and Hyderabad, or thereabouts." " Pray 
 
 recollect, that they were misled into flight ; that they had agreed to 
 subscribe to the treaty, and would have done so, had it not been 
 Ali Moorad's policy utterly to sever them from us, that he might 
 obtain their confiscated estates ; that they were innocent of the acts 
 laid to their charge (robbing dawks, &c.), which led them to fly and 
 you to pursue; that they had not armed to the extent that was 
 represented ; * and that whatever rabble soldiery they had assembled, 
 was solely with a view to self-defence, in misapprehension of our 
 real objects, misrepresented as they were to them by Ali Moorad ; 
 and much more that may be urged in excuse for such suspicious 
 people, who have had little reason, heretofore, to estimate our good 
 faith very highly. At least, if you are not satisfied on these points, 
 as I hope you are, I shall not fail to prove them to you, opposed 
 although lam by the bribed tools of Ali Moorad who surround me" 
 
 The villanous manoeuvres of Ali Moorad are laid bare by 
 Major Outram, in a communication to Sir C. Napier (page 21). 
 He says, 
 
 " By the bye, in answer to your remark, that had Ali Moorad 
 brought you back from Emaum Ghur by the other road, in order that 
 
 * The Governor-General says This was all a mistake, and nothing in- 
 tended against us.
 
 134 
 
 you should avoid an interview with Meet Roostum, he would not 
 have taken you the road we went to Eraaum Ghur; I forgot to 
 mention, that, in going, he relied on causing Roostum to fly ; and 
 doubtless he would have done so, had I not anticipated him by riding 
 over to the old chief's camp, before he had time to effect his purpose. 
 Recollect, that very morning, just before I told you, Roostum was 
 there ; AH Moorad had told you he had fled to a distance." 
 
 A caution was given to Sir C. Napier by Major Outram, 
 not to advance with his force ; but it was disregarded : 
 
 " These fools" (says the Major, 12th Feb. 1843,) " are in the 
 utmost alarm, in consequence of the continued progress of your 
 troops towards Hyderabad, notwithstanding their acceptance of the 
 treaty, which they hoped would have caused you to stop. If you 
 come beyond Halla (if so far), I fear they will be impelled by their 
 fears to assemble their rabble, with a view to defend themselves and 
 their families, in the idea that we are determined to destroy them, 
 notwithstanding their submission. I do hope, therefore, that you 
 may not consider it necessary to bring the troops any further in this 
 direction ; for I fear it may drive the Ameers to act contrary to your 
 orders to disperse their troops (or rather not to assemble them, for 
 they were all dispersed yesterday}, and thus compel us to quarrel 
 with them." 
 
 In announcing to Sir Charles Napier that the Ameers of 
 Upper and Lower Sinde had accepted the treaties, Major 
 Outram (page 37) informs him that the old story of justice 
 to Roostum was the reiterated cry, notwithstanding the Com- 
 missioner's constant replies that the abdication was his own 
 act: 
 
 " This they higgled at more than signing away their own property, 
 which is confiscated by the new treaty, and would insist on saying 
 that your letter, telling them that I was sent to settle every thing, 
 empowered me to settle that also ; although I as positively told 
 them, that I had nothing to do but with the draft treaty." .... 
 " He" (Meer Roostum) " has always been consistent in his story 
 and brings forward strong proofs ; and, indeed, it appears notorious 
 that he was, in the first place, actually surrounded by Ali Moorad's 
 sentries, and his own people removed from him, and that Ali Moo- 
 rad afterwards caused him to fly, to avoid, as he (Ali Moorad) led 
 him to believe, a worse evil." .... " From what I saw yesterday
 
 of the spirit of the people, it appears to me that the Ameers are 
 now execrated for their dastardly submission (as they consider it) to 
 what they style robbery" 
 
 Adverting to the friendly interference and exertions of the 
 Ameers, even at the last hour, and amidst all their provoca- 
 tions, in protecting the Commissioner from the outrages of the 
 Beloochee soldiery, exasperated by the treatment of Meer 
 Roostum Khan and denial of any assurance that that chief 
 would be righted, Major Outram requests the attention of 
 General Napier (page 38) to the fact, that 
 
 " The Ameers had reason to fear that their Beloochees might at- 
 tempt mischief, having been engaged the whole day in paying off 
 and dismissing those who had flocked to the city since the night be- 
 fore last, on hearing the continued advance of your troops; before I 
 went to Durbar they had got the city quite clear, but after dark 
 great numbers flocked in again." 
 
 Meer Roostum Khan's answer to the proclamation of Sir 
 C. Napier, (page 66,) evinces more clearly than ever, that that 
 chief was the dupe of the vile traitor Ali Moorad,ashe denied 
 having ever conveyed any message (as alleged) to the General 
 that he was in the hands of his brothers and children, and 
 had not the power of acting that friendly part towards the 
 British Government he would desire, and that, if an opportu- 
 nity offered, he would join the British forces ; and with re- 
 ference to the counsel given him to act according to the advice 
 of Ali Moorad, he stated, 
 
 " Afterwards, on the night before he left Dejee-Kote, Noor Ma- 
 homed Hafiz (a confidential servant of Ali Moorad) brought a mes- 
 sage at midnight from that chief, to the effect that it was the pur- 
 pose of the General to come to Dejee-Kote; that there he would 
 meet Meer Roostum, from whom he intended to extort three lacs of 
 rupees, and otherwise to degrade him ; that if the money was not 
 paid, the jewels and property of the Zenana were to be seized ; 
 therefore, that Ali Moorad advised him to go off to the desert at 
 once. He (Roostum) accordingly did so early in the morning." 
 
 Nothing could be more friendly than the conduct of the 
 Ameers to Major Outram personally. They had sent (page 
 41), to say that the Beloochees had become quite uncon-
 
 136 
 
 trollable ; had taken an oath on the Koran to have (term) 
 Yageo, unless Roostum was righted ; and refused to obey 
 them in any way. They begged the Commissioner to depart 
 as soon as possible, and gave the advice from pure friend- 
 ship, &c. 
 
 Numerous intimations were made to Major Outram (pages 
 42, 43), by the Ameers, that unless some pledge could be held 
 out that Meer Roostum Khan should be reinstated, and the 
 land given to AH Moorad restored to the other Ameers of 
 Upper Sinde, so that justice might be rendered to them, it 
 would not be in their power to control the Beloochees, who 
 had taken a solemn oath to unite to oppose the British, and 
 not to sheathe the sword till they were righted ; but the Major 
 could only promise that their representations should be fairly 
 placed before the General, which, however, would not satisfy 
 them. 
 
 The seizure by an officer under General Napier's orders, of 
 twenty-five Murrees (page 43), was much deprecated by Major 
 Outram ; he was afraid it would bring matters to a crisis, and 
 cause the Beloochees to commence plundering. He consi- 
 dered hostilities likely to occur in consequence, although he 
 believed the Ameers had not had any intention of commencing 
 them, they only hoping to get Roost urn's party benefited by 
 making an appearance of ferment amongst their Beloochees; 
 but the appeaiance would probably change to reality, since 
 the capture of these men. 
 
 An extract of a letter from General Napier to the Governor- 
 General, dated 13th March, 1843, (page 48,) is given, but it 
 would have been more satisfactory to have had the whole 
 despatch, as we may infer from the following quotation, that 
 it was peculiarly interesting : 
 
 "/ had no prejudice against the Ameers. I certainly held their 
 conduct as rulers to be insufferable by any strong government ; but 
 as individuals I felt pity for them, as weak princes, whose folly 
 had brought them into difficulties. It was this feeling that made 
 me restore them their swords ; for assuredly I was not insensible 
 to the honour it would be to the family of a private gentleman to 
 possess the swords of so many princes, surrendered to him on the
 
 137 
 
 field of battle ; and I believe, by all the rules and customs of war, 
 their swords were mine. This was an undoubted proof of my feel- 
 ings then. Since then I have seen their real character developed, 
 and I do think that such thorough villains I never met with in my 
 life. Meer Sobdar is even worse than the others. He had 5,000 
 men in the action; I doubted this at first, as he was not there 
 in person. Being now assured that your Lordship will occupy the 
 country, I can act decidedly, and shall have cause for the troops 
 very soon." 
 
 The address of Sir Charles Napier to the poor captive 
 Ameers of Hyderabad (page 89), is a fine specimen of tem- 
 perate remonstrance ; it cannot be omitted. 
 
 " I am also much surprised by the falsehoods which you tell. I will 
 no longer bear this conduct ; and if you give me any more trouble by 
 stating gross falsehoods, as you have done in your two letters, I will cast 
 you into prison as you deserve. You are prisoners, and though I icill 
 not kill you, as you ordered your people to do to the English, / will 
 put you in irons on board a ship. You must learn, Princes, that if 
 prisoners conspire against those who have conquered them, they will 
 find themselves in danger. Be quiet, or you will suffer the conse- 
 quences of folly. Your friend, Meer Shere Mahomed, has prevented 
 the letter from the Governor- General, as to your fate, from reaching 
 me ; his soldiers intercepted the dawks. He is a very weak man, and 
 will soon cause , himself to be destroyed; and so will you, unless you 
 submit more quietly to the fate your own rash folly has brought 
 upun you. I will answer no more of your letters, which are only 
 repetitions of gross falsehoods that I will not submit to." 
 
 The victory gained by Sir Charles Napier near Hyderabad, 
 on the 24th March, 1843, (page 50,) over the force com- 
 manded by Meer Shere Mahomed, is too well known to be 
 further noticed here. Lord Ellenborough, in the General 
 Order (page 91), bore ample testimony to the gallantry of 
 the British forces, which were certainly entitled to all the 
 praise bestowed on them. His Lordship rather exultingly 
 observes: 
 
 "To have punished the treachery of protected princes ; to have 
 liberated the nation from its oppressors ; to have added a province, 
 fertile as Egypt, to the British Empire ; and to have effected these 
 great objects by actions in war unsurpassed in brilliancy, whereof a
 
 138 
 
 grateful army assigns the success to the ability and valour of its Ge- 
 neral ; these are not ordinary achievements, nor can the ordinary lan- 
 guage of praise convey their reward." 
 
 There was not much cause for triumph, for the Governor- 
 General might, with the large armies at his command, very 
 easily take possession of every other independent State in 
 India, if it were his pleasure ; but the question is, would it be 
 just or right to do so? 
 
 Many pages of the volume (viz. from page 56 to 71), are 
 occupied with the representations of the several Ameers to the 
 Governor of Bombay, all much to the same effect. We shall 
 select a few sentences from the first in order, that of Meer 
 Nusseer Khan, who gives a very temperate and feeling state- 
 ment of his hard case. He says, 
 
 " It is to be found in history, that Christianity requires its follow- 
 ers, above all things, to observe the rules of friendship and good treat- 
 ment towards mankind ; for friendship is the result of honesty and 
 goodness. Expecting therefore to meet with the same friendship from 
 the British Government, I, in spite of the enmity of the Affghans, and 
 the indignation of the Beloochees, never allowed any thing to prevent 
 my giving satisfaction to the English Sahib Bahadoors." 
 
 And after a long detail of the events connected with the 
 execution of the new treaty and the opposition of the Be- 
 loochees, on account of the injustice done to Meer Roostum, 
 already noticed, and also the circumstances under which he 
 was compelled to offer resistance to General Napier's force ; 
 the Ameer adds, 
 
 " As long as Major Outram was there, every thing went on well ; 
 after his departure, Moonshee AH Akbar brought a message that the 
 English gentlemen wished to see the fort, and asked me to send some 
 confidential servants with them. I accordingly sent Bahadoor Ak- 
 hoond Buchal and Moonshee Mhetaram to accompany them. Colonel 
 Pattle, Captain Brown, and Mr. Fallon, together with two regiments 
 of cavalry and infantry, entered the fort on the pretence of looking 
 at it, plundered the treasury, the ferarh khanas, and other establish- 
 ments, and carried off gold and silver, swords, muskets, knives, dag- 
 gers and shields, together with valuable property, jewels, jewels of 
 the ladies, cloths, clothes, korans, books, horses, camels, mules, 
 valuable pots, copper pots, china ware, and the ornaments prepared
 
 139 
 
 at Jyepore, by the English Government, for the marriage of my son 
 Meer Hoossien AH Khan. They also rushed into my seraglios. The 
 Sepoys who guarded the gate of the Fort of Hyderabad deprived every 
 female they met of her ornaments. My ladies, who had never left 
 the house, went out of the fort, throwing away their nose and ear- 
 rings, in fear for their lives, and dreading to be seen by strangers." 
 
 Others were stated to have been plundered and ill-treated, 
 and the Ameer says, 
 
 " I have seen in books and histories, that oppression is no way al- 
 lowed by the religion of Jesus Christ. From the time the English 
 Government took possession of the country of India, never was such 
 oppression, tyranny, and disgrace experienced by any one." 
 " Under such circumstances I solicit redress, and trust the oppression 
 to which I have been subjected will, in accordance with the com- 
 mandments of Jesus Christ, and the justice and equity of the British 
 Government, be removed. Whatever civility and kindness your Ex- 
 cellency may show me will tend to redound to your fame in the world. 
 I further beg that the above circumstances may be brought to the 
 notice of Her Majesty the Queen and the Governor-General." 
 
 It was a rather extraordinary circumstance, that the whole 
 of the women of the Ameers refused to accompany them and 
 remained at Hyderabad (page 71). They said they had no 
 means of subsistence ; this was stated to be untrue. The 
 General positively forbade their personal ornaments of gold and 
 jewels to be taken from them by the prize agents, but whether 
 they carried out treasure or not he could not say. The 
 General was very indignant at an " infamous article" which 
 appeared in the Bombay Times, which " is one lie from begin- 
 ning to end" There was not, he said, a single irregularity, nor 
 was there a woman, much less one of the ladies of the Zenana, 
 in any officer's quarters, nor did he believe any one of these 
 ladies had ever been seen by any officer of the army. The 
 Governor-General remarked (page 77), that 
 
 " The separation of the women from the Ameers appears so ex- 
 traordinary and unnatural, that I can hardly think the women will 
 persist in their refusal ; however, if they should do so, it is essential 
 to our character, that they should be treated with all respect and 
 honour, according to the feelings and prejudices of the East, and I
 
 140 
 
 shall be prepared to sanction any arrangement you may think it ex- 
 pedient to make for their maintenance, and for their residence."* 
 
 There is a Memorial from Meer Hoossein All Khan to the 
 Court of Directors, 5th June, 1843 (page 81), in which he 
 adverts to the friendly services rendered by his late father, 
 Noor Mahomed Khan, in allowing the army to pass through 
 Sinde (although he thereby incurred the enmity of the AfF- 
 ghans and Beloochees), and collecting boats, carriage, and 
 supplies. Captain Eastwick was sent with a treaty, in which 
 a demand was made of twenty-one lacs of rupees, to be paid 
 at the time. His father was to pay seven lacs, and fourteen 
 lacs were to be paid by Meer Nusseer Khan and Meer Ma- 
 homed Khan. It was also ordered, that the three Ameers 
 should pay a lac of rupees each annually to the British 
 Government. 
 
 " This (says he) was the first fruit of their friendship for my 
 father ; but the British army having arrived at Jeruck (through my 
 father's exertions) unopposed, all former professions were disregarded, 
 and my father, with the other Ameers, was compelled to submit to 
 the terms imposed. He felt that they were arbitrary and unjust ; 
 but being helpless, and at his (Sir J. Keane's) mercy, he complied 
 with them. Subsequently, a treaty of twelve articles was concluded 
 with Sir Henry Pottinger, in which it was declared, that thereafter 
 no demand should be made upon us, nor would the English ever look 
 upon our country to covet it. The English army continued its march 
 to Cabool ; and from the time Major James Outram was appointed 
 Resident in Sinde, my father was guided entirely by his counsels. 
 When my father was on his death-bed, he took my hand and placed 
 it in that of Major Outram, consigning me to his care and protec- 
 tion ; after which he breathed his last. After this Major Outram 
 treated me as if I was his son, and I lived happy and contented until 
 Sir Charles Napier arrived in Sinde," &c. 
 
 The memorialist took no part in the attack on the British 
 force; and he went and met the General, to whom Major 
 Outram, who was present at the time, said, " There is no 
 charge against this boy :" nevertheless he was deprived, after 
 
 * This was like a gallant and generous nobleman, and relieves his Lord- 
 ship from much of the odium attached to the disgraceful proceedings at 
 Hyderabad.
 
 141 
 
 Major Outram's departure, of everything, and sent to 
 Bombay. 
 
 Meer Nusseer Khan's representation (page 82) is much to 
 the same effect as his address to the Government of Bombay. 
 There is just one passage that must be noticed. He admits 
 he was present at the action, although he had done all in his 
 power to allay the excitement of the Beloochees. He went 
 next morning, of his own accord, and delivered his sword into 
 the General's hands. 
 
 " He kindly returned it to me, and buckled it round my waist, 
 using many consoling expressions, and telling me that in twenty-five 
 days my affairs would be satisfactorily settled, and that I should be 
 placed in Hyderabad as formerly. . . If the General says he con- 
 quered Sinde, I reply, that, as we were tributaries and subjects of 
 the English for many years, he can hardly claim a victory over your 
 own subjects. Truly, this slaughter of the people of Sinde, plunder- 
 ing their property, was at the expense of the Queen of England. . 
 I have read that Christianity is opposed to oppression of every kind ; 
 but, from the time the British first arrived in India, to the present 
 date, no such tyranny was ever practised on us. Had a shot been 
 fired from the walls of Hyderabad, the British army might have law- 
 fully plundered it ; but the fort was given up on a pretence that it 
 was merely to be inspected, and after a pledge of security was given, 
 peace declared, and assurances made that we should be restored to 
 power ; after this to plunder the treasury, and to disgrace the rulers 
 of the country, is not allowed by any law ; and I had heard from ex- 
 perienced persons, that it was not the custom of the English to punish 
 a man before he was proved 7 guilty, nor to disgrace him on the hearsay 
 of others. I, therefore, hope that you will first investigate my case, 
 and then determine by the laws of Christianity, whether or not we 
 are suffering from injustice. I look to you for justice, and to be sent 
 back with my former honour and dignity to my country, where I 
 pledge myself to be bound by the kindness of the English, as long 
 as I live to serve and obey them, and this will exalt the renown of 
 the English all over the world. Restore me, therefore, to my plun- 
 dered country." 
 
 A peculiar degree of sensitiveness is evinced by General 
 Napier (page 87) to the complaints made against himself and 
 the three Prize Agents and the Commissioner, Lieutenant
 
 142 
 
 Brown, respecting the plunder in Hyderabad ; which accusa- 
 tion the General knew to be concocted by a hostile party at 
 Bombay. These and other complaints were " gross, impudent 
 falsehoods all" The gallant officer, as usual, deals in no mea- 
 sured terms. The statements of Majors M'Pherson and Reid, 
 Captains Blenkins and Bazett, and Lieutenant Brown, con- 
 tradict the assertion of ill-treatment of the ladies of the 
 Zenana and the plunder of their ornaments ; but one of the 
 parties, Captain Bazett, admits, "that the jewels found with 
 other state property in the toshakhanas, these being entirely 
 detached from the Zenanas, were considered as state jewels, 
 and as such retained by me; as also the jewelled swords and 
 matchlocks found in them." 
 
 There is a very long paper of " Observations by Sir Charles 
 Napier on the Memorials of the Ameers of Sinde," 12th June, 
 1843, (page 91,) beginning with his oft-repeated, favourite 
 phrase, that " the complaints of the Ameers form a tissue of 
 falsehoods." He is particularly severe on Meer Mahomed 
 Khan, who solemnly signed the draft treaty in full Durbar, 
 attacked the residence of the Commissioner with the inten- 
 tion to massacre the said diplomatist and all that were with 
 him, and afterwards tore the treaty to atoms ; and although 
 none of the Ameers went by his orders to fight, they did fight, 
 and he was bound to have prevented them if not, he must 
 take the consequences : but the General disbelieved the facts 
 as stated by the Ameer. Sir Charles certainly adduces some 
 strong arguments, tending to show that Meer Sobdar had not 
 been the faithful ally he was always supposed ; but if all the 
 General's suspicions had been facts, they would not have justi- 
 fied the subsequent cruel treatment of the Ameer. The 
 General observes 
 
 " The Ameer Sobdar says, ' No sepoy in my service fought in the 
 recent battle by my orders.' This hypocritical quibbling is of a 
 piece with that of the Ameer Mahomed. The answer is, * Your 
 chiefs lie dead at Meannee, by the side of our men, whom they slew ; 
 and for this his Highness must answer, or the responsibility of Govern- 
 ment for the conduct of its subjects has become a farce, and a bye- 
 word among men.' In regard to another Ameer, Major
 
 143 
 
 Outram was deceived in the intentions of Meer Shere Mahomed, and 
 the battle of Hyderabad was the result." 
 
 The General makes out rather a strong case against Meer 
 Nusseer Khan, viz. 
 
 " The words attributed to me, when I returned him his sword on 
 the field of battle, are utterly false. The Ameer proceeds to say, 
 4 as long as Major Outram was there, every thing went on well;' as 
 if Major Outram had the power in any way to interfere with his 
 treatment. Major Outram had no power whatever in Sinde, or over 
 the Ameers; and I have given the charge of the Ameers to Lieut. 
 Brown, the accusation against whom, together with Lieut.-Col. 
 Pattle and Major McPherson, which immediately follows this sen- 
 tence, has already been answered by those gentlemen." 
 
 And the gallant Commander winds up with an astounding 
 tirade of his favourite phrases. " The Ameer again says, 
 ' After granting quarter, making peace, promising satisfac- 
 tion, and agreeing to restore the fort,' 8cc. That we granted 
 quarter, is true; nobody was either injured or even insulted, 
 after the fight was over: but the ' making peace,' is a false- 
 hood ; 'promising satisfaction,' another; and 'agreeing to 
 restore the fort,' a third. What remains of the complaint, is 
 an accumulation of falsehoods." 
 
 A very remarkable omission on the part of General Napier 
 now comes to light. It appears, by a despatch to the Secret 
 Committee, dated 13th June, 1843, (page 94.) that the Go- 
 vernor-General had never seen, till that day, the very important 
 Notes of Conference* between Major Outram and the Ameers, 
 while he was acting as Commissioner under Sir Charles Napier, 
 for the settlement of the details of the treaty; and his Lord- 
 ship knew absolutely nothing of what may have passed. 
 General Napier's explanation of his omission in not having 
 forwarded these documents to the Governor-General, is very 
 far from satisfactory. Now observe, the General expressly 
 intimated to Major Outram, on the llth Feb. 1843, (page 32,) 
 with reference to these Notes of Conference, 
 
 " I have no power to discuss former treaties, but I will state to 
 
 * These conferences will be found in the first series of papers, commenc- 
 ing at page 534.
 
 144 
 
 Lord Ellenborough all the Ameers say, because it is fair to them ; 
 but I am sure that tee should not tell them so ozr, because they 
 would build interminable discussions thereon ; but / will at once 
 send Lord Ellenborough a copy of what passed ; for though I do not 
 think he will alter one iota, he may incline to show them favour in 
 the Roree district affairs." 
 
 The excuse made to the Governor-General by Sir C. Napier 
 in his letter of llth July, 1843 (page 105), was, that 
 
 " The notes of the meeting of the 8th of February, I received on 
 the llth. These I could not forward to your Lordship, because, 
 after the 13th, our communications were intercepted ; but the en- 
 closed copy of a letter to Major Outram shows that I intended to 
 do so, although I did not think it necessary, as we were on the eve of 
 a battle, which I knew could not take place, if the Ameers were 
 honest, and spoke the truth. After the action the Ameers placed my 
 small fprce in such danger, by their intrigues with Meer Shere Maho- 
 med, that I never thought more of Outram's ' minutes' till I received 
 your Lordship's present letter." 
 
 But behold, after making the above excuse, Sir Charles 
 Napier finds he has grossly committed himself, and in point 
 of fact, it was an egregious oversight (to use the mildest 
 term), for what does he say only two days after, in a letter to 
 the Governor-General, dated 13th July, 1843 (page 107). 
 
 " I was much vexed at myself for not having sent Major Out- 
 ram's notes of his interview with the Ameers, because I received 
 them on the llth of February, and the post was open to the I3th t as 
 IJind by a long letter written by your Lordship on that day." 
 
 Mark the contradictions, also, in the following paragraphs. 
 
 " We were all hard worked at that time, and I recollect thinking 
 that, as a battle would take place, or peace be made in a few days 
 (if Major Outram's assertions were correct), the face of affairs would 
 change. I therefore delayed sending this paper till I heard of the 
 Ameers having signed the draft treaty. I had, however, made pre- 
 parations for sending the notes of Outram's meeting to your Lord- 
 ship ; for I have just found among my papers a copy of this paper 
 prepared for transmission to your Lordship, and with it I find my 
 private notes on reading it. I had by that time discovered that there 
 teas a party resolved to support the Ameers through thick and thin." 
 
 The General then proceeds to say, that he received the notes
 
 145 
 
 on the llth ; his notes must have been made that evening, the 
 copy could hardly have been ready before the 12th. He required 
 time for reflection upon the conflicting information sent by 
 Major Outram, and the reports of his own spies. " It was im- 
 possible to jump at conclusions" Major Outram 's character and 
 local experience gave great weight to his assertions; yet they 
 were diametrically opposed to the statement of the scouts. 
 There remained little doubt of the way in which "Outram had 
 been duped." He thought it essential that copies of the letters 
 found on the Murree chief, Hyat Khan, should be sent to 
 his Lordship, in case of any misfortune befalling the troops. 
 He still hoped for the promised treaty, and must have in- 
 tended to send that and the notes of the interview together. 
 This is altogether a very lame excuse. The copy was ready 
 on the 12th, and a long letter written to the Governor-General 
 on the 13th ; and not one word communicated to his Lord- 
 ship on the subject of the conferences, without exception, 
 perhaps, the most important documents in the whole series 
 of papers ; and upon the due consideration of which events 
 of such magnitude depended. The General concludes, that 
 after the 14th all communication was at an end. 
 
 " The march upon an enemy of such force was alone so engrossing, 
 that really, if I had thought these papers important (which [ neither 
 did nor do now) I could not have attended to them. If they produce 
 annoyance or throw difficulties in your Lordship's way, very deeply 
 shall I regret that I forgot to send them after the battle." 
 
 In the letter of llth July, Sir C. Napier in impugning the 
 judgment of Major Outram, in several instances, observes 
 
 " Major Outram had been deceived by the Ameers. On the 10th 
 and llth February he sent two letters to me, following each other, 
 by express; these letters contained three important things. 1. A 
 request that I should halt the troops. 2. A request that I should 
 go in person to Hyderabad. 3. The information that the Ameers 
 had dispersed all their troops." [The General refused compliance with 
 all these, and submits his reasons for thinking that the Ameers did 
 not want peace, but time to get our troops into a snare ; and if he 
 had gone to Hyderabad ' my throat would have been cut of course.'] 
 (Page 106,) He adds, " As Major Outram seems to have for- 
 warded his notes, I think he ought also to have forwarded my denial 
 of Meer Roostum's assertions."
 
 146 
 
 The General's wrath is much excited (page 103) by attacks 
 upon him at Bombay. He remarks to the Governor-General, 
 " A private letter from Bombay informs me that a letter 
 
 received from " says he, " considered the destruction of 
 
 Emaurn Ghur as a more flagitious act than the attack upon 
 the Residency." His answer to this is, that it was done by 
 the consent of Ali Moorad (the usurper, by the bye), reluc- 
 tantly obtained, however; and his highness joined in the 
 fun by firing some of the guns, and once or twice three shells 
 into the fort. A precious ally indeed ! 
 
 Another charge against him was, that 
 
 " My continued march upon Hyderabad, in despite of the advice 
 of Major Outram, teas that which forced the Ameers to tear. I cer- 
 tainly did reject Major Outram's advice, because I soon saw that he 
 was grossly deceived by the Ameers. I had several proofs of this, 
 one or two of which I now feel it right to state to your Lordship." 
 
 The General then enters into an explanation of his course of 
 proceeding, in entire opposition to the views and solicitations 
 of Major Outram, the experienced commissioner who was 
 negociating the treaty and communicating personally with 
 the Ameers, after having had a long aquaintance with them, 
 and being fully informed of their feelings and character; but 
 the General thought he had got amongst a set of desperate, 
 irreconcilable, and untractable savages, on whose professions 
 no confidence could be placed ; although our object was to 
 induce them, by persuasion, to execute a treaty, conferring 
 upon ourselves great privileges. 
 
 A provision for the support of the ex-Ameers of Sinde and 
 their attendants (page 96), is made by the Bombay Governor 
 at the suggestion of Lieut. Gordon, in charge, to the amount 
 of 15,000 rupees per month, exclusive of the expense of 
 providing carriages, horses, and other articles of outfit ; and a 
 proportionate increase would be required when the ladies of 
 the Seraglio and their attendants, 400 in all, should arrive. 
 Here then is an expense of several lacs of rupees per annum 
 entailed upon the East India Company, by an attempt to en- 
 force a harsh treaty really of no use to them ; but which treaty, 
 even oppressive as it was, would have been acceded to and 
 observed by the Ameers, if Major Outram had only been per-
 
 
 147 
 
 mitted to yield a little in one or two immaterial points, and to 
 give assurance of redress to Meer Roostum ; and had General 
 Napier been less hasty and bent on battle and the capture of 
 Hyderabad. Will the revenues of Sinde, even under the 
 best management, or the increase of commerce, ever repay us 
 for all this wasteful expense and the miseries entailed upon the 
 Ameers and others? 
 
 The Governor-General, in a long despatch to the Secret 
 Committee, dated 26th June, 1843 (page 98), gives a recapi- 
 tulation of his objects and views in proposing the new treaty 
 to the Ameers of Sinde. His Lordship observes, 
 
 " I have endeavoured to judge my own conduct as I would that 
 of another, and I cannot think, in reviewing it, that in the circum- 
 stances in which I stood, I was unjustified in requiring from the 
 Ameers, the specific modifications of their engagements, which I in- 
 structed Sir Charles Napier to propose to them. These modifica- 
 tions in the existing treaty involved on our part the abandonment 
 of a considerable revenue,* payable to us every year by the Ameers, 
 Tinder the name of tribute. They involved, undoubtedly, the sacri- 
 fice, on their part, of lands of more than equivalent value ; but the 
 penalty imposed did not seem disproportioned to the offence I had 
 reason to believe they had committed." . . . . " They had no 
 claim to consideration on the ground of ancient possession, or of 
 national prejudice. Certainly they had none arising out of the 
 goodness of their government. To take advantage of the crime they 
 had committed to overthrow their power, teas a duty to the people 
 they had so long misgoverned. It was essential to the settlement of 
 the country, that I should take at once a decided course with respect 
 to the Ameers ; and having no doubt that I was justified in dethroning 
 them, I determined on at once adopting and announcing that deci- 
 sion." . . . . " Any half measure would have failed. Adopting the 
 decisive measure of taking the province into our hands, I determined 
 to adapt the means to the end, and not to omit any step by which 
 security could be given to the new possession." ..." The vast tracts 
 which the Ameers have converted into shikargahs, will also be sur- 
 veyed. Such of the woods as it may be necessary to retain, will be 
 carefully preserved ; and extensive portions of land, having the richest 
 soil, lately reserved for hunting grounds by the Ameers, will be 
 
 * Not revenue, but tribute imposed originally to reimburse us for pro- 
 tecting Sinde ! Protection indeed !
 
 148 
 
 restored to cultivation." ..." It is impossible to calculate the extent 
 to which, by opening ancient courses to the waters of the Indus, and 
 by extending means of irrigation, we may improve the productive^ 
 ness of the soil. As little can we calculate the extent to which the 
 assurance of protection given to the people may increase their indus- 
 try, and thus finally promote their prosperity. You may be assured, 
 that no exertion of mine shall be wanting to make the conquest of 
 Sinde by the British arms no less the source of happiness to the 
 inhabitants of the country than of advantage to our own." 
 
 The ladies of the Zenana had, at length, says General 
 Napier, on the 27th June, 1843, (page 102,) consented to 
 take a monthly allowance of 4,500 rupees for their mainte- 
 nance ; and if the General had at the same time returned 
 them some of their ornaments and various useful articles 
 taken from the Zenana, it would have evinced a praiseworthy 
 degree of gallantry towards these unfortunate grass widows 
 and fair damsels, left unprotected by their husbands and fathers 
 removed into captivity. Whether he did so, is not stated ; but 
 it may be presumed, perhaps, that many of the valuables 
 seized at Hyderabad, will hereafter be exhibited in this country, 
 as trophies of the valour of our troops under the great con- 
 queror Napier. Oh ! what a delusion often exists in the 
 public mind, in respect to the means by which some of our 
 victories in the East have been achieved ! While we are re- 
 joicing, only reflect how many are weeping and wailing ; the 
 innocent victims of cruelty, rapacity, and insatiable ambition ! 
 And we may judge of the intensity of feeling under which they 
 suffered from oppression, by the exclamation of one of the 
 Ameers, " that there would be no justice till the Almighty sat 
 in judgment." 
 
 The Governor-General assured Sir C. Napier 13th July, 
 1843, (page 108), with reference to the charges made against 
 His Excellency, the officers and troops, by the ex-Ameers, 
 that he never attached any weight to accusations, monstrous 
 in themselves, under any circumstances, as directed against 
 soldiers of honour, and certainly not deriving any peculiar 
 and unusual value from the character of the persons from 
 whom they were made to proceed. And on the 7th August, 
 1843, (page 112,) the Governor-General in Council intimated
 
 149 
 
 to Sir C. Napier, that after reading his explanations with 
 respect to the correspondence with Major Outrara, immediately 
 before the battle of Meeanee, and the position of the army at 
 that period, the supreme Government could not but feel that 
 it was to the penetration and decision of the General that the 
 army owed its safety. 
 
 " Major Outram 's confidential letter to you, of the llth of Feb., 
 he had intended to send by a servant of Meer Roostum, who was 
 then betraying him by a false statement of his force at Kohera ; yet 
 that letter contained a suggestion, which, if communicated to Meer 
 AH Moorad, might have added him to the confederacy against us." 
 
 " On the loth Feb., Major Outram observed, that his despatches 
 of the last few days would have led you to expect that his earnest 
 endeavours to effect an amicable arrangement with the Ameers of 
 Sinde would fail ; yet, on the previous day, the Ameers had affixed 
 their seals to the treaty, a proceeding usually viewed in the light of 
 an amicable arrangement, or at least an arrangement intended to pre- 
 clude hostilities not immediately, as in this case, to precede them." 
 
 There are two long papers by Sir Charles Napier (pages 
 112 to 115), of "recollections of conversations and circum- 
 stances," and a "conversation with Ali Moorad," the chief ob- 
 ject of which appears to be, to prove the correctness of his own 
 judgment, and the want of foresight and sagacity on the part 
 of Major Outram, who had given him offence, by submitting 
 to the Government his side of the question. The two con- 
 cluding paragraphs can alone be quoted : 
 
 " Well, what the law of England would have done for him, Ali 
 Moorad did for himself, and by his own power. However, upon 
 these matters, Major Outram, or Major Anybody, may form their 
 own opinions they are indifferent to me ; but Major Outram had 
 not a right to say that I had given power and riches to Ali Moorad, 
 and that that caused the war, because there is no foundation for such 
 an erroneous assertion. And by giving his notes of a conversation 
 with Meer Roostum and the other Ameers at Hyderabad, in which 
 I am represented and, certainly, by implication, made to have 
 forced Meer Roostum into his brother's power, and to the surrender 
 of the turban and all his territory, without accompanying such notes 
 by my denial of the circumstance, I do consider Major Outram to 
 have acted very unjustly towards me, if Major Outram did so ; of 
 which I have no proof, except hearing of these notes being in the
 
 160 
 
 hands of high and influential authorities without any notice being 
 taken of my contradiction. All this I am determined shall be 
 cleared up." 
 
 " With regard to returning Sinde to the Ameers, I consider it 
 would be a match for the imbecility of old Roostum. "With regard 
 to the depriving All Moorad of his territory, I think the more we 
 take into our own hands the better for the Sinde people, and for hu- 
 manity ; but, as Aristides said to the proposal of Themistocles, * it 
 would be advantageous, but not just,' I do not see how it is possible 
 to deprive a man of his territory, who has not committed a single 
 breach of treaty, or even been suspected of having done so, and who 
 has always been ready to be a mediator between the English and his 
 family, I have now stated facts, from which every; one who reads 
 them can form his own opinion. My own are formed, and im- 
 movable." 
 
 The Governor-General in Council, in addressing the Secret 
 Committee, 14th August, 1843, (page 117,) observes, 
 
 u We strongly feel that it was to Major-General Sir C. Napier's 
 penetration and decision that our army owed its safety ; and we are 
 astonished at the extent to which Major Outram suffered himself to 
 be deluded by the Ameers." 
 
 Here an observation naturally occurs ; what business had 
 the army to advance so near Hyderabad at all ? Was the 
 threatening attitude of Sir C. Napier's force, his seizure of the 
 Murrees, and the destruction of Emaum Ghur, with his thun- 
 dering proclamations and notices to the Ameers, not sufficient 
 to cause apprehension that he would not even be satisfied by 
 their signing the treaty, but intended to attack Hyderabad ; 
 and was it not proper that they should make preparations for 
 resistance ? Even rats will make an attack when they see no 
 way of escape. The Ameers were goaded, and the Beloochees 
 driven to desperation by the General, and hence the outbreak, 
 which would never have occurred if a more mild, but not so 
 far-seeing a general as Sir C. Napier had been employed, and 
 the vile intrigue of AH Moorad not been countenanced ; 
 for it is evident the last circumstance mainly brought on the 
 struggle. The legal opinion (page 120), obtained from the 
 Mahomedan professors, on Ali Moorad's title, is really un- 
 worthy of notice, when the facts of this extraordinary case, as 
 already detailed, are known ; and it is beyond a doubt, that
 
 151 
 
 the title on which he founds his claim, was obtained by fraud 
 and force from Meer Roostum, when under duresse. 
 
 Additional memorials, dated 22d and 24th Sept. 1843, 
 (pages 125 to 134,) were transmitted to the Court of Directors 
 by Meer Nusseer Khan, Meer Sobdar Khan, and Meer Ma- 
 homed Khan ; and it is hoped they will meet the attention 
 they deserve. These memorials are little more than a repeti- 
 tion of former statements of all the circumstances connected 
 with their services and fidelity, and their subsequent ill-usage 
 and hardships. They all pray to be restored to their country, 
 where they will continue grateful as long as they live. 
 
 Another exculpatory letter, against the statements of Major 
 Outram, relating to the case of AH Moorad, is submitted by 
 Sir Charles Napier to the Governor-General, under date 
 29th Sept. 1843 (page 134). 
 
 A statement of evidence, given by Meer Budroodeen, the 
 pliant Moosahib, or confidential servant of the ex-Ameer, 
 Sobdar Khan, of Hyderabad (page 136), is transmitted 
 through Sir C. Napier, to the Governor-General in council, 
 24th Oct. 1843. It appears from this, that so late as the 
 10th Feb. 1843, the Ameer remained the faithful ally of the 
 British Government, and on the night of that day had actu- 
 ally sent to the General to say, ft if he comes quickly, it will 
 be well ; but if he delay, the force will very greatly increase ;" 
 and the Ameers did not commence collecting troops until 
 Meerza Khoorsoo returned from the General, when that, 
 person wrote from Nowshera to the Ameers : " The General 
 is bent on war, so get ready. When the Meerza returned to 
 Hyderabad, the order for collecting troops was given." The 
 collection of troops had commenced before Major Outram 
 reached Hyderabad ; and if the Ameers had gained the vic- 
 tory, every soul of the British force would have been massacred. 
 It is unnecessary to offer any comment upon this statement, 
 given by a discarded native servant, who might find it conve- 
 nient to serve under the new government ; and the same 
 observation applies, with equal force, to the paper with which 
 the volume concludes, namely, a memorandum of a conversa- 
 tion between Meer Gholam Shah, Meer Fuzzil Ali, Meer 
 Bijjur, and Lieutenant Rathbone, relative to the part taken by
 
 162 
 
 Meer Shabad, in the attack of the Residency on Feb. 15, 1843. 
 There is just one passage worthy of being noticed: 
 
 " Meer Gholum Shah, on the morning of the attack, also waited on 
 Meer Sobdar, who desired him to join in the attack also. Meer 
 Gholam Shah replied, that he was not going to put himself under 
 the orders of an inexperienced child like Shabad, especially as he 
 thought the business a bad one ; but, if Meer Sobdar chose to go 
 himself, he would, as in duty bound, accompany him ; Meer Soldar 
 then laughed, and said that icould never do" 
 
 From the foregoing digest, it will be observed, that the 
 supplementary papers add very little to the information pre- 
 viously conveyed in the first series, or alter the principal 
 features of the case, as before known ; except as exhibiting 
 a lamentable discrepancy between the statements and opi- 
 nions of the two principal actors on the occasion, viz., Sir 
 Charles Napier and Colonel Outram ; and it will rest with the 
 superior authorities to decide whose judgment of the two is 
 most to be relied upon ; while it is hoped the scale of justice 
 will be fairly balanced, in weighing all the evidence for and 
 against the unfortunate Ameers of Sinde, now in exile from 
 their native land. By the happy consummation of their 
 restoration, so devoutly to be desired, we should retain all 
 the political and commercial advantages that can be required 
 in our connection with that country, at a much less cost to 
 the State than at present; and Britain would thus display to 
 the world an act of magnanimity greatly redounding to her 
 credit and repute. 
 
 NOTE. It will not fail to be noticed, that in the papers presented 
 to Parliament, there is not a single communication from the India 
 Board or the Court of Directors of the East India Company, or the 
 slightest intimation whatever, of the sentiments entertained by those 
 controlling authorities, iipon the proceedings of the Governor-General. 
 The author's views are the result of many years' experience, as a civil 
 functionary of the Company, in another and a distant part of India, 
 and an attentive study of the politics and commerce of the East gene- 
 rally. He has considered that the same principles which have so 
 beneficially regulated our conduct in other divisions of our vast 
 Eastern Empire, may likewise be applied to our intercourse and pro- 
 ceedings with Sinde, with which we have but recently had any 
 intimate connexion' 
 
 London, 3rd Feb., 1844. 
 
 London: Printed by STBWAHT and MUKKAY, Old Bailey.
 
 NOTICE. 
 
 A LITTLE delay has taken place in the publication of this 
 work, which was entirely written, and a great part of which 
 was printed, prior to the discussion in Parliament, on Friday, 
 the 8th inst. Just as the two last sheets were throwing- off. 
 
 o ' 
 
 the Writer's attention was drawn to the leaders in the 
 " Morning Chronicle," of the 9th, and the " Times," of the 
 10th inst., of which he subjoins short extracts, bearing on the 
 Sinde question. 
 
 " Really, were the circumstances written as a romance, neither 
 characters nor events would need one touch of exaggeration. The 
 more simply the tale of the poor Ameers is told, the more touching, 
 convincing, and overwhelming was it." Morning Chronicle, 9th 
 Feb. 1844. 
 
 " It cannot be denied, that, up to the present moment, SIR 
 CHARLES NAPIER has been almost as successful as SIR JOHN 
 KEANE ; but the future is not wholly couleur de rose. Scarcely 
 ever, perhaps, since the days of SENNACHERIB if the late accounts 
 are to be trusted, has an army, lying at peace in its tents, experi- 
 enced the sweeping losses of our Sindian detachments. In the utterly 
 helpless state to which some of them are said to be reduced, it rests 
 with our relentless enemies and double-dealing friends to cut them 
 in pieces or not, as they please. Disease appears to have done 
 already the greater part of the work ; let us hope the Beloochee 
 swordsmen will not take in hand the rest. Meanwhile, we have to 
 
 L
 
 ' 
 
 
 154 
 
 ask how is the country to he kept in order for the future ? Is the 
 same tremendous loss to be hazarded every year in this confessedly 
 pestilential country ? And if so, where are the lives to come from 
 which are thus to he thrown away ? It will be difficult, and not 
 without danger, to procure a constant supply of Sepoys for that pur- 
 pose. Our Indian army is faithful and enduring ; but it has some- 
 times shown that there are limits to its fidelity and endurance, which 
 it is more than hazardous to pass. Or, Spartan-like, are we to keep 
 the country in order by annual invasions during the cold season, to 
 punish the excesses which have been committed in the hot ? Or 
 must our troops, after all, retire from the country? No cotirse 
 appears wholly without its difficulty. We are glad that it does not 
 fall upon us to choose them." Times, 10th Feb. 1844. 
 
 The object of the Writer has been to give a simple narra- 
 tive, allowing the principal actors in this complicated drama 
 to strut their little hour upon the stage, and tell their own 
 story. 
 
 London, 12tk Feb. 1844.
 
 BHH^H 
 
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