POLITICAL ETHICS, 
 
 DESIGNED CHIEFLY 
 
 FOR THE USE OF COLLEGES AND STUDENTS AT LAW. 
 
 Lex, communis reipublicae sponsio. SENECA. 
 
 BY 
 
 FRANCIS LIEBER, LL.D., 
 
 CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE, ETC.; 
 
 AUTHOR OF "ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT," "PRINCIPLES OP LEGAL AND 
 POLITICAL INTERPRETATION," ETC., ETC. 
 
 VOL. II. 
 
 SECOND EDITION, REVISED. 
 
 EDITED BY THEODORE D. WOOLSEY. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA: 
 
 J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 
 
 LONDON : TRUBNER & CO. 
 1876.
 
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1874, by 
 
 MATILDA LIEBER, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
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 X* 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 . BOOK III. 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 PAGH 
 
 Ambition. Its various Manifestations. Is it radically bad? Political 
 Apathy a great Evil. Politics! Ingratitude. Jealousy. Political Mod- 
 esty. Self-Esteem. Vanity. Titles without Office, and External Dis- 
 tinctions, such as Ribbons. The Chinese. De Ruiter. Personal 
 Affection. Friendship: in ancient Times; in modern. Its high Value. 
 Epaminondas. Abuse of Friendship and of the Word. Favoritism : 
 in Monarchies; in Ministers and all other Citizens. Its ruinous Effects. 
 Washington and Pym. Family Affection. Providing for Members 
 of the Family. Papal Nepotism. Its Character when highest . . 9 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Gratitude fully discussed. Ingratitude. Excess of Gratitude aids Usurp- 
 ers. Cassar, Napoleon. Distinction between Gratitude and Popularity. 
 Popularity. Sudden and Passing Popularity; Lasting Popularity. 
 We have no Right to seek Popularity, but must suffer it to seek us. 
 Power of spontaneous Popularity ; peculiar Power of spontaneously re- 
 turned Popularity. Slavery of Popularity. Danger of Popularity, in 
 Free Countries, to ihe Individual. Crowds to receive distinguished 
 Men. Great Danger of Personal Popularity for Liberty. Pericles. 
 Demagogues. Athenian Demagogism. Monuments. The Duty of 
 Attention. Observation of Primary Agents and Elements. Truth and 
 Justice connected with it. Obligation to study the History of our 
 Country, its Institutions and their Classical Periods. It is necessary in 
 modern Times to read Newspapers ....... 35 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Continency. Political Evils of Incontinency ; of Prostitution. The pri- 
 mary Foundation of Society, the Family, is undermined by it. Evils of 
 general Incontinency in the highest Classes, and the lowest. Religion. 
 Its Universality. Its importance for Morality; for Society; for the 
 State. Fanaticism. Fanaticism of any kind. Religious Fanaticism. 
 The Bible. Revelation. Both exclusively religious. Persecution. 
 
 3
 
 CONTENTS. 
 4 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Direct and indirect Persecution. Political and social Persecution. 
 Hypocrisy and Desecration of Religion. Regulation of political or 
 social actions by Tenets * 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Patriotism. The Patriotism of the Ancients; of the Moderns. Some 
 have rejected Patriotism. National Conceit, Pride. Narrowness of 
 Feeling a Counterfeit of Patriotism. What is true Patriotism? It is 
 noble and necessary for Liberty. Loyalty. Public Spirit. What it 
 consists in. Calamitous Consequences of a Want of Public Spirit. 
 Veneration for the Old; Forefathers. How far just, necessary. When 
 injurious. The Age of Action under Forty; of Conservatism over 
 Forty ._Do Times grow worse? When are we more experienced 
 than our Forefathers ? Stagnation and Heedlessness . . . . 80 
 
 BOOK IV. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Education. What it is. Strong and universal Tendency to form Habits 
 and continue them. Great Importance of Education in Politics, not 
 only of elementary and general School Systems, but also of superior 
 Education and literary Institutions. Expeditions, Libraries, Museums. 
 Industrial Education. The Rich as well as the Poor ought to be 
 actively engaged in some Pursuit, whether purely mental, or industrial. 
 Law of Solon. Connection of Crime with want of regular industrial 
 Education in modern Times. Statistics. Habits of Industry, of Obe- 
 dience, of Independence, of Reverence, and of Honesty. Ancient His- 
 tory for Children. Concentric Instruction. Gymnastics. Sexes. The 
 Woman. Difference of physical Organization, Temperament, and 
 Powers in Woman and Man. The Family (and through it the Society 
 of Comity and the Country) is the sacred Sphere of Woman's chief 
 Activity. The Connection of Woman's Activity with the State. 
 Woman is excluded from Politics. She is connected with the State 
 by Patriotism. Lady Croke. The Petitioning of Women. Lady Rus- 
 sell a Model. History of Woman. Is the Woman represented though 
 she cannot vote at the Poll ? 108 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Obedience to the Laws. How highly the Greeks esteemed it. Obedi- 
 ence to Laws one of Man's Prerogatives. Absolute Obedience impos- 
 sible. Ad Impossibilia Nemo obligatur. Ad Turpia Nemo obligatur. 
 
 Viscount Orthes. Unlawful Demands made by lawful Authority. 
 
 High Importance of the Judiciary with reference to Obedience to the
 
 CONTENTS. 5 
 
 PACK 
 
 Law. Not all that is not prohibited may be done by the Citizen, any 
 more than all that is positively permitted. Penalties are not equiva- 
 lents of Crime. Malum in se, Malum prohibitum : Is the distinction 
 essential, and can we found any Rule of Action upon it? The Ques- 
 tion of Obedience to Laws a Question of Conflict. Obedience in the 
 Army and Navy. Articles of War. Obedience in the Civil Service. 
 How far is the Citizen bound to obey the Laws ? Justifiable Dis- 
 obedience. Necessary and morally demanded Disobedience. Non- 
 compliance with the Laws, or passive Resistance. Active Resistance. 
 Armed Resistance. Insurrection. Revolution. Resistance formerly 
 considered lawful and received in the Charters. Mobs and Mob-law, 
 so called. Duty of Informing: in the Officer; in the Citizen at large. 
 Professional Informers for Rewards. Secret Police. Delatores and 
 Mouchards. The Obligation of Informing against intended or com- 
 mitted Offences ..... . . ' . . . . . 139 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Associations. Associated Means, Endeavors. Associations for the Pro- 
 motion of Morals. Pledges. Trades-Unions. Ancient Guilds. Un- 
 lawful Combinations for Purposes lawful if pursued by the Individual. 
 Evil Effects of Trades-Unions. Disclosures respecting them in Scot- 
 land and England . . . . 194 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Liberty of the Press. Primordial Right of Communion. Journalism. 
 High moral Obligations of Editors. Temptations in the Way of Editors. 
 Power of -Leaders, good or bad, rests upon their seizing upon that 
 Principle which is the moving Agent of the Mass. In what the Power 
 of leading Papers consists. Conditions which give great Power to 
 single Papers. Populous Capitals in Connection with the Influence of 
 Papers. Obligation of Veracity peculiarly strong for Editors. Political 
 Importance of gentlemanlike Tone. Publishing private Letters. Dan- 
 gers of Newspaper Flippancy. The Political Position of the Clergy- 
 man. Opinion of ancient Theologians. How far the Clergyman ought 
 to share in the Politics of his Country ....... 205 
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Voting. Principle of Unanimity; of Majority and Minority. Deliberative 
 
 Procedures. All who have a Right to vote ought to vote. Accord- 
 
 ' ing to what Rules. (Election Statistics.) Voting for Officers. When 
 
 we ought to abstain from Voting. Influencing Elections. Canvassing.
 
 6 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Intimidation, individual and official. Bribery. Severe Laws against 
 it at Athens. Mutual Insurance Companies for Bribing at Athens. 
 Bribes of common Voters. Bribing Judges ; Legislators. Bribes by a 
 Government of its own Citizens. Bribes by foreign Powers. Betting 
 on Elections. Election Riots and Disturbance around the Poll. 
 Various other Election Malpractices 22 6 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Parties. Has any free Country existed without Parties ? Can a free 
 Country possibly exist without Parties? Is it desirable that a free 
 Country should exist without Parties? Historical Parties and passing 
 ones. Conservative and Movement Parties. Characteristics of a sound 
 Party. Dangers of Party Zeal and factious Passion. Party Signs. 
 Misunderstanding of Language in high Party Spirit. Ought a conscien- 
 tious Citizen to attach himself to a Party ? The Law of Solon. 
 Independents. Trimmers 252 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Opposition. Government. Administration. What is a lawful Opposi- 
 tion. A well-understood Opposition the essential Safeguard of Liberty. 
 The Opposition a great Institution of Modern Times. As such it 
 dates more especially from the Times of Walpole and Pulteney. It is 
 lawful to oppose the Majority, which is not always right. (Order of 
 Sitting in Legislative Assemblies.) Public Opinion and General Opin- 
 ion. Ethical Rules relating to Opposition and to Parties in general. 
 How far ought a Citizen to go in his Opposition, especially in times 
 of War? Coalitions. Parties formed on the Ground of foreign National 
 Extraction 268 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Public Men. Leaders. Self-examination before a Citizen embarks in 
 Public Life. Physical, Moral, and Mental Qualities desirable in a 
 Public Man. Necessary Knowledge for a Public Man. Caution in 
 entering upon Public Life ......... 284 
 
 BOOK VI. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Extra-constitutional Meetings. Their Necessity. The Representative. 
 Summary of his Duties. He is the Guardian of the public Treasures. 
 When ought he to vote liberally ? The Framing of Laws. Legis- 
 lation upon the Principle of mutual Accommodation. Importance of a
 
 CONTENTS. 7 
 
 PACK 
 
 gentlemanly Character for the Representative. Instruction. History 
 and the various Constitutions show that the Right of Instruction has 
 been claimed and disclaimed as promoting and as injurious to Liberty, 
 according to the Circumstances of the Times. The Representative Gov- 
 ernment is not a mere Substitution for direct Democracy. Essential 
 character of the Representative Government. The different character- 
 istic Principles of Ancient States, the Middle Ages, and Modern States. 
 Nationalization of States ; Socialization of Population. National 
 Representation the great Feature of Modern Times. Difference be- 
 tween Deputative and Representative Systems. Oath in New Jersey 
 and the Netherlands to promote Public Welfare. How does the Repre- 
 sentative faithfully represent? Advantages of Representative Govern- 
 ment. Objections to the doctrine of Instruction. Instruction belongs 
 to the Deputative System ......... 295 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Subject of Instruction with particular Reference to the United States. 
 The ancient Articles of Confederation founded upon the Deputative 
 System. The Articles of Confederation compared to the Constitution 
 of the former United Provinces of the Netherlands, the Swiss Act of 
 Mediation, the present Constitution of the Swiss Confederation, and the 
 Germanic Confederacy. The Constitution of the United States boldly 
 changed the former cleputative character of the Confederacy into a repre- 
 sentative one. Senators are not Ambassadors. In Leagues the strongest 
 Member of those on terms of parity according to the letter must sway. 
 Hegemony in Greece, Phoenicia, the Low Countries, etc. Relation 
 of the State Legislatures to the respective Senators elected by them. 
 The History of Instruction in modern times, as connected with the 
 Representative System 339 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Responsibility of the Representative. Pledges. Implied and positive, 
 general and specific Pledges. Are Pledges moral, and consistent with 
 general Liberty and Justice ? When are they so ? Pledges originated 
 with the Court Party and Aristocracy. Strong Power of Implied 
 Pledges. Breaking Implied Pledges, and throwing one's self upon 
 the Constituents by Resignation. Duties of Presiding Officers of de- 
 liberative Assemblies; Speakers 363
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK VII. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 FAGB 
 
 Executive Officers. Difficulty of controlling them. Their Interference 
 with Elections : in Athens, Rome, France, England, the United States. 
 Plato's Opinion of the Duties of Officers. Post-Office. The Chief 
 Executive Officer. Confidential Officers. Official Interpretation of Con- 
 stitutions and Laws. The Veto. Ancient and Modern Veto. Absolute, 
 suspensive, and conditional Vetoes. Privilege of Pardoning in Mon- 
 archies ; in Republics. Danger and Difficulty in Republics. For what 
 Purpose is it granted ? Rules which ought to be observed in making 
 use of the Power of Pardoning 373 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Judge, Juror, Advocate, and Witness. Official, external and moral Inde- 
 pendence of the Judge. Sanctissimus Judex of the Romans. The 
 Judge, where there is doubt, must interpret in Mercy, in Penal Cases ; in 
 Favor of civil Liberty, in all. The Institution of the Jury. The sacred 
 Office of the Juryman. What is he to do when the Law is contrary to 
 the universal Conscience? The Institution of the Advocate. Moral 
 Obligation of the Advocate. Political Relations of Lawyers in Free 
 Countries. Duties of the Witness ....... 401 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 War. Definitions. Present Exaggerations against War. Christian Re- 
 ligion does not prohibit just War; neither the Bible, nor the early 
 Writers of the Church. Objections against War on the Score of Moral- 
 ity; of Reason; of Political Economy. Just and Patriotic Wars have 
 morally raised Nations. Eternal Peace. Arbitration by a Congress of 
 Nations. Just Wars. National Debasing Effect of suffering national 
 insult and Injustice without Resistance. The Age of Louis XIV. 
 Wars do not absolve from Obligations to the Enemy. Who is the 
 Enemy ? Are Citizens of the hostile State Enemies ? What Means of-- 
 injuring the Enemy are admissible ? Treaties containing Provisions for 
 the Case of War between the Contracting Powers. Shall Confidence 
 be abused in War ? Does War allow Deception ? Capitulations are 
 sacred. Destruction in War. Carrying off Works of Art, Archives, etc. 
 Duties of the individual Soldier 426
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 BOOK III. 
 
 (Continued.} 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Ambition. Its various Manifestations. Is it radically bad ? Political Apathy a 
 great Evil. Political Ingratitude. Jealousy. Political Modesty. Self- 
 Esteem. Vanity. Titles without Office, and External Distinctions, such as 
 Ribbons. The Chinese. De Ruiter. Personal Affection. Friendship: in 
 ancient Times; in modern. Its high Value. Epaminondas. Abuse of 
 Friendship and of the Word. Favoritism: in Monarchies; in Ministers and 
 all other Citizens. Its ruinous Effects. Washington and Pym. Family 
 Affection. Providing for Members of the Family. Papal Nepotism. Its 
 Character when highest. 
 
 XXXVI. THE English word ambition is used for very dif- 
 ferent degrees of the same affection of the human soul, from 
 its laudable original principle to its immoral or criminal excess, 
 for which some other languages have different words. This 
 want of terms has not unfrequently exercised an unfavorable 
 influence upon the views which have been taken of the sub- 
 ject. By ambition we designate a desire of distinction or 
 superiority, whether it only prompts to legitimate emulation, 
 increases to a longing for distinction, or degenerates into a 
 craving and ultimately into an ungovernable passion for it. 
 If we comprehend all these gradations under one term, namely 
 that of desire of distinction, I believe that we do no violence 
 to language. Of course we must waive the Latin etymology 
 of the word ambition, since the meaning originally attached 
 to it in that language has entirely faded away in our own 
 
 9
 
 10 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 idiom. The question is, Is ambition a legitimate desire, laud- 
 'able, beneficial, or must a conscientious citizen extinguish it, 
 and can he do it, or is it an original, elementary, and there- 
 fore necessary principle in our soul, so that we ought to 
 cultivate and moderate rather than eradicate it ? 
 
 We have seen that men are ordained to exist as individuals, 
 not only physically so, like the animals, not only each with 
 his own moral value, but also with an infinite variety in the 
 combination of mental faculties and ethical inclinations, a 
 variety far greater and more surprising than that which we 
 observe in the combination of matter around us. Diversity, 
 taken in its deepest meaning, and not sameness, is the law of 
 everything that lives ; the propelling agent, most especially, 
 of society. Closely connected with, and indeed directly re- 
 sulting from it, are emulation and competition. Without them 
 little energy would be roused, and it is not only justifiable in, 
 but it is demanded of us, that in whatever line we are conscious 
 of possessing peculiar powers we should strive to emulate 
 those who are before or above us, to rise, if possible, superior 
 to them, since we have enjoyed already the advantage of their 
 example and acquisitions. Desiring, then, to distinguish our- 
 selves is far from necessarily implying vanity, but it may, and 
 indeed ought to, be a desire to develop our individual nature, 
 stamped upon us as our peculiar intellectual compound char- 
 acter, to the utmost extent, so that we may be all that which 
 our Maker destined us to be, and distinguish ourselves by 
 perfection, if he has given us peculiar faculties. In this view 
 ambition, or a desire of distinction, is not only legitimate, but 
 it is one of our great duties. Skill, knowledge, wisdom, and 
 virtue may thus become in a variety of spheres, humble or 
 high, the object of laudable ambition, the vis motrix of society 
 and civilization. Without it there would be stagnation, inanity 
 -listless barbarity. But it has been asked, How is this am- 
 bition compatible with that modesty which all systems of 
 morals must hold up as a virtue, that humility of mind which 
 the Christian religion especially demands? I believe the 
 question would never have been asked, had not an erroneous
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. II 
 
 view respecting men and society been taken, according to 
 which a state of perfection, towards which we were bound to 
 strive, was believed necessarily to consist in a state of same- 
 ness ; but we have already seen that where there is individu- 
 ality there is diversity, and this diversity of combination seems 
 to be one of our Maker's greatest laws of life, by which his 
 greatness, inconceivable by man, appears nevertheless the 
 more holy the longer and deeper man contemplates it and 
 follows it out as far as his limited faculties will sustain him. 
 If we take the opposite view, that perfection of life does not 
 consist in infinite combinations of character and infinite mu- 
 tual relations, necessary in order to keep society joined to- 
 gether, but also necessarily founded upon variety and contrast, 
 because without it society would dissolve into equal and 
 equally inert atoms, we must ultimately arrive, if we consist- 
 ently reason, at that state held up by the wisest Hindoos as 
 the state of perfection, in which we are " indifferent to all 
 pairs of opposite things, as honor or dishonor, and the like, 
 remaining absorbed in the Divine Essence." 1 
 
 XXXVII. Desire of distinction is just and all depends 
 upon these points, that we desire to excel or distinguish our- 
 selves in something laudable, that after calm examination this 
 appears to be within the reach of our faculties, endowments, 
 and position, so that we mistake not the aim pointed out to 
 us by our individual combination, that the desire do not be- 
 come excessive, or a diseased function of the soul, and that 
 consequently we do not desire distinction because it is such 
 but because it is in a good cause and our duty calls us to 
 excel in it as we have the endowments for it, and therefore 
 do not envy or hate those who excel in the same paths, but, 
 on the contrary cherish, them as striving for the same good 
 and noble end. 2 Many persons have entirely missed their 
 
 1 Ordinances of M nu, translated by Sir William Jones, London, 1799, vol. 
 iii. p. 237. 
 
 2 * The very ruinous effect of small v inity, which is highly dangerous in all truly 
 free governments, is strikingly illustrate.:! in the following extract from Sir Samuel
 
 I2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 aim by striving to excel in poetry while they were made per- 
 haps to be sound practical men ; many have ruined the use- 
 fulness of their life and their happiness by not proportioning 
 their ambition to their faculties or other means; many, by 
 placing it upon worthless subjects; many, again, by crimihally 
 placing it upon subjects legitimate in themselves. And in this 
 latter point of view, in which it becomes especially important 
 in politics, we must not forget that it is closely coupled in 
 gifted minds with that urgency to action which we find always 
 to exist in proportion to a man's faculties, and from which rises 
 the love of power, not wrong in its principle, but often carried 
 to such insatiate excess that it bewilders the mind, deranges 
 all other functions of the soul, and ends in a monomania. 
 Yet, though ambition has frequently intoxicated superior 
 minds and led less gifted ones to many follies, we can in 
 politics as little dispense with ambition as in the arts, sciences, 
 or literature, in the school, the house, or the various avoca- 
 tions of practical life. For if ambition in those gifted citizens 
 who by their peculiar mental organization are fitted for offi- 
 cers or as leaders is extinguished, either by disgust at a de- 
 
 Romilly's Narrative of his own life, in Memoirs of the Life of Sir Samue 
 Romilly, 2d edit., London, 1840, vol. i. p. 107. He had paid a visit to Paris at 
 the beginning of the revolution, and says, "What struck me as most remarkable 
 in the dispositions of the people. that I saw, was the great desire that everybody 
 had to act a great part, and the jealousy, which in consequence of this was enter- 
 tained of those who were really eminent. It seemed as if all persons, from the 
 highest to the lowest, whether deputies themselves, declaimers in the Palais 
 Royal, orators in the coffee-houses, spectators in the gallery, or the populace 
 about the door, looked upon themselves individually as of great consequence in 
 the revolution. The man who kept the hotel at which I lodged at Paris, a cer- 
 tain M. Villars, was a private in the National Guard. Upon my returning 
 home on the day of the benediction of their colors at Notre Dame, and telling 
 him that I had been present at the ceremony, he said, 'You saw me, sir?' I 
 was obliged to say that I really had not. He said, ' Is that possible, sir? You 
 did not see me ! Why, I was in one of the first ranks all Paris saw me !' I 
 have often since thought of my host's childish vanity. What he s -oke was felt 
 by thousands. The most important transactions were as nothing but as they 
 had relation to the figure which each little self-conceited hero acted in them. To 
 attract the attention of all Paris, or of all France, was often the motive of con- 
 duct in matters which were attended with most momentous consequences."
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 13 
 
 generate state of things or their own haughtiness, and if it 
 be not properly kindled in the rising generations by directing 
 their attention to the noblest examples of civic worth in the 
 history of their country or that of other great nations, one of 
 the greatest and most ruinous evils of a state must unavoid- 
 ably befall it, that of political apathy or indifferentism, which 
 always fo/nents political demoralization, as it partly arises 
 from it; until it finally extinguishes all public spirit and 
 patriotism. 
 
 If the best, the well-informed, the honest, do not strive for 
 the honors of the commonwealth, the wicked, ignorant, or 
 dishonest will ; if all matters of political distinction, be it in 
 the way of parliamentary honor, distinction of high office, on 
 the bench, or in whatever other manner, be disregarded or 
 derided, matters of justice and politics themselves soon will be 
 treated so too. If the substantial citizens become indifferent- 
 ists and do not vote, perhaps because they are too proud to 
 mingle in the crowd, or unwilling to exercise so high a privi- 
 lege of liberty at the expense of some personal inconvenience, 
 they ought to know that others will not do the same, and that 
 the " faex infima populi," where such have a right of voting, 
 will infallibly be at the poll. Indifferentism in politics leads 
 to what was called in a previous passage political atony, a 
 dissolution of the political ties, and of course to the death 
 of justice and liberty, an awful state of things, out of which 
 convulsive revolutions alone, accompanied with suffering and 
 violence, can develop a new order of things. 
 
 XXXVIII. We ought not to forget that distinction in 
 sciences or other branches may be acquired not indeed with- 
 out sacrifices, for there is no good to be acquired without 
 proportionate exertion and sacrifice, but without those sacri- 
 fices from which nobler minds would shrink. The move- 
 ments of liberty, however, are in their nature not unfrequently 
 of a rough character, because they are the affairs of masses, in 
 which we cannot always expect delicacy of relations. With- 
 out ambition, without love of distinction, there would then not
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 14 
 
 exist sufficient incentive for those who have the mind and 
 mould of soul to become great citizens. 
 
 For this reason, however, it is also necessary not to with- 
 hold from the excellent or great the just reward of their am- 
 bition, not to instil into them by unworthy ingratitude the 
 poison of jealousy, or contempt of popular acknowledgment, 
 not to permit that honorable ambition, which respects and 
 obeys the public voice, to degenerate into the love of power for 
 its own sake, the most reckless and unscrupulous of passions. 
 Habitual ingratitude produces one of two things : either it 
 leads those who long for power to use the people while they 
 despise it, or it drives the best minds from the stage of poli- 
 tics. Niebuhr, in his History of Rome, says, " M. Manlius, 
 the preserver of the capitol, of whom the chronicles relate 
 that in birth and valor he was second to none, and in personal 
 beauty, exploits, eloquence, vigor, and daring superior to all, 
 found himself bitterly disappointed in his claims to gratitude 
 and honor. Camillus, his enemy, to whom he felt himself 
 at least equal, who had not shared in the distress of the 
 siege, who had imprecated curses on his country, was re- 
 peatedly raised by the houses to the dictatorship, and by the 
 comitia, which were under the influence of the aristocracy, 
 to the military tribunate : while he, though a consular, found 
 himself excluded from all dignities. This insulting neglect 
 in return for an action standing foremost but not alone in a 
 heroic life, the energy of which was still unexhausted, poi- 
 soned his heart with virulent rancor. He was one of those 
 powerful-minded men who have received a calling to be the 
 first among their countrymen, and feel an unconquerable long- 
 ing to fulfil it, while low minds, envying and disliking them, 
 are resolved to keep them back from the place which is their 
 due ; one of those, the superhuman vehemence of whose char- 
 acter, when drawn forth by such a conflict, makes even hon- 
 est but timid natures shrink. For indeed it is their doom to 
 be haunted by a spirit against the snares of which nothing 
 can protect them but the confidence and esteem of honorable 
 minds. God will require their souls from those who have
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 15 
 
 driven them into fatal courses : their faults he will judge more 
 mercifully than the faults of those who ruined his noblest 
 work. These mighty characters have always an intense in- 
 born feeling in behalf of justice, truth, and whatever is glo- 
 rious ; they are animated by love and pity, by hatred and 
 indignation of the right sort : these become subservient to 
 their fierce passions, but do not die away : it is glaringly 
 unjust, even when they have gone irretrievably astray, to re- 
 gard actions, which in a man of blameless life would be ex- 
 tolled as noble and praiseworthy, in any other light in them, 
 although vulgar souls may do the same things from selfish 
 motives." x So far the historian of Rome. We shall return 
 to the subject of gratitude and popularity in politics. 
 
 XXXIX. If excessive or unfounded jealousy towards great 
 and honorable citizens is blamable, it marks .no less an evil 
 disposition if thie ambitious show it towards one another, and 
 allow themselves to be carried away so far as to sacrifice their 
 country, or even its partial welfare, to these animosities which 
 are below a truly great mind. 
 
 The danger when a man's ambition is greater than the re- 
 sources within him, has been already alluded to. If his posi- 
 tion is such that he cannot effect much except by the power 
 which he could only acquire by a superior mind, the injury 
 is not only on his side ; he will earn disgrace ; but it is also 
 greatly owing to this disproportion in the endowments of 
 many men that we meet with so many restless, turbulent, and 
 noisy politicians in their limited spheres, men who have too 
 much ambition to remain quiet, and too limited a mind to 
 comprehend what is truly noble, great, or good, and whose 
 petty pride makes them jealous of all true distinction and 
 influence in others. They are very troublesome members of 
 the community, and become sometimes highly injurious. It 
 is the duty of every true citizen to keep within his proper 
 sphere. This disproportion between the impulse and the 
 
 Eng. trans., Amer. ed., ii. 451.
 
 jg POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 faculties is of immense danger in disturbed times, when 
 rapid changes are unavoidable, and in persons who by their 
 position, acquired by adventitious circumstances, have for a 
 time at least power or influence. How easily may not a 
 country be ruined by the ambition of a weak-minded man, 
 whether monarch or demagogue, in such times of danger! 
 The duke of Norfolk, who conspired against Elizabeth, in 
 order to marry Mary of Scots, queen of England, is repre- 
 sented by Hallam 1 to have been such, and therefore to have 
 fallen by "a sentence amply merited, the execution of which 
 was indispensable." The French revolution shows many 
 examples of this species of character in a most glaring and 
 appalling light. 
 
 XL. Ambition, as first limited, is not incompatible in any 
 way with modesty, a virtue which is indeed no less amiable in 
 private life than in public. Nor is modesty incompatible with 
 self-esteem. 2 Anaxagoras, when exiled in Lampsacus, was 
 pitied because he now was deprived of Athens : " Rather 
 Athens of me," he replied. 3 Whether this proud answer was 
 well founded in the case of Anaxagoras, is not the place here 
 to investigate ; but certain it is that there are great men who 
 are as valuable to their country as that is to them, who, be- 
 cause they are of a great and comprehensive intellect, cannot 
 but see clearly their position, and surely would not act morally 
 if they should attempt to hide the consciousness of their own 
 
 1 Constitutional History of England, vol. i.'pp. 181, 182. 
 
 a * Pitt (afterwards Lord Chatham) is said to have expressed, in 1757, these 
 words to the duke of Devonshire : " My lord, I am sure I can save this country, 
 and nobody else can." Walpole's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 271. 
 
 So did his son William Pitt, at a very early period, " prefer the profession of 
 the law to any official connection with an administration of which he did not 
 form a part." Soon after he declared publicly that he had* determined "never 
 to accept any subordinate office, meaning an office which did not entitle him 
 to a sea in the cabinet." (Tomline's Memoir of William Pitt, 2d ed., vol. i. p. 
 66.) The consciousness of his talents entitled him to do this. Cases of great 
 emergency would of course make an exception. The delicate hand of a Phidias 
 would be justly placed to the rope in cases of impending shipwreck. 
 
 3 Diog. Laert., ii. 10.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 17 
 
 importance by hypocrisy, one of the great evils in politics. 
 Yet, as in all morals so in politics, we must beware of ex- 
 tremes, and political arrogance is as dangerous a rock in 
 politics as hypocrisy is undermining. Theodatus Gozon, as 
 we learn from the chronicle of the Rhodian Knights, in ad- 
 dressing the conclave which had convened for the purpose 
 of electing a grand master of that heroic order, after making 
 a review of all the qualities and virtues necessary for a 
 commander of the illustrious order in its dangerous duty of 
 warding off the Mohammedans and of preventing them from 
 overflooding western Europe, and mentioning the solemn oath 
 he had taken to propose the proper person, uttered these 
 closing words : " Thus, I find no one fitter to rule the order 
 than myself." He was almost unanimously elected, and the 
 order found no reason to rue the election. 1 These are extraor- 
 
 1 Having mentioned the Order of the Knights of St. John on account of this 
 instance of political self-esteem, I cannot forbear mentioning it on account of the 
 glorious and almost superhuman perseverance of the Knights in resisting the 
 gigantic power of Mahomet II., who intended to conquer the West of Europe, 
 and, though death prevented him from carrying his cherished plan into execution, 
 had it engraven on his tomb-stone, " I meant to conquer Rhodes and fair Italy." 
 If we thus see in the resistance of the Order under Villiers a noble instance of 
 fortitude and calm perseverance, coupled with the greatest heroism, we find in 
 that same siege an instance of the infamous guilt to which jealousy may lead, 
 in the case of Amaral, who, forgetting duty, religion, humanity, was bent on de- 
 livering Rhodes into the hands of the Turks and thus laying open to them a 
 farther progress towards the West. The siege of Rhodes is an instance of some 
 political virtues so nobly displayed, and its history is every way of so thrilling an 
 interest, that it cannot fail to sink deeply in the mind of the reader, especially 
 of the young, whence it may rise again as a supporting and encouraging example 
 in a time of need. Vertot, History of the Knights Hospitallers, 5 vols., Edin- 
 burgh, 1770. 
 
 In appending this note I am reminded of two striking instances of self-esteem 
 or consciousness of worth, though not of a political kind. Most of my readers 
 will remember the clause in Lord Bacon's Testament, " My name and memory I 
 leave to foreign nations; and to mine own countrymen, after some time be passed 
 over." In Eckermann's Conversations with Goethe during the Last Years of his 
 Life, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1836 (in German), we are informed (vol. i. p. 143) of the 
 following and, in my judgment, just opinion which Goethe had of himself: 
 " Tieck [a distinguished German poet] is a star of superior order, and no one 
 can appreciate his merits more than myself, but when they attempt to elevate him 
 VOL. II. 2
 
 Ig POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 dinary cases, and in general it may be given as a sign of po- 
 litical modesty if a citizen betrays no eagerness for place or 
 honor, but dutifully accepts whatever place he is called to and 
 for which he feels himself capable, always keeping strictly the 
 public benefit in view. There is perhaps no more striking 
 trait in the whole life of Washington than that on no occasion 
 during his whole political career did he seek or solicit a single 
 place or appointment, still less, of course, did he intrigue for 
 one. Yet in paying this just and great tribute to that illus- 
 trious citizen let us not be unjust towards others, and not 
 forget that this abstinence from striving higher is not always 
 possible and would not be right for every citizen. The Amer- 
 ican revolution was no internal revolution; it was the severing 
 of colonies from their mother country. When intestine wars 
 devastate a country, when the horrors of civil war demand a 
 remedy at the moment, a citizen who is conscious of resources 
 within and power without would certainly neglect his duty 
 were he not boldly to strive for that position in which alone 
 he could be of service. Would Spain, in her bleeding state > 
 not bless such a citizen, if there were one sufficiently great 
 for the task ? 
 
 XLI. True ambition is incapable of vanity, a vice by which 
 rulers but too often have found it possible to attach to a bad 
 cause numerous men who without it might have well deserved 
 of their country. Ambition seeks distinction in reality; vanity 
 is satisfied with outward distinction, or its form, without sub- 
 stantial basis, and if common and habitual in a nation it 
 deprives it of the proper manliness indispensable for civil 
 liberty. Marks of distinction seem not only to be wise but 
 just, because by it the opinion which is invisible and may be 
 evanescent is embodied and condensed in a permanent sign ; 
 
 above himself, and to raise him on a level with me, they err. I may say this as a 
 plain matter of fact, for what is it to me ? I have not made myself. It would 
 be the same if I were to compare myself to Shakspeare, who neither made him- 
 self, and yet is a being of a superior kind, to whom I look up, and whom I 
 must venerate." Eckermann -was the daily and domestic companion of Goethe.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. \ g 
 
 it is gratitude made visible and symbolically expressed; the 
 person who receives it is by the feeling of acknowledgment 
 and gratitude in turn more closely connected to those who 
 thus palpably show their feeling towards him, his friends feel 
 cheered in the acknowledgment of merit in him, and the com- 
 munity at large have in their act a representation of the virtue 
 or merit which dwells among them, and the encouragement it 
 meets with at their hands. It is the same principle which 
 prompts the passengers of a wrecked vessel to present a silver 
 tankard to the pilot who may have saved their lives. Among 
 these public marks I count the thanks of Congress or Parlia- 
 ment, swords voted to deserving officers, the bestowing boun- 
 ties upon meritorious citizens for instance the land granted 
 to Lafayette the civic crown of the Romans, the sword of 
 honor bestowed by Napoleon upon the brave, or, where there 
 exist different privileges in the civil fabric of a nation, the 
 bestowing of these upon the most meritorious. If France 
 believes that peers for life are necessary or salutary in the 
 organization of her government, I consider it as a very noble 
 trait, and am bold enough to claim it as a general good sign 
 of the times, that she raises to this political dignity and influ- 
 ence, among others, men who have evinced the influence 
 which they exercise by no other power than that which the 
 gifted always must exercise over the less gifted minds in 
 short, to literary and scientific men. There are now above 
 sixteen peers in France who had no other claim to the peerage 
 than that of thought. He who denies that such examples are 
 not inciting to others has in my opinion no correct view of 
 mankind. Britain, though formerly far in advance of France 
 by admitting commoners to the high peerages, has now re- 
 mained behind her; and all the distinction that science can 
 aspire to in England byway of political honor is knighthood, 
 once so degraded under James I. that people would pay fines 
 rather than accept it. Strange that no minister has sought 
 additional strength by boldly bestowing the peerage on scien- 
 tific men ; while mere riches in many cases have obtained 
 the peerage. Yet, if the French have thus nobly broken the
 
 20 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 path it was Napoleon who first saw how wise it was they 
 stand in another respect much behind the English, namely, 
 by promoting petty vanity in the citizens through the profuse 
 bestowment of those outward signs ribbons which appear 
 to the national taste of the Anglican race beneath a manly 
 spirit. A friend of liberty could not read, without a degree 
 of mortification, the many debates on the "cross of July" 
 which began almost as soon as the smoke of the guns at the 
 barricades had vanished. Ribbons, and titles unless they 
 serve for an expression of something substantial, for instance 
 as that of peer of France, which in fact is no title, but merely 
 the name of a station, are mere play of vanity, and cannot 
 possibly be conducive to a lastingly healthy state of the pub- 
 lic. The world has done without mere titles, and it will do so 
 again. Already is no title of nobility conferred upon a French 
 commoner when made peer. Canova, the great sculptor, was 
 made marquis of Ischia. Who knows it? He himself never 
 used the title. But when Frederic the Great ordered the 
 number 66 to be placed in the coat of arms of Major Chazat, 
 whose regiment had taken sixty-six standards in the battle of 
 Hohenfriedberg, there was more substance in the token. The 
 whole continent of Europe has greatly suffered in consequence 
 of the trifling and unworthy spirit manifesting itself in empty 
 titles, that is, titles of offices without office, or of rank with- 
 out privilege. These and crosses and orders came into vogue 
 when popular liberty and substantial civism gave way more 
 and more to court politics and court government; and in the 
 same degree as civil liberty shall return to those countries 
 where the abuse exists now, empty titles and unmeaning rib- 
 bons will give way, because in popular and national politics 
 the question is respecting the real character which a citizen 
 has been able to found for himself. The Chinese government 
 is also in this respect of much interest to us, because similar 
 causes have produced similar effects. We find there, as in 
 some European continental states, a court government with a 
 thoroughly organized and vast hierarchy of officers, and we 
 find there likewise a variety of merely honorary titles, pro-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 21 
 
 motions of rank independent of promotion of offices, and signs 
 of court favor and official distinction, such as the peacock 
 feather, together with presents which seem to correspond to 
 the snuff-boxes with brilliants frequently given by continental 
 monarchs to favored persons. 1 These marks of distinction, 
 essentially belonging to the epoch of court politics, have al- 
 ready, it would seem, begun to diminish, both in frequency 
 and the estimation in which they are held. 
 
 Filippo Strozzi, the distinguished Florentine and opponent 
 of the Medici's, though connected with them by marriage, 
 said, when his fellow-citizens would give him the title of 
 Messire (Mr.), " My name is Filippo Strozzi ; I am a Floren- 
 tine merchant, and whoever gives me a title offends me." 
 Orders bestowed by the executive alone should always be 
 considered as injurious to true liberty; for they give a con- 
 siderable power founded upon a paltry motive, and may be 
 entirely independent of all that which ought to confer real dis- 
 tinction. The grants of the order of the Legion of Honor 
 by Louis XVIII. furnish a striking instance. 
 
 In matters of morality examples are cheering and reas- 
 suring. I may be permitted, therefore, to conclude these ob- 
 servations with mentioning the great admiral de Ruiter, as an 
 example of great modesty united to undaunted courage and 
 valor, in which Lord Collingwood was not unlike him. That 
 great naval hero of the United Provinces often said, " I will- 
 ingly dispense with all praises if I only satisfy my conscience 
 and follow the commands sent me." He would never grant 
 
 1 * Yet it is very curious that distinction not only by title, but actually by rib- 
 bons, crosses, and stars, seems to have had a very decided effect upon the whole 
 career of Nelson, and he owed his death to the wearing of his orders in the 
 battle at Trafalgar. See A Narrative of the Battle of St. Vincent, with Anec- 
 dotes of Nelson before and after that Battle, by Col. Drinkwater Bethune, F.S.A., 
 author of the History of the Siege of Gibraltar, zd edit., 8vo, pp. 97, London, 
 1840. Colonel Bethune was present and reports a curious conversation with 
 Nelson after the battle of St. Vincent, showing how eagerly Nelson coveted the 
 order of the Bath. Extracts from the above book are to be found in the London 
 Literary Gazette of August 8, 1840. See likewise the extract from the London 
 Literary Gazette of May 2, 1840.
 
 22 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 permission to publish from his log-books the most important 
 acts of his eventful life. His repeated answer was, " Not I, 
 God has done it." Frequently, when relating some of his 
 remarkable exploits, he would suddenly stop when his son- 
 in-law asked for the date of an event, because he was afraid 
 it would be used for a biography. The king of Spain made 
 him a duke, but the patent arrived after his death; his son 
 requested the king to grant him a more modest title. 1 
 
 XLII. Personal affection between particular individuals, 
 whether it grows out of relations of consanguinity, out of the 
 difference of sexes, out of a proportional coincidence and 
 disagreement of dispositions, gifts, and acquisitions, or out of 
 mutual service, belongs to the primary agents of all human 
 society. Let us consider the last-mentioned affection, friend- 
 ship, first. The ancient philosophers held friendship to be a 
 subject worthy of their fullest attention. Aristotle treats of 
 it in two books, the eighth and ninth, of his Ethics ; Plato, 
 Pythagoras, and after them Cicero, speak of it as one of the 
 most sacred means of cultivating virtue. The poets celebrate 
 this union of souls no less, from Homer, who ends his eighth 
 song with the words, " Not less indeed than even a brother of 
 the same blood is an honest friend, kind and judicious in 
 m nd," down to the latest. The ancients indeed considered 
 friendship a wedding of the souls, and not unfrequently the 
 act of concluding friendship was accompanied by religious 
 consecration. The same intensity and specific character 
 of friendship, perhaps, no longer exist ; the causes of this 
 fact may be various. Our practical life is more movable, 
 our social intercourse and hence our personal acquaintance 
 vaster and more changeable, our mind is occupied with a 
 much larger variety of subjects in science as well as litera- 
 ture, our states are wider, and our religion points at a morally 
 perfect being towards whom all minds are directed as their 
 
 1 Brandt, De Ruiter. Van Kampen, History of the Netherlands, Ham- 
 burg, 1833.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 23 
 
 great example, so that necessarily, it would seem, the atten- 
 tion to a specific personal relation must be lessened, unless 
 very extraordinary causes are added. The same perhaps 
 would be applicable to our matrimonial relations, which 
 nevertheless are certainly stronger and intenser, generally 
 speaking, than in ancient times; but the reason of this appar- 
 ent inconsistency seems to lie in the circumstance that the 
 position of woman has risen in the course of civilization ; and 
 the greater importance of the family with us is of itself one 
 of the causes to account for the phenomenon of which we 
 speak. 
 
 Yet, although friendship may not any longer be so often as 
 in antiquity of that fervor and religious intensity with which 
 the ancients considered it, it remains an important element 
 of society, and, like every moral good, ought to be carefully 
 cultivated; the nobler the souls the greater the blessing of 
 friendship. Friendship is a mutual affection, or intensity of 
 feeling towards another, arising from an inmost pleasure in 
 the soul of a good man, which it feels in honoring, admiring, 
 and cherishing what is good, pure, or great, and in being 
 honored and cherished by the good and pure, together with 
 the feeling of delight which the soul enjoys at being fully and 
 wholly understood in this world of general misunderstanding 
 or necessary difficulty of mutual comprehension, the thrill- 
 ing delight of confidence, of mutual repose. There is an 
 essential approach of souls in friendship as in love of the high- 
 est sort, or a finding out of one another's essence, stripped 
 of all adhesion, accident or what may arise from different 
 position, nay, even sometimes stripped of the difference of 
 opinion ; and as we fervently believe that the Creator will 
 develop in another world that which was goo 1 and pure in 
 each man here beneath, though single and separate, and 
 which led the different individuals in this nether world to dif- 
 ferent or even opposite opinions, and separated the republican 
 from the monarchist, the rationalist from the enthusiast, the 
 cautious from the bold, and will thus expand and mature 
 what He laid in each individual, and unite them all in greater
 
 24 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 perfection, so does He allow men in this world faintly to fore- 
 taste in friendship the bliss of a future world, where no acci- 
 dent of difference can any longer exist. 
 
 As the love of Romeo and Juliet elevated their souls above 
 the strife of their houses, so can friendship elevate two hearts 
 above the struggles of their time, though the individuals be 
 even engaged in it ; while those friends who happily walk the 
 same path cheer and strengthen each other by their mutual 
 example ; and, since essential confidence can exist between 
 good men only, they propel each other in the path of virtue : 
 for it is a primary law of all intercourse, that if two or more 
 of the same inclination, pursuit, or character good, frivolous, 
 or wicked are brought into close contact with one another, 
 in that same direction they will propel one another still more 
 rapidly. Friendship must rest on mutuality; it is one of its 
 essential qualities ; for one of its requisites and blessings is 
 the enjoyment of confidence a luxury to good men ; and 
 ^Eschylus is right when he says that kings suffer one evil, 
 they do not know how to confide in friends ; while the reason 
 that was given of Trajan's having friends, is that he was a 
 friend himself. * 
 
 Friendship thus cultivates disinterestedness, forbearance, 
 liberality, kindness, and generosity ; it improves our judgment 
 by admitting the counsel of the friend in whom we confide, 
 and who views our case, though interesting, yet less personal 
 to him, as a physician prescribes for a brother of his profession 
 in his illness ; it makes the cultivation and practice of that 
 primary virtue, justice, easier to us, because it accustoms the 
 mind to view occurrences not solely with reference to our- 
 selves ; and since friendship is partly founded upon the pecu- 
 liar personalities of men, and these personalities may on 
 
 1 " Habes amicos quia amicus ipse es." (Plin., Panegyr.) Christ, to prove 
 to the apostles that they are what he calls them, his friends, mentions confidence, 
 the fact that he trusted the highest truth to them : " Henceforth I call you not 
 servants; for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth; but I have called 
 you friends ; for all things that I have heard of my Father I have made known 
 unto you." John xv. 15.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2$ 
 
 account of some prominent feature lead to the friendship with 
 one person, and on account of some other prominent feature 
 to the same or a similar relation with another, it unites medi- 
 ately more than two individuals. Friendship thus becomes a 
 ramified bond of society, a tie of good will between individuals 
 who otherwise might remain insulated. 
 
 XLIII. It is evident from the foregoing remarks how very 
 important an element friendship is in the social order, and 
 how carefully we ought to cultivate it wherever it is offered 
 by the circumstances of our life; for being an affection it 
 cannot be forced. Yet although a man may be more or less 
 successful in meeting with that individual whose nature is so 
 happily conformed to his own that the relation of friendship 
 follows as a matter of course, it may be safely assumed that 
 in a community in which free and various action is not sup- 
 pressed, and in which, especially, public life exists, a man who 
 has never succeeded in forming some strong friendship or 
 other must, if not unusually unfortunate, look for the causes 
 of this great privation within himself to his egotism. 
 
 That friendship, as designated above, in its highest degree, 
 cannot be obtained by every one is clear, and, as is the case 
 with all other relations, it necessarily exists in a variety of 
 gradations ; but it is an abuse of terms, too common at 
 present, to apply this sacred word to the relation subsisting 
 upon mere acquaintance, to persons perhaps known to us 
 only by a chain of intermediate recommendations, or among 
 those who but temporarily are united for some selfish or evil 
 ends. Those are companions or followers, but not friends, of 
 whom the Bible gives so severe a test. (John xv. 13.) 
 
 As a rule for a life in general as well as in politics in par- 
 ticular, it is far more important, in order to secure all the 
 advantages of friendship, moral or practical, to make one or 
 a few close friends who will "stick closer than a brother" 
 (Prov. xviii. 24), than many whose friendship consists rather 
 in the negative character of an absence of ill will, or merely 
 in a general and undefined but not very active good will, not
 
 2 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 in a positive affection of the inmost soul, which rejoices at the 
 success of the friend and grieves at his grief. " It is of far 
 greater importance to a statesman" (it is so to every man) "to 
 make one friend who will hold out with him for twenty years, 
 than to find twenty followers in each year, losing as many." 1 
 
 And here a question of importance offers itself: "How far, 
 in politics, should we carry our friendship, taking the term in 
 its intense meaning? Of course we are not allowed to assist 
 in doing the wrong which the friend may contemplate or 
 actually commit, or to do injustice to others, to sacrifice truth 
 or public welfare to this special relation ; but there are cases 
 which are not so easily decided. Our friend may have com- 
 mitted an error which we would disapprove of and would 
 loudly censure were we his opponents ; or our friend may 
 commit a positive fault : how then ? I would answer, The 
 more you find that public clamor sets violently in against 
 your friend, the more loudly his fault is discussed, and the 
 more vehement the cry against him, the more consider your- 
 self in this public trial his natural advocate, endeavoring, as 
 in a trial of justice, to show whatever may be favorable for 
 him, which no one will do if you do not, so that whatever is 
 redeeming in your friend may not be swept away in the gen- 
 eral excitement. Stand by him so long and so far as your 
 conscience will permit, and as your perfect consciousness of 
 your own disinterestedness supports you, and believe that by 
 exhibiting an example of generous faithfulness, and of trying 
 all in your power even for a fallen friend, you do a great ser- 
 vice to public morality. But of course this allows of no 
 weakness, of which such innumerable instances are preserved 
 in history, of men who disapproved thoroughly of a measure, 
 who declared it criminal, and yet, when they found their 
 friend irresistibly bent on it, finally yielded and assisted. It 
 is a great thing to know we have a friend who will stand 
 by us ; it is a great misfortune to have none who will boldly 
 sacrifice us, if unfortunately bent on wrong, to justice, right, 
 
 1 Taylor, The Statesman, London, 1836.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 27 
 
 and truth. We may firmly cling to Plato, but must cling more 
 firmly to Truth. 
 
 The friendship of great souls, founded upon pure patriot- 
 ism, may produce the greatest effects. It may shine on a 
 Thebes like a suddenly rising sun. Whether the friendship 
 as it existed between Pelopidas, the rich and ardent, and 
 Epaminondas, the poor and far-seeing, be the noblest and most 
 inspiring example of the excellence of friendship between two 
 patriotic souls and have its equal in history or not, I feel con- 
 vinced that my younger readers will do themselves a great 
 service by reading the biography of Pelopidas in Plutarch. 
 No heart in which there is a generous spark can ponder it 
 without delight at their nobleness, patriotism, mutual love, 
 absence of jealousy, and disinterestedness, despite their great 
 diversity of character and fortune. 
 
 XLIV. Quite different from friendship, and yet frequently 
 cloaked with its name, because the term " friend" is abusively 
 extended to followers, adherents, and adherents' adherents, is 
 what we will call favoritism in politics, the bestowing of favors 
 without regard to justice, merit, and public welfare, or in 
 direct contradiction to it. Favoritism is one of the most dan- 
 gerous vices of governments, because it may steal in under 
 the garb of that which in itself is good and right, of gratitude 
 to those who served us, of liberality, or, as we have seen, of 
 friendship. We need not discuss that favoritism which sets 
 out from vice or from an egregious affront to all justice, as 
 we see it exemplified in the " minions" of some of the most 
 corrupt periods of the French court or that of Spain, or in 
 the Dorsets and Buckinghams, Gavestons and others in Eng- 
 land, or in the corruptest periods of some republics, since 
 it is too glaringly vicious to deserve especial notice. We 
 might with equal justice treat of murder as a highly repre- 
 hensible crime in rulers. But favoritism is highly dangerous 
 also in other places, and arising out of sources which may 
 be originally pure, as more difficult to resist. Elizabeth, the 
 great statesman, as Richelieu called her, earned no substantial
 
 2 g POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 advantages from her partiality to Leicester or Essex. Is it 
 not, then, a bitter condition of monarchy that rulers must 
 studiously avoid allowing personal inclinations, the friend- 
 ships of private life, to acquire such control that they can no 
 longer be resisted, but have acquired a preponderance over the 
 interests of the public welfare ? Undoubtedly it is so ; but 
 we must not forget that although monarchy is necessary for 
 many states, it is in itself an expedient to avoid certain evils; 
 it is a government which, not viewed with regard to practical 
 utility but in the abstract, contains always this contradiction, 
 that we adopt for the highest, most important place a princi- 
 ple which civilization steadily eliminates in wider and wider 
 circles, as injurious to society, respecting all other offices of 
 any importance, that of inheriting them without reference to 
 capacity. Even those who do not see in the monarch the 
 highest officer, but something more and higher, must at least 
 admit that among other things he is an officer or magistrate 
 likewise, unless they claim a confused essence in the monarch, 
 according to which he is the mystic shrine of sovereignty, a 
 view which I endeavored to refute in the first volume. But 
 nowhere can we depart from strict principle and resort to com- 
 promising expediency, however necessary or right, without 
 proportional sacrifice. The monarch who does not obtain 
 his place by his talent must allow himself to be surrounded 
 with fetters which for the private citizen would not be en- 
 durable. 
 
 The favoritism of a monarch becomes still more serious in 
 countries in which the expediency of hereditary government 
 is carried still farther against abstract principle, and the crown 
 is suffered to descend upon that sex which otherwise is justly 
 excluded from all public employment. While favoritism has 
 with female sovereigns the additional incentive of difference 
 of sex, which by no means needs on that account to be 
 founded upon unlawful affection, it is, generally speaking, for 
 them more difficult to overcome the feeling of partiality by 
 reason alone; since the soul of the woman is by nature more 
 active in the spheres of affection and feeling than in that of
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 2 9 
 
 the reasoning judgment. It is necessary therefore that ruling 
 princesses and their advisers most especially guard against 
 this dangerous political fault. These remarks do not hold 
 good against real friendship in a monarch. On the contrary t 
 if he is himself capable of friendship, and if he has a friend 
 on terms which are very different from capricious favoritism 
 in the one or interested submission in the other, friendship is 
 one of the greatest blessings to monarchs. I do not know 
 that anything in Henry IV. of France is a truer sign oS great- 
 ness of soul than that he could be so true a friend as he was 
 to Sully, nor could any event in his reign be called happier 
 than that he found Sully and concluded a friendship with 
 him. They were united in the great desire to live for France, 
 in a generous, candid, manly friendship. But the narrower 
 the mind of the monarch, or of any man of power, the more 
 danger exists that favoritism will steal in under the garb of 
 friendship. 
 
 Favoritism is, however, not only dangerous in monarchies, 
 or there in the monarch only ; it is equally dangerous in re- 
 publics, and in every citizen according to his sphere. If it 
 becomes general, it tramples justice, the foundation of the 
 state, under foot; it stifles virtue and exertion of talent, be- 
 cause they do not avail ; it leads to party rancor, because it 
 bestows places of profit or honor upon "friends" alone, not 
 for past merit and future benefit to the commonwealth, but 
 for past and future party services ; or it substitutes altogether 
 caprice for reason, and leads infallibly to a state of general 
 public dishonesty, in which public places are considered as 
 berths of enrichment, of pilfering, or of family aggrandize- 
 ment; it leads to the appointment of incompetent men and to 
 general public disgrace and apathy, to servile adherence and 
 ruinous flattery. There are letters of Washington's which 
 might show how utterly unjust and subversive of the best in- 
 terests of the state he considered favoritism. Pym is another 
 striking example of perfect freedom from this vice. " He 
 knew neither brother, kinsman, nor friend, superior nor in- 
 ferior, when they stood in the way to hinder his pursuit of
 
 , POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the public good." It was a saying of his, " Such a one is my 
 entire friend, to whom I am much obliged, but I must not pay 
 my private debts out of the public stock." 1 " To such a de- 
 gree and with such sincerity did he act upon this principle, 
 that when his friends frequently put him in mind of his chil- 
 dren and pressed upon his consideration that although he 
 regarded not himself yet he ought to provide that it might be 
 well with them, his usual answer was, 'if it were well with the 
 public his family was well enough.' " 
 
 XLV. The family is not only important for the stricter 
 political reasons which have been dwelt upon in previous pas- 
 sages, but likewise as affording those relations out of which 
 mutual affections grow, feelings strongly connected with pub- 
 lic spirit and patriotism. The love of our family, of our kins- 
 men, is not only innocent, but necessary and a powerful agent 
 in society, an incentive to exertion and a source of public 
 spirit. Yet, like all other original agents, it must be ju- 
 diciously watched lest it grow stronger than it ought to be, 
 lest it transcend its legitimate and natural power. Not to 
 have greater forbearance towards members of our own family 
 than to others, so long as strict duty allows of this forbear- 
 ance, would certainly be wanting in duty ; but to allow family 
 considerations to outweigh higher and the highest considera- 
 tions is either pusillanimous or dastardly. If William III. 
 saw, as I for one believe that he did, that England was in 
 danger of being ruined and of being forced into retrograde 
 steps or into a political system similar to that of France and 
 Spain, appalling indeed to every honest man ; if he felt con- 
 vinced that James had become a rebel against the country and 
 constitution, and saw that he himself could rescue England > 
 when called upon by circumstances and by many of the en- 
 dangered nation, he would have shown extreme weakness of 
 
 1 These two extracts are from Stephen Marshall's Sermon preached before 
 Parliament at the Funeral of Mr. Pym, 410, 1644, as quoted in the Westminster 
 Review for July, 1833, in an article on the life of Pym, from which likewise the 
 next following quotation in the text is taken.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 3! 
 
 mind in allowing family relations to weigh against this sacred 
 calling of the welfare of Britain and of Europe. 
 
 Yet as the undue attachment to friends or favorites assumes 
 the dangerous form of favoritism, so does the excessive attach- 
 ment to the members of one's family become nepotism. The 
 name of this political vice comes from the government of the 
 papal hierarchy, and has been chiefly restricted to it ; but the 
 evil principle is visible elsewhere too, and there is no reason 
 why we should not use the term in a general sense. Ne- 
 potism, or the showering of riches, power, and honors upon 
 the nephews (nepoti) of the pope (hence the name), became 
 actually a state institution, not unlike to the keeping of royal 
 mistresses in France, until, finally, endowed and powerful re- 
 lations of the pope were considered necessary for the honor 
 of the pope and despatch of business, even by some of the 
 highest clergy in Rome, who do not always seem to have 
 had flattery in view. 1 Indeed, the government was so badly 
 contrived, the cardinals so divided and subservient to foreign 
 courts, and the state of Italy so utterly demoralized, that the 
 pope was not expected to trust all his secrets to any stranger 
 out of his family ; yet the business required some minister 
 or other who had the confidence of the pope. Who then 
 could be this person except a relation of his ? 
 
 There is indeed no danger at present that nepotism, as it 
 existed towards the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of 
 the sixteenth century, can reappear there or in any other 
 state ; yet it is one of our duties to weigh attentively any in- 
 stitution or fact in which we find a general principle, good or 
 bad, developed distinctly and in all its consistency, in all its 
 beauty or hideousness. We shall then better understand the 
 
 1 I believe that papal nepotism, in its various historical phases, has nowhere 
 been so thoroughly and amply represented as by Ranke, History of the Popes, 
 Eng. trans, (in the Amer. ed. of 1841. See especially vol. i. pp. 46, 51, 99, 
 274, 275, 301). See also the remarks of Macchiavelli on this subject in the first 
 book of his History of Florence. That not only nephews were promoted by th's 
 nepotism, but, under the name of nepoti, the natural sons also of popes, as for 
 instance under Alexander VI., is a well-known fact.
 
 3 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 less distinct manifestations of the same principle at other 
 periods or in other spheres. The crime and plunder which 
 were connected with nepotism were appalling : state property 
 was alienated and changed into hereditary principalities for 
 the nepoti, until at last these treasonable procedures were 
 prohibited by the pope and cardinals themselves ; the nepoti 
 obtained money for selling justice, or, what is perhaps most 
 curious and strikes a professional politician as a choice rarity, 
 as the naturalist is interested by some peculiar monstrosity, 
 the " cardinal nepote" gave (and of course sold) " non grave- 
 turs," which were immunities against all future procedures by 
 way of justice, amounting to more than an anticipation of 
 pardon of a general kind, as the English kings formerly gave 
 them in cases of impeachment. 1 Lorenzo de Medici writes to 
 Pope Innocent VIII. that other popes had not waited so long 
 in bestowing property upon their family, and that should he 
 hesitate longer, other reasons would be suspected. " Zeal and 
 duty," he continues, " oblige me to remind your holiness that 
 no man is immortal; that a pope signifies as much as he 
 chooses to signify ; his office cannot be made hereditary ; 
 only the honor and benefices which he bestows upon his 
 family he can call his own." 2 The very theory followed by 
 some prime ministers ! Washington, in a letter, dated Feb- 
 ruary 20, 1797, to John Adams, when president, expresses his 
 hope that promotion will not be withheld from Mr. John 
 Quincy Adams "because he is your son." 3 Equally strik- 
 ing are letters written by that pure and single-hearted man, 
 
 1 Under Urban VIII., for instance. See Ranke, as above, vol. i. (also vol. ii., 
 i.e., vol. iv. of Princes and Nations of Southern Europe), p. 442, extract from 
 MS. l>v Cardinal Cecchini. 
 
 3 In Fabroni Vita Laurentii, ii. 390. 
 
 3 This letler happens to be preserved in a pamphlet entitled Correspondence 
 between the Hon. John Adams and William Cunningham, Boston, 1823, pub- 
 lished by the son of the latter. Washington adds that if he were now to be 
 brought into the diplomatic line he would not disapprove of the caution hinted 
 at in Mr. Adams's letter, "upon the principle which has regulated my own con- 
 duct," but he says that the case differs. The question is only promotion of a 
 valuable public servant.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 33 
 
 when president, to relatives who solicited offices. 1 It is uni- 
 versally considered odious to see the relatives of a minister, 
 distant or near, like so many birds feasting upon the carcass 
 of the public revenue, and mere decency ought to prevent an 
 undue -favor towards relations; 2 though it is true, on the other 
 hand, it would look much like political prudery if relationship 
 should actually impede. It is advisable on the score of mere 
 prudence that a high officer should never appoint a near rela- 
 tive to another high office near him, for the public feel in- 
 secure and naturally uneasy at it. Very many constitutions 
 prohibit such appointments. Brothers and sons of the doge 
 of Venice were excluded from high appointments. The con- 
 stitution of Geneva prohibits more than two persons of the 
 same name and family from sitting in the council of state, 
 
 1 Washington's Writings; such letters as those to Bushrod Washington, New 
 York, July 27, 1789, and to Benjamin Lincoln, Mount Vernon, March n, 1789. 
 Mr. Sparks gives part of a letter in a note to page 478, vol. ix., which contains 
 the following passage : " Among all these anxieties, I will not conceal from 
 you, I anticipated none greater than those that were likely to be produced by 
 applications for appointments to the different offices which would be created 
 under the new government. Nor will I conceal that my apprehensions have 
 already been but too well justified. Scarcely a day passes in which applications 
 of one kind or another do not arrive; insomuch that had I not early adopted 
 some general principles I should before this time have been wholly occupied in 
 this business. As it is, I have found the number of answers which I have been 
 necessitated to give in my own hand an almost insupportable burden to me. 
 
 " The points in which all these answers have agreed in substance are, that, 
 should it be my lot to go again into public office, I would go without being under 
 any possible engagements of any nature whatsoever ; that, so far as I knew my 
 own heart, I would not be in the remotest degree influenced, in making nomi- 
 nations, by motives arising from the ties of family or blood ; and that, on the 
 other hand, three things, in my opinion, ought principally to be regarded, 
 namely, the fitness of characters to fill offices, the comparative claims from the 
 former merits and sufferings in service of the different candidates, and the dis- 
 tribution of appointments in as equal a proportion as might be to persons belong- 
 ing to the different States in the Union." 
 
 2 Earl Grey, universally esteemed, even by the opposition, probably suffered 
 no severer attacks than those founded upon the reproach that he provided too 
 anxiously for his extensive family relation-. It will be remembered that it was 
 favoritism and nepotism which furnished Junius with the materials for some of 
 his most caustic sarcasms. 
 
 VOL. II. 3
 
 34 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 composed of twenty-four members, and more than five indi- 
 viduals of the same name and family in the representative 
 council, composed of two hundred and seventy-four mem- 
 bers. 1 In so small a state, where frequent intermarriages pro- 
 duce powerful family affiliations, this may be a serviceable 
 law; but since the powerful agency of the public press has 
 become a vital political agent, such matters are in most cases 
 better left to public opinion, until it shall be found insuf- 
 ficient.' Besides, laws of this sort rarely prevent the evil, if 
 there is a disposition to engender it, except that it is well 
 enough thus decidedly to express by a law the opinion which 
 society entertains of the subject. 
 
 1 Constitution du Canton de Geneve, tit. iv. 89, and tit. iii. 42.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Gratitude fully discussed. Ingratitude. Excess of Gratitude aids Usurpers. 
 Csesar, Napoleon. Distinction between Gratitude and Popularity. Popu- 
 larity. Sudden and Passing Popularity; Lasting Popularity. We have no 
 Right to seek Popularity, but must suffer it to seek us. Power of spontaneous 
 Popularity; peculiar Power of spontaneously returned Popularity. Slavery of 
 Popularity. Danger of Popularity, in Free Countries, to the Individual. 
 Crowds to receive distinguished Men. Great Danger of Personal Popularity 
 for Liberty. Pericles. Demagogues. Athenian Demagogism. Monu- 
 ments. The Duty of Attention. Observation of Primary Agents and Ele- 
 ments. Truth and Justice connected with it. Obligation to study the History 
 of our Country, its Institutions and their Classical Periods. It is necessary in 
 modern Times to read Newspapers. 
 
 XLVI. INGRATITUDE has at all times been held one of the 
 worst of vices ; it proceeds from meanness of soul, and anni- 
 hilates one of the indispensable and most genial ties among 
 men. To requite good with evil, or to remain untouched by 
 the good conferred upon us, shows a callous heart ; and of 
 whatever changes the human heart is capable, the change 
 from meanness or callousness to nobleness or warmth is the 
 rarest of all, because a whole deep-rooted disposition and 
 turn of feeling and thought is to be changed, which can be 
 effected by a long training only ; but this requires in the 
 commencement a degree of nobleness of purpose. Gratitude, 
 in all its manifestations, towards the living and the dead, 
 who directly or indirectly have conferred good upon us, even 
 though it be in no other way than by leaving us an encour- 
 aging, cheering, or inspiring example, ought to be cultivated 
 from the earliest period in education. Public ingratitude, 
 wanton disregard of the best men and the best exertions and 
 purest sacrifices, is no less vicious and injurious to public wel- 
 fare than private ingratitude is in its own sphere. It proceeds 
 from sordidness and promotes it. Noble souls find a pleasure 
 and deep enjoyment in warmly acknowledging real benefits 
 
 35
 
 3 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 and genuine kindness, and in reverencing what is good and 
 great ; it is the little-minded and narrow-hearted, or the evil- 
 disposed, who are troubled and haunted by fretting jealousy, 
 who see in all greatness of action or elevation of thought, 
 and in the acknowledgment by the public of the virtues of 
 others, a reflection on themselves, as well as a danger to the 
 public. They, judging from their own selfishness, believe that 
 no greatness can exist without injury to the common liberty, 
 and have at times even publicly proclaimed the " danger of 
 talent," thus becoming rebels against God's own order of 
 things and the fairest works of his hands ; but " there is a con- 
 geniality between vast powers of thought and dignity of pur- 
 pose. None are so capable of sacrificing themselves as those 
 who have most to sacrifice, who in offering themselves make 
 the greatest offerings to humanity." 1 The wicked and the 
 little-minded are ever leagued against grateful reverence of 
 high-minded patriotism ; and he that cannot be grateful or 
 feel esteem deserves neither love nor esteem. His soul is 
 void of some of the best impulses. 
 
 Why do we love liberty? Why does mankind eternally 
 struggle for it? If liberty necessarily required the sacrifice 
 of the noblest traits and imprints of humanity, if the same- 
 ness of mediocrity were its condition, it ought to be shunned 
 as the most unfortunate state in which society can be placed. 
 We love liberty, we sacrifice everything to her, as the last 
 and highest good, because it is that state of things which 
 most corresponds to God's order of things, which promotes 
 the freest development of thought and action ; because man, 
 made for thought and action, is most really man if protected 
 by her. Were it otherwise, liberty would be the most un- 
 natural state, opposed to the highest calling of humanity. Let 
 a nation for any length of time systematically cast aside its 
 best and loftiest characters, those of which it ought to be 
 proud as finding its spirit and endeavors nobly represented 
 and concentrated in them ; let a community for a series of 
 
 1 Rev. Dr. Channing.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 37 
 
 years reward its purest and most gifted citizens with ungrate- 
 ful neglect, and with unworthy partiality for servile flatterers ; 
 let a monarchy adopt the policy of overlooking those upon 
 whom public opinion bestows grateful honor, or a republic 
 requite faithful and generous patriotism, civic wisdom, and 
 stanch justice with petty jealousy or chill disrespect, and they 
 will soon lose public dignity, morality, and elevation, and sink 
 into sordid and corroding egotism the most unfailing of 
 national dissolvents. 
 
 XL.VII. Yet is it not true that nations have as often sinned 
 by way of gratitude as of ingratitude ? Have not free nations, 
 in far the greater number of cases, lost their liberty because 
 they were intoxicated with gratitude or admiration of real 
 or imagined benefits received at the hands of the usurper? 
 Is not the willingness with which the mass give up their 
 liberties, with which they sometimes press upon the usurper 
 the surrender of freedom on their part, frequently due to this 
 cause ? By what indeed are in most cases usurpers supported 
 and emboldened, if not by the acclamation of the people ? 
 To destroy the rights or liberties of one part they must neces- 
 sarily have the support of the other, if the question is of 
 intestine revolutions and not of conquests by foreigners. 
 
 In order to answer these questions correctly and see the 
 subject in all its bearings, it is necessary to make careful 
 distinctions. 
 
 In some cases the act of the usurper is but the final accom- 
 plishment and ratification of a radical change prepared and 
 effected throughout a social system from a period long ante- 
 cedent to that of the usurpation ; and the existing system, 
 bestowing franchises upon some, once salutary, has, by the 
 change of circumstances and of the people's spirit, become 
 galling or ruinous to the mass, or the people have become 
 unable any longer to uphold the institutions of former liberty. 
 Such was the case when Csesar grasped the reins. Rome was 
 no longer Rome. It is indeed no subject fit for the present 
 occasion to inquire whether Caesar belonged in mind to the
 
 3 g POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 class of mean usurpers, who prefer the purple and an elevated 
 throne in the hall of audience to a lofty place in history, and 
 are willing to exchange for a regal title, which has graced the 
 worst as well as the best, the proud name of a great citizen ; 
 but certain it is that even if Caesar had been one of the best, 
 full of calmness of soul and love of justice like Washington, 
 placed as he and the Roman commonwealth were, rotten as 
 the whole framework of government and demoralized as the 
 public spirit were, he would have been bound, with his power 
 and insight, to consummate the fall of the old order of things 
 and establish a new one. The constitution of Rome, grown 
 out of a totally different state of things and calculated for it, 
 had become a nuisance. Civil war and fermentation were the 
 order of the day ; the aristocracy factious, the democracy law- 
 less and indolent, while both were rapacious. In a crisis of 
 this serious import it is very natural that the people should 
 willingly throw more power than he before had into the hands 
 of a powerful man, and should even rejoice, by a natural in- 
 stinct, if he assumed more and more, because they first of all 
 desired protection against bloodshed and extortion. Whether 
 we admire Napoleon or not, whether we consider his saying 
 to Las Cases, " If I had aped Washington I should have been 
 guilty of a mere silliness ; all that I could strive for was to be 
 a crowned Washington," as empty words or not, whether we 
 believe that he criminally abused his power and neglected 
 every opportunity of developing a civic spirit or of sowing its 
 seeds, as the only means of strengthening, restoring, and per- 
 manently healing France, there can be no manner of doubt 
 that, had he been as pure as Doria, 1 he still would have been 
 
 1 Andrew Doria, whose name, the historian Rotteck says, calls up the name 
 of Timoleon, was born at Genoa, in 1466, a period when his republic was rent 
 by factions and northern Italy was the unceasing battle-field of the European 
 continental powers. Genoa had lost her fairest dominions. Galeazzo Sforza, 
 duke of Milan, ruled likewise over Genoa, once fre and powerful. He had 
 ordered to draw ropes where walls should be erected from the castle to the sea, 
 as an additional means of security against the Genoese. The assembled multi- 
 tude was gaping at this token of subjugation, when a bold man, Lazzaro Doria, 
 stepped forward and severed the ropes in presence of Galeazzo's servants. The
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 39 
 
 called upon to break up the ill-jointed and injuriously-work- 
 ing machine of government that then existed, and popular 
 applause would have been justly bestowed upon him. 
 
 XLVIII. Secondly, we must not mistake popularity, of 
 whatever sort, for the expression of public gratitude, which 
 was designated above as a virtue of high importance in poli- 
 tics. Popularity is a subject of magnitude, and it behoves us 
 to examine it well. 
 
 What is popularity ? To speak plainly, it is the being liked 
 and cherished by many ; being acceptable to the people. A 
 man, a measure, a tune, a color, may thus be popular. The 
 power of popularity, therefore, rests essentially on sympathy, 
 
 people were roused ; but their excitement vanished ; the best citizens emigrated, 
 to avoid servitude. Columbus left Genoa at this time, and Andrew Doria, having 
 served against the Turks, went to Urbino. Genoa revolted against Mantua, and 
 acknowledged France. Doria took service under the king, Louis XII., but he 
 never forgot his country. When Francis I. had succeeded Louis, had broken 
 his oath taken to Charles V., and suddenly fallen upon Italy, and the troops of 
 Charles fled to Naples, and everything seemed to indicate the ascendency of 
 Francis, feared by all Europe, and Italy especially. Doria hoisted the imperial 
 flag and turned the scale. He acted very differently from the Constable Bour- 
 bon ; Doria was not subject to France, and Francis tyrannized over Genoa. She 
 hoped for deliverance at the hands of this hero. He entered the city victoriously, 
 and expelled the foreigners; the people, carried away by gratitude, greeted him 
 as their prince. Doria might undoubtedly have established a dynasty, nor did he 
 need to found it with blood. His fellow-citizens urged a crown upon him ; but 
 he was greater : he declined, although his family had been for centuries allied 
 with emperors and kings. He exhorted his fellow-citizens to be united and vir- 
 tuous, that they might be free, in a speech which ended, " With pride and emo- 
 tion I call myself a free citizen of Genoa. This and your friend I desire to be, 
 not your ruler; and may it never be said of Doria that when he served his 
 country he had selfish ends in view." He used the favorable spirit of the people 
 to establish with their co-operation a new constitution, by which the tyranny of 
 the aristocracy and the lawlessness of the people, which had so often distracted 
 Genoa, were avoided a constitution which lasted three hundred years, until the 
 great revolutions of Europe hurried away this with so many others, in their 
 sweeping course. Doria died ninety-four years old, honored and loved as a very 
 father by his republic. His tomb bears this inscription : " Andreas Aurise, civi 
 optimo, felicissimoque Vindici atque Authori publicoe Libertatis, Senatus Popu- 
 lusque Genuensis posuit."
 
 40 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the adaptation, assimilation, or prominent development of the 
 feelings and likings of the community, or the set of people 
 with whom we are popular. This leads us at once to two dis- 
 tinctions. The feelings from which this sympathy arises may 
 be good or bad ; a leader of robbers may be popular with his 
 band by humoring or satisfying their bad feelings and pro- 
 pensities, as Doria was popular with the good by good meas- 
 ures ; and popularity may be passing or lasting, suddenly 
 excited by suddenly humoring a feeling strongly excited at 
 the moment, or well founded upon the esteem of some promi- 
 nent quality which is valued as an important one by the 
 people, and which they have reason to believe exists in an 
 eminent degree in the popular person. 
 
 The good citizen can of course cherish the popularity of 
 the good only, as a welcome cheering on the path of duty and 
 a power to do good. But how must he obtain it? Popu- 
 larity is not. an ultimate object; the ultimate object is to do 
 right. We are not allowed, therefore, to obtain popularity by 
 sacrificing right or duty. We must not seek popularity as an 
 end, which may ultimately determine our actions, because 
 thereby we should establish an arbitrary and extra-ethical 
 standard for our actions. We must allow popularity to come 
 to us; if it comes in consequence of our acting right, and 
 gaining the sympathy of fellow-citizens because we feel in 
 common with them and for them, well and good; if it does 
 not, we have not to answer for it. No moral code makes 
 the demand, Thou shalt be popular. The moral code says, 
 Try to obtain the esteem of the good, but before all act 
 right, although all should abandon you. It is a happy fact, 
 however, that, with very few exceptions, no surer means 
 exists to obtain lasting popularity, a popularity which, though 
 it may be lost for a time, will return, and, if so, with re- 
 doubled strength, than that which is founded upon the esteem 
 of our fellow-men. Esteem does not necessarily constitute 
 popularity, which, we have seen, rests on sympathy, and 
 there are many reasons which thus may withhold it from an 
 honorable man. He may not share the feelings of the public ;
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 41 
 
 all his chief endeavors may be directed to a point uninterest- 
 ing to the community ; his manners may not be pleasing. 
 Nor is popularity the infallible reward of the good for good 
 and pure endeavors. The best may be misunderstood, the more 
 easily so the farther they are in advance of their age, while less 
 elevated endeavors, perhaps mediocrity, for the very reason 
 that it can be understood by the many, may meet with gen- 
 eral popularity, if it happens successfully to strike common 
 sympathy. How many instances are recorded in history of 
 overwhelming popularity of contemporaries, which vanished 
 like clouds with posterity, and of neglect by contemporaries 
 of men whose names posterity has placed highest on the list 
 of great and wise men ! Popularity, therefore, is as little an 
 ultimate criterion as it is an ultimate moral object. But this 
 remains certain, that esteem forms necessarily an essential in- 
 gredient of lasting political popularity with the good; and 
 such alone we ought to value. 
 
 XLIX. Popularity is pleasing, it delights the heart, not 
 only in politics, but in all spheres. How could it be other- 
 wise for man, a being created for society ? This is only a 
 stronger reason why we ought not to make it the standard of 
 our actions. So soon as a man does this, he submits to the 
 worst species of slavery that of mind and heart. He throws 
 away his own standard within, and seeks for one without, a 
 changeable one withal ; he loses self-esteem and strict recti- 
 tude, and in short is a mental slave. There is no institution 
 in this nether world which has not together with its advan- 
 tages its dangers, and the danger of civil liberty and publicity 
 of politics the one cannot exist Without the other is the 
 danger of popularity. The power of public opinion, the just 
 principle that we ought in many cases not indeed in all 
 ultimately to submit to it, and in part to regulate our conduct 
 by it, are so many inducements which will lead the faint- 
 hearted to yield to this servitude. The dread of unpopu- 
 larity has ruined many statesmen, led authors to abjure truth, 
 seduced citizens to crooked paths, and shows its unfortunate
 
 42 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 effect with the young in the schools and colleges of free coun- 
 tries. There is no teacher, I suppose, who has not seen or felt 
 the evil influence which a positive desire of popularity or fear 
 of unpopularity exercises upon many young men in institu- 
 tions for education, seducing not a few even to vice and final 
 ruin. It is, therefore, one of the first duties of the young, early 
 to learn manfully and unequivocally to do right for its own 
 sake; and for their teachers to imbue their souls early and 
 deeply with this element of rectitude. It will be one of the 
 best preparations for future and public life, for the support of 
 the commonwealth and genuine patriotism. Once more, the 
 danger of free countries is morbid desire of popularity. 
 
 L. The ingredients of sound popularity are esteem at home 
 and the sympathy of the people. This popularity in truly 
 free countries begins generally at home, a circumstance of 
 still greater importance in vast Countries, in which the people 
 at a distance cannot judge of the private character of a citizen 
 except by the name and standing he enjoys at home. Popu- 
 larity begins in the house and family, extends to village, 
 county, state, and moves in concentric circles over the 
 country. Keep, therefore, your house and affairs in good 
 order, treat your wife well, and educate your children care- 
 fully ; be a benevolent neighbor and public-spirited member 
 of the community ; and you will generally lay a firm founda- 
 tion for popularity. Or if degenerate times despise these ele- 
 ments, if the people banish even an Aristides, all you have to 
 remember is that popularity is no duty, but only a welcome 
 effect of duty if it comes of itself. 1 On the other hand, as 
 popularity is a. power, and, if just, a lawful power, as in many 
 cases the leading citizen cannot act without it, and as it de- 
 pends at the same time upon sympathy, it is clear that he 
 
 1 Mirabeau frequently exclaimed, " J'expie bien cruellement les erreurs de 
 ma jeunesse," and Dumont says lie knew that Mirabeau would have gone 
 through fire to clear himself, not, certainly, on account of morality itself, but on 
 account of the injury his popularity continued to suffer from his former reputa- 
 tion. Dumont, Souvenir sur Mirabeau, etc., chap. xiv.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 43 
 
 must not slight it. There are national feelings, and even 
 prejudices, unimportant in themselves yet strong on account 
 of extensive and historical or other associations, which it 
 would be wanton unnecessarily to offend ; and by " unneces- 
 sarily" I mean if they do not stand in the way in the obtain- 
 ing of a laudable object, or actually produce evil. In the 
 latter case it may not be your duty to attack them, either be- 
 cause you are not quite certain regarding them, or because 
 you have no adequate power to overcome them and by an 
 attack upon them would fritter away the influence and means 
 you might use for other purposes. One man cannot do 
 everything. A citizen engaged in reforming the penal laws 
 of his country may observe great and even injurious errors in 
 the literary taste of his countrymen. He is not bound on 
 that account to engage in a contest against perverse taste. 
 Very many citizens have deprived themselves of all power to 
 do good by attacks which did not come from an intention to 
 overcome and extirpate an error, but rather from a weakness 
 which deprived of the power of silence a power as great as 
 that of speech. But in no case ought one to favor directly or 
 indirectly what he believes to be absolutely wrong, or sacrifice 
 to it; in no case ought he to give way to national follies; he 
 should make due allowance for prejudices, and not ruin the 
 best cause by throwing away the whole because he can only 
 obtain part, or by presumptuously setting up a standard of 
 perfection ; but in no case should he administer to passion, 
 wickedness, or crime, either by remaining silent when silence 
 must be construed into approval or by giving in a cowardly 
 manner a qualified approval. 1 
 
 1 Within sixty years there were executed in Geneva one hundred and fifty 
 witches; yet Calvin does not once express his dissatisfaction with this error in his 
 many writings and innumerable letters. We are justified, therefore, in concluding 
 that he shared the general error of the times, although he does not speak in 
 favor of the trials, because we must expect that he would otherwise have felt 
 himself bound to pronounce his opinion; his silence necessarily appears as 
 qualified assent. That Calvin does not pronounce dissent, I mention on the 
 authority of Mr. Henry, Life of John Calvin, in German, page 489.
 
 44 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The citizen who is to act must be understood by the 
 community; but we are not understood byword of mouth 
 only; we must have the sympathy of the hearer, this con- 
 stant interpreter of human words, which are but broken ac- 
 cents without it. " How difficult is it," exclaimed Cato when 
 the last time before judges, "to defend one's self before men 
 with whom one has not lived !" 
 
 LI. There is a subject not unconnected with that of popu- 
 larity, which deserves a moment's attention the crowds 
 which at times receive distinguished citizens. As a faithful 
 and distinguished citizen must be scrupulously on his guard 
 against the full tide of popularity in general, since it is but 
 too apt to throw him off his guard, under most pleasing, stir- 
 ring, or even inspiring forms ; so he must not mistake the 
 meaning of crowds. It may be well imagined that it must 
 be animating to a citizen or general to see thus visibly and 
 strikingly the feeling of his country towards him represented 
 by thousands of eyes turned upon him, as perhaps the sole 
 cherished object of the attention of all. Who would envy 
 him the enjoyment of so elating and electrifying a moment if 
 he deserves it ? But he must remember that of itself it shows 
 little, proves nothing; for, though thousands maybe pres- 
 ent, many more thousands may not be. When Charles II. 
 made his entry into London after the death of Cromwell, and 
 saw the many people rejoicing at his return, he exclaimed, 
 " Where are my enemies ?" There were enough, but they were 
 not present, or, if so, could of course not be discerned. Who, 
 that ever has seen it, can forget how multitudes and crowds 
 were never wanting to stare at enemy after enemy that made 
 his entry into a populous city, during the many changes in 
 the times of the wars of Napoleon? When Riego entered 
 Madrid, he was greeted by crowds ; when Ferdinand followed, 
 he was greeted likewise. It is not necessary to suppose that 
 these crowds were entirely composed of the same persons ; 
 but it shows that crowds in large cities prove little, unless the 
 mere excitement itself may, as in fact sometimes it does,
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 45 
 
 prove something ; as when a citizen not high in official sta- 
 tion is received by thousands. There are always very many 
 who go to see a sight no matter of what kind because 
 others go, and very many people to whom huzzaing of itself 
 seems to be an enjoyment. There are persons who, when the 
 bells begin to toll in indication of fire, will suddenly break 
 forth in a lusty shout, as if an opportunity only had been 
 wanting for their shouts to go off. The same persons will 
 throw their hats and hurrah loudly for any one, whoever he 
 be. Yet princes are very frequently deceived by assembled 
 crowds and their huzzas. I do not speak of those crowds 
 which the police at times have paid for hurrahing ; but bona 
 fide crowds with bona fide shouts amount to little, and are 
 rarely faithful indexes of anything which might be of impor- 
 tance, except they are overwhelmingly strong, or are silent, 
 for "the silence of the people is the censure of kings." 
 Princes, instead of allowing flatterers to pay them compli- 
 ments upon the assembled multitudes, would feel rather hum- 
 bled, if they considered that it is the show which brings the 
 greater number together. They can serve as no foundation 
 for any political satisfaction. The coronation of few monarchs 
 was attended more numerously than that of Charles X., yet 
 his crown was not for all that the faster on his head. 
 
 LII. Popularity, if sought as an object worth obtaining for 
 itself, is not more dangerous to individuals seeking it than it 
 is to the people, who do not grant it for virtue and talent but 
 on personal or capricious grounds and in spite of the law. 
 Nothing indeed is more dangerous to liberty than the per- 
 mitting a citizen to lead or rule on account of great popu- 
 larity, and the greater the popularity and the longer the sway, 
 the more ruinous will be the effect; because the political 
 energy of the state concentrates in him, and receives from 
 him its impulse, the institutions lose their energy, the law as 
 law loses its vigor, and the community becomes unfit for civil 
 liberty. If the leader, thus placed beyond the line which 
 no citizen ever should be allowed to overstep, is restless and
 
 4 g POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 nuprincipled, he may become a usurper ; but even if he be 
 naturally of a most generous mind, and have the general wel- 
 fare alone before his eyes, the effect is always disastrous. If 
 the people are willing to confide the government into the 
 hands of even so glorious a leader as Pericles, on account of 
 his personal popularity, and allow him momentous influence 
 besides and beyond the law, because he is great and glorious, 
 if they confide in him, the individual, because they are 
 charmed by him and not because he acts out their institu- 
 tions, they must be content to- follow, when the mortal lot 
 befalls this glorious leader, so low and puffed-up a demagogue 
 as Cleon. So no monarch properly provides for his state 
 who does not powerfully promote institutions, but makes the 
 government essentially dependent upon his personality, how- 
 ever brilliant this may be. The most gifted monarchs are 
 frequently those who are most easily betrayed into this 
 political error. 
 
 LIII. Free nations who value their liberty ought jealously 
 to frown down all leading and ruling popularity which does 
 not strictly keep within the limits of the law, and to allow no 
 essential influence except within its institutions, none what- 
 soever on account of a mere personal, still less a capricious, 
 popularity. This does not exclude a sound and healthy oppo- 
 sition, of which we shall treat presently. I speak of that popu- 
 larity which does not merely oppose the administration but 
 infringes the laws and their spirit, and stands instead of ad- 
 ministration. Out of this spirit arise demagogues men who 
 gain popularity and sway by unlawful or wicked means and 
 by flattering or pampering the evil dispositions of men. After 
 Pericles, or through him, demagogism was raised in Athens, 
 we might almost say, to a state institution, as we have seen 
 that nepotism was under the popes of the fifteenth century 
 a most melancholy condition for democracies. For it has this 
 peculiarity, that while it clips and stints more and more the 
 lawful operation of established institutions, which demagogues 
 never fail to do in order to flatter the crowd, it Drives on the 
 
 * o
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 47 
 
 other hand more and more essential power to the undefined 
 and unrestricted influence of the demagogue, under the de- 
 lusive garb of giving power to the people another and sub- 
 stantial reason against democratic autarchies, in addition to 
 those which we found in the first volume. Neither Pericles, 
 the guardian of Alcibiades, nor Socrates, his teacher, was able 
 to regulate his ambitious temper, because the indulgent love 
 of the people spoiled and ruined him. He became a traitor 
 to his country. The history of Athens after Pericles almost 
 concentrates in a series of demagogues, Cleon, Hyperbolus, 
 Callias, Alcibiades, and whatever their names were. Opposite 
 to the demagogue rose the oligarchist, dealing in treachery, 
 and a vile tribe of sycophants prospered in the struggle, while 
 the people were carried madly to their ruin. 1 
 
 LIV. Before we dismiss the subject of national gratitude I 
 desire to add a few words on statues and other monuments 
 erected in honor of events or persons by authority or the 
 community at large. Ought we to erect such ? It has been 
 often said, " Much better that the memory of a person or event 
 live in the hearts of the people than that it be perpetuated in 
 stone." No doubt it is ; so it is better that knowledge be in 
 the head than 'in books, but still books are not only useful 
 but necessary. I for my part am decidedly in favor of judicious 
 
 1 Frederic the Great has a whole chapter on flatterers in his Anti-Macchiavelli. 
 
 There is a remarkable passage in the Memorial de Sainte-H61ene, which I 
 give because worthy of reflection, and, though we shall not entirely agree with 
 Napoleon, that which he advances respecting what people say applies at least more 
 or less to all excited times. The emperor, having spoken of popularity and debon- 
 nairete, adds, " Thus we ought to serve the people worthily, and not occupy our- 
 selves with pleasing them. The best way of gaining them is by doing them good ; 
 nothing more dangerous than to flatter them : if after that they do not obtain all 
 they desire, they become irritated and believe that faith has not been kept with 
 them ; and if we resist, they hate so much the more, as they believe themselves 
 duped. The first duty of a prince is doubtless to do that which the people wants ; 
 but that which a people wants is hardly ever that which it says : its will, its 
 wants ought rather to be in the heart of the prince than in his mouth." Page 
 no, vol. ii., Paris ed., 1824.
 
 4 8 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 monuments, and my reasons are these. I consider them moral, 
 honorable, elevating, and useful. 
 
 Whatever has a tendency to impress man with the fact that 
 he is a member of society, influenced and influencing of a 
 society which is closely connected with the past ; whatever 
 leads man to feel attached to mankind has a tendency to ele- 
 vate him, to suppress or soften that which is selfish or brutish; 
 whatever tends to insulate man, to stifle the consciousness in 
 him that he is an integrant part of society, produces egotism 
 and crime, because it weakens humanity in him, which is in 
 a great manner founded upon sociality. Hence the great use 
 of studying history : it makes us conscious that we belong to 
 a great union of beings, existing for important purposes. 
 Sismondi, in his History of the Fall of the Roman Empire, 
 justly says, "The morality of a nation is preserved by asso- 
 ciating its sentiments with all that is stable and permanent : 
 it is destroyed by whatever tends to concentrate them on the 
 present moment. So long as our recollections are dear to us, 
 we shall take care that our hopes be worthy of them ; but a 
 people who sacrifice the memory of their ancestors or the 
 welfare of their children to the pleasures of a day are but 
 sojourners in a country they are not citizens." The study 
 of history and every means of commingling its reminiscences 
 with our soul make us modest, yet firm and persevering; 
 history gives substance, earnestness, and a necessity of action, 
 not of talk, to the mind. All periods which have been most 
 fruitful to a nation or mankind at large, most active in build- 
 ing and sowing, not in destroying and uprooting, have ever 
 distinguished themselves by an earnest zeal to understand the 
 past ages, which generated the present; all periods which 
 destroyed and ruined without developing, which are distin- 
 guished for superficial clamor and theories without character, 
 substance, or sense, are distinguished for arrogant disregard 
 of any knowledge beyond the present day, which is considered 
 as overflowing with wisdom. Man never studies the past 
 without earnestly thinking of the future ; but so soon as man's 
 thoughts dwell upon the past and meditate the future destinies
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 49 
 
 of that which surrounds him, so soon as his affections are 
 roused by that which is absent, he feels elevated, and returns 
 to the consideration of that which now exists and is close be-, 
 fore him, to the present moment and himself, with an expanded 
 heart and a greater soul ; and he is only thus able to consider 
 the present and himself individually without selfishness. So 
 soon as man, on the other hand, dwells upon the present 
 without any connection with the past and the future, he ex- 
 poses himself to sordid views and arrogant conceit. The 
 truth of this position may be tested in a proportionate degree 
 by every one in his daily life and smallest transactions, as in 
 the actions and performances of whole nations. Since monu- 
 ments, however be they columns, inscriptions, entire fabrics, 
 or whatever else are means to connect our thoughts with 
 the past, and thus lead us to dwell upon the possible future, 
 they are desirable for any nation which feels that its destiny 
 is higher and nobler than the mere care for the present mo- 
 ment could indicate. Monuments are impressive tokens and 
 illustrations of history, and not merely for those who do not 
 read, nor even most so for them, but the impressions received 
 through the eye in shape and form are strong and lasting. A 
 thoughtful man will dwell upon a monument with fruitful 
 thoughts, while the volatile are arrested for a moment, re- 
 minded of one that was great, good, heroic, and one more 
 name, one more date, will be stored up in vivid remembrance. 
 The image of a statue or monument, frequently passed by the 
 school-boy, will sink with many associations deeply into his 
 heart, so that the busiest life of later periods will not make it 
 vanish again. A public monument honors those who erected 
 it. In viewing it we feel that a debt of gratitude in some 
 manner is paid; we feel that we live in a community sensible 
 to worth, merit, nobleness of action, and willing to acknowl- 
 edge them. To the active, monuments are incentives: no 
 Boston school-boy feels the worse for having viewed Chantrey's 
 statue of Washington, and if he could view in his early dreams 
 another of Hancock it would not harm him. A column has 
 been erected to Walter Scott in Glasgow, with the inscrip- 
 VOL. II. 4
 
 5 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 tion, " that it may record their [the citizens of Glasgow] ad- 
 miration of his genius, their deep sense of the honor which his 
 name reflects on his country, and their gratitude for the delight 
 which they have received from his writings." A statue of 
 Fulton, with some similarly appropriate inscription, in some 
 conspicuous landing-place at New York, would be a just 
 tribute, harm no one, and do good to many. The lion erected 
 at Thermopylae in honor of Leonidas must have told a preg- 
 nant story to many a Greek. Monuments show and testify 
 palpably and strikingly that society is not always occupied 
 with material interests alone, but allows the nobler sentiments 
 their proper sphere. Whoever can view Westminster, or the 
 Pantheon in Paris, without stirring feeling, must be without 
 sympathy for anything great ; whoever can believe that those 
 places do not exercise their moral and inciting influence, not 
 only on those who visit them but on the nation at large, can- 
 not be acquainted with the human heart. By monuments we 
 take the fine arts, one of the choice flowers of civilization, into 
 public service, and in turn promote them ; and society is 
 deeply interested in their promotion. They humanize, soften, 
 and refine, and at the same time elevate the standard of taste, 
 one of the most efficient agents of national industry. 1 Bacon 
 says, " Imo citra omnem controversial!!, artes emolliunt mores, 
 teneros reddunt, sequaces, cereos, et ad mandata imperii due- 
 tiles : ignorantia contra, contumaces, refractories, seditiosos : 
 quod ex historia clarissime potet, quandoquidem tempora 
 maxime indocta, inculta, barbara, tumultibus, seditionibus, 
 mutationibusque maxime obnoxia fuerint." 2 
 
 The expense of money for monuments or other works of 
 art is one of the most common objections against them. If 
 money is spent in erecting them, and objects of more press- 
 
 1 On this subject I have given my views more fully in the Report on Girard 
 College. 
 
 Repeatedly has the vast usefulness of diffused taste and pleasure in the fine 
 arts, with reference to industry, and the duty of governments to promote them as 
 far as in them lies, been amply acknowledged in the British parliament. 
 
 * De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum, lib. i.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 51 
 
 ing necessity are neglected, it is of course folly, in this as in 
 any other case, to attend to the less important in preference 
 to the more important. On the other hand, if there are suf- 
 ficient means for both, and judiciously managed means may 
 effect much, it must not be forgotten that money laid out 
 in anything which promotes essential civilization promotes 
 thereby, directly or indirectly, harmony of thought and feel- 
 ing, and peace among individuals, security, intercommunion, 
 and the standard of social life and comfort ; and thus not only 
 is the value of exchangeable articles enhanced, but civilization 
 imprints, with every progress, the character of exchangeable- 
 ness upon things, performances, and various species of skill 
 and labor, which without it remain without any exchange- 
 able value. We have but to look around us, and every day 
 will furnish us with numerous examples. We must never 
 forget that taste forms an essential ingredient of national in- 
 dustry no less than necessity; that the wants of civilization, 
 upon which all industry is founded, consist as really in the 
 wants of taste as of necessity. If the leading motives to in- 
 dustry are wants and security, both are more or less directly 
 promoted in part by the cultivation of the fine arts. 
 
 Monuments promote who would seriously deny it? 
 glowing patriotism. Whatever is good or great it is well to 
 impress symbolically and compactly on the mind. It is not 
 because we are of a gross nature that we require this ; it is 
 because concentrated signs and forms make concentrated im- 
 pressions. The badge of office makes a sudden, palpable im- 
 pression. No German passing through Wittenberg requires to 
 be reminded that this is the place where Luther lived, fought, 
 and died ; his mind will be filled with recollections and reflec- 
 tions. Still, the iron statue of the Reformer at that place will 
 contribute to present still more vividly the man and the period 
 which affected his country so deeply and lastingly. Few men 
 who travel to the battle-field of Liitzen will stand in need of 
 being reminded that there Gustavus Adolphus fell. Yet is 
 there a great difference between this general reminiscence of 
 history, and the ideas which crowd upon the mind when we
 
 52 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 sit down near the stone which marks the spot where the great 
 man fell, or when we see the spot in the town-house of Liitzen 
 which to this day exhibits the floor marked by the blood of 
 the expiring king. It was a praiseworthy custom of the 
 Romans to deposit the ashes of their distinguished men in 
 suitable tombs near the high-roads. In travelling along be- 
 tween rows of sepulchres a man was reading the annals of the 
 great state written in deeply impressive symbols. 
 
 It shows no grossness if we love to admire the wisdom of 
 God in the wonderful construction of a small insect's wing 
 and make it thus a symbol of his vast power. So it is not 
 gross when we present great deeds, illustrious men, or periods 
 to which we owe what we are, symbolically in form and shape, 
 by monuments or statues, and when the ingenuity of men is 
 employed to find fit forms delicately to express complicated 
 actions or characters, the spirit of exalted periods, or the 
 sentiments of the founders of states. 
 
 But have not monuments been greatly abused ? Has not 
 repulsive flattery often erected them ? So has religion, so has 
 everything of any general interest to men, been abused. Nor 
 is the love of the fine arts an infallible indication of elevation 
 of the soul. It is not an unfrequent phenomenon that pecu- 
 liarly corrupt natures, even cruel to excess, have a strong 
 tendency to sentimental emotions, and please themselves in 
 them ; T but would these enormities be seriously urged against 
 the general influence of the fine arts, if, as is always made a 
 condition, other important objects are not neglected, and the 
 object is the erection of patriotic monuments ? Let it be 
 adopted as a rule that no statue shall ever be erected to a 
 living person, but only after the survivors or posterity have 
 pronounced upon the merit, as the censors used to give their 
 judgment upon the doges of Venice after their decease. If, 
 
 1 Several Roman emperors are striking instances. In 1830, a woman, Mar- 
 garet Gottfried, was executed for having successively poisoned more than thirty 
 people, and to her last day she liked sentimental emotions and would at times cry 
 at the recital of poems. See her Biography, published by her counsel, Bremen, 
 1831.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 53 
 
 however, monuments do exist, it is a sacred duty of the citizen 
 to preserve them inviolate, and to bring up the young with a 
 fear of falling into the vandalism of injuring public property 
 in them or in any other shape. 
 
 LV. There is a general duty and consequent virtue of the 
 last importance, which for want of a better term we may call 
 the virtue of attention, comprehending therein observation and 
 reflection upon what has been observed. We have seen that 
 the intellect forms an ingredient of man's ethical character, 
 and that the human race constitutes a continuous society, col- 
 lecting and transmitting knowledge and improving by experi- 
 ence. The animals, " quae natura prona atque ventri obedi- 
 entia finxit," 1 have but a limited degree of observation ; man's 
 erect posture, '' his eyes turned towards heaven," no more 
 indicate his destiny, as the ancients said, than his duty of free 
 observation around him. We cannot learn and reflect without 
 observing the phenomena around us, and our mind, like our 
 eyes, remains dull and unable to distinguish, if not trained by 
 practice. Observation and attention do not mean a hasty and 
 fretful curiosity, undirected by a concentrated and composed 
 mind which glances at the surface without receiving a lasting 
 impression mere craving for news and change ; but they 
 mean that attention which is the effect of a desire to know 
 the elements of things or principles of phenomena, and their 
 mutual connection with and bearing upon one another the 
 truth of things, their essential character. Every experience or 
 observation, without it, is shallow and unsound, and propriety, 
 judiciousness, wisdom, and even that primary virtue, justice, 
 depend essentially upon this attention. If we pay the slightest 
 attention to the subject, we shall find that every man is suc- 
 cessful in his sphere, from the humblest to the most elevated, 
 useful to his neighbors, and efficient in his calling, in the 
 same degree as he unites with a peculiar skill or talent for his 
 specific calling a knowledge of his subject which is the fruit 
 
 Sallust, Bell. Catilin., i.
 
 54 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of patient attention to its primary elements and agents alone. 
 We receive no proper knowledge of a tree by satisfying our- 
 selves with a general view of its outward size and bulk. To 
 know it thoroughly we must examine, among other things, a 
 fibre under the microscope. We are cheered in our attention 
 when by closely observing one fibre we gain the knowledge 
 of millions of fibres of the same class. 
 
 Those men who may be considered the leaders of mankind, 
 the philosophical minds, by which I mean all who with a 
 philosophical, that is accurate, analyzing, and comprehensive, 
 mind, examine and grasp their subject, historians, rulers or 
 statesmen, poets, artists, and moral teachers, will be found 
 to have influenced society so far as and no farther than they 
 combined with a native activity of mind a penetration of reality 
 around them, a comprehension of the nature and operation of 
 the elements or integrant parts of society and all its relations 
 and conditions, and discarded wayward or arbitrary fancy. 1 
 In this as in so many other respects the ancients ought to 
 serve us as models. Their laws as well as their literature show 
 in an eminent degree, which cannot be sufficiently weighed by 
 us, their clear and lively perception and keen penetration of 
 the real state of things. 2 In this alone lies the advantage of 
 experience, in this the power of the school of misfortune. They 
 
 1 [Polybius has a fine passage (ix. 22) in speaking of Hannibal. Dr. Lieber 
 cites the passage in his manuscript notes. " So truly great and wonderful is a 
 man and a soul properly fitted according to the original constitution of its nature 
 to any human work to which it may bend its eiforts."] 
 
 3 I have elsewhere spoken of our obligation not to lose by negligence what 
 has been gained at earlier periods and under more fortunate circumstances for a 
 particular subject, but perhaps at great expense to society or under totally dif- 
 ferent circumstances, which it is not in our power to bring back, or not right 
 for us if we could. Christianity and modern civilization have very materially 
 changed the relation in which the individual stands with the world. We have a 
 world within, with which we strive to bring the outer world in connection and 
 harmony. The real world was the problem of the ancients. We ought surely 
 not to return to their view, but are in duty bound to learn whatever good may 
 have been produced by it without paying the same price. We theorize too easily ; 
 we start from ideas and carry them over into the material world : the ancients 
 started from ihe/act, the object without.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 55 
 
 force knowledge and penetration of reality upon us ; if they 
 do not succeed in doing this, they have no improving effect, 
 as we may frequently observe with persons of a dull mind. 
 The necessity of observation, which Bacon so urgently and 
 solemnly presses upon the student of nature, 1 is no greater for 
 him, not even as great as for the student of men and society. 
 Many sufferings and misfortunes have afflicted mankind be- 
 cause their rulers or legislators perceived the important phe- 
 nomena of society outwardly only, and did not penetrate to the 
 component parts and to their principle of action and mutual 
 relation to one another. Frederic the Great acknowledged 
 that as an administrator of a realm he had gained invaluable 
 knowledge when his father obliged him to act the part of a 
 subaltern officer in one of the administrative courts at Custrin. 
 He there studied the fibres, the first and last operation of the 
 agents of society, those minute elements which make up the 
 bulk of what we call society or state ; he became acquainted 
 with the action of laws, not only with their words. The 
 essence of a law does not lie in what its words decree, but in 
 the effect which they have upon the given state of things. 
 Nor is it difficult to perceive by perusing the letters and biog- 
 raphy of Niebuhr, alluded to before, how that historian was 
 enabled shrewdly to unravel some of the most perplexing 
 questions in Roman history, and to penetrate Roman and past 
 reality, by his constant attention to present reality around him, 
 by never sneering at any knowledge, however humble in ap- 
 pearance, provided it led him to perceive the connection of 
 things. His knowledge of the various relations of the soil to 
 its owners in his native country alone gave him an important 
 key to the corresponding relations with the Romans. So 
 Gibbon, in his Miscellaneous Works (vol. i. p. 136, ed. 1814), 
 says of himself, " My principal obligation to the militia was 
 the making me an Englishman and a soldier. In this peaceful 
 service I imbibed the rudiments of the language and science 
 of tactics, which opened a new field of study and observation. 
 
 1 Novum Organum.
 
 5 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The discipline and evolutions of a modern battalion gave me 
 a clearer notion of the phalanx and the legion ; and the cap- 
 tain of the Hampshire grenadiers (the reader may smile) has 
 not been useless to the historian of the Empire." 
 
 It is painful indeed to observe how many persons walk 
 through life with an obtuse mind and dull eye and yet do not 
 feel prevented from boldly pronouncing their opinion upon 
 all occasions. Many persons are not struck either by the 
 characteristic form or even the color of things, and when 
 they have to give an account it is undefined, unsatisfactory, 
 erroneous, or exaggerated, one way or the other. The most 
 delicate phenomenon in nature, the surprising and admirable 
 connection of a chain of causes and effects, agents of awful 
 simplicity and magnitude, can be laid before them without 
 eliciting their inquiry.. Nothing which constitutes the frame- 
 work of society and gives it its peculiar character attracts 
 them : they do not ask in what relation the tiller of the ground 
 stands to the owner of the soil ; how the taxes are decreed, 
 assessed, and levied ; what are the pastimes of the people ; 
 how often they eat meat in a week ; what their standard of 
 comfort, their habits of cleanliness are ; in what relation their 
 religion stands to their morality or practical life ; whether the 
 people read or not, and what. Still less do they inquire into 
 the most important institutions, and how they became such. 
 They never look, as Bacon calls it, " abroad into universality." 
 
 Without this attention we insulate. our mind, or the things 
 which may happen to interest us, and cannot see them in their 
 connection, that is in their truth. 
 
 LVI. This duty of attention, enjoined upon man because 
 he has received reflective faculties and has the general obli- 
 gation of truth in all its bearings, is of singular importance 
 in politics, for every one who has to act ; hence in free coun- 
 tries for all citizens. The virtue of attention is one of those 
 which require most practice; it cannot begin too early. What- 
 ever we see or hear we ought to try to understand, attempt at 
 least to learn its connection ; of a word, term, thing, institu-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 57 
 
 tion, person, or event, its peculiar character, meaning, his- 
 tory, elements, and causes. A single set of casters on our 
 dining-table, if viewed in all their connections, may teach a 
 vast lesson of political economy, geography, and civilization. 
 We ought not to read the name of a place without combining 
 the idea of its situation with it, or of a law without that of its 
 operation. We thus not only acquire the knowledge of the 
 thing itself, but our horizon expands, one species of knowledge 
 supports others in our mind, our intellect acquires the proper 
 classification of things a fixed frame-work for further acqui- 
 sition ; it gains clearness and retentiveness, and above all we 
 learn to see things more and more in their true light and 
 bearing, and as our knowledge becomes firmer, truer, and 
 more substantial, we enable ourselves to become juster, and 
 are less exposed to be swayed by casualties or impulses which 
 originally may not have been bad. The judgment of some 
 men upon the whole English revolution has been swayed by 
 the exclamation of James II. when he returned to London 
 and found that Princess Anne had fled: "Good God, my child 
 too has left me !" He who can read this without emotion 
 must have a hard heart; but so natural an exclamation of the 
 afflicted father will weigh very little with him who views the 
 infatuated king in his whole connection with the country over 
 which he so injudiciously ruled. Hardly had the world ceased 
 to applaud the French for manfully resisting a criminal execu- 
 tive outrage, when many not only lavished their sympathy 
 upon the duchess of Berry for attempting to raise a civil 
 war, and in their admiration of her spirited conduct forgot 
 her licentious course of life but actually turned their feeling 
 against Louis Philippe. It may be hard for the duke of Bor- 
 deaux to be deprived of a throne, but if we view him in his 
 whole connection we may not find reason to wish him back 
 in the Tuileries. 
 
 LVII. We must gather experience : without it no man 
 would be wiser at forty than he was at fifteen, nor England be 
 safer after her Protestant settlement, with its various organic
 
 5 g POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 laws, than she was under Charles II. But what is experience ? 
 It is not the mere witnessing or going through the perils or 
 drudgery of a thing, nor the bare knowledge that a fact has 
 happened. It is the knowledge we derive by reflection upon 
 that which happens. Men may pass through a variety of 
 scenes without gathering any experience, as an obstinate 
 physician may kill hundreds by the same physic in the same 
 cases, because he refuses to reflect upon what he witnesses. 
 Attention, therefore, to what we witness, see, or learn, consti- 
 tutes an ingredient of experience, and this experience may be 
 personal or not, that is, we may see with our own eyes or not, 
 perceive with our own senses or not. This distinction, however, 
 is far less definite than is generally supposed. For if personal 
 experience relates to effects upon my own senses or person 
 alone, it is necessarily extremely limited. If we extend its 
 meaning, and would comprehend within it what has happened 
 at our own times, the distinction becomes arbitrary ; for we 
 may or may not know an event of our own times more 
 thoroughly than one of past periods. It is the certainty of 
 knowledge which is important, and this may at times be 
 much greater when we were not present at an event than 
 when we were. Experience, true knowledge, a just view of 
 the things and relations among which we live, or whatever 
 we may call it, demand of every citizen two things, that he 
 know the society he lives in as thoroughly as with his means 
 he is able to do, and, in order to do it, that he know the his- 
 tory of its growth and of the development of its character (its 
 generic history). 
 
 There is an absolute duty of the citizen to make himself 
 acquainted with the history of his country, for, whatever it is, 
 it did not spring forth yesterday, but it became such gradu- 
 ally, and the institutions which surround the citizen, which 
 form the essence of his government, are not known from their 
 casual appearance as it may strike him at first glance, but 
 from their operation, which is but their history ; nor can we 
 possibly know whither they tend, and whether they work 
 good or evil, without knowing the causes from which they
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 59 
 
 sprang, and the mode in which they have operated. Besides, 
 no genuine and firm patriotism is possible without its re- 
 ceiving aliment from the knowledge of our institutions, the 
 history of our country. Without it we shall feel and act as 
 selfish insulated ephemerals " sojourners in our country, not 
 citizens," as Sismondi expressed it. Cicero very truly com- 
 pares those who do not know history to children, because 
 they are deprived of experience. To rule or legislate for one's 
 country, one must know it ; to know it, one must study it ; but 
 our country is not these few millions who happen to be alive at 
 this precise moment, nor this land on which they stand, which 
 they cultivate but our country, patria, is this land, with all 
 the relations subsisting between it and the dwellers upon it, 
 their institutions, their growth and history. " In it alone can 
 the citizen study his obligations and rights," x which he really 
 enjoys and ought carefully to preserve, and transmit inviolate 
 to his children ; through it alone he can learn how to appre- 
 ciate what is good in it, and discover what requires amending, 
 and how it ought to be amended. 
 
 A nation does not live an equally active and productive life 
 at once in all spheres. A variety of circumstances must com- 
 bine in order to produce a period in which, by the united 
 activity of many, a certain branch, a certain institution, a cer- 
 tain part of the public law, will be cultivated with peculiar 
 felicity and effect. General attention is directed with peculiar 
 intensity to one or the other subject; many of the most gifted 
 minds being engaged in the* same pursuit or animated by the 
 same idea propel one another in their common or similar ca- 
 reer; one discovery leads to another; while the public, being 
 influenced by the same spirit and common circumstances, in- 
 cite and reward by their interest the peculiar votaries of that 
 branch which is the flourishing one of the times, and at the 
 same time public opinion, keen as to this branch, acquires 
 tact and taste, and modifies what may be extravagant or re- 
 tards what may be over-zealous in those who give their whole 
 
 Jovellanos, Complete Works, Madrid, 1830, vol. ii. p. 438.
 
 5o POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 mind to that particular subject. Thus are produced what I 
 have called on another occasion the classical periods of these 
 peculiar branches. 1 It is thus in literature and the arts, in law 
 and politics. If, then, we do not study history, and try faith- 
 fully to learn in what persons have excelled, what are the re- 
 sults of a specific branch in its own classical age or in the 
 period in which it was cultivated with success, when by for- 
 tunate circumstances the public mind was rendered peculiarly 
 sensitive respecting it, we neglect the true fruits of civilization 
 and disregard one of the most solemn duties of man as a so- 
 cial being; that is, as a being who is not only called upon to 
 live in social relations with the living, but who owes his social, 
 his human relation to the continuity of society and is socially 
 connected with past generations that he is a social being not 
 only within the limits of his generation, but also by a lineal 
 connection with the past generations, through influences 
 derived from them, and with the future generations, by influ- 
 encing them. In order, therefore, that man may know his 
 true position, he must understand the past likewise. This is 
 the solemn and sacred character of history. 
 
 If we do not train our minds in duly finding and appre- 
 ciating the elements of phenomena around us, we shall be 
 unguarded against that fault in reasoning to which all men, 
 without exception, are but too liable, namely, the mistaking 
 of the co-existence of two things for a sufficient proof that 
 they stand in the relation of cause and effect a fault which 
 has produced very grave evils in politics. Nothing is more 
 common than that public men or an administration are 
 charged with the evils under which the country happens to 
 suffer, merely because those men happen to be at the helm, 
 although there may be no more connection between the two 
 than between a general epidemic and the administration at 
 the time. If we do not learn to discover the elements of the 
 phenomena around us, we shall continually fall into that 
 grave error which has convulsed large nations, namely, the 
 
 1 1 have dwelt upon this subject at some length in the Hermeneutics.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 6 1 
 
 mistaking of great social evils for merely political evils ; for 
 a remedy of which we seek, therefore, in a change of laws 
 or institutions, while the seat of the disease is in a totally 
 different region, and the cure must, consequently, come from 
 different remedies. 
 
 As to the general duty of attention to the present society 
 and times, in and through which we are what we are, I wish 
 to add only that, since we do no longer assemble in the mar- 
 ket, and our states have become extensive political societies, 
 and since, at the same time, printing has become so powerful 
 and active an agent of transmitting knowledge and thoughts, 
 it is our duty not to slight those vehicles which bring us 
 information of the daily occurrences of life, near and far, 
 important and trivial, cheering and saddening in short, of 
 life such as it is. It is the duty of a free citizen to read 
 attentively some newspapers. Without it he lives in the dark 
 as an Athenian would have done who had not visited the 
 agora. We seize with avidity upon the letters written in 
 past periods, even the gossiping ones, because they bear the 
 imprint and breathe the spirit of the period in which they were 
 penned. Newspapers are letters. It indicates, in my opinion, 
 very little knowledge of our whole human character and call- 
 ing, if persons, as I have actually found some, assert with 
 superciliousness that they never look at a paper. Let the 
 newspapers of some countries differ ever so far from what" 
 they ought to be, or the feeling of hauteur at the society 
 around those persons be ever so great, still the papers are the 
 channel through which alone a mass of the most important 
 knowledge respecting our society can be obtained, and the 
 country remains the society in which we live and to which 
 our sympathies ought to belong. The noblest and the worst 
 things may happen, and to penetrate reality we ought to 
 know both. A Ross may return from his three years' expe- 
 dition and be received by the people of Hull in a manner 
 which reminded the public of the reception of Columbus after 
 his first voyage public defalcations may be discovered, im- 
 provements of all sorts may take place; crimes or noble
 
 6 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 deeds may be performed, or portentous signs foreboding evil 
 may show themselves, without ever being noticed by so neg- 
 ligent a citizen. Only let us read the papers attentively, and 
 not merely to fill vacant time. The gradual enlargement of 
 knowledge by a serious and regular newspaper reading, with 
 the proper aid of books of reference, is very great, and it 
 ought to be observed, especially for the young there is much 
 knowledge of details irretrievably lost, knowledge perhaps of 
 great importance at some future period, when unexpectedly we 
 may greatly need to possess it, in the sweeping course of the 
 news of the European race, if we do not store it up gradually 
 as it is offered, and endeavor to keep on a level with facts and 
 events in the political as well as scientific life of the civilized 
 nations. This species of acquiring knowledge can be abused, 
 like everything else. As to the importance and duties of 
 editors, they will be touched upon farther below.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Continency. Political Evils of Incontinency ; of Prostitution. The primary 
 Foundation of Society, the Family, is undermined by it. Evils of general In- 
 continency in the highest Classes, and the lowest. Religion. Its Univer- 
 sality. Its importance for Morality; for Society; for the State. Fanaticism. 
 Fanaticism of any kind. Religious Fanaticism. The Bible. Revelation. 
 Both exclusively religious. Persecution. Direct and indirect Persecution. 
 Political and social Persecution. Hypocrisy and Desecration of Religion. 
 Regulation of political or social actions by Tenets. 
 
 LVIII. CONTINENCY, a virtue demanded by all moral sys- 
 tems and purer religions, is a moral element of great impor- 
 tance in a civil point of view. The legislators of all times have 
 acknowledged it, both by the direct support and countenance 
 given to lawful marriage and well-constituted families, and 
 the serious discountenance given to prostitution, from ancient 
 times to modern. Hardly had the attempt been made during 
 the first French revolution to pronounce by law that dissolu- 
 tion of some of the most elementary ties of human society, 
 which had been eating itself into its vitals for upwards of two 
 centuries, when, on the simple ground of public necessity, 
 many of the violent political fanatics petitioned for legislative 
 repression of universal profligacy, or, placed in authority, 
 urgently recommended measures of the kind. 1 It is not only 
 
 1 Some of these reports are contained in a work of the saddest, indeed, but 
 also the deepest interest for every reflecting man who studies human society with 
 that earnestness and truthfulness which is anxious to know the real state of things 
 and society in all its elements, not shuddering or averting the face from truth 
 and fact, even though it be loathsomely hideous, as no physician allows himself 
 to be repelled by the most sickening suffering, or, if he does, is a worthless 
 votary of the healing art. I allude to the work De la Prostitution dans la 
 Ville de Paris, consideree sous le Rapport de 1' Hygiene publique, de la Morale 
 et de 1'Administration, etc., par A. I. B. Parent-Duchatelet, Paris, 2d ed., 1837, 
 2 vols. 8vo. It is a work of the first importance to the moralist, philosopher, 
 
 63
 
 64 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 because prostitution at large is invariably coupled with crime 
 that it becomes so dangerous to the state, as the experience 
 of all periods and all nations, ancient and modern, without 
 exception, proves that general incontinency becomes a dan- 
 gerous political vice. There is another reason, and, in my 
 opinion, of much greater import still. We have seen how in- 
 dispensable the family is for civilization as well as virtue ; we 
 called it the hearth of the best traits of man, of virtue, of gen- 
 erosity, of patriotism. We have seen that monogamy is justly 
 considered as one of the most important elements, perhaps 
 the most important of all to which Europe owes her early 
 and great superiority over the Eastern world, where yet civi- 
 lization was of much earlier date. If we carefully examine 
 Roman history, I believe no one can fail to observe that a 
 very great part of all that we feel ourselves bound to admire 
 in it, the great power which the word law acquired in that 
 city, and that peculiar trait in her politics which we may call 
 Roman steadiness, was owing to the early acknowledgment of 
 the family in its sacredness, and the consequent esteem of 
 womankind, especially of wives and mothers the high char- 
 acter which the Roman attributed to the matron, who there- 
 fore stands prominent in their history from an early period, 
 some of the traditions of which are mixed with fiction, but 
 which nevertheless prove, even in this shape, the. state of na- 
 tional feeling. We shall return to this subject when we treat 
 of Woman. In the middle ages, and especially in that period 
 which more particularly is designated as the age of chivalry, 
 few things served to restrain the lawlessness of the times, in 
 some degree at least, more effectually than the rising esteem 
 of woman, extravagant and distorted as even this feeling gen- 
 erally was, or however extravagant the views of many per- 
 sons to this day respecting the universal purity of this feeling 
 at those times may be. It is a fact that it formed one of 
 
 politician, criminalist, and statistician, to every one who studies man considered 
 individually or socially, and gives a deep insight into one of the darkest, lowest 
 sinks of vice, avarice, and crime.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 65 
 
 the essential points from which modern civilization started 
 anew. 1 
 
 LIX. If the family, however, is so important, it is evident 
 that continency, its very support and life-blood, is so likewise. 
 The former cannot exist in its purity and in that solidity which 
 is necessary to make it a substantial element of political wel- 
 fare, without the latter," without the purity of woman. Yet 
 this does not exhibit the whole importance of continency. So 
 soon as continency is generally disregarded or slighted, self- 
 ishness will likewise become general, because families are not 
 formed that circle where disinterestedness is fostered most, 
 and the more lasting connection between the two sexes, if 
 formed, is founded upon selfish gratification only; the claims 
 of children upon their parents for education, the pride of 
 parents in their children, that they may do honor to the 
 name, is weakened or entirely destroyed ; and woman sinks 
 from the position of a companion to the father and an honored 
 mother to the offspring, to a mere means of gratification. In 
 short, the first principle from which civilization starts, and 
 that from which at all periods it draws the most substantial 
 support, is undermined. There are four different impulses 
 which, more than any others, prompt man to generous actions, 
 elevate him above the calculation of interest, and imbue his 
 soul with those motives without which utility and expediency 
 would remain as the only causes and prompters of action : 
 these four are religion, love, patriotism, and the feeling of 
 justice. Love, that peculiar sympathy between men, and 
 which we have considered in friendship, one of its prominent 
 manifestations, is intensest and most general in the sympathy 
 which exists between the two sexes, so much so that the poets 
 of all ages have been naturally led to it, as the surest means 
 to excite interest on the largest scale. That disinterested 
 spirit of love, which is often called the romantic spirit, has 
 
 1 Hallam's History of the Middle Ages, mentioned here, out of so many others, 
 only on account of its greater accessibility to most readers. 
 VOL. II. 5
 
 66 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 not unfrequently led to extravagances, errors, sometimes to 
 vices and crimes; yet this is only because it is so general, and 
 if it were blotted out from the human heart it would scarcely 
 be possible to keep human society together, aside from the 
 extinction of many of the noblest exertions. But general 
 profligacy does extinguish it, and we find therefore that at all 
 times those classes which are not touched by public opinion, 
 and give themselves up to libertinism, which become callous 
 and selfish, disavow the obligations of continency and of family 
 life, and in doing so become dead to many of the most sacred 
 calls of morality, are of extreme danger to the whole com- 
 monwealth ; whether such a class be in the social scale at the 
 head, as the libertine nobility in France, England, and several 
 other countries in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
 or at the bottom of that scale, as the poorest classes are at 
 present, in England, for instance, and several other highly- 
 peopled countries. 1 Whether squalid wretchedness or arro- 
 gant profligacy deaden the power of public opinion, the effect 
 and the danger, though not the same, are equally great, with 
 this difference, perhaps, that the wretched may still be coerced 
 by a strong government into submission to the laws in some 
 degree, while the others soon may become daring rebels 
 against the most sacred interests of society, having necessarily 
 a considerable part of authority and power in their own hands. 
 In this respect, too, the history of Roman dissoluteness fur- 
 nishes us with admonishing facts and experience. There were 
 many reasons why France could not remain without a deeply 
 penetrating revolution but one of them will always be found 
 
 1 I refer here to the various Reports of the Poor Laws Commissions to Parlia- 
 ment since the whigs have formed the administration. The work I have used 
 in particular is the Report from the Commissioners for inquiring into the Ad- 
 ministration and practical Operation of the Poor Laws, published by Authority, 
 London, 1834. Several works of value have been published by private individ- 
 uals on subjects connected with the above, for instance, " The Manufacturing 
 Population of England, its Moral, Social, and Physical Conditions," etc., by P. 
 Gaskill, London, 1833. Some of the first British political economists have like- 
 wise written on the subject ; nor can Mai thus on Population be forgotten here 
 where we speak of the effect of general unchastity in a political point of view.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 67 
 
 to have consisted in the profligacy and shamelessness of a 
 very large part of the higher classes, which made even Burke 
 give so sad and contemptible a picture of the French nobility 
 before the revolution, so much more dangerous, though prob- 
 ably not in itself greater, than that of the court of Charles II. 
 and James II., because it had lasted longer and settled down 
 far more into a certain code and system. 1 
 
 LX. Society is deeply interested in religion. If we com- 
 prehend within this term all belief, true or erroneous, in an 
 agent or agents overruling the actions and destinies of men, 
 possessed of a power surpassing human power, which extends 
 to the changes in the physical world, we shall find that men 
 have never existed without some religion, whether it be in the 
 form of the grossest fetish religion, adoring bodies which do 
 not even represent real or imagined animate beings, or poly- 
 theism, or monotheism. The consciousness of our depend- 
 ence and of the great limitation of our power, fear or hope, 
 desire of superior aid, or a longing for support and comfort 
 in adversity, which every man feels that he himself or his 
 fellow-man are incapable of affording, has invariably led man 
 to acknowledge a superior agency of some sort or other. 
 Man has always adored. If, therefore, there were no other 
 reason why we should promote pure religion and there are 
 many indeed this would be a strong one, that man will not 
 and cannot live without some religion, of whatever character; 
 and if he has not a true one he will embrace a false one ; if 
 he has not belief or a pure faith he will resort to superstition, 
 
 1 The historical memoirs, a branch of literature so peculiar to France, furnish 
 most melancholy proofs of the enormous height to which unchastity as a social and 
 political evil had risen in that country. Quite lately a new contribution to this 
 history of vice has been made in the Memoirs of the Duchess of Nevers from 
 1713 to 1793. We can hardly trust our eyes when we read the attending cir- 
 cumstances of the well-known fact that Cardinal Fleury, prime minister of 
 France, was the person who deliberately seduced the then young monarch, Louis 
 XV., still attached to his wife, to adopt the countess du Mailly as his mistress, 
 and thus began a career of vice which during a long reign extended its fatal 
 influence over a country doomed to the greatest sufferings.
 
 68 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 or rather his heart will naturally engender it. But if a religion 
 acknowledges a God " who is of purer eyes than to behold 
 iniquity/' who is love and all-pure, it needs no farthe/ discus- 
 sion to show how deeply the whole society is interested in 
 maintaining the diffusion of such a faith, which affords the 
 two most powerful agents of morality, namely, on the one 
 hand, the mental communion with a being who is purity him- 
 self, and, being omniscient, does not judge by signs or out- 
 ward actions but searches the motives in the deepest recesses 
 of our heart, and who, being almighty, affords support to all 
 who seek it in purity from him ; and on the other hand, the 
 belief in the immortality of the soul. It extends at once the 
 whole sphere of action ; its effects and tests go beyond the 
 mere calculation of expediency, and thus the belief must 
 needs become the most powerful primitive impulse to good 
 action, uprightness, disinterestedness, kindness, love of truth, 
 and admiration of what is truly good, beautiful, noble, and 
 great. 
 
 The promotion of religion in a community takes place 
 chiefly by instruction in the family, and by that society which 
 is founded upon the principle of religion, called the church. 
 It belongs to the province of natural law to inquire whether 
 the state as such, that is the jural society of men, has the 
 right, and, under certain circumstances, the duty, to sup- 
 port that particular ecclesiastical society or church which is 
 founded upon the religion professed by all members of the 
 state or the majority, and to exercise a supervising or regu- 
 lating authority over all the religions professed by the various 
 members of the state. But to the science of politics proper 
 it belongs to discuss those means which may be best war- 
 ranted by experience as well as by principles of strict right to 
 carry out that supervision or direct promotion, should it be 
 found either that it is necessary or right ; in short, to discuss 
 the important subject of how far any connection between 
 church and state can or ought to subsist, for instance as in 
 England, where the established church has, in some respects, 
 a political form and substance, or as in France, where the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 69 
 
 churches of the various denominations are supported by the 
 state, but otherwise distinctly separate from it, since the revo- 
 lution of 1830. We have already seen, in the first volume, 
 that in no case whatever has the state the right to interfere 
 with the religious belief of the individual, that is with his re- 
 lation and communion with his Maker. A few remarks on 
 religion will be added when we shall come to treat of educa- 
 tion. In political ethics one of the subjects connected with 
 religion, which claims especially our attention, appears to me 
 to be fanaticism. 
 
 LXI. By a fanatic we understand an individual who is actu- 
 ated by a false zeal for some general principle or truth, real 
 or supposed, so far that he commits wrong. A bigot is, in the 
 attachment to what he holds to be true, illiberal and narrow- 
 minded to those who think differently. Fanaticism includes 
 bigotry, but the bigot need not be a fanatic. The falseness of 
 the zeal in the fanatic may consist in the excess of its degree, 
 or a zeal for something wrong of itself, or in the fact that the 
 zeal and fervor of the individual mislead him to carry prin- 
 ciples and standards of action into spheres which ought to 
 remain entirely foreign to them. It was fanatical when a re- 
 vived spirit of religion, after papacy had sunk lowest, carried 
 some popes to the destruction of ancient works of art; it 
 was fanatical when the admiration of the fine arts in antiquity 
 induced people to write against Christianity. I believe that 
 according to common adaptation the word fanatic always im- 
 plies action injurious to others, especially persecution, or to 
 ourselves (as persons have crucified themselves), while the 
 word enthusiast, perhaps, denotes only the excess of zeal. So 
 long as the two musical schools in Paris at the time of Rous- 
 seau carried their zeal only to an excess of love of music, 
 forgetting in their ardor many important duties, we would call 
 them musical enthusiasts; but when they began to injure one 
 another, I believe we must call them musical fanatics. It is 
 very clear that the enthusiast will in most cases be ready, if 
 opportunity offers, to become a fanatic.
 
 ;o 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 As the zeal with which we are animated for the prosecution 
 of anything may degenerate into excess, so there may be 
 fanaticism in the pursuit of any truth or principle, real or 
 pretended. The Nominalists and Realists in the middle ages 
 became actual fanatics in their philosophical zeal. So there 
 have been frequently political fanatics, who have persecuted 
 one another for the sake of political principles or truths, and 
 all party excitements are liable to the danger of political 
 fanaticism. Indeed, whenever we forget the aim, and in ex- 
 cessive zeal mistake the means to obtain the aim for the aim 
 itself the very general error of which I have spoken already 
 we are close upon the limit where fanaticism begins. Any- 
 thing engaging the zeal of men may degenerate, I repeat, into 
 enthusiasm, as the innocent love of flowers did at one time 
 degenerate into the actually disastrous tulipomania ; and so 
 soon as enthusiasm acts injuriously to others, by blinding men 
 to their due interest or inciting to injustice and persecution, it 
 is fanaticism. I remember an instance when a juryman could 
 not be persuaded by his eleven fellows to agree to a verdict of 
 guilty, although the evidence of theft left no doubt whatever 
 of the crime, and finally declared he would not consent to the 
 verdict, because the prisoner belonged to his own political 
 party. If this was not on the ground of some sordid interest, 
 it was, I believe every one will agree, political fanaticism. But 
 no species of fanaticism has been more common or more dis- 
 astrous than religious. The reasons are clear. Religion, true 
 or false, is, as we have seen, one of the most universal princi- 
 ples, and hence its fanaticism is likewise so. All feel interest 
 in some religion or other ; not all in the fine arts or in philo- 
 sophical systems. As religion occupies itself with the relation 
 of man to his supreme ruler, men who take a confined view 
 of religion and of their maker, as all fanatics do, imagine that 
 religion, with reverence be it spoken, is the peculiar province 
 of God, and forget that every truth and true principle, for in- 
 stance justice and its pure administration, is his likewise. 
 The religious fanatic believes that everything which does not 
 belong to religion as he imagines it is worthless or the evil
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. *j\ 
 
 production of man. God willed the state and the relations 
 of justice among men as much according to his divine inten- 
 tions as he willed the church. The fact alone that he willed 
 it is proof of the truth; for in him everything is infinite and 
 eternal, and in his will every principle is of equal importance. 
 The struggle of the Catholic church and some other denomi- 
 nations to supersede the state and make it a mere vassal 
 of the church was founded upon this erroneous view. The 
 religious fanatic believes that God is peculiarly honored by 
 peculiar measures, and therefore proportionably offended by 
 their omission or opposition. Everything, therefore, in his 
 opinion, ought to give way to these particular measures, even 
 justice, which he conceives to be of human origin. Crimes 
 have been at times committed or palliated because it was blas- 
 phemously believed that they were for the promotion of the 
 cause of God, as if the purest being, and the only all-pure 
 and all-powerful being, could be served by untruth, or injus- 
 tice, or impurity ; as if his honor could in any way depend 
 upon the actions of finite and impure beings, and as if there 
 was any other way of serving him than that of truth and 
 right. The enthusiast, moreover, has arrived at his views by 
 processes which are not deducible from reasoning ; there is 
 therefore in him that instinctive and restless fear of unsound- 
 ness or of taking offence at others not agreeing with him, as 
 if their disagreement cast reflection upon his belief senti- 
 ments which, in default of the power of truth, lead to perse- 
 cution either by way of revenge or propagation of its tenets. 
 Radical conviction is calm; superficial conviction restless, 
 heated, angry. 1 
 
 LXII. These remarks apply to fanaticism in all religions; 
 but there are some features peculiar to Christian fanaticism, 
 arising out of the peculiar character of the Bible, that code on 
 which the faith of the Christian is founded. The Bible is a 
 
 1 [Enthusiasm in a good sense is a generous ardor for that which is good, true, 
 humane. In a somewhat degenerate sense it is ardor disproportionate to the 
 magnitude of the object. Fanaticism is that one-sided zeal united with hatred.]
 
 7 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 book composed of various parts, which have a different char- 
 acter; it contains inspired truths and revelations, it contains 
 records of facts, or, in other words, historical accounts, and the 
 political laws calculated for a peculiar government, a theocracy 
 of a particular nation, the Hebrews. To what melancholy 
 errors and unspeakable sufferings the mistaken impression 
 has led, that those historical parts which record facts con- 
 tain, in addition to the truths legitimately drawn from their 
 aim and purpose, others applicable in totally different spheres, 
 for instance in science and politics, how consciences have 
 been coerced and the purest religion has been degraded into 
 a handmaid of sordid passions, every one who has but glanced 
 at history knows well. The whole code of laws destined for 
 the Jews and adapted to the specific state of their civilization 
 and to the object to be obtained by that specific theocracy, 
 has led to fearful fanaticism, applied, as it has been, to objects 
 for which it was never intended. The Mosaic law of prop- 
 erty, of government, of administration of justice, especially 
 the penal laws, would be subversive of the most sacred inter- 
 ests of society if put in practice in our times, for many of them 
 are repulsive to the feelings of humanity which have become 
 developed by the intervening diffusion of Christianity, in con- 
 sequence of that very civilization which those laws contributed 
 to bring about 
 
 The Bible has not nullified man's moral or intellectual 
 character; it contains absolute prescriptions of principles, not 
 absolute prescriptions of specific actions, such as the officer 
 for instance receives from his commander. 
 
 LXIII. Respecting the inspired parts of the Bible, which 
 reveal religious truths, I must remind the reader of what was 
 said in the first part, of the character of those truths which 
 Christ taught, namely, that he limited himself strictly to re- 
 ligious truths. A similar remark applies to the whole Bible. 
 Two different views may be taken of revelation through the 
 mouth of man. Either the inspired writer utters words by way 
 of dictation, or he pronounces in human language what reve-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 73 
 
 lation, a direct communication from the divine to the human 
 mind, leads the latter to pronounce. The translations of the 
 Bible into modern languages will somewhat explain the latter 
 view. They contain the full revelation, yet the words con- 
 veying them were not inspired dictation. Whichever view 
 may be taken, it appears that the inspiring Spirit did not pur- 
 pose to stop by this act the course of the development of 
 mankind, but only to reveal so much as was necessary for 
 religion ; and therefore religious truths only. The inspired 
 men were not made divinely omniscient; their minds were 
 led to promulgate truths, and these alone were inspired. 
 As they had to deliver their inspiration in human language, 
 so they remained men of their own times, in all that had no 
 direct relation to religion, in many of their views respecting 
 public or domestic government, for instance, the arts, the 
 sciences, or other branches; and God has allowed other na- 
 tions far to exceed the Hebrews in very many branches, which 
 yet are of the highest importance to mankind. The Greeks, for 
 instance, far excelled the Jews in the fine arts, in composition 
 and criticism, and in all the sciences; and it would be no 
 greater error to seek for the principles of architecture, mathe- 
 matics, dramatic poetry, or botany, in the Bible, than to derive 
 an equitable and safe system of justice or the organization of 
 government for a civilized and free people of our times from 
 the laws of the Jews. The Bible was not intended to make 
 men inert copyists. We are destined to exert ourselves, and 
 to pursue with those powers with which the Creator has be- 
 nignly endowed us the aims he has prescribed in his wisdom. 
 Still less are we justified in accusing those of irreligion who 
 conceive the Bible to be a book of religion, and I believe they 
 act impiously if they take it as a book of science, politics, or 
 the arts. There are very strong passages in the works of some 
 of the Reformers against the abuse of the Bible in using it 
 for foreign purposes. A modern writer, archbishop Whately, 
 speaking of the unhallowed attacks which have been made 
 upon political economy under the cloak of religion, makes 
 some remarks which agree so well with what I hold to be
 
 4 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 true that I shall be excused for subjoining an extract from 
 them. 1 Who would doubt but that by the revelation of a few 
 
 1 " Till the advocates of Christianity shall have become universally much bet- 
 ter acquainted with the true character of their religion than universally they have 
 ever yet been, we must always expect that every branch of study, every scientific 
 theory that is brought into notice, will be assailed on religious grounds, by those 
 who either have not studied the subject, or who are incompetent judges of it ; or, 
 again, who are addressing themselves to such persons as are so circumstanced, 
 and wish to excite and to take advantage of the passions of the ignorant. ' Flec- 
 tere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo.' 
 
 " Some there are who sincerely believe that the Scriptures contain revelations 
 of truths the most distinct from religion. Such persons procured accordingly a 
 formal condemnation (very lately rescinded) of the theory of the earth's motion, 
 as at variance with Scripture. In Protestant countries, and now, it seems, even 
 in Popish, this point has been conceded ; but that the erroneous principle that of 
 appealing to revelation on questions of physical science has not yet been entirely 
 cleared away is evident from the objections, which most of you probably may 
 have heard, to the researches of geology. The objections against astronomy 
 have been abandoned rather perhaps from its having been made to appear that 
 the Scripture accounts of the phenomena of the heavens may be reconciled with 
 the conclusions of science, than from its being understood that Scripture is not 
 the test by which the conclusions of science are to be tried. And accordingly, 
 when attention was first called to the researches of geology, many who were 
 startled at the novelty of some of the conclusions drawn, and yet were averse to 
 enter on a new field of study, or found themselves incapable of maintaining many 
 notions they had been accustomed to acquiesce in, betook themselves at once to 
 Scripture, and reviled the students of geology as hostile to revelation ; in the 
 same manner as, in pagan and Popish countries, any one who is conscious of 
 crime or of debt flies at once to the altar and shelters himself in the sanctuary." 
 
 ..." Historical or physical truths may be established by their own proper 
 evidence ; and this, therefore, is the course we are bound to pursue. The Chris- 
 tian will indeed feel antecedently a strong persuasion that such conclusions as I 
 have been speaking of, or any others which are really inconsistent with the IJible, 
 never will be established; that any theory seemingly at variance with it will 
 either be found deficient in evidence, or else reconcilable with the Scriptures. 
 But it is not a sign of faith on the contrary, it indicates rather a want of faith, 
 or else a culpable indolence to decline meeting any theorist on his own ground, 
 and to cut short the controversy by an appeal to the authority of Scripture. For if 
 we really are convinced of the truth of Scripture, and consequently of the falsity of 
 any theory (of the earth for instance) which is really at variance with it, we must 
 needs believe that that theory is also at variance with observable phenomena, and 
 we ought not therefore to shrink from trying that question by an appeal to these. 
 The success of such an appeal will then add to the evidence for the truth of the 
 Scriptures, instead of burdening them with the weight of defending every point 
 which they incidentally imply. It is for us to ' behave ourselves valiantly for our
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 75 
 
 principles in natural philosophy for instance, or political 
 economy, many of the gravest errors and much consequent 
 bloodshed might have been prevented; yet he who did not 
 choose to reveal these principles and allowed mankind in due 
 time to find them out must have had his wise ends. Since 
 he has denied revelations except on religious truths, we act 
 irreligiously if we misapply his revelations for ends for which 
 they were not intended. 
 
 The government of the Hebrews was a theocracy, and 
 everything in it was subservient to this one great object, the 
 protection of the worship of a single God against contamina- 
 tion, until at length monotheism should cease to be a national 
 religion and become that of the world. So soon as this mo- 
 ment had arrived, the Hebrew government, solely calculated 
 for that object, and for the Jews in their then state, lost its 
 meaning, and it is utterly unfit to be imitated by other 
 nations, who have to solve totally different problems. It is 
 just, therefore, to say that no book is less fit to be imitated 
 in politics than the Old Testament, because no system of 
 politics has been calculated for so entirely peculiar a state of 
 things ; and yet, since Christ does not touch politics, we find 
 that at all times fanatics, if they turn for politics to the Bible 
 at all, will naturally be chiefly attracted by the Old Testa- 
 ment. I have mentioned elsewhere already for what opposite 
 and often awful political systems and pretensions the Bible 
 has been abused to serve as a foundation. Catholics and Prot- 
 estants have equally erred on this subject, and while some 
 denounced all force and constraint exercised by government, 
 and preached the most revolting licentiousness, all the time 
 pretending to rely for every proposition of theirs on the Bible, 
 Bossuet could write his Polities drawn from the proper words 
 
 country and for the cities of our God,' instead of bringing the ark of God into the 
 field of battle to fight for us. He will, at all events, we may be sure, defend his 
 own cause, and finally lay prostrate the Dagon of infidelity, but we, his professed 
 defenders, more zealous in reality for our own honor than for his, shall deserve to 
 be smitten before the Philistines." Lect. ii., Introductory Lectures on Political 
 Economy, London, 1831.
 
 76 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of holy writ, almost entirely in biblical phrases, and yet pro- 
 duce a work in the spirit of his absolute master, Louis XIV., 
 and in his own spirit of a careful courtier-prelate to such a 
 master. 
 
 LXIV. If we call religious fanaticism all perversion of our 
 actions by undue application or influence of religious doctrines 
 in spheres which are not strictly religious, we shall be led to 
 the following truths and rules respecting political and othej 
 social relations : 
 
 Persecution is not only irreligious, but there is likewise no 
 earthly right of using political power and authority for re- 
 ligious persecution, because political power is power arising 
 out of the state, which is the society of right, and right has 
 nothing to do with matters of faith. 
 
 Persecution, however, though it be not of a political char- 
 acter, may be highly oppressive and yet remain essentially 
 social. A man may be deprived of his good name, necessary 
 intercourse or subsistence, by social action, and yet be unable 
 to use political protection against it. It is one of the worst 
 species of persecution, because there is no protection against 
 it. But lately a very disgraceful instance took place in Eng- 
 land. The bishops of Durham and Norwich, having sub- 
 scribed for a copy of a work written by a Unitarian, were so 
 loudly and vehemently clamored against by clergymen and 
 laymen that they believed themselves obliged to write what 
 cannot be termed other than submissive letters. 1 Thus a 
 
 * The letter of the bishop of Norwich bears date November I, 1838. The 
 bishop of Durham had previously written one. Both found it necessary to ex- 
 cuse their subscribing O n the ground that they did it on account of politeness 
 to Mr. Turner, the Unitarian author, according to them a man of unblemished, 
 character and great talent. Requisitions to the archbishop of Canterbury, to 
 institute an episcopal commission to inquire into the conduct of the two bishops 
 " in having subscribed to a work intended to promulgate the infidel heresy of 
 Socinianism," were signed by the clergy of the several dioceses. The epithets 
 given to the two prelates remind one of the worst and bitterest times of contro- 
 versy when the church preached and supported the doctrine of divine right and 
 absolute obedience. They were called " consecrated culprits," " obscene and
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 77 
 
 theologian would not even be allowed to study all books on 
 theology. The articles written and the speeches made against 
 them showed sufficiently the profane hypocrisy and political 
 rancor against these two prelates, they having been appointed 
 by the whig administration in power. And this is one of the 
 necessary consequences of all fanaticism, that it lends aid to 
 and promotes hypocrisy, and on the other hand seeks for the 
 proof of essential religion in specific acts, without considera- 
 tion of their whole bearing, thus making of the most spiritual 
 and divine things a gross matter of outward signs. 
 
 The same must be said of that indirect persecution which 
 favors, in the mutual dependence of society, persons accord- 
 ing to tenets. The danger is invariably that on our own part 
 we expose ourselves to all the dangers of fanaticism, because 
 we are carrying by this very means principles of religion into 
 spheres to which they are alien ; for instance, if we decline to 
 buy from an honest and poor merchant, because he is not of 
 our sect. And on the other hand we promote hypocrisy and 
 desecrate religion, because we make tenets the test of actions 
 and of intercourse which ought to have nothing to do with 
 them. I know of instances where commercial credit was given 
 on a recommendation of a minister on strictly so-called reli- 
 gious grounds. Is not this desecration ? The only safe rule, 
 I believe, is this, that we regulate our intercourse of mutual 
 dependence solely by the honesty, purity, skill, and claims of 
 
 flippant pamphleteers," " time-serving remonstrants," " rotten liberals," " hard- 
 ened criminals," "men at the thought of whom the soul sickens," "liberal and 
 Protean bishops," " loose and lowly priests," " Judases," " perfidious prelates," 
 " surpliced traitors," ' white-robed ministers of Satan," " pet sons of the devil," 
 and many more names as disgusting. All these invectives were in articles of 1017 
 papers, which sanctimoniously pretended to write for the true cause of Christ, 
 and the crown of England, frequently in strains of blasphemous hypocrisy. In- 
 deed, seeing at the distance, as we did, those articles of virulence and acrimony 
 garnished with passages from the book of peace and love, we could hardly be- 
 lieve that they belonged to our times. It is the duty of every well-wisher of his 
 species firmly to look truth in the face, and fix upon evils, if dangerous, without 
 fear. It is in this spirit that this note has been written. Let us all take an ex- 
 ample, and call scandal what is scandalous, disgraceful what disgraces, and gloss 
 nothing over in fear or sectarian party spirit.
 
 78 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 dependence in the individual himself. For, the moment that 
 we direct our daily actions of common intercourse by the 
 profession of religious tenets, we desecrate religion, and pro- 
 mote hypocrisy on the one hand or chilling and ruinous irre- 
 ligion on the other. * : 
 
 In doing this we likewise fetter the mind, and prevent free 
 and conscientious inquiry, and expose ourselves to one of the 
 most grievous errors, that of hiding the faults or crimes of 
 those who profess the same tenets with ourselves. The Cath- 
 olic orders as well as many Protestant sects have frequently 
 committed this grave fault of mistaking the means, the uniting 
 into a sect or church, for the object, truth, religion, active 
 piety. I have mentioned already the just view of Augustine 
 on this subject, that it is better that scandal arise. than that 
 truth and justice suffer. This false spirit is not peculiar to 
 religious societies ; all bodies of men have that esprit du 
 corps and weakness of shrinking from exposing their fellow- 
 members ; but, as fanaticism always believes that everything 
 it does or suffers is for the honor of God, so is religious fanati- 
 cism peculiarly apt to mislead in this particular. 
 
 Of vast danger is religious fanaticism in politics if it seizes 
 upon free nations and introduces into politics the test of re- 
 ligion which, if this word is applied to large masses and by 
 way of distinction, means of course the profession of certain 
 tenets. The state is the jural society, and as conscientious 
 citizens we have no right to judge by anything but relations 
 of right. We act unconscientiously if, for instance, in voting 
 for or against a citizen, we are influenced by other tests than 
 his uprightness, honesty, capacity, and general fitness for the 
 particular object. It is indirect persecution if we are influ- 
 enced by dogmas, for he has a right to have his own, as we 
 have ours; we turn the state from its true end, we promote 
 the mere profession of tenets, that is hypocrisy, and may, for 
 aught we can calculate, pave the way to open and cruel per- 
 secution. The history of the Western and Eastern Empires 
 after the conversion of Constantino, when dogmas became the 
 most active elements of politics, and led to indescribable
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 79 
 
 misery and wretchedness, physical and mental, as well as the 
 many instances of the unfortunate and unhallowed application 
 of dogmas to politics by both Protestants and Catholics, arising 
 out of the religious struggle of the times of the Reformation, 
 ought to be taken as a lesson too grave ever to be disregarded. 
 I repeat that persecution may be violent, undermining, and 
 ruinous, without showing itself in bloodshed. It may be 
 strictly social, and thus may degrade that which is the best of 
 all things that man can possess a pure and true religion. The 
 more a man values his religion and the sacred communion 
 which the infinite Deity permits a finite individual to hold 
 with himself, the less he will be apt to desire its desecration 
 by making his belief a test of external intercourse with so- 
 ciety at large. The more men pretend to intermix politics or 
 the intercourse arising out of mutual exchange with religion, 
 the surer we may always be that they are either blinded by 
 fanaticism or prompted by selfish ends, or, as is most common, 
 jointly by both.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Patriotism. The Patriotism of the Ancients ; of the Moderns. Some have re- 
 jected Patriotism. National Conceit, Pride. Narrowness of Feeling a Coun- 
 terfeit of Patriotism. What is true Patriotism ? It is noble and necessary for 
 Liberty. Loyalty. Public Spirit. What it consists in. Calamitous Conse- 
 quences of a Want of Public Spirit. Veneration for the Old ; Forefathers. 
 How far just, necessary. When injurious. The Age of Action under Forty; 
 of Conservatism over Forty. Do Times grow worse ? When are we more 
 experienced than our Forefathers ? Stagnation and Heedlessness. 
 
 LXV. WE have seen, in the first volume, that with the 
 ancients the individual, as far as rights were concerned, was 
 almost absorbed by the state ; all they were felt to be they 
 were in and through the state ; and not only was their state 
 a political institution, but a separate religion, with peculiar 
 national deities and distinct national dogmas, was closely 
 interwoven with it. The national religion thus aided in sepa- 
 rating the specific state or nation from others a circumstance 
 powerfully promoted by another fact. The Greeks, and after 
 them the Romans, were so far advanced in civilization beyond 
 the other tribes known to them that they looked down upon 
 them as benighted beings of an inferior kind; the stranger 
 was a barbarian. In the attachment, therefore, which an an- 
 cient felt for his state, in his love of country, his patriotism, 
 were united and amalgamated nearly all the intensest affections 
 which animate the human breast religion, with all the power- 
 ful associations of poetry, legends, and mythologic history; the 
 affection for his kindred tribe and native land, its institutions 
 and history, its language and literature ; and consciousness 
 of superiority, disdain of foreigners, and hatred when they 
 became invaders and threatened to smother this superior 
 civilization. When the Persian attacked the Greek, not only 
 were his life and property endangered, but his higher life, 
 his whole being as an individual, which we believe will last 
 80
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 8 1 
 
 beyond this earthly existence, was in jeopardy. Patriotism, 
 therefore, comprehended the acme of all virtuous feelings, of 
 piety, of love of civilization ; it was the meridian of man's 
 most noble existence. Christianity severed religion from the 
 soil, from earthly citizenship. He was told that religion is 
 above, beyond the difference of language, color, kindred, 
 descent, or country. Chivalry arose, and became a tie be- 
 yond national affection ; the church with its monasteries 
 became a super-national society, which with its common lan- 
 guage, the Latin, with the monastic orders extending over 
 many political limits and under one common discipline, th6 
 seminaries, mingling the youths of various nations, the pil- 
 grimages to distant lands, 1 and the frequent emigrations of 
 priests, produced a common feeling, despite the many feuds 
 between parts and particles in this European society. Vast 
 enthusiastic movements, such as the crusades, aided still 
 more, if not in cementing nations (for the feudal systems pre- 
 vented this), in extinguishing that form of patriotism which 
 it had naturally assumed among the ancients. In the course 
 of time, however, three great historical processes took place 
 in the European race : first, that which we may call the 
 nationalization of tribes and governments; France became 
 gradually one France, Spain one Spain; then the growth of 
 national languages, poetry, and literature, in opposition to the 
 Latin, by the rise of nations and great minds among them. 
 Dante, who dared to sing in " vulgar Italian," and pressed at 
 once the seal of his genius upon the idiom of the unlettered, 
 felt still obliged to ask pardon that he did not continue to 
 compose in Latin, as he had begun, on so sacred a subject as 
 
 1 Among others, Frederic Riihs, in his Manual of the History of the Middle 
 Ages, Berlin, 1816, mentions the pilgrims as one of the means by which mutual 
 knowledge of one another among the nations of Europe was kept up, a slender 
 means, yet in the absence of other and powerful ones in the darkest periods not 
 undeserving of attention. I quote from memory, but believe I am correct as to 
 the above author. Whether this be so or not, I consider it a fact that the innumer- 
 able pilgrimages, attended with many evil consequences, had also the mentioned 
 good effect of aiding to keep alive sympathy among the Western Christian 
 nations. 
 
 VOL. II. 6
 
 82 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 his was. Finally, the Reformation. This event or process 
 of civilization broke in many countries the uniting tie of the 
 church. But a new common bond had arisen, and was rapidly 
 increasing in strength, a general pursuit of knowledge, the tie 
 of common European science, promoting in its turn intercom- 
 munication, both mental and, owing to the gradual fusion of 
 the sciences and arts, physical also, which was still more in- 
 creased by the greater security caused by the gradual nation- 
 alization of states and governments. Sciences naturally lead 
 to general views ; they have, in the main, a strongly cosmo- 
 politan character; and, above all, we have seen that natural 
 law, that science which treats of the rights of men, flowing 
 from their nature, of justice, and not merely of positive or his- 
 torical law, arose, and was and is cultivated by the moderns, 
 while the Christian religion must ever continue to exercise a 
 more and more cosmopolitan character, the more purely it 
 dwells among men. There was thus no possibility of a return 
 of patriotism in its ancient manifestation. 
 
 LXVI. It was felt and seen that ancient patriotism, height- 
 ened to national or state egotism, could no longer exist or be 
 endured. " The barriers are broken which severed states and 
 nations in hostile egotism. One cosmopolitan bond unites at 
 present all thinking minds, and all the light of this century 
 may now freely fall upon a new Galileo or Erasmus." 1 On 
 the other hand, it was observed how churlish, narrow, unjust, 
 or even wicked that frequently is which is claimed as patriot- 
 ism, how directly opposed to truth, how blind in its selfishness. 
 
 I do not speak here of clannishness, which is at its height 
 and extreme perhaps in the Scotchman, and which by the 
 great painter of his country's customs has been represented, no 
 doubt in strong yet in true colors, as rising at times beyond 
 everything, even the fear of final eternal doom; 2 nor of the 
 
 1 Schiller, Inaugural address on : " What is, and for what purpose do we study, 
 universal history?" first delivered in 1789. It is contained in his works. 
 
 2 Walter Scott depicts this fearful feeling of attachment to the chief of the clan, 
 family, etc., in Elspeth in "The Antiquary," etc., especially in chap. xii. vol.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 83 
 
 petty and selfish feeling, the utmost extent of which is the 
 town limit; but I speak of that national egotism which is 
 blind to truth and callous to justice beyond the nation's fron- 
 tier, and which has been used for various and opposite evil 
 ends, so much so that men have not been wanting who not 
 only looked upon patriotism as beneath a true elevation of 
 mind, but have actually declaimed against it. A late writer 
 exclaims, " What misery has not already been caused by the 
 love of country! How much has not this counterfeit virtue 
 excelled all acknowledged vices in wild fury ! Is the selfish- 
 ness of a country less a vice than that of an individual ? Does 
 justice cease to be a virtue so soon ,as we exercise it towards 
 a foreign nation ? It is a fine species of honor, indeed, which 
 prohibits us from declaring ourselves against our country 
 when justice no longer stands by its side!" 1 If patriotism is 
 founded upon selfishness, and therefore cannot but lead to in- 
 justice, if it tends to blind us against truth, then indeed it is 
 one of our first and most sacred duties to pluck this rank 
 
 ii., in colors which every foreigner would certainly consider beyond all possibility, 
 did he not know that Scott never, probably, gave a wrong account of manners, 
 national feelings, etc., except from want of knowledge, which in the above char- 
 acter cannot well have been the case. 
 
 * Louis Borne, a late German writer of much keenness and boldness, who was 
 obliged to leave Germany and take up his abode at Paris, where he wrote many 
 a bitter, many a witty, many a true, and many a false thing. He belonged to a 
 party, if such it can be called, in Germany, who wish to unite their endeavors 
 with that which gives itself the singular name of la jeune France, thus raising, 
 probably for the first time, age into a political party distinction. These parties 
 seem to think that liberty has yet to be born, and that this new god will be 
 brought forth by the union of the two great nations to whom all this procreation 
 of new liberty seems to have been assigned, the French and the Germans. The 
 Anglican tree of liberty, which is an oak of centuries, is thus treated as if its 
 mighty branches did not reach already over many countries, and over France and 
 Germany too. But I must stop, lest I should make of a note an historical dis- 
 cussion. As to the above passage, to which this note is appended, I have for the 
 present to say only that the author is mistaken as to the degree of fanaticism 
 which has arisen out of patriotism. I know of no fanaticism which has so re- 
 peaiedly affected mankind in so great a degree as religious fanaticism. His 
 whole argument would thus turn more strongly still against religion were it cor- 
 rect in its conclusion.
 
 8 4 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 weed out of our heart. Justice is above all ; truth is the only 
 legitimate sphere of the human mind and soul. 
 
 LXVII. If patriotism consisted in national vanity, pride, or 
 self-sufficiency, which are its counterfeits, and one or the other 
 of which we meet with in all nations from the Chinese to the 
 Americans, it should be avoided by every wise man. But is 
 it so? does there not exist a real virtue, compatible with 
 purity of heart and general good will, and which has pro- 
 duced the best effects, which is deeply planted in the human 
 breast and ought to be most carefully awakened and culti- 
 vated P 1 
 
 Reflecting men have frequently fallen into two serious 
 errors, of which the one is, indeed, a consequence of the 
 other. In seeking for truth, and hence for distinctness and 
 clearness, they have often conceived that only to be real, 
 sound, or true which can be established by the calculating or 
 analyzing understanding, of which the plain end and object, 
 
 1 To give instances of national vanity would be a task difficult on account of 
 the difficulty of choice only. I will merely mention that quite recently I have 
 met with a passage in a distinguished French work, which speaks of the French 
 as being at the head of civilization with an assurance which resembles the man- 
 ner in which Napoleon spoke of " the Great Nation." In another work, soon 
 after, I saw it stated that Prussia stands at the head of European civilization. 
 In an address of a large sect to Queen Victoria, the British nation was called the 
 greatest on the face of the earth ; and that the Americans in their turn are the 
 first in the world, we may easily find by turning to any of their endless and in- 
 numerable addresses. Of all the feelings connected with this subject pride is 
 nevertheless the least evil, while small conceiledness, as we find its prototype in 
 the last stages of Athenian democracy, is a serious disease without any redeem- 
 ing quality. It affords a handle to narrow-minded demagogues and unfits the 
 people for any just or enlarged views and elevated feelings. There are rules ot 
 good breeding of social intercourse gradually settled by good sense and mutual 
 regard. Among these rules it is now universally adopted that gross flattery 
 shows excessive ill breeding, and is taken rather as an insult than a compliment. 
 When shall we have our rules of good breeding in politics? When will flat and 
 gross, dull and cumbrous flattery in a public speaker be taken as an insult by his 
 hearers, as a young lady would feel grossly offended were we to address speeches 
 to her which were given as pattern speeches to ladies in works on politeness two 
 hundred years ago ?
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 85 
 
 the use as well as the origin, can be stated in so many 
 words; forgetting at once that as finite beings we must begin 
 to reason from a finite beginning, and that the ultimate object 
 must be beyond utility, because utility expresses only a ser 
 viceableness for an object, so that the ultimate object itself 
 must be good in its own nature. We may show how one 
 thing serves for another ; but we must needs end somewhere, 
 that is, we must arrive at a final object which is its own 
 end. 1 
 
 The second error is that men have been misled to consider 
 their subject as totally separate and insulated, forgetting that 
 everywhere there are gradual and connecting transitions be- 
 tween those points where things show themselves in their 
 fullest and most developed character transitions which exist 
 no more between the animal and the plant, for instance, than 
 between the arts, or institutions, or ideas, as the Useful and 
 the Ornamental, the Just and the Fair, or anything that is 
 mental, social, or human. It is not only right but necessary, 
 in order to obtain the clearest possible insight into any sub- 
 ject, first to consider it absolutely, that is in its essentials, by 
 which it wholly differs from all other things, for which pur- 
 pose we must examine it when at the highest degree of per- 
 fection peculiar to itself. If we omit this, we shall obtain but 
 indistinct ideas, leading to a thousand erroneous conclusions. 
 But having done this it is equally important to view the same 
 subject in all its transitions, through which it is affiliated and 
 joined, in the various directions, to other things. By doing 
 this we can alone discover its position and bearing. As an 
 instance I will take the courts of justice. They have to ad- 
 minister justice, they have to do with right. This is the 
 characteristic of this institution. The opposite extreme to 
 strict justice is self-denying love. Between the two stands 
 
 1 I have met with an old German sermon in pamphlet form, entitled " The 
 Utility of Eternal Bliss" (Ucber den Nutzen eruiger Gliickseligkeif]. It was in 
 the hands of a seller of old books, and I have often regretted that I did not pur- 
 chase it; but I did not then know how often in my life I should be reminded of 
 this unique instance of extravagant consistency in the utilitarian theory.
 
 86 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 fairness ; and we shall not obtain a perfect and partial view of 
 courts of justice if we do not consider, among other things, 
 the very subtle transition from the strictly just to that which 
 is fair, and if we do not consider that, although the law is the 
 rule by which the judge is bound to decide, this very law, 
 being made by man and drawn up in human language, is not 
 absolute like a mathematical formula, but in many cases must 
 be interpreted in its application. These rules, the omission 
 of either of which has misled many philosophers, are of great 
 importance in all meditations on subjects connected with the 
 state, and, as we shall see presently, on patriotism. 
 
 LXVIII. One of the strong impulses to action is interest, 
 but alone it would altogether fail to effect many necessary 
 things ; and a stronger impulse than is afforded by interest is 
 that of sympathy. It gives in many cases the first impulse to 
 action, and often supersedes interest or that which is clearly 
 to be proved by the understanding. Men were destined, as 
 we have seen, to establish families; from them civilization 
 proceeds : yet neither did men originally nor do they gen- 
 erally now unite in marriage after having calculated their 
 interest, nor, in most cases, after having clearly represented 
 to themselves the pleasure they may derive from domestic 
 happiness. Sympathy attracts them, and weds closer than 
 cither of the other two motives could do. Nor does a man 
 who feels deeply attached to one woman among so many 
 thousand thereby declare that he holds her to be better, 
 wiser, purer than all the rest. He merely shows that sym- 
 pathy draws him to her in particular. We are commanded 
 to love our parents, which means of course to love and 
 cherish them in particular, but by obeying this command- 
 ment we do not mean to express that we consider them 
 better than all the rest of mankind, nor that we hate the 
 others because we love these in particular. The command- 
 ment directs particular attention to the lawful effect of a pecu- 
 liar sympathy, and to the callousness of a heart in which 
 this primary sympathy has no effect. .Yet it cannot be proved
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 87 
 
 by the mere understanding, The parents in many cases may 
 indeed not deserve the warm thanks of their offspring ; they 
 may have done no more than what in the common relations 
 of society they could not well help doing. The children may 
 have many reasons for dissatisfaction, and yet sympathy is 
 not on that account extinguished. It is the same with 
 patriotism : it is not to be calculated according to interest, 
 nor is it a duty first established by a train of reasoning; but 
 we reason upon the feeling already existing, and then find 
 how great an agent it is in God's household. The immense 
 power of association, in all its varieties, from the nursery song 
 to the highest national epic, forms, sounds, colors, things and 
 persons, joys and pains, all have seized upon us, and we feel 
 attached to our country, we love it; but we do not hate 
 others on that account. We may value other countries 
 higher, in the abstract We might say, We believe if we were 
 to be born again, and were to have the choice, with present 
 knowledge and without present feelings, we would choose a 
 certain other, and yet would love our country, such as we 
 now are, because our soul feels there at home. We may see 
 our country engaged in a wrong war, and yet we shudder at 
 the bare idea of fighting against her. We may reprove her 
 follies or vices, may strive to correct them and justly acknowl- 
 edge that other countries have no such vices, and yet we feel 
 closely attached to her. We may not be able to arrive by 
 mere reasoning at the result that we should labor for our 
 country or sacrifice ourselves for her. We might say, Is not 
 the state that institution which exists for the great purpose, 
 among others, of protecting my life? how then is it reason- 
 able to expect that I should expose it for the state, or rush to 
 offer it when not called upon ? and yet would feel tJiat within 
 us which prompted Sir John Eliot calmly to assign over 
 every portion of his extensive estates to relatives in trust 
 for the benefit of his family, make all directions respecting 
 the education of his children, dearly beloved by him, and 
 then go to the "great, warm, and ruffling" parliament of 
 1626, where he expected, and, unfortunately, met with, all the
 
 38 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 danger for which he had prepared himself. 1 We may honor 
 Eversteen of Holland, whose father and four brothers had 
 fallen by the enemy, who yet asked for re-appointment in ser- 
 vice, so that he might likewise fall " on the bed of honor." 2 
 We honor Aristides, whom injustice banished, and who still 
 loved Athens. And why ? Because we love our country. 
 
 LXIX. But it is not sufficient that we see that it is so. 
 The question is whether it ought so to be. Most assuredly 
 it ought to be so. For all nobler pursuits there must be one 
 primary impulse, beyond interest, and which binds us reli- 
 giously to that pursuit. We ought to do good even without 
 any selfish ends; why? Because the love of the good impels 
 us to acknowledge it. It is the religion of morals. The 
 scholar pursues his science; for interest's sake? It may be 
 directly against it. For the promotion of ease, or quiet of 
 mind ? He may be led to much anxiety, and yet not give 
 up his career. It is the religious love of truth which impels 
 him, the yearning for action, for the use of those faculties 
 with which he is peculiarly endowed. The artist produces 
 his works of art. He might enjoy greater tranquillity, per- 
 haps, in other spheres. His religious love of the beautiful 
 impels him. The patriotic citizen acts for the benefit of 
 others ; not for his interest, but because that sympathy and 
 impulse, patriotism, impels him to share dangers, to work out 
 liberty for those who are not yet born, to preserve liberty. 
 Patriotism is the religion of liberty and the state, and at 
 all times have tyrants and sordid politicians been at pains 
 to deride it, unless they expected to turn it to their own 
 account. 
 
 Without patriotism, we might easily show that a free 
 state could not possibly endure, for, extinguish patriotism or 
 public spirit, a species of the former, and all must dissolve 
 into dreary, heartless egotism. But even to regret such an 
 
 1 Forster's Life of Sir John Eliot, vol. ii. p. 38, of British Statesmen. 
 
 2 Van Campen, History of the Netherlands, vol. ii. p. 196.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 89 
 
 occurrence and strive to prevent it requires patriotism in all 
 cases when we can gain nothing for ourselves, or when in all 
 probability we shall sacrifice more than we can obtain. We 
 can see its necessity from those higher points of view from 
 which we perceive that society is a continuous union, with the 
 great ends of justice and civilization; but no man indeed can 
 prove by enlightened self-interest what earthly interest I ought 
 to take in future generations, or what it matters to me per- 
 sonally whether the literature of my country flourishes or is 
 eradicated by a barbarian foe. 
 
 LXX. Patriotism forms likewise the transition and link be- 
 tween the state as the jural institution, and the society as the 
 aggregate of living men, with their associations arising out of 
 their history and the soil in short, the country ; it stands be- 
 tween the abstract demand of justice and love of kindred. It 
 is that sympathy which brings affection into the state, and 
 without which the state would often be deprived of its primum 
 mobile ; for right is based, as we have seen, on individuality ; 
 interest may unite, but it may also sever. Without patriotic 
 spirit, men would separate into different sects, hostile parties, 
 companies, schools of science ; and interest alone or abstract 
 right would not be able to supply the bond. Those Asiatic 
 tribes which for centuries have passed from one conqueror to 
 another, and Rome ever since the downfall of the republic, 
 afford us melancholy instances of the absence of patriotism. 
 If then we mean by patriotism the " whole body of those 
 affections which unite men's hearts to the commonwealth," 1 
 it is for any nation a most indispensable element of civil suc- 
 cess, which cannot be supplanted by any utility; it infuses life 
 and vigor into all parts of the nation, and produces mutual 
 support, magnanimity, and elevation of public action ; it is a 
 virtue as much as the love of parents. Still, we do not say 
 that it is an affection to which all others must absolutely give 
 
 1 This is the definition which Mackintosh gave of public spirit in Peltier's trial. 
 (State Trials, vol. xxviii. p. 573.) But I believe it designates patriotism.
 
 go POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 way. " Patria cara, carior libertas." If those elements which 
 make up what we call our country (patria) the land, the 
 people, their history, their institutions, their liberty separate, 
 we must adhere to the higher and highest, in preference to the 
 lower. If we cannot have liberty in our native country, and 
 cannot aid in establishing it there, if we are oppressed, we 
 are surely not bound to stay, although we may feel pain at 
 the separation even then, and often look back with a home- 
 sick heart. 
 
 Patriotism is an affection for our country, made up, as are 
 all deep-rooted affections, of a thousand associations and in- 
 fluences. Patriotism in modern times, when the stages of 
 action, knowledge, and our very feeling to all men are so much 
 enlarged, in comparison with what they were in ancient times, 
 requires a country, to be deep and fruitful. Our reminiscences 
 and attachments must be national ; the glory in which we 
 delight must be that of the country, the glory acquired by 
 our nation in the fields of science and the arts, of literature, 
 and of arms in defending her institutions and liberty ; the 
 sympathy and powerful associations must be sufficiently dis- 
 tinct from those of the men of other countries, to make patri- 
 otism an intense feeling; but a small community, for instance 
 a city, does not supply a sufficient amount of affections to 
 seize upon the whole inner man, and consequently does not 
 afford a marked line by which to distinguish these strong 
 affections from those of others ; as for instance the patriotic 
 affections of a German for Germany are distinguished from 
 those of a Frenchman for France. In ancient times this was 
 different. Languages, literature, historic reminiscences, ex- 
 tend over countries. And even in ancient times, when was the 
 Greek more nobly and more admirably and truly Greek than 
 when he was Grecian in a national sense? Whether at Olym- 
 pia or at Marathon, he was greatest when he felt himself 
 wholly Greek. Sismondi's work on the Italian Republics in 
 the Middle Ages contains a passage in one of the concluding 
 chapters (end of chapter cxxvi., vol. xvi., ed. of 1818) which 
 illustrates the preceding remarks in a pointed manner : " Italy."
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. gi 
 
 says the celebrated historian, "towards the end of the eigh- 
 teenth century had always soldiers, riches, a large population, 
 flourishing agriculture, commerce and manufactures which 
 presented still great resources, men versed in the sciences, 
 others whom nature had made fit to acquire them soon; but 
 the feeling and life were missing ; and when the French revo- 
 lution broke out, there was no one in Europe who could not 
 see that Italy had neither the will nor the power to defend 
 her independence, and that a nation which had no longer 
 a country (jtatrif) could not resist, either to defend itself or its 
 neighbors." Mr. Von Raumer, speaking, in the sixth volume 
 of his History of Europe, of the endless sufferings to which 
 Germany was exposed by Louis XIV., says that so it always 
 will be when the Germans forget, that they have one common 
 country, and that they ought to have one common national 
 feeling, into however many parts they may be politically 
 divided. 
 
 Patriotism is much connected with loyalty, a warm attach- 
 ment to the institutions of our country, and an upright desire 
 to act according to the true spirit of its laws. In monarchies 
 loyalty has often been used to designate a warm attachment 
 to the royal person, which has not unfrequently existed in- 
 deed, but has also often been supposed to exist when the real 
 feeling was for the country, and the monarch was only its visi- 
 ble sign, its standard a distinction which is seen as soon as 
 the monarch ceased to represent the country. The history of 
 all times, especially since Napoleon, who produced so many 
 changes, furnishes many examples. The attachment is warmest 
 for the country, that is for the land, the people, and their his- 
 tory; that for a king, personally, must always be comparatively 
 weak in a vast country. When Nelson meant to inspire his 
 sailors before the battle of Trafalgar, he told them that Eng- 
 land expected every man to do his duty. It told well. Had 
 he said, parliament expects, it would have been much weaker, 
 yet not without effect, for it is a vast institution. Had he said, 
 the king expects, it might have had very little effect; and 
 surely it would have sounded very odd, and stirred no soul,
 
 g 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 had he said, George III., or the regent, expects, etc. The 
 name of an institution is well calculated to inspire men with 
 h feeling of duty by way of obedience. Congress have sent 
 orders to such or such an effect, would be a weighty expres- 
 sion with an officer in war; but if men were expected to act 
 with noble inspiration, it would be necessary to remind them 
 of " their beloved country." 
 
 LXXI. It was significant that with the Romans the word 
 impins comprehended at once failing against the gods, the 
 country, and the family. They felt that a temerity or base- 
 ness of heart subverting society in its elements was requisite 
 for impiety in all three cases. Patriotism is founded upon 
 what was called in the first volume national allegiance, that 
 indestructible sympathy and attachment which every uncor- 
 rupted heart feels towards its own country, not necessarily 
 the native land, but the land of one's parents and history ; 
 that "allegiance" which in reality and not in theory "is of a 
 greater extent and dimension than laws or kingdoms, and 
 cannot consist by the laws merely, because it began before 
 laws, it continueth after laws, and it is in vigor when laws are 
 suspended and have had their force," x as Lord Bacon said of 
 personal allegiance. This allegiance can consist, as we have 
 seen, with a desire or duty of emigration, but it will ever pre- 
 vent a man of any true feeling from fighting against his 
 country, except perhaps in cases of invasion of his adopted 
 country by an army of his native one. A man who can do 
 it has ever been despised as a dastard. It is not easy in some 
 cases to say where or what the country is. On the one hand 
 
 1 State Trials, vol. ii. p. 596. Bacon as well as Coke was desirous, as is well 
 known, to prove in Calvin's case that the post-nati, or Scots born after the acces- 
 sion of James I. to the throne of England, were natural subjects of the king of 
 England, and they did it by claiming personal against national allegiance. I 
 have spoken more fully of the subject in the first volume. Every one must now 
 admit how untenable a ground is the principle advanced by Bacon; for it places 
 the king, and the primitive relation of the subject to him, entirely beyond the law. 
 The whole famous case contains many positions that are more than doubtful.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 93 
 
 it is sufficiently plain that Thrasybulus did not fight against 
 his country when he returned to Athens with his army to 
 deliver her from the Spartan yoke ; on the other, no one 
 fails to be struck with the arrogance of the French emigrants 
 during the first revolution, who actually called their assem- 
 blage at Coblentz, France. It is likewise plain enough that 
 calling in armed foreigners and fighting with them against 
 the army or part of the army of our own country is one of 
 the greatest evils. The French have often declared it to be, 
 under any circumstances, treason of the worst kind, and have 
 never forgiven Moreau for having joined the allied princes, 
 nor Bernadotte for having commanded his Swedes against 
 France. Of the latter case we do not speak. A king is an 
 institution, and Bernadotte would certainly have acted treach- 
 erously towards his new country had he consulted for one 
 moment his own feelings. Although he was not then king 
 but only crown-prince, the crown was already fixed upon his 
 brow. Had he, in that situation, not felt wholly assimilated to 
 Sweden, but, as Napoleon demanded, remained a Frenchman, 
 because he was so before he entered into a solemn covenant 
 with Sweden, and had he allowed his actions to be influenced 
 by this feeling to the injury of his adopted country, treason 
 would have lurked in his heart. In the case of Moreau, our 
 decision must partly depend upon the point whether he con- 
 sidered Napoleon and his government national, or not. If he 
 faithfully believed that France was irrecoverably tyrannized 
 over so long as Napoleon ruled, and, besides, that a change 
 would be produced long ere the allied powers should enter 
 France, he certainly cannot be placed on a par with Hippias, 
 who infamously led the way for the Persians to his native 
 Attica and Greece. Yet, though we do not feel the execra- 
 tion at Moreau which the baseness of Hippias excites, does 
 not every one feel the strongest repugnance, and pause 
 with pleasure, in the account of the same wars, at the ex- 
 ample of Carnot, who had never joined Napoleon, but the 
 moment when foreigners set foot on French soil forgot the 
 government, thinking but of France, and offered his services ?
 
 94 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 His gallant defence of Antwerp showed how earnest he 
 was. 
 
 How careful we ought to be in pronouncing upon this sub- 
 ject an absolute rule, declaring, for instance, that without 
 exception the bringing of foreigners into our country is the 
 greatest of all calamities, is shown by the case of William III. 
 Were not those Englishmen right who came over with him 
 and were ready to fight against the established government 
 of the country ? Would they have deserved well had they 
 scrupled to go over from Holland with a foreign army? The 
 circumstances were peculiar, I own. The fact that the re- 
 public of the United Provinces was comparatively but a small 
 power, so that a conquest could not take place, and the chief 
 work must remain to be done by the English themselves, 
 either by fighting for William or by readily receiving him, 
 was of the greatest importance. This shows that there are 
 exceptions. On the other hand, all that Demosthenes said of 
 foreigners being called in against Philip remains generally 
 true, and the consequences proved that the Athenian was 
 right. We do not here speak of cases such as that of the 
 duke of Bourbon's leaving the French army and fighting 
 against his native country. He merited the reproach of the 
 dying Bayard. 
 
 LXXII. That genuine patriotism enlarges instead of nar- 
 rowing our views, should have appeared from the previous 
 passages. It is therefore a poor counterfeit of patriotism or 
 public spirit if foreigners, though their services should be 
 considered necessary, are excluded from this service. It is 
 against the spirit of our times, which acknowledges a general 
 union of civilization too much to admit of so narrow a view. 
 In sciences and arts in particular, foreign scholars and artists 
 have for centuries received calls from one country into another. 
 If it is perhaps less so at present in some countries than in 
 the middle ages, it is only because the chairs can now be more 
 easily filled with natives. Spain, which rapidly rose under 
 Ferdinand and Isabella, owed her glorious rise in a great
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 95 
 
 measure to her rising universities, which no natives probably 
 contributed so much to elevate as the foreigners placed in 
 their chairs, as for instance Peter Martyr. Erasmus in Eng- 
 land is another striking instance. 
 
 Among the foremost citizens in loyalty when times are 
 gloomy, foreigners who are citizens by choice and not by 
 chance will always be found. The American revolution is 
 full of such examples; nor should we forget the names of 
 Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Cabot, William I. of Orange, 
 William III., all of whom served in faith and peril or brought 
 glory to their adopted countries. 
 
 LXXIII. The term public spirit has often been used for 
 patriotism, the word patriot having become somewhat ob- 
 jectionable at some periods. Words are unimportant. By 
 patriotism we designate perhaps more specifically that sacred 
 enthusiasm which prompts to great exertions and has the 
 welfare, honor, reputation of the country at large in view; by 
 public spirit, a practical disinterestedness and cheerful readiness 
 to serve the community and promote its essential success in 
 every way. A perfect stranger to a country might still show 
 much public spirit. 
 
 Hume says, "A man who loves only himself, without re- 
 gard to friendship and desert, merits the severest blame ; and 
 a man who is only susceptible of friendship, without public 
 spirit or a regard to the community, is deficient in the most 
 material part of virtue." 1 The freer a country, the more it 
 
 1 Essay III., on Politics a Science. Self-forgetting, not self-denial, delights 
 us wherever we meet with it, so universal is the admiration of disinterested- 
 ness, the dislike of selfishness, although our interests betray us continually into 
 it. If we are attentive, we shall find in how great a degree in all branches the 
 principle exists. An author delights most when we see he has entirely forgotten 
 himself and is but the spokesman of his subject; we admire a work of art when 
 we see how entirely free from vanity and selfish conceit the artist was, and that 
 he forgot himself entirely in his work. It goes so far that a sentence or a con- 
 ceit never intended to be heard or seen frequently gives pleasure, although it is 
 neither witty nor interesting enough to do so, so soon as we know it was not 
 intended to be .heard. Nothing touches the heart so deeply as to become ac-
 
 t 
 
 96 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 stands in need of public spirit and the more baneful becomes 
 isolating selfishness. But it may well be asked, How far shall 
 public spirit prompt a man to act? There are some who ruin 
 their own affairs or who become burdensome in consequence 
 of mistaken public spirit. A citizen who attends every meet- 
 ing but neglects his own affairs, or lectures on education and 
 brings up his own sons as idlers, cannot be said to have 
 public spirit, for one of those things in which a community is 
 primarily interested is that every one keep his own affairs in 
 a sound state. Public spirit shows itself chiefly in substantial 
 and noiseless ways, and prompts the citizen to perform those 
 elementary functions on which he knows the existence of 
 society depends, even at the price of some inconvenience or 
 loss of time, without any hope of reward in public acknowl- 
 edgment. A public-spirited man will vote, though he need take 
 no active part in party measures ; he will willingly serve on a 
 jury, and he will aid in his proportion with money and time 
 in any fair and reasonable project, without seeking to promote 
 thereby his own interest. 1 It has been mentioned too often 
 already to dwell here any longer on this subject, how useless 
 all laws become, and that no community can expect success, 
 when public spirit has fled ; but the reader will find below to 
 
 quainted with great or good deeds long after they were performed in a manner 
 which shows that they were done without any expectation of their ever becoming 
 known. 
 
 1 We were once marching on a road broken up by the rain and the passing of 
 many troops. At each step we sank deep in the clay. It was a toilsome march ; 
 and any impediment in the road was much disrelished by the weary men. In 
 the midst of this road happened to lie a stone covered by the mire, but of suffi- 
 cient size to hurt any one who knocked against it. Each soldier, as he knocked 
 himself, grumbled and passed on. The colonel observed this, and stopped, whilst 
 the troops passed. At last a soldier arrived who likewise knocked and hurt him- 
 self severely. He showed it by the expression of his face, but immediately went 
 to work to remove the stone, and then passed on. ." Stop," called the colonel: 
 " what's your name ? More than ten men have passed here and hurt themselves, 
 and you are the first who had public spirit enough to remove the stone. You 
 shall be one of the first corporals." This was real public spirit, in however 
 humble a sphere.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 97 
 
 what political misery and extravagance the absence of this 
 elementary principle may lead. 1 
 
 1 Where sound patriotism and healthy public spirit are wanting, factious spirit 
 and selfishness united with boldness must be rife. This selfishness may have 
 ends of avarice, ambition, or revenge. We all know into how deplorable a state 
 the South American States have been thrown in consequence of their want of 
 public spirit, of disinterestedness applied to politics, since they have broken their 
 allegiance to Spain. Even that public spirit which may partly arise from interest, 
 yet interest well enlightened respecting its real advantage, is entirely wanting in 
 the great mass of the people. We not unfrequently meet with accounts from 
 those regions that the polls of a certain place were entirely deserted, no citizen 
 appearing to think it worth his while to vote. Apathy leads to, or is the effect 
 of, anarchy and lawlessness ; armed faction succeeds faction ; and so frequent has 
 this been in some states that a judicious traveller, Mr. Chevalier, was enabled to 
 write a certain theory of these factious movements in Mexico. As the causes 
 and men are always similar, it is very natural that the different stages of an 
 insurrection should succeed in a similar and certain order. " In Mexico," says 
 Mr. Michel Chevalier, in a series of letters written from that country, and pub- 
 lished, in 1837, in the Paris journals, " insurrections have become an act of mere 
 common life. There have gradually been established perfectly well-defined forms 
 for it ; which, like the rules of the noble game of tric-trac or the receipts of the 
 cuisinitre bourgeoise, it is understood, admit no deviation. The procedure is 
 sufficiently simple, and in Mexico sufficiently humane likewise : it resembles, if 
 not a battle at the opera, at all events a harmless enough guerilla warfare. The 
 first act of a revolution is called pronunciamiento. An officer of any grade, from 
 that of general to that of lieutenant downwards, pronotinces himself against the 
 established order of things, or any institution which he does not approve of, or 
 anything else of any description. He collects a party, a company, or a regiment, 
 which generally hastens to place itself at his disposal. The second act of the 
 revolution is called grito the cry, in which the motives and objects of the insur- 
 rection are reduced to three or four heads or articles. When the subject is of 
 some importance, the cry assumes the name of a plan. In the third act, the in- 
 surgents and partisans of the government come into each other's presence. There 
 are skirmishes, there are reconnoissances of their respective forces. In the fourth 
 they come to action definitively. But, according to the improvements which have 
 been introduced recently into the art of revolution-making, this is clone in the 
 most guarded manner and at the most respectful distance. There must, how- 
 ever, be a victor and a vanquished. If you are beaten, you unpronounct yourself; 
 if victorious, you march upon Mexico. In the fifth and last act, the conqueror, 
 whoever he is, makes his triumphal entry into the capital, whilst the vanquished 
 embarks at Vera Cruz, or Tampico, with all the honors of war." With the ex- 
 ception, perhaps, of the bloodlessness of these movements, which reminds us of 
 the captains in Italy towards the end of the sixteenth century counting the num- 
 VOL. II. 7
 
 9 g POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 LXXIV. The word old, denoting in its strict and primary 
 sense a length of time that an object has existed, 1 came, by a 
 natural transition from designating the old people, also to 
 designate the times in which they lived, and these once being 
 called old, the previous ones would be still older ; old came to 
 be used for expressing what we now more strictly call ancient; 
 in short, old is used not only to denote length of years but 
 also distance of time in the retrospect, an ambiguity which 
 has at times exercised a certain effect in politics ; which obliges 
 us to dwell for a moment upon this subject. In treating of it 
 I shall not restrict myself to the consequences of the ambi- 
 guity alone, but treat of old applied to the living, to ancestors, 
 and to institutions, in so far as this is of moment in politics. 
 
 It belongs to the province of ethics in general to point out 
 the respect, forbearance, and peculiar kindness we owe to 
 old age, and the reasons why this is a duty, the absence of 
 which is always considered by the virtuous as an indication 
 of a heart in which anything which might be called generous 
 must have given way to obdurate selfishness or a callousness 
 which easily may pass over into brutality. We not only feel 
 a degree of respect for gray hairs, but it affects us deeply to 
 see an old man arraigned or convicted of a crime, because 
 it contends so directly with the feeling which we desire to 
 entertain for advanced age. A feeling so general, the absence 
 of which indicates so much more than a mere dereliction of 
 a single duty, is of course of itself important to the com- 
 munity in politics. Its extinction would indicate general 
 selfishness and callousness, incompatible with the essential 
 success of any community. Montesquieu goes so far as to 
 say that " nothing maintains morals more firmly than an ex- 
 treme subordination of the young towards the old." This, 
 it would seem, is extravagant ; for the veneration of the old 
 
 bers opposed to each other, without fighting, the same theory applies pretty much 
 to the changes in Portugal. 
 
 1 The word old is derived from the root a/, to "grow," Latin al- and ol- in 
 adolesco ; Gr. perhaps in akooq, and found also in Gothic, High German, and 
 Irish. Comp. Curtius, Gr. EtymoL, 4th ed., No. 523, b.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 99 
 
 may be coupled with or arise from other causes not pro- 
 pitious to morals. In no country is the subjection of the 
 young to the old more complete and systematically as well 
 as religiously carried out than in China, a country which we 
 would certainly not place at the head as to morality, however 
 willingly we may acknowledge its superiority in this respect 
 over most other Asiatic countries. But this is certain, no- 
 where can sound morality subsist, or liberty endure and be 
 prevented from degenerating into licentiousness, folly, fickle- 
 ness, where the young are without modesty, respect and 
 deference for superior age and experience, and a sincere ven- 
 eration of those who by their works and continued labors 
 have proved the sincerity of their zeal or have added honor to 
 their community or country. 
 
 LXXV. Authority, which begins in the family and passes 
 over to the similarly situated elders of the tribe, is naturally 
 connected in all early times with old age, so that the names 
 of offices and judicial or legislative institutions are in most 
 early nations derived from the words indicating old age. 1 
 They by the mere fact of being older enjoy a degree of re- 
 spect, they have experience and know the laws better than 
 the young, because the latter have not yet been able to learn 
 them from tradition. When nearly all that can and must 
 be learned respecting public affairs is to be learned by oral 
 transmission, and when the various classes of society are as 
 yet little separated from one another, but the education and 
 knowledge of all are nearly on a par, old age of itself must 
 necessarily be of considerable importance and weight. It is 
 different when laws, finances, and other branches require 
 study, and study leisure, which by the difference of fortune is 
 allotted in very different degrees to the various classes. In 
 this state of society it is frequently the case that a young man 
 
 1 It will be hardly necessary to remind the reader of the word senatus derived 
 from senex, of the Greek yepovaia, counsel or senate, from yepuv, an old man, and 
 many corresponding terms in ancient times and the middle ages, as Signior, 
 Patrician, Alderman, Presbytery, Council of the Ancients.
 
 I00 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 may have read, heard, seen in fact, lived more than an old 
 one; and in a state of a populous society far advanced in civil- 
 ization we cannot any longer assign the same official impor- 
 tance to old age which naturally is attached to it in earlier pe- 
 riods. Men but too frequently ru.n into extremes, and, while 
 we allow the above position, we must also acknowledge the 
 absurdity of attaching wisdom to youth, and making youth, as 
 it were, a party-sign and qualification, as seems now to be 
 actually the case in some countries. That there have been 
 great and rare minds who at the age when others are yet 
 learning wielded the helm of vast affairs or brilliantly shone 
 in the sciences, we all know. Pitt, Napoleon, De Witt, Gro- 
 tius, Laplace, and many other distinguished names among 
 the moderns and ancients, prove it abundantly ; but they were 
 extraordinary men, geniuses, the very character of which con- 
 sists in leaping beyond what for others is the natural course. 
 From exceptions we cannot draw our rules. Macchiavelli 
 rightly observes, " If we choose a youth, he must have shown 
 himself already worthy of this election by something distin- 
 guished." It is right, then, not to withhold from them a sta- 
 tion due to their genius and nobleness of soul ; but we must 
 first have this pledge, and not trust to favorites, to Buck- 
 inghams, despite their youth. 
 
 In the common course of things we know that the young 
 are the readier and bolder for action, prompted by a more 
 lively temperament, and not yet tamed and chilled by repeated 
 failures and bitter disappointments. The distinctive age as to 
 readiness of action is about the fortieth year. The average 
 age of the signers of the American Declaration of Independ- 
 ence was nearly forty-four ; yet if we deduct of the fifty-five 
 signers the age of seven citizens who were sixty years old or 
 above, the average age comes down to forty. 1 Most of those 
 who first embraced the Reformation were about forty years 
 
 1 Of fifty-five signers there were under thirty years 2, both twenty-seven years 
 old; thirty, and less than forty, 17; forty, and less than fifty, 22; fifty, and less 
 than sixty, 8; sixty, and less than seventy, 6; seventy, i.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. IOI 
 
 old, or younger. 1 Far the greater number of the most dis- 
 tinguished generals have been young, and, when all other 
 circumstances were nearly equal, the young general opposed 
 to an old one has almost always been victorious. 2 
 
 Those governments therefore which contain the principle 
 of movement, which give a field or call for prompt action, 
 
 1 The Venetian ambassador at the court of France, Micheli, reported in 1561 
 to the doge that except among the common peasantry, " who continue to visit 
 the churches zealously," "the young men under the age of forty, almost without 
 exception," belong to the new doctrine that is, Protestantism. According to a 
 despatch in 1562 from the Venetian ambassador in Spain, there were many 
 Huguenots throughout Spain. (Ranke, History of the Popes, etc., vol. ii. pp. 16 
 and 21.) Passion and action together belong chiefly to the male sex from 
 twenty to thirty, during which age therefore by far the greatest number of crimes 
 are committed. 
 
 3 We must remember here, however, that these young generals had always 
 tried and experienced soldiers around them. They counselled and planned ; the 
 young gave energy, promptness, boldness, on which victory, after a good plan 
 has been made, so much depends. Alexander, Caesar, Frederic, Napoleon, were 
 young when first victorious ; Themistocles, at Salamis, twenty-six ; Leonidas, 
 when he fell, twenty-one; Scipio African us, when he conquered Hannibal, little 
 above twenty; Eugene, at the battle of Mohacz, twenty-four; Charles XII., at 
 Narva, eighteen ; and many more might be cited. Camillus is said to have 
 been but fifteen years old when he performed the heroic deed which soon ele- 
 vated him to the censorship, and in his eightieth year he was dictator the fifth 
 time a full life indeed ! 
 
 [Dr. Lieber's examples are to be taken cum grano sails. Themistocles, if born, 
 as seems probable, in 514 B.C., was thirty-four years old at the sea-fight of Sa- 
 lamis. Leonidas had been king, before he fell, nine years. His niece and 
 wife was, according to Clinton, twenty-nine at that time. His brother Doricus, 
 soon after the accession of their half-brother Cleomenes, who reigned nineteen 
 if not twenty-nine years (Clinton), left Sparta to found a colony, and Leonidas 
 was born, as Herodotus says, "right after Doricus." (V. 41.) All this shows 
 the story that he was only twenty-one at Thermopylae to be a fable. Scipio 
 Africanus, again, probably born B.C. 234, and seventeen years old at the battle 
 of the Ticinus, when he first encountered and defeated Hannibal at Zama in 202 
 was thirty-two. Prince Eugene did not command at Mohacz, but the duke 
 of Lorraine. His great victory at Zenta, of which Dr. Lieber was probably 
 thinking, was gained in 1697, when he was thirty-four. The story of Camillus 
 being chosen a censor not long after he was fifteen is ridiculous. He was cen- 
 sor probably in 403 B.C., and died in 365, so that, if eighty years old at his death, 
 he was forty-two when elected censor. Charles XII. remains, hare-brained in 
 his youth, hare-brained until his death.]
 
 102 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 bring men upon the stage of action at a comparatively early 
 age. Many of the most prominent Athenians were very 
 young when they first acted; while in Sparta, founded upon 
 conservatism, the citizens acquired consideration and privi- 
 leges with the different advances of age. Liberty in general 
 is favorable to bringing forward men in the prime of life.- 
 On the other hand, the conservatism which is an indispen- 
 sable element of all true liberty, and not a cant or desire to 
 retain what ought not to be retained, the spirit which arises 
 out of a conviction that no healthy government can spring 
 into existence as by a magic wand, but that development of the 
 laws wisely founded upon the existing facts is necessary, this 
 is more generally a characteristic trait of those beyond forty 
 years of age. They have experience, not only the mere knowl- 
 edge which amounts to no more than the remembrance of 
 that which we have seen, but the convictions and -impressions 
 and vivid consciousness with which the operations and effects 
 of laws and institutions, and the forcible illustrations and in- 
 terpretations of history afforded by what we witness ourselves 
 in practical life, deeply imbue our mind ; they, the old, have 
 in many cases acquired tact or instinct of great importance in 
 those numerous cases in which mere reasoning and counter- 
 balancing the advantages and disadvantages, as Cecil used to 
 do, cannot lead us to a decisive result. This tact, indispen- 
 sable wherever we have to act in very complicated cases, may 
 be native in genius, but its possessor must be a genius if it be 
 native. If the old are on some occasions too reluctant to do 
 what ought to be done because it is new, the young are on 
 the other hand apt to adopt measures because they are new. 
 In times therefore like ours, in which new and powerful 
 moving agents have been brought into play in politics, such 
 as the power of the daily papers and the swift mails, it be- 
 hoves us to allow their full share to the principles and ele- 
 ments more strongly represented by the old in public matters. 
 
 LXXVI. Veneration for our forefathers arises, if real, and 
 we do not occupy ourselves here with hypocritic cant, from
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 103 
 
 two causes ; the one just, the other erroneous. It is one of 
 the most indelible feelings in the human breast that we honor 
 the memory of our parents. The basest criminal, dead to 
 almost all other feelings, will resent a reproach cast upon his 
 parents ; few things sting the heart of a man so deeply, even 
 of the vulgarest, as reproach cast upon father or mother. A 
 good name is, with all honorable men, an expression of vast 
 import. Nothing is so sad for the receding Indian as when 
 he " takes leave of the land in which the bones of his fathers 
 lie ;" nothing so solemn in the Old Testament as when the 
 Hebrew is admonished by the God of his forefathers. 
 
 It would seem that Providence has made this feeling one of 
 the primary agents to unite society, one generation with the 
 other, to make of communities continuous societies, and to 
 prevent them from crumbling and disintegrating into mere 
 masses of -selfish particles. This feeling, as we have seen, ex- 
 tends farther back than to our own bodily parents. We feel 
 grateful for the blessings, which may be the effects of the 
 endeavors of our forefathers, perhaps of their struggle and 
 suffering. If we enjoy well-founded liberty, it is they who 
 must have established it or provided for its growth ; if it cost 
 them sacrifices, they must have been prompted to bear them 
 by the consciousness that they would thereby obtain it for us; 
 they lived, toiled, and died for their country, and that country 
 includes the thought of future generations. If, however, we 
 ascribe superior wisdom to our forefathers, we must have a 
 specific reason for it ; they may have established an institution 
 when peculiar circumstances favored them to obtain superior 
 wisdom as to this subject, or to see with greater disinterested- 
 ness, because the times may have been fitter for it. Enthu- 
 siasm for what is great and good may have been more general, 
 as, for instance, when our forefathers struggled for independ- 
 ence. But this may also not be the case. An Englishman 
 who should carry his veneration for his forefathers so far as to 
 look upon the courtiers of Charles II. or his judges as upon 
 men of superior probity or wisdom would deviate from all 
 truth. If, however, we have reason to be grateful to them, it
 
 IO4 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 must be an active gratitude, not an oral one, which frequently 
 is but a cloak to our own indolence, or our vanity, or pride of 
 descent, to lower others by comparison. Our gratitude must 
 consist in acting out farther and farther what they have begun, 
 not in a desire to remain stationary and to consider that which 
 they were able to obtain under their circumstances as the last 
 degree of perfection that may be obtained. The ideal of a 
 nation, that for which it strives, must lie onward, not be be- 
 lieved to consist in something absolute established in former 
 ages and the keeping of which in that precise state forms the 
 highest duty. The Hindoos, the Chinese, thus look back, not 
 forward. The excellence of all laws depends upon their fit- 
 ness that is, upon the sound principle judiciously applied to 
 the existing state of things ; these things, however, change in 
 the course of time ; real standing still is therefore impossible, 
 and if we do not move onward, if we force the same laws 
 upon changed circumstances, we must ruin the state. 
 
 The erroneous cause of the veneration of our forefathers is 
 the popular and very old belief that times grow worse and 
 worse; not a little promoted by the feeling of discomfort 
 which must befall all old people when men and things around 
 them change. This belief is very old. Even Homer makes 
 Pallas say, " Few children indeed are equal in virtue to their 
 father, many are worse, and but very few better." 1 History 
 does not justify this dictum, and Homer himself, since he has 
 been quoted once, says in another passage, "We claim to be 
 much better than our fathers." Hallam, treating of the period 
 of Elizabeth, and speaking of the Tower, says, " It seems like 
 a captive tyrant reserved to grace the triumph of a victorious ( 
 republic, and should teach us to reflect in thankfulness how 
 highly we have been elevated in virtue and happiness above 
 our forefathers." And in a note appended to this passage he 
 adds, " There is no line in Homer which I repeat more fre- 
 quently or with greater pleasure than the boast of Sthenelus : 
 rot Tcarlpwv plf ct/xetWec t>//*#' etvai. This is a truth of 
 
 1 Odyssey, ii. 277.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 105 
 
 which the impartial study of history persuades us ; and yet, 
 like other truths, it has its limitations." 1 Let us not forget 
 that even the Spartans, certainly the most conservative of the 
 prominent Grecian tribes, appeared at one of their national 
 festivals in different choruses. The chorus of the ancients 
 chanted, "We were brave in days gone by." The chorus of 
 men responded, "We are brave, come who may to try it;" 
 when the chorus of the boys concluded, " Brave we shall be ; 
 our deeds shall outshine yours." In the only branch in which 
 the Spartans were proud to excel, they acknowledged that an 
 onward endeavor was the only spirit to maintain what they 
 valued most highly national valor. 
 
 Not only has it been believed that a regular course of moral 
 degeneracy is gcing on, but at a very early period it was be- 
 lieved that men became feebler and more diminutive with 
 every generation. 2 
 
 The reason of so general a belief is that we see and feel the 
 evils of the present time, but not those which belong to the 
 past, while dissatisfaction with the present time or real suffer- 
 ing causes us to magnify the virtues of our ancestors, to which 
 a general respect for our own parents and grandparents already 
 naturally inclines us. 
 
 LXXVII. The advantage which old persons possess over 
 young ones is experience. Respecting the world in general, 
 then, we are the old ones compared to our forefathers, pro- 
 vided always we have endeavored to possess ourselves of their 
 experience and that of our own times, and do not presump- 
 tuously think that the mere fact of our being born after them 
 makes us wiser. We must truly study and respect their en- 
 deavors before we can say that we are wiser. Bacon's remark 
 to this purpose appears to be a mere truism as soon as dis- 
 tinctly stated; yet not unfrequently the old times are appealed 
 
 1 Constitutional History of England, i. 202. 
 
 a There existed formerly a nursery-story, founded upon this belief, which pre- 
 dicted that men would become so small that the ovens used by us would become 
 their palaces.
 
 I0 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 to as authority as we would appeal to old persons. 1 But it is 
 very necessary to keep some points distinctly in our mind 
 respecting old institutions. I will state them briefly: 
 
 The more ignorant a person, and the less acquainted there- 
 fore with what has been done, said, tried, suffered, what has 
 miscarried or succeeded, what difficulties are in the way, or 
 what evils, no longer visible, have been suppressed by a cer- 
 tain institution not inconvenient itself; the less a person is 
 conscious of the great multiplicity of actions and operations 
 in society ; the more forward he will be found to intrude his 
 new thought or system upon men, as if happiness or sense 
 should date only from the day when his system was intro- 
 duced; the more he believes in an absolute goodness of laws; 
 and the less substantial the qualities of his mind ; the more 
 prone he will be to destroy rather than maintain, develop, 
 enlarge. 
 
 The inexperienced and ignorant alone believe that a pro- 
 jected institution can, in all its bearings, be comprehended at 
 once without practical application, and that laws and institu- 
 tions are finished if drawn up on paper, regardless of the state 
 of things in and with which they have to operate. 
 
 Those institutions are the best which, if good at all, have 
 their roots deep in the soil of the nation, whose body of laws 
 consists mainly in the alluvial soil deposited by the course of 
 time, since thus alone institutions which have grown and 
 have developed themselves in the course of time meet with 
 the spontaneous action of the people; they have been checked, 
 expanded, fashioned as the course of history required, and 
 have become endeared to the nation as blessings, as realities. 2 
 
 Old institutions have the advantage of being tried, and 
 
 1 Benlham calls the reason which is derived from the oldness of an institution 
 alone in its favor the Chinese argument. Archbishop Whately, in the Appendix 
 to his Elements of Logic, has a few words on the term " old." 
 
 " Cicero de Respubl., ii. i. " Nostra republica non unius [est] ingenio sed 
 multorum ; nee una hominis vita sed aliquot constituta sseculis et setatibus ; . . . 
 neque cuncta ingenia conlata in unum tantum posse uno tempore providere, ut 
 omnia complecterentur sine rerum usu et vetustate."
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ID/ 
 
 hence are known, while of new ones we have yet to see how 
 they operate, and what ultimate effects they produce. 
 
 Old institutions ought not to be pulled down except evil is 
 perceived to be produced by them. 
 
 We must be especially careful in touching those laws which 
 were made by those whom we know to have lived in better or 
 more favorable periods. 
 
 It is a wicked idolatry to sacrifice the living to the memory 
 of the dead, and obstinately to insist upon old laws simply 
 because they are old, although bad, and perhaps cruel. 
 
 Stability is of itself a most desirable thing; it promotes 
 probity, and gives moral tone to society ; but to preserve that 
 which is bad is either foolish or immoral. The star-chamber 
 was an old institution : should it have been preserved ? The 
 institution of the vizier in Asiatic despotism is older than any 
 British one : is it on that account good ? The cause of civili- 
 zation and of a liberty worthy of man is neither promoted by 
 Asiatic stagnation, whose Koran says, Every new law is an 
 innovation, every innovation is an error, and every error leads 
 to eternal fire, nor by the arrogance of a jacobin declaring 
 war against everything that exists and has existed. 1 
 
 1 Dumont, speaking of Paine, in the Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, ch. xvi., says, 
 " He was a caricature of the vainest Frenchman. Paine said to Dumont that 
 if it were in his power to annihilate all libraries he would do it without hesita- 
 tion, in order to destroy all the error deposited in them, and to commence a new 
 chain of ideas and principles with the Rights of Man." How many Paines in 
 their respective spheres, and more or less bold, have we not seen since, and are 
 we not seeing daily !
 
 BOOK IV. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Education. What it is. Strong and universal tendency to form Habits and 
 continue them. Great importance of Education in Politics, not only of ele- 
 mentary and general School Systems, but also of superior Education and 
 literary Institutions. Expeditions, Libraries, Museums. Industrial Educa- 
 tion. The Rich as well as the Poor ought to be actively engaged in some 
 Pursuit, whether purely mental, or industrial. ^- Law of Solon. Connection 
 of Crime with want of regular industrial Education in modern Times. 
 Statistics. Habits of Industry, of Obedience, of Independence, of Reverence, 
 and of Honesty. Ancient History for Children. Concentric Instruction. 
 Gymnastics. Sexes. The Woman. Difference of physical Organization, 
 Temperament, and Powers in Woman and Man. The Family (and through 
 it the Society of Comity and the Country) is the sacred Sphere of Woman's 
 chief Activity. The Connection of Woman's Activity with the State. 
 Woman is excluded from Politics. She is connected with the State by Patri- 
 otism. Lady Croke. The Petitioning of Women. Lady Russell a Model. 
 History of Woman. Is the Woman represented though she cannot vote at 
 the Poll ? 
 
 I. EDUCATION, the transmission of knowledge, skill, and 
 morality, that principal tie by which one generation is con- 
 nected with another and thus mankind becomes a continu- 
 ous society, is a subject of the first magnitude in everything 
 that relates to society. I waive the great importance of 
 education in developing and perfecting, humanizing and 
 elevating the individual as such, on which a few words were 
 given in the first volume, when the views taken by the an- 
 cients respecting education were compared with the light in 
 which this subject appears to the civilized modern nations. 
 
 Society is deeply interested in general education : in no 
 
 subject more so; in very few equally so. In educating we 
 
 ought to strive by aiding and cultivating to develop the whole 
 
 man, as much as all the given circumstances admit. We have 
 
 108
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 109 
 
 seen throughout this work that man, destined for civilization 
 as well as moral independence, has a social and individual 
 destiny, and man to be fully man must be a citizen, that is a 
 member of the state. It is one of the unalterable destinies 
 prescribed by Providence for our existence. The future citi- 
 zen, or active member of the state, is then to be included in 
 the objects of education. All education consists in storing 
 and training the mind, if we comprehend within the latter 
 term the purifying guidance in morals and religion as well as 
 the training of the intellect, imparting method and vigor by 
 exercise and habit ; and, finally, the imparting of sound habits, 
 which again may be moral, intellectual, and social habits, a 
 subject of the utmost importance, because it is, as Bacon 
 already quoted said, custom that governs man in far the 
 greatest number of practical cases hourly occurring. Indeed, 
 the constant tendency of man to custom and habit, to uni- 
 formity in manner, opinions, and desires, " the centripetal 
 power of custom," as Hallam calls it, is one of those agents 
 without which society could not possibly exist, which operates 
 long before reflection makes us conscious of it, and after re- 
 flection has made us conscious operates far more effectually, 
 generally, and constantly than mere reflection would be capa- 
 ble of doing. This primitive tendency, strongly founded upon 
 the impulse of imitation, from which the development of the 
 mind in earliest childhood starts, but which remains a power- 
 ful agent throughout life, naturally carries along with it its 
 evil effects; as we have observed, in previous passages, of 
 other elementary agents or impulses in the human soul. It 
 leads men to perpetuate evil customs, to accommodate them- 
 selves to erroneous opinions, to continue upon bad precedents; 
 but it would be as impossible, and, were it possible, as disas- 
 trous to society, to extinguish this elementary tendency of 
 uniformity and custom, of imitation and perpetuation, on ac- 
 count of its evil effects, as it would be to quench the desire of 
 union between the different sexes on account of its evil effects ; 
 as, we all know, has been attempted by many enthusiasts of 
 all periods for many thousand years, if not in all mankind at
 
 IIO POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 least in certain classes and societies and as an additional 
 means of attaining greater perfection. Customs, habits, there- 
 fore, will be formed; and, for the same reason which was 
 adduced respecting religion, we are bound to cultivate good 
 habits, even had we not other and urgent considerations for so 
 doing. If we do not cultivate the habit of industry, we may 
 be sure that by this very neglect we cultivate the habit of in- 
 dolence ; if we do not promote the habit of propriety and 
 modesty, we directly aid in forming the habit of indecency 
 and boldness. 
 
 II. The reader will, of course, not expect in the present 
 work a sketch of a whole system of education. I must con- 
 fine my remarks to a few general observations, and some hints, 
 which experience has taught me to consider as not unimpor- 
 tant with regard to education as related to politics. Education, 
 we have seen, aims at developing the whole man : we may 
 consider man, however, either as a moral and religious being, 
 as an intellectual being, as a social being, as a physical being, 
 or as an aesthetic being, that is a being endowed with taste, 
 in other words, who has a sense for the beautiful ; and as no 
 man can be a good and sound citizen who is not a good and 
 sound man, so the best education for future citizens will be 
 that which is the completest and fullest education of the indi- 
 vidual as an entire man. Let us keep in mind that all edu- 
 cation, adapting itself to man in his various capacities just 
 mentioned, may be training, that is invigorating and producing 
 habits, or storing, that is imparting knowledge. Finally, all 
 education is either domestic education, school education, in- 
 dustrial education, by which, for want of a better word, I 
 mean all education for a trade, profession, or station in life ; 
 or social education, by which we may designate that indirect 
 yet highly important training which every man receives by his 
 living in and with a society the formation of his mind by the 
 influence of his society and age. 
 
 III. How important nay, how indispensable, domestic edu-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. Ill 
 
 cation is, both in training and storing, morally, intellectually, 
 and physically, is clear to every one who has paid the slightest 
 attention to the subject. For it is in the family where those 
 earliest impressions are received and habits formed which 
 adhere longest to a man, or go with him as far as to the last 
 goal of his life. Example, powerful everywhere, is most so at 
 home; because it there presents itself earliest, most frequently, 
 and most authoritatively in that authority which is stronger 
 than that of king or law, the authority of the parent. Yet 
 division of labor, necessary everywhere, is likewise so in edu- 
 cation : hence the necessity of school education ; and as it is 
 out of the power of many whole communities, and of large 
 classes in most communities, to provide for a sound school 
 education, either for want of individual means or knowledge 
 sufficient to select or obtain the best teachers, general sys- 
 tems of school education have become highly important for 
 all civilized nations. It is one of the peculiar traits of the 
 latest times that all the most civilized and elevated nations 
 have with much care and earnestness established general 
 school systems or are actively striving to establish them. 
 And it is a fact no less pleasing that of late the whole science 
 and practice of education have become so diffused and hon- 
 ored that in some countries, for instance in Germany and par- 
 tially in France, the word School is used in as comprehensive 
 a meaning as the word Church was used in former times, or 
 as we are wont to use the word Law or Bar, meaning thereby 
 the whole system, organization, members, and the distinct 
 acknowledgment of its importance by society. Jovellanos 
 said perhaps too much when he pronounced that "the foun- 
 tains of social prosperity are many, but all originate from one 
 and the same well, and this is public instruction;" 1 but, al- 
 though using too strong terms when he recommended a 
 measure so much neglected by his countrymen, this excellent 
 man was certainly not far from truth and only erred in the 
 expression of a principle itself true and essential. Modern 
 
 1 Complete Works, Madrid, 1831, vol. iii. p. 292.
 
 II2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 nations cannot fulfil their duty, nay, they cannot even protect 
 themselves sufficiently against evils otherwise unavoidable, 
 the consequences of civilization and density of population, 
 without general and public instruction. 1 
 
 * Although single persons may have the means to provide 
 for the education of their children at home, the sons never- 
 theless should go to school. Every one is destined for civili- 
 zation, for society, and an education is very incomplete if the 
 mind of the boy has not been fashioned among others, under 
 the influences of society. This begins earliest and most effect- 
 ually in the school. In the school the boy steps out of the 
 close family circle, where it is possible to pay attention to a 
 thousand minute details, into a larger society, yet not so pub- 
 lic as public life but still it is a sort of public life. There 
 the boy forms the earliest attachments beyond those of kin- 
 dred, has his angular points rubbed off, learns to judge for 
 himself more freely, and stands much more upon his own 
 legs. The King of the French has shown in a remarkable 
 manner how strong national society is at present by sending 
 his sons to the schools of Paris, open to all citizens' boys 
 common schools inasmuch as they are open to every one. 
 
 IV. It is, however, a grave error into which some have 
 fallen, who believe that the state as such, or civil society, is 
 interested only in the promotion of education among the poor, 
 in other words in systems of public instruction restricted to 
 the diffusion of elementary knowledge among large masses. 
 This is the opposite error to that which in former ages so fre- 
 quently induced governments richly to endow a few institu- 
 tions of learning and totally to neglect common education. 
 A complete system of public instruction comprehends all 
 institutions which are necessary for the society, and which 
 nevertheless cannot or will not be established by private 
 means. Society at large, down to the lowliest cottager, is 
 
 1 I must ngain refer, respecting this point, to my Letter on the Relation be- 
 tween Education and Crime.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 1 13 
 
 deeply interested in the highest possible degree of cultivation 
 of the sciences ; for they shed light and diffuse civilization by 
 a thousand rays and in a thousand channels over the whole 
 of society. If science, untrammelled and unconcerned about 
 any immediate application, does not boldly press forward, 
 since its application to practical life always necessarily fol- 
 lows at a considerable distance, the actual state of science will 
 stand still or retrograde. The Chinese, spurning every species 
 of knowledge, every experiment, which cannot be proved at 
 once to be of direct use, furnish us with a very impressive 
 illustration of this fact. Had Laplace always thought how 
 his soaring calculations might be applied at once to naviga- 
 tion, he would never have produced his Celestial Mechanics, 
 which nevertheless will effect great practical benefits, not only 
 by having led our race a step farther on its great road of civ- 
 ilization, but by way of actual use. Science is not a mere 
 luxury. Well it is that science is a luxury to some minds to 
 reward them for many privations or disheartening disappoint- 
 ments. For society the sciences are of imperative necessity, 
 and fall entirely within the province of that civilization which 
 we found to be the destiny of man. The sciences are like the 
 sun of heaven. When his rays descend upon the blade, the 
 blossom of the tree, you do not see them unfold themselves 
 at once. Yet when he has passed onward in his heavenly 
 course, the ray of noon is still effecting its enlivening and 
 transforming processes even in the humblest and minutest 
 herb or the moss which derives its modest existence from the 
 bounty of the lofty tree. The state is directly interested in 
 sustaining the highest institutions of learning, which require 
 means hardly ever at the disposal of private individuals ; nor 
 has it any right to wait for private contributions towards the 
 foundation of public seats of learning, however cheerfully it 
 may receive them if offered. Every citizen, as such, low or 
 high, simply as a member of the state, has an undoubted right 
 to demand this, just as much as he has an absolute, natural, 
 primitive right to demand an establishment of some sort 
 or other to administer justice. Even if political society were 
 VOL. II. 8
 
 II4 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 nothing but an agglomeration of atoms, if it were not as we 
 have found it to be a continuous society, it would still be the 
 state's duty to promote these institutions, for on the one hand 
 they are of general utility, on the other hand the pursuit 
 of the sciences requires means which the individual, who 
 must turn his industry towards objects which by direct ex- 
 change will furnish him the means of subsistence, does not 
 possess. These means are chiefly leisure and money. Instru- 
 ments, libraries, those conductors, concentrators, and bridges 
 of civilization, collections, expeditions, measurements, scien- 
 tific surveys, are all wholly or in part of a character not to 
 be obtained or executed by private means, especially by the 
 means of those who generally are the peculiar votaries of 
 knowledge and feel the greatest direct interest in these sub- 
 jects. Had not governments effected the measurements of a 
 degree, what private person would or could have done it? 
 Yet the more accurate knowledge of the earth's formation has 
 already proved of great importance to society at large in a 
 thousand ways. The more knowledge multiplies and branches 
 out, the vaster our experiments and inquiries become, the 
 more time the various patient investigations require, the more 
 necessary also becomes 'public support of knowledge. Had 
 the Greeks felt the same want, had sciences obtained with 
 them the same importance, and their pursuit been attended 
 with the same difficulties, as with us, they would have simply 
 taxed their Girards or Rothschilds with a "liturgy," to send an 
 expedition to the north pole. We cannot and must not do 
 this. Who, then, can do it ? Society, of course ; and let me 
 add, how small are these expenses compared to so many 
 others of less and even of doubtful importance ! how incalcu- 
 lable their benefits ! 
 
 The fine arts are, as we have seen, of great national impor- 
 tance, in an industrial, moral, and patriotic point of view. 
 Museums, therefore, if more important subjects are not sacri- 
 ficed to them, and if they remain national institutions and 
 national schools, are subjects justly claiming their due and 
 proportionate support of the state.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 115 
 
 V. Let us return to the subject of general education. If 
 general school education, imparting that ele r.entary knowl- 
 edge without which an individual nowadays is a sort of 
 outcast from the common pale of civilized society, is of great 
 importance in politics, that species which was called indus- 
 trial education (by which, I beg to remind the reader, I intend 
 by no means a training in schools for certain trades) is not 
 less so, and is perhaps even more so. Every citizen without 
 exception, in some sphere of activity or other, strictly indus- 
 trial or mental, should apply himself, and manifest himself as 
 a real and active member of his society. Without it he loses 
 his hold upon society and becomes dangerous, whether he 
 be prompted to do so by riches or poverty. Man is not made 
 for indolence ; he loses his inward equipoise, and becomes 
 morbid or criminal, fanciful or self-willed, if he is not acting. 
 He neglects his duty towards society if he thus severs him- 
 self from the common course of action and plunges into unde- 
 fined and indolent selfishness. As to those who cannot be 
 seduced into such a course because they do not possess 
 wealth, it is necessary to observe that among the most fruit- 
 ful sources of all crimes a neglected habit of industry is the 
 foremost. Solon, according to Plutarch, decreed that the son 
 was not bound to support his aged father one of the most 
 sacred obligations in his code if the latter had not brought 
 up his son to some trade. This is very striking. Very posi- 
 tive experience must have induced that sage to express in so 
 forcible a form the observation of a political result. Obser- 
 vation in modern times will furnish the same facts. I do not 
 speak of riots, or political disturbances, which, when they are 
 not founded on a substantial evil, are in most cases chiefly 
 promoted by those who are not engaged in industrious pur- 
 suits, but limit myself to the commission of crime. 1 In my 
 
 1 Idleness as a political evil reached its " classical age" in the worst periods of 
 Grecian democracy, and in Rome. In the former, presence in the popular assem- 
 bly came to be paid for, as in the worst time of the French revolution. During 
 the decline of Rome, the idling wretches sank so low that, too cowardly to 
 march against the conquering tribes, they nevertheless were delighted at seeing
 
 U(5 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 inquiries respecting education, industry, and crime, I have 
 found among other remarkable results this : that of three 
 hundred and fifty-eight criminals two hundred and twenty- 
 seven had never been bound out to any trade or regular occu- 
 pation, seventy-nine were bound out but ran away before they 
 had stayed out their time, and only fifty -two were bound out 
 and remained with their respective masters until the comple- 
 tion of their proper time; and that the average time of the 
 sentence of imprisonment in the case of those who had served 
 out was a little less than four years, but of those who ran 
 away, a little above five years, thus indicating a much greater 
 degree of criminality. Here it might be objected that the 
 running away from the master is the effect of vicious habits, 
 and not the cause of the future crime ; but whether the one 
 be the cause of the other, or both the effect of the same cause, 
 it is for our purpose the same : it shows how closely the want 
 of industry is connected with viciousness and criminality, 
 and how right it is, like Solon, to insist upon universal indus- 
 trial education. 
 
 It would be well could the right of voting be connected not 
 only with a degree of education, but also with some steady 
 employment. This, however, belongs to Politics proper. 
 
 I ought to observe here for the general reader, that binding 
 out is not restricted to mechanical trades, but extends, with 
 us, to agricultural pursuits likewise. 1 The facts ascertained 
 
 the agony of the dying gladiator. When Treves was devastated by German 
 predatory tribes, the first thing which the inhabitants, deprived of house and 
 property, asked for, was Circensian games. Salvian de Gub. Dei, vi. 146. 
 
 1 Mr. Wood, warden of the Eastern Penitentiary in Pennsylvania, and Mr. 
 Yard, keeper of the New Jersey Penitentiary, have with much kindness made at 
 my request inquiries and furnished me with statements respecting the industrial 
 education of criminals, and the age at which criminals lost their parents, of 
 high interest, the results of which I shall not omit to make public on some 
 proper occasion. The Rev. Mr. Barrett, chaplain to the Connecticut State 
 PrLon, has furnished me likewise with valuable statistics as to the age 
 when the criminals lost their parents. I made this point one of my inquiries, 
 because it shows the probability of moral and industrial neglect in the convict 
 when young, if he has lost his parents early ; the great value, therefore, of sound 
 education, and it may be added of judicious-orphan asylums. For some im-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 117 
 
 in other countries corroborate the observation made above. 
 The training for vice, as testified to before parliamentary com- 
 mittees, and the harvest of crime growing on the luxuriant 
 soil of indolence, is appalling. 1 
 
 VI. Besides the habit of industry, the four following are of 
 much importance in education applied to politics; the habit 
 of obedience, of independence, of reverence, or whatever it be 
 called, by which term I wish to express that earnestness in 
 contemplating things which strives to know their real char- 
 acter and connection, and the absence of arrogant forward 
 ness and self-sufficiency, which considers everything silly, 
 useless, or unmeaning because not agreeing with its own 
 views or not showing its character at once to the superficial 
 observer, and, lastly, the habit of honesty. We have seen 
 that it is the high prerogative of man to acknowledge supe- 
 riors and inferiors, to have laws and to obey them ; but since 
 individual interest as well as the pleasure or allurement of 
 resistance and opposition is in itself frequently very strong, 
 as selfishness is but too apt to grow up like a rank weed, we 
 ought to imbue the young early with true loyalty, that is with 
 a sincere desire to act as members of a society, according to 
 rules not arbitrarily prescribed by themselves, and with a 
 submission of individual will and desire to that of society. 
 They ought to learn that it is a privilege of men to obey laws, 
 and a delight to obey good ones. That these habits, early 
 and deeply inculcated, may lead to submissiveness and want 
 
 portant remarks on the connection between habits, morality, and labor, and its 
 quality, see H. C. Carey, Principles of Political Economy, Philadelphia, 1838. 
 vol. ii. p. 207, et seq. 
 
 1 An article in the London Times, of December, 1838, contains extracts from 
 statements made before parliamentary committees in 1837, respecting the careful 
 and effectual education in crime practised in London, of great importance to the 
 criminalist and philosopher. Mr. Wakefield has attentively inquired into this 
 hideous subject, and written upon it. It were desirable that the French penal 
 statistics, issued yearly with such laudable zeal by government, would in future 
 include some statement by which the industrial -education might be ascertained, 
 as likewise statements of the age when the convict lost one or both his parents.
 
 H8 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of independence, is only to be feared where education is im- 
 perfect or liberty at a low ebb. The greater the liberty 
 enjoyed by a society, the more essential are these habits, 
 especially in modern times, when various new and powerful 
 agents of intercommunication and diffusion of knowledge 
 have produced a movability and thirst for inquiry which can- 
 not leave in us any sincere fear on the ground of dull tame- 
 ness in the adult, wherever liberty is at all established. The 
 ancients knew the value of these habits, and all their wise 
 men insisted upon them. Nations which lose the precious 
 habit of obeying, that is of self-determined obedience to the 
 laws because they are laws, lose invariably likewise the 
 precious art of ruling. Greece, Rome, and Spain, for the 
 last centuries, as well as the worst times of the feudal ages, 
 are examples. 
 
 I believe, moreover, that an individual destitute of that rev- 
 erence by which he feels linked to his fellow-men, present and 
 past, is as unfortunate as he is dangerous. It is a sad thing 
 to be imprisoned in selfish arrogance. The habit of inde- 
 pendence includes the love of justice, of right, of acting man- 
 fully by principle, of disdaining popularity when need be, of 
 holding up the head in spite of the heavy blows which fate 
 may inflict of being honestly, bravely, yet calmly, a true man. 
 Lastly, the habit of honesty in the smallest details, and ap- 
 parent trifles, both as to truth and property, cannot be too 
 early and too anxiously cultivated. It is not sufficient that 
 the young learn- early to shun pilfering, but it is necessary 
 that a sacred regard for property, in all its manifestations, be 
 early instilled into their souls; a regard which must increase 
 in the same degree as the protection of property is wanting, 
 and towards public property, even though consisting only in 
 the school or college utensils, as much as towards private 
 property. That greatest aim of all moral education, to make 
 men just and true, kind and self-controlled, is also the most 
 important moral education for the state. Let men be just 
 and true, and what is no gained ! 
 
 As regards the instruction of the child with reference to its
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 1 19 
 
 future citizenship, I would mention that the soul of the child 
 is best awakened by noble examples. We ought to make it 
 early acquainted with some of the best in history, and, as an- 
 cient history is far more striking and symbolical, simpler and 
 more direct, as well as more significant in forms and signs, 
 than modern history, which is more complicated and covered, 
 if I may use this expression, the former will always be found 
 to be far more appropriate to warm, incite, and occupy the 
 child. Plutarch, or some parts of Herodotus, cannot be sup- 
 planted by books on the history of late centuries. At the 
 same time, that concentric instruction which starts from what 
 is near us and extends in wider and wider circles, indispensa- 
 ble, in my opinion, for leading the child to vivid perceptions, 
 is highly advisable likewise in leading the young to a just 
 appreciation of distant actions and institutions and to a habit 
 of observation and attention. It is in political instruction s 
 in geography, in which the course of the largest rivers, and 
 the laws which they obey, can be best shown by following 
 the course of a rill or rivulet near at hand. At a successive 
 period the history of our own country in connection ought to 
 follow, and finally a more particular acquaintance with our 
 political duties and responsibilities, for which the instruction 
 in history gives opportunity in a desultory yet very important 
 manner from its first commencement. The attempt to teach 
 political economy to children is one of the ludicrous effects 
 in our times of a disregard of the various conditions resulting 
 from different ages, sexes, and other circumstances a folly 
 resulting from superficiality, not unfrequently from sordid 
 desire of gain in those who offor instruction, and of ignorance 
 in the parents, who do not know that learning formulas by 
 heart, and printed answers for printed questions, drawn up 
 moreover not unfrequently in an injudicious manner, does not 
 constitute teaching and cultivating the mind of the young. 
 Conscientious education cannot be carried on in so hasty or 
 wholesale a manner. 
 
 It is hardly necessary to mention gymnastics. They are of 
 such decided moment that I do not know what to say of
 
 I20 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 them except that they are even morally of the first impor- 
 tance, without entering into a discussion the length of which 
 would be unsuited for the present work. They are far too 
 little regarded as an indispensable branch of education, and 
 ought invariably to be connected with public instruction. Our 
 climate, with its great changes of heat and cold, our exceed- 
 ing ease of travelling without physical exertion, our free in- 
 stitutions, and our entire dependence upon the people at large 
 for the defence of the country, demand it imperatively. 
 
 VII. I have spoken here chiefly of elementary education 
 only. As to superior education, the classical department will 
 always be of the highest importance. It is a principle in all 
 education that its efficiency, thoroughness, and completeness 
 depend in a high degree upon the question whether it is 
 founded upon the main elements of that civilization in which 
 the individual to be educated lives and has to act, and which 
 he is expected to promote in turn. Now, the factors of that 
 product which we call our civilization the civilization of the 
 West Caucasian race besides those factors without which no 
 civilization whatever can exist, namely, accumulated experi- 
 ence (knowledge) and accumulated labor (skill and capital), are 
 Christianity, antiquity, and the Teutonic element. From these 
 three elements arose, and still arises, our peculiar and high 
 civilization, through them alone we can find a key to it, and 
 upon them we must found our education, if we endeavor 
 thereby to develop the mind in such a manner that it may 
 harmonize with the civilization we breathe. Every time that 
 an attempt has been made to discard one or the other, expe- 
 rience has shown that injurious deficiency must be the con- 
 sequence. The history of education amply proves it. 
 
 It appears to me that the gigantic effect of Chinese educa- 
 tion is owing to the fact that it is strictly founded upon the 
 factors of Chinese civilization. Whatever we may think of 
 the latter, and however fettering instead of developing and 
 invigorating we may consider Chinese education, it cannot be 
 denied that the effect is gigantic ; perhaps more so than that
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 121 
 
 of any other extensive national education. Nearly four hun- 
 dred millions of bustling and industrious people, in an over- 
 peopled country, without a religious element which induces 
 them to consider this life as a minimum existence to be regu- 
 lated in part with reference to an endless existence hereafter, 
 or if part of these people, the Buddhists, believe in a future 
 existence, they believe it to depend upon certain performances 
 rather than the morality of their acts in this life and all 
 these many people under a weak government, which does not 
 even share in this latter religion and yet they live in peace, 
 and form an unbroken whole. It is by education alone that 
 the Chinese government rules this colossus, and this educa- 
 tion does produce this surprising effect, as it appears to me, 
 only because it is strictly founded upon the chief factors of 
 their peculiar civilization, being entirely a civilization of their 
 own. It is not a patriotic education, but a most essentially 
 Chinese one. I need not repeat that I have mentioned this 
 instance only with reference to the magnitude of its effect. 
 
 VIII. In the whole scale of our terrestrial creation we find 
 that the higher life rises in its functions, and therefore the 
 nobler the organism is of which it is the result, the more dis- 
 tinct and prominent becomes the difference of sexes. Vege- 
 table as well as animal life exhibits this important phe- 
 nomenon. In the very lowest animals no difference of sexes 
 exists ; with the higher station of the animal in the long 
 chain of organic bodies the marked distinction of the sexes 
 increases, until we find it in man, the concluding link, more 
 prominent and thorough than in all other animals. It is a 
 divine order of things, and has been early acknowledged as 
 such by the various nations, as the ancient religions and 
 systems of philosophy show. So striking is this difference in 
 the great household of organic life that men have frequently 
 applied the same principle to inorganic matter, and even to 
 abstract principles, 1 while they likewise naturally expressed 
 
 1 Most of the religio-philosophical systems of the East have adopted in their 
 accounts of creation a principle by which they typify a mysterious union of
 
 122 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 their feeling and conceptions by applying the different gram- 
 matical genders to inanimate objects around them, as the 
 early and original languages do, I mean those idioms which 
 did not originate by the process of mixture at a period when 
 the people were comparatively advanced and reflection pre- 
 vailed over impulse. 
 
 The female of the human species is smaller, the chest nar- 
 rower, the muscular system little developed, the voice an oc- 
 tave higher, and the nervous system predominant ; hence her 
 sensibility is greater. The peculiar state of her lymphatic and 
 cellular systems, and the circumstance that her sanguineous 
 system is less active than in man, are the causes of her greater 
 whiteness and transparency of skin and roundness of form, in 
 short of her greater charm, of her less activity, and of a 
 greater want of fiercer passions, which characterize the bilious 
 temperament. She is framed and constituted more delicately, 
 and in consequence of this marked difference of organization 
 has advantages and disadvantages compared to the male sex, 
 differences which are fundamental and of the last importance 
 for the obtaining of those ends for which man and mankind 
 are placed on this globe, and from which likewise different 
 positions, callings, duties, and spheres of activity result. 
 
 The woman is more timid, more affectionate, keener in feel- 
 ing, hence sprightlier in those thoughts which originate from 
 acute sensitiveness ; she is less ardent in far-reaching plans, 
 more uninterruptedly busy in a sphere of quiet activity, more 
 graceful in soul and body, more attractive, more patient and 
 
 the masculine and feminine principles, from which the first existence of things 
 takes its origin. The dogma, in certain mythologies, of the supposed interven- 
 tion of a masculo-feminine principle in the development of the mundane egg, 
 bears a singular parallel to the Chinese Tai-Ky, a mystic figure which represents 
 the union of Yang and Yn, the male and female principle. [The Tai-Ky really 
 denotes the absolute, that beyond which there is nothing more. Wuttke, Gesch. 
 Heidenth., ii. 14.] Davis, The Chinese, vol. ii. p. 65, gives an account of it. 
 Respecting the Hindoo philosophy on this point I must refer to the History of 
 Ancient Philosophy, by Ritter (iii. 349-418, Hamb., 1834). So did the Pytha- 
 goreans enumerate among the primeval elements of nature the Masculine and 
 Feminine. Arist., Met., i. 5, 6.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 123 
 
 cunning in obtaining her objects, more confiding and be- 
 lieving. Man is stronger, bolder, more energetic and active, 
 and of consequence more exhausted by his efforts, thus stand- 
 ing in greater need of deep repose; he is more judging and 
 inquiring, hence more just if his passion is not roused; less 
 patient and enduring; less willing calmly to submit; more 
 ardent and much stronger in the powers of combination and 
 comprehension ; his mind has greater grasp ; he is more in- 
 dependent, freer in action and thought, bolder in braving the 
 opinion of others. These mental differences are no less im- 
 portant for the constitution of the family (as it rises in char- 
 acter with the progress of civilization) than the physical 
 difference which the Creator has ordained as the necessary 
 condition of procreation for nearly all organic life, and upon 
 which those differences of disposition and faculties are 
 founded. 
 
 IX. From this different organization arise different rela- 
 tions, as has been observed already. The woman is fitter for 
 all those actions which must be impelled chiefly by affection; 
 hence she is more fit to foster and educate the young, and to 
 nurture in turn their hearts with affection ; she is more dis- 
 posed to cling to a protector, and far readier to consent to 
 sacrifices; she graces society, and sentiment being one of the 
 spheres in which she is most active, and chastity her first 
 virtue and honor she is the chief agent in infusing delicacy, 
 gentleness, taste, decorum, and correctness of morals, so far 
 as they depend upon continency, into society at large. These 
 in turn attract the male sex, and inspire the sterner bosom of 
 man with those feelings of romance and delicate reverence 
 which form, however extravagant they may at times appear, 
 not only a salutary but a necessary element of high civiliza- 
 tion. It belongs to the province of general ethics to discuss 
 the question, why continency is the chiefest virtue of the 
 woman and inseparably connected with her honor, and why, 
 according to the universal sentiment of mankind, incontinency 
 in the male sex, however immoral, does not create the same
 
 124 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 feeling of disgust with which it is viewed in the other sex. 
 Thus much only may be stated here, that Providence, ordain- 
 ing that the family in its purity and inviolateness should form 
 the nucleus of civilization, and that it should be formed by 
 the union of sexes, seems to have imposed as one of the primi- 
 tive elements of human society, on man, not only the desire 
 for this union, but the choice of his desire, on the one hand, 
 and the acute feeling of bashfulness of woman on the other 
 hand, so that man's desire should partake of reverence and 
 be more than mere appetite, from which circumstance attach- 
 ment and perpetuity of union arise. If the desire in man 
 were not strong, selfishness might prevent the existence of 
 families ; if the woman were not bashful, an equal disorder 
 would arise. When the family has been formed, the actual 
 knowledge of the child's parentage that knowledge which 
 is derived from the evidence of the senses, and not from moral 
 conviction is confined to the woman alone ; and as the 
 family, with the affections between the parents and their off- 
 spring, forms an absolutely necessary element of man's ethical 
 and political relations, the continency of the woman, on which 
 the purity and intenseness of family feeling depend, becomes 
 naturally the more important, so that moral conviction of the 
 child's parentage as far as concerns the father may fully sup- 
 plant the want of conviction by the senses. 
 
 X. The true sphere of woman's best and noblest activity, 
 and a sacred one it is, assigned to her in the distribution of 
 the degrees of affection and intellect, ardor and reliance, is the 
 family, where she acts as wife, mother, daughter, and sister, 
 and through it that society which we have called the society 
 of comity, where she graces, humanizes, and reconciles, and, 
 through both, the country. In what way her activity is con- 
 nected with the country, and mediately with the state, is the 
 subject which will now occupy us. 
 
 The nature and consequent duties of woman exclude her 
 from public life ; her timidity, bashfulness, delicacy, and in- 
 ferior grasp of mind, as well as the necessity of acting out
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 125 
 
 those sacred duties more especially assigned to her, require 
 her being more retired than the other sex. A woman loses 
 in the same degree her natural character, as woman, as she 
 enters into publicity. There are, of course, women whose 
 extraordinary mental organization is such that they form ex- 
 ceptions ; but wherever this fundamental principle is aban- 
 doned as a general rule, evil ensues, as in every other case of 
 deviation from the laws of nature. The woman cannot de- 
 fend the state : if she were physically able to do it, she would 
 necessarily lose her peculiar character as woman, and thus a 
 necessary element of civilization would be extinguished. Here, 
 too, emergencies may make exceptions exceptions of the 
 noblest and proudest kind ; but should they cease to form 
 exceptions, a subversion of the whole moral order of things 
 would be the consequence. She does not preach, she does 
 not judge in court, nor debate in the legislative halls, nor take 
 a direct part in politics ; if she does so, it is always to the 
 injury of society, be it by way of court intrigue, as was the 
 case in so eminent a degree in France before the first revolu- 
 tion, or by way of popular excitements, as was frequently the 
 case in Scotland during its most agitated periods in the sev- 
 enteenth century, 1 or in a hideous degree during the French 
 revolution. 
 
 We have seen that the family in its unity and purity is 
 necessary, and that to produce and maintain these the retired- 
 ness of woman is equally necessary. A natural consequence 
 of this circumstance, in addition to the fact that her affections 
 and feelings are stronger than those of man if not blunted by 
 corruption or absurdity, is that she is naturally less apt to 
 judge of public business, and to allow the principle of right, 
 of justice alone, full weight. Her situation in the family gives 
 her less opportunity to cultivate this feeling of mere justice 
 than she otherwise might do. Women, therefore, are carried 
 away by that which naturally operates most actively in them, 
 
 1 Raumer, History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, illustrated by 
 Original Documents, London, 1835, vol. ii. p. 337, and previous passages.
 
 126 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 by sentiment, even in spheres where it is of the utmost im- 
 portance to repress it as much as human frailty will permit. 1 
 Hence the fact that if women once enter into politics, and 
 especially take part in party strifes, they show themselves less 
 scrupulous than men, are apt to be entirely carried away by 
 personalities, and to trespass much farther than men upon the 
 limits of fairness, justice, and truth. 
 
 There are other reasons, however, why women should be 
 strictly excluded from active politics. The woman, weaker 
 by nature, hence gentler and more dependent, is naturally 
 given more to intrigue if she once transgresses the line of her 
 proper sphere. Boldness, strength, and public action being 
 denied her, originally or as a natural consequence of her 
 position, she will the sooner resort to intrigue, and as she 
 naturally acts more by attraction and charm she becomes 
 necessarily the more dangerous. No true civilization is possi- 
 ble where there does not largely exist that chivalric feeling in 
 man which gladly yields, wherever possible, to the weaker and 
 more delicate, gentler and more graceful sex. This feeling, 
 however, operates in politics, where Right should rule alone, 
 very dangerously. If woman were to be admitted to an active 
 participation in politics, she must do it at the price of her 
 whole peculiar nature, her grace and her attraction, and would 
 henceforth be distinguished from man by her greater weak- 
 ness alone, and in consequence become greatly oppressed. 
 If woman claims to be admitted as a member of a jury, she 
 must allow herself to be sworn in as a constable. The woman 
 who should go to the poll must have disrobed herself of her 
 essential nature as woman, and either be treated as men are, 
 which would lower her character and position in society, or 
 she must be treated with deference, which would be disastrous 
 to the fundamentals of the state. 
 
 The family is necessary not only for procreation, but for the 
 promotion of morals and civilization; unity, love, forbearance 
 
 1 In this respect women are like people living in countries in which there is no 
 public political life. They do not learn to modify their opinion by seeing it 
 opposed, or to respect the perfect right of others to oppose it.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 127 
 
 in it are necessary ; the woman stands in need of protection 
 and support ; the man, of being led to the sphere of affections, 
 to the unselfish love of his wife and children. But if the 
 woman were to take an active part in the politics of free 
 countries, the unity would be disturbed, husband and wife 
 would no longer be one; the most gloomy consequences 
 must follow, it would be impossible for womankind long to 
 retain modesty and continency, and thus society would hasten 
 to speedy dissolution. She would likewise lose her great 
 privilege of softening and pacifying society, of being the bond 
 which unites many discordant elements. If we look around 
 us, we see how daily and hourly woman, because she enjoys 
 her peculiar position, brings elements in contact, if she does 
 not reconcile them, which otherwise would bitterly war with 
 one another. " She shall have peace in market or fair, whether 
 the feud among men be never so great," says the ancient law 
 of the Visigoths. The most sacred interests, then, of man, 
 of woman, and of society demand, as much as strict justice, 
 that she should not meddle with politics. 
 
 XI. There is, nevertheless, a cord by which the woman is 
 strongly connected through her liveliest sentiments with the 
 state it is patriotism. Let it not be said that this virtue can- 
 not be strong in her if we deny her an active part in the daily 
 political affairs. On the contrary, that feeling is frequently 
 strongest by its native vigor in those individuals whose feel- 
 ings have not been exposed to the blunting effects of political 
 strife and rancor, for patriotism is the love of country, not the 
 love of the state only. Through her husband and children 
 and brothers she is connected with the actions of the state ; 
 let her cultivate the noblest feelings, let her be both a support 
 and an incentive to her husband, let her in herself represent 
 to him the country which is worth living, toiling, dying for, 
 let her early imbue her children with this sacred love, and, 
 when finally need shall be, let her act boldly and heroically 
 if she have the constitution, bestowing an honor upon her 
 country. Let the woman look upon the numberless Roman
 
 128 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 wives and mothers who, though so strictly domestic, willingly 
 could die for their country, and then say whether their lot is 
 low. I believe it can be said without contradiction that in all 
 periods of free nations, in which the noblest deeds have been 
 performed and the greatest sacrifices made to liberty, and in 
 which the nation has evinced a spirit that stands as an en- 
 kindling example to the latest periods, woman has stood in 
 this her true position, as wife and mother, linked most closely 
 to her country through husband and son. 
 
 It seems to me one of the great destinies of woman that, 
 not being ordinarily called upon in the great order of things 
 to mingle in the turmoil of life, in the strife and struggle of 
 the times and the bustle of business, or in those pursuits of 
 knowledge or practical life which make men acquainted with 
 the selfish, criminal, and foul aberrations of human nature, she 
 is more able to keep the simple and elementary sentiments 
 and impulses untainted in their native freshness and purity. 
 Men in this respect appear to me like the lawyers or judges, 
 who, by long practice, seeing so much, weighing so much 
 for and against, must frequently become blunted in their na- 
 tive quick feelings of right; but women, like the lookers-on, 
 unprofessional ye.t deeply interested in the issue. And should 
 it be necessary to add that men, frequently seeing so much 
 corruption abroad, are apt to be influenced by the lower 
 standard around and above them ? It becomes, therefore, the 
 more necessary that in the wife, not exposed as she is to 
 these unhallowed effects, and cultivating as she does in the 
 stillness of the house the virtue of her children, the broad and 
 pure principles of patriotism should continue' to be repre- 
 sented. When the sentence respecting Hampden's ever- 
 memorable ship-money case was to be pronounced, and the 
 British court used its whole influence to obtain an opinion of 
 the bench favorable to the unlawful usurpations of the crown, 
 but subversive of one of the most elementary principles of the 
 British constitution, and nearly all the judges, dependent crea- 
 tures of the crown, had made up their minds to support them 
 at all hazards, Justices Croke, Hutton, and Denham alone
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 129 
 
 dared to side with justice, honor, truth, and their country. 
 Croke, however, before he gave his final opinion, had wavered, 
 not because undecided as to the great question of right, but 
 because he saw that his seat on the bench was at stake. It 
 was then that his patriotic and high-minded wife " implored 
 him not to sacrifice his conscience for fear of any danger or 
 prejudice to his family, being content to suffer any misery 
 with him rather than to be an occasion for him to violate his 
 integrity." Her name ought to be held dear and in living 
 remembrance forever. 
 
 XII. It is high-minded patriotism which, among other deep- 
 seated motives, may induce women in times of emergencies 
 to perform the most heroic deeds, boldly braving danger or 
 supporting all the suffering that human nature can endure. 
 We need not seek for instances in Telesilla, who valiantly 
 defended Argos when the youths of her country were slain, 
 or in Leaena, who, tortured by Hippias to compel her to be- 
 tray the secrets of her lover Aristogiton, bit off her tongue 
 for fear she might be unable to resist the pain; 1 we find 
 many of the proudest instances of heroism and devotion in all 
 periods of struggle for a noble object. The. history of the 
 Dutch war of independence is full of the brightest examples, 
 and we have seen in our own times the women of Saragossa 
 abide by their fighting husbands unto death, 2 and the Prussian 
 women of all ranks attend the hospitals, in organized societies, 
 and do every work, the most arduous or loathsome not ex 
 cepted, which the state of the wounded required, in the years 
 1813 and 1814, when every able-bodied man was in the field: 
 at which time they did not shun the malignant typhus fever, 
 then raging in the hospitals and carrying off many of these 
 ministers of humanity, who did not exclude from their care 
 their wounded enemies ! It is sufficient to read the papers 
 of the day in order to be satisfied, by the accounts of ship- 
 
 1 [Comp. Plut. de Mulier. Virt., iv. ; Pausan., i. 23.] 
 
 2 Napier, Peninsular War, book v. ch. 3. 
 VOL. II. q
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 wrecks for instance, of what heroism woman is capable. 1 Yet 
 let us remember that in those periods of extremity in which 
 woman has performed so noble a part, she had not prepared 
 herself for these arduous deeds by previously misplacing her- 
 self in society, or by intruding into spheres which would have 
 deprived her of her character. It was the loving mother, the 
 faithful wife, not the female politician or the spinster who had 
 delivered public speeches, that could suddenly step upon the 
 wall and look into the enemy's face. 
 
 I believe, then, that the most important calling of the 
 woman respecting politics is, that, as wife, she identify herself 
 with her husband in his best endeavors, and aid him in keep- 
 ing alive and active the purest principles, and as mother, that, 
 besides the whole cultivation of her children, which in so 
 eminent a degree depends upon her, she sow with religious zeal 
 the seeds of lofty patriotism in their hearts from early infancy. 
 For this purpose she ought to make herself acquainted with 
 the best examples in the history of her own and other coun- 
 tries. A story received in early youth from a mother's lips' 
 sinks deep into the soul, and becomes a very part of it. 
 
 On the other hand, I believe that woman transgresses the 
 proper line, to her own injury and the detriment of society at 
 large, if she takes public part in the ordinary politics of the 
 day. I think it highly objectionable, unfair, and injurious if 
 women canvass for elections, 2 and highly dangerous for their 
 position and character if they hold public meetings and pub- 
 licly debate, as several times they have done of late in Eng- 
 
 1 * It is a great omission that the French women of the revolution were not 
 mentioned here; for, while the fishwomen of Paris were loathsomely vile and 
 bloodthirsty, all France literally abounded with the greatest heroines, who sacri- 
 ficed themselves, as wives, mothers, sisters, daughters, and friends. See by all 
 means Raumer, Histor. Taschenb., Neue Folge, vol. i., 1840, essay 3 : " die 
 Frauen der Franzos. Revolution." 
 
 2 There is perhaps no more striking instance of ladies canvassing for election, 
 however common in England, on record, than when, previous to the famous 
 Westminster election in 1784, the duchess of Devonshire and Mrs. Crewe can- 
 vassed for Fox, and the countess of Salisbury for Sir Cecil \Vray. Wraxall 
 gives an account of it in his Posthumous Memoirs.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 13 1 
 
 land ; T and I believe it manifestly out of place if they petition 
 legislative bodies respecting public measures, unless it be 
 against a direct injustice done to them as women, of which 
 indeed they do not stand in much danger in our times. 
 Women ought to abstain in particular from petitions for par- 
 doning criminals. Their sentiment as well as their want of 
 acquaintance with practical life inclines them naturally towards 
 charity as soon as sentence is pronounced upon a convict ; 
 they forget his crime, and the cause of morality and society, 
 little thinking what injury may be inflicted by frustrating the 
 course of law, and in particular by the new crimes which 
 the pardoned criminal will not be unlikely to commit. I shall 
 say more on pardoning in general in another place ; suffice it 
 here to say that petitions for pardon from women are unjust 
 and unfair in the highest degree. Either they study the par- 
 ticular case or not: if they do not, it is preposterous to solicit 
 a pardon ; if they do, they throw away one of their first privi- 
 leges in life, that of being exempt from the necessity of 
 making themselves acquainted with the foulest diseases of 
 society. I speak here of those written petitions with a number 
 of names, of which we all know with what degree of ignorance 
 of the case in question they are signed. Who would consider 
 it wrong in a single woman to implore mercy in cases which 
 do not touch common and base crimes and which interest her 
 individually ? 
 
 Were I asked which of the women known in history sig- 
 nally embodies those qualities which appear to me essential 
 to the modern woman, not by way of exception or rare dis- 
 tinction for talents, but as eminently showing those qualities 
 which ought to be in all, in short showing the" modern wife 
 and mother in the noblest light, I should point out Lady 
 Russell, wife of Lord William Russell. Kind and considerate 
 to children and husband, she always invited him to unbosom 
 
 1 I would certainly not go so far as to pronounce against all meetings of 
 women, placed in so peculiar a situation, for instance, as those working in some 
 of the American factories. But even there they ought always to take care not 
 to endanger their essential female character by entering into publicity.
 
 j 3 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 himself to her in his patriotic anxieties; she understood him; 
 she felt with him ; when he was imprisoned, she did all pos- 
 sible service to him ; when he was tried for his life, she was 
 not overwhelmed, but stepped forward in court and took notes 
 for him ; when he was sentenced, she lost no time in bewail- 
 ing his doom, but attempted every lawful means to avert the 
 blow, and to comfort her lord in prison by her own high- 
 minded composure ; and when, on the evening before his 
 execution, she took her last farewell from a husband she 
 loved better than aught on earth, and whom she knew to be 
 unrighteously sacrificed, even then she had the greatness of 
 soul to stand the trial. " He kissed her four or five times ; 
 and she kept her sorrow so within herself that she gave him 
 no disturbance by their parting." 1 This fortitude, and the 
 patience with which she bore her affliction through the rest 
 of her life, was greater heroism than any ancient or Asiatic 
 self-immolation could have proved. 2 
 
 1 " After she was gone," continues Burnet in his journal, from which this ac- 
 count was taken, " he (Lord Russell) said, * Now the bitterness of death is past,' 
 and ran out into a long discourse concerning her how great a blessing she had 
 been to him ; and said, ' what a misery it would have been to him if she had not 
 had that magnanimity of spirit, joined to her tenderness, as never to have desired 
 him to do a base thing for the saving of his life, whereas, otherwise, what a week 
 should I have passed, if she had been crying to me to turn informer and be a 
 Lord Howard !' " Lady Russell's whole character may be seen from Lord John 
 Russell's Life of William Lord Russell. I hope I do not trespass the limits of 
 a note, if I add a few words on the widow of Barneveldt. Maurice, stadtholder 
 of Holland, caused the wise patriot to be executed ; at any rate, he did not, as 
 he had the power to do, prevent it, when the most unfortunate religious excite- 
 ment against the poor Remonstrants ran high. When, some time after, the son 
 of Barneveldt had shared in a conspiracy against Maurice, and been sentenced 
 to die, the mother threw herself at the stadtholder's feet to implore mercy for 
 her son. He asked why she could beg now for her son, and had not done so 
 for her husband, whom, it ought to be mentioned, the stadtholder declared 
 himself at the time ready to save, if he would implore mercy; but the old man 
 would not belie his innocence, as Russell declined the same. The heroic answer 
 of the afflicted mother but proud widow was, " My husband was innocent, my 
 son is guilty." Her prayer was not granted. Van Campen, History of the 
 Netherlands, vol. ii. p. 43. 
 
 2 See also Letters of Lady Rachel Russell, from the Manuscript in the Library 
 at Woburn Abbey, etc., 6th ed., London, 1801.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 133 
 
 XIII. The history of woman in her domestic and social as 
 well as in her civil relations, and more particularly in her jural 
 position and social influence, is one of the most interesting 
 and important branches of the history of civilization, which, 
 so far as my knowledge of literature extends, has not yet been 
 treated with the profoundness of thought and extent of knowl- 
 edge that the subject deserves, although valuable materials 
 have been collected for this inviting task. 1 
 
 In the earliest times, when physical subsistence and bodily 
 protection form the absorbing objects of human activity, it is 
 natural that woman should occupy a very subordinate position. 
 She was not only considered mentally, but also morally, in- 
 ferior to man, as she was physically inferior to him. She 
 was so little considered a human individual of herself, that 
 not only most essential rights were denied her, but, as a 
 natural consequence, also moral responsibility, even to a late 
 period, not only metaphysically but legally, so that it be- 
 came necessary to restore legal responsibility to her. 2 Man, 
 being conscious of the necessity that the woman should 
 associate with him and form an ingredient of the family, could 
 not at once acknowledge this necessary association and yet at 
 the same time her entire moral individuality. Though from 
 early ages affection has prevailed over power, the daughter, 
 like her brother, was considered the property of her father, 
 and when married she was sold to the wooer. The ancient 
 
 1 There have been several collections of the biographies of distinguished women. 
 Alexander, History of Women, 2 vols. 4to, 1779; Segur, Les Femmes, 3 vols., 
 1802 ; Communications from the Lives of Distinguished Women (in German), 
 Stuttgard, 1828; with many other works. Meiners wrote a History of the Fe- 
 male Sex (in German), Hanover, 1788-1800, 4 vols. For any one who desires 
 to inquire thoroughly into what has been written on this subject, as well as on 
 the influence of Christianity upon the position of woman, and other points con- 
 nected with the general subject, it would be well to examine the list of works 
 appended to the article Woman (Frau) in Krug's Dictionary of Philosophical 
 Sciences ; though it is far from being complete. 
 
 3 King Magnus Erichsen of Sweden " was able to decree, in 1335, that 'the 
 woman shall suffer for her crimes like the man, especially for crimes touching 
 life.' " Geijer, History of Sweden, Hamburg, 1832, vol. i. p. 273. The words 
 "was able" are very significant.
 
 134 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 history of Asiatic nations, for instance the Bible, and of other 
 tribes, shows this, as well as the customs observed to this day 
 by the tribes of the East. 1 Polygamy, legitimate even with 
 the Hebrews, 2 though not favored or general,3 did not rapidly 
 promote the jural or social emancipation of the woman. In 
 Europe, among the Greeks and Romans as well as other tribes, 
 monogamy existed from early times, and we consequently find 
 the woman there in a very different position. She has now 
 become the companion of the husband. Greek history records 
 many of the brightest examples of women as wives or mothers, 
 but the annals of no nation probably exhibit so many as those 
 of Rome ; instances of heroic devotion, which continue far 
 into the corrupt periods of the Western empire. The Teu- 
 tonic tribes, which hastened the downfall of crumbling Rome, 
 
 
 
 showed, from the earliest periods in which we find them men- 
 tioned, no less than in their whole mythology, a peculiar regard 
 for the female, which, together with the humanizing influence 
 of the church in general, and its direct efforts in many instances 
 to improve the position of woman, had a salutary effect on 
 the European population. When chivalry sprang up, in which 
 religious ardor, desire of adventure, and devotion to woman 
 were romantically blended, the exaltation of woman became, 
 in one class at least, an absorbing concern of life. Though 
 this adoration of woman led to many fantastic and even im- 
 moral aberrations, 4 and had far less effect upon the essential 
 
 1 Niebuhr the elder, Burckhardt, and all the other travellers in the East. So 
 do we find instances of the buying of wives in Odyss., xi. 281; Iliad, xi. 244; 
 Herod., i. 196; Strabo, p. 745, etc. 
 
 " Michaelis, Mosaic Law, ii. 85; Saalschutz, Mos. Recht, chap. 103. 
 
 3 Michaelis, ii. 95 ; Jahn, Arch., i. 2. 
 
 * The morals of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries were of the 
 most licentious character. Chateaubriand, in the third volume of his Etudes 
 Historiques, gives instances, such as establishments in imitation of nunneries 
 with vows of immorality. Whoever is in the least acquainted with the morals of 
 those ages, with the peculiar government and corporate privileges of the prostitutes 
 in the various cities during former periods and with the courts and monasteries of 
 those times, will consider the advance of morality in our race during the last 
 two centuries, despite all existing irregularities, as one of the most signal traits
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 135 
 
 position of woman in general, and the morals of the age, than 
 many persons, satisfied with insulated and poetic accounts, 
 rashly believe, still every one acquainted with the history of 
 civilization will admit the romantic devotion of the middle 
 ages to have been one of the factors in producing a better 
 state of things and in somewhat tempering even the miseries 
 of part of the worst periods. The cities, with their industry 
 and wealth, rose in power and number, governments became 
 more general institutions, the feudal lords more subdued ; 
 peace was more and more established, and the rights of the 
 commons, of the people in general, and also those of the 
 women in particular, became gradually more clearly defined, 
 extended, and valued. Woman was more and more acknowl- 
 edged in her own moral capacity. Laws became juster to- 
 wards her. When the period of re-discussion of all human 
 rights began during the last century, inquiry naturally was 
 extended to the position and rights of woman, which, the 
 more these attracted attention, became in many instances very 
 limited indeed as to extent, though acute as to the single 
 object which happened to be under discussion ; and finally a 
 series of writings appeared, beginning perhaps with Mary Woll- 
 stonecraft's Vindication of the Rights of Women, published 
 towards the end of the last century, which, in determining the 
 proper sphere of action in society and the state for man and 
 woman, altogether lost sight of the different organization of the 
 two sexes, and the pervading divine order of things founded 
 upon it. One step led to another, and finally writers ap- 
 peared, x both male and female, who endeavored to break up 
 that institution which was already considered by the ancient 
 philosophers, poets, and priests as forming together with the 
 institution of property the only firm foundation of all civiliza- 
 tion the institution of matrimony. Two late writers in par- 
 ticular, a man and a woman, have written upon this subject 
 and the intercourse between the two sexes, with so disgusting 
 
 in modern history. The change which has taken place is far beyond what any 
 one wlio has not perused the histories and chronicles of the times can imagine.
 
 I3 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 a temerity that I seriously doubt whether any previous period 
 has been disgraced by compositions of equally loathsome im- 
 morality, pitiful and superficial reasoning, and gross ignorance. 
 
 XIV. Neither the literary progress of women and their dis- 
 tinction in the province of letters, on the one hand, nor, on the 
 other, the question why females should be allowed to sit upon 
 a throne, when excluded from all other public business, is a 
 subject to be discussed here. The one belongs to the history 
 of literature or female civilization, the other to politics proper. 
 It is nothing more than a mere question of high political expe- 
 diency. Yet although the subject of voting by females does 
 not belong, strictly speaking, to our province, but to natural 
 law and politics proper, as defined in the first part, I may be 
 allowed to give here a very few additional remarks on the 
 subject. 
 
 Either we acknowledge the difference of sexes, and conse- 
 quent different spheres of action, as necessary and founded in 
 the great order of things, or not. If the former, then there 
 is no more denial of right in excluding women from public 
 business than there is in not calling on them to take up arms or 
 to work, by way of taxation, in repairing high-roads. If the 
 latter be the case, we ought not only to allow them to vote, 
 for that is a very specific and limited political act indeed, but 
 they ought to be in every respect admitted and consequently 
 called upon to do all that men do. It is erroneously supposed 
 by some that voting is a natural and absolute right, inherent 
 in each individual. This is a very great mistake ; for though 
 every one's interest ought to have its due weight in the de- 
 vising of public measures, whose degree of justice depends 
 upon the average benefit they bestow upon the whole, it is not 
 necessary that this be effected by his voting. Universal suf- 
 frage is a term too vast for what is meant to be expressed. 
 There are always persons excluded from voting. Soldiers do 
 not vote, and ought not to vote for instance in their barracks ; 
 the French constitution of Herault de Sechelles excluded do- 
 mestics from voting, because too dependent in their situation ;
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 137 
 
 many constitutions exclude the clergy from voting, because 
 their influence, always great, is feared if they interfere with 
 politics. Nor is the question of universal suffrage to be other- 
 wise decided upon abstract ground. Universal suffrage in 
 Illyria or in any semi-barbarous tribe in near contact with 
 civilization would be a very melancholy thing. So no civil- 
 ized nation in which, from whatever cause it may result, there 
 are vast classes, ignorant, rude, and poor, excluded from the 
 common stream of civilization, can endure universal suffrage. 
 Those who insist on the natural birthright of man to vote 
 cannot in my opinion demonstrate the legality of a represent- 
 ative government, nor of any other government except that 
 of a tribe which daily decides by a simple numerical majority 
 of all its members upon every subject. Yet we are told that, 
 allowing all these positions, the woman is not even repre- 
 sented. This too rests upon an error. Is not the whole life of 
 the husband daily, hourly, and most thoroughly influenced 
 by her and by his position towards her? And if he takes, as 
 he necessarily must do, this whole frame of mind with him 
 into legislative proceedings, is his wife unrepresented ? The 
 agriculturist is far less sure that a merchant of his district will 
 represent his interest than the wife is that her husband repre- 
 sents her. 1 How are the sick or the old represented who 
 cannot go to the poll ? If indeed by true representation be 
 meant that each one should have a direct spokesman, and not 
 the political organism through which we arrive at the public 
 opinion and public will of the whole, after those of the parts 
 of society have modified one another, I do not see how indeed 
 the minority is represented in any representative government, 
 or how a law of the majority in an absolute democracy can 
 
 1 It is always a painful, sometimes a dangerous, task to be obliged to touch 
 upon important and highly debated points without being able to give and develop 
 the whole: for it is not agreeable to be misunderstood on such topics. I can of 
 course not explain my whole view of governments, etc., but I may be allowed to 
 add at least that I consider it a principle in politics that the right of voting, if it 
 exist at all, ought to be extensive, and not restricted, or it will work far more 
 mischief than good.
 
 138 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 have any binding power upon the minority. For it is certain 
 that in the former case the representative does not directly 
 represent the minority, since he says and does things totally 
 at variance with their opinion ; nor is the law in the latter case 
 the direct law, that is the public will of the minority. 
 
 I conclude with a passage of Mr. Guizot's, and only add 
 that he is the husband of a lady highly distinguished even in 
 literature. He says, " Society, however simple may be its 
 structure, has other affairs than such as are merely domestic 
 to engage its attention ; affairs that demand an extent of ca- 
 pacity not possessed by females and minors. Let us suppose 
 a discussion to arise in some savage tribe, or in some state 
 already civilized, relative to a warlike expedition or the adop- 
 tion of a civil law : neither women nor minors are capable of 
 deciding upon interests of this description ; Providence has 
 destined the former for a state of existence purely domestic, 
 while the latter have not yet attained to the plenitude of their 
 individual existence and the full power of their faculties. 
 Naturally, then, and by the operation of one of those truly 
 providential laws in which fact and right are so very harmo- 
 niously blended, the right of suffrage does not belong to them. 
 Capacity, then, is the principle, the necessary condition, of 
 right. And the capacity here spoken of is not merely due to 
 intellectual development or to the possession of this or that 
 particular faculty; it is a complex and profound whole, com- 
 prising spontaneous authority, habitual situation, and natural 
 acquaintance with the different interests to be regulated ; in 
 fact, a certain aggregate of faculties, knowledge, and methods 
 of action which animate the whole man, and which decide, 
 with more certainty than his spirit alone, upon his course of 
 conduct and the use which he will make of power."
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Obedience to the Laws. How highly the Greeks esteemed it. Obedience to 
 Laws one of Man's Prerogatives. Absolute Obedience impossible. Ad Im- 
 possibilia Nemo obligatur. Ad Turpia Nemo obligatur. Viscount Orthes. 
 Unlawful Demands made by lawful Authority. High Importance of the Judi- 
 ciary with reference to Obedience to the Law. Not all that is not prohibited 
 may be done by the Citizen, any more than all that is positively permitted. 
 Penalties are not equivalents of Crime. Malum in se, Malum prohibi- 
 tum: Is the distinction essential, and can we found any Rule of Action 
 upon it ? The Question of Obedience to Laws a Question of Conflict. Obe- 
 dience in the Army and Navy. Articles of War. Obedience in the Civil 
 Service. How far is the Citizen bound to obey the Laws? Justifiable Dis- 
 obedience. Necessary and morally demanded Disobedience. Non-compli- 
 ance with the Laws, or passive Resistance. Active Resistance. Armed 
 Resistance. Insurrection. Revolution. Resistance formerly considered law- 
 ful and received in the Charters.^Mobs and Mob-law, so called. Duty of 
 Informing: in the Officer; in the Citizen at large. Professional Informers for 
 Rewards. Secret Police. Delatores and Mouchards. The obligation of 
 informing against intended or committed Offences. 
 
 XV. " STRANGER, tell the Lacedaemonians that we lie here 
 in obedience to their laws." ' This was the simple inscription, 
 composed by Simonides of Ceos, to commemorate the heroic 
 and conscious devotion of the faithful band of Leonidas at 
 Thermopylae; and in which a nation of peculiar sagacity, and 
 promptitude of mind as well as ardor of soul for liberty, a na- 
 tion with whom " freedom was what the sun is ; the most bril- 
 liant and most useful object of creation a passion, an instinct," 
 thought to express the highest acknowledgment of a deed 
 which every Greek remembered with national pride. It was 
 not merely the happy conceit of an individual ; it was the 
 true expression of the public spirit. Of all that was noble 
 and great in this patriotic act, the noblest and greatest seemed 
 to them that the gallant citizens had been obedient to the 
 
 1 Herodotus, vii. 228. 
 
 139
 
 140 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 laws and their country even unto death. Youthful reader, 
 whose noble and happy lot it is to be born in a free country, 
 an heir to the laws of liberty, weigh well this inscription, in 
 which one of the noblest nations of the earth has concentrated 
 its lively spirit and dear experience, a lesson for every one 
 who cherishes freedom, and intends to make it prosper, as far 
 as in him lies, as the best cause of mankind. 
 
 XVI. To make, acknowledge, and obey laws is one of the 
 high prerogatives as well as duties of man among all the ani- 
 mate beings of the visible creation. Obeying a law, in this 
 case, means conforming our actions willingly to laws, that is, 
 to rules in which principles, as applied to a class of cases, are 
 pronounced. The individual himself, as well as society at 
 large, stands in need of laws ; without them there would be 
 physical and moral disorder. The individual who does not 
 adopt general laws of conduct or principles of action is ex- 
 posed to all the dangers of being carried away by impulses 
 which may arise from causes wholly unconnected with what is 
 good, right, or wise, by selfishness and vices ; and society does 
 not only stand in need of laws that it may avoid violence and 
 consequent suffering, but also because without laws society 
 would lose its moral character, man would forfeit his destiny 
 as a social being, and civilization, that produce of united ex- 
 ertion, would be impossible. Man is wholly man only in 
 society ; society is what it ought to be only through laws ; 
 laws are virtually laws only when obeyed : therefore man's 
 destiny requires obedience to laws. Obedience to laws, then, 
 is necessary, for without their being followed they are no 
 longer laws in essence, because no longer rules of action. 
 Habitual disregard of laws in a society not only produces 
 confusion and clashing of action, but it leads to a want of 
 energy, of mutual reliance, and of public spirit, as well as to 
 a want of manly independence in the" individual. It invigor- 
 ates the soul, lends energy and gives precision of action, and 
 promotes a general feeling of right, if the individuals obey the 
 laws they have chosen to obey. Few things promote more
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 141 
 
 the formation of a manly character and a deeply-seated sense 
 of justice in the young, than decisive and good laws or pre- 
 cepts, strictly acted out. Even the severest laws, if but clearly 
 pronounced and strictly enforced, may leave some feeling of 
 independence; but dependence upon humor gives an insuper- 
 able feeling of slavishness. He who obeys laws only as so 
 many insulated regulations, depriving him of more or less in- 
 dividual liberty which he has given up for the public good, 
 has not penetrated to that high degree of civic sense which 
 makes obedience to the laws an inspiring cause of nobility 
 of character. 
 
 Yet we have seen that man cannot divest himself of his 
 moral individuality and responsibility; the will of another 
 cannot virtually become his own will ; and, therefore, abso- 
 lute obedience is impossible, and, were it possible, immoral. 
 Every approach to it becomes in the same degree immoral. 
 Absolute obedience can be claimed for the commandments of 
 the Deity alone; but even here it must be observed that the 
 evidence that such commands do proceed from the Deity 
 is to be judged of by the individual; reason and conscience 
 must decide upon the character of the authority which de- 
 mands compliance with the command presented as coming 
 from the Deity. A law presented by Mohammedans as a divine 
 law would not be obeyed by Christians in Turkey, at least 
 not as a divine law. In all matters between man and man 
 absolute obedience would destroy the moral as well as the 
 jural ground on which their relations are founded. Never- 
 theless, passion, as well as temerity of partial reasoning, has 
 repeatedly induced man to claim absolute obedience for some 
 authority or other, in ecclesiastic spheres as well as political. 
 I have stated already that it seems to me to be one of our 
 obligations to pay serious and particular attention to any act 
 or institution in the whole range of history or of our own ob- 
 servation in which a principle, virtue, error, or vice has been 
 most consistently carried out. In the one case we become 
 acquainted with a degree of perfection perhaps unattainable 
 at the times we live in, yet worthy of being approached as
 
 142 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 much as possible; in the other case we see the evil acted out 
 in all its hideousness, and therefore the danger increasing 
 with every degree of approach : they distinctly say to us, 
 " To this it will come." In either case we observe truth in its 
 fulness. Respecting absolute obedience I know of no more 
 striking instance of its being carried out in daring consistency 
 than that which the Jesuits demanded from the inferior to the 
 superior, and we may well say to those who demand it in 
 any other sphere, " To this it will come." z 
 
 XVII. Indeed, all promise of absolute obedience would vir- 
 tually amount to taking archbishop Laud's famous and absurd 
 " Et-Caetera Oath," by which people should bind themselves 
 to " maintain the government of the' church by archbishops, 
 
 1 " But one thing shall exist instead of every other relation, every impulse of 
 activity, namely, obedience, obedience without any reference to what it extends." 
 (Epistle of Ignatius "Fratribus Societatis Jesu qui sunt in Lusitania," 7 Kal. Apr. 
 I 553> 3-) The superior shall appear as the representative of Divine Providence, 
 the " Locum Dei tenens" (pars 5, cap. 3, Constit. Ignat.) ; even a sin, if de- 
 manded in the name of Christ, or in virtute obedientiae, shall be committed. 
 Well may Mr. Ranke, in quoting the two following passages from the " Consti- 
 tutiones" of the society, add, " we hardly trust our eyes when we read this :" 
 
 " Et sibi quisque persuadeat, quod qui sub obedientia vivunt, se ferri ac regi 
 a divina providentia per superiores suos sinere debent, perinde ac cadaver essent." 
 Constit., vi. I. 
 
 'fVisumest nobis in domino . . . nullas constitutiones declarationes vel or- 
 dinem ullum vivendi posse obligationem ad peccatum mortale vel veniale indu- 
 cere, si superior ea in nomine domini Jesu Christi vel in virtute obedientire 
 juberet." Const., vi. 5. 
 
 Is it to be supposed that this iniquitous passage was understood to mean that 
 nothing, in reality a sin, would be demanded in the name of Jesus Christ, 
 although, according to all appearance and common notion, it might appear so to 
 the inferior? If this be the case, waiving the still remaining audacity and dan- 
 ger, it would only prove that absolute obedience cannot be carried through, and 
 must stop somewhere. The passage contained in part vi. ch. I of Const. Ignat. 
 is not much better : " Nee solum in rebus obligatoriis, sed etiam in aliis, licet nihil 
 aliud quam signum voluntatis superioris sine ullo expresso prsecepto videretur." 
 
 Bacon, although he has but just bestowed fulsome flattery upon a monarch at 
 once one of the meanest and most arrogant, says, even to a James I., " Nam qui 
 caecam obedientiam fortius obligare contenderit quam officium oculatum, una 
 opera asserat, caecum manu ductum certius incedere, quam qui luce et oculis 
 utiti.r." De Dignitate Sclent., i.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 143 
 
 bishops, deans, chapters, et cetaera." " Yet, although absolute 
 obedience has been so frequently demanded in theory, prac- 
 tice has always shown its impossibility, and those who de- 
 manded it most have generally proved the least ready to sub- 
 mit to it, so soon as it did not suit their position. The Jesuits 
 have had at times violent struggles within the bosom of their 
 society ; though they took the additional vow to go whither- 
 soever the pope might send them, they would not obey him 
 had he commanded anything against the doctrine of the 
 church. They would say that he does not do this as pope ; 
 and this is all that ever a sober mind has insisted upon for the 
 vindication of the right and duty of disobeying laws that is, 
 that they are no longer, or never were, lawful ; or that the 
 authority demanding it is not, in doing so, any longer lawful. 
 There is no government ever so absolute in theory which 
 has not sanctioned acts of disobedience even to the command 
 of the prince, because done on account of the still more impor- 
 tant interest of the same prince. How often have monarchs 
 wished that they had been disobeyed ! Napoleon was, ac- 
 cording to Bourrienne, on some occasions highly pleased 
 when he learned that he had not been obeyed. In short, 
 obedience is always acknowledged in practice as something 
 relative, and of this the individual, of course, must judge. 
 Nowhere in political spheres, probably, was the theory of 
 absolute obedience more roundly acknowledged than in the 
 Prussian army, to its head, the king, under Frederic Wil- 
 liam I. ; yet when his son was tried for attempted escape 
 from his insufferable treatment, and the king appeared at 
 least to insist upon the blood of his son, a colonel 2 rose, tore 
 open his vest, and said, " If your majesty want blood, take 
 mine : that there you shall not have as long as I can utter a 
 word." The king, vehement as he was, did not carry out the 
 theory of absolute obedience, but was silent; and the colonel 
 was not prevented from promotion. 
 
 1 Laud caused this oath, attached to certain new canons, to be passed by the 
 convocation of 1640. 
 
 3 The name of this independent man was Buddenbrock.
 
 144 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 From ancient times the maxim has been acknowledged, Ad 
 impossibilia nemo obligator; that which is impossible, there- 
 fore, need not be attempted, though ordered ; nor is the 
 omission of attempting it punishable; and, farther, that Ad 
 turpia nemo obligatur; no one is bound to do what is iniqui- 
 tous. Mankind have uniformly agreed in applauding resist- 
 ance to that which is iniquitous, because they have always 
 either acknowledged or at least felt that man cannot lose his 
 own moral value, his independent moral individuality, and 
 that authority, even if supposed to rest upon some divine 
 origin, may be and ought to be either disobeyed or opposed 
 if it perverts its character and demands things against God's 
 laws, as expressed by revelation, nature, the feeling of human- 
 ity, morals, reason, or physical necessity. When Charles IX. 
 of France, or his mother, issued orders to slaughter the Prot- 
 estants in the provinces as they had been murdered in Paris 
 on the eve of St. Bartholomew, several governors and other 
 officers Sully mentions seven declined obedience. Vis- 
 count Orthes, or Ortez, commandant at Bayonne, wrote back, 
 " Sire, I have found in Bayonne honest citizens and brave sol- 
 diers only, but not one executioner. Therefore they and 
 myself supplicate your majesty to use our arms and lives in 
 possible (feasible is the original) things." * He was right to 
 call this demanded murder an impossible, an unfeasible thing 
 for an honest man. Iniquitous things (turpia) are as to obe- 
 dience as impossible (impossibilia) as physically impossible 
 things. 
 
 The difficulty, however, which arises out of the two neces- 
 sities, that I cannot give up my individuality, my responsi- 
 bility and judgment, on the one hand, and that I am obliged 
 to obey the laws, on the other, is not thus easily solved. 
 There are laws which though not atrocious ought to be dis- 
 
 1 The original is, " Sire, je n'ai trouve parmi les habitans et les gens de guerre 
 que de bons citoyens, de braves soldats, et pas un bourreau. Ainsi eux et moi 
 supplions V. M. d'employer nos bras et nos vies a choses faisables." All the 
 original historians of the times have it. Count de Tende was another officer who 
 dared to disobey. Both died soon after, it was supposed by poison.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 145 
 
 obeyed, others which may be disobeyed, and still others 
 which may be or ought to be resisted ; and again there is 
 a difference between a just law and its unjust execution or 
 the mere order of an officer, even in countries where this dis- 
 tinct difference has not, as in England or the United States 
 it has, been acknowledged. These points I propose to con- 
 sider in the following sections. Long and vehement as the 
 discussions of the right of resistance have been, they seem 
 to me not to be more important nor so difficult as a clear 
 view of the various questions touching obedience and non- 
 compliance which are of daily occurrence. We have seen 
 that obedience is necessary, in general ; disobeying or non- 
 compliance is the exception ; hence it is difficult to find gen- 
 eral principles of solid and practical value; yet the subject 
 is so important that it deserves our fullest attention, and, 
 remembering Bacon's " Ut nihil veniat in practicam cujus 
 non fit etiam doctrina aliqua et theoria," we must endeavor 
 to discover this general theory or those principles which may 
 guide us. 
 
 XVIII. The freer a state, the greater is the authority of the 
 law, as such and not as the personal direction of an individual, 
 and less circumscribed at the same time is individual action. 
 These are not so much, as we have seen, necessary conse- 
 quences of civil liberty, as essential attributes. The freer, 
 therefore, a state, the greater is the necessity of reverence for 
 the law. Despotic governments may far more easily dispense 
 with moral compliance to the law ; they may coerce, and thus 
 maintain their character; free states stand in need of willing 
 compliance with the law, because it is law; otherwise disor- 
 ganization, instead of advance of society, must follow. Civil 
 liberty shows in this, as in so many other respects, its superior 
 character. Force may greatly support absolutism ; liberty is 
 of a moral nature. Yet we must needs know what is the law. 
 Is every demand in the name of the law, every order of an 
 individual clothed with authority by the law, that law which 
 the conscientious citizen is desirous of obeying? Can no law 
 VOL. II. 10
 
 ! 4 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 though made by the proper authority transgress its rightful 
 limits ? Do not laws themselves, if applied to practical cases, 
 contradict each other at times, so that it becomes impossible 
 to obey both at once ? And, finally, cannot laws, the organs 
 of the state, injure or destroy the very objects of the state, 
 and are there no cases in which refusal of compliance^or even 
 positive resistance becomes the necessary and the only duty 
 of the citizen ? All these questions have been, at various 
 times, more or less comprehensively discu-ssed, generally 
 under the excitement of disturbed times, when passionate par- 
 tiality, or a judgment warped by considerations foreign to the 
 jural character of the state, has induced men to assert extrav- 
 agant opinions beyond the proper limits of truth one way or 
 the other. Or men, anxious to carry out with consistency 
 one theory or the other, have arrived at opposite results, the 
 one as far removed from truth as the other. It was natural, 
 besides, that the views entertained of this subject should par- 
 take of all the errors or necessary peculiarities incident to the 
 gradual progress of political civilization. Power is the most 
 striking attribute of the state, and we have seen already that 
 that part of government which wields it most signally is, in 
 the course of political progress, for a long time mistaken for 
 the government itself, a mistake which misleads farther, so 
 that he or they who have supreme public power come to be 
 considered the state itself. ' Had these political errors not 
 existed, disobedience to officers would not have been con- 
 sidered equivalent to disobedience to law, non-compliance 
 with lawar refusal to yield obedience to orders of one branch 
 of government only equal to resistance, and resistance equiv- 
 alent to insurrection. So deeply seated has become, in the 
 course of time, the idea that the executive, or the executive 
 in conjunction with the law-making power, is the whole gov- 
 ernment, that many writers to this day, although belonging 
 to the liberal portion of mankind, consider the acknowledg- 
 ment of the principle that somewhere in the state an authority 
 may exist which can decide upon the legality of government 
 measures, to be an "engrafting of revolution upon the state,"
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 147 
 
 classing the ancient Justicia (chief justice) of Aragon z in the 
 same category with the ephori of the Spartans or the council 
 of the hundred in Carthage. We cannot discuss here the 
 best means of watching over the legality either of executive 
 measures or of laws themselves, in how far they agree with 
 or differ from general laws or principles declared to be funda- 
 mental. It is a subject which belongs to politics proper; but 
 the principle, so far from being revolutionary, is the only con- 
 servative principle of free and civilized nations, as we have 
 seen when speaking of the all-important subject of an inde- 
 pendent judiciary. It is a fact that an authority, for the pur- 
 pose of watching over the lawful course of the high author- 
 ities of the state, either has or has not power superior to them. 
 If it have not, it is inefficient, and becomes only the more 
 dangerous by apparently legalizing the respective measures; 
 if it have, it is the supreme authority, and requires in turn to 
 be restrained and watched. It seems, therefore, that no expe- 
 dient will be discovered so efficient, safe, and lawful in its 
 operation as the independence of a judiciary, which in each 
 practical case may declare unlawful and without authority an 
 order, measure, or decree purporting to be a law ; an operation 
 . far more extensive than at first glance it might appear, because 
 every decision of a single case settles or distinctly pronounces 
 the essential principle involved in the whole class of cases. 
 The independence of the judiciary may, indeed, frequently be 
 
 1 If the reader will refer to the Introduction of Prescott's Ferdinand and Isa- 
 bella, he will find the high authority of the Justicia, and admit, I suppose, that 
 although those early times had not yet discovered many expedients which we 
 possess to insure the easy operation of the law against executive encroachment, 
 nor that of making responsible ministers answerable for every act of the monarch, 
 yet the essential idea in the Justicia was the insurance of the law against power, 
 and that this institution, considering the general state of the times, so far from 
 engrafting revolution on the state, was, on the contrary, fitted to insure much 
 more quiet. That it did not develop and modify itself, and become more and 
 more a blessing to the state, seems to be owing far less, if at all, to any inherent 
 incongruity with sound government than to powerful extraneous circumstances, 
 the vast and rapid increase of power in Spain in general, connected as much 
 with domestic as with general European causes.
 
 14 8 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 \ 
 unable to calm the high seas of power, but it may, like firm 
 
 rocks on shore, break the single wave and disperse it into 
 harmless spray. 1 
 
 The danger that in turn the judiciary may become the su- 
 preme authority and may err as well as the others, is greatly 
 obviated by the following circumstances, which have in part 
 been mentioned already. The judiciary has neither honor nor 
 places to bestow ; it is accompanied by no pageant ; its po\ver 
 rests more essentially upon moral power than that of any 
 other branch ; it gives the reasons of its decisions after dis- 
 cussion ; it is comparatively no compact body, and its de- 
 cisions may in time be overruled. I cannot conclude this 
 
 1 In England, proclamations, etc., of the executive are, as a matter of course, 
 subject, as to their legality, to the decisions of the courts, and every officer exe- 
 cuting an unlawful order, even were it from the king in council, does it at his 
 own peril. But Lord Coke (8 Coke, 118), Chief-Justice Hobart (in Dayw. Sav- 
 age, Hob. 87), and Chief-Justice Huh (City of London vs. Wood, 12 Mod. R. 687) 
 held and decided that even in England, where parliament is technically termed 
 omnipotent, acts of parliament may be controlled either by common law or by 
 natural equity. This natural equity is what Cicero beautifully calls the reason of 
 God : " Lex vera atcjue princeps, apta ad jubendum et ad vetandum, ratio est 
 recta summi Jovis." (De Legg., ii. 4.) In the United States, as was observed 
 in the first part, the proper courts must decide whether a law, made by a legis- 
 lature acting under a constitution, is in conflict with the supreme law, or not. In 
 the state courts or circuit courts of the United States the principle had long been 
 acted upon, when in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, Secretary of the United 
 States (i Cranch, 137), in 1803, the supreme court of the United States, through 
 the chief justice Marshall, declared it to be " the power and duty of the judiciary 
 to disregard an unconstitutional act of congress or of any state legislature," " an 
 argument approaching to the precision and certainty of a mathematical demon- 
 stration," as Chancellor Kent (Comment., vol. i. 453, or part iii. lect. xx.) ex- 
 presses it. (See the same Commentaries, vol. i. p. 448.) The report of the case 
 is likewise contained in the collection of Chief-Justice Marshall's most important 
 "Writings upon the Federal Constitution" (Boston, 1839), consisting of the 
 opinions of that eminent man, delivered in the supreme and circuit courts 
 on constitutional questions of vital importance. It is a valuable compilation, of 
 great interest to every student of constitutional history and politics. As to obey- 
 ing officers demanding unlawful things, of which I have twice already spoken, 
 there is no civil liberty possible where the principle of the armies is followed, 
 that the citizen must first obey, and then complain, and where the judiciary has 
 not to decide on each particular case in due form of justice, whether the de- 
 mand is lawful or not, and whether the citizen therefore is not right in disobeying.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 149 
 
 section without remarking that since the first part of this 
 work has been published I have been asked, from a distant 
 country, what I precisely understand by an independent ju- 
 diciary. I own that my previous observations on the inde- 
 pendence of the judiciary were calculated for Americans or 
 Englishmen. I will add here that the chief demands of an 
 independent judiciary are that the decision upon law be 
 wholly left to it, and that in no case the judge demand ex- 
 planation of the law in a pending case from any person or 
 branch soever except the law itself; that the judiciary decide 
 in cases between the citizen and the executive; that the judge 
 be in a situation which shall insure moral independence as 
 much as possible ; that therefore he be not removable except 
 with comparative difficulty, for instance by impeachment, and 
 that he hold his office during good behavior. For further 
 remarks I must refer the reader to the chapter on judges, 
 farther below. 
 
 XIX. Before I proceed to the consideration of the subject 
 proper, I may be permitted to make the following brief re- 
 marks, connected with obedience to the laws. We have seen 
 already that a conscientious citizen is not at liberty to do all 
 that is directly permitted by law : unjust, immoral, and cruel 
 things have at times been permitted. When the English law 
 made it felony to teach a Catholic child in Ireland, and the in- 
 former was remunerated out of the forfeited property of the con- 
 demned, an honest citizen was not on that account in conscience 
 allowed to make use of the law. As the British courts of 
 law hold him answerable who does anything against law, 
 though directed to do so by lawfully constituted authority, 
 as having acted in that single case unlawfully, so we may 
 suppose, if there be any responsibility at all, will God hold 
 him responsible who does anything upon the authority of 
 injustice passed in the form of law against his eternal laws 
 of justice, reason, and humanity. The law does not make us 
 unthinking and unjudging beings ; it does not substitute itself 
 for individual responsibility. We cannot, consequently, allow
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ourselves either to do all that is permitted or that is not pro- 
 hibited. There are many evil, and even wicked things, which 
 cannot be prohibited, or whose prohibition has not yet been 
 called for, as the ancient Roman laws, we are told, were silent 
 upon parricide. 
 
 A sheriff in the state of Kentucky, in a contested election 
 case, 1 withheld the ballot-box, because the returns were 
 against his party. There was indeed no specific positive law 
 prohibiting this daring offence against all reason and justice. 
 Was he on that account justifiable in doing so? The state 
 soon after made it felony for the future. When Tiberius 
 Gracchus ordered the clerk to promulgate the motion of his 
 first agrarian law, his colleague Octavius steadily forbade the 
 clerk to read it, no tribune being allowed to read it himself. 
 Octavius had the general tribunal power of vetoing, but he 
 nevertheless acted unjustly. 
 
 Nor are punishments equivalents to offences, or compo- 
 sitions, as the fines for most crimes were called in the early 
 penal tariffs so peculiar to the Teutonic tribes. We are there- 
 fore by no means allowed to commit offences or disobey laws 
 merely on the ground that we have previously made up our 
 minds to submit willingly to the appointed penalty. Not to 
 speak of the fact that, even taking the penalty as an equiva- 
 lent of the offence, we should remain debtors to society so 
 long as we have not submitted to the penalty, there remains 
 always the moral consideration of the individual case, the in- 
 jury we do to the sufferer, and to society at large ; for, though 
 all offences should be punished, increase of crime would remain 
 equally deplorable, and punishment is by no means intended 
 as a moral or social atonement for the offence. Yet nothing 
 is more frequent than this belief of offenders, even though 
 they have committed the blackest crimes. All who are ac- 
 quainted with the moral treatment of convicts know well that 
 this supposition, that the moral account is balanced by the 
 
 1 In the contested case between Mr. Moore and Mr. Letcher, in Lincoln, Ken- 
 tucky.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 151 
 
 suffering of penalty, as debt and credit are in money matters, 
 is one of the most common obstacles to finding entrance into 
 an obdurate heart. 1 It is well known that fines are frequently 
 the avowed equivalents for acts demanded by authority, with- 
 out any reference to morality or offence ; in many cases they 
 are preferred. That these fines, not being penalties, have no 
 connection with the above question is evident, but it is neces- 
 sary not to mistake fines intended as penalties for offences for 
 fines intended as equivalents for services. Whenever a fine is 
 imposed fora service which may be fully obtained for that 
 service, we have a right to consider the fine as an equivalent 
 for the service. But it is necessary that this service must be 
 fully obtainable for the money paid as fine. If the service is 
 such that besides the work to be done it is important on ac- 
 count of public opinion that every citizen should cheerfully 
 join, we must not consider the fine as a full equivalent. If 
 the demanded service, for instance, is a share of labor in the 
 building of a public road, the corresponding fine may in ordi- 
 nary times be considered an equivalent. But if the citizens 
 of a beleaguered town are requested to throw up redoubts, 
 and it is important that every one should contribute to keep 
 alive patriotic cheerfulness and readiness to do all in his power 
 to save the town, the fine would not be an equivalent. That 
 fines for omissions by which the community is endangered, for 
 instance for omitting the sweeping of chimneys, or for actions 
 by which the rights of others are endangered, as for trespassing 
 on their grounds, cannot be considered as equivalents of the 
 acts or omissions, is clear. 
 
 XX. The peculiar view taken of an original state of nature, 
 according to which the state appeared something made, arti- 
 ficial, and not unfrequently arbitrary a view which I have 
 
 1 Even that remarkable criminal, the woman Gottfried, already cited, ex- 
 pressed repeatedly, during her last days, that a person could do no more than 
 die for his sins,' and several other opinions, which clearly indicated that she con- 
 sidered her moral account perfectly balanced. It will be remembered that she 
 poisoned above thirty persons, including her parents, children, friends, etc.
 
 152 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 endeavored to show in its whole untenableness in the first 
 part of the work has affected no part of the theory of law 
 more strangely than that which treats of the degree of obe- 
 dience due to the laws according to their presumed original 
 source, namely, nature, revelation, and positive human legis- 
 lation. As the original view was founded upon an error, so 
 was the view of the obedience due to the laws equally erro- 
 neous. Jurists distinguished between mala in se, that is 
 actions pronounced immoral by conscience according to na- 
 ture or revelation, and mala prohibita, that is actions " simply 
 and purely penal, where the Jthing forbidden or enjoyed is 
 wholly a matter of indifference, and where the penalty in- 
 flicted is an adequate compensation for the civil inconve- 
 nience supposed to arise from the offence." (i Blackstone, 58.) 
 The commentator, who has previously called the legislating 
 authority of the state an " inferior authority," that is inferior 
 to the natural law, thus arrives actually at what was termed 
 in a previous passage a tariff of penalties, and positively states 
 that conscience is no farther concerned in the non-compliance 
 to the law " than by directing a submission to the penalty in 
 case of the breach of those laws" (the commission of mala 
 prohibita, see the same place as above). Errors in original 
 notions necessarily lead to inconsistencies, and thus we find 
 grave ones in those passages of Blackstone in which he treats 
 of the present subject. He instances the case of a poacher 
 as one in which the offender may simply take the penalty as 
 an equivalent for the malum prohibitum ; but I apprehend it 
 would be very difficult to make out that transportation, and not 
 fine, is equivalent for unlawfully shooting deer. On the other 
 hand, Blackstone concludes his passage on mala prohibita, 
 and the penal theory founded on the idea of equivalents, with 
 these remarkable words : " But where disobedience to the law 
 involves in it also any degree of public mischief or private 
 injury, there it falls within our former distinction, and is also 
 an offence against conscience." Now, with what earthly sub- 
 ject has the state a right to meddle by way of penal law 
 except it involve "public mischief or private injury" ?
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 153 
 
 XXI. The distinction which is imagined by some writers to 
 exist between natural law, and the law made by the " inferior 
 authority" of the law-makers, vanishes if the view of the state 
 which I have labored to establish be correct, namely, that the 
 state is the sole state of nature of man. It is one of God's 
 highest ordinances, if in a human manner we may distinguish 
 between them, that man should live in the state. He wills 
 the state through the laws he planted in our reason and the 
 principles he established in our physical constitution. A 
 legislature making laws is no less natural than the original 
 feeling of right in man. Every-wise and just law is willed by 
 God as much as he wills that the infant receive nourishment 
 from the mother, or that man, gifted with reason and hands 
 and having the earth before him, shall plough it up, sow, and 
 reap ; for our intellect is his gift, our living in the state his 
 ordinance, and hence our providing for ourselves by laws, his 
 work. " In every law positive well made is somewhat of the 
 law of reason and of the law of God ; and to discern the law 
 of God and the law of reason from the law ppsitive is very 
 hard." ' 
 
 Secondly, the relation which the revealed law bears to the 
 state can only be appreciated if we remember that the state is 
 emphatically the jural society, that is, it has to do with right 
 only, so that the revealed law can enter into state law so far 
 only as it has to do with right ; which idea of right implies, 
 among other things, that if more mischief ensues from state 
 interference than from leaving an evil untouched, it ought to be 
 left untouched. Thus, natural as well as revealed law prohibits 
 theft. Nevertheless, most codes declare that a child living in 
 the house of its parents cannot commit theft against the 
 latter. Yet the moral evil remains ; the child commits a 
 grievous sin, but the state thinks it wiser not to make it a 
 punishable crime. 
 
 The reason why all mankind feel that there is a great differ- 
 
 * Words quoted in Christian's note to I Blackstone, 58, from the Doctor and 
 Student, Dial. I. chap. 4.
 
 154 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ence as to the degree of guilt in various actions is twofold : 
 first, the degree of danger to which the act exposes may be 
 different, and I speak here of moral danger as well as phys- 
 ical ; ' secondly, the law in question may be viewed differently 
 by different persons as to wisdom, if it is enacted for some 
 convenience, or it may relate to a principle which every one 
 without exception acknowledges, such as the broad and fun- 
 damental principles of morality. Blackstone calls mala in se 
 acts which are " naturally and intrinsically wrong." But acts 
 of themselves are never intrinsically wrong ; it is the principle 
 alone which makes them so. Thus, killing is not intrinsically 
 wrong, for there is justifiable homicide and demanded homi- 
 cide, if, for instance, I defend my wife against pirates. If a 
 shepherd makes a fire in the field, it may be a very innocent 
 act, but it is a highly penal act in many countries. Nor is 
 it intrinsically wrong if the same shepherd makes a fire near 
 the sea-shore, where vessels are constantly passing, thus ex- 
 posing the lives and property of many fellow-creatures to 
 destruction. 
 
 The difficulty, therefore, as to conscientious obedience to 
 the laws does not lie in distinguishing between mala in se and 
 mala prohibita, because as the general rule it is malum in se, it 
 is naturally and intrinsically wrong a positive moral wrong 
 to disobey the law ; for it is the will of God and demand of 
 nature that we have laws, and consequently obey them. The 
 difficulty arises solely, as in the other cases of duty, out of 
 conflict. 'No man has a right to disobey a law without rea- 
 son, but he may and in many cases must disobey it when that 
 law conflicts with superior laws ; and the difficulty for the con- 
 scientious man lies in settling in many cases which is the supe- 
 rior law. It is in politics as in other spheres. We must obey 
 father and mother. Yet Christ says the son will be against 
 the father for his sake. The difficulty in many practical cases 
 arises out of the difficulty of ascertaining to the satisfaction of 
 
 1 I have given my view respecting the moral and physical danger in the Letter 
 on Subjects of 1'enal Law.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 155 
 
 the conscience whether there be a sufficient reason to disobey 
 so true and holy a law as that requiring obedience to father 
 and mother. It is the object of the following passages to 
 discuss these cases of conflict in politics. 
 
 XXII. In obeying laws we must guard ourselves against 
 interpreting them too loosely or too strictly in favor of indi- 
 vidual interest, and against a pedantic observance of their 
 letter beyond their spirit. In either case we do not act accord- 
 ing to the true sense of the law. When Napoleon returned in 
 October, 1799, from Egypt, expected by France to rescub her 
 from anarchy and advancing enemies, it was natural for him 
 not to stop at Frejus, his landing-place, to perform quaran- 
 tine, and for the people, believing him to be the only one who 
 could save the country, to break through all the sanitary 
 regulations. The rule in these cases is the common moral 
 rule, that the important, essential, and general prevails over 
 the trivial or particular. The practice of this rule is daily and 
 hourly called for in life. The same applies to clashing laws. 
 I have given my ideas more fully on this subject in the Legal 
 and Political Hermeneutics, to which I must be permitted to 
 refer. 
 
 We must observe here that as " it is an established rule in 
 the exposition of statutes that the intention of the lawgiver 
 is to be deduced from a view of the whole and of every part 
 of a statute, taken and compared together," 1 so it is in doubt- 
 ful or conflicting cases the obligation of a citizen to examine 
 and understand a whole law as a part of the whole political 
 system, and to understand it in that sense in which alone any 
 authority can be vested in the lawgiver, that is, as limited by 
 the lawful objects of the state and the immutable principles 
 of right and wrong. All that is to the contrary is not lawful, 
 and, strictly speaking, not law at all, because ordained or de- 
 manded against legitimate authority. The principle is suffi- 
 ciently evident and simple; the application not so, because 
 
 1 Kent, Comment., i. 461.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the opinions of men differ or are strongly affected by the 
 prevailing interest at the time. 
 
 XXIII. The efficiency of the land and naval forces depends 
 so essentially upon unity, quickness, and energy of action, 
 that at all times stricter and far less limited obedience has 
 been exacted in the army and navy than in any other branch. 
 The Roman soldier stood, in many respects, in the relation of 
 a slave to his commanding general. Armies without disci- 
 pline are not only of no use, but they are positive evils to 
 their country ; and discipline consists mainly in a universal 
 habit of obedience throughout the whole body. History is 
 full of the most striking instances : take, for instance, the 
 efficiency of the navy under Cromwell, and the respect in 
 which England was universally held as a maritime power, on 
 the one hand, and the lax state of the navy under Charles 
 II., when De Ruyter swept the Thames and naval disaster 
 followed disaster, on the other hand, because there was no 
 discipline, no obedience in the navy, most of the captains 
 being young noblemen of families in high favor at the cor- 
 rupt court, as we most abundantly learn from Pepys's Diary. 1 
 Not that discipline can become a substitute for patriotism or 
 that ambition with which a great captain knows how to inspire 
 his army. One Spartan who glories in falling for his country 
 is worth twenty Medes who, as Herodotus tells us, were 
 whipped into the fight by their officers against the. Grecian 
 band at Thermopylae. Patriotism in an army, however, will 
 become efficient only in the same degree as it is coupled with 
 discipline. The Prussian militia in 1813 were animated by 
 the best spirit; they loved to fight for their country; they 
 willingly died for it; yet they became truly efficient and 
 averted danger only in the same degree as they became dis- 
 ciplined. The history of the American war of independence 
 shows the same. 
 
 1 Diary of Pepys [especially notices in 1666, 1667; and comp. Knight's His- 
 tory of England, vol. iv. chap, xviii.].
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 157 
 
 Yet even in the army and navy absolute obedience is not 
 and cannot be demanded. Disobedience to commands of 
 superiors in these branches of the service may take place be- 
 cause the command may be unlawful. Or the command may 
 be lawful, yet the inferior may be absolutely convinced that it 
 was given under misapprehension, and that the superior would 
 not have given it had he possessed the same knowledge which 
 he, the inferior, possesses of facts as they really were at the 
 time when the command was given, or as they have come to 
 be since it was given ; or that the execution of the command 
 would be absolutely destructive ; or, finally, that the command 
 or order, though lawful according to the letter of the law, is 
 unlawful according to the general and immutable objects of 
 all law and government, that is, the security and welfare of 
 the state, or, in free countries, the safety, prosperity, and liberty 
 of the people. 
 
 XXIV. As to the first, disobedience to unlawful com- 
 mands, because contrary to the established law of the land, 
 it is now settled in England and the United States that an 
 officer of the forces who executes the unlawful order remains 
 personally answerable. If the highest in command, the 
 British monarch himself, order, contrary to law, an officer to 
 quarter his soldiers upon the citizens, to annoy and oppress 
 them, as Charles I. did, the officer remains responsible in the 
 fullest sense of the term to the law of the land. All that has 
 been gained by the arduous and protracted struggle which 
 began to show itself most signally under Charles I. may be 
 summed up in the few words, that the law shall be superior 
 to all and every one and to every branch of government; that 
 there is nowhere a mysterious, supreme, and unattainable 
 power which despite the clearest law may still dispense with 
 it or arrest its course. This is the sum total of modern civil 
 liberty, the great, firm, and solid commons' liberty. The 
 British and American articles of war demand obedience to all 
 lawful commands. 1 
 
 1 Article ix. of the American Rules and Articles of War says, " Any officer or
 
 l$S POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 As obedience to commands and thorough discipline are so 
 absolutely necessary to obtain those objects for which the 
 forces are maintained, and as, therefore, the power given to a 
 superior over his inferiors is much more extensive and dis- 
 cretionary than in any other branch, the inferior, before he 
 disobeys, ought to be convinced that the command is most 
 clearly illegal. He must decide it at his own peril or respon- 
 sibility. But even in absolute monarchies, where the executive 
 and legislative are one, and where the principle is adopted that 
 all right of complaint or hope of redress is forfeited at once 
 by not first of all obeying the superior, it is always acknowl- 
 edged that under certain circumstances the inferior may dis- 
 obey; for instance, if the superior were to command the inferior 
 to commit a palpable crime or treason, or if he should show 
 himself palpably cowardly in surrendering a fortress. The 
 oath to be taken by every soldier, according to the Prussian 
 articles of war, ends with these words : " I will everywhere obey 
 the articles of war now read to me, and conduct myself, in 
 the execution of all my duties, always in such a manner as is 
 proper and fit for an honorable (the original is elirliebcnd, that 
 is, honor-loving) and undaunted soldier." He clearly can do 
 nothing, then, against honor and conscience. 
 
 Respecting the second point, disobedience on the ground 
 that the commander could not possibly have been sufficiency 
 informed, we find in all wars instances which have been ac- 
 knowledged as lawful. An officer would make himself highly 
 responsible were he pusillanimously to allow a manifest 
 advantage or victory to escape, when it was evident that the 
 commander in giving his order could not have considered or 
 
 soldier who shall strike his superior officer, etc., being in the execution of his 
 office, on any pretence whatever, or shall disobey any lawftil command of his 
 superior officer, shall suffer death, or such other punishment," etc. Article xiv. 
 of the Naval Law, page 95 of the Red Book, Washington, 1826, snys likewise, 
 " No officer or private in the navy shall disobey the laivfitl orders of his superior 
 officer," etc. So the British articles of the navy, which have served as a model 
 to the American, say (Art. xxii.), "And any person presuming to quarrel with 
 any his superior officer, being in the execution of his office, or disobeying any 
 lawful command of any his superior officer, shall suffer death or," etc.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 159 
 
 known of the particular combination of circumstances. There 
 are instances of this in the wars of Napoleon. Yet here again 
 the inferior must act upon his own responsibility, and a very 
 high one it is : yet it is nothing more than a natural conse- 
 quence of the fact that those who command are but limited 
 and finite men, and that those who obey do not cease to be 
 individual men with their own power and duty of reflection 
 and responsibility. Sully, in his Memoirs, speaking of the 
 war of Henry IV. against the duke of Savoy, says, " I did 
 not scruple to disobey his (the king's) orders by forwarding 
 the ammunition," etc. 1 The case is far more difficult when 
 the inferior officer disobeys, not because he is convinced that 
 the superior was insufficiently informed or circumstances have 
 changed since the order was given, but because he sees the 
 commander was in error, and a great advantage is to be gained 
 by disobedience, perhaps impending ruin to be averted. Deli- 
 cate and dangerous as these cases are, yet there have been 
 such as would not only warrant but even demand disobedience 
 of an honorable man. There are exceptions when we must, 
 as in other cases of grave conflict, seriously weigh the matter, 
 and if we feel bound to obey the higher commands of con- 
 science, honor, and patriotism, we must do it with a full con- 
 sciousness and readiness to abide by the consequences of the 
 strict law of martial discipline should they eventually fall upon 
 us. Of Nelson himself it was said that at times "he would 
 look at signals, given him in battle, with his blind eye." 2 If 
 the plain and direct order has been disobeyed, it has been gen- 
 erally held that the disobeying officer should be made strictly 
 answerable, without regard to the success, even if it were bril- 
 
 1 Memoirs of Sully, book xi. vol. ii. p. 26, London, 410, eel. of 1761. 
 
 2 * A courier arrived just before the battle of Zentha, and Prince Eugene told 
 him to wait until after the battle. He would not open the dispatches, knowing 
 their contents. 
 
 Major Saldern resolutely declined the plundering of Hubertsburg Castle in 
 1761, as " contrary to honor and duty," which Frederic the Great had ordered. 
 Fred;ric ordered Icilius to do it, and was obeyed. Saldern lost nothing of the 
 high favor in which he stood with the king. Preuss, Leben Filed, d. Gros., p. 249.
 
 1 60 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 liant, of his disobedience ; and this is right ; for so great is the 
 general necessity of strict obedience, and in many, nay, most 
 cases, the impossibility of penetrating all the combinations of 
 the commander in issuing his orders, that disobedience, were 
 it authorized, would bring on ruin. A man who loves his 
 country and knows likewise the nature of the service will be 
 ready to satisfy the discipline by manfully bearing the conse- 
 quences of his disobedience, which nevertheless he thinks 
 right. Such a conflict may end tragically ; yet should not 
 a man know how to die willingly for his country, even if 
 her call presents itself in this stern demand of her military 
 law? 
 
 The last case is that when we know the order to be lawful 
 according to the letter of the law, but wickedly intended 
 against the objects for which these laws were established. 
 This is a case of the uttermost responsibility; yet it is never- 
 theless true that all obedience without exception, even the 
 military oath of obedience, is conditional ; that it can be de- 
 manded only with reference to the ultimate ends of all gov- 
 ernment, the eternal objects of mankind organized in a state. 
 The military man does not become an unfeeling, unthinking, 
 unseeing, absolute instrument. Yet when is he to resort to 
 this last and highest authority? Again, it is impossible to 
 give rules, for these are cases of extremity, nor can any one 
 else decide for the individual placed in that difficulty. If be- 
 fore his God he is plainly convinced that the orders of his 
 superiors are palpably at variance with the essential objects 
 of the state and therefore traitorous to his country, and if at 
 the same time he is fully convinced that his disobedience, or 
 resistance, if need be, does not bring on greater calamity than 
 the execution of the orders, he is in conscience bound to 
 disobey. According to the British law, the monarch is com- 
 mander-in-chief of all the forces, and disposer of peace and 
 war. Admiral Pennington had been sent by Charles I., amid 
 the acclamations of England, seemingly to carry out a humane 
 treaty with the oppressed and besieged Huguenots at Ro- 
 chelle ; but he had no sooner arrived at the place of his des-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. l6l 
 
 tination than he found himself under secret orders to give up 
 his vessels to French command in a " murderous warfare 
 against British honor and the Protestant religion." Here was 
 a flagrant conspiracy of Charles and Buckingham against the 
 state, an outrageous abuse of power executed with criminal 
 deception, and Pennington was right not to obey, and to draw 
 up his high-minded protest; the sailors were right who wrote 
 " what is called a round robin against the service, end laid it 
 under the Bible of their admiral, whose sentiments accorded 
 with their own." 2 An officer of Charles X. of France who 
 in 1830 was convinced that it was the government, not the 
 people, which had daringly broken the fundamental law, was 
 right in not firing upon the latter; the soldiers were right, 
 they were in honor bound to join them. An English soldier 
 who was wholly convinced that James II. had become a 
 usurper by breaking down the law of the land was right in 
 joining William III. So long as there is doubt in the breast, 
 it is honorable to remain even with the unsuccessful com- 
 mander; that moment at which it becomes clear to us that 
 country and commander stand opposite to one another, the 
 name of honor used to designate obedience to the commander 
 has no longer any meaning ; for there is no honor without 
 doing right, and it is right to abide by the country in preference 
 to all else. 
 
 XXV. The civil service not requiring that instant energy 
 and decisive unity of action which is necessary to make the 
 army and navy answer their ends, it follows that less abso- 
 lute power ought to be given to the superiors, and that civil 
 officers have a wider scope to consider the legality of an 
 order, or may take more time for farther information from 
 their superiors before they obey orders, than military officers. 
 As to free countries, where, as has repeatedly been remarked, 
 
 1 Brodie, History of the British Empire, Edinburgh, 1822, vol. ii. p. 70. Also, 
 Lord Nugent, Memorials of John Hampden, London, 1832, vol. i. p. IOO, and 
 Appendix A of vol. i., where the instructions are given. See also note 2 to p. 35 
 of vol. ii. of Forster's British Statesmen, in Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopaedia. 
 VOL. II. ii
 
 !6 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the law is supreme, it is clear that no officer is bound or 
 ought to obey an illegal order. When Charles X. shortly 
 before the last French revolution sent orders to the civil 
 officers throughout the kingdom to vote for certain candidates 
 for the chamber of deputies, the officers were clearly free of 
 all obligation to obey such mandates. That the civil officer 
 has the same right, and, as the case may be, the same duty in 
 cases of extremity to disobey a command although within 
 the letter of the law, with the officer of the army or navy, is 
 evident. In ancient and modern times laws have been issued 
 which demand disobedience to the orders* of superiors under 
 certain circumstances. 1 I shall speak more fully on some 
 obligations of the officers belonging to the executive depart- 
 ment in another place, and at once turn to the subject of the 
 disobedience to law of the citizen at large. 
 
 In countries in which the people are not conceived to 
 form the state, which is understood to be one and the same 
 with the government, it is very clear that proportionally high 
 notions of the duty of obedience are entertained by the rulers. 
 If, however, the view of the state as given in the first volume 
 is correct, many cases of just non-compliance or actual dis- 
 obedience take place. We call that citizen loyal who, satis- 
 fied with the main principles of his government, although he 
 may be very strongly opposed to the characteristic features 
 of the administration for the time being, conscientiously en- 
 deavors to act in the main not only according to the letter, 
 but also and rather according to the true spirit, of the laws of 
 his land, so long as he can conscientiously do it. Laws may 
 be, or under certain circumstances must be, disobeyed, if they 
 are contrary to the fundamental law of the land, if they are 
 
 1 Majorian, that excellent emperor of Rome, too late, however, to find a sphere 
 for his noble soul, prohibited the infamous pulling down of ancient monuments 
 for private purposes, and decreed the severest penalties to be inflicted upon every 
 subordinate officer who should obey his superiors in these scandalous grants. 
 (Gibbon, chap, xxxvi., or vol. iv. pp. 63,64, Bonn's ed.) The Norwegian Consti- 
 tution (of November 4, 1814) says, ? 85, " He who obeys an order whose object 
 is to disturb the liberty or safety of the storthing makes himself guilty of treason 
 against his fatherland.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 163 
 
 against the law of God, that is of morality, nature, and con- 
 science, against primordial rights, against the spirit of the 
 times, if I am driven by superior force to comply with other 
 commands, and, in general, if I cannot obey otherwise than 
 by disobeying a superior law. 
 
 XXVI. We are citizens because we are men, and in order 
 to obtain our ends as men ; and we shall continue to be moral 
 individuals long after we have ceased to be either citizens or 
 men. The demands of the state, therefore, are by no means the 
 sole or ultimate laws by which in cases of exttemity we must 
 regulate our conduct. If a law prohibits, under certain cir- 
 cumstances, giving a degree of education to my child which 
 I nevertheless may be convinced that its peculiar capacity 
 deserves, I am not bound to obey ; for it is one of the very 
 first objects of man to become all that God has given him the 
 capacity to become. In Hesse-Cassel it was found that far 
 too many young men received a university education, thus 
 >reparing them for careers in which they could not succeed, 
 owing to the number of applicants. A law was passed which 
 allowed the children of certain parents only to study in the uni- 
 versities. Yet if a father in that country should have seen that 
 his son was peculiarly fitted for the sciences, would he have 
 been chargeable with any dereliction of duty if he should have 
 evaded the law and sent his son to some foreign university ? 
 Dissenters were formerly not allowed to keep schools in Eng- 
 land ; yet in many districts there were none other but dis- 
 senters' schools. Was it disloyal for dissenters to keep a 
 school despite the law ? Was it not, on the contrary, a mani- 
 fest duty to disobey, provided there was the slightest chance 
 of success, because the state glaringly transcended its legiti- 
 mate sphere ? x A law may be disobeyed if unlawful authority 
 
 1 Lord Russell, Memoirs of the Affairs of Europe from the Peace of Utrecht, 
 says, " The Schism Bill was introduced by Sir William Wyndham, one of the 
 chief ornaments of their party. Its object was to prevent the education by dis- 
 senters in any way ; and it went to prohibit them from keeping schools even for 
 their own children." So I find it quoted ; I have not the work at hand.
 
 1 64 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 has issued it, or rather it is no law, because against the funda- 
 mental law, for instance when James I. bestowed unlawfully 
 the soap monopoly upon favorites. We must not forget that 
 laws may be passed in regular and lawful form, and yet be 
 clearly against the plainest rights of the citizens, although 
 outwardly conformable to the fundamental law. There is, 
 however, a fundamental law superior to any fundamental 
 charter, that is reason, right, and nature, and that superior 
 fundamental law of all humanity requires, in cases of high 
 conflict, first to be obeyed. An immoral law is no law, and 
 my yielding to it or not is a mere question of expediency, just 
 as I may or may not yield to the demands of a robber. If 
 my government prevents me from importing what books I see 
 fit to use for the pursuit of my studies, I have an undoubted 
 right to evade the law if I deem it expedient, for the pursuit 
 of truth is a law of infinitely greater authority, and therefore 
 infinitely more demands obedience, than any law enacted by 
 temporary authority ever can. 
 
 Laws which are manifestly against the spirit of the time, 
 which cannot be obeyed whatever the law may demand, may 
 and must be disobeyed. If the government neglects changing 
 the laws according to the change of circumstances, it is not 
 the obligation of the citizen to adhere to the law. Such are 
 laws manifestly fallen in disuse, of which some striking ones 
 have been mentioned in previous passages, laws which it 
 would be morally impossible to obey. It is true, indeed, that 
 by the strict principles of the common law an act of parlia- 
 ment cannot be repealed by a "non-user;" 1 yet where are 
 
 1 2 Term Rep. 275 ; 2 Dwarris on Statutes, 672. But the contrary has been 
 laid down by a writer of authority, Wooddeson's Elements, 63, and it is also to be 
 found in the Roman law, Digest, lib. i. tit. 3, \ 32. I must be permitted here to 
 give the whole of that section, because it contains true principles of right, and 
 many of my readers out of the profession of tlie law may not have an easy oppor- 
 tunity of perusing it. The Digest says, " Respecting those matters for which we 
 have no written law, that must be followed which has been introduced by cus- 
 tom and manners, and if this does not exist respecting a subject, that must be 
 followed which lies nearest and that which results from analogy of similar cases : 
 if nothing else can be obtained even in this way, the custom of the city of Rome
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 165 
 
 there more laws virtually fallen into disuse, which it would 
 be impossible to act out and which it is, consequently, not 
 immoral to disobey, than in England? Let us not forget that 
 even Lord Mansfield, when acting as the highest organ of the 
 law itself, told the jury to find a verdict of theft for an amount 
 far less than the articles before the eyes of the jury evidently 
 amounted to, in order to rescue the prisoner from the effects of 
 a law wholly dissonant with the spirit of the time, and to give 
 her the benefit of more humane and more efficient modes of 
 punishment, discovered since the establishment of the ancient 
 law. Whatever reason there was in early times for punish- 
 ing almost any theft with hanging, in England, whether the 
 state of society then required it, or whether even then the law 
 was injudicious, sure it is that Lord Kenyon pronounced no 
 more than a solemn truth when he said, when a girl, sen- 
 tenced to be hung for her first theft, dropped down dead in 
 court, " I then felt, as I now feel, that this was passing sen- 
 tence not on the prisoner but on the law." J 
 
 If a law is against nature I am at liberty to disobey. It is 
 God's order that all animal life shall be sustained by food ; if 
 then government lays so high a duty on necessary articles of 
 food that it becomes impossible properly to support the body, 
 as has been the case and that repeatedly, I have a right, if I 
 am able and see fit in other respects, to import the food 
 against the law. The duty on salt was in some parts of 
 France before the first revolution so exorbitant that the 
 people could not purchase it. Had the most conscientious 
 
 must be followed. All rooted custom is justly followed as law, and that which 
 has been founded by custom is law. For if the laws themselves bind us for no 
 other reason than because they have been adopted by the pronounced will of the 
 people, that likewise binds justly every one which the people have sanctioned 
 without writing ; for what matters it whether the people declared their will by 
 voting or by the thing and fact itself? It has therefore with perfect justice like- 
 wise been adopted as a rule that laws may be abrogated not only by the pro- 
 nounced will of the lawgiver, but also in consequence of universal tacit consent 
 by disuse." 
 
 1 Related by Mr. Morris, in the house of commons, in 1811. (English) Law 
 Journal, May, 1837, 296.
 
 166 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 citizen to reproach himself in any degree if he smuggled salt 
 for his family? What is more natural than language? what 
 more ungodly and tyrannical than to make the use of one's 
 mother tongue penal ? Yet governments have repeatedly 
 passed laws to that effect. If laws are passed respecting re- 
 ligious beliefs, they are naught in themselves, because they 
 aim at that which is impossible, to believe according to com- 
 mand. And if I believe that a certain service is essential to 
 my religion, I have certainly an undoubted right to disobey 
 the law and celebrate it in secret, if I thereby do not injure 
 any one else. If, finally, I am forced by a conqueror or 
 usurper to obey his orders contrary to the laws of the land, I 
 am not answerable for disobedience, for one of the first objects 
 and duties of all governments and laws is to protect me ; if 
 they fail to do so, I am not bound, though I may choose to 
 do so, to expose myself to the penalties of the rulers in actual 
 possession. 
 
 To sum up the whole, then, it is evident that in obeying 
 laws we must, wherever laws clash, obey the superior in 
 preference to the inferior; and this superior law may, in 
 many cases, be one that was never enacted, perhaps for the 
 very reason that it was of itself universally binding, like the 
 demands of physical nature ; farther, in many cases of this 
 conflict, nothing can decide which is the superior law, and 
 whether disobeying the inferior law be justified, except the 
 conscience of the individual. I am well aware that hasty and 
 forward citizens, fanatics, and wicked men have asserted that 
 their conscience commanded them to disobey, when it ought 
 to have told them the opposite. South asserts the truth when 
 he says, " No such instrument to carry on a refined and well- 
 woven rebellion as a tender conscience and a sturdy heart. 
 He who rebels conscientiously rebels heartily." Abuse, how- 
 ever, does not disprove the rule. Men have often pretended 
 to change their religion for conscience' sake, when sordid in- 
 terest or turpitude guided them. Should we establish on that 
 account the rule that the conscience must not decide upon the 
 change of one's religion ?
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 1 67 
 
 XXVII. Merely disapproving of a law by no means gives 
 us a right to disobey it ; we must be clearly and conscien- 
 tiously convinced that it may be disobeyed upon one of the 
 main grounds enumerated, or that it does not come from law- 
 ful authority, when in fact it is not law but the semblance of 
 law. Another question is, whether we may under any circum- 
 stances make use of or profit by a law of which we disap- 
 prove. If the law goes against our own main principles we 
 must not expect to stay its own evil effects by partial compli- 
 ance ; for instance, if we were in times of violence to accept 
 of confiscated property with a view to restore it to the owner 
 or to rescue it out of the hands of the despoilers. That this 
 is, however, very dangerous is very clear, for the feeling of 
 every one marks such a procedure as a partial co-operation, 
 and no one at present will read without disapproval or very 
 reluctant excuse the account that some persons, otherwise 
 standing high for their virtuous character, accepted at the 
 hands of James II. the lands confiscated in consequence of 
 Jeffrey's sanguinary procedures, with the declared view of 
 making the best use, of them and preventing their falling into 
 the hands of his greedy and licentious courtiers. 1 
 
 XXVIII. So far we have considered only the cases when a 
 conscientious citizen may disobey or must disobey; for the 
 latter must depend upon his conscience alone. If he believes 
 that by obedience he positively co-operates in the furtherance 
 of iniquity, he must disobey. This is the ground upon which 
 the Quakers decline paying taxes towards the army. Still, it 
 is not to be forgotten in any of these cases that obedience to 
 the laws is of itself a duty so long as we can conscientiously 
 obey, and that the penalty is not an equivalent ; and that we 
 must carefully guard ourselves against presumption, that is 
 setting up our conscience against that of all who made or 
 favor the law. The case, therefore, must always be a strong 
 one. 
 
 1 See Mackintosh's History of the Revolution of 1688.
 
 !68 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Another question is, has the citizen the right to resist, and 
 can he under certain circumstances go so far as to take up 
 arms against those in power ? Despite the vehement discus- 
 sions on this point at periods when it was of practical impor- 
 tance, there has been but little difference as to the actual 
 theory. Those monarchs who have most strenuously main- 
 tained the principle of "absolute non-resistance," for instance 
 the Stuarts, have fostered and fomented resistance against the 
 governments established in consequence of their own de- 
 thronement. George III., who maintained very high notions 
 respecting the obedience due to a government, not only con- 
 nived at but promoted the plan of Queen Matilda of Den- 
 mark, then residing at Zelle, to overthrow the existing 
 Danish government, and to make herself, not what she had 
 been before the execution of Struensee, but actually regent 
 of the kingdom. 1 Ferdinand VII. rewarded the persons 
 who had resisted the cortes and himself, after he had been 
 re-established in absolute power by the assistance of Louis 
 XVIII. The duchess of Berry incited the people to civil 
 war, from whom she claimed the throne on the principle of 
 legitimacy. The pope has in repeated instances promoted 
 resistance and fostered revolt. 
 
 So far the question has only respected resistance to the 
 whole government on account of its entire unlawfulness. 
 Another is, may a lawful government be resisted in unlawful 
 demands ? and, finally, may a people take up arms against a 
 whole government, previously considered lawful ? When 
 this question has been discussed without peculiar reference to 
 practical cases of deep interest at the time, the greater num- 
 ber of jurists and philosophers have allowed that there are 
 cases in which it is lawful and necessary to resist with arms, 
 that is to resort to insurrection. Generally writers have re- 
 stricted the cases of justified resistance against monarchs to 
 resisting atrocities on the part of the prince ; in short, they 
 
 1 Wraxall, Posthumous Memoirs [i. 374-418. Compare what Lord Mahon says 
 in his History, v. chap. 50, note.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 169 
 
 have maintained that armed resistance is admissible only 
 against tyrants, and among the characteristics of a tyrant, who 
 was generally depicted in such a manner that there was no 
 necessity of telling people that it was lawful to resist such a 
 monster, atrocious cruelty was generally one. This was partly 
 because writers were afraid to speak out, partly because they 
 really feared to make resistance too easy. Times have 
 changed, however. Physical cruelty is no longer considered 
 as the only ground upon which resistance is admissible. 
 Already have German and other continental writers ex- 
 pressed themselves very differently. 1 As to the principle 
 there can be no doubt whatever. Every unlawful govern- 
 ment ought to be resisted and permanently changed, if it 
 permanently and obstinately insists upon a course injurious 
 to the people, and if the evils accompanying the change are 
 not greater than the blessings to be obtained by the change. 
 In the abstract we might easily go farther; we might say, 
 Government ought to be resisted whenever it acts unlawfully. 
 But there arises the unavoidable difficulty of deciding when 
 it acts unlawfully; for the people may be mistaken as well as 
 the government. Our forefathers enacted in many cases that 
 if the ruler distressed the people against law, it was lawful to 
 resist him. 2 The difficulty adhering to all discussions on the 
 
 1 One of the early writers who treats the subject with great freedom is Hubert 
 Languet, in his Vindicise contra Tyrannos, sive de Principis in Populum Popu- 
 lique in Principem legitima Potestate, Stephano Junio Bruto, Celta Auctore, 
 Edinburgi, 1579. A work I recommend to the student. 
 
 3 Charles the Bald, grandchild to Charlemagne, was obliged to sign in 856 
 A.D. a charter in which it was pronounced that the nobility should have the right, 
 unitedly, and with arms, to resist whenever the emperor should demand anything 
 unjust. The Magna Charta says, " Ipsi Barbnes cum communitate totius terroe 
 distiingent et gravabunt nos modis omnibus quibus poterunt, scilicet per captionem 
 castrorum, terrarum, possessionum, et aliis modis quibus potuerint, donee emen- 
 datum fuerit secundum arbitrium eorum." [But in the Charta this is made the 
 end of a series of attempts to obtain justice. See art. 70.] Andrew II. of 
 Hungary granted the right of resistance in case the then concluded compact 
 should be broken. King John of Denmark acknowledged the right in the three 
 kingdoms subject to his power, if he should not listen to their complaints of 
 grievances. (Schiitz, Universal History, v. 194.) Alphonso III. of Aragon
 
 170 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 practical application of the right of resistance, which has ever 
 been acted upon by the people when it comes to the last, and 
 will be acted upon so long as the world stands, has been in- 
 creased by the two circumstances of which we have spoken 
 already; that the executive has been, and still frequently 
 is, mistaken for the government, and resistance against the 
 executive, though it should be in defence of the law, as 
 in France in 1830, is taken for resistance against the whole 
 government ; and, secondly, that monarchs have been erro- 
 neously surrounded with an extra-political halo. A relation 
 between the subject and the monarch on religious grounds 
 beyond the foundation of the state and law is imagined ; a 
 sacred, indelible, and indestructible allegiance is supposed to 
 exist. Yet that the Bible does not teach the theory of non- 
 resistance we may easily gather from the Old Testament; 
 and it is a fact that Christ does not speak of politics, and that 
 none have so much disagreed on the subject as the theo- 
 logians. Indeed, they have advocated resistance, under cir- 
 cumstances which to them seemed to warrant it, more freely 
 and positively than any other writers. 1 No set of theologians 
 have, I believe, so stanchly and unequivocally, though by no 
 means in all cases consistently, maintained the principle of 
 non-resistance as the writers of the Church of England during 
 the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They did not in- 
 
 granted in 1287 to the barons by the two Pacts of Union the right of insurrection 
 against the king if their liberties should be infringed after they had protested. 
 (Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, Introduction, xci.) Of the Polish rocoss I 
 have spoken previously. I might increase the instances. [See what Mr. Guizot 
 says of the right of resistance in feudalism, History of Civilization, i. 100, and 
 History of Civilization in France, iii. 96, 97, Amer. ed. of trans].] 
 
 1 Even Luther did not hesitate to sanction resistance to the emperor who will 
 not follow " signed privileges" (beschriebene Rechte), and considered an em- 
 peror lawfully dethroned if the empire and electors unitedly dissolve the alle- 
 giance. Luther saw this case of a German emperor clearer because he was an 
 elected prince. For us there is no difference. All princes are conditionally 
 monarchs, that is for the good of the people. None is by intrinsic legitimacy 
 so. The mild Melanchthon thought tyrannicide admissible. Loci Theologici, 
 De Magistr.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS, 
 
 171 
 
 deed maintain the doctrine of absolute obedience, for they 
 demanded " passive obedience" only, and allowed therefore 
 non-compliance. 1 
 
 XXIX. Of the force of allegiance we have spoken already. 
 Yet even where the theory which I have endeavored to estab- 
 lish in the first volume is not admitted, it is certain that no 
 man can be lawfully bound or lawfully promise to do what is 
 unlawful. This is self-evident. Even the canon law says, "In 
 malis promissis non expedit servare fidem." So that neither 
 allegiance nor oath can bind to obey that which is unlawful. 
 This therefore would absolve every one from absolute obedi- 
 ence. Yet if we merely decline to co-operate or obey but do 
 not in cases of uttermost emergency resist, we leave all power 
 to do that which we hold to be unlawful in the hands of the 
 government. In the opinion of those who sincerely believe 
 that dynasties or certain specific governments are from God, 
 we ought to suffer everything at their hands as so much pun- 
 ishment inflicted by the Deity. That this idea does not agree 
 with our views of government supported throughout this work 
 is clear. The government is an organism for the purpose of 
 obtaining the great ends of the state, the state an institution 
 to secure the great social and individual ends of humanity, 
 and if the former ceases to obtain its object, either from want 
 of energy or because it endeavors systematically and con- 
 stantly to undermine and destroy those ends, society has no 
 doubt the simple right of establishing a new one, even where 
 there is no particular compact between the rulers and the 
 ruled. The government is no longer a lawful one, though 
 established according to all the formalities of the law, because 
 no longer answering the purpose or obtaining the ends and 
 objects of the law. Mankind have always acted upon this 
 principle. Yet so necessary is a government, so unrighteous 
 is it not to deliberate in all matters relating to society whether 
 
 1 Hallam, Constitutional History, in various places, among others, vol. ii. p. 625, 
 et seq.
 
 1/2 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 we may not injure others more than we assist them, so doubt- 
 ful, calamitous, and frequently demoralizing are the effects of 
 insurrection and of civil war, so easily is the individual de- 
 ceived respecting his own rights and the probable success of 
 measures which may appear suitable to the temperament of 
 our mind at the time, so much increased is the evil of tyranny 
 in case of unsuccessful attempts at resistance, so frequently 
 does resistance, even though successful against the govern- 
 ment, lead to a tyranny worse than the previous one to 
 military government and so often does it open an arena for 
 the worst passions and for a shallow mediocrity, noisy, for- 
 ward, and unconcerned about the harm it produces, that he 
 who on slight grounds resorts to force against the existing 
 government indeed commits treason against society. 1 
 
 An insurrection may take place on the strict ground of re- 
 sistance ; that is, people may take up arms to resist every 
 attempt to enforce a certain law or measure, without the in- 
 tention of going farther than this resistance. This may 
 especially take place when single provinces rise. In very 
 many cases in history such insurrections have had salutary 
 results ; because government learns practically that it cannot 
 go beyond a certain line. Every measure of sufficient mag- 
 nitude and radical importance may be sufficient to warrant 
 armed resistance ; but as it necessarily leads to political inter- 
 ruption, and especially as a partial insurrection may lead to a 
 revolution though originally intended for armed resistance 
 only, it .is necessary both that the cause be of sufficient mag- 
 nitude, and that all common and regular means of redress 
 have previously been fairly and honestly tried. By revolution 
 I understand a violent change of the fundamentals, or one 
 fundamental, of the government; a violent change of the ad- 
 ministration would be a rebellion, or rebellious riot. Aristotle 
 (Pol., v. 1,4) mentions two species of revolutions, those by 
 which the constitution is changed, and those which leave the 
 
 'See the judicious remarks of Mackintosh in his History of the Revolution 
 of 1688, chapter ix.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 173 
 
 constitution but bring another set of men into power : he does 
 not mean, however, by another set, another administration, 
 but other rulers, for he instances the monarchy and oligarchy. 
 The change of persons in these states, that is, the change of 
 the power-holders, is evidently a change of one of the fun- 
 damentals of the government, and thus falls within our defi- 
 nition. 
 
 As to revolutions, they can never be justified by a single 
 executive measure except it be a coup d'etat but by a per- 
 verse course of ruinous, unjust, and malevolent or infatuated 
 measures, and after all civil means of redress have been tried 
 in vain ; and there must be either fair hope of success, or the 
 people be driven to desperation, so that a serious risk shall 
 seem more endurable than the existing state of things. For 
 revolutions are most grave, bitter, and uncertain processes. 
 
 On the other hand, it must be admitted that there exists 
 no nation with well-established freedom which has not been 
 obliged to resort at some period to resistance and does not 
 owe some of its choicest blessings and most deeply-founded 
 liberties to armed resistance or revolution. There is rarely a 
 clear understanding between the government and the people 
 of free nations unless at some period or other they have 
 passed through this process and crisis. It is a maxim ascribed 
 to the duke de Sully, and adopted by Burke, 1 that there are 
 no unprovoked revolts. If we understand by revolts insur- 
 rections of the people, and not conspiracies of the nobility or 
 generals, the remark is certainly true. Thus Sully must have 
 meant it, for otherwise his own times would but too abun- 
 dantly furnish us with instances to the contrary, while we 
 have but to look at South America to see unprovoked army 
 revolts happening in almost uninterrupted succession. Revo- 
 lutions are fearful, yet they are at all times not only unavoid- 
 able but salutary. The whole political institution of a country 
 may become so corrupt or so thoroughly unfit for the existing 
 
 1 Sally's Memoirs, and Burke, Thoughts on the present Discontents [Works, 
 i. 310, Bohn's ed.].
 
 174 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 and changed state of things that it engenders misery and 
 political immorality and altogether loses its jural character. 
 Revolutions then become unavoidable and just; nor should 
 any conscientious citizen then shrink from them. -What the 
 great Boerhaave says of fevers, " Febris saepe sanationis optima 
 causa," applies with equal force to political diseases. I do 
 not speak here of separations of colonies from their mother 
 countries, which we call likewise revolutions in the English 
 language though they differ materially from domestic revolu- 
 tions. 1 Whatever power affections may have, and they are in 
 many instances salutary, it is certain that so soon as a distant 
 colony has the power of maintaining its independence, and can 
 promote the whole social interest by independent domestic 
 laws, she has the right and, it may be, the sacred duty of 
 entering into the lists with independent nations. ' 
 
 XXX. If there is danger in the right and necessity of re- 
 sistance or in justifying revolution, there is much more danger 
 in the doctrine of non-resistance ; for, while power naturally 
 and by inherent quality tends to increase, the people are re- 
 luctant to resort to resistance except in cases of extremity, 
 a powerful and privileged class always excepted. The under- 
 tainty of success, the difficulty of united action, the natural 
 disposition in the citizen to follow the law and authority much 
 rather than to disobey it, are no mean guarantees against the 
 wicked application of the right of resistance. Moreover, we 
 
 1 Revolutions may be of a very different character. They may be revolutions 
 of the people against the domestic government, as the English and French revo- 
 lutions were; or against foreign, imposed governments, as Ihe revolution of 
 Portugal against the Spaniards, that of Masaniello in Naples, or of Hofer in 
 Tyrol, if the latter be not called mere insurrections on account of failure of suc- 
 cess; or the separation of colonies or distant provinces, as the North and South 
 American revolutions ; or the separation of part of the country, as in the late 
 case of Belgium; or the re- establishment of independence, as in Portugal when 
 the Spaniards were expelled ; or the expulsion of one branch of the family by 
 another without participation of the people, as not unfrequently in Asia; or a 
 revolution of the prince against the state, for instance when an elective monarch 
 makes himself hereditary.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 175 
 
 ought to remember that the resistance or revolt of no people 
 is so fearful and calamitous as that of those who have not been 
 accustomed to freedom. The resistance of the freest nations 
 has been the freest from those atrocious crimes which sully 
 the civil wars of nations that shake off the chain of bondage ; 
 so that the very acknowledgment of the right of resistance, as 
 an accompaniment of liberty, becomes a guarantee of its being 
 used rarely and of its being attended with less evil than if the 
 right were denied. 
 
 The necessity of resistance has, as we have seen, often been 
 acknowledged. I will not speak of the emperor Trajan, who, 
 when he handed the sword of the praetorian prefect to Sabu- 
 ranus, said, " Use it for me if I rule well, if not, against me." 1 
 As a sentiment it is fine for a Roman emperor; but acted 
 upon as a political principle it would be a sort of janizary 
 constitutional law, and make Saburanus a strange super- 
 emperor. Hume says that the laws ought to be silent on the 
 right of'resistance, but he guards himself against the suspi- 
 cion that he desired to prevent its discussion. If by resistance 
 is meant the citizen's resisting any procedure against him 
 contrary to the law, then the laws of England and the United 
 States have in a great measure sanctioned it, and there is 
 indeed no firm and substantial civil liberty imaginable without 
 its acknowledgment. If resistance against laws themselves, as 
 contrary to the fundamental law or on any other ground, be 
 meant, it would be useless and inconsistent were the laws to 
 acknowledge it beforehand ; for who shall decide whether the 
 law be lawful or not? If the citizen for himself, nothing is 
 gained ; if some authority, except the courts in the regular 
 course of expounding and administering law as to the specific 
 case, then this authority again, whoever it might be, might 
 abuse its power. The constitution must acknowledge some 
 highest legislative power, and cannot at the same time call 
 upon the people to resist if this power should be abused; this 
 
 1 [Djon Cass., Ixviii. 16; Victor, de Goes., 13, who mentions the prefect's 
 name.]
 
 176 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 would require another power to resist the abuse of the latter. 
 The French therefore had gained nothing when they declared 
 in the rights of men enumerated in the constitution of 1793, " If 
 the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection 
 is for the people and for every portion of the people the most 
 sacred and most indispensable duty." Insurrection belongs 
 strictly to political ethics, and must in cases of extremity be 
 decided upon by the most solemn act of the conscience ; it 
 cannot be made a subject of politics proper and be drawn into 
 positive law ; but resistance may so far be made matter of 
 positive law that an authority may be appointed by the con- 
 stitution which shall decide after the resistance has taken 
 place whether the resisted law, measure, or demand was 
 conformable to the fundamental law or not, and, consequently, 
 whether or not resistance was warranted. And the courts of 
 the United States have actually such power. 
 
 XXXI. Entirely different from resistance, yet frequently 
 confounded with it, or justified on the same ground, is what 
 by a contradiction in the term itself has been called of late 
 mob law. A mob the o-/X<>q of the Greeks, and turba of the 
 Romans, is a lawless multitude impelled by a common desire 
 for the obtaining of some immediate object, or drawn together 
 by a common impulse, for instance curiosity. 1 A mob, it 
 
 1 Mob is the abbreviation of mobile (the movable), which we find used at 
 length in the diaries and familiar letters written at the time of James II. and 
 Charles II. I do not remember that it occurs in Pepys. It is of frequent occur- 
 rence in the Ellis correspondence, edited by Lord Dover, London, 1828. The 
 abbreviation was probably brought into use by the newspapers, like so many 
 others, for instance scrip. Whether the word mobility, which Walter Scott puts 
 in the mouth of a courtier of James I. (in the Fortunes of Nigel), it should be 
 presumed without anachronism, preceded the introduction of the word mobile, 
 or vice versa, I do not know. It is evidently a word of derision closely resem- 
 bling that of nobility, and must have come in use when the masses attracted at 
 least so much notice as to be derided by the privileged, which always precedes 
 that period when the masses really obtain power. It was so in Rome, the 
 Netherlands, France, England. For the barbarous word mobocracy, that is the 
 aristocracy of the mob, though properly speaking the rabble is meant in this case,
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 177 
 
 would appear, need not be the rabble, by which we designate 
 more especially a tumultuous congregation of the vulgar or 
 their aggregate in the abstract. The term " dregs of the peo- 
 ple," the faex,yfo infima, of the Romans, designates the ab- 
 ject class of a population visited with ignorance and poverty 
 and consequently stricken with vice and crime. They were 
 also most significantly called by the Romans, carrying out 
 the trope of the vessel of the state, the bilge-water of the 
 republic, expressing at once their loathsomeness, danger, 
 and fickleness, which, together with a gust of wind, may 
 indeed throw the vessel on her beam-ends. " Sin tu exieris, 
 exhaurietur ex urbe tuorum comitum magna et perniciosa 
 sentina rei publicae." Cic., Cat., I, 5, 12. 
 
 When Suetonius (Julius, xiv.) tells us that, when Caesar in- 
 sisted upon punishing the Catiline conspirators by confiscation 
 alone, " a body of the equestrian order, holding up their arms, 
 threatened him with immediate death," they acted as a mob, 
 though they were originally lawfully assembled there as a 
 guard. Thus the British commons have been hyperbolically 
 called at times a mob, to designate their occasional planless 
 procedures. I have already spoken of the grievous and 
 mischievous error in politics 1 when a mob take the law into 
 their own hands, as it is inappropriately called, for the law 
 ceases to be such at the instant it is taken out of the hands 
 of the legitimate officer, be this by prince, officer, or mob. 
 On that occasion the error was chiefly considered in the 
 light of justice and natural law. In this place I shall add 
 a few observations respecting the ethical character of the 
 subject. 
 
 The most noticeable political effects of mobs are when they 
 pretend to deal out justice, when they overawe the legislature 
 or administration of law and destroy property for their own 
 
 that caricature of government when the mob claim the privileges of exemption 
 from law, the Greek term was oxkoKparia. It is one of the most uncompromising 
 specie* of aristocracy. 
 
 1 See on Lynch Law, in Part First. 
 VOL. II. 12
 
 178 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 supposed interest and necessary support; as was the case 
 with the machine-breakers in England some time ago. 1 
 
 Although the people composing mobs will generally con- 
 fess that in interfering with the regular course of justice they 
 only do so by way of exception, it must not be forgotten that 
 no moral phenomenon is more common, of which every one 
 upon reflection finds instances in his own life, and of which 
 we have spoken already, than that interest, excitement, or 
 passion presents to us that case which excites us as a par- 
 ticular one, deserving of exception from the principles we may 
 have laid down for the guidance of our own action in calmer 
 moments. One of the main objects of all justice is protec- 
 tion by the interposition of law between blinding interest or 
 excited passion and the object complained of. The mob 
 tramples down this wall of safety, and derides the majesty of 
 the law a term of the greatest import, however shamefully 
 it has been abused in periods of political and legal degeneracy. 
 The very existence of the mob is, in most cases, evidence of 
 the excitement, hence of its unfitness to judge or execute 
 judgment. The mob, generally, consists of the most mova- 
 ble part of the population, not of the steady laborer or me- 
 chanic, hence of the least reflecting and most excitable people ; 
 and of those whom it is not difficult to guide with any 
 moderate skill in the art of the demagogue. The London 
 apprentices, so conspicuous in British history, afford instances. 
 In delicate times, when the best patriots labor to secure great 
 blessings by a steady and considerate course, and when it 
 requires all the consideration of the calmest minds not to 
 trespass a distinct line beyond which all becomes insecure 
 and dangerous, a mob not unfrequently rends the whole. 
 
 The mob disregards property; and everything which ren- 
 
 1 How ill-guided the destroyers of the machinery were, who believed that they 
 should lose their bread, can now be incontrovertibly proved by statistics. Ma- 
 chinery made cotton goods so cheap that millions could use them who formerly 
 could not, and consumption altogether increased in an unexampled manner, so 
 that far more hands are now employed with the machines to satisfy the increased 
 demand than formerly whhout them.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 179 
 
 ders property insecure, by whatsoever means, be it by un- 
 settled and partial taxation, 1 or government oppression, or 
 insecure inheritance, or mob violence, destroys one of the 
 chief objects of the state, security of property, a chief object 
 not only on account of mere safety, but also because inse- 
 curity of property injures the steady and moderate pursuit of 
 property, and engenders idleness, immorality, and unfitness 
 for substantial liberty. The fact that either there is no chance 
 of acquiring property, or little chance of preserving that which 
 has been acquired, has the effect, not to cause people now to 
 strive to obtain the more in order to be the better able to 
 sustain partial loss, but to give up altogether the accumulation 
 of property. 
 
 The suspicion and fear of being overreached, want of confi- 
 dence in themselves, and consequent fretfulness arising from 
 the absence of organization ; the consciousness of unlawful 
 and very brief power, and consequent thirst for making rapid 
 use of it; the fearful and natural operation of mutual excite- 
 ment, of which I have spoken before ; the absence of indi- 
 vidual responsibility, 2 and the desire in many of outdoing in 
 boldness the rest, with the unrestricted action of revenge and 
 final cruelty, are so many reasons why mobs, when they take 
 it upon themselves to execute what they believe to be justice, 
 interfere most injuriously with the lawful state of mankind ; 
 and no one who loves his country, respects the dignity of 
 man, has regard for the sacred objects of society, or reverence 
 
 1 Boeckh, in his Political Economy of Athens, translated from the German, 2 
 vols., London, 1828, specifically mentions the liturgy, or special and heavy 
 charge of rich individuals for the performance of some public act, as one of the 
 causes of public ruin by rendering property insecure, and the author substantiates 
 his case, not without the aid of ancient authors themselves. 
 
 * There is a saying of Napoleon's, in Las Cases, not unworthy to be mentioned 
 here. At St. Helena he found an old Malny, of (he name of Toby, who had 
 been kidnapped and sold at that island. Napoleon was much affected by his re- 
 cital, and said, among other things, " If this crime has been committed by the 
 captain alone, he is no doubt one of the worst of men ; but if it has been com- 
 mitted by the whole crew unitedly, it may have been done by persons who, after 
 ill, are not so wicked as one would think at first." Vol. ii. p. 26, ed. of 1825.
 
 l8o POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 for truth and justice (which is truth enacted), will talk slightly 
 or speak jocosely of them ; which, nevertheless, is but too 
 frequently done in our papers. The hanging at the lantern 
 in the beginning of the French revolution, the awful and un- 
 righteous excitement and cruelty in the times of Titus Gates, 
 the barbarous slaughtering of the prisoners of war in Spain, 
 when a commanding officer declared by proclamation that the 
 people demanded the slaughter of fifty-five persons, and 
 rather justified the act upon this ground, 1 evidently from fear, 
 the procedures in our own country at Vicksburg in i835 2 
 and at Boston against a convent, are warnings which no one 
 ought to leave unheeded. No one who has not been present 
 at such unfortunate procedures can have any idea of the 
 rapidity with which suspicion rises, is received, passes on, in- 
 creases, and terminates in a sanguinary act of revenge. The 
 multiplying power of excitement in a mob by rapid circula- 
 tion is perhaps the most conspicuous example of the power 
 of reciprocal influence and sympathy lodged in our nature 
 that human life ever presents. 
 
 To overawe the legislature or courts of justice is equally 
 pernicious and unjust. We can trace in the history of every 
 revolution the fact that evil consequences of the gravest kind 
 have attended it. In France the sans-culottes at the bar, in 
 England the people in the galleries in the times of the ascend- 
 
 1 We find, in the year 1838, Juntas of Retaliation formed in Spain, and the 
 Paris journals published a proclamation of the general commanding at Valencia, 
 which contains the following deplorable passage : " Brave national guards and 
 inhabitants of Valencia : The Junta of Retaliation began its labors yesterday. 
 Conformably to its advice and the general clamor of the people, although much 
 against my inclination and painfully for my heart, I find myself under the neces- 
 sity of causing to be shot fifty-five of the Carlist captives in the prisons of this 
 city, etc. . . . The fatal system of moderation which we have followed must 
 cease. The enemies of the throne and of liberty tremble in learning that her 
 mnjesty's government has recovered all its energy and suppressed forever all 
 that benevolent sentiment which made us regard them only as erring Spaniards. 
 If the despot pretends to subjugate us by blood, it is in blood that we will extin- 
 guish his projects, and it is with blood that we will consolidate the constitutional 
 throne of Isabella and liberty." 
 
 * Niles's Register, Baltimore, August I, 1835.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 181 
 
 ency of the Presbyterians and Independents, and the boister- 
 ous people in the hall of the cortes in 1821, are all instances 
 of what is nere maintained ; and little do those who invoke 
 this overawing by the mob know what chains at that moment 
 they rivet on their own limbs. Silence, therefore, in legisla- 
 tive halls and courts is not only a debt of respect and decency, 
 but a political duty of grave import; not to speak of other 
 inconveniences arising out of habitual applause or disappro- 
 bation from the galleries. It is one of the surest means to 
 give confidence to those insipid yet ever-ready talkers of 
 whom every assembly has some, and who constitute a polit- 
 ical as well as social nuisance. Overawing by the mob does 
 not only occur in times of revolution : we find an instance of 
 it during peace, in Walpole's day, in the commons, when an 
 outcry was made against the excise bill, 1 the people being 
 heated into fury by the frauds of stock-jobbers at the time of 
 the South Sea bubble ; and of late, in the legislature of one of 
 our states, another of a very serious character. 
 
 When we come to speak of the nature and essence of the 
 representative government, we shall see how utterly incom- 
 patible with it is the influence of mobs upon the representa- 
 tives mobs which daringly assume the name of people. 
 Mobs, if in any way allowed to influence assemblies, produce 
 those bursts of passion or excitement, so much to be dreaded 
 in all politics, monarchical or republican, for which the French 
 during the first revolution had a technical term, calling them 
 decrets d'enthoitsiasme, so that Dumont, in his Memoirs of 
 Mirabeau, gives us an instance of a decree of enthusiasm of 
 war. There is, we all know, such a thing as passing a propo- 
 sition by acclamation ; but in excited times it is exceedingly 
 difficult to distinguish between universal enthusiasm and uni- 
 versal bawling respecting the passage of a measure, either to 
 urge it forward or to denounce it. When on February 7, 
 1787, Sheridan brought forward his fourth charge against 
 Hastings, and had charmed the audience by his most brilliant 
 
 1 Robert Walpole's Memoirs, vol. iii., ed. of 1816.
 
 l% 2 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 display so much that members, peers, and strangers expressed 
 their approbation by long-continued applause a procedure 
 new and irregular an adjournment of the debate was moved 
 and carried " to afford time for the dispassionate consideration 
 of the question, and to avoid coming to a vote while the 
 minds of members were under the fascinating impression of 
 that speech." Tomline calls this reason justly an "unprece- 
 dented" one, although just. Fox opposed it, but it was carried 
 without a division. 1 
 
 XXXII. The obligation of informing the proper state 
 authority against offences before or after the fact has at all 
 times been considered a very serious one, and demands our 
 attention. The whole subject may be considered first in re- 
 gard to government officers, and secondly respecting the citi- 
 zen at large. That every officer has not only the right but 
 the duty to inform against all offences belonging to his proper 
 sphere which come to his notice, and diligently to trace them 
 out, is evident. For what else is he appointed, if not to sup- 
 port and assist in the regular course of law ? An officer, 
 therefore, is bound by the relation in which through his office 
 he stands to society, and the object for which power and au- 
 thority have been delegated to him, not only to take proper 
 notice of offences relating to his department, if he has unde- 
 niable evidence of them, but also diligently to trace out the 
 truth so soon as he has reasonable ground of suspicion. With 
 respect to offences which do not touch his particular depart- 
 ment, he has only, it seems to me, the obligation common to 
 all citizens at large. Before we treat of this latter subject, it 
 will be necessary to speak of some dangers and evils con- 
 nected with informing. 
 
 Governments have not unfrequently held out regular re- 
 wards, proportioned to the offence or crime of which infor- 
 mation is given. It was formerly so in England. The more 
 a government is a government of law, and not of executive 
 
 1 Tomline, Memoirs of \Villiam Pitt, vol. ii. p. 271, 2d ed.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 183 
 
 management alone, the less effective must necessarily become, 
 upon the whole, a preventive police; for one of the main 
 ideas of a strict government of law and of civil liberty is that 
 the citizen be allowed to do all he chooses, provided he do not 
 offend against the laws, and that proper notice shall be taken 
 of the offence only, and then only according to law, after an 
 abuse of that right to do what one chooses has taken place, 
 in other words, after an offence has been committed. I do 
 not mean to say that all preventive police is contrary to civil 
 liberty. On the contrary, it is infinitely better to prevent 
 crimes than to punish them ; and one of the means to prevent 
 them is a preventive police. Yet it is certain, on the other 
 hand, that a preventive police cannot and ought not to be 
 established on so expensive and thorough a plan in a free 
 country as is possible in a well-regulated and carefully or- 
 ganized absolute monarchy. 1 
 
 The comparative inefficiency of a thoroughly organized pre- 
 ventive police, under institutions of civil liberty, might induce 
 us to consider this additional means of detecting offences by 
 holding out a regular reward for information, as peculiarly 
 necessary in free countries ; for the necessity of punishing 
 offences remains in all societies the same. But we must con- 
 sider that none but the abject portion of the community will 
 show themselves willing to make a profession of informing 
 for money, people who are incapable, perhaps, owing to their 
 
 1 * There are two questions not distinctly stated here : Is a man bound to in- 
 form? and when is he bound not to inform ? For the latter compare the follow- 
 ing words of Lord Mansfield, when speaking of the laws against the Catholics, in 
 the case of James Webb, at the suit of Payne, a "common informer" of that 
 period : 
 
 " But now the case is quite altered. The pope has very little power, which 
 seems to grow less and less daily. As for Jesuits, they are now banished out 
 of most kingdoms in Europe; so that there is now nothing to fear from either of 
 these quarters, and consequently no necessity of enforcing these laws ; neither 
 was it ever the design of the legislators to have these laws enforced by every 
 common informer, but only at proper times and seasons, when they saw a neces- 
 sity for it, and by proper persons appointed by themselves for that purpose; and 
 yet more properly speaking, they never were designed to be enforced at all, but 
 were only made interrorem." From J. Holiday's Life of Mansfield, 1797, p. 179.
 
 184 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 lost reputation, or unwilling, to make a living in the steady 
 and industrious pursuit of a regular trade. These informers, 
 therefore, will not limit themselves to informations of fully- 
 committed crimes and to lawful evidence of them, but they 
 have always been found prone to foment crimes, to mature 
 offences, which otherwise would not have been consummated, 
 with whatever care they could, to invent evidence and procure 
 perjured witnesses who share in their reward; so that the 
 professional informers themselves become in turn a most 
 criminal portion of the community, and constitute a most 
 alarming evil, totally inadmissible in a well-regulated society. 1 
 I do not mean to discuss here how far the police should feel 
 authorized in thickly-settled countries, and especially in very 
 
 1 Various acts to encourage the apprehending of felons were passed in Eng- 
 land, in 1692, 1694, 1699, 1707, 1720, 1741, and 1742, granting rewards from 
 ;lo to ^50 sterling. By the statute of 1699, besides the .40, an immunity from 
 all parish offices was allowed to any person who should prosecute to conviction 
 a felon guilty of certain crimes. The Tyburn tickets, as the certificates of ex- 
 emption were called, were sold at high prices, even to ^306. In 1813 the reward- 
 money amounted to .18,000. Officers would seduce poor people, especially, to 
 utter counterfeit money, in order afterwards to prosecute them. A certain 
 M'Daniel confessed, in 1756, that he had caused by his testimony seventy men 
 to be condemned to death. When he was tried with two others, the people feared 
 so much his acquittal upon some flaw or other that they were killed on the spot. 
 In 1792 a similar case happened, in which twenty men had become the victims 
 of an informer. In 1817 four police-officers conspired against poor men and were 
 sentenced to death, but released upon judicial informalities by the twelve judges. 
 These conspirators had induced poor women to pass counterfeit money and seized 
 them in the act ; they frequently changed small offences into capital ones, for in- 
 stance if a work-bag had been stolen they swore that it had been tied with a 
 string to the arm and torn from it by violence, thus theft became robbery, and 
 they received ^"50. Another revolting case happened in 1817, when two soldiers 
 wrestled for a wager of one shilling, and wilh the greatest difficulty escaped death, 
 the sentence for robbery having already been pronounced, through the perjured 
 exaggeration of the police. Counterfeiters, well known to the police, were fre- 
 quently not prosecuted, because good customers, but only the utterers. Alder- 
 man Wood asserted in 1818, in parliament, that visiting the prisons he had found 
 thirteen men, mostly Irish or Germans, who had received counterfeit money to 
 buy bread, and were seized upon in the act of passing it by the police. These 
 iniquitous rewards were at length abolished in 1818 by an act 58 George III., 
 c. 70; but the abuse respecting counterfeit bank notes, for the convicted utterance 
 of which banks pay ^30, remained.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 185 
 
 populous cities, for the necessary protection of the commu- 
 nity, to make use of crime and vice itself to obtain hints and 
 clues of the criminal doings in the community, for instance 
 by pardoning criminals on condition of their informing the 
 proper authority in future of the procedures of their for- 
 mer comrades. I am too well acquainted with the fact that 
 criminals in large cities act upon most extensive and ingenious 
 plans, and carry on crime upon systems ramified in a thou- 
 sand directions, including distant agents to dispose of goods, 
 and men who know the law to defend them with perjured wit- 
 nesses and for rewards which are a share of the criminal plun- 
 der. Constables of large cities and experienced agents of 
 prisons are the only ones who have a sufficient knowledge 
 of these often frightfully extensive ramifications, necessarily 
 hidden from the honest part of the community. So much, 
 however, is certain, that although the protection of the honest 
 may render these operations of the police excusable, they are 
 wholly incompatible with right, justice, and sound govern- 
 ment, so soon as they are made use of for anything farther 
 than to obtain clues of crimes afterwards fully to be proved 
 upon regular evidence and not on that of the criminal informer 
 alone, or so soon as they are carried to such an extent as to 
 foment and prosper crime. 
 
 XXXIII. I have referred so far to common crimes only; but 
 when a government keeps spies, or establishes what is called 
 "a secret police," to report upon the doings and the disposition 
 of the honest part of the community, especially upon their 
 political sentiments, it is engaged in a ruinous and criminal 
 course of measures. To watch and mislead men under false 
 pretences has at all times been considered so dishonorable and 
 shameful an occupation, even by the employers of the spies, 
 that none but the worthless and abandoned will enter upon so 
 disgraceful a trade. All the dangers mentioned in the previous 
 section are in this case increased, for here the question is of 
 dispositions which cannot be strictly defined, and the inno- 
 cent may be affected ; the citizen has no remedy against such
 
 1 86 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 espionage, because the reports are made secretly, and therefore 
 may, and generally do, vastly differ from truth; it is of itself an 
 unlawful proceeding of government, which is established to 
 protect and to acknowledge, pronounce and maintain right and 
 law, not to pry into the thoughts and dispositions of the citi- 
 zens ; and the knowledge of the existence of spies and secret 
 police, besides destroying candor, frankness, and the spirit of 
 mutual reliance, engenders immorality by the conviction which 
 the people have that the government consider themselves sepa- 
 rate from and opposite to the people. Of all the unfortunate 
 features of that institution which, view it in whatever light we 
 may, appears as one of the worst, most immoral and demoral- 
 izing, if indeed there is another equally unjust one in history 
 the Inquisition, the most deplorable perhaps was that it 
 rendered an extensive system of spies called familiars 
 necessary, and, by the help of fanaticism, made espionage and 
 informing honorable among all classes ; for there were famil- 
 iars among the highest nobility and poorest pedlars. And, 
 ruinous as this whole institution has been for Spain, this part 
 of its operation had probably the most mischievous effect upon 
 the national character of the Spaniard, who thereby became 
 distrustful. If we are told that by a system of informers many 
 offences may be discovered which otherwise might never be 
 brought to light, we shall place the whole question at once on 
 its proper ground, by asking that question which we are bound 
 to ask whenever we wish to judge correctly of an institution : 
 What is among other effects its moral operation, always of 
 greater importance than the physical ? The many sacrifices 
 which have been offered by the Inquisition are doubtless a 
 grave subject, but it is of little importance that the various 
 writers differ by many thousands. It is the moral effect which 
 this baleful institution has had, which is infinitely greater 
 than all the physical pain which it inflicted with fiendish zeal. 
 Those who were burnt would at any rate slumber now in 
 the grave, but the nation where it flourished continues to be 
 ruined. 
 
 The history of every despotic government is replete with
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 187 
 
 proofs of the misery entailed by informers and a secret police. 
 The informers during the Roman empire form one of its worst 
 features ; they grew out of the pestilence of demoralization, 
 and flourished by the public ruin. All that Tacitus says of 
 the delatores, the vermin and pests of.human society, and 
 whom he calls " genus hominum publico exitio repertum," is 
 but too true. The secret informations and summary actions 
 upon them in the former republic of Venice were often awful. 1 
 All the imprecations in France against the "mouchards" were 
 but too well founded. 2 The secret police under Napoleon in 
 France and all the countries he conquered, in all classes from 
 the highest to the lowest, and the counter secret police to. 
 observe the first, were some of the .most melancholy traits in 
 that grave period. To the shame of our advanced race, we 
 find that the Chinese penal code makes all anonymous infor- 
 mation against a penal offence punishable with death, whether 
 the information be true or not, and any officer who takes upon 
 
 1 The brass lion hollow and with open mouth in front of the doge's palace 
 received the anonymous informations. 
 
 2 Within our own times a case has occurred which shows the effects of such a 
 system in all its horror. The elder branch of the Bourbons, after their restora- 
 tion, soon found that they were not the race of the people, not national. Their 
 government became uneasy. Conspiracies were suspected ; a desire to punish 
 soon grew up. Carron, an officer residing at Colmar, in Alsace, was in 1822 
 abused by a diabolical intrigue of the ultra-party to commit himself so that a 
 show of an intended insurrection in Alsace might be made. Kochlin, deputy 
 from that part of France, intrepidly published in 1823 the whole plot, for which 
 he was punished. A court-martial sentenced Carron to death ; letters to bring 
 the sentence before the court of cassation at Paris, to which Carron had a right 
 by law, were retained by the post-office for some days, and an application to the 
 keeper of the seals for staying the execution until the court of cassation should 
 decide, received answer from Mr. Peyronnet, then keeper of the seals, that he 
 would consider it after a few days, on October 4. In the mean time a telegraphic 
 despatch had ordered the execution of Carron on the 2d October, when it actually 
 took place. And now for the " mouchards." Two of them, sergeants, were 
 made officers ; a captain was made chef d'escadron ; the two former and another 
 sergeant received each one hundred and fifty francs, and others still the cross of 
 the legion of honor. The French dictionary says, ad verbum Mouchard, with 
 much naivete, " Those who have the misfortune to employ these abject persons 
 think to disguise their contemptibleness by calling them observers."
 
 1 88 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 himself to proceed upon such anonymous information shall 
 receive one hundred blows, while no individual shall be pun- 
 ishable upon evidence thus obtained. I do not even find that 
 high treason makes in this case an exception, though the code 
 exempts cases of treason from almost every advantage granted 
 to the accused. 1 In Spain the Inquisition proceeded not only 
 upon secret information, but the accused could not learn the 
 accuser and informer a right frequently though unsuccess- 
 fully asked for by the descendants of the Jews and Moors, 
 who were willing to pay for it a high sum. 
 
 Governments are frequently desirous either to get rid of 
 individuals against whom they have not sufficient evidence to 
 justify any serious procedures, or to obtain more power by a 
 show of danger. For this purpose they ensnare their victims 
 in pretended conspiracies, or induce them to utter unlawful 
 cries, and the like. This diabolical procedure, to which all 
 despotisms resort if convenient, was technically termed tre- 
 panning, under Charles II. and James II. The public trials for 
 treason at the time are full of evidence of this infamous meas- 
 ure, and the diaries and correspondence of the times show 
 us the use of the term. Any free people who omit promptly 
 to impeach a minister guilty or strongly suspected of this 
 crime of trepanning, or even of establishing a system of mou- 
 chards, omit one of their most urgent public duties. 
 
 The Greeks had probably no systematic secret police, ex- 
 cept under the tyrannis. There we find perfect models of it. 
 Hiero I. used to send listeners to the banquets of citizens, 
 The Greeks have various names for these instruments of 
 tyranny. 2 But the absolute democracy of Athens had, if 
 not a regularly organized secret police, its sycophants or in- 
 formers, a shameless class of men, who were as mischievous 
 in the passionate, wavering, and arbitrary administration of jus- 
 tice of the times of democratic absolutism as the demagogues 
 
 1 Sir G. T. Staunton's translation, p. 360. 
 
 2 Aristotle, Pol., v. ix. 3, speaks of them. They were called TloTayuyidef at 
 Syracuse. Hpoaayuyevc was another term for a mouchard.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 189 
 
 were in its politics. The sycophants were considered by the 
 ancients as a natural and unavoidable consequence of absolute 
 democracy, and in this as in many other instances we see 
 the great similarity which all absolute governments, of what- 
 ever form, bear to each other, a fact on which we have dwelt 
 already in the first volume. 1 The worst period of the French 
 revolution shows the same. 
 
 It is a different question whether governments have a moral 
 right to allow a crime, of which they have knowledge, to 
 mature to a certain degree. Undoubtedly it is a principle of 
 justice as well as of policy rather to prevent crime than to 
 punish it when committed, as has been stated already; but it 
 is not unfrequently of great importance for the public service 
 to punish or otherwise extinguish a criminal act, for instance 
 a conspiracy, of which government may have evidence suffi- 
 cient for moral but not for legal conviction. Were a govern- 
 ment in these cases to proceed in the prosecution at too early 
 a stage of the crime, it would only turn public opinion against 
 itself, by showing itself unable to sustain its charges, and would 
 thus in many cases strengthen the offenders. A government 
 has certainly not an absolute obligation to stay crime of which 
 as yet there exists no legally convincing proof; but it has no 
 right to allow the crime to mature to such a point that citi- 
 zens suffer thereby, if it have any convincing proof; still less 
 to favor the consummation of crime in any way whatsoever. 
 
 . XXXIV. Most codes of civilized nations make it a punish- 
 able act to omit informing either the proper police authority 
 or the endangered person of an intended crime against the 
 safety of society or the life, health, honor, reputation, or 
 property of an individual, if it can be done without endanger- 
 ing one's self or any third person. The English law does not 
 acknowledge this obligation except in cases of conspiracies 
 against the community or state. The former codes on the 
 
 'See, for instance, Athen., iii., 74 ; Schol. Aristoph., Plut., 31; Simoniies, 
 apud Plutarch., Timol., 37.
 
 190 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 continent of Europe made informing after the fact likewise a 
 legal obligation ; but all inflicted only a very slight punish- 
 ment for the omission, because the informer, if not bound by 
 his office, has at all times been held " in universal and natural 
 abhorrence, which the legislator has reasons to esteem." T 
 The lightness of the penalty shows that, even in countries 
 where informing is obligatory, the penalty for the omission 
 may be fairly considered as belonging to those which I have 
 a right to consider as an equivalent for the offence, to which 
 I may willingly expose myself if I have reason to disobey 
 the law. Informing, therefore, becomes everywhere an act 
 wholly or nearly wholly one which we must strictly consider 
 as falling within the sphere of political ethics. 
 
 On the one hand, a frank and honorable intercourse among 
 the members of society is so necessary for its whole well- 
 being, and informing, without urgent reasons, has been 
 always so much abhorred by honorable men, and, on the 
 other hand, the condign punishment of crime is so necessary 
 for the physical and moral welfare of society, that the rules 
 for an upright citizen need to take both these considerations 
 into account. The establishment of a government in itself in 
 a very great measure relieves the private citizen from the 
 obligation of informing; for all the sacrifices of time, prop- 
 erty, and other things made to the government, and the 
 restrictions to which he submits are, for the very purpose, 
 among others, that the government shall protect him and 
 shall find out, prosecute, and punish offences. This is its. 
 business. The more a government circumscribes individual 
 action, the less obliged is the citizen freely to assist. This 
 has always been felt. The more restricted a government is, 
 on the other hand, the more it becomes the affair of the 
 people, and the greater ought also to be, and generally will be, 
 the people's readiness to assist the government. Now, I hold 
 it to be a sound rule that a citizen has a fair right to leave it 
 
 1 Remarks on the Penal Code of Bavaria, Munich, 1813, published by author- 
 ity, vol. i. p. 221, also p. 211.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 191 
 
 wholly to his government to look after all minor offences, for 
 otherwise a citizen might lose his whole time. Police offences, 
 except those of a generally dangerous character, for instance 
 against general health, belong to this class. The citizen, 
 however, ought freely to inform against grave offences or 
 crimes, unless the information would militate against other 
 sacred duties or ties, for instance those of near consanguinity. 
 Yet it must be observed that the citizen is not bound to ferret 
 out the crime if he suspects it only upon rumor or insufficient 
 indications, nor will he find himself obliged or at liberty to 
 inform of offences the apportioned punishment for which he 
 holds to be wholly out of proportion. No honorable man 
 would have felt himself at liberty to inform against a shop- 
 lifter while the English law existed which punished even the 
 first offence with death. 1 Or who would inform, except in 
 cases of utmost extremity, against near relations-? The family 
 ties are so sacred and of such primary necessity for society that 
 they must be respected. The Chinese code makes informa- 
 tion against superior relations a punishable act. (Staunton's 
 transl.,p. 3/1.) But it is pusillanimous not to inform against, 
 or, where the law allows of individual prosecution, to prose- 
 cute crimes or offences which endanger society, its safety or 
 liberty, and the penalties for which are in due proportion to 
 reason and justice. The citizen who omits to take the proper 
 step to bring a murderer, a public defaulter, a conspirator 
 against public liberty, or a traitor, to his just punishment, or 
 who allows a fellow-creature whom he knows to be innocent 
 to be prosecuted or his reputation unjustly injured, loads his 
 conscience with a great offence, and promotes the disregard 
 of public morality, without which society cannot obtain its 
 
 1 According to the Spanish law, the descendants of a convict in the first and 
 second degrees are incapable of holding office. What Spaniard would not 
 have condemned a person who should have informed against such a person who 
 might have succeeded in obtaining an office, the crime of the father being for- 
 gotten ? What must every man think of Lord Bristol, himself a Catholic, when 
 he impeached Lord Clarendon, in 1663, among other things, for having en- 
 deavored to bring in popery? Compare Pepys's Diary under July IO, 1663.
 
 1 92 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 highest and noblest ends. He gravely offends against the 
 general moral law. Public spirit and patriotism require him 
 to act even at the price of his own inconvenience. 1 Informing 
 becomes an especial duty when the committed offence con- 
 tinues to affect the rights or essential interests of others, for 
 instance, as observed above, if an innocent person is con- 
 sidered guilty or even only prosecuted, if a slur remains upon 
 the reputation of a man, if he continues to be deprived of 
 lawful property, as by documents we know to be falsified, if 
 the committed crime is an indication that similar ones will be 
 committed, such as theft or the fabrication of false documents, 
 and if the offence is against the liberty and protection of the 
 people, like that of unlawful voting, or falsified returns of 
 polls. Of course it must depend upon the citizen whether 
 he thinks it more advisable to inform the authority or the 
 interested individual. 2 
 
 These rules relate to offences already committed. Respect- 
 ing inchoate crimes, or any offences of a graver sort, with 
 which an honest citizen may become acquainted, it is too 
 clear upon all grounds of morality, and the love of our neigh- 
 
 1 There existed a short time ago, and probably still exists, in one of the Amer- 
 ican cities, a society of gentlemen mutually pledged to inform against the com- 
 mitting of a certain offence which they considered of great injury to society. That 
 division of responsibility, if I can so call it, so frequently used for iniquitous pur- 
 poses, was applied here for a good end. The obligation was entered into upon 
 general grounds. The odium attached to individual information, therefore, did^ 
 not exist; and when the individual case occurred, the odium or reluctance 
 caused by the individual case and by the temporary office of prosecutor vanished 
 and was merged in the general and distinct obligation into which many had pre- 
 viously entered. We have only to glance at history to observe how frequently a 
 similar division has served for the same reason, namely on account of the ap- 
 parent extinction of personality in the case, for evil ends. I have spoken of this 
 in the Legal and Political Hermeneutics. 
 
 a The Motives of the Penal Code for the Kingdom of Wiirtemberg, 1835, say 
 (page 92) that the new code abolishes the general obligation of denunciation ex- 
 isting according to the old laws, because informing is against the general senti- 
 ment. Exceptions, however, are made, respecting crimes of general danger or 
 if innocent persons are under trial, from which, again, are excepted cases where 
 the accused is by blood or marriage a relative of the individual who might inform, 
 or where knowledge of the fact has been obtained by religious confession.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 193 
 
 bor, both in relation to the party who intends to offend and 
 that against whom the offence is intended, that the citizen 
 acquainted with the projected evil is bound to prevent the 
 offence, as far as in him lies, either by dissuading the evil- 
 disposed party, or, if this be impossible or promise no success, 
 by informing the endangered party. 
 
 VOL. II. 13
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Associations. Associated Means, Endeavors. Associations for the Promotion 
 of Morals. Pledges. Trades-Unions. Ancient Guilds. Unlawful Combi- 
 nations for Purposes lawful if pursued by the Individual. Evil Effects of 
 Trades-Unions. Disclosures respecting them in Scotland and England. 
 
 XXXV. DIVISION and combination of labor, of energy, or 
 of means, and the tendency to association, are, as we have seen, 
 two of the main elements of all civilization. Both develop 
 themselves more distinctly and forcibly with each step of 
 the progress of society, and associated endeavors in a great 
 variety multiply with every advance of civil liberty. Despot- 
 ism naturally dislikes association ; yet each association, if not 
 carefully regulated, bears within it the germ of more or less 
 despotism, either towards others or its own individual mem- 
 bers, for the simple reason that it increases intensity of action, 
 separates in some degree at least the associated members from 
 the rest of the community, and subjects them to separate rules 
 of action. We have associations for the promotion of mutual 
 industrial interest, such as insurance companies, for public 
 convenience 1 or objects of public spirit, or, as is frequently the 
 case, for both ends united ; associations for the promotion of 
 knowledge in the higher spheres, as academies of sciences, or 
 for the diffusion of general knowledge, common schools, etc.; 
 associations for the promotion of charity or other moral ends, 
 such as societies to promote prison discipline, temperance, 
 or vaccination ; religious associations, such as the monastic 
 
 1 General insecurity as well as the religious spirit produced innumerable frater- 
 nities and associations, sometimes of a purely devotional character, at others for 
 the purposes of public utility and safety, yet connected with religious usages. 
 Such were, for instance, the fratres pontifices, or bridge-brethren, in the south of 
 France, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century, for the building and sup- 
 porting of bridges, roads, ferries, hospices, and their safety and police. They 
 degenerated, and were abolished by Pope Julius II. 
 194
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 195 
 
 orders and Bible societies ; and political associations. These 
 may be either for mutual protection, as in times of great 
 danger or feebleness of a government, when it is unable to 
 perform certain acts which are nevertheless necessary for men, 
 like administering justice, or common protection in general; 
 or for the obtaining of certain rights or privileges; or, finally, 
 for opposing and ultimately changing a government. These 
 are generally and necessarily for a time secret societies. 
 
 It is evident that there are societies which combine several 
 of these objects at once. In 1584 an association was formed 
 in England the object of which was to protect Queen Eliza- 
 beth against every attack upon her or her government; a 
 similar one, it is well known, was formed under William III. 
 in 1696, and in a degree made compulsory. 1 The Spanish 
 Hermandad was a league of numerous cities to protect their 
 liberties in seasons of civil war so common in the feudal 
 times. 2 But these associations of cities, of great importance 
 in the middle ages, and which did the greatest service in the 
 advance of civilization and of the civil liberty of the commons, 
 may be more properly called leagues. The Carbonari were a 
 secret Italian society for the promotion of certain political 
 ends. Ireland has seen of late many political associations, 
 among the rest the so-called precursor society, formed by Mr. 
 O'Connell. The clubs in France at the time of the first French 
 revolution were political associations, which have acquired 
 great notoriety. 
 
 Not unfrequently associations, temporary or permanent, 
 have been formed to carry elections, defray their expenses, or 
 pay counsel at disputed elections. We shall find a more con- 
 venient place to consider all these strictly political associations, 
 after having spoken of the subject of parties. At this oppor- 
 tunity we shall consider associations in a moral point, and 
 such as exist in the regular state of society, when govern- 
 ment is in full operation and neither anarchy nor revolution 
 
 1 Trevor, William III., vol. ii. p. 291. 
 
 a See, for instance, Prescott, History of Ferdinand and Isabella, Introduction.
 
 196 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 demands peculiar protection. Finally, we may mention those 
 societies which preserve some religious, moral, or other mys- 
 tery. In the early stages of society it can be easily imagined 
 that the ignorance and vehement superstition of the whole 
 people at large should make it necessary to make of some 
 great religious truth, for instance the belief in one God, per- 
 haps introduced from some distant and more advanced region, 
 a mystery, for fear that if not kept as such it would soon be 
 entirely eradicated. So likewise may certain scientific truths* 
 militating with the common belief, be exposed to total extir- 
 pation by fanaticism, if not kept within a circle of initiated 
 persons ; but it seems that knowledge and religion with the 
 white race have become so diffused that no such mysteries are 
 any longer necessary, and that we are thus likewise spared 
 the dangers to which these societies must always expose 
 themselves as well as others. 
 
 XXXVI. The law must determine what are lawful com- 
 binations and associations and what are not; but there are 
 many which the law cannot and ought not to prohibit, which 
 nevertheless, being either dangerous or injurious, ought to be 
 avoided by the conscientious citizen. The law of all countries 
 says in general that every combination is unlawful which in- 
 terferes with the just and fair rights of others or of society; 
 but political ethics demands that we should avoid not only all 
 associations which interfere directly with the rights of others, 
 or in a manner that it may be cognizable by law, but also 
 those which have a tendency indirectly to do so, or which in 
 the nature of things lead to that indirect persecution which 
 although not cognizable by law may nevertheless be very 
 oppressive. 
 
 The first rule, then, is that we should inquire, Does the 
 association directly or indirectly abridge the free exercise of 
 any fair right of those who do not belong to it ? Such asso- 
 ciations will in general be the most harmless as have a simple 
 clearly-defined object, openly stated ; and especially if they 
 are for mutual industrial interest or the promotion of arts or
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 197 
 
 sciences only. But when the moral conduct becomes the ob- 
 ject of associations, it must be remembered that they easily 
 superinduce a spirit of exclusiveness, of supposed superiority, 
 of indirect injury to others by advancing the members of the 
 association only, in the various ways of mutual assistance, and 
 of hypocrisy in some, who, seeing that they are in need of the 
 aid of such an association for worldly purposes, accommodate 
 themselves outwardly to it. Nor must it be forgotten that no 
 moral phenomenon is more common than that the more com- 
 pact an association becomes, the more its members are apt, be 
 it by the common esprit de corps or by an erroneous feeling 
 of honor, to value the interest of the association higher than 
 any other, and sometimes, as has but too frequently happened, 
 to end in adopting a moral code or standard of their own, to 
 be judged of only by the promotion of the interests of that 
 association. In a free country there is this additional danger, 
 that such associations once formed, and having obtained a 
 strong hold upon the affections and sympathies of its mem- 
 bers, most easily become channels and vessels of political agita- 
 tions and dissensions. Political unions, however, in themselves, N 
 have always been so interesting to all members of free states 
 that they alone, without any additional aid, have a sufficient 
 tendency to create divisions and separations, frequently dis- 
 turbing the plain and easy intercourse of society. Nor can it 
 be denied that experience amply proves that, whenever mixed 
 up with extraneous matters, such clubs become injurious 
 and may easily end in fanaticism of one sort or another. 
 Morality is a general obligation, and every individual ought 
 to promote it as much as in him lies, and keep himself as 
 much untrammelled respecting all moral action as possible. 
 Speaking in a general way, specific pledges will not easily 
 improve the state of society at large, which is promoted by 
 general improvement, instruction, and general diffusion of 
 morality. Yet it cannot be denied that there is a great moral 
 power in mutually countenancing one another by association, 
 and vices may have become so general or have obtained such 
 strong hold upon society at large that the individual, such as
 
 198 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 most men naturally are, will be too weak or frail to make a 
 bold stand against them. Suppose, for instance, that the vice 
 of gaming has become so general in some or all classes that 
 it actually has infused itself into the whole intercourse of so- 
 ciety, and that a man who should make a bold stand against 
 it would not only be derided, but actually cut off in a great 
 measure from that intercourse which is nevertheless necessary 
 for him. Such a state of things has existed. Even then I 
 believe it is far more thoroughly beneficial for society, in most 
 cases, for the individual to take his stand boldly, prevail on 
 others to join his endeavors and promote their common 
 views, than to form a specific society for that purpose. The 
 operation may be at first slower, but will be safer and more 
 radical, without exposing us to the inconveniences or dangers 
 indicated before. Dissension, hypocrisy, pride, the error of 
 seeking the essence of virtue and distinction of goodness in a 
 few definite outward actions only, and indirect oppression are 
 evils carefully to be avoided. Still, it will be admitted that 
 cases of extremity make here as everywhere exceptions. In- 
 temperance has been to this day a national calamity in our 
 country. Innumerable other vices and crimes as well as great 
 misery arise out of it. Temperance societies have had, in 
 many parts of our country, a beneficial effect. Yet even a 
 society with so simple an object has led in some instances to 
 dissension and indirect oppression. It is safe to say, then, that 
 all associations formed for the avowed purpose of regulating 
 the moral conduct of its members by means of pledges should 
 be resorted to by way of exception only. We might other- 
 wise dissolve society into numberless associations of a similar 
 kind, and coercion and violence instead of freedom of con- 
 science would be the consequence. 
 
 XXXVII. A species of association which has lately ac- 
 quired great importance requires to be mentioned here in 
 particular ; I mean the trades-unions, or those associations 
 of mechanics which have for their purposes the regulation of 
 wages and time of labor, as well as the turns in which the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 199 
 
 members of the union shall find employment, or the propor- 
 tion in which the employment of the unskilled shall stand to 
 that of the skilled. 
 
 In former times there existed all over Europe corporations 
 or guilds of mechanics, with monopolies and political privi- 
 leges. They were necessary for the protection of the humble 
 burgher and infant industry against an unruly aristocracy, as 
 well as in some cases for the transmission of knowledge and 
 skill. Moreover, it was the prominent feature of the times 
 that every mass of men in any way whatever associated was 
 also incorporated. Without them the cities would never have 
 performed their high service in the promotion of civilization 
 and the acknowledgment of the burgher's rights. The vari- 
 ous trades were separated by these guilds, but within them 
 the employer and employed had a common interest. The 
 French revolution abolished these corporations, which in turn 
 had, in many cases, become oppressive in the highest degree. 
 Many other countries, for instance Prussia, followed the ex- 
 ample, and in England their political influence was totally 
 overthrown by the late reform act. The administration of 
 justice has become general, governments have become na- 
 tional, and skill and knowledge are so diffused that no special 
 protection by way of monopolizing corporations is any longer 
 deemed necessary. The more enlightened countries acknowl- 
 edge it as one of the most substantial blessings of civil liberty 
 and order that labor, skill, and industry find their proportion- 
 ate reward in the market open to all. But now associations 
 were formed for the above-named purposes ; they divided the 
 employed as a class distinct from and opposite to the em- 
 ployer. Trades-unions may be considered in their relations 
 to law, morals, political economy, and politics in general, as 
 to their general influence upon the safety of society. 
 
 Not a few persons believe that all lawful acts may likewise 
 be lawfully done in regulated combination with others ; yet it 
 is a principle of the law of all civilized nations that not only 
 unlawful acts become the more criminal if done by combina- 
 tion of many, but also that lawful acts may become unlawful
 
 200 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 by combination, if the just exercise of the rights of others or 
 the lawful operation and necessary intercourse of society is 
 thereby infringed. Such combination is called conspiracy, and 
 the conspiracy is committed when such a combination has 
 been entered into, though no further combined act may have 
 taken place. An officer may throw up his commission when- 
 ever he likes, but if a number of officers combine to throw up 
 their commissions at the same time it justly becomes a pun- 
 ishable act. 1 All this has been repeatedly decided in England 
 and America, 2 and Mr. Livingston in his projected code defines 
 conspiracy, in Art. 683, thus : " Conspiracy is an agreement 
 between two or more persons to do any unlawful act, or any 
 of those designated acts which become by combinations inju- 
 rious to others." In Art. 689 he says that the agreement 
 " stipulating that the parties to it will not give more than a 
 certain price for any particular species of service or property, 
 or that they will not furnish or render any such property or 
 service for less than a stipulated price, is injurious to that free 
 competition necessary to commerce. And if such agreement 
 be made between two or more persons, not being partners, it 
 is a conspiracy, and shall be punished," etc. It is needless to 
 quote other codes. All, I believe, agree in considering a com- 
 bination to extort higher prices as unlawful; few, however, 
 declare it with sufficient distinctness equally unlawful for 
 employers to extort by combination lower wages ; although 
 the cases do not differ for the political economist, who well 
 knows that the latter combination falls entirely within the 
 sphere of the first ; for if the employer extorts lower wages 
 he only extorts a higher price (that is, demands more labor 
 done) for the money which he pays, as in the reversed case 
 the workman wants more money for his labor. That simple 
 
 1 It was decided by Lord Mansfield, Burr. 2472, Vertue vs. Lord Clive ; Ib. 
 2419, Parker vs. Lord Clive. 
 
 3 Mod. R. 10 ; Ib. 320, The King -vs. Edwards et al.; 2 Mass. R. 329, The Com- 
 monwealth vs. Dryden and others. So in New York, by the Supreme Court, in 
 the case of the People vs. George M. Fisher, Stephen Fowler, and Anthony C. 
 Hoyt.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2OI 
 
 principle of political economy, that if I buy a barrel of flour 
 for six dollars from A B, A B likewise buys six dollars for a 
 barrel of flour from me, is, though so evident and of primary 
 importance in judging of a thousand relations both of ex- 
 change and of right, continually forgotten ; in other words, it 
 is always forgotten that money is nothing but a commodity, 
 although the most desired by all. Justice therefore demands 
 as a matter of course that a combination among employers 
 for the purpose of denying higher wages or of lowering the 
 same is as unlawful as that of the employed not to take any- 
 thing less than a certain amount. Indeed, the act is morally 
 more unlawful, inasmuch as it is easier for the employers to 
 combine than for the day-laborers, and they can generally hold 
 out longer. 
 
 XXXVIII. The evil effects of these trades-unions, as they 
 have appeared of late, in many countries, may perhaps be 
 summed up thus : They are oppressive to the employer, who 
 cannot freely choose the workmen he prefers ; they interfere 
 with society at large, by interrupting the free course of de- 
 mand and supply, create unnatural prices, or wholly inter- 
 rupt entire branches of industry; they necessarily therefore 
 drive capital to other regions, where it will find its natural 
 market, and thus the workman is injured; they promote idle- 
 ness by procuring for the unskilled the same chance of labor, 
 and, when once established, are oppressive to apprentices, of 
 whom they admit but a small number in order not to increase 
 the number of workmen and consequently the chance of labor ; 
 they intimidate and oppress masters and those workmen who 
 are not members ; they promote expense and immorality 
 among the members by the strikes, and have it always in 
 their power to injure grievously their employers by selecting 
 periods for their strikes when they are under heavy engage- 
 ments ; they hurt themselves by actually raising wages in 
 many cases above the natural price, and thus make industry 
 flow to other countries ; they are the more apt to adopt and 
 follow their own code of morals, the more secret and unlaw-
 
 202 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ful they know their proceedings to be ; they impose heavy taxes 
 upon the intimidated and fearfully support the guilty of their 
 association. In brief, they form a most oppressive, flagrant, 
 and unrighteous aristocracy, knowing no interest or moral 
 code but their own. 
 
 According to our principle, that we ought always to pay 
 proper attention to those cases in which the principle of the 
 subject under consideration has most strongly, distinctly, and 
 consistently shown itself, I will give here a few facts respect- 
 ing the trades-unions in England and Scotland elicited by 
 several trials and statements before parliamentary committees. 1 
 Of course it is not meant that all have committed the same 
 outrages, but these are the evils to which they may lead. 
 Trades-unions are originally voluntary associations, but they 
 easily intimidate those workmen who will not join them ; 
 they force the masters to employ men of their union only ; 
 they fix the proportion of the number of the skilful workmen 
 to the apprentices to be employed ; they elect their overseer ; 
 they regulate wages and time of labor; and woe to him who 
 disobeys. In many cases refractory workmen have been 
 murdered, or were made blind by vitriol being thrown into 
 their eyes. The colliers of Lanarkshire, taking advantage of 
 the great demand for iron in 1835 and 1836, issued a mandate 
 that no colliers should work more than three days or four in 
 the week, and at the utmost five hours in each day. The 
 order was implicitly obeyed, not only there but in many other 
 counties. They held out several months, and the price of 
 coal was immeasurably raised, so that the total loss from 
 coal monopoly and strike caused by the colliers' combina- 
 tion in eighteen months amounted to ^"678,000 sterling. 
 The master is forced to employ those whose turn it is on the 
 list: thus the main inducement to industry and skill is anni- 
 hilated, and the inferior workmen, always more numerous 
 
 1 Report of the Trial of Thomas Hunter, Peter Racket, etc., Operative Cotton 
 Spinners in Glasgow, before the High Court of Justiciary at Edinburgh, January, 
 1838, for the crimes of illegal conspiracy and murder. By Archibald Swinton, 
 Edinburgh, 1838.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 203 
 
 than the skilful, are encouraged. To keep the union from 
 increasing too much, a very large entrance-fee is demanded, 
 and the time of apprenticeship made very long. High re- 
 wards are paid for discovering any disobedience, or even for 
 " unshopping," that is, throwing out of employment, highly 
 skilful hands. Secret oaths were taken to keep the first oath 
 itself secret, to inform against refractory workmen, and even 
 to commit assassination of obnoxious masters, if commanded 
 by the secret committee elected by intermediate elections. 
 High sums were paid for assassination, the defence of the 
 assassins carried on by common expense, and false alibis 
 easily sworn to. In single cases the unions must be almost 
 always successful ; because, as was stated already, they select 
 for their strikes those periods, if possible, when the employers 
 are most embarrassed and heavy bills are running against 
 them, while those that strike are supported from the common 
 fund. The trades-unions wean the members from their fam- 
 ilies, and crimes, as is exhibited by statistical tables, have in- 
 creased lamentably with their increase. The enormous losses 
 which the community at large has suffered during the fifteen 
 years when the unions have been in most vigorous action, and 
 which were ultimately likewise sustained as a matter of course 
 by the working classes, are almost inconceivable. Never has 
 aristocratic monopoly been probably carried out more sternly, 
 ruinously, and barbarously than by the Scottish trades' unions. 1 
 If it should be objected that the abuse here stated, and un- 
 deniably proved by judicial and patient trials as well as by 
 minute statistical inquiries, proves no more against trades- 
 unions in general than murders would prove the unlawfulness 
 of keeping arms in general, we must observe that the cases 
 
 1 With regard to Ireland, see Mr. O'Connell's speech, Mirror of Parliament, 
 February 4, 1838. 
 
 I would refer the reader to an article on Trades-Unions and Strikes, in the 
 Edinburgh Review for April, 1838, replete with most interesting facts and 
 statistics. 
 
 See also Miss Martineau's Tale of the Manchester Strike. 
 
 Respecting combinations in general, see Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 
 1825. Also, T. Gibson's opinion, in Hall's Journal of Jurisprudence, 226.
 
 204 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 are not the same, for trades-unions, if they are for the pur- 
 pose of extorting higher wages, are in their principle unlawful 
 as well as unjust on moral grounds ; that according to the 
 natural course of things, according to the universal character 
 of man, they must lead to oppression and great abuse, as they 
 have done everywhere, though they need indeed not lead to 
 assassination; but that with regard to this latter point we 
 ought also to remember that these awful effects of trades- 
 unions took place not in nations where murder is common, 
 but among the Scotch a people not prone by any means 
 to violent crimes. 
 
 It is not necessary here to mention that unions among the 
 working classes for charitable purposes and mutual support 
 in distress are lawful and highly laudable.
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Liberty of the Press. Primordial Right of Communion. Journalism. High 
 moral Obligations of Editors. Temptations in the way of Editors. Power 
 of Leaders, good or bad, rests upon their seizing upon that principle which 
 is the moving Agent of the Mass. In what the Power of leading Papers 
 consists. Conditions which give great power to single Papers. Populous 
 Capitals in Connection with the Influence of Papers. Obligation of Veracity 
 peculiarly strong for Editors. Political Importance of gentlemanlike Tone. 
 Publishing private Letters. Dangers of Newspaper Flippancy. The Political 
 Position of the Clergyman. Opinion of ancient Theologians. How far the 
 Clergyman ought to share in the Politics of his Country. 
 
 XXXIX. IT has been seen that the liberty of the press, or 
 communion by print, belongs properly to the general and 
 primordial right of communion, and ought to be abridged, 
 among those nations which under the developing influence of 
 civilization have arrived at a distinct perception of rights, only 
 in exceptional cases, for instance in a besieged fortress. Com- 
 munion is absolutely necessary for men, and the free inter- 
 communion of minds by means of print is as necessary for 
 the existence of civilized society as the word of mouth for 
 the daily intercourse of men. The story reported by ^Elian 
 is too pointed a caricature of the restriction of communion 
 not to be mentioned here. 1 A certain tyrant Tryzus pro- 
 hibited talking, in order to prevent dangerous combinations 
 among the citizens. They resorted to communion by ges- 
 tures ; these too were prohibited. The citizens obeyed ; but 
 it so happened that some general misfortune touched all of 
 them so deeply that they were on the point of breaking forth 
 in tears. These symptoms of their feelings would likewise 
 have been a sort of communion, and Tryzus ordered his police 
 to prevent and prohibit weeping in the market. Upon this, at 
 
 1 .Lilian, Var. Hist., xiv. 22. 
 
 205
 
 206 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 length, some idea of individual and primordial right, above 
 the government and that of sighing or crying, it would 
 appear, must be acknowledged to be one occurred to the 
 patient burghers : they revolted, and the tyrant was slain. 1 
 
 The press is a power, a gigantic power; and can it not in 
 turn become tyrannical, as well as other powers can ? The 
 press, and especially the newspaper press, which with its 
 whole organization and all its qualities and powers is now 
 termed journalism, has been mentioned already as one of the 
 mightiest agents in all that interests society, and especially in , 
 politics, peculiar to our own times, of which neither the an- 
 cients nor the middle ages knew anything. It not only gives 
 increased rapidity, and, in many cases, greater vigor, at least 
 for a time, to political action for better or worse, but it gives 
 to public opinion a new intensity as well as rapidity of action, 
 and even where it is best regulated draws before the public a 
 thousand transactions or events which without it would have 
 remained strictly private, and by the force of public sentiment 
 submits individuals to some sort of public trial. I do not 
 speak here of common cases of slander, but of cases which, 
 however private in their origin, oblige the individual to pay 
 regard to public opinion simply because the case has once 
 been touched upon by the papers and the reputation of an 
 individual is at stake, or in which it is otherwise necessary to 
 disabuse the community. For instance, a London physician 
 of eminence was lately suspected not to have rendered that 
 speedy and humane assistance to a friend travelling in his 
 company on the railroad and suddenly falling sick, which it 
 was believed he ought to have rendered. A long controversy 
 and several statements by the physician and his friends, ex- 
 culpating him by proof of facts, were the consequence. It 
 would have availed the physician little to go to law, for some- 
 
 1 * The Spanish government published an order by beat of drum, at Madrid, 
 prohibiting all persons from speaking of the destruction of the Spanish fleet off 
 Sicily by Admiral Byng (Viscount Torrington) on the nth of August, 1718. 
 .Dispatch of St. Aignan to the Regent of France, M6moires de Noailles, vol. v. 
 p. 96. I quote from Lord Mahon's History of England, i. 477 (i. 331).
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2O/ 
 
 thing was at stake which never could have been fully estab- 
 lished by a legal trial, bound as it necessarily is to fixed forms 
 within a fixed sphere. Here the press subjected a private 
 individual to a trial of its own. Similar instances are daily 
 occurring. It is not maintained that this is to be deplored. I 
 merely speak for the present of the fact as showing the new 
 and great power of the press. Very frequently, indeed, it 
 re-establishes reputation, however bitter the trial may be to 
 which the individual must submit in being unceremoniously 
 handled by just and unjust, honorable and malignant editors. 
 But for the press, rankling slander would go on, without 
 being openly inquired into or satisfactorily contradicted, and 
 would be taken for truth in that circle in which it became 
 known, or would leave sinister suspicion. 1 
 
 Whenever a vast new agent of society is brought into play, 
 it takes some time before it and the laws become mutually 
 adapted ; it was so when Christianity became a vast social 
 agent, when the commons or third estate rose in importance, 
 power, and political consciousness, when the Reformation 
 became a great agent and diffused knowledge : hence it appears 
 to me that upon examination it will be found that one of the 
 main problems of our times is, and for a long time to come 
 will continue to be, how this agent of the public press, un- 
 equalled perhaps in power, at any rate in movability, by any 
 previous one, is properly to co-exist with the rights of the 
 individual, of society, and of the state at once. The struggle 
 through which all great problems must necessarily pass has 
 only begun, and we find on the one hand as much tyrannical 
 abuse of this mighty power as on the other hand we find 
 fruitless or ruinous endeavors to disown its naturalness and 
 
 1 The recent case of Lady Flora Hastings is strikingly in point. Bitter indeed 
 as for her this public trial must have been, is it not upon the whole better for her 
 that all has thus become known than that infamy should carry on covert slander ? 
 The above was written and going to press when the news of the death of this 
 lady arrived. What was stated in the previous lines has been still more strikingly 
 illustrated. The injured maiden made a dying request that her innocence should 
 be proved by a post-mortem examination. It has been done, and the papers are 
 carrying the certificate of the physicians into all parts of the reading world.
 
 208 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 its necessary pl'ace in the course of civilization, as indeed 
 has always been the case when new agents come into ex- 
 istence and play. Crowns have been lost because those who 
 wore them shut their eyes against the press or attempted to 
 strangle it; and societies have been convulsed because the 
 press would act as though it were an agent which justly pos- 
 sessed absolute power. The ministers of Charles X., in their 
 report of July 26, 1830, which preceded the fatal decree that 
 " The liberty of the periodical press is suspended," had this 
 passage: "At all periods, indeed, has the periodical press 
 been only, and it is in its nature to be only, an instrument of 
 disorder and sedition." 1 The same has been said at times, for 
 similar reasons, against printing in general, against the claim 
 of the people freely to read the Bible, against natural philoso- 
 phy, the study of which was actually abolished in the Spanish 
 universities by a decree of Ferdinand VII., and indeed against 
 all inquiry. The press is like a thousand other things ; the 
 question is not, shall we rule without it ? It may be interest- 
 ing by way of speculation to inquire whether it would be 
 better for mankind were there no press ; but this is a wholly 
 fruitless inquiry in politics, for the press is a fact, a given con- 
 dition of our period, just as much as the soil forms one of the 
 given conditions for each country, or the clime for each region. 
 The statesman has not to speculate about them, but his laws 
 must take them as' facts, and be shaped accordingly. The 
 only question is, how shall we regulate and preserve liberty, 
 
 1 This report, signed by seven French cabinet ministers, is a valuable docu- 
 ment, which I would recommend for perusal, not to satisfy curiosity respecting 
 what a party considered tyrannical has to say, this is not the true use which we 
 ought to make of historical documents of such importance, but because it prob- 
 ably embodies the most important views of one of the two contending parties on 
 that subject in our times. We must never forget that the true principle respect- 
 ing subjects of magnitude develops itself out of the struggle, and is never pro- 
 duced at once in an absolute and finished manner. United with this report and 
 the subsequent ordonnances must be the spirited protest of the Paris journals and 
 that of the deputies. I believe we do not venture too far if we say that the 
 liberty of the press and consequently the journals had become the pledge and 
 symbol of civil liberty.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 209 
 
 public and private, with the press ? It is as natural and neces- 
 sary now as crying was to the subjects of Tryzus. The same 
 question might be raised respecting large cities : do they or 
 do they not promote crime, tumults, rebellions? this is not 
 the question. We have them, we ought to have them, civ- 
 ilization requires them, there they are ; the question can 
 only be, how shall we maintain order and liberty with them ? 
 A distinguished writer of the last century discussed the 
 subject whether, upon the whole, the disadvantages of easy 
 intercommunication by good roads, especially in cases of in- 
 vasion, did not overbalance their advantages? He is, upon 
 the whole, against many good roads. But this is not the 
 problem. Roads belong to the social agents of civilization ; 
 the question can only be, how shall we govern with them ? 
 It would be as rational to ask whether it would not be easier 
 to govern a state composed of blind people. It is for the 
 science of politics proper to indicate how this great agent is to 
 be reconciled and amalgamated with all the other great and 
 indispensable objects of the state or of society at large: 1 
 here our object can only be to consider the ethic points 
 involved in the great subject 
 
 XL. The whole periodical press, literary, religious, and 
 political, is of vast importance to society; the diffusion of 
 knowledge, truth, error, or falsehood is multiplied. The 
 press at the same time is not unfrequently conducted, partly 
 or wholly, by persons so unqualified and upon principles of 
 moral responsibility so doubtful that it most assuredly de- 
 serves the closest and frankest attention. But the general 
 
 1 Thus, it has been proposed in an article ascribed to one of the most eminent 
 men of our age that protective societies should be formed against newspaper 
 slander and all attacks upon reputation, partly to discourage subscription to slan- 
 derous papers, partly to prosecute them at law with the rigor of united means; 
 and possibly such protective societies may become necessary in some parts of the 
 world. 'If the press really becomes tyrannical, and the individual should be 
 incapable of resisting it single-handed, societies of this kind would be as neces- 
 sary as protective unions were necessary in the middle ages against feudal aris- 
 tocracies. 
 
 VOL. II. 14
 
 2io POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 subject of the present work requires that we should limit our 
 inquiries to the political press. Of this the newspapers form 
 of course the most prominent part, although it seems that his- 
 tory will point out the influence of some quarterly periodicals 
 as very great, because they offer an opportunity for discussions 
 extensive enough to be thorough or detailed, and yet too 
 short to form a work; which discussions often would not have 
 found half as many readers had they been issued as separate 
 books. The periodical reappearance of these works, and 
 therefore the periodical rediscussion of important subjects in 
 their various aspects, increases greatly their power. 
 
 Newspapers have become the substitutes of the oral com- 
 munion in the ancient market, when cities were states ; but 
 their action is in some respects greater and more lasting, be- 
 cause print lasts. Journalism is communion multiplied and 
 of swifter action than oral communion ; what orally would 
 slowly travel from mouth to mouth, or drop before it had 
 become extensive rumor, is now conveyed within a few hours 
 to many thousands. All the moral obligations, therefore, of a 
 man and citizen which refer to communion in general, hold 
 likewise respecting this species of communion, with this ad- 
 ditional characteristic, that in the same degree as this com- 
 munion is vaster and more powerful, so do all the moral 
 responsibilities connected with it increase in intensity. This 
 appears to be evident : if a man says an untrue thing of his 
 neighbor to a single person, it is an offence of which he 
 ought to be ashamed, yet not so great an offence as if he says 
 the same in an assembly ; this again is not so great as if he 
 writes it in a letter to be shown to many ; this in turn is a less 
 offence than when the same is coolly stated in a pamphlet. 
 Yet party excitement seems to have almost established it as a 
 principle that the wider and more rapid the action of commu- 
 nication, the less binding are the moral obligations of him who 
 makes them. If there is a class of men upon whom it would 
 be more binding to be good men, good citizens, and true gen- 
 tlemen than upon any other, that class are editors. To me, 
 the calling of an editor, be it as promulgator, instructor, guar-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 211 
 
 dian, or leader, seems a very grave one, however many of 
 them may disregard it themselves ; they have peculiar charges 
 in the service of modern civilization, taking this word in its 
 most comprehensive meaning. 
 
 Yet every fair observer will acknowledge that many diffi- 
 culties are inherent in and peculiar to this branch of industry, 
 such, for instance, as that a newspaper, while on the one hand 
 it assumes the charge of informing if not always of instruct- 
 ing, is on the other hand an article of merchandise, and sub- 
 ject, as a matter of course, to all the laws which regulate 
 every demand and supply ; and that, owing to the multiplicity 
 of papers, a certain strong language is necessary to effect only 
 a hearing which by language far less strong is obtained in 
 private intercourse, or in works in which arguments may be 
 developed at their full length ; or that when a newspaper be- 
 longs avowedly to a party it becomes in a degree its organ, 
 and will be, therefore, more careful in not allowing advantages 
 to the opposite party than the private citizen as member of a 
 party feels called upon to grant, while this circumstance like- 
 wise is a strong temptation to trench upon the cause of truth. 
 For these and many other reasons it becomes only the more 
 necessary to consider the ethical obligations of conductors of 
 papers. On the one hand we have seen that unshackled liberty 
 of the press is not only a most valuable right of freemen, but 
 society at large is deeply interested in seeing free discussion 
 of all public measures and men protected in as wide a range 
 as public security and morality as well as private rights admit; 
 on the other hand, the licentiousness of the press and its 
 tyranny is a great calamity, and it is exceedingly difficult to 
 maintain the precise line between the two by positive law, 
 in many cases is absolutely impossible. The moral obligation 
 of the conductors of the press, therefore, becomes the greater 
 from whatever point of view we may consider it. For this 
 purpose it is necessary to dwell on some particulars for a 
 moment longer. 
 
 XLI. Some persons believe that the power of newspapers
 
 212 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 to lead the public is far greater than it actually is; others un- 
 dervalue their power. In general it may be observed, as has 
 been alluded to already in a previous part of this work, that 
 leaders, be they citizens in private or in official situations, 
 editors, parliamentary leaders, legislators, reformers, or even 
 monarchs, possess power only in so far as they have the pene- 
 tration, intellectual or moral vigor, sagacity, instinct, greatness 
 of soul, divination, or whatever else it may be, to seize upon 
 the principal moving agent of the masses or times, to pro- 
 nounce clearly what the masses feel, and to act out what all 
 more or less consciously strive for or the circumstances of the 
 times demand. This maybe for better or worse according to 
 the tendency of that body of men whose feelings or purposes 
 the leader sagaciously pronounces or represents. The chief 
 of a piratical expedition is in this respect as much a leader as 
 the wisest statesman or purest patriot may be for a whole 
 nation in its noblest and grandest efforts. It is true, therefore, 
 that a leader can be such only and in so far as he follows the 
 general impulse or acknowledges the common principle of 
 movement ; but it is likewise true that, this once done, a leader 
 greatly concentrates, invigorates, propels, and accelerates. In 
 a leader a party or society becomes conscious of its own 
 wants, endeavors, and energies. 
 
 These remarks apply to newspapers according to the degree 
 of leadership which they possess. A remarkable instance 
 seems to be on record. It is confidently reported that when 
 the question of British reform was on the eve of being seri- 
 ously discussed in the commons, the proprietors of the London 
 Times newspaper sent agents into various parts of England 
 to ascertain how the great body of the people seemed actually 
 disposed respecting this intended great measure. The report 
 was that the people were in favor of it. This once done, no 
 one, I believe, will deny that this paper, in conjunction with 
 others, such as the London Chronicle and the Globe, were of 
 decided and marked service in bringing about this measure. 
 They acted like burning-glasses. Where there are no rays* 
 the burning-glass cannot collect them ; but where they are
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 213 
 
 scattered about it, may collect them and direct them power- 
 fully to one point A paper, % the Rhenish Mercury, edited in 
 1813 and 1814, when the allied powers warred against Napo- 
 leon, was, somewhat hyperbolically, yet not without truth, fre- 
 quently called "the fifth ally," 1 the other four being Great 
 Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia. 
 
 The chief papers of the various countries occupy, in this 
 respect, different positions. The more populous the capital 
 of a country, and the more the political and social life of a 
 whole nation is concentrated in such a capital, and at the same 
 time the more the laws or other circumstances prevent a mul- 
 titude of papers, the greater will be the specific influence of 
 single ones ; because the subscription-list of the papers will 
 be greatly increased, which of itself would enhance their in- 
 fluence, and the income of the paper being so much larger, its 
 proprietors have it in their power to unite higher and more 
 varied talent in its service. Papers may thus acquire a power 
 which may be very dangerous or salutary, according to cir- 
 cumstances. In no country, I believe, have papers within 
 their respective countries a greater influence than in France, 
 owing to the peculiar position which Paris as a capital enjoys. 
 Subscription-lists of daily papers have amounted there to 
 twenty thousand. Each paper is not only read by several 
 persons, as is common everywhere, but there are " reading 
 cabinets" in which people throng from morning to night to 
 read them, and some places where a person reads the most 
 important parts to audiences around them. In England, 
 owing to the very different position which London, although 
 much larger than Paris, as being the capital of a less numer- 
 ous nation, occupies, and because the political life is far more 
 diffused in all parts of the country, papers do not exercise 
 such dictatorial power. In France likewise it is, as it seems, 
 on the decrease in the same proportion as the communities at 
 large acquire more and more distinct political life and action. 2 
 
 1 By Mr. Gorres. 
 
 a An extensive view of the circulation, and remarks upon the influence, of the
 
 214 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In the United States, where there is no capital to be compared 
 to Paris or London, where the political action which otherwise 
 might become dictatorial is broken by the circumstance of 
 the population being scattered over a vast country, by the 
 numerous state legislatures, and by the great political action 
 each community enjoys, the leading influence of the papers is 
 comparatively small. Yet all papers, it will be allowed, pos- 
 sess a propelling power in their sphere. Even if we consider 
 many papers as nothing more than letters written to sub- 
 scribers, they receive an influence from their uniformity in 
 writing the same to many, from their constant repetition, and, 
 what is not the least, from the fact that anything in print, even 
 although he who prints may not be held in universal esteem 
 either for rectitude of conduct or capacity of mind, has for 
 most men some sort of authority ; at any rate, whatever stands 
 before our eyes in print receives more attention than what is 
 uttered by word of mouth, or pen and ink alone. 
 
 London papers and periodicals are to be found in a work entitled " The Great 
 Metropolis," 1837, London and New York. The facts collected there are of high 
 interest. The article "Newspapers" in McCnlloch's Commercial Dictionary 
 contains most valuable statistical information, especially respecting Great Britain. 
 For remarks on the history of Newspapers, and their existence in the various 
 countries in the world about ten years ago, see the article " Newspaper," in the 
 Encyclopaedia Americana. It is well known that within the last few years a 
 government paper in Turkish has been established in Constantinople ; while the 
 Sandwich Islands as well as New South Wales have theirs. About eight years 
 ago a weekly paper called the Cherokee Phoenix was established at New Echota, 
 in the state of Georgia, printed partly in Cherokee, partly in English. Gradually, 
 however, the Cherokee part in it seemed to diminish, and I am not aware whether 
 it still exists. The newspaper has become so decided an accompaniment of our 
 civilization that wherever it extends the newspaper likewise takes its root. Even 
 the negro colonists at the infant colony of Liberia have their paper. For a 
 general estimate of the papers issued by the American press, see the American 
 Almanac, annually issued in Boston. The newspaper is emphatically a con- 
 comitant of modern European civilization. The Chinese have long possessed a 
 paper in their capital; but it is only an official promulgator. [A number of 
 newspapers now published in the United States (1874) for number of subscribers 
 compare with the most popular European ones, and for enterprise in collecting 
 news from various parts of the world far outstrip, it is believed, any published 
 outside of England.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 21$ 
 
 XLII. Though daily or weekly papers are expected to give 
 an account of all the most interesting facts which occur, to 
 be in a degree the cast of actual life as it passes on, presented 
 for the calm consideration of the beholder, it is advisable for 
 every paper that it should have one branch of communication 
 in which it is peculiarly strong and may be depended upon, 
 of whatever sphere this may be. Thus alone it can calculate 
 upon lasting and considerable influence. Steadiness and 
 singleness of purpose have here as everywhere else a great 
 effect Let the editor clearly know himself, in what branch 
 he is capable of being a guide, and in what he ought to 
 attempt merely to be a reporter of what occurs. 
 
 It is not only allowable, but, I believe, desirable and neces- 
 sary, that parties, societies, institutions, of importance and 
 engaged in a decisive movement, should have their avowed 
 organs, papers to which the community can at all times look 
 for the particular view which that part of society takes of 
 specific cases. But this in no way disengages such an organ 
 either from the common and eternal obligation of truth or plain 
 morality, which must ever regulate the intercourse of men, if 
 society is to be maintained ; still less does it allow any one 
 actually to sell his talent or conscience either for specific re- 
 ward or. for the profit expected from subscription. 1 This 
 would be a prostitution of mind and soul. In no case what- 
 soever can an editor be allowed to utter a known or suspected 
 falsehood, or imprudently to assert anything against the repu- 
 tation of individuals or societies. It is his bounden duty first 
 to inquire. The assertion that if false it will be contradicted 
 is of no avail. This would equally well apply to many false- 
 hoods in private life, and the obligation of truth is general ; 
 but though falsehoods uttered in papers may in many cases 
 be expected to be contradicted in large cities, where there are 
 many opposite papers, or if vented against eminent men, it 
 
 1 It has happened that an English paper wilfully slandered a respectable lady, 
 merely to come into notice by the ensuing trial, which was worth more to the 
 paper than it lost by the fine. Goede, if I recollect right, mentions a case in his 
 England, Wales, etc., Dresden, 1806.
 
 2l6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 must not be forgotten that the contradiction does not neces- 
 sarily flow in the same channel and to the same parts of the 
 country. There cannot be any doubt that a man may be 
 seriously injured by false assertions, leaving, even if contra- 
 dicted, shades of suspicion, which all who are vain of their 
 own peculiar sagacity are ever ready to adopt, especially if 
 the attack be systematically repeated. Not only may contem- 
 poraries be deceived, but posterity likewise. A newspaper 
 ought ever to keep in mind that it acts in a most unfair and 
 ungentlemanly manner by using that advantage which it 
 daily has over a private individual of uttering to many hearers 
 whatever it pleases. If hints and insinuations are highly 
 reprehensible in private intercourse, they are on this account 
 far more so in newspapers. 
 
 It would be hardly necessary to mention that if in any situ- 
 ation the pampering of vitiated or criminal appetites is one 
 of the greatest derelictions from duty, it becomes tenfold so 
 in newspapers. It is no answer that the respectable or moral 
 part of the community Will not read them. Perhaps not; but 
 many do read them who are vitiated by these accounts and 
 become more and more confirmed in their disposition. Any 
 person who has paid attention to the unfortunate portion of 
 the other sex, and to criminals in general, well knows that 
 lascivious papers as well as the constantly repeated detailed 
 accounts of atrocious crimes do infinite mischief in all coun- 
 tries. 1 There is not the slightest testimony of competent 
 
 1 Reports of trials are necessary; the public are deeply interested in them; 
 but they differ from those accounts of crime and atrocity which depict merely to 
 satisfy a vicious craving for atrocious stories, or represent vices and offences 
 with levity. There are weekly papers which occupy a large part of their columns 
 with these accounts, accompanied by disgusting wood-cuts. There exists an 
 American weekly periodical, called the Terrific Register, etc., the title itself 
 being a register of everything that is loathsome and criminal. Quite similar 
 periodicals exist in England and France. There are several mentioned in " The 
 Stranger in America." Many criminals have not only been originally familiar- 
 ized with crime by such accounts, but, as they have confessed, their appetite was 
 first excited by it. This is not a fit place to discuss the psychologic phenomenon 
 the fact may well be mentioned that frequently the desire of incendiarism, and 
 sometimes that of poisoning, is awakened by accounts of these crimes.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 persons to the contrary, that I am aware of. But we need 
 not speak of these two extreme^ only. There are many other 
 injurious dispositions or inclinations which may be pampered, 
 developed, sped to a ruinous extent, by the papers. Ridi- 
 culing whatever commands respect, with that zest which for 
 many persons mere boldness or impudence ever has, and 
 which is so often mistaken for wit ; attacking directly or in- 
 directly private character ; seasoning with gross personalities 
 excitement of all sorts arising from political and religious 
 fanaticism, hypocrisy, or narrow-mindedness ; making light of 
 the laws of the land ; all these evils may be greatly promoted 
 by newspapers. They may indeed be caused by any writing; 
 but newspapers are more widely diffused and constantly re- 
 newed, hence if bad their danger is greater. Many papers 
 act in times of excitement as though there were no danger in 
 throwing brands at random among combustibles, as if their 
 highest duty were to foment and disturb, and as if they were 
 not conscious of the infinite concatenation of everything good 
 or bad in the millions of elements constituting society, inter- 
 course, and national life. 
 
 In continually making overstatements, 1 or, what is of course 
 still worse, habitually employing misrepresentations, which 
 generally are far worse than positive falsehoods, because so 
 much more insinuating, language loses its proper value, and 
 part of the community accustom themselves to look upon all 
 similar assertions as not to be trusted, so that truth can no 
 longer rouse from torpor or find entrance with those to whom 
 it is not advantageous or palatable. This is a state of things 
 which very frequently takes place in times of great excitement. 
 The spirit of veracity and with it of honesty and courtesy flies, 
 and a considerable part of the community becomes morally 
 
 1 Instances are unnecessary : still, one may stand here for many, and is ex- 
 traordinary enough. A London daily paper, one of the first of its pa^rty, said in 
 August, 1838, that every true Englishman's blood must curdle at the idea that 
 Lord Durham had proposed, at a public entertainment in Canada, the health of 
 the President of the United States. Even merely as an entertaining anecdote I 
 think it is not undeserving of a place in a note.
 
 218 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 blunted. Society is not only interested in a general gentleman- 
 like intercourse on account of general convenience and refine- 
 ment, but free states are, in my opinion, for political reasons 
 deeply interested in a general esteem of gentlemanly pro- 
 priety, founded upon a nice feeling of that honor which is 
 ashamed of doing anything even slightly mean, upon mutual 
 acknowledgment and readiness to serve, or absence of selfish- 
 ness, and upon habitual avoidance of what may hurt one's 
 neighbor, which elements are perhaps the most prominent in 
 the character of the true gentleman. In this respect polite- 
 ness, decorum, acquire political importance. Cicero and 
 Washington fully acknowledge it in their writings. News- 
 papers, however, may very largely and essentially contribute 
 to lower this sentiment by ungentlemanly personalities, and 
 in general by discarding those rules which are universally 
 acknowledged in well-bred society and from which they can 
 never be absolved. 1 " Nothing is easier," wrote Erasmus 
 (Jortin's Life of Erasmus, i. 257), " than to call Luther a block- 
 head ; nothing more difficult than to prove him one." Editors 
 ought to remember, likewise, that, as a uniformly gentleman- 
 like behavior gives, according to all experience, great influence 
 in deliberative assemblies, so does a paper acquire a very 
 powerful aid from a uniformly unruffled gentlemanlike tone. 
 Its words will be taken in their full value; its arguments will 
 be allowed more readily; its sincerity will find greater credence. 
 Is it necessary to mention here that editors sport with most 
 sacred rights if they publish private letters without being 
 authorized, and that in these cases they constitute themselves 
 what we have seen to be one of the most hateful features of 
 despotism a secret police? 8 It is not unfrequently the case 
 
 1 That scurrilous papers use all sorts of language is natural ; but both in Eng- 
 land and America leading papers forget themselves frequently. A distinguished 
 citizen of the United States was frequently called, during one of the late most 
 exciting discussions, by opprobrious names, that alluding to his name not ex- 
 cepted. A leading London paper of December 22, 1834, speaks of the " goose- 
 head patriot of Charing Cross." The duke of Wellington was called " blockhead" 
 during the reform -excitement. 
 
 <* * That to do this is against law unless permission of the writers [or theii
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 219 
 
 that single editors, and among them many who have had no 
 other preparation for their task than that of having been com- 
 positors, assume the task of judging of all subjects, of politics, 
 literature, theology, or the fine arts. Leaving their presump- 
 tion out of the case, which must draw the ridicule of the 
 considerate upon them, they lower that tone of reverence 
 which, whatever may be said to the contrary for the sake of 
 flattering, is indispensable for the true life of every individual 
 and of all society. Where skill, talent, industry, knowledge, 
 learning, perseverance, proved rectitude, experience, profes- 
 sional reputation, no longer receive that due share of regard 
 and influence which talent, virtue, and reputation ought to 
 enjoy, to distinguish human society from animal herds, it 
 cannot, it will not prosper. Folly must necessarily supersede 
 wisdom, arrogance must outweigh worth. I cannot conclude 
 this section without mentioning the disingenuousness of giving 
 garbled reports. It is a mere subterfuge, unworthy of an age 
 in which it is largely acknowledged that in all human interests 
 common sense must aid us in ascertaining and maintaining 
 truth, to say that in having given mutilated and garbled reports 
 we have asserted nothing false. Such a report may be one 
 of the worst, nay, most infamous, falsehoods. 1 
 
 It does not lie within our scope to speak of the general 
 advantages and disadvantages of an extensive news press, the 
 diffusion of knowledge on the one hand which it undoubt- 
 edly promotes, and the superficiality and hastiness of argu- 
 ment on the other ; or the unity of feeling which it creates in 
 large countries by aiding that general sympathy and greater 
 uniformity of feelings and desires, without which liberty can- 
 not avoid constant exposure to partial and provincial corn- 
 
 heirs or other representatives] be obtained was fully settled in the case of Pope 
 vs. Curll, June 5, 1741, by Lord Hardwicke, quoted by Lord Mansfield in the 
 famous case of Miller vs. Taylor, respecting the unauthorized print of Thom- 
 son's Seasons, 4 Burr. 2303. Holliday's Life of Mansfield, p. 216. 
 
 1 An article, ascribed to Lord Brougham, on the Abuses of the Press, in the 
 Edinburgh Review for April, 1838, deserves to be read: though the author ap- 
 pears to place some evils in too bold a light.
 
 220 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 motions. Upon the whole, the good derived from newspapers 
 is decided, and, though it were not, it is certain that they form 
 one of the conditions of modern social life : we must en- 
 deavor, therefore, to have them as sound, respectable, and true 
 to every good cause as possible. All are interested in this. 
 Vicious papers should be frowned down and lose all support; 
 active and good ones ought to meet with all possible fair 
 support. 
 
 XLIII. It is desirable that we should consider the press in 
 one more view. The state or a society cannot be supported by 
 those three branches alone of which we have spoken on pre- 
 vious occasions ; namely, the legislative, judiciary, and execu- 
 tive. A power is necessary which penetrates where those 
 powers cannot reach : it is the censorial power, that power 
 which watches over morality, private life, and industrial econ- 
 omy, so far as they form integrant elements of the common- 
 wealth. The ancients embodied this power in institutions. 
 In Rome it was the censorship, which Cicero calls the magis- 
 tratus pudoris et modestise. But the sphere of the censor 
 extended farther than merely to what we should strictly 
 express by morals : the censor watched, for instance, over the 
 agriculture and took official notice-of a neglected farm. The 
 areopagites in Athens, and the Spartan ephori, had a similar 
 tutorial power. We moderns have not enacted this censorial 
 principle into an institute, but our states are societies like 
 theirs, and we cannot dispense with the principle any more 
 than they could ; that is, we too want a power which will 
 impel the indolent and restrain the licentious. We do not 
 constitute, however, this power into an institution ; we leave 
 the censorial action of society, with very few exceptions, which 
 include as a matter of course public immorality, to the gen- 
 eral action of public opinion. This public opinion, which we 
 have acknowledged already as so mighty a power, appears, 
 therefore, in this case likewise as an indispensable agent of 
 society. It is not necessary to investigate here how far the 
 press may be considered as leading public opinion : it suffices
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS, 221 
 
 to consider that they are closely connected. We all know, 
 moreover, that wherever there exists in cases like the present 
 any connection at all, there is likewise a continual reciprocal 
 action and reaction. The papers, therefore, stand in a close 
 connection with this censorial power of the state necessary, 
 and yet so easily becoming tyrannical in its exercise; a power 
 which it may be as wrong to weaken by making light of vice, 
 as to use despotically to the discomfort of the individual. 
 
 XLIV. Owing to the peculiar relation in which the clergy- 
 man stands to his flock, it is necessary that we should consider 
 for a moment his position with reference to political ethics. It 
 is a question solely appertaining to politics proper, whether 
 it be wise or necessary that the clergy should be represented 
 as a separate body in the legislative assemblies, whether it 
 ought not, or under what circumstances it ought, to be con- 
 sidered as forming a separate " estate" by itself. We can 
 occupy ourselves only with the question whether there are 
 any rules applicable peculiarly to the clergy to guide their 
 action in matters relating to politics. 
 
 The sacred charge which a priest, clergyman, or minister 
 has of instructing and guiding the people is so necessary and 
 constant a one, that from the earliest to the latest times of 
 Christianity there have been distinguished theologians who 
 have maintained and urged that not only should the clergy 
 nowise occupy themselves with politics, but that they should 
 continue faithfully to discharge their sacred duties uncon- 
 cerned about the government, even though a usurper swayed 
 the supreme power. It is, so maintained those theologians, 
 no matter of theirs. 1 I am well aware that in the earlier times 
 
 1 Among the many passages which might be quoted I will instance but the fol- 
 lowing. See the History of the Gallican Church (in French), vol. i. I, 2, year 
 383, respecting the conduct of the Spanish and Gallic bishops, and of St. Martin 
 himself, towards the tyrant Maximian; the letter of St. Ambrosius (Ep. Ivii., ad 
 Eugen.) to the usurper Eugenius, who was placed on the throne by Arbogastes 
 the Frank when Valentinian II. was strangled ; the letter of Gregory the Great 
 to Phocas, who had massacred the emperor Maurice and his family (lib. 13,
 
 222 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of Christianity this view was sometimes taken partly on the 
 ground, or at least partly originated from the belief, that the 
 clergy were too sacred to occupy themselves with the so-called 
 merely worldly affairs of the laymen. 1 Such views were nat- 
 ural when an ascetic spirit was likewise natural; and, consider- 
 ing the turmoil and warring confusion of the times, it was a 
 view not without its salutary effects. Nor am I ignorant that 
 in not a few cases the Catholic church maintained this view 
 to make the clergy, the church, the more independent and 
 compact in itself. But these were not the only grounds, nor 
 were they the lasting reasons, upon which the above view was 
 supported. 
 
 XLV. Our times have arrived at different convictions. We 
 believe that governments exist according to the decrees of 
 God, which ordained man to be a social being, and to have 
 reason that he might maintain right; we believe that civil 
 freedom is as sacred and holy a cause as any on earth, and 
 that every one ought cheerfully and conscientiously to con- 
 tribute his aid for supporting it. A minister or priest, there- 
 
 Judic. vi., Ep. xxxi., ad Phocam) ; the protocols of the clerical assemblies of 
 France (in French), vol. iii. p. 686, et seq.; and, on pages 90 and 91, the answer 
 of pope Gregory XIII., which ever since has been considered as a rule of con- 
 duct. We all know very well that the church has but too frequently meddled 
 with politics; but these were at least the professed and acknowledged principles. 
 As to Protestant theologians, there have been some, indeed, who taught contrary 
 principles, but far more professed the same. Quite recently, in 1839, the Meth- 
 odist conference in New Jersey passed a resolution, if the papers have reported 
 correctly, declaring that any clergyman who should hereafter become a candidate 
 for the state legislature or congress would receive the general disapprobation of 
 the conference. 
 
 1 Eusebius says, "One description of Christians live a higher life than that of 
 the founders of Greek and Roman freedom. . . . He who has chosen out this 
 life to himself, who is dead to the lower life of mankind, who lingers on earth 
 with his body only, and dwells in thought and with his soul in the heavens, 
 looks down on this world as it were contemptuously, like a deity." In another 
 passage the same author calls the laity the lower class, because they care for 
 household concerns, engage in judicial business, carry on trade or agriculture, 
 and for learning and hearing the word of God have appointed fixed days only.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 fore, ought to give a good example in the performance of our 
 civil duties. I think they ought to vote whenever called upon, 
 if it does not interfere with their clerical duties, or if they have 
 not otherwise specific reasons to abstain from it. But it seems 
 that no one ought to guard himself more strictly against med- 
 dling, directly or indirectly, with politics, taking part with 
 one or the other side, than the clergy. There are many 
 powerful reasons, which perhaps may be comprehended under 
 the following heads. 
 
 A minister will necessarily lessen his influence and the good 
 he may do, as the messenger and fosterer of peace and love, 
 in the same degree as he sides strongly for or against a meas- 
 ure or party. All are Christians, and to all he should be a 
 friend, an unsuspected and unprejudiced friend. 
 
 The more ministers meddle with politics, the more, in the 
 natural course of things, is religion carried over into politics, 
 and the more we are, consequently, exposed to fanaticism and 
 persecution, open and violent, or secret and indirect. We 
 cannot be too careful of leaving these two elements separate. 
 Shall history have recorded so innumerable and melancholy 
 accounts in vain ? so many proofs that religion, instead of 
 being the balm of life, becomes, if once brought into contact 
 with party strife, the fiercest of all excitements ? The history 
 of the Netherlands, when most of the ministers had become 
 politicians, and persecutions and executions of the wisest and 
 purest, such as Barneveldt, were the consequences, would alone 
 suffice, if honestly and attentively perused, to check our rash- 
 ness in this respect forever. 
 
 It is not only against the most essential interests of the 
 minister and of the cause for which, if pure, he lives, when 
 the pulpit is turned into a rostrum of political strife; it is also 
 unfair in the highest degree. The minister has not been ap- 
 pointed nor is he supported for that purpose. Merely regard- 
 ing him as a gentleman, he ought never to make use of that 
 place where no one can answer him, to debate politics. Is 
 he not, among gentlemen, considered peculiarly exempt from 
 insults because he is known to be unable to answer them like
 
 224 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 other men ? On a similar principle he ought to abstain from 
 political discussions or allusions in the pulpit 
 
 Ministers, like all other men whomsoever, from the president 
 to the constable, are apt to mistake opposition to them per- 
 sonally, or to certain steps of theirs, for opposition to their 
 whole cause and to the principles or systems which they 
 defend. But as the cause of the ministers, for which they 
 professionally live, is religion, they are, upon this principle 
 common to all men, apt to mistake any opposition or resist- 
 ance to them for an opposition to religion. Hence partly the 
 great vehemence and inveteracy whenever religion is mixed 
 up with politics. 
 
 The minister or priest has naturally much influence over 
 part of his flock : on this ground it becomes dangerous to the 
 people if they abuse this influence in making it serve for 
 political ends. Civil liberty can nowhere exist where the 
 clergy act thus against their own sacred calling. That the 
 clergyman cannot observe these rules if he strives for or ac- 
 cepts of political offices, and must interfere by doing so with 
 his own essential efficiency as a clergyman, is evident. The 
 ^English revolution, as well as the history of the British court, 
 furnishes ample proofs. 
 
 XLVI. I do not recommend political indifferentism. On 
 the contrary, I believe that, generally speaking, the clergy in 
 our times urge far too little the importance and sacredness of 
 all civil duties and political virtues upon the people. Let 
 them cultivate and expound the holiness of obedience to the 
 laws of the land, of love of liberty, of the fruitfulness of pub- 
 lic spirit for the community as well as for him who possesses 
 it, of the inspiration of patriotism, of the instructive, invigor- 
 ating, and tempering effect of the study of our own history; 
 and if they make these virtues gush forth from the heart like 
 pure and native streams to nourish and irrigate a thousand 
 different plants, the ministers will not be idle as citizens, but 
 will form, even in a political point of view, a most invaluable 
 class of men. But so soon as they turn the Bible to support
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 225 
 
 or attack one measure or the other, they cannot but diffuse 
 mischief. In cases of extremity, when the land is in danger 
 by invasion, when liberty is to be defended by war, then in- 
 deed let them mount the pulpit and inspire their hearers with 
 all the life they can ; when citizens, faithful to their country, 
 suffer hunger and plague, besieged by the enemy, let them 
 exhort and comfort and strengthen, as those of Leyden did 
 against the Spaniards, as George Walker did in Londonderry 
 in I689- 1 Who that believed William III. a benefactor to 
 England would not thank Walker for his conduct? On the 
 other hand, we have the instance of the hermit Nicolas of 
 Flue, who, when the Swiss cantons in 1481 were on the point 
 of disunion because they could not agree on a division of 
 Burgundian booty, and when the danger had reached its 
 highest point, darted forth from his solitude, went among the 
 confederates, and called for peace in the name of that God 
 who had given them so many victories. His words were 
 penetrating, his admonition powerful ; he saved his country. 
 He could not have done it had he habitually or occasionally 
 interfered with politics. 2 The Rev. Dr. Witherspoon was 
 one of the signers of the American Act of Independence. 
 Those times were of an extraordinary character; but even in 
 those excited times he continued to exhort from the pulpit, 
 to show a spirit strong in resisting any call to surrender the 
 rights of freemen, yet ready for reconciliation upon the con- 
 dition of the security of those rights. 3 
 
 Nearly the same may be said of the ethico-political obliga- 
 tions of schoolmasters with reference to their pupils. Let 
 them cultivate true and generous patriotism. 
 
 1 Trevor, Life of William HI., vol. ij. chap. 3. 
 
 a Johannes von Muller, Swiss History, vol. vi. p. 299. A very hrief account 
 may be found in the Swiss History forming part of Lardner's Cabinet of His- 
 tory. 
 
 3 For instance, in his Pastoral Letter from the Presbyterian Synod of New 
 York and Philadelphia, in 1775, written after the battles of Bunker Hill and 
 Lexington. 
 
 VOL. II. 15
 
 BOOK V. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Voting. Principle of Unanimity ; of Majority and Minority. Deliberative Pro- 
 cedures. All who have a right to vote ought to vote. According to what 
 Rules. (Election Statistics.) Voting for Officers. When we ought to abstain 
 from Voting. Influencing Elections. Canvassing. Intimidation, individual 
 and official. Bribery. Severe Laws against it at Athens. Mutual Insurance 
 Companies for Bribing at Athens. Bribes of common Voters. Bribing 
 Judges; Legislators. Bribes by a Government of its own Citizens. Bribes 
 by foreign Powers. Betting on Elections. Election Riots and Disturbance 
 around the Poll. Various other Election Malpractices. 
 
 I. VOTING is the usual way of ascertaining the disposition 
 of any number of men or a society respecting the adoption or 
 rejection of a certain measure or person. Whenever a num- 
 ber of men must come to a final conclusion and joint action, 
 voting must be resorted to if there is not unanimity among 
 them. By voting on a large scale, public opinion passes into 
 public will. The ancients were acquainted with voting, and 
 had largely introduced it into politics ; they had majorities 
 and minorities ;. but in the middle ages the principle of una- 
 nimity, and, in cases where mere rejection of some proposed 
 measure did not suffice, of forced unanimity, a principle we 
 act upon still in England and America in jury verdicts, was 
 in many cases adopted. The election law of the German 
 emperor, of 1356, called the Golden Bull, decrees that if the 
 electors shall not have chosen an emperor within thirty days 
 they shall have nothing but water and bread until choice be 
 made, and that when the election has ultimately taken place 
 it shall always be considered as unanimous. 1 A single voice 
 
 1 Constitutio Aurene Bullse, tit. ii. 5 and 6. 
 226
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 227 
 
 against a bill at the diet of Poland was sufficient for its defeat. 
 Any single member of the ancient Aragonese Cortes had the 
 power to put a stop, by his dissent, to the progress of any 
 measure during the whole session. 1 Many instances might 
 be added. In other cases, for instance when the council of 
 free cities voted, a majority of three-fourths was requisite for 
 the passing of a proposition. 2 There were many reasons why 
 procedures appearing to us so surprising were natural in those 
 ages. In a future part of this work we shall recur to this 
 subject, when we have to treat of the citizen as representative, 
 and of Instruction. Here it may be observed that the depu- 
 ties in the middle ages were agents sent from more or less 
 independent bodies or corporations, not representatives of 
 nations, which nations or states were not yet considered and 
 felt to be one organic whole ; people had not yet re-learned 
 for the experience of the ancients had been lost that the 
 excellence of a measure is not an absolute one, that people 
 therefore may widely differ in their views respecting laws, 
 even though passed ; and parliamentary management and the 
 laws of deliberative assemblies had not yet become' settled 
 and developed ; nor is it so even to this day in many nations 
 whose state is one of political infancy. 3 
 
 1 Prescott, Ferdinand and Isabella, 2d edit., Introd., xciii. ; Schmidt, History 
 of Aragon, Leipsic, 1828 (in German), 6th division, Constitution. 
 
 3 Among other works, see Sismondi's History of the Italian Republics, vol. xiv. 
 ch. 126. 
 
 3 The American or English reader, brought up almost from early youth in an 
 acquaintance with, and in many respects even under the influence of, the parlia- 
 mentary law and usage for it extends to our very schools considers many 
 things indeed most natural and hardly worth reflection which nevertheless re- 
 quired ages to become acknowledged, and for want of which civil liberty, or at 
 least the expedition of the common business, could not prosper. All usages and 
 laws which relate to debating, such as we know them, for instance as they are 
 embodied in Hatsell's Precedents of Proceedings in the House of Commons or 
 Jefferson's Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Senate of the United States, 
 are of essential importance to liberty itself, and they must be considered as one 
 of the safeguards of liberty which we possess in advance of the ancients. Jeremy 
 Bentham has systematically treated of this subject in his Tactics of Legislative 
 Assemblies a work which contains much that is excellent. To form an idea
 
 228 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The more civil liberty becomes acknowledged and pro- 
 tected, the more important also becomes the subject of voting. 
 There is no subject connected with voting, that I can think 
 of, \\hich is not deserving of great attention, from the ques- 
 tion who shall have a right to vote and for what, to the mere 
 external conveniency and security of the poll and other 
 measures of election police. The extent of the right of voting, 
 as to citizens, and the subjects which shall depend upon 
 voting, the expediency of frequent voting, of direct or mediate 
 election, the age of voters, their registering, the open vote or 
 the vote by ballot, the legal obligation of voting, the distribu- 
 tion of polls, their accommodation, what subjects shall depend 
 upon mere majorities, what shall require two-thirds of the 
 votes, the question of majorities and pluralities, of judges of 
 elections, of their managers, all these subjects are either in 
 
 how piteously people had formerly to struggle, for want of experience in this 
 means of ascertaining and guarding deliberative truth, and how difficult it was 
 for them, with the best wishes, to observe deliberation and come to any conclu- 
 sion, the reader may peruse, for instance, the account given of the French diet 
 in 1614, in Raumer's History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, illus- 
 trated by Original Documents, vol. i. p. 438, et seq. Well may Mr. Raumer 
 end this communication with the words, "All these manuscript sources of informa- 
 tion confirm the fact that fixed form and rights were wanting to these assemblies. 
 There was much ado about nothing." The whole first French revolution is one 
 continued melancholy instance of the want of this law and usage. For a whole 
 week the members of the assembly would debate and inflame one another, with- 
 out having even so much as a question before the house. Dumont, the well- 
 known editor of Mr. Bentham's works, relates, in his Reminiscences of Mirabeau 
 and the two first Assemblies, edited by J. L. Duval, an instructive anecdote. He 
 says, " These primary assemblies [to elect deputies] were at a loss how to 
 organize themselves and to make an election. During breakfast, at Mon- 
 treuil-sur-Mer (if I recollect right), our landlord gave us an account of the 
 tumult and embarrassment of their meetings: two or three hours had been 
 lost already in palavering and disorder ; a president, a secretary, ballots or 
 votes, counting the votes, all this was unknown. Dumont and his friends, in 
 mere joke, drew up some regulations. The host, delighted, took it, and when 
 Dumont arrived at Paris the papers bestowed much praise on the commune of 
 Montreuil, on account of the greater order with which the election had been 
 carried en than anywhere else." In order to have a just idea of British consti- 
 tutional history it is necessary likewise to follow up the history of parliamentary 
 usage.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 229 
 
 principle or practice of the greatest importance, and must be 
 treated of in politics proper. 
 
 II. The question has been made, whether a citizen, pos- 
 sessing the right to vote, ought not to be legally bound to 
 vote for general elections, as the citizen is obliged to serve 
 on juries. 1 Why, it is asked, should those, for instance, who 
 possess most property and receive the full benefit of the law, 
 from indolence, superciliousness, or cowardice be allowed to 
 refuse to join in that manner of expressing public opinion or 
 of appointing law-makers which the law of the land estab- 
 lishes ? It cannot be denied that affixing a penalty for un- 
 excused omission of votiifg would have this advantage at 
 least, that the public opinion respecting the obligation of 
 every citizen lawfully to aid in the politics of his country, and 
 the discountenance given to political indifferentism, would be 
 fixedly pronounced by law. But there would also be diffi- 
 culties in the way, deserving attention. If the penalty were 
 imprisonment, it would be a very harsh measure in many 
 cases ; if it were a fine, it would be difficult either to make it 
 expansive enough to strike the rich and poor with equal force, 
 or to prevent tyrannical exaction, to which all extensive fines 
 are but too liable. The case, in whatever light it may be 
 viewed, however, differs essentially from that of the jury, as 
 the slightest attention will show. The subject, as being one 
 of right alone, belongs properly to politics; but it is for polit- 
 ical ethics to consider the moral obligation of the citizen to 
 go to the poll. We have treated already of the bad motives 
 and mischievous tendency of political apathy or supercilious- 
 
 1 The ancient Galli punished, according to Qesar, B. G., v. 56, absence from 
 or coming too tardy to armed popular assemblies, with death. This is somewhat 
 strong. In Athens, those who attended received three oboli, called the iKKhr/oiaa- 
 TIKOV, except such as came too late, as the sans-culottes of Paris were paid for 
 attendance when the first revolution was highest. This is dragging the suffrage 
 into the mire at once. It draws the poorest, even the paupers, to the poll, and 
 they, finding their account in elections, will increase their number. It makes of 
 elections schools of idleness, which we have seen it is one of the first interests 
 of society to repress, and extinguishes every spark of public spirit.
 
 230 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ness. A man who from indolence or blamable disdain does 
 not go to the ballot-box knows little of the importance of 
 the whole institution of the state, or must be animated by 
 very little public spirit ; or he deserves the mantle of lead 
 which Dante apportions to cowards in the lower regions. 
 There seem to me to be t\vo rules of perfect soundness and 
 elementary importance in popular politics. 
 
 1. There is no safer means of preventing factious move- 
 ments of any kind, and the state from falling a gradual prey 
 to calamitous disorders, wherever the franchise of voting is 
 enjoyed on an extensive scale, than the habitual steady voting 
 of all who have the votive right at all primary elections ; 
 and , 
 
 2. The moral obligation of depositing without fail one's 
 vote increases in the same ratio as the right of suffrage ex- 
 tends, which right will necessarily more and more extend 
 with modern civilization, so that with increasing civilization . 
 this obligation of voting increases. 
 
 When democratic absolutism and fearful corruptions had 
 reached their height in ancient Greece and several places of 
 Lower Italy, it was natural that some philosophers laid it down 
 as a maxim that a man who loved wisdom should not meddle 
 with politics, and included in this meddling with politics the 
 voting in the place of assembly. When the ascetic spirit of 
 the middle ages, partly from misunderstood disregard of this 
 world, and the transplanting of asceticism from Asia into 
 Europe, and partly from the troubled state of Europe, was a 
 natural effect of the state of things, we cannot be surprised 
 at finding it again and again recommended that we should 
 withdraw as far as possible from this wicked world and all its 
 affairs. Our times, however, move on a different principle 
 that of substantial, practical, civil liberty, in conjunction with 
 open, public civilization and knowledge, not merely contem- 
 plative knowledge retired within itself. There is no great 
 principle which has ever actuated mankind that has not had 
 likewise its inconvenience for the individual ; so has the main 
 moving principle of our times ; but we are not on that account
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 231 
 
 absolved from conscientiously acting upon it and acting it out. 
 Therefore, if we have a mind honestly to join in the great 
 duties of our period, we must act as conscientious citizens, and 
 if we mean to do this we must go to the poll. It is, I repeat 
 it to my young readers, of primary importance, and the more 
 they read history the more they will feel convinced of it. The 
 more extended the elective franchise is, the more it must like- 
 wise extend to those persons to whom time is of little value, 
 to people who make a feast-day, perhaps a riotous day, of the 
 election-time. They whose voting is the least desirable are 
 the surest to be at the poll; but the industrious mechanic, the 
 laborious farmer, the man of study, the merchant and pro- 
 fessional man, in short all those who form the sinew and sub- 
 stance of the state, feel it a sacrifice of time to go to the place 
 of voting, where they are not unfrequently delayed for a long 
 time by the other class from depositing their vote, especially 
 in populous places. They are, therefore, the more impera- 
 tively called upon to keep constantly before their minds how 
 important it is that they should vote, and not leave the elec- 
 tion to be decided by those who have the smallest stake in 
 society. Let no man be prevented from voting by the con- 
 sideration of the loss of a day's labor, or the inconvenience to 
 which he may expose himself in going to the poll. 1 
 
 1 Election statistics are of much interest. Among other things, they show the 
 interest taken in elections. 
 
 In Athens not more than 5000 votes were generally given on the most interest- 
 ing questions. (Thucyd., viii. 72; Boeckh, Public Economy of Athens, Eng. 
 trans., vol. i. page 309, note.) For ostracism 6000 votes were requisite. The 
 whole number of citizens that is, as I understand it, of voters, not the children 
 included amounted to about 20,000 or 25,000. (Boeckh, i. book i. 7.) So that 
 about the fifth man made use of his franchise. 
 
 In France we find that in 1834 the number of electors was 171,015, the 
 number of real -voters 129,211. In 1837 there were 198,836 entitled to vote, 
 and 151,720 did vote. That is, in 1834 there were 151 votes given out of 200, 
 and in 1837, 153 out of 200. (Paris papers of September, 1837.) Thus, .in 
 France about three voted out of four who had the right. 
 
 The proportion greatly decreases with the extension of the franchise, as will 
 be seen from the following statistics of the United States. The reason is 
 probably twofold. First, the extension of the franchise itself is, unfortunately, a
 
 232 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 III. If it is important for every one to vote who has this 
 right, it is of course of great importance to know how the 
 individual should be influenced in giving his suffrage. The 
 object of primary elections is either the appointment of men, 
 or the settlement of a law or measure which may come before 
 the primary elective bodies directly, for instance when the final 
 adoption of a constitution, or amendments, are proposed to 
 them, or indirectly, when we know that the election of an 
 individual mainly or solely turns upon the final adoption or 
 rejection of a certain law. 
 
 cause of decrease in interest. The individual thinks his single vote will not 
 make much difference. Secondly, where the franchise is universal many persons 
 find it inconvenient to leave their work, or to move to a distant county poll, while 
 in France the elective franchise is restricted to the class which lives in ease. 
 
 At the election for governor in Connecticut, in 1830, it will be found that the 
 seventeenth person of the whole population voted. , Yet where there is universal 
 suffrage it is certainly not beyond truth if we suppose that every fifth or at least 
 sixth person has a right to vote. Suppose that the many manufactories in Con- 
 necticut, employing a large number of females, increase the proportion, we may 
 at least say, with perfect safety, that every seventh man has a right to vote. Hence 
 less than half who had a right to vote did vote. In the same state there were 
 given, in 1839, for governor, 43,578 votes, which, if the papers have reported 
 correctly, would indicate a very highly increased interest. [In 1873 l ^ e votes for 
 governor were 86,881, or more than I to 3^ of all the males.] 
 
 In Pennsylvania I find that in 1830 (when the census was taken, and the popu- 
 lation therefore is known) every tenth man voted. The late propositions in that 
 state, first to hold a convention to amend the constitution, and afterwards upon 
 the proposed amendments, excited of course much interest. According to the 
 official journals, there were polled for a convention 86,670, against it 73,166, 
 together, therefore, 159,836; and for the amendments to the constilution, pro- 
 posed by the convention, 113,971, against them 112,759, together, therefore, 
 226,730. This would give about the sixth man of.the whole population, and, if 
 we take the fifth man entitled to vote, it shows a very intense interest indeed. 
 
 At the presidential election of 1828, the votes given throughout the Union 
 amounted to 1,200,000; the white population, at the same time, amounted to 
 9,500,000 : hence every eighth white man voted, which shows much interest in 
 the election. In 1836 the votes polled for the presidential election amounted to 
 1,498,885, while the white population in 1830 amounted to 10,526,248. Consid- 
 ering the increase of the population from 1830 to 1836, we shall find that only 
 one out of eleven white persons voted. In the above votes those of South Caro- 
 lina are not counted, because the legislature then elected the presidential electors 
 in that slate. This circumstance would bli^htly alter the proportion in favor of 
 the interest shown in the election.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 233 
 
 Respecting the election to single offices it ought to be 
 hardly necessary to mention that a. citizen should give his 
 vote for that individual only who unites with general worth 
 and fitness the peculiar capacity requisite for the specific office 
 in question. Yet it is unfortunately but too frequently the 
 case that the citizens of free countries at large, as well as the 
 appointing officers in free or unfree countries, are swayed by 
 totally different considerations, and quiet their conscience by 
 the consideration, " he will do well enough." The appoint- 
 ment of incapable officers, however, and the habitual appoint- 
 ment to offices on considerations wholly foreign to the office, 
 be it family interest, court favor, party reward, or clannishness, 
 is equally detrimental to free and to absolute states. It lowers 
 the whole standard of morality, capacity, and activity in the 
 public service, and with it the public morality of the commu- 
 nity at large ; it deprives the state of that necessary promotion 
 of the public good which can be effected only by having 
 sound and capable officers devoted to the public service, and 
 makes them satisfied with barely coming up to the words of 
 their patent in the fulfilment of their duties ; it begets bold- 
 ness in the incapable or dishonest. These remarks must 
 appear almost superfluous, if thus stated; yet the importance 
 of the subject invites attentive reflection in all its bear- 
 ings. The history of Spain during the last century, and that 
 of Athens after Pericles, give proper illustrations of the above 
 remarks. 
 
 If a citizen has to vote for an individual in a more or less 
 representative character, he ought to be influenced by the 
 candidate's wisdom, probity, and general tenor of life respect- 
 ing those principles which the voter holds to be essentially 
 important. If there are other more or less strong additional 
 guarantees, for instance that a candidate is bound to these 
 principles by his connections, his family, or any strong inter- 
 ests of a worldly character or of reputation, so much the 
 better. But neither single sayings nor single transient actions 
 nor protestations ought to weigh much. (As to regular 
 pledges, I shall speak of them in treating of representatives.)
 
 234 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 We do not judge of a character in history by single anecdotes; 
 we must take the whole man, and above all the tenor of his 
 actions, unless the very character of a single act or saying is 
 in itself sufficient to show the mind of the man. 1 " I ask," 
 says Montesquieu in the preface to his Spirit of the Laws, "one 
 favor of the reader, which I fear will not be granted, namely, 
 not to judge by the perusal of a moment the work of twenty 
 years ; to approve or to condemn the whole book, and not 
 some passages. If we are desirous of discovering the plan of 
 the author, it is not possible to do it except in the plan of the 
 entire work." No one can deny the reasonableness of this 
 request ; and may it not with equal force be applied to public 
 characters and the whole lives of men ? Have they not the 
 very fair right of asking to be judged by "their work," that 
 is, by their actions taken in connection ? Has he who wishes 
 to judge of the man, generally, anything else by which he 
 could do it conscientiously? Is not many a man justly 
 acquitted in court from apparently very strong charges, 
 simply because it is impossible to imagine any connection 
 between the single offence charged to him and the unde- 
 viating tenor of his life ? Yet no blindness is recommended, 
 nor can the principle of law that a man shall be considered 
 innocent until proved to be the contrary be transferred to 
 politics, so that a man shall be considered capable until 
 proved the contrary. We want positive proofs and facts in 
 order to elect a man. " Les gens de bon sens jugent des 
 faits," said Napoleon, according to Las Cases. 
 
 IV. Absolute knowledge is possible in human life only in 
 a few cases, and our judgment respecting our votes is subject 
 to the same rules for forming an opinion to which our judg- 
 ment is always subject. We judge directly where we can, 
 mediately through those of whose sound judgment and 
 agreement with our principles we have sufficient knowledge, 
 
 1 See Legal and Political Hermeneutics, where I speak of the interpretation 
 of spoken words.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 235 
 
 or by strong probabilities, derived from past facts. If, how- 
 ever, a citizen is incapable of deciding respecting a man or a 
 measure by his own knowledge or capacity, and if he finds 
 that those he has most reason to trust are divided upon a 
 measure or course of policy which nevertheless strongly 
 affects his country, in that case, it seems to me, he ought not 
 to be swayed by extraneous circumstances, but to abstain 
 from voting ; for this omission to vote in such a case seems 
 to me to be even necessary for a substantial representation 
 of public opinion upon such a measure. This is one of the 
 very few and rare cases in which a citizen should consider 
 himself absolved or even prohibited in his conscience from 
 casting his vote. 
 
 If he must give his vote on a measure, directly or indi- 
 rectly, as mentioned above, let him in no case whatsoever 
 forget to ask himself, how will the law operate in given cir- 
 cumstances ? The essence of the law, the reality of the law, 
 consists neither in its wording nor in its professed principles 
 of themselves, but in the action of those principles upon the 
 material. If you read a proposed law, imagine it passed, and 
 say to yourself, " And what then ?" Try to see it operate in 
 advance ; represent it clearly and in a lively picture to your- 
 self; but do not suffer yourself to be disposed one way or the 
 other by party vanity a very powerful agent dislike, re- 
 venge, or merely the pronouncing of a favorite principle or 
 political idea of yours. This question respecting the actual 
 operation of a law becomes, perhaps, most important when we 
 abolish institutions. Laws and institutions ought to be abol- 
 ished, not with our faces turned backward to the principle 
 from which we started, but with the principle in our mind 
 turned forward to anticipate its operation ; for surely we do 
 not make laws for the pleasure of proclaiming them, but for 
 their action. The wisest is he who, like Janus, may look at 
 once back into history and forward at the future operation. 
 Quacks or deceivers always deal most in general principles; 
 honest and wise men know and feel their sacredness and 
 prove them by facts.
 
 236 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 V. All popular representation rests essentially upon elec- 
 tion ; everything, therefore, which in any way interferes with 
 election, either by demoralization of the voters or by disturb- 
 ance or falsification of the election, is a grave offence against 
 public liberty; but in a representative republic, in which the 
 whole government rests on representation and supreme power 
 is in the people, we cannot but consider every such offence as 
 a crime against the majesty of the people, a crimen laesae 
 majestatis. As it is treason in monarchies to falsify acts of the 
 prince, or to control his actions by combination around him, 
 as it has been punished as treason strongly to influence the 
 prince to the detriment of the people's liberty, so we cannot 
 but acknowledge that in principle every forcible or malicious 
 influence upon elections, or their unlawful interruption or 
 falsification, by false votes or false returns, is treason against 
 the people in an elective and representative republic ; for it is 
 a hostile act against the fundamental principle of the body 
 politic. I do not know that a greater political outrage can be 
 committed than to surround the poll with a set of stout fel- 
 lows and thus forcibly prevent all voters of the opposite side 
 from depositing their vote. It is the use of brutal force in a 
 place all the meaning and sense of which is that the opinion 
 of the assembled citizens shall be ascertained. It amounts to 
 waylaying and carrying off the monarch in order to extort his 
 assent to certain acts. When Huskisson was candidate for 
 Dover, in 1802, he was opposed by Mr. Spencer Smyth, whose 
 brother, Sir Sidney, had got possession of the church in which 
 the election was held with his boat's crew, and effectually 
 prevented the approach of any voter for Huskisson. No year 
 passes in which similar outrages are not committed in the 
 largest cities of America and England. As to bribes, they are 
 prostitution in the bribed, simony in the briber a simony of 
 the worst kind and treason in both. We shall return to the 
 subject of bribes. 
 
 Elections may be wrongfully influenced by unjustly influ- 
 encing the voters before they give their votes. I do not speak 
 here of maliciously publishing falsehoods though every elec-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 237 
 
 tion in America and England exhibits instances of this polit- 
 ical immorality, which is too clear in itself, nor of the grave 
 offence of influence on elections by officers, as I shall return 
 to this subject on another occasion. Canvassing may be un- 
 lawful, permitted, or desirable. How jealously the early 
 Romans considered the abuse of canvassing appears from 
 the origin of the word ambitus, from ambire, to " go about," 
 though afterwards it was done most publicly and the crimen 
 ambitus 1 included all electioneering offences, bribing, etc., and 
 all ways of obtaining an office by unlawful means, except, as 
 it would seem, the ambire itself. Canvassing is not only 
 allowable but necessary in many cases. The people ought to 
 know their candidates, and if these are young, or if a particular 
 question is pending, they or their friends ought publicly to 
 avow their views. In this respect hustings and speeches "on 
 the stump," if unaccompanied by feasting and riot, are on 
 occasions advisable in thinly-settled countries or where the 
 people have not known their representative personally. Per- 
 sonal intercourse and political contact between representative 
 and constituents are necessary in order that the representation 
 shall be real. But I believe all individual canvassing by men 
 or women and the latter often takes place in England, all 
 individual canvassing in the houses of voters or elsewhere, to 
 be objectionable, both in itself and because it leads but too 
 naturally to the greatest of all evils in representative govern- 
 ments, bribery, whether direct or indirect. There are cases, 
 it is readily allowed, of very little difference as to the choice 
 between the candidates, for instance when both belong to the 
 same party and are not in the least opposed to one another, 
 
 1 The term crimen ambitus, in the French brigue, which is retained in the law 
 of countries that have adopted the civil law, refers to the obtaining of an office 
 by unlawfully influencing some person or persons, and signifies with reference to 
 government officers something similar to simony respecting ecclesiastic appoint- 
 ments. The German word for ambitus is very significant, and means the obtain- 
 ing of an office by fawning and creeping (AmiserscAleichttftg). Simony, according 
 to the canon law, embraces, in its widest signification, nineteen chief crimes, of 
 which the ambitus ecclesiasticus is a species. Feuerbach, Manual of the Common 
 German Penal Law, \ 181, et seq., and note to \ 184.
 
 238 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 I 
 
 but merely try both their chance of election. It would seem 
 that these cases are very rare in England. In America they 
 occur occasionally, and not only when the election is for in- 
 ferior places, for I have known two frien-ds of the same party 
 to run for the governorship of a state without opposing one 
 another farther than by thus aiming at the same place. In 
 these cases individual canvassing by the friends of one or the 
 other candidate might be harmless ; but such cases are rare, and 
 if common would introduce a dangerous custom. Properly 
 speaking, individual canvassing is the opposite of what it often 
 pretends to be ; it is saying to a citizen, We know or suspect 
 that you care so little about giving your vote conscientiously 
 that we come to beg you to throw it into our scale. 1 
 
 1 There is an interesting passage in a letter from Mr. Macaulay in reply to one 
 from the secretary of the Leeds Political Union respecting certain questions 
 previous to Mr. Macaulay's election. I quote from the Spectator of August 15, 
 1832: 
 
 "The practice of canvassing is quite reasonable under a system in which men 
 are sent to parliament to serve themselves; it is the height of absurdity under a 
 system in which men are sent to parliament to serve the public. While we had 
 only a mock representation, it was natural enough that this practice should be 
 carried to a great extent. I trust it will soon finish with the abuses from which 
 it sprang. I trust that the great and intelligent body of people who have obtained 
 the elective franchise will see that seats in the house of commons ought not to be 
 given, like rooms in an almshouse, to urgency of solicitation ; and that a man 
 who surrenders his vote to caresses and supplications forgets his duty as much as 
 if he sold it for a bank-note. I hope to see the day when an Englishman will 
 think it as great an affront to be courted and fawned upon in his capacity of 
 elector as in his capacity of juryman. In the polling-booth, as in the jury-box, 
 he has a great trust confided to him a sacred duty to discharge: he would be 
 shocked at the thought of finding an unjust verdict because the plaintiff or the 
 defendant had been very civil and pressing; and, if he would reflect, he would, 
 I think, be equally shocked at the thought of voting for a candidate for whose 
 public character he felt no esteem, merely because that candidate had called 
 upon him and begged very hard and had shaken his hand very warmly. I am 
 delighted, though not at all surprised, to find that the enlightened and public- 
 spirited gentlemen in whose name you write agree with me on this subject. My 
 conduct is before the electors of Leeds; my opinions shall on all occasions be 
 stated to them with perfect frankness : if they approve that conduct, if they con- 
 cur in those opinions, they ought, not for my sake but for their own, to choose 
 me as their member. To be so chosen I should indeed consider as a high and 
 enviable honor; but I should think it no honor to be returned to parliament by
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 239 
 
 All intimidation previous to an election, all personal or 
 official bullying, 1 all threats, as for instance of withdrawing 
 employment of workmen, which happens with us on account 
 of the extended franchise, or of shopkeepers, which happens 
 frequently in London, all intimidation of tenants, as often in 
 England, or of government officers holding their appointment 
 at the pleasure of some superior officer are high political 
 offences. The worst of all election offences, however, is 
 bribery. 
 
 VI. Whatever offence or crime may be committed, it be- 
 comes doubly loathsome if committed for the consideration of 
 money if to the offence itself the meanness of doing it for 
 gain or hire is added. At all periods have laws pronounced 
 the public abhorrence of bribed voting, and all states where 
 this evil has become common have been irretrievably lost. 
 The laws of Athens were severe against bribing of any kind, 
 both against the briber and the bribed. 2 But when Athens 
 sank into licentious democratic absolutism, bribing became 
 so common that bribing companies were formed, called syno- 
 mosies (ffuvw^oaia, an association upon oath) a sort of mutual 
 immoral insurance companies to bribe the judges, the council, 
 and popular assemblies, for the benefit of the members, 3 not 
 unlike the companies formed towards the end of the thirteenth 
 century in England to bribe judges, whose bribes had risen 
 since the high penal laws passed against them under Edward I. 4 
 
 persons who, thinking me destitute of the requisite qualifications, had yet been 
 wrought upon by cajolery and importunity to poll for me in despite of their better 
 judgment." 
 
 1 I know of a case, which happened some fifteen years ago, when a notorious 
 duellist of great courage carried numbered ballots to the voters, telling them 
 that he would fight every one whose respective numbered vote should not appear 
 on counting the votes. 
 
 2 Aea<r^6f, the office of bribing ; 6upo&Kia, of being bribed. [See Meier u. 
 Schom., Alt. Prozess, p. 351.] 
 
 3 Thucyd., viii. 54; Xenophon, de Republ. Ath., iii. 7 ; Pollux, viii. 121; 
 Demost., Or. poster, in Steph., p. 1137. 
 
 * Hume, History of England, chap. 13.
 
 240 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 [At Rome, in the worst times of the republic, bribery was 
 even more common than at Athens. In the latter state there 
 were public prosecutions (fpa<paC] of both givers and receivers 
 of bribes, and it lay with the judges to estimate the amount of 
 the penalty, which, it is probable, might even be the loss of 
 life. At Rome the multitude of laws concerning ambitus would 
 be a proof of the frequency and inveteracy of the crime, if 
 history did not furnish us with clearer proofs.] The Romans 
 bribed in the way of giving festivals, as well as money directly 
 on the largest scale, as soon as public offices were sought for 
 the profit they afforded, and the sums previously spent to 
 obtain them were looked on as a mere outlay, to be largely 
 refunded by plunder and extortion after the office was obtained. 
 This cancer had long been eating in the vitals of Rome, until 
 at length it was with criminal shamelessness sanctioned in 
 the case of the election of Vatinius, a partisan of Caesar's, to 
 the prsetorship, to the exclusion of Cato. The consuls had 
 largely bribed the people, and, to escape the danger of heavy 
 penalties on account of the crimen ambitus, they moved in 
 the assembly of the people a resolution, which passed, to the 
 effect that the new praetors should not be liable to any punish- 
 ment for illegally obtaining their election: "ne qui praeturam 
 per ambitum cepisset ei propterea fraudi esset" I 1 
 
 The English laws are very severe against bribing, 2 but 
 
 1 Cicero, pro Plane., \\ 15-19, Ccel., \ 7, Sest., \ 15, ad frat., ii. 3, iii. I, 51; 
 Plutarch, Vit. Cses., \\ 21, 28, 29, Pomp., \ 51, Cato Min., \ 44; Sueton., Vit. 
 Jul. QES., \ 19; Appian, Bell. Civ., ii. 19. 
 
 3 The following is an extract as they now stand : 
 
 First, as regards the bribed. 
 
 Every person having, or claiming to have, a right to vote, 
 
 Who shall take, or even ask for, any money or other reward, by way of gift, 
 or loan, or any device; 
 
 Or who shall agree or contract for any money, gift, employment, or other 
 reward whatsoever 
 
 Either to vote, or to forbear from voting is subject 
 
 First, to a penalty of ^500, which may be recovered, together with all costs 
 of suit, by any person who thinks proper to sue for the same. 
 
 Secondly, to indictment or information, and, upon conviction, to fine and im- 
 prisonment.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 241 
 
 the crime is common, as it is in many large cities with us 
 despite our laws against it. Livingston, in his code for 
 
 Thirdly, on judgment being obtained against him in any such action, or on 
 any such indictment or information, he becomes at once forever disabled to vote 
 in any future election ; as well as, 
 
 Fourthly, disabled to hold or exercise any office or franchise to which he may 
 then or afterwards be entitled as a member of any city or borough, the same as 
 though he were naturally dead. Thus, if a burgess of any city or borough, he 
 loses his burgess right forever. Statute 2 Geo. II., c. 24. 
 
 And any person who shall accept any money, gift, or reward, or any promise 
 thereof, or who shall accept any office, place, or employment, upon any engage- 
 ment to procure, or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to parliament, 
 shall forfeit the value of any money so received to the queen, and he shall 
 forfeit any such office, place, or employment : 
 
 And shall besides forfeit a penalty of ^500, to b recovered, with full costs of 
 suit, by any person who shall sue for the same. Statute 49 Geo. III., c. 118. 
 Secondly, as regards the briber. 
 
 Any person who shall by any gift or reward, or by any promise or agreement 
 for gift or reward, corrupt or procure any person to vote, or to forbear to vote, 
 is subject 
 
 First, to a penalty of ,500, to be recovered, with full costs of suit, by any 
 person who shall sue for the same. 
 
 Secondly, to fine and imprisonment. 
 
 Thirdly, to the loss of his vote forever. 
 
 Fourthly, to disability to hold any office or franchise, as member of any city 
 or borough, as in the former case. Statute 2 Geo. II., c. 24, sec. 7. 
 
 And any person who shall give, directly or indirectly, or promise to give, any 
 sum of money, gift, or reward, to any person, on an engagement to procure, 
 or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to serve in parliament, shall 
 
 If himself returned, be incapacitated to sit in parliament on such election. 
 
 If not returned, shall forfeit the sum of ^1000, to be recovered, with full 
 costs of suit, by any one who 'may sue for the same. Statute 49 Geo. III., c. 
 118, sec. I. 
 
 For a history of the laws against bribing, see Hallam, Constitutional History, 
 vol. iii. p. 405, et seq., and other passages, for which see his index. According 
 to the English papers themselves, bribery at elections has increased much ot 
 late. The following is a case of interest, Rogers vs. Mills, tried it Lewes in 
 1837. The action was brought to recover the ^500 penalty accorded by the Act 
 of George III., and was instituted by Henry Rogers against James Mills (agent of 
 Mr. Easthope, one of the proprietors of the Morning Chronicle) for having on 
 17th April last corrupted one James Baker at the election for Lewes, to give his 
 vote for John Easthope, a candidate, by giving to him ,15, which was given as 
 a reward for his vote, whereby the defendant forfeited for his offence ^500. The 
 case was ably argued, and the trial lasted eighteen hours. In summing up, Mr. 
 Justice Littledale said the matter charged was equally an offence whether the 
 VOL. II. 16
 
 242 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Louisiana, is no less severe. 1 Yet it is but too true that if 
 the people at large are so debased that bribing for elections 
 becomes morally possible, laws against it will avail very little, 
 simply because public opinion is already corrupt. If, then, 
 history holds up such fearful examples; if the universal spirit 
 of mankind, expressed in the laws of all ages, points out 
 bribing as a shameless crime; if conscience tells us unequivo- 
 cally that it is a crime; if we know that a representative gov- 
 ernment becomes a melancholy farce when we acknowledge 
 the form and violate the principle; if we remember that all 
 nations, Asiatic or European, however widely different the 
 principles of their political and domestic life, have invariably 
 felt or pretended to feel the same disgust at bribery, for the 
 pretence shows in this case as much the truth of the principle 
 as the feeling itself no citizen who values either his own 
 honor or conscience, or the safety of the state, or the essence 
 of civil liberty, or right, or virtue, ought on any account to 
 offer or receive a direct or indirect bribe, however safe the 
 latter might be against any punishment according to the letter 
 
 party to whom the money was given were corrupted or not. The question was, 
 whether* or not Baker was mistaken in saying that Mills was the man who gave 
 him the 1$; and the jury would decide whether the admission of Mills that 
 he gave the money was spoken in a serious manner or merely as an interrogation. 
 
 The jury retired for about a quarter of an hour, and found a verdict for the 
 plaintiff of ^500 ; costs, 40.?. 
 
 There exists probably far less bribery with us, owing to the greater extent of 
 the franchise, and thinner population; on the other hand, we never prosecute a 
 case of bribery. 
 
 Before a member of the Netherlandish chamber is admitted to the oath as 
 representative, the constitution demands of him to take the following oath : 
 
 " I swear that I have neither promised nor given, neither shall I promise or 
 give, any gift or present, direct or indirect, under whatsoever pretence, to any per- 
 son in or out of office, in order to obtain my election as member of the second 
 chamber of the States-General." Constitution of the Netherlands, $ 84. 
 
 1 Code of Crimes and Punishments, Title vii. chap, i., " Of Bribery and undue 
 Influence." The first article punishes offering or receiving bribes to influence 
 votes at public elections with a fine not less than one hundred dollars nor more 
 than five hundred dollars, forfeiture of all political rights (the Greek alimia), and 
 imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than one year. The penalty 
 for bribing judges is still higher, as might be supposed.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 243 
 
 of the law. In monarchies it is held that the subject owes 
 allegiance to the prince whether the latter be actually 
 crowned or not, or the former have actually taken the oath 
 of allegiance or not. Is there no natural allegiance to truth 
 and liberty, whether we have taken our oath in court or not ? 
 We have called certain acts in voting, falsifications, trea- 
 son against liberty; bribery is the worst of these treasons. 
 It would amount to treason of the highest kind in a mon- 
 archy to substitute a changeling for the -legitimate infant 
 who is heir of the crown. Is it less criminal to substitute 
 a counterfeit for a genuine public opinion, for what the true 
 election returns ought to be the foundations on which the 
 fabric of civil liberty greatly rests? And do we not commit 
 these substitutions if we allow ourselves in any way to be 
 bribed, that is, if we allow ourselves by any considerations 
 of interest or favor to vote differently from what our judgment 
 tells us we ought to do ? Does it not amount to perjury if I 
 solemnly deposit a vote that vote which the most funda- 
 mental laws of the state carefully, jealously, and solemnly 
 secure for me which is against my conscience? Is this act 
 not a guiltier lie than a false word in a mere account of an 
 event? There are many lies infinitely worse than the lies in 
 words they are the lies of actions, of the tenor of our life. 
 Since then laws cannot avail much in this particular, and ruin 
 must inevitably follow, if bribery becomes common, it is for 
 each citizen to hold himself bound by all that is true and holy 
 and just and pure to crush this crime wherever he meets it, 
 as infallibly as he would rush to arms should he discover a 
 band of enemies in the midst of his own camp. 1 
 
 1 The classical age of Bribery is when the Roman empire was sold by the prse- 
 torians, and the zenith of this splendid period is when the praetorians sold it by 
 auction to the highest bidder after the death of Pertinax; when Didius Julianus 
 obtained it against the bidding of Sulpicianus, father-in-law of Pertinax. Still, 
 the public would not, depraved as it was, brook this ; and Severus made it the 
 reason why he disbanded the praetorians. 
 
 A most startling instance of regular bribery reduced to a proper price current 
 is given in Raumer's Europe from the E;id of the Seven Years' War to the 
 American War, from Documentary Sources, vol. i., where he speaks of the in-
 
 244 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 In writing this I am not unmindful of that trial of a good 
 citizen, one of the severest he can be placed in, when he sees 
 that the malignant and shameless are ruining his own beloved 
 liberty by the infamy of bribery, and that would he but resort 
 by way of defence to the same expedient he might, apparently, 
 save it. Has he not the right to defend himself, as against a 
 murderer or in war, by the same means that are employed 
 against him ? No, he has not. The difference is essential. 
 Killing is in itself not criminal; bribing is. We might thus 
 protect ourselves by perjury against perjury. If I kill a man 
 who strives to murder me, I do not commit murder. Bribery 
 remains bribery. Besides, what is gained ? If bribe be op- 
 posed to bribe, general demoralization is only consummated 
 the sooner, while one party's abstaining from it may become 
 the germ of a better state of things, and may indeed save the 
 country. 
 
 " Corruption wins not more than honesty. 
 Still in thy right hand cany gentle peace, 
 To silence envious tongues. Be just, and fear not : 
 Let all the ends thou aim'st at be thy country's, 
 Thy God's, and truth's." SHAKSPEARE, Henry VIII. 
 
 trigues of France, England, Russia, etc., in Sweden, previous to the Revolution 
 in 1771,- when the king, Gustavus III., upset the old constitution, especially on 
 pages 216, 222, and 234. The diplomatic dispatches say that the present diet 
 will cost us so much, for we require so many votes : the votes of the nobility cost 
 so much, those of the clergy so much, the election of the speaker of the cities so 
 much, that of the speaker of the peasants so much. See this especially on page 
 235, where the British minister writes home, March 24, 1769. He makes a 
 classification of votes, namely: I, votes to be had by the highest bidder; 2, 
 those who have taken their resolution but require pay to go to the diet to vote 
 according to their resolution (that is Bacon's selling justice, but not injustice); 
 3, unbribable ones. Three thousand dollars were needed for a vote of the first 
 class ; two thousand dollars for a vote of the second. The election of the 
 speaker of the citizens will cost one hundred thousand dollars, of the peasants 
 thirty thousand. The whole diet will cost thirty-four thousand five hundred and 
 forty pounds. Later dispatches say the clergy may be had for six thousand 
 pounds. Russia had spent three hundred thousand rubles, Denmark one hundred 
 thousand rix-dollars, and added later ninety thousand ; France paid four million 
 five hundred thousand livres. The bribing of the diet was estimated to cost me 
 various powers three hundred a,nd seventy thousand pounds.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 245 
 
 VII. The bribing of judges' is so vile an outrage, and, 
 thanks to the advances of society in the most civilized coun- 
 tries, so unheard-of a crime, at least with reference to direct 
 bribes, that I abstain from dwelling upon it. It is like poi- 
 soning a well from which hundreds of beings must draw 
 their water. 1 Bribing legislators, however, is not by any 
 means so unheard of; and yet is it not a fearful crime? 
 Legislators indeed have been known to consider themselves 
 fairly " retained" by the receipt of a fee, and have argued that 
 the retainer was received by them simply, as they said, that 
 they should use their influence in expediting a measure, 
 whether the result should prove favorable or unfavorable ; 
 thus cloaking over what cannot be and never has been other- 
 wise considered than bribery. Such a case I believe was 
 that of Sir John Trevor, speaker of the commons, who was 
 expelled from the house in 1694 for having received one 
 thousand guineas for expediting a very just and humane 
 bill respecting certain property and privileges of the London 
 orphans. 2 So we have seen that Bacon in his case of bribery 
 made a distinction between "sale of justice," which he avowed 
 he had done, " and of injustice," which he had not committed, 
 in the which, Lord Nugent says, 3 and let us mention it to 
 rejoice at the improved state of things he was " countenanced 
 by long-prevailing practice in that court (the chancery court) 
 and by such examples as it would be shameful to urge in 
 excuse of such a man." 
 
 All bribes offered to members of legislative bodies, as in- 
 
 1 That this crime may be still now and then committed in the United States, 
 Germany, England, or France, in the most secret darkness, is possible; that even 
 some trial of a judge for this crime may have occurred of late, without my knowl- 
 edge, I will certainly not deny; but I consider it well worth stating as a fact, 
 that, beinw no inconsiderable reader of the newspapers of various countries, I do 
 not remember having met with such a case, or so much as the breathing of sus- 
 picion of bribery against a judge, in any paper, say for the last ten years. [Dr. 
 Lieber could not have written this in 1874.] 
 
 2 Trevor's Life of William III., vol. ii. c. 15. 
 
 3 Lord Nugent, Some Memorials of John Hampden, his Party and Times, Lon- 
 don, 2 vols., 1837, vol. i. p. 44.
 
 246 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 deed all bribes, may be classed under the heads of direct, 
 indirect, and unconscious bribes. Direct bribes given by 
 private individuals to legislators are now exceedingly rare, or 
 perhaps do not occur at all, owing chiefly, it is probable, to 
 the Argus-like press, to the dread of inevitable ruin should it 
 ever be divulged, and to the great probability that some day 
 or other the evil deed will transpire, and, once transpiring, will 
 be most extensively known through the papers. But bribes 
 proceeding from the government are not of rare occurrence 
 either in England, the United States, or France. They con- 
 sist generally in the direct promise or intimation of prefer- 
 ment, or elevation of rank, either with reference to the general 
 course on which a legislator shall proceed, or to his vote and 
 influence respecting some specific, important measure. Direct 
 money bribes offered by governments are probably now rare; 
 they are difficult to be kept from detection, owing to the 
 better state of the control of finances. Yet Lord Russell tells 
 us in his History of England that the favorite ministerialists 
 under Lord North's administration were permitted to take 
 part in the loans, which they sold directly at ten per cent, ad- 
 vance, that Fox charged Lord North repeatedly with having 
 sacrificed nine hundred thousand pounds sterling of a loan in 
 order to buy votes, and that some members of parliament at 
 that time received money directly for their votes. Indirect 
 bribes occur frequently, though they are sufficiently open to 
 be branded at once in the eye of every honest citizen with 
 their true character, and though their shape can appease only 
 those consciences which are ready to derive comfort from the 
 forms and not the essence of transactions. The promise to 
 legislators in America of the privilege of subscribing for a 
 certain number of bank shares, and the guarantee of a fixed 
 advance on the par price, provided a bank charter, yet pend- 
 ing, should pass, is no less than a direct bribe amounting to 
 the sum thus guaranteed in advance, whatever the form of the 
 bribe may be. According to the English papers, it appears 
 that sometimes considerable sums are given to members of 
 either house, but especially to lords, in order to induce them
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 247 
 
 to vote for canals, roads, or railroads, if they pass through and 
 injure the property of those members. It has been frankly 
 maintained that this is fair, for it was certain that the person 
 in question would not vote to his own injury if no equivalent 
 were paid. If, however, we consider the case plainly, it will 
 appear to be indirect, perhaps even direct, bribery; for the 
 legislator ought not to vote in his private and interested 
 capacity, but in his legislative. As the juryman must give 
 his verdict according to evidence and nought else, so must 
 the legislator vote for the general welfare to the best of his 
 judgment, and for nought else. 
 
 I would call that person unconsciously bribed who un- 
 consciously allows hims-elf to be swayed in his judgment 
 respecting his vote as legislator by advantages probably 
 accruing to him or his friends from the passing or defeat of a 
 bill. We are all exposed to this error, and must be the more 
 careful to avoid it, the more easily it may steal upon us. But 
 above all, let no legislator under any circumstances allow 
 himself to be rewarded, directly or indirectly, in any way 
 whatsoever, for his vote. It must needs ultimately lead to 
 that system of pilfer and pillage of which we have spoken 
 several times ; it takes away from the representative or legis- 
 lator all feeling of manly independence and bold reliance on 
 his own honor, and diffuses a general depression of morals, 
 substituting sordid selfishness for public spirit. 
 
 There is one species of bribes, of great importance in his- 
 tory, and happily likewise on the decline in our times 
 namely, the influence which foreign powers once exercised 
 by gratifying the sordid' interest or vanity of citizens, min- 
 isters, or even monarchs. The pensions paid by Louis XIV. 
 to so many ministers of other states ; the money he gave to 
 Charles II. on condition that he should do what the latter 
 knew to be unlawful ; the regular presents, that is pensions, 
 which the cardinals formerly received from the chief mon- 
 archs, especially from Spain and France, and according to 
 which they were openly divided into French, Spanish, or 
 other " factions," that is parties, which followed distinct
 
 248 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 leaders, acknowledged as such by the respective foreign mon- 
 arch ; the unhallowed gold which flowed so abundantly from 
 Persia into Greece, that Boeckh considers it as an important 
 source of the increase of gold in Europe, and which set 
 Greek against Greek ; the snuff-boxes with diamonds, por- 
 traits with brilliants, 1 the titles, orders, and estates offered 
 to a foreign minister if a proposed peace should be brought 
 about all these belong to this species of international bribes, 
 and ought not 'to be suffered in any shape. 
 
 VIII. A practice which affects elections in an immoral and 
 mischievous manner, and which has become very widely 
 spread in the United States, according to the proofs in the 
 newspapers as well as the charges of various grand juries, 2 is 
 betting on elections. The practice is not new : we meet with 
 bets in Rome on papal elections, three centuries ago ; 3 but 
 
 1 The American Constitution prohibits every officer from taking any present 
 whatsoever from foreign powers or in the course of any public transaction. In a 
 very few cases it was believed necessary to accept them ; but they have been in- 
 variably deposited with the United States. It was lately mentioned by the papers 
 it is to be hoped with truth that the late signing of the treaty between the six 
 powers relative to Belgium and Holland would be the second signing of an 
 important treaty without the usual presents of snuff-boxes, rings, etc., to the 
 respective diplomatists. The treaty when these presents were first dispensed with 
 was said to have been the alliance between England, France, Spain, and Por- 
 tugal, respecting the two latter countries. 
 
 2 At a sitting of the court of common pleas, in Bucks county, Pennsylvania, in 
 December, 1834, Judge Fox very properly called the attention of the grand jury 
 
 'to the prevailing practice of betting on elections, and to the law on that subject. 
 The Bucks County Intelligencer says, "The judge said he intended hereafter to 
 bring this subject to the attention of the respective grand juries : he believed it 
 to be pregnant with the most pernicious consequences to society, and indirectly 
 subversive of the purity and fairness of the elective franchise. He said, the law 
 prohibitory of such practice ought to be known, and, being known, he should en- 
 join it upon grand juries, hereafter, to observe its letter and spirit. He referred 
 to the election in Philadelphia, and said that betting, there, had become a com- 
 plete system of gambling, and was the pursuit of many men, during the excite- 
 ment which precedes elections." 
 
 3 Odds, we are told, were very strong against cardinal Monte; yet he was 
 elected pope, in 1550. Monte called himself Julius III. Ranke, History of the 
 Popes, etc., vol. i. p. 177 (Eng. trans., i. 172).
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 249 
 
 the betting persons were not voters themselves. Everything 
 is to be much dreaded which leads elections in anyway what- 
 ever from their true and straight channel. By bets, persons 
 frequently the most doubtful in character among the voters 
 become deeply and passionately interested in the elections, 
 and when high sums are at stake, as is frequently the case, 
 use any illegal means to insure their winning. It is frightful 
 indeed to behold by the offers which many brokers publicly 
 make in the papers or in their shop-windows, or by the clus- 
 ters of persons who offer or accept election bets at certain 
 places in some of our large cities previous to elections an 
 election turned into a lottery affair or the sport of gamesters. 
 In many states the laws are against it ; everywhere they ought 
 to be enacted ; for they would at least prevent public offers of 
 bets, which cannot be considered other than a glaring political 
 indecency. 1 In England a vote is invalidated if a man is 
 
 1 I copy the following advertisement from the Albany Argus of October 17, 
 1832. These advertisements are quite common, and I merely select this because 
 it happens to be at hand : 
 
 " Bets To all persons who feel the least confidence in the success of the op- 
 position tickets. The following bets, or hazards, have been left with the sub- 
 scribers, for negotiation. Responsible persons, desirous to take them up, will 
 
 please call at our office. 
 
 First Bet. 
 
 $500 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Pennsylvania. 
 
 $500 That Andrew Jackson, if he lives, will be elected president of the United 
 States. 
 
 $500 That William L. Marcy will be elected governor of this state at the 
 ensuing election. 
 
 ^500 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in the state of New 
 
 York. 
 
 Second Bet. 
 
 $1000 That Andrew Jackson, if he lives, will be elected president of the 
 United States. 
 $1000 That Martin Van Buren, if he lives, will be elected vice-president of the 
 
 United States. 
 
 Third Bet. 
 
 $100 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Ohio. 
 
 do. do. do. do. Kentucky. 
 
 do. do. do. do. Louisiana. 
 
 $100 do. do. do. do. Pennsylvania.
 
 250 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 proved to have been interested in a bet. 1 This is right, but 
 by no means sufficient. No good citizen ought to suffer him- 
 self to promote or be drawn into an evil by which an addi- 
 tional vicious and most active passion, that of gaming, is 
 connected with politics ; for to protect politics against pas- 
 sions which it naturally produces, without perplexing it by 
 additional ones, has been at all times the most difficult problem 
 of the wisest legislators and best citizens. What would the 
 public think if it should become known that physicians of a 
 hospital were in the habit of betting on the chances of recovery 
 of the patients under their charge? The case seems to me very 
 similar. We should feel disgusted if they, appointed to heal 
 and save if possible, allowed frivolous ideas of gain, which 
 might even influence their 'actions, to mix up with their calling. 
 
 IX. The process of election itself may be seriously dis- 
 turbed by the riot and drunkenness which in many places 
 accompany it. It is humiliating indeed to think, what is 
 nevertheless a fact, that on election-days, the days when the 
 
 $100 That the Jackson electoral ticket will be elected in Illinois. 
 
 $JOO 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 Indiana. 
 
 $100 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 Missouri. 
 
 $100 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 Mississippi. 
 
 $100 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 Alabama. 
 
 $100 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 do. 
 
 New Jersey." 
 
 Here follow the names of the brokers, with other lottery advertisements. 
 
 1 In 1838, the Youghal election committee of the British commons was occu- 
 pied a whole day with the following case : 
 
 " The petitioners objected to the vote of James Browne on the ground that he 
 had betted a new hat on the result of the Youghal election, by which act it was 
 contended that he had become interested in the event, and had consequently 
 rendered himself utterly incompetent to exercise the franchise with which he had 
 been intrusted. The case excited the deepest interest throughout the day, and so 
 nicely were the arguments on both sides balanced, so equal the weight of au- 
 thority adduced, that it was not till about three minutes before the speaker was 
 at prayers that the committee were able to come to a decision, that as Browne 
 was offered the bet with' a fraudulent motive, his vote should be held good. It 
 appeared that an unscrupulous non-elector had basely betrayed James Browne 
 into the business expressly in order to invalidate his vote, which alone induced 
 the committee to come to the above favorable decision." London papers of 
 March, 1838.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2 $ I 
 
 people ought to appear in their most solemn capacity, that 
 of manifesting their integral and substantial citizenship, more 
 crime probably is committed than on any other. An English 
 clergyman of late strongly denounced the corruption, the 
 drunkenness, the poisoned state of the public mind, and the 
 violation of truth at elections, and probably with good reason. 1 
 In many places in the United States we all know that drunk- 
 enness is frequent at elections. 2 A great evil is the disturb- 
 ance of the poll, or the besieging it so that none except of one 
 party can approach, or at least not without great difficulty : 
 the falsification of elections by bringing electors of other 
 wards or places, or people who have no right to vote at all, 
 causing them perhaps to commit the additional crime of per- 
 jury; the falsification of returns by destroying the votes of 
 one or more voters [ballot-stuffing, as it is called] ; the an- 
 noyance of well-known citizens these are all serious and 
 deplorable offences. Every citizen ought to feel disposed to 
 prosecute all of such offences that are at all punishable by 
 law. To do this, however, he ought first of all to free himself 
 of having directly or indirectly taken part in any election mal- 
 practice. The time may come it has perhaps arrived in 
 which a society for the promotion and maintaining of fairness 
 and justice at elections should be formed. As it is an object 
 of political importance itself, yet in itself of no partisan color, 
 there could be no objection against it ; and a society of this 
 sort would frequently make salutary agreements between two 
 parties to give up some election abuses ; while attention and 
 discussion would be drawn to these important subjects, and 
 better laws be promoted. 
 
 1 A Sermon preached by a curate at Hounslow, in October, 1837. 
 
 3 In some Swiss cantons all disturbance, noise, drinking, standing in large 
 numbers around the election-house, are prohibited. According to a law of De- 
 cember 18, 1832, of the Pays de Vaud, against Brigues, that is ambitus, the elec- 
 toral college (election judges) have the right to order any tavern, inn, or other 
 public house to be closed during election-day, and to order all customers away 
 if they see fit. The law, consisting of twenty-six chief points, contains some 
 interesting features. Under William III. a statute was passed against giving 
 beer at elections. Trevor's Life of William III., vol. ii. p. 255.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Parties. Has any free Country existed without Parties ? Can a free Country 
 possibly exist without Parties? Is it desirable that a free Country should exist 
 without Parties? Historical Parties and passing ones. Conservative and 
 Movement Parties. Characteristics of a sound Party. Dangers of Party Zeal 
 and factious Passion. Party Signs. Misunderstanding of Language in high 
 Party Spirit. Ought a conscientious Citizen to attach himself to a Party ? 
 The Law of Solon. Independents. Trimmers. 
 
 X. IF I have felt upon some occasions, while writing this 
 work, more deeply impressed with the solemnity and great- 
 ness of its subject, and more ardently desired that my pen 
 might be guided by the spirit of truth, discernment, and the 
 power of clothing my thoughts with accurate and appropriate 
 language, than upon others, I have never felt more so than 
 now that I propose to write upon the subject of parties. Cato, 
 when he stood the last time in the presence of judges, ex- 
 claimed, How difficult it is to defend ourselves before persons 
 with whom we have not lived ! But it is more difficult still 
 to be plainly understood by contemporaries upon matters 
 which greatly agitate the times. To mould the result of our 
 experience and reflection into words which convey all we are 
 anxious to say and no more, and to avoid the danger of un- 
 bidden associations, is difficult indeed ; yet when the word has 
 been uttered with due consideration, how few are there who 
 endeavor to understand it in any other sense than that with 
 which accidental association in the individual reader happens 
 to invest it ! I premise these remarks for my younger 
 readers, that they may bestow upon this subject all the atten- 
 tion which its urgent importance on the one hand, and its 
 many dangers on the other, demand, and that before all they 
 may avoid the drawing of hasty conclusions apparently jus- 
 tifying what indeed is to be carefully shunned as a wasting 
 disease of the commonwealth. 
 252
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 253 
 
 XL By a party we understand a number of citizens who, 
 for some period and not momentarily, act in unison respect- 
 ing some principles, interest, or measure, by lawful means, 
 keeping therefore within the bounds of the fundamental law 
 and for the real or sincerely supposed common good of the 
 whole commonwealth. If either of these latter requisites be 
 wanting ; if that body of citizens act by unlawful means or 
 for sordid, selfish ends, or strive, secretly or openly, beyond 
 the fundamental law that is, if they no longer strive for a 
 change of the administration or of some laws, but for a change 
 of the government itself they are called a faction. 1 All parties 
 are exposed to the danger of passing over into factions, which 
 if carried still farther may become conspiracies. 
 
 Before we attentively consider the various bearings of this 
 vast subject, it will be well briefly to answer three questions. 
 First, has ever any free country, at any period of history, existed 
 for any length of time without parties? Secondly, can we 
 possibly expect any free country to exist without parties ? 
 And thirdly, is it desirable that a free country should exist 
 without parties ? Has there ever existed a free country for 
 any length of time without parties ? This is a question of 
 fact, and can be decided by history alone; and, that no mis- 
 understanding may exist, I will add that by a free country I 
 mean here any country in which the citizen, according to the 
 law or custom of the land, has a right to take, and does take, 
 a more or less direct and positive, and not a mere indirect or 
 negative, part in the acts of government ; in short, a body 
 politic in which there is a widely diffused political action 
 among the citizens at large. After this explanation I avow 
 that, as far as my knowledge goes, I know of no instance of a 
 free state without parties. Forms may deceive ; a state may 
 have a republican form, for instance, yet be hemmed in by 
 overwhelming power, like the republic of Cracow, and parties 
 may indeed not exist; but does there exist there any free 
 
 1 If they act overtly and physically, they become either insurgents or rebels, as 
 the case may be.
 
 254 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 political action? The history of many free countries exhibits 
 brief periods, indeed, in which common and imminent danger, 
 or a universal and pure enthusiasm produced by a happy 
 combination of circumstances, quiets all existing differences 
 for the time ; but I believe that there never existed a free 
 country actively developing within its bosom constitutional 
 law, and feeling deeply interested in the great problems of 
 right and public justice, in which there were not also parties. 
 For neither in the physical world nor in the moral or intel- 
 lectual is anything great to be obtained without struggle, and 
 where there is struggle there must be two sides, two parties. 
 Indeed, we must answer at once the second question, that it 
 is impossible for civil liberty to exist without parties. Politics 
 does not differ in this respect from any other sphere of untram- 
 melled action whatsoever. Where there is free action of what- 
 ever sort, political, scientific, or in the fine arts, and especially 
 where men thus situated strive to obtain some common end, 
 to establish some principle, or to act out some idea, those who 
 hold to the same principles will naturally and must neces- 
 sarily unite in some degree and combine their endeavors, 
 strength, and energy. Without such union it would be as 
 impossible, in many cases, to remove some impediment in the 
 course of civilization, or to introduce some truth into practical 
 life, as it would be to remove a physical obstacle without a 
 union of several forces. Parties exist not only where there is 
 political liberty, but, as was just observed, wherever there is 
 freedom of action. Thus, as soon as an absolute monarch, 
 with a superior mind and iron will, ceases to force all around 
 him to walk in his prescribed paths, we shall find divisions, 
 parties, factions of the court. We may lay it down, then, as 
 a principle, that in the same degree as there is room for com- 
 bined and self-directing action in any sphere, so likewise must 
 parties exist. 
 
 Thirdly, upon many grounds it is desirable that parties 
 should exist. Without parties there could be no loyal, 
 steady, lasting, and effective opposition, one of the surest 
 safeguards of public peace, as we shall see hereafter, for the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 255 
 
 want of which parties became in antiquity and the middle 
 ages so much more frequently factions than in modern times 
 in those nations which best understand the practical oper- 
 ation of civil liberty. Without parties many of the wisest 
 measures could never be carried, and many of the best in- 
 tended measures would remain harsh, unmodified, absolute ; 
 the polity of a free commonwealth would greatly lose its 
 proper character. Without parties well understood, restless, 
 shallow, ambitious theorists, the mischievous appendages of 
 modern liberty, would worry society in a manner which, in 
 many cases, would lead to serious reactions. Every vain, 
 loud, and inexperienced innovator would harass society far 
 more than such persons are now capable of doing. Lastly, 
 the freedom of action in which civil liberty consists must 
 leave a great degree of combination at the option of the citi- 
 zens, which liberty will naturally be made use of in many 
 cases by men misguided either by error, evil design, or fanat- 
 icism. How then are we to counteract them otherwise than 
 by counter-combination ? how is it possible to displace a 
 vicious administration except by a combination of efforts? 
 
 Yet let us always and at every stage of this inquiry re- 
 member that parties themselves are exposed and expose 
 others to much danger. This consideration, and the fact that, 
 on the other hand, they are both unavoidable and useful, 
 must prompt us the more honestly, manfully, and practically 
 to inquire into the very essence of the matter, so that the 
 subject may become the more and more justly understood. 1 
 
 XII. There are two great classes of parties historical and 
 passing ones. By historical parties I understand those which 
 are founded in the history of their country through a long 
 
 1 In this respect the subject of parties only resembles a thousand others, for 
 instance that of power, of punishment, of all the primary impulses, such as the 
 desire of property, the wish to convince others of what we hold to be true our 
 selves, the union of the sexes, the partiality for our kindred, the very love of our- 
 country, nay, the first physical impulses, of eating and drinking: all are un- 
 avoidably necessary, yet expose men to moral or physical danger.
 
 256 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 series of years, parties which adhere to certain political ideas, 
 which have been handed down from generation to generation, 
 developed and modified by repeated practical application, and 
 expanded into a certain system and doctrine, having taken 
 root in the practical life of the nation. They become the 
 more especial representatives of their respective ideas, and the 
 nation at large becomes well acquainted with their actions and 
 operations, not their professions only; the nation knows how 
 to appreciate them. Such, for instance, are the Tories and 
 Whigs in England. It is a great advantage for a free state if 
 its history has been propitious to the growth of such parties. 
 They greatly aid in the steady development of substantial 
 liberty. 
 
 Passing parties, on the other hand, are those formed for 
 momentary purposes only, as for the carrying of some single 
 measure, or merely the displacing of an administration, to 
 which species coalitions generally belong ; or for the sole 
 object of "getting in," not in order to obtain power for the 
 purpose of carrying out some principles or plan, but only for 
 the sake of the power and emolument itself. It is one of 
 the worst political accidents if the parties are merely divided 
 into " ins" and " outs." They can hardly ever escape be- 
 coming factions. There are, moreover, two traits which 
 generally, and especially in modern times, although we can 
 discern them very frequently in antiquity, particularly in 
 Rome and Athens, distinguish one or the other party. There 
 are those that adhere to what exists, who strive to maintain 
 and preserve, who represent the necessary stability of the 
 state, without which no society can exist; and those who 
 look forward, desire to change, improve, and develop ; they 
 represent the movement, without which it is, on the other 
 hand, impossible for any society to exist. The former fre- 
 quently carry their endeavors too far, and wish to preserve 
 indiscriminately, so that conservation alone becomes the 
 watchword. But that which is bad, inconvenient, or mis- 
 chievous ought not to be retained; and Raumer, the historian, 
 justly observes that it has been frequently as revolutionary to
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 257 
 
 preserve as to destroy. The others often go too far in their 
 turn, disregarding the gradual nature of all development, that 
 it is always necessary and unavoidable for one generation 
 to grow out of a preceding one, and they desire change with- 
 out experience or modification change for its own sake. 
 We do not observe these two distinctive traits in politics 
 only : they appear in religion, in science, in philosophy, in 
 taste ; they appear more or less clearly everywhere. 
 
 XIII. A sound party, which the conscientious citizen may 
 join, ought to have the following characteristics. Its prin- 
 ciple, upon which it exists or claims to act, or its object, 
 ought to be an enlarged and great one, a noble principle 
 worthy of moving masses; its numbers ought to be, if pos- 
 sible, large, or at least the ground on which it is formed 
 ought to be such that the party may have .the power of be- 
 coming national; its consistency and mutual adherence ought 
 to be chiefly a moral or mental one, and it should have its 
 strength in physical organization ; its members ought to feel, 
 and act as if they felt, that before all they are citizens of their 
 country, and that their position as such is not changed by the 
 party, consequently that the party does not treat itself as if it 
 were the country, or a sort of privileged aristocracy to which 
 the others are to be made passive subjects only, and that it 
 does not show a spirit of bitter persecution as soon as a 
 member feels himself conscientiously bound to dissent on 
 some measure from the prevailing opinion. 
 
 Without the first, an enlarged principle or worthy and great 
 object, parties become only the supporters or promoters of 
 meanness, intrigue, or cabals. 1 All paltriness in matters of 
 
 1 The word cabal, as is well known, is now generally believed, according to 
 Hume, ch. 65, to have been composed of the letters with which the names of the 
 five dangerous ministers of the time began, namely, Clifford, Ashley, Bucking- 
 ham, Arlington, and Lauderdale. (Burnet, Own Times, an. 1672.) Others 
 derive it from the Hebrew Cabala, denoting a mysterious philosophy brought 
 from Egypt. [It is certain that cabal was used to denote a faction or junto 
 before the time of Charles II. It was borrowed from the French, who derived 
 it from Cabala.] 
 
 VOL. II. 17
 
 258 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 union among men lowers the mind, depresses the moral stand- 
 ard, and in politics leads to factiousness. The second is like- 
 wise important; it prevents, in a great degree, intriguing; for 
 large masses cannot easily be intrigued with, and, as Napo- 
 leon said, " the really guilty ones are the intriguers of all colors 
 and all doctrines." 1 Every party must act with some sort of 
 uniformity, otherwise its object of united action would be lost; 
 public meetings and the meeting of delegates, as well as a 
 certain mutual support in what is considered of general ad- 
 vantage, and, in the case of members of legislatures, pre- 
 paratory meetings for the management of questions of great 
 import, are indispensable, and have at all times been held, in 
 ancient and in modern. In fact, without them very little 
 business of importance or advantage would be transacted. 
 But nothing is more to be shunned than regular party organ- 
 izations, with lists of admission and erasures of expelled 
 members, with regular party assessments and distinct party 
 obligations, with absolutely dependent papers dictated to by 
 a leading paper, which is servilely re-echoed by the other 
 party organs. Parties so organized are factions, or stand at 
 any moment on the point of becoming such, and gather 
 strength from the two facts that they are removed out of the 
 common politico-legal operation of the state, and yet are close 
 societies, so that they easily supersede the government. They 
 may easily become what the fearful French clubs were during 
 the first revolution of France ; and, although it will be readily 
 admitted that much of the insane cruelty perpetrated by the 
 Jacobin club was owing to a number of quite peculiar circum- 
 stances, yet no one can study well the history of those clubs, 
 especially of the Jacobin club, without perceiving that the 
 dangers of close parties or clubs are demonstrated there in 
 fearful consistency and glaring light, and no change of cir- 
 cumstances could prevent great evils from growing out of 
 similar institutions. To speak briefly, a party ought not to 
 
 1 " Les vrais coupables sont les intrigans de toutes les couleurs et de toutes 
 les doctrines." Mem. de Sainte-Helene, vol. iii. p. 30, Paris edit, of 1824.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 259 
 
 be a society, lest it expose its members to all the dangers 
 which have been noticed when we treated of societies, more 
 especially of trades-unions. At Athens there were many 
 political clubs, Iratpsiat, not without sacramental obligations. 
 When democratic madness raged in that city, we cannot 
 wonder that some citizens fled to this last hope. 1 We cannot 
 treat here of what may become necessary in cases of utmost 
 extremity. No principle is truer than that, if a nation were 
 in a state of dissolution, the best citizens might act wisely and 
 rightly in forming societies to administer justice. 
 
 XIV. Let us now consider the danger to which all party 
 combinations are exposed, so that we may the better avoid 
 them. 
 
 Every individual pursuing with earnestness a certain object 
 of importance is exposed to the error of pursuing it to the 
 exclusion of other objects equally important, of becoming 
 "one-sided." This is the case in all spheres, the sciences, 
 the arts, religion, politics, the pursuit of wealth, in education, 
 in short, everywhere. The danger naturally increases both 
 with the degree of power we may possess, and of opposition 
 which may be offered ; for the one stimulates our eagerness, 
 the other lends the means to act it out. Parties, however, 
 always meet with opposition, else they would not exist ; and 
 they combine the endeavors, energy, and powers of many, 
 countenancing one another; so that they are more exposed 
 to the error of one-sidedness than men who pursue their 
 object individually, with whatever eagerness. 
 
 The next danger, equally great, if not greater, is that the 
 individual will lose his moral independence, and the party 
 become too close, when it is exposed to all the perils which 
 we have viewed under the head of associations, in short, 
 that the party will become factions ; that the parties foment 
 the spirit of dissension, while it is the duty of every citizen to 
 assuage discord and allay civil strife as much as possible; 
 
 1 Thucydides, viii. 54.
 
 260 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 that we shall deceive ourselves in taking the opinion of our 
 party for that of our nation, or that of a fraction of our party 
 or a mere political coterie 1 for the opinion of the whole party; 
 that party spirit will run into a variety of channels, such as 
 religious distinction, the various classes of society, or separate 
 trades, while the health of a commonwealth consists greatly 
 in the close and intimate union of all classes, professions, and 
 employments; that our own judgment 2 and even moral feel- 
 ing may become warped and distorted, and that we shall 
 judge of those things by which alone parties can be truly 
 measured, such as justice, the prosperity of the whole country, 
 truth, right, which are indeed the first principles upon which 
 all politics shall move, by the standard derived from the party, 
 thus making that which ought to be the standard the thing 
 to be measured, and that which ought to be measured the 
 standard, as inflamed sects will sometimes measure the truth 
 by their tenets, not their tenets by the truth. The danger is 
 that we shall look upon the party as the end and object, 
 striving to make the community subservient to it, while that 
 only which can give sense and meaning to a party is the com- 
 munity, the commonwealth, the country. In this latter re- 
 spect we are all apt to forget the primary end and object, as 
 indeed all men in all pursuits, when earnestly striving for 
 some object, are prone to forget the end and place instead of 
 it that which originally was but the means to obtain it. Gen- 
 
 1 There is hardly any danger which besets men in civilized life, and especially 
 those in the higher classes, more constantly than the mistaking of coterie talk for 
 public opinion, coterie opinion for public judgment. Private individuals, authors, 
 politicians, statesmen, and monarchs are equally exposed to it, and Charles X. 
 of France lost his crown by mistaking a court coterie for the national party. 
 Few men, indeed, have sufficient sagacity and elevation of mind to withstand the 
 power of repetition in their circle, or to rise above it and see life and reality 
 untainted by it. Observe real life, and do not neglect signs and clear tokens or 
 proofs because they disagree with what you hear around yourself. 
 
 2 Even so considerate and calm a man as Newton, it would appear, did not 
 withstand party acrimony in his transactions with Flamsteed. This is not men- 
 tioned to justify us, inferior to him, but to serve as a still more significant 
 beacon.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2 6l 
 
 erals forget the object of the war; lawyers, that the ultimate 
 end is not the rescuing of a criminal but the doing of jus- 
 tice. Pope Paul IV. (Caraffa) desired assistance from the 
 Protestants, and urged the Turks to attack Naples and Sicily. 1 
 In brief, the danger is that we forget for what the party strug- 
 gle is, and liken it to a war, the end of which is victory in 
 itself, by whatever means or stratagems. Lastly, this blind- 
 ing party zeal may pass over into factious passion and fury. 
 Dumont, in his Reminiscences of Mirabeau, ch. xviii., says 
 of Brissot it is indifferent for the present purpose whether 
 with perfect correctness or not, for it is at any rate a correct 
 picture of the malady of which we speak " Brissot was one 
 of those men in whom party spirit was much stronger than 
 all morals, or rather who saw no morals except in the party ; 
 he had more of monastic zeal than any one else ; as a Capu- 
 chin he would have loved his vermin ; as a Dominican he 
 would have burnt heretics ; as a Roman he would have shown 
 himself not unworthy of following Cato or Regulus; as a 
 French republican he was bent on destroying the monarchy, 
 and neither disdained to calumniate nor to persecute, nor 
 himself to perish upon the scaffold, so that he obtained his 
 object." 
 
 Considering the danger of fomenting dissension, we ought 
 ever to be careful not to let party distinction and animosity 
 pass over into private life. It is delightful to see men who 
 rigorously oppose one another upon conscientious grounds 
 remaining in a strictly gentlemanlike or perhaps friendly pri- 
 vate intercourse, a circumstance which can take place only 
 where there is great liberty. For liberty accustoms men to 
 respect the opinion of others, while absolutism or want of 
 freedom so thoroughly weans men from this noble mutual 
 justice that if for some reason dissension does break out it is 
 
 1 His confessions on this head are given in Bromato, Vita di Paolo IV., vol. ii. 
 p. 369, cited by Ranke (History of the Popes, ii. 184, transl.). The pope called 
 upon Suleiman I. to give up his wars in Hungary and to throw himself with all 
 his power upon Naples and Sicily. This was done to strengthen himself against 
 His Most Catholic Majesty of Spain.
 
 262 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 invariably vehement and inveterate, and every opponent is at 
 once considered as an enemy. While the party spirit between 
 the Union men and States'-right party ran highest in Charles- 
 ton, several of the most active leaders of the opposite parties 
 remained on terms of amity, and showed themselves to be so 
 in public. , 
 
 All party signs are to be deprecated, except it comes to an 
 extreme, when indeed the question touches no longer the 
 subject of parties, and a sign is taken as the symbol and elo- 
 quent pledge of the struggle, such as the tricolor in France in 
 1830. The fool's cap and beggar's bag of the Gueux in the 
 Netherlands did great service. Signs rouse the inert, and 
 commit the active irreversibly; they pledge and compromise, 
 and are therefore useful in insurrections, but not until then. 
 So long as peace can be maintained, party signs are much to 
 be dreaded, whether they consist in the color of the cap dis- 
 tinguishing the theological factions at Constantinople, or in 
 the Guelf's wearing the plume on the right side and the 
 Ghibelline's wearing it on the left, 1 or in the "blue and buff" 
 of the Whigs in the times of Fox, or the orange opposed to 
 the green in Ireland. 
 
 Party spirit may run so high that the greatest link and tie 
 of humanity, language, loses its very essence, and people 
 cease to understand one another, when even the best-intended 
 words, as in the theological controversies of religiously ex- 
 cited times, are unintentionally yet passionately or wilfully 
 wronged, misconstrued, wrung from their very sense ; such as 
 Thucydides says was the case in Greece during the Pelopon- 
 nesian war, " when the received value of names imposed for 
 the signification of things was changed in an arbitrary way; 
 inconsiderate boldness being counted true-hearted manliness ; 
 provident deliberation, a specious fear; modesty, the cloak of 
 
 1 The distinction of party signs showed itself in the cutting of bread, in the 
 wearing of the girdle, etc. (Ranke, communicating it from a relazione, in his 
 Popes, etc., vol. i. p. 250, of the translation, Amer. ed.) The Chronicle of 
 Cologne says that the two parties distinguished themselves even by their manner 
 of husbandly. Biographical Notices of B. G. Niebuhr, vol. ii. p. 381.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 263 
 
 cowardice; to be cautious in everything, to be lazy in every- 
 thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valor. 
 To re-advise for the better security was held to be a fair pre- 
 text for tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty; 
 and he that was the opposite of such a one was suspected. 
 He that laid a snare, if it took, was a wise man ; he that 
 could find out the trap was a cleverer man than he; but he that 
 had been so provident as not to need to do one or the other 
 was said to be a dissolver of fellowships, and one that stood 
 in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip 
 another in the doing of an evil act, or that could persuade 
 another thereto that never meant it, was commended." The 
 vivid description of that excellent historian goes on much 
 farther, exhibiting to us the ripe fruits of those seeds which 
 all of us carry within us ; and if I have previously referred to 
 the history of the Jacobin club as instructive for every citizen, 
 I do so with no less earnestness to this whole part of the 
 Grecian history ; I urgently refer to it my younger readers. 1 
 It is very true, indeed, that our danger is not so great as that 
 of ancient times, because our states are vaster, our race is less 
 apt to be moved by masses, we value individuality higher, our 
 religion, so long as it is unsullied by fanaticism, is of a temper- 
 ing character, and, above all, we act through representative 
 governments. Where the democracy is absolute, and the 
 state small, the one indeed requires the other, it is difficult 
 
 1 Thucydides, iii. 70-85. I recollect having seen, in a Madrid paper of the 
 year 1822, this passage in an account of some tumult in the Spanish capital: 
 "The infamous ciy, Long live our country! was heard.'' Archbishop Parker, 
 "who had been reckoned moderate in his proceedings towards Catholics, com- 
 plained of what he called 'a Machiavel government;' that is, of the queen's 
 (Elizabeth's) lenity in not absolutely rooting them out." (Hallam, Constitutional 
 History, vol. i. p. 191.) The note which Hallam appends to that page gives in- 
 stances, if indeed they were needed, of the truth contained in the remarks of 
 Thucydides respecting the perversion of language in times disordered by the fury 
 of party, and which are but too applicable to all patties at the period of the Refor- 
 mation. In the first French revolution the words virtue, patriotism, consistency, 
 had received entirely new meanings, as the word Thorough had between arch- 
 bishop Laud and Lord Strafford, and probably among their whole party.
 
 264 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 to see how any party can be secure against breaking out into 
 passion. Let us, then, upon this ground among so many 
 others, value and foster the more earnestly our representative 
 system. Yet, despite all difference, the danger still exists; 
 and will exist so long as men on the one hand cherish free- 
 dom of action, and on the other are, and in their nature ought 
 to be, according to God's will, mental and moral individuals, 
 differing therefore in their dispositions, and so long as they 
 pursue with zeal what they hold to be true or right. 
 
 XV. Ought a well-meaning citizen to attach himself to 
 some party, and to act with it? If he joins a party, how far 
 ought he to act with it? When ought he to leave his party? 
 These are questions of great moment, as all know who have 
 practical knowledge of the politics of liberty. 
 
 The law of Solon, according to which a man who stands 
 neuter in time of sedition is punishable with " atimia," or loss 
 of civic rights, has been called by Plutarch peculiar and 
 surprising. 1 Solon, even though he may have erred in pro- 
 curing the passage of this law, must nevertheless have had 
 strong reasons. Undoubtedly he strove by this very law to 
 
 1 Plutarch, Solon, 20; Cicero, ad Att., 10, I; Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, i. 
 2, c. 12 : " Solon capita sanxit, si qui in seditione non alterutrius partis fuisset." 
 I own this seems to me to be one of those many laws which express a principle 
 or theory, and may be repeated for centuries, but of which a man acquainted 
 with the practical part of civil liberty cannot easily see the operation. One or 
 the other party engaged in the sedition must be victorious. Suppose it is that 
 party which was opposed to the administration in power. Can we imagine the 
 successful party to begin their administration with indicting all citizens who did 
 not take uparms againstthem, or punishing all who remained neutral, while they 
 leave unpunished those who fought against them ? But if it is expected that 
 they will punish the neutrals, or passive, and all who fought against them, the 
 law must needs work very mischievously. Indeed, it seems that the law of Solon 
 would, if acted out, forestall every amnesty, with which peace must necessarily, 
 begin after civil commotions. I am not acquainted with a case of .itimia having 
 been inflicted for this offence of neutrality. When Emeric Tokeli was ap- 
 pointed commander of the Hungarian insurgents against the emperor Leopold I. 
 in 1678, he proclaimed that he would suffer no neutrals. Since he fought 
 against the imperialists, it is evident that he meant every one should be bound 
 to take up arms with him. [Comp. Grote's History, vol. iii. p. 190.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2 6$ 
 
 prevent broils and tumults, which, it has been observed al- 
 ready, must be frequent in small democracies if any excite- 
 ment exists ; on the other hand, he was probably aware of 
 the fact that nothing favors strife and political turbulence 
 more positively than when apathy or fear of mixing in the 
 contest keeps the large mass of well-disposed citizens from 
 taking part in politics. It surrenders the whole field to the 
 restless and wicked, who certainly will try to occupy it, as 
 they always have done. I do not know how it is now, but 
 once the crime of murder was greatly promoted at Havana 
 by the circumstance that as soon as the cry of murder was 
 he.^rd in a street, every one hurried away as fast as possible, 
 tlu.t he might not become a witness and expose himself either 
 to the revenge of the murderer's associates or the dangers 
 anj sufferings of the badly-conducted trials which were com- 
 mon in the Spanish colonies. We have spoken already of the 
 general obligation of voting as resting on every one who has 
 a right to vote. But the obligation of attaching one's self to 
 a party is not so general, although I believe that in contests of 
 great political importance it -allows of but few exceptions. A 
 r.jan may be occupied with absorbing subjects lying wholly 
 out of the sphere of politics, or he may, as actually will hap- 
 pen, expose himself and his family to danger or loss by 
 decidedly joining a party. Yet, I repeat, these are but ex- 
 ceptions, and upon the whole it strikes me that the rule will 
 hold, that a citizen ought, in times of great political danger, 
 to attach himself to some party or other, if he can possibly 
 find a party by taking part in which he does not do violence 
 to his conscience, and if he has not very specific reasons for 
 the contrary. There are, indeed, some men who are naturally 
 timid, both in thought and in action. Their character is such 
 that they may be useful members of society, if left alone; 
 they are conscientious, and will not knowingly do wrong, but 
 they become useless, and even dangerous, if they are forced 
 out of their retired position, which is the element that the 
 whole compound of their temperament requires. These two 
 constitute exceptions.
 
 266 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 XVI. Respecting the relation in which citizens may stand 
 to parties, they may be classified, I think, under the following 
 heads : apathists, neutrals or independents, party-members, 
 partisans or zealots, factionists, and trimmers. 
 
 Of apathists, and their danger in free countries, we have 
 spoken. If we understand by neutrals or independents those 
 citizens who do not attach themselves to any existing and 
 exacting party, and do not consider themselves pledged or in 
 any way bound to vote with it on all those questions which 
 in themselves are indifferent but become important on party 
 grounds only, and who consider themselves perfectly free and 
 disengaged to vote for whomever they think best I speak of 
 citizens at large they form a highly valuable class of the 
 community, and may contribute much to extricate their 
 country from undue excitement and party action. But it must 
 be well remembered that it is absolutely impossible for any 
 person to have sufficient opportunity or grasp of mind to judge 
 thoroughly and conscientiously upon every subject. Those 
 who merely call themselves independent are not unfrequently 
 influenced by ill-judging vanity ; refusing to acknowledge that 
 due influence which the opinion of friends and the aggregate 
 opinion of that body of men whom one has reason to trust 
 should always exercise over a rational man. The develop- 
 ments of events, of laws, and of institutions reflect themselves 
 in parties, and we ought not to set up our stolid self-suf- 
 ficiency against this fact. Of course, no man of self-esteem 
 will consider himself so bound by his party as not fully to 
 reserve his private judgment, to strike off from ballots, for 
 instance, whatever names he thinks he ought conscientiously 
 to leave out. Nor should he feel himself bound to stand up 
 as a defender not only of all that the leaders of a party do, 
 but of every single member, and of his private life as well as 
 his political acts. Excited party-men not unfrequently make 
 this demand; but this is party zealotism, and is as injurious to 
 a sound state bf the country at large as to a party itself. It 
 weakens of necessity; while acts rising by way of justice, 
 generosity, or truth above the party never fail to gain great
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2 6/ 
 
 strength for the party in the end ; for they gain general confi- 
 dence, which is power. Huskisson, when a member of the 
 cabinet, went so far as to oppose, in 1822, a measure brought 
 forward by the government through the leading minister in 
 the commons ; and he opposed it successfully. In the case of 
 the East Retford Disfranchisement Bill he likewise opposed 
 the government to which he belonged. 1 Very frequently, 
 however, citizens call themselves independent in order to 
 cover political vacillation, from weakness, inconsistency of 
 temperament, or self-interest. They are the independent men 
 whom Fox, if I mistake not, humorously defined when he 
 said, an independent man is a man you can never depend 
 upon. The latter, those who fluctuate between courses of 
 action, are properly called trimmers, a term taken from nau- 
 tical terminology, which has lost, I believe, much of its use 
 since the times of Charles II. and James II., when everybody 
 who was attached to the cause of royalty, and even ready to 
 wink at much abuse, was stigmatized with the name of trim- 
 mer as soon as he showed himself unwilling to support and 
 defend all the atrocities and corruptions of the court party. 
 Real trimmers are to be shunned in politics as in every other 
 sphere of action ; for they are lacking in perseverance and 
 manliness. 
 
 The remaining important questions respecting parties will 
 be more conveniently treated of in the chapter on the opposi- 
 tion, which comes next in order. 
 
 1 [Mr. Huskisson having in 1828 voted for transference of the franchise of 
 East Retford to Birmingham, which the government opposed, resigned his seat 
 in the cabinet on that account, with Lord Palmerston and others.]
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Opposition. Government. Administration. What is a lawful Opposition. 
 A well-understood Opposition the essential Safeguard of Liberty. The Op- 
 position a great Institution of Modern Times. As such it dates from the 
 Times of Walpole and Pulteney. It is lawful to oppose the Majority, which 
 is not always right. (Order of Sitting in Legislative Assemblies.) Public 
 Opinion and General Opinion. Ethical Rules relating to Opposition and to 
 Parties in general. How far ought a Citizen to go in his Opposition, espe- 
 cially in times of War ? Coalitions. Parties formed on the Ground of foreign 
 National Extraction. 
 
 XVII. GOVERNMENT, we have seen, is that establishment 
 which has been agreed upon in order to obtain the ends of 
 the state. It is the machinery of the state. We understand 
 by government chiefly the characteristic and fundamental or- 
 ganism of the jural society, through which it acts as a jural 
 society, including in monarchies the ruling family, inasmuch 
 as the established dynasty is considered as one of the funda- 
 mental and, so long as that government exists, unchangeable 
 features of the state machinery. The constitutional monarch 
 is an institution. By administration we understand the appli- 
 cation of those characteristic and fundamental principles to 
 the occurrences of the day, and, more especially, the chief 
 appliers of those fundamental principles ; the chief officers 
 the cabinet ministers, who for the time have the application, 
 the acting out, of the executive laws and government princi- 
 ples as they understand them, in their hands. Now, this ad- 
 ministering of government, this application of the principles 
 to practical cases, may not only be carried on in the spirit of 
 wisdom, justice, conscientiousness, and soberness, or of folly, 
 injustice, wickedness, and profligacy ; but the best and calmest 
 men may perfectly agree as to the principles of government 
 but totally differ in opinion as to their application in specific 
 and yet highly important cases. All those who desire a 
 change of this spirit of application, and consequently of the 
 268
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 269 
 
 chief persons officers or law-makers whose business it is to 
 make this application, from whatever motive their desire may 
 arise, and who unite in a party in order to prevent, by united 
 efforts, the administration from the adopted course as much 
 as possible, in order to dislodge those who occupy the chief 
 places, so as to place in their stead persons of their own views, 
 are called the opposition. An opposition is under and within 
 the fundamental law, in England against the minister, for in- 
 stance Walpole, in America against the president ; but if in 
 the former case the opposition went beyond Walpole and 
 worked against George the First or the Second, as the Jacob- 
 ites did, or if in the latter case an opposition should strive to 
 subvert congress or the constitution, they cease to be oppo- 
 sitions, and become factions, treasonable bodies, or insurgents, 
 as the case may be. Oppositions, therefore, are lawful ; they 
 are not only to be suffered, but they are, if not factions, of the 
 greatest usefulness ; and when the government itself becomes 
 rebellious as to the fundamental law within and traitorous as 
 to the relations of the country without, as for instance Charles 
 II. became in the treaty of May 22, 1670,' with France, oppo- 
 sitions are the only safeguards to rescue a nation. Without 
 well-understood, lawful, and loyal opposition, that support of 
 all substantial civil liberty, namely, that the minority be pro- 
 tected and have every fair chance secured to them of con- 
 verting the majority, would be either a mockery, or lead to 
 continual violences ; for opinion is like the air, harmless and 
 easy if allowed freely to expand, but of tremendous power 
 and danger if compressed. 
 
 XVIII. Without well-understood opposition, liberty cannot 
 
 1 The treaty of Charles with France, after the conversion of Charles and 
 James to Catholicism, in the second article of which it is declared that the king 
 will make public his conversion, and receives the promise, from the king of 
 France, of assistance by armed force in the carrying out of this design in Great 
 Britain. For the copy of the original of this second article, see Life of William 
 Lord Russell, i. 51, ed. 3. [Comp. Hallam, Const. Hist., ii. 518.]
 
 2/O 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 co-exist with peace and order. 1 Hence the many sufferings 
 of the republics in the middle ages. Nor is any state safe 
 which excludes lawful opposition and treats all disagreement 
 from the opinion of those in power as sedition or treason. 2 
 The fact is well known, that formerly the discharging of a 
 minister from the divan of the Porte was always accompanied 
 at least with banishment, and frequently with the silken cord: 
 it was considered natural that he who is discontented must 
 become, or thereby is already, a traitor. In most absolute 
 monarchies, the displacement of a minister is called disgrace, 
 and not unfrequently accompanied by a suggestion not to 
 approach the capital within a certain circuit. So late as in 
 1610, when after the assassination of Henry IV. the imbecile 
 French cabal had resolved to change all the political princi- 
 ples upon which that great king had conducted his govern- 
 ment, Sully, his almost equally great minister, when informed 
 of this change, said to his wife, " If I am wise, I shall quietly 
 resign all my posts and employments, withdraw all my money, 
 or as much as I can, with part of it purchase some strong 
 castle in one of the most distant provinces, and keep the re- 
 mainder for any exigencies that may happen." 3 So, absolute 
 democracies or aristocracies could not endure opposition, not 
 even the passive existence of those who were known to belong 
 to the opposite side. Banishment followed banishment. Any 
 administration in our modern representative states, which 
 stigmatizes ever)'' opposition as factious, shows that it is either 
 very weak or factious itself, and ought not to be borne with 
 by the mass of substantial and good citizens. 
 
 1 Mr. Ellice called Sir Robert Peel, in a speech relating to Lord Durham's 
 mission to the Canadas, in January, 1838, if the papers be correct, the leader of 
 her majesty's opposition. There is a deeper sense in this than that of mere pleas- 
 antry. Tlie representative government of a free country is not complete without 
 a lawful opposition. A proper lever is wanting. 
 
 a * In order to show the necessity and salutariness of opposition, I ought to 
 have shown historically how often the principles of right and liberty have been 
 insisted upon and carried by the way of excellent measures by the opposition, 
 whether tory or whig. There must then be some classes of measures which can 
 be more truly viewed by the opposition, simply because it is not in power. 
 
 3 Memoirs of Sully, vol. iii. p. 260, Lond. edit, of 1761.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 27 1 
 
 As to the history of this great institution, for thus I feel 
 tempted to call it, I believe we cannot date its perfection far- 
 ther back than under George II. against Walpole, after the 
 Jacobites had given up the idea of restoring the Stuarts, and 
 when Pulteney (afterwards Earl Bath) vigorously, yet not, at 
 times, without the spirit of faction, led it. There existed, in- 
 deed, a regular opposition against William III., but it was 
 generally more or less revolutionary; that is, it was in the 
 interest of the Stuarts. The opposition in France mixes up 
 frequently the two revolutionary parties of the legitimists and 
 republicans, which is unavoidable so soon after the expulsion 
 of a dynasty. 1 
 
 1 The manner in which members of legislative bodies place themselves is not 
 a subject without importance in constitutional legislative police. It belongs to 
 the external arrangements or police of parliamentary politics, hence to politics 
 proper; yet I may be permitted to say a few words on it by way of note. The 
 British commons sit on benches, close together, in rows on the right and left side of 
 the speaker. On the right is the bench usually called the treasury bench, because 
 the ministers take their seats there by custom, be they whig or tory. The admin- 
 istration party, therefore, sils always on the right, and the opposition opposite to 
 them. In France the members, likewise at liberty to choose their places, ar- 
 range themselves according to party colors. The seats are disposed of in a semi- 
 circular form. The extreme right is always occupied by the party claiming to be 
 the most royalist, or, as is the case now, super-royalist, that is, by the party who 
 are for the old Bourbons; the extreme left, by those who claim to be the most 
 
 J m 
 
 liberal, or by republicans. Between them we have the right, the right centre, 
 the centre, the left centre, and the left. Of whatever party the administration 
 may be, these groups do not change their places. The ministers sit on distinct 
 places appropriated to them. At one period during the first French revolution the 
 Jacobins occupied the upper tiers, and were therefore called the Mountain party, 
 while the Girondists occupied the lower seats, and were called the Valley. The 
 American distribution of seats differs from both the present English and French 
 arrangement. Each American member of a legislative assembly selects any one of 
 the unappropriated seats which he likes, and keeps it throughout the session. I 
 know of no exception in the various state legislatures. All party colors are mixed ; 
 administration and opposition are not represented to the eye. Each member has a 
 desk, with writing-materials, drawers, etc., and the members sit in arm-chairs. 
 This different arrangement may have originated from the fact that at the period 
 when the like subjects were not yet settled by custom there was such unanimous 
 spirit respecting the administration of General Washington that there existed no 
 open, compact opposition. At present the disposal of the seats according to the 
 choice of the first comer has been adopted in most of the standing rules of the 
 legislatures. At first glance it might appear that the American method is prefer-
 
 272 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 XIX. If there were any more truth in the pretended maxim 
 that the majority is always right, and that it is the foundation 
 of republican liberty, than in the monarchical, that the king 
 can do no wrong, that is, if it were anything more than a 
 political fiction to lay down rigid rules for the control of legis- 
 lative bodies and citizens in their choice of measures, every 
 opposition would be factious or treasonable as soon as the 
 sense of the majority had been ascertained and an administra- 
 tion formed accordingly. We have seen in the case of the 
 trades-unions that the majority may not only be grievously 
 wrong, but they may naturally form the inferior body, and be 
 disposed to oppress the superior in that case the most skilled 
 and most industrious. Republican liberty lies far deeper than 
 in a maxim, such as that the majority is always right a posi- 
 tion a thousand times contradicted by history. Republican 
 liberty consists, among other things, in the unrestrained right 
 of the minority, of a fraction, nay, of an individual, to convert, 
 if it can be done by lawful means, the majority; republican 
 safety consists in the fact that the measures of those who have 
 the power, even be they the representatives of an overwhelm- 
 ing majority, may become modified by opposition ; for right, 
 if we speak of any continued course of action, is never abso- 
 lutely on one side. ,We may go farther: the more over- 
 whelming a majority becomes, the more necessary, steady, 
 yet lawful, opposition may become, and in most cases actually 
 does become, lest government approach to the vortex of abso- 
 lutism. The history of all civilization, and that of political 
 is not excepted, presents hardly any other picture more fre- 
 quently, than that of an orderly succession of changes pro- 
 duced by minorities hardly visible in their origin, gradually 
 
 able, inasmuch as it might be supposed that it does not aid at least in increasing 
 undue parly spirit; but, upon the whole, the English arrangement strikes me as 
 far the best, and the American as the least eligible. The sitting dose together, 
 according to parties, and especially without desks, is a decided preventive of 
 those interminable speeches with which the smallest-minded always beset assem- 
 blies most, while the expediting of business is much promoted by sitting close 
 and in parties together. The desks are objectionable, and ought to be abolished. 
 [At present seats are taken more or less by lot.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 273 
 
 swelling in number and power, and enlarging in thought, 
 modified by experience, and ultimately growing into a major- 
 ity, supplanting a former one which has been gradually 
 dwindling into a minority. A majority does not always even 
 indicate public opinion, although it may show momentary 
 general opinion, to which rumor belongs. By public opinion 
 we must understand that opinion of the community which has 
 been influenced either by the modifying correction of time, or 
 the talent or knowledge of those who are peculiarly able to 
 judge upon the subject in question. General opinion maybe 
 and very often has been egregiously mistaken. Error, want 
 of information, fear, excitement, revenge, thirst for gain, 
 pride, superstition, fanaticism, false shame all these may be 
 common to most or all members of a community, and con- 
 sequently influence general opinion, and mislead entirely. 
 Public opinion indicates always some settled more or less 
 digested opinion respecting subjects which involve matters 
 of right, the true appreciation of which consists in the due 
 counterbalancing of a number of considerations. For this 
 reason it is so important when it is turned towards these sub- 
 jects ; but as to matters of knowledge only a single individual 
 may, and often has, justly set up his own thorough knowl- 
 edge against the whole general opinion of his age and many 
 antecedent centuries. It might perhaps be appropriately ex- 
 pressed thus, that by general opinion we mean simply the 
 aggregate opinion of many individuals singly taken, an opin- 
 ion which is general to many individuals ; by public opinion 
 we understand the opinion of the community as a connected 
 and organized body, the ultimate result of mutually modify- 
 ing or counterbalancing opinions of men who as the members 
 of a community mutually influence and depend upon one 
 another. But eve-n well-settled and clearly-pronounced pub- 
 lic opinion may be erroneous, and greatly so. It cannot be 
 denied that it was public opinion at Athens that she should 
 side with Philip. Yet Demosthenes was right. Public, at 
 least general opinion, it was that cried out, Crucify, crucify. 
 On the other hand, it will have appeared, from the remarks 
 VOL. II. 18
 
 274 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 on public opinion in the first volume, that it is always entitled 
 to the greatest respect, and that a citizen ought to follow it 
 unless he have distinct and powerful reasons for not doing so ; 
 and that indeed he makes himself a very annoying member 
 of the community, if he opposes it from supercilious vanity 
 or wrong-headed arrogance, or a factious member, if he does 
 so from sordid interest or sinister ambition. A means of 
 judging with a degree of fairness between both parties is to 
 consider them as if both were recorded on the pages of the 
 past, as if you met with them in history ; disentangle your- 
 self from the meshes of self-interest, and before all apply the 
 plain yet very powerful test of asking yourself, Would you 
 frankly acknowledge your inmost motives for which, however, 
 you must diligently or honestly search before posterity? 
 
 To return once more to public opinion. We have first to 
 inquire whether the subject at issue is one on which there can 
 exist any public opinion at all, so that we do not mistake 
 general opinion for public. If millions believe certain state- 
 ments touching matters of fact, of which I have undeniable 
 evidence contrary to the general belief; if I live among peo- 
 ple who yet judge by the mere appearance of the heavenly 
 bodies, and who believe that the moon is larger than all the 
 stars, or who pronounce a general for having lost a battle in- 
 capable, or perhaps a traitor, while I may have the undeniable 
 knowledge to the contrary, or am perhaps acquainted with the 
 opinion of a great captain who pronounces that general to 
 have shown the greatest skill and talent in that very battle 
 which he lost in all these cases general opinion has no sort 
 of weight, and I should prostitute my mind, perhaps my con- 
 science, were I to follow it. The same is the case in many 
 trials. There may be a very general opinion, loudly, clamor- 
 ously expressed, respecting the guilt or innocence of the 
 arraigned person, and yet the juryman before whom the facts 
 are divulged in their successive order and in their true bear- 
 ing ought to pay no regard to any opinion of any person 
 or of the public except the judge only. Nevertheless, real 
 public opinion is carefully and respectfully to be consulted, for
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 275 
 
 the two reasons, first, that there is a very great chance that if 
 it be settled, and, of course, touches a subject on which there 
 can exist any public opinion, it is upon the main correct, and 
 if not, that there is at any rate much to be learned from it ; 
 secondly, that it is the greatest, mightiest of all powers, and 
 therefore not to be slighted. It must be observed, however, 
 that it requires tact and honest observation to ascertain public 
 opinion. Clamor is not public opinion. The organs of a 
 nation, of whatever kind they be, for instance the members 
 of legislatures, the public press, the courts, pronounce some- 
 times not only hastily, but repeatedly, one thing, while facts, 
 carefully observed, show at the same time that public opinion, 
 the settled sentiment of the people, takes its current in an 
 entirely contrary direction. It is the discovery of the latter, 
 and the acting boldly upon it, which has given some states- 
 men so great a power in executing vast designs, apparently 
 in direct contradiction to public opinion, because opposed to 
 what those organs, for some reason or other misrepresenting 
 public opinion, pronounced. A common case of this sort is 
 when parliamentary bodies opposed to an administration are 
 dissolved, and an "appeal to the people" is made, who by 
 their new elections show that they side with the administra- 
 tion, and that the former therefore misrepresented public 
 opinion. Finally, a shrewd statesman may know that though 
 this public opinion of the great mass, upon which he is de- 
 sirous to found his strength against what he conceives to be 
 the misrepresenters of public opinion, does not yet exist, the 
 elements for it are there, and that \twill rise and support him. 
 This it was that Napoleon meant when he said that he was 
 often obliged to act against all those who could express or 
 represent public opinion, knowing that the masses would 
 support him. 
 
 XX. If then a citizen is in the opposition and indeed most 
 of the ensuing remarks relate to parties in general, whether in 
 or out he ought to observe, it would seem, the following rules : 
 
 The moment that justice is sacrificed to party interests, the
 
 276 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 party or individual so doing becomes factious ; for justice 
 being the grand object of the law, of the constitution, of the 
 state itself, the party sets itself above these, and makes itself 
 its own object, while a party can have no right to exist except 
 so far as it is formed for the public good. In denying justice 
 the party turns into a faction. No party consideration, there- 
 fore, ought in any case to influence votes on private bills, 
 especially not if the restitution of reputation or property be 
 in question. If the old proverb, Fiat justitia et pereat mun- 
 dus, has any meaning and why else has it been handed down 
 so many centuries? it is certainly much truer still, fiat jus- 
 titia et pereant partes. 
 
 There are many measures, for instance appointments for 
 offices, which may be fairly and justly influenced by party 
 considerations, provided always the honesty and fitness of the 
 applicant be kept in view. We have seen already that it is 
 ruinous to the whole state if persons are habitually appointed 
 without regard to their fitness. As to appointments of broad 
 utility for the people at large, and not merely for simple ex- 
 ecutive places, party considerations ought to have no sway, 
 for it is the public service, not party service, which is the 
 object. Appointments for critical transactions of great mo- 
 ment, for scientific tasks, for the administration of justice, 
 ought to be influenced by party considerations only when 
 there is actually a suitable choice left, which is not very fre- 
 quently the case. It gives great strength to a party if it rises 
 above itself and gives a frank vote on the mere consideration 
 of public utility, nay, even of rewarding high individual worth, 
 and sees only the honor and reputation of the nation at large 
 reflected in such preference on account of talent and character. 
 
 There are measures which are of public utility, nay, of pub- 
 lic necessity, and which an honest opposition may neverthe- 
 less oppose without becoming factious, because to adopt them 
 would give new vigor to an administration which the oppo- 
 sition holds to be ruinous or vicious. One of these cases is 
 the common one of supplies. A man in the opposition votes 
 against supplies, not because he means to say that they ought
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 277 
 
 not to be passed, but simply because he desires to deprive 
 the administration of the means of getting on. But if the 
 proposed measure is one of broad and lasting utility to the 
 people, and would materially suffer, or even be only endan- 
 gered, from not being passed now, it is factious to oppose it 
 though its passage would strengthen the administration. If 
 a citizen in the opposition were to oppose an advantageous 
 treaty, in order to prevent an administration which he con- 
 siders vicious fro*m gathering new popularity, it would be 
 highly factious. But the rule does not merely apply to the 
 more important class of measures. Suppose an opposition 
 member in the United States should be convinced that for the 
 essential benefit of the whole the decennial census ought to 
 be connected with an extensive collection of statistics, and 
 that this could not be executed without creating some new 
 offices, and yet, on the consideration that this would give new 
 strength to the administration, he should oppose it; such an 
 act would be reprehensible. The great question how far an 
 opposition ought not only to yield, after war has once been 
 declared, but to aid patriotically in carrying it to a glorious 
 end, belongs to this class of measures. Wars may be wicked, 
 nay, infamous or stupid; they may be undertaken for the 
 very purpose of distracting public opinion and turning it 
 against popular liberty; or they may be undertaken by a 
 large majority of the people, and yet against the decided 
 opinion of the opposition. Now, I believe that a rule, which 
 allows of but very few and peculiar exceptions, is this : If 
 your nation engages in the war, and not simply a preposter- 
 ous administration, against your opinion, you may act in the 
 relations of a private citizen as you like, provided always you 
 do in no sort or manner aid directly or indirectly the enemy, 
 although a patriotic citizen will not doubt what he has to 
 do ; but if you are a representative or officer, you are bound 
 first of all to bring the war to a happy and glorious end, and 
 not to cripple the administration. The latter would be trea- 
 sonable. Remember that it is your state, your nation, that 
 declares and fights out the war, not this or that minister;
 
 278 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 remember that the honor and history of your country are 
 engaged ; that, however conscientious you may be in your 
 opposition, you may err after all ; that you cannot oppose the 
 administration without strengthening the enemy who has un- 
 sheathed his sword against your kindred, and that, whatever 
 your opinion was as to the beginning of the war, all consider- 
 ations absolutely cease when the enemy approaches your own 
 country. 1 A traitor is he who will not gladly defend his own 
 country. If an opposition feels really and conscientiously 
 convinced that the war is inexpedient, let them follow the old 
 Roman rule : treat after victory, but fight until then. The 
 English history from the times of Henry VIII. is full of in- 
 struction respecting all different sorts of war, but mean, imbe- 
 cile as the government of Charles II. was, I suppose no one 
 would call him a true Englishman who, however opposed to 
 his corrupt court, should have embarrassed the administration 
 after De Ruyter had swept the Thames with his broom on the 
 quarter-deck. We must not forget that nations as a whole 
 have their meaning and destiny; not the individual only. 
 
 In brief, if you are conscientiously in the opposition, annoy 
 the administration as much as you' think you can answer for, 
 but do not harass the public or embarrass public service, and 
 do not forget, while you make a distinction between the ad- 
 ministration which you believe you may lawfully oppose, and 
 public service on account of which you claim lawfully ^to 
 oppose the administration, to make likewise the proper dis- 
 tinction between your opposition and the public; do not be- 
 lieve that everything which suits your party is on that account 
 beneficial to the public because you believe the administration 
 in the wrong. 2 
 
 1 * Fox went altogether beyond the proper line of lawful opposition when, in 
 1792, he sent Mr. Adair, as his representative and with his cipher, to St. Peters- 
 burg, there to frustrate the objects for which the minister from the crown was 
 authorized to .treat. He succeeded in this design, and did actually frustrate the 
 king's minister in some of the objects of his negotiation. This was justly called 
 treasonable misdemeanor at least. (Tomline, Mem. of Pitt, 2d edit., vol. iii. p. 
 310, etc.) Fox did it on his own account. The party did not know it. 
 
 * [The author would doubtless limit these remarks to cases of expediency, as
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 279 
 
 XXI. As to our own judgment in party matters, we ought in 
 all matters of expediency to yield fairly to the collected opin- 
 ion of our friends, and not set up our self-sufficiency against 
 them. 1 If it comes to principles, if, after careful examination, 
 we believe that a compromise of principle is demanded, or 
 that our party has become factious, we must either act for our- 
 selves in the respective single case, or entirely abandon the 
 party, all the clamor about deserters and traitors to the con- 
 trary ; though no good or prudent citizen will do this upon 
 slight grounds. 
 
 The remark which was made, that a party ought always to 
 take a broad national ground, as being the best preventive of 
 pettishness or factiousness, applies especially to oppositions. 
 In studying the times or history, we sometimes observe little 
 oppositions which remind us of a dog tied behind a fast- 
 rolling wagon. The animal opposes indeed, but, although its 
 four feet are stiffly set against the wagon's motion, the four 
 horses move on unconcerned about the opposer behind, who 
 is obliged to follow, and, if he would but give up his opposi- 
 
 where there was just or lawful ground for war, but the war would be hurtful to 
 national interests. An unjust war, like any other unjust transaction, must be 
 opposed by all, whether in the opposition or on the side of the party in power.] 
 
 1 Lord Durham said in 1837, "I have already, in parliament, proposed house- 
 hold suffrage and triennial parliaments, and my opinions are still the same. But 
 at the same time I am not prepared to press them obstinately against those of 
 other reformers ; for, though I will not yield under any circumstances whatever 
 to our enemies, yet I am not ashamed to say that when true and real reformers 
 differ from me I give way to their particular views. As to vote by ballot, you 
 are all aware, gentlemen, that considerable difference of opinion prevails upon 
 this question. Some think it not advisable, and somewhat inconsistent with the 
 practice of a free state; but I tell you that my opinion is decidedly in favor of 
 the ballot. This is not a declaration made to serve a momentary purpose. Those 
 who know me best know that I have long entertained that opinion, and that I 
 have acted upon it. ... 
 
 " Let me observe that when I alluded to the subject of compromise I meant 
 compromise with an enemy, not that fair concession which may and must occa- 
 sionally take place with a friend. There is no real reformer but will yield his 
 opinion on minor points to those who are actuated by the same principles with 
 himself; but what I object to is the system of mutilating and compromising to 
 gain an enemy who cannot be conciliated."
 
 280 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 tion, might trot comfortably enough between the wheels nay, 
 in the end might be taken up perhaps by the coachman, on 
 the box. In short, if we do not oppose on broad grounds, 
 we expose ourselves to that fault which we have called polit- 
 ical grumbling, or what is equally to be shunned to spend- 
 ing the force of an opposition in merely harassing the other 
 party. All broad, bold, open, straightforward, and perse- 
 vering opposition earns esteem, but harassing embitters the 
 opponent. By political harassing I mean all opposition for 
 the sake of annoying. If the reduced party offers the annoy- 
 ance, it will only irritate the other party still more and lead it 
 on to violence ; if the reduced party suffers the annoyance, it 
 may be driven on to desperation ; it is always embittered. In 
 every political sphere, not only among parties, spite, annoy- 
 ance, and wilful humiliation are as much to be shunned as in 
 private intercourse, and they have ruined many a party, class, 
 or government. They are forms of revenge, and therefore, 
 with all kinds of revenge, totally to be discarded. 
 
 The question of coalitions of parties is not so important in 
 an ethical point of view as in a merely prudential. If parties 
 believe that they can conscientiously unite, without compro- 
 mising principles which they hold and have ever proclaimed 
 to be essential, for without this they amount to factious con- 
 spiracies, there is of course no objection on the score of 
 morality. But it must be observed that although parties at 
 variance as to essential principles may unite for some definite, 
 well-understood, and publicly proclaimed end, as for the over- 
 throw of an administration, after this each party is again to 
 stand on its own ground. There is always great danger of 
 contamination of principle, and that the broad moral principle 
 of the party should be forgotten or overshadowed in the ex- 
 pediency of the case. Coalitions generally arouse distrust in 
 the public mind against the coalescing parties, and if a 
 coalition has been formed not only for attack, but also for 
 continuance after the dislodgment of the administration, it is 
 exceedingly difficult to give it that moral strength which a 
 pure national party alone can have. Coalitions must, in their
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 2 8l 
 
 nature, be in most cases weak after they come into power : 
 it is easy to oppose unitedly, as men of all different qualities 
 may easily pull down a house, but their different opinion, 
 taste, and skill would appear the moment that they came to 
 rebuild it. In coalitions, one party .is generally the dupe of 
 the other. The coalition of Fox and Lord North was made 
 to last, and not for opposition only; the coalition of part 
 of the whigs and tories, the latter then generally Jacobites, 
 against Walpole was such that a compromise of principle 
 seemed evident, and the public very generally considered it 
 as factious on that ground. The late coalition in France 
 against Count Mole is perhaps the most interesting on record 
 as for the mere purpose of opposition. It united, for the time, 
 the extreme left with the extreme right, republicans with 
 legitimists, with almost all intermediate shades, and nearly all 
 the many ministers whom France had since the year 1830 and 
 who supplanted one another in the various changes of ad- 
 ministration. Of course, no one could believe that these 
 many fragments could keep one moment together after their 
 common object, the displacement of the administration, should 
 have been obtained. 1 
 
 XXII. I believe I ought not to conclude my remarks on 
 this subject without adding a word on parties or fractions of 
 parties formed on the ground of extraction or foreign nation- 
 ality, a subject of importance in the United States. If a 
 country is so happily situated as to be able to afford a ready 
 reception to emigrants from distant countries, and the nation 
 which inhabits it so liberally disposed as to offer their own 
 citizenship, in its fullest and almost unlimited 2 extent, upon 
 
 1 A remarkable coalition was that in Belgium preceding the revolution, by 
 which the professed unbelievers united with the ultra-Catholic party. However, 
 this has happened before, as for instance in England, even when persecutions 
 were going on for heterodoxy. 
 
 a The foreigner by birth who has become a citizen of the United States is in 
 every way whatsoever equal to the native citizen, except that the constitution 
 dees not allow him to become president of the United States unless he was a 
 citizen at the time when the constitution was adopted.
 
 282 . POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 easier terms than those of the naturalization of any other 
 country, it appears to me, from whatever point of view we 
 may take, even that of mere national courtesy not excepted, 
 entirely inadmissible to form unions, of whatever consistency 
 they may be, for political purposes on the avowed ground of 
 different national extraction. Generally speaking, it is well, I 
 believe, if an emigrant, after having become a citizen, abstains 
 from all party matters proper, though he ought under the 
 general obligation of the citizen conscientiously to vote, and 
 thus may usually vote with a party. This, however, he must 
 decide for himself; yet it strikes me that no choice is left him 
 as to the other point, namely that of forming a party on the 
 distinction of birth. He must decide for himself whether he 
 will accept of the citizenship or prefer to remain an alien : 
 when once, however, the oath is taken, he is bound by all 
 moral and political considerations to be, act, and pass him- 
 self as a bona fide citizen of his adopted country, and not 
 to abuse national hospitality in so glaring a manner as to 
 throw the entirely extraneous element of foreign national feel- 
 ing or animosity into the party movements and excitements 
 of his adopted country. It strikes me as a very great derelic- 
 tion of duty, and as a high-handed offence against true and 
 conscientious allegiance an ill return for liberal laws. There 
 is nothing more dangerous to a country than the dissension 
 of its citizens on the score of national extraction. We have 
 the case of Canada before us. The Athenians and Romans 
 would hardly have hesitated to treat such combinations as 
 treasonable, if indeed they would not have spurned the idea 
 of suffering them to grow into any sort of importance. The 
 spirit of exclusiveness of the ancients, according to which all 
 distant foreigners appeared as barbarians, would indeed have 
 been sufficient to prevent the like affiliations on the basis of 
 foreign nationality together with the enjoyment of full citizen- 
 ship ; but, though our religion as well as the diffusion of a 
 common civilization over many nations teaches us far different 
 sentiments regarding foreigners, I still believe that every citi- 
 zen of a free country should cherish his own citizenship with
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 283 
 
 sufficient patriotism, pride, and jealousy to prevent him from 
 associating the names of foreign countries, however noble or 
 endeared to him they may be, however sacred he may keep 
 their names in the inmost recess of his soul, with affairs pecu- 
 liarly those of his country. There is no just middle term, 
 that I can think of, between an alien and a bona fide citizen 
 joining heart and hand in the weal and woe of the country 
 whose citizenship he has, by choice and not by force, received. 
 If these remarks are founded in truth, it is clear that it is 
 equally offensive in native citizens to foment this improper 
 spirit, to make use of national inclinations and dislikes for 
 party purposes, and to call upon those adopted citizens as the 
 natives of foreign countries and according to their various 
 nationalities. Is the citizenship of a free country so light a 
 thing that it can be changed like a vestment and be put on 
 temporarily only for convenience' sake, so that under it the 
 foreigner remains a foreigner, unchanged, unaltered by the 
 new oath of allegiance ? We ought to change the ancient 
 saying, " the sea washes off all evil," into " let the sea wash 
 off all difference." 1 But what shall we say of those native 
 citizens who make use of the ignorance or criminal levity of 
 the lowest portion of emigrants, to bring them to the polls 
 long before the law permits it, and who make these poor 
 beings begin their career in the new country which they mean 
 to adopt with a flagrant breach of its sacred laws, with a 
 bribe and perjury? That they fully share in the guilt of this 
 treble crime. If it is the fundamental law of a country that 
 the majority of the lawful votes lawfully polled shall be the 
 last decision, the final supreme authority, which decides and 
 can be appealed to, it amounts to a contamination of the 
 supreme authority when we corrupt it by the introduction of 
 any foreign element. But enough was said on this subject 
 when we treated of bribery. 
 
 i'&i TTUVTO ravdpuKuv /coxa. Eurip., Iphig. in Taur., 1193.
 
 X 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Public Men. Leaders. Self-examination before a Citizen embarks in Public 
 .JLife. Physical, Moral, and Mental Qualities desirable in a Public Man. 
 Necessary Knowledge for a Public Man. Caution in entering upon Public 
 Life. 
 
 XXIII. IN all free countries there are citizens who, owing 
 to the influence they exercise over a portion of their fellow- 
 citizens and in guiding or impelling the public mind, have 
 left the sphere of the private citizen proper, and who may at 
 times actually be charged with public offices, but need not be 
 so, while yet they essentially influence the politics of their 
 state. These men we call public men, and, according to their 
 influence, leaders. Their influence depends upon themselves 
 and upon circumstances. They may actually rule, and yet be 
 not officers but simply public men. The most remarkable 
 instance is probably afforded in the case of Pericles, who 
 swayed the destiny of Athens for upwards of forty years, and 
 yet was but a public man or leader. Where there is a real 
 active political life, it is natural that there are public men, 
 more or less influential, or important, according to the wider 
 or narrower circle of the respective community in which they 
 move. Every county, every village, even every ward in a 
 large city, has its public men. From these, in the natural and 
 salutary course of things, are generally taken those citizens 
 whom the public of free states charges with offices, especially 
 the representatives and all elective officers. 
 
 Now, whenever a man fails in his calling, mistakes his 
 powers, and deceives himself as to his proper strength and 
 natural vocation, bitter disappointment, perhaps an acrid tem- 
 per, and, above all, the despairing consciousness of having 
 failed in active usefulness and in gathering the harvest of a 
 well-guided life, on- the one hand, v'th a more or less direct 
 284
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 285 
 
 injury to the community on the other, are the infallible con- 
 sequences. How many men have learned with sorrow, in thfc 
 middle of life, that they had wholly mistaken their powers, 
 inclinations, or peculiar strength ! All writers upon the vari- 
 ous professions have endeavored to exhibit the characteristics 
 necessary for the several callings, and the obstacles unavoid- 
 ably met with in them, so that the aspirants may calmly 
 examine themselves before they make so important a choice, 
 which must very powerfully influence their peace and con- 
 tentment through life. A proper self-examination of this sort, 
 however, is more important before a citizen fairly embarks or 
 suffers himself to be drawn into public life, than when he con- 
 templates entering into other spheres of action. For of all 
 the agents which may prompt a citizen to do this, a degree of 
 ambition will almost always be one ; and bitter indeed is the 
 darkness of chill neglect which follows the bright dreams of 
 ambition. The acquisition of wealth is but very rarely and 
 by way of exception connected with politics in a free and 
 comparatively pure country ; yet though the citizen, when 
 young, may have no desire of wealth, the years may come 
 when he sees his former companions accumulating wealth 
 and amply providing for their offspring, and when he regrets 
 having pursued what now perhaps appears to him a bauble. 
 Success in politics requires a peculiar compound of tempera- 
 ment, which is the free gift of nature and cannot be made 
 at will ; which does not, indeed, insure success, but without 
 which success can rarely be calculated upon. Politics is an 
 exciting pursuit, and whoever is accustomed to excitement 
 finds without it an intolerable void, so that, once accustomed 
 to excitement, the citizen will continually return to it, though 
 he is conscious that he ought to give up a political career and 
 that it is not his proper calling. And, finally, the freer a 
 country, the more frequently are chances offered for embark- 
 ing in politics. Yet a man who was not destined to be a 
 public man, but nevertheless continually obtrudes himself into 
 this sphere, is a great annoyance to a free community, and 
 may, if he chances to obtain an influential employment, be-
 
 286 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 come a very dangerous and injurious member of a political 
 society without even suspecting it himself, through his mistake 
 of his own powers. We see, then, that a citizen owes it to 
 himself, his family, and his community, not heedlessly to enter 
 politics. Every man is a valuable member of the community 
 if he is in his proper place, sphere, and utility ; but a man 
 who might have pursued the profession of medicine with real 
 delight may feel himself daily disgusted with the profession 
 of the law, and may do much harm to his fellow-citizens ; and 
 vice versa. A man that meets with constant disappointment 
 as a merchant, or misses his true aim of life as a clergyman, 
 might have made a contented, useful, active farmer, contrib- 
 uting his essential share to the common stock of national 
 success. Philip III. of Spain, it is reported, exclaimed in an- 
 guish, on his death-bed, " Oh that I had never ruled ! that I 
 had rather been the poorest man !" Are there not many citi- 
 zens who in the secret of their hearts feel something similar 
 respecting their pursuit of politics? 1 
 
 In order to see more clearly to what points this examination 
 ought to be directed, it will be serviceable to inquire into the 
 most necessary qualities of a public man, especially of a leader, 
 as experience suggests them, or as we may learn what they 
 are from the best leaders in history. Afterwards we may make 
 the necessary and individual deductions from this image, when 
 we look at the more reduced spheres of various classes of 
 public men. I do not mean to say that no one can hope 
 for success who does not combine all the qualities which will 
 be exhibited. Genius, peculiar circumstances, may become 
 powerful substitutes. Zisca commanded his army when blind. 
 Nor do I say that the union of these qualities will insure 
 
 1 * Many consider themselves, nnd are considered by others, most capable, 
 until the real opportunity of showing it arrives, when at once it is seen that they 
 seemed to be worthy of power only so long as they were out of it. " Omnium 
 consensu capax imperil, nisi imperasset." (Tacit., Hist., i. 29, of Galba.) Out 
 of power we may shine by speeches; in power action is necessary, not single* 
 actions, but substantial action throughout; that is, we must have sound funda- 
 mental or main ideas, of which the actions are but the overt facts.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 287 
 
 success ; but certain it is that without the conjunction of 
 many or most of them a citizen cannot calculate upon or even 
 hope for success. Nor is it sufficient to say that the freer a 
 people the easier they will be the judges of the capacities 
 required. No one who knows the least of the operation of 
 politics in free countries will assert this. A man must have 
 shown himself ready in some sort before they can choose him. 
 Town meetings must lead to parliament or congress. 
 
 XXIV. A public man ought to be of a strong constitution, 
 enjoy a free flow of health, and have naturally sound digestive 
 organs ; for the excitement and labor of public life, especially 
 parliamentary excitement and long speaking, will affect even 
 the best ; but a deranged digestion is apt to deprive memory 
 of its full retentiveness, the brain of its easy action, and to 
 render a man nervous, and nervously sensitive. But a ner- 
 vous man will ruin himself if he meddles with politics, unless, 
 indeed, he confines himself to writing. He ought to have a 
 fair and clear memory, or he will be continually defeated by 
 surprise ; exactness of mind, a natural tact of observation, of 
 dissolving whatever appears around him into its elements and 
 seizing upon what constitutes its vital principle; and that 
 power of imagination which combines what is separated by 
 time or space and grasps and seizes upon masses. He ought 
 to have a ready eye for facts, for reality, and a keen mind to 
 understand them thoroughly and to see beyond them to 
 divine. One of the greatest minds of the age has said, He 
 who cannot read between the lines of a book cannot under- 
 stand a great work. Well may it be said, He who cannot see 
 between facts cannot understand a great nation or a great pe- 
 riod, present or past, be he statesman or historian. A leader 
 ought to have the native inventiveness of mind and elevation 
 of soul which together produce that fecundity of which Cicero 
 speaks when he says, " Periclem censet Socrates uberem et 
 fecundum fuisse." 1 He ought to have that noble quality of 
 
 [But Cicero, Or., 4, 15, attributes these qualities of Pericles to the instructions
 
 288 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 communicating to others the moral sparks of his inmost 
 activity, and the higher he rises the more he must trust in his 
 own principles and purposes and freely leave to others their 
 own respective departments in carrying them out. Defeat 
 must not deject him ; he must esteem his friends, and not 
 reject their advice with obstinacy, yet be constant and firm. 
 He must be cautious, yet have the courage finally and de- 
 cisively to make up his mind and boldly to act accordingly, 
 even where many reasons are for and against opposite meas- 
 ures. Let him be liberal in opinion and expense ; a man of 
 action, and of contemplative mind ; love his kind, and be free 
 from selfishness. He ought to be of a naturally confiding 
 disposition, and not of a suspicious temper. We gain confi- 
 dence by confiding. He will be deceived ; yet if he trusts no 
 one he will lose more, or rather gain nothing. He ought to 
 be a firm friend, and be of that temper which can commune 
 with minds in a sphere above the temporary questions which 
 divide parties. 
 
 A leader ought to be a man of untarnished integrity and 
 tried reputation ; he must have sufficient ambition to impel 
 him, and faith in those whom he leads. Men cannot for any 
 length of time be led by mere imposition, nor can imposition 
 sufficiently animate the leader. People soon find out whether 
 he who wants their support despises them or has faith in them 
 or his time. He ought to be a man of strong nerve, of eleva- 
 tion and purity of soul, rather than of delicate susceptibility; 
 of tenacity of purpose, yet esteem for the opinion of others. 
 He must know that his best-meant actions will be misrepre- 
 sented, and that a thousand annoyances will be tried to dis- 
 gust him. Let him disregard all attacks upon his motives 
 and his character; his friends will take care of that. Pitt 
 never answered a single one of the thousand slanders levelled 
 against his motives; but when an editor accused him of 
 speculating in the stocks while minister of the finances, he 
 
 of Anaxagorns, and refers to Plato (Ph.nedr., 270, A.), where Socrates makes a 
 similar remark. Inventiveness and elevation of soul are not referred to.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 289 
 
 promptly brought a suit of slander against him. A public 
 man must not shrink from having his most private affairs 
 scanned and misrepresented. As to his capacity, let him 
 prove it by works and actions, not by words ; it is the only 
 effectual answer, the only convincing reply, in any sphere 
 whatever. An ungrateful son represented Sophocles as in his 
 dotage and unfit to manage his affairs ; Sophocles read his 
 CEdipus at Colonos, just finished, to the judges, and he was 
 carried home in triumph. Aristophanes held up Socrates 
 to ridicule in the theatre: the sage, after the conclusion of 
 the satiric comedy, is said to have risen up out of his seat in the 
 theatre, that strangers to him might have a view of his person. 1 
 When the fate of sacred music depended upon the sentence 
 of the papal committee, of which the strict and devoted 
 Charles Borromeo was a member, and much was urged to 
 endanger it, Palestrina composed a work, on the manuscript 
 of which are found the words, " O God, enlighten my eyes," 
 and his work brought victory for his cause. 
 
 The public man must be a man of no timidity; he must be 
 able to speak boldly before those who dislike his truth, and 
 he must have courage to take his stand decidedly. 2 He ought 
 
 1 [For the first anecdote see Plut., an seni ger., \ 3, p. 785, c. ; for the second, 
 ./EL, Var. Hist., ii. 13. Both need better vouchers.] 
 
 2 As a striking instance of self-knowledge, not indeed otherwise to be imitated, 
 I copy the following passage of one of the letters of Erasmus. " I see now," says 
 he, " that the Germans are resolved at all adventures to engage me in the affair 
 of Luther, whether I will or not. In this they have acted foolishly, and have 
 taken the surest method to alienate me from them and their party. Wherein 
 could I have assisted Luther, if I had declared myself for him and shared the 
 danger along with him ? Only thus far, that, instead of one man, two would 
 have perished. I cannot conceive what he means by writing with such a spirit: 
 one thing I know too well, that he hath brought great odium upon the lovers of 
 literature. It is true that he hath given us many a wholesome doctrine and many 
 a good counsel ; and I wish he had not defeated the effect of them by his intoler- 
 able faults. But if he had written everything in the most unexceptionable man- 
 ner, I had no inclination to die for the sake of truth. Every man hath not the 
 courage requisite to make a martyr ; and I am afraid that, if I were put to the 
 trial, I should imitate St. Peter." Jortin's Life of Erasmus, London, 1808, vol. 
 i. p. 250. 
 
 VOL. II. 19
 
 290 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 to be a man who can resolutely make up his mind, and, 
 having made up his mind, promptly act ; he must not be by 
 natural constitution a man of timid hesitation or of that de- 
 gree of scrupulosity which prevents one from finally making 
 up his mind. When young, he ought to be careful before 
 he compromises himself; at the same time he must know 
 that he has no lever for whatever energy he may possess until 
 fairly committed to some great principle. 1 No pilot can steer 
 a vessel through a winding channel by orders from the shore ; 
 he must join his danger and hope with those of the crew. 
 He must be frank, and his sympathies must be those of the 
 people ; without it they do not understand one another ; he 
 must be of enlarged liberality, yet keep out of debt, and com- 
 mand respect by all his domestic affairs ; he must be calm, 
 and in all the excitement around him be able to seize upon 
 what is real and substantial, and separate it from what is but 
 spray washing over the deck. He must be active, and a man 
 of business. " Par negotiis nee supra," is a phrase of great 
 import. Clarendon, no friend of Hampden, yet describes him 
 
 1 Few things more strengthen the action of a man, whether in politics or any 
 other sphere, than to be fairly and wholly committed to some great principle. 
 It gives a steady direction and consistency to all the single actions, promotes 
 self-respect and character, and gives efficiency to life, while in the public it in- 
 spires steady regard, and the important conviction, that the individual may be 
 relied upon. That devotion to his principles alone, which the public can judge 
 of only by a series of actions, will bring back to a man the public esteem that 
 may have left him for a time. But a public man, as in truth any man who moves 
 in any active life, cannot take too much care to avoid committing himself too 
 easily in regard to minor points ; for this must produce fluctuation. This danger 
 is best avoided, not by subtlety or intrigue, but by silence that silence, I mean, 
 which is broken only when necessary. There are many garrulous men who 
 daily commit themselves either upon points not sufficiently known or weighed, or 
 farther than they intended ; they then must retract, or modify all which weakens. 
 There is a great power in silence ; a great manliness in suffering tl e actual cases 
 to arrive, as the judge on the bench does, and decide when fully heard. Still, no 
 man, of whatever genius in his respective sphere, can avoid committing errors. 
 If such is the case, there is again great power in candor, in positively and frankly 
 acknowledging a mistake. Only we must take heed, in this case again, to be 
 calm and considerate, and not to be rash in pronouncing judgment upon our 
 own error, as we were before in committing it.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 291 
 
 as peculiarly made for a leader, and dwells repeatedly upon 
 his calmness and activity, and on the fact that he was "not 
 to be tired out." Alexander won his battles because he 
 moved briskly about on horseback, while his stately enemy 
 was enthroned on a scaffold or high wagon, that all soldiers 
 might see him. Neither stately speeches nor senatorial man- 
 tles can lead ; Napoleon was never so much himself as in his 
 gray coat. It is action that gains respect and sways. Exact- 
 ness and activity have given to many a citizen an influence 
 far superior to that acquired by men of much greater capacity 
 who were indolent. A public man must be a man of veracity ; 
 no arguments ever so conclusive will convince, if the hearers 
 first of all do not believe that the speaker himself believes in 
 them ; he must be honest in money matters to a degree of 
 minute scrupulosity; he must be ever ready to retire, content 
 with his own merit, without grumbling; he must be prepared 
 to meet with ingratitude, as every one must who follows 
 him or serves those that have power. "Let him be a man of 
 fervent religious veneration ; without it the busy life, prac- 
 tical turmoil, the immundicity through which he must wade, 
 the thousand impurities with which he becomes acquainted, 
 will infect him and make him sordid. His religion therefore 
 must be of that true and genuine kind which enlivens and 
 purifies, and rejoices in adoring and loving, and not that 
 unhappy counterfeit of religion which benumbs the heart by 
 encompassing it with dogmatic bitterness and narrow illiber- 
 ality, or equally unjust and unholy fanatical excitement. His 
 manners ought to be affable, yet never cringing; he ought at 
 any moment to disregard his comfort, to revere justice, and 
 love his country. 
 
 
 
 XXV. A public man ought always to know well the ele- 
 ments of his own society, be it small or large, its whole public 
 and social economy. He must know how the things that are, 
 the laws and customs, operate, and how they become such as 
 they are. The history of the institutions of his country is 
 indispensable for him, or he will commit a thousand errors or
 
 292 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 dangerous faults. He ought especially to study those periods 
 in which the most important institutions rose to their highest 
 action or showed their vigor in struggling into life. In brief, 
 he ought to know the constitutional history of his country 
 well, and if a nation has branched out from another at a time 
 when the latter had already many settled and important insti- 
 tutions, as our nation from the British, he must connect the 
 study of these latter with it. To these he ought to add the 
 study of Greece, especially of Athens, and of Rome, because 
 they were great nations, belong to the past, afford an undis- 
 turbed study, and unite with the glory of their rise and high 
 civilization the pointed lessons of their decay and ruin. 
 
 A public man, acting in a wide or elevated sphere, will de- 
 rive great benefit from the minute and deep study of some 
 great man who with few means produced vast results, to 
 whom he feels especial inclination. If he feels attracted by 
 the peculiar character of a man such as Washington, Chat- 
 ham, De Witt, Sully, and has the means of carefully tracing 
 his character and actions, he will invigorate his soul and 
 enlarge his mind by penetrating them and making them his 
 own more and more. Fortunate will it be if, in addition to 
 this, the literature of his own country furnishes him with a 
 truly great poet, who has exercised a vast influence upon his 
 nation and thereby shows that the vigor of his mind knew 
 how to seize upon the vital principles of man's life in general 
 and of his nation in particular. The English and Americans 
 are peculiarly fortunate in their Shakspeare. A public man 
 cannot read him too much. Not that he should learn par- 
 ticular lessons of public action in specific cases from this 
 great poet, although even as to this point he furnishes golden 
 passages which in times of need will suddenly rise up in the 
 mind of one who is familiarized with his immortal works. 
 But the reasons why I would recommend the ever-repeated 
 perusal of his unrivalled poems are of greater extent. There 
 is so vast a stage of action in his works, such a quintessence 
 of all human life, such a vigorous delineation of character and 
 such depth of observation, such an exuberance of thought, of
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 293 
 
 subtle penetration, and endless variety of sentiment, all the dif- 
 ferently combined motives of the infinite multitude of human 
 individualities are so impartially viewed and given from a 
 point so high above them, vulgarity is drawn so truly, and 
 human greatness, joy, and misery are presented with such 
 loftiness, that his works are like a concentration of all that is 
 essential in the active life of men, of what ephemerally passes 
 or historically lasts, so that no one can penetrate into his 
 works without having his mind invigorated and enlarged and 
 his vision made keener as well as loftier. 1 
 
 XXVI. Every one, therefore, before he embarks voluntarily 
 
 1 There is a remarkable passage in Las Cases, containing Napoleon's opinion 
 of the poet Corneille and the influence which so great a poet exercises on a 
 nation. Napoleon was then emperor, and ended with the words, " Yes, gentle- 
 men, were he living now I should make him prince." Though he probably 
 would not have done so, it sufficiently shows in what manner he viewed a great 
 dramatic poet. Las Cases, vol. ii. p. 344, Paris ed. of 1824. 
 
 The passage of Mackintosh's pamphlet, A Discourse on the Study of the Law 
 of Nature and Nations, in which he defends Grotius and speaks of his quoting 
 poets and orators, deserves here to be mentioned. " He was not," says Sir 
 James Mackintosh, " of such a stupid and servile cast of mind as to quote the 
 opinions of poets and orators, of historians and philosophers, as those of judges 
 from whose decision there is no appeal. He quotes them, as he tells us himself, 
 as witnesses whose conspiring testimony, mightily strengthened by their discord- 
 ance on almost every other subject, is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the 
 whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of 
 morals. On such matters poets and orators are the most unexceptionable of all 
 witnesses, for they address themselves to the general feeling and sympathies of 
 mankind ; they are neither warped by system nor perverted by sophistry ; they 
 can attain none of their objects, they can neither please nor persuade, if they 
 dwell on moral sentiments not in unison with those of their reader: no system 
 of moral philosophy can surely disregard the general feelings of human nature 
 and the according judgments of all ages and nations. But where are those feel- 
 ings and that judgment recorded and observed ? In those very writings which 
 Grotius is gravely blamed for having quoted. The usages and laws of nations, 
 the events of history, the opinions of philosophers, the sentiments of orators and 
 poets, as well as the observations of common life, are, in truth, the materials out 
 of which the science of morality is formed; and those who neglect them are 
 justly chargeable with a vain attempt to philosophize without regard to fact and 
 experience, the sole foundations of all true philosophy.
 
 294 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 m the rough and rolling vessel of politics, or suffers himself 
 to be imperceptibly drawn into the currents of public life, 
 ought to ask himself whether he be willing or able, according 
 to his mental and bodily frame, to make all the sacrifices 
 which he assuredly will be called upon to make, and whether 
 public life might not become to him a continued chafing and 
 disturbance of mind; whether other pursuits would not suit 
 his particular temperament, constitution, and taste far better, 
 and afford him that superior repose which our souls always 
 derive from continued useful action blessed with success, or 
 from mental activity which is peculiarly their own, and in 
 which we feel we are completely what we were intended to 
 be. There are some men so framed as to be strong, original, 
 acute, and bold in the stillness of retirement, and to be capa- 
 ble of sending forth from thence many works of extensive 
 and essential influence, affecting whole ages ; or so organized 
 that they are of substantial usefulness in all the varied social 
 relations of their community, while unconnected with politics; 
 but so soon as they are brought into contact with the con- 
 crete dealings political life involves, where things must needs 
 be taken in mass, they shrink and lose their vigor. 
 
 Yet it may be asked, how is it possible to know before 
 trial whether we are calculated for public life or not ? The 
 only rule, it seems, that can be given respecting this sub- 
 ject, is, first, that a citizen, doing all acts to which he thinks 
 active public spirit should prompt him, should allow public 
 opinion to concentrate upon him, that he should let public 
 opinion seek him, and not himself seek public opinion for 
 single employments or elevations, and that he should follow 
 this rule throughout life, which guards even established public 
 men against many errors ; and, secondly, that having once 
 begun his public career, he should be exceedingly cautious 
 before he commits himself too much, while he has a fair 
 earnest of public life and still is not yet so deeply affected by 
 its peculiar character that a retreat would be too difficult.
 
 BOOK VI. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Extra-constitutional Meetings. Their Necessity. The Representative. Sum- 
 mary of his Duties. He is the guardian of the public Treasures. When 
 ought he to vote liberally ? The framing of Laws. Legislation upon the 
 Principle of mutual Accommodation. Importance of a gentlemanly Character 
 for the Representative. Instruction. History and the various Constitutions 
 show that the Right of Instruction has been claimed and disclaimed as pro- 
 moting and as injurious to Liberty, according to the Circumstances of the 
 Times. The Representative Government is not a mere Substitution for direct 
 Democracy. Essential character of the Representative Government. The 
 different characteristic Principles of Ancient Slates, the Middle Ages, and 
 Modern States. Nationalization of States ; Socialization of Population. 
 National Representation the great Feature of Modern Times. Difference be- 
 tween Deputative and Representative Systems. Oath in New Jersey and the 
 Netherlands to promote Public Welfare. How does the Representative faith- 
 fully represent ? Advantages of Representative Government. Objections to 
 the doctrine of Instruction. Instruction belongs to the Deputative System. 
 
 I. THE true and easy operation of a representative govern- 
 ment, and, still more, the entire realization of national civil 
 liberty, that is, of civil liberty as appertaining to a national 
 state, not to a city-state, of which presently more, depends in 
 a very great measure upon those many extra-constitutional, not 
 unconstitutional, meetings, in which the citizens either unite 
 their scattered means for the obtaining of some common end, 
 social in general, or political in particular, or express their 
 opinion in definite resolutions upon some important point be- 
 fore the people. These meetings may be entirely unofficial ; 
 sometimes they are semi-official, at others they are conven- 
 tions of delegates, sent by the people, and yet they proceed 
 altogether from the spontaneous action of society, without 
 being called into existence by the prescribed rules of the 
 constitutional law. No nation can hope for substantial civil 
 liberty before it is well acquainted with this important social 
 
 295
 
 296 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 agent, so indispensable for modern, that is national, liberty. 
 Many attempts at liberty have failed, because the people had 
 no idea of these free extra-constitutional meetings, and ex- 
 pected constitutions to operate without them. In these meet- 
 ings society frequently acts as such, separate from the state, 
 for instance when they consist of members sent for industrial, 
 or, as we have lately seen, for scientific purposes, from vari- 
 ous countries ; sometimes they are greatly abused and made 
 the seat of party excitement ; but, generally speaking, it is 
 undeniable that they are at once the generators of that interior 
 power which makes the machine of a constitutional govern- 
 ment move and work in a national spirit, and the safety-valves 
 through which the superabundant volume of that power 
 escapes, when otherwise it would cause fearful explosions. 
 
 If we comprehend under these meetings all those which 
 are composed either of the people themselves, or of delegates 
 having an extra-constitutional character, we shall see at once 
 that they are of great importance in order to direct public 
 attention to subjects of magnitude, to test the opinion of the 
 community, to inform persons at a distance, representatives or 
 the administration, for instance, of the state of public opinion 
 on certain measures, whether yet depending or adopted ; to 
 resolve upon and adopt petitions ; to encourage individuals 
 or bodies of men in arduous undertakings requiring the 
 moral support of well-expressed public approbation ; to effect 
 a union with others, striving for the same ends; to disseminate 
 knowledge by way of reports of committees ; to form socie- 
 ties for charitable purposes or the melioration of laws or 
 institutions; to sanction by4he spontaneous expression of the 
 opinion of the community 'measures not strictly agreeing with 
 the letter of the law, but enforced by necessity ; to call upon 
 the services of individuals who otherwise would not feel war- 
 ranted to appear before the public and invite its attention, or 
 feel authorized to interfere with a subject not strictly lying 
 within their proper sphere of action ; to concert upon more 
 or less extensive measures of public utility, and whatever else 
 their object may be. It does not seem, however, necessary
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 297 
 
 to dwell upon them particularly 'with reference to political 
 ethics, except that, as they are necessary and salutary if freely 
 and calmly operating, it becomes the greater dereliction of 
 duty in influential men to use them for selfish ends, so that 
 the country, instead of reaping the benefits of a steady opera- 
 tion of social agents from them, is exposed to all the feverish 
 and withering effects of passionate, fluctuating, and wild agi- 
 tation. A citizen of probity ought to remember two things : 
 first, that he deceives himself who feels flattered by the ex- 
 citing agitation which he has been able to produce for it is 
 frequently very easy to produce this effect, and the easier the 
 less proud we should feel of those upon whom excitement 
 has been produced. It is the calm and substantial action 
 action which bears within it the genial power of vivifying the 
 seeds of action in others of which alone a true man feels 
 proud. Secondly, that the extra-constitutional meetings re- 
 semble in their necessity and usefulness, and at the same 
 time in their possible abuse, other primary agents of society 
 and of nature : they are salutary, if in their proper path ; 
 fearful, if in irregular licentiousness. 
 
 Those who are not personally acquainted with the practical 
 operations and necessities of civil liberty are apt to consider 
 all popular meetings as so many deviations and exceptions 
 from the regular government, and ask, where is the guarantee 
 against their abuse ? The guarantees against the abuse are 
 varied, manifold, and mutually connected ; to a great extent 
 they consist in mutual modification. An absolute guarantee 
 exists against their abuse no more than against that of any 
 primary vast principle. Great as the principle of modern 
 hereditary monarchy is, and forming and having formed one 
 of the agents of modern European civilization as it does, where 
 is the final guarantee against the chances of birth, of contract- 
 edness of mind, or weakness of conscience, except in the 
 mutual modification of a number of other political agents ? 
 The sun warms and enlivens, but we have no guarantee 
 against all the injury he may do, and actually does in a 
 thousand instances, in parching the soil or breeding fever.
 
 298 POLITICAL ETHICS, 
 
 The citizen ought to keep in mind that unnecessary meet- 
 ings either excite and stir uselessly, and therefore injuriously, 
 or lessen the interest in public meetings, which is equally un- 
 desirable, and may be injurious to public liberty ; and that, on 
 the other hand, it is unbecoming a free man, who values his 
 liberty, to be prevented by civil indolence from taking those 
 measures which through public meetings would produce 
 demonstrations of public sentiment sufficient to arrest danger, 
 pusillanimity, or civil immorality. If a citizen is sent as a 
 delegate to a meeting for a specific end, especially political, 
 he must be the more careful not to transgress the lines 
 which we have endeavored to ascertain as the proper limits of 
 party movements, the more definite the end is for which he 
 has been sent, and the more decidedly he has been sent, 
 perhaps, on party grounds ; in brief, the more avowedly the 
 end of the meeting is one of a party character, the more 
 imperative becomes caution against being betrayed into fac- 
 tiousness. 1 
 
 II. Before we proceed to consider the citizen in office, 
 having viewed him in his capacity as an individual member 
 of the state, we have to examine him in one of the most im- 
 
 1 The pamphlet is one of the great agents of modern liberty, and of the greatest 
 usefulness, in nations who value it. Some English pamphlets have acquired his- 
 torical importance. They are excellent vehicles for certain communications, but 
 they do not dispense with the public meeting. The public meeting is always 
 necessary for action. Nations who neglect the public meeting and rely on the 
 pamphlet alone for discussion of subjects of the deepest interest will not come to 
 energetic action. Dumont goes so far as to express the opinion that the parties 
 which multiply pamphlets weaken their power and hold on the public: they ac- 
 custom themselves to talk instead of acting. I counted in the publishers' cata- 
 logue of 1838, sent me from Germany, one hundred and thirty writings, more or 
 less voluminous, on the question of the archbishop of Cologne. In the United 
 States there is a deluge of pamphlets, but on a thousand different and very fre- 
 quently wholly uninteresting subjects. The unfortunate fashion of asking every 
 one that delivers some public speech or other for a copy, and to print it a 
 fashion so common that it is no longer any honor, while its omission conveys 
 a reflection deprives the American public of all courage to look at anything 
 issued in pamphlet form.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 299 
 
 portant stations in which he can be placed, a position pecu- 
 liarly belonging to modern civilization namely, as a repre- 
 sentative of his fellow-citizens, that is, as elected by a number 
 of them to share in and contribute to the legislation of their 
 jural society or state. On what he ought to legislate, and 
 how he ought to do it, are questions to be answered by the 
 science of politics, and involve in fact the whole subject of 
 legislation, political society, social and public economy, and 
 can of course not be expected to be developed here, nor in- 
 deed in any work, with specific reference to the representative. 
 In general, it is his duty to make himself acquainted to the 
 best of his ability with all the subjects essentially affecting 
 public welfare, and especially affecting that portion of the 
 society which he represents. On 1,he other hand, it appears 
 manifest that all the general rules given in the preceding 
 pages as applying to the conduct of the citizens in general or 
 of public men in particular receive additional force if viewed 
 in connection with the representative ; for he stands not for 
 himself alone ; his conduct, influenced by and reflecting in 
 a great degree the general temper of the society which he 
 represents, strongly influences it in turn. All his responsi- 
 bilities as a man and citizen are infinitely multiplied, as are 
 likewise, in many cases, his temptations for instance, in party 
 matters the temptation to transgress the proper line between 
 party and faction. Yet it may not be without some profit 
 if we reconsider or point out in particular a few principles of 
 especial importance regarding the representative; after which 
 I propose to inquire into the important question of instruc- 
 tion, which involves that of the essential character of the 
 representative. 
 
 Perhaps we may sum up the most important points in the 
 following manner: 
 
 Justice, truth, and disinterestedness are with him above 
 every other consideration, and lend far greater strength than 
 their dereliction ever can do. 
 
 The true representative is in the service of the public : he 
 is sent neither for his own ambition or gain, nor for his party,
 
 300 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 neither to serve exclusively a certain privileged class, nor 
 a single division of the nation according to occupation or 
 interest. 
 
 Liberty demands for him ample freedom of speech : hence 
 his conscience alone must in most cases regulate the use which 
 he makes of this great liberty of speaking before his nation, 
 both as to the time which he occupies and takes from the 
 furtherance of other business, and as regards either the prin- 
 ciples or views he may thereby disseminate among the people 
 at large, the standard of his respective assembly, which he 
 may thus contribute to raise or lower, and the character of 
 individuals which he may injure. No representative ought 
 ever to speak except for the furtherance of that business which 
 is actually before the houee ; and then always to the point. 1 
 There is no real, no masterly, eloquence except that which is 
 strictly to the point. Demosthenes, Cicero, Chatham, Burke, 
 Foy I abstain from mentioning living orators amply prove 
 it, 8 and their best passages most so. Habitual, loose, prolix, 
 
 1 * Simple as the following rule may be, it is of very great importance both to 
 the community and to your own influence : 
 
 Speak never unless there is an especial reason for it, and this can consist only 
 in this : 
 
 That you know the subject, or some part of it, thoroughly, or better than any 
 one else ; 
 
 That you are universally expected to speak, and silence would be misconstrued; 
 
 To justify your own vote, to the community; 
 
 To repel an attack upon yourself if very marked or peculiar, upon a particular 
 friend, upon your constituents or part of country; 
 
 To explain ; 
 
 If your constituents are the particular subject. At least, in such case, if all that 
 is to be said has been said and well said, you ought to rise and say so, and that 
 you mean to vote one way or the other. It is decent towards your constituents. 
 
 To talk against time may be an excusable artifice for some high purpose, but 
 it is very rarely so. 
 
 If you are known to speak only if you have anything to say, you derive great 
 influence from this fact alone. 
 
 But to speak for two or three hours solely to have your voice heard is folly. 
 
 8 The more active men's thoughts are on a subject which engages their atten- 
 tion, and the better it is understood, the plainer, simpler, and more forcible are 
 the discourses respecting it, in books as well as in speeches, on religious as well
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 301 
 
 and low speaking, without the nerve of thought and high 
 sentiment, has a very decided and injurious effect upon the 
 public at large. Every man who is really filled with his object, 
 that is, whose soul and life belong to it, and who, therefore, 
 acts for it, is brief-spoken. Soldiers, physicians, ministers, 
 Christians, who are what they are wholly and thoroughly, act, 
 and do not talk much of their action. 
 
 The honesty of the representative, applied to money mat- 
 ters, comprehends care with regard to himself individually 
 that he propose or vote for or against no measure on account 
 of any individual advantage, direct or indirect, out of the 
 money of the people. According to the peculiar development 
 which the representative system has taken in the European 
 race since the middle ages, he is and ought to be the especial 
 guardian of the public money. Waste in governments is not 
 only oppressive to those from whom alone the money can 
 come for any length of time and to any amount the people; 
 it is not only a great injustice, but wastefulness is immoral 
 in its character. It leads the government from its true end 
 and object, begets a desire for wealth without labor, and thus 
 trains men in corruption, to the destruction of public spirit, 
 independence, and virtue. Monarchies and republics are 
 
 as on political matters. Not that I undervalue, in any degree, true eloquence : 
 I hold ready, striking, and elevated eloquence as one of the very noblest mani- 
 festations of the human mind ; but it is this very eloquence which suffers and is 
 stifled by a flowing style, tasteless disquisitions, or far-fetched comparisons. How 
 simple are Demosthenes and Chatham ! Any one who has read the speeches of 
 the deputies composing the estates at the beginning of the modern age will have 
 observed how unwieldy and pointless their words are, and what is indeed a 
 necessary consequence how obscure they leave the main subject. To give 
 but one instance, I would refer to the French diet of 1593, of which Raumer 
 gives contemporary accounts in his already quoted History, etc., vol. i., towards 
 the end. The Old Testament, and natural history and philosophy as then under- 
 stood, are ransacked before an idea is expressed, such as that the third estate, 
 though inferior to clergy and nobility, still forms part of the state. The history 
 of British eloquence, as it may be gathered from various historical works, and on 
 which it is high time that we should be furnished with a thorough and philo- 
 sophical treatise, shows the same progress, namely, that the simplicity and truth 
 of eloquence increase together.
 
 302 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 equally bound to shun wastefulness. A nobility feeding and 
 feasting upon the money of the people recklessly squandered 
 away by a corrupt court, like that of Charles IV. of Spain, 
 Charles II. of England, or Louis XV. of France, is as dan- 
 gerous as the Athenian demagogue or Roman seducer of 
 the people who distributed the public treasure among the 
 populace. 
 
 Yet parsimony is not saving, but waste in disguise, in all 
 human affairs, in public not less than in private. Jealous 
 of all public expenditure to a degree of rigidness, the repre- 
 sentative ought ever to be liberal first of all in every case of 
 justice, which ranks above all things, and surely above the 
 popularity of the representative and the disposition of his 
 constituents. Indeed, giving every one his due cannot be 
 called liberality. Therefore, the representative must readily 
 vote for the discharge of all debts of the public to individuals, 
 and punctiliously for the fulfilment of all engagements for 
 which public faith stands pledged. The force of the law 
 which binds the intercourse "between citizen and citizen ought 
 to be felt most imperatively when the question is one of en- 
 gagements between the state or any part of it on the one 
 hand, and individuals or other states on the other. Prudence, 
 happily, coincides here with justice ; for nothing opens greater 
 resources for a state in a thousand different ways than unde- 
 viating justice and honesty in all its engagements. If repre- 
 sentatives would consider how small the amount of the state's 
 just dues become, when one compares the public means for 
 paying them with the public gain obtained by the act of jus- 
 tice, they, would never hesitate to vote frankly and readily for 
 the discharge of any honest debt. History furnishes abundant 
 examples both of encouragement and of warning. 
 
 The representative ought liberally to give his vote for all 
 expenditures, commensurate to the means of his society, for 
 the essential promotion of education, that is for the elevation 
 and extension of knowledge, and for promoting the elevation 
 of mind, be this by way of diffused knowledge or the promo- 
 tion of discovery and of the arts. He ought liberally to vote
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 303 
 
 for all improvement of intercommunication, 1 if it cannot be 
 obtained by private means ; for appropriations demanded by 
 the needs of administration, public justice, and public security. 
 The representative ought readily to vote for what is due to 
 faithful and efficient service, according to the general standard 
 of reward in the community at the period in which he lives. 
 One of the main objects of all calm and settled governments 
 must be to render justice as purely and effectually and to 
 protect society within and without as powerfully as possible, 
 and, in striving for these objects, to press as little upon the 
 people as possible : these ends are accomplished, not by con- 
 triving that the citizens shall pay little or less than is neces- 
 sary (which indeed makes a very expensive government), but 
 that they shall receive the fullest possible equivalent for the 
 justly decreed and levied taxes which they pay. There were 
 few, and frequently no, systems of constant taxation in the 
 middle ages ; every free and elevated nation at present has 
 many. Yet our present governments in the end are cheaper 
 than those of the middle ages. If, for instance, the regular 
 administration of justice by sufficiently paid judges demands 
 a greater outlay than irregular justice dealt out occasionally 
 by officers appointed likewise for other purposes, as for the 
 executive and military command of a county, which was fre- 
 quently the case in the middle ages, we must not forget the 
 immense gain of the people in the rise of property and value 
 of labor, effected by regular and systematic law courts. 
 
 In framing or voting for a law, the representative ought to 
 consider well whether the law, intended as it is to be general, 
 rests on a general principle and is not a mere expedient; and, 
 on the other hand, how it will operate, together with its gen- 
 eral principle upon, or by means of, the given circumstances 
 of the society for which the law alone is calculated : yet he 
 ought never to introduce a law for its supposed philosophical 
 principle alone, which is but a misnomer; for no law is philo- 
 
 1 [Q u - by incorporations only, or by money grants to private individuals or 
 companies ?]
 
 304 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 sophical which does not grow out of the given circumstances 
 out of that society for which it is calculated. They are but 
 the productions of the brain. Locke's constitution for South 
 Carolina, and the first French republican constitution (the 
 second in number of the many constitutions which that coun- 
 try has witnessed since the first revolution), are illustrations. 
 A wise law must have these two requisites: it must be called 
 for by the circumstances, and must consist in a just principle 
 judiciously applied to these circumstances, which implies 
 that it be harmoniously applied to the whole state system 
 and do not jar with it. The representative ought to test the 
 bill upon all imaginable adverse grounds ; for he may rest 
 assured that, in the endless variety of combined cases which 
 practical life daily offers, all the weak or mischievous points 
 of the law will some time or other come into play or develop 
 themselves. In finally making up his mind as to all that is 
 urged for and against a general law, it is average justice which 
 must guide him. In this consists one of the great differences 
 between the legislator and the judge, who must not decide 
 by average justice but deal out specific justice. Finally, the 
 representative ought on no account to change partially or 
 entirely an organic law of the state in order to suit a particu- 
 lar and momentary end, whatever the excitement or strong 
 desire of the moment may be. To do so is the worst of all 
 legislation, even if not against the solemn oath of the law- 
 making department. 
 
 The representative, like every public man, must prove in 
 all his acts that he is actuated by public spirit, by patriot- 
 ism, leading him not only to self-denial, but also controlling 
 him in all the wider circles of his political activity. He 
 ought to obey the law which prevails throughout the uni- 
 verse, that the greater, wider interest prevail over the lesser 
 and narrower. The interest of the country or of the state 
 must be preferred to that of the province; that of the prov- 
 ince to that of a county ; that of a county to that of the 
 town ; that of the town to that of a street ; that of the street 
 to that of a house ; that of the whole house to that of an
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 305 
 
 individual in it ; that of our whole family to that of ourselves 
 individually. 
 
 The fact that every law ought to have the nerve of a gen- 
 eral principle, that it ought to stand the test of general con- 
 sideration, even though it be a private bill or a bill directly 
 affecting but a part of the community, prevents, if conscien- 
 tiously acted upon, that public calamity of legislation arising 
 out of the mutual accommodation of separate and selfish 
 interests, which on a gigantic and enormous scale was acted 
 out when the Roman triumvirs made the grand compromise 
 of their proscription-list, and which is always in principle 
 equally immoral. It is, as we shall see more fully below, 
 directly opposed to the true representative principle, and was 
 one of the great difficulties in the way of safe politics in the 
 states of the middle ages. In a limited degree it is unfortu- 
 nately still acted upon in some legislatures, and has received 
 in one of the American states the vulgar but not unmeaning 
 name of log-rolling, because when the people clear the abo- 
 riginal forests they unite their labor in removing each other's 
 heavy logs. The simile of this union of labor truly applies 
 to the mutual support in the state, but the comparison of the 
 log with a bill to be passed is seriously vicious. It was an 
 awful log-rolling of this character indeed when, as alluded 
 to, Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus united and gave up each 
 other's friends and their common country. In principle, all 
 political log-rolling amounts, more or less, to conspiracy. 
 
 The representatives are deeply interested in always support- 
 ing the character of the true gentleman. Whatever the ap- 
 parent sacrifice for the moment may be, they will greatly gain 
 in the end by it : their example strongly affects the manners 
 and intercourse of the community, and large and gentleman- 
 like conduct in all transactions of life is of moral and polit- 
 ical importance, as has been mentioned before. The whole 
 character, efficiency, and wise action of a deliberative assem- 
 bly depend in a very great degree upon the habitual gentle- 
 manlike conduct and intercourse of its members. Decorum 
 in the speech and manners of legislative assemblies has the 
 VOL. II. 20
 
 306 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 same important bearing on their dignity, their self-respect, 
 and, consequently, on the respect paid by others to their manly 
 action and moral deportment, which universal decorous habits 
 of a nation in dress and domestic life have on a universal feel- 
 ing of independence, self-respect, and political dignity. Per- 
 sonalities, therefore, are usually against order in these assem- 
 blies j 1 nor will a member be apt to resort to them who values 
 even his own influence. It is generally one of the greatest 
 advantages which a member can throw into the hands of an 
 opponent, if he deals in personalities and the other does not 
 retort on him, but shows his respect to the assembly by an 
 unruffled reply. 
 
 Lastly, the representative must be the true representative 
 of his constituents. What is the entire meaning of this ex- 
 pression ? It is the answer to this question which will occupy 
 our attention on the following pages. 
 
 III. According to the natural order of the subject, I ought 
 to treat first of pledges, and then of the right of instruction ; 
 
 1 Hence very properly it is out of order in the British parliament and in all 
 American legislatures and congress to speak of a member by name. The rules 
 of order can, however, carry decorum too far; especially if the order is that 
 members must appear, or at least speak, in a particular dress. This is against all 
 business-like debating, and leads to that unfortunate custom of reading prepared 
 discourse after discourse without any reference of one to another. Louis XVIII. 
 dwells on the importance of his prescription of the robe in which alone the depu- 
 ties were allowed to speak. He was right from his point of view ; it was to 
 restrain genuine debate ; but where real liberty and conformable legislation is 
 the object, the matter assumes a different aspect. It is for business these assem- 
 blies meet, and not for parade ; and no one can have seen the former French 
 chamber of deputies I do not know the precise character of their present trans- 
 actionsand the British commons, without perceiving at once that legislative 
 debating is wholly a natural, genuine thing with the latter, which it had not yet 
 become with the former. As to the members keeping their hats on, as the British 
 commons do, and the members of congress did until 1837, unless speaking, a 
 certain taste of course can alone decide. I confess, I rather liked it ; it showed 
 the business style of the house ; and there is history in it, as well in the case of the 
 English parliament in particular, as that in general the cap, the hat, and to remain 
 covered, have always been with the western race, from the times of the middle 
 ages, the emblems and evidences of liberty and independence.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 307 
 
 but the latter involves a discussion of the true character of 
 representative governments, and many points which materially 
 serve in solving the question of pledges, so that it will be 
 advisable to treat of instruction first. 
 
 By instruction of a representative we understand, in the 
 politics of representative governments, his being directed by 
 his constituents, subsequent to his election, to vote on a 
 question yet depending, in a manner pointed out to him ; or 
 the command over the vote of a representative by his con- 
 stituents. The relations of representatives to those who elect 
 them are different, and the subject of instruction has been 
 viewed accordingly. If a political body, organized and be- 
 longing itself to the government, elect representatives, as is 
 the case with the senators of the United States, who are 
 elected by the state legislatures, instructions are held by 
 many to have mandatory power; that is, they must be obeyed. 
 If the constituents, it is farther maintained by some, are the 
 people themselves, and the convening of them, except at the 
 election, is not regular or in forms prescribed by law, the 
 instruction can have no mandatory power, but ought to be 
 unreservedly obeyed as soon as the representative is con- 
 vinced that the instruction expresses the opinion of the 
 majority of his constituents. 
 
 I shall treat of the subject in as far as it relates to the 
 United States senators separately, and first view the matter in 
 general. 
 
 Before we proceed, however, it is necessary to divest the 
 question of all the undue associations that generally cling to 
 every subject which has strongly and in opposite directions 
 interested large numbers. The most important of these is 
 the belief of many persons that an adherence to the doctrine 
 of instruction is naturally coupled with a warm affection for 
 general liberty, and that those who disclaim the doctrine be- 
 long necessarily to that class of men who habitually distrust 
 the masses or are shy of general liberty. It is easy to be ex- 
 plained why this view should be prevalent now on account of 
 the late history of this doctrine ; yet the view is unfounded,
 
 3 08 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 as can be shown from history. It was the very instructions 
 received by the members of the mediaeval estates which pre- 
 vented the nations, with the exception of England, from rising 
 to general civil liberty ; and, on the other hand, the second 
 republican constitution of France, of 1795, surely not want- 
 ing in democratic spirit, contains the following paragraph 
 ( 52) : "The members of the legislative body are not repre- 
 sentatives of the departments which have elected them, but 
 of the whole nation, and no specific instruction shall be given 
 them." The same expression is to be found almost verbatim 
 in the constitution of the Cisalpine republic of 1797. In all 
 the constitutions established under the dictatorship of Na- 
 poleon, the terms national representative and national repre- 
 sentation are carefully avoided ; and when he was greatly 
 dissatisfied with the deputies, convoked, in consequence of his 
 disastrous campaigns, in 1813, after they had been disregarded 
 during his imperial reign, he said to a deputation of them, 
 "And who are you? Not the representatives of the nation, 
 but the deputies of the departments." 1 On the other hand, 
 again, we find in article ninth of the constitution or " Edict" 
 of the grand duchy of Hesse, of 1820 an instrument which 
 no reader of Anglican views would consider liberal that no 
 member of the first or second chamber can exercise his vote 
 by proxy, or receive instructions for his vote. 2 So has the 
 constitution of the Batavian republic, of 1805, by which Na- 
 
 1 It was on the same occasion, January I, 1814, that Napoleon strikingly ex- 
 pressed the view he took of his whole position : " You strive, in your address, 
 to sever the sovereign from the nation. I alone am the true representative of the 
 nation, for who of you would be able to take upon himself this burden ? The 
 throne is a thing of wood covered with velvet; only he who occupies it gives 
 meaning to it," etc. I have heretofore remarked that Napoleon was the French 
 democracy grown into monarchy; his power rested, like that of the Roman em- 
 perors, upon popular absolutism. See the end of book second. How different 
 from this avowal is the British expression, "The queen is an institution." 
 
 a The prescribed oath, taken by every deputy, runs thus : " I swear fidelity to 
 the grand duke, obedience to the law, punctual observance of the constitution, 
 and to further the common weal only, in the meeting of the deputies, according 
 to my own best conviction, uninfluenced by any charge" (instruction).
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 309 
 
 poleon, having crowned himself as emperor of the French, 
 made that state approach more nearly to monarchy, for which 
 he had destined it, the following provision (Art. 23): "Their 
 high mightinesses (that is, the representatives) vote singly 
 according to their personal opinion, without mandate or in- 
 structions received from the departments. They are in no 
 manner answerable to the departmental meetings for their 
 conduct in the hall of their high mightinesses." The anxiety 
 to sever the representative from his constituents is here evi- 
 dent. Lastly, I may mention here the bill of rights, preceding 
 the constitution of North Carolina, adopted in 1776. Article 
 eighteenth of that bill says, " That the people have a right to 
 assemble together, to consult for the common good, to instruct 
 their representatives, and to apply to the legislature for redress 
 of grievances." But what, according to the public law of that 
 state, this instruction precisely is is not clear ; for the legis- 
 lature of North Carolina passed, in 1838, certain resolutions 
 with reference to the votes to be given by her senators in 
 congress on a question of importance then pending ; and 
 when the senators asked whether they should consider these 
 resolutions as instructions, the legislature passed a resolution 
 declaring that they had spoken clearly enough, and declining 
 any more distinct or mandatory instruction. 
 
 In short, if we peruse the one hundred and thirty or forty 
 written constitutions, more especially so called, which the 
 European race has produced, we shall find that instruction 
 has been declared inadmissible sometimes because the power- 
 holders granting the constitution were afraid of too direct a 
 connection between the representative and his constituents, 
 sometimes because the people establishing the constitution 
 felt that it was impossible otherwise largely to protect civil 
 liberty and give it that guarantee which advanced political 
 civilization and national liberty demand. Adherence to the 
 doctrine of instruction, therefore, is of itself in no way a 
 sign of liberal politics. Instruction has been claimed and 
 disclaimed on entirely opposite grounds, according to the 
 peculiar circumstances of the time.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 IV. The doctrine of instruction, as it is now presented by 
 its advocates in the United States, may be stated thus : The 
 representative ought, as far as he is able, truly to represent the 
 wishes of his constituents, and if on any important question 
 the views and desires of the majority of his constituents are 
 made known to him in any manner which convinces him that 
 it is really the voice of the majority, he ought either to obey, 
 or, if he cannot conscientiously do so, to resign. An attempt 
 is thus made to give to the representative a character between 
 that of a representative and a deputy, the difference between 
 whom we shall presently consider more accurately. The 
 chief arguments urged in favor of the above doctrine, and in 
 fact, as far as my knowledge extends, the only ones, are these : 
 That, could the people meet, as in ancient times, in the mar- 
 ket, they would act for themselves, each according to his 
 interest and views, and that now, when the number of inhab- 
 itants or extent of country prevents them from meeting in a 
 general and primary assembly, it is clear that those who are 
 sent for the mere sake of expediting the business, instead of 
 the people's convening themselves, must speak as the people 
 themselves would have spoken. The representatives are the 
 speaking-trumpets of their constituents, and nothing more. 
 Secondly, which in fact is but the above in other terms, the 
 representative is the servant of his constituents ; and how can 
 he be called a servant if he does not their will ? See Tucker's 
 Blackstone, Appendix, 192, et seq., where Judge Tucker 
 quotes with entire approbation a passage from Burgh's Polit- 
 ical Disquisitions, from which it appears that both of them 
 had in mind, when speaking of popular liberty, what was 
 called in the first part of this work democratic absolutism, 
 seeking for the essence of liberty in the entirely unrestrained 
 execution of the will of the people, which is in practice, as a 
 matter of course, of the multitude or the majority; but not in 
 guarantees, checks, and organic laws, controlling the will of 
 the supreme power, whoever may be its holder. The ques- 
 tion does not, indeed, seem to be solved, according to their 
 own argument, in this manner ; for the term people is in this
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 31 \ 
 
 case, as in so many others, taken in different meanings in the 
 same argument. First, when it is maintained that the repre- 
 sentative is the representative of the people, the word is used 
 as meaning the aggregate of all men of a certain society ; a 
 groundwork is thus obtained for the right of instruction ; but 
 when it comes to the most important point of the right of in- 
 struction, namely the guidance of the individual representa- 
 tive, the word people does not mean any longer the aggregate 
 of all the citizens as imagined in the agora, but the small part 
 only who elected the particular representative. If the repre- 
 sentative is merely a speaking-trumpet of the people who can 
 no longer assemble, it appears to me perfectly clear that con- 
 sistency would actually demand that he should speak say 
 three hours for a measure and one against it, if he has been 
 elected by six thousand votes against two thousand, for these 
 two thousand would or might have spoken in the general 
 assembly and laid their views before the assembly. I beg to 
 observe that this is not advanced in a sportive sense but 
 gravely. If we are to have absolute democracy with agents 
 who do not speak for the minority, this minority loses all the 
 right which it had in the primary assembly. 
 
 Those who build the theory of instruction upon the fact 
 that the representatives are the servants of the people, do not 
 inform us who are meant by the people, whether the voters 
 only, that is the'majority of the voters, or the people at large, 
 of whom many may not have the right to vote but certainly 
 are members of the state and ought to be represented, for in- 
 stance where freeholders or householders alone possess the 
 elective franchise. 
 
 Now, at no time has the doctrine been maintained that 
 the laws of the assembled citizens should be adopted accord- 
 ing to a balance and calculation of the individual and selfish 
 interests of each individual ; but, the frequent practice to 
 the contrary notwithstanding, it has always been maintained" 
 that even when the citizens assembled in the agora they 
 were expected to judge of general measures with reference 
 to general welfare, according to the light which they might
 
 312 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 receive then and there. The contrary has always been con- 
 sidered as detestable meanness, or even selfish treason, and 
 acts of egotism were positively punished in Athens on the 
 ground of egotism. The more corrupt the times in those 
 republics founded upon direct and absolute democracy were, 
 the more frequent and loud we find the demagogues in their 
 protestations that they act for the public benefit only. Where 
 has there ever yet been a man who recommended a measure 
 except on the real or pretended ground of public, that is gen- 
 eral, benefit ? If the Athenian citizen had not been expected 
 to vote with reference to this public and general advantage, 
 but with reference to his tribe, section, or street, I do not see 
 where we can stop until we come down to the individual him- 
 self; and what becomes of public spirit, country, and all that 
 is good and glorious in political life ? No people ever were 
 farther from such views than the ancients. But if the repre- 
 sentative has to obey the so-called instruction of the people, 
 that is the instruction of the majority of voters, which may 
 indeed be a small minority of the people, the result would be 
 far worse than the one resulting from absolute democracy 
 founded upon mere individual selfisnness ; because in the 
 ancient forum each voter heard at least what was urged for 
 and against the subject in question, not indeed elicited by 
 debate or deliberation proper, but at least in the various dis- 
 courses delivered to them ; while in our case, if instruction is 
 believed to be absolute, the vote cannot be affected by the 
 light which may be thrown upon the matter, and a repre- 
 sentative instructed to vote against war, because it would ruin 
 the wealth of his manufacturing or commercial constituents, 
 would have no right to vote for war, though he had become 
 convinced, since he met in the assembly of the representatives, 
 that war alone might save the country from servitude or dis- 
 grace. The citizen in the agora of the ancient city-state would 
 have had, in a corresponding case, the enviable privilege of 
 voting patriotically for a war which he nevertheless knew 
 would make him individually a poor man, or expose the quar- 
 ter of the city in which he happened to live to fearful ravages.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 313 
 
 V. If we resort to representatives only because we cannot 
 any longer meet in the agora ourselves, the whole represen- 
 tative system amounts to nothing more than a second-hand 
 contrivance, something which may be good enough and with 
 which we must put up, since unfortunately we cannot any 
 longer have the true and essential thing itself, the ancient 
 pure, real, and visible market-democracy; a political pis-aller 
 at best ; something indirect and circuitous. 
 
 Yet in reality the representative system is a flower of civil- 
 ization, such as neither antiquity nor the middle ages either 
 enjoyed or conceived of, something direct and positive in 
 itself, an institution having its own full, distinct, and inde- 
 pendent character, the excellence of which is not to be meas- 
 ured by asking how closely it may approach to something 
 beyond it, which would be the best thing could we but have 
 it, but which for some reason or other we must needs resolve 
 to give up forever. The representative system seems to me one 
 of the very greatest of the political institutions that adorn the 
 pages of the history of civilization, for through it alone can 
 be obtained real civil liberty, broad, extensive national lib- 
 erty, founded upon equally extensive political societies, and 
 not on narrow city-communities. 
 
 We might ask, indeed, Why not return to the ancient state 
 of things? Why not split into a number of city-states again? 
 If direct democracy is the only political truth, and the other 
 systems but approximations to it, more or less successful sem- 
 blances of this truth, why do we not strive for this real good, 
 and why are we satisfied with shadows ? Increased popula- 
 tion in modern times cannot be the chief reason which pre- 
 vents us from doing so. Very few parts of the United States, 
 for instance, are now as peopled as Etruria, Sicily, Greece, 
 the Greek colonies, and Phoenicia were, when all these regions 
 were divided into numberless independent states, working out 
 in their way and according to the proper means of their time 
 their own task of civilization. Perhaps we are answered, It 
 might be done, but it cannot be done, because the people will 
 not do it. And why not ? Why should they dread the idea
 
 314 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of shivering their society into numerous parcels in the manner 
 of the ancients, and why could they not do it, even should 
 they attempt it? Because their feeling, sympathy, and very 
 instinct prevent it; not the accidental taste of the time, but 
 the very genius and character, the moving principle of modern 
 times prevents it. Because the people have tasted the sweets 
 and securities, the mutual support and mutual elevation, which 
 modern political society, enlarged as it is yet forming one or- 
 ganized and united thing throughout, the social guarantee 
 which the modern state alone affords, and can afford ; and 
 because this political form, a nationalized society and social- 
 ized population, stands pn an enlarged and broad foundation, 
 is the essential form of our times independent of the denser or 
 sparser population, and is the only form which can satisfy the 
 many high, great, and noble demands which, in the course of 
 civilization, men have come to urge in our present period 
 demands never made in ancient times or the middle ages. 
 
 The free ancient states have been spoken of in the first part 
 of this work. We observed that their character designated 
 them essentially as city-states, and that their liberty consisted 
 mainly in the equal participation of each citizen in govern- 
 ment, not in the broad protection of the individual and his 
 peculiar individual rights. The ancients knew of no nations, 
 in the modern acceptation of the term. There were tribes 
 and races, coalesced or superinduced one upon the other; 
 there existed vast empires, but they were only annexations 
 of countries over which one victorious tribe the Mede, the 
 Persian, the Arab ruled, without fusing the many discordant 
 components into one society, one organized thing, one nation 
 which should be animated and impelled, in some respect or 
 other, by one moral agent, one vital social principle, or im- 
 pulse extending through all parts and through a series of 
 periods. [In fact, the Median, Persian, and Arabic political 
 forms themselves arose out of some coalescence of earlier 
 tribes of blood-relations under one government, and that 
 not without the help of force.] 
 
 In the middle ages, again, we find no state, if we give to that
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 315 
 
 word the sense in which we generally take it, that is, a clearly 
 organized, enlarged political society, until after the time when 
 the free cities had raised themselves into existence. In the 
 earlier times of the middle ages there was but a concatenation, 
 and frequently hardly anything more than a co-existence, of 
 numberless almost independent communities, a feature which, 
 though gradually vanishing, continued to appear down to the 
 beginning of modern history. Everything in the middle ages 
 had a tendency to individual and isolated independence, a 
 condition of things most necessary in the course of civiliza- 
 tion, but below our broad civil liberty. The castles, cities, 
 bishoprics, republics, communities, or whatever the character 
 of the various independent groups and clusters was, were not 
 strictly socialized with one another, that is, they had not 
 grown into one comprehensive society ; one active political 
 system did not pervade and unite the whole, though in most 
 cases the various independent bodies were founded upon the 
 same principle. The various populations had not, properly 
 speaking, become nationalized. 1 This spirit of establishing 
 independent circles was not territorial, but any mass of men 
 united for some permanent purpose was forthwith incor- 
 porated, with rights and prescribed actions peculiarly its own. 
 Every trade, profession, or occupation, even dishonorable 
 occupations 2 formed separate corporations. I do not say that 
 
 1 I beg the reader to keep in mind that I mean by nationalization of the 
 populations the growing of a people, which did not exist in the strictly feudal 
 times, and by nationalization of governments, something entirely different from 
 mere centralization of government. Centralization is the convergence of all 
 the rays of power into one central point; nationalization is the diffusion of 
 the same life-blood through a system of arteries, throughout a body politic ; 
 indeed, it is the growing of the body politic as such, morally and thoroughly 
 cemented, out of a mass otherwise uncememed. The following sections, I trust, 
 will make the subject clearer than it will appear at the present stage to those 
 unversed in the history of the periods touched upon. 
 
 2 Prostitutes were frequently incorporated. There is a curious passage in 
 Thourel's Histoire de Geneve depuis son Origine jusqu'a nos Jours, 1833, relating 
 to the women of the town before the Reformation : " Pour que suivant 1'ancienne 
 coustume ces pecheresses soyent mieux dirigees, elles pourront eslire et se con- 
 stituer une reine, laquelle prestera serment en leurs mains, sur les saints evan-
 
 316 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 these corporations are necessarily hostile to general liberty, 
 nor that they have not been at times too much abandoned in 
 the modern era. We have not to investigate this subject here. 
 But such as the corporations show themselves in the middle 
 ages, they evidently belong to the general spirit of forming 
 little independent circles and appearing each to every other 
 as one separate whole only circles which are in a greater or 
 less degree approximations to sovereignties. 
 
 These independent territories were indeed, in many cases, 
 in contact with one another, but not joined ; connected, but 
 not united. It is the characteristic trait of the feudal times. 
 Indeed, at one time there was such a total dissolution into 
 unconnected baronies, jarring or in open hostility with one 
 another, that an event like the crusades, animating and im- 
 pelling once more whole masses with one and the same idea, 
 became in the opinion of some great historians a real blessing 
 to the Western world. 1 
 
 giles, d'exercer le dit emploi bien et fidelement de tout son pouvoir, sans affection 
 ni haine." 
 
 1 The crusades, though much deplored by some, for instance Sismondi, are 
 nevertheless held by many of the calmest historians to have been one of the most 
 powerful means by which Providence has rescued the Western world from bar- 
 barity and led it on in its amazing career of civilization. Heeren, the historian, 
 places them in this light at the beginning of his essay on the Political Conse- 
 quences of the Reformation (translation, Oxford, 1836), in dwelling on the new 
 impulse they gave to the mental life of Europe, the great political changes which 
 they produced in Europe itself; though their immediate object was no more ob- 
 tained than that for which Columbus started into unknown seas. Abel Remusat, 
 the French Orientalist, among others, has well traced the intercourse of Euro- 
 peans with Asiatic princes, which, relighting as it did the ardor for knowledge, 
 was first of all brought about by the contact of the West and East during the 
 crusades. (See Memoires sur les Relations politiques des Princes Chretiens avec 
 les Empereurs Mongols.) The discovery of America is doubly connected with 
 the crusaders, internally and externally : the first, because that indomitable desire 
 of discovery, adventure, enlargement of knowledge, and of striving physically 
 and mentally beyond the known limits, that peculiar longing for the distant, 
 which characterizes the period of maritime discoveries, standing in close connec- 
 tion with the information continually brought from the East, was first of all 
 caused by the crusades; the latter, because the great Columbus was actually in 
 search of the Zipangi of Marco Polo, when he stumbled on America because it 
 lay across his way.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 317 
 
 While these many separate districts, in the course of civil- 
 ization, could not withstand the gradual and growing social- 
 ization, and were forced into closer contact, they met together, 
 nevertheless, in a very great degree as separate elements, with 
 s parate interes's and desires, separate rights, privileges, char- 
 te s. The estates of the middle ages consisted of deputies, 
 strictly instructed, limited, and fettered; sending for new in- 
 stru.tions on each new question which might turn up; jeal- 
 ously, often hostilely, extorting from one another ; granting 
 and demanding, like separate sovereigns ; little concerned 
 about the advantage of the other parties or general justice and 
 universal fairness ; treating as now a congress of plenipoten- 
 tiaries, sent from various independent nations would do, but 
 upon no broad or social and mutual principle : thus, Guizot 
 observes that " the cortes, like the states-general of France, 
 have been an accident in history, and never a system, never a 
 political organization or regular means of government ;" only 
 we must give a correct sense to the term " accident in his- 
 tory." * In the feudal times we have many independent 
 
 1 The term Accident is so totally denied by some, and, again, superficial ob- 
 servers please themselves so much in ascribing the vastest historical phenomena 
 to accident, that I believe an explanation of this term is not undeserving the 
 brief space of a note. 
 
 If we call accident a fact which has been produced by causes wholly extraneous 
 to a subject but which materially influence the latter, we may certainly say that 
 a man died by accident if his skull was broken by a tile which the violence of 
 the wind tore from a roof, in contradistinction to a death which is the neces- 
 sary consequence of causes in the system of man in general or of this individual in 
 particular. In the highest point of view there are no accidents, inasmuch as we 
 imagine Providence overruling the universe in all its elements. In a historical 
 point of view there are few accidents, far less than many superficial observers 
 imagine, who ascribe wars to momentary indispositions of monarchs and the 
 like. Yet there are certainly accidents of momentous importance. That Gus- 
 tavus Adolphus was shot in the battle at Liitzen was, historically speaking, an 
 accident; for it was a fact brought about by causes not founded in or growing 
 out of the necessary development of society. There was no connection between 
 the social state of Europe and the pistol from which the ball was fired. Yet this 
 accident was [seemingly] of the most momentous consequences for all civilized 
 mankind. How differently, in all probability, would history have turned out had 
 Gustavus Adolphus lived to make himself Protestant emperor of Germany ! Bui
 
 318 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 authorities, but not public authorities ; royal power itself is, 
 down to the times of Louis XI. in France, and of Isabella 
 in Spain, but an isolated feudal power. There were in France 
 pays d"obeissance-le-roi, pays dcs barons, and pays hors fobeis- 
 sance-le-roi. Much of this is, doubtless, to be ascribed to 
 baronial arrogance and lawlessness, but this very baronial 
 arrogance is a thing peculiar to those times, at least in its 
 extent and prevalence. We find in the middle ages power 
 enough, but not public power; an infinity of institutions, but 
 not public institutions; numberless chartered and frequently 
 highly valuable privileges, but not what we now term public 
 law. We have, in brief, as indicated already, separate yet 
 clustered independence, not individual yet public liberty. 
 
 Civil liberty, something very different from feudal independ- 
 ence, became established only in the same degree in which 
 these many separate groups united into a society, these isolated 
 parts into nations, and in which the deputies of the separate 
 estates were transformed into national representatives a 
 career in the history of civilization in which England long 
 preceded all other nations, and for the want of which other 
 countries, such as Germany, Italy, France, and Spain, failed 
 so long to obtain liberty, or fail to this day to enjoy it. For, 
 though the British parliament, having grown into a national 
 body, a body that belonged to and represented political society 
 at large, was also for that reason, in periods when civil liberty 
 was yet but indistinctly felt and seen, more subservient to the 
 
 when some superficial writers tell us that the Reformation was caused by the ac- 
 cident that a bungling seller of indulgences, Tetzel, happened to meet with so 
 fiery a man as Luther, they show how little they know of mankind, society, 
 and the connection of social phenomena. The Reformation must have not only 
 taken place, but pretty much at that period, though neither a Tetzel nor a 
 Luther had ever lived. The estates, therefore, were very far from being acci- 
 dents ; they were most necessary and natural phenomena in the course of the 
 social development of civilized mankind; but we might call them accidents with 
 reference to the effects which some of them hnd in producing national represen- 
 tation, because they arose out of causes which had nothing to do directly with a 
 nationnl representation, but on the contrary were founded upor an opposite prin- 
 ciple, that of chartered, insulated independence.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 monarch, as for instance under Henry VIII., than the deputies 
 of estates in other countries, for instance in Spain, might have 
 proved, still the broad foundation of civil liberty was laid ; 
 and when the period of absorbing centralization of power 
 arrived for the continent of Europe, the British alone of all 
 were able to withstand it, though they had monarchs as wise, 
 and wiser, and as much disposed for centralization, for instance 
 Elizabeth, as much so as Ferdinand the Catholic or Philip II. 
 in Spain, or Louis XI. and Louis XIV. in France. Prescott 
 even distinctly says that the extraordinary power committed 
 to the commons in Castile was unfavorable to their liberties. 1 
 The reason is, as I said before, these independent territories 
 prevented the growth of a foundation for national representa- 
 tion, and that broad, mutual support in the cause of liberty, 
 which cannot be built upon any other foundation ; and when 
 the time came that the many loosely connected political par- 
 cels grew into one real body politic, a firmly knit political 
 society, which process all nations had to follow, because their 
 languages, laws, literatures, and, with many, their churches, 
 necessarily became national, there was no other large power 
 left but the general government, the monarch. It will always 
 remain a characteristic and peculiar feature of British liberty 
 that England passed over from the feudal independence of 
 estates or single communities to national and public liberty, 
 without the intermediate process of entire concentration of 
 power ; or that, at any rate, the attempt at it under the Tu- 
 dors, who did it judiciously, and under the Stuarts, who did it 
 injudiciously did not succeed, but led at once to determined 
 resistance. On the continent of Europe power was firmly 
 concentrated, or where this did not take place, on account of 
 
 1 History of Ferdinand and Isabella, page 50, Introduction. I would like- 
 wise refer to pages 60 and 80 of the same Introduction, as in fact to the whole 
 of it. The reader finds there repeated proofs of the important fact that it was 
 owing to the want of nationalization of the deputies that Castile and Aragon, 
 whose estates enjoyed greater liberties than those of any other extensive coun- 
 tries in the middle ages, did not obtain modern civil liberty, and are now in such 
 painful travail to give birth to it.
 
 320 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the imbecility of government, not of the resistance of the 
 people, as in Spain, a state of things still worse, that of 
 planless interference, a restless and aimless despotism, was 
 the consequence. 
 
 It was, therefore, an immense step made in the cause of 
 French liberty, and indeed the one from which it dates, that 
 in 1789, at the convocation of the estates under Necker, after 
 very protracted debates on the question whether the "cahiers" 
 (instructions) of the deputies should be considered absolutely 
 binding, while many of the nobility desired to join the third 
 estate, but scrupulously doubted whether they were not bound 
 to adhere to their instructions as members of another estate, 
 at length the deputies declared themselves representatives, 
 and the estates changed into a national representation. 
 
 It does not belong to our present inquiry to show how 
 truly fortunate England was, that amid circumstances fre- 
 quently disastrous in their immediate effect, yet beneficial in 
 breaking the power of the barons and producing national 
 representation, this prodigious civil change did not fuse all 
 estates into one chamber, but suffered the idea of estates so 
 far to continue as to assign a separate house to the high no- 
 bility, from which fact the highly important political institu- 
 tion of two houses, or the bi-cameral system, arose. Any one 
 who wishes to convince himself of the actual misery we 
 cannot call it otherwise attending all the debates, if such 
 they can be termed, of the feudal estates, where the necessity 
 of a national system began strongly to be felt, but was pre- 
 vented by the relations of the deputies to their principals, 
 must read the detailed accounts of the French estates, or of 
 the diets of *the German empire. 
 
 The great change of the British deputy into a national 
 representative was consummated in the sixteenth century, 
 especially when the old law, requiring members of parliament 
 to be resident burgesses to make the elections valid, fell into 
 entire disuse. Hallam (Constitutional History, i. 362) says, 
 of a debate on the proposed abolition of the law in 1571, 
 " This is a remarkable and perhaps the earliest assertion of an
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 321 
 
 important constitutional principle, that each member of the 
 house of commons is deputed to serve not only for his con- 
 stituents, but for the whole kingdom ; a principle which marks 
 the distinction between a modern English parliament and such 
 deputations of the estates as were assembled in several conti- 
 nental kingdoms ; a principle to which the house of commons 
 is indebted for its weight and dignity, as well as its beneficial 
 efficiency, and which none but the servile worshippers of the 
 populace are ever found to gainsay." Here I have only to 
 observe that not only worshippers of the populace gainsay it, 
 but persons of the opposite character likewise, because op- 
 posed in their 'whole view to modern popular liberty, which 
 they see well is so closely connected with broad, national 
 representation. Niebuhr, in one of his letters, written in 
 1808, says of Mirabeau, of whom he has just spoken in high 
 terms, "Assuredly he is likewise innocent of the terrible idea 
 of a general representation" (" schreckliche Idee der allge- 
 meinen Representation. " Biographical Notices, vol. ii. p. 72.) 
 Both the licentious demagogue and he who fondly clings to 
 the past age of corporative separation and the consequent 
 systems of mere deputations are right, each in his way, in 
 opposing the vast principle of national representation. 1 
 
 VI. It appears then, and I confidently state, that every page 
 of history will furnish to the student ample evidence of the 
 fact that ancient politics was characteristically city politics ; 
 that a leading political trait of the feudal times was a number 
 of almost independent power-holders under a suzerain, defy- 
 ing, and extorting from, one another; and that the prominent 
 
 1 With reference to various subjects touched upon in the previous section, as 
 well as in several antecedent passages of this work, I would recommend to the 
 reader the perusal or reperusal of the concluding chapters of Sismondi's History 
 of the Italian Republics in the Middle Ages, beginning with chapter 126. The 
 historian gives in them so lucid a view of his opinions upon a variety of subjects 
 connected with ancient and modern liberty, and his opinions are entitled to so 
 much respect, that attentive reflection upon them must be fruitful to the reader^ 
 even though he should differ in some points, as in fact the writer of these lines 
 does, from the philosophical historian. 
 VOL. II. 21
 
 322 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 feature of political activity in modern times consists in the 
 endeavors to establish broad civil liberty, guarantees, checks, 
 and justice, on extensive national grounds, not on accidental 
 specific grants. Hence the universal establishment of consti- 
 tutions so peculiar to our times. The European race has only 
 stepped over the threshold of this third period, having in 
 many cases as yet to struggle against centralization of yower, 
 which frequently was nevertheless necessary in order to an- 
 nihilate feudal baronies. Our modern civil liberty demands 
 justice broadly diffused throughout a state, not chartered or 
 wrung from some one contesting it, obtained separately and in 
 a variety of degrees by the different communities ; it demands 
 the broad guarantee of society, not the specific and chartered 
 ones of essentially independent corporations. An instance 
 will serve as illustration. Where do we expect a firmer guar- 
 antee of the free exercise of religion, or for Protestantism in 
 particular? in modern France, where society at large has 
 pronounced by the constitution that every man shall be al- 
 lowed peaceably to exercise his religion, or after the wars of 
 the League, when the edict of Nantes granted to the Protest- 
 ants a number of fortified places exclusively, and the right to 
 keep armed men ? Where do we expect less hardship and 
 burden ? from a general taxation as in our states, or from the 
 separate and tenaciously contested grants or even immunities 
 and exemptions in the middle ages? In short, where is there 
 more justice, more knowledge, more action, and higher act- 
 ivity, and greater impulse in our bodies politic or socialized 
 states, or in the many smaller or larger circles in the middle 
 ages ? 
 
 These enlarged societies, however, cannot obtain or guar- 
 antee liberty, except by representation, and their representation 
 must be social, national, that is, it must represent not only the 
 separate component parts but the totality of society as one 
 organized whole. The representation itself must form a faith- 
 ful organ of the entire and unbroken society, which, to repeat, 
 is not an agglomeration of severed atoms, but a union of parts 
 belonging to one organic whole.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 323 
 
 It is by this representative system alone that mutual sup- 
 port, mutual reliance, mutual protection, and mutual elevation 
 can be effected, which, as we have seen, constitute the envia- 
 ble trait of modern times. The representatives must'in order 
 to be the true representatives of society, which is one organ- 
 ized, living thing, with nerves and arteries of life ramified 
 throughout, represent this whole society as such ; they again 
 form one whole organ, and though there are only a few con- 
 stitutions which actually impose an oath upon every repre- 
 sentative " not to assent to any law, vote, or proceeding which 
 shall appear to him injurious to the public welfare" (Constitu- 
 tion of New Jersey, adopted in 1777, par. 23), or that "to the 
 best of his power he will contribute to the advancement of the 
 public welfare, without swerving from it on account of indi- 
 vidual or provincial interest" (Constitution of the Netherlands, 
 of 1815, par. 84), yet is not this oath written in every man's 
 heart, is it not actually imposed in our times upon every honest 
 man by plain common sense ? 
 
 And here it ought to be observed that the above oath quoted 
 from the Constitution of the Netherlands is imposed upon the 
 members of the states-general, who are nevertheless elected 
 by the provincial estates, corresponding to the former sover- 
 eign provinces 1 of the United Provinces. 
 
 VII. The representative of modern times, therefore, differs 
 materially from the deputy of the feudal estates. Yet shall 
 he not represent the sense and sentiment of his constituents? 
 
 1 The United Provinces formed, as is well known, a confederacy of sovereign 
 states, which sent deputations, not representatives, to the States-General, not 
 very unlike the Swiss confederacy of the present day, though even less cemented, 
 I believe, than these, according to the law. The confederacy of the Netherlands, 
 which furnishes such a noble chapter to the history of the world, could not act 
 with enough of social organic power, because it did not abandon the feudal 
 idea of deputies and rise to a representation. The confederacy rapidly sank in 
 power and consideration. On the restoration of the independence of the Low 
 Countries, after having formed part of the French empire, we find, therefore, in 
 the constitution, the following paragraph as the first of the division on the States- 
 General : " The States-General represent the nation." Par. 77.
 
 3 2 4 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 He must emphatically do so, not as a deputy of a separate 
 feudal body, representing their limited or perhaps selfish de- 
 sires, but representing them as part and parcel of the state, as 
 a living limb of the whole body politic. That the body of 
 representatives may form a real representation of the whole, 
 it is necessary that the wishes and views of all parts shall have 
 an organ. The representative is not appointed by a few, as a 
 deputy, or minister to carry certain points, but he is elected 
 by the concurrence of voices of his fellow-citizens for the 
 pledges which his constituents find in his whole life: he is 
 elected because his constituents believe that his views, princi- 
 ples, and sympathies are identified with their own, and because 
 he will speak and act as the organ of their public opinion, not 
 as the instructed deputy who shall wring advantages from the 
 others. If it were so, he should receive instructions before- 
 hand. But he represents his constituents fully and wholly, 
 that is, as a body connected with the whole, whose entire 
 public opinion, thus brought together from various parts, mu- 
 tually modifying one another, and insuring the prevalence 01 
 general justice and fairness, passes over through these various 
 organs into the public will of the whole, which is into law. 
 
 It is evident, therefore, that the representative is bound by 
 these two great duties, arising out of the essence of the repre- 
 sentative system itself. On the one hand he must represent 
 as closely and as conscientiously as possible the interests and 
 opinion of the whole district which sends him. He does not 
 only represent the majority of his voters, but the minority 
 likewise ; otherwise insufferable party aristocracy would be at 
 once established ; and if the election has chiefly turned upon 
 some prominent measure, and he be elected by a very small 
 majority of a large number of voters, he is in conscience 
 bound to allow to the views of his minority a very different 
 weight in his judgment from what he would be called upon 
 to do had he been elected by an overwhelming majority. He 
 is farther the representative of the more especial interests of 
 all the non-voters of his district, of the men without votes, 
 of the women, the children, for they are all component and
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 325 
 
 essential parts of the community which he represents for the 
 purpose of finally making up public opinion, and law. On 
 the other hand; he is bound to represent his community, not 
 as a detached part, independent in the feudal sense, but as a 
 living limb of his state or nation, and hence bound to allow 
 the public opinion of the whole its due influence in modifying 
 the opinion which he has brought from his particular section. 
 Else why should he be sent to commune with the other repre- 
 sentatives ? Why should debates precede the passing of 
 bills? Why, in particular, should, in cases of joint appoint- 
 ment, a difference of opinion be permitted ? If they are the 
 deputies of their respective constituent circle only, this would 
 amount to absurdity. In France the elective franchise is 
 comparatively much restricted. On an average each depart- 
 ment has but two thousand two hundred electors, each com- 
 mune but five. Is the representative sent to represent these 
 five men in each commune only, or all men, women, children, 
 and even property ? The French representative, the moment 
 that he is elected, is the national representative, whether he 
 be elected by many or by few. 
 
 That in all the business which has exclusive reference to 
 his section, or to individuals in it, the representative is the 
 peculiar and proper servant of the public, and must give his 
 whole time and exertion to their benefit, and serve them, to 
 the best of his ability, and conscientiously, in endeavoring to 
 obtain all that is right and fair, is evident. 
 
 We see, then, that all that is sacred in civil liberty makes 
 political society equally interested in the two following points: 
 The representative ought frequently to give his trust back to 
 the people, and pass the trial of election, so that he may re- 
 main the true representative of his constituents and of his 
 community. The word frequent is of course a relative term, 
 and must receive its true meaning from a variety of circum- 
 stances ; for there are as many evils in unnecessarily fre- 
 quent elections as there are in those which occur at too long 
 intervals. Secondly, the true character of a representative 
 government does not admit of mandatory instructions to the
 
 326 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 representative, for it makes at once of the representative a 
 mere deputy, who ought to have his instructions from the 
 beginning. But in this case he ceases to be the representative 
 of the people, and becomes a mere plenipotentiary either of a 
 party or corporation. Yet it is true, again, that real public 
 opinion and public will can only be elicited by the closest 
 possible attention of each representative to the interests and 
 desires of his constituents and community ; he therefore will 
 cheerfully be influenced by petitions, resolutions, or any other 
 information from his constituents, a circumstance of the 
 greatest and especial importance in monarchies, in which the 
 influence of the crown must always be great and the repre- 
 sentative is easily seduced from the people. But it would be 
 a serious mistake to believe that special instructions are the 
 best guarantee of the people against the seductions of the 
 crown. Special instructions fetter as often as they lend 
 power, and the crown, or indeed any powerful executive, of 
 whatever name, can be effectually opposed only by free, 
 united, broad, national opposition. The history of England, on 
 the one hand, and that of the continental estates, on the other, 
 prove this fact most abundantly. There are several other 
 considerations against binding representatives by instructions, 
 especially in states where there exist written constitutions, 
 which will presently be given. 
 
 For the present I would sum up the previous remarks thus: 
 The true representative is bound to represent his constituents 
 closely, honesty, and patriotically: closely, so that by the 
 union and mutual modification of the opinion of all parts 
 strictly represented a true opinion of the whole may be formed; 
 honestly, so that he neither meanly nor weakly desert his 
 constituents, nor basely obey the dictates of passing passion 
 or excitement in the district from which he comes ; and, 
 lastly, patriotically, so that he can sacrifice his own advan- 
 tage or that of any part of the state to the benefit and ad- 
 vancement of the whole state. 
 
 These principles will lead to the rule, which I believe will 
 be admitted to be correct, that the representative, constitu-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 327 
 
 tionally elected for a fixed terra, as he is bound to maintain 
 the fundamental law in every way, is also, in his own case, 
 not to infringe it by receiving specific mandatory instructions, 
 since the constitution does not acknowledge them ; but, on 
 the other hand, he will feel obliged, in order to maintain close 
 representation inviolate, to resign as soon as he is convinced 
 that the public opinion of his district decidedly differs from 
 his, not on a single measure, but on a continued course of 
 actions and series of views respecting important political sub- 
 jects, and that they would differ had they all the knowledge 
 which he has acquired in the necessary contact with the other 
 organs of the public opinion of his state. The representative 
 must feel convinced that he differs seriously and permanently, 
 and that the difference does not arise from any sudden and ex- 
 cited change in his constituents ; for in the latter case it is one 
 of the very objects of the constitution, which says that he shall 
 be elected for such a term, to avoid sudden and passionate 
 changes. If one or the other be neglected, it seems to me 
 that the essential character of a representative government is 
 seriously impaired. 
 
 VIII. The meaning of a representative government, it ap- 
 pears, then, is very different from and far nobler than a mere 
 approach to something we cannot obtain, the government of 
 the people in the forum, or the ecclesia, to use the Athenian 
 term. It has a great, a deep meaning of its own, and from 
 what has been observed in the first part of this work, when 
 we considered the nature of power and the necessity of its 
 restriction, in whose hands soever it may be lodged, as well 
 as from the remarks just made, it will sufficiently appear that 
 the following are among the vast advantages which we obtain 
 by this institution which the historian, it may be ventured to 
 affirm, will always consider with reverence and rejoicing. 
 
 Masses are always impetuous. I do not speak of the 
 rabble or mob ; I speak of every mass, high, low, or mixed, 
 as such. Every one of us is impetuous as soon as he belongs 
 to a mass. The reason is simple : so long as we belong to a
 
 328 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 mass, brought together by the same impulse, desire, or in- 
 terest, each individual has but that one object in view, else 
 he would not have joined or been drawn into that mass which 
 strives for it. 1 The moment we are singled out to act for 
 the mass, that moment one of two things must happen: either 
 responsibility is lawfully thrown upon us by the process of 
 some appointment or election, when we feel at once the ne- 
 cessity of circumspection and moderation, because we act for 
 others, and are answerable for the consequences ; or some 
 reason or other, arising out of the impulse or excitement of 
 the agitated mass itself, devolves the duty of leader upon us. 
 The leadership, thus acquired, depends upon the impulse itself, 
 and we feel naturally tempted to lead on the mass in this im- 
 pulse, for every one is careful to maintain that foundation 
 upon which his power or authority rests. Now, as masses 
 cannot in most cases act directly, but must have leaders of 
 some sort or other, these become, in the natural course of 
 things, the rulers or leaders of the unmitigated masses. But 
 by the representative system we obtain these two advantages : 
 we restrict the impulse which is inherent in the mass as such, 
 and must be restricted, because every power-holder needs a 
 check ; and we avoid being ruled by one leader, as the Athe- 
 nians always were in the later portion of their history. We, 
 the people, therefore, are not absent from the legislative halls 
 only because, for local reasons, we cannot be there, but be- 
 cause we ought not to be there as a people, as a mass, for the 
 same reason that in monarchies the king is not allowed to be 
 present in the halls of justice, or as the legislators cannot 
 debate in the presence of the monarch. In both cases the 
 reason is the same. The prince, that is, the power-holder (be 
 he the people or the monarch), must be limited and circum- 
 scribed by law, especially in republics, because, as we have 
 
 1 [In a note Dr. Lieber corrects what he says in the text, adding that " masses 
 are impetuous for two reasons. I. They feel they are not organized, and their 
 action therefore is insecure; they are hasty, anxious. 2. Masses cannot be 
 reasoned with, nor can the members reason with one another. That which is 
 bold, violent, striking, alone can obtain attention and command."]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 329 
 
 seen in Part First, the power of the people is never a theory, 
 as that of a monarch frequently is, but irresistible reality; that 
 is, for the same reason that the power-holder must not sit in 
 judgment, his presence must not overawe the legislature. 
 
 It was right that all the commons were silent when Charles 
 I. went to them on January 4th, 1642, to demand Pym and 
 the four other members from among them ; and it was right 
 for the. British judge to tell the king that he must not come 
 into court. 
 
 The government of a free state must act out public opinion. 
 To do this, two things are necessary : first, it must know 
 public opinion, and, secondly, its action must be the regular 
 action of society, not an irregular series of accidental im- 
 pulses. Public opinion, however, can be ascertained by the 
 sifting process of a representative system only. Otherwise, 
 general, momentary opinion, rumor, even whim, will rule, in- 
 stead of true, settled public opinion. The representative must 
 truly obey public opinion, not momentary impulse, excite- 
 ment, panic, fear, revenge, spite, or fanaticism all of which 
 may seize and have seized masses because they seize upon 
 the individuals composing them. 1 The representative, stand- 
 ing at a distance, being separated from the crowd, feels, in 
 many cases at least, the necessity of calm reflection and of 
 opposition to the sweeping .current of excitement. 
 
 1 " I did not obey your instructions : No. I conformed to the instructions of 
 truth and nature, and maintained your interest, against your opinions, with a 
 constancy that became me. A representative worthy of you ought to be a per- 
 son of stability. I am to look, indeed, to your opinions ; but to such opinions 
 as you and I must have five years hence. I was not to look to the flash of the 
 day. I knew that you chose me, in my place, along with others, to be a pillar 
 of the state, and not a weathercock on the top of the edifice, exalted for my 
 levity and versatility, and of no use but to indicate the shiftings of every fashion? 
 able gale. Would to God the value of my sentiments on Ireland and on America 
 had been at this day a subject of doubt and discussion ! No matter what my 
 sufferings had been, so that this kingdom had kept the authority I wished to 
 maintain by a grave foresight and by an equitable temperance in the use of its 
 power." Burke, in his Speech to the Electors of Bristol in 1780. It will be 
 well for the American reader to consider what the instructions were he consid- 
 erately disregarded.
 
 330 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 All unmeditated action in politics is dangerous, because it 
 is power, for unrestricted power, be it physical, mental, or 
 moral, is hazardous and dangerous. But not only this ; im- 
 petuous and direct action, mischievous as it may be at the 
 moment, is apt suddenly to lose its hold again. It is the 
 gradual but well-directed action, in almost all cases, which is 
 certain. The British house of commons, which at present has 
 in reality the appointment of ministers, acts much more safely 
 and powerfully than when in 1641, and on some other occa- 
 sions, it aimed at direct appointment. It may safely be said 
 that upon the whole the commons have an infinitely stronger 
 influence over the ministers now than they would have were 
 the appointment thrown upon them. . 
 
 Masses are swayed by gratitude or the imposing pageantry 
 of power, and, enraptured or bewildered, grant away their 
 rights ; the representative acts for others, and is cautious, pro- 
 vided only there are sufficient means to make him always a 
 true representative. 
 
 By a representative government alone we can arrive at 
 political truth. 
 
 By it alone, deliberation, debate, which neither absolute 
 democracy on the one hand nor instructed deputations on the 
 other admit of, becomes possible ; and debate, whatever its 
 frequent abuses may be, is of the utmost importance for civil 
 liberty. Frequently, indeed, precious time is wasted by point- 
 less speeches of unreasonable length ; but we must not forget 
 the mass of political information which thus is daily thrown 
 among the public. Frequently members will be infatuated by 
 party spirit, so that they will not listen to truth ; but we ought 
 to remember that debate also, in many cases, prevents them 
 from becoming so infatuated. Debate, well guided, is an 
 indispensable palladium of civil liberty. Instruction would 
 make, and unfortunately has made, out of deliberative assem- 
 blies, assemblies without freedom of deliberation and without 
 freedom of thought, which is a tyranny with painful conse- 
 quences. Indeed, directing men to vote one way or the other, 
 in a case in which it is nevertheless maintained that previous
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 33! 
 
 inquiry ought to guide, is repugnant to all respect for truth 
 and for conscience. Napoleon, so it is said, directed at times 
 courts-martial to find persons guilty before the trial had com- 
 menced. It may not be true ; but what does every reader feel 
 in reading it ? 
 
 By the representative system alone we can act upon the 
 salutary principle of the majority, the social principle, to the 
 exclusion of the unanimity principle or principle of feudal 
 independency. On this point presently more. 
 
 By the representative system, that is, by a representation 
 gathered from the whole society, upon uniform and extensive 
 principles proportionally applied to that society, we alone are 
 able to gather public opinion. The deputy system does not 
 aim at arriving at the public opinion of the state ; it merely 
 strives to redress single " grievances." Hence it could happen 
 and be tolerated that the deputation from one city represented 
 many cities, that of Salamanca, for instance, about a hun- 
 dred places, from which it received their various instructions 
 and acted accordingly. To have the "grievances" redressed 
 was the main business of the deputy ; to have public opinion 
 gathered and acted out is the essence of representation. 
 
 By the representative system alone can be secured publicity 
 of governmental action, which cannot be done in absolute un- 
 represented democracies, because there cannot be there real 
 debates. By the representative government alone the exten- 
 sion of a political society can be united with substantial public 
 liberty; the necessary energy of a government with its equally 
 necessary control ; and by it alone we can safely steer be- 
 tween the fanaticism of theorists and unprincipled expediency 
 one of the great objects of good government. 
 
 IX. From the foregoing remarks it will appear, therefore, 
 how little those writers on politics have penetrated into the 
 essence and real meaning of the representative principle, who 
 consider it as the main problem to unite the extension of 
 states with the ultimate rule and sway of the multitude alone, 
 as ascertained by a census. The true and difficult object in
 
 332 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 politics, as everywhere where men have to act, is to secure by 
 wise, that is by safe and appropriate, means, the discovery of 
 truth and the empire of mind over matter, chance, force, and 
 bulk. The mere number of itself does no more guarantee 
 truth than the chance of birth. There can be no doubt that 
 an overwhelming majority of all the inhabitants of the earth 
 believe that the sun moves and not the earth, or that the 
 chief object in punishing offenders is to deter others by the 
 acuteness of suffering inflicted upon the former. Yet both 
 opinions are equally wrong : and we justly prefer to adopt 
 the opinion of those comparatively few whom we have good 
 reason to believe well acquainted with the truth, the opinion 
 of countless millions to the contrary. Few, indeed, of all 
 the men that people our globe believe in one God, spiritual, 
 omnipotent, and omniscient ; yet we hold fast to the belief 
 in him. Suppose, however, that we had agreed that the 
 opinion of the mere number should sway, that is, as we 
 termed it, the general opinion, and not the public opinion, 
 which is, I repeat, the opinion of society as an organized 
 thing, settled and influenced by the knowledge of those who 
 best understand the respective subject, their views and conclu- 
 sions having been likewise influenced and modified both by 
 the action of society upon them in forming their views and in 
 receiving them suppose we had agreed to this abstract 
 principle, we should be still as far from the ultimate object as 
 before. For if the mere theorist says that each man shall 
 vote, and that nothing shall be law unless directly voted for 
 by the majority of all the individual men composing the re- 
 spective political society, the question arises at once, Who 
 are these men that must have the right? Shall women vote? 
 and if not, why? Shall children vote ? and if not, upon what 
 abstract ground do we decide that the twenty-first year, for 
 instance, shall mark the distinction between the mature and 
 the immature intellect ? Many a youth is wiser at twenty 
 than other persons at fifty years of age, as our daily expe- 
 rience proves. Nay, more, how is it that the principle of 
 maturity of mind is suddenly added to the theory which
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 333 
 
 nevertheless was originally founded upon the principle of 
 number alone? 
 
 James Harrington, the celebrated author of the Oceana, 
 which was published during the protectorate and intended to 
 be the image of a pure republic, provides in that work that 
 the people shall elect a senate, and this senate the highest 
 officers with a strategus at the head. The senate alone has 
 the right of proposing laws, on each of which the people vote 
 and adopt or reject it accordingly. This is the idea upon 
 which the right of direct and binding instruction is demanded, 
 carried out consistently. Not to regard, however, the utter 
 impracticability of this constitution, it would nowise guarantee 
 the ascertaining of true public opinion, for reasons given 
 above. 
 
 It is a universal law, pervading all physical and intellectual 
 creation, so far as human observation and experience reach, 
 without one exception, that the higher or nobler the thing, 
 being, or object to be produced or obtained, the longer 
 and more varied is the chain of processes, and the more or- 
 ganic are these processes, by which it has been matured; and 
 the lower the thing or creature, the more it is determined 
 by agents from without; the higher it is, the more active 
 becomes its own organization within. A mushroom starts 
 into existence perfect, within a few hours, so soon as the 
 necessary agents from without exist, but it takes a long 
 time and requires a variety of processes, one connected with 
 the other, before the flower of the magnolia adorns the rich 
 foliage of its noble tree. The infusory animal detaches part 
 of its body, and a new being moves quickly for itself, but il 
 requires a long time before man's body and mind arrive at 
 maturity; and before he comes into existence as a detached 
 individual he has undergone a long series of the most wonder- 
 ful processes and transformations in order to become suffi- 
 ciently matured for parturition. The same principle obtains 
 in the intellectual and political world. For a gross nation, 
 gross despotism, perhaps determined by gross chance or the 
 equally gross principle of mere force, may suffice. The little
 
 334 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of opin on which exists in a tribe on the pampas of America 
 or the steppes of the East is easily ascertained. The signal 
 is given, the men assemble, a proposition is made, assent or 
 dissent is expressed, and the whole process is at an end ; but 
 the public opinion of an extensive, civilized, and organized 
 society is neither so rapidly generated nor so rapidly ascer- 
 tained. The farther society advances, the higher it rises, the 
 more organic must be the process by which it is ascertained, 
 and stripped of casual adhesion due to prejudice, interest, or 
 excitement; and this organic process for producing the flower 
 of public opinion upon the many-branched tree of society is 
 effected, so it seems to me, by the representative system. In 
 this consists its highest meaning, and as such it has a high 
 value of its own, not a mere relative one by way of approxi- 
 mation to something beyond our reach a value which we 
 shall honor and cherish the more, the better we become 
 acquainted with the true spirit of past ages and the occur- 
 rences of the day, and which will the more inspire us with' 
 an ardent desire to cultivate, perfect, and expand, not to stint 
 and cripple it, the more we penetrate its essence. 
 
 X. If the doctrine of instruction be right, I hold it to be 
 evident that it is entirely inconsistent to allow an instructed 
 member, who disagrees with his instruction, to resign before 
 he has voted. He who acts the part of a deputy or pleni- 
 potentiary is bound first to vote according to instruction, and 
 then he may ask leave to resign ; otherwise his constituents 
 lose unjustly their vote or share of influence upon final action. 
 Such action would have been expected of every deputy in the 
 middle ages, and to this day would be expected of an ambas- 
 sador, who may conscientiously do thus because he is. nothing 
 but an agent sent for the very purpose of voting, if any voting 
 is to be done, in a prescribed way ; but who is a representative 
 in no real sense of the word, and is only so called because he 
 resembles one in the outward form. But what honorable and 
 independent man would degrade himself so low as to defile 
 his lips by a vote against his conscience and judgment, when
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 335 
 
 he was sent under oath to vote according to truth, to the 
 fulness of conscience and the best of his judgment ? If repre- 
 sentatives are nothing but deputed officers, why would it be 
 considered an outrageous act of immorality if a representative 
 coming from a manufacturing or agricultural district were to 
 take money for defending the interests committed to him, as 
 the lawyer does, and as the deputies in the middle ages fre- 
 quently did, or as to this day advocates do when sent by some 
 corporation or society to the bar of the commons ? No one 
 finds fault with them. If we have the right bindingly to in- 
 struct after the election, we have likewise a right to elect on 
 condition of certain instructions, and may exact " elective 
 capitulations," as the conditions were called upon which the 
 German electors used to elect the emperor. Suppose our 
 electors of the President of the United States were either to 
 agree upon such an elective capitulation before the election, or 
 to send him instructions after election : would not the whole 
 people scorn the idea, or consider it as a most arrant con- 
 spiracy ? Yet this is quite imaginable, and there is not one 
 argument brought in favor of instruction of representatives 
 which would not apply to the assumed case. If the doctrine 
 of instruction is sound, it is but the legitimate inference that 
 the constituents should have also the right to recall their 
 representative, as the deputies of the former estates were fre- 
 quently recalled. Yet why do the constitutions of representa- 
 tive governments nowhere give this very important power, but 
 universally prescribe the term for which a representative is to 
 be elected, which was rarely done in the ancient estates and 
 only where they approached the representative system ? Be- 
 cause it has been universally felt that a representative differs 
 in character from the deputy. 1 We may go farther : if the 
 
 1 One of the senators of the United States, from Virginia, who was instructed 
 to vote for the well-known expunging resolution, says, indeed, in his letter of 
 February 27, 1836, to the legislature of Virginia, when declining to comply with 
 their behest, " I do not hesitate to declare that if you had, as the accredited 
 organs of the people, addressed me a request to vacate my seat in the senate, 
 your request would have had with me the force of law : not a day or an hour
 
 336 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 representative is the mere agent acting under instruction of 
 those who unfortunately cannot be present themselves, I 
 maintain that not only ought the constituents to have a right 
 to recall him, but they ought to have the undeniable right of 
 vetoing his vote, as was actually proposed by some theorizing 
 politician in the French constituent assembly. He was perfectly 
 consistent, if he believed the representatives to be assembled 
 there merely because all France could not be present. The veto 
 of the supreme executive upon any treaty signed by a plenipo- 
 tentiary is now universally acknowledged, and the same ought 
 to hold good if our representatives are but plenipotentiaries. 1 
 
 It is said the representative is elected by his constituents, 
 he is their servant, and must do their bidding, " otherwise it 
 is a confined aristocracy, in which the people have nothing 
 more to do than to choose their rulers, over whose proceed- 
 ings, however despotic and repugnant to the nature and prin- 
 ciples of the fundamental laws of the state, they have no 
 control." 2 If this be true, the Americans live most assuredly 
 under a confined monarchy, for no president would obey an 
 instruction; nor would this absence of all confidence be in 
 the slightest degree a guarantee against despotic proceedings. 
 
 A mere term has considerably misled in this inquiry, as in 
 so many others. The representative is called a servant of the 
 people ; so is the president of the United States called, and 
 he frequently calls himself, a servant of the people ; but the 
 word " servant," from the servus servorum, as the pope signs 
 himself, down to the menial negro, is used in very dififerent 
 
 could I desire to remain in the senate beyond that hour wherein I came to be 
 informed that it was the settled wish of the people of Virginia that I should 
 retire from their service." This is introducing a very extraordinary and serious 
 power, of which the constitution knows nothing, if it mean that in instructing 
 the legislature really expresses the " settled wish of the people." How can we 
 know that they do ? They were not elected, according to the constitution, to 
 express such an opinion. 
 
 1 [For this, which is not universally acknowledged in regard to treaties con- 
 cluded according to full powers and secret instructions both, see Wheaton, 
 Elements, part iii. 2, | 257-263.] 
 
 a Tucker's Blackstone, Appendix, p. 193.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 337 
 
 meanings. It may signify one that serves another, labors for 
 him, or one that mechanically does as he is bid to do. It is 
 always considered an honor to be a representative, but there 
 is no honor in doing the bidding of any one, people or mon- 
 arch, without individual independence. The representative 
 system requires not only men of talent, but of manly inde- 
 pendence ; liberty is not efficiently served by menials, or by 
 men who do not think independently and who shrink from 
 speaking and voting in candor and conscience. The doctrine 
 of instruction greatly favors hypocrisy, for cases have occurred 
 when representatives, seeing that measures upon which they 
 stood compromised were fast losing ground, sent home to be 
 instructed to vote contrary to the votes formerly given by 
 them. 1 Where there is a constitution and properly speaking 
 there is a constitution that is fundamental law wherever there 
 are representatives but especially where there is a written 
 constitution, upon which the representative takes his oath, the 
 right of instruction becomes especially incongruous, for the 
 representative is a guardian and trustee of and under the con- 
 stitution upon oath that constitution which is far above him 
 and his constituents. It cannot be maintained that if he is 
 instructed to do what he holds to be contrary to the constitu- 
 tion as when the Virginia senators were instructed by their 
 legislature to vote for the renowned expunging resolution 
 the very fact that his own constituents, the very makers of his 
 authority, view it differently, shows him that he must yield. 
 The legislature of South Carolina elects the supreme judges 
 of the state; the judge takes the oath upon the constitu- 
 tion, and may be called upon not only to act dissentingly from 
 the legislature which actually made him, but as judge may 
 declare a law which it has passed unconstitutional. How is 
 this, if the relation of the electors and the elected neces- 
 sarily creates the relation of master and servant, ordainer and 
 
 1 It is a well-known anecdote, that John Wilkes, with whom the modern his- 
 tory of the instruction question may be said to begin, when asked how it was 
 possible to allow his judgment to be fettered by such a rabble as had instructed 
 him, answered, " Oh, as to that, I always take care to write my own instructions.'* 
 VOL. II. 22
 
 338 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 obeyer? How is it in the militia, where officers are elected 
 by the rank and file ? 
 
 The advocates of the right of instruction appear to forget 
 one fact, which seems to me very weighty. Among other 
 political guarantees we have constitutions, fundamental laws, 
 we have representatives, and fixed periods for renewed elec- 
 tions, for the purpose of protecting the community, for the 
 continuity of views and opinions for a certain space of time in 
 the legislation of the country ; and we have laws to secure 
 that manner of election by which the state hopes to secure 
 best the rights of all citizens, that is, impartial elections 
 and certainty of election. Whatever the representative, thus 
 elected by the organic law of the state, does, he does consti- 
 tutionally, so long as he remains within the strict sphere of the 
 constitution. But suddenly we have an extra-constitutional 
 interference; men hold a meeting unappointed by law, unguar- 
 anteed as to its regularity, and they assume not to select -an 
 organ of legislation but something far more, to bid this organ 
 already elected to legislate one way or the other. In Virginia, 
 cases have actually occurred when papers were carried to the 
 constituents to sign their names whether for or against the 
 proposed instruction. The minority may be deeply interested 
 in not having the member instructed thus extra-constitution- 
 ally ; they are wronged out of their right ; it becomes tyran- 
 nical ex parte legislation. The right of instruction may be 
 easily made use of by skilfully seizing upon some excitement 
 to " instruct a representative out of his seat," who may be dis- 
 agreeable to some of his party. And, in general, it is highly 
 dangerous to allow any man or any number of men or any 
 authority to arrogate power not strictly laid down by the law. 
 It is incompatible with all civil liberty. Binding and com- 
 manding instruction seems to me to loosen the very founda- 
 tion-stones of true essential modern liberty in its broad, noble, 
 and elevated character, because it defeats one of the essential 
 features of the representative system, without which modern 
 liberty cannot exist. -Washington was averse to positive 
 instruction. (Sparks's Writings of Washington, i. 491.)
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 The Subject of Instruction with particular Reference to the United States. The 
 ancient Articles of Confederation founded upon the Deputative System. The 
 Articles of Confederation compared to the Constitution of the former United 
 Provinces of the Netherlands, the Swiss Act of Mediation, the present Constitu- 
 tion of the Swiss Confederation, and the Germanic Confederacy. The Consti- 
 tution of the United States boldly changed the former deputative character of 
 the Confederacy into a representative one. Senators are not Ambassadors. In 
 Leagues the strongest Member of those on terms of parity according to the 
 letter must sway. Hegemony in Greece, Phoenicia, the Low Countries, etc. 
 Relation of the State Legislatures to the respective Senators elected by them. 
 The History of Instruction in modern times, as connected with the Repre- 
 sentative System. 
 
 XI. IN order to show completely the relation of moral re- 
 sponsibility in which I hold a representative* to stand to his 
 constituents, it will be necessary to treat of the subject of 
 Pledges. Before we proceed to it, however, I must say a few 
 words on the right of instruction, with peculiar reference to 
 the relation in which the senators of the United States stand 
 to the several legislatures by which they are elected. 
 
 Very rarely indeed has the doctrine of instruction been 
 acted upon in the United States by the primitive constituents 
 of a representative in congress. The whole discussion as a 
 practical question seems to have reference to the senators ex- 
 clusively, and the reason can easily be perceived. As to the 
 representatives the case is too clear ; they are real representa- 
 tives of the people, not deputies, forming a national represen- 
 tation, not states-general ; and whatever the theory may be, or 
 jealousy or love of power may prompt some to assert, sound 
 instinct, produced by long valuable political tradition in the 
 Anglican race, and good common sense require the people 
 at large to view their representative only in the light of a 
 representative and not in that of a circumscribed or fettered 
 deputy. It is different with regard to the senators; their 
 
 339
 
 340 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 election, as well as the formation of the senate, differs mate- 
 rially from that of the representatives, and it is necessary, 
 therefore, that we should ascertain the precise character of the 
 senate of the United States. Thus alone we shall be able to 
 judge correctly of the right of instructing its members. 
 
 The confederacy of the United States under the ancient 
 Articles of Confederation of 1778 was nothing more than a 
 league of entirely independent states (politically independent 
 though united by feeling and sympathy), connected only by 
 whatever might be agreed upon by their deputations, accord- 
 ing to certain principles primarily adopted by the states ; 
 without any system or government proper ; resembling the 
 union of the former United Provinces of the Netherlands, or 
 of the Swiss Cantons [under the Constitution of 1815]. In 
 some respects the American Confederacy was a closer union, 
 in others it was a looser one, but, if I mistake not, congress 
 had the nature and character of states-general, and nothing 
 else. The members of congress were deputies, and no more. 
 This appears clearly from the Articles of Confederation them- 
 selves, and, among other points, from these : The states 
 appoint the delegates as they think best, and may recall them 
 in order to send others (art. 5,1); their number is left to the 
 option of the states, although for the sake of expedition of 
 business and for other reasons the minimum of two, which 
 became the prototype for the later number of senators under 
 our present constitution, and the maximum of seven, were 
 fixed (5, 2); each state was to maintain her delegation, be- 
 cause she alone was interested in it (5, 3); each state -was to 
 have but one vote, as a matter of course, according to the 
 common principle in the feudal estates applicable to commu- 
 nities, professions, provinces, classes, and estates, because the 
 deputies represented their respective primaries as a whole, and 
 only them. If the deputies of any state were equally divided, 
 the state lost the vote. Upon all the material points of the 
 confederacy nine assenting states were necessary (9, 6). 
 
 Let us compare these features with the corresponding ones 
 in the most prominent confederacies of modern times. The
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 341 
 
 Netherlands, as I mentioned before, never elevated themselves 
 to broad social or national representation; their governments, 
 provincial or general, never became enlarged social govern- 
 ments, but remained chains of more or less connected inde- 
 pendent communities ; even the single cities had supreme or 
 "sovereign rights," of which it was a natural consequence on 
 the one hand that no resolution of the provincial states was 
 considered binding unless it passed by unanimous concurrence, 
 and on the other hand that the utmost inequality of represen- 
 tation existed : the cities formed the powerful aristocracy, the 
 farmers were almost entirely disregarded. 1 The reader will re- 
 member an instance I mentioned, when speaking of the love of 
 power, in the first part of this work. We must always keep in 
 mind that the principle of the feudal times was mutual exaction 
 of liberty, or at least separate conquest of liberty ; the motto, 
 get as much as you can, without reference to proportion, to 
 general fairness, to common welfare. The principle of modern 
 liberty, of socialized states, is public liberty, public, that is, 
 common and mutual guarantee, public check, universal jus- 
 tice. The oath of fidelity by the stadtholder and soldiers was 
 taken to the " confederate states of the Low Countries, that 
 is, to the higher and the inferior orders of nobles, and to the 
 magistrates of the towns of Holland," etc. Nothing can show 
 more clearly the difference which I have endeavored to ex- 
 
 1 In addition to the striking instance alluded to, I will mention here that in the 
 province of Holland the independent communities of the province were repre- 
 sented by nineteen deputies chosen out of the nobility, the senators, and magis- 
 trates (that is, city authorities) ; the nobles having but one voice, the cities 
 eighteen. The farmers, who bore the heaviest public burden, were neglected. 
 Amsterdam had but one single voice in the states, and the smallest city in the 
 province likewise. I believe the constitutional history of no state after that of 
 Great Britain is so instructive to an American as that of the United Provinces, 
 such as we may learn it from Basnage, Annales ' des Provinces Unies depuis la 
 Negotiation pour la Paix de Munster, avec la Description historique de leur 
 Gouvernement. The ancient cortes of Castile excluded many old cities, and 
 would not readmit their deputies, after they had omitted to send them, and Pres- 
 cott justly says they " imprudently" excluded the old cities, because, as I ob- 
 served before, it was an additional obstacle in the way of the formation of a 
 national or social representation.
 
 342 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 hibit between the feudal principle of independence, with the 
 consequent deputative system, on the one hand, and the 
 modern social states-principle of civil liberty and civil guar- 
 antee, with the consequent representative system, on the 
 other. The effects of this system were consistent ; the states- 
 general of the United Provinces could decide upon war and 
 peace, treaties of commerce, and all taxes and impost, by 
 unanimous concurrence only. 
 
 I have on a former occasion briefly touched upon the prin- 
 ciple of unanimity and majority in voting; we shall now be 
 able to understand what otherwise appears so absurd, that a 
 single man should have had the right of vetoing the proce- 
 dure of an assembly, as it is frequently expressed, in the old 
 estates. The expression is not accurate. The term veto ex- 
 presses the idea of nullifying the action of some united body; 
 but the old deputies were not such ; unanimity was with them 
 as natural, according to the principle which gave them exist- 
 ence, as it is now with a congress ( of ambassadors ; each party 
 is bound only so far as it has assented, because entirely inde- 
 pendent ; so that defeating a general result by a single dissent 
 was as little a veto with those ancient estates as it would be 
 with ambassadors at present. If the principle of unanimity 
 was, nevertheless, in many minor cases abandoned, it was 
 because the mere furtherance of business required it. But 
 the principle appears more or less in all the most important 
 estates (cortes, diets, etc.) in the middle ages, strongly at first, 
 and the less so the more the various countries became national- 
 ized and the interest of the different parts began more and 
 more to affect one another. The salutary majority principle 
 could only become known and well introduced with the com- 
 plete victory of representation over deputation. 
 
 The Grand Pensionary of Holland, the chief officer of the 
 chief province, and, indeed, virtually, the executive and chief 
 magistrate of the whole United Provinces, took place after 
 the deputies, because the latter represented independences, 
 corporations with " sovereign rights." The members of the 
 states-general came to no resolution without instruction and
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 343 
 
 specific authorization from home; the provinces sent two 
 or more members at pleasure, but the votes were given by 
 provinces, not by the single voices of members ; the time of 
 service for deputies was differently regulated in the various 
 provinces, as if it were a matter of utter indifference to the 
 states-general ; some were chosen even for life. 1 I have men- 
 tioned already the amended constitution of the Netherlands 
 of 1815, which declares each member of the states-general to 
 be a national representative, and gives him, consequently, a 
 vote belonging to his moral, individual self as representative, 
 not to his deputed authority as a mere deputy, nor depending 
 on instructions, and settles their number, though they are 
 elected, as formerly, by the provincial states. (Constitution 
 of the Netherlands, 83.) 
 
 The Swiss Act of Mediation (of February 19, 1803), di- 
 gested under the direct influence of Napoleon, 2 in order to 
 abolish the democratic concentrated government then lately 
 established in imitation of France, ordains that each canton 
 shall send one deputy to the general congress (Tagsatzung), 
 that they shall have definite instructions and powers of attor- 
 ney, and shall not vote against their instructions. (Ch. 20, 
 tit. i, 25, 26.) And by the Swiss Act of Union of August 
 7, 1815, it is ordained that congress (Tagsatzung) shall consist 
 of "ambassadors from the sovereign estates," meaning the 
 cantons. They are the ambassadors of the twenty-two can- 
 tons and are bound to vote by their instructions. Each canton 
 has one voice. Three-fourths of the votes are necessary for 
 war or peace, treaties, and some important internal affairs. 
 (Act of*Union, 8.) Lastly, let us throw a glance at the 
 
 1 The deputy is the special agent or ambassador of the body which sends him ; 
 he has no general character as a member of one common system, as the repre- 
 sentative has. What did it matter to the powers assembled in the congress of 
 Vienna whether the minister of one or the other was recalled and another sent ? 
 The case of the deputy is similar. 
 
 2 Napoleon, in the days of his greatest power, called himself emperor of the 
 French, king of Italy (not of the Italians), protector of the Rhenish Confederacy, 
 and Mediator of Switzerland.
 
 344 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 present Germanic confederacy [1838]. If ever a government 
 unfolded itself under most unfortunate circumstances, it was the 
 former Germanic empire, which had all the vices and organic 
 defects of an elective monarchy, with this evil superadded, that 
 while in other countries the nobles were reduced and national 
 monarchy rose, the nobles in Germany reduced the emperor 
 and made themselves independent, while the subjects lost the 
 advantages which they would have derived from a national 
 government. The imperial monarchy had the effect of pro- 
 ducing the independence of all the princes and petty states of 
 the empire, and the consequent exposure and humiliation of 
 Germany. Napoleon consolidated them considerably; and 
 when he fell, the German princes felt that a union of some 
 sort or other was deeply founded in the spirit of the nation 
 and called for upon the score of common safety; consequently 
 the Germanic Act of Union of 1815 was adopted at the Con- 
 gress of Vienna. The Germanic confederacy is a league of 
 princes and states, who send ambassadors to the diet, which 
 ambassadors, of course, act by regular instruction ; the mem- 
 bers vote in two different ways, either in the " closer meeting," 
 in which the larger Germanic powers have each one vote, but 
 three, four, or five together of the petty states only one ; or 
 the}'- vote in " plenum," some states, as Austria, Prussia, etc., 
 having four votes, others three, two, and each member of the 
 Union at least one. Austria has the permanent precedency. 
 This brief exhibition alone will suffice to show its unnational, 
 unrepresentative character, in which the people at large have 
 indeed little interest, as to their advantage. The Act of Con- 
 federation of the Rhine (of July 12, 1 806), under the* protec- 
 torship of Napoleon, needs not to be mentioned here : it was 
 a mere league of princes. 1 
 
 1 [The present constitution of the latest German empire, framed in 1870, says 
 of the Reichstag, or house elected by direct vote of the people, that the members 
 " are representatives of the people as a whole, and not bound to commissions 
 and instructions." (Art. 29.) It is otherwise with the Bundesrath, or Federal 
 Council. Art. 7.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 345 
 
 XII. How much superior, how lofty and great, appears our 
 federal constitution, the very first in history in which the bold 
 attempt has been made of substituting the representative sys- 
 tem for the deputative in a confederation, thus adapting it to 
 the necessary tendency of modern public liberty, and securing 
 those advantages which such a system alone can possibly 
 guarantee! As^a federal charter, it is a matchless monument 
 in history matchless, indeed, despite the faults which it may 
 be supposed to have on general grounds, for it is the work 
 of men, and some of which it is not difficult now to discover; 
 yet the historian, without blind or slavish idolatry, cannot 
 help frequently gazing with reverence at this grand fabric, 
 built upon such simple principles and on so vast a scale. 
 
 That the deputative character of the ancient congress was 
 boldly and grandly transformed into a representative, we see 
 from the constitution of the United States ; and especially I 
 beg the reader to compare the following points with those 
 of the Act of Confederation which I cited -above in order to 
 prove the deputative character of the ancient congress. 
 
 First of all the constitution establishes an entire govern- 
 ment with separate and regular branches, and it establishes 
 not only a separate legislative branch, but this branch on the 
 principle of two chambers which belongs to the representative 
 system ; it separates from " congress" the executive, elected 
 by the people of all the states at large, and unlike an execu- 
 tive committee of deputies chosen from among themselves, 
 such as the former " committee of the states." (Articles of 
 Confederation, 5.) 
 
 The first paragraph of the " constitution" (no longer called 
 articles of confederation) establishes a house of representa- 
 tives (no longer mere delegates). (Art. I, sect. I, I.) 
 
 The time for which the senators and representatives are 
 elected is fixed. (Art I, sect. 2, I, sect. 3, I.) 
 
 The number of senators to be sent from each state is fixed, 
 yet one individual vote is constitutionally secured to each 
 senator. They vote personally or individually, not deputa- 
 tively [and an organic character is given to the senate as a
 
 346 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 whole by the provision that one-third is renewed every second 
 year]. (Ibid.) 
 
 Congress may make all elective regulations, except as to 
 the places of choosing senators. (Art. I, sect. 4, I.) 
 
 Each house is to judge of the election returns and qualifi- 
 cations of its own members, which is incompatible with depu- 
 tations. (Art. I, sect. 5, I.) 
 
 A majority of each house forms a quorum. (Ibid.) 
 
 Each house may punish its members for disorderly be- 
 havior, and even expel a member by two-thirds of the votes. 
 (Art. i, sect. 5, 2.) 
 
 The yeas and nays may be easily demanded, that is, it is in 
 the power of one-fifth of those present to throw each member 
 upon his individual responsibility and representative character. 
 (Art. i, sect. 5, 3.) 
 
 Senators and representatives are compensated out of the 
 treasury of the United States (Art. i, sect. 6, i), and not 
 paid by the bodies who send them. 
 
 Congress legislates for the people of the United States, not 
 for the states separately. If a tax is levied it is upon the people ; 
 the quotas are not sent to the state legislatures ; which must 
 have been done upon the feudal deputative principle. 
 
 Let us now see what is the true respective character of the 
 senate and the house of representatives, according to the con- 
 stitution. What is their difference ? The senators have fre- 
 quently been called the ambassadors or ministers of the states. 
 It is an unbefitting term. He would be but a poor ambas- 
 sador who is not instructed beforehand, and cannot be re- 
 called at any moment, but is appointed for a definite period 
 of six years, and who joins a body of co-ambassadors, presided 
 over, not by a member elected from among themselves and 
 by rapid rotation, as was the case in the freest of the former 
 estates, but by an officer in the origin of his authority wholly 
 extraneous to the senate an officer who does not come from 
 a particular state, but from the people at large, like the presi- 
 dent of the United States. The constitution thus links the 
 senate, coming from the states as such, to the general system
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 347 
 
 of government, of which it forms a part. But a body of am- 
 bassadors must be wholly independent, or it has no meaning. 
 How could a body of independent ambassadors possibly form, 
 not the supreme body of some confederation, but an integrant 
 and permanent part of a continuous regular government of 
 a union ? The constitution gives one separate vote to each 
 senator, even, though the two senators from one state dis- 
 agree, which is inconsistent with the function of a deputy and 
 an ambassador, being strictly and wholly representative. For, 
 besides the moral importance and influence upon society of 
 seeing the two senatorial colleagues vote openly, even if op- 
 posed to one another, the subject becomes still more impor- 
 tant in those cases in which two-thirds of the votes are 
 required, as in impeachments of the president of the United 
 States or of any other officer, or in cases when treaties with 
 foreign powers are submitted to the senate (Art. I, sect. 3, 6, 
 Art. 2, sect. 2, 2), or in all cases where pluralities only and 
 not majorities are required, and finally in all cases in which the 
 two respective senators are opposed to each other and one 
 happens to be absent, which of course must frequently happen. 
 
 The senate, moreover, is a deliberative assembly in its very 
 nature ; but ambassadors do not freely deliberate, they only 
 negotiate ; they try to persuade others to agree to subjects 
 already settled in their mind, and for which they are particu- 
 larly sent. 
 
 The representative character of the senators, therefore, is 
 incontrovertible, yet they differ from the members of the 
 house of representatives. The problem of the framers was 
 to unite the representative system, without which, as I shall 
 presently show, we must have been exposed to great disorder, 
 with the system of a confederacy. If I do not misunderstand 
 the history of our constitution, the true character of the sen- 
 ator and representative of the United States is that the senator 
 is the representative, but not the deputy, of his state as such, 
 that is as a political society of itself, yet a member of a union; 
 in which capacity of course all members, that is, states, are 
 equal, and for which reason an equal number of these state
 
 348 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 representatives is fixed for all ; and the members of the house 
 of representatives are the direct representatives of the people, 
 hence they are, injustice, apportioned according to the popu- 
 lation all over the land. That those from one state will act 
 in many instances unitedly is natural, for the interest and 
 public opinion of their constituents will lead them to do so ; 
 yet that they do not do so in a thousand cases, and ought not 
 to do so, we all know. I hold it to be a principle of the last 
 importance, that the representative in congress is a national 
 representative, not only for the general reasons urged in pre- 
 vious passages, but also for one which relates to confeder- 
 acies in particular. If this position of ours is correct, it 
 appears that it is not acting upon the true principle of the 
 constitution of the United States if members of the house of 
 representatives of congress are elected by general state tickets, 
 as [was formerly] done in four states, and not by separate 
 district tickets. The states as states are already represented 
 by the senators. 1 
 
 XIII. Wherever mere leagues or confederations on the 
 deputative principle are formed, and where the states meet 
 as absolutely equal, or on terms of parity according to the 
 letter of the compact, without the mediating representative 
 principle, inequality in fact, notwithstanding parity in terms, 
 must exist; that is, in the natural course of things the most 
 powerful must necessarily sway where individuals as separate 
 individuals meet. He that is the strongest governs. There 
 is not one exception in history. The Greeks could not help 
 leaguing together ; their whole national spirit, always more 
 powerful than single institutions or laws, led them to it ; com- 
 mon language, religion, extraction, recollections, and similar 
 laws, were so many ties counteracting governmental sepafa- 
 tions. But, as they had no representative system ramifying like 
 
 1 [Since Dr. Lieber wrote this, a general law passed by congress in 1842 
 provided for a common plan of election in all the states. This requires that 
 election shall be by districts, choosing one congressman each, and it overthrew 
 the general ticket system of five states.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 349 
 
 a nervous system through the whole, one state or the other, 
 Athens, Lacedaemon, or Thebes, must needs have the sway, 
 or supremacy the hegemony, as they called it. The Am- 
 phictyonic council was a general institution indeed, and not 
 without some occasional influence, but it consisted of ambas- 
 sadors or deputies only ; it was a general institution in which 
 most of the Greeks as tribes and not as city-states had 
 a share, but, strictly speaking, not a national one, 1 frailer still 
 than the American confederacy under the ancient Articles. 
 A large part of Greek national history, therefore, is one con- 
 tinued struggle of this inward yearning for union, or impulse 
 of native national sympathy, on the one hand, and the struggle 
 for and against the preponderance the hegemony on the 
 other ; a struggle of great bitterness. For tribes and states 
 follow in this respect the same law which regulates the inter- 
 course of private individuals ; that is, the more sympathy or 
 natural relations tend towards union, the more bitter will be 
 the conflict if this inner urgency is counteracted by external 
 separation. In the confederacy of the independent Phoenician 
 cities, Tyre, Sidon, or some one of the richest and most power- 
 ful had the hegemony. A similar phenomenon is observable 
 in the ancient Hansa, in the old city-union in the South of 
 Germany and in Northern Italy, in Catalonia, and wherever 
 we may direct our attention. When the Low Countries sepa- 
 rated from Spain, the seven provinces, each independent and 
 sovereign, confederated, and Holland, the strongest, neces- 
 sarily obtained the hegemony so decidedly indeed that a 
 citizen like De Witt, pensioner of Holland, became the virtual 
 regent and ruler of the United Provinces, and one of the most 
 influential European statesmen of his age. The Swiss cantons 
 have formed a confederacy in the ancient style, and Bern 
 sways in a considerable degree; while the Germanic states 
 formed a confederacy, in which Austria and Prussia had the 
 controlling influence ; and however daring and fruitless it may 
 
 1 F. W. Tittmann on the Union of the Amphictyons (in German), Berlin, 1812. 
 [E. A. Freeman, History of Federal Governments, vol. i., London and Cam- 
 bridge, 1863.]
 
 350 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 generally be in politics to deal in suppositions as to that 
 which might or would have been the case, I believe that there 
 can be no manner of doubt that, if our former confederation 
 had continued to exist upon its ancient articles, New York 
 must by this time have been in possession of the American 
 hegemony, or, what is more likely, repeated wars for the 
 American hegemony between such states as Virginia, which 
 was indeed wellnigh obtaining it or may be said to have 
 possessed it already in a degree, Pennsylvania, and New York, 
 must have disturbed our social system. We have only to 
 imagine the election of representatives for congress all over 
 the Union to proceed by a " general ticket" throughout each 
 respective state, to see at once the consequences. Pennsyl- 
 vania and New York, or New York and Ohio, leagued to- 
 gether, would almost infallibly sway the whole congress. 
 
 It is on this point in particular that our constitution appears 
 to me deserving of our deepest veneration and gratitude. By 
 introducing the representative system, that is, proportional and 
 social representation, and not representation of the states as 
 corporate bodies alone, by nationalizing the house of repre- 
 sentatives, all struggle for the hegemony which drowned the 
 glory of Greece in the torrents of the Peloponnesian war 
 was avoided. Am I not justified, then, in calling the framing 
 and adoption of the constitution a great historical act ? 
 
 XIV. It will now be easy for us to view the question of 
 senatorial instruction in its true light. The legislatures of the 
 different states elect the senators of their respective states. 
 This is admitted; the constitution commands it. But we have 
 seen already, in the case of the presidential election and in 
 that of judges or militia officers, that election alone constitutes 
 no sort of foundation for the right of instruction. This right, 
 if it exists, must be proved on distinct grounds. The dif- 
 ferent state legislatures elect the senators in virtue of a com- 
 mon constitution. The constitution does not say that the 
 senators are their ambassadors; and the legislatures have no 
 more right to issue mandatory instructions than the electors
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 351 
 
 of the president of the United States have to instruct the 
 president, or than a state governor has who may have ap- 
 pointed a senator to fill a sudden vacancy. If he is elected 
 directly by the people, as he is in all the states at present, 
 such a governor stands in the relation of an intermediate 
 party between the people and the senator whom he thus ap- 
 points. But who would tolerate it if the governor should 
 undertake to instruct ? 
 
 The legislatures are bound to elect for six years ; they have 
 no right given them to recall the senators, which at the time 
 of the adoption of the constitution was demanded in one or 
 two cases, but largely overruled. We all know perfectly well, 
 however, that the right of instruction amounts in almost all 
 cases of real importance, that is, when the instructed differs 
 in opinion from his instructors, to a virtual recall ; for if both 
 parties agree, the instruction can have value only by way of 
 moral weight. The legislatures have sworn to maintain the 
 constitution, and must not arrogate so important a power as 
 to interfere with and virtually to abrogate one of its most 
 important provisions nay, to blot out one of its leading fea- 
 tures. The constitution gives no right to recall the resisting 
 senator ; but what does the right of instruction amount to, if 
 there be no means of enforcing it ? It is answered, the in- 
 structed senator is morally bound to obey or to resign. If he 
 is morally bound, and not constitutionally, it follows that he 
 likewise has to judge of the case. The right of instruction 
 is said to be implied in the idea of representation. Does im- 
 plication differ in this case from construction ? Is, not, then 
 the right which the state legislatures assume in instructing a 
 constructive right, and dangerous to civil liberty ? That ac- 
 cording to my view it does not follow from the general prin- 
 ciples of representation has been seen. Below are instances 
 to show that this feature election of senators for six years, 
 would be totally erased from the constitution if mandatory 
 instruction were introduced l 
 
 1 The following is a passage of the speech of Senator Southard [of New Jersey] 
 in the senate of the United States on February 22, 1835 :
 
 352 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The constitution of the United States has introduced the 
 system of two houses, so justly dear to the whole Anglican 
 race as one of the happiest expedients which has been adopted 
 by all nations that follow in their path of political civilization. 
 But what is the true meaning of this system of two houses ? 
 It is a political guarantee, a check, and one of peculiarly beau- 
 tiful operation. Masses, we observed, are impetuous; houses 
 of representatives likewise as masses become impetuous. It 
 is important, therefore, to have two houses so organized that 
 they will not be easily swayed by the same impetuosity, in 
 other words, that the two houses be founded upon different 
 principles. If not, as is the case in the present Belgian con- 
 stitution, according to which the senate is elected by the 
 representatives from among themselves, little more than the 
 
 " It may, it often does, happen that the political character of the legislature is 
 frequently changed. Upon this theory there must be a new senator upon every 
 change. In Rhode Island, if I recollect correctly, the changes have been such 
 that she might have had, nay, ought to have had, six senators in two years. So 
 in Ohio : last year she instructed her senators : one of them disobeyed ; if he had 
 resigned, the present legislature, which is of a different political aspect, would 
 have instructed his successor, and we should have had two new senators upon 
 the floor, and the state had five in a little more than one year. The rebellious 
 one of last year might have been restored ; unless indeed the legislature should, 
 as they ought under such circumstances, spurn him from their confidence for his 
 servility, as destitute of that moral courage and independence of character with- 
 out which a public agent is a public curse. The history of my own state is not 
 destitute of facts to illustrate this doctrine. The changes which have taken place 
 in the political parties there since 1824 would have given to us some six or eight 
 different members, and this resulting from no versatility or changeableness in the 
 character of her people. The number of our counties is small only fourteen. 
 The parties throughout the state have long been nearly balanced. In several 
 of the counties the change of a few votes, or the neglect of a small number to 
 attend the polls, would not only give a new representative in the legislature, but 
 change its political character; a little more than one hundred votes, in one or 
 two of several counties, would have changed the late instructions. There are, I 
 believe, about twenty members of the majority who hold their seats by an aver- 
 age of not more than one hundred and twenty votes ; some of them by less than 
 one hundred. Suppose there should be a small alteration of opinion, resulting 
 from some general or local cause ; the political aspect will be changed. Shall 
 the legislature again instruct, drive the recently elected senator from his seat be- 
 fore he has had time to become familiar with it, and restore the one whose office 
 is about expiring?"
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 35 3 
 
 outward form of the bicameral system is obtained. Now, if 
 our representatives come fresh from the people at short inter- 
 vals, and the state legislatures, coming from the same people 
 at equally short intervals, undertake to instruct the senators, 
 who are elected for six years, the system of two houses as a 
 guarantee, most wisely established, is- evidently destroyed, and 
 we have upon all important questions but one house, though 
 sitting in two different places ; only two bureaux, as the French 
 would call it, of the same body. 
 
 It has been objected, however, Suppose that the representa- 
 tives or senators should really vote against the dearest interests 
 of their constituents ; in fact, I have heard it asked, what 
 should we do if our representatives should vote for a law 
 directly in contradiction to the fundamental law? All I would 
 answer is, Suppose, on the other hand, the representatives will 
 not vote for such a law but should be instructed to do so ? 
 One is as imaginable as the other. These are extravagant 
 suppositions, against which no human system can provide, 
 and the victorious power of public opinion, under which the 
 representative emphatically stands, is altogether forgotten. A 
 thousand similar suppositions might be made respecting the 
 ultimate point of any constitutional institution. The British 
 monarch can make an unlimited number of peers, and when, 
 under Walpole's ministry, the earl of Sunderland proposed to 
 close the list of peers forever, the commons most strenuously 
 opposed depriving the crown of this prerogative, and to the 
 objection that the crown might make a hundred peers in one 
 creation, gave answer that the responsible minister stands 
 under public opinion that many things which migJit be done 
 nevertheless cannot be done. Our congress has the right of 
 expelling any member by two-thirds of the votes : suppose 
 the members should league together to expel in the regular 
 way the representatives of a certain district. All this might 
 be done, but it cannot be done unless public opinion sinks so 
 low as to permit it. There is no form, no guarantee, which 
 can protect a degraded people ; no senate could protect under 
 a Tiberius, for all were degraded. 
 VOL. II. 23
 
 354 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Another objection is, that although it be admitted that a 
 constant recurrence to the right of instruction would deprive 
 a parliamentary body of its deliberative character, yet it will 
 be resorted to only in cases of extremity. This, however, is 
 by no means so very certain ; custom and repetition might 
 soon reduce the representative system to one of mere depu- 
 ties. But let us admit even that this would not probably be 
 the case, all guarantees and checks are most impprtant when 
 cases of magnitude arrive ; they exist for that very purpose. 
 The most varied and even opposite forms are frequently indif- 
 ferent in the common run of cases ; but when the periods of 
 difficulty arrive it is the very time they must show their es- 
 sence. We try the wisdom of a political law of importance 
 not by common cases but by great emergencies. The trial 
 by jury is not of so great importance for the punishment of 
 petty thefts; other forms of trial might sometimes be even 
 preferable; but when difficulties arrive, when power of office 
 and public opinion, resentment of the judge and unbiassed 
 fairness, struggle with one another, then the trial by jury must 
 show whether it is justly held dear by the Anglican race or 
 not. 
 
 I know full well that it would be trying to see a senator 
 perseveringly vote against what, according to the existing 
 opinion, seems to be decidedly the general opinion of the 
 state, without having the power to correct him according to 
 the doctrine of instruction adopted by some states. But let 
 us weigh well whether it is not one of the very objects of the 
 constitution which orders him to be elected for six years, that 
 upon occasions he should not quickly follow a sudden turn 
 in the opinion at home ; and, above all, whether, however 
 wrong or obstinate he may be, it is not upon the whole infi- 
 nitely better to suffer this passing and specific evil than to 
 suffer the subversion of the representative character of the 
 senate of the constitution itself. Is there no such necessity 
 in politics as moral restriction, and manly suffering of an evil 
 in order to avoid a still greater one ? We must ask again, 
 has public opinion no ultimate force in a free country ? I be-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 355 
 
 lieve that no senator could possibly withstand for any length 
 of time the course of settled public opinion if opposed to his 
 course of action ; though he may, as has often happened, 
 oppose the drift of general opinion on specific, single meas- 
 ures. He lias, in my opinion, received his peculiar authority 
 by the constitution, among other reasons, for the very reason 
 that he may do so. When is it that a senator is generally in- 
 structed, or that this whole subject becomes important? Not 
 when he agrees with the instructions, nor when he flagrantly 
 abandons his former course upon which he was elected. He 
 cannot, in the nature of things, frequently dare to do so. He 
 knows too well that his character would be gone forever. In- 
 struction, then, becomes important generally in those cases in 
 which not the senator but the opinion at home has 1 suddenly 
 changed since his election. Is it not for these very cases that 
 the constitution grants him a term of six years, while it grants 
 only the brief period of two years to the representatives ? Is 
 jiot the claim to the right of instruction by the state legisla- 
 tures the old desire of power for more power, which steals so 
 easily upon all of us, and to check which is one of the objects 
 of fixed fundamental laws ? 
 
 I do not believe that it has ever been maintained, even in 
 impassioned controversy, that the legislatures would have the 
 right to instruct when the senate was sitting as a high court 
 of impeachment. There seems to be something so revolting 
 in the case, reminding so directly of the worst cases under 
 the Stuarts, when the judges were distinctly told by the court 
 how to sentence, that I do not believe the right of instruction 
 has ever been claimed for these cases. But why not? Be- 
 cause the senators sit as judges, and because to judge without 
 trial, that is, to judge without conscientious conformity of 
 the judgment to what appears upon trial and with regard to 
 something else, is felt at once by every one to be the highest 
 iniquity. But is it less unwise to legislate on any other 
 grounds except the information brought to us by the debate, 
 than it is iniquitous to judge except upon the information 
 brought to us by the trial ? Does not a single legislature by
 
 356 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 instruction assume to legislate for the Union, because it directs 
 the vote of one who still continues to enjoy by the constitu- 
 tion the character and influence of a legislative representative; 
 thus assuming to decide the case, while the other unin- 
 structed senators continue to be influenced by the debate and 
 the opinion of society at large as elicited by the deliberation? 
 Upon 'the general ground upon which the state legislatures 
 claim to instruct senators in legislative business the respective 
 governors might claim, and, in my opinion, with much more 
 plausible right, to instruct the senators upon executive busi- 
 ness ; for the governors, especially where they are elected by 
 the people directly, are the true representatives of the people 
 for all executive business. Yet this has never been claimed. 
 
 In giving these my views, I am well aware that I have ex- 
 pressed myself directly against what some distinguished men 
 have stated as their deliberate opinion, men in intellect and 
 experience much superior to me. Yet the opinions of other 
 great men support the views here given, and I believe it is 
 not difficult to see that the former may have erred, as every 
 one is apt to err, by regarding the opposite of wrong to be 
 right. 1 If we have to combat one evil we are apt to go too 
 far on the other side. If there were not a corrective process 
 in the course of time, and if succeeding generations should 
 not take deeper and more enlarged views, no advance of civil- 
 ization would be possible, and we should become Chinese, 
 looking back to their Confucius and Mencius as unalterable 
 types. Not Plato, but Truth. 
 
 XV. It is evident from the previous remarks that the sub- 
 ject of instruction could not become matter of discussion so 
 long as the system of deputation existed; for this was founded 
 upon it. But when the deputies had changed into representa- 
 
 1 * The great, although natural, mistake of continental liberals towards the end 
 of the eighteenth century, and of Americans after them, was this, that they thought 
 that the establishment of liberty consisted in the transmission of the assumed 
 powers and rights of the despot to the people. Liberty consists in something 
 essentially different.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS, 
 
 357 
 
 tives, and the British parliament had gradually become more 
 and more distinctly acknowledged as the national representa- 
 tion, it was natural likewise that the precise relation in which 
 a representative, though national, still continues to stand to 
 his particular constituency, and his obligation to represent 
 their especial wishes, should become matter of earnest dis- 
 cussion. I believe the beginning of the history of this'more 
 earnest discussion must be dated, as already mentioned, from 
 the time when John Wilkes was elected by the Westminster 
 constituents, and more especially from Mr. Burke's speeches 
 to the electors at Bristol in November, 1774. Mr. Burke, as 
 we have seen, maintains that the imperative duty of the 
 British representative requires him to attend to all the in- 
 terests and desires of his constituents to his utmost power, 
 but likewise to vote to the utmost of his conscience as the 
 broad national interest demands, even should he go against 
 the supposed or actually expressed wishes of the majority of 
 his constituent-voters. The war between Great Britain and 
 America, as well as the whole spirit of the eighteenth century, 
 led many reflecting men to inquire, among other subjects, 
 into the precise character of a representative. The British 
 commons were, as is we'll known, under the almost total sway 
 of the aristocracy of the land, and far from representing in 
 many cases the people at large. In addition to this sway, the 
 powerful influence of the crown, and the protracted period of 
 seven years for which a member of the commons is elected, 
 since the passing of the septennial bill in 1716, were causes 
 tending to separate the interests of the members of the house 
 of commons from the great mass of the people. Thes* con- 
 siderations, and the erroneous idea that the whole meaning 
 of the representative government was that of an expedient 
 and substitute for the meeting in the forum, made necessary 
 by increased population, prevailing among most liberally edu- 
 cated men towards the end of the last century, led many of 
 the prominent English advocates of parliamentary reform to 
 the opposite of the evil of which they complained, as is nearly 
 always the case during the first period of opposition to a deep-
 
 358 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 rooted error or other evil. Men like Burgh, in his Political 
 Disquisitions, and Major John Cartwright asserted that the 
 representative is (and they actually called him so) " the legis- 
 latprial attorney" of his constituents : at least this is the ex- 
 pression of Cartwright thus reducing the representative to a 
 mere deputy of the feudal ages. The cause of this error is 
 now easily seen. These men, whenever they spoke of liberty, 
 had in mind what was called in the first part of the present 
 work democratic absolutism. Their error, which was natural 
 in the course of this discussion, has, I hope, been exhibited. 
 A collection of " legislatorial attorneys" would be far worse 
 than an " ecclesia" of the ancient absolute democracy, as we 
 have seen, because in the latter the individual voting for him- 
 self alone may be influenced by the demands of the public wel- 
 fare, which the former cannot be, bound, mind and conscience, 
 as he is by his instruction and power of attorney. Indeed, 
 there is some contradiction in the term legislatorial attorney, 
 for a legislator must needs weigh and reflect, and shape his 
 course according to weighty considerations, even were he to 
 legislate merely according to interested views. In the middle 
 ages the instructions were no contradiction, for in most cases 
 the deputies were not legislators proper, not at all so if we 
 compare their functions with those of our representative 
 bodies ; they assembled chiefly for the granting of subsidies, 
 acknowledging laws or persons, or exacting franchises. It is 
 now amply settled that the British member of parliament is 
 the representative of the .nation. 1 
 
 1 As Tate as 1837, the radical member for Leeds, being applied to by the secre- 
 tary of the Leeds Committee for giving relief to certain people of Leeds, said in 
 his answer if the papers reported correctly that he was the representative of 
 England, Scotland, and Ireland, and not of the borough of Leeds, and that he 
 could not provide for all the needy of the realm. (London Ledger, October 
 1837.) Hume gives a few remarks on instruction, with particular reference to 
 the then existing British system of representation, in a note appended to Essay 
 IV. of his Moral, Political, and Literary Essays. The fourth Essay is on the 
 Principles of Government. These Essays were published in 1792, after Mr. 
 Burke, therefore, had treated of the subject. Hume's remarks, however, are 
 quite passing only.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 359 
 
 In France, as we have seen already, the opposite course 
 took place : liberty became closely allied with the defeat of 
 specific instructions and the elevation of the deputy to the 
 dignity of a national representative ; and in the many phases 
 through which the cause of liberty has passed in that country 
 during the last half-century the representative was always re- 
 pressed into a deputy whenever the cause of absolute power 
 was in the ascendant. When Louis XVIII. returned to 
 France in 1814 the name of deputy was retained, as it well 
 agreed with the general spirit of the charter promulgated by 
 him an instrument which cautiously granted the least de- 
 gree of liberty compatible with the urgent demands of the 
 nation, and with the necessity on the part of the Bourbons of 
 creating some sort of support for themselves. When in 1830 
 the charter was amended, and the power of the chamber of 
 deputies greatly increased, the name was not changed ; but 
 the present French deputy is essentially and avowedly a 
 national representative, not a departmental deputy. 
 
 In the United States the subject of instruction has become 
 especially interesting on account of the senators. Many state 
 legislatures have passed resolutions "to instruct the senators 
 and request the representatives" to oppose or promote certain 
 measures ; but many senators have likewise resisted, and of 
 course, as there is no power conferred by the constitution to 
 remove a non-complying senator, have done so successfully. 
 Indeed, instruction by legislatures cannot be said to have as 
 yet assumed any higher authority than that of very distinct 
 and implicit information, to which of course the senator is 
 bound in strict conscience to pay the highest regard, as a 
 governor, elected by the people, would pay due regard to 
 powerful petitions or resolutions of powerful and respectable 
 meetings in cases of great emergency, but would not receive 
 instructions. In the state of Virginia alone it is considered 
 by many that the right of instruction has, in a sort, become 
 common law of the state ; that is, a citizen accepting the 
 senatorial chair might be considered as having accepted it on 
 the implied condition of acknowledging instruction, provided
 
 360 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 always this citizen have not during his previous life candidly 
 and openly expressed his opinion, or distinctly, previously to 
 his election, to the contrary. Yet even in Virginia the diffi- 
 culty is by no means removed which must forever arise out 
 of the contradiction which necessarily lies in instruction in 
 America, for the two simple reasons that the so-called right 
 of instruction, though of organic and fundamental importance, 
 is merely implied, nowhere granted, hence is without means 
 for its enforcement, and consequently unsubstantial; and that 
 a senator, who must be supposed to be a conscientious man 
 and hence feel the sacred obligations of oaths, takes a solemn 
 oath upon a distinct law and instrument, called the constitu- 
 tion, which is above him, legislature, and all, as much as the 
 law of nature and God is above king and subject. This plainly 
 appeared in the case of Mr. Watkins Leigh, in 1836, as men- 
 tioned above. The argument of his letter is this : " I fully 
 acknowledge the right of instruction, but only within the con- 
 stitution, by which all of us are primitively bound. If, there- 
 fore, you instruct me against the constitution, I cannot obey 
 without perjuring myself." Mr. Leigh did not resign, yet, as 
 he himself informs us in his letter, he was the citizen who 
 in 1812 drew up the resolutions by which the legislature of 
 Virginia endeavored to establish the right of instruction, and 
 he endeavors to show that those resolutions do not apply to 
 his case in i836. z The legislature in such cases of course 
 
 1 It is not easy to say what is the precise doctrine at present of Virginia, how- 
 ever simple the subject may appear at first glance. Mr. Leigh says in the letter 
 above cited that "the resolutions of the legislature in 1812 were the work of his 
 own hands without assistance from any other person whatever, and drawn up (as 
 he but too well remembers) with a haste which in his own apprehension at the 
 time materially impaired its value." However, he says that upon a recent and 
 careful review he finds no reason to retract or modify anything. Yet these very 
 resolutions were assumed and quoted in 1836 as the rules upon which Mr. Leigh 
 was instructed, and by him as supporting him in not obeying the instructions. 
 The instructions of 1836 state that they merely " reassert" the right, which " sur- 
 prises" Mr. Leigh. No one who knows the high integrity of this gentleman will 
 entertain for a moment any doubt that he expresses his real sentiments. I will 
 sub/oin one of the resolutions of 1836, because it seems to me very strongly to
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 361 
 
 answers, What is instruction, if not to guide you when we 
 differ? When we agree, there is ho necessity for it; now, this 
 is a case of disagreement because we do not believe that what 
 we demand is against the constitution. It amounts in these 
 cases, indeed, precisely to the same dispute which has fre- 
 quently occurred in the Catholic church, when a person ac- 
 knowledged the infallibility of the pope upon all matters upon 
 which the decision belonged to him, matters of doctrine under 
 the dogma of the church, but denied that the specific subject 
 under question belonged to this class ; while, on the other 
 hand, the pope declared that his infallibility would amount to 
 nothing if it was not he himself who should determine whether 
 this was a case within his competence to decide or not. The 
 dispute of the Roman curia and the Jansenists turned upon 
 this very point. It is worthy of observation that if the Vir- 
 ginia theory of instruction were adopted the senate would be 
 a more changeable body than the house of representatives, 
 because many state legislatures are changed every year, at 
 least in their lower branch ; and if they instruct accordingly 
 the senate is also changed yearly, and thus one of the most 
 fundamental features of our constitution would be annihilated. 
 From what has been stated before, it must clearly appear 
 that the author, in his humble judgment, considers the Vir- 
 ginia doctrine unwarranted, inconsistent, and unconstitutional. 
 Yet it is necessary for the reader to inform himself thoroughly 
 upon the subject; and I believe that the chief periods during 
 which the subject of instruction was most discussed and be- 
 came more and more settled in Virginia are when the Bank 
 
 show how boldly men must always act in politics if they abandon the safe rule 
 of law and constitution. It runs thus : " That after the solemn and now repeated 
 expression of the opinion of the general assembly on the right of instruction and 
 the duty of obedience thereto, no man ought henceforth to accept or retain the 
 appointment of senator of the United States from Virginia who does not hold 
 himself bound to obey such instructions or to resign the trust with which he is 
 clothed." If all legislatures make similar proclamations, an entirely new pro- 
 vision is evidently added to the constitution of the United States, without pur- 
 suing the constitutionally prescribed course. Power, and nothing but arrogated 
 power, would in that case have changed the constitution.
 
 362 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 of the United States was chartered in 1791, when the renewal 
 of the charter was discussed in congress in iSii, 1 and when 
 the Virginia senators in 1836 were instructed to vote for the 
 before-mentioned expunging resolution, upon which occasion 
 one of the senators declined to give the vote required, but re- 
 signed, while the other declined both the vote and the resig- 
 nation, on the ground, as we have seen, that the instruction 
 was against the constitution. I must refer to the debates, 
 resolutions, and letters relating to the subject. 
 
 1 See Mr. Giles, senator from Virginia, on this occasion, against instruction, in 
 the Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States, Clarke 
 and Hall, Washington, 1832; and the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, 
 passed in February, 1812, drawn up, March 2, 1836, by Mr. Leigh. There is no 
 point at which arrogation of power can stop. Although Mr. Watkins Leigh is 
 the author of these resolutions, he quoted them in his own defence for not com- 
 plying with the instruction in 1836, but without effect upon the legislature : on the 
 contrary, they passed very strong resolutions against "the two several letters of 
 Benjamin Watkins Leigh," in December, 1836. (See Niles's Register.) Sev- 
 eral of the debates on the adoption of the constitution of the United States, as 
 published by congress, contain interesting passages respecting this subject. 
 There is a series of articles against instruction by Mr. Hopkinson, of Philadelphia, 
 Circuit Judge of the United States, of great merit, and for instructions, by an 
 author with whose name I am unacquainted, in several numbers of the Literary 
 Messenger, published at Richmond, Virginia, of the year 1837. The judge de- 
 livered likewise a speech against instruction on the floor of congress, in 1812. 
 The Federalist (especially the remarks of Mr. Madison) is of course to be con- 
 sulted. It will sound, I allow, strange if an author refers his reader to a work 
 which is not yet published and with the contents of which he is entirely unac- 
 quainted, and yet I cannot but refer to the Madison Papers, now printing by con- 
 gress; for I cannot doubt that they must contain much valuable matter bearing 
 upon the point of our discussion, since they contain the debates of the constituent 
 congress on the constitution then forming, and I humbly yet confidently hope that 
 they will support the arguments of the text, especially the chief one, that it 
 was the very intention of the constituent congress to superinduce the repre- 
 sentative system upon the former deputative, as established in the Articles of 
 Confederation.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Responsibility of the Representative. Pledges. Implied and positive, general 
 and specific Pledges. Are Pledges moral, and consistent with general Liberty 
 and Justice ? When are they so ? Pledges originated with the Court Party 
 and Aristocracy. Strong Power of Implied Pledges. Breaking Implied 
 Pledges, and throwing one's self upon the Constituents by Resignation. 
 Duties of Presiding Officers of deliberative Assemblies ; Speakers. 
 
 XVI. WE have found that one of the most essential results 
 of a well-regulated and truly representative government is 
 the security and protection of public liberty, that is, of civil 
 liberty as appertaining to and extending over the whole state, 
 the whole jural society as one organic thing, and not as a 
 loosely connected chain of separate independences. This 
 broad, extensive public liberty consists, together with the 
 protection of all essential individual or, as we have called 
 them previously, primordial rights, in the sway of public 
 opinion, and its regular passing over, by a safe and organic 
 process, into public will that is, law. This public opinion 
 which becomes public will is the well-ascertained and clearly- 
 settled opinion of the whole jural. society or state, sifted and 
 freed from the adhesions of momentary excitement, of sordid 
 and local selfishness, and of the tyrannical dictation of one part 
 of society over the rest. The elements of which this supreme 
 public opinion is formed are the opinions of the several parts 
 of that society, closely and truly represented or enunciated 
 by their respective representatives, gathered according to an 
 even, fair, and proportionate distribution over the whole of 
 the society, upon principles which appear to that particular 
 society the best adapted for collecting the opinion of the 
 whole, and modified by mutual influence according to the 
 main and fundamental principle upon which all legislation and 
 execution rest, that is, general justice and public welfare. An 
 additional and equally important feature of the representative 
 
 363
 
 364 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 government is that civil liberty requires that no one should 
 finally act in any matters of the state without responsibility : 
 where this principle is abandoned, there is absolutism. As 
 the prince;, therefore, in constitutional or representative mon- 
 archies cannot dictate laws at will, although he be, within the 
 constitution and as long as it lasts, personally irresponsible, 
 so does public liberty on the other hand, and especially in 
 republics, where the people are the acknowledged powqr- 
 holders, require that they do not dictate directly their laws 
 upon no responsibility, which would constitute democratic 
 absolutism, but through responsible intermediate persons 
 the representatives ; although the people, as the monarch in 
 the previous case, are irresponsible in their suffrage for repre- 
 sentatives. The representative who has received these con- 
 stitutionally not morally irresponsible suffrages is bound 
 in all his actions, so soon as elected, by the constitution of 
 the land, and is responsible to the people, who pronounce 
 upon him by their next election, but not in each single case 
 in which he votes; for this last would establish at once direct 
 dictation of the power-holder and defeat one of the main 
 objects of representative government. 
 
 The representative, then, must represent his constituents 
 closely, under the mediating and uniting influence of general 
 welfare, and hold himself responsible to the people. These 
 considerations, I think, will lead us safely in discussing the 
 subject of pledges. 
 
 XVII. Representative pledges are assurances or gages given 
 by a candidate respecting his future course as a representative, 
 should he be elected. They may be implied or positive, and 
 the latter may be general or specific. Frequently it is impos- 
 sible for the electors to have a sufficiently accurate knowledge 
 of the candidate's views respecting subjects of great impor- 
 tance in their estimation. Meetings therefore will propound, 
 through committees, certain questions, which the candidate 
 is required to answer, and on which the suffrages of the 
 querist are made to depend. Since the representative is bound
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 365 
 
 in duty to discharge his office with strict honesty, a perfect 
 understanding between the constituents and himself is impor- 
 tant, and, in order to give him the necessary weight in his 
 elevated position, indispensable. So long, therefore, as the 
 pledges touch principles and views they are right; but the 
 sacred duty of the representative and he has none so sacred 
 as this to do all he can for the public benefit according to 
 his best judgment, which consists of the opinion of his con- 
 stituents brought along with him, but enlightened and regu- 
 lated by the contact with that of other parts, represented and 
 pronounced by his fellow-representatives, must prevent him 
 from giving pledges as to any definite measures or laws, for in 
 this case he robs other citizens of their undoubted right to 
 state their opinion through their representative and ask a 
 proper share of influence upon the opinion of the legislative 
 body for it before the law be finally passed. 
 
 There are times of the utmost exigency in which everything 
 seems to turn upon one measure which for years has been 
 discussed by the nation at large and as to which a candidate 
 is undoubtedly authorized to give a more definite pledge than 
 is compatible with his duty in common cases. Such a one I 
 take to have existed when, in 1832, the question in England 
 was reform or not reform. Yet here again it would have been 
 very presumptuous in a candidate to promise that he would 
 only vote for such or such minute details as might be laid 
 before him on the hustings. Every one sees that pledges of 
 detailed laws are nothing less than antecedent instruction, so 
 that they would amount to a bargaining for votes, and would 
 raise party power and exclusion very high ; because a voter 
 might desire to vote fora candidate on account of one pledge, 
 but not of others. Definite pledges, therefore, either beyond 
 principles or great outlines of important broad measures 
 which had long been before the people and had formed per- 
 haps for periods broad party distinctions, would at once defeat 
 the object of representative government, and cannot be given 
 by an honest citizen who religiously loves his country; but 
 they are as a matter of course very readily proffered by dema-
 
 366 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 gogues, the fawning courtiers of the people, just as some 
 judges were ever ready to inform James I. how they would 
 give judgment in such or such a case should it be brought 
 before them. 
 
 Pledges, like instructions, have often been believed to be 
 necessarily connected with the popular or liberal cause, but 
 history shows the fact to be very different. Pledges to the 
 court and ministers were formerly common, and Lord 
 Brougham showed in parliament that ministerial and aristo- 
 cratic pledges were common and customary at the time when 
 one lord would return ten or fifteen members, and that no 
 pledges were exacted on the popular side, but that they did not 
 originate, as had been stated, with the reform of parliament 
 in 1832.' Lord Brougham is decidedly opposed to pledges, 
 as highly injurious to the cause of liberty and the necessary 
 character of a member of the commons as a representative 
 of the nation. I subjoin the opinion of a gentleman who has 
 distinguished himself alike for sound thought and liberal feel- 
 ing, and who was foremost in the cause of reform. 2 There are 
 
 1 Hansard, xxx., page 590, debate of August 17, 1835. James II., desirous 
 to have his decreed " liberty of conscience" sanctioned by the parliament to be 
 assembled, sent, in 1687, military officers, civil officers, priests, and laymen of 
 influence, into various counties, to obtain pledges of certain persons that if 
 elected they would vote for the king's measure. " The most general answer 
 appears to have been that, if chosen to serve in parliament, the individuals to 
 whom the questions were put would vote according to their consciences, after 
 hearing the reasons on both sides; that they could not promise to vote in a man- 
 ner which their own judgment after discussion might condemn; that if they 
 entered into so unbecoming an engagement they might incur the displeasure of 
 the house of commons for betraying its privileges; and that they would justly 
 merit condemnation from all good men for disabling themselves from performing 
 the duty of faithful subjects by the honest declaration of their judgment on those 
 arduous affairs on which they were to advise and aid the king." Mackintosh, 
 Review of the Causes of the Revolution in 1688, chapter vi. 
 
 " Mr. Macauhy, in the Letter to the Secretary of the Leeds Political Union, in 
 August, 1832, quoted in a previous passage, where I treated of Canvassing, says, 
 "I wish to add a few words touching a question which has lately been much 
 canvassed, I mean the question of the Pledges. In this letter, and in every 
 letter which I have written to my friends at Leeds, I have plainly declared my 
 opinions. But I think it, at this juncture, my duty to declare that I will give NO
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS, 367 
 
 several striking instances of manly resistance against pledges. 
 A near connection of Lord Brougham's resigned his place 
 
 1 LEDGKS. I will not bind myself to make or to support any particular motion. 
 I will state as shortly as I can some of the reasons which have induced me to form 
 this determination. The great beauty of the representative system is that it 
 unites the advantages of popular control with the advantage arising from a division 
 of labor : just as a physician understands medicine better than an ordinary man 
 just as a shoemaker makes shoes better than an ordinary man a person whose 
 life is passed in transacting affairs of state becomes a better statesman than an 
 ordinary man. In politics, as well as every other department of life, the public 
 ought to have the means of checking those who serve it. If a man finds that he 
 derives no benefit from the prescription of his physician, he calls in another; if 
 his shoes do not fit him, he changes his shoemaker ; if his representatives mis- 
 govern him, he can discard them at the next election : but when he has called 
 in a physician of whom he hears a good report, and whose general practice he 
 believes to be judicious, it would be absurd in him to tie down that physician to 
 order particular pills and particular draughts; while he continues to be a cus- 
 tomer of a shoemaker, it would be absurd in him to sit by and meet every motion 
 of that shoemaker's hand ; and in the same manner it would, I think, be absurd 
 in him to require positive pledges aTid to exact daily and hourly obedience from 
 his representative. My opinion is that electors ought at first to choose cautiously, 
 then to confide liberally; and when the term for which they have selected their 
 member has expired, to review his conduct equitably and to pronounce on the 
 whole taken together. 
 
 " Consider, too, that the business of a member of parliament is the pursuit, 
 not of speculative truth, but of practical good; and that though, in speculation, 
 every truth is consistent with every other truth, yet in practice one good measure 
 may be incompatible with another. It is often absolutely necessary to bear with 
 a lesser evil in order to get rid of a greater. For example, I think the corn-laws 
 an evil; but if there had been in this parliament a hundred or a hundred and 
 fifty members absolutely bound by pledges to attempt the abolition of the corn- 
 laws, there would have been a division in the ranks of the reformers; the lories 
 would have triumphed; and I verily believe that, at the moment at which I am 
 writing, Lord John Russell's bill would have been lost, and the duke of Welling- 
 ton would have been prime minister. Such cases may and will occur again. 
 Some such cases I can, I think, distinctly foresee. I conceive, therefore, that it 
 is the true wisdom of electors to choose a representative whom they believe to be 
 honest and enlightened, and, having chosen him, to leave him a large discretion. 
 When his term expires when he again presents himself before them it will be 
 their duty to take a general survey of his conduct, and to consider whether he 
 have or have not pursued that course which has, under all the circumstances, 
 most tended to promote the public good. . ,, 
 
 " If the people of Leeds think fit to repose in me that confidence which is 
 necessary to the proper discharge of the duties of a representative, 1 hope that I
 
 368 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 because he would give no pledges, though he agreed with his 
 constituents on all points on which they asked pledges. 1 
 
 XVIII. Implied pledges, for the reason that they are im- 
 plied, have a very strong power, as they necessarily have 
 everywhere with a gentleman. Implied pledges are derived 
 from the life of the individual, his professed principles, his 
 habitual siding with one or the other party, or from some 
 definite action which may justly induce the voters to believe 
 that it indicates some distinct view or other. The implied 
 party pledge can never go farther, as must clearly appear from 
 what was stated on parties as well as on the general character 
 of pledges, than the broad civil principles and views upon 
 which the party is avowedly built; they cannot bind the indi- 
 vidual to vote on all important occasions blindly with the 
 party. On the contrary, it is just these highly important 
 occasions on which the citizen may feel himself conscien- 
 tiously bound to leave the party. Suppose a member has 
 been elected as a member of one party, and after his election 
 the question of war or peace, and, as he believes, dishonor 
 and misfortune, comes up. His party votes against war, 
 which he conscientiously believes to be necessary for the 
 country. In this case he cannot be considered as being 
 bound by an implied or moral pledge to his constituents to 
 vote against the war, for the great pledge of public welfare 
 
 shall not abuse it. If it be their pleasure to fetter their members by positive 
 promises, it is in their power to do so. I can only say that on such terms I can- 
 not conscientiously serve them." 
 
 I ought to refer the reader back to the passage previously quoted, because part 
 of it very slrongly bears upon the present point. 
 
 1 The scene which happened when Mr. Poulett Thomson was nominated at 
 Manchester, England, in 1835, as reported in the London papers of the time, is 
 sufficiently characteristic and instructive. The candidate underwent a long and 
 detailed public examination which he sustained with dignity and apparent hon- 
 esty, without binding his conscience, by absolute pledges. The account was 
 copied into the American papers, for instance the National Gazette, Philadelphia, 
 of June, 1835.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 369 
 
 stands first ; nor ought he to resign before voting, for it may 
 be very important in his conscientious opinion for the country 
 that he should give his vote. In these cases, however, in 
 which he changes but his constituents do not, it will be 
 honorable, honest, and gentlemanlike to throw himself upon 
 the judgment of his constituents by a resignation, as of course 
 also it will be in those cases in which the representative has 
 knowingly broken the implied pledge on grounds of un- 
 avoidable urgency. Sir Robert Peel justly resigned his seat 
 for the university of Oxford, February 4, 1829, because he had 
 determined to introduce measures for the relief of the Roman 
 Catholics, while previously, and before matters assumed so 
 dark an aspect of threatening civil war in Ireland as Lord 
 Wellington at least confessed in the lords he had always 
 strenuously opposed Catholic emancipation, and he knew per- 
 fectly well that of all bodies in the world the university of 
 Oxford would probably be the very last to send a member 
 who should profess liberal principles towards the Catholics. 1 
 The implied pledge seems to me to require the tenderest 
 regard. 
 
 XIX. A subject which demands the faithful attention of 
 the representative, wherever the modern representative system 
 exists, is the interpretation of the fundamental law, and its 
 construction in those cases for which it does not specifically 
 provide, but which nevertheless must be judged by that in- 
 strument. In the ancient deputative system, the deputy being 
 directly occupied with the advantage of his corporation and 
 of the estate to which it belonged, the case was not so diffi- 
 cult. Charters or other fundamental laws might be inter- 
 
 1 When Sir Francis Burdett, elected as a whig, openly became a tory in 1837, 
 he resigned his seat, at the request of some of his constituents, to stand a new 
 election at Westminster, and, by the great exertion of the tories, was re-elected 
 against Mr. Leader. Had he not done so, it is evident that he must have lost 
 all power, influence, and consideration, for it would have been a palpable deser- 
 tion and betrayal of his constituents. * 
 VOL. II. 24
 
 370 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 preted with much ease by them, as by special attorneys, by 
 lawyers in their special pleading. The case is very different, 
 however, where public liberty is sought for with a legislation 
 based upon public spirit, and where the representative is 
 bound to understand and interpret for whatever consists in 
 human words must be interpreted the constitution, as the 
 conscientious representative of the whole society. It was at 
 this stage of my work that I originally intended to give my 
 views of interpretation and construction, but, as I have indi- 
 cated in the preface, my remarks increased to such an extent, 
 without the possibility of curtailing them so as not to injure 
 the clearness of the subject, that I resolved to follow the ad- 
 vice of publishing them separately. 1 I consider, however, the 
 subject of interpretation so closely connected with political 
 ethics, not indeed in its distinct rules, but in their faithful 
 application, that I feel bound to refer the reader to the work 
 alluded to, as to a complement of this work. 
 
 XX. The experience of all constitutional countries has 
 amply shown what every one who has ever been a member 
 of a deliberative assembly with power to decree is fully con- 
 vinced of that no such assembly can in the least degree ap- 
 proach the object for which it meets, if considerable power be 
 not given to its presiding officer, especially when it consists 
 of many members, like the British commons or the French 
 deputies, who amount to nearly six hundred. The history of 
 the first French revolution proves the lamentable conse- 
 quences of a want of knowledge in managing the debates 
 and rules of order, as I have stated before; and Dumont, 
 teh judicious and experienced author of the Reminiscences 
 of Mirabeau and of the two first legislative assemblies, enu- 
 merates among the nine chief causes of the unfortunate turn 
 taken by the French revolution as the third, " the bad mode 
 
 1 Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of Interpretation and Con- 
 struction in Law and Politics, with Remarks on Precedents and Authorities. 2d 
 edition, Boston, 1839.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 371 
 
 of deliberating;" 1 in which opinion every one who knows 
 the details must readily agree with him. The importance of 
 judicious parliamentary debating has been spoken of: here it 
 must be observed that the chief part of this vitally important 
 subject is formed by the rules to be enforced by the speaker, 
 to which many other important duties are generally added, 
 especially that of appointing committees. Even if a speaker 
 had no other duty and power than that of granting the floor 
 by " catching the eye of a risen member, " and he or some 
 individual must needs have this power, and that of appoint- 
 ing committees, his power must be very great indeed, and 
 may be very outrageously abused to the detriment of all fair- 
 ness and free representation. The presiding member who has 
 the power held by the American and English speakers that 
 of the presiding lord on the woolsack is considerably less 
 must always remember that he holds one of the most exalted 
 stations ; he presides over arid in a measure guides the repre- 
 sentation of the whole nation ; to whatever party he may have 
 belonged, the moment he is elected he ought to remember 
 the words of Louis XII., who had been duke of Orleans, when 
 he became king : " The king of France must not revenge the 
 injuries done to the duke of Orleans ;" for as the whole repre- 
 sentative organism is the nation's, so is the speaker emphat- 
 ically a national officer ; upon him rests in a great measure 
 the whole operation of the representative system ; he may 
 promote a free hearing of all parties, for which they are sent 
 there, if he do his duty, or debar it by injustice. A. speaker 
 ought to remember that he is speaker of the whole house, 
 that is, of the whole representation of the whole nation, and 
 not of a party; that in giving an opportunity of speaking, 
 therefore, and in appointing upon committees, justice and fair- 
 ness ought always to guide him, as in all other acts done by 
 the authority of his chair. The more necessary the great and 
 discretionary power is which he exercises, the more is he 
 
 1 Souvenirs sur Mirabeau, ouvrage posthume publi6 par J. L. Duval, Brussels, 
 1822, chapter xvii.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 bound morally to exercise as a true citizen, justly, judiciously, 
 and patriotically. 1 
 
 1 The rtglements of the various legislative bodies on the continent, as the 
 French call all that part of our parliamentary law and usage which relates to the 
 internal management of the house itself, are interesting on this account. It is by 
 far the best reglement, here as in so many other cases, if public opinion is so 
 strong that it prevents the speaker from widely swerving from his duties. Long 
 custom and the conviction that strict justice in the speaker is to the advantage of 
 all cause the speaker of the British commons to act, upon the whole, with great 
 justice and high-minded impartiality.
 
 BOOK VII. 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Executive Officers. Difficulty of controlling them. Their Interference with Elec- 
 tions : in Athens, Rome, France, England, the United States. Plato's Opinion 
 of the Duties of Officers. Post-Office. The Chief Executive Officer. Confi- 
 dential Officers. Official Interpretation of Constitutions and Laws. The Veto. 
 Ancient and Modern Veto. Absolute, suspensive, and conditional Vetoes. 
 Privilege of Pardoning in Monarchies; in Republics. Danger and Diffi- 
 culty in Republics. For what purpose is it granted ? Rules which ought to 
 be observed in making use of the Power of Pardoning. 
 
 I. " How can a man serve the public ? When out of office, 
 his sole object is to attain it ; and when he has attained it, his 
 only anxiety is to keep it. In his unprincipled dread of losing 
 his place he will readily go all lengths." These words sound 
 as if they were taken from a modern debate or a discussion in 
 our papers of recent date, yet they were spoken two thousand 
 five hundred years ago by the greatest sage of a people at the 
 other end of the world, utterly independent in its whole civil- 
 ization upon the western, Caucasian race to which we belong; 
 they are the words of the Chinese sage Confucius, 1 in which I 
 have substituted only the word public for that of prince, not 
 an illegitimate substitution ; for even the Chinese acknowl- 
 edge in their laws, their classical works, and in the prayers 
 offered up by the emperor, that he is the vicegerent of heaven 
 for the maintaining of justice, order, morality ; in short, for 
 the benefit of the people. 
 
 The Greeks found the same difficulty of controlling their 
 executive officers. Their whole history testifies to the fact. 
 It is shown also by the constant, generally annual, rotation 
 
 1 Lun-yu, Conversations and Sayings of Confucius, recorded by his Disciples, 
 chap. 17, sect. 1 6, quoted from Davis's " The Chinese." [Lun-yu has been 
 translated by Schott, 1830.] 
 
 373
 
 374 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 in office, and the drawing of lots in some cities for offices and 
 magistracies ; by the very extensive system of checks, which, 
 in Athens for instance, was carried out into the minutest de- 
 tails, as the reader may see in Boeckh's Public Economy, book 
 ii. 8; by the repeated and periodical inquiry not only into the 
 accounts of officers, but into the whole administration of their 
 office the euftbvrj, which the Greeks valued very highly, and 
 upon the absence of which in the Lacedaemonian council 
 Aristotle animadverts (Politics, ii. 9 ;) and by the Athenian 
 nomophylakes, the office intended for the purpose of control- 
 ling the officers. And to mention no other of the many laws, 
 institutions, and events which prove the fact, we actually meet 
 with insurrections of the people against the -officers, who, 
 it was believed, had established themselves as a party and 
 become an unlawful oligarchy, such as that of the Thes- 
 pians mentioned in Thucydides, book vi. 95. Comp. also 
 Aristot, Pol. vi. 7, 19. 
 
 The whole Roman history is one continued commentary 
 on the difficulty and danger to be encountered in the solution 
 of the grave political problem, how to give sufficient power 
 to the officers, and at the same time to prevent them from 
 arrogating more, and uniting into a formidable aristocracy of 
 placemen. 
 
 Modern monarchies and republics offer no different spec- 
 tacle. The crown or executive has the command over the 
 legion of executive officers, and must have it in a high degree, 
 for otherwise no government would be able to obtain its end; 
 and, on the other hand, this influence is abused for purposes 
 separate from the interests of the state, or directly hostile to 
 the liberties of the people, and to the very objects for which 
 alone the whole government is established, and for which the 
 different officers have received authority under and within the 
 same. Every chief executive officer of whatever name, king, 
 president, or consul, and every subaltern under them, indeed, 
 every one that has power, feels, when opposed, the desire 
 rise in his bosom to carry his point and to interrupt the steady 
 course of law by the " per speciale mandatum regis," by which
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 375 
 
 the Stuarts would have set at nought all British liberty, had 
 they been suffered to do it. The whole struggle for civil 
 liberty in England turns upon what the commons thought 
 undue influence of the executive in setting aside acts of par- 
 liaments, despite special acts of parliaments against this 
 license and against the boldly arrogated influence and direc- 
 tion of elections on the part of the executive, which forms a 
 peculiar difficulty in all representative governments. 1 
 
 In France, to speak but of the latest times, we find that the 
 first charge against Polignac, when impeached after the July 
 revolution of 1830, was that of having unconstitutionally inter- 
 fered with the freedom of election, by sending circulars to all 
 public functionaries, requiring them to vote for the ministerial 
 candidates, in addition to which, written evidence was ex- 
 hibited showing that places and offices had been promised in 
 return for votes. 2 
 
 In the United States we find in the report made by a com- 
 mittee sent in 1839 by congress to the city of New York, to 
 inquire into certain affairs connected with the custom officers 
 of that city, that they had been assessed, not indeed by au- 
 thority, in proportion to their salaries to furnish contributions 
 towards election expenses. Nor is it possible here to pass 
 over in silence the open interference of the office-holders with 
 the election laws of the state, which occurred in the state of 
 Maryland in the year 1836. 
 
 II. The difficulty then has been felt at all times and in all 
 governments, but in some respects it greatly increases with 
 the establishment and firmer securing of modern liberty, such 
 as it has been characterized in the previous book. A govern- 
 ment whose only object is security and justice, not liberty, 
 
 1 It is perhaps not useless for me to refer here, among the many authors and 
 collections relating to this point, to Brodie's British Empire, vol. i. p. 113, et 
 seq., and, indeed, to the whole of his Introduction ; the reader will find there 
 and in Hallam's Constitutional History all the necessary references carefully 
 collected. 
 
 2 English Annual Register of 1830, published in 1831, p. 224.
 
 376 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 has to watch over the honesty, efficiency, and obedience of 
 the officers only ; but where the additional and highly impor- 
 tant object of government is the security and protection of 
 liberty, the people have a right to watch over the officers that 
 they do not interfere with it, especially with the elections, the 
 primary means by which we endeavor to secure it. If the 
 officers paid by the state to serve as agents of the government 
 interfere with it, this virtually amounts to conspiring against 
 one of the greatest of state objects : it is a capital usurpation. 
 We have seen that the very idea of modern liberty state- 
 liberty as contradistinguished to feudal corporation liberty 
 requires enlarged societies and continuous and systematic 
 governments. These again require a large number of officers 
 well united into one coherent system, and thus, of course, ex- 
 pose society in the same degree to the danger of seeing those 
 who were intended to be the mere agents of the law and gov- 
 ernment becoming the masters or leaders, secure in their 
 places, from which it may become the highest interest of 
 society to dislodge them. There is no single and absolute 
 principle, however, by strict adherence to which we may be 
 sure to avoid all difficulty, as by the fixed operation of a 
 machine. The contrary has been often erroneously supposed. 
 The Greeks at length threw aside all consideration of talent 
 and peculiar moral fitness, and resorted to the lot. 1 The state, 
 as was natural, rapidly declined, and bribery and dishonesty be- 
 came the order of the day. Incessant rotation begets evils as 
 great as the danger intended to be avoided by it. It prevents 
 any one from making himself thoroughly acquainted with his 
 official duties, deprives society of the service of many most 
 qualified persons, and, by holding out a hope to the least 
 qualified to have their turn of office, begets a general greedi- 
 ness and thirst for it, and a mean anxiety for salary among 
 those who either are unfit or indisposed for any steady, regu- 
 lar, and laborious trade or profession, to the exclusion of 
 
 1 [The author seems to think the lot universal in Greece, but it belonged to 
 extreme democracy, and became more common with time ; but even at Athens 
 sundry officers were chosen by cAtrofonia.']
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 377 
 
 those to whom an office no longer affords any inducement, 
 either by way of remuneration or honor, to interrupt their 
 own proper pursuits. Thus the government sinks gradually 
 more and more, and becomes the most expensive of all ; for 
 t ere is nothing more expensive than to feed indolence and 
 incapacity, while a state loses just so much in nerve and 
 healthiness as the desire to obtain money without labor in- 
 creases, and as offices are bestowed for other reasons than 
 merit and capacity. The more an officer knows that he does 
 not stand upon his own merit and capacity, so much the more 
 dependent he feels himself to be upon his employers, and con- 
 siders himself their tool and servant, not the public's, a mere 
 party follower whom good luck has thrown into a good berth, 
 of which, therefore, he must make the best while the time 
 lasts. Want of high-toned honor, genuine love of liberty 
 and country, ready devotion to her best interests, whole and 
 entire, and pride of his citizenship, must give way to a spirit 
 of dishonor and dishonesty; he sinks from a citizen of his 
 country to a lackey of his party ; from a deserving citizen who 
 is conscious that the workman is worthy of his hire, to a pil- 
 fering or blood-sucking slave. The system of throwing all 
 appointments into the hands of the people affords no certain 
 guarantee in itself; for if the general spirit of honor and lib- 
 erty is depressed, this system will only make of every idler a 
 petty demagogue, hurrying on general decay. The system 
 of mutual check and periodical inquiry of the last impor- 
 tance, and far too much neglected in many modern states is 
 still not sufficient alone to guard against the danger; witness 
 its little utility in Athens. We must acknowledge, then, that 
 in addition to wise laws relating to the tenure of offices, to the 
 real responsibility of those who hold them, and to the power 
 of appointment and removal, conscientious discharge of official 
 duties and jealous watching over them on the part of the 
 people are of the highest importance, and cannot be dispensed 
 with, whatever laws or principles we may resort to. It is the 
 error of those who fail in experience, or take but superficial 
 views of the affairs of men, to believe that a sort of govern-
 
 378 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 ment machine can be possibly invented, or some principle be 
 discovered, which must operate exactly, independently of the 
 character of its agents. Were it so, man would no longer be 
 the moral being which his Creator made him. The science 
 of politics has to treat of the laws and principles by which 
 men will be most likely to secure a discharge of official ac- 
 tions consentaneous to the constitution and the objects of the 
 state ; it is for political ethics to consider the duties of official 
 men, and impress them upon the citizen. Let us keep strictly 
 in our mind that as the great problem of our times is to unite 
 civil liberty with extensive, socialized states, which as we 
 have seen is to be obtained by the representative system, so 
 it is one of the more important of our problems to make a 
 large number of officers compatible with civil liberty a 
 problem the solution of which we can hardly say has as yet 
 fairly begun, and which, like every great political problem, 
 cannot be solved by merely proclaiming and inconsiderately 
 carrying through some apparently very simple and sym- 
 metrical theory, but must be solved by results obtained by 
 lofty views applied with careful observation, conscientious 
 love of truth, and wise consideration of all the given circum- 
 stances, and of the gradual development of the many relations 
 which constitute the state. 1 
 
 III. All those duties and principles which are most impor- 
 tant respecting executive officers are so simple, so clear and 
 
 1 If we study history with that spirit of truth which alone makes it a wise in- 
 structor, we shall find that no men have been greater benefactors to their coun- 
 tries or times than those whose moral and intellectual loftiness led them to adopt 
 great and elevated principles, and whose comprehensive and penetrating mind 
 enabled them to apply them wisely for the whole of society, who, therefore, even 
 while they struggled actively and zealously against obstacles, comprehended, 
 nevertheless, in their true and ultimate object the whole; and that none have 
 done more injury than those men who, possessed of a narrow mind, were never- 
 theless placed in high stations, either by birth or circumstances, and whose con- 
 fined intellect made them settle upon some general theses and adore them with 
 obstinate idolatry without regard to reality. Some of the prominent actors in the 
 French revolution, and James II. of England, are instances of the latter ; Henry 
 IV. of France, and Washington, of the former.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 379 
 
 evident, that they are hardly ever denied by word of mouth ; 
 yet it is very different if we consider men's actions. We must 
 pay, then, some attention to points which otherwise it would 
 be gratuitous in an author to touch. Though truisms, they 
 must be repeated. 
 
 Cicero says in his Offices, " Those who design to be par- 
 takers in the government should be sure to remember those 
 two precepts of Plato : first, to make the safety and interest 
 of their citizens the great aim and design of all their thoughts 
 and endeavors, without ever considering their own personal 
 advantage ; and secondly, to take care of the whole collective 
 body of the republic so as not to serve the interest of any 
 one party to the prejudice or neglect of all the rest: for the 
 government of a state is much like the office of a guardian or 
 trustee, which should always be managed for the good of the 
 pupil, and not of the persons to whom he is intrusted ; and 
 those men who, whilst they take care of one part of the citi- 
 zens, neglect or disregard another, do but occasion sedition 
 and discord." (Offices, i. 25.) No one dares to deny the 
 truth of these words, yet thousands act in opposition to them. 
 
 The officer is the officer of the government which is for the 
 benefit of the people, and " by the word people is signified a 
 community taken as a whole; but an oligarchy means only 
 a party." (Athejiagoras in Thucydides, vi. 39.) 
 
 From this fundamental truth it naturally follows that the 
 officer must not abuse his position for his own interest or that 
 of his friends or party, nor to the injury or detriment of the 
 people, and he must conscientiously strive to obtain the ob- 
 ject for which he is appointed, that is, first, to act according 
 to the true spirit of the laws, and secondly, to do as much 
 essential service to the public as he can. Respecting the first 
 point, dishonesty, as well as the pampering of any passion or 
 lust, is wholly and essentially against the oath, nay, the very 
 sense, of office. No charge has ever been held more odious 
 than that of official filching or robbing on a large scale. We 
 have sufficiently considered this subject under the head of 
 Honesty. The officer acts equally against this fundamental
 
 380 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 principle when he supports matters personal to himself by 
 official power, be this on a small scale in an underling, or 
 on a large scale by designating those who oppose him as op- 
 ponents to the public welfare. Parties are very apt to con- 
 found these two points which are yet distinct : they frequently 
 go so far as to stigmatize every one who is not the open, 
 active friend of their leader as not only hostile to him but to 
 the public at large. The ministerialists under George III. of 
 England and Charles X. of France called themselves the 
 king's friends, and Mr. O'Connell, on the accession of Vic- 
 toria, wrote a letter to Ireland to form a party to be called the 
 queen's friends. In the United States those who oppose the 
 administration, or only a single measure, have been repeatedly 
 termed enemies of the constitution. 
 
 As an officer is grossly dishonest who uses official informa- 
 tion for his own pecuniary advantage, or furnishes early in- 
 formation to his personal or political friends, so is he likewise 
 grossly dishonest who uses the power and influence, or even 
 the means which he obtains through his well-earned salary, 
 for party purposes, especially for elections. This the laws 
 and political procedures of all free nations corroborate. Of 
 all usurpations one of the most odious and unwarranted is 
 an oligarchy of place-holders, men who use the very means 
 granted them by the people against them for they use their 
 power against the people as soon as they interfere with the 
 free operation of elections, whether this be by influence before- 
 hand, or by making themselves active at the polls. I have 
 seen in the United States sheriffs, who have no official busi- 
 ness at the polls as they have in England, taking a most 
 offensive part in " bringing up" voters, and other procedures. 
 It is surprising that all the world agrees to set down a man as 
 an offender who uses a power of attorney for his own benefit 
 or against his employer, and yet that the officer, under oath 
 to keep the laws of the land, and having received his office, 
 directly or indirectly, only for the intended benefit of his em- 
 ployers, should not be considered such when he does the 
 same thing. All political deliberations in the army or navy
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 381 
 
 are justly looked upon by free nations with a jealous eye, and 
 in most nations are punishable acts ; but so ought likewise 
 the executive officer to be disfranchised as long as he holds 
 his office, and where this is not the law he ought in common 
 decency to abstain from such arrant political interference. 
 Still more odious and intolerable it becomes if whole institu- 
 tions, established for the convenience or protection of the 
 people, are made use of to serve the partial interests of those 
 who happen to have authority over them. There is no insti- 
 tution more necessary for modern civilization, more directly 
 for the convenience and necessary wants of the people, and 
 the officers of which ought to consider the performance of its 
 duties more religiously sacred, because it exists by tfust and 
 confidence alone, than the post-office. And yet this offers a 
 most wide-spread means of usurped influence, and of seriously 
 injuring some of the most essential interests of the citizen. 
 In several countries this sacred agent of European and Amer- 
 ican civilization has been shamelessly abused by its officers 
 for prying into the political sentiments or plans of the citizens ; 
 and the large and peculiarly well organized, affiliated, and dif- 
 fused body of postmasters has been made subservient to the 
 administration, thus superinducing a usurping government 
 upon that granted by law, which it is exceedingly difficult for 
 the citizens to shake off. 1 
 
 IV. The duties of a superior or chief executive officei 
 necessarily embrace those of the citizen and of the subordi- 
 nate officers in general, but the higher he stands, the more 
 imperious are the claims of duty upon him : especially is this 
 true of the chief magistrate, for he must be in many cases 
 the last resort, upon whom the ultimate decision depends. 
 As regards his more particular actions I propose to consider 
 
 1 * It is to be considered whether the post-office ought not to be made inde- 
 pendent. What has the postmaster to do with the cabinet ? I have written an 
 article for the New York Review on the subject, at the suggestion of Senator 
 Preston. May, 1841.
 
 382 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 them in the following order: his appointment of officers, 
 and discharging them, the use he makes of his personal in- 
 fluence and power in the legislation of the country, before a 
 bill comes fairly before him for approval, and the conformity 
 of his actions to the spirit of the laws and their interpreta- 
 tion, which is closely connected with the legitimate use which 
 he ought to make of peculiar privileges, for instance of the 
 power of pardoning. 
 
 As to the pervading and general principle of his conduct, 
 he, before all, ought to realize in his actions the great end and 
 object of the state, that is, justice; truth and justice on the 
 one hand, prudence and wisdom on the other, ought to be to 
 him what the light and heat of the sun on the one hand, and 
 care and foresight on the other, are to the husbandman. 
 When Charles V. had cited Luther before the diet at Worms, 
 and many high prelates importuned the emperor not to keep 
 his promise of safe-conduct to the heretic, the youthful mon- 
 arch exclaimed, " If faith and truth are banished from all the 
 world, they must find with me a refuge." 
 
 The chief magistrate is the magistrate of the state, of the 
 whole. He cannot too frequently represent this to his mind ; 
 not only in order to avoid acts of injustice and low partiality 
 (do we not expect the same of every mayor, captain, school- 
 master, or father of a family ?), but also in order to shape his 
 course and guide the government. All the science of ruling, 
 in whatever narrow or extensive sphere, resolves itself into 
 aiding the society over which we rule, and not part of that 
 society merely, in obtaining its greatest and highest end ; 
 all the art of ruling resolves itself into reconciling, through 
 lofty principles, the opposites, mediating contrasts, and making 
 all parts, however opposed to one another, move towards the 
 same great and common goal. We rule, when we seize upon 
 the principle of life in each component part and make it aid 
 and support every other part ; we only conquer or destroy 
 when we oppress or suppress one part by the help of another. 
 
 It has been mentioned several times how baneful it is for a 
 country if, in the appointment of officers, no regard is paid to
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 383 
 
 capacity; still worse if moral unfitness is disregarded, and 
 men with tainted or actually wrecked reputation, disowned by 
 the society of the honest, are seen clothed with public office, 
 to the detriment of that public moral feeling without which 
 political vigor and the necessary buoyancy of civic spirit can- 
 not exist. Republics and monarchies are equally interested 
 in the appointment of fit and honorable persons. 1 If capacity 
 for office no longer constitutes a title for office, general cor- 
 ruption and universal public robbery follow, while the affairs 
 of the commonwealth, conducted by imbecile men, are neg- 
 lected, and a state of things is produced against which excited 
 party passion may be blind at the time, but which never fails 
 to produce melancholy and universally felt consequences for 
 the next generation. 
 
 That a chief officer will prefer a citizen of his own party if 
 he has the choice, is clear ; he is in many cases bound to do 
 so ; but, as has been remarked already, to appoint a less fit 
 person because he is one of our party, when a fit person might 
 have been found of different political opinions, only he must 
 not be a zealot of his party, is placing the party above the 
 public. Those officers who have to advise the chief magistrate, 
 or who fill offices the faithful execution of which requires an 
 
 1 General Washington's views respecting appointments are given in his own 
 words in Sparks's Writings of George Washington, vol. i. p. 455. It is true that 
 Washington had to contend with no party; but there would have been parties 
 under almost any other mortal. I cannot forbear giving here Montesquieu's 
 impressive words respecting the court-government of Louis XV., for the French 
 government, after the injudicious total severance of the government from the 
 people, destroyed institutions and was embodied in the personality of the mon- 
 arch. Montesquieu's words apply likewise to the Roman history, and partially, 
 mutatis mutandis, to some existing states as well : " L' ambition dans Poisivite, la 
 bassesse dans 1'orgueil, le desir de s'enrichir sans travail, 1'aversion pour la verite, 
 la flatterie, la trahison, la perfidie, 1'abandon de tous ses engagements, le mepris 
 des devoirs du citoyen, la crainte de la vertu du prince, I'esp6rance de ses fai- 
 blesses, et plus que tout cela, le ridicule perpetuel jette sur la vertu, forment, je 
 crois, le caractere du plus grand nombre des courtisans. Or il est tres-malaise 
 que la plupart des principaux d'un etat soient mal-honne'tes gens, et que les infe- 
 rieurs soient gens de bien; que ceux-la soient trompeurs, et que ceux-ci consentent 
 \ n'etre que dupes "
 
 384 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 indispensable agreement of political principles as well as of 
 views and dispositions with those of the chief executive offi- 
 cer, in short, confidential officers, must, as a matter of course, 
 change with a change of the administration ; but it produces 
 very evil consequences if it comes to be considered that a 
 change of the administration is the signal of a universal turn- 
 ing out of office, and if every minor officer is declared to be a 
 confidential one. Such a procedure produces a general thirst 
 for office and consequent subserviency in the party that is to 
 come in ; it engenders a spirit of spoliation, and makes the 
 office to be considered a spoil won by victory, so that the 
 public service, the people, are forgotten ; and when the party 
 is in, it makes the office-holders fearful to act openly as just 
 citizens in their simple and primary civil duties. A degree of 
 political recklessness is necessarily diffused in the state, and 
 if it is not low sordidness which prompts to these actions, it is 
 the political bigotry which declares every one dissenting in 
 opinion to be opposed to public welfare, or even destitute of 
 honesty. James II., when heedlessly rushing on in his mad 
 career of projected absolutism, after the fashion of Louis XIV., 
 declared (in 1686, to Lord Rochester, Clarendon Correspond- 
 ence, ii. 117, and other works) that no one should retain an 
 office who was not " of his (the king's) opinion." He must 
 have no other interest but what he acknowledges, supports, 
 and promotes. A compact and subservient body with official 
 subordination is thus formed ; an aristocracy of officers, far 
 worse than an aristocracy of birth, is thus produced, and a 
 number of citizens are led meanly to betray ^their best rights 
 for fear of losing their posts ; in short, the saying of Confu- 
 cius placed at the head of this chapter becomes amply veri- 
 fied. The French lately felt it with the greatest indignation 
 that some of the officers were turned out because they had 
 voted against the Mole ministry in 1839. I repeat, all confi- 
 dential officers ought to be changed if a different party comes 
 into the administration ; but it is vicious to make all subaltern 
 officers, for instance, those of the custom-house, confidential, 
 that is, to compel them to assist the administration, beyond
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 385 
 
 what the public service demands of them in their respective 
 places. 1 
 
 1 There are some passages of interest with reference to this subject in the late 
 . speeches of Lord Russell and Sir Robert Peel on the vote of confidence respect- 
 ing the administration of Ireland, in April, 1839. I ought to add that the whole 
 question of discharging officers, which is important already but will grow in 
 magnitude with the increased demand of liberty and increased extent of states, 
 is very differently viewed on the continent of Europe and by the Anglican race. 
 In Germany and France there is such an immense number of government officers, 
 and government employment offers so regular and steady a career, that numbers 
 choose it as their regular profession, for which in not a few countries regular 
 preparatory studies are demanded. The officers form a hierarchy, and calculate 
 upon regular promotion as the reward of honesty and talent, precisely in the same 
 way that with us or in England an individual chooses the army or navy for his 
 profession. It is evident that where this state of things exists, the question of 
 the power of discharge is of vital interest to thousands, and it has been held that 
 no officer ought to be discharged without inquiry and giving reasons; especially 
 is it so where there is no public liberty. In these latter countries honor, title, 
 consequence, support, and future promotion depend upon the office. To be dis- 
 charged is disgrace and ruin, as it is for the mandarin to be struck from the list. 
 In brief, in those countries discharge without reason or sufficient inquiry is con- 
 sidered as exceedingly tyrannical. With the Anglican race the question assumes 
 a totally different aspect, for two reasons : first, the number of general government 
 officers is comparatively small, and many officers have retained their civil charac- 
 ter; citizens fill the office for a time and leave it again; secondly, since civil 
 liberty exists with them on a large scale, changes of administrations have hap- 
 pened more frequently. These changes, however, have required several further 
 changes in the officers, so that on the one hand it is no disgrace to be turned out, 
 on the other hand the offices, being few in number and insecure, are not calcu- 
 lated upon as a regular profession there is no officer-hierarchy. The latter is a 
 necessary effect of centralization of government power, the prominent feature of 
 the European continental history of the last century, and will and must vanish 
 again with it. Yet I do not say that the question is solved ; it will form one of 
 the most interesting questions of politics to ascertain how a sufficiently free power 
 of discharging in the executive which in free countries must exist is to be 
 united with that degree of security for the officer which shall protect him against 
 executive tyranny. It forms a very different question. In monarchies, which are 
 not free, the security of the officer against being turned out without some legal pro- 
 cedure is, not without reason, considered as a sort of guarantee against ministerial 
 and monarchical despotism. Free nations want far different guarantees, and, 
 though the question of appointment and dischnrge ahvnys remains an important 
 one, it never can acquire with them that grave importance which, to judge from 
 various works, it has acquired on the European continent, where, as I have said 
 already, the only remnant of public life is the service in government office. 
 Since the above was written, the speeches of Sir Robert Peel and the duke of 
 VOL. II. 25
 
 3 86 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The executive has repeatedly endeavored to influence the 
 votes of the legislative body by open declaration of his senti- 
 ments, or he has beforehand declared that he would use his 
 authority of non-approval if such or such a bill should be 
 passed. The constitution cannot prohibit such declarations, or, 
 if it did, could effect nothing, because there would be always 
 means enough to evade the prohibition; but such acts of an 
 executive are certainly directly against the spirit of a truly 
 constitutional country, where legislation must be as free and 
 unfettered as possible until it comes to be connected with the 
 executive by his approval or rejection. The English are at 
 present peculiarly jealous of perfectly untrammelled debate, 
 and it would lead to very serious consequences should now a 
 member of either house make a declaration similar to that of 
 earl Temple in the lords, that the king would consider every 
 one his enemy who would vote for the East India Company 
 bill brought in by the coalition ministry. 1 
 
 Wellington, on May 13 and 14, 1839, to explain their proposed change of some 
 ladies of the court of Victoria which led to a failure of Sir Robert's attempt to 
 construct an administration, have reached us. They are not without interest 
 respecting one of the most important points in constitutional monarchy. They 
 touch upon a question which will become more important every year. 
 
 1 * This was in December, 1783. Fox and his friends were vehement against 
 ''secret influence," "secret cabal;" and Mr. Baker, seconded by Lord Maitland, 
 proposed the following motion in the commons : " That it is now necessary to 
 declare that to report any opinion or pretended opinion of his majesty upon any 
 bill or other proceeding depending in either house of parliament, with a view to 
 influence the votes of the members, is a high crime and misdemeanor, derogatory 
 to the honor of the crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of parliament, 
 and subversive of the constitution of the country." William Pitt warded it off. 
 (Tomline, Memoirs of Pitt, vol. ii. p. 225.) The clamor against the use of the 
 king's name in this affair was, however, so great that Lord Temple gave back 
 the seals he had received three days before. (Tomline, as above, p. 231.) The 
 letter which George III. wrote on March 20, 1785, to Pitt, after he had laid his 
 plan of a reform of parliament before the king, who was unfriendly to the meas- 
 ure, is worthy of tbe reflection of any chief magistrate. George states that he 
 should think it ,very base in him to influence members upon so momentous a 
 question, and that he should think very ill of any man who would vote on such 
 a question biassed by friendship. He moreover declares that he never had given 
 ,his opinion, nor should he do so before parliament had discussed it. (Tomline, 
 :.as above, vol. ii. p. 40.)
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 387 
 
 The earliest period when the principle that the executive 
 should not influence debates by declaring his decision before- 
 hand came to be more particularly discussed, or at least when 
 it was stated that despite such a declaration debate on the 
 respective subject is not useless, because the executive may 
 be induced by that very debate on the strength of the vote 
 to yield, is probably that period when Charles II. opened 
 several parliaments by declaring that he would grant all 
 reasonable demands, but that they must not touch the hered- 
 itary succession (that is, exclude his brother James), and the 
 tories told the whigs that all their attempts to exclude James 
 were useless, since the king would never concur ; whereupon 
 the whigs answered that kings had often yielded, and that at 
 any rate the houses must do what they consider their duty, 
 and leave it to others to do theirs. They justly observed that 
 constitutionally no person can know the king's mind or be 
 charged to declare it upon a subject which has not yet been 
 brought constitutionally before him; that, therefore, all these 
 declarations of his intended veto are but surmises or sus- 
 picions, not sufficient to be made by the houses the founda- 
 tions of actions of the highest magnitude. 
 
 Declarations not unlike this have been made in congress; 
 at least, members believed, and in fact known, to be personal 
 friends of the executive have declared that it was useless to 
 debate on a certain subject, because the executive would veto 
 the bill if it should pass. This is as much against parlia- 
 mentary dignity and decorum as against true constitutional 
 spirit. One of the great objects of constitutions is to secure 
 independent action to various branches, and to produce by a 
 union of all a well-poised result. These gentlemen could not 
 have considered what frightful consequences might ensue 
 from this incipient abuse. If it were carried out with any de- 
 gree of consistency, it would soon virtually deprive the legis- 
 lature of its initiative power, and make it a body which has 
 only to confirm or reject .measures proposed by the adminis- 
 tration ; and in whatever degree it might be acknowledged, it 
 would effectually forestall all necessary reforms, to which, for
 
 3 88 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the time being, the majority as well as the executive were 
 known to be opposed all those " annual motions" which 
 have in most cases succeeded by dint of unconquerable per- 
 severance. Who does not know that it is frequently of the 
 greatest importance first of all to start the discussion on a 
 subject at large in the country by a debate in the house? 
 Those who made that unconstitutional declaration forgot that 
 a house of representatives is very different from a body of 
 mere deputies. The house of representatives is, as we have 
 seen, the organ of public opinion, with the power of making 
 it public law, and it is one of its most important functions 
 that it represents public opinion also in this, that the incipient 
 nucleus of a minority, nay, individual opinion, may grow into 
 the opinion of a majority, if it have the internal strength of 
 truth and be supported by perseverance. Whether the execu- 
 tive shall veto or not must remain to be seen, after he is 
 acquainted with the arguments and with the greater or smaller 
 majority which carried a bill. Still worse is it if the chief 
 officer endeavors personally to influence elections by requests 
 or threats. Charles X. sent letters signed by himself to the 
 various officers to inform them how to vote, and that the min- 
 isters were acting in his spirit. If this were suffered, it would 
 of course destroy all constitutional responsibility of ministers 
 and all check upon the monarch. It is held that the British 
 monarch cannot give personal instructions. If it is inad- 
 missible in the subaltern officer to influence elections, it is 
 evidently a far greater dereliction of duty in a chief magis- 
 trate. Nor does it add to his strength, for every movement 
 beyond the limits of constitutional law and propriety betrays 
 weakness, lowers him in the eye of the people, and will ulti- 
 mately recoil upon him. 
 
 V. I have shown on another occasion 1 that it is absolutely 
 
 1 Legal and Political Hermeneutics, where the reader will find also some 
 remarks on the subject of Precedents, which is of much interest in executive 
 questions.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 389 
 
 impossible for the human mind to devise any written law 
 which can possibly provide for all cases, or the sense of which 
 may not be stretched or narrowed according; to the inter- 
 
 o 
 
 preter's disposition. As the interpretation of the chief magis- 
 trate is of the last importance, it is equally important that he 
 should never abandon the two main props of all sound inter- 
 pretation, without which the most liberal constitution may be 
 made to mean the most servile things, and the wisest pro- 
 vision maybe made to cover the most selfish designs; I 
 mean good faith and common sense. These must be the 
 main guides in the interpretation of the constitution, of the 
 laws which he is charged to execute, and of the privileges 
 bestowed by the former upon him: he must fairly interpret 
 according to the spirit of the law and constitution, of con- 
 stitutional and representative liberty in general, and of the 
 genius and history of his people in particular. The constitu- 
 tion of the United States gives the right of nominating officers 
 to the president, but the senate of the United States must con- 
 firm the nomination, except in the case of inferior officers, 
 where by law the full appointment is vested in the president 
 or some other chief officer. The president, several years ago, 
 nominated a person to a certain office, but the senate declined 
 approving the appointment. The moment the senate had 
 adjourned, the same person was re-nominated, and when the 
 senate met again the new nomination was laid before them. 
 This was certainly not in the spirit of the constitution, which 
 can have no other meaning than that there shall be a check 
 upon the presidential nominations, and that if some nomi- 
 nated person is rejected some other should be chosen ; else 
 of what use could be the whole provision ? Yet the act of 
 the president was in conformity with the letter or form of the 
 law. The constituent people of Texas, who adopted their 
 constitution soon after this event, seem to have taken counsel 
 in it, for they added a provision to their constitution that the 
 chief magistrate shall have no power to re-appoint a person 
 rejected by the senate.
 
 390 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 
 
 The executive veto, absolute, conditional, or suspensive, 1 
 that is the necessity of concurrence on the part of the chief 
 executive or monarch in a bill before it becomes law, and 
 consequently his power to deny his concurrence, is a point 
 of much importance in political law. It has misled many 
 writers and politicians, that they treated of the veto as a 
 separate privilege, a prerogative which seemed to be given 
 directly to interfere with the acts of another branch, as the 
 veto of the Roman tribunes in many cases actually was, for 
 their specific sanction was not necessary to make a bill a law; 
 they had the power of the intercession or veto as such ; they 
 were not asked to approve, but they had the prerogative of 
 interposing in other cases as well as with reference to laws ; 
 they could veto, that is, stop the farther procedure in the 
 comitia, they could suspend the administration of justice, the 
 execution of a sentence, and could interfere even with the 
 procedures of the consuls. Indeed, the origin and essence of 
 the tribunitial power was an interference with a particular act 
 of a consul for the purpose of protecting a man of the plebs or 
 common people. It is different with us: according to modern 
 constitutional law, it is believed necessary that the executive 
 should have a concurrent authority in making laws, partly in 
 order to prevent the absolute tyranny of the legislature, of 
 which history gives many instances, partly to pledge the ex- 
 ecutive to the execution of the laws by securing his consent 
 to their enactment; to prevent him also from becoming a 
 mere committee, as it were, of the legislature, and for various 
 
 1 An absolute veto is possessed, in theory, by the king of England ; a suspen- 
 sive veto by the king of Norway. If he declines concurring, the same bill may 
 be proposed by the next storthing (parliament) ; if the king declines again, and 
 if the next storthing after passes the same bill, it becomes thereby a law without 
 the concurrence of the king. This provision belongs to the constitution of 1814 : 
 in 1824 the king desired such an alteration of the constitution as would give him 
 an absolute veto, but the Norwegians repeatedly declined. The president of the 
 United States has a conditional veto : if he declines concurring, the senate and 
 representatives may repass the bill by a majority of two-thirds, whereby the bill 
 becomes law ; but whatever has happened in one congress, which lasts two 
 years, can in no wise affect the next.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 391 
 
 other reasons. This constitutional concurrence will be found, 
 upon thorough inquiry, to belong to those main constitutional 
 discoveries characteristic of modern times, and to those polit- 
 ical guarantees which are peculiar to civil liberty. For it is 
 very clear that without it the executive either loses all energy 
 or is at war with the legislature; in either case factions must 
 decide, and the sway of public opinion is impaired or anni- 
 hilated. But while this privilege of the chief magistrate's 
 concurrence allows public opinion to acquire a greater degree 
 of pow.r, his frequent use of his power of non-concurrence 
 meets with an obstacle in the same public opinion. Still, this 
 concurrence or non-concurrence is quite different from the 
 vast, absolute Roman veto. That our veto is no original 
 privilege of itself is clear, among other things, from the fact 
 that most modern constitutions of any degree of liberality 
 settle the form in which the chief executive shall withhold his 
 approval or sanction ; in most constitutions it is expressed in 
 a courteous form, such as, the king will think about it, or will 
 examine. The veto question, in modern political law, can 
 never be properly treated, except as part of the greater ques- 
 tion of executive concurrence in the great political act of 
 making laws. This concurrence is the primary question, the 
 veto a consequence only. The concurrence, however, is, as 
 it appears to me, one of those necessary conciliatory principles 
 so indispensable in politics. But it must appear, likewise, 
 plain that the veto, being but incident to the concurrence, 
 while the concurrence is the last finish given to a law, not the 
 essential production and generation of it, which is the prov- 
 ince proper of the legislature, ought to be used with the 
 utmost caution and only when it appears to the executive 
 that insurmountable obstacles are in the way of his sanction- 
 ing the proposed measure. The veto question is more impor- 
 tant in governments like that of the United States, where a 
 disagreement between the executive and legislature may exist 
 not only in theory but practically, since there is no practical 
 means of enforcing harmony at the instant, no constitutional 
 conciliatory principle until new elections take place. At least
 
 392 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 no such means has as yet worked itself out in practice. Con- 
 gress has no means indirectly to coerce the executive into 
 compliance, as parliament has by refusing supplies, which 
 would not have the same effect in the United States ; nor has 
 the executive any power to produce compliance if it should be 
 diametrically opposed. 
 
 In constitutional monarchies, where the monarch is above 
 and outside of the administration, we all know the practical 
 operation of the conciliatory principle, which has worked 
 itself out of the supplies on the one hand, and out of the con- 
 stitutional impossibility of regal action without ministerial co- 
 operation on the other. Hence the king of England has not 
 declined concurring for above a century, except, indeed, by 
 anticipating the necessity of non-concurrence by proroguing 
 parliament. The president of the United States may veto, 
 and has often done so. It becomes therefore the more 
 urgently necessary for him to do so faithfully, consci- 
 entiously, and cautiously, in the constitutional spirit of his 
 country; not in the narrow limit of a party. 
 
 VI. In most countries in which there exist constitutions, 
 the privilege of pardoning and reprieving is conferred upon 
 the chief executive, with few or no limitations, if we speak of 
 the punishment for common offences only. The restrictions 
 relate in almost all states exclusively to impeachments and 
 p&litical offences, to protect which the executive might feel 
 tempted or which may involve the executive itself. The 
 question of pardoning has not received by any means that 
 degree of attention which it deserves, since the time of the 
 essential change which has taken place in the spirit of penal . 
 laws on the one hand, and the more decidedly acknowledged 
 sway of the law as indissolubly connected with substantial 
 civil liberty on the other. Montesquieu says that pardoning is 
 the most beautiful attribute of sovereignty ; T a recent writer 
 on constitutional law 2 calls it the most precious right of the 
 
 1 Esprit des Lois, vi. 5. 
 
 2 Aretin, Staatsr. d. constitutioneller Monarchic, i. 205.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS, 
 
 393 
 
 monarch. Whether these assertions are exaggerated or not 
 it is not necessary to examine here. Certain it is that when 
 Montesquieu wrote, and when the penal law bore the imprint 
 of a spirit of revenge and indignation at rebellious disobedi- 
 ence against the will of the power-holder, mercy in pardoning 
 justly appeared to be a most beautiful attribute ; and we can 
 understand the meaning of pardoning hundreds and thou- 
 sands at a time, on some joyous occasions, though there was 
 also a wrong idea always connected with it. In our times it 
 becomes flagrant violation of the law if whole numbers of 
 common criminals not of political offenders are pardoned, 
 and the community is thus exposed again to all the dangers 
 to life and property, as was for instance lately the case when 
 a son was born to the king of Naples. If it was unnecessary 
 to keep the criminals imprisoned, it was shocking to retain 
 them at all ; if it was right and necessary to retain them, it 
 was shocking to let them loose upon the community. To 
 make either dependent upon the birth of a prince, a wholly 
 extra-judicial and extra-legal event, is contrary to the spirit 
 of the law and the duty of the executive. The king might 
 have pardoned all whom he conceived to have offended him 
 or his authority more individually; but he evidently abused 
 his prerogative in pardoning common criminals. It may be 
 very consonant to a father's heart bounding with joy to give 
 joy to hundreds, in a moment of happy exultation, but it is 
 no pleasure to the honest to have criminals turned upon them 
 by the hundred, most of whom, there is not the slightest 
 doubt, committed new crimes before three days had passed. 
 
 Yet the incalculable mischief caused by unwarranted and 
 injudicious pardons in monarchies hardly deserves mention 
 if we compare it to the evil caused by this interruption of the 
 proper course of law in the United States, already so mild in 
 many parts, and yet so often set aside upon the most frivolous 
 grounds, indeed very frequently upon no grounds at all, ex- 
 cept that some persons, who allow their zeal to be stirred 
 more by sympathy with the guilty than with the honest 
 obtain a number of signatures to a petition. " Foreasmuch as
 
 394 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 many doe offend in hope of pardon that pardons be very 
 rarely granted," has been said already by Lord Coke. 1 In 
 some of the United States pardon almost amounts to cer- 
 tainty; and, were we not warranted in drawing the conclusion 
 from statistics, we have the confession of the criminals them- 
 selves, to the effect that the impunity held out by constant 
 pardons has influenced them greatly, either in a direct way, 
 or indirectly by lessening the fear of the law in general. Yet 
 this is not the greatest of the evils caused by injudicious par- 
 doning. Clergymen who injudiciously collect signatures for 
 pardons little think of the incalculable injury they do to many 
 young persons by aiding the propagation of crime, by return- 
 ing unpunished and hardened criminals upon the community, 
 and to society by loosening the necessary framework of the 
 law. This, however, is not the place fully to expose all these 
 many evils. It belongs to criminal statistics, and to the whole 
 science of punishment, and I must refer the reader for further 
 discussion of the subject to works relating to those branches 
 especially. 2 But one remark I wish to make for charitably 
 disposed persons, who see in 'the punishment of a sentenced 
 criminal some evil or other befalling an individual only, and 
 forget his previous crime, the welfare of society, and the 
 will of God that we should have laws, and that therefore we 
 should obey and not interfere with them. My remark to 
 such persons is this, that if they knew the affiliation and 
 what might be called the whole economy of crime, they 
 would know among other things that an immense number of 
 offences remain untried, and an immense number of tried 
 offences unpunished, and that the common offender stands 
 already, in all countries in which the summary process is 
 
 1 3d Institute, 243. 
 
 a Beaumont and Tocqueville, The Penitentiary System in the United States, 
 translated and provided with Notes by myself, Philadelphia, 1833, in the Intro- 
 duction to which, p. xxix., I have given my views on pardoning; and my Letter 
 on Subjects of Penal Law, published by the Philadelphia Prison Society, 1838. 
 The repeated Reports of the Agents of Penitentiaries, and many persons in high 
 employ in prison-matters in Europe, all concur that injudicious pardoning is a very 
 great dereliction of duty in him who has the power. [Cf. Civil Liberty, App. II.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 395 
 
 justly abandoned, a great chance of escape, without holding 
 out to him this additional hope of ultimate impunity, after 
 tiresome proof and conviction. 
 
 VII. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the pardoning power 
 exist somewhere, even where the laws are conformable to the 
 spirit of the age, and imprisonment is not of a kind to expose 
 the prisoner to contamination and greater corruption. For it 
 is impossible for any legislator to frame his laws in such a 
 manner that their application to some complex cases should 
 not operate against their own spirit or object. Other consid- 
 erations, such as imperative demands of public welfare, may 
 exist, which make the suspension of the rigorous course of 
 the law advisable or necessary; or actual mistakes may hap- 
 pen, so that the execution of the sentence would be no longer 
 the execution of the law, but unlawful barbarity. A French- 
 woman, Elizabeth Colliaux, was sentenced, in consequence of 
 an error which the jury themselves had noticed, to five years' 
 imprisonment. The jury, who expected her acquittal, were 
 surprised at her sentence, and prayed at once for pardon. 
 Strange to say, she was not pardoned on the day of St. Charles, 
 when many real criminals were; she was put in the pillory 
 and branded. 1 
 
 On the other hand, a pardon or reprieve, being an inter- 
 ruption of the law, is of itself dangerous in all states in which 
 the supremacy of the law is justly considered the .main shield 
 of civil liberty. This difficulty is much increased in republics, 
 because in them the supremacy of the law is of the very last 
 importance, and at the same time the chief magistrate is so 
 easily accessible that resistance against solicitations for pardon 
 becomes the more difficult. By what principles ought those 
 magistrates, then, to whom this prerogative is confided, or the 
 ministers of the crown who propose pardons, to be guided ? I 
 believe by the following: 
 
 * All France was deeply affected at this heart-rending event. Gazette des 
 Tribunaux, No. 1347 of 1829.
 
 396 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Pardoning power has been granted by the state to an indi- 
 vidual only for the better obtaining of the true ends of the 
 law, or the better fulfilment of its true spirit and not of its 
 mere form. The contrary would imply an absurdity. It would 
 be absurd, indeed, first to make laws with great expense and 
 trouble, then to make offenders amenable to these laws with 
 still greater expense, and finally to invest an officer with a 
 privilege to set at naught all these ends, unless it were meant 
 that this privilege should aid in obtaining the general end of 
 all law, that is, right and justice. There ought always to 
 exist peculiar and strong reasons, not why the law ought to 
 be adhered to, but why its regular course ought to be inter- 
 rupted. A case actually occurred a few years ago, when the 
 governor of one of the largest western states of the Union 
 respited a criminal sentenced for murder in open daylight, 
 " in order that the sentiments and wishes of the people of [a 
 certain] county might be known," declaring "that if at the 
 expiration of the time he could be satisfied that it is the wish of 
 the citizens of [said] county generally that this sentence should 
 be commuted to that of imprisonment for life, their wishes 
 could then be complied with." Thus the governor introduced 
 on his own responsibility the entirely new system of making 
 the execution of the sentence, after having been delivered in due 
 course of law, dependent upon the " wishes" of the majority 
 of that county to which the criminal happened to belong. 
 What a view of general law and general justice ! 
 
 If, therefore, a case is brought before the chief magistrate 
 who has the power of pardoning, he ought to inquire whether 
 there are any strong palliating circumstances of which the 
 law could not take notice, or circumstances which render the 
 sentence, although in strict conformity with the law, severer 
 than the intention of the law-makers themselves can fairly be 
 supposed to have been. If such be the case, a partial or entire 
 pardon is proper. 
 
 If the law is manifestly and offensively against the more 
 humane spirit of the age, especially if old laws demand cruel 
 punishments and tortures, a pardon is right ; for it is fair and
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 just to suppose that this is one of the cases for which the 
 privilege was granted, namely, to temper the law by equity 
 and mercy. The code of Prussia decrees for some crimes the 
 punishment of breaking on the wheel; the judges are bound 
 to award it ; but the king invariably issues an order to strangle 
 the criminal before his body be broken on the wheel, or com- 
 mutes the punishment into simple beheading. 
 
 The more recently, therefore, the laws have been revised, 
 and the more the process of revision has been such that we 
 may suppose it to have been fairly influenced by the spirit of 
 society, the more rarely pardon ought to be exercised. 
 
 It is dangerous, however, in the highest degree, if pardons 
 are granted from a merely private compassion for the offender, 
 or from any other motive unconnected with the welfare of the 
 state or the peculiar hardship of the single case. The enor- 
 mous abuse of pardoning in the United States has contributed 
 to undermine political morality, and has seriously interfered 
 with the greatest safeguard of right and liberty, the govern- 
 ment of law. If a case presents circumstances which can 
 leave no feeling heart without regret, which yet are the neces- 
 sary consequences of the law, known perfectly well by the law- 
 makers at the time of making the law, for instance, the afflic- 
 tion of a respectable family by the committal of a degenerate 
 son to prison, or the want and poverty of a mother with her 
 children in consequence of her husband's having been sen- 
 tenced for a crime, the pardon must necessarily be refused ; 
 for the magistrate is not charged to consider these circum- 
 stances. 1 
 
 1 I cannot forbear transcribing here a passage from Beccaria's Essay on Crimes 
 and Punishments, Engl. trans!., Edinburgh, 1807, chap. xlvi. Beccaria will be 
 allowed to be the best authority for a lenient spirit: 
 
 "As punishments become more mild, clemency and pardon are less necessary. 
 Happy the nation in which they will be considered as dangerous ! Clemency, 
 which has often been deemed a sufficient substitute for every other virtue in sov- 
 ereigns, should be excluded in a perfect legislation, where punishments are mild 
 and the proceedings in criminal cases regular and expeditious. This truth will 
 seem cruel to those who live in countries where, from the absurdity of the laws 
 and the severity of punishments, pardons and the clemency of the prince are
 
 398 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 Every pardon granted upon insufficient grounds becomes a 
 serious offence against society, and he that grants it is, in jus- 
 tice, answerable for the offences which the offender may com- 
 mit, and for the general injury done to political morality by 
 undue interference with the law. The pardoning magistrate 
 ought never to forget that society and the criminal form two 
 parties, the one invisible as a whole and unrepresented, the 
 other under sufferance before him and hence engaging his 
 feelings very differently ; and that, moreover, while it is but 
 natural that our feelings should turn somewhat in favor of the 
 prisoner the moment that sentence is actually pronounced, 
 because he appears as the vanquished party, these feelings 
 must not sway him in whose hands society has in part 
 intrusted the maintenance not the subversion of law, the 
 protection not the undermining of society. Still more objec- 
 tionable is it if considerations such as the female sex of the 
 offender are urged in favor of a pardon. Is then woman not 
 a moral and a responsible being, and shall we again disgrace 
 her by holding her unaccountable after she has been raised 
 by positive laws to moral accountability? The Chinese wife 
 is not morally emancipated to this day. They have a maxim 
 to this day that a " married woman can commit no crime ; the 
 responsibility rests with the husband." How degrading for 
 the woman ! I have cited on another occasion the Swedish 
 law of 1335 by which the woman of that country was made 
 amenable to the laws in her own individuality. 1 Lately, some 
 respectable British papers expressed the hope that an atro- 
 
 necessavy. It is, indeed, one of the noblest prerogatives of the throne, but, at 
 the same time, a tacit disapprobation of the laws. Clemency is a virtue which 
 belongs to the legislator and not to the executor of the laws; a virtue which 
 ought to shine in the code, and not in private judgment. To show mankind 
 that crimes are sometimes pardoned, and that punishment is not the necessary 
 consequence, is to nourish the flattering hope of impunity, and is the cause of 
 their considering every punishment inflicted as an act of injustice and oppression. 
 The prince, in pardoning, gives up the public security in favor of an individual, 
 and, by ill-judged benevolence, proclaims a public act of impunity. Let, then, 
 the legislator be tender, indulgent, and humane. 
 
 1 My letter to the Philadelphia Prison Society, p. 39.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 cious murderess would be pardoned, because she was a woman 
 and the monarch was of the same sex ! Nor do those who 
 so readily claim pardons for women because they are women 
 seem to be aware that a woman once a criminal generally 
 belongs to the very worst and most dangerous class of of- 
 fenders. " What use is there in dragging a weak woman to 
 prison ?" is current cant assuming the garb of generosity, 
 while it is in fact the effect of an unfortunate laxity in all 
 views of public morals, of right, and the most sacred prin- 
 ciples of society and mankind. 
 
 If doubts are proved as to the correctness of the verdict or 
 of the sentence, pardon ought to be granted. 
 
 If for whatever reason the punishment becomes severer 
 than the sentence intended it to be, for instance by the 
 prisoner's becoming consumptive in a prison in which proper 
 medical aid or care cannot be obtained by him, pardon may 
 be granted under certain circumstances, although it is not 
 necessary that it should be. 
 
 If the offence has been committed in the opinion that it was 
 a right or perhaps a praiseworthy act and no danger accrues 
 from pardoning, pardon ought certainly to be granted on all 
 fair grounds, for instance in cases of political offences. 
 
 If the law is cruel or obviously against the spirit of the 
 whole society, there is no harm if the magistrate forms a rule 
 for himself to grant conditional or entire pardons in all such 
 cases, for instance if no children are ever executed in Eng- 
 land although they are sentenced to die. But it becomes 
 highly dangerous if by this privilege a chief magistrate sets 
 himself up against a law which he individually considers in- 
 expedient ; for instance if he should be opposed to capital 
 punishment and on that ground were to pardon all convicts 
 sentenced to die. He would legislate in a very important 
 sphere alone and uncontrolled by society, for he would evi- 
 dently change the law, which he was acquainted with before 
 entering office, and to maintain which he took a sacred oath. 
 
 The reported reformation of the convict must in no case 
 form the sole ground for pardoning. This is acknowledged,
 
 400 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 I believe, by almost all penologists of note and practical 
 knowledge ; and where it has been tried to hold out an 
 abridgment of the punishment as a reward for good be- 
 havior, the consequences have been found to be bad, as for 
 instance in France, where the officer who drew up the law 
 holding out that reward petitioned, after having observed its 
 operation, for its abolition. 1 I speak here always of revised 
 laws, and proper systems of punishments, for nothing can be 
 given as a rule for bad laws and worse punishments. The 
 hope of pardon for good behavior, which of course can never 
 be absolutely known, leads to hypocrisy, and prevents the 
 very reformation sought for, because it does not allow the 
 prisoner to enter into that state of calm resignation which, 
 according to all experience in criminal psychology, is an in- 
 dispensable requisite for reformation. If the punishment is 
 mild, and the penitentiary system sound, the truly reformed 
 convict himself will hardly desire a pardon. 
 
 The pardoning magistrate ought to be influenced, in con- 
 junction with other considerations, by the nature of the guar- 
 antees the individual to be pardoned can offer, such as whether 
 he knows a trade, has received some education, has honest 
 relations who acknowledge him or not, and can give other 
 pledges of a probably steady life. 
 
 1 Mr. cle la Ville de Mirmont, Inspector-General of the Central Prisons, says 
 in his work, Observations sur les Maisons Centrales de Detention a 1'Occasion de 
 1'Ouvrage de Beaumont et Tocqueville, Paris, 1833, p. 55, et seq., that he was 
 the one who obtained the law in 1818, and that he often repented of it. The 
 Bavarian code offers pardon after three-fourths of the time of imprisonment have 
 elapsed, if the conduct has been correct. Of course the apportionment of pun- 
 ishments is made accordingly. I do not know how the law operates.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 J ucl ge, Juror, Advocate, and Witness. Official, external, and moral Independ- 
 ence of the Judge. Sanctissimus Judex of the Romans. The Judge, where 
 there is doubt, must interpret in Mercy, in Penal Cases ; in Favor of civil Lib- 
 erty, in all. The Institution of the Jury. The sacred Office of the Juryman. 
 What is he to do when the Law is contrary to the universal Conscience? The 
 Institution of' the Advocate. Moral Obligation of the Advocate. Political 
 Relations of Lawyers in Free Countries. Duties of the Witness. 
 
 VIII. FROM all that has been said of justice as the main 
 and broad foundation of the state, of the superior sway of law 
 as an indispensable requisite of civil liberty and the necessary 
 independence of the judiciary, it must appear that there is no 
 member of the state or officer of government superior in im- 
 portance to the judge, and indeed very few of equal impor- 
 tance with him. All mankind, if at all advanced in political 
 civilization, have agreed that an unjust judge defiles the very 
 altar for the service of which he was ordained a priest. The 
 religious codes of the most remote antiquity, the law-books 
 of the absolute governments of the East, fettered by heredi- 
 tary castes, pronounce this universal feeling as distinctly as the 
 religions, laws, or poetry of the modern or freest nations the 
 Vedas as well as Shakspeare. A truckling judge fawning on 
 power, whoever may possess it, whether monarch or people, 
 is one of the most offensive and humiliating sights, and a de- 
 moralizing example to a nation. If it be shameful or criminal 
 for a citizen, to whom no peculiar charge has been confided, to 
 betray his country, it is doubly so in a judge to betray justice 
 .and liberty by yielding to power, and swerving from what is 
 just, true, and right, because to him in particular has their cus- 
 tody been confided, and in forsaking justice and liberty he 
 betrays his country. It is painful to peruse the bad periods of 
 monarchies or republics, when judges are found ready to bend 
 the law according to the desire of the monarch or ruling party, 
 VOL. II. 26 401
 
 402 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 and it is comforting indeed when we find, on the other hand, 
 men who comprehended the lofty character of the judge, and 
 had sufficient firmness to stand as the independent interpreters 
 or pronouncers of the law, for or against whomsoever this 
 might be. The names of judges great in their views, calm in 
 their decisions, and. pure in all their life, who are known by 
 the whole people to have distinguished themselves by un- 
 swerving honesty and stout hearts, judges whose grasp, pene- 
 tration, and blandness of mind were equally great, form a 
 moral element in the history of a nation ; they constitute a 
 most valuable part of the inherited and traditional stock of 
 national virtue, and give a moral tone and stability to the 
 community, for which nothing else of equally great effect can 
 be substituted. Those great judges whom England counts 
 in her history have done more of good than the infamous 
 ones who have disgraced the British bench have been able to 
 do of evil. The greater the liberty the greater likewise, as is 
 natural, the necessity of unbiassed, clear, learned, and strong- 
 minded judges that is, oracles of the law. This truth of 
 general import has fully appeared from all the preceding parts 
 of this work ; but it is necessary to mention here in particular 
 that the moral independence of the judge is of most particular 
 importance in republics founded upon an extensive popular 
 principle : this is owing to the fact which has been touched 
 several times, that resistance against the crown has something 
 heroical in it and will seldom fail to awaken the sympathy of 
 the multitude, while resistance to popular clamor, passion, or 
 interest appears in the eye of the excited many as sin and 
 heresy. The American history offers instances of judges who 
 either have been overawed by the clamor of the people, or, 
 which is equally to be shunned, have participated in the 
 general excitement. 
 
 The idea which the Romans entertained of the judge, the 
 Sanctissimus Judex (Cic. pro Plane., xiii. 32), and indeed the 
 very origin of the word Judex, 1 are characteristic, and distin- 
 
 1 Judex from jus-dicere, as vindex from vim-dicere. The judex, therefore, was 
 not in the eye of the Roman the avenger, as he is called in several languages. So
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 4 O 3 
 
 guish them strikingly, and in this particular favorably, from the 
 Greeks. The latter likewise acknowledged the law, not only 
 as infinitely superior to the individual charged to execute it, 
 but also as that which alone should have true supremacy. 
 Yet this was the case, with respect to law in general only. The 
 Greeks never sufficiently separated judicial law from political 
 and administrative; the judge, therefore, with them never 
 appeared in so sacred a light as with the practical and honest 
 Romans. 1 It might, indeed, be observed here as a general 
 remark that the Sacrosancta Auctoritas inherent in the highest 
 offices is quite peculiar to Rome, and indicates one of the 
 most essential features by which that republic so remarkably 
 differed from the Grecian states. 
 
 If the judge, then, ought to be independent in every way, 
 he ought to be, as we have seen in the first part of this work, 
 independent of the executive and power-holder, unswayed by 
 prince or people; 2 he ought to be made independent in his 
 situation ; his salary ought to be sufficient both to elevate him 
 above want and its influences and to command the highest 
 talent ; for in every well-regulated commonwealth a judgeship 
 should always be the last and highest goal the lawyer looks for: 
 his salary, again, ought to be fixed, not dependent upon fees, 3 
 and so not dependent, in appearance at least, upon those whom 
 
 are Justice and Revenge or Retribution in many idioms one and the same word; 
 but Judex meant the pronouncer, declarer of right. [But jus denoted originally 
 id quod populus juhet. The moral sense came into it.] 
 
 1 [The Romans lost this feeling of the sacredness of the judge at length. For 
 instance, the question between senate and equites, as to the order from which the 
 judices should be drawn, had for its motive in part to screen persons under 
 accusation for peculation, maladministration, etc.] 
 
 8 This applies in a great measure to all law-officers whose ultimate end is the 
 administration of justice. Erskine calls Lord Coke even Coke " the infamous 
 prosecutor of Raleigh." (Defence of Thomas Hardy, for High Treason.) The 
 dereliction of duty is equally great if the sovereign is not the monarch but the 
 people, though it may not appear so at the time. 
 
 3 There is a strange anomaly in the British high court of admiralty. The judge 
 has no salary, and consequently very little indeed in peace, but in times-of war his 
 salary amounts to about eight thousand pounds. Nothing is more directly against 
 all true principles of government than to give part of confiscations to the judges
 
 404 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 he judges, nor diminished whilst he holds his seat, lest he 
 become or be suspected of being dependent upon his em- 
 ployers, the legislature or executive. His independence im- 
 plies, as we have seen previously, his immovability from office, 
 except by impeachment. Finally, it is not sufficient that the 
 judge be placed in a state of independence: he must place 
 himself so as much as in him lies. Lord Brougham lately 
 pronounced himself against judges having any seat as mem- 
 bers of elective legislatures, so as not to be influenced by their 
 constituencies. 1 It is of course impossible to draw with any dis- 
 tinction the line beyond which a judge ought not to go in his 
 participation in public political meetings ; but certain it is that 
 he injures the sacredness of his office in the same degree in 
 which he becomes a partisan, and that he ought ever to be 
 mindful that his moral power in pronouncing judgment ac- 
 cording to the law already made will be impaired, if he mixes 
 in the excitement which may be connected with the making 
 of it. His moral weight, of the greatest importance in every 
 free country, is derived greatly from the fact that he can say, 
 " Not I, directly or indirectly in any way whatever, but the 
 law, which is given to me and is my master, says thus." 
 
 As it is a rule that where a law leaves any doubt it shall be 
 interpreted in mercy for the prisoner, so ought the judges in 
 a wider sphere to consider themselves as the perpetual ser- 
 vants of civil liberty and of strict government by law, and 
 never to join either the -executive or any party, political or 
 religious, in persecutions, in injurious interpretations or dis- 
 tortions of law, or in any even the slightest oppression. 
 Where there as doubt at all on points of public or constitu- 
 tional law, the judge ought always to interpret in favor of 
 civil liberty ; and, in fine, he ought not in penal cases to con- 
 sider the mere disobedience to the law in itself an additional 
 offence besides the crime or offjnce committed a view which 
 
 as reward for their alacrity in prosecuting, as we give a small piece of the hunted 
 game to the hounds who pursue it, to incite their future zeal. 
 1 In the Lords, February 12, 1839.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 405 
 
 formerly led but too frequently to harsh punishments, and 
 afforded a basis for the inadmissible penal theory which de- 
 rives the punitory power of the state from public vengeance. 
 
 IX. By the institution of the jury two great ends, the one 
 of liberty, the other of the administration of justice, have been 
 united namely, direct participation of the people in the dis- 
 pensing of justice and the preventing of it from falling entirely 
 into the hands of the executive or of a separate and closed 
 caste. From whatever point of view we may examine this 
 peculiar institution as it has developed itself in the Anglican 
 race and it may be viewed in a great many, all equally im- 
 portant it will always appear that the citizen cannot act in 
 any more solemn capacity than that of a juror : in my opinion, 
 in no capacity so solemn and important. Society requires the 
 state; the state acts through laws; the laws are the great 
 organs of human society, of combined reason ; and now, when 
 the very moment ultimately arrives for which the law was 
 made, when it is finally to be applied as a general rule to a 
 practical and concrete case, when, in short, the abstract prin- 
 ciple is to be realized in practical life, for weal or woe, for the 
 protection of some or the punishment of others, all this is in 
 a great measure left to the juror, to the citizen taken fresh 
 from the people. The jurors, therefore, are justly called by 
 the British law the country. 1 There is a deep meaning in 
 this expression, as it has grown in the course of centuries ; 
 for the jury truly and practically represent the country to the 
 person that is to be tried. The law is the expression of pub- 
 lic will, and the jury represent the jural society, in judging 
 whether in the given case the facts warrant the* application of 
 the law. The jury represent the country, not the government; 
 they judge of facts according to rules and laws indeed, but also 
 with the feelings of living men, and not merely as if they repre- 
 
 1 For instance, when the clerk, reading the indictment, concludes thus : " Upon 
 this indictment, gentlemen, the prisoner has been arraigned; upon his arraign- 
 ment he pleaded not guilty ; and for trial hath put himself upon God and his 
 country ; which country you are," etc.
 
 406 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 sented the abstract law as it is written down. To represent 
 this a learned judge would be sufficient. The jury represents, 
 or rather is, whenever faithful, the living, operating law. In- 
 deed, it may justly be said that though for a brief time, yet, 
 for this brief time, a jury represents more fully and entirely 
 human society as formed into a state, with its-great objects, 
 than any other person or body of men, even the monarch's 
 person not excepted. Not that I mean to intimate the idea 
 as if on this account the jury were released either from strict 
 obedience to law or proper advice. Even though they were 
 the very sovereign, we have seen on a previous occasion that 
 sovereignty and absolute power are very different. On the 
 contrary, the jury according to the essence of their character 
 are strictly bound by the law, yet by the law as their country 
 requires it or must be supposed to require it, applied to the 
 particular and, probably, complex case before them. 
 
 A juryman, therefore, ought to serve with the deepest im- 
 pression of the grave responsibility which his oath has im- 
 posed upon him : he sits there for his country, he acts for the 
 country; the laws must be applied through him, they must 
 strike or protect through him. The foundation of the state 
 is justice; the country asks it at his hands for the prisoner. 
 The just object of the state is protection; the country demands 
 it against crime at his hands. The juryman therefore must not 
 trifle with his duty, either by discharging it lightly or indo- 
 lently j 1 he does not sit there to dispense with the laws, or set 
 them at naught by ill-advised and weak compassion for guilt, 
 but to apply the law ; and he is bound by sacred ties to 
 his country and mankind to receive the law at the hands 
 
 1 I have seen a juryman asleep during a trial for murder. It is true it was hot, 
 and in the afternoon. Feuerhach, in Considerations on Public and Oral Admin- 
 istration of Justice, Giessen, 1825, vol. ii. p. 221, says that he has seen the judges 
 in Paris repeatedly sleep on the bench ; but it ought to be observed that there are 
 several judges, and that Feuerbach does not speak of the presiding judge or 
 president ; as, indeed, in the above case it was not the foreman who slept. The 
 author adds in a note an extract from a French Dictionary, published in 1778, 
 according to which sleeping and talking about the news of the day was. then not 
 uncommon for judges when in audience.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 407 
 
 of the judge, wherever necessary. No consideration, pri- 
 vate favor or disfavor, no political bias, must influence his 
 judgment. All this indeed amounts to embracery on an en- 
 larged scale: although it cannot be made indictable, yet it 
 has all the guilt of embracery, which is the offence of im- 
 properly influencing the jury. The juror, as he is always 
 instructed to do, must judge by the evidence which is brought 
 before him, and nowise by the capricious impression which 
 he may have received elsewhere. Respecting this point, he 
 must remember that the words of the verdict " not guilty" are 
 not of absolute import, but have a legal meaning; that is, the 
 jury, in delivering the verdict, do not mean to say, We abso- 
 lutely declare the prisoner at the bar not guilty, nor even that 
 they are morally convinced of his innocence. All that a ver- 
 dict of not guilty can mean- is this, that according to the dis- 
 tinct rules of law and the evidence as now laid before us in the 
 course of the trial, the prisoner cannot in the sense of the law, 
 according to such application of it as society demands, be 
 called guilty ; or, in other words, according to those rules 
 which society wills us strictly to obey in judging of the 
 prisoner, he has not been proved guilty. 
 
 X. Here I have arrived at a question of a peculiarly serious 
 and delicate character, which it is nevertheless necessary can- 
 didly to discuss in a work that occupies itself professedly with 
 ethics in connection with the state, or the subject of right. 
 The question is, Can a jury, under any circumstances, bring a 
 verdict of Not Guilty, if, according to evidence as well as 
 the letter of the law, their verdict ought to be Guilty, without 
 perjuring themselves? Many distinguished jurists have un- 
 qualifiedly answered that, whatever the law may be, the jury 
 are bound to go by its letter : it is no province of theirs to 
 judge of the law and its mild or severe effects. This is un- 
 doubtedly true in all cases except those of extremity, and 
 these are the very ones which constitute the difficulty. So it 
 is not for the soldier to judge whether what his officer bids 
 him to do is right; yet in cases of extremity he will and must
 
 408 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 do so. Mankind will not and cannot be reasoned out of their 
 original and natural sentiments; and so, as obedience to the 
 laws is a general duty, while resistance adopted as a general 
 principle would necessarily dissolve human society, we dis- 
 obey and resist in the extreme case when a government 
 openly, directly, and repeatedly acts against the very objects 
 for which it was established. So it is absolutely impossible 
 to force mankind into an obedience to laws which directly and 
 palpably militate with the conscience of every one, whatever 
 learned men may have said to the contrary. If an ancient law 
 punishes the pilfering of a trifle with death, it is absolutely 
 impossible to force a jury who, with the whole age in which 
 they live, consider the law murderous, into what they would 
 feel to be directly opposite to the ends of all law, that is jus- 
 tice and protection. If the law-maker neglects to adapt the 
 law to the altered circumstances and the spirit of the whole 
 age, the law may indeed remain undisturbedly upon the books, 
 but the inevitable difficulty of applying that law to real cases 
 is not thereby avoided. The jury will not bring a victim to 
 so barbarous a law, nor load their consciences with having 
 contributed in destroying him. Some of the most eminent 
 judges have evidently entertained the same opinion. Lord 
 Mansfield, as I have mentioned already, instructed a jury to 
 find a verdict for theft of less than twenty shillings, when the 
 amount of stolen goods had been proved to be worth far 
 more ; because the case was of a very peculiar character and 
 the prisoner would otherwise have been hanged. Now, on 
 what ground could the judge instruct thus or the jury bring 
 a verdict against the truth before them ? Were they then not 
 perjured? They could, it seems to me, bring this verdict, 
 which was clearly at variance with the real state of things 
 before their eyes, on the ground that the words of the verdict 
 have a meaning relatively to the law, the case, etc. If a jury 
 formerly, although the crime was proved, brought a verdict 
 of not guilty for a prisoner, say twelve years old, charged with 
 shoplifting, for which the law said that he should be hanged, 
 the words of the verdict mean, I take it, Not Guilty in the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 sense in which the country wills the law to be understood ("in 
 mitiori sensu," as it were) the law which has a sense and 
 meaning only in so far as it is for the benefit and not the ruin 
 of society, and the letter of the law, which in this case, when 
 a boy of tender years would be hanged for an offence arising 
 out of juvenile thoughtlessness, palpably militates against the 
 very objects of the state. I am well aware that nothing is 
 more dangerous than to look habitually towards the effect of 
 the law, for a jury who ought in common cases to decide 
 only on what is submitted to them. But I speak of extraor- 
 dinary cases, which do occur in some instances, and, despite 
 their danger, must be decided one way or the other. Nor do 
 we gain anything by deciding them theoretically, against the 
 universal conscience of mankind. For the practice will prove 
 too powerful for the theory. Where the laws, however, are 
 mild, perhaps already too mild, where many pardons are in- 
 judiciously granted, a jury ought to consider nothing but the 
 peculiar questions before them, and consider neither condi- 
 tion, sex, 1 nor any such circumstance in making up their ver- 
 dict. 2 The jury ought never to forget that the cases spoken 
 of above remain exceptions. 3 
 
 1 It is lowering the character of the woman, if juries are influenced by the fact 
 that the arraigned prisoner is a female, or by her beauty; though this has fre- 
 quently happened. 
 
 "The utmost attention and care are necessary in juries; sad mistakes have 
 taken place, and are on the records of legal history. I would refer the reader 
 to Blackstone, iii. pp. 378-385 ; Kent's Commentaries in the proper places. The 
 Guides for Jurymen, with which I am acquainted, relate more to the business 
 than to the ethical relations of the juryman. 
 
 3 [The author here substantially invests the jury with a pardoning power. This 
 ground is a dangerous one: his extreme cases must multiply, if all persons ad- 
 mitted that the jury had anything to do besides saying that the facts were proved. 
 One man would never find guilty in cases where the punishment was capital ; 
 another, where it seemed to him of great general evil to society. All biasses 
 which prevent a juryman from looking at the question of fact, of guilty or not 
 guilty, are wrong. All meanings given to guilty or not guilty, relatively to the 
 benefit of society, are false meanings. The jury could recommend for mercy, 
 they could even protest against the law ; but they must not take their oath in a 
 non-natural sense.]
 
 4io 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 XI. Wherever nations have arrived at any high degree of 
 political civilization, so as to value the protection of individual 
 rights, we find the institution of the advocate, which, such as 
 we know it, we may consider as peculiarly belonging to 
 Western or European life. We find, indeed, attorneys and 
 "the borrowing of another's mouth" in Sumatra, 1 among some 
 of the Hindoo nations, and in Morocco; 2 but neither Turkey, 
 Siam, Persia, nor China has advocates proper, whose order 
 the venerable D'Aguesseau calls " as ancient as the office of 
 the judge, as noble as virtue, and as necessary as justice." 3 
 This is certainly a little French, and, whatever we may think 
 of the second position in particular, it is nevertheless true 
 that the institution is absolutely necessary for the true empire 
 of the law. Despotism sees very little or no difference be- 
 tween civil and penal actions; all actions become penal, they 
 are trials, and all trials are conducted upon the principle of 
 inquisition on the part of the judge; 4 and the trials are by no 
 means conducted on the principle of the greatest possible pro- 
 tection under the law so far as the ends of the law and justice 
 admit. 
 
 XII. That it is dishonorable for a lawyer to foment dis- 
 putes as there are those who do in all countries is too clear 
 to need any consideration. It amounts to actual robbing of 
 the clients. Physicians might as well first promote sickness 
 in order to have afterwards the benefit of curing. Nor does 
 
 1 " Pinjam mulut;" Marsden, History and Description of Sumatra. 
 
 2 Host, Information of Morocco. 
 
 3 D'Aguesseau, Discours sur l'Ind<Spendance de 1'Avocat. CEuvres, torn. ii. 
 p. 4, Yverdun edit. 
 
 * In despotic empires exists what Montesquieu calls "la magistrature unique," 
 that is, there is but one judge, and not a number of judges. Feuerbach, in his 
 Considerations on Public and Oral Administration of Justice (in German), vol. 
 i. p. 354 et seq., has many pertinent remarks on the subject. He there exhibits 
 also the great error of Montesquieu, who asserts that "in despotic governments 
 there is no law; the judge is his own rule" (Esprit des Lois, vi., ch. i. 3), when 
 in fact the body of Turkish, Chinese, and Hindoo established and collected laws 
 equal or exceed in bulk those of Rome or England.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 4II 
 
 it require our attention to consider how much more honor- 
 able it is if he who knows the law uses his knowledge in 
 giving advice to prevent rather than profit by litigation. In 
 this respect, honorable lawyers of extensive practice are real 
 blessings to a community. Let us proceed at once to the 
 consideration of some of the prominent duties of the advocate 
 during trial, as they interest political society at large, leaving 
 all the other duties to the consideration of those who may 
 make hereafter legal ethics the peculiar subject of their 
 studies. It certainly deserves the fullest attention ; and many 
 points would then be examined by reflecting men which at 
 present have in some countries hardly attracted any notice, 
 while in others they are considered with great rigidness. 
 
 The advocate, wherever the institution exists, enjoys various 
 privileges. In some countries he is actually considered an 
 officer. For what purpose are those privileges granted him? 
 
 The state, on the one hand, must needs act upon the 
 principle that the law is known to every one, or may be 
 known to every one, if he chooses to know it; while on the 
 other hand it knows full well that in every civilized society it 
 is impossible that the law in its whole extent can be actually 
 known to every citizen. The advocates, therefore, as a class, 
 are favored by society, that they may freely give advice 
 before a lawsuit has commenced, and may freely speak for 
 the client, with all their knowledge of the law, during the 
 trial. Secondly, the state, desiring to extend to every one 
 full protection and civil liberty, is as much interested in see- 
 ing the full protection of the law realized in each case, that 
 is, that no more be demanded than what the law does de- 
 mand, and that all the advantage granted by the law be 
 actually enjoyed, as it is in seeing every wrong suppressed 
 and right secured or re-established wherever it has been 
 interrupted. 
 
 To obtain these various equally important objects, the insti- 
 tution of the advocate is established ; and from these premises 
 we shall be able to derive some very important ethical con- 
 clusions.
 
 412 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 The advocate exists for the better obtaining of justice and 
 protection. It would be absurd to imagine that human society 
 first makes laws with great pains and expense, and then suffers 
 or charters a whole class of skilful men to defeat them. All 
 the conclusions, therefore, which people have drawn from the 
 analogy between warfare and a lawsuit are utterly inadmissi- 
 ble. It has been even asserted that the counsel are permitted 
 to state what is not true, just as the soldier is permitted to 
 deceive the enemy. Nothing can be more erroneous. That 
 which characterizes war is the fact that the belligerents appeal 
 from reasoning to the use offeree; the lawsuit, however, and 
 the whole administration of justice, are founded upon the 
 very ideas of truth, justice, and reasoning, according to sound 
 rules of judgment and proof. The lawsuit is part and parcel 
 of the intercourse of the citizen in peace and within the sphere 
 of law : it is, in short, the very opposite to war in every re- 
 spect. So it has been said that the lawyer has nothing what- 
 soever to do with the morality of the case which he defends, 
 and that he lets out his talent and knowledge to his client, 
 who, if he himself possessed it, would use it in every way for 
 his advantage. This again is erroneous ; for, first, no man 
 can divest himself of his moral individuality, as we have seen 
 before : else the hired assassin would be right, who says, My 
 employer hires me; he has not sufficient physical strength or 
 courage ; these I lend him for money ; but I have nothing to 
 do with the morality of the murder. Secondly, even if it were 
 so, it would be wrong in the client to state falsehoods ; and, 
 finally, if it were actually so, the state could do nothing better 
 than speedily to abolish so dangerous a class of men. If it 
 means that the lawyer should defend every case if called upon, 
 that he ought to do everything consistent with law and mo- 
 rality which may be advantageous to his client, this is correct, 
 as we shall see presently more fully. 
 
 Lastly, it has been said that the lawyer has no more to do 
 with the morality of the case offered to him than the physician 
 who may be called upon to save a man whom he knows to 
 be an injury or dishonor to his country. Thus, though the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 413 
 
 lawyer fully knows that the case which he defends is founded 
 upon fraud, and that if he succeeds he will rob others of their 
 property, say an orphan in defending the case of a fraudulent 
 guardian, he has nothing to do with the causes and possible 
 effects of the case, but merely to handle it according to the 
 best knowledge of the law and the skill which he possesses, as 
 the physician, called upon to attend the patient who when in 
 health ill-treats his wife and children, has nothing whatever 
 to do with any other consideration than how, with his experi- 
 ence, he can soonest cure his patient. But the sole object of 
 the whole healing art is the re-establishment of physical health, 
 or, where this cannot be done, the greatest possible diminution 
 of physical suffering. The object of all administration of jus- 
 tice is Right; and the vocation of the advocate has a sensible 
 meaning only as forming part of this administration of justice. 
 He is allowed to speak for another on so solemn an occasion 
 as that of a trial, for the very purpose that truth may be better 
 known and justice better done, but not to veil the one or to 
 defeat the other, knowingly and purposely. It would be, as 
 was said before, absurd. 
 
 It is believed that the ends of justice are best promoted, 
 among other things, if every person charged with an offence 
 have counsel, versed in the law, both to protect him against 
 unlawful oppression and to obtain all the advantages for him 
 which the law may offer ; but the state cannot sanction im- 
 morality or the infringement of the rights of others. That 
 my remarks do not apply to suspicions and rumors must be 
 clear; I speak here of wrong only that is positively known by 
 the advocate. 
 
 XIII. The rules of action for the counsel are twofold, as 
 appears to me the common ethical rules, and those which 
 are peculiar to his profession. 
 
 As to the first, the advocate does not cease to be a human 
 being with all his ethical and religious obligations, a citizen 
 with all his political obligations to his country and her laws, 
 and a gentleman with all the obligations of honor and civil
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 intercourse. He is no morally privileged person, as no man 
 can be. The more justice and due protection of the citizen 
 require that he should have great freedom of speech and ac- 
 tion in court, the more he is bound to regulate his conduct 
 towards a witness by genuine courtesy, and towards the court 
 by due deference to the cause of justice partly represented by 
 the bench. Yet a true advocate will never forget that in de- 
 fending a citizen he is as much the representative of the law 
 of the land, which wills protection to every one, as is the 
 judge, and, with all proper respect for the bench, he will, if 
 the case calls for it, stand for his client's rights as Erskine did 
 in the trial of the dean of St. Asaph. 1 
 
 As to the second class of rules, he must abide by the rules 
 agreed upon among the members of the bar as best calculated 
 to promote professional intercourse and the advantages of the 
 profession, so far as they agree with the advantages of the 
 community. 
 
 As it is the object of the institution of the advocate that 
 every person should have all the advantage which the law 
 affords, and that final sentence be given only after all that 
 may be urged on both sides is said and sifted, there is no case 
 in which a person charged with an offence should not be de- 
 fended. Many codes enact this principle as law. There are 
 not a few persons who revolt at this idea, conceiving of a case 
 in which the guilt of the offender is known to every one. 
 Defending, however, does not necessarily mean representing 
 the prisoner as innocent, but merely, first, seeing that the guilt 
 be actually proved, for every man, as is well known, must 
 be held innocent until proved guilty, and, secondly, that no 
 more than what is strictly warranted by the law should be 
 awarded. Nothing is more common than that counsel give 
 up a case as absolutely hopeless; but still they must continue 
 
 1 In the trial of Shipley, the dean of St. Asaph, for libel, Justice Buller said, 
 " Sit down, sir ; remember your duty, or I shall be obliged to proceed in another 
 manner." Mr. Erskine answered, " Your lordship may proceed in what man- 
 ner you think fit : I know my duty as well as your lordship knows yours. I shall 
 not alter my conduct."
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 415 
 
 to protect the client against a privation of any advantage 
 which the law warrants, for instance that the sentence be not 
 too severe. 
 
 I do not know that anything redounds more to the honor 
 of the Americans than the readiness with which in 1770 the 
 British soldiers who had fired upon the people in Boston 
 found counsel even during that great excitement which pre- 
 ceded the Revolution, and that counsel, too, men who, as 
 American citizens, were enthusiastic for the popular cause. 
 There is a remarkable letter in the Life of Josiah Quincy, jun., 
 of Massachusetts (written by his son, Josiah Quincy, Boston, 
 1825). He had been engaged for one of those soldiers, and 
 his father inquired with great anxiety whether it was true that 
 his son had become "an advocate for those criminals who are 
 charged with the murder of their fellow-citizens. Good God!" 
 he continues, " is it possible? I will not believe it." The son 
 answered, in a noble letter, that they had not yet been found 
 guilty, but were only charged with the guilt. 1 
 
 Cicero says that the judge must always follow out the truth, 
 but that the advocate may defend what is but the semblance 
 of truth, though it be short of truth. I think the truth on 
 this point is that the advocate hasno more right to abandon 
 truth than any one else in the whole world, but he is bound 
 to represent his case in the best possible light consistent with 
 the truth ; so that if there be any substantially good point it 
 may be found out. Cicero is not altogether very distinct or 
 precise in this passage : thus, he says, "we need not, on the 
 other hand, make any scruple of speaking sometimes in be- 
 
 1 The work is written by the son of its subject, Josiah Quincy, President of 
 Harvard University, Boston, 1825. The letter of the father is of March 22, 1770, 
 that of the son, of March 26 of the same year. It is historically important and 
 highly honorable to the people then on the eve of a revolution, that the most 
 prominent men in the community where blood had been spilt, such as Adams, 
 Hancock, Warren, Cooper, Henshaw, Gushing, Moleneux, Pemberton, Philipps, 
 strongly advised and urged Quincy to undertake the defence of the indicted sol- 
 diers. It is the evident manifestation of the Anglican veneration for the law, 
 even in the midst of much excitement, and in the face of much popular odium 
 which miyht have visited a zealous advocate with bitter hostility.
 
 41 6 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 half of the guilty, provided he be not wholly villanous and 
 abominable." But what is wholly villanous and abominable ? 
 Every one ought to be defended, that is, be it repeated, he 
 ought to be so protected that he may receive all the advan- 
 tage which the law justly and wisely affords and which his 
 peculiar case allows. Escape of the client is not the ultimate 
 object, but justice alone. 
 
 An advocate has not the right of injuring knowingly and 
 willingly another person, either in reputation or property, in 
 order to save or serve his client. It is evident that he cannot 
 have the right knowingly to rob another for his client, or 
 make aspersions upon the honor and reputation of an inno- 
 cent man. He would certainly load his conscience with heavy 
 guilt were he to exert his skill in defending, for instance, what 
 he actually knew to be a forged will, and such a case may 
 be imagined ; or were he to defend a criminal for a fee con- 
 sisting, to his knowledge, of the very goods for stealing which 
 the prisoner is indicted. This may not only be imagined, but 
 has taken place. Nor is this surprising, for where the profes- 
 sion of the law is extensive and it will always be extensive 
 where civil liberty is enjoyed in a high degree it is but 
 natural that many of the best and some of the meanest 
 citizens should belong to it. Every person charged with an 
 offence ought to be defended, that is, duly protected ; but this 
 differs widely from aiding a client in committing a crime by 
 gaining a fraudulent lawsuit, for instance by making use for 
 his defence of documents most strongly suspected by the 
 advocate to be forged. There may be many cases of this sort 
 imagined in which no honorable lawyer would be willing to 
 engage. 
 
 The advocate ought on no occasion to m'--stat" th law, or 
 endeavor to mislead the judge, or to misstate a fact in order 
 to deceive the jury. This of course does not exclude the en- 
 deavor to make the best of the law for his client, or to present 
 the more favorable points of the law or facts with peculiar 
 force. Morality and prudence coincide here, as they so often 
 do ; for an advocate will but little advance his reputation as a
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 lawyer, and consequently as little his worldly interest, by 
 habitual disingenuous handling of the law or the fact. 1 It 
 lends considerable power to a lawyer if judge and jury listen 
 to him with the belief in his honesty. 
 
 There is a consideration which I submit to the peculiar re- 
 flection of those who intend to become members of the pro- 
 fession, because it is of grave importance to society, and yet 
 perhaps but little known to lawyers themselves. From fre- 
 quent and free conversations with convicts in the peniten- 
 tiaries I know it to be a fact that many criminals have been 
 led on in the path of crime by the circumstance that when 
 young and indicted for the first offence, perhaps for a petty 
 theft, and when they were deeply impressed with the conse- 
 quences to which their guilty thoughtlessness had brought 
 them, they became reassured when hearing their counsel 
 boldly utter things in their defence which the young offenders 
 knew that their counsel well knew not to be true. If, in par- 
 ticular, a verdict of not guilty was the effect, the young crimi- 
 nal came out of the trial with his previous rashness confirmed 
 into conscious and settled purpose. 
 
 It is a serious evil which is necessarily connected with all 
 public trials and defences in the presence of the criminal, both 
 that he learns many ways and means intended by the law as 
 
 1 " An honorable barrister will never misstate either law or facts within his 
 own knowledge ; but he is justified in urging any argument, whatever may be his 
 own opinion of the solidity or justness of it, which he may think will promote the 
 interests of his client, for reasoning in courts of justice and in the ordinary affairs 
 of life seldom admits of geometrical demonstration : but it happens not unfre- 
 quently that the same argument which appears sophistry to one is sound logic in 
 the mind of another, and every day's experience proves that the opinions of a 
 judge and an advocate are often diametrically opposite. Many circumstances 
 may occur which will justify or compel an individual member of the profession 
 to refuse the defence of a particular client, but a cause can hardly be conceived 
 which ought to be rejected by all the bar, for such a conduct in the profession 
 would excite so strong a prejudice against the party as to render him in a great 
 degree condemned before his trial." (Christian's note to 4th Blackstone, 356.) 
 But there are cases, as mentioned before, in which the aid of the advocate is re- 
 quired, in order that with his knowledge fraud way be committed; which of 
 course must be declined by all honest men. 
 VOL. II. 27
 
 4 i8 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 the protection of innocence, but, of course, used also by the 
 guilty as a screen for nefarious doings, and that he becomes 
 more hardened by hearing the counsel speak so confidently 
 and openly in his favor. The necessary assurance of the ad- 
 vocate becomes shamelessness in the offender. He accustoms 
 himself to consider the whole trial a game of skill and clever- 
 ness, and no more. This evil, great as it is, cannot pos- 
 sibly be separated from public and oral trial, the many and 
 substantial advantages of which, and, indeed, the necessity of 
 which for civil liberty, make us endure it. Still, we ought to 
 remember that the evil exists, and that it is a great one. The 
 advocate, for this very reason, ought not to increase the evil by 
 adding his authority, in the mind of the criminal, to his own 
 disregard of right and wrong. 
 
 From all that I have been able to learn from convicts as 
 well as the most intelligent superintendents in the peniten- 
 tiaries, I cannot but consider the circumstance just spoken of 
 as an active cause in the diffusion and propagation of crime, 
 and deserving, therefore, I feel sure, the fullest attention of 
 every honorable advocate. 
 
 Few things are more important for the upright advocate 
 than to scrutinize with the utmost delicacy of honor and 
 tenderness of conscience all opportunities of increasing his 
 wealth which may accrue out of his legal transactions, except 
 those of receiving fees in the strictest sense of the term ; nor 
 must he ever be unmindful of the object for which he is em- 
 ployed by his client, that is, the client's advantage, which in- 
 cludes the quickest possible termination of the particular case, 
 or, in other words, that he is in the service of the client and 
 that his client is not his prey. 
 
 If the advocate is a prosecutor for the public, or, as it is 
 called in monarchies, for the king, it is very necessary for him 
 never to forget that, although it is the advocate's bounden 
 duty to represent a case in the best possible light when he is 
 counsel for the private party, it by no means follows that it is 
 his duty, when he prosecutes for the public, to represent the 
 case in the worst possible light, or to aim always at the high-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 est damage or penalty which the case may allow. This would 
 amount to reasoning backwards, and is therefore wrong. The 
 defending counsel must represent the case in the best possible 
 light, for the very reason that he defends a being prosecuted 
 by public power; he defends the individual against the society. 
 But to draw from this fact the conclusion that because the 
 case of the accused person is presented by his counsel in the 
 best possible way, the first and originating party, that is, the 
 state, ought therefore to present it in the worst possible light, 
 would be turning the effect of the original danger, that power 
 may be too strong for the individual, into a new cause of its 
 own increase. And, be it observed, this remark holds equally 
 good where the criminally indicted prisoner has no counsel 
 allowed to him : the prosecuting officer in such a case is in 
 conscience bound to consider himself the protector of the pris- 
 oner, 1 the impartial substitute for the counsel who ought to be 
 
 1 Christian, in his note to 4th Blackstone, 356, says, " Hence, in all criminal 
 . prosecutions, especially where the prisoner can have no counsel to plead for him 
 [the writer therefore includes all cases, and says indeed as fully as I have said 
 in the text, that a prosecuting officer is not allowed to make the case as black as 
 his ingenuity will permit], a barrister is as much bound to disclose all those cir- 
 cumstances to the jury, and to reason upon them as fully, which are favorable to 
 the prisoner, as those which are likely to support the prosecution." It is right 
 to give this as a rule, but it is likewise right to consider man's nature, and that 
 few are willing and still fewer capable of thus willing a thing (the accusation 
 anrl representation of guilt of a man) and at the same time of throwing all possi- 
 ble obstacles (the reasons for the prisoner) in the way. Indeed, the theoretical 
 junction of the British prosecutor and defensor in penal cases is contradictory in 
 itself, and, speaking in reference to legal philosophy, as absurd as the threefold 
 person " as which we are told we must consider the judge in the inquisitorial 
 process (the one in practice in most countries in which the civil law has been 
 adopted), namely "as representative of the offended state, inasmuch as he is 
 bound, in its place, to see right done according to the penal law; as representa- 
 tive of the accused, inasmuch as he is bound at the same time to find out and 
 represent everything on which the innocence or a less degree of criminality can 
 be founded ; and, finally, as judge, inasmuch as he must judge of and decide 
 upon the given facts." (Feuerbach's Manual of the Common German Penal Law, 
 10th edit., \ 623.) I know of no higher authority than Feuerbach ; I know of no 
 passage ever written by the adversaries of the inquisitorial process which sets forth 
 half so well its general badness and its utter incompatibility with civil liberty as the 
 quoted one. One mortal man shall be at once accuser, defender, and judge!
 
 420 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 assigned to him. Nor ought a citizen ever to be placed in a 
 state of accusation on insufficient grounds, for the reason that 
 the state has provided for him ample means of defence and 
 barriers of security. An individual is to be defended because 
 accused, but not to be accused because he will be defended. 1 
 
 Although we do not suffer the evils of an inquisition, whose 
 mere accusation is blasting although acquittal follows,- still 
 the prosecuting officer should never forget that he cannot cal- 
 culate or know how much suspicion may deface a man's char- 
 acter even after a fair acquittal. Since the only true object 
 of society in prosecuting is justice, he has no manner of busi- 
 ness to involve the accused in greater difficulty, or to throw a 
 heavier cloak of suspicion over him, than the simple facts of 
 the case warrant and the objects of political society demand. 
 A penal case is not a case between two equal parties, nor a 
 trial of skill and ingenuity between two advocates, nor a mat- 
 ter of legal reputation for the respective lawyers, but it is a 
 very grave case between the state and an individual charged 
 with that is, until proved, strongly suspected of an offence ; 
 it is the case of Justice one and indivisible alone, not a tour- 
 nament of legal dialectics. 2 
 
 In cases where affection is not the foundation, as in the family, but where 
 right forms the sole basis ! There are some advantages connected with the in- 
 quisitorial process, indeed, which the process of accusation lacks ; but what are 
 these advantages, compared to this startling jumble of the most opposite char- 
 acters ? Where is there the slightest guarantee for times of usurpation ? To pre- 
 vent misconceptions, however, I ought to mention that, though the judge is also 
 defender, a separate defender is assigned to the indicted person, and, what is re- 
 markable, in most countries a person cannot be sentenced for any high offence 
 without- having been defended, even though the defender should plead guilty. 
 Yet the defences by such a defender sound to us, accustomed as we are to the 
 freest and often boldest scope of counsel, very tame indeed, and the court 
 frequently rebukes where we should not see any boldness in his words or 
 arguments. 
 
 1 [Dr. Lieber, in a manuscript note, here discusses malicious prosecution and 
 prosecution on insufficient grounds. The substance of his remarks is inserted in 
 his Civil Liberty, chap. vii. p. 77.] 
 
 3 I must refer the reader for some more remarks on the ethical relations of a 
 barrister, especially with respect to his obligations connected with interpretation, 
 and the important question whether he may feel himself at liberty, as a strictly
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 42I 
 
 XIV. Where there is enduring civil liberty, the supremacy 
 of the law must be acknowledged ; where the supremacy of 
 the law is acknowledged, the lawyers must necessarily pos- 
 sess much influence. It is so at present with all free nations, 
 who are not merely enjoying a transient period of liberty, but 
 have founded it on lasting institutions ; and it was so in an- 
 cient times, in which the freest republics have probably never 
 suffered so much from professional lawyers as from dema- 
 gogues who were not members of their profession. 1 Their 
 constant occupation with the laws of the land and ques- 
 tions of right, and their habit of consecutive reasoning, as 
 well as the necessity in which they constantly find them- 
 selves of viewing a subject in its different lights, make them 
 more fit to grapple with many questions which involve the 
 rights and interests of many and opposite parties, than other 
 people, as well as more liberal, upon the whole, towards those 
 who dissent from their opinion, and bolder in asserting rights 
 where there is danger in doing so, because they are better 
 able to find out the firm ground of positive law and of well- 
 acknowledged precedent. These advantages, however, have 
 also their counterbalancing evils. The professional lawyer, 
 accustomed to seek the best arguments for any side on which 
 he may be engaged, not unfrequently loses the original im- 
 pulse of the first principle from which matters of state derive 
 their value or want of value. The professional lawyer carries 
 at times the habit of special pleading into the halls, where 
 subjects are to be treated of on the broad principles of general 
 good; and this may be the cause that we find few of the great- 
 est British statesmen and great parliamentary leaders to- have 
 
 moral man, to make use of "artful interpretation," to my Legal and Political 
 Hermeneutics. Mr. Justice Story speaks of the general duties and elevated 
 position of the advocate in his inaugural address as D.ane professor in the law 
 school of the University at Cambridge, Massachusetts (Miscellaneous Writings, 
 p. 452). He likewise touches upon the subject in his Law of Agency, Boston, 
 1839, page 25. [Comp. Dr. Lieber's Civil Liberty, chap. xx. p. 239, et seq.] 
 
 1 [In free Greece there were rhetoricians and teachers of rhetoric, but no law- 
 yers. In Rome the profession was but in its infancy when the republic fell. 
 That lawyers thrive in a country is no proof of free institutions.]
 
 422 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 been professional lawyers, or, if they had entered the bar, like 
 Pitt, they can hardly be called virtual lawyers. Impulses 
 towards great reforms in legislation have rarely, I believe, 
 proceeded from the profession. 1 
 
 The lawyer, always looking up to the law as his great au- 
 thority, which, as was mentioned, makes him frequently the 
 bolder in asserting right, becomes generally rather the repre- 
 sentative of that which exists than the advocate of that which 
 ought to be; still farther, he is not unfrequently blinded by 
 existing laws and institutions, and resists improvements which 
 must be judged of upon strict principle and consist in a change 
 of what exists. For this reason it is always desirable that the 
 lawyers take an active part in the legislation of a country; for 
 it is most necessary that the existing state of things be fairly 
 represented, and that the legislators of a state do not precipi- 
 tate the state into heedless speculation or untried experiments, 
 appearing brilliant to the unexperienced ; but their number 
 
 1 * There is a very excellent passage on this subject in the reflections of Sir 
 Samuel Romilly on himself and the good he might do should he be appointed 
 lord chancellor, page 384 et seq. of vol. iii. of his Memoirs, ad edit., Lond., 1840. 
 He says, " It is not from such [men as have for a long period been appointed 
 to the chancellorship] that we should expect comprehensive reforms or important 
 alterations in the law. His education, his inveterate habits, the society he has 
 lived in, the policy by which he has always regulated his conduct, have all tended 
 to inspire him with a blind reverence for every part of that system of law which 
 he has found established. When we reflect on this, when we trace the former 
 lives of all the chancellors of modern times, when we see them, from the mo- 
 ment when they quitted college, giving up their whole time to the study of one 
 positive science and cultivating no faculty of the mind but memory, the talent of 
 discovering and pursuing nice and subtle distinctions and forced analogies, and 
 the art of amplifying and disguising truth, when we see them stunned, as it 
 were, during the best years of their lives, by the continual hurry of business, read- 
 ing nothing but what relates to the particular cases before them, shutting out all 
 liberal knowledge from {heir minds, and contracting their views to the little 
 objects with which they are continually occupied," etc. 
 
 The passage must be read much farther. 
 
 With reference to America, however, we must observe that the lawyers as a 
 class form the most liberal part of the people, and withal the only large class 
 who attain anything like a gradual political education and represent more than 
 mere momentary excitements and measures.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 must not overbalance the other portion of the legislators, who 
 view the existing law without that charm with which it is in- 
 vested to the eye of the lawyer, and without that fond per- 
 tinacity which arises from the pains the lawyer has taken to 
 learn the law with all the intricate difficulties attending it 
 The greatest part of the most important, radical, and salutary 
 reforms have not originated with lawyers, as was mentioned 
 already : still, we must not forget that Pym was probably as 
 great a man as Hampden, and quite as indispensable to his 
 great party. 
 
 When power struggles with liberty, and yet is forced to de- 
 rive an appearance of support from law, as is the case when the 
 crown or a despotically disposed party endeavors to arrogate 
 undue power over a people still cherishing their rights and 
 the endeared tradition of liberty, it is natural that the party 
 of power should always find many valuable aids among law- 
 yers, because there are men in all professions who desire their 
 advancement at any price, and it is the willing lawyer who, in 
 the cases alluded to, is of the greatest value on account of his 
 peculiar species of knowledge. .When the state of things is 
 such that clergymen can better or equally well give their aid 
 to existing power, there are never members of that profession 
 wanting that are ready to degrade their skill, knowledge, and 
 influence in a like manner. Indeed, the clergy have more 
 frequently and more extensively sided with power and au- 
 thority, in states where government can offer any preferment, 
 than the lawyers. . Though the British prerogative-lawyers 
 have prostituted their knowledge to the essential injury of the 
 people, we must also remember that liberty owes to the aid 
 afforded by the profession of the advocate some of the great- 
 est achievements in the cause of national progress. Laud and 
 Strafford hated the lawyers most cordially : their instinct taught 
 them rightly. How much has not Erskine done for the asser- 
 tion and clearer representation of many valuable constitutional 
 points ! Does not our whole race bwe much, in the cause of 
 freedom, to such judges as Lords Somefs and Camden? 
 
 If a lawyer then becomes a member of legislating assem-
 
 424 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 blies, he must carefully strive to elevate his mind above the 
 level of special pleading, so as not to be the mere advocate of 
 his party or of power, and to view subjects on the ground of 
 broad national interest. That in smaller matters he must not 
 carry the dust of the courts adhering to his vestments, with 
 all the petty manoeuvring to which a circumscribed practice 
 frequently leads, into the halls of the legislature, need not be 
 mentioned. 
 
 XV. The importance of the pure administration of justice for 
 the state in general, as well as for individuals, lends of course 
 proportionate importance and solemnity to every part and 
 element of this administration, whether it consist in applying 
 the law and giving every one his due after the truth is known, 
 or in aiding to find out this truth. Among the elements of 
 the administration of justice belonging to the latter class the 
 witness is the most important. A witness upon the stand, 
 whoever may have called him there, whether the government 
 or a private party, ought ever to consider himself as being for 
 the time in the service of Justice herself, and unbiassed truth 
 becomes his binding, solemn, and sole obligation. The oath 
 or affirmation to tell " the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 
 but the truth," puts a very serious, solemn, and great obliga- 
 tion upon the witness ; for it is necessary that as witnesses we 
 abstain first from every falsehood, even the smallest; secondly, 
 from everything which in one sense may be true, but in the 
 sense in which it will be probably taken by the adverse party 
 or the court is not true; thirdly, from all omissions which 
 materially interfere with the whole truth ; and fourthly also 
 that we solemnly bind ourselves to state nothing in rashness, 
 nothing which we believe to be true but which nevertheless 
 is only a framework of facts filled up with the productions of 
 a lively imagination, so often repeated in our mind that they 
 appear to us perfect truth an evil to which women in par- 
 ticular are subject. Nor must we allow our feelings to be 
 wrought up so that something may appear to us true at the 
 moment we are testifying, which nevertheless is not true or
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 not precisely as we state it The holy cause of justice de- 
 pends in a degree upon every word that drops from the lips 
 of a witness ; and the oath he takes, which to his fellow-men 
 becomes the most solemn of all pledges of truth, ought to be 
 within him a fervent prayer that his memory may be correct 
 and his mind calm and clear, so that he himself mistake not 
 semblance for truth and that he be in a frame of mind to 
 choose the proper words precisely to express what he wishes 
 to express. A witness must take care, therefore, not to suffer 
 his temper to be ruffled, even though the questioning advo- 
 cate should forget his duty by impertinence and arrogance. 
 In all such cases it is by far the best for the witness to appeal 
 at once to the court for protection, and not to enter by pert rep- 
 artees into a contest with an insolent lawyer. A witness ought 
 to prepare himself for the discharge of his duty, especially 
 when he has to testify to facts either long gone by, or ob- 
 served by him when he himself was excited, or which happened 
 surrounded by tumultuous agitation. Few who have not made 
 some careful experiments upon themselves have any idea how 
 far we allow ourselves to be deceived by our constantly work- 
 ing and combining, picturing and deceiving imagination, and 
 in what degree we may succeed in undeceiving ourselves and 
 unravelling the mazes of our own fancy. Persons of a lively 
 imagination are especially bound to review facts well and to 
 endeavor to sift and prune what the imagination may busily 
 have added, before they asseverate anything as witnesses for 
 or against any man. The law makes a considerable difference 
 between questions which may or may not be put to a witness 
 under different circumstances ; but whatever the law does 
 allow to be asked over which the court watches- must be 
 answered in the spirit of absolute veracity. There is in the 
 oath or affirmation of witnesses no different kind or degree of 
 obligation to state the truth ; all witnesses, whether for or 
 against the prisoner (virtually they are all for Justice), sol- 
 emnly pledge themselves to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
 and nothing but the truth.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 War. Definitions. Present Exaggerations aqainst War. Christian Religi D 
 does not prohibit just War ; neither the Bible, nor the early Writers of the 
 Church. Objections against War on the Score of Morality ; of Reason ; of 
 Political Economy. Just and Patriotic Wars have morally raised Nations. 
 Eternal Peace. Arbitration by a Congress of Nations. Just Wars. National 
 Debasing Effect of suffering national Insult and Injustice without Resistance. 
 The Age of Louis XIV. Wars do not absolve from Obligations to the 
 Enemy. Who is the Enemy? Are Citizens of the hostile State Enemies? 
 What means of injuring the Enemy are admissible? Treaties containing Pro- 
 visions for the Case of War between the Contracting Powers. Shall Confidence 
 be abused in War? Does War allow Deception? Capitulations are sacred. 
 Destruction in War. Carrying off Works of Art, Archives, etc. Duties 
 of the individual Soldier. 
 
 XVI. IN this last chapter it is proposed to give a few re- 
 marks on War, as connected with our subject. I am well 
 aware that the whole subject of war belongs properly to the 
 so-called law of nations and international ethics ; yet so much 
 has been advanced of late regarding war as affecting the 
 morality of the individual, and so many cases which are to be 
 decided on ethical grounds by the individual necessarily occur 
 in every war, that I feel obliged to add this chapter to the 
 present work, although international ethics in general have 
 been excluded from it. I shall confine myself, however, to 
 some remarks touching in general the admissibility of war 
 among rational and moral beings, and some respecting the 
 conduct of the individual who takes part in a war, excluding 
 from our inquiry the whole important field of the law of war 
 proper. 
 
 War is a state of enmity between two parties, in which each 
 is known by the other to be ready to obtain its ends by other 
 means besides intellectual ones, especially by force and strat- 
 agem. We generally use the word War as applied to con- 
 siderable masses, and of a protracted contest ; hence partly the 
 426
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 427 
 
 term " state of enmity" has been used ; for the word protracted 
 is not sufficiently definite. Otherwise the following might 
 be the simplest and most comprehensive definition : War is 
 protracted and active enmity. 
 
 That it has been found difficult to give an exact definition 
 of war is owing to the fact that the term is used for almost all 
 shades of contest and continued enmity, more or less meta- 
 phorically. Most definitions which have been given of war 
 would apply equally well to mere battles, or they exclude the 
 various means besides force which we make use of in war in 
 order to obtain our object, for instance, cunning, intimidation, 
 the devastation of one's own country to deprive the enemy of 
 sustenance, etc. 1 
 
 1 Cicero, in saying in his Offices that " there are two kinds of contests between 
 men, the one by argument and the other by force," though undoubtedly meaning 
 by the latter war, cannot have meant to give a strict definition, for this would apply 
 to single battles likewise. But a war generally comprehends battles, on the one 
 hand, and on the other there have been wars without battles. Grotius saw this 
 deficiency distinctly. Albericus Gentilis, in his work De Jure Belli, Oxon., 
 1588, says, " War is a just contention of the public force." Surely, in that case, 
 Ferdinand of Aragon and Louis XII. could never have been at war, despite all 
 the blood with which their captains drenched the fields of Italy. Or, if Aragon 
 pretended to be right in spoliating her poor kinsman, how should we call wars 
 professedly undertaken for robbing? [Albericus means just in idea, as a judge 
 may give an unjust decision in a court of justice.] Hugo Grotius says, " War is 
 the state of contending parties, considered as such" (helium status per vim cer- 
 tantium, qua tiles sunt). (De Jure Belli et Pacis, cap. i. 2.) Puffendorf calls 
 war the state in which those are who in turn harm one another and repel the 
 harm by force, or who strive to obtain their due by force. (Law of Nature and 
 Nations, i. ch. i, 8.) Bynkershoek, in his excellent treatise on the Law of War, 
 says, " War is a contest carried on between independent persons, by force or 
 fraud, for the sake of asserting their rights." This would exclude civil wars, 
 and apply to the single battle as well as the whole war. Vattel says, " War is 
 that state in which we prosecute our right by force." (Book 3, ch. i.) There 
 have been wars in which actually the possession of no rights was pretended. 
 I have mentioned one in Book I. \ xxxix. But was this no war? See also 
 Wheaton's Elements of International Law, 8th edition, 1866, 295, et seq. 
 General Clausewitz, in his work On War (Vom Kriege), Berlin, 2 vols., 1835, 
 says, " War is the act of compelling an opponent to submit to one's will. Thus, 
 force is the medium, and submission the object, and the latter can only be ob- 
 tained by the development of the former. In order to effect this, the enemy
 
 428 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 XVII. War may be considered in various points of view, for 
 ins'ance, that of religion, of pure morality and right, of utility, 
 and with regard to its effects. On all these and other grounds 
 war has, at times, been represented as entirely inadmissible 
 among rational beings, and, as is usually the case in discus- 
 sions of this sort, men have gone all sorts of lengths, some 
 from sincere zeal, others from vanity, and still others from 
 sinister views. While some political economists and pulpit 
 orators have maintained, in contradiction to facts and history, 
 that nations in no case gain by wars anything to be compared 
 to the loss sustained thereby, or that war may be the interest 
 of one man but can never be that of the people, others have 
 gone still farther in their exaggeration, and denied that great- 
 ness of intellect is shown and proved by great generalship ; as 
 if we could without paradox possibly deny energy and inde- 
 pendence of thought, elevation and firmness of character, in- 
 tensity of action, vastness of combination, inventive fertility, 
 penetration into the simple elements of what is complicated, 
 confused, and hidden, and that peculiar attribute of greatness 
 of intellect by which it communicates the spark of moral elec- 
 tricity to others and obtains mental dominion over them, the 
 command of souls, to men like Hannibal, Caesar, Gonsalvo of 
 Cordova, William I. of Orange, Gustavus Adolphus, De Ruy- 
 
 must be rendered powerless. .This is the grand aim of all hostilities." This 
 definition does not include the defence of small states against attacks of large 
 ones, whom they cannot intend, because they cannot hope, to render powerless. 
 Have not small communities, when attacked, gone into war, resolved to sacrifice 
 themselves, and knowing that this would be the end ? Yet this was, never- 
 theless, war. 
 
 The word War is radically the same with the German Wehr, meaning arms 
 and protection, defence; Wehren, the verb, means defending and interfering 
 with something, and is, radically, the same word with the Anglo-Saxon Weran, 
 Swedish Varja, Icelandic Veria; which we have still in Beware, which means 
 to take care, guard one's self; as the German Bewahren means to preserve and 
 keep properly. The French Guerre, Spanish Guerra, and the corresponding 
 terms in the other Romanic languages are all derived from the Teutonic War or 
 Wehr, the w changing into gu, as it does frequently, for instance in the names 
 of Witt, Vitus, into Guido, Guy. [War, Anglo-Saxon Werra, is more naturally 
 connected by philologists with Werran = Wirren, German, to confound, disturb.]
 
 429 
 
 ter, Frederic, Napoleon, Nelson, or Wellington. 1 If some of 
 these men have committed acts which we disapprove, or are 
 supposed to have used the greatness of their intellect alto- 
 gether for evil ends, it does not invalidate the position that 
 the fact of their having been truly great generals shows also 
 the greatness of their intellect, any more than the fact of 
 Bacon's soiling his pages with umvorthy flattery of a puerile 
 monarch proves him not to have been a great philosopher, or 
 of Lord Coke's having disgraced himself by some of the most 
 servile arguments in favor of the crown and to the ruin of the 
 persecuted disproves his having been a capacious and pene- 
 trating lawyer. Views like these have generally been main- 
 tained by persons who have an inadequate idea of what war 
 actually is, what a general has to do, and into what parts war 
 resolves itself. They see troops moving by command on the 
 drilling ground, and think armies are commanded in a like 
 manner and as easily, and that moral vigor is altogether out 
 of the question. Others have pushed the argument so far as 
 boldly to assert that soldiers never fight from patriotism, and 
 that, if they did, it would not be worth much, patriotism being 
 altogether worth little to a Christian ! Verily, it is seen that 
 
 1 * [" A nation's external life, then, is displayed in its wars, and here history 
 has been sufficiently busy : the wars of the human race have been recorded when 
 the memory of everything else has perished. Nor is this to be wondered at ; for the 
 external life of nations, as of individuals, is at once the most easily known and the 
 most generally interesting. Action, in the common sense of the word, is intelligible 
 to every one; its effects are visible and sensible ; in itself, from its necessary con- 
 nection with outward nature, it is often highly picturesque, while the qualities 
 displayed in it are some of those which by an irresistible instinct we are most 
 led to admire. Ability is the adaptation of means to ends, courage, endurance, 
 and perseverance, the complete conquest over some of the most universal weak- 
 nesses of our nature, the victory over some of its most powerful temptations : these 
 are qualities displayed in action, and particularly in war. And it is our deep 
 sympathy with these qualities, much more than any fondness for scenes of horror 
 and blood, which has made descriptions of battles, whether in poetry or history, 
 so generally attractive. He who can read these without interest differs, I am in- 
 clined to think, from the mass of mankind rather for the worse than for the better : 
 he rather wants some noble qualities which other men have, than possesses some 
 which other men want." Inaugural Lecture, Lectures of Modern History, by 
 T. Arnold, D.D.]
 
 430 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 these writers can never have taken up arms in defence of their 
 country, or have been ready to shed their blood for it without 
 earthly reward. How much are those to be pitied whose 
 hearts remain cold at some of the choicest pages of history 
 that testify to every glowing bosom the nobleness of human 
 nature! A devoted, humble citizen bleeding and dying for 
 his beloved country, her laws and liberty, the freedom of his 
 children, their religion, their language, for their very intel- 
 lectual existence, is nothing to them. 1 
 
 It is not difficult to see why men at our time should urge 
 the inadmissibility of war, or assert the extravagant extremes 
 just mentioned, more loudly than perhaps at any previous 
 period. Europe had seen most melancholy and unrighteous 
 wars during the seventeenth century. Most governments 
 strove for concentration, and military service was the best 
 rewarded and most honored of professions. While thus good 
 and pious as well as judicious men naturally began to raise their 
 voices against war, it was likewise an inducement for the bold 
 and witty to speak against great generals as if no better than 
 common robbers either in capacity or morality, and a Shaftes- 
 
 1 Mr. J. Dymond, in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Prin- 
 ciples of Christianity, etc., 3d edition, Philadelphia, 1834 a work which would 
 seem to embody all the objections that have been raised on the ground of the 
 Christian religion against war, and on this account is to be consulted by the stu- 
 dent declares that soldiers do not die for their country, and seeks to prove 
 it by asserting that no one of them would be willing quietly to be executed for 
 his country in a distant land : hence, he thinks, it is clear that glory alone 
 prompts him to fight for his country. As to the first point, it must be observed 
 that no doubt there are some who would willingly lay down their lives for their 
 country. If his own heart does not tell him that there are some such, let him 
 look at history, which will give him instances of men who willingly died for 
 their country but could not have expected their names ever to be known. 
 Why not deny the same respecting religion ? Regarding the second, I do not 
 know how glory can be the all-powerful agent in a national war such as the 
 Dutch war of independence was against the Spaniards. Soldiers know that their 
 names will not be gazetted. I do not see what glory there was to be earned by the 
 poor people of Leyden, who still held out against the Spaniards, when reduced to 
 famished skeletons, despite ravenous hunger, fever, and total exhaustion, unless 
 we call glory that which a man feels within him when he sacrifices himself to 
 his duty, to the liberty of his country, to the cause of mankind and his religion.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 43I 
 
 bury, strange to say, came to agree with bishop Watson. At 
 a still later period, political economy, viewing national trans- 
 actions chiefly in the light of their immediate and pecuniary 
 results, was more and more studied, while, on the other hand, 
 wars on a gigantic scale were carried on by Napoleon, and 
 many states since then have enjoyed the sweets and rapid 
 improvements of peace. Thus people were easily carried to 
 another extreme, and while in former times military glory 
 was almost the only, certainly the highest, title to political 
 distinction, now persons are induced to decry military talent 
 as having a merely brutal character, and glory, even though it 
 be earned in a noble cause, as ludicrous ; nay, even patriotism 
 as beneath either high religious feeling, or pure utilitarian 
 perception unalloyed by any dross of feeling. 
 
 XVIII. A just war implies that we have a just cause, and 
 that it is necessary ; for war implies suffering on the part of 
 some, and it is a principle of all human actions that, in. order 
 to be justified in inflicting suffering of any kind, we must not 
 only be justified, but that there is a necessity for the inflic- 
 tion. I shall speak more of just wars further below. 
 
 If a war is just, the Christian religion does not prohibit it. 
 If it did, one of two things must be true, either war must be 
 directly prohibited, or the prohibition must be fairly im- 
 plied in other direct commandments. This would be neces- 
 sary for the Protestant; for the Catholic there might be a- third 
 supposition, namely, that the church from earliest times should 
 have traditionally prohibited all war. Neither of these posi- 
 tions, however, can be maintained ; while there are strong 
 biblical reasons which support the advocates of just war. The 
 Bible nowhere directly prohibits war. Indeed, it may be 
 answered, So there are many vices and offences not specifically 
 prohibited, for instance suicide. But war is positively en- 
 joined in the Old Testament, and not only war but even con- 
 quest; while in the New Testament it is not prohibited, 
 although war was raging in the world, and the subject was 
 brought almost directly before Christ and the apostles : still
 
 432 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 they said not a word of it. Compare, for instance, Luke vii. 
 8 and iii. I4. 1 To this we may add Paul's words, " For he 
 [the ruler, magistrate] beareth not the sword in vain." (Ro- 
 mans xiii. 4.) What is the sword ? An edged weapon to 
 compel if need be by force, even at the risk of the opponent's 
 life. If Paul acknowledges this power to compel or overawe 
 as lodged in some one at home, if he acknowledges in the 
 ruler not only the right to wear the sword but to use it, for 
 " he does not bear it in vain," if he acknowledges the right 
 of having armed servants, for this is evidently meant by the 
 sword, since the ruler alone cannot use the sword, and of using 
 these armed servants not only to compel subjects and citizens 
 but actually to avenge, it is very plain that the ruler must have 
 a still greater right to protect his subjects against unjust ag- 
 gression and oppression ; for, be it said at this early stage of 
 our inquiry, the question as to the original and moral legality 
 of war is no other than the general one of resistance that is, 
 ought force to be resisted by force ? 
 
 Lastly, the fathers of the church amply acknowledge the 
 right of war, and not only this, but it is acknowledged that 
 war once declared and justly declared, the Christian may carry 
 it on by open force or by fraud, that is, stratagem. See St. 
 Augustine, Quest. 10, in Josuam. 2 
 
 Against this it is said that our religion is eminently peace- 
 ful in its character, commands that we should love one an- 
 other, prohibits revenge and hatred, commands to overcome 
 evil with good, that we should be meek, etc. 3 Some point at 
 passages such as, " I say unto you, that ye resist not evil, but 
 whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him 
 the other also" (Matthew v. 39), and, " Put up again thy sword 
 
 1 Both passages mentioned by Paley, Moral and Political Philosophy, vi. ch. xii. 
 
 2 [The words are, " cum justum helium susceperit, utrum aperta pugna utrum 
 insidiis vincet, nihil ad justiliam interest." Qusest. in Heptateuch, on Joshua, 
 cap. viii. (iii. I, 906, Paris reprint of Benedict, ed. 1836). All sorts of fraud are 
 not here allowed.] 
 
 3 See the cited work of Dymond, and the last chapter of Wayland's Elements 
 of Moral Science, New York, 1835.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 into his place, for all they that take the sword shall perish 
 with the sword" (Matthew xxvi. 52), or the commandment, 
 " Thou shalt not kill," as containing more direct or typical 
 commands for the Christian never to use the sword. 
 
 Upon this it is to be answered, that although Christ came 
 among other things to preach and diffuse love, forbearance, 
 charity, and even love of our enemy, he by no means intended 
 to abolish thereby all relations of right, all law, all defence of 
 right, for this would necessarily lead and actually has misled 
 crazy religionists more than once to the abolition of all 
 magistracy and of the institution of the state itself. How 
 often in history has not this advent of dissolution been 
 preached by fanatics, such as the Anabaptists, who ended, as 
 nearly all these fanatics do, by using every species of cruelty 
 and ferocity in order to compel others into their belief of 
 non-resistance ! Christ came to infuse the spirit of kindness, 
 not to abrogate the principles of God's creation. A stone is 
 attracted by the centre of the earth now, as before Christ ; a 
 conclusion drawn according to the logical laws of reasoning 
 is now as binding as before Christ ; and the eternal principles 
 of justice are now as strong, as imperative, and as sacred 
 as before Christ. Let the law do justice and full justice 
 alone, and leave love to the individual ; for, sacred as it is, 
 it becomes so only if added to justice, but not if put in the 
 place of justice. Every one ought to be reminded again and 
 again that mutual love is a great virtue, but before all we 
 must be just, which is not so easy. 
 
 Christ as well as the apostles acknowledged positively law, 
 the state, and the magistracy. A citizen who fights because 
 called upon by his government, a man who fights in a just 
 cause, does not on that account hate his military enemy ; he 
 does not shoot at him from hatred or revenge. 1 He would do 
 
 1 It is well known that enemies, as soon as overcome, that is, as soon as made 
 harmless, treat each other without any feeling of personal malignity, and even 
 with chivalrous acknowledgment of their gallantry. Whatever cases may occur 
 to the contrary, they are, among civilized nations, considered with universal dis- 
 approval, and form exceptions. A very striking instance that war does not beget 
 VOL. II. 28
 
 434 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 this if he were to fight for the sake of fighting, but the object 
 of just fighting is peace, the obtaining of right and its protec- 
 tion, and he fights against the enemy only because he cannot 
 obtain these ends without removing the wanton obstacle in 
 the way of obtaining it that is, the enemy. This appears 
 from the fact that all personal cruelty is prohibited, and that 
 after a battle the wounded enemy is taken care of equally with 
 the wounded friend. 
 
 As to the supposed injunctions never to fight, we must 
 understand these passages as all the others, and as anything 
 expressed in human language, that is, in conjunction with 
 other passages, in the spirit of the whole document or text, 
 and without losing sight of the first key of all interpretation, 
 that is, of common sense and good faith ; we must take what 
 is tropical as tropical, what is hyperbolical as hyperbolical. 
 It stands, Thou shalt not kill. Does not this m_an, Thou shalt 
 not unjustly kill? For killing means violently depriving of 
 life. If we apply the commandment to every violent extinc- 
 tion of human life and it is difficult to see how this can be 
 done, since the commandment is in the Old Testament, in 
 which war was absolutely commanded by the same author- 
 ity from which this commandment proceeded we may as 
 well extend it to all animal life, as indeed some sects have 
 done. Nor is there any reason why we should stop here. 
 Plants have undoubtedly life too, and the commandment 
 might be supposed to extend to vegetable as well as animal 
 life. Here, every one would exclaim, This is against all 
 sense ! This is precisely the answer which is the correct one 
 to be given to those who take the precept literally. 
 
 The other passage must be likewise understood in conjunc- 
 tion with the whole Bible; and \\e have seen already that 
 
 personal hatred occurred in the year 1838, when Marshal Soult, who had com- 
 manded the French in the Peninsular war against the British under Welling- 
 ton, visited England. The marshal was received by the duke, as well as by the 
 whole British people, wherever he went, with the greatest respect, and a warmth 
 of feeling which was acknowledged by Soult himself as well as by the French 
 nation was highly conducive towards increasing the good feeling now subsisting 
 between those two great nations.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 435 
 
 Paul speaks of the necessity of the sword to the magistrate, 
 and that Christ does not seize upon those opportunities 
 which we may fairly suppose he would have improved had 
 he intended to prohibit war altogether. The expression that 
 when smitten on one cheek we ought to turn the other 
 is as evidently hyperbolical, in order to teach in a strongly 
 impressive figure of speech the general principle of love and 
 forgiveness, as are the similar passages which command us to 
 give our cloak when robbed of our coat, or when compelled 
 to go a mile to go twain. Christ taught principles, not abso- 
 lute mathematical formulas, but addressed them to rational 
 beings, who therefore must apply them with reason. If the 
 various passages of the Bible were to be taken literally, no 
 book would contain greater contradictions or render it more 
 impossible for any one to obey all commands at the same 
 time. In addition it ought to be observed that I should 
 actually commit a moral wrong in literally following these 
 precepts and in not resisting without hatred wicked attacks, 
 for I should thus induce the evil-doer to commit still more 
 wrong or crime. Literally when asked for a coat to give a 
 cloak besides, to offer the one cheek if the other has been 
 smitten, to walk two miles if bidden to march one, would 
 amount to an invitation to the robber, the insolent, and the 
 oppressor to proceed in their path of crime. Respecting the 
 typical sense of Christ's command to his disciple to put up 
 the sword, we must observe that no typical sense can be 
 supposed to exist where we have not otherwise the means to 
 find out that it is typical ; else how could we know that it is 
 typical ? In this case, we ought to know from other parts 
 of the Bible that war is absolutely prohibited before we can 
 maintain that this passage is typical. It would be surprising 
 indeed if a command should be given in typical form and 
 leave men therefore in doubt ! 
 
 XIX. On the score of ethics alone the objections against 
 war may be comprehended under the following divisions: 
 Men that is, rational beings ought to contend with one an-
 
 436 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 other by argument, that is, by the strength of reason, and not 
 by force, by which they sink to the level of animals. We do 
 not prove our right even if we obtain victory, which is, never- 
 theless, doubtful. In wa$ those suffer who probably had 
 little or no hand in bringing it about. War is immoral, be- 
 cause it is a cessation of morality, and in addition it breeds 
 immorality. The effects of the most successful wars are al- 
 ways disproportionate to the evils which they entail. Finally, 
 war being necessarily caused by an act of injustice, of im- 
 morality on one side if not on both, it is at least evident that 
 it must cease with a state of diffused morality, and might be 
 stopped, on a very large scale at any rate, if a large number 
 of independent states would adopt among themselves the same 
 rule which the various civilized societies adopt within them- 
 selves, namely, to prohibit the obtaining of right by force, and 
 to allow it to be obtained by argument, by reasoning, on the 
 powerful ground of justice alone. 
 
 XX. As to the first objection, that men are rational beings 
 and ought to decide all differences by reason, we have to ob- 
 serve that although they ought to do it there are many who 
 will not do it, and that it is not in the power of the good 
 always to prevent those who will not from doing so. Through- 
 out human life we resort to force if we cannot obtain our 
 right otherwise. Resorting to physical force is not on that 
 account brutish. Raising a wall around our garden, fasten- 
 ing our doors by locks and bolts, is resorting to physical 
 means, because we know the thief would not allow himself 
 to be argued away, or we have no time or obligation to watch 
 the door until he come that we may argue with him. We 
 chastise a child, that is resort to force, when it is so young 
 that we cannot yet reason with it and an evil disposition 
 shows itself so prominently as to need to be controlled. We 
 prevent people from using a path by blocking it up, that is 
 we resort to physical force, because a mere tablet, with a re- 
 quest to passengers not to use it, would be without effect. 
 Going to law, is in all cases in which there is a malign intent
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 on one side, resorting to force, only with this difference, that 
 we wisely give up, or are forced to give up, private force, and 
 resort to public. For we all know full well that our unjust 
 adversary would not do the bidding of the court and abide 
 by its decision were it not supported by public force. We do 
 not go to the court to convince our adversary, but to convince 
 the judge. A lawsuit against a wicked person amounts to 
 this : A has wronged B ; B goes to the executive and demands 
 assistance against A. The executive says, " I will lend as- 
 sistance, but I must first be convinced that you are not mis- 
 taken, or that A did not mean, perhaps, to wrong you. Go 
 to C, who has been appointed to see, in such cases, who is 
 right. He is a judge ; and if he says that you are right, come 
 back, and I will lend you force to obtain right from A." Let 
 us go farther. My child is attacked by a murderer : have I 
 not the right in this case to protect him, which protection 
 may make absolutely necessary not only the parrying off of 
 the assassin's blows but also the rendering him innocuous ? I 
 have the right to kill an animal which attacks me and en- 
 dangers my life. If a murderer attacks me he thereby lowers 
 himself for that moment to an animal, and he puts it out of my 
 power to use any other means than those I would use against 
 the animal, so long as I must avert the danger to which, like 
 an animal, he exposes me ; and whatever danger or suffering 
 accrues from it is his own doing, not mine. I am bound to 
 protect my life, for my Creator has given it to me for various 
 solemn purposes. Were I not to protect it, brute force would 
 rule, and the most sacred ends -of humanity would be set 
 at naught. Man is a reasonable being indeed, but he is not 
 ordered to act by reason alone. But against killing a human 
 being this objection has been made: You settle the doom of 
 the killed. The answer is, that if a human being is killed 
 according to the principles of justice and perfect right and the 
 necessity of the case brought on by the assailant, we must 
 needs suppose that this was intended to be his final hour, 
 whatever consequences may be attached to it, because the 
 principles of justice and right come from the Creator and are
 
 438 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 essentials in his vast system. If then they were to militate 
 with others of his intention's, there would be contradiction in 
 his government of the world, which it is absurd to suppose. 
 In brief, the ancient "vim vi repellere licet" is not only justi- 
 fiable, but is one of the principles of God's whole creation, 
 and the abolition of it would create universal moral and 
 physical disorder. 
 
 We do not prove our right by victory. This is very true, 
 as it is likewise true that our injustice is not proved by defeat; 
 but no one maintains that wars are undertaken to prove any- 
 thing ; they are not, like the ancient ordeals, a supposed trial 
 of justice. We undertake wars in order to obtain right, and 
 if victory is doubtful and we still undertake it, we do so be- 
 cause we believe the loss by submission would be so great 
 that we must at least try to protect ourselves and hope that 
 God will grant victory to the just cause : with such a hope 
 the Swiss fought for their liberty against Austria, and the 
 Americans resorted to arms because without it they were to 
 be subjected by British arms, or made to submit to legislation 
 which they thought disgraceful. 
 
 In war those suffer generally most who were least the cause 
 of wrong. This is undoubtedly true ; but first it is not in the 
 power or the choice of those whom we suppose unjustly as- 
 sailed to avert the evil, they only protect themselves ; and 
 secondly the evil, though great, as has been admitted, is not 
 so great as is often supposed. For it is the plan of the Cre- 
 ator that government and people should be closely united 
 in weal and woe : no state of political civilization, no high 
 standard of national liberty and general morality, is possible 
 where this is not the case. History offers no more deplorable 
 objects for the historian's contemplation than those nations 
 which, owing to whatever cause, take no part in their govern- 
 ment, are unconnected by feeling with it, and change alle- 
 giance as rapidly as the fate of battle may change, like the 
 people of the kingdom of Naples in the seventeenth century. 
 If, however, this union of government and people is desirable, 
 the evil above alluded to cannot be averted. But, however
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 439 
 
 this may be, it is not for those who are threatened with war 
 to submit because innocent persons under the assailing gov- 
 ernment may suffer. The same principle applied to municipal 
 matters would infallibly bring confusion and ruin upon so- 
 ciety ; for there is hardly a single sentence inflicted upon a 
 criminal which does not affect in the infinite catenation of 
 human connections, morally or physically, some innocent 
 person children who depend upon the father, a mother who 
 mourns the disgrace of her son, or an innocent wife or a 
 friend. 
 
 XXI. We come now to consider the last positions : War is 
 immoral and begets immorality; it never furnishes advantages 
 which can compensate for the evils it entails ; and, as rational 
 beings, nations ought to settle, and might easily settle, their 
 differences in the same way as those of individuals are 
 settled. 
 
 An unjust war is not only immoral, but it is one of the 
 greatest crimes murder on a large scale; wars undertaken for 
 plunder, or for the unrighteous end of compelling men in their 
 belief, beget immorality and crime, annihilate the fixed stand- 
 ard of morality and pure justice, and are on this account alone, 
 were there no other reasons, destructive to civil liberty, the 
 government of law and right. So is unjust litigation immoral 
 in its effects as well as in its cause. Yet, for all this, there 
 would be much greater immorality and unrighteousness were 
 there no courts of justice, and were people to suffer the wicked 
 to commit their wrong without any litigation. So-called re- 
 ligious wars, or wars of plunder, are ruinous in the very high- 
 est degree both to society at large and to the individuals who 
 engage in them. But just wars are not demoralizing. As 
 protracted peace is not unalloyed with evil (for instance, in 
 frequently begetting sordid selfishness and degrading sub- 
 missiveness, increasing with each generation, as we see to be 
 the case in China), so is a just war not without its great ad- 
 vantages. Public spirit, founded upon the very principle of 
 unselfishness, is roused by few national events so much and
 
 440 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 raised to such a pitch as by a just war. The tone of morality 
 of those who engage in a patriotic war is eminently raised ; no 
 one who is acquainted with all the details can deny that the 
 whole moral tone of the German nation was greatly raised by 
 their struggle for national independence against the French 
 in 181214 a moral elevation which showed itself in all 
 spheres and all branches ; and it was universally observed at 
 the time that the soldiers had returned from those wars with 
 high and elevated tone of moral feeling. The Americans cer- 
 tainly came out of their revolutionary struggle none the worse 
 in their morals ; and is not the nation to this day intellectually 
 and morally feeding, as it might be called, upon their struggle 
 for liberty? Whence do the Americans habitually take their 
 best and purest examples of all that is connected with patriot- 
 ism, public spirit, devotion to common good, purity of motive 
 and action, if not from the daring band of their patriots of the 
 Revolution ? If war frequently, nay generally, makes party 
 spirit run high in a free country, and very often leads to ca- 
 lamitous consequences, we must not forget that, notwithstand- 
 ing all warmth and undue, nay dangerous, zeal, parties during 
 wars are generally much purer than those which, growing 1 
 up in protracted peace, are founded, like court factions of 
 corrupt monarchies, on the worst principles of selfishness, 
 intrigue, and avidity for plunder. The British parties of 
 Pitt and Fox are certainly not the worst in English history. 
 High as the American parties ran during the last war, who 
 would say that they were not purer than those of some later 
 periods in the American history ? Many nations have been 
 morally rescued by wars, which imparted new vigor to them. 
 In no situation whatever are so frequently pure, close, and 
 lasting friendships concluded, after the first period of unsus- 
 picious youth has passed, as in a just war. Is this not an act 
 eminently moral in its character ? To no period whatever do 
 men look back in their old age with such animating delight 
 as to that in which they fought for a good cause. Poets can- 
 not delight or animate a nation except by that which is founded 
 or finds a responding chord in the better part of the human
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 44! 
 
 soul, as has been already observed by Mackintosh ; but what 
 has been the most unceasing theme of all the inspired bards 
 of all nations and all periods times of general depravity only 
 excepted, when tartness of spicy wit must succeed to generous 
 feeling which no longer exists, or satire against vice must 
 stand in the place of admiration of virtue and greatness if 
 not death for our country ? Has this been so by agreement, 
 or were the poets paid for it, or is it not the general, spon- 
 taneous burst of men's noblest emotions ? Wherever we find 
 in a nation or period a general incapacity of feeling the heart- 
 stirring beauty of this theme, we may set them down as lost 
 to every thing that goes beyond self-interest and consequently 
 appertains to the best traits of human society. Soldiers are 
 proverbially known for frankness and generosity. Who that 
 has any practical knowledge would be so bold as to assert 
 that the soldiers engaged in a national war are as a class im- 
 moral ? Who, indeed, would maintain that the officers even 
 of a standing army are less moral than any other class on a 
 similar level of education ? Who would maintain that officers 
 are less moral, for instance, than lawyers? Facts speak 
 against it. Actions in court against officers are in fact pecu- 
 liarly rare. But though the severest charges against war and 
 soldiers on the score of diffusing immorality were true, it is 
 equally true that the immoral consequences of submission to 
 foreign conquerors, and of habitual submission to injustice, 
 plunder, and insult, are still greater, and penetrate deeper, for 
 they tend to extinguish that lively feeling of justice without 
 which no free state can flourish. 
 
 XXII. That wars never compensate for the evils which they 
 entail is as sweeping a remark as if a person were to assert that 
 men would be all the healthier for having no such profession as 
 that of medicine. Even if it were true in a physical point of 
 view, the remark would yet be far too sweeping. But it is not 
 true even thus considered. Nations are sometimes so situated 
 that, for instance, the possession of the estuary of their largest 
 river is of the greatest importance to their whole industry,
 
 442 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 while those who inhabit the country around the mouth of 
 that river may likewise be greatly benefited by being united 
 with the interior, and a war which unites both may become 
 a great and lasting advantage to both. The continual efforts 
 requisite for a nation to protect themselves against the ever- 
 repeated attacks of a predatory foe may be infinitely greater 
 than the evils entailed by a single and energetic war which 
 forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied, I 
 suppose, that Niebuhr is 'right when he observes that the ad 
 vantage on the score of power and national vigor to Rome of 
 having conquered Sicily were undeniable. But, even if it were 
 not so, are there no other advantages to be secured ? No 
 human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, 
 nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, 
 all the immeasurable blessings which have resulted to man- 
 kind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over 
 the rolling masses of servile Asia, when they were nigh 
 sweeping over Europe like the high tides of a swollen sea, 
 carrying ruin over all the germs of civilization, liberty, and 
 taste, and nearly all that is good and noble. Think what we 
 should have been had Europe become an Asiatic province, 
 and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation so deeply 
 infused into her population that no process ever after could 
 have thrown it out again. Has no advantage resulted from the 
 refusal of the Hebrews in the times of the Maccabees' to 
 be ground in the dust, and ultimately annihilated, by stifling 
 servitude, and from the wars which followed their resolution? 
 The war of independence in the Netherlands has- had a pene- 
 trating and decided effect upon modern history, and, in the eye 
 of all who value the most substantial parts and elementary 
 ideas of modern civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, both 
 directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequent'y 
 been, in the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating 
 civilization if carried on by civilized people, as in the case of 
 Alexander, whose wars had a most decided effect upon the 
 intercourse of men and extension of civilization; or of rousing 
 and reuniting people who had fallen into lethargy, if attacked
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently we find 
 in history that the ruler and victorious tribe is made to revive 
 civilization, as it were already on the wane, in a refined nation. 
 Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is nevertheless 
 amply proved by history that the closest contact and con- 
 sequent exchange of thought and produce and enlargement 
 of knowledge between two nations otherwise severed is fre- 
 quently produced by a war. War is indeed a state of suffer- 
 ing, but it is often one of those periods of struggle without 
 which no great and essential good ever falls to the share of 
 man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Religion, 
 philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal 
 rejoicing brightens up a mother's eye without the anxiety of 
 labor. 
 
 Of what good, however, it has been asked, is war to those 
 who fail in a war by which we may suppose one nation ulti- 
 mately to be benefited ? Both the merest utilitarian and many 
 religious people have fallen into the error of never considering 
 man except in his isolated capacity, the one with respect to 
 material advantages, the other with regard to mental. Men, 
 however, are social beings, not only as they are destined to 
 help out one another better to obtain their isolated benefits, 
 but because societies, nations, have their destinies as such, 
 and men are destined to live for one another, one man for his 
 brother, and one generation for another. All that is noblest 
 in man is connected with his sociality, his denial of self, and 
 his living and striving in close union with others. If it were 
 not so, nothing could be more absurd, and indeed a more 
 direct self-contradiction, than the idea of sacrificing one's self 
 for another, for one's children, one's country, for truth, which 
 of course can mean only truth in so far as it shall become 
 known by and therefore part of others ; yet " greater love 
 hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his 
 friend." 
 
 XXIII. One word respecting the proposed plan of settling 
 national disputes by a congress of nations, according to an
 
 444 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 international code, on the plan of a petition lately laid before 
 the congress of the United States. 1 
 
 The idea of a perpetual peace has been repeatedly conceived 
 by modern writers, as by St. Pierre, Bentham, and Kant, and 
 has been a favorite one with associations for the promotion of 
 peace. 2 The way of settling amicably what at other times would 
 have led to bloodshed has of late become more frequent, and 
 is undoubtedly upon the whole an evidence either of a more 
 generally diffused love of peace, or of the fact that govern- 
 ments have, in the course of civilization, more or less changed 
 their character from cabinet governments to national govern- 
 ments. Nations also have not in the present state of things 
 as frequent desires for war as formerly, or as individuals may 
 be supposed to have ; though we should be unjust if we were 
 to ascribe the many former wars always to the warlike spirit 
 of princes. It was the spirit of the times, and in not a few 
 cases were the princes urged by the people to a war in which 
 they reluctantly engaged. 
 
 Yet we err if we suppose that the settlement of international 
 questions by congresses of ambassadors has not had in some 
 cases most grievous consequences for some nations. It is 
 impossible to bring nations into such close contact as those 
 congresses allow, and yet to separate the international ques- 
 
 1 I would refer the reader to a very able report made by Mr. Legare, from the 
 committee on foreign affairs of the house of representatives, June 13, 1838, on a 
 memorial of the New York Peace Society, praying to refer the subject in dispute 
 between the United States and Mexico to a third power for arbitration, and that 
 the government of the United States should send a proposal to those of other 
 nations " that they would unite with it in the establishment of a great international 
 board of arbitration, or a congress of nations, to which to refer international dis- 
 putes ; and also for the purpose of digesting and preparing a regular code of 
 international I aw, obligatory on such nations as may afterwards adopt it." 
 
 [Of the two, a congress of nations and compromissory arbitration by arbiters 
 whom the parties choose, the latter, of which many instances are to be met with 
 in modern diplomacy, has in the present state of the world the advantage.] 
 
 a On Perpetual Peace, a Philosophical Sketch, written in 1795, in vol. vii. of 
 Kant's Complete Works, Leipsic, 1838. This paper, much as there is con- 
 tained in it for reflection, belongs certainly to the we'aker productions of that 
 philosopher.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 445 
 
 tions strictly from questions which, though domestic, are of 
 general interest. Domestic interference is an almost neces- 
 sary consequence. Wherever people meet, the most power- 
 ful must sway, in politics as in every other sphere; and 
 wherever parts of nations or entire nations meet nominally on 
 terms of parity, it is unavoidable that the most powerful must 
 sway the less powerful. Independent national development, 
 therefore, one of the most necessary requisites of a general, 
 diverse, and manifold civilization, in law, language, custom, 
 and literature, would be as seriously interfered with by such 
 a proposed congress of nations as it was for a long time in the 
 middle ages by the papal power. All legislation at a distance 
 becomes inconvenient, not unfrequently ruinous, because un- 
 adapted to the specific case. A congress on the banks of the 
 Po, or on the Bosphorus, for Asia, Europe, and America, 
 would make galling decisions for people near the Rocky 
 Mountains. All the inconveniences and hardships of so- 
 called universal monarchies would be felt. Nor can many 
 international questions possibly be settled like mathematical 
 questions. The difference of nations, which nevertheless is 
 necessary, must needs lead to very different wants and views. 
 Something similar takes place in many law cases. Right and 
 wrong are frequently not so strictly divided in complex cases 
 that we can demonstrate it with absolute mathematical cer- 
 tainty. Still I may be answered, They are settled by the 
 courts. They are settled, indeed; but how? Are both par- 
 ties satisfied? They abide by the decision for two reasons: 
 because public opinion compels them to do so, and because 
 if they would not, there is the executive, the compelling 
 power, without which no state could exist. The one of these 
 agents would be very weak, the other would not exist at all, 
 in those decisions of a supposed congress. Moreover, inter- 
 national law is one of the proudest victories of civilization, 
 despite whatever incongruities there may still exist in it as it 
 appears in the best authorities. Yet why is it so ? Where 
 does its force lie ? Because it has gradually developed itself 
 out of the intercourse in peace and war of civilized nations,
 
 446 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 and a united feeling of justice or fairness, mutual advantage 
 and honor; but a mere legislation even of the wisest men of 
 all nations, should we suppose them ever to agree, would 
 fall to the ground like any other legislation, if not founded 
 upon existing circumstances and customs. Finally, we Amer- 
 icans should be the very last to propose such a congress, 
 because we might be sure that our republican ministers would 
 play a very subordinate part in a congress of ambassadors 
 consisting almost entirely of monarchical deputies, whose 
 principles and views, therefore, would always be prevalent. 
 
 -XXIV. A war, to be justifiable, must be undertaken on just 
 grounds that is, to repel or avert wrongful force, or to estab- 
 lish a right ; must be the last resort that is, after all other 
 means of reparation are unavailable or have miscarried ; it 
 must be necessary that is, the evil to be averted or redressed 
 should be a great one; and it must be wise that is, there 
 must be reasonable prospect of obtaining reparation, or the 
 averting of the evil, and the acquiescence in the evil must be 
 greater than the evils of the contest. 1 
 
 1 The following passage on war comes from so excellent a writer, and contains 
 such just views, that I feel authorized in transcribing it : 
 
 " The war of a people against a tyrannical government may be tried by the 
 same tests which ascertain the morality of a war between independent nations. 
 The employment of force in the intercourse of reasonable beings is never lawful 
 but for the purpose of repelling or averting wrongful force. Human life cannot 
 lawfully be destroyed, or assailed, or endangered, for any other object than that 
 of just defence. Such is the nature and such the boundary of legitimate self- 
 defence in the case of individuals. Hence the right of the lawgiver to protect 
 unoffending citizens by the adequate punishment of crimes ; hence, also, the 
 right of an independent state to take all measures necessary to her safety, if it be 
 attacked or threatened from without ; provided always that reparation cannot 
 otherwise be obtained, that there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining it by arms, 
 and that the evils of the contest are not probably greater than the mischiefs of 
 acquiescence in the wrong; including, on both sides of the deliberation, the or- 
 dinary consequences of the example, as well as the immediate effects of the act. 
 If reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and therefore 
 no just, cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining it by arms, a gov 
 ernment cannot, with justice to their own nation, embark it in war; and if tin 
 evils of resistance should appear, on the whole, greater than those of submission
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 447 
 
 Just wars may be : 
 
 Wars of insurrection, to gain or regain liberty, as in the 
 late case of the Greeks; for man is not bound to suffer 
 oppression. His moral character is deeply involved in it. 
 
 Wars of independence ; for instance, if a colony has grown 
 into sufficient strength to provide for its own safety by inde- 
 pendent legislation [and is treated oppressively by the mother 
 country]. 
 
 Wars to quell armed factions, like those of Henry IV. in 
 France. 
 
 Wars to unite distracted states of the same nation, or in a 
 country destined by nature to form one political society, as 
 the wars of the Swedish monarchs who united the conflicting 
 states and parts of Sweden. 
 
 Wars of defence ; for instance, against invasion or conquest. 
 A war may be essentially defensive, and yet we may begin it, 
 for instance, if we must prevent an invasion which is under 
 preparation. Wars undertaken to assist an ally according to 
 a previous treaty of common defence are wars of defence. 
 
 Wars of chastisement. A nation which habitually would 
 suffer insult, depredation, and plunder would soon sink into 
 meanness and lose its own respect. What in the first gener- 
 ation might have been mistaken generosity I say mistaken, 
 for it is the business of the state to protect its subjects 
 would be meanness in the next. It is one of the prominent 
 
 wise rulers will consider an abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a 
 sacred duty to their own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the 
 great commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike 
 members. A war is just against the wrong-doer when reparation for wrong can- 
 not otherwise be obtained ; but it is then only conformable to all the principles 
 of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by whom it is levied to 
 greater evils than it professes to avert, and when it does not inflict on the nation 
 which has done the wrong sufferings altogether disproportionate to the extent of 
 the injury. When the rulers of a nation are required to determine a question 
 of peace or war, the bare justice of their case against the wrong-doer never can 
 be the sole, and is not always the chief, matter on which they are morally bound to 
 exercise a conscientious deliberation. Prudence in conducting the affairs of their 
 subjects is, in them, a part of justice." Mackintosh, History of the Revolution 
 in 1688, chap. ix.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 features in the Roman history, which showed that they had 
 an elevated view of the state, that at an early period they 
 considered the state pledged to protect the individual against 
 foreign injury. They early saw the essence of the state. The 
 Roman ambassador, when sent to remonstrate with the Epi- 
 rote queen for the piracies committed by her and her sub- 
 jects against Romans, sai'd, " We Romans have the admirable 
 custom of avenging with the whole force of the state offences 
 done to private individuals, and aiding those who have under- 
 gone injustice. By the aid of the gods, therefore, we shall 
 speedily and vigorously endeavor to constrain you to amelior- 
 ate the royal regulation of Illyria." 
 
 The German empire and the republic of the Netherlands, 
 but a short time previously so great and powerful, and indeed 
 all the neighbors of France, were fast sinking into degradation 
 and sustained incalculable moral and physical evil when they 
 allowed Louis XIV. to commit his endless and insulting 
 iniquities in robbing land and cities, and in other ways, during 
 times of peace, from the conclusion of the Peace of Nimeguen 
 to the breaking out of the third war in 1688 ; and no man can 
 calculate what would have become of all Europe, how deep 
 it might have sunk in utter degradation, through the loss of 
 the sense of justice and love of liberty, had not salvation 
 ultimately come from England, whence, as William justly 
 wrote in 1681 to Lord Hyde (Clarendon Corresp., i. 56, 59), 
 salvation for Europe alone was possible. We are apt to con- 
 sider the revolution of 1688 only in its mighty effects upon 
 British and, through it, upon European and American civil 
 liberty. But William is no less a great British king than he 
 is a great European hero, for having stemmed the current 
 which was fast enslaving and politically demoralizing all Eu- 
 rope, and was the more dangerous as it was accompanied by 
 the dazzling yet unsound grandeur of an unprincipled mon- 
 arch. The year 1688 was probably no less portentous for 
 Europe than the years 590 and 580 before Christ had been, 
 when the gallant Greeks stemmed the Asiatic invasion. A 
 nation which at the proper time does not know how to un-
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS 440 
 
 sheathe the sword can never be considered as resting its 
 liberty or morality on a certain and firm basis. 
 
 Those cases of war where the possession of some place or 
 province becomes absolutely necessary for the safety or exist- 
 ence of a state or nation, clearly seeing that its destiny is to 
 exist as a nation and to manifest itself as such, to which I 
 have alluded before, must be considered as exceptions pro- 
 duced by the clashing interests of various parties. Although 
 these cases have been frequently made the iniquitous pretexts 
 for the worst wars, truth, nevertheless, binds us to acknowl- 
 edge that such cases of extreme necessity do actually occur. 1 
 
 XXV. War does not rest on the contest of argument or 
 reason ; but it by no means absolves us from all obligation 
 towards the enemy, for various reasons. They depend in 
 part on the objSct of war, in part on the fact that the belliger- 
 ents are human beings, that the declaration of war is, among 
 civilized nations, always made upon the tacit acknowledgment 
 of certain usages and obligations, and partly on the fact that 
 wars take place between masses who fight for others or not 
 for themselves only. 
 
 I repeat that I do not intend by any means to give here an 
 outline of the law of war, but shall merely touch upon some 
 points of importance in public ethics. 
 
 War does not absolve us from ,all obligations to the enemy. 
 The Romans acknowledged no matter how far they prac- 
 tised upon it that " war had its rights as well as peace, and 
 that the Romans had learned to conduct war justly no less 
 than gallantly." These are, according to Livy (v. 27), the 
 words of Camillus. (" Sunt et belli sicut pacis jura, justeque 
 ea non minus quam fortiter gerere didicimus.") Cicero, de 
 Leg. ii. 14, acknowledges the same principle. What then is 
 permitted, and what not? 
 
 So soon as war is declared, or the respective parties are 
 
 * [Rather dangerous ground. What is the necessity of a nation's existence, 
 compared with the necessity of adherence to the right?] 
 VOL. II. 29
 
 450 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 fairly in a state of war, it is understood that they appeal to 
 force and stratagem. I may deceive the enemy whenever, and 
 must injure him wherever, I can. 1 Deceit is allowed, but not 
 perjury; and as to the injury I do to the enemy, it must be 
 remembered that I must injure him as an enemy, that is, so 
 far as he is there to oppose me in obtaining the ends which I 
 consider as the next object of the war for instance, that of 
 obtaining possession of the capital or the country, or that of 
 gaining the ultimate object of the war, which among civilized 
 nations is always peace, on whatever conditions that may be. 
 " Truth and Peace" was Cromwell's remarkable watchword in 
 the battle of Winceby, or Horncastle, near Lincoln. 2 
 
 From these positions we shall derive important conse- 
 quences, after having settled who the enemy is. Properly 
 speaking, the enemy is the hostile state, next represented for 
 the belligerent in the hostile army, but also represented in 
 all its citizens from whom the means of carrying on the war 
 are drawn or who furnish them. The armed enemy, therefore, 
 whether he actually have arms in hand or not (Bynkershoek, 
 Law of War, ch. i.), provided he would or can use them, must 
 be repelled and injured by arms ; the unarmed enemy, in sup- 
 plying the means for the war directly or indirectly. 
 
 I have not the right to injure my enemy without reference 
 to the general object of the war or to that of the battle. We 
 do not injure in war in order to injure, but to obtain the object 
 of war. All unnecessary infliction of suffering, therefore, re- 
 mains cruelty as among private individuals. All suffering 
 inflicted upon persons who do not impede my way, for instance 
 upon surgeons or other inoffensive persons, if it can possibly 
 be avoided, is criminal; equally so is all turning of the public 
 
 1 " The law of nature," says Heeren, " as applied to war, or pure military law, 
 recognizes no further principle than ' I injure my enemy wherever I can.' " An 
 Examination of the Questions respecting the Claims of the Armed Neutrality. In 
 his Historical Treatises, translation, Oxford, 1836. I remind the reader of the 
 necessity of remembering who the enemy is. 
 
 2 Which took place October n, 1643. Forster's Cromwell, vol. vi. of Eminent 
 British Statesmen, London, 1838.
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 war to private ends, such as extorting money for private use, 
 all use of arms or of the power which I enjoy as a soldier for 
 private purposes, as for the satisfaction of lust, all unnecessary 
 destruction of private property, 1 all avoidable destruction of 
 works of art or science in particular, and all unnecessary de- 
 struction of any kind. No pain can be inflicted nor harm be 
 done in war which does not aid the operations of war directly. 
 As soon as an enemy is rendered harmless by wounds or 
 captivity, he is no longer my enemy, for he is no enemy of 
 mine individually. On the same ground I have no right to 
 employ assassins, even if the general principle of honor did 
 not make us abhor it. I ought not only to abstain from in- 
 juring the harmless, but to protect them against the unlawful 
 attack of others, simply because this becomes a perfectly 
 private case. 
 
 XXVI. On the other hand, I am not only allowed which 
 is altogether an unimportant question in war but it is my 
 duty to inflict on my enemy, as such, the most serious injury 
 I can.Jn order to obtain my end, whether this be protection 
 or whatever else. The more actively this rule is followed out, 
 the better for humanity, because intense wars are of short 
 
 1 The question of privateering crmnot be discussed here. I will only say thnt 
 those who defend it do it chiefly on the ground that when war. is declared my 
 avowed object is to injure my enemy as much as possible, in order to compel 
 him to peace at my will. So far as this object is in view, I use and have a right 
 to use all means. Capture of private property in land wars is not generally resorted 
 to, because it would not serve the purpose ; but no general would be pardoned 
 for not taking it if it were to support the enemy in his endeavors to injure me, 
 for instance if it consisted of grain. Now, there is very frequently no other^vay 
 of injuring the enemy so that he feel it than by making maritime prizes. Ten 
 captured vessels may dispose the enemy more to peace than a lost battle. The 
 injustice of the case, it is maintained, is lessened, so far as the war is with the 
 state; and all are bound to one fate, although it is admitted that it is a peculiarly 
 hard case for those who lose the prize, yet no more than, for instance, in the 
 case of the soldier who is crippled. This too is an individual hardship. 
 
 [Since this was written, most of the nations of Christendom have agreed to 
 abolish privateering, and to allow enemies' goods on neutral vessels engaged in 
 innocent trade to go unharmed. Every merchant can now put his goods on a 
 safe vessel, so that nearly entire exemption from capture.is already reached.]
 
 452 
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 duration. If destruction of the enemy is my object, it is not 
 only my right, but my duty, to resort to the most destructive 
 means. Formerly, when there were so many wars, in which 
 only the amount of suffering interested the nations concerned, 
 and which the belligerents were often conscious of under- 
 taking for trifling or unjust causes, it was natural that many 
 niceties should be considered as laws of war. Wars were 
 somewhat like duels, or tournaments, and the laws which 
 regulated them were carried over to the wars. Certain arms, 
 advantages, and means of destruction were declared to be un- 
 lawful, or not considered honorable. The " Chevalier" lost 
 his battle against King George, because he thought it unfair 
 to take advantage of the battle-ground ! When nations are 
 aggressed in their good rights, and threatened with the moral 
 and physical calamities of conquest, they are bound to resort 
 to all means of destruction, for they only want to repel. First, 
 settle whether the war be just; if so, carry it out vigorously : 
 nothing diminishes the number of wars so effectually. It was 
 formerly much debated whether it was right to poison wells, 
 on the ground that it was not fair, because the enemy was not 
 prepared for it. But it is one of the things I want against a 
 wrongful aggressor in war that he be not prepared. Should 
 I not surprise him ? Who would blame the Athenians if, in 
 retiring from Attica to their ships, they had poisoned the 
 wells, in order to make the Persians retire the sooner ? A 
 just war is not made for the pleasure of fighting. The only 
 consideration can be this : Do we inflict an evil upon the 
 individual which will cruelly afflict him after he has ceased 
 to be an enemy, and which we can avoid ? If so, let us avoid 
 it by all means. As for the destruction alone, in whatever 
 number or by whatever means, it is lawful and advisable, for 
 the reasons already given. 1 
 
 1 See Bynkershoek, Law of War, translated by Peter S. Duponceau, Philadel- 
 phia, 1810, chap. i. [In 1863, Dr. Lieber prepared a code of laws of war at 
 the request of the United States government, which is entitled Instructions for 
 the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. He there says 
 (article 70, under section iii.), " The use of poison in any manner, be it to poison
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 453 
 
 Respecting deception we must observe that within the 
 sphere of war it is perfectly lawful, but not beyond. Hence 
 capitulations must be kept; for peace is the end of war; peace 
 is founded upon confidence, but the breaking of capitulations 
 would destroy it. A capitulation or any agreement, for in- 
 stance an armistice, or a permitted convoy, is evidently 
 above the declaration of war ; an exemption from it ; founded 
 upon confidence, otherwise it would not be made. For the 
 same reason we are bound to observe those provisions of 
 treaties which were made for the case that war should break 
 out at some future period between the contracting powers. 
 These stipulations must be faithfully kept; if not, it was ab- 
 surd to make them, and the confidence necessary for the basis 
 of a future peace is destroyed ; but, as was observed, peace 
 being the ultimate object of just war, we destroy the very 
 object of the war in which we are engaged. Indeed, if no 
 degree of confidence remained between the belligerents, every 
 war would become an internecine war; and such is the case 
 between all savage tribes, who have lost all confidence in one 
 another. The treaty between the United States and Prussia 
 of 1785 (Treaties of the United States, 1871, p. 706 and onw.) 
 stipulates, among other things, that in case of war merchants 
 of either nation residing in the country of the other shall 
 have nine months' time to wind up their business, and be au- 
 thorized to carry off all their property; no artisan, etc., thus re- 
 siding is to be molested; no letters of marque are to be given, 
 
 wells or food or arms, is wholly excluded from modern warfare. He that uses 
 it puts himself out of the pale of the law and usages of war." He had, as this 
 shows, learned something since this chapter was published, in which he seems to 
 follow too much the somewhat savage and questionable doctrines of Bynkershoek 
 in his QujEst. Jur. Publ., book first. Great lawyers are apt to be harsher than 
 great military officers who are not imbruted by selfish lust of acquisition ; for 
 the former see war only in its abstract features, the latter see it written out in 
 letters of blood. Dr. Lieber here approves of poisoning, but two pages back 
 justly condemns the employment of assassins. But to kill a general in an under- 
 hand way is surely no worse than to poison half a regiment. Our author's ma- 
 ture and well-digested opinions in the code of war do him the highest honor, and 
 modify what he says in this chapter in several particulars.]
 
 454 . POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 and private property is to be safe on land or sea ; prisoners are 
 not to be sent into unhealthy climates, etc. In all treaties be- 
 tween maritime powers, a certain time is stipulated, in case of 
 wars, for private vessels in distant regions, during which they 
 shall not be molested though war be declared. Such con- 
 ditions ought to be most punctiliously and most cheerfully 
 fulfilled, for they are the moral points remaining in a state of 
 force. Yet they have often been broken for instance, when 
 Charles II. seized the Dutch vessels in the Mediterranean, in 
 1672, long before six months after the declaration of war 
 had elapsed, although by the Peace of Breda this time had 
 been stipulated to give the citizens of the two states time to 
 remove their property. (State Tracts of William III., i. 35.) 
 For the same reason that capitulations or treaties must not 
 be broken, perhaps, or because the injury done in war beyond 
 the necessity of war is' at once illegitimate, barbarous, and 
 cruel, works of art generally ought not to be carried off by the 
 victorious party; because it galls the conquered nation beyond 
 the time of war, and, as peace requires mutual good will, and 
 war of itself causes irritation, the carrying off of these works 
 would awaken feelings opposed to continued peace. Yet I can- 
 didly confess that I cannot see the jural ground on which the 
 right of carrying off books and works of art, provided they 
 belong to the nation, is denied. It is universally admitted that 
 levying a contribution for the sake of chastisement for a wrong- 
 ful war, beyond the expenses of the war, is lawful, as it un- 
 doubtedly is. Why then should it be wrong to carry away 
 works of art for the sake of chastisement ? If they are truly 
 national, connected with the history and feelings of a nation, 
 and were carried off for vain-glorious exhibition, it would be 
 cruel. Nothing must be done in war but what is considered 
 necessary. The destruction of works of art is vandalism, and, 
 as their removal exposes to destruction, this is an additional 
 ground why it ought but very rarely to be resorted to. Still, 
 this is merely an adventitious reason, not one founded in the 
 subject itself. The works of art may thus be injured; but 
 they may also not. They may be saved from destruction by
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 455 
 
 being carried off by the victor. What should we possess 
 of the wonders of ancient art, had Rome's conquering sword 
 not collected them ? There would be no Vatican. 
 
 Wars are undertaken under the silent acknowledgment of 
 certain usages, which, therefore, must be kept; both on the 
 common ground of honor, and because they are necessary, 
 either for mitigating the evils of war and bringing it within 
 the sphere of civilization, or for obtaining the end of peace. 
 Thus, flags of truce must be honored; heralds were sacred 
 in most ancient times ; indeed, with them begins, we may say, 
 international law. Envoys must be kept sacred; they are, 
 indeed, the remaining representatives of reason, in the state 
 where force is chiefly appealed to. 1 
 
 1 I do not know that the entire denial of our right to use arms, or, in other 
 words, of the legality of war, was ever adopted into any system, except by Quakers, 
 before the publication of Wayland's Elements of Moral Science, New York, 
 1835. It may be proper, therefore, to notice his objections in detail. On page 
 443, under the head of Redress of Grievances, under which he comprehends the 
 violation of treaties, he says, 
 
 1. That the fact that a nation solely relied upon the justice of its measures 
 and the benevolence of its conduct would do more than anything else to prevent 
 the occurrence of injury. 
 
 This might be true in some cases, in others not. Besides, there are two points 
 left out of consideration. National measures are in many cases not so absolutely 
 just or unjust that they cannot appear in very different lights to different persons. 
 We see this daily with respect to municipal questions; but respecting inter- 
 national questions there is the additional difficulty of nations forming separate 
 communities, large enough to be, in a degree, their own world, and separated by 
 language, history, law, views, prejudices, desires, etc. Secondly, benevolence is 
 a delicate feeling, depending upon the individual view and disposition of men. 
 Where many have to decide, as is the case in national questions, it is not often 
 possible that problems be solved by delicacy of feeling, which depends so much 
 on individuality. All we can and ought to desire is to see the questions solved 
 upon the rules of strict justice; and even upon this it is not always easy to unite 
 a number of men. We must not forget that governments have their power in 
 trust, and as 1 might do a thousand things with my own money which I dare 
 not do if I am a guardian, so government cannot act in many cases by way of 
 benevolence, but must go by the principles of justice. 
 
 2. If wrong is done, the proper appeal for moral beings upon moral questions 
 is not to physical force, but to the conscience of men. 
 
 This prohibits us from going to war before we have tried every other means. 
 But it is not wrong to trust to physical force against a thief for instance, as was
 
 456 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 XXVII. Connected with the subject of war is that of armies. 
 All we have to observe with regard to the soldier, to his con- 
 
 said above, by way of a lock. Those who deny the right of using physical force 
 almost always commit the error of arguing against force altogether. Yet no 
 Quaker hesitates in using strictly defensive force for instance, an iron chest. 
 The question then is not, as stated here by Wayland, whether we are permitted 
 to use force instead of applying to conscience, but whether we are allowed to use 
 compelling force, and, above all, whether we are allowed to kill fellow-men in 
 our endeavor to apply compelling force. For, I repeat it, neither destruction nor 
 killing is the object of war. The object of war is either my defence or the com- 
 pulsion of another, and in effecting this, owing to my being impeded in my way 
 by the enemy, arms are used. If the question is thus reduced, it remains to be 
 answered whether we are prevented from killing men under any circumstances. 
 The Quakers say yes; we deny it. If I am attacked by a murderer, I hold it to 
 be my solemn duty to kill him in order to save myself, because God does not 
 want murder to triumph, because it is right according to the moral order of 
 things that the wicked meet with their desert, because my life, being that of an 
 innocent man, is worth more than the murderer's, and for a number of other 
 reasons, unnecessary to state here. Puffendorf says, very justly, " If, then, some 
 one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my 
 ruin, he could not without the last degree of impudence (impudentissime) pre- 
 tend that after this I should still consider him as a. sacred person who ought 
 not to be touched; in other words, that I should betray myself and abandon the 
 care of my own preservation in order to give way to the malice of a criminal 
 that he may act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since he 
 shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in a 
 position which does not permit me safely to practise towards him the unties of 
 peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me ; so 
 that, if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to accuse himself only, since 
 he has reduced me to this necessity." (De Jure Nat. et Gent., lib. ii. ch. v. I.) The 
 same applies to wars. I would recommend the perusal of the whole second 
 book with reference to this subject. 
 
 3. Suppose this method to fail, that is, the appeal to the consciences of men ; 
 why, then let us suffer the injury. 
 
 I have already shown the reasons why I believe this to be against the Bible, 
 against God's law " written in our hearts," against reason, and subversive of all 
 right and righteousness. Why not apply the same principle much sooner to the 
 daily and municipal intercourse of men ? Reason with a defaulter or a robber, 
 and if he will not listen, why, suffer the evil. For it will not be said that in ap- 
 pealing to courts we appeal to reason alone. Courts are not arbitrations. They 
 decide upon reason, no doubt, but their decision is to be enforced if not willingly 
 obeyed. All the arguments of the first part of p. 444 of Wayland's work would 
 apply with much more strength to municipal courts. 
 
 By adopting the law of beijevolence, as Wayland calls the adoption of the
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 duct towards his own country, and to his right of independent 
 action, is this : 
 
 He does not decide upon the justness of war, and is free of 
 all obligation respecting this point. 1 Cases of the utmost ex^ 
 U-emity, such as revolutions, when, as mentioned, he is ordered 
 to fire upon his fellow-citizens for resisting unlawful and ruin- 
 ous decrees of government, form exceptions, and cannot be 
 brought under any general rule. He must decide whether it 
 is a case of utmost extremity and whether the most sacred 
 duties do conflict. In all other cases obedience for him is a 
 
 principle never to use force between men, a nation would render the event of 
 being subjugated highly improbable. He adds, "There is not a nation in 
 Europe that could be led on to war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and 
 defenceless people." 
 
 But history does not only show that states or societies have been attacked 
 again and again that would not fight, but even such as could not fight have been 
 attacked and swallowed up, just as readily as the ancient New Englanders used 
 force with the Quakers, despite their non-resistance principle. The fact is, an 
 undefended state known to have the rule of suffering everything would become 
 the prey of all the others. What should prevent the African or Asiatic pirates 
 from plundering such a nation for instance, from attacking our vessels trading to 
 China, should we adopt the " law of benevolence" ? 
 
 If, however, says Wayland, such a case of subjugation should nevertheless 
 occur, we ought to suffer. 
 
 We must not forget that an individual in bondage may be free, but a nation 
 cannot : for the individual may have a rare elevation of mind and be born free; 
 were he born in a jail, he could not but be base, unless he were particularly in- 
 structed. Every nation in servitude becomes debased. Strange, indeed, that we 
 are expected willingly to sacrifice everything divine our moral elevation, civil- 
 ization, government of law and right, and God's own liberty for which he made 
 men simply in order to avoid doing one single thing, that is, resisting; as 
 if it were said anywhere that this was absolutely the greatest evil. As life is not 
 the greatest good, so dying is not the greatest evil. 
 
 1 * A question which in 1846, when the United States went to war with 
 Mexico, became of great practical importance, is, whether a man whose govern- 
 ment has gone to war has a right to volunteer, if he considers the war unjust, 
 whether he can say, In my individual opinion the war is wrong, but it is, after 
 all, an individual opinion, and my country has thought differently, and I am not 
 answerable for it. But who is the country? For instance, in the present case 
 the president plunged us into the war, and congress was obliged to follow. Had 
 it not been for this ethical consideration, I should probably have solicited a 
 con.mission, and, I dare say, should have got one.
 
 458 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 principal point of honor. The very meaning of an army is 
 founded upon obedience. He therefore destroys his own 
 character if he does not obey and does not do this as a duty. 
 He may rest assured that in the same degree as he aids to 
 infuse any other spirit than that of patriotism, obedience, and 
 gallantry into the army, he injures the cause of liberty. A 
 disobedient army is a curse to its country. The soldier, there- 
 fore, must under no circumstances allow the army to become 
 deliberative, or a politically agitated body. Let the soldier, 
 if he have a right, go to the poll, but the necessity of sub- 
 ordination ought to deprive the army of its political character. 
 I believe officers in actual service ought not, in political deli- 
 cacy, to offer themselves as candidates for the place of repre- 
 sentative where they are allowed to sit in the legislature. 
 
 Never, except in cases of the utmost extremity, ought the 
 citizens of a republic to elect an officer of the army, in service, 
 as their chief magistrate. The Americans have had a glo- 
 rious exception in General Washington ; but the exception 
 cannot invalidate a rule so sound and clear in itself, and so 
 well proved by all history and our own times. When civil 
 feud distracts the country, such a selection may become neces- 
 sary. So are many evils necessary to overcome greater ones. 
 But where it is customary to select candidates for chief 
 magistracy from the army, we must not look or hope for 
 liberty. 1 
 
 1 [Since this was written, two men, never distinguished in civil life, have been 
 elected presidents of the United States on account of their reputation as military 
 officers, and two others were brought into notice, although insignificant enough 
 in themselves, by their participation in war. With a great army in a country this 
 would be dangerous. But as supplies, recruiting, and much else must precede 
 the subversion of the national liberties, the danger from military officers in this 
 country is not very imminent. There are in this country so few prominent per- 
 sons, and of these the real statesmen are so far above the power of the people to 
 estimate them, that some conspicuity is needed in the head or the figure-head of 
 a party of a sort to strike the popular mind. Our problem must be to carry 
 government on with the minimum of talent. Add to this that politicians have 
 been before the country and have made enemies. A new man comes in more 
 easily. Moreover, the people justly dread the schemes, bargains, mutual in- 
 surances and assurances of old foxy politicians.]
 
 POLITICAL ETHICS. 
 
 459 
 
 Lastly, it is the imperative duty of the soldier, that is, of 
 every man under arms regularly embodied in a corps, to show 
 himself superior to adversity, to show his courage and strength 
 as much in suffering and, in performing harassing service as 
 in fighting, to observe the strictest discipline, not to murmur 
 for want of pay, dress, or food, to show great moral strength 
 and alacrity in tiresome sieges, not to maraud or oppress, to 
 alleviate as much as in him lies the evils of war, neither to 
 be rash nor backward, to remember the great cause which is 
 at stake in a just war, and that the success of war depends 
 mainly upon the willing and perfect performance of duty by 
 every individual : and let his country and his God be ever 
 before his eyes. 
 
 THE END.
 
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