Ill I 
 
 ■11 Pi I 
 
 i 
 
 "''t[l''.i''f'
 
 
 M-i 
 
 6NtO\ 
 
 THE LIBRARY 
 
 OF 
 
 THE UNIVERSITY 
 
 OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 LOS ANGELES
 
 ^\J 
 
 
 ^. ^\yh f p . ,- 
 
 \Jyy
 
 H I S T O li Y 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND,
 
 I-ONDON : 
 
 r. r. noDusoN, printkr, 1 gough squark, flret street.
 
 '^HISTORY 
 
 or THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND : 
 
 KMBRACI.Vt; THK 
 
 OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON ]\IENTAL SCIENCE 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME. 
 
 ) 
 
 By Robert! BLAKE y, a.m. 
 
 AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE, 
 ESSAY OX MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, ESSAY' ON LOGIC, &C. 
 
 A'OLUME 1 
 
 LONDON: 
 LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS, 
 
 PATEKNOSTER ROW. 
 
 1850.
 
 TO y. I 
 
 HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PE.INCE ALBEET, 
 
 CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITV OF CAMBRIDGE, 
 &C. &C. &.C. 
 
 THESE VOLUMES 
 
 A RE 
 
 (s'y permission) 
 
 MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED, 
 
 BY 
 
 II IS ROYAL HIGH NESS'S 
 
 VERY OBEDIENT, 
 
 HUMBLE SERVANT, 
 
 THE AUTHOR. 
 
 > 
 
 ^«:;m<>/l(>
 
 PREFACE, 
 
 It is upAvards of twenty years since I first formed 
 the intention of writing' a work of this description. 
 Having been an ardent cultivator of metaphysical 
 literature from early youth, I often experienced the 
 want of some guide to a knowledge of authors, and 
 their several publications on this species of philo- 
 sophy ; and it occurred to me that a work, which 
 simply brought into one focus the multifarious and 
 scattered elements of speculation Avhich every civi- 
 lized country possessed, could not fail to prove 
 highly useful, not only to the mere scholar like 
 myself, but even to those more advanced in philo- 
 sophical knowledge and acquirements. To form 
 a plan, however, is one thing ; but to execute it, 
 another. I soon found the great difficulties which 
 lay in my path. In England it is more arduous to 
 write a history of philosophy, than in any other 
 country in Europe ; chiefly from the deficiency 
 of works on the literature of tlie Middle Ages. 
 Nearly all Continental lil;raries, even those of
 
 Vi PREFACE. 
 
 small towns and villages, have more or less of 
 this species of literature; but in England the 
 best libraries in our provincial cities are almost 
 entirely without works of this description. The 
 time required for reading was another obstacle 
 in my way ; for more urgent and pressing pursuits 
 engrossed almost every hour I had to spare. In 
 consequence of these and other impediments which 
 it is not necessary to particularize, I have some- 
 times been compelled to suspend the work for three 
 or four years together ; and many a time and oft 
 have I altogether despaired of ever being able to 
 complete it. Circumstances however have at length 
 enabled me to do so ; and after a good deal of 
 anxiety, I now present it to the philosophical 
 world, with a firm persuasion that they will act justly 
 towards it, and award me that portion of com- 
 mendation to which I may be entitled, however 
 small it may be ; and to more I have no right to 
 aspire. 
 
 There are two modes of writing a history 
 of philosophy. The one is to classify authors 
 under general heads, in conformity with a prin- 
 ciple of resemblance or affinity subsisting among 
 their respective speculative opinions. This is 
 called philosophical history. The other is, to 
 follow the order of time, and give a distinct and 
 personal outline of every philosopher's views, in
 
 PREPACE. Vll 
 
 the precise order in which chronoloi^y develops 
 them. Both plans have their respective advan- 
 tages and disadvantages ; and it is a nice point to 
 determine which to prefer. To me, in all tlie 
 purely historical works of a classified kind that 
 I have seen, there has appeared no small degree of 
 confusion ; and this I helieve is commonly felt as 
 a great inconvenience by young students, when 
 they enter upon tlie study of mental science. 
 Generalization on the philosophy of mind ought 
 not to precede observation and instruction, but to 
 follow them. For these and other reasons, I have 
 adopted the order of time, as nearly as the nature 
 of the subject would admit; leaving the reader, 
 except in some few special cases, to select and 
 classify wa-iters according to his own opinions and 
 judgment. The historical or classified arrange- 
 ment is certainly more dignified and imposing ; but 
 I conceive the chronological is better fitted to im- 
 part elementary and correct information, and to 
 preserve the mind from many false notions which 
 an arbitrary or imperfect classification is apt to 
 create, in reference to particular authors and their 
 respective systems. 
 
 This work is arranged upon a plan somewhat 
 particular. It is almost exclusively confined to 
 mental science. I am not acquainted with any 
 publication precisely of the same kind, with the
 
 Vlll PREFACE, 
 
 exception of Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to 
 the Encyclopedia Britannica. Every reader knows 
 that, on the Continent, religion, morals, and po- 
 litics, as well as metaphysics, are comprehended 
 under the general term Philosophy. In England, 
 however, we have commonly kept these topics 
 apart from each other ; allowing each to rest upon 
 its own basis ; and this I consider a better 
 plan upon the whole. It is obvious, notwith- 
 standing, that by adopting it, I have, in a 
 corresponding degree, contracted the sphere of 
 discussion and observation ; and, therefore, there 
 must necessarily be less variety in my statements 
 and reasonings than if I had launched freely, on 
 every occasion that presented itself, into mat- 
 ters intimately connected with the fundamental 
 principles of religion, morals, and politics. Not 
 that I have altogether refrained from touching 
 upon these respective branches of knowledge ; this 
 it would have been impossible for me to do, had I 
 wished ; but on those occasions where a direct 
 reference is made to any of them, it is only in 
 order to illustrate more clearly and pointedly the 
 precise nature and bearing of some particular me- 
 taphysical principle or system. My aim has con- 
 stantly been to furnish a history of Iletaphysical 
 Philosophy^ and nothing more. 
 
 I ha AC been desirous of combining some portion
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 of elementary instruction on the science of mind, 
 in conjunction with the historical sketches and 
 details I have given. This will account for some 
 short chapters or dissertations in several parts of 
 the work, apparently unconnected with the course 
 of simple chronological narration. I trust that, 
 though this method may be considered in some 
 measure novel, it will not be without corresponding 
 benefit, particularly to young students and general 
 readers. I once purposed to make these elemen- 
 tary essays more numerous ; but the increasing 
 pressure of purely historical matter did not allow 
 me to follow this course to a greater extent than 
 I have done. A considerable portion of the benefit 
 and pleasure to be derived from a historical sketch 
 of any branch of knowledge, arises from our know- 
 ing something of its leading and fundamental 
 principles ; and this applies to the science of mind 
 more, perhaps, than to any other. 
 
 The same cause which limited those elementary 
 statements and reflexions, operated in curtailing 
 the development and discussion of several systems 
 of metaphysical speculation treated of in the work. 
 It has often been to me a matter of deep regret, that 
 my limits did not allow me to illustrate many inte- 
 resting and important principles to the extent I de- 
 sired, in order that they might be comprehensively 
 and accurately understood. This will account, in
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 many instances, for the imperfect and circum- 
 scribed notice of several theories, and their col- 
 lateral branches; and for the abrupt discontinu- 
 ance of my remarks, when perhaps a discussion 
 had just reached that precise point at which it be- 
 came most interesting to the inquirer. Consider- 
 ing the extent of the ground over which I had to 
 travel, and the numerous historical notices required, 
 these imperfections, however much to be lamented, 
 were unavoidable. I^ifty, instead of four volumes, 
 would scarcely have sufficed to give any thing 
 approaching to a full view of the different systems 
 enumerated, and to point out all their bearings on 
 each other, and on other departments of human 
 knowledge. 
 
 One of the chief designs of this work has been 
 to impart to it a universal character and interest; 
 to make it, in some measure, as interesting to the 
 philosopher of Paris as of London. With this vievf, 
 a copious account of English and Foreign philo- 
 sophical publications is given ; in order that those 
 who feel an interest in mental pursuits may have 
 as accurate and comprehensive a view of all that 
 has been written on the philosophy of mind, as it 
 was practicable in such a limited publication to 
 afford. To remedy in some degree the imperfection 
 of more extended elucidations and comments, on 
 many foreign authors in particular, lists of their
 
 PREFACE. XI 
 
 names and respective various publications will be 
 found in the Notes appended to the work. 
 
 I feel myself under great obligations to many 
 philosophical historians, both in my own country 
 and abroad. I cannot, however, enumerate all 
 from w^hom I have received assistance. Among 
 English treatises, I have consulted Stanley, Cud- 
 worth, and Enfield, with some slight advantages. 
 To Dugald Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to the 
 last edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, I lie 
 under considerable obligations. I am also much 
 indebted to Mr. Ilallam ; and in perusing his 
 " Literature of the Middle Ages," I have often 
 experienced regret that he has not treated some 
 mental speculations of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
 centuries at greater length. Every thing he says 
 is so excellent, both in matter and in stvle, that 
 on many occasions his brevity has been felt as a 
 painful infliction. I tender my acknowledgments to 
 Mr. Lewes for his recent able and useful "Biographi- 
 cal History of Philosophy," though I must add that 
 I cannot concur with the general aim and spirit of 
 his speculative opinions. In examining the systems 
 of philosophy of the present age, Mr. Morell's 
 historical work, which is well entitled to the 
 patronage and commendations it has received, has 
 often been of service to me; and I have felt a 
 peculiar pleasure in the perusal of his writings,
 
 Xll PREFACE. 
 
 from the circumstance that his opinions and my 
 own have so many points of resemhlance. To 
 the Erench historians I owe much ; especially to 
 De Gerando, Cousin, and Damiron ; and likewise to 
 the lahours of Brucker, Emitter, Michelet, and other 
 distinguished German authors. 
 
 Erom the wide range of inquiry I have taken, 
 the varied topics on which I have commented, 
 their innate complexity and diversified aspects, 
 and, ahove all, from my own imperfections and 
 shortcomings for such an important task, it is 
 probable I may have fallen into errors, both as to 
 matters of fact and of opinion. To candid and 
 dispassionate criticism I cheerfully commit my 
 labours with all their faults ; having every reason to 
 believe, that, as the love of truth has ever been my 
 polar star in their prosecution, the same feeling 
 animates the spirit of criticism of modern times ; 
 and that if correction be needed, it will only pro- 
 ceed from generous and honourable motives ; and 
 prove as beneficial to the receiver, as commendable 
 to the giver. 
 
 London, Oc/. 1818.
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 P A O K . 
 
 Introduction xvii 
 
 CHAPTER T. 
 On the Histories of Philosophy, Ancient and Modern 1 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 Mental Philosophy of Grefce. — The Ionic School: 
 Thales — Anaximandcr — Anaxinieues — Ilermotinius of Cla- 
 zoniene — Diogenes of Apollonia — Anaxagoras 5 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Italian School of 
 Metaphysics : Pythagoras 1 7 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Eleatic School of 
 Metaphysics : Xenophanes — Parmenides — Melissus — Zeno 
 of Elea — Ileraclitus 21 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Second Eleatic School 
 of Philosophy : Empedocles — Leucippus — Democritus .... 35 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Greek Sophists: 
 Protagoras — Gorgias 42 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Socrates Jl 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Cyrenic and Cy- 
 nical Schools 5y 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Schools of Megara, 
 Elis, and Eretria : Euchd -V
 
 XIV CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOK. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Plato 59 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Aristotle 72 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Analysis, Synthesis, 
 and Analogy, considered in relation to Greek Philosophy . . 100 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Sceptical School 
 of Metaphysics : Pyrrho 121 
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Epicurus 126 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Stoical School of 
 Metaphysics : Zeno — Chrysippus 130 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — On the Notions com- 
 monly adopted by the Ancients, up to the Period of the Stoics, 
 on the Origin of our Knowledge and the Nature of Truth 136 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Second Academy : 
 Arcesilaus — Carneades — Philo — Antiochus — Clitomachus 
 — Posidonius — Panoetius 143 
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 The Alexandrian School of Metaphysics ' 153 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 On the Notions entertained by the different Schools of Philo- 
 sophy on the Nature of General Principles and Propositions, 
 up to the time of the Foundation of the Alexandrian School 158 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 The Roman School of Mental Philosophy. — Lucre- 
 tius — Cicero — Alcinous — Maximus of Tyre — Alexander of 
 A])hrodisias — Galen 166
 
 CONTENTS. XV 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 TriE Latkr School of Metaphysical Scepticism. — 
 .I'Enesiclemus — Agrippa — Phavorinus — Se.xtas Empiricus . . 182 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 On the Opinions of Ancient Philosophers, up to this period of 
 History, on a Deity and the Human Soul 1 1) I 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 Mental Philosophy of India. — Sankhva and Yo2;a — . 
 Bhagavad-Gliita — Nyaya and Vaisechika — Vedanta 207 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 The Union of Eastern Doctrines with those or 
 Greece and Rome. — Aristobulus — Philo — ApoUonius of 
 Tyana — Plutarch — Lucius Apuleius — Xumenius 219 
 
 CHAPTER XXV, 
 The Gnostic Metaphysicians 228 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. 
 The Metaphysical Principles of the New Plato- 
 NiSTS. — Ammonius Saccas — Longinns — Plotinus — Por- 
 phyry — Jamblicus — Proclus — Marinus — Isidore of Gaza . . 229 
 
 CHAPTER XXVII. 
 On the Metaphysical DisQi;isrrioNS of the Ancient 
 Fathers of the Church. — Justin Martyr — Tatian — 
 St. Athenagoras — St. Theophilus — St. Pantsenus — Origen 
 — St. Clement — Herm#s — TertuUian — Arnobius — Irenseus 
 — Lactantius — Anatolius — St. Augustine — Nemesius — St, 
 Gregory — Synesius — Claudianus ^lamertus — Boethius — 
 ^lartin Capella — Cassiodorus — St. John Damascenus .... 244 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 Observations and Reflections, from Ascetic Wri- 
 ters, on Matters connected with Reasoning and 
 General Knowledge, — St. Peter the Anchorite — St. 
 
 Alonzo de Vega — Pelagius 2/7 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 On the Principle of Authority, in Matters of Philosophy and 
 Theology, maintained by the Fathers of the Church 300
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 / 
 
 xvi CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOK. 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 On Moral Evidence, after the Full Establishment of Christianity 3 1 1 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 On the Opinions of the Fathers of the Church, on 
 THE Liberty and Necessity of Human Actions. — 
 
 Isnatius — Justin Martyr — Tatian — Ireneeus — Clement of 
 Alexandria — Tertullian — Origen — Cyprian — Eusebius — 
 Athanasius — Cyril of Jerusalem — Hilary — Epiphanius — 
 Basil — Gregory Nazianzen — Gregory of Nyssa — -Ambrose 
 — Jerome — Augustine — Chrysostom — Theodoret 317 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 On the Metaphysical Notions of the Arabians. — 
 
 Alkendi — Alfarabi — Avicenna — Algazeli — Avicebron — 
 Averroes — Theophilus 340 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIII. 
 The Persian Sophists. — Avenpace 3(i4 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 The Cabalistic Metaphysics 364 
 
 CHAPTER XXXV. 
 On the Philosophy of the Jews. — Eben Ezra — Moses 
 Maimonides 3G9 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 On Distinct Faculties of the Mind, as recognised by Philo- 
 sophers up to the Ninth Century . . • 3/5 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 General Remarks on Faculties of the Mind, and of what may 
 be urged against their individual Existence, Nature, and 
 Operation 383 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
 On Saxon Metaphysics. — Alfred the Great — Alcuinus, or 
 Albinus Flaccus — Bede ,411 
 
 Concluding Remarks 433 
 
 Notes and Illustrations 439
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 Phi'losopiiy is a conipreliensivo term, and, in 
 its fullest extent, embraces evorv tliinj? which 
 a man can know and feel. Philosopliers are 
 however, like otlier humbler workmen, obliged 
 to divide their labours in order to ensure more 
 successful and efTicient execution ; and accord- 
 ingly we find that, from the first dawn ol' any 
 thing like science and literature, all knowledge 
 has been classified under three leading divisions ; 
 namely, a knowledge of external bodies, of mental 
 faculties or powers, and of moral duties or obliga- 
 tions. In no possible state of human existence can • 
 these three branches of thousrht be conceived in a 
 state of complete isolation or independent opera- 
 tion. There is a bond, an indissoluble union, con- 
 necting them ; and the precise limits where one ends 
 and another commences, it is impossible to point 
 out Avith any thing like fractional nicety. But 
 still this consideration does not prevent men 
 from making useful and practical divisions, or 
 from designating them by general terms. It has 
 accordingly been almost universally proclaimed 
 in all ages, that pliilosopliy may be substan- 
 * b
 
 Xviii INTHODUCTION. 
 
 tially divided into three leading parts ;— what can 
 be known of nature, of God, and of man. 
 
 It has commonly been affirmed, that the consi- 
 deration of visible nature is prior to every other 
 inquiry. Whether this be correct or not, is of 
 little moment to our present purpose. Man is 
 evidently placed in an immense arena, and sees 
 himself surrounded by a universe of infinite extent 
 and variety. He feels the influence of external 
 objects, and in turn exercises his power over them. 
 What is the order and result of this reciprocity of 
 action, is a matter of vital moment to him ; and 
 he therefore institutes inquiries into the laws which 
 regulate the movements and properties of external 
 thm2:s. To these he ffives the name of Natural or 
 JPhysical FMlosojjhy. This science has matter, 
 and its various modifications, for its basis. 
 
 This inquiry into material bodies can scarcely be 
 conceived in operation apart from some considera- 
 tion of the thinking and active principle which 
 conducts and guides it. Here the origin of mental 
 science is placed. It has often been defined, but it 
 is one of those branches of knowledge not suscep - 
 tible of a formal and concise definition. Speaking 
 generally, it has mind, both human and Divine, 
 for its object. Aristotle terms it the first philo- 
 sophy, not only on account of its superiority to all 
 other branches of human w isdom, but also as being 
 prior, in the order of time, to the whole of the arts 
 and sciences. We cannot, however, lay much 
 stress on the theories which attempt to account 
 for the origin of speculative philosophy ; because
 
 INTRODUCTION. XIX 
 
 it is quite obvious that speculations as to tlie 
 beginning of things, their nature, and the laws 
 which govern and regulate their existence, must 
 have been coeval with the very first rudiments of 
 human thought. Man is never able to refer to any- 
 period in the liistory of his species, in which there 
 was not some system of philosophy recognised. 
 Every child, and every savage, is a philosopher in 
 his way ; and the only difference between tlie 
 scholar and the boor is, as to the relative degree 
 in which each is able to investigate and arrang<^ 
 the phenomena of existence. Both are, in their 
 respective spheres, placed under the same govern- 
 ment, and influenced by the same circumstances 
 and events. But whatever opinion may be adopted 
 on this point, certain it is, that mental science forms 
 one of the three great divisions of human inquiry. 
 
 Another division of human thought, containing 
 many important subdivisions, and which is clearly 
 defined, arises from the very first wants and duties 
 of human life. This department of knowledge 
 relates to morals, or the conduct of mankind. In 
 no situation of life can we conceive a total suspen- 
 sion of the principles of morality. The obligations 
 and bonds of connection which subsist between 
 man and those around him, must form the first 
 elements of his knowledge. These, like the physi- 
 cal laws of the universe, are of a fixed, determined, 
 and eternal character. They form the ground- 
 work of Moral Philosophij . 
 
 The philosophy which springs out of and com- 
 prehends a knowledge of mental systems, may be 
 
 62
 
 XX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 viewed under several aspects. If we look at it 
 merely through its naked or abstract principles, it 
 is one thing ; if exclusively through its practical 
 influence on the condition of human thought in a 
 state of society, it is another thing ; and if both 
 these be amalgamated with other branches of 
 physical knowledge, it presents again altogether 
 different features. Yet all possess a solid sub- 
 stratum of truth ; and the propriety or obligation 
 of taking any particular view of the philosophy of 
 mind, can only be defended upon comprehensive 
 considerations of what is in accordance with the 
 general interest, judgment, and happiness of man- 
 kind. 
 
 That it is a condition of human existence that 
 some system of mental speculation should be cul- 
 tivated, and be made to serve as a ground-work 
 for other necessary and interesting studies, is a 
 position as irrefragably true as important. It is a 
 law of human thought that every thing shall centre 
 in mind ; in a knowledge of its faculties or powers ; 
 and in a thorough acquaintance with all those ge- 
 neral conceptions which are incorporated in every 
 intellectual manifestation or state of being. We 
 cannot exile ourselves beyond the sphere of this 
 influence ; for if we could, impenetrable darkness 
 and ignorance would be our portion. It is not a 
 matter of choice whether a man shall be ignorant 
 of mental philosophy or not ; it is imperative that 
 lie should cultivate it, if he is ever to attain a 
 complete knowledge of other sciences. It is tlie 
 portal through which he must pass to the inner
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXI 
 
 temple of intellectual treasures. Mental pliilo- 
 sopliy is not itself the sum of all knowledge, but 
 the necessary instrument in the successful pro- 
 secution of all other branches of human wisdom. 
 Without it, every man is a child, an intellectual 
 imbecile, and can have nothing valuable or abiding 
 in him. To illustrate this point a little more fully, 
 we shall make a fe^ observations on the indis- 
 soluble and dependent connection between certain 
 kinds of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. 
 
 We shall not dwell upon the obligations which 
 even physical science lies under to metaphysical 
 pursuits. We may, however, barely remark, in 
 reply to the enthusiastic admirers of the positive 
 philosophy, that they are not in a position to 
 mould their own facts, nor to illustrate or me- 
 thodise their views, even in reference to the sim- 
 plest phenomena of the external world, nor can 
 tlieir opinions and conclusions be enforced upon 
 the attention of others, without the virtual recog- 
 nition of principles which have an exclusive re- 
 lationship with mental science. It is only by 
 stepping beyond the strict limits of their own 
 sphere, as mere .collectors of facts and observations, 
 that they can be understood, either by themselves 
 or by others. A system professing to be founded 
 ou facts, and facts alone, is an inconceivable thing 
 to the mind of man. The truth of this may be 
 readily tested by the most superficial consideration 
 of the subject. 
 
 Leaving, however, for the present, this part of the 
 subject, we shall direct especial attention to three 
 great divisions of human knowledge ; namely, mo-
 
 XXll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 rality, religion, and politics. A profound acquaint- 
 ance with all or any of these, must be obtained 
 through the channels of mental science. 
 
 The science of morals is of a comprehensive 
 character, and of universal interest. It affects 
 all classes of mankind, from the king to the 
 beggar. All its principles and facts, however, 
 relate to mind ; they belong tb man's internal con- 
 stitution ; they proceed from certain a priori sug- 
 gestions or conditions of the human conscious- 
 ness, and are not matters which come under the 
 cognizance of the senses, or can be measured or 
 weighed. What is involved in the terms moral 
 freedom, morcd duty, moral ^responsibility , moral 
 obligation, moral feelings, moral princip)les, emo- 
 tions, passions, desires, reioards, and punishments ? 
 Something, undoubtedly, of a purely mental cha- 
 racter ; which, in order to be effectively analyzed, 
 and brought to open day for the satisfaction of 
 man's reason and interest, requires an intellectual 
 process of the most subtile and refined kind. 
 Here nature cannot be interrogated by material 
 instruments ; we must deal with her solely through 
 the means of our internal consciousness, and those 
 liabits of inward analysis and deduction which can 
 only be detected and efiiciently wielded by the 
 mental philosopher. Eor a man to write pro- 
 foundly and correctly on the principles of morals, 
 without a respectable portion of metaphysical 
 learning, would be as impossible as for a man born 
 blind to write intelligibly and philosophically on 
 light and colours. 
 
 Theology stands in nearlv the same relation as
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXUl 
 
 morality to mental philosophy. The former has 
 to deal with those principles of the mind which 
 constitute the foundation of natural and revealed 
 religion. Here cause and effect, existence, intel- 
 ligence, wisdom, final causes, and an immense 
 variety of other abstract conceptions of the human 
 understanding, form the ground-work of theolo- 
 gical science, and create and support its entire 
 principle of vitality. We have the existence of 
 the Supreme Being, His moral government, the 
 naind's immateriality and immortality, the whole 
 science of morality as contrasted and compared 
 with the morality of the Scriptures, the doctrines 
 of revealed religion considered in relation to the 
 course of nature and the inward suggestions of the 
 human soul ; and a thousand other matters, any one 
 of which is sufficient to occupy the active mind of 
 man during a whole life time, in order to fully illus- 
 trate and enforce it in all its bearings and rami- 
 fications. But in this extensive field of speculation 
 and interest, nothing can be done without a know- 
 ledge of mental subjects. Divines may, and in fact 
 do, regulate their acquirements in metaphysical lore 
 according to their individual circumstances, tastes, 
 and mental capabilities ; but the theologian is not 
 to be envied who can enter a pulpit, or commit his 
 theological thoughts to the public through the 
 press, totally unacquainted with the general out- 
 lines of mental speculations. Indeed this fact 
 is so well understood, that among nearly every 
 class of Christian teachers, it is now an established 
 part of theological tuition, that the candidates for
 
 XXiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the office of the ministry shall possess a competent 
 knowledge of metaphysical science, before they can 
 be qualified for holy orders. 
 
 Politics as a science, not viewed through the 
 medium of party, are essentially founded on men- 
 tal knowledge, and their general principles are of 
 a spmtual or abstract cast. They have also an in- 
 timate and necessary relationship with morality 
 and theology. All declarations of personal rights 
 and freedom, allegiance, civil and criminal codes of 
 laws and jurisprudence, or the law of nations, are 
 severally founded on abstract principles of thought, 
 and have their seat in the deep and inward recesses 
 of the soul. We have only to look at the constitu- 
 tional charters of any state or kingdom, to be con- 
 vinced of the refined and mental abstractions of 
 which they are composed. The science of juris- 
 prudence, for example, is chiefly constituted of a 
 multitude of recondite maxims, of which, unless a 
 man has some knowledge of metaphysical subjects, 
 and is well acquainted with the rules and principles 
 of abstract reasoning, he can never be able fully to 
 comprehend the justice and soundness, nor their 
 applicability to the state of human affairs. 
 
 If such, then, be the intimate connection between 
 these three most important departments of human 
 knowledge, and the philosophy of mind, how ne- 
 cessary and obligatory is it that we should assi- 
 duously cultivate it, and should form to ourselves 
 comprehensive views of its nature, limits, purposes, 
 and ends. It ought to constitute an important 
 branch of every young man's education, particularly
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXV 
 
 if he be destined to pursue any professional occupa- 
 tion. Unless habits of inward reflection are formed 
 and cultivated in earlv life, and the rules of mental 
 analysis and deduction are familiarised to the mind, 
 it is impossible to rear any great or respectable 
 superstructure of philosophical expertness upon 
 the best and most enlightened systems of public 
 or private tuition. Such systems may make ^full, 
 but not a clever man. 
 
 Of late years a lively interest has been awakened 
 in regard to the history of speculative opinions. 
 The European mind has been aroused from a state 
 of comparative apathy, and is now bent on testing 
 every principle and every fact, both by historical 
 evidence and by logical deduction. We are called 
 upon to trace opinions from the most remote pe- 
 riods of time, and to view them in conjunction 
 with institutions and modes of thinking of the pre- 
 sent day. This extensive inquiry is considered by 
 various classes of men in different lights, and with 
 different feelings; some mth aversion, and some 
 with approval; some with an anxious desire to 
 effect social improvements, and promote know- 
 ledge ; and some, unhappily, to throw impediments 
 and doubts in the path of human progress. Still, 
 however, powerful sympathies have been awakened ; 
 and we may rationally hope that it only requires 
 time, and suitable seasons of calm and dispas- 
 sionate reflection, to realize important benefits 
 from their exercise. 
 
 In Germany the spirit of speculative inquiry
 
 XXVI INTRODUCTION. 
 
 has, for nearly a century, displayed remarkable 
 activity. It lias formed one of the leading branches 
 of public education, and conducted its cultiva- 
 tors to distinction and renown. It has been made 
 subservient to the elucidation of every other de- 
 partment of the philosophy of human nature, and 
 thrown a steady light on many problems which 
 had previously been enshrouded in almost impene- 
 trable darkness. In Prance the same activity has 
 prevailed for nearly the same period. Here, too, 
 speculative philosophy has imparted a higher tone 
 to the general current of literature and scientific 
 investigations, and has been eminently successful 
 in adding to the general stock of rational and en- 
 lightened inquiry. Italy has likewise partaken in 
 some measure of the prevailing enthusiasm, and 
 has relaxed the hitherto inflexible severity of aus- 
 tere injunctions against novel doctrines and opi- 
 nions ; and has, consequently, extended the bless- 
 ings of intellectual liberty among her people. And 
 the same may be remarked of several other conti- 
 nental nations. In proportion as mental philo- 
 sophy has broken in upon the dull and stupifying 
 routine of antiquated and worn-out systems of edu- 
 cation and academical instruction, in the same pro- 
 portion do we trace a favourable change in the 
 general current of the public mind. The spirit of 
 man feels the salutary influences of unrestricted 
 freedom, and enters upon that state which is most 
 conducive to the full and cfi'ective exercise of all 
 its loftier and more ennobling powers and energies. 
 True it is, that these advantages from the
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXVll 
 
 ardent cultivation of speculative topics, are not 
 invariably obtained without some serious draw- 
 backs and inconveniences. In Germany and 
 Erance, in particular, there has unquestionably 
 been manifested at intervals a philosophical spirit 
 but little in harmony with the progress of rational 
 knowledge, and the best and most sacred interests 
 of man. The unfettered liberty of thought has in 
 these countries occasionally run into licentiousness. 
 The philosophic mind has degraded itself, and out- 
 raged common sense and common feeling. But 
 still Ave must hold the balance with a steady and 
 even hand. It seems to be one of the necessary 
 conditions of human progress, that no great ad- 
 vances shall be made in the intellectual acquire- 
 ments of nations, nor in the firm and complete 
 consolidation of those important abstract principles 
 which lie at the root of their civilization, pros- 
 perity, and freedom, without some corresponding 
 disadvantages, though of an evanescent or tran- 
 sitory nature. The public mind, long pent up 
 within a narrow sphere, often rebounds beyond its 
 wholesome and natural limits, when its fetters are 
 taken off and all forcible restrictions removed. 
 It revels in the wild and frantic enjoyment of its 
 liberty, and feels but little inclination for the 
 moment to listen to the dictates of soberness and 
 truth. But this feverish state passes over, and 
 seasons of solid thought and reflection succeed, 
 bearing the fruits of real wisdom and matured 
 experience. And an appeal can safely be made to 
 all who have any thing like a competent know^ledge
 
 XXVlll INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of the general literature of Germany and Prance, 
 that, amid much speculative inquiry of a question- 
 able kind, and not a little positively unsound and 
 injurious, there is still a very striking improvement 
 manifested in every branch of general informa- 
 sion in these countries within the last century, 
 in which abstract reasoning is especially required, 
 and where the human mind is called forth to ex- 
 ercise all its higher powers of rationalistic dex- 
 terity. And this advancement in the loftier walks 
 of literature and science, may be fairly attributed 
 to the impetus given to the general intellect, by 
 the ardent study of the principles of mental phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 Mental studies have not been much cultivated 
 in Great Britain for the last three quarters of a 
 century. In Scotland, however, they have main- 
 tained a respectable footing ; and almost all per- 
 sons intended for the church, the bar, or public 
 offices of any description, make it a point to go 
 through a regular course of study in metaphysical 
 science. In England it is otherwise. Here it can 
 be scarcely said to form any portion of acade- 
 mical instruction. This may be attributed to 
 many causes. The preponderance of mechanical 
 and commercial pursuits among ns, naturally in- 
 disposes the great masses of even intelligent and 
 reflecting people to view speculative or purely in- 
 tellectual investigations with a friendly and en- 
 couraging eye. What is material, palpable, and 
 immediately profitable, becomes the grand and 
 engrossing object of interest. The external sources
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXIX 
 
 of enjoyment and happiness prevail over the men- 
 tal or spiritual ; and this sentiment pervades 
 the whole mass of the people, impartini^; to 
 the national mind a strong material tendency. 
 Again, those who, from inclination and their 
 position in society, were fitted to take a leading 
 part in the discussion and propagation of the prin- 
 ciples of mental philosophy, have for more than 
 half a century entertained doubts as to its benefits, 
 chiefly from the circumstance that the mystical 
 and idealistic notions so rankly prevalent in some 
 parts of the continent, might be possibly trans- 
 planted into England, and corrupt the mind of the 
 nation, and withdraw it from those important ob- 
 jects on which it ought invariably to rest. That 
 there is something plausible in these apprehensions, 
 must be conceded. But a little further inquiry into 
 the nature of all speculative doctrines, and into 
 the modes and degrees in which they influence 
 the current thought of a people, would cer- 
 tainly have the effect of greatly mitigating, if it 
 did not entirely remove, any such anticipated 
 sources of danger. For how stands the real 
 position of the question ? There is no stopping, 
 successfully, the progress of inquiry of a whole na- 
 tion ; if you close any particular avenue of thought, 
 another must be opened in its stead. It becomes, 
 therefore, purely a question as to the choice of 
 evils. If we have eschewed the dangers from 
 mystical and idealistic theories, we have un- 
 questionably encouraged the growth of a cold and 
 lifeless materialism, which operates, in a thousand
 
 XXX INTRODUCTION. 
 
 unperceived modes, to banish all lofty moral and 
 religious feelings from the minds of men. By an 
 undue encouragement of physical science, with a 
 view to make it supply the whole of the mental 
 wants of the nation, we insensibly, though power- 
 fully, and from the very nature of things, throw 
 the mind of man entirely upon a species of know- 
 ledge calculated, when it fully and exclusively 
 engrosses his affections and energies, to limit the 
 powers of his intellect, and to strip them of their 
 most ennobling and glorious attril^utes. By con- 
 sequently dwelling on material phenomena, and 
 making mere secondary causes objects of the mind's 
 attention, we gradually descend from the lofty and 
 improving regions of thought, and consider the 
 Supreme Being, and all the wonders of intellec- 
 tual nature, as only results and modifications of 
 tlie visible things around us. This is neither a 
 natural nor advantageous mode of procedure. The 
 practical and the theoretical should invariably bo 
 conjoined in the intellectual culture of all men ; 
 inasmuch as this is the only mode which nature has 
 appointed for steadily preserving a hold on their 
 affections, and preventing them from lapsing into 
 any irremediable state of apathetic indifference, or 
 sordid, unqualified selfishness. 
 
 When we come to look narrowly at the influence 
 of physical science on tlie minds of the masses of 
 the people, we are struck with its limited range, 
 and its cold and evanescent impressions. The laws 
 of the material world seldom occupy more than a
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXxi 
 
 passing moment's reflection; and the improve- 
 ments which mechanical science may bring to tl\e 
 workman's fire-side, he accepts and uses as a 
 mere matter of course, but never makes them 
 anxious objects of his thoughts or contemplations. 
 He is under an almost instinctive conviction, that 
 it is an affair which does not particularly concern 
 him. And the same thing is true of every other 
 class of society. The elements of thought and 
 reflection are of another cast. They relate to other 
 objects apart from the laws and qualities of mate- 
 rial bodies. Does the intelligent mechanic dwell 
 any length of time upon the principles of his art ; 
 upon the formulas of the screw, the lever, or the 
 inclined plane ? Docs he make them the con- 
 stant objects of his thought and solicitude ? By no 
 means. His mind is elsewhere. He lives with 
 his wife, his family, his relations, his countrymen ; 
 and, it is hoped, with his God. It is the l)onds, 
 the connections, the sympathies, the feelings, the 
 hopes, the fears, the cares, and anxieties, which 
 arise out of the relationship he stands in as a 
 son, a parent, a member of society, and an immor- 
 tal spirit, which fill the measure of his thoughts, 
 and give life and interest to his existence. What 
 a slender hold have all material agents upon him ? 
 What to him the number or nature of the laws 
 which regulate their movements ; the great law of 
 gravitation, or the atomic theory of chemical 
 affinities ? Scarcely any thing. They touch but 
 very lightly indeed the vital and stirring principles
 
 XXXU INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of his being. They are not the staple articles of 
 his intellectual sustenance and strength. The 
 social, the moral, the political, the domestic ties 
 of life, are the objects of his constant interest and 
 unceasing solicitude. He rests upon intellectual 
 and moral manifestations ; and always allows the 
 phenomena of the material world, numerous and 
 wonderful though they be, to hang loosely about 
 him, and never for a moment suffers them to be 
 placed in competition with the claims, obligations, 
 and duties of humanity. 
 
 It is not the natural philosopher ; it is not the 
 Newtons, the Laplaces, the Davys, however vene- 
 rable their names may in the abstract be, who most 
 excite the sympathies of mankind, and engross 
 their undivided attention. These are not the house- 
 hold gods which universal humanity sympathe- 
 tically worships. It is men who develop the prin- 
 ciples of mind ; who make human nature their 
 study ; who unfold the latent thoughts, purposes, 
 and principles of human feeling and action ; who 
 distinguish themselves as lawgivers, statesmen, 
 historians, theologians, poets, painters, and writers 
 on the every-day movements and phases of human 
 life. These find kindred spirits in all ages and 
 countries ; and enjoy a reputation and fame, 
 founded on infinitely more noble and interesting 
 objects, than those on which rest the cold and 
 formal approbations conferred on the physical 
 philosopher, or the zealous disciple of positive 
 science.
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXlll 
 
 "VVe contend, therefore, that the decided pre- 
 dilection for physical science manifested in Eng- 
 land, and for the rules and principles of reasoning 
 necessarily involved in and derived from it, is not 
 grounded upon an enlarged conception of the na- 
 ture and purposes of human knowledge, nor of the 
 advantages to be realised by the national mind 
 from its extended cultivation. We readily admit, 
 as a true and general maxim, that all knowledge 
 is more or less improving ; but it by no means 
 follows that when we unduly confine the public 
 mind within certain prescribed limits, and only 
 call into exercise one set or class of its faculties or 
 powers, we are doing our best to advance the 
 cause of popular instruction, and to elevate the 
 sentiments of the nation to their loftiest point of 
 general improvement. On the contrary, we liumbly 
 conceive that we are, by sketching out and ado[)t- 
 ing such a narrow and contracted system, milita- 
 ting against one of the plainest and most impera- 
 tive dictates or laws of our nature ; and if we ol)- 
 stinately persist in pursuing such a course, we 
 must fully expect to reap those bitter fruits 
 which are the inevitable result of violating one of 
 the estabKshed canons of nature's decrees. To 
 effect the intellectual refinement of a people, there 
 must be a judicious combination of all the different 
 elements of knowledge and thought ; and among 
 the chief and most influential of these, is the sci- 
 ence of human nature. 
 
 It must not, however, be inferred from these 
 remarks, that, in order to comprehend other 
 
 c
 
 XXxiv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 branches of knowledge and science, it is absolutely 
 requisite that we should be intimately acquainted 
 with mental philosophy, and be able to trace its his- 
 tory with accuracyand minuteness. In the pursuitof 
 information we are frequently obliged to take many 
 principles for granted, without being able to prove 
 their truth. All that we contend for is, that the 
 science of mind is more or less a necessary ingre- 
 dient in all human investigations, and that we 
 cannot hope to take a conspicuous part in any 
 department of general knowledge, without either 
 tacitly or experimentally adopting many of the 
 most essential axioms on which the fundamental 
 movements of the intellect depend. The active 
 principles of intelligence must be either theore- 
 tically or practically recognised and understood, 
 before we can successfully apply them to any 
 purpose whatever. 
 
 Nosystem of education can be considered more mea- 
 gre and imperfect, than that which entirely excludes 
 the philosophy of mind from its range of inquiry. 
 One of the chief benefits of instruction is entirely 
 lost ; that which enables us to cultivate both the 
 active and reasoning powers of the mind, and to 
 strengthen and mature them to that degree of 
 excellence which is indispensably requisite to 
 secure us against adopting the most erroneous 
 opinions, and the most glaring and palpal)le 
 absurdities. 
 
 One of the most powerful causes, perhaps, which 
 have operated to clieck the general cultivation of 
 speculative philosophy among a certain class of in-
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXV 
 
 telligent people, not only in England but in other 
 countries, is the conception that its history pre- 
 sents nothing but a wild chaos of abstruse systems, 
 of conflicting opinions, and unshapely chimeras ; 
 the natural tendency of which is to lead men into 
 error, to fill their minds with shadows and de- 
 lusions, and to excite false hopes and expectations, 
 l^his is the popular accusation brought against the 
 philosophy of mind, and on which rest the apathy 
 and scepticism commonly felt and expressed as to its 
 nature and benefits. But a moment's calm reflection 
 will immediately dissipate this rash conclusion and 
 vulgar prejudice. That there are various and con- 
 flicting opinions relative to some of the funda- 
 mental principles of the science, and to their in- 
 fluence upon, and applicability to, other branches 
 of human investigation, is an indisputable truth ; 
 but this admission does not compromise the va- 
 lidity and importance of mind, considered as an 
 independent and legitimate branch of philosophical 
 inquiry. We find the same spirit of disputation 
 and contention prevailing among those who culti- 
 vate every kind of knowledge. The abstract prin- 
 ciples on which they all rest, are more or less 
 matters of discussion, and are subjected to a va 
 riety of judgments and opinions. But this state 
 of things proves nothing. It is the very nature, 
 essence, and province of knowledge, to separate the 
 true from the false, the hypothetical and con- 
 jectural from the certain and conclusive, the good 
 from the bad, and the expedient from the inexpe- 
 
 c2
 
 XXXvi TNTRODUCTIOX. 
 
 dient. How great is the importance of morality 
 both to individuals and to whole nations ; it is the 
 very life blood of their social and confederated 
 existence. But where shall we find a theory of 
 morality Avhich is not open to a difference of opi- 
 nion, or which is fully adequate to account for all 
 the moral manifestations, rules, principles, obliga- 
 tions, and ideas of merit and demerit, which dis- 
 play themselves in the wide arena of the moral 
 universe ? Again, the science of politics is of the 
 highest possible interest to man ; but to what con- 
 tentions, varieties of sentiment and opinion, and 
 bitter conflicts, does it not give rise ? Where is the 
 writer who has ever penned a political system or 
 theory which has been universally, or even ge- 
 nerally, received ? Why the very abstract maxims 
 or principles on which all societies of men rest, are 
 at the present moment, in spite of all the learning 
 and scientific investigations of three thousand 
 years, speculative objects of the most opposite and 
 conflicting nature, among the able and intelligent 
 legislative philosophers and politicians of all coun- 
 tries. If, again, we cast an eye to religion, we 
 find the primary principles of both natural and re- 
 vealed theology matters of every-day and eager 
 discussion, and susceptible of being viewed through 
 various mediums ; and the same is applicable to 
 legal science. Where shall we find a greater dis- 
 similarity of judgment than that to which the laws 
 and customs of various people give rise ? Nay, 
 we shall advance a step further, and maintain 
 that even physical science, which prides itself on
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXVll 
 
 its 2)osUive results, is not removed beyond the pale 
 of differences of opinion, and conflicting judgments, 
 relative to many of its theories, principles, and 
 conclusions. Now, taking all these matters into 
 consideration, would a man act wisely or con- 
 sistently, were he to conclude, that, because in 
 morals, politics, religion, law, and physical science, 
 we find opposite theories and conflicting judg- 
 ments supported by those who cultivate these 
 respective departments of knowledge, he is war- 
 ranted in afiirming that they are all delusions, and 
 that there is not the slightest substratum of truth 
 or logical validity for them to rest upon ? Certainly 
 not. A man who should entertain an opinion of 
 this sort, and endeavour to act upon it, would be 
 deemed unfit to be reasoned with on any subject 
 whatever. 
 
 What we claim therefore from ordinary candour 
 and consistency is, that mental science be placed 
 upon the same footing as other branches of know- 
 ledge. That there are differences of opinion about 
 its fundamental truths, we readily admit ; but they 
 are neither greater in number, nor more discordant 
 in their nature, than what appertain to almost 
 every other topic of philosophical investigation. 
 And it certainly appears the height of incon- 
 sistency for us to assume that there is no truth 
 whatever in that particular science the principles 
 of which are absolutely necessary to ascertain and 
 to adjudge the amount and nature of truth to be 
 found in every other subject. Of all perverse 
 modes of reasoning, this must appear to be the
 
 XXXVlll INTllODUCTION. 
 
 most self-contradictory and unsatisfactory to every 
 well-regulated and candid mind. 
 
 As it is with mental science alone that we have 
 immediately to do, we shall just briefly notice some 
 of those general maxims or elementary principles, 
 which seem to have been either logically demon- 
 strated or tacitly assumed, in almost every system 
 of speculation alluded to in this history of philo- 
 sophy. A voluminous record of this kind, extend- 
 ing over more than two thousand years, offers, at 
 first sight, a somewhat perplexing aspect to even 
 scientific minds ; but a little examination into the 
 matter, and an ordinary degree of exercise of the 
 power of generalization, will soon enable the intel- 
 ligent and attentive reader to detect, amid the 
 crowd of objects which present themselves, some 
 distinctive land-marks which will serve to lead him 
 out of the apparent labyrinth of endless specula- 
 tion, and impart to his mind some steadiness of 
 jiurpose. The diversity of systems and theories is, 
 strictly speaking, more in appearance than in 
 reality ; for we often find, that though their ex- 
 ternal dress be very diversified, yet when we look 
 narrowly at them, we soon recognise an affinity or 
 sameness among the principles which form the 
 nucleus of a great variety of speculative fabrics. 
 The importance of these varied illustrations of the 
 same fundamental positions, cannot, on many 
 occasions, be too highly estimated ; but still it is 
 always valuable to observe the philosophic rule of 
 looking at the elementary propositions on which 
 different views of the human mind profess to rest.
 
 INTRODUCTION. XXXIX 
 
 It is this susceptibility of the principles of mental 
 science to be viewed throug-h various mediums, 
 and to be Illustrated by materials drawn even 
 from opposite quarters, that imparts so much real 
 interest to tliis branch of knowledge, and makes 
 it such a necessary and useful instrument for the 
 testing of truths in other departments of human 
 inquiry. 
 
 And here it may be remarked, that the illustra- 
 tions of principles connected with the human 
 mind in all its grand aspects and divisions, stand 
 so prominently distinct, — possess such an indivi- 
 duality of character, in their susceptil)ility of being 
 varied, to an almost infinite extent, in every thing 
 belonging to the mere physical investigations of 
 the universe, — that we perceive at a glance the ra- 
 dical distinction between the truths of natural phi- 
 losophy and those of human nature. A treatise 
 on Astronomv, Ilvdrostatics, or Chemistrv, is 
 always the same, with the exception of recent dis- 
 coveries, which are simply stated as matters of 
 fact, and are linked to the general mass already 
 accumulated. Writers in any of these depart- 
 ments of knowledge, follow each other in a beaten 
 track, and have no latitude whatever for invention. 
 There is no want of inclination to impart novelty 
 and interest to physical science ; but its cultivators 
 have no room to effect any such thing. They travel 
 in a path bounded by a lofty wall on each side, 
 which shut out nine-tenths of nature from their 
 view ; and, consequently, they have liberty neither 
 to turn to the right hand nor to the left. But
 
 xl INTRODUCTION. 
 
 wliat different circumstances accompany the illus- 
 trations of truths springing' out of the deep re- 
 cesses of the human lieart and understanding. 
 How susceptible are they of infinite variation, and 
 of becoming inexhaustible sources of interest. 
 Conviction and mental pleasure rush at once into 
 the soul from a thousand channels ; and yet the 
 perfect identity between the leading principles of 
 human thought and action is never weakened or 
 destroyed. The grand outlines of humanity are 
 always visible. The truths of mind, of religion, 
 of morals, of politics, of matters of intellectual 
 taste, of the every- day movements of life, passion, 
 and desire, are each of them the never-failing 
 fountains from which the streams of human wis- 
 dom and genius perennially flow, to gladden and 
 cheer the heart of man, and to impart to him that 
 necessary mental sustenance, the ceaseless cravings 
 for which constitute one of the striking character- 
 istics of his being. The scientific classifications of 
 the natural philosopher die almost the moment 
 they are born ; but not so the speculations of the 
 mental philosopher, the moralist, the divine, the 
 dramatic writer, or the poet ; these enjoy a per- 
 petual youth, and time itself stamps upon their 
 respective eflPusions the seal of immortality. 
 
 We may now observe, in the first place, that one 
 of the leading positions which seem to be esta- 
 blished by the historical statements and details of 
 philosophy in all countries and ages, is, that mind 
 and matter are two separate and distinct things. 
 The whole current of speculation scarcely fur-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xli 
 
 nishes us Avitli any thiug approaching to a single 
 comjilete theory, which in all its aspects, and in 
 all its logical deductions, points to an opposite 
 principle. The mind of man, in every state of ex- 
 istence of which we have any authentic record, has 
 always been struggling to give utterance to this 
 fundamental truth, or manifestation of its inward 
 consciousness. It assumes, it is true, a variety of 
 appearances, but it constantly retains the unity of 
 its character intact. Erom the banks of the 
 Thames to the banks of the Ganges ; from the 
 first mutterino's of science in the East, to the 
 finished philosophical productions of the present 
 hour ; this truth has never ceased its influence over 
 the minds of countless millions of our race, who 
 have passed through life under external circum- 
 stances and with speculative theories infinitely 
 varied. Here there is a solemn unity of universal 
 assent, which no hardihood of assertion can deny, 
 nor captious sophistry gainsay. 
 
 In the second place, it may be observed, that we 
 clearly perceive, from the whole range of ancient 
 philosophy, that the religious spirit was more or less 
 incorporated Avith it ; that man was considered as 
 of a heavenly origin, and as possessing a more refined 
 and elevated nature than the mere animals around 
 him. It was also clearly taught, from the same 
 authority, that all investigations into the structure 
 of his intellect, could only be successfidly pro- 
 secuted by constantly keeping in view this double 
 relationship or dependence. Whenever, therefore, 
 we set out in our philosophical inquiries into the
 
 Xlii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 nature of mental phenomena upon an opposite 
 tack, and contemplate man with the sole view of 
 referring them to the same laws, and subjecting 
 them to the same logical ordeal, which govern and 
 influence other creatures around us, we do, in fact, 
 not only run counter to the universal experience 
 and testimony of mankind, most indisputably and 
 unequivocally expressed ; but we also find that all 
 doctrines, founded on such a mode of investigation, 
 are not only lamentably defective in point of 
 logical merit, but, when reduced to practice, bear 
 fruits inimical to the moral and intellectual im- 
 provement and well-being of man. 
 
 And do we not witness the verification of this 
 truth in every stage of the history of speculative 
 principles ? The whole course of human progress, 
 since the first dawn of letters, bears testimony to 
 the fact, that mankind have received incalcuable be- 
 nefits from the belief in the existence of the theolo- 
 gical principle. Man is thus viewed as fitted for a 
 higher destiny than other terrestrial and animated 
 beings ; and we feel assured also, that in proportion 
 as he keeps this opinion steadily before him in all his 
 philosophical researches, the universe around him 
 and the general course of events inspire him with 
 a firm persuasion that he is endowed with faculties 
 and powers expressly fitted for exercise, and to be 
 eminently productive of benefit to mankind, and 
 glory to the Creator of his existence. This con- 
 clusion does not rest upon a mere theoretical con- 
 jecture ; it is susceptible of incontrovertible de- 
 monstration, from the records of history, as well as
 
 iNTiiODUCTioN. xliii 
 
 from the overpowering feelings and convictions of 
 the human heart. 
 
 Every form which the great theological principle 
 assumes in the history of philosophy, rests upon 
 the position of mind, connected with a creative and 
 y over ning power. The notions of mental operations, 
 and those of a Deity, are purely elemental, and 
 seem to be co-existent in the inward consciousness 
 of man. Whether this primary truth can be fully 
 demonstrated, either psychologically or ontologi- 
 cally, we need not stop here to determine ; but 
 certain it is, that the history of men's opinions 
 strikingly proves that it lies at the root of every 
 form of speculation, and seems to be one of those 
 necessary and fundamental axioms, without which 
 all reasoning is nugatory, all mental conviction 
 impossible, and human life a dream. 
 
 And we further feel confident, that a candid and 
 accurate consideration of theories of philosophy 
 will lead the mind to perceive, that there is nothing 
 in the general constitution of them hostile to the 
 leading features and doctrines of the Christian sys- 
 tem. In fact, there exists a surprising harmony 
 between all speculative theories which have any 
 degree of truth or solidity in them, and the ele- 
 mentary principles of revealed theology ; and phi- 
 losophic truth and theological truth will be found, 
 in almost all cases, to act and re-act on each other, 
 to the mutual elucidation and advantage of both. 
 What may be termed the metaphysics of the Bible, 
 if such an expression may be allowed, are in strict 
 keeping with every thing which has been ob-
 
 Xliv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 served and recorded, by the universal assent of 
 mankind, relative to intellectual plienomena. 
 There is no radical or constitutional discrepancy 
 between them. The authoritative declarations of 
 Scripture are intelligible only because they rest 
 on the general perceptions and judgments of men; 
 and the high purposes and hopes with which Reve- 
 lation is conversant, are, in every case, powerfully 
 and universally responded to by the most charac- 
 teristic feelings and impulses of human nature. 
 
 The religious principle is, therefore, a necessary 
 and wholesome ingredient in every system of 
 speculative thought or inquiry. Nothing is in- 
 telligible without it. It speaks with a thousand 
 tongues ; and like the universal ether, to which it 
 has often been made to claim affinity, pervades all 
 nature, and is ever present to the mind of man. 
 Its manifestations are sometimes faintly traceable 
 in his mental physiology, and even oftimes they 
 become the sport of the wildest vagaries and most 
 fantastical caprice ; but we think not, we act not, 
 without their co-operation, or beyond the pale of 
 their influence. 
 
 In the third place, the existence and certainty of a 
 number of a priori mental principles or conceptions, 
 are decidedly recognised in every system of philoso- 
 phy of which there are any full or regularly classified 
 details. These original ideas become the life-spring 
 of thought, and the steady guides of the under- 
 standmg. They depend upon nothing capricious, 
 variable, evanescent, or transitory ; they form the 
 primitive foundations of all human observation,
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlv 
 
 experience, and reasoning. From whence they are 
 derived, and how regulated and guided, it is not 
 our province here to inquire ; it is sufficient to state 
 that there will not be found, in all the historical 
 sketches of systems of which we have any account, 
 a single instance where their existence is not tacitly 
 or expressly acknowledged. 
 
 In the fourth place, we shall find, from an 
 accurate study of history, that philosopliy is of a 
 progressive character. Though its principles are 
 abstract, and of ana piHori description, yet their full 
 and complete development rests with time. We 
 find this depicted on the lineaments of philosophi- 
 cal speculation, from the remotest ages to the present 
 hour. Unquestionably there have been very great 
 vicissitudes in the progress of mental knowledge. 
 Sometimes it would seem to have been almost sta- 
 tionary ; then to have made a sudden bound in a 
 forward direction ; and again to lia^e relapsed into 
 a state of quietude and apatliy. But still, on the 
 whole, a decided and permanent progress was in- 
 variably secured. This onward course was not, 
 however, characterised by the discovery and de- 
 velopment of neto truths or principles of human 
 nature, but in illustrating the individual 
 operations of those already known, and in more 
 accurately tracing out their respective bearings on 
 other important and collateral branches of human 
 investigation. There is not, in fact, a principle of 
 the human mind in our most approved modern 
 treatises on its nature and faculties, which may not 
 be found among the speculations of the Grecian 
 philosophers : but still we have greatly the ad-
 
 Xlvi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 vantage over the ancients, in the copiousness of 
 illustrations ; the nicer processes of analytical and 
 deductive reasoning ; in displaying the power and 
 influence ofmental science over other subjects; and, 
 above all, in those refined yet solid distinctions, 
 which we can now make on almost every topic 
 connected with man, as a thinking, moral, religious, 
 and social being. It is this expansiveness or am- 
 plification of the primary elements of mind, which 
 constitutes the progressive character of philoso- 
 phical speculations on its powers or faculties ; 
 inasmuch as it more completely opens out to our 
 view the whole arcana of thought, in many of those 
 sudden and rapid operations which were inade- 
 quately comprehended by antiquity, and ap- 
 peared in the eyes of some of the ancient sages 
 as partaking of the character of individual and 
 instinctive imj)ulses. 
 
 Besides this, there is a progressive character 
 stamped upon every thing we behold. The Avhole 
 economy of human nature proclaims it. We 
 instinctively follow it from the cradle to the grave. 
 There is no human being without a regularly 
 formed system of speculative or theoretical know- 
 ledge, relative to his own nature and to that of the 
 beings around him, however crude or limited it 
 may be ; and when we come to analyse this theory, 
 we find it made up of varied materials, some 
 illustrative of this principle, and some of that. 
 Order, method, selection, revisal, are conspicuous 
 everywhere; and the sum total of an ordinary 
 man's views of himself, and of human life generally, 
 is a perfect epitome of the more elaborate and sja-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xlvii 
 
 tematic treatises of the philosopher. We recognise 
 in both the progressive character of the mind ; one 
 truth is made predominant here, and another 
 there ; one subject is considered in this light, and 
 another in that ; weeding out the errors of yester- 
 day by the fuller experience of to-day ; and, in fact, 
 invariably labouring towards a state of ideal har- 
 mony and perfection, and always making a decided 
 step towards its attainment. This is the condition 
 of humanity, and the whole body of human know- 
 ledge, and particularly mental philosophy, is 
 marvellously confirmatory of the fact. 
 
 Indeed, to plead for the eclectic, or progressive, 
 philosophy, is but a very trite and common-place 
 affair; since it is nothing more nor less than to 
 argue for that wholesome equilibrium among 
 the leading branches of man's knowledge and 
 springs of action, which all ages of the world, and 
 all sects of philosophers, have more or less recog- 
 nised as one of the indispensable conditions of 
 human thought, power, and happiness. To be 
 convinced of the utility of this, we have only to 
 conceive for a moment, man, as now constituted, 
 under the exclusive control of any one of the three 
 grand divisions of human investigation, nature, 
 mind, and God. Were he merely incessantly look- 
 ing at the material changes and operations of things 
 around him, he would be nothing more than a mere 
 statue or vegetable excrescence ; he might be said 
 to exist, but not to live. Again, were men entirely 
 engrossed by the feelings and movements of their 
 minds, and to take no heed of external things,
 
 Xlviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 they could liot exist a single day. And, finally, 
 were we continually making the nature, attril)utes, 
 and mode of government of the Deity, exclusive 
 objects of our perpetual contemplation, we should 
 only he attempting to do what is impossible. So 
 that every thing depends upon a due and propor- 
 tional sul3ordination of one thing to another ; and 
 this is the reason why the progressive character is 
 imposed upon human knowledge, in order that it 
 might be reared up into an immense and splendid 
 temple, by the aggregate and universal thought of 
 mankind. 
 
 Let us just cast a glance over the speculative 
 opinions of mankind, and we shall instantly 
 perceive the progressive character of mental 
 philosophy. In Greece there was a system of 
 great intellectual excellence, embracing within 
 its range nearly all the primary principles of a 
 comprehensive and matured body of thought. 
 These were discussed by the Greeks in a manner 
 and with a tact peculiarly their own ; but towards 
 the latter years of their political glory and inde- 
 pendence, their speculations seemed to have been 
 nearly worn out, and to have become decidedly 
 tame and insipid. The Christian dispensation 
 gave new life to human speculation. The Greek 
 philosophybecame amalgamated with it ; and novel 
 and highly interesting philosophical combinations 
 were the result. New light was thrown on a thou- 
 sand important questions connected with the na- 
 ture of man, with which the Greek mind was unable 
 to grapple alone. The philosophy of the Chris-
 
 INTRODUCTION. xllX 
 
 tian Fatliers was followed by that of the School- 
 men ; and, as far as the science of human nature 
 was concerned, there was another step gained in a 
 forward direction, Por though we are apt to talk 
 glibly, and with no small degree of self-compla- 
 cency, of the dark ages ; yet no one who is even 
 tolerably acquainted with the nature and history 
 of the philosophy of this period, can be ignorant 
 that, independently of mere abstract investigations 
 on mind, and of the principles of doctrinal theo- 
 logy, all the most important laws and institutions 
 of European society were dug out of the mines of 
 this ponderous and inexhaustible mass of human 
 speculation. And we need scarcely add, that since 
 the days of the Scholastic inquiries, we have made 
 considerable progress, particularly in all our phi- 
 losophical methods of investigation and reasoning, 
 in shewing the mental dependencies, bearings, and 
 relationships which subsist among all branches of 
 knowledge ; and in what way, and to what degree, 
 they can be advantageously cultivated and applied. 
 It must be interesting to all cultivators of the 
 science of intellect to have some general idea of 
 the present state of speculation, both at home and 
 abroad ; and to observe those philosophical ten- 
 dencies which the mental investigations of parti- 
 cular countries decidedly manifest. There never 
 was, however, a period in the history of mankind, 
 when it was more difficult to predict, with any 
 thing approaching to certainty or probability, the 
 turn which the speculative ideas of nations may 
 
 d
 
 1 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 take, than at the present moment.* We see men's 
 minds in every direction moved and agitated in a 
 remarkable manner. The first principles of all 
 human knowledge are called in question, and sub- 
 jected to the most rigid logical ordeal. What was 
 mere theory, thrown with off-hand indifference 
 upon the surface of intellectual society but a few 
 years ago, is now brought upon the arena of prac- 
 tical life, and is attempted to be made the ground- 
 work of sweeping legislative enactments and social 
 innovations. The horizon of thought seems dark, 
 overcharged, and threatening; and the prophetic 
 power of the most comprehensive and penetrating 
 sagacity is almost entirely paralyzed. At such 
 a moment we instinctively fall back upon the 
 eternal law of progressive improvement, and dwell 
 upon the anticipations derived from a species of opti- 
 mism, more or less vigorous in every human breast, 
 that '* all things are for the best." Hopeless despair 
 is never a justifiable sentiment either in nations or 
 individuals. On the contrary, we are called upon 
 to look at the cheering side of things, from many 
 weighty considerations. We therefore place un- 
 limited confidence in the imperishable nature of 
 mind. All its movements have for their grand 
 aim, the ultimate increase of man's real know- 
 ledge, and the promotion of his happiness. There 
 may be seasons of mental aberration ; of reckless 
 and discontented movements of the inner man ; 
 but these are but transitory, and last only for 
 
 * September, 1848.
 
 INTRODUCTION. U 
 
 a season. The intellectual apparatus of a nation 
 soon rights itself. The influence of error is 
 commonly prompt in its manifestations, and the 
 progress of truth slow. Pifty or a hundred years 
 are but as a hand's-breadth in the life of a whole 
 people ; and on this account we are called upon to 
 check impatience and cherish hope. In the men- 
 tal commotion of kingdoms, " the darkest hour is 
 nearest to the dawn;" and after a few convulsive 
 throes and struggles, a brighter era arises ; and 
 more refined, spiritual, and rational views occupy 
 the mind of the nation. 
 
 As we have already noticed, the philosophy of 
 mind has been assiduously cultivated in many 
 continental countries, within the last century. In 
 Germany this has been particularly the case. But 
 Germany is just one of those places where it is 
 extremely difficult to draw general conclusions 
 from the intellectual movements of its philo- 
 sophers. Though speculation has there a decidedly 
 national character, yet its details are so multifa- ftr 
 
 rious and incongruous, that anything like accurate 
 generalization becomes almost impossible; and 
 anticipations of its future progress and prospects 
 are difficult to realize. Philosophical inquirers have 
 there taken unusual directions; have penetrated 
 into every arcanum of the material and spiritual 
 world ; have by turns doubted all things and de- 
 fended all things; have moulded and theorised 
 every aspect or phase of human thought and life 
 into a thousand forms ; so that we have but a very 
 feeble guarantee indeed for the fulfilment of any 
 
 d2
 
 Hi INTRODUCTION. 
 
 prediction wliich may be hazarded ou the move- 
 ments of spirits so bold, ambitious, and versatile. 
 
 Looking, however, at the general features of 
 German speculation within the last thirty years, 
 we perceive a manifest change for the better. We 
 see common sense and reason more generally re- 
 cognised ; and a growing desire among all the 
 leading minds of the country to weed out of the 
 national philosophy whatever is wild, incompre- 
 hensible, unsound, and irrational. The nation has 
 become sick of speculation for the mere sake of 
 speculating, and of doubt for the mere sake of 
 doubting. Sober and thinking men sigh for 
 something solid and satisfying; something more 
 valuable than the fantastical absurdities of by-gone 
 times. Every year we witness a decided move- 
 ment towards a healthier state of things. The 
 waters are subsiding to their natural level, leaving 
 in every direction large portions of speculative 
 debris behind them. Spiritualism is gradually 
 becoming more material, and materialism more 
 spiritual ; so that the absurdities from the ex- 
 tremes of both sources of inquiry mil soon lie 
 obliterated l3y doctrines of a more intermediate and 
 reconcileable complexion. Idealism will be made 
 subservient to lofty and interesting purposes, and 
 will ultimately coerce empirical facts and principles 
 into wholesome and fruitful channels of thought 
 and action. On the other hand, the natural 
 tendency of pure spiritualism to degenerate into 
 rhapsodical and incomprehensible vagaries, will 
 receive a wholesome check by the power of deduc-
 
 INTRODUCTION. liii 
 
 tive reasoning and accurate observation. And 
 thus do we hope, that ere many years pass away, 
 sound and enlightened systems of mental philo- 
 sophy will be everywhere prevalent in the high 
 seats of intelligence throughout the whole of the 
 Germanic empire. 
 
 Perhaps we may take upon us to add, before 
 closing our observations on Germany, that the con- 
 flict in this country, at the present moment, lies 
 between a rational spiritualism and an absolute 
 and uncompromising materialism. The latter is 
 the last enemy which the spirit of reform has to 
 vanquish. The venerable and learned Baron Hum- 
 boldt leads the way in the empirical philosophy of 
 his country ; and we cannot but feel deep regret in 
 witnessing a long and arduous life spent in the 
 promotion of physical science, having nothing 
 better to cheer it, or to leave as a legacy to man- 
 kind, even at the grave's mouth, than a material 
 and primordial necessity, and a deep *' sense of 
 insecurity" in every philosophical system which 
 professes to maintain that there is any thing in 
 the universe save mere objective existences.* 
 Splendid and influential, however, as the Baron's 
 acquirements and reputation unquestionably are, 
 we have no apprehension of anything like a 
 general adoption of his opinions. They may cap- 
 tivate or dazzle the unreflecting and superficial for 
 a season, but they carry within themselves the 
 seeds of a mortal dissolution. No man, be his 
 spirit ever so " deeply mersed in matter," can 
 
 * !?ee lluniboklt's Cosmos, Londou, 1845.
 
 liv INTRODUCTION. 
 
 impress upon the minds of men, for any length of 
 time, the idea that the universe is a Godless uni- 
 verse. The bare attempt is a violent outrage on 
 one of the most powerful and overwhelming con- 
 victions of the human soul. 
 
 Looking now at Erance, we clearly perceive that 
 since the commencement of the present century, a 
 great change for the better has been effected in 
 the speculative philosophy of the country. Por 
 some years in the latter part of the last, and the 
 beginning of the present century, we find ultra- 
 materialism everywhere prevalent, and the philo- 
 sophical intellect of the nation sunk to a low ebb. 
 But in due course of time, the principles and 
 spirit of the Scotch philosophy began to gain 
 ground, and to shake and supplant tlie low and 
 grovelling views of the mechanical philosophers. 
 This was one important step gained in a right 
 direction. By slow degrees the idealism of Ger- 
 many came to the rescue, and greatly aided, under 
 the peculiar circumstances in which Prance was 
 placed, the good work of mental spirituality and 
 regeneration. Nor ought we to pass over, without 
 special notice, the great benefits derived from the 
 Paris translations of the Greek metaphysicians, 
 which have had a direct and powerful tendency to 
 induce the young and rising thinkers of Prance 
 to consult authorities on matters of abstract specu- 
 lation admirably calculated to elevate and imjirove 
 the general tone of academical studies, and guide 
 them into more refined, rational, and wholesome 
 channels.
 
 INTRODUCTION. Iv 
 
 In casting a retrospective eye on France for the 
 last forty years, to the time when the speculations 
 of Destutt-Tracy, Cahanis, and Volney constituted 
 the staple elements of the national thought, what 
 surprising strides she has made in mental inquiries. 
 How varied and discursive, intelligent and able, have 
 been the numerous publications which have issued 
 from her press. The philosophical disquisitions of 
 her able thinkers undoubtedly possess, like those of 
 Germanv, a distinctive and national character, and 
 have frequently been directed into questionable 
 channels ; yet the Ereuchman has never wandered 
 so far from real life, nor thrown around his lucu- 
 brations such a halo of mysticism, as his German 
 brethren. The Gaulic i)hilosopher has always been 
 the more rational and unpretending of the two. 
 And there is scarcely a modern French publication, 
 of any note whatever, on the human mind, and on 
 its various faculties and powers, which does not dis- 
 play great ability, and a sincere and anxious desire 
 to arrive at truth. The whole tenor of philosophical 
 investigation and criticism has been changed for 
 the better within these few years. Great truths 
 on religion, morals, mind, politics, and human 
 knowledge generally, have been discussed in a truly 
 enlightened spirit ; and many valuable additions 
 made to the common stock of sober and rational 
 discussion. Numerous verifications of this truth 
 might be adduced from her literature, and from 
 her social and religious institutions. And though 
 she be now under a cloud, there is no ground 
 for dejection or despair as to the future advance- 
 ment of the nation in mental philosophy, or the
 
 Ivi INTKODUCTION. 
 
 soundness of many of its leading j)i'i^^ipl^^* 
 Every thing betokens that she will steadily and 
 firmly retain the great truths she has so ably and 
 enthusiastically laboured to illustrate and pro- 
 mulgate; and gradually leave behind that old 
 leaven of materialism and folly, which the last 
 century bequeathed, and which has been prolific of 
 so many evils, both speculative and practical, to 
 her character and institutions as a great nation. 
 
 In Italy there is a bright and cheering prospect 
 that this first regenerator of speculative philosophy 
 in Europe will speedily occupy a conspicuous and 
 honorable position in mental science among other 
 continental countries. Within the last quarter of 
 a century the numerous publications which have 
 appeared in different states of the kingdom, are 
 characterised by an enlightened spirit, and by 
 great good sense and pliilosophical acumen. The 
 predominance of a state and influential theology 
 has, doubtless, given a formal and limited range 
 to her philosophy ; but still there is so much real 
 heart and pith in it, that it would betray a narrow 
 spirit indeed to refuse our hearty commendations 
 of its general merits. Speaking with some reser- 
 vations, the ordinary bent of ItaKan metaphysics 
 at the present moment is decidedly of an eclectic 
 and common- sense complexion. Ontology and 
 psychology go hand in hand ; and though a priori 
 truths of the mind are highly valued and uni- 
 versally recognised as necessary and important 
 elements of all reasoning, yet they are not placed 
 in opposition, to the actual exclusion of external 
 and sensational sources of knowledge. The leading
 
 INTllODUCTION. Ivii 
 
 Italian philosophers of the present day, among 
 whom we place Gioberti, Mamiani, and Tomaseo, 
 — now severally and actively engaged in achieving 
 the social reformation and political independence 
 of their country — are all influenced by lofty views 
 of the nature of philosophic truth, and deeply 
 convinced of its immense importance in regene- 
 rating the institutions and improving the intel- 
 lectual faculties of a nation, and in preserving it 
 from error and mischievous delusions. In no part 
 of the Euroj)ean continent do we find mental 
 speculations impressed with a more subdued, 
 sober, candid, and discriminating tone, and more 
 in accordance with the highest purposes and best 
 interests of man, than in the writings of the modern 
 cultivators of philosophy in this interesting and 
 intelligent country. 
 
 The progress of mental philosophy in Belgium 
 and Holland is at the present moment highly 
 satisfactory and encouraging. The deep thinkers 
 of these countries, especially the Belgian writers, 
 have more or less looked up to France as a monitor 
 and guide, without, however, making the least 
 compromise of their own intellectual independence. 
 Thesre has always been less philosophy of a mate- 
 rialistic tendency in the Netherlands than in 
 Prance ; and the present treatises on the human 
 mind are seldom tinged, in any deep degree, with 
 unsound or irreligious opinions in this part of the 
 continent. Although great liberty of discussion 
 is allowed and enjoyed, yet everything from the 
 philosophic press of the two kingdoms is charac- 
 terised by a sober and rational spii-it, becoming
 
 Iviii INTHODUCTION. 
 
 reflective and intelligent communities. At no 
 former period in the history of these European 
 states, was mental philosophy more assiduously 
 and profoundly cultivated than it is at the present 
 time ; and by philosophers too, such as Van 
 Meenen, Van Heusde, Van De Weyer, Gruyer, 
 Ubaghs, E/ciffenberg, Tiberghien, Quetelet, and 
 others, of vast literary attainments, and possessing 
 a most accurate and comprehensive acquaintance 
 with the whole speculative thinldng of Europe. 
 Everything from their pens bespeaks the innate 
 power to grapple with questions of the greatest 
 magnitude and complexity ; and they have all 
 besides manifested a strong desire to support and 
 defend the cause of truth generally, by a course of 
 discussion at once candid, enlightened, and for- 
 bearing. 
 
 In other northern nations, and in some of the 
 southern, with whose respective literature we are in 
 Great Britain but partially and imperfectly ac- 
 quainted, we see much to encourage hope as to the 
 future progress of the philosophy of mind. Every 
 year affords some additional proof of its more 
 general improvement and diffusion. In Sweden 
 and Denmark, works are regularly issuing fiM)m 
 the press which display an intimate knowledge of 
 speculative systems, and great powers of abstract 
 reasoning on topics connected with human nature. 
 Even Russia is gradually extending encourage- 
 ment and protection to subjects of speculation, 
 which a very few years since were not admitted 
 within the pale of her Universities. And the 
 same may be remarked of Spain and Portugal ;
 
 INTRODUCTION. lix 
 
 in both of which we perceive one bulwark after 
 another against enlightened philosophical discus- 
 sion slowly giving way, and the avenues to scien- 
 tific and reflective investigations becoming daily 
 less obstructed by narrow prejudices, intolerance, 
 and bigotry. 
 
 In the Western hemisphere, we find the active 
 spirits of the United States cultivating a know- 
 ledge of mental science in every direction. Their 
 continent has become a vast emporium for the 
 speculations of all the European kingdoms ; and 
 there is scarcely a work of any note published in 
 the Old World, on the science of human nature, 
 which does not speedily find its way here, and 
 which does not go tlirough a regular critical ordeal 
 in the chief periodicals of the country. AVhere 
 there is such a regular influx of novel opinions, it 
 becomes hazardous to venture on general con- 
 clusions as to the preponderance of particular me- 
 taphysical views and systems ; but we may afiirm, 
 without speaking dogmatically on the subject, that 
 within the last twenty years, there has been more 
 or less a visible increase in the spiritual notions of 
 mind throughout all the more enlightened and in- 
 tellectual portions of the States. In the Reviews 
 and Magazines of the country we see this change 
 daily verified ; and still more striking manifesta- 
 tions of it may be found in the general tone of the 
 lectures delivered on mental studies, in the several 
 chief places of academical instruction throughout 
 the whole Union. The theological spirit of the 
 nation is actively roused to a deep sense of the 
 utility and importance of metaphysical studies ;
 
 Ix INTllODUCTION, , 
 
 and seems resolutely bent on clearing them from 
 all the dross and mischievous elements which may 
 be more or less incorporated with them when newly 
 imported from every quarter of the world. 
 
 It has become almost a common remark, that 
 in Great Britain mental philosophy has been en- 
 tirely stationary for nearly the last half century. 
 There is unquestionably much truth in this ; but 
 there have been latent signs of life in the study, 
 of late years, which promise better things at no 
 very distant day. Several publications have made 
 their appearance which bespeak great ability and 
 knowledge ; and though they do not treat us Avith 
 elaborated systems, yet their general tendency is 
 on the side of improvement ; and in many instances 
 they are calculated to throw new and interesting- 
 light on several individual sections of the science 
 of universal mmd. The recent movements in 
 theological literature and speculation have had no 
 small degree of influence in imparting more 
 spiritual views to some English treatises on meta- 
 physical subjects. 
 
 It is therefore cheering to those who feel a 
 lively interest in such studies, and are deeply im- 
 pressed Avith their absolute utility and importance, 
 to witness so many indications of their progress 
 and extension, in every direction to which Ave can 
 direct the intellectual eye. We know that great 
 ideas are never lost ; and Ave consequently feel an 
 inward and firm conviction, that the advances 
 Avhich Ave are, in this age, effecting in the first of 
 aU branches of human knowledge, Avill never be 
 efi'aced by any future retrograde movements Avhat-
 
 INTRODUCTION. Ixi 
 
 ever, in the minds of individuals or of nations. 
 The whole progress of human society speaks loudly 
 against any such catastrophe. 
 
 But whatever the unreflecting and superficial 
 may think of mental philosophy, or of its future 
 destination, we are firmly impressed with the belief 
 that to those who are acquainted with its prin- 
 ciples, and imbued with its spirit, it cannot fail 
 to recommend itself, from the comprehensiveness 
 of its range, the lofty aim of its disquisitions, 
 and the firm and decided tone which it imparts to 
 tlie intellect. It greatly quickens the reflective 
 powers of man, and enables him to wield them 
 with ease and energy. It gives an ever-living 
 freshness to old truths, and reduces, by subtile and 
 mysterious agencies, the most discordant thoughts 
 and materials into a state of logical harmony, 
 beauty, and order. It has the universe for its 
 object — aU matter and all mind ; and its spirit is 
 a universal presence. It is as sublime, boundless, 
 and inexhaustible as the ocean. We can traverse by 
 its means the whole region of human knowledge ; 
 and no soil and no age is exempt from its pene- 
 trating glance. The science of mind is, from its 
 very nature and essence, universal and difi'usive. 
 Its ramifications and connections are infinite; 
 and these reveal to us the hidden and interesting 
 analogies subsisting among all topics of investiga- 
 tion, and shed a lustre over our path as we travel 
 from one great truth of human nature to another. 
 It exacts an intellectual tribute from every pro- 
 vince of inquiry ; and expends its treasures in
 
 Iviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 rearing a splendid temple, more colossal and du- 
 rable than tlie material universe itself. 
 
 The philosophy of man is the sublimest of stu- 
 dies, and its spirit is the most elevating and 
 transcendental of all the gifts of God. The over- 
 whelming grandeur of its themes — themes which 
 have "thoughts that wander through eternity" 
 for their object — fills the mind with holy and im- 
 proving contemplations, and removes it from all 
 that is tame, earthly, formal, and material. Its 
 speculations are the sacred vehicles of the most 
 important and vital truths ; and its reasonings 
 relate to "things which speak not of earth." 
 It deals with mighty passions, affections, and 
 thoughts which stretch into futurity ; which have 
 all mind and creative energy for their object ; and 
 which give expression and thrilling interest to 
 those lofty and refined aspirations which seek after 
 something more pure and consoling than the ordi- 
 nary movements and concerns of life aflTord. These 
 aspirations are the germs of the inward man, which 
 are bound up in the soul just as the living and 
 fructifying principle is incrusted in the seed. They 
 constitute the vivifying energy which makes all 
 things new; which moulds the combinations of 
 matter and mind into an endless variety of forms ; 
 and develops them, by virtue of new afiinities and 
 the immutable laws of intellect, into those splendid 
 and beautiful creations of philosophical thought, 
 which the mere matter-of-fact man can neither 
 grasp nor comprehend, and without which the 
 universe itself would be a chaos, and human life 
 an incomprehensible enigma.
 
 PllOM THE EARLIEST PEKIOD OP 
 
 MENTAL SPECULATION 
 
 TO THE COMMENCEMENT OP THE 
 
 SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.
 
 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 ETC. ETC. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ON THE HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT AND 
 
 MODERN. 
 
 It is not intended to give in this chapter any 
 thing lilve a lengtliened account of the numerous 
 Histories of Philosophy, hut only to bring before the 
 reader's attention a few of the principal of them, 
 with a view of fixing in his mind some of the lead- 
 ing periods of history when certain works were 
 published. It must also be premised, that what is 
 generally meant by Histories of Philosophy, is not 
 limited to liistories of mental philosophy alone, but 
 embraces morals, poUtics, rehgion, and even phy- 
 sical science. Metaphysics are, m all histories of 
 philosophy wliich have yet appeared, mixed up and 
 blended with other subjects. On this account, if a 
 person wishes to trace out for himself the history 
 of opinions relative to the human mind, he will have 
 to select them from amonj^st a vast varietv of other 
 topics, with which they are historically classed. 
 
 * B
 
 2 HISTOKIES OF PHILOSOPHY, 
 
 Three of the most distingiiished ancient histo- 
 rians of philosophy are Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. 
 Though not professed chroniclers of previons opi- 
 nions, yet their treasures are uncommonly valuable, 
 as frequent allusion is made, in unfolding their in- 
 di^ddual opinions, to the \dews and systems of other 
 speculative men who had preceded them, but of 
 whose labours we have little or no account direct 
 from themselves. Plato, in his dialogues, brings 
 contemporary writers on the stage, and paints their 
 characters and systems in his otmi way. Aristotle, 
 again, in lajdng down his own systems, furnishes 
 us with the individual systems of other metaphysi- 
 cians and philosophers. And Cicero, in his specu- 
 lative traditions, has handed down many opinions 
 exceedingly interesting to all speculative minds.* 
 
 Hippocrates was an eminent Greek physician. 
 He alludes to the great advantage of an accurate 
 knowledge of the human faculties, relative to the 
 history of opinions. Xenophon is well known as a 
 A'aluable historian of philosophic opinions ; and 
 Lucretius gives us an account of the metaphysical 
 ideas of Democritus and Epiciuais. "We have 
 the system of the Stoics expoimded by Seneca, and 
 the Sceptical Philosophy by Sextus Empiricus. 
 If Plutarch be the author of the book entitled De 
 Tlacitis Fhilosopliorimi, he has added to the useful 
 documents of ancient philosophy ; and to the book 
 of Galen, TJie Philosophical History^ we are equally 
 indebted. 
 
 * Gedike has collected together all the passages of Cicero relative to 
 Philosophy. Berhn, 17B2.
 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN. 3 
 
 Diofjenes Laertius is an historian of ffreat merit. 
 In his work, "^ Lives of the Philosophers," we have 
 many valuable extracts from the writings of the 
 ancients, and many interesting facts respecting 
 their lives and opinions. We find in several of 
 the early Pathers of the Church, some valua1)le 
 sketches of philosophical opinions and systems, par- 
 ticularly in Eusehius, St. Clement of Alexandria, 
 and Ejiiphanius. 
 
 In the fourth century, we have the " Lives of the 
 Philosophers and Sophists," by Eunapius, a general 
 writer and a physician. He is zealously attached to 
 the Eclectic philosophy, and displays great virulence 
 against the Christians of his day. A little after 
 liim we find John Stoba^us, who made large extracts 
 from the philosophy of the ancients. Both these 
 works are of great value to the historian.* 
 
 In the middle of the sixth century, Hesychius, a 
 grammarian of Alexandiia, composed an " Abridg- 
 ment of the lAves of Fhllosophers,'" arranged in 
 alphabetical order, f The work is cliiefly taken 
 from Diogenes Laertius. A long intellectual niglit, 
 of several centuries' duration, here intervenes, in 
 which nothing was accomplished in philosophical 
 history worthy of any especial notice. 
 
 An Englishman, of the name of Burley, in the 
 fifteenth century, published ^'Lices of the Philo- 
 sophers,'" and the book is amongst the early speci- 
 mens of printing in this country. In Italy, Pici- 
 nus, under the patronage of Cosmo de Medicis, and 
 
 * See an edition of Stobseus, by Ileeren. Gottingen, 1792. 
 
 t Ilesych. Milet. interpvete Iladriano Juno. Anvers, 1572. 8vo. 
 
 B 2
 
 4 HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Pouiponius, otherwise styled Peter Calabria, re- 
 vived a knowledge of the works of Plato and Aris- 
 totle with great eclat. After the partial revival of 
 learning in Europe, we have John Louis Yives, a 
 Spaniard by birth, but educated at Paris and Lou- 
 vain, who wrote a work " On the Origin of Sects, 
 and the Merits of Philosophers. ^^ Daniel Chry- 
 trius published his treatise, " A List of Philoso- 
 phers, and their princijml Sects, from Thales to 
 Cicero:'' nearly at the same time we have William 
 Morel's " Table of the order of Succession, Doc- 
 trines, and date of the Ancient Philosophers ;'' and 
 also, the " Chronological Library of Classical Phi- 
 losophers,'' by J. J. Pries. 
 
 It would prove tedious, as well as unprofitable, 
 to give an individual and detailed account, from 
 this period, of all the writings which contain an 
 account of philosophical opinions, down to our own 
 day. It will sutficiently answer all the ends we 
 have in view to furnish the reader with a bare 
 enumeration of works, of such a character and ex- 
 tent, as will prove amply useful for all ordinary 
 purposes of reference or consultation, both as to 
 the history of philosophy in general, and metaphy- 
 sics in particular. This we shall do in a note at 
 the end of this volume.* 
 
 * See Note A. at the end of this Volume.
 
 THE IONIC SCHOOL. 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE TOXIC SCHOOL. 
 
 The philosophy of Greece is full of interest to 
 every iiiquiring mind. It has peculiar claims upon 
 our attention ; for it exhibits the innate power of 
 the mind of man to grapple with those interesting 
 and abstruse questions which spring out of his 
 existence, and which force themselves upon his 
 notice by the powerful and irresistible law of his 
 nature. Among the Grecian sages we perceive 
 what has been accomplished by the speculative 
 faculties, unaided and undirected by the genius of 
 revelation ; and how far, and in what degree, the 
 errors and shortcomings of these philosophers 
 may be profitable to our 'instruction in more in- 
 telligent and enlightened times. Mutilated and 
 circumscribed as the Grecian philosophy has come 
 down to us, still we perceive that, take it as a 
 whole, it is a noble monument of thought ; and 
 that its powerful influence has been felt and 
 acknowledged in every stage of literature and 
 civilization. Amidst a vast deal that is crude and
 
 6 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 fantastical, we can still recognise truths of great 
 moment, and universal application ; and the man- 
 ner in which they are often developed and illus- 
 trated, affords the most indisputable evidence of 
 the superior powers of the Grecian understanding. 
 Many speculations might be hazarded on what 
 some modern writers have considered the origin of 
 the Greek philosophic spirit. But these would 
 inevitably lead us into too wide a field of discussion 
 and controversy for our present purpose. Suffice 
 it to remark, that there seem to have been three 
 leading influences operating on the general mass 
 of their speculative notions of mind, and which 
 communicated to them that peculiar feature by 
 which they are distinguished ; namely, a religious 
 feeKng or sentiment, a love of poetry, and those 
 habits and customs which arose out of their 
 popular civil and political institutions. 
 
 The religious feeKng or sentiment has an in- 
 separable affinity to the true philosophic spmt. 
 Wliatever attempts are made to form conceptions 
 of creative power, wisdom, and intelligence, dii'ectly 
 lead to the formation and exercise of all those 
 habits of mental culture and accurate analysis, on 
 wliich true philosophy rests. In every department 
 of Grecian speculation we find that mental in- 
 quiries were viewed through the medium of theolo- 
 gical principles ; and we also find that, in projoor- 
 tiou as rational notions of natural religion were 
 recognised, a corresponding degree of clearness and 
 rationality pervaded the popular stream of philoso- 
 phical discussion. This fact is illustrated in everv
 
 THE IONIC SCHOOL. 7 
 
 age of Grecian literature. "Wlienever low and 
 grovelling ideas prevailed on the nature of deity 
 and a presiding mind over the affairs of the Avorld, 
 in an exact proportion do we find the system of 
 mental speculation, fantastical, irrational, and 
 untenahle. And this arises from the established 
 laws of human thought. It is impossible to con- 
 ceive an opposite state of things. The same 
 powers which enable us to investigate the laws of 
 human intelligence, and develop their mutual rela- 
 tions and dependencies, are precisely those which, 
 when judiciously used, direct to all those primary 
 truths on which the religious feeHngs and senti- 
 ments of mankind rest. 
 
 The same thing may be remarked of the ima- 
 ginative or poetic feeling. Tliis is closely allied 
 to relii]^ion. There can be no true or sublime 
 poetry apart from theological sentiment, though 
 that sentiment may, occasionally, be grossly per- 
 verted. Poetry has also the human mind for 
 its domain and object. It treats of the ideal ; it 
 lives in the reahns of thought. AYhatever, there- 
 fore, is favourable to its successful cultivation, 
 must necessarily prove conducive to the exercise of 
 all those refined powers of analysis and inward 
 reflection, which have the mind for their common 
 centre of operation. The creative energies of the 
 poet directly lead to those abstract and sublime 
 topics, which belong exclusively to the province of 
 the metaphysician. 
 
 Social and political institutions have human 
 nature for their basis, and they likewise greatly
 
 8 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 influence mental disquisitions. Where freedom is 
 the ground-work of a commonwealth, and the 
 people have elevated conceptions of their rights 
 and duties, a sound mental philosophy will in- 
 variably be found to flourish. The whole history 
 of Greece is a striking confirmation of this position. 
 
 Thales. 64i0 b. c. 
 
 Thales was one of the most early sages of 
 Greece who turned their attention to mental pur- 
 suits. None of his discourses or writings have 
 been transmitted du-ectly from himself, but only 
 through the medium of Aristotle, Plutarch, and 
 Strabo. Thales, even in his early day, soon seized 
 upon a mental proposition which has subsequently, 
 in divers shapes and forms, filled the world of phi- 
 losophy with discussion; namely, the spontaneity 
 of the mind of man. Aristotle tells us that Thales 
 maintained that "the essence of the soul, or thinl^- 
 ing principle of man, was motion ; a spontaneous 
 motion, a self -moving power." Plutarch says that 
 Thales' definition of mind was "that it was a thing 
 possessing self-contained or perpetual motion." 
 Strabo mentions the same thing ; " that mind, ac- 
 cording to Thales, was that which contained self- 
 will or motion."* 
 
 This early fragment of metapyhsical philosophy 
 is extremely valual)le, inasmuch as it indicates, 
 that this distinguished man had deeply studied the 
 
 * Arist. De Anima. 1. Plut. De PI. Ph. 4. 2.
 
 THALES. 9 
 
 nature of liis own inincl ; and that the same dif- 
 ficulties presented themselves to him wliich have 
 in all subsequent ages been so perplexing to spe- 
 culators on the abstract natui'e of mind, and of its 
 various powers and faculties. . 
 
 Thales is considered one of what are called the 
 Seven Sages of Greece; philosophers who wandered 
 about from place to place, promulgating their doc- 
 trines and opinions. All accounts of him agree 
 that he was passionately fond of speculating into 
 the origin of all things, and that he founded the 
 theory, that loater was the primary principle of the 
 world. Plutarch states the philosopher's reasons 
 for tliis belief. Pirst, because natural seed, the 
 principle of all Kving things, is humid ; whence it 
 is highly probable that humidity or moistiu*e is 
 also the principle of all other things. Secondly, 
 because all kinds of plants are nourished by mois- 
 ture, T\^thout which they wither and decay. And, 
 thii'dlv, because fii'e, even the sun itself and the 
 stars, are nourished and supported by vapours pro- 
 ceeding from water, and consequently the Avhole 
 world consists of the same.* 
 
 There has been considerable dispute among the 
 learned, whether this principle of water was a 
 purely passive principle or agent, or an active and 
 creative one. It must ever be a doubtful point to 
 determine what Thales' real opinion was ; but it 
 does seem probable that the philosopher only con- 
 sidered his machinery of watery vapours to be the 
 
 * Arist. Met. 1. 1 . Diog. Laert. 1. 1. Plut. PI. Ph. 1. 1. c. 7.
 
 10 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 instrmnents in the liand of a living and active 
 power. Erom liis definition of what he considers 
 the nature or essence of the mind of man, akeady 
 staf ed, tliis probability is considerably strengthened. 
 The same reasons, and the same trains of thoua^it, 
 which brought him to the general conclusion, that 
 mind, and creative or active power, were identical, 
 would naturally force the conclusion on liis under- 
 standing that the world and every thing he beheld 
 in it were the result of an active and efficient 
 agent. This process of reasoning seems natural 
 and consistent. 
 
 Anaximander. 610 b. c. 
 
 This philosopher was a disciple and friend of 
 Thales, and embraced and extended the general 
 principles of his system. Anaximander cultivated 
 physical inqumes to a considerable extent, as well 
 as topics connected with human nature. It is said, 
 that he was the first philosopher of antiquity who 
 announced the famous axiom that " Out of notliing, 
 nothing can be made." It is impossible, however, 
 to ascertain in what sense he understood this gene- 
 ral proposition ; whether as a sunple physical fact, 
 or as a principle on which a comprehensive theory 
 of philosophical speculation could be established. 
 There can be no doubt but such an acute reasoner 
 as x^naximander would readily perceive that this 
 famous axiom of his cut, like a two-edged sword, 
 both wavs ; that it had necessarilv two distinct 
 meanings attached to it ; and that it might serve
 
 ANAXIMANDER. 11 
 
 both for rational and irrational speculations on the 
 nature and constitution of all mental and physical 
 phenomena. 
 
 Anaximander considered the infinite as the first 
 principle of things. All things are produced by, 
 and immerge into it. Of course there have been 
 many different notions of what is here meant by 
 infinite. Aristotle and Plutarch materiahze the 
 term, and make it stand for mcdter in general; 
 and the learned Cudworth coincides with this in- 
 terpretation. Others again think it highly pro- 
 bable that a guiding and intelligent principle was 
 still recognised by Anaximander, and that by infi- 
 nite was merely meant that seemingly endless and 
 concatenated series of phenomena, which a contem- 
 plation of the world every way naturally suggests 
 to most inquiring minds.* 
 
 The historian Hitter observes, that Anaximander 
 " is represented as arguing, that the primary sub- 
 stance must have been infinite to be all-sufficient 
 for the limitless variety of produced things with 
 which we are encompassed. Now, although Aris- 
 totle expressly characterises this infinite as a mix- 
 ture, we must not think of it as a mere multiplicity 
 of primary material elements ; for to the mind of 
 Anaximander it was Unity immortal and imperish- 
 able ; an ever-producing energy. This production 
 of individual thins^s he derived from an eternal 
 motion of the infinite y \ 
 
 * Pint. 1. 1. Arist. Plivs 1 1. Cudworth, c. ."5. 
 t Ritter, Hist. Phil. Oxford, 183!).
 
 12 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 This interpretation is very fanciful, but it is 
 natural in E/itter. Such a term as infinite^ is too 
 good a tiling for a German to let pass, without at- 
 tempting to make something grand and mysterious 
 out of it. The word enables him to revel in luxu- 
 rious profundity.* 
 
 Anaximenes. 556 b.c. 
 
 Anaximenes was a companion and disciple of 
 Anaximander, and a promulgator of his system of 
 philosophy. The former indulged in speculations 
 as to the origin of the world, and maintained the 
 doctrine, that air is the vivifying principle of the 
 universe, of which all things are engendered, and 
 into which all things are resolved. Our soul or 
 spirit is air ; for spirit and air are two names signi- 
 fying the same tiling. 
 
 Air he considers as the living Deity, because it is 
 ever in motion. Some authors consider that air 
 should not be taken in its common signification, but 
 as a subtile ether, penetrating all material bodies, 
 and communicating to them that motion and life 
 necessary for their production and reproduction.! 
 
 Hermotimus, op Clazomene. 520 b.c. 
 
 Hermotimus of Clazomene was a distinguished 
 early metaphysician. He entered deeply into all 
 
 * See Note B. at the end of this Volume. 
 
 t Simplicius ad Phy. lib. 1. Lactantius, lib. 1.
 
 HEKMOTIMUS — DIOGENES. 13 
 
 the mental speculations known in his day. He dis- 
 played great original powers of thinking ; and if we 
 are to believe Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, 
 ApoUonius, and several others, he was the original 
 propounder of the system of Anaxagoras. Her- 
 motimus clearly perceived the important distinction 
 between mental subjects and physical inquiries ; and 
 he seems to have kept this essential distinction per- 
 petually before his eyes, in all liis abstract specu- 
 lations. 
 
 Pliny, in his Natural History, mentions, that 
 Hermotimus entertained the idea that the soul often 
 quits the l)ody, and wanders to a great distance from 
 it, in order to obtain that knowledge which is denied 
 to it whilst residing in its earthly tenement. It 
 was from this singular notion that his enemies as- 
 sassinated him, that his own soul might wing its 
 way to that situation destined for its reception in a 
 future state of existence. 
 
 Diogenes, of Apollonia. 500 e.g. 
 
 Diogenes was a follower and disciple of Anaxi- 
 menes ; but gave a more spiritual interpretation to 
 his master's doctrines on the origin of the universe. 
 The subtile ether which Anaximenes employed to 
 create and sustain the world, became, in the hands 
 of his pupil, endowed with a species of wisdom and 
 intelligence. It was not blindness and fatality; 
 it operated by a settled plan or method. The 
 wisdom and order displayed in every part of nature, 
 seem to have made a deep impression upon the
 
 14 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 mind of Diogenes ; for he affirms tliey give evident 
 testimonies for the existence of a ruling principle 
 
 of REASON. 
 
 Anaxagoras. 500 b. c. 
 
 Anaxagoras was one of the most renowned phi- 
 losophers of his day, and succeeded in unfolding 
 more just and comprehensive principles of theism, 
 and of the general government of the world, than 
 any preceding speculator. His opinions on mental 
 suhjects are hut few, and limited in their range, and 
 are handed do^^Ti to us hy Aristotle and Sextus 
 Empiricus. Anaxagoras clearly pointed out how 
 the judgment may occasionally he led astray from 
 the truth, hy the delusive appearances furnished hy 
 the external senses. The judgment, or reasoning 
 power, is the governing principle in man, and is in- 
 tended to correct the errors which first impressions 
 may create in his mind. In pointing out the im- 
 perfections of our sensations as infallihle guides to 
 truth, he has heen accused hy some ancient philo- 
 sophers with manifesting a decided leaning to scep- 
 ticism; hut this accusation is without any solid 
 foundation. What he says may he conceded hy 
 every right-thinking man. He only shows that, 
 on many occasions, such sensations or notions as 
 relate to colours, the appearances of ohjects seen 
 through various mecUa hy the eye, may undergo a 
 multitude of changes ; and yet the mind may de- 
 duce the truth respecting them from a variety of 
 different considerations suhmitted to the reasoning
 
 ANAXAGOllAS. 15 
 
 faculty. On this principle there cannot be two 
 opinions. 
 
 Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, had his theory 
 as to the origin of the world. He held that the 
 material principle of all things is one and many, of 
 infinite parts, similar and contrary, continuous to the 
 touch, sustaining themselves, not contained by any 
 other. Every indi^ddual thing in nature is consti- 
 tuted of particles peculiar to itself; and it is just this 
 atomic construction which makes it what it really 
 is. Bone, for example, is made from a certain spe- 
 cific form of its particles ; gold and silver, and, in 
 fact, everything else, from the same principle of 
 individual adaptation. Lucretius describes this 
 process in the following lines : 
 
 " With Anaxagoras, great Nature's law 
 Is similarity ; and every compound form 
 Consists of parts minute, each like a whole ; 
 And bone is made of bone, and flesh of flesh ; 
 And blood, and fire, and earth, and massy gold. 
 Are, in their smallest portions, still the same."* 
 
 Anaxagoras is more decidedly theistical than any 
 of his predecessors. His distinction between mind 
 and matter, between the Creator and the thing 
 created, is clearly annunciated. Plato affirms that 
 he taught the existence of a regulating mind over 
 all things ; and Aristotle declares that mind is the 
 supreme and ruling element, and possesses within 
 itseK all creative power and thought. Plutarch 
 gives his testimony to the same effect. He says, 
 
 * Plut. PL Ph. 1. Arist. Phys. 3, 4.
 
 16 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 " the Ionic philosophers who flourished before the 
 days of Anaxagoras, made a blind fatality or destiny 
 the first elemental principle in nature ; but Anax- 
 agoras maintained that a pure mind, free from all 
 material influences, governs the universe." Cicero 
 says that the Grecian sage afiirmed the existence of 
 an "infinite mind, not inclosed in any body ; " and 
 Lactantius and Saint Augustine declare the same 
 thing.* 
 
 There were several distinguished disciples of 
 Anaxagoras ; among the number may be mentioned, 
 l?eriGles, son of Xantippus ; Archelcms, son of Apol- 
 lodorus; Euripides , his biographer; Socrates, son 
 of Sophroniscus ; and Metrodorus, of Lampsacum. 
 Some few metaphysical opinions are ascribed to 
 these persons, but they are not entitled to any par- 
 ticular enumeration. 
 
 *** Vide Heuman. Act. Phil. i. 16; iii. 165, 173. Burnet, Arch. 
 1- 10. Cudworth, Int. Sjst. c. 1. Cyril cont. Julian. 1. 1. Velesii Phil. 
 Sac. c. 31. August. De Civit. Dei, 1. 8. Scaliger, Ep. 306. Themistii 
 Orat.26. MorhofF. Polyh. t. 2. Lipsii Phys. 1. 2. Thomasii Obser. Hal. 
 t. 2. MuUerus, De aqua principio rerum ex mente Thaletis. 1718. Bud- 
 dseus de Phil. Mor. Thalet. § 10. Brucker Hist, de Ideis, sect. 1. Gro- 
 tius de Verit. 1. 1. Dickenson Phy. c. 4. Thomas. Hist. Ath. c. 4. Le 
 Clerc, Bibl. Choisie, t. 2. Schmidius de Vit. Anaximenis, p. 1. Plouc- 
 quet. Diss. De Thalet. et Anaxag. 1.2. Bayle. Thalet. Ritter, Hist. Phil. 
 Oxford, 1839. Tennemann. Hist. Phil. Renouvier, Mon. de la Phil, an- 
 cienne. Cousin, Cours de Phil. Degerando, Hist. Comparee des Sys- 
 t^mes. Enfield's Hist. Philosophy. 
 
 * Arist. De Anima. 1. 1. Plut. 1. 1. Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1. 1. Au- 
 gust, de Civ. Dei, 1. 8. Lact. 1. .'5.
 
 rrALIAN SCHOOL OF HklETAPHYSICS. 17 
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE ITALIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Among the leading philosophers on the science 
 of the human mind in the Italian school, stands 
 Pythagoras, a man of vast capacity, extensive infor- 
 mation, indefatigable industry, and great original 
 powers of thought. lie was born in the Isle of 
 Samos, and received his early education there. 
 
 P}i;hagoras was the founder of a school of specu- 
 lative philosophy, and his principal followers and 
 admirers were Ocellus, Timaeus, Archytas, Philo- 
 laus, Ilipparchus, and Ptolemy. 
 
 The Pythagoreans speculated deeply on the 
 origin of the world, and on the principles of natural 
 theism. On the human mind their inquiries seem 
 not to have been directed with much judgment, 
 nor sio^nalised bv much success. This sect of me- 
 taphysicians maintained that man had some affi- 
 nity not only witli the gods, but Tvdth the animal 
 creation; and that the same principle of intelli- 
 gence runs through the whole of living existence, 
 
 * 
 
 c
 
 18 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GTIEECE. 
 
 and unites the different parts into one uniform 
 compound. We are distinguished from the hrute 
 creation by the possession of language. The hu- 
 man soul is di\dded, by these Pythagoreans, into 
 two parts, or rather two leading faculties"; i the 
 one embraces all the physical wants of the body, 
 and all the blind and impetuous passions or im- 
 pulses ; and the other those controlling and modi- 
 fying powers, which guide and propel mankind to 
 wtuous and noble deeds, and which are commonly 
 denominated wisdom, judgment, or reason. 
 
 The soul is in an imperfect state. It has three 
 elemental divisions : Heason, Intelligence, and 
 Desire. The inferior creation possess the two last 
 attributes, but are denied the first ; reason. The 
 soul is a monad — one. It may have many aspects, 
 but its essence or unity remains the same. In 
 proportion as the rational, intelligent, or sensual 
 principles predominate, so is the character of man 
 proportionally affected. He may be a profound 
 philosopher, a man of the world, or a low and 
 i3eastly creature. " This soul, which can look be- 
 fore and after, can shrink and shrivel itself into an 
 incapacity of contemplating aught but the present 
 moment. Of what depths of degeneracy it is capable ! 
 What a beast it may become ! And, if something 
 lower than itself, why not something higher ? And 
 if something higher and lower, may there not be a 
 law accurately determining its elevation and de- 
 scent ? Each soul has its peculiar evil tastes, 
 brinffinsT it to the likeness of different creatures be- 
 neath itself; may it not be under the necessity of
 
 PYTHAGORAS. 19 
 
 abiding in the condition of that thing to which it 
 has adapted and reduced itself?"* 
 
 There has always existed considerable doubt as 
 to what the real opinions of Pythagoras were. He 
 was a public teacher of philosophy, but left no 
 written records of his \dews. Conjecture has, 
 therefore, to supply the place of positive informa- 
 tion. His school was a school of mathematics also; 
 and to his blending the two sciences together no 
 small portion of his obscurity may be attributed. 
 The essence of the universe was Nmnher ; but 
 whether numbers were real things, or merely sym- 
 bolieal representations, has been the great source 
 of contention among the commentators and critics 
 on the Pythagorean system. Some maintain that 
 the philosopher considered numbers as the real 
 2wlnciples of things, or the cause of all material 
 existences, or the final nature of things. Others 
 again contend that these references to numbers 
 were only a sort of mathematical formula, to be 
 symbolieallij applied. It would be useless to enter 
 into this controversy ; for the reasons and autho- 
 rities on each side seem to be nearly balanced. 
 For myself, I confess I am inclined to join with 
 Emitter, and to think that the numbers of Pvtha- 
 goras were purely s\axLbolical representations. The 
 other hj^othesis appears to me so utterly incom- 
 prehensible and absurd, that for the credit of the 
 human intellect we should throw it aside. 
 
 The doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls is 
 invariably connected with the philosophy of the 
 
 * Encv. Metrop. Art. Moral and Metaphy. Philos. 
 
 c 2
 
 20 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 Pythagoreans. It was tliis notion wMcli induced 
 them to abstain from animal food, and to exckide 
 animal sacrifices from all their religious ceremo- 
 nies. Ovid represents Pythagoras as speaking in 
 the following strain, rendered into our vernacular 
 tongue by the immortal Dryden. 
 
 " What then is death^ but ancient matter drest 
 In some new figure, and a varied vest ? 
 Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies ; 
 And here and there th' unbodied spirit flies. 
 By time, or force, or sickness dispossessed. 
 And lodges where it lights, in man or beast ; 
 Or hunts without, till ready limbs it find, 
 And actuates those according to theii- kind ; 
 From tenement to tenement is tost. 
 The soul is still the same, the figure only lost ; 
 And as the softened wax new seals receives. 
 Their face assumes, and that impression leaves ; 
 Now called by one, now by another name. 
 The form is only changed, the wax is still the same : 
 So death, thus call'd, can but the form deface, 
 Th^ immortal soul flies out in empty space. 
 To seek her fortune in some other place." 
 
 *** Vide Arist. Met. 1. 1. 6. Sextus Empiricus, folio, Paris, 1621. 
 Meiners, Histoire des Sciences dans la Grece, t. 2. (French Translation). 
 Justin. Hist. 20. 4. Dioge. Laert. 8. Leipsic. 1833. Kitter, Hist. Anc 
 Phil. Oxford. Tenneraann, Manuel de I'Hist. de la Philosophic, by Cousin, 
 Paris, 18.30. Schwartz, Manuel de 1' Histoire de la Philosophic Ancienne. 
 Liege. 1842. Renouvicr, Manuel de Philosophic Ancienne. Paris, 1844. 
 Tissot. Hist. Abregee de la Philosophie. Dijon. 1840. Hist. Abre'gce de 
 la Philosophie, par Bouvier, Eveque de Mans; Paris, 1844.
 
 ELEATIC SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 21 
 
 CHAPTEH IV. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE ELEATIC SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The Eleatic Scliool of metaphysicians took its 
 rise from the Italian and Ionian speculations. 
 It differed, however, essentially from both. It 
 had more boldness, more originality, and more 
 system. The Eleatics affected a more complete 
 severance between mental objects and the rules of 
 reasoning applicable to them, and to the ordinary 
 principles of natural theology and morality, with 
 which they had previously been associated. 
 
 The philosophical predecessors of the Eleatics were 
 not so ambitious as the latter. The former con- 
 tented themselves with taking the constitution of 
 things just as they found it, and modestly at- 
 tempted only to ascertain the laws which regulated 
 their action on one another, in all their mutual 
 relationships. The Eleatics, however, took higher 
 ground. They attempted to explain the origin of 
 all things ; and, by arguments a priori, to deduce 
 the whole complicated and multifarious phenomena 
 of matter and mind, from certain abstract principles.
 
 22 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Xenophanes. 456 b.c. 
 
 Xenoplianes was tlie most distingidslied pliilo- 
 sopher of this scliool. Considerable difference of 
 opinion has existed, both in ancient and modern 
 times, as to the precise notions he entertained on 
 the mental laws of our constitution. By one 
 class of historians he has been accused of complete 
 scepticism; and by others, as a defender of the 
 infallible certainty of human knowledge. The 
 mass of evidence, and the general current of pro- 
 bability, are in favour of the latter hypothesis. 
 
 There is, unquestionably, a great deal of material 
 necessity intermixed with all the mental specula- 
 tions of Xenophanes. He affirms that nothing 
 which exists can possibly change. Every thing is 
 one being, and is not susceptible of diversities of 
 form or essence. Thought, according to him, is 
 the only real substance; permanent and immu- 
 table in its nature and properties. 
 
 The spirit of Xenophanes' mental jihilosophy 
 bears a very close affinity to some modern systems, 
 founded upon a particular apj)lication of the prin- 
 ciple of necessary connexion. Those who will cast 
 their eye over both, will instantly recognise the 
 almost complete identity. The principle is the 
 same in both the ancient and modern theories ; 
 only the proofs and illustrations are somewhat 
 chfferent. The reasoning of Xenojihanes was of an 
 a priori description ; whereas the modern adopters 
 of his peculiar views employ both a priori argu-
 
 XENOPHANES. 23 
 
 ments, and proof di'awn from every-day expe- 
 rience. 
 
 The Patliers of the Church, St. Clement oi 
 Alexandria, and Eusebius, have preserved some 
 verses of Xenophanes, in which he expresses him- 
 self with great freedom on the superstitious notions 
 which the generality of mankind entertain as to 
 the natui'e of the gods. He seems, however, to 
 have had just and elevated conceptions of the 
 Pirst Great Cause, from other verses mentioned 
 by Sextus Empiricus, where he says, " God sees 
 all, hears all, knows all ; and His wisdom governs 
 all things without effort." 
 
 The Unity of the Divine nature is, then, de- 
 cidedly affirmed by Xenophanes. Deity is self- 
 existent, and consequently eternal; immoveable, 
 unmoved, and without change. 
 
 The peculiar expression that " God is a sphere," 
 used by Xenophanes, is thus explamed by M. 
 Cousin. " The word sphericcd is simply a Greek 
 locution to pomt out the absolute equality and 
 unity of the Deity, and of which the conception of 
 a sphere may be an image. The at^ai^iKoq of the 
 Greeks is the rotundus of the Latins. It is a 
 metaphorical expression similar to that of square, 
 meaning perfect and coniplete ; a mode of speak- 
 ing which though now considered in some measure 
 obsolete, had at the early age of mathematical 
 science, something dignified and noble in it, and 
 is found in most elevated poetical compositions. 
 Simonides speaks of a 'man square to his feet, 
 his hands, and his mind,' meaning a complete.
 
 24 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 perfect, or accomplished man; and the same me- 
 taphorical expression is used by Aristotle. We 
 cannot, therefore, be surprised that Xenophanes, 
 who was a poet as well as a philosopher, writing 
 in verse, and not being successful in fixing upon 
 the metapliysical term which fully expressed liis 
 ideas, should have borrowed from the language of 
 imagination that word which would most fully 
 denote his meanino'." 
 
 Professor Pulleborn di-aws the following parallel 
 between Xenophanes and Spinoza. " Though the 
 system of Xenophanes does not display the same 
 ability and profundity as that of Spinoza, yet we 
 cannot fail to perceive that they both moved in the 
 same direction, and adopted the same principles. 
 The only difference which distinguishes them lies 
 in the proofs they respectively employ. Xeno- 
 phanes belonged to a period when philosophical 
 studies were but as it were in their infancy, and 
 the forms of language, as a medium of abstract 
 reasoning, but imperfectly understood. After 
 developing a general principle essential to his 
 system, he clothed it with other attributes, 
 and took a circuitous route. Spinoza, on the con- 
 trary, always went direct to his object. The 
 former dealt exclusively in reasonings a priori, and 
 rejected exj)erience ; whilst the latter used the 
 a priori instrument in conjunction with that of 
 observation and experiment." 
 
 " In Sj^inoza's day the ideas of unity, substance, 
 and the like, were determined with some precision, 
 particularly by the writings of Descartes ; and the
 
 XENOPHANES. 25 
 
 Jewish philosopher had a more definite idea of 
 necessary connection^ than the ancients possessed. 
 When they embraced a general principle or propo- 
 sition, they pushed it to its utmost limits, without 
 reservation or qualification ; and hence a host of 
 absurd and iiTational deductions was the conse- 
 quence. That mathematical form which Spinoza 
 employed with so much effect in the exposition of 
 his views, was not used by Xenophanes."* 
 
 The scepticism wliich has been attributed to 
 Xenophanes, and which certain expressions as- 
 cribed to him apparently countenance, was certainly 
 of a loose and indefinite character. It was not 
 dogmatical. It evidently arose in the philo- 
 sopher's mind from a deep conviction of the 
 circumscribed and imperfect faculties of man to 
 embrace the wide expanse of Creation. He was, 
 as every man ever must be, no matter how sound 
 and orthodox his theological opinions, overawed 
 and confounded by the mere attempt to inquire 
 into the great problem of existence. He essayed 
 it again and again ; but at every fresh eff'ort a new 
 host of insurmountable difficulties and perplexities 
 presented themselves ; 
 
 "Alps on Alps arose ;" 
 which compelled him to fall back on his own puny 
 littleness and insufficiency, and exclaim, when 
 smarting under the bitter feelings of defeat, that 
 ^^ error is spread over all things. ^^"X 
 
 * Fulleborn, Dissertat. De Xenoplia. Halle, 1/89. 
 t Vide Arist. De Xenopha. chap. I. Metapliy. Diogenes Laert. 9. 
 Sextus Enipiricus, Pynhon. 1.22. Cicero. Academ. Qiisest. 2. 37-
 
 26 mental philosophy of greece. 
 
 Parmenedes. 430 b.c. 
 
 Parmenides Avas a disciple and follower of Xe- 
 noplianes, and considerably extended the range of 
 his philosophical system. The former consolidated 
 and arranged the thoughts of the latter, and, with 
 great judgment, spii'it, and boldness, gave them 
 a more complete and systematic form. Some 
 recent historians have affirmed that Parmenides 
 was the first pliilosopher who attempted to found a 
 regular theory of human knowledge. 
 
 This philosopher composed a Poem " On Nature^'' 
 in the prologue to which he represents the goddess 
 of wisdom directing the philosophical inquirer to 
 truth and happiness. The goddess speaks nearly 
 in these words : "I hail thee, O thou, whom the 
 heralds of the goddess have conducted to my habi- 
 tation. Rejoice, and count it not a misfortune 
 that thou hast been conducted by a path un- 
 known to mortals. Thou slialt discern the immu- 
 table and eternal things which truth teaches ; and 
 thou shall form just conclusions, both as to the 
 phenomena of nature around thee, and the varied 
 and conflicting elements of human opinions. Keep 
 steadily in this path ; and never allow thyseK to 
 become the slave of tliv outward senses ; of thine 
 eye and thine ear. It is by shunning such guides, 
 by the force of reason, that thou shalt be able to 
 comprehend what I shall announce to thee. If 
 we suifer ourselves to be directed bv mere senti- 
 ment or feeling, we shall infallibly be misled from 
 the true path."
 
 PAHMENIDES. 27 
 
 In the book " On Nature ,' we find mental 
 speculations treated under tlie head of " The 
 Intelligible,'' or " The Truth;' or the " JJnitij of 
 Existence y The allegorical form is kept up, and 
 the goddess " reveals what reason will discover in 
 its researches. E-eason teaches that ichich exists. 
 The existence of a nonentity. Speech, thought, and 
 existence, are all positive realities. Men, blinded 
 by their senses, confound them by turns ; and 
 separate existence from creation. Eollow then the 
 path, which points out the reality of things. 
 Many reasons prove that that which has never 
 begun, cannot cease to exist. Existence is a whole ; 
 it is one ; it is immutable ; it is infinite. Eor does 
 any one ask me from whence is this existence de- 
 rived? Erom what source does its perpetual stream 
 of creation flow ? Erom whence doth it proceed ? 
 These are questions we cannot answer. Eor no 
 person can conceive or tell why a thing exists, 
 or what power is able to call it into being, or why 
 it has appeared at a particular time, neither sooner 
 nor later. It is necessary, then, that existence 
 should always be, or never be ; for tliis maxim is 
 eternally true, that a thing cannot by itself be 
 created out of nothing. Existence is founded upon 
 itself; it universally reposes on itself, and is in- 
 vested with unmutability ; the chains of necessary 
 power envelop it. Thought, and the object of 
 thought, are one and the same. We cannot have 
 the thought, with the object which is cognizant to 
 the mind." 
 
 This Poem ends with the following remark;
 
 28 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 "The unclerstanding is to man, wliat the bodily 
 members are to his frame ; for the thinking prin- 
 ciple possesses the same unity of nature and 
 design, as the organs of the outward man ; all is 
 filled by thought." 
 
 The general features of the speculative system 
 of Parmenides, have no small resemblance to those 
 which have been designated, by some modern 
 thinkers, by the term common sense. He was less 
 addicted to paradox than his predecessors ; and 
 seemed to seize those general principles of mind 
 which display themselves in the every-day move- 
 ments of the mass of mankind, and which form 
 the ground-work of that universal sjrmpathy and 
 harmony Avhich subsist throughout the whole 
 region of thought.* 
 
 Melissus. 424 B.C. 
 
 Melissus of Samos expoimded the doctrines of 
 Parmenides. On the real existence of thinjjs, he 
 remarks, "We cannot determine the quantity of 
 any thing without taking for granted its existence. 
 But that which is real cannot be finite ; it must 
 be infinite ; not in sjmce, but in time. It fills all 
 time, and must always be the same in itself." 
 
 Aristotle calls the unity of Parmenides a rational 
 unity, but that of MeKssus a material one.f 
 
 * Arist. Met. 1. 1. Sextus Empiricus 1. 9. Diogenes Laert. 1. !). Plato 
 in Parmen. 1. 11. Plat. adv. Colut. 1. 6. Eusebius 1. 1. 
 t Tissot, Ilist. Abre'gee de la Phil. p. 106. Dijon, 1840.
 
 ZENO. 29 
 
 The German historian Emitter makes the following 
 remarks on Melissus. " As, however, the develop- 
 ment given hy Melissns to his theory of being 
 strongly resembles the method in which it was 
 carried out by Parmenides, we may here pass over 
 much, and only bring forward what is peculiarly 
 his own, and what is requisite to indicate its re- 
 lation to other philosophical doctrines. This con- 
 sists chiefly in the manner in which, as an Ionian 
 and living among lonians, he necessarily put most 
 prominently forward those points which it was 
 indispensable to establish against the Ionic phi- 
 losophy. Melissus, in common with Parmenides, 
 does not found his argument on the notion of the 
 Deity, but on that of being. On the former point he 
 recedes so far from Xenophanes, that he expressly 
 declares, ' men must not speak of the gods, for of 
 them we have absolutely no knoAvledge.'* Accord- 
 ingly, the central point of the whole system — the 
 notion of the perfect one — was even still more lost 
 sight of by him than by Parmenides ; and the 
 whole argumentation bears the appearance of an 
 empty sophism. On this account he was much 
 less esteemed by the ancients than Parmenides ; 
 and Aristotle is of opinion that his principles 
 present little or no difiiculty."t 
 
 Zeno, of Elea. 450 b. c. 
 Zeno was the able, bold, and successful defender 
 
 * Diog. Laert. 1. 1. 9. 24. t Ritter, Hist. Phil. p. 481.
 
 30 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 of the Eleatic pliilosopliy. He possessed in a high 
 degree all the mental requisites for an expert and 
 formidable controversialist. He was remarkably 
 acute, knew well how to handle general principles, 
 so as to confound and annoy an adversary, and 
 had, besides, a copious fund of information on all 
 the current topics of the day. He may be con- 
 sidered as the founder of that general system of 
 philosophical discussion, so prevalent for many 
 subsequent ages, in all the countries of the East. 
 
 Among his controversial discussions we find the 
 following, tending to invalidate the systems of 
 those who founded all science on pure experience. 
 " Every body constantly occupies a portion of space 
 equal to itself; it is then constantly in repose. 
 Now if it move itself, it should move in every 
 instant ; it would then be both in motion and at 
 rest at the same time." 
 
 Zeno attempted to establish the doctrine of 
 perfect and ahsolute unity. On the divisibility of 
 matter, he observes, "When we arrive at the 
 utmost boundaries of divisibility, we shall then 
 only have a mathematical point; which is really 
 nothing." 
 
 On the successful cultivation of the art of 
 reasoning, and investigating truth, and communi- 
 cating it to others, he laid down many excellent 
 principles and rules. He divided this art into 
 three distinct branches ; the first, the art of draw- 
 ing consequences or inferences from principles ; 
 secondly, the art of dialectics ; and thirdly, tlie art 
 of speaking.
 
 HERACLITLS. 31 
 
 Of the importance of the dialectics of Zeno, we 
 have the testimony of M. Cousin, who says, " The 
 polemical method entirely disconcerted the dis- 
 ciples of the Ionic philosophy, and excited a 
 lively curiosity and interest for the stability of the 
 doctrines of the Italian school ; and thus was sowti 
 in the capital of Greek civilization and refinement, 
 the prolific germ of a more lofty development of 
 philosophy." Hitter also observes, " On account 
 of the readiness and scientific skill with which 
 Zeno indicated the contraries of all things, he has 
 been called bv Plato the Eleatic Palamedes. The 
 dialogistic form of his composition was calculated 
 to give rise to a sophistical tendency, as was shewn 
 in latter times ; but even in his reasonings there is 
 often so close a trenching upon subtile and falla- 
 cious distinctions, that he has frequently been 
 classed among the Sophists ; nevertheless, when 
 we consider the serious end which he pursued, we 
 cannot but suppose that he merely employed those 
 fallacious artifices as a by-play and relief to his 
 dialogue, or in mocking defiance of the want of 
 skill and the helplessness of his opponents."* 
 
 Heraclitus. 460 b. c. 
 
 Heraclitus belonged to the school of the Eleatics, 
 and signalised himself by his profound study of 
 the general laws of the universe. On mental sub- 
 jects he observes, "The human soul, such as is 
 
 * Arist. Met. 1. 1. Pioge. Laert. 1. 3. Sext. Emp. Math. /. Plato, 
 Parm p 127. Strabo 6. I.
 
 32 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 endowed with reason, is an emanation from the 
 universal mind; but it is united to an animal 
 nature, in common with the inferior orders of 
 creation. Man breathes the universal soul or 
 mind, and readily unites with creative intelligence, 
 in a state of watching ; sleep l^eing an immediate 
 and temporary suspension of this communication." 
 
 This metaphysician established the maxim which 
 exercised, in subsequent ages, a great influence 
 over speculative minds, "that a thing can only be 
 known by the same thing." " Conception is 
 founded only upon the similitude between the 
 agent and the object." This principle was con- 
 sidered, when viewed in all its bearings and rami- 
 fications, as destructive of the evidence of the 
 senses ; and places the discovery of truth solely in 
 the faculty of reason. But in opposition to this 
 conclusion from his premises, Heraclitus maintained 
 that the senses were the apertures through which 
 we inhaled the divine reason. 
 
 " Our sensations," says he, " do not appertain 
 to external objects ; they reside only in ourselves ; 
 for they vary amongst individuals, and even in the 
 same individual, from the varied condition of the 
 organs themselves. These senses cannot, then, 
 communicate any certain knowledge of external 
 things, since their operation is so unsteady and 
 fluctuating. The understanding alone possesses 
 the power of teaching us the absolute nature of 
 objects; it alone can impart truth to us." 
 , He argues however in another place for the 
 testimony of the senses ; for he remarks, " The
 
 HERACLITUS. . 33 
 
 judgments wliich mankind in general form, possess 
 the certain testimony of truth ; this common light 
 wliich diffuses itself over all at once, is nothing 
 else but the Divine E-eason, shed over all our under- 
 standings by a direct and immediate effusion." 
 
 On the nature of memory he observes, "the 
 mind represents to itself the universe such as it 
 has been preserved by the memory ; we arrive then 
 at truth when we borrow from memory that true 
 and veritable sketch which has been deposited and 
 confided with it. Wisdom is then accessible to all 
 men." 
 
 His notions on the origin of the world did not ma- 
 terially differ from those which had been promulgat- 
 ed by many of his predecessors. Fire, or an ethereal 
 exhalation, is the principle of existence and life. This 
 agent consists of two indivisible portions or atoms, 
 which are simple in their natures, and eternal, and 
 indestructible. The particles of which this ethe- 
 real exhalation consists, are in perpetual motion. 
 From the various modes in which these two con- 
 stituent elements are combined, we have the result 
 of all the numerous and diversified forms of ma- 
 terial existences. There is a rational or thinking 
 principle incorporated with this primary fire, and 
 this principle animates the whole, and preserves 
 and changes the face of nature at its will. * This 
 principle, in fact, is God, the maker of all things. 
 
 There is a story told about the writings of He- 
 racUtus, that they were deposited in the temple of 
 
 * Clem. Alex. Prot. p. 42. Tertull. Contr. Marcion. 
 * D
 
 34 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Diana, at Ephesus, and remained tliere unknown 
 for a considerable period. At length they were 
 discovered and published ; and the poet Euripides 
 made known their contents to a public audience 
 in the same celebrated temple. This circumstance 
 excited a lively feeling amongst the philosophers 
 of the day, some of whom immediately declared 
 themselves Heraclitus's disciples. Among the 
 number was Hippocrates, the famous physician. 
 
 We shall close tliis notice of Heraclitus with a 
 few observations of Emitter's upon the system of the 
 Grecian philosopher. " The notion of life implies 
 that of alteration, which by the ancients was gene- 
 rally conceived as motion. The Universal Life is 
 therefore an eternal motion, and consequently tends, 
 as every motion must, towards some end; even 
 though this end, in the course of the evolution of 
 life, presents itself to us a mere transition to some 
 ulterior end. Heraclitus on this ground supposed 
 a certain longing to be inherent in fire, to gratify 
 which it constantly transformed itself into some 
 determinate form of being, without, however, any 
 wish to maintain it, but in the mere desire of trans- 
 muting itself from one form, into another. There- 
 fore to make worlds is Jove's pastime."
 
 EMPEDOCLES. 85 
 
 CHAPTEU V. 
 MENTx\L PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE SECOND ELEATIC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This second scliool of Eleatics was distinguished 
 by many important and subtile speculations on 
 mental subjects ; but its general scope and tenor 
 had a decided leaning to the most objectionable 
 forms of materialism. They were devoted and 
 zealous students of philosophy, but they adopted 
 general principles ^\dtliout sufficient discrimination, 
 and supported them by fictions and fallacies dis- 
 creditable to discerning minds. 
 
 EMPEDOCLES. 444 B. C. 
 
 This philosopher was born at Agrigentmn, in 
 Sicily, about the year 400. Erom his youth he 
 devoted himself to medical pursuits with great zeal 
 and success. He travelled also a great deal, and 
 became, by his skill in medicine, and the boldness 
 and singularity of his character, a well known per- 
 sonage, even beyond the limits of his oami country. 
 
 He prosecuted the science of mind with some 
 
 D 2
 
 36 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 success. His theory of sensation is worthy of 
 notice, principally from its singularity. He fol- 
 lowed the general maxim of his predecessors, that 
 the same thing could only he perceived by the same 
 thing. He attached to each of the senses a 
 particular element ; thus, the fire could only be 
 perceived by the fire, that is, sight ; the air by the 
 air, which is the ear. To the w^hole of the senses 
 he joined other two — ^namely, discord, wliich is per- 
 ceived by discord, and love, which is perceived by 
 love. He explained the general phenomena of 
 sensation by affirming that there was a complete 
 identity between the object perceived and the 
 sensation itself. The colours of objects, for 
 example, were certain forms, proceeding from 
 things external, and transmitted to us through the 
 medium of the organ of sight.* 
 
 Empedocles makes a distinction between divine 
 and human knowledge, and yet he rather inconsis- 
 tently attempts to resolve all kinds of knowledge 
 into the Divine Mind. However, it would appear 
 that, according to his idea, man has some portion 
 of this divine intelKgence given him to balance his 
 sensual knowledge. How it operates, what are its 
 limits, what influences it exerts, or in what degree 
 it counteracts material agents, we can form no 
 conception, neither from the philosopher's own 
 language, nor from any of his commentators. 
 
 The system of the universe, as promulgated by 
 Empedocles, is dimly shadowed forth. World- 
 
 * Arist. De Sensu, cjip. -1. I'lut. <le Placit. Phil. A.
 
 LEUCIPPUS. 37 
 
 making mth him is a very crude and bungling 
 affair. He collects all the elemental principles to- 
 gether, separates them, descants upon them indivi- 
 dually, and then mixes them in such confusion, 
 that it becomes in the end impossible to obtain 
 even a gKmpse of his system. 
 
 Letjcippus. 428 b. c. 
 
 Leucippus belonged to this school, and struck 
 out a new system of philosophy. He was a subtile 
 observer of the laws of the human mind. His 
 whole theory of human knowledge and the consti- 
 tution of nature, is founded upon an obvious train 
 of thought, when contemplating the world around 
 us. We incessantly see an endless variety of 
 forms, and a perpetual change of motion amongst 
 all bodies, whether animate or inanimate. We see 
 one thing slowly but steadily amalgamating with 
 another thing, and the forms and properties of 
 both changed. These multifarious changes of na- 
 tiu-e almost naturallv excite the mind to suffffes- 
 tions of thought foimded upon the gratuitous 
 assimiption, that a system of motion amongst the 
 inanimate particles of matter, whether organized 
 or imorganized, must be the efficient cause of all 
 the varied forms of creation. There seems to be 
 no other feasible solution of the phenomena we be- 
 hold, save a theory of this description ; the mind 
 rests for the moment upon it, and seems to feel 
 a temporary pleasure and satisfaction that it affords 
 a probable solution of philosophical difficulties of 
 such magnitude. Hence it is that this theory of
 
 38 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Leucippus, and modifications of it, have prevailed 
 since the first daT\Ti of letters amongst men, and 
 will, ill all hnman probability, keep its ground till 
 the end of time. 
 
 Leucippus supposes that every atom of matter is 
 invested with a peculiar principle of motion ; and 
 that a number of these atoms produce a kind of 
 vortex. Huet and Bayle have both remarked, that 
 this theory is very similar to that broached by 
 Descartes in modern times. 
 
 Leucippus says, " There are then two principles 
 in all things, one primitive, and the other positive : 
 space, and a vacuum." " Thus," he adds, " the 
 whole train of events we see are subjected to a 
 principle of necessity." 
 
 These few words embody the whole system of this 
 Eleatic philosopher, as it has been handed down 
 to us through the wi'itings of the ancients. He 
 thought it fully accounted for all the diversified 
 appearances of the universe, both physical, mental, 
 and moral. * 
 
 The metaphysical views of Leucippus are, of 
 course, founded upon the same material basis. 
 Life, thought, motion, are all one thing ; respira- 
 tion is the condition, and heat the sign of them. 
 The soul, in which these three properties of life, 
 thought, and motion reside, is itself only an aggre- 
 gation of atoms ; a compound of fiery particles 
 which circulate in all bodies. 
 
 We must, notwithstanding tliis system of mate- 
 rialism, award the high honour to Leucii)pus of 
 being the first philosopher Avho clearly detected.
 
 DEMOCRITUS. 39 
 
 and fully explained, that important principle in 
 metaphysics, so highly valued in recent times ; 
 namely, the distinction between the primary and 
 secondary qualities of matter. 
 
 The whole system of Leucippus is also worthy 
 of remark as being the first regular theory founded 
 ujion materialism in its most absolute sense. 
 
 Democritus. 460 b. c. 
 
 Democritus followed in the same path of specu- 
 lation as Leucippus ; and more fully developed his 
 system. The ^dews of the latter, relative to the 
 distinction between the 'primary and secondary 
 qualities of matter, were, however, not entertained 
 by Democritus, who stoutly contended that the 
 secondary qualities were nothing but mere modifi- 
 cations of the thinking principle. "Honey," says 
 he, " is in itself neither sweet nor sour, but it pro- 
 duces upon the organ of taste an impression to 
 which we give the name of sweet ; and from hence 
 is derived the varied class of sensations which dif- 
 ferent individuals experience. It is precisely the 
 same with colours, sounds, and odours. ' ' He thought 
 that the sense of touch was the onlv one which 
 really taught us the knowledge of external objects. 
 
 He maintained, likewise, that all human intelli- 
 gence was of a passive character. " All our per- 
 ceptions come to us from without, and the ol^jects 
 which produce them emit certain emanations re- 
 sembKng them, and like images are imprinted on 
 the soul." Again, for example, water, which com- 
 poses the principle of life or vitality, furnishes as
 
 40 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 it were by reflection, a copy of its properties to the 
 mind ; the air transmits them through the ear, by 
 an internal movement of particles, precisely similar ; 
 and thus it is with all the other organs of sense. 
 
 Democritus aflirmed that there were two kinds 
 of knowledge, the genuine and the abstract. The 
 first has its foundation in the mind ; and the latter 
 from the operation of the external senses. The 
 abstract or obscure species of knowledge is acquired 
 by the influence of external agents on the thinking 
 faculty (vovg), and thus conceptions are generated.* 
 Bodies operate, however, only by contact. There 
 must be an impression on the soul from without, f 
 This is indispensable. An external object is made 
 kno^vn to us by a sense, through the medium of 
 certain eflQ.uxes filled with sensation and impres- 
 sion, which the philosopher calls images (t'/^wXa) ; 
 these drop as it were from the object, and after 
 assimilating themselves with the surrounding air, 
 enter into the organ of sensation through certain 
 channels or pores. This process communicates 
 certain figures corresponding to the external ob- 
 jects from whence they come. But it is only the 
 external covering or surface of these objects which 
 we perceive ; and this is the chief reason of the 
 mass of obscurity which hangs over their real 
 nature or properties. There is always, therefore, 
 a cloudiness and haziness hanging over everything 
 around us ; and it is in vain to think of ever re- 
 mo\dng it from the sensuous organization of man. 
 
 * Arist. de Aniiiia. 1. 2. t Arist de Sensu, 2.
 
 DEMOCRITUS. 41 
 
 We have only, in fact, a one-sicled glimpse of na- 
 tural objects.* 
 
 We must not, however, suppose that all know- 
 ledge was confined to this imperfect sensuous 
 operation. There was a higher principle of intelli- 
 gence ; something which guided and directed us 
 to truth, independent of the impressions from 
 external objects. There were certain internal 
 perceptions or elements of thought which seemed 
 to form part of the construction of the mind itself. 
 This has been considered by some writers as the 
 faculty of reflection (Siavota), which forms such an 
 important element in modern metaphysical science. 
 Whatever opinion may be formed on this point, 
 certain it is, that Democritus seems to have been 
 constrained to admit, though in. rather ambiguous 
 language, the existence of certain primary elements 
 of thought, apart from the mere mechanism of 
 sensation. 
 
 Condorcct, in his Sketch of the Progress of the 
 Human Mind, has the following remarks relative to 
 the philosophy of Democritus. 
 
 " Democritus regarded all the phenomena of the 
 universe as the result of the combinations and 
 movements of simple bodies, possessing a deter- 
 mined and fixed shape, and having received a 
 primary impulsion, from whence was imparted a 
 quantity of motion, which modified itself in every 
 distinct atom, but which, in the entu^e mass, 
 always preserved an aggregate harmony." 
 
 * Theophr. dc Sensu, 63.
 
 42 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE GREEK SOPHISTS. 
 
 We come now to notice that class of speculative 
 persons whom historians have distinguished by the 
 term Sojyhists. They occupied a prominent station 
 among the learned Greeks, although they did not 
 form any distinct school or party, properly so 
 called. The spiiit of their system encouraged an 
 independent tone of thinking, and but little in ac- 
 cordance with the constraint or authority of any 
 federal head whatever. 
 
 There were two species of Sophists : the one 
 generally exercised the profession of Rhetorician, 
 and the other confined themselves to the instruc- 
 tion of their pupils in all the branches of mental 
 philosophy. 
 
 The philosophy of the Sophists comes down to 
 us under great disadvantages, both for their repu- 
 tation and our own conviction. They left no writ- 
 ings of any moment behind them ; and what re 
 cords there were, have all perished. We have their 
 oj)inions, systems, and characters, only through
 
 THE GKEEK SOPHISTS. 43 
 
 somewhat suspicious and prejudiced channels. 
 It is therefore by way of inference alone that we 
 can approximate to the truth. 
 
 The philosophical system which the Sophists 
 adopted, if it can be called a system, was the 
 natural result of the peculiar state of speculative 
 science in this age. Men of active habits and 
 inquiring minds, had seen one sect of reasoners 
 after another usurping public attention, by at- 
 tempting to solve the problem of the origin of the 
 world, and the constitution of all things, both 
 physical and mental. Their opinions were marked 
 by great subtility, inconsistency, and extravagance. 
 They seemed to agree only to differ from one 
 another. Nothing had been satisfactorily proved; 
 no one general principle established ; nor was 
 there a single philosophical resting-place for the 
 sole of the foot. This state of things natm^ally 
 created a reaction. Men of bold and stirring 
 habits shook off the cobwebs of speculative 
 subtility, seized hold of the reality of things around 
 them, and made a straightforward appeal to the 
 feelings, opinions, and common sense of mankind. 
 It is easy to see that an enterprise of this kind, 
 under such circumstances, was sure to prove 
 successful. Mankind listened, and they even 
 fancied they obtained instruction. All the recluse 
 and subtile philosophers were deeply shocked by 
 this Gothic irruption into then* territory. The 
 withering jeers of the multitude were keenly felt 
 by the speculative recluse. He had no means
 
 44 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 of repelling the attack. His weapons were too 
 refined for sucli rude and vulgar warfare ; for, 
 under such circumstances, his retaliation would in 
 reality have been " to chop blocks with a razor." 
 
 We can readily therefore imagine, that no good 
 feeling would exist between the disciples of the old 
 schools of Greece, and the Sophists. There was 
 no communion of fellowship and sympathy between 
 them. It may readily be conceded — indeed the 
 matter seems quite ob^vdous — that the majority of 
 the Sophists would be shallow and declamatory 
 personages, dealing in generalities, and avoiding 
 every thing like abstruse reasoning and deduction. 
 But still they could not propagate their views 
 without spreading useful truths far and wide. 
 They would doubtless make a liberal use of ridicule 
 and banter in their popular orations ; and would, 
 on many occasions, push their principles to an 
 extravagant length. And there can be no doubt 
 but that many of the expressions and propositions, 
 which Plato and Aristotle have handed down to 
 us, as falling from the lips of the Sophists, were 
 uttered in the heat of extemporary oratory, or 
 when smartmg under some unmerited persecu- 
 tion. Making, however, every allowance, there is 
 reasonable groimd for supposing that their ser- 
 vices in the cause of true knowledge were con- 
 siderable, and that they by no means merit that 
 contempt and derision which many ancient and 
 modern philosophers have heaped upon them.
 
 PROTAaORAS. 45 
 
 Protagoras. 475 B.C. 
 
 Protagoras was one of the most eminent and 
 early of the Sophists. His metaphysical notions 
 may be gathered from what Sextus Empiricus has 
 told us of them. They are in substance the follow- 
 ing, Man is the standard of the truth of all 
 things. He is the proper criterion of the reality 
 of every thing which exists. This is the funda- 
 mental principle of all human knowledge. Matter 
 is in a perpetual flux and reflux ; it is constantly 
 changing its forms. Our bodily senses, which 
 are affected by and perceive these changes, undergo 
 also a modification from old age, disease, and 
 other circumstances. The foundation of every 
 thing which the senses can perceive, or be affected 
 by, resides in matter. But men at different times, 
 and under different circumstances, derive various 
 impressions from external objects. Those whose 
 organs are in a healthy and \agorous state, perceive 
 objects just in the same manner as other persons 
 do who are in a similar situation, and whose sen- 
 suous faculties are in a snnilarlv ors^anised con- 
 dition. On the other hand, those whose organs 
 are impaired or diseased, recognise external objects 
 in precisely the same way as those who labour 
 under corresponding imperfections and infirmities. 
 Man, then, is the sole criterion of the truth of 
 things. We are perpetually in the habit of making 
 references to our own individual feelings and per-
 
 4G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 ceptions as the infallible test of truth and false- 
 hood.* 
 
 Plato, in one of his works, gives the most un- 
 equivocal evidence that the above is the sum and 
 substance of the system of Protagoras. In the 
 passages quoted by Plato, he makes the Sophist 
 take his stand upon the common and every-day 
 feelings of himian nature ; and supposes one man 
 to test the truth of his sensations and feelings, by a 
 direct appeal to the consciousness of his neighbour. 
 Tliis is the first great effort which was made to 
 bring the ordinary emotions and opinions of man- 
 kind to bear upon the extreme subtility and ab- 
 stract refinement of the various schools of philo- 
 sophy which had, up to this period, prevailed 
 throughout Greece. Protagoras spoke a language 
 responded to by all mankind. A fine field was 
 open to his rhetorical talents ; and there is little 
 doubt but that the common sense tone of his philo- 
 sophical discussions must have produced a power- 
 ful influence on the inquisitive spirit of his day.f 
 
 On the merits of Protagoras and his system, 
 philosophical historians are widely at difference. 
 Degerando observes, " Les autres Sophistes adop- 
 taient indifferemment toutes les opinions ; Prota- 
 goras essayait de prouver que chacune a des fonde- 
 mens legitimes. La plupart des autres Sophistes 
 n'eurent que des audit eurs ; Protagoras exer9a une 
 influence importante sur la marche de I'esprit 
 
 * Arist. Met. 3. 5. Diog. Laert. !). 50. Cicero, Acad. Qua^st. 4. 
 Plato. Theat. 2.
 
 GORGIAS. 47 
 
 liumaiii. La plupart des autres Sopliistes furent 
 bientot oubliees et meritaient de I'etre ; Protagoras 
 a pose des problemes qui subsistent encore, et qui 
 peut-etre ne sont pas entierement resolus. Enfin, 
 il soumit a des regies I'art que professaient les 
 Sophistes ; il decouvrit plusieurs formes de raison- 
 nement, et on convient que sa methode se rap- 
 prochait a quelques egards de celle de Socrate."* 
 
 Emitter observes : " In all these propositions and 
 reasonings of Protagoras we recognize at once the 
 endeavour to resolve conception into sensation, 
 and to deny the universality of pure intellectual 
 thought. It was in this sense that the ancients 
 understood the position, that all is in a continual 
 state of incipiency ; for since every sensation is 
 nothinsr more than the result of the concurrent 
 activities of the percipient and the perceptible, 
 and thought merely sensation, the former must 
 consequently be a production of the constant varia- 
 tion of these changeable activities. All, therefore, 
 according to Protagoras, lives merely in the sensi- 
 ble changeableness, and is in fact this mutability 
 itself. The sensible is indeed true, so far as it is 
 sensibly perceived. But nothing in itself is cold or 
 hot, nor generally has any sensible quality ; but is of 
 such or such qualities, according as it is perceived 
 as such."t 
 
 GORGIAS. 452 B. c. 
 
 Gorgias was another Sophist of distinction. In 
 addition to the general current of opinions held l)y 
 
 * Ilistoire Comparee, vol. 2. p. S3, t Hist. Philosophy, vol 2. p. 5/6.
 
 48 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 his predecessors, he advanced many original propo- 
 sitions of his own, and pushed them to a great 
 length. In a hook entitled " On ichat is not, or 
 on Nature i'^ he attempts to estahlish three distinct 
 principles or axioms, all, however, directed against 
 the stability of human knowledge. They are the 
 following. ' Pirst, — That nothing exists. Second, 
 — That if anything really exists, it cannot be 
 known to man. Third, — That if he could know it 
 he has not the power of communicating that know- 
 ledge to others. 
 
 The first proposition, that nothing exists, Gorgias 
 attempts to establish by the following arguments. 
 At first nothing existed. Then reality had no ex- 
 istence. Now everything must have either been 
 eternal, or must have been made ; or must have 
 possessed the characters of being both eternal and 
 created. If matter be eternal it could not have 
 been created, and must be infinite ; but that which 
 is infinite has no parts ; it must also be different 
 from that which contains it ; and nmst also be 
 comprised in space. This space must then be a 
 different and a greater thing than it ; which is a 
 notion not in unison with infinity. If matter has 
 been produced, it must have either been created 
 from that which previously existed, or from no- 
 tliing. On the first supposition it has not been 
 created, it has only been changed in its form ; and 
 on the other hand it is contradictory to say that 
 a thing has been created which never existed. 
 
 On the second proposition, that if anything should 
 even have a real existence, we could not know it ;
 
 GORGIAS. 49 
 
 he, in substance, argues as follows : We cannot 
 know what things are in themselves ; for it would 
 be necessary, for this purpose, that there should be 
 a perfect relationship established between our con- 
 ceptions and those external realities ; that what 
 they offer to our senses should be the very qualities 
 themselves, under the self-same form that they are 
 perceived ; but all this is absm-d. If we could 
 conceive, for example, that a man could walk upon 
 the winds, or a chariot drive along the siu^face of 
 the sea, we should then be entitled to conclude 
 that a man might fly, and that a chariot might 
 ride upon the surface of the waters. That, there- 
 fore, which really exists escapes our knowledge. 
 Each sense only perceives that which belongs to 
 its own province ; a thing is called visible because 
 it is the object of sight ; but it does not cease to 
 exist because it cannot be seen. Wliat then can 
 be conceived may exist, though it may not affect 
 our senses, because it is beyond the limit of their 
 range. 
 
 The third proposition, that if anything really 
 existed^ loe could not communicate its existence to 
 others^ he defined in this manner. The means we 
 have of communicating with others, is through the 
 medium of language. But language is not identi- 
 cal with external things, or real objects. We only 
 transmit to others om- own words. Now that 
 which is visible is not felt by the ear, nor does the 
 ear see external objects ; the province of these two . 
 senses is quite separate and different. We say, 
 indeed, that language is formed from the impres- 
 
 * , ' E
 
 50 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 sions we receive from external objects, through 
 the medium of the senses ; as colour, for example, 
 is derived from the act of vision. It does not, 
 however, follow from this that our words really 
 and fully express the qualities or properties of 
 things without us ; hut simply the effect they pro- 
 duce upon our organs of sensation. Even admit- 
 ting that the objects of sense really exist, we are 
 not from hence entitled to say that they are the 
 objects of language. Om' sensations and words 
 are two different things. * 
 
 There were several other Sophists distinguished 
 in their day as bold and reckless declaimers. Pro- 
 dicus, Hippias, Euthydemus, Thrasymachus, and 
 Callicles, are the chief names mentioned by Xeno- 
 phon and Plato. Some of these Sophists were 
 charged with blasphemy by the civil authorities, de- 
 nounced as corrupters of youth, and condemned to 
 public execution. 
 
 * Arist. de Gorg. Plato, Meno. p. 7^. Sext. Empiricus 1. 1. 85.
 
 SOCRATES. 51 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Socrates. 400 b. c. 
 
 The name of Socrates forms a landmark in 
 mental philosophy. Though not strictly a meta- 
 physician, yet his influence as a pubKc teacher 
 produced a marked effect upon all the subsequent 
 speculations on mind. His powers were not of a 
 system-making or speculative cast, but were of the 
 highest order of common sense. In fact, he was a 
 sober-minded, rational sophist, who had as thorough 
 a contempt for pure quibbling, as for shallow and 
 empty declamation. His scholastic acquirements, 
 and his knowledge of the world, were so happUy 
 balanced, that he exercised all the influence and 
 power of a monarch over opposite and conflicting 
 systems and parties. 
 
 Besides the mode of reasoning adopted by So- 
 crates, metaphysical science received great indirect 
 assistance from the soundness and consistency of 
 his ideas upon matters connected with natural 
 theology. These were in strict keeping with his 
 lofty ideas of the reasoning faculty, and the various 
 
 e 2
 
 52 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 important offices to wliicli it must be applied. His 
 notion of the soul of man, according to Xenoplion, 
 was, that it was allied by its nature to the divine 
 mind, not by essence, but by virtue of its nature. 
 Man was elevated beyond all the ranks of animated 
 beings, and this by the power of his reason.* 
 
 The influence of Socrates upon metaphysical 
 science arises from his peculiar method of instruc- 
 tion. This was based upon the general workings 
 and principles of his own mind. " Know thyself," 
 was the key- stone to his philosophy. The first 
 step in the pursuit of useful knowledge was a rigid 
 examination into man's nature. This he ever 
 steadfastly kept in view. He took his stand upon 
 the perfect and absolute certainty of human know- 
 ledge, and never for a moment allowed his thoughts 
 to wander into the regions of doubt and perplexity. 
 He took the world of thought just as he found it ; 
 and all its daily and varied manifestations consti- 
 tuted the materials of his method. Every pupil of 
 Socrates was early initiated into the invaluable 
 habit of looking into his own mind ; of practically 
 operating upon his own consciousness ; and of de- 
 ducing rules and principles for the government 
 and direction of his reasoning powers. This dia- 
 lectic discipline enabled the student to place every 
 idea and thought in a variety of aspects, and to 
 fortify his logical conclusions by numerous and 
 apposite illustrations. 
 
 Erom what we learn of Socrates, it is quite ob- 
 
 * Xenoph. Memora. 1. I.
 
 SOCRATES. 53 
 
 \dous that he was well acquainted with several 
 metaphysical theories, though it does not appear 
 that he ever formally reduced his o^vn thoughts 
 upon the subject to regular order or method. 
 "VThen developing his mode of instruction he always 
 proceeds upon propositions generally received as 
 true or self-evident. Aristotle savs, that Socrates, 
 in studying the moral virtues, was the first who, 
 in giving a definition of them, sought to conform 
 them to reason, and establish them upon the rea- 
 lities of things. Socrates rendered two essential 
 ser\ices to true knowledge, — the introduction of the 
 inductive method of reasoning, and an accurate 
 mode of using general terms. But Socrates did 
 not separate universal ideas from particular facts ; 
 his successors did tliis, and gave them the name of 
 ideas.* 
 
 Emitter, in his History of Philosophy, has the 
 follo^\ing observations on Socrates, which I think 
 sound and correct. " It is clear that the ultimate 
 object of the Socratic method was to apprehend in 
 the thought the essence of a thing, and that 
 strongly impressed mth the character which pre- 
 dominates in the Platonic and Aristotelian, it 
 made the explication of terms the centre of its 
 system, and sought to exhibit, in the definition, 
 the real nature of the object. Consequently, 
 although we must hesitate before we assert, with 
 a later writer, t that Socrates was the first to es- 
 tablish the doctrine of ideas, still we cannot deny 
 
 * Arist. Metaphysic. 1. 6, chap. 4. t Aristocles, ap. Euseb. 10. 3.
 
 54 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 that the connection which he discovered between 
 the idea and its object, must naturally have 
 awakened investigations calculated to call the 
 ideal theory into existence."* 
 
 * See also the following works : Olearius, De Genio Socratis. Vie 
 tie Socrate, Amsterdam 1699. Gilbert Cooper's Life of Socrates, Lon- 
 don, 1749. Wasser, De Vita, Factis, et Philosophia Socratis. Menzius, 
 Dissert, de Socratis methodo docendi, &c. Leipsic, 1740. Lossius, De 
 arte Obstetrica Socratis, Erfurt, 17B5. Simon, Dissert, de Socratis me- 
 ntis in Philosophiam, &c., Wittembergh, 1797. Heller, Socrates. 
 Franckfort, 1789. M. Stapfer, De Philosophia Socratis, Berne, 1786. 
 Dr. Wigger's Life of Socrates.
 
 THE CYRENIC AND CYNICAL SCHOOLS. 55 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE CYRENIC AND CYNICAL SCHOOLS. 
 
 The Cyrenic and Cynical Schools of Philosophy 
 formed a rather singular feature in the history of 
 mental inquiries. The members of them professed 
 to reject all formal rules of abstract reasoning, to 
 study nature A^ath all possible simplicity of design, 
 not to avail themselves of any aid from mathema- 
 tical forms or principles, but to be solely guided by 
 the common and every-day rules and maxims of 
 life. 
 
 Their views relative to the nature of the human 
 mind, and all its powers and faculties, approached 
 very nearly to those systems in modern times, de- 
 nominated by the general term " idealism." We 
 cannot in substance, say they, perceive and know 
 anything save our own impressions, — not the ex- 
 ternal causes of them. When we are affected by 
 the image of white, or the taste of siveetness, we 
 can very truly affirm the effect these produce upon 
 ourselves, but not that the object of whiteness or 
 sweetness has any real existence. The words we
 
 56 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 use to designate these sensations do not designate 
 the objects, but simply our feelings at the moment. 
 The intervening links, the motion, the transforma- 
 tions, involved in this act of sensation, form a 
 complete barrier to our knowledge of what external 
 things are in their own nature. Hence it follows 
 that there is really nothing in common amongst 
 men relative to their sensations, except the mere 
 language they use to point them out ; for there is 
 no invariable or unalterable law of sensation for the 
 whole species. We employ the terms white and 
 sweetness, but they stand for different feelings in 
 different persons. Every man judges for himself, 
 and not for his neighbour ; he can only know that 
 which affects himself personally. Though our de- 
 cisions are expressed in the same language, there 
 is still no infallible criterion to judge of other 
 men's feelings, sensations, or emotions. 
 
 The three principal pliilosophers of these two 
 schools were Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Dioge- 
 nes ; but the metaphysical gleanings from them 
 are very scanty. Their principal disquisitions re- 
 lated to morals. What we have already mentioned 
 embodies nearly every notion attributed to them 
 on mental inquiries.* 
 
 * Ai'ist. Metaph. 1. 8. chap. 29. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. Diog, Laert. 6. 
 Lactantius. Divin. Inst. I. 5. Clemens Ales. Admon. Sect. 46.
 
 EUCLID. 57 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE SCHOOLS OF MEGAHA, ELIS, AND ERETRIA. 
 
 These schools were branches or offshoots from 
 the Eleatic Philosophy, and always retained the 
 fundamental lineaments of the parent establish- 
 ment. 
 
 Euclid. 400 b.c. 
 
 Euclid was the most distinguished philosopher 
 of the school of Megara. He was imbued with a 
 subtile spu'it, and enjoyed knotty and puzzling 
 questions. In dialectics he took the opposite 
 principle to Socrates; for he did not attack the 
 premises, but the conclusion. He is charged with 
 having renounced all analogical reasoning; but 
 this is absurd, he could not do so, were he ever so 
 confirmed a sceptic. Analogy constitutes the 
 foundation of nine-tenths of aU hmnan knowledge. 
 The rule which Euchd laid down as to reasoning 
 was a solid and substantial one ; that in any 
 inferences drawn from two cases, or sets of circum- 
 stances, it is necessary that every thing in these
 
 58 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 cases and circumstances should be identical. Any- 
 little variation may make the greatest difference 
 in the deductive reasoning. To every man, there- 
 fore, who wishes to cultivate truth, this maxim of 
 Euclid is invaluable. It is for want of its know- 
 ledge and observance, that such erroneous reason- 
 ings, on every thing connected with human na- 
 ture, are presented to our notice in the ordinary 
 concerns of life. 
 
 The other distinguished disciples of the Megarean 
 school were Eubulides, Diodorus, and Alexinus. 
 Their metaphysical opinions are unimportant. 
 E-itter observes, " The majority of the later mem- 
 bers of the Megaric school are famous either for 
 the refutation of opposite doctrines, or for the 
 invention and application of certain fallacies ; on 
 wliich account they were occasionally called Eristici 
 and Dialectici. Still it may be presumed that 
 they did not employ these fallacies for the purpose 
 of delusion, but of instructing rash and hasty 
 thinkers, and exemplifying the superficial vanity 
 of common opinion. At all events it is certain 
 that they were mainly occupied with the forms of 
 thought, more perhaps with a view to the dis- 
 covery of particular rules, than to the foundation 
 of a scientific system or method." 
 
 Phsedo of Elis, a scholar of Socrates, was the 
 founder of the Elian school. That of Eretria 
 sprung out of it. The leading doctriae of both 
 was, that what was good, and what was true, were 
 based upon reason and intelligence.* 
 
 * Ciceio. Qu. Acad, 2. 42. Diog. Laert. 1. 2. Pint. adv. Colot. 23.
 
 PLATO. 59 
 
 CHAPTEE X. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Plato. 430 b.c. 
 
 We come to notice, at as full a length as is 
 consistent with the limited plan of this work, one 
 of the most eminent metaphysicians and general 
 philosophers of whom antiquity can boast. Under 
 his auspices the nature and powers of the human 
 mind were fully investigated, and clothed with a 
 clearness and facility of expression, which have 
 served as shining lights to illumine the paths of 
 mental philosophy for more than two thousand 
 years. 
 
 The powers of Plato's mind were of the highest 
 order. He possessed a more than ordinary share 
 of that mental energy, so requisite an ingredient 
 for all great enterprises of philosophy. In all the 
 learning of his age he was profoundly skilled, 
 as well as in the lighter departments of polite 
 literature. He was a great writer, orator, and 
 politician ; and possessed, besides, the power of 
 enduring mental labour to a surprising extent. 
 
 This distinguished philosopher improved all these
 
 60 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GEEECE. 
 
 talents and acquirements by varied and extended 
 travelling. In Italy he devoted ninch of his time to 
 the sages of the Pythagorean School; at Cyrene he 
 studied geometry ; and in Egypt he contracted an 
 acquaintance with the priests, studied astronomy 
 with them, and attempted to penetrate into the 
 sacred mysteries of which they were the sole 
 depositaries. He overran the whole of Greece, re- 
 sided thrice in Sicily, and made himself acquainted, 
 in all the countries he visited, with their forms of 
 government, laws, manners, and social institutions. 
 
 The speculations of Plato constitute an impor- 
 tant epoch in the liistory of mental science ; and 
 chiefly for the following reason. He was the first 
 heathen philosopher who possessed enlarged and 
 refined conceptions of a first universal cause, and 
 of a clivme providence. The loftiness and purity of 
 his principles of natural theology, gave a tone and 
 elevation to all his mental investigations, and 
 preserved him also, in a great measure, from all 
 those extravagant conceits and paradoxes which 
 so materially mar the speculations of his prede- 
 cessors. He cultivated the science of mind in 
 conjunction with the dignified investigations of a 
 comparatively pure theism, and niade, in some de- 
 gree, the former co-operate towards the elucidation 
 of the latter. 
 
 Plato was the first metaphysician who cleai'ly 
 and forcibly laid doTVTi the general principle that a 
 knowledge of the laws of mind was an indispen- 
 sable qualification for prosecuting, with success, 
 physical inquiries. He says, " Philosophers have
 
 PLATO. 61 
 
 laboured for the establishment of science, but have 
 neglected to ask themselves, beforehand, what 
 that science is ; they have speculated upon tilings, 
 and have omitted to examine the nature and 
 offices of that principle of intelligence which 
 alone can exercise itself upon siu'rounding objects. 
 What has been the consequence ? ^^ly, they have 
 transferred their own sensations to objects ; have 
 been entangled in all manner of contradictions ; 
 and have bewildered themselves in clouds of diffi- 
 culties and embarrassments." 
 
 There are, in a certain sense, two souls in man ; 
 we give the name of soul to that physical life and 
 spontaneous activity, to that organic power we 
 possess in common with the animal and vegetable 
 creation. But in a rigorous sense we apply the 
 word soul only to designate the principle of sensi- 
 bility and thought ; this principle is one and 
 simple; for the subject which judges is identical 
 with that which conceives and thinks ; therefore, 
 all knowledge, judgment, and science, appear to be 
 involved in this notion of mental identity or union. 
 This soul which thinks, feels, reasons, and judges, 
 exists only in man ; it emanates from the supreme 
 intelligence ; it is immaterial ; it falls upon the 
 organs of sense, and is not subject to change. 
 Body and soul, though different in their nature 
 and essence, are nevertheless linked together by a 
 powerful bond of union, and exercise on each other 
 a reciprocal influence ; and the health and happi- 
 ness of man consists, in a great measure, in pre- 
 serving this constant harmony.
 
 62 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 We can only thorouglily understand the facul- 
 ties of the mind by carefully studying the effects 
 they produce. We ought then to distinguish as 
 many faculties of the mind as there are different 
 and distinct mental operations. I distinguish at 
 first two principal faculties, that of feeling and 
 thinking . To feel is to be affected by an external 
 impression ; to think is to operate upon our ideas. 
 The faculty of thinking divides itself again into 
 two others, the understanding and reason. The 
 understanding is that power which combines sensi- 
 ble images ; reason is that supreme faculty which 
 regulates all others, directs to an end or object, 
 marks the relations of things, and forms conclu- 
 sions from the whole. The understanding and 
 reason exercise themselves both under an active 
 Sind passive form; under the latter form they re- 
 ceive and preserve notions ; and under the former 
 they are united, separated, combined, and placed 
 in logical and methodical order. These two powers 
 are equally exercised on external objects and intel- 
 lectual notions. Wliat is eminently characteristic 
 of the power of thought, is that ability of uniting, 
 judging, and concluding relative to sensations and 
 ideas. Thought is a species of inward self-instruc- 
 tor; it interrogates itself and furnishes the answers. 
 This self-instructor, through the means of language, 
 forms the Judgment, which consists in the uniting 
 of ideas together, in the same manner as discourses 
 are formed through the instrumentality of nouns 
 and verbs. 
 
 The understanding is closely linked to sensa-
 
 PLATO. 63 
 
 tion ; for every sensation is but a confused judg- 
 ment, which the understanding has afterwards to 
 develop. The latter power unites in one image 
 the detached and apparently unconnected impres- 
 sions to which sensation gives birth; the senses 
 furnish the materials, and the understanding ela- 
 borates them. Though sensibility and reason be 
 two separate powers, opposite in their nature, yet 
 they possess mutual relationships ; they appertain 
 to the same tliinking being, which unites, by an 
 act of mental consciousness, the objects of thought 
 furnished from both sources. 
 
 Let us consider more in detail the particular 
 functions attached to each of these faculties, and 
 the fruits of their joint and separate exercise. 
 There are in our minds images^ notions^ and ideas ; 
 the first belong to sensation, the second to the un- 
 derstanding, and the third to reason. Let us com- 
 mence then with sensible images, for they develop 
 themselves in man a considerable time before the 
 faculty of thinking. The infant experiences sen- 
 sations at its birth, but the indications of thought 
 manifest themselves much later, and in some indi- 
 viduals are hardly ever recognized at all. Besides, 
 the soul and reason cannot be conceived without 
 life and thought, nor these again without the influ- 
 ence of external things upon the organs of sense. 
 There are three things involved in every individual 
 external perception; — the object perceived, the 
 subject which perceives it, and the perception 
 itself which bears a mutual relation to both. Co- 
 lours, smells, &c., reside not in the objects, — they
 
 64 MENTAL PHILOvSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 have their seat only in ourselves. Sensations are 
 then only a certain kind of affections or modifica- 
 tions of the power of sensibility ; the soul is pas- 
 sive in receiving them. An external object acts 
 upon the organs of sense ; certain fibres receive and 
 transmit this impression to the soul. Sensibility 
 is the faculty of being affected, modified, and 
 changed in its condition by this process of sensa- 
 tion. External impressions are remarked and 
 noticed from their diversity and the changes they 
 undergo. In fine, external objects which affect 
 the soul, leave certain traces behind them, the me- 
 mory preserves them, and imagination revives 
 them. 
 
 Sensible perceptions are then the effect of the 
 combined action of external objects upon our organs 
 of sense ; and it is necessary also that these percep- 
 tions should be united in a centre or common focus, 
 and the result of this concentration is the power of 
 consciousness. Each sense transmits to us only a 
 particular species of impressions; the sight, co'- 
 lours ; the ear, sounds ; and so on. Now we have 
 the power of comparing these divers classes of im- 
 pressions, and judging of their analogy and distinct- 
 ness. "Wliat is the faculty which makes this com- 
 parison ? It can be neither one sense nor another ; 
 it must have its source in the soul itself. It is the 
 understanding which performs this office. At the 
 moment when our senses are apprised of the ex- 
 istence of an external ol)ject, we appreciate not at 
 first all its divers qualities of greatness, smallness, 
 &c. This operation belongs to the judgment,
 
 PLATO. 65 
 
 wliicli is seated, as it were, in the centre of the 
 soul, to take cognizance of these impressions. It 
 is in this that the power of abstraction consists. 
 The understanding forms notions then ; that is to 
 say, perceptions of relations and generic qualities, 
 whether as distinguished from or combined with 
 objects possessing a common resemblance or differ- 
 ence ; it isolates them from the particular incidents 
 belonging to them, and thus produces all those 
 abstract notions, without which there could be no 
 clear perception whatever. These abstract notions 
 are partly the fruits of external sensations, and 
 partly of the internal power of thinking ; and, un- 
 der this second relation, are grounded upon our 
 own mental nature. Sensation furnishes us with 
 what is particular and individual ; the understand- 
 ing with what is common and general. The senses 
 furnish us with confused perceptions in the concrete 
 form, and the understanding clear perceptions in 
 the abstract form. 
 
 Such is the general outline of the metaphysical 
 system of Plato. It has many very valuable prin- 
 ciples involved in it ; and it must be considered 
 by aU intelligent and candid judges, as the most 
 important step in the path of speculative inquiry 
 which had, up to his own time, been taken by any 
 philosopher, on the nature and powers of the human 
 mind. 
 
 The great dispute about Plato's metaphysical 
 system, has arisen from doubts as to what he means 
 by the word idea. Controversies innumerable fill 
 the annals of philosoj)hy on this point ; and to this
 
 66 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 hour the question remains as unlikely to be solved 
 as when first propounded. To wade through these 
 controversies can be neither pleasant nor profit- 
 able. Were I to hazard an opinion I would say, 
 that, from all I have read upon the subject, I 
 am fully convinced that Plato meant by the word 
 idea, just the same thing — neither more nor less, 
 than what we do in common conversation or dis- 
 course at the present hour. It is conceded on all 
 hands, that he employed the word to designate al- 
 most all things, both particular and general ; and 
 this can only be accounted for upon rational 
 grounds, that he understood it to mean, according 
 to Locke's definition, tvhatever it is that is the 
 object of a man when he thinks. If Plato had been 
 asked to give a definition of this word, this must, 
 from the mere nature of the tiling, have been what 
 he would have said. Idea is the simple sign of 
 thought. It may be general, it may be particular, 
 it may be true, it may be false ; but it is, in all its 
 phases, just that, and no more, which occupies the 
 mind, or is in the mind, at the time Ipeing. How 
 could Plato, or any man else, give a different defi- 
 nition ? The thing is impossible. To define idea 
 is to define what is the essence of thought.* 
 
 The scientific method of Plato is essentially the 
 same as that of Socrates, with some additions and 
 improvements. In fact, Plato's method is the best 
 which he could form out of all preceding systems, 
 and that of his great master in particular. His 
 
 * See Note B. in the A|)i)entlix to this Volume.
 
 PLATO. 
 
 67 
 
 object, like that of Socrates, was, ^liich was the 
 best mode of seeking after, as well as of communi- 
 cating:, knowledge ? On this point, the following 
 observations from Mr. John Mill are very judicious. 
 Contrasting Plato with Socrates, he says, "No 
 doubt the disciple pushed his mere inquiries and 
 speculations over a more extended surface, and to a 
 greater depth below the surface, than there is any 
 reason to beheve the master did. But though he 
 continually starts more original and valuable ideas, 
 it is seldom that these, when they relate to the 
 results of inquiry, are stated with any air of con- 
 viction, as if they amounted to fixed opinions. 
 But when the topic under consideration is the pro- 
 per mode of philosophising — either the moral spirit 
 in which truth should be sought, or the intel- 
 lectual processes and methods by which it is to be 
 attained ; or when the subject matter is not any 
 particular scientific principle, but knowledge in the 
 abstract, — the differences between knowledge and 
 ignorance, and between knowledge and mere opi- 
 nion, — then the views inculcated are definite and 
 consistent, are always the same, and are put forth 
 with the appearance of earnest and matured be- 
 lief. Even in treating of other subjects, and even 
 when the opinions advanced have the least sem- 
 blance of being seriously entertained, the discourse 
 itself has generally a very strong tendency to illus- 
 trate the conception which does seem to be really 
 entertained of the nature of some part or other of 
 the process of philosophising. The inference we 
 would draw is, that, on the science of the investi- 
 
 F 2
 
 68 MENTAL PniLOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 gation of science, the theory of the pursuit of truth, 
 Plato had not only satisfied himself that his prede- 
 cessors were in error, and Jioio, hut had also adopted 
 definite views of his own; while, on all or most 
 other suhjects, he contented himself with confuting 
 the absurdities of others, pointing out the proper 
 course for inquiry, and the spirit in which it should 
 be conducted, and throwing out a variety of ideas 
 of his o^Ti, of the value of which he was not quite 
 certain, and which he left to the appreciation of any 
 subsequent inquirer competent to sit in judgment 
 upon them." 
 
 Plato has always been a great favourite with the 
 philosophic poets of all countries. Every thing he 
 said, and every thing about him, strengthened this 
 prepossession. The Platonic orb, though burning 
 in a sepulchre, has been as a sliining light to their 
 path. Milton, Young, Thomson, Akenside, as 
 well as Shakspeare and Pope, are conspicuous in- 
 stances in our own country. The four first poets 
 were unusually proficient in Platonic knowledge. 
 They drank its spirit at its source, the genuine 
 living fountain. Shakspeare' s all-searching genius 
 derived its intelligence and direction from such 
 scattered glimpses as shone, to his acute percep- 
 tions, in the pages of the olden and less learned 
 philosophers of the middle ages. The philosophic 
 light was subdued, but it had much resemblance to 
 those roseate hues that linger on the mountain 
 tops long after sun-set ; and men of upward ten- 
 dencies of soul, like Shakspeare, are the cliff's which 
 catch them.
 
 PLATO. 69 
 
 Pope knew little of Platonism himself, and wliat 
 he did know was solely from the Discourses of 
 Bolingbroke, who studied it in the Latin version 
 of the monk Picinus, with all the facility, but le- 
 vity, of his natural temperament ; and who seems 
 to have retailed it, so far as he had mastered it, to 
 his admiring pupil as msdom of his owti. How 
 little Warhurton really knew of the Grecian sage 
 may be guessed at from this, that though the editor 
 of Pope, he did not know that his most brilliant 
 work, " The Essay on Man," was but depraved and 
 corrupted Platonism. 
 
 Goethe has the following remarks on Plato, of 
 whom, like all minds of an imaginative kind, he 
 was passionately fond. " Plato was a happy and 
 beneficent spirit, sent into this world to sojourn in 
 it for a season. He did not seek so much to make 
 himself profoundly acquainted with it, as to com- 
 municate with gracefuhiess those treasures of wis- 
 dom of which mankind stood so much in need. 
 He penetrated into the abyss of speculation, mofe 
 from the lofty grandeur of his nature than from 
 any vain desire for abstraction. He took his flight 
 to celestial regions, his soul glo"vving with desire 
 to participate again in its divine nature. Every 
 thing he said had a relation with the good, the 
 beautiful, and the immutably true ; and he ardently 
 desu-ed to inspire all those who heard him with the 
 same lofty and noble sentiments." 
 
 The same principle which has so powerfully acted 
 on the philosophical spirit of poetry, from Plato's 
 speculations, has also exercised a great influence on
 
 70 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GHEECE. 
 
 the current of theological thought, from the first 
 introduction of Christianity to the present hour. 
 Plato has always been a much greater favourite 
 with divines of all denominations than his pupil 
 Aristotle. There is doubtless spirituality in the sys- 
 tem of the Stagirite ; but it is not the spirituality 
 of Plato. The deity of Aristotle is indeed an active 
 creation, but no more. It exercises no providential 
 care or interest over human affau's. In the eyes 
 of Aristotle the soul is distinct from the body, but 
 without a body it cannot exist. The understanding 
 is connected with the soul, as the soul is with the 
 body, and they must all three perish together. 
 We can readily see, therefore, that Christian phi- 
 losophy could never have any very close alliance 
 with opinions of this description. In Plato, how- 
 ever, we see the creation of the world, and its 
 government, referred directly to the Deity himself; 
 and the immortality of the soul is unqualifiedly 
 maintained. These theological principles consti- 
 tute the great bond between him and all Christian 
 philosophers ; and that bond will remain unsevered 
 till the end of time. 
 
 *** It is impossible to enumerate a fiftieth part of the authors who have 
 written on the works of Plato. Patricius counts, among the ancients 
 alone, sixty-five commentators on the Platonic Philosophy, before the time 
 of Ammonius Saccas in the year 220. We shall give the follovting list of 
 publications on the subject, which will, it is hoped, be found ample 
 enough for any rational purpose of consultation or reference. Apu- 
 leius, De Dogmat. Platonis ; Alcinous, De Doctrina Platonis ; Diog. 
 Laertius, Olympiodorus, Ilesychius. Guarini di Verona, Vita Platonis ; 
 Marsilius Ficinus, Vita Platonis; Melancthon, Oratio de Vita Platonis; 
 L'Abbe Fleury, Discours sur Platon ; Dacier, Vie de Platon ; Sam. Par- 
 ker, A Free and Impartial Censure of Platonic Philosophy, London, 16()6 ;
 
 PLATO. 71 
 
 Bernardi, ia the second book of his Serainarium Totius Philos. Venice, 
 1599; Coclenius, Idea Phil. Platonicse, Marbourg, 1612; Patricius, Plato 
 Mysticus et Exotericus, Venice, 1591 ; Keuke, Disser. De Philos. Pla- 
 tonis, Helmstadt, 1776; Weigenmeier, Disser. De Philos. Platonis, Tu- 
 bingen, 1623; The Articles of the Abbes Fraguier, Garnier, Sallier, and 
 Arnaud, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, Paris ; Tenne- 
 mann. System of Platonic Philosophy, in German, Leipsic, 1792, 4 vols.; 
 Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato, London, 1760. The fol- 
 lowing works are on the Platonic Theory of Ideas : Scipione Agnelli, 
 Venice, 1615, fol. ; Thomasius, LSth Letter; Sibeth, Rostock, 1720 ; 
 Schulz, Wittemberg, 1 755 ; Fachse, Leipsic, 1 795 ; Schants, London, 
 1795 ; Bartstedt, Erlangen, 1761. M. Cousin has given a translation of 
 Plato's AYorks, in French, in 13 vols.; and the reader will find an English 
 translation by Floyer, Sydenham, and Thomas Taylor, in 5 vols., Lon- 
 don, 1804.
 
 72 MENTAL PlIILOSOPnY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Aristotle. 384 b. c. 
 
 The successor of Plato was Aristotle, his pupil ; 
 a genius of transcendent powers and boundless re- 
 putation. He stands alone, without a single com- 
 petitor, in the history of the philosophy of the 
 human mind ; and his speculations have been the 
 fruitful source of more extensive and varied discus- 
 sion, explanation, and comment, than the writings 
 of any other human being that ever figured on the 
 stage of life. 
 
 The extensive range of his inquiry precludes the 
 possibility of giving here anything approacliing 
 even to an outline of his labours. The extent of 
 his acquired knowledge, the systematic turn of his 
 mind, his indefatigable application to study, his 
 unrivalled power of analysis, liis sagacity in detect- 
 ing general principles from a chaos of particular 
 facts, his ardent love of truth, and his clear and 
 forcible language, have been, ever since his own 
 day, the theme of admiration of all the lovers of 
 learning in every civilized country.
 
 ARISTOTLE. 73 
 
 In the following observations under the head of 
 Aristotle, we shall confine ourselves to four points, 
 namely, liis theory of Sensation, his Categories, the 
 Syllogistic theory, and a few cursory remarks as 
 to the nature and principles of Logic in general. 
 These four divisions will embrace the leading topics 
 which the writings of Aristotle, considered exclu- 
 sively in the light of a metaphysician, usually sug- 
 gest to the minds of philosophical readers. 
 
 SENSATION. 
 
 Aristotle's theory of sensation may be developed 
 in the folloAving observations. — 
 
 Sensation is the feeling or emotion we experience 
 from external objects acting upon our organs of 
 sense. This sensation or feeling is, in the first 
 instance, passive and transitory, and is always to be 
 distinguished from those universal feelings which, 
 when once brought under the influence of the will, 
 have a permanent residence in the mind. Of the 
 five senses, Aristotle considered that of touch to 
 be the most important, inasmuch as it is diffused 
 over the whole body, and cannot be destroyed but 
 mtli life itself. The sense of taste he considers a 
 species of touch, for an especial object, — the nutri- 
 tion and support of the body.* The three other 
 senses reside in particular organs, which may be 
 impaired, andeven destroyed, without the risk of 
 life itseK. 
 
 The eye and the ear are appropriated to colours 
 
 * De Anima. 1. 2. c. 3.
 
 74 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 and sounds ; and motion and form are conveyed to 
 the mind through more senses than one. A third 
 class of perceptions are communicated to the mind 
 through the united action of all the senses. 
 
 The real qualities and properties of external 
 bodies are made known to us through the senses ; 
 but those qualities and properties, such as they 
 appear to us, have no actual existence until they 
 are perceived. Previous to sensation, they exist 
 only in what Aristotle calls their causes ; that is, in 
 their fitnesses or susceptibilities to produce certain 
 effects upon our organs of sense. Were man 
 differently constituted, the world would probably 
 assume a very different aspect ; for then sensation 
 might not only inform us of the nature of external 
 things, considered in themselves, but also consi- 
 dered in relation to the peculiar organization of the 
 individual senses. 
 
 The powers of imagination and memory depend 
 upon the senses, and are, in a certain degree, 
 common to man with many other animals. As 
 sensation is created by certain motions excited in 
 the organs ; so imagination and memory, which are 
 copies of sensation, exert their power and energy 
 tlirough the medium of fainter motions, which are 
 representatives of the former.* 
 
 Aristotle considers that the perceptions of ima- 
 gination and memory are amenable to a certain 
 law of order and progression, and differ in this 
 respect from mere sensations. The movements and 
 
 * Rhetor. 1. 1. c. 11
 
 ARISTOTLE. 75 
 
 influences of the latter seem more capricious and 
 wayward. Reminiscences are in some degree un- 
 der the influence of the human vnll ; and the prin- 
 ciples which seem to govern them are four in num- 
 ber, — proximity in time, continuity in place, re- 
 semblance or similarity, and contrariety or contrast. 
 And to shew, he says, how much the will has to 
 do with the act of remembrance, we are conscious 
 of hunting cihoitt, as it toere, among our thoughts, 
 until we meet with connecting cu'cumstances, which 
 bring the past perceptions sought after present be- 
 fore the mind.* 
 
 This faculty of reminiscence, and the poAver the 
 will seems to have over the train of our ideas, is, 
 in Aristotle's conception, a boundary line between 
 man and the other sentient members of creation. 
 The divine principle of reason is recognized in man 
 by the power which he possesses of nioulding the 
 more common sensations and emotions into more 
 elevated and harmonious compounds. Every spe- 
 cific act of remembrance implies comparison ; and 
 every act of comparison, expressed in the simplest 
 manner, indicates a substance diff'erent and separ- 
 able from mere matter. This substance we may 
 not be able fully to detect or describe ; but still we 
 are convinced of its existence, by the mere power 
 of those attributes which we conceive to belong to 
 it, and wliicli manifest their influence by the irre- 
 sistible feeluis^s of consciousness. 
 
 Between the nature and properties of mind and 
 
 * De Memor. p. 682.
 
 76 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GHEECE. 
 
 those of matter, there is a wide and palpahle dis- 
 tinction. It is not sense or fancy wliich has the 
 power to recognize its own heing or existence ; it 
 is the intellectual nature alone. It is this which 
 ennohles man, and confers on him a resemhlance 
 to his Creator. It is this which, when separated 
 from the body, is invested with an immortal and 
 divine nature, and which does not decay mth the 
 bodily tenement it inhabits.* 
 
 THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. 
 
 The different Categories, according to Aristotle, 
 comprehend all of which we can have the least 
 knowledge. They are ten in number, namely, 
 Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, 
 The Where, The When, Position in Space, 
 Possession, and Substance. 
 
 Quantity. — Quantity is divided into discrete and 
 continued. Discrete is that whose parts can really 
 be separated, as number, &c. Continued is that 
 whose parts cannot be separated. These are again 
 divided into successive and permanent. Successive 
 quantity is that which comes by succession, as time 
 and motion. The parts of these cannot be divided 
 as those of number, but run onwards in a continued 
 series. Permanent quantity is that wliich remains 
 always the same, as space, which never changes as 
 
 * De Anima, 1. 3. c. 6. Yarious interpretations have been put upon 
 Aristotle's expressions in this part of his work. We refer the critic to 
 Dr. Gillies' translation of the " Ethics and Politics," vol. L p. 57, and 
 Note ; and also to Lord Mouboddo's " Ancient Metajjliysics," vol. 2. 
 p. 165.
 
 ARISTOTLE. 77 
 
 time and motion do, but has always a lasting and 
 permanent existence. Its category is long, broad, 
 and deep. And here we may ol) serve, that quantity 
 when considered l)arely as extended, without breadth 
 or depth, is called a line ; when it has both length 
 and breadth, a surface ; and when it has length, 
 breadth, and depth, it is denominated a solid. 
 
 Quality. — Tliis is divided into four kinds. Pirst, 
 liahits, which are such endowTnents as are either 
 created or very materially strengthened, by repeated 
 acts of the mind. "V\Tien a man is \irtuous, we say 
 he possesses the habit of virtue. In a similar qua- 
 lified sense we apply the word habit to ivisdom, 
 temj^erance, learning^ &c. Those endoTMnents 
 wliich are acquu*ed by different acts of the mind 
 are also considered as qualities, but they are usu- 
 ally called habits. Secondly, natural poicers, which 
 relate more particularly to our bodies, such as the 
 power of walking, riding, &c. These powers are 
 possessed more or less by all mankind, and can be 
 exercised as occasion requires. Thu-dly, sensible 
 qualities, which are those we acquire by our senses 
 from the operation of external objects, such as co- 
 lours, tastes, smells, sounds, &c. Yovl^lHAj, figure 
 midifoi'm are also ranked under this category ; all 
 external objects must be possessed of these. 
 
 Relation. — This indicates the relative con- 
 nexion of one thing with another, as parent and 
 child, master and servant. It also denotes resem- 
 blance, equality, greatness, smallness, &c. 
 
 Action. — This is either internal or external. 
 Internal action is when I think of a particular
 
 '78 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GllEECE. 
 
 thing confined witliin myself, and effect nothing 
 without me. External action regards something 
 without, as when I cut a piece of wood or hew a 
 stone. 
 
 Passion. — After action, passion naturally fol- 
 lows ; and is always expressed hy a verb. 
 
 The Where. — This answers to the question, 
 "Where was such thing done ? If one ask where 
 such a battle was fought, I tell him it was in such 
 a country, and near such a city. 
 
 The When. — This category gives answers to 
 questions relative to tbne. As, How long is it 
 since he died ? One hundred years ago. 
 
 Position in Space. — This relates to standing, 
 sitting, before, beliind, right, left, &c. 
 
 Possession. — This involves the whole rights of 
 property. 
 
 Substance. — Tliis is divided into two kinds, sjn- 
 ritual and temporal. Spiritual is divided into liv- 
 ing creatures, as men, beasts, birds, &c. ; and tem- 
 poral into inanimate tilings, as metals, minerals, 
 earth, air, stone, &c. Both orders may be subdi- 
 vided again into almost endless classes and varieties. 
 
 These are the famous categories of Aristotle, 
 and every one must see how defective they really 
 are, as a philosophical classification of things. 
 Tliis list was considered for many centuries as the 
 most perfect and complete arrangement of the 
 phenomena of nature that ever was made. On 
 this point Dr. Gillies observes, " The reduction of 
 things to genera or classes, by applying to them 
 common names, is the foundation of division and
 
 ARISTOTLE. 79 
 
 definition, whicli have been called by a just meta- 
 phor the firm handles of science. Each of the 
 categories, or classes, above mentioned, that of 
 substance for example, may be variously divided 
 according to the intent of the division, which may 
 be undertaken for explaining the works of art or 
 of nature ; for delineating the institutions of civil 
 policy, or describing the structure of plants and 
 animals ; in a word, for examining any object, 
 whether material or intellectual, about which 
 human thought is conversant. But for whatever 
 purpose the division is intended, it can be perspi- 
 cuous and satisfactory only when it descends from 
 the more general classes or terms to those which 
 are less general, until it arrives at the lowest 
 species of all, which rejects all further partition but 
 into individuals only. The intermediate terms 
 between the highest genus and the lowest species, 
 stand each of them in two distinct relations, and 
 therefore receive two diff'erent names, that of 
 genus with respect to the less general terms which 
 they contain, and that of species with respect to 
 the more general terms under which they are con- 
 tained. Such is Aristotle's own doctrine concerning 
 classification and division ; a doctrine continually 
 exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well 
 as physical ; and admirably illustrated by some 
 modern writers, especially on the subjects of na- 
 tural history. 
 
 Syllogism. 
 Our observations in this division shall be con-
 
 80 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GUEECE. 
 
 fined to three distinct heads ; namely, first, to show 
 what the syllogism is, according to the usual ex- 
 planations given of it hy logicians and metaphy- 
 sicians ; secondly, to inquire into its nature and 
 ohject ; and thirdly, to state, as briefly as possible, 
 what are the general opinions of the learned on its 
 real luerits, as an instriunent for the discovery and 
 communication of truth. 
 
 The process of reasoning involved in the syllo- 
 gism, has, by some logicians, been looked upon as 
 simply a process of comparison. When we com- 
 pare two things of dissimilar qualities together, we 
 cannot affirm or do anything respecting them, with- 
 out endeavouring to find some intermediate ideas, 
 to reconcile as it were to the mind these dissimilar 
 or contrary qualities. But, it may be asked, by 
 what process is this efi'ected ? And how do these 
 intermediate ideas come to discover the relations 
 of things of an incongruous and opposite nature ? 
 No rational answer can be given to these questions, 
 except this, that such is the constitution of our 
 nature, that when two ideas are presented to our 
 attention, from which no reasoning conclusion can 
 be adduced, it so happens that when one or more 
 intermediate ideas are presented to our minds, and 
 contemplated by them in conjunction with the 
 other two ideas, we instantaneously, as it were, 
 draw a logical inference from the whole. 
 
 It is from this cause that those writers who have 
 argued in favour of the use of syllogisms have 
 founded their doctrine on the principle, that every 
 act of reasoning assumes the form of a syllogism.
 
 ARISTOTLE. 81 
 
 Tliey consider reasoning to be merely an operation 
 of the mind, which deducts some unknown propo- 
 sitions from other propositions which have been 
 rendered familiar by a previous exercise of reason- 
 ing, or are intuitively certain. In every simple 
 process of reasoning, two members or parts are 
 employed; and these members or parts must of 
 themselves be obvious to the understanding, and 
 we assent to their truth immediately upon their 
 enunciation. In a syllogism, the premises are 
 assumed to be self-e\'ident truths ; and if this were 
 not the case, we could never draw any logical in- 
 ference from them. In the major of a syllogism, 
 the connexion between the subject and the predi- 
 cate could not be observed by the mind, by a mere 
 attention to the ideas themselves which compose 
 the major ; for this proposition requires as much 
 proof as the conclusion cbawn from it. In tliis 
 case the mind must find out fresh matter to trace 
 the connexion wanted, and furnish another syllo- 
 gism to establish the first point in the general 
 one. And should it so happen, that this second 
 syllogism is not found sufficient to establish the 
 truth of the first, we must have recourse to a 
 thii'd, and a fourth, and so on, till it be discovered. 
 We go on in this manner, till we arrive at perfect 
 intuitive truths, and here we are compelled to rest 
 satisfied. 
 
 Erom these remarks, it is maintained, therefore, 
 that every single process of reasoning is founded 
 upon intuitive propositions ; and if tliis be not the 
 case, syllogisms must be employed to lay the
 
 82 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 foundation. By this view of the matter, every 
 train of reasoning consists of a greater or lesser 
 number of syllogisms. These may not, in many 
 cases, be put into a formal shape ; but it is entirely 
 from the natural connexion which subsists among 
 the propositions, that the force and conclusiveness 
 of general reasoning proceed. 
 
 To show the nature of the syllogism more 
 clearly, we shall here give an example. Let us 
 take the proposition, and form it into the shape of 
 a syllogism — that man ought to practise justice. 
 Now, we want to discover the relation which ought 
 to subsist between man and Justice ; for the mind 
 does not perceive tliis relation, as the proposition 
 at present stands. By considering the matter a 
 little, we soon learn, that for man to be under an 
 obligation to do a thing, he must have the sagacity 
 to perceive, and the power to execute it. A 
 creature must have the faculty of distinguishing 
 good from evil, as well as the liberty of choosing 
 either, otherwise he lies under no obligation to 
 perform the one or refrain from the other. Now, 
 these are the middle terms or ideas, wliich must be 
 compared by the mind with the first term in the 
 proposition, namely man ; and when we have made 
 this comparison, we find that it may be affirmed of 
 him, that he is a being who can distinguish good 
 from evil, and that he has the liberty of choice in 
 his actions. We have here, then, two distinct 
 judgments that man can distinguish good from evil, 
 and that he has the poicer of himself to do either ; 
 and a third judgment immediately suggests itself,
 
 ARISTOTLE. 83 
 
 that man ought to practise justice. The argument 
 may now be put into the shape of a syllogism, thus — 
 
 " Every creature possessed of reason and liberty 
 ought to practise justice ; 
 Man is a creature possessed of reason and 
 
 liberty, 
 Therefore man ought to practise justice." 
 
 In this syllogism three distinct parts or proposi- 
 tions are involved ; and they are so arranged as to 
 agree with the mode which our minds naturally 
 follow in the arrangement of our ideas in reason- 
 ing. The first two propositions are denominated 
 the premises, because they go before, or lay the 
 foundation for, the other proposition, which is 
 called the conclusion, in consequence of its naturally 
 groA\TLQg out of the premises. But there is a 
 matter here which the reader will do well to 
 consider thoroughly, and make himself master of. 
 The two terms man and Justice, which express the 
 two ideas whose connexion or relation we wish to 
 find out, are called the extremes ; and the inter- 
 mediate idea, by which this connexion or relation 
 is discovered, namely, a being possessed of reason 
 and liberty, takes the name of the middle term. 
 Now we are to understand that before the premises 
 of a syllogism can be established, the terms called 
 the extremes, and the middle term, must be 
 compared together ; for out of this comparison 
 proceeds the very essence of the syllogism. The 
 conclusion is the proposition which arises from the 
 extremes being considered either in connexion 
 
 G 2
 
 84 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 with, or separated from, that wliich appears the 
 result of this comparison. 
 
 E/easoning in common life has been affirmed to 
 be nothing' more than merely ascribing the general 
 qualities of tilings to their objects in matters with 
 which we are concerned. We refer a particular 
 object to some general head or class, which general 
 head or class possesses some fixed attribute or 
 quality. We then ascribe that attribute or quality 
 to the particular object we have placed under the 
 general assortment of things. Thus, if I scrutinize 
 the character of my friend John, and find it to be 
 virtuous, I then begin to reflect that a virtuous 
 character is worthy of esteem and reward ; and I 
 draw the conclusion, that the conduct of John is 
 worthy of esteem and reward. This is the common 
 process which the mind follows in forming judg- 
 ments of tliis description. If we wish to arrange 
 the process of reasoning in the form of a syllogism, 
 it will stand thus : — 
 
 " Every virtuous man is worthy of esteem and 
 reward ; 
 John is a virtuous man. 
 Therefore John is worthy of esteem and reward." 
 
 These few remarks apply to syllogisms in ge- 
 neral. But we come now to speak of the diffe- 
 rent kinds or sorts of syllogisms. There are four 
 general assortments, which take tlieu' rise from the 
 particular situation wliich the middle term holds 
 in the syllogism. 1st, That in which the middle 
 term is the subject of the major proposition, and
 
 ARISTOTLE. 85 
 
 the predicate of the minor. 2nd, That in which 
 the middle term becomes the predicate of both 
 premises. 3rd, That in which the middle term 
 becomes the subject of both premises. And, 4th, 
 That in wliich the middle term is the predicate of 
 the major proposition, and the subject of the 
 mmor. These four different classes or assortments 
 become divided again according to what logicians 
 call their anodes, which are determined by the 
 quantity and quality of the propositions framed into 
 syllogisms. By quantity is meant the consideration 
 of propositions as they relate to universals or par- 
 ticulars ; and by qtiallty^ whether these proposi- 
 tions be of an affirmatice or negative description. 
 All the possible modes of syllogisms may be found 
 by ascertaining how many combinations may 
 be made out of these four general kinds. The 
 number will be sixty-four, which, multiplied by 
 four, will give two hundred and fifty-six. 
 
 Each of these figures has rules peculiar to itself; 
 but there are some rules which are common to all 
 syllogisms ; and Aristotle enumerates the follow- 
 ing. 1st, Every syllogism must have only three 
 terms or propositions. 2nd, The middle term must 
 be taken universally in one of the premises. 3rd, 
 If one of the extremes be particular in one of the 
 premises, it must also be particular in the conclu- 
 sion. 4th, The conclusion must be particular^ if 
 either of the premises be particular ; and negative ^ 
 if either of the premises be negative. 5tli, No term 
 can be taken universally in the conclusion, if it be 
 not taken universally in the premises.
 
 86 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 Without drawing out these general remarks on 
 the natiu'e of syllogisms to a greater length, we 
 shall now advert to a few only of the different 
 kinds of syllogisms. These will he sufficient for 
 common purposes, as well as to illustrate the 
 leading principles of the syllogistic theory. 
 
 There is a kind of syllogism in which the 
 numher of propositions is more than three. This 
 syllogism is technically called a sorites; which 
 means a numher of propositions piled up one upon 
 another, in which the predicate of the first pro- 
 position is made the suhject of the second, and 
 so on, till in the conclusion the predicate is 
 attributed to the first suhject : thus, 
 
 " Man is an animal. 
 Every animal is a body. 
 Every body is a substance. 
 Therefore, every man is a substance." 
 
 Now this particular combination of propositions, 
 it must appear obvious to the reader, may be con- 
 tinued to almost any length we desire, without 
 weakening the premises or grounds on which 
 the conclusion rests. The reason of this is, that 
 this kind of compound syllogisms may be divided 
 into as many simple ones as there are middle 
 terms in the sorites. When such a division takes 
 place, and the simple syllogisms follow one 
 another, the last in the series becomes the con- 
 clusion of the compound syllogism or sorites. 
 This method, therefore, of constructing syllogisms 
 is nothing more nor less than joinmg together
 
 ARISTOTLE. 87 
 
 several simple syllogisms; and consequently the 
 sorites must stand upon the same ground, in 
 respect to logical stability, as do the individual 
 parts of which it is composed. 
 
 There is another kind of syllogisms, called by 
 logicians entliymeme\ where one of the parts is 
 omitted, and is left for the mind to supply upon 
 the spur of the moment. This happens when one 
 or more of the premises is a self-evident truth, and 
 familiar to the mind of every one. Such, for 
 instance, is the foUo^ving : 
 
 " Everv man must breathe. 
 Therefore the king must breathe." 
 
 This syllogism has the appearance of being 
 imperfect, as having only two propositions; but 
 this is not the case. It is really complete ; for the 
 minor proposition, evenj Idng is a man, is omitted, 
 and the reader is suppossd to supply the ellipsis in 
 liis own mind. 
 
 Ealse syllogisms are called paralogisms ; and a 
 false syllogism, the error or fallacy of which is not 
 very readily perceived by the mind, is called a 
 sophism. The following kinds of sophisms are 
 generally treated of by writers on logic. 
 
 Iffuoixitio eleuchi, or a mistake of the question, 
 is a term applied to a proposition which has no 
 necessary connexion with the subject in- dispute. 
 If, for example, a man should Tvish to establish 
 the position, that God is infinitely good and 
 merciful, and begin by demonstratmg His om- 
 niscience, this would be a deviation from the
 
 88 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 question under consideration; for God's omni- 
 science may be granted, and yet His goodness and 
 mercy may still remain subjects of discussion. In 
 like manner, a man may argue that all religion is 
 a delusion; for he has seen some persons who 
 have made loud professions of piety and devotion 
 in public, who were, nevertheless, very profligate 
 and wicked in their general conduct. This also is 
 an ignoratio elenchi, or a mistake of the question ; 
 for a hypocritical professor of a system is here 
 made the test or standard by wliich the nature 
 and truth of that system are to be estimated. 
 
 Fetitio prmcijni, or begging the question, is a 
 term employed to denote the taking for granted 
 the proposition you wish to prove. If a man were 
 to maintain that a certain act of his was not in 
 the least immoral, because it was not contrary to 
 the acknowledged rules of morality, nor to com- 
 mands of Scripture ; he would here be begging the 
 question, and assuming in the outset the very 
 thing he was desirous to prove — the harmless 
 nature of the act. This mode of reasoning is also 
 sometimes called arguing idem per idem. 
 
 Arguing in a circle is when the premises are de- 
 monstrated by the conclusion, and the conclusion 
 by the premises. If, for instance, it be affirmed 
 that the authority of any particular church proves 
 the truth of the sacred Scriptures, and the 
 Scriptures the authority of that church ; this 
 would be arguing in a circle. 
 
 Non causa pro causa^ the assigning of a false 
 cause for any effect. Thus when a person ascribes
 
 ARISTOTLE. 89 
 
 certain events to good or ill luck, to the influence 
 of the planets, or the Hke. 
 
 Fallacia accidentis, arguing from what is local 
 and incidental to what is general and essential. 
 If, for example, a person were to maintain that a 
 bank-note of any country is of a value as universal 
 and absolute as a piece of gold, this would be a 
 fallacia accidentis; for paper money has only a 
 local, but gold a general value. And further, if a 
 man were to say that any particular amusement is 
 dangerous or immoral because it is liable to be 
 abused, this is arguing from what is particular and 
 accidental, to what is general and essential. 
 
 Sophisms of eqiiiuocation, are those which are 
 formed by the employment of ambiguous terms, or 
 terms which are of doubtful meaning. The follow- 
 ing is an old example. — 
 
 " He that says you are an animal says true ; 
 He that says you are a goose, says you arc an 
 
 animal ; 
 Therefore, he that says you are a goose says true." 
 
 We shall add to these remarks on the nature 
 of the syllogistic theory, a few observations from 
 Dr. Ueid, Avho wrote an Analijsis of Aristotle's 
 Logic. The following extract forms a compendium 
 of the precise mode of reasoning exemplified in 
 three forms of the syllogism. 
 
 "In the first figure, the conclusion afiirms or 
 denies something of a certain species or individual; 
 and the argument to prove this conclusion is, that 
 the same thing may be affirmed or denied of the
 
 90 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GllEECE. 
 
 whole genus to wliicli that species or individual 
 belongs. 
 
 " In the second figure, the conclusion is, that 
 some species or individual does not belong to such 
 a genus ; and the argument is, that some attribute 
 common to the whole genus does not belong to 
 that species or individual. 
 
 "In the third figure, the conclusion is, that 
 such an attribute belongs to part of a genus ; and 
 the argument is, that the attribute in question 
 belongs to a species or individual which is part of 
 that genus. 
 
 "I apprehend that, in this short view, every 
 conclusion that falls within the compass of the 
 three figures, as well as the mean of proof, is 
 comprehended. The rules of all the figures might 
 be easily deduced from it; and it appears that 
 there is only one principle of reasoning in all the 
 three ; so that it is not strange, that a syllogism 
 of one figure should be reduced to one of another 
 figure. 
 
 "The general principle in which the whole 
 terminates, and of which every categorical syllo- 
 gism is only a particular application, is this, that 
 what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus may 
 be affirmed or denied of every species and individual 
 belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted 
 certainty indeed, but of no great depth. Aristotle 
 and all the logicians assume it as an axiom, or 
 first principle, from which the syllogistic system, 
 as it were, takes its departure ; and after a tedious 
 voyage, and great expense of demonstration, it
 
 ARISTOTLE. 91 
 
 lands at last in this principle, as its ultimate 
 conclusion. O ciiras homimim ! O quantum est 
 in rebus inane .'" 
 
 That one of the principles on which the syllogism 
 rests is, that the same word is invariably used in 
 the same sense, is quite obvious. Indeed the truth 
 of this position has been attested by a number of 
 enlightened philosophers. Lord Bacon says, "A 
 syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of 
 words, and words are the signs of notions ; there- 
 fore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confined, 
 and over hastily taken from things, notliing that is 
 built on them can be firm."* Professor Stewart 
 remarks, that "the whole theory of the syllogism 
 proceeds on the supposition, that the same word is 
 always to be employed in the same sense ; and 
 that, consequently, it takes for granted, in every 
 rule wliich it furnishes for the guidance of oui* 
 reasoning powers, that the nicest, and by far the 
 most difficult part of the logical process, has been 
 previously brought to a successful termination." f 
 We find M. Turgot making the same remark : — 
 "Tout I'artifice de ce calcul ingenieux, dont 
 Aristote nous a donne les regies, tout I'art du 
 Syllogisme, est fonde sur I'usage des mots dans le 
 meme sens ; I'emploi d'un memo mot dans deux 
 sens difi'erens fait de tout raisonnement un so- 
 pliisme; et ce genre de sophisme, peut-etre le 
 plus commun de tout, est une des sources les 
 plus ordinaires de nos erreurs.":j: 
 
 Nov. Org., part 1. f Elements of M. Phil. vol. 1, p. 35fi. 
 
 (Euv. de M. Turgot, torn. 3, p. 66.
 
 92 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 The nature as well as the utility of the syllogis- 
 tic theory has heen long and keenly contested. 
 !For many ages it was considered almost sinful to 
 call in question either its truth or usefulness. 
 There was no language too eulogistic to sound its 
 praise. The syllogism was considered the noblest 
 and most useful invention ever produced by man ; 
 the universal organ of science; the eye of the 
 intellect ; and, like the sun, the light of the world. 
 It was called the " ars artium, scientia scientiarum, 
 organum organorum, instrumentum instrumen- 
 torum, ancilla, clavis, testa, murus philosophise, 
 docendi discendique magistra, veri falsique discep- 
 tatrix et judex." Aristotle himself was extolled in 
 the same extravagant terms. Pather Par dies, a 
 Prench writer, says, " Que si, dans sa physique, il 
 a parle en homme, dans sa morale il a parle en 
 Dieu ; qu'il y a sujet de douter si, dans ses 
 morales, il tient plus du jurisconsulte que du 
 pretre ; plus du pretre, que du prophete ; plus du 
 prophete que de Dieu." Averroes, an Arabian phi- 
 losopher, declares that " Nature was not altogether 
 complete till Aristotle was born ;" and that in liim 
 " she received the finishing stroke, and could 
 advance no further !" 
 
 The language of modern times is, however, more 
 subdued and modified. We are not all in the same 
 way of tliinking on Aristotle's merits as a logician. 
 There is a diversity of opinion as to the nature and 
 importance of the syllogistic theory. But the dis- 
 pute, though still undecided, is now carried on 
 with more calmness and liberality than in bygone 
 times. And perhaps the day is not far distant
 
 ARISTOTLE. 93 
 
 when an unanimous and settled opinion will be 
 formed by all speculative thinkers, as to the true 
 nature of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of 
 that portion of praise to which they are justly 
 entitled. , 
 
 On the general value of the syllogistic art, I 
 cannot refrain from giving the opinion of the late 
 Professor Stewart. He says : — " The remarks which 
 were long ago made by Lord Bacon on the inutility 
 of the syllogism as an organ of scientific discovery, 
 together Tvith the acute strictures in Locke's Essay 
 on this form of reasoning, are so decisive in point 
 of argument, and, at the same time, so familiarly 
 knoAvn to all who turn ^heir attention to philo- 
 sophical inquires, as to render it perfectly unneces- 
 sary for me, on the present occasion, to add any 
 thing in sujiport of them. I shall, therefore, in 
 the sequel, confine myself to a few general and 
 miscellaneous reflections on one or two points 
 overlooked by these eminent writers ; but to which 
 it is of essential importance to attend, in order to 
 estimate justly the value of the Aristotelian logic, 
 considered as a branch of education. 
 
 "It is an observation which has been often re- 
 peated since Bacon's time, and Avhich, it is astonish- 
 ing, was so long in forcing itself on the notice of 
 philosophers, that in all our reasonings about the 
 established order of the universe, experience is our 
 sole guide, and knowledge is to be acquired only 
 by ascending from particulars to generals ; whereas 
 the syllogism leads us invariably from universals 
 to particulars, the truth of which, instead of being
 
 94 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 a consequence of the universal proposition, is im- 
 plied and presupposed in the very terms of its 
 enunciation. The syllogistic art, therefore, it has 
 been justly concluded, can be of no use in extendi/ng 
 qur knoioledge of nature. 
 
 " It isj not, however, merely as a useless or 
 inefficient organ for the discovery of truth, that 
 this act is exceptionahle. The importance of the 
 very ohject at wliich it professedly aims, is not a 
 little douhtful. To exercise with correctness the 
 powers of deduction and of argumentation ; or, in 
 other words, to make a legitimate inference from 
 the premises before us, would seem to be an in- 
 tellectual process which requires but little assist- 
 ance from rule. The strongest evidence of this is, 
 the facility with which men of the most moderate 
 capacity learn, in the course of a few months, to 
 comprehend the longest mathematical demonstra- 
 tions ; a facility which, when contrasted with the 
 difficulty of enlightening their minds on questions 
 of morals or politics, affords a sufficient proof that 
 it is not from any inability to conduct a mere 
 logical process that our speculative errors arise. 
 The fact is, that, in most sciences, our reasonings 
 consist of a very few steps ; and yet, how liable 
 are the most cautious and the most sagacious to 
 form erroneous conclusions ! 
 
 "The fundamental idea on wliich Aristotle 
 evidently proceeded, and in which he has been so 
 implicitly followed by many even of those who have 
 rejected his syllogistic theory, takes for granted, 
 that the discovery of truth chiefly depends on this
 
 ARISTOTLE, 95 
 
 reasoning faculty which constitutes the intellectual 
 superiority of one man ahove another. The simi- 
 larity between the words reason and reasoning, of 
 which I formerly took notice, and the confusion 
 which it has occasioned in their appropriate mean- 
 ings, has contributed powerfully to encourage and 
 to perpetuate this unfortunate mistake."* 
 
 Logic. 
 The principle laid do^ii by Aristotle, is, that all 
 reasoning whatever rests on one simple principle : 
 that "what is predicated, either affirmatively or 
 negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated 
 in like manner of anything contained under that 
 term." This, I conceive, must ever be considered 
 a very inadequate definition of what a process of 
 reasoning is, metapliysically considered. All rea- 
 soning is called 2^ process ; now we want to know 
 what this process is. But we shall look in vain 
 for any thing in the logical works of Aristotle, or 
 of his commentators, ancient or modern, wliich 
 throws light on this curious process. To afiirm, 
 or deny, or predicate anything of one or of 
 many things, is not a process ; it seems, from an 
 appeal to consciousness, to be a simple act of the 
 mind; consequent, however, upon other previous 
 acts or perceptions of the thinking principle. It 
 may be safely afiirmed, that the whole theory of 
 reasoning, considered as invoMng mental pheno- 
 mena, is very imperfectly understood, even from 
 
 * Elements of the Pliil. of the Mind, p. 42/. Edit. 183G.
 
 96 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 the WTitings of our ablest and most perspicuous 
 writers. This subject will, however, come under 
 the reader's attention in a subsequent part of 
 this work. 
 
 Aristotle dissented from Plato's notion relative 
 to the nature of ideas, and in many parts seems to 
 condemn it rather severely. But it is still a mat- 
 ter of great difficulty to determine the precise 
 character and import of Aristotle's objections to his 
 master's theory. The former agrees with the latter, 
 that the essences of things are expressed in our 
 notions of them, but that this essence is not found 
 in the general ideas which we form. This contro- 
 versy has given rise to considerable discussion in 
 Germany ; and to those who may feel any interest 
 in it, we refer them to the end of the volume.* 
 
 To these remarks I would add the foUomng 
 observations from Mr. Stewart, whose opinion on 
 the subject in question, is entitled to great respect. 
 "On most of these points, the i^liilosopliy of Aris- 
 totle seems to have coincided xjery nearly icith that 
 of Flato. The language, however, which these plii- 
 losophers employed on this subject was different, 
 and gave to their doctrines the appearance of a 
 wider diversity than probably existed between their 
 opinions. While Plato was led, by his passion for 
 the marvellous and the mysterious, to insist on the 
 incomprehensible union of the same idea or essence 
 with a number of individuals, without multipli- 
 cation or division; Aristotle, more cautious, and 
 
 * See Note C. at the end of this Volume.
 
 ARISTOTLE. 1)7 
 
 aiming at greater perspicuity, contented himself 
 with saying, tliat all individuals are composed of 
 matter and form ; and that it is in consequence of 
 possessing a common form, that different indivi- 
 duals belong to the same genus. But they both 
 agreed, that as the matter or individual natures 
 of objects were perceived by sense, so the general 
 idea, or essence, or form, was perceived by the 
 intellect ; and that as the attention of the vulgar 
 was chiefly engrossed with the former, so the latter 
 furnished to the philosopher the materials of his 
 speculations. 
 
 "The chief diff'erence between the opinions of 
 Plato and Aristotle on the subject of ideas, relates 
 to the mode of their existence. That the matter 
 of which things are made, existed from eternity, 
 was a principle which both admitted; but Plato 
 further taught, that of every species of things, 
 there is an idea of form w^hich also existed from 
 eternity; and that this idea is the exemplar or 
 model according^ to which the individuals of the 
 species were made; whereas Aristotle held, that, 
 although matter may exist without form, yet that 
 form could not exist without matter."* 
 
 On the subtile, though important, doctrine of 
 Cause and Effect, Aristotle's opinion is worthy of 
 a passing notice. He divides all causes into four 
 kinds ; the material, the formal, the efficient, and 
 the Jinal. Material causes relate to the substance 
 or matter out of which things were originally 
 
 * Philos. of Mind. Vol. 1. p. 88. See also Brucker, Dr. Reid, 
 Harris's Hermes, and the work, " Origin and Progress of Language." 
 
 * H
 
 98 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 made ; the formal designate that inward structure 
 or form, on which rest the outward figure and 
 diversified appearances of things ; the efficient 
 cause is the instrument of motion or change ; and 
 the final cause is the end or purpose which certain 
 things were made to accomplish. 
 
 "A student passing from the works of Plato," 
 it has heen well said, " to those of Aristotle, is 
 struck first of all with the entire ahsence of that 
 dramatic form and that dramatic feeling with 
 which he has been familiar. The living human 
 beings with whom he has conversed have passed 
 away. Protagoras, and Prodicus, and Hippias are 
 no longer lounging upon their couches in the 
 midst of groups of admiring pupils ; we have no 
 walks along the walls of the city; no readings 
 beside the Ilissus ; no lively symposia, giving 
 occasion to high discourses about love ; no Critias 
 recalling the stories he had heard in the days of 
 his youth, before he l3ecame a tyrant of ancient 
 and glorious republics ; above all no Socrates form- 
 ing a centre to these various groups, while yet he 
 stands out clear and distinct in his individual 
 character, showing that the most subtle of dialec- 
 ticians may be the most thorouglily humorous and 
 humane of men. Some little sorrow for the loss 
 of those clear and beautiful pictures will perhaps 
 be felt by every one; but by far the greater 
 portion of readers will believe that they have an 
 ample compensation, in the precision and philoso- 
 phical dignity of the treatise, for the richness and 
 variety of the dialogue. To hear solemn disquisi-
 
 ARISTOTLE. 99 
 
 tions solemnly treated; to hear opinions calmly 
 discussed without interruptions or personalities ; 
 above all, to have a profound and considerate judge, 
 able and not unwilling to pronounce a positive 
 decision upon the evidence before him ; this they 
 think a great advantage, and this, and far more 
 than this, they expect, not wrongfully, to find in 
 Aristotle."* 
 
 *** The Commentators on Aristotle are still more numerous than on 
 
 Plato. The following may be consulted with advantage : The ancient 
 
 Commentators, Simplicius, Alexander Aphrodisicus, Ammouius son of 
 
 Hermeas, Porphyry, and Themistius. Among the moderns : Bernardi, 
 
 Seminarium Philos. Peripat., Lyons, 1599; Crassot, Institutiones in 
 
 Universam Aristotelis Philosophiam, Paris, 1619; La Ramee, Animad- 
 
 versiones Aristot. Paris, 1518; Gassendi, Exercitationes Paradoxicae, 
 
 Grenoble, 1624; Delaunay, De vari. Philosoph. Arist. Paris, 1653; 
 
 Charpentier, Descriptio universEC artis Disserendi ex Ai'istotelis Logico 
 
 Organo, Paris 1564; Mazzoni, Italian translation, Venice, 1547; Back- 
 
 mann, German translation, Nordhausen, 1629; French translation by 
 
 Charpentier, 1574. The English reader will find Gillies' translation of 
 
 several of Aristotle's works useful ; and the translation of all his works 
 
 by Taylor, in 9 Volumes, may also be beneficially consulted. 
 
 * Ency. Metropoli. Art. Moral and Met. Phil. 
 
 h2
 
 100 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 ON ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND ANALOGY, CONSI- 
 DERED IN RELATION TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 In almost all the speculations of the ancient 
 philosophers, we find more or less attention given 
 to the powers of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. 
 The degrees of importance assigned to these 
 respective powers were various ; some referring 
 nearly the whole phenomena of thought to them ; 
 while others again confer upon them hut a passing 
 notice. To enter into all the discussions on the 
 nature and limitations of the faculties we find in 
 the writings of the sages of antiquity, is out of our 
 power ; but we shall hazard a few general observa- 
 tions on these constituent principles of thought, 
 which exercise so marked an influence over the 
 mental movements of all mankind. 
 
 By analysis we must understand the dividing 
 and separating a general truth or proposition into 
 its elementary or component parts. This is a
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 101 
 
 mental process carried on to a great extent by all 
 men, without their being, in ordinary cases, in the 
 least degree conscious of its operation. Wlien a 
 beautiful and extensive landscape bursts suddenly 
 upon our view, the mind is occupied with the con- 
 sideration of the whole taken together ; but after 
 a certain time has elapsed, we begin to examine 
 the different parts of which this landscape is 
 composed; to reflect upon and examine them, 
 and to apportion out to each individual part, ac- 
 cording to our knowledge and taste, its due propor- 
 tion of influence in the general effect produced. 
 We examine the landscape by piece-meal ; begin- 
 ning, in ordinary cases, with the most important 
 parts, and descending in the scale of promi- 
 nency, till our observations have assumed a suffi- 
 cient degree of minuteness to gratify the spmt 
 of inquiry, or to grasp the mental object of which 
 we are in search. 
 
 Those who can attend to the operations of their 
 o\\Ti minds, wdll readily perceive the vast use of 
 this power of analysis, and how necessary its culti- 
 vation and exercise are to our making any progress 
 in many important branches of human knowledge. 
 Referring again, by way of illustration, to an in- 
 teresting landscape, we know that the artist who 
 can furnish a representation of it, must be greatly 
 indebted to this power of analysis. He must 
 carefully attend to the effects of the scene as a 
 whole ; and yet he must, at every step of his per- 
 formance, be carrying on a most accurate and 
 minute process of analytical division. He must
 
 102 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 give to every part of the landscape a proper degree 
 of attention. The general aspect is grasped as a 
 whole by his mind ; and then it is parcelled ont 
 among the rocks, and prominences, and waterfalls, 
 and woods, and buildings, &c., in suitable propor- 
 tions, according to the principles of art. Indeed, 
 it is to this habit of analyzing his ideas of the 
 sublime and beautiful in external nature, that he 
 owes his skill ; for if he had no art to separate his 
 general conceptions into theu' component parts, 
 and apportion out to each its suitable situation, as 
 to dimensions, light, shade, distance, colour, &c., 
 his canvass would l3e one miiform representation 
 of shapeless nonentities. 
 
 And the case is precisely the same with one 
 who, instead of representing a landscape on can- 
 vass, presents you with a verbal description of it. 
 No general language can possibly convey to you 
 the most distant conception of the landscape, till 
 the describer descends into particulars, and divides 
 the object which occupies his thoughts into its se- 
 veral parts. He must talk to you of the conical- 
 topped mountain ; the rugged and prominent cliff, 
 overhanging the banks of the river ; the weeping 
 willows shading the waters from your view ; and 
 the tremendous roar of the mountain torrent, as it 
 dashes from rock to rock. There must be indivi- 
 duality embodied in every part of his description, 
 that it may be understood and relished by those to 
 whom it is addressed; and when the whole has 
 been analyzed into sufficiently minute portions, 
 these are all summed up, as it were, by the mind,
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 103 
 
 and united into one general and uniform represen- 
 tation. 
 
 The same power of the mind we are here de- 
 scribing, is called into active exercise in tlie efforts 
 made in the current literature of all ci\dlized na- 
 tions to delineate human character, in its various 
 forms and aspects. But here, as in painting and 
 descriptive writing, general ideas must be resolved 
 into their individual parts, before our descriptions 
 of character can be rendered intelligible, or in 
 unison with nature. In drawing a mental or moral 
 portrait, we must begin with the leading and more 
 conspicuous traits of character, and gradually de- 
 scend to the more hidden and* minute principles of 
 action and passion; filling up the sketch, as we 
 proceed, with the little angular prominences and 
 ' whimsical eccentricities, which diversify the wide 
 and extended range of human nature. In those 
 Avritings descriptive of men's habits of thinking, 
 powers of mind, moral principles, passions and 
 sentiments, we immediately recognise the hand of 
 a master, if the description display a minute and 
 skilful exercise of the power of analyzing. We are 
 never deceived in this matter, but promptly pro- 
 nounce the portrait to be admirably drawn, when 
 all the parts wliich constitute the picture pass in 
 review before our minds, and become invested with 
 an evident unity of design and appearance. 
 
 In subjects of an abstract and profound nature, 
 the mind follows the same plan to arrive at truth. 
 The process employed in abstruse sciences has fre- 
 quently been illustrated by a piece of machinery.
 
 104 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Let US take the steaiii-engine for an example. We 
 wish to make ourselves well acquainted with its 
 nature and mode of operation. If we wish to ob- 
 tain this information by the analytic method, we 
 take the engine to pieces, and examine its parts 
 separately. When we have seen the action and 
 use of all the parts of which it is composed, com- 
 pared them together, and seen their mutual de- 
 pendence and relationship, we then discern the 
 nature and use of a steam-engine. We have \m- 
 ravelled the mystery, and can now discover the 
 cause of those phenomena which so often puzzled 
 us. 
 
 Before proceeding farther, however, we would 
 call the attention of the reader to a few remarks in 
 reference to the j)ower of analysis. The analytic 
 method is never used alone, but generally conjoin- 
 ed with the synthetic method. They are often 
 alternately employed by the mind ; and these alter- 
 nations are, in the majority of instances, so quick 
 and rapid, that we cannot perceive them, even by 
 the strongest efforts of consciousness. The manner 
 in which we exert these faculties is this. We first 
 take the general proposition as a whole, divide it 
 into its elementary parts; we then sum up all 
 these parts again, to form afresh the original pro- 
 position. Thus we employ both analysis and syn- 
 thesis. These two operations are strictly distin- 
 guishable from each other, from the point at which 
 they set out in the reasoning process. If we begin 
 at the top, and descend, it is analysis; if at the 
 bottom, and ascend, it is synthesis.
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 105 
 
 Analysis by itself would never, however, lead us 
 to truth. And here we must notice a peculiarly 
 important principle, arising out of the mechanism 
 of the understanding, in relation to this analyzing 
 process. Were we to go on to analyze every object 
 presented to our minds, we would never get any 
 nearer the truth. There is a limit beyond which 
 our division of objects must cease ; but this limit 
 cannot be specifically pomted out by any precise 
 rules or precepts of logic. This discriminating 
 power is under the control of the superior faculties 
 of the mind ; and commonly goes by the name of 
 judgment^ taste, &c. To be entirely destitute of 
 this power, is to be entirely destitute of intellec- 
 tual acumen ; and on the contrary, to possess this 
 power, and to know how to regulate it properly, 
 constitute the distinguishing properties of a ra- 
 tional being. 
 
 Let us suppose that a painter, when he endea- 
 vours to represent a landscape, should direct his 
 attention so minutely to evcrytliing which com- 
 posed the rural scene before him, as to dwell upon 
 every leaf of a tree, every blade of grass, and every 
 minute object which came within the sphere of liis 
 vision, he could never by this means complete a 
 picture at all. The analysis would be too minute, 
 and carried beyond its legitimate boundaries. 
 Agam, should a man, when he wishes to make 
 himself acquainted with a piece of machinery, such, 
 for instance, as the steam-engine already referred 
 to, dwell with fastidious and scrutinizing minute- 
 ness on the nature, configuration, and properties
 
 106 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 of all the fibres of wood which compose the frame- 
 work of the machine, or the grains of metal, or the 
 shape and number of the nails which have been 
 employed in the construction of the boiler ; if, in 
 fact, he were to attempt to analyze every thing re- 
 lating to the object of his inquiries, he might so 
 employ himself for a thousand years, and be no 
 nearer a correct understanding of the nature and 
 power of the engine, than the first day he com- 
 menced his investigations. Thus it appears that 
 an unlimited analysis can lead to nothing. But 
 this power is wisely placed under the control of 
 the judgment ; and, while she occupies her supre- 
 macy, the power of analysis is carried just to that 
 point which is necessary to make us perceive the 
 truth of the general propositions of which the mind 
 is in search. 
 
 These two powers of analysis and synthesis enter 
 into every process of reasoning, however limited or 
 unimportant. We are almost every moment of 
 our lives employing them. These operations, how- 
 ever, are frequently so subtle and rapid, that it can 
 only be from long attention to the inward workings 
 of our own minds, that a habit can be permanently 
 formed of readily recognising their existence and 
 influence upon our intellectual movements. Erom 
 the writings of logicians and metaphysicians, the 
 reader might be led to imagine that the analytic 
 and synthetic methods of reasoning are purely 
 matters of art^ and only of very recent invention. 
 But this is a great mistake. The division of our 
 general conceptions or ideas into their component
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 107 
 
 parts, and the power of again uniting them into 
 their former state of aggregation, are faculties inti- 
 mately blended with the very earliest movements 
 of the mind of man, however rude or unenlightened 
 it may be. We recognise the application of these 
 intellectual instruments in the savage, as well as in 
 the philosopher, as far as their respective degrees 
 of knowledge require that application. 
 
 These remarks will be sufficient to illustrate the 
 analytic method of reasoning ; we come now to the 
 synthetic method, or that of induction. We here 
 reverse the order followed in analysis. In seeking 
 knowledge for ourselves, or in communicating it to 
 others, by the synthetic plan, we begin with the 
 simple and elementary parts of which general 
 truths or propositions are composed. In abstract 
 science, we commence with intuitive or self-evident 
 truths or axioms, and advance by regular steps up- 
 wards, carrying evidence and conviction along with 
 us ; so that, at every interval of our reasoning, we 
 have a clear view of the ground wliicli we have 
 immediately gone over, and the reasons which, at 
 every point, have commanded our assent. 
 
 In natural philosophy the synthetic method is 
 generally adopted. In making experiments and 
 observations upon various objects, we notice the 
 result ; and by comparing and judging, we come 
 to the knowledge of those quantities or properties 
 of bodies which are common to many apparently 
 different sul) stances. As we follow up this process 
 we come to generalize still more, until we arrive at
 
 108 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 what we call the ultimate principles of bodies, or 
 general laAVs of nature. 
 
 What generally passes under the denomination 
 of method, is simply the exercise of these two 
 powers of analysis and induction. Our all-wise 
 Creator has assigned them a conspicuous place 
 among our intellectual principles. There is in man 
 a love of order and arrangement, which manifests 
 itself at a very early period of life. At the first 
 dawn of reason, ere the mental powers have ac- 
 quu^ed almost any strength, we find the young 
 child begin to make selections of material objects, 
 and to arrange and classify them according to a 
 particular standard fixed in his mind, as to colour, 
 size, &c. Some faint traces of this power are 
 discernible in the inferior creation ; but it is vastly 
 pre-eminent in man. It gradually develops itself 
 as he advances to manliood ; enables him to divide 
 and methodize his thoughts and sentiments ; and 
 becomes of vital importance in the proper discharge 
 of those numerous duties which fall to his lot to 
 perform. 
 
 Analysis and induction, however, viewed singly, 
 cannot be regarded as instruments either for the dis- 
 covery or promulgation of truth. Another power 
 is absolutely necessary, — that of analogy ; and to 
 it, therefore, we shall call the attention of the 
 reader. 
 
 We have, in the preceding remarks, pointed out 
 at some length the importance of the two opera- 
 tions of the mind, called analysis and synthesis. 
 But we must here observe, that these faculties
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 109 
 
 .would be of very little use if we did not pos- 
 sess the power of reasoning from analogy. If 
 we required to analyze every object which came 
 before us, and to resolve it into its general prin- 
 ciples, before we could pronounce with certainty 
 any thing respecting it, our actual knowledge 
 would be exceedingly circumscribed indeed. Here, 
 however, another operation of the mind is brought 
 into ]olay, which relieves us from an inconceivable 
 degree of trouble, enlarges our knowledge, and 
 expands our reasoning powers to an almost indefi- 
 nite extent. This process is analogy. If we ana- 
 lyze a portion of matter into its elementary parts, 
 we firmly believe that another, possessing the same 
 external appearances as the former, is composed of 
 like materials. If Ave see a man following a certain 
 line of conduct, and bringing upon himself and 
 others poverty and disease, we immediately draw 
 the conclusion that the like will happen to others 
 if they tread in the same steps. In these respec- 
 tive instances we do not institute an inquiry into 
 every indi\ddual object upon which we reason and 
 decide ; Ijut we di'aw our conclusions from what we 
 have actually experienced, and apply them to 
 objects of a similar nature, which we may, never- 
 theless, never have submitted to personal examina- 
 tion. 
 
 The term analogy is generally used, both in 
 common language and in systems of logic and 
 philosophy, to denote a certain degree of relation, 
 agreement, or resemblance in some points, between 
 two or more objects, which in other respects have
 
 110 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 little in common, or possess altogether different 
 properties or quaKties. It must he ohvious, from 
 the immense variety of the works of creation, that 
 the ohjects which hear a relation or resemhlauce to 
 one another must be numerous beyond the possi- 
 bility of calculation, and we shall tind that analogy 
 or resemblance is of every degree, from nearly 
 complete identity to direct opposition or contra- 
 riety. 
 
 A great portion of the reasoning of mankind is 
 founded upon analogy. It is in constant and uni- 
 versal use, and is employed alike by the rustic and 
 the philosopher. It is one of those instruments 
 which the Almighty has placed in our hands to 
 secure our comfort and welfare, and to develop for 
 our information the laws of nature ; but, like all 
 other gifts from the same munificent source, it 
 requu'es to be judiciously applied to the proper and 
 legitimate ]ourposes for which it was given. 
 
 In almost every department of human know- 
 ledge analogical reasonings are employed to a great 
 extent, and are found to be of vast utility. In 
 the science of comparative anatomy, for example, 
 it is of singular importance to trace out the resem- 
 blances between the structiu^es of different animals, 
 their organs of sensation, digestion, and motion; 
 and from this analogical inquiry we may draw 
 useful conclusions for the government of our own 
 conduct and constitution, and the promotion of 
 our interests. Por example, we make experiments 
 with certain kinds of food on the digestive organs 
 of dogs, and from these we infer or draio con-
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. Ill 
 
 elusions that such and such effects will result to 
 ourselves from taking these same kinds of food; 
 and these experiments have often led to the forma- 
 tion of rules of diet and regimen of considerable 
 importance to our bodily health. Many highly 
 beneficial discoveries in medicine may be traced to 
 experiments and observations made upon the in- 
 ferior animals, founded upon the resemblance be- 
 tween their functions of life and our own. 
 
 In chemical science we may perceive the won- 
 derful effects produced by the operation of the 
 principle of analogy. Many of the most splendid 
 and important discoveries in this science were the 
 result of analogical reasonings. It was from this 
 source that Dr. Priestley proved the compound 
 nature of atmospheric air ; and it is related that it 
 was in consequence of hints which he had given, 
 when on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded 
 entirely upon analogical conjectures, that the latter 
 philosopher was induced to commence experiments, 
 with the View of proving the compound nature of 
 water, and of reducing it to its constituent ele- 
 ments. Indeed the whole history of this impor- 
 tant and useful department of human knowledge 
 exhibits very striking and incontestable proofs, 
 how much of the science owed its existence to 
 mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many 
 cases, upon slight resemblances or analogies. 
 
 In the science of astronomy we find that analogy 
 has been the principal instrument in conducting 
 us to important discoveries and improvements. 
 The law of gravitation, as unfolded by Sir Isaac
 
 112 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Newton, was discovered by a train of analogical 
 reasoning founded on one of the most trifling cir- 
 cumstances which daily present themselves to our 
 notice. While Sir Isaac sat ruminating under a 
 tree in his garden, an apple happened to drop from 
 it, and hit him on the head. He conceived that 
 the same law which determined the fall of the 
 apple might possibly be that which moved the 
 heavenly bodies in their orbits. This led to in- 
 quiry, and inquiry ended in a full and settled con- 
 viction, that the law which regulates the motion 
 of terrestrial bodies is the same which regulates 
 the movements of the sun, moon, and whole plane- 
 tary system. And it is by observing the motions 
 of the planets which belong to our solar system, 
 and by comparing their annual and diurnal motions 
 with the corresponding motions of the earth, that 
 we come to the well-grounded conclusion that 
 these planets are the habitations of various orders 
 of living beings ; for we are confident that the sun 
 imparts both light and heat to the planets as well 
 as to our globe ; and as his inflaence gives birth to 
 the various animated beings with which we are 
 conversant, "analogy," says La Place, "induces 
 us to believe that his influence produces similar 
 effects on the planets ; for it is not natural to sup- 
 pose that matter, of which we see the fecundity 
 develop itself in such various ways, should be 
 sterile upon a planet so large as Jupiter, which 
 like the earth has its days, its nights, and its years, 
 and on which observation discovers changes that 
 indicate very active forces. Man, formed for the
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 113 
 
 temperature which he enjoys upon earth, could 
 not, according to all appearance, live upon the 
 other planets; hut may there not he a diver- 
 sity of organization suited to the various tempe- 
 ratures of the glohes of this universe ? If the 
 difference of elements and climates causes such 
 variety in the productions of the earth, hoAV in- 
 finitely diversified must be the productions of the 
 planets and their satellites. The most active imagi- 
 nation cannot form any just idea of them, hut still 
 their existence is extreihely probable." 
 
 It would be impossible in this chapter to advert 
 to all the advantas^es which analo£:ical reasonino* 
 has conferred, and is daily conferring, upon science. 
 But these advantages are not exclusively confined 
 to matters of abstract speculation ; they influence 
 us also, to a wonderful extent, even in our common 
 and every-day occupations, opinions, and language. 
 Nearly the whole of oiu' knowledge of human 
 nature is founded upon analogy; though it is 
 commonly, but very erroneously, attributed to 
 experience. We conclude, that any given line of 
 conduct Avill be pleasant or disagreeable to our 
 fellow-men, merely because we conceive them to be 
 of a similar construction with ourselves in body, 
 mind, and moral feelings. "Wlien we confer bene- 
 fits upon our neighbour, we conceive that he will 
 feel grateful, because we presume that his nature 
 is similar to our own; and for the same reason, 
 when we inflict an injury upon him, we conceive 
 that he will feel and express indignation. The 
 
 *
 
 114 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 food wliicli is palatable and noimshing to us, 
 or that which is unpleasant and pernicious," we 
 judge will produce like effects upon other people, 
 solely because we ground our conclusions upon the 
 analogical hypothesis that there is a close simi- 
 larity among all men in the organs of digestion and 
 general powers of life. 
 
 The whole structure of metaphorical language 
 is grounded on the resemblance or analogy which 
 the imagination conceives to exist among different 
 objects. We say that vii'tue is fair and beautiful, 
 that the mind is strong and robust, active and 
 lively, precisely because we conceive there is some- 
 thing in the moral and mental qualifications 
 angilogous to the material objects which we clothe 
 with these attributes. Metaphorical expressions 
 will always be found most numerous in the 
 writings of those authors who are led, from the 
 habits of theu' minds, into extensive comparisons 
 and a minute examination of the works of nature. 
 The poet is a well known instance of this. It is 
 from metaphors and similes that a great deal of the 
 pleasure which poetry affords us is derived. We 
 clothe the objects of nature, both animate and 
 inanimate, with various properties and attributes ; 
 but all these must in true poetry be founded upon 
 some real or apparent analogy or resemblance, 
 otherwise we derive no pleasure from poetical 
 metaphors ; on the contrary, nothing so readily 
 disgusts and puts us out of humour with our 
 author, as when his similes and metaphors do
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 115 
 
 not suggest to our minds some natural or fancied 
 resemblance to the objects which they are designed 
 to represent. 
 
 But though analogy is one of the most powerful 
 and general operations to which the mind resorts, 
 and the exercise of it seems indispensable to our 
 comfort, nay, to our very existence, yet it is not 
 placed beyond the reach of misapplication. Ana- 
 logy frequently leads us into gross errors, both in 
 speculation and practice; and we ought at all 
 times, in using it, to exercise a \dgilant circum- 
 spection over all conclusions which seem to rest 
 exclusively on analogical reasonings ; and more 
 especially if these conclusions involve subjects of 
 deep interest to our present or future well-being. 
 Were we able, in the majority of cases, to trace 
 the remote or hidden springs of those actions 
 which hiu'iy the unthinking and profligate part 
 of mankind to a course of life destructive of their 
 virtue, their comfort, and existence, we should find 
 that a great part of their misfortunes might he 
 fairly attributed to erroneous or fanciful analogies, 
 or miscalculations as to the effects of any given 
 line of conduct. 
 
 In our abstract and speculative opinions, we are 
 also greatly affected by erroneous or doubtful re- 
 semblances ; and no one can take up a book on 
 controversial topics of any description, without no- 
 ticing that the differences of opinion may, in nine 
 cases out of ten, be attributable to some false ana- 
 logies incidentally introduced, as it were, into the 
 
 I 2
 
 116 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF GREECE. 
 
 discussion, and made the ground- work of tlie wliole 
 matter of dispute. To give an example of this kind 
 of influence on our speculative conclusions, arising 
 from erroneous analogies, will perhaps prove more 
 strikingly illustrative of the truth of these remarks, 
 than any general observations T^liich could be made 
 upon the subject. The quotation I am about to 
 give relates to the long and keenly contested ques- 
 tion on liberty and necessity ; and the extract is 
 the more valuable as having come from the pen of 
 a very able and accomplished American writer, the 
 Reverend Jonathan Edwards. Of course it would 
 be altogether out of place here to express any opi- 
 nion on the questions under dispute ; it is simply 
 our duty to notice how false analogies may impose 
 upon the strongest minds, and vitiate a long chain 
 of close and argumentative reasoning. •" There is 
 a vast difference," says he, " between the sun's 
 being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth 
 of the atmosphere and the brightness of gold and 
 diamonds, by its presence and positive influence, 
 and its being the occasion of. darkness and frost in 
 the night by its motion, whereby it descends below 
 the horizon." " If the sun were the proper cause 
 of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of 
 these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat ; 
 and then something might be argued from the na- 
 ture of cold and darkness to a likeness of nature in 
 the sun ; and it might be justly inferred, that the 
 sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are 
 black and frosty. But, from its being the cause, 
 no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 117 
 
 can be inierred, but the contrary ; it may justly be 
 argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if 
 cold and darkness are found to be the consequence 
 of its withdrawnient ; and the more constantly and 
 necessarily these effects are connected vdila. and 
 confined to its absence, the more strongly does it 
 argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. 
 So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive 
 agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the 
 contrary, arises from the withholding of his action 
 and energy, and under certain circumstances ne- 
 cessarily follows on the want of his influence ; this 
 is no argiunent that he is sinful, or his operation 
 evil, but, on the contrary, that he and his agency 
 are altogether good and holy, and that he is the 
 fountain of all holiness. It would be strange ar- 
 guing indeed, that because men never commit sin 
 but only when God leaves them to themselves, and 
 necessarily sin when he does so, their sin, therefore, 
 is not from themselves, but from God, and so God 
 must be a sinful being ; as strange as it would be 
 to argue, that because it is always dark when the 
 sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is pre- 
 sent, all darkness, therefore, is from the sun, and 
 his disk and beams must needs be black." 
 
 Now the whole of this argument from analogy 
 is foim^ded upon the assumed principle, that there 
 is a reseynhlance of the sun, a created and depen- 
 dent olDJect, to the Almighty Creator of that same 
 object, and of every thing else. But a moment's 
 consideration ^vill convince us, that there can really 
 be no resemblance between the principle on which
 
 118 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 the movements and energies of a dependent crea- 
 ture rest, and the principle on which depends the 
 active power of the Being who made that creature. 
 The two objects have nothing in common ; that is, 
 the sun wants the essential attributes of self-mo- 
 tion, will, and intelligence, which must be consi- 
 dered as inherent qualities in the divine nature. 
 
 We cannot fail to view with wonder and admira- 
 tion that subtile power of mind, which, in general 
 cases, balances so nicely, and promptly too, the 
 different degrees of evidence which result from dif- 
 ferent degrees of analogy existing among various 
 objects. Where the analogy or resemblance be- 
 tween two or more objects is almost perfect, the 
 mind readily, and upon the spur of the moment, 
 reasons upon both, and draws similar conclusions 
 from them ; and when this analogy or resemblance 
 becomes fainter and more imperceptible, then we 
 advance in our reasoning with more hesitation, and 
 our conclusions are encompassed with a greater 
 portion of doubt and uncertainty. How surprising 
 is this power of the mind, and how subtile and 
 dexterous are its movements ! 
 
 Now, looking at the great importance of analogy, 
 both as it influences our abstract and speculative 
 principles and reasonings, and as it bears upon our 
 practical conduct, we ought to be perpetually upon 
 our guard to employ this mighty engine in a pro- 
 per manner. In this consists the greater part of 
 that which generally goes under the denomination 
 of judgment. Let us be cautious in drawing ana- 
 logical inferences and conclusions from certain sets
 
 ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 119 
 
 of facts or circumstances, which are not in all par- 
 ticulars alike. It is from the neglect of this pre- 
 caution that we are so frequently involved in diffi- 
 culties and perplexities in our reasonings, and 
 thus led into error on many important subjects. 
 In all our speculations we shall do well to keep 
 this precaution steadily in our mind's eye, and we 
 shall thereby be prevented from falling into many 
 mistakes of moment, both as it regards our ab- 
 stract principles and our actual comfort and 
 happiness. 
 
 Looking over the Grecian metaphysical systems 
 as a whole, we may plainly perceive, that they are 
 varied in character, almost solely from the propor- 
 tion in which Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy, 
 are mingled together. Where the synthetic prin- 
 ciple predominates, we see a more determined love 
 of system, and often a reckless habit of generaliz- 
 ing. In the early philosophers of Greece, this is 
 very observable. On the other hand, when anlaysis 
 unduly prevails, we see the genius of philosophy 
 bolstering up its influence by minute, unimportant, 
 and frivolous particularities. Again, when we see 
 the speculative habit resting principally on Analogy, 
 we find theories and systems full of crudities and 
 inconsistencies. It is when all these three great 
 prmciples of our mind are rightly adjusted and 
 proportioned, that the happiest results may be 
 anticipated. And what is true of individuals, is 
 true in respect of the philosophical spirit of a 
 whole people. 
 
 It may be remarked, that aU readers of Grecian
 
 120 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE. 
 
 Philosopliy will readily recognise the great know- 
 ledge wliicli the sages of that country generally dis- 
 play, in their appreciation of the nature and use of 
 these principles of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. 
 They mix and blend them, so to speak, with con- 
 summate skill. In all the most valuable portions 
 of their "\Tritings we see the right application of 
 these general powers of thought. It is only when 
 very abstruse theories are developed, and fanciful 
 systems advocated, that we perceive any derange- 
 ment in the management of the reasoning faculties. 
 The works of Plato and Aristotle furnish us with 
 innumerable examples of the beautiful application 
 of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy ; especially in 
 those sections of their respective treatises, which 
 depend upon a correct observation of nature's 
 operations, and the every-day appearances she 
 presents to our view. In all the various dialec- 
 tical systems of Greece, we see no errors from the 
 application of these rudiments of reasoning ; it is 
 only when ultimate principles of being and of 
 thought are brought into play, that we find room 
 for dissent or censure.* 
 
 * See the Author's " Essay on Logic," Second Edit. 1848, publislied 
 by Saunders, 6 Charing Cross.
 
 THE SCEPTICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 121 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE SCEPTICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Pyrrho. 340 B. C. 
 
 Pyrrho stands at the head ofthe ancient Sceptics. 
 We are not, however, to understand by the term 
 sceptic, as here used in reference to the personal 
 opinions of Pyrrho himself, that he embraced the 
 notions commonly indicated by the generic term 
 Pyrrhonism in modern times. He did not deny 
 the absolute existence of truth; but only showed 
 that in seeking after it we often feel a difficulty in 
 seizing hold of it, from the mass of error which 
 commonly surrounds it. 
 
 Pyrrho formed part of the court of Alexander 
 the Great, in his grand expedition to Asia. The 
 personal friend of the philosopher was Anaxarchus, 
 from whom he derived a knowledge of the specula- 
 tive opinions of the Eleatics. Pyrrho also learned 
 the Indian doctrine of the Gymnosophists. He 
 attended the philosophical school of Megara, and 
 studied with great care and zeal the writings of
 
 122 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GEEECE. 
 
 Democritus. He was greatly esteemed by all his 
 contemporaries for the piuity and simplicity of liis 
 life and conversation. 
 
 The Te}i Tropes^ so often alluded to in the philo- 
 sophical writings of the ancients, and which con- 
 tain the general tenets of what goes nnder the 
 name of Pyrrhonism, are attributed to Pyrrho as 
 their author. The principles of doubt involved in 
 these rules go simply to recommend a suspension 
 of assent, rather then a positive denial of matters 
 submitted to the judgment. His scepticism was 
 more of a passive than an active type. A Prench 
 historian of philosophy, and a Catholic bishop, 
 makes the foUoT^Tno^ observations on Pvrrho. 
 " Que Pyrrhon ait ete amene, par son doute 
 universel, a ne pouvoir agir, a ne croupe a rien 
 dans la pratique, a ne pas se detourner pour eviter 
 un precipice, comme le raconte Diogene Laerce, 
 ces assertions sont sans fondement et tout-a-fait 
 invraisemblables. Ce pliilosophe reconnaissait, au 
 contraire, I'autorite du bons sens, des lois, des 
 usages ; il admettait des regies de morale, et pre- 
 tendait que ces regies avaient leur fondement dans 
 le coeur. II voulait qu'on suivlt les apparences, 
 sans se mettre en peiae de la realite; qu'on agit 
 comme le commun des hommes, qu'on evitat 
 soigneusement les discussions epuieuses qui ne 
 pouvaient enfanter que le doute, et qu'on demeiu^at 
 dans ce repos d'esprit qui seul pent faire le 
 bonheur de I'homme."* 
 
 * Bouvier, Hist. Abregce de la Philosophic. Vol. 1. p 184. Paris. 1844.
 
 PYRRHO. 123 
 
 The strong hold of the Sceptics was the variahle 
 nature of our ideas of pure sensation. These al- 
 ways afforded them weapons against the attacks 
 of their adversaries. The sceptics carried their 
 analogical reasonings from tliis source into every 
 department of human knowledge, but particularly 
 into our notions of what constituted good and evil. 
 Here too, they received fresh succour, from the 
 apparently discordant opinions and judgments of 
 mankind upon the rules and obligations of mora- 
 lity. People in different countries have different 
 notions of what is proper and beneficial ; and this 
 diversity is strictly analogous to the variable sensa- 
 tions of external things, produced by the operation 
 of the senses. It would be idle to deny, that 
 such analogical reasonings would have a powerful 
 effect upon popular opinion ; but still the nature 
 of all similar logical declamations exercises a per- 
 nicious iniiuence over the progress of sound and 
 rational knowledge.* 
 
 The more abstract scepticism among the Greek 
 and Uoman philosophy has a great uniformity of 
 character, because it was grounded upon "vdews and 
 argmnents which lay very open to common remark 
 and observation. The following may be stated as 
 the principal springs, out of which the various 
 
 * On the Sceptics, see Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1. Diog. Laert 9. 74. 
 Cicero, De Fini. 2. 13. Epictet. Fragm. ed. Schweigh. Bayle, Diction. 
 Huet, Traite de la faiblesse de I'esprit humain ; Ploucquet, Disser. de 
 Epoche Pyrrhonis, 1758; Beausobre, Le Pyrrhonisme raisonnable, 
 Berlin, 1753; Langheinrich, Disser. De Timon. &c., Leipsic, 1720.
 
 121 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 currents of sceptical opinions flowed, in almost 
 every period of tlie ancient pliilosopliy. 
 
 1st. The great diversity in animal nature, as to 
 its origin, organization, &c. ; tlie differences in 
 wliicli external objects are viewed by the inferior 
 creation; all of which go to show what a vast 
 variation there must necessarily be in the concep- 
 tions formed of the qualities and properties of 
 external bodies, through organs of sense so much 
 varied. The question then is, as animals are 
 deprived of reason, what grounds have we to 
 prefer our perceptions to theirs when we are in the 
 search of truth ? 
 
 2nd. The diversity of character is very great in 
 human nature; and the differences among men, 
 both in mental and bodily qualifications, are varied 
 beyond all conception. This contrariety, joined 
 to the interminable disputes among philosophers 
 themselves, and the differences in tastes and aflFec- 
 tions particularly noticed by physicians, render all 
 attempts to arrive at the truth of things hopeless. 
 
 3rd. There is a great difference m the organs 
 of sense, and every organ has its appropriate ob- 
 jects. Do the qualities of these objects belong to 
 the particular conformation of our senses, or only 
 to the objects themselves ? Have they only as 
 many and such qualities and properties as we 
 perceive, and have they none which we do not 
 perceive ? What are the constituent elements of 
 objects, have they just such and such qualities and 
 no other ? 
 
 4th. The various ways in which our physical
 
 PYRUHO. 125 
 
 organs are affected, by disease, sleep, old age, 
 sadness, fear, cold, heat, and a thousand other 
 circumstances, must necessarily create a great di- 
 versity of judgment relative to things around us. 
 
 5th. The differences from variation in the quan- 
 tities of things, produce often opposite judgments 
 and conclusions. A little more heat, a more rapid 
 motion, or a little more wine or spirit, creates 
 divers changes in our opinions. The general 
 aggregation or di\dsion of homogeneous J)odies 
 greatly modifies sensation. 
 
 6th. The various kinds of education among men, 
 and the different laws and conventional rules of 
 society, beget opposite opinions and conclusions on 
 the most important subjects. 
 
 7th. Erom the interminable mixtures and com- 
 binations of things, it is next to impossible to form 
 a correct opinion of the mass of objects around us. 
 Colours, density, and forms, are for ever changing; 
 and the eye can only judge of that which is, at tlie 
 moment, an object of vision. 
 
 8th. The relations of things one with another are 
 continually changing. We seldom see an object 
 precisely in the same point of \iew tvnce in succes- 
 sion. 
 
 9th. All relations, and objects, opinions, notions, 
 and principles, are connected together, and have 
 mutual dependencies one upon another; so that 
 the mind of man can never be certain that the 
 conclusions it forms are the really true ones. All 
 things are not perceived, therefore our judgments 
 are onesided.
 
 12G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTEE XIV. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 Epicuuus. 341 B. C. 
 
 EpiCURirs was the founder of that school of phi- 
 losophy which has gone nncler his name for many 
 centuries. He was a philosopher of great parts, 
 and cultivated inquiries into the nature of the 
 human mind, in conjunction with speculations on 
 the principal questions of morals. 
 
 The foUomng is the suhstance of the metaphy- 
 sical theory of Epicurus. The soul is corporeal; it 
 is composed of the most refined and suhtile matter; 
 it is inherent in the whole of bodies, and forms a 
 constituent element of their nature or essence. 
 We can distinguish three separate or distinct 
 elements in the soul. The senses; the appetites, 
 diflPused over the whole organization of man ; and 
 intelligence or reason, placed in a sort of inter- 
 mediate position between the senses and the ap- 
 petites, sharpening the former, and guiding and 
 regulating the latter. The senses are a kind of 
 soul within a soul. They form the organs or in- 
 struments hy which the soul seizes hold, as it
 
 EPICURUS. 127 
 
 were, of external objects. It is thus that objects 
 vastly varied act upon us, and that we are enabled 
 to distinguish the differences amongst them. Porms, 
 colom's, sounds, smells, and tastes, which affect 
 severally the five senses, are composed of cor- 
 puscles, disposed in different orders, endowed with 
 different motions, and these corpuscles are received 
 into the various organs of sensation, by pores or 
 canals proportional)ly suited to their nature. These 
 elementary corpuscles penetrate even into the sen- 
 sorium itself, strike and affect it, and give bii-th, 
 in our sentient being, to images similar to these 
 external things. These images may be compared 
 to the impression of the seal left on wax. 
 
 The principle of intelligence or reason exercises 
 supreme authority over the senses. Its province 
 is, whilst the senses are affected by external objects, 
 to think, to perceive, to conceive, to reflect, to 
 meditate, to discuss, and to deliberate. Heason is 
 not passive. But how is this thought excited ? 
 By a phenomenon analogous to that which produces 
 sensation ; by airy or sjnrittml essences, which pre- 
 sent themselves to reason. These spiritual essences 
 are disengaged from bodies, or are formed in the 
 air, and seize hold of the mind, and fix themselves 
 in it. But in the multitude of intelligences, these 
 essences choose those whose attention is excited, 
 and such as direct themselves to particular forms 
 of thought ; to others they remain perfect strangers. 
 Attention is then reason's principal instrument ; by 
 it, judgments and conclusions are formed. 
 
 The appetites and passions relate primarily to
 
 128 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE, 
 
 pleasure and pain; and from these follow hope 
 and fear. The soul naturally expands itself when 
 under the influence of pleasurable feelings, and, on 
 the contrary, shrinks from what is painful and un- 
 pleasant. This pleasure and pain result also from 
 the subtile and minute corpuscles of bodies, which 
 introduce themselves into our organs of sensation. 
 When there is a natural harmony between these 
 subtile corpuscles and our internal thinking prin- 
 ciple, pleasure is produced ; but, in a contrary 
 state of things, when this harmony does not exist, 
 the delicate organs of sense are wounded, and pain 
 and suffering are the consequence. 
 
 Again, it is by an action enth'ely mechanical 
 that the soul puts the divers members of the body 
 in motion. The whole system of mental pheno- 
 mena may be compared to a macliine of wheels 
 and springs, the two ends of which rest upon 
 external objects. But there is, nevertheless, this 
 essential characteristic relative to voluntary motion, 
 that the soul judges beforehand, and wishes the 
 effect which it produces. 
 
 Of the absolute certainty of our knowledge from 
 the senses, Epicurus was a strenuous advocate. 
 Sensations are the criterion of truth; the only 
 test of certainty ; they never deceive us. Wlienever 
 there is error, it may be traced to the judgment ; 
 it arises, from our hasty or premature decisions 
 upon objects which act externally on the senses. 
 
 The circumstance of the perfect freedom of the 
 human mind to act or not act, just as the will 
 pleases, is a curious, and apparently an incon-
 
 EPICURUS. ^ 129 
 
 sistent item in tlic metapliysical system of Epi- 
 curus. All other phenomena seem pretty tightly 
 chained down to the principle of necessity or fate ; 
 but the mind, or intelligent principle, he sets at 
 complete liljerty. 
 
 The notions of Epicurus as to the formation of 
 the world, are nearly the same as those of Dcmo- 
 critus, with whose system he was intimately con- 
 versant. His primary elements arc the atoms of 
 Democritus. The atoms of Epicurus harmonize 
 and repel each other, and generate a rebounding 
 and oscillatino; motion. Thev combine and form 
 various systems, which constitute what we deno- 
 minate visible bodies or Avorlds. These primary 
 atoms are infinite in number, and, therefore, an 
 infinite nimiber of worlds may be framed out of 
 them. It is needless to say that such notions arc 
 vague and childish. 
 
 *:^* Diog. Laert. 10. Cicero De Nat. Deo. 1. 25. Sextus Empi. Math. 
 7. See also the works of Gassendi, the modern commentator on the 
 Philosophy of Epicurns : and the following works : — Sorbiere, Lettrcs sur 
 la Vie, &c., Paris 16G0; Jacques Rondel, La Vie d'Epic. Paris IHJO; 
 Pierre de Villemaudy, Manuductio ad Philosophiae Aristotelia;, Epicurese 
 et Cartesianse Parallclismum, Ainsteidam U)S1 ; L'Abbs Batteux, Morale 
 d' Epicure, La Haye, 1686; Temple's Essay on the Gardens of Epicurus, 
 London 1696. TragilU Arnkiel, De Philoso. et Schola Epicuri. 1671 ; 
 Faust. Diss, de Deo Epicuri, Strasburg, 1655. 
 
 * 
 
 K
 
 130 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 MENTAL rniLOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 THE STOICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 As we proceed dovm. the stream of time, we find 
 the discussions and speculations on the nature of 
 the human mind hecoming more diversified, pro- 
 found, and important. The Stoical School of Phi- 
 losophy, especially in reference to the principles 
 and practice of morals, has long maintained a con- 
 sideral)le portion of respect and attention among 
 the learned in all countries ; and the discussions of 
 this school on the laws of mind are also well en- 
 titled to a careful and attentive notice. 
 
 Zeno. 362 B. c. 
 
 Zeno was one of the most able and distinguished 
 masters of this school. He followed the profession 
 of a merchant for some time, but relinquished it, 
 and attended all the most celebrated seminaries of 
 learning and philosophy. 
 
 The idea of this philosopher, as to the abstract 
 nature of the evidence which our senses furnish
 
 ZENO. 131 
 
 US, was, that knowledge was certain and immuta- 
 ble. In this respect he vigorously opposed the 
 general doctrines of the Sceptics, in all their shapes 
 and forms. The train of thought which appears to 
 have been in his mind on this occasion, is exceed- 
 ingly curious and interesting ; as it seems, as far as 
 we are able to judge of the matter, to have led him 
 to precisely the same conclusions which several 
 metaphysicians of modern times have propounded 
 with all the pomp and display of new discoveries. 
 I allude here to the doctrine of ultimate truths, 
 or, as some term it, the doctrine of common sense. 
 Zeno maintained that evidence, and evidence alone, 
 was the foundation of his theory of human know- 
 ledge, — the very key-stone of his system ; and he 
 points out a guide to the use of this instrument. 
 He calls it right judgment, or healthy reason. 
 This right judgment, or healthy reason, is partly 
 founded on an accurate knowledge of things, and 
 partly upon the condition and state of the soul, as 
 to its exemption from corruption. Nature has fur- 
 nished us with a kind of model or expression of 
 herself, by which the mind gathers together the 
 divers notions of tilings. These notions furnish 
 the elementary principles of all science. By their 
 assistance an extensive field is opened for the pro- 
 secution and investigation of truth. As nature is 
 the same in all mankind, those primary notions 
 form a sort of common sense, which appertains to 
 the entire mass of humanity. 
 
 Zeno distinguished eight faculties of the soul ; 
 the five senses, generation, language, and thought. 
 
 K 2
 
 132 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE. 
 
 It will be perceived by tlie reader, that lie here 
 classifies generation, a physical power, with the 
 other faculties which essentially constitute our 
 thinking principle. The reason of this is not 
 stated. These eight powers or faculties are, accord- 
 ing to Zeno, a kind of governess to our soul, to 
 lead and guide us in all matters of knowledge and 
 life. We can say, under this point of \iew, that 
 there is in the soul only one faculty, from which 
 all others are derived. Tliis faculty is passive when 
 it receives external impressions, and active when it 
 unites, separates, and combines them, for the pur- 
 pose of forming general notions and judgments from 
 them. Thus the nature and operations of the soul 
 form one perfect whole, like a smaller universe. 
 
 The Stoics introduced in their school the famous 
 maxim, " that there is nothing in the understanding 
 which has not been previously in the senses.^' They 
 did not admit of innate ideas. They distinguished 
 natural ideas from artificial notions. The former 
 were obtained without any eff^ort of the mind itself, 
 and were denominated anticipations ; the latter 
 were the work of the remote spontaneity of the 
 mind, and were called notions. 
 
 Artificial notions were derived from several 
 sources, namely, from analogy, composition, pro- 
 portion, opposition, transposition, repetition, and 
 privation. 
 
 Zeno differed from Plato as to the latter' s theory 
 of ideas. The Stoic coincided with Aristotle, but 
 did not implicitly adopt all his opinions on mental 
 speculations.
 
 CHRYSIPPUS. 133 
 
 His notions as to the origin of things were, that 
 there were two principles. The one is primordial 
 matter, which is the passive material of which all 
 thin^rs are formed. The second is the active ele- 
 ment which moulds and forms every thing ; this is 
 Reason, Destiny, God. The laws of matter are 
 imprinted on it by this intelligent and active 
 principle. 
 
 Chrtsippus. 250 b. c. 
 
 Chrysippns was another distinguished pliiloso- 
 plier of the Stoical school. On many points he 
 entertained correct views as to several important 
 principles of mental philosophy. 
 
 He agreed with Zeno as to the difference between 
 sensible perceptions of external objects, and notions 
 of the mind created by its reflecting on its own 
 poAvers, or consciousness. These notions are not 
 propagated immediately from the senses ; they 
 exclusively appertain to thought. They institute, 
 as it were, a comparison between objects of sense ; 
 they seize the common and general features or cha- 
 racteristics which belong to them ; the one opera- 
 tion is founded upon natural causes, and the other 
 upon the reflective faculty of the understanding 
 alone. 
 
 Chrysippns attempted to make a catalogue of 
 im.demonstrable or elementary truths. His idea 
 was, that all other truths should be arranged 
 under some one of these. These general truths 
 may be reduced to two kinds ; those which include 
 propositions necessarily involved in propositions
 
 134 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 previously admitted as true; and consequences 
 which result from disjunctive propositions. The 
 minor details of this system of reasoning are com- 
 prehended under the heads of simple and complex 
 maxims; possible and impossible; necessaiy and 
 contingent ; probable, paradoxical, rational, and 
 empirical. 
 
 On the doctrine of Causation, Chrysippus divided 
 causes into two descriptions ; those which he con- 
 sidered purely mechanical, which belonged to the 
 aggregate masses of matter ; and those which were 
 organic, and constituted the principles of vegetable 
 and animal life. 
 
 Most of the opinions of Zeno and the Stoics of 
 tliis period generally, on the nature of the Deity, 
 are extremely rational. They clothe the Divine 
 nature with noble and sublime attributes. They 
 regard Him as infinitely perfect, and every way 
 worthy of adoration and homage. It must, how- 
 ever, be stated, that there is a great drawback to 
 this species of theism. Though they invest the 
 Deity with these attributes, they nevertheless be- 
 lieve Him to be essentially connected with matter. 
 They say that the Deity constitutes both the visible 
 and the invisible world ; that God is the soul of the 
 world ; that He penetrates all parts of it ; that He 
 is the Kving and vivifying principle of it ; in fact, 
 that the world was composed of God, who was the 
 soul of it, and matter, which was its body. 
 
 Zeno and his school were strict and absolute 
 necessitarians. Every thing was linked together 
 by an inexorable fatality. They made some little
 
 CHEYSIPPUS. 135 
 
 display of allowing the Pirst Cause a degree of 
 liberty or choice ; hut it was evidently a mere piece 
 of philosophical delusion. Cicero accuses them of 
 this fruitless attempt to reconcile liberty with 
 necessity.* Both Zeno and Chrysippus saw the 
 chfficulty, that if they did not invest man with 
 personal freedom, it was impossible to conceive how 
 actions could be considered either praiseworthy or 
 blameable, or entitled to rewards or punishments. 
 They were, therefore, obliged to cede a form of 
 liberty, to harmonize, in some measure, this moral 
 responsibility with the other parts of their system, f 
 The Stoical doctrines, as a whole, present much 
 that is praiseworthy and valuable. The philo- 
 sophers of this school set themselves against the 
 whole mass of vain and conceited quibbling which 
 too often usurped the name and authority of 
 philosophy and true wisdom. They took human 
 life and human nature as they found them. The 
 whole of their doctrines were grounded on the 
 more obvious and striking principles of men's 
 thoughts and actions. They say, in substance, If 
 your system be against common sense, it must be 
 erroneous ; we may not perhaps be able to rebut 
 all your refined and subtile arguments, but be you 
 assured, that nature has not left the first princi- 
 ples of speculation and action to be trifled with hj 
 the weak and puny sophistry of man. Upon these 
 grounds the whole of their public teaching was 
 based. 
 
 * C icero, Noctes Atticse, 4. 2. 15. 
 
 t Cicero, De Fato, 10. 12. Nemesius, De uatura Ilominis. c. 2.
 
 136 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF GllEECE. 
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 ON THE NOTIONS COMMONLY ADOPTED BY THE 
 ANCIENTS, UP TO THE PERIOD OF THE STOICS, 
 ON THE ORIGIN OF OTJR KNOWLEDGE, AND THE 
 NATURE OF TRUTH. 
 
 We sliall attempt, in tliis chapter, to give a 
 general but concise view of some important and 
 elementary principles discussed by the ancient 
 sages ; simply with a view of fixing the ordinary 
 reader's attention more firmly on the real amount 
 of progress which the philosophy of the mind had 
 made, up to this point of history. 
 
 The first question with the philosophers of 
 Greece was, Erom whence is our knowledge de- 
 rived ? Does it proceed from ourselves ? Does it 
 emanate from any physical channel or source we 
 can recognize ? Does it own a di\dne or heavenly 
 origin? Theu' inquiries soon, however, brought 
 them to something which seemed to point out 
 what appeared to indicate, in some measure, a 
 probalde solution of the great problem. This
 
 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 137 
 
 something was Sensation. They saw that an 
 affection of the senses was prior to thought. This 
 conclusion was established not only from every 
 man's hom-ly experience, but from a consideration 
 of the infant years of mankind, when the deve- 
 lopment of sensation was more strikingly and 
 pointedly marked, as an anterior operation to 
 the knowledge of the existence and qualities of ex- 
 ternal objects. No man could be ignorant, much 
 less a philosopher, that a mountain, or lake, or 
 river, must be seen by the eye before a person can 
 possibly have an ideci of it ; that sounds must be 
 heard by the ear, before we can have an idea of 
 them, or be able to feel the exquisite pleasures 
 which are derived from their mechanical combina- 
 tion in the art of music. And the like may be 
 remarked in reference to the other three organs of 
 sensation. This being the precise state of the 
 case, inquiring men took their stand on Sensation. 
 They perceived that it was, in some way or other, 
 indissolubly and invariably conjoined Avith know- 
 ledge ; this they were in no position to deny, 
 either as philosophers or men. Nature decided 
 with peremptory authority. She pointed her 
 finger to the final cause of this great source of 
 knowledge, that this peculiar organization of our 
 senses shall be the medium of that information of 
 the qualities and properties of external bodies and 
 agencies which is absolutely requisite for the 
 support and enjoyment of animal existence. 
 
 We find, therefore, no difference worth mention- 
 ing among the various schools of philosophy as to
 
 138 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE. 
 
 common and every-day operations of sensation, 
 considered as mere phenomena of existence. Its 
 necessary connection with knowledge coukl not be 
 denied. But a little inquiry below the surface of 
 things suggested another important question, Are 
 there any thoughts, or ideas, or notions, or prin- 
 ciples in our minds, which do not seem to have 
 their origin in this peculiar affection of our 
 senses, either from their separate or collective 
 operations ? We have the colours and confor- 
 mation of bodies by the eye, sounds by the ear, 
 smells by the nose, tastes by the mouth, and feeling 
 by the touch ; but does any one, or do all of these 
 produce those ideas, for example, which I have of 
 myself, of being or existence in general, of space, 
 of time, of number, of infinity, of right, of obliga- 
 tion, of cause and effect, and of a thousand others 
 which are in every man's mind, and which form 
 as it were the pabulum of his mental existence ? 
 This is the point of departure of mental philoso- 
 phy. To solve this problem has been the great 
 object of all metaphysicians from the earliest re- 
 cords of speculation ; and the question is still ask- 
 ed from a thousand different quarters, even at the 
 present hour. 
 
 The first step which philosophers took to throw 
 some light on this intricate question was, to divide 
 our sensations into two classes ; the one related to 
 the simple or secondary qualities of material bo- 
 dies, and the other to their primary ones. Our 
 simple ideas or notions of the secondary qualities 
 or properties of things, arc only conditionally or
 
 ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 139 
 
 relatively uniform. Let us, for example, take the 
 sensation of warmth. Take a bason of water heat- 
 ed to a certain degree, and put a cold hand into it, 
 and a warm one. The water will feel quite warm 
 to the cold hand, but cold or chilly to the warm 
 one. Does then this sensation belong, as an inhe- 
 rent quality, to water ? Does it form a constituent 
 portion of its nature ? If this were granted, it would 
 make the water both hot and cold at the same 
 time, which is absurd. Such sensations are called 
 s'miple or secondary ones, because they depend 
 upon and are apparently regulated by the phy- 
 sical state or condition of the organs of sense. But 
 whether water be hot or cold, warm or chilly, it 
 always occupies space, it has a certain volume or 
 bulk, and a certain density or weight. These quali- 
 ties appertain to it, independently of our sensations, 
 or the state of our organs of feeling, taste, smell, 
 or sight. These, therefore, are termed the iwimary 
 qualities of matter, and seem to form the ground- 
 work of a mighty structure of intellectual mechan- 
 ism and contrivance. 
 
 We come now to the third step in the progress 
 of inquiry. Was there any inward principle in 
 man which could elaborate or concoct any ideas or 
 notions out of the ordinary sensations which our 
 senses produced ; or did these ordinary sensations 
 merely operate as exciting causes to the mind, 
 forming out of its otvh resources notions or ideas 
 which did not seem to have any immediate or 
 necessary connexion mth the process of sensa- 
 tion ? This was a puzzling question to the inquir-
 
 140 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GPvEECE. 
 
 ing philosoplier. It was clear to him that there 
 were certain notions in our minds, and very familiar 
 ones too, which did not seem to owe their exist- 
 ence to the operation of external objects on the 
 senses ; but how to account for them, constituted 
 the difficulty. There were two modes of attempting- 
 to remove the perplexity ; the one supposed that 
 the mind, as by some chemical laboratory, distilled, 
 as it were, these more rarefied notions from the 
 mass of common ones which flowed throu£?h the 
 senses; and the other, that these refined ideas 
 were di'awTi from the internal resources of the 
 mind itself, independent of sensation. These two 
 theories both came under the notice of the ancients, 
 wliose systems we have previously glanced at. The 
 evidence preponderates in favour of the solution that 
 those general abstract notions which we possess, and 
 which seem to be so necessary for the acquirement 
 and cultivation of knowledge, owe Iheir existence 
 to the mind itself; and that the operation which 
 evolves them is called reflection. We find that the 
 most acute and comprehensive reasoners on men- 
 tal subjects, from Thales down to the time of the 
 Stoics, were obliged to admit this inward power of 
 reflection, to be enabled to make any progress in 
 the study of mind themselves, or to convey their 
 information and knowledge to others. 
 
 The abstract nature or character of truth, Avas 
 another stumbling block to all the ancient sages 
 of Greece. Are our sensations to be taken as the 
 evidence of truth ? They are variable and imcer- 
 tain. Do our more abstract and refined notions or
 
 NATUHE OF TRUTH. 141 
 
 ideas afford more evidence ? We cannot rely upon 
 them either. Is there any criterion by which we 
 can determine a thing to be true or false ? Some 
 lay down one test, and some another. The Aca- 
 demics maintained there was no criterion of truth 
 whatever. The Dogmatists all agree upon a cri- 
 terion of truth, but differ about that in which it 
 consists. Plato would allow no criterion from the 
 testimony of the senses ; for, says he, " from them 
 we have nothing but opinion." He affu'med, how- 
 ever, that we had a criterion from pure intellect, 
 which afforded a test for certain knowledge. Aris- 
 totle differs in some degree from his master. The 
 former allows that the pure mind confers upon us 
 certain conviction, although the evidence from the 
 senses was sometimes very variable and uncertain. 
 Among all the sects of philosophers none contended 
 so zealously and boldly for a criterion of truth as 
 the Epicureans. They established thek test on 
 three principles ; sensation, anticipation, and pas- 
 sion. Subsequently, the most indefatigable hunters 
 after a criterion of certainty were the Stoics. They 
 suggested several modes by which this great desi- 
 deratum might be found.' Some amongst them, in 
 order to conquer what they conceived as prejudices, 
 went so far as to distrust the intimations from 
 their own senses, and to contend that the ordinary 
 principles of action among men ought not to be 
 implicitly relied on. They conjectured that some 
 wicked demon might insinuate falsehood through 
 this channel, and make men the objects of their
 
 142 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 wicked and malicious sport. After laying aside, 
 however, all the usual maxims received among 
 men, they seem to have heen driven into a corner 
 at last, and compelled to admit, that truth might 
 rest upon the evidence of their own minds.
 
 THE SECOND ACADEMY. 143^ 
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 The Second Academy. 
 
 The philosophers of the Second Academy dif- 
 fered in several points from Zeno and his followers. 
 The former especially directed their discussions 
 towards those parts of the mental philosophy of 
 the Stoics which related to the foundations of hu- 
 man knowledge, and the nature of truth in general. 
 This conflict of opinions is exceedingly interesting. 
 The truth of important principles was at stake; 
 and the various combatants brouq-ht to the task 
 great natural acuteness, and a perfect knowledge 
 of aU preceding systems. 
 
 Arcesilaus. 315 b. c. 
 
 According to Sextus Empiricus, Arcesilaus di- 
 rected his logical attacks against Zeno's theory of 
 perception. The liistorian teUs us that *' The Sto- 
 ics maintained three tilings ; science, opinion, and 
 comprehension ; the last of which occupied an in- 
 termediate place between the other two. Upon
 
 144 MENTAL PniLOSOPTIY OF GREECE. 
 
 tliis point they were attacked by Arcesilans. As 
 comprehension has to be sustained by science and 
 opinion, it cannot be the arbiter of their nature or 
 essence. Now this comprehension resides either 
 in wisdom or folly. If it resides in wisdom, it is 
 science itself ; if in folly, it is no opinion, but mere 
 empty jargon. This comprehension, by which we 
 pretend to derive the power of giving assent to 
 visi]3le things, exists nowhere. We do not give 
 assent to what we merely see, but to reason alone. 
 Men only affirm formal or implied propositions. 
 Besides, are there not thousands of delusions from 
 visual objects, as well as true representations ? If 
 then wisdom gives its assent upon the strength of 
 this criterion of the Stoics, it only gives an assent 
 to a very illusory opinion." 
 
 This philosopher seems, however, to have limited 
 liis observations to the phenomena of external 
 things, and not to have carried his doubts to the 
 existence of the mind itself. But on this point 
 there is a diversity of opinion. 
 
 Cahneades. 215 B. c. 
 
 This philosopher, according to Sextus Empiricus, 
 not only opposed the Stoics in their general tenets, 
 but seems to have founded upon their own cri- 
 terion a system that went to establish contrary 
 propositions. Lactantius also mentions that Car- 
 neades had an intuitive quickness in perceiving the 
 weak sides of his adversaries' doctrines, and designed 
 their overthrow by the inward consciousness that 
 he would prove successful.
 
 CAENEADES. 145 
 
 On the nature of perception Garneades has the 
 following observations. " The criterion which 
 pronounces upon truth can consist only in an ad- 
 hesion to the mind which creates the evidence of 
 the object. The senses begin to indicate the exist- 
 ence of objects only when they are affected by 
 them, whilst the former undergo divers alterations 
 in comino* in contact wdth the latter. It is in 
 these affections, and in these divers modifications 
 of feeling produced by external bodies, that we 
 must seek for the foundations of truth. Vision, 
 for example, shows us two things at once ; a mo- 
 dification of feeling we experience, and the object 
 which exercises itself upon us. It is thus that 
 light shows itself, and manifests the object which 
 strikes our eyes. But the sense of vision does not 
 invariably teach us the real nature of objects, but 
 sometimes deceives us. All \dsual things cannot, 
 then, be taken as an infallible standard of trutli, 
 but those things are only true which are proved to 
 be so in themselves." 
 
 Garneades established the proposition, that a 
 chain of probable evidences is connected with the 
 exercise of aU our organs of sensation ; but this is 
 more strikingly indicated from the exercise of the 
 organ of sight. He says, " Perception represents 
 two tilings at once ; the external object perceived, 
 and the subject which perceives it. Vision must 
 then be considered under two distinct relations. 
 First, relatively to the object perceived. This may 
 be either true or false ; true, if in conformity with 
 it ; and false if otherwise. Secondly, relatively to 
 * L
 
 146 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 the subject perceiving. That which is true appears 
 to differ from that which is false. That which 
 bears the appearance of truth is probable. Some- 
 times this indication of truth is faint and weak ; 
 it may be from the smallness of the object, or from 
 the weakness and confused operation of the senses 
 themselves. Sometimes this appearance is very 
 striking and evident ; in such cases this distinct- 
 ness is a sure criterion of truth ; it is sufficiently 
 manifested by itself." 
 
 On the doctrine of necessary connection Car- 
 neades seems to have been inclined to the li- 
 berty of human thoughts and actions. He says, 
 "From the proposition, that there is no effect 
 without a cause, it does not follow that every thing 
 which happens arises from external causes. Now 
 our walls are subjected to no antecedent cause. 
 Such is the nature of all voluntary actions, that 
 the cause of them arises from the will itself." 
 
 E-itter observes, that " Carneades laboured to 
 prove that all previous attempts of philosophy to 
 establish a criterion of truth had miscarried, and 
 moreover that it was impossible to find such a 
 criterion. Eor, he argued, it must be placed either 
 in sensation, or in conception, or in reason. Now 
 as to the last, he mamtained that it could not be 
 found in reason independently of both sensation 
 and conception, for that which is the object of any 
 judgment of the reason must first appear to the 
 mind in a conception, which is impossible unless 
 it has been first of all presented to it by some 
 irrational sensation ; so that every operation of the
 
 PHILO — ANTIOCHUS. 147 
 
 reason is originally dependent upon sensation, which 
 is irrational, and consequently the truth of ra- 
 tional cognition depends upon that of sensation.* 
 
 PHILO. 100 B. c. 
 
 Philo's metaphysical disquisitions related chiefly 
 to the abstract nature of truth and e\idence. 
 Sextus Empiricus informs us, that this philosopher 
 maintained that the reality of objects could be 
 known from that comprehensive perception on 
 which the Stoics founded their criterion. 
 
 Philo remarked that a logical consequence might 
 be true, though it was united to a false sup- 
 position. He distinguishes three species of truths; 
 first, that which is deduced from a self-evident 
 proposition ; secondly, that wliich is deduced from 
 a false proposition, though conditionally true ; and, 
 tliirdly, from a proposition from which the con- 
 clusion presents not only a hypothetical, but a 
 real truth, in spite of any absurdity contained in 
 the proposition itself ; as the earth moves ^ therefore 
 it exists. 
 
 Antiochus. 86 B. c. 
 
 This philosopher of the Second Academy seemed 
 to be actuated, in all his mental inquiries, with a 
 sincere and ardent love of truth. He set himself 
 to correct the general principles of the school, and 
 
 * Hist. Phil. Vol. 3. p. 614. Oxford 1839. 
 L 2
 
 148 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE. 
 
 to banish tliat species of loose and imdefined scep- 
 ticism wliich had, ever since the foundation of the 
 academy, hung around it, and engaged it in per- 
 petual quibbling discussions and irrational specula- 
 tions. 
 
 "Philosophy," says Antiochus "has two prin- 
 cipal objects in \dew; truth and happiness. He 
 can have no pretensions to true "uasdom, who does 
 not keep this double end in ^iew ; who is ignorant 
 from where he sets out, and whither he is going. 
 A real philosopher ought to establish himself upon 
 sound principles." 
 
 Cicero, who enjoyed the personal friendship of 
 this philosopher, tells us, that, on the long con- 
 tested point, the real foundation of human know- 
 ledge, Antiochus makes the following remarks. 
 " The testimony of the senses is worthy of all con- 
 fidence, if they are themselves free to act, are in a 
 healthy state, and no obstacle intervenes to ob- 
 struct the faithful perceptions they furnish. If 
 this were not the case, of what use would be our 
 deductions from them ? What would be the founda- 
 tion of memory ? What distinction would there 
 be between knowledge and ignorance, between the 
 lettered and the unlettered man? What would 
 there be attached to reason ? Of what use would it 
 prove to exercise its powers and faculties ? Scepti- 
 cism is at direct variance with the whole nature of 
 man, his desires, powers, and destination. Desii^es 
 influence the will, and suppose certain judgments 
 in the mind. If men wish to act, they must hold 
 by the truth presented to them. But above all,
 
 ANTIOCHUS. 149 
 
 virtue is the best testimony to the certainty of 
 human knowledge. How could men resolve to 
 suifer inconceivable torments rather than desert 
 their duty ? or why should they bring upon them- 
 selves the vengeance of rigorous laws, unless they 
 were imder the control of clear, fixed, and deter- 
 mined principles ?" 
 
 The predecessors of Antiochus in the new 
 academy had made a fine and subtile distinction, 
 in theu' metaphysical system, between a clear 'per- 
 ception^ and a real perception. This distinction 
 was combated by Antiochus. He argued. How 
 could we affirm that an object, for example, was 
 white, if we happened to take it for black ? Or 
 how would we know when a perception was a 
 clear perception imprinted on our minds, if we 
 were not certain whether it was a real one or not ? 
 Such a mode of reasoning Avould go to establish 
 that there is neither colour, nor body, nor truth, 
 nor reasoning, nor' sensation, nor any thing truly 
 seen by the mind. We are so constituted that 
 our minds give their assent to testimony, just as 
 the scale of the balance is influenced by greater or 
 lesser weights. 
 
 Antiochus exercised great influence in his day ; 
 and w^as certainly a metaphysician of no mean 
 order. He was not, however, successful in fram- 
 ing any peculiar system ; but his aim seemed to be 
 to arrive at a species of eclecticism in reference to 
 all pre\aous speculations on the nature and facul- 
 ties of the human mind.* 
 
 * Sextus Empi. Pyrrho. 1. 2'ib. Nemeskis ap. Euseb. 14. 9. Stobaeus 
 Eclec. 2. p. 38. et seq.
 
 150 mental philosophy of greece. 
 
 Clitomachus. 125 b. c. 
 
 Tills metaphysician was a disciple of Carneades, 
 and wrote four books on tlie reasons which ought 
 to induce us to suspend our assent to the general 
 truth of things. Cicero tells us that he distin- 
 guished vision into two kinds ; the one embraces 
 all things which we perceive, and those which 
 we perceive but indistinctly; the second, those 
 which are probable, and those which are not 
 probable. 
 
 POSLDONIUS. 
 
 This pliilosopher established a philosophical 
 school at Rhodes, where, it is said, he had Pom- 
 pey and Cicero for his hearers. He was partial to 
 the system of Aristotle, whose general arrange- 
 ment of mental speculation seemed to coincide 
 with his views. He opposed Chrysijipus on the 
 division of the soul. His great anxiety appeared 
 to be to reconcile if possible all the conflicting 
 theories of human nature, and to reduce them to 
 some common-sense level. It was j)robably with 
 this view that he revived the Platonic division of 
 the mental powers or faculties. 
 
 The direct influence which the bodily organiza- 
 tion exercises over the mind, engaged the attention 
 of Posidonius. He thought this influence was very 
 considerable, and that previous pliilosophers had 
 not made due allowances for it in their systems of 
 the mind.* 
 
 * Galen, 1. 4. pp. 143. 153. Plutarch, Fragio. 1. (^.
 
 PAN^TIUS. 151 
 
 Human nature, in the opinion of Posidonius, 
 was a compound material, in wliicli the desires of 
 the creature corresponded to vegetable life ; the 
 violent passions, as anger, &c., to the brutish or 
 animal life ; but reason was the exclusive attribute 
 of man.* The doctrine of physical temperaments 
 is here clearly shadowed forth ; and there can be 
 no doubt that both the Sceptics and Stoics gene- 
 rally, in their public teachings and dissertations, 
 must have dwelt very often on the striking con- 
 nection which subsists between the bodily organiza- 
 tion and the mental habits and acquirements. This 
 was one of those prominent topics which the every- 
 day intercourse of human life must have forced 
 upon their attention. 
 
 PAXiETIUS. 
 
 Pansetius was a jiopular teacher of mental and 
 general philosophy, and endeavoured to communi- 
 cate his opinions with all possible simplicity and 
 clearness. This spread his fame in every direc- 
 tion; and many of the most celebrated Roman 
 lawyers attended his lectures, and became his phi- 
 losophical disciples and advocates.! 
 
 His metaphysical opinions are but little known. 
 His talents and acqukements did not lie in abstract 
 questions and theories. The system of logic he 
 taught had an especial reference to grammar, and 
 did not rest upon a full development of those prm- 
 
 * Galen, ibid. p. 170. 
 
 t Van. Lynden, De Panactio Khodio, Liigd. 1802. p. 50.
 
 152 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE. 
 
 ciples of reasoning so commonly incorporated with 
 many other ancient systems of Logic. 
 
 Pansetius was passionately fond of Plato, and 
 considered him the greatest philosopher that ever 
 lived. 
 
 The notions of Pansetins on the soul differed 
 from those entertained by some of the earlier mas- 
 ters of the Stoical school. He only admitted it to 
 have six parts ; and referred the faculty of speech 
 to voluntary motion, and maintained that gene- 
 ration belongs not to the soul but to vegetable 
 nature. 
 
 None of the speculative works of Pansetius have 
 come down to us. Only two physical treatises 
 have survived.* 
 
 * Cicero, De Fini. 4. 28. Idem De Divina. 1. 3. Nemesius, De 
 Natur. Horn. 15. p. 96. Clem. Alexand. Strom. 2. p. 416. Stobseus 
 Eclec. 2. p. 114. Diog. Laert. 7- 92.
 
 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 153 
 
 CHAPTER XYIII. 
 THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The formation of the Alexandrian School of 
 philosophy forms an important era in the history of 
 mental speculations. A vast number of the most 
 subtile reasoners, and the most renowned men of 
 whom the history of letters can boast, attended, 
 in some part of their lives, at the Alexandrian 
 Seminary. This school of learning claims also 
 peculiar attention from its connexion with the 
 early introduction of the Christian faith, and with 
 the reciprocal influence which philosophy and re- 
 ligion exercised upon each other, at this eventful 
 period of the history of the human race. 
 
 The doctrines of the Grecian philosophy were 
 gradually introduced into Alexandria by the inter- 
 course maintained with the most eminent men in 
 Athens. Antiochus corresponded with Heraclitus 
 of Tyre, who taught at that time in Alexandria ; 
 Strabo, the geographer, had amalgamated the 
 doctrines of Zeno with those of Aristotle; and 
 Ammonius attempted to reconcile the doctrines
 
 154 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL 
 
 of Plato with those of his distinguished pupil. 
 These learned men soon established a taste for 
 abstract speculation and useful knowledge; and 
 metaphysics formed a very conspicuous portion of 
 their general system of public instruction. 
 
 It is impossible to think of the School of 
 Alexandria without emotion. To the di^dne, the 
 philosopher, and the lover of general science, she 
 is, and ever must be, an object of supreme interest 
 and regard. Every movement of her mind, from 
 her earliest establishment, has been fruitful of 
 important results, and has, in every civilized 
 country, left indelible memorials of her influence. 
 She was destined to play an interesting part in the 
 history of speculative opinions. She succoured the 
 exiled sages of Greece, and furnished them with 
 new weapons to combat their enemies, and even to 
 overthrow their own systems. She changed the 
 whole current of men's thoughts. Old theories were 
 renounced, and new ones adopted, which created 
 and fostered whole families of illustrious men. Her 
 name is inseparably connected with the greatest 
 event this world ever witnessed; the rise and 
 progress of that Christian system, which is destined 
 for ever to hold the flambeau to that philosophy 
 which she, in her early years, considered as fixed 
 on a rock of adamant. She is still glorious even in 
 her ruins. 
 
 The philosopher Potamon was one of the most 
 distinguished among the early founders of the 
 Alexandrian School, for his cultivation of mental
 
 OF METAPHYSICS. 155 
 
 science. He had studied wdtli great care and 
 success the most important writings of Grecian 
 literature, and was highly esteemed among his 
 contemporaries for his skill and judgment on all 
 knotty and dithcult questions. According to 
 Diogenes Laertius, he was the founder of the 
 Eclectic sect of philosophers. The historian 
 ohserves : " But a short time since a new sect 
 called Eclectic had heen introduced hy Potamon 
 of Alexandi'ia, who selected from each school of 
 philosophy that which he considered the most 
 worthy and important. He thought there were 
 two criteria of truth. One resided in the same fa- 
 culty which judges ; that is reason, which presides 
 over the whole system of intellectual laws or move- 
 ments. The second consisted in those perceptions 
 which serve as the measure or instruments hy 
 wliicli knowledge is communicated ; or, in other 
 words, in the certainty and evidence of the received 
 impressions from external ohjects." 
 
 The Stoical pliilosophy was zealously studied 
 and cultivated at Alexandria. Aristotle had many 
 disciples and commentators ; and the doctrines of 
 Plato were hoth openly and secretly cherished by 
 many philosophers, of a more enthusiastic and 
 imaginative temperament. Here every thing he- 
 longing to philosophy was to be foiuid ; and the 
 wide interchange of opinions was greatly promoted 
 by the trading and commercial importance of the 
 city. Here were men of all nations collected 
 together for the purposes of traffic ; and the proxi-
 
 156 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL 
 
 mity to the seat of eastern speculation soon led to 
 the gradual introduction of principles and theories 
 with which the Grecian sages had previously been 
 unacquainted. This famous seminary of philoso- 
 phy and learning soon gave evident proofs of new 
 doctrines and new systems. The spirit of inquiry 
 received a powerful impetus; and those seeds 
 were profusely sown, which were afterwards to 
 yield such a rank and luxurious harvest. 
 
 We shall have to enumerate, in subsequent 
 parts of our history, some of the most eminent 
 pliilosophers who flourished at this notable seat 
 of learning. 
 
 We may allude generally to one or two doctrines 
 which took their rise at this famous seat of learnins', 
 and which are commonly connected with its history.. 
 The one is what is called the Alexandrian Trmity, 
 and the other the doctrine of Myianations. 
 
 It must be observed, in reference to the first 
 doctrine, the Alexandrian Trinity, that many 
 writers have supposed that it arose directly from 
 the Scriptm-e doctrine of the Trinity, and was not 
 an original theory or speculation either from Alex- 
 andria or from any other place. This, on the 
 other hand, has been stoutly denied. It would 
 be contrary to the spirit and object of this work, 
 to enter into any controversy on the question; 
 therefore we shall refer the reader to ecclesias- 
 tical historians for a full statement of arguments 
 on the point in dispute. 
 
 The metaphysical doctrine of the Alexandrian
 
 OF METAPHYSICS. 157 
 
 Trinity is this. God is of a threefold nature, and 
 at the same time but one. His essence contains 
 three distinct elements, substances, or persons, and 
 these three make, or constitute. One Being. 
 These three distinct persons or substances have 
 also distinct and individual attributes. The first 
 is Unitij ; the second is Intelligence ; and the third, 
 the Universal soul, or the vivifjdng cause of life 
 and motion. 
 
 This theory of the Divine Nature produced many 
 heresies in religion, and led to a great mass of idle 
 speculation on the nature of the human mind. 
 We shall have frequent opportunities of alluding 
 to this doctrine, in the com^se of our subsequent 
 inquiries into pliilosophical systems of a later date. 
 
 The theory of Emanation arose naturally enough 
 out of the Alexandrian Trinity. Something was 
 wanted to manifest the connexion between divine 
 and earthly natures; and hence the doctrine of 
 Emanation, which was invented to explain the 
 phenomenon. The human soul is identified with 
 the Infinite ; andi the world, and every thing in it, 
 is an Emanation from this Great Eirst Cause. 
 This opinion was a prolific soiu'ce of contention 
 for several centuries, in all the schools of philosophy 
 and theology.
 
 158 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS 
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 ON THE NOTIONS ENTERTAINED BY THE DIFFE- 
 RENT SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY ON THE NATURE 
 OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSITIONS, UP 
 TO THE TIME OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALEX- 
 ANDRIAN SCHOOL. 
 
 It must appear to the attentive reader, tliat a 
 considerable portion of that controversial matter 
 which formed so essential a part of the philoso- 
 phical disquisitions of the ancient sages of Greece 
 and Rome, consisted in the nature, extent, and 
 application of general principles and propositions. 
 To examine these in all theu^ abstract nakedness ; 
 to estimate then' influence and power over indivi- 
 dual minds, and masses of men ; to see the mode 
 of their operation in detecting truth and falsehood; 
 to point out their relationsliip to the various 
 individual powers of the mind; and, in fine, to 
 view all theu' manifold offices in the general phe- 
 nomena of thought, was the perpetual aim of nearly 
 all the profound speculators on human nature, of 
 whom, in ancient times, we have any record.
 
 ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 159 
 
 On a subject so recondite, and far removed from 
 ordinary observation, and tbe common trains of 
 thought, we might fairly expect to find a consider- 
 able diversity of opinion. This anticipation we 
 find realized by unquestionable facts. Some schools 
 of philosophy treated of general principles and 
 propositions in a plain and common sense manner, 
 making them comparatively easy of comprehension; 
 and, at the same time, calculated to promote the 
 cause of sound and rational knowledge. Others, 
 again, sublimated and refined to a great extent, and 
 placed those elementary rules of reasoning and 
 truth at a considerable distance from the grasp of 
 ordinary minds. While no small number of inqui- 
 sitive thinkers were led to form theories and 
 systems, which had the evident tendency to call 
 in question all truth and knowledge, and submerge 
 the human mind in the slough of irredeemable and 
 universal scepticism. 
 
 But though these \iews were opposite in their 
 nature and tendency, yet necessity, and the force 
 of nature, kept the generality of philosophers 
 within certain bounds, and gave to all theu' dis- 
 cussions a portion of uniformity and system. They 
 could not labour, nor convey their views to others, 
 without making use of certain formal and recog- 
 nized instruments of thought. This laid them 
 under obligations to arrange and systematize their 
 weapons of reasoning and argumentation. It will, 
 therefore, prove of advantage to the general reader 
 to present him with a bird's-eye view of this in-
 
 160 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS 
 
 tellectual armoury, so far as the common opinions, 
 statements, and systems of the ancient sages 
 will afford us materials. 
 
 It may he remarked here, in passing, that ge- 
 neral principles and propositions, for the purpose 
 of mental instruction, are not confined to mere 
 metaphysical knowledge. They embrace a wider 
 range. They claim a connexion with the whole 
 circle of the sciences ; and are applicable to the 
 discussion of every topic relating to human nature. 
 
 It was a generally received opinion amongst the 
 ancients, that all knowledge was founded upon 
 certam ultimate or first principles, which were 
 supposed, by several men of distinguished renown, 
 to have been imprinted on the mind at its forma- 
 tion, by the hand of the Supreme Being himself. 
 These elementary principles went, at various pe- 
 riods of history, under divers names ; but on the 
 whole they were considered, by a decided majority 
 of speculators on the mind, to be of a really innate 
 character. These principles may be divided into 
 three classes or sorts ; namely. Speculative, Prac- 
 tical, and Theological. 
 
 Speculative principles were, in the systems of 
 the ancients, those which related to the nature and 
 constitution of things, and concerning which the 
 mind, or the more elevated part of the intellect, 
 had to exercise its contemplative or thinking 
 powers ; as, for example, when we say that a whole 
 is greater than a part, or that two and three make 
 five. These purely speculative principles are ex-
 
 ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 161 
 
 ceeclingly numerous, and must always, from the 
 natiu'e of the mind itself, be the ground- work of a 
 great portion of pliilosophical discussion. Accord- 
 ingly we find that they formed, so to speak, the 
 stock in trade of a considerable number of the 
 ancient schools of philosophy ; and though these 
 principles are in appearance distantly removed from 
 the ordinary \T.ews and affairs of men, yet this cir- 
 cumstance did not prevent them in bygone times, 
 and will not prevent them now, from exciting the 
 most lively and ardent feelings, foLinded on intel- 
 lectual rivalry, superiority, and distinction. 
 
 Practical principles were, in the eyes of the an- 
 cients, those which required something to be done ; 
 which led to some immediate action, and which 
 were determined in their nature and influence by 
 the suggestions of nature, or the necessities men 
 foimd themselves under to reduce them to applica- 
 tion. Such, for example, as that parents should 
 be honoured and obeyed; honesty and integrity 
 observed ; and contracts fulfilled. These practical 
 principles were of every-day use, and formed the 
 basis of human society, confederation, and brother- 
 hood. They constituted the materials of that 
 which had, more or less, been incorporated into all 
 systems of philosophy, and must always be invested 
 with paramount interest ; namely, the common- 
 sense feelings and opinions of mankind. 
 
 Theological princip^les were such, in the ancient 
 systems of speculation, as related to divine or ce- 
 lestial things ; as the existence, nature, and mode 
 of action of the Great First Cause; and these 
 * M
 
 162 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS 
 
 principles also embraced all those rules of conduct 
 and trains of thought, which were grounded upon 
 that sense of duty wliich prompted mankind to 
 feel a desire to worship and obey the Creator and 
 Sustainer of the universe. 
 
 There are three attributes, in the opinion of the 
 ancients, belonging to all innate or ultimate prin- 
 ciples or propositions ; namely, that they are self- 
 evident, universal, and the source of many con- 
 clusions. 
 
 1st. Self-evident principles are such as the mind 
 readily gives its assent to, as soon as the terms, or 
 any form of words in wliich they are embodied, are 
 expressed and understood. All negative propositions 
 are self-evident ; as a square is not a circle, nor a 
 man a horse. But then these propositions, and all 
 others of a similar nature, wanted one important 
 qualification requisite to all innate principles ; that 
 they are not the source of a number of conclusions. 
 Keither from the proposition that a square is not a 
 circle, nor a man a horse, is there any conclusion 
 necessarily deducible. 
 
 2nd. Universal propositions are such as are 
 agreed to by persons of all nations and creeds. 
 
 3rd. Principles are said to be the som^ce of a 
 number of conclusions, from which we can deduce 
 a great many truths. 
 
 Innate ideas may also be further subdivided, in 
 accordance with the ancient philosophy, into four 
 descriptions, immediate, common, external, and 
 immutahle. 
 
 1st. Immediate principles are those, the truth of
 
 ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 163 
 
 which we can perceive without the help of any 
 intermediate ideas, such as those which constitute 
 the evidence on which mathematical conclusions 
 are grounded. 
 
 2nd. Common principles are such as are agreed 
 upon by all mankind. 
 
 3rd. External principles are those which ever 
 have been, and always must be, true. Though, for 
 example, a triangle had never been formed or de- 
 scribed, yet it needs must have been eternally true 
 that its three angles are equal to two right ones. 
 
 4th. Immutable principles are those which re- 
 main always the same. We cannot conceive how 
 even Omnipotence Himself could reverse their na- 
 ture. The terms in which such propositions are 
 couched may be reversed ; but their mental nature 
 or essence seems to be unchanged and unchange- 
 able. A square may be called a circle, and a circle 
 a square ; but still to the mind's eye, or to the 
 eye of the understanding, the nature of these two 
 mathematical conceptions remains the same. We 
 conceive it is not in the power of the Almighty 
 Himself to make two contradictory propositions, 
 both true and false at the same time, nor cause 
 the same individual to be at two different places at 
 the same moment. This does not argue any im- 
 perfection in the Supreme Being ; on the contrary, 
 to make Him the author of an absurdity, ought to 
 be considered as a manifest and great imperfection. 
 
 Aristotle, and the Peripatetics generally, main- 
 tained the idea that there were two principles, of a 
 seemingly discordant and contradictory nature, on 
 
 M 2
 
 164 NOTIONS or THE ANCIENTS 
 
 which a great part, if not the whole, of our know- 
 ledge was huilt. The first of these principles was, 
 "Whatever is, is;" and the second, "It is im- 
 possible for the same thing to be and not to be." 
 The first proposition was called a direct one, be- 
 cause it was thought to form the basis of all direct 
 or certain information. The second was termed 
 indirect, and was conceived to be the ground of 
 all indirect demonstrations, or such as led to ab- 
 surd and ridiculous consequences or conclusions. 
 Some of the ancient Sages, who were smitten with 
 a love of system to a great extent, went so far as 
 to declare that the first proposition, that "What- 
 ever is, is," embodied the sum and substance of all 
 human knowledge. 
 
 The discussion, in the different schools of philo- 
 sophy, relative to the general doctrine of ultimate 
 or first principles, gave rise to a variety of opinions 
 and systems. One class of reasoners, deeply im- 
 pressed with the importance of truth, were anxious 
 to divest themselves of prejudices and partiali- 
 ties of every kind, in order to guard against error 
 more effectually. They attempted the study of 
 nature with minds like a tabula rasa. This led 
 them formally to renounce all established princi- 
 ples. They supported tliis course of proceeding 
 by urging that, from personal experience, their 
 various organs of sensation deceived them, and 
 conveyed to their minds false impressions of exter- 
 nal objects ; and, in fact, that these faculties of 
 perception were so capricious in their operations, 
 that no positive or legitimate conclusions could be
 
 ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 165 
 
 drawn from them. These reasoners also main- 
 tained, that they had been induced to place faith 
 in a variety of things from the prejudices of edu- 
 cation; and that they were daily called upon to 
 renounce some favourite principle or other, which 
 a more extended acquaintance with the maxims of 
 philosophy showed to be perfectly absurd or ridi- 
 culous. Even with respect to self-e^ddent maxims 
 and propositions, they felt themselves not fully 
 justified in placing implicit confidence in them. 
 This brought all such reasoners to the verge of 
 complete scepticism. The existence of a material 
 universe seemed almost to vanish from their belief. 
 The reader will readily recognise from the pre- 
 ceding remarks, that the speculative principles 
 greatly predominated in the seats of learning at 
 particular periods. They also gave way at in- 
 tervals to investigations of a practical or common- 
 sense character ; and very often both were blended 
 in the elucidation of theological principles, relative 
 to the existence of nature, and the modes of opex'a- 
 tion of the Divine or Supreme Mind.
 
 166 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 CHAPTER XX. 
 THE ROMAN SCHOOL OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The E-oman School of metaphysics, considered in 
 itself, is but of little moment. In viewing it, 
 however, in conjunction with various Grecian 
 systems, it becomes more interesting, and has a 
 higher claim to our regard. 
 
 The Roman people were altogether different 
 from the Grecians. The warlike character, the 
 rude and abrupt manners, and the enterprising 
 restlessness of the former, present a striking con- 
 trast to the mild, refined, and effemmate ci\Tlization 
 of the Greek republics. The Roman was, therefore, 
 a man whom both nature and education had in a 
 great measure unfitted for very abstract specula- 
 tion. His forte lay in activity and martial ardour. 
 Pure speculation hung always loosely about him, 
 because it proved but a drag or incumbrance to 
 his movements. The theatre of his action was 
 confined to the bustle and turmoil of public life ; 
 and his only hope of fame and distinction rested on
 
 OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 167 
 
 tlie active and efficient discharge of duties which 
 society imposed upon him. Not so the Greek. 
 His soul was fashioned in a softer mould. Luxu- 
 rious ease, and contemplative equanimity, were the 
 grand objects of his life. He lay upon his couch, 
 or sauntered in his garden, with his soul buried in 
 sublime speculation ; and to solve a problem or 
 develop a theory, afforded him more intense grati- 
 fication, than the possession of a crown or the 
 subjugation of an empire. 
 
 Some philosophical historians have expressed 
 their surprise that the E-omans added so little to 
 the science of mind. Why should tliey be sur- 
 prised at this result ? Do men " gather grapes 
 of thorns, or figs of thistles ?" It is no easy 
 matter to change the frame-work of a nation's 
 mind. Many ages of discipline and favourable 
 external circumstances, are requisite to effect such 
 a result. AYe may readily imiagine witli what 
 wonder the inhabitants of Rome would first listen 
 to the development of Grecian metaphysics, con- 
 veyed through the medium of a different and 
 unknown tongue ; couched in a dialectic form to 
 which they were entire strangers ; and aiming at 
 nothing short of accoimting for the origin of the 
 universe, and every tiling in it. The seeds of such 
 knowledge must have fallen upon many hard and 
 stony places. Several ages must have been 
 required to cultivate and enrich the soil for their 
 reception and fruition. Our surprise therefore 
 ouc^ht to be that the Romans reallv made so much 
 progress in the knowledge of the philosophy of
 
 168 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 Greece, as they actually did, considering the 
 manifold obstacles from political institutions, 
 social habits, difference of language, and consti- 
 tutional temperament. 
 
 The Romans first became acquainted with the 
 mental speculations of the Greeks, through the 
 channels of political relationship. The consular 
 and ambassadorial dignities carried the seeds of the 
 new pliilosophy to Rome. Scipio long patronized 
 the Stoic Pangetius, who seems to have been 
 extremely zealous and successful in disseminating 
 his views in the metropolis of the world. It is 
 said that he fully developed both the Platonic and 
 Stoical systems ; and made many converts of rank 
 and influence. A knowledo;e of other schools and 
 sects followed. The doctrines of the Epicureans, 
 and of the New Academy, were promidgated ; and 
 Sylla brought to Rome the works of Aristotle, 
 which became generally accessible, through the 
 means of a translation, eff'ected bv Tyrannion and 
 Andronicus of Rhodes. 
 
 Lucretius. 
 
 The first fruit of Grecian speculation among the 
 Romans, was that of Lucretius. He was a disciple 
 and admirer of Epicurus. His poem, De Rerum 
 Natiira, contains all the leading views and princi- 
 ples of the Epicurean pliilosophy. We have the 
 religious veneration and fear of the gods ridiculed ; 
 the necessity of emancipating the mind from all 
 notions of a Divine Nature; but, at the same time.
 
 LUCRETIUS. 169 
 
 to endow it with that resolute and inflexible deter- 
 mination and self-government, that will enable it 
 to triumph even over destiny itself. Nature is the 
 only Deity which the poet can recognise ; but even 
 here, we find that strildng circumstance occur, 
 which demonstrates tliat poets cannot go on long 
 without some active or creative power ; and hence 
 it is that we find him gi^^ing life, vitality, and in- 
 telligence, to this very principle or abstraction 
 which he calls nature. In fact, he makes a Deity 
 of it, both in its essence and offices. It is only 
 through the instrumentality of this \dvifying or 
 active principle, that he has been able to make 
 any thing like a readable poem out of the Epicu- 
 rean system. He personifies Nature. He repre- 
 sents her as a ruling unity, who makes her power 
 and influence felt in every direction. Even when 
 this power and influence are delegated to inferior 
 agents, as the sun or stars, the same vital principle 
 goes with them, and discharges the active duties 
 of their office. This is not ascribable to any poetic 
 license, but arises from the very nature of things 
 themselves. There is no other course open to the 
 poet, no matter what his notions of fatality may be. 
 Lucretius' notions on the human soul are very 
 perplexed and irrational. His theory of the nature 
 of the primordial atoms of which all things consist, 
 is the only key we have as to what liis opinions 
 really were. He talks of atoms having a principle 
 of self motion* ; and these are the elements out of 
 
 * "Prima moventur enim per se primordia rerum." b. 2. 132.
 
 170 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 which the voluntary powers are fabricated. The 
 different forms of the atoms, and the direction 
 they take, either straight or oblique, determine 
 the individual character of the soul. These forms 
 are finite, but the seeds of each configuration are 
 innumerable ; and hence, by inference, the immense 
 variety in animated creatures. 
 
 Cicero. 106 b. c. 
 
 Cicero is the most distinguished civilian in 
 E/Oman history. As an historian, a politician, a 
 statesman, and an orator, he is unrivalled ; as a phi- 
 losopher he holds a respectable station. We esti- 
 mate him in this last character, not so much for 
 what he has left us of his otvti speculations, as 
 for what he has given us of the opinions and 
 systems of others. He was not a profound and 
 subtile genius, who could frame a system, and work 
 it out with the most refined and elaborate illustra- 
 tions ; but he had a powerful and brilliant judgment, 
 and keen intellectual perception, which could pene- 
 trate into matters of the most recondite nature. 
 Still, however, he was no theorist. He knew a 
 great deal of many systems ; felt some partialities 
 for particular ones ; but he never assumed the cha- 
 racter of a philosophical partisan, in the strict sense 
 of the word. He dived a little into this system, 
 and a little into that, but never appeared as a 
 thorough-paced proselyte, determined to defend 
 certain dogmas, whether they were true or not. 
 The structure of his mind, and the habits of his
 
 CICEUO. 171 
 
 life, were quite in opposition to a eliaracter of 
 this description. He was in every sense of the ex- 
 pression, a man of the world. Knowledge was to 
 him an instrument for use, not an object of mere 
 curiosity or display. It was to promote his views 
 and fame as a lawyer, an orator, a statesman, and a 
 politician, that lie cultivated an acquaintance with 
 philosophy ; and in every movement of his active 
 mind, of which we have any literary memorial left, 
 we may fairly discern how adi'oitly he turned tliis 
 acquaintanceship to a profitable and honourable use. 
 
 We shall consider him chiefly as a metaphysician. 
 His genius embraced every section of Greek philo- 
 sophy. He had studied with considerable care and 
 success both Aristotle and Plato, as well as the 
 Epicurean and the Stoical systems. Por a critical 
 knowledge, he sufficiently mastered the most im- 
 portant theories connected with the nature and 
 faculties of the human miderstanding.* 
 
 On the nature of the human soul, this celebrated 
 man observes : " The soul is derived immediately 
 from the Di^dnity. It retains ties of relationship 
 with celestial beings ; and hence it comes to pass 
 that amidst all animated nature, man is the only 
 creature which possesses the knowledge of a Supreme 
 Being. The possession of this knowledge is then 
 sufficient to entitle man to point to Ms upward 
 origin. Nature has placed in us certain necessary 
 and elementary notions, Avliich form the basis of all 
 true wisdom and science. "f 
 
 On the nature of the organs of sensation Cicero 
 
 * See Note D. at the end of this Volume. t De Legibus 1. 8. 9,
 
 172 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 remarks, "Our senses have been conferred upon 
 us, in our present state of being, to act the part of 
 so many satellites or messengers, each of which is 
 invested "with its own proper function, and the per- 
 fection of each sense consists in percei^dng, mth 
 promptness and certainty, those things which nature 
 submits to them." 
 
 It is not possible, however, to determine whether 
 Cicero considered our sensations as affording us a 
 standard of truth, or whether they were fallacious, 
 and not to be depended upon. He is wdshful to 
 steer a kind of middle course between conflicting 
 systems. He could not go the whole length of say- 
 ing, that the impressions by the senses were stamped 
 mth infallible certainty; neither, on the other hand, 
 would his movements among men of the world, and 
 an active participation in all its duties, allow him 
 to consider these impressions, in the vast majority 
 of cases, as uncertain and illusory. To solve the 
 difficulty in some measure, he instituted a species 
 fdi iwohahility , which was to serve the common and 
 ordinary purpose of guiding men to safe and rational 
 conclusions, on all matters appertaining to the 
 mere phenomena of sensation. There is, however, 
 great vagueness and uncertainty on every thing the 
 philosopher has advanced on this question. In 
 some places he considers the senses as the mere 
 channels through wliich objects are conveyed to the 
 mind ; and that it is the peculiar province of this 
 intelligent principle, to procure information, to 
 combine, and compare, and to judge.* This position 
 
 * Tusc. 1. 20.
 
 CICERO. 173 
 
 is, however, laid down with so many qualifications 
 and reservations, that it becomes quite obvious 
 that he had no decided or systematic opinions on 
 the subject of sensation generally.* 
 
 On the difficulties which present themselves in 
 all investigations after truth, Cicero thus expresses 
 himself: "All knowledge is encircled with diffi- 
 culties. Such is the natural obscurity of things, 
 and the constitutional weakness of the principle of 
 intelligence, that the most sagacious minds of an- 
 tiquity have doubted whether we ever can arrive at 
 truth at all. The most part of mankind em- 
 brace opinions without having the power of choosing 
 them. They judge of what they do not know ; and 
 attach themselves to some favourite system, as 
 mariners do to a rock in a tempestuous sea. But 
 a philosopher will only give his assent after he has 
 patiently heard both sides, and after a careful 
 re\dew of all the opinions which have previously 
 been advanced on the subject." 
 
 Cicero seems to have established his metaphysi- 
 cal creed upon the general principles of Plato's 
 system. Though well grounded in various other 
 doctrines relative to the mind, he decidedly gives 
 the preference to those of this eminent Grecian 
 sage. Cicero almost always had a fondness for Plato. 
 They had many things in common. There were 
 the same elevation of thought, and warmth of feel- 
 ing, displayed in both ; and the same deference 
 paid to the common-sense feelings and sentiments 
 of mankind. This must have proved a powerful 
 
 * De Finibns. 2. 12.
 
 174 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 bond of union. And there can be no rational doubt 
 but that the predilection which the great orator and 
 statesman manifested for Plato's views of the human 
 understanding, arose from an inward and powerful 
 conviction that they were more in unison with the 
 duties and destinies of man, than those of any other 
 of the Grecian philosophers.* 
 
 The immediate followers of Cicero in pliilo- 
 sophical disquisitions, were not signalized by any 
 advancements in the study of mind. Indeed it 
 was in a great measure neglected by all the latter 
 disciples of the Stoical School at Rome. The 
 speculations of the learned men who still adliered 
 to the forms of philosophy, were directed to the 
 principles which regulate the ordinary current of 
 human life, and into the nature of public and 
 private good and evil. The Stoical school, for a 
 long period after the death of Cicero, clearly indi- 
 cates how disinclined the Romans were to abstract 
 studies, and what a faint relish they displayed for 
 all the most sul3lime speculations which formed the 
 intellectual glory of Athens. With the exception 
 of the doctrine of the freedom of the human will, 
 we can scarcely recognize a single speculation 
 of a metaphysical character, brought prominently 
 
 * Vide, The Memoirs of Gauthier tie Sibert, on the Philosophy of 
 Cicero, iu the 27th book of the Academy of Inscrijjtions, Paris ; Facci- 
 olati. Vita C iceronis Litteraria, Paris, 1760 ; Middleton's Life of Cicero, 
 London ; Hulsemann, De Indole Philosophica M.TulliiCiceronis, Luxem- 
 burg, 1 700 ; Meniers, Oratio de Phil. Ciceronis, Leipsic ; Adam Bursius, 
 Dialectica Ciceronis, Zamosck, 1604 ; Janson de Nares, Brevis et 
 distincta Quajst. in Ciceronis Philosophia, Pavia, loJ)/ ; Waldin, Oratio de 
 Phil. Ciceronis Platonica, Jena, \753.
 
 ALCINOUS. 175 
 
 forward on the stage of public discussion, for a 
 long series of years. To this doctrine, however, 
 the Stoics were enthusiastically attached. Indeed 
 it forms the grand key- stone to then- whole sys- 
 tem of morals. A few scattered thoughts on the 
 philosophy of mind may he found connected with 
 the names of Q. Sextus, Demetrius, Demonax of 
 Cyprus, (Enomaus of Gadara, Athenodorus of 
 Tarsus, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and 
 M. Aurelius Antoninus. 
 
 ALCINOUS. 
 
 Amongst the most eminent metaphysicians 
 who adorned the school of the new Platonists at 
 Rome, Alcinous took a distinguished rank. His 
 " Introduction to the Fhllosophj of JBlato^^ is the 
 very best summary of Plato's system which has 
 ever been given. 
 
 Alcinous maintains that that w^liich has for its 
 object intelligent things, is science, or scientific 
 reason ; that which embraces sensible things, or 
 sensations, is doxatical reason, or opinion. 
 
 It foUow^s then from this, that all which flows 
 from the exercise of this scientific reason, is solid 
 and immutable, because it is itself founded upon a 
 basis which embodies these two qualities. On the 
 other hand, factitious reason or opinion offers only 
 general probabilities, and resemblances, because 
 it is founded only upon uncertain data. 
 
 The understanding is the foundation of science, 
 Avhich has for its objects intelligent tilings; and
 
 176 ROMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 sensation is the link wMcli connects the under- 
 standing with our senses. 
 
 Sensation is an impression which the soul re- 
 ceives from external objects, and which impression 
 indicates its passive nature. 
 
 When, then, the soul receives, through the 
 instrumentality of the senses, a sensible impres- 
 sion, — that is to say, a sensation, — instead of its 
 being destroyed, or erased by time, it remains and 
 is treasured up there ; and the continuation of its 
 future existence, is that effect of sensation which 
 produces what we term memory. 
 
 When we recognize a sensible object, whilst the 
 presence of that object produces in us a sensation, 
 and this sensation is imprinted on the memory ; 
 when we perceive again tliis identical object, we 
 compare the preceding sensation, which has been 
 preserved by the memory, with the new sensation ; 
 and we thus say to ourselves, for example, Socrates^ 
 horse, fire ; and so of other things. 
 
 When, then, we compare a previous sensation 
 with another just experienced, the effect of this act 
 of comparison is termed opinion. When the two 
 objects compared are in unison, the result of the 
 comparison is truth ; on the contrary, when there 
 is want of agreement, the opinion is false and 
 erroneous.* 
 
 Maximus of Tyre. 
 This writer on the mind follows nearly the same 
 
 * Introrliiction to the Philosophy of Plato.
 
 MAXIMUS OF TYRE. 177 
 
 path as Alcinous. The distinction between reason 
 and the mere sentient principle, he points out in 
 ^the following manner. 
 
 "Let us inquire what that is in man to which 
 we apply the terms to know, to learn, to app^^eliend, 
 and other phrases of a similar nature which indi- 
 cate that the soul is in a contemplative state of 
 existence. Do we call by the name of science that 
 which the senses assemble as in a contemplative 
 picture-frame, and which we commonly designate 
 by the name of experience ; that, in fact, which is 
 submitted to the eyes of the mind, and which reason, 
 after due examination, stamps with its own seal ? 
 Such a science as this, it must be owned, is common 
 to brutes ; for they receive sensations, acquire ex- 
 perience, and possess a species of wisdom. The 
 superiority of man is derived from his reason, and 
 liis relation to science is nothing but this reason 
 bringing under its power, for a sufficient length of 
 time, the multitudinous objects submitted to its 
 notice ; and in its active powers detecting resem- 
 blances and contrarieties ; separating, uniting, dis- 
 tinguishing, and producing an harmonious whole, 
 out of a mass of incongruous and diversified ma- 
 terials. The soul of man is a compound of mortal 
 and immortal elements. The latter qualities Linite 
 him with the gods. Instinct is the gift of the 
 former ; intelligence that of the latter. Prudence 
 or sagacity holds a situation between them both ; 
 and establishes the supremacy of our immortal 
 nature upon that which we possess in common with 
 the animal creation. Experience has created the 
 
 * N
 
 178 HOMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 arts ; prudence or sagacity governs the passions and 
 emotions of the soul ; and intelligence represents 
 the laws of tliis external habitation of ours — laws 
 which have been created by God himself. I call 
 true science the harmonious combination of these 
 three faculties or powers." 
 
 We find Maximus entertaining the '^most lofty 
 ideas of the nature of the soul. He had evidentlv 
 drunk deep in the Platonic philosophy. It is only 
 the internal and intelligent parts of the man which 
 command liis admiration and respect ; it is these 
 alone which raise him to the dignity of claiming an 
 affinity with Deity itself. There is a genuine spiri- 
 tuality and life in his mental speculations, which 
 are not displayed in the lucubrations of his pre- 
 decessors.* 
 
 Maximus did not fail to notice the various sources 
 of error mankind had to contend against in their 
 pursuit of truth. Not only the passions of the soul 
 blind and misdirect the reason, but even philosophy 
 herself, infallible as she is commonly considered, 
 is but a frail and uncertain guide. The rivaby of 
 different and opposing sects, the influence of am- 
 bitious singularity, and the strong prepossessions in 
 favour of particular studies and sciences, distract 
 the judgment of the most sedate and able men, and 
 convert them into instruments of delusion. The phi- 
 losophy of Thales was viewed through the medium 
 of astronomy ; of Pythagoras, through music ; of 
 Heraclitus, through solitude ; of Socrates, througli 
 
 * Maximus Tvr. Diss. 12. U. 17
 
 ALEXANDER. GALEN. 179 
 
 the moral affections ; and of Epicurus, through vo- 
 luptuousness. Thus mankind are bewildered and 
 tossed from one set of doctrines to another.* 
 
 Alexander op Aphrodisias. 
 
 This metaphysician was a distinguished com- 
 mentator on Aristotle, to whose ideas he added some 
 notions of his own. He attacks the Platonists, 
 the Stoics, and the Epicureans, and seems to have 
 been a stout and resolute defender of the perfect 
 stability of human knowledge. 
 
 Alexander was a strenuous advocate for free-will. 
 He maintains that this power was given to man, 
 and is one of the marks which distinguish him 
 from mere animal nature. He points out, with 
 great force, the moral and social evils which follow 
 the doctrines of necessary connexion, when they 
 are once brought into active operation in the con- 
 duct of individuals or whole bodies of men. 
 
 Galen. 
 
 This distinguished physician did not confine his 
 inquiries to those topics more immediately con- 
 nected with the physical constitution of man ; but 
 with indefatigable labour investigated those hidden 
 springs of mental action, which always exercise a 
 greater or lesser influence over the bodily powers 
 of human nature. He seems to have freed himself 
 
 * Diss. 25. 
 
 n 2
 
 180 KOMAN SCHOOL. 
 
 from the trammels of systems, and to have prose- 
 cuted his inqumes under the influence of a sincere 
 and ardent love of truth. 
 
 On the abstract nature of evidence he makes 
 some profound and just remarks. He saw the 
 great error which pervaded many of the systems 
 promulgated by the ancients, which principally 
 consisted in an absurd and ridiculous aj^plication of 
 general terms, without making those perpetual re- 
 ferences to facts, which are indis^Densable for the 
 foundation of comprehensive branches of science 
 and knowledge. In his definition of synthesis and 
 analysis, he points out the nature of both these in- 
 struments, the limits of each, and the most ap- 
 proved rules for the advantageous combination of 
 both. 
 
 He distinguished four kinds of demonstration. 
 The first produced all science ; it seized the reality 
 of things, and investigated their nature completely ; 
 the second, that logical process on which dialec- 
 tics were founded ; the third, that which embraced 
 foreign testimony, grounded upon the probability 
 of the statements advanced ; and the fourth rested 
 on commonly received notions or opinions. 
 
 Galen remarks, that evidence is the source of all 
 intellectual light ; if there were no evidence, there 
 could be no exercise of the human understanding.- 
 This power is to the soul what the eye is to the 
 body. To perceive, is to comprehend, to know, to 
 be assured of the existence of things. It is necessary, 
 then, to commence all our inquiries with essential 
 and fundamental things, and to take our departure
 
 GALEN. 181 
 
 from those things that are easy of comprehensiorij 
 and are immediately around us. 
 
 This philosopher considered that the common 
 source of error amongst men, arose from a too hasty 
 generalisation. The successful search after truth 
 essentially consists in an extensive and careful in- 
 vestigation, and an exact comparison as to the 
 differences and resemblances of thinors.
 
 182 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 CHAPTER XXI. 
 THE LATEK SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICAL SCEPTICISM. 
 
 At stated periods in the history of mental phi- 
 losophy we find that certain men invariably at- 
 tempted to gain distinction and notoriety, by call- 
 ing in question the fundamental maxims of know- 
 ledge, truth, and reasoning. We find all shades 
 and degrees of scepticism; from the humble and 
 simple doubter, to the absolute and dogmatical 
 disbeliever in even his own personal existence. 
 The nature of mental inquiry is favourable to tliis 
 intellectual disease ; chiefly from the abstract na- 
 ture of its principles, the uncertainty and imper- 
 fections of language, the difficulty attending a close 
 and consecutive examination of the phenomena of 
 thought, and the variable motives which may 
 influence the judgments of the metaphysician 
 throughout the whole course of his investigations. 
 
 tEnesidemus. 
 ^nesidemus was a reviver of the doctrines of the
 
 ^NESIDEMUS. 183 
 
 Pyrrlionians. He was a contemporary of Cicero, was 
 a native of Crete, and taught philosophy at Alex- 
 andria. He wrote a work to point out the distinc- 
 tion between the doctrines of the Academicians, 
 and those of the followers of Pyrrho. In the se- 
 cond book of this work ^nesidemus treats of truth, 
 causation, action, chance, motion, production, de- 
 struction, with a view of showing the imperfections 
 of om' knowledge on all these matters. In the 
 third book he treats of our sensations, and endea- 
 vours to show that there is a great want of uniformity 
 amongst them. The fourth book is occupied with 
 the imperfections of signs ; and the fifth points out 
 the uncertainty accompanying all those deductions 
 which we make from sensible tilings, to matters 
 removed from the senses. The sixth attacks the 
 ordinary maxims respecting cause and effect ; and 
 the other three books are confi.ned to questions as 
 to good and evil, and the end and destiny of man. 
 
 On the subject of causation, this philosopher 
 makes the following remarks : " Bodies cannot be 
 the cause of other bodies ; for if they act, they 
 must either act by themselves, or by others, as 
 intermediate agents. If by themselves, they can 
 only produce that which ah'eady forms a part of 
 their own nature or essence ; if they act through 
 the instrumentality of others, then these become 
 necessarily one and the same substance. That 
 which is incorporeal cannot, moreover, be the 
 cause of another incorporeal substance; and for 
 this reason, beings cannot produce that which 
 forms no part of their own nature. Besides, that
 
 18i LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 which is incorporeal cannot he in contact with, or 
 act upon, or he acted upon hy, that which is material. 
 Bodies cannot he the cause of incorporeal natures, 
 nor can the latter be the cause of the former, for 
 they contain opposite properties or principles. A 
 body at rest cannot be the cause of another body 
 also at rest, nor can a body in motion be the cause 
 of another that moves itself."* 
 
 What JGnesidemus meant by being or essence, is 
 difficult to conjecture. His views on the primary 
 causes of things seem at variance with the general 
 scope of his speculations. The essence (ovaia) was 
 the primeval body ; but whether it included a se- 
 condary body, is uncertain, f He also considered 
 air as the principle of all things. There seems, 
 however, to have been great confusion in his mind 
 on every topic of speculation. 
 
 Agrippa. 
 
 This ancient writer was the successor of ^Ene- 
 sidemus, and cultivated his system with great 
 zeal and success. He made additional maxims 
 to the theory of Pyrrho. These maxims are five 
 in number. The first relates to the differences 
 amongst the various schools of philosophy, on the 
 truth of theu' respective elementary principles. 
 The second arises from the notion of infinity in- 
 volved in every chain of proofs, that one depends 
 upon another ad infinitum. The third maxim, of 
 
 * Photius, Bibl. pp. 642. 648. t Sextus Empiri., Pyrrb. 3. 138.
 
 PHAVORINUS — SEXTTJS EMPIRICUS. 185 
 
 doubt, refers to the uncertainty we must always 
 labour under as to the real nature of objects ; inas- 
 much as we can only speak or judge of things by 
 our own individual sensations or perceptions. 
 Fourthly, we are led into doubt and error from the 
 hasty adoption of purely gratuitous principles. 
 And the fifth maxim is the common practice of 
 reasoning in a circle. There seems, however, no- 
 thing novel in all these maxims. They have been 
 repeated over and over again by many preceding 
 philosophers.* 
 
 Phavomnus. 
 
 This philosopher wrote a treatise on Vision, as 
 well as upon the Academical propositions, and the 
 views of Pyrrho. Philostratus informs us that 
 these works were of high merit. It was against 
 this philosopher that Galen directed his metaphy- 
 sical writings. The latter remarks, "That some 
 recent writers, and amongst the number is Pha- 
 vorinus, carry their doubts to such a pitch, as to 
 call in question the existence of the sun."t 
 
 Sextus Empimcus. 
 
 Sextus was not only a most profound metaphy- 
 sician himself, but he was, on the whole, a most 
 able and candid historian of mental theories and 
 systems generally. He had paid great attention 
 
 * Diog. Laert. 9. 88. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1. pp. 164 —178. 
 t Diog. Laert. 9. 87.
 
 186 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 to this department of knowledge ; and it is chiefly 
 to him that we owe any information at all of the 
 views and writings of several eminent philosophers 
 of ancient times. 
 
 His own personal opinions seem to have classed 
 him amongst the Sceptics ; but it has long been a 
 question, since his day, what was his degree of 
 doubt, and how far he carried out his scepticism 
 on the fundamentals of human science and know- 
 ledge. On this point it will be difficult to form a 
 correct opinion. We have only a few scattered 
 observations of his own, and very slender probabi- 
 lities to guide us. It would seem, however, that 
 he did not carry his system, of doubt to such a 
 length as to invalidate the testimony of our senses, 
 or the elementary principles of reason. On this 
 subject he remarks, " We never examine how sen- 
 sible things fall under our senses, nor how intelli- 
 gent perceptions arise in the understanding and 
 are there perceived by it; we receive both in a 
 simple and absolute manner, as a matter unac- 
 countable and undefinable." 
 
 Sextus remarks also, that the philosophers who 
 preceded him had maintained three standards 
 of truth, or rather we should say, three instru- 
 ments for the discovery of truth and falsehood. 
 The first is that wliich belongs to man, and which 
 forms his power of judgment ; the second, the 
 means he employs for judging, that is, Ms senses 
 and understanding ; and the third, that action or 
 power by which he applies these objects or instru- 
 ments. The first principle he rejects, on account
 
 SEXTUS EMPimCUS. 187 
 
 of the compound nature of man, possessing a body, 
 as well as a soul, wliich must, in his opinion, give 
 rise to many operations we never can know any- 
 thing about. The second criterio7i he also refuses 
 liis assent to, principally on the ground of the 
 conflicting and variable nature of our organs of 
 sense, and the sources of delusion to wliich the un- 
 derstanding is liable from this and other causes. 
 The tliird standard is rejected likewise, from the 
 doubt thrown over our organs of vision. 
 
 The notions entertained by Sextus on the human 
 soul, are of a material complexion. He thought 
 we knew little or nothing about it.* All the 
 higher kinds of thought were but the relations to 
 the sensible particles of matter. Our sensations 
 seemed to be the only ground he had for anytliing 
 approaching to truth and certainty. But Sex- 
 tus was not apparently consistent even in this 
 position : for he maintained that man did not 
 know anytliing whatever of himself. We have no 
 sure means of arri\dng at the truth of our own 
 natures, either bodily or mental, f Every thing 
 is tainted with doubt. If the mind can know any 
 thins? of man, it must know him onlv throua^h 
 three channels, the body, the senses, or itself. If 
 the body compels the mind to think, then the body 
 moves without any reason, and consequently our 
 minds must be moved or impelled irrationally. 
 The same objection lies against the position that 
 the senses can be known by the mind, for they are 
 
 * Pyrrh. Hyp. 3. 51. t Pyrrh. 2. 29.
 
 188 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 themselves irrational in their movements and 
 operations. If we learned what the senses were 
 through the medium of the imderstanding, this 
 would reduce all to the same uniform nature or 
 essence. As to the mind taking notice of its own 
 thoughts, feelings, opinions, and emotions, this is 
 evidently impossihle, for we should have neither a 
 suhject to know, or an ohject to he known. Eor the 
 mind to know itself, it must know what its real suh- 
 stance is, all its laws of action, where its proper lo- 
 cation is ; and, in fact, in what mode it operates on 
 matter, and matter operates on it. 
 
 These douhts and objections are reiterated over 
 and over again by this learned Sceptic, but there 
 is little method or ingenuity displayed in the ar- 
 rano;ement of his views. 
 
 The ideas of Sextus on cause and efiTect, are 
 clothed in the same mystification as his other 
 notions on the foundations of truth in general. 
 Causation from the contact of material bodies is 
 considered very doubtful. No two bodies can 
 touch each other; it may be conjectured that they 
 may touch each other at theu^ surfaces, but the 
 bodies themselves can never come in contact.* 
 The same thing may be affirmed of all mixtures of 
 material elements, and the various changes they 
 seem to undergo in consequence. There is no real 
 contact of the particles in such cases. 
 
 On cause and effect generally, the objections 
 urged by Sextus are very subtile, and fairly stated, 
 
 ' Pynhoa. Hyp. 3. 12.
 
 SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. 189 
 
 In modem times we have seen them often brought 
 upon the stage of philosophical discussion. If 
 one thing, says Sextus, can be the cause of another 
 thing, one of the following circumstances must 
 take place ; either the quiescent must be the cause 
 of the quiescent, or the moved of the thing in 
 motion; or a moving cause produce a quiescent 
 effect, or a quiescent cause a moved effect. Now 
 this cannot be, because it is maintained, as a 
 general maxim, that like things can only produce 
 like things. Again, it is affirmed that cause and 
 effect must have a co-existent nature. That a 
 cause cannot be posterior to an effect is quite true ; 
 neither can an effect be subsequent to a cause, for 
 this reason, that if the cause be anterior to the 
 effect, there must be a certain time when it was 
 deprived of, or separated from, the effect, therefore 
 making it no cause at all. If again the effect be 
 posterior to the cause, then it must exist when its 
 cause ceases to exist, which would make it, in fact, 
 an effect without a cause, which is a thing impos- 
 sible to be conceived. 
 
 Besides these objections, it is urged by the 
 Sceptics, that our ordinary theory of causation 
 involves the position that all causes are active 
 principles, and all effects are passive ones. Now 
 this cannot be proved. Indeed this theory of 
 cause and effect contains many contradictory con- 
 clusions ; and it is from the consideration of these, 
 that Sextus sees it is impossible to extricate him- 
 self from this labyrinth of doubt and perplexity. 
 
 On the nature of Deitv, the whole of the doubts
 
 190 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM. 
 
 and speculations of Sextus are of a material 
 nature and tendency. There is nothing of novelty 
 "in them.* • 
 
 * See the three works of Sextus Empiricus ; the PjTi-honistie Hypoty- 
 poses, that against Encyclic Sciences, and that against the Philosophical 
 Sects. The two last are joined in one called Adversus Mathematicos. 
 
 i
 
 OPINIONS ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 191 
 
 CHAPTER XXII. 
 
 ON THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, 
 UP TO THIS PERIOD OF HISTORY, ON A DEITY, 
 AND THE HUMAN SOUL. 
 
 As we have now arrived at what may be strictly 
 called the termination of heathen speculations on 
 the mental nature of man, it will prove of advan- 
 tage to take a retrospective view of the general 
 notions entertained by the sages of antiquity on 
 the nature of a First Great Cause, and of the hu- 
 man soul. These are two branches of knowledge 
 so nearly allied to metaphysics, so closely inter- 
 woven with all the inquisitive powers of men's 
 minds, so vitaUy important to the right application 
 of aU speculations on human nature, and so deeply 
 momentous to the present and future interests of 
 mankind, that no apology can be necessary here 
 for giving these topics the fullest consideration 
 possible. Indeed, unless these important doc- 
 trines were founded in truth, and taken with us as 
 guides throughout life, it is difficult to conceive 
 what could really be the ol)ject in instituting any
 
 192 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 investigations into tlie laws of either matter or 
 mind. The doctrines of a Deity, and the spiri- 
 tuality of the human soul, are the true vivifying 
 principles of intellectual existence; and without 
 them all speculation would only present a melan- 
 choly and dreary wilderness, without a single ob- 
 ject of substantial interest for the eye of man to 
 dwell upon. 
 
 Among the various modern writers on the prin- 
 ciples of natural theology, and the evidences of 
 Christianity, there are evidently two classes, cha- 
 racterized by strong marks of difference. One por- 
 tion have always shown a marked jealousy against 
 allowing the heathen philosophers the smallest 
 credit for any knowledge of a Supreme Being ; and 
 the other have been apt to misconceive and over- 
 rate the importance of that heathen knowledge. 
 The former writers have, in substance, maintained 
 that Christianity should have the sole undi\dded 
 honour of revealing to man the existence and attri- 
 butes of a Deity ; that human reason had no just 
 claim to such a magnificent discovery; and that 
 had it not been for the direct and positive declara- 
 tions of Holy Writ, no knowledge would have been 
 found at this day among the human race, on this 
 interesting and all-absorbing topic. Now I con- 
 ceive there can be no good grounds for depreciating 
 ancient knowledge on the nature of a Deity. There 
 is nothing here to detract from the merit of Chris- 
 tianity ; but on the contrary, to strengthen its 
 evidences, and to make them take a firmer hold of 
 the human understanding. It is quite obvious, as
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 193 
 
 a matter of fact, that many of the sages of anti- 
 quity had very clear and elevated notions of a Su- 
 preme Being ; and these notions had heen worked 
 out by the pure force of their natural mental fa- 
 culties, and their accurate modes of interrogating 
 nature. And this is perfectly in accordance with 
 the declarations and spirit of Revelation itself ; for 
 it declares that God did not leave himself without 
 a witness ; inasmuch as he had given to every man 
 a Kght to guide him to a knowledge of Himself. 
 
 We find, on the other hand, that some theolo- 
 gical writers have descanted on the nature of the 
 knowledge wliich the heathen possessed of a Su- 
 preme Being, as if that knowledge was every thing 
 that could be desired ; and that the subsequent 
 revelations from heaven on this grand subject, 
 were nothing more than a simple recapitulation of 
 the opinions of Aristotle or Plato. This is errmg 
 on the opposite side. We should, therefore, hold 
 the balance fairly between both parties. The opi- 
 nions of the ancient philosophers are well worthy 
 our special regard ; but we must amalgamate them 
 with the more full and comprehensive develop- 
 ments of the Divine nature and attributes, which 
 the Christian system unfolds. 
 
 There is one very obvious difference between the 
 Deity of the heathen philosophers and the Deity of 
 the Christians. The former is invariably repre- 
 sented as a Being very far removed from all hu- 
 man sympathy and regard. He rules and governs 
 the world by general laws, but takes no interest in 
 the petty affau's of man. Now the Christian sys- 
 * o
 
 194 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 tern brings the Deity, so to speak, nearer to man- 
 kind ; institutes a close and mutual sympathy be- 
 tween them; and represents both under the fa- 
 miliar and interesting relationship of Father and 
 children. When this difference of character is duly 
 estimated by the practical consequences wliich must 
 follow from it in our modes of worship, the result 
 must display the great defects in the speculative 
 systems of the ancient world, in reference to the 
 existence and attributes of the Author of the 
 universe. 
 
 We find that those ancient philosophers who 
 discussed the nature of the Great Pirst Cause, pur- 
 sued the same line of argumentation which has 
 commonly been employed by all theological writers 
 in modern times. There is a very interesting and 
 striking resemblance on this point. The proofs of 
 a Deity furnished by the ancients, may be classified 
 under three distinct heads ; namely, Immcm testi- 
 mony ; the order and constitution of the loorld ; and 
 the 'jjerniciotts consequences of Atheism. Under 
 the first head they showed the almost universal 
 opinion entertained by all mankind on the sub- 
 ject of a Pirst Cause, and that nien of the greatest 
 wisdom and penetration had given their cordial as- 
 sent to it. In the second place, they considered 
 the order and wisdom displayed in the constitution 
 of every department of nature, '^'\1lere intelligence 
 is so strikingly imprinted on every thing around 
 us, it is but reasonable to suppose that an intelli- 
 gent cause must be the creating and sustaining 
 principle of action. Again, nothing is so perni-
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 195 
 
 cious as the doctrine of Atheism. Every noble 
 principle, and every disinterested feeling, become 
 paralyzed under its withering and hateful influ- 
 ence. It destroys all religion, all morality, all 
 wisdom and justice among men. 
 
 One of the most early notions respecting the 
 Deity entertained by the ancient philosophers, was 
 that the all-creating Cause was not different in 
 nature or essence from the universe itself. They 
 imagined the Divinity to pervade all space, to be 
 every way present, and that no change or move- 
 ment could be produced but by His direct will or 
 influence. We find traces of this opinion through- 
 out the whole range of heathen philosophy. It 
 does not appear, however, that they deduced any 
 atheistical inferences from it. The reasonable sup- 
 position is that very elevated and transcendental 
 notions of supreme power led inquirers to this train 
 of thought, and by not mshing to mix the actions 
 of the Deity with every petty mundane afiair, they ' 
 talked of this Spirit pervading and forming part of 
 the whole frame of universal creation. 
 
 Some philosophers — and the Stoics were of this 
 number — considered that the Deitv consisted of 
 more than one person. Cicero, in his Treatise on 
 the Nature of the Gods, says that all the theology 
 of the Stoics may be divided into four parts ; 
 namely, first, that there are gods ; secondly, that 
 their nature may be defined ; thirdly, that the gods 
 govern the world ; and fourthly, that they especially 
 interest themselves with the affairs of men. 
 
 Akin to this last opinion, was the one generally 
 
 o 2
 
 196 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 prevalent amongst the Eastern nations, wliicli 
 embraced, in divers sliapes and forms, the two 
 principles of good and evil. This idea was the 
 groundwork of many systems of theology. 
 
 There was a notion almost universally enter- 
 tained amongst all classes of the ancient philoso- 
 phers, that the Deity acted under the influence of 
 an irrevocable fate or destiny. The affairs of the 
 world, and the constitution of things in general, 
 could not be otherwise managed than we find 
 them. They were always more or less scrupulous 
 in admitting the application of this doctrine, in all 
 its fulness, to the superior or intellectual part of 
 man, but seem to have tacitly acquiesced in it, in 
 reference to the Deity. There were, however, 
 many qualifications and modifications of the doc- 
 trine of necessity, when thus applied to the influ- 
 ence of the universal Cause. 
 
 Another opinion, somewhat curious, was adopted, 
 that the Deity and the Creator of the world were 
 two Separate Beings ; the latter, however, only the 
 agent or instrument in the hands of the former. 
 This notion, it may be observed, was confined to a 
 very small section of the philosophical world of 
 antiquity. 
 
 The Deity of the ancients was almost invariably 
 associated with a high degree of intelligence. He 
 was the centre of all thought, truth, and wisdom. 
 The intelligent principle is always the leading 
 and prominent attribute of his nature ; and good- 
 ness and benevolence were made to occupy a sub- 
 ordinate station in the character of the Divinity.
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOTJL. 197 
 
 This notion gave a great variety of colourings to 
 tlieir theological systems. 
 
 There were, as we have already noticed, three 
 leading arguments used by the ancients for the 
 existence of a Deity, namely, testimony, the con- 
 stitution of the world, and the evils of atheism ; 
 yet, in addition to these, there were other powerful 
 influences which seemed to have a great effect upon 
 all their reasonings on this interesting question. 
 Among these, the origin of mcJtion occupied a con- 
 spicuous place. We find that, whenever a reasoner 
 was placed in any real or apparent dilemma on the 
 nature and existence of Deity, he invariably took 
 shelter in the origin of motion. He demanded, 
 how could a body move itself ? There must be a 
 first cause, or you cannot advance a single step 
 in accounting for anything. Yoar philosophy is 
 puerility and nonsense without it. Every reader 
 of the works of the Grecian sages can readily bring 
 to his recollection innumerable instances of the 
 adoption of this line of argumentation.* 
 
 The opinions of the ancient philosophers on the 
 nature of the human soul were exceedingly diversi- 
 fied, often contradictory, and sometimes unintelli- 
 gible. We can do little more here, therefore, Avith 
 any hope of profit, than just present the reader 
 with a few general remarks, on some of the leading 
 systems which obtained currency amongst the spe- 
 culators of antiquity. 
 
 There were a few of the ancient philosophers 
 
 * See Note E. at the end of this Vohime.
 
 198 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHEHS 
 
 who maintained that the soul was propagated by 
 parents to their chikben by the ordinary laws of 
 generation. Against this opinion it was contended, 
 that if the soul were created in this manner, it 
 must either be from the body or from the soul of 
 the parents. If it proceeded from the body, the 
 soul wonld then be a material substance ; and the 
 effect, in this case, would be vastly more noble and 
 exalted than the cause. If, on the other hand, our 
 thinking principle proceeded from the soul of our 
 parents, then the difficulty presented itself, that by 
 thus making the soul a simple uncompounded 
 substance, it could not possibly be dissolvable or 
 communicative. Again, it was asked, If the soul 
 be propagated from parents, by the ordinary laws 
 of generation, is it from the soul of one of them, 
 or from both ? There is no reason why it should 
 be from the one parent more than the other ; and 
 if we say it is from both, then vre are immediately 
 betrayed into the absurdity, that the soul is made 
 up of parts. Its unity is hereby destroyed, which 
 is one of the leading attributes attached to the 
 soul or mind of man. The opponents of this 
 theory always insisted, that it was impossible to 
 conceive how the souls of two parents should be 
 so united, as necessarily to produce a new soul. 
 On the other hand the advocates of the theory 
 attempted to illustrate their principles in the 
 followmg manner. The soul exerts a thought ; 
 that thought becomes the germ or seed of another 
 soul. There was no greater difficulty involved in 
 this simple assumption than there is when speak-
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 199 
 
 ing of the (jerm or seed of material things. But 
 here it was objected, that if by a thought one spirit 
 could produce another, then one superior intel- 
 lectual nature could produce its own kind in like 
 manner; which would end in chaotic confusion. 
 Besides, this theory involved the notion, that the 
 soul was capable of an act of creation, which is 
 the especial prerogative of the Divinity itself ; for 
 whatever can produce a substance out of nothing, 
 possesses undoubtedly a power of creation. If the 
 soul of man had the power of creating another soul 
 from a simple thought, and if that thought be main- 
 tained at the same time to have nothing in itself of 
 a substantial form, then the soul would possess that 
 same creative power which we consider as the sole 
 attribute of the Deitv. To avoid this conclusion, 
 it was contended that though the soul had not the 
 absolute power of creation, yet it possessed a power 
 to multiply itself, and so produce other souls, in 
 precisely the same manner as a candle is lighted 
 from another, Avithout diminishing its substance. 
 
 There was a very commonly prevailing o])iuion 
 amongst the ancients, that the souls of men were 
 originally made l3y the divinity himself at the 
 creation of all things ; and existed in a prior state, 
 Avhere they were completely happy, and might have 
 continued so for ever, had they not committed 
 some heinous offence against their Creator, and 
 thereby lost their primitive integrity and purity. 
 In consequence of this, they were placed in bodies 
 as punishments for their former crimes. This 
 doctrine was objected to on the general ground.
 
 200 OPINIONS or ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 that if this were the real state of the case, how 
 comes it to pass that men had no remembrance 
 whatever of any former state of existence ? To 
 this it was answered, that eternal oblivion consti- 
 tuted one of the chief elements of the punishment 
 inflicted upon them for then' disobedience. 
 
 The doctrine of the Qiietempsycliosis, or transmi- 
 gration of souls, c\MniQi\. a kindred alliance with the 
 above doctrine. It maintained that the souls of 
 men passed after death into the bodies of other 
 living animals, whose habits, modes of life, and 
 dispositions, bore a suitable resemblance to those 
 moral pursuits and intellectual qualities, which 
 defined the characters of individuals on earth. If a 
 man led a debased and sensual life, he was doomed, 
 after death,to be imprisoned in some wretched beast, 
 there to perform a species of penance for several 
 ages. If, on the contrary, he lived a sober, tem- 
 perate, and virtuous life, he was more fortunate 
 in being sent to some happy and peaceful animal. 
 Some of the ancient philosophers pretended to have 
 had visions on this subject. One describes the soul 
 of Orpheus, who was musical, melancholy, and a 
 hater of the fair sex, as entering into a swan ; the 
 soul of Ajax, represented full of anger and ferocity, 
 into a lion; the soul of Agamemnon, who was 
 soaring and ambitious, into an eagle ; and the soul 
 of the scoffer Thersites, into a monkey. This doc- 
 trine of transmigration has often been alluded to by 
 modern writers of great note. How fine is Dry den' s 
 translation of Pythagoras' speech, in the fifteenth 
 book of Ovid's Metamorphoses, touching the im-
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 201 
 
 propriety of eatiiig animal food. And most literary 
 readers must know the famous prologue which 
 Congreve fixed to one of his very best comedies, in 
 which the following lines occur, with respect to 
 the supposed consequences of this grand doctrine 
 of transmigration : — 
 
 " Thus Aristotle's soul of old that was. 
 May now be damn'd to animate an ass ; 
 Or, in this very house, for ought we know. 
 Is doing painful penance in some beau." 
 
 There were a considerable number of the ancient 
 sages who strenuously maintained that the j)ower 
 or faculty of thinking was an inherent and essential 
 property of the soul, and if this thought were taken 
 away from it, its nature would be entirely destroyed. 
 They affirmed, that the soul was a substance alto- 
 gether distinct and different from matter, the con- 
 stitutional properties of which were solidity and 
 extension. If the soul be neither solid nor ex- 
 tended, then, said they, we cannot conceive how it 
 can exist, when it does not think. It may be true 
 indeed, that a body when put in motion may con- 
 tinue to move in a straight line, until it comes in 
 contact with some other body which may give it 
 another direction ; but this case does not apply to 
 the general argument, for a body when moving is 
 entirely passive, whereas the soul of man is per- 
 petually active in all its creations ; and, therefore, 
 it must be concluded, that constant thinking is an 
 essential attribute of the mental nature of man. 
 
 This opinion was qualified, in some degree, l)y 
 asserting that the essential principle of the soul
 
 202 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 was not perpetual cogitation, bnt only a communi- 
 cated power to think. Thought was considered re- 
 latively to the soul, what motion is to the body ; as 
 it is not always necessary that the body should be in 
 motion, neither is it necessary for the soul always 
 to think. To account for the soul's existence when 
 it does not think, we have only to suppose that 
 though the soul is not solid, so as to offer resistance 
 to bodies, yet it is extended ; and it is as easy to 
 conceive how the Divinity might communicate a 
 power of thinking to extended matter, as to ac- 
 commodate an immaterial substance, so as to har- 
 monise with a material one. 
 
 We must here notice those persons who adopted 
 the atomic or corpuscular theory of matter, for their 
 notions of the nature of the soul were in a great 
 measure peculiar to themselves. They accounted 
 for the soul's influence over the body upon similar 
 principles with those which in modern times have 
 been ascribed to the doctrine of attraction and 
 gravitation. It was a fundamental pro^iosition with 
 these reasoners that the seat of the soul was in the 
 head, and that the thinking principle is not gene- 
 rally diffused throughout the various parts of the 
 bod}^ The soul is limited to this locality, and 
 it is also maintained that the soul does not act upon 
 the body immediately . There are certain nerves, 
 canals, or channels, distributed through almost 
 every part of the body, even the most remote. All 
 these conduits are much of the same nature as the 
 strings of a musical instrument ; so that Avhen one 
 end of any of them is moved, the others partake of
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 203 
 
 the motion. All these canals or channels of sen- 
 sation have a connexion with the head, and con- 
 sequently with the soul itself. Wlien the soul 
 wishes to move any particular part of the hody, 
 there is a motion immediately communicated 
 through these nerves or canals, which in their turn 
 move the soul, and then the sensation of pain or 
 pleasiu-e is produced. This was the ordinary pro- 
 cess by which these mental speculators endeavoured 
 to account for the manner in which the soul moved 
 the hody, and the way in which external things excite 
 sensations in the mind. They would not allow pure 
 spirit to move bodies immediately , nor bodies to act 
 on spirit immediately ; but the action and re-action 
 must be solely through the intervention of a third 
 medium. 
 
 There was a small section of philosophers 
 amongst the various schools of learning, who seemed 
 to have adopted that hypothesis respecting the 
 nature of the soul, which is now pretty generally 
 maintained as the most orthodox one. This view is 
 grounded on the notion, that at the organization of 
 the body, Avhen the receptacle is properly furnished, 
 the soul is immediately created by God himself, 
 and infused into the body ; like a person taking pos- 
 session of his new habitation, when all things are 
 in readiness for his reception. 
 
 Several metaphysicians of antiquity, of great 
 note, were exceedingly puzzled, by their inability 
 to conceive how the soul could act upon the body, 
 or the body upon the soul ; or in other words, how 
 a spiritual substance could have any influence over
 
 204 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS 
 
 a material one, so as to move and act upon it. 
 This difficulty led these reasoners to adopt the 
 notion — a notion which has formed the foundation 
 of several metaphysical systems in modern times 
 — that all our actions were brought about by the 
 direct interference of God himself. This was con- 
 ceived to be effected in two ways. Pirst, whenever 
 there was an impression upon any of our organs of 
 sense from external objects, there was a sensation 
 suitable to this impression excited in the soul by 
 the Deity himself. Second, whenever the soul 
 wishes to move any particular member of the body, 
 immediately upon the existence of this volition, 
 God excites a corresponding motion in that par- 
 ticular member. According to this doctrine, the 
 will of the soul is not the immediate cause of the 
 motion of the body, but only the exciting cause of 
 the Divinity's creating that motion ; and the im- 
 pression made by a body upon any organ of sense, 
 is not the cause of the sensation, but only an 
 inducement for Divine interference to effect that 
 purpose. When, for example, I wish to move my 
 finger, or any other member of the body, it is not 
 my soul which moves my finger, or the member; 
 but the Deity, upon my volition, takes the occasion 
 to move either the one or the other. 
 
 A portion of the ancients considered the soul 
 and body to be but of one substance. They main- 
 tained that the particles of which the soul consists, 
 are not different in nature, but are only of a finer 
 and more subtile kind than those of the body. 
 
 There was a very influential theory amongst a
 
 ON A DEITY AND THE SOITL. 205 
 
 number of the ancients, respecting the nature and 
 operations of the human soul, grounded upon a 
 very subtile and refined principle of concord or 
 harmony between the soul and the body. The 
 soul being a thinking or spiritual substance, could 
 not act upon the body, nor could the body act upon 
 it, but only through the medium of a certain con- 
 stituted asfreement l^etween the volitions of the 
 soul and the motions of the body. This theory 
 may be illustrated in this way. The Divinity has 
 decreed that every soul should have a certain train 
 of thought and desires, and no other ; and that 
 all mental operations should go on according to a 
 regular and circular order or plan. A thought may 
 produce a desire, and a desire a will, and an effort 
 of the will a motion of the body, and so on, in a 
 regular progression. In every body there are cer- 
 tain sprmgs for producing every species of action, 
 and every body must perform certain actions agree- 
 ably to its natui'C, and no other. This is a binding 
 and unerring law; and, consequently, it is impossible 
 for any given body to perform any other kinds of 
 motion than those it was destined to perform from 
 the beginning. Now among so many souls, possess- 
 ing an immense variety of different thoughts and 
 volitions, and so manv bodies with such different 
 springs or principles of action, the Deity chooses 
 one soul Avhose thous^hts and volitions mio'ht cor- 
 respond to the motions of some suitable body. 
 Here is a mutual sympathy created ; which may 
 be compared to two pendulums which do not act 
 upon each other, but when one is down the other
 
 206 OPINIONS ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 
 
 is clown also, and vice versa. Por example, wlien 
 the soul had a desire to eat, the human hody was 
 so modelled from the beginning of time, as to take 
 victuals at a certain period, and in a certain given 
 way or manner ; and when the soul willed to go 
 in any particular direction, the feet were deter- 
 mined to move in this same direction. 
 
 Another prevailing notion was, that the soul of 
 man was a real part of the divine nature; not 
 different in nature or essence, but only in degree. 
 This svstem had varied and extensive ramifications, 
 and formed the nucleus of many doctrines on 
 natural theology.
 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPnY OF INDIA. 207 
 
 CHAPTER XXIII. 
 
 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDL\. 
 
 The positive knowledge we shall be able to 
 derive from the Indian philosophy, ^vill not be 
 great in amount, nor very satisfactory in its nature. 
 The obscurity which hangs over it is so murky and 
 dense, that even those who have devoted nearly a 
 whole lifetime to its consideration, have not been 
 able to reduce it to anything like system, or to 
 recognise what are its first or elementary prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 The few observations we shall make on the sub- 
 ject, are suggested from a perusal of the " Trans- 
 actions of the Royal Asiatic Society." The members 
 of this Society have displayed the most commend- 
 able zeal in all their inquiries on this subject ; and 
 the only regret one feels is, that their labours 
 should have proved so comparatively barren and 
 fruitless.
 
 208 MENTAL PaiLOSOPIIY OF INDIA. 
 
 The Sankhya and Yoga. 
 
 This is considered the best known of all the 
 systems of Indian speculation on philosophy. 
 There are three kinds of knowledge which are 
 here recognised, namely, perception, mediate know- 
 ledge, arising from the varions forms of the Syllo- 
 gism, and traditional knowledge. The first, percep- 
 tion, appertains to sensible objects; but this faculty 
 is not of itseK sufficient to account for all the 
 various kinds of thought ; therefore, recourse must 
 be had to the second species of knowledge, reason- 
 ing or demonstration, which assumes two forms, 
 either going from cause to effect, or from the effect 
 to the cause. The Sankhya acknowledges no 
 intuitive knowledge whatever ; this is reserved for 
 beings of a higher grade than man. 
 
 All objects of scientific knowledge are either 
 creative and not created, or both creative and 
 created, or created and not creative, or neither 
 creative nor created.* Creation is the first prin- 
 ciple of things, without it nothing could exist. 
 This creative energy is supposed to be a subtile 
 fluid or essence, which operates in and through 
 the senses. This fluid or essence possesses, how- 
 ever, perfect unity of nature ; it is one and not 
 many. The evidence for this creative unity arises 
 chiefly from the uniform appearances of nature, 
 from the singleness of design imprinted upon every 
 
 * Colebrooke, Isvara- Crishnas, 1. p. 31.
 
 THE SANKHYA AND YOGA. 209 
 
 tiling, and from the impossibility of conceiving a 
 creative power acting harmoniously, without being 
 invested with unity of conception and purpose. 
 This creative energy or power is not, however, 
 possessed of intelligence; it is a blind corporeal 
 body, but of a very subtile nature, so as to elude 
 all human perception. 
 
 That object which is neither created nor creates, 
 is the soul of man. The evidence for the existence 
 of this soul arises from many considerations. We 
 find a blind corporeal body in existence, whose 
 physical capabilities may be likened to a musical 
 instrument, such as an organ for example. Now 
 this piece of workmanship owes its existence to 
 some designing agent, and is made for some 
 pur2:)ose. This purpose is to aiford a suitable place 
 of residence for the soul. The e^ddence of the 
 existence of a soul is also evinced from the con- 
 sideration of its various feelings and emotions, and 
 its numerous sources of pleasure and pain. We see, 
 too, that the blind incorporeal matter cannot move 
 or direct itself, and, therefore, this argues the 
 necessity for a soul. All the higher feelings of 
 which the soul is susceptible afford likewise con- 
 vincing proofs of its separate nature and superior 
 excellence. 
 
 It is almost needless to observe, that there are 
 paljoable contradictions involved in all these opi- 
 nions and statements. Matter or body is consider- 
 ed a blind and immoveable thing, and the soul as a 
 vivifying energy, and possessed of intelligence. 
 Now this creative or living power, which is the
 
 210 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP INDIA. 
 
 first principle of tilings, — the source of all being, — ■ 
 is denied intelligence, which is conferred upon a 
 more humble and subordinate agent, the soul of 
 man. This is obviously very contradictory and 
 inconsistent. 
 
 The principle of all corporeal things is simple 
 unity ; but the principle of all thinking creations 
 is multiple. All bodies may assume different 
 forms, still they are but one; a multiplicity of 
 souls have all distinct natures, which is evinced l3y 
 the different parts they are made to act in the 
 drama of existence. 
 
 The first emanation which arises from the 
 creative principle of things, is mind. All rational 
 and thinking beings are minor emanations from 
 this great 3I'md. It overrules all. A Deity means 
 this first-created Being, or mental energy. It has 
 divers modes of manifestation. There are five 
 elementary energies which are productive or cre- 
 ative of things above sensible objects, and which 
 energies are not perceptible to man. Those which 
 produce sensible objects are of a subordinate or 
 grosser character. These create the five senses ; 
 and to correspond to these, five other organs of 
 activity are framed, which are, as it were, the 
 material instruments by which these senses act. 
 These active organs are, the tongue, the organ of 
 speech ; the hands, the feet, the alimentary and 
 secretive organs, and the organs of generation. 
 These active instruments are made parallel to other 
 elements of an ethereal and active nature.
 
 EHAGAVAD-GHITA — NYAYA. 211 
 
 The Bhagavad-Ghita. 
 
 This record of Indian speculation is more of a 
 theological nature than the preceding one we have 
 mentioned. There seems one simple and absorbing 
 principle, which is that God, or the Supreme Mind 
 or Soul, is the Creator of all things. Creation is 
 just a manifestation of the existence and nature of 
 this first great principle. All souls emanate from 
 it; and maintain a perpetual sympathy with it, 
 in all states of their existence. " The great Deity 
 is my womb, in it I lay my fruit, and the origin of 
 all things emanates therefrom. The Deity is the 
 great womb ; and I the seed-giving father." Such 
 are the terms employed to express tliis connection 
 between heavenly and earthly natures. 
 
 The Ntata and the Vaisechika. 
 
 This branch of specidation is considered by ori- 
 ental scholars as one of the most intellectual systems 
 of Indian philosophy. It attempts to develop more 
 fully the principles and rules of reasoning, than the 
 systems we have just glanced at ; but it must be con- 
 fessed, that after one or two elementary maxims are 
 laid down,we are lost in the wild and irregular super- 
 structure which is built upon these maxims of the 
 Nyaya. European thought has not yet been able to 
 penetrate into the mysterious arcana of their logic. 
 A species of syllogism is used, consisting of five, 
 instead of our three parts. The following is given- by 
 
 p 2
 
 212 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF INDIA. 
 
 Colebrooke as an an example. 1. Tlie hill is fieiy. 
 2. Because it smokes. 3. Whatever smokes is fieiy, 
 e. g. a kitchen hearth. 4. The hill also smokes. 
 5. Therefore it is fiery.* 
 
 According to tliis branch of Indian speculation, 
 the soul is possessed of altogether different pro- 
 perties from the body. Thought is the grand dis- 
 tinctive attribute of the former. This is displayed 
 in knowledge, desire, aversion, and the pleasures 
 and pains of our internal mental structure. Body 
 has none of these qualities or afPections. There is, 
 however, a bond of union between it and the soul, 
 and this bond is manifested by the connections 
 which exist between our external senses and our 
 physical organs. These senses are five in number, 
 and are not mere modifications of consciousness or 
 internal feeling, but they possess a corporeal nature. 
 To correspond with these five senses, there are five 
 elements provided, which sympathise or keep up 
 a constant intercourse with these senses thi'ough 
 the instrumentality of some subtile powers or 
 other, T\ hich are not clearly defined. 
 
 The act of perception is considered a compound 
 act, but of homogeneous parts alone. Hetero- 
 geneous or dissimilar agencies cannot act together, 
 or be combined into one whole. 
 
 The atomic theory of the Indians bears a strong 
 resemblance to that of Greece. It is afiirmed by 
 the philosophical schools of the former, that an 
 extreme point or limit must be arrived at, otherwise 
 
 * Colebrooke, 1. p. 116; and also Windischmann, p. 32. 38.
 
 THE VEDANTA. 213 
 
 investiijations would be endless and inconclusive. 
 If all bodies consist of an infinite number of parts, 
 all must be alike infinite, and then we must concede 
 the conclusion that a part is equal to a whole. To 
 avoid so absurd a conclusion, it must be assumed 
 that all compound bodies are the result of a union 
 among corresponding parts ; and when these parts 
 are separated, we must come to some atom whose 
 di\ision ceases.* Certain dimensions are never- 
 theless given to this ultimate atom, for its magni- 
 tude is defined to be the sixth part of a particle 
 floating in the sunbeam. 
 
 On matters of theology, the Nyaya is very ob- 
 scure. It maintains that the soul is the highest of 
 created things, but that it is fettered by the body, 
 which is essentiallv the source and active instru- 
 ment of all evil. It is on this ground that the 
 Metempsychosis is advocated. The soul which has 
 committed any sin or fault, is, after death, again 
 united to a body. In this philosophy, the existence 
 of a Eirst Cause is obscurely stated. What notions 
 are entertamed seem to be of a material character. 
 The portion of Divine intelKgence and wisdom is 
 small, and undefined in its operations. 
 
 The Vedanta. 
 
 The Vedanta claims to be the orthodox expounder 
 of the religion of the Brahmins. A peculiarity in 
 this system of speculation on human knowledge is, 
 
 * Wiadischraanu, p. 1924. Colebrooke, b. I. p. 105.
 
 214 MENTAL PHILOSOPKY OF INDIA. 
 
 that it is maintained that there are other sources 
 of information besides what is derived from per- 
 ception ; and these sources are revelation and tra- 
 dition. The knowledge conveyed in tliis revelation 
 is eternal ; and the language in wliich it is con- 
 veyed, is also immortal, and not of human invention. 
 All matter by its nature is inert, and cannot move 
 itself, nor eflPect spontaneously any change in its 
 structure. There must, therefore, be a spirit of 
 some kind ; and this spirit must be endowed with 
 self-existence and a creative energy. It exists in 
 itself, and can perceive, reflect upon, and be con- 
 scious of its own powers. The properties of the 
 body are all deficient in these attributes. They 
 cannot feel, or be sentient of their own natiu'es ; 
 they are only the instruments through which the 
 soul feels, and thinks, and understands. 
 
 On the natiu'e of matter and mind, which this 
 school of philosophy held, Sir William Jones makes 
 the following remarks : — "The difficulties attending 
 the vulscar notion of material substances, induced 
 many of the wisest among the ancients, as well as 
 the Hindoo philosophers, to believe that the whole 
 creation was rather an energy than a work, by 
 which the Infinite Mind, who is present at all times 
 and in all places, exliibits to his creatures a set of 
 perceptions like a wonderful picture, or piece of 
 music, always varied, yet always uniform."* 
 
 "The Vedantis," the same author observes, 
 " unable to form a distinct idea of brute matter, 
 
 * Introduction to a Translation of some Hindoo verses.
 
 TIIE VEDANTA. 215 
 
 independent of mind, or to conceive that the work 
 of supreme goodness was left a moment to itself, 
 imagine that the Deity is ever present to his work, 
 and constantly supports a series of perceptions, 
 which in one sense they call illusory, though they 
 cannot but admit the reality of all created forms, 
 as far as the happiness of creatures can be affected 
 by them." 
 
 " The word Maya, or delusion, has a subtile and 
 recondite sense in the Vedanta philosophy, where 
 it signifies the system of perceptions, whether of 
 secondary or primary qualities, which the Deity was 
 believed, by Epicharmus, Plato, and many truly 
 pious men, to raise, by his omnipresent spirit, in the 
 minds of his creatures ; but which had not, in their 
 opinion, any existence independent of mind."* 
 
 On the nature and existence of a Pirst Cause, 
 the Vedanta is very confused ; and Oriental scholars 
 are at variance on the precise doctrines of this 
 branch of the Indian system. It is generally laid 
 down, that where there are decisive marks of de- 
 sign and contrivance in the construction and ar- 
 rangement of external objects, there must be a 
 designing and intelligent cause. But at the same 
 time this principle is clogged with so many quali- 
 fications and restrictions, that at length it becomes 
 difficult to say what is really meant by Indian sa- 
 vants. Mr. Kennedy controverts the opinion of 
 Colebrooke, that, according to the Vedanta, God is 
 not only the efficient but material cause of the 
 
 * Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India.
 
 21G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA. 
 
 universe. The former gentleman insists that the 
 Indian philosophy does not acknowledge the idea 
 of matter at all, nay, absolutely denies its very 
 existence.* It is observed by Emitter, that " It 
 vidll at once occur to the reader, that the strongest 
 argument on wliich the Vedanta could have rested, 
 must have been the view which pervades the whole 
 philosophy of India, that the multiplicity of phe- 
 nomena does not destroy the unity of the essence. 
 Thus it was held, that as the essence of the soul 
 may remain intact, notwithstanding that the most 
 diversified phenomena are mirrored upon it ; so the 
 Supreme Mind or Spirit is not altered in its essence 
 by the change of the mundane objects which arise 
 out of itself. In this view the identity of the es- 
 sence is so firmly maintained, as to exclude every 
 possible change that can happen to or in it. Ac- 
 cordingly it is said of God, that although he can 
 transmute liimself into all, and create all things 
 out of liimself, he is nevertheless without shape or 
 form ; not affected by the states of the universe ; 
 without passion or change ; and similar to the clear 
 crystal, which apparently receives into itself dif- 
 ferent colours, but in reality is equally transparent 
 at all times ; or to the light of the sun or moon, 
 which, although it is invariable in itself, neverthe- 
 less appears different according as it shines upon 
 different objects. The Mind or Spirit may be com- 
 pared to pure space, wherein all exists and goes 
 through change after change, but which is not it- 
 
 * Royal Asiatic Soc. 3. p. 412.
 
 THE VEDANTA. 217 
 
 self changed thereby. In these there is no differ- 
 ence between the recipient, the perceived, and the 
 perception ; it is without multiplicity, and he who 
 believes it must be multiple, dies death upon 
 death."* 
 
 We have given a short sketch of the mental spe- 
 culations of an imperfectly civilized portion of our 
 race ; and every candid reader must allow, that in 
 one point of ^dew this Indian philosophy does not 
 flag far behind that of more polished and intellec- 
 tual nations ; that is, in reference to the notions 
 entertained as to a first or creative principle. To 
 the Indian understanding, mind is indispensable to 
 enable even the savage to conceive any active or 
 creative power in nature at all ; and on this ac-* 
 count he is placed on precisely the same footing 
 as the most favoured people among whom the arts 
 and sciences flourish in the highest degree of vi- 
 gour and perfection. The savage and the civilized 
 man are nearly, if not identically, on a level as to tlie 
 first step in philosophy ; but the great discrepancy 
 between then* respective views arises from the dif- 
 ferent ways in which each analyzes and illustrates 
 the principle. Both admit sunply that a mind is 
 indispensable to the solution of the phenomena of 
 existence ; but when each attempts to describe in 
 what way and manner this mind operates and dis- 
 plays itself, then we recognise the great disparity 
 between ignorance and intelligence. The man of 
 civilization and science gives some plausible and 
 
 * Hist. Phil., vol. 4. p. \\o%.
 
 218 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA. 
 
 rational theory for liis views and opinions ; but the 
 savage, or half civilized, run riot in the wildest ex- 
 cesses of ignorant conjecture and superstitious fears. 
 Both set out from the same starting point ; but they 
 take opposite directions, and, of course, the longer 
 and farther they travel, the greater is the interval 
 of space which separates them from each other.* 
 
 * See Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 1. pp. 19.43. 92. 118. 439. 466. 
 679.; and Vol. 2. pp. 1.39.
 
 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES. 219 
 
 CHAPTER XXIV. 
 
 THE UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES WITH THOSE 
 OF GREECE AND ROME. 
 
 We come now to a marked and important epoch 
 in the history of mental speculation, namely, the 
 amalgamation of the Greek doctrines with that 
 great and varied mass of refined and attenuated 
 philosophy which prevailed in many of the more 
 intelligent and civilized parts of the Asiatic conti- 
 nent. This alliance caused an obvious change in the 
 mode of conducting investigations into the laws of 
 the human mind ; and made, moreover, these in- 
 vestigations more subservient to other branches of 
 knowledge, than they had liitherto been in the 
 divers schools of pliilosophy at Athens, Rome, and 
 Alexandria. Discussions on the nature of mind 
 took now a more lofty a priori station ; were sub- 
 limated into endless refinements ; were more com- 
 pletely shrouded in mysterious allegories, and en- 
 veloped in the gorgeous pomp of Eastern metaphor 
 and imagery. All this proved a source of inter- 
 minable and unprofitable inquiries and discussions ;
 
 220 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES. 
 
 clouded the whole horizon of the philosophy of 
 nimd ; and ushered in a long and dreary night of 
 wrangling, douht, and obscurity. 
 
 What were the precise causes of this union, do 
 not very clearly appear from any historical records 
 we possess. Certain it is, that a mixture took place 
 between some of the leading systems of Greece, 
 and the peculiar views of Oriental nations ; and 
 that Alexandria was the principal seat of learning 
 where tliis union manifested itself. The doctrines 
 of Plato and Pythagoras seem to have been great 
 favourites, but there are also evident traces of some 
 of the opinions which exclusively belong to the 
 Stoical school of philosophy. 
 
 The chief difference between what is termed 
 Oriental philosophy and Grecian, arises from 
 this ; the Oriental chiefly relates to notions or j)rin- 
 ciples immediately connected Tvith Di\"inity, and 
 endeavours to develop those laws connected with 
 the creation and regulation of mundane afiairs. 
 The'Greek speculation follows a different route. It 
 starts with man, his mind, his feelings, his moral 
 emotions, and social and physical existence. It is 
 obvious that a different result would be effected by 
 these varied modes of inquiry; and as general 
 principles in both cases became more minutely 
 analyzed, the divergency from the respective points 
 of departure, would necessarily become wider and 
 more palpable. Now this is precisely what we find. 
 Both the Oriental and Grecian streams of know- 
 led":e took their rise from nearlv identical locali- 
 ties, from a united desire to know the origin of all
 
 ARISTOBULUS. 221 
 
 tilings ; but they flowed through diversified regions 
 of thought, and at their point of junction we see 
 them tinged with the respective intellectual strata 
 over which they had passed. The Oriental was thick 
 and turbid, and the Greek comparatively pellucid 
 and clear. 
 
 Amstobulus. 
 
 After the Jews returned from their capti^dty at 
 Babylon, they brought with them many of the 
 pecuKar philosophical notions prevalent among the 
 Babylonians, and other neighbouring nations. This 
 importation of speculative novelties, changed and 
 corrupted the simple philosophy of the HebrcAV 
 people; and their learned men made various at- 
 t tempts to unite the foreign with their ovsti peculiar 
 abstract views of human nature. 
 
 Aristobulus was one of the first among the 
 learned Babbins who made this attempt at amalga- 
 mation. His views on metaphysical subjects were 
 precisely those of Plato, with a little admixtiu*e of 
 Asiatic hyperbole, and metaphor. He endeavoured 
 to explain the doctrines of the Jewish faith through 
 the means of the abstract principles of the Greek 
 philosophy. There are none of his writings extant; 
 therefore we cannot furnish the reader with any 
 details as to his peculiar ^dews on the nature of the 
 faculties of the human mind. 
 
 Philo. 
 Philo was a distinguished Jewish writer. He
 
 222 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES. 
 
 had studied with great care and success all the 
 principal Greek systems on the human mind ; and 
 he was, also, partially versed in the mystic philoso- 
 phy of the East. 
 
 He maintained that there were two distinct souls 
 in human nature ; the one a reasonable, and the 
 other an irrational or animal soul. To the reason- 
 able soul he attributed three separate faculties, 
 understanding, sensation, and speech ; and to the 
 irrational soul, the sensual passions and affections. 
 Pliilo affirms that the understanding is not only a 
 divine spirit, but an inseparable portion of the 
 divine essence itself. It is also the loord, analogous 
 to the Deity ; it bears his image, and virtually con- 
 tains in it all forms. The soul pre-exists in bodies, 
 and is possessed of complete liberty of action. God 
 has given to man prudence to govern his reason, 
 courage to restrain his passions, and temperance to 
 repress his sensual desires. Sometimes the soul, 
 invested with the senses, only sees sensible objects ; 
 sometimes, by taking a spontaneous flight, it dis- 
 euffasres itself from material influences, and elevates 
 itself to the perception of intelligent things. It is 
 this deliverance from the bondage of the body, that 
 the truly wise always aspire after; this conflict 
 between the senses and the free exercise of the 
 understanding, constitutes wisdom in its loftiest 
 acceptation. It is from this contemplation of the 
 divine essence that man obtains all his true know- 
 ledge, and arrives at virtuous excellence. 
 
 Philo dwells upon some of the sceptical argu- 
 ments of the Academic School of Greece, by repre-
 
 PHiLO. 223 
 
 sentiiig the great difficulty there is in man's ability 
 to detect the truth in matters of abstract specula- 
 tion. The impressions from the senses are not 
 always to be relied on; and even those more refined 
 thoudits which seem to have their source out of 
 the mind itself, may lead us into error and delusion. 
 Man cannot penetate into the arcana of nature ; 
 and the only kind of knowledge which is calculated 
 to improve and delight, is that which arises from a 
 contemplation of the powers and faculties of the 
 soul.* But even here our desire for knowledge 
 receives a severe check ; for it is as unreasonable 
 for the soul to know itself, as it is for the human 
 eye to direct its powers to its own movements. We 
 know not the nature of the soul; it may be blood, or 
 air, or fire, or it may have no material quality what- 
 ever. How little then can we really know of the 
 matter ! All true science will teach man humility, 
 and will force him to acknowledge that he indeed 
 knows nothincf. God alone is the source of all 
 knowledge. 
 
 Considerable difference of opinion exists among 
 philosophical liistorians as to the proportion of 
 heathen notions incorporated with Philo's owai 
 Jewish system. This is a controversy not easily 
 decided. The majority of the German critics refer a 
 great portion of his philosophy to an eastern origin ; 
 but there is really no solid ground for this. The 
 theological principles involved in the Jewish Scrip- 
 tures were sufficient of themselves to give that 
 
 * De Ebriet. 40. p. 382.
 
 221 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES, &C 
 
 peculiar cast to a speculative system, which we 
 recognise in the writings of this distinguished 
 Rabhi. In every thing he advances there is a 
 great portion of common sense; few thoughts of 
 fanatic absurdity or oriental mysticism are percep- 
 table. His views are just such as an inquisitive 
 mind might be supposed to entertain, who had the 
 revealed system of Moses, and the Grecian philoso- 
 phy to guide him ; without availing himself of any 
 speculations from the Magi, or the Gymnosophists.* 
 
 APOLLONIUS OF TYANA. 
 
 There is very little known of this philosopher. 
 He was a sort of marvel-monger, and dealt in mi- 
 racles, soothsayings, and omens. On metaphysical 
 questions he seems to have made Pythagoras his 
 model and guide. Apollonius recommends that we 
 should adopt a pure worship of the Supreme God, 
 a sort of personal and inward movement of the soul 
 towards Him, apart from all parade or external ce- 
 remony. He also maintains that the anunal crea- 
 tion bore an affinity to man, and that the doctrine 
 of the Metempsychosis was well founded. He un- 
 dertook long journeys into India and Upper Egypt 
 to consult the Magi ; and he affirms, that the result 
 of his personal inquiries and investigations was, 
 that Pythagoras derived his philosophical opinions 
 from Indian sages. 
 
 * See Dahne's Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, Jahrg. 1833. p 984. The 
 same author treats very fully of Philo in his Geschichtliche Darstellung 
 (\. Jiulisch-Alexandrinischen Religiosen Philosophic, Ilalle, 1834.
 
 plutaech — luciits apuleius. 225 
 
 Pltjtarch. 
 
 Tills philosopher is better knowii for his biogra- 
 phical laboiu's and moral disquisitions, than for his 
 metaphysics. He was not, hoAvever, altogether 
 unacquainted \^ith the science of mind, and its kin- 
 dred doctrines as to the origin of the world and 
 the nature of the human soul. The systems of 
 Plato and Aristotle were great favourites with him, 
 but especially that of Plato, whose views of life, and 
 speculative ideas on the Deity and the human soul, 
 were more in unison with his own. He adopts 
 Plato's division of the soul into five members ; the 
 nutritive, the sensitive, the sensual, the irascible, 
 and the rational. 
 
 LiTcius Apuleius. 
 
 This philosopher was a public teacher of the doc- 
 trines of Plato and Aristotle, in the time of Anto- 
 ninus, at the city of Madaura, in Numidia. He 
 endeavoured to reconcile the opinions of Plato and 
 the Stagirite, and steered a sort of middle path 
 between them on controversial points. His notions 
 of the Deity are rather singular. He maintains 
 that it would be highly derogatory to the Almighty 
 to guide and regulate the affairs of this world ; and 
 for tliis reason Apuleius thinks that mundane con- 
 cerns are all committed to the superintendence of 
 a host of angelic ministers. These ministers have 
 thek abode in the air, and fill up that great void 
 between heaven and earth. 
 * • Q
 
 226 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES. 
 
 All the clivers forms of religion among men, even 
 the most ignoble and degrading rites and ceremo- 
 nies, have their respective representatives among 
 these aerial ministers or agents. They know every- 
 thing, doAvn to the intents and purposes of the 
 human heart. He likewise affirms that the Divine 
 Mind is constituted of a kind of trinity of faculties, 
 and is immutable and eternal. All ideas reside in 
 this divine E-eason. 
 
 NUMENIUS. 
 
 The metaphysical opinions of this learned man 
 are but very imperfectly known. He was born at 
 Apamea in Syria, and is supposed, on this account, 
 to have entertained a marked predilection for Ori- 
 ental ideas. He was a great favourite with the 
 New Platonists, who considered his system, (if his 
 peculiar views are entitled to that designation), as 
 singularly profound and valual3le. He held the 
 character of Moses in high veneration, and was no 
 doul3t well acquainted mtli his writings. The phi- 
 losophical opinions of the Egyptians, the Magi, and 
 the Brahmins, he studied carefullv, and is even said 
 to have made free with the personal history of our 
 Saviour.* 
 
 His opinion on the general constitution of things 
 seems to have been, that there could be no cor- 
 poreal substance, unless there was some incor- 
 poreal agent previously existing. This is nothing 
 
 * Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 9. pp. /• 8.
 
 NUMENIUS. 227 
 
 more nor less than saying, that mind must have 
 existed prior to matter. Everything, according to 
 Numenius, which is corporeal, is subject to decom- 
 position and decay ; an immaterial soul or princixile 
 is, therefore, requisite to secure immortaKty. 
 
 On the nature of the Divine essence, we have a 
 good deal of refined and mysterious speculation. 
 This is a point on which both Numenius and most 
 of his commentators have been sadly puzzled. The 
 philosopher attempted to explain the connection 
 which subsists between a spiritual and creative 
 mind, and the material universe. This was an 
 arduous task, and we cannot wonder that he should 
 fail. Indeed all his conjectures and fancies on this 
 subject are not worth the trouble of exposition or 
 comment.* 
 
 * Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 15. 17- 
 
 Q 2
 
 228 THE GNOSTIC METAPHYSICIANS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXV 
 THE GNOSTIC METAPHYSICIANS. 
 
 The mental disquisitions of the Gnostic sect of plii- 
 losopliers are but very imperfectly understood. They 
 were generally incorporated with their peculiar 
 doctrines on the nature of the Supreme Being, the 
 creation of the world, the nature and origin of good 
 and evil, and the future destiny of the human race. 
 These Gnostic speculators were divided into many 
 different sects or parties ; but they all seemed to 
 maintain that man was a being compounded of two 
 distinct souls ; the one intelligent, and the other 
 sensitive. The ordinary division of the mind into 
 various faculties or powers, appears to have obtained 
 their general assent. The practical application of 
 their metaphysical principles was, that man should 
 cultivate his intelligent at the expense of his sensi- 
 tive faculties. " Man," say they, " is only a passive 
 instrument in the hands of the Divinity. Science 
 comes solely from this source ; and reason should 
 detach itself not only from the influence of the 
 senses, but even from itself. The ascetic, or he who 
 elevates himself to God, alone possesses true know- 
 ledge. All is then pure ecstasy.
 
 THE NEW PLATONISTS. 229 
 
 CHAPTER XXVI. ; 
 
 THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW 
 
 PLATONISTS. 
 
 The philosopliical scliool of the New Platonists 
 was formed from the m.ixture of the doctrines of 
 Plato, with the traditions and mysteries of the East. 
 This school is sometimes termed by historians, the 
 Alexandrian School of Plulosophy. The opinions 
 which were promulgated by these learned men, 
 exercised a very marked and powerful influence over 
 the whole philosophy of the mind for many sub- 
 sequent centuries, and even over the moral and 
 religious principles of a large portion of the civilized 
 world. 
 
 Ammonius Saccas. a. d. 200. 
 
 Ammonius Saccas was the founder of this school 
 of philosophy at Alexandria. It is said that he was 
 the son of Christian parents, and had received a 
 Christian education ; but that when he became of riper 
 age, he gave himself up to the study of the Greek phi-
 
 230 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 losopliy, and afterwards to the observance of tlie 
 rites and ceremonies of Paganism.* 
 
 The principal aim in his philosophical studies was 
 to reconcile the discrepancies between the Platonic 
 and the Aristotelian systems. How far he was able 
 to accomplish this task, does not very clearly appear, 
 from any historical accounts which we have of 
 him. 
 
 There are two philosophical fragments of Am- 
 monius Saccas, preserved by Nemesius, Bishop of 
 Emessa, in which some of his opinions on inte- 
 resting and important questions may be found. 
 
 On the immortality of the soul, Ammonius seems 
 to have a fixed and decided opinion. He advocates 
 its spirituality and indestructibility. A corporeal 
 body, according to his notion, must have some 
 principle or essence, by which its individual parts 
 can be held together and sustained ; for it is quite 
 obvious, that this principle or essence must be of a 
 different nature from that wliicli has no life in itself, 
 and which cannot communicate life, activity, and 
 motion. There may be a mode of the two natures, 
 corporeal and spiritual, acting on each other, but 
 their real essences must necessarily be diametrically 
 opposite, t 
 
 On the nature of the Deity, Ammonius held that 
 he was eternal and immutable, the cause of all 
 
 * See on this point, Essai Historique sur la vie, &c. d' Ammonius Saccas, 
 ])ar M. Dehaut, Bruxelles, \S36. 
 
 t See the learned and critical Essai of Dehaut, already mentioned, 
 p. 135.
 
 LONGINUS PLOTINUS. 231 
 
 things, the substance of all substances, the being of 
 all beings, the essence of all essences, and the arche- 
 type of all intellectual perception and power. The 
 Deity does not possess relative, but Sihsohite unit i/ ; 
 and He is not pure intelligence, for He is above all 
 intelligence, and had a prior existence to it. 
 
 LONGINTJS. 
 
 Lono-inus, the author of the treatise " On the 
 Suljlime," cultivated philosophy among the New 
 Platonists. He did not, however, adopt their most 
 extravagant and mystical doctrines. He rejected 
 the theories of Epicurus and Chrysippus, because 
 they had a dii'ect tendency to materialize the 
 human mind. Longinus affirms it is foolish to 
 think that the phenomena of thought and intelli- 
 gence can be the result of simple mechanical action, 
 or of a mere combination of material atoms. 
 
 Plotinus. 206 A.D. 
 
 Plotinus was one of the ablest and most renowned 
 of the New Platonician Metaphysicians. He was a 
 writer of vast acquired information, and of a vigor- 
 ous and powerful mind. His mental speculations 
 are contained in a treatise, called the " Mieade.'' 
 This is truly considered one of the most interesting 
 books on abstract science of which antiquity can 
 boast. It contains nine parts. The first treats of 
 morals ; the second of physics ; the third, general 
 considerations on the laws of the universe; the
 
 232 PRINCIPLES OP THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 fourth, on the human soul; the fifth, on intelK- 
 gence ; and the sixth is a summary of the whole. 
 Some of the chapters or parts are douhle ones. 
 
 This speculative work of Plotinus is confessedly 
 one of the most abstruse which antiquity has handed 
 down to us. It is extremely difficult to obtain a 
 right conception of its leading principles, or the 
 end which the author had in view to establish. 
 The theory seems grounded on a peculiar notion 
 of unity ; but the exact meaning to be applied to 
 this word is not easily divined. Plotinus calls it 
 absolute, j^^rfect, and primordial unity. He tells 
 us again that this unity is necessary, immutable, 
 and infinite ; it is not numerical unity ; not the in- 
 divisible point of the arithmetician and geometri- 
 cian. It is universal unity, perfect in its own sim- 
 plicity. It is the highest degree of perfection ; it 
 is the beau ideal, the only true beauty ; it is the 
 supreme good, the highest excellence. 
 
 After this subtile and laboured attempt to explain 
 a very remote abstraction of the mind, Plotinus 
 endeavours to point out how this principle of unity 
 operated in the production of the universe. " At 
 first, from its own bosom proceeds the supreme in- 
 telligence ; a secondary, subordinate, but perfect 
 principle. It proceeds from its source without ex- 
 ternal action or internal volition ; without the first 
 principle of unity being either modified or affected ; 
 in fact, it emanates like light from the sun. This 
 intelligence is the image, the reflection of unity ; 
 the luminous crown or glory of it . This intelligence 
 embraces the object conceived, the subject which
 
 PLOTINUS. 233 
 
 conceives it, and the action of conception itself; 
 the whole of these three things are embodied in 
 itself. This principle of supreme intelligence con- 
 stantly contemplates itself; this contemplation is 
 its essence." 
 
 " The universal soul is the third priaciple, suljor- 
 dinate to the other two. This soul is thought, 
 speech, an image of intelligence, the exercise of its 
 spontaneity ; for intelligence acts only by thought. 
 But this thought is determined only because it is 
 infinite. All chis train of events or cu'cumstances 
 acts not in time, but in eternity ; and the three 
 principles, primordial unity, supreme intelligence, 
 and the universal soul, though forming a hierarchy 
 of separate and independent dignities or orders, are 
 nevertheless co-eternal mth each other." 
 
 On the nature of existence generally Plotinus 
 maintained, that natural beings were not the true 
 beings. The real universe admitted neither of al- 
 teration nor transformation ; it is identical with 
 the Deity; it is the Divinity itself, such as he 
 manifests himself, and is eternal and immutable 
 like him. 
 
 On the nature of the human mmd in particular, 
 this subtile philosopher observes, " The human mind 
 has two ordinary modes of acting, and knowing ; 
 the one by a participation in intelligence and the 
 other by forms. It enjoys the former when filled 
 and illuminated with intelligence, which enables it 
 to see and feel immediately. It enjoys the second, 
 by means of certain characters, or certain laws 
 which have been engraven on our natures. Eor
 
 234 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 the Supreme Being has imprinted on the himian 
 mind the rational form of things. True knowledge 
 is that, when the object conceived or known is 
 identical with the subject which conceives or knows 
 it." 
 
 " The faculties of the soul are of two kinds. The 
 one, derived from above, constitutes reason; the 
 other, descending to the inferior regions, forms sen- 
 sibility and vegetation." 
 
 " Reason is placed in an intermediate position 
 between the understanding and the senses. It acts 
 not by the agency of the bodily organs, but solely 
 by the force of intelligence." 
 
 Plotinus entertained some curious notions as to 
 the nature of memory. He affirmed this faculty 
 did not consist in preserving impressions received 
 from the senses, but solely in an innate develop- 
 ment of self-power or energy. And the power of 
 memory was in strict proportion with the internal 
 strength of this power. According to this opinion 
 it is not necessary to place confidence in memory, 
 to recal the impressions which externals may have 
 made upon it ; for the mind possesses in itself for 
 the retaining of knowledge, a sufficient power by 
 its intercourse with superior intelligences. 
 
 On the nature of sensation, he remarks, " The 
 perceptions we obtain from external objects are 
 always obscure ; while, on the contrary, those we 
 receive from reflection are always clear and lumi- 
 nous." 
 
 r 
 
 The general outline of the doctrine of Plotinus 
 bears a striking resemblance to some modern specu-
 
 PonrHYUY. 235 
 
 lations on the human mind, Avhich we shall have 
 to notice in a subsequent part of this work. 
 
 Plotinus seems to have followed in the wake of 
 Ammonius Saccas, and to have moulded his philo- 
 sophical system upon the principles of that learned 
 person. Plotinus was of an ardent and imagina- 
 tive mind; and this led him, in conjunction mth 
 the general tone and character of the philosophy 
 of the times, into mystical and fanatical specula- 
 tions. These shed a cloudv haziness over the more 
 rational and solid portions of his system; for it was 
 not so devoid of valuable disquisitions as some 
 historians have imagined. There is a strong under- 
 current of common sense in his writings ; and his 
 ideas of the philosophy of the mind in particular, 
 show that he had culled from the systems of Plato 
 and Aristotle some of the best and soundest 
 maxims on this branch of kno^^ ledge, and that he 
 fully appreciated their intrinsic worth and impor-' 
 tance. 
 
 Porphyry. 
 
 Porphyiy was the pupil and personal friend of 
 .Plotinus, and embraced essentially the same prin- 
 ciples, as to the natiu'e of the human mind and 
 its modes of operation. 
 
 With the view of reconciling the doctrines of 
 Aristotle with those of Plato, which was one of the 
 grand aims of the new Platonists, Porphyry wrote 
 a work on the Fredicahles of Aristotle, and endea- 
 voured to enter into a minute analysis of the
 
 236 PEINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 notions we commonly attach to particular generic 
 terms of reasoning; such as genus, species, con- 
 trariety, identity, 8fC. This is considered a very ex- 
 cellent work of its kind, and it shows the profound 
 attention with which he had studied the metaphy- 
 sical works of the Stagirite. 
 
 The ideas Porphyry entertained on the nature of 
 general terms, may be inferred from the following 
 remarks on this eagerly contested point. " Genus 
 is the principal, which contains the species and the 
 individuals placed under it ; and involves an idea 
 of multitude, or number." ^^ If genus and species 
 possessed each a separate and independent exist- 
 ence, or were two distinct and separate notions 
 of the mind, then, on the first supposition, they 
 would have a corporeal existence; and on the second, 
 they would be of an incorporeal nature, for they 
 would be separated from sensible or external 
 thin2:s." 
 
 Porphpy compared the human mind, in re- 
 ference to sensation, to the harmonv elicited from 
 the cords or strings of a musical instrument. The 
 senses are the agitated cords, and the soul is the 
 musician who moves them. The human soul 
 has reasons contained within itself for all things ; 
 and it is on this account, and by this special reason, 
 that it can always operate on the senses, whether 
 there be an external exciting cause, or merely the 
 internal suggestions of its ovm. nature or will. If 
 there be an external exciting cause, then this leads 
 the mind to the cognizance of external objects ; if 
 only an internal suggestion, then we are led to the
 
 JAMBLICUS. 237 
 
 contemplation of more intelligent ideas. Sensa- 
 tion never takes place without a modification being 
 experienced by the organs of sense ; and the under- 
 standing in its turn never receives assistance from 
 its own imaginative workings, without these intel- 
 lectual objects receiving an intellectual impres- 
 sion. The human understanding is essentially 
 uniform, of perfect unity of parts, one and indi- 
 vidual in every thing which constitutes it. 
 
 Jamblictjs. 
 
 This philosopher composed a work, addressed to 
 Porphyry, " Upon tJie Egyptian My steries^'" in which 
 there are a great number of curious and important 
 remarks on divers topics connected with the mind 
 of man. The fundamental system of the new Pla- 
 tonicians is strenuously upheld. Jamblicus main- 
 tains the existence of an intellectual and a sensible 
 world ; but considers the former as containing in 
 itseK the whole of the latter ; or perhaps, to speak 
 more plainly, that the sensible or external world is 
 only the shadow of the intellectual one. " The 
 Gods," says he, " which compose tliis superior re- 
 gion, contemplate their own divine ideas ; the stars, 
 or visible Gods, are only the images created by 
 divine and intellectual realities. A bond of union 
 associates these two orders of existences into one 
 indissoluble whole ; the visible Gods being con- 
 tained within the intellectual ones. The farther we 
 ascend in this chain of existence, the more we de- 
 velop first causes by their genus and essence, — the
 
 238 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 more we shall be directed to the consideration of 
 parts of the stupendous whole, and the better able 
 to detect that sublime and perfect unity of design 
 and purpose, so visibly imprinted upon every thing 
 we behold." 
 
 "This knowledge of the Gods is intimately 
 blended with our own individual being. It is an- 
 terior to every mental act of examining, judging, 
 and reasoning. It has been co-existent, from the 
 beginning of time, with a certain predisposition in 
 our souls towards that which is good. It is the same 
 with all those superior intelKgences which fill up 
 the intervening space between the Gods and the 
 human soul ; which form the intermediate link 
 between both, in that immense chain which binds 
 the most elevated things with the most common, 
 and sustains the harmony and order of the whole 
 creation." 
 
 Peoclijs. 412. A.D. 
 
 Proclus was one of the great shining lights 
 amongst the metaphysical philosophers of the new 
 Platonic School. He was a man of great and 
 varied accomplishments, and gathered around him 
 a lively and intense interest during his scholastic 
 reign. He was born at Constantinople, in 412 of 
 the Christian era, and at an early age was sent to 
 Alexandria to study pliilosophy, oratory, and belles- 
 lettres. 
 
 Proclus adopted the system of Plato in all its 
 fulness and in all its bearings. The latter says,
 
 PROCLUS. 239 
 
 that " unitv and variety are the essential characters 
 of human thought;" and this principle serves Pro- 
 clus to workout a very extended, subtile, and elevated 
 commentary, in reference to the whole constitution 
 of nature. 
 
 According to this philosopher the human mind 
 may he considered under three points of view, the 
 essence of every thing, identity, and diversity. 
 These elementary forms give rise to three other 
 princi]iles of a prolific nature. "The world," he 
 says, " is composed of harmony. Now harmony is 
 unity in variety. Unity and variety exist then 
 primarily in the conceptions of the Grand Architect; 
 or rather the Grand Architect is only the highest 
 unitv, which embraces in its bosom all other divine 
 unities. Similitude is the limit which determines 
 diversity from infinity. Similitude assembles, diver- 
 sity disperses. These three tilings, essence, identity, 
 and diversity, produce by theu' action all the forms 
 or unities which reside in individual tliin<?s." 
 
 Proclus distinguished five orders of faculties in 
 the human soul. The first is confined to the exer- 
 cise of the external senses. The second is that 
 which displays the soul's connexion mth the body, 
 and yet preserves her own individuality. The third 
 consists in rectifying and testing our opinions and 
 conclusions, by the aid of superior intelligences and 
 wisdom. The fourth detaches the soul from all in- 
 ferior and grovelling impressions, renders it peace- 
 able and tranquil, looks into its own powers, feel- 
 ings, and emotions, and observes the harmonious 
 action of the whole inward man. And the fifth
 
 240 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 power is that which excites and sustains our 
 sympathies with all our kindred of mankind, and 
 with aU those angeUc forms, in which superior de- 
 grees of intelligences reside. 
 
 In accordance with these five powers, there are 
 five branches of knowledge. The first relates to 
 matters of a very humble character ; to material 
 objects and such as influence us by the force of 
 physical destray. The second order of intelligent 
 tilings has for its object all general notions, which 
 form the basis of reasoning. The third embraces 
 absolute unity, or the power of analysing and dis- 
 cus sing general principles, a knowledge of causes, 
 and conclusions and inferences draivn from them. 
 This branch of knowledge also embraces all mathe- 
 matical forms, and numbers. The fourth di\dsion 
 includes all theories, resolutions, compositions of 
 reasoning, definitions and demonstrations, and all 
 systems of speculative truth. The fifth class of 
 things relates to matters of a high and lofty cha- 
 racter; to a divine exaltation, gradually assimi- 
 latiug the human mind to the nature of the divine 
 Being and his attributes. 
 
 Proclus sought above all things to give order and 
 logical method to his speculations. Consequential 
 reasoning was, in his opinion, indispensable to all 
 useful human learning. It was one of the great 
 lal)ours of his life to give his master Plato's pliilo- 
 sophy in a logical form, and he has left us a strik- 
 ing memorial of his zeal and industry in this direc- 
 tion. But his great work of method is his " Me- 
 ments of Theology,'' which he has treated of at
 
 MARINUS — ISIDORE. 241 
 
 sreat leno-tli, and which embodies the chief ele- 
 ments of the Platonic system, as defined and illus- 
 trated bv Proclus and his immediate successors. It 
 is impossible to look over the methodical propo- 
 sitions of this Treatise, without recognizing it as 
 the prolific parent of many subsequent theories, 
 both in theology and philosophy. It is an exceed- 
 ingly interesting exposition of an ancient system, 
 and treated in a manner the most profound and 
 logical. The whole of the propositions will be 
 found at the end of this volume.* 
 
 Marinus. 
 
 This philosopher was a disciple and biographer of 
 Proclus. The former filled the chair of Instruction 
 at the death of the latter. 
 
 Little is recorded of the mental speculations of 
 this writer. He examined with considerable pro- 
 fundity the nature of our abstract concejitions, 
 and the laws of thought which seem to accompany 
 their development. 
 
 Isidore of Gaza. 
 
 This member of the new Platonic theory suc- 
 ceeded the preceding philosopher in the chair of 
 Philosophy. He appears to have given to his meta- 
 physical speculations a decidedly rehgious turn. He 
 remarks, "that human knowledge and reasoning are 
 
 * See Note F. at the end of this Vohirae. 
 * R
 
 242 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 
 
 but feelDle succours for that sublime wisdom whicli 
 is alone agreeable to the Divinity. To enlighten 
 the reason is the privilege of God himself ; man can- 
 not confer it ; but he must receive it as a gift."* 
 
 With the name of Proclus the ancient Grecian 
 system of philosophy may be said to terminate. 
 It had run a long and noble course ; was charac- 
 terised by profound thought, patient investigation, 
 comprehensive views, noble aspirations, and inde- 
 fatigable zeal ; and was destined to leave the im- 
 print of its existence upon the minds of all succeed- 
 ina: asres of civilized men. But it was henceforth 
 to shine only with a borrowed light. Its own 
 effulgence was to be obscured by brighter rays of 
 truth ; and it was to be used only as an instrument 
 for the illustration or defence of more sublime 
 doctrines, and more lofty views of the future destiny 
 of man. Another power had been established, 
 which was hourly on the increase, and which 
 should solicit the suffrages of manlvind, and place 
 
 * See I'Histoire de I'EclecticIsme, by Beausobre, Avignon, 1/66 ; Ole- 
 arius, Dissert, de Eclecticis ; Cudwortb's Intellectual System ; Mos- 
 heim's Ecclesiastical History ; Tbe Histories of Philosophy by Brucker, 
 Tiedemann, Buhle, and Tennemann; Victor Cousin's Translation of 
 the works of Proclus ; Taylor's Translation of Proclus ; Eeussling, De 
 tribus Hypostasibus Plotini, Wittenberg, 1690; Hebenftreet, Dissert, 
 de Jamblichi Philos. Leipsic, 1764; Fichte, Dissert. De Philos. Novae 
 Platonicse origine, Beroliai, 1818; Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Articles, 
 Proclus, Marinus; Stobaeus b. 1. Articles, De Gradibus, De Anim. Viri- 
 bus, De eo quod est in nostra potestate ; De Gerando, Hist. Comparee, 
 vol. 3 ; Ritter's His. of Philosophy, vol. 4.
 
 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 243 
 
 speculative pliilosopliy upon anotlier and a firmer 
 basis. The great problems which Grecian inge- 
 nuity raised, were to be solved in a manner, and 
 with a clearness and conclusiveness, of which the 
 disciples of Plato and Aristotle had no conception. 
 The lofty hopes which many of the Grecian sages 
 entertained were to be realized to their more for- 
 tunate successors ; and those bright rays of light, 
 which gleamed in the distance, and which they but 
 distantly recognised, were to shine, to all future 
 philosophers, "more and more unto the perfect 
 day." 
 
 But though the independence of the Grecian 
 speculation was to be destroyed for ever, it was 
 still to be a useful and often melded instrument 
 in the hands of future cultivators of philosophy. 
 This honour was, however, to be confined to the 
 two great pillars of Grecian thought, Plato and 
 Aristotle. The smaller sects were to be compara- 
 tively forgotten in the new order of things. The 
 Stoics, the Epicureans, the Pythagoreans, the 
 Sophists, the Sceptics, were to pass away, but 
 Plato and Aristotle were to remain ; and for many 
 centuries were to divide the opinions and applause 
 of the learned and contemplative. We shall have 
 frequent occasion, in our historical progress, to 
 record the influence of theii* respective systems, 
 and the favourable or unfavourable judgments of 
 rival partizans. But that undi\dded and despotic 
 power they for many huncbed years exercised over 
 the minds of men, was now to crumble gradually to 
 the dust, without any hope of future resuscitation. 
 
 ii2
 
 244 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 CHAPTETl XXVII. 
 
 ON THE METAPHYSICAL DISQUISITIONS OF THE 
 ANCIENT FATHERS OF THE CHURCH. 
 
 It is necessary we should fall back a little upon 
 the regular course of time, and notice at some 
 length the labours of the first promulgators of 
 Christianity in the field of mental philosophy. 
 These labours constitute an important epoch in the 
 history of the human mind. 
 
 The establishment of the Christian dispensation 
 must always be considered the most important and 
 interesting event in the history of the philosophy 
 of human nature in all its departments. Science 
 no longer stood alone, upon its own abstract prin- 
 ciples and merits, as an intellectual exercise ; but 
 all its doctrines were, in the future ages of the 
 world, to be discussed in reference to the great 
 truths revealed to mankind in the Holy Scriptures. 
 Heligion and Philosophy, it is true, had to wage 
 many bitter and protracted conflicts; they had 
 both to undergo a most rigid scrutiny before the 
 tribunal of human reason ; they were frequently 
 placed, by the over-heated zeal and mistaken views
 
 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 245 
 
 of tlieir respective advocates, in direct opposition 
 to one another; but still we find, that as time 
 rolled on, their points of difference became gra- 
 dually less, and both seemed calculated to throw 
 additional light upon, and to give natural suj^port 
 to, each other. 
 
 And this was nothing but a natural consequence 
 from the constituted order of things. Eevealed 
 religion did not profess to make man an entirely 
 new creature ; to give him a new body and a new 
 mind, endowed with various faculties wliich were 
 never before recognized in the human species. No! 
 it only assumed to direct his ordinary bodily and 
 mental fimctions, to objects and pursuits more 
 sublime and important, and which were but dimly, 
 and in many cases not at all, shadowed forth by 
 the mere Kght of natm-e. The relative position, 
 therefore, in which religion and philosophy stood to- 
 wards each other, was a natural position. Philoso- 
 phy professed to investigate all those powers of body 
 and mind which distinguish our species from the 
 inferior creation ; and to unfold the laws wliich go- 
 vern their mutual dependencies and relationships. 
 The heathen philosophers had to labour in the same 
 vineyard as the professors of Christianity. That 
 both parties should form different opinions as to 
 the value of their own exertions and the merits of 
 theii" respective modes of cultm-e, is quite natural. 
 Revealed religion was not a mere simple fact, or 
 mental conception, or intimation from heaven; but 
 it appealed to human reason, based itself upon prin- 
 ciples, laid do\^Ti abstract propositions, and openly
 
 246 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 clialleno:ecl the liuman race to their discussion. It 
 did not set itself in opposition to human learning, 
 bnt only declared that that was insufficient of itself 
 to produce certain results, and guide to certain ends. 
 
 These general remarks will be fully borne out, 
 by a brief summary of the philosophy of the an- 
 cient Pathers of the Church, relative to man's 
 moral and mental natures, and to those opinions 
 and principles connected with the important doc- 
 trines of natural and revealed religion. It cannot 
 fail to prove extremely interesting to all reflective 
 minds, to have laid before them an intellectual 
 chart of the opinions of these distinguished men 
 on points of faith and speculation, which must al- 
 ways, as long as the world lasts, exercise a very 
 powerful influence over the minds of the general 
 mass of manldnd. 
 
 Here we may briefly notice, in passing, that 
 many distinguished writers have entertained a very 
 low estimate of the opinions of the Eathers, and 
 have upbraided them with numerous and palpable 
 contradictions. It must be admitted there is some 
 truth for these accusations. But to form a just 
 estimate of the Pathers, we ought always to keep 
 before us their exact position relative to religious 
 doctrines and other opinions connected with sub- 
 jects closely allied to them. We know that many 
 of the Pathers had been either educated in Pagan 
 systems, or were more or less brought into close 
 fellowship with them, in their daily commimications 
 with those around them. This circumstance must 
 have exerted a powerful influence over the every-
 
 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 247 
 
 day current of their thoughts and opinions. They 
 would daily meet ^dth men who had to be converted 
 through a formal refutation of these false systems ; 
 and this could only be done by means of an accurate 
 acquaintance with them, and an effort on the part 
 of religious teachers to accommodate their owti doc- 
 trines to the minds of their pupils. There would 
 always be going on a sort of compromise of prin- 
 ciples and opinions, with a view of obtaining a hold 
 of the minds of men, and subjecting them to a 
 peaceable course of instruction and con^dction. 
 Teachers would occasionally diverge a little to gain 
 a victory over the stubborn and deep-rooted pre- 
 judices of a convert. This would be done with the 
 best intentions, and frequently with the most happy 
 effect. Many of the Pathers went from country to 
 country, from district to district, and from town 
 town to, making converts, and imparting instruc- 
 tion as they well could. And it is quite ob^dous 
 that their public addresses must have varied con- 
 siderably from each other, on account of the diver- 
 sity of heathen notions, rites, and ceremonies, enter- 
 tained and practised by their hearers. If therefore 
 these addresses were afterwards published, it is 
 quite a thing to be expected that considerable dis- 
 crepancies would be apparent upon the face of them ; 
 not springing from any defection of doctrinal purity, 
 or from the lack of soim.d knowledge, but from 
 casual and incidental cu'cumstances. This would 
 naturally, in after times, give rise to observation 
 and comment, and a difference of opinion would
 
 248 DISQUISITIONS or the tathers. 
 
 thus be formed. A Pather would appear under the 
 disadvantage of self-contradiction, and inconsistency 
 of statement, and thus his authority and influence 
 would become weakened from no justifiable cause 
 whatever. 
 
 Justin Martyk. 99 a. d. 
 
 Justin Martyr was one of the early Pathers of 
 the Church who successfully cultivated philosophy 
 with a view of extending and illustrating the Chris- 
 tian system. He had been educated in foreign 
 schools of learning, and, for a considerable period 
 of his life, had followed the heathen modes of wor- 
 ship. He especially studied the doctrines of Aris- 
 totle, Plato, and Pythagoras, and was minutely 
 acquainted with all the various divisions and mo- 
 difications of these different schools of philosophy. 
 After his conversion to Christianity, he still con- 
 tinued to cultivate profane learning ; and his re- 
 marks upon the use of speculative doctrines are 
 admirable. He says, " Philosophy is a very noble 
 thing, and very agreeable to God, since it leads us 
 to Him ; and truly happy are those who avail them- 
 selves of such an aid. Though the doctrines of 
 Plato, and the Stoics, as well as the writings of 
 historians and poets, are not in strict conformity 
 with the Gospel, yet they do, nevertheless, bear a 
 certain relationship to it ; and what good and just 
 things have been here said, are calculated to ad- 
 vance Christianity. The writings which existed
 
 JUSTIN MARTYR — TATIAN. 249 
 
 previous to the Gospel gave us a glimpse of those 
 great truths which it has revealed ; and have vastly 
 aided the Divine reason wliicli is implanted in us 
 from our hirth. This reason is the germ or seed 
 which Christianity is to fructify." 
 
 Again, he says, " Socrates exhorted men to raise 
 themselves above mythological fables, and to search 
 again for the unknown God, whose existence it was 
 reserved for the Gospel alone fidly to demonstrate." 
 " The true philosopher is neither a Platonist, Pe- 
 ripatetic, nor a Stoic, nor a Pythagorean. If he 
 belongs to any of these sects, he has substituted 
 human authoritv for reason." 
 
 It is mentioned by Eusebius that St. Justin had 
 written a work upon the nature of the human soul, 
 in Avhich he had unfolded the various opinions 
 which the Pagans held of this subject ; and that he 
 intended to write another Treatise, to expose the 
 fallacy of these opinions, and also to show what were 
 his own notions on this important doctrine. None 
 of these works, however, have descended down to 
 our times.* 
 
 Tatian. 170 A. D. 
 
 Tatian, who was St. Justin's disciple, paid great 
 attention to mental philosophy in all its branches. 
 He had travelled a great deal, and visited many 
 eminent seats of learning, and possessed a very ac- 
 curate knowledge of aU the subtile and distinguished 
 
 Apologia. Sect. 13. 15. 46. Benedictine Eilition.
 
 250 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 controversies of his clay. He maintains that there 
 are in man two distinct mental principles. " The 
 one is the soul, the other is superior to the soul ; 
 it is the understanding, the image of God. The 
 soul in itself is full of darkness ; alone it is sub- 
 jected to matter, and is confounded with it ; and it 
 is not simple but compound ; the mind or under- 
 standing uniting itself with it, gives light, power, 
 and life to it. It elevates and purifies it. This 
 mind is the di^dne reason, or Logos. It is not 
 communicated to all, hut only to those who live in 
 accordance with the dictates of justice and wisdom. 
 The soul, being an emanation from the Deity, is 
 light ; it only becomes obscured by its connection 
 with matter." 
 
 The peculiar philosophical opinions of Tatian are 
 expounded in his Gratia ad Grcecos, the only ge- 
 nuine treatise we have of this waiter. In this 
 apologetical work we find that the author was 
 deeply skilled in Oriental systems ; for the general 
 tone of all his speculations on mind and matter 
 bears a great resemblance to those opinions pro- 
 mulgated in the early days of the Alexandrian 
 
 Academv^ 
 
 Tatian considered that matter was the som-ce of 
 all imperfection and evil. In this respect he fol- 
 lows Plato. This opinion had probably led him 
 to the Gnostic idea that our Saviour had no real 
 body.* 
 
 * See the Oxford Edition of the " Oratio." 1700.
 
 ST. ATHENAGORAS. 251 
 
 St. Athekagoras. 172 a. d. 
 
 The attachment of St. Athenagoras to specula- 
 tive learning is well known. Even after he had 
 been converted from Paganism to Christianity, 
 he still wore the costmne used in the East in his 
 o^vn day by the studious and philosophic. In his 
 Apology, addressed to the Emperor, Marcus Aure- 
 lius, in the year 176, he enters very fully into se- 
 veral speculative theories, and compares them with 
 the general principles of the Christian faith. In 
 the writings of the poets and historians he found 
 the doctrine of the unity of the Deity recognised, 
 and several other important truths, which were 
 more fully and clearly revealed in the Gospel. His 
 grand aim was to reconcile the Christian creed 
 with the doctrines of the founder of the Academy. 
 " Plato," says he, " contemplated, with a lofty 
 stretch of thought, that eternal intelligence and 
 Divinity which reason alone can conceive; that 
 Being who is the only true one, who is unchange- 
 able, full of goodness and truth. He saw in Him 
 infinite power, that glorious Source of all perfec- 
 tion, that celestial Uuler, the universal Cause which 
 is every way present. The Idea is the first crea- 
 tion of the celestial Ruler; it is the type of all 
 creation. This type was necessary to shapeless 
 matter, to that nature which invoked and oflTered 
 itself to it, and which was again plimged into con- 
 fusion and chaos to receive that consolidation of 
 parts, and form and beauty, Avhich we now behold.
 
 252 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 Though this faculty of reason be the same in all 
 men, yet it takes different directions, elevating 
 some to sublime conceptions, to heavenly things, 
 and to the great Author of all ; while on the other 
 hand the same reason produces worldly and gro- 
 velling pursuits, vain imaginations, and the sug- 
 gestions of evil spii'its. AVhile the soul is soft and 
 flexible, and has not embraced sound princij)les, 
 nor contemplated the truth, nor carried its thought 
 up to the great Creator of the universe, it is sus- 
 ceptible of false opinions, and of the influence of 
 malicious spirits, thirsting for the blood of their 
 victims, and filling their imaginations with delu- 
 sions, from which spring all kinds of idolatry and 
 superstitions."* 
 
 St. Theophilus. 172 a. d. 
 
 St. Theophilus was one of the Alexandrian Fa- 
 thers, and manifested a passionate attachment to 
 the philosophy of Plato. He became bishop of 
 Aiitioch in 170, and governed his diocese for thir- 
 teen years with great zeal and prudence. He was 
 a zealous disputer with heretics, and it is in these 
 controversial writings that we find the philosophical 
 opinions which he seems to have entertained. He 
 had evidently studied deeply both Aristotle and 
 Plato ; for the latter of whom, as just stated, he 
 shows a decided preference. St. Theophilus points 
 out to his opponents the great defects in all liea- 
 
 * Legatio pro Lhristianis. Sect. 5. G. 8. 15.
 
 ST. PANTiENUS— ORIGEN. 253 
 
 then speculations, and how much superior the phi- 
 losophy of Christianity was, to anything which 
 mortal man had been able to discover. 
 
 St. Theophilus has furnished us with an historical 
 chronology from the creation of the world to his 
 own time ; and he endeavours to prove that the 
 history of Moses is the most ancient and authentic 
 account we have of the early days of the hmnan 
 race.* 
 
 St. Pant.enijs. 180 a. d. 
 
 The first school opened at Alexandria for the in- 
 struction of Christians in philosophy, was by St. 
 Pantsenus. He belonged to the sect of the Stoics, 
 and on account of his great knowledge and talent, 
 was appointed to carry the Gospel into India, and 
 to convert the Brahmins from their idolatry. He 
 was well acquainted with the works of Aristotle 
 and Plato; but manifested a decided preference 
 for the philosophy of the Stoics. He thought the 
 system of the latter, considered in relation to prac- 
 tical life, more in accordance with the important 
 practical precepts of the Christian faith.* 
 
 Origen. 185 A. D. 
 
 The famous Origen, a disciple of St. Clement's, 
 was a prodigy of learning and science. Prom the 
 
 * See Gesner's Edition of the works of St. Theojihilus. Zurich, 1546 ; 
 also Du Pin, Lardner, Mosheim, and Cave. 
 
 t See Cave, Lardner, Milner, Du Pin, and Mosheim.
 
 254 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 accounts of Eiisebius, he had studied almost every 
 system of speculation, and made himself completely 
 master of the whole circle of knowledge in his own 
 times. There was nothing too varied or profound for 
 the versatility and grasp of his mind. His wonder- 
 ful activity and zeal showed he possessed an intel- 
 lect susceptible of great mental labour and appli- 
 cation. He was intimately skilled in the doctrines 
 of the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Platonists, and 
 the Pythagoreans ; and also with the traditionary 
 knowledge of the Hebrews as well as all the 
 heathen systems of speculation celebrated in his 
 own day. He divided ail human science into three 
 kinds'; namely, first, profane wisdom, which com- 
 prehended natural philosophy, mathematics, and 
 what came under the denomination at that time of 
 the fine arts, as poetry, rhetoric, grammar, music, 
 and medicine ; secondly, the tvlsdom of the p>rinces 
 of this icorld, which embraced all the mysteries and 
 speculative theories of the Egyptians, the Chal- 
 deans, and the Brahmins ; and thirdly, that wisdom 
 which was especially revealed to man in the Holy 
 Scriptures. 
 
 Origen seems to have entertained the opinion of 
 the alisolute reality of all moral distinctions. He 
 remarks that, " if the reality of the Gospel is in 
 accordance with that of the Greeks, it is because 
 the notions of moral rectitude are destined to regu- 
 late human life, and are engraved on the soul of 
 man by the finger of the Deity himself, in the same 
 manner as He has recorded theiu upon the minds 
 of the prophets and of our Lord and Saviour."
 
 ST. CLEMENT. 255 
 
 This clistingiiislied Father of the Church believed 
 in the fact, that all the Grecian pliilosophy had 
 been originally derived from the Hebrew nation. 
 His notion of the immortality of the soul, was 
 grounded on the supposition of its pre-existence in 
 a former more elevated sphere ; and that when it 
 took up its abode in a material body, it still had the 
 faculty of recognising a Divine Being, of obeying 
 his laws, and of preparing itself for a life of full en- 
 joyment with him for ever. This notion was com- 
 mon both to the Gnostics and to the new Pla- 
 tonists.* 
 
 St. Clement. 218. a. d. 
 
 We come now to St. Clement of Alexandria, 
 who was the shining light and glory of his age. 
 His acquisitions and labours were prodigious. He 
 knew all the learning of the Greeks, the Sp'ians, 
 the Egyptians, and the Hebrews ; and had visited 
 every seminary of knowledge wliich was of any 
 note in his own day. He viewed the philosophy 
 of human nature throuo^h a candid and enlis-htened 
 medium ; and he embraced every opportunity of 
 shelving how nearly, on many points, the princijiles 
 enforced by the ancient philosophers were allied 
 to those laid down in the Sacred Scriptures. He 
 contended it was a most mistaken, as well as a 
 mischievous, opinion, that Christianity opposed 
 itseK to the cultivation of himian knowledge. On 
 the contrary, he zealously and eloquently contended 
 
 * Seethe Works of Origen by the Benedictines. Paris, 1783.
 
 256 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHEKS. 
 
 that it was only by tlie cultivation of science and 
 useful information, that revealed truth could either 
 he promulgated or understood. 
 
 St. Clement openly declared himself favourable 
 to the Greek philosophy, even in spite of the 
 opinions of some of his brethren, who were hostile 
 to the speculative system of this country. He 
 says, " The Grecian philosophy forms the man to 
 virtue, and teaches him, also, that it proceeds from 
 God himself. Those, then, who would judge harshly 
 of the philosophy of Greece, ought to be prepared 
 to prove their statements ; and in order to enable 
 them to do this, they must study and examine it. 
 If it does not rest on a perfectly solid foimdation ; 
 if it does not always conduct to satisfactory con- 
 clusions ; it is ornamental at least, and exercises 
 the student in detecting truth from falsehood. As 
 the labourer first waters the bosom of the earth, 
 before he commits the seed to it ; in like manner 
 when we extract out of the writings of the Greeks 
 what we can advantageously borrow from them, 
 we are watering the earth, that the sun may 
 exercise his influence in giving vitality to the 
 intellectual seed. I do not give the name of philo- 
 sophy to the particular doctrines of the Portico nor 
 of Epicurus, nor of Plato, nor of Aristotle, but to 
 what appertains to justice and sound religion in 
 all these diflerent schools. I give the name of 
 philosophy to that which is really excellent in all 
 their doctrines ; and above all to that of Socrates, 
 such as Plato describes him to have been. The 
 opinions of Plato upon ideas, is the true Christian 
 and orthodox philosophy. Those intellectual lights
 
 HERMAS TERTULLIAN, &C. 257 
 
 amongst the Greeks have heen communicated by- 
 God himself. But they have not been charmed by 
 their power, but have mingled them with human 
 errors and delusions."* 
 
 St. Clement frequently remarks that true wis- 
 dom or philosophy is the right understanding of 
 human and divine things; and severely rebukes 
 those who fall into habits of snarling disputation 
 or captious scepticism. He however strenuously 
 recommended fixed rules of reasoning, and parti- 
 cularly the Greek system of dialectics. On this 
 subject he remarks, that " Dialectics form a sort 
 of rampart for the protection of truth against 
 the assaults of sophistry. The cause of all error 
 and false judgment is, that we cannot detect the 
 reasons on which the accordance or differences of 
 things amongst themselves are founded ; and thus 
 we erroneously classify things together which 
 ought to be separated. It becomes necessary, 
 then, to apply the art of dialectics, as a useful in- 
 strument to conduct us to truth, to enable us to 
 demonstrate it to others, and to protect and defend 
 it from captious argumentations. But we must 
 guard against the abuse of this art."t 
 
 Hermas — Tertullian — Arnobius — Iren^us — 
 
 LACTANTirS, &C. 
 
 We must here make an allusion to several of the 
 
 * Stromal . lib. 1. Ed. Paris, 1641. 
 
 t See the Oxford Edition of the Works of St. Clement, 1/15; also 
 Du Pin, Blount's Censura, Fabricius, Mosheim, Lardner, &c.
 
 258 DISQTJISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 learned Fathers, who entertained strong prejudices 
 against all kinds of profane philosophy whatever. 
 They were led to form notions of its dangerous ten- 
 dency to revealed religion, from the many examples 
 of eminent and learned individuals forming semi- 
 naries of learning under the auspices of revealed 
 religion, and imparting to numerous classes of per- 
 sons, who afterwards took an active part in ec- 
 clesiastical affairs, those peculiar doctrines which 
 emanated from these different schools of instruction. 
 These philosophical establishments became on many 
 occasions, and from the sheer force of particular 
 circumstances, formidable instruments in the hands 
 of zealous sects and parties ; and hence arose certain 
 feelings of jealousy against both them and theu' 
 principal professors. Hermas, Tertullian, Arno- 
 bius, Irenaeus, and Lactantius, were the leading 
 Fathers of the Church, who, with various modifica- 
 tions, adopted these opinions as to the general 
 tendency of human learning in matters of rehgion. 
 Hermas wrote a treatise to refute the Pagan 
 philosophers, which contains a considerable portion 
 of the Grecian metaphysics. Irenseus waged war 
 most zealously against all the religious heresies of 
 his own times ; and attributed them to the pesti- 
 lential influence of the Gnostic system, Tertullian 
 entertained a determined hostility to the doctrines 
 of Plato, which he regarded as the prolific source 
 of all the heresies which harassed the Christian 
 Church. " Heresies," says he, " are the individual 
 opinions of men and demons. They have their 
 source in that insatiable curiosity for human science
 
 HERMAS — ^Tertullian, &c. 259 
 
 which our Lord himself severely reprobated, while 
 he promulgated those views which appeared fool- 
 ishness in the eyes of the world. This modern phi- 
 losophy presumptuously attempts to interpret the 
 Divine nature, to mislead unwary spirits." Of the 
 Academicians, TertuUian says, "Who art thou, im- 
 pudent Academician ? You overturn every con- 
 dition of life; you derange the whole order of 
 nature ; you remove a divine superintending Pro- 
 vidence. It must have given, according to your 
 doctrine, the senses to men as the most fallacious 
 organs for comprehending and admiring His stu- 
 pendous and marvellous works. Is not every thing 
 under the control of the senses ? Is it not 
 through their ministration, that all men receive 
 that subordinate instruction which embraces the 
 sciences, the common affairs of society, the relations 
 of things, the joys, the sorrows, the hopes, the fears, 
 the wants, and every thing which ornaments human 
 life ; since it is only by these same identical senses, 
 that man can be distinguished as a rational crea- 
 ture, capable of knowledge, even to commence 
 Academician himself."* 
 
 Arnobius, an African by birth, and, during a part 
 of his life, a zealous advocate for Paganism, expres- 
 sed, after his conversion to the Christian faith, his 
 decided hostility to all kinds of philosophy. The 
 science of Logic fell especially under his displeasure. 
 He maintained that with all its display of metho- 
 dical arrangement and demonstrative conclusions. 
 
 * Tertullian, De Prsescript. cap. 7- 
 
 s 2
 
 260 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 it was but a very inefficient instrument for guiding 
 us to truth.* Lactantius followed in liis wake 
 with the same class of opinions. This venerable 
 Father entered very fully into all the heathen sys- 
 tems, with a design to collect together, and place 
 in one point of view, the numerous contradictions 
 and discrepancies to be found in these various spe- 
 culative theories. By this plan he made a consi- 
 derable display in favour of liis own peculiar opi- 
 nions. On the nature and use of human knowledge 
 generally, the following quotations will furnish us 
 with his views; and they embody, in point of prin- 
 ciple, the real essence of his writings on this siibject. 
 " Science," says he, " cannot be derived from hu- 
 man intelligence, nor could it be unfolded by the 
 mere effort of thought. It is the prerogative of the 
 Deity himself, and not that of man to possess sci- 
 ence properly so called. Man can only receive that 
 knowled2:e which comes from without. This is the 
 reason why the Di\ine Mind has given him organs 
 of sensation, through which knowledge is conveyed 
 to the soul." " The human soul is shut out in the 
 obscure abode in the body, from the means of ac- 
 quiring knowledge. Thus ignorance is the lot of 
 humanity, as wisdom is the inherent attribute of 
 the Deity. We need, then, a light to dissipate the 
 dark clouds which envelope human thought. The 
 Deity is this light of the human soul ; and he who 
 receives it in his heart, will immediately discover 
 the mysteries of truth ; but on the other hand, he 
 
 * TertuUian, De Prfescript. lib. 2. cap. 9.
 
 ANATOLIUS — ST. AUGUSTINE. 261 
 
 who is deprived of this celestial light, must always 
 remain full of error." 
 
 On the nature and offices of Logic, Lanctantius 
 has the following remarks. " That portion of phi- 
 losophy which we call Logic, is that which contains 
 dialectics, and the rules of reasoning. The Divine 
 reason has no need of any such assistance, it re- 
 sides not in forms of words but in the heart, and it 
 is of little moment what language we employ ; for 
 it is things we seek, and not words."* 
 
 ■■o'- 
 
 Anatolius. 226 a. d. 
 
 This Christian writer was a public teacher at 
 Alexandria, and obtained great celebrity from his 
 extensive knowledge in philosophical systems. He 
 studied Aristotle profoundly, and endeavoured to 
 amalgamate his opinions with those of other Gre- 
 cian and heathen speculations. It is however 
 unknown whether he succeeded in this enterprise, 
 as none of his commentaries upon Aristotle have 
 sm-vived to oiu' times. He was a profound mathe- 
 matician, and made an attempt to explain subjects 
 of mental pliilosophy upon mathematical prin- 
 ciples, f 
 
 St. Augustine. 354 a. d. 
 St. Augustine comes next in order, as a disciple 
 
 * De Ira Dei, cap. 1. ; Divin. Inst. lib. 2. cap. 3. ; lib. 3. cap. 16. 
 t See the fragments of Anatolius' Philosophy in Fabricius, BibK. 
 Grec, Vol. 2. pp. 274—277.
 
 262 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 of Plato. He had at first been attaclied to the 
 Aristotelian theory, but it did not correspond with 
 his wishes, and he exchanged it for the doctrines of 
 Plato; these were more in accordance with the 
 nature of liis mind, being a man of a lively and 
 active imagination, and warm feelings. 
 
 We shall only make a few brief remarks on, 
 and quotations from, St. Augustine's work ^'Against 
 the Academicians^^ which is the most important 
 connected with the history of philosophy. He 
 commences the work by urging the most powerful 
 inducements to study philosophy, and to excite in 
 the student's bosom an ardent love of truth. Then 
 follow copious outlines of the heathen notions on 
 speculative topics, showing theu' various changes 
 and modifications during many centuries. These 
 he examines and discusses with great care, and 
 minuteness. The opinion entertained by the Aca- 
 demicians, that happiness consisted in seeking after 
 truth, he attempts to refute ; and endeavours to 
 establish the opposite theory, that happiness arises 
 from the possession of truth itself. In the third 
 book, he attempts to define the indefinable notion 
 which the Academicians entertained about probabi- 
 lity and resemblance ; and he finishes by refusing 
 his assent to the philosophy of the Academy, which 
 maintained that the human mind had not the power 
 of seizing hold of real truth. 
 
 This work of Agustine's is written in the form of 
 dialogue, and is exceedingly interesting. The lead- 
 ing idea throughout the whole treatise is, that the 
 Academicians have been obliged, in spite of them-
 
 ST. AUGUSTINE. 263 
 
 selves, to admit the existence of sucli a thing as 
 truth; which showed, at once, that their whole 
 reasoning rested upon a sceptical foundation. 
 
 In St. Augustine's work " On Order,'' he has 
 developed that -argument for a superintending 
 Providence, which has in recent times been so ad- 
 mirably handled by many learned and able men. 
 He says, "Order is wisdom and perfection; disorder 
 is evil. Order is that law by which the Almighty 
 executes all which he had ordained. The wisdom 
 embodied in this order is united to the Deity, be- 
 cause that he conceives himself every thing of 
 which He is the source." 
 
 This venerable Father, in his soliloquies, attempts 
 to furnish us with the distinctive characters of 
 truth and falsehood. "Truth," says he, "is supe- 
 rior to right ; it is eternal and immutable. There 
 is truth in God, and in the human mind. Trutfi 
 is the source of all intelligence or wisdom." 
 
 In St. Augustine's book " On the Quantity of the 
 Soul," that is, on its power or nature, he has given 
 us a full discussion of every thing which the light 
 of nature and revelation estabhshes respecting our 
 spiritual frame. He treats of the origin of the 
 soul, of its nature, what are its faculties or powers, 
 why it was placed in the body, what is its condition 
 while it is placed here, and what will be its condi- 
 tion in a future life. The soul is a substance en- 
 dowed with reason, and placed in the body for the 
 purpose of guiding and directing it. " The soul 
 derives its origin from God ; it is simple and im- 
 material; and what proves tliis is, that it can con-
 
 264 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 ceive ideas of abstract quantities and dimensions 
 which are not corporeal ; though it is susceptible 
 of feeling through the agency of the body, it is not 
 extended over the body." 
 
 St. Augustine distinguishes the visual perceptions 
 of objects, from the judgments which accompany 
 them. On the subject of sensation generally he 
 has the following remarks — " Sensation is produced 
 from external objects, which act upon the soul. 
 Sensation is not science ; and science itself differs 
 from reason. By reason we seek and develop 
 science, and reasoning is the instrument which con- 
 ducts us to it." Again he remarks, " The exercise 
 of the faculties of the soul may be divided into 
 seven distinct stages. In the first, these powers are 
 manifested in that life or being which belongs to 
 vegetable existence. In the second, these powers 
 give birth to sensation; they move and direct bodies, 
 and form the foundation of animal life. In the 
 third, they rise above the brute creation ; they com- 
 pare material objects with one another ; act upon 
 them ; change their natm'e and appearances : apply 
 them to human wants ; and create all that mul- 
 tiplicity of objects and pursuits, which we deno- 
 minate the arts of life. The fourth stage of these 
 powers of the soul, displays itself in giving birth to 
 a moral world ; enabling us to detach and contem- 
 plate our minds apart from external and sensible 
 things ; and in recognizing the principles of justice 
 and virtue. The fifth period is marked by the soul's 
 reflecting upon its own powers, enjoying it self fully 
 in its own innate liberty and ease. The sixth, or
 
 ST. AUGUSTINE. 265 
 
 last stage, is characterised by a kind of sudden 
 bound, by which the soul at once aspires to really 
 superior things ; purified by this long course of j)ro- 
 bation, it steadily dii-ects its eye, with a calm and 
 confident assurance, towards the region of pure and 
 exalted intellect. In fine, intuition, the contem- 
 plation of truth itself, is the last act, the summit 
 of the ladder, the sublime end of all its efforts, and 
 is thus carried to the Great First Cause, to the 
 Supreme Author of all things. 
 
 St. Augustine has been accused, in modern 
 times, of a decided leaning to Pantheism ; but this 
 accusation rests upon a very slender fovmdation. 
 The fact is, that the same charge might, with equal 
 justice, be brought against many hundreds of able 
 and orthodox divines, of almost every Christian 
 church, and in every period of ecclesiastical history. 
 Everything depends upon the meaning which is 
 attached to the word Pantheism. It is almost unpos- 
 sible to tie men down to anything likea fixed defi- 
 nition of words of this description ; particularly 
 when employed under the heat and excitement of 
 sectarian controversies.* 
 
 There are none of the Fathers of the Church 
 whose lives are so full of interest, relative to spe- 
 
 * The following is the passage from St. Augustine, on which this ac- 
 cusation rests. " SubstantiaUter Deus ubique diffusus est. Sed sic est 
 Deus per cuncta diffusus, ut non sit quahtas mundi, sed substantia crea- 
 trix mundi, sine labore regens et sine onere continens mundum. Non 
 tamen per spatia locorum, quasi mole diffusa, ita ut in dimidio mundi 
 corpore sit dimithus, atque ita per totum totus; sed in solo coelo totus, et 
 in sola terra totus, et in ccelo et in terra totus, et nuUo contentus loco, 
 sed in se ipso ubique totus."
 
 266 DISQUISITIONS or the fathers. 
 
 dilative opinions, as that of St. Augustine. His 
 mind underwent many changes ; and these changes 
 exercised a powerful influence over his active ener- 
 gies and pursuits.* 
 
 Nemesius. 356 a. d. 
 
 The writings of Nemesius are well worthy of 
 especial notice at this period of the Christian 
 Church. He was Bishop of Emessa, a city of 
 Phenicia, and wrote a book in the Greek language, 
 in forty-four Chapters, called, " On the Natui^e of 
 Man.^^ This is unquestionably one of the very 
 best productions of Christian pliilosophy of which 
 the early Christian Church can boast. The author 
 combated, with great power and zeal, the doctrine 
 of fatality involved in the system of the Stoics ; 
 and he also showed himself greatly averse to the 
 speculative opinions of the Manicheans. He adopted 
 however the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, 
 which had been revived by Origen, and which was 
 afterwards, in the year 551, condemned at the 
 Council of Constantinople. Nemesius also studied 
 anatomy and physiology; and we find it stated 
 in the Oxford edition of his works, in 1671, 
 that he made important discoveries on the nature 
 and uses of the bile; and that he was well ac- 
 
 * See Confessions, lib. 1. 2. 3. 4. 7- 8. 9. The best edition of St. Au- 
 gustine's vvoiks is that published by the BenetUctines at Antwerp, 1703, 
 in 12 vols, folio.
 
 NEMESIUS. 267 
 
 quainted with that important fact, the circulation 
 of the blood. 
 
 On the nature of the human soul, Nemesius en- 
 tered very fully, and discussed the various opinions 
 which preceding philosophers had expressed on 
 tliis interesting but abstruse subject. He main- 
 tains that the soul is immaterial, and that it is not 
 the result of a peculiar organization of body. " The 
 soul," says he, "is united to the body." Again, 
 " A portion of the faculties of the soul are destined 
 to serve, and another to command. The organs 
 of sense, their movements, and the appetites which 
 belong to them, compose the first class, and reason 
 the second." 
 
 Nemesius advances a theory of sensation in 
 which both intellectual and physiological facts are 
 stated with great clearness and effect. He had 
 evidently been a very attentive and discriminating 
 observer of nature. He distinguishes sensations 
 from conclusions of the understanding which ac- 
 company them ; and affirms that all our errors are 
 solely confined to the latter and not to the former. 
 The judgment and the memory are, in his opinion, 
 the two principal faculties which conduct the mind 
 to important abstract truths. He rejected the theory 
 of Porphyry, who maintained that the soul saw 
 every thing through sensation, as through a mir- 
 ror. "The memory," says Nemesius "preserves 
 the perceptions obtained by the senses; and the 
 understanding combines and arranges these mate- 
 rials furnished by the senses and the memory." 
 Again he remarks, " We are conscious of the ex-
 
 268 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 istence of things whicli we have been accustomed 
 to think and judge of; as, for example, reason inti- 
 mates to us the existence of the sea, and the sand 
 on the sea shore ; though we cannot fix or define 
 the limits of the sea, nor number the individual 
 grains of sand. We can conceive the general ideas 
 of the sea and of the sand, but not the individual 
 parts of which they are composed." 
 
 To the doctrines of voluntary and involuntary 
 actions, Nemesius had paid considerable attention. 
 He has made many judicious remarks on this ab- 
 struse branch of the philosophy of mind. 
 
 St. Gregory. 372 a. d. 
 
 St. Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, wrote a work on 
 the immortality of the soul, which has been often 
 highly praised by learned divines since his day. 
 He argued strenuously against the Platonic notion 
 that the soul was composed of many different parts, 
 a sort of little municipality or commonwealth. He 
 allows, however, three distinct parts or principles 
 of the soul, namely, the vegetable life, the sensitive 
 life, and the intellectual life. He also refuted several 
 heretical opinions on tliis subject, which had gained 
 a considerable portion of popularity in the East. 
 
 Stnesius. 410 A. D. 
 
 The learned Synesius was the ornament and 
 philosopliical light of the age. He was an Afri- 
 can, born at Cyrene of illustrious parents. He
 
 CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS. 269 
 
 studied the sciences with great success ; and hav- 
 ing embraced the doctrines of Aristotle, he gave to 
 that system of philosophy additional charms and 
 interest, by his ingenious illustrations and the 
 fervour of his fancv. His mind was enerrossed 
 with the most lively feelings of philosophical and 
 religious adoration of the works of nature ; and his 
 reflections on the attributes of the Supreme Mind 
 and of the human soul, are at once just and sub- 
 lime. 
 
 SjTiesius, after having been for several years an 
 Aristotelian, began to study with great minuteness 
 the pliilosophy of Plato ; and more especially those 
 views of it which were rife in the Alexandrian 
 school. He became, in consequence, more ideal 
 and mystified in his opinions on the nature of a 
 Deity, the human soul, and the intellectual prin- 
 ciple. His orthodoxy in matters of religion was 
 generally questioned. It is certain he entertained 
 doubts on the doctrine of the E/Csurrection. 
 
 Clatjdianus MAMEHTrs. 450 a. d. 
 
 This Christian writer was a learned Presbvter at 
 Vienna. He was deeply versed in the dialectic 
 system of Aristotle, and displayed great eloquence 
 in his philosophical discourses. His work " On 
 the State of the Soul," is a curious v/ork. It is 
 grounded on the principles of two divisions, the 
 senses and the powers of reflection.* 
 
 * Fabricius, Bibli. lat. t. 2, p. 642.
 
 270 DISQUISITIONS OP THE FATHERS. 
 
 BOETHIUS. A. D. 470. 
 
 Boetliius was famous for his virtues, talents, civil 
 distinctions, and misfortunes. He was born at Home 
 in the year 470 ; and studied philosophy and general 
 learning at Athens. In the year 525 he suffered 
 an icrnominious death, without the forms of law, for 
 an alleged treasonable correspondence. 
 
 Boethius studied the doctrines of Aristotle, and 
 made himself completely master of them in all 
 their ramifications. He translated the Categories 
 at Rome, and several other tracts of the Stagirite, 
 and also the Commentaries of Porphyry. But 
 though nominally belonging to the school of Aris- 
 totle, yet in spirit he was a real Platonist. The 
 sublime doctrines of the latter class of philosophers, 
 seemed to have entirely engrossed his mind, and to 
 have led him, in all liis speculations, to give that 
 form and expression to his thoughts, which were 
 widely removed from the dryness and technicality of 
 the AristoteKan theory. He loved to roam amongst 
 the lofty doctrines of the Grecian sages. The stu- 
 pendous operations of nature ; the mysterious union 
 of the soul and body ; the nature and attributes of 
 the Divine Mind ; the immortality of the soul ; and 
 a future state of rewards and punishments ; filled 
 his comprehensive intellect with the most exalted 
 conceptions, calculated to elevate and dignify the 
 human mind, and console and cheer the heart of 
 man. Never was there a genius better fitted, both 
 from its worldly afflictions, and from its own rich
 
 MARTIN CAPELLA — CASSIODORUS. 271 
 
 and inexhaustible resources to unfold " Tlie Conso- 
 lations of JPJiilosophfj ; a work which must always 
 remain an imperishable monument to his name, as 
 well as a tender memorial to his virtuous and un- 
 merited suifering.* 
 
 Martin Capella. 474 a. d. 
 
 Martin Capella, who was an African by bii'th, 
 wrote a book, entitled " Satyricon, or the Me-union 
 of Philosophy loith Mercury.'''' Part relates to my- 
 thology and part to the fine arts. He also wrote on 
 grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, 
 astronomy, and music. He adopted all the rules 
 and maxims of philosophy taught by Aristotle and 
 the Stoics. His writings are a sort of common 
 gathering of all the opinions and systems which 
 history had handed down, as prevalent at different 
 periods amongst the Greeks and Romans. 
 
 Cassiodorus. 480 a. d. 
 
 Cassiodorus, who was a contemporary of Boethius, 
 wrote several works on metaphysics and on other 
 kindred branches of knowledge. He was an ardent 
 admirer of Aristotle, and conceived his philosophy 
 to embrace the whole of what mankind could ever 
 know of the laws and principles of the human 
 mind. The works of Cassiodorus formed the text 
 books in the schools in the East, for a considerable 
 period after his death. 
 
 * See Fabricius, Bib. Lat.; ami Vies des Saints, Vol. 1. par Baillet.
 
 272 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 Erom the beginning of the fifth to the end of the 
 sixth century, the discussions amongst the learned 
 Eathers were not so detached and independent of 
 each other, as they previously had been. There 
 was more of unity and party, and fewer individual 
 theories struggling for distinction and public favour. 
 Nearly the whole of the writings of the priesthood 
 on philosophy in general, were divided, or rather 
 amalgamated, into two leading divisions ; those 
 which were in favour of the theory of Plato, and 
 those who contended for the supremacy of Aristotle. 
 Under these two banners, the general mass of dis- 
 putants and writers were arrayed, and many were 
 the varied aspects of party success, during this long 
 and conflicting struggle. 
 
 There were several distinguished expounders of 
 the leading principles of the Platonic doctrine at 
 this period. In their writings against the Mani- 
 chean heresy, as well as in many other tracts, they 
 showed the harmony which existed between this 
 Grecian system, and the leading principles of na- 
 ture and revealed religion. Their opinions were at 
 once truly enlightened and liberal ; and manifested 
 how carefully they had studied both the philoso- 
 phical tenets of heathenism, and the theological 
 doctrines contained in the Holy Scriptures. 
 
 In the 7tli and 8th centuries the two most emi- 
 nent men, in reference to the cultivation of the philo- 
 sophy of human nature, were John the Grammarian 
 and St. John Damascenus. The first composed 
 extensive and erudite commentaries upon the works 
 of Aristotle ; and the second attempted to simplify 
 the Greek philosopher's doctrines, so as to render
 
 ST. JOHN DAMASCENTJS. 273 
 
 them more comm.oiily understood. His general re- 
 marks as to the nature of pliilosophy, are very ad- 
 mirable. "Philosophy," says he, "is the science 
 of things which are just what we find them to be. 
 It is divided into two parts, speculative and prac- 
 tical. Speculative philosophy comprehends theo- 
 logy, physiology, and mathematics ; practical phi- 
 losophy comprehends etliics, economics, and poli- 
 tics. Theology has for its object that which is im- 
 material, such as the Deity, angels, and the souls 
 of men. Physiology embraces a knowledge of ma- 
 terial things, as of animals, plants, minerals, &c. 
 Mathematics consist in things which, though not 
 strictly corporeal themselves, have a relation to 
 external bodies, as number, proportions, figures, 
 and the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Dia- 
 lectics, or the art of reasoning, is more an instru- 
 ment of philosophy, than one of its leading divi- 
 sions. It is, from its very nature, a preliminary 
 acquisition. The Sceptics were guilty of self-con- 
 tradiction when they afiirmed that philosophy had 
 no claim to a knowledge of things. There is no- 
 thing more excellent than knoAvledge ; it is the 
 light of an intelligent soul. Seek it, explore for it, 
 by unremitting investigations ; and at the same 
 time consult the works of the ancient heathens, 
 where you will find many important truths, which 
 you must disentangle from the errors with which 
 they are associated." 
 
 He has the following observations on method. 
 " There are four dialectic or logical methods. The
 
 274 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 first is the di^dsion wliich separates genus and spe- 
 cies ; the second is the definition which defines the 
 sul)ject by the genus ; the third is analysis, wliich 
 decomposes every part ; and the fourth is demon- 
 stration, which establishes the truth by means of 
 the last term." St. John Damascenus also dis- 
 tinj?uishes analysis into three distinct kinds ; na- 
 tural, logical, and mathematical. The first resolves 
 compound ideas into their simple elements ; the 
 second resolves the syllogism into its different 
 parts ; and the third consists in admitting the cor- 
 rectness of a certain principle, in order to arrive at 
 a knowledge of an important truth. 
 
 On the doctrine of Sensation, St. John Damas- 
 cenus maintains that the faculty of sight informs us 
 of the magnitude, position, and distance of objects. 
 
 " Imagination," says he, " is a faculty belonging 
 to the irrational di^dsion of the soul, which operates 
 through the organs of sense. TVTien the soul per- 
 ceives external objects by the organs of sense, it 
 forms to itseK an opinion or judgment ; when it 
 knows, by thought, things which appertain to the 
 understanding, it conceives a notion. Such notions 
 cannot proceed from the senses ; they can be ob- 
 tained only by instruction. Memory is the image 
 which has been left by objects offered to the senses, 
 and seized by the action of the soul, or preserved 
 from that which has been perceived through the 
 senses, or the inward process of thought."
 
 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 275 
 
 A long darkness in tlie Lower Empire now suc- 
 ceeded to the comparative light which we have just 
 described. Leo, the philosopher, obtained con- 
 siderable reputation in the Byzantine Empire for 
 his various writings. Photius flourished at Con- 
 stantinople, in general philosophy, oratory, and 
 poetry. Leo VI., son of the Emperor Basil, dis- 
 tinguished himself in general literature. 
 
 There were a great number of commentators on 
 Aristotle in the latter centuries of theLower Empire. 
 David was an eminent critic and expounder of the 
 pliilosophy of the Stagirite ; Eustratius composed 
 treatises on dialectics and morals. Nicephorus, a 
 learned monk, cultivated general philosophy with 
 divinity. George Pachymera composed an Epitome 
 of the PJdlosophy of Aristotle, and a Compendium of 
 his Logic. Theodoras Metachita stood at the head of 
 the school at Constantinople, for his eloquence and 
 profundity. Magentinus illustrated the doctrines 
 of many of the Pythagorean philosophers. George 
 Cyprius, surnamed Gregory, obtained well merited 
 honours from the patrons of learning in his own 
 day. Michael Psellus cultivated philosophy, me- 
 dicine, and mathematics, and obtained the title of 
 the "Prince of Philosophers." He composed and 
 published an " Exposition of the Chaldean Oracles^'' 
 and a " Treatise on the Faculties of the SoulP 
 
 *jt* The following, among many others, are interesting works on the 
 philosophical principles and opinions of the Fathers of the Church. 
 Thomasius, Origin. Hist. Ecclesi. et Phil. Mosheim, De Turbata per 
 Platonicos Recentiores Ecdesia. (This work has occasioned considerable 
 discussion among learned ecclesiastics of modern times ; particularly 
 Baltus and the Benedictines of Saint Maur.) Huet, Origenia. Clerc, 
 
 T 2
 
 276 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 Biblioth. Select. Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. Carus, L'Etude de I'homme 
 et la Psychologic en particulier. Jean-Baptiste Crispus, De Ethnicis Phi- 
 losophis caute Legendis. Souverain, Le Platonisme Devoile. Baltus, 
 Defense des Saints Peres; Jugemens des Saints Peres sur la Morale 
 de la Philosophic Paiennc, (Strasburg). Barbeyrac, Traite de la Morale 
 des Peres de I'Eglise. StandHn, Progr. de Patrum EcclesifE Doctrina 
 Morali. Eberhard, Spirit of Primitive Christianity, (in German). 
 Roessler, De Originibus Philosophise Ecclcsiasticse. The fourth Volume 
 of the Bibliotheque des Peres de I'Eglise. Tennemann, Grundriss der 
 Geschichte der Philosophic, the seventh Volume. Cave's Lives of the 
 Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Antiquities. Whiston's Primitive Christianity. 
 Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Lardner's Account of the Christian Fathers. 
 Journal des Savans, 1734. Tillemont, Mem. Ecclesi. Gaudentius, Diss, 
 de Compar. Dogm. Orig. cum Dogm. Platonis.
 
 ST. PETER THE ANCHORITE. 277 
 
 CHAPTER XXVIII. 
 
 ■ 
 
 OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS, FROM ASCETIC 
 WRITERS, ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH REA- 
 SONING AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 As we are just upon tlie eve of entering into a 
 long night of comparative stillness and unprofit- 
 able discussion, we shall lay before the reader a few 
 scattered fragments, culled from ascetic sources, 
 on matters bearing a. certain relationship to mental 
 studies. These fragments, though very scanty and 
 limited in their range of inquiry, will be found not 
 altogether devoid of interest, considering the pe- 
 riod and the circumstances under which they were 
 written. 
 
 St. Peter the Anchorite. 410 a. d. 
 On Simian Wisdom and Learning. 
 
 " It has often appeared to me that there are 
 among the learned of this world, and even among 
 some of our ablest divines, many odd and curious 
 notions about the nature of human wisdom and
 
 278 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 learning. I have long come to the conclusion that 
 there is no learning nor wit of men that is not 
 grounded in religion — Kttle that is not decidedly of 
 a religious character ; and my reasons for this opi- 
 nion I shall state to you as briefly as I can. 
 
 " Men pride themselves on theii* wisdom in ob- 
 serving the causes of things, and their effects. A 
 physician, for example, is called a learned man in 
 proportion to his knowledge of the cause of human 
 ailments, and the effects that particular drugs have 
 upon them. And, again, a man is called a wise 
 legislator who is acquainted with the causes of so- 
 cial happiness and prosperity, and with the effects 
 which particular measures have upon the welfare 
 of the community. Here causes and effects are the 
 materials of Avisdom. Now I conceive that no 
 man can be intimately conversant about these, 
 make them daily objects of his attention and no- 
 tice, and pride himself on his mode of arranging 
 them in Ms mind, without his thinking often of 
 the First Great Cause, which made and sustains 
 all things. I know well there are thousands of 
 learned men who never directly refer theu" wisdom 
 to the Deity ; but still the thought is in their 
 minds, whether they give formal utterance to it or 
 no. And this is the thing to look at. If there 
 were not indirectly a reference made to this know- 
 ledge of Deity, it is difficult for me to see how there 
 could be anything like wisdom in the world, or 
 why men should pride themselves upon possess- 
 ing it, and demand praise from others for it.
 
 SAINT PETER THE ANCHOUITE. 279 
 
 " You have heard me often mention in conversa- 
 tion, that I very much douhted if there were ever 
 such a being as an Atheist; and it is upon the 
 strength of this doubt that I am now offering my 
 opinions. All the philosojjhers I have read of who 
 have been charged with denying the existence of a 
 God, always had a notion of supreme power about 
 them. This notion mav have assumed various forms, 
 but it is always in the mind of man, and influences 
 him without his knowing it. It is never destroyed, 
 and I question much whether it be ever very much 
 weakened. The natural man, it is true, does not 
 know God as we Christians know Him; but he 
 does know Him notwithstanding. We are not in 
 a precise situation to estimate the influence which 
 this primary notion of the Deity may have over the 
 other faculties of the mind, nor over the judgments 
 we form of things. We cannot do this either wiA 
 other people or ourselves. But I hold it evident 
 that the whole frame-work of our nature rests upon 
 it ; and there would be nothing in the miiverse we 
 could call wisdom or learning, unless it were based 
 upon this fundamental principle of theology. 
 
 "Learning and wisdom Avould not be placed 
 against each other in the world's estimation, if men 
 would only base their knowledge upon religion. 
 They ought to commence with it, and descend 
 to other branches of information ; and not begin 
 with the latter, with a vicAV of obtaining a know- 
 ledge of the former. This is inverting the natural 
 order of things. Most of the heathens, and even
 
 280 ASCETIC WRITEliS. 
 
 some good Patliers of the Church, have maintained 
 that Socrates was the wisest man of ancient times ; 
 and the proof that is adduced for this is, that he 
 connected his knowledge with some definite notions 
 of a God. This has often struck me as a very curi- 
 ous circumstance; hut it is very confirmatory of 
 what I am now contending for. If we couhl make 
 ourselves acquainted with every thing in this world, 
 and yet had no notion of what lay beyond it, what 
 men call wisdom would he hut a poor and miserable 
 thing indeed. And in all the Pagan writers we find 
 that continual references were made to the wisdom, 
 favour, and applause of the gods, when they were 
 intent on doing great things. The Deity must be 
 the fountain of all knowledge and wisdom, and in 
 proportion as men direct their minds to him, they 
 will make real progress in knowledge ; but if they 
 tleglect liim, all they can know is but dross and 
 emptiness."* 
 
 St. Alonzo de Vega. 530 a. d. 
 
 Nature of Unbelief. 
 " In moving much in the world, in the early part 
 of my life, it has often been my lot to meet with 
 men who refused to give credence to the Gospel ; 
 and the variety of reasons they adduced often at- 
 tracted my notice. But I have almost uniformly 
 found that, at bottom, such men did not approve 
 
 * Dies y siete Coloqnios y Discursos Yarios, Salamanca, 1593, Vol. 1. 
 )))). 310 — 314. Flos Sanctorum, Madrid, 1710,
 
 ST. ALONZO DE VEGA. 281 
 
 of religion in theii* lives, and this, I conceive, made 
 them averse to its truths. Some exceptions to 
 this rule I have met with ; and when the parties 
 were men of intelligence and learning, I have felt 
 no small degree of interest in discussing points of 
 doctrine with them. 
 
 "In all my encounters of this kind, I have 
 noticed that their oT)j actions were much of the 
 same cast as those which the old pliilosophers used 
 to employ in their discussions and wranglings with 
 one another, on the general doctrines of a Deity 
 and a superintending Pro\ddence. The latter, as 
 well as modern douhters, always wanted to know 
 the reasons for things being constituted as they 
 are. Now this is a silly notion, because it is just 
 as pertinent against as for those who use it. It 
 is a two-edged sword. Therefore, whenever I 
 have met with persons who followed this line df 
 argumentation, I have endeavoured to turn their 
 own weapons upon themselves, and this has often 
 made them plead for mercy. I adopted this mode 
 of warfare, from an accident which befel me in one 
 of my travels, and which I shall here relate. 
 
 " Going once over one of the most wild and 
 mountainous parts of Spain, I was accompanied by 
 a physician, with whom I had become acquainted 
 in the last town in which I had rested. He was a 
 very intelligent man ; knew Hippocrates and Galen 
 by heart ; was fond of disputation ; but would not 
 listen to my doctrines of religion. We were be- 
 nighted in the midst of one of the mountain passes;
 
 282 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 but, after a good deal of suffering and fatigue, were 
 seen by a shepherd, who took us to his humble 
 dwelling, and succoured us for the night. The 
 badness of the weather prevented us from leaving 
 our quarters the next day. To beguile the hours, 
 my friend, the physician, began to converse with 
 the shepherd, with a view of sounding the depth 
 of his knowledge of sundry matters. The physi- 
 cian found him a keen and witty man by nature. 
 This gave some zest to the conversation. My com- 
 panion attempted to explain several things dis- 
 tinctly connected with his own profession, but the 
 shepherd would not believe his statements, and 
 always met his declarations and reasonings with 
 the inquiry, why such and such a thing was made 
 in this or that particular manner, rather than in 
 some other ? When the physician attempted a 
 solution of any question, the shepherd laughed and 
 shook his head in derision. When the physician 
 affirmed that such and such things were true in phi- 
 losophy, the shepherd denied the truth of the state- 
 ment, and asked, with no small portion of ironical 
 wit, why should the thing be in that way, when 
 another way, apparently much simpler, would have 
 answered the purpose ? I saw my friend was ex- 
 ceedingly annoyed ; but I enjoyed the dispute my- 
 self; for it so happened that when I attempted to 
 unfold any theological principle or doctrine, he 
 dexterously employed the same line of argument 
 against me which the simple and untutored shepherd 
 now used against liimself. The physician was in
 
 ST. ALONZO DE VEGA. 283 
 
 the habit of asking me why the Almighty had not 
 made us so as not to have needed the costly sacri- 
 fice of His own Son ? why we could not see the 
 truth of another life in a much clearer light than 
 we do ? why there should l)e any evil at all in the 
 world ? These and many more questions of a simi- 
 lar nature he urged to haflB.e and confute me. Now, 
 I fancied he had thought of this in his conflict with 
 the shepherd, and had felt inward mortification in 
 consequence. Por my part, I felt a secret pleastlre 
 at his discomfiture, and I endeavoured to draw a 
 useful lesson from it. I have found such argu- 
 ments as these used by the shepherd, to question 
 the truth of jDlain prmciples of knowledge, almost 
 universally employed among doubters of the Gospel. 
 When the real nature of these arguments is ex- 
 amined, they will be found a very weak subterfuge 
 for error and delusion."* 
 
 On the Immortality of the Soul. 
 
 *' All my readuig and reflection have convinced 
 me that man lives after his earthly career ; and my 
 reasons for this opinion are drawn more from 
 human testimony, and the nature of things, than 
 directly from the Scriptures themselves. The opi- 
 nion of another life is universal ; no people are 
 devoid of it. Idolatry of all kinds is a striking 
 manifestation of it. It was the creed of the Egyp- 
 tians, and Chaldeans, and Persians, and Greeks, 
 
 * Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 1564. Vol. 1 pp. 200. 202.
 
 284 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 and Romans, and Jews, and is interwoven with all 
 Pagan rites and ceremonies." 
 
 " Socrates says, ' I hope there will be something 
 after death, and that the future life will he better 
 for vii'tuous men than for the wicked.' Plato, in 
 his letters, remarks, ' That we ought to assent to 
 the ancient and sacred opinion, that the soul of 
 man is immortal ; and that after this life it will be 
 judged and punished severely.' Aristotle spoke of 
 the happiness of a future state as an opinion of very 
 great antiquity, even in his day. Cicero says ' that 
 the immortality of tlie soul has been adopted and 
 defended by the most distinguished men.' And a 
 like opinion may be found in Homer, Thales, Py- 
 thagoras, and Zeno."* 
 
 Pelagius. 768 a. d. 
 
 Pelagius was born in some part of Sj^-ia, but 
 the exact place is not known. The events of his 
 life are but briefly related by his Spanish bio- 
 graphers. 
 
 It would appear that this recluse was born of 
 rich and influential parents, who gave him a very 
 learned education. He was employed, in the early 
 part of his life, in the service of Prince Abdalrah- 
 man, who, in 750, at the revolution of the Caliphate 
 at Damascus, having fled from the massacre of his 
 family, came into Spain, and fixed liis residence at 
 
 * Los Padres del Disierto, Vol. 1. p. 250.
 
 PELAGITJS. 285 
 
 Cordova. Here he found an independent kingdom, 
 where the arts and sciences were introduced and 
 cultivated with assiduity, during a period when 
 most other kingdoms of Europe were involved in 
 heathen darkness, barbarity, and ignorance. * 
 
 Pelagius, for several years after the establishment 
 of Prince Abdalrahman in Spain, laboured with 
 uncommon zeal and effect in promoting a know- 
 ledge of all kinds of science, and a love of general 
 literature. In this laudable undertaking he met 
 with every degree of encouragement from his mu- 
 nificent and intelligent patron, who kept him about 
 his own person, and consulted him in every under- 
 taking for the welfare of his kingdom. 
 
 At the age of fifty-three he was tiredof all public 
 life, and determined to withdraw into solitude to 
 devote himself exclusively to the perusal of the 
 Holy Scriptures, to which he thought he had not 
 paid so much attention as he ought. This resolve 
 gave Prince Abdalrahman great pain. He used 
 every art of persuasion to induce Pelagius to change 
 his mind, but all to no purpose. 
 
 He sought out one of the most barren and deso- 
 late places in the country, where to fix his dwelling 
 place, wliich was a cave hewn out of a soKd rock. 
 Here he lived upon the wild fruits of the earth, 
 and drank nothino^ stronsrer than water. In the 
 heat of summer he had a kind of cradle erected 
 upon a lofty tree which over-hung his cell, wherein 
 he slept during the night. His mental occupations 
 were the reading of the Scriptures, and the study of
 
 286 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 some of tlie most distinguished of the Grecian and 
 Roman philosophers, of whose writings he was 
 passionately fond. 
 
 It is related that once in every year he paid a 
 -v^sit to the Prince, his kind patron, who was always 
 delighted to see and converse with him. It is not 
 known in what year he died, but his age is stated 
 to he eighty-two. He was buried with great pomp, 
 and many thousands of persons, from aU parts of 
 the country, came to pay their respects to the ashes 
 of this singular and talented man. 
 
 His literary remains are under the head of "Prag- 
 ments," from which the following extracts are made. 
 His knowledge of philosophy is singularly great for 
 the time in wliich he lived. 
 
 On matters relating to Knowledge in general^ 
 and Reasoning . 
 
 The human mind is divided into two faculties, 
 viz. the judgment, and the memory. Philosophy 
 is of use to inform and rectify the mind ; but it 
 will be necessary to give a definition of the word 
 philosophy, and to show whence it had its origin. 
 The ancients who employed their time in the search 
 of knowledge were called Sophoi, l3efore Pythagoras 
 existed, who, out of an air of modesty, refused the 
 name, as being proper to immortal gods only ; in- 
 stead of which, he assumed the name of philosopher, 
 and which, since his time, has been attributed to 
 the former characters, and hence arose this desig- 
 nation.
 
 PELAGIUS. 287 
 
 Vulgar knowledge is that by which we know 
 only the bare existence of things, without being able 
 to give reasons why they are so and so. Solid know- 
 ledge is that of which we know the causes and 
 effects ; as that the sun melts snow, and the frost 
 , congeals water. 
 
 Aristotle divided his works into two kinds, exo- 
 terica and acroamatica ; the former he wrote for 
 the vulgar, without giving any reason for what he 
 affirmed — as, God was to be worshipped, or the 
 soul was immortal, which men were to believe 
 upon his word. The latter he taught his disciples, 
 to whom he proved every thing he said with the 
 strongest arguments he could advance. 
 
 Prom hence may be drawn the following four 
 corollaries : — 
 
 First — Vtilgar knowledge is that which we wholly 
 acquire by the senses, and is the foundation of all 
 solid knowledge ; for we must know a thing is so, 
 before we can offer a reason for it. Vulgar know- 
 ledge is the least degree of knowledge we can 
 conceive. 
 
 Second — Solid knowledge does not depend so ex- 
 clusively upon our senses, but upon right reason ; 
 that is, by deducing some truths from others by a 
 necessary conclusion. But there are some parts of 
 learning which cannot be called philosophy ; such 
 as mathematical arts ; and even theology, because 
 acquired by revelation. As to mathematical arts, 
 though they be deduced from some principles of 
 philosophy, yet it commonly happens that the arts
 
 288 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 are themselves illustrated by an inquiry into the 
 nature of things, and by practice and experience. 
 It may be said, since right reason is the faculty of 
 deducing some truths from others, how comes it to 
 pass that we embrace false opinions ? We answer, 
 by an unavoidable mistake, or erroneous judgment, 
 from whence many errors proceed. But a philoso- 
 pher ought not to receive any doctrine but what 
 can be deduced from seK-evident truths, principles, 
 and axioms. On the other hand, there are some 
 doctrines which cannot be demonstrated by axioms 
 and definitions ; in that respect they have recourse 
 to probability and analogy. 
 
 Philosophy is divided by some writers on meta- 
 physics into subjective and objective. 
 
 Pirst — Objective is a system or collection of so 
 many dogmas or opinions. 
 
 Second— Subjective is a faculty, or a certain 
 habit of deducing some truths from others. If we 
 understand philosophy in the second sense, viz. 
 subjectively, sceptics may be recorded among phi- 
 losophers, as being always searcliing after truth, but 
 never coming to a resolution on the certainty of 
 any thing. But if we place philosophy in the for- 
 mer, (where we may with more propriety,) they 
 have no claim to be classed with philosophers. 
 
 Philosophy by some is divided into true and 
 false. 
 
 True philosophy is that which is founded upon 
 right reason. Pliilosophy does not deserve the 
 name of false, because there is no such thing. Phi-
 
 PELAGIUS. 289 
 
 losopliy is by others called eclectic ; this name was 
 given to those who, out of doctrines and opinions 
 which they had heard or read, chose what they 
 thought l)est, and most agreeable to truth and 
 reason. 
 
 The objects of philosophy are truth and goodness ; 
 and the end of it, the true happiness of mankind. 
 
 Philosophy is again divided into instrimie)ital, 
 theoretical, and practical. The first part of philo- 
 sophy is logic, which is instrumental, or, as Aristotle 
 called it, organon, a machine, because it is to the 
 mind what an instrument is to the body. I cannot 
 cleave a piece of wood with my hand, but easily 
 with an axe ; so logic affords proper help and as- 
 sistance to the mind for investigating truth, and 
 distinguishing it from falsehood. 
 
 But it is necessary to give the derivation , of the 
 word logic. It comes from the word logos, i. e. 
 sermo, or ratio ; and it is very probable it comes 
 from logos in the last sense, because it is the art of 
 reasoning. Though some who occupy themselves 
 in trifling speculations, call it sermo, because, 
 say they, thoughts are the internal speeches of 
 mind. The object of logic is truth in general ; and 
 the end of it, the investigating of truth, and com- 
 municating it to others. 
 
 Logic may be defined the science for discovering 
 and propagating truth. A science is any part of 
 learning which depends upon seK-evident truths or 
 undoubted principles. Hence logic may justly be 
 termed a science, because it is founded upon axioms 
 or self-evident principles. Truth is, as it were, hid- 
 * u
 
 290 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 den in a pit, and logic is the ladder by wliicli we 
 may descend to searcli for it. Truth is Ijlended 
 with falsehood, and therefore logic is rendered 
 more necessary, which teaches the method of in- 
 vestigating truth. 
 
 Logic is conversant about three things : — 
 
 Pirst — The nature of the human understanding. 
 
 Second — The nature of truth. 
 
 Third — The method of investigating truth and 
 communicating it to others. 
 
 The nature of the human understanding, which 
 is divided into two principal faculties, the under- 
 standing and the will. The understanding is chiefly 
 conversant about truth ; the will, about goodness. 
 
 In the understanding mind there are certain ideas 
 which experience tells us are infinite in their num- 
 ber. Plato, and the philosophers of his time, were 
 of opinion, that these ideas were stamped or im- 
 printed iipon the mind of man from its first forma- 
 tion, ])y the Author of nature ; and these were 
 called innate truths or ideas. 
 
 The idea we have of immaterial things comes 
 from the inward man; that is, by reflecting on 
 what passes in the human mind. Hence some are 
 to be found fault with in saying we have our ideas 
 of immaterial things from material things, as the 
 passions of hope and fear, joy, anger, &c. These 
 could never be acquired by material objects. Thus, 
 suppose a man void of any of the passions, as for 
 example, anger ; he could never form an idea of it 
 from merely seeing a man in a rage, with his 
 countenance changed, and speaking loudly; but
 
 PELAGIUS. 291 
 
 tliat which gives him an idea of it, is by reflecting 
 on what passed in his o\Yn mind when he was 
 affected with this passion ; for, until he feel it 
 himself, he can never have a just idea of it. ^^Tien 
 the mind is furnished with a considerable num- 
 ber of ideas, the first thing which occupies it is, 
 the comparing two of them together, to see whether 
 they be equal or unequal, whether they agree or 
 disagree ; as when we see a child that knows the 
 difference between a book and a leaf of paper, by 
 lifting and comparing them together. But when 
 the objects cannot be removed and applied to one 
 another, as two buildings, we must have recourse 
 to some intermediate measure, as a rope, yard, 
 &c., and measure the one, and then the other, and 
 see whether they agree or disagree. 
 
 There are three acts of the mind, which are called 
 perception, judgment, and reasoning. First, Per- 
 ception is that which we barely perceive, without 
 passing any judgment upon it, as the fire, a house, 
 the sun, moon, or stars, &c. This is called percep- 
 tion, and sometimes apprehension. Second, Judg- 
 ment is the comparing of two ideas together, as, I 
 have an idea of Grod, and another of justice, and 
 can judge that God is just, for I see that these ideas 
 agree. Third, E;easoning is the third act of the 
 mind : it takes place when two thmgs cannot be 
 afiirmed to agree or disagree without the help of 
 some intermediate idea, as for example, I want 
 to compare my soul with matter. I cannot do it 
 immediately, but I find out an intermediate idea, a 
 middle term, which is tJiinhing. I first compare 
 
 u 2
 
 292 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 tliinldng with matter, and I find it does not agree 
 with it, then I conclude that my soul is not matter. 
 If we were only endued with these three faculties, 
 all our knowledge would be very confined, and would 
 depend upon things present ; for example, if I were 
 shut up in a room tallciug with a man, then all my 
 knowledge would he confined mthin these walls ; 
 but the Author of Nature hath endowed us with an 
 act of the mind called the imagination, whereby we 
 can excite the ideas that were formerly in our mind 
 from the world around us : the imagination is the 
 knowledge of things absent as if they were present. 
 I can form an idea of a horse or an ape, though 
 they do not immediately aff'ect my senses : thus 
 the imagination brings into our mind the ideas we 
 formerly had. By the help of the imagination we 
 can excite the ideas of objects, corporeal things, 
 and exert certain faculties about them. I think 
 there are four such faculties, viz. Compounding, Dis- 
 cerning, 'Recalling, and Retaining. 
 
 Pirst — Compounding is the combining or gather- 
 ing our ideas into one collection, as the idea of a 
 unit ; and ]3y joining as many ideas to it as make a 
 dozen, or a score, I have as distinct an idea of these 
 numbers as I have of a unit. Wliat would be our 
 condition if we wanted this faculty ? We should 
 then have no idea, for example, of the college, be- 
 cause it consisted of many houses ; but only of our 
 room ; and so of other things which consist of parts. 
 
 Second — Discerning, or distinguishing, is the 
 separating our ideas from one another. I have an 
 idea of two men being intimate friends ; I cannot
 
 PELAGIUS. 293 
 
 distill guisli tlie one from the other, in their friend- 
 ship. 
 
 Third — Recalling is the bringing back into our 
 minds the ideas we formerly had. By this act we 
 remember our former acts. It is commonly called 
 the memory, which is, as it were, the repository of 
 all our ideas. 
 
 Pourth — Retaining is the keeping in our mind 
 the idea of an absent corporeal object excited in 
 our mind bv the imas^ination. I have the idea of 
 a triangle, and can retain it in my mind until I 
 have compared all its parts. But it is almost im- 
 possible for one to keep his thoughts for a month 
 or two fixed upon one object, on account of the 
 vast number of ideas that crowd in upon us : no 
 sooner does one disappear than another appears. 
 Hence, this faculty of retaining is so imperfect in 
 some men, that it renders them very unfit for ac- 
 quiring knowledge, because they cannot keep in 
 their minds any thing so long as to examine and 
 consider its properties and qualities. 
 
 Thus, then, that faculty which keeps and retains 
 an idea for some time is exceedingly useful to 
 man ; and without which all our ideas would be 
 jumbled together as a chaos. 
 
 There are three / other faculties : Comparing^ 
 Naming, and Ranging of oiu' ideas into different 
 classes. 
 
 Pirst — Comparing our ideas together; namely, 
 two triangles together to find the difference. 
 
 Second — Naming is an act of the mind, by which 
 we express om* ideas by articulate sounds, called
 
 294i ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 words, in order to distinguish one thing from 
 another. Words are nothing else but the marks 
 of our thoughts, by which we keep converse, and 
 communicate our knowledge one with another. 
 
 Third — Hanging, or reducing our ideas into pro- 
 per classes. To illustrate these, we observe that 
 many things produced by nature have a certain 
 resemblance one with another; as, when we ob- 
 serve a certain rank of beings of an erect form, 
 with their heads set, so as to make them look 
 towards heaven ; these we commonly comprehend 
 under one general class called men : so also as 
 to horses, birds, and fishes. If we had not this 
 faculty we should be obliged to give a name to 
 every individual, which, in the first place, would 
 be impossible, because no man could be endowed 
 with such a memory as to find a name to every 
 grain of sand, or single hair ; and even if we were, 
 it would be idle and superfluous, because by nam- 
 ing the hairs of our head we could not convey any 
 diff^erent idea to ourselves or others. However, 
 there are some classes that occur in common con- 
 versation, of which we are obliged to call every 
 individual thing by a particular name, for distinc- 
 tion sake, in order to excite the same idea which 
 is in the minds of others. Hence, every man is 
 called by a particular name; and it is even the 
 same with horses sometimes. In like manner 
 sportsmen distinguish dogs ; and we call countries 
 and kingdoms by particular names, for no other 
 reason than because they frequently occur in com- 
 mon conversation ; and we thus communicate a dis-
 
 PELAGIUS. 295 
 
 tinct idea of them into the minds of others. The 
 shepherd calls his dog by name ; but he need not 
 use this formality to his sheep. But we may pro- 
 ceed further. All those who have life, and are 
 endued with spontaneous motion, we call by the 
 name animal. Yet some who are more speculative 
 have found out a more general name, under which 
 we may comprehend all things which have life, 
 whether rational, sensitive, vegetative, called by the 
 name vivens. Some have gone further, and have 
 comprehended all things material under one name, 
 called substance. But there is another power of 
 the mind wliereby we make one singular idea 
 universal. Every idea as it enters the mind is 
 single, and we make it complex by making that 
 simple idea represent a whole class of things ; as 
 when I have the idea of a book, by abstraction I 
 can make it represent all books, of different sizes. If 
 we had not this act of the imagination, we could not 
 have a general idea, but only l3e conversant about 
 individuals ; as we could not have the idea of a 
 triangle in general, but only of some certain one. 
 Thus it is by the act of compounding we combine our 
 ideas, excited in the mind by the imagination, into 
 one collection ; then by an act Ave can imagine a 
 pole which reached from our eyes to the stars ; and 
 first having a notion of gold, and then of a mount, 
 we can form the idea of a golden mountain, a sea 
 of milk, &c., which are called creatures in the mind^ 
 but not in the nature of things. 
 
 Again, ideas which contradict and destroy one 
 another, which neither exist in the mind nor in the
 
 296 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 nature of things, are called nonentia, as a square 
 circle, since the imagination may compound ideas 
 which cannot exist in nature. To prevent being 
 led into errors and mistakes, there is need of the 
 judgment to distinguish these ideas from real ones ; 
 hence it is that he whose judgment predominates 
 is fit for philosophy, the civil laws, &c. ; and he 
 who excels in the acts of the imasrination is best 
 qualified for poetry and oratory ; and he that ex- 
 cels in memory is fit for acquiring the languages. 
 Since the mind of man is endued Tvdth such acts or 
 faculties, how comes it to pass that we often em- 
 brace falsehood and fall into errors ? It has been 
 a question much agitated among philosophers, 
 what is the source and spring of all errors and 
 mistakes P One of the ancient philosophers im- 
 putes it to the depravity of the will ; but others 
 say that it is the limited natui'e of the human 
 mind, and the understanding being so narrowly 
 confined is the source of all errors and mistakes. 
 The prejudices of autliority and 'precipitancy aj;e 
 the chief leadino' causes of error. 
 
 First, the prejudice of authority is defined to be 
 the embracing of or rejecting an opinion without 
 thoroughly examining into it, upon the qualifica- 
 tions or endowments of the persons who maintain 
 it, as children are obliged to obey their superiors, 
 parents,' and nurses, and to believe for truth what- 
 ever they say, since they cannot search into the 
 arguments upon which the doctrine is supposed to 
 rest. So when they come to the years of maturity, 
 and are able to converse with their acquaintances,
 
 PELAGIUS. 297 
 
 and the doctrines are never contradicted which 
 were tokl them by their nurses, parents, or others, 
 in their tender years, they make such impression 
 upon their minds, that they think them sacred, 
 and a thing unpardonable to part with them as 
 long as they live. Another instance is this ; many 
 follow the opinion of Zeno, who said there was no 
 vacuum. In this country, we believe the contrary. 
 Besides, there is a prejudice in religion, as we see 
 from experience; for almost whatever doctrines 
 prevail in the country where we are brought up, 
 we adhere to without examining them, chiefly be- 
 cause the minister or people around us maintain 
 them. 
 
 There are more prejudices, as those of antiquity, 
 honour, fame, and probability ; and there is a pre- 
 judice which is still more ridiculous, as we see most 
 common people believe what theu' rich superiors 
 say, because they are rich, and for no other reason. 
 Thus far concerning the prejudice of authority. 
 
 Second. The next grand prejudice is that of 
 'precipitancy or rashness. It is defined to be a re- 
 jecting or embracing an opinion without acearately 
 considering it, as we see most people are averse to 
 reasoning or entering into a long series of argu- 
 ments whereby they may prove the principle they 
 embrace, and are content with a superficial know- 
 ledge of them ; and their minds are often changed 
 with the books they read, or by the arguments 
 they hear advanced about any subject. Por ex- 
 ample, when they hear the argument raised to 
 prove the immortality of the soul, they easily as-
 
 298 ASCETIC WRITERS. 
 
 sent to it ; and when tliey hear the argument as- 
 serted, to prove the contrary, they as easily embrace 
 it, and alter their opinions as often as they hear 
 different arguments offered. 
 
 Under this class may be comprehended that 
 prejudice which is called a spirit of contradiction. 
 We see a great many show their wit and learning 
 in contradicting whatever arguments they hear 
 advanced either on the right or wrong side of the 
 question; and also a great many debates g^rise 
 about the meaning of words in matters of religion.* 
 
 On the Thinking Principle of Animals. 
 
 It has been often a keenly agitated question 
 whether the lower orders of creation perceive ideas 
 as we do. Some of the ancient philosophers, who 
 abounded in nice distinctions, particularly those 
 who resided at Alexandria, divided souls into three 
 kinds — rational^ sensitive, and vegetative. The first 
 was given to man, the second to animals, and the 
 third to plants. 
 
 There were two philosophers who made no 
 small noise in Arabia, about fifty years ago, that 
 maintained that animals were susceptible of sensa- 
 tions from external objects, and, consequently, that 
 they had a sensitive soul, but were deprived of a 
 perceptive one, whereby they are prevented from 
 reflecting upon their own inward sensations, and 
 from comparing two or more ideas together. 
 
 * See Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 15G4. 2 A"ol. Art. St. Pelagiiis.
 
 PELAGirs. 299 
 
 I have often perused with amusement the treatise 
 on this subject, composed by the good Nemesius, 
 Bishop of Emessa, who was a decided advocate for 
 giving certain animals credit for a great share of 
 artifice and prudent calculation. He cited a variety 
 of instances which had come under his own per- 
 sonal observations, wherein great msdom and fore- 
 thought were clearly manifested in the animal 
 nature. But it must be allowed on all hands, that 
 there is something pre-eminent about man, over 
 all classes of the living creation.* 
 
 * See Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 1564. 2 Vol. Art. St. Pelagius.
 
 300 PUINCIPLE OP AUTHORITY 
 
 CHAPTER XXIX. 
 
 ON THE PRINCIPLE .OF AUTHORITY, IN MATTERS 
 OF PPIILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, MAINTAINED 
 BY THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH. 
 
 In cultivating an acquaintance witli pliilosopliy, 
 it was natural for the Eatliers of the Church to 
 view all its principles through the medium of the 
 doctrines contained in revelation. A rigid exami- 
 nation of every abstract proposition grounded on 
 human nature, would he instituted with a view of 
 ascertaining all its hearings upon vital questions 
 of faith and duty. This practice, so natural to 
 men placed in their situation, would almost insen- 
 sibly suggest rules and maxims of religious autho- 
 rity. Human nature, in its widest range, was the 
 common arena of disputation, both for philosophers 
 and theologians. It was the source from which 
 both drew all their materials, though they received 
 them through different channels. Philosophers spe- 
 culated in the closet ; theologians in society ; the 
 one illustrated their principles by mental abstrac- 
 tions, the other by the every day scenes of life and 
 character. The theologian would, in consequence.
 
 MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 301 
 
 be powerfully iuclined to appeal to human autho- 
 rity, in support of his general views and abstract 
 principles of human nature. The ordinary modes 
 of thinking and l^eling among mankind would be 
 constantly referred to, and become invested, in 
 his eyes, with an authority in matters of specula- 
 tion, from which there could be no philosophical 
 appeal. 
 
 The every-day discharge of the arduous and 
 important duties of the Clergy, would invariably 
 strengthen this principle of authority. A Divine 
 Revelation is of itself an act of authority of the most 
 comprehensive and decided nature. It is opposed 
 to the doctrine of the infallibility of human reason ; 
 it deiines limits to speculative inquiries ; it directs 
 them into particular channels ; and renders them 
 subordinate to certain ulterior purposes and ends. 
 This revelation, therefore, involved the doctrine of 
 authority, in all its fulness and purity, and could 
 not but prove powerfully influential on the minds 
 of those, whose herculean labours were du'ected 
 towards its extensive promulgation among man- 
 kind. 
 
 It must have proved, also, not a little influential 
 on the minds of the Eathers, that many of the 
 ancient heathen philosophers, whose writings were 
 famiKar to them, acknowledge the necessity of some 
 divine authority and communication, to direct men 
 to sound and wholesome conclusions on philoso- 
 phical doctrines and systems. The Pathers were 
 acquainted with the declarations, on this point, of
 
 302 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY 
 
 Pythagoras,* Socrates, f Plato, J Aristotle, § Hip- 
 pocrates, 1| Cicero,^ Catullus,** and Seneca.ff 
 
 Indeed this question of religious authority has 
 always, since the introduction oi Christianity, heen 
 more or less a suhject of discussion ; and has exer- 
 cised over speculative philosophy a much more ex- 
 tensive influence, hoth directly and indirectly, than 
 is commonly imagined. In our o\^ti day, especially 
 in continental countries, it is quite a popular con- 
 troversy ; and it may be considered as a singular 
 thing, in the history of modern speculation, to find 
 some of the most distinguished of the German me- 
 taphysicians maintaining the necessity of a divine 
 revelation to guide mankind in their philosophical 
 inquiries. To hear this from Pichte, Schelling, 
 Hegel, and Herder, whose speculative systems lead, 
 by a short route, to absolute pantheism, must 
 be considered as something both curious and in- 
 structive. 
 
 St. Justin, after having alluded to the disputes 
 among philosophers, and the uncertainty of almost 
 every fundamental principle which they have at- 
 tempted to establish, attributes this unsatisfactory 
 state of affairs, to the opinions they entertained as 
 to the infallibility of human reason, and the vain 
 attempt to dispense with instruction. " Quod a 
 peritis dlscere noluerint, sed esse existimaverint 
 
 * Deinoph. Lact. Pythagoras. f Memorab. Socrat. 1. 4. 
 
 X Phfcdo.'p. 83. § De Alundo. Cap. 4, 
 
 II Book. 3. II De Legg. 1. 7- 2. 14. 
 
 ** Liber 64. Ver. 385 et seq. ft Lpis. JJO.
 
 MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 303 
 
 mentis liumanse solertia claram coelestiuni reriim 
 cognitionem assequi posse, cum ue terrestrium. 
 quiclem potuerint." And he concludes T\-ith refer- 
 ring to the doctrines of the ancients, who had faith- 
 fully transmitted the truth to us, which they had 
 originally received from God himself. " Quocirca, 
 ciim veri nihil de E^eligione a doctorihus vestris 
 (Grsecis) prgecipi posse constet, et idoneum satis 
 documentum vobif ignorationis ipsi suae per dissi- 
 dentes inter se factiones exhibuerint, reliquum esse 
 opinor, ut ad majores nostros revertamur, qui et 
 magistros vestros longe tempore anteverterunt, et 
 nihil de suis ipsorum cogitationibus et placitis 
 docuerunt ; minim e ipsi mutuis dissensionibus in- 
 vicem conflictantes, aut alii aliorum dicta evertere 
 in anunum inducentes ; quippe qui omni conten- 
 tionis studio et factionum dissidio liberi, sicuti a 
 Deo acceperunt, ita nobis doctrinam tradidermit." 
 
 Hernias descants upon the errors and contradic- 
 tory systems of philosophers ; and contrasts their 
 pretended knowledge, ^^dth the certainty of that 
 which is transmitted to all mankind by tradition. 
 *' Beatus apostolus Paulus, Corinthiis, qui juxta 
 Laconicam Grseciam habitant, scribens, cluu pro- 
 nunciavit sapientiam mundi hujus apud Deimi 
 stultitiam esse, prseter rei yeritatem locutus non 
 est. Videtur enim mihi ab anc^elorum defec- 
 tione principium repetiisse, cur philosophorum 
 decreta inter se neque consentiant neque appro- 
 bentur." 
 
 Clement of Alexandria maintains that the first 
 principles of philosophy are obtained by faith, and
 
 304 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY 
 
 not by demonstration. " Ostensmn est principil 
 Tiniversorum esse earn, quae fide liabetur, scientiam, 
 non autem demonstrationem." [Stromat. lib. 2.) 
 He says, besides, that common sense should form 
 the basis of all demonstration, and that the human 
 mind, in all its investigations, ought to set out 
 from an immutable principle, which can only be 
 established by faith. " Si ejus quod est certuni et 
 extra controversiam referatur fides ad id quod 
 omnes confitentur, illud est constituendum doc- 
 trinjB principium. ... Si est demonstratio, omnino 
 necesse est prius esse aliquid ex se credibile quod 
 quidem dicitur primum et indemonstrabile. Ad 
 fidem ergo indemonstrabilem reducitur omnis de- 
 monstratio." {Ibid. lib. 8.) 
 
 In opposition to the incredulity, that faith is the 
 foundation of all our knowledge and movements, 
 St. Theophilus of Antioch says, " Quid, obsecro, 
 incredulus es ? Non animadvertis actiones omnes 
 antecedere • fidem ? Quis, cedo, agricola metere 
 potest, nisi prius semen credat sulcis ? Quis mare 
 poterit trajicere, nisi prius semetipsum credat navi 
 et gubernatori ? Quis, morbis implicitus, sanitatem 
 recuperare poterit, nisi semetipsum prius credat 
 medico ? Quam artem, quam scientiam quis dis- 
 cere poterit, nisi prius semetipsum tradiderit et 
 credlderit prseceptori ? Si igitur agricola credit 
 telluri, navigaturus navi, infirmus medico, tune 
 refugis temetipsum credere Deo, a quo tot fidei 
 arrhabones accepisti." 
 
 Tertullian calls philosophers the 'patriarchs of 
 heretics.
 
 MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 305 
 
 Origen proclaims that all human things depend 
 upon faith. Quomodo Deo credere non sit ration! 
 cousentaneum magis, ciim a fide omnia hummia 
 pendeant? {Cont. Celsus, lib. 1.) 
 
 Arnohius says, in his work against the Gentiles, 
 that we can explain nothing without faith, which 
 is the foundation of the social and scientific order 
 of things. " Itaque cum nobis intenditis aversionem 
 a religione priorum, causam convenit ut inspiciatis, 
 non factum ; nee quid reliquerimus opponere, sed 
 secuti quid simus potissunum, contueri. Nam si 
 niutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen, et a 
 veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque 
 migrare, criminatio ista et vos spectat, qui toties 
 vitam consuetudinemque mutastis ; qui in mores 
 alios atque alios ritus, priorum condemnatione 
 transistis." 
 
 St. Augustine wrote a book on the utUitij, or 
 necessity, of faith. He urges that every one ought 
 to commence bv faith ; for without it there can be no 
 soKd foundation for rational religion. He says that 
 the medicine of the soul consists of two ingredients, 
 mithority and reason. Authority acts by faith, and 
 prepares the way for reason, and by this means in- 
 tellectual knowledge is created. [See De ut'ilit. cre- 
 dendi, &c.] 
 
 In the works of Theoderet there are long and 
 numerous passages to be found, in favour of the 
 same doctrine. 
 
 Vincent of Lerins maintains that faith is in 
 strict conformity Avith human nature. Faith is the 
 basis upon which the natural order of things rests.
 
 306 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOUITY 
 
 It guides US in all our actions ; is common to all 
 men ; and it may safely be concluded, from these 
 facts, that if it be necessary in matters of human 
 knowledge, how much more necessary must it be in 
 matters appertaining to heavenly things. 
 
 Lactantius estabhshes the necessity of attending 
 to traditionary and revealed knowledge, as helps to 
 reason and judgment. (See Dwin. Inst. lib. 1. 3. 7.) 
 
 St. Hilary says, "Non est de Deo humanis judiciis 
 sentiendum; a Deo dlscendum est, quod de Deo 
 intelligendum sit ; quia non nisi autore cognosci- 
 tur." {De Tr'm. lib. 5.) 
 
 We have the principle of authority still more 
 minutely and forcibly stated by St. Peter the 
 Anchorite, who lived about the middle of the fifth 
 century. This pious recluse states his case in the 
 following manner. — 
 
 " To the ears of the enemies of our holy faith, 
 and to those latitudinarian people who never care 
 much about any thing serious, the authority of the 
 Church is a matter of ridicule and mockery. But 
 not so to the humble and intelligent Christian. It 
 is his constant theme of exultation, the foundation 
 of all his hopes, and the never-failing stimulant to 
 all his exertions. Without authority, human and 
 Divine, such a thing as a Church could not exist, 
 any more than the human body could exist without 
 a soul." 
 
 " But men even of intelligence and piety greatly 
 perplex themselves and others, with abstruse specu- 
 lations upon the nature of ecclesiastical authority, 
 and from whom it derives its life and power;
 
 MAINTAINED RY THE FATHETIS. 307 
 
 whereas the matter appears somewhat plain to me. 
 It is quite obvious that the spmtual authority of 
 the Church, (for I am only considering it in this 
 light) must be involved in every revelation from 
 heaven. This revelation must be simply the decla- 
 rations'or commands of the Deity to men. Authority 
 is here implied in the very act of revelation, and 
 arises from the relative situation of the lawgiver, 
 and those who receive his commands or precepts. 
 To argue, therefore, that church authority has no 
 foundation, is in fact to argue that there was no 
 revelation at all. And it has often appeared to me 
 that this is the only consistent result to which a 
 man can arrive, if he doubt at all the obligations 
 and injunctions of ecclesiastical authority. No 
 communication from heaven, no matter for what 
 end, could ever be of ])encfit to any save those who 
 immediately heard it, if the principle of authority 
 be once shaken or denied. Por in order to transmit 
 the revelation from those to whom it was imme- 
 diately given, to the next generation, reliance, the 
 most perfect and unconditional, must be placed upon 
 the words and declarations of men ; otherwise the 
 thinc^ revealed is at an end. There is no channel 
 for its perpetuity to succeeding races of men. 
 Authority, which is simply faith in the declarations 
 of a particular set of men relative to a particular 
 matter, is the verv essence of all revealed truth, 
 and the vital principle by which alone its life can 
 be preserved." 
 
 " Now if this be the nature of church authority, 
 when considered in relation to those who imme- 
 
 x2
 
 308 PRINCIPLE OP AUTHOEITY 
 
 diatelv receive a Divine communication, it must still 
 retain all its leading attributes, when descending 
 the stream of time, among succeeding ages of men. 
 The perfect unity of its nature can never he de- 
 stroyed. There is the same obligation for us to be 
 guided by the authority of St. Athanasius or St. 
 Augustine, as lay upon them to respect the authority 
 of the Church under St. Justin or Irenaeus ; and 
 the latter to respect the authority of the Apostles 
 and their immediate successors. All is suspended 
 as it were by a chain, the first link of which is fixed 
 in the heavens, and +he last touches the earth. But 
 I think I hear a question put to me, ' Pray do you 
 say that every thing which a nmnber of the clergy 
 affirm is to be the unerring rule of my faith and 
 conduct ? Is my judgment or reason to have no 
 part in the matter ?' Now I would answer to 
 this very natural and pertinent question, that you 
 are under no obligation to attend to what they 
 command, if they tender you no proofs of their 
 authority. But then the clergy of the Church always 
 carry the instruments of their power mth them ; 
 that is, the word of God, of which they are the ex- 
 pounders and interpreters. This word, as they now 
 give it to you, they received from their immediate 
 predecessors, who again received it from theirs ; and 
 so on, till they came to the Apostles and Prophets 
 themselves, who were the recipients of the direct 
 wiU of God." 
 
 " I can conceive it consistent for a man who im- 
 piously denies the existence of a divine revelation, 
 to deny also religious authority ; but for any one
 
 MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 309 
 
 to pretend to believe the divine origin of the Scrip- 
 tures, and yet deny the authority and power of the 
 Church in matters of religious opinion and belief, 
 is to me one of the most contradictory things 
 imaginable. Indeed, it seems to me unreasonable 
 for men to object to Church authority, inasmuch 
 as the same thing is to be found in ordinary life. 
 What is called public opinion, the general voice of 
 the world, common sense, and such like things, 
 are nothing but modes of expression to indicate 
 human authority displaying itself in matters of 
 general and universal interest. Much of the every- 
 day knowledge of the world, which we have all 
 more or less to be acquainted with, and to put in 
 practice, is derived from sheer acts of human au- 
 thority. Men are guided in their conduct by it, 
 and pay a hallowed reverence to its injunctions. 
 If this were not the case, the world would l)e in a 
 most lamentable condition. The analogy is com- 
 plete between hmnan authority in worldly aifairs, 
 and religious authority in matters of theology. In 
 the concerns of life there are certain latitudes al- 
 lowed for a difference of opinion and conduct ; but 
 essential and vital principles are of universal appli- 
 cation, and objects of universal belief. So in mat- 
 ters of theology, a certain sphere is permitted for 
 non-essentials ; but general and vital doctrines are 
 of paramount obligation and necessity for man's 
 salvation."* 
 
 * Dies y siete Coloquios y Discursos varios, Salamanca, 1593. Vol. 1 
 pp. 310. 316. Flos Sanctorum, Madrid, 1710. 2 vols. Origen de lo 
 Frayles Ermitanos, Barcelo. 1628.
 
 310 AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS. 
 
 Every one aequamted with the philosophical 
 doctrines zealoLisly promulgated both on the conti- 
 nent of Europe and in Great Britain within the 
 last century, vnR readily recognise, in these state- 
 ments, the outlines or germs of some favourite theo- 
 ries of metaphysical theology. These will he more 
 fully developed in another part of this Work.
 
 ON MOHAL EVIDENCE. 311 
 
 CHAPTER XXX. 
 
 ON MORAL EVIDENCE, AFTER THE FULL ESTABLISH- 
 MENT OF CHRISTIANITY. 
 
 There was no department of human knowledge 
 which received such a marked accession of improve- 
 ment, after the introduction and establishment of the 
 Christian dispensation, as the principles, rules, and 
 maxims appertaining to moral evidence. Here, in 
 a comparatively short space of time, great altera- 
 tions were effected ; general principles of evidence 
 were more firmly grounded in the minds of men ; 
 their various applications and modifications were 
 more clearly defined ; and the whole framework of 
 reasoning, on subjects connected with human na- 
 ture, was more widely and securely extended over 
 its former foundation. All this had a weighty in- 
 fluence over the moral, religious, intellectual, and 
 social condition of mankind. 
 
 The introduction of Christianity threw an im- 
 portant element into the arena of human disputa- 
 tion. Here a great number of new principles were 
 announced ; new doctrines unfolded ; novel motives
 
 312 ON MOHAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 to human action enforced ; a fresh catalogue of 
 future rewards and punishments published ; an im- 
 mense variety of mii'acles, facts, supernatural ap- 
 pearances, historical declarations, personal narra- 
 tives, deeds, exploits, sayings, and observations, 
 were made known ; and more full and conclusive 
 illustrations of all those elementary and abstract 
 principles of theology, morals, and civil institutions, 
 which the pure light of nature had previously sug- 
 gested to men's minds, were furnished to the think- 
 ing part of mankind. This immense augmentation 
 of materials for reasoning overwhelmed the narrow 
 framework which heathen philosophy and logic had 
 erected, and compelled the application of a more 
 comprehensive and accurate instrument for the in- 
 vestigation and establishment of truth, than had 
 liitherto been employed. 
 
 It is quite obvious to ordinary readers, that the 
 modes of reasoning generally prevalent amongst 
 the heathen sages, were marred and disfigured by 
 a perpetual inclination for sophistical wrangling 
 and ingenious trifling. These were their great lo- 
 gical besetting sins. When, therefore, Christianity 
 took a firm hold of men's minds, these imperfec- 
 tions were gradually removed. Men disputed and 
 argued under the influence of more powerful and 
 lofty motives than hitherto. Truth was not now a 
 mere toy or plaything, but a matter of deep and 
 universal concern ; and on this account it was to 
 be enforced and promulgated with becoming seri- 
 ousness, and under the most weighty and biading 
 obligations. Hence it is, that we perceive the great
 
 ON MORAL EVIDENCE. 313 
 
 change wliicli men's minds underwent by reason of 
 the Christian faith, and how firmly and judiciously 
 were important bulwarks erected, to preserve men 
 from falling again into the sea of universal scep- 
 ticism and doubt. 
 
 It is a difficult matter to give a full and precise 
 definition of what is meant by moral evidence. It 
 is not confined to matters of mere morals, but em- 
 braces a wider range, and is commonly understood to 
 comprehend all those topics connected Avith the na- 
 ture of man as a moral, an intellectual, a religious, 
 and a sociable being. It is in this acceptation that 
 we emplov the term moral evidence. It must be 
 obvious, that the principles connected mth subjects 
 so important and varied must be very numerous, 
 and would require, for their full development, a 
 space far beyond what can be allotted. Our re- 
 marks must, therefore, be of a very general nature ; 
 but, it is confidently hoped, they will not be alto- 
 gether unsuitable or unprofitable. 
 
 The fu'st principle which was firmly established, 
 relative to the nature of moral proof, at the period 
 of the establishment of Christianity, was the de- 
 fining of the nature of moral evidence from other 
 kinds and descriptions of e\ddence. This was a 
 most important matter ; not only to the moral, 
 intellectual, and social interests of mankind, but 
 also to their religious welfare and interests. This 
 distinction lay at the foundation of all theological 
 discussions, and proved of incalculable value to the 
 Ancient Pathers in their disputes with the heathen 
 philosophers, and in their systematic expositions of
 
 311 ON MORAL EVIDENCE, 
 
 Gospel truth. It was clearly pointed out that mo- 
 ral evidence differed essentially from demonstrative 
 evidence. That no facts or arguments grounded on 
 human nature, stood in the same relation to abstract 
 truth, as arithmetical numbers or mathematical 
 forms. 
 
 Moral evidence, at this period, vras considered to 
 consist of two leading parts or divisions ; namely, 
 observation or experience, and testimony. 
 
 Experience was considered as particular and ge- 
 neral ; particular when applied to a man's own ob- 
 servation, and general when derived from the com- 
 mon observation of mankind. These two kinds are 
 mixed and blended together in a variety of propor- 
 tions ; and this amalgamation gives rise to a vast 
 portion of our knowledge, and to the diversified 
 means of applying it to our circumstances in life. 
 
 Testimony was considered of two kinds, divine 
 and human. Divine testimony was looked upon 
 as the highest degree of moral evidence ; for nothing 
 could be considered as untrue, if revealed from God 
 himself. This was, in all its leading features, a new 
 species of evidence, arising out of revealed religion, 
 of which mankind had no conception till the intro- 
 duction of the Christian system. 
 
 Human testimony is of various kinds ; single and 
 compound, direct and indirect, written and unwrit- 
 ten. But all human testimony must be modified 
 by experience ; and it is only when taken in con- 
 junction with it, that this species of evidence can 
 lead us to safe conclusions. 
 
 This mixture of experience with testimony gives
 
 ON MORAL EVIDENCE. 315 
 
 rise to a multitude of rules respecting the evidence 
 of things in general. The nature of the matters 
 submitted to our judgment ; the character and num- 
 ber of the observers ; what were their opportunities 
 for careful observations ; are all important elements 
 arising out of this combination. 
 
 Besides these there is analogy, which is often mis- 
 taken for experience. It is an im23ortant branch 
 of moral evidence. In addition, we have the ^j^'^- 
 stmiptive, ov internal evidence of things, which forms 
 a considerable portion of what goes under the de- 
 nomination of moral evidence. 
 
 Certain rules of application arise out of these 
 general principles. These are very numerous, and 
 of infinite utility for the advancement of truth. 
 There is, 1st. The necessary personal qualifications 
 to discuss any particular question. A man may be 
 wholly incapable of discussing a question, from ig- 
 norance, the force of prejudice, interested views, 
 and manv other causes. 2nd. We must be sruided 
 in all our inquiries by strict rules of evidence ; these 
 must not, on any account, be lost sight of. 3rd. 
 "We should in all discussions endeavour to look out 
 for, and make our observations and illustrations 
 subservient to, some general principle, on which 
 the whole question may rest. This is of singular 
 importance ; as it strengthens the mind, and gives 
 it a just confidence in its own movements. 
 
 These were some of the leading principles re- 
 specting moral evidence, which are conspicuously 
 illustrated by the writings of the learned, after the 
 introduction of Christianity. From its first an-
 
 316 ON MORAL EVIDENCE. 
 
 nouncement, till its firm establishment in all the 
 seats of learning and science, we find a gradual pro- 
 gress was made towards rational and enlightened 
 principles of discussion. The peculiar nature of 
 the Gospel aided this ; because it contained every 
 variety of fact and doctrine which were calculated 
 to excite profound and interesting disputes amongst 
 the learned men of the day, whether Christian or 
 heathen.
 
 HUMAN ACTION. 317 
 
 CHAPTER XXXI. 
 
 ON THE OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS OF THE 
 CHURCH, ON THE LIBERTY AND NECESSITY OF 
 HUMAN ACTIONS. 
 
 The doctrine of the necessity or lil^erty of the 
 human will, decidedly belongs to the science of 
 metaphysics. It is not only a very curious and in- 
 teresting question, when considered in reference to 
 the variety and forcible nature of opposing argu- 
 ments involved in it ; hut it is also of the highest 
 importance to our welfare as moral and religious 
 agents. It cannot therefore be considered out of 
 place, in a history of this kind, to give a succinct 
 outline of the sentiments of the Philosophical 
 Eathers of the Church, on this interesting topic ; a 
 topic which it requires no keen prophetic powers to 
 divine, will ever remain a standing subject of dis- 
 cussion amongst mankind. As the question is so 
 intimately blended with theological and moral doc- 
 trines and principles of the utmost moment, it can- 
 not Imt prove of use to students of theology and the 
 kindred science of morals, as well as to the general 
 reader, to have an epitome of the opinions of the
 
 318 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 early sages of the Christian dispensation, on a doc- 
 trine of such importance and interest. 
 
 It is a common, but a very superficial notion, 
 that the doctrines of free-will and necessary con- 
 nexion, are purely speculative crotchets, and have 
 little or no legitimate bearing, either directly or 
 indirectly, upon any portion of really useful human 
 knowledge. Now, it so happens, that these doc- 
 trines are vitally interwoven with all natural 
 and revealed religion; and there has not been 
 a single controversy about the principles of either, 
 or their application to human conduct, that has 
 not arisen directly out of these philosophical 
 doctrines. And a moment's consideration must 
 prove sufficient to convince us that this could not be 
 otherwise. E^eligion is a system of duties and obliga- 
 tions, and of rewards and punishments. This must 
 of course relate to a code of laws, and to beings who 
 have to attend to it, and to reap the fruits of their 
 observance or neglect of it. Here the elements of 
 j)Ower in the lawgiver to enact and enforce, and in 
 the agent to obey, are at once appealed to, and our 
 constitutional notions of the nature and limits of 
 both, become the subject of eager discussion and 
 intense interest. This is the prolific germ of all the 
 different systems and views of religious truth ; and 
 a firm foundation is here laid, as long as the human 
 mind is constituted as it now is, for an extensively 
 varied outline of religious doctrine and l)elief. 
 
 It woLild necessarily lead us too much into detail, 
 were we to illustrate this position by a reference to 
 all the religious controversies for the last eighteen
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 319 
 
 liundred years. The bare enumeration of tliem 
 would be scarcely possible within the limits of an 
 ordinary volume. But we may be allowed to glance 
 at some of the more prominent ones, with which 
 every theological student is supposed to be fami- 
 liarly acquainted. 
 
 On the very first introduction of Christianity, 
 we find that the doctrines of grace, original sin, and 
 predestination, were eager topics of discussion in the 
 religious community. Dr. Priestley, in his " Cor- 
 ruptions of Christianity," boldly afiirms that these 
 doctrines were scarcely knowai until the fourth cen- 
 tury, but this is evidently a great mistake. Though 
 they might not have at first assumed that j)recise 
 form and character with which they have, in recent 
 times, been invested, yet the ^;rw?ci7;/^ on which 
 these doctrines rest, as on a common centre, were 
 debated by the early Christians with keen perti- 
 nacity. The Gnostic heresy, introduced into the 
 Christian church in the first centurv, did in fact 
 embrace, in point of principle, the whole of these 
 doctrines within itself. Here we distinctly find 
 that the principtle of evil was necessarily confined 
 to, and formed a component part of, all material 
 objects ; that the divine influence upon man's 
 life and conduct, was under the direction of this 
 mechanical association ; and that all diseases, trou- 
 bles, wars, devastations, and \dces, were necessarily 
 under the control of a certain species of malignant 
 demons or spirits. The doctrines of Simon Magus 
 were essentially the same as those of the Gnostics. 
 He held the eternity of matter, and the influence
 
 320 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 of the evil ])rmciple over the minds of men. The 
 systems of philosophical theology advocated by 
 Menander and Cerinthus, who lived a little after 
 Simon Magus, are precisely similar to his in all 
 their leading features. The Gnostic Theory was 
 the parent of this entire and numerous brood of 
 heretical notions. 
 
 The famous Pelagian controversy, in the fourth 
 century, related to the powers of the human will. 
 This celebrated dispute branched out into various 
 ramifications, and kept the minds of speculative 
 disputants in full activity for some centuries after- 
 wards. Some took a certain portion of human 
 liberty, and others took a little less, into their 
 respective systems, and this discretionary licence 
 gave rise to numerous distinctions, ^\ hich the lapse 
 of ages has buried in forgetfulness. 
 
 Then follow the fierce and long continued con- 
 tests of the Schoolmen. Here we find the doctrines 
 of liberty and necessity fully entered into and dis- 
 cussed in all their bearings and dependences. 
 The learning and genius employed on this occasion, 
 have been the theme of admiration of all the specu- 
 lative theologians of modern times. 
 
 The Protestant Reformation brought the doc- 
 trines of free-will and necessity again into the field 
 of controversy, with all the stirring interest which 
 belonged to this singular and important event. 
 The Roman Catholic notions of human merit, and 
 the discipline of the Church founded upon them, 
 were the especial topics of opposition by all the 
 leading Reformers ; and this circumstance naturally
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 321 
 
 led them to advance principles of an opposite com- 
 plexion. Religious controversies of a very extended 
 nature were the fruits of this conflict. 
 
 The writings of Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Zuin- 
 glius, Melancthon, and others, as well as the proceed- 
 ings of the Council of Trent, go to prove the deep in- 
 terest involved, at the time of the Reformation, in the 
 doctrines of free-will and fate, and the intimate rela- 
 tionship conceived to exist between these doctrines 
 and the principles of natural and revealed religion. 
 
 Prom the period of the Reformation to the pre- 
 sent hour, theological controversies have run in the 
 same channel. There may have been a change of 
 names amongst them, and subtle and refined dis- 
 tinctions made in modern times ; but the essentials 
 of discussion are precisely similar to those Avhich 
 have gone the round of the Christian world for tlie 
 last eighteen hundred years. The doctrines of jus- 
 tification, redemption, faith, election, the influence 
 of the Holy Spirit, &c. &c. are to be received on the 
 authority of Holy Scripture. A spirit of true philo- 
 sophy should lead us at once to embrace whatever 
 the Sacred Record teaches; while the disputes which 
 have ever agitated mankind upon these subjects are 
 obviously grounded, to a very great extent, upon 
 peculiar and partial views of the doctrine of human 
 freedom and necessary connexion: and owe tlieir 
 very existence to the deep-rooted hold these philo- 
 sophical speculations have on the primary elements 
 of the human mind. 
 
 We shall now give a short account of the opinions 
 * y
 
 322 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 of the Christian Fathers of the Church as to their 
 conceptions of free-wilL These quotations will 
 clearly show that there was but one opinion amongst 
 them as to the intimate connexion which exists 
 between this doctrine, and man's moral and reli- 
 gious obligations to obey the divine commands. 
 
 Ignatius. — " I do not s^ ^Iv of two natures of 
 men, but that the one man is sometimes of God. 
 sometimes of the devil. If any one be pious, he is 
 a man of God ; but if any one be impious, he is a 
 man of the devil, being made so, not by nature, 
 but by his own will." 
 
 Justin Maiityr. — " God foreknows some who 
 would be saved by repentance, and some, perhaps, 
 who are not yet born. But lest any one should ima- 
 gine that I am asserting that things happen accord- 
 ing to the necessity of fate, because I have said that 
 things are foreknown, I proceed to refute that 
 opinion also. That punishments and chastisements 
 and good rewards are given according to the worth 
 of the actions of every one, having learned it from 
 the prophets, w^e declare it to be true ; since if it 
 were not so, but all things happen according to 
 fate, nothing would be in our own power ; for if it 
 were decreed bv fate that one should be cood and 
 another bad, no praise would be due to the former, 
 or blame to the latter. And again, if mankind had 
 not the power, by free-will, to avoid what is dis- 
 graceful, and to choose what is good, they would 
 not be responsible for their actions. But that man
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 323 
 
 does what is right, and what is wrong, by his own 
 free choice, we thus prove : we see the same person 
 passing from one thing to that which is contrary 
 to it ; hut if it were fated that we shoukl he either 
 had or good, he would not he capable of doing con- 
 trary things, or so often change ; but neither would 
 some be good and others bad, since we should so 
 declare fate to be the cause of bad things, and to 
 act contrary to itself. Or that which was before 
 mentioned would appear to be true, that neither 
 virtue nor vice is in reality anything, but is only 
 imagined to be good or bad ; which in truth is the 
 highest impiety and injustice. But we say that 
 there is this immutable fate, namely, to those who 
 choose what is good, a worthy reward; to those 
 who choose the contrary, a worthy punishment. 
 For God has not created man like other things, as 
 trees and four-footed beasts, incapable of acting by 
 choice ; for then he could not desu'e reward or praise, 
 not ha\dng chosen good of himself, but being made 
 so ; nor if he were bad, would he deserve punish- 
 ment, not being such of himself, but miable to be 
 anything except that which he was made." 
 
 Tatian. — " The Word, before the formation of 
 men, created angels. But each species of these 
 created beings was endowed with power over 
 themselves, not ha\ang natural goodness excejDt 
 only from God, being perfected by men through 
 the freedom of choice ; that he who is wicked may 
 be justly punished, being made wicked by himself; 
 
 y2
 
 324 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 and that he who is just may deservedly be iDraised 
 on account of his good actions, not having, through 
 his power over himself, transgressed the will of 
 God. Such is the nature of angels and men. But 
 the power of the Word having in itself the fore- 
 knowledge of what would happen, not according to 
 fate, hut by the determination of free agents, fore- 
 told future events, and guarded against wickedness 
 hy prohibitions, and commended those who should 
 persevere in goodness. 
 
 " Free-will destroyed us. Being free we became 
 slaves ; we were sold because of sin. No evil pro- 
 ceeds from God. We have produced wickedness, 
 but those who have produced it have it in their power 
 again to renounce it." 
 
 luEN^TJS. — " John the Baptist, speaking of Christ, 
 says, ' He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, 
 and with fire : whose fan is in his hand, and he will 
 thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat 
 into the garner ; but he will burn up the chaff with 
 unquenchable fire.' He therefore w^ho made the 
 w^heat, and who made the chaff, are not different 
 persons, but one and the same person, judging, 
 that is, separating them. But the corn and chaff 
 being inanimate and irrational, are made such by 
 nature. But man, being endowed with reason, and 
 in this respect like to God, being made free in his 
 will, and having power over himself, is himself the 
 cause that sometimes he becomes wheat and some- 
 times chaff. Wherefore he will also be justly con-
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 325 
 
 demned ; because being made rational, he lost true 
 reason, and living irrationally, he opposed the justice 
 of God, -delivering himsell* up to every earthly spi- 
 rit, and serving all lusts." 
 
 Clement of Alexandria. — "Neither praise, nor 
 dispraise, nor honours, nor punishments, would be 
 just, if the soul had not the power of desiring and 
 rejecting, and if vice were involuntary. 
 
 " As, therefore, he is to be commended who uses 
 his power in leading a virtuous life, so much more 
 is he to be venerated and adored who has given us 
 this free and sovereign power, and has permitted us 
 to live, not ha^dng allowed what we choose or what 
 we avoid to be subject to a slavish necessity. 
 
 " That thing is in our own power, of which we 
 are equally masters, as of its opposite ; as, to phi- 
 losophize or not ; to believe or not. 
 
 " ' Por therein is the righteousness of God re- 
 vealed from faith to faith.' The Apostle therefore 
 seems to announce two faiths, or rather one which 
 admits of increase and perfection ; for a common 
 faith is laid as a foundation. 
 
 " Since some are without faith and others con- 
 tentious, all do not obtain the perfection of good. 
 Nor is it possible to obtain it without our own 
 exertion. The whole, however, does not depend 
 upon our own will, for instance our future destiny ; 
 * for we are saved by grace,' not indeed without 
 good works. But those who are naturally disposed 
 to good, must apply some attention to it. 
 
 " Faith, although it be a voluntary consent of
 
 326 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 the soul, is, however, the worker of good things, 
 and the foundation of a right conduct. 
 
 " His will is, that we should be saved by our- 
 selves. This then is the nature of the soul, to move 
 by itself. Then we who are rational, philosophy 
 itself being rational, have some relation to it. Wit- 
 ness, indeed, is a tendency to virtue, but it is not 
 virtue. All men then, as I said, are qualified by 
 nature for the acquisition of virtue. But one man 
 makes a greater progress, another less, both in 
 knowledge and practice. Therefore some men have 
 attained even to perfect virtue, but others have 
 gone only a certain length ; and again others, being 
 neglected, though they had otherwise a good na- 
 tural disposition, have turned in an opposite di- 
 rection. 
 
 *' Wlierefore, when we hear ' Thy faith hath 
 made thee whole,' we do not understand him to say 
 that men will be saved, however they have believed, 
 unless good works also shall follow." 
 
 Tertullian. — " Every one has a right belonging 
 to man, and a natural power, to worship that which 
 he shall think right ; nor is any one injured or be- 
 nefited by the religion of another. Nor is it any 
 part of religion to force religion, which ought to be 
 taken up spontaneously, not by force. 
 
 " I find that man was formed by God with free- 
 will, and with power over himself, observing in him 
 no image or likeness to God more than in this 
 respect ; for he was not formed after God, who is 
 uniform, in face and bodilv lines, which are so va-
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 327 
 
 rioiis in mankind ; but in that substance which he 
 derived from God himself, that is, the soul, answer- 
 ing to the form of God ; and he was stamped Avitli 
 freedom and power of his will. The law also itself, 
 which was then imposed by God, confirmed this 
 condition of man. Por a law would not have been 
 imposed on a person who had not in his power the 
 obedience due to the law ; nor again Avould trans- 
 gression have been threatened mth death, if the 
 contempt also of the law were not placed to the 
 account of man's free-will. The same tinner also 
 you may find in the subsequent laws of the Crea- 
 tor, when he sets before men good and evil, life and 
 death, and likewise the whole order of discipline, 
 arranged by precepts ; God dissuading, and threat- 
 ening, and exhorting, and man being free and at 
 liberty to obey or to despise. Por it was necessary 
 that the image and likeness of God should be form- 
 ed with a free will in his own power, in which this 
 very thing, namely, freedom of will and power, 
 misrht be considered as the imac^e and likeness of 
 God. He who shoidd be found to be good or bad 
 by necessity, and not voluntarily, could not mtli 
 justice receive the retribution of either good or evil. 
 "Therefore, though we have learnt from the 
 commands of God both what he wills and what he 
 forbids, yet we have a will and power to choose 
 either, as it is written, ' Behold I have set before 
 you good and evil ; for you have tasted of the tree 
 of knowledge.' Therefore that which is sul)ject to 
 our own T\ill, we ought not to refer to the will of 
 God ; he who wills no evil, wills that we should
 
 328 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 have a will. Thus it is our own will, when we will 
 evil, contrary to the will of God, who wills that 
 which is good. Moreover, if you ask whence that 
 will conies hy which we will anything contrary to 
 the will of God, I ^vill tell you ; it conies from our- 
 selves. And not without reason; for you must 
 resemble the origin from which you sprang, since 
 Adam, the author both of our race and of sin, 
 willed that in which he sinned. Eor the devil did 
 not communicate to him the will to sin, but sup- 
 plied matter for the will. But the will of God di- 
 rected him to obedience. Wherefore if you do not 
 obey God, who having given you a command, has 
 formed you ^ith a free power, you will voluntarily 
 fall, by the freedom of your Avill, into that which 
 God does not will. And thus you think that you 
 are destroyed by the devil, who although he wills 
 you to will that which God does not will, yet he 
 does not cause you to will : because neither did he 
 compel our first parents to the will of sin ; nor 
 were they unwilling, nor ignorant of what God 
 forbade ; for he forbade it to be done when he made 
 death the consequence of doing it. Therefore the 
 only work of the devil is, to tempt that which is in 
 you, whether you ^vill. But when you have willed, 
 it follows that he turns it to his own purpose (sibi 
 subjungit,) not having caused the will in you, but 
 having taken an opportunity to work upon your 
 will. Therefore, since the will is in ourselves only, 
 and by it our disposition towards God is proved, I 
 say that we must deeply and earnestly consider the 
 will of God." ' -
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 329 
 
 Origen. — "Moreover, because the soul, having 
 substance and life in itseK, when it departs out of this 
 world, will be disposedof accordingtoitsmerits, either 
 enjoying the inheritance of eternal life and bliss, if 
 its conduct shall have procured this for it, or suffer- 
 ing eternal fire and punishment, if the guilt of its 
 sins shall have thrust it into that condition ; and 
 because there w^ill be a time of the resurrection of 
 the dead, when this body, ' which is sot\ti in cor- 
 ruption, will be raised in incorruption ; and that 
 which is sown in dishonour ^^dll be raised in glory ;' 
 this also is settled in the doctrine of the Church, 
 that every rational soul has free-will, and that it 
 has to contend against the devil and his angels, and 
 the powers which oppose it, because they strive to 
 burden it with sins : but we, if we live rightly and 
 prudently, endeavour to rescue ourselves from this 
 kind of burden. "Whence, consequently, we may 
 understand that we are not subject to necessity, so 
 as to be compelled by aU means to do either bad or 
 good things, although it be against our will. Eor 
 if we be masters of our wiU, some powers, perhaps, 
 may urge us to sin, and others assist us to safety ; 
 yet we are not compelled by necessity to act either 
 rightly or wTongly. 
 
 " I assert that man is endoAved with free-will, 
 declaring that this is the greatest gift conferred 
 upon him by God, because all other tilings are by 
 necessity obedient to the command of God. Eor if 
 you speak of the heaven, it stands bearing the Lord,
 
 330 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 not moved from its appointed place. And if you 
 choose to speak of the sun, it performs its appoint- 
 ed motion, not refusing its course, but by necessity 
 serving the Lord. And in like manner you see the 
 earth fixed, and hearing the command of him who 
 ordered. In like manner other things by necessity 
 serve the Creator, not any one of them being able 
 to do any other thing than that for which it was 
 made. Wherefore we do not praise these things 
 which are thus obedient to the Lord ; nor is any 
 hope of better things laid up for them, because they 
 have voluntarily observed what they are command- 
 ed. But it is the will of God that man should obey 
 the understanding, and he has received ]iower to 
 subject himself, not being governed by the necessity 
 of nature, or destitute of power ; which I say is 
 being endowed with free-will, for the sake of better 
 things, that he may receive better things from Him 
 Avho is more excellent (which is the consequence of 
 obedience), and moreover, as it were, a debt from 
 the Creator. Eor I do not say that man was thus 
 made to his injury, but for the sake of better things. 
 For if he had been made like one of the elements, 
 or any thing of that kind, there would have been a 
 necessity that he should serve God; he would no 
 longer receive a suitable reward of his choice, but 
 man would be as an instrument of his Creator, and 
 he who uses it would be the cause of these thinsrs. 
 But neither would man have arrived at suj^erior 
 knowledge, knowing nothing else but that only for 
 which he was formed. I say therefore that God
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 331 
 
 has thus honoui'ed man ; it being his will that he 
 should know better things, he has given him the 
 power to be able to do what he chooses." 
 
 Cypeian. — "That a man has free-will to believe or 
 not to believe, we read in Deuteronomy, ' I have set 
 before you life and death, blessing and cursing ; 
 therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed 
 may live!' Also in Isaiah, 'If ye be willing and 
 obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land ; but if 
 ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the 
 sword ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.' 
 Also in St. Luke's Gospel, ' The kingdom of God is 
 within you.' " 
 
 EusEBius. — "So that it must be altogether ac- 
 knowledged that we have liberty, and the free-will 
 of a rational and intelligent nature. 
 
 *' The Creator of all things has impressed a na- 
 tural law upon the soul of every man, as an assist- 
 ant and ally in his conduct, pointing out to him 
 the right way by this law ; but, by the free liberty 
 with which he is endowed, making the choice of 
 what is best worthy of praise and acceptance, and 
 of greater rewards, on account of his good conduct, 
 because he has acted rightly, not by force, but from 
 his own free-will, when he had it in liis power to 
 act otherwise. As again, making him who chooses 
 what is worst, deserving of blame and punishment, 
 as having by his OAvn motion neglected the natural 
 law, and becoming the origin and foundation of 
 wickedness, and misusing himself, not from any
 
 332 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 extraneous necessity, but from free-will and judg- 
 ment. The fault is in him who chooses, not in God. 
 Eor God has not made nature, or the substance of 
 the soul, bad ; for he who is good can make nothing 
 but what is good. Every thing is good which is 
 according to nature. Every rational soul has na- 
 turally a good free-will formed for the choice of 
 what is good. But when a man acts wrongly, 
 nature is not to be l)lamed; for what is wrong 
 takes place not according to nature, but contrary 
 to nature ; it being the work of choice and not of 
 nature. Eor when a person who had the power of 
 choosing what is good, did not choose it, but vo- 
 luntarily turned away from what was worst, what 
 room for escape could be left to him who is become 
 the cause of his own internal disease, having neg- 
 lected the innate law, as it were his Saviour and 
 physician ?' 
 
 )'> 
 
 Athanasius. — " Eor the knowledge and accurate 
 comprehension of the way of truth, we have need 
 of nothing but ourselves. Not, as God is above ail 
 things, so is the way which leads to these things, 
 remote or extraneous to ourselves ; but it is in our- 
 selves, and it is possible to find its beginning of 
 ourselves." 
 
 Cyril of Jerusalem. — " God requires nothing 
 else of us but a good will. Do you say. How 
 are my sins blotted out ? I say to you, by will- 
 ing, by believing. What can be more concise than 
 this ? But if your lips declare a willingness,
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 333 
 
 and your heart does not, he who judges knows the 
 heart. From this day, therefore, cease from every 
 evil work. Let not your tongue utter irreverent 
 words ; let not your eyes sin ; let not your thoughts 
 Avander about vain things." 
 
 Hilary. — "What, therefore, we are, is rather 
 our own gain than His who formed us what we 
 are; because God, not grudging his own eternal 
 goodness, takes us into the perception and use of 
 liis own blessed goodness. But he who is per- 
 fect and good used his goodness towards us, and 
 his blessedness, not without reason and method. 
 Por he permitted to every one of us the liberty of 
 life and sense, not fixing necessity either way, so 
 that the law should compel every one to be by 
 nature good or bad ; but he who had benevolently 
 created us to enjoy his blessedness, appointed us a 
 qualification for it, through the merit of an inno- 
 cent and honest life. Eor Avhat honour and reward 
 could the necessity of goodness deserve, when a 
 certain force, interwoven in our nature, would not 
 sufi'er us to be bad ? Goodness, therefore, is per- 
 mitted to the will ; that the will of goodness might 
 obtain to itself a reward ; and that there might be 
 again and enjojTuent of this eternal blessedness 
 from merit, and not an indiscriminate necessity by 
 law. And though he invited us to the will of 
 goodness, that is, to live well and honestly by the 
 hope of deserving and experiencing his goodness, 
 yet he added a punishment for shunning and de- 
 spising it; so that when he had left us a liberty of
 
 334 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 will to deserve goodness, because a necessity of 
 nature did not admit of desert, the terror of punish- 
 ment threatened on the other hand proved this 
 very liberty. And thus lil3erty was permitted for 
 the deserving of reward, with a due reward to 
 equity and justice ; and the power of liberty is, 
 through the goodness of God, restrained by the 
 fear commmiicated to us ; that the hope of deserv- 
 ing might admonish us to a good will, and the 
 punishment of apj^ointed revenge might dissuade 
 us from a bad will." 
 
 Epiphanius. — " How does he seem to retain the 
 freedom of his will in this world ? Eor to believe 
 or not to believe is in oiu' own power. But where 
 it is in our power to believe or not to believe, it 
 is in our power to act rightly or to sin ; to do good 
 good or to do e^dl." 
 
 Basil. — " These things are in our own power, 
 as to subdue the passions, or to indulge in plea- 
 sures ; as to restrain anger, or to attack him 
 who provokes us ; to speak truth or falsehood ; to 
 be meek and gentle, or proud and overbearing. 
 Do not then seek the origin of those things, of 
 which you are yourself the master, from any other 
 quarter ; but know that that which is in itself evil, 
 derived its origin from voluntary lapses. For if it 
 had been involuntary, and not m our own power, 
 those who act unjustly would not have had so great 
 fear of the laws hanging over them." 
 
 "If the origin of vicious and virtuous actions be
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 335 
 
 not in ourselves, but there is an innate necessity, 
 there is no need of legislators to prescribe what we 
 are to do and what we are to avoid ; there is no 
 need of judges to honour virtue and to punish 
 wickedness. Eor it is not the injustice of the thief 
 or of the murderer, who could not restrain his hand 
 even if he would, because of the insuperable neces- 
 sity which urges him to the action." 
 
 Gregory Nazianzen. — " The good derived from 
 nature has no claim to acceptance ; but that 
 which proceeds from free-will is deserving of praise. 
 Wliat merit has fire in burning ? For the burn- 
 ing comes from nature. What merit has water in 
 descending? Por this it has from the Creator. 
 What merit has snow in being cold ? Or the sun 
 in shining ? Por it shines whether it will or not. 
 Give me a virtuous will. Give me the becom- 
 ing spiritual, from being carnal ; the being raised 
 by reason, from being depressed by the weight of 
 the flesh ; the being found heavenly, from having 
 been low-minded; the appearing superior to the 
 flesh, after havmg been found to the flesh." 
 
 Gregory oe Nyssa.— " Since man was made 
 in the likeness of God, and was blessed in being 
 honoured with free-will, (for to have power over 
 himself, and to be subject to no master, is peculiar 
 to the blessedness of God), to be forcibly impelled 
 to anything by necessity, would have deprived 
 him of his dignity. Por if voluntarily, according to 
 the motion of free-will, they directed the human
 
 336 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 nature to anything improper, and were driven 
 from it forcibly and by necessity, such a pro- 
 ceeding would have taken away from them the 
 pre-eminent good, and would have deprived 
 them of the honour of being like to God. Por 
 the free will is likeness to God. Therefore, 
 that both power might remain to human na- 
 ture, and that evil might be done away, the wis- 
 dom of God devised this mode, to suffer man to 
 pursue those things which he wished ; that having 
 tasted the evils which he desired, and learned by 
 experience what exchange he had made, he might 
 voluntarily return by his own desire to his former 
 blessedness, shaking off from his nature every- 
 thing which disturbs the passions or is inconsistent 
 with reason, as a burden." 
 
 Ambrose. — "We are not constrained to obedience 
 by a servile necessity, but by free-will, whether we 
 lean to virtue, or are inclined to vice. 
 
 " No one is under any ol3ligation to commit 
 a fault, unless he inclines to it from his own 
 will." 
 
 Jerome. — "Do not think that there are only good 
 or only bad things in the world, since this world con- 
 sists of different things, contrary to each other, hot 
 and cold, dry and moist,hard and soft, dark and light, 
 bad and good. But God has done this, that wis- 
 dom maybe displayed in choosing good and avoiding 
 evil, and that free-will may be left to man. 
 
 '" If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the 
 good of the land ; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 337 
 
 shall be devoured with the sword ; for the mouth 
 of the Lord hath spoken it.' He preserves free- 
 will, that either way there may he punishment or 
 reward, not from an antecedent decree of God, hut 
 according to the merit of every individual. 
 
 " He gave them free-will ; he gave them the 
 liberty of their own mind, and that every one might 
 Kve, not under the absolute command of God, but 
 under his own direction ; that is, not by necessity 
 but by mil, that there might be room for virtue, 
 that we might be distinguished from other animals, 
 while, after the example of God, it was permitted 
 us to do what we will. Whence both the judgment 
 against sinners is equitable, and a just reward is 
 given to the holy or just." 
 
 Augustine. — "Pree-will is given to the soul, 
 which they who endeavour to weaken by trifling 
 reasoning, are blind "to such a degree, that they do 
 not even understand that they saw those vain and 
 sacrilegious things with their own vnR. 
 
 " Every one is author of his own sin. Whence, 
 if you doubt, attend to what is said above, that sins 
 are avenged by the justice of God ; for they would 
 not be justly avenged, unless they were committed 
 with the will. 
 
 " Lastly, if we do not act wrongly with the will, 
 no one is to be reproved at all, or admonished ; 
 and if you take away these things, the Christian 
 law and the whole discipline of religion must 
 necessarily be destroyed. Therefore sin is com- 
 mitted by the will. And because there is no doubt 
 * z
 
 338 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS 
 
 but sin is committed, I perceive that not even this 
 is to be doubted, that souls have free-will. Eor 
 God judged that his servants would be better if 
 they served him freely ; which would be impossible 
 if they served Mm not with the will, but from 
 necessity." 
 
 Chrtsostom. — " God, from the first formation 
 of man, implanted in him the law of nature. And 
 what is the law of nature ? He framed it for his 
 conscience, and enabled us to know from ourselves 
 the difference between good and evil. 
 
 " Since he has made us masters of the choice of 
 bad and good actions, and wishes us to be volun- 
 tarily good ; therefore if we be not willing, he does 
 not force, he does not compel ; for to be good by 
 force is not to be good at all. 
 
 "When you hear these tilings, do not imagine 
 that the calling carries with it necessity, for God 
 does not compel, but leaves men masters of their 
 free-will, even after they are called." 
 
 Theodoret. — " God created the whole nature of 
 incorporeal things, making it rational and immortal. 
 Free-will is peculiar to what is rational. But of these 
 some have preserved a good disposition towards 
 the Creator, but others have fallen into wickedness. 
 This we may also find among men. Eor some 
 indeed are lovers of virtue, but others are workers 
 of wickedness. If, therefore, any one complains of 
 the creation of mcked persons, he deprives the 
 champions of virtue of the prizes of victory. Por
 
 ON HUMAN ACTION. 339 
 
 if they had not the desire of virtue in the choice of 
 the will, hut were unalterably fixed by nature, 
 those who successfully struggle for piety would be 
 unknown. But since the will has the choice of 
 what is good, and of the contrary, some justly ob- 
 tain the crown of victory, and others suffer punish- 
 ment for their voluntary offences."* 
 
 * See the Author's work on "Free Will," second edit., 1848, pubhshed 
 by Saunders, Charing Cross ; and also the writings of Drs. Copple- 
 stone, Hampden, and Whately, who have treated the bearing of the doc- 
 trine of Necessity on Theological doctrines, at considerable length. — 
 See also Note G. at the end of the Volume. 
 
 z 2
 
 310 AJIABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXII. 
 
 ON THE METAPHYSICAL NOTIONS OF THE 
 ARABIANS. 
 
 We shaU now take a retrospective view of the 
 state of metaphysical knowledge amongst the Ara- 
 bians, soon after the introduction of Christianity. 
 This does not promise to be a very fruitful field of 
 inquiry ; but still the subject is well worthy of a 
 particular notice. We shall also allude to the 
 notions of the Jews on mental subjects ; at least 
 that portion of this ancient and interesting people, 
 who resided in the East, and mingled with the 
 Arabs and other kindred oriental tribes. 
 
 The Arabs, in point of philosophy, must always 
 appear a curiously constituted people. In the early 
 parts of their history, they were the bold, courage- 
 ous, and fierce conquerors of the East ; and it was 
 a considerable time after these successful invasions 
 had been made, that the attention of the people 
 was directed towards the cultivation of letters and 
 philosophy. Wandering in arid deserts, and lead- 
 ing a pastoral life, their minds sQcm to have been
 
 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 341 
 
 insensibly trained to severe habits of inward con- 
 templation ; and the charms of poetry, and the 
 mental mechanism of numbers, appear to have 
 formed the primitive elements of their early learn- 
 ing. This habit of inward reflexion, however, pro- 
 duced other fruits in the due course of time. It 
 led the Arabs to dwell upon the nature and powers 
 of their own understandings ; to scan all the pecu- 
 liarities of thek actions ; to watch all their subtile 
 movements ; and to pourtray the divers important 
 ends and purposes which the inward macliines were 
 so admirably fitted to accomplish. The intellectual 
 history of this people is still buried in comparative 
 obscurity ; although there are, in many of the public 
 libraries throughout Europe, an immense number 
 of Arabian manuscripts, which, if brought to the 
 light of day, would undoubtedly tend materially 
 to dissipate the thick clouds which at present en- 
 velop the philosophical opinions and acquirements 
 of this singular race of mankind. 
 
 All the modes of life and intellectual habits of 
 the Arabs peculiarly fitted them for entering into 
 the subtile questions connected with metaphysical 
 disquisitions. This is strikingly conspicuous in 
 all their writings. They invariably manifested a 
 decided preference for abstract forms of disputa- 
 tion, and rigid rules of investigation. Aristotle, 
 on this account, proved their great master, their 
 guide, the object of their most devoted veneration 
 and attachment. His dry and formal rules accorded 
 admirably with the genius of their minds. Plato, 
 and his commentators and disciples, were never,
 
 342 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 consequently, relished, if we except Plotiniis and 
 Proclus. The Platonic system abounded too much 
 with imaginative and lively theories and senti- 
 ments, and breathed moreover too ardently the 
 spirit of liberty and freedom, to suit the taste of 
 the slavish worshippers of the Koran. 
 
 It is remarked by a Prench writer of great learn- 
 ing and genius, " That there is, between the philo- 
 sophical productions of the Greeks and Arabs, the 
 same difference, or rather the same contrast, wliich 
 exists between the literary works, the manners, 
 genius, and civil institutions of the two peoples. 
 The philosophy of the Greeks had in it something 
 brilliant, fascinating, and lively, like the beautiful 
 views in Attica and Asia Minor ; that of the Arabs 
 had something grave, monotonous, and arid, like 
 the deserts they inhabit. Pull of charms, even in 
 its errors, the former excited an enthusiasm simi- 
 lar to that which inspired it ; the latter, dull and 
 malancholy, even whilst they seized hold of truth, 
 breathed the habit of resignation, and the influence 
 of fanaticism. The Greeks displayed an easy eleva- 
 tion and spontaneity of thought, though a certain 
 restlessness of spirit; while the Arabs displayed 
 mdomitable patience, and bore upon them the im- 
 print of rigorous formalities. The Athenians prided 
 themselves on harmonious co-ordinations ; the in- 
 habitants of the desert on complicated combina- 
 tions. The genius of poetry seemed to preside in 
 the meditations of the Greeks ; the laws of calcula- 
 tion in those of the Arabs. The Greeks imagined, 
 invented, created matter; the Arabs laboured at
 
 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 343 
 
 what was placed in their hands, and imprinted 
 form upon it. Intellectual light seemed to spring 
 up among the Greeks as by enchantment ; among 
 the descendants of Ishmael, it was the fruit of 
 painful conquest. 
 
 We shall mention here the three famous Arabian 
 Caliphs who exercised such a marked influence 
 over the intellectual progress of their countrymen ; 
 namely, Almanzor, Alraschid, and Almamon. His- 
 torians described the first, Almanzor, as having 
 been a very enlightened and intelligent prince. 
 He was passionately fond of learning and philoso- 
 phy. He studied politics in conjunction with in- 
 tellectual learning and astronomy ; and he trans- 
 lated into the Syriac and Arabic languages several 
 treatises of Grecian literature. Alraschid was equally 
 distinguished for his wisdom and love of knowledge; 
 and in addition to his taste for the abstract doc- 
 trines of philosophy, he had a thorough knowledge of 
 poetry and the belles lettres. Almamon, who flou- 
 rished in the 9th century, was still more reno\^^led 
 then either of his two predecessors. He endea- 
 voured to obtain knowledge from all parts of the 
 then known world. He invited learned men to 
 his Court, without any reference to their religious 
 opinions. He penetrated into all the abstruse 
 doctrines of the Chaldeans, the Persians, and the 
 Greeks. Public schools of philosophy were esta- 
 blished, and those of Bagdad and Bassora obtained 
 especial distinction. The doctrines of Aristotle 
 were taught and expounded within the walls of 
 Tunis, Tripoli, and other African cities.
 
 34<1 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Alkendi. 
 
 Alkendi, who attended the Court of Almamon, 
 was a distinguished philosopher. He inspired the 
 Arabs with an enthusiastic veneration for the doc- 
 trines of Aristotle, and furnished them with trans- 
 lations and commentaries upon several of his works. 
 Alkendi published a " Treatise on the Study ofFhi- 
 losopliy i" containing questions on logic and meta- 
 physics. He also cultivated mathematics and phy- 
 sics with singular success. There is besides a book 
 ascribed to his pen, ^'■ZTpon the Compositions of 
 Medicines.'" 
 
 Alfarabi. 
 
 AKarabi obtained well merited fame at the 
 school of Bagdad. His mind embraced a wide range 
 of study. He was a mathematician, an astronomer, 
 a physician, and a philosopher ; and devoted his 
 whole life to study and learning. " He penetrates" 
 says Albufarage, " into the most profound points 
 of logic ; but in his endeavours to revive them, he 
 renders them difficult of comprehension. He sug- 
 gested ingenious but subtile speculations ; and 
 completed the investigations of Alkendi upon the 
 arts of analysis and method." Alfarabi added very 
 useful commentaries to Aristotle's art of thinking, 
 and made the Arabs acquainted with his rhetoric. 
 
 We must also notice here two tracts of Alfarabi, 
 the first " JJpofi the Sciences'^ and the second " TJp)0}i
 
 ALrARABI. 345 
 
 the Understanding.'" The first is a sort of dictionary 
 or methodical classification of various branches of 
 knowledge; embracing the leading and fundamental 
 principles of these sciences, and their relative con- 
 nexion mth one another. At the head of all these 
 departments of knowledge, he places divine wisdom, 
 which he divides mto three parts, the last of which 
 embraces immaterial objects. "This science," says 
 ho, " demonstrates that these objects, in their aggre- 
 gate number, are gradually elevated to the height 
 of perfection. The ascending scale terminates at 
 the first principle anterior to all things ; this is 
 that primordial unity, which confers existence and 
 design upon every thing we see. Truth flows from 
 it as its source." 
 
 In Alfarabi'swork, ''On the Understanding," we 
 find, in substance, the following propositions and 
 principles laid down. These form the latent germs 
 of several subsequent abstract systems of mental 
 philosophy, which enjoyed considerable notoriety 
 in the East, This philosopher took Aristotle for 
 his guide. The former maintains that the human 
 understanding is that faculty of the soul by -which 
 men acquire the certainty of universal and neces- 
 sary truths and propositions. These are not, as 
 commonly imagined, obtained by labour or atten- 
 tive meditation, but arise out of the native resources 
 of his own mind, without his knowing from whence 
 they came, or from what derived. The understand- 
 ing is, however, itself composed of three distinct 
 powers or faculties ; namely, the understanding of 
 power, the understanding in action, and the active
 
 346 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 understanding. It is by this macliinery tliat all its 
 important functions are performed. The under- 
 standing of poioer separates the/brms of substances 
 from those tilings in which they reside, and trans- 
 fers them to itself. These forms are distinguished 
 from corporeal forms in this, that the former is 
 imprinted only upon the surface, but the latter 
 penetrates into the very depth of things. "When 
 the understanding has received these/orms, it then 
 becomes the understanding in action^ and the forms 
 are 'perceived in reality^ and become the forms of 
 the understanding itself. In this new state these 
 forms are not what they were when they resided in 
 theu' substances. There they were bound to cer- 
 tain conditions which are now removed. Here 
 they are considered under new relations, and re- 
 ceived into the understanding in action ; they enter 
 into the universality of existing things, which be- 
 come the exclusive province of intelligence. "When 
 then the soul embraces all intelligent tilings, by a 
 glance of the unde^'standhig in action it perceives 
 itself, it perceives its own act, and recognises its own 
 proper essence. It has here acquired noilim^ fi^om 
 loithout, but only from an inward act of reflexion. 
 
 The province of the active understa/nding is, to 
 recognise that which is most perfect in itself. It 
 grasps, in an abstract manner, the forms which 
 belong to substances ; not such, however, as resid- 
 ed in them previously to their being detached from 
 these substances, but, penetrating into the nature 
 of all sul)stances, the active understanding im- 
 prints these forms on itself, such as they really are
 
 AVICENNA. 317 
 
 in their abstract natures. These forms are indivi- 
 sible. The active understanding^ so to speak, sub- 
 stantializes itself in man ; its essence, action, reality, 
 are identical. There is here no need of the common 
 substances of bodies ; no need of assistance from 
 any corporeal organs ; no need of either senses or 
 imagination ; for its own action embraces all bo- 
 dies, and the powers which manifest themselves in 
 them are simply the materials upon which the ac- 
 tive understanding exercises itself.* 
 
 AviCENNA. 
 
 Avicenna was another most distinguished Ara- 
 bian metaphysician. A great part of his life 
 was spent in public turmoils and engagements ; 
 but still he was enabled to devote a considerable 
 portion of his time to the cultivation of learning 
 and science. He also studied medicine ; and gained 
 such celebrity in this important branch of know- 
 ledge, as induced some liistorians to call him the 
 Eippocrates of the Arabs. 
 
 Avicenna was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, and 
 lost no opportunity of inculcating and expounding 
 his doctrines. Professor Tiedemann makes the fol- 
 lowing remarks upon him. " We find in the views 
 of Avicenna a remarkable clearness and precision ; 
 in all his reasonings a profound acuteness ; and in 
 all his thoughts a natural and pleasing connection." 
 
 In Avicenna' s Treatise on Logic, we find he 
 adopts the principles of Aristotle, but does not fol- 
 
 * Alfarabi, De Scicntia. Paris, 16:38. pp. 35. 62.
 
 348 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 low him slavishly in every abstract doctrine. The 
 Arabian philosopher maintains that "All know- 
 ledge consists in representation and conviction. We 
 may represent things to ourselves very well, with- 
 out, however, persuading ourselves of their truth. 
 E-epresentation is acquired by definition, or some 
 similar thing ; but conviction is derived from rea- 
 soning." 
 
 Avicenna qualified the doctrine of Aristotle re- 
 specting his division of the negative, sensible, and 
 rational soul. The former remarks that those 
 distinctions indicate rather three modes of action, 
 than three distinct things. " The vegetable soul 
 has three faculties ; nutrition, augmentation, and 
 generation ; the sensitive has two faculties, those of 
 apprehension and motives; the latter excites or 
 produces motion, and creates appetites. The fa- 
 culty of apprehension is a compound one. It exer- 
 cises itself both externally and internally. We 
 commonly attach to it five external senses, and five 
 internal ones. The bodily or external senses em- 
 brace hearing, seeing, touching, tasting, and smell- 
 ing ; the five internal ones are, first, \dsion ox fan- 
 tasy, the second, imagination, the third, cogitative, 
 the fourth, estimatwe, and the fifth, memory. The 
 rational soul is divided into two grand parts ; the 
 one embraces the faculty of knowledge, and the 
 other of activity. These two rule and guide the 
 whole inward man. 
 
 Avicenna points out, in few words, the process 
 by which children learn to distinguish one object 
 from another. " The first image," says he, " which 
 is traced in the mind of an infant, is the particular
 
 ALGAZELI. 349 
 
 form of a man or a woman. But it cannot distin- 
 guish between the man who is its parent, and him 
 who is not ; nor between its mother and a stranger. 
 Nevertheless it soon learns to recognise this differ- 
 ence, and to make proper distinctions amongst par- 
 ticular objects. Eor a short time after its birth it 
 has only very confused notions of single objects."* 
 
 Algazeli. 
 
 Algazeli, in the eleventh century, obtained great 
 honour as a philosopher at Bagdad and Alexandria. 
 He was a person of great penetration and sagacity, 
 and his powers of imagination were far above the 
 common order. He cultivated theology with unre- 
 mitting ardour ; and his work on the " Religions 
 Sciences " enjoyed unrivalled popularity throughout 
 the whole Eastern republic of letters. 
 
 In all his disquisitions on mental subjects, he 
 followed a most independent course, and manifest- 
 ed a becoming anxiety to examine everything for 
 himself, and to take nothing on trust. As might 
 naturally be expected, from this turn of mind, and 
 from the nature of philosophy herself in this age 
 and country, he differed in many respects from his 
 contemporaries. He combatted the new Platonists 
 upon the eternity of the world, a universal ema- 
 nation, absolute identity, perfect unity, the non- 
 existence of matter, and the migration of souls. 
 The general proposition of this school, that " In- 
 
 * See Logique d'Avicene, translated by Vattier, Paris ; Metaphj's. 
 Trait. 2. chap. 1. ; and also Note H. at the end of the Volume.
 
 350 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 telligence can only know itself," he argued against 
 with great zeal and effect. 
 
 On the intricate question of cause and effect, 
 Algazeli made some remarkably subtile and curious 
 observations. It is quite evident that the theory 
 of Hume is here anticipated. 
 
 On the general nature of the human understand- 
 ing we find the following is, in substance, an epi- 
 tome of the system x)f Algazel. The human soul 
 has two faces, the one by which it directs its atten- 
 tion to the wide region of superior things, there 
 extracts the light of knowledge, and, by virtue of 
 its own distinctive character, receives the emana- 
 tions from this superior light. The other face is 
 dii'ccted towards inferior things, under the govern- 
 ment and guidance of proper organs. Sensibility 
 and imagination can only exercise themselves upon 
 material objects ; they can seize only individual 
 things ; they perceive or conceive them under cer- 
 tain conditions, as time, place, figure, &c. The 
 faculty of estimation depends then upon substances 
 or external things, since it derives from this source 
 the perceptions on which it rests. But we have 
 also another faculty which seizes the essential pro- 
 perties of things, and strips them, as it were, of 
 their particular qualities or accidents. This is sum- 
 mary or general abstraction. This faculty differs 
 from the preceding ; it is the understanding ; and 
 it gradually elevates and develops itself, in propor- 
 tion as it is exercised. 
 
 The following remarks display the judicious and 
 accurate observer of mental habits and phenomena. 
 "The understanding can perceive itself; it can
 
 AVICEBRON. 351 
 
 perceive its own perception ; it can perceive what 
 it produces ; it can pass from the strong to the 
 weak, from the obscure to the luminous, without 
 any essential change of its nature. It is strength- 
 ened, instead of being weakened, by years. The 
 derangement of the organs of sensation may, it 
 is true, act upon the intellectual faculties in two 
 modes ; viz. by causing a distraction of the mind, 
 when accompanied by pain ; and by depriving the 
 mind of the assistance of these organs for the in- 
 vestigation of external objects. But our intellectual 
 power can, by virtue of its own innate energy, 
 emancipate itself from this double dependance."* 
 
 AviCEBRON. 
 
 This was a very acute and distinguished Arabian 
 philosopher. The only account of his writings is 
 from Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Wil- 
 liam of Paris. We gather from these three sources, 
 the following short outline of the leading views en- 
 tertained by this writer. 
 
 He attempted to penetrate into the original 
 cause of all things. He wished to investigate what 
 was the quality of the jii^st matter, and the first 
 form, which produced all things. The quality of 
 the first matter is to receive, to be the subject, to 
 contain ybrm in itself, to exist by itself; that is to 
 say, not to exist in anything else. The nature of 
 the first form is to be in another thing, to give 
 reality to matter, to determine its power, and to 
 
 * Logica et Philos. Cologne. 150().
 
 352 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 form a portion of its essential nature in this com- 
 pound state. Matter is thus maintained to reside 
 in intellectual things, comprised under quantity, 
 combination, and contrast. The author attempts 
 then to prove that this first or primary matter is 
 purely spiritual, as it expresses the highest and 
 most refined abstraction, after being stripped of all 
 its variety of particular forms. The Supreme Being 
 is not, however, included in this spiritualised 
 matter, for He is above all forms or qualities. 
 
 The 2)ri7nari/ foi'm is intellectuality. Intelligence 
 occupies the first rank in the order of beings ; it is 
 itself composed of matter smdform ; its form, then, 
 presides in all things. The primary form imposes 
 limits to the modifications of matter. Intellectu- 
 ality is such, that it comprehends all things ; it is 
 that from which all forms proceed, and from which 
 every thing in heaven or in earth takes its rise. 
 
 These two elementary principles being laid down, 
 there is an affent to . carry them into operation. 
 This is termed the ^;riwi«rj/ agent. His act con- 
 stitutes the light of intelligence. It resides in per- 
 fect simplicity or absolute unity. It cannot act im- 
 mediately ; because the will is the instrument of 
 action. This will contains within itself the reason 
 or word for everything which exists. It chooses out 
 of the general treasure those figures or types it 
 wishes to act with. It determines the first or 
 primary matter; it imprints upon it the first 
 act of intellectual light. This intellectual light is 
 varied according to the variety of figures or types. 
 It produces, by degrees, matter, under the relations 
 of quantity, combination, and contrariety. It is
 
 AVERROES. 353 
 
 thus that the will always proceeds from unity ; for 
 intellectuality penetrates all things by vu'tue of its 
 own simplicity. All form is, at the commencement, 
 the author of its own archetype. 
 
 AvERROES, 
 
 This was, without doubt, one of the most 
 able and subtile of all the Arabian philoso- 
 phers. He had studied the philosophy of Aristotle 
 with peculiar care and attention, and became en- 
 thusiastically enamoured of his doctrines. By un- 
 wearied zeal, great learning, intense application, 
 and a profound subtility, he imprinted his mind 
 upon his own age; and long after his death, re- 
 tained the distinction of being one of the most able 
 and original commentators on the Aristotelian phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 "We find, in his remarks upon Aristotle's meta- 
 physics, that he was an admirer of the doctrine of 
 an intelligent hierarchy and universal emanation. 
 He remarks, " that motion can be imparted only by 
 intelligence; all motion presupposes a motive which 
 appertains to a spiritual or immaterial being. The 
 celestial spheres have their intelligent attributes, 
 derived from the Supreme Power, the first princi- 
 ple of all things. This motion is communicated 
 successively into all regions ; from the highest de- 
 gree of creation, even into our own sublunary world, 
 this nation is conducted and transmitted by a suc- 
 cession of intelligent agents." 
 * 2 a
 
 354 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 On the sj^iritual or immaterial nature of mental 
 perception, this metaphysician entertained some 
 very refined notions. He conceives that our organs 
 of sensation only perceive the sensible qualities of 
 matter, detached from matter itself. This consti- 
 tutes, in his opinion, the act of perception, a spiritual 
 or immaterial act. Some of these qualities of matter 
 are universal, and some particular and individual. 
 But these two kinds of qualities are not perceived 
 in the same manner. The mind seizes hold of ge- 
 neral or universal ideas, without any direct com- 
 munication, so to speak, with matter itself ; there 
 is no intermediate agency requisite to obtain these 
 ideas. On the contrary, to obtain individual or 
 particular qualities, there must be an intermediate 
 agent to communicate with matter, for without 
 this intermediation, the mind would not be able 
 to distinguish these particular, from general or uni- 
 versal, qualities. Nature has provided /orwzs, to 
 act as these agents, which hold a middle station 
 between corporeal and material ; these forms are 
 material relatively to objects, but spiritual rela- 
 tively to the soul. As interposing instruments they 
 are thus of a mixed character. Now these inter- 
 mediate assents are the instruments of the senses ; 
 those things which perception requires, to detect or 
 seize hold of universal or general qualities. The 
 act of perception is so much the more perfect, in 
 exact proportion as the intermediate agent is re- 
 fined and subtile. This mental operation may be 
 illustrated, more particularly, by a reference to the 
 senses of sight, hearing, and smelling. The air, by
 
 AVERROES. 355 
 
 the aid of light, receives the forms of objects, and 
 bears thera to the retina of the eye ; from thence 
 they are transmitted to the common sensorlum^ 
 which also receives the forms of the objects. Erom 
 there these forms are again transported to the im- 
 agination, where a new and spiritual character is 
 given to them. Here, then, are three successive 
 orders of i\iQs,Q forms of external objects : the first 
 is corporeal ; the second resides in the organs of 
 sensation ; and the third is the faculty of the ima- 
 gination. The second is spiritual, and the third 
 is still more so ; and this is the reason why the 
 imagination has need of the presence of external 
 objects, in order that this form should be presented 
 to itself. This process is what Aristotle wished to 
 illustrate by the mirror with a double face. If the 
 spectator place this mirror opposite to him, he will 
 see, on one of its faces, his own image ; and if he 
 place the mirror in such a position that this image 
 it retains may be reflected upon the surface of the 
 water, he will perceive a second image similar to 
 the first. Now in the process of sensation i\\Q,form 
 perceived is like the image of the spectator ; the 
 mirror is like the air which transmits the form ; 
 the water is the eve or the organs of sense. One of 
 the faces of the mirror is the sensitive faculty ; 
 and the other face is the imaginative one. If the 
 spectator turn the mirror and consider only the 
 second face, then the reflected part will not be upon 
 the water, and there will, consequently, be no more 
 than one image. Similar phenomena take place in 
 the process of perception in reference to both hearing 
 
 2 A 2
 
 356 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 and smelling. Bnt this faculty of perception is not 
 tjie same in all animals ; man alone is able to seize 
 hold of the proper qualities of objects, with all 
 their shades and degrees, resemblance and contra- 
 riety. He can extract the juice from the fruits, 
 whilst the brute creation have to stop and peel off 
 the bark. As a proof of this, man is the only ani- 
 mate creature who can appreciate fully the har- 
 mony of sounds in all their multiplied variety. 
 
 The way in which we obtain abstract notions, is 
 described by Averroes in this manner. In our 
 common organs of sense reside the images, the cha- 
 racter of which is precisely the same here as in sen- 
 sible objects ; and the relation of these images to 
 the material understanding is the same as these 
 sensible objects are to the senses themselves. This 
 may be comprehended more distinctly by saying, 
 that this image is to reason, what the sensible ob- 
 ject is to sensation. The soul can then conceive 
 nothing without the assistance of the imagination; 
 nor the material understanding, without the help 
 of sensation. Here we perceive two images asso- 
 ciated together, and our intelligent notions become 
 corrupted through the influence of this contagious 
 contact. As to these intelligent notions, they are the 
 qualities of the/brms of imagination detached from 
 matter ; and must needs have different qualities 
 from the latter. 
 
 The material understanding is a notion peculiar 
 to this Arabian philosopher. He explains its na- 
 ture and operation in the following manner. The 
 faculty of imagination retains the forms which have
 
 theophiltjS. 357 
 
 been made upon it ; these forms are transmitted to 
 the material understanding, there to become the 
 objects of thought. But an agent is requisite to 
 impress them upon the latter, and that agent ap- 
 pertains to the active understanding. This material 
 understanding conceives abstract notions, so that 
 the abstract understandino; makes one with it. To 
 conceive abstract notions or ideas, is no other thing 
 than simplv to conceive a thinsc subsistmo^ bv itself.* 
 
 Theophilus. 
 
 This author was a native of Seville, and a physi- 
 cian and philosopher. His work entitled FMloso- 
 'plius Autodid actus, is a very curious one, and has 
 been translated into Prench, English, German, and 
 Dutch. He obtained great reputation and respect 
 amongst all the leading tribes of the Arabs, and 
 also among the Jews. The learned Leibnitz de- 
 clared he had perused this publication with delight, 
 and found it abounding with elevated and just con- 
 ceptions of human nature in general. 
 
 Thisphilosopherremarks, thatman possessesthree 
 relations of similitude or affinity ; namely, one Avith 
 the animal creation, another with celestial beings, 
 and the third with the necessary and divine Being. 
 To these three orders of relationship appertain three 
 modes of action. The first exercises itseKupon our 
 material organs ; the second upon the vital spirit ; 
 and the third upon its own essential essence. 
 
 The first mode of action is directed towards sen- 
 
 * Commeut. in Aristot. Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 2. See also Note I. at 
 ' the end of the Volume.
 
 358 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 sible objects. Far from acquiring instruction here, 
 we often meet with great obstacles; for external 
 things are a kind of veil which envelops true sci- 
 ence and knowledge. The second only obtains an 
 imperfect intuition, or a confused assemblage of 
 objects ; but when directed upon its own essence, 
 it then confers knowledge. By the third action we 
 acquire complete and perfect intuition. Its atten- 
 tion is absorbed in the contemplation of necessary 
 existence. It annihilates itself ; it vanishes like a 
 vapour. Its own essence, and all other essences of 
 things, disappear before that one Being, who at 
 once possesses unity, truth, grandeur, sublimity and 
 power. 
 
 Celestial bodies have three attributes ; one by 
 which they throw light, heat, and rarefaction over 
 inferior substances ; the second relates to their own 
 nature, their happiness, holiness, purity, and power 
 of rapid motion ; and the third refers to the Su- 
 preme Being, whose will they execute, whose power 
 they recognise, and whose presence they perpetually 
 enjoy. Man ought to imitate these three kinds 
 of attributes. To conform himself to the first, he 
 ought to extend a benevolent protection to all ani- 
 mal natures, and to all plants, and endeavour to 
 preserve them in a perfect condition. To bring 
 himself under the influence of the second attribute, 
 he should preserve himself from all impurities ; 
 practise ablutions ; pay great attention to the pro- 
 prieties of the body and of dress ; and use suitable 
 exercise, and even circular movements, though he 
 should thereby experience giddiness of the head. 
 In reference to the third attribute, he should
 
 THEOPHILUS. 359 
 
 shun all obstacles from sensible objects ; shut his 
 eyes and ears ; repress all flights of imagination ; 
 and reduce all his faculties to a certain state of 
 languor, until he approaches a state of pure intel- 
 lectuality. 
 
 Arrived at this high state of perfection, man will 
 learn that his own essence does not differ from the 
 essence of the Supreme Being ; that there is really 
 but one universal essence. The Divine Essence is 
 like the rays of the material sun which expand over 
 opaque bodies, and which appear to proceed from 
 the eye, though they are only reflected from its sur- 
 face. All beings distinct from mere matter, which 
 possess this knowledge, are identified with the di- 
 vine essence; for knowledge is nothing but this 
 essence itself. These beings are, therefore, not dif- 
 ferent, they are only one and the same. Multipli- 
 city, variety, and aggregation appertain only to 
 bodies. The sensible world is only the shadow of 
 the Divine world. 
 
 Theophilus further remarks, " In considering the 
 number of his organs, and the variety of their func- 
 tions, man would appear to be a compound being ; 
 but in lookinsc asjain at the secret tie which unites 
 all these organs, and their principle of action, man 
 shows himself to be truly but an individual being. 
 This unity is derived from the unity of the vital 
 principle. ^^ 
 
 This philosopher led a life of singular abstraction, 
 and enjoyed fits of pure intellectual ecstasy. In 
 one of these he afiirms that he saw the supreme 
 and celestial sphere, in which the essence of im-
 
 360 AKABIAN METAPHYSICS. 
 
 materiality resided. All joy and beauty dwelt here, 
 and the sight was the most ravishing imaginable. 
 He perceived a spiritual Being, who was neither the 
 first of beings, nor the sphere itself; without, how- 
 ever, its being different from both. It was like 
 the image of the sun produced in a mirror, which 
 is neither the sun itself, nor the mirror.* 
 
 *** See Geor. Elmacinus, Historia Saracen. Lugd. 1625; Assemani, 
 Historia Arabum. Rome 1/19; Bayle — articles, Alchabitius, Alchindus, 
 Averroes, Almacin; Peringer, Historia Linguae et Erudit. Arabum, Al- 
 pini, 1694 ; Ludovicus, De Historia Rationalis Philos. apud Arabos et 
 Turcas ; Nagel, De Studio Philos. Graecse inter Arabos ; Fabricius, Bib. 
 Graec. De Viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabos ; The Histories of 
 Philosophy by Brucker, Tiedemann, and Tennemann; Bodiiguez de 
 Castro, Bibl. Espagnole, book 1st. 
 
 * 'I 
 
 Theoph. Philosophus Autodidactus, edition by Pocock.
 
 THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS. 361 
 
 CHAPTEE, XXXIII. 
 THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS. 
 
 The metaphysical notions of the Persian So- 
 pliists are but very imperfectly kno^^Ti. They are 
 shrouded and enveloped in a mighty maze of ec- 
 static rapture and frantic abstraction. Their phi- 
 losophy is but a jumT)le of most of the opinions of 
 the Oriental nations, -with a few slight peculiarities 
 belonging to the Persian nation. 
 
 The Sophists considered the human mind to be 
 under the direct influence of the Divine nature. 
 This influence they designated by the terms ema- 
 nation, call, proclamation, attraction, &c. They 
 declared that the path which conducted to God, was 
 the commencement of that which introduced you 
 to the bosom of the Eternal himself, and which 
 placed you in full possession of the true spiritual 
 absorption. 
 
 The doctrine of absolute unitv, maintained and 
 enforced by the New Platonists, was also a fa- 
 vourite pliilosophical dogma of the Persian So- 
 phists. They affirmed that every man whose heart
 
 362 THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS. 
 
 was free from doubt, knew, with the most perfect 
 certainty, that there was but one Being in all na- 
 ture. I and the Divinity are the same thing. The 
 Sophists also represented the body as a sort of 
 prison-house for the mind or soul. " Do you wish 
 to enjoy true liberty ?" say they, " then disengage 
 yourself from the vain illusions which obstruct you, 
 and take refuge in the Divine essence, where truth 
 exclusively resides." On the doctrine of Divine 
 emanations they remark that "This universe is 
 only a small meandering rivulet from the ocean of 
 Divine Beauty and Perfection." Pour species of 
 Divine manifestation are distinguished; namely, 
 iirst, the contemplative mind sees the absolute es- 
 sence, under the figure or representation of some 
 corporeal being; secondly, he sees this absohtte 
 unity under one of its attributes of action, as the 
 giving of what is needful ; the third appears under 
 the form of one of the attributes which constitute 
 its own essence, as science or life; and in the 
 fourth, the contemplative spirit loses its conscious- 
 ness in its existence. 
 
 The Sophists enveloped their disquisitions on the 
 mind of man with a crowd of fables and allegories. 
 To assist the flights of contemplative ardour and 
 ecstasy, they recommended the practice of ab- 
 stinence, watchings, silence, restraint of the appe- 
 tites ; a renouncement, in fact, of all bodily plea- 
 sures. They urged that men should bring themselves 
 to a state of apathetic insensibility, in order that 
 they might fully realize the delights of celestial 
 beatitude.
 
 AVENPACE. 363 
 
 AVENPACE. 
 
 Little is now known of the metaphysical specu- 
 lations of this author. He was a physician, cul- 
 tivated mathematical learning, and had studied the 
 works of Aristotle with great zeal and attention. 
 
 His peculiar ideas on the mind of man are con- 
 tained in a letter entitled " The Conjunction of the 
 Understanding loith Man." In this fragment he 
 supposes that all intelligent things are produced or 
 created ; and that everything which is produced of 
 this intellectual natiu'e, is possessed of an essential 
 character or quality. The understanding has the 
 power, by virtue of its own peculiar natm-e, to de- 
 tach this essential character from things, and make 
 it an object of abstraction. He concludes that the 
 human understanding is a uniform thing in all 
 mankind ; and that it is a separate and independent 
 thino' from matter in all its forms and modifica- 
 tions. It may be remarked here, that this writer's 
 notions are but very imperfectly expomided, and 
 seem shrouded in a more than usual portion of 
 mvsticism.* 
 
 * See IMalcolm's History of Persia; Journal des Savans, 1821 et 
 1822 ; Sufismus, sive Theosophiee Persarum Pantheistica. Berlin, 1821 ; 
 and Note J. at the end of the Volume.
 
 364 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 
 
 CHAPTER XXXIV. 
 
 THE CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 
 
 The origin of those speculative opinions, which 
 sprang from the minds of what are termed the Ca- 
 balistic Philosophers, is enveloped in great obscu- 
 rity. Several learned and lengthened controversies 
 have arisen out of their history, relative to their 
 precise opinions on many important doctrines which 
 they profess to discuss. It seems, however, to be 
 pretty generally considered at the present day, that 
 thek speculative views are a compound of theo- 
 logical, philosophical, and mystical opinions ; and 
 that a great portion of the attention which this sect 
 excited in their own day, as well as that which they 
 have subsequently obtained from modern histo- 
 rians, arose from the allegorical, mysterious, and 
 symbolical language in which they clothed all their 
 thoughts and principles. 
 
 The chief divisions of the Cabalistic doctrines are 
 the following. 
 
 Out of nothing, nothing can be produced; be- 
 cause the distance between existence and non-exist-
 
 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 365 
 
 ence is infinite. Matter, though achnitted to be 
 something, is an imperfect thing, and cannot he 
 self-existent. The Creator of all things is a Spirit, 
 eternal, uncreated, and of infinite intelligence, hav- 
 ing witlun itself all life and motion, as attributes 
 of its nature. This Creative Spirit fills all space, 
 and is called En-Soph, the Infinite Deity. This 
 spiritual power is the fountain of all created exist- 
 ences, which emanate from it, but are neverthe- 
 less united with it. The universe, and everything 
 we behold in it, is an emanation, which displays 
 the attributes and properties of this Pirst Cause to 
 human intelligence. 
 
 Anterior to creation, all space was filled mth 
 the Or Haen-Soph, or Infinite Intellectual Light. 
 When the Divine volition willed the creation of 
 nature, the eternal light hitherto difiiised through 
 infinite space, withdrew to an equal distance, in 
 every direction, from a central point, as a sphere 
 of operations where all things were to be created. 
 There are traces left in this vacated space of the 
 existence of the Divine essence, and these traces or 
 detached portions of Infinite Intelligence are to 
 l)ecome the seeds of future worlds. Erom a cer- 
 tain point in the concave surface of the eternal 
 Kght which envelops the opaque sphere, the crea- 
 tive emanation is first exerted, and the rays of in- 
 telligence or mind emerge in straight Knes into 
 the abyss of darkness or non-entity. This beam of 
 light effected a communication between creative 
 agency and non-entity, through the means of which 
 future worlds can be produced. Through the
 
 '^GQ CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 
 
 opening caused by this beam of light, various 
 streams of intelligence flow, in clivers distances 
 from the centre, and are separated from each other 
 by dark portions of space. There are ten of these 
 circles of light, which are called Sephir^ or 
 Splendoks. 
 
 The first emanation from the Living Eountain, 
 is the rectilineal beam, and this is the source of 
 all other emanations, or creative existences. This 
 rectilineal emanation is designated by the name of 
 Adam Caijmus, the first man, the primary effect 
 of Divine power, the Son of God. These Sephirse 
 are fountains from which flow every created thing 
 subordinate to this Adam Cadmus, and are named 
 in the following order : Intelligence, or the Crown, 
 Knowledge, Wisdom, Strength, Beauty, Greatness, 
 Glory, Stability, Victory, Dominion. These must 
 not, however, be considered in the light of mere 
 agents or instruments of the Divine operations, 
 but simply media though which creative energy 
 manifests its power. They are not detached por- 
 tions of the Divine Essence, but purely attributes, 
 virtues, or powers, possessing an individual but de- 
 pendent existence, through the mediation of Adam 
 Cadmus, the primary emanation. 
 
 In the Ensophic world, or world of infinity, there 
 are four inferior worlds or emanations, depending, 
 however, upon the superior one. These have ap- 
 propriate designations. Aziluth, is the world of 
 emanation which produces the Sephirse ; Brish, 
 embraces certain sj)iritual natures or forms which 
 derive their essence from the Sephirae; Jezirah,
 
 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 867 
 
 or the world of forms ; and Asiah, or the visible 
 and material world, comprehending every thing 
 susceptible of motion, composition, division, or de- 
 composition. 
 
 These derivative or secondary worlds may be 
 considered as evolutions or expansions of the Divine 
 nature, and possess more or less splendour, in pro- 
 portion to their distance from the centre of Eternal 
 Light. The last and most remote emanation is 
 MATTER, which is produced by a species of re-action 
 of the divine light, in receding from the fountain, 
 whereby it becomes so attenuated as to be absorbed 
 in darkness, and nothing but an opaque substance 
 is left as a residue. This matter or residue is only 
 one degree removed from non-entity. It has no 
 separate or independent existence, but is purely a 
 modification of the emanative power of the Eternal 
 Light. 
 
 These derivative or secondarv worlds have vari- 
 ous orders of creative beings. Those in Aziluth, 
 are superior to spirits, and are denomiated Persons. 
 The beinsrs of the second world are called Thrones, 
 on account of the authority they exercise over other 
 natures of an Angelic order, which inhabit the 
 third world. The fourth region is that devoted to 
 evil spirits, the refuse of emanation. These are 
 the Authors of evil ; but they are always aspiring 
 towards the Sephirse, and will, in the revolution of 
 ages, return once more into the fountain of Eternal 
 Light. 
 
 The human soul, which proceeds by emanation, 
 is of the same order as the Eternal Mind. When
 
 368 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 
 
 united with tlie body, it forms a complex creation, 
 endowed with reason, and capable of action. This 
 soul consists of four parts, the principle of vitality, 
 the principle of motion, the power of intelligence, 
 and the divine principle by which it can contem- 
 plate, and hold intercourse with, the Ensophic 
 world. 
 
 All souls were created at once, and existed in 
 the first emanation, Adam Cadmus. Every hu- 
 man soul has two guardian angels, created by 
 emanation at the time of the production of souls. 
 The human mind is connected with the Divine 
 nature, lilve the radii of a circle with their centre. 
 
 The Divine energy upholds all things. When 
 this energy is exerted, new forms of life and being 
 are produced ; when it is withheld or lies dormant, 
 the streams of life return again to their proper 
 fountain from whence they came.* 
 
 * See Enfield's His. Philo. Vol. 2. p. 220 ; Menasseh Ben Israel, De 
 Great, p. 27 ; Reimann, His. Theol. Jud. ; Budd, Introd. Philos. Heb. ; 
 Burgonovo, Select. Cabb. Dogm.; Basnage, Hist. ; Brucker, Hist. Crit. 
 Philos. ; Wolf, Bibliotheca Hsebr. ; Hottinger, Biblioth. Orient. ; Morus, 
 Fundamenta Philos. sive Cabbal. ; Helmont, Dialogi Cabalistici.
 
 ox THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 3G9 
 
 CHAPTEH XXXV. 
 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 
 
 The metaphysical opinions of the Jews after their 
 complete dispersion over almost every civilized 
 country in the world, are not of very great import- 
 tance. The principal service they rendered to mental 
 philosophy, was their diffusing the knowledge of 
 many of the speculative opinions of the Greeks, 
 among those nations they visited for the purposes 
 of mercantile traffic and gain. This tended in 
 many cases to keep alive an interest in those 
 ancient mental theories and systems, even among 
 a class of but comparatively learned people, and 
 very incompetent to appreciate, to the full extent, 
 their nature and worth. 
 
 At what precise time the Jews became acquainted 
 with the speculative philosophy of other eastern 
 nations, it is a difficult matter to determine. But 
 certain it is, that there were learned persons among 
 the Jews who obtained considerable notoriety for 
 their knowledge of foreign speculation, and for 
 their amalgamation of it with their own Hebrew 
 notions. Simon Magus, Dositheus, and Menander, 
 
 * 2b
 
 370 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE JEWS. 
 
 are instances of this. It is commonly affirmed 
 that they were all three well acquainted with 
 Oriental opinions as to the nature of Deity and 
 the human soul ; and that they zealously laboured 
 to form something approaching to systematical 
 theories, out of the miscellaneous and scattered 
 fragments of philosophy they had collected to- 
 gether, from divers eastern nations. 
 
 It is well known that the Jews were, at a later 
 period of their history, divided into several sects, 
 who grounded their differences in rites and ceremo- 
 nies upon certain speculative tenets. The chief of 
 these sects were the Sadducees, the Karseites, the 
 Pharisees, and the Essenes. The Sadducees main- 
 tained the materiality of the human soul. It died 
 with the body. Neither had angels or spirits any 
 separate existence from the corporeal frames or vest- 
 ments in which they were enveloped. They believed 
 in the existence of the true God, the supreme and 
 intelligent Governor of the universe. His perpe- 
 tual and providential care was also a tenet of their 
 creed. The human a\t11 was, however, free from 
 any interference or control from this cause ; and 
 this was the reason for the obligatory nature of all 
 moral and religious institutions. The homogene- 
 ous nature of man was a point they zealously main- 
 tained, without any conditions or compromise what- 
 ever.* 
 
 The speculative tenets of the Karseites were some- 
 what different from those of the Sadducees. The for- 
 mer affirmed that all created existences derived tlieir 
 
 * Josei)lms. DeBfll. J 1. 2 o V2.
 
 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 371 
 
 Origin from an uncreated and eternal Deity, to whom 
 they bear no resemblance whatever. The Supreme 
 Being rules and governs every thing ; the human 
 mind is under His influence to a certain extent, 
 but at the same time its voluntary powers and ener- 
 gies are maintained to their full extent unimpaired. 
 The human soul is immortal, and, if virtuous, goes 
 after death to dwell with celestial intelligence for 
 ever ; but if unworthy and wicked, is subjected to 
 suffering and disgrace.* 
 
 The Pharisees were a powerful and influential 
 sect among the Jews. Their metaphysical opinions 
 were that the universe is the work of one intelligent 
 and eternal God, who governs all things by the 
 word of his power. Man is under the divine in- 
 fluence, but still his will is free to act. The soul 
 is spiritual and immortal, and will be rewarded in 
 a future life accordins^ to merits or demerits in this 
 life. There are other spiritual existences besides 
 man ; as good and bad angels. f 
 
 The opinions of the Essenes were that the hu- 
 man soul was immortal, that it was constituted of 
 a very subtile kind of ether ; that it was in a state 
 of exile or imprisonment in this earthly body ; and 
 that when it was released by death, it would, if 
 good, wing its way to celestial and happy regions 
 beyond the ocean, and, if bad, to where there was 
 unceasing lamentation and woe. The Deity, by in- 
 finite wisdom, created all things, and by His provi- 
 dential care maintains and supports them. I 
 
 * R. Japhet. Lev. Conf. Wolf. Bill. Heh. 
 
 t JosepliTis. Ant. .Tud. 1. \3. c. 9. + Josephus. De Bell. J. 1. 2. c 12. 
 
 2 B 2
 
 372 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 
 
 After the destruction of Jerusalem, and tlie dis- 
 persion of its inhabitants, little is known of the 
 speculations of the learned among the Jews. Their 
 peculiar philosophical notions seem, for a long pe- 
 riod, to have been buried in oblivion. It is stated, 
 however, that so early as the year one hundred and 
 thirty-eight of our era, a Jewish school was estab- 
 lished by Akibha, at Lydda or Dioscopolis, and 
 that he had as many as twenty-four thousand stu- 
 dents.* The peculiar opinions he held Avere sup- 
 posed to have been a compound of Pythagorean and 
 Cabalistic speculations ; but we have no detailed 
 account of them. After Akibha, Simeon Ben Ja- 
 chai flourished, at the commencement of the third 
 century, and taught the Cabalistic doctrines with 
 great pojoularity among the Jewish people.! After 
 this we hear almost nothing of the public teaching 
 of this peculiar nation, until the beginning of the 
 tenth century, when the Schools of Sora and Pum- 
 beditha were renovated under the auspices of Uabbi 
 Saadias Gaon, a native of Egypt, well skilled in 
 most of the philosophical opinions and systems which 
 had been promulgated for many centuries previous 
 in the Alexandrian Academy. | This Jewish writer 
 composed two works, one called " The Philosopher's 
 Stone," and the other " A Compendium of Jewish 
 Theology ;" the latter illustrated at great length by 
 a series of abstract and logical statements and 
 proofs. 
 
 * Zemncli David, ad An. IMiindi. .'57(10. Dayle. Liglitfoot, Hor. Heb. 
 t 2. ]). 4A^). 
 . t Woir.Bib : Hel). Chap. 1. j.. 70:.'. + Gauzii Zemach David, p. 51.
 
 EBEN EZRA. — MOSES MAIMONIDES. 373 
 
 Through the influence of the Arabians and Chris- 
 tians, the Jews became acquainted with the Greek 
 philosophy, particularly the works of Aristotle. This 
 gave, in some measure, a new impulse and direc- 
 tion to theu' speculative labours and views. Seve- 
 ral learned men sprang up amongst them, who dis- 
 played great natural aptness for general philoso- 
 phical and mental speculations. 
 
 Eben Ezra. 
 
 This was a very learned and talented Jew, in 
 Spain, who flourished about the middle of the 
 twelth century, and who cultivated an acquaintance 
 with many branches of philosophy. He was a native 
 of Toledo, and his contemporaries conferred upon 
 him the name of the " admirable," on account of 
 his varied and profound acquirements. In his writ- 
 ings, he treats of philosophy, astronomy, medicine, 
 poetry, grammar, theology, and the interpretation 
 of the sacred books of the Cabalistic Science. 
 
 MosES Maimonides. 
 
 This philosopher was a native of Cordova, in 
 Spain, and had studied all the Grecian metaphysics, 
 with great attention and success. Among his own 
 sect of the Jews, he excited a spirit of opposition ; 
 and a charge was brought against him of having 
 imbibed some of the doctrines and opinions of 
 Islamism. On this account, he fled from Spain 
 to Egypt. He established a philosophical school at
 
 374^ ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 
 
 Caii'o, where his fame soon procured him a large 
 crowd of students and admirers. 
 
 A very just remark was made by this learned 
 man, relative to the study of theology, which has 
 called forth imqualiiied approbation from sound 
 thinkers of almost every age since his day. " The- 
 ology," says he, " ought to be preceded by the 
 study of other philosophical branches of knowledge. 
 God can be known only by his works, and the in- 
 vestigation of the laws of nature is the route which 
 will conduct our reason to Him." 
 
 Maimonides was the author of a work on Logic, 
 called Miloth Higayon. This treatise was origi- 
 nally written in Arabic, but was afterwards trans- 
 lated into Hebrew, by Moses Eben Tibbon. Mai- 
 monides follows Aristotle's method, though he en- 
 deavours to make it applicable to his own peculiar 
 theological views. 
 
 Tliis learned Jew was also the writer of a work 
 On Psychology, in which the various powers and 
 faculties of the mind are examined and commented 
 on. This work presents a curious medley of no- 
 tions ; and is, on the whole, the most unintelligible 
 of all Maimonides' speculations.* 
 
 *** See Zeltner, Diss, de Beruria, Altdorf, 1/14 ; Rabbi Moses Mik- 
 kozi ; Zeraach David, Hist. Misha. and the writings of Wolf, Basnage, 
 Rowland, Lightfoot, Hottinger, Buddaeus, and Prideaux. 
 
 * See Scheycr's " Psychology of Maimonides," Frankfort, 1H45.
 
 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 375 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVI. 
 
 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND, AS RECOG- 
 NISED BY PHILOSOPHERS UP TO THE NINTH 
 CENTURY. 
 
 At this point of the liistory of mental philosophy, 
 we shall make a few remarks upon the different 
 faculties of the mind, which metaphysicians have 
 noticed, and attempted in their writings to define. 
 The number and names of these faculties have oc- 
 casionally undergone changes, in accordance with 
 divers general theoretical systems ; but still we 
 shall be able to give such an outKne, as will answer 
 the purpose of fixing the reader's attention upon the 
 more obvious divisions of our intellectual structure. 
 
 The operation which has generally been recog- 
 nised by almost all previous writers, is that of per- 
 ception. There has been great uniformity in the 
 language employed, to describe the nature and 
 limits of this faculty. There can be no act of per- 
 ception unless the mind receives an impression 
 from external objects. This seems to have been
 
 376 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 
 
 unanimously agreed to by all reasoners. This power 
 has sometimes been considered under two aspects ; 
 the one mediate and the other immediate. When, 
 for example, we read a book, the letters are what 
 we perceive mimedlately ; while the ideas which 
 are signified by them are what may be considered 
 as perceived mediately. 
 
 It is clear from the speculations of almost every 
 writer on the mind, up to this stage of history, that 
 perception claimed and obtained priority of con- 
 sideration before any other mental power. It is 
 also well known, that whatever opinion there might 
 be entertained by different sects of philosophers, as 
 to the evidence which perception affords us to arrive 
 at truth, or to form a decision as to a knowledge 
 of things, there never was any doubt but that it 
 was really and truly through the influence of our 
 organs of perception, that we owed all the informa- 
 tion we had of external nature. 
 
 The next important faculty of the mind noticed 
 and discussed by the ancient philosophers was that 
 of memory. This fills an important office in their 
 ideas of the mental economy. It consists in re- 
 taining those simple and complex ideas or notions, 
 which Ave receive from sensation and reflexion. 
 Aristotle and others paid great attention to this 
 power. Its mode of operation was well observed 
 by nearly all the ancients ; and the various degrees 
 of retention enjoyed among men, were accurately 
 noticed, in the very early periods of intellectual 
 history. Memory was seen under two phases ; the 
 one merely keeping the idea for some time before
 
 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 377 
 
 it, dwelling upon it, and turning it, as it were, 
 over on every side. This was called contempla- 
 tion ; and the same term is used now to express this 
 phenomenon of memory. We have again another 
 form of memory, namely, the power of reviving 
 certain past ideas or trains of thought, after they 
 have been for a long period absent from the mind's 
 perception. The Grecian philosophers dwelt often 
 on this exhibition of memory ; and seem to have 
 marked the laws of recurrence with great accuracy. 
 They considered memory as a kind of store-house 
 or repository of ideas or notions. Our language 
 of the present day, is strikingly expressive of the 
 same thing. 
 
 TVliat are called the laios of memory were accu- 
 rately and scientifically investigated by the ancient 
 metaphysicians. The modes in which they dis- 
 cussed their philosophical principles led them by a 
 direct route to pay great attention to those laws. 
 Attention and repetition were found powerful as- 
 sistants to remembrance. When attention becomes 
 interestedly and intensely fixed, retention and ac- 
 curacy are the necessary results ; and repetition 
 formed in ancient times, as it does now, an ex- 
 ercise of the highest importance in the divers plans 
 of scientific and ordinarv education. 
 
 In all the historical epochs of philosophy, we 
 find certain plans and suggestions for aiding and 
 strengthening the power of memory. The every- 
 day practical importance of the faculty, naturally 
 gave rise to these projects for increasing its power 
 and usefulness. Cicero speaks of artificial means
 
 378 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 
 
 of strengtliening the retentive principle, and that 
 he found them of service in his own case, in the 
 delivering of his public orations. Several other 
 distinguished men of antiquity availed themselves 
 of these mechanical aids to remembrance. 
 
 Of all the ancients, Aristotle seems to have 
 viewed memory in its widest signification. His 
 rules and definitions of it became quite philosophical 
 canons in succeeding ages ; and we find, throughout 
 all the scholastic writings, his notions of this men- 
 tal power were invariably adopted by the school- 
 men of all parties. 
 
 The judgment was an important intellectual 
 power among the ancient pliilosophers. They did 
 not define it very accurately; but it seemed to 
 stand for that prompt internal perception of truth, 
 which results from a calm and dispassionate consi- 
 deration of evidence. Among the sceptical sects of 
 antiquity, we seldom find suspicion thrown upon 
 the judgment itself, but chiefly on the materials 
 which were supposed to be submitted to its notice, 
 through the channel of the external senses. The 
 power itself generally escaped unscathed; and where 
 there was doubt as to the reality of its determina- 
 tions, that doubt was attriljuted, by the Scej^tics, 
 to deceptive elements thrown in the path of the 
 judgment, to warp or distort its decisions. 
 
 Judgment was often denominated a perceiving 
 or discerning of truth ; just as we speak, in ordi- 
 nary language, of that power at the present time. 
 The various kinds of judgment, or rather, perhaps, 
 the various topics on which it was exercised, were
 
 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 379 
 
 often subjects of remark and observation among- 
 the ancients; and distinctive names or epithets 
 were given to these efforts of the judgment, when 
 directed to particular departments of knowledge. 
 
 Abstraction was a power of the mind which the 
 earliest metaphysicians recognised. They consider- 
 ed it much in the same light as we do at present. 
 With them, as wdth us, it was the withdrawal of 
 an idea or general notion from others with which 
 it might be accidentally or necessarily connected, 
 and considering it apart. The mathematical stu- 
 dies of the ancients were highly instrumental in 
 bringing this faculty of the mind perpetually before 
 them, and of impressing them with a lively convic- 
 tion of its great usefulness and importance. 
 
 Reasoning, in the general opinion of the ancients, 
 was related more intimately to the dialectic art, 
 than to the judgment. Reasoning was of a more 
 light and artistic character than the latter. Gra- 
 vity and circiunspection were the characteristics of 
 the judgment. Reasoning, on the contrary, seemed 
 not to have much necessary connection with truth, 
 and not by any means to possess a very lively and 
 disinterested affection for her. Mere reasoners were 
 always plentiful, and to be found every where, and 
 ready armed upon all questions ; but men of judg- 
 ment were more rare. E/casoning often coquetted 
 with error, but judgment showed more steadiness 
 and fidelity. The former often brought temporary 
 discredit upon philosophy by attempting to show 
 " the weaker to be the stronger reason ;" but the 
 power of the judgment was a prudent and faithful
 
 380 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 
 
 friend, whose opinion was always valuable, and car- 
 ried lasting esteem and respect with it. 
 
 Imagination was a well known and universally 
 recognised faculty of the mind among the ancients. 
 It stands prominently out from the other faculties, 
 and enjoys a more striking individuality of charac- 
 ter. It is the source of many pleasures and pains, 
 and exercises a powerful influence on the weal or 
 woe of mankind. This the olden philosophers were 
 not slow to perceive ; but I think we have no very 
 decided evidence to show, that they were so fuUy 
 sensible of the immense power of this faculty, in 
 contributing to our rational pleasures, as more mo- 
 dern speculators on the mind have proved them- 
 selves to be. The cultivation of imaginative excel- 
 lencies in the last two centuries, has far exceeded 
 anything which the ancients ever performed, or 
 had any conception could be achieved. 
 
 But perhaps the most common division of the 
 mental faculties which the ancient metaphysicians 
 made, was that which placed them under two 
 classes, — those of the understanding^ and those of 
 the icill. We meet with this classification every 
 way, in the history of philosophy. And we cannot 
 help suspecting that this division must have pre- 
 sented some obvious advantages, or been considered 
 as the most natural arrangement, when we find it 
 so generally adopted. At bottom, the faculties of 
 the understanding and the icill stand for those 
 which we in modern times call the intellectual and 
 actioe powers of man. Our mode of treating and 
 illustrating these does not differ from that adopted
 
 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 381 
 
 by the ancient sages of Greece, nor from that 
 which all the Fathers of the Church recognised. 
 
 And it may be observed, in passing, that there is 
 notlimg in nature more distinctly marked than the 
 active and contemplative powers of the mind, There 
 is no mistake about their respective modes of ac- 
 tion ; but there is a great variety of human cha- 
 racter resulting from the irregular manner in which 
 they are distributed among mankind. The active 
 and speculative powers are never found in full per- 
 fection in any single individual. Indeed this is 
 impossible ; for it falls little short of demanding 
 that a man should be moving and still, at one and 
 the same moment. Wherever a mind is naturally 
 inclined to speculation or contemplation, there is a 
 corresponding depression of his active energies ; 
 and, on the other hand, where physical and men- 
 tal activity is the prominent feature, there the spe- 
 culative powers become correspondingly inert. And 
 this is a wise and providential arrangement. It 
 seems impossible to conceive how the affairs of the 
 world could be carried on, were this not the case. 
 The most profound and the most important specu- 
 lative principles or systems would l^e a dead letter, 
 if they were not matm^ed and nourished by the 
 every-day active powers of the mass of mankind. 
 And again, if action Avere not regulated and guided 
 by contemplative minds, no beneficial end could 
 be attained. 
 
 In discussing systems of education, the active 
 and speculative powers of individuals should be 
 carefully studied. The active greatly preponderate
 
 382 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 
 
 over the passive or contemplative powers. Still 
 they ought both to be provided for in all compre- 
 hensive schemes of instruction, either public or 
 private. If this be neglected, or imperfectly at- 
 tended to, no happy result can possibly follow.
 
 REMARKS ON FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 383 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVII. 
 
 GENERAL REMARKS ON FACULTIES OF THE MIND, 
 AND OF WHAT MAY BE URGED AGAINST THEIR 
 INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE, NATURE, AND OPERA- 
 TION. 
 
 It must be obvious to every reader of the history 
 of mental philosophy, that there were, in almost 
 every age, a small number of persons Avho seemed 
 inclined to adopt the absolute unity, or singleness 
 of the mind of man. It is difficult to emT)ody the 
 general arguments for this opinion, principally 
 from their extreme subtility, and the imperfections 
 of language. But the fact is quite clear, that the 
 usual doctrine of separate faculties, was not very 
 cordially embraced by some, at least, of the emi- 
 nent sages of antiquity. 
 
 As this abstract question is interesting to all 
 expounders of metaphysical doctrines, I shall state 
 what I conceive to be the chief arguments against 
 distinct faculties or powers of the mind. This 
 shall be done fully, without confining myself to 
 what may be considered as the exclusive opinions
 
 384 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 of the ancients on this point. Allusions to modern 
 writers and modern opinions will be made, in order 
 that the reader may have as full a view of the 
 arguments on each side, as I am able to furnish. 
 I beg to state, however, that I do not wish to have 
 the following observations considered as my own 
 individual sentiments on this subject ; but simply 
 as conveying a few thoughts on a mental hypo- 
 thesis opposite to that which is most commonly 
 adopted by writers on the human mind. 
 
 Judging from a cursory glance, there appears to 
 be little foundation for the doctrine of distinct or 
 separate faculties of the mind. Were it composed 
 or made up of parts or principles independent of 
 each other, we should instantly be able to recog- 
 nise them, and point out their specific differences, 
 as readily as we do between an arm or a leg of our 
 own bodies. When we attend carefully, however, 
 to what passes in our own mind, and l)ring the 
 matter in dispute to the test of consciousness, we 
 can perceive no real difference between many men- 
 tal operations which are commonly referred to dis- 
 tinct faculties. Let us take a case for illustration. 
 Almost all metaphysicians agree that judgment 
 and imagination are very different powers from 
 each other. But in what does that difference con- 
 sist ? What is it that constitutes them two dis- 
 tinct faculties ? Can theii* specific differences be 
 clearly pointed out ? I think not. When a person 
 proposes, for example, a question to me, that two 
 and three make five, I readily solve it ; but I can- 
 not do this without bringing to my recollection
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 385 
 
 (by an effort similar to that which is called imagi- 
 nation) what the terms two and three stand for. 
 Now what is this effort of the mind which suggests 
 the ideas we have attached to the words tioo and 
 three ? Is it not the same mental power as that 
 which forms other combinations which are usually 
 referred to imag-ination ? Let any one attend to 
 what passes in his own mind, when he goes over 
 again a»y simple proposition in geometry without 
 having the diagram before him. He will perceive 
 that he cannot take a single step in the process of 
 demonstration without employing what is termed 
 the faculty of imagination. At first he will form a 
 conception of the diagram ; and then commence to 
 show the numerous relations which subsist between 
 the divers parts of it. But the same mental power 
 which is here employed, may also be perceived, 
 when a person desires me to furnish him with 
 an account of an accident which befel a mutual 
 friend in America, or any other distant part of the 
 world. The ideas a1)out which the mind is em- 
 ployed in these two cases are very different ; but 
 still that faculty of the mind by which I solve the 
 geometrical problem, and that by whicli I give an 
 account of the accident which befel my friend, 
 seem, as far as the testimony of consciousness goes, 
 to be one and the same. When the request is 
 made to give a faithful account of the accident in 
 question, I immediately form a conception of my 
 friend's person, similar to what I do of the dia- 
 gram; and then begin to relate the various and 
 serious circumstances attending the accident, by the 
 * 2 c
 
 386 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 same mental processes, to all appearance, which 
 were used in solving the proposition in geometry. 
 
 Shall we say, then, there is no difference be- 
 tween imagination and judgment ; two faculties 
 which have been distinguished by mankind in all 
 ages ? The true answer to this question, I appre- 
 hend, is, that though mankind have always made 
 such a distinction in our mental nomenclature, yet 
 that distinction arises solely from the circumstance 
 that the ideas the mind is employed about, are 
 (if I may be allowed such phraseology) true in the 
 one case, and false in the other; or in other 
 words, that real and fictitious representations con- 
 stitute the onlv difference between these two men- 
 tal powers. Even philosophers themselves point 
 out no palpable distinction, save what arises from 
 the truth or falsehood of the ideas employed in 
 both cases. A writer, for example, who gives an 
 account of any transaction just as it happened, 
 without adding the slightest colourable circum- 
 stance, (if ever such a T^a^iter did exist), would be 
 called, in the language of philosophical criticism, a 
 Avriter without any imagination. Another author, 
 however, w^ho gives a description of the same trans- 
 action, but amplifies and distorts every incident 
 which really took place, would be called a man 
 of a fine and lively imagination. But what is the 
 difference between them ? Only this, that the one 
 gives, or is supposed to give, a real representation 
 of facts ; and the other, a fictitious one, or at least 
 a narrative mixed with a goodly portion of fictitious 
 circumstances.
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 387 
 
 It appears, then, that the word imagination is 
 employed by mankind to denote what has no foun- 
 dation in truth ; and this is all they mean when 
 they speak about the faculty of imagination. We 
 very frequently find, when we A^dsh to convince 
 individuals of the truth of any proposition in na- 
 tural or moral philosophy, with which they are 
 previously unacquainted, and which seems contrary 
 to their experience, they will immediately charge 
 you with dealing in fiction, and employing the fa- 
 culty of imagination instead of that of reasoning. 
 Why ought the exercise of the imagination to be 
 so strictly guarded against in philosophical disqui- 
 sitions ? Why the philosopher will tell you, be- 
 cause it would lead you from the truth. 
 
 The word imagination may also be considered, 
 in many cases, as only another word for invention, 
 mien a man sits do^\Ti to A^Tite a novel or a play, 
 he must be conscious, if he be capable, or in the 
 habit, of reflectmg on what passes in his mind, that 
 he employs no other intellectual faculty than if he 
 were to sit doA\Ti and write a book on metaphysics, 
 or any other branch of philosophy, in which inven- 
 tion is said chiefly to be employed. By way of illus- 
 tration : to say that the one author has invented a 
 novel or a play, and of the other that he has imagined 
 a book on metaphysics, would be a departure from 
 both common and philosophical language, but it 
 would be no very absurd statement of the fact ; 
 and the phrase would enable us to form as correct 
 notions respecting the faculty by which the former 
 author composed his novel or play, or the latter 
 
 2c 2
 
 388 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 his treatise on the miiicl, as if we were to use the 
 common phraseology that the novelist had been 
 exercising his imagination, and the metaphysician 
 his invention. 
 
 It may be objected to these observations, that 
 imagination, and what in some systems of men- 
 tal philosophy is called conception, are here con- 
 founded together. But I would observe, that their 
 difference has not been clearly pointed out, even 
 by those who have so ably and zealously contended 
 they were distinct faculties. Mr. Dugald Stewart, 
 in his chapter on Conception,* says, " The business 
 of conception, according to the account I have 
 given of it, is to present us with an exact transcript 
 of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, 
 moreover, a power of modifjdng our conceptions, 
 by combining the parts of different ones together 
 so as to form new wholes of our o^vn creation. I 
 I shall employ the word imagination to express 
 this power ; and I apprehend that this is the pro- 
 per sense of the word, if imagination be the power 
 which gives birth to the productions of the poet 
 and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of 
 the mind. It pre-supposes abstraction, to sej)arate 
 from each other qualities and circumstances which 
 have been perceived in conjunction ; and also judg- 
 ment and taste to direct us in forming the combi- 
 nations. If they are made wholly at random, they 
 are proofs of insanity." A little farther on in the 
 chapter he says, " A talent for lively description, 
 
 * Philosophy of the lliimnn Mind. Vol. 1. p. VAb.
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 389 
 
 at least in the case of sensible objects, depends 
 chiefly on the degree in which the describer pos- 
 sesses the power of conception." — " Nor is it merely 
 to the accuracy of our descriptions that this power 
 is subservient ; it contributes more than any thing 
 else to render them striking and expressive to 
 others, by guiding us to a selection of such circum- 
 stances as are most prominent and characteristic ; 
 insomuch that I think it may reasonably be doubted 
 if a person would not write a happier description of 
 an object from the conception, than from the actual 
 perception of it. It has been remarked, that the per- 
 fection of description does not consist in a minute 
 specification of circumstances, but in a judicious 
 selection of them ; and that the best rule for making 
 the selection is, to attend to the particulars that 
 make the deepest impression on our own minds." 
 
 Conception, according to the above, is that fa- 
 culty which presents us with an exact transcript of 
 what we have felt or perceived ; and the power of 
 modifying our conceptions is called imagination, 
 which is not a simple faculty, for it pre-supposes 
 abstraction, judgment, and taste. Now, if a talent 
 for lively description arises from possessing the 
 power of conception in a high degree, and this 
 power is said to present us with an exact transcript 
 of what we have felt or perceived, how can we con- 
 sistently say that, in exercising this faculty, we 
 make a ^^ judicious selection'' of our feelings ? Does 
 not ^ ^\judicious selection'"' ^vQ-s\ii\)])0'&Q the exer- 
 cise of abstraction, judgment, and taste ? Surely.
 
 390 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 Then wherein does the difference lie between ima- 
 gination and conception ? 
 
 It is said that tliese faculties of the mind, sucli 
 as judgment, imagination, memory, and taste, never 
 exert their power separately, but are always more 
 or less combined with one another. There is no 
 reasoning without memory ; and there can be no 
 taste without imagination, judgment, and memory. 
 If this be the case, how can we ascertain the exist- 
 ence of any mental faculties at all ? If these facul- 
 ties are never perceived in a simple form, we can 
 never be certain that there are any independent 
 faculties whatever. Wliat should we think of a 
 chemist who should strenuously maintain that a 
 certain substance was composed of a number of 
 other substances, T^diich he might call primary 
 ones, when the substance in question had resisted 
 all the chemical processes hitherto known to de- 
 compose it ? 
 
 Mr. Locke appears to have been fully aware of 
 the impropriety of talking about the faculties of 
 the mind, and of the difficulty of proving their 
 existence. In one place he says,* " But the fault 
 has been that faculties have been spoken of and 
 represented as so many distinct agents ; for it being 
 asked, what it was that digested the meat on our 
 stomachs, it was a ready and very satisfactory an- 
 swer to say, that it was the digestive faculty . What 
 was it that made anything come out of the body ? 
 
 * Kssay on the Human Understanding, "^'ol. 1 . book 2. chap. 21 .
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 391 
 
 T\iQ expulsive faculty. What moyed ? Hha motive 
 faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual fa- 
 culty, or the understanding understood ; for fa- 
 culty, ability, and power, I think, are hut different 
 names for the same things ; which ways of speak- 
 ing, when put in more intelligihle words, will, I 
 think, amount to thus much ; — that digestion is 
 performed by something that is able to digest; 
 motion, by something able to move ; and under- 
 standing, by something able to understand." 
 
 It may be alleged, that though we can form no 
 abstract notion of the faculties of the mind, any 
 more than we can form an abstract notion of the 
 principle of gravitation, or of the screw or the lever, 
 yet the hypothesis, which is founded on the exist- 
 ence of independent mental faculties, may be fa- 
 vourable to a proper classification of intellectual 
 phenomena, and may assist us in our researches of 
 the mind, in the same way as the principle of gra- 
 vitation, of which we have no conception, has been 
 instrumental in aiding us in our physical investiga- 
 tions. To this it may be replied, that it is a very 
 doubtful proposition that gratuitous principles can 
 ever be instrumental in the discovery of truth — the 
 end and object of all pliilosophy. It is an establish- 
 ed maxim with those philosophers who maintain 
 the doctrine of mental faculties, that we ought to 
 be very cautious in reasoning from material pheno- 
 mena to those of the mind, for we may fancy there 
 is an analogy in a case where, for any thing we can 
 tell, there may not be the slightest resemblance. 
 Therefore, if we have taken a principle for granted
 
 392 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 in our physical researches, of which we have no 
 idea, we are not fully warranted in doing the same 
 in investigating the human mind ; for such a mode 
 of proceeding would lead to the grossest ahsurdities. 
 Why are Hartley's System of Vibrations and Aris- 
 totle's Ideal System rejected by many modern phi- 
 losophers ? Because in the one case, we cannot 
 perceive any vibrations ; and in the other, are not 
 conscious of any images, or forms, or species of ex- 
 ternal objects being transmitted by the channel of 
 the senses to the immediate seat of thought. Upon 
 the same principle of reasoning, why ought we to 
 say that there are distinct faculties of the mind, 
 when these faculties cannot be perceived. 
 
 The fact seems to be, that philosophers in gene- 
 ral have called certain kinds of ideas, and their 
 various combinations, by the name of faculties, with- 
 out ascertaining the existence, or informing us of the 
 nature of those faculties or powers, by which these 
 ideas are generated, and their combination effected. 
 A knowledge of the faculties and powers seems evi- 
 dently above the reach of human sagacity. The 
 great progress the science of natui*al philosophy 
 has made, is chiefly ascribed to that mode of reason- 
 ing which, recommended by Bacon, commences with 
 an examination of facts, and gradually mounts up 
 to the more general laws of nature. But the phi- 
 losophy of the human mind does not seem to be 
 capable of receiving much aid by a similar mode of 
 investigation. We can only view the mind in a 
 naked state. We are beings that are conscious 
 of ideas, or feelings, or perceptions, and this is all
 
 FACULTIES or THE MIND. 393 
 
 we know of our minds ; and whatever may be urged 
 in favour of general laws or principles of the mind, 
 the existence of such laws or princijiles must be 
 always problematical at best ; for we can never be 
 conscious of their mode of operation; and what we 
 are not conscious of, we have little grounds to be- 
 lieve can have any existence. 
 
 There is a great difference in prosecuting the 
 study of natural or experimental pliilosophy, and 
 the philosophy of the human mind. In the for- 
 mer, a person may be put in possession of the va- 
 rious improvements and discoveries that have been 
 made during many ages, without undergoing a 
 hundredth part of the bodily and mental toil that 
 was found necessaiT before the orio^inal inventors 
 could bring these improvements and discoveries to 
 light. But in the science of the human mind there 
 has no method been yet found to facilitate, in an 
 equal degree, the knowledge of discoveries in this 
 department of human inquiry. As much time and 
 attention are frequently necessary to enable us to 
 form correct notions of intellectual appearances, 
 treated of by metaphysical writers, as would bring 
 these appearances to our view by our own individual 
 and unassisted efforts. 
 
 There are many causes of this difference. One 
 of the principal, however, is, that no one can un- 
 derstand what another writes on metaphysics un- 
 less he has pre\dously learned the art of scrutinizing 
 his own thoughts ; or, as some say, of exercising 
 his own consciousness. This art bears, in a great 
 measure, the same relation to the science of the
 
 394 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 raind, as experiment does to natural philosophy. 
 To many it is an art hoth difficult in its attainment 
 and difficult in its practice. But it is necessary ; 
 and until a person has learned it, and can practise 
 it with ease and dexterity, he cannot reasonahly 
 hope to reap much pleasure or improvement from 
 perusing treatises on the human mind. Without 
 this preliminary knowledge, such writings must 
 necessarily appear almost unintelligihle, and will 
 speedily disgust the reader with a constant repeti- 
 tion of words and phrases to which he can attach 
 no clear or definite notions ; and which cannot 
 fail to produce disappointment, inasmuch as they 
 pretend to he descriptive of mental operations, whose 
 existence, for want of reflecting on his own mind, 
 he is unahle to perceive. 
 
 To those, however, who are in the hahit of exer- 
 cising their consciousness, I suhmit the few fol- 
 lowing observations on abstraction. I know they 
 will differ from the opinions of many eminent phi- 
 losophers of the present day ; but in inquiries of 
 this nature, authority considered merely as such, 
 however great and weighty, must go for nothing, 
 where not supported by the evidence of conscious- 
 ness. It is to this power that all appeals must 
 be made for determinino; the truth or falsehood of 
 propositions in metaphysics ; for without such a 
 tribunal, this science would soon relapse into that 
 state of comparative confusion, from which it has 
 so lately been rescued. 
 
 It appears to me that general principles, which 
 are said to be formed by the faculty of abstrac-
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 395 
 
 tion, are nothing but certain words representing a 
 number of individual thoughts, perceptions, or, if 
 you will, observations ; and that it requires no 
 other faculty to speak or think of such general 
 principles, than to speak or think of any one of 
 the individual thoughts or perceptions that com- 
 pose them. All projected bodies, for example, have 
 a tendency to fall to earth again. This is a general 
 principle in natural philosophy, and is formed, it is 
 commonly said, by abstraction. But when we come 
 to examine how the mind arrives at this conclusion 
 or general principle, we shall see there is nothing 
 that ought to induce us to attribute its formation 
 to any other operation of the mind than that by 
 which we perceive and speak about individual ob- 
 jects. Let us suppose a being possessed of all the 
 susceptibilities of knowledge which we possess, to 
 make his appearance on this globe. The first 
 time he saw a stone thrown up into the air, he 
 would 2)e)^cewe that after a certain time had elapsed, 
 it would fall again to the ground. A second time 
 he would perceive the same result ; and if similar 
 experiments were made with projected bodies a 
 thousand times with different substances, and "with 
 different velocities, he would perceive the same 
 effect, that all these bodies would ultimately return 
 to the earth from whence they were thrown. Hence 
 he would conclude, that all projected bodies would 
 return to the earth again : which is nothing more 
 than an expression of a number of individual per- 
 ceptions. — The first time he saAV the stone fall, it 
 was, agreeably to the common theory, by the faculty
 
 396 GENERAL ilEMARKS ON 
 
 of perception ; and is there not every reason to 
 believe that the last time, as well as the interme- 
 diate ones, were perceived by the same power ? 
 
 In like manner, it may also be slio^vn, that 
 general principles in morals and politics are formed 
 in the same way as the preceding. When we say 
 that all men are more or less influenced in their 
 actions by self-love, we only mean that we, as well 
 as others, have always perceived that the greater 
 part of the exertions of mankind tend to the grati- 
 fication of some passion or appetite. Unless the 
 individual observations, on which general principles 
 are founded, have come under our view, we cannot 
 be said to understand them, or give a rational 
 assent to them. On the contrary, in proportion to 
 the number of our indi^ddual observations, the 
 truth of such moral principles will be more uni- 
 versally acknowledged. 
 
 The resemblance and disagreement among the 
 objects of nature form the foundation on which all 
 abstract or general reasoning is built. But the 
 mere circumstance of the mind expressing a re- 
 semblance or analogy among a number of indi- 
 vidual objects, cannot warrant us in maintaining 
 there is any other faculty employed for tliis pur- 
 pose, than that which enables us to affirm or deny 
 any thing about any individual object of thought 
 or perception. Here is certainly a difference of 
 effect, but if we attend to our consciousness, no 
 difference of cause is observable. The perception 
 of reseml)lance of colour, for instance, between two 
 or more objects, is perceived as quickly, and is
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 397 
 
 as much an individual object of thought, as the 
 figure, density, or any other quality of the objects. 
 That faculty by which we perceive the figure and 
 other qualities, and that by which we perceive the 
 resemblance of colour, must, I think, be considered 
 as one and the same. 
 
 The manner in which general terms are said to 
 originate, throws no light upon the faculty of 
 abstraction. The commonly received theory of the 
 origin of these terms is that mentioned by Locke, 
 Condillac, and Adam Smith. The last author, in a 
 Dissertation on Languages, prefixed to his Tlieory 
 of Moral Sentiments, says; "The assignation of 
 particular names to denote particular objects — that 
 is, the institution of nouns substantial, would pro- 
 bably be one of the first steps towards the forma- 
 tion of language. The particular cave, whose cover- 
 ing sheltered the savage from the weather ; the 
 particular tree, whose fruit relieved his hunger ; the 
 particular fountain whose water allayed his thirst, 
 would first be denominated by the words cave, 
 tree, fountain ; or, by whatever other appellations 
 he might think proper, in that primitive jargon, 
 to mark them. Afterwards when the more en- 
 larged experience of this savage had led him to 
 observe, and his necessary occasions obliged him to 
 make mention of, other caves, and other trees, and 
 other fountains, he would naturally bestow upon 
 each of those new objects, the same name by which 
 he had been accustomed to express the similar he 
 was first acquainted with. And thus these words, 
 which were originally the proper names of indivi-
 
 398 . GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 duals, would each of them insensibly become the 
 common name of a multitude. What constitutes 
 a species ^^'' he continues, " is merely a number of 
 objects bearing a certain degree of resemblance to 
 one another ; and, on that account, denominated 
 by a single appellation, which may be applied to 
 express any one of them," Condillac also says,* 
 " A child calls by the name of tree, the first tree 
 which we show him. A second tree which he sees 
 recals to him the same idea, and he designates it 
 by the same name ; he gives the same name to a 
 third, the same to a fourth. Thus we find that the 
 word tree, applied at first to an individual object, 
 becomes the name of a class or genus, an abstract 
 idea,t comprehending all trees in general." 
 
 There is nothing in these passages respecting the 
 origin of general names that requires any other fa- 
 culty than that which treats of individual objects. 
 What constitutes a species, says Mr. Smith, is 
 only a single name given to a number of objects 
 bearing a certain degree of similarity to one an- 
 other. But why should we suppose that a different 
 faculty is required to give a name to an individual 
 
 * " Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le i^remier arbre que nous lui 
 montrons. — Un second arbre qu'il voit ensuite lui rappelle la meme idee ; 
 il lui donne le meme nom ; de meme a un troisieme, a un quatrieme ; et 
 voilii le mot d'Arbre, donne d'abord a un individu, qui devient pour lui 
 un nom de classe ou de genre, une idee abstraite qui comprend tons les 
 arbres en general." See also Locke, Essay on the Human Under- 
 standing, Book ii. c. ii. sect. 9 ; and Book iii. c iii. sect. 7. 
 
 t Abstract idea, or abstract term, for I am doubtful whether " idee" 
 means, in this passage, precisely what we should understand by idea, 
 when speaking simply of the act of percention.
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 399 
 
 object from that which gives a name to a multi- 
 tude of objects that bear a certain degree of resem- 
 blance ? The savage and the child, upon the as- 
 sumed theory now stated, give the name of tree to 
 the first tree they perceive, or that is pointed out 
 to them ; and when a number of trees of various 
 kinds are exhibited to their view, thev denominate 
 them by the term tree^ because they resemble, in a 
 variety of particulars, the tree or trees they al- 
 ready know. But I see no reason for creating a fa- 
 culty for the purpose of giving this number of trees 
 a common name, merely because their resemblance 
 is not so complete as to amount to identity. To 
 say that where the resemblance between two or 
 'more objects is so great as to constitute them of 
 the same kind, we assign names to them by means 
 of one faculty of the mind ; and where that resem- 
 blance is not so evident, we give names to ol)jects 
 by means of another faculty of the mind ; is, in 
 my opinion, neither philosophical nor just. Be- 
 sides, may it not be asked, that as no two objects 
 in nature are precisely the same in all particulars, 
 at what point of resemblance does the one faculty 
 cease to act and the other begin ? 
 
 Mr. Locke seems to have employed the word ab- 
 straction in a more limited sense than modern phi- 
 losophers have done. He says, " The acts of the 
 mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple 
 ideas, are these : — Pirst, combining several simple 
 ideas into one compound one. Secondly, bringino* 
 two ideas together, and setting them by one an- 
 other; bv which we come at all ideas of relation.
 
 400 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 Thirdly, separating' our ideas from other ideas that 
 accompany them in their real existence." To this 
 last act of the mind he gives the name of abstrac- 
 tion ; to the other two acts he gives no names 
 whatever.* I believe that most metaphysicians 
 since Mr. Locke's time have referred all these dif- 
 ferent acts of the mind to abstraction. The dis- 
 tinctions, however, this philosopher has here point- 
 ed out, would certainly justify us in referring them 
 to distinct faculties, as much as manv other dis- 
 tinctions that are commonly referred to separate 
 principles. It may be considered as something 
 curious that he should say in his third and fourth 
 books that general ideas are fictitious contrivances 
 of the mind. 
 
 Mr. Stewart observes,! "This poAver of consider- 
 ing certain qualities or attributes of an object apart 
 from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to de- 
 fine it, the power which the understanding has of 
 separating the combinations which are presented 
 to it, is distinguished by logicians by the name of 
 ahstr action.''' Had the celebrated author confined 
 himseK to the fii'st part of this sentence, as con- 
 veying what he meant by the faculty of abstrac- 
 tion, his definition would have been intelligible 
 enough : but being desirous to define it better, he 
 has only rendered it more obscure. Eor what is 
 meant by combinations presented to the mind I am 
 at a loss to conjecture. If Mr. Stewart means that 
 
 * Essay on the Human Understanding, Book 2. c. 12. sect. 1. 
 t Elements of tlie Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. 1. 
 )). 156.
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 401 
 
 certain thoughts are presented to the mind in a 
 complex or compounded state, and that the mind 
 has the power of analysing them into their elemen- 
 tary parts, then I differ from him. The thoughts 
 of man must be considered as individual objects, 
 apparently incapable of analysis. If they can be 
 analysed, they can be subdivided ; and what is ca- 
 pable of subdivision, may be divided ad infinitum. 
 Then if thoughts are infinitely divisible, they must 
 be infinitely extended; and what is infinitely di- 
 visible and extended, can have no elementary parts ; 
 consequently thoughts must be nothing at all. — 
 What a fine doctrine for the Sceptics ! 
 
 But if the first part of this sentence be a defini- 
 tion of what Mr. Stewart calls abstraction, viz. the 
 power of considering certain qualities or attributes 
 of an object apart from the rest, then I say that 
 the mind never does anything else but abstract ; — 
 with this qualification, however, that the mind only 
 considers one quality or attribute of an object at 
 the same instant, and not more than one, as Mr. 
 Stewart here affirms. It is a commonly received 
 maxim, that the mind can only be occupied with 
 one idea at the same time. When a tree comes 
 before my view, I do not in the same instant of 
 time contemplate its height, its thickness, its figure, 
 its extension, the colour of its bark and leaves, and 
 the disposition of its branches. If I attend to one 
 of these qualities or attributes, the rest must be 
 excluded from my mind at the moment the other 
 is under contemplation. These attributes must 
 come into my mind in succession, and cannot all 
 * ' 2d
 
 402 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 be present to it, so to speak, at the same indiyidual 
 point of time. This is sufficient, I think, to shew, 
 that the human mind is always employed about in- 
 dividual objects, and that what are called complex 
 or general ideas have really no existence, in the 
 sense in which they are commonly considered. 
 
 Such phrases as compoimding and decompounding 
 our ideas, seimrating the combinations of sense, and 
 many others of a like description, have absolutely 
 no meaning when applied to the mind. When con- 
 fined to the science of chemistry, they may be very 
 correctly and very usefully employed ; but there is 
 not the slightest analogy to justify their application 
 in mental philosophy. Are we ever conscious of this 
 composition and decomposition among our ideas ? 
 Sulphate of iron and nut-galls are two distinct 
 substances ; but when joined together they make 
 another substance very different from either, and 
 which much resembles, in its properties and appear- 
 ance, the ink I write with. Do we ever see a sim- 
 ple idea. A, for example, entering into combination 
 with another simple idea, B, and forming, by their 
 union, another totally different idea, C ? I think 
 every one who has paid the slightest attention to his 
 own mind, must answer this in the negative. Yet, 
 unless there be appearances of this description ob- 
 servable in our mind, such phrases, making every 
 allowance for metaphorical language, ought to be 
 employed only in a qualified sense ; for instead of 
 enlightening and guiding our judgment, they are 
 apt, in such inquiries, to darken and lead it astray. 
 
 If we examine the svstem of mental faculties a
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 403 
 
 little more narrowly, we shall find, that instead 
 of its proving conclusive, it is pregnant with dif- 
 ficulties, which are apparently insurmountable. 
 There are very few, if any, of the faculties, accord- 
 ing to the received theory on the subject, which 
 can be considered as acting simply ; for we find by 
 appeals to our consciousness, that they seem to 
 be incapable of being conceived in a single state. 
 What is called the faculty of attention is defined 
 to be that by which we simply think of a particular 
 thing or object. The faculty of reason is also said 
 to be that by which we are able to draw inferences 
 from premises. This is considered a simple faculty, 
 not a compound one. Now, it is utterly incon- 
 ceivable how a man w^ould draw an inference 
 from premises, without paying attention to that 
 inference and those premises ; or, in other words, 
 T\dthout thinking of them. Again, perception is 
 defined to be the faculty by which we perceive 
 things. Now, we cannot draw^ inferences from 
 premises, unless we perceive these inferences and 
 premises. Here, then, we have the faculty of reason, 
 considered a simple faculty, compounded of atten- 
 tion and perception. How many questions arise 
 from these considerations, which it w^ould be very 
 difiicult to solve ? Might we not ask. What is the 
 nature of this faculty of reason, when influenced by 
 these faculties of attention and perception ? What 
 effects would it produce if acting by vii'tue of its 
 own inherent power ? And by what means shall 
 we be able to perceive in what respect it differs 
 from the other powers combined with it ? 
 
 2d 2
 
 404 GENEHAL REMARKS ON 
 
 Eor the sake of further illustration, we will take 
 another faculty, memory for instance, and we shall 
 find that we cannot look upon it as a simple faculty. 
 It implies perception, attention, and consciousness. 
 When a past idea is present to the mind, we must 
 perceive it, and we must also attend to it, otherwise 
 the words perception and attention have no meaning. 
 And there appears to he so close a connection he- 
 tween consciousness and memory, that we might, 
 without producing an ambiguity, define this latter 
 faculty, that by wliich we are conscious of a past 
 idea. This definition would he in unison with th3 
 established mode of speaking among the generality 
 of mankind ; for when their memory is taxed to 
 remember any past event, they say, " I am not 
 conscious of having said or done such a thing." 
 A phrase can mean nothing more or less than, " I do 
 not remember having said or done such a thing."* 
 
 It must appear evident, upon the slightest con- 
 sideration, that distinct mental faculties can in no 
 way be useful in explaining mental appearances, 
 until the nature of these faculties themselves is 
 well understood, and we are able to furnish a satis- 
 factory explanation of those laws which regulate 
 the simple powers of which they are said to be 
 
 * It may be worth while to remark here in passing, that Mr. Stewart, 
 in treating of attention as being a distinct faculty of the mind, says, 
 though several authors have spoken of attention in general terms, he 
 was not aware that any author, ancient or modem, had spoken of it as 
 a separate faculty. But if he will look into Condillac's " Precis des 
 Lemons Prelim inaires, vol. 8 of his works, he will find attention not only 
 enumerated among the mental facidties, but an attempt is made to re- 
 solve several other faculties into it.
 
 PACULTIES OF THE MINJJ. 405 
 
 compounded. This is absolutely necessary as a 
 preliminaty step. That wiiich is to serve as an 
 explanation, ought to be clearer and more evident 
 than the thing to be explained, otherwise no ex- 
 planation can be effected. It certainly cannot be 
 considered as an infallible method of arriving at 
 truth, to take a principle for granted, and after- 
 wards prove the truth of the inferences drawn 
 from it. We should demonstrate the truth of the 
 principle first, and the truth of the inferences will 
 consequently be estabKshed. Now, has any meta- 
 physician ever undertaken to show in what manner 
 the faculties of abstraction, judgment, and taste, 
 act upon the faculty of imagination, so as to make 
 it form imaginary appearances ? Or in what way 
 the faculties of consciousness, perception, and atten- 
 jtion act upon memory, by which we are capable of 
 bringing to our recollection past events ? No one, 
 as far as my information goes, has ever undertaken 
 any such thing. 
 
 If by mental faculty is simply meant, the power 
 the mind has to do any particular thing, then no 
 one will deny that the mind has faculties who does 
 not deny the active state of the mind. But then 
 the faculties of the understanding must in conse- 
 quence be multiplied to an enormous degree, for 
 every distinct act of the mind. I see a table before 
 me, which I am said to perceive by the faculty of 
 perception ; I look out of my room window and see 
 a man standing in the street ; but can any one pro- 
 duce a single argument to prove that I perceive 
 the man in the street by the same faculty by which
 
 406 GENERAL REMARKS OK 
 
 I perceived the table ? Again, when I have medi- 
 tated on the properties of a triangle, and have come 
 to the conclusion, that the three angles are equal 
 to two right ones ; how do I know that I come to 
 this conclusion by the same mental faculty by 
 which I determined that the square of four is six- 
 teen ? It may be said there is a difference in the 
 processes of the mind in the two cases ; but then, 
 I reply, that these processes are not discoverable 
 by consciousness, and consequently the only test of 
 their existence is wanting. The mind can be con- 
 scious only of its ideas ; and therefore it follows 
 clearly, that if we were conscious of any such mental 
 processes, they must necessarily be themselves com- 
 posed of ideas, othermse they could not be objects 
 of our consciousness. Here, then, upon this posi- 
 tion, that we are conscious of these processes, when 
 we are endeavouring to prove that ideas are the 
 result of certain distinct and individual powers or 
 faculties inherent in the mind, we are only all the 
 time striving to prove, that one set of ideas are the 
 cause of the existence of another set : a principle 
 that fact and experience declare we know nothing 
 about. 
 
 The system of faculties appears to have been 
 established with a view of satisfying one of the 
 most powerful propensities of the human mind, 
 viz. a desire to know the true cause of every event 
 which falls under its notice. But those who have 
 correct views of mental and material philosophy, 
 know that philosophers do not set out in their in- 
 quiries with a view of ascertaining the causes of
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 407 
 
 the phenomena which fall under their ohservation, 
 but to observe those laws which regulate their con- 
 stant conjunction. 
 
 We shall here give a quotation from a very acute 
 Avriter on mental subjects, relative to distinct facul- 
 ties of the mind. " If," says he, " the mind pos- 
 sesses powers, it may be asked, upon what they 
 are exercised? The answer must be, upon the 
 objects of mental perception ; which are sensations 
 and ideas. Now, in what manner are we to under- 
 stand the action of the intellect, by means of its 
 powers upon ideas ? Nothing seems more obvious, 
 though nothing be really less so, than the action 
 and reaction of bodies ; but when we argue in this 
 instance analogically from the material to the im- 
 material world, it must be confessed that we are 
 utterly forsaken by the light of reason. To suppose 
 the existence of power at all, may perhaps be 
 nothing else than the hypothesis of men who admit 
 the occult assertion of something, wliich is no 
 object of the understanding, for the purpose of 
 accounting for events. In attributing powers to 
 the mind, it would be well to consider Avhat we 
 mean by the mind; and, before we assert that 
 this acts by its powers upon ideas, how our souls 
 can be shown to be different from our thoughts 
 and feelings. It is yet more embarrassing to con- 
 ceive what is meant by the action of powers upon 
 ideas. Bodies are said to impinge upon and to impel 
 each other, to transmit powers and to communicate 
 motion ; but, when this mode of reasoning is ap- 
 plied to our intellectual nature, a very little reflec-
 
 408 GENERAL REMARKS ON 
 
 tion may suffice- to convince us that the analogy is 
 altogether inadmissible."* 
 
 To put what may be further urged against the 
 faculty of abstraction in as small a compass and in 
 as clear a light as possible, we shall just state the 
 following. Suppose a certain piece of matter to be 
 possessed only of four qualities, namely, extension, 
 hardness, colour, and figure; and that we desig- 
 nate our ideas corresponding to those qualities by 
 the letters A, B, C, and D. In former times, and 
 particularly among the Schoolmen, it was a pre- 
 vailing opinion, of a numerous party of them at 
 least, that besides the four simple and individual 
 ideas denoted by these four letters, which com- 
 posed all substances, we had another idea (which 
 we call E) made up of, or comprehending, the 
 other four simple ideas ; and this idea E was called 
 substance in general, or an abstract general con- 
 ception. The faculty of abstraction was confined 
 almost exclusively to the producing of these general 
 notions. But it is long since this doctrine of ab- 
 stract general conceptions began to lose ground in 
 England, and at the present day its advocates are 
 few in number. In consequence of this, the pro- 
 vince of abstraction is considerably curtailed ; and 
 is now, I believe, generally understood to be that 
 faculty by which we think of one quality or part 
 of an object, distinct from the rest of the qualities 
 or parts which compose it. Now, when we talk 
 about considering a quality of an object separately 
 
 * Academical Questions bv Sir William Drnmmond.
 
 FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 409 
 
 from the other qualities which belong to it, we 
 evidently go upon the principle, that we are able 
 to think of all the different qualities of an object 
 at the same moment of time ; a mere gratuitous 
 assumption, unsupported by one single argument 
 from an appeal to mere consciousness. But waving 
 this objection, nay, let us even take it for granted 
 that we can pay attention to many things at a time, 
 still this does not by any means go to prove that 
 the facultv bv which we attend to several thing-s is 
 different from that by which we attend to an indi- 
 vidual thing. If we can perceive and attend to 
 A, B, C, and D at the same moment, there is the 
 highest possible probability that we perceive and 
 attend to them by the same faculty by which we 
 perceive and attend to either A, or B, or C, or D, 
 separately. There is nothing to lessen this proba- 
 bility, unless one thing can be shoA\Ta, and that is, 
 if we are conscious of a difference in the perceiving 
 faculties in the two cases here mentioned. If when 
 we perceive and attend to A, B, C, and D, jointly, 
 we are conscious that the same faculty does not 
 enable us to perceive and attend to any of them 
 separately ; then we ought to come to the conclu- 
 sion, that a number of things are not perceived' 
 and attended to by the same power by which we 
 perceive and attend to an individual thing. This 
 is the only way by which the question can be 
 settled. 
 
 These observations will not, I hope, be considered 
 out of place, when we remember, that upon this 
 question of distinct and independent mental facul-
 
 410 GENERAL HEMAEKS. 
 
 ties, many important conclusions in philosophy 
 depend. It must ever vary the complexion of 
 metaphysical theories. It forms a point of depar- 
 ture for abstract speculation ; and systems diverge 
 or approximate to each other, in exact proportion 
 as we consider the mind as being constituted of a 
 collection of faculties or powers, or as merely dis- 
 playing a series of states, operations, or phenomena. 
 It is contended by some philosophers, that the dis- 
 pute is only a dispute about words ; but this, I ap- 
 prehend, is an erroneous opinion. The question lies 
 deeper than verbal ambiguities. It rests upon the 
 very nature of things ; and from the first moment 
 of our being able to contemplate, by consciousness, 
 the operations of our own minds, and to draw con- 
 clusions respecting them, we are presented with this 
 knotty controversy in all its complicated difficulties.
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 411 
 
 CHAPTER XXXVIII. 
 ON SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 There are but very few writers on mental phi- 
 losophy, in Saxon literature, of whom we have any 
 authentic accounts. There are only three of whom 
 we shall take any notice ; namely, Alfred , Alcui- 
 mis, and Bede. 
 
 Alfred the Great. 
 
 On Chance. — " It is nought when men say any 
 thing happens by chance, because every thing comes 
 from some other things or causes, therefore it has 
 not happened from chance ; but if it came not from 
 any thing, then it would have occurred from chance. 
 
 "Then said I, Whence first came the name? 
 Then quoth he, My darling Aristotle, mentioned 
 it in the book that is called Phisica. Then said I, 
 How does he explain it ? He answered, Men 
 said formerly, when any tiling happened to them 
 unexpectedly, that this was by chance. As if any 
 one should dig the earth, and find there a treasure
 
 412 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 of gold, and should then say that this happened by 
 chance. But yet, I know that if the digger had 
 not dug into the earth, and no man before had 
 hidden the gold there, he would by no means have 
 found it. Therefore it was not found by chance." 
 
 On the Preedom of the Will. — " I would ask 
 thee, whether we have any freedom or any power, 
 what we should do, or what we should not do ? or 
 does the divine pre-ordination or fate compel us to 
 that which we wish ? 
 
 " Then said he, We have much power. There 
 is no rational creature wliicli has not freedom. He 
 that hath reason may judge and discriminate what 
 he should will, and what he should shun; and 
 every man hath this freedom, that he knows what 
 he should will and what he should not will. Yet 
 all rational creatures have not a like freedom. 
 Angels have right judgments and good will, and 
 all that they desire they obtain very easily, because 
 they wish nothing wrong. But no creature hath 
 freedom and reason, except angels and men. Men 
 have always freedom, and the more of it as they 
 lead their minds towards divine things. But they 
 have less freedom when they incline their minds 
 near to this world's wealth and honours. They 
 have no freedom, when they themselves subject 
 their own wills to the vices ; but, so soon as they 
 turn away their mind from good, they are blinded 
 with unwiseness." 
 
 Why Men have Freedom of AVill. — " I said, 
 I am sometimes very much disturbed ! Quoth he, 
 At what ? I answered :
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 413 
 
 " It is at this which thou savest, that God g-ives 
 to every one freedom to do e^dl, as well as good, 
 whichsoever he will: and thou savest also, that 
 God knoweth every thing before it happens ; and 
 thou also sayest, that nothing happens, but that 
 God wills, or consents to it ; and thou sayest that 
 it shall all go as he has appointed. Now, I wonder 
 at this : why he should consent that evil men 
 should have freedom that they may do evil, as well 
 as good, whichsoever they will, when he knew 
 before that they would do evil. 
 
 "Then quoth he, I may very easily answer 
 thee this remark. How would it now look to you, 
 if there were any powerful king, and he had no 
 freedom in all his kingdom, l)ut that all were 
 slaves ? 
 
 " Then said I, It would not be thought Ijy me 
 right, nor also reasonable, if servile men only 
 should attend upon him. 
 
 " Then quoth he, It would be more unnatural, 
 if God, in all his kingdom, had no free creature 
 under his power. Therefore he made two rational 
 creatures free; angels and men. He gave them 
 the great gift of freedom. Hence they could do 
 evil as well as good, whichsoever they would. He 
 gave this very fixed gift, and a very fixed law with 
 that gift, to every man unto his end. The freedom 
 is, that man may do what he will ; and the law is, 
 that he will render to every man according to his 
 works, either in tliis world or the future one ; good 
 or evil, whichsoever he doeth. Men mav obtain
 
 414 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 through this freedom whatsoever they will; hut 
 they cannot escape death, though they may by 
 good conduct hinder it, so that it shall come later, 
 indeed, they may defer it to old age, if they do 
 not want good mil for good works. 
 
 "Then said I, Thou has well removed that 
 doubt." 
 
 On the Divine Pore-appointment. — " But I 
 am yet grieved with much more trouble, even to 
 sadness. 
 
 " What is thy grief about ? 
 
 " It is about the Divine pre-ordination. Because 
 we heard it, some while since, said, that all shall 
 happen as God, at the beginning, had appointed, 
 and that no man can change it. Now me-thinketh, 
 that he errs, when he honoui'eth the good, and 
 also when he punishes the evil ; if it be true, that 
 it was so shaped by him, that they cannot do 
 otherwise. We laboiu' unnecessarily when we pray, 
 and when we fast, or give alms, if we have no more 
 merit from it, than those that in all things proceed 
 according to their own ^vill, and run after their 
 bodily pleasures. 
 
 " I tell thee, if this be true, we ought to say, 
 that it was an unnecessary commandment in the 
 divine books, that God should order man to forsake 
 evil and do good ; and, again, the saying which he 
 expressed, that the more a man laboureth the 
 greater reward he shall receive. I woncler why 
 thou hast forgotten all that we spoke about before. 
 We said before, that the Divine Providence wrought
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 415 
 
 every good and no evil, nor appointed any to be 
 made, nor ever made any ; but that indeed we are 
 directed to good. 
 
 "It is thought evil by common people that He 
 should avenge or punish any one for his evil. 
 
 " But did we not also say in this same book, 
 that God had appointed freedom to be given to 
 men, and made them free ; and that if they held 
 this freedom well, he would greatly dignify them 
 with everlasting power ; and if they misused this 
 freedom, that he would then punish them with 
 death ? 
 
 " He has appointed that if they sin in any thing 
 through this freedom, they shall, by penitence, com- 
 pensate for it, to recover that freedom ; and if any 
 of them will be so hard-hearted, that he will do no 
 repentance, that he shall then have a just punish- 
 ment. He has appointed all creatures to be ser- 
 vants, except angels and men, and hence they are 
 the servants of these other creatures. They have 
 their ministerial duties till doomsday. But men 
 and angels, they are free. He dispenses with their 
 servitude. 
 
 " What ! can men say, that the divine Providence 
 has appointed this, that they should not fulfil their 
 duties, or how ? May they neglect them ; that 
 they may not do good? Now it is written that 
 God will render to every man according to his 
 works. Why then should any man be idle, that he 
 work not ?' 
 
 " Then said I, It is obvious enough to me, that
 
 416 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 G-od knew it all before, both good and evil, before 
 it happened. But I know not, whether that shall 
 all happen unchangeably, Avhich he knows and has 
 appointed. 
 
 "Then, quoth he. There is no need that all 
 should happen uncliaugeahly : though some of it 
 shall happen unchangeably. This will be that, 
 which will be best for our necessities ; and that will 
 be his will. But there are some so directed that 
 there is no necessity for this ; and though its being 
 done would neither injure, nor benefit, nor be any 
 harm, yet it will not be done. 
 
 " Think now, by thyself, whether thou hast ap- 
 pointed anything so firmly, that thou thinkest that 
 it shall never be changed by thy will, nor that thou 
 canst be without it ; or whether thou again art so 
 divided in opinion on any thouglit, whether it shall 
 happen to help thee, or whether it shall not. Many 
 are the things which God knows before they hap- 
 pen, and he knows also whether it vnR hurt his 
 creatures that they should happen. But he knows 
 not this for the purpose of willing that they should 
 happen, but that he may take previous care that 
 they should not happen. Thus a good ship-steerer 
 perceives many a stormy wind before it occurs, and 
 folds his sail, and awhile also lays down his mast, 
 and then abides the beating, if, before the threaten- 
 ing of the adverse wind, he can guard himself against 
 the weather." 
 
 On Human Nature and its best interests. — 
 *' Then said I, Thou hast very well helped me hy this
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 417 
 
 speech. I wonder why so many wise men shoukl 
 have laboured so much on the subject, and have 
 found out so little that was wise. 
 
 " Then quoth he, Why wonderest thou so much? 
 Is it so easy to be understood ? How knowest 
 thou not, that many things are not understood so 
 as they exist ; but according to the quality of the un- 
 derstanding of him that inquires after them. Such 
 is wisdom. No man from this world can under- 
 stand it, such as it really is; though every one 
 strives according to the quality of his understand- 
 ing, that he may perceive it if he can. Wisdom 
 may entirely comprehend us, such as we are, though 
 we may not wholly comprehend that, such as it is 
 in itself; because wisdom is God. He seetli all 
 our works, both good and evil, before they are done, 
 or, for this purpose, thought. But he compels us 
 not to tliis, that we must necessarily do the good, 
 nor prevents us from doing evil; because he has 
 given us freedom. I can teach thee also some 
 examples, by which thou mayest the easier under- 
 stand this speech. What ! thou knowest the light, 
 and the hearing, and the taste : they perceive the 
 body of man, and yet they perceive it not alike. 
 The ears perceive so that they hear, but they per- 
 ceive not yet the body entirely as it is ; our sense 
 of feeling must touch it, and feel that it is the body. 
 We cannot feel whether this be black or white, 
 fak or not fau^; but the light at the beginning 
 turns to these points ; and as the eyes look on 
 things, they perceive all the appearance of the body. 
 But I will give thee some further explanation, that 
 * 2 E
 
 418 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 thou mayest know that which thou wonderest at. 
 
 " Then said I, What is this ? 
 
 " He said, It is that man understands only 
 that which he separately perceives in others. He 
 perceives separately through his eyes ; separately 
 through his ears ; separately through his nostrils ; 
 separately hy his reason ; separately by his wise 
 comprehension. There are many living things that 
 are unmoving, such as shell-fish are ; and these 
 have yet some portion of perception ; or they would 
 not else live, if they had no grain of perception. 
 Some can see, some can hear, some taste, some 
 smell ; but the moving animals are more like man, 
 because they have all that the unmoving creatures 
 have, and also more too. This is, that they obey men. 
 They love what loves them, and hate what hates 
 them ; and they fly from what they hate, and seek 
 what they love. But men have all that we have 
 before mentioned, and also add to them the great 
 gift of reason. Angels have a still wiser under- 
 standing. 
 
 " Hence are these creatures thus made, that the 
 unmoving shall not exalt themselves above the 
 moving ones, nor contend with them ; nor the 
 moving ones above men ; nor men above angels ; 
 nor angels strive against God. 
 
 " But this is miserable, that the greatest part of 
 men look not to that which is given to them, that 
 is, reason; nor seek that which is above them, 
 which is what angels and wise men have ; this is 
 a wise understanding. But most men now move 
 with cattle, in this, that thev desire the lusts of
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 419 
 
 tlie world like cattle. If we now had any portion 
 of an unhesitating understanding, such as angels 
 have, then we might perceive that such an under- 
 standing would be much better than our reason. 
 Though we investigate many things, we have little 
 ready knowledge free from doubt. But to angels 
 there is no doubt of any of those things which they 
 know, because theii* ready knowledge is much bet- 
 ter than our reasoning ; as our reasoning is better 
 than the perceptions of animals. Any portion of 
 understanding that is given to them, is either to 
 those that are prone, or to those that are erect. 
 But let us now elevate our minds as supremely as 
 we may towards the high roof of the highest un- 
 derstanding, that thou mayest most swiftly and 
 most easily come to thine own kindred, from whence 
 thou camest before. There mav thv mind and thv 
 reason see openly that which they now doubt 
 about ; — every thing, whether of the Divine pre- 
 science, which we have been discoursing on, or of 
 our freedom, or of all such things. 
 
 On THE Divine Nature. — " I would ask thee 
 first one thing, Whether thinkest thou that any 
 thing in this world is so good as that it may give us 
 full happiness ? I ask this of thee ; I do not wish 
 that any false likeness should deceive you and me, 
 instead of the true comfort ; for no man can deny 
 that some good must be the most superior, just as 
 there is some great and deep fountain from which 
 many brooks and rivers run. Hence men say of 
 some advantages, that they are not entirely with- 
 
 2 e 2
 
 420 SAXON mi<:tapiiysics. 
 
 out. Yet every thing would go to nought, if it had 
 not some good in it. 
 
 " Erom this you may understand, that from the 
 greatest good come the less goods ; not the greatest 
 from the less ; no more than the river can be the 
 spring and source, though the spring may flow into 
 a river. As the river may return again to the 
 spring, so every good cometh from God, and re- 
 turns to him; and he is the full and the perfect 
 good ; and there is no deficiency of will in him. 
 Now you may clearly understand that this is God 
 himself. 
 
 " Then answered I, and said, Thou hast very 
 rightly and very rationally overcome and convinced 
 me; I cannot deny this, nor indeed think otherwise, 
 but that it is all so as thou sayest. 
 
 " Then said Wisdom, Now I would that thou 
 shouldest think carefully till thou understand where 
 true happiness is. How ! knowest thou not, that 
 all mankind are \^dth one mind consenting that 
 God is the beginning of all good things, and the 
 governor of all creatures ? He is the supreme 
 good. No man now doubts this, because he knows 
 nothing better, and indeed nothing equally good. 
 Hence every reasoning tells us, and all men con- 
 fess the same, that God is the highest good. Thus 
 they signify that all good is in him ; for if it were 
 not, then he would not be that which he is called ; 
 but something has existed before him or is more 
 excellent. Then that would be better than he is ; 
 but nothing Avas ever before him, nor more excel-
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 421 
 
 lent than lie is, nor more precious than hinisell'. 
 Hence he is the beginning, and the fountain, and 
 the roof of all good. Tliis is clear enough. Now 
 it is openly shown, that the true felicities are in 
 no other existing tiling but in God, 
 
 " Then said I, I am consenting to this. 
 
 "Then he answered, I conjure thee that thou 
 rationally understand this; that God is full of 
 every perfection, and of every good, and of every 
 happiness. 
 
 " I then replied, I cannot fully understand it. 
 "Wherefore tell me again, the same that didst men- 
 tion before. 
 
 " He saidj Then I will say it again. I would 
 not that thou shouldest think this, that God is the 
 father and the origin of all creatures, and yet that 
 his supreme goodness, of which he is full, comes to 
 him from any where from without. I also would 
 not have thee think that any other can be his good 
 and happiness but liimself ; because, if thou sup- 
 posest that the good which he hath comes to him 
 any where from without, then that thing from 
 which it comes to him would be better than he, if 
 there were such. But it is very silly, and a very 
 great sin, that men should think so of God ; either 
 to suppose again, that anything were before him, 
 or better than he is, or like him. But we should 
 agree that he is the best of all things. 
 
 " If thou believest that God exists so as men 
 are, either he is a man that hath soul and body, or 
 his goodness is that which gathereth good else- 
 where, and then holds it together, and rules it. If
 
 422 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 thou then believest that it is so with God, then 
 shalt thou necessarily believe that some power is 
 greater than his, which it so unites as that it mak- 
 eth the course of things. But whatever thing is 
 divided from others is distinct, — is another thing, 
 though they may be placed together. If, then, any 
 thing be divided from the highest good, it will not 
 be that highest good. Yet it would be a great sin 
 to think of God, that there could be any good with- 
 out him, or any separated from him. Hence no- 
 thing is better than He is, or even as good. What 
 thing can be better than its creator ? Hence I 
 say, with juster reason, that He is the supreme 
 good in his own nature, which is the origin of all 
 things. 
 
 " Then I said. Now thou hast very rightly con- 
 vinced me. Then quoth he. Did I not before tell 
 thee that the supreme good and the highest hap- 
 piness were one ? I answered. So it is. He re- 
 plied. Shall we then say that this is any thing else 
 but God ? I said, I cannot deny this ; because I 
 assented to it before. 
 
 " He is the stem and foundation of all blessings. 
 From him all good cometh, and every thing tends 
 to Him again. He governs them all. Thus He 
 is the beginning and the support of all blessings. 
 They come from Him so as the light and bright- 
 ness of the planets come from the sun ; some are 
 brighter, some are less bright. So also the moon : 
 she enlightens as much as the sun shines on her. 
 When he shineth all over her, then is she all 
 bright.
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 423 
 
 " When I heard these observations I was then 
 astonished, and much awed, and exclaimed, This 
 is a wonderful, and delightful, and reasonable obser- 
 vation, which thou expressest to me. 
 
 " He answered. It is not more pleasant nor 
 wiser than the thing that thy discourse was about. 
 We will now talk about that ; because me-thinketh 
 it good that we connect this with the former. Then 
 replied I, What is that ? 
 
 '' What I expressed to thee before was, that God 
 was happiness ; and that from this true felicity come 
 all the other goods that we discoursed about be- 
 fore ; and return to Him. Thus, from the sea the 
 water cometh into the earth, and there freshens 
 itself. It proceedeth then up into a spring ; it goeth 
 then into a brook ; then into a river ; then along 
 the river till it floweth again into the sea. But I 
 would now ask thee how thou hast understood this 
 assertion ? Whether dost thou suppose that the 
 five goods which we have often mentioned before, 
 that is, power, dignities, celebrity, abundance, and 
 bliss : I would know whether you suppose that 
 those goods were limbs of the true felicity, so as 
 a man's limbs are those of one person, and belong 
 all to one body ? Or dost thou think that some one 
 of the five goods makes the true felicity, and after- 
 wards that the four others become its goods ; as 
 now the soul and body compose one man ? 
 
 " The one man hath many limbs, and yet to 
 these two, that is, to the soul and the body, belong 
 all this man's comforts, both spiritual and corporeal. 
 It is noAV the good of the body that a man be fair
 
 424 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 and strong', and long and broad, witli many other 
 excellencies besides these. Yet they are not the 
 body itself; because, thongh he should lose any of 
 these good things, he would still be what he was 
 before. Then the excellencies of the soul are, pru- 
 dence, moderation, patience, righteousness, and 
 wisdom, and many such virtues ; and yet, as the 
 soul is one thing, so the wtues are another. 
 
 " I then said, I wish that thou wouldest explain 
 to me yet more clearly, about the other goods that 
 belong to the true felicity. 
 
 " He answered, Did I not inform thee before, 
 that the true happiness is God? Yes, I replied. 
 Thou hast said he was the supreme good. Then 
 quoth he. Art thou now consenting that power, 
 and dignities, and fame, and plenty, and joy, and 
 happiness, and the supreme good, are all one ; and 
 that this one must be the Deity ? 
 
 " I said. How should I now deny this ? Then 
 he answered. Whether dost thou think that those 
 things which are the limbs of the true felicity is 
 that felicity itself ? 
 
 " I replied, I know not what thou wouldest say ; 
 but it will please me better that thou should speak 
 to me some while about it than ask me. He then 
 said, How ! couldest thou not reflect that if these 
 goods were limbs of the true felicity, they would be 
 somewhat distinct from it as a man's linibs are 
 from his body ? But the nature of these limbs is, that 
 they make up one body, and yet are not wholly alike. 
 
 " I then remarked. Thou needest no more speak 
 about it. TliOLi hast explained it to me clearly
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 425 
 
 enough that these goods are no whit separated 
 from the true felicity. 
 
 " Then quoth he. Thou comprehendest it right 
 enough. Thou now understandest that all good is 
 the same that happiness is, and this happiness is 
 the supreme good, and the supreme good is God, 
 and God is always inseparably one. 
 
 " I said, There is no doubt of it. But I wish 
 vou now to discourse to me a little on what is 
 unknown. 
 
 " Well ! O men ! Every one of you that be free 
 tend to this good, and to this felicity ; and he that 
 is now in bondage with the fruitless love of this 
 world, let him seek liberty, that he may come to 
 this felicity. Por this is the only rest of all our 
 labours. This is the only port always calm after 
 the storms and billows of our toils. This is the 
 only station of peace ; the only comforter of grief 
 after all the sorrows of the present life. The golden 
 stones and the silvery ones, and jewels of all kinds, 
 and all the riches before us, will not enlighten the 
 eyes of the mind, nor improve their acuteness to 
 perceive the appearance of the true felicity. They 
 rather blind the mind's eyes than make them 
 sharper ; because all things that please here, in this 
 present life, are earthly ; because they are flying. 
 But the admirable brightness that brightens all 
 things and governs all; it will not destroy the 
 soul, but will enlighten it. If, then, any man 
 could perceive the splendour of the heavenly light 
 with the pure eyes of his mind, he would then say
 
 42G SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 that the radiance of the shining of the sun is not 
 superior to this; is not to be compared to the 
 everlasting brightness of God." 
 
 Description of the Deity. — " Hence we 
 should with all power inquire after God, that we 
 may know what he is. Though it should not be 
 our lot to know wiiat He is, yet we should, from 
 the dignity of the understanding which he has 
 given us, try to explore it. 
 
 " Every creature, both rational and irrational, dis- 
 covers this, that God is eternal. Because so many 
 creatures, so great and so fair, could never be sub- 
 ject to less creatures and to less power than they 
 all are, nor indeed to many equal ones. 
 
 " Then said I, What is eternity ? 
 
 " He answered. Thou hast asked me a great and 
 difficult tiling to comprehend. If thou wilt under- 
 stand it, thou must first have the eyes of thy mind 
 clean and lucid. I may not conceal from thee what 
 I know of this. 
 
 " Know thou that there are three things in this 
 world ; one is temporary ; to this there is both a 
 beginning and an end; and I do not know any 
 creature that is temporary, but hath his beginning 
 and his end. Another thing is eternal, which hath 
 a beginning, but hath not an end : I know not 
 when it began, but I know that it will never end : 
 such are angels and the souls of men. The third 
 thing is eternal, both without end, and without 
 beginning ; this is God. Between these three there 
 is a verv great discrimination. If we were to in-
 
 ALFRED THE GREAT. 427 
 
 vestigate all this subject, we should come late to 
 the end of this book, or never. 
 
 " But one thing thou must necessarily know of 
 this previously, Why is God called the Highest 
 Eternity ? 
 
 " Then said I, Why ? 
 
 *' Then quoth he. Because we know very little 
 of that which was before us, except by memory and 
 by asking; and yet we know less of that which 
 will be after us. That alone exists rationally to us 
 which is present ; but to Him all is present, as 
 well that which was before as that which now is, 
 and that which after us will be. All of it is pre- 
 sent to Him. 
 
 " His riches increase not, nor do they ever dimi- 
 nish. He never remembers anything, because he 
 never forgets aught ; He seeks nothing, nor in- 
 quires, because He knows it all ; He searches for 
 nothing, because He loses nothing; He pursues 
 no creature, because none can fly from Him ; He 
 dreads nothing, because He knows no one more 
 powerful than himself, nor even like him. He is 
 always giving and never wants. He is always Al- 
 mighty, because he always wishes good, and never 
 evil. To Him there is no need of anything. He 
 is always seeing ; He never sleeps ; He is always 
 alike mild and kind ; He will always be eternal. 
 Hence there never was a time that He was not, 
 nor ever will be. He is always free. He is not 
 compelled to any work. From His divine power 
 He is every where present. His greatness no man 
 can measure. He is not to be conceived bodilv,
 
 428 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 but spiritually, so as now wisdom is and reason. 
 But He is wisdom ; He is reason itself."* 
 
 Alctjinus, or Albinus Elaccus. 
 
 This was an English prelate, and a disciple, some 
 say, of Bede's. He went on an embassy from Offa 
 to the court of Charlemagne, and was the principal 
 agent in the formation of the public schools esta- 
 tablished by the Emperor. Alcuinus was considered 
 one of the most learned men of his time ; though 
 some historians have maintained that he knew little 
 of philosophy in general ; and even in theology it- 
 self he was by no means a proficient. His narrow 
 views have been ascribed as the reason why these 
 schools were limited in their scope, and so unpro- 
 ductive of real knowledge. An Italian historian, 
 Eather Andrea, makes the following remarks upon 
 these early seminaries of learning. " They learn 
 there to read, to sing, and to calculate, and nothing 
 more. The schools have regularly established mas- 
 ters, but it is sufficient if they know grammar. If 
 any of them pretends to a little knowledge of ma- 
 thematics or astronomy, he is considered an oracle. 
 Books are given to consult, but they are all eccle- 
 siastical ones. If in some schools the fine arts 
 are cultivated, it is only with the view of making 
 them subservient to the illustration of the sacred 
 l3ooks."t 
 
 The opinions of Alcuinus on the human soul are 
 
 * Turner's Anglo-Saxon History, pp. 41 — 51. 
 
 t Dcir origiuc, progresso c state att. d'ogni letter, torn. 1. c. 7.
 
 ALCUINUS. 429 
 
 well entitled to notice. He divides it into three 
 parts, the appetites, the rational part, and the 
 irascible. Two of these appertain to the inferior 
 creation as well as to ourselves. But reason be- 
 longs alone to men ; and it is by tliis power that 
 he judges, counsels, and excels in wisdom. The 
 faculty of reason is that which directs and governs 
 the whole moral nature of man ; and all our vir- 
 tues, as prudence, justice, temperance, and forti- 
 tude, pre-suppose its active vigilance. Wlien these 
 virtues are sanctified by a holy and pure benevo- 
 lence, they bring the soul nearer to the Divine na- 
 ture,* 
 
 Memory, will, and intelligence are all distinct 
 powers, but are, nevertheless, united into one. 
 Unity does not destroy their individuality. " I 
 perceive that I perceive, will, and remember; I 
 will to remember, perceive, and will; and I re- 
 member that I have willed, perceived, and recol- 
 lected, "f 
 
 " We may remark the wonderful svsdftness of the 
 soul in forming things which it has perceived by 
 the senses. Prom these, as from certain messen- 
 gers, it forms figures in itself, with inexpressil^le 
 celerity, of whatever it has perceived of sensible 
 things ; and it lays up these forms in the treasury 
 of its memory. 
 
 " Thus, he who has seen Rome figures Rome in 
 his mind, and its form ; and when he shall hear 
 the name of Eome, or remember it, immediately the 
 
 * Opera, pp. 770.. t Ibid. p. 773.
 
 430 SAXON METAPHYSICS, 
 
 animus of it will occur to the menioiy, where its 
 form lies concealed. The soul there recognises it, 
 where it had hidden it. 
 
 " It is yet more wonderful, that if unknown 
 things be read or heard of by the ears of the soul, 
 it immediately forms a figure of the unknown 
 thing; as of Jerusalem. When seen it may be 
 very different from the figure of our fancy ; but 
 whatever the soul has been, in other cities that are 
 known to it, it imagines that it may be in Jerusa- 
 lem. Prom known species it imagines the un- 
 known. It does not fancy walls, houses, and streets 
 in a man ; nor the limbs of a man in a city, but 
 buildings, as are usual in cities. So in every thing 
 the mind from the known forms the unknown. 
 
 " While I think of Jerusalem, I cannot, at that 
 moment, think of Home ; or when I think of any 
 other single thing, I cannot then think of many ; 
 but that thing only is present to my mind whicli 
 I deliberate upon, till, sooner or later, this departs 
 and another occurs. 
 
 " This lively and heavenly faculty, which is 
 called mens, or animus, is of such great mobility 
 that it does not even rest in sleep. In a moment, 
 if it chooses, it surveys heaven ; it flies over the 
 sea, and wanders through regions and cities. It 
 places in its sight, by thinking, all things that it 
 likes, however far removed." 
 
 "The mind, or soul, is the intellectual spirit, 
 always in motion, always living, and capable of 
 willing both good and evil. By the benignity of 
 its Creator it is ennobled with free will. Created to
 
 ALCUINUS. 431 
 
 rule tlie movements of the flesli, it is invisible, 
 incorporeal, without weight or colour, circum- 
 scribed, yet entire in every member of its flesh. It 
 is now afiiicted Avith the cares, and grieved with 
 the pains of the body ; now it sports with joy ; 
 now thinks of known things ; and now seeks to 
 explore those which are unknown. It wills some 
 things ; it does not will others. Love is natural to 
 it. 
 
 " It is called by various names ; the soul, while 
 it vivifies ; the spirit, when it contemplates ; sen- 
 sibility, wliile it feels ; the mind, when it knows ; 
 the intellect, when it understands ; the reason, 
 while it discriminates; the will, when it consents; 
 the memory, when it remembers; but these are 
 not as distinct in substance as in names ; they are 
 but one soul. Virtue is its beauty; vice its de- 
 formity. It is often so affected by some object of 
 knowledge, that, though its eyes be open, it sees 
 not the things before it, nor hears a sounding 
 voice, nor feels a touching body. 
 
 "As to what the soul is, nothing better occurs 
 to us to say than that it is the spirit of life ; but 
 not of that kind of life which is in cattle, which is 
 without a rational mind. The beauty and orna- 
 ment of the human soul is the study of wisdom. 
 What is more blessed to the soul than to love the 
 Supreme Good, which is God ? What is happier 
 to it than to prepare itself to be worthy of ever- 
 lasting beatitude, knowing itself most truly to be 
 immortal."
 
 432 SAXON METAPHYSICS. 
 
 Bede. 
 
 The history of this singular and learned man, 
 is well known to most readers. We shall here 
 transcrihe a few remarks upon some of the meta- 
 physical topics he discusses in his works. 
 
 He compares the three inseparable essences of 
 the Trinity to the circularity, light, and heat of 
 the Sun. The globular body of the Sun never leaves 
 the heavens ; but its light, which he compares to 
 the Pilial Personality, and its heat, which he ap- 
 plies to the Spii'itual Essence, descend to earth, 
 and diffuse themselves everywhere, animating the 
 mind, and pervading and softening the heart. Yet, 
 although universally present, light seems never to 
 quit the sun, for there we always behold it ; and 
 heat is its unceasing companion. As circles have 
 neither beginning nor end, such is the Deity. 
 Nothing is above; nothing is below; nothing is 
 bevond him: no term concludes him; no time 
 confines him. 
 
 He pui'sues the same analogies in other parts of 
 nature. In water he traces the spring, its flow- 
 ing river, and terminating lake. They differ in 
 form, but are one in substance, and are always 
 inseparable. No river can flow without its spring, 
 and must issue into some collecting locality. 
 
 " His \iew of nature is not unpleasing. " Ob- 
 serve how all things are made to suit, and are 
 governed; heat by cold, cold by heat; day by 
 night ; and winter by summer. See how the 
 heavens and the earth are respectively adorned :
 
 BEDE. 433 
 
 the heavens by the sun, the moon, and stars ; the 
 earth by its beautiful flowers, and its herbs, trees, 
 and fruits. From these mankind derive all their 
 food; their lovely jewels ; the various pictures so 
 delectably woven in their hangings and valuable 
 cloths ; their variegated colours ; the sweet melody 
 of strings and organs ; the splendour of gold and 
 silver, and the other metals ; the pleasant streams 
 of water, so necessary to bring sliips, and agitate 
 our mills ; the fragrant aroma of myrrh ; and, 
 lastly, the interesting countenance peculiar to the 
 human form."* 
 
 *:,:* The preceding pages have been taken chiefly from Mr. Sharon 
 Turner's History, and the Literature of the Middle Ages in Lardner's Cy- 
 clopedia. As the authors of both these works have paid great attention 
 to every thing connected with the Saxon period of our history, what is 
 here stated may be fully relied on ; and contains, in fact, every thing 
 which can be found associated with the names of those ancient worthies, 
 which bears upon the philosophy of mind. 
 
 We have now sketched out the history of the 
 philosophy of mind, for nearly fifteen centuries, 
 and traced its ramifications and bearings among 
 the crash of empires and the mouldering remains' 
 of mighty kingdoms. We saw it in Greece as a 
 grain of mustard seed. In the days of Socrates, 
 and Plato, and Aristotle, it was a plant of gigan- 
 tic growth, and its shade long formed a philoso- 
 phical retreat for the ardent and speculative minds 
 of men. The Grecian metaphysics for some ages 
 retained their compactness and system ; but as 
 
 * Bede de Subst. vol. ii. p. 308. 
 
 * 2f
 
 434 HEMARKS. 
 
 time rolled on, tliey were spKt into cletached frag- 
 ments, and gave birth to various and contending 
 sects, who vied with each other in giving new 
 colourings to old truths and antiquated doctrines. 
 The rage for novelty became strong; and men 
 racked their minds to give old theories in a new 
 form. Every philosopher was ambitious of forming 
 a school of his own, which might establish his 
 present fame, and hand down his name with honour 
 and applause to future generations. Still, however, 
 the divergency from the olden system of Grecian 
 speculation, was not so great among the multitude 
 of new sects, as what at first sight might lead one 
 to imasjine. The frame-work of Plato and Aristotle 
 was never essentially broken or disjointed; nor 
 were their leading views and doctrines of mind 
 supplanted by other original systems. The various 
 sects and parties were merely commentators and 
 expounders of the two great champions of Grecian 
 intellect ; and though, on many occasions, they dis- 
 played consummate genius and skill, they never 
 could make any considerable inroad upon the phi- 
 losophical arrangements of these two wonderful ex- 
 pounders of abstract thought. 
 
 Through the influence of political changes and 
 vicissitudes, we find the Grecian philosophy of in- 
 tellects transplanted to the Etonian capital, among 
 minds of a bolder and fiercer stamp. Here it en- 
 joyed an exotic existence but for a short period. It 
 then found its wav to Alexandria, where it came in 
 contact with some novel systems, and was gradually 
 subjected to many transformations and changes of
 
 REMARKS. 435 
 
 character. It became enveloped in the mysterious 
 cosmogony of the East ; and that regular and con- 
 solidated system of Grecian thought, which had 
 common sense and the every-day feelings of man- 
 kind for its basis, became so corrupted and debased, 
 as scarcely to present a single feature of its original 
 grandeur and simplicity. Everything became crude, 
 unintelKgible, fanatical, and childish. 
 
 Christianity, however, came to the rescue ; and 
 gradually, though slowly, stripped off the myste- 
 rious allegories of the East, and took the " divine 
 Plato" and the erudite Stagirite under her guid- 
 ance and protection. There was an active and 
 living sympathy between them that no adverse 
 circumstance could weaken, nor time destroy. 
 They imparted mutual light and strength to each 
 other. And as the Christian system became more 
 firmly rooted in the minds of men, and more widely 
 extended, in the same proportion do we perceive 
 the champions of the Church embrace with cordi- 
 ality all the leading principles of Grecian specula- 
 tion on human nature. The cause of this is obvious ; 
 the great truths involved in both bore a striking 
 affinity or relationship to each other. They both 
 took man as they found him; they analyzed his 
 nature and powers ; they laid down rules for liis 
 government ; and both aimed at the permanent re- 
 finement and ameKoration of his condition. These 
 constituted the secret and powerful bond of union 
 between human and divine knowledge ; between the 
 sages of Greece and the disciples of the Cross. 
 
 2 f2
 
 NOTES 
 
 AND 
 
 ILLUSTRATIONS.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTHATIONS. 
 
 NOTE A.— Page 4. 
 
 We beg to give here a short Catalogue of Works on the History 
 of Philosophy, It might have been considerably extended ; but 
 the list, it is hoped, will be found sufficient for ordinary purposes 
 of reference. — 
 
 Adelung, J. C, Geschichte der philosophie fiir Liebhaber. Leipz. 
 1786, 1787, 1807. 
 
 ^^?r«5, Cours de Philosophie. Paris, 1838. 
 
 Anderson, Wm., The Philosophy of Ancient Greece Investi- 
 gated. London, 1794. 
 
 Ast, Frid., Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie. Lands- 
 hut. 1825. 
 
 Berchon de Penhoen, (Le Baron), Ilistoire de la Philosophie 
 Allemande. Paris, 1836. 
 
 Berchetti, Filosofia dcgli Antichi Popoli. Perugia, 1818. 
 
 Blessig, Joh. Law., Diss, de Origine Philosophic apud Romanes. 
 Strasburg, 1770. 
 
 Born, Fri. Gloh., Institutiones Histori. Philos. Leipsic, 1798. 
 
 Boiivier, Histoire Abregee de la Philosophie. Paris, 1844. 
 
 Boioen, Francis, Critical Essays on a few Subjects connected 
 with the History and present Condition of Speculative Philosophy. 
 Boston (U. S.) 1842. 
 
 Brandis, Handb. der Gesch. der Griech. und Rom. Philosophie. 
 Berlin, 1835. 
 
 Brueker, Joh. Jah., Kurze Fragen aus der Philosophischen 
 Historie. Ulm, 1/31. — Idem, Ilistoria Critica Philosophise a 
 Mundi incunabulis, etc. Lips. 1742.
 
 440 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Buddeus, J. F., Historia Philosophica, Succincta delineatio. 
 Halle, 1712. 
 
 Buhle, Joh. Glieb., Geschichte des Philosophirenden Verstandes. 
 Lemgo, 1793. — Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic und 
 einer Kiit. Literatur derselben. Gotting. 1796, 1804. 
 
 Biirigtiy, Histoire de la Philosophic Payenne. La Haye, \724. 
 
 Buschiny, Ant. Fr., Vergleichung der Griech. Philos. mit der 
 Neuern. Berlin, 1785. 
 
 Ccqjasso, J. B.., Hist. Phil. Synopsis. Neap. 1728. 
 
 Capajigue, Histoire Philosophique des Juifs, depuis la Decadence 
 des Machabees jusqu'a nos jours. Bruxelles. 
 
 Cai'us, F?'. Aug., Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophic. Lands- 
 hut, 1808. — Idem, Hauptrnomente der Gesch. der Philos. Mu- 
 nich, 1829, 
 
 Cousin, Cours de I'Histoire de la Philosophic. Paris, 1829. 
 — Idem. Fragmens Philosophiques. Paris, 1839. 
 
 Cro)iiaziano, Agatojnsto, (Ajunaiio Bnonafede,) Delia istoria 
 e della indole di ogni filosofia. Lucca, 1766, 1771- 
 
 Dacier, Bibliotheque des Anciens Philosophcs. Paris, 1796. 
 
 Damii'on, Cours de la Philosophic. Paris, 1839. 
 
 De Gerando, Histoire Comparee des Systemes de Philosophic. 
 Paris, 1846. 6 vol. 
 
 Deslandes, M. D., Andr. Fr. Boiwemi, Histoire Critique de la 
 Philosophic, ou Ton traite de son origine, de ses progres, et des 
 diverses revolutions qui lui sont arrivees jusqu'a notre temps. 
 Paris, 1730, 1756. Leipz. 1770. 
 
 Diderot, Histoire Generale des Dogmes et Opinions Philoso- 
 phiques. London, 1769. 
 
 Dntens, Recherches sur I'Origine des Decouvertes attribuees 
 aux ISIodcrnes, &c. Paris, 1766. 
 
 Eberhard, Joh. Aug., AUgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. 
 Halle, 1788. — Idem, Auszug aus der Allgeui. Geschichte. Halle, 
 1798. 
 
 Enfield, Will., History of Philosophy from the earliest Times, 
 &c. Loud. 1791. 
 
 Erdmann, Versuch einer Wiss. Darst. der Gesch. der Neuern, 
 Philos. Riga, 1834. 
 
 Ernesti, Encyklopiidisclies Handbuch einer Allgem. Geschichte 
 der Philosophie. Lemgo. 1807.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Ml 
 
 Feuerbach, Die Neuern Philos. v. Bacon, Spinoza, &c. Anspach, 
 1833. 
 
 Formey, Abrege de I'histoire de la Philos. Amsterd. 1768. 
 
 Fries, Geschichte der Philos. Halle, 1837. 
 
 Ftdleborn, Von der Verschiedenheit der Alien und Neuern Phi- 
 iosophie. — Idetn, Kurze Geschichte der Philos. 
 
 F^nelon, Be la Motte, Abrege des Vies des Anciens Philosophes. 
 Paris, 1795. 
 
 Gaudentius, Paganimis, De Philosophiag apud Romanos Origiue 
 et Progressu. Pisa, 1634. ^ 
 
 Gaudentius, De la Philosophic Payenne. La Haye, 1724. 
 
 Gedike, Frid., Ciceronis Historia Philosophies. Berlin, 1782. 
 
 Gentzkenius, F., Hist. Phil, in usum lect. Hamb. 1724, 1734. 
 
 Gmeiner, Fr. Xav., Ljiterargesch. des Ursprungs und Fort- 
 gangs der Philosophic, wie audi aller philos. Secten und Sys- 
 teme. Griez. 1789. 
 
 Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum. Franck. 1613. 
 
 Goess, Ge. Frid. Dan., Die Erziehungswissenschaft nach den 
 Grundsiitzen der Griechen und Romer. Anspach, 1808. — Idem, 
 De Variis, quibus usi sunt Grseci et Romani Philosopliise Defini- 
 tionibus Comm. Ulm, 1811. 
 
 Gravius, Historica Philosophica. 1674. 
 
 Guillon, Histoire Abregee de la Philosophie. Paris, 1835. 
 
 Gurlitts, Joh., Abriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipsic, 
 1788. 
 
 Hallam, Literature of the Middle Ages. London, 1839. 
 
 Hamerskold, L., Grundziige der Geschichte der Philos. Stock- 
 holm, 1828. 
 
 Hegel, G. W. F.,Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philo- 
 sophie. 
 
 Hehieccius, Jo. GottL, Elementa Hist. Philosophicze. Berlin, 
 1743. 
 
 Henry, Br., An Epitome of the History of Philosophy. New 
 York, 1842. 
 
 Hilaire, Saint, M. Barth. De I'Ecole d'Alexandrie. Paris, 1845. 
 Hillebrand, Josejih, Geschichte und Methodologie ^der Philos. 
 Heidelberg, 1819.
 
 442 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Hippeau, Histoire Abregee de la Philosopbie. Paris, 1839. 
 
 Histoire Critique de I'Eclectisme ou des Nouveaux Platoniciens, 
 1766. 
 
 Historia Philosophise. Lipsise, 1711. 
 
 Historia Philosophise. Lovanii, 1834. 
 
 Hornie, Ge., Historia Philosophica. Lugd. 1655. 
 
 Huet, Traite Philosophique de la Faiblesse de I'Esprit Humain. 
 Amsterdam, 1723. 
 
 Kayssler, A., Beitrage zur Kritischeii Geschichte Neuern Philo- 
 sopbie. Halle, 1804. « 
 
 Krause, K. Char. Fr., Vorl. iib. die Grundw. der AViss. etc. 
 Gott. 1829. 
 
 Krug, Wilh. Franz, Geschichte der Philosophic. Leipsic, 1828. 
 
 Lapena, Ensayo Sobre la Historia de la Filosofia. Burgos, 
 1807. 3 vol. 
 
 Le Maitre, Rod., Les Divins Mysteres de la Philosophic Plato- 
 nique. Paris, 1628. 
 
 Lewis, Biographical History of Philosophy. London, 1846. 
 
 Lodtmann, Kurzer Abriss der Geschichte der Weltweisheit. 
 Helmst. 1758. 
 
 Maleville, GuilL, Histoire Critique de I'Eclectisme, ou des Nou- 
 veaux Platoniciens. Paris, 1766. 
 
 Mai-tini, Storia della Filosofia. Torino, 1839. 
 
 Martini, Lorenzo, Storia della Filosofia. Milano, 1840. 
 
 Matter, Jacques, Essai Historique sur I'Ecole d'Alexandrie. 
 Paris, 1820. 
 
 Meiner, Ch., Geschichte des Ursprungs, Fortgangs, und Ver- 
 falls, der Wissenschaft in Griechenland und Rom. Lemgo, 1781. — 
 /c?e/«, Grundriss der Geschichte der Weltweisheit. Lemgo. 1789. 
 
 Morell, J. D., An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative 
 Philosophy of Europe, in the Nineteenth Century. London, 1847. 
 
 Mussman, J. G., Gesch. der Christlichen Philosophic. Halle, 
 1838. 
 
 Naigeon, Dictionnaire de Philosophic, Ancienne et Moderne. 
 Paris, 1791. 
 
 Olearius, Historia Philosophise. Lipsise, 1711. Venet. 1733. 
 
 Pelvert, Exposition Succincte et Comparaison de la Doctrine des 
 Anciens et des Nouveaux Pbilosophes. Paris, 1787.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 443 
 
 Plessi?iff, Fr. Vict. Lebrecht, Hlstorische und Pliilosophische 
 Untersuchungen iiber die Denkart Tlieologie und Philosophie der 
 altesten Vcilker, vorziiglich der Griechen bis auf Aristoteles Zeit. 
 Elbing, 1785. 
 
 Plexiacus, Lexicon Philosophicum. Hagse, 1716. 
 
 Posself, Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 1840. 
 
 Pullenbe?'ff, P. J., Kurze Darstellung des Haupt-Inh. der Ge- 
 schichte der Philos. Lemgo, 1838. 
 
 Rapin, R4n^, Reflexions sur la Philosophie Ancienne et Mo- 
 derne. Paris, 1625. Reflexions sur la Philosophie Ancienne et 
 Moderne. Paris, 16/6. 
 
 Reinhardus, Laur., Compendium Hist. Philosophicse. Lipsise, 
 1735. 
 
 RemholJ, E., Geschichte der Philosophie. Gotha, 1828—30.— 
 Idetn, Lehrb. der Geschichte der Philos. Jena, 1838. 
 
 Uenouvier, CAar., Manuel de Philosophie Ancienne. Paris, 1844. 
 
 Ritter,H., Geschichte der Philosophie. Hamburg, 1829. 
 
 Rixner, Ans. Thadd., Handbuch der Geschichte der Philos. 
 Stulzbach, 1823. 
 
 Sacchi, Storia Delia Filosofia Greca. Pavia, 1818. 
 
 Sanchez, Historia Moral y Filosofica. Madrid. 
 
 Schaller, Karl Aug., Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie. 
 Halle, 1809. 
 
 Schwartz, N. J., Manuel de I'Histoire de la Philosophie Anci- 
 enne. Liege, 1842. 
 
 Simon, M. Jules, Histoire de I'Ecole d'Alexandrie. Paris, 1845. 
 
 Snell, Phil. Ludtv., Kurzer Abriss der Geschichte der Philo- 
 sophie. 1819. 
 
 Socher, Geo., Gruudriss der Geschichte der Philosophischen 
 Systems von den Griechen bis auf Kant. Miinchen, 1808. 
 
 Stanley, Thomas, History of Philosophy. Lond., 1655, folio; 
 Ed. 3. 1701—4. 
 
 Steck, Erh. Gottl., Die Geschichte der Philosophie. Riga, 1808. 
 
 Tennemann, Wilh. Gottl., Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipz. 
 1798 — 1819. — 7<?e/rt, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philos. Leip- 
 sic, 1819. 
 
 Tiedemann, Histoire de la Philosophie Speculative. Marbourgh, 
 1791. 
 
 Tissot, Histoire Abregee de la Philosophie. Paris, 1840.
 
 444 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 VacheroU M. Et., Histoire Critique de I'EcoIe d'Alexaudrie. 
 3 vols. Paris, 1846. 
 
 Vollbeding, John Christ., Kurze Uebersicht der Geschichte der 
 Philos. Berlin, 1798. 
 
 Vossius, De Philosophia et Philosophorum Sectis. 1658. 
 
 JFalch, F. G., Erliiuterungen der Philosophie von Verf. Halle, 
 1738. 
 
 Weiller, Karl., Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Miiu- 
 chen, 1818. 
 
 Werdennann, J. L. G., Geschichte der Philos. Leipsic, 1798. 
 
 Willm, J., Histoire de la Philosophie Allemande. 4 vols. Paris, 
 1846. 
 
 Windischmann, Carl. Joh. H., Die Philosophie im Fortgang der 
 Weltgeschichte. Bonn, 1838. — Idem, Krit. Betrachtungen Uber 
 die Schicksale der Philosophie. Frankfort, 1828. 
 
 NOTE B.— Page 12. 
 
 " The reason why Anaximander regarded the primary substance 
 as infinite, finds a natural explanation in the infinite variety of the 
 evolutions of the world, which have their ground in it. He is re- 
 presented as arguing that the primary substance must have been 
 infinite, to be all-sufficient for the limitless variety of produced 
 things with which we are encompassed. Now although Aristotle 
 expressly characterises this infinite as a mixture, we must not, 
 nevertheless, think of it as a mere multiplicity of primary material 
 elements ; for to the mind of Anaximander it was a unity, im- 
 mortal and imperishable, an ever-producing energy. This pro- 
 duction of individual things was derived by Anaximander from an 
 eternal motion of the infinite ; from which it would appear that he 
 ascribed to it an inherent vital energy, without, however, employing 
 the terms life and production in any acceptation except the only 
 one allowable byjthe character of his philosophy, — in the sense, i. e. 
 of motion, by which the primary elements of the infinite separate 
 themselves one from another. 
 
 •' According]^to Anaximander, it was not by any continuous trans- 
 mutation of the primary substance into a variety of secondary states,
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 445 
 
 that the sensible qualities of things begin to be ; but by separation, 
 according to their kind, of opposite elements, which in the infinite 
 are confusedly and separately combined into unity ; which secretion 
 is effected by the eternal motion. According to this, the primary 
 being of Anaximander is undoubtedly a unity ; but it comprises 
 within itself the multiplicity of elements out of which things are 
 composed ; and these need only to be divided, in order to their 
 appearing as separate phenomena of nature. Thus on the decom- 
 position of the infinite, the kindred elements were attracted to- 
 gether ; so that what in the All was gold, without, however, appear- 
 ing to be such, in consequence of being blended with its opposite, 
 now appears gold ; and what was earth, earth ; for nothing new is 
 produced, or assumes other qualities different from those it pre- 
 viously had ; but all was antecedently the same as subsequently it 
 exhibited itself to be. This is evidently founded on the grand 
 principle of the mechanical theory of physics, that nothing alters 
 its qualities, but ever remains identical, and only moves among the 
 other elements, whereby, in the altered mixture, the same element 
 appears different at different times. We shall see these same con- 
 ceptions occurring again in the more detailed explanations of nature 
 given by Anaximander, and thereby his whole theory placed in 
 direct opposition to that of the Ionian dynamicists. 
 
 "The issuing of individual things from out of the infinite All was 
 thus explained by Anaximander : The central point in the cosmo- 
 pceia was the earth ; for, being of cylindrical form with a base in 
 the ratio 1 : 3 to its altitude, it was retained in the centre by the 
 air, and by the equality of its distances from all the limits of the 
 world ; the stars, on the other hand, moved round it at equal dis- 
 tances from each other, — the planets and fixed stars lowest, then 
 the moon, and ultimately the sun ; each one of these bodies being 
 borne on wheel-like ring (its sphere). According to this view 
 of the system of the world, the motion of the infinite productive 
 unity, which comprises within itself all opposites, appears to 
 have suggested first of all the opposition the centre and circum- 
 ference, and then again to have referred this to a further oppo- 
 sition between the earth and the heavens, of which the former 
 indicated to his mind the cold, the latter the warm : so that in the 
 first place the cold elements separate themselves from the warm, 
 the former constituting the centre, and the latter the circumference
 
 446 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 of the world. This representation is everywhere paramount with 
 Anaximander ; all formation, either of the universe or individuali- 
 ties, must necessarily evolve itself in the contrariety of the inner 
 and the outer, inasmuch as the outer surrounds and encloses the 
 inner, as the bark does the tree. The earth, therefore, in its first 
 formation, was supposed to be a mixture of cold, watery, and earthy 
 elements, which had been separated out of the infinite from the 
 warm and fiery, by means of the eternal motion. The heaven, on 
 the contrary, he considered as a hollow fiery sphere, which con- 
 tains the atmospheric air. The system of the world, however, after 
 this first formation, proceeded to evolve itself to a further degree ; 
 aud whilst the earth was improved by the force of fire, occasioning 
 the division of the land and the waters, the heavens likewise ex- 
 perienced a further separation. The revolution by which this was 
 brought about, is described by Anaximander as a disruption of the 
 heavenly sphere, by which means several single fiery systems were 
 formed — the present heavenly bodies — which, being thereupon en- 
 closed in aerial spheres, are onlj' visible through certain apertures. 
 Here again we meet with the opposition between the outer and the 
 inner, the enclosing air and the enclosed fire ; only the fire in the 
 compass of the world presents itself differently from what it does 
 in the centre, or rather in the world itself, — for with respect to the 
 latter, the inner core of the world, in its narrow sense, is the cold ; 
 and the water, or the heaven, is the warm ; but contrariwise, in the 
 heavenly bodies the inner is the warm, and the enclosing integu- 
 ment the cold. It is impossible not to see in all this an intentional 
 pursuit of contrariety, which again is further evident from the mode 
 in which, attached to the polytheist conceptions of his country- 
 men, he designates the universe and the heaven — by which latter 
 term he understands the stars — as gods. When, however, he 
 speaks of an infinity of co -existent worlds, he must, consistently 
 with his entire theory, employ the term world in a subordinate 
 acceptation, for the oneliness of the world or universe was a staple 
 point in all his speculations, — since he supposed, on the one hand, 
 an influential action of the heavenly bodies on the formation of the 
 earth, and on the other, that the earth and the heavenly bodies, 
 maintaining certain definite distances, constituted one orderly 
 system , 
 
 " In all these formations the mode of production is evidently me-
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 447 
 
 chanical ; thus it is the eternal motion which separates the contra- 
 ries, and collects the warm elements in the circumference, and the 
 cold elements in the centre. Again, the opposition of heavy and 
 light seems to have played its part in the system of Anaximander, 
 and to have been looked upon by him as the cause of motion. 
 And the mathematical laws also, which are so naturally allied 
 to the mechanical physiology, are employed in his theory to deter- 
 mine the ratio of the earth's altitude and base, to calculate the 
 distance of the intervals between the subordinate worlds, and to 
 compare the size of the earth with that of the sun. 
 
 " But there is yet another point which displays still more re- 
 markably the close affinity of his whole view with the mechanical 
 tlieory of nature ; which indeed — as we shall see the same point 
 occur in an exactly similar manner with all the mechanical philoso- 
 phers of the Ionian school, and nothing similar being to be found 
 among the dynamicists — affords a test whereby to recognise in the 
 details the historical connexion of the various expositions of this 
 theory, which is, however, otherwise sufficiently manifest from the 
 general view. The greatest difficulty for the mechanical theory of 
 nature must have been to account for the organical construction of 
 living beings, since this view does not recognise an original vital 
 energy really capable of transmuting itself into other changeable 
 states. Hence we invariably find the mechanicists occupied in 
 framing hypotheses which might serve to explain on mechanical 
 laws the phenomena of animal and vegetable life. Those put for- 
 ward by Anaximander for this purpose have been very inaccurately 
 reported to us ; sufficiently, however, for us too see that they com- 
 pletely coincide with his whole notion of a progressive formation of 
 the world by means of the gradually evolved contrarieties of heat 
 and cold ; and also bear the greatest resemblance to a very ancient 
 representation of the origin of men and brutes, which in its general 
 features has been transmitted by Diodorus Siculus." — Ritter, Hist. 
 Phil. Yol. l.pp. 163—172. 
 
 NOTE B.— Page 66. 
 ** As, however, in the midst of these logical or dialectical disqui- 
 sitions, we have fallen upon that which from of old, has ever been
 
 448 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 considered at once the centre and the difficulty of the Platonic sys- 
 tem — his theory of ideas, it is indispensable to ascertain precisely 
 the true Platonic sense of the term idea. This is the more neces- 
 sary, the greater the disposition that has been evinced in modern 
 times to take a very partial view of the subject, and to explain the 
 ideas either by the general properties of objects, or by the general 
 notions of genus and species, and even to confine them exclusively 
 to the ideal conceptions of the good, the beautiful, and the just. 
 The expressions of Plato, hov^ever, far transcend all these narrow 
 limitations, and there is no species of being which he does not 
 comprise within his idea. In order, however, to determine from 
 his own writings the extent of the term as employed by him, it is 
 necessary to bear in mind that he speaks in the same sense of his 
 Vc?eff, and of the permanent essence, unity, or absolute being, which, 
 to his mind, indicated the objective of the ideas. Now we find 
 that he comprises therein not merely the highest and most perfect 
 within his own knowledge, the beautiful and the good, justice and 
 science, but even their contraries — every species of vice, evil, and in- 
 justice. Moreover, he speaks of ideas of resemblance and difference, 
 of the one and the manifold, of magnitude, of health, and strength, 
 and even of speed and slowness ; so, too, of the unity of man and of 
 beast, of the sphere, in and by itself, the circle, in and by itself; of a 
 bed and a stable, even of the name or the noun. And lest, perchance, 
 this should be misunderstood to refer merely to the general character 
 of genus and species, the individual soul is represented as an idea ; 
 and what Socrates is, and what Simmias is, is distinguished from 
 what is common to both. What, however, is still more calculated 
 to excite surprise, is the attribution of an essence even to the sen- 
 sible and the inchoate, so that it is requisite to consider as an idea 
 that which to all appearance is the most to its nature. Thus an 
 essence is attributed to a colour and a sound, and prototypes are 
 given to the different species of life, and a permanence of essence is 
 ascribed, not merely to things, but also to their actions and activi- 
 ties. This is, however, perfectly consistent with the comprehensive 
 and searching character of Plato's mind, which would not allow of 
 science being limited to any close and narrow domain, or of aught 
 being excluded from the sphere of right knowledge. This extensive 
 view of science is exhibited in a manner truly philosophical, in the re- 
 proof which tlie young Socrates is made to receive from Parmenides,
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTKATIONS. 449 
 
 for evincing a disinclination to recognise, .-is possible, the reality of 
 the ideas of man, fire, water, nay, even of hair and of clay, and 
 other equally mean and paltry objects ; for Parmenides observes, it 
 is unbecoming a true philosopher to defer to the opinion of the 
 many, and to consider any object as wholly despicable. In another 
 sense, the Platonic acceptation of Idea is still more extensive ; for 
 among the ideas after which the sensible world was formed, he even 
 reckons the tribes of mortal creatures ; which, however, to his mind, 
 indicate nothing more than different grades in the development of 
 one and the same living essence ; since the soul, in its migration, 
 passes from one to the other. Hence we may clearly infer, that 
 the Ideas may indicate certain natural grades of development — and 
 not merely the essence of things, which, in every possible relation, 
 invariably remains identical with itself. "We have, however, from 
 Plato himself, as general a determination of the province of Ideas 
 as could be desired ; for he expressly declares, that an Idea may be 
 attributed to whatever, as a plurality, may be indicated by the same 
 name. It must be manifest to all, whose notions of the theory are 
 tolerably clear and precise, that this expression cannot be under- 
 stood as exclusively referring to species and genera, which, in the 
 individual, appear as the manifold, but also to such individuals as, 
 expressed by one common name, exhibit themselves in many phe- 
 nomena. Furthermore, it could not escape Plato's observation, 
 that every property, every condition, and every relation of things, 
 expressed by a term, can be valid by many ; and finally, that even 
 the variable activities, as also generation or becoming, can be ex- 
 pressed by a noun, and combined with many verbs ; so that, in 
 fact, it must be admitted that according to him there is nothing 
 which does not participate in Ideas, or may not be comprehended 
 in an Idea." 
 
 " Now, that the term Idea should have been used by Plato in 
 this wide and general sense, will surprise no one who has con- 
 sidered, however slightly, the basis on which his whole theory rests. 
 This, indeed, is the Idea of science, for the reality of which that of 
 the Ideas is indispensable. If, then, Plato maintained that there 
 must necessarily be Ideas to exhibit the unalterable and eternal 
 truth of the objects of every science, in order that the science itself 
 should be possible, he was constrained to find Ideas wherever there 
 is a true essence, and scientific investigation is possible. But what 
 * 2 G
 
 450 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 was there to which, in Plato's opinion, scientific inquiry might not 
 attach itself, or in which some truth might not yet be found ? For 
 consistently with the comprehensive view he entertained of science, 
 he must have clearly seen that there is a truth to be discovered, 
 even in individuals, even in the qualities and properties of things, 
 and in all that comes into being, and that consequently an idea 
 must be found for them all. We must, therefore, dismiss all nar- 
 row views of the Platonic Idece, and understand by them whatever 
 exhibits an eternal truth, — a persistent something which forms the 
 basis of the mutability of the sensible. As the ideal theory was 
 the conjoint result of the controversy against the sensuous presen- 
 tation interpreted by the Sophists, and against the denial of all dis- 
 tinction to which the Eleatic theory manifestly tended, there 
 were two points principally which it is of importance to it to 
 establish clearly and firmly, — first, that the sensible is not the true, 
 but that science alone, which teaches that there is an unchangeable 
 truth, can adequately express the unchangeable essence of things ; 
 and secondly, that truth, or the real and true being, is not indis- 
 tinguishably one and identical, but that it comprises a multitude of 
 separate notions, every one of which expresses, in a manner pecu- 
 liar to itselfj the eternal essence of things ; and although it consti- 
 tutes in itself a true unity, nevertheless, in reference to others, 
 it appears as a multiplicity. 
 
 " But there is yet a third point which is immediately implied in 
 the Ideal theory, viz. that the true and the real are exhibited in 
 general notions as elements of science, which are so related to each 
 other that every higher notion embraces and combines under it 
 several lower ; consequently, that the elements of truth cannot be 
 so separated from each other as not to be nevertheless held together 
 by some higher bond. Now, as Plato maintained this coherency 
 of ideas to be indispensable to science, he naturally proceeded to 
 show that all those theories are subversive of it, which consider any 
 special truth to exist absolutely in and of itself. This connexion 
 of the individual essences he supposed to be similar to that by 
 which individual ideas are comprehended under the more general ; 
 which in his mind is a true and a real connexion, and not merely 
 conceptual. Here, then, we have the reality of the general ex- 
 pressly asserted, which however is not a mere abstract generality, 
 but one in which the special and the individual are comprised.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 451 
 
 That this must possess a verity, and consequently reahty, needs 
 not, according to Plato, any other voucher than the truth and 
 reahty of science, of which the general is the constituent." — Ritter, 
 Hist. Philos. Vol. ii. p. 1/0—172. 
 
 NOTE C— Page 9Q. 
 
 " But, although Aristotle agreed with Plato in thinking that the 
 essences of things are expressed in the notions, he nevertheless 
 impugned the Platonic theory of ideas, in so far as it taught that 
 this essence is to be found in the general ideas. This controversy 
 is carried on by Aristotle in very different ways. At times he 
 attacks the manner in which Plato attempts to gain, by means of 
 ideas, and of the mathematical notion of numbers, a transition from 
 the becoming, to the eternal verity. In this attack Aristotle con- 
 fines himself to bringing forward a variety of doubts, which the 
 vagueness of Plato's views, and those of his disciples, on this sub- 
 ject, naturally give rise to, and which, although they do not enter 
 deeply into the spirit of the doctrine, are nevertheless well fitted 
 to awaken attention to its weakness. This mode of the contro- 
 versy does not, however, concern us in the present place, where 
 our first object is that which relates to the notion of essence. In 
 this respect Aristotle objects to the ideal theory, that it possesses an 
 essence which has no part in motion or change ; for the ideas are 
 said to indicate the eternal alone, and that, consequently, it renders 
 all investigation into nature impossible. This objection was in 
 some measure connected with his conviction, that the ideal theory 
 had its origin in logical, as opposed to physical, researches. Simi- 
 larly, Aristotle urged that ethical investigations also are impossible 
 in the ideal theory, since these investigations are not concerned 
 about the good in itself, but the good which is the end and result 
 of human conduct and actions. From admitting Slich grounds of 
 science Aristotle was prevented, by his doctrine that we must rise 
 from the better known to us, or from that which is more nearly 
 allied to the sensible, to the knowledge of what is better known in 
 and by itself. On this ground he likewise shews, that if the ideas 
 are contained, or ought to be, in us, that they must be moveable, 
 or sensible, since there is in the soul a movement and perception of 
 
 2 G 2
 
 452 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 forms. Herein is apparent the endeavour of Aristotle to find such 
 an essence as would facilitate the explanation of experience, and 
 the sensuous phenomenon of becoming ; for he regards it as the 
 great defect of the ideal theory, that it rends the universal from 
 the material, in order to make the sole ground of the special. It 
 did not indeed escape Aristotle, that Plato's doctrine does not alto- 
 gether neglect phenomena, but that, on the contrary, it attempts to 
 reconcile sensation with the ideal; but he considered that it accom- 
 plishes this not only very vaguely, but even very strangely. Thus he 
 says, that what the Platonists call a participation of objects in the 
 ideas, is a mere vague, idle talk ; and he designates as absurd the 
 position of the ideal theory, that even general notions indicate an 
 essence, or entity, since, according to such a view, a single essence 
 might be composed of several diiferent essences ; a consequence 
 which would imperil the legitimacy of the principle of contradiction. 
 At times, indeed, he evidently misinterprets the Platonic doctrine, 
 and is of opinion that Plato considered the ideas to be altogether 
 separate from sensible things, to which he may perhaps have been 
 misled by the fact, that Plato does not assign a place to the ideas, 
 but evidently looks upon them as existing wholly without the rela- 
 tions of space. But the principal defect which he imputes to 
 Plato's theory is, that it confounds the grounds of all things, and, 
 by a necessary consequence, teaches concerning things, doctrines 
 which do not coincide with phenomena. In opposition to this view, 
 Aristotle observes, that it is necessary to assume different grounds 
 of entity, a sensible for the sensible, a perishable for the perishable, 
 and an eternal for what is eternal, and generally to admit for every 
 class of objects a peculiar and correspondent ground. From this 
 confusion of the grounds of Plato it has necessarily resulted, that he 
 could not assume any properly supra-sensible grounds of things, but 
 believed that, by adding to the sensible ground the words "in and 
 by itself," he could elevate it into the supra-sensible. In this 
 respect Aristotle compares the ideal theory to humanizing represen- 
 tations of the Deity ; for, in the same manner that these form at 
 most but eternal men, the Platonic doctrine makes the sensible 
 species of things conceived as eternal, to be the ground of things. 
 The great absurdity of the doctrine is, that it assimilates in species, 
 things, like the perishable and imperishable, which are generically 
 different.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 453 
 
 " It cannot be denied that, by following out these consequences, 
 Aristotle did not attack Plato in the true spirit of his theory. This 
 spirit Aristotle misunderstood, in consequence of following a very 
 different notion of essence from that which Plato did. While the 
 latter viewed the essence of things in a very general light, and 
 without any proximate determination, as that which exhibits itself 
 in sensible phenomena as the abiding law, which admits of being 
 apprehended in a scientific notion, Aristotle sought to discover 
 some ground which, as absolutely subsisting, should furnish the 
 ground of all things. The principal object of Plato was to discover 
 and to trace the true and the real in all sensible objects, aud this 
 he considered to be the essence ; Aristotle, on the contrary, sought 
 to explain the origin of sensations by the mutual action and passion 
 of things on their essences. And if Plato looked upon the true 
 not merely as individual, but also as universal, still Aristotle does 
 not deviate from him in this respect ; he only objects to Plato's 
 giving to the universal the term essence. Moreover, he took too 
 narrow a view of the ideal theory, when he believed that Plato did 
 not admit ideas of individual objects as well as of the universal. 
 Here again he was probably deceived by the language of Plato, 
 who, in truth, does consider every particular idea as a universal, 
 but at the same time regards every individual entity as universal or 
 general, since it also comprises under itself a multiplicity of sensuous 
 determinations. That on this point there subsisted nothing more 
 than a verbal misunderstanding between Plato and Aristotle is clear 
 from the fact, that the latter even looked upon the general, although 
 it may be predicated of many things, as something which, not 
 merely in name, but also in being, is one and the same, and as 
 only cognizable by the intellect indeed, but still actually present in 
 the sensible. Aristotle found it necessary to maintain this, because, 
 otherwise, any inference from a universal truth would be impos- 
 sible. He held that science, as Plato had previously shewn, is 
 dependent on the universal, only this universal is not something 
 extrinsical to things. We cannot deny that this account still leaves 
 a difference of view between Aristotle and Plato; which, however, does 
 not consist in this, that while one denied the existence of the general, 
 the other denied that of the individual ; but merely in the different 
 directions they respectively followed in their attempts to explain 
 phenomena. Plato sought to deduce the individual from the uni-
 
 454 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 versal ; but Aristotle, on the contrary, believed tbat the universal 
 has its grounding in the individual. Logically, the tendency of 
 the latter is mainly expressed in his endeavour to find an ultimate 
 subject of the proposition, an " hypostasis " of which all else may 
 be predicated j such are individual objects, for ideas are merely 
 idle words, and the general is not anything subsisting absolutely 
 in and for itself, but it is invariably predicated of something else." — 
 {Ritter, Vol. iii. p. 108.) 
 
 NOTE D.— Page 1/1. 
 
 *' II fut aussi le prince des philosophes romains, ce citoyen 
 illustre, qui fut le prince des orateurs. Le premier, il cleva sur 
 cette terre nouvelle un monument a la science de la sagesse ; et 
 tjuel monument ! C'est un portique majestueux qui introduit h 
 toutes les branches de la science. Ciceron est historien et peintre 
 tout ensemble ; il fait revivre les ecoles diverses en meme temps 
 qu'il en raconte I'origine, S'emparant ensuite de leur heritage, il 
 eleve la philosophic a la plus haute dignite, lui assigne son veritable 
 but, lui prete le plus noble langage, I'arrache aux subtilites des 
 ecoles pour la transporter sur la scene de la socicte, I'anime d'une vie 
 toute nouvelle. Ce n'est pas a I'intelligence seule qu'il s'adresse, c'est 
 Tame tout enticre qu'il interesse a ses doctes lecons. Comment les 
 anciennes preventions qui repoussaient les etudes philosophiques ne se 
 seraient-elles pas dissipces, lorsque leur cause obtenait un tel apo- 
 logiste, lorsqu'elles recevaient de la bouche de ce grand homme 
 les plus magnifiques eloges, lorsqu'on apprenait de lui qu'elles 
 avaient ete sa lumiere dans les affaires publiques, son delassement 
 dans ses travaux, sa consolation dans I'adversite ; qu'il avait trouve 
 en elles et un guide pour son genie, et une source inalte'rable de 
 bonheur, et le vrai fondement de la vertu ; lorsque Ciceron lui-meme, 
 si justement fier des services qu'il avait rendus a son pays, placait 
 au ^premier rang de ces services le bonheur d' avoir pu introduire ces 
 concitoyens a I'etude de cette science ? II nous apprend qu'avant 
 lui divers ecrivains s'etaient dej^ exerces sur le meme sujet ; mais 
 ils etaient restes dans une obscurite dont I'orateur romain croit in- 
 utile de les tirer. II est cependaut singulier qu'il ne fasse jamais 
 mention du pocme de Lucrece. Ciceron nous confie lui-meme qu'il
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 455 
 
 s'est propose quatre vues principales : faire connaitre aux Ro- 
 xnains les doctrines des Grecs, y puiser librement ce qui lui parais- 
 sait digne d'estime, les revetir des ornements du style et de tout 
 I'eclat qu'elles peuvent emprunter k I'art oratoire, et les rapporter 
 aux resultats de I'utilitc la i)lus relevce et la plus etendue ; aussi 
 trouvons-nous dans la philosophie de Ciceron les quatre caracteres 
 essentiels qui distiuguent les travaux des philosophes remains pen- 
 dant le cours de cette periode ; una science empruntee aux sages 
 de la Grece, mais composee d'un choix de matc'riaux fait dans les 
 diflFcrentes ecoles, una science rendue accessible, attrayante, mise a 
 la portce de tons les hommes iustruits, une science cminemment 
 pratique et appliquee aux besoins gcneraux de la socictc, comme a 
 ceux de la morale privee ; en sorte que Ciceron n'a pas ete le vrai 
 fondateur de la philosophie h Rome, mais qu'il est en quelque sorta 
 pour nous comme le representant de tons ceux qui I'ont cultivee 
 apr^s lui. En tracant rapidement ici le resume de ce qu'il a fait 
 pour elle, nous expliquerons done mieux que par une froide nomen- 
 clature bibliographique, le point de vue dans lequel les Romaius se 
 sent places pour I'etude de cette science, et I'esprit dans lequel ils 
 I'ont traitee. 
 
 " L'ecole d'Epicure est la seule a laquelle Ciceron n'ait voulu payer 
 aucun tribut, et I'eloignement qu'il montra pour elle est justifie en 
 partie par Tabus qu'on commencait a en faire, par la pressentiment 
 de celui qu'on en ferait par la suite. II lone Pythagore, il rand 
 a Socrate une sorta da culte, il professe pour Platon I'admira- 
 tion la plus constante ; il associe Aristote aux hommages dont il 
 environne le fondateur de I'Academie, il se plait a voir dans ces deux 
 philosophes plutot deux aUie's que deux rivaux ; il s'est pe'netre des 
 austeres maximes de Ze'non, il s'est range a la suite de Carneade et 
 de Philon dans les rangs de la moyenne Acade'mie ; mais ca qu'il 
 y a surtout cherche, c'est I'avantage qu'offre cette ecole de pouvoir 
 comparer, discuter hbrement toutes les doctrines, les opposer entre 
 elles, et faire un choix judicieux. II cherche lui-meme comment 
 on peut composer, de I'enseignement des sages de la Grece depuis 
 Socrate, un systeme unique ou du moins principal, modifie seule- 
 ment par les additions ou les corrections de ses sucesseurs ; il va 
 quelquefois jusqu'a forcer ca rapprochement, et jusqu'a supposer 
 que la doctrine des Stoiciens ne difFere que dans les termes da cel- 
 les da Platon et d' Aristote. On est force de reconnaitre toutefois
 
 456 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 que, dans ses vastes recherches, il n'a pas toujours exactement saisi, 
 fidelement rendu, la veritable pensee des auteurs dont il se rendait 
 
 I'interprete. 
 
 "En general, Ciceron suit la moyenne Academie dans les ques- 
 tions speculatives, Platon dans la psychologie ; Aristote et Ze'non 
 surtout le guident dans la morale ; il s'attache de pre'ference a Avis- 
 tote dans la politique ; mais c'est Platon qu'il prend constamment 
 pour modele dans sa methode ; il se plait a imiter la forme de ses 
 dialogues : s'il ne I'egale pas dans I'extreme delicatesse de ses ana- 
 lyses, il I'egale souvent en ele'vation, il le surpasse en clarte, et 
 ofFre lui-meme a 1' eloquence philosophique un modele qui n'a jamais 
 ete eo-ale jusqu'a ce jour." — De Gerando, Histoire Conipar^e des 
 Systemes de Philosojihie, Vol.ii. p. 178.) 
 
 NOTE E.— Page 197. 
 
 We shall here cite a few passages from the writings of some of 
 the Greek and Roman sages, on the nature of a Deity. Plato, on 
 Cause and Effect, reasons thus :^-" Whatever is produced, must 
 be produced by some cause ; for it is impossible that anything should 
 be produced or made without a cause." (Timseus, p. 28). " The 
 Universe received its origin, not from any fortuitous concourse of 
 atoms, but from a prudent potent first cause." (Tim. p. 265.) 
 " We must take it for granted that nothing can make itself." 
 (Thetetetus). " God is the primary and principal mover in nature, 
 (like the soul to the body) who moves himself, and all things that 
 are, were, or shall b^ in the world." (Leg. x. p. 894). Plato 
 states the argument for a Deity, drawn from the order, harmony, 
 and beauty of the world, in the following words : " The admirable 
 order of the universe, and the regular motion of the stars and other 
 celestial bodies, ordered by the Divine mind, demonstrate an intel- 
 ligent cause. For no mortal man who shall look into these 
 things with a diligent, inquisitive eye, can so far be an Atheist, as 
 not to acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being." (Leg. xii. 
 p. 966). Cicero says, " that Nature herself has impressed a notion 
 of a Deity on the minds of all men." (De Nat. Deor. lib. 1). 
 " For God is the first Being and Cause of things." (Simplicius in
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 457 
 
 Epict. c. 1, p. 9). Seneca, although he speaks of a pluraUty of 
 gods, asserts the existence of a supreme Deity in language which 
 cannot be mistaken : " The Framer and Former of the universe ; the 
 Governor, Disposer, and Keeper thereof; Him upon whom all 
 things depend ; the Mind and Spirit of the world ; the Artificer 
 and Lord of this whole mundane fabric ; to whom every name be- 
 longeth ; from whom all things spring ; by whose Spirit we live ; 
 who is in all his parts, and sustains himself by his own power ; 
 by whose counsel the world is provided for, and guided in all its 
 movements ; by whose decree all things are done ; the Divine 
 Spirit that is diffused through all things, both great and small ; 
 the God whose power extendeth to all things ; the greatest and 
 most powerful God, who supports himself and maintains all things ; 
 who is present everywhere ; the God of heaven whom we worship 
 and adore." (Nat. 2, lib. 2.)^ 
 
 NOTE F.— Page 241. 
 
 Exposition of Theology by Proclus. 
 Prop. 1. All multitude participates in a certain respect of the 
 
 ONE. 
 
 Prop. 2. Everything which participates of the one, is both one 
 and not one. 
 
 Prop. 3. Everything which becomes one, becomes so through the 
 participation of the one, and is one, so far as it suffers the partici- 
 pation of the one. 
 
 Prop. 4. Everything which is united is different from the one 
 itself. 
 
 Prop. 5. All multitude is posterior to the 07ie. 
 
 Prop. 6. Every multitude consists either of things united, or of 
 unities. 
 
 Prop. 7. Everything productive of another is more excellent 
 than the nature of the thing produced. 
 
 Prop. 8. That which is primarily good, and which is no other 
 than the good itself, is the leader of all things that in any way 
 whatever participate of good. 
 
 Prop. 9. Everything which is sufficient to itself, either according
 
 458 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that 
 which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection 
 suspended from another cause. 
 
 Prop. 10. Everything which is sufficient to itself is inferior to 
 that which is simply good. 
 
 Prop. 11. All beings proceed from one first cause. 
 
 Prop. 12. The principle and first cause of all beings is the 
 good. 
 
 Prop. 13. Every good has the power of uniting its participants, 
 and every union is good ; and the good is the same with the one. 
 
 Prop. 14. Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if 
 moved, it is either moved by itself or by another. And if indeed 
 it is moved by itself, it is self-motive ; but if by another, it is alter- 
 motive. Everything, therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, 
 or alter-motive. 
 
 Prop. 15. Everything which is converted to itself is incorporeal. 
 
 Prop. 16. Everything which is converted to itself, has an essence 
 separate from all body. 
 
 Prop. 17. Everything which moves itself primarily, isconvertive 
 to itself. 
 
 Prop. 18. Everything which imparts existence to others, is it- 
 self that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are 
 supplied by it with existence. 
 
 Prop. 19. Everything which is primarily inherent in a certain 
 nature of beings, is present to all the beings that are arranged ac- 
 cording to that nature, and this conformably to one reason and 
 after the same manner. 
 
 Prop. 20. The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intel- 
 lectual nature is beyond all souls, and the one is beyond all intel- 
 lectual hypostases. 
 
 Prop. 21. Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a 
 multitude of every order, and is referred to one monad. 
 
 Prop. 22. Everything which subsists primarily and principally in 
 each order is one, and_is neither two, nor more than two, but is only 
 begotten. 
 
 Prop. 23. Every imparticipable gives substance from itself to 
 things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are 
 extended to imparticipable hyparxes. 
 
 Prop. 24. Every thing which participates is inferior to that
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 459 
 
 which is participated ; and that which is participated is inferior to 
 that which is imparticipable. 
 
 Prop. 25. Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those 
 things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all. 
 
 Prop. 26. Every cause which is productive of other things, it- 
 self abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and 
 such as are successive. 
 
 Prop. 27. Every producing cause, on accouut of its perfection, 
 and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures. 
 
 Prop. 28. Every producing cause gives substance to things simi- 
 lar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar. 
 
 Prop. 29. Every progression is effected through a similitude of 
 secondary to first natures. 
 
 Prop. 30. Everything which is produced from a certain thing 
 without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds 
 from it. 
 
 Prop. 31. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing essen- 
 tially, is converted to that from which it proceeds. 
 
 Prop. 32. All conversion is effected through the similitude of 
 the things converted to that which they are converted. 
 
 Prop. 33. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing and 
 is converted to it, has a circular energy. 
 
 Prop. 34. Everything which is converted according to nature, 
 makes its conversion to that, from which also it had the progression 
 of its proper hypostasis. 
 
 Prop. 35. Everything caused, abides in, proceeds from, and re- 
 turns or is converted to, its cause. 
 
 Prop. 36. Of all things which are multiplied according to pro- 
 gression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than 
 those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively. 
 
 Prop. 37. Of all things which subsist according to conversion, 
 the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than 
 those that follow ; but the last are the most perfect. 
 
 Prop. 38. Everything which proceeds from certain numerous 
 causes, is converted through as many causes as those are through 
 which it proceeds, and all conevrsion is through the same things as 
 those through which progression is effected. 
 
 Prop. 39. Every being is either alone essentially converted, 
 or vitally, or also gnostically.
 
 460 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Prop. 40. Of all things which proceed, from another cause, those 
 which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsis- 
 tent essence, are the leaders. 
 
 Prop. 4 1 . Everything which is in another, is alone produced by 
 another ; but everything which is in itself is self-subsistent. 
 
 Prop. 42. Everything self-subsistent is convertive to itself. 
 
 Prop. 43. Everything convertive to itself is self-subsistent. 
 
 Prop. 44. Everything which is convertive to itself according to 
 energy, is also converted to itself essentially. 
 
 Prop. 45. Everything self-subsistent is unbegotten. 
 
 Prop. 46. 
 
 Prop. 47. Everything self-subsistent is incorruptible. 
 
 Prop. 48. Everything which is not perpetual, is either a com- 
 posite, or subsists in another. 
 
 Prop. 49. Everything self-subsistent is perpetual. 
 
 Prop. 50. Everything which is measured by time, either accord- 
 ing to essence, or according to energy, is generation, so far as it is 
 measured, by time. 
 
 Prop. 5 1 . Everything self-subsistent is essentially exempt from 
 the natures which are measured by time. 
 
 Prop. 52. Everything eternal is a whole which subsists at once. 
 And whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the 
 whole at once present, nor will it have this thing pertaining to itself 
 now subsisting, but that afterwards which as yet is not ; but as 
 much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution 
 and. without extension ; or whether it has its energy as well as its 
 essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding 
 in the same measure of perfection, and, as it were, fixed immoveably 
 and without transition, according to one and the same boundary. 
 
 Prop. 53. Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and 
 time exists prior to everything which subsists according to time. 
 
 Prop. 54. Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and 
 every time is the measure of things in time ; and these are the only 
 two measures of life and motion in beings. 
 
 Prop. 55. Everything which subsists according to time, either 
 subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a 
 part of time, 
 
 Prop. 56. Everything which is produced by secondary natures.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 461 - 
 
 is produced in a great degree by prior and more casual natures, 
 by whom such as are secondary were also produced. 
 
 Prop. 57. Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, 
 and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it. 
 
 Prop. 58. Everything that is produced by many, is more com- 
 pounded than that which is produced by fewer causes. 
 
 Prop. 59. Everything which is essentially simple, is either 
 better or worse than composite natures. 
 
 Prop. 60. Everything which is the cause of a greater number 
 of effects, is better than that which is allotted a power of producing 
 a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the 
 wholes of which the other gives subsistence. 
 
 Prop. 61. Every power which is imparticipable is greater, but 
 when divided is less. 
 
 Prop. 62. Every multitude which is nearer to the one, is less in 
 quantity than things more remote from it, but is greater in power. 
 
 Prop. 63. Everything which is imparticipable gives subsistence 
 to two-fold orders of participated natures, one indeed in things 
 which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always 
 and connascently participate. 
 
 Prop. 64. Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives sub- 
 sistence to a two-fold number ; one indeed of self-perfect hypos- 
 tasis, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis 
 in other things. 
 
 Prop. 65. Everything which has any subsistence whatever, 
 either subsists according to cause, so as to have the form of a prin- 
 ciple, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, after 
 the manner of an image. 
 
 Prop. 66. All beings, with reference to each other, are either 
 wholes, or parts, or the same, or different. 
 
 Prop. 67. Every wholeness (6\oTr]Q) is either prior to parts, or 
 consists of parts, or is in a part. 
 
 Prop. 68. Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that 
 whole which consists of parts. 
 
 Prop. 69. Every whole which consists of parts, participates of 
 the wholeness which is prior to parts. 
 
 Prop. 70. Everything which is more total among principal, 
 illuminates participants, prior to partial natures, and when these 
 fail, still continues to impart its illuminations.
 
 462 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Prop. 71. All things which, among nrincipal causes, possess a 
 more total and a higher, in their effects, according to the illumina- 
 tions proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subjects to 
 the communications of more partial causes. And the illumina- 
 tions indeed, from higher causes, receive the progressions from se- 
 condary causes ; but the latter are established in the former. And 
 thus some participations precede others, and some representations 
 extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, 
 more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more par- 
 tial, supplying their participants with their communications poste- 
 rior to the energies of more total causes. 
 
 Prop. 72. All things which in their participants have the rela- 
 tion of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes. 
 
 Prop. 73. Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and 
 participates of being, but not every being is a whole. 
 
 Prop. 74. Every form is a certain whole, for it consists of many 
 things, each of which gives completion to the form ; but not every 
 whole is a form. 
 
 Prop. 75. Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt 
 from its effect. 
 
 Prop. 76. Every thing which is generated from an immoveable 
 cause has an immutable hyparxis ; but every thing which is gene- 
 rated from a moveable cause has a mutable hyparxis. 
 
 Prop. 77. Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that 
 which is in energy. And that which is in capacity proceeds into 
 energy. That also which is in a certain respect in a capacity, so 
 far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain 
 respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity, pro- 
 ceeds from that which is all things in energy. 
 
 Prop. 78. Every power is either perfect or imperfect. 
 Prop. 79. Every thing which is generated, is generated from a 
 two-fold power. 
 
 Prop. 80. Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suflFer ; 
 but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is es- 
 sentially efficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is in- 
 corporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body j 
 just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incor- 
 poreals. 
 
 Prop. 81. Every thing which is participated in a separable
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 463 
 
 manner, is present with its participants by a certain inseparable 
 power which it inserts in it. 
 
 Prop. 82. Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, 
 when it is participated by other things, is participated in a sepa- 
 rable manner. 
 
 Prop. 83. Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is en- 
 tirely converted to itself. 
 
 Prop. 84. Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite 
 power. 
 
 Prop. 85. Every thing which is always becoming to be, or ris- 
 ing into existence, (aei yivofxevov,) possesses an infinite power of 
 becoming to be. 
 
 Prop. 86. Every thing which is truly being, (ojtwc ov,) is infi- 
 nite, neither according to multitude nor according to magnitude, 
 but according to power alone. 
 
 Prop. 87. Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every 
 being is eternal. 
 
 Prop. 88. Every thing which is truly being, is either prior to 
 eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity. 
 
 Prop. 89. Every thing which is primarily being consists of 
 bound and infinity. 
 
 Prop. 90. The first bound and the first infinity subsist by 
 themselves, prior to every thing which consists of bound and the 
 infinite. 
 
 Prop. 91. Every power is either finite or infinite. But every 
 finite power indeed derives its substance from infinite power. And 
 infinite power subsists from the first infinity. 
 
 Prop. 92. Every multitude of infinite powers is suspended from 
 one first infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, 
 nor in things which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, 
 not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all 
 beings. 
 
 Prop. 93. Every infinite which is in (true) beings, is neither 
 infinite to the natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite 
 to itself. 
 
 Prop. 94. Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not 
 every infinity is perpetuity. 
 
 Prop. 9.5. Every power which is more single, is more infinite 
 than that which is multiplied.
 
 464 NOTES AND ILLrSTRATTONS. 
 
 Prop. 96. The power which is infinite of every finite body, is 
 incorporeal. 
 
 Prop. 97. In each series of things, every cause which has the 
 relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of 
 itself ; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is accord- 
 ing to diminution. 
 
 Prop. 98. Every separate cause is at one and the same time 
 every where and no where. 
 
 Prop. 99. Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, 
 does not derive its existence from another cause : but it is itself 
 the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every 
 principle in each series is unbegotten. 
 
 Prop. 100. Every series of wholes is extended to an impartici- 
 pable cause and principle. But all imparticipables are suspended 
 from the one principle of all things. 
 
 Prop. 101. Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things 
 that participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that 
 participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things that parti- 
 cipate of being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is 
 prior to intellect. 
 
 Prop. 102. All beings which exist in any manner whatever, 
 consist of bound, and the infinite through that which is primarily 
 being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the 
 first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through 
 the first intellect. 
 
 Prop. 103. All things are in all, but appropriately in each. 
 
 Prop. 104. Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its 
 essence and its energy eternal. 
 
 Prop. 105. Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every 
 thing perpetual is immortal. 
 
 Prop. 106. The medium of every thing which is entirely eter- 
 nal, both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its 
 essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly 
 is measured by time. 
 
 Prop. 107. Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly 
 temporal, is, at one and the same time, being and generation. 
 
 Prop. 108. Every thing which is partial in each order, is able 
 to participate in a two-fold respect of the monad which is in the 
 proximately superior order, viz., either through its own wholeness.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. tL65 
 
 or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordi- 
 nate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series. 
 
 Prop. 109. Every partial intellect participates of the unity 
 which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect 
 which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is 
 co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, 
 participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul 
 which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every 
 partial nature of body participates of the soul, which is a whole 
 through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul. 
 
 Prop. 110. Of all things that are arranged in each series, such 
 as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to parti- 
 cipate of the natures which are proximately established in the supe- 
 rior series, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and 
 remote from their proper principle, are not naturally adapted to 
 enjoy these natures. 
 
 Prop. 111. Of every intellectual series, some things are divine 
 intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods ; but others are 
 intellects alone. And of every physical series, some things are 
 intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects ; but others 
 are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have 
 souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, 
 destitute of the presence of souls. 
 
 Prop. 112. Of every order, those things that, are first have the 
 form of the natures prior to them. 
 
 Prop. 113. Every divine number is unical. 
 Prop. 114. Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self- 
 perfect unity is a God. 
 
 Prop. 115. Every God is super-essential, super-vital, and 
 super-intellectu;)l. 
 
 Prop. 116. Every deity except the one is participable. 
 Prop. 117. Every God is the measure of beings. 
 Prop. 118. Everything which is in the Gods pre-exists in 
 them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the 
 Gods is unical and super-essential. Hence, all things are con- 
 tained in them unically and super-essentially. 
 
 Prop. 119. Every God subsists according to super-essential 
 goodness, and is good neither according to participation nor accord- 
 * 2 H
 
 4>GG NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 ing to essence, but super-essentially ; since habits and essences are 
 allotted secondary and manifold orders from the Gods. 
 
 Prop. 120. Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a provi- 
 dential inspection of the vrhole of things. And a providential 
 energy is primarily in the Gods. 
 
 Prop. 121. Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis 
 goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued, and at once 
 incomprehensible by all secondary natures. 
 
 Prop. 122. Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, 
 and is exempt from the subjects of his providential care, providence 
 neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that 
 which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence. 
 
 Prop. 123. Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of 
 its super-essential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary 
 natures ; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. 
 Hence, that which is first is alone perfectly unknown, as being im- 
 participable. 
 
 Prop. 1 24. Every God knows participable natures imparticipably, 
 temporal natures without time, things which are not necessary ne- 
 cessarily, mutable natures immutably ; and, in short, all things in a 
 manner more excellent than the order of the things known. 
 
 Prop. 125. Every God, from that order from which he began 
 tc unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures ; 
 always, indeed, multiplying and dividing the communications of 
 himself, but preserving the peculiarity of his own hypostasis. 
 
 Prop. 126. Every God who is nearer to the one is more total, 
 but the God who is more remote from it is more partial. 
 
 Prop. 127. Everything divine is especially primarily simple, 
 and on this account most sufficient to itself. 
 
 Prop. 128. Every God, when participated by natures nearer 
 to himself, is participated without a medium; but when partici- 
 pated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is 
 through a less or greater number of media. 
 
 Prop. 123. Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. 
 But every soul is divine through a divine intellect. And every 
 intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And 
 unity indeed is of itself a God ; intellect is most divine ; soul is 
 divine ; but body is deiform.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 467 
 
 Prop, 130. In every divine order, such things as are first are 
 in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged 
 under them, than these latter are from beings subsequent. And 
 secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate 
 superiors, than follovs'ing natures to those. 
 
 Prop, 131, Every God begins his own energy from himself. 
 
 Prop, 132, All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by 
 a medium. 
 
 Prop. 133. Every God is a benificent unity, or a unific (kuo- 
 TTOLoc) goodness ; and each, so far as a God possesses this hyparxis. 
 The first God, however, is simply good, and simply one. But each 
 posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain unity. 
 
 Prop. 134. Every divine intellect intellectually perceives in- 
 deed as intellect, but energizes providentially as God. 
 
 Prop. 135. Every divine unity is participated by some being 
 immediately, or without a medium ; and every deified nature is 
 extended to one divine unity. As many also as are the partici- 
 pated unities, so many are the participating genera of beings. 
 
 Prop. 136. Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer 
 to the first, is participated by a more total genus of beings. But 
 the God who is more partial, and more remote from the first, is 
 participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is to 
 being, so is one divine unity to another. 
 
 Prop. 137. Every unity in conjunction with the one gives sub- 
 sistence to the being which participates of it. 
 
 Prop. 138. Of all the deified natures which participate of the 
 divine peculiarity, the first and highest is beinff itself. 
 
 Prop. 139, All things which participate of the divine unities, 
 originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature. 
 
 Prop. 140. All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal 
 origin, and proceeding through an appropriate medium, extend as 
 far as to the last of things, and to places about the earth. 
 
 Prop. 141. Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed 
 being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other 
 being co-arranged with them. 
 
 Prop. 142. The Gods are present with all things after the same 
 manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with 
 the Gods. But everything participates of their presence according 
 to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some 
 
 2 11 2
 
 468 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 things uniformly, but by others manifoldly; by some things eter- 
 nally, but by others according to time ; and by some things incor- 
 poreally, but by others corporeally. 
 
 Prop. 143. All inferior natures fail before the presence of the 
 Gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to 
 participation. Everything foreign indeed from divine light becomes 
 far removed from it. But all things are illuminated at once by 
 the Gods. 
 
 Prop. 144. All beings, and all the distributions of beings, ex- 
 tend as far in their progressions as the orders of the Gods. 
 
 Prop. 145. The peculiarity of every divine order pervades 
 all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate ge- 
 nera of beings. 
 
 Prop, 146. The ends of all the divine progressions are assimi- 
 lated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning 
 and without an end, through conversion to their principles. 
 
 Prop. 147. The summits of all the divine orders are assimi- 
 lated to the ends of the natures (proximately) situated above 
 them. 
 
 Prop. 148. Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold 
 manner, from the summit which is in it, from its middle, and from 
 its end. 
 
 Prop. 149. Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded 
 according to number. 
 
 Prop. 150. Everything which proceeds in the divine orders, is 
 not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing 
 cause. Nor, in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the 
 powers of the natures prior to themselves, but the latter have 
 certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incom- 
 prehensible by the beings themselves. 
 
 Prop. 151. Everything paternal in the Gods is of a primary 
 nature, and is pre-established in the rank of the good, according to 
 all divine orders. 
 
 Prop. 152. Everything which is generative in the Gods, pro- 
 ceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, 
 proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the 
 never-failing indications in the progressions of secondary natures. 
 
 Prop. 153. Everything which is perfect in the Gods, is the 
 cause of divine perfection.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTUATIONS. 469 
 
 Prop. 154. Everything which is of a guardian nature in the 
 Gods, preserves everything in its proper order, and is uniformly 
 exempt from secondary, and estabhshed in primary nature. 
 
 Prop. 155. Everything vivific in the Gods, is a generative 
 cause, but every generative cause is not vivific. 
 
 Prop. 156. Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guar- 
 dian order. But, on the contrary, not everything of a guardian 
 order is the same with the purifying genus; 
 
 Prop. 157. Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to 
 things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every 
 thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to 
 composite natures, and precedes their order and division according 
 to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal 
 cause, in the more partial genera of things. 
 
 Prop. 158, Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from 
 a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera. 
 
 Prop. 159. Every order of the Gods consists of the first prin- 
 ciples, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree 
 derived from bound, another from infinity. 
 
 Prop. 160. Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form 
 of the one, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from it- 
 self, and produces other intellects. 
 
 Prop. 161. Everything which is truly being, and is suspended 
 from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable. 
 
 Prop. 162. Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly 
 existing being, is occult and intelligible ; occult indeed, as being 
 conjoined with unity ; but intelligible, as participated by being. 
 
 Prop. 163. Every multitude of unities which is participated by 
 imparticipable intellect, is intellectual. 
 
 Prop. 164. Every multitude of unities which is participated by 
 every imparticipable soul, is supermundane. 
 
 Prop. 165. Every multitude of unities which is participated by 
 a certain sensible body is mundane. 
 
 Prop. 166. Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. 
 And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by 
 mundane souls. 
 
 Prop. 167. Every intellect intellectually perceives it. But the 
 first intellect indeed perceives itself alone ; and in this, intellect and 
 the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent in-
 
 470 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 tellects perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the 
 intelHgible to each of these is partly that which it is, and partly 
 that from which it is derived. 
 
 Prop. 168. Every intellect knows in energy that which it intel- 
 lectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to 
 perceive^ and of another to perceive that it perceives. 
 
 Prop. 169. Every intellect has its essence, power, and energy. 
 
 Prop. 170. Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all 
 things. But imparticipable intellect indeed simply perceives all 
 things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all 
 things, according to order. 
 
 Prop. 171. Every intellect is an imparticipable essence. 
 
 Prop. 1/2. Every intellect is proximately the producing cause, 
 being perpetual and immutable according to essence. 
 
 Prop. 173. Every intellect is intellectually both the things 
 which are prior and posterior to itself. 
 
 Prop. 174. Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior 
 to itself, by intellection ; and its fabrication consists in intellection, 
 and its intellection or intelligence in fabrication. 
 
 Prop. 175. Every intellect is primarily participated by those 
 natures which are intellectual, both according to essence and ac- 
 cording to energy. 
 
 Prop. 176. All intellectual forms are in each other, and each 
 is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest. 
 
 Prop. 177. Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one in- 
 deed is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial 
 forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner 
 such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. 
 But the inferior intellects contain more partially such things as 
 those that are prior to them contain more totally. 
 
 Prop. 178. Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal 
 natures. 
 
 Prop. 179. Every intellectual number is bounded. 
 
 Prop. 180. Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of 
 parts and is united to other things, and at the same time separated 
 from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed is simply a whole, 
 as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect 
 possesses the whole as in a part, and thus in all things partially.
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTllATIONS. 471 
 
 Prop. 181. Every participated intellect is either divine, as be- 
 ing suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only. 
 
 Prop. 182. Every (divine) participated intellect is participated 
 by divine souls. 
 
 Prop. 183. Every intellect which is participated indeed, but 
 is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither di- 
 vine nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of 
 intellect. 
 
 Prop. 184, Every soul is either divine or is changed from in- 
 tellect, or always remains as a medium between these, but is in- 
 ferior to divine souls. 
 
 Prop. 185. All (divine) souls are indeed Gods psychically. But 
 all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual 
 attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of 
 mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods. 
 
 Prop. 186. Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, and se- 
 parate from body. 
 
 Prop. 187. Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible. 
 
 Prop. 188. Every soul is both life and vital. 
 
 Prop. 189. Every soul is self-vital. 
 
 Prop. 190. Every soul is a medium between imparticipable na- 
 tures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies. 
 
 Prop. 191. Every participate soul has indeed an eternal essence, 
 but its energy accompanies by time. 
 
 Prop. 192. Every participable soul ranks among the number of 
 (truly existing) beings, and is the first of generated natures. 
 
 Prop. 193. Every soul subsists proximately from intellect. 
 
 Prop. 194. Every soul contains all the forms which intellect 
 primarily possesses. 
 
 Prop. 1 95. Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles 
 paradigmatically, and after the manner of an exemplar ; but intelli- 
 gibles iconically, or after the manner of an image. 
 
 Prop. 196. Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual 
 body which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis. 
 
 Prop. 197. Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a 
 life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All 
 things likewise subsist in, at once, the essential, the vital, and the 
 gnostic ; and all things are in all, and each is separate from the 
 rest.
 
 472 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 Prop. 198. Everything which participates of time and is always 
 moved, is measured by periods. 
 
 Prop. 199. Every mmidane soul uses periods of its proper life, 
 and restitutions to its former state. 
 
 Prop. 200. Every period of soul is measured by time. The 
 period of other souls indeed by a certain time ; but that of the first 
 soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of 
 time. 
 
 Prop. 201. All divine souls have triple energies ; some indeed 
 as souls ; but others as receiving a divine intellect ; and others are 
 suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole 
 of things as Gods; but they know all things through an intellectual 
 life, and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis. 
 
 Prop. 202. All souls attending upon, and always following the 
 Gods, are inferior to divine, but more eminent than particular souls. 
 
 Prop. 203. Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed 
 being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according 
 to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a 
 middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And 
 partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed 
 into a greater number. 
 
 Prop. 204. Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that 
 always follow the Gods ; and of a still greater number of such as 
 sometimes receive this order. 
 
 Prop, 205. Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul 
 under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to 
 the vehicle of the other. 
 
 Prop. 206. Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into 
 generation, and to ascend from generation to real being. 
 
 Prop^ 207. The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an 
 immoveable cause. 
 
 Prop. 208. The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essen- 
 tially indivisible, and impassive. 
 
 Prop. 209. The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed 
 with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united 
 to the soul by an abolition of everything material, and a recurrence 
 to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it. 
 
 Prop. 210. Every connascent vehicle to the soul, always pos- 
 sesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 473 
 
 greater and less, and of dissimilar figure, through the additions and 
 abolitions of other bodies. 
 
 Prop, 211. Every partial soul descending into generation, de- 
 scends wholly, nor does one part of it remain on high, and another 
 part descend. 
 
 NOTE G.— Page 339. 
 
 The controversy between the Calvinists and Arminians, 
 grounded on a particular view of the doctrines of necessary con- 
 nexion and free will, seems, at the present day, to be as far re- 
 moved from a settlement as ever. Indeed, an agreement on the 
 point is almost hopeless. This arises not from sectarian or party 
 feelings, but solely from some leading metaphysical ideas, of oppo- 
 sing character and influence, which lie at the bottom of the dispute. 
 We shall hazard, however, a few general observations on the sub- 
 ject, chiefly with the view of directing the attention of the reader 
 to the leading principles and difficulties involved in this interesting, 
 though perplexing, theological question. 
 
 It is common with Calvinistic writers to maintain, that their 
 theory is altogether different from the principle of necessary con- 
 nexion, advocated by many philosophers. Let us see how this is. 
 The Calvinists aflfirm, that the Deity must have foreseen all events, 
 and by virtue of His Omniscience^^ nothing could have happened 
 otherwise than it has done, or will do in future. The doctrine 
 which is called philosophical necessity may be defined to be that 
 which asserts that all the phenomena of the moral world, like that 
 of the physical, are regulated by fixed and immutable laws ; or, in 
 other words, the human mind is first excited to action, and conti- 
 nually influenced by motives ; that these motives originate from, 
 and depend upon, the circumstances in which man is placed, and 
 over which circumstances he has not the least absolute control. 
 
 Now then, taking these two doctrines as thus explained, may it 
 not be asked, what diff'erence is there between every thing being 
 done by the immediate agency of the Almighty, and every thing 
 being done by necessary and fixed laws which He has created and 
 ordained ? In both cases the freedom of the human will is com- 
 j)letely excluded ; so that, as far as it is concerned, these two doc-
 
 474 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 trines are one and the same. Yet it does seem somewhat strange 
 that Calvinists should look upon the first doctrine, that every thing 
 is regulated by the immediate interposition of Almighty power, as 
 the very foundation of Christian orthodoxy ; and that the other 
 doctrine, that God governs the world by fixed laws, is to be con- 
 sidered as atheistical and dangerous to the interests of morals and 
 religion. There is a great apparent inconsistency in this. It is 
 not in the power of the most subtile theological disputant to point 
 out any difference between Calvinism and necessity, {so far as both 
 relate to the human will, which is the only point which can render 
 them interesting,) that seems not purely arbitrary and absurd. The 
 only perceptible difference is, that the two doctrines in question 
 are designated by different names. 
 
 Calvinists would, we conceive, stand upon firmer ground, if they 
 would take their main principle in all its sweeping fulness and 
 integrity, and not fritter it away, with useless illogical qualifica- 
 tions. They complain that Arminians reason disingenuously with 
 them, by drawing inferences from their doctrines, which they are 
 not warranted to do. But then the Calvinists do the very same 
 thing with their antagonists, the philosophical necessarians ; and 
 even with the Arminians too. The doctrine of predestination is 
 this, that certain individuals will be doomed to everlasting punish- 
 ment, and a certain nvimber to everlasting life. So far there is no 
 ambiguity nor inconsistency in the principle laid down. But when 
 iVrminians or others draw inferences from this maxim of theology, 
 that such a view of the Divine procedure, appears inimical to cor- 
 rect notions of the attributes of the Deity, such as justice and 
 mercy, the Calvinistic complains that the proceedings are un- 
 fair and illogical. Now the only way in which Calvinists have 
 argued against both philosophical necessarians, and Arminians is, 
 by urging the force of inferences against the truth of a principle. 
 This has been the invariable practice followed in every stage of this 
 keenly contested point, for many hundreds of years. 
 
 Most Calvinistic writers meet their opponents with such qualifi- 
 cations of Divine decrees as the following : " So far as the Divine 
 government is concerned, the rational mind is in all its delibera- 
 tions and decisions voluntary , and even free, in the more common 
 and less accurate sense of the words. The secret purposes of the 
 Divinity have no influence in determining the human will, and of
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 475 
 
 consequence can never destroy a responsibility to the Divine law. 
 " That the soul always chooses that which, all things considered, is 
 the most agreeable, is an identical truth." " The will is ulti- 
 mately governed by the understanding." " The activity of mind 
 implies a general capacity of volition." " The mind is chiefly 
 regulated by its own innate predilections."* 
 
 These admissions, which are merely a repetition of what has 
 been over and over again said, show how difficult a matter it is, to 
 get rid of the freedom of the human will ; and how impossible it is 
 for Calvinists to carry out their main principle to all its logical con- 
 sequences. 
 
 On the Arminian side of the dispute we again meet with the 
 same difficulty viewed under another aspect. To make the human 
 will independent of the Divine omnipotence and government, is 
 another stumbling-block. The advocates of this theory, like their 
 antagonists, shrink from the inferences of their own principle, and 
 take shelter in qualifications and compromises. The only course, 
 therefore, which is left to both parties, is to agree to differ. 
 
 NOTE H.— Page 349 
 
 &"• 
 
 It has been noticed by some historians, that there are some parts 
 of the writings of Avicenna which would seem to countenance a 
 recent theory, maintained by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim. We shall 
 here quote a few sentences from the fifth volume of Avicenna's 
 works, which may be considered to bear such an interpretation. 
 
 " Virium autem apprehendentium, occultarum, vitalium, prima 
 est fantasia, quae est sensus communis, quse est vis ordinata in 
 prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per seipsam formas omnes, quae 
 imprimmitur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Post banc, et 
 imaginatio, vel quae est etiam formans, quae est vis ordinata in ex- 
 tremo anterioris concavitatis cerebri, retinens quod recipit sensus 
 communis a quinque sensibus, et remanet in ea post remotionem 
 illorum sensibilium. Post banc, est vis quae vocatur imaginativa, 
 comparatione animae humanae, quae est vis ordinata in media con- 
 cavitate cerebri, ubi est nervus, et solet componere aliquid de eo 
 quod est in imaginatione cum alio, et deinde aliquid ab alio, secun- 
 dum quod vult. Deinde est vis estimativa, quae est vis ordinata in 
 
 * Sermons on Election. London, 1822.
 
 476 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 summa media concavitate cerebri, apprehendens intentiones, non 
 sensatus, quse sunt in singulis sensibilibus, sicut vis quae est in ove 
 dijudicans quod a lupo fugiendum est ; videtur etiam hsec vis op- 
 erari in imaginationis compositionem et divisionem. Deindeestvis 
 memorialis et remiriiscibilis, quae est vis ordinata in posteriore con- 
 cavitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit vis sestimationis, de in- 
 tentionibus non sensatis singulorum sensibilium." — De Anima. 
 
 NOTE I.— Page 357. 
 
 Mr. Hallam observes that the general doctrine held by AveiToes 
 was, " that there is one common intelligence, active, immortal, in- 
 divisible, unconnected with matter, the soul of the human kind ; 
 which is not in any one man, because it has no material form, but 
 which yet assists in the rational operations of each man's personal 
 soul, and from those operations which are all conversant with par- 
 ticulars, derives its own knowledge of universals. Thus, if I un- 
 derstand what is meant, which is rather subtile, it might be said, 
 that as in the common theory particular sensations furnish means 
 to the soul of forming general ideas, so, in that of Averroes, the 
 ideas and judgments of separate human souls furnish collectively 
 the means of that knowledge of universals, which the one great 
 soul of mankind alone can embrace. This was a theory built, as 
 some have said, on the bad Arabic version of Aristotle which Aver- 
 roes used. But, whatever might have first suggested it to the 
 philosopher of Cordova, it seems little else than an expansion of 
 the Realist hypothesis, urged to a degree of apparent paradox. 
 For if the human soul, as an universal, possesses an objective 
 reality, it must surely be intelligent ; and, being such, it may seem 
 no extravagant hypothesis ; though incapable of that demonstra- 
 tion, we now require in philosophy to suppose that it acts upon the 
 subordinate intelligences of the same species, and receives impres- 
 sions from them. By this also they would reconcile the knowledge 
 we were supposed to possess of the reality of universals, with the 
 acknowledged impossibility, at least in many cases, of representing 
 them to the mind." {Lit. Middle Ages, Vol. 1, p. 196.)
 
 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 477 
 
 NOTE J.— Page 363. 
 
 4 
 
 Le Livre des Conseils, par Ferideddin Attar, quoique essentielle- 
 ment destine a offrir uii recueil de Preceptes moraux et de Conseils 
 pratiques, renferme aussi quelques vues sur la connaissance de 
 Dieu, suivant le langage des Arabes, sur la vie spirituelle et con- 
 templative. C'est en effet par la contemplation que cette connais- 
 sance s'acquiert. Celui qui connait veritablement Dieu par la 
 contemplation, est convaincu que la veritable existence consiste 
 dans I'aneantissement. Si tu connais bien ton ^me sujette aux 
 passions, tu connaitras le Dieu Trcs-Haut et veritable dans ses dons. 
 Celui-la seul possede la science qui connait Dieu. La contempla- 
 tion consiste a disparaitre et a s'aneantir devant Dieu. La con- 
 templation ne s'occupe ni de ce monde, ni de la vie future ; toutes 
 ses facultes sont absorbees dans le desir de son union avec Dieu. 
 Ce monde est semblable a un fantome que voit un homme durant 
 son sommeil ; lorsqu'il est eveille, il ne lui reste aucun profit de ces 
 douces illusions." 
 
 "Quoi que cette theosopbie mystique se soit particulierement, 
 nous la voyons se produire aussi parmi les Maures d'Espagne ; elle 
 trouve, au milieu du douzieme siecle, un sectateur dans Iban 
 Baiiah, que S. Thomas a appele Avenpace, et qui est plus connu 
 sous ce dernier nom. Avenpace, disciple du philosophe et medeciu 
 Avenzoar, avait ecrit des lettres philosophiques et theologiques, au 
 nombre desquelles il en est une sur le detachement des choses hu- 
 tnaines et I'union de V amour avec Dieu. Ses opinions lui attirerent, 
 de la part des docteurs musulraans, une accusation d'here'sie. II 
 avait cultive les sciences mathematiques ; car il avait commente 
 Euclide. 11 avait egalement travaille sur Aristote ; Averrhoes le 
 cite souvent, et c'est par ces citations seules que nous connaissons 
 aujourd'hui ses idees philosophiques, Avenpace, dit Averrhoes, 
 s'occupa beaucoup de I'entendement, et particulierement dans la 
 lettre qu'il intitula : De la Conjonction de V entendenient avec 
 Vhomme, et dans son Traite de I'Ame. Voici le fondemeut qu'il 
 etablit: d'abord il supposa que les intelligibles sont produits ou 
 crees ; que tout ce qui est produit a une quidditi (une qualite essen- 
 tielle ;) que I'entendement est capable par sa nature de de'tacher 
 cette quiddite ; qu'il en abstrait ainsi les formes des intelligibles, 
 en quoi il Concorde avec Alfarabi. II ajouta que les intelligibles ne
 
 478 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 
 
 comportent point la pluralite, si ce n'est a raison de la reunion des 
 formes spirihielles par lesquelles elles subsistent dans chaque in- 
 dividu ; d'ou il suit que I'intelligible depouille de ces formes, est un 
 pour tous les hommes. La quiddite, I'intelligible, et la forme, 
 n'ont point elles-memes de forme spirituelle ; elles ne subsistent 
 dans aucun individu ; elles ne sont point la quiddity d'un individu 
 particulier, d'ovi il conclut encore que I'entendement est unique 
 cbez tous les hommes, et qu'il constitue une substance separee et 
 distincte." — Histoire Compar^e par De Gerando. Tom. 4, p. 286. 
 
 PKINTEn BV C. F. HODGSON, 1, UOUOU SQUAIiE, FI.EBT STKKKT, LONIlO.V.
 
 University of California 
 
 Return thismateriaHoJhilibrap^ 
 
 trom whtehjlwasbonwred. 
 
 Dl 
 
 Form L9
 
 II mill nil nil II 
 
 3 1158 00685 5927 
 
 LIBRARY FACILITY
 
 i 
 
 Hi'ii 
 
 I