THE MONROE DOCTRINE . 
 
 AN ESSAY 
 
 A. F. MORRISON 
 
 TJ1TI7BRSITT 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE 
 
 AN ESSAY 
 
 A. F. MORRISON 
 
 Read before the Chit-Chat Club, of San Francisco, 
 December 9, 1895 
 
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 3I7BRSITT 
 
 SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 C. A. MURDOCK & Co., PRINTERS 
 
 1896 
 
THE MONROE DOCTRINE. 
 
 (Read before the Chit-Chat Club, of San Francisco, December 9, 1895.) 
 
 THE Monroe Doctrine, as it is understood to-day, is 
 something different from what it was at the time 
 of its declaration by President Monroe. The Monroe 
 declaration, aside from the political events that imme- 
 diately called it forth, was the embodiment of a national 
 sentiment which had grown and developed among our 
 people. But the Monroe Doctrine, as it is understood 
 to-day, is much more comprehensive than the simple 
 declaration made by Monroe. It represents a larger 
 growth and a further development. 
 
 What that doctrine is, has never been authoritatively 
 defined. Our understanding of what it is, and its scope, 
 must be gathered from the history of our country and 
 the declarations of our Presidents and other distinguished 
 statesmen, as precedents. 
 
 As in the case of the "balance of power" with 
 Europe, we know that our nation believes that the main- 
 tenance of the Monroe Doctrine is necessary to our 
 safety and welfare. And, like the "balance of power," 
 the doctrine seems to be flexible and elastic ; and doubt- 
 less the scope of its assertion will, in a large measure, 
 depend upon the circumstances under which it may be 
 invoked. 
 
 It will be seen, therefore, that an intelligent under- 
 standing of this doctrine must be derived from a review 
 of the events which constitute its history. 
 
 As the people of the United States emerged from the 
 
4 
 
 period of the Revolution and the Confederation, and as 
 the spirit and sentiment of nationality gained deeper 
 root, the vision of a mighty destiny grew upon them 
 until it became an abiding conviction. As the country 
 grew and prospered under a democratic constitution, 
 original to our people, and without a prototype, the 
 further conviction took deep and vigorous root that this 
 nation had a mission to perform in spreading the light 
 and exemplifying the blessings of democratic institutions 
 among the nations of the earth, and especially among 
 the peoples who inhabited these American continents. 
 As the result of two fierce wars with the most powerful 
 nation of the world, we early had what may be called a 
 "past," which was filled with national heroes and with 
 the traditions of heroic deeds. The traditions of those 
 wars kindled and fanned the fires of patriotism, while 
 the consciousness of a great mission and the vision of a 
 great destiny gave a direction and a scope to that 
 patriotism which made it apostolic and extra-territorial, 
 so far as the immediate national boundaries were con- 
 cerned. Besides all this, the American people had made 
 their country an asylum for those who were disaffected 
 with the tyranny and harsh conditions of the Old World. 
 The fact that they were maintaining such an asylum 
 under the very eyes of the reactionary despotisms then 
 pervading the Old World made the people of this nation 
 feel conscious, and perhaps rightly so, that the success 
 and example of their free institutions were ungrateful 
 things in the eyes of the Old World despotisms. As a 
 result of this consciousness, our people grew suspicious, 
 apprehensive, and jealous of all political influences that 
 might emanate from the Old World. They felt that the 
 preservation of their own institutions depended on their 
 holding aloof from entangling alliances with Europe, and 
 
in discouraging European intervention in the political 
 affairs of the American continents. 
 
 A solemn and influential expression of the first of 
 these feelings was given in Washington's farewell 
 address; and the declaration there made has profoundly 
 affected the policy of this country. Washington said : 
 
 "The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign 
 nations is, in extending pur commercial relations, to have 
 with them as little political connection as possible. So 
 far as we have already formed engagements, let them be 
 fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop. 
 
 "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us 
 have none, or a very remote, relation. Hence she 
 must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of 
 which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, 
 therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, 
 by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
 politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of 
 her friendships or enmities. 
 
 "Our detached and distant situation invites and 
 enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain 
 one people, under an efficient government, the period 
 is not far off when we may defy material injury from 
 external annoyance ; when we may take such an attitude 
 as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve 
 upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent 
 nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions 
 upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provoca- 
 tion ; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, 
 guided by justice, shall counsel. 
 
 "Why forego the advantage of so peculiar a situation ? 
 Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, 
 by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of 
 Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils 
 of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or 
 caprice?" 
 
 But the first distinctively American territorial system 
 or policy a policy that would exclude European influ- 
 ences from the political affairs of this continent, seems 
 
6 
 
 to have been conceived and developed by Jefferson. 
 When Secretary of State, in Washington's Cabinet, he 
 labored persistently to acquire from Spain the right to 
 the free navigation of the Mississippi, and also the 
 cession of an entrepot at the mouth of that river. 
 During the time these negotiations were pending, a 
 rupture between England and Spain became imminent, 
 and Jefferson became fearful that England would take 
 advantage of such a war to seize the Spanish possessions 
 lying on our border, including Florida and Louisiana. 
 
 On August 12, 1790, he wrote to Gouverneur Morris, 
 the United States informal agent in Great Britain, a letter, 
 in which he says that the conduct of the British Ministry 
 proves that 
 
 "They view a war as very possible; and some 
 symptoms indicate designs against the Spanish posses- 
 sions adjoining us. The consequence of their acquiring 
 all the country from the St. Croix to the St. Mary's are 
 too obvious to you to need development. You will 
 readily see the dangers which would then environ us. 
 We wish you, therefore, to intimate to them that we 
 cannot be indifferent to enterprises of this kind. That 
 we should contemplate a change of neighbors with 
 extreme uneasiness ; and that a due balance on our 
 borders is not less desirable to us, than a balance of 
 power in Europe has always appeared to them. We 
 wish to be neutral, and we will be so, if they will execute 
 the treaty fairly and attempt no conquests adjoining us." 
 
 On October 29, 1808, while we were surrounded by 
 the possessions of European powers on all sides, and 
 before the Spanish Colonies had revolted, Jefferson, 
 then President, wrote to William C. C. Claiborne, the 
 Governor of the Territory of Orleans, as follows : 
 
 "The truth is that the patriots of Spain have no 
 warmer friends than the administration of the United 
 States; but it is our duty to say nothing and to do 
 
7 
 
 nothing for or against either. If they succeed, we shall 
 be satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their 
 present dependence ; but very unwilling to see them in 
 that of either France or England, politically or com- 
 mercially. We consider their interests and ours as the 
 same, and the object of both must be to exclude all 
 European influence from this hemisphere. . . . 
 
 " These are sentiments which I wish you to express to 
 any proper characters of either of these two countries, 
 and particularly that we have nothing more at heart than 
 their friendship.'* 
 
 On August 4, 1820, in a letter to William Short, 
 Jefferson speaks of conversations which he had lately 
 had with the Abbe* Correa, who for a number of years 
 had been Portuguese Minister at Washington, but who 
 had lately been appointed by the Government of Portugal 
 as Minister to Brazil ; and he says : 
 
 "From many conversations with him, I hope he sees, 
 and will promote in his new situation, the advantages of 
 a cordial fraternization among all the American nations, 
 and the importance of their coalescing in an American 
 system of policy totally independent of and unconnected 
 with that of Europe. The day is not distant when we may 
 formally require a meridian of partition through the 
 ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the 
 hither side of which no European gun shall ever be 
 heard, nor American on the other ; and when during the 
 rage of the eternal wars of Europe, the lion and the 
 lamb, within our regions, shall lie down together in 
 peace. . . . The principles of society there and 
 here, then, are radically different, and I hope no Amer- 
 ican patriot will ever lose sight of the essential policy of 
 interdicting in the seas and territories of both Americas 
 the ferocious and sanguinary contests of Europe. " 
 
 But Jefferson's ideas were, even at this time, somewhat 
 advanced, as will be seen from the following declaration, 
 made this same year (1820) by that sterling American 
 statesman, John Quincy Adams. Mr. Adams was then 
 
 ' 
 
 "* 
 
Secretary of State. He tells us, in his diary, that this 
 same Abbe* Correa, mentioned in Jefferson's letter to 
 Short, had suggested to him that the United States and 
 Portugal, as "the two great powers of the Western 
 hemisphere " should concert together a grand American 
 system. But Mr. Adams, as his biographer says, after 
 giving vent to some contemptuous merriment, replied 
 "with a just and serious pride": 
 
 "As to an American system, we have it; we con- 
 stitute the whole of it; there is no community of interests 
 or of principles between North and South America." 
 
 But, as we shall see later, the opinion of Mr. Adams 
 underwent a great change within the next three years. 
 
 About this time, events were fast shaping themselves, 
 both in the Old and in the New World, in a way that 
 brought all of the peoples of this hemisphere into a 
 closer sympathy with each other, and made them 
 anxious to see both continents emancipated from 
 European influences. 
 
 The revolutions in the Spanish-American colonies, 
 which commenced about 1810, had become so practically 
 successful by March, 1822, that our Government recog- 
 nized those colonies as independent states. Spain, 
 however, continued to make desultory attempts to recon- 
 quer them for many years after. The revolted colonies 
 naturally looked to us, who had so recently thrown off 
 the European yoke, for sympathy and support. The 
 eloquence of Henry Clay had roused in their favor the 
 sympathy of this nation; and, while our Government 
 maintained a strict neutrality, many were the privateers, 
 fitted out in American ports, which gave unofficial succor 
 to the cause of Spanish- American independence. 
 
 Such a change, too, had been worked in the official 
 life of the nation that we find Mr. Adams, the Secretary 
 
9 
 
 of State who, in 1820, had told the Portuguese Minister 
 that there was "no community of interests or of prin- 
 ciples between North and South America," writing now 
 to Mr. Rush, our Minister to England, under date of 
 July 2, 1823, as follows : 
 
 "These independent nations [that is, those of South 
 America and Mexico] will possess the rights incident to 
 that condition, and their territories will, of course, be 
 subject to no exclusive right of navigation in their 
 vicinity, or of access to them by any foreign nation. A 
 necessary consequence of this state of things will be, 
 that the American continents henceforth will no longer 
 be subject to colonization. Occupied by civilized nations, 
 they will bfe accessible to Europeans and each other on 
 that footing alone ; and the Pacific Ocean, in every part 
 of it, will remain open to the navigation of all nations in 
 like manner with the Atlantic." 
 
 And again, on July 22, 1823, in writing to Mr. Middle- 
 ton, our Minister to Russia, on the Russian claims to the 
 Northwestern Territory, Mr. Adams said : 
 
 "There can perhaps be no better time for saying 
 frankly and explicitly to the Russian Government that 
 the future peace of the world, and the interests of Russia 
 herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements 
 upon any part of the American continent. With the 
 exception of the British establishments north of the 
 United States, the remainder of both American con- 
 tinents must henceforth be left to the management of 
 American hands. It cannot possibly be the purpose 
 of Russia to form extensive colonial establishments in 
 America. The new American republics willl be as 
 impatient of a Russian neighbor as the United States." 
 
 But a more powerful influence than sympathy for the 
 struggling patriots of Spanish America awakened our 
 people and statesmen to the dangers as well as the 
 undesirability of European neighborhood and influence 
 on this hemisphere. It was the threatened armed inter- 
 
ference, on behalf of Spain, and against her colonies, by 
 the most powerful league of European states that ever 
 existed. And the danger was still further heightened by 
 the possibility that, as the result of such interference, we 
 might no longer have weak and impoverished Spain for 
 our neighbor ; but, instead of her, we might find England 
 in Cuba, commanding the Gulf of Mexico and the 
 mouth of the Mississippi River, France in Mexico, and 
 Russia west of the Mississippi. 
 
 After the downfall of Napoleon, and while the Allies 
 were still in possession of France, the Emperors of 
 Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia signed a 
 treaty, which is known in history as the treaty of the 
 Holy Alliance. 
 
 The treaty was signed September 26, 1815. The 
 Alliance was finally joined by all the European states 
 except England and the Pope. The avowed purpose of 
 the Holy Alliance was to secure the government of states 
 in accordance with the precepts of the Christian religion; 
 and to this end the allied monarchs, "looking upon 
 themselves as delegated by Providence" to rule over 
 their respective countries, pledged themselves to "lend 
 to one another, on all occasions, and in all places, assist- 
 ance, aid, and succor." The real purposes of the Alli- 
 ance seem to have been to check and suppress the 
 growth of liberal and republican ideas. 
 
 The members of the Alliance held a number of meet- 
 ings or congresses from time to time. Among the most 
 important of these congresses was that convened at 
 Troppau, in Silesia, in October, 1820, and which removed 
 later in the same year to Laybach, in Styria. By its reso- 
 lutions, at Troppau, the Alliance placed "revolt" and 
 "crime" in the same category; and it further resolved 
 
"that the powers have an undoubted right to take a 
 hostile attitude in regard to those states in which the over- 
 throw of the government may operate as an example;" 
 
 thus announcing, as a principle, the right of the Alliance 
 to forcibly interfere in the internal affairs of other states. 
 Later, at Laybach, the Alliance announced the prin- 
 ciple that all popular and constitutional rights are held 
 as grants from the crown, and not otherwise; and in the 
 spring of 1821, the Congress addressed a circular to 
 the foreign representatives of the assembled sovereigns, 
 in which it declared 
 
 "that useful and necessary changes in legislation and 
 in the administration of states ought to emanate from 
 the free will and intelligent and well-weighed con- 
 viction of those whom God has rendered responsible for 
 power. All that deviates from this line necessarily leads 
 to disorder, commotions, and evils far more insufferable 
 than those which they pretend to remedy"; and it 
 denounced as "equally null and disallowed by the 
 public law of Europe, any pretended reform effected by 
 revolt and open force." 
 
 As Webster said, this was the "old doctrine of the 
 divine right of kings, advanced by new advocates, and 
 sustained by a formidable array of power." 
 
 Under the sanction of this Congress, Austria forcibly 
 suppressed popular revolutionary movements in Pied- 
 mont and Naples. In the meantime, in 1820, in Spain, 
 the constitutional, or liberal, party had gained the 
 ascendency, and had compelled Ferdinand the Seventh 
 to accept a liberal constitution. 
 
 At a congress of the Alliance, held at Verona in 
 October, 1822, this Spanish revolution was the chief topic 
 of consideration ; and from this congress the Alliance 
 issued a circular in which it announced its determination 
 "to repel the maxim of rebellion, in whatever place and 
 
12 
 
 under whatever form it might show itself"; and a secret 
 treaty was signed, in which the Allies mutually pledged 
 themselves "to put an end to the system of represen- 
 tative governments" in Europe, and to adopt such 
 measures as should destroy the " liberty of the press." 
 
 When the Congress of Verona adjourned, it was with 
 the secret understanding that France should invade 
 Spain, set aside the new constitutional government, and 
 restore Ferdinand to his former despotism. France 
 entered Spain with an army of 100,000 men, and 
 succeeded in her task, early in 1823. England protested 
 vigorously against this interference in the internal affairs 
 of Spain, but went no further; although the popular 
 sympathy in England with the Spanish nation was so 
 strong that the incident came near leading to war. The 
 English statesmen of the day were too prudent, however, 
 to wish a war with the Alliance, then in the zenith of its 
 power. 
 
 When France had destroyed Spanish liberty, Ferdi- 
 nand then wished the Alliance to assist Spain to recon- 
 quer the revolted colonies in the New World. Some of 
 the most powerful members of the Alliance were agree- 
 able to the enterprise. It was evident that unless Spain 
 received such assistance her colonies would be lost to 
 her forever; and she herself would have been willing 
 to reward the powers who might assist her by ceding 
 to them part of the territory recovered. It was known 
 that France coveted Cuba as her reward for what she 
 had already done in restoring Ferdinand's despotism, 
 and that she also expected to get Mexico as her reward 
 for her assistance in the new enterprise. Russia would 
 probably take the Pacific Coast. 
 
 The agitated and delicate condition of affairs at this 
 time, both in the Old and New World, is shown by the fol- 
 
lowing incident touching the Island of Cuba: England, 
 being aware of the designs of France on that island, had 
 determined to anticipate France, by sending a squadron 
 to take possession of Cuba. About this time, also, the 
 domestic situation in Cuba, where the people were 
 divided in sympathy between the party of the king and 
 the party of the Cortes, together with constant fears of 
 slave uprisings, became so intolerable that many Cubans 
 looked to the United States, and many to England, as a 
 means of escape from the desperate condition of the 
 island. In this state of affairs our Government was 
 informed by the French Minister at Washington that 
 his Government had positive information of designs by 
 England upon Cuba. 
 
 Mr. Rush, our Minister to England, was instructed to 
 notify the British Government of the existence of such 
 rumors, and that the United States could not see with 
 indifference the possession of Cuba by any European 
 power other than Spain a declaration suggestive of 
 the later Monroe Doctrine. Mr. Canning, on behalf of 
 the British Government, disavowed any intention to 
 take Cuba; but, at the same time, he declared that his 
 Government would not see with indifference the occupa- 
 tion of that island by either France or the United States; 
 and he proposed an understanding, without formal con- 
 vention, between the British, French, and American 
 Governments, that Cuba should be left in the possession 
 of Spain. President Monroe assented to this, leaving 
 England to secure a similar assent from France. Such 
 was the condition of affairs in Europe and America 
 during Mr. Monroe's second administration. 
 
 The course of the Holy Alliance in Europe, and the 
 possibility of its interference in behalf of Spain for the 
 recovery of her lost colonies, excited grave apprehen- 
 
14 
 
 sion in this country. The possibility of having such 
 unwelcome neighbors as France or England in Cuba, 
 France in Mexico, and Russia west of the Mississippi, 
 made our statesmen realize that the day might not be 
 far off when " our detached and distant situation," and 
 the ''advantages of so peculiar a situation," spoken of 
 by Washington, might be things of the past ; and that the 
 theater of the eternal strifes of Europe might be trans- 
 ferred to our own borders, if not to our own soil. If 
 such things came to pass, how could we escape "inter- 
 weaving our destiny" with Europe, which Washington 
 so much feared? 
 
 Luckily for us, England, with her great sea power, 
 found her interests at this time lying in the same direc- 
 tion as our own. 
 
 We had already acknowledged the independence of 
 the revolted ^Spanish colonies. England would have 
 liked to do the same thing; but she feared such a course 
 would involve her in a war with the Holy Alliance. 
 Since the revolt of those colonies and the abolition of 
 the exclusive colonial monopolies of Spain, a large and 
 valuable commerce had grown up between the colonies 
 and England. A return of the colonies to their former 
 allegiance, or a transfer of their possession to any of the 
 allied powers, would almost inevitably restore such 
 monopolies, and thus deprive England of a large part of 
 her rich trade. 
 
 England was satisfied that, if left to themselves, the 
 colonies could maintain their independence; and she 
 was, therefore, very anxious that the Alliance should not 
 interfere. Accordingly, in August and September, 1823, 
 Mr. Canning proposed to our Minister, Mr. Rush, that 
 the United States and England should make "a joint 
 declaration before Europe" to the effect that while 
 
15 
 
 neither England nor the United States desired any por- 
 tions of the Spanish colonies for themselves, and while 
 they would not obstruct any amicable relations between 
 Spain and her colonies, they, nevertheless, could not see 
 with indifference the intervention of any foreign power, 
 or the transfer to such power of any of those colonies. 
 
 Mr. Rush replied that his instructions did not authorize 
 him to take such a step, but, nevertheless, he would 
 assume the responsibility, if the British Government 
 would acknowledge the independence of the colonies. 
 The British Government was not yet ready, however, to 
 go as far as that. Mr. Rush reported these conversa- 
 tions to his Government. President Monroe imme- 
 diately submitted the matter to Jefferson and Madison. 
 Jefferson replied to Monroe on October 24, 1823; and 
 his letter is so important in the history of the Monroe 
 Doctrine, and so excellent, that I will give it in full : 
 
 "MONTICELLO, Oct. 24, 1823. 
 
 "DEAR SIR: The question presented by the letters 
 you have sent me is the most momentous which has 
 ever been offered to my contemplation since that of 
 Independence. That made us a nation; this sets our 
 compass and points the course which we are to steer 
 through the ocean of time opening on us. And never 
 could we -embark upon it under circumstances more 
 auspicious. Our first and fundamental maxim should 
 be, never to tangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. 
 Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with 
 cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a 
 set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and pecu- 
 liarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of 
 her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While 
 the last is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, 
 our endeavor should surely be to make our hemisphere 
 that of freedom. 
 
 "One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this 
 pursuit ; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us 
 
16 
 
 in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her 
 from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale 
 of free government, and emancipate a continent at one 
 stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and 
 difficulty. Great Britain is the nation which can do us 
 the most harm of any one of all on earth, and with her 
 on our side we need not fear the whole world. With 
 her, then, we should sedulously cherish a cordial friend- 
 ship, arid nothing would tend more to knit our affections 
 than to be fighting once more side by side in the same 
 cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the 
 price of taking part in her wars. 
 
 " But the war in which the present proposition might 
 engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, 
 but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the 
 American system of keeping out of our land all foreign 
 powers, of never permitting those of Europe to inter- 
 meddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain 
 our own principle, not to depart from it. And if, to 
 facilitate this, we can effect a division in the body of the 
 European powers, and draw over to our side its most 
 powerful member, surely we should do it. But I am 
 clearly of Mr. Canning's opinion that it will prevent 
 instead of provoke war. With Great Britain withdrawn 
 from their scale and shifted into that of our two con 7 
 tinents, all Europe combined would not undertake such 
 a war. For how would they propose to get at either 
 enemy without superior fleets ? Nor is the occasion to 
 be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring 
 our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights 
 of nations, by the interference of any one in the internal 
 affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, 
 and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, 
 calling itself Holy. 
 
 "But we have first to ask ourselves a question: Do 
 we wish to acquire to our own confederacy any one or 
 more of the Spanish provinces ? I candidly confess that 
 I have ever looked on Cuba as the most interesting 
 addition which could ever be made to our system of 
 States. The control which, with Florida Point, this 
 island would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the 
 countries and isthmus bordering on it, as well as all 
 
17 
 
 those whose waters flow into it, would fill up the 
 measure of our political well-being. Yet, as I am sen- 
 sible that this can never be obtained, even with her own 
 consent, but by war, and its independence, which is 
 our second interest (and especially its independence^ of 
 England), can be secured without it, I have no hesitation 
 in abandoning my first wish to future chances, and 
 accepting its independence, with peace and the friend- 
 ship ot England, rather than its association at the expense 
 of war and her enmity. 
 
 "I could honestly, therefore, join in the declaration 
 proposed, that we aim not at the acquisition of any of 
 those possessions, that we will not stand in the way of 
 any amicable arrangement between them and the mother 
 country; but that we will oppose with all our means the 
 forcible interposition of any other power, as auxiliary, 
 stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, and 
 most especially their transfer to any power by conquest, 
 cession, or acquisition in any other way. I should think 
 it, therefore, advisable that the Executive should encour- 
 age the British Government to a continuance in the dis- 
 positions expressed in these letters by an assurance of 
 his concurrence with them as far as his authority goes ; 
 and that, as it may lead to war, the declaration of which 
 requires an act of Congress, the case shall be laid before 
 them for consideration at their first meeting, and under 
 the reasonable aspect in which it is seen by himself. 
 
 " I have been so long weaned from political subjects, 
 and have so long ceased to take any interest in them, 
 that I am sensible I am not qualified to offer opinions 
 on them worthy of any attention. But the question now 
 proposed involves consequences so lasting and effects so 
 decisive of our future destinies as to rekindle all the 
 interest I have heretofore felt on such occasions, and to 
 induce me to the hazard of opinions which will prove 
 only my wish to contribute still my mite toward anything 
 which may be useful to our country. And, praying you 
 to accept it at only what it is worth, I add the assurance 
 of my constant and affectionate friendship and respect." 
 
 Mr. Madison also approved of co-operation with Eng- 
 land in making such a declaration, but he believed that 
 
iS 
 
 Mr. Canning's proposal, though made with an air of con- 
 sultation as well as concert, was founded on a predeter- 
 mination to take the course marked out, whatever might 
 be the stand taken by our Government. 
 
 When the matter came up in Monroe's Cabinet, some 
 were so cautious as to hesitate about the advisability of 
 making the declaration at all, as it might lead to war. 
 
 On the other hand, Mr. Adams tells us, in his diary, 
 that Mr. Calhoun believed that the Holy Alliance " had 
 an ultimate eye on us; that they would, if not resisted, 
 subdue South America. . . . Violent parties would 
 arise in this country, one for and one against them, and 
 we should have to fight on our own shores for our own 
 institutions"; and he believed in authorizing Mr. Rush 
 to join England in making the declaration. Mr. Adams 
 opposed our making a joint declaration with England, 
 except on the basis of England's acknowledging the in- 
 dependence of the Spanish- American states. He did not 
 believe that the Alliance would try to establish a mon- 
 archy among us; but, at most, if they should subdue the 
 Spanish provinces, they would, after partitioning them 
 among themselves, recolonize them. He believed Russia 
 might take California, Peru, and Chili; France might 
 take Mexico; and England, if she could not resist the 
 course of events, would at least take Cuba as her share 
 in the scramble. 
 
 If we should join England in such a declaration as pro- 
 posed, we would occupy an uncomfortable and anoma- 
 lous position, with England as our neighbor in Cuba and 
 France in Mexico. Mr. Adams strenuously insisted that, 
 unless England should put herself on record and recog- 
 nize the independence of those colonies, we should 
 make our own declaration independently of her. As 
 events turned out, it is fortunate that Mr. Adams' views 
 
I 9 - 
 
 prevailed, and fortunate also that England delayed 
 recognizing those states. Otherwise, instead of a distinct- 
 ively American and patriotic declaration of policy, the 
 property of our own country alone, we should have had a 
 joint English and American declaration, to the effect that 
 England and the United States, while desiring no por- 
 tion of the territory of the Spanish colonies for them- 
 selves, would not permit any intervention of other pow- 
 ers against them or their transfer to any other power. It 
 would have been England's declaration as much as our 
 own. 
 
 As a result of the deliberations of Monroe's Cabinet, 
 the President's next annual message to Congress, on De- 
 cember 2, 1823, contained two passages which have since 
 become historical, as containing what is known as the 
 Monroe Doctrine. These passages are as follows: 
 
 ( i) ' ' At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Govern- 
 ment, made through the Minister of the Emperor residing 
 here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted 
 to the Minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to 
 arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights 
 and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast 
 of this continent. A similar proposal had been made by 
 his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, 
 which has likewise been acceded to. The Government 
 of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly 
 proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they 
 have invariably attached to the friendship of the Em- 
 peror, and their solicitude to cultivate the best under- 
 standing with his Government. In the discussions to 
 which this interest has given rise, and in the arrange- 
 ments by which they may terminate, the occasion 
 has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in 
 which the rights and interests of the United States are 
 involved, that the American continents, by the free and 
 independent condition which they have assumed and 
 maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as sub- 
 jects for future colonization by any European power. " 
 
20 
 
 (2) "It was stated at the commencement of the last 
 session that a great effort was then making in Spain and 
 Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those 
 countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with 
 extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely be remarked 
 that the result has been so far very different from what 
 was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the 
 globe with which we have so much intercourse, and 
 from which we derive our origin, we have always been 
 anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the 
 United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in 
 favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men 
 on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European 
 powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have 
 never taken any part, nor does it comport with our 
 policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded 
 or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make 
 preparation for our defense. With the movements in 
 this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately 
 connected, and by causes which must be obvious to 
 all enlightened and impartial observers. The political 
 system of the allied powers is essentially different in this 
 respect from that of America. This difference proceeds 
 from that which exists in their respective governments. 
 And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by 
 the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by 
 the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under 
 which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole 
 nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and 
 to the amicable relations existing between the United 
 States and those poiuers, to declare that we should con- 
 sider any attempt on their part to extend their system 
 to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our 
 peace and safetv. With the existing colonies or depend- 
 encies of any European power we have not interfered, 
 and shall not interfere; but with the governments who 
 have declared their independence and. maintained it, and 
 whose independence we have on great consideration 
 and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view 
 any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or 
 controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any 
 European power, in any other light than as the manifes- 
 
21 
 
 tation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United 
 States. In the war between those new goverments and 
 Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their 
 recognition, and to this we have adhered, and sha/l con- 
 tinue to adhere; provided no change shall occur which, 
 in the judgment of the competent authorities of this 
 Government, shall make a corresponding change on the 
 part of the United States indispensable to their security. 
 " The late events in Spain and Portugal show that 
 Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no 
 stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers 
 should have thought it proper, on a principle satisfactory 
 to themselves, to have interposed by force in the internal 
 concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition 
 may be carried, on the same principle, is a question to 
 which all independent powers whose governments differ 
 from theirs are interested, even those most remote; and 
 surely none more so than the United States. Our policy 
 in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early 
 stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter 
 of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, 
 not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its 
 powers; to consider the government de facto as the legi- 
 timate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations 
 with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, 
 firm, and manly policy; meeting, in all instances, the just 
 claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. 
 But in regard to these continents circumstances are 
 eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible 
 that the allied powers should extend their political 
 system to any portion of either continent without endan- 
 gering our peace and happiness; nor can any one believe 
 that our Southern brethren, if left to themselves, would 
 adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, 
 therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in 
 any form, with indifference. If we look to the compara- 
 tive strength and resources of Spain and those new 
 governments, and their distance from each other, it must 
 be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still 
 the true policy of the United States to leave the parties 
 to themselves, in the hope that other powers will 
 pursue the same course." 
 
While the relation between these two passages of the 
 President's message is intimate, in that both look to the 
 exclusion of European influence from our hemisphere, 
 yet they occur in widely separated parts in the Presi- 
 dent's message, and, in reality, treat of two conditions 
 of things differing widely in their origin. The first pas- 
 sage declares against future European colonization on 
 these continents. The second declares against the 
 extension of the political system of the Holy Alliance to 
 this hemisphere, and against the intervention of any 
 European power in the affairs of the Spanish-American 
 states, for the purpose of oppressing them or in any 
 other manner controlling their destiny. 
 
 The first passage is frequently misunderstood. Some 
 have even gone so far as to claim that it means there 
 must be no more European colonies planted on these 
 continents; whereas, in fact, it treats of a condition of 
 things that has ceased to exist; and it is not the part of 
 the message that can be invoked in our day as an active 
 principle, without giving it a meaning not intended by 
 the message. 
 
 The striking similarity of language between the first 
 passage of the message relating to colonization and the 
 letter of Adams to Rush, quoted above, leaves little 
 doubt that this passage originated with the Secretary of 
 State. 
 
 The declaration in this passage had its origin in our 
 dispute with Russia concerning the Northwest Boundary, 
 Russia claiming as far south as fifty-one degrees north 
 latitude, while England and our Government claimed a 
 large part of the same territory. 
 
 It will be seen from Mr. Adams' letter to Rush, and 
 from this passage in the President's message, that it was 
 the intention of the Secretary, and of the President, to 
 
23 
 
 declare merely a principle of the public law of nations, 
 which they held to be then applicable to the condition of 
 these continents. The message did not seek to claim 
 that, if any part of the territory of these continents were 
 then in a wild state of nature, unclaimed by any civilized 
 nation, such territory would still, nevertheless, be closed 
 to European colonization. What both the President and 
 Mr. Adams claimed was, that all of the territory of both 
 of these continents was then "occupied by civilized 
 nations," meaning that every part of the surface of 
 both continents had an owner whose rights were recog- 
 nized by the law of nations. Therefore, there was no 
 room for future claims founded on discovery and colo- 
 nization methods of acquiring territory, in wild, 
 unclaimed countries, recognized by the law of nations. 
 It was the custom of those times, also, that colonial 
 trade was completely monopolized by the mother coun- 
 try. Thus it will be noticed that Mr. Adams, in his 
 letter to Rush, explains this position, when he says that, 
 by reason of the fact that these Spanish-American colo- 
 nies have become independent states, hereafter "their 
 territories will, of course, be subject to no exclusive 
 right of navigation in their vicinity, or of access by any 
 foreign nation." 
 
 When Mr. Adams was himself President, he con- 
 firmed this view, in his message to the House of Repre- 
 sentatives on March 26, 1826, in which, referring to the 
 non-colonization portion of Monroe's message, he said : 
 
 "The principle had first been assumed in the nego- 
 tiation with Russia. It rested upon a course of reason- 
 ing equally simple and conclusive. With the exception 
 of the existing European colonies, which it was in no 
 wise intended to disturb, the two continents consisted 
 of several sovereign and independent nations, whose 
 territories covered their whole surface. By this their 
 
24 
 
 independent condition, the United States enjoyed the 
 right of commercial intercourse with every part of their 
 possessions. To attempt establishment of a colony in 
 those possessions would be to usurp, to the exclusion of 
 others, a commercial intercourse which was common 
 to all." 
 
 Thus it will be seen that if Mr. Adams' position, that 
 the whole of the two continents was occupied by inde- 
 pendent and civilized nations, were conceded to be cor- 
 rect as a fact, then the conclusion must follow that they 
 would not be subjects for future colonization by other 
 powers than the owners; for any attempt by one power 
 to colonize the territory of another would be an act of 
 war. So the correctness of the principle stated in this 
 first paragraph of the message depended on a geograph- 
 ical question of fact : Was it true that the whole of the 
 continents was occupied ? 
 
 England denied the correctness of the position as- 
 sumed as to colonization. It must be conceded that there 
 is an apparent inconsistency and a very loose statement, 
 if not mistake, of facts in this part of the message. This 
 is noticeable on a comparison of this passage with the 
 second passage of the message. In the first part, the 
 President speaks of "the American continents, by the 
 free and independent condition which they have as- 
 sumed and maintain." But at that time the northern 
 half of North America had not assumed a "free and 
 independent condition." On the contrary, it was under 
 Russian and British dominion a fact plainly recognized 
 in the second passage, where the President says : " With 
 the existing colonies or dependencies of any European 
 power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere." 
 
 But whether or not the assumption of President Mon- 
 roe or Mr. Adams was correct, at that time, the declara- 
 tion contained in this part of the message has now ceased 
 
25 
 
 to be of much practical importance, unless it is given the 
 new meaning of "no more European colonies," which, 
 however, was not the original intention. For, by reason 
 of treaties, and long possession, the boundaries of the 
 nations claiming both continents are now universally 
 recognized to include the whole surface ; and they have 
 been so determined and adjusted that there is no further 
 room for acquisition of territory by right of discovery 
 and colonization. 
 
 Historically, it is the second passage of the message 
 which contains the basis of the present active principle 
 involved in the Monroe Doctrine. Its utterance was 
 received with scarcely more enthusiasm in this country 
 than in England. Brougham said : 
 
 " The question in regard to Spanish America is now 
 I believe, disposed of, or nearly so ; for an event has re- 
 cently happened than which none has ever dispensed 
 greater joy, exultation, and gratitude over all the freemen 
 of Europe ; that event which is decisive on the subject 
 is the language held with respect to Spanish America in 
 the message of the President of the United States." 
 
 And Sir James Mackintosh said: 
 
 "This evidence of the two great English common- 
 wealths (for so I delight to call them, and I heartily pray 
 that they may be forever united in the cause of justice 
 and liberty) cannot be contemplated without the greatest 
 pleasure by every enlightened citizen of the earth." 
 
 England's position toward the Holy Alliance, backed 
 by the declaration of President Monroe, not only de- 
 terred the Alliance from its contemplated enterprise in 
 America, but, as Mr. Calhoun said, gave it a blow from 
 which it never recovered. Its influence began to decline, 
 and it finally perished in the European revolutions of the 
 middle of this century. 
 
 But as an evidence of the conservatism that has from 
 
26 
 
 the beginning pervaded the Government of the United 
 States, it is to be noted that, while the sentiments per- 
 vading the Monroe Doctrine were a part of the historic 
 growth of our people; while the doctrine, when it was 
 uttered, met with a hearty, popular welcome; while it has 
 ever been cherished by our people, and seems almost to 
 be a passion with them, yet it has never received the 
 sanction of Congress, and it remains to this day, so far as 
 official sanction goes, only a declaration of the adminis- 
 tration which uttered it and of subsequent administrations 
 which have approved or amplified it. 
 
 The declaration of Monroe itself accomplished its im- 
 mediate purpose. The designs of the Alliance on this 
 hemisphere were abandoned. When the danger was 
 past, our statesmen hesitated about affirming the doctrine 
 as a part of our national policy. Some acted from tim- 
 idity, some from conservatism and a belief that its asser- 
 tion would lead us into difficulties and disputes that were 
 none of our affairs, and that it was contrary to our tradi- 
 tional policy, so earnestly recommended by Washington, 
 of not entangling ourselves in the affairs of Europe. In 
 the very Congress to which President Monroe's message 
 was addressed, Henry Clay introduced the following 
 resolution in Committee of the Whole on the State of the 
 Union: 
 
 "Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives of the United States of America, in Congress 
 assembled: That the people of these States would not 
 see, without serious inquietude, any forcible intervention 
 by the allied powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to re- 
 duce to their former subjection those parts of the conti- 
 nent of America which have proclaimed and established 
 for themselves, respectively, independent governments, 
 and which have been solemnly recognized by the United 
 States." 
 
27 
 
 A similar resolution was also introduced by Mr. Poin- 
 sett, of South Carolina, but neither resolution was ever 
 called up for action. 
 
 As to the meaning of this second passage of the mes- 
 sage, there has probably been as much misunderstanding 
 as in case of the first. 
 
 In Mr. Canning's proposal to Mr. Rush, he asked that 
 the joint declaration to be made by both countries should 
 declare not only against intervention by the Holy Alli- 
 ance, but also that the two Governments themselves did 
 not aim at the possession of any of the Spanish colonies, 
 and that they could not with indifference see any portion 
 of them" transferred to any other power. 
 
 We have seen also that in Jefferson's letter to Monroe 
 he advised a joint declaration, stating 
 
 "that we aim not at the acquisition of any of those 
 possessions; that we will not stand in the way of any 
 amicable arrangement between them [the colonies] and 
 the mother country; but that we will oppose with all our 
 means the forcible interposition of any other power as 
 auxiliary, stipendiary, or under any other form or pretext, 
 and most especially their transfer to any power by con- 
 quest, cession, or acquisition in any other way." 
 
 Monroe's message, however, is confined to making 
 the following declarations : 
 
 First. Against " any attempt on their part [that is, 
 the Holy Alliance] to extend their system to any portion 
 of this hemisphere." Literally, this meant the system 
 of the Holy Alliance. It is scarcely probable that it was 
 intended to convey any idea of hostility to monarchical 
 institutions as such, because during this very Monroe 
 administration, we were among the first to recognize the 
 Emperor Iturbide in Mexico and the Emperor Dom 
 Pedro in Brazil. 
 
28 
 
 Second. It declared against "any interposition for 
 the purpose of oppressing them [the Spanish-American 
 States] or controlling in any manner their destiny, by 
 any European power." 
 
 It will be observed that the message does not follow 
 either Canning or Jefferson, in declaring against new 
 acquisitions of territory by European powers; and there 
 is nothing in the message that would preclude a Euro- 
 pean power from acquiring the territory of an independent 
 American state, provided it were done by voluntary treaty, 
 and provided there were no oppression or coercion, or no 
 interposition by third powers. Furthermore, there is 
 nothing in the message that would preclude a European 
 nation from making war upon an American state, if such 
 war were made for a just cause and not for purposes of 
 a political or ambitious nature; and there is nothing that 
 would prevent the European state acquiring the territory 
 of the American state as the result of such a war. For 
 the right to wage war almost necessarily involves the 
 latter proposition. On this point, Mr. Richard Henry 
 Dana, Jr., has said : 
 
 " Confining itself to a declaration against interposition 
 to oppress or control, or to extend the system of the 
 Holy Alliance to this hemisphere, the message avoids 
 committing the Government on the subject of acquisi- 
 tion, either by the United States or the European 
 powers, and whether by cession or conquest. Possibly 
 the administration may have paused at Mr. Jefferson's 
 caution in his letter referred to : * But we must first ask 
 ourselves a question Do we wish to acquire any one or 
 more of the Spanish provinces? before we can unite 
 in the proposed declaration.' " 
 
 And Mr. Dana further says : 
 
 "When we compare the declarations in the message 
 with the joint declaration proposed by Mr. Canning and 
 
29 
 
 recommended by Mr. Jefferson, and consider our own 
 prior history and our then position, it certainly is affair 
 inference that the administration purposely avoided any 
 specific and direct statement as to transfer of dominion 
 by competent parties in the way of treaty or by conquest 
 in war." 
 
 Evidently the doctrine, as declared by Monroe, recog- 
 nizes the complete independence of the different Ameri- 
 can States ; and, of course, this would include their 
 right, of their own volition, to do with their own terri- 
 tory or their own form of government, as they pleased, 
 even to ceding their territory to a European power. 
 
 But at this day the Monroe Doctrine is not confined 
 within the letter of the Monroe declaration. It is very 
 questionable if the United States would permit any 
 European nation to acquire more territory, from any 
 independent nation on these Continents, than such 
 European nation is at present entitled to, even by 
 voluntary cession. And it is almost inconceivable that 
 the United States would permit such close neighbors as 
 the British provinces on the north, or even Cuba, to fall 
 into other European hands than their present owners. It 
 is quite as certain also that the United States would not at 
 this day permit any such acquisition of territory by a 
 European power, as the result of a lawful or just war. 
 
 As early as 1845, President Polk, in dealing with the 
 Northwestern Boundary question, sought to give to the 
 colonization declaration of the Monroe message the 
 meaning of "no more European colonies." But he 
 confined his declaration to North America. He said : 
 
 " It should be distinctly announced as our settled 
 policy that no future European colony or dominion shall, 
 with our consent, be planted or established on any part 
 of the North American Continent." 
 
 And in 1848, when different parties of the white people 
 
30 
 
 of Yucatan offered the sovereignty of that country to 
 the United States, Great Britain, and Spain, respect- 
 ively, President Polk, in a message to Congress, de- 
 clared that: 
 
 "We could not consent to a transfer of this dominion 
 and sovereignty to Spain, Great Britain, or any other 
 power." 
 
 There are two notable instances in our career, in one 
 of which we seem to have repudiated the Monroe Doc- 
 trine, and in the other of which we seem to have aban- 
 doned it. 
 
 The first is the case of the Panama Congress. 
 
 In 1825, the Spanish-American countries called a con- 
 gress at Panama for the purpose of discussing and adopt- 
 ing measures affecting the welfare and development of 
 the American continents, and of forming some sort of an 
 alliance, based on the Monroe Doctrine, as applicable to 
 this hemisphere. President Adams accepted the invita- 
 tion to join the Congress and appointed envoys whose 
 names he sent to the Senate. After a bitter debate in 
 both houses, the Senate finally concurred in the appoint- 
 ment of the envoys; but they were only to take part in a 
 diplomatic way. In the House of Representatives when 
 the question of making an appropriation for the expenses 
 of the envoys came up, the House adopted a resolution 
 stating that the United States ought not 
 
 "to form any alliance offensive or defensive, or nego- 
 tiate respecting such alliance with all or any of the South 
 American republics; nor ought they to become parties 
 with them, or either of them, to any joint declaration 
 for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of 
 the European powers with their independence or form 
 of government, or to any compact for the purpose of pre- 
 venting colonization upon the continents of America; but 
 that the people of the United States should be left free to 
 
act, in any crisis, in such manner as their feelings of 
 friendship towards these republics, and as their own 
 honor and policy, may at any time dictate." 
 
 Before our envoys reached Panama the Congress had 
 adjourned. 
 
 The other instance the one where our Government 
 seems to have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine was the 
 entering into the treaty with England known as the 
 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in 1850. 
 
 This treaty provides that neither Government " will 
 ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control 
 over " the ship canal contemplated in the treaty; that 
 when completed, they "guarantee the protection and 
 neutrality of the canal "; and both governments " agree 
 to extend their protection, by treaty stipulations, to any 
 other practicable communications whether by canal or 
 railway across the isthmus "; and especially those 
 "which are now proposed to be established by the way 
 of Tehuantepec or Panama." 
 
 In the correspondence between Mr. Frelinghuysen 
 and Earl Granville in 1882, upon the subject of this 
 treaty, taking the matter up where it was left off by 
 Mr. Elaine, Mr. Frelinghuysen maintained that a pro- 
 tectorate by a European nation would be in conflict with 
 the Monroe Doctrine. I will quote Mr. Frelinghuysen's 
 language, as that of one who was considered an able and 
 a safe statesman, and also because it is so recent an 
 expression by one in authority in relation to this doc- 
 trine. He says: 
 
 " The President believes that the formation of a pro- 
 tectorate by European nations over the isthmus transit 
 would be in conflict with a doctrine which has been for 
 many years asserted by the United States. This senti- 
 ment is properly termed a doctrine, as it has no pre- 
 scribed sanction, and its assertion is left to the exigency 
 
32 
 
 which may invoke it. It has been repeatedly announced 
 by the Executive Department of this Government, and 
 through the utterances of distinguished citizens; it is 
 cherished by the American people, and has been 
 approved by the Government of Great Britain. 
 
 4 ' It is not the inhospitable principle which it is some- 
 times charged with being, and which asserts that Euro- 
 pean nations shall not retain dominion on this hemi- 
 sphere, and that none but republican governments shall 
 here be tolerated; for we well know that a large part of 
 the North American continent is under the dominion of 
 her Majesty's Government, and that the United States 
 were in the past the first to recognize the imperial author- 
 ity of Dom Pedro in Brazil and of Iturbide in Mexico. 
 
 " It is not necessary now to define that doctrine; but 
 its history clearly shows that it at least opposes any 
 intervention by European nations in the political affairs 
 of the American republics." 
 
 From the statements of some of our public men and 
 newspapers, it is evident that an opinion prevails, quite 
 extensively, that the Monroe Doctrine makes our nation 
 the protector of all the independent states of this hemi- 
 sphere, and that, while we cannot control the conduct 
 of these states, we are, nevertheless, bound to espouse 
 their quarrels, if one party thereto is a European nation. 
 While such a position would be an absurd one for us to 
 take, yet, if the Monroe Doctrine is to be maintained as 
 at present understood, we must be prepared to find our- 
 selves, on occasions, in positions of great delicacy and 
 difficulty. As a great, enlightened, and just nation, we 
 are justified in following a policy which our honest judg- 
 ment tells us is for our best interests. But while we 
 claim complete independence for ourselves, are we not 
 denying such complete independence to our neighbors, 
 when we declare that they cannot, even voluntarily, cede 
 their own territory to a European power, or that they 
 may not invite the protectorate of a European power ? 
 
33 
 
 We certainly should not allow ourselves to be dragged 
 into the unwise and reckless quarrels which those too 
 often very unwisely governed states may bring upon 
 themselves. For such an attitude on our part, would only 
 encourage the insolence of some of those states toward 
 European nations; and that is a quality, in some of them, 
 which does not need to be encouraged. But, if we 
 assume to so far deny the independent sovereignty of 
 those states as to deny their right to cede their territory, or 
 to invite a European protectorate, we certainly must have 
 some corresponding duty toward them. We should 
 doubtless see to it that they are not oppressed or im- 
 posed upon in their dealings with European states ; but 
 we must at the same time admit that our position in this 
 respect is one which will be maintained, not for their 
 sakes, but for our own, and with a view, regardless of 
 their theoretical rights, to prevent and forestall possible 
 dangers to our own safety and welfare. 
 
 It must be evident that it is extremely difficult to frame 
 a definition of our relations with the Spanish-American 
 states which will be satisfactory to them and to us also. 
 In addition to the extreme delicacy inherent in the sub- 
 ject itself, especially from our assumed interests in this 
 whole hemisphere, there is the further fact that the con- 
 trol of the matters involved frequently changes hands ; 
 and the different, and sometimes divergent, views of 
 those in control of our affairs change the character and 
 the line of action from that pursued by their prede- 
 cessors. 
 
 For instance, when Mr. Elaine was in the State De- 
 partment, during the war between Chile and Peru, in 
 1881, the affairs of Peru became so desperate that it 
 seemed as if she might be wiped out of existence. 
 
-34 
 
 President Grvy of France proposed a joint interven- 
 tion by France, England, and the United States. Mr. 
 Elaine declined the invitation, giving as a reason, that 
 while our Government appreciated the motive, yet it 
 gravely doubted "the expediency of a joint interven- 
 tion with European powers, either by material pressure 
 or by moral or political influence." Mr. Elaine wrote 
 Mr. Trescott, our special envoy, that if our own good 
 offices were refused to prevent the absorption of Peru 
 by Chile, we would be free to " appeal to the other Re- 
 publics of this Continent to join in an effort to avert" 
 such consequences. 
 
 A few months later, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Mr. Elaine's 
 successor in the State Department, wrote Mr. Trescott 
 that the President was " convinced that the United States 
 has no right which is conferred either by treaty stipula- 
 tions or by public law to impose on the belligerents, un- 
 asked, its views of a just settlement." 
 
 Mr. Elaine, afterwards, in discussing this episode, in 
 his essay on the foreign policy of the Garfield admin- 
 tration, said: 
 
 " Our own Government cannot take the ground that 
 it will not offer friendly intervention to settle troubles 
 between American countries, unless at the same time it 
 freely concedes to European Governments the right of 
 such intervention, and thus consents to a practical de- 
 struction of the Monroe Doctrine and an unlimited in- 
 crease of European influence on this continent. The late 
 special envoy to Peru and Chile, Mr. Trescott, gives it 
 as his deliberate and published conclusion, that if the in- 
 structions under which he set out upon his mission had 
 not been revoked, peace between those angry belliger- 
 ents would have been established as the result of his 
 labors necessarily to the great benefit of the United 
 States. If our Government does not resume its efforts 
 to secure peace in South America, some European Gov- 
 
-35- 
 
 ernment will be forced to perform that friendly office. 
 The United States cannot play between nations the part 
 of dog in the manger." 
 
 Probably the nearest to a satisfactory definition of our 
 relations with the Spanish-American states that has ever 
 been made, is that contained in a letter from Mr. Seward 
 to General Kilpatrick, our Minister to Chile, on June 2, 
 1866, at the time of the Spanish bombardment of Val- 
 paraiso. Mr. Seward said: 
 
 "We maintain and insist with all the decision and 
 energy compatible with our existing neutrality, that the 
 republican system which is accepted by the people in 
 any one of those states shall not be wantonly assailed, 
 and that it shall not be subverted as an end of a lawful 
 war by European powers. We thus give to those re- 
 publics the moral support of a sincere, liberal, and we 
 think it will appear a useful, friendship. . . . Those 
 who think that the United States could enter as an ally 
 into every war in which a friendly republican state on 
 this continent became involved forget that peace is the 
 constant interest and unswerving policy of the United 
 States." 
 
 This was the position which our Government took with 
 regard to Mexico in dealing with the French invasion of 
 that country. 
 
 One of the brightest incidents in our national history 
 is the assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in the case of 
 this French invasion. 
 
 Spain, England, and France had heavy claims for debts 
 and damages against Mexico, and they formed a conven- 
 tion, by which they agreed, if Mexico refused to settle 
 their claims, they would take possession of Mexican 
 ports and sequestrate the customs toward such payment. 
 That such a step was within the rights of their powers, 
 and not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, is plainly; 
 stated by Secretary Seward, who said: 
 
"The President does not question that the sovereigns 
 represented have undoubted right to decide for them- 
 selves the fact whether they have sustained grievances, 
 and to resort to war against Mexico for the redress there- 
 of, and have a right also to levy the war severally or 
 jointly. " 
 
 But he asserted the Monroe Doctrine when he said 
 further that the United States was happy to be informed 
 and believe that 
 
 " Neither one nor all of the contracting parties shall, 
 as a result or consequence of the hostilities to be inaugu- 
 rated under the convention, exercise in the subsequent 
 affairs of Mexico any influence of a character to impair 
 the right of the Mexican people to choose and freely to 
 constitute the form of its own government." 
 
 The troops of the allies had scarcely landed at Vera 
 Cruz when the sinister designs of Napoleon became 
 manifest, and Spain and England promptly withdrew 
 from the enterprise. While our hands were full with 
 our Civil War, Napoleon made Maximilian of Austria 
 Emperor of Mexico, and maintained him in his position 
 by French bayonets. Our Government hearing that 
 Austria was also to send troops to support Maximilian, 
 notified the Austrian Government that if it sent any 
 troops for such a purpose, we would no longer " remain 
 as silent and neutral spectators." 
 
 Finally, as American troops, under Sheridan, were 
 being sent in large numbers to our Southwestern frontier, 
 Napoleon deemed it wise to withdraw his French troops, 
 and Mexico soon regained her independence. 
 
 This case, by reason of the ultimate political designs 
 of the French Emperor, involved a genuine application 
 of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 The Mexican case and the statements of the Monroe 
 Doctrine made in the diplomatic correspondence relating 
 
37 
 
 to it show that it is not a violation of that doctrine for a 
 European state to make war upon an American state, if 
 not made for political or ambitious purposes, or even to 
 take possession of the ports or custom-houses of the 
 American state in order to enforce the collection of 
 indemnities or debts. 
 
 Of course, if claims of this kind were simply subter- 
 fuges to cover designs for acquiring territory, or over- 
 throwing the chosen form of government of the people 
 of such state, the case would be different. 
 
 Therefore, when the British recently took possession 
 of the port of Corinto, in Nicaragua, there was no 
 violation of the Monroe Doctrine, although such was 
 loudly and widely asserted to be the case in some 
 quarters. The cause of England's grievance against 
 Nicaragua was an insult to the dignity of the British 
 nation, represented in the person of one of her consular 
 agents. England claimed that some of her private citi- 
 zens had also been maltreated. But their claims she 
 was willing to leave to a tribunal of arbitration. For the 
 insults to the consul, however, she demanded seventy- 
 five thousand dollars smart money. While this is a large 
 sum of money, it could not be said that its payment 
 would involve or endanger the independence of Nica- 
 ragua. For a much less offense than that given to 
 England in this matter in fact, for injury to the property 
 of private American citizens, our Government, in 1854, 
 demanded an indemnity of twenty-four thousand dollars 
 from the town of San Juan de Nicaragua, and when it 
 was not promptly paid, an American man-of-war bom- 
 barded the town, and afterwards, "in order to inculcate 
 a lesson never to be forgotten," burned such of the 
 buildings as were left standing. 
 
 Another conspicuous example, showing that the occu- 
 
pation of a city or port of an American state for the col- 
 lection of a just claim is not a violation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine, is found in the correspondence between Mr. 
 Elaine and the Governments of France and Venezuela 
 on the subject of the claims of France against Venezuela. 
 This correspondence is published in the document on 
 foreign relations for i88r. A number of European Gov- 
 ernments, and also our own Government, had claims 
 against Venezuela. France had succeeded, however, in 
 anticipating the other Governments in having her claims 
 recognized by Venezuela, by treaty. But Venezuela was 
 not living up to the terms of payment. France contem- 
 plated taking possession of Venezuelan ports to collect 
 her claim. Mr. Elaine interceded for Venezuela. 
 
 In this correspondence Mr. Elaine refers to the ru- 
 mored design of France to take " forcible possession of 
 some of the harbors and a portion of the territory of 
 Venezuela in compensation for debts due to citizens of 
 the French Republic." 
 
 This last phrase may be an unfortunate use of words. 
 The taking of Venezuelan territory " in compensation for 
 debts" would certainly be a violation of the Monroe 
 Doctrine as declared by Polk and Seward. 
 
 To the pathetic appeals of Mr. Comacho, the Vene- 
 zuelan Minister, Mr. Elaine replied that he did not believe 
 France contemplated such an extreme step. The Vene- 
 zuelan Minister calls Mr. Elaine's attention to the fact that 
 the people of Venezuela are in great anxiety and distress 
 over the matter, and that they do not believe that the 
 French impatience with them is on account of the small 
 dispute about payments, as the expense France must go to 
 in the armed enforcement of her claims would be far greater 
 than the amount involved. He also calls Mr. Elaine's at- 
 tention to the ambitious colonial designs of France in Mad- 
 
-39 
 
 agascar and other quarters of the globe, and asserts his 
 belief that France has designs on Venezuelan territory. 
 Our Minister in Paris had like fears. Mr. Elaine does 
 not once in this correspondence, either with the Vene- 
 zuelan or our own representatives, refer to the Monroe 
 Doctrine ; but in his letters to Minister Noyes he claims, 
 and he instructs that Minister to so represent to the 
 French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that such a course 
 as that which it was reported France intended to take 
 would be unjust to the other creditors of Venezuela, 
 including the United States. He protested that, if Vene- 
 zuela was to be treated as an independent nation, all of 
 her creditors must stand on the same footing, and France 
 had no right to priority; if Venezuela was to be regarded 
 as a bankrupt, still all of her creditors should stand on 
 the same footing ; and that if France should take the 
 steps reported to be contemplated, the other nations 
 would be deprived of a part of their security. Finally, 
 Mr. Elaine suggests, ''without attempting to prescribe 
 or dictate," that the United States place an agent at 
 Caracas, authorized to receive monthly payments from 
 Venezuela, and to distribute the same pro rata among 
 the creditor nations; and, in the event of default for a 
 certain time, that this agent should take possession of 
 the custom-houses of the two principal ports of Vene- 
 zuela and collect the customs. To France he expresses 
 the "solicitude" of our Government "for the higher 
 object of averting hostilities between two republics, for 
 each of which it feels the most sincere and enduring 
 friendship." 
 
 That the Monroe Doctrine does not require us to as- 
 sume the guardianship of our Southern neighbors is 
 further shown by the following occurrences in which ouf 
 Government did not feel called upon to interfere. 
 
40 
 
 In 1842, and again in 1844, England blockaded the 
 port of San Juan de Nicaragua. In 1851, England laid 
 an embargo on the traffic of the port of La Union, in 
 Salvador, and blockaded the whole coast of that state. 
 
 In 1862 and 1863, England seized a number of Brazil- 
 ian vessels in Brazilian waters, by way of reprisal for 
 the plundering of an English ship off the coast of Brazil. 
 
 In 1838, France blockaded the ports of Mexico, in 
 redress for unsatisfied demands. In 1845, France and 
 England blockaded the ports and coast of Buenos Ayres, 
 for the purpose of securing the independence of Uru- 
 guay. 
 
 In 1866, Chile invoked the Monroe Doctrine and sought 
 our aid in her war against Spain, which latter power was 
 at the time bombarding Valparaiso. Mr. Seward, as we 
 have seen, wrote to General Kilpatrick, our Minister, 
 defining the position of our Government, and stated in 
 effect that the United States was not bound to take part 
 in the wars in which a South American republic may en- 
 ter with a European sovereign, when the object of the 
 latter is not political or ambitious in its nature or for the 
 establishment of a monarchy under a European prince, 
 in place of a subverted republic, as in the case of Mexico. 
 
 Probably as extreme a case of the assertion of the 
 Monroe Doctrine as has ever occurred in our history is 
 that just made by President Cleveland in the Venezuela 
 boundary controversy. But under the facts of the case, 
 as generally understood, it would seem, if the Monroe 
 Doctrine is to be considered a vital principle of our pol- 
 icy, that the position taken by the President is right and 
 just, and should be maintained. Regardless of whether 
 England is in the right or Venezuela is in the right, the 
 fact remains that there is a dispute of over half a cen- 
 tury's duration, as to the proper boundary between the 
 territories of British Guiana and Venezuela. 
 
41 
 
 The territory involved is a large one an empire in 
 extent. The portion lying east of what is known as the 
 Schomburgk line is said to be about forty thousand 
 square miles. But the British claim has varied at differ- 
 ent times, so that the extreme British claim is more than 
 twice that area. If a war should occur between Vene- 
 zuela and England, it is certain that Venezuela, whether 
 right or wrong, must go to the wall. If it should be that 
 Venezuela is in the right, and it should come to pass, 
 as the result of such a war, that she would lose this ter- 
 ritory, then undoubtedly Venezuela would be oppressed 
 and despoiled of her territory; and her territory would 
 pass to a European power as the result of such oppres- 
 sion and spoliation. It is almost universal among civi- 
 lized nations to refer disputes as to boundaries which 
 cannot be ascertained accurately to friendly arbitration. 
 England and the United States have frequently resorted 
 to such methods, and will doubtless do so again. The 
 position of England, therefore, in the Venezuela matter 
 seems harsh, unjust, and oppressive, and would seem to 
 indicate a feeling of weakness in the justice of her case. 
 Our Government has asked England to consent to a 
 friendly arbitration. England has hitherto refused to 
 comply with this reasonable and just request, except as 
 to a portion of the territory in dispute. This condition 
 of affairs has called forth a declaration of the Monroe 
 Doctrine, which, while it does not go as far as the decla- 
 rations of President Polk, has a wider scope, in that it 
 includes the South American continent^ The President 
 declares: 
 
 4 'That the traditional and established policy of this 
 Government is firmly opposed to a forcible increase by 
 any European power of its territorial possessions in this 
 continent ; that this policy is as well founded in principle 
 as it is strongly supported by numerous precedents ; 
 
42 
 
 that, as a consequence, the United States is bound to 
 protest against the enlargement of area of British Guiana 
 in derogation of the rights and against the will of Vene- 
 zuela; that, considering the disparity in strength of 
 Great Britain and Venezuela, the territorial dispute 
 between them can be reasonably settled only by friendly, 
 impartial arbitration, and the resort to such arbitration 
 should include the whole controversy, and is not satisfied 
 if one of the powers concerned is permitted to draw an 
 arbitrary line through the territory in debate, and declare 
 that it will submit to arbitration only the portion lying 
 on one side of it." 
 
 This new declaration seems to involve a new and 
 additional principle, namely, that in certain cases of 
 disputes between a strong European power and a weak 
 American state, where the disparity of strength is so 
 great that the American state would necessarily suffer 
 defeat as the result of a war, regardless of the justice of 
 its cause, the dispute must be settled by arbitration. 
 This will be especially so, where the result of the contro- 
 versy might mean the extension of European territory on 
 this hemisphere. 
 
 There have always been many who have opposed the 
 Monroe Doctrine as a mischievous one, because, they 
 claim, it is opposed to the principle of non-intervention 
 and neutrality, so earnestly advocated by Washington 
 in his farewell address. But while it may have a 
 tendency to entangle us in the affairs of the states on 
 these American continents, its maintenance must have 
 a tendency to keep us out of the broils of Europe. 
 Jefferson, who was passionately for peace and against 
 entangling alliances, disposes of this objection in his 
 letter to Monroe, where he says : 
 
 " But the war in which the present proposition might 
 engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her 
 [England's] war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and 
 
43 
 
 establish the American system of keeping out of our land 
 all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe 
 to intermeddle with the affairs of our nations. It is to 
 maintain our principle, not to depart from it." 
 
 And passionately as Jefferson loved France, we find 
 him, in 1802, writing to Livingston, our Minister to that 
 country, with reference to the cession of Louisiana by 
 Spain to Bonaparte, that this act would convert France 
 into "our natural and habitual enemy." He says: 
 
 "It is impossible that France and the United States 
 can continue long friends when they meet in so irritable 
 a position. . . . We must be very improvident if we 
 do not begin to make arrangements on that hypothesis. 
 The day that France takes possession of New Orleans 
 fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within 
 her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations 
 who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession 
 of the ocean. From that moment we must marry our- 
 selves to the British fleet and nation." 
 
 As Mr. Morse says, in his biography of Jefferson: 
 
 "One almost discredits his own senses as he beholds 
 Jefferson voluntarily proclaiming the banns for these nup- 
 tials, which during so many years past would have 
 seemed to him worse than illicit." 
 
 Still there can be little doubt that Jefferson proclaimed 
 a great truth. How much of the present ill-feeling 
 toward England in this country is created by her neigh- 
 borhood to us on this continent ? 
 
 There can be scarcely a doubt that if this cause of 
 irritability were removed, the popular feeling in this 
 country toward England would become much more 
 patient and friendly. Why all our anxiety and talk of 
 coast and harbor defenses and more ships for our navy ? 
 What mean the heavily fortified naval stations maintained 
 by England at Halifax and Esquimalt? Whom do we 
 fear, that we must make mighty preparations for our 
 
44 
 
 own defense and safety? There is only one answer: 
 England and her dependency on the north. 
 
 The absence of powerful neighbors has been an 
 inestimable blessing to the United States in many ways. 
 The nation has thereby been spared much in the 
 possibility of wasteful and ruinous wars, and in the 
 necessity for maintaining powerful standing armies. It 
 has been able to devote all of its wealth and energies 
 to material development and growth, and to the pursuit 
 of the arts of peace. With the exception of the British 
 dominion on our north, the only powers who could do 
 the United States serious injury, in case of war, are the 
 European powers. The acquisition of permanent foot- 
 holds by those powers, on this hemisphere, would give 
 them a basis of operations, more or less advantageous, 
 against us, in case of war. Powerful and warlike neigh- 
 bors, with political interests on this hemisphere, would 
 mean for the United States a system akin to the militarism 
 of Europe. If our nation believes that such a condition 
 of things must result from European dominion on this 
 hemisphere, and that its peace and safety-StnVeatened 
 thereby, why is it not justified in resisting the further 
 extension of such dominion? Does the Monroe Doctrine 
 need any more justification than does the doctrine of the 
 " balance of power " in Europe? 
 
 Did not Mr. Canning justify the Monroe Doctrine, 
 and was not this what he meant when he boasted: "I 
 called the New World into existence, to redress the 
 balance of the Old?" 
 
 "The balance of power" is justified by writers on 
 international and public law, on the ground that a state 
 has a right to protect itself from anything that would 
 endanger its peace or its own existence. If the people 
 of this country believe that the maintenance of the 
 
45 
 
 Monroe Doctrine is essential to their peace, welfare, and 
 safety, and they have the power to maintain it, why is 
 not their position equally justifiable? One thing is 
 certain our southern neighbors have not complained 
 of it. The only complaint in that direction is that they 
 expect too much. 
 
 From the foregoing review, it must be evident, as 
 stated in the beginning of this essay, that the Monroe 
 Doctrine of to-day is a more comprehensive doctrine 
 than that originally proclaimed by Monroe ; and that 
 those who would confine it to the strict letter of Monroe's 
 message are in error. The Monroe Doctrine of to-day is 
 rather the underlying spirit of the original declaration. 
 I cannot better summarize its scope and limitations than 
 by quoting the summary made by Richard Henry Dana, 
 Jr., which was lately amplified by Professor John B. 
 McMaster, and published in the New York Herald, 
 about the time of the Corinto affair. Here it is : 
 
 1. It must be remembered, in the first place, that the 
 ' declaration on which Monroe, in 1823, consulted his 
 
 Cabinet and his two predecessors, Jefferson and Madison, 
 related to the meddling of the powers of Europe in the 
 affairs of American states. 
 
 2. That the kind of meddling then declared against 
 was such as tended to control the political affairs of 
 American powers, or was designed to extend to the 
 New World the political systems and institutions of the 
 Old. 
 
 3. That the declaration did not mark out any course 
 of conduct to be pursued, but merely asserted that the 
 interposition of the kind mentioned would be considered 
 as dangerous to our peace and safety, and as a manifesta- 
 tion of an unfriendly dispositon toward the United States. 
 
 4. That this doctrine has never been indorsed by 
 
- 4 6- 
 
 any resolution or act of Congress, but still remains the 
 declaration of a President and his Cabinet. 
 
 5. Nevertheless, it is an eminently proper and 
 patriotic doctrine, and as such has been indorsed by the 
 people of the United States, and needs no other sanction. 
 The people, not Congress, rule this country. It is not 
 of the smallest consequence, therefore, whether Con- 
 gress ever has or ever does indorse the doctrine which 
 very fittingly bears the name of the first President to 
 announce it. 
 
 6. The Monroe Doctrine is a simple and plain state- 
 ment that the people of the United States oppose the 
 creation of European dominion on American soil ; that 
 they oppose the transfer of the political sovereignty of 
 American soil to European powers, and that any attempt 
 to do these things will be regarded as "dangerous to 
 our peace and safety." 
 
 What the remedy should be for such interposition by 
 European powers the doctrine does not pretend to state. 
 But this much is certain, that when the people of the 
 United States consider anything "dangerous to their 
 peace and safety " they will do as other nations do, and, 
 if necessary, defend their peace and safety with force 
 of arms. 
 
 7. The doctrine does not comtemplate forcible inter- 
 vention by the United States in any legitimate contest, 
 but it will not permit any such contest to result in the 
 increase of European power or influence on this con- 
 tinent, nor in the overthrow of any existing government, 
 nor in the establishment of a protectorate over it, nor in 
 the exercise of any direct control over its policy or institu- 
 tions. Further than this the doctrine does not go. 
 
47 
 
 ADDENDUM. 
 
 Much history has been made in connection with the 
 Monroe Doctrine in the short interval since the foregoing 
 paper was written. 
 
 The passage by Congress of the Venezuelan Boundary 
 Commission bill, in answer to the President's Venezuelan 
 message of December 17, 1895, is a virtual sanction by 
 Congress of the Monroe Doctrine. Hereafter, therefore, 
 it cannot be said, as it could have been said until the 
 passage of that bill, that the doctrine has never been 
 sanctioned by the American Congress in both branches. 
 
 In his annual message to Congress, of December 2, 
 1895, President Cleveland said, that "the traditional 
 and established policy of this Government is firmly 
 opposed to a forcible increase by any European power 
 of its territorial possessions in this continent." 
 
 As the action of England towards Venezuela, which 
 was then under consideration, would, if the territory 
 in dispute belonged to Venezuela, amount to "a forcible 
 increase" of England's territorial possessions, the Presi- 
 dent's language is suitable and appropriate to the occa- 
 sion; and as he was dealing with a specific case, and 
 was not attempting to give a comprehensive definition 
 of the Monroe Doctrine, it can not be said that this 
 statement necessarily involved any narrowing of the 
 scope of the doctrine, as now understood. It is often 
 advisable in controversies of this kind not to state 
 propositions advanced more broadly than the case in 
 hand calls for, thereby not inviting, and perhaps avoid- 
 ing, unnecessary disputation. 
 
 But in his message of December 17, 1895, the Presi- 
 dent uses this language : 
 
 " Great Britain's present proposition has never thus 
 
far been regarded as admissible by Venezuela, though 
 any adjustment of the boundary line which that country 
 may deem for her advantage, and may enter into of her 
 own free will, cannot, of course, be objected to by the 
 United States." 
 
 It must be admitted that, on broad grounds, the 
 menace to the peace and safety of the United States 
 involved in a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, is 
 scarcely less when a substantial increase of European 
 dominion is obtained peaceably than when it is obtained 
 forcibly. And, at first blush, the foregoing statement 
 in the Venezuelan message would seem to imply that 
 a peaceful acquisition of territory would be tolerated. 
 
 We find, also, such an authority as Senator Sherman 
 of Ohio, recently made Chairman of the Senate Com- 
 mittee on Foreign Relations, declaring that the Presi- 
 dent's "assertion of the Monroe Doctrine is a correct 
 one"; and there has been very little dissent from this 
 position by those who admit the applicability of the 
 Monroe Doctrine to the Venezuela case. It is more than 
 likely that this position is held by reason of the peculiar 
 nature of the dispute in question. The position is doubt- 
 less founded on the assumption that there is a bona fide 
 dispute between two nations whose rights to adjoining 
 territory on this hemisphere are admissible and fully 
 recognized. But if Venezuela, who is directly and 
 vitally concerned in the territory in dispute, shall volun- 
 tarily, and without coercion, consent to compromise such 
 dispute, presumably maintained in good faith, then our 
 Government will take that as a conclusive proof that the 
 Monroe Doctrine has not been violated. For the Presi- 
 dent says that the correspondence with England was 
 conducted in the belief that the Monroe Doctrine was 
 involved in the "pending controversy" ; and that 
 "without any conviction as to the final merits of the 
 
49 
 
 dispute, but anxious to learn in a satisfactory and con- 
 clusive manner whether Great Britain sought, under a 
 claim of boundary, to extend her possessions on this 
 continent without right, or whether she merely sought 
 possession of territory fairly included within her lines 
 of ownership, this Government proposed to the Govern- 
 ment of Great Britain a resort to arbitration as a proper 
 means of settling the question, to the end that a vexatious 
 boundary dispute between the two contestants might be 
 determined, and our exact standing and relation to the 
 controversy might be made clear." 
 
 It must be conceded that any European nation owning 
 territory on this hemisphere may, in perfect good faith, 
 have a boundary dispute with a neighboring American 
 state; and, having such a bona fide dispute, may 
 defend its position to the uttermost. To say that such a 
 boundary dispute, when existing in good faith, and not 
 trumped up by the European state, for the purpose of 
 wrongfully acquiring the territory of the American state, 
 cannot be settled, even if the immediate parties are 
 willing to settle it, without an inquiry on our part as to 
 whether the Monroe Doctrine is involved, would doubt- 
 less be going to an unnecessary extreme at the present 
 time in the assertion of that Doctrine. 
 
 In the Venezuela correspondence Lord Salisbury 
 claims that England is not violating the Monroe Doctrine. 
 In reply to Mr. Olney, he says : 
 
 "Her Majesty's Government have no design to seize 
 territory that properly belongs to Venezuela, or forcibly 
 to extend sovereignty over any portion of her popu- 
 lation." 
 
 He also says : 
 
 "Her Majesty's Government . . . fully concur 
 with the view which President Monroe apparently enter- 
 tained, that any disturbance of the existing territorial 
 distribution in that hemisphere by any fresh acquisitions 
 
- 5 o 
 
 on the part of any European state would be a highly 
 inexpedient change." 
 
 But he denies the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine 
 to the Venezuela case, and bluntly refuses to allow an 
 impartial tribunal to pass on the controversy. Yet if it 
 shall appear, on an impartial investigation, that England 
 is making fresh acquisitions of Venezuela's territory, 
 why is not the doctrine applicable? England, however, 
 has taken the position that she will keep by force as 
 much of the disputed territory as she desires. 
 
 As Mr. Olney puts the case, England's position 
 toward Venezuela may be stated thus : 
 
 "You can get none of the debatable land by force, 
 because you are not strong enough ; you can get none by 
 treaty, because I will not agree, and you can take your 
 chance at getting a portion by arbitration only, if you 
 first agree to abandon to me such other portion as I may 
 designate." 
 
 Certainly the acquisition of territory under such 
 circumstances is as much a forcible acquisition as if the 
 territory were taken and held by British troops. 
 
 The President's message, in view of its approval by 
 Congress and the people, has been called a contingent 
 declaration of war; for he has advised Congress that when 
 the report of the Commission is made and accepted, it 
 will, in his opinion, 
 
 "be the duty of the United States to resist by every 
 means in its power as a willful aggression upon its rights 
 and interests the appropriation by Great Britain of any 
 lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over 
 any territory which after investigation we have deter- 
 mined of right to belong to Venezuela." 
 
 While these are strong words, and may mean war in 
 a contingency, they are simply a reply to England's 
 warlike attitude, which can only mean that force and 
 
not justice shall decide this controversy. England has 
 refused the peaceful methods of an impartial judgment. 
 
 Regardless of the opinion of the United States and of 
 the civilized world, she says, in effect: " This dispute can 
 only be settled my way, or by war." Her attitude, and 
 not ours, is a challenge to war a fact that is misappre- 
 hended by some of our own people, and certainly by the 
 press and people of Europe. All that our Government 
 ever asked was that the dispute should be settled by 
 peaceful means. As England refused to be a party to 
 an impartial arbitration, our Government, in order that it 
 might take further action only if the facts should warrant 
 us, has appointed a Commission of distinguished men to 
 investigate the truth about the matter. 
 
 It will be the duty of that Commission to find out, and 
 to inform us and inform the world, whether England, 
 relying upon her superior strength, is attempting to rob 
 an American state of its territory, or is simply defending 
 in a reckless, warlike, and uncivilized manner what is 
 justly her own. 
 
 While our attitude may mean war, if we find that 
 England is despoiling Venezuela, and she shall refuse to 
 desist, yet we do not propose to prejudge her case; and 
 we will act only in case it is necessary to protect our 
 cherished principles, one of which is to defend from 
 European aggression the integrity and autonomy of the 
 existing free states on the American hemisphere. Such 
 is the position which the Monroe Doctrine imposes on us. 
 When we abandon it, we will lose the prestige and influ- 
 ence which it gives us among the American states and 
 before the world; and we will lose, also, much of the 
 pride arid honor which Americans feel in their country. 
 
 Would not peace under such conditions cost too 
 much ? 
 
 
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