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D 
 
 
 
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 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
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HARVARD ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
 PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF 
 THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 
 
 VOL. IX 
 
THE FRENCH 
 GRAIN TRADE 
 
 1660- 1710 
 
 LEGENDA 
 
 Areas from which Paris 
 'was supplied, and 
 Route* by which outlying 
 areas were tapped. 
 
 5otable Independent market areas: 
 
 Lyons and its sources of supply, 
 Rouen " " " " " 
 +++ + Orleans " " " " *' 
 Bordeaux and the export trade- 
 oft he Upper Garonne 
 Marans and La Rocbelle 
 
 &&&ff Small Independent market areas: 
 (a) in isolated rural districts 
 enclaves within an area 
 of active trade ' 
 e.g. Tours 
 Blois 
 Rheims 
 Nevers 
 La Charite' 
 
 Supply areas exploited by 
 two or mure market areas 
 
 (a) Route of the export trade 
 from L'pper Languedoe 
 
 (b) Rouies in the 
 Upper^Marne Valley 
 
 Spanish frequent the Fairs 
 
 at Giront, ft. Beat. 
 
 Bagneret-de-Luch 
 
 coming for grain 
 
Longitude East 2* from, Paris 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE 
 GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 1400-1710 
 
 BY 
 
 ABBOTT PAYSON USHER, PH.D. 
 
 INSTRUCTOR IN ECONOMICS IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY 
 
 CAMBRIDGE 
 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
 
 1913 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1913 
 BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
 
PATRI DILECTO 
 FILIUS GRATUS 
 
PREFACE 
 
 THE history of the grain trade acquired great prominence 
 in France in the eighteenth century. The Physiocrats made it 
 one of the issues in their struggle for commercial freedom, and 
 the scandal attached to the King's name in connection with 
 the Pacte de Famine still furnishes the political historian with 
 an interesting episode in pre-Revolutionary history. The 
 earlier history of the grain trade does not appeal to the same 
 interests. There is none of the intensely dramatic tone of the 
 great episodes of the eighteenth century. It is a chapter in 
 the history of social evolution, interesting perhaps, but com- 
 plicated and difficult because it involves an understanding of 
 conditions so strangely different from those of our own day. 
 Changes in the mode of marketing seem to be relatively unim- 
 portant and it is only with an effort that we bring ourselves to 
 realize how closely these changes are associated with the develop- 
 ment of economic solidarity. 
 
 The increasing complexity of the division of labor creates a 
 necessity for more accurate determinations of value. Everyone 
 is concerned either as a producer or as a consumer. Today 
 there is a high degree of refinement in the valuation of the great 
 staples, and the achievement of this success is one of the triumphs 
 of modern institutions. Grain, cotton, wool, oil, iron and steel, 
 beef, and some other products are valued today with reference 
 to the demand of the world. It is perhaps the greatest novelty 
 in our modern economic organization. The history of the grain 
 trade is significant because it presents most clearly some of the 
 first steps in the evolution of these new modes of marketing. 
 France is peculiarly important, not because the general develop- 
 ment is different in Germany and in England, but because the 
 history of France exhibits more clearly some of the stages in 
 the process. The story is more easily read. The crises leave 
 
 vii 
 
Vlii PREFACE 
 
 a deeper impress on the records. The great dearths of the 
 seventeenth century revealed the defects of the local market 
 systems. The need of wholesale markets becomes unmistakably 
 clear. Then, too, conditions in Burgundy exhibit the strength 
 of the old system and make it possible to understand the extreme 
 slowness of the evolution. 
 
 The study of the limitations of the market area is essential 
 to an understanding of the history of commerce, though other 
 topics ^usually attract more attention. The importance of 
 foreign trade and the greater volume of records available tend 
 to distort our views. The general character of trade between 
 tropical and temperate zones, too, creates an appearance of 
 world marketing that is somewhat deceptive. The history 
 of the great stream of trade that flowed through Europe from 
 the Mediterranean countries does not belie the conclusions 
 reached by a study of domestic trade. The analysis of price- 
 making, the characteristic problem of domestic trade, merely 
 emphasizes the need of a more careful study of the cosmopolitan 
 trade of the middle ages. This stream of commerce, which we 
 would today designate as foreign, presents as its characteristic 
 problem the liquidation of trade balances. Development in 
 the organization of domestic trade is measured in terms of market 
 organization; the changes in the mechanism of the general 
 trade of Europe can best be appreciated in terms of the growth 
 of financial machinery for the handling of commercial credit. 
 The principal topics in that story are the development of credit 
 instruments, the history of banking, and the development of 
 money markets. The history of European commerce in this 
 sense is still unwritten. The subject is gradually taking form, 
 material is being collected and rendered available, but the narra- 
 tive is still incomplete. As yet we know only the vague out- 
 lines of the history of the bill of exchange. Ehrenberg has 
 laid the foundations for an understanding of the money markets 
 of the transition period, but much remains to be done. The 
 histories of banking are becoming more genetic; there is less of 
 antiquarianism and a deeper sense of consistent growth. But 
 the history of financial organization is truly European in its 
 
PREFACE IX 
 
 scope. It is a story that begins on the shores of the Mediter- 
 ranean, that contains many intricate chapters on the trade 
 and commerce of Central Europe, and that is finally concluded 
 only in the Low Countries and in England. The breadth of 
 the field constitutes a serious obstacle to adequate research. 
 It is not enough to work over the archives of any single country 
 or of any single period, in the end the historian will be obliged 
 to follow the thread of the narrative wherever it leads him. 
 
 The history of the grain trade furnishes only a chapter in 
 this larger history of commerce and trade, but this episode is 
 sufficiently independent to be treated separately. 
 
 This study has been the outcome of work with Prof. E. F. 
 Gay, and in a two-fold sense. The interest in these problems 
 of economic growth was first kindled by his lectures, and this 
 particular investigation, begun at his suggestion, could not have 
 been carried to a conclusion without the assistance he has so 
 willingly given at every stage of the work. His suggestions 
 have repeatedly opened up new aspects of the problem and 
 made the study more comprehensive than would otherwise 
 have been possible, and his criticisms have been invaluable 
 both in judgment of material and in preparation of the text. 
 
 It gives me great pleasure also to have this opportunity 
 of thanking the officials of the various libraries and archives 
 for their courtesy and kindness. The staff at the Archives 
 Nationales at Paris, M. Rochez, Archivist at Lyons, and the 
 Archivists at Dijon helped me through many difficulties and 
 saved me errors and much loss of time. In other libraries, 
 too, the character of the manuscripts was carefully explained 
 to me and the relation of the deposit to my work made clear. 
 
 A. P. U. 
 
 GRAFTON, MASSACHUSETTS, 
 September, 1912. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PART I 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 PAGE 
 
 MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 3 
 
 I. LOCAL MARKETS AND METROPOLITAN DEMAND. Conditions of 
 efficient price-making. The medieval market incapable of meeting the 
 requirements of inter-market trade. Depletion of the producing 
 regions by the metropolis. The medieval market inherently defective, 
 but seriously inadequate only in time of dearth. 
 
 II. TYPES or LOCAL MARKETING. Isolated markets, with or 
 without blatters. Small market systems in two forms; two inter- 
 dependent markets, a central market with tributaries. 
 
 III. LOCAL MARKETS AND WHOLESALE TRADE. " Country buy- 
 ing " and the disorganization of tributary market systems supply- 
 ing the wholesale trade. The passive granary trade' of the river towns. 
 Tendency of the wholesale trade to become independent of the local 
 markets. Early wholesale markets at Bray and Vitry. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 45 
 
 References to the grain trade of Paris at the close of the thirteenth 
 century. Types of merchant and sources of supply. Character of 
 the problems in the history of the Parisian trade. 
 
 I. DELIMITATION OF THE SUPPLY AREA. Fifteenth century; Pari- 
 sian merchants in Normandy, Rouenese in the Oise valley. The estab- 
 lishment of definite trading limits in the sixteenth century. Extension 
 of Parisian trade in the seventeenth century. Parisian merchants in 
 Normandy and on the Loire. Break-down of the old market systems. 
 
 II. THE UPPER SEINE BASIN AND PROBLEMS OF MARKETING. 
 Abundance of supplies in the Seine Basin. Relation of abundance 
 to the development of new modes of marketing. The wholesale trade 
 before 1660; granaries and 6/a//er-supplied markets. The sixteenth 
 century a period of slight pressure upon supply. Occasional export to 
 foreign countries during this period. Growth of Paris in the early 
 seventeenth century. New tendencies. Probable chronology. 
 " Country buying." Selling by sample. The Beauce. Soissonnais. 
 Futile attempts to check these new practices in Soissonnais. 
 
 xi 
 
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 III. THE FIRST WHOLESALE MARKET. Changes in the granary 
 trade along the Marne; further concentration in Chalons and Vitry. 
 Blatiers and " country buying " in the Seine valley. The market at 
 Bray. The Colmet episode in 1694. Delamare at Vitry in 1 709. His 
 market ordinance. Vitry as a distributing point. 
 
 IV. THE PARISIAN MARKETS. The Port de Greve. The Port de 
 Tficole. The Halle. The bakers and the bread markets. Market 
 Regulations. Delays in transit and entrepots near Paris. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS AND THE WHOLESALE 
 MERCHANTS 126 
 
 Character of trade in the Rhone valley. Lyons and her sources of 
 supply. The grain trade in the early fifteenth century. The Chambre 
 d'Abondance of 1481. Growth of trade in Burgundy and Languedoc, 
 1485-1500. The Chambre d'Abondance of 1500. The Commission of 
 1504. Trade in Burgundy, 1500-1585. Encouragement of the mer- 
 chants by the municipality. Municipal purchases and interference. 
 The meeting of May 13, 1586. Absence of municipal activity, 1586- 
 1630. The Abondance reestablished and made perpetual, 1630-43. 
 Policy of the Abondance, 1643-60. Development of wholesale trade, 
 1660-90. Chaiz'in Languedoc, 1693. Reorganization of the Abon- 
 dance in 1694. The last phase. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 LYONESE MERCHANTS AND DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING 
 REGIONS 180 
 
 Acuteness of market problems in Burgundy and Languedoc. Signifi- 
 cance of the years 1693 and 1709. 
 
 I. LANGUEDOC AND PROVENCE IN 1693. Purchases by the Lyonese 
 in September and October. Local apprehension. Baville's reports of 
 distress in Upper Languedoc. 
 
 II. BURGUNDY IN 1708-09. Local apprehension of dearth. The 
 closing of the granaries in anticipation of higher prices. Prohibitions 
 by the Intendants. Outbreaks of violence in March and April 1709. 
 Extremes of distress. Increased disorder. Letters of the Bishop 
 of Chalons. 
 
 III. LANGUEDOC IN 1708-09. Good harvests. Prospects of heavy 
 export. Prohibition of foreign export. Restrictions imposed upon 
 the Lyonese. Distress in Languedoc in March, 1709. Cessation of 
 trade. Baville opens the granaries. Negotiations with Toulouse. 
 
 IV. The genesis of panics in the grain trade. Conception of an " ade- 
 quate supply." Administrative attempts to secure a steady flow of 
 trade. Invisibility of supply. Crop statistics attempted. Tendency 
 of granary buying to foment panic. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Xlli 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 
 PAGE 
 
 AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS AND EXTREMES OF 
 MISERY 203 
 
 Effect of dearth on relatively isolated markets. Enclaves in the larger 
 market systems. Small market systems in the back country. Election 
 of Brive. Auvergne. Size of villages in the less fertile sections. Sub- 
 stitutes for bread in time of famine. Records of extreme misery. Re- 
 lief of distress among the poor. Administrative purchases in Limousin. 
 Difficulties in Dauphine. 
 
 PART II 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE, 1500-1660 . . . .223 
 
 The Physiocratic interpretation of the early history of the grain trade. 
 Sully and the origin of the Free Trade policy. Error of this view. 
 Restricted application of general edicts. Relation of the general edicts 
 of this period to the conditions in the Seine Basin. 
 
 I. EMPIRICAL OPPORTUNISM, 1500-59. Edicts of 1507, 1515, 1535, 
 J 539> I 54Q, 1558. The freedom of the inter-provincial trade. Attempts 
 to gather information. 
 
 II. COMPREHENSIVE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION, 1550-71. The 
 Bureau of 1559. Activities of the Bureau. The projects of 1567 and 
 
 III. INERT TRADITIONALISM, 1571-1660. Edicts of 1573, 1574, 1577, 
 1587. Policy of Henry IV. The prefaces and the Physiocratic concep- 
 tion of Sully's policy. Seventeenth century edicts. 
 
 CHAPTER II 
 
 LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE, 1500-1660 . . . 240 
 
 Conflict of interest between consuming centers and producing regions. 
 Dread of dearth in Paris and Lyons. Fear of the wholesale merchants 
 in the producing regions. The King as arbiter. The producing 
 regions usually represented by provincial officials; governors and Parle- 
 ments. Officials identified with Paris and Lyons. Baillis and Sene- 
 chaux relatively unimportant. 
 
 BURGUNDY AND LYONS. First visits of the Lyonese to Burgundy. 
 Hostility shown the Lyonese in Burgundy, 1528. Royal prohibitions in 
 Burgundy, 1539. Countervailing patents granted the Lyonese. Ne- 
 gotiations with Villefrancon in 1556-57. His unwillingness to recog- 
 nize royal patents. Later episodes of a similar character. 
 
XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 THE SEINE BASIN. Regulation of grain movements in the vicinity of 
 Paris. Prohibitions in Champagne and Picardy. Importance of munic- 
 ipal prohibitions. 
 
 NORMANDY AND LANGUEDOC. Regulation of foreign export by local 
 authorities. 
 
 CHAPTER III 
 COLBERT'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN TRADE . . 268 
 
 Colbert and the traditions. The Intendants. Their correspondence 
 with the Controleur General. Steps toward greater freedom of trade. 
 Colbert at once a " free trader " and a " protectionist." General 
 edicts. The inter-provincial trade. The attempt to adjust general 
 measures to local needs. A new outlet for Burgundian grain. Difficul- 
 ties arising from the general permission of export in 1678. Exemptions 
 in Picardy, Champagne, and Normandy. Special privileges claimed 
 by Bordeaux. Bordeaux and Guienne. Peculiarity of the situation of 
 Languedoc. Foreign markets and the needs of Provence. Adminis- 
 trative interference with the trade in favor of Provence. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE, 1683-1709 . . 295 
 
 Necessity of more careful regulation of the domestic trade after the 
 death of Colbert. The Intendants and the old traditions. Significance 
 of the great dearths. Increased authority of the Chatelet. Policies 
 of the Intendants: laissez faire and interference. Constructive at- 
 tempts at market regulation. Prohibitions and the license system. 
 The Seine Basin and market regulation. The license system in Bur- 
 gundy, Brittany, and Languedoc. Special administrative problems 
 at Orleans. 
 
 THE SEINE BASIN. Preponderance of the Chatelet and fichevinage. 
 Jurisdiction over the grain trade. The dispute over the incidental 
 powers of the Echevinage. Establishment of the claims of the Chate- 
 let. Its policy. The old market regulations and new commercial 
 practices; 1660-63. History of the dearth of 1693-94. Attempt 
 to suppress associations among the merchants. The case of Jean Roger. 
 The years 1698-99. Delamare at Bray. The dearth of 1709. Dela- 
 mare's visit to Vitry. Genesis of the market ordinance. 
 BURGUNDY AND LYONS. Importance of prohibitions in Burgundy. 
 Estimates of supplies in 1693 by the Intendants in Burgundy and at 
 Lyons. Criticism of the Lyonese by the Controleur General. Prob- 
 ability that the Lyonese over-estimated the supplies. Strict regulation 
 of the trade from Burgundy in 1698. The Intendant supported by the 
 Contrdleur General. Demand for export licenses. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS XV 
 
 PACK 
 
 LANGUEDOC, PROVENCE, AND BRITTANY. Control of the trade by 
 Baville in 1708-09. Italians and Lyonese excluded. Granaries 
 opened. Lebret and the trade of Provence. Licenses in Brittany. 
 ORLEANS. Relation of Orleans to the supplies of the Loire Valley. 
 Through traffic and intermediate points. Orleans and shipments to 
 Paris in 1694. 
 
 SUMMARY. 
 
 CHAPTER V 
 CONCLUSION 346 
 
 Conceptions of national solidarity implied in the royal edicts. The 
 " real " world reflected in the policies of the local officials. Ideals and 
 the critical interpretation of society. Pragmatic policies and institu- 
 tional growth. 
 
 I. IDEALISTIC POLICIES. Conception of the state in the edict of 1557. 
 Christianity and early conceptions of free trade. Beginnings of protec- 
 tion. Conception of the state as an economic entity. Laffemas. 
 Montchretien. Colbert's conception of economic solidarity. Probable 
 influence of these idealistic policies. 
 
 II. THE PRAGMATIC POLICIES. Character of pragmatic policies. 
 Stages of development. The consciously realized conflict of interest. 
 The effort to secure harmony. Discovery of a solution. General 
 application of the solution. Lyons and Burgundy. Paris and Rouen. 
 The upper Seine Basin. Freedom of the will and social evolution. 
 
 FRENCH DRY MEASURES OF THE OLD REGIME 365 
 
 GLOSSARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE TERMS 369 
 
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 374 
 
 (a) MANUSCRIPTS. 
 
 (6) PRINTED LITERATURE. 
 
 INDEX 385 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN TRADE 
 IN FRANCE 
 
 PART I 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN 
 TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 
 
 MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 
 
 THE transition from the local market of the middle ages to 
 the wholesale markets of the nineteenth century presents a 
 difficult problem in the study of value. The theorist is content 
 to state the principle. It is sufficient for his purposes to recog- 
 nize that prices are approximations, attempts to ascertain values 
 that are never completely successful. The historian must 
 study the relation of price to value somewhat more closely, if 
 he would gain insight into the fundamental factors in the 
 development of new forms of marketing. Changes in the form 
 of markets imply that the community needed more accurate 
 determinations of value. The simple forms of market were 
 adequate as long as economic interests were confined to a small 
 area. The expansion of trade made the problem more com- 
 plicated. New factors in valuation were introduced, to which 
 the local market could not give effect. The historian is con- 
 cerned with the degree of approximation between prices and 
 values. A system of marketing that secures a close approxima- 
 tion is efficient and good. A system that results in prices which 
 bear no close relation to values is inefficient and in need of 
 reorganization. 
 
 A market is an assemblage of buyers and sellers, but any 
 assemblage of buyers and sellers does not constitute a good 
 market. A market, in the ordinary sense of the term, is asso- 
 ciated with a territorial area. It is an assemblage of buyers 
 and sellers from a given area. What then is an efficient market ? 
 
:f > i? G^ 7 ^ 7^4> ^ FRANCE 
 
 Clearly, a market which gives effect in its prices to all the factors 
 that should influence the value of the commodity within that 
 area. Those who wish to buy should be able to ascertain the 
 full extent of the demand for their goods. All the buyers and 
 all the sellers from the area concerned should be present on the 
 market, and no buyers or sellers from any othef area should be 
 there. The area from which the supply is drawn must corre- 
 spond to the area from which the demand comes. A local supply 
 can be efficiently valued only with reference to local needs. 
 Demand that can be satisfied only by drawing upon the supplies 
 of the known world can be handled only on markets which take 
 cognizance of the supply available in the known world. 
 
 The medieval market was in form self-sufficient and isolated; 
 in reality, it was part of a complex system. Market regulations 
 assumed that the town was isolated, and municipal authorities 
 persistently placed the interest of the town before the well-being 
 of the community as a whole. Despite the recognized impor- 
 tance of trade with neighboring towns, such trade had no definite 
 status nor any well defined organization. It was illegal in France 
 to store grain except for one's own use, but granaries were formed 
 in town and country which were important sources of supply 
 for the large towns and for the export trade. This grain never 
 appeared on the local market, and consequently did not enter 
 into the trading system that was recognized by law. The 
 granary trade existed by sufferance. The municipal authorities 
 and their friends were usually engaged in the trade, so that they 
 were reasonably secure from interference, but their action was 
 illegal. When the inter-market trade was small in volume, it 
 was usually in the hands of Uatiers. They were persons with 
 little capital who carried small quantities of grain from one 
 market to another. They were tolerated because it was not 
 supposed that they would be a factor of any consequence in 
 the local market. This was true as long as they were not nu- 
 merous, but in many places they became the predominant factor 
 on the market. The old form remained, but the essence was 
 gone. The blatier, however, had no right to attend the market. 
 He could be excluded at any time by the local authorities. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 5 
 
 The central problem in the history of the grain trade is the ' 
 organization of this inter-market trade. A solution involv 
 two changes; the creation of a le^al basis for the wholesale 
 trade, the recognition of the predominance of general over local 
 interests. Reorganization was the result of the efforts of Paris 
 and Lyons to secure an adequate and assured supply of grain. 
 In a community dominated by petty municipal selfishness, 
 they alone represented the higher ideal of interdependence and 
 solidarity. In their advocacy of the general interest there was 
 much that was selfish. A public spirited policy was forced upon 
 them by their necessities, but the achievements of their officials 
 laid the foundations of our modern organization of distribution. 
 The small towns were reactionary, seeking to perpetuate in 
 law an isolation that had ceased to exist. The large towns 
 endeavored to break down the old system and create new admin- 
 istrative traditions that should be in accord with the needs 
 of the time. 
 
 The element of selfishness in the policy of the large towns 
 was important historically. They were interested in supplying 
 their own wants. They were not concerned with the necessities 
 of the producing regions, and many of the reactionary measures 
 of the small towns were an attempt at self-preservation. In 
 time of dearth, the large towns might secure supplies at the 
 expense of the small towns and villages of the producing regions. 
 The distress was likely to be felt most intensely in the small 
 markets. Each local market affected by metropolitan demand 
 was influenced not by any particular part, but by its full inten- 
 sity. This was an inevitable consequence of the independence of 
 the markets, and it was the perennial source of complaints. The 
 market was designed to make prices with reference to local 
 conditions; the division of the supply between the town and 
 the metropolis was not one of its normal functions. The organ- 
 ization of this inter-market trade was, in fact, the most pressing 
 necessity. The local market could not discharge such a function, 
 and until the wholesale markets were established both province 
 and metropolis suffered. There was no means of giving effect 
 to the general interest. 
 
6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Consider the situation in a local market with a surplus. Pres- 
 ent in the market are the townsmen buying for their immediate 
 needs, wealthy bourgeois who would like to secure grain for 
 hoards, merchants from the metropolitan town. Under these 
 circumstances, it is clear that the only limit 1 to the price in 
 such a market is the price that can be obtained in the metropoli- 
 tan town. As long as the metropolitan merchant can be rela- 
 tively certain of getting a higher price at home, so long will he 
 bid against the bourgeois, unless he is restrained by positive 
 administrative regulation. Consequently, the equilibrium of 
 demand and supply upon such a market cannot be described 
 as a local supply, balanced against a local demand: it is a supply 
 that is somewhat in excess of local needs pitted against the full 
 intensity of the joint demand of the locality and of the metrop- 
 olis. Such a concentration of demand is dangerous as it tends 
 to carry away from the local market more than the actual excess 
 of supply over consumptive wants. 
 
 An illustration will make this relation between local and 
 metropolitan demand somewhat less abstract. To represent 
 the local market let us take the little village of Attichy in Sois- 
 sonnais. There was a market here every Saturday, " to which 
 come the inhabitants of the villages for two or three leagues in 
 the vicinity. They buy the grain, bread, and meat which they 
 will need for the following week." 2 It is, thus, just such a 
 market as we have had in mind throughout the previous dis- 
 cussion. The constant export of grain to Paris from this section 
 introduces the other factor that is under discussion, the 
 metropolitan demand. In ordinary seasons there was little 
 trouble; but a severe dearth generally revealed all the dangers 
 of this connection with the metropolis. In May, 1709, the pur- 
 chases for Paris were so heavy that no grain whatever appeared 
 on the market at Attichy. " There was a great tumult in the 
 three preceding markets, and in today's market," writes Maril- 
 lac, May 12, " the officers of my jurisdiction appeased the first 
 
 1 I omit, for the present, the effects of special hours at the opening of the market 
 reserved for bourgeois buyers. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1650. Attichy, 12 Mai 1709. Marillac. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION J 
 
 troubles by compelling the steward of my estates to expose 
 some of my grain on the market, though I really have none to 
 sell. ... I then wrote to d'Ormesson to have him cancel my 
 contracts with a merchant of Soissons named Pannier, who had 
 purchased all the grain that I had for several years received as 
 rent. He had also stored in my granaries grain purchased by 
 him of several farmers of this vicinity. In all there are about 
 1 60 muids (8,520 bushels) and I urged d'Ormesson to have this 
 merchant bring some of his grain to the market." l This deple- 
 tion of the local supply by the intensity of the metropolitan 
 demand was general for the rural parts of Soissonnais. The 
 Bishop writes on May 4: "I see it is no longer possible to pre- 
 vent the shipments which Sr. Pannier is making from this vicin- 
 ity, but it must not be carried too far. . . . The situation 
 is most serious in the rural districts where Pannier has made 
 his purchases. All the markets of this section, Ferre-en-Tarlen- 
 ois, Braine, Vailly, Coucy, and the rest are without grain, and 
 it is because there is none in the region. Paris has taken so 
 much and in such a short space of time. There is a gentleman 
 living near Braine, M. le Comte d'Aumale who has more 
 than 100 muids (5,200 bushels) in his granaries. This would 
 be a great resource for all this countryside, both for food and for 
 seed. . . . Within the last four days, all that grain was taken 
 up by the agents of this Pannier, and yesterday there was no 
 grain on the market at Braine. There was a very considerable 
 riot, and, if these little markets of the country continue to lack 
 supplies, the disorder will increase." 2 
 
 In these particular cases, the supplies of the local market 
 had been carried off by purchases from the peasant cultivators 3 
 outside the market, or by purchases of hoards that might have 
 supplied the region even if all the year's crop had been taken up 
 by merchants. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1650. Attichy, 12 Mai 1709. Marillac. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1650. Soissons, 4 Mai 1709. fiveque de Soissons. See also the letter 
 of 25 April 1709. fiveque de Soissons. 
 
 3 The French word is " laboureur," for which peasant cultivator is perhaps a 
 more exact rendering than laborer. 
 
8 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 But this exhaustion of the locality is. not the most significant 
 feature of these disorders. The prices paid for the grain are the 
 most definite indication of the intensity of demand, and there is 
 fortunately enough evidence to indicate the tendency of the 
 merchants of Paris to set the price at any figure necessary to 
 secure the grain. Thus, at Provins, in 1693-94, one Colmet 
 purchased 100 muids, paying 100 livres per muid when " the 
 highest price current at Provins was 25-30 ecus". (75-90 
 livres). 1 At Bray, the peasants said that it was well known 
 that the wife of Colmet offered 2 sous per sack above the current 
 price for any grain that they would bring in from the country. 2 
 Some time after their first dealings with Colmet, the latter told 
 them that he would " take any grain they could buy of peasant 
 proprietors and farmers, paying whatever the peasants asked." 3 
 Illustrations can be multiplied, but these few references are 
 enough to bring out the point at issue. When metropolitan 
 demand began to influence a local market, there was nothing to 
 protect the local market from its full intensity. The only 
 limit to prices in the locality was the highest price that could 
 be had at the metropolis. Ignorance on the part of the peasants 
 of these conditions, their inability to realize how high prices 
 could rise in the large towns enabled the merchants to secure 
 the local grain at prices which were high perhaps in the opinion 
 of the peasants and townspeople, but still much lower than the 
 prices prevailing in the great markets at such times of crisis. 
 
 Under the pressure of dearth, the local market was thus 
 entirely disorganized. The region might be drained, and saved 
 only by official intervention, or it might merely suffer from 
 high prices. In any event, all its troubles were due to the 
 metropolis, and to the inadequacy of local market machinery 
 for the determination of the actual extent of the surplus of the 
 locality. But dearths were by no means a frequent phenomenon, 
 and to understand the local market it must be studied not only 
 in time of dearth but in time of plenty. The ordinary function- 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 320. Deposition de Pierre Brisard. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 320 et suiv. Deposition de Fiacre Pionnier, Vigne- 
 ron, demeurant a Servan. 
 
 3 Same deposition. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 9 
 
 ing of this mechanism is quite as significant as its disorders. 
 In normal circumstances the surplus available for export might 
 be determined in two ways, without in the least disturbing the 
 efficiency of the market. The metropolitan demand might be 
 supplied with grain taken from iJie granaries of landlords and 
 bourgeois, which had never appeared on the local market; or 
 the surplus of each market day might be purchased by small 
 merchants who made it their business to buy on the less impor- 
 tant markets, to sell on the larger markets where the metropoli- 
 tan merchants appeared. We know of the existence of both 
 of these forms of wholesale supply, but their effect on the local 
 market is necessarily pure conjecture. The reasoning involved, 
 however, is simple. The formation of hoards in regions where 
 there was an excessive supply was the only means of preventing 
 such an overstocking of the market that prices would fall abnor- 
 mally low. Any marked tendency to form hoards is indeed the 
 surest indication of a considerable surplus. Where such stores 
 were seen to be essential, the large land-owners were obviously 
 the best fitted to forego immediate realization on the crop. The 
 withdrawal from the market of the grain received as rents was 
 thus an advantage to the peasant, as it protected him against 
 excessively low prices. Unless there was an obvious likelihood 
 of dearth, there would be little temptation to form granaries 
 by purchases on the market. If prices were lower than usual, 
 such hoards might be formed. In such a contingency there 
 would probably be purchases on the market until prices reached 
 the customary level. If there was a slight scarcity, the gran- 
 aries would not be likely to afford immediate relief, as the pos- 
 sibility of a dearth would hold out such prospects of gain that 
 the doors of the granaries would remain closed. The hoard 
 could be formed in ordinary years without greatly affecting the 
 market, and such hoards could be purchased by metropolitan 
 merchants without disturbing the local trade. The possibility 
 of dealing in large quantities was eminently satisfactory to both 
 landlords and merchants, and the granaries played a prominent 
 part in the history of the wholesale trade. These granaries 
 did not represent a very exact determination of the surplus of 
 
10 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the region, but when there was no pressure minute precision 
 was not essential, and the rough and ready separation of the 
 hoards and market supply was quite adequate. 
 
 This is undoubtedly the most important and most wide-spread 
 mode of satisfying general and local interests. But the relation 
 of metropolitan to local markets takes another form. Where 
 a market was situated in a fertile region, it was quite possible, 
 and in many cases probable, that the supply offered would be 
 in excess of the simple consumptive demand. Several things 
 might happen: the surplus might be carried home again by the 
 peasants; prices might be reduced to such a point that some 
 of the townspeople would be induced to buy two or three weeks' 
 supply instead of one; or the surplus might be sold to merchants. 
 The unwillingness to carry the grain home was frequently sup- 
 plemented by a regulation prohibiting such practices, or at the 
 most permitting the storage of the grain in some public place 
 till the following market day. A great reduction of price was 
 contrary to the practice of the time. 1 The prohibition against 
 removing unsold grain from the market led regularly to a market 
 surplus in many sections. The possibility of disposing of this 
 grain on other markets created a class of small itinerant mer- 
 chants known as blatiers. They were occupied in buying the 
 surplus on the small markets, carrying the grain to the larger 
 towns in the vicinity that could not be adequately supplied 
 by the peasants. The inter-market trade of this type was very 
 considerable in the total amount, though the dealings of any 
 particular blatier were conducted on a very small scale. Grain 
 that once entered the trade in this way might pass through 
 several markets, each larger than the last, until finally it 
 reached a market frequented by metropolitan merchants. The 
 striking fact here is the relatively accurate determination of 
 the excess of local supply above local needs. The blatiers were 
 not allowed to buy on many markets until after a fixed hour 
 and in that event the surplus would be determined in the most 
 convincing manner possible. These regulations, however, were 
 
 1 This I infer from ordinances about speculative dealing, comments on the 
 practices of merchants, and the characteristic speculation on hoarded grain. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION II 
 
 by no means universal, and were not very stringently enforced, 
 so that the blatier was generally able to enter the market as 
 freely as anyone. Even then the relation of the blatier trade to 
 the market is not essentially altered. The exports are still a 
 real surplus. The blatier was not possessed of a large capital: 
 he must needs realize what little profits he could in a small way, 
 without exposing himself to large risks. He could not under- 
 take any great strokes: recklessly running up the prices in one 
 market on the chance of selling higher elsewhere. He could 
 not purchase in large enough quantities to affect the market 
 notably. Every aspect of his position confined his dealings to 
 conservative purchases at the current market price. His pres- 
 ence merely assured the maintenance of the customary price, 
 and obviated the inconvenience of a surplus. Even if he was 
 not actually forced to wait until the bourgeois and peasants 
 had made their purchases, he represented merely a contingent 
 demand, standing ready to take any excess at current rates. 
 
 In ordinary years, both the hoards and the blatier trade pro- 
 moted stability and tended to maintain the local price that would 
 be made if there were no excess supply and no metropolitan 
 demand. The influence of the metropolitan trade ruled in 
 times of dearth; the influence of local stability and conservatism 
 was predominant in years of plenty.*^ In the lean years, the 
 trade was disorganized by the intensity of metropolitan demand, 
 and prices were so largely dependent upon ignorance and fear 
 that they represented no true equilibrium of demand and supply. 
 In the fat years, local prices governed. The trade on the market, 
 the inter-market trade, and the dealings of landlords and mer- 
 chants, everything was dominated by real local prices. The 
 local surplus was taken off the market by the formation of hoards 
 or by the blatiers buying the market surplus, so that the conduct 
 of the market and the prices were made practically what they 
 would have been if the market were completely isolated. The 
 defects of the medieval market organization, though serious, 
 were, thus, for the most part, latent defects. Prices did not 
 represent a very exact equilibrium of demand and supply; the 
 surplus in the producing regions was very crudely determined; 
 
12 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the larger towns could never be very certain where they would 
 be able to get supplies. But ordinarily no degree of accuracy 
 was necessary in any of these particulars. Any greater elabora- 
 tion of market machinery would generally have been a super- 
 fluity. Today, these matters have acquired an importance 
 that renders such machinery a primary necessity, and to us 
 the medieval system is difficult to understand because of its 
 ability to dispense with any great degree of nicety of adjustment. 
 It is difficult for us to become accustomed to a system that is 
 so exclusively adapted to normal local conditions that the least 
 departure from the ordinary disrupts and disorganizes the 
 whole. Yet this is the most fundamental feature of medieval 
 institutions. The State drags out a troubled existence even in 
 ordinary times, but it requires very little to dissolve a feudal 
 kingdom into the anarchy of Stephen's reign in England, or the 
 disorders of Louis XI's reign in France. The Church maintains 
 itself for centuries, but national sentiments in the College of 
 Cardinals can create the Great Schism. Heresy was dreaded 
 with a fear that to us seems unreasoning, simply because the 
 unusual was so powerfully associated in medieval thought with 
 social disintegration. Disruption under pressure of extraordi- 
 nary circumstances was so common, that it was assumed as an 
 axiom. The economic organization was no exception to the 
 rule, and we must not forget either the tendency to disorganiza- 
 tion under stress or the fairly adequate functioning in the general 
 routine of daily life. 
 
 It would not be just to suppose that the bourgeois of the med- 
 ieval town had any special fancy for this element of discon- 
 tinuity in the economic or social life. It was no " parti pris " 
 that made them prefer institutions that worked most of the 
 time to institutions that would work all of the time ; they did 
 not see how institutions could be given the desired elasticity. 
 
 II 
 
 A local market in the narrowest sense of the term would be 
 an isolated market in which producers and consumers were 
 brought together without the intervention of middlemen. In 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 13 
 
 most of our thinking about the middle ages we assume that such 
 local markets were really characteristic of the period, but there 
 is reason to doubt the validity of the conception. Even the 
 smallest of the organized markets were not entirely isolated, and 
 the existence of some middlemen is at least possible. We must 
 remember, too, that many towns and villages did not possess 
 organized markets, and that intense isolation would probably 
 be evidenced by the absence of definite mercantile organization. 
 The significance of a market can be essentially local even if it 
 is not completely isolated, and it can be a very simple mechanism 
 even if some middlemen are present. These qualifications of 
 the abstract conception of the local market center about the 
 blatier. He was a middleman, sometimes engaged in -trade 
 between two markets, sometimes bringing grain from the farms 
 to the town market. The characterization of the blatier, how- 
 ever, is difficult. Most of the available information is contem- 
 porary with trade conditions which must have exerted a great 
 influence upon even the most backward regions. The com- 
 parative method is not entirely trustworthy, and, even if it 
 were, the proper sequence of the various functions of the blatier 
 would necessarily be somewhat conjectural. Probably the 
 blatier was characteristically engaged in inter-market trade. 
 
 If the evidence from the Seine basin is excluded, as repre- 
 senting influences of metropolitan " country buying " which 
 were too new to be typical, the only detailed descriptions of the 
 blatier are the letters from Orleannais and Bourbonnais in 1693 
 and 1709. These are contemporary with the letters from the 
 Seine Basin, but conditions were not so far advanced, and there 
 was less likelihood of reflex influences from " country buying." 
 
 De Seraucourt, writing from Bourges in December, 1694, 
 describes the operations of the blatier. The grain supplies from 
 the vicinity of Bourges are small, he says, and do not appear on 
 the market, because the poorer farmers cannot spare any and the 
 richer farmers are holding in expectation of higher prices. " The 
 markets of this town (Bourges) have been supplied only with 
 such grain as comes from Bourbonnais, and from Vatan and 
 Gracay, which are in Orleannais. This trade is carried on by 
 
14 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the poorest peasants of those provinces, and of this province. 
 With 40 11. or 50 11. capital, borrowed from their masters, and four 
 or five little horses, they make a trip every week and bring 
 20-22 bushels of grain on which they gain 5-6 sols per bushel 
 above expenses. This is sufficient to support their families. . . . 
 It is easy to see that the bad roads are very disadvantageous, 
 as these petty merchants called petons 1 do not come so often. 
 They load their horses less heavily and sell more dearly in order 
 to gain the usual profit." 2 The suggestion of Vatan and Gracay 
 makes it difficult to avoid interpreting the passage as a descrip- 
 tion of an inter-market trade. But the letter is really too 
 ambiguous to warrant any conclusion. Letters from Romoran- 
 tin in 1709 say much about market purchases, but nothing 
 sufficiently definite to connect these purchases with blatier 
 trade. May n, Pronard writes to Bouville (Intendant at 
 Orleans) : " The Intendant at Bourges actually prevents the 
 peasants and other individuals of your Generality from buying 
 grain in the markets of his department, either for food or to sow. 
 The town officials here are obliged to have the markets supplied 
 "by individuals, even when it trenches on the provision made for 
 their own households." 3 Later, Pronard repeats much of this 
 criticism of prohibitions. New towns are mentioned, notably 
 Vierzon, Gracay, and Valencay. " For more than two months," 
 he says, " this town has not been able to get ten muids of grain 
 from Gracay or Valencay, on account of the obstacles opposed 
 by Foulle." 4 This would confirm the supposition that the 
 blatier trade previously referred to originated on the markets 
 and not on the farms. 
 
 This interpretation, however, is very seriously affected by 
 a letter of Creil from La Charite, in October, 1693. This is a 
 report on the edict of September, 1693, in regard to the declara- 
 tions of grain, and the bringing of grain to the nearest market. 
 This interfered with the ordinary course of trade on the pro- 
 vincial boundaries, as the local authorities interpreted the edict 
 
 1 Almost the only reference to a term other than blatier. 
 
 z G 7 . 1634. Bourges, 16 Dec. 1694. De Seraucourt. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1646. Romorantin, n Mai 1709. Pronard a Bouville (enclosed). 
 
 4 G 7 . 1646. Romorantin, i Juin 1709. Pronard. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION IS 
 
 to mean the nearest place within their own jurisdiction. On 
 these grounds " several judges refused to furnish any grain to 
 inhabitants of Romorantin, and refused to permit sales to 
 ' blatiers ' who come to buy grain in the farms (dans les lieux) to 
 carry it to the wool workers and weavers" l This is a fairly clear 
 statement of buying in the farms, as the phrase " dans les lieux " 
 is nearly always used in such a sense. But there certainly is not 
 enough evidence to permit of any definite statement. Probably 
 it would be unwise to endeavor to draw a very sharp issue on the 
 question. It is quite possible that there should have been some 
 buying in farms, even if the characteristic mode of purchase 
 was on the markets. This is on the whole the safest view. The 
 blatier did buy, at times, of the peasants for a rather distant 
 market, but before 1660 he ordinarily secured his supplies on 
 some local market, and this aspect of his trade was most promi- 
 nent. 
 
 An additional difficulty is created by the occasional character 
 of the blatier. During the late spring and summer he fre- 
 quently seems to have been a day laborer. When the har- 
 vesting was finished and his summer employment was at an 
 end, he earned small sums by turning blatier during the most 
 active period of trade. He is in a sense a labour eur. Can we 
 be sure that the blatier is 'not frequently confused with farmers 
 bringing their own crops to market ? A letter from Bar-sur- 
 Seine illustrates the difficulty. If " particuliers " is taken to mean 
 farmers and proprietors, the letter describes a purely local market 
 supplied entirely by the peasants of the countryside and having 
 no relations with other grain markets. " This region,'* write 
 the magistrates collectively, " is a part of Burgundy. It is 
 devoted to wine culture, and produces scarcely enough grain to 
 maintain its inhabitants a month. Accordingly, it could not 
 subsist without the aid of several parishes of the wheat country, 
 among others Magnan, Fralignes, Chefaine, Villensade, Court- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. LaCharite, 19 Oct. 1693. 
 
 See also a letter of Bouville, 17 July 1694. Boislisle, op. cit., I, 371, 1350. But 
 all these references are after 1660. The real question is the character of the blatier 
 before 1660. Was his buying hi the farms an imitation of merchants buying 
 wholesale in the farms ? 
 
1 6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 enot, Beure, Briel, Montreuil, and others, in the province of 
 Champagne. But these places are only one or two leagues 
 distant from Bar. The inhabitants of those parishes bring 
 hither grain for the maintenance of this town." 1 The distinc- 
 tion between a purely local market and a market with the 
 minimum inter-market trade must not be pressed too far. The 
 distinction is doubly difficult if the question is considered from 
 the general point of view. Bar-sur-Seine, while probably pre- 
 senting an instance of a purely local grain market, might have 
 been the seat of a brisk trade in wine. But with all these quali- 
 fications, we can regard the blatier as the outward sign of the 
 transition from the purely local market to a market engaged in 
 trade with other markets. 
 
 In the regions where the inter-market trade is long established 
 the position of the blatier is much clearer. With possible excep- 
 tions, the blatier is the intermediary in this trade based upon 
 the local market. Once the blatier becomes a permanent feature, 
 too, the chief difference between the markets lies in the degree 
 of elaboration of the net work of inter-market relations. 
 
 One of the simplest cases of the inter-market trade appears 
 on the border of Provence and Dauphine. Gap, one of the 
 principal towns of lower Dauphine, received much of its food 
 supply from the market of Sisteron, which was supplied by 
 peasants. The interruption of trade at Sisteron " causes famine 
 at Gap and in the environs, as Sisteron is the granary of this 
 section." " This interference with trade has another result. 
 The merchants, who usually form granaries there with the inten- 
 tion of shipping grain to Dauphine, no longer send out any grain. 
 They buy no more on the market at Sisteron and that affects 
 Sisteron. The parishes in the vicinity which have grain to sell 
 no longer carry their grain thither, as the merchants have ceased 
 buying." 2 
 
 This trade is somewhat distinct from the ordinary type of 
 simple trade, as the merchants are evidently fairly well-do-to. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. Bar-sur-Seine, 24 Nov. 1708. Magistrals de Bar-sur-Seine. 
 * G 7 . 1634. Gap, (3) Juin 1694. L'fiveque de Gap a Lebret, Intendant en 
 Provence. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 17 
 
 The Bishop of Gap says in his letter that the merchants at 
 Sisteron professed themselves ready to maintain granaries in 
 the town sufficient to supply all its needs till the harvest, if the 
 municipal officials would leave their trade free. Merchants 
 capable of making such an offer are obviously possessed of 
 considerable capital. 
 
 In central Provence there was a similar trading connection 
 between the markets of Manosque and Pertuis, and between 
 Aix and Marseilles. The details are not very full, and it is 
 impossible to say whether the inter-market trade was in the 
 hands of blatiers or merchants of greater wealth. 1 The possi- 
 bility of a change in the direction of this trade indicates signifi- 
 cantly the fluidity of medieval supply. In 1709, Marseilles 
 and Aix complain because the supply that should come down 
 from Manosque and Pertuis is all moving north to Sisteron 
 and thence to Gap. 2 The difficulties experienced at Aix and 
 Marseilles disclose the weakness of this market system. The 
 larger towns could never be sure of controlling their supply area. 
 Even if the tributary market had its usual excess, very little 
 was required to deflect it to another town where prices were 
 higher and gains more considerable. 
 
 Other cases of a trade between a single local market and the 
 market of a larger town appear in lower Guienne between Mont- 
 de-Marsan and Bayonne; in Poitou between Mirebeau and 
 Poitiers. The volume of trade between Mont-de-Marsan and 
 Bayonne was considerable; as much as 100 wagon-loads were 
 sold each market day. Some of this grain was exported; most 
 of it, however, was consumed by Bayonne. 3 Apparently the 
 trade was controlled by merchants of means. The trade between 
 Poitiers and Mirebeau is merely mentioned incidentally; it 
 was probably in the hands of blatiers. 
 
 The curious feature of this trading relation between two 
 markets is the presence of well-to-do merchants instead of 
 
 1 G 7 . 1648. Aix, 18 Mars 1709. Lebret. * Letters cited above. 
 
 G 7 . 1648. Aix, 17 Avril 1709. Lebret. 
 
 * G 7 . 137. Bordeaux, 2 Fev. 1697. Bezons au C. G. 
 
 G 7 . 138. Bordeaux, 26 Mai 1699. Bezons au C. G. 
 
 G 7 . 1640. Agen, 18 Avril 1709. de la Bourdonnaye au C. G. 
 
1 8 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 blatiers. This was doubtless the result of the volujne of trade. 
 Where there was only one tributary market, it was likely to be 
 located in a town scarcely inferior in size to the town supplied. 
 The concentration of trade was considerable and business could 
 be done on a scale that was attractive to merchants of wealth. 
 All these factors were present both at Sisteron and Mont-de- 
 Marsan. 
 
 When there is one market supplied by several smaller markets, 
 the trade is so small on each local market that it falls to the 
 blatiers. Fontainebleau illustrates this type, deriving its supplies 
 from the markets of Melun, Malesherbes, Nemours, and Mon- 
 tereau. 1 This suggests a complication that frequently occurs. 
 One local market sends supplies in two or even three directions, 
 just as most of these towns sent grain both to Paris and to Fon- 
 tainebleau. But the clearest and simplest case of this type of 
 trade is Tours and its subsidiary markets. The officers of the 
 Presidial at Tours describe the market arrangements. " Tours 
 has the misfortune of possessing no granaries within its walls 
 or even within six leagues. The bourgeois form no granaries 
 for their own use, and never were accustomed to make such 
 provision for the future. There are no wealthy merchants 
 engaged in wholesale grain trade. We have only small retail 
 merchants called blatiers, who twice a week bring to our market 
 the grain that they buy in the neighboring markets. This is 
 a kind of regrating that renders the market at Tours absolutely 
 dependent upon the other markets, both in regard to price, 
 and in regard to the supply of grain. . . . The neighboring 
 towns, such as Langeais, Chinon, Loches, Cormery, Sainte- 
 Maure, Richelieu, Montbazon, Chateau-Regnault, close all the 
 roads from which we might procure subsistence from Berry 
 and Poitou, and these towns themselves draw no more grain 
 from the outside." 2 The ordinary supply markets are not 
 distinctly mentioned, but probably the towns named are usually 
 supply markets. The officials, at this juncture, desire to reach 
 the country districts from which the local markets are supplied, 
 
 1 G 7 . 1647. Fontainebleau, 23 Mai 1709. Dorchemer. 
 1 G 7 . 1651. Tours, Avril, 1709. Les Officiers du Presidial. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 19 
 
 since they represent the action of these towns as very hostile to 
 Tours. 
 
 The trade supplying Rouen combines the inter-market blatier 
 trade with inter-market trade in the hands of wholesale mer- 
 chants. There were two groups of markets, four fairly near the 
 town which were frequented by the wholesale merchants, and 
 beyond these, smaller markets in the country which supplied 
 the wholesalers' markets. The inner markets were Elboeuf, 
 Caudebec, Duclair, and Les Andelys. In addition to these 
 supplies, much grain was brought directly to the Halle at Rouen 
 by peasants and land-owners. 1 The four markets were supplied 
 by blatiers j and the grain was brought thence to the market at 
 Rouen by ninety-nine titular grain merchants, licensed by the 
 municipality. " They are under contract to furnish the Halle 
 with such quantities of grain as may be needed for the sustenance 
 of the inhabitants of the town. They shall procure this grain 
 in the four neighboring markets, Elboeuf, Caudebec, Duclair, 
 and Andelys, where they shall have preference over all other 
 merchants." 2 The market of Elboeuf was supplied largely by 
 blatiers coming from Neubourg and that vicinity. 3 Caudebec 
 was supplied from an even wider range. Much came thither 
 from Caen and the markets on the right bank of the Orne, 
 Argences, and Troarn. The grain was carried along by blatiers 
 from market to market; 4 grain was also brought to Caudebec 
 from Bolbec near the mouth of the Seine, but the people there 
 made trouble at home. " The inhabitants of Bolbec are nu- 
 merous and ill disposed, for it is an industrial section, where there 
 are many workmen who have nothing to lose. They are begin- 
 ning (25 April 1709) to wish to prevent the blatiers from coming 
 to this market to buy. . . . This blatier trade, however, is 
 quite necessary, as it furnishes the market at Caudebec." 8 
 
 1 G 7 . 496. Rouen, 3 Juillet 1700; Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 216, 559; G 7 . 1632. 
 Rouen, 17 Avril 1693; G 7 . 496. 5 Dec. 1698. 
 
 2 Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 216, 559, letter of 14 Sept. 1709. 
 8 G 7 . 496. Rouen, 5 Dec. 1698. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1635. Rouen, i Juillet 1694. Montholon. Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 
 129, 375. Caen. G 7 . 1642. Caen, 23 Dec. 1709, Me"moire. 
 6 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 25 Avril 1709. 
 
 fi 7 -rfien T.illphnrmp. 1*7 Tin'n T7rw 
 
 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 25 Avnl 1709. 
 G 7 . 1650. Lillebonne, 17 Juin 17059. 
 
20 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The market of Duclair drew its supplies from markets of the 
 pays de Caux, which are not clearly indicated in the corre- 
 spondence; Andelys was furnished from Gisors, Magny, and 
 Vernon. 1 The market system around Rouen was the most 
 complicated development of trade based entirely upon local 
 markets. It represents the highest achievement of what we 
 may call the pure medieval system. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Wholesale trade developed in the large towns, particularly 
 Paris and Lyons, and in regions which regularly exported grain 
 to foreign ports: notably, parts of Touraine, Brittany, the upper 
 basin of the Garonne, and a district on the borders of Poitou 
 and Saintonge. In all these districts, the local markets were 
 affected by the existence of this trade with distant points. The 
 relation of the trade to the markets of the locality varied. In 
 some regions, the wholesale trade was concentrated in towns 
 which were supplied by a system of markets reaching back 
 into the country districts. The trade at Saumur and Mont- 
 soreau is one of the best instances of this form of organization. 
 Elsewhere, the wholesale trade was usually based on granaries, 
 and was relatively independent of the markets although it 
 frequently exerted an unfortunate influence upon them. In the 
 upper basin of the Garonne and on the coasts of Brittany trade 
 was of this type. In the course of the seventeenth century the 
 market systems were gradually disorganized by canvass of the 
 farms and the formation of granaries by direct purchase. This 
 occurred in Touraine and in many parts of the Seine Basin. It 
 was illegal, because it was an infringement of the prohibitions 
 against the purchase of grain in the farms or on the way to 
 market; its prevalence led to the reiteration of the old ordinances, 
 and determined efforts were made to suppress these practices. 
 Buying grain outside the market was not in itself a new phe- 
 nomenon, but it was a great break with the past when merchants 
 
 1 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 25 Mars 1709; Rouen, 28 Avril 1709, and other letters 
 in the same carton. Pavilly and Bourgachard are noted near Duclair, but their 
 relation is not quite clear. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 21 
 
 and their agents began to scour the whole countryside, paying 
 practically any price asked and buying all the grain in sight. 
 It was a new fact because different persons were the active pur- 
 chasers, and because the object of their purchases was different. 
 This practice may be described as " country buying," and, 
 although the words might be applied to the infrequent extra- 
 market dealings that always existed, the phrase will be applied in 
 succeeding chapters only to that late development which was the 
 result of greater activity on the part of the wholesale merchants. 
 
 " Country buying " was not the primary or ordinary means 
 of securing grain for the large towns, but an extraordinary 
 device to secure supplies when the granaries of the towns ceased 
 to promise all that could be sold in the metropolis. Then, the 
 merchant must buy on the market in competition with the towns- 
 people, or he must go among the farms. With this alternative 
 before him, it required little perspicacity to see the wisdom of 
 scouring the country and dealing separately with each individual. 
 The merchant might, indeed, be forced to pay the full market 
 price, but he need never pay more, and in all probability he 
 could secure the grain for less. This work was at first under- 
 taken by the chief agents of the metropolitan merchants. Later, 
 they pressed blatiers into service, and many bourgeois, seeing 
 the possibility of gain, profited by the example. Finally, the 
 blatiers who had dealt almost exclusively on the markets, began 
 to buy systematically on the farms as well. 
 
 The effect of this practice upon the local market was fatal. 
 The other developments of wholesale metropolitan trade had 
 left the local machinery intact. This form of buying tended 
 to destroy the local market. There was no pretence at local 
 price-making; the predominance of metropolitan influence was 
 complete ; it was the first manifestation of the idea that prices 
 could most adequately be made with reference to metropolitan 
 interests. 
 
 But " country buying " is significant for much besides a mere 
 destruction of old customs, and of old forms of market organiza- 
 tion; it also indicates a new attitude toward the supply. The 
 local market had been passive. No attempt was made to get the 
 
22 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 supply out into sight. The peasants were left to themselves, 
 and when they chose to bring grain to market, it would be 
 included in the equilibrium of supply and demand. If no grain 
 came to market, there was no remedy except interference by the 
 administrative officials. No machinery, formal or informal, 
 existed by which the grain was brought in contact with the 
 market, until each individual felt moved to act. The initiative 
 was with the seller, not with the buyer, largely no doubt 
 because the buyer was not a professional merchant. Even 
 the wholesale trade was relatively passive in so far as it was 
 limited to granaries. The merchants had to rest content with 
 what they could find in such granaries as the owners saw fit to 
 open, and granaries were habitually concealed. " Country 
 buying " was the first indication of an active mercantile attempt 
 to hunt out the whole supply. It was above all an effort to 
 discover how much grain was hidden away in farms, chateaux, 
 and tithe-barns, how much secluded in little villages, guarded 
 by ultra-conservative farmers or grasping proprietors waiting 
 anxiously to secure the highest possible price. This endeavor, 
 to widen the scope of the " visible " supply is quite as significant 
 as the destruction of the local price-making machinery. 
 
 The wholesale trade assumed three forms: the system of 
 local markets; the granary trade of the older type, in which the 
 granaries were owned by residents of the producing region; 
 the granary trade of the newer type, in which the granaries 
 were formed by merchants coming from the consuming or ship- 
 ping center. Until the latter half of the seventeenth century the 
 older type of granary trade was doubtless the most important. 
 Where the trade was considerable, it was based on such granaries. 
 The systems of markets contributed relatively small quantities 
 of grain to the metropolis or export point. In regions where 
 the surplus was large, granaries were sure to be formed. The 
 territorial distribution of these different types of wholesale 
 trade was thus definitely related to the agricultural character 
 of the region, and to the extent of its surplus. 
 
 In the vicinity of Paris there were many tributary market 
 systems of varying degrees of complexity. The simplest of 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 23 
 
 these centered about the market of Montdidier. A petition 
 of the inhabitants asserts " that all the grain sold on the markets 
 of the town and in the villages of the election, amounting to 
 2000 sacs per week, comes from the vicinity of Peronne, Artois, 
 and Cambresis." l Much grain came to Paris from Montdidier, 
 brought overland by blatters, doubtless to some of the markets 
 near Paris, though we have no details. Another line of trade 
 of the same type begins in Soissonnais. Blatiers bought gram 
 in the markets of Crepy-en-Valois and the vicinity, bringing 
 it down to Dammar tin and Gonesse, markets within a few leagues 
 of Paris, much frequented by bakers. 2 The trade from the 
 Beauce on the south side of the city and from Brie on the east 
 came up to Paris through just such a system of local markets. 3 
 The blatiers were everywhere the active intermediaries in this 
 inter-market trade. Where this trade was wholly in the hands 
 of blatiers, it was small in volume and passed through a great 
 number of markets. 
 
 In the Loire Valley the grain trade presents a degree of com- 
 plexity unequalled in any part of France. The demand acting 
 upon the local markets is the metropolitan demand of Paris, 
 the demand arising in connection with the export trade from 
 Nantes, the demand of cities in the Loire Valley, notably Nantes 
 and Orleans, and at times Blois, Tours, and others seeking sup- 
 plies here. The intensity of demand concentrated on the supply 
 area is extraordinary in every respect. The complexity of inter- 
 market relations is no less unusual. The merchants from Paris, 
 Orleans, or Nantes seldom went beyond Saumur and Mont- 
 soreau where the grain supply of the valleys of the Vienne and 
 Creuse was concentrated. This is the primary division of the 
 trade: the major wholesale trade at Saumur and Montsoreau; 
 the minor wholesale and the blatier trade engaged in collecting 
 the grain in the back country and in conveying it to the Loire. 
 Even this simple statement shows that the system is more 
 
 1 G 7 . 1634. Montdidier, Fev. 1694. Placet des Habitants, envoy6 par 
 Chauvelin, i Mars 1694. 
 
 8 G 7 . 513. Soissons, 16 Mai 1700. Sanson. 
 1 See infra in connection with " country buying." 
 
24 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 elaborate than any yet considered. There is an additional group 
 of wholesale merchants: the minor wholesale merchants who 
 help the blatters bring the grain to the Loire. But this is not the 
 most serious complication. Trade in this region was developing 
 very actively in the latter seventeenth century. The minor 
 wholesale merchants were probably a relatively recent phe- 
 nomenon. Besides this development of an additional group 
 of wholesalers, the trade here was much influenced by the prac- 
 tice of " country buying." In the Seine Valley the new mode 
 of purchase was extremely significant. There its effects were less 
 far-reaching, but it did much to complicate the inter-market 
 trade. The forms of trade previously considered were in exis- 
 tence before 1650 and maintained their integrity well into the 
 seventeenth century. They had become fixed, either from lack 
 of capacity of further growth or from lack of necessity for 
 expansion. 
 
 In the Loire Valley, the activity of trade required more efficient 
 organization, and the letters from Touraine in 1693, 1698, and 
 1709 afford interesting insight into the possibility of a develop- 
 ment of trade based upon blatier-supp\ied wholesale markets. 
 The main line of trade is described very comprehensively by the 
 Subdelegue at Thouars. " There are several grain merchants 
 who live in the parishes on the border between Anjou and Poitou. 
 They usually have a very extensive trade in grain, buying much 
 in our markets in this town and much in the country. They 
 ship it at once to Montreuil and Saumur, where there are boats 
 that are loaded for Paris or Nantes. ... The grain comes to 
 our markets from Saint- Jouin, Assais, and Airvault, where the 
 merchants buy. The Bureaux, merchants of Doue, and other 
 merchants from Montreuil-Bellay buy the grain here and carry 
 it to Montreuil-Bellay where boats are waiting to carry it to 
 Saumur." 1 Grain also came to Saumur from Doue and Lou- 
 dun. 2 With the omission of the "country buying" referred 
 to, this description would probably represent the conditions in 
 this region before the changes that appear in 1693. The grain 
 
 1 G 7 . 451. Thouars, 28 Dec. 1698. M. le Subd61egu6 a d'Ableiges. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1651. Saumur, 2 Fev. 1709. Boisayrault. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 2$ 
 
 passed through three or four markets successively before it 
 started on its journey up or down the Loire. Trade was 
 partly in the hands of blatiers, partly in the control of mer- 
 chants. 
 
 The changes consist primarily in the development of " country 
 buying " both in farms and in country granaries, and hi the 
 simplification of machinery between the farm and the market 
 at Saumur. The merchants send out agents to buy directly 
 for them. The trade falls into the control of the merchants; 
 and these are of two types, the local dealers who propose to sell 
 at Saumur or Montsoreau and the richer merchants from Nantes 
 and Paris. The efforts of these merchants develop new sources 
 of supply which concentrate at Montsoreau. 
 
 This exploitation of the valleys of the Vienne and Creuse 
 is first mentioned in 1699. " Miromenil was informed in the 
 month of July that merchants and commission agents from 
 Saumur, Chinon, and Isle-Bouchard were buying standing 
 grain in the environs of Chatelleraud, Le-Port-du-Pille, and 
 Sainte-Maure, along the Creuze and the Vienne. They pay 
 five sous more per bushel than the market price of old grain, 
 and take up all the grain among the peasants and metayers." * 
 
 The buying in the farms had appeared around Thouars in 
 1693 and continued with even greater disorders in 1698-99 and 
 1709. " The Bureau and one Trois Cheminee of Doue ... go 
 day and night through the country districts, with valets and 
 other men, buying grain. They form extensive granaries and 
 raise prices on the markets; so that the poor cannot get a bushel 
 of grain in any way whatsoever. A few days ago at Argenton- 
 Chateau near Bressuire, the common people rose against them 
 saying that the grain was sent to foreign countries." 2 In 1698, 
 d'Ableiges writes: " There are persons in the markets who force 
 prices up by leaps and bounds. They take all the grain so that 
 the bourgeois and inhabitants cannot get any. This has hap- 
 pened at Thouars, which is only seven leagues from Saumur, . . . 
 
 1 G 7 . 524. Feuille en main de Secretaire. Abre*ge d'une lettre perdue. Bois- 
 lisle, op. tit., II, 4, 13, 10 Oct. 1699. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1632. Thouars, 9 Dec. 1693. La Veuve Marie. 
 
26 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 and at Montaigu." x The same abuses appear " near La Have, 
 Sainte-Maure, and in all Touraine." " The merchants buy of 
 the peasants." 2 
 
 In 1708-09 the formation of country granaries appears more 
 clearly. Before the dearth became generally known, the mer- 
 chants of Saumur were eagerly seeking permits to export grain. 
 Granaries had been formed in the chateaux. Turgot said that he 
 knew personally of more than ten chateaux filled with grain for 
 export. He proposed to prohibit export and thus force the 
 merchants to sell on the markets. 3 The Lieutenant du Roi 
 at Saumur tells the same story. " The merchants are buying 
 all the grain in the province, forming stores in all the chateaux 
 and abbeys, and finally shipping to Nantes. ... As the 
 merchants take up practically all the grain in the back country, 
 little or none comes to the market here. Prices are excessively 
 high, and the people are restive as they see the grain going 
 abroad." 
 
 The trade, which was originally carried through a series of 
 markets, gradually left the markets and was carried on entirely 
 apart from the market system of the locality. The trading 
 was conducted without any formalities and without organiza- 
 tion. At Saumur, the merchants bid against each other in 
 some of the granaries whose owners were not engaged in trade 
 with Nantes or Paris, 4 but many of the merchants were shipping 
 to Nantes or Paris from country granaries of their own. Much 
 of the grain stored in chateaux and abbeys by the merchants 
 never came in contact with any market. The intensity of 
 demand had been too great for the market system, and trade 
 around Saumur had become completely disorganized. 
 
 The export trade from lower Poitou which passed through 
 Marans is not unlike this Saumur trade in some respects. There 
 were wholesale merchants buying directly in the country, per- 
 
 1 G 7 . 451. Poitiers, 8 Dec. 1698. d'Ableiges. 
 
 8 G 7 . 524. Tours, 8 Juillet 1699. Miromenil. G 7 . 524. Saumur, 5 Aout 
 1699. Dandenac. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1651. Tours, 17 Nov. 1708. Turgot. See also G 7 . 1651. Tours, 6 
 Fev. 1709. Turgot. 
 
 4 G 7 . 524. Tours, 15 Juillet 1699. Miromnil. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 2J 
 
 sonally or through agents. Granaries were formed in the country 
 in anticipation of this demand. The gram that was the basis 
 of the wholesale trade left the country without touching the 
 wholesale market. The principal difference is the apparent 
 relation of the trade to the market at Marans. The market 
 was supplied by peasants and blatiers and was a considerable 
 feature in the trade of the vicinity. But all the trade of Marans 
 did not pass through the market. The larger merchants, who 
 collected in Poitou by agents, sold at Marans in the granaries. 
 There were thus two phases of the Marans trade: one, the normal 
 trade of the ordinary local market; the other, a highly systema- 
 tized wholesale trade which had no more connection with the 
 market at Marans than the trade at Saumur with the local 
 country markets or the town markets. 
 
 This curious duality of the Marans trade is not easily per- 
 ceived, and the descriptions do not bring it out clearly. The 
 practice is most distinctly indicated in a memorial drawn up by 
 Roujault, the Intendant at Poitiers. He puts the case in dia- 
 lectical form. " The issue between the inhabitants of Aunis 
 and Poitou is not to determine whether or no the peasants of 
 Poitou may carry grain to the market at Marans, as they do to 
 markets in Poitou. The real question is : does the edict permit 
 the merchants of Marans to buy their grain at wholesale in the 
 granaries of Poitou ? Does it permit them to sell at wholesale 
 to other merchants at Marans ? Does it permit them to ship 
 ten, twenty, thirty tons of grain at a time to the markets at 
 Marans, under the pretext of selling there at retail ? Can this 
 go on, without our being able to force them to carry a grain of 
 corn to the markets of Poitou ? l 
 
 ' Then, too, there are peasants of Poitou who have granaries 
 at Marans, although they live far from that town. They are 
 all registered as grain merchants, and, under pretext of carrying 
 grain to the market at Marans, which they never enter, they ship 
 all the grain from their farms to their granaries at Marans." 2 
 
 1 The French of the original is extremely involved; the translation is free, but 
 reproduces faithfully the ideas of the text. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1647. Memoire pour le Commerce des Bleds entre le Poitou et PAunis, 
 fait par Roujault a Poitiers, 6 Dec. 1709. 
 
28 THE &RAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 This is couched in rather rhetorical form but it is evidently 
 meant to be a concise description of the trade. " It must be 
 admitted," he says, " that this wholesale trade between Poitou 
 and Marans has been established since time immemorial (est 
 estably de tout temps)." Then he describes the trade in more 
 detail. " Rochelle is supplied in two ways; by the markets of 
 the parishes of Aunis and Saintonge which send grain to the 
 market at Rochelle; by the bakers who buy at wholesale at 
 Marans. The wholesale trade of Poitou is thus merely con- 
 centrated at Marans f<pr further sale. . . . The trade is also 
 important for the maritime undertakings and the provision of 
 merchant-men setting out from La Rochelle." l 
 
 Many of the assertions of Roujault are confirmed by a memoir 
 of d'Ableiges drawn up in 1699. This inquiry was primarily 
 concerned with the mode of purchasing in Poitou and the grana- 
 ries at Marans. The tone of the letter suggests the separation 
 between the wholesale trade and the market trade. " I have 
 secretly made a very exact investigation of the grain trade from 
 Poitou. I have the honor to submit a memoir by which you 
 will perceive that Marans is the principal depot. Some grain, 
 however, passes through the Isle de Re and Rochelle. The 
 memoir contains all the details and you can trust it. . . ." 
 The memoir then continues: " The principal merchants at 
 Marans are Large, Grignon, and Aurard who say they have 
 commissions to buy grain. They have agents and merchants 
 in Poitou who buy for them. Sr. Clereau, formerly Grefner at 
 the Cour des Aides, has a lease of the abbey of Neuil. He has 
 his steward buy for him and carries on a great trade. He has 
 the grain delivered at Marans, La Rochelle, and Isle de Re. 
 Martineau de Brilhouet and his son-in-law buy extensively. 
 It is supposed that they are agents for Sr. Jouet, Receiver of 
 the Taille at Fontenay. One La Fontaine, agent of this Mar- 
 tineau, says that Martineau has three granaries at Lugon. 
 According to his mother-in-law he has also three granaries at 
 Marans. Boutet de Nailliers also buys incessantly and ships 
 
 1 See in this respect the letters of Colbert de Terron. Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 
 101, 85. Ibid., 86, 222. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 29 
 
 to Marans. He is agent for the said Jouet, Receiver of the 
 Taille at Fontenay. . . ." l The memoir continues in this 
 fashion giving a detailed account of all the merchants. It is 
 quite clear that the buying in Poitou is very extensive. Mer- 
 chants, agents, granaries in the country and at Marans, we have 
 here all the ^machinery for an invisible wholesale trade that we 
 found at Saumur. But while this trade in lower Poitou is 
 essentially a wholesale trade entirely independent of markets, 
 the appearance of connection with the local market at Marans 
 must not be forgotten. 
 
 A more ordinary type of wholesale trade is based on granaries 
 formed in river towns by residents, who sell to merchants from 
 the large towns. This form suggests a rather passive trade at 
 every stage, presenting a sharp contrast to the feverish energy 
 that appears in the Saumur district and at Marans. The per- 
 sons forming granaries make no energetic canvass of the country 
 to secure grain. They wait passively for the arrival of the 
 merchants from the larger town. The latter rest content with 
 the supplies in the granaries. This form is prevalent in the 
 Saone and Marne Valleys in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
 centuries, in the Upper Loire in the latter seventeenth century 
 and possibly earlier, and in the Upper Garonne. 
 
 Conditions in the valleys of the Marne and Saone will be 
 considered in detail later, and as the general aspects of this 
 type of trade appear sufficiently well in the Garonne Valley 
 and on the Upper Loire, it will be most expedient to confine 
 our attention to these cases. 
 
 The trade of the Garonne was devoted only in part to supply- 
 ing Bordeaux. Grain was frequently sent abroad, although 
 Bordeaux was also an importing region. The organization 
 of the wholesale trade was designed to cover both means of 
 disposing of the surplus of the Upper Garonne. The character- 
 istic feature in the producing regions is the formation of grana- 
 ries in the principal towns, especially, but not necessarily, river 
 
 1 G 7 . 457. Poitiers, 22 Jan. 1699. d'Ableiges. For additional details see 
 G 7 . 1645. Memoire sur le Commerce des Bleds en Poitou et Aunis, envoyee par 
 les Maire et fichevins de la Rochelle, 2-5 Nov. 1709. 
 
30 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 towns. " The election of Riviereverdieu of which Grenade is 
 the capital," writes Foucault in 1681, " is the most fertile section 
 of the .Generalite of Montauban. In almost all the towns of 
 this election I find that the principal inhabitants have large 
 stores." 1 De Ris reports, in 1683, that there are rumors " of 
 many granaries, made by individuals, who hope to double their 
 money in a very short time." 2 In 1701, de la Bourdonnaye 
 says, " the inhabitants around Agen and above are already 
 1(io Sept.) beginning to form granaries, in the hope that war 
 or inclement weather will prevent Bordeaux from procuring 
 grain from abroad, so that they can sell at their own prices." 
 In 1709, the granary trade was recognized and regulated by 
 local ordinances. All wholesale merchants were required to 
 give statements of the quantities of grain they bought, with 
 the name and residence of the sellers. 3 The principal depots of 
 this granary trade were Montauban, L'Isle-en-Jourdain, Grenade, 
 Verdun, Beaumont, Gimont, Gaillac, Magistere, Agen, and 
 Port-Sainte-Marie. 4 
 
 In bringing the grain from the granaries to Bordeaux two sets 
 of merchants found occupation; merchants resident in the pro- 
 ducing regions and merchants resident at Bordeaux. The former 
 
 1 G 7 . 390. Grenade, 6 Mai 1681. Foucault. 
 
 2 G 7 . 132. Bordeaux, 30 Avril 1683. de Ris. 
 8 G 7 . 1646. Montauban, 17 Aout 1709. 
 
 4 The most detailed indications of the sources of supply are found in a group of 
 notices of grain arrivals at the port of Bordeaux. G 7 . 132. 23 Dec. 1682- 
 2 Jan. 1683. 10 Mars 1683-5 J um 1683. The names mentioned are Magistere, 
 Montaigne, Agen, Mast, Boue, Verdun, Villemur, Saint-Surin-de-Mortaigne, 
 Moissac, Laspeyres, Gaillac, Saint-Christolly, Castelmoron, Couserans, Conac, 
 Calonges, Clayrac, Montauban, Saula. The relative importance is indicated in 
 part by frequency of appearance but more accurately by a report of the amount of 
 grain in store in the Gen6ralite of Montauban in September, 1684. 
 
 Estat des Bleds qui sont dans les magazins des elections de Montauban. 
 Montauban 21,600 sacks Le Burgaud 750 sacks 
 
 Anconville 2,050 
 
 Le-Mat-en-Verdun 2,250 
 
 Merville 1,300 
 
 L'Isle-en-Jourdain 25,300 
 
 Verdun 7,000 
 
 Bouret 1,450 
 
 Grenade 13,650 ' 
 
 Beaumont 7,350 ' 
 
 Saint-Sardos .^. 1,200 ' 
 
 Colonger 900 ' 
 
 Gimont 9,300 ' 
 
 Total, 96,600 sacks. 
 
 G 7 . 390. Montauban, 28 Sept. 1684. Bois du Baillet (enclosed in letter). 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 31 
 
 were called marchands forains and sold their grain through 
 agents called courtiers. These courtiers or brokers were not 
 supposed to engage in trade on their own account, but com- 
 plaints indicate that abuses were numerous. " These agents 
 frequently have grain of their own to sell, so that they take 
 pains not to execute the orders of foreign merchants immediately, 
 for fear of causing prices to fall, or of selling less of their own 
 grain. Nor is this their only interest in delaying the sale of 
 grain addressed to them. After gram has been exposed three 
 days, they are allowed to unload the boats and to store the grain 
 in warehouses which they own. The agents store the grain and 
 charge the foreign merchants rent for the use of the granary." l 
 
 But this is not the only source of abuses in the wholesale 
 trade. " There was no regulated market. All the gram came 
 down the river, and, when a boat came in, it was straightway 
 sold. The only persons who bought were bakers, as the well- 
 to-do bourgeois provided for their own needs and the poor were 
 not able to buy except at retail." 2 In short, there was no market 
 and the bakers were the principal buyers on the port. These 
 conditions invited underhanded practices, and Courson felt 
 assured that the bakers acted in concert to^maintain prices by 
 controlling the trade. Some were engaged in the grain trade. 
 " They would have grain sent down to Bordeaux, and when it 
 arrived they would feign to buy it at a price much higher than 
 they paid." It was impossible to remedy this abuse at once, 
 as there was no grain in Bordeaux except what was in the hands 
 of the bakers, who took care not to have much in their grana- 
 ries. ... "I thought it most expedient to engage several 
 merchants to buy grain on their own account so I inquired after 
 merchants while touring the department to levy the taille, and 
 I had them promise to send grain down to Bordeaux giving 
 them names of agents whom they could trust. In the end I 
 secured in this way 20-25,000 bushels, including what was in 
 individual granaries in the town. Then it was no longer possible 
 
 1 G 7 . 139. Avril, 1702. Memoire des Jurats de Bordeaux concernant le 
 placet presente au Roy pour le Courtage des Grains. 
 
 * G 7 . 1641. Bordeaux, 8 Fev. 1710. Lamoignon de Courson. 
 
32 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to doubt the combination of the bakers. Only the grain in 
 the boats of men we did not know was bought. Nothing was 
 offered for the grain which my merchants placed on sale, though 
 it was quite as good, and they were willing to sell it cheaper. . . . 
 This induced me to speak to the bakers, and to let them know 
 that I understood their game. I told them I would make trouble 
 for them if the price of grain at Bordeaux did not fall to the level 
 of prices in the Generalite. It was hard for them to make up 
 their minds, but when they saw that I was prepared to execute 
 my threats, 2,500 bushels of grain suddenly appeared on the 
 ports from some unknown source. It was sold at a considerable 
 reduction." 1 
 
 It is not of great consequence to know whether all Courson's 
 suspicions were justified, for the significance of the incident 
 does not depend on the truth of Courson's allegations. The 
 important fact to note is the complete invisibility of the whole- 
 sale trade. The bakers may or may not have had a controlling 
 influence, but this much is certain, the trade was entirely 
 independent of any formal market both in the producing regions 
 and in the town. Under such circumstances wholesale prices 
 were practically guess work: there was not enough competitive 
 dealing to make a* satisfactory price. 
 
 Such little wholesale trade as existed on the Upper Loire was 
 based primarily upon granaries. In 1693, d'Ableiges writes: 
 "It is true that merchants in the vicinity of Aigueperse and 
 Cusset formed granaries last year. This year too they are again 
 at work." 2 Other letters report " that Sanson and Levassor 
 (merchants from the lower river) have purchased, directly or 
 through agents, all the grain in the large farms and in the grana- 
 ries in the vicinity of Aigueperse." 3 Evidently there was 
 some active work on the part of the metropolitan wholesalers, 
 but the more usual local trade was also in evidence. " Several 
 persons of quality in the province, Dallegre de St. Herent, 
 Du Terrail, d'Estain Ribeyre, have boats ready to ship down 
 
 1 Letter cited previously. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1630. Clermont, 15 Sept. 1693. d'Ableiges au C. G. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1630. Aigueperse, 3 (?) Nov. 1693. Grimaudet a d'Ableiges. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 33 
 
 stream. Besides these, the " Receveurs Generaux," the lessees 
 of the coal mines in Nivernais, and other individuals are engaged 
 in the same business." l 
 
 This trade in the Upper Loire was part of the supply of Orleans 
 and Paris. In Brittany there was a considerable wholesale 
 trade for foreign export. Some of this grain went to Bor- 
 deaux, occasionally grain was shipped to Paris by way of the 
 Loire through Nantes, or by sea through Rouen. Most of the 
 Breton grain was sent to Spain or Portugal. The trade was not 
 a general provincial trade in the sense of being comprehended 
 in one trading system, but conditions were essentially the same 
 throughout the province. On the south coast, the trade fell 
 into two general classes: it was in part concentrated at Nantes 
 and shipped thence up the Loire, or to Spain and Portgual; in 
 part the grain was shipped directly from the coast ports, Vannes, 
 Quimper, Auray, and Hennebont. On the north coast, there 
 were two or three rather distinct trading systems, notably 
 centered around Saint-Brieuc and Saint-Malo. A small coast- 
 ing trade was carried on by many of the small ports: little 
 places that now scarcely afford anchorage for light pleasure 
 craft were then considered favorable for trade. 
 
 Apart from these geographical aspects of the trade there is a 
 more significant difference between conditions in Brittany and 
 conditions in the producing regions which were tributary to 
 some domestic consuming center. In the Garonne Valley, on 
 the Upper Loire, on the Marne, the merchants who bought in 
 the granaries came from the metropolis. There was a sharp 
 differentiation between resident and foreign merchants. In 
 Brittany there was no distinction of this type. The merchants 
 who handled the export trade resided, in a general way, in the 
 district from which they drew their supplies. But these Breton 
 merchants amassed large resources and gradually developed 
 extensive systems of correspondents and agents. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1630. Clermont, 4 Nov. 1693. d'Ableiges a Pussort. See also G 7 . 
 1632. Ord. du Lieu. Gn. d'Aigueperse, 23 Nov. 1693. G 7 . 1635. Letter of 
 24Fev. 1694. Boutz, Marchand d'Orleans. G 7 . 1630. 3(?) Nov. 1693. Grimaudet 
 a d'Ableiges, enclosed in a letter of d'Ableiges to Pussort. 
 
34 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The wholesale trade here was primarily based on the rents 
 of the province. " All the rents are paid in grain, very rarely 
 in money. Consequently little grain is to be found in the country 
 as elsewhere. Almost all of it is carried to the granaries of per- 
 sons in easy circumstances and landed proprietors. The rest 
 is used for seed, and for the maintenance of towns and communi- 
 ties. All the (wholesale) purchases are made in these granaries, 
 which are closed whenever the proprietors please. Most of 
 them, indeed, sell only when grain is high." 1 As another writer 
 says almost twenty years earlier: " Brittany waits to sell her 
 grain not only until there is a light harvest in the province and 
 the adjoining provinces, but until there is a general dearth 
 throughout Europe. All the granaries are near the coast, 
 shipments are easily made, and the profits are large. It is 
 worthy of note that the wealthiest men in the province are 
 engaged in the trade, and these companies buy large quantities 
 of grain when prices are low." 2 In ordinary seasons, therefore, 
 the separation of wholesale and retail trade was based on these 
 rents in kind. A definite portion of the crop was, of course, 
 applied to these payments and in a rough way the division 
 doubtless represented the proportion actually available for 
 export. 
 
 As the Due de Chaulnes suggests, the merchants engaged in 
 this trade were men of means. Royal projects bring us in touch 
 with one St. Vast Foliot, who describes himself as a " native 
 of Saint-L6, engaged in this wholesale trade for the last twenty 
 years." Replying to the proposals made by the administra- 
 tive authorities, he says: " As our means are not large, we cannot 
 undertake to secure more than two or three hundred tons of 
 grain. Grain is high at present and we would be obliged to 
 form associations with our friends. ... I have correspondents 
 at Quimperle, Hennebont, Auray, and Vannes, which are cantons 
 where the harvest promises to be fine. I could give orders to 
 correspondents to buy what grain they can." 3 Similar indica- 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 96, 298. 6 Fev. 1709. Ferrand. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, 166-167, 638. 6 Dec. 1688. Due de Chaulnes, Gouv. de Bretagne. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1641. Quimper, 12 Juillet 1709. St. Vast Foliot, Marchand a Quimper. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 35 
 
 tions of the scale of operations, and of the associations, are 
 furnished in a letter from Desgrassieres, a royal official in Brit- 
 tany. " Falconneau, who is employed to buy in the Bishoprics 
 of Vannes and Quimper, has received word from Hennebont that 
 M. Coetmadeu has delivered to one Le Sage and his associates 
 150 tons of wheat and 150 tons of rye. These merchants are 
 forming large granaries. Billy and Mercier, merchants of Vannes, 
 have 1 20 tons of grain in their granaries. It is reported that one 
 Rallet, buying in the Bishoprics of Saint-Brieuc and Treguier, 
 has already taken up 6-7,000 bushels (103 tons)." l 
 
 In general there was probably little interference with the 
 markets, but in 1693 and 1709 troubles appeared here as else- 
 where. The merchants persisted in scouring the country and 
 in buying in the markets to the exclusion of the peasants. The 
 purchases of Rallet just mentioned were made with such indif- 
 ference to local needs that there were riots, notably at Paimpol. 
 The market there was completely drained of supplies, and to 
 quiet the people the senechal forced him to place some of his 
 grain on sale. At Quimper, in 1709, the wholesale merchants 
 bought grain " at the gates of the town and on the highways 
 without higgling at all over prices. They gave the peasants 
 what they asked." 2 
 
 In the Oise Valley, we find wholesale trade that is based in 
 part on granaries of rentiers, and in part on granaries formed by 
 bourgeois who buy on the market. The wholesale merchants 
 also buy directly on the market. The evidence is so contradic- 
 tory that it is difficult to be at all certain of details. It was 
 apparently most usual for the wholesale merchants to buy on 
 the market or in the granaries of bourgeois who had bought on 
 the market. The Lieutenant Civil, who was examined in 1660, 
 comments particularly on the quantity of grain brought to the 
 market to supply the wholesale trade. It was then early in 
 November, so that the new grain was coming rapidly to market, 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. 18-19 Juillet 1709. Desgrassieres et Barclay, copie, avec apos- 
 tilles par Nointel. 
 
 * G 7 . 1641. Quimper, 30 Sept. 1709. Le Proc. du Roy a Quimper. 
 See also G 7 . 1630. Memoire sur les Bleds. Bretagne, 1693. 
 
36 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE ' 
 
 and the arrivals were probably greater than usual as the trade 
 had attracted particular attention. He thought that " there 
 was an unusual quantity of wheat and oats in the town, for much 
 had been coming in from Saint-Quentin, Santerre, Bapaume, 
 Arras, Brussels. The blatiers arrived daily from Monday to 
 Saturday when the market was held, so that the market-place 
 was completely filled. For some time, eighty, ninety, or one 
 hundred muids (Parisian measure) had come daily to the mar- 
 ket and had been sold. It was bought by merchants trading 
 with Paris and by the bourgeois of Noyon. Most of the resi- 
 dents were accustomed to form granaries which they sold ulti- 
 mately to merchants of Paris." l This movement of grain to 
 the market of Noyon is also indicated by the complaint that some 
 merchants had been buying at the sources of the supply so that 
 grain which should have come to Noyon failed to appear. This 
 complaint is made by Valentin Meniole, Charles le Brun, 
 Toussaint, and La Maire, merchants resident at Noyon trading 
 with Paris. " Every week boats come up from Beaumont, 
 Creil, Pont-Sainte-Maxence, and Compiegne, which take loads 
 not only of grain bought at Noyon, but also of grain purchased 
 at Nesle and Peronne. All this grain should come to the market 
 at Noyon. Furthermore, certain merchants of Gonesse and 
 Saint-Denis go even as far as Peronne, where they buy grain 
 which they carry on horses to Pont-1'Eveque near Noyon, 
 where they load it on boats." But they had been doing the 
 same thing themselves. " Within the last three months they 
 had bought grain at Ham where there is much to be had both 
 on the markets and in granaries. But when they wished to carry 
 the grain to Noyon, the pack trains were robbed." 2 The 
 merchants at Chaulny were also buying directly in the towns 
 of Picardy whence the blatiers came. They frequented Saint- 
 Quentin. 3 The land-owners also played a considerable part in 
 the trade, although they are not so much in evidence. 4 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 240. Noyon, 4 Nov. 1660. Proems Verbal. 
 
 2 Ibid. 245v. Noyon, 4 Nov. 1660. Proems Verbal. 
 8 Ibid. 247. Chaulny, 4 Nov. 1660. Proces Verbal. 
 
 4 Ibid . 245V-6. Noyon, 4 Nov. 1660. Proces Verbal. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 37 
 
 The buying on the market, and the independent buying in 
 the country continues after 1660. Le Vayer in 1682 speaks of 
 the great quantity of grain coming to the markets at Noyon 
 from Cambresis, Vermandois, Artois, and Santerre. He also 
 speaks of grain brought by the merchants of Noyon to Pont- 
 1'Eveque and shipped thence to Paris. 1 On the whole this 
 seems to have been the characteristic form of the wholesale 
 trade at Noyon : a combination of buying on a &/a/w-supplied 
 market with buying in granaries formed by well-to-do bourgeois 
 and land-owners. The different modes of purchase are not 
 always equally important. Some years the merchants from 
 Paris are active, buying extensively in the towns of Picardy. 
 Then, when the harvests have been plentiful, the Uatier supply 
 on the market becomes so considerable that the wholesale trade 
 is largely supplied from this source. The general appearance 
 of the trade at Noyon was thus likely to change somewhat, 
 although the essential features remained unaltered. 
 
 This description has possibly failed to suggest the great 
 variety in the forms of market organization, for the common 
 principles that can be traced and above all the universal inade- 
 quacy efface the impression of diversity that is most apparent 
 when the analysis is not. carried so far. The market systems 
 fall into three general classes: those based entirely on town 
 markets; wholesale trade based on Wa^er-supplied markets; 
 wholesale trade based on granaries in the producing regions. 
 The inter-market relations based on the town markets present 
 by far the greatest variety of individual forms. They vary 
 both in the different degree of the dependence and in the number 
 of markets brought together in one system. Every possible 
 combination can be found. One consuming market trading 
 with one supply market, or a great town market like that of 
 Rouen with an elaborate system of small local markets passing 
 the grain along from remote sections of the back country. In the 
 second general group, the variety of form is not so great. There 
 
 1 G 7 . 510. Memoire de Le Vayer sur L'filection de Noyon, 23 Mai 1682. 
 See also G 7 . 512. Soissons, 1 1 Juin 1 69 7 . de la Houssaye. The granaries formed 
 by residents of Noyon. 
 
38 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 is the large town market supplied by smaller markets. Noyon 
 was supplied in this way from Flanders. The wholesale mer- 
 chants appear on the market and buy for the metropolitan 
 town. Differences in this group are largely confined to the 
 relations between the town market and tributary markets. 
 The conduct of the merchants and their relations to the metro- 
 politan and local markets are very much the same in all places. 
 In the last general group of trading systems, the differences 
 are very slight and seldom significant or essential. 
 
 All the forms of the inter-market relation were inadequate. 
 The machinery for price-making and distribution did not assure 
 a competitive price. The system that is based throughout on 
 the local markets over-emphasizes local interests. It inverts 
 the relation between central and local market. The demand 
 of the central market is sure to control in the end, but this 
 system of market organization persistently endeavors to ignore 
 the presence, or at any rate, the importance of the demand of 
 the central market. It represents an effort to transact wholesale 
 business on the basis of local prices. The combination of whole- 
 sale trade with blatier-supplied markets introduces no factor 
 that overcomes the deficiencies of the simple town market 
 system. The preponderance of the local market is still assured. 
 The only new feature is the emancipation from the market of 
 the later stages of the trade. This affords opportunities for 
 deals and combinations among the merchants, it decreases com- 
 petition, and renders the supply more invisible than if the ftrade 
 were more closely connected with the markets. The wholesale 
 trade that is entirely independent of the markets is the most 
 dangerous of all. It is in a sense the most advanced form of 
 trade organization, but in respect to price-making it is certainly 
 the least efficient. There is no organized market in the granary 
 towns. There is no strictly regulated market on the ports of 
 the metropolis. In most places the merchants were required 
 to fix a price on each boat-load when it was first placed on sale, 1 
 
 1 KK. 1014. Ms. " Le Commerce d'Eau a Paris." G 7 . 132. Reports of 
 grain arrivals at Bordeaux, 1683, with the prices set for each boat-load. H. 1837. 
 Reg. du Bureau, 404. 31 Juillet 1677. Statuts et RSglements des Jurez Mesu- 
 reurs, Art. 24. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 39 
 
 and that price could not be increased. As the boats were fre- 
 quently large, the grain might not be sold within a fortnight 
 of its arrival. Prices would naturally change, but the old grain 
 must be sold at the first price or at a reduction. There was 
 little competition in the ports in any event, and the natural 
 tendency was much restrained by the limitations imposed in 
 imitation of the town market regulations. In addition to the 
 defects in price-making, the supply coming from this wholesale 
 granary trade was almost completely invisible. The extent 
 of such supplies could never be estimated in advance. In short, 
 every form of market that appears before 1680 is inadequate 
 and inefficient: all types involving wholesale trade are more 
 inefficient than the simpler types based on the old town markets. 
 The process of evolution is in an inverse direction. Exten- 
 sion of any one of these three forms of organization merely made 
 matters worse, emphasizing all the latent defects of the primitive 
 system. All three forms had been developed as far as possible, 
 and any further effort to widen their scope or secure additional 
 supplies would result in a complete destruction of the market 
 system. The dearths of 1693, 1698, 1708-09 created this need 
 for additional supplies; greater efficiency in marketing became 
 necessary, and reorganization of the trade was inevitable. 
 
 Reform of the market system could only be based on some 
 type of market different from any that had existed and unlike 
 any of the varieties that were the outcome of the three general 
 forms that had developed more or less logically on the basis of 
 the local markets, wholesale merchants, and granaries. The 
 new variety of market that was so sorely needed appeared at 
 Bray. It was first noticed in 1693 by Delamare, but its full 
 significance was not perceived till 1709. The investigation of 
 1693, however, showed conclusively that the new type of market 
 had developed at Bray shortly after 1680. No exact dates can 
 be determined since the new departure was at first merely an 
 informal commercial usage. 
 
 The appearance of this new variant at such a crucial time was 
 by no means pure accident, neither was it a natural development 
 out of any of the three general forms of market organization. 
 
 
40 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 It combined features of the blatier-supp]ied market with the 
 independence of local markets that characterized the granary 
 trade. The traits that had been fundamental in the old blatier- 
 supplied market do not appear at all in the new form. What 
 had been incidental in the old local market is alone adopted. 
 Similarly in the selection of features from the wholesale granary 
 trade, the independence of the local market system is preserved, 
 but the complete absence of organization is not retained. The 
 market at Bray was, indeed, a natural product of all the circum- 
 stances of the time, but it is more than a mere progressive modi- 
 fication of any one of the three general types of market. The 
 curiously felicitous blending of old elements in a new combination 
 was made possible by the breaking-down of many of the sharper 
 distinctions that had previously differentiated the primary types. 
 All the lines became blurred so that new combinations were not 
 only probable but almost inevitable. 
 
 The character of this period has already been suggested in 
 the description of the various types. In the Saumur system 
 we have already noted the efficiency of the active canvass for 
 the old blatier-supp\ied market. In Brittany, the wholesale 
 merchants tended to encroach on the local markets and the 
 supplies held by peasants for local needs. The blatter trade 
 was developing new affiliations with the country and with the 
 wholesale merchants. The wholesale trade was coming into 
 closer contact with the markets. The blatiers acquired a new 
 freedom and independence; the wholesale merchants became 
 more visible, and were less inclined to keep their trading secret. 
 All these changes were the result of the practice of " country 
 buying." 
 
 The form of the market at Bray prior to 1660 is largely a 
 matter of conjecture. 1 The wholesale trade at Provins, Nogent, 
 Pont-Sainte-Maxence, and Mery was primarily based upon 
 granary supplies. The Parisian merchants bought in local 
 granaries formed by rent-owners, and, to a very limited extent, 
 by persons purchasing on the markets. Probably conditions 
 at Bray were not very different. Possibly it was not then as 
 
 1 Full details will be given in the following chapter. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 41 
 
 important as it became later. The trade of this region was very 
 much affected in 1660 by the "country buying," and the trans- 
 formation of the market system under the influence of this new 
 ferment is the most significant incident in the history of the grain 
 trade in this period. 
 
 Buying in granaries was advantageous to the merchants, but 
 only part of the supply of the region was accessible in that form. 
 Consequently, the pressure of a dearth would impel the mer- 
 chants to seek additional supplies either in the farms or on the 
 markets. It is a natural development of the increased needs of 
 the consuming center. Profits rose so high that the merchant 
 was not content to limit his trade to the granary supply. . The 
 dearth of 1662 in the Seine Basin was the first occasion when 
 these conditions became sufficiently intense to render them 
 significant. Already there had been indications that such 
 troubles were possible, but they became serious only in that year. 
 The energy of the merchants is most notable in the sections near 
 Paris especially at Montereau, where they invaded the markets 
 in addition to buying in the farms. One Nepveu, agent of the 
 Widow Rousseau, " was in the granaries at Montereau and in 
 the environs, buying all the grain there, so that no grain came to 
 market on the following market day." 1 According to another 
 account, this same Nepveu " visited the peasants within six 
 leagues of Montereau, raising the price and buying of everyone." 2 
 " Lavalle, a servant of the Widow Rousseau, has also been in 
 this section running around among the farms where he has 
 bought all the grain held by the peasants." Louise Martin 
 heard that several merchants of Paris were scouring the country 
 in the vicinity of Provins, especially Rebigois, and one Le Brie, 
 agent of the Widow Rousseau. 3 Three years later, a Parisian 
 merchant declared in court that all the grain he shipped from 
 Bray was bought in the farms and villages of the vicinity. None 
 was bought on the market at Bray. " This," he says, " is the 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 261. Procfcs Verbal. 31 Juillet 1660. Marie 
 Coudray. 
 
 8 Ibid. 216. Louise Pigre. 
 8 Same Proces Verbal. 
 
42 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 practice of most of the Parisian merchants at Bray." 1 Ap- 
 parently the commercial customs of the region had been con- 
 siderably modified. 
 
 The natural result of this energetic canvass of the country 
 districts was to call attention to the intensity of the demand 
 for grain. The apathetic peasantry would be roused to a realiza- 
 tion of the possibilities of trade. They saw that the Parisian 
 merchants would take all the grain they carried to Bray, and 
 would pay good prices. It was no longer merely the quiet 
 local trade of a small town, doubly dull because of the large 
 excess of local supplies over local needs. The feverish restless- 
 ness of the metropolis, the stimulus of feeling that the demand 
 was limitless, the assurance of high prices to be had for the asking: 
 all this combined to give a different tone to the trade of the 
 region. The stimulus of the suggestions of 1660 worked power- 
 fully, and produced a marked flow of trade to Bray. 
 
 No contrast could be more striking than that presented by 
 Bray in 1663 and the same town forty years later. In 1663, 
 as we have seen, trade was dead, confined to granaries and to 
 the shipment of additional supplies purchased in the country. 
 After the change, the town was the scene of an active and steady 
 trade. " The peasants and blatiers have begun to bring grain 
 to town daily. They expose it at the Halle so that it is a sort 
 of continuous market. . . . The fertility of the country around 
 Bray and the facilities for shipment to Paris attract such a 
 volume of trade that the spacious Halle of the town could not 
 contain the whole supply, if it were all brought in the same day. 
 The peasants and blatiers come from Champagne, Burgundy, 
 and other distant places. This extension of the market is not 
 authorized by any ordinance. It is a mere custom, but the 
 municipal officials and the principal inhabitants say that their 
 experience proves that the practice is advantageous. The 
 blatiers from a distance could not arrange to arrive each time 
 on Friday, the regular market day, and if they were obliged to 
 stay in town until the market day, it would increase their expenses 
 and cause them to sell at higher prices. In Brie the roads are 
 
 1 H. 1817. Reg. du Bureau, v c iiii. 13 Juillet 1663. 
 
MARKETS AND MARKET ORGANIZATION 43 
 
 so rough and difficult that in winter the country folk could not 
 be sure of arriving on the day prescribed. Liberty to sell at 
 any time attracts them and produces abundance. Notwith- 
 standing this freedom, the Halle is always well supplied on 
 Friday, and the ordinary market day sees a greater quantity 
 on hand than the other days of the week. This liberty to sell 
 grain every week-day gives the Parisian merchants greater 
 facilities. They can ship daily to Paris." * 
 
 This is a real wholesale market. The supply flows into the 
 town in anticipation of' a metropolitan demand, and the antic- 
 ipation is so keen that practically all the available supply comes 
 to market without any special canvassing. The purpose of 
 the market is frankly avowed, and no pretence is made of con- 
 trolling the trade from the point of view of local interests. The 
 local market has been completely engulfed in a wholesale market. 
 The new practice was not very firmly fixed. There was no legal 
 basis for the system, and the habits were not firmly settled. 
 But the idea of a wholesale market had taken visible form. The 
 conception was so new that Delamare did not sympathize with 
 such a complete departure from the ordinary market regulations. 
 The practical efficiency of the idea, however, commended it, and 
 it was allowed to survive. 
 
 It was long before the full significance of this new market 
 was impressed upon the administrative officials. Even more 
 time was required before the new form supplemented completely 
 the older modes of handling the wholesale trade. But this was 
 destined to be the solution of all the difficulties. The wholesale 
 organization was defective in two respects: lack of real whole- 
 sale price; invisibility of supply. Both of these defects would 
 be remedied by the application of the new principle. The 
 assembling of the wholesale merchants and the concentration 
 of the available supply obviated the most distressing feature 
 of the old system in the producing regions. Metropolitan 
 demand was no longer pressing upon a supply that was assembled 
 primarily with reference to local conditions. This concentration 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 981. The order of the paragraphs has been altered to 
 give the description more continuity. 
 
44 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of trade had made the supply visible. The purchases of grain 
 merchants could no longer be secret. The market in the pro- 
 ducing region was public, and if each producing region had a 
 public wholesale market of this type, the available metropolitan 
 supply would be definitely known long before it appeared at 
 Paris. Then it would no longer be possible to play upon the 
 apprehensions of the Parisians by forming subsidiary granaries 
 or by delaying grain in transit. The supply would be visible. 
 The price would represent a serious attempt to meet the condi- 
 tions of the wholesale trade. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 
 
 
 THE changes that took place in the market systems of Paris 
 
 were important and considerable, but the development is not 
 obvious since the outward appearance of the grain trade was 
 only slightly affected. When the trade appears in the records 
 of the late thirteenth century, it is already highly organized and 
 acquainted with distant sources of supply. Some grain came 
 to Paris overland, much came by water. 1 There were wholesale 
 merchants, some residents of Paris, some from the provinces; 
 there were retail dealers, called blatiers, and the usual peasants 
 and tithe owners. The market system of Paris in 1300 was 
 quite as highly developed as the system of Bordeaux in 1700. 
 But the trade of Paris in 1300 was not quite what a general 
 description might lead us to expect: there were merchants 
 indeed, but doing a very small business; supplies from a wide 
 area, but they were very occasional and they did not represent 
 any attempt to exploit the region systematically. The native 
 merchants leave no trace in the records, but the bourgeois for ains 
 were required to enter into partnership with some native mer- 
 chant, whenever they wished to trade at Paris, and this formality 
 gave them a place on the registers of the municipality. Michel 
 Dean, who had brought fourteen muids of grain to the city in 
 1293, without forming any association with a native of Paris, 
 was fined. 2 Other merchants complied with the regulations 
 and are duly recorded. " Maci de Gigors brought ten muids 
 of grain from Noyon, the Thursday after Saint Honore. It was 
 put in a granary. Geoffroi of Dammar tin brought four muids, 
 
 1 Livre des Metiers d'fitienne Boileau, p. 21. "Si Mesureur mesure aucun 
 grain quelqu' il soit, soil en granier, sail en nef il aura de chascun muid IV deniers." 
 
 * Le Roux de Lincy, Eistoire de V Hotel de Ville. Sentences du Parloir des 
 Bourgeois, p. 120. 
 
 45 
 
46 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 which was put in a granary. Symon Dandin brought four 
 muids." l The merchants are thus much less important than 
 they became later, if these figures are at all representative of the 
 ordinary amounts of their purchases. In the seventeenth 
 century, the larger merchants handled several hundred muids, 
 and frequently had several boats (20-30 muids each) on the ports 
 at one time. 
 
 The Livre des Metiers of Etienne Boileau mentions the mer- 
 chants, but without revealing any essential feature. The 
 resident and non-resident merchants are clearly distinguished. 
 The principal interest of the Livre des Metiers, however, is the 
 establishment of the dues to be paid by the various dealers 
 in grain. The wholesale merchants seem to enjoy the privilege 
 of exemption from the obligation to employ the official meas- 
 urers. This was the most marked difference between the 
 obligations of the merchants and the blatiers. " Buyers and 
 purchasers are not required to pay the two deniers per mine, if 
 they do not have the grain measured. They are not required 
 to have the grain measured unless they are blatiers." 2 The 
 blatier was not allowed to sell more than one setier without 
 having it measured by the sworn measurer. 
 
 This blatier was evidently quite a different person from the 
 small inter-market trader known by that name later. The 
 Livre des Metiers is explicit. " Whoever wishes to be a blatier, 
 that is, a buyer and seller of grain at Paris, may engage freely in 
 that occupation on paying the tonlieu and the other dues that 
 are levied on grain. Whoever is a blatier at Paris may have as 
 many journeymen and apprentices as he desires. He may have 
 a measure, sealed with the royal seal, and may measure up to 
 a setier." 3 The distinction between the blatiers and the tale- 
 malers is not very clear ; both were retail dealers, but the blatiers 
 
 1 Le Roux de Lincy, Histoire de VHdtel de Ville. Sentences du Parloir des 
 Bourgeois, p. 176. 
 
 8 Livre des Metiers d'fitienne Boileau, p. 312. But compare p. 21. " Nus 
 marchans de grain, c'est asavoir vendeur ou achateur de grain quelqu'il soit, 
 dedanz la Ville de Paris ne puet ne ne doit mesurer chose qu'il vende, plus haut 
 d'un sextier a une fois." This must refer to the blatier. 
 
 8 Livre des Metiers d'fitienne Boileau, p. 20. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 47 
 
 seem to have dealt in grain only, while the talemalers might 
 deal in other commodities. 
 
 The inter-market blatier does- not appear in any of these early 
 sources. He is probably confused with the peasants, possibly 
 with the blatiers mentioned by Etienne Boileau. It is hardly 
 conceivable that there were no middlemen of the type of the 
 blatier of the seventeenth century. 
 
 This supposition is strengthened by the indication of a widely 
 extended trade that appears in the Sentences du Parloir des 
 Bourgeois in 1304. It was a year of dearth, and commissioners 
 were sent out to discover how much grain was available in the 
 producing regions. Two groups of agents were sent out: some, 
 with royal commissions to the Baillis of Sens, Tours, Orleans, 
 Gizors, Troyes, Senlis, Vermandois, Vitry, Chaumont-en- 
 Bassigny, and Amiens; others, with commissions from the 
 Provost of Paris, to the towns in the vicinity of Paris, Gonesse, 
 Saint-Cloud, Chateaufort, Claye, Montgay, Dammartin, Poissy, 
 and Marly. 1 Two years later, Robert Ausgans and Matthew 
 of Gisors were sent out to the environs to stimulate shipments 
 of gram to Paris. Instead of discharging their commission 
 they bought grain and shipped to Rouen. 2 Then, too, we must 
 remember the shipments from Noyon to Paris that are noted in 
 another passage of the Sentences. The exact significance of 
 these obscure references cannot be determined, but it is clear 
 that we must not conceive this early Parisian trade to be highly 
 concentrated in a small region close to the city. The land trade 
 with the immediate environs certainly existed and doubtless 
 constituted the principal part of the supply. If we may draw 
 inferences from the commissions of 1304, the plains to the north 
 and west of Paris were at that time a more important source of 
 
 1 Leroux de Lincy, op. at., Livre des Sentences du Parloir des Bourgeois, 161, 
 anno 1304, Mardi avant Pasques. 
 
 It is impossible to decide which Marly is intended. There is a Marly la Ville 
 not far from Dammartin. The other and more famous Marly is between Versailles 
 and Saint-Germain-en-Laye. Poissy is on the Seine northwest of Saint-Germain. 
 Chateaufort is south of Versailles on the upper border of the Beauce. 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 339. Les Olim, III, 193-194. 1306, Mercredy avant 
 St. Andre". 
 
48 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 supply than the Beauce and Brie, which became the principal 
 sources of the overland trade in the seventeenth century. The 
 markets of Gonesse, Dammar tin, and Claye drew from the north 
 and sent the "grain on to Paris. On the west side of the city, 
 Poissy and Chateaufort served as tributary markets. The 
 location of Chateaufort, on the northern edge of the Beauce, 
 suggests that trade was soon likely to push farther into that fertile 
 region. But none of the later markets of the Beauce or of Brie 
 are mentioned. Besides this land trade, there was a river trade 
 that reached well up the Oise, the Seine, and the Marne. Prob- 
 ably this river trade was very irregular, carried on by merchants 
 to whom a shipment of grain was incidental to other commercial 
 ventures which occupied most of their attention. The general 
 trading relations between Paris and the towns of the Upper 
 Seine Basin were intimate. The fairs of Champagne carried 
 many traders to Provins, Bray, and Troyes. The textiles of 
 Chalons and Rheims attracted merchants from Paris. Ship- 
 ments of grain were an occasional source of profit. This early 
 acquaintance with the possible sources of supply, however, is a 
 noteworthy feature of the Parisian trade. 
 
 The fourteenth century leaves almost no record of the grain 
 trade. The lacuna is in part due to lack of material, but there 
 is good reason to suppose that little notable change occurred. 
 The marked institutional advance of the later thirteenth century 
 was a crisis, which was followed in the grain trade, as in other 
 matters, by a period of relative stagnation. 
 
 I 
 Delimitation of the Supply Area 
 
 The late thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries are notable 
 for the evident acquaintance with a wide supply area; the 
 fifteenth century affords the first definite indication of a serious 
 effort to utilize more completely the great resources that lay so 
 close to the city. The Parisian merchants extended their 
 operations in the Upper Beauce, and most especially in the Seine 
 Valley between Mantes and Rouen. Some of this grain was 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 49 
 
 brought to Paris overland but the larger part came by water. 
 The development of the Upper Basin, curiously enough, was 
 primarily the work of merchants of Rouen, while the Parisians 
 developed what would seem to be properly a source of supply 
 for Rouen. Here we find a confusion of commercial relations 
 that is thoroughly typical of medieval trade. But such crudity 
 of organization could not continue permanently. Paris and 
 Rouen had distinct market systems, and it was practically neces- 
 sary to bring about some close connection between the market 
 systems and the territorial areas from which the markets were 
 to be supplied. Each market would work most efficiently if it 
 had the assurance that its supplies would not be taken by mer- 
 chants from other towns. In the latter part of our period the 
 acceptance of this policy is evident. Each market town had a 
 fairly well denned sphere of influence, and any encroachment 
 upon the supplies of this area was keenly resented. The develop- 
 ment of this aspect of the Parisian and Rouenese markets is the 
 principal episode in the history of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
 centuries. 
 
 When all the possible sources of supply are considered, it is 
 singular that the extension of the Parisian trade should first 
 proceed westward to Rouen. Probably there was then an 
 exportable surplus in Normandy that was not needed by Rouen 
 herself until later. Doubtless the intimacy of general trading 
 relations tended to draw the grain trade in that direction. 
 Whatever the reason, the first considerable movement does take 
 that direction; the trade pushes down the river from Poissy 
 to Mantes, from Mantes to Andelys, from Andelys to Elboeuf, 
 and even to Rouen itself. The merchants also work into the 
 back country. 
 
 These movements are somewhat obscure and the paucity of 
 information renders great caution necessary in drawing inferences ; 
 it is above all essential to avoid minute conclusions in regard to 
 dates. There is a lacuna of more than thirty years (1411-47) 
 in the registers of Rouen from which much of the evidence is 
 drawn, and the records of the Compagnies Francises for the 
 succeeding generation show that many aspects of the trade are 
 
SO THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 very inadequately indicated by the municipal registers. The 
 dates of the available evidence are probably of no significance; 
 the movements indicated are general for at least the first half 
 of the fifteenth century. At the beginning of the century Rouen 
 was deriving her supplies from the Vexin and the " pays de 
 Neubourg" which were the most important sources of supply 
 in the seventeenth century. 1 The markets of Andelys, Gisors, 
 Elboeuf, and Neubourg are not definitely mentioned, but the 
 relation of the markets to each other was probably approxi- 
 mately the same as it was later. 
 
 The appearance of Parisian merchants in the immediate 
 vicinity of Rouen naturally caused some apprehension, but in 
 this period it spent itself in deliberation and discussion. In 
 1457, we fi n d the Echevins considering " the great export of 
 grain that is taking place daily, from Andelys, from the farms of 
 the Vexin, from Elboeuf, from the vicinity of Neubourg, from 
 Rouen itself, and from other parts of the duchy. This grain 
 is carried up the Seine to ' France ' 2 or down to the sea." 3 
 Some Parisian merchants were frequently engaged in such 
 ventures. In 1430, a group of merchants had been operating 
 more or less independently beyond Rouen, in the parts of Nor- 
 mandy that were not at that time very closely bound to the 
 . Rouenese market. " The Cotentin, Bessin, Pays de Caux, 
 and other places " furnished a very considerable field for opera- 
 tions. 4 The ports from which the grain was shipped are not 
 indicated, and it is quite possible that the frequent shipments 
 from Rouen and Elboeuf were purchased in this back country 
 to the west of Rouen. The registers of the Compagnies Fran- 
 Daises give nothing beyond categorical statements of quantity, 
 place, and price. 5 The proposition to execute prohibitions at 
 
 1 Arch. Som. de Rouen, Reg. Consulates, p. 28. 8 Jan. 1406-07. 
 
 2 " France " is applied to the district along the Maine from its confluence 
 with the Seine to the border of Champagne. 
 
 8 Arch. Som. de Rouen, Reg. Consulaires, p. 60. 27 Dec. 1457. They conclude 
 that prohibitions would be expedient. 
 
 4 Delamare, op. cit., II, 345. 
 
 6 Bib. Nat., Col. Moreau, 1062, ff. 28v, 21 Fev. 1455; 45> 24 Mars 1457; 47, 
 29 Mai 1458; 47, 5 Juillet 1458; 4?v, 9 Juillet 1458; 4?v, n Juillet 1458; 48, 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 51 
 
 Bouille, Caumont, La Poterie, Quilleboeuf, and Pont-Audemer 
 would confirm the inference that exports by Parisian merchants, 
 at this time, were from the plains west of Rouen. 1 But the 
 merchants might at any time invade the regions on the east 
 which generally supplied Rouen, and complaints in 1460 would 
 indicate that extensive purchases were made there. " Ever 
 since August there have been heavy shipments from the Vexin, 
 and from the environs of Neubourg. Wheat and other kinds 
 of grain have been purchased and sent up the Seine. " The 
 merchants were said to have " purchased much in the farms and 
 in the villages," 2 and if the rumours were true there would be 
 added reason for supposing that the purchases in the back coun- 
 try were shipped from Rouen and Elboeuf . 
 
 But the movement was not all in one direction. Almost 
 contemporaneously with the trade from Normandy to Paris 
 there was an equally extensive trade from the Oise Valley to 
 Rouen. Less frequently there were shipments from the Seine 
 or Marne Valleys to Rouen. There are few instances in which 
 the movements take place in both directions in the same year, 
 but some cases of this do appear even in the scanty material 
 available. The year 1459 was rnost notable for the shipment 
 of grain from the vicinity of Rouen to Paris, but Jean de Bilain, 
 a merchant of Rouen, enters into Compagnie Franqaise, 23 June 
 1459, m order to ship thirty muids of grain to Rouen from some 
 place in the commercial jurisdiction of Paris. 3 In the following 
 year there is a similar instance of cross-trade. 4 Throughout 
 the fall of 1460 there were shipments from Rouen, Elboeuf, and 
 Neubourg to Paris. In the spring, the trade turned ; merchants 
 of Caen, Elboeuf, and Rouen bought in the Oise Valley, shipping 
 
 17 Aout 1458; 49, 2 Sept. 1458; 63, 21 Juin 1459; 66v > 24 Nov. 1459; 72, 7 Fev. 
 1459; 72, 5 Dec. 1459; 7&v, 18 Juin 1460; 98v, 21 Dec. 1461; all these cases, Rouen 
 or Elboeuf to Paris, f. 29, i Mars 1455, Saint-Clere to Paris. 
 
 1 Arch. Som. de Rouen, Reg. Consulates, p. 60. 15 Jan. 1457-58. 
 
 2 Ibid., p. 61. 16 Dec. 1460. The reference to "country buying" at this 
 date shows the impossibility of making any rigid classifications. Even if the 
 practice were relatively common, it does not have the significance that it acquires 
 later. 
 
 * Bib. Nat., Col. Moreau, 1062. f. 63, 23 Juin 1459. 
 4 Ibid. f. 78, 5 Juin 1460. 
 
52 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to Rouen and Elboeuf. Possibly supplies in the vicinity of 
 Rouen were exhausted and all the wholesale merchants were 
 obliged to transfer their activity to a new source of supply. 
 Additional color is lent to this explanation by the shipments 
 from the Oise Valley to Paris in the spring of 1462. In short, 
 everything points to the conclusion that Paris and Rouen drew 
 supplies from Normandy up to the last of December, 1461, or 
 even through January and February, and then perforce turned 
 to Noyon and Compiegne till the following harvest. 1 There is 
 doubtless some truth in such an interpretation but the Rouenese 
 trade from the Oise Valley is so considerable that it is probably 
 an export trade. The quantities mentioned in the registers 
 are: " 60 muids, 260 muids, 155 muids, 136 muids, mesure de 
 Compiegne " ; " 68 muids, 87 muids, 31 muids, 18 muids, 
 mesure de Rouen; 205 muids, mesure de Crepy. 100 muids, 
 mesure de Paris.' 7 The measures differ considerably, those of 
 Compiegne and Crepy are only a fourth or a fifth of the Parisian 
 or Rouenese measure. But even with all allowance for this 
 factor, the trade is much more considerable than the trade from 
 Rouen, which generally consisted of consignments of less than 
 ten muids. Furthermore, the registers of Compagnies Franqaises 
 give us only a part of the whole commercial movement, as the 
 trade by resident Parisian merchants does not appear. For this 
 reason it is not safe to conclude that the turn of the trade took 
 place in February and March, 1462 as the records of trade of 
 non-resident merchants seem to indicate. Even if the exact 
 character of the episode could be established, the successive 
 exploitation of Normandy and Santerre is not the significant 
 feature. It gives an impression that can easily be misinter- 
 preted in the light of modern commercial practice. It looks 
 too much like the well-directed buying that characterizes the 
 modern metropolitan market. In reality the whole incident 
 is strikingly medieval. Paris and Rouen are distinct markets, 
 each supplied by different groups of merchants. Their opera- 
 tions are relatively short-sighted. The Parisian merchants 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Col. Moreau, 1062. ff. 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 15 Mars 1461-2 
 Aotit 1462. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS S3 
 
 buy in the vicinity of Rouen where they come into competition 
 indirectly with the merchants of Rouen. As much of the trading 
 is done in granaries and farms, this competition amounts to 
 little. But the supply available for export is not as considerable 
 as the supply in the Oise Valley ; the latter is somewhat more 
 difficult to reach and consequently is not touched except in last 
 resort. The merchants of Rouen perceived the activity of the 
 Parisians, and bought in distant places for the supply of the town 
 or for export; but there was no determined effort to drive the 
 Parisians out of the neighborhood in order to preserve the supply 
 for the town and its export trade. Two entirely distinct trades 
 cross each other, leading to much unnecessary transportation 
 and to a confusion of trading relations that is hardly compre- 
 hensible. There are indications in 1458 and 1460 that the 
 Echevins of Rouen were beginning to feel strongly on the ques- 
 tion. They resented the intrusion of the Parisians and endeavored 
 to prevent export from the duchy. The activity of the mer- 
 chants, however, shows that the idea was not carried out. Great 
 latitude in all these matters apparently prevailed throughout the 
 fifteenth century. 1 
 
 In the early sixteenth century the effort to secure a sharp 
 limitation of areas becomes insistent and finally triumphs. The 
 Parisians cease to buy in Normandy except with permission; 
 the Rouenese no longer buy in the Oise Valley unless they have 
 been granted special licenses. 
 
 An important factor in the new development of policy and 
 organization was the necessity for a wider area to supply Rouen. 
 In the fourteenth century, the Vexin and Pays de Neubourg had 
 sufficed. In 1520, the agents of the town work up into the 
 Beauce to Nogent-le-Roy and Chartres. 2 The efforts of the 
 municipality to secure grain are in themselves significant. This 
 edge of the Beauce gradually came to be considered a regular 
 source of additional supply. 3 In 1528, the Echevins speak of the 
 
 1 This is inference. There is a serious lacuna in the Registers of Rouen from 
 1472-90. 
 
 * Deux Chroniques de Rouen, pp. 124-125. 1521-22. 
 
 * Arch. Som. de Rouen, Reg. Consulates, pp. 124-125. 18 Avril 1522. 
 
54 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Beauce as the region which has " always been our principal 
 resource in time of necessity." 1 
 
 The pressure was in part due to the growth of the city, but it 
 was primarily caused by the closing of the Valley of the Oise to 
 Rouen. There is a striking contrast between the brisk trade on 
 the Oise in 1462, and the humble petition of the Echevins in 
 1528, craving permision to buy grain along the Oise. " We 
 believe that you are informed of the great distress which we have 
 suffered twice in the last seven years from dearth of grain, 
 and inasmuch as we apprehend similar trouble in this current 
 year we have commissioned Gilles des Froisses, a merchant of 
 this town, to go to Santerre, where we have been advised of the 
 existence of considerable quantities of grain. He was instructed 
 to buy one or two hundred muids. He has made his purchases 
 and engaged to place the grain on sale at Rouen. . . . Dear 
 brothers and friends, you know that we have always freely 
 permitted the passage of all the goods that you have found 
 necessary, raising no obstacles. So we beg you to assist us in 
 this affair of ours, and to permit that the grain be transported 
 incontinent to Rouen." 2 Such complete acknowledgment of 
 the power of Paris is an interesting commentary on the change 
 that had taken place since 1462. The Oise had been closed to 
 the merchants of Rouen, except under special permission. For 
 foreign export and for maintenance Rouen was ordinarily depen- 
 dent on Norman grain. As in this case, the permission was 
 generally granted but under strict limitations and subject to 
 much formality. " Gilles des Froyses," declare the Echevins 
 of Paris, " is given leave to export 100 muids of grain to Rouen, 
 upon furnishing security not to export in excess of that quantity. 
 On condition also that he will within six weeks certify that the 
 grain has been sold and distributed at the markets of Rouen." 3 
 Besides this consignment secured directly by the intervention 
 of the Echevins of Rouen, merchants of Paris made some ship- 
 ments to Rouen on their own initiative. But they were required 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, II, 16. 20 Mars 1528. 
 
 2 Ibid., II, 16. 20 Mars 1528. 
 
 3 Ibid., II, 16-17. 24 Mars 1528. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 55 
 
 by the Provost of Paris to obtain special permits from him. 
 Even this degree of intercourse seemed dangerous to the Provost 
 of Merchants, who represented the authority of the municipality, 
 and partly to protect the supplies of the city, partly to assert 
 his power over the royal official, a very vigorous protest was 
 entered against the assumption of this jurisdiction by the Pro- 
 vost. The case was laid before the Council and decision ren- 
 dered in favor of the Provost of the Merchants. 1 The policy 
 of Paris was thus clearly asserted. The Seine Basin outside 
 of Normandy was subject to the jurisdiction of the Provost of 
 Merchants of Paris. No towns in other parts of France could 
 make purchases in this region without first securing permission. 2 
 Permits would be issued under certain conditions, but such 
 exports were closely watched. Thus, in April, 1536, permission 
 to export was cancelled on account of " the great shipments 
 of grain by the river Seme to Rouen, and because the merchants 
 of Normandy make great exports from divers places, which they 
 have amassed at Rouen and other places in Normandy, so that 
 grain is cheaper at Rouen than at Paris." 3 The movement 
 of grain from the Parisian sphere of influence was thus forcibly 
 stopped in the first half of the century. 
 
 The trade from Rouen to Paris leaves little trace. There 
 seems to be little effort at Rouen to stop such movements of 
 grain, but despite this apparent indifference there is nothing 
 to suggest the continuance of the extensive operations of Parisian 
 merchants in Normandy. What the Normands gave up un- 
 willingly and under pressure, the Parisians abandoned volun- 
 tarily. The development of the Upper Seine, of the Marne, 
 of the Oise, of parts of the Beauce, all probably took place 
 in this century, though the evidence is not very definite. The 
 full possibilities of the Upper Seine Basin seem to have been 
 realized for the first time. The perception of the value and 
 richness of these sources of supply rendered the city jealous of 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, II, 28. 26 Juin 1528. 
 1 At times, Lyons seeks grain in the Beauce. 
 
 8 Reg. du Bureau, II, 218. 27 Avril 1536. See also ibid., II, 225. 30 Juin 
 1536. 
 
5 6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 any encroachment from outside, and the great resources of the 
 area made the city quite independent. The renunciation of 
 the exploitation of Normandy cost little, when greater abun- 
 dance was to be had nearer Paris in the upper waters of the 
 Seine, even more advantageously situated for water transport. 
 
 The abandonment of trade with Rouen was not absolute. The 
 dearth of 1563, more severe in the Seine Basin than in Nor- 
 mandy, sent Parisian merchants down stream to make purchases 
 for the town. 1 In 1596, also, purchases were made at Rouen 
 in behalf of the Echevins of Paris. 2 
 
 The extension of Parisian influence, which took the form of 
 excluding the competition of other towns from the Upper Seine 
 Basin, assumes in the seventeenth century an entirely different 
 character. After a moderate degree of consolidation of trade 
 within the sixteenth century area, the capital town begins to 
 reach out still farther. There is a real attack upon the- supply 
 areas of other towns. The old Norman trade is revived ; Pari- 
 sian merchants again invade the vicinity of Rouen, as in the 
 fifteenth century, but in a very different manner. Aspects of 
 modern metropolitanism appear. Then, too, the trading system 
 of the Loire Valley is invaded. A supply area in Touraine that 
 had been developed by Nantes for export trade is entered by 
 Parisian merchants who carry off a continually increasing portion 
 of the supply. From Saumur, the ubiquitous merchants pass 
 on to Nantes ; from Nantes, they are led on to the other source 
 of her export trade Brittany. The larger history of the export 
 trade in the seventeenth century is thus concerned with a remark- 
 able extension of Parisian influence. The Rouenese market 
 area is invaded; the Loire Valley is tapped; the Breton granaries 
 pour their supplies into the boats of Parisian merchants. It is 
 all a great movement towards a centralization of the northern 
 grain trade in Paris, a revelation of the growing tendency of 
 Paris to dominate the commercial life of northern France. 
 
 The new phase of the relation between Rouen and Paris 
 appears as early as 1626. The municipality of Rouen issued 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, V, 221. 10 Mai 1563. 
 
 2 Ibid., XI,. 221. 21-22 Fev. 1596. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 57 
 
 prohibitions against exports from its jurisdiction by Parisian 
 merchants. 1 In 1629 and 1630, the Parlement of Normandy 
 undertook the defence of the Rouenese area Against the en- 
 croachments of Paris. The apprehensions of the authorities 
 were amply justified by the facts. In 1643 the Parisians had 
 organized the trade in Normandy. We find one Pierre Pinon 
 of Paris, in partnership with Jean Renault of Elboeuf, engaged 
 in trade from Rouen to Paris. Pierre Pinon describes the 
 condition of their trade to the officials at Paris: " They have a 
 boat on the Port de 1'Ecole charged with 100 muids of grain, 
 none of which has yet been sold. Besides this they have 300 
 muids of grain in their possession, in the Beauce, at Pont-de- 
 1'Arche, Elboeuf, and at Rouen: all destined for Paris. But 
 it must pass Pont-de-1'Arche, Andelys, and Vernon, which are 
 all within the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Rouen^ The 
 Parlement, however, has prohibited the export of grain from the 
 province. These arrets must be annulled by the Council, and 
 the officers of Pont-de-1'Arche, Andelys, and Vernon must be 
 summoned to give account of their conduct. A distinction is 
 drawn between the upper and lower Beauce. All the grain of 
 the Upper Beauce is sent to Paris from Etampes where no diffi- 
 culties are placed in the way of the merchants. But the grain of 
 the Lower Beauce is brought ordinarily to Nogent-le-Roy, 
 where the merchants of Paris and of Normandy go to buy. Pur- 
 chases for Rouen in the Lower Beauce should be stopped in 
 retaliation against the prohibitions made by the Parlement of 
 Rouen against exports from the province. The prohibitions in 
 Normandy ought not to apply to grain purchased by merchants 
 of Paris within the jurisdiction of Paris and passed through the 
 jurisdiction of the Parlement of Rouen merely for the con- 
 venience in shipping. The 30x5 muids, which the said Pinon 
 and Regnault have declared, can reach Paris only by way of 
 Pont-de-1'Arche, Andely, and Vernon." 2 Pierre de Vaux, 
 
 1 H. 1802. Reg. du Bureau, viii^tii. 25 Avril 1626. 
 
 2 H. 1806. Reg. du Bureau, iii c xl. Enquete par les Prevost des Marchands 
 et fichevins, 28 Mars 1643. There is a copy of this at the Bib. Nat., Fr. 16741. 
 f. 9. The name of the merchant is there given " Pierre Simon." 
 
58 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 another merchant, declares that he has a boat-load of 25 muids of 
 grain at Elboeuf , about 80 muids arrested at Oudan below Pont- 
 de-1'Arche, and about 200 muids at Chartres, Nogent-le-Roy, 
 Elboeuf, and Rouen. 1 The encroachment is thus obscured in some 
 degree by the legal dispute over jurisdiction. There is a tacit 
 admission of the legal independence of each area, but the Parisian 
 merchants propose nevertheless to restrict the sphere of influence 
 of Rouen. The right to carry grain through the Rouenese area 
 would have opened endless opportunities for the shipment of grain 
 purchased within the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Rouen. 
 
 In 1649, the municipality of Paris was again seeking to annul 
 the prohibitions in Normandy, 2 and without great success. But 
 despite the opposition of the Parlement of Rouen, the trade to 
 Paris continued from this period to 1693, when the aggressive- 
 ness of the Parisian merchants became more marked. The 
 apparent lacuna in the evidence is bridged by the history of 
 Jean Roger, in 1694 one of the wealthiest grain merchants of 
 Paris. His father was a merchant of Rouen engaged inci- 
 dentally, if not principally, in the grain trade with Paris. Jean 
 began his career as a clerk under his father. In 1650, Jean 
 moved to Paris and acted as Parisian agent for the house until 
 1656, when he set up in business for himself. His father con- 
 tinued his business, and a few years later, when his son lost 
 heavily on certain ventures, the elder Roger took him into 
 partnership again on some consignments from Normandy. 
 Between 1662 and 1693, Jean changed the basis of his operations 
 to Soissons. 3 Jean Regnault and the widow of Pierre Simon, 
 of whom we first hear in 1643, are engaged in the Rouenese 
 grain trade as late as 1661, though the partnership has apparently 
 been dissolved. 4 The Parisian encroachment thus persists 
 without intermission. 
 
 1 H. 1806. Reg. du Bureau, iii e xl. Enquete par les Prevost des Marchands 
 et fichevins, 28 Mars 1843. There is a copy of this at the Bib. Nat., Fr. 16741. 
 f. 9. The name of the merchant is there given " Pierre Simon." 
 
 2 H. 1809. Reg. du Bureau, iii c xlv. 13 Oct. 1649. 
 
 3 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 368. Factum pour Jean Roger. Paris, Juillet-Aout, 1693. 
 
 4 H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, cli. 10 Juin 1661. 
 Ibid., cxxviii. 7 Mai 1661. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 59 
 
 Towards the close of the century the movement becomes 
 more aggressive. It is no longer an attempt to carry grain 
 from the edges of the Rouen market area, but a deliberate 
 invasion of the whole region from which Rouen drew supplies. 
 Beuvron writes from La Mailleraye, 3 January 1694: "A 
 great quantity of oats has been shipped to Paris from Caudebec, 
 and from the country round about within a radius of seven or 
 eight leagues. Oats have become dear and very scarce, so that 
 many have been impelled to form partnerships to engage in 
 trade. . . . They are constantly shipping and buying. They 
 take up all that is to be had of the peasants, forming granaries 
 at Caudebec and other places, so that very little is available 
 for the markets. In a short time there will be absolute dearth 
 in this section." l Three months later Montholon writes: 
 " Elboeuf, which ordinarily furnished the market at Rouen 
 with 60-80 muids of grain per week, brings now only 14 or 15 
 muids. The day before yesterday only 4 muids came from 
 Elboeuf. The blatiers carry everything off to Magny and thence 
 to Paris. They buy even on the market to Rouen." 2 In July, 
 the Parisian merchants were still active. " The market of 
 Elboeuf furnishes nothing, all its supplies go to Paris. Caudebec 
 has been supplied from Caen and has sent considerable quantities 
 to Rouen." 3 The local authorities made some futile attempts 
 to oppose this encroachment of Parisian merchants, but neither 
 the Parlement nor the Echevins of Rouen dared take the drastic 
 measures that would have been effective. In 1698 and 1699 
 the same problem confronted Rouen. 4 " There is always a 
 swarm of blatiers in the markets of Elboeuf, Du Clere, Caudebec, 
 and Andelys, buying up the grain that should come to Rouen, so 
 that little comes to town. The grain of Neubourg and of that 
 whole section is carried off without even passing through the 
 market at Elboeuf." 5 Then, in the following year we find 
 
 1 G 7 . 1635. La Mailleraye, 3 Jan. 1694. Beuvron. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1635. Rouen, 6 Mars 1694. Montholon. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1635. Rouen, i Juillet 1694. 
 
 4 G 7 . 495. 1697, Placet envoy6 par Jean Patty et Jean Mulheau. 
 
 * G 7 . 496. Rouen, 5 Dec. 1698. Also letters of 16 and 22 Nov. 1698; 15 
 and 19 Dec. 1698. 
 
60 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 similar reports. " Several millers, peasant proprietors, and 
 farmers of the elections of Mantes, Chaumont, and Pontoise, 
 especially in those parts of the elections which are in the juris- 
 diction of the Parlement of Normandy, buy grain on the local 
 markets, convert it into flour, and ship to Paris." 1 "At Magny, 
 Gisors, Vernon, and other places the merchants who declared 
 their intention of selling at Paris, Saint-Germain-en-Laye, 
 Mantes, and other places bring back no certificates of sale. 
 They assert that the local officials refuse to issue the certifi- 
 cates." 2 
 
 During the great dearth of 1709 every aspect of this invasion 
 of the supply area of Rouen appears in clearer outline. In a 
 letter of April 10, 1709, the Intendant says: " I fear that the 
 blatiers who are shipping to Paris will cause a rise in prices. They 
 have already invaded the market of Du Clere, three leagues 
 northwest of Rouen, buying at any price that is asked without 
 stopping to haggle." 3 Two days later he writes: " they have 
 reached Louviers and Neubourg on the south side of Rouen. 
 I am afraid they will go next to Bourgachard, and in that way 
 drain all the local markets. It would bring Rouen to the verge 
 of famine." 4 A fortnight later his fears were realized. " The 
 blatiers have surrounded us. They have invaded the markets 
 of Routot, Bourgachard, and Caudebec, where they are buying 
 at any price that is asked." 8 
 
 The careful delimitation of supply areas so gradually worked 
 out in the course of the sixteenth century was thus completely 
 broken down. The metropolitan importance of Paris was 
 asserted. The idea that a supply should be reserved for a 
 particular city was abandoned. The grain trade acquired a 
 ubiquitous character that is distinctly modern: the supply of 
 Paris, like that of the modern metropolitan market, was re- 
 cruited freely wherever a merchant from Paris could find grain. 
 
 G 7 . 430. 26 Aout 1699. 
 G 7 . 496. Rouen, i Dec. 1699. 
 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 10 Avril 1709. 
 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 12 Avril 1709. Courson au C. G. 
 G 7 . 1650. Rouen, 28 Avril 1709. See also letters of 29 Avril, 15 Jinn, 
 7 Juin, 14 Sept. 1709, all in the same carton. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 6 1 
 
 But while the Parisian market was metropolitan in its far- 
 reaching canvass for supplies, it was itself distinctly medieval 
 in regard to distribution of supply. It was a consumptive 
 rather than a distributive market. Supplies were poured in 
 from every quarter of northern France ; nothing was sent out. 
 
 The same general features were disclosed in the extension of 
 Parisian trade in the Loire Valley. In this way, Paris acquired 
 control of the only important source of supply in northern 
 France not previously tributary to the growing capital. The 
 date of this movement is obscure. Indications of Parisian 
 trade in the Loire Valley do not appear in the Parisian sources 
 before 1650, but it is quite possible that local material would 
 carry the date back to a more remote period. The approxi- 
 mate coincidence with the encroachment upon the Rouenese 
 area, however, might suggest that the Loire Valley trade with 
 Paris really began in the middle of the seventeenth century. 
 
 Previous to this connection with Paris, the trade of the Loire 
 Valley was dominated by Nantes and by Lyons. The supplies 
 available in Touraine, coming to Saumur from the back country, 
 were purchased by merchants from Nantes who were engaged 
 in foreign export trades in addition to the local trade of the town. 
 Nantes was engaged in a considerable trade with Spain and 
 Portugal in which grain played a subsidiary but significant 
 part. The possibility of foreign export attracted to Nantes a 
 quantity of grain far in excess of the needs of the town, and this 
 is doubtless the primary factor in the sixteenth century trade 
 of the Lower Loire. 1 On the upper reaches of the river the 
 surplus was small and trade was irregular. The principal 
 sources of supply were in the vicinity of Clermont-Ferrand and 
 Aigueperse. In the sixteenth century Lyons drew supplies 
 from the region through Roanne. 2 The appearance of Parisian 
 merchants on the Loire led to a complete reorganization of trade 
 throughout the valley. The grain from the upper river was 
 
 1 See Arch. Communales de Nantes, ff. 176, 180, 186, 187, 188, 189. It was 
 impossible for me to see this material, but the printed inventory indicates its 
 general character, and the conclusions stated above. 
 
 * Archives Municipales de Lyon. See ch. iii for details. 
 
62 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 deflected from Lyons and came down to Orleans, passing thence 
 to Paris. From Saumur a large portion of the available supply 
 came up stream to Orleans and Paris. The trade of the river 
 converged on Orleans, and proceeded to Paris, either by way 
 of the Canal de Briare or overland. 
 
 The Loire Valley trade, however, was tending to assume this 
 form quite independently of Parisian influence. At an early 
 date Lyons ceased to purchase grain in Auvergne, and, as the 
 grain of the Beauce went primarily to Paris, Orleans found it 
 necessary to seek supplies both in Auvergne and in Touraine. 
 In years of dearth, too, Blois and Tours frequently needed 
 supplies beyond what could be secured in the immediate vicinity. 
 The similarity of the development of the trade of Orleans and 
 of Paris renders the history of the Loire Valley curiously com- 
 plicated. There are three distinct lines of trade: to Paris, 
 to Orleans, and to Nantes. The first two draw both from the 
 upper and lower river, the latter derives its supplies wholly from 
 Touraine. The distance of the sources of supply from the con- 
 suming towns makes the encroachment upon these areas less 
 distinct than in the case of Rouen where the Parisian merchants 
 bought in the immediate vicinity of the city. There is less 
 feeling of exclusive right to the supply here in the Loire. The 
 local officials have the same feeling towards all wholesale mer- 
 chants; the merchants feel a certain community of interest. 
 Orleans and Nantes, whose interests are most seriously threat- 
 ened, have no jurisdiction over the producing regions, though 
 the position of Orleans enables her to exert some control over 
 the grain passing to Paris. The appearance is somewhat dif- 
 ferent; the movements are essentially the same. Both in Nor- 
 mandy and on the Loire the larger towns suffered from the 
 competition with Paris for supplies previously left to them with- 
 out external interference. 
 
 In 1662, Parisian merchants were buying in Auvergne. 1 
 Their operations were based on purchases in the granaries, 
 but the resources of the region were not considerable and no 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel Colb., 107 bis. Riom, 3 Jan. 1662. De la Barre. Ibid., 107 
 bis. 632. Riom, 24 Jan. 1662. De la Barre a Colbert. 
 
TEE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 63 
 
 great quantity could be obtained. De la Barre says in his letter 
 of January 3, that 1200-1500 setiers might be obtained tor Paris, 
 and this probably represents about the proportion that could be 
 secured by Parisian merchants. March n, he reported that 
 5000-6000 setiers had gone down the river to Orleans, Blois, 
 and Tours. 1 May 30, he writes: " I have just returned from 
 the ports of the Allier where more than eighty boats, loaded with 
 13-14,000 setiers of wheat are waiting for the river to rise. It 
 is extremely low just at present, but the weather has been very 
 wet lately and the river will soon become navigable." 2 But 
 the boats did not get off at once, and by the time the river had 
 risen the grain fleet had increased remarkably. June 19, he 
 writes: " I have left the ports of the Allier only after having 
 sent off a fleet of two hundred boats, charged with more than 
 20.000 setiers of grain. ... I have no doubt that the fleet 
 will relieve the misery throughout the Loire Valley." 3 The 
 ambiguities here are typical. The Parisian merchants are 
 mentioned. De la Barre is himself possibly buying on royal 
 account for Paris; but there is no means of distinguishing the 
 activities of Parisian merchants from those of merchants of 
 Orleans or of Auvergne and Bourbonnais. All are mentioned, 
 but the fleet of two hundred boats goes down the river " en 
 masse." 
 
 In 1693 the Parisian merchants do not appear. " Several 
 individuals proposed to ship oats to Paris," but d'Ableiges, 
 the Intendant, refused to grant the necessary permits. 4 In the 
 fall of 1698, several Parisian merchants, who generally made 
 their purchases in Champagne, were forced to seek supplies 
 elsewhere. They went to Auvergne, Nivernais, and Nor- 
 mandy. 5 In January there were considerable arrivals of grain 
 from the Upper Loire, presumably the result of the purchases 
 made in November. On the third of January, eight boats 
 
 Bib. Nat., M61. Colb., 107, 275. Memoire sur Auvergne, n Mars 1662. 
 Ibid., 108, 833. Clermont, 30 Mai 1662. 
 
 Ibid., 109, 352. Clermont, 19 Juin 1662. See also ibid., 109 bis. 696. 
 Orleans, 7 Juillet 1662. Brachet, Maire a Orleans. 
 
 G 7 . 1630. Clermont, 4 Nov. 1693. d'Ableiges a Pussort. 
 G 7 . 428. (Paris), 7 Nov. 1698. Dubois. 
 
64 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 arrived at the Port de Greve from Bourbonnais. Ten days 
 later, d'Argenson writes that " the Port de Greve is well supplied. 
 There are at least thirty boats with grain from Auvergne and 
 Brittany, in all about five hundred muids." l 
 
 On the Lower Loire the operations of the Parisian merchants 
 are quite as completely lost in the general trade. The officials 
 make no attempt to distinguish. It is likely that the Parisians 
 went down to Saumur as early as they went up to Auvergne, 
 but in 1662 they could have found little incentive to seek grain 
 in Touraine as the dearth was more extreme there than in most 
 parts of the Seine Basin. In 1693, 1698, and 1709,2 the mer- 
 chants of Paris are referred to, but it is impossible to form any 
 idea of the extent of their dealings except through the measures 
 taken by the officials at Orleans to prevent complete exhaustion 
 of the supplies of their town. This is indeed the curious feature 
 of the Loire Valley trade its elusiveness in the producing 
 regions, its volume when it passes Orleans. 
 
 The position of Orleans was peculiar; situated on one side of 
 the Beauce, the most fertile plain of all France, placed in a 
 commanding location on the Loire with the possibility of receiv- 
 ing grain from either Auvergne or Touraine, it was nevertheless 
 in constant dread of dearth. The grain, which seemed to be 
 at hand on every side, had a tendency to move towards Paris. 
 Orleans was in the center of a brisk trade, but it moved around 
 the city, without affecting the market. Bouville's letter of 
 November 14, 1699, gives the most complete description of the 
 situation of the town. " The individuals who have previously 
 carried on a great business have ceased entirely. All the grain 
 they could get hold of has been shipped to Paris, so that Orleans 
 is without resource. Every week the town consumes 12-1400 
 muids of grain (mesure d'Orleans). There are only two markets, 
 in each of which there is generally about four hundred muids, 
 so that even when the markets are well supplied quite as much 
 
 1 G 7 . 430. Paris, 4-14 Jan. 1698. d'Argenson. 
 
 * G 7 . 1635. Estat des bleds qui sont entre" dans le Canal de Briare. Sept., 
 i6g3-Juillet, 1694. G 7 . 524. Divers Estats des bleds sorties par les Bureaux de 
 Touraine pour Orleans et Paris, 1698, etc. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 65 
 
 must come by river. The water trade, however, has ceased, 
 as only the poor bourgeois are still engaged in the grain trade. 
 Consequently, there is every reason to fear a dearth. Paris 
 will carry off all the grain in the Beauce, and, if the ice forms 
 soon, the river will be so low that no aid can be expected from 
 that source." l Creil, the predecessor of Bouville, had been 
 similarly struck by the tendency of the grain of the Beauce to 
 go to Paris. He thought " it would be expedient to prevent 
 the peasants from carrying to Etampes, Dourdan, and Mont- 
 Ihery grain which they could sell for almost as much here at 
 Orleans." 2 In years when there was any trouble, 'Orleans was 
 always on the point of suffering from dearth in the midst of 
 abundance. 
 
 The volume of trade passing Orleans on its way to Paris is 
 best indicated by the figures giving the monthly shipments 
 through the Canal d'Orleans for Paris, between September, 
 1693 and July, 1694. This does not include the overland trade, 
 or the trade passing through the Canal de Briare, which were 
 both considerable : 
 
 Wheat Oats Rice 
 
 muids muids Ibs. 
 
 1693 November 453s 280 .... 
 
 December 1,452 583 .... 
 
 1694 January -. . . . 103 139^ 
 
 February 60 400 
 
 March 1,242 308 300,00x3 
 
 April 4,162^ 2,3155 420,240 
 
 May 1,099 i?5s QWS 
 
 June 3,462 960 
 
 July 1,311 920* 
 
 In 1699 the volume of trade must have been greater. Bouville 
 writes, January 15: " within the last three months more than 
 eight thousand muids has entered the Canal d'Orleans alone. 
 There is much on the river and there is no accurate measure 
 of the great quantity that has been shipped overland." 4 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., II, n, 42. 14 Nov. 1699. Bouville. 
 1 Ibid., I, 304, 1146. 8 Dec. 1692. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1635. Estat des Bleds qui sont entr6 dans le Canal d'Orleans pour 
 estre porte" a Paris. Sept., i693-Juillet, 1694. 
 
 4 G 7 . 419. Origans, 15 Jan. 1699. Bouville. There are some figures from 
 
66 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Orleans had good cause for serious apprehension many times, 
 but the much-dreaded dearth never arrived. The appearance 
 was deceptive. The Intendant understood this situation and 
 never lost confidence in the liberal policy of permitting this 
 trade to continue without restriction. Orleans was never 
 assisted by grain destined originally for Paris, but the inde- 
 pendent efforts of the merchants were generally successful in 
 supplying the city. In December, 1698, prices were rising 
 despite the abundance of grain on the markets. Shipments 
 were made to Paris from all sides. Speculation had developed 
 to such an extent that the same lot of grain would pass through 
 five or six hands without leaving the granary, rising in price 
 from 250 fL to 360 ff. 1 Despite all this, Bouville could write, 
 two days later: " I know that prices cannot fall in the provinces, 
 especially in this province, until prices have gone down in Paris, 
 which must be supplied by the provinces. I can assure you that 
 I leave no stone unturned to secure safety for the transportation 
 of grain. I am convinced, also, that the merchants, of Paris 
 and the bakers should be allowed to buy in the markets." 2 
 Why should he adopt such a policy ? Because Orleans could 
 secure supplies in the lower river. The Parisian trade floating 
 by the town was not to be reckoned upon. It could not be 
 touched, because that would call in question the privileges 
 needed to bring grain up the river past Blois and Tours. It was 
 easier to stimulate the independent trade of Orleans than- to 
 stop the Parisian grain boats. Bouville states this as his policy. 
 " At the beginning of 1694, I found the city much less ade- 
 quately supplied than it is today, but it did not suffer. I even 
 permitted shipments to Paris, because a number of wealthy mer- 
 chants, grocers, and others, on the strength of my promises, were 
 willing to make large purchases in Brittany"* Orleans was in 
 reality seriously menaced by the extraordinary development 
 
 Touraine for December, 1698. They purport to distinguish between the shipments 
 for Paris and the shipments for Orleans, but they must be based on false declara- 
 tions by the merchants. G 7 . 524. 22 Dec. 1698-7 Jan. 1699. 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 508, 1800. 4 Dec. 1698. Bouville. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, 508, 1800. 6 Dec. 1698. 
 8 Ibid., II, n, 42. 14 Nov. 1699. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 67 
 
 of Parisian trade, but no consequences were felt, as the burden 
 could be shifted to the producing regions, Auvergne, Touraine, 
 or Brittany. The principal effect upon Orleans of the extension 
 of Parisian influence in the Loire was an increased emphasis on 
 the river trade. Orleans could count less on the Beauce, and 
 became more dependent upon Auvergne, Touraine, and Brittany. 
 The spectacle of Parisian exports was tantalizing but not serious. 
 The sources of supply were somewhat different and the market 
 of Orleans was left relatively intact. 
 
 Below Orleans, the influence of the intrusion of Parisian 
 demand was more serious, both in the region supplying the whole- 
 sale trade at Saumur and Montsoreau, and in the independent 
 river towns. These places, like Orleans, saw the Parisian trade 
 passing by, but they had neither the energy to procure supplies 
 independently nor the patience to permit the shipments for 
 Paris and Orleans to pass unmolested. In November, 1693, 
 the boats coming to Orleans were stopped at Blois. The mer- 
 chants were obliged to sell at prices fixed by the officials although 
 this was less than the grain cost in Brittany. This continued 
 despite ordinances, and despite the passports carried by the 
 merchants. 1 In April, 1694, the disturbances were quite as 
 frequent. 2 Boats were stopped at Saumur, Amboise, and 
 Tours. 3 The merchants feared that scarcely one-tenth of the 
 quantity shipped would arrive at Orleans. They were even 
 inclined to countermand their orders. The Echevins of Lorris, 
 a little town on the Canal d'Orleans, described the popular 
 feeling in most detail: " The people of our town and of the 
 neighboring parishes," they say, " are without bread and without 
 grain. They are on the point of mutiny, and there is little 
 security for the boats passing on the Canal. Threats of pillage 
 are rife, and we have been obliged to go twice to the Canal to 
 maintain order. Three boats were stopped at Coudrey, and 
 we were obliged to withdraw. We have just come from the 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Orleans, 12 Nov. 1693. de Creil. G 7 . 1632. Vend6me, 19 
 Nov. 1693. Bertin. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1635. Origans, 30 Avril 1694. Bouville. 
 1 G 7 . 1635. Tours, 18 Mai 1694. Huot. 
 
68 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Canal, where we had the boats released on account of their 
 passports, issued by Pontchar train, on behalf of the Hospital 
 at Paris. All the merchants who pass on the Canal have similar 
 passports, so that we do not know what to do. We are even 
 resolved to leave town, in order to escape the violence that may 
 appear. The people wish us to procure bread for them from the 
 boats passing on the Canal, but we do not dare to do so, although 
 the people are literally starving." l 
 
 The larger towns could secure material relief only by making 
 special efforts to stimulate trade. The amounts secured from 
 passing merchants were generally too small to afford more than 
 temporary respite. Angers, in 1709, formed a public fund for 
 the purchase of grain. 2 Other towns frequently did likewise. 
 At Tours the Intendants often made purchases on the royal 
 account. 3 At times very considerable royal purchases were 
 made, and distributed at less than cost. Such supplies generally 
 came from a distance, as the vicinity was either exhausted or 
 the people so much incensed at the conduct of the merchants 
 that no grain could be taken from the towns in the producing 
 regions. 
 
 At La-Ferte-Bernard, the Maire says: " I have found it 
 impossible to furnish the markets, as there is no grain in the 
 parishes of my jurisdiction." The other sources of trouble 
 were more frequent. Tours was often menaced by the closing 
 of Poitou and Berry. May i, 1709, an inhabitant of Tours 
 writes: " the city cannot subsist fifteen days unless Berry, 
 Brittany, and Poitou permit exports. The merchants and 
 millers who take the risk of going to buy there are robbed. 
 Famine will be upon us before the end of the month." 4 A 
 description of a market at Chatillon tells the same story in 
 more detail: " The person that I sent to the market at Chatillon 
 yesterday reported that there was great disorder. The inhabi- 
 tants would not permit any grain to leave the town for Touraine; 
 
 1 G 7 . 1635. Lorris, 26-28 Avril 1694. fichevins de Lorris. 
 
 * G 7 . 1651. Angers, 27 Mars 1709. Autichamp, Lieu, du Roi. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1651. Tours, 30 Avril 1 709. Turgot. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1647. i Mai 1709. Anon. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 69 
 
 not even barley. More than two hundred persons were obliged 
 to return home without any grain. Barley is needed for seed, 
 and the markets of Tours, Cormery, Loches, and Eseville are 
 all inadequately furnished." 1 
 
 The effect of the Parisian trade upon the markets of the 
 producing regions has already been considered. 2 The chain 
 of blatier-suppMed markets was disorganized. Buying in the 
 farms and in granaries spread throughout the region. The 
 agents of the large wholesale merchants, the resident mer- 
 chants, and even the blatiers scoured the countryside over a 
 considerable area. The grain in the Valley of the Vienne was 
 collected at Montsoreau without corning in contact with any 
 markets. On the Thouet, the markets of Montr euil-Bellay 
 and Thouars were seriously affected, but not completely dis- 
 organized. The bulk of the trade, however, was quite inde- 
 pendent of the market system. To attribute all these disorders 
 to the appearance of the Parisian merchants is perhaps unjusti- 
 fiable, but there is much to warrant such a severe judgment. 
 These abuses appear only where the demand becomes very 
 intense, and it is hardly probable that the trade of the Loire 
 Valley itself would have been sufficient to develop the requisite 
 pressure to lead to such practices. The Parisian merchants 
 increased the demand in the producing regions, indirectly as 
 well as directly; it was not only what they bought that influenced 
 prices and modes of buying, but also what the depletion of the 
 supplies of Orleans made it necessary for Orleans to buy. The 
 addition of Parisian demand in times of dearth was practically 
 certain to create an intensity of demand that far exceeded the 
 supplies available. Such pressure was sure to develop the new 
 practices that would disorganize the local markets. 
 
 The invasion of Normandy and of the Loire Valley by Parisian 
 trade was a step towards the formation of a metropolitan area; 
 but it was only the prelude to the great change that finally 
 completed the fabric of the new organization. The overthrow 
 of the system of relatively limited supply areas was the purely 
 
 1 G 7 . 1651. Loches, 8 Mai 1709. Puiguibaut. 
 See ch. i. 
 
70 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 destructive aspect of the new tendencies. In the Loire Valley 
 this destructive element does not appear as clearly as in the 
 invasion of Normandy. On the Loire, the independent supply 
 areas were transformed rather than destroyed. The depletion 
 of the supply affected the rural districts and the small towns, 
 rather than the large towns of the region. But here, as in Nor- 
 mandy, the breaking-down of old customs, the formation of 
 new commercial habits, the intrusion of a ubiquitous metro- 
 politan demand created new problems. Questions were raised 
 which led to the development of new forms of commercial 
 organization. The fundamental importance of problems of 
 marketing was emphasized. Beneath all these difficulties lay 
 the question of the relation between the local market and the 
 wholesale trade, or between the wholesale trade and the metrop- 
 olis. The local markets needed protection against the intensity 
 of metropolitan demand; the metropolitan market needed 
 some means of rendering its supplies more completely visible. 
 
 II 
 
 The Upper Seine Basin and Problems of Marketing 
 
 The evolution of market machinery in the Seine Basin is one 
 of the most important and most interesting aspects of the com- 
 mercial history of Paris. In no other section of France are the 
 difficulties inherent in the old market system and the transition 
 to the freer modern system more clearly revealed. The basic 
 factor in the Parisian area is the presence of a large and easily 
 available food supply. By no means the only foundation for 
 the predominance of a commercial center, it is none the less 
 the most important consideration in the development of a great 
 inland capital like Paris. 
 
 The influence of abundance upon the development of trading 
 organization will be more apparent after the subsequent study 
 of the grain trade in the Rhone basin. There, the constant 
 dread of dearth, the prohibitions in the producing regions, the 
 elaborate negotiations in regard to the trade, everything mili- 
 tated against a free development of commercial machinery. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS ^\ 
 
 In the Seine Basin, the abundance of the supply reduced super- 
 vision to a minimum and rendered the crudity of the market 
 organization less serious. The merchants were not forced to 
 make so many concessions to the medieval system, and in time 
 of dearth the supplies were sufficiently great to make trade 
 possible. The distribution of the supply was no easy matter, 
 but it was seldom necessary to prohibit trade entirely. This 
 was of the utmost importance, for it was in such times of stress 
 that significant changes most frequently occurred. In the less 
 fertile regions, where trade was completely disorganized in time 
 of crisis and discontinued for an interval, the trade was resumed 
 without any considerable alteration. In the Seine Basin, where 
 trade continued despite dearths, innovations of far-reaching 
 consequences were at times made under the pressure of the crisis. 
 The dearths of 1693-94, 1698-99, 1708-09 are for this reason 
 more interesting in the Seine Basin than in Burgundy. Condi- 
 tions there became so serious that trade was suspended during 
 the crisis of the dearths. In the Seine Basin, the trade was 
 maintained upon an organized basis though with difficulty. 
 The tendency to break down under stress was the primary 
 defect of the medieval market system. No solution could be 
 found unless there was enough grain in the region to make con- 
 tinuous trade a possibility. The dearth must not be so severe 
 that the dreaded famine could become an actuality. The market 
 could develop only in a region where the difficulties were due 
 not to lack of grain but to inefficient markets; where it was 
 not a question of getting grain, but of distributing a supply 
 that was barely adequate. 
 
 The character and the extent of the available supply is most 
 evident in the latter part of the seventeenth century, when it 
 was more completely utilized than previously. The supply 
 falls into two classes: the overland grain from the Beauce, 
 Brie, and France; the water-borne grain from the Valleys of 
 the Oise, Marne, and Seine. The most valuable figures appear 
 in a few reports of the year 1700. Quantities are given in the 
 Parisian muid, which is equivalent to 51.4 bushels English. 
 Some of the headings are ambiguous, but I have used the classi- 
 
THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 1700 
 
 Ch,lons & 
 Vitry 
 
 France 
 &Brie 
 
 Unspecified 
 Seine and 
 Marne 
 
 Oise 
 
 Total by 
 Water 
 
 Halle 
 
 22 Sept.-2 Oct 
 
 muids 
 4M 
 
 muids 
 360 
 
 muids 
 368 
 
 muids 
 2O 
 
 muids 
 I 161 
 
 muids 
 181 
 
 2 20 Oct 
 
 I d.l6 
 
 O2 
 
 
 8s 
 
 
 
 2227 Nov 
 
 3 CQ 
 
 80 
 
 4OO 
 
 3O 
 
 J 593 
 
 Qfio 
 
 *3 a 
 
 1 3 C 
 
 4, 18-22 Dec 
 
 250 
 
 250 
 
 800 
 
 64 
 
 1,364* 
 
 LOJ 
 222 
 
 fications of the reports. " France and Brie " means, primarily, 
 the region shipping from Bray, Nogent-sur-Seine, and Mary. 
 The significant feature is the proportion between the water- 
 borne grain and the grain coming overland to the Halle. The 
 figures for the Halle should be increased somewhat as only wheat 
 is reported regularly in the letters. Other kinds of grain amounted 
 to half as much again. Then, too, flour came in considerable 
 quantity, but the flour frequently represented water-borne 
 grain. In all probability, the overland grain constituted in 
 1700 about one-fourth or one- third of the supply. The propor- 
 tion between the various branches of the water trade is probably 
 indicated justly, but as the reports are not comprehensive the 
 total quantities received do not appear. There are compre- 
 hensive reports of shipments from the ports of the Oise for nine 
 months of 1700 and for January, 1702. These are based on 
 the declarations of the merchants and seem to be accurate in 
 every respect. The Parisian figures for 1700 happen to include 
 only the less considerable arrivals so that the Oise figures are low. 
 From March, 1709, to December, 1710, we have very careful 
 reports of arrivals at Paris. The water-borne trade is at times 
 
 EXPORTS FROM THE GENERALITY OF SOISSONS TO PARIS. 2 
 
 muids muids 
 
 1700 April 801 1700 September 102 
 
 May 139 October 210 
 
 June 345 November 181 
 
 July 212 December 206 
 
 August 23 1702 January 397 
 
 1 G 7 . 431. Reports of different dates, 22 Sept.-22 Dec. 1700. 
 1 G 7 . 513. Letters of 16 Mai, 7 Juin, 6 Juillet, 6 Aout, 8 Sept., 8 Oct., 7 Nov., 
 5 Dec. 1700. 5 Jan. 1701 to n Fev. 1702. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 
 
 73 
 
 GRAIN ARRIVALS ON THE PORTS AND ON THE HALLE, AT PARIS l 
 In Muids, Mesure de Paris 
 
 
 Vitry & 
 Chalons 
 
 Bray & 
 Provins 
 
 France & 
 Brie 
 
 Noyon & 
 Soissons 
 
 Total by 
 Water 
 
 Halle 
 
 1709 March 
 
 I<X 
 
 2QO 
 
 34O 
 
 190 
 
 1,175 
 
 1,160 
 
 April 
 
 
 140 
 
 400 
 
 1 2O 
 
 1, 060 
 
 605 
 
 May 
 
 78 
 
 2Q c 
 
 875 
 
 26 
 
 2,074 
 
 853 
 
 June 
 
 22Q 
 
 34-O 
 
 4.6O 
 
 lie 
 
 1,688 
 
 1,186 
 
 July . 
 
 137 
 
 2^O 
 
 760 
 
 
 1,487 
 
 1,220 
 
 August 
 
 7O 
 
 128 
 
 IQC 
 
 
 838 
 
 1,253 
 
 September 
 
 76 
 
 68 
 
 26l 
 
 
 7?c 
 
 882 
 
 October 
 
 216 
 
 1 20 
 
 158 
 
 
 I,O64 
 
 I,C76 
 
 November 
 
 20 
 
 6<; 
 
 <6* 
 
 CQ 
 
 I OOO 
 
 961 
 
 December 
 1710 January 
 February 
 
 24 
 
 227 
 80 
 
 108 
 142 
 
 I4."r 
 
 161 
 280 
 281 
 
 30 
 4 
 84 
 
 323 
 673 
 
 ^QO 
 
 1,025 
 1,293 
 825 
 
 March 
 
 7O 
 
 178 
 
 28<C 
 
 A A 
 
 607 
 
 1,018 
 
 April 
 
 2O 
 
 
 270 
 
 4O 
 
 1, 2 "?O 
 
 854 
 
 May . . 
 
 2Cf 
 
 271 
 
 
 2C 
 
 701 
 
 003 
 
 June 
 
 2fA 
 
 283 
 
 641 
 
 7Q 
 
 I,2IO 
 
 1,098 
 
 July . 
 
 l8s 
 
 2^7 
 
 SQO 
 
 
 832 
 
 1,056 
 
 August 
 
 1 2O 
 
 IOO 
 
 4.C7 
 
 
 677 
 
 1,108 
 
 September .... 
 
 80 
 
 40 
 
 4.72 
 
 
 847 
 
 I,AQ7 
 
 October 
 
 iqr 
 
 70 
 
 688 
 
 
 803 
 
 1,441 
 
 November 
 December 
 
 60 
 
 345 
 
 140 
 25 
 
 475 
 470 
 
 48 
 
 2 
 
 1,263 
 I,OO2 
 
 i, 080 
 
 1,211 
 
 described only as so many boats, but the load of the boats was 
 sufficiently uniform to admit of satisfactory estimates of the 
 quantity. The abnormal condition of the trade makes it neces- 
 sary to refrain from any precise deductions, but the statistics 
 are suggestive. The arrivals on the Halle are extraordinarily 
 large, on the whole equal to the total arrivals by water. This 
 is partly due to overland trade from Orleans, and to arrivals 
 from a wider area in the Beauce than usual. Much of the trade 
 from Normandy was doubtless overland. In part, too, the 
 dearth in the Upper Seine Basin reduced the shipments from 
 those sections. This interpretation of the effect of the dearth 
 is supported by the comparison of the average semi-weekly 
 
 1 G 7 . 1654 and 1655. Semi-weekly reports of d'Argenson. 
 
74 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 arrivals in 1709. For the thirteen weeks reported in 1700, the 
 highest figure is 87 muids; the average is 45-50 muids. In 
 1709-10, the highest figures are 500 muids, 260 and 228 muids. 
 These unusual arrivals are ascribed in the reports to the ship- 
 ments overland from Orleans. The lowest figures are 45 and 
 53 muids. Scattering reports from 1708, which are not included 
 in the table, confirm the impression that the normal semi-weekly 
 market seldom saw more than 60-70 muids on the Halle. 1 The 
 dearth of 1709 reduced the water-borne supply and the deficiency 
 was made up in part by a more intense exploitation of the 
 Beauce, France, and Brie. The continuity of the trade with the 
 Seine and Marne Valleys is really the most significant fact in 
 these reports. Despite the severity of the dearth, despite the 
 heavy drain caused by the campaign of 1709 in the Low Countries, 
 trade .with Paris continued with no serious interruption. 
 
 The abundance of grain in the distant river valleys which 
 made such continuous trade possible, even in time of dearth, 
 freed the merchants from any serious interference from the 
 officials in those regions. The abundance of grain in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of Paris freed the merchants from harassing 
 regulation by the Parisian authorities. The blatier trade to the 
 Halle was very steady, and, as it brought nearly one-fourth 
 of the total supply, the irregularities of the river trade were not 
 of moment. At Lyons, where there was no such volume of 
 land trade, the municipality was obliged to play an important 
 part in the grain trade, largely to secure some guarantee against 
 the irregularity of water-borne supply. Ice on the river, low 
 water, intentional delays in shipment combined to render the 
 river trade singularly erratic. In April, 1710, nine hundred 
 muids arrived at the Port de Greve during the first two weeks. 
 From the sixteenth to the twenty-sixth of April, only ninety 
 muids came in. From April thirtieth to May twentieth only 
 one hundred and fifty-five muids arrived; on May twenty-first, 
 two hundred and fifty muids arrived. 2 But this uncertainty 
 
 1 G 7 . 1654. 7 Avril, 5 Mai, 2 Juin, 4 Juillet, 5 Sept., 3 Nov., i Dec. 1708, 
 2 Jan., 6 Fev. 1709. Reports of d'Argenson. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1655. Letters of d'Argenson. Dates indicated. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS J$ 
 
 was not serious. The Halle sufficed to tide the city over the 
 intervals between arrivals of grain on the Ports. The wholesale 
 merchants of Paris were thus subjected to the minimum amount 
 of regulation and the trade was allowed to develop naturally. 
 
 The absence of energetic administrative supervision involves 
 the history of the Parisian trade in considerable obscurity. 
 Official regulation and interference are responsible for nearly 
 all our information about the trade, so that the relative freedom 
 of the trade appreciably diminishes the bulk of our evidence. 
 This difficulty of obtaining information is further enhanced by 
 the destruction of the Municipal Archives of Paris during the 
 Commune. The Registers of the city which had been trans- 
 ferred to the Archiyes Nationales are now the only considerable 
 extant record of the activities of the municipality. These 
 circumstances make it impossible to treat the sixteenth century 
 with much certainty, but the main features of the period can 
 be reconstructed by reading the scanty material available in 
 the light of seventeenth century evidence. 
 
 The abundance of supply made very simple modes of trading 
 practical. The early systems of marketing continued with 
 little apparent change in all the producing regions until the 
 seventeenth century. Consequently, the investigations that 
 were made when the active development began disclosed not 
 only the new conditions and the innovations, but also the old 
 trading system that was soon to be supplanted. The differences 
 in the market systems of the three valleys of the Upper Seine 
 Basin were not great, and no distinction can safely be drawn 
 before 1660. Trade in granaries and wholesale buying upon 
 the market are found on the Marne, Seine, and Oise. There 
 are differences in the emphasis placed upon these modes of 
 buying, but it is practically certain that both forms existed 
 throughout the sixteenth century. In 1649, the concentration 
 of the trade in the towns appears clearly in an examination of 
 gram merchants at Paris. Charles Ferre says there are six 
 thousand muids of grain at Soissons; and other merchants also 
 testify to the existence of hoards in Soissons. 1 Louis Presle 
 
 1 H. 1809. Reg. du Bureau, iHiii xr vi. 20 Aout 1649. 
 
76 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 declares that there are twelve thousand muids at Chalons, 
 and four thousand muids at Vitry. 1 But the details of this 
 granary trade do not come fully to light till 1660. Inquests in 
 October and November of that year brought out the real char- 
 acter of the trade. " Louis Lallement and Pierre Coq depose 
 that there are great quantities of grain at Vitry and Chalons 
 in the houses of divers individuals." 2 " Charles Appert, grain 
 porter at Chalons, said he acts as grain factor at Chalons; that 
 is to say he buys for the merchants of Paris in accordance with 
 the orders given by Farez of Chalons,. Lallement, and others 
 who are agents of Parisian merchants. In the month of July, 
 the present witness, together with Hemary and Lambert, bought 
 two thousand setiers of grain in different houses. The witness 
 believes that there are 200,000 muids of grain in different houses 
 where it has been stored for five or six years." 3 " Pierre Chalons, 
 merchant of Chalons, says that he acts as agent for merchants 
 of Paris, and that he buys ordinarily in the granaries." 4 In 
 1660, the granaries of Chalons were supplied in part by the 
 Uatier trade from Lorraine and from the region south of the 
 Marne, 5 but the general form of the trade was not changed, 
 as this grain was purchased by resident merchants and bour- 
 geois who hoarded it until it suited their interest to sell to the 
 Parisian merchants who came to their granaries. The simpler 
 form of the trade appeared at La-Ferte- Gaudier and Coulom- 
 miers. The commissioners felt that many persons in these 
 towns falsified their testimony, but the witnesses summoned 
 declared on oath that the grain they handled came from their 
 estates. At the house of Jean Montguillon, at La-Ferte- Gaucher, 
 the commissioners " found 9-10 muids of wheat which Mont- 
 guillon declared to be the product of the payments made by 
 his tenants. He affirmed that he had no more than 20-25 
 muids of grain which he had collected in the course of seven or 
 eight years. He has sold much to merchants who have come 
 
 1 .H. 1809. Reg. du Bureau, ii^ii xx vi. 20 Aout 1649. 
 
 a Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 357. 4 Nov. 1660. Proces Verbaux a Chalons. De- 
 positions de Louis Lallement et Pierre le Coq. 
 
 1 Ibid. 4 Nov. 1660. Proces Verbal a Chalons. 
 
 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. Magdelaine Goudouin. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 77 
 
 to buy, and he is ready to sell whenever merchants offer to 
 buy." 1 This passive attitude of the landlord is one of the most 
 interesting features of the granary trade. There is no effort to 
 find a market. The landlord waits patiently year after year 
 till the merchants come to buy. At Coulommiers the com- 
 missioners found 105 muids of wheat and 20 muids of rye in 
 granaries. " There was much more in the town," they say, 
 " but we are not able to make a more comprehensive report 
 because the municipal officials and the officials of the election 
 are all engaged in this trade. They have stores in their granaries 
 and in their country houses." " Most of the witnesses deposed 
 that Lambert and his associates had more than 400 muids of 
 grain at Coulommiers and in the environs." 2 D'Alengon, 
 the Lieutenant General, who was accused, of participating 
 in this trade, declared that " he carried on no trade, that he 
 hoarded only the grain coming from his estates, and that he 
 sold daily to such as presented themselves. He had about 
 twenty-six muids. He showed us also another granary of wheat, 
 belonging to Sr. Barbe, an Attorney at the Court. This grain 
 comes from his estates." 3 no muids of grain was found at 
 Trillebardou; one- third of this came from Chalons and Vitry, 
 the rest belonged to residents. 4 At Meaux, similar conditions 
 prevailed. 
 
 In the Seine Valley, the principal resident grain dealers 
 affirm persistently that the grain they handle comes from their 
 farms. " Sansoy of Provins said that he was not a merchant, 
 that he had not purchased the grain in his possession, it was the 
 product of his estates for several seasons. He declared that he 
 had refused no offer made by the factors of merchants of Paris. 
 Since the preceding harvest he said that he had sold about one 
 hundred muids, Paris measure, and that he still had about 
 150 muids." 5 In this vicinity, too, there was a gentleman named 
 
 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 30 Oct. 1660. La-Ferte"-Gaucher. 
 Ibid. 190. Oct. 1660. 
 Ibid. 204. 30 Oct. 1660. Procs Verbaux. 
 Ibid. 190. Oct. 1660. 
 
 Ibid. 210. 2 Nov. 1660. Provins. Many other affirmations that the grain 
 comes from their own estates. 
 
78 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Chenoist, who had 500-600 muids in his chateau. 1 At Provins, 
 there were three or four individuals engaged in a regular granary 
 trade, but the transition was becoming marked even in 1660, 
 and it is difficult to disentangle the old and the new. It is 
 evident, however, that the granary trade had been considerable, 
 and it must have been the characteristic form of trade in the 
 sixteenth century. 
 
 In the Valley of the Oise the commissaries found conditions 
 somewhat different. The essential feature is indicated by their 
 mode of stating the quantity of grain found. " In the granaries 
 of Noyon, belonging to merchants trading with Paris, was found 
 2180 muids of wheat and meteil." 2 In the Marne and Seine 
 towns the granaries generally belonged to the residents who 
 sold in the granaries to merchants of Paris. Here at Noyon 
 the merchants bought on the market, and then stored the grain 
 until it was advantageous to ship. The market was supplied 
 with reference to this demand. " Each market day grain 
 came in from Santerre, Vermandois, Artois, and Flanders, 
 especially from Brussels, Arras, Bapaume, Perronne, Saint- 
 Quentin, Ham, and other places. More than one hundred 
 muids arrived for each market." 3 This estimate seems high, 
 but it is confirmed by figures of 1700, giving the arrivals at 
 Noyon of grain from other generalities. 4 
 
 GRAIN ARRIVING AT NOYON FROM OTHER GENERALITIES 
 
 Quantities Generality 
 
 Paris muids of export 
 
 1700 May 182 Haynault, Flanders, Amiens. 
 
 June 131 Amiens. 
 
 July 142 Amiens, Flanders. 
 
 August 62 Amiens. 
 
 September 79 Amiens. 
 
 October 80^ Amiens. 
 
 November 62 Flanders, Picardy. 
 
 December 69 Picardy, Flanders. 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 210. 2 Nov. 1660. Provins. 
 
 2 A mixture of wheat and rye, or wheat and barley. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 190. 
 Noyon. 
 
 * Ibid. 190. 
 
 * G 7 . 513. Estat des Bleds arrives dans la G6n. de Soissons. Letters of San- 
 son, 7*Juin, 6 Juillet, 8 Sept., 8 Oct., 7 Nov., 5 Dec. 170x3, 5 Jan. 1701. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 79 
 
 Besides this foreign grain, much would come to the market 
 from the immediate vicinity, so that we may accept the figures 
 of the Lieutenant General. Pont-Sainte-Maxence was another 
 important shipping point on the Oise, and there the trade was 
 carried on in much the same manner as at Noyon. The com- 
 missioners report that " they summoned one Pierre Carabin, 
 a grain porter. He said that some of the bourgeois and resi- 
 dents of the town bought grain on the market to sell to mer- 
 chants who had granaries and engaged in trade with the town. 
 At times, too, the bourgeois sold to persons of Beaumont, Creil, 
 or other places. The Widow Chevalier and one of her sons 
 are engaged in this trade at Pont-Sainte-Maxence. They 
 buy daily at Pont, and in the environs, to sell again later. They 
 have long had great quantities stored in their houses and gran- 
 aries. The dearth at Pont was caused by the purchases made 
 by the Widow Chevalier and others. They took up all the 
 grain exposed on the market to hoard it and sell later." l The 
 prosecuting attorney of the town (Le Procureur du Roi) con- 
 firmed this statement. Most of the grain coming to market 
 was purchased by merchants resident in the town or coming 
 from Beaumont, Creil, and other places. 2 There is reason to 
 believe that the trade at Soissons was conducted on a similar 
 basis before 1660, but there is little precise evidence. The 
 market was completely disorganized by the new commercial 
 practices, but the merchants had apparently been buying on 
 the market up to that time. 
 
 The evidence that these conditions had existed throughout 
 the sixteenth century is not very considerable. The most 
 definite statement is made by the Lieutenant Civil of the Chate- 
 let of Paris. ' At a general assembly at the Hotel de Ville, Sep- 
 tember 13, 1565, he says " that he has been in Champagne 
 recently and knows that there are large quantities of grain 
 stored in the chateaux, and in some of the towns." 3 This 
 does not state definitely that the granaries were the usual source 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 235. 2 Nov. 1660. Pont-Sainte-Maxence. 
 
 2 Ibid., eod. loc. 
 
 8 Reg. du Bureau, V, 510-520. 13 Sept. 1565. 
 
80 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of supply, but it indicates that the granaries of landlords and 
 tithe owners were even then a considerable factor in the trade. 
 Aside from this statement, there is evidence that the sixteenth 
 century trade was very closely associated with a few of the 
 river towns. In 1565, the Parlement of Paris issued a special 
 ordinance authorizing " all persons to buy grain in the towns 
 and villages of the vicinity: even in Chalons, Chateau-Thierry, 
 Meaux, Provins, Melun, Etampes, and others." l In September 
 of the same year, the Provost of Merchants sent H. Simon to 
 Nogent, Pont-sur-Seine, Troyes, Vitry, Chalons, Epernay, 
 Chatelnaudry, Meaux, and other towns in Champagne and 
 Brie. The exact character of the mission does not appear, 
 but it was primarily an effort to secure permission to buy grain 
 in these towns. 2 In 1585, commissioners were sent up the 
 Seine to Pontz, Bray, and Montereau-sur-Yonne, to have 
 grain shipped to Paris. 3 Two years later the municipal officials 
 ask the King to write to the Governor of Champagne and Brie, 
 bidding him " to permit the shipment of grain from Chalons 
 and Vitry, where it is abundant." 4 The concentration of 
 trade in the towns and the occasional statements that great 
 quantities were to be found in the towns, both point to the 
 granary trade. 
 
 This was the simplest form of wholesale trade. In the Saone 
 Valley, whence we have abundant evidence for the sixteenth 
 century, the granary trade was the characteristic form. It 
 was transformed there somewhat earlier than in the Seine Basin, 
 as the supplies were not so large and better ways of bringing 
 the supply to market had to be found. This granary trade was 
 essentially passive; the owners made no effort to seek the 
 market; if the merchants did not discover them, they could 
 wait until dearth came. Prices would rise, and the effort to 
 secure supplies would bring merchants to the doors of the granary, 
 prepared to pay good prices. The abundance of the total avail- 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 1007. 
 
 2 Reg. du Bureau, V, 517-518. 10 Sept. 1565. 
 1 Ibid., VIII, 437. 2 Avril 1585. 
 
 4 Delamare, op. cit., II, ion. 3 Juillet 1587. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 8 1 
 
 able supply in the Seine Basin was so great that even this cum- 
 bersome and crude system was adequate for a century and a 
 half. It is this relation to the fundamental feature of trade in 
 the Seine Basin that affords the best ground for our surmise. 
 Long continuance of the granary trade would be possible only 
 in a region where supplies were, on the whole, somewhat in excess 
 of demand. This granary system was still perceptible in 1660; 
 the whole of the preceding period was characterized by lack 
 of pressure on the supply; so it is by no means too much to 
 infer that the granary system, which would have been so well 
 adapted to the conditions of the sixteenth century, was in fact 
 the characteristic mode of marketing. 
 
 The absence of real pressure upon the supply of the Seine 
 Basin is most clearly indicated by the existence of a sporadic 
 export trade to foreign countries. It will be remembered that 
 the surplus of the Seine Basin during the fifteenth century 
 went to Rouen or to foreign ports through Rouen. The six- 
 teenth century witnessed the delimitation of supply areas for 
 Rouen and Paris. The most unfortunate effect of this upon 
 the producing regions of the Parisian area was the reduction 
 of the demand, and so considerable a reduction that there was 
 apparently a real surplus. This could find a market only on 
 the Lower Seine at Rouen, or at the coast ports on the Somme, 
 particularly Saint-Valery. 
 
 In February, 1501, a general assembly was held at Paris. 
 The whole subject was canvassed, and the meeting finally 
 decided " that action should be taken to prevent the exhaustion 
 of Santois, Beauvoisis, and neighboring provinces, by foreign 
 export down the Somme." Then the Echevins ask the Parle- 
 ment to issue letters to the Baillis of Senlis, Amiens, Vermandois, 
 and to the Senechal of Ponthieu, ordering them to prevent 
 the export of grain abroad by way of the Somme. 1 In 1508 
 we hear that " the merchants go up to Santerre to buy all the 
 grain they can, and then ship to Rouen by way of the Seine." 2 
 A month later the merchants complain of the prohibitions at 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, I, 53-54. 20-27 Fev. 1501. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, 148. 23 Fev. 1508. 
 
82 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Paris. They say that there is no more danger and that the 
 prohibitions should be removed. The Echevins finally decide 
 to allow the merchants to export grain up or down the river, 
 if they agree to place half of their grain on sale at Paris. 1 There 
 are other indications of this foreign trade which will be noted in 
 another connection ; it is sufficient here to note the movement. 
 There is this elusive trade to foreign parts, generally causing 
 apprehension and restrictive regulation at Paris. It continues 
 spasmodically despite prohibitions, because the Parisian demand 
 was not great enough to carry off the whole supply. 
 
 The possession of this abundant supply renders the history 
 of the Parisian trade in the sixteenth century dull and unin- 
 teresting. There is no active development of organization, 
 no serious difficulty in time of dearth, so that even in the sources 
 the trade leaves little trace. The second quarter of the following 
 century, however, sees the beginning of a change. The surplus 
 supply was then required by the growing needs of the city. 
 The merchants were extending their commercial connections. 
 New means of securing supplies were needed. The old passive 
 granary trade, which had maintained itself during the quiet 
 years of the preceding century, was now beginning to prove 
 inadequate for the demands of the growing trade. The grain 
 trade acquired new vitality, new importance, and new interest. 
 A period of active development begins, which carries us rapidly 
 from conditions that are purely medieval to conditions that are 
 almost modern. 
 
 What then was the occasion of this pressure upon the supplies 
 of the Seine Basin that changes the appearance of the trade 
 so fundamentally ? There are two factors that might increase 
 the pressure on the mercantile grain supply: actual growth of 
 population; dependence upon the markets of sections of the 
 metropolitan population that had formerly secured grain inde- 
 pendently of the markets. 
 
 The growth of Paris previous to 1789 cannot be accurately 
 traced. The population of the city seems never to have been 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, I, 150. 23 Mars 1508. In this connection the loss of the 
 municipal records of Paris is a real misfortune. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 83 
 
 accurately known. The conventional figure of 600,000 persons 
 appears in the documents throughout the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries. It is not the highest figure given at the 
 close of the eighteenth century, but it is accepted even then as 
 the conservative estimate. In short, the statistical attempts 
 are worse than useless, they suggest a stationary condition 
 that certainly did not exist at any time in the course of those 
 two centuries. No conception of the rate of growth can be 
 formed from the data now available, but in many respects this 
 numerical side of the question is by no means its most significant 
 aspect. The periods of most active growth are of most con- 
 siderable importance, and these can probably be inferred from 
 the material expansion of the city. Maps of the city are extant 
 which exhibit the gradual extension of habitation, and the studies 
 of the topography of the old city inaugurated by Baron Hauss- 
 mann supplement the evidence afforded by the contemporary 
 maps. 1 
 
 Until the middle of the sixteenth century the city was con- 
 tained within the walls: on the right bank these followed the 
 line of the Grands Boulevards of today; on the left bank the 
 walls began at what is now the Bibliotheque Mazarin, then 
 the Porte de Nesle, and formed a rather narrow circuit which 
 included the University quarter. The Porte Saint-Michel, 
 which was the point in the circuit most distant from the river, 
 was only a little beyond the Sorbonne, on the street which is 
 now the Boulevard Saint-Michel. After 1550 there was a 
 distinct tendency to build outside the walls. Three faubourgs 
 developed: the industrial faubourgs on the right bank, out- 
 side the Porte Saint Denis, and the Porte Saint Antoine: the 
 fashionable Faubourg Saint Germain, on the left bank. Edicts 
 were issued in 1554, 1587, and in 1627, 1632, and 1648, forbidding 
 the erection of buildings outside the walls without special per- 
 mits; but the movement continued in ever-increasing volume. 
 The close of the sixteenth century witnessed a rapid extension 
 
 1 Histoire Monumentale de Paris. Topographic du Vieux Paris, 6 vols. See 
 especially vols. iii-vi. The general account given here is based on material 
 in vol. iii, pp. 7, 127 ff. 
 
84 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of the faubourgs. New streets were cut, roads were declared 
 to be streets, and the corner lots were quickly taken for building 
 sites. The movement in the industrial suburbs is not traced 
 in detail, but the development of the Faubourg Saint Germain 
 can be followed as closely as the most ardent antiquarian could 
 desire. The first generation of the seventeenth century brought 
 ten religious houses to Paris from various provincial towns. 1 
 All the new congregations established themselves in the Fau- 
 bourg Saint Germain. Nobles who had formerly remained 
 on their estates came to Paris and built in the Faubourg. Dur- 
 ing the reign of Louis XIV this growth of the city continued. 
 Saint-Sulpice, the largest parish church in the city, was begun 
 in 1643, to provide adequate facilities for the constantly increas- 
 ing number of parishioners established in this new quarter 
 outside the walls. The nobles and higher clergy came to Paris 
 in greater numbers, attracted by the court and the intellectual 
 fascination of the great capital. The industrial development 
 of the city is less easily followed, but the growing commercial 
 importance of Paris in the seventeenth century suggests that 
 the concentration of the special industries of the capital was 
 increasing. The city seems to have begun to expand in the 
 middle of the sixteenth century, growing slowly until the death 
 of Louis XIII and then increasing more rapidly, until in 1715 
 it was unquestionably the first city in the kingdom. 
 
 The other factor in the development of pressure upon the 
 commercial supply will be suggested by an estimate of the con- 
 sumption of Paris in 1637. According to this account 1600 
 muids of grain were consumed each week. 800 muids were 
 brought to the markets of the city as bread; 450 muids came 
 to the Ports and Halle as grain; 350 muids were used by the 
 religious houses, who received it from their farms or purchased 
 it privately outside of Paris. 2 Almost one-fourth of the supply 
 
 1 Topographie de Paris, III, 135. 1602, Freres de la Charite; 1605, Petits 
 Augustins; 1622, Benedictins de Calvaire; 1626, Maison des Jeunes Filles; 1630, 
 Monastere du Precieux Sang; 1633, Jacobins, Augustins de Laon; 1634, fitablisse* 
 ment Hospitalier; 1635, Chanoinesses de Saint-Sepulcre; 1636, Benedictins de 
 Saint-Liesse; Religieuses de Saint Nicholas de Tulle, etc. 
 
 2 Memoires des Intendants sur Us Generality: Paris, p. 657. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 85 
 
 of the city did not enter into the trade at all. Besides the 
 religious houses, many of the nobles and the wealthy bourgeois 
 procured their own supplies in the country without any contact 
 with the trade. Obviously a change in these habits, an aban- 
 donment of this private buying would swell the volume of trade 
 in the hands of the merchants. If the merchants were to buy 
 in the same place as the private individuals or the religious 
 houses, it would affect the trade slightly, but they would prob- 
 ably buy where they were accustomed to, and the change in 
 the trade might be of importance. An increase in the volume 
 of the trade handled by the merchants would tend to develop 
 new forms of commercial organization even if the actual demand 
 of Paris remained stationary. 
 
 After 1625-30 the Parisian grain trade begins to develop new 
 practices which are largely the outgrowth of the increased 
 pressure upon the supply. The changes are not especially 
 significant in years of abundance, but the dearths of the period 
 seem to exert some influence upon the organization of the trade. 
 Even the moderate scarcity of the years 1626, 1630-31, 1643, 
 and 1649 was probably not without effect. The full extent of 
 the changes cannot be measured. There were official inquiries, 
 but such papers as survive afford little information, and, in the 
 absence of the full reports of the commissaries, it is idle to 
 speculate upon the conditions of that period. 1 Some of the 
 Proces Verbaux of these numerous commissions might be found 
 among the papers of the Chatelet; those submitted to the 
 municipality were destroyed with the Hotel de Ville. The 
 evidence available thus represents but a small part of the testi- 
 mony actually taken, and under these circumstances it is neces- 
 sary to avoid definite conclusions. There is, however, a little 
 evidence of " country buying." At a general assembly at 
 Paris in 1630, Sr. Perrot says that " the merchants have created 
 
 1 See Delamare, op. cit., II, 372 and 1020. Comm. of 14 Dec. 1630. Bib. 
 Nat., Fr. 21641. 145. 12 Jan. 1631. Commissions. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21635. 38. 
 Arret du Parl. 6 Mai 1626. Commissioners sent to Chartres, Soissons, and other 
 places. H. 1803. iii=lx; H. 1806. 1; H. 1806. iiii c xlvii and vi c xi. Reg. du 
 Bureau. Commissions of the fichevins, 1631, 1643. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21635. 46. 
 26 Jan. 1649. Comm. by Parlement of Paris. 
 
86 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the high prices, by going among the farms and paying more than 
 the peasants expected." l 
 
 The testimony of various grain merchants taken at Paris 
 shows clearly that the granary purchases were still the basis 
 of the trade. Nicolle Eucheve says that her husband is "at 
 Vitry-le-Frangois shipping oats and rye that he bought there of 
 merchants of Chalons." 2 Louise Duquesnoy says that "she 
 has at Chalons 500 se tiers of wheat and 250 setiers of rye, which 
 was bought for her by Husson Ruche, her agent at Chalons." 
 Hughes de Cloos " has a boat-load at Noyon, ready to be shipped, 
 and 400-500 setiers of rye at Chalons. All this grain was pur- 
 chased by his factor, Pierre Marchand, who lives at Chalons." 
 Bissart Tirant " has sixty muids in granaries at Fimes and 
 Soissons. It has all been bought within the last three weeks by 
 Combray, his factor at Fimes." " Pierre de Clerc has 600 setiers 
 of grain at Chalons that was purchased for him by Arras, his 
 factor at Chalons." All the principal merchants buy through 
 resident agents, and apparently most of the purchases are made 
 in granaries. But some of the merchants were probably buying 
 in the country. " Nicolle Regnault says that her husband 
 is in France 3 to ship grain that he has bought there within 
 the last three days." " Isabelle Labbe says that her husband 
 has a boat-load of grain on the Marne. She does not know 
 the quantity, but her husband bought it in France." Similarly, 
 " Marguerite Froissart says that her husband has a boat-load 
 of grain on the Aube, about sixty muids in all. Her husband 
 bought part at Soissons, but she does not know where he bought 
 the rest. He has some grain at Lizy." 4 The vagueness of this 
 information is suspicious; when the towns are not clearly indi- 
 cated it generally means that the purchases are made in the 
 country. It is quite possible, too, that the resident factors 
 should have sought supplies outside the town granaries. Later, 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 368. 12 Dec. 1630. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 136-142. All the testimony is from this document. 
 " Assemblee en la Chambre Saint-Louis pour les Bleds." The witnesses are grain 
 merchants. 
 
 3 /. e. the Marne towns below Meaux. 
 
 4 All citations from the same Proces Verbal. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 87 
 
 the resident factor is generally engaged in systematic " country 
 buying," so that it is possible that the merchants were cover- 
 ing up unpopular practices by feigning ignorance of where 
 the factors made their purchases. The subject is hopelessly 
 obscure. 
 
 In 1660, doubt is no longer possible. The merchants began 
 to buy extensively in the country, and by their energetic can- 
 vass of the farms the loca.1 markets were seriously affected. 
 An anonymous memoir describes these practices. " One Godet, 
 merchant at Chalons, first made prices rise by his canvass of all 
 the granaries in the town, and by his trips in the environs among 
 the laborers. He spread false rumors, and also bought large 
 quantities. At the same time, Tixerand senior, merchant 
 and Elu of Vitry-le-Frangois, made a circuit of the granaries 
 of the town and scoured the surrounding country. He forced 
 prices up to such a point that the municipal officers have pro- 
 hibited exports. Four merchants of Paris have gone to La 
 Ferte-sous-Jouarre where they made their agreements. The 
 same day they left the place and spread through the country, 
 making prices rise without buying very large quantities." 1 
 Around Soissons this " country buying " was not regarded as a 
 novelty, so that our surmises in regard to the " country buying " 
 after 1630 would be confirmed. " Nicole Gigue, laborer at 
 Soissons, said that the merchants and inhabitants of Soissons 
 always (de tout temps) bought grain in the country, up as far 
 as Pontavert. They ship the grain down to Soissons in boats, 
 unload the grain, and store it in their houses or granaries." 
 Henriette Violette, widow of a miller at Soissons, testifies to the 
 same facts. 2 At Mary-sur-Seine, one Lefavre showed the 
 commissaries a granary containing twenty muids. " He said 
 that he sent a boat to Paris every week. The last went the pre- 
 ceding Saturday. The grain we saw had been bought of peas- 
 ants within eight or ten leagues. It was brought to Mary in 
 carts." They visited the house of Romain Gray, the factor of 
 Audiger of Paris. Gray was not at home. " His daughter 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 173. Memoire, 1660. 
 
 2 Ibid. 363. Proces Verbal, 7 Oct. 1660. 
 
88 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 said that he had been in the back country for three days, buying 
 grain, and that he was likely to be away another week." 1 Along 
 the Seine, at Montereau and in the back country between the 
 Seine and the Marne, there was much " country buying." 
 Louise Pigre, widow of the notary of Montereau, said " that 
 Nepveu, who is the agent of the Widow Rousseau, buys in the 
 market at Montereau and of the peasants for six leagues around." 
 Another witness says: " He has been buying among the peasants 
 for the last month, so that he has affected all the markets. 
 Almost nothing comes to market. One Lavalle has also been 
 among the peasants buying their grain." 2 The Courier of 
 Champagne reports " that five or six merchants of Paris are 
 riding post through the country." 3 
 
 This development of energetic canvassing was fatal to the 
 local markets. Their supplies were sapped. The peasants 
 sold to the wholesale merchants in the farms, without taking 
 the trouble to bring the grain to market. The market-place 
 was bare. When grain still came to the local market the whole- 
 sale merchants appeared and bought it up, if a popular revolt 
 did not force them to beat a hasty retreat. The full signifi- 
 cance of the " country buying " is revealed only in the dearths 
 of 1693, 1698, and 1709. The practice did not affect all regions 
 alike but everywhere the old modes of marketing were seriously 
 disturbed. This opened the way to reorganization which in 
 some places was significant, in other places, of little moment. 
 
 The destructive aspect of this new phase of the grain trade 
 was most conspicuous in the Beauce. There the result was 
 disorganization of the many little markets and a gradual con- 
 centration of the trade. In the early seventeenth century the 
 trade from the Beauce fell into two general divisions; Etampes 
 was the principal market on the eastern side, and on the western 
 side Chartres was most important. " Some of the grain from 
 Etampes was sent to Paris in small boats as late as 1670, but 
 the completion of the paved road from Etampes to Paris ren- 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 197. 10 Oct. 1660. Proces Verbal. 
 
 2 Ibid. 261. 31 Juillet 1660. Proces Verbal. 
 
 8 Ibid., Testimony of Francoise Viaret and of Louise Martin. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 89 
 
 dered the land route superior. 1 In those days there were thirty 
 to forty boats in the port of Etampes, especially adapted for 
 the navigation of that river. They carried ten muids each, 
 and scarcely sufficed to handle the trade with Paris. . . . Some 
 grain was sent to Paris by the carters." 2 But although Chartres 
 and Etampes were the principal markets of these sections 
 many other markets were in direct connection with Paris. In 
 the direction of Chartres, we hear especially of Dourdan, Houdan, 
 Montfort-1'Amaury, Rambouillet, Epernon, and Nogent-le- 
 Roy. 3 In the direction of Etampes, Corbeil, Melun, and Mont- 
 ereau were most important. " In those days, no merchant of 
 Etampes sent grain to the market of Montlhery, nor to other 
 markets. They shipped directly and uniquely to Paris. The 
 towns of Sens, Montereau, Melun, and Corbeil likewise shipped 
 directly to Paris. Now all the merchants of Etampes have two 
 or three granaries at Montlhery, and the merchants of the 
 other towns have recognized that the markets of the towns 
 near Paris are most advantageous because of the presence 
 of the bakers. Latterly, the bakers have been possessed of 
 more capital, and have canvassed the markets, buying at any 
 price. They do not make much profit on their bread unless 
 grain is dear, so they do not higgle over prices. ... In these 
 markets of the country there are great numbers of men called 
 blatters, who bring in grain on horses and mules. On market 
 days there are 400-500 of these animals at Montlhery, all loaded 
 with wheat, oats, and barley. The blatiers are villagers who 
 cultivate no land but spend all their time in scouring the coun- 
 try." 4 This concentration of trade at Montlhery was not 
 only bringing together the grain from the eastern side of the 
 Beauce, it was also drawing from the vicinity of Chartres, thus 
 tending to bring to one market the whole trade of the Beauce 
 
 1 G 7 . 425. 5 Sept. 1685. Memoire de Menars sur 1'filection d'fitampes. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 354. 8 Sept. (1698). Memoire sur les desordres qui 
 se commettent es environs de Paris. 
 
 8 Memoires des Intendants sur les Generalites: Paris, p. 659. Notices sur les 
 marches dans les environs de Paris. 1686. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 354. 8 Sept. (1698). Memoire sur les desordres qui 
 se commettent es environs de Paris. 
 
90 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 with Paris. " The market at Montlhery is one of the most 
 important for thirty leagues around. The farmers of Yenville 
 (Janville) and of Chartres bring in such great quantity every 
 Monday that there are actually as much as four or five hundred 
 muids on the market." * The market at Montlhery, in 1699, 
 thus handled about twice as much grain as the Halle at Paris, 
 a striking development for a market that is not even mentioned 
 in the memoir of 1686 on the grain markets supplying Paris. 
 Much grain still went to Paris direct from the minor market 
 towns, but there is clearly a significant concentration of the 
 trade. 2 
 
 The volume of trade passing through Montlhery, the number 
 of bakers, merchants, and Uatiers buying and selling, led to 
 speculative purchases. The grain trade attracted all types of 
 speculators; some sought to gain by scouring the country, 
 buying outside the markets, others confined their attention 
 to operations in the town. In all this ferment of speculation 
 the markets fared badly, Montlhery no less than the minor local 
 markets. At times, the distress took the form of inexplicably 
 high prices; at times, the markets were ill supplied with grain. 
 Then, quite frequently, the markets were unusually well sup- 
 plied. This extraordinary confusion makes the trade of the 
 Beauce very difficult to understand, but despite the great 
 variety of reports, it is quite evident that the system of marketing 
 was changing rapidly. 
 
 The canvass of the farms by merchants and Uatiers is reported 
 from all sides. " The merchants of Paris . . . have been to 
 Janville and Chartres among many of the farms. They have 
 bought or contracted to take all the grain of that section, so 
 that only 20-30 muids has come to Montlhery since 29 January 
 (1699). " 3 Desperrieres writes from Chartres, "it is necessary 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21644. 6. Memoire sur les Bleds. Undated (1699). 
 
 2 Desperrieres, in a letter of 18 Dec. 1698, from Chartres (G 7 . 419) comments 
 on the old trade from the Pays Chartrain. He speaks of the movement from 
 Nogent and- Chartres to Houdan and thence to Mantes. He does not feel quite 
 sure of the destination of the grain, however, and seems inclined to think that it 
 goes down the Seine to Rouen. 
 
 3 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21644. 6. Memoire sur les Bleds. (1699.) 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 9! 
 
 to prevent the merchants from buying in the farms and houses 
 of the peasants." l From Melun, we hear that all classes " are 
 engaged in the gram trade : magistrates, all kinds of merchants, 
 and even artisans. Some, doubtless the well-to-do, or the 
 most avaricious, buy in the barns of the peasants." 2 Bouville 
 says that he is informed that " many of the merchants are buy- 
 ing of the metayers." 3 In the vicinity of Limours there are 
 rumors of the same practice. The collector of that town is 
 said to be forming granaries: " for the last two weeks carts 
 loaded with grain have been met at night on all the roads leading 
 to Limours and Chevreuse. Several persons of Rambouillet 
 are doing likewise, and it is said that they buy of the peasants 
 on the farms." 4 
 
 But this " country buying " was only one of the changes 
 in the Beauce. The larger market towns witnessed an appear- 
 ance of speculative buying that caused much apprehension. 
 The officials were at a loss to know how this new phenomenon 
 should be treated, but they were thoroughly convinced that it 
 was dangerous. " I have been told," writes one De Poix, 
 " that three-quarters of the 1 200 setiers brought to Paris in the 
 last fortnight from the Beauce was not sold on the markets, 
 at market prices in accordance with the ordinances. It is 
 sold at prices made outside the markets, at the inns and cafes. 
 The peasants exhibit samples in their handkerchiefs or in their 
 pockets, and higgle with the merchants over their cups. The 
 prices are concluded, then they separate to go to the market, 
 where they meet again. They open the sacks and make believe to 
 run the price up to the figure agreed upon. The grain is meas- 
 ured and is then carried off in carts, or on the horses and mules 
 brought to town by the buyers and the millers. The bourgeois 
 and the peasantry who come to buy are seriously inconvenienced, 
 as they cannot secure grain and are forced to return to their 
 homes empty-handed. Meanwhile these buyers and market 
 
 \ G 7 . 419. Chartres, 18 Dec. 1698. Desperrieres a Bouville. 
 
 * Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 457. Melun, 16 Dec. 1698. Parry a (Delamare). 
 
 8 G 7 . 419. Orleans, 4 Dec. 1698. Bouville au C. G. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21645. 88. Extrait d'une lettre ecrite de Villepreaux. (1699.) 
 
92 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 speculators send out into the farms, and carry away stealthily 
 grain for which they have contracted on the basis of samples, 
 in addition to what they have bought on the market.'' l In 
 this manner the wholesale traders managed to secure the larger 
 part of the supplies of the region without entering into public 
 competition with each other or with the local demand. Inci- 
 dentally, an important departure from the old system appeared 
 in the buying by sample. 
 
 At Montlhery, this type of extra-market dealing is found in 
 conjunction with other irregularities whose character is not very 
 clear. " When the farmers see that grain is dear, they carry 
 samples of grain to market in their pockets. They show these 
 samples to the bakers from Paris, and make their sales on this 
 basis. The bakers then send their millers to the farms and 
 carry off the grain at their convenience. One miller at Juvisy, 
 named Conart, has shipped as much as fifty muids of grain in 
 one day, on behalf of bakers of Paris." 2 At Montlhery, also, 
 the bakers at times engaged in curious speculative attempts 
 to manipulate the market. " The bakers of Montlhery and 
 Linas go every Saturday to the market at Dourdan, but instead 
 of buying what they need for a week or two they form granaries 
 there. They ship from these granaries to Montlhery, where 
 prices are high. To further their ends they make heavy pur- 
 chases at Dourdan on Saturday, the market day, making prices 
 rise by their operations, and as the market at Montlhery on 
 Monday is influenced by that at Dourdan, the bakers are able 
 to dispose of their grain at Montlhery at a considerable advance 
 in price. Then, too, the wealthier farmers of the environs of 
 Montlhery, for three or four leagues around, come regularly 
 to market on Monday without bringing a single bag of grain. 
 They watch the course of the market, and almost every time 
 they buy grain of the farmers of the environs who cannot hold 
 their grain, but are forced to sell even before it is threshed. 
 These sales are made on the basis of samples, which the farmers 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21644. 301. Paris, 13 Jan. 1699. De Poix. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 356. 8 Sept. 1698. Memoire qui marque les dSsordres 
 qui se commettent es environs de Paris. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 93 
 
 carry in their pockets. The sellers agree to deliver the grain 
 as soon as it is threshed. This goes on every market day, and 
 it contributes much to cause high prices, because the grain is 
 not brought to market by the owners as soon as it is threshed, 
 but is diverted into granaries. Many farmers have thus come 
 to market regularly without bringing any grain to be sold." * 
 
 At Chartres, the other considerable market in the Beauce, 
 the same intensity of speculative buying appeared, but the 
 accounts are not so detailed. There was much canvassing of 
 the farms in the neighborhood, and in the town itself every one 
 was engaged in the trade; " from the richest to the poorest," 
 all had caught the fever, even " the porters of the market-place 
 and their wives. They are all buying and selling. The well-to- 
 do peasants, who have grain of their awn still un threshed, buy 
 daily on the market. They form granaries and trade both on 
 the markets of the neighborhood and on the town market. 
 I have been assured that among all the traders there are no 
 more than three or four hundred muids of grain." 2 
 
 At Nemours, everything was on a smaller scale, but the 
 general aspects of the situation were the same. " Several mer- 
 chants," writes an anonymous correspondent, " have purchases 
 made for them by secret agents and then they sell again imme- 
 diately at higher prices. Most of the merchants come to market 
 before the appointed hour and make secret agreements in regard 
 to prices with the carters who have grain to sell. The latter 
 keep their sacks closed all through the market, and when it is 
 over they deliver the grain to the merchants. Some merchants 
 stop the peasants in the streets before their houses; others 
 seek them in the cafes and inns; others go among the farms, 
 scouring the rural districts." 3 In short, there was no longer 
 any organized market at Nemours. 
 
 In this confused picture of the destruction of the old market 
 system in the Beauce is revealed the full meaning of the pressure 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 356. 8 Sept. 1698. Memoire qui marque tous les 
 d6sordres qui se commettent es environs de Paris. 
 
 2 G 7 . 419. Chartres, 18 Dec. 1698. Desperrieres a Bouville. 
 
 8 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21645. 333. Extrait d'une lettre e"crite de Nemours, 1699. 
 
94 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 which began in the last years of Louis XIII. The increased 
 intensity of commercial demand destroyed the traditions of a 
 century and a half. The transition is difficult to follow because 
 it leads to so little that is definite. There is a concentration 
 of trade at Montlhery that is really significant, but the new 
 market is not based on any definite regulations. It is the crea- 
 tion of commercial convenience, and disappears in a large meas- 
 ure amidst the confusion of the period. The trade flows 
 through Montlhery, indeed, but there is no well-organized 
 market. The inadequacy of the old system is proved, but 
 nothing new supplants it. The markets exist in form, without 
 any of the regularity that secured for the buyers and sellers the 
 comprehensive competition that should be found on a market. 
 The merchants buy freely in the cafes and inns; supplies no 
 longer appear in full on the market; the farmers are content 
 to bring samples to market; the merchants, too, scour the coun- 
 tryside, buying in the farms, so that the peasants no longer 
 come to market with their wonted regularity. In short, the 
 problem of marketing appeared in all its complexity; all the 
 dangers and disadvantages of the chaos were perceived more 
 or less clearly by the administrative officials; the solution 
 of the difficulty was, however, beyond them. They were natu- 
 rally inclined to enforce the old regulations, but the inexpediency 
 of such measures was quickly revealed and the attempt was 
 abandoned. In this section of the Seine Basin the disorganiza- 
 tion of the markets produced no helpful results; no new forms 
 were developed that promised any improvement in price-making 
 and distribution. 
 
 In the Valley of the Oise the disadvantages of the prevailing 
 methods of the wholesale marketing appeared, but not in such 
 an exaggerated form that thorough reorganization of the system 
 became necessary. Nothing could better illustrate the inertia 
 of institutions. No far-reaching change took place until the 
 old system became impossible. The old market was seriously 
 affected; the wholesale trade became quite independent of the 
 town market, and finally encroached upon the supply coming 
 to the town, but despite all the difficulties of the case, nothing 
 
'THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 95 
 
 was done to organize the trade on a new basis. The general 
 aspects of the trade at Soissons underwent little change in the 
 course of the latter half of the seventeenth century; the character 
 of the marketing in 1660 is typical. Conditions in the town 
 itself are described by the Procureur du Roi. " The merchants 
 trading with Paris and other inhabitants do not allow the grain 
 to come into town for the market, but go out to meet the carters. 
 They buy secretly not only outside the town but even in the 
 streets. This impairs the market so that generally only three 
 or four muids are offered for sale." l But much grain was 
 bought in the country, either on the farms or in granaries of 
 landlords. Thus, Claude Archin had eighty muids of grain 
 " which he had bought from day to day of the peasants of the 
 country and others." 2 Another merchant has 300 muids in 
 the granaries of the Abbey of Saint Jean des Vignes, 3 part of 
 which was probably bought of the Abbey. In another granary 
 eighty muids were found: the product of the dues of " Lest- 
 rage," which had been farmed out by the Lieutenant Particulier 
 of Soissons. 4 Another granary had been filled with grain brought 
 in within the last three weeks from Fer-en-Tretenois. 5 Antoine 
 1'Eveque had 240 muids of- wheat, 66 muids of mixed grain, 
 40 muids of rye, 30 muids of oats, which he had bought from time 
 to time in the town of Soissons or in the neighborhood. In 
 partnership with Audiger and Le Vaux, he had bought about 
 900 muids of grain of the Marechal d'Estrees. Part of this 
 was in the Chateau at Soissons, part at Crevecoeur; and what 
 had not already been shipped to Paris was still in the Chateau. 6 
 The wholesale trade had thus taken control of practically 
 all the supplies of the region; what the merchants did not 
 themselves buy in the country was bought by them or by bour- 
 geois as soon as it reached the town. The town was necessarily 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 250 and 254. 6 Nov. 1660. Depositions du Procureur 
 du Roi and du Sr. Martinet. 
 
 2 Ibid., sous nom " Claude Archin." 
 
 3 Ibid., deposition de la femme de Danre". 
 
 4 Ibid., deposition d' Antoine Martinet. 
 
 5 Ibid. 250 ff. 7 Nov. 1660. 
 
 6 Ibid., testimony of Antoine L'fiveque. 
 
96 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 dependent upon the wholesale merchants, since its supplies were 
 largely derived from their granaries. The position of the town 
 was insecure, but the consequences of the domination of the 
 trade by the wholesalers were not necessarily serious. The 
 merchants were left to do very much as they pleased for long 
 periods. In 1660, there was some complaint about the failure 
 to enforce the ordinances. The principal judicial officers were 
 said to be interested in the trade, so that they purposely re- 
 frained from enforcing the regulations. 1 At all events, the trade 
 continued on this illegal basis throughout the remaining years 
 of the century. In 1670, the merchants even had the courage 
 to claim exemption from market dues on the ground that their 
 trade did not pass through the town market. They declared 
 that 20,000 muids were shipped annually to Paris, and they 
 implied that most of the grain was bought outside the town. 2 
 
 The danger of this domination of the wholesale trade appeared 
 in 1684, when the intensity of the Parisian demand caused an 
 extraordinary rise in prices. Soissons was threatened with 
 dearth by the extent of the shipments to Paris. The Intendant 
 writes: " Wheat, which was worth only 20-22 ecus per muid 
 last year, rose to 38 ecus in June and July, and now, September 
 ist, grain is worth 46 ecus, a figure never before reached at 
 this season of the year. These high prices have caused general 
 consternation, and the common people murmur. ... I have 
 just sent the Echevins an ordinance, which requires the mer- 
 chants to take turns in supplying the markets. Measures 
 have also been taken to prevent prices from exceeding prices 
 at Paris. No sales may be made to merchants of Paris, so long 
 as any individuals desire to buy at retail to supply their wants." 3 
 The principle involved in this ordinance was important but no 
 reorganization of the trade was effected. The town of Soissons 
 was protected; the proper relation between the wholesale and 
 the local trade was established by an administrative order, and 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 250 ff. 6 Nov. 1660. 
 
 2 H. 1822. Reg. du Bureau, clxii. 1670. 
 
 3 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 28, 107. i Sept. 1684. Le Vayer. G 7 . 510. i Sept. 
 1684. Text of the Ordinance enclosed with letter. Godard: Pouvoirs des Inten- 
 dants, p. 313 n., cites the Ordinance. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 97 
 
 yet there was no progress toward the development of machinery 
 to do automatically what Le Vayer was obliged to compass by 
 ordinance. The Intendant had to act as " Deus ex machina "; 
 fortunately, his discretion and insight enabled him to conduct 
 himself creditably. The adequacy ^of the expedient as a safe- 
 guard against the disorders of the chaotic wholesale trade 
 assured the persistence of the old conditions. 
 
 In 1693-94, there was a repetition of the experiences of 1684. 
 The point of view of the Parisian authorities was altered by their 
 interest in purchases made for the government in Soissons. 
 The correspondence is largely filled with this affair, but the 
 general conditions do not appear in the letters. Incidental 
 information, however, shows that the wholesale merchants were 
 engaged in the usual operations. Delamare writes: "Twenty 
 merchants of Neuilly-Saint-Front are buying up all the grain, 
 forming granaries, and selling to merchants of Paris." l An 
 anonymous correspondent writes from Compiegne, one " France 
 bought on the market through secret agents, but he was dis- 
 covered, and the two women buying for him were arrested. . . . 
 The merchant then went to Gillecourt, a village near Crepy, 
 buying there in the farms, for twenty sous per sack more than 
 the market price. Since that time, all the farmers for five leagues 
 around take their grain to him. He has relatives here who 
 receive his purchases and declare that it is from rents." 2 At 
 Soissons there was much apprehension, and Bossuet admits 
 that the supplies of the province are small. He feels that it 
 will be necessary to control the trade with care, if exhaustion 
 is to be avoided. 3 On the whole it is probable that the conditions 
 were the same as in 1684. This much at least is certain; the 
 wholesale merchants were again made responsible for furnishing 
 the local market. Bossuet says: " according to an old regula- 
 tion the maire and echevins for the last two months have re- 
 quired the merchants to place a fixed quantity of grain on sale 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 270. Note by Delamare, 1684. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 275. Lettre anonyme de Compiegne a Mme. 1'Abbesse 
 de 1'Hotel Dieu de Paris, 1693-94. 
 
 * G 7 . 1632. Soissons, 13 Juin 1693. Bossuet. 
 
98 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 in a specified place. They set the price at some figure slightly 
 below the current price, and the grain is sold to the poor artisans 
 in the presence of echevins." 1 The measure of Le Vayer was 
 not reproduced in its fulness, although the practical effect of 
 the ordinances may well have been similar. The wholesale 
 trade amassed such quantities of grain in the town that it was 
 hardly possible for the town to suffer serious inconvenience. 
 The rural districts were much more likely to feel the pressure 
 of the dearth, and they were not assisted by the supply brought 
 to the market at Soissons by the wholesale merchants. The 
 peasants and villagers had no means of protecting their interests 
 except open violence, and the stopping of carts and of grain 
 boats was not an efficient means of securing reorganization of 
 the trade. The comparative security of the town made the 
 officials indifferent, except in times of crisis when their empirical 
 expedients remedied the trouble that lay at their door, without 
 in the least removing the fundamental cause of the disorders. 
 
 This intensification of the distress in the rural sections ap- 
 peared strongly in 1697 and 1709. Apprehension was aroused 
 by heavy shipments towards the north, in part designed for the 
 army, but in part private trading ventures. The incident is 
 not described clearly by the Intendant and most of the details 
 are not relevant. It is worthy of note, however, that the vio- 
 lence was most considerable in the smaller towns, Genvry, 
 La Fere, Haut, Marie, and Chaulny. There was trouble at 
 Noyon, also, but less violence. 2 In 1709 the difference between 
 the distress in the towns and in the country is still more clearly 
 marked. At Soissons it was primarily a matter of high prices, 
 extraordinary prices, to be sure, but grain could be bought. 
 " Prices went up a pistole per muid at the last market," writes 
 d'Ormesson, March i, 1709, " and merchants who have come 
 up from Paris this last week have bought in the granaries of 
 bourgeois at 52 ecus per muid of Soissons. 3 In the next five 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Soissons, 3 Oct. 1693. Bossuet, avec reponse du Sr. du Pile 
 en marge. 
 
 2 G 7 . 572. Soissons, u, 12, 13, 15 Juin 1697. De la Houssaye. 
 
 8 Twenty-two ecus was an ordinary price, see supra. G 7 . 1650. Soissons, I 
 Mars 1709. d'Ormesson. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 99 
 
 weeks, 805 muids of wheat and 57 muids of oats were sent down 
 to Paris, notwithstanding the high prices. 1 In the six weeks 
 preceding April 18, nearly 2000 muids were shipped to Paris 
 from Soissons, without counting other ports on the river. Evi- 
 dently the rate of export increased rather than diminished. 
 But no word of distress in Soissons. D'Ormesson fears for the 
 province as a whole, and declares that any attempt to draw 
 grain from Soissons for the army is likely to provoke popular 
 violence. The Bishop writes that the village markets of the 
 back country are in many places entirely without supplies and 
 without hope of securing any grain, unless the grain purchased 
 by merchants of Paris is placed on sale. Fere-en-Tarlenois, 
 Braine, Vailly, Coucy, and Attichy are mentioned particularly, 
 but the distress was probably not confined to those villages. 2 
 The country districts thus suffered most severely from the dis- 
 orders of the wholesale trade, but the relative indifference of 
 Soissons left the trade unreformed. 
 
 As in the Beauce, there was much distress and chaos, but it 
 did not happen to take a form that led to practical results. 
 Empirical expedients and the comparative security in the larger 
 towns on account of the swelling volume of the trade made it 
 possible for the towns to tolerate the informality of trade that 
 was contrary to the interests of the back country and of Paris. 
 At Noyon, circumstances were tending towards the establish- 
 ment of a wholesale market, but the tendencies fell just short 
 of definite results. The stream of blatters coming into town 
 from day to day might easily have led to the development of 
 an informal wholesale market such as appeared at Bray. But 
 something was lacking. The volume of trade was not great 
 enough. The opportunity of selling privately to the merchants 
 and bourgeois was too alluring. The trade may have been 
 too irregular. At all events, the apparently significant ten- 
 dencies at Noyon came to nothing. Unquestionably an impor- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1647. Bleds charges a Soissons pour Paris depuis le 6 Mars jusqu'au 
 13 Avril 1709. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1650. Soissons, 25 Avril et 4 Mai 1709. vque de Soissons: Attichy, 
 12 Mai 1709. Marillac. 
 
100 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 tant factor was the absence of severe pressure of Parisian demand. 
 Supplies could be secured elsewhere in case of need, and the 
 dependence upon Soissonnais was never very great. It was an 
 occasional source upon which little reliance was placed. Con- 
 sequently, purchases in Soissons were generally curtailed before 
 the region was very seriously affected. The metropolitan 
 demand was sufficiently intense to exhibit the possibilities, 
 but it never pressed beyond that point. The history of the trade 
 there is for this reason peculiarly tantalizing; it presents the 
 problem, but the problem never seems to need a complete 
 solution. 
 
 Ill 
 
 The First Wholesale Market 
 
 In the Valleys of the Marne and Seine, the history of the 
 trade is more significant. The general forms of market organiza- 
 tion in 1660 were very similar to the forms in the Oise Valley. 
 The larger towns were quite as indifferent to the welfare of the 
 back country. But these regions were the primary source of 
 water-borne supply, the reliance of Paris; Paris was conse- 
 quently ready to take an active part in the regulation of the 
 trade throughout this section. The interest of Paris, too, 
 was never asserted without regard to local conditions. The 
 efforts of Parisian officials were ever directed towards finding 
 some means of reconciling all the conflicting necessities. The 
 pressure upon the sources of supply, was more persistent in 
 time of stress, and there was a distinct attempt to regulate the 
 trade from the broad standpoint of the general welfare of all 
 .sections. The pressure led to new forms of market organiza- 
 tion; the far-sighted administrative officials were alert and 
 ready to seize upon a solution of the ever-present problem. The 
 history of the trade on the Marne and Seine consequently led 
 to definite results. The first wholesale markets appeared. 
 
 In the Valley of the Marne, the abundance of the available 
 supply rendered administrative control relatively infrequent. 
 Information is inadequate, and there is every indication that 
 the market system developed less rapidly than in the other parts 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS' ici : 
 
 of the Seine Basin. The indifference of the resident merchants 
 persisted longer than elsewhere, both in their dealings with the 
 wholesale merchants and with the blatters. At Chalons, the 
 granaries were doubtless the basis of the wholesale trade, as 
 has been stated in a previous chapter, but the mode in which 
 these granaries were rilled is a matter of importance. In the 
 early period, rents in kind were the most important source of 
 supply. In 1660, this was no longer true. Magdelaine Gou- 
 douin says that blatiers from Lorraine brought great quantities 
 of grain to the town. 1 Probably this blatier trade was quite 
 extensive even then, so that grain came to the town in that 
 way from the vicinity as well as from Lorraine. The blatiers 
 doubtless sold their grain on the market to the bourgeois, and 
 the well-to-do had an opportunity to increase their stores by 
 judicious purchases on the market. Trade on the Marne was 
 thus very considerable even in those years which mark the 
 beginning of active development in the Oise Valley or on the 
 Upper Seine. But both at Chalons and at Vitry it was the dull 
 granary trade, apathetic, inert, manifesting none of the 
 feverish effort to secure the maximum profit that characterizes 
 modern trade. 
 
 The " country buying " that was so wide-spread in the Seine 
 Valley in 1660 did not appear on the Upper Marne until 1694. 
 That great dearth indeed marked the beginning of the transition 
 from the old market system to the new. The merchants of 
 Chalons began to devote more attention to the business ; instead 
 of waiting for the grain to come to them, they made an active 
 canvass of the country. The region between the Marne and the 
 Seine offered the greatest supplies, and although there was 
 some competition with merchants who worked up from the 
 Seine, the traders penetrated to Arcis-sur-Seine. In January, 
 1694, " Lorinet and Clement, merchants at Chalons, came to 
 Arcis four or five times. They bought and shipped great quan- 
 tities of grain which they said were destined for the king's 
 store houses. After the grain had been measured and put in 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 357. 4 Nov. 1660. Testimony of Magdelaine Gou- 
 douin. 
 
ID2 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 sacks, it was left for 6-8 weeks in the granaries at Arcis." The 
 witness, a measurer, said that " he had no. idea of 'the quantity 
 secured by the merchants, but every trip occasioned the ship- 
 ment of 20-30 wagon-loads." l 
 
 Some grain went to Vitry from Arcis, most particularly grain 
 purchased by one Guidor, a merchant of Nogent-sur-Seine. 
 He shipped ordinarily to the Seine ports, but at times sold grain 
 to merchants at Vitry. 2 Roger, a merchant of Vitry, also made 
 purchases in this vicinity, notably " of a couple of Uatiers who 
 lived at Aunay. These blatiers bought of the peasants in the 
 farms, and sold to the various wholesale merchants at Arcis." 3 
 
 But the direct buying in the distant villages by merchants 
 of Chalons and Vitry was relatively unusual. There was con- 
 siderable trade in the hands of blatiers who bought on the Aube 
 and sold at the Marne ports. This was quite as new as the direct 
 " country buying," and much more important. In 1630, the 
 Aube Valley sent its grain directly to Paris; 4 in 1694, the direct 
 trade with Paris was A still notable. The commissioners said 
 that there were three classes of merchants at Arcis-sur-Aube, 
 " the merchants who traded directly with Paris, Piot and Thomas; 
 merchants limiting their operations to Arcis itself, buying and 
 selling in the town; persons who acted as agents of Parisian 
 merchants." 5 But the blatier trade with the Marne ports 
 tended to carry the grain to the larger entrepots. " Blatiers 
 who come from neighboring towns buy a considerable portion 
 of the grain on the market, and even buy of the merchants of 
 Arcis. They sell later in the markets of La-Fere- Champenoise, 
 Vitry, Chalons, and other places where wholesale merchants 
 buy." 6 Jean Barbaron, one of the witnesses, describes the 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 239. i Aout 1694. Arcy-sur-Aube. Testimony of 
 Jean Barbaron. 
 
 2 Ibid. 239. i Aout 1694. Charles Dedet. 
 
 3 Ibid. 248v. 2 Aout 1694. Pierre Hughes. Ibid., 247. Marion, factor of 
 Faure, testifies to the same facts. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 136. Testimony of Marguerite Froissart, 16 Dec. 
 1630. 
 
 6 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 194. 30 Juillet 1694. 
 
 6 Ibid. 194. 30 Juillet 1694. Proces Verbal, Arcis. General statement of 
 the result of the inquest. 
 
TEE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 103 
 
 operations of Plot and Thomas in detail. He speaks of their 
 shipments to Paris, " they -shipped four or five boat-loads of 
 grain to Paris during the last year. Under this pretext they 
 scoured the country, buying in all the farms and villages around 
 Arcis. They brought this grain to their granaries in the town. 
 But he has observed, of late, that they sold to blatters of Epernay, 
 La-Fere-Champenois and other places, instead of shipping to 
 Paris." 1 The smaller resident merchants were even more 
 dependent upon the blatiers, if we may trust the report of Claude 
 d'Osse, the Surgeon. " The merchants who have less capital 
 than Piot and Thomas buy the grain that is brought to the 
 market at Arcis by the peasants. This they store in granaries 
 and sell later to blatiers who come to buy." 2 The Aube Valley 
 trade was gradually drawn towards the larger shipping ports 
 of the Marne. The resident merchants who had previously 
 been engaged in trade with Paris were assuming the functions 
 of collectors for the Marne towns, assisted by the numerous 
 blatiers who were carrying grain from market to market. The 
 growing volume of this blatter trade rendered unnecessary 
 special efforts on the part of the merchants of the Marne 
 towns. The passive attitude toward supply was, on their 
 part, the more characteristic even in these closing years of the 
 century. 
 
 There was some " country buying " in this region in 1697- 
 1700 and in 1709, but it was quite inconsiderable in comparison 
 with the extent of the granary trade, and it was largely the work 
 of Parisian merchants or local merchants who resided in the 
 small towns. The merchants of Chalons and Vitry remained 
 indifferent to the trade outside the town. 
 
 In 1697, Larcher speaks of trouble from " country buying " 
 on the frontier of Champagne. " There are many merchants 
 and blatiers in these cantons, who are carrying grain away from 
 the villages by night as well as by day." But this was for export 
 over the frontier at Mezieres. 3 In 1699, we hear that Sr. Peraud, 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 239. i Aout 1694. Jean Barbaron. 
 
 8 Ibid. 239. i Aout 1694. 
 
 3 G 7 . 227. Chalons, 17 Nov. 1697. Larcher. 
 
104 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Procureur at the Baillage of Chalons, had formed several grana- 
 ries, at Pontavert, Chalons, and other places. He was said to 
 have scoured the whole countryside for grain. 1 In 1 700, Pomereu 
 made a careful investigation and reports " that some of the 
 merchants of Chalons who trade with Paris are suspected of 
 buying grain in the farms instead of on the markets." 2 In 
 regard to merchants of Vitry, he is even more doubtful of the 
 reliability of general reports: " there are some who are suspected 
 of taking up grain in the country districts, but these accounts 
 are vague rumors without any proof." 3 But there were 
 instances, particularly on the frontier, in Rethelois, where an 
 anonymous correspondent complained of the practices of one 
 Mme. Perart of Chalons, apparently with real foundation. 
 Of this woman Pomereu writes: " she and her husband who live 
 here, together with a brother-in-law at Charleville, have been 
 engaged in a very considerable grain trade for several years. 
 They buy everywhere and most of the shipments are said to 
 be destined for Paris." 4 With due allowance for these individual 
 exceptions, it is evident that the trade was characteristically 
 centered in the towns, Vitry and Chalons. 
 
 Detailed evidence of the handling of grain at Chalons does 
 not appear. The one precise statement in regard to the mode 
 of buying is found in the declarations of a number of grain mer- 
 chants in 1698. De Vige, one of the principal merchants, says 
 that in the course of the preceding month he bought 150 setiers 
 of grain of blatiers who brought it to his door. 5 Very likely 
 this was a typical mode of buying. It is in keeping with the 
 character of the trade, an outcome of the apathy of the merchants 
 and of the desire of the blatiers to sell their grain without waiting 
 for the regular market day. 
 
 At Vitry, the trade was certainly of this type. The granary 
 was the basis of all trading, both of buying and of selling. There 
 
 1 H. 1837. Reg. du Bureau, 202. 9 Mars 1699. 
 
 2 G 7 . 229. Chalons, 13 Nov. 1700. Pomereu. 
 
 3 G 7 . 229. Chalons, 18 Nov. 1700, Pomereu. 
 
 4 G 7 . 229. Chalons, 22 Aout 1700. Pomereu and enclosure from Rethel, 
 1 8 Aout 1700. See also G 7 . 1642. Chalons. 13 Fev. 1709. Harouys. 
 
 6 G 7 . 228. Chalons, 2 Oct. 1698. Larcher. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS IOS 
 
 was some " country buying," but it was not very wide-spread. 1 
 In 1694, we get brief indications of the character of the trade 
 in the town. The Provost says: " the country people are 
 accustomed to carry their grain directly to the merchants to 
 whom they sell, and from whom they frequently receive loans." 2 
 These customs were rudely disturbed by the agent of the Provost 
 of Paris who endeavored to enforce the old market regulations, 
 requiring that all grain be sold on the market. 3 The result of 
 this was a complete cessation of trade at Vitry. " In two months, 
 scarcely enough grain came into town to load one boat . . . 
 the peasants and blatiers went to Chalons or to Troyes where 
 the trade was free." 4 Trade was reestablished at Vitry only 
 by the publication of an ordinance permitting " peasants and 
 country people to bring their grain to town, and to dispose of 
 it as they see fit, permitting merchants to buy freely, except 
 from twelve o'clock of the day before market day to noon of 
 the following day." 5 Nothing could show more clearly that 
 the blatier trade had grown to such an extent that grain was 
 coming every day and that the blatiers were selling to the mer- 
 chants in their houses. The old market regulations could no 
 longer be enforced. The wholesale trade had become concen- 
 trated in the town; there was little " country buying," but 
 there was no organized wholesale market. 
 
 Fortunately, however, we are not obliged to depend solely 
 upon these inferences. The trade of Vitry is comprehensively 
 described in a letter from Pomereu that leaves nothing to be 
 desired. " There are ninety- two grain merchants who have 
 registered in the Baillage of Vitry. Only thirty ordinarily 
 trade personally with Paris, the others assist them when they 
 have not enough to fill a boat, for it is always possible to buy 
 
 1 In addition to the statement of Pomereu in his letter of 18 Nov. 1700, see G 7 . 
 1630. Vitry, ii Nov. 1693, where three women are accused of buying in the 
 farms. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 48. Vitry, 19 Dec. 1694. Le Bel, PreV6t a Vitry. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1635. Also Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. I9 . 19 Oct. 1694. Ord. de Le Blanc, 
 Comm. des Prevot des March, et Echevins de Paris. 
 
 4 Letter of Le Bel, see note (2). 
 
 6 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 26. Vitry, 15 Dec. 1694. Ord. du PreVdt. 
 
106 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 enough in their granaries to complete the consignment. They 
 all buy part of their grain in the markets, but they are also 
 accustomed to receive at their houses the peasants and other 
 people who bring them samples of grain. They trade on the 
 basis of these samples and fix the price. Then the peasants 
 deliver at the granaries the quantity agreed upon without 
 bringing the grain to market. This is not strictly in accordance 
 with the ordinances, but the usual regulations are very properly 
 suspended, as the grain purchased in this manner is destined 
 for the provision of Paris." l Clearly the general conditions 
 of trade were what they had been in 1694. The town was 
 frequented by the peasants and blatiers of the immediate neigh- 
 borhood and from Lorraine. The volume of trade thus con- 
 centrated in the town was considerable. In its general aspect 
 it was the same tendency that appeared in the Beauce, in Santerre 
 and Soissonnais, in Touraine, but the effect on the organization 
 of the trade was somewhat different. At Montlhery, the trade 
 was confined primarily to the market days, there was selling by 
 sample in the cafes as well as on the market, but in some form 
 or other there was a concourse of buyers and sellers, competing 
 with each other. At Noyon, for a time, the blatiers flocked 
 into town not only on market day but on other days of the week. 
 The merchants bought on the market, and there seemed to be a 
 possibility of the establishment of a wholesale market. But the 
 merchants did not rest content with waiting until grain came to 
 Noyon ; they persisted in working up into the supply regions to 
 buy on the tributary markets. Whatever came to Noyon 
 was quickly purchased, but there was no reliance upon the 
 blatier supply. Here at Vitry, and probably at Chalons, the 
 abundance of the available supply rendered the merchants 
 less enterprising. They were quite willing to wait for supplies 
 to be brought to town, but the combination of general sluggish- 
 ness and the long-established custom of buying in granaries 
 
 1 G 7 . 229. Chalons, 18 Nov. 170x3. Pomereu. This letter is in unusually 
 bad condition. It has suffered from book-worms, dampness, and dirt, so that some 
 words are entirely missing. The last line or two of my citation is somewhat con- 
 jectural, though the general meaning of the original is clear. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS IOJ 
 
 resulted in informal dealing in the houses of the merchants. 
 The concentration of trade needed for the establishment of a 
 market was present, but the assembling of buyers and seUers 
 did not accompany the other feature of the market. 
 
 In the Seine Valley, the combination of circumstances was 
 more felicitous. The trade of the region was 'remarkable, even 
 in 1660, for the enterprise and vigor displayed by the merchants. 
 If the available supply was not as great as that of the Marne, 
 the inherent difficulties merely served to stimulate the mer- 
 chants to greater efforts. This feverish energy of the wholesale 
 merchants was communicated to the blatiers, and the wide- 
 spread endeavor to realize the anticipated profits of the trade 
 gave it a briskness that is very modern. This difference in the 
 temper of the traders, combined with the gradual tendency 
 towards concentration, led to the formation of a real wholesale 
 market at Bray. 
 
 The early appearance of " country buying " in this region 
 has already led to some study of conditions in 1660. The activity 
 of the merchants in these districts has received considerable 
 attention. The " country buying " around Montereau by 
 Nepveu, Lavalle, Le Brie, and other factors of Parisian mer- 
 chants, the formation of granaries in the towns for convenience 
 in shipping, the legal recognition of this irregularity, by the 
 acknowledgment that grain passing through a town in such a 
 manner need not pay market dues, all this has been discussed. 
 The significance of the change is somewhat concealed by the 
 persistence of the granaries in the shipping towns. There 
 is a wide difference between the granary formed in the town 
 by purchases on the market, and the granary formed by grain 
 purchased in the country. 
 
 When the trade quieted down after the dearth of 1663, the 
 merchants became less active in their operations in the country; 
 the blatiers were able to take advantage of the opportunity 
 left by the merchants. The Seine towns witnessed an increase 
 of the market trade, especially at Bray. There was an approxi- 
 mation to conditions on the Marne. The town granaries of 
 merchants and bourgeois were filled by this blatier trade, but 
 
108 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the enterprise of the merchants led to active buying from the 
 Uatiers. They sought out the Uatiers instead of waiting for 
 the Uatiers to come to their houses. This resulted in the estab- 
 lishment of a wholesale market. The Uatiers naturally came 
 to the Halle, the merchants sought them there, and bought 
 freely every week-day, whether it was a market day or not. 
 There was thus a concourse of buyers and sellers, who were 
 assembled not for local but for wholesale trade. The limitations 
 of the local market regulations were no longer in force, and the 
 trade was continuous instead of being intermittent. 
 
 The date of the change cannot be ascertained with accuracy. 
 The first descriptions of this custom come from the year 1694, 
 when the practice is said to be the customary form of the trade, 
 interrupted for the two years preceding by the " country buy- 
 ing " of Jean Roger and his factors. Doubtless the custom 
 took form gradually between 1680 and 1690. Even in 1692, 
 the market at Bray can hardly have presented the definite form 
 suggested by Delamare's account, in the Traite de la Police. 
 The careful statement of Pierre Philipon presents all the irregu- 
 larities and qualifications that must be added to the sharp, 
 clear-cut description of Delamare: " Every Friday," says 
 Philipon, " the grain market is held at Bray. It opens at 
 eight o'clock for the bourgeois and for the bakers, and when 
 they are all supplied the merchants are allowed to buy. Be- 
 tween Martinmas and Easter the peasants bring grain to Bray 
 every day, whether it is market day or not. They carry their 
 grain to the Halle or to the houses of individual merchants, 
 and sell to such persons as present themselves. In years of 
 plenty, the peasants brought such a great quantity that all who 
 were engaged in the trade could buy what they wished, but 
 for the last two years grain has been dear. Much less has come 
 to the market, as the peasants of Brie have become accustomed 
 to carry their grain elsewEere. Almost no one has come to 
 Bray save the peasants and Uatiers from Burgundy who have 
 continued to come every day of the week." l Thus we must 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 311 ff. 20 Juillet 1694. Inquest at Bray, testimony 
 of Pierre Philipon. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 109 
 
 not think of this informal wholesale market at Bray as a definite, 
 comprehensive system; much of this blatier grain was sold to 
 the merchants at their granaries just as at Vitry. Possibly 
 the proportion of grain sold in that manner was really con- 
 siderable. At all events, the trade was very unstable, changing 
 its form considerably under the pressure of rather slight cir- 
 cumstances. 
 
 In 1693-94, the customary mode of buying was completely 
 disorganized, primarily by the energetic efforts of Roger and 
 his partners to secure control of the grain in the Seine Valley. 
 With agents in most of the important ports and what was then 
 a rather large capital, Roger had his agents buy extensively 
 in the farms and in the towns, urging them to secure the grain 
 at any cost. " Colmet, the Receiver of the Domain, was Roger's 
 agent at Bray. He had acquired control of practically all the 
 grain brought to Bray. His wife, who was engaged in collecting 
 the tolls at the bridge, combined this task with the grain trade. 
 She stopped all the peasants' carts bringing grain to town, talked 
 with the drivers and told them to carry the grain to her house. 
 When it was market day and the peasants were obliged to go 
 to the Halle, Colmet's wife would come and outbid all the other 
 merchants, so that she secured the greater part of the grain, 
 although she paid more than the other merchants had decided 
 to offer. Colmet himself rarely appeared on the market at 
 Bray. He went off on horseback. The witness did not know 
 where he went, but last year, between Martinmas and Christmas, 
 many cart-loads of grain came to Bray in sacks bearing Roger's 
 mark, so that he supposed it was grain that Colmet had pur- 
 chased in the farms." 1 Other witnesses said confidently that 
 Colmet bought extensively in the country. The resident 
 merchants were equally guilty of this " country buying." Etienne 
 Musseau says: " the merchants of Paris buy in the farms when- 
 ever they are in the region. The merchants of Bray do likewise, 
 especially Gaillard, who is factor of Thomas Viard of Paris. 
 He has never seen Gaillard buy grain on the market, although 
 he carries on a very large trade in the neighborhood, and has 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. -311. 20 Juillet 1694. Pierre Philipon. 
 
IIO THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 granaries at Donne-Marie and at Vimpelles. Colmet, agent 
 of Roger, also buys in the country of the peasants, so that very 
 little grain comes to market." l The Notary gives a more 
 detailed account. " The officials at Bray wished to stop these 
 abuses. They ordered the peasants to bring their grain to the 
 market, and required the merchants to buy there, but this 
 regulation was not observed for more than six or eight markets. 
 The merchants began to scour the country again, asserting that 
 they had received permission to buy in the farms. ... In the 
 streets of the towns, Colmet's wife' and other merchants stopped 
 the peasants on their way to market, prevented them from 
 proceeding to the Halle, and even forced them to sell their 
 grain on the spot. After such purchases the merchants fre- 
 quently divided the grain between them, and at times with 
 much heat and quarreling. Each tried to out-bid the other, 
 and the peasants said that they could sell their grain for whatever 
 they wished, so great was the eagerness of the merchants to 
 secure it." 2 
 
 The incipient wholesale market was thus disorganized shortly 
 after the custom had become established. Even after 1694, 
 the old custom did not reassert itself at once. The disorder 
 continued through 1699. " For five or six years," says Louis 
 Cajon, " the peasants have ceased to bring their grain to town 
 for the regular market. They also have ceased to unload at 
 the Halle. Instead, they carry the grain directly to the mer- 
 chants, who buy on the bridge or in the streets and have the 
 grain delivered at their houses. Pierre Blot, Lamy, Cottereau, 
 de la Noue, the widow Chaillot, and Philippe de Billy, grain 
 merchants, stop the carts of the peasants on the bridge, examine 
 the samples, bargain, bid against each other, quarreling and 
 becoming so excited that they are almost ready to fight." 3 
 Nicolas Amant tells the same story. " The peasants frequently 
 bring grain to town on all days of the week except feast days. 
 They have come more frequently for the last six weeks than 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 311. 20 Juillet 1694. fitienne Musseau. 
 
 2 Ibid. Ed m e Mercier. 
 
 8 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 317. 3 Jan. 1699. Louis Cajon. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS III 
 
 previously. At the same time, la Noue, Jacques Sennene, 
 Cottereau, Lamy, Philippe de Billy, and the widow Chaillot go 
 out to meet them at the bridge. They stop them, examine 
 the samples, and bid against each other." l If this were all, 
 the tendency towards a definite wholesale market would be 
 very clear. We have a real competition among the merchants, 
 and it is of little moment whether they meet the grain at the 
 Halle or on the bridge. There is a concourse of buyers and 
 sellers. Bidding on the lots of grain is animated. Speculation 
 is rife. Prices rise beyond the usual local figures, so that this 
 active wholesale trade causes great apprehension. Doubtless 
 the existence of this trade in the town induced Delamare to 
 insert in his Traite de la Police the description of the daily mar- 
 ket at Bray. His knowledge of the facts was extensive, since 
 these inquests were made by him personally, or by officials 
 in close touch with him. But it is necessary to recognize 
 clearly the qualifications that must be added. The trade 
 which still comes to town during these years is only part of 
 the trade. 
 
 A remarkable change had taken place in the attitude of the 
 blatters and country people. Colmet says that " for four years 
 or more the peasants in the vicinity of the town, who became 
 wealthy during the dearth, have no longer brought their grain 
 to the Halle at Bray, but have waited for the merchants to come 
 to them. They even refuse to sell except in the late season, 
 and then only if the season offers special advantages. If the 
 merchants do not offer the prices they expect, these peasants 
 hold the grain over until the following year. This avarice 
 reduces the market of Bray to a few muids of grain, although 
 formerly the peasants brought in 40-50 muids." 2 At all events 
 the merchants of Bray bought freely in the farms. La Noue 
 had " an agent at Goix, named Rizon, another at Vimpelle, 
 and two or three others in different places. They do nothing 
 but run from farm to farm, buying up all the grain they can lay 
 their hands on. When one of them has five or six cart-loads, 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 317. 3 Jan. 1699. Nicolas Amant. 
 
 2 Ibid. 317. 3 Jan. 1699. Jean Colmet. 
 
112 TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 he sends it to de la Noue at Bray or to a granary that de la Noue 
 hasatPort-Moutain." 1 
 
 Granaries were formed even in the back country. At Plessis- 
 Saint-Jean, one Chatelain bought extensively of peasants, 
 personally and by agents. An inn keeper at Montigny acted 
 as agent. All the grain was amassed in granaries. Chatelain 
 sold only by sample, and in the late season when prices were 
 high. 2 
 
 In this chaos of speculation it is difficult to see anything 
 sufficiently precise and permanent to be of significance. Even 
 our wholesale market is pretty elusive. But it was its appear- 
 ance, even with this extreme disorder, that gave Delamare 
 the idea of a legally established wholesale market, which he 
 applied at Vitry with such success in 1709. The zeal of the 
 merchants in the Seine Basin was too keen to enable any regula- 
 tion to survive a period of dearth, but the relative quiet in the 
 Upper Marne Valley gave administrative regulations a better 
 chance of survival. In all probability the tendencies towards 
 order would establish themselves in the ordinary years, even 
 at Bray, but the real significance of the wholesale market is 
 in our period limited to Vitry. 
 
 The conditions of trade there previous to 1709 have already 
 been described. The history of the year 1709 turns upon 
 the experience of Delamare in the Seine Valley in 1694 and 
 1699, when he drew up the inquests which we have just con- 
 sidered. 
 
 The marked contrast between the trade at Vitry and Chalons 
 and the trade at Bray is explained by Delamare's letter of 
 August 14, practically the first report sent back to Paris: " I 
 perceive that most of the grain in this province is in the hands 
 of the wealthy bourgeois and officials. The resident grain 
 merchants are well-to-do, but few of the merchants from Paris 
 are rich or capable of carrying on a large trade. They buy here 
 on credit. The sellers are not under any necessity of selling, 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 317. 3 Jan. 1699. Louis Cajon, also Nicolas 
 Bridon. 
 
 2 Ibid. Several depositions following the deposition of Jean Colmet. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 113 
 
 and do so only when they find it convenient. The buyers 
 have little ready money, but they pay what the residents ask. 
 The credit they are obliged to give forces them to increase the 
 price enough to give them interest on their money. Would 
 to God that they might cease to give credit! If they came 
 themselves to Paris, we would have our grain cheaper. It 
 would pass through two hands, whereas now it passes through 
 three or four hands." l The extraordinary feature of the trade 
 of Vitry, however, is the importance of the granaries formed 
 from rents. " The officers and notable bourgeois who live on 
 their rents, even the farmers of the ecclesiastical estates and 
 others who receive rents in kind, have always had complete 
 freedom to form granaries. In many cases their tenants are 
 required by their leases to deliver at Vitry the grain turned 
 over in payment of rent." 2 But most of these persons were 
 not very wealthy. " All the property of the residents of Vitry 
 is land, and their income is paid in kind. What they now have 
 in their granaries is the product of seven or eight years' rents 
 on which they had realized nothing. Lately, most of them have 
 been selling, but there are only five or six families that could 
 really be called rich. The others have very moderate fortunes 
 or are actually poor. All have some domains, however, both 
 rich and poor, so that the grain is distributed among such a 
 number of families that no individual has been able to secure 
 large profits." 3 
 
 But the trade of Vitry was not entirely based on these 
 rents. The situation of the town, practically at the head of 
 navigation on the Marne, attracted a considerable volume of 
 trade; not only the grain of the neighborhood came thither, 
 but even grain from distant sections outside the Baillage, 
 especially Lorraine and Bar. This grain was purchased by 
 the resident merchants or by the bourgeois. It is the trade 
 that is described by Pomereu in 1700. Since that time, how- 
 ever, some merchants had moved out to the suburbs so that 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21647. 62. Vitry-le-Francois, 14 Aout 1709. Delamare. 
 
 2 Ibid. 21650. 246. Observations pour la police des grains a Vitry. 
 
 3 Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 267, 693. 5 Fev. 1710. Delamare. 
 
114 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 they might the more easily secure the grain brought in by 
 peasants. 1 
 
 The trouble at Vitry was not lack of grain. Delamare had 
 been sent up from Paris to prevent the merchants from holding 
 back their shipments. He began by visiting the granaries 
 and by urging the merchants to forward considerable consign- 
 ments to Paris. " These shipments," he says, " stimulated 
 trade, and divers foreigners arrived at Vitry with grain in carts 
 or on pack horses. I spoke with them and assured them of my 
 protection, I even permitted them to sell daily in the public 
 square, which had never before been done." 2 These foreigners 
 were the Lorraine blatiers who had formerly sold their grain 
 to the merchants in their houses. In 1709, the merchants 
 had begun to stop these blatiers in the streets or on the roads 
 outside the city, so that Delamare had granted them full per- 
 mission to sell on the public square. This provision attracted 
 more trade, and " prices fell. . . . The people were very much 
 pleased, but the rich bourgeois and merchants were much put 
 out. They endeavored to harass the Lorrainers and other 
 foreigners, refusing to make any offers for their grain. The 
 foreigners came to find me, and I enabled them to sell their 
 grain at a satisfactory price. They are coming in daily. It 
 is one continual stream of convoys from Lorraine, Bar, the 
 Bishoprics of Toul and Verdun, some from Alsace, and I have 
 even been told that some are en route from Franche Comte." 3 
 The increasing volume of trade spread dismay among the mer- 
 chants, who had expected prices to rise from a continually increas- 
 ing scarcity. Delamare feared intrigues and was anxious to 
 establish trade on a basis that should be so satisfactory to the 
 blatiers that they would continue to come. To this end, he 
 issued the ordinance of 21 October 1709. "All grain which 
 has been despatched to Vitry and all grain en route shall be 
 brought to town and placed on sale in accordance with the 
 ordinances and police regulations. Peasants and other persons 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21650. 246. Observations sur la police des Bleds a Vitry. 
 
 2 Delamare, op. cit., ad ed., Ill, Supp. p. 39. 
 
 3 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21647. i2gv. Vitry, 20 Oct. 1709. Delamare. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 115 
 
 living within three leagues of the town shall expose and sell 
 their grain at the Halle on Mondays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. 
 All other persons shall expose and sell their grain on the Square 
 in the center of the town on all days of the week save Sundays 
 and feast days. No one shall go out to meet the grain entering 
 the town." 
 
 " No one shall sell grain except at the Halle or on the Public 
 Square." 
 
 " The market at the Square, which is to be held daily except 
 on feast days, shall be open to peasants and foreigners, who 
 may expose their grain as soon as they arrive, and sell at all 
 hours of the day. On the Square, all persons may buy: the 
 people, the bourgeois, the bakers, and merchants, save that 
 the first hour shall be for the bourgeois and country people 
 who have need." l 
 
 This is the first attempt to organize a regular wholesale 
 grain market. The local demand is legally given the freedom 
 of the wholesale market, but in practice it is not likely that 
 many local purchases were made on the Square. The habit 
 of marketing on fixed days was too inveterate to be quickly 
 supplanted by new modes of buying. The market on the Square 
 with its wholesale supply was devoted almost exclusively to 
 the wholesale trade. Even on market days, the wholesale 
 market was independent of the town market at the Halle. 
 The wholesale trade, which had existed so long without any 
 definite organization, the haphazard buying in granaries, the 
 energetic scouring of the country, the disorderly bargaining 
 with the carters outside the town gates or in the streets, all 
 this chaos had at last been supplanted by an orderly daily market 
 with a steady inflow of supply and a comprehensive representa- 
 tion of the wholesale demand. 
 
 Another feature of improved market organization appeared 
 at Vitry in these years of dearth. There was a striking tendency 
 towards the distributing market, the market that does not 
 collect merely for itself and a single line of export trade, but 
 gathers together the supply of a whole region and then dis- 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., 2d ed., Ill, Supp. pp. 39-40. 
 
Il6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 tributes the abundance of one section among the towns and 
 villages that are inadequately supplied. An illustration will 
 make this distinction clearer. The characteristic feature of 
 medieval trade was the independent exploitation of the supply 
 region by all the towns whose provision was not assured near 
 at hand. In the neighborhood of Vitry the conduct of the 
 Lorraine blatiers illustrates the point. In 1660 some of these 
 Lorraine blatiers were not satisfied with prices at Vitry and passed 
 on to Chalons. 1 They endeavored themselves to find the 
 most advantageous market in the whole region, rather than to 
 sell at a central market whence the surplus was sent to the 
 localities in need. In 1710, a similar incident occurs; a group 
 of Lorrainers passes on to Rheims instead of selling at Vitry. 
 Delamare was disturbed by this tendency, but he wrote with 
 great satisfaction a few days later: " The blatiers passed through 
 Vitry last Monday, on their way back from Rheims, and one 
 of them came to see me. He confessed that they had sold their 
 grain for less than they were offered here." 2 
 
 But this manner of supplying the towns of Champagne was 
 not at all general in 1708-09. For the most part the grain came 
 direct to Vitry and was then distributed according to the needs 
 of the Parisian or of the local trade. The combination of 
 metropolitan and local trade at Vitry is not as striking as it 
 might be, because the towns of Champagne were seeking barley, 
 which did not enter very considerably into the Parisian trade. 
 It is nevertheless significant that much of the barley consumed 
 in Champagne in 1709 came from Lorraine to Vitry, where it 
 was purchased by agents and merchants of the neighboring 
 towns. This movement had begun in December, 1709, when 
 Delamare arrived at Vitry. The deputies of Rheims had bought 
 wheat and barley in large quantities, but he forbade the shipment 
 of the grain. They would have had a right to carry off this 
 grain if they had bought on the markets, but they had bought in 
 the granaries, and in granaries of Parisian merchants. " Such 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 357. Chalons, 4 Nov. 1660. Magdalaine Goudouin. 
 
 2 Ibid. 21647. 156. Vitry, 19 Jan. 1710. Delamare. See also Fr. 21648. 
 79. Vitry, 17 Jan. 1710. Delamare. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS llj 
 
 grain constitutes a part of the supply of Paris and may not be 
 diverted to any other destination." 1 Later, Delamare was 
 less disposed to enforce the strict regulations in regard to the 
 Parisian supply. In May, 1710, he writes: " The great exports 
 from this province for the army in the Low Countries and for 
 the fortresses, and the continual passage of troops have created 
 more or less dearth, especially in Upper Champagne where the 
 harvest was light. A prodigious crowd of poor people comes to 
 town every market day to purchase barley and bread. The 
 townspeople regard this with apprehension, but the Lorraine 
 blatters are just now bringing more barley than wheat so that 
 they have been a great assistance to us." 2 A couple of weeks 
 later, " the town of Epernay sent,a deputy to buy barley. He 
 came to me and asked permission to buy a few loads on the 
 market. I did not feel justified in refusing permission to buy, 
 after the townspeople were provided. So long as we have such 
 supplies of this grain as we have had in the past, I am sure that 
 it will not be wise to refuse permission to the neighboring towns. 
 This extra trade encourages the Lorrainers and constantly 
 attracts more. The assistance given the towns makes them 
 less inclined to seek our wheat." 3 A month later he says: 
 ' The inhabitants of Upper Champagne continue to depend 
 upon us for their subsistence. I see that they are given all the 
 barley they desire. The foreigners are bringing such great 
 quantities that we have enough for the town, and for these 
 poor country people." 4 
 
 This dependence upon Vitry was not unusual, although 
 we seldom have so detailed a description. In 1708, Harouys, 
 in a general report upon the trade of the province, says that 
 Rheims, Epernay, and the frontier towns Sedan and Mezieres 
 have to come to Vitry for wheat. 5 Vitry was thus beginning 
 to serve as a, general distributive market. Grain came in from 
 a wide area and was divided between Paris and the parts of the 
 
 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21647. 145. Vitry, 27 Dec. 1709. Delamare. 
 /&. 21648. 17. Vitry, 8 Mai 1710. Delamare. 
 Ibid. 21648. 25. Vitry, 30 Mai 1710. Delamare. 
 Ibid. 21647. 198. Vitry, n Juin 1710. Delamare. 
 Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 73, 226. 
 
Il8 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 \ 
 
 province that were not naturally well supplied. The larger 
 function of the wholesale market appeared as well as the definite 
 regulations of the market. 
 
 In the producing regions supplying Paris there was- one feature 
 common to all. On the Oise, on the Marne, and on the Seine, 
 in the Beauce, even in the Loire Valley, there was a marked 
 concentration of the wholesale trade. In each region one or 
 two markets gradually attracted all the trade. The wide and 
 complicated ramifications of the sixteenth century trade were 
 simplified. In 1709, Paris was practically supplied from the 
 markets of Noyon, Soissons, Vitry, Chalons, Bray, Montlhery, 
 Chartres, and Saumur. At Vitry and Bray, definite wholesale 
 markets were taking form. The idea could easily be applied 
 to the other great market towns. Once that step was taken 
 the worst of the troubles of the grain trade would be overcome, 
 but some* difficulties still remained. These were more inti- 
 mately connected with Paris herself, and with the grain in 
 transit. 
 
 IV 
 
 The Parisian City Markets 
 
 Wholesale price-making at Paris was quite as crudely organized 
 as in the provinces. There was no systematic competition, no 
 correlation of the conditions existing in the different supply 
 areas. This indefiniteness created uncertainty which could 
 easily generate a panic in times of stress. The inadequacy 
 of market machinery had the further consequence of inviting 
 speculative operations on the part of the grain merchants. 
 
 There was no single, comprehensive, wholesale grain market 
 at Paris. Each of the three principal sources of supply had a 
 separate market. The Port de Greve, near the Hotel de Ville, 
 on the quai opposite the Isle Saint-Louis, was the mart for all 
 grain coming down the Seine or Marne. The supplies from 
 Soissons, Noyon, and from the Lower Seine arrived at the 
 Port de FEcole, the quai on the right bank near the old Louvre 
 and the church of Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois. The Halle au 
 Ble, opposite Saint-Eustache, on the site of the present Halles, 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 119 
 
 was the market for the overland grain. These three markets 
 received practically all the grain that came to the city. But a 
 large portion of the supply of food stuffs never entered the city 
 in the form of wheat. In 1637, one-half the total supply came 
 in the form of flour. The grain from which this was made 
 was bought by bakers on the markets of the environs. The 
 concentration of trade in the seventeenth century brought much 
 of this bakers' buying into touch with the general trade at 
 Montlhery, but many of the smaller markets were still important, 
 especially on the Marne in the vicinity of Meaux; on the Seine, 
 near Corbeil and Melun; and in the section of Brie nearest 
 the city, Rozoy, Brie-Comte-Robert, and other markets. 
 
 The operations of the bakers in the environs in the latter 
 part of the seventeenth century were very extensive. They 
 appear in few of the records, but the inquiries of Delamare in 
 1699 reveal the general character of their activity. From Lagny 
 he writes: "The bakers from the Faubourg Saint- Antoine 
 scour the countryside, buying in all the farms. Some send their 
 grain to the mill at Noisel, a league from the town, and then 
 ship by river to Brie-sur-Marne, where they go for it with carts. 
 Others ship at the village of Javelins, two leagues from Lagny, 
 a false port used to conceal their operations. Some use the port 
 of Trillebardou and send the grain down to Saint-Maur. The 
 town market has consequently been quite deserted for eighteen 
 or twenty years. The peasants do not come to town with their 
 grain, and if it were not for eight or nine petty merchants who 
 buy of the peasants and bring grain to market, it would fre- 
 quently happen that there would be no gram on the market." 1 
 Further investigation by Delamare produced a list of names 
 of the principal persons engaged in the trade at Lagny. He 
 found six bakers of Paris buying regularly in the farms; six 
 factors of merchants and bakers of Paris; and thirty or forty 
 peasants who were most frequently visited by the Parisian 
 bakers and merchants. 2 Very much the same troubles appear 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21645. 49. Lagny, 19 Fev. 1699. Delamare. Letter, with 
 copy of depositions of witnesses. 
 
 1 Ibid. 75. Lagny, 1699. Delamare's notes. 
 
120 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 at Brie-Comte-Robert. " The peasant proprietors and farmers 
 have ceased to bring their grain to market, coming instead with 
 samples in their pockets. The bakers and the merchants who 
 buy conclude the bargain on the basis of the samples and then 
 go to the farms for the grain." l 
 
 The wholesale trade of the city was not really visible even 
 at Paris; the quantities held by the bakers could never be 
 ascertained. The importance of this element of uncertainty 
 doubtless increased in the course of the eighteenth century, 
 but even in 1700 it was a serious complication. To this element 
 of difficulty must be added the indefiniteness arising from the 
 absence of concentration in the sale of bread. The bakers 
 sold directly in the retail markets of the various quarters, so 
 that the trade was an absolutely incalculable factor. Grain 
 thus appeared on three independent markets; bread and flour 
 on sixteen different markets, seven of which were really of first- 
 class importance. 2 Speculative dealing that had already begun 
 in some of the producing regions was vigorously and successfully 
 suppressed at Paris. There was no bond of unity between the 
 numerous markets engaged in the grain trade. 
 
 At Paris, indeed, the conservatism of the period was strongest. 
 New 'ideas worked in only with the greatest of difficulty. The 
 active buying and selling among merchants without displacement 
 of the grain was not permitted. Such regrating was frowned 
 upon with all possible severity. The wholesale merchants at 
 Paris sold on the ports to bakers, 3 and to the well-to-do bourgeois 
 who accumulated stores for their use and had the grain ground 
 as their needs demanded. It was all, in a sense, retail trade. 
 The retail buyer was ill-informed, careless of minute differences 
 of price, and relatively unskilled in the technique of buying. 
 But in addition to the ignorance and incapacity of the buyers, 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 2ii v . 13 Juillet 1694. Proces Verbal. Testimony 
 of fitienne Lesueur. See also a memoir on the market at Tournan in 1699, Bib. 
 Nat., Fr. 21645. 576. 
 
 2 Coin de Saint-Paul; Place Maubert; Marche"Neuf; Faubourg Saint- Germain; 
 les Quinze Vingtc; le Marais; Quai des Grands Augustins. See G 7 . 1659. R e ~ 
 ports of d'Argenson, 1709-10. 
 
 3 See especially G 7 . 1659. Memoire du 30 Nov. 1709 sur Le Port de Greve. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 121 
 
 the efficiency of the grain markets was seriously affected by one 
 of the regulations to which the merchants were subjected. The 
 elasticity of the market was impaired by the restrictions placed 
 upon the liberty of the merchants to raise prices. Each boat- 
 load of grain was regarded as a unit, although the boats contained 
 30-40 muids (150-200 bushels). The whole load must be sold 
 at the opening price or at a lower figure. Sales were frequently 
 very slow, so that portions of many boat-loads would be on sale 
 at the same tune. Whatever grain was held thus could not be 
 influenced by any conditions which would cause a rise in prices. 
 Furthermore, any grain arriving on the port must be placed 
 on sale; the merchants were not allowed to remove the grain 
 to granaries unless it had been damaged by water so that special 
 treatment was necessary. All these circumstances aggravated 
 the general defects of the market system of Paris. Unprofes- 
 sional buying of a retail, rather than wholesale, character, 
 absence of responsiveness to changes in demand, regulations 
 distinctly hostile even to the honest interest of the merchants, 
 everything tempted the merchant to play upon the weakness 
 of the metropolis, in the hope of realizing the gains which a better 
 organization would have permitted within the limits of the law. 
 
 The efforts of the merchants to hold back their consignments 
 of grain were the outcome of the regulations in regard to sale. 
 If a boat arrived when the market was dull, the merchant suf- 
 fered not only from a slow sale, but also found himself deprived 
 of any hope of benefiting from an improvement in the market. 
 The low prices of the dull period would be the maximum that 
 could be realized upon that grain. What wonder that the mer- 
 chants formed granaries just outside of Paris, that they devised 
 expedients for delaying grain in transit, that they devoted them- 
 selves to a careful study of the idiosyncrasies of the Parisian 
 market! Driven to such measures in pure self defence, they 
 were not slow to discover the vast opportunities for gain afforded 
 by the inadequacy of the market organization and by the extra- 
 ordinary invisibility of the wholesale supply. 
 
 The investigations of 1660 were first directed against these 
 entrepots, and with great success. Quantities of grain were 
 
122 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 found and sent to Paris to relieve the distress. The Proces 
 Verbaux contain long lists of visits to granaries. ' " The wife 
 of Sebastian Toussaint said that her husband was not at Trille- 
 bardou. She opened a granary containing thirty-four muids of 
 wheat, which had been brought down from Chalons and Vitry." l 
 In some cases the declarations give the date of purchase. At 
 Meaux, for instance, one of the dealers said that " the grain 
 had all been bought at Chalons about two years ago." 2 En- 
 trepots of up-river grain were found at Trillebardou, Meaux, 
 Mary, La-Ferte-Gaucher, La-Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and Lizy. 3 
 Some of the grain had been kept in store for five or six years, 
 but that was probably exceptional. The same abuse evoked 
 complaints throughout the rest of the century. In 1684, the 
 Provost of Merchants says that the merchants " place their 
 grain in granaries and entrepots in various towns on the river 
 by which the grain is brought to Paris. They consult with each 
 other and agree to ship small quantities from these towns to 
 Paris. They even delay the boats in transit, so that the ports 
 shall not be abundantly supplied. They seek to assure them- 
 selves unjust gains at the expense of the public." 4 In 1698, 
 the Provost issued summons to one Francois Marin, Measurer 
 and Merchant of Meaux, " who has recently purchased thirty 
 muids of wheat at Vitry, to be carried into Meaux and to be 
 mixed with grain from France and Brie, before being brought 
 to Paris." 5 In 1700, commissioners were sent to Chateau- 
 Thierry to secure the shipment of grain delayed in transit. 
 For some reason or other, the Proces Verbal of the commission 
 was copied into the Registers of the city, so that it has survived. 
 In this instance about 300 muids of oats had been sent down 
 from Chalons to Chateau-Thierry. The report is significant 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 194. 7 Oct. 1660. Proces Verbal a TriUebardou. 
 
 2 Ibid. 205. 29 Oct. 1660. Meaux. 
 
 3 Ibid. 289 and 298. Originals, signed by the Commissioners and witnesses. 
 Oct. 1660. 
 
 4 H. 1830. Reg. du Bureau, Ixix. i4^ept. 1684. Commission to Bon Risle, 
 huissier, to open granaries. The municipal records probably contained the reports 
 of the commissioners. See also H. 1831. Reg du Bureau, 923. 30 Juillet 1688. 
 
 6 H. 1837. Reg. du Bureau. 28 Aout 1698. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 123 
 
 chiefly because it reveals the manner in which the legal require- 
 ments were evaded. To prevent entrepots, boats arriving at 
 the ports were required to exhibit way-bills (Lettres de Voiture) 
 stating the place where the grain was shipped and the destination. 
 If this ordinance could be enforced, the entrepots could not be 
 formed. But the regulation was of no practical importance. 
 The merchants shipped from the up-river ports without taking 
 way-bills, by necessity working in confidence with the local 
 officials. As the local officials were themselves engaged in the 
 trade, the difficulties of getting off without way-bills were 
 reduced to a minimum. 
 
 Practically none of these boats sent down to Chateau-Thierry 
 were accompanied by way-bills. Le Lieurre, who received them 
 at Chateau-Thierry, said that " he did not know whence they 
 had been shipped, but that the boatmen were from Chalons. 
 The boats were addressed to him by Pouillot, a factor at Chalons, 
 and orders had been sent to unload the boats and store the grain 
 in granaries. He could not say to whom the grain belonged, 
 as there were no way-bills (Lettres de Voiture). 1 Another con- 
 signment arrived while the commissioners were on the spot, so 
 that they were able to get detailed information from Barbier, 
 the boatman. He said that he had brought six boats down 
 six weeks before. They contained 100 muids of oats, which 
 he had taken aboard at Thou-sur-Marne, four leagues above 
 Chalons. Charles Pouillot, factor for Collinet of Chalons, had 
 the grain loaded. The grain belonged to Collinet of Chalons 
 (a merchant trading regularly with Paris). There were no 
 way-bills because the oats were not destined for Paris, but merely 
 a note from Pouillot addressing the consignment to Robert 
 Fournier, a measurer at Chateau-Thierry." 2 All these inci- 
 dents are significant: the shipment from a little village outside 
 Chalons; the absence of way-bills; the evasive explanation 
 of the informality in shipment. They explain the persistence 
 of the entrepots on the Lower Marne, despite the constant 
 efforts of the Provost of Merchants to stop the delays in transit. 
 
 1 H. 1839. Reg. du Bureau, 10. 23 Aotit 1700. Testimony of Le Lieurre. 
 * Ibid. 
 
124 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The final shipment from the lower Marne towns was a simple 
 matter. Those towns were all important shipping points for 
 the grain of the vicinity, most of them busy trading ports with 
 granaries of resident merchants, and there was the additional 
 facility of weekly or semi-weekly freight boats. Consequently 
 the entrepot trade could easily be concealed under cover of the 
 normal trade of those towns. 1 
 
 The wholesale supply of Paris was thus rendered invisible 
 by an extraordinary combination of circumstances. In the 
 producing regions, the trade was largely independent of markets. 
 In some places the trade was carried on in the granaries, 
 while in other places the merchants scoured the countryside, 
 buying in the farms. In either case, the grain never came 
 into general view. At Paris, the wholesale traders were obliged 
 to engage in what was practically retail trade. Such few advan- 
 tages of concentration as were secured in the producing regions 
 were nullified by the multiplicity of city markets. The bakers 
 added to the confusion by procuring a portion of their supplies 
 in the immediate vicinity of the city, buying in small quantities 
 on local markets, or canvassing the farms with the same energy 
 that was displayed by the merchants in the more distant pro- 
 ducing regions. Lastly, the difficulties of disposing of grain 
 advantageously at Paris gradually led the merchants to form 
 entrepots nearby, from which they could bring grain to the 
 ports at short notice. It is difficult to imagine a more completely 
 invisible supply. 
 
 This invisibility and the sense of insecurity it engendered 
 caused constant apprehension in the metropolis. Even in these 
 days of agitation against great corporations, the intensity of 
 feeling of the seventeenth century Parisian can hardly be under- 
 stood. His outpourings on the subjects of monopoly and 
 regrating are likely to excite little besides derisive comments 
 on the obsolete economic thought of the time. But a sympa- 
 thetic comprehension of his actual situation leads to the recog- 
 nition that there was some reason for his panicky fears and his 
 
 1 See the Proces Verbaux of Delamare in 1699 a t Meaux, La-Ferte'-sous-Jouarre, 
 and Lizy. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21645. 29, 92, 158. 
 
THE HISTORY OF THE PARISIAN MARKETS 12$ 
 
 suspicious hostility to the merchants. All classes were so sen- 
 sitive to the least sign of danger that the instability of the 
 Parisian markets was doubtless much increased. It was this 
 deep-seated apprehension that yielded a ready credence to the 
 legend of the Pacte de Famine in the latter eighteenth century. 
 Then, as in 1709, the source of all trouble was inadequate 
 market machinery. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS AND THE WHOLE- 
 SALE MERCHANTS 
 
 THE history of the trade that developed around Lyons differs 
 in one important feature from the history of the Parisian trade. 
 In the Seine Basin the sources of supply were numerous and 
 fairly well utilized from an early date ; the relative abundance 
 rendered official interference less conspicuous. The trade was 
 allowed to develop according to the play of circumstances. The 
 Lyonese trade followed a very different course. The supply of 
 grain available was barely adequate even in years of ordinary 
 fertility. Every dearth caused a panic, both in the producing 
 regions, and in the city. All were convinced that the supply 
 was inadequate. This feeling was intensified by the incomplete 
 knowledge of the relative importance of the possible sources of 
 supply. The most favorable regions were the last to be sys- 
 tematically exploited, and then, instead of drawing supplies 
 regularly from every possible source, the merchants endeavored 
 to purchase in one region all the grain needed by the city. 
 There was little of the concurrent utilization of the many sources 
 of supply that is so striking in the Seine Basin. Lastly, the 
 /'officials left the merchants too little freedom. In critical 
 / moments the provincial officials stopped the trade absolutely, 
 
 / or at least assumed complete control of all movements of grain. 
 The municipal officials endeavored to encourage the merchants, 
 
 \ but they frequently apprehended serious deficiencies and then 
 \. engaged in trade on the account of the city. At such times, the 
 Consuls intended to force the merchants to sell at lower prices, 
 and actually sold the municipal grain at cost. But these ventures 
 generally resulted in severe losses, and the good intentions of 
 the Consuls were misrepresented. The losses attracted public 
 attention, and the merchants, who suffered from competition 
 with the municipality, were not slow to spread rumors of under- 
 
 126 
 
THE CHAMBER D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 
 
 hand practices. They suggested various methods by which 
 private gains might be secured at the expense of the public. 
 All these differences may be traced to the normal excess of supply 
 in the Seine Basin, and to the bare adequacy of the supply 
 available for meeting the necessities of Lyons. 
 
 The organization of the trade at Lyons was less advanced. At 
 Paris even in the thirteenth century, there were wholesale mer- 
 chants trading in distant sections and bringing grain to Paris by 
 water. At Lyons, there was no wholesale water-borne trade even 
 in the early fifteenth century. .The trade in the Rhone Basin 
 never achieved the degree of organization found at Bray and 
 Vitry in 1 709. The simple local market persisted longer at Lyons, 
 and the wholesale trade was less highly organized. In addition 
 to this element of connection with early types of marketing, 
 the emphasis upon early forms is intensified by the possibility 
 of treating the sixteenth century at greater length. The history 
 of that period in the Seine Basin seems to have been relatively 
 uneventful. At all events, the records are inadequate, especially 
 when compared with the richness of material for the late seven- 
 teenth century. In the Rhone Basin, the sixteenth century was 
 a period of significant development, and the records have sur- 
 vived practically intact, so that the gradual rise of the wholesale 
 trade can be traced in considerable detail. Then too, the seven- 
 teenth century leads to so little that is new that the interest in 
 Lyonese development lies rather in the point of departure than 
 in the final result. Every feature of the Parisian trade carried 
 our attention forward to the creation of the modern market sys- 
 tem. Every incident in the history of the trade of Lyons carries 
 us back to medieval conditions. 
 
 The specific problems of the grain trade at Lyons were due 
 in great measure to the physical characteristics of the region. 
 The situation of Lyons is truly magnificent, but the nature 
 of the advantages of the location entails disadvantages which 
 have exerted a great influence upon the history of the city. 
 The rough mountainous character of eastern France necessarily 
 gives great prominence to the depression between the Saone 
 and the Jura, which continues for a short distance below the 
 
128 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 junction of the Rhone and the Saone. The many advantages 
 offered by this strip of fertile plain, in the midst of the numerous 
 ranges of mountains, inevitably created an important settlement 
 at the junction of the rivers, the point which commanded 
 the whole plain, and in addition possessed the advantage of a 
 good road over the mountains to central France. Lyons was 
 the natural entrepot for all the trade between Italy or Germany 
 and Central or Northern France. The mountainous character 
 of the region produced a concentration of trade that would not 
 have developed without some such compelling circumstance. 
 The excellence of the site of Lyons is due to this isolation between 
 the Massif Central, the Alps, and the Jura. But despite the 
 brilliant commercial development founded upon this unique 
 position, the permanent welfare of the city could be assured 
 only by some more lasting source of wealth than the Italian 
 trade that was poured into France through Lyons in the six- 
 teenth and seventeenth centuries. The silk trade encouraged 
 manufacturers, and an industrial development began of which 
 the Lyonese had great hopes. But then the disadvantages of 
 the situation of the city became apparent. The configuration 
 of the region hampered industrial development; great concen- 
 tration of population was impossible because of the limited 
 food supply available in the relatively infertile Rhone Basin. 
 
 The available supply of grain was small not only in the imme- 
 diate vicinity of Lyons, but also in the more distant regions 
 whence grain could be procured without prohibitive cost. The 
 plains near the city are exceedingly narrow. Opposite the 
 city, the foot hills of the Jura are scarcely fifteen miles distant. 
 Below the junction of the rivers, the hills approach more and 
 more closely so that the identity of the plain is soon lost. Above 
 Lyons the plain is wider and extends north up the Saone Valley 
 with little serious interruption, but Lyons could not rely upon 
 that region, since the Saone towns drew their support from 
 the upper reaches of this plain. The rougher districts were 
 hardly more than self-sufficient, and at times they were even 
 dependent upon Lyons. Lyons was thus actually confined 
 to the region within thirty or forty miles of the city. Bresse, 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 129 
 
 Bugey, and a corner of Dauphine furnished the excess supply 
 available in the immediate vicinity. 
 
 The difficulty of securing abundant supplies in the immediate 
 vicinity led to a determined effort to discover reliable sources 
 of supply elsewhere, but this was no simple matter. Grain 
 could be secured on the Lower Rhone in small quantities, both 
 in Languedoc and in Provence. There was ordinarily a small 
 surplus in Auvergne, in the vicinity of Clermont-Ferrand. A 
 more considerable supply could be found in Burgundy and 
 Bassigny. But each region presented some special difficulty. 
 The swift current of the Rhone made transportation from 
 Languedoc and Provence costly and difficult. The surplus of 
 the Lower Rhone too was not very large, and official opposition 
 combined with these uncertainties to prevent the development 
 of regular trade between Lyons and the Lower Rhone. From 
 Auvergne, transportation was costly, as much of the journey 
 was overland from Roanne to Lyons. Burgundy was the most 
 favorable source of supply, but the principal producing sections 
 were far from the river, and grain was not collected in the river 
 towns until the activity of the Lyonese had started a movement 
 of trade in that direction. These difficulties checked the develop- 
 ment of trade. The merchants hesitated to embark in the 
 risky venture of buying grain in Languedoc, Auvergne, or Bur- 
 gundy, though the Consulate endeavored to encourage private 
 enterprise. These three features are characteristic in the history 
 of the Lyonese trade: scarcity of grain, timidity of the private 
 merchants, municipal participation and stimulation of trade. 
 
 The Parisian trade had begun to assume considerable propor- 
 tions before the records became sufficiently elaborate to furnish 
 any indications of its character. At Lyons there is no such 
 " pre-historic " period. The grain trade first appears in the 
 records in the late fourteenth century, but unlike the Lime 
 des Metiers of Etienne Boileau, these documents suggest the 
 utmost simplicity of trade. At Lyons, the earliest material 
 easily available is to be found in the Letters Patent and Letters 
 Close, a much less fruitful source of information than guild 
 statutes. Letters Close were issued in 1386 by the Governor 
 
130 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of Dauphine to the Castellans of Vaulx, Saint-Symphorien- 
 d'Ozon, Pusignan, Mezieux, Colombier, and other places, 
 ordering them to allow the citizens of Lyons to carry off their 
 rents in grain. 1 The right of Lyons to draw supplies from the 
 plain was thus recognized at an early date, despite the compli- 
 cations caused by the provincial boundary. This is the theme 
 of all the early letters. In 1415, the ecclesiastical consistory 
 of Dauphine was required to authorize inhabitants of Lyons to 
 transport grain from Dauphine to Lyons. The complaints of 
 the Lyonese were occasioned by the difficulties experienced in 
 carrying to Lyons tithes, cens, and other payments in kind. 2 A 
 couple of years later the subject was canvassed more thoroughly 
 by the Consuls at Lyons and the Governor of Dauphine. The 
 Consuls asserted that citizens of Lyons were not allowed to bring 
 to the city the rents that accrued in Dauphine. 3 This narrow 
 limitation of rights is striking, and although it is easy to infer 
 too much from what is left unsaid, it is none the less remarkable 
 that there was no reference to grain merchants or to trade 
 between Dauphine and Lyons. In 1432, the charter of the 
 Governor of Dauphine permitted ordinary trade: " the inhabi- 
 tants of Dauphine shall be allowed to sell their grain in Lyons, 
 and the inhabitants of Lyons may procure grain in the province." 4 
 This is clearly the last phase of the struggle to obtain full trading 
 rights in the plain to the east of Lyons. The limits of the region 
 are indicated by the letter of 1386, and although the later meas- 
 ures bear no restriction, it is fairly certain that active trade 
 was limited to the small area between the foot hills of the Jura 
 and the Rhone. The most significant aspect of this episode 
 is the suggestion of a very simply organized trade. The people 
 of Lyons evidently drew most of their grain from the immediate 
 vicinity and much of it was the product of their own estates. 
 Gradually, regular trade with this corner of Dauphine became 
 necessary. The city was small and the mechanism of the grain 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 78, 18. 10 Dec. 1386. See also AA. 77, n. 4 Sept. 
 1379, similar letter by Carolus de Bouille. 
 
 2 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381, i. 6 Nov. 1415. 
 
 3 Ibid., 381, 2. 1417. Divers Lettres. 
 
 4 Ibid., 381, 4. 21 Sept. 1432. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 131 
 
 trade very rudimentary. Probably there were no merchants 
 engaged in bringing grain up or down the river. The market 
 was supplied by the blatiers and peasants of the plain. In 1460, 
 we find the first reference to grain markets at Lyons. Pro- 
 hibitions in Forez led ultimately to Royal Letters Patent ad- 
 dressed to the Bailli of Macon and the Senechal of Lyons: 
 " Prohibitions have recently been issued in Forez and Beaujolais, 
 so that the merchants and other persons of those provinces 
 have not dared sell their grain to our subjects of Lyons. . . . 
 The merchants and inhabitants of Lyons have consequently 
 been unable to engage in trade with those of Forez and Beau- 
 jolais, as they are wont. This has caused the price of grain to 
 rise at Lyns and in Lyonnais. . . . For these reasons we order 
 you to permit all merchants of Lyons and Lyonnais to export 
 from Forez and Beaujolais grain already purchased or to be 
 purchased." * 
 
 If this was the only evidence to suggest a very simply organized 
 trade, I should hesitate to characterize the first half of the 
 fifteenth century in this manner. Charters are a particularly 
 unreliable basis for conclusions since there is so much chance 
 involved in their preservation. Large numbers have been lost, 
 and there is no reason to infer that the decimation of such 
 material has been governed by anything but blind chance. 
 The charters cited, however, are only a small portion of the ma- 
 terial on which inferences may be based, and, where there is so 
 little tangible evidence, it is necessary to read it in connection 
 with evidence of a later period. In the history of the Lyonese 
 grain trade the first important mass of material appears in 1481, 
 as the result of municipal attempts to secure grain. The incident 
 is significant not only in its general character but in its date. 
 It is an indication of the beginning of the rise of Lyons, and 
 helps to explain both the simplicity of organization in the grain 
 trade before 1450 and the energetic efforts of the municipality 
 at the close of the century. The fairs of Lyons were established 
 in 1463; the first important patents to the silk weavers were 
 granted by Louis XI; at that time, the Italians began to come 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381, 6. 3 Juin 1460. 
 
132 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 in considerable numbers. None of these elements in the com- 
 mercial growth of Lyons were of great importance in the latter 
 half of the fifteenth century, but all these little facts suggest 
 that this was indeed the period when the great expansion of the 
 city began. The small provincial town was beginning to expand. 
 Development of new sources of food supply had become a press- 
 ing question. 
 
 In 1481, the Consuls undertook to purchase grain directly; 
 there was scarcely any reference to merchants, and no reference 
 to regular grain merchants. There is no indication that there 
 was any regular trade with distant sections. Apparently this 
 municipal undertaking was a bold pioneer enterprise. It was 
 essentially the work of merchants engaged primarily in other 
 lines of trade. The project was sketched in full at the first 
 meeting that considered the subject. On the fifth of August, 
 1481, " all the councillors assembled to consider the grain supply, 
 and to prevent the city from suffering any inconvenience. Hum- 
 bert de Vary was summoned to attend and join in the delibera- 
 tion. ... It was finally decided to send to the king in order 
 to get permission to procure grain in Languedoc, Dauphine, 
 and the Beauce, and if possible to secure exemption from tolls. 
 Furthermore, it was decided to receive in the name of the town 
 such monies as might be subscribed for the purchase of grain. 
 The price should be fixed by the councillors to yield the profit 
 deemed expedient. This done, it was decided to send Taille- 
 mand to Moulins on the morrow, as he reported that grain 
 had arrived there. He shall forward grain promptly to the city, 
 and shall also endeavor to discover if grain can be bought in the 
 Beauce. He shall consider whether it would not be well to 
 buy as much as 2000 anees. 1 One Papillon of Moulins has 
 said that he would be willing to be party to a venture of 1000 
 francs, if Taillemand would make him a loan, so the latter was 
 asked if he would engage in the venture. He said that he was 
 already in partnership with Papillon." 2 These last lines suggest 
 
 1 The ane*e is equivalent to 6 bushels English measure. 
 
 8 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 352, II, Actes Consulates. 5 Aout 1481. The MS. 
 is difficult, and the reading of the last two lines is somewhat uncertain. The 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 133 
 
 a mercantile undertaking independent of the project of the 
 consulate, but this is the only reference to distant purchases by 
 private individuals. The proposal to get special Letters Patent 
 from the King led to the specific description of the regions 
 whence supplies were to be derived. The proposal tc buy in 
 the Beauce also appeared in the instructions to the agent of the 
 municipality. On the whole, the scheme has the appearance 
 of being the result of deliberations by merchants who think of 
 buying grain, in this time of need, in the provinces to which 
 their trade carries them. The trading connection with Orleans 
 and Paris suggested the Beauce. The frequent trade at the 
 fair of Beaucaire of Avignon suggested purchases in Languedoc. 
 The great distance to which they propose to send indicates a 
 perception of the futility of relying entirely upon the grain in 
 the immediate vicinity of Lyons. Neither the plain to the east 
 of the city, nor the parts of Forez and Beaujolais frequented 
 by the petty merchants, could suffice for the growing needs of 
 the city. 
 
 The municipality at first endeavored to direct the purchases 
 itself. Humbert de Vary, who was acting as an agent for the 
 Consuls, bought 1 500 anees of grain at Orleans and other places 
 in that region, early in September. Just as he was ready to 
 have the grain shipped, prohibitions were issued. At this 
 juncture the expediency of securing Royal Patents was revealed. 
 The envoy at the Court reported that the King had issued the 
 Patents desired, and the Consuls at once forwarded the docu- 
 ments to Orleans. 1 But the Consuls found the details of the 
 undertaking burdensome, particularly when the grain had 
 arrived and it became necessary to distribute the municipal 
 supply by selling grain and bread in the small quantities needed 
 by individuals. 
 
 These aspects of municipal purchases were probably respon- 
 sible for the final organization agreed upon at the meeting of 
 October 28th. It was then resolved that the city "would 
 
 Archivist kindly revised my transcript. This volume of the registers contains 
 the notes taken during the meetings, and the record is at times influenced by the 
 hurry of note-taking. 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 352, III. 22 Sept. 1481. 
 
134 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 entrust the matter to four well-intentioned citizens who were 
 skilled in such affairs. These persons should make the purchases, 
 arrange for the payments, and do all other things that were 
 necessary. In order that the notables who had loaned funds 
 should be protected by a more complete guarantee, the Consuls 
 summoned the wardens of the guilds and other notables." 
 This Assembly agreed to all the propositions of the Consuls, 
 and gave them full authority to establish the commission of 
 four to handle all details of the purchases. 1 " The commissioners 
 purchased large quantities of grain in the name of the town, 
 procuring such supplies that the city and vicinity were main- 
 tained in abundance for the greater part of a year in which they 
 would have suffered severely without this aid. . . . Between 
 Christmas 1481 and July 1482, the commissioners distributed 
 about 3300 anees of grain: 1000 anees as raw grain, 2300 anees 
 in the form of bread." 2 The operations of the municipality 
 were, thus, of great importance at the time. Very likely grain 
 had never before been handled at Lyons in such quantities. 
 The Consuls had shown what could be done in the wholesale 
 grain trade, and although their object was primarily to meet 
 immediate needs, the desire to stimulate private effort was 
 doubtless present. 
 
 The energy of the consulate seems to have roused the mer- 
 chants of the city to a realization of the possibilities of the grain 
 trade. The next twenty years were marked by the appearance 
 of wholesale grain merchants. In 1489, there is an interesting 
 indication of the rapidity with which the city was becoming 
 accustomed to dependence upon more distant sources of supply. 
 The bakers complained that the shipments from Burgundy, 
 Dauphine, and Dombes had been stopped by local prohibitions. 
 They protested against this interference with long established 
 custom. 3 Ten years later the merchants were more definitely 
 established. Several merchants offered to supply the city with 
 grain " at six ' blancs ' (sic) per anee above cost," if the city 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 19, 138. 9 Aotit 1489. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 381, 10. 
 
 3 Ibid., BB. 19, 138. 9 Aout 1489. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 135 
 
 would guarantee them against loss. 1 The Consuls agreed to 
 this proposition. A year later, there was dearth in Lyonnais, 
 Dauphine, and Bresse. The Consuls decided to ask permission 
 to export 5-6000 mines from Burgundy. The register is not 
 explicit, but it implies that the grain was to be bought by mer- 
 chants, although the municipality undertook to obtain the 
 necessary permits. 
 
 In these twenty years, the outward aspect of the grain trade 
 was completely transformed. Before 1481, there is no evidence 
 of wholesale trade. The city was supplied by peasants from the 
 plain, and to some extent by small quantities of grain drawn 
 from Forez and Beaujolais. There is nothing to suggest ac- 
 quaintance with more distant sources of supply, nothing to 
 suggest the presence of wholesale merchants, nothing that could 
 properly be called wholesale trade. In the distress threatening 
 in 1481, the Consuls resolved to make purchases in distant 
 regions. Certain merchants were commissioned to buy grain 
 and manage the undertaking. There was no perception of 
 the best sources of supply, but large quantities of grain were 
 bought primarily in the Beauce and in Auvergne. Then the 
 merchants turned their attention to the grain trade. In 1489, 
 dependence upon Burgundy was declared to be an " immemorial " 
 custom. The merchants who had thus extended the scope 
 of the Lyonese food supply, however, were probably not pro- 
 fessional grain merchants. The venture in grain may well have 
 been an incident among other transactions. But wholesale 
 dealing in grain had begun and there was some knowledge of 
 the regions where grain could be found. 
 
 In 1500, the fear of dearth led to the organization of a Bureau 
 to buy grain on account of the municipality. This measure 
 was taken in December and the experience of 1481 was evidently 
 still fresh in the minds of the Consuls. Four persons were 
 named " to act as bursars and to act as sureties for the sums 
 subscribed." Two of the persons named failed to appear on 
 the following day to accept the office, and after a short interval 
 their places were filled. 2 There was thus a commission with 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 24, 176. 3 Aotit 1498. 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 24, 289, 290, 298. 18, 19 Dec. 1500; 15 Fev. 1500-01. 
 
136 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 practically the same powers as the commission of 1481, but the 
 presence of a body of wholesale grain merchants altered the 
 situation fundamentally. The municipal Bureau could not 
 proceed with the complete independence that was not only 
 possible but necessary in 1481. The merchants rendered direct 
 purchases by the commissioners less necessary, and the munici- 
 pality scarcely needed to do more than procure Letters Patent 
 from the King. This step indeed had been taken before the 
 commission of four was chosen. The King was asked to grant 
 patents for the export of grain from Burgundy, Bassigny, Cham- 
 pagne, Franche Comte, Languedoc, and Provence a most 
 comprehensive catalogue of all the possible sources of supply. 1 
 The Patents arrived at Lyons early in January, and then there 
 was a most interesting recognition of the changed conditions of 
 the grain trade. " To proceed to the execution of the said 
 Patents, the Consuls summoned the principal merchants, who are 
 accustomed to buy grain in the Duchy of Burgundy, Bassigny, Cham- 
 pagne, and the County of Burgundy" Then the various merchants 
 were asked what amounts of grain they would agree to buy. 
 " Pierre Prestreau offered to bring 100 charges of grain to Lyons. 
 Thibaut Canis said he would buy 500 charges in Burgundy. 
 Jehan Combe, a baker, offered to secure 500 charges in Bas- 
 signy." " Benoit Panthier agreed to bring 300 anees from 
 Burgundy within a month, and 300 more before Easter." 2 
 When the merchants made agreements of this type, the city 
 issued passports to them addressed to the officials of the pro- 
 ducing regions. The activity and number of merchants seems 
 to indicate a remarkable rapidity of development. 
 
 Despite the complications introduced by the presence of 
 merchants, the municipal commission made purchases in the 
 name of the town. February ninth, the Consuls ordered " that 
 Pierre Renard should send a trustworthy man to Roanne, on 
 the morrow, to find out how much grain there was in that town, 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 24, 288. n Dec. 1500. 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 24, 292. 5 Jan. 1500-01, and 19 Jan. Quarnet et Papier fait pour 
 tenir raison de la traicte des Bleds que le Roy a octroyee a la Ville. See also the 
 deliberations of the Consuls, 7-8 Jan., p. 293. 
 
axilly 
 oPoutaillier 
 
 St.Jean de Losne 
 
 Pagny 
 
 Burgundy 
 and Bassigny 
 
 Shaded Area represent* the districts 
 
 whence the bulk of the wholesale 
 
 supply was derived 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 137 
 
 and to buy 400 anees at any price that it is necessary to pay." 1 
 A week later, Pierre Renard was ordered " to go to Burgundy 
 to buy grain in the name of the town." 2 He was instructed 
 to buy freely according to his judgment. The Consuls also 
 had grain purchased in Languedoc. The agent" in that section, 
 however, interpreted his instructions too liberally, buying 
 3000 anees at a cost of 12,000 francs. The Consuls were unable 
 to furnish this sum, so the grain was turned over to one of the 
 merchants. 3 Other contracts in Languedoc and Provence to 
 the amount of 1600 ecus (4800 if rancs) were accepted by the 
 Consuls. The function of the four commissioners is not very 
 clear. Their commission had given them full authority, but 
 the Consuls retained the control of the grain trade. The organi- 
 zation of the commission had followed the precedent of 1481, 
 but the difference in conditions was soon perceived, and the 
 Consuls found that they could easily attend to all the details 
 of the trade. In July, 1504, a commission of six persons was 
 organized "to procure a fund of 10,000 francs, to send to court 
 and to the Governor of Burgundy to secure Patents for the 
 export of grain." 4 This commission did not make any direct 
 purchases, but contracts were made with merchants to guarantee 
 them against losses due to a fall in prices. 5 The municipal 
 efforts were not important, and the merchants were left to their 
 own devices. In reality, municipal trading of the type that 
 appeared in 1481 was obsolete even in 1500, and the increased 
 activity shown by the merchants rendered encouragement super- 
 fluous. It seemed as if the stimulus given the wholesale trade 
 had been so completely successful that the municipality could 
 cease to concern itself with that matter. 
 
 But there was still a need for some encouragement and control. 
 The merchants were only too willing to receive aid, and guaran- 
 tees against loss and passports could advantageously be offered 
 to merchants who were willing to undertake the trade. The 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 24. 9 Fev. 1500-01. 
 Ibid., BB. 24. 17 Fev. 1500-01. 
 Ibid., BB. 24 (304). 15 Mars 1500-01. 
 Ibid., BB. 24, 466. 29 Juillet 1504. 
 Ibid., BB. 24, 466v. 12 Aout 1504. 
 
138 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 years 1500-1504 had witnessed the opening up of great pros- 
 pects. The trade awoke to a full consciousness of all the sources 
 of supply, and no region was too distant to tempt the mer- 
 chants. Languedoc, Provence, Beauce, Burgundy, Bassigny, 
 Champagne, Franche Comte, all held out hopes to the Lyonese. 
 But this extraordinary extension of the trade was not permanent. 
 The merchants possessed a very inadequate knowledge of the 
 relative advantages or the extent of the supply available in 
 these regions, and hopes of great gains faded gradually before 
 the obstacles that were revealed by bitter experience. But a 
 full knowledge of conditions in the producing regions was gradu- 
 ally obtained. 
 
 This resort to the distant regions of the Rhone Basin was 
 probably irregular during the early sixteenth century. Supplies 
 were ordinarily secured nearer the city, but in case of need 
 merchants were ready to buy in Burgundy or Languedoc. The 
 first fifty years of the century are interesting by reason of the 
 gradual development of regular dependence upon Burgundy. 
 The regions near the city were still utilized in part, particularly 
 the plains of Dauphine and Bresse. But while the other sections 
 gradually lost their importance, the wholesale merchants turned 
 their attention more and more definitely towards Burgundy. 
 The trade developed a distinct organization in the Saone towns, 
 and with the gradual improvement of the system of marketing, 
 the resources of Burgundy became steadily more available. 
 In 1529, Burgundy was not mentioned in the sources of supply 
 enumerated by the witnesses examined by the Governor of 
 Lyonnais, to discover the cause of the high price of grain. " The 
 high prices are due," they said, " to the prohibitions which 
 have been issued in the neighboring provinces, Dombes, Beaujo- 
 lais, Forez, Vivarais, Auvergne, and Velay, which generally 
 supply Lyons. Grain is generally brought from these provinces 
 to Lyons, but none has come recently on account of the pro- 
 hibitions." l Merchants were busy in Burgundy, but they were 
 not buying for Lyons, and it is hardly likely that they were 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381. 21 Oct. 1529. Proces Verbal fait 
 a Lyon par Pomponne de Trevoux, Gouverneur ez Pais de Lyonnais. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 139 
 
 Lyonese. In February, 1527, Genoa purchased 1500 mines of 
 grain in Burgundy. 1 A month later the Consuls permitted the 
 Commander of the Knights of Saint John to carry 164 anees of 
 grain down the river from Burgundy. 2 A year later the Consuls 
 were disturbed by the quantities of grain passing the city, so 
 they sent a deputy to the Governor of Burgundy asking him 
 to require the merchants to leave one-third of their grain at 
 Lyons. 3 This proposal seemed to meet with little success for 
 in May the same fears appear in the deliberations. Jehan 
 Charreton asked for permission to carry 700 mines of grain 
 down the river. He said that it was purchased in Burgundy 
 and Champagne, and that it was destined for the Grand Master 
 of Rhodes. It is pretty clear that the Consuls disliked to issue 
 the permit, but Charreton exhibited Royal Patents and they 
 dared not interfere. 4 The general question was discussed for a 
 while but no decision was reached. A week later, a merchant 
 from Provence came down the Saone with 1200 anees of grain 
 destined for Aries. He had Royal Patents, but the Consuls 
 persuaded him to sell part of his grain at Lyons. 5 The shipments 
 from Burgundy to the lower river were possibly heavier than 
 usual in 1528, but it was not an infrequent phenomenon 6 and it 
 does not suggest an explanation of the omission of Burgundy 
 from the list of sources of Lyonese supply. Lyons was able 
 to do without Burgundian supplies in ordinary years, and the 
 Burgundian surplus was disposed of elsewhere. 
 
 The slow development of Lyonese trade in Burgundy was 
 primarily due to two factors, the slow growth of the demand 
 of Lyons and the difficulties of trading in Burgundy. Of the 
 two, the absence of organization in the producing region was un- 
 doubtedly the more important, for the moment that facilities be- 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381, 17. 15 Fev. 1527. 
 
 Ibid., Chappe IV, 381, 17 bis. 15 Mars 1527. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 47, 15. 30 Avril 1528. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 47, 16. 7 Mai 1528. Chappe IV, 460, 3. The Royal Patents 
 mentioned in the registers. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 47, 19. 14 Mai 1528. 
 
 Ibid., Chappe IV, 393, 33. 16 Fev. 1539. Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 256. 24 
 Jan. 1530-40. 
 
140 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 came greater in Burgundy the less favorable sources in Auvergne 
 and Velay would be abandoned. It was not essential that the 
 demand of Lyons should greatly increase. The advantage 
 of trading with Burgundy was not only a matter of quantity 
 but also a matter of transportation to Lyons. These basic 
 factors, however, were of little avail in the early sixteenth cen- 
 tury, as the grain was not collected in Burgundy with reference 
 to the Lyonese trade. It was not easy to find, and the most 
 fertile regions were far from the Saone, so that even when the 
 merchant had secured his grain, he must needs arrange for land 
 transportation in a province where he was not familiar with the 
 routes or the carters. 
 
 'From the point of view of the Lyonese, the most serious 
 difficulty was the absence of any considerable supplies in the 
 river towns. It is hazardous to assert that there was, at that 
 time, no movement from the back country to Auxonne, Maxilly, 
 and Saint- Jean-de-Losne, but it is quite certain that such move- 
 ments were inconsiderable. In 1505, the Echevins of Dijon 
 mentioned a rumor " that several carters had passed carrying 
 grain to the Saone." l The next day they issued an order to 
 pay a gratuity to a peasant who informed the proper officials 
 that grain was passing (Axsery) on carts toward Saint- Jean-de- 
 Losne. 2 In 1509, the implication was less direct. The Echevins 
 complained of high prices, of markets that were inadequately 
 furnished ; all the troubles were attributed to the export of grain 
 from the vicinity under the cover of darkness. 3 In 1531, grana- 
 ries are mentioned at Auxonne, but they were based on the 
 revenues of estates. 4 The towns were used as shipping ports, 
 but the merchants were obliged to buy in the back country. 
 Thus, in 1529, the Mayor of Dijon induces one of the Lyonese 
 merchants to sell one-half the grain collected at Saint-Pierre- 
 de-Massilly. " The Lyonese merchants, who were two in num- 
 ber, said that they had only 100 mines of grain, which they 
 
 1 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 258. 12 Juin 1505. 
 
 2 Ibid., G. 258. 13 Juin 1505. 
 
 8 Ibid., G. 258. 1509. Memoire centre la Cheret6. 
 4 Ibid., G. 260. 27 Mai 1531; 3 Jan. 1532. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 141 
 
 had bought in divers places Lorraine, Champagne, and else- 
 where." 1 
 
 In reality the Burgundian trade was very loosely organized 
 at this time. Dijon and Langres were the only towns where 
 there was much trade in grain. There were merchants in both 
 places, but even in these towns the wholesale trade was largely 
 a matter of sales in the granaries of the landlords. 
 
 The local merchants of Burgundy were essentially merchants 
 of the earlier type, persons buying on the local market, hoard- 
 ing, and selling when prices rose. They engaged in the move- 
 ment of grain only to a slight degree, although they did buy 
 in country granaries. The Echevins of Dijon mention such 
 merchants in 1509. " There are several wealthy merchants 
 here engaged in engrossing, despite the ordinances." 2 In 
 1539, the Lieutenant of the Bailli of Dijon issued an ordinance 
 against " merchants and other persons who go daily to the 
 market towns, where they buy grain and form granaries." 3 
 The Lieutenant of the Governor also took measures against 
 merchants, " who have bought grain in the markets in order to 
 form hoards. ... or who have bought or given earnest money 
 for the grain of nobles or of other persons." He ordered that 
 any grain in excess of private needs should be straightway 
 sold on the public market. 4 The scale of the operations of these 
 merchants of Dijon is not very clear, but the information about 
 the merchants of Langres gives some idea of the magnitude of 
 their business. We have this note of a single transaction: 
 " Jehan Gastebois, merchant resident at Langres, acknowledges 
 the receipt of 2172" from the agents of Dijon, in consideration 
 of divers consignments of grain, viz: 120 mines 6 U 5 s ; 160 
 mines bought by them of me and of Nicholas ifendelot, merchant 
 at Langres " etc. 5 The merchants of Langres probably secured 
 
 1 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 258. n Mai 1529. 
 
 2 Ibid., G. 258. 1509. Memoire stir les Bleds. 
 
 3 Ibid ., G. 256. 15 Jan. 1539. Ord. du Lieu, du Bailli de Dijon. 
 
 4 Ibid., G. 264. 14 Mai 1539. Copie d'une Ordonnance du Lieu, du Gou- 
 verneur. See also G. 256. i, 18, 22 Oct. 1535. Ord. du Lieu, du Bailli de 
 Dijon. 
 
 6 Ibid., G. 263. 26 Juillet 1532. G. 263. Compte des Bleds achete's pour la 
 Ville de Dijon suivant 1'Ordon, du 17 Mars 1531-32. 
 
142 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 their grain by purchases on the markets and in country granaries. 
 The merchants at Dijon doubtless handled quite as large a trade 
 as the merchants of Langres. On the whole, it is not too much 
 to assert that we find at this time the beginnings of the local 
 wholesale trade. 
 
 The merchants, however, controlled only a part of the trade. 
 The granaries of rentiers were probably a more important factor 
 than the granaries formed by merchants. These hoards formed 
 of rents in kind were not necessarily located in the towns. In 
 many cases, the grain was stored at least temporarily in the 
 country. The significance of this form of hoard is not much 
 influenced by its location, though it was naturally much easier 
 to deal with the persons who had town granaries. 
 
 The extent of these granaries was revealed by the efforts of 
 the Echevins of Dijon to secure supplies in times of distress, 
 Visitation of granaries was the most obvious and most successful 
 provision against dearth. , This was the first step taken in 1529. 
 The Echevins decided that " it was necessary to know who had 
 granaries in the town and in the country." It was proposed to 
 buy grain in the name of the town, and without any inquiry 
 " they resolved to speak to M. de Firloix, Madame d'Agen, 
 M. Joigny, Maitre Gerard Benigny, factor of the Admiral, 
 Sr. Valrien, Thomas Mathus, M. des Barres, Antoine C (?) 
 and MM. de Saint Esleu (?), all of whom are said to have grana- 
 ries in the town." 1 These were the people whose granaries 
 were so well known that it was a matter of common knowledge. 
 The next day other granaries were reported, notably those 
 of Mile, de Maillotz, who had 60 mines at Dijon, and 60 mines 
 at Chevigny. 2 In June, one of the Echevins reported that he 
 had purchased grain in the granaries of the Admiral at Mirabel, 
 Beaumont, Charmes, Rouvre, and Fontaine-Franchise. 3 Other 
 granaries were mentioned. 4 In 1531, it was the same story, 
 though there was more buying at Langres and the importance 
 
 1 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 258. 26 Avril 1529. 
 
 2 Ibid., G. 258. 27 Avril 1529. The names are difficult to read. 
 
 3 Ibid., G. 258. 7 Mai 1528; 19 Juin 1529. 
 
 4 Ibid., G. 259. Compte des Bleds achetes en 1529. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 143 
 
 of the clerical granaries was emphasized. The memoir mentions 
 only the quantities that are still to be shipped, but even these 
 are considerable. From the Dean of Langres, 60 mines were to 
 be received; from M. 1'Omcial of Langres, 40 mines; from M. 
 Andre Bobinet, prebend, 18 mines; 50 mines at Givey in Mon- 
 tagne were still to be paid to the Dean of Langres." l Lay 
 granaries were visited at Rouvre, Breteniers, Thorey, Saulon, 
 La Chapelle, 2 Montigny, 3 and Vauldrimont. 4 Another interest- 
 ing phase of the purchases made by Dijon in 1531, was the buying 
 of grain that was stored in the villages of Bassigny by merchants 
 of Langres: 61 mines were bought of Jacques Benne, merchant 
 at Langres, to be delivered at Cogirnon near Chalindrey in 
 Bassigny. Other merchants of Langres agreed to deliver grain 
 at Chassigney, Prangey, Chaume, Mormand, Troichaud, Rozet, 
 Trouchoit, Monteycourt, Belleme, and Saint-Maurice. 5 Most 
 of these little places can hardly be identified today, but it is 
 necessary to call attention to the extent of this practice. The 
 grain was very slightly concentrated. Despite the appearance 
 of merchants at Dijon and Langres, the grain remained in the 
 villages until it was hunted out by the merchants or until the 
 absentee landlord decided to sell the accumulated rents of his 
 estates. There was little-or no movement of grain. It required 
 a great effort to amass any considerable quantity, and if it were 
 not for the size of some of the granaries, it would have been 
 well-nigh impossible to collect a large quantity. The resources 
 of the province were great, but they could not be easily utilized 
 because of the absence of organization of the wholesale trade. 
 
 When the Lyonese merchants first came to Burgundy they 
 generally went to Dijon, but the municipal officials disliked to 
 see them buying in the vicinity, and there were various ways 
 of passing them on to other regions. Even the agents of Dijon 
 
 1 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 258. Me"moires des Restes des grains qui sont a venir 
 des achapts faits par la Ville de Dijon depuis le careme derrenier passe. 1531. 
 
 2 Ibid., G. 261. 9 Fev. 1531. 
 
 3 Ibid., G. 260. 3 Juin 1531. 
 
 4 Ibid., G. 260. Pentecdte, 1531. 
 
 6 Ibid., G. 263. Compte des Bleds achets pour la Ville de Dijon suivant 
 1'Ordonnance du 17 Mars 1531-32. 
 
144 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 at court endeavored to dissuade the Lyonese from attempting 
 to buy in Burgundy. " Much better terms could be made with 
 the merchants of Champagne and Bassigny," they said. 1 This 
 unwillingness to encourage purchases around Dijon undoubtedly 
 added to the difficulties of the Lyonese. Supplies were unques- 
 tionably to be had in Bassigny, but transportation was difficult 
 and the trade in Bassigny was not concentrated even to the degree 
 that the trade of Burgundy was concentrated at Dijon. In 
 these conditions, we have the explanation of the slow develop- 
 ment of Lyonese trade in Burgundy. The trade had too little 
 connection with the Saone towns; the importance of local and 
 town granaries made it difficult for a stranger to engage in the 
 trade; the jealous regard of Dijon for the supplies of Burgundy 
 generally obliged the merchants to push on to Bassigny where 
 all the difficulties were increased. 
 
 Despite the obstacles in the way of regular trade, the Lyonese 
 merchants travelled up to Burgundy in continually increasing 
 numbers, so that in 1557 Burgundy was called " the nurse of 
 Lyons and Lyonnais." 2 It was at this period that the influence 
 of this persistent buying began to appear. The gradual develop- 
 ment of trade with Lyons attracted trade to the Saone towns, 
 and in 1556 the transition, which ultimately produced a com- 
 plete reorganization of trade in Burgundy, was well under way. 
 Dijon and Langres lost much of their importance, and Auxonne, 
 Talmay, Maxilly, and Saint- Jean-de-Losne became the centers 
 of an active trade drawing from Burgundy and Bassigny for 
 the support of Lyons. 
 
 Our information, in 1556-57, is derived from letters written 
 by the Deputies sent to Burgundy by the Consuls of Lyons. 
 The first letter indicates nothing new. They were shipping 
 grain at Auxonne and visiting granaries in Burgundy, Bassigny, 
 Lorraine, and Tranche Comte. 3 In the letters of the following 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 101, 12. Paris, 15 Jan. 1528-29. Laurencin. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 339-340. Proces verbal faite par Mre. Jehan de Fournel. 
 Conseiller du Roy, Lieut. Gen. en la . senechaussee et siege prsidiale de Lyon, 10 
 Fev. 1556-57- 
 
 3 Ibid., AA. 32. Auxonne, 27 Mars 1556. Guimbre. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 145 
 
 year indications of change appear. There are references to 
 merchants resident in the river towns. This addition to the 
 trade from Bassigny to the Saone caused a pressure upon means 
 of transportation that enabled the carters to charge two or three 
 times the ordinary rates. " There is a rumor in these parts/' 
 writes the Deputy, " that Dutenot, Craignat, and Mascoyer 
 are going to ship more than 3 ,000 mines of grain. The merchants 
 of Auxonne and Guillaume Imbellot of Chalons-sur-Saone have 
 also shipped great quantities." 1 " The carters are so persis- 
 tently sought out by these merchants of Auxonne, Dijon, Beaune, 
 and Chalons that it almost impossible to get hold of any." 2 
 " Mascoyer and Oudelot sent out three men to find carters, but 
 the best they could do was to secure a promise of twelve or 
 thirteen next week, and if Oudelot were not Capitan of the 
 carters of the Commissariat he would not have been able to 
 compass more. His position enabled him to secure others, 
 and the shipment of the grain has begun." 3 " The carters 
 have at last banded together after having been beaten by the 
 agents of Mascoyer, as well as by those of Dutenot and Arginot, 
 and by the agents of the merchants of Auxonne and Beaune. 
 The carters now ask forty sous for what they used to do for 
 fifteen sous, and for the trip from Bassigny which formerly 
 gave them 35 sous, they how ask 3" 15 sous (75 sous)." 4 The 
 trade was rapidly losing the apathy of the earlier period, and it 
 was beginning to move to the Saone towns to meet the Lyonese 
 merchants. 
 
 The development of the trade of the river towns proceeded 
 steadily and in 1581 there were active merchants in all the more 
 important towns, collecting grain to sell to the Lyonese. It 
 is unfortunately impossible to trace the details of the transition, 
 but the general fact of the change is indicated by the corre- 
 spondence between the officials of the Saone towns and Lyons. 
 It is in itself significant that there was enough trade to engender 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 32. Langres, 26 Mars 1556-57. 
 
 2 Ibid., Letter of 22 Avril 1557. 
 
 3 Ibid., Letter of 26 Mars. 
 
 4 Ibid., AA. 32. 3 Avril 1556-57. 
 
146 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 such correspondence, and the letters are so explicit that it is 
 impossible to escape the conclusion. In January 1581, the 
 Echevins of Auxonne write to the Consuls of Lyons: " The 
 merchants of this town who are engaged in trade with Lyons 
 make complaints of the conduct of a collector who wishes to 
 levy * Coupenage ' on the grain sent to Lyons. . . . You 
 will find that this is important, as it will increase the cost of 
 grain, and some merchants may lose interest in the trade." l 
 Later in the same month, " the merchants of Macon assembled 
 with the merchants of the Duchy of Burgundy, the Vicomte 
 of Auxonne, and of Bassigny, to secure relief from the extortions 
 of the Reverend Archbishop of Lyons, who asserts a right to 
 levy ' coupenage.' " 2 There are similar complaints from Chalons- 
 sur-Saone. 3 In 1589 a hoard was purchased by Sr. d'Acier of 
 Auxonne and other merchants who were associated with him. 4 
 The first step in the organization of the wholesale trade had been 
 taken; local merchants had begun to collect grain at the shipping 
 ports on the river. 
 
 The municipality exerted an important influence upon this 
 development of the wholesale trade, since the difficulties of 
 marketing in Burgundy, the hesitation between the different 
 sources of supply, the fear of loss, all tended to discourage the 
 merchants. Throughout the century the municipality was 
 constantly assisting and stimulating the merchants. 
 
 The most direct form of assistance needed by the merchants 
 was protection against the prohibitions issued by the local 
 officials of the producing regions. This task the municipality 
 discharged easily. There was generally a deputy at the Court, 
 who could at any time secure Royal Patents to cancel the pro- 
 hibitions issued by the Governors, provincial parlements, or 
 municipalities. Deputies were also sent to the producing 
 regions to secure the repeal or modification of prohibitions, or 
 to assure the execution of the Royal Patents and of the licenses 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mim., AA. 70, 32. Auxonne, 15 Jan. 1581. 
 
 2 Ibid., AA. 72, 35. Macon, 21 Jan. 1581. 
 
 8 Ibid., AA. 70, 91. Chalons, 19 Jan. 1581. 
 
 4 Ibid., AA. 29. Paigny, 5 Nov. 1589. Charny. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 147 
 
 issued by the Consuls on the authority of the royal letters. 
 All these forms of control must needs be exercised by the Consuls 
 themselves. There could be no question of creating a Chambre 
 d'Abondance after the plan of 1481. 
 
 The great risks of the trade were a more serious difficulty, 
 and did much to deter the extension of private enterprise. This 
 was important even in ordinary seasons when the merchants 
 were trading in Burgundy. In years of dearth, the consequences 
 of this timidity of the merchants furnished more ground for 
 apprehensions. At such times, the Consuls felt that it was 
 necessary to stimulate trade from all possible sources of supply, 
 encouraging buying not only in Burgundy but also in Auvergne 
 and in Languedoc. The risk of such ventures was enhanced 
 by the infrequency of trade, and the actual risk was magnified 
 by ignorance. Conditions in Languedoc in 1529 are typical. 
 Claude de Bourges had been sent to Avignon by the Consuls 
 to stimulate the local merchants, and to buy for the city. He 
 found grain in plenty. The Legate " addressed him to three 
 merchants, M. de Lers, who had about 1000 se tiers of wheat, 
 Maitre Moreton, steward of my Lord the Legate, who had 
 1 200 setiers, and Sr. Honnorat Plonyer. In all there were 
 3000 anees, located near the river, conveniently for shipment. . . . 
 If prices were high enough, he says, there are plenty of persons 
 who would be willing to send grain up to Lyons. I know half 
 a dozen already, who will ship if they are guaranteed against 
 losses." * At Romans, the Maitre de le Monnaye tells him that 
 there is plenty of grain, but that it is dear. If trade were free, 
 it would perhaps be possible to buy advantageously, but the 
 merchants will not send grain up to Lyons at the risk of selling 
 at the same price there. 2 At Valencte, he found a man who 
 would send grain up to Lyons, if he were guaranteed the price 
 of twenty-eight sous per bichet. 3 There is no evidence that 
 such contracts were made in that particular instance, but such 
 guarantees were freely given by the Consuls. The contracts 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 29. Avignon, 6 Nov. 1529. Claude de Bourges. 
 
 2 Ibid. Valence, 26 Oct. 1529. Claude de Bourges. 
 
 8 Ibid. Valence, 12 Nov. 1529. Claude de Bourges. 
 
148 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 were made and enforced to the letter. In 1544, such an 
 agreement had been made with Etienne Tremblay of Charlieu, 
 who engaged to bring 600 anees to Lyons from the Beauce. He 
 complained that he had been able to sell only 40 anees before 
 prices fell, and he claimed reimbursement. The Consuls refused 
 to pay. They declared that he had not kept any of the articles 
 of the contract. The grain had not reached Lyons within the 
 time specified, and he had refused to sell either at the price 
 agreed upon, or at the current price. 1 Somewhat later, the 
 Consuls summoned Robert Tricaut, and asked him if he would 
 go to the Beauce to bring grain to Lyons. They agreed to 
 guarantee a price of twenty-four sous per bichet, 2 but Tricaut 
 .refused, and the Consuls finally decided to send him " to Orleans 
 and other places on the road where grain merchants are to be 
 found." He was instructed to secure promises from merchants 
 to bring grain to Lyons, and guarantee them 24-26 sous per 
 bichet at least, and if prices were higher the merchants were to 
 have the surplus. 3 In 1573, the Consuls adopted even more 
 vigorous measures. " Claude Platt, Andre Mornier, Claude 
 Belleton, Franc/ois Lobat, and Benoit Montcony were ordered 
 to purchase 1000 anees of grain for the provision of the city, to 
 prevent the people from suffering want at the end of the season. 
 The merchants replied that they were willing to make the pur- 
 chases and that they would give their time and use their credit 
 to the best of their ability, but they did not think that the loss 
 should fall on them if the grain were shipwrecked or sold below 
 cost, or if they lost any of the specie which they must needs send 
 to Burgundy." The Consuls agreed to guarantee the mer- 
 chants against loss. 4 This case was rather involved as the mer- 
 chants were themselves Consuls, and were thus guaranteeing 
 private ventures with the authority of the town. It indicates 
 the opportunity for transactions that were perhaps of doubtful 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 61, 270. 9 Avril 1543-44. See also BB. 61, 234. 
 3 Mars 1543-44- 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 61, 237. 10 Mars 1543-44. Note also of a similar contract with 
 Antoine Bouyn. 
 
 8 Ibid., BB. 61, 240. 14 Mars 1543-44. 
 4 Ibid., BB. 91, 52. 17 Fev. 1573. 
 
TEE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 149 
 
 ethical character. In the same year, an agent was sent to 
 " Dauphine and Avignon to discover how much grain was 
 available for export to Lyons, and to assure the merchants that 
 the Consulate would guarantee them against loss." * Later 
 a premium of two sous per bichet was offered to all " foreign " 
 merchants who brought grain to Lyons during the months 
 of April, May, and June. 2 This type of encouragement 
 may fairly be characterized as an established policy. Such 
 powers must necessarily be exercised by the Consuls them- 
 selves. It was not a task to be delegated to a subordinate 
 commission. 
 
 But when the Consuls endeavored to extend their activity 
 beyond these limits, when they purchased grain instead of 
 encouraging the merchants, the difficulties multiplied out of all 
 proportion to the results. Direct municipal purchases were 
 made in 1528-29, 1530, 1532, 1544, 1573, and 1580, but the 
 administration of the affair was always hopelessly involved. 
 In 1528, the purchases were not large, but the gram had to be 
 forced on the bakers at the end of the season at a distinct sacri- 
 fice, as it had been held too long. A list of the bakers was drawn 
 up and each assigned a fixed amount of grain, which they were 
 required to buy weekly of the Consuls at twelve sous five deniers 
 per bichet. They were ordered to use no other grain while the 
 ordinance was in force. 3 The bakers were bitterly opposed to 
 this action as the price was high. They refused to take the 
 amounts assigned, or, in some cases, took the grain but refused 
 to pay the price, delaying payment indefinitely. All these 
 troubles meant loss to the municipality, and cast discredit on 
 municipal purchases. In 1573, the Consuls ordered the dis- 
 tribution of i oo anees per week to the bakers, and this time there 
 was less trouble. 4 In 1580, the grain had to be forced on the 
 bakers by measures which caused much ill feeling. The bakers 
 complained of the prices charged for the grain, and of the prices 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 91, 83. 8 Mai 1573. 
 3 Ibid., BB. 91, 105. 7 Juillet 1573. 
 8 Ibid., BB. 47 & 71. 28 Mai 1528. 
 Ibid., BB. 91, 87. 19 Mai 1573. 
 
150 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 at which they were allowed to sell their bread. Some refused to. 
 take the grain. 1 
 
 Another mode of assuring the city against the irregularities 
 of trade was the control of a private granary secured by reason 
 of special favors or by a direct contract. In September 1559, one 
 Tipperaus " offered to store 2000 anees of grain in the city to 
 be sold at such times, previous to the Saint- Jean, 1560, as shall 
 please the Consuls. In consideration of this agreement, the 
 said Tipperaus was paid fifteen sous per bichet." 2 A more 
 elaborate contract of the same type was made in October of 
 the same year: " Claude Tisserand, merchant and citizen of 
 Lyons, promises to secure and place in granaries before Christ- 
 mas 2000 anees of grain which shall be stored at his expense 
 and risk until the Saint- Jean following. He agrees further to 
 sell said grain to the inhabitants of Lyons as the Consuls 
 shall direct, with the understanding that he shall sell at one 
 sou less than the market price if the current price exceeds 
 eighteen sous per bichet, and that in case the price falls 
 below fifteen sous six deniers per bichet, the Consuls will be 
 liable for the difference between the current rate and fifteen 
 sous six deniers." 3 
 
 The policy of the Consuls during this period of growth was a 
 policy of encouragement of private initiative, and of supple- 
 mentary purchases on the credit of the town. The wisdom of 
 encouragement can hardly be questioned; the trade was in such 
 a condition that the hope of gain was pretty evenly balanced 
 by the risk of loss. Legal obstacles contributed to dissuade the 
 merchants. These troubles could be adequately met by the 
 Consuls directly; the ordinary organization of the city was able 
 to deal with all questions which arose in the fulfilment of this 
 aspect of municipal policy. But the Consuls were never content 
 to stop at this point. The wholesale trade, even with the en- 
 couragement of the municipal guarantees, tended to fall below 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 105, 66. 12 Avril 1585. Also GG. Chappe IV, 481. 
 Comptes de 1573. Ibid., BB. 117, in. 15 Avril 1586. 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 81, 196. 7 Sept. 1559. 
 Ibid., BB. 81, 205. 5 Oct. 1559. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 151 
 
 the amount required to keep prices within comfortable limits in 
 periods of stress. The Consuls were constantly seeking to reduce 
 prices below the level which the merchants judged necessary to 
 assure a fair hope of profit. To accomplish this purpose, the 
 Consuls were obliged to undertake ventures which were almost 
 certain to involve loss. They placed on the market quantities 
 of grain which lowered prices below the actual cost of the 
 grain. 
 
 The expediency of this policy was never very seriously ques- 
 tioned. Criticism was levelled at the details of administration 
 rather than against the policy. At times, there were accusations 
 of fraud. In the period from 1500 to 1580, municipal pur- 
 chases were not large, but as the community became convinced 
 that some purchases of this sort were desirable, it became 
 equally certain that the Consuls could not advantageously 
 administer the undertaking themselves. At no time between 
 1504 and 1586 was a commission actually established, as in 1481, 
 1500, and 1504, but in one way or another it just missed being 
 established. The rise of the wholesale merchants made direct 
 purchases less necessary than they had been in 1481, and the 
 importance of the Consulate in affording encouragement to the 
 merchants tended to put everything related to the trade in 
 the hands of the Consuls. Then, too, there was an unwilling- 
 ness to recognize the necessity of direct purchases by the munic- 
 ipality. The Consuls were ever hoping to render the private 
 trade wholly adequate. But the experience of the sixteenth 
 century demonstrated both the necessity of some regular pur- 
 chases by the municipality with the expectation of some loss 
 and the necessity of some subsidiary commission to manage 
 this undertaking. 
 
 The idea of a definite and independent Chambre d'Abondance 
 appeared throughout the century, but it was not carried out 
 until the necessity of some regular municipal trade was recog- 
 nized. The early plans were not adopted because the Consuls 
 could not persuade themselves that direct purchases were more 
 than a temporary expedient of such exceptional character as to 
 make the special machinery of a Commission unnecessary. 
 
152 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 In 1528, the first year of serious trouble after 1504, the larger 
 outlines of a Chambre were sketched. " M. Champyer . . . 
 thought that all should contribute a quantity of grain propor- 
 tionate to their means, so that the poor people should not lack. 
 Four persons should be elected to take charge of the affair. 
 They should be given the list of contributors. " The other 
 persons present were of the same opinion, and the Consuls went 
 so far as to draw up a list of contributions, but the commission 
 was not heard from. 1 This Bureau would have been a much 
 less important commission than that of 1481, but it was not 
 unlike that of 1504. Purchases were made by the municipality 
 in 1528, and the mode in which they were made suggests a prob- 
 able explanation of the view that no special Commission was 
 necessary or desirable. Claude de Bourges, the agent in Langue- 
 doc, was sent thither to stimulate private trade by assurances 
 against risk or by promise of definite prices. His purchases 
 for the municipality were certainly only an incident in his com- 
 mission, and it is quite possible that they were made only when he 
 found it excessively difficult to stimulate individual initiative. 
 He says, indeed, in the letter of November 6: "I declared to 
 the Legate the cause of my journey, . . . the permission to 
 export grain from Languedoc." 2 Similar implications appear 
 in the letter of October 26, from Valence. Evidently the Con- 
 suls had hoped that the trade would flow towards Lyons once 
 the prohibitions were cancelled and the merchants excited by 
 the expectation of good prices. This aspect of the policy of the 
 Consuls is more directly revealed by reports of Guimbre, the 
 agent in Burgundy. In April, the Consuls hear that " the mer- 
 chants of Auxonne and others who have grain complain that 
 their grain cannot be sold, or at any rate has a very small sale 
 on account of the prohibitions." Guimbre writes that the mer- 
 chants of Burgundy dare not send their grain down to Lyons on 
 account of the prohibitions. 3 Rumors and statements of this 
 type inevitably led the Consuls to attach an exaggerated impor- 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 47, 165. 8 Dec. 1528. 
 
 2 Ibid., AA. 29. Avignon, 6 Nov. 1528. 
 8 Ibid., BB. 47, 224. 5 Avril 1529. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 153 
 
 tance to the prohibitions. They were slow to learn that there 
 were many other causes which tended to make the wholesale 
 trade less considerable than they hoped. Direct purchases 
 were, in many cases, if not regularly, a last resort, a mode of 
 procuring supplies that was adopted only when the agents had 
 failed to stimulate the local merchants to make shipments. 
 
 In 1544, we have some of the commissions of the deputies of 
 the town. They were probably given much the same powers as 
 the deputies of 1528. Antoine Bouyn was sent to Languedoc, 
 Decapelle to Beauce, Charollais, Nivernais, and Bourbonnais, 
 Janot and Guillaume du Mont of Seurre, to Forez and Auvergne. 
 All the commissions were at first drawn up in the same terms: 
 " we have given and give power and authority to ... to 
 proceed to ... (Languedoc) . . . and other suitable places 
 to take up grain, and make contracts and agreements with the 
 merchants and other persons to the effect that grain shall be t 
 sent to Lyons, in such quantities as he shall deem proper. For 
 the assurance of the price and purchase of -the grain, he shall have 
 authority to contract liabilities binding upon us as councillors, 
 and upon the property of the town, and if he judges it expedient 
 he may contract liabilities binding upon us as private individuals 
 and upon our property." 1 The intention is here obscure. 
 The commissioner is charged both with stimulation of private 
 trade and with purchases in the name of the town. The draft 
 was unsatisfactory to the Consuls, and a revised form was issued 
 the next day. Antoine Bouyn was given this commission, 
 which emphasizes the policy of encouragement. " The said 
 Bouyn shall make agreements with such merchants as he shall 
 find suitable, engaging them to ship not more than 10-12,000 
 anees of grain. He shall agree that if they cannot sell the grain 
 for a price that is fixed by him, they shall be indemnified for the 
 loss suffered. The merchants shall agree to bring the grain to 
 Lyons at their expense and at their risk, and they shall be 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mtm^ BB. 61, 214. 25 Fev. 1543-44. The original is obscure 
 in phrasing, especially the words " pour recouvrer des bleds, et illec marchander 
 et convenir avec telz marchands et personnes qu'il verra estre son affaire. Pour 
 fair venir en ceste ville telle quantite" dea bleds qu'il s'avisera." 
 
154 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 required to sell as soon as the grain arrives." l The commission 
 to Jannot was of the same character. He was instructed to go 
 to Puy, Riom, Montferrand, Clermont, and elsewhere in Au- 
 vergne, to see if he could not come to some agreements with the 
 merchants and other persons having granaries. If he found 
 merchants who were willing to sign contracts, he might engage 
 for the delivery of 6000 anees, and might guarantee a price of 
 twenty-three sous per bichet. 2 
 
 The effort to confine the deputies to the policy of encourage- 
 ment is marked. This is more significant when it is considered 
 in connection with the failure of a project for a loan to be used 
 for the purchase of grain. The preceding August, the Consuls 
 had gone so far as to summon an assembly of notables " to find a 
 remedy for the dearth, to form granaries and to find money." 3 
 The resolution was carried in due form, but there is no record of 
 any meeting, nor any accounts of grain bought outright in the 
 name of the town. The commissions first drawn up for the 
 deputies were revised to avoid a possibility of interpreting them 
 as a grant of power to make purchases. The intention of the 
 municipality is clear. The policy of encouragement and insur- 
 ance against risk was to be maintained as long as possible, and 
 in that year it was not necessary to resort to direct purchase. 
 
 In 1573, we find the municipality not only engaged in direct 
 purchase of grain, but also establishing a commission to attend 
 to the details. The Consuls had purchased 1000 anees of grain. 
 On February 2, the first instalment arrived. The Consuls 
 then ordered " that the grain should be placed in the most 
 convenient granaries at the Port Saint Vincent, and that Sr. de la 
 Capelle should be commissioned to keep account of the entry 
 and of the distribution of the grain. And because certain 
 bourgeois have offered to lend money to assist the town, on 
 condition of being reimbursed with the money received from the 
 sale of the grain, it has been decided to accept the loans offered. 
 In case the sums subscribed by the bourgeois are not sufficient, 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 61, 216. 26 Fev. 1543-44. 
 
 * Ibid. 
 
 8 Ibid., BB. 6 1, 113. 17 Aotit 1543. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 155 
 
 2ooo u shall be borrowed on the Place to be employed in the pay- 
 ment of the 1000 anees. To do this, we commission the Council- 
 lors Morniers and Demasses, both to receive the loans of the 
 bourgeois, and to borrow the surplus on the Place. . . . The 
 said Consuls agree and promise both in their capacity as Consuls 
 and in their private capacity, to guard the sums entrusted to 
 them and repay each person in full." 1 This special committee 
 of two Consuls possessed many of the duties of the later Chambre 
 d'Abondance, but the Consulate as a body retained direction of 
 all the purchases. 2 In the next few years, there was a growing 
 conviction that the supplies furnished by the wholesale trade 
 were likely to be slightly inadequate. These purchases in 1573 
 were followed in 1574 by a more formal recognition of the prob- 
 able necessity of similar measures in the future. The Consuls 
 went so far as to secure Royal Letters Patent granting them full 
 power to make purchases and receive loans. 3 The Patent is 
 so much concerned with the question of provincial prohibitions 
 that it is difficult to decide whether the cancellation of the pro- 
 hibitions or the grant of authority to form reserves was its 
 principal object. The inclusion of the provisions for the forma- 
 tion of municipal granaries indicated that the idea was occupy- 
 ing a larger place in the minds of the Consuls. 
 
 In 1580, the project was again brought forward, and the 
 motives are stated. " Inasmuch as the city frequently suffers 
 from dearth, the Consuls have resolved to establish a general 
 granary which shall always be kept filled, and renewed at regular 
 intervals. With this in view, all the Estates of the town and 
 the inhabitants of the neighborhood shall be invited to contribute 
 to this good and holy enterprise." 4 The conception of a per- 
 manent reserve was entirely new, and the proposal signifies an 
 increased lack of confidence in the adequacy of the wholesale 
 supply. The difficulties were in reality two-fold; there was a 
 great possibility that the merchants would fail to bring enough 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 91, 35. 2 Fev. 1573. 
 a Ibid., BB. 91, 82. 7 Mai 1573. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 52. 7 Oct. 1574. Lettres Patentes de Henri III, 
 confirmees par le Due de Lorraine, 20 Oct. 1574. 
 
 4 Ibid., BB. 105-106. 7 Jan. 1580. Chappe IV, 443, i. 
 
156 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 grain to Lyons, and it was even more likely that irregularity of 
 arrival w^uld subject the town to periods of distressingly high 
 prices. The formation of a municipal granary of moderate 
 capacity would remedy both of these dangers which were at last 
 believed to be inherent in the conditions of the trade. The 
 idea of such a granary managed by an independent commission 
 gained more and more hold on the citizens of Lyons. It was an 
 essentially different conception from the Bureaux of 1481, 
 1500, and 1504. The main idea of the early commissions was 
 to purchase supplies in distant sections from which there was no 
 regular trade to Lyons. The growth of the wholesale trade 
 had rendered this type of municipal policy obsolete even in 
 1500 and 1504. The new policy of encouraging individual 
 effort supplanted the policy of municipal purchase and succeeded 
 until the trade ceased to expand. Then the municipality found 
 that some purchases could advantageously be made. It was 
 beginning to be necessary to supplement individual endeavor. 
 It was expedient to form a reserve to protect the city against 
 the irregularities due to the uncertainty of river transport and 
 the temporary delays caused by prohibitions. 
 
 The experience of 1586 brought this policy to the point of 
 complete expression. The fulfilment was long postponed, but 
 the conception of the new policy was complete in every essential 
 feature. The gradual pressure by which the Consuls were 
 driven to make extensive purchases is the most significant 
 feature of the episode. In the latter part of March, the Consuls 
 apprehended serious inconvenience from the prohibitions in 
 Burgundy and Dauphine. The merchants were unable to 
 afford any immediate relief on account of these obstacles, so that 
 a visitation of private granaries was ordered. These were to be 
 opened to provide for the needs of the town until grain could be 
 obtained. 1 Meanwhile, Patents had been obtained from the 
 King, cancelling the prohibitions. The deputies of the town 
 in Burgundy were instructed to enforce these patents; and a 
 deputy was sent at once to Auvergne to secure the passage of the 
 grain held at Roanne. 2 A week later the fear of dearth had 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 116, 63. 20 Mars 1586. 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 116, 67. 29 Mars 1586. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 157 
 
 become more pressing. The prohibitions in Burgundy and 
 Bassigny seemed so dangerous that another agent was sent to 
 the King to obtain fresh Patents to nullify the prohibitions. 
 Then the Consuls began to doubt the possibility of securing 
 supplies from Burgundy in time; the agent to the King was 
 consequently instructed to buy grain at Orleans. " He shall 
 pass through Orleans to see if he can not find some merchant 
 willing to sell 800-1000 muids of grain, to be delivered at Lyons 
 by May fifteenth." 1 April 15, a deputy arrived from Roanne 
 to report that there was a considerable quantity of grain but the 
 prices were high. He was sent back at once with instructions 
 to buy 2000 anees, and although there was at first some desire 
 to limit the price to be paid, he was finally given carte blanche, 
 for fear that the opportunity of securing the grain might be lost. 2 
 A week later, the deputies in Burgundy were sent instructions 
 to buy 3000 anees or more anywhere they could and at any price. 3 
 The Consuls had given up all hope of securing adequate supplies 
 from the merchants. The prohibitions might be removed, but 
 the delays incident to getting private ventures under way would 
 render this resource of no avail. The city needed grain at once. 
 The only expeditious means of obtaining supplies was direct 
 municipal purchase, and the Consuls did not hesitate. Their 
 efforts were successful. The first serious realization of danger 
 appeared on April fourth. On May tenth, 4 the first instal- 
 ments arrived from Burgundy. Municipal purchases continued 
 till the harvest. 5 
 
 The prohibitions in the provinces gave the crisis a severity 
 that was distinctly abnormal, but the inadequacy of the private 
 trade, so powerfully impressed upon the Consuls, was real. 
 The volume of trade might at any time fall below the amount 
 needed by the city; prohibitions, ice on the river, mere timidity 
 on the part of the merchants might cause a temporary but pro- 
 longed scarcity. The absence of a large supply close at hand 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 116, 68. 4 Avril 1586. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 117, 113. 15 Avril 1586. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 117, 119. 22 Avril 1586. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 117, 134. 10 Mai 1586. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 117, passim. Chappe IV, 411, 60 bis. Paris, 19 Juin 1586. 
 
158 TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 exposed the city to dangers from irregularity that were no 
 serious menace to cities like Paris and Rouen. The crisis in 
 1586 was phenomenal; it resulted in a remarkably precise 
 formulation of all the ideas that had been in the air since 1573. 
 May 13, 1586, a general assembly was summoned to consider 
 a plan drawn up by the Consuls to prevent the recurrence of 
 the difficulties experienced so frequently. 
 
 In the opening speech, Mandelot, the Governor of Lyonnais, 
 stated the motives which impelled the Consuls to call the meet- 
 ing. He laid great stress on the feeling that private trade was 
 at times unable to meet the needs of the town. " Even the 
 Consuls," he says, " have recently had great difficulty in securing 
 grain, on account of the severity of the dearth throughout 
 France. To prevent the recurrence of such distress in the 
 future, the Consuls have decided to empower six notable bour- 
 geois to buy grain after the harvest. Their purchases shall be 
 stored in a public granary, to succor the people in time of 
 famine." 1 
 
 The remarkable feature of this proposal, however, was the 
 extraordinary completeness of the provisions for the organiza- 
 tion of the Commission. " The Commission shall have the 
 title Intendants d'Abondance and shall promise the Consuls 
 to buy or have bought, after the harvest of the present year, 
 such quantities of grain, wheat, rye, and lentils, as the Consuls 
 and the Intendants shall deem expedient. They shall make 
 these purchases in Beauce, Sologne, Nivernais, Bourbonnais, 
 Auvergne, Charollais, and other neighboring regions. As far 
 as possible they shall refrain from purchasing grain in Burgundy, 
 in order not to curtail the opportunities of the merchants to engage 
 in the trade which they ordinarily pursue in Burgundy and Bassigny. 
 Likewise the said Intendants shall make no purchases in the 
 government of Lyonnais, nor in the Pays de Dombes, since 
 the bourgeois, citizens, and other inhabitants are accustomed 
 to make provision for their families by purchases in these 
 regions. 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 116, 89; 117, 140. 13 Mai 1586. Assemblee en 
 THostel Commun de la Ville de Lyon. The wording of the speech is condensed. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 159 
 
 " The Intendants shall provide for the shipment of all grain 
 bought in pursuance of their orders, and shall store it in granaries 
 of which they shall hold the keys. 
 
 " The Consuls shall entrust to the Intendants not more than 
 20,000 ecus soleil in specie, drawn either from the personal 
 fortunes of the Consuls or from sums borrowed by them on their t 
 own credit. In acknowledgment of this sum, the Intendants 
 in their own names shall deliver receipts to each of the amount 
 loaned, which shall be repaid at the end of the year with the 
 profit of - % per year, or from fair to fair at the rate of 
 ' change ' in this city. 
 
 " And inasmuch as it would be advisable to create a larger 
 fund than this 20,000 ecus, the Intendants shall exert their 
 influence to borrow the sum needed for the purchases, transporta- 
 tion, and other expenses incidental to the undertaking. For 
 these sums, the Intendants shall give receipts made out in their 
 own name, to bear such interest and profit as they shall agree 
 upon. 
 
 " For the transaction of these various affairs, they shall 
 assemble at a regular place of meeting. All six Intendants shall 
 attend if possible, but, in the absence of one or two, the four 
 present shall decide such questions as arise, and their decisions 
 shall afterwards be ratified by the absent members. The 
 duties shall be divided among them, and they shall have authority 
 to commission such agents as they shall find necessary, to make 
 the purchases and supervise transportation. Likewise one of 
 their number shall be particularly charged to keep or supervise 
 the keeping of the cash book and other papers concerning the 
 undertaking. 
 
 1 The duties and authority of the Intendants shall terminate 
 annually, beginning with the feast of Saint- Jean Baptiste, and 
 ending on the same feast day in the following year. At the end 
 of the year thus indicated, three of the six Intendants shall 
 leave office and in their place three persons shall be elected by 
 the Echevins and the Intendants. These newly-elected Inten- 
 dants' shall discharge the duties of the office for the year, and 
 at its close the three Intendants of longest standing shall leave 
 office, and three others shall be elected. 
 
l6o TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 " At the end of each year, between Easter and the Saint- 
 Jean, the aforesaid grain purchased and stored in the city shall 
 be sold by persons appointed by the Intendants for the purpose, 
 who shall take charge of all the product of the sale, in order to 
 pay the loans from individuals, both principal and interest. . . . 
 
 " When the grain has been sold, the Intendants shall render 
 account of their administration to the Consuls, and to the three 
 incoming Intendants. The Governor, the Clergy, the officers of 
 Justice, and other notables may be present, and if it appears by 
 the account that there has been a loss, whether because of sale 
 below cost, or by reason of deterioration, excessive expense of 
 transportation, or loss from shipwreck, fire, violence, theft, 
 or pillage, the Consuls in their private capacity shall indemnify 
 the Intendants and reimburse them immediately after the 
 rendition of the account, without any formal process. 
 
 " The sum thus paid by the Eerie vins to the Intendants 
 shall be distributed and imposed on all the inhabitants of the 
 town, as the Orders and the Estates have expressly consented. 
 Likewise, if it shall please God to grant any profit, it shall belong 
 to the public and remain to serve as part of the fund assigned 
 to the enterprise." 1 
 
 This elaborate attempt to organize municipal purchases 
 was premature. It was the result of an unusual crisis which was 
 somewhat artificial because of the excessive influence of pro- 
 hibitions. The moment chosen for the establishment of the 
 Chambre d'Abondance was unfortunate; coming at the close 
 of a season, when the municipality had extended its credit for 
 immediate purchases, it proved to be impracticable for the Con- 
 suls to turn over the sum of 20,000 ecus, provided for in the plan. 
 The six Intendants d'Abondance were duly elected and they 
 endeavored to discharge the duties imposed upon them, but there 
 was no money. At the end of October, they appeared at the 
 Consulate, and said that they had sent into the provinces to 
 make purchases, but that the Echevins had failed to pay the 
 20,000 ecus without which the enterprise could not be pros- 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 116, 89; 117, 140. 13 Mai 1586. One of these 
 registers is the minute made during the meeting, the other is the formal copy. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS l6l 
 
 ecuted. They added that they would be obliged to resign, if 
 the funds were not speedily forthcoming. The Consuls asked 
 for time to consider the subject, but no record of a decision 
 appears. 1 There are no accounts of purchases by these In ten- 
 dan ts d'Abondance, so that it is likely that they resigned on 
 account of lack of funds. 
 
 There is no more significant commentary upon the nature of 
 institutions and of institutional development than the absence 
 of any municipal purchases for the half century that follows 
 the formulation of the elaborate scheme of 1586. It was not an 
 unprecedented proposal ; the origin of every feature of the scheme 
 can be perceived in the history of the preceding decade, and above 
 all in the events of the first four months of 1586. We can 
 rarely trace the gradual development of a relatively new institu- 
 tion with more completeness. Nothing could produce a more 
 convincing impression of permanence and of appositeness, and 
 yet all this structure crumbled and fell to the ground, incapable 
 of supporting its own weight. For fifty years there was no 
 suggestion of a recurrence of such a crisis as that of 1586; no 
 renewal of the project to form a municipal granary. The 
 private trade, which in 1573, 1580, and 1586 had revealed serious 
 incapacity to supply the needs of the city, succeeded for a long 
 period in meeting all the wants of Lyons. When the Consuls 
 finally became convinced that the general wholesale trade was 
 not quite adequate, the trade ceased to cause further difficulty. 
 The problem which had seemed so serious in 1586 apparently 
 ceased to exist for half a century. 
 
 The explanation of this curious feature of the grain trade at 
 Lyons is probably similar to the explanation that has been 
 suggested for the persistence of the system of local marketing. 
 There were latent defects in organization which were really 
 inherent in the conditions of the trade, but they appeared only 
 under pressure of unusual circumstances. Some chance incident 
 might reveal the nature of the difficulty long before the pressure 
 of conditions had become sufficiently insistent to require com- 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 117, 233. 31 Oct. 1586. The Consuls were to 
 decide the matter the third of November, but there is no record under that date. 
 
1 62 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 plete reorganization. The solution of many social problems 
 is frequently conceived long before the difficulty has become so 
 pressing that reform is necessary. In this sense, the Abondance 
 of 1586 was a premature solution of the grain trade problems 
 of the seventeenth century. The sixteenth century was char- 
 acterized at Lyons by the effort to stimulate individual en- 
 deavor; the municipality avoided direct purchases as far as 
 possible, and wisely relied upon the supplies procured by mer- 
 chants. The seventeenth century was characterized by a 
 deepening conviction of the inexpediency of reliance upon the 
 private trade. A fortuitous combination of circumstances in 
 1586 happened to bring out most of the essential difficulties 
 that characterize the seventeenth century, so that the policy 
 of the seventeenth century was strikingly foreshadowed long 
 before it became a practical necessity. 
 
 In 1620, the first indication of renewed trouble in the grain 
 trade appeared. The Consuls were not active, but the judicial 
 officers endeavored to protect the city against want. The 
 expedient adopted was a curious compromise between the 
 policies of encouragement and of direct purchase. The mer- 
 chants of the city were summoned towards the end of March 
 and ordered " to maintain fixed reserves in their granaries until 
 the month of August. Until then each merchant shall replenish 
 his granaries as he sells, so that the quantity in his possession 
 shall never fall below the amounts indicated in the annexed 
 roll. To free the merchants from any fear of a decline in price 
 which might cause them to lose money, it is also ordered that 
 until the month of August, the bakers of the town shall be 
 required to buy grain of the said merchants, at the price of 
 I2 U 5 sous per anee for wheat from the Pays de Verdun or above, 
 and 13 n per anee for wheat from the lower river." 1 
 
 Ten years later, the project for a Chambre d'Abondance 
 reappeared. The Abondance was formed to supplement the 
 efforts of private merchants, especially by endeavoring to procure 
 supplies in regions not generally frequented by the merchants. 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 427, 3. 27 Mars 1620. Ordonnance de la 
 S6n6chaussee. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D J ABONDANCE AT LYONS 163 
 
 The merchants confined their attention to Burgundy, but it was 
 hazardous to rely so completely upon a source of supply which 
 might be rendered valueless by a local crop failure. The natural 
 tendencies in the development of the wholesale trade had been 
 unsound; the advantages of Burgundy were so marked, the 
 disadvantages of the lower river so distinct, that the private 
 merchants gradually neglected entirely the sources of supply 
 which had been utilized for a brief period in the early sixteenth 
 century before the Burgundian trade had become concentrated 
 in the Saone towns. Trade with the lower river might have been 
 stimulated, perhaps, by means of guarantees and premiums, but 
 the delays and indirectness of such procedure were too serious 
 to render such a policy expedient. In 1630, the Consuls frankly 
 adopted the essential features of the Abondance of 1586. The 
 Bureau was charged with making purchases in the regions unfre- 
 quented by the merchants and with the formation of granaries 
 designed to secure the city against the dangers arising from the 
 irregularity of the trade. 
 
 As in 1586, the project was laid before a General Assembly 
 of the town, but the assembly was much less ambitious than its 
 predecessor. The Intendants pour F Abondance were appointed 
 for a year only, but their attributions were practically identical 
 with those of the Indendants of 1586, and the constant reference 
 to the meeting of 1586 indicates direct influence. A few men 
 who had attended in 1586 were present in 1630. The chief 
 difference lay in the mode of securing funds. In 1586, the 
 Consuls had agreed to contribute 20,000 francs and private 
 subscriptions were to be solicited; in 1630 a loan was to be 
 raised entirely by private subscriptions, and 30,0x30 francs were 
 promised at the meeting. There was no provision for any loan 
 from the municipality, so that the financial basis of the Chambre 
 d'Abondance was quite independent of the municipality. The 
 rate of interest to be paid was fixed at 6i% and the guarantee 
 against loss was to have an official character, which it possessed 
 actually, but not technically, in 1586. A new provision was 
 added requiring the bakers to buy gram of the Abondance at 
 fixed prices, in order to dispose of supplies left in the granaries 
 
164 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 at the close of a season. 1 In other respects the articles of 1586 
 and 1 630 were identical. 
 
 This Chambre d 'Abondance remained active till 1632. It 
 was reestablished in 1637-38, without any noteworthy change in 
 organization. In 1643, tne organization of the Chambre was 
 modified in many details and it was proposed to make it per- 
 manent, thus adopting at last the most ambitious element of the 
 plan of 1586. The articles drawn up by the General Assembly 
 were printed and distributed quite widely, and, as the Abondance 
 then became a permanent body, the year 1643 came to be re- 
 garded as the date of the establishment of the Chambre d'Abond- 
 ance. There were some important changes. The number of 
 directors was increased from eight to eleven, and it was pro- 
 vided that the Provost of Merchants and one Consul should 
 be members ex officio. In regard to raising of the loan there 
 was a compromise between the plans of 1586 and 1630. " The 
 purchases of grain shall be made with funds subscribed by the 
 Directors of the Abondance and by the Consulate. The Con- 
 sulate shall subscribe in its official capacity as member of the 
 Abondance, and shall employ the municipal funds." Evidently 
 reliance upon voluntary subscriptions had proved to be inade- 
 quate and the loans were given a more official character. The 
 other provisions of previous plans were repeated: the limitation 
 of purchases to distant sections unfrequented by merchants, 
 the interest to be paid on loans, the guarantee against loss, and 
 the regulation that the bakers must buy remainders at prices 
 fixed by the Directors of the Abondance. 2 
 
 The permanence projected in 1643 was really achieved. The 
 accounts are the simplest indication of the persistence of the 
 Chambre. The Archives at Lyons still possess the accounts 
 of the Abondance for the years: 1648-50, 1651-53, 1654, . . . 
 1667-70, and for each subsequent year to 1713. The Abondance 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., GG. Chappe IV, 442-443. (Extrait des Registres Con- 
 sulaires), 30 Juillet 1630. 
 
 a G 7 . 1633. ImprimS, Paris, 1667. Bib. Nat., Fr. 18599, 4 2 9- Imprime', 
 Paris, 1667. 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 5 and 6. Several copies. The original 
 minute is, of course, in the Actes Consulaires under the date 31 Aout 1643. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D' ABONDANCE AT LYONS 165 
 
 was not maintained from 1713 to 1730. But in 1730 it was 
 reestablished and remained in existence until the Revolution. 1 
 Some registers of the deliberations of the Abondance have also 
 survived, covering roughly the period i63o-84. 2 The Abon- 
 dance was thus an important factor in the history of the Lyonese 
 trade after 1643. 
 
 If the Chambre d' Abondance is considered solely from the 
 point of view of organization, the year 1643 marks the beginning 
 of the last phase of this form of public purchase of grain. The 
 policy adopted by the Abondance, however, underwent consider- 
 able change. The relations with the merchants were very 
 different in 1693 and 1643. It is scarcely too much to say that 
 the real purpose of the Abondance was fundamentally different. 
 
 The registers of deliberations for the years 1630-49 show that 
 the policy of the directors was closely related to the municipal 
 policy of the sixteenth century. The Consuls of that period 
 had sought primarily to stimulate the private wholesale trade 
 with Burgundy. In the early seventeenth century the directors 
 of the Abondance were commissioned in part to purchase grain 
 directly in Auvergne, Beauce, and Languedoc, but also to stimu- 
 late private merchants to engage in trade with these regions. 
 Lyons needed to have the possibility of recourse to more than 
 one source of supply. The private merchants were accustomed 
 to trade only with Burgundy and it was desirable to induce 
 them to extend the range of their purchases. The stimulation 
 of trade was hardly one of the purposes of the establishment 
 of the Abondance, but in practice it became a definite policy. 
 In fact, the Abondance from 1630-50 adopted the policy of the 
 Consuls of the sixteenth century, although the different aspects 
 of the policy received different emphasis. The Abondance 
 gave much attention to direct purchases. Grain was bought 
 more frequently and in larger quantities than at any time in 
 the sixteenth century. Like the Consuls, they were obliged 
 to secure special Letters Patent from the King to protect their 
 shipments and to safeguard the merchants against the local 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., GG. Chappe IV, 481. 
 * Ibid., GG. Chappe IV, 538, 49, 50, 51- 
 
1 66 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 prohibitions. But the directors of the Abondance also made 
 many contracts both with the local and the Lyonese merchants, 
 engaging to secure them against changes in price if the mer- 
 chants agreed to deliver the grain at Lyons within specified 
 periods. This was the policy of the sixteenth century. 1 Local 
 " foreign " merchants were brought to a consciousness of the 
 possibilities of trade with Lyons; the Lyonese were shown the 
 advantages of making purchases in Languedoc, as well as 
 Burgundy. 
 
 In the course of the seventeenth century, there was a distinct 
 development of trade with Languedoc. Auvergne and the 
 Beauce were very seldom visited by Lyonese whether at the 
 instance of the Abondance or on private initiative, since both 
 regions offered few advantages and the difficulties were great. 
 The lower river was more tempting, and it is pretty evident 
 that it was visited more and more frequently. This change 
 was in part due to the efforts of the Abondance to stimulate 
 trade, in part due to the normal development of the wholesale 
 trade. It was this change that altered the relation between the 
 Abondance and the merchants. 
 
 The transition cannot be dated with accuracy, but the char- 
 acter of the changes in the organization of the trade can be very 
 clearly traced in the letters of the* deputies of the Abondance 
 in Burgundy, 1667-77. I n the latter half of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury the Burgundian trade had begun to flow toward the Saone 
 towns. Local merchants appeared who collected the grain in 
 the back country and brought it to the river to meet the mer- 
 chants from Lyons. The organization of this wholesale trade 
 developed steadily, and by the middle of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury it was so highly concentrated in the river towns that the 
 Lyonese merchants did most of their buying in the towns. The 
 Lyonese merchant thus tended to become a capitalist who 
 confined his attention to the latter stages of the trade, trusting 
 commission agents or factors with the collection of the grain 
 in the producing regions. The papers of a law suit, in which 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., GG. Chappe IV, 538-549. Registres des Deliberations 
 1' Abondance. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 
 
 the Consuls of Lyons were engaged in 1630, indicate that this 
 capitalistic form of trade was an established practice even then. 
 The Lyonese merchants were buying in Champagne, in Bassigny, 
 and in Burgundy. 1 In most of the towns, the larger merchants 
 were represented by factors. There are traces of partnerships. 2 
 These and other facts indicate that the conditions we find in 
 1667-77 ma y have prevailed much earlier. In all probability, 
 however, there is a change in degree. Even if there were factors 
 and commission agents in the early seventeenth century, it 
 is hardly likely that this form of trade was so important. The 
 conduct of the Abondance in the years 1630-50 shows that the 
 merchants could not then be easily induced to buy on the lower 
 river. Later, when the development of the local wholesale 
 trade had emphasized the capitalistic side of the trade of the 
 Lyonese merchants, they found it easier to turn their capital 
 in any direction. The large mercantile house with its staff 
 of factors and its regular commission merchants could readily 
 develop relations with the local commission merchants of the 
 lower river. The larger scale of doing business was in itself 
 likely to make the merchant more willing to direct his trade 
 to the most advantageous sections. 
 
 The letters of 1667-77 show that the trade had reached this 
 stage of development, and they also suggest that the large scale 
 of operations was relatively new. The local merchants were 
 nearly all working on commission for Lyonese merchants. Du 
 Pradt writes in November, 1667, " there are very few mer- 
 chants here who have not commissions from Lyons. One 
 Fegnet, at Talmay, collects great amounts by reason of his 
 intimate knowledge of Franche Comte and the vicinity of 
 Langres. He works on commission, and has promised not to 
 engage himself on new commissions without speaking to me." 3 
 Other agents are noted, " one Balan d'Apremont, who ordinarily 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 411, 67. Juin-Sept. 1630. Proces entre les 
 fichevins de Chalons-sur-Saone et de Lyon. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 411, 63. 12 Avril 1628. Arret de Conseil. . . . 
 
 3 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Gray, 10 Nov. 1667. Most of these letters were 
 written by Du Pradt, a deputy of the Chambre d' Abondance, to the Directors of 
 the Chambre at Lyons. 
 
1 68 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 works on commission for merchants of Lyons." 1 The Aigneus, 
 uncle and nephew, " Dugas and his company," and many 
 others are mentioned. The Aigneus worked on a standing 
 engagement with certain merchants, and this contract made 
 such demands on them that Aigneu said he could not undertake 
 to buy a couple of hundred mines for the Abondance, as he did 
 not wish to break with his regular employers. 2 The efforts of 
 these local dealers brought the grain to the river very quickly. 
 In 1671, Du Pradt says that the granaries of the river towns 
 were generally filled by the first week in November. 3 In Sep- 
 tember, 1667, he says that there is no new grain to be had any- 
 where, but that there will be an abundance before the end of 
 October. 4 This does not mean, of course, that the whole crop 
 was moved towards the river, but the portion of the crop usually 
 available for wholesale trade appeared in the river towns early, 
 so that the local merchants were well supplied by the first of 
 November, and were ready to ship to Lyons. 
 
 The complete ascendency of the local merchants appears 
 most clearly when the grain is followed into the back country. 
 Almost everywhere we meet the merchants of the river towns, 
 rarely Lyonese merchants. The proportions of the trade in 
 the towns attracted many blatters, so that the factors were able 
 to buy much grain on the town markets or in the streets. This 
 appearance of blaliers in the towns is indeed one of the most 
 striking features of the period. Writing from Auxonne in 
 November, 1667, Du Pradt says: "from Langres, which is 
 ten leagues distant, much grain comes to this town. At Marsilly 
 and at Talmay, there are many carts loaded with grain." 5 
 At Gray, in 1669, 120 carters came in during a single week. 
 Arrivals were quite as frequent at Auxonne. 6 But the intensity 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 20 Nov. 1667. Du 
 Pradt. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Gray, 31 Oct. 1667. Du Pradt. See also ibid., 
 Chalons-sur-Sa6ne, 4 Dec. 1667. Du Pradt. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 8 Nov. 1671. Du Pradt. 
 
 4 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 14 Sept. 1667. Du Pradt. 
 
 6 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 3 Nov. 1667. Du Pradt. 
 
 8 Ibid., Gray, 22 Nov. 1669. Du Pradt. Auxonne, 25 Nov. 1669. Du Pradt. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 169 
 
 of competition among the commission merchants did not always 
 allow the blatters to get to the town market. The rivalry was 
 particularly keen between Dugas and the Aigneus. In Decem- 
 ber, 1667, Du Pradt says: "Dugas and his associates have 
 2500 anees of grain already purchased, and they are still buying, 
 striving to get ahead of the Aigneus who have quite as much as 
 they have. They have agreed several times to divide equally 
 what is brought to town and take it all at the same price. But 
 they break their agreement almost as soon as it is made. Last 
 Tuesday, they nearly came to blows. They pushed prices up 
 to 27 sous 6 deniers per bichet" (15-16 sous was a normal 
 price). Du Pradt could not resist the temptation to enter 
 into the game, so he advised the Aigneus to stop buying in the 
 town. " The granaries of Dugas were full, both in the town 
 and in the country. Dugas would soon be unable to house 
 more grain, and, as he has no commissions, he would have to 
 stop buying. Prices would fall and Aigneu would be able to 
 secure his grain at a moderate figure." l The merchants also 
 bought in the back country directly of the peasants. Dugas 
 and the Aigneus were buying in the country in 1667. In 1669, 
 one of the merchants of Lyons was scouring the country buying 
 of the peasants. 2 In 1667, bakers from Lyons were buying 
 in the farms, forcing prices up to extraordinary figures. 3 In 
 1672, two local merchants were said to be making a round of 
 the country districts. 4 The trade was thus characteristically 
 centered in the river towns. Carters came in from Tranche 
 Comte, Bassigny, and Champagne. The merchants bought 
 in or near the towns. Some -of the merchants bought in the 
 country, both in the granaries of landlords and of the peasants. 5 
 From time to time, Lyonese merchants endeavored to compete 
 with the commission agents, and perforce bought in the country. 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 2 Dec. 1667. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Gray, 22 Fev. 1669, Aigneu aux Directeurs. 
 
 3 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 3 Nov. 1667. Du Pradt. 
 
 4 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Auxonne, 17 Dec. 1672. Du Pradt. 
 
 6 Ibid., Chappe IV, 460, 30. Gray, 16 Nov. 1669. Du Pradt. " A Rey . . . 
 tous ecus qui se meslent (du commerce des bleds) n'en ont pas 2000 mesures, et 
 c'est la plus grande partie bled de ferme." 
 
170 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 On the whole, the trade was in the hands of the commission 
 agents. The organization of the Burgundian trade upon this 
 basis made the Lyonese merchants feel much less closely at- 
 tached to the locality, and reduced their part in the trade to 
 wholesale buying and selling of the simplest form. This inevi- 
 tably tended to increase the mobility of their operations. In- 
 dependently of these causes the scale of buying tended to 
 increase. 
 
 In 1693, the Abondance was facing a very different situation 
 from that of 1630. Then, the merchants were disinclined to 
 buy outside of Burgundy. They were accustomed to the narrow 
 routine of their trade, devoting much of their energy to finding 
 supplies in Burgundy. In 1693, they were possessed of more 
 capital. They were free to devote their attention to the larger 
 aspects of the trade, as the petty business of collecting grain 
 in Burgundy was done by the local commission merchants. 
 They were ready to buy in Languedoc and Provence, and quite 
 as well prepared as the Abondance to undertake such a venture. 
 In 1693, the private merchants were buying in Languedoc and 
 Provence even before the Abondance. The Chambre was no 
 longer necessary because the merchants confined their attention 
 too exclusively to Burgundy, or because they were over-cautious 
 and unwilling to incur risks in novel ventures. The Abondance 
 stood in a new relation to the city and to the merchants. What 
 was its influence upon the private trade ? Did it still discharge 
 a useful function ? The necessity of asking these questions 
 suggests the extent of the change that had taken place. Pre- 
 vious to 1693 the utility of the Abondance was not seriously 
 questioned, and the judgment of the historian confirms the 
 opinion of contemporaries. Before 1693, it is relatively easy 
 to see many good reasons for such a municipal commission. 
 After 1693, whatever our final judgment may be, the Chambre 
 d'Abondance presents a serious question. 
 
 Some criticism appears as early as 1683, when the Intendant 
 wrote to the Controleur General: " The Chambre d'Abondance 
 stores grain in large granaries, to insure adequate supplies in 
 time of dearth. If the rules of this establishment were well 
 
THE CHAMBRE & ABONDANCE AT LYONS 
 
 observed, it would be a great aid to the city, but when people 
 who have inferior grain sell it at high prices to the Abondance, 
 the city gains little and the poor suffer. It is said that the 
 Abondance costs the city 5000-6000 u annually, although it 
 ought to be no occasion for loss and might even yield a profit. 
 The directors should buy when grain is cheap and sell when it 
 is high." 1 All too frequently it happened that this was just 
 what the Abondance failed to do. They waited until the dearth 
 was perceived and then bought frantically at any price. Con- 
 sequently their purchases were made while prices were highest 
 and some grain was often unsold when prices had fallen to the 
 normal level. This difficulty arose in part from the unwilHng- 
 ness of the bourgeois to make loans to the Abondance when the 
 prospect of dearth was not immediately before them. Even 
 " if they promised subscriptions many delays in payment might 
 occur which would seriously impair the efficiency of the Abon- 
 dance." The bourgeois took little interest in the Abondance 
 except in time of crisis. 
 
 In the fall of 1693 this indifference to the needs of the Abon- 
 dance was striking. The Hotel de Ville had contributed 40,000 
 livres, the Abondance raised 20,000 livres among its directors, 
 and several bourgeois promised loans amounting to 340,000 
 livres. But only 70,000 livres of these voluntary subscriptions 
 were paid in, and those who were still to pay objected to placing 
 their funds in the hands of the Consuls, lest the Consuls should 
 apply the loans to some other purpose. 2 The Abondance did 
 not possess resources that would render it independent of the 
 Consuls, and as soon as the Consuls interfered, the Abondance 
 lost much of its slight influence with the bourgeois. The 
 Abondance needed to have larger funds at its disposal; it should 
 not be harassed by delays in payment of subscriptions ; and its 
 relation to the Consulate needed to be defined more clearly. 
 Some reform was essential. In the fall of 1693 it was too weak 
 to be of real assistance, but it had sufficient vitality to involve 
 the city in considerable losses. At this time, the sentiment 
 
 1 G 7 . 355. Memoire sur la Police de Lyon. Aout, 1683. d'Ormesson. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 19 Sept. 1693. Montgivraut. 
 
172 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of the citizens was favorable to the Abondance; it was not a 
 question of doing away with it, but of a reorganization designed 
 to increase its efficiency. 
 
 In September and October, the principal amendment sug- 
 gested was an increase in the number of Directors. Each 
 Director was supposed to contribute to the funds employed, 
 and the idea current was in favor of adding from twelve to 
 fifteen directors to the nine special directors chosen in accor- 
 dance with the Regulation of 1643.* The Due de Villeroy 
 opposed this on the ground that " the great number of Directors 
 might cause much trouble. The wisest measures are seldom 
 taken by large bodies, which agree on the course to be taken 
 only with great difficulty/ ... It would be much better to 
 raise the standard of wealth required of each Director." 2 De- 
 spite the great influence of Villeroy at Lyons, his criticism had 
 no immediate effect. The Controleur General sent Letters 
 Patent for the increase in the number of Directors, and some 
 attempt was apparently made to organize the work on this basis. 
 The failure was complete. October 20, Montgivraut writes: 
 " your letters on the augmentation of the Directors of the 
 Abondance were received three weeks ago, but nothing has been 
 done. For I do not consider that anything is accomplished 
 by the mere appointment of from twelve to fourteen men, 
 who not only have not been set to work, but who have not even 
 been informed of their appointment. There is not a sou in 
 the chests of the Abondance, and 200,000 francs are still due on 
 the subscription made four months ago. There is no thought 
 of procuring new loans. I am convinced that the lack of funds 
 prevents any active buying; nothing is being done." 3 The 
 failure of these attempts led to new projects for reform of the 
 Abondance, and gradually the wisdom of Villeroy's suggestions 
 became clear. The discussion was lengthy, and week after 
 week passed without any hope of seeing the Abondance in 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 19 Sept. 1693. Montgivraut. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Du camp de Carniere, 15 Oct. 1693. Villeroy, Gouverneur de 
 Lyonnais. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 20 Oct. 1693. Montgivraut. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D' ABONDANCE AT LYONS 173 
 
 condition to undertake any active work. The possibility 
 of dearth was constantly haunting the Consuls, and they began 
 an energetic canvass of Languedoc and Provence. Unfor- 
 tunately, the deputy who was sent to make the purchases for 
 the Consuls proved to be more active than discreet. All the 
 worst features of municipal interference were emphasized, and 
 his conduct exerted a marked influence upon the attitude of the 
 Lyonese to the Chambre d'Abondance. Public opinion which 
 had been favorable became more or less hostile, and there was 
 much severe criticism of all interference with the grain trade. 
 
 In previous attempts to supplement the purchases made by 
 merchants, the Consuls and the Abondance had always endeav- 
 ored not to interfere with the merchants. All the early regle- 
 ments of the Abondance had required the directors to purchase 
 grain only in those regions not frequented by merchants. Every- 
 thing was done to assist and stimulate private endeavor. In 
 1693, the Consulate gave every one the impression that it was 
 seeking to drive the private merchants out of business. Whether 
 this was the result of Chaiz's indiscretion or whether the Consuls 
 really had designs against the merchants, we cannot now be 
 certain; but the conduct of Chaiz on the lower river is not 
 involved in any obscurity. Complaints of his arbitrary action 
 appear in September, and continue in increasing volume for the 
 next two months. 
 
 A merchant of Lyons writes, 16 September: " I have just 
 received letters which declare that Sr. Chaiz pretends to have 
 orders giving him exclusive right to purchase gram. This 
 has caused us to stop buying. He has forbidden the boatmen 
 under pain of imprisonment to ship gram, for anyone besides 
 himself, and this has intimidated the boatmen. Those who had 
 started up river with our gram have stopped on the way, unwill- 
 ing to proceed, and others refuse to handle our grain at all." 1 A 
 month later, Berulle, the Intendant at Lyons, reports a mass 
 of rumors and suspicions. " Chaiz not only prevents the 
 merchants from continuing their purchases but even forces 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 16 Sept. 1693. Jourdan de Grousse, Marchand a Lyon, 
 au C. G. 
 
174 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 them to agree to make none in the future. To compel them 
 to obey, he prevents them from shipping the grain already 
 purchased, and obliges them to turn it over to him at the cost 
 price. This conduct estranges the merchants so completely 
 that I fear we shall be without grain. I remonstrate daily 
 with the Provost of Merchants. ... It is more than a month 
 since any grain has arrived at Lyons. The conduct of Chaiz 
 and of the Consulate is particularly suspicious. Chaiz has 
 gone to Baville and to Lebret (Intendants of Languedoc and 
 Provence) and has told them that it is your (i. e. the Controleur 
 General's) desire that the merchants should buy no more grain, 
 and that the grain belonging to the town should alone be shipped. 
 I have written them to the contrary, but everything at Aries 
 is held up, and Baville holds four large boats at Pont-Saint- 
 Esprit, so that nothing comes through to Lyons. It would 
 be well for you to write. Although you have ordered the Con- 
 sulate to do nothing without informing me, they let me know 
 nothing of what is going on, as they do not wish to have anyone 
 spying around or contradicting them. Their only thought 
 is to make profits. If the Echevins prevent the merchants from 
 loading grain, it is simply to harass and discourage them, so as 
 to induce them to turn over their grain to Chaiz at a low price. 
 The Echevins find it very agreeable to sell for 40" what cost 
 them only 30 . I should not worry over their profits, if I did 
 not feel that their treatment of the merchants would infallibly 
 result in a scarcity." 1 
 
 The complaints finally had some effect. November 7, the 
 Provost of Merchants, Du Lieu, says that he will recall Chaiz, 
 and that he has already urged him to encourage the merchants. 2 
 But it is difficult to be sure of the effect of the letter referred to. 
 The exhortation to Chaiz to encourage the merchants apparently 
 reached him about the i8th, and this is doubtless the letter 
 to which the factor of Saladin and Jourdan refers: " I gave 
 Chaiz the last letter of the Provost of Merchants," he says. 
 " Chaiz flew into a rage, saying that he would rather be recalled 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, (24) 27 Oct. 1693. Bemlle au C. G. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 7 Nov. 1693. Du Lieu. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D' ABONDANCE AT LYONS 175 
 
 than do anything contrary to his duty. He gave a list of all 
 his purchases to Lebret, who gave him permission to ship. 
 Chaiz said that he could not sincerely include our purchases 
 in the list as they were not bought on the account of the city, 
 and as they were to be sold to the bourgeois at high prices. . . . 
 You ( i. e. his principals) must try to get letters from the Inten- 
 dant, if you expect to ship any grain from these provinces . . . 
 for the Intendant does not wish to permit the export of any 
 grain except by Chaiz, the deputy from Lyons. If Chaiz had 
 only wished to help us, he need only have said that our grain 
 was for Lyons, and the Subdelegue would have made no trouble. 
 But Chaiz insists on interfering. He has told the Intendant 
 that we merchants must sell to him, and that he alone was to 
 ship. . . .' M Towards the end of November, Chaiz was re- 
 called, 2 and the complaints of the merchants on the Lower 
 Rhone were less numerous. 
 
 The hostility to the merchants was doubly serious, for the mer- 
 chants were buying quite as actively as the Consuls. An esti- 
 mate, drawn up November 24, represents the purchases of the 
 Consuls and the merchants as about equal. 3 The discourage- 
 ment of the merchants was thus a serious indiscretion on the 
 part of the Consuls, and the incident doubtless explains much 
 of the opposition to municipal interference that comes to the 
 surface in connection with the reorganization of the Abondance 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Tarascon, 18 Nov. 1693. Meinard a MM. Saladin et Jourdan. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 28 Nov. 1693. Du Lieu. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 24 Nov. 1693. 
 
 For the Consulate For the Merchants 
 
 In Granary 2000 anees. Saladin & Jourdan .... 10,000 ane*es 
 
 At the Abondance 2550 " Guignier 4000 
 
 En Route 2500 " Chapeyron 3000 
 
 Ready for shipment in Galdy 3000 
 
 Languedoc and Provence 11,600 " Rollin 3000 
 
 Others 3000 
 
 Ordered at Genoa . 8000 " 
 
 26,000 
 
 26,650 ' 
 
 See also a memoir of 10 Dec. 1693 (also G 7 . 1631). Estimates of arrivals from 
 10 Juillet-io Dec. 1693: 14,460 anees for the Consulate, and 15,809 anees for 
 the Merchants. 
 
176 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 in January, 1694, while all the details were fresh in people's 
 minds. One of the privileges to be given the Abondance was 
 preference in the use of all means of transportation. This 
 awoke vivid memories of the troubles of November, 1693, 
 and Villeroy protested: " I will say frankly that I do not approve 
 of that article. The preference in the right to use boats will 
 be a serious blow to commerce, which is already sufficiently 
 disturbed. I will even say that in my opinion the only way to 
 procure an abundance of grain is to allow private persons com- 
 plete freedom to bring grain to Lyons. The Chambre d'Abon- 
 dance by its care and industry may assure lower prices, and 
 properly speaking that is its function, but I am persuaded that 
 a commercial town like Lyons should not limit the freedom of 
 individuals." 1 Berulle, the Intendant, denies that the Abon- 
 dance is of any utility. " The trade should properly be left 
 to the merchants, and to them alone. That is a principle in 
 which I firmly believe. To them alone does Lyons owe its food 
 supply, and not in the least to the Chambre d'Abondance. . . . 
 We should not begrudge the merchants their gain." 2 At no 
 previous time do we find such vigorous expressions of hostility 
 to the Abondance. It is due in part to a real change in the rela- 
 tion of the Abondance to the merchants, in part it is a reflection 
 of the antagonisms aroused by Chaiz in November, 1693. On 
 the whole, I am inclined to think that the distrust of the Abon- 
 dance in January, 1694, was largely due to the indiscretions of 
 Chaiz. The proposed reform evoked opposition, indeed, but 
 the Chambre was reorganized and worked steadily until 1713, - 
 nearly twenty years. In 1699, Villeroy commended the directors 
 for their public spirit and for their services to the city. In 
 short, everything points to the conclusion that the Lyonese 
 still believed that the Abondance was necessary. They still 
 hoped that it would prevent- extraordinarily high prices and secure 
 the city against serious dearth. The merchants were certainly 
 no longer in need of encouragement; no new sources of supply 
 remained to be developed or emphasized; the merchants were 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit. y I, 350, 1273. 14, 17, 22-26 Jan. 1694. Villeroy au C. G. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, 350, 1273. 23 Mai 1694. Berulle. 
 
THE CHAMBRE D'ABONDANCE AT LYONS 
 
 quite ready to trade either in Burgundy or LanguedoC; the 
 most notable reasons for the creation of an Abondance no longer 
 existed. What, then, was the Abondance supposed to do ? 
 
 The new regulations for the organization of the Chambre 
 throw some light upon this question. They present a marked 
 contrast to the provisions of 1643. In the plan of 1694, there 
 is no long article providing that the directors shall make 
 all purchases in provinces seldom frequented by the merchants. 
 Emphasis is placed on the mode of procuring funds. " Each one 
 of the (ten) directors shall place 10,000 u in the Chest of the 
 Abondance. He shall receive interest at 6%." 1 This was an 
 innovation only in part as the directors had previously been 
 required to contribute something, though no stated sum was 
 mentioned. The next two articles are more novel and more 
 significant. "The Consulate shall place a fund of 120,000 u 
 at the disposition of the Treasurer of the Abondance, and the 
 Consuls shall not claim interest or restitution of the principal 
 under any pretext whatsoever. This sum is to serve as capital 
 and as gage of surety for the reimbursement of the sums fur- 
 nished by the Directors and of the sums borrowed by them of 
 individuals. ... At all tunes there shall be at least 10,000 
 anees in the granaries of the Abondance, and the grain shall be 
 sold each year and replaced." " If the advances of the Con- 
 sulate are consumed by the payment of interest and by losses, 
 it shall make additional advances." There was provision for 
 the repayment of the Consulate if the gains of the trade enabled 
 the directors to dispense with the loan made by the Consuls. 
 This article, however, was evidently inserted to cover a con- 
 tingency that was not regarded as at all probable. One other 
 article shoulcj be noted: "The Directors shall not engage in 
 the grain trade on their own account, directly or indirectly, 
 during their tenure of office." 
 
 The Abondance was thus to have a minimum capital of 220,- 
 ooo 11 , increased by possible private loans; but interest was to 
 
 1 My notes are from the copy at the Arch. Nat. G 7 . 1633. Other copies may 
 be found at Lyons, Chappe IV, 450, 15 and in the Serie BB. under the date 9 Jan. 
 1694. 
 
1 78 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 be paid only on half of this capital. The 120,000" advanced 
 by the Consuls was to be regarded as irrevocably spent. In 
 short, the Abondance was not expected to be a financial success. 
 Losses were anticipated. They were indeed an inevitable 
 feature of the Abondance as it was conceived in 1694. It was 
 to do two things: it was regularly to hold grain through the 
 season; it was to take special measures in time of dearth in 
 order to keep prices low. Sales of grain at cost, or even below 
 cost, were certainly regarded by the Abondance as one of its 
 distinctive functions. Both of these duties almost necessarily 
 involved a loss. The grain in store not only resulted in a con- 
 stant expense for housing and for interest charges, but it must 
 needs be held until the end of the season and it must generally 
 be sold for less than it cost. The directors were not usually 
 allowed to market at favorable moments ; only in time of dearth 
 might the granary be drawn down below the 10,000 anees pre- 
 scribed. The losses likely to result in time of dearth are easily 
 understood. The directors would begin to buy in large quantities 
 only when prices had begun to rise; they would be obliged to 
 continue to buy until prices at Lyons were reduced to a sat- 
 isfact^ry figure. 
 
 These features of the policy of the Abondance in time of dearth 
 appear clearly in 1698-99. The prohibitions of Ferrand, Inten- 
 dant of Burgundy, issued on October 14, and the letter of the 
 Controleur General, showed the directors that no reliance 
 could be placed upon Burgundy. Ferrand had even declared 
 positively that he could not permit the export of more than 
 9500 anees, which would enable Lyons to wait for grain from the 
 lower river. 
 
 " The Chambre held a consultation immediately, and sent 
 commissioners in all directions to buy and ship grain with all 
 possible expedition. The high prices caused by Ferrand's pro- 
 hibitions in no wise deterred the Abondance. Of the 9500 anees 
 to be exported from Burgundy, the Abondance took licenses 
 for 3500 anees and distributed the rest among the charities of 
 the town and the merchants. . . . We distributed to the bakers 
 of the town the 2000 anees of grain which came from Burgundy, 
 
THE CHAMBRE D' ABONDANCE AT LYONS 179 
 
 fixing the price at 36 u . ... It was deemed expedient not 
 to make the price lower, in order not to discourage the mer- 
 chants; and this much more than fear of loss forced us to maintain 
 this policy. We were not sure that we could do without their 
 aid. The fear of ice and the closing of the river made us anxious, 
 and we realized that the individual merchant is more industrious 
 than a whole company." 1 
 
 The Abondance clearly considered itself bound to furnish 
 Lyons with grain at less than the market price. There was a 
 constant feeling that the high prices of seasons of dearth were 
 in a sense iniquitous and that prices must be brought down. 
 This could be done only by sales at less than ordinary mercantile 
 rates. It is difficult not to feel that the desire for low prices 
 in time of dearth was unreasonable, and that the Abondance 
 is from this time on endeavoring to procure a more abundant 
 supply than could have been secured if all the trade were to 
 yield a profit. Here we find the influence of the location of 
 the city important. The possibilities of procuring food stuffs 
 were limited. Lyons was never destined to become a great 
 metropolitan center, but at the close of the seventeenth century 
 the aspirations of the Lyonese were extensive. At that time 
 the city was certainly of first-class importance, and the Lyonese 
 were anxious for the future of their city. It is perhaps not too 
 much to see in this last phase of the Abondance an indication 
 of the pressure which was destined to limit the growth of the 
 city. The population of Lyons was tending to increase more 
 rapidly than the available food supply would warrant. The 
 endeavor to procure grain at less than the commercial rate 
 was a natural outcome of this pressure. But the efforts were 
 doomed to failure, and in the course of the eighteenth century 
 the Abondance gradually declined, almost in the same measure 
 as the commercial prestige of the city. As Lyons sank into its 
 natural position, the effort to procure grain below cost was 
 abandoned. 
 
 1 G 7 . 358. Lyon, 25 Juillet 1699. Le PrSvot des Marchands a Villeroy. 
 
/ 
 \ 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
 
 LYONESE MERCHANTS AND DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING 
 
 REGIONS 
 
 THE history of the grain trade in the Rhone Basin presents 
 two relatively distinct problems. The more prominent is the 
 creation of a supply area for Lyons. This required municipal 
 encouragement, and even when the private trade had reached 
 a high degree of development the citizens still felt that municipal 
 purchases were necessary to assure reasonable prices. The 
 other problem in the Rhone Basin attracts less attention but 
 it is quite as important and throws more light upon the character 
 of medieval trade and methods of marketing. There was a 
 constant tendency to subject the producing regions to excessive 
 withdrawals of grain, so that there was at times a serious dearth 
 in the rural districts. . In time of scarcity, the cities, with their 
 free capital and wealthy bourgeois, could generally secure all 
 the grain they needed. The poverty of the rural sections 
 rendered much of the rural demand ineffective. The grain 
 flowed towards the towns, and if any region suffered it was the 
 country. 
 
 This seeming paradox is the fundamental fact in the relation 
 between town and country. The commercial power of the town 
 gave it an advantage that was decisive in seasons of dearth. 
 The mechanism for supplying the city developed faster than 
 the mechanism for protecting the country against the aggres- 
 siveness of the merchants. This was true both in the Seine 
 Basin and in the Rhone Basin, but the difference in conditions 
 rendered this feature of the trade less harmful in the Seine 
 Basin than in Eastern France. The abundance of supply in 
 most of the regions tributary to Paris, combined with the number 
 of sources which might be utilized, prevented this pressure upon 
 the country from becoming an actual menace to the welfare of the 
 region. The dread of this contingency was, however, perennial. 
 
 180 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS l8l 
 
 In Champagne it recurs again and again, particularly in the 
 regions on the frontier. From Soissonnais we receive graphic 
 accounts of the impending peril. On the Upper Seine there are 
 frequent complaints, especially from Troyes. But the danger 
 is always forestalled. The anticipation is so lively, the means 
 of relief so close at hand, that the ominous forebodings are never 
 realized. In the Rhone Basin, the possibility becomes an 
 actuality. The narrow limitations of supply, the difficulty 
 of resorting to other sources, or of shifting the burden of trade 
 from one locality to another, made the pressure of dearth felt 
 in every section of the Rhone Basin whenever the crops failed 
 to yield the average return. In the Seine Basin the rural dis- 
 tricts suffered little from the lack of highly organized market 
 machinery. In Eastern France, the country was in great need 
 of protection from the excessive exports that might be made by 
 the Lyonese merchants. 
 
 The source of all trouble was the inexact determination of the 
 surplus above local needs. Both Burgundy and the Lower 
 Rhone had a surplus, and if exports could be confined to this 
 there would be no trouble, but the wholesale markets could not 
 be forced to limit their purchases to the actual surplus. The 
 crudity of market organization made it impossible to obtain 
 any accurate information of the abundance of the harvest, of 
 the amount of exports, or of the grain in the hands of the whole- 
 sale merchants but still in the province. Absence of reliable 
 information on these fundamental points would have rendered 
 current prices valueless, even if no other factors were involved. 
 In addition to the ignorance of these conditions, we must bear 
 in mind the influence of the modes of marketing. In the Rhone 
 Basin, there were no true wholesale markets. The trade was 
 not concentrated, except for shipment. There was little active 
 competition among the wholesale merchants. They bought 
 directly in the country, as far as possible, and did their best 
 to avoid competition. Such competition as appears was in- 
 tensely personal and not wide enough in scope to be properly 
 effective. The wholesale supply was thus so invisible that the 
 current prices did not represent the interplay of all the factors 
 
1 82 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 in the grain trade. This characteristic of current prices is most 
 strikingly exemplified in connection with the relation between 
 the local demand and the wholesale trade. These two demands 
 upon the supplies of the producing regions were never formally 
 pitted against each other. Wholesale merchants at times came 
 into competition with the bourgeois of a particular town, but 
 there was no general attempt to estimate the local demand of 
 the whole producing region, nor any attempt to secure a com- 
 prehensive representation of the Lyonese demands. 
 
 The inadequacy of prices as a basis for the distribution of 
 commodities is the most fundamental characteristic of the 
 medieval market system. In some form, these general facts 
 can be perceived throughout the history of the grain trade, 
 without any important limitation as to time or place. It is 
 the most wide-spread of all phenomena. But in most places 
 the general principle is suggested only by a few brief remarks, 
 or by indications so scattered that effective presentation is 
 impossible. Three incidents, however, in the history of the 
 trade in the Rhone Valley in 1693 and 1709 exhibit clearly what 
 is elsewhere obscure, but everywhere of capital importance. 
 These three episodes thus deserve attentive consideration not 
 only because they are intrinsically interesting, but also because 
 they afford an opportunity of appreciating fully the nature 
 of the curiously tangled web of inter-market relations that 
 prevailed throughout the medieval period and well into the 
 eighteenth century. 
 
 I 
 
 Languedoc and Provence in 1693 
 
 After the harvest of 1693, the merchants and the Consuls 
 of Lyons took measures to secure grain in Languedoc and Pro- 
 vence, as it was soon perceived that the crop in Burgundy 
 was not so large as usual. Private merchants had been buying 
 in the south before the harvest in May and June, but heavy 
 losses on some of their shipments had discouraged them. 1 They 
 hesitated at first to undertake new ventures, but the realization 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 6 Juin 1693. B6rulle au C. G. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 183 
 
 of conditions in Burgundy roused them to activity and they were 
 soon buying eagerly at Narbonne, Aries, Tarascon and in the 
 other entrepots of the southern provinces. In September, 
 the merchants were well under way with their new purchases, 
 equipped with licenses from Berulle, the Intendant at Lyons, 
 to authorize their exports from Languedoc despite the prohibi- 
 tions. 1 The granting of licenses continued throughout Sep- 
 tember and October in ever increasing volume. 2 At the end 
 of October, one of the agents charged with buying provisions 
 for the army writes that he can do nothing in Languedoc and 
 Provence on account of the merchants of Lyons who are buying 
 everywhere and monopolizing all existing means of transporta- 
 tion. 3 In Provence especially, the activity of the Lyonese was 
 notable. Chaiz was buying for the municipality, making enemies 
 of all the private merchants by his efforts to prevent the ship- 
 ment of their grain and to secure their purchases at a discount. 
 
 This feverish excitement on the part of the Lyonese caused 
 much apprehension. Early in October, Baville, the Intendant 
 in Languedoc, ordered a domiciliary visitation to determine 
 the quantity of grain available in the province and the popula- 
 tion to be supplied. 4 The results were anything but encouraging. 
 A population of 1,553,271 persons was reported. Nimes, Agde, 
 Beziers, Narbonne, Carcassonne, Saint-Papoul, and Mirepoix 
 had a surplus of 410,524 quintals, above what was needed for 
 their own consumption. These towns, however, were the 
 principal shipping points in the province and elsewhere there 
 was less than was needed to maintain the population to the 
 next harvest. This deficiency was estimated at 1,741,918 
 quintals, very considerably in excess of the small surplus of the 
 shipping points. Besides these statistics the commissioners 
 made various observations in the text of their report. Of the 
 dioceses of Uzes and Mende, they say: " The merchants of 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 17 Sept. 1693. Berulle. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Estat des Passeports donnez pour les Bleds de Lyon, 15 Sept.- 
 10 Oct. 1693. The diversity of measures makes the calculation of totals more 
 burdensome than is worth while. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1632. Paris, 30 Oct. 1693. Signature illegible. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1631. Narbonne, 5 Oct. 1693. Le Franc de la Grange. 
 
1 84 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Lyons have carried off more than 20,000 quintals from the 
 diocese of Uzes alone, and, although the diocese suffers, it will 
 be able to get along with the chestnuts which are gathered there. 
 But the situation is different in Mende. The supplies there 
 will last only till April. 
 
 " Only in one part of Vivarais was the harvest tolerably good. 
 In the rest of the diocese it was utterly inadequate. But there 
 was a good crop of chestnuts, and as M. de Baville took care to 
 prevent exports, and some grain was sent up from Nimes, and 
 Upper Languedoc, it is hoped that the diocese will be able to 
 subsist. 
 
 " The dioceses of Lodeve and Saint-Pons scarcely ever pro- 
 duce enough grain for the maintenance of their inhabitants, 
 who seek markets in the provinces of Narbonne and Beziers, 
 where there is ordinarily enough to supply their wants. 
 
 " Castres, Lavaur, Alby, and Montauban have not witnessed 
 so poor a harvest in many years. Some assistance can be sent 
 from Saint-Papoul and from Carcassonne, but it can hardly 
 be commensurate with their needs. . . ." l 
 
 Two months later, Baville writes from Narbonne: " so large 
 a number of poor come from Rouergue and Auvergne, singly 
 and in families, that it is scarcely possible to provide for them. 
 Their faces show that they abandon their homes rather on ac- 
 count of extreme misery than from any spirit of disorder and 
 brigandage. The misery is greatest in the dioceses of Saint- 
 Pons, Alby, Castres, and Mende. There is no grain, no money, 
 and the dioceses have no credit.' 7 2 
 
 In Languedoc, then, the Lyonese merchants succeeded, during 
 the fall, in depleting the reserves at the shipping points which 
 otherwise would have served for the maintenance of the dioceses 
 which had lacked. These dioceses, however, stood in no different 
 relation to the markets in the shipping points, than Lyons. 
 Consequently, the first merchants to arrive could purchase 
 the available grain. The Lyonese were sure to arrive first, 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Proces Verbaux sur la Recherche des Grains dans Languedoc, 
 1693. 
 
 * G 7 . 1631. Narbonne, 5 Dec. 1693. Baville. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 185 
 
 as the dioceses nearby could maintain themselves for a short 
 time and ordinarily came down to Narbonne and the other 
 coast ports only in the spring and early summer. The trade, 
 if left to itself, would inevitably result as it did in 1693. This 
 exhaustion of the province was the logical and inevitable result 
 of the lack of organic interdependence between the various 
 local markets of the province. 
 
 In Provence, the effect of the Lyonese purchases was less 
 serious; there was constant apprehension, but the province was 
 saved by relatively good crops in the interior, where the grain 
 was not so convenient for shipment to Lyons. 
 
 Notwithstanding considerable imports from Languedoc, Pro- 
 vence, Burgundy, and Morocco, Lyons was not very easily 
 supplied. In the latter part of May, 1694, Berulle writes that 
 there is only grain enough in the city to supply its wants for 
 four days. Large shipments, however, were on their way up 
 stream, and on June 12, the markets of Lyons were filled to 
 overflowing. 1 
 
 II 
 
 Burgundy in 1709 
 
 In 1709, we find that the endeavor to supply Lyons affects 
 both Burgundy and Languedoc seriously. Unfortunately, there 
 is no one in Burgundy so completely in touch with every detail 
 as Baville in Languedoc. The story of the troubles in Bur- 
 gundy does not come to us, therefore, with his clearness of 
 insight and masterly knowledge, but if we read between the lines, 
 piecing together the scattered information that flows in from 
 intendants, mayors, bishops, and private individuals, the gen- 
 eral outlines of the narrative may be perceived. 
 
 Trouble began soon after the harvest of 1708. The first 
 reports came in from Tranche Comte whence mucn grain was 
 generally shipped to the Saone towns. " The light crop," writes 
 an official of Besangon, " has obliged us to employ all our powers 
 in maintaining supplies in the public markets. But we have 
 encountered many obstacles, through the great shipments made 
 
 1 G 7 . 1633. Lyon, 23 Mai 1694. Bfulle. Lyon, 12 Juin 1694. Bundle. 
 
1 86 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 by Lyonese merchants. They have already exported 40,000 
 sacks, and the shipments continue without interruption by reason 
 of the Order in Council of September 22, which permits the 
 transportation of grain frpm one province to another. . . . 
 More than thirty commission merchants have come from Lyon- 
 nais. They are now contracting for all the grain in the prov- 
 ince. Prices have doubled, and if their contracts are executed 
 in their entirety, we shall be reduced to famine." l 
 
 A merchant, who had contracted to deliver 15,000 sacks of 
 wheat at Auxonne for the army, gives a more general account 
 of conditions in the area supplying the same towns. He went 
 up into Lorraine, October 10, and was much surprised to find 
 a wide-spread apprehension of dearth of grain. " The bakers 
 of Nancy were scouring the countryside,, for six and seven leagues 
 around, offering 6-7 livres of their money per rezal. . . . 
 Such as had any grain to sell had closed their granaries as soon 
 as the rumors of dearth became current. The panic spread 
 to all the towns and villages of Lorraine, especially along the 
 frontier of Champagne and Franche Comte, where there are 
 more than fifty villages whose crops were completely ruined 
 by the hail. The inhabitants have assembled in bands and pre- 
 vented the shipment of grain purchased by the merchants of 
 Auxonne. They cut the sacks and handle roughly those who 
 are sent to ship the grain." z 
 
 One of the directors of the Chambre d'Abondance also de- 
 scribes the unusual conditions existing in Burgundy. Writing 
 from Gray, August 30, he says: " Yesterday I passed the day 
 at Maxilly and Talmay where there are great entrepots of grain 
 coming from Langres, but I found no one who would sell. They 
 say they have none. I commissioned Pettier of Auxonne and 
 Christianot of Maxilly to make a tour of Bassigny in secret, 
 to see what they can find. However, there is little hope of 
 
 1 G 7 . 1644. Besancon, 16 Nov. 1708. Vicomte, Mayeur. Lieu. Gen., et 
 fichevins de B. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1645. Memoire pr6sent6 par Sebastien Mar6chal a M. de St. Contest 
 concernant le traitte de 15,000 sacs de froment, qu'il s'est oblige de fournir a 
 Auxonne dans le fin de Dec. 1708. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 187 
 
 getting any grain from the section before All Saints'. All we 
 can do is to give commissions to trusty merchants to buy what 
 they can along the Saone or in Tranche Comte." * 
 
 Prohibitions had been issued by the Intendants in the months 
 of July and August. There had been extensive purchases for 
 the army, which had consumed the ordinary reserves, and on the 
 crop failure their apprehension increased almost to the point of 
 panic. 2 The incident furnishes an interesting illustration of the 
 inadequacy of the market system. The supplies of the province 
 were already seriously depleted, but nevertheless the merchants 
 were no less eager to buy. The Intendant Pinon puts the 
 matter very tersely in his letter of September 7. ' l The dearth 
 which you fear at Lyons is already present in this province." 
 But Lyons was soon reduced to desperate straits. Ravat writes 
 from Lyons, October 9: "Including what we have received 
 from Burgundy, we have only 5000 anees of grain. We need 
 1400-1500 anees per week. We are not allowed to ship freely 
 from Languedoc and Provence. Lyonnais and Beaujolais 
 have no grain, and are on the verge of lacking bread." 4 Despite 
 the seriousness of the situation at Lyons, the cities of Burgundy 
 were no better off. The people at Dijon were on the point of 
 breaking out in a bread riot, and the officials tried to calm them 
 by renewing the old prohibitions. 5 
 
 The panic, which was imminent throughout the fall and winter 
 of 1708-09, finally broke out in the spring. The officials had 
 arranged for limited shipments to relieve Lyons, but the people 
 took the law into their own hands. Burgundy became a scene 
 of violence and disorder which swept away the last vestige of 
 organized trade. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1645. Gray, 30 Aout 1708. Pen-in, Direct. d'Abondance a Ravat. 
 Enclosed by Ravat in his letter of 7 September. 
 
 2 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 453, 20. Memoire pour etre envoye a M. 
 d'Argenson. Oct. 1708. This gives a brief account of the year preceding the 
 date. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1645. Bourg en Bresse, 1708. Pinon. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1645. Lyon, 9 Oct., 7 Sept. 1708. Ravat, PreV. des Marchands. 
 
 6 G 7 . 1641. Dijon, i Dec. 1708. Bouchu. Prem. Pres. du Parlement de 
 Bourgogne. 
 
1 88 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 " The fury of the people burst all bounds when they learned 
 of the ordinance providing for the passage of the grain of Trem- 
 ville, destined for the Abondance of Macon, and of some belong- 
 ing to private merchants. It is said quite openly at Pontaillier 
 and Auxonne that all grain will be stopped without distinction. 
 The orders of the Intendant are disregarded. At Auxonne, 
 the town guard and other troops were called out to stop the grain 
 boats coming down the river. At Pontaillier, the grain of the 
 Abondance de Lyon was seized and distributed to the people 
 at a set price." 1 Similar violence was directed against the grain 
 boats at Maxilly, Mantouche, and Gray. 2 
 
 Around Dijon, the dearth had become actual famine. Com- 
 missioners of the Parlement of Dijon report, April, 1709, that 
 " the peasants in the greater part of the province are already 
 reduced to living on the bushes and herbs growing wild in the 
 fields. They eat horses and other animals that have died of 
 disease. In nearly all the towns and villages, the people are 
 in revolt against the municipal officers and threaten to burn 
 and kill the few inhabitants who have any property. In many 
 places armed bands of peasants stop the convoys of grain des- 
 tined for the sustenance of the towns." 3 Three days later, 
 the market at Dijon was so scantily furnished (only 100 meas- 
 ures) that bread could hardly be had of the bakers. The 
 President of the Parlement resolved to send out four companies 
 of infantry to procure grain. 4 
 
 Despite all this, mark the attitude of the Lyonese merchants. 
 " Scarcely was the edict registered prohibiting the assemblies 
 designed to interfere with the grain trade, than the merchants 
 from Lyons came in great numbers to Saint-Jean-de-Losne 
 and carried off all the grain. This may be the occasion of a 
 great outburst of violence. . . . They give no heed, however. 
 Several villages are reduced to frightful extremities; the inhabi- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1645. Auxonne, 31 Mars 1709. Rude, Voi tuner des B16s. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1645. Lyon, 9 Avril 1709. Ravat. 
 
 8 G 7 . 1641. 22 Avril 1709. Rapport des Commissaires du Parlement de 
 Dijon. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1641. Dijon, 25 Avril 1709. De Migieu. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 189 
 
 tants maintain life only by eating boiled herbs and roots. Chil- 
 dren of four or five years, for whom the mothers have no bread, 
 feed in the fields like so many sheep." l 
 
 Langres, in the center of the main source of supply, was 
 barely able to maintain itself through the spring months. " No 
 longer able to draw any grain from the country, the bourgeois 
 were obliged to furnish the markets and support the people 
 from the month of February to the present time (July i). Their 
 charity and zeal for the public welfare have compassed so much, 
 that although they ought to have closed their granaries to inhabi- 
 tants of the country and reserved them for the townspeople, 
 nevertheless they have continued markets for the country 
 people two days of the week. Grain is furnished only to those 
 who have a certificate of indigence from their curate. These 
 markets have prevented the country people from dying of 
 starvation, but they have drained the town of oats, and the 
 wheat is nearly consumed." 2 
 
 Upper Burgundy, the Saone towns, Dijon, and Langres 
 were pretty well drained. The situation was even more serious 
 in Lower Burgundy, Maconnais, and the territory around 
 Chalons-sur-Saone. Inadequately supplied by the vicinage, 
 these towns generally secured some assistance from Upper 
 Burgundy, but the Lyonese trade was about the only trade 
 permitted at all during the year 1708-09, so that the distress 
 was intense along the river between Lyons and Upper Burgundy. 
 Curiously enough, the officials in these towns were under the 
 impression that Lyons was superabundantly supplied. " We 
 see numbers of boats pass, carrying grain for the Abondance 
 at Lyons," writes the Bishop of Macon. " I checked a crowd 
 of peasants who wished to stop the boats and buy of the boat- 
 men, but I cannot promise to restrain them in the future. I 
 know that the granaries of the Abondance at Lyons are full of 
 grain, and it is trying to see them making reserves beyond their 
 needs, when we are in actual want. . . . The peasants flock 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. Dijon, 4 Mai 1709. Quarre", Proc. Gen. au Parlement de Dijon. 
 8 G 7 . 1643. Memoire sur 1'etat Present de la Ville de Langres, envoye" i Juillet 
 1709. Signe par M. L'fiveque et tout le corps de la Ville. 
 
190 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 into town in crowds, seeking to buy grain. Frequently they 
 are obliged to return without any." * 
 
 The other side of the story appears in a letter of Ravat, the 
 Provost of Merchants at Lyons: " In Burgundy and along 
 the Lower Rhone, it is just as if we were in hostile territory. 
 Our grain is violently seized without any formality. The boat- 
 men are attacked by armed men, who threaten to kill them if 
 they offer the least resistance." " The needs of the city be- 
 come daily more considerable, by reason of the peasants who 
 flock in from all sides under the pretext of bringing a little 
 butter or garden truck for sale. They eat their fill of bread 
 and carry away as much as they can conceal from the guards 
 at the gates." 2 A month later, " We have put everybody 
 on rations of a pound of bread per diem, and to make the bread- 
 stuffs last longer we have ordered every one to eat black bread. 
 We no longer separate the bran from the flour." 3 
 
 In the river towns, however, the distress of famine was in- 
 creased by the lawlessness and brigandage which became general 
 in April and May. At Auxonne, a crowd assembled about a 
 merchant, whose life was saved only by a squad of soldiers. 
 Somewhat later, all the grain merchants of Auxonne left the 
 town for fear of being assaulted. The most graphic accounts 
 appear in the letters of the Bishop of Chalons. He has a some- 
 what different explanation for some of the phases of the distress, 
 but the difficulty of obtaining exact information is such that it 
 is impossible to go beyond the statements made. 
 
 "There is great distress in this province," he writes April 12, 
 " not on account of scarcity of grain, however, for that has 
 existed for several years. The source of trouble is the avarice 
 and hardness of the engrossers. Perceiving that the harvests 
 were light, they bought up nearly all the grain, and guard it 
 like so many dragons. The price is already high, and will 
 double shortly, if the cupidity and avarice of these engrossers 
 is not brought within bounds. Practically all persons of means 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. Macon, 5 Avril 1709. fiveque de Macon. 
 * G 7 . 1645. Lyon, n Avril 1709. Ravat. 
 8 G 7 . 1645. Lyon, 25 Mai 1709. Ravat. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 
 
 of all ranks and conditions have turned grajn merchants within 
 the last two months in order to profit by the distress of the 
 people. Under pretext of not allowing the shipment of the grain 
 in the villages, the peasants have taken arms. In some places, 
 seditious spirits without honor or property have placed them- 
 selves at the head of these peasants, and lead them around, 
 breaking into granaries to steal and pillage. They sell on the 
 markets what they have stolen. Others infest the roads, crying 
 and begging for bread, often demanding it with threats of 
 violence. Throughout the country districts there is no security 
 for one's purse or for one's life. The poverty of individuals 
 is such that they cannot sow even the lesser grains, as they have 
 none, nor any money to buy. The miserly engrossers wish 
 to sell at seven and eight livres per bushel what we used to buy 
 at eight or ten sous. We have issued an ordinance in this town 
 requiring all the lesser grains to be brought to market within 
 the next fortnight, to be sold at a reasonable price. . . . 
 
 " One other thing that does much to increase the misery is 
 the pretext of the necessities of Lyons. That town has twice 
 as much grain as it can use for several years. The granaries 
 of the Hospital and of the Abondance are full. The only distress 
 there was during the closing of the Saone to navigation by the 
 ice. Since then, when all the river towns were resting on the 
 assurance that they had an abundance of grain for several years, 
 Lyons, which does not lack people who seek only their personal 
 gain, has carried off all the grain in Bassigny, on the frontier 
 of Lorraine, and in Burgundy. . . . Meanwhile, all the towns 
 and villages of Burgundy suffer. The poor, unable to secure 
 grain or bread, take whatever they can lay their hands on. The 
 peasants leave their villages, and crowd into the towns, which 
 close their gates in order not to increase the number of paupers. 
 
 " There is a little town called Seurre, noted for the rebellions 
 in the wars of 1640-50, and for similar disorders in 1694. The 
 well-to-do have turned t pirattes de bled.' They scour the 
 country for four or five leagues, taking everything on land or 
 on the rivers. One of those who are most active has a band of 
 100-120 men, with a train of wagons. They break into the 
 
192 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 chateaux where there is grain, and carry off whatever they find 
 on the rivers Saone and Doubs. All is carried to Seurre, where 
 they have more than 15,000 bichets. If the war breaks out 
 in the provinces, town against town, and the peasants all in 
 arms, these disorders can end in nothing short of a general insur- 
 rection." l 
 
 " There is no grain on the markets of the towns. The towns 
 that wish to procure supplies from outside can obtain them only 
 by means of escorts of 100-200 men. The peasants are massed 
 on the highways to prevent the shipment of grain from their 
 villages, and the strongest carry off the grain. It is the beginning 
 of a Civil War. The Intendant has ordered that all grain 
 shall be carried to market, but little comes. Yesterday there 
 were only eight bushels for 300-400 peasants who were com- 
 plaining of the famine. The inhabitants of Macon, not wishing 
 to take the risk of going after grain, have spread hand bills 
 through the country for five or six leagues around offering to 
 pay 100 francs per bichet. Despite the fact that the Lyonese 
 have carried off more than 300,000 bichets in the last eight 
 months, they are still scouring the country around the Saone 
 and Doubs, offering 25-30 ecus." 2 
 
 " At Chauvort, a little village a quarter of a league from 
 Verdun, and three from Chalons, there was a young man, Jean 
 Baptiste Bret, formerly a grain merchant. He ruined himself 
 by his misconduct and is now trying to redeem his fortune 
 at the expense of the countryside. He has taken advantage 
 of the general misery, to practise brigandage. With his band 
 of followers he goes to the houses where he knows there is grain, 
 carries it off by force, pays for part of it at such prices as suit 
 his fancy, orders his men to take the rest under the pretext 
 of pressing necessity, although most of his band are really engaged 
 in the grain trade like their leader. At the least resistance 
 they batter in the doors. All the honest people have already 
 abandoned the town, on account of this violence. One of the 
 
 - 1 G 7 . 1641. Chalons-sur-Sa6ne, 12 Avril 1709. Henri, fiveque de Chalons. 
 See also the letter of 8 May 1709 for further details about Seurre. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1641. Chalons-sur-Saone, 21 Avril 1709. Henri, fiveque de Chalons. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 193 
 
 fichevins, after resisting for quite a while, finally joined the 
 band, and now boasts that he will soon be at the head of five 
 hundred resolute men. He swears that he will make himself 
 more feared in Burgundy than Cavalier was in the Cevennes." l 
 
 The letters of the Bishop of Chalons seem to be rather ill- 
 informed in many respects; he has no accurate conception of 
 conditions at Lyons, or of the extent of exports to Lyons, but his 
 general impression of the cause of the trouble in Burgundy is 
 probably true. It is hard to believe that there was really less 
 grain in Burgundy in April and May, 1709, than was needed by 
 the inhabitants. The closing of the granaries and the complete 
 abandonment of even t^ie old market system are quite enough 
 to account for all the disorder. Yet, it is difficult to see how 
 the crisis could have been met. The necessities of Lyons and 
 the supplies sent to the royal granaries created a demand that 
 led inevitably to the feverish speculation and disorganization 
 of the markets. Lyons certainly did not secure any more grain 
 than was barely necessary for her sustenance. The crisis re- 
 vealed in startling clearness the necessity of closer organization 
 of the trade. 
 
 Ill 
 
 . Languedoc in IJOQ 
 
 In Languedoc there was more calm. The different factors 
 can be traced more clearly, and the repression of the panic 
 removed the distorting elements of violence and disorder. 
 The harvest of 1708 in Languedoc was better than the average; 
 distinctly good in Lower Languedoc, it was only slightly less 
 abundant in the more fertile Upper Languedoc. 2 ' These reas- 
 suring crop prospects attracted a considerable trade to Langue- 
 doc. The Genoese came, as usual; the Lyonese also appeared, 
 as in 1693 ; some grain passed from Upper Languedoc to Guienne. 
 The fertile area in Languedoc thus shipped in three directions. 
 The magnitude of the exports contemplated soon gave Baville 
 reason for serious apprehension. The Genoese were planning 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. Chauvort, 3 Mai 1709. P. Lebault. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1644. Montpellier, 5 Aout 1708. Baville. 
 
194 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to buy 40,000 quintals, and by August 18 had sent 60 ships to 
 Agde and Cette. The dearth in Guienne and Provence was then 
 known. Baville proposed that prohibitions of foreign export 
 be used. 1 A week later, he reported that the Genoese came in 
 increasing numbers. Without waiting for orders from the Con- 
 troleur General, he required them to get permits from him for 
 the export of grain, and on his own authority limited exports 
 temporarily to 1000 setiers. 2 The magnitude of the demands 
 of the Genoese is explained by their intention of exporting to 
 Spain and to the Estates of the Duke of Savoy. 3 They were 
 only allowed to export 5000-6000 setiers, and before the general 
 edict arrived at the end of October, most of the Genoese had 
 left. 4 Shortly after, the municipality of Nice asked permission 
 to buy, but they were refused. 5 In short, a very considerable 
 element in the potential demand on Languedoc was deflected 
 by administrative interference. 
 
 Before the Genoese had gone (September 16), the Abondance 
 of Lyons appeared on the scene. They proposed to buy in the 
 eastern portions of Languedoc where shipment up the Rhone 
 would be easy. 6 Two weeks later, the demands of Lyons had 
 taken definite shape in a request for permission to buy 18,000 
 setiers along the Rhone 7 the least fertile part of the province 
 which raised scarcely enough for its own maintenance. Baville 
 refused to grant the request, and told the agents from Lyons 
 to begin by purchasing 3,000 setiers. By October 16, prices had 
 begun to rise, despite the prohibitions of foreign export and the 
 careful limitation of export to Lyons and Provence. Baville 
 tried to deflect the Lyonese agents to Narbonne. 8 Throughout 
 December, the merchants of Lyons, Provence, and Guienne were 
 drawing supplies from Languedoc. Towards the end of January 
 
 1 G 7 . 1644. Montpellier, 18 Aotit 1708. Baville. 
 
 2 Ibid. 26 Aout 1708. Baville; 
 
 Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
 Ibid. 
 
 1 Sept. 1708. Baville. 
 28 Oct. 1708. Baville. 
 
 2 Nov. 1708. Baville. 
 
 1 6 Sept. 1708. Baville. 
 i Oct. 1708. Baville. 
 
 Ibid., 1 6 Oct. 1708. Baville. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 
 
 1709, Baville reported that prices were still rising. He was 
 obliged to extend his prohibitions to Guienne, though exports 
 were to continue under cover of permits. In this manner, 
 20,000 setiers, purchased by Bourdonnaye, the Intendant at 
 Bordeaux, were to be shipped to Agenois. Meanwhile, Provence 
 had become practically dependent upon Languedoc. Baville 
 was trying to furnish 25,000 quintals per month. 1 In March, 
 distress appeared in Languedoc. " Grain is as dear as in Guienne 
 or Provence. In many places there have been popular tumults, 
 especially in the Vivarais. In this crisis it will be impossible 
 for me to continue with my plans to aid Provence. I shall 
 oblige the merchants, to whom I have given permits, to go there, 
 although they would much perfer not to ship their grain from 
 Languedoc, where they can sell as dear as in Provence without 
 incurring any risk." 2 By the end of the month, panic had 
 developed. " The price of grain has declined at Toulouse, and 
 risen slightly in Lower Languedoc, but the difficulty is no longer 
 a matter of prices. The grain itself is lacking everywhere. 
 There has suddenly been a complete cessation of commerce, 
 arising in part from the fear that there will be no harvest this 
 year. All who have a little grain have resolved to hoard it 
 and keep it for their sustenance. All the markets have ceased 
 hi the larger towns. The towns, beginning with Montpellier, 
 are oppressed by anxieties, rendered doubly keen by the mer- 
 curial temper of the people. Narbonne, Beziers, and Agde, 
 which are the granaries of the province, have sent deputies to 
 beg me to allow them to hold what they have, as it is no more 
 than sufficient for their needs. Although it is contrary to my 
 principles, I have issued several ordinances requiring the opening 
 of granaries and the bringing of grain to market. I have also 
 instigated inquiries to discover how much grain we could count 
 on." 3 
 
 In April, serious consequences appeared in Lower Languedoc. 
 " The trade with Upper Languedoc had ceased." Baville 
 
 1 G 7 . 1644. Montpellier, 25 Jan. 1709. 
 
 2 Ibid., 15 Mars 1709. 
 
 3 Ibid., 26 Mars 1709. Baville. See also, Montpellier, 18 Mars 1709. Baville. 
 
196 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 proposed " to open the granaries in the dioceses of Toulouse, 
 Lavaur, and Alby, to take what was absolutely necessary." x 
 Montpellier and Nimes had only enough grain to last two weeks. 
 Baville accordingly proposed that Joubert, the Sindic of Langue- 
 doc, should go to Castelnaudary, to confer with Royer from 
 Toulouse and with the merchants who had been buying in 
 Guienne and Montauban. It was hoped that some division 
 of supplies could be arranged for both Toulouse and Lower 
 Languedoc. 2 This was finally done after much negotiation, 
 and both Toulouse and Lower Languedoc were supplied. 
 
 The scarcity prevailing and the slight hopes of an average 
 harvest in 1709 rendered some importation indispensable. In 
 May, Baville began to arrange for shipments from the Levant. 
 The towns of Montpellier, Nimes, Carcassonne, and Agde gave 
 pledges to secure the residents against loss. The province as 
 a whole furnished some funds. 3 This grain began to arrive 
 in September and arrivals continued throughout the winter 
 months of 1709-10. 
 
 IV 
 
 These three incidents in the history of the trade in the Rhone 
 Valley indicate at once the possibility of actual depletion of the 
 producing regions and the importance of the element of panic. 
 The quantities of grain available seem to have been much less 
 inadequate than the confusion and distress would give us reason 
 to believe. Administrative interference did much to relieve 
 pressure upon the supply in the granaries, and formed reserves 
 uncertain in extent, but of great importance in time of distress, 
 thus tending to counteract the unfortunate circumstances which 
 so frequently fomented panics. The presence of these correc- 
 tive tendencies makes it peculiarly difficult to determine how 
 much of the excitement in time of dearth was mere unreasoning 
 fear, and how much was well grounded apprehension. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1644. Montpellier, 19 Avril 1709. Baville. 
 
 2 Ibid., 22 Avril 1709. Baville & Riquet 2 e . Pie's, du Parlement de 
 Toulouse. 
 
 3 Ibid., 21 Mai 1709. Baville. See also Letters of 7 Juin 1709, 23 Juin 1709. 
 
DEARTH IN TEE PRODUCING REGIONS 197 
 
 The most cursory reading of the official correspondence in 
 time of dearth suggests that much of the complaint of dearth 
 was wholly due to a failure to understand new developments 
 in trade. The cry of disette appears as soon as some busybody 
 asserts that there is not enough grain in town to last until the 
 next harvest. No attention whatever is given to the possibility 
 of securing grain from other points to replace grain exported. 
 The possibility of such compensating movements is relatively 
 foreign to the ordinary thought of the time. Each worthy 
 burgher was possessed with the idea that famine stared him in 
 the face, if the granaries of the town did not actually contain 
 all the grain that would be needed till the next harvest. The 
 largest towns had, of course, outgrown these notions, but else- 
 where there was no conception of a steady flow of trade supply- 
 ing the wants of the town from month to month without ever 
 accumulating any very considerable reserve. A steady dis- 
 tributive trade of this type was in truth a relatively new feature 
 in commercial life. Trade had been highly seasonal, and, except 
 for the trade of the locality centering on the town market, the 
 connection of the town with the larger centers of commerce was 
 limited to the various fairs. The grain trade had never had 
 quite the 'same customs as the other branches of trade, but the *"\ 
 principle appears in this feeling that the producing region should \ 
 never permit the exportation of grain unless the maintenance 
 of the area till the next harvest was assured. When these limits / 
 were reached, the parties seeking grain should be excluded and / 
 sent elsewhere. Each town was to secure supplies for itself / 
 without regard to the needs of other towns. Combination / 
 among towns to secure a supply to be used for common needs 
 was foreign to the ideas of the ordinary people, even in the 
 seventeenth century, though it appears clearly in some phases 
 of administrative policy. 
 
 In 1693, Aries and Tarascon wished to close their gates to the 
 merchants of Lyons. The harvest in the immediate vicinity 
 had been light, and the Lyonese merchants were active. Prices 
 had begun to rise early in September, and even the Subdelegue 
 
198 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 suggested some limitation of shipments to Lyons. 1 In October, 
 Lebret writes: "The inhabitants of Aries, Tarascon, and the 
 vicinity have already sold to the Lyonese, or the merchants 
 from Dauphine, two- thirds of their surplus grain." 2 Appre- 
 hensions were repeated frequently in the letters. In November, 
 Lebret ordered a domiciliary visitation to determine the quantity 
 of grain in Aries, Tarascon, and other places. The investigation 
 revealed that Aries had not enough to last till the harvest. 3 
 A week later, the magistrates of Aries were surprised to find 
 that Lebret was authorizing a shipment of 600 setiers to Lyons. 
 " We take the liberty to represent that this grain is included 
 in the declaration which we submitted. If what remains for 
 our own provision is deflected elsewhere, we shall no longer 
 be able to find sustenance for our inhabitants. We have not 
 the resources which we once possessed." 4 Lebret yielded to 
 these instances, 5 but he had had quite a different plan for the 
 conduct of the grain trade. 
 
 The policy that he had intended to follow is sketched in his 
 letter of September 25: "The orders I have given to Chaiz, 
 to discontinue his purchases, have produced the effect I had in 
 mind. The price of grain along the Rhone has risen to a figure 
 that will attract foreign grain, without giving the people cause 
 to grumble. I hope to be able to continue after this fashion. 
 When the price falls rather low, I shall give currency to the 
 talk of dearth at Lyons; then, if the price rises to i9 u -2o u 
 per charge, I shall have all purchases discontinued. In this 
 Way, I shall be able to allow Lyons to draw from Provence 
 for more than six months. The success of this project will 
 depend on what comes in from foreign ports, so that I shall have 
 to maintain the strictest secrecy. None must be informed of 
 my intentions but the little birds that I use to spread my rumors. 
 Our principal object should be to attract foreign grain. To 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Aix, 6 Dec. 1693. Lebret. Ibid., Aries, 22 Aout 1693. Le Roy, 
 Subdele"gue. Ibid., Aix, 10 Sept. 1693. Lebret. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1632. Aix, 14 Oct. 1693. Lebret. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1631. Lambesc, 13 Nov. 1693. Lebret a Berulle. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1631. Aries, 24 Nov. 1693. Maire et fichevins d' Aries a Lebret. 
 6 G 7 . 1631. Lambesc, 26 Nov. 1693. Lebret a Canaples. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 199 
 
 do that, prices must be maintained at a relatively high level, 
 so that it will be inexpedient to publish any statement to the 
 effect that Lyons will have no more need of the grain of Pro- 
 vence/' 1 
 
 The development of continuous trade was of importance in 
 most of the towns of Languedoc and Provence and in other 
 places, such as Rouen, Orleans, Bordeaux, and Nantes. But 
 it would be easy to exaggerate the extent of this new feature 
 in the grain trade. While it is true that in areas of active move- 
 ment it was no longer customary to hoard the year's supply, 
 the old self-sufficiency was still an actual fact. It is hard to 
 stigmatize as unreasoning the apprehensions which appear 
 in relatively infertile sections, when the season's supply is not 
 assured. 
 
 Closely connected with the gradual transition to a continuous 
 distributive trade were the latent defects of the old market 
 system. These were much more potent breeders of panic than 
 the failure to perceive the new tendencies. Uncertainty, which 
 is the insidious cause of every panic, obscured every stage in 
 the wholesale marketing of grain. At no step in the process was 
 it possible to perceive clearly the extent of either supply or 
 demand. The total amount of the crop was never accurately 
 known, since the amount of grain hidden away in the granaries 
 of land-owners was quite beyond any powers of calculation. 
 Added to these uncertainties was the uncertainty as to the exact 
 amount of grain purchased by merchants from distant towns for 
 export. 
 
 The statistics which appear in the administrative correspon- 
 dence as " Etats des Bleds " merely reveal the colossal extent 
 of contemporary ignorance. In 1693, a fairly systematic 
 endeavor was made to prepare such estimates throughout the 
 kingdom. 2 The attempt was carried out in several provinces, 
 but it was found that it did more harm than good. The figures 
 for the towns were generally pretty accurate, and as the inquiry 
 frequently revealed greater scarcity than had been realized, the 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Aix, 25 Sept. 1693. Lebret. 
 
 2 G 7 . ; 630-34, passim. 
 
200 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 reports merely spread panic. The inquiries were successfully 
 prosecuted only in the regions of slight activity. in the grain 
 trade or in the consuming regions. In the producing regions, 
 crop estimates never progressed beyond the merest guesses'. 1 
 
 This invisibility had curious results. In 1662, the Parlement 
 of Toulouse issued prohibitions of export from its jurisdiction. 
 Hotman was buying in the vicinity for Paris and the Lower 
 Loire Valley. The merchants with whom he had made engage- 
 ments cancelled their contracts. Hotman then proceeded to 
 buy large quantities in the granaries of the nobility. Permits 
 made shipments possible despite the prohibitions, and Paris 
 and the Lower Loire were thus supplied from an area where 
 there was sufficient scarcity apparent to give color to prohibi- 
 tions. 2 This curious paradox is simply and adequately explained 
 by the ignorance of the quantities available in the granaries. 
 It is possible, of course, that the prohibitions were not based 
 on any sincere conviction of their necessity, but references to 
 riots in divers places render this supposition unlikely. 
 
 The evidence is not always quite so clear, but there are many 
 indications that a similar explanation would frequently apply 
 to Burgundy. In September, 1693, it was clearly the intention 
 of the merchants to draw entirely from the granaries. " The 
 grain merchants of Lyons, who have through their correspon- 
 dents the best information about Burgundy, are quite certain 
 of the places where the grain of preceding harvests is to be 
 found. They assure me that the new grain and the buckwheat 
 (ble noir), which is the ordinary food of the people, are more 
 than sufficient for the sustenance of the inhabitants, and that 
 Burgundy can safely dispose of its old grain." 3 The inde- 
 pendence of the granary supplies and the local markets thus 
 created a greater appearance of dearth than was actually war- 
 ranted. The quantity existing in the granaries was never known, 
 
 1 Excepting, of course, the estimates for single towns, such as those made by 
 Delamare in 1709, and by other agents of Paris at various dates. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., M61. Colb., 107 bis. 832. Agen, 21 Jan. 1662. Hotman. Ibid., 
 107, 463. Agen, ii Fev. 1662. Hotman. Ibid., 107, 22. Bordeaux, 20 Mars 
 1662. Hotman. Ibid., 108, I52V. 17 Avril 1667. Memoire par Hotman. 
 
 9 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 4 Sept. 1693. Jourdain, Marchand de Lyon. 
 
DEARTH IN THE PRODUCING REGIONS 2OI 
 
 and was generally under-estimated. All these factors were 
 more likely to create panic than to afford confidence to a people 
 that saw its markets scantily supplied. 
 
 Finally, the informal manner in which wholesale purchases 
 were made was sure to give rise to the wildest kind of rumors. 
 There is a definiteness about a market which is always an element 
 of safety. The market may be subject to great eccentricities, 
 and there is, of course, a tendency to mild hysteria at times, 
 but the concentration of buying on a market does render the 
 demand an ascertainable factor. The absence of such markets 
 in most of the producing regions made trade conditions subject 
 to panic in the calmest moments. The administrative corres- 
 spondence is constantly revealing this curious feature, now in 
 brief asides, now in strict injunctions to some agent, now in 
 scornful criticism of the clumsy action of agents or merchants. 
 Not infrequently, the first rise in prices in a period of dearth 
 is attributed exclusively to this cause. Speaking of Burgundy 
 in March, 1693, Berulle writes: " there was never so much 
 grain in that province as there has been this year. The muni- 
 tionnaire has made all his purchases there, and there is still a 
 vast quantity left. I am told that certain individuals in that 
 province have purchased more than 100,000 anees. The rise 
 in prices is due to the slight precautions taken by the agents 
 of the munitionnaires. Instead of making secret contracts for 
 their purchases, they ride around the country in person in their 
 chaise roulant. Le Noble, who was charged with the purchases, 
 sent prices up, an ecu per anee, at one stroke, by his unskilful 
 conduct. Still, what has contributed the most has been the 
 formation of granaries by divers inhabitants of Burgundy, 
 who are persuaded that grain is sure to rise. They have bought 
 all they could and have closed their granaries; as little grain 
 comes to market prices have risen." l 
 
 It is the same story in the south. " The rumor has spread 
 here," writes Le Bartz at Marseilles in June, 1693, " that orders 
 for large purchases are to come from Lyons. I have been told 
 since that a man has arrived who says that he is to buy 15,000 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 2 Mars 1693. Berulle, Intendant a Lyon. 
 
202 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 charges. A fine beginning! His purchases should all be made 
 before anyone knows that he is here buying; and when it is all 
 done he must minimize the extent of his shipments. If he has 
 really bought 15,000, he must admit only 3000-4000." l With 
 all their worldly wisdom, the merchants were seldom able to 
 restrain themselves at the critical moment following the realiza- 
 tion that a dearth was likely. The mercantile parlance develops 
 an idiom which expresses rather exactly the character of the 
 wholesale trade at such periods. When the merchants hurry 
 through the country, buying right and left in the granaries or 
 of the peasants, seeking to secure control of the crop at any 
 cost, they are said to " mettre le feu sur les bleds." 2 This idiom 
 is of universal currency, appearing in all sections, and with all 
 its connotation it no more than expresses that state of feverish 
 speculation which such haphazard buying so inevitably created. 
 But despite all this excitement, despite all this publicity of 
 scattered, isolated incidents in the buying of the wholesale 
 merchants, there is never the slightest possibility of discovering 
 how much they have bought or how much there is to buy. 
 Every fact that tends to develop panic is paraded before the 
 public, every detail that could allay apprehension is usually 
 inconspicuous or secret. The merchants themselves are as 
 much in the dark as the people. Each knows the extent of his 
 own dealings, none can have any idea, however crude, of the 
 extent of others' purchases. A panic is essentially unreasoning 
 fear, but under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that 
 reasonable men became panic stricken. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Marseille, 8 Juin 1693. Le Bartz. See also G 7 . 1632. Mar- 
 seille, i Juin 1693. Le Bartz. 
 
 2 Here is an example from Tournus sur Saone, from Le Noble, the munition- 
 naire: " Les lettres que je recois de Maxilly et de Saint- Jean-de-Losne me marquent, 
 que le feu se met tout de nouveau sur les bleds qui restent en Bourgogne. . . . 
 Le nomme Vacher d'Auxonne, et le nomme" Bonnardot qui demeure du coste de 
 Verdun et qui est frere et parent de trois ou quatre marchants du mesme nom a 
 Lyon, ayant porte la mine de Saint- Jean-de-Losne qui ne peize que 650 Ibs. a 5O 11 . 
 C'est a dire que celle de Maxilly qui peze 750 Ib. va venir a 55 11. bien qu'elle 
 n'etoit que 48 11. ... Si ces gens la qui ont desia de fort grosses parties de bleds 
 acheptees et enarres ont la liberte d'aller leur train dans le temps present ... les 
 bleds n'auront point de prix." G 7 . 1631. Tournus, 14 Juillet 1693. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS AND 
 EXTREMES OF MISERY 
 
 IN regions of active trade all the difficulties can be traced 
 to the confusion caused in the producing regions by the demands 
 of the larger towns; in those parts where the local markets 
 were not thus disturbed, other troubles developed out of the iso- 
 lated position. No part of France escaped, whether fertile or 
 sterile; frequented by metropolitan merchants, or so com- 
 pletely isolated that the local market had practically no relations 
 with the outside world. The producing regions tributary to 
 the great cities might be threatened with dearth, but usually 
 relief could be procured either through prohibitions or by imports 
 from some favored regions. In the remote sections of the back 
 country, supplies were almost never carried off by unduly aggres- 
 sive merchants, but if the crops failed in these sterile sections, 
 it was very difficult to secure relief from elsewhere. The apathy 
 of the few merchants of such towns was so great that little could 
 be hoped from private initiative, so that here, too, the grain 
 trade was in need of administrative interference. These rural 
 sections were constantly confronted with the possibility of 
 actual famine, and on the whole these isolated localities experi- 
 enced the greatest extremes of misery. 
 
 The conditions were not characteristic of all areas where the 
 market system was highly localized; a number of relatively 
 isolated towns escaped the form of trouble that most threat- 
 ened the independent local market. Where the locality formed 
 an enclave in the territorial area comprised in the market system 
 of a great city, there was little danger. Local supplies were 
 usually adequate, and generally unmolested by the wholesale 
 merchants. If crops failed and the province was threatened 
 with dearth, the existence of the great trade routes offered 
 
 203 
 
204 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 sufficient facilities for obtaining supplies. These locab'ties 
 were numerous. The markets of Blois and Tours, which have 
 been described in a previous chapter, were both of this type. 
 So also, on the Upper Loire, were all the larger towns between 
 Orleans and Riom. On the Rhone, such towns as Chalons- 
 sur-Saone, Macon, Vienne, Montelimar, Avignon were in this 
 position. None were regularly in trade with any large town; 
 their supplies were obtained independently. In the Seine Basin, 
 it is more difficult to classify the doubtful towns. The river 
 towns for the most part were engaged in trade with Paris, except 
 when they were beyond the usual trade limits. But there were 
 many towns on the borders of the territory tributary to Paris 
 which were enclaves. Rheims, Laon, Rethel, in the Marne 
 Valley; Sens and the Yonne towns; Troyes and the upper 
 reaches of the Seine all these were outside the usual area of 
 Parisian trade, and yet near enough to derive relief from the 
 wholesale merchants in the time of dearth. In the south, many 
 towns of this type can be found along the trade routes, both in 
 Languedoc, on the line of the Canal du Midi, and in Guienne, 
 on the Garonne. These places probably suffered less from the 
 disorders of the grain trade than any other type of market area. 
 They enjoyed all the advantages of freedom from intimate 
 connection with the large towns, and at the same time, all 
 the possibilities of relief assured them by the proximity of such 
 organized trade as existed. 
 
 The special problems arising out of the highly localized market 
 system were confined to the inhospitable cantons of central 
 France, to the rugged sections of the north-east, and to the 
 sandy plains of Saintonge and Angoumois. The inhabitants 
 of these extensive regions were obliged to draw their livelihood 
 from the sterile soil and from the forests. There was little 
 trade, little industry, little communication of any kind with 
 the outside world. Even in the latter part of the seventeenth 
 century, many of these remote towns and villages seem almost 
 literally "self-sufficing." But the dearth of records in such 
 regions reduces us to mere conjecture, and as " self-sufficiency " 
 should not be emphasized as a vital feature of the localized 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 2O$ 
 
 market, it is best not to insist on the probabilities. Whenever 
 detailed descriptions come to light, some inter-market trade 
 is revealed, a very inconsiderable trade to be sure, involving 
 only two or three small markets, but still inter-market trade. 
 One of the most precise reports from a region of highly localized 
 trade is the memoir of Saint Contest on the Election of Brive, 
 in Angoumois. 
 
 " The election is composed of ninety-four parishes, in half 
 of which a considerable quantity of wine is made. Part is 
 consumed locally, and part is sold in Upper Limousin and down 
 Bordeaux way. The grain raised is rye, barley, patris, buck- 
 wheat, and all sorts of vegetables. These lands do not produce 
 one- tenth of the wheat and oats needed. Those grains, are 
 imported from the vicinity of the Vicomte of Turenne, from 
 Perigord, and from Quercy. The other sorts of grain do not 
 suffice for the' inhabitants, and the deficiency is made up by the 
 other half of the election, by Tulle, and by Auvergne. Pas- 
 turage is very rare. In the other half of the election there is an 
 abundance of rye and of chestnuts, a sufficiency of forage and 
 pasture, and also much buckwheat and oats. There is very 
 little commerce in the election, and the commodities sold there 
 are very low in price. In some cantons, there is a very delicate 
 sort of wine, which is sold in the parishes that have no vine- 
 yards and in the vicinity of Limoges; formerly the trade was 
 considerable . . . but since vines have been planted in Upper 
 Limousin there has been a great diminution in the sales. The 
 poorer wines are turned into brandy and sent down to Bordeaux 
 . . . but that trade does not amount to much. The trade in 
 cattle is more considerable. Wheat is so cheap that the Paris 
 bushel sells at 5-6 sous." l 
 
 The interesting fact here is not so much the slightness of the 
 general trade of the region, as the independence of central mar- 
 kets. Grain prices are apparently determined not by prices 
 in Montauban, Toulouse, or Bordeaux, but by the local demand 
 and supply. Part of the supply indeed comes from sections 
 
 1 G 7 . 345. 16 Juillet 1687. Memoire de St. Contest sur 1'filection de 
 Brive. 
 
206 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 that might at times be in touch with the Garonne Valley 
 trade, but for the most part this little area is governed by its 
 own local market. The medieval system, in its developed 
 form of a market with Uatiers, is quite adequate in ordinary 
 seasons. * 
 
 Auvergne, another of the relatively barren provinces, is not 
 without trade. " This province is composed of six elections, 
 Aurillac, Brioude, and Saint-Flour, or Upper Auvergne, Riom, 
 Clermont, and Issoire, or Lower Auvergne. In Lower Auvergne 
 there is the section called Limagne, which is a very fertile but 
 not a wealthy section, as the difficulties of trade oblige the 
 inhabitants to consume themselves what is produced. 1 
 
 " Upper Auvergne is a mountainous country, covered with 
 snow for six months in the year, but it possesses great advan- 
 tages for grazing, which is the basis of considerable trade in 
 cattle and cheese. The inhabitants secure their grain in Lower 
 Auvergne." 2 
 
 Local rural trade of this type appears also in Rouergue. 
 Velay and the Venaissin drew supplies from the neighborhood 
 of Millau. There was a slight trade in grain between the elec- 
 tions of Limoges and Bourganeuf. 
 
 In all of these cases there is some definite record, but a large 
 portion of the territory of the kingdom does not appear in the 
 records at all. The condition of these sections is by no means 
 unimportant although we can do little more than speculate. 
 Fortunately we are not entirely without evidence. The great 
 dearth of 1693 led in some regions to the creation of crude 
 statistics which are of especial interest by reason of the light 
 thrown upon the distribution of population. 
 
 In Alengon, in 1693, there are detailed figures for each village, 
 and a tabulation of four territorial divisions exhibits these 
 results, which represent a very fair average for the region. 
 (See table on following page.) 
 
 1 The grain from this section was the basis of the trade of Paris, Orleans, and 
 Lyons in Auvergne. Recourse was had to Auvergne perhaps only in years of 
 trouble but there was always a spasmodic grain trade with this part of Auvergne. 
 
 2 G 7 . 101. 1683. Memoire envoyee par M. de Bercy. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 
 
 207 
 
 An inspection of the roll of parishes suggests that about one- 
 half the population was living in villages of less than five hun- 
 dred inhabitants. 1 Similar statistics for the Generalite of Pau 
 show that the average size of villages was 200 inhabitants. 2 
 
 Election 
 
 No. of 
 
 Parishes 
 
 No. of towns 
 of 1000 or 
 more inhab. 
 
 Extreme 
 range in the 
 size of, villages 
 
 Size of towns 
 
 
 
 
 persons 
 
 
 Verneuil 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chat, de la Ferte" Ar- 
 
 
 
 
 
 nault 
 
 2O 
 
 
 I 20450 
 
 
 Alenqon 
 
 
 
 
 
 Baillage de Moulins . 
 
 17 
 
 I 
 
 130-700 
 
 I QOO 
 
 Vicomte d'Effey 
 
 53 
 
 7 
 
 So-^OO 
 
 1000-3000 
 
 Vicomte d'Alencon . . 
 
 42 
 
 3 
 
 153-938 
 
 IIOO, 
 
 
 
 
 
 1180, 12,000 
 
 In 1682, in the County of Bigorre, an enumeration of the villages 
 and towns by families gives the following results : 
 
 Less than 
 10 families 
 
 10-20 
 
 families 
 
 21-50 
 families 
 
 families 
 15 
 
 IOI-200 
 
 families 
 
 201-500 
 families 
 
 In the whole county there were only thirteen places of more 
 than 100 families. The characteristic size of the village was 
 between 15 and 45 families. 3 
 
 On the whole, there is enough evidence to suggest that the 
 population, especially in the infertile districts, was very widely 
 scattered in relatively small villages. There was a minimum 
 of concentration, and for this reason these little villages must 
 have been able to get along with very rudimentary com- 
 mercial machinery. A few small villages and a central market 
 town may well have found no development of the primitive 
 market necessary. These out of the way regions escape notice, 
 but it is well not to forget their existence, for the pushing of the 
 
 1 G 7 . 
 
 2 G 7 . 
 
 1630. 5 Dec. 1693. 
 
 1640. Sept. 1709. Denombrement de tout le pays de Basse Navarre. 
 
 132. Papiers des fitats de Beam. Estat de Villes et Paroisses qui sont 
 
 dans la Comte de Bigorre; avec la nombre des feux et des families. 
 
208 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 metropolitan market system into these remote sections is one of 
 the characteristic features of the late nineteenth century, a 
 reflex movement following the perfection of central organization. 
 So far as we have any material, it appears that the compara- 
 tively infertile sections were outside the general movement of 
 the grain trade. The effect of a failure of crops in these regions 
 is thus an interesting speculation. If we draw the simpler deduc- 
 tions that suggest themselves, we might infer that in periods of 
 scarcity the people simply starved. This, indeed, was only too 
 frequently the case. 
 
 An idea of the intensity of famine may best be obtained from 
 the substitutes resorted to. In some regions there were systematic 
 endeavors to ascertain the utility of common herbs. The most 
 elaborate record of such attempts, with which I am acquainted, 
 is in the papers of Dr. Gilbert Retif, of Pont-de-Vaux in Lower 
 Burgundy. This was a region of great distress in 1693; it 
 was just south of the more productive parts of the province, 
 and unable to secure much relief, as whatever went out was sent 
 to Lyons. The experience of that year was apparently the 
 moving cause underlying his experiments, for when he sent 
 his memorials to Paris in 1699, they were evidently the result 
 of considerable labor. He used the daffodil or asphodel most 
 frequently in his trials, but he does not seem to have considered 
 much more than the agreeableness of his bread. The experi- 
 ments most frequently took the form of giving people this as- 
 phodel bread when they supposed they were having ordinary 
 bread; failure to perceive any difference is the principal argument 
 in its favor. There was no consideration of the actual food 
 value of the bread. This doctor made a trip through Angoumois 
 and Limousin to experiment on the herbs there, an interesting 
 indication of the needs of that ill-favored region. The asphodel 
 was found, and Retif made his suggestions. The local officials 
 demurred; they said that the root was poisonous. He cited the 
 doctors and herbalists of antiquity in favor of the herb. In one 
 place the local doctors were commissioned to test the plant. 
 They boiled it, and made " learned " notes on the properties 
 of the mash. Then they burned it, and examined the ashes. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 2OQ 
 
 Next they pressed it, and subjected the liquid to such tests as 
 could be made with the five senses of man. After this hocus 
 pocus the herb was pronounced safe. 1 
 
 None of the other attempts at substitution were quite as 
 deliberate as that of the Burgundian doctor, but all sorts of 
 expedients were tried with various degrees of success. In 
 Rouergue, in July, 1709, the chestnuts gave out, and the people 
 eked out the little rye and barley that remained with the as- 
 phodel. 2 The same root was used in parts of Touraine in lyog. 3 
 In parts of Languedoc, dog-bane (chien dent) was used mixed 
 with rye or wheat. 4 In all these cases, the subsidiary roots 
 were used merely to make the small supplies of grain last longer. 
 The use was apparently not attended with any serious results. 
 In Limousin and Perigord, turnips were used as a dilution for 
 the grain. 5 
 
 The Due de Lesdiguieres, writing from Dauphine in May, 
 1675, says that " the inhabitants (of Dauphine) have lived 
 during the past winter on bread made from acorns and roots, 
 and now they are reduced to eating grass in the fields and the 
 bark of trees." 6 
 
 In 1686, Baville writes that many people in the Cevennes 
 live on acorns and herbs. 7 In September, 1693, Bouchu, Inten- 
 dant in Dauphine, writes a most extraordinary letter. He speaks 
 of the difficulties in the way of making investigations of the 
 quantity of grain, and after admitting that conditions are 
 desperate, he continues: " the hard life to which these people 
 are accustomed is in itself a ground for hope. It is no exag- 
 geration to say that the greater part of the provinces of Tarantais 
 and Maurienne have lived, since 1690, on flour made from nut- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1637. 1699. Memoires et Documents sur le pain de Racine nou- 
 vellement inventi par M. Gilbert Retif, Doc. en Med. de la Ville de Pont-de-Vaux. 
 Journal d'un Voyage en Angouleme et Limousin. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1646. Montauban, 31 Juillet 1769. Le Gendre. 
 
 3 Boislisle, op. cit., Ill, 171-450. 14 Juin 1709. Turgot a Tours. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1644. Montpellier, 30 Aout 1709. Baville. 
 
 6 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 514, 1828. 17 Jan. 1699. Bernage, Intendant a Limoges. 
 G 7 . 138. Perigueux, 2 Jan. 1699. fiveque de Perigueux. 
 
 6 Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 171, 333. Grenoble, 29 Mai 1675. 
 
 7 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 65, 265. 29 Mars 1686. 
 
210 TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 shells, in which the most well-to-do do not mix more than a 
 tenth part of oats or barley meal. M. de Chamlay is a witness 
 to the truth of this, and he has carried samples of this sort of 
 bread to the King." l 
 
 At times some villages in the distressed regions were reduced 
 to downright starvation, and in these crises, anything, every- 
 thing was used. The accounts seem at times to indulge in an 
 excess of statement, but the official character of the corre- 
 spondence and the position of the writers make it hard to believe 
 that the letters fail in any respect but understatement. In 
 March, 1662, M. Bellay, a doctor at Blois, writes to the Marquis 
 de Sourdeac, " In the thirty- two years that I have been a doctor 
 in this province, I have never seen anything that approaches 
 the desolation now existing at Blois, where there are 4000 (poor) 
 who have flowed in from neighboring parishes. In the country 
 the dearth is greater. The peasants have no bread. They pick 
 up all kinds of meat scraps, and the moment that a horse dies, 
 they fall upon it and eat it. 
 
 " Malign fevers are beginning at Salinier (?). The poverty 
 is so great that there is a little barley that has not been bought, 
 as no one had any money. The artisans are dying of hunger, 
 the bourgeois is so grievously afflicted (that he cannot aid the 
 poor). I have just learned that a child was found at Cheverny 
 that had eaten its own hands. These are horrors which fairly 
 make your hair stand on end." 2 In order to arouse the sym- 
 pathy of the Parisians, and to secure relief funds, a letter from 
 the Superior of the Carmelite Convent at Blois was printed 
 and distributed at Paris as a hand-bill. " There are 3000 poor 
 in the town and faubourgs of Blois. Grain is worth 200 ecus 
 per muid, measure of Paris, and prices are still rising. The 
 poor people in the country look like disinterred corpses. . . . 
 Whenever they find dead horses or mules or other beasts they 
 fill themselves with the rotten meat, which destroys rather 
 than maintains life. The poor people of the town live like pigs 
 on bran mash, and consider themselves lucky when they get a 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 338, 1235. 22 Sept. 1693. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 107, 344. Bellay, Medecin a Blois, 2 Mars 1662. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 211 
 
 belly full of that stuff. They pick up decayed cabbage stalks 
 in the gutters, and then they cook these with bran. They beg 
 for the water in which salt codfish has been cooked. ... In 
 the fields and along the roads, women and children have been 
 found dead, their mouths still full of grass." l 
 
 In the spring of 1694, there were reports of serious famine 
 in various places. Near Villefranche in Beaujolais, some of the 
 peasants had been reduced to such poverty by the failures of the 
 crops that they no longer had any money to buy grain, and were 
 reduced to eating raw herbs. 2 In another part of Beaujolais, 
 the distress was due to actual physical lack of supplies. " There 
 is not in any parish of Charollais half the grain that is needed 
 for its sustenance till the harvest. At present the poor people 
 live on bread made from the roots of ferns, which causes terrible 
 outbreaks of disease. The decent people cannot stay in the 
 churches during mass. At Charolles and Paray the poor die of 
 hunger in the streets, without anyone being able to assist them. 
 They are far to6 numerous, and grain is not to be had for money." 3 
 In Lower Armagnac, the Archbishop of Auch says the population 
 is only a quarter of what it was three years before. Sickness 
 and migration are responsible for the diminution. In many 
 places the people live on grape pips (Pepins de raisins), roots, 
 and ferns which they grind up to make flour." 4 
 
 In 1709, similar extremes of misery are reported. At Valence, 
 " les plus mauvaises herbes font a present presque toute leur 
 nourriture." 5 In the less fertile sections of the generality of 
 Orleans the distress was intense. " The people in the country 
 near Bourges, having no money to buy grain are reduced to eating 
 herbs and roots, which they boil without any salt or other 
 seasoning, so that grave epidemics are feared." 6 The officers 
 
 1 Arch. Nat., A. D. XI, 37. 1662. Imprime dans la Bibliotheque Rondonneau. 
 " Avis Important." 
 
 2 G 7 . 1635. 1694. Deux Placets de Noyel, Receveur General de la Taille 
 en Villefranche. 
 
 3 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 357, 1298. 
 
 4 Ibid., I, 360. 6 Sept. 1694. Archeveque d'Auch. 
 
 5 G 7 . 1643. Valence, 14 Mai 1709. fiv^que de Valence. 
 
 6 G 7 . 1640. Bourges, 3 Mai 1709. Foulle, Intendant a Bourges. 
 
212 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of Douzy write: "We have no grain for our maintenance. 
 More than three-quarters of the inhabitants and the peasants 
 for four leagues around are reduced to eating unseasoned herbs 
 and the cattle that they kill in the fields." l 
 
 It is idle to deny the sporadic existence of the utmost extremes 
 of misery, but a moment's reflection will bring these relatively 
 isolated cases within proper bounds. In many instances the 
 extremes were suffered only by the indigent, swelled undoubt- 
 edly in number by the heavy losses entailed by accident to the 
 crops, but, after all, only a part of the population. Further- 
 more, actual lack of bread was confined to rural districts. At 
 times the towns were possessed of very small reserves; occa- 
 sionally, they were obliged to put their inhabitants on rations, 
 as at Lyons in 1693 and 1709. But the towns did not starve. 
 Then, too, only certain parts of the country districts suffered. 
 I have seen only one instance of such suffering in a fertile region, 2 
 and in that case the lack of means was perhaps a more consider- 
 able factor than lack of grain. Despite all the highly colored 
 statements that have been made up about the dearths in France, 
 I cannot believe that the extremes of distress pictured were 
 anything more than infrequent and highly localized phenomena. 
 All the cases of the sort that I have seen have been cited here 
 or in other places, 3 and the presumption is very strong when such 
 striking conditions are not reported more frequently in a mass 
 of correspondence, such as that of the Controle General. 4 Con- 
 ditions were bad enough, but they certainly were not as desperate 
 
 as has often been represented. 
 
 i 
 
 1 G 7 . 1646. Douzy, 13 Juin 1709. Les Officiers de la Fairies de Douzy. 
 
 2 Boislisle, op. tit., I, 363, 1320. 6 Mai 1694. Larcher in Champagne 
 says, " La calamite est encore plus affreuse dans les villages, oft la plupart des 
 manouvriers ne trouvant presque plus de travail, ou du moins si peu qu'il ne suffit 
 pas a leur gagner du pain pour eux et pour leurs families, sont des jours entiers 
 sans en manger un morceau, reduits a vivre de son ou de racines, qu'ils font cuire 
 avec un peu de sel, et les plus a leur aise sont ceux qui peuvent avoir du pain 
 d'avoyne ou de sarrazin." It is the artisans that suffer, and from lack of money 
 rather than lack of grain. 
 
 8 See Chap. IV. A case in Lower Burgundy. 
 
 4 I have carefully examined the whole of the correspondence on the great 
 dearths. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 213 
 
 The most serious depletion of the population was due to the 
 fevers and epidemics. These, in many cases, owed their origin 
 to a local dearth, but the question was intimately connected 
 with the question of poor relief. At all times, whether of abun- 
 dance or of dearth, the pauper or semi-pauper class was the 
 element in the population that suffered the miseries so graphi- 
 cally described by the critics of the Old Regime. There was 
 little organized charity, and most of the attempts at relief 
 originated with the Church. The Intendants, however,, took 
 the matter in hand in the periods of greatest distress, but at 
 such times it was difficult to create an efficient organization. 
 Workhouses and public works were established, but they fre- 
 quently spread the epidemics and increased rather than de- 
 creased the death rate. This was Bouville's complaint of the 
 Aumones Generates in Limousin in 1691. " This great assem- 
 bling of the poor of all ages and sexes gives rise to horrible 
 abominations, and leads to an incredible spread of disease, which 
 is favored by the inadequate nutrition. When the grain begins 
 to turn color, these almshouses encourage idleness, by affording 
 a certainty of having bread and soup, and by making possible 
 a life of licentious freedom. This general assembly of the poor 
 should be prevented by obliging each town to feed its own poor. 
 The paupers should be ordered to do the work assigned to them 
 by the -directors, so that none should be induced by idleness to 
 enter the workhouse." l 
 
 In Beam in 1693, the poor who had flocked into Pau were shut 
 up in barns and houses, and given rations, but this merely made 
 matters worse. The fevers which had already appeared in- 
 creased at an alarming rate, especially among the poor, and out 
 of 800-900 shut up in the relief houses, two hundred died within 
 a fortnight. In the country districts thousands were suffering 
 from extreme destitution. 2 From Montauban in 1694, the 
 Archbishop writes: " The price of grain has already risen so 
 high that the poor can no longer buy. Seven or eight dead 
 persons are found at the gates of the town each day, and in my 
 
 1 Boislisle, op, cit., I, 228, 1018. 
 
 * Ibid., I, 321, 1191. 12 Mai 1693. Sanson. 
 
214 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 diocese of 150 parishes, 400 people die daily from improper 
 nourishment. I myself feed 300 poor each day, in town or on 
 my estates." l In 1695 the Intendant at Montauban says that 
 the district is in a pitiable state. " The people are in misery 
 transcending all powers of the imagination, so exhausted that 
 they are incapable of any exertion. The sterility of previous 
 years carried off one-half or two-thirds the population of parishes, 
 so that in many places there are not enough people left to culti- 
 vate the soil. The distress is not equally spread, however. 
 It is worst in Armagnac, and it may be necessary to colonize 
 from neighboring provinces to repopulate that canton." 2 
 
 The problem of poor relief was increased in difficulty by the 
 migratory habits of the population. In June, 1693, " whole 
 communities of the elections of Rouergue and Quercy abandoned 
 their villages and sought food elsewhere. Near Figeac, Cahors, 
 Villefranche, and Rodez some of these unfortunates have been 
 found dead in the fields, with their mouths full of grass." 3 
 
 The appearance of dearth in a canton was generally sufficient 
 to set numbers of the poor in motion. When there was a large 
 town near, they flocked into town; if no such hope of finding 
 relief presented itself, they wandered from province to province, 
 so that the infertile sections of the Massif Central were the scenes 
 of many curious migrations of paupers. In 1692, Perigord was 
 suffering. The poor had collected in great masses, and Bouville 
 feared that they would set out for Limoges. 4 In 1698, a private 
 correspondent writes from Bordeaux: " The dearth in Perigord 
 has already caused large numbers of persons to leave their 
 homes," " en trouppe et en famille," seeking places where grain 
 has been stored. 5 In Roussillon, the distress is equally great. 
 " If the king does not send grain for the sustenance of this town 
 (Prais de Mollo) more than fifty families (220 persons) must 
 needs leave, exclusive of six families that have already left. . . . 
 
 1 Boislble, op. cit., I, 360, 1308. 16 Avril 1694. fiveque de Montauban. 
 
 2 Ibid., I, 391, 1432. 28 Mai 1695. Sanson. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1632. Montauban, 19 Juin 1693. Brunot, Rec. Gen. des Finances. 
 
 4 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 297, 1122. 2 Oct. 1692. 
 
 5 G 7 . 138. Bordeaux, 21 Nov. 1698. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 215 
 
 All are going to foreign parts." 1 In 1705, the Curates of the 
 election of Cahors write: " our parishes are reduced to the sad 
 necessity of dying of starvation or of abandoning the country 
 unless they receive sufficient aid to enable them to subsist 
 till the harvest. . . . Some have already abandoned their 
 homes, and all are inclined to follow their example. Only a 
 very extraordinary charity can stop them." 2 
 
 These infertile districts were thus in need of a double relief; 
 in the first place, the break-down of the local market system 
 rendered administrative intervention necessary to secure grain 
 from the principal grain producing regions, then when this grain 
 had arrived, a large share had to be distributed as a charity. 
 
 In 1694 and 1698-99, Limoges and Limousin were quite depen- 
 dent on the importations of grain made by the Intendant from 
 Brittany and Bordeaux. In the fall of 1693, a letter of the 
 Bishop of Limoges suggests that something was done to procure 
 grain from Berry by public subscription. The local crops, 
 however, were not consumed until the spring of 1694. Bernage 
 perceived the necessity of extraordinary measures as early as 
 February. " The nearer I approached Limoges, the more 
 striking were the misery and the dearth. I was fairly frightened 
 by the prodigious crowd of paupers, but the Bishop assured me 
 that it was quite ordinary." Nevertheless, he straightway 
 obtained a grant of 3o,ooo u to procure grain in Bordeaux, 
 Poitou, or Brittany. In March, he writes: " I urged the 
 merchants to form a company to import grain from the neigh- 
 boring provinces, but the merchants of this section do not wish 
 to undertake anything of the sort at their own risk. Their 
 unf amiliarity with that trade, and the many risks frighten them. 
 
 1 promised them armed escorts, but it does not reassure them. 
 They would like to act as Royal agents, but they refuse to make 
 any advances or to take any risks." Bernage proposes a scheme 
 for royal action. The grain will have to be sold at less than the 
 market price, but the King need not lose more than i5,ooo u 
 
 1 G 7 . 506. Prais de Mollo, 7 Nov. 1698. Chevalier de Landort a d'Albaret. 
 
 2 Boislisle, op. cit., II, 283, 911. 13 Nov. 1705. See also Ibid., II, 255, 821. 
 
 2 Juin 1705. 
 
2l6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 on a sum of i2o ) ooo }1 . 1 The grain was purchased for the most 
 part in Brittany and Poitou and was shipped to Rochefort and 
 Bordeaux. 2 The grain arrived in May, June, and July, 3 and was 
 distributed throughout an extensive territory. One granary 
 was established at Angouleme, others at Limoges, Souillac, 
 Terrasson, Pressac, and Saint-Jean-d'Angely. From these 
 entrepots the relief was distributed to all parts of the distressed 
 region. 4 
 
 In 1698, it was a repetition of the same story. The neces- 
 sities of the province were early perceived. Bernage urged 
 the merchants to engage in the trade but they refused. He 
 borrowed from the royal tax collectors and bought grain in 
 Brittany. 5 Perigord was equally dependent upon administra- 
 tive relief. Writing from Bergerac in April, 1699, Bezons 
 says: " the price of grain has not risen here, as I have had 
 large quantities put on the market and have given orders to 
 continue. I am obliged to secure wagons to transport the grain 
 from Perigueux. The Bishop has bought grain to sell below 
 the market price." 6 A couple of weeks later the Bishop says: 
 " with the aid of the Intendant I have purchased grain and 
 lentils at Bordeaux, Libourne, Saint-Foix, Bergerac, and Mont- 
 leduc, whence I have them brought here (Perigueux). They 
 are no sooner arrived than they are sold. But this trade cannot 
 long continue, as we have not the money necessary. The 
 province will be without grain. I ask only for 10,000 francs 
 which I will use for lentils." 7 
 
 Dauphine is difficult to classify; in some respects it is an 
 infertile, non-commercial region, but regarded in other lights 
 it appears as a supply area. In truth, there were small sections 
 that were fertile, which were frequently engaged in a border trade 
 with Savoy or Lyons. The rest of the province seems to have 
 
 G 7 . 1634. Limoges, 19-22 Mars 1694. Bernage. 
 
 Ibid. Limoges, 17 Avril 1694. Bernage. 
 
 Ibid. Limoges, 8 Juin 1694, 6 Juillet, 27 Juillet 1694. 
 
 Ibid. 1694. Memoire sur les Bleds acheptes pour le Limousin. 
 
 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 491, 1756. Summaries of several letters. 
 
 6 G 7 . 138. Bergerac, 12 Avril 1699. Bezons. 
 
 7 Ibid. Perigueux, i Mai 1699. fiveque de Perigueux. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 217 
 
 hardly sufficed for its own needs. The army was also introducing 
 complications in the trade from time to time. The border 
 trade tended to deplete the local markets. Details are not very 
 plentiful, but references appear in both 1698 and 1709. " The 
 price of grain is rising steadily, " writes Berulle from Grenoble 
 in October, 1698, " partly on account of the light harvest, 
 partly on account of the shipments to Savoy by the Pont-de- 
 Beauvoisin. I have felt assured that you (i. e. the Controleur 
 General) would approve of the prohibitions that I have issued, 
 as there were many persons forming granaries in Savoy. The 
 inhabitants of Bourgoin and neighboring places complained 
 that certain rich usurers of Bourgoin bought the greater part 
 of the grain of the region, converted it into flour and shipped 
 it to Lyons, as the grain from Dauphine was selling 4 U per 
 quartal higher than the inferior Burgundian grain. This move- 
 ment was very considerable and caused so great a dearth that 
 flour had risen to three sous per pound. The prohibitions 
 have produced a decline in price." l 
 
 In 1709, the border trade was a more serious problem. " The 
 Parlement of Grenoble issued an edict dispensing inhabitants 
 of Gapenc.ois, Embrunois, and Briangonnais, from the obliga- 
 tion to sell on the public markets. If the arret is not revoked, 
 . . . the whole country will be reduced to famine, and we shall 
 not know to whom to appeal for grain. I have been obliged 
 to interrupt this letter, to go to the market place to pacify the 
 crowd. Everyone is grumbling and complaining as they find 
 no grain of any kind." 2 
 
 This trade, however, was hardly more than local, merely 
 a distribution of the provincial crop. There were no regular 
 trading connections which could assist when the crops of the 
 province failed. At those periods of distress, Dauphine was 
 quite dependent on the supplies procured by administrative 
 activity. This phase of action appears most distinctly in a 
 letter of Bouchu written 26 September, 1693 : 
 
 1 G 7 . 244- Grenoble, 7 Oct. 1698. Berulle. G 7 . . 244. Fenestrelle, 18 Sept. 
 1699. Berulle. See also G 7 . 243. Grenoble, 10 Sept. 1695. Berulle. 
 
 >99. ISerulle. bee also u'. 243. urenoble, 10 bej 
 8 G 7 . 1631. Gap, i Juin 1709. fiveque de Gap. 
 
2l8 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 11 For more than a month, I have vainly exhorted the principal 
 towns to raise funds to buy grain in Languedoc, or in the sea- 
 ports of Provence. What would have cost eighteen francs then 
 costs 23 francs now. ... I have assembled here in Grenoble 
 deputies from all the towns in the province. I have spoken to 
 each separately and then to all assembled. Even if the most 
 moderate conclusions possible are drawn from their testimony, 
 the province has not enough grain to maintain its inhabitants 
 after February. The towns of Dauphine have no revenues, 
 so that it is not easy to devise remedies. All that I have been 
 able to do after thorough discussion is to make a contract with 
 one man, who agrees to advance money to the town of Vienne 
 for the purchase of 12,000 quintals. That will relieve the most 
 pressing needs in that canton, and some aid can be sent to 
 neighboring places. 
 
 " At Grenoble, the price of grain is rising at each market, 
 so that it is now selling at 4 livres, or 4 livres 5 sous per quartal. 
 Everything was ripe for a fourth increase, when the pains that 
 have been taken and the manifestations of popular feeling 
 induced several individuals to sell the grain that they had in 
 boats on the river. But there is not a large enough quantity 
 to reduce the market price, and as the dealers made less than 
 they had hoped for, they are not likely to continue in the enter- 
 prise. As the town has no revenue at all, I have deemed it 
 expedient to provide for the needs of the town. So I have 
 made a contract with an individual who agrees to deliver 18,000 
 se tiers at Grenoble for 3 francs 10 sous per quartal, under the 
 following conditions: He is to sell only one-half of the whole, 
 in proportionate lots during November, December, January, 
 and February. This first half assures me that the price of grain 
 will not rise above 3 francs 10 sous per quartal. The other hah , 
 which he is to sell only in accordance with my orders, gives me 
 some assurance for May and June. I have also stipulated in the 
 contract that I can have him sell at less than 3 francs 10 sous, 
 if I reimburse him. ... I am working out a little scheme 
 on this basis. By manipulating the prices of this grain, I hope 
 to derange all the calculations of those who are hoarding grain 
 in anticipation of a rise in price. 
 
AREAS OF HIGHLY LOCALIZED MARKETS 
 
 "As for Lower Dauphine, the towns of Romans, Valence, 
 Crest, and Montelimar, the trouble there is more serious than 
 at any of the other places. The town of Montelimar proves 
 by its registers of the flour coming in from the neighboring 
 mills, that the annual consumption of grain is 23,000 setiers. 
 By the register of the tithes, the year's harvest is estimated at 
 12,000 setiers, 3,000 setiers are needed for seed, so that there is 
 only 9,000 setiers to supply the town. Notwithstanding all this, 
 the price of grain is much lower there than at Grenoble where 
 the harvest was even lighter. This is apparently due to the fact 
 that there are few strangers in these small towns. Each inhabi- 
 tant consumes what he has, and is on the verge of a severe dearth 
 without realizing it. Under these circumstances, it is hard to 
 know how to secure grain for these towns in other provinces. 
 The cost of transportation amounts to more than the price of 
 the small quantities of grain sold on their markets, so that 
 any efforts to relieve them would seem to impose an unnecessary 
 burden." * 
 
 This explanation of conditions in Montelimar is a complete 
 exposition of the defects of the market system in these non- 
 commercial regions. The improvidence and the inability to 
 meet extraordinary conditions are both worthy of note. For 
 the distribution of the local supply these merchants were all 
 the machinery needed, but in those exceptional crises which 
 occurred once in a decade or once in a generation, the local 
 market was absolutely inadequate. Here again, we have the 
 characteristic feature of all medieval institutions. They were 
 carefully adapted to the ordinary conditions, and so long as 
 nothing new appeared to change the situation, the cumbersome 
 machinery worked satisfactorily. The least strain, the least 
 element of novelty, anything extraordinary reduced the system 
 to inefficient chaos. In the producing regions, the market system 
 was unable to preserve an equilibrium between the demands of 
 the metropolis and the country. In the non-commercial regions, 
 the markets afforded no assistance when the usual local sources 
 of supply failed. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1630. Grenoble, 26 Sept. 1693. Bouchu & Pussort, Copie envoyee au 
 Controleur General. 
 
220 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 These constant break-downs in times of crisis are the most 
 fertile cause of our misunderstandings of the medieval regime. 
 We forget that the system did work ordinarily, and we also forget 
 that the effort to devise some means to meet the recurring 
 crises is what transforms medieval into modern society. The 
 afflictions of a crisis were borne with that resignation which 
 we still find in the Orient. The man sat down calmly to meet 
 his fate. If it pleased God to smite him with famine, so be it. 
 The idea that these troubles can or should be avoided is a strictly 
 modern idea. 
 
PART II 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 1500-1660 
 
 THE early history of grain trade regulation was treated by the 
 Physiocrats from the standpoint of the protective controversy. 
 They drew comparisons between Sully and Colbert, much to 
 the disadvantage of the latter. They sought to identify Colbert 
 with the protective policy that they criticised. " Colbert, 
 despite his sincere regard for the welfare of the state, followed 
 the wrong course and was in the end seriously embarrassed. 
 Sully with less art had based his action on the natural principle. 
 He regarded land as the source of all wealth, both of necessities 
 and of luxuries. The increase of this wealth is the true interest 
 of the state. The encouragement of commerce and industry 
 is thus dependent upon freedom of export, for without freedom 
 there will be no trade." l Sully was therefore a representative 
 of Physiocratic ideas. Without full knowledge of their truths, 
 he acted in accordance with their conceptions. They were thus 
 able to describe their policy as a return to an older tradition 
 unwisely abandoned by Colbert. 
 
 The origin of the free trade policy is doubtless one of the 
 most interesting problems of the period, but the question cannot 
 be answered as easily as one might be led to suppose by the 
 insinuations of the Physiocrats. Free trade and protection 
 mean different things at different times. The sense we attach 
 to these terms is somewhat different from their meaning to the 
 Physiocrats, and in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
 they had still another meaning. There is a steady growth in 
 the freedom of commercial intercourse, and a degree of restric- 
 tion that would today be designated as protection was formerly 
 called free trade. The distinction between tariff for revenue 
 
 1 Forbonnais, Recherches sur les Finances de France, Paris, 1760, 1, 292. 
 
 223 
 
224 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 only and tariff to protect home industry is relatively new. In the 
 sixteenth century, the distinction was drawn between absolute * 
 prohibition of export and permission of export subject to all 
 duties. Such a permission of export is all that can be found in 
 the sixteenth century, but, while there is an element of liberalism 
 in such a policy, it is hardly what we would call free trade. 
 The prohibitive edicts, too, must be scrutinized carefully. 
 Prohibitions were frequently issued with the express intention 
 of permitting export under the cover of special licenses. The 
 sale of these licenses was a source of revenue sufficiently attrac- 
 tive to lead to some prohibitive legislation that was more directly 
 related to the needs of the Crown than to the exigencies of the 
 grain trade. Considerations of revenue, however, were seldom 
 predominant. The trade was regulated primarily with reference 
 to the interests of the consumers. The King intended to en- 
 courage export when harvests were good, and to prohibit exporta- 
 tion when there was danger of dearth. 
 
 The general terms in which royal edicts were issued might 
 easily lead to a misunderstanding of a different type. The 
 solidarity of the modern state and the enforcement of laws 
 throughout the national area is likely to close our eyes to the 
 discrepancy between the form and the reality of royal mandates 
 in the days of the old monarchy. Edicts, general in form, were 
 frequently local measures in reality. Some measures could not 
 be enforced in all parts of the kingdom because of the weakness 
 of the royal officials. More frequently, a general edict was 
 restricted in its influence through the legitimate exercise of 
 discretion by the local authorities. Such action was expected, 
 and there was a real elasticity in the application of general 
 edicts because they did not become law until published in the 
 locality. 1 The edict did not become a dead letter merely through 
 the indifference of the local officials; it was deliberately with- 
 held and for cause; it never acquired legal force in that part 
 of the kingdom. Publication did not follow as a matter of course 
 
 1 Ordonnance Civil. 1667. Art. V. The commentary on this article by the 
 eighteenth century jurists is particularly significant, e. g. Serpillon, Paris, 1776. 
 See also infra, pp. 253, 276, 279, 280-281, 284, 288, 289, 293. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 22$ 
 
 in every part of the realm, and this was particularly true in the 
 case of detailed administrative measures like the grain trade 
 edicts. 
 
 The tendency of the royal chancery to generalize makes it 
 highly probable that many of the royal measures of this period 
 were significant primarily in the Seine Basin. The weakness 
 of the monarchy in the south during the Wars of Religion makes 
 it unlikely that any great degree of control was exercised over 
 that part of the kingdom, and there is sufficient evidence to 
 suggest that the interests of the Seine Basin would sufficiently 
 explain much that was done. 
 
 The foreign export trade from the Seine Basin has already 
 been described. 1 In the fifteenth century most of the grain 
 from the Oise Valley went down to Rouen, whence considerable 
 quantities were sent abroad. The gradual exclusion of the 
 Rouenese merchants from the Oise and the Upper Seine Basin 
 still left the surplus of this fertile region available, though the 
 trade was in the hands of Parisian merchants. In all probability, 
 the volume of exports decreased on account of the increased 
 demand of Paris, but there were years when the abundance 
 of the harvests made foreign export possible. At such times 
 the grain either followed the old route, down stream to Rouen, 
 or it passed overland from Noyon to the Somme, and reached 
 the sea at Saint-Valery. The extent of this movement cannot 
 be ascertained, but of its existence there can be little doubt. 
 In February, 1501, the Echevins of Paris found it necessary 
 to adopt measures " to prevent the exhaustion of Santois, 
 the Beauvoisis, and neighboring provinces by exports down the 
 Somme to foreign destinations." 2 In 1508, the Echevins were 
 informed " that peasants and others of Corbeil, Melun, Etampes, 
 and other towns are carrying quantities of grain from Paris 
 each day by wagons or otherwise. They go even to Champagne 
 to buy, selling and delivering the grain to merchants who export 
 it. ... Furthermore, the merchants take up all that they can 
 buy in Santois, and ship it to Rouen by way of the Seine." 3 
 
 1 Part I, Cfc. II, 2. Ibid., I, 148. 23 Fev. 1508. 
 
 2 Reg. du Bureau, I, 53-54. 20 Fev. 1501. 
 
226 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 A month later, the Provost of Merchants says that he has been 
 besieged on all sides by merchants " desiring permission to ship 
 grain from Paris." The destination is not given, but much 
 probably went abroad. 1 The Parisian authorities were con- 
 stantly worried by the question. It was necessary to permit 
 the passage of grain destined for neighboring towns, but at the 
 same time they were anxious to prevent foreign export. These 
 fears were especially evident in 1528, and in 1536 the Provost 
 of Merchants declared that heavy exports were being made to 
 Rouen and that the merchants of Rouen were shipping to foreign 
 ports. 2 In 1565, a bourgeois of Paris declared that " there were 
 exports of grain once in four or five years, when it pleases God 
 to grant abundant crops, and when there is dearth in Spain 
 and Portugal." 3 
 
 The anxiety with which these exports were regarded was the 
 basis of much royal interference with the grain trade in the 
 sixteenth century. The fear was. quite independent of the actual 
 volume of trade. It made no difference whether exports were 
 large or whether they were small and infrequent. It was cur- 
 rently believed that a dangerous export existed and it was 
 the uncertainty as to the extent of the trade that kept alive the 
 fears of all officials. The remedy that suggested itself to the 
 sixteenth century official was prohibition of trade in time of 
 dearth and careful regulation of trade in years of plenty. Prob- 
 ably, too, the royal councillors were inclined to stop the export 
 trade completely, in order to insure Paris an adequate supply. 
 The importance of this purely Parisian influence is somewhat 
 obscured by the general character of many of the edicts. 
 
 The general period, 1500-1660, falls into three clearly marked 
 divisions, which indicate a moderate development in policy. 
 From the beginning of the century until 1559, very little 
 systematic policy can be discerned. At one moment the 
 desire to check exports from the Seine Basin is paramount. 
 Then, financial motives appear. There are suggestions in 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, I, 150. 23 Mars 1508. 
 
 2 Ibid., II, 218. 27 Avril 1536. II, 225. 30 Juin 1536. 
 Ibid., V, 491- 1565- 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 22J 
 
 1539 that some systematic regulation was contemplated, but 
 nothing definite appears till twenty years later. Throughout 
 these years, grain trade edicts were dictated by momentary 
 expediency, without regard to large views. It was a period 
 of empirical opportunism. Between 1559 and 1571, there were 
 several efforts to establish an administrative department to 
 regulate the grain trade throughout France in accordance with 
 definite principles. These schemes failed, as the bureaucracy 
 was not then sufficiently developed to undertake such a task. 
 The^break-down of the system of 1559 and 1571 tended to dis- 
 organize subsequent efforts to regulate the trade. Not even 
 Colbert sketched any project quite as ambitious as these. But 
 the traditions remained, and until the rise of Colbert the tradi- 
 tions were applied without material modification. 
 
 After 1571 the regulation of the grain trade presents little 
 that is new. Between 1571 and 1660 there is merely an alter- 
 nation of prohibitions and permissions of export. There is an 
 attempt to adjust this policy to the state of the harvests, but 
 there is no evidence that the efforts of the Crown met with any 
 great degree of success. The period is significant merely for the 
 maintenance of the traditions. It is interesting to note the 
 relative unimportance of the edicts of Henry IV upon which 
 the Physiocrats laid so much emphasis. 
 
 1500^1559 
 
 The scattered edicts of this period cannot be brought within 
 any general scheme, since each arises naturally from special 
 circumstances. They are without logical sequence or relation. 
 Sometimes the trade of the Seine Basin is the principal motive, 
 more frequently the lean treasury influences the measure. The 
 first edict of the sixteenth century is little more than a declaration 
 that the King proposes to regulate the grain trade exclusively, 
 without any interference from governors, barons, dukes, munic- 
 ipal or other officials. The preface says that it has been 
 customary for these persons to urge the King to prohibit export 
 in order that they might derive profit from issuing permits 
 
228 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to the merchants desiring to engage in trade. 1 The need of 
 such a declaration is an eloquent commentary on the confusion 
 of jurisdictions and the weakness of the monarchy as an adminis- 
 , trative power. Furthermore, we might infer that royal attempts 
 to regulate the trade were more frequent than the extant edicts 
 would suggest. This is by no means impossible. Many edicts 
 and Letters Patent may have been lost or at least escaped the 
 collectors of ordinances. March 12, 1515, an edict was issued, 
 addressed to the Provost of Paris and the Baillis of Chartres, 
 Senlis, and Vermandois: " Your jurisdictions, having abundant 
 supplies of grain, are being daily drained, under the pretext of 
 trade with our subjects and foreigners, to the damage and loss 
 of our subjects, so that if the necessity arose of provisioning our 
 towns and fortresses, it would be difficult to find sufficient 
 supplies. Hence you are ordered to proclaim by public crier in 
 all the towns and villages of your jurisdictions, that no grain 
 shall be carried from the country in any manner or under any 
 pretext whatsoever." 2 Obviously, an edict restricted to the 
 Seine Basin, and suggested by supposed exports from the 
 interior. 
 
 In 1535, we have a general permission of export. The har- 
 vests have been abundant so that " all merchants and other 
 persons generally are permitted to buy grain, in such parts of 
 the kingdom as they shall see fit, for export to such provinces 
 or countries as they shall choose." 3 Then in 1539, there was a 
 prohibition which was clearly a fiscal expedient. All previous 
 edicts were annulled, and all export from the kingdom forbidden, 
 " except when expressly permitted, under royal letters patent, 
 and then only upon condition of paying one ' ecu soleil ' 4 
 per tonneau." This project, however, was not executed without 
 difficulty. Many evaded the edict and exported under cover 
 of old Letters Patent. Estimation of the amount of the extra 
 duty was difficult, on account of the difference in measures. 
 A special commissioner, De Neufville, was sent through the 
 
 1 Ordonnances des Rois de France, XXI, 363. 12 Fev. 1507. 
 
 * Delamare, op. cit., II, 918. 
 
 8 Ibid., eod. loc., 20 Fev. 1534-35. 
 
 4 /. e. the larger 6cu equivalent to five francs. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 22$ 
 
 Seine Basin to learn what sums were due from the merchants, 
 and to enforce the edict upon the basis of six setiers of Paris 
 (1300 Ibs.) per tonneau. 1 But the whole scheme had to be given 
 up, because there was no administrative machinery to enforce 
 it, and because the abundant crop made it necessary that the 
 merchants should be freed from the uncertainties of subterfuges 
 and evasions. Consequently, May 27, 1540, all persons were 
 given permission to export grain to all and any countries save 
 Geneva, without payment of the " ecu soleil " per tonneau. 2 
 
 Again in August, 1558, we find Letters Patent granting per- 
 mission for six months to export freely from all baillages within 
 the jurisdiction of the Parlement of Paris. But all customs 
 duties must be paid. 3 
 
 Besides these edicts and Letters Patent concerning the foreign 
 export trade there are two other measures of significance. June 
 20, 1539, an edict declares the inter-provincial trade free. " We 
 have wished and declared," it runs, " that all persons should be 
 permitted to transport their grain, wine, etc., freely within 
 the confines of the Kingdom, without interference from gover- 
 nors, their lieutenants, baillis, senechaux, ' gardes des ponts, 
 ports, ou passages ' or others. But understanding that our 
 wishes have not been carefully observed in some places, and 
 desiring to have this right guarded by a perpetual edict, so that 
 the provinces shall be mutually aided in their necessities by 
 this movement and trade in foodstuffs, with that intercourse 
 and friendship which our subjects should have with each other, 
 we have ordered that all our subjects shall be permitted to trans- 
 port their grain and wine freely within the limits of the kingdom, 
 upon paying the duties customarily paid." 4 The opening words 
 might lead us to suppose that there had been previous edicts, 
 
 1 All documents given by Delamare, op. cit., II, 920. Edict of 20 Nov. 1539. 
 
 2 Isambert, Reaieil des Lois, Arrets, et Ord., XII, 674-676. 
 
 3 Delamare, op. cit., II, 923-924. 
 
 4 Ibid., II, 922. It is interesting also to note a reference in undated Letters 
 Patent of Charles VIII (Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381, 13). It runs: 
 " Bien que nous avons voulu et ordonne par edit perpetuel que le trafic et negoce 
 des bleds soient libres entre nos sujets de province en provence ... a nostre 
 tres grand regret sommes adverty se pratique au contraire en nostre pays de Dau- 
 phine . . ." etc. 
 
230 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 but the reference is doubtless to the special Letters Patent 
 issued to various governors, in that decade. The intention 
 was evidently to make it possible to dispense with the necessity 
 of obtaining special royal orders to quash such local prohibitions. 
 This object was not fulfilled, and the local authorities continued 
 to issue prohibitions as before, recognizing nothing but special 
 Letters Patent as competent to annul their acts. 1 The second 
 measure is the general ordinance of August, 1539, which con- 
 tains an interesting provision on the grain trade. The justices 
 were ordered to obtain reports upon the value of the various 
 kinds of grain and upon the current ideas of the abundance of 
 the harvests. Information was to be derived from the mer- 
 chants, who were compelled to furnish the required data gratui- 
 tously, under the penalty of fines, imprisonment, prohibition of 
 right to continue their trade, or such other penalties as the courts 
 might choose to impose. 2 This gives evidence of a desire to 
 obtain information which is the most notable suggestion during 
 the period of serious intent to regulate the grain trade. It is 
 clearly a step in the direction of that systematic control so 
 sincerely attempted in 1559 and 1571. 
 
 II 
 
 The edict of December 20, 1559 is the logical result of the 
 rather aimless projects of Francis I. " We have proposed and 
 decided to grant permission to export grain each year in accord- 
 ance with the quantity which it shall be found can be shipped 
 from our Provinces without inconveniencing our people, and 
 in order that there shall be none of the abuses which have been 
 in the past prejudicial to our rights and to the interest of the 
 people, who have often been reduced to necessity before the new 
 harvest by reason of excessive exports, while at other times 
 unduly strict prohibitions have left their grain on their hands 
 without profit. We have resolved to establish in Paris a Bureau 
 composed of eight Resident Councillors or Commissioners, 
 
 1 Evidence on this subject is too abundant to render citations necessary here. 
 The details will appear in the following chapter. 
 
 * Isambert, Recueil des Lois, Arrets, el Ord., XII, pt. 2, 621, art. 102. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 231 
 
 and a Secretary of Finance, who shall sign any decisions and 
 orders issued by the Bureau's Treasurer, who shall receive and 
 account for the money received from our customs, and two 
 Sergeants. This Bureau shall be authorized to make regulations 
 for the trade in grain and wine, in accordance with the following 
 provisions : 
 
 " i. This commission shall be given full authority to grant passports for 
 the export of grain or wine from our kingdom, to alien or to native 
 merchants, understanding always that the total of permits so 
 issued shall be limited to the quantity which shall be declared 
 at the beginning of each year. 
 
 " 2. This commission shall regulate all details of the exportation of 
 gram. 
 
 " 3. All previous Letters Patent shall be annulled. 
 
 " 4. Governors, lieutenant governors, and others in authority are for- 
 bidden to issue any orders concerning the trade. 
 
 " 5. All export by land or by sea is prohibited, except so far as authorized 
 by the Commission. 1 
 
 " Finally, inasmuch as the preceding year has been abundant, 
 proclamation shall be made of a general export of 50,000 ton- 
 neaux of grain, and of 100,000 tonneaux of wine, subject to 
 increase, if more accurate information makes it seem expedient." 2 
 
 Although it is hardly possible that this Commission or Bureau 
 should have discharged the duties assigned to it, there are ref- 
 erences in the archives at Lyons which show that some permits 
 were issued by the Bureau, and that a serious attempt was made 
 to establish the elaborate administrative machinery outlined. 
 
 February 28, 1559-60, two months after the establishment 
 of the Bureau, Jehan Marechal, bourgeois of Pont-de-Vaulx 
 in Bresse, is negotiating with the Echevins of Lyons for the 
 passage of grain which he has agreed to furnish the Duke of 
 Savoy. He is allowed to carry his grain past the city, on con- 
 dition of exhibiting f within a month Letters Patent of the King 
 or of the Bureau et Chambre d'Abondance recently established 
 at Paris. 3 The Bureau was not only concerned with the sub- 
 ject of foreign export; all matters of royal customs on grain and 
 
 1 The wording is condensed. 
 
 2 Delamare, op. cit., II, 924-925. 20 Dec. 1559. 
 
 3 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 81, 253. 2# Fev. 1559-60. 
 
232 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 wine came within its jurisdiction. In March, 1561, the fichevins 
 of Lyons had made a contract with a merchant for the delivery 
 of 2000 anees of grain from Burgundy. By special Letters from 
 " the Chambre d'Abondance recently established by the King," 
 he was allowed to ship his grain from Burgundy without paying 
 any duties. 1 Later, in the same year, the Echevins of Lyons 
 complained of the action of the master of the port at Macon. 
 He justified himself by sending " an extract of the royal edict, 
 with an extract of the letter sent him by the Commissioners 
 lately established by the King at Paris. Also, a letter from the 
 King to him in regard to the movements of trade. . . . and if 
 you desire to understand His Majesty's wishes more com- 
 pletely," he writes, " you can address yourselves to the Com- 
 missioners of the Abondance in Lyons, who will communicate 
 the Letters Patent sent them, in accordance with which I am 
 required to send to the said Bureau (at Paris) an extract of the 
 register that I have made of the grain and wine which have been 
 shipped from the province." 2 
 
 Although there may be some reason to doubt the exact pur- 
 port of these rather obscure references, I am inclined to apply 
 them to the Bureau created by the edict of December, 1559. 
 Evidently, something had been done towards a real execution of 
 the edict. Commissioners had been established in some of the 
 large towns, and the local authorities had been instructed to 
 prepare statistical reports of movements of grain and wine. 
 
 The registers of the municipality of Paris supply us with 
 the substance of Letters Patent which do not appear in Dela- 
 mare. This measure, dated at Avignon, September 25, 1504, 3 
 was primarily fiscal, but it is interesting because it contemplated 
 the establishment of controllers at all ports. The rest of the 
 edict was devoted to an elaborate statement of dues to be paid 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 82, 18. 4 Mars 1560-61. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 60 bis. 3 (13) Aout 1561. Le Maitre des Ports a Mascon 
 aux fichevins de Lyon. These few facts came to light in an endeavor to trace 
 the growth of the Chambre d'Abondance at Lyons; a search in the Departmental 
 Archives might furnish more material upon this interesting attempt at administra- 
 tive control, but the difficulties of the search would be very considerable. 
 
 8 Reg. du Bureau, V, 490. 12 Fev. 1564-65. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 233 
 
 in different provinces, but only a small part of the text appears 
 in the registers. It is clear that the monarchy was at this time 
 making a great attempt to extend its administrative authority. 
 
 In 1565, an edict of June 8 carries us back to the isolated 
 edicts of Francis I. There seems to be a complete abandon- 
 ment of the Bureau of 1559. This act of June 8 prohibited 
 exports, because " the severe cold, the snows, fogs, and frosts 
 of the present year, indicate clearly that there will be little 
 grain at the harvest, and that we shall be obliged to depend 
 upon the old grain which is already dear." l 
 
 In 1567, the aims of 1559 appear in somewhat less ambitious 
 form. There is no commission established, but the King pro- 
 hibits all exports, and announces that he intends to grant special 
 permits when the information received from local officials 
 shows that such favors may safely be accorded. 2 In June, 1571, 
 this scheme is elaborated. Provision is made for systematic 
 reports from the M>cal officials, and the results were to be ex- 
 amined by the Council and used as a basis for the granting of 
 permits. The statement of motive is like that in most of the 
 previous edicts. The King desires " to limit the excessive export 
 by which grain is daily sent out of the Kingdom to the detri- 
 ment of our subjects, turning our abundance into dearth, and 
 making imports necessary." " Accordingly we declare that the 
 power of granting permissions for export is a right inherent in 
 our Crown, which we intend to delegate to no one, infringement 
 of which shall be deemed ' lese majeste.' ' 
 
 " None shall ask for a grant of permission to export, or for 
 exemptions from any dues arising from exportation. All judges 
 are hereby forbidden under pain of an equivalent fine, to make 
 any account of such moneys, as we intend to devote these sums 
 to the support of our army, without having them enter our 
 Treasury. 
 
 " No grain shall be exported without express royal permission 
 under pain of confiscation of grain, ship, wagons, horses, and 
 fines." 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 959. 8 Juin 1565. 
 * Ibid., II, 926. 4 Fev. 1567. 
 
234 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 These clauses were merely designed to deprive all previous 
 acts of legal force, and to allow royal authority full sway in the 
 creation of the new means of control, described in the following 
 clauses : 
 
 " All baillis, senechaux, or their lieutenants, shall send com- 
 missions each August to the judges of their district, seigniorial 
 as well as royal judges, in virtue of which the said judges shall 
 order the officers of towns, boroughs, and villages to inform 
 themselves as to the crops. Reports shall be sent by them to 
 the Bailli, who shall immediately inform us." Various pains 
 and penalties are provided to enable the judges to enforce these 
 provisions, and the treasurers of the generalites, who exercise 
 the functions of the intendants of the seventeenth century, 
 are instructed to gather such information as they can upon 
 the circuits undertaken to assess the direct taxes. 
 
 The crop statistics derived from these two sources were then 
 to be examined, and the exportable surplus determined. That 
 quantity would then be divided among the generalites, and 
 Letters Patent issued stating the amount that had been assigned 
 to each. The bailli, or some other official acting in his stead, 
 should then fix a date for the public sale of licenses for the 
 export of grain. Any person might bid for the right to export 
 any quantity from one tonneau or one charge to the whole 
 quantity assigned to the district. The license was not to include 
 exemption from duty, but the price should be sufficiently moder- 
 ate to permit profit. In all cases the permits should be accorded 
 to the highest bidder. 
 
 Minimum prices were fixed by the edict at 3 livres 10 sous 
 tournois per tonneau or 10 sous per charge. The differences 
 of weight and measure were provided for. The forms to be 
 used at the auction were prescribed. Terms of payment were 
 left to be established later in accordance with the suggestions 
 of the baillis. In order to facilitate execution, export was 
 restricted to specified ports, and domestic shippers were required 
 to give security to insure the landing of their cargo at the ports 
 specified in their sailing papers. 1 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 926-930. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 235 
 
 The scheme was chimerical and its fiscal object is evident, but 
 it indicates the nature of the policy of the time. The narrow 
 limitations of effective royal control appear when we examine 
 the character of these two edicts, which really attempt only to 
 systematize the policy that was pursued spasmodically through- 
 out the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The naivete of 
 the idea of so close an adjustment of royal regulation to crop 
 conditions reveals the lack of comprehension of the practical 
 difficulties of executing such a measure. For the highly organ- 
 ized bureaucracies of the present day it would be a serious 
 undertaking; for the administrative system of Henry III it 
 was an impossibility. It is hardly more than an expression 
 of royal intentions. The desire to regulate the economic interests 
 of the state was present; the means, the knowledge of conditions, 
 the ideas of what might be done did not correspond in the least 
 respect with the magnitude of the design. The ignorance of the 
 conditions of the kingdom is perhaps the most striking feature 
 of these curious attempts. The monarchy was working in the 
 dark, drafting plans based upon naive a priori reasoning, sketch- 
 ing policies which would require the exact cooperation of officials 
 over whom the monarchy had little direct control. 
 
 The most complete illustration of the delusions cherished 
 by the King is furnished by the frequently repeated assertions 
 that the inter-provincial trade was free. This idea reappears 
 at regular intervals in practically the same form. Traces can 
 be found in the fifteenth century. Francis I states the prin- 
 ciple very carefully in 1539 and endeavors to give the liberal 
 policy all the weight of his authority. The edicts of 1567 and 
 1571 contain clauses to the same effect. In 1577, the same pro- 
 vision is reenacted. " Trade from province to province shall 
 be free, and none shall be compelled to secure permits from any 
 local officers. . . . Such persons shall stop shipments of grain 
 only when so authorized by special Letters Patent." l Nothing 
 could be more explicit, and yet the local archives of the period 
 are full of ordinances of governors, baillis, senechaux, lieutenants 
 of all sorts, mayors, provosts of merchants, syndics, or provincial 
 1 Delamare, op. '/., II, 705. 27 Nov. 1577. 
 
236 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Parlements, all prohibiting, or otherwise interfering with the 
 domestic grain trade. In this aspect of trade regulation, the 
 Crown claimed an authority that it never exerted. It did pos- 
 sess some power, but not of the type suggested by its persistent 
 declarations that local officials should have nothing to do with 
 the grain trade. There is an element of unreality in all this 
 apparent activity. There is much pretence and benevolent 
 intention. 
 
 Ill 
 
 After 1571, grain trade policy is merely an expression of the 
 idea that it is good to allow exportation when crops are abun- 
 dant, and necessary to prohibit export when "the harvest fails. 
 Dearth or fear of dearth led to prohibitions in October, 1573, 
 September, 1574, and September, I587. 1 The general edict of 
 November 27, 1577 contains a prohibition that is essentially 
 the outcome of fiscal necessities. It amounted to the imposition 
 of a new duty designed to secure the funds needed to pay the 
 Swiss debt, but the fiscal element is supplemented by a com- 
 plete prohibition of export from Picardy and Champagne. 
 
 The much-discussed reign of Henry IV is but slightly con- 
 cerned with grain trade regulation. In March, 1595, there was 
 a prohibition; in February, 1601, a temporary permission of 
 export was granted. In 1604, there was a momentary suspen- 
 sion of the border trade with Spain, growing out of diplomatic 
 difficulties. To build upon this foundation the great principles 
 of Sully's free trade doctrine requires no little imagination. 
 Both general edicts are provided with prefaces which are filled 
 with the spirit of the sixteenth century. The preface of the 
 edict of March, 1595 is largely copied from the notable preface 
 of 1557.* There is nothing new either in preface or provision 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 960-962. 
 
 2 Ibid., II, 962. " Combien que V experience nous enseigne que la liberte du 
 traffic que les Peuples et Sujets des Royaumes font avec leurs Voisins et Etr angers, est un 
 des principaux moyens de les rendre aisez, riches et opulens . . . neanmoins apres avoir 
 reconnu que Dieu . . . nous a mis en main un Royaume compose de diver ses contrees et 
 Provinces, chacune desquelles en son endroit est autant que nulle autre de la Chretiente, 
 fertile et abondante . . . et que ce qui defaut en Vune se trouve facilement en V autre; 
 tellement que les habitans d'icelui n'ont besoin . . . d'aller emprunter le secours du voisin t 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 237 
 
 of the act of 1595. Similarly the act of 1601, the only " liberal " 
 edict issued, displays that combination of fiscal and commercial 
 motives which we found in the edicts of 1540, 1577, and in less 
 striking fashion in the edits of 1559 and 1571. The lengthy 
 preface confesses previous manipulation of the trade with fiscal 
 intent. Prohibitions have been issued and exports permitted 
 from certain provinces upon payment of extra duties. This 
 edict grants general freedom of export for one year without 
 payment of the extra duties. The limitation of the effect 
 of the edict to one year is literally the only new feature. The 
 ideas of the time appear much less clearly than in the edicts 
 of 1557, 1559, and 1571, and the policy differs in no respect 
 from that of Francis I in 1540, or of Henry III in 1577.* 
 
 The first half of the seventeenth century witnesses no real 
 innovation in grain trade policy, though at times there is a 
 recurrence of explicit limitation of edicts. But as this limitation 
 was tacitly assumed in the sixteenth century, it is hardly proper 
 to attach much importance to the formal appearance of a time 
 clause in the edict of 1601, and those of Louis XIII. 
 
 The history of these years is little more than a catalogue of 
 edicts. The general Ordinance of January, 1629, restates the 
 whole policy: " Henceforth the export of grain and wine shall 
 not be permitted, unless we are duly informed by our local and 
 municipal officials that our provinces are sufficiently supplied. 
 With this in view the farms of the export duties shall be let 
 out with the reservation of the right to permit or prohibit export 
 as is deemed expedient." 2 
 
 lequel de son coste est tous les jours contraint d'en venir chercher en nos terres; 
 considerans aussi que si sous pretexte de la liberte du trafic nous permettions les con- 
 tinuations des Traittes et transports de bleds et autres grains et legumes aux Pays 
 Etrangers, comme nous avons fait par le passe, il seroit a craindre que pensant ayder 
 a autrui, nostre Royaume n'en demeurast tellement degarni, que nos Sujets apres 
 avoir langui sous le faix de tant de miseres . . . ne vinssent a tomber en une ex- 
 treme disette . . . Nous . . . avons fait et faisons . . . inhibitions. ..." See 
 below, pp. 347 f., for preface of 1557. 
 
 The section italicized repeats as to substance, and in part verbally, portions of 
 the edict of 1557. 
 
 1 Delamare, op. tit., II, 932. 
 
 2 Isambert, Recueil des Lois, Arrets, et Ord., XVI, 328, art. 419. 
 
238 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Other edicts were issued as follows : 
 
 24 Nov. 1625, a prohibition of export on account of deficient harvests. 1 
 30 May 1629, permission of export, upon paying customs. 2 
 
 30 Sept. 1631, prohibition of foreign ex^>rt, with an express reservation 
 
 of the inter-provincial trade. Deficient harvest alleged. 3 
 19 Nov. 1639, permission of foreign export, upon payment of the 
 
 customary duties. 4 
 
 5 Oct. 1642, prohibition of foreign export on account of dearth. 5 
 9 April 1643, prohibition designed to enforce the preceding act. 6 
 2 Oct. 1643, prohibition of foreign export. 7 
 
 31 Aug. and 3 Oct. 1648, prohibition of export, largely due to military 
 
 policy. 8 
 
 4 Sept. 1649, prohibition of foreign export, on account of dearth. 9 
 19 March 1655, permission of foreign export for the remainder of the 
 
 year. 10 
 
 This barren review of Letters Patent and edicts can hardly 
 have failed to weary the reader. The royal attempts have so 
 little connection with the real problems of the sixteenth century 
 trade that the study of the royal policy is without interest 
 except for the antiquarian. The Crown dismissed the inter- 
 provincial trade with the reiterated assertion of its freedom; 
 foreign trade was to be regulated with care. But even if the 
 intentions of the Crown had been carried out, it would have failed 
 to touch the real issue in the grain trade, which was not the 
 limitation of foreign export, but the regulation of domestic 
 trade. France was not characteristically a grain-exporting 
 country. Brittany, Languedoc, Aunis, Picardy, and Normandy 
 sent grain to foreign countries, but only in the case of Brittany, 
 Languedoc, and Aunis was the grain a staple export. Exporta- 
 tion was a relatively incidental problem in France; the serious 
 issues involved in the grain trade were all questions of the 
 regulation of domestic trade. 
 
 Isambert, Ibid., XVI, 153. 
 H. 1803. Reg. du Bureau, vi**x. 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 963. 
 Isambert, op. cit., XVI, 514. 
 Bib. Nat., Fr. 16740. 266, copy. 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 963. 
 
 Ibid.y II, 964. H. 1806. Reg. du Bureau, vHiii. 
 Bib. Nat., Fr. 16740. 265. 
 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 964. H. 1809. Reg. du Bureau, iiilxiii. 
 10 Bib. Nat., Fr. 16740. 264. 
 
ROYAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 239 
 
 It is for this reason that the emphasis upon the protectionist 
 controversy has been so unfortunate. All attention has been 
 concentrated on royal policy, when royal policy is almost negli- 
 gible, not only because the foreign trade is in itself unimportant, 
 but because the Crown accomplishes so little. Despite the loud 
 protestations of offended dignity, the efficient control throughout 
 the sixteenth century was in the hands of the local officials. 
 The Crown accomplished nothing more than the establishment 
 of a tradition to which Colbert gave vitality. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 
 LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE. 1500-1660 
 
 THE local measures are very similar in form to the royal edicts 
 which we have been studying. They are, for the most part, 
 prohibitions or permissions of export, combined with the system 
 of special permits allowing exportation despite the general 
 prohibitions. But while there is little difference in the outward 
 appearance, there is a great difference in their purpose and in 
 their effect upon trade. The domestic trade introduces com- 
 plications that do not appear at all in foreign trade; in one, 
 the interest of a producing region is the principal cause of solici- 
 tude; in the other, both producing and consuming regions are 
 involved. The absence of any national boundary, too, makes 
 it impossible to sacrifice either region, and the administrative 
 officials are thus charged with the task of discovering some 
 means of moderating the intensity of this conflict of interests 
 between different parts of the same Kingdom. 
 
 The measures of local officials, whether prohibitions or per- 
 missions, were always a relatively spontaneous reflection of the 
 public opinion in the province. In the seventeenth century, 
 the intendants endeavored to maintain a considerable degree 
 of detachment from local interests, but in the sixteenth century 
 most acts were the outcome of strong local feeling. Each 
 region sought its own welfare without much regard to the needs 
 of neighboring sections. The consuming centers like Paris 
 and Lyons were in constant dread of dearth, because they were 
 dependent on distant sources of supply which might be cut off 
 more or less completely at any time by provincial prohibitions. 
 The producing regions also had their fears. They were not 
 exposed to any serious danger of lack of grain, due to inade- 
 quate harvests, but the intensity of metropolitan demand 
 constantly exposed them to the danger of excessive exports, 
 
 240 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 241 
 
 which would seriously deplete the supplies of the province. 
 Years of scarcity were certainly a menace to both regions. 
 Frequently, there was enough grain physically in existence to 
 prevent suffering in either the producing or consuming centers, 
 but there was no means of distributing this grain equably be- 
 tween the two regions. The defects of the market system gave 
 the advantage in bargaining to the consuming centers, so that 
 there was a distinct likelihood that the producing regions would 
 experience greater difficulty in time of dearth than the centers 
 they supplied. This possibility was clearly realized in the grain- 
 growing sections, and it was contemplated with panic-stricken 
 fear. The producing provinces thus regarded the grain mer- 
 chants with ill-disguised hostility. To them, the merchant 
 meant distress and suffering in times of dearth. In the cities 
 there was a similar feeling against the provinces. The officials 
 were regarded as hard-hearted, unchristian beings, bent upon 
 stopping the supplies of the large towns in order to swell their 
 private fortunes by the sale of licenses. The peasants of the 
 producing regions and the inhabitants of small -towns along 
 the rivers were regarded as thieves and robbers ready to attack 
 the merchants at any moment, to steal the grain outright, or 
 take it at less than cost. 
 
 When considered in detail, the history of grain trade regulation 
 in the sixteenth century enables us to form some conception of 
 the relative importance of the factors that ultimately produced 
 the close organization of the metropolitan market. In every 
 aspect of the problem, the sixteenth century reveals real 
 growth. In the early years, the conflict of interests, which 
 is never very apparent except in the areas supplying Lyons 
 and Paris, is hardly perceptible even in the Lyons area. The 
 increasing frequency of resort to Burgundy finally brought 
 out expressions of local feeling, and, in 1557, the issue was joined 
 between Burgundy and Lyons. This apparent deadlock was 
 solved by an appeal to the King. All through this phase of the 
 history of the grain trade, the King appears in this essentially 
 medieval capacity. He is not an administrator, but an arbiter, 
 not seeking to govern in the modern sense by actual adminis- 
 
242 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 trative regulations for the welfare of the people, but serving 
 merely to moderate the discord in the body politic. This aspect of 
 royal activity, however, appears clearly only when the opposition 
 of local interests has become sharp and well denned. But once 
 this element of arbitration enters into the situation, it remains a 
 permanent factor. In the sixteenth century, the King acted 
 directly through edicts and patents; in the seventeenth century, 
 the intendants assumed this function. Severally and collectively, 
 they exerted all their influence in favor of the general welfare 
 when local interests would naturally result in a narrow pro- 
 vincial policy. Social harmony was thus secured only by the 
 active interference of the King or his personal representatives, 
 the intendants. They endeavored to remedy the evils caused 
 by the defective market system, and this forced them, in many 
 instances, to assume complete control of the distribution of 
 grain. This tendency was not very strong in the sixteenth 
 century, as the Crown was not sufficiently informed of the details 
 of the trade, but in the seventeenth century the policy reached 
 its full manifestation. Intendants like Baville would, at times, 
 direct all details of the distribution of grain throughout their 
 provinces during the whole period of distress. 
 
 Interests of two types were effectively represented by the local 
 officials: the intensely circumscribed interests of individual towns, 
 and the wider interests of those real geographical regions which 
 formed the provinces. The relation between political boun- 
 daries and the natural divisions of the country is of significance 
 in the history of the grain trade, as a province or government 
 was almost certain to include the whole of a fertile area; and, 
 as they frequently included several of those sharply defined 
 regions, they represented a local interest of a very pronounced 
 kind. The products of the various sections differed, and fre- 
 quently the whole province was ultimately dependent upon one 
 part for its grain supply. This natural basis of provincial 
 boundaries made the province the best unit for regulation 
 of the grain trade during the sixteenth century. A prohibition 
 of export from the province permitted the ordinary local trade, 
 but guarded the region against any disturbing influence of extra- 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 243 
 
 provincial demand. The towns which were used as shipping 
 points could give additional force to restrictive measures by 
 prohibitions of export of grain stored within the town. The 
 governors and the provincial parlements were usually the 
 authorities who issued provincial prohibitions, and not infre- 
 quently both combined in their efforts to protect local interests. 
 The Estates seldom, if ever, did anything. The welfare of the 
 large commercial towns seeking grain was, of course, defended 
 by the municipal officials. At Paris, the Parlement of Paris 
 and the Chatelet assisted. The characteristic feature of adminis- 
 trative regulation in the sixteenth century was the persistent 
 effort of provincial governors or parlements to limit the export 
 trade of the province. On the part of the agents of Paris or 
 Lyons, there was an energetic attempt to maintain freedom 
 of trade. The former relied upon their local privileges, the latter 
 secured royal Letters Patent annulling in whole or in part the 
 arrets and ordinances of the provincial authorities. The local 
 officials joined the issue, the question was settled by appeal 
 to the King. 
 
 The baillis and the senechaux were the only officials with 
 whom we are concerned who were closely in touch with the 
 royal government. They were charged with the general task 
 of administration of the royal domain, and had cognizance of 
 all matters, judicial, administrative, and financial. They 
 enjoyed a large measure of individual initiative and possessed 
 some ordinance making power. But they played a relatively 
 small part in the history of the grain trade. The nature of the 
 area under their authority made effective regulation difficult, 
 if not impossible. As they had charge only of the royal domain, 
 all lands belonging to the Church or to nobles were exempt 
 from their control, forming enclaves within their jurisdiction. 
 The baillage or senechausee never included a solid block of 
 territory, and, quite apart from the confusion caused by the 
 enclaves of extra-domain land, the limits of the baillages were 
 never well ascertained as regards each other. In matters of 
 judicial and financial administration this aspect of the form of 
 the baillage was not of great importance, but such a jurisdiction 
 
244 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 was obviously unfitted to deal with questions of trade. Further- 
 more, the power of the bailli had been, so to speak, " put into 
 commission " in 1498. The diversity of his authority was so 
 great that a considerable number of assistants were required, 
 and they gradually developed a deal of independence in the 
 exercise of their functions. Unity of action was preserved to 
 some degree by the formation of a council of the baillage com- 
 posed of these officers. But such a body acted slowly, and, 
 even in the sixteenth century, had begun to limit itself more and 
 more to the judicial duties which later became its sole function. 1 
 
 Burgundy and Lyons 
 
 The Lyonese merchants began to seek supplies in Burgundy 
 at the close of the fifteenth century. These purchases, however, 
 attracted little attention and caused no anxiety in Burgundy. 
 A few years later, when the first prohibitions were issued, the 
 Lyonese secured countervailing Letters Patent from the King. 
 But there was no marked hostility to the Lyonese. In May, 
 1520, the Governor of Burgundy permitted the Lyonese mer- 
 chants to export 2500 mines of grain purchased by them in 
 Burgundy and Bassigny. Prohibitions had been issued, and the 
 Lyonese had sent to the King for Letters Patent, giving them 
 the right to export grain. The Governor of Burgundy yielded 
 to the royal Letters Patent, apparently without debate, although 
 the limitation of exports to 2500 mines may have been his own 
 idea. 2 
 
 In 1528, we have more details of the negotiations between Lyons 
 and Burgundy. The Consuls of Lyons complained in August 
 of light harvests and of attempts of Italians and others to make 
 shipments to Savoy and Piedmont. They proposed to secure 
 Letters Patent from the King prohibiting export from Lyonnais. 3 
 December 7, the Consuls assembled the notables of the town to 
 
 1 G. Dupont-Ferrier, Les Officiers Royaux des Baillages et des Senechaussees 
 et les Institutions Monarchiques en France d la Fin du Moyen Age, Paris, 1902, 
 p. 119. 
 
 2 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381, 16. 26 Mai 1520. Notarial copy 
 of Letters Patent. 
 
 3 Ibid., BB. 47, 35- 20 Aoflt 1528. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 245 
 
 inform them that they had sent envoys to the King and to the Gov- 
 ernor of Burgundy in order to secure the right to export grain 
 from Burgundy. The Consuls asked for money with which to 
 purchase gram on the account of the municipality. 1 A month 
 later, one Henry Guimbre was commissioned to go to Burgundy 
 to buy one thousand mines of grain on the account of the munici- 
 pality. January 30, Letters Patent, dated January 15, arrived 
 from the Court, authorizing these Lyonese exports from Bur- 
 gundy. These Letters were at once forwarded to Guimbre. 2 
 Letters and reports indicate that the purchases in Burgundy 
 aroused no opposition, either official or popular. 3 In the letter of 
 May 6, it is remarked, however, that the Lyonese " merchants 
 hesitate to ship to Lyons, on account of the rioting that occurs 
 there, and because prices are higher at Villefranche and Belleville 
 and other places which are passed on the way down" 4 There 
 was only gram enough at Lyons to supply the city for two 
 days, 5 and the anticipation of difficulties in Burgundy or on the 
 way had already suggested resort to other provinces. On April 
 23, the Consuls had resolved to send agents to the Parlement 
 of Grenoble to secure the right to export from Dauphine. May 
 n, Letters Patent were received from the court, authorizing 
 Lyons to export three thousand anees of grain from Dauphine, 
 Viennois, Forez, and Velay. Letters were also received from 
 the Governor of Auvergne and Bourbonnois, permitting the 
 export of one thousand se tiers of grain. 6 At the end of the 
 month, more royal Letters Patent arrived, covering exports from 
 Dauphine. 7 On September 13, royal Letters Patent were 
 issued, covering further exports from all these provinces. 8 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 47, 164. 7 Dec. 1528. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 47, 183, 191. 7 Jan. 1528-29, 20 Jan. 1528-29. 
 
 Ibid., BB. 47, 200, 233, 248. 10 Fev., 20 Avril, 6 Mai 1528-29. 
 
 This is a singularly direct illustration of an important consequence of the 
 independence of the divers municipal markets. 
 
 Letter of 6 May. 
 
 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 381. 18, u, 25 Mai 1529. Copies des 
 Lettres Patents de Francois I et des Lettres du Gouveneur d' Auvergne et de 
 Bourbonnois. 
 
 7 Ibid., Chappe IV, 381, 19. Original. 30 Mai 1529. Autres Let^es Patentes 
 13 Sept. 1529. Chappe IV, 38, 124. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chappe IV, 381, 20. 13 Sept. 1529. 
 
246 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 These frequent royal Letters Patent seem to be directed 
 against a customary provincial prohibition. Their object was to 
 anticipate possible objection, rather than to annul prohibitions 
 that had actually been issued by the provincial authorities. It 
 was an attempt to secure that freedom of the provincial trade so 
 vainly enunciated in the general edicts. At this period, there was 
 almost no obstacle in the producing regions, save inertia. 1 
 
 In September, 1539, there is a suggestion of a more positive 
 desire for protective prohibitions in the producing sections. 
 Royal Letters Patent were issued prohibiting export from Bur- 
 gundy. These were doubtless obtained by direct intercession 
 at Court. 2 The King was equally accessible to other influences, 
 however, and in October, Letters Patent were given the Consuls 
 at Lyons authorizing citizens of Lyons to export grain from 
 Burgundy, Bresse, Bourbonnois, Auvergne, and Dombes. 3 
 
 This use of royal Letters Patent continued for the next twenty 
 or twenty-five years. There were occasional Patents pro- 
 hibiting export from Burgundy, as, in September, 1540 and 
 October, 1544; more frequently there were grants of privilege 
 to Lyons. 4 On one occasion the Lyonese addressed themselves 
 directly to the Governor of Burgundy, who permitted the export 
 of one hundred mines of grain. 5 
 
 In 1556-57, the attitude of the Burgundian officials changed. 
 They no longer assented readily to the export of grain to Lyons 
 but discussed seriously the expediency of permitting any export. 
 Royal Letters Patent received little more attention than other 
 forms of request. 
 
 The harvest of 1556 was not abundant, and considerable 
 exports to Lucca and to Malta tended to exhaust Burgundy 
 
 1 See also Lyon, Arch. Mini., Chappe IV, 381, 25. 2 Fev. 1530. Lettres 
 Patent es of Francois I. 
 
 2 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 256. 13 Sept. 1539. Ord. du Bailli de Dijon, portant 
 mandement aux Maire et Echevins de Dijon de publier les lettres Patentes de 
 Francois I du 4 Sept. 1539. 
 
 3 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 393, 32. 28 Oct. 1539. 
 
 4 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 256. 28 Sept. 1540. 28 Oct. 1544. 
 
 6 Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 61, 102-119. 18 Juillet, 21 Sept. 1543. Ibid., 
 Chappe IV, 393, 34 bis. 26 Oct. 1543- Ibid., Chappe IV, 393, 37. 26 Oct. 
 1545. Ibid., Chappe IV, 393, 38. n Dec. 1545. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 247 
 
 and to excite the apprehensions of the Lyonese. Joined to 
 these unusual demands upon Burgundy and Lyons was tjie 
 quartering of the army of the Due de Guise, then at Lyons. 
 This naturally stimulated the Lyonese merchants to greater 
 activity in Burgundy. The officials there became apprehensive 
 and prohibited export. " At Auxonne, Seurre, Chalons, Macon, 
 they prevent the shipment (February, 1557) of the grain that 
 the merchants customarily buy for the provision of Lyonnais. 
 . . . They even prevent the passage through Burgundy of the 
 grain purchased in Franche Comte and lands under the juris- 
 diction of the Empire." 1 
 
 The prohibitions were thus more positive and more deliberate 
 than formerly, and they were the direct outgrowth of fear of 
 dearth. 
 
 The Consuls of Lyons resorted to the old expedient. Royal 
 Letters Patent were secured February 24, 1557, granting Lyons 
 the privilege of exporting 30,000 charges of grain from Burgundy, 
 Bresse, and Dombes. 2 But this policy no longer had an imme- 
 diate effect as before. On March 13, new Letters Patent were 
 granted with the same end in view. 3 But this did not clear away 
 the obstacles. The local officials proceeded to negotiate and 
 bargain. The twentieth of the month, the Governor of Bur- 
 gundy made an agreement with the Commissioners of the Con- 
 suls at Lyons. The whole negotiation is an illuminating instance 
 of the nature of royal authority. The Letters Patent of the 
 King were absolute grants of the privilege of exporting gram 
 from Burgundy, but the document embodying the result of the 
 negotiations states " that in consideration of the Letters Patent 
 of the King of Feburary last, the said Barthelemy Alexandrin, 
 bourgeois of Lyons, and Jacques Guimbre, Commissionaire 
 of the King at the fortifications of Lyons, both in their private 
 capacities, and as Commissioners of the Echevins of Lyons, 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 393, 34. 26 Mars 1542. Chappe IV, 
 393, 40. 10 Fev. 1556-57. Proces Verbal faite par M. Jehan de Fournel. Con. 
 du Roy: Lieu. Gen. en la Senechaussee et Siege Presidial de Lion. The whole of 
 the above is an account drawn from this document. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 393, 41. 24 Fev. 1556-57. 
 
 3 Ibid., Chappe IV, 393, 42. 13 Mars 1556-57. 
 
248 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 have signed the treaties and conventions which follow: viz: 
 the said Sieur de Saulx, Governor of Burgundy, grants them the 
 right and privilege of exporting 500 mines of the grain that they 
 have assembled at Maxilly and vicinity, with the understanding 
 that said grain shall be carried down the Saone to Lyons . . . 
 and in return, said Alexandrin and Guimbre have agreed to 
 carry to Dijon 250 mines of grain, which they shall be required 
 to purchase in Bassigny and Langres, or other places outside 
 the government of Burgundy, in those granaries in which they 
 have been buying. This they shall do within a month. . . . 
 And when the said quantity of 250 mines of grain shall have been 
 delivered at Dijon, the said de Saulx promises to grant them the 
 privilege of exporting 500 mines of grain from Maxilly on like 
 conditions of delivering 250 mines at Dijon." l The Governor 
 of Burgundy thus imposed such limitations as he deemed neces- 
 sary upon the royal order. 
 
 The Echevins of Lyons were not very well satisfied with this 
 rather hard bargain, and proceeded to obtain fresh Letters 
 Patent from the Court. 2 These recite the whole story. " Inas- 
 much as by our Letter Patent of February 24, we have permitted 
 the Consuls and Echevins of Lyons to export 30,000 charges 
 of grain from Burgundy and other provinces . . . and not- 
 withstanding this, the Lieutenant of the Governor of Burgundy 
 has not only persisted in his refusal, but even seized and arrested 
 all the grain that the said petitioners had purchased and trans- 
 ported from Lorraine, Tranche Comte, Champagne, and Bas- 
 signy, together with the boats on which the grain was loaded 
 at Maxilly and other parts of the Saone, . . . Accordingly, 
 we order the release of all the grain belonging to the petitioners 
 or to merchants supplying Lyons, whether the grain is of the 
 growth of Burgundy, Franche Comte, Lorraine, or other lands." 
 
 Meanwhile, Grolier and Guimbre, the agents of Lyons in 
 Burgundy, were doing their best to overcome the insistence of 
 the Lieutenant, Villefrancon, upon the dearth and the necessities 
 of Burgundy itself. Guimbre writes from Dijon, March 31, 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 401, 46. 20 Mars 1556-57. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 46. 31 Mars 1556-57. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 249 
 
 1 Today, I have presented M. de Villefrancon with the Letters 
 of the King, which he has treated as he has the previous Letters. 
 Then, in accordance with your last instructions I presented 
 him with the petition of which I enclose a copy. 1 He would 
 give me no reply. I asked for an acknowledgement of having 
 seen the Letters of the King, but he refused that request also. 
 . . . The said Seigneur was persuaded to grant permits for the 
 export of your grain only with great difficulty, and to secure 
 the permits for the rest of the grain covered by the first contract, 
 he has forced me to sign another, agreeing to leave at Maxilly 
 250 mines of grain instead of those that I was to deliver at Dijon 
 a month hence. His reason for doing this is that Dijon is not 
 adequately supplied, and the 250 mines are to remain at Maxilly 
 for six weeks, where the people of Dijon can go to get them if 
 they have need. ... As for the grain that Nicholas Molle 
 has sold you, you cannot expect to receive it for a long while. 
 Still less, the grain at Saint-Jean-de-Losne, on account of the 
 strict prohibitions and the order given the Lieutenant of that 
 town by Villefrancon, and despite all these fears, there are 
 4000 anees at Saint- Jean-de-Losne, more than the town could 
 consume in two years." 2 
 
 Towards the end of April we begin to get reports of the results 
 of the Lyonese attempts to execute the royal Letters Patent 
 of March 31. They began at Macon 3 and gradually worked 
 up the river, exhibiting the royal Patents and bidding the munic- 
 ipal authorities to publish their contents by the public crier. 
 " We have found the local officials very respectful and obedient 
 to royal commands and by that authority we have secured the 
 release of much grain. It is true that last Saturday, upon 
 arriving at Auxonne, we found that Villefrancon, advised of 
 our action on the lower river, had sent a commission prohibiting 
 exports. This was executed an hour before our arrival, so 
 
 1 This petition is apparently the document, Chappe IV, 411, 60 bis. Placet 
 de MM. les Echevins de Lyon a M. de Villefrancon, Lieu, au Gouvernement de 
 Bourgogne. 
 
 * Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 32. Dijon, 31 Mars 1556-57. Guimbre. 
 
 3 Ibid., AA. 32. Mascon, Mardy de Pasques, 1557. Grolier. Rapport d'un 
 Proces Verbal fait a Mascon. 
 
250 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 that we left immediately for Dijon to speak with Villefrancon. 
 After making the necessary remonstrances, ... he finally 
 granted us the right to export all the grain that had been pur- 
 chased by the city or by merchants for the provision of the city. 
 . . . Since the publication of the right of export several persons 
 have manifested much energy in shipping grain to Lyons. . . . 
 We have sent copies of the Patents to Langres, and have left 
 Dijon for Maxilly to publish them there." l But Villefrancon's 
 concessions were not as complete as this letter would seem to 
 indicate. The commissioners write on May ist: "Villefrancon 
 permits the export of 1700 mines of grain. Since that promise, 
 too, he has agreed to allow the shipment of all the grain we have 
 at Maxilly. We expect that there will be forty boats ready to 
 leave by the sixth day of May, carrying more than 5000 anees, 
 belonging in part to the city, in part to merchants." Then, 
 just as their mission has succeeded, they admit the reality of the 
 apprehensions which have actuated Villefrancon and the local 
 officials. " The Maire and fichevins of Dijon," they say, 
 " have agreed not to interfere with our shipments in the future, 
 unless there is urgent need as in this present year, during which 
 they say that they have suffered as much from dearth as we 
 have. For this reason, we have not published our letters by 
 crier, as we have in other places." 2 
 
 The Echevins of Lyons, however, were anxious to bring suit 
 against Villefrancon for his interference with the trade, and the 
 commissioners were instructed to collect evidence. Grolier 
 replied to these directions of the Echevins in a long letter defend- 
 ing Villefrancon's conduct: 
 
 "I have received your letters of April 27," he writes, "ordering 
 me to neglect no opportunity of gathering information in all 
 the places where Villefrancon had the grain boats stopped. 
 In reply, I may say that in all the towns of Burgundy where 
 our Patents have been published we have had notarial copies 
 made of the orders and prohibitions of Villefrancon in virtue 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 32. Auxonne, 27 Avril 1557. Grolier et Guimbre. 
 * Ibid., AA. 32. Auxonne, i Mai 1557. Guimbre et Grolier. Also AA. 32. 
 Auxonne, 2 Mai 1557. Grolier. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 251 
 
 of which the merchants were stopped. This is incontrovertible 
 evidence of the wrongs done the city of Lyons, and of his dis- 
 obedience of royal commands. Furthermore, we have taken 
 depositions of witnesses at Saint- Jean-de-Losne of the arrest 
 and seizure of the grain boats, and of the exaction of illegal 
 dues by the measurers and other officers established by Ville- 
 francon. . . . But I have not wished to initiate any proceed- 
 ings, for reasons which it will please the Councillors of Lyons 
 to consider. In the first place, the principal object of our 
 voyage was the prompt shipment of the grain purchased by the 
 town and by merchants. This we could not have compassed, 
 if Villefrancon had supposed that we were inclined to proceed 
 against him; and it would have been absolutely impossible, if 
 he had learned of such inquiries before the grain had left Auxonne. 
 We should then have been in a much worse position than before, 
 as he has the complete confidence of Sieur d'Aumale, of the 
 Duchess of Valentinois, and generally of the brothers of the 
 House of Guise. They would have supported him, as Burgundy 
 is certainly suffering from dearth, and would have profited from the 
 enforcement of his prohibitions. All this we were able to infer 
 from the fact that mere publication of the general permission 
 of export, without our having first informed him, had so irritated 
 him that he had issued prohibitions in all the places we had passed 
 through. I was thus constrained in much perplexity to follow 
 the maxim of the great dramatist, ' Ne quid nimis/ which 
 proved to be good policy, for by means of the diplomatic lan- 
 guage that I used with him, ... we are sending down to Lyons 
 nine to ten thousand anees, . . . and since my return to Auxonne 
 Villefrancon has sent me several missives directed to the officers 
 of all the river towns, instructing them to allow the Lyonese 
 boats free passage. 
 
 " Secondly, I felt that the Echevins should be satisfied with 
 meeting the present necessity without indulging in any formali- 
 ties against a Governor of Burgundy who has the support of 
 most of the members of the ' Conseil Prive/ and who could 
 easily justify himself by proving the dearth that existed in his 
 
252 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 provinces. Furthermore, after hearing the reasons which had 
 influenced Villefrancon, I recognized that he is a virtuous man, 
 and that any of the Echevins of Lyons would have done as much 
 had they been in his place." 1 
 
 The local prohibitions in Burgundy in 1557 are the earliest 
 manifestation of a consciousness of real danger from the exports 
 of the wholesale merchants. From this time, the local policy 
 in Burgundy is the outcome of a persistent dread of exports in 
 years of scarcity. The exact extent of the sufferings of Bur- 
 gundy cannot be known, for no information was ever gathered 
 that could decide such a question. None the less, we are fre- 
 quently confronted by such admissions as those just cited from 
 the letters of the Commissioners of Lyons. Grolier and Guimbre 
 evidently believed that the dearth in Burgundy was an actuality. 
 It was not, of course, a wide-spread famine; that, as we have 
 seen, was rare and confined primarily to the infertile sections 
 of France, but dearth could bring many serious consequences 
 in its train, even without becoming actual famine. The recur- 
 rence of dearths, more or less acute in both consuming and 
 producing regions, is the basis of all the local regulations and 
 negotiations concerning the grain trade* in this region. 
 
 In 1559-60 there was some little difficulty, and light crops 
 induced the Governor of Burgundy to issue prohibitions. The 
 Echevins of Lyons procured Patents from the King and secured 
 permits from the Governor. 2 
 
 In 1570, the old problem recurred. In September, the Parle- 
 ment of Dijon prohibited export from the province, and enjoined 
 the officers of Auxonne, Saint- Jean-de-Losne, Seurre, and Cha- 
 lons to prevent shipments. The sergeant of the Parlement 
 made a trip to Maxilly and Pontaillier to enforce the execution 
 of the ordinance. He had the local officials collect information 
 about the merchants who were amassing stores or securing grain 
 for shipment by giving earnest money. He made a tour of the 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 32, 89. Auxonne, 6 Mai 1557. Original. AA. 32, 83. 
 Copy of above. 
 
 2 Ibid., BB. 81, 212, 242, 257. 28 Nov. 1559, 4 Fev. 1559-60, 12 Mars 
 1559-60. Delib. Consulates. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 253 
 
 Saone towns and stopped several boats. 1 The Echevins of Lyons 
 endeavored to secure from divers local authorities permission to 
 export, but without much success. The Syndic of Dijon writes 
 in January: " I have communicated your letters to the Estates. 
 They have begged me to grant no permits, and, in very truth, 
 grain is so dear in these parts that any accident to the coming 
 crops would reduce us to famine. Furthermore, the Estates 
 have obtained Letters Patent from the King prohibiting export 
 from the Province." 2 Lyons then proceeded to get Patents 
 from the Court, securing, in February, the right to draw 10,000 
 anees of grain from Burgundy. 3 These were followed in April 
 by a similar permit for Bassigny. 4 But these were not executed 
 without difficulty. The Parlement of Dijon refused (June 20) 
 to register either Patent, " until inquiry had been made into 
 the necessities of the province." 5 A letter of April 8' also suggests 
 that many difficulties were encountered by the merchants and 
 agents of Lyons. The municipal officers did not attach much 
 credit to the royal Patents. 6 In September, after the harvest, 
 the Patents were executed by order of the Governor of Burgundy. 7 
 In 1572-73, the necessities of Burgundy were pressing, but the 
 authorities seem to have become more accustomed to the situa- 
 tion and permitted limited exports to Lyons without quite so 
 much negotiation. The Echevins of Lyons continued to keep 
 their agent at Court busy securing royal Patents to overrule 
 the action of the Estates or of the Governor, and a couple of 
 letters from this agent show the devious method employed. But 
 these Patents granted by the King, " a la barbe des Etats de 
 Bourgogne," 8 do not seem to have had any great effect. The 
 Governor apparently felt free to decide the case according to 
 
 1 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 256. 23 Sept. 1570. Ord. du Parlement. 
 
 2 Lyon, Arch. Mun., Chappe IV, 411, 60 bis. Dijon, 13 Jan. 1571. 
 
 3 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 48. 8 Fev. 1571. Lettres Patentes de Chas. IX. 
 
 4 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 49. 6 Avril 1571. 
 
 5 Arret joined to above piece. 
 
 6 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 29. Dijon, 8 Avril 1571. CMtillon. 
 
 7 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 50. 6 Sept. 1571, and letters of the Governor 
 annexed. 
 
 8 Ibid., AA. 98, 4, 5. Amboise, 3 Fev. 1572, 5 Avril 1572. 
 
254 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 his own judgment. " You are such near neighbors of this 
 province," he writes to the Echevins of Lyons (May 20), " that 
 you must know how great the dearth is, and yet I have en- 
 deavored to close my eyes to all this indigence, and have granted 
 you a second permit for the export of 500 mines of wheat to 
 succor you in your present need. But at the same time, I 
 feel it necessary to make this final, and shall not grant any more 
 permits, as I must prevent further exports from this province, 
 or I shall soon be in the midst of severe famine. You are out 
 of the danger which threatened you, as we have left the trade 
 relatively free, and have not made any very searching inquiry 
 into the quantity of grain shipped to Lyons." 1 Evidently, 
 the Governor is acquiring the habit of a close regulation of the 
 grain trade, seeking to adjust the permission of export as ex- 
 actly as possible to the needs of his own province, and of Lyons. 
 He endeavors to keep himself informed of local conditions as 
 far as it was possible in his time, and while he recognizes the 
 necessity of some limitation of export to protect Burgundy, 
 he does not make his prohibition absolute to the detriment of 
 Lyons. He seeks to reconcile the conflicting interests of his 
 province and the distant city. 
 
 In 1573, there were suggestions of trouble, both in the spring 
 and in November, after the harvest. 2 A letter of De Rubys, 
 an agent of Lyons, speaks in strong terms of the actuality of the 
 dearth in Lower Burgundy, 3 and the letter of Charny in Novem- 
 ber discloses an equally serious condition and a careful endeavor 
 to adjust his policy to all the necessities of the case. 
 
 There is somewhat more information for 1579, although the 
 situation seems to have been hardly more serious. Prohibitions 
 had been issued by the Estates. The Echevins of Lyons had 
 obtained Letters Close from the Queen Mother and from Mande- 
 lot, Governor of Lyonnais, urging the Burgundians to grant 
 the export of 10,000 mines of grain. The Parlement of Dijon 
 
 1 Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 29, 150. Paigny, 20 Mai 1572. Charny, Lieu, du 
 Gouverneur. 
 
 2 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 51. 14 Mai 1573. Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 29, 28. 
 
 3 Ibid., AA. 36. Chalons-sur-Saone, 25 Mai 1573. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 255 
 
 refused to acceed to the petitions of the Lyonese, and supported 
 the Estates in their policy of prohibition. 1 Charny refused to 
 do anything definite. " I will do what I can," he writes, " and 
 I will add this word. The necessity which you fear should make 
 you henceforth husband your supplies better than you have 
 in the past. Your town has drawn from Burgundy in the last 
 twelvemonth quite enough to leave you adequately supplied." z 
 
 After the harvest of 1585, there was a similar stringency and 
 the same negotiations and conflict of authorities, with the dif- 
 ference that the Parlement of Dijon played a larger part in the 
 affair than previously. 3 
 
 From this time, there is little evidence of acute trouble until 
 
 1628. Difficulties continued for three or four years, but the 
 material is not abundant enough to make it possible to give a 
 definite account of the period, even if it were worth while. 
 There are almost no new features, and with the scattered informa- 
 tion at hand, it is difficult to arrive at any conclusion as to the 
 severity of the crisis. 4 Prohibitions, Royal Patents, and Letters 
 indicate spasmodic trouble during the decades of the forties 
 and fifties, but here again we have not adequate basis for a 
 continuous narrative, although it is evident that the problem 
 which was so acute in the latter sixteenth century had reappeared 
 in its old form. From this time, indeed, the conflict of interest 
 between Burgundy and Lyons became steadily more serious. 
 The consideration of this development, however, must be 
 postponed for a later chapter. We have only to observe that 
 the defence of local interests in Burgundy was undertaken 
 primarily by the Governor and by the Parlement of Dijon, 
 the municipalities acting in subordination to the provincial 
 authorities. 
 
 1 All this appears in the act of Parlement of Dijon, 8 Oct. 1579. Lyon, Arch. 
 Mun., AA. 29. Copy. 
 
 2 Ibid., AA. 29. Paigny, 10 Oct. 1579. Charny. 
 
 8 Ibid., Chappe IV, 401, 54, 55, 5 6 , 57- 27 Sept. 1585, 12 Fev. 1586, 13 Fev. 
 1586, 27 Fev. 1586. Ibid., 427, i. 14 Juillet 1586. Lyon, Arch. Mun., AA. 71. 
 Langres, 2 Dec. 1586. Maire et fichevins. Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 265. 14 Dec. 
 1585, 31 Mai 1586, 10 Juin 1586, 24 Oct. 1586. 
 
 4 Ibid., Chappe IV, 61-68; AA. 72, 82. 26 Fev. 1628. AA. 78, 8. 20 Nov. 
 
 1629. AA. 103, 14. 29 Dec. 1629. 
 
256 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The Seine Basin 
 
 In the Seine Basin the different economic and constitutional 
 conditions exerted a great influence upon the form and character 
 of local regulation. The fertility of the region and the tendency 
 to foreign export transformed completely the economic aspect 
 of the grain trade problem. The weakness of the provincial 
 organization and the greater opportunity for direct royal control 
 had a marked effect upon the power of the governors of Cham- 
 pagne and Picardy. There were no provincial Estates and no 
 local parlement, so that the governor was the only local official 
 possessing jurisdiction over a wide area. The most cursory 
 consideration of conditions in this region suggests a greater 
 degree of political solidarity than existed between Burgundy 
 and Lyons, while the conflict of interest in economic matters 
 was not likely to be so acute. Furthermore, the obvious political 
 preponderance of Paris deprived the play of political forces of 
 that relative equality which gives such an interest to the negotia- 
 tions between Lyons and Burgundy. Then, too, the Court 
 was hardly an impartial arbiter in the affairs of the Seine Basin. 
 
 The most striking feature of local regulation here in the early 
 sixteenth century is the effort of the Parisian authorities to 
 regulate shipments from Paris to other towns or to foreign parts. 1 
 The foreign exports in 1501 from the sources of Parisian supply 
 have already been mentioned. These were met by despatching 
 letters from the Parlement of Paris to the Bailli of Amiens and 
 the Senechal of Ponthieu. 2 But at the same time, there was 
 complaint that " the inhabitants of Melun, Corbeil, Etampes, 
 and other places in the vicinity purchase considerable quantities 
 of grain at Paris daily, and also buy in Champagne and at 
 
 1 It is proper to observe that there are traces of such regulations at Lyons, 
 especially in 1580, when Lyons permitted exports to Crest, Montelimar, Valence, 
 and other towns on the river and in Dauphine. Lyon, Arch. Mun., BB. 104, 30, 
 32, 33. BB. 105, 35, 65, 89. Chappe IV, 401, 53 bis. There are frequent 
 instances of the arrest of all boats endeavoring to pass Lyons. Chains were 
 stretched across the Saone near the Archeveche, and a keeper appointed who would 
 allow specified classes of trade to pass. But these movements of grain from Bur- 
 gundy to points below Lyons were rare, so that these cases must not be understood 
 to imply conditions such as existed around Paris. 
 
 2 Reg. du Bureau, I, 53, 4. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 257 
 
 Meaux, so that there is ground to apprehend dearth at Paris." 1 
 These complaints were repeated at a meeting held a few days 
 later. 2 In 1504, the central and eastern provinces appealed 
 to Paris for grain to relieve their distress. 3 In 1508, Paris was 
 also treated as an entrepot whence grain could be secured for 
 export to points outside the Seine Basin. " The peasants 
 and others of Corbeil, Melun, and Etampes are carrying large 
 quantities of grain each day from Paris, by wagons and other 
 means of transportation. They also go to Champagne to buy, 
 selling and delivering the grain to merchants who export it. 
 Similar exports are made from the Lower Loire, so that grain 
 has become dear at Paris. Other merchants take up all they 
 can buy in Santois and ship down the Seine to Rouen." 4 Pro- 
 hibitions were issued. Then, a month later, the Provost of 
 Merchants said that he had been importuned by divers mer- 
 chants for permits to export rain. The merchants asserted 
 that exports had been restricted sufficiently to remove all 
 possibility of danger, so that the Provost proposed to allow 
 merchants to export limited quantities of grain up or down the 
 river, on the condition that they should expose equal quantities 
 for sale at Paris. 5 
 
 In 1521, there was more trouble from exports. Considerable 
 quantities of grain were being shipped from Paris under cover 
 of darkness. Consequently, orders were issued against any 
 movements of grain boats after dark, and chains were stretched 
 across the river. 6 Strict control of exports was still maintained 
 in the following spring, when one unlucky merchant was caught 
 after getting his grain away from the city. He was brought 
 back and fined. 7 
 
 In 1529, " great crowds of people daily carried considerable 
 quantities of grain away from Paris, and by reason of these 
 
 Reg. du Bureau, I, 53. 20 Fev. 1501. 
 
 Ibid., I, 54. 27 Fev. 1501. 
 
 Ibid., I, 92, 99-100. 9 Aout 1504, 15 Jan. 1505. 
 
 Ibid., I, 148. 23 Fev. 1508. (Parts of this have been cited previously.) 
 
 Ibid., I, 150. 23 Mars 1508. 
 
 Delamare, op cit., II, 354. Arret du Parlement, 7 Avril 1521. 
 
 Reg. du Bureau, I, 272. 27 Mai 1522. 
 
258 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 exports dearth was feared. It was decided that the inhabi- 
 tants of neighboring towns should be allowed to draw limited 
 quantities of grain from this town for their provision, but that 
 the gates should be guarded to prevent the passage of any grain 
 without the permission of the Provost of f Merchants." * This 
 control was at times exercised with too much rigor. In 1532, 
 for instance, the municipal authorities had received royal orders 
 to permit no exports from the town, which they enforced so 
 strictly that they refused to allow a religious house at Poissy 
 to carry through Paris the grain that came from its farms at 
 Brie. The Parlement interfered and the grain passed on. 2 
 
 These regulations of passing grain were directed primarily 
 against shipments to Rouen, which were all too frequently 
 designed for export. In 1528, there was much dispute as to the 
 jurisdiction over this trade. The Provost of Paris asserted that 
 it belonged properly to him, the Provost of Merchants declared 
 that this jurisdiction had always been exercised by the munici- 
 pality and not by the Chatelet. The King settled the dispute 
 temporarily by instructing the Parlement to defend the munici- 
 pality in the exercise of this control of the grain trade. " Hence- 
 forth they shall grant permits for the export of grain, but they 
 shall require security to guarantee that the grain is not exported 
 from the Kingdom." It was this fear of foreign export that led 
 to the complete prohibition of all movements of grain down the 
 Seine in the spring of 1536. The Provost of Merchants de- 
 clared that " heavy shipments of grain had been made to Rouen 
 and to other parts of Normandy, and that the Norman mer- 
 chants exported the grain amassed at Rouen and other places. 
 Grain was lower in Normandy than at Paris. Permission to 
 export grain from Paris was withdrawn. Letters were to be 
 sent to the King to inform him of the trouble occasioned 
 by these exports. All permits should henceforth be signed 
 by the Provost of Merchants." 3 Persistence in this resolu- 
 tion^is indicated by the deliberation of June 30, when it was 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, II, 54. 8 Avril 1529. 
 
 2 Ibify, II, 140. 1 6 Jan. 1632. 
 
 3 Ibid., II, 218. 27 Avril 1536. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 259 
 
 decided that no general permissions to export grain should be 
 granted. 1 
 
 This aspect of the trade in the Seine Basin becomes less and 
 less important. During the latter part of the century, indeed, 
 there is a change in the relation of the Parisian demand to the 
 available supply, which renders export from the region less 
 frequent and more obviously inexpedient. Prohibitions of 
 export from Paris become practically permanent, 2 and only in 
 1596 does the permission of limited export to neighboring towns 
 reappear. 3 
 
 Although the conflict of interest between the producing 
 sections and Paris was less intense than that between Lyons 
 and Burgundy, there are instances of prohibitions in Champagne 
 and Picardy. Such action by the governors appears in 1529, 
 1530, 1531, 1556, and 1587, so that it is no exaggeration to de- 
 scribe this type of regulation as extremely irregular. 4 
 
 The comparative weakness of the provincial organization 
 and the fertility of Champagne and Picardy rendered it unlikely 
 that the action should be provincial, for quite apart from the 
 governor, there was little probability that the supplies of a whole 
 province would be sufficiently jeopardized to warrant general 
 action. The distress, so far as it existed at all, was intensely 
 localized, so that the opposition came more naturally from 
 municipalities than from provinces. This opposition is in no 
 wise different from the municipal action in Burgundy, except 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, II, 225. 30 Juin 1536. 
 
 2 Ibid., V, 93. 21 Mai 1561. Ibid., V, 234. 25 Juin 1563. Ibid., VIII, 579. 
 8 Mai 1586. Ibid., VII, 332. 4 Jan. 1576. In June, 1563, an exception was 
 made in favor of Meaux. 
 
 3 Ibid., XI, 261. 12 Juin 1596. Circular letter to the towns of the vicinity 
 offering them limited quantities of grain. 
 
 4 Ibid., II, 59. Aout 1529. Prohibition by Governor of Picardy. Ibid., II, 59. 
 2 Sept. 1529. Prohibition by Governor of Champagne. Ibid., II, 75. 31 Aout 
 1530. Prohibition by Governor of Picardy. Ibid., II, 133-134. 24 Nov. 1531. 
 Reference to Prohibitions by the Governors of Champagne and Picardy. 
 
 Ibid., IV, 45. Dec. 1556. Vague reference to prohibitions in Picardy, not 
 necessarily by the Governor. 
 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, ion. 3 Juillet 1587. Decision to get letters from the 
 King ordering the Governor of Champagne to permit export, hence suggesting 
 prohibition by the Governor himself. 
 
260 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 in its independence of general provincial action. It is not 
 a phenomenon confined to the Seine Basin, though the absence 
 of other forms of opposition naturally throws the municipal 
 opposition there into stronger relief. It is perhaps just to dis- 
 tinguish two forms of this interference with the grain trade, 
 the official and the unofficial: the former, prohibitions issued 
 by municipal authorities; the latter, the manifestations of 
 popular fear in riots directed against the grain merchants. 
 Properly speaking, this popular interference was illegal, and 
 generally so largely due to mere panic, that it would be quite 
 unworthy of formal treatment, it if were not at times the only 
 indication of the unsatisfactory working of the grain markets in 
 this region. Unfortunately, this type of opposition does not 
 attract much attention in the scanty records that we possess 
 for the sixteenth century, and it is only in the early seventeenth 
 century that it becomes noticeable. 1 
 
 Action by the town becomes pronounced in 1 626. The Provost 
 of Merchants was told on April 25 by divers merchants " that 
 their trade in grain had been interrupted, and that all the towns 
 whence they were accustomed to ship grain had issued prohibi- 
 tions against export, especially Rouen, Chartres, Soissons, 
 Noyon, Chaulny, La Fere, Roye, Peronne, Montdidier, Saint- 
 Quentin, Vitry-le-Francois, Chalons, and Melun. The gover- 
 nors and officers of these aforesaid towns were so strict that 
 they could ship no more grain, so that Paris would be reduced 
 to famine." 2 The Provost of Merchants repaired straightway 
 to Fontainebleau to secure Patents from the King ordering the 
 towns to release the grain held by Parisian merchants. The 
 King acceded readily enough, reiterating the prohibitions to. 
 export from the Kingdom and ordering the local officials to inter- 
 fere in no wise with the grain trade. 
 
 These municipal prohibitions are somewhat incomprehensible, 
 as the merchants declared that exports to foreign ports were 
 continuing from many of the towns in Picardy which had cut 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, I, 54. 27 Fev. 1501. Delamare, op. cit., II, 1002. 7 Avril 
 1521. Ibid., II, 1009. i Juillet 1573. Ibid., II, 1011-1012. 7 Juillet 1587. 
 
 2 H. 1802. Reg. du Bureau, vii**ii. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 261 
 
 off the trade with Paris. Thus, one Sieur de Saint-Genis de- 
 posed before the officers of the Chatelet: " that the merchants 
 have made purchases in Champagne and Picardy, that they are 
 prevented from shipping by the governors and judges of the 
 towns . . . that there are large quantities of grain at Saint- 
 Quentin, Peronne, Montdidier, and other towns of Picardy 
 which do not cease to leave the Kingdom, despite the pro- 
 hibitions." Sieur du Poix said that the couriers from Cambray 
 had informed him that a considerable quantity of grain had 
 been sent from Peronne to Cambray. Sieur Ferrand declared 
 that Vitry, Chalons, Chartres, Noyon, Soissons, and other 
 places had closed their gates. Another witness said that there 
 were 800 muids of grain in Vitry, and that the officers had for- 
 bidden the sale of more than two bushels to any bourgeois." l 
 Doubtless the towns of Picardy regarded export as the regular 
 trade, and, finding it necessary to sacrifice either the Parisian 
 or the Flemish market, preferred to give up the relatively in- 
 frequent Parisian trade. 2 
 
 In March, 1643, tne merchants summoned before the Echevins 
 of Paris mention prohibitions in some of the towns of the Seine 
 Basin. Chartres, Provins, Elboeuf, Pont-de-1'Arche, and Oudan 
 are explicitly mentioned. 3 Another document enumerates 
 Meaux, Provins, Saint-Jean-des-Jumeaux, Lizy, Rebes, Coulom- 
 miers, Chateau-Thierry, and refers to reports mentioning other 
 towns. 4 Doubtless, there is some confusion here between popu- 
 lar violence and official action, but much of the opposition was 
 the work of local officials. In 1649 the merchants say that 
 they have made extensive purchases, but that they are unable 
 to bring their gram down to Paris on account of prohibitions 
 and open violence. "" " It will not suffice to send parchments," 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21634. 177. Du Landy, 27 Avril 1626. Proces Verbal faite 
 en 1'Assemblee de la Police Generate au Chatelet. 
 
 2 It is fairly certain that Paris did not draw supplies regularly from the towns 
 mentioned as exporting. 
 
 3 H. 1806. Reg. du Bureau, iiitod. 28 Mars 1643. Enquete pourquoi les 
 bleds sont si rares a Paris. Prohibitions on the Oise are mentioned in 1630. Bib. 
 Nat., Fr. 21641. 136. 16 Dec. 1630. Deposition de Denis de St. Genis. 
 
 4 Ibid., vi c vi. 2 Oct. 1643. 
 
262 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 they say, " and, unless the Grand Provost and a Company 
 of Archers are sent to chastise the rebels, there is no hope of a 
 successful prosecution of the affair." L Further deliberations 
 at Paris resulted, September 12, in the sending of a circular 
 letter to the municipal officers of Chalons, Vitry, Chateau- 
 Thierry, Meaux, Nogent-sur-Seine, Provins, Montereau, Melun, 
 Soissons, Noyon, and Beaumont-sur-Oise. The replies to 
 these letters appear, but they are hardly more than purely formal 
 acknowledgments of the receipt of the circular. 2 Chalons and 
 Vitry, however, sent a more creditable excuse for their action: 
 " We have too much sympathy for your needs to deny you our 
 aid, . . . but the present exigencies are so obvious and so press- 
 ing, that we have been obliged to seek means of obviating the 
 difficulty. We interfere with our trade only with regret, and 
 in order to preserve our supplies we are forced to deny aid even 
 to our farmers, our vinegrowers, and our neighbors. The eager- 
 ness displayed in conveying grain to Paris after the opening 
 of the river has so exhausted our town f wheat and rye that 
 we have not enough to last until the coming harvest. We 
 have no hope of receiving anything from the country districts, 
 partly because of the general sterility of the season, and partly 
 because the merchants from the frontier are going the rounds 
 of our villages and carrying off the small reserves that remain. 
 ... In order to show you our condition without any reserve, 
 we enclose an enumeration of the grain in the town of Chalons. 
 According to this investigation there are 13,888 setiers belonging 
 to bourgeois, 2,740 setiers in reserve, and 9,828 setiers belong- 
 ing to outsiders (Forains). Of this we have had tp contribute 
 2,000 setiers of rye to the support of his Majesty's armies, so 
 that we have none too much for the support of 16,000 persons." 3 
 The officials at Vitry write: "The sterility of the year has 
 been so extraordinary, and our town has been so exhausted 
 that we have not enough to last the sixth part of the year, and 
 
 1 H. 1809. Reg du Bureau, iiHix. 10 Sept. 1649. See also ibid., ii c iiii xx vi. 
 20 Aout 1649. Cites prohibitions at Chalons and Montereau. 
 
 2 Ibid., iii c lvi. 12 Sept. 1649. 
 
 3 Ibid., iiii c xxxi. i Oct. 1649. Maire et fichevins de Chalons. Three or four 
 setiers were needed per person each year. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 263 
 
 most of this supply is in the hands of the merchants. We have 
 thus been obliged to seize what we could. We are suffering 
 from extreme dearth. Even if we wished, we could not permit 
 the transport of grain to Paris, as the prohibitions have been 
 issued by our Bailli or his Lieutenant, and in the event of ship- 
 ments the people might well execute the threats that have been 
 made to rob the merchants." 1 
 
 The Parisian encroachment upon the sources of the supply 
 of Rouen in the seventeenth century led to attempts to limit 
 the movement by means of prohibitions. The first of these 
 appear in 1630 and 1643^ but this phase of the grain trade does 
 not become very striking until after 1660. 
 
 Normandy and Languedoc 
 
 In Normandy and Languedoc we find the local authorities 
 playing still another role. Both of these provinces were rela- 
 tively independent, politically as well as economically. Their 
 commercial tiqs with foreign countries, too, were, in some respects, 
 closer than their relations with the rest of France. Local 
 regulation thus assumed the form of limiting the freedom of 
 export to foreign parts, so that local policy was connected 
 with the question of foreign rather than of domestic trade. 
 This independent local regulation of the trade of the maritime 
 provinces is a valuable illustration of the great qualifications 
 that must be made in regard to the application of the ostensibly 
 general royal edicts. In these provinces, as in central France, 
 royal authority was exercised in large measure through Patents, 
 directed to the local officials, and, as* in the other provinces, 
 many of these Patents were a direct response to local demands 
 and suggestions, so that this type of royal action is hardly more 
 than local policy indirectly expressed through the medium of 
 royal orders. 
 
 In Normandy, the* political situation was complicated, the 
 provincial organization still retained much vigor, and although 
 
 1 H. 1809. Reg. du Bureau, iiiixxxiii. Vitry. n Oct. 1649. 
 * Delamare, op. cit., II, 1014. Ibid., II, 1015. 1630. H. 1806. Reg. du 
 Bureau, iiii c xl. 28 Mars 1643. 
 
264 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the authority of the Estates declined in the course of the sixteenth 
 century, the Parlement continued to exert much influence. 
 The governor was not a conspicuous figure. The Bailli of 
 Rouen and the municipal officers played a relatively subordinate 
 part. Ordinarily, the Estates confined themselves to sugges- 
 tions as to grain trade policy in preference to undertaking 
 positive regulation, so that the appearance of royal control and 
 supremacy was maintained in form, if not in reality. The 
 submissiveness of these local bodies is striking. In February, 
 1500, we hear that prohibitions had been issued at the time of 
 the last meeting of the Estates, " at the request of the Estates." l 
 On April i, 1505, there was a deliberation under the presidency 
 of Louis Dare, Lieutenant of the Bailli. The officers of the 
 baillage were present, and the meeting decided to represent 
 to the Lords of the Exchequer of Normandy the danger of con- 
 tinued export of grain. The following day, letters were sent to 
 the King urging prohibition of export. 2 In June, 1506, an assem- 
 bly of the Estates of the baillage was held, at which delegates 
 were present from the Estates of the Vicomte of Pont-Audemer 
 and of the Vicomte of Auge. All were of the opinion that letters 
 should be sent to the King to secure prohibition of export. 3 
 There was a constant dread of export and these requests to the 
 King or protests against the action of some officials in granting 
 special permits continued at frequent intervals. The full details 
 of the internal politics, however, could be obtained only by care- 
 ful study in the Archives at Rouen. 
 
 In Languedoc, there was less submissiveness to royal authority. 
 The Estates issued positive prohibitions in January, 1496-97, 
 January, 1508-09, November, 1513, October, 1524, December, 
 1529, November, 1529, December, 1530, November, 1531, 
 October, 1532, November, 1534, October, 1535, and October, 
 I538. 4 Later in the century, the political relations of the various 
 authorities became more complicated, and the Estates acted 
 
 1 Invent. Som. des Arch. Mun., Rouen, 91. n Fev. 1500. 
 
 2 Ibid., 92. 1-2 Avril 1505. 
 
 3 Ibid., 94-95- 15 Juin 1506. 
 
 4 Invent. Som. des Arch. Dept., Haute Garonne, C. II, i, 6, 10, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
 26, 27, 28, 32. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 265 
 
 less vigorously. In this early period, the Estates at times flatly 
 refused to obey royal orders. Thus, in December, 1504, they 
 would not authorize the execution of the missives of the King 
 permitting the export of two hundred charges of grain for His 
 Holiness the Pope. Likewise, they refused to permit the ship- 
 ment of two or three thousand charges by Florentines provided 
 with similar passports. 1 The Estates, however, issued special 
 permits on their own authority. 2 
 
 But the Estates were not the only power acting in Languedoc. 
 In December, 1523, we find a prohibition of export issued by the 
 Senechal of Carcassonne, limited, of course, to his jurisdiction, 
 but as this included Narbonne, the most considerable grain 
 port in Languedoc, the act was important. 3 A few scattered 
 letters from Clermont-Lodeve, the Lieutenant Governor, indicate 
 that he also took an active interest in the grain trade, issuing 
 permits and at times prohibitions. 4 One of these letters dis- 
 closes the persistent effort to discover the precise extent of the 
 available supply, and to regulate prohibition and permission 
 in such manner as to dispose of the surplus. "Despite a light 
 harvest," he says, " divers merchants and others have amassed 
 large quantities of grain, and are now endeavoring by various 
 subtle means to secure the right to export, although it would 
 exhaust the country and be highly prejudicial to the interests of 
 the inhabitants. . . . Accordingly, all royal officers in each 
 town of the diocese of Maguelone are ordered to assemble the 
 consuls, sindics, and procureurs, bidding them to make diligent 
 search of the quantity of grain available and careful estimates 
 of the amount needed. Reports shall be made within a week, 
 and from these a general report for the diocese shall be drawn 
 up before the Procureur of the Senechaussee of Beaucaire, in 
 order to acquaint the King with the facts, so that he may issue 
 such declarations as may seem proper." 5 
 
 1 Invent. Som. des Arch. Dept., Haute Garonne, C. II, 4. 
 
 2 Ibid., C. II, 6, 15. Jan. 1508-09, Nov. 1520. 
 
 3 Vaisette, Hist. Gen. de Languedoc (26 Edition), XII, 389. 
 
 4 Ibid. (2e Edition), XII, 405. 40^.1526. XII, 418. n Mai 1527. XII, 
 439. 22 Nov. 1527. XII, 440. 24 Dec. 1527. XII, 451. 
 
 5 Ibid., XII, 439. 22 Nov. 1527. 
 
266 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 In the latter part of the sixteenth century, the governor 
 became more important, representing the increased influence 
 of the royal power. But this is a phase of constitutional history 
 that has little to do with the grain trade in particular. 1 In 
 any event, the policy is simply that of limiting export by means 
 of prohibitions and special permits. When the acts are royal, 
 they are suggested by various local officials or bodies, and are 
 the outcome of immediate needs, rather than of visionary ideas, 
 such as influenced so many of the general edicts. 2 
 
 Judgment upon particular incidents of trade regulation in 
 the sixteenth century is now impossible. Material is too scanty 
 and the survival of what we have has been too much influenced 
 by special circumstances to make it a safe basis for an expression 
 of opinion. Mistakes there must have been; in some years 
 prohibitions were doubtless unnecessary and inexpedient. 
 Direct corruption, too, played its part in the history of the 
 negotiations between merchants and officials, and between the 
 officials of various sections and the Court. . But there is no 
 necessity of reaching any conclusions upon these matters, all of 
 which can safely and wisely be allowed to rest in oblivion. 
 
 The larger aspects of the situation, however, are not veiled 
 in this impenetrable obscurity. Our information is sufficient 
 to reveal the general conditions of the period, and the results 
 are an interesting chapter in the history of the growth of adminis- 
 trative control. Official action deserves commendation for 
 its perception of the necessity of emphasizing the fundamental 
 community of interest between different provinces. The hostility 
 between town and country was restrained by the officials who 
 steadily became more convinced of the necessity of close inter- 
 dependence. In the absence of definite market machinery 
 
 1 Invent. Som. des Arch. Dept., Haute Garonne, C. II, 38, 44, 50, 53, 129, 133, 135, 
 255, 272, 287. 
 
 2 The inquiry could be pushed into some other regions, notably the Lower 
 Garonne and Lower Loire valleys. Material for these regions, however, is not 
 available in print, and work in local archives of these sections was abandoned 
 for want of time. The results would merely add to the variety suggested as 
 characteristic of local regulation. 
 
LOCAL REGULATION OF THE GRAIN TRADE 267 
 
 for the adjustment of the interests of the provinces and the 
 capital, the officials did their best to secure the equable dis- 
 tribution of grain that would have been assured by the existence 
 of centralized price-making. The sixteenth century leads to 
 little; but a sound body of tradition was developed, which 
 exerted a powerful influence upon Colbert and upon the intend- 
 ants of the late seventeenth century. This early period is 
 thus the foundation of all that follows, and it is difficult not to 
 feel respect for the individuals who labored sincerely in ob- 
 scurity to make possible the accomplishment of a later genera- 
 tion. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 COLBERT'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN TRADE 
 
 WHEN Colbert obtained the King's favor in 1660, he began 
 a reorganization of the administrative system which soon gave 
 new meaning to the traditions of the monarchy. The grain 
 trade did not secure much of the great minister's attention, 
 and may well be considered one of the least important depart- 
 ments of his activity. But the general administrative develop- 
 ment was not without effect. The centralization of control 
 included the grain trade within its scope, and, while the policy 
 of preceding generations was not radically modified, the change 
 in general political conditions made the actual effect of the old 
 policy somewhat different. In the sixteenth century, we found 
 an evident desire to regulate the foreign export trade in accord- 
 ance with the state of the harvests. At one time, the judges 
 were required to send reports, later a Bureau was established 
 to undertake both the task of collecting information and of 
 regulating the trade. Then the King proposed to discharge 
 these duties directly through his council. But at no time was 
 much accomplished. Information was scanty, the central 
 officials had little besides vague rumors to direct their policy, 
 and the exigencies of the case practically limited their action 
 to the Seine Basin. The efficient control of the trade was largely 
 the work of local authorities, acting indeed through royal Patents, 
 but none the less directing the policy in accordance with the 
 local needs, of which they alone possessed anything like accurate 
 knowledge. Lack of information was thus the principal cause 
 for the failure of royal efforts to control the grain trade in the 
 sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. There was no dis- 
 pute as to what should be done, but an efficient execution of the 
 policy was possible only if the central officials were furnished 
 with an intimate knowledge of local conditions. 
 
 268 
 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 269 
 
 It is in this respect that the significance of the general ad- 
 ministrative changes becomes most apparent. The intendant, 
 who had existed in clivers forms since the days of Henry III, 
 finally became the efficient administrative officer that was so 
 prominent in the last century and a half of the history of the 
 monarchy. Given charge of the financial areas, called the 
 intendancies, which were ordinarily of considerable territorial 
 extent, obliged to make circuits of his district annually in order 
 to apportion the direct taxes, and in close contact with all the 
 various local officials, royal, seigniorial, and municipal, no one 
 was better able to obtain accurate and systematic information 
 of the condition of the country. Furthermore, unlike any pre- 
 vious royal officials, the intendant under Colbert gradually 
 became charged with the duty of regular correspondence with 
 the Controleur General. The early intendants had been special 
 commissioners, ordinarily sent out for a specific object, so that 
 their task consisted either in acting in accordance with instruc- 
 tions given at the beginning, or in reporting at the conclusion 
 of their mission, after the manner of the maitres des requetes, 
 from whose numbers these early intendants were largely drawn. 
 The intendants of the early seventeenth century were legally 
 under the obligation to correspond with any secretary of state 
 demanding information. 1 But this obligation was never en- 
 forced to any appreciable extent. Scattered letters from inten- 
 dants previous to 1660 may be found, but there is no evidence 
 of any regular correspondence in either national or depart- 
 mental archives. The history of the office, too, would suggest 
 that it does not present the characteristic blending of judicial 
 and financial functions until after 1651. The administrative 
 correspondence between Colbert, his brother Colbert de Terron, 
 and a few of the intendants in western France was thus a far- 
 reaching innovation. This rather personal correspondence 
 begun by Colbert, just previous to his rise into prominence, 
 developed with his gradually increasing influence. During 
 the early years of his activity, when his official position was ill- 
 
 1 Boyer de Sainte Suzanne, C. V. E., Baron de, Les Intendants de la Gineralite 
 d 'Amiens, Paris, 1865, p. 21. 
 
270 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 defined and his power was dependent upon personal influence, 
 this correspondence remained personal. 1 Later, when his 
 personal power had become more definitely connected with the 
 " Controle General," he systematized the correspondence, 
 and began the formation of the public administrative archives. 2 
 The development of the informing function of the intendants 
 was thus one of the most direct results of the personal influence 
 of Colbert. Nor was any function of the new administrative 
 official more important or more literally unique. It was a 
 phase of that effort to create a true administrative government 
 which was from this time on the primary object of the monarchy. 
 The novelty of the idea is interestingly revealed by the corre- 
 spondence itself. At first, it is relatively barren the moment 
 the intendant takes leave of matters of pure administrative 
 routine. The much desired information about agricultural 
 and industrial conditions is merely a collection of current rumors. 
 At times such letters passed without comment, but occasionally 
 Colbert turned impatiently upon the intendant and proceeded 
 to give him a lesson in letter writing. Thus, in 1670, Daguesseau 
 had written from Bordeaux that frosts had injured the vines. 
 Colbert replies: " I am already informed that there will surely 
 be less wine in some of the vineyards, notably in Grave and 
 Langon, but I am told that this diminution will be offset in other 
 localities where there is abundance. It is very important for 
 the royal service that you should rise above vulgar rumor 
 to penetrate the real truth of the situation. When I ask for 
 information, at the King's instance, you must not be satisfied 
 by the reports made by interested persons, or by those mediocre 
 minds that draw conclusions from the odds and ends of informa- 
 tion they happen to possess. In this particular case, the King 
 is not particularly concerned with the product of the vine- 
 yards of Grave and Langon; the interest of His Majesty is 
 in the welfare of his people, he asks only if Frenchmen and 
 foreigners will export more wine in one year than in another, 
 for that is the only means of bringing more or less money into 
 
 1 Preserved as the Melanges Colbert, at the Bib. Nat. 
 
 a The Series G 7 . at the Arch. Nat. See Boislisle, op. dt. t I, Introduction. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 2?I 
 
 the Kingdom." l Ordinarily, no statistical information was 
 expected. The intendants wrote their general impressions 
 of the state of the harvest, based either upon their journeys 
 in their generalite or upon reports of merchants and officials. 
 Tables of prices, however, appear from time to time in the 
 earlier correspondence, and quite frequently in the letters of the 
 Controle General (i. e. after 1677). In 1693, there was an 
 attempt made to collect systematic statistics of quantities of 
 grain, population, and prices. Commercial statistics, which 
 are almost non-existent before this time, were sent occasionally 
 in strict tabular form. In 1682-83, we have elaborate figures, 
 month by month, of all trade passing up or down the Canal de 
 Languedoc. We have compilations from the registers of the 
 customs bureaux of grain passing the limits of the Cinq Grosses 
 Fermes. Some statistics of other trade movements appear, 
 but on the whole, it is clear that systematic statistical com- 
 pilations were impractical on account of the irregularity of trade. 
 In September, 1677, f r instance Colbert had asked for details 
 concerning the export of grain to foreign ports from Normandy. 
 Le Blanc replied that " the certificates of the clerks at the cus- 
 toms houses of the department of Rouen showed that, during 
 the months of July and August, there had been no exports from 
 Dieppe, Havre, Honfleur, or Rouen." 2 
 
 The persistent efforts of Colbert, his ceaseless criticism of 
 inadequate reports, his constant emphasis upon the importance 
 of full information created precedents which gathered headway 
 gradually, and finally bore fruit hi the fulness of the reports and 
 letters of the period 1683-1 71 5. 3 The correspondence of the 
 intendants remained centralized in the Controle General, and 
 affords an insight into conditions of the time rivalled only by the 
 elaborate governmental publications which begin in the prin- 
 
 1 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., II, 567. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 8751. 203 ff. Colbert a Le Blanc, 13 Sept. 1677. 
 
 3 The correspondence continued throughout the century, but became scat- 
 tered between 1715 and 1730. Most of the later correspondence is in the Depart- 
 mental Archives, which are doubly important as the intendants correspond with 
 their subdelegues. The correspondence of an intendant in Dauphine (1720-40) 
 is preserved at the Bib. Nat. as one of the annexes au fonds Francais. The papers 
 were preserved by the intendant as private property! 
 
272 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 cipal European countries in the latter half of the nineteenth 
 century. 
 
 The development of this new source of information was not 
 without a far-reaching influence upon the question of grain 
 trade policy. With fuller knowledge of local conditions, it be- 
 came possible to exert more effectually the influence that the 
 monarchy had aimed at since the days of Henry III. The 
 main lines of policy persisted; the change was primarily in 
 the degree of execution. But there was one element of novelty. 
 The reduction of custom duties both domestic and foreign was 
 one of Colbert's most cherished projects for general commercial 
 reform, and it appears in his regulation of the grain trade. From 
 May, 1669 to April, 1674, exportation of grain was permitted for 
 the most part without the payment of any duties at all, and 
 qualification is made necessary only by the requisition of one- 
 half the ordinary dues between January, 1672 and April, 1673. 
 Thus, for nearly five years, the grain trade enjoyed a freedom 
 that was at that time absolutely unique. So far as I am aware, 
 the idea of according this degree of commercial liberty was 
 original with Colbert. In the grain trade, there had never before 
 been any conception of permission of export that did not require 
 the payment of all customs, royal and seignorial. The first 
 systematic campaign against the local duties was that initiated 
 by Colbert, culminating in his so-called " protective " tariff 
 of 1664. While there is no denying the " protective " elements 
 in that edict, it is none the less true that it contains much besides. 
 It was directed quite as much against local duties as it was 
 against foreign imports, and it is hard to say whether we should 
 emphasize most the firm conception of complete freedom of 
 domestic trade that appears in this treatment of local duties, 
 or the " protective " duties levied on foreign imports. 1 
 
 The contradiction involved in this question of policy is funda- 
 mental. Some aspects of Colbert's policy are unquestionably 
 
 1 A letter of 23 Juin 1673, Colbert a de Ribeyre, Intendant at Tours, would 
 seem to connect this policy of exemption from duties with " mercantilist " reasons. 
 " La grace que le Roy a faite a ses peuples de leur permettre I'enlevement de leurs 
 bleds, sans payer aucuns droits, a eu pour fin d'attirer Pargent des pays estrangers 
 dans le royaume." Clement, Lett. Inst. el Mem., IV, 262. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 273 
 
 the antecedent of much latter-day " protectionism," but there 
 are other elements in his work which held quite as high a place 
 in his mind, and which exerted a more direct influence upon 
 his time. In these aspects, he appears as the keen economist, 
 fully cognizant of elementary principles, one of the first to 
 perceive many of these principles, and, as a result, an ardent 
 advocate of a policy which was designed to liberate trade from 
 all obstacles hindering automatic adjustment. Colbert is at 
 once the precursor of the modern protectionist and of the modern 
 free trader, both in policies and in fundamental ideas. The 
 conceptions of each school appear in embryo in Colbert's letters, 
 and both schools influence his policies. Protectionism Colbert 
 received as the heritage of Barthelemy Laffemas and Mont- 
 chretien. The free trade tendency in his thought seems to be a 
 consequence of his perception of the possibility of equable 
 physical distribution of commodities through differences in 
 price. Both his free trade policy and his protectionism are 
 results of his firm belief in national solidarity; the former affects 
 his attitude toward domestic or inter-provincial trade, the latter 
 affects foreign trade. Colbert's foreign grain trade policy, 
 however, in so far as it was not purely traditional, was dis- 
 tinctly a free trade policy, and the insistence upon the idea of a 
 trade that should be free even from customs duties was a long 
 step toward free trade. The contribution of that idea is, in 
 fact, the one element of originality in Colbert's treatment of the 
 grain trade. 
 
 Except for this period when all duties were removed, Colbert 
 followed the old policy of permitting exports when crops were 
 abundant, of prohibiting exports in times of dearth, of grant- 
 ing freedom to the inter-provincial trade at all times. His 
 attention was primarily directed toward securing information 
 about crop conditions, in order to make the necessary adjust- 
 ments. The variations of the harvests, however, fall into two 
 fairly defined periods : 1669-75, good harvests with continu- 
 ous permission of export ; 1675-83, alternations of good and 
 indifferent harvests, leading to a corresponding alternation in 
 policy. 
 
274 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The years preceding 1669 leave little trace, except for an edict 
 of December 2, 1661, which is the only instance of royal regula- 
 tion of the grain trade in this time. This prohibits export to 
 foreign countries, but makes very express declaration of the 
 freedom of the inter-provincial trade. 1 No special limitation of 
 time is mentioned in the edict, and as harvests were unfavor- 
 able in 1662, and for several years following, this prohibition 
 was doubtless applied for a considerable period, if not to the 
 whole interval up to 1669* 
 
 May 20, 1669, we have the first of the edicts permitting 
 export. The edict mentions the abundance of the harvest 
 and declares that " all subjects shall be permitted to export, 
 to sell, and to transport their wheat and other grain to such 
 kingdoms, states, and provinces, as they please, up to the first 
 of October next, without paying any export dues." 3 The 
 explicit limitation in time is new, and continues to be one of 
 the means by which Colbert maintains a close supervision 
 of the trade. 
 
 September 27, 1669, the edict of May 20 was renewed for 
 a period of six months, but further limited to the provinces 
 of Poitou, Touraine, Anjou, Normandy, Picardy, Soissonnais, 
 Champagne, Burgundy, Bourbonnais, and Berry. 4 Further 
 continuations were issued in March and August, 1670. In 
 connection with this last renewal, it is interesting to note the 
 circular letter of Colbert of August 22: "As the term of the 
 edict of March 18 will soon expire, and as His Majesty could 
 perhaps grant a continuation of those privileges, do not fail 
 to let me know whether or not the harvest has been good in 
 
 1 H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, iii c xiii. 2 Dec. 1661. Ext. des Reg. du Conseil. 
 
 2 See especially a circular letter of Colbert to the intendants, 15 Juillet 1663: 
 " La saison qui a este jusqu'a present assez dereglee, et les pluies frequentes qui 
 sont arrivees dans le milieu de 1'este, diminuant en quelque facon I'esperance 
 qu'on avoit concue de la fertilite de 1'annee, . . . je vous ecris ces lignes pour 
 vous prier de m'informer en detail de 1'estat auquel sont a present les biens de la 
 terre dans vostre generalite, et si, suivant les apparences, la recolte sera bonne; me 
 marquant ... les endroits du pays qui auront este affliges de la gresle ou d'autre 
 accidens, et ceux qui n'en auront rien souffert." Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., 
 IV, 216. 
 
 3 Delamare, op. cit., II, 933. 4 Ibid., II, 933. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 
 
 your generalite this year. Send me also the price of grain, 
 so that His Majesty can decide what is most advantageous for 
 his subjects." l It is difficult to be sure that reports were 
 actually received from the intendants, but I should be inclined 
 to think that such was the case, and that this, as well as other 
 renewals, was granted only after Colbert had definite assurance 
 of the condition of the harvests. 2 Further continuations were 
 issued February 28 and May 30, 1671, with the same exemptions 
 from duties. The exemptions were limited to half the ordinary 
 duties in the edicts of December 31, 1671, and October 26, 1672. 
 The complete exemption was restored in April, 1673, only to be 
 withdrawn the following year, in order to obtain money for the 
 war. 3 
 
 After 1675, the condition of the harvests resulted in an alter- 
 nation of prohibition and permission of export. There are 
 prohibitions issued July 6, 1675, September n, and October 
 6, 1677, May 16, 1679, and June 24, 1681. Export was per- 
 mitted generally December 31, 1675, June 4, 1678, June i, 1680, 
 August 7, 1683 . 4 How closely these royal edicts were adapted 
 
 1 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IV, 233. 22 Aout 1670. 
 
 2 The bulk of material made it impractical to note all letters, especially the 
 ordinary crop reports, and there is every reason to believe that many letters are 
 missing in the collection preserved. 
 
 3 Delamare, op. cit., II, 934-937. 
 
 4 Ibid., II, 938, 965. Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IV, 285, note (26 Juin 1681). 
 A. D. XI, 37. Edicts of n Sept. and 6 Oct. 1677, i Juin 1680, 7 Aout 1683. 
 
 (There was a prohibition in August, 1682, but the edict is lost. References appear 
 in the letters.) The Collection Rondonneau, at the Archives Nationales, is a com- 
 prehensive collection of edicts and Letters Patent, arranged chronologically and 
 by subjects. It was made by a private person connected with the Parlement, 
 and even at the time it had a semi-official character and was used by the advo- 
 cates and judges. At the death of the collector, Rondonneau, it was purchased 
 by the Government. It is now one of the most important and trustworthy sources 
 for the study of royal ordinances from 1660 to the Revolution. After 1683, Dela- 
 mare is less complete, and the series A. D. XI, 37, adds many edicts to his list. 
 The policy, however, is a simple continuation of that of Colbert in all respects, in- 
 cluding the exemptions from duties and the control of the trade, by means of annual 
 or semi-annual edicts that are renewed if circumstances permit. There is a very 
 complete series of edicts from 1683 to 1715. From 1686 to 1689, export is per- 
 mitted and exemption is granted from duties. After 1692, prohibitions alternate, 
 and the serious crop failures make the prohibition most frequent till after 1700, 
 when there was another period of free export. 
 
276 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to local conditions is necessarily somewhat uncertain, but the 
 special exemptions of some provinces from general provisions, 
 and the careful inquiries made by some intendants before 
 publishing the edicts would suggest that these measures were 
 much more real regulations of trade than were the royal edicts 
 of the sixteenth century. 
 
 Breteuil, the Intendant at Amiens, writes from Aire, June 19: 
 " I received the edict (of June i) concerning the permission 
 of the export of grain to foreign countries. The news gives 
 much pleasure on all sides, but before publishing it formally, 
 I have thought it wise to write to all the officers of the baillages, 
 elections, and towns, to inform me precisely of the conditions 
 of the crops in their districts. While waiting for their reply, 
 the possibility of injury to the harvests from hail or other acci- 
 dents will be past. I will not publish the edict until there is that 
 certainty concerning the harvest that your letter enjoins" l Col- 
 bert replies, June 27: "You have done well to postpone the 
 publication of the edict for the export of grain until you are sure 
 of the conditions of the harvest. But as I learn from all parts 
 that the harvest will be fine, I do not doubt that you have 
 published it by this time." 2 A few days later, Colbert writes 
 again: " As you have published the edict, and as you feel 
 assured of an abundant harvest, let me know if there is really 
 likelihood of considerable exports from your generalite." 3 
 There are other cases in which the general edicts were suspended 
 in particular localities, so that it is not unfair to conclude that 
 these edicts of Colbert were really executed in those districts 
 where special reasons did not lead to local exemptions arranged 
 between Colbert and the intendants. 
 
 Allusion has already been made to the repeated assertion 
 of the freedom of the inter-provincial trade. The declaration 
 appears formally in subsidiary clauses of some edicts, as in 
 December, 1661, more frequently it is assumed, as indicated 
 by divers letters, which are called forth by local limitations 
 
 1 G 7 . 84. Aire, 19 Juin 1680. Breteuil a Colbert. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 463, 453. Colbert a Breteuil. 
 8 Ibid., 463, 478. Colbert a Breteuil, 4 Juillet 1680. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 277 
 
 upon freedom of circulation. " The grain trade between the 
 provinces of the kingdom has never been restricted," says Col- 
 bert in many letters to intendants. 1 Colbert must have real- 
 ized that this statement was by no means justified by the facts, 
 but he persistently refused to recognize the existence of any 
 problem in the domestic distribution of grain. Such blindness 
 to obvious facts is hardly comprehensible, as he is singularly 
 practical in most political questions, and rarely misled by pre- 
 conceived notions. But here he seems to be hopelessly in- 
 volved in confusion by his strong feeling of nationality. At 
 all events, he never gave any attention to the domestic grain 
 trade, dismissing it with the declaration that it ought to be 
 perfectly free and upbraiding any officials who endeavored to 
 restrict the freedom of movement within the Kingdom. 2 
 
 Colbert, however, did not confine his regulation of the foreign 
 trade in grain to purely general measures. His desire to adjust 
 policy to local conditions and his perception of the essential 
 differences in the interests of some provinces led him to adopt 
 a means of control more cognizant of local needs than the 
 general edicts of his predecessors. His general edicts were 
 issued with the express injunction to intendants to publish 
 them only if the conditions in their generalite warranted such 
 action. Consequently, an adequate conception of the regulation 
 of the trade requires study of Colbert's dealings with special 
 provinces. 
 
 Burgundy 
 
 In the history of the trade in the Saone Basin, there are two 
 incidents of special interest. The first was an outgrowth of 
 Colbert's desire to reduce the obstacles to trade created by local 
 customs, the second case is an illustration of the working of the 
 administrative system at times when the slowness of communi- 
 cation might have had serious results. 
 
 1 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mim., IV, 277, 282. 26 Oct. 1679; 18 Dec. 1680. 
 Ibid., IV, 286. 16 Juillet 1681. References of this type can be multiplied 
 
 without difficulty. 
 
 2 Read in this connection the letters cited in ch. I, of this part, apropos of 
 prices and grain movements. 
 
278 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Colbert was aware of the importance of Burgundy as a source 
 of grain supply, and was anxious to secure adequate outlet for 
 the large crops of 1671. There had been complaint that trade 
 was slow, that prices had fallen to such a point that returns 
 were slight even when it was possible to sell. News of large 
 shipments from Provence and Languedoc to Italian ports sug- 
 gested the possibility of an outlet for Burgundy, either in 
 Languedoc and Provence, or in export to Italy. 1 The intendant 
 replied that the trade proposed could not be profitably under- 
 taken because of the heavy tolls and local customs. Colbert 
 then writes: " If it is true that the tolls on the Saone and 
 Rhone prevent the export of grain, some remedy can be found. 
 You must look into the matter with the farmers of the customs 
 of the Saone. Find out how much grain has actually been 
 shipped down the river during the last six months, and if the 
 quantity is not considerable, persuade the farmers to remit half 
 the customs, explaining to them that by that means they will 
 gain much more than by levying duties on the present basis. 
 As soon as they have consented to the diminution, the King 
 will issue an order reducing all the tolls on the Rhone by one- 
 half." 2 Without waiting for any reply, an ordinance was issued 
 on April 2, covering both the town octrois and the other tolls 
 levied along the rivers Saone and Rhone. 3 This was followed, at 
 the end of the month, by another order removing the remaining 
 half of the old dues. 4 The attempt to stimulate this export 
 trade was a failure, and the chief effect of the acts was to 
 relieve the Lyonese trade of the burden of duties. This was not 
 contemplated in the orders, however, and when it was learned 
 that the merchants were availing themselves of this opportunity, 
 interpretative orders were issued May 31 and June 3, expressly 
 forbidding the application of the exemption from duties to the 
 grain going to Lyons. 5 
 
 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IP, 651-652. 22 Mars 1672. 
 
 Ibid., II 2 , 652, note i. i Avril 1672. 
 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 934. 
 
 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., II 2 , 652, note i. 20 Avril 1672. 
 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 935. 
 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 279 
 
 In 1678, the crops had been fine and a general permission of 
 export had been issued June 4. The following harvest was less 
 abundant, and the inconvenience and danger of foreign export 
 became evident in the spring of 1679. This feeling ultimately 
 resulted in the prohibition of May 16, 1679, but the difficulty 
 in Burgundy arising from export over the Alsatian border had 
 already reached an acute stage by May u. The only royal 
 edict governing the case was that of June 4, 1678. A letter of the 
 Sindic of Burgundy throws much light upon the legal standing 
 of the edict in Burgundy: " I was extraordinarily surprised," 
 he writes, " when I was shown the edict of June 4, 1678 by which 
 the King permits the export of grain. The edict was in the hands 
 of the clerks of the customs office at Bellay. They told me 
 that the farmers of the Cinq Grosses Fermes had secured the 
 edict and that the director at Lyons had sent it to them. This 
 edict, like the prohibitory edict, is addressed to the intendants, 
 but it is not signed by any of them. It has never been published 
 in Burgundy, 1 and was issued upon the supposition that there 
 was a large quantity of grain in the various provinces. But 
 grain is scarce everywhere. These reflections, in connection 
 with the dearth and the high prices current, have obliged me 
 to oppose the execution of that edict, partly to prevent the 
 famine which would be inevitable if exports were permitted, 
 partly to prevent rioting and popular outbreaks." 2 An accom- 
 panying " proces verbal " indicates that the sindics and officers 
 of the baillage of Bugey confiscated large quantities of grain 
 that had been prepared for export. The vigor of the local 
 officials is thus beyond doubt. Bouchu, the Intendant, was 
 less certain of the proper course to follow. He submitted the 
 whole case to Colbert without, however, taking any action 
 against the local officials. By May 31, Bouchu had received 
 
 1 Publication had perhaps been purposely withheld in Burgundy, if we may 
 judge from similar cases elsewhere. At such times copies sent in unofficially, as 
 here, always made some difficulty, though it seems to have been a principle of 
 administrative law that no general edict applied to any particular jurisdiction 
 until published by the officials to whom it was addressed. 
 
 2 G 7 . 156. St. Rambert, n Mai 1679. Balme, Sindic en Bourgogne. 
 
280 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the prohibition of the i6th, which of course settled the whole 
 dispute. 1 
 
 The discretion possessed by the local authorities and the 
 diversity of the official staff were important sources of elasticity 
 in the administrative system of the seventeenth century. The 
 officials were not expected to be servile media of central activity. 
 General edicts were to be applied only if adapted to local con- 
 ditions. 
 
 Picardy, Champagne, and Normandy 
 
 The northern province^ furnish instances of both types of 
 special action, both special royal orders and exemptions from 
 general edicts upon the initiative of the intendants. 
 
 In November, 1672, a royal order was issued discharging 
 exports from Picardy and Champagne from the payment of 
 half the ordinary dues. There is an implication that full dues 
 are paid from other provinces, though the general edict of October 
 26, 1672 seems to have been still in force. 2 The order of April n, 
 1676 was more explicit. Export from Picardy and Champagne 
 is expressly permitted, but strict prohibitions are levied against 
 export from other provinces. 3 In 1678, permission of export 
 was granted in general by the edict of June 4, but in Picardy 
 and Champagne this right was withdrawn by an edict of July 23, 
 prohibiting export. 4 Then, after the harvest, exports from 
 Picardy and Champagne were permitted, 5 by edicts of October 
 22, 1678 and January 7, 1679. A letter to Miromenil, Intendant 
 in Champagne, suggests that Picardy and Champagne were 
 exempted from the general prohibition issued May 16, 1679. 6 
 
 The intendants also used their discretion. In June, 1681, 
 Faul trier, in Hainault, issued a prohibition of export from his 
 
 1 G 7 . 156. Dijon, 15 Mai 1679. Bouchu encloses the letter of Balme and 
 the "proces verbal." Dijon, 31 Mai 1679. See also Colbert's letter of 24 Mai 
 1679, sending the edict of 16 Mai. Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 461, 569. 
 
 2 Delamare, op. cit., II, 936. 8 Ibid., II, 937-938. 
 4 Ibid., II, 939, cited in edict of 7 Jan. 1679. 
 
 6 Ibid., II, 965, cited in edict of 16 Mai 1679. References in a letter of Bre- 
 teuil to Colbert. G 7 . 84, Arret. 31 Oct. 1678. Breteuil says that the permission 
 will have a good effect. Edict of 7 Jan. 1679. Delamare, op. cit., II, 939. A. D. 
 XI, 37- 
 
 Bib. Nat, Mel. Clair., 462-471- Colbert a M., 19 Juillet 1679. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 28 1 
 
 department before the general edict appeared. 1 Scarcely a 
 month later, Colbert writes to Bazin at Metz: " As you find it 
 inexpedient to publish the prohibition of export, there is no 
 reason why you should not suspend it." 2 
 
 In regard to Normandy, there is little that is worthy of note. 
 Meliand, at Caen, prefers not to publish the edict of June i, 
 1680, permitting export. " I have received the edict for the 
 permission of the export of grain from the Kingdom, and I 
 should have published it as you order. But the continual rains 
 in these parts for the last six weeks render the harvest so uncer- 
 tain that I have felt obliged to defer the publication of the edict. 
 I may say that the grass in the meadows is covered with water, 
 and that the grain is lodged in many places. There are no apples 
 anywhere." 3 
 
 The following year conditions were reversed. A general pro- 
 hibition was issued June 24, but crops in Normandy were good. 
 Colbert writes to Le Blanc at Rouen: " I am glad to hear that 
 there will be an abundant harvest in the generalite of Rouen, 
 and that prices have been falling each market day. Con- 
 sequently, you can suspend the publication of the edict to pro- 
 hibit export." 4 
 
 Bordeaux 
 
 In the south, the necessity of special attention was even more 
 marked ; local authorities were more independent and conditions 
 differed widely from those of the northern provinces. At 
 Bordeaux, in 1663, the municipality endeavored to regulate the 
 grain trade in its own interest by preventing the passage of 
 shipments from the Upper Garonne. This action, which was 
 hardly warranted by conditions, evoked an immediate protest. 
 In April, Colbert received an anonymous letter from Bordeaux, 
 stating the case of the exporting merchants: "This letter 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 464, 323. C. a Faultrier, 18 Juin 1681. 
 
 2 Ibid., 465, 25 v. Colbert a Bazin, n Juillet 1681. See also Letters between 
 Colbert and Breteuil. Ibid., 467, no. Colbert a Breteuil, 6 Aout 1682. G 7 . 84. 
 Amiens, 16 Aout 1682. Breteuil a Colbert. 
 
 3 G 7 . 213. Caen, 17 Juin 1683. Meliand. A very characteristic report of 
 conditions. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 465-49 v. Colbert a Le Blanc, 24 Juillet 1681. 
 
282 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 is designed to show you how you can render a great service 
 to the provinces of Languedoc and Guienne. They,re burdened 
 with direct taxes ; they have an abundance of grain but no hope 
 of selling. The Garonne is covered with loaded grain boats. 
 The granaries of the province are full, but the municipal officers 
 of Bordeaux prevent the passage of grain. Numbers of English, 
 Dutch, and Flemish merchants have made extensive purchases 
 of grain that is spoiling in granaries on the Tarn and Garonne. 
 They are not likely to come again after this experience. All 
 because of the obstinacy of the Jurats of Bordeaux, which M. de 
 Saint-Luc is unable to overcome. The King would be sure of 
 the tax receipts, if the passage of this grain were permitted. 
 It is to the interest of His Majesty that money should come into 
 the kingdom from foreign countries." l Colbert took immediate 
 action. The question was brought before the Council and the 
 Jurats of Bordeaux were ordered to exhibit the titles, in virtue 
 of which they had taken to themselves this authority over the 
 grain trade. The intendant was instructed to examine the 
 documents produced and to terminate the affair, establishing 
 freedom of trade on the Garonne. 2 Le Jay, however, was much 
 less prompt than Colbert desired him to be, and as no news 
 was forthcoming, another letter was despatched on the seventh 
 of June. 3 In*the course of the following month, the case was 
 brought to a conclusion. The town had practically no authority. 
 There was a charter of Henry II, which Colbert considered 
 quite irrelevant, and a royal Patent of June, 1662, giving the 
 city the right to take one-third of the grain passing the town, 
 upon condition of paying the market price. 4 After the harvest, 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 115, 454. Avril, 1663. Bordeaux. This is a very 
 characteristic form of the so-called " Mercantilism " of the period, but it would 
 seem necessary to distinguish this from the more systematic form. The immediate 
 effects of specie movements are alone in view in these statements of the necessity 
 of obtaining specie, and it would be difficult to prove that a dearth of specie was 
 not sufficiently common to give great importance to the current movements of 
 coin and bullion. Such a mercantilism is quite distinct from the money-hoarding 
 system that is too frequently represented as the universal economic doctrine of the 
 seventeenth century. 
 
 2 Depping, Correspondence Administrative, III, 26-27. 5 Mai 1663. 
 
 3 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IV, 207-208. 7 Juin 1663. 
 
 4 Ibid., IV, 215. 13 Juillet 1663. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 283 
 
 Bordeaux complained of excessive exports and rising prices, 
 and petitioned for authority to interfere with the trade on the 
 river. Colbert did not attach much weight to their complaints, 
 but he did urge the intendant and the premier president of the 
 Parlement to look into the matter to see if there was any ground 
 for the fear of dearth. 1 He desired above all things to afford 
 Montauban and Languedoc an adequate market for their grain, 
 so far as it could be done without really imperilling Bordeaux. 
 Le Jay writes very reassuringly a month later. He is in corre- 
 spondence with Pellot at Montauban, and they are both agreed 
 upon the necessity of keeping the river free for the exportation 
 of grain from the upper waters. " If there should be any con- 
 siderable change in conditions," he says, "or if an excessive 
 export should cause prices to rise unduly, Pellot and I could 
 come to some understanding about the proper means of pro- 
 ducing such limitations of shipments as should be necessary." 2 
 From this time, the intendant at Bordeaux was in unques- 
 tioned control of the grain trade; for the most part he followed 
 the general edicts but there are exceptions. One of the most 
 interesting cases arose in July, 1675. A general prohibition 
 had been issued on the sixth, but the weather was fine in the 
 south and the prospect of an abundant harvest was assured. 
 On the nineteenth, Colbert wrote to de Seve, recommending 
 him to suspend the publication of the prohibition. De Seve 
 replied that he had already done so, and that he had written to 
 Paris on the eighteenth to inform Colbert of his action. 3 Similar 
 exceptions to the general edicts appear in 1681 and 1682. In 
 1 68 1, a prohibition had been issued, but crop reports from 
 Guienne were favorable, so that Colbert wrote: " I am glad that 
 the harvest promises to be abundant in Guienne; there is no 
 reason why you should not suspend the order prohibiting export. 
 
 1 Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IV, 220. 25 Sept. 1663. Colbert a Pellot, Int. a 
 Montauban. Depping, Corr. Admin., Ill, 341. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat, Mel. Colb., 117 bis, 817. 22 Oct. 1663, Bordeaux. Ibid., 117 bis, 
 818. Pellot a Le Jay. 
 
 3 Ibid., 172, 179. Bordeaux, 25 Juillet 1675. de Seve. Bib. Nat., Me"l. Clair., 
 796, 323. Colbert a de Seve, 25 et 29 Juillet 1675. Some of the letters are lost, 
 but a full account appears in the letter of de Seve of 25 Juillet. 
 
284 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 But I doubt if that will lead to trade with Spain, as the harvests 
 are good there." l A similar prohibition was issued in 1682, 
 and Colbert was so uncertain as to conditions in Guienne, that 
 he practically left the intendant free to publish it or not. " I 
 send you the edict," he says. " You will let me know whether 
 you decide to publish it or not." 2 Some of his uncertainty 
 was shared by de Ris and by Foucault, who was located at 
 Montauban, but made a trip to Bordeaux at this time. Foucault 
 writes, on the twenty-fourth: " I arrived here this morning, 
 and my first care was to confer with de Ris on the condition 
 of the harvest. . . . He tells me that the crops have been poor 
 throughout his department. Nevertheless, the price of grain 
 has fallen, and this confirms my opinion that it is not expedient 
 to prohibit export, particularly as I have just received letters from 
 Montauban, which represent conditions there as unchanged." 3 
 The hesitation seems to have continued for some time, for 
 on the first of October, we still find Colbert writing to de Ris: 
 " although grain has gone up a little, I do not think it necessary 
 to prohibit export." 4 
 
 Languedoc 
 
 Languedoc necessitated more special treatment than any 
 other province in the Kingdom. The normal trade of the prov- 
 ince was with Spain and Italy. There was little community 
 of interest with the interior; the principal, if not the only, ques- 
 tion was the relation between Upper and Lower Languedoc. 
 Ordinarily Lower Languedoc was relatively self-supporting, 
 and as Upper Languedoc had a surplus, it was obliged to export. 
 In times of dearth, however, as we have seen in a preceding 
 chapter, Lower Languedoc might suffer if export were permitted. 
 The frequent necessities of Provence and the difficulty of divert- 
 ing the grain of Languedoc thither are the most interesting 
 features of the efforts to control the trade of Languedoc. It 
 
 1 Bib. Nat, Mel. Clair., 465, 28. Colbert a de Ris, 16 Juillet 1681. 
 
 2 Ibid., 467, 138. Colbert a de Ris, 17 Aout 1682. Ibid., 136. Colbert a 
 Foucault, 17 Aout 1682. 
 
 3 G 7 . 390. Bordeaux, 24 Aout 1682. Foucault. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 467, 248. Colbert a de Ris, i Oct. 1682. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 285 
 
 is a clear indication of the fact that Provence was a group 
 of distinct markets which were less favorable, on the whole, 
 than the equally distinct markets in Italy and Spain. 
 
 In Languedoc, too, the intendant enjoyed much more inde- 
 pendence than elsewhere. Baville was dubbed the " King of 
 Languedoc," and the phrase does not connote too much. But 
 it is quite as important to realize that the powers of the inten- 
 dant in Languedoc were exceptional as it is to remember that 
 the relative impotence of the intendant at Lyons is equally 
 exceptional, on account of the prestige of the governor and the 
 power of the municipality. 
 
 The earliest information from Languedoc consists of a few 
 letters written in the spring of 1662, but apparently they give us 
 only the latter part of the episode. Bezons had been discussing 
 the expediency of prohibiting export, and finally issued a pro- 
 hibition on his own authority, March 20. There was trouble 
 in Upper Languedoc in regard to shipments to be sent down 
 the Garonne, and, to remedy this, guards had to be despatched 
 to protect the grain boats. 1 ' Prices continued to rise at Nar- 
 bonne, so that Bezons felt quite satisfied with his conduct. 
 The harvest promised well, and there was reason to hope for a 
 speedy termination of the stringency. 2 The weather continued 
 fine, and by the end of July, Bezons writes that it will be quite 
 necessary to permit export, unless it should be proposed to 
 divert the grain of Languedoc towards the interior, by shipping 
 up the Rhone or down the Garonne. The Rhone presents many 
 difficulties and he would hardly care to advise such a course. 3 
 
 In 1668, there were no prohibitions, but there was no demand 
 for the grain of 'Languedoc, as Italy was supplied, either by her 
 own grain or from other sources. 4 After 1670, trade improved 
 and for three years was carried on without any official inter- 
 ference. 5 In fact there is little evidence of any special regulation 
 till 1678. 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 107, 20. Beziers, 20 Mars. 1662. Bezons a Colbert. 
 
 2 Ibid., 107, 92 v. 28 Mars 1662. Bezons a Colbert. Pezenas. 
 
 3 Ibid., 109 bis, 936. 23 Juillet 1662. Bezons a Colbert. 
 
 4 Depping, Corres. Adminis., I, 378. 10 Nov. 1668, D'Oppede a Colbert. 
 6 G 7 . 295. Statistics of exports, 1670, Languedoc. 
 
286 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The harvests in 1677 had been deficient and general pro- 
 hibitions had been issued. Provence, however, declared that 
 the coasting trade with Languedoc was necessary. Marseilles 
 asked for permits to import 25,000 charges from Languedoc. 
 But these demands were treated very suspiciously. December 
 17, Colbert writes to Rouille, Intendant in Provence: "As 
 for the grain that you say is needed by Marseilles, I will say 
 that the King has not intended to interrupt the trade between 
 the provinces of the kingdom. Express prohibitions have 
 been made against export from frontier provinces without 
 licenses, and it is quite certain that Languedoc will not permit 
 the shipment by sea of the 25,000 charges that you demand. 
 The profit that could be made by carrying the grain to Genoa 
 or Spain, instead of Marseilles, is too great, and it is so easy 
 to change the route. You ought not to be surprised by the 
 strictness of the prohibition. It is hard to believe that Marseilles 
 alone can have need of 25,000 charges of grain. . . . Further- 
 more, as Marseilles is a free port, there would be nothing to 
 prevent shipment to foreign parts, once the grain was landed." l 
 Rouille replies that he has not written of the distress in Marseilles 
 without having made investigations. The town has only enough 
 to last through January. Nor did he intend to give the impres- 
 sion that the 25,000 charges were for Marseilles alone. 2 As a 
 matter of fact, exports of considerable quantities of grain were 
 passing from Languedoc to Messina, and perhaps to other parts 
 of Italy. 3 
 
 In January, 1678, Rouille renews his demands, but this time 
 is very humble: " If you will do me the favor to procure a few 
 licenses for the export from Languedoc of a moderate quantity 
 of grain for the province, especially for Marseilles and Toulon, 
 I will use them only in case of real necessity and with all the 
 proper precautions. Prices are everywhere one-third higher 
 than is usual." 4 
 
 1 G 7 . i. (copie), 17 Dec. 1677. Colbert a Rouille. 
 
 2 G 7 . 458. 28 Dec. 1677. Rouille a Colbert. 
 
 3 G 7 . 295. P&senas, 14 Jan. 1678. a Colbert. G 7 . 295. Estats des achepts de 
 bleds fait par la C ie . de Commerce de Cette, pour estre porte a Messine. Mars, 1678. 
 
 4 G 7 . 458. Aix, 25 Jan. 1678. Rouille\ 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 287 
 
 The shipments to Italy from Languedoc continued, and Dagues- 
 seau discovered that the army contractors had been shipping 
 down the Rhone and thence to foreign ports, on the strength 
 of licenses issued before the recent prohibitions. 1 But it is 
 hard to believe that there was really any great dearth in either 
 Provence or Languedoc, as general permissions of export for 
 those provinces were issued May 14 and 27.* Bad weather 
 in Provence, however, diminished the prospect of good harvests, 
 and these permits were no sooner issued than Rouille began to 
 doubt their expediency. This was before he had received the 
 edict of May 27 for Provence. 3 A week later, he was even 
 more firmly convinced that the permit should not be published. 
 Prices were already above the maxima of previous years, and 
 were still rising. 4 There is little information from Languedoc, 
 but apparently export was permitted only under cover of special 
 licenses. In November, the Company at Cette asked for licenses 
 for export to Italy. Daguesseau did not like to grant them, 
 so that there was doubtless some apprehension in Languedoc. 
 In January, we find Daguesseau and Rouille entering into cor- 
 respondence, in order to arrange exports to relieve distress in 
 Provence. Colbert practically ordered Daguesseau to devote 
 his attention to assisting his neighbor, 5 and thus promptly 
 quieted the fears of Provence. 6 
 
 Daguesseau, meanwhile, had been investigating conditions 
 in his province. In the producing regions, " I find everywhere 
 considerable quantities," he says, " more than will be consumed 
 before the harvest. Were it not for Lower Languedoc, where 
 prices are always high, and for Provence, it would be advisable 
 to permit general export. But as it is necessary to harmonize 
 
 1 G 7 . 295. Toulouse, 9 Mars 1678. Daguesseau encloses a list of these 
 exports. Toulouse, 16 Mars 1678. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 2 Delamare, op. cit., II, 938. Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., II, 853. A. D. XI, 
 37. 27 Mai 1678. 
 
 3 G 7 . 458. Aix, 7 Juin 1678. Rouille. 
 
 4 G 7 . 458. Aix, 14-15 Juin 1678. Rouille. See also letter of Aix, 6 Aout 1678. 
 6 G 7 . 295. Montpellier, 19 Nov. 1678. Daguesseau au C. G. and other 
 
 letters. 
 
 6 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 461, 37. 13 Jan. 1679. Colbert a Rouille. Ibid., 
 461-479. Clement, Lett. Inst. et Mem., IV, 271. Colbert a Rouille, 27 Jan. 1679. 
 
288 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 these conflicting interests, I think it wise not to open the door 
 completely by granting absolute freedom of export, and yet 
 on the other hand, I would not close the ports. In short, I 
 should advise a qualified permission, allowing shipment only 
 from Narbonne, which is the export point for Upper Languedoc. 
 As the quantity of 50,000 setiers which you allowed for Provence 
 has all been shipped, I think that His Majesty could now permit 
 the export of 100,000 setiers to foreign parts, on condition of 
 paying the customary duties. If you will please divide this 
 quantity into two licenses of 50,000 setiers each, I will use them 
 only to facilitate the passage of grain from Upper to Lower 
 Languedoc and will not publish the second until I see that there 
 is plenty of grain in Lower Languedoc to suffice for some time. 
 I do not think that I can do more to prevent abuses than by 
 following the course adopted last year. No preference or per- 
 sonal discrimination is shown, those who are first ready to put 
 to sea receive the permits." 1 Colbert assented to these prop- 
 ositions and forwarded the licenses. "It is almost impossible 
 to prevent influential people from getting permits which they 
 use as a source of revenue. Accordingly, avoid using these 
 licenses, if you can, and grant general freedom of trade." 2 
 A few days later, Colbert decided to issue an edict permitting 
 export generally from Languedoc. 3 But Daguesseau did not 
 publish the royal edict, issuing instead an order of his own, 
 permitting export from Narbonne but from no other ports. 4 
 
 Then come complaints from Provence: "I had hoped that 
 I would not be obliged to write you again about the dearth 
 in this province," writes Rouille, April 8, " but everything has 
 been against us this year. The severity and length of the winter, 
 which still continues, has held back the crops which never in 
 the memory of man gave less promise. The little grain that 
 remains has been hoarded, and prices have risen. The people 
 
 1 G 7 . 295. Lavaur, 4 Fev. 1679. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 2 G 7 . i. 17 Fev. 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 461, 
 158. 17 Fev. 1679. Passports. 
 
 3 Ibid., 461, 182-183. 24 Fev. 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 
 4 Ibid., 461, 291. Clement, op. cit., IV, 272, note. 24 Mars 1679. Colbert 
 a Daguesseau. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 289 
 
 of Marseilles sent to Languedoc, last month, but as there has 
 been a general permission of foreign export there, prices have 
 risen so high that the merchants do not engage in the trade 
 sufficiently to supply Marseilles. . . . The Echevins of Mar- 
 seilles have already been obliged to seize several small boats 
 that were going to Italy." * There was a threat of a general 
 grain riot at Marseilles, but the crisis passed without actual 
 outbreak. 2 
 
 These accounts from Provence mystified Colbert completely. 
 " I am particularly surprised/' he writes, " by your statement 
 that the merchants have had difficulty in buying grain in Langue- 
 doc, except at excessive prices. Languedoc does not complain, 
 and is continually demanding freedom of export. You will 
 admit that it is difficult to reconcile such conflicting reports. 
 However, the King bids me write in strong terms to M. Dagues- 
 seau to have him correspond with you and consider if it is neces- 
 sary to prohibit export from Languedoc." 3 Colbert again 
 took matters into his own hands without waiting for a reply; 
 a prohibition of export from Languedoc was issued April 18. 
 This evoked a long letter from Daguesseau who insisted upon 
 continuing his previous policy. " The edict will do no good to 
 Provence and will do much harm to Languedoc." 4 Colbert 
 disliked to insist and finally gave Daguesseau instructions to 
 act as he thought best. 5 Daguesseau finally published the pro- 
 hibition of foreign export, but the coasting trade with Provence 
 was continued under bond. 6 The correspondence is rather 
 voluminous even after this, but there is nothing of importance 
 until the harvest introduced new elements. 
 
 The news that crops were good in Languedoc induced Colbert 
 to issue a special ordinance, permitting export from the province 
 
 1 G 7 . 458. Aix, 8 Avril 1679. Rouille au C. G. 
 
 2 G 7 . 458. Aix, ii Avril 1679. Rouille a Daguesseau and enclosure of a 
 letter from Marseilles, 8 Avril 1679. 
 
 3 Clement, op. cit., IV, 272, note. 20 Avnl 1679. Colbert a Rouille'. Bib. 
 Nat., Mel. Clair., 461, 394. 20 Avril 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. Ibid., 461, 
 418. 27 Avril 1679. Colbert a Rouille.. 
 
 4 tj 7 . 295. Montpellier, 29 Avril 1679. 
 
 6 Bib. Nat,, Mel. Clair., 461, 488. 11 Mai 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 8 Ibid., 461, 521. 18 Mai 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 
290 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 but not to foreign ports. 1 This tended to stimulate the move- 
 ment of grain from Languedoc to Provence, much to the relief 
 of all concerned. General permission of foreign export from 
 Languedoc was withheld solely on account of the needs of 
 Provence, 2 and letters from Rouille indicated that this difficulty 
 was likely to continue, as crops were light in Provence. 3 
 
 Complete freedom of trade from Languedoc was considered 
 seriously, but Colbert warned Daguesseau that even if such 
 permission was granted, it must not be published until he had 
 assured himself that the needs of Provence and Dauphine 
 were adequately supplied. 4 Shortly after this, Daguesseau 
 sent in a report of conditions in his province: "There have 
 been divers accidents which have rendered the harvest in Upper 
 Languedoc less abundant than was expected. There are no 
 oats anywhere, and prices are high. There is very little wheat in 
 the mountains, more in the plains, but less than last year, so 
 that wheat is high considering the season. Prices have risen 
 even since the harvest in Lower Languedoc, on account of the 
 hoards made by merchants in hopes of complete freedom of 
 export. On the whole, there will be no extraordinary abundance 
 of grain, but there will probably be enough, not only for Langue- 
 doc but also for the neighboring provinces. Prices will doubt- 
 less run high throughout the year. At the same time, it is 
 certain that the people of Upper Languedoc cannot live or pay 
 their taxes, except through the sale of their grain, and I have 
 noticed that even when there were complaints of dearth, Upper 
 Languedoc always has some old grain left. Furthermore, 
 there is an unusual crop of millet in Upper Languedoc and in 
 the mountains, and, as millet is the ordinary food of the peasants, 
 this will compensate in some measure for the light wheat crop. 
 I feel that it would be advantageous to permit export until 
 October or November, quite as much to complete the sale of 
 the old grain, as to give the people some means of procuring 
 money. But this permission should be limited to Narbonne 
 
 1 Clement, op. cit., IV, 275, note. 2 Aout 1679. 
 
 2 Ibid., 9-10. Aout, 1679. 
 
 8 G 7 . 458. Aix, 15-16. Aout, 1679. Rouille* a Colbert. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Me"l. Clair., 462, 151. 17 Aout 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 2<)l 
 
 as an outlet for Upper Languedoc." 1 Colbert assented to this 
 proposition and sent an edict permitting export from Narbonne 
 until November 30.* 
 
 The dearth in Provence continued, 3 and there was some 
 difficulty in other provinces. This revived Colbert's old proj- 
 ect of turning the grain of Languedoc inward. He writes to 
 Daguesseau, November 23 : "I doubt if the King will continue 
 the permission of export from Narbonne. There is ground 
 to apprehend a serious dearth in the kingdom, so that if Langue- 
 doc has too much it can easily ship to the neighboring provinces 
 by land or by sea." 4 
 
 Daguesseau, of course, finds some basis for disagreement. 
 He will see that no grain leaves Narbonne except for other ports 
 of Lower Languedoc or for Provence. But he does not think 
 it wise to allow exports from Lower Languedoc even for Provence. 
 There is very little grain in Lower Languedoc. 5 A couple of 
 weeks later, he takes a new point of view. The Estates have 
 asked for permission to export from Narbonne, Vendres, Serignan, 
 Agde. He feels " that His Majesty -can safely grant this per- 
 mission, for it would take some time for foreigners to learn of it, 
 even after the permission were published locally. Then they 
 will have to enter into correspondence with their agents, so 
 that they could not very well begin actual shipments before the 
 end of March or the first of April. They would not then have 
 a very long time before the harvest. But as regards Lower 
 Languedoc, from Beziers and Agde to the Rhone, it is important 
 not to remove the prohibitions." 6 This is the special permission 
 from Narbonne dressed up in different words with new excuses. 
 But it is as incomprehensible as ever to Colbert, who evidently 
 cannot conceive of the extreme specialization of trade routes, 
 to which Daguesseau's policy was adapted. Colbert accordingly 
 
 1 G 7 . Toulouse, 23 Aout 1679. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 * Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 462, 220. 7 Sept. 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. G 7 . 
 295. Montpellier, 23 Sept. 1679. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 3 G 7 . 458. Marseille, 26 Sept. 1679. Aix, 17 Oct. 1679. Bib. Nat, M61. Clair., 
 462, 316. 6 Oct. 1679. Colbert a Rouille. 
 
 4 Ibid., 462, p. 462. 23 Nov. 1679. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 8 G 7 . 295. Pezenas, 4 Dec. 1679. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 6 G 7 . 295. Pezenas, 19 Jan. 1680. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
292 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 returns to the charge: " I must confess that the demands of 
 the Estates for export from Narbonne have seemed quite extra- 
 ordinary to His Majesty. He receives daily complaints of 
 dearth from Provence, Dauphine, and Burgundy, and it seems 
 to him that, if there is too much in Upper Languedoc, there is 
 nothing to prevent shipping to Provence, or up the Rhone to 
 those provinces which lack. 1 As prices are high there it would 
 be very advantageous to Languedoc, and would not be so prej- 
 udicial to national interests, as export to foreign countries.'' 2 
 
 Daguesseau replies: " As regards export of grain from Upper 
 Languedoc, I shall have the honor to inform you that there are 
 shipments daily from Narbonne to Provence, but the consump- 
 tion of that province is not sufficient to discharge Upper Langue- 
 doc, which ordinarily has a great abundance of grain and has 
 no other means of obtaining money and paying taxes. This 
 is what obliges the Estates to demand freedom of export from 
 Narbonne, even to foreign countries. To send grain up the 
 Rhone to Dauphine and Burgundy is not practicable, on account 
 of the great expenses of transportation. The Rhone is so 
 swift that a great number of horses is required to get boats 
 up the river. TJien, too, there are frequent delays arising 
 from the contrary winds which are very strong in the Rhone 
 Valley. Furthermore, there are heavy dues, on account of the 
 tolls, which are levied quite close to each other. The difference 
 in the price of grain among these provinces is not great enough 
 to cover all these expenses. This is a* route that has not been 
 tried except for salt ; as that trade is regular and annual, a com- 
 pany has been formed which has undertaken that work for a 
 fixed price. But that is a great establishment and the same 
 method could not be applied to the grain trade. 
 
 " Accordingly, Languedoc has only two routes for the dis- 
 posal of its grain: the sea which is the usual outlet both for 
 Provence and foreign countries, and the Tarn and Garonne, for 
 shipment through Bordeaux. But this latter route is available 
 
 1 Note through here the insistence on the idea of equable national distribution 
 as a result of differences of price. 
 
 2 Clement, op. cit., IV, 278. i Fev. 1680. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 
COLBERT AND THE GRAIN TRADE 293 
 
 only when there is dearth in Guienne, when that demand is 
 supplied before there is any resort to Languedoc. Thus, it 
 is necessary to facilitate export by sea. The uncertainty of the 
 coming harvest can alone cause hesitation. As you have asked 
 for my opinion, I may say that there are only two courses open. 
 You may permit export from Narbonne, even to foreign ports, 
 with the understanding that prohibitions are to be issued towards 
 the close of April, if the news from Languedoc or Provence 
 gives reason to fear for the harvest. Or on the other hand, 
 you may leave the present prohibitions in force until the latter 
 part of April, deciding then to continue or to remove them, in 
 accordance with the news you receive at that time." 1 
 
 The letter had the effect desired; Colbert agreed to a per- 
 mission of export from Narbonne, even to foreign ports, but to 
 take effect only on March 15. A drought in Lower Languedoc 
 made Daguesseau hestitate to publish the edict but, as prices 
 did not rise, he finally issued it. 2 This drought, however, practi- 
 cally destroyed the crops of Lower Languedoc, and that fact 
 exerted a great influence on Daguesseau's policy in regard to 
 the latter part of 1680. Writing June 5, he says: " The crops 
 in the dioceses of Narbonne, Beziers, and Agde are entirely 
 ruined. ... In some places, they have ploughed their wheat 
 fields and sown millet in order to get some crop. I have never 
 seen desolation equal to that in some localities, and it is certain 
 that most of the farms in these three dioceses will not yield 
 enough to serve as seed." 3 Conditions became more serious in 
 the course of the month and other dioceses were affected so that, 
 while the crops were good in Upper Languedoc, there was practi- 
 cally nothing in the rest of the province. This made Daguesseau 
 unwilling to publish the general edict for permission of export 
 issued June 4.* Colbert assented. "The King," he says, 
 " leaves you full discretion to publish the edict or not, according 
 
 1 G 7 . 295. Montpellier, 17 Fev. 1680. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 463, 137. 22 Fev. 1680. Colbert a RoiiiUe". Ibid., 
 463, 159. 29 Fev. 1680. Colbert a Daguesseau. G 7 . 295. Montpellier, 29 
 Mars 1680. Daguesseau a Colbert. 
 
 3 G 7 . 295. Toulouse, 5 Juin 1680. Daguesseau. 
 
 4 G 7 . 295. Toulouse, 2 Juin 1680. Daguesseau. 
 
294 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to the information you secure in your province. I should say, 
 however, that reports from all the other provinces indicate a 
 considerable abundance." l The difficulties experienced in 
 Lower Languedoc, in August, September, and October, fully 
 justified Daguesseau's policy, but the details of these relief 
 works are hardly relevant here. 2 
 
 The last three years present little that is new or interesting. 
 The correspondence in regard to crops, dearth, and abundance 
 continues, although it is less voluminous. It is a ceaseless 
 repetition of the same theme. Prohibitions, in time of dearth; 
 permission, if there is plenty. The whole attention of the 
 administrative staff is given to finding out the facts, disen- 
 tangling the complicated commercial conditions which are of 
 influence, and seeking to achieve some crude adjustment of 
 supply to demand. The apparent complexity of the grain 
 trade policy is wholly due to its intimate connection with cur- 
 rent conditions. The simple idea, foreshadowed vaguely in 
 the time of Francis I and more clearly sketched in the edicts 
 of 1559 and 1571, persists with little change in form to the close 
 of our period. But the rather intricate mass of detail presented 
 in connection with Colbert's efforts will have failed of its purpose 
 if it does not suggest that Colbert realized, to a considerable 
 extent, the dreams and intentions of his predecessors. 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 463, 494. 18 Juillet 1680. Colbert a Daguesseau. 
 
 2 G 7 . 295. Toulouse, 21 Aout; Cette, 2 Sept. 1680; Montpellier, 7 Sept. 1680; 
 Montpellier, 29 Sept. 1680; Montpellier, 15 Oct. 1680. Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 
 463, 642. 28 Aout 1680. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE, 1683-1709 
 
 AFTER the death of Colbert, there was a much greater change 
 in the efficient regulation of the grain trade than appears upon 
 the surface. Royal edicts for the control of foreign trade 
 appear with increasing frequency and form an almost unbroken 
 chain throughout the remaining years of the reign. In these 
 edicts there is no sign of a new policy, and if it is too much to 
 assert that they were without influence on the trade, it is none 
 the less true that the relative importance of royal activity was 
 very greatly reduced by the energetic and efficient control 
 exerted by the intendants. Their policy must be regarded as 
 the continuation of the efforts of the sixteenth century officials 
 to regulate the domestic trade. The influence of Colbert is 
 manifest, and, in this sense, there is at least an apparent con- 
 nection with the traditions of royal policy. But the influence 
 of the central administration is not that of an authority con- 
 trolling export trade; it is rather a new representative of the 
 crown acting as arbiter ^between conflicting local authorities. 
 The intendant was a personal representative of the Crown, 
 and, although resident in the district, in the late seventeenth 
 century he was charged with the care of general rather than 
 local interests. The intendants trained by Colbert were the 
 product of many influences; they brought together admin- 
 istrative traditions that were formerly entirely distinct. They 
 inherited the policy of the old local officials, many of whom 
 no longer possessed the power whose trappings they still retained, 
 but they also received the impress of the powerful personality 
 of Colbert, and were filled with a solicitude for the commonweal 
 that was entirely new in a French administrative official. 
 
 It is fortunate that this transformation of the administrative 
 system should have been completed just before the critical years 
 
296 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 of the late seventeenth century. For many years the domestic 
 grain trade had presented no great problem, nothing but dreary 
 persistence of old traditions. Some of the seeming quietness of 
 the early seventeenth century is probably due to the accidental 
 loss of important records. But when every qualification is made, 
 there seems to have been no development of importance in the 
 early years of the century, and even after the rise of Colbert, 
 the regulations of the domestic trade are of the traditional type. 
 
 The relative fertility of the years of Colbert's ministry removed 
 the domestic trade from the sphere of active administrative 
 supervision. There was a recrudescence of old prohibitive regu- 
 lations in some places; the Parlement of Toulouse, for instance, 
 issued prohibitions in 1660, and the Jurats of Bordeaux inter- 
 fered with the trade, as we have already seen. There is some 
 indication of active regulation in the Seine Basin in 1660, but 
 these efforts of the Chatelet and Echevinage did not assume 
 a sufficiently positive character to make them of immediate 
 importance. Those years were, indeed, of interest as regards 
 the extension of the jurisdiction of the Chatelet, but they do 
 not disclose any change in administrative policy. The activity 
 of the officials in the Seine Basin in 1660 was largely based on 
 the old traditions, presenting no novelty, but better informed 
 than previous similar efforts. The difficulties arising from the 
 location of Orleans appear very distinctly in 1662-63, an d the 
 letters of the Intendant and of the Maire afford considerable 
 insight into conditions. 1 With these exceptions, the administra- 
 tion of Colbert has little significance from the standpoint of 
 domestic policy. He himself was but slightly interested, partly 
 because he felt that the reiteration of the declarations that the 
 inter-provincial trade should be free was all that was necessary, 
 partly because the grain trade as a whole was of subordinate 
 interest to him. 
 
 Ten years after the death of Colbert, the first of the great 
 dearths created a crisis in the regulation of the domestic trade 
 such as had never before existed. There had been failures of 
 the crops that were almost as serious, although the area affected 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mil. Colb., 108, 188, passim. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 297 
 
 in 1693 was probably more extensive. But never before had 
 such a dearth occurred at a time of rapid growth towards metro- 
 politanism. The danger from metropolitan demand that had 
 ever been present was rendered doubly intense by the great 
 change in commercial practice. The change was apparent 
 even before 1660, but there had been no dearth sufficiently 
 severe to reveal all the consequences of the new developments 
 around Lyons and Paris. 
 
 This crisis came upon France just as the changes in the ad- 
 ministrative system had created new officials admirably suited 
 to grapple with the new problem. The intendants were, for 
 the most part, in control of the trade, but there were other 
 officials, too, who had acquired new powers. The struggle 
 between the Chatelet and the Echevinage at Paris had smoul- 
 dered for generations, without notable results of any kind. 
 There are signs of change as early as 1630. The Chatelet was 
 gaming in prestige, and by 1660 was definitely in the possession 
 of new powers which made it one of the most important influences 
 in the Seine Basin. The Echevinage made a futile attempt 
 to regain its old authority, but the general control of the grain 
 trade passed to the Chatelet. The time demanded new policies 
 and new officials, or old officials with new powers, prepared 
 for the crisis. 
 
 The character of the official body precluded the possibility 
 of any definite scheme for the regulation of the trade. The 
 need was not for men with preconceived ideas, whether favoring 
 restriction or complete freedom of trade; it was a time that 
 called for men conversant with all the details, provided with 
 the authority and the will to do whatever a concrete case de- 
 manded. Openness of mind, the administrative rather than the 
 theoretical temperament was needed. It is this spirit that was 
 most conspicuous in the intendants, and in this they exhibited 
 most strongly the finer qualities of Colbert. But there was 
 great diversity of opinion and policy. Intendants in different 
 districts pursued distinct policies. The one believed in pro- 
 hibitions under certain conditions ; the other asserted the advis- 
 ability, nay, even the necessity, of complete liberty. 
 
298 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Advocacy of freedom of inter-provincial trade was not un- 
 common. We find de la Bourdonnaye writing from Bordeaux, 
 that grain is a " commodity that cannot be given too much 
 freedom of circulation." ... " Only complete freedom of 
 trade can produce abundance." "The least constraint will 
 spoil everything." 1 D'Argenson at Paris says: "Freedom of 
 trade in grain is a public benefit, restraint alarms and ordinarily 
 produces nothing but unfortunate results." He makes some 
 concession to the old views, but persists in his belief that freedom 
 is essential. " If it be necessary to prohibit at times the trans- 
 port of grain from province to province, it would seem best to 
 exempt the large towns like Paris and Lyons from the effect of 
 such restriction." 2 Bouchu says that prohibitions are unwise 
 in any case, since " they are always the cause of the increase 
 in prices, and even of the scarcity of grain in the markets, because 
 they render the people more inclined to hoard. The object 
 of the prohibition, too, is rarely attained, fol* the officials charged 
 with the execution of the orders are easily corrupted." 3 In 
 1709, the Controleur General writes: " The first thing that the 
 King deemed necessary when the lightness of the harvest of 
 1708 became known was to establish an entire and absolute 
 freedom of trade in grain from province to province, so that those 
 having too much might succor those that lacked. His majesty 
 has never approved of having his intendants shut themselves 
 up in their departments, preventing the export of grain." 4 
 This was apparently a very bold assertion of the old policy of 
 freedom for the inter-provincial trade, but it is nevertheless an 
 indication of the persistence of the old idea, with perhaps an 
 increased vitality. Notwithstanding these wide-spread and force- 
 ful assertions of the liberal ideal, the effective policy retains, as 
 before, a very considerable element of restraint. Sanson, writ- 
 ing from Soissons, states the policy that is most successfully 
 applied to the grain trade. " I think," he says, " that the trade 
 cannot be stimulated too much in times of abundance nor watched 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., II, 103, 358. 19 Jan 1702. 
 
 8 Ibid., I, 509, 1811. 24, 27 Dec. 1698. 
 
 8 Ibid., II, 2, 4. 1 8 Sept. 1699. 
 
 * Ibid., Ill, 204, 532. 8 Sept. 1709. C. G. a Le Gendre. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 299 
 
 too closely in time of dearth. It is necessary to go from one 
 extreme to the other, according to the different circumstances." l 
 
 This course advocated by Sanson was not new. It is funda- 
 mentally the idea of the local officials of the sixteenth century, 
 but its adaptation to circumstances led to progressive modifi- 
 cation. There had long been a feeling that the trade must be 
 regulated, the great question was, How ? In the sixteenth 
 century, the prohibition and an assertion of the old market 
 regulations were the only modes of regulation proposed. At 
 the close of the seventeenth century, the prohibition became 
 a more flexible instrument, by reason of a systematic develop- 
 ment of special licenses. The purely reactionary endeavor to 
 maintain the old markets, too, gave way to attempts to regulate 
 the markets on an entirely new principle. The old system had 
 sought to preserve the independence of the local market from 
 metropolitan influence. The new attempts were in the direction 
 of subordinating the local markets to the metropolitan market. 
 Prices, instead of being made on the local market, were to be 
 determined by the metropolitan market. This idea appears 
 most clearly in a letter of Daguesseau where the preponderant 
 influence of Paris is treated as an established fact: " Paris, 
 so to speak, determines the prices of grain for a great part of 
 the Kingdom. When Paris is sufficiently supplied and grain 
 is reasonable there, less is drawn from the provinces, and local 
 prices follow approximately the prices at Paris." 2 
 
 The prohibition and the license system were designed to 
 perform the work that would be done by a well-organized metro- 
 politan market; they were to assure an equable distribution 
 of available supply. The new regulations for the markets were 
 steps towards the metropolitan market itself. One was a 
 temporizing policy, the other was a constructive policy; in the 
 one case, the intendant acted constantly as Deus ex machina, 
 in the other case, he sought to render trade independent of 
 external interference. The license system was much less novel 
 than the new market regulations. Licenses had been issued 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. tit., II, 125, 444. 19 Oct. 1702. 
 * Ibid., Ill, 102, 313. 24 Fev. 1709. 
 
300 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 quite generally throughout the sixteenth century, and the 
 abortive projects for the regulation of foreign trade present 
 in full the idea of regulation by prohibition and license as it 
 was realized in the domestic trade in the late seventeenth century. 
 The license system, then, is new chiefly in respect to the high 
 degree of systematization, and in the actual application of the 
 policy to the concrete facts. 
 
 But while, in a general sense, these two modes of regulation 
 appear during this period, they do not appear in the same 
 regions, nor have they an equal degree of historical significance. 
 The effort at constructive market regulation was practically 
 confined to the area described in previous chapters as the upper 
 Seine Basin. This was the primary supply area of Paris. Here 
 the trade was relatively regular. * Supplies were seldom actually 
 inadequate, and it wa fairly well realized that the chief problem 
 was to distribute the grain equably. Downright prohibitions 
 were infrequently resorted to, and a careful control of markets 
 was ordinarily adequate. In Burgundy, the possibility of 
 exhaustion was greater; the fertile area of the province was not 
 extensive, local needs were considerable, the Lyonese demand 
 insistent and heavy. A short crop was really a just cause for 
 apprehension. Prohibitions and licenses consequently play 
 a great part in the Rhone Valley trade. Conditions were not 
 very different in Brittany and Languedoc, where there was an 
 additional complication by reason of the frequency of export 
 to foreign countries. 
 
 The other parts of France present somewhat different prob- 
 lems. There is nothing that is worthy of the name of grain 
 trade policy except at Orleans, where conditions are very curious. 
 Situated on the southern edge of the Beauce, with a possibility 
 of securing additional supplies from Saumur, Brittany, or even 
 from Auvergne, it might seem as if Orleans enjoyed a singular 
 security in respect to its food supply. But Paris exerted so 
 great an influence on all these sources that Orleans was often 
 seriously affected. The city was not possessed of the legal 
 right to interfere with the movements of trade on the river, 
 where the shipments were designed for Paris. In the producing 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 30! 
 
 regions, there was, of course, the possibility of buying, but only 
 in competition with Paris. This, too, was less easy, as the city 
 could usually be supplied from the Beauce, so that the merchants 
 of Orleans were not accustomed to buy regularly in the lower 
 Touraine. In times of dearth, too, the grain of the Beauce 
 tended to flow toward Paris rather than to Orleans. The city 
 was thus occasionally placed in the curious situation of being 
 in want, when an abundance was floating by on its way to Paris. 
 
 Our consideration of policy will fall naturally into three 
 divisions: the attempt at constructive market regulation in 
 the Seine Basin; the development of licenses in Burgundy, 
 Languedoc and Brittany; the policy of the officials at Orleans, 
 the most typical enclave. 
 
 The Seine Basin 
 
 In the Seine Basin, some peculiarities are presented by the 
 presence of the Chatelet and the Echevinage. The munici- 
 pality of Paris retained much of the power enjoyed in the six- 
 teenth century, and the Provost of Paris continued to occupy 
 a unique place. He and his lieutenants increased their authority, 
 despite the appearance of the intendants. The Intendance of 
 Paris, indeed, was created later than most of the others, and the 
 intendant there never possessed the wide field of activity that 
 characterizes the office in the more distant sections of France. 
 The proximity of the Court and the extensive jurisdiction of 
 the municipality and of the Chatelet, all conspired to render the 
 intendant of Paris inconspicuous. 
 
 Besides this complicating fact that the trade of the region 
 was, in part, controlled by the Chatelet and the Echevinage 
 of Paris, the history of the latter part of the seventeenth century 
 is somewhat confused by the keen rivalry of the two Parisian 
 authorities. The Chatelet was reaching out for more power, 
 the Echevinage was striving to retain at least its old prestige 
 and influence. 
 
 This question of jurisdiction is not without significance as 
 it throws light on the character of the authority of the Chatelet, 
 which was quite different from that of the intendant, and there 
 
302 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 can be little doubt but what the nature of its power had an im- 
 portant influence upon the policy of the Chatelet and upon the 
 development of new means of controlling the grain trade. The 
 Chatelet had the supervision of the trade on land; the Echevin- 
 age had the regulation of the river trade. The jurisdiction of 
 the Chatelet covered infringements of the market regulations in 
 the immediate vicinity of Paris and any illegal conduct occurring 
 during the transportation of the grain to Paris. The old market 
 regulations were primarily ordinances fixing market hours for 
 bourgeois and merchants, excluding merchants from markets 
 within ten leagues of Paris, reserving specified markets to bakers, 
 prohibiting the buying of grain off the markets, along the 
 roadside or in the streets of the town, and also prohibiting 
 partnerships among the merchants. Violence on the part of the 
 inhabitants toward the grain merchants fell naturally within the 
 criminal jurisdiction of the Chatelet. This authority was not 
 unlike that exercised by the baillis and senechaux of the fifteenth 
 and sixteenth centuries, when these functions were acquired by 
 the Chatelet. 1 
 
 The Echevinage of Paris, represented primarily by the Pro- 
 vost of Merchants, had gradually acquired jurisdiction over 
 all water-borne traffic. With the grain trade, this involved the 
 right to prevent the passage of grain through Paris, and even 
 the right to control all the movement on the river down to the 
 bridges at Mantes, which were the boundary between the 
 Rouenese and the Parisian spheres of influence. The most 
 
 ' V 
 
 characteristic features of the jurisdiction of the Provost of 
 Merchants were his right to require the shipment of grain pur- 
 chased with the intention of bringing it to Paris, to prevent 
 the stopping of the grain at intermediate points by the mer- 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21624. 53. Le sommaire des moyens allegues par M. le 
 Prevot des Marchands et fichevins en 1'assemblee qui se faisoit 19 Dec. 1660. 
 H. 1805. Reg. du Bureau, vii^vii. sans date; H. 1825. Ibid., cxxx. 31 Jan. 
 1675; H. 1826. Ibid.^xxxi. 21 Jan. 1678; H. 1835. Ibid., 161. 28 Juin 1695; 
 passim. G 7 . 1632. Paris, 20 Sept. 1693. Dubois. Memoire pour les Prevot 
 des Marchands et fichevins, de Paris. G 7 . 1635. Dec. 1694. Petition au 
 Parlement de Paris. Many other references can be given for details of this interest- 
 ing episode in constitutional history. The story runs along through the Registres 
 du Bureau. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 303 
 
 chants themselves or by the officials or inhabitants of river 
 towns, and to regulate the sale of grain from the boats at the 
 ports of Paris. These powers involved incidental acts which 
 were less precisely determined. Thus, the Provost of Mer- 
 chants had some oversight of the quality of grain sold, of the 
 measures used, and of the various circumstances which might 
 prevent shipment from the point of origin. The merchants 
 were not supposed to store their grain after it was bought, 
 longer than was necessary to accumulate a boat-load. The 
 execution of this provision of course involved some interference 
 with the trade on land in the river towns. Similarly, when 
 market dues were exacted in these shipping points, the merchants 
 could appeal to the Echevinage of Paris, representing that such 
 dues were not properly levied on grain that was purchased 
 in the country and merely brought into the river town for ship- 
 ment. This, of course, raised the question of the right to buy 
 outside the market. 
 
 This confusion as to the nature of the incidental powers of 
 the Echevinage was the basis of the whole conflict of jurisdiction 
 with the Chatelet. The officials of the latter body asserted 
 that they had authority over the grain trade as long as it was 
 on land, whether it was to be shipped to Paris by land or by 
 water. The Echevinage declared that its authority covered 
 the trade entering Paris by water, from the time and place of 
 purchase to the sale on the ports at Paris. 
 
 The merits of the case presented a rather nice point of law. 
 Appeal to precedent was useless, as there had been in the past 
 little effort to regulate the up river trade before it reached the 
 river town. Furthermore, there was scarcely any means of 
 settling the question legally, so that in practice the jurisdiction 
 over the up river trade, while on land, ultimately fell to the body 
 most capable of exercising this new branch of trade regulation. 
 
 In the respect of possessing means of executing its policy 
 the Chatelet had an overwhelming advantage. The type of 
 regulation was practically the same as that applied to the land 
 trade near Paris, so that the accustomed measures could be easily 
 extended to this wider field which lay equally within the general 
 
304 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 jurisdiction of the Chatelet. The special commissaries and the 
 Huissiers d cheval were efficient agents for the execution of the 
 policy and orders of the Lieutenant Civil, who was the principal 
 official representing this aspect of the jurisdiction of the Chatelet. 
 The Provost of Merchants, on the other hand, found himself 
 confronted by a relatively new problem, and without any means 
 of executing his policy, save commissioners whose effectiveness 
 depended largely upon the good will of the local officials invited 
 to execute their orders. Besides these advantages, the Chatelet 
 obtained additional hold upon this jurisdiction through the 
 union in one person of the offices of Lieutenant Civil and Pro- 
 vost of Merchants. This happened several times in the middle 
 of the century, and, as the office of Lieutenant Civil was the 
 more important of the two, the functions of the Provost of 
 Merchants were confused with those of the Lieutenant Civil, 
 establishing precedents which were later extremely awkward for 
 the Echevinage. In this rather devious manner, then, the Chate- 
 let extended its authority and its traditional regulation of 
 markets to the whole area of Parisian supply. 
 
 This novel extension of an old power was not without signifi- 
 cant effects. The Chatelet proposed to control the Parisian 
 grain trade, and to exercise this control, not through the system 
 of prohibitions and licenses devised by the provincial authorities 
 and inherited by the intendants, but by a systematic regulation 
 of the local markets and the grain merchants. This policy 
 was not undertaken as result of any scheme conceived at one 
 time by any individual, but, by a process of evolution, it came 
 to be the policy of the Chatelet. It was a projection of the oldest 
 ideas of .grain trade regulation into an entirely new sphere, 
 in which these old ideas were transformed under stress of cir- 
 cumstance. The Chatelet ultimately gave definite form to 
 commercial customs which became the basis of a new type of 
 market organization. 
 
 The control of the trade in the Seine Basin was thus in the 
 hands of three distinct types of authority: the Chatelet; the 
 municipality of Paris, and, to some extent, other municipal 
 officers; and lastly, the intendants. At times, they worked 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 305 
 
 harmoniously, more frequently there was considerable friction, 
 so that the ultimate result was quite different from that con- 
 templated by any official or group of officials. The history of 
 this complicated tangle of policies and authorities will be clearer 
 if we include in our study the years 1660-63. The situation at 
 that time is a sort of interlude between the older local regulation 
 and that of the three great dearths that mark the closing years 
 of the century. There were no general provincial prohibitions, 
 but many of the towns interfered with shipments of grain. 
 There was also much trouble arising from the disorganization 
 of the local markets. 
 
 In 1660, there was no serious difficulty until early summer. 
 Then the towns on the Marne, Oise, and Seine began to interfere 
 with the movement of grain. At Meaux, Crecy, and a few 
 other places, the townspeople pillaged the boats of the mer- 
 chants. 1 The interruption of traffic soon became so serious 
 that the Chatelet, in October, sent commissioners to many river 
 towns to discover the cause of the cessation of traffic. They 
 went up the Oise to Noyon, up the Marne to Chalons, up the 
 Seine to Port-Moutain, in the vicinity of Bray and Provins. 
 In each town the granaries were inspected, formal reports drawn 
 up, and the officials and townspeople were questioned. 2 Con- 
 siderable quantities of grain were found, and the inquiry sug- 
 gested that the trouble arose primarily from the improper 
 conduct of merchants and municipal officials. In the minds 
 of the commissioners, both merchants and officials were equally 
 guilty. At Chalons, they were told by the Lieutenant General 
 of the town, " that there were 400,000 setiers which could be 
 exported without inconveniencing the town. The cause of 
 disorder in sale of grain was that the Parisian merchants, after 
 buying, would not remove their grain from the granaries in 
 the time agreed upon. They obliged the sellers to bring suits 
 
 1 H. 1815. Reg. du Bureau, cciiiix^iv, 24 Juillet 1660. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 190 ff. Delamare's papers. Original Proces Verbaux, 
 copies, and extra.cts. 
 
 The commissions are of 16 Oct. 1660, and appear in Delamare's Traiti de la 
 Police, 2d ed., II, 376. The commissioners were divided into three groups, one 
 for each river valley. 
 
306 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 against them to force them to clear the granaries." l At Soissons, 
 the commissioners learned of serious abuses in regard to the 
 marketing of the grain. The Parisian merchants bought in 
 the streets of the town, or on the highways outside the gates. 2 
 In both places there was evidence of partnerships among the 
 merchants, and at Soissons there were many assertions that the 
 town officials were engaged in the trade and used their official 
 position to further private ends. 3 A more elaborate description 
 of these associations and the accompanying practices appears 
 in an order of July, 1660". It declares in the preamble that 
 information has been given " that certain merchants have re- 
 cently formed granaries at Paris and disseminated divers 
 false rumors, although the grain is in good condition in the 
 principal provinces. And to contribute to the success of their 
 pernicious design, they have made agreements to buy all the 
 grain of the provincial merchant immediately upon arrival, 
 for fear that the latter would be satisfied with the ordinary 
 honest gain of a merchant. Once possessed of the grain, they 
 could sell at whatever price they pleased. Not content with 
 all these illegal practices, they have ridden post through the 
 provincial towns to spread the false rumors, and to make them 
 more credible they have purchased small quantities of grain 
 at high prices to keep prices up. In consequence of these 
 actions, the inhabitants of some towns have risen and endeavored 
 to prevent shipment to Paris. Then, to profit by their malice, 
 the merchants bring their grain to market a little at a time." 4 
 All these acts were prohibited again and again, both by the 
 Chatelet and by the Echevinage. The ordinance of the Provost 
 of Paris was followed, August 7, by an ordinance of the Provost 
 of Merchants. The merchants were enjoined to ship their grain 
 to Paris without any delays in transit, and to sell the whole 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21641. 190. Oct. 1660. Chalons-sur-Marne. , 
 
 2 Ibid., 250, 254. 6 Nov. 1660. Le Proc. du Roy au Sr. Martinet, fermier du 
 droit d'estallage. 
 
 3 Ibid., Soissons. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 16743. Io8 - 2 9 Juillet 1660. Delamare, op. cit., 2d ed., 
 11,374- 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 307 
 
 boat-load at one price. 1 October 26, the Echevinage again 
 took this matter in hand: "All partnerships and associations 
 in the grain trade are hereby annulled and cancelled. Mer- 
 chants are forbidden to enter into any contracts of this nature 
 in the future. They are enjoined to make their purchases 
 separately, each on his own account, and to divide within a 
 month all grain which they now hold in common." 2 In Novem- 
 ber, the Chatelet issued an ordinance on the same subject. 3 
 
 This dread of associations dominates all the evidence taken 
 by the commissioners of the Chatelet in 1660. They were 
 searching eagerly for just such abuses, and it is hardly surprising 
 that they found what they were looking for. 
 
 The chief result of these inquests was the shipment of large 
 quantities of grain to Paris and the accumulation of information 
 that showed the Parisian officials the necessity of regulating 
 the trade. The conflict of jurisdiction between Chatelet and 
 Echevinage became more intense. The Echevinage resented 
 the action of the Chatelet and the whole case was presented 
 to the Council. 4 The immediate decision favored the Echevin- 
 age, and when difficulties arose in the following year, com- 
 missioners were sent out by that body to regulate all aspects 
 of the river trade. These commissions are the first indication 
 of trouble; two were sent up the Seine and Oise to Soissons, 
 and two up to Chalons. Their commissions were very similar 
 to those of the Chatelet of the preceding year. 5 Shortly after 
 these commissions were issued, the Provost at Chalons pro- 
 ceeded to limit the export from the town to such quantities 
 as he should permit. All the merchants were inscribed on a roll, 
 and permits were issued in order, as the Provost deemed expe- 
 dient. 6 In the following month there were similar restrictions 
 
 1 H. 1815. Reg. du Bureau, ccclvi. 7 Aout 1660. 
 
 2 H. 1815. Ibid., viiii"vii. 22 Oct. 1660. 
 
 3 Delamare, op. tit., 2d ed., II, 377-378. 26 Nov. 1660. 
 
 4 H. 1815. Reg. du Bureau, vii^vii. Long account of both sides of the 
 from the point of view of the fichevinage. 
 
 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 53. Similar statement of the case by the Chatelet. 
 
 5 H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, clxi. 18 Juin 1661; Ibid., clxiii. 18 Juin 1661. 
 
 6 H. 1816. Ibid., ix"xix. 
 
308 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Sit Vitry. 1 Other towns followed their example, and the trade 
 suffered from this species of interference for the rest of the 
 season. Ordinances were issued both by the Chatelet and by 
 the Council, cancelling the prohibitions of the local officials 
 and ordering immediate shipment to Paris. But these measures 
 were not entirely successful. 2 In September, more commissioners 
 were sent out by the Echevinage to go up the rivers to send 
 down grain. 3 Difficulties at Chalons continued, and finally, 
 in January, 1662, one of the Echevins was commissioned to 
 travel through " the provinces of Brie and Champagne, ac- 
 companied by four horsemen, to execute the ordinance of Decem- 
 ber 2, and in consequence, to cause to be shipped to Paris such 
 grain as merchants of Paris or others shall have in store, des- 
 tined for the provision of this town. He shall also see to it 
 that the merchants are not prevented or hindered in any way 
 in the purchase and transport of grain. He shall cause the 
 granaries to be opened and have the grain placed on sale, and 
 to that end, if need be, have it carried to the neighboring markets. 
 He shall also inquire into the acts of violence which are com- 
 mitted to prevent shipments of grain. Similarly, he shall 
 investigate the associations, monopolies, or other evil practices, 
 and the transport of grain from the kingdom." 4 He was given 
 plenary power to act in the name of the town and to call upon 
 any judicial officers for assistance. The commission is interest- 
 ing because of the inclusion of the power to regulate the markets, 
 and the recommendation of an investigation of the practices 
 of the merchants. But it was an undertaking which was not 
 really carried out. The principal prohibition of export was at 
 Chalons; and there, despite all that had been done in the fall of 
 1 66 1, despite the plenary powers of Mouthers, the Echevin of 
 Paris, the restrictions were maintained at least as late as May 6. 
 The merchants were still compelled to dispose of a large pro- 
 portion of their grain to the Echevins of Chalons, as a condition 
 
 1 H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, clxxii. 5 Juillet 1661. 
 
 2 H. 1816. Ibid., iMiiii, cites arret of 2 Sept. 1661. Delamare, op. cit., II, 382, 
 2 ded. 
 
 * H. 1816. Ibid., iMiiii. 20 Sept. 1661. 
 4 H. 1816. Ibid., iii c xxxvii. 14 Jan. 1662. 
 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 309 
 
 of being allowed to export the rest. 1 The conclusion of the 
 episode does not appear, but the mission of Mouthers was appar- 
 ently a failure. 
 
 These years are instructive because they made the Parisian 
 authorities realize that the delayed shipments and prohibitions 
 might be due even more largely to defective market organization 
 than to the actual lack of grain so frequently alleged by the 
 officials in the producing regions. The minute investigations 
 of the Chatelet in 1660 were entirely new, and revealed a situa- 
 tion that was quite unlike the Utopian dreams of Colbert and 
 his predecessors. The necessities of Paris made them feel 
 the vital importance of uninterrupted trade, and their careful 
 investigation of the causes of the municipal prohibitions was 
 destined to inaugurate great changes. The main lines of the 
 policy of the future appear in the Proces Verbaux of the Chatelet, 
 and more definitely in the commission of Mouthers. It is to 
 be a policy of regulation of merchants and markets, which are 
 to be made to work without the constant interference of admin- 
 istrative officials. But these years do no more than suggest 
 the break with the old traditions. The details of the policy 
 are not clear ; the active agents in its execution are uncertain. 
 
 After 1662, there is a long interval during which there are 
 few incidents worthy of note. The Echevinage had petty 
 cases brought before it from time to time, but the regulation 
 of the grain trade does not again become important until 1693. 
 Then, all the issues of 1662 reappeared. The officials in Cham- 
 pagne declared that dearth was such an immediate menace 
 that prohibitions were necessary. The Parisian officials were 
 more inclined to believe that the real source of all the trouble 
 lay in the disorganization of the markets and in the associations 
 of merchants designed to create corners and to control prices. 
 As a matter of fact, there was probably some truth on both sides. 
 
 The general history of the years 1693-94 differs slightly from 
 that of other years of dearth. Apprehensions arose in part from 
 
 1 H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, iiittiii**. 14 Fev. 1662. H. 1816. Ibid., iiii c xix. 
 12 Avril 1662. H. 1816. Ibid., iiii c xxii. 13 Avril 1662. H. 1816. Ibid., iiiMxvii. 
 6 Mai 1662. 
 
310 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 the light crop of 1693, and the poor prospects for the succeeding 
 harvest filled the summer and fall with violence and unrest. 
 In January, 1693, the first complaints began to come in from 
 the outer edge of the Beauce. The Lieutenant of the Prevote 
 at Montargis writes : " There is a man here acting for M. Berthe- 
 lot of Plaineuf, who is shipping all the wheat in our province. 
 He says that it is for the Invalides. Every one complains of 
 the granaries he is forming, for it is certain that we shall be with- 
 out grain in a month. If I had not taken pains to stop six 
 grain boats last year, we should have suffered from famine, 
 and the situation is much more serious this year as there is no 
 old grain from the preceding harvest." l The Procureur du 
 Roy writes about the same time: " We are all persuaded that 
 this grain of M. Berthelot cannot be shipped without causing 
 a dearth in this little province which scarcely raises enough for 
 its own maintenance." 2 In May, the Provost of Merchants 
 issued an ordinance which refers to interference with the grain 
 trade in " many places of Brie, Burgundy, and Gatinais." 
 " The inhabitants have even maltreated the merchants and 
 cut the ropes of the boats." 3 The violence is especially notable 
 at Montargis and vicinity. " At Rogin, three or four peasants, 
 or rather their wives, took twenty to thirty bushels of grain 
 from the blatiers who had come to buy in that parish." 4 In 
 August, the local authorities at Chalons were roused to the point 
 of taking measures to secure grain on the account of the munici- 
 pality. Much of this was for the indigent, but the pressure 
 of dearth was beginning to be felt generally. Larcher, the 
 Intendant, also complained of high prices and danger of scar- 
 city. 5 Shipments were prevented at Nogent-sur-Seine. 6 In 
 January, 1694, there was real suffering at Rheinis: " Out of 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Montargis (Jan.-Fev.) 1693. Gaillard a Creil, Intendant a Orleans. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1632. Ibid. M. Le Proc. du Roy a Creil. 
 
 3 H. 1834. Reg. du Bureau, 204. 15 Mai 1693. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1632. Montargis, 30 Mai 1693. Monard, Prevot des Marechaux, 
 i. e. chief police officer. 
 
 6 G 7 . 1630. Chalons, 26 Aout 1693. fichevins de Chalons. Chalons, 27 
 Aout 1693. Henri, fiveque de Chalons. Chalons, 8 Sept. 1693. Larcher. 
 6 H. 1834. Reg. du Bureau, 340. 9 Sept. 1693. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 31 1 
 
 the 25,000 or 26,000 persons, of which the town is composed, 
 1 1,000 or 12,000 are reduced to begging, and have to be supported 
 by alms. But all the pains that have been taken have not 
 prevented the death of 4,000 within the last six months." 1 
 About the same time, Chalons and Vitry were hard pressed. 
 There was no prohibition at Vitry, but the port of Chalons 
 was closed by the Echevins. 2 The other details may be easily 
 inferred, but as the bulk of the information is not large, it is 
 hardly safe to imagine a very extensive dearth. There were 
 no general prohibitions and the municipal interference came 
 more largely from the inhabitants than from the officials. On 
 July 10, thaChatelet sent out commissioners. The commission 
 declared " that several ill disposed people had made divers 
 monopolies to evade the royal ordinances, and had diverted 
 from its proper course much of the grain that should have been 
 brought to Paris or to neighboring markets." 3 MM. Poiret 
 and Chevalier went through Hurepoix, the Beauce, and Vexin, 
 MM. le Maistre and du Mesnil, through France, Valois, and 
 Picardy, Delamare and le Page, through Brie, Burgundy, and 
 Champagne. " The results of these investigations confirmed 
 the conjecture that the malice of men had been much more 
 truly the cause of the dearth than actual scarcity of grain. 
 The commissioners found the grain of the preceding harvests 
 on all sides, in the farms, in the houses of the wealthy bourgeois, 
 and in the granaries of the merchants. They enjoined each 
 individual to carry a certain quantity of grain to the nearest 
 market and to bring back a certificate from the judge. They 
 attended the markets themselves, as far as their itinerary would 
 permit, and they had the satisfaction of seeing abundance 
 reestablished by the grain they had sent to market." 
 
 The commissioners Delamare and le Page reached Sens, 
 Thursday, July 22. Saturday they were told that there was 
 a riot in the central square where the market was held. " They 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 349, 1272. 13 Jan. 1694. Lieu 8 . Gen*, du Conseil, et 
 fichevins de Reims. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1634. Chalons, 17 Jan. 1694. Larcher. G 7 . 227. Placet des Maire et 
 fichevins de Chalons. 
 
 3 Delamare, op. cit., 2d ed., II, 1053. 10 Juillet 1694. 
 
312 TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 went thither . . . and finally discovered that a rich cultivator 
 of a village near Sens, who worked his farm himself, had his 
 barns filled with old grain, but nevertheless came each market day 
 to buy more. He always paid more than the current price and 
 forced prices up. ... That day, at the opening of the market, 
 the man's wife had come and forced prices up three sous per 
 bichet, which had caused the people to attack her and to besiege 
 the house to which she had fled. . . . The woman was sent to 
 prison. . . . The Provost of Sens went to the village where 
 she lived, and found the grain as indicated. A part was con- 
 fiscated and the farmer fined. 
 
 " All these pains that the commissioners took in the provinces 
 had indeed for their object the relief of all, but their principal 
 intention and care was always to reestablish abundance on the 
 markets of Paris. The movement which they gave to trade, 
 getting the grain out of the places in which it was hoarded and 
 having it brought to market, gave the merchants and Uatiers 
 an opportunity to buy, and made the grain work its way down 
 towards the capital. The discovery and the opening of the 
 granaries on or near the rivers, the great numbers of boats which 
 they had loaded and sent down to Paris, were a great aid. Fur- 
 thermore, they spread a terror among the merchants by their 
 investigations of the practices of those who had caused high 
 prices by their usuries 1 and monopolies, by the imprisonment 
 of some of the principal offenders and the suits against others. 
 . . . The merchants were thus obliged to confine themselves 
 within the limits of legitimate trade. 
 
 "By these means the price of grain diminished at Paris, 
 ten days after the departure of the commissioners, from 54 
 per setier to 36 U . Two days later prices fell to 32^ and in the 
 same week to 28, 27, 26; at the end of the month wheat was 
 at 20. This fall in prices continued to Martinmas when the 
 best wheat was selling at 15 to i6 n . Thus ended that apparent 
 dearth and that period of high prices which lasted nearly two 
 
 1 Doubtless purchases on earnest money, which enabled a man to control a 
 large supply by means of a small sum of ready money. The right to the crop 
 was frequently secured by loans to the farmers. 
 
REGULATION OF TEE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 313 
 
 years." l The fall in prices was, of course, due in part to the 
 harvest, which naturally relieved much of the pressure. How- 
 ever, it is probable that Delamare's interpretation of this par- 
 ticular year in this region is just. The element of panic was 
 always great, even in regions where there was little serious 
 trouble, and this unreasoning fear which disorganized trade 
 was doubtless the whole basis of such difficulties in 1693-94 
 as were not directly due to the illegal conduct of the grain 
 merchants. 
 
 The fichevinage had also made an attempt to enforce the 
 market regulations and to restrain the grain merchants. In 
 December, 1693, fines of 500 apiece were imposed upon Philipon, 
 the widow Cressy, Channes, Mercier, the widow Chaillot and 
 de la Noue, all of Bray, " for having purchased grain in the 
 country districts of the peasants and farmers, both threshed 
 and un threshed, and for having gone out of town to meet the 
 peasants bringing grain to the markets, and for having bid up 
 prices one against another, both outside and on the markets, 
 and for having set prices higher than that of the opening of 
 the market." 2 There are also orders against the delaying of 
 shipments on their way to Paris, and against associations of 
 merchants. 3 The principal denunciation of these practices 
 is that of October 19, 1694. " The excessive dearness of grain 
 having forced us to investigate its causes, we have recognized 
 that several provincial merchants, expecting that their con- 
 traventions would not come to our notice, have formed associa- 
 tions to increase prices. Furthermore, they did not ship to Paris 
 the grain that they had purchased in Champagne, Brie, and 
 other provinces, intending to buy and sell amongst themselves, 
 for great profits were made in that way. They accordingly 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 1054-55, 2d ed. 
 
 Some of the Proces Verbaux of these commissions are now in Delamare's papers 
 at the Bib. Nat., and some of this evidence has been used previously. But I 
 do not feel sure that all the Proces Verbaux are now in Delamare's collection. 
 Some may have been lost, the rest might perhaps be found in the Serie Y at the 
 Arch. Nat. 
 
 2 H. 1834. Reg. du Bureau, 382. i Dec. 1693. 
 
 3 H. 1834. Ibid., 482. 18 Mars 1694. H. 1834. Ibid., 494. 2 Avril 1694. 
 
314 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 neglected to bring their grain to Paris, so that it reached Paris 
 only after having passed through divers hands and after the 
 price had been very considerably increased. Furthermore 
 divers persons, induced by reprehensible avarice, preferred 
 the grain trade to more honorable professions in which they 
 were engaged, and made extensive purchases in the said prov- 
 inces both in the towns and in the country; this they do by 
 means of agents who compete with the ordinary merchants." 
 The intentions of the Echevinage were thus quite as far-reaching 
 as those of the Chatelet, but its lack of executive power was a 
 serious obstacle. In order to enforce the ordinances which the 
 merchants had infringed in the manner described, the Lieutenant 
 General of the Baillage of Vitry was ordered to enforce the 
 regulations in Champagne. 1 An ordinance was actually issued 
 November 15, 1694, by the Chatelet. The activities of the 
 Chatelet appear, in part, in Delamare's description of his tour, 
 but even more distinctly in the account of the prosecution of 
 Jean Roger. 
 
 Roger had been engaged in the grain trade since 1656, when 
 he established himself at Paris. He had long been one of the 
 principal merchants of Paris, and it is beyond question that 
 he changed the character of his business considerably in 1693. 
 Up to that time, he had bought principally in the vicinity of 
 Soissons. In that year, he transferred his operations to the 
 upper Seine Valley. 2 As early as January, 1693, Roger is 
 accused of being the most unprincipled and most avaricious 
 of the grain merchants. " He is absolute master in all the 
 markets where grain is exposed for sale, and of the farmers, 
 cultivators, and the minor merchants, to whom he gives the 
 law personally or through his factors. ... It is known that 
 the said Roger, since the months of May and June (1692) has 
 taken up grain in the markets of Provins, Mary-sur-Seine, 
 
 1 H. 1835. Reg. du Bureau, 63. 19 Oct. 1694. See G 7 . 1635. Letter of 
 De la Reynie,.4 Dec. 1694, apropos of Le Blanc's Ordonnance of 15 Nov. 
 
 2 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 368. Factum pour Jean Roger (imprime). This is 
 a defence of Roger. There is a reference to him in H. 1816. Reg. du Bureau, 
 Ixxxvii. 5 Avril 1661. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 315 
 
 Bray, Nogent, Sergines, Pont, Montereau, Sens, Melun, and 
 other places, in farms, in tithe barns, and in the houses of private 
 individuals. It is a prodigious quantity in all, which would 
 have sufficed to supply Paris for a year. It would be impossible 
 to imagine what has become of it all, were it not for the immense 
 granaries which he has in divers places. . . . 
 
 " Viard, whom every one knows, is also under agreement 
 with Roger and Crecy, to subject France to famine. They en- 
 gage in (commercial) war with the provincial merchants both 
 in the provinces and at the Port de la Greve, trying to render 
 themselves masters of their grain. Viard, Roger, La Bague, 
 and Tournois write to their factors to ship no grain by land 
 or water, except by their express orders." l 
 
 These were the general accusations against Roger, and the 
 presence of these memoirs in Delamare's papers doubtless indi- 
 cates that they furnished the initial impulse in the suit against 
 Roger. At all events, proceedings were well under way in the 
 middle of July, 1694, shortly after the departure of Delamare 
 on his commission of July 10. De la Reynie, Lieutenant de la 
 Police at Paris, writes on the fifteenth: " I have seen by what 
 we are doing in the Roger affair that Colmet, farmer of the 
 ' minage ' at Bray, has done much to cause the disorders 
 there. It is important that you should amass as much evidence 
 as possible against him, not only as regards his doings at Bray, 
 but in other places. . . . He has come to Paris since the im- 
 prisonment of Roger to confer and receive instructions. He 
 will return to Bray Saturday, and you can have him arrested 
 on the writ that I have issued against him." 2 
 
 Delamare reached Bray at eight o'clock in the evening, on 
 the eighteenth. The next morning, Colmet was arrested and his 
 papers confiscated. Besides ten letters of Roger to Colmet, 
 accounts of all their dealings were found. These indicate that 
 the size of the business of Roger was hardly exaggerated: 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21642. 290 et 293. 15 Jan. 1693. Memoire des auteurs de 
 la Cause de la Cherte des Bleds, par Leger de la Verbissonne. 
 
 2 Ibid. 309. Paris, 15 Juillet 1694. De la Reynie a Delamare. 
 
3l6 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 27 Aug. 1692 15 Jan. 1693 .... 
 
 Remittances 
 of money 
 
 73,595 
 
 Shipments 
 of grain 
 
 4^,298 U 
 
 Grain in Bray 
 and vicinity 
 
 28 298 U 
 
 15 Jan. 1693 30 April 
 
 e<r,4Q7 
 
 T*0 ? V^ 
 
 AQ 78^ 
 
 .&U, ^.\^^j 
 57IO 
 
 30 Apr. 1693 6 Nov 
 
 08 01 3 
 
 T~y ? / o 
 
 96,988 
 
 it *y 
 
 I 526 
 
 6 Nov. 1693 15 Mar. 1694 . . . . 
 15 Mar. 1694 13 June 
 
 y u > wj ->5 
 .... 60,480 
 
 65,128 
 
 56,655 
 62,626 
 
 3,825 
 2,$02 1 
 
 The next day witnesses were summoned to testify in regard 
 to the case. Much of this testimony has been used in another 
 connection and a repetition here is needless; suffice it to say 
 that there was abundant evidence that Colmet had disorganized 
 the trade at Bray and in the surrounding towns, buying in the 
 country, forming granaries at Bray and buying much that was 
 offered at the market. The trade of the region was, to a great 
 degree, in his control. The general accusations were thus justi- 
 fied in large measure. 
 
 The principal point legally, however, was the question of 
 partnerships and agreements with other merchants. On this 
 subject the accusations are admitted even by the " Factum pour 
 Roger." " Asked if it was not true that the partnership with 
 Huge had been kept secret in order to raise the price of grain, 
 the defendant replies that, if this was kept secret, it was only 
 because the l Commissionaires Facteurs ' might have claimed 
 30 sous per muid as fee, although the merchants of Paris have 
 always been exempt from this due. 2 Furthermore, these part- 
 nerships between merchants have always been practised, and it 
 would be difficult to furnish the ports without clerks or partners 
 in the provinces, and inasmuch as the grain has always been 
 sold at the price current when the boat arrived, the public has 
 suffered no injury. ... If the partnership had been formed 
 by several merchants of the same province to buy all the grain 
 and thereby render themselves masters of the price, . . . that 
 would be a case contemplated as illegal by the law. . . . Fur- 
 thermore, if the defendant has entered into partnerships, they 
 are with provincial merchants more than ten leagues from Paris. 
 The utility of this type of establishment is so well recognized 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 2 1642. 300. Notes f aites par Delamare des " Papiers trouvges 
 Chez Colmet." 19 Juillet 1694. 
 
 2 This form of question and answer seems to be adopted merely for convenience. 
 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 317 
 
 at the Hotel de Ville, that when disputes arise between the 
 merchants of Paris and their partners in the country, the Pro- 
 vost of Merchants decides the case in accordance with the clauses 
 of the partnership agreement." 
 
 The question of delaying shipments with reference to the 
 condition of the market was more difficult. A specific case was 
 alleged, and no effort was made to deny the fact, but a defence 
 of a rather slippery character was forthcoming. 
 
 " By a letter written by the defendant to Huge, to delay 
 for a few days the shipment of 100 muids of grain which they 
 had put into partnership, the defendant shows that this was 
 done not with the intention of making a great gain, but merely 
 because he had other grain on the ports. ... As for the gain 
 on that 100 muids, it is true that it came to 1800 apiece, 
 but that profit ought not to be considered unjust if all the risks 
 of the trade are considered." l 
 
 The defense set forth in this little pamphlet is extremely 
 clever and very well calculated to calm the popular feeling against 
 the defendant. But the evasiveness of the answers is signif- 
 icant. The one point that was really sound was the assertion 
 that partnerships had become legal through the tacit recogni- 
 tion by the Provost of Merchants. That was the crucial ques- 
 tion. The law of the case ultimately depended upon the legality 
 or illegality of the trading partnerships and associations of mer- 
 chants ; the merchants could produce decisive evidence to prove 
 that such partnerships had long existed; the authorities could 
 produce a long series of prohibitions. The case is important 
 for bringing a definite issue between the traditional prohibition 
 of partnerships and the actual development of partnerships 
 among the- merchants. Both the Chatelet and Echevinage had 
 cried out against these associations of merchants in 1660-63, 
 and again in the years 1693-94, to say nothing of spasmodic 
 outbursts in the interim. 2 Both official bodies were inclined 
 
 1 All these citations are from the Factum pour Jean Roger. Bib. Nat., Fr. 
 21642. 368. ch. 7 of the Factum. 
 
 2 It is possible that the edict of Sept. 1690 for the creation of 60 grain brokers 
 at Paris should be cited in this connection. The measure, however, seems to be 
 
318 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 to attribute much of the trouble to the dealings of these associ- 
 ated merchants. On the whole, they were probably right in 
 their judgment of the situation, but they did not have any means 
 of distinguishing between legal and proper partnerships and the 
 partnerships formed with a distinct intention to manipulate 
 the Parisian market. Roger had doubtless been engaged in 
 wholesale manipulation of the local and the Parisian markets, 
 but the most that could be done was to impose a fine. In short, 
 officials had put their hands on the real difficulty, but they 
 had not found the true remedy. The practices of Roger and 
 his associates were made possible by the inadequacy of market 
 organization. The creation of wholesale markets was the most 
 effective means of keeping the merchants within proper bounds. 
 Visibility of supply and a. proper correlation of local and metro- 
 politan interests were the true solution of the problem. 
 
 After 1693, the effort to suppress partnerships ceased to play 
 an important part in the regulation of the trade. The old 
 laws remained on the registers, but there was no such serious 
 attempt to enforce them as in 1693, though the popular dread 
 of monopolies always kept the subject in view. 
 
 The years 1698 and 1699 served to emphasize an element 
 that the Parisian officials were disposed to overlook, the possi- 
 bility of a serious depletion of local supplies in the producing 
 regions. There had been prohibitions in Soissons in 1693-94, 
 but Soissons was not one of the most important sources of supply, 
 and the Parisian officials were more impressed by the quantity 
 of grain on the Seine and Marne than they were by the scarcity 
 in Santerre and Soissonnais. 
 
 Our information for these years is singularly incomplete; 
 the Chatelet and Echevinage do little in the Upper Marne, 
 so that we have nothing but scattered letters from Larcher, 
 the Intendant in Champagne. He had been strongly impressed 
 by conditions in 1697, when the markets had been very notably 
 disturbed in November by activity of the merchants and blatiers. 
 
 more or less of a financial expedient, and I do not like to take it too seriously. See 
 Delamare, op. cit., II, 967, 970. H. 1834. Reg. du Bureau, 75, 147, 272-282. 
 G 7 . 1630. Chalons, 1693. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 319 
 
 The high prices lasted only three or four markets at Chalons 
 and Vitry, however, and although he resorted to prohibitions 
 at Sedan and Mezieres, he did not interfere with the Parisian 
 trade. But he was disposed towards a prohibitive policy. 
 Otherwise he would hardly have been so ready with his general 
 prohibition in September, 1698: " I have been through the can- 
 tons of Rheims, Rethel, and Sainte-Menehould where I have 
 found that there is very little grain and that prices are rising 
 daily. . . . Here in Vitry, which has the largest grain trade 
 of any town in the province, and the only town where the mer- 
 chants have granaries, I discovered by means of an inquiry that 
 there is about 30,000 seders, Parisian measure. This is hardly 
 sufficient for the subsistence of Vitry, and the succor of Rheims, 
 Chalons, Saint-Dizier, and Joinville. I have given or*ders that 
 none should leave Vitry except for those towns, and I have sent 
 word to the Provost of Merchants, so that he may not be 
 surprised if the merchants of Vitry send no grain to Paris, 
 where I hear there is abundance and lower prices than here in 
 Champagne." 1 
 
 The Controleur General thought that Larcher was somewhat 
 over-anxious, 2 but the difficulties in Champagne increased. 
 Prices rose steadily. There were constant complaints, and many 
 of the larger towns had sent deputations, representing that there 
 had been no wheat at the markets for several weeks. Larcher 
 did his best to meet the trouble, but he could not do much, as 
 the wheat crop had been a failure and there was little old wheat. 
 The best farms had scarcely yielded enough to serve as seed. 
 Fortunately, barley, oats, rye, and buckwheat were plentiful 
 and three-quarters of the rural population was living on those 
 grains. But even these were excessively high, and it was to 
 be feared that supplies would be exhausted before the end of 
 the year. The common people were becoming anxious, and 
 distributions of public grain were necessary to allay the fear. 
 At his suggestion, indeed, Troyes, Rheims, Sedan and other 
 towns had held several markets with grain brought in from 
 
 1 G 7 . 228. Vitry, 21 Sept. 1698. Larcher. 
 * Apostille sur la lettre. 
 
32O THE GRAIN' TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 outside. Other towns would have liked to adopt the same policy, 
 but lacked the necessary funds, and could find none to under- 
 take the enterprise. Besides, they did not know where to pro- 
 cure grain and they feared violence. 
 
 At the end of the month, Larcher issued an ordinance pro- 
 hibiting export from the province, cancelling all contracts " for 
 the delivery of grain, and urging the peasants to thresh and 
 bring their grain to market." A copy was sent to the Controleur 
 General, who replied: " There is no desire to condemn the 
 ordinance, but it cannot be approved. The essential thing 
 is that the prices of grain diminish." l Despite the ordinance, 
 difficulty was experienced at Troyes; 2 in February, Chalons was 
 obliged to purchase grain on public security. 3 
 
 There was little positive regulation on the part of the Chatelet 
 that is of great importance. Delamare, however, was not 
 inactive, and a trip to Bray, made in January, 1699, seems to 
 have been influential. The object of the trip was doubtless 
 the same as in 1694, but although the grain merchants were 
 found to be guilty of various illegal practices, nothing seems 
 to have been done. The ordinary market at Bray was com- 
 pletely disorganized, 4 but an informal market had grown up 
 and the significant fact is Delamare 's acquiescence in this 
 illegal commercial custom. He says, in his Traite de la Police: 
 11 The market is held Friday, but the peasants and blatiers 
 have become accustomed to bring their grain to town on all 
 days of the week, exposing it for sale at the Halle, so that there 
 is a sort of continuous market. This extension of the market 
 is not authorized by any regulation. Custom alone has estab- 
 lished it, but according to the testimony of the officers and 
 inhabitants experience has shown that it is useful to the 
 trade." 5 
 
 1 All the above in Boislisle, op. cit., II, 500, 1787. Nov. 16. 
 
 2 G 7 . 228. Troyes, 7 Dec. 1698. Maire et Echevins, 23 Dec. 1698. 
 
 3 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 518, 1838. 8, 16 Nov. 1699. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21643. 317. Proces Verbal a Bray-sur-Seine, 3 Jan. 1699. I 
 infer that this is the basis of the notice on the market at Bray in the Traite de la 
 Police. 
 
 6 Delamare, op. cit., II, 977, 2d ed. Bray-sur-Seine. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 
 
 The perception of the practical value of a continuous whole- 
 sale market was of importance, because it exerted a controlling 
 influence upon the policy pursued by Delamare at Vitry in 
 1709, where conditions were gradually tending in the same 
 direction. The suppression of partnerships was abandoned 
 as a policy, and there was an obvious unwillingness to interfere 
 very much with the trade. Even the prohibitive policy of the 
 Intendant was very mildly criticized, and Delamare, the princi- 
 pal agent of the Chatelet in this phase of its action, was more 
 than ever inclined to adopt a purely empirical policy, founded 
 on commercial usages. 
 
 By 1708, de Harouys had become Intendant in Champagne, 
 a man much less inclined to use prohibitions than Larcher had 
 been. Harouys could not escape entirely from the idea of a 
 control of trade by licenses, but his intentions were liberal. 
 This is indeed the striking feature of the policy pursued in 
 the grain trade in the latter part of 1708 and the first six months 
 of 1709, when the Intendant and the Controleur General had 
 control. 
 
 Some little pressure had appeared soon after the harvest of 
 1708, but Harouys was determined not to issue prohibitions. 
 In November, 1708, he told the merchants of Vitry and Perthois 
 that they would be allowed to continue their trade with Paris, 
 on the basis of licenses. 1 This policy was continued throughout 
 December, January, and February. Harouys considered it 
 eminently successful and wrote, February 13: "After having 
 prevented the merchants from scouring the country and selling 
 to each other, I have established a complete freedom for the 
 circulation of grain by means of licenses. I have had the satis- 
 faction of seeing prices fall, at a season when every one expected 
 them to rise. The markets are adequately furnished. ... I 
 have been opposed in this policy only by the officers of police, 
 most particularly by a regulation issued by the Lieutenant 
 of Police at S6zanne. . . . ' The grain of one Robert was 
 seized, a part confiscated, and a general order issued, prohibit- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 9 Dec. 1708. De Harouys. G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 21 
 Jan. 1709. De Harouys. G 7 . 1642. Chalons, n Fev. 1709. De Harouys. 
 
322 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 ing trade in grain in the Baillage of Sezanne. Harouys annulled 
 the order of the Lieutenant of Police. 1 The Parisian officials, 
 however, did not approve of this act, and their criticism induced 
 Harouys to abandon the policy of giving licenses. 2 The trade 
 was left to itself for a while, but the license system was ultimately 
 restored. 
 
 At Vitry, the local officials found it necessary to make some 
 provision for the needs of the town itself, and in March all 
 merchants were ordered to sell to the town at the market price 
 5 se tiers of every 100 exported. This was sold to the indigent 
 by the Subdelegue at Vitry. 3 
 
 These were the measures proposed by the general administra- 
 tive staff to avert distress. It is merely the result of the dis- 
 trust of the traditional prohibitive policy. The merchants 
 were left almost entirely to their own devices, with a slight 
 restraint designed to safeguard the local interests. The only 
 constructive element in the policy was this endeavor to enforce 
 upon the wholesale trade its responsibility for local wants. 
 
 This policy was shown to be inadequate by the course of 
 events in April, May, and June. The first sign of trouble came 
 from Bassigny. " The subdelegues of Langres and Chaumont 
 write me," says de Harouys April i, " that since you have deemed 
 it expedient to suspend the use of licenses, the merchants of 
 Burgundy and other provinces have entered Bassigny and are 
 carrying off all the grain, without regard to the prices they have 
 to pay. That little district which is usually one of the surest 
 resources of Champagne will soon be exhausted." 4 
 
 Two weeks later, disasters affecting the crop increased the 
 apprehension throughout the province. " All the municipal 
 corporations come to me to demand grain for public granaries. 
 From Perthois to the Meuse on one side and to Troyes on the 
 other, Vitry is the only town that can furnish them with supplies. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 13 Fev. 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1642. Paris, 26 Fev. 1709. Daguesseau au C. G. G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 
 28 Fev. 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1642. Paris, 14 Mars 1709. Lallement. G 7 . 1642. Vitry, 26 Mars 
 1709. M. le Subdelegue" a Vitry. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, i Avril 1709. De Harouys. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 323 
 
 But quite apart from the fact that there are only 30,000 setiers 
 in Vitry, the merchants of Paris and several factors . . . have 
 purchased so large a quantity that the granaries of Vitry will 
 be exhausted if some measures are not taken at once. I am 
 quite well aware that the provinces should succor Paris, but 
 in order to prevent the exhaustion of Champagne, the matter 
 must be conducted with some system." l An additional com- 
 plication appeared in the necessity of securing provisions for 
 the armies in the Low Countries. These purchases were made 
 almost entirely through the intendants, and generally quota 
 were levied on the various towns. 2 
 
 The town of Chalons considered itself seriously threatened. 
 An exact enumeration of all the grain in the town was made, 
 and it was found that there was only enough for six or seven 
 months. No grain was then coming in from the country, and 
 the neighboring villages were quite dependent upon Chalons. 3 
 A committee of nineteen had been formed to take charge of 
 the grain trade. They were to fix the price of grain and of 
 bread, to decide what villages should be allowed to buy bread 
 and grain in the town, and to determine the quantity of grain 
 which should be assigned each week to the inhabitants. 4 
 
 All these provisions indicate the fallacy underlying the whole 
 policy of prohibitions, the notion that the true basis of calcula- 
 tion is the condition at any one moment, supposing that all 
 trade were stopped. The town that could not see within its 
 walls enough grain to last till the harvest was sure to raise the 
 cry of dearth, or, even as at Chalons, when there was just about 
 enough to last till after the harvest (six months from April). 
 The conception of a continuous flow of trade was entirely 
 foreign to the thought of the ordinary bourgeois of the time, 
 and it is only fair to say that trade was hardly regular 
 enough to warrant much general confidence. Still, the main- 
 tenance of trade with proper market regulations was the only 
 
 1 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 14 Avril 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 1 6 Avril 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 27 Avril 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 4 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21648. 234. Imprime. Chambre Particuliere pour la police 
 des bleds dans la Ville de Chalons. 
 
324 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 remedy. The mere shutting of the gates of each town was 
 quite inadequate. 
 
 In a sense, it is unfair to insinuate that a continuous circula- 
 tion of trade was not desired. The more accurate statement 
 would be that the trade was forever stopping in times of dearth, 
 and, as no one seemed to be able to keep it moving, every one 
 proceeded to hold what he had. This all appears in a letter 
 of de Harouys of April 30: "As regards the 15,000-20,000 
 sacks of wheat and rye that you ordered me to buy to be sent 
 to Charleville, I must tell you that the agents I sent to the 
 elections of Vitry and Sainte-Menehould have just come back 
 without having been able to buy a single sack. At first, when 
 every one feared an extreme dearth, which is now only too 
 certain, those who had grain in store, whether from their farms 
 or from purchases, made no difficulty about selling. The only 
 obstacle was the violence shown by the people. But now matters 
 have come to such a pass that those who have grain are afraid 
 to sell, for fear of the violence with which they are threatened." 1 
 Rheims was threatened seriously by this general cessation 
 of trade. " Here, we are all in the throes of dearth," write the 
 Lieutenant General and the Echevins. " Not one grain of 
 wheat comes to the market. The little that we have is being 
 consumed, and even the grain grown in our election is stopped 
 everywhere. Yesterday we sent some carters to Pouilly and 
 Hery, with an escort of fifteen men to get 120 setiers of wheat, 
 that we had bought. All in vain. The peasants assembled 
 with arms and prevented the passage of the grain. . . . Sieur 
 de Vige, whose grain has already been a great aid, told us that 
 he had a large quantity at Verdun and in that vicinity, but that 
 it would be impossible to get it here without an escort of regular 
 troops." 2 It is the same story at Troyes. " Yesterday we 
 sent a convoy of twenty wagons with a company of archers to 
 Chavange, to bring in the grain that we have bought for the 
 
 1 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 30 Avril 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1642. Reims, 20-30 Avril 1709. Lieu. Gen. du Conseil et fichevins 
 de R., a Harouys. 
 
 G 7 . 1642. Reims, 30 Avril 1709. M. le Lieu. Ge"n.; Savary, Ancien Maire; 
 et d'Origny, Avocat du Roy au C. G. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 325 
 
 provision of our town. We had reason to believe, too, that the 
 licenses and orders of the intendant would be respected and 
 would facilitate the passage of the grain. But things were 
 carried to such a point that not only were the sacks of grain 
 stolen, but the archers and carters were quite unable to resist 
 the force of three villages combined in a body of three thousand 
 strong, so that our men were obliged to seek safety in flight 
 after being exceedingly misused." l 
 
 Meanwhile, exports to Paris continued from Vitry and to 
 some extent from Chalons. 2 This trade was carried on under 
 cover of licenses, and violence did not manifest itself there as 
 soon as in the country districts. It is this factor that rendered 
 the situation really serious, a continuance of exports from the 
 shipping ports, despite a cessation of the movement from the 
 country districts. But riots soon began in Vitry and Chalons. 
 The first trouble at Vitry was on May 10, when the people 
 endeavored to prevent shipments to Rheims and to Paris. 3 
 De Harouys immediately began to assemble troops; in the course 
 of a fortnight regiments were sent up from the Beauce to main- 
 tain order. There was a tumult at Chalons, but no one was 
 killed. 4 
 
 This seems to have been the crisis. The month of June passed 
 more quietly, and although the promise of the harvest was not 
 great, it inevitably tended to relieve pressure. It was at this 
 time that Delamare made his first trip to Champagne, after 
 the worst period of congestion, but while trade was still com- 
 pletely disorganized. Up to that time, there had been no 
 successful attempt to restore the normal conditions of circu- 
 lation, and this was the problem to which Delamare addressed 
 himself. 
 
 Among the papers now at the National Library, there is a 
 memoir of 1709, which seems to contain an outline of the policy 
 Delamare proposed to adopt. If it was not drawn up before 
 
 1 G 7 . 1642. Troyes, 8 Mai 1709. Maire et fichevins. See also letter of the 
 Notables of Troyes, n Mai 1709. G 7 . 1642. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 9 Mai 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 12 Mai 1709. De Harouys. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1642. Chalons, 1 8 Mai 1709. De Harouys. 
 
326 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 he actually reached Vitry, it must have been written soon 
 after his arrival: 
 
 " In order to maintain the continuity of trade between Lorraine, Bar, 
 
 Alsace, and Vitry, and between Vitry and Paris, three things must be done: 
 
 i* The foreign (i. e. to Vitry) merchants must be given facilities for 
 
 selling their grain on the day of its arrival. 
 
 2* The grain purchased by merchants of Vitry, which they now retain 
 in granaries or storehouses in concert with merchants of Paris, 
 must be set in motion towards Paris. 
 3* The Bourgeois must be prevented from making stores, and must be 
 
 compelled to carry their grain to market. 
 " To succeed in this: 
 
 " It will be necessary to have at Vitry a fund of 6o,ooo u in charge of a 
 trustworthy and solvent man, who shall act as if he were a private merchant. 
 " Freedom of trade must be guaranteed the merchants. 
 " The commission agent shall buy only such grain as shall be left at 
 the end of the market, at the market-place, the Halle, or the central square. 
 " As soon as a merchant of Vitry shall have a boat-lod of grain, he shall 
 be obliged to load it at once and ship to Paris, or sell to the commissioner, 
 who shall appear as a merchant willing to buy. 
 
 ' ' The commissioner may go to Lorraine and Bar or elsewhere if the 
 Royal agent shall consider it expedient. 
 
 " The commissioner shall have granaries at Vitry to store his grain, until 
 he shall have enough for a boat." l 
 
 The document thus has all the aspects of being a detailed 
 project of the policy to be followed, and in general it was followed. 
 The buyer was never established, but the significant feature 
 of the project is its emphasis upon market organization, and 
 the obvious intention to solve the difficult problem by direct 
 commercial machinery, rather than by external administrative 
 regulation. It was a project, first and last, to keep the trade 
 moving, and to make the markets work. 
 
 The execution of the task involved many unforeseen difficulties, 
 but most of these were surmounted. " The merchants of Paris 
 were then at Vitry. They had already sent five to six hundred 
 muids to our ports, at my instance. I secured a continuance 
 of this assistance by visiting again the granaries and storehouses 
 of the merchants. I drew up a Proces Verbal of the quantity 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21646. 94. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 327 
 
 of grain still held by them, and they agreed to sell it for the sus- 
 tenance of Paris. 
 
 " This increased demand revived trade. I saw several 
 foreign merchants come to Vitry bringing grain in carts or pack 
 saddles. I spoke to them, and assured them of protection 
 whenever they should have need of it. I permitted them to 
 sell daily in the central square, which had not been done before. 1 
 They then brought so great a quantity of grain that they did 
 not find a ready sale for all of it. This forced me to hire granaries 
 for them in order not to have them become disgusted with the 
 trade." 2 
 
 But Delamare did not propose to confine his attention to 
 Vitry, and hearing of difficulties at Troyes and at Sezanne 
 he went thither, first to Troyes, and not without misgivings: 
 
 " When I left Vitry, I was afraid that the trade there would 
 languish. It can be kept in movement only by force. Every 
 one has an idea that wheat will be worth ioo u at Easter. Here 
 (Troyes) the people are ready to rise at the slightest provocation. 
 The houses of the magistrates and of several of the richest 
 inhabitants have already been invested twice with threats of 
 incendiarism. ... It must be confessed that the disorder 
 of the market contributed much to maintain these movements. 
 There was scarcely any attempt at control. I restored order 
 and enforced the regulations, especially that requiring all per- 
 sons to bring grain to market. Eagerness to secure grain and 
 the desire on the part of some to form hoards impelled them 
 to go out to meet the grain on the highways. All was stopped 
 in the suburbs so that little reached the market place. I 
 now send squads of archers out on the highways on market 
 days. All comes in to the market. I give the ' menu peuple ' 
 preference for two hours, and the minor grains have gone down 
 by a half." 3 Similar reforms were made at Sezanne. A trip 
 was made down the Aube, and another to Bray and Provins. 4 
 
 1 Note the influence of the investigation at Bray in 1699. 
 
 2 Delamare, op. cit., 2d ed., Ill, Supp. 39. 
 
 8 Bib. Nat., Fr. 21647. 86. Troyes, 4 Sept. 1709. Copie avec apostilles. 
 4 Ibid. Sezanne, 16 Sept. 1709. Copie. 
 
328 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 11 But while I was at Sezanne, I learned that the inhabitants 
 of Vitry kept the grain in their granaries and wished to sell at 
 the excessive price of 6o u some even for seventy and eighty. 
 This obliged me to return to Vitry. I found three to four hun- 
 dred muids of wheat and had a part delivered to our merchants 
 of Paris and to their agents. I fixed the price of this wheat at 
 50 per setier, founding my action on that clause in the ordi- 
 nances which forbids selling at higher prices in granaries than 
 in the market, for 50" was then the market price. 
 
 "The grain, which I was thus drawing from the granaries 
 of Vitry, was replaced literally every day by the Lorraine mer- 
 chants. They bring in grain continually, and scarcely a week 
 passes without the arrival of eight or ten muids. They are 
 beginning to bring barley also, of which there is an abundance 
 in their country. This grain from Lorraine is purchased by the 
 merchants of Vitry for the provision of Paris." 1 
 
 Delamare seems to have then returned to Sezanne and con- 
 tinued the investigations interrupted by the bad news from 
 Vitry. But no letters were preserved. October 20, he is back 
 in Vitry. " I have learned," he writes, " that the measures 
 I had taken to prevent the bourgeois, the merchants, and the 
 people from going out to meet the grain were successful, and 
 have caused a considerable diminution in price. . . . The 
 people are much pleased . . . but the wealthy bourgeois and 
 merchants are not. I have learned since my return from Sezanne, 
 that divers persons have been harrassing the Lorraine merchants 
 and other foreigners, even to the point of refusing to buy their 
 grain. The foreigners, having learned of my return, came to 
 me. I reassured them and helped them to sell their grain for 
 a price with which they are well satisfied. . . . Others continue 
 to arrive daily. There are continual convoys from Lorraine, 
 Bar, the bishoprics of Toul and Verdun, some from Alsace and 
 I am even told that some are en route from Tranche Comte. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1643. Vitry, 29 Sept. 1 709. Delamare, original. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21647. 
 3. Same letter. Copy. This duplication indicates that Delamare kept copies 
 regularly, but that some of the originals sent were lost, and so do not appear in 
 the Series G 7 . It is possible that some of these Delamare letters may be in the 
 cartons of the Serie G 7 . called " Lettres Communs." 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 329 
 
 All the foreigners, with whom I have spoken, have told me 
 that there was no town more convenient for them." l 
 
 The ordinance of October 2 1 , which we have already discussed 
 in a previous chapter, concluded the practical work of the 
 first visit to Champagne. The influence of the energetic 
 commissioner can hardly be denied. His untiring persistence, 
 his great knowledge, both of the old regulations and of the con- 
 ditions of trade, his desire to do nothing unpractical, to keep 
 the trade moving at any cost, all combined to render his work 
 singularly important at this critical moment in the history of 
 the grain trade. 
 
 But after Delamare had left Vitry, the old jealousies and the 
 avarice of the merchants of Vitry interrupted the steady flow of 
 trade that he had started. This necessitated a second visit, 
 and Christmas Eve, 1709, found Delamare again at Vitry. The 
 Lorraine merchants had left Vitry almost entirely, bringing 
 their grain to Saint-Dizier. Delamare purchased grain in 
 Lorraine by his agents and had it shipped to Vitry. This started 
 the stream again, and by means of coaxing and negotiation 
 the trade was completely revived. Various ordinances were 
 issued both at Vitry and other places to regulate the markets, 
 but there was little in his policy that did not appear in his work 
 on the first visit. He also made a hurried trip to Lorraine, 
 and that trade continued to be the basis of the relief afforded, 
 not only to Paris, but to the larger towns of Champagne, especially 
 Rheims and Chalons. The work of the commissioner was thus 
 of immediate value, as well as being the most significant step his- 
 torically in the organization of the wholesale market in grain. 2 
 
 The regulation of trade in the Seine Basin was thus largely 
 controlled by the Chatelet. The difficulties were primarily 
 difficulties of marketing, and as early as 1660 there was a mani- 
 fest desire to abandon mere prohibitions for measures regulating 
 the conduct of merchants, without actually stopping trade. 
 The first attempt of the Chatelet was directed against the 
 
 1 Bib. Nat, Fr. 21647. 129 v. Vitry, 20 Oct. 1709. Delamare. 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., 2d ed., II, Supp. 41 ff. Also letters. Bib. Nat., Fr. 21648. 
 J 3> 9> 34, 282. G 7 . 1643. i Jan. 1710, 23 Mars 1710. 
 
330 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 associations of merchants. The old prohibitions were renewed, 
 and commissioners were sent out to collect evidence for prosecu- 
 tions. The investigations of 1660-63 produced no immediate 
 effect, but prosecutions were undertaken on a larger scale in 
 1693. The troubles of that year were certainly due in no small 
 measure to the operations of Jean Roger and his associates. 
 He was selected as the most conspicuous offender and a deter- 
 mined effort was made to secure a conviction that would serve 
 as an example to other merchants. The legal intricacies of 
 the case were too considerable, however, and no decisive action 
 resulted. The failure of this policy left the Chatelet with no 
 precise scheme for the regulation of the trade, but at this point, 
 the personality of Delamare became important. In his work 
 at Bray in 1693 and later in 1699, he became acquainted with 
 modifications of the market system which had developed there 
 under the stimulus of a growing volume of trade. The old 
 market regulations were no longer strictly observed, and instead 
 of trade being confined to two days of the week, buying and 
 selling of grain became a daily event. This informal market, 
 too, was a wholesale, rather than a retail, market. In these 
 new practices, Delamare saw the solution of the problem. The 
 cessation of trade in time of dearth could be overcome by sound 
 market regulations, above all, by increased facilities for daily 
 buying and selling. The great desideratum was movement 
 rather than regulation. Both the provinces and Paris would 
 be secure against dearth so long as the grain could be kept in 
 motion. This was a natural outgrowth of the earliest policy 
 of the Chatelet. It is the fundamental feature of all the regula- 
 tions from that source throughout the century. But the means 
 of securing the much desired continuity of movement were not 
 perceived until Delamare furnished the excellent example of 
 his visits to Vitry, in 1709 and 1710. His measures not only 
 relieved distress in the Seine Basin, but led to a great advance 
 in market organization. All the fundamental conceptions of 
 wholesale marketing appear in his letters and orders of 1709, 
 and it is the first time such ideas had been applied to the market- 
 ing of a bulky commodity of relatively uniform character. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 331 
 
 
 
 Burgundy and Lyons 
 
 In Burgundy, the traditional policy of the sixteenth century 
 underwent little change. Although intendants assumed many 
 of the functions previously discharged by provincial and munici- 
 pal officials, the new officers did not bring new policies as in the 
 Seine Basin. Every factor in the Parisian supply area led 
 administrative activity into new channels, in Burgundy every- 
 thing tended toward the persistence of the old traditions. 
 
 In Champagne, greater quantities of grain were available, 
 and the possibility of securing additional supplies from Lorraine 
 gave the trade of Vitry and Chalons a very broad basis. Dela- 
 mare's policy was founded on these features of the trade, and 
 it is by no means certain that his liberal policy would have 
 been equally successful in the absence of such resources for the 
 large markets. 
 
 In Burgundy, there was little concentration of trade, no possi- 
 bility of securing supplementary resources, such as those of 
 Lorraine, and a smaller general surplus in the producing region 
 itself. None of the Saone Valley towns controlled as large a 
 volume of trade as Vitry, or Bray, though there is a perceptible 
 tendency towards concentration at Gray. The Saone Valley 
 was able to draw grain only from Burgundy proper and Bassigny ; 
 the Vosges and the Jura cut off communication with other grain- 
 raising sections, and the foot-hills were more suitable for vines 
 than for wheat. Wheat culture was thus confined to the favored 
 regions of the province that contributed regularly to the supplies 
 of Lyons. Then too, Lyons was more dependent upon Bur- 
 gundy than Paris upon the Upper Marne. Paris could and 
 did draw grain from several other regions. Lyons could pro- 
 cure supplies elsewhere only with difficulty, so that the demand 
 of Lyons pressed upon Burgundy with even greater severity 
 in years of dearth than in years of plenty. This difference in 
 the intensity of metropolitan demand inevitably produced a 
 degree of apprehension in Burgundy that seldom, if ever, existed 
 in Champagne. The province was barely capable of supplying 
 the Lyonese in times of average fertility, in times of dearth all 
 were skeptical. Under such conditions a policy of market 
 
332 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 
 
 regulations designed to keep the grain in motion was not sure 
 of success. There was less grain to move and it was never 
 possible to be sure that enough remained to support trade till 
 the next harvest. 
 
 A sweeping condemnation of the prohibitive policy in Bur- 
 gundy is unwarranted. The province possessed only a rela- 
 tively small surplus, and the Lyoriese demand was great enough 
 seriously to deplete the Burgundian supply. The only remedy 
 was the prohibition. The expediency of the measures is largely 
 a question of the particular circumstances. The intendants 
 are to be judged only by the accuracy of their perception of 
 the extent of the available supply. A crude, haphazard appli- 
 cation of prohibitions, merely on account of popular rumor, 
 is hardly defensible. But if the extent of the depletion is care- 
 fully investigated, and the prohibitive measures are issued 
 only after thoughtful consideration, it is fairly evident that the 
 intendant was doing all that was humanly possible to meet a 
 trying situation. 
 
 In the spring of 1693, prohibitions were issued in Burgundy, 
 much to the disappointment of the Lyonese. Berulle, the 
 Intendant at Lyons, was very much put out. He declared that 
 the prohibitions were not justified by conditions, and that it 
 was a device to enable the Burgundian officials to make illicit 
 gains in the grain trade. The prohibitions were ostensibly 
 the outcome of an investigation made by the intendant, which 
 showed only 32,000 charges beyond local needs. 1 
 
 " If it were true," says Berulle, " that there were only 32,000 
 charges left in Burgundy, I could but approve of what they have 
 done. But this memoir is not accurate. There are still more 
 than 300,000 charges in Burgundy as will appear by the enclosed 
 memoir. The commissioners sent to investigate the quantity 
 of grain in most of the towns were satisfied with taking the 
 declarations of the owners of the granaries, without having the 
 grain measured. They did not visit the villages near the Saone, 
 and were content to accept the common reports of the quan- 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Estat contenant la quantit6 de bleds qui se sont trouves dans la 
 province de Bourgogne au mois de Mars. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 333 
 
 titles there. The subdelegues, who are all engaged in the grain 
 trade, have concealed the truth from M. d'Argouges, in order 
 to oblige the merchants who had large stores to., sell to them 
 at low figures." 1 Berulle enclosed an estimate prepared by 
 " a rich merchant of Burgundy." 2 The accusations against 
 Burgundian officials are even more sweeping in a letter, written 
 in June. He then tells the Controleur General that the Sindics 
 of Burgundy have imposed upon him by their false reports 
 that there were only 32,000 charges of grain in the province. 
 " They are all engaged in the grain trade, as well as most of the 
 Councillors of the Parlement of Dijon. They have even bought 
 standing grain by giving earnest money. I have just been told 
 that the Sindic of Bugey, Sr. de Blame, a man of whom many 
 complain, was the real author of the tumult at Louhans. It 
 was stirred up by him to prevent the Lyonese merchants from 
 shipping- theii^ grain, so that he could buy it cheap. That is 
 the way it is done in Burgundy." 3 
 
 On the whole, there would seem to be some foundation in 
 Berulle's contention that the Burgundians under-estimated the 
 available supply, but the course of events indicated that he had 
 over-estimated the supply considerably. He acted on the assump- 
 tion that there was plenty of grain in Burgundy, and issued many 
 certificates to merchants. Cherishing the hope that the Con- 
 troleur General would be brought round to his point of view, 
 he neglected to make any great efforts to obtain supplies from 
 the south. 
 
 These certificates did not give the Lyonese merchants the 
 right to export from Burgundy, but they were an assurance 
 that those merchants, would be given the benefit of any permits 
 that should be issued. Feeling confident that they would get 
 the grain out in some way, these merchants bought extensively 
 in Burgundy. They proceeded to accumulate large hoards, 
 " and rendered themselves the masters of all that remained in 
 the country." " These monopolists," says Le Noble, " together 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 14 Mai 1693. Be"rulle. 
 
 * Ibid. See besides the memoire, the letter of 30 Mai 1693. 
 
 8 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 325, 1199. 
 
334 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 with the Lyonese bakers are the cause of all the disorders which 
 have occurred. Having a common understanding, the grain 
 which is permitted to be exported is sent down only when the 
 need is most pressing, so that the highest prices are realized." l 
 
 The high prices and the panic, which were the outcome of 
 these practices, made it very difficult to ship grain from Burgundy. 
 As the " munitionnaires " enjoyed special privileges, contracts 
 were made with them. But they were hindered both by the 
 officials and the people. In June, a shipment was seized by 
 the subdelegues. 2 In July, the boats were stopped at Chalons. 3 
 In August, grain boats were stopped at Macon and at Tournus. 4 
 This, too, is but a slight indication of the violence. 
 
 At the end of the month, the officials at Seurre write to Dijon 
 " to find out what it is best to do in their extremity." 5 An agent 
 of the municipality of Dijon writes: "I come from Bassigny 
 where the dearness of grain frightened me. At Langres, where 
 I am at present, I do not dare to make offers to buy grain. There 
 are more buyers than there is grain, and I assure you that if 
 it were worth twenty ecus per mine, and people dared to ship, 
 I scarcely know where I could go to buy. ... In these 
 parts every one trembles for the future, and resolutions are 
 formed to let no grain leave the province until every one is 
 supplied." 6 
 
 Lyons was also in distress. In the middle of August, the last 
 100 sacks in the granaries of the Abondance were distributed, 
 and 1500 charges were taken from the royal quartermaster 
 at Lyons, despite his protests. 7 
 
 Inasmuch as every one was suffering to a considerable extent, 
 each endeavored to shift all the blame to the other's shoulders. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Auxonne, 3 Mai 1693. Le Noble au C. G. 
 
 2 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 18 Juin 1693. Berulle, notes letter of 15 Juin. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1631. Chalons-sur-Saone, 14 Juillet 1693. Le Noble. 
 
 . 4 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 5 Aout 1693. Berulle. 17 Aout 1693. Berulle. (Other 
 cases passim.} 
 
 6 Dijon, Arch. Mun., G. 256. Seurre, 28 Aout 1693. Maire et fichevins de 
 Seurre. 
 
 8 Ibid., G. 266. Langres, 30 Aout 1693. Mosseur. 
 
 7 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 330, 1216. 18 Aout 1693. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 335 
 
 The Controleur General, however, was not inclined to conceal 
 his opinion that the main trouble lay in the conduct of Berulle, 
 the Intendant at Lyons, and in the activity of the municipality. 
 
 " The whole trouble," he writes, " comes from the obstinate 
 perseverance with which Berulle and the Consulate have en- 
 deavored to draw grain from Burgundy, neglecting to procure 
 supplies in Provence, despite the orders that I gave them from 
 the King. Both are worthy of blame, with this difference, 
 that the former is at fault by reason of his rash confidence in 
 the promises of Le Noble, and in his hope of an abundant har- 
 vest in Burgundy. In addition to this, some of the Consuls 
 have shown an extraordinary desire to make themselves masters 
 of the purchases of grain needed for the sustenance of the town. 
 They continue to manifest the desire in regard to the purchases 
 in Provence. 
 
 " Throughout the late spring I received complaints from 
 Burgundy almost daily, mostly from d'Argouges, who declared 
 again and again that Burgundy was being exhausted by the 
 Lyonese merchants. This obliged me to write to Lyons, order- 
 ing them to cease to buy in Burgundy and to go to Provence. 
 By my express orders, M. Le Noble (the munitionnaire) was 
 charged with furnishing Lyons with the small quantities of 
 Burgundian grain that would be needed until the grain arrived 
 from Provence. If sufficient pains had been taken at that time 
 to secure grain in Provence, only eight or ten thousand anees 
 would have been needed from Burgundy, and these Le Noble 
 was to furnish. But the officials at Lyons neglected to make 
 purchases in Provence, and subjected themselves to the necessity 
 of continuing to depend on Burgundy; to cover this second 
 mistake, a third was made, in contracting with Le Noble to 
 procure in Burgundy such grain as they might need." l 
 
 The crisis was so severe at Lyons and delays in the south were 
 so considerable that the grain already purchased in Burgundy 
 had to be shipped to assist the town. The boats stopped at 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, 30 Aout 1693. Canaples a Barbezieux, Copie avec apostilles 
 faits par le C. G. The authorship of the marginal notes is placed beyond doubt by 
 a letter of Canaples, Lyon, 22 Sept. 1693. 
 
336 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Chalons, Macon, and Tournus were released, and some small 
 lots allowed to pass on new permits. 1 
 
 But there is almost no note of any shipments from Burgundy 
 after November, 1693. Until the following harvest, Lyons was 
 obliged to seek sustenance elsewhere. The qualified prohibitions 
 in March, 1693, thus seem to have been justified whether the 
 inquiry of d'Argouges was accurate or not. Berulle's insistence 
 upon the possibility of considerable exports from Burgundy 
 did nothing but increase the distress and violence. 
 
 After the harvest of 1694, trade began again, though the 
 intendants kept it under close supervision. Ferrand had issued 
 a prohibition in August. 2 The authorities at Lyons protested, 
 and, at the command of the Controleur General, negotiations 
 between the intendants began. 3 Ferrand agreed to allow the 
 shipment of a limited quantity, but did not feel sure of the 
 exact amount. He was certain, however, that it would be 
 unwise to allow the merchants liberty to buy as they chose. 
 " To avoid the export of a larger quantity than is permitted, 
 d'Herbigny should choose those whom he desires to charge with 
 the undertaking. A list should be sent to Ferrand, and each 
 week these persons should submit a statement of their purchases." 4 
 
 This was the more ordinary state of affairs, for the lack of 
 concert between the intendants in 1693 was unusual. This 
 is the outcome of the conflict of interests. The intendant 
 in Burgundy is in favor of a relatively complete prohibition. 
 The officials at Lyons insist upon having the right to make 
 some shipments from Burgundy. The intendant in Burgundy 
 recognizes the necessity of some concessions and proceeds to 
 negotiate in regard to the amount. Licenses are then issued 
 through the Lyonese officials to the merchants. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1631. Lyon, i Sept. 1693. Berulle, Lyon, 4-5 Sept. 1693. Canaples, 
 passim. G 7 . 1631. 6 Sept. 1693. G 7 . 1630. Buxy, 7 Sept. 1693, d'Argouges, 
 etc. 
 
 2 Boislisle, op. cit., I, 374, 1360. 16 Aout 1694. 
 
 3 G 7 . 1633. Lyon, 8 Sept. 1694. Berulle, enclosed letter of Ferrand to him. 
 
 4 G 7 . 1634. Dijon, 27 Nov. 1694. Ferrand. 
 
 G 7 . 1633. Me" moire sur les Bleds necessaires pour la ville de Lyon. (Envoy6 
 avec la lettre de M. d'Herbigny. 23 Nov. 1694.) 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 337 
 
 This system is somewhat less crude than the sixteenth century 
 system. The latter was more or less haphazard. There was 
 little feeling of community of interest between the divers groups 
 of local officials. The intendants were less attached to their 
 locality, and were always controlled to some extent by the 
 Controleur General at Paris. Everything rendered negotiation 
 easier in the seventeenth century, and there was a conscious 
 effort to discover the real extent of the exportable surplus. 
 
 Soon after the harvest of 1698, Ferrand, the Intendant in 
 Burgundy, found it advisable to prohibit the export of grain. 
 The Controleur General took the special precaution of writing 
 to the Consuls of Lyons, instructing them to place little reliance 
 upon Burgundy. Ferrand sent word that he could permit 
 the export of only 9,500 anees, a quantity that was considered 
 to be sufficient to enable Lyons to wait for aid from Languedoc, 
 Provence, and foreign countries. The licenses for this grain 
 were divided between the Abondance and the merchants. 1 
 These shipments were all to be discharged at Lyons before 
 Christmas. 
 
 In January, d'Herbigny was begging Ferrand to restore 
 complete freedom of trade between Lyons and Beaujolais, 
 Maconnais, and Brionnais. Ferrand was not at all disposed 
 to accede to the request. " Grain is cheaper in every part of 
 the department of M. d'Herbigny than it is in Burgundy," 
 he writes to the Controleur General. "If we have any grain, 
 it is much better for us to keep it to assist you in case of need 
 (i. e. for the army), than to send it to a province where it is 
 desired merely to create greater abundance and to decrease 
 the price of grain, but where prices are continually lower than 
 in Burgundy." 2 Later in the month, prices fell notably at 
 Lyons, and the Abondance discontinued its purchases in Bur- 
 gundy. 3 From this time, we hear little of Burgundy till July. 
 
 1 G 7 . 358. Lyon, 25 Juillet 1699. Relation tres sincere a M. le Mare"chal de 
 Villeroy de la conduite des Prevot des Marchands et fichevins de Lyon et des 
 Directeurs de 1'Abondance. 
 
 2 G 7 . 159. Dijon, 5 Jan. 1699. Ferrand. The statement about comparative 
 prices is questionable, though it is quite possible that prices in parts of Burgundy 
 should be higher than at Lyons. 
 
 3 G 7 . 358. Lyon, 18 Jan. 1699. d'Herbigny. 
 
THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Then, there were many demands for freedom of trade between 
 Burgundy and Lyons. This was readily explained by Ferrand. 
 "It is because I have been very careful to give no permits 
 except in concert with d'Herbigny. The merchants of Burgundy 
 see themselves on the eve of the harvest and apprehend a con- 
 siderable loss from the decline in price that will follow the harvest. 
 Some have shipped to Lyons without licenses, through the con- 
 nivance of the farmers of the octrois. I stopped this abuse 
 by new orders. It will, of course, be necessary to remove the 
 prohibition after the harvest, but storms may injure the crops, 
 and, as Lyons is in no need, it is well not to take any steps until 
 the harvest is assured." l 
 
 The presence of this supply available for exportation just 
 before the harvest may well be cited as an indication that exports 
 to Lyons might have been more freely permitted. It is indeed 
 a case that illustrates the crudity of the device, but we must 
 remember that there was literally no means of knowing how 
 much these merchants had secreted, just as there was never 
 any evidence to show that they really possessed a considerable 
 quantity. Relatively small amounts might easily give rise 
 to a rather marked demand for licenses. This ignorance of the 
 available supply was the most dangerous feature of conditions 
 in Burgundy, and that alone would justify prohibitions at such 
 a time. 
 
 The years 1708-09 present no new phases of grain trade 
 policy, so that a detailed treatment may be omitted. 
 
 The history of the dearths in Burgundy, then, points rather 
 strongly to the conclusion that prohibitions were necessary 
 to assure the satisfaction of the needs of the province. In 1693, 
 when the evidences of dearth were not taken seriously at Lyons, 
 the substantial accuracy of the judgment of local officials in 
 Burgundy was abundantly confirmed by subsequent events. 
 Despite all the confidence of Berulle, Lyons was not able to 
 secure any great quantity of grain in Burgundy during the late 
 season. Supplies had to be procured hurriedly in the south, 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. tit., I, 535, 1894. 20 Juillet 1699. On the 23d, freedom of 
 export was granted. 
 
REGULATION OF TEE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 339 
 
 and the inevitable delays reduced Lyons to sore straits. In 
 1698, and in 1709, the intendants limited exports from Burgundy. 
 Lyons sought provisions in the south, and little difficulty was 
 experienced in the north. The expediency of the prohibitions 
 in Burgundy can hardly be doubted. They were the only means 
 of forcing the Lyonese to enlarge the area of their supply market. 
 
 Languedoc 
 
 Most of the features of the policy characteristic of Languedoc 
 have appeared, either in the discussion of Colbert's relations 
 with Daguesseau, or in connection with the study of the exhaus- 
 tion produced by uncontrolled trade. The policy in regard 
 to the exports of grain to maritime ports is not notably different 
 under Baville. In 1709, however, the severity of the dearth 
 obliged Baville to undertake the general direction of the internal 
 trade of the province. In August and September, 1708, he 
 found it necessary to send away the Italians who had come to 
 buy at Narbonne, and other coast ports. Then the demands 
 of Lyons and Provence must needs be satisfied. After much 
 effort, the Lyonese were driven out of the districts along the 
 Rhone, and forced to go to Narbonne. The supplies of the 
 province were next attacked in the Upper Garonne, by a move- 
 ment down towards Bordeaux. This was limited like the trade 
 with Lyons and Provence to a trade with licenses. By March 
 and April, 1709, the distress in Lower Languedoc was extreme. 
 All the markets were disorganized and the regular circulation 
 of trade completely suspended. Baville was obliged to take 
 measures to assist the larger towns, opening granaries in the 
 dioceses of Toulouse, Lavaur, and Alby, to supply the most 
 pressing wants in Lower Languedoc. Besides this, he issued 
 divers market ordinances, though he did not adopt anything 
 like Delamare's policy. His treatment of conditions in Langue- 
 doc was indeed the exact antithesis of Delamare's. The latter 
 endeavored to restore the normal conditions of a trade passing 
 properly through the markets. Baville went to the other 
 extreme, practically running the trade himself. His personal 
 control went to the length of procuring grain from the Levant, 
 
340 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 partly on the security of the province, partly on the security 
 of divers towns. 1 
 
 Lebret, in 1693, plays a different part in the trade. The 
 Lyonese merchants were buying freely around Aries and Taras- 
 con, and the needs of Lyons were so pressing that he perceived 
 the necessity of permitting these purchases. But at the same 
 time, he proposed to stimulate imports of Barbary grain, and 
 with that in view he secured control of a quantity of grain 
 which he proposed to place on the markets in such way that 
 both ends should be gained. 2 Thus, in one way or another, 
 the intendants supplied the defects of the imperfect market 
 organization. Here, helping to determine the quantity that 
 was really available for export, there distributing grain when 
 the markets had broken down, in a third place, trying vainly 
 to make the towns realize the meaning and significance of a 
 steady flow of trade. 
 
 Brittany 
 
 In Brittany, licenses were used extensively to authorize 
 domestic trade at times when foreign export was prohibited. 
 The regularity of trade had reduced the granting of licenses 
 to a system. The merchants of Quimper, Concarneau, and 
 other towns sent the intendant a statement of their projected 
 shipments immediately after the harvest. He then secured 
 royal licenses for carrying these amounts to the domestic ports 
 indicated by the merchants. 3 Even Nantes could draw supplies 
 from Lower Brittany only upon royal licenses, and the corre- 
 spondence of the years of dearth is filled with the details of 
 the administration of this license system. When other towns 
 were dependent upon coastwise grain trade, they, too, were 
 obliged to secure licenses to permit shipment. 4 
 
 1 This whole episode will be found in part I, ch. IV. 
 
 2 See part I, ch. IV. 
 
 3 G 7 . 181. Hennebont, 22 Sept. 1699. Dutel, Commis. du Roy. 
 
 4 G 7 . 181. Rennes, 4 Oct. 1699. De Nointel. Letter enclosing a list of 
 licenses needed by Nantes and Saint-Malo. 
 
 G 7 . 181. Saint-Malo, 7 Nov. 1699. Sainte-Marie. 
 
 G 7 . 181. Nantes (28 Nov. 1699, date of receipt). De Mianne. 
 
 G 7 . 181. ii Dec. 1699. De Nointel. Says he has delivered the licenses; 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 341 
 
 In 1709, to expedite matters, it was arranged that " Ferrand 
 should issue permits upon the presentation of certificates from 
 the Provost of Merchants of Paris. When supplies for the army 
 were needed, Ferrand should be given notice of the quantity 
 necessary." 1 In the course of a year or so, the care taken at 
 first was no longer used. Ferrand began, after a while, " to 
 charge his subdelegues with the issue of the necessary permits." 
 Then these subdelegues began to commission their inferiors for 
 the same duty, " so that there was a great opportunity for abuses 
 in the granting of licenses." 2 
 
 Furthermore, general permissions that were issued at Paris 
 were not always promptly received and enforced. Not infre- 
 quently the merchants learned of the ordinance through their 
 correspondents, so that we have the curious situation described 
 in a letter of May 5, 1702: " I take the liberty to address Your 
 Excellency apropos of the loading of certain barques and other 
 vessels with barley and wheat. The masters demand sailing 
 papers to carry this grain to Spain and Portugal, on the strength 
 of an Order in Council of March 28 which permits export. 
 In this jurisdiction (admiralty of Nantes) we have heard nothing 
 of such an Order, and as there are several orders prohibiting 
 export, I have thought it wise to write to you." 3 The order 
 of March 28 had been sent to Brittany, but for some inexplicable 
 reason, it had not been sent around. It was finally published 
 in the middle of May, too late to be of any value to the mer- 
 chants. 4 
 
 similar details for the year 1701 will be found in the letters G 7 . 182. Rennes, 27 
 Avril 1701, and many other letters. 
 
 1 G 7 . 1641. 3 Oct. 1709. Deliberation d'une assemblee tenue chez M. 
 Daguesseau. See also G 7 . 1642. Saint-Malo, 17 Oct. 1710. Ferrand, with 
 enclosed memoir of licenses granted. 
 
 * G 7 . 1642. 17 Nov. 1710. Clairambault. See also G 7 . 1642. 6 Nov. 
 1710. Laurencin, Marchand a Nantes a M. Ferrand. Speaks of clandestine 
 export to Spain. G 7 . 1642. Rennes, 3 Dec. 1710. Ferrand acknowledges 
 receipt of letter apropos of the abuses mentioned by Clairambault. Says that he 
 has reprimanded the two subdelegues. 
 
 3 G 7 . 182. Nantes, 5 May 1702. Dangy, Lieu, de la Marine a Nantes. 
 
 4 G 7 . 182. Paris, ii Mai 1702. de Messureaume. G 7 . 182. Nantes, 16 
 Mai 1702. Dangy. 
 
342 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 Orleans 
 
 It is extremely difficult to give any definite conception of 
 the policy followed at Orleans, because there is so little positive 
 action and so much discussion and negotiation. But the position 
 of the town brings out strongly one feature of the seventeenth 
 century trade, and the conduct of the officials illustrates the 
 gradual break-down of the old ideas and the development of 
 new commercial usages. 
 
 The custom among the Marne Valley merchants of bringing 
 their grain down to a point near Paris and then storing the grain 
 to wait for a good market had produced among the Parisian 
 officials a strong determination to enforce the old regulation 
 requiring the immediate and continuous shipment of all. grain 
 from the point of purchase to the ultimate destination. A 
 regulation of this sort was, of course, calculated to preserve the 
 independence of trades supplying different towns from the same 
 source of supply. In the Marne Valley, this was of little con- 
 sequence, as there was no large town between the shipping 
 points and Paris. In the Loire Valley, it was quite another 
 matter. The slight surplus of Auvergne, coming down the river, 
 might either stop at Orleans or continue to Paris. Grain coming 
 up from Saumur or Nantes could likewise be applied to supply 
 the demand of either Orleans or Paris. The rigorous enforce- 
 ment of the provision requiring continuous shipment made it 
 necessary to decide upon the final destination before the grain 
 was shipped. This, of course, prevented any very exact ad- 
 justment to the conditions at Orleans or Paris, especially as 
 there was an additional factor in the more energetic punishment 
 of violence done to shipments destined for Paris. 1 If strict 
 law were followed, the trade supplying Orleans must have been 
 entirely distinct from the trade supplying Paris. The Parisian 
 grain passed through Orleans, but only physically, without influ- 
 encing the market, and was technically incapable of being applied 
 to the satisfaction of the demand of Orleans. This limitation 
 of the movements of grain was favorable to Paris, but prejudicial 
 
 1 G 7 . 1632. Orleans, 20 Dec. 1693. De Creil. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 343 
 
 to intermediate points, and in this respect, the Parisian officials 
 stood in the way of that fusion of the entire wholesale trade 
 which would be the final result of the completed wholesale 
 market system. The persistent protest of Orleans against 
 this rigid specialization of lines of trade is thus one of the forces 
 tending to break down the old medieval system and to sub- 
 stitute for it the more highly organized market system, which 
 seeks to meet the needs not only of a tyrannical metropolitan 
 demand but also the local demands of all parts of the area. 
 In the upper Seine Basin, no town was large enough to protest 
 with effect, and ordinarily there was no need. Orleans, however, 
 was naturally an entrepot of the Loire Valley trade, and its 
 own needs were such that it was quite essential that the whole 
 trade of Loire should pass through the market at Orleans. 
 The separation of Parisian trade from that of Orleans* could not 
 be maintained. 
 
 Some of these aspects of the relation between Orleans and 
 Paris appear in 1662, in the letters of Brachet, the Maire of 
 Orleans. 1 But the significance of the case can be perceived 
 only by reading between the lines. In 1694, the situation is more 
 completely revealed by the letters of Bouville, the Intendant. 
 " The whole country between La Charite and Chateauneuf 
 will suffer severely, because no grain leaves Berry or Bour- 
 bonnais, and of that coming up the river none passes Orleans 
 except for Paris. There is also great dearth towards Montargis 
 and around Blois and Beaugency, as I do my best to prevent 
 them from stopping boats. However, sir, as most of the mer- 
 chants of Orleans have marked Paris as the destination of their 
 grain, it is certain that Orleans will be without grain in a short 
 time, if we are obliged to allow all grain to pass that is billed 
 for Paris in the Lettres de Voiture. All the rural districts will 
 suffer, as they draw their provisions from the large towns." 2 
 Later he writes: " I beg you not to compel the merchants to 
 carry their grain to Paris; I am persuaded that this liberty 
 
 1 Bib. Nat., Mel. Colb., 108, 246, 380, 382, 464, 475, 543, 557, 653, 745- 
 
 2 G 7 . 1635. Orleans, 17 Avril 1694. Bonyille; La Charite, 27 Avril 1694. 
 Bouville. 
 
344 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 will procure aid for us here, and that more will even be shipped 
 to Paris than the quantity promised by the merchants. Once 
 the Loire towns are supplied the people will not be inclined to 
 interfere with the passage of boats. I am acting in concert 
 with the merchants here, and if Miromenil does as much at 
 Tours, I hope that all the Loire towns will be supplied and that 
 the rural districts will feel the benefit. Paris will also find much 
 assistance, for, besides the grain that passes daily on the Canal, 
 all the grain that comes into the country towns in the Beauce 
 will go to Montlhery, and then to Paris. Everything depends 
 upon freedom of trade." l 
 
 In 1699 and 1709, there was little real trouble at Orleans. 
 The harvests had been fairly abundant and the town served as 
 an entrepot. So far as there was any apprehension, it was more 
 like what, we find in any producing region. In this case, the 
 fear was of excessive shipments from the Beauce, where much 
 of the town's supply was procured. 
 
 In general, two distinct types of policy appear in these clos- 
 ing years of the seventeenth century. The new constructive 
 market regulations of the Chatelet in the Seine Basin, on the 
 one hand, and the development of the old sixteenth century 
 policy in the hands of the intendants in the other parts of 
 France. The policy of the Chatelet was not without its tra- 
 ditional basis, but novel results were obtained. A well-organized 
 wholesale market was created at Bray and at Vitry; the trade 
 was kept moving ; and this idea of continuous circulation through 
 the markets was definitely adopted as the basis of future regula- 
 tion of the Parisian trade. 
 
 The trade in other sections of France was less highly organ- 
 ized. The local markets still played' so large a part in the distri- 
 bution of grain that the policy adopted by the Chatelet would 
 have been impossible. In Burgundy, in Languedoc, and in 
 Provence the local markets were still the basis of trade, and 
 in every crisis this market machinery proved inadequate. The 
 
 1 Boislisle, op. /., I, 360, 1309. 18 et 23 Avril 1694. Bouville. See also G 7 . 
 1635. Orleans, 27 et 28 Avril 1694. Bouville. 
 
REGULATION OF THE DOMESTIC GRAIN TRADE 345 
 
 old relief measures of the sixteenth century were applied, but 
 with more care, a better knowledge of conditions, and a more 
 accurate perception of the character of the problem. In 1698 
 and 1709 the regulations of the intendants in Burgundy and 
 Languedoc were on the whole distinctly successful. These regu- 
 lations may have been a poor substitute for improved market 
 organization, but in the absence of the metropolitan market, 
 these inferior substitutes were necessary. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 Political Theory and the Administrators 
 
 THROUGHOUT our period, grain trade policies fall into two dis- 
 tinct types. On the one hand, the Crown insists on the essential 
 harmony of interest between different parts of the kingdom; 
 on the other, the local officials are ever harrassed by the imperfect 
 adjustment of inter-provincial interests. The Crown declares, 
 in edict after edict, that " France is more fertile than any other 
 kingdom in Christendom, that a dispensation of kind providence 
 has granted to one province what its neighbor lacks, so that by 
 mutual succor the wants of all are supplied. " The correspon- 
 dence of local authorities, however, instead of depicting this 
 harmonious exchange of the blessings of Heaven, reveals a bitter 
 strife, accompanied by mutual recrimination, abuse, and violence. 
 The Crown endeavors to bring home to its recalcitrant subjects 
 the ideal of interdependence. 
 
 \\11 royal measures were designed to bring about the ideal 
 social state that hovered before the eyes of sixteenth century 
 statesmen as the goal of human endeavor. No province should 
 be utilized for the relief of some other kingdom until the needs 
 of France had been supplied. No province should be allowed 
 to impose any obstacles to complete freedom of trade between 
 different parts of the kingdom. No unpatriotic merchants 
 should be allowed to increase their private fortune at the expense 
 of the commonweal, by selling grain to foreigners when dearth 
 was possible. 
 
 The local officials were not concerned with ideals, with the 
 growth of nationalism, or with any large conceptions of social 
 interdependence. They saw only a discordant conflict of man 
 with man, of town with town, of province with province. The 
 one motive apparent to them was self-interest, a determined, 
 
 346 
 
CONCLUSION 347 
 
 rapacious effort on the part of each man, or each group, to secure 
 the complete satisfaction, of its wants without reference to the 
 needs of others. The large towns sought grain in the provinces, 
 and carried off great quantities, usually regardless of the needs 
 of the locality. The peasantry plundered grain boats destined 
 for the large towns, assaulted and abused local merchants. 
 The merchants sought their own ends without consideration 
 for town or country. The country people suffered at times 
 from depletion of local supply, but as long as there was no actual 
 violence the merchant gave their situation no thought. Paris 
 or Lyons might be reduced to intense distress, but the merchant 
 would delay his grain boats another day or another week, if 
 he could secure an additional sou per bichet. 
 
 But the theoretical and practical points of view were not in 
 antagonism. While the Crown and such writers as Laffemas and 
 Montchretien were developing trie idea of the state as a social 
 organism, the administrators were actually organizing the ill- 
 coordinated feudal monarchy into the firmly-knit national state. 
 
 The earliest expression of the idea of this new nationalism 
 is the preface of an edict of Henry II. It possesses more dis- 
 tinction of style than most of the effusions of the chancellries 
 of the sixteenth century, but the constructions are still labored 
 and awkward. This edict of February 14, 1557 granted complete 
 freedom of trade in all commodities except grain, a change 
 of policy that was considered to be so great a departure from 
 ordinary custom that some explanation was deemed necessary. 
 The preface, accordingly, proceeds to an elaborate defence of 
 free trade. 1 
 
 " It has always been known by common experience that the 
 principal means of making the people of a kingdom, country, or 
 
 1 There are occasional expressions of similar sentiments in the provinces, 
 notably a passage from the papers of the Estates of Languedoc. A resolution of 
 14-25 Sept. 1501 reads: " Que pour prevenir la famine, requete soit fait aux 
 Commissaires du Roy, afin qu'ils empeschent plusieurs seigneurs, nobles, et mar- 
 chands d'amasser les bleds, et de les vendre hors du pays, attendu que les trois 
 senechaussees sont tout un carps mystique, que 1'une pourra bailler ses bleds a 1'autre 
 pourveu que les bleds soient portes par terre." Invent. Som. des Arch. Dept., 
 Haute Garonne, Serie C, vol. II, p. 2. 
 
348 TEE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 province, well-to-do, rich, and opulent, is freedom in the trade 
 and commerce in which they are engaged with their neighbors. 
 They sell, barter, and exchange the goods, merchandise, and 
 commodities which they bring from their country, to bring back 
 others which they lack, together with gold, silver, and other 
 things useful and necessary. If it were not for trade, the com- 
 modities and fruits of each kingdom, country, province, all their 
 specialties and manufactures must needs be consumed by the 
 subjects and inhabitants, so that the greater part of their com- 
 modities and fruits would be relatively useless, so that the 
 landlord would be disappointed in his hopes of profit, and the 
 laborers and artisans would receive no return for their indus- 
 try. Consequently, upon the petition of the Third Estate 
 at the last general assembly of the principal Estates of our 
 kingdom, that they should be allowed to enjoy the freedom 
 of trade needed during this time of war, and the exemption 
 from the export duties recently levied, we have remembered 
 that God, by his blessed grace, has given us a kingdom composed 
 of divers countries and provinces, each of which is in itself as 
 fertile as any lands in Christendom, abounding in a variety 
 of commodities, so that what is lacking in one is found in another. 
 The inhabitants of this kingdom, indeed, are constrained by no 
 necessity of food or other useful articles, to ask assistance of their 
 neighbors, or of foreigners. But, on the other hand, it is more 
 reasonable that each should (freely) seek his gain from his land, 
 his labor, his industry, or his commerce, and that in doing this 
 he should serve himself, his country, and others, by the benefits 
 flowing from trade. . . ." 1 
 
 Here is a fairly clear conception of a country within which 
 there is a certain territorial division of labor, potentially a self- 
 sufficing economic entity, and yet engaging freely in trade with 
 other nations because there is a greater advantage in complete 
 freedom of trade than in restriction, even within national boun- 
 daries. There is no tinge of the narrow-minded hatred and 
 distrust of foreigners, no trace of the delusion that the gain 
 of one party necessarily involved loss on the other side, no hint 
 
 1 Fontanon, Ordonnances des Rois (1610), I, pp. 958 f. 
 
CONCLUSION 349 
 
 of the short-sighted confusion between money and the real 
 wealth of a country. The short, highly abstract passage sug- 
 gests the conception of the metropolitan area and that freedom 
 of trade which is most expedient between such areas. 
 
 The same type of " free trade " doctrine appears in Bodin 
 and in an anonymous tract ordinarily ascribed to du Haillan. 
 Their statements are interesting as they reveal more completely 
 the ideas underlying their views. In the Discours sur le rehausse- 
 ment et la diminution des Monnoies (1578), Bodin says that 
 trade with foreign nations is indispensable, and then proceeds: 
 " Even if we could do without their goods, we should nevertheless 
 trade, buy, sell, exchange, lend; nay we should give some of 
 our goods to foreigners, if it were only to maintain intercourse 
 and friendship between them and us. ... We owe them that 
 charity by a natural obligation. We must share with them 
 the goods with which God has blessed us." l The treatise of 
 du Haillan, which appeared in 1586, expresses similar views:' 
 " Every one knows that trade consists in the interchange of 
 commodities, and although certain people of rank have en- 
 deavored to restrict the freedom of trade, supposing that we 
 can dispense with foreign commodities, it is really impossible, 
 . . . and even if it were possible, we sho.uld none the less share 
 what we have with our neighbors, as much from the duty of 
 charity, which commands us to succor others, as to maintain 
 friendship with them." 2 In this sixteenth century " free trade," 
 the economic question is judged entirely in the light of religious 
 and philosophical cosmopolitanism. 
 
 This conception of a community of interest appears in various 
 kinds of local material. In such cases, Christian duty is supple- 
 mented by the sentiment of nationality. Thus, in 1504, Lyons 
 and certain towns of Burgundy and Auxois desired to purchase 
 grain at Paris to relieve their distress. A meeting of the municipal 
 authorities of Paris, held November 29, 1504, resolved that 
 something should be done to aid their neighbors. A more 
 
 1 Cited in Baudrillart, Bodin et son temps, p. 176. I have been unable to obtain 
 the use of a full text of the Discours. 
 
 2 Fournier, Varietes, Historiques, et Litteraires, VII, 185. Discours de 1'Ex- 
 tresme Cherte. 1586. 
 
350 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 general meeting was called to consider the matter further. 
 On January 15, it was finally decided that it was proper to assist 
 their fellow-countrymen in time of trouble, but that it would 
 not be wise to allow strangers to go to Santerre and other places 
 where the Parisian merchants buy, so that it was arranged that 
 the purchases should be made by Parisian merchants and turned 
 over to the Lyonese at Paris. 1 
 
 The last decade of the sixteenth century reveals a change 
 in contemporary ideas. In 1596, Barthelemy Laffemas pub- 
 lished his first treatise, and began his energetic struggle to secure 
 the adoption of his policies. His proposals were fundamentally 
 different from anything suggested by previous sixteenth century 
 politicians; the active measures suggested were new, the pre- 
 dominance of purely economic over political, religious and 
 cosmopolitan motives was notable, the conception of the eco- 
 nomic unity of the State was more aggressively and clearly as- 
 serted. 2 The influence of Sully in the ministry of Henry IV 
 long made the efforts of Laffemas unavailing, but the persistence 
 and energy of the man finally resulted in the appointment of a 
 commission to consider his projects for the encouragement of 
 industry and commerce and to take such action as was neces- 
 sary. The work of Laffemas falls into two general divisions: 
 the treatises, stating his doctrines, and the papers of the Council 
 of Commerce, which embody his views. 
 
 He advocated the exclusion of foreign goods and of foreign 
 influence as far as possible, the stimulation of domestic industries, 
 the improvement of means of communication, the encourage- 
 ment of more careful stock breeding, the protection of inventors 
 
 1 Reg. du Bureau, I, 98-100. See also letters between Rouen and Paris, 1528. 
 Ibid., II, 1 6. References can easily be multiplied in the local material. 
 
 2 The inaccessibility of the treatises of Laffemas makes this account of his work 
 general in character, but the complete publication of his political acts in connection 
 with the Conseil de Commerce reveals the larger elements of his policy. See 
 Champollion-Figeac, Documents Historiques Inedits, tires des Collections Manu- 
 scrites de la Bib. Nat. et des Archives, ou des Bibliotheques des Departements , IV torn. 
 Paris, 1848. Coll. des Docs. Inedits pour servir a 1'Hist. de France. The 
 papers of Laffemas are published in Vol. IV. For a complete catalogue of the works 
 of Laffe'mas, see Boyer de Sainte Suzanne, Les Intendants de la Generality d'Amiens f 
 P- 552- 
 
CONCLUSION 351 
 
 of mechanical labor-saving appliances. Except for the financial 
 reforms of Colbert, there is almost no phase of Ris activity 
 which does not find its counterpart in the " Proces Verbaux " 
 of the Conseil de Commerce of 1601. In fact, most of the 
 industries encouraged by Colbert were marked out by Laffemas 
 for attention, and, in many cases, much was done. Underlying 
 this policy was a strong consciousness of nationality; in a word 
 he advocated " Colbertism " before Colbert. 
 
 The views of Laffemas were like those of his contemporary, 
 Montchretien. Litterateur, bon-vivant, and duellist, Mont- 
 chretien became interested in the economic problems of his 
 time after a residence in England rendered necessary by his skill 
 with the rapier. He returned to France determined to urge the 
 government to adopt measures to promote the industrial and 
 commercial prosperity of France, and thus impose a much- 
 needed check upon the growing preponderance of English and 
 Dutch industry and commerce. Poet by nature, familiar 
 with the political works of the Greek philosophers, he writes 
 with ari elegance and breadth of view that gives his penetrating 
 analysis a rare distinction. 1 
 
 Montchretien has a real perception of the reciprocal economic 
 interests of the community. In one passage, he likens the 
 interdependent arts and industries to "a marvellous chain 
 of interlacing rings of gold, vitalizing and attracting within 
 its scope all affairs of this world, as did the chain which the 
 poet Homer puts in the hands of Zeus." 2 In another passage, 
 he suggests the analogy that inspired much of Spencer's sociologi- 
 cal work, and that still haunts the literature of the subject. 
 " There is a great similarity between the well-organized state 
 and the bodies of animals. Animals are controlled by three 
 faculties, which are different manifestations of one force, rather 
 than distinct forces. The doctors call these faculties, spirits. 
 The first is the vegetative, possessed in common with trees and 
 plants; this force has its seat in the liver and the blood. It 
 
 1 Antoyne de Montchretien, Traitt de V Economic Politique, d6die" au Roy et la 
 Reyne, en 1615. Reimprime par Funck-Bretano. Paris, 1889. 
 8 Montchr^tien, op. cit., p. 17. 
 
352 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 nourishes the body, and is dispersed through the members 
 by the veins. The laborers and farm hands correspond to this 
 element in the body politic. The second faculty, that of feeling 
 (' sensitive '), has its seat in the heart. It is the source of the 
 natural heat of the body and is diffused by the arteries. In 
 the state, the artisans and journeymen represent this faculty. 
 The third is the animal, and has its seat in the brain, where it 
 directs the instincts and actions, and by means of the nerves 
 imparts movement to the whole body. To this faculty may 
 be compared the merchants. 
 
 "By these three types of men, laborers, artisans, merchants, 
 the whole state is nourished and sustained. Through them, 
 all profit comes and is made, and in the various digestions, as 
 in the natural body, it is always transformed with advantage." l 
 
 Dropping the metaphor, in another passage, he emphasizes 
 the national character of this economic entity. " France is 
 the most complete ' corps du Royaume ' that the sun can behold 
 from his rising in the East to his setting in the West. The 
 members are more diverse and yet more perfectly arranged 
 in the symmetry demanded of a finely organized state." Then' 
 after enumerating various natural sources of wealth, he continues, 
 " the greatest of these is the inexhaustible abundance of men, 
 if they can only be properly directed. . . . Indeed, the spec- 
 tacle of France, teeming with men, might lead one to believe 
 that she was burdened and in distress, but it is only a lack of 
 order. Its greatest blessing may become, through ignorance 
 or neglect, its greatest curse. But who does not know that 
 organization is the prime requisite for the efficient functioning 
 of a state ? The exquisite harmony of their constituent ele- 
 ments is the primal manifestation of the power of great organic 
 bodies." z 
 
 While conceiving economic, as well as political interdependence, 
 it is clear that Montchretien's political ideas led him to suppose 
 that the areas coincided. He failed to perceive that complete 
 economic interdependence exists only within the limits of the 
 market. 
 
 1 Montchretien, op. cit., 32-33. z Ibid., 23-24. 
 
CONCLUSION. 353 
 
 The immediate influence of Montchretien was very slight. 
 The Court of the Regency had other interests. But Colbert's 
 connection with Laffemas is involved in little doubt. The 
 papers of the Council of Commerce form a part of the collection 
 of manuscripts at the Bibliotheque Nationale coming from the 
 library of Colbert. The only uncertainty attaches to the date 
 of acquisition, and this may well be supposed to be relatively 
 early in Colbert's ministry, when he was most busily assembling 
 documents of previous administrations. On the whole, it is 
 highly probable that Colbert was acquainted with the ideas 
 of both Montchretien and Laffemas. The influence of this 
 early seventeenth century writing upon Colbert was probably 
 considerable, and may be regarded very properly as the beginning 
 of the policies and ideas grouped under the term, " Colbertism." 
 
 Although the fundamental conceptions that seem to underlie 
 seventeenth century policies are outlined by Montchretien, 
 there is nevertheless a marked development in the precision 
 of the ideas, and many subsidiary points are brought to light. 
 Our own studies of the market system have revealed the impor- 
 tance of the machinery for the distribution of commodities over 
 the market area. This diffusion of material things is the most 
 direct manifestation of economic organization. The laws of 
 price, value, and price-making are the basis of the economic 
 structure of society. Some perception of the nature of these 
 problems accordingly might well be expected of these early 
 theorists. Bodin had disposed of one of the mysteries in regard 
 to money and prices, but he contributed little to an under- 
 standing of the importance of the subject of value and price. 
 Montchretien proceeded a step further, drawing distinctions 
 between real wealth and money, and between value and price. 
 "It is not the abundance of gold and silver, or the quantity 
 of diamonds and pearls that makes a state wealthy it is the 
 ease of producing the necessities of life and articles of clothing. 
 The more of these commodities possessed, the greater the 
 wealth." l Elsewhere we find: " The real value of com- 
 modities is immovable, but not the momentary price, which 
 
 1 Montchr6tien, op. cit., 241. 
 
354 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 depends upon many factors. Nothing is dear which has not 
 been cheap and nothing is cheap that may not become dear. 
 Nor do prices always follow the changes in the value of money." 1 
 But he does not get beyond these elementary distinctions. The 
 importance of differences of price in stimulating movements 
 of commodities is clearly perceived by Colbert, though seldom 
 well stated. The idea appears frequently in his letters, and he 
 is often mystified by the absence of the movements he expects. 
 March 22, 1672, he writes to Bouchu, Intendant at Dijon: 
 " I am informed that there have been heavy shipments of grain 
 from Provence and Languedoc to relieve the dearth in Italy 
 and Naples. These exports have rendered grain very dear in 
 those provinces, which should result in the movement of a great 
 quantity of grain from Burgundy and Champagne. As I do 
 not hear from you of any shipments down the Saone, and as 
 there is nothing more important for all of these provinces than 
 the relief of the dearth in Provence and Languedoc and a move- 
 ment of specie to Burgundy and Champagne, I beg you to go to 
 one of the river towns, and establish yourself there as perma- 
 nently as your affairs permit. Procure information of everything 
 that is going on, urge the merchants to ship, enter into corres- 
 spondence with Provence and Languedoc with that in view, 
 remove all obstacles that the merchants may encounter, and if 
 necessary, let me know and I will send any orders of which 
 you have need." 2 
 
 This little -incident reveals the conceptions of Colbert. The 
 nation is an economic unit, and within it there is complete 
 mobility of commodities in response to differences in prices. 
 Prices should differ in the various provinces only by the amount 
 
 1 Montchretien, op. cit., 257. 
 
 2 Clement, Lett. Inst. el Mem., II, 651-652. See also ibid., IV, 298. Letter 
 of 15 Avril 1683. " Lorsque les bleds sont chers dans une ville, 1'industrie de 
 tous les hommes, francois et estrangers, consiste a porter des marchandises dans 
 les lieux ou elles sont cheres." See also G 7 . i. 8 Nov. 1679. Colbert a M. 
 d'Herbigny, Int. en Dauphine". " La grande application, que les particuliers ont a 
 tirer les bleds de la province de Dauphine, est une preuve constante qu'il est plus 
 cher dans les lieux ou on le veut porter que dans cette province, ainsy vous voyez 
 que cela prouve une chose contraire a celle que Ton veut vous prouver. . . ." 
 Also Bib. Nat., Mel. Clair., 462, 423. Colbert a M. Bouchu. 8 Nov. 1679. 
 
CONCLUSION ^ 355 
 
 of the cost of transportation. In short, he has in mind the fully 
 organized metropolitan area. He assumes its existence, al- 
 though the evidence of facts might well have disillusioned him. 
 
 These ideas were rapidly disused and at the close of the cen- 
 tury were very generally known. The best indication appears 
 in the interesting discussion of the fixation of the price of grain 
 in 1709. The inadequacy of some impracticable proposals was 
 clearly explained in the course of the controversy. One anony- 
 mous writer points out that the chief difficulties lie in the impos- 
 sibility of an absolutely uniform price, and in the diversity of 
 measures. " The merchants are stimulated to buy and sell 
 only through the hope of gaining through the transport of their 
 grain. If the price is uniform they will find no profit in moving 
 grain. 
 
 " Unless a uniform measure is introduced, the merchants 
 will evade the established prices by means of the diversity of 
 measures. But if it be supposed that these Hiffir.n1t.ies were 
 surmounted by fixing the price of grain with reference to 
 the distance of the sources of supply from the consuming 
 area, and by a reduction of measures to weight, it would still 
 be necessary to overcome the disposition to form granaries." l 
 
 The other most important aspect of metropolitan organization 
 is suggested by the mercantilistic idea of the balance of payments. 
 This is, of course, an anticipation of the results of the perfected 
 use of negotiable paper. The system was rapidly taking shape 
 during the closing years of the century, although it had hardly 
 attained the completeness that is connoted by the mercantilistic 
 idea of a definite balance of payments between countries, to 
 liquidate their commercial dealings. This element of mer- 
 cantilism is significant as it emphasizes the unity of the metro- 
 politan or national area as against other areas. 2 
 
 1 G 7 . 1635. Memoire centre la fixation des bleds. 
 
 2 I have not been able to trace the history of this idea of a balance of payments. 
 The mercantilist doctrine is generally said to begin in the late sixteenth century. 
 I have seen little real evidence of it in French sources, and no definite conception 
 of a balance of payments, prior to Colbert. It appears in his " Memoire sur le 
 Commerce," Lett. Inst. et Mem., II, cclxix, but he does not lay so much stress upon 
 the idea as do later writers. 
 
356 i THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 The larger aspects of the metropolitan distributive organiza- 
 tion were thus conceived by the last generation of the seven- 
 teenth century. This anticipates by nearly one hundred years 
 the full realization of the idea. But it does not necessarily 
 follow that this anticipation enabled the politicians materially 
 to accelerate the growth towards the new form of organization. 
 Questions of policy are decided upon the supposition that certain 
 organic relations already exist, and the policy is necessarily 
 vitiated to a great degree by the failure to adjust policy to fact. 
 Under such conditions the energies of the statesman may be 
 misdirected. The encouragement of domestic industry by 
 Colbert, for instance, could exert relatively little influence 
 upon the growth of the economic area, though the industrial 
 side of his policy was, to him, one of his most important spheres 
 of activity. So far as he exerted any influence by those efforts, 
 the results differed considerably from his expectations. 
 
 The economic policy of the Crown was thus based upon 
 unfounded assumptions, since it failed to appreciate the strength 
 of the centrifugal forces in the community. The Crown was 
 ever prone to assume that the state was a closely organized 
 national unit, when in reality the degree of territorial inter- 
 dependence was far less considerable than was supposed. 
 
 The edicts of 1559 and 1567 illustrate the general tendency 
 in its extreme degree. The Crown assumed that it possessed 
 an administrative system that could carry out a general ordi- 
 nance involving a vast amount of executive detail. That was 
 a less comprehensible mistake than the assumption, in the royal 
 edicts, that the problem of grain trade regulation was primarily a 
 question of excessive exports to foreign ports, and that an asser- 
 tion of complete freedom of inter-provincial trade was all the 
 regulation that was needed in the domestic trade. This false 
 view of the situation was due to a belief in a national economic 
 unity that did not exist. The policy was, therefore, necessarily 
 ineffective. 
 
 The policy of Colbert conveys the same moral. But Colbert 
 is two different men: he was at once a theorist and a man of 
 action; he had a capacity for setting aside all general ideas 
 
CONCLUSION 357 
 
 when it was necessary to act. His general ideas led him astray 
 only in regard to the regulation of domestic trade. He always 
 assumed complete freedom of inter-provincial trade and probably 
 never understood the seriousness of the problems presented 
 by the domestic trade. 
 
 The growth of a national policy of regulation in the hands 
 of the " practical men," the local administrators, is difficult 
 to trace. But despite the confusion caused by conflicts of 
 interests and opinions, several periods may be distinguished. 
 In the first, two groups appear in conflict, the producing regions 
 and the large consuming center. At Paris, an additional com- 
 plication is introduced by the energy and wealth of the whole- 
 sale merchants. They perceived opportunities for profit that 
 frequently subjected both town and country districts to severe 
 strain. In this first period, opinions are influenced almost 
 exclusively by the interests of the group with which the official 
 is most intimately concerned. In this manner, an issue is 
 joined, and the clash of interest becomes evident to all. Once 
 the difficulty is clearly seen, there is a distinct change in the char- 
 acter of official regulation. The more conscientious officials 
 seek means of harmonizing the discordant interests and no 
 longer insist stubbornly upon the complete satisfaction of the 
 desires of the group they represent. This leads to much groping 
 and tentative experimentation, most of it fruitless, but ulti- 
 mately a solution is discovered. Then, the new idea is applied 
 systematically and all the consequences and details are worked 
 out. The clearest instance of the first stage of this process is 
 the history of the relations between Lyons and Burgundy in the 
 sixteenth century. For twenty or thirty years the presence 
 of the Lyonese excited little comment in Burgundy, but after 
 1529 the conflict of interests gradually appeared. The Bur- 
 gundian officials were prone to seek refuge in prohibitions. 
 The Lyonese secured from the King full permission to buy grain 
 in Burgundy. Soon the right to seek supplies along the Upper 
 Saone was regarded as one of the privileges of the town. In 
 the producing region, meanwhile, the prohibition became more 
 
358 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 frequent. Finally, an unusually severe failure of crops produced 
 an acute crisis in '1557. The Lyonese proposed to buy exten- 
 sively, but the people of Burgundy were bitterly opposed to the 
 action of the Consuls of Lyons. On the one hand there was 
 refusal to permit further exports, on the other, defiant assertion 
 of intention to carry off the grain under cover of royal privileges. 
 The divergence of interest is hard for us to understand, but the 
 bitter recrimination, the threats of the Lyonese to prosecute 
 Villefrancon, the violence all along the river, all testify to the 
 intense reality of the discord. 
 
 The acute crisis of 1557 was, in itself, the beginning of a new 
 departure in policy. The necessities of Lyons led to the sending 
 of Grolier and Guimbre to Burgundy. They started with a 
 firm conviction of the justice of the complaints of Lyons; they 
 returned with a realization that there was much to be said on 
 the other side. Their long association with Villefrancon brought 
 both sides to an appreciation of the difficulties of the situation. 
 A compromise was made; Villefrancon abandoned his policy 
 of absolute prohibition, and the agents of Lyons contented 
 themselves with securing carefully restricted permissions of 
 export. 
 
 The difficulties of the situation of Burgundy were not suffi- 
 ciently great to lead to a complete solution of the grain trade 
 problem. The intermittent character of the problem and 
 the tolerable success of official regulation established this tem- 
 porary expedient as the fixed policy of the region. The discord 
 between the groups called for no delicate remedy, and after 
 1557 and 1573 there is no further progress in the regulation 
 of the grain trade in the Rhone Basin. 
 
 If the records of the Parisian Echevinage were still extant, 
 we should probably be able to trace a similar clash of interest 
 between Rouen and Paris in the fifteenth century. Paris was 
 habitually buying grain in the vicinity of Rouen. Merchants 
 from Rouen were buying in the Valley of the Oise for foreign 
 export. This cross movement of trade was inconsistent with 
 the spheres of influence that had been created by the " Com- 
 pagnie Franchise " of the Parisian merchants, and by the 
 
CONCLUSION 359 
 
 " Compagnie Normande " of the Rouenese. After a period of 
 recrimination and rivalry, both parties became reconciled to the 
 inevitable, compromised, and applied the idea of distinct spheres 
 of influence to the grain trade. 
 
 In neither of these instances is the increase in social harmony 
 and the promotion of closer economic interdependence the result 
 of vague general ideas deduced from theological precept or 
 national sentiment. In each case, the increasing economic unity 
 of the community is brought about by an empirical solution, 
 more or less complete, of a concrete difficulty. The conflict of 
 interest reveals the necessity of cooperation and interdepen- 
 dence, and the concentration of attention upon the question 
 ultimately results in the discovery of some means of reconciling 
 the hostile groups, and bringing them together as parts of a 
 larger group. 1 
 
 The later history of the trade in the Seine Basin is more inter- 
 esting. There, the conflict of interest was more complicated. 
 The old territorial antagonism persisted. Champagne felt 
 in some measure the hostility towards Paris .that Burgundy 
 felt towards Lyons. But the feeling in Champagne was so 
 weak that it serves merely to emphasize the lack of close relations 
 between the province and the capital. In this region, the 
 development of close economic interdependence was the result 
 not of "the conflict of territorial groups, but of Parisian groups: 
 the merchants and the general public. 
 
 The problem was peculiarly fitted to bring about a general 
 reconciliation of conflicting interests. The merchants forced 
 the Parisian authorities to regulate the trade with reference 
 to Paris, but the ubiquity of the wholesale merchants made it 
 impossible to found any adequate regulations upon Parisian 
 
 1 Ratzenhofer lays down as a social law that small, relatively independent 
 groups are constantly being merged into larger groups. Undoubtedly a true 
 observation, but historically the interest centers upon the manner in which the 
 fusion of small groups is brought about. It is not a process that accomplishes 
 itself. It is the result of persistent efforts of individuals to reduce social discord 
 and to promote harmony. The absence of human volition in the operation of 
 Ratzenhofer's laws is purely fictitious. It is the result of an exclusion of the 
 concrete details, which is justifiable only if the exclusion is constantly borne in 
 mind. Ratzenhofer, Zweck und Wesen der Politik. 
 
360 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 interests alone. The merchants exerted quite as much influence 
 upon conditions in the producing regions as they did upon the 
 Parisian markets. Any regulations would have to cover the 
 activity of the merchants from the time grain was bought in 
 the farms or on the local markets to the final sale at the Halle 
 or Ports of Paris. If the regulations were to be successful, they 
 must obviously command the sympathy of the provinces. 
 Thus, the solution of difficulties which were primarily Parisian 
 involved the working out of a general reconciliation of all the 
 groups affected by the grain trade throughout the Seine Basin. 
 
 Within the period covered by this study, we find the first 
 two phases of the solution of the problem. The years 1630-60 
 reveal the sharp conflict of interest between the great wholesale 
 merchants and the Parisian public. The latter part of the 
 century is marked by the persistent efforts of the Chatelet to 
 find the proper means of controlling the grain merchants, and 
 of confining them within proper limits. 
 
 The uncertainty of the officials in 1660, the adoption of the 
 policy of prohibiting associations and partnerships, the failure 
 of the policy, all this administrative muddle has been related 
 at length. From 1660 to 1693, little was accomplished beyond 
 the collection of information. The officials gained a deeper 
 insight into the details of the situation, but the grain trade prob- 
 lem was no less acute than it had been in 1660. Then, this 
 aimless groping was suddenly brought to an end by Delamare's 
 perception of the importance of the development of the general 
 wholesale market at Bray. The solution of the problem by 
 the establishment of wholesale markets had occurred to no one; 
 it was too great a departure from old precedents; but therein 
 lay the possibility of ending the discord and unrest in the trade 
 of the Seine Basin. Once a steady flow of trade was established, 
 all the panic and distrust in the producing regions disappeared; 
 the merchants shipped more regularly to Paris, because of the 
 certainty that no exorbitant profits could be realized by delay- 
 ing the boats. The visits of Delamare to Vitry in 1709 and 
 1710 sealed the victory of administrative regulation. Thence- 
 forth, it was only necessary to carry out the brilliant idea which 
 
CONCLUSION 361 
 
 would make possible the national unity that had so long been 
 the dream of theorists and politicians. 
 
 The development of social institutions seems to be the result 
 of conscious individual effort to diminish the- intensity of social 
 conflict, and this effort is much more than an automatic reaction 
 upon the environment. There is not any inherent reason for 
 assuming the presence of this desire to improve the physical 
 and social conditions of life. In fact, the fatalistic attitude 
 is the more natural, and actually the more wide-spread. Plague, 
 disease, and famine are regarded in primitive society as a divine 
 judgment, an act of God from which man should not seek 
 to escape. If there be any truly spontaneous reaction between 
 men and their physical surroundings, this fatalism must be 
 regarded as the true social law. 1 The individual feels helpless 
 in the presence of the great forces of nature. 
 
 The fatalistic attitude discloses its value as a social power 
 in the oriental countries. The famines recur periodically, 
 sweeping off vast numbers of individuals who accept their doom 
 with resignation. The difficulties in those countries may have 
 been more or less acute than the similar troubles in France 
 during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The actual 
 extent of physical distress is not the significant feature. The 
 recurring famines in the Orient lead to no change. The market 
 system that is adequate for the ordinary years breaks down 
 regularly under the stress of dearth, but nothing is done to create 
 a market system that shall work even in time of dearth. It 
 is the will of God that misfortunes come, the efforts of men 
 cannot avail, wherefore struggle against the powers of nature ? 
 
 If this attitude had prevailed in Europe none of the modern 
 structure of western civilization would have come into being. 
 There was no social law necessarily bringing about an allevia- 
 tion of the intensity of conflicting interests. Progress is not 
 inherent in the environment; it is the result of conscious human 
 effort to deal with concrete problems. The true background 
 of the history of the grain trade is the firm conviction that the 
 troubles of the famine years could and ought to be remedied. 
 
 1 Townsend, M., Asia and Europe, 1901. 
 
362 THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE 
 
 In this respect, this chapter in history is merely typical of the 
 history of Western Europe. It is the record of an extraordinary 
 mastery of the physical and social environment by the resolution 
 and acumen of many relatively obscure individuals, lawyers, 
 administrators, and statesmen. 
 
 It is a gradual process, a series of victories over the environ- 
 ment that begins in those regions where the difficulties are least 
 serious. Thus, in the grain trade, the most fruitful develop- 
 ment occurs in the Seine Basin, where the actual physical dis- 
 tress of famine was least intense. In Burgundy, where distress 
 was greater, nothing of permanent importance was done. In 
 the infertile regions, the history of years of dearth is merely a 
 harrowing record of disease and death. But the solution of 
 the problem discovered in the Seine Basin was subsequently 
 applied to the relief of distress throughout France. The per- 
 fection of distributive machinery both as regards market tech- 
 nique and physical transportation made dearth a tradition 
 handed down from " the good old times." 
 
APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX I 
 
 FRENCH DRY MEASURES OF THE OLD REGIME 
 
 WEIGHTS and measures of the old regime present a problem of great 
 difficulty, partly on account of their diversity, partly on account of 
 the difficulty of securing information. Some of the official standards 
 still exist, and these together with documentary evidence constitute 
 the basis of our information. The principal documentary evidence 
 is the royal examination of measures in Northern France made hi 
 1673. This had special reference to the grain trade, and, as it is 
 summarized by Delamare in his Traite de la Police, it is easily acces- 
 sible. Commercial dictionaries of the period also give considerable 
 information. The relation of the old measures to the metric system 
 has been worked out by the Vicomte d'Avenel in his Histoire cono- 
 mique de la Propriete, des Salaires, des Denrees, et de tons les Prix en 
 General , depuis Van 1200 jusqu'en 1800. (Paris, 4 torn., 1894-98.) 
 He nowhere gives a detailed account of the method followed in con- 
 versions, and the omission is unfortunate, to say the least. In the 
 conversions given here, all equivalents are based on his figure of 
 1.56 hectoliters per setier of Paris. 
 
 The complexity of measures before the Revolution was of two kinds : 
 differences in content of measures having the same name, differences 
 in the names of the measures used. Differences in the names of meas- 
 ures were not unrelated to sectionalism based on cultural, political, 
 and commercial bonds. In most cases, each district used the same 
 names for measures. Barring minor exceptions, there was a distinct 
 system of measures in the Seine Basin; three systems, in the basin of 
 the Rhone and Saone; a distinct system in Brittany, in Guienne, 
 and in Gascony. Sometimes, the system was distinct throughout, 
 sometimes, the smaller measures had the same name while the larger 
 measures of account were different in name and content. 
 
366 APPENDIX 
 
 Dry Measures of Paris and the Seine Basin 1 ' 
 
 i boisseau of wheat weighed 20 livres. 
 
 3 boisseaux = i minot = 60 livres. 
 
 4 minots = i setier = 240 livres. 
 12 setiers = i muid = 2 2 80 livres. 
 
 The setier and the muid were measures of account, the boisseau and 
 the minot were actual measures. These names prevailed throughout 
 the Seine Basin and nearly always bore the same relation to each other, 
 though the content of the measures differed widely in different towns. 
 In a few towns different primary units were used, the bichet and the 
 mine. The bichet contained 40 livres when filled with wheat, and the 
 mine, 50 livres. But even in these places, quantities of wheat are 
 usually given in setiers or muids. 
 
 Taking d'AvenePs figure of 1.56 hectoliters for the Paris setier, 
 we have the following table of English equivalents: 
 
 i boisseau = 20 livres = .3575 bushels, 
 
 i minot = 60 livres = 1.0725 bushels. 
 
 i setier = 240 livres = 4.29 bushels, 
 
 i muid = 2880 livres = 51.48 bushels, 3120 pounds. 
 
 The measures of Paris were somewhat larger than the measures 
 of the same name used in the provinces. Delamare gives a list of 
 rough equivalents for most of the towns of the Seine Basin. The 
 most important differences for the purposes of this study are: 
 Soissons, 
 
 i setier = 80 livres 
 
 3 setiers de Soissons = i setier de Paris. 
 
 Chalons-sur-Marne, 
 
 i setier = 12 boisseaux du pays, 
 
 i setier de Paris = 13^ boisseaux du pays. 
 
 Vitry-le-Franoois, 
 
 i setier =12 boisseaux du pays, 
 
 i setier de Paris = 14^ boisseaux du pays. 
 Bray, 
 
 i setier = 8 boisseaux du pays, 
 
 i setier de Paris = 9 boisseaux du pays. 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 744-745. These are presumably the wheat measures. 
 For the other grains the measures were somewhat different. See H. 1823. Reg. du 
 Bureau, ii c xxix. 24 Mars 1671. Resolution that oats should be sold by wheat 
 measure of 24 boisseaux per setier, instead of the former oats measure: H. 1822. 
 Reg. du Bureau, 29 Aout 1669. Assembly to consider the reform of measures: 
 H. 1822. Reg. du Bureau, ii c lvii. Text of Royal Ordinance of October 1669. 
 
APPENDIX 367 
 
 At Orleans the names were similar, but the system was dif- 
 ferent: 
 
 i mine = 50 livres of wheat. 
 12 mines = i muid = 600 livres. 
 
 The muid at Orleans wa? thus equivalent to 2\ setiers of Paris. 
 
 In Brittany, grain was usually sold by the tonneau. This measure 
 varied in different ports. According to Posthelwayt's Universal 
 Dictionary of Commerce, 
 
 The tonneau at Auray contained 2200 livres. 
 
 The tonneau at Hennebont 2 95 livres. 
 
 At other towns the measure lay between these extremes. 
 
 In the Rhone Basin, there were three sets of measures; those of 
 Burgundy, represented by Dijon, those of Lyons, and those of 
 Languedoc and Provence. The Lyonese were so active that the 
 Lyonese measures were used frequently both hi Burgundy and in 
 Languedoc. 
 
 The measures of Dijon were: * 
 
 1 quatranche =42 livres of wheat. 
 
 4 quatranches = i quartau = 168 livres. 
 
 2 quartaux = i bichot = 336 livres. 
 2 bichots = i emine = 672 livres. 
 
 Assuming these weights to be given according to Paris standards, 
 the equivalents would be : 
 
 i quatranche = 2 livres more than 2 boisseaux de Paris. 
 
 i quartau = 8 boisseaux de Paris (Approx.) = 2.86 bushels. 
 
 i bichot = 1 6 boisseaux de Paris (Approx.) = 5.72 bushels. 
 
 i emine = \ muid, mesure de Paris (Approx.) = 11.44 bushels. 
 
 At Lyons, the unit was the boisseau. Six boisseaux made one 
 anee, and this was the ordinary gram measure. 
 
 i anee = 8 setiers de Paris or muid = 34.32 bushels. 
 
 In Languedoc and Provence, quantities were usually given in 
 " charges." The system of measures, according to Posthelwayt, 
 was: 
 
 i seder = 90 livres. 
 
 4 setiers = 360 livres = i charge. 
 
 1 Delamare, op. cit., II, 745. 
 
368 APPENDIX 
 
 The equivalents cannot be figured with certainty as it is not clear 
 what kind of weights Posthelwayt has in mind. He uses " pounds," 
 but I doubt if he means English pounds. I presume the unit intended 
 is the local unit, as the figures are in round numbers. The livre 
 in the Rhone Valley was somewhat less than the livre of Paris. At 
 all events the setier of Languedoc was a much smaller measure than 
 the setier of Pa,ris. 
 
APPENDIX II 
 
 GLOSSARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE TERMS 
 
 ADMINISTRATIVE terms have not been translated in the text, as 
 there are no English equivalents that would not be more misleading 
 than helpful. In the second part, a brief treatment of certain phases 
 of administrative history has been deemed essential, but it has not 
 been possible to discuss these topics comprehensively in the text, 
 and some recognition of the constitutional problem is necessary. The 
 constitutional history of the period is singularly involved, and, 
 in the light of new material, much of it is being rewritten. The 
 dictionaries of Dareste de Chavannes and of Cheruel are already 
 obsolete in many respects. The recent monographs are not always 
 at hand. 1 Some terms frequently used in this study do not receive 
 much attention from the general historian. Consequently, a few 
 concise descriptions of the functions of officials may assist the reader, 
 though it is impossible to do more than call attention to the historical 
 problems involved. 
 
 Awcat du Roi. A member of the staff of the baillage supposed 
 to give advice on legal matters. His functions seem to have been 
 essentially advisory. 
 
 Bailli. The bailli was the administrator or steward of some part 
 of the royal domain or of a seigniorial domain. In the south, the 
 official of tnis type was called senechal, but the functions were sub- 
 stantially the same. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the 
 
 1 Dupont-Ferrier, G., Les Officiers royaux des baillages et senechaussees. Paris, 
 1902. 
 
 Jacqueton, G., Documents rdatifs a V administration financiere en France de 
 Charles VII a Francois I. 1443-1523. Paris, 1891. 
 
 Hanotaux, Gabriel, Les Origines de V institution des Intendants des Provinces. 
 Paris, 1884. 
 
 Arbois de Jubainville, Henri d', L 'Administration des Intendants d'apres les 
 Archives de I'Aube. Paris, 1880. 
 
 Jouvencel, Henri de, Le Controleur General des Finances sous Vancien regime. 
 Paris, 1901. 
 
 Delamare, Traite de la Police, gives many details not easily found elsewhere, 
 and many references are given in Viollet, P. Histoire des Institutions Politiques et 
 Administrative* de la France. 3 vols. Paris, 1890-1903. 
 
 369 
 
370 APPENDIX 
 
 bailli or senechal was a general administrative officer not unlike the 
 steward of the English manors. The growth of the royal domain, 
 and the increase in royal power made thej3ailli more of an adminis- 
 trative official. He possessed both financial and judicial functions. 
 In all respects he was accountable to the Parlement. He managed 
 the revenue of the royal domain, and, as a judicial officer, he exercised 
 the rights of the Crown. Within the confines of the domain, he had 
 final jurisdiction over petty cases, and, subject to appeal to the Parle- 
 ment, jurisdiction in first instance over nearly all other matters. 
 As representative of the Crown, he possessed an ill-defined juris- 
 diction over the seigniorial courts. The " cas royaux " were in the 
 jurisdiction of the bailli, and as they received the fees they were anxious 
 to extend the royal authority. In 1498, the bailli were forbidden to 
 exercise judicial functions in person. The authority still remained 
 vested in the office, but the actual exercise devolved upon the lieu- 
 tenants of the bailli. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the 
 financial functions of the bailli were overshadowed by the develop- 
 ment of new taxes and a financial system in which the domain was 
 no longer the administrative unit. 
 
 Baillage. The area under the jurisdiction of a bailli. The com- 
 plications in regard to the baillages arose from the fact that the 
 administrative boundaries had little relation to local geography. The 
 baillage included, in most cases, all portions of the royal domain in a 
 given region. Frequently, as the result of historic accident, a village 
 would be attached to one baillage when every fact of geography or con- 
 venience would place it more naturally in another. Then, too, there 
 were frequent disputes over jurisdiction. Even in 1789, the Crown 
 did not possess precise knowledge of the confines of the baillages. 
 
 Chatelet. The castle used as official residence by the Provost of 
 Paris. The term is used in a general sense to refer to the jurisdiction 
 of the Provost. It is particularly appropriate after 1498, when the 
 office of Provost was put into commission. 
 
 Consul. The title given the members of the municipal corpora- 
 tion in the south of France. In a general way, they may be com- 
 pared to the Echevins of the north, and the aldermen of the English 
 boroughs. 
 
 Contrdleur General des Finances. It is scarcely too much to say 
 that no two Controleurs Generaux had the same authority or power. 
 The title was old even in Colbert's day. In the sixteenth century, 
 the Controleur was merely an auditor. The title was given to Colbert 
 
APPENDIX 371 
 
 to conceal the fact that he was to exercise the functions of Surin- 
 tendant des Finances. The Surintendant was the principal minister 
 of finance, and Sully had exercised a predominant influence while 
 he held that office. Colbert's authority was the result of a combina- 
 tion of several offices in his hands. Some of these functions became 
 definitely associated with the Controle General and were included 
 in later commissions. Some of the offices were regularly conferred 
 upon the Controleur General. After the death of Louis XIV the 
 Controle General became the center of the constitutional struggle. 
 
 Echevin. The title of a member of the municipal corporation 
 in the north of France. 
 
 Election. A division created in the fourteenth century to facili- 
 tate the assessment and collection of the direct taxes. The assessors 
 were originally elected by the land-owners of the district, hence the 
 name, but the election soon ceased to have any real meaning. In 
 the later period, the election is an administrative division of the 
 generalite. 
 
 Generalite. An area formed originally with reference to the 
 collection of the direct taxes. By a very complicated process of 
 growth, the division came to be the general administrative area 
 under the supervision of the intendant. The number of generalites 
 was constantly changing. The boundaries were at times the old 
 provincial boundaries, but more frequently their limits bore no 
 relation to any of the older administrative divisions. 
 
 Intendant. The title intendant is used in several distinct mean- 
 ings during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Inten- 
 dants de Justice of the sixteenth century were royal officers sent 
 from Paris to attend to fairly specific judicial matters. During 
 the Wars of Religion, Intendants d'Armee were frequently attached 
 to the armies. In the early seventeenth century, the intendant 
 developed new functions in connection with the taxes. This change 
 was really a fusion of offices that had formerly been distinct. The 
 Intendant de Justice was given the functions of the Receveurs Gene- 
 raux. The change is difficult to trace in detail, but it was this new 
 development that brought the intendant into close contact with 
 the generalites, and made him a local administrative officer. Colbert 
 emphasized these administrative functions and made the intendant 
 an efficient agent of the central administration. Under Louis XV, 
 the authority of the central administration diminished and the 
 intendants became more independent. Apart from the differences 
 
372 APPENDIX 
 
 in the powers of the intendants at different periods, there are impor- 
 tant differences in their authority in different places. In Languedoc, 
 the intendant enjoyed a large measure of discretion. Baville was 
 called the " King of Languedoc." At Paris, the intendant was not 
 very important. At Lyons, local influences were strong and the inten- 
 dant complained at times that he scarcely knew what was being done. 
 
 Lieutenant Civil. In 1498, the judicial authority was taken 
 from the Provost of Paris and given to the Lieutenants at the Chatelet. 
 Both the lieutenant civil and the lieutenant criminel claimed prece- 
 dence. The dispute remained undecided until 1630, when the lieuten- 
 ant civil was given precedence. He thus exercised general supervision 
 over all the work of the tribunal. 
 
 In some of the baillages, there was an official with this title. 
 
 Lieutenant Criminel. After 1630, the lieutenant criminel exercised 
 the criminal jurisdiction of the Chatelet, subject to the general control 
 of the lieutenant civil. In the absence of the lieutenant civil the 
 lieutenant criminel presided. 
 
 This title also appears in some of the baillages. 
 
 Lieutenant General. The lieutenant general was a resident of 
 prominence empowered to discharge all the functions of the bailli 
 throughout the baillage, when the bailli was absent. As the duties 
 of the bailli increased, more and more of his power passed to the 
 lieutenant. In the larger baillages, there were lieutenants generaux 
 in all of the important towns. Technically, they had jurisdiction 
 throughout the baillage; in practice, they did little outside of their 
 immediate vicinity. They discharged the functions of the bailli, 
 not only when he was absent from the baillage, but also when he 
 was merely occupied in some other part of his baillage. After 1498, 
 the lieutenants generaux were the real administrators of the baillages. 
 
 Lieutenant Particulier. This lieutenant was a subordinate of 
 the lieutenant general, and had jurisdiction only within the portion 
 of the baillage most immediately subject to the lieutenant general. 
 The lieutenant particulier was not supposed to act if the lieutenant 
 general could be found, and the lieutenant general was supposed to 
 be accessible at all times. If all went well, there would be nothing 
 for the lieutenant particulier to do. 
 
 Parlement. The Parlements of French history were judicial 
 and administrative bodies, in which the judicial functions steadily 
 gained the upper hand. Legislative power, in the true sense of the 
 term, they never possessed. The Parlement of Paris was somewhat 
 
APPENDIX 373 
 
 different in attributions and organization from the provincial Parle- 
 ments of Toulouse, Grenoble, Bordeaux, and Dijon. For the purposes 
 of this study, the most important feature of the activities of the 
 provincial Parlements is their resistance to the increase of the power 
 of the Crown in the provinces. Although these Parlements technically 
 possessed no legislative authority, refusal to publish unpopular 
 royal edicts, and the enforcement of edicts more in accord with local 
 interests, gave them the means of exerting much real influence. The 
 Parlement of Paris did not come into conflict with the Crown in any 
 matters pertaining to the grain trade. It seldom did anything more 
 than confirm the measures of others. 
 
 Procureur du Roi. A royal attorney attached to the staff of the 
 baillages to defend and supervise the judicial interests of the Crown. 
 
 Provost of Merchants (Prevot des Marchands). At Paris, Lyons, 
 and some other cities the chief municipal officer was called Provost 
 of Merchants. This was a souvenir of the origin of the municipal 
 charter in a grant of privilege to the merchants of the town. The 
 jurisdiction varied in accordance with the charter, and the actual 
 importance of the office was largely dependent upon the political 
 situation in the locality. 
 
 Provost of Paris (Prevot de Paris). The Provost of Paris was an 
 administrative officer of the royal domain possessing roughly the 
 same attributions as a bailli. The resemblance, however, does not 
 extend far. The influence of the Crown in the Isle de France was so 
 strong that the character of the official and of the office were excep- 
 tional in many ways. The edict of 1498 withdrew all direct judicial 
 administration from the hands of the Provost and assigned it to the 
 lieutenants civil and criminel. There was no specific division of 
 powers, and the struggle for precedence that ensued was not settled 
 until 1630. 
 
 Senechal. See Bailli: 
 
 Senechaussee. See Baillage. 
 
 Subdelegue. The subdelegue was an agent of the intendant, 
 appointed by him and directly subject to his authority in all respects. 
 There were subdelegues in some of the generalites early in the seven- 
 teenth century, but it was not until 1709 that they became universal. 
 From that time on they become increasingly important. The powers 
 of the subdelegue cannot be described very definitely, variations in 
 different localities were considerable, and, even in the same generalite, 
 their powers changed in many important respects. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 MANUSCRIPT MATERIAL 
 
 THIS statement of manuscript material should not be treated as 
 a comprehensive manuscript bibliography. A complete list of the 
 sources that might be used in a study of the grain trade would be 
 too voluminous in extent and too general in character to be of any 
 assistance. The sources for such work are almost entirely official 
 documents, and the variety of jurisdictions coming in contact with 
 trade was so considerable that research can be continued indefinitely. 
 In some " depots d'archives " there are cartons of material entirely 
 devoted to the subject of grain trade regulation; such collections of 
 material are of value as indicating the jurisdiction that is most active 
 in the locality, and as affording some general ideas of conditions. 
 But these selections of material are seldom to be trusted, and it is 
 generally necessary to examine all the general documents of the 
 authorities acting. 
 
 The quantity of material that was available forced me to limit 
 my work to what may be called the Parisian and the Lyonese manu- 
 scripts. The Parisian material included the correspondence of the 
 central authorities at Paris from 1657-1710; the extant records of the 
 Echevinage of Paris, and the records of the Chatelet in so far as they 
 were collected by Delamare. 
 
 Of these three sources of information, the general correspondence 
 of the Controleur General with the intendants is least satisfactory. 
 The letters contain an extraordinary variety of information, but most 
 of it is irrelevant and letters are most infrequent in the regions of 
 the most active development. 
 
 This correspondence has an involved and curious history which 
 still appears in the manner in which it is preserved. It is divided 
 into three large masses, and small volumes of letters may be found 
 where they are least suspected. 
 
 i. The "Melanges Colbert," preserved at the Bibliotheque Nation- 
 ale, consist of the letters addressed to Colbert by intendants, private 
 persons, and various officials with whom an incidental correspondence 
 developed. This covers the years 1658-77. Many of these letters 
 
 374 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 375 
 
 have been published by Depping, in his Correspondence Adminis- 
 trative, 1 but the publication by no means exhausts the letters of 
 general interest, and there is reason to believe that the selection was 
 not made with great care. Judgment of the value of Depping's pub- 
 lication is doubly difficult because of a change in the classification 
 of MSS. at the Bibliotheque. The bulk of the Colbert Correspon- 
 dence figured at that time as "Volumes Vert," and if we may judge 
 by the numbers reported by Depping in his bibliography, the present 
 collection of correspondence has been augmented by the addition 
 of other volumes. Exactly what has happened, the present staff 
 at the Bibliotheque does not seem to know. For the purposes of 
 the present study the volumes " Melanges Colbert," 101-126, were 
 examined carefully, but on account of the apparent barrenness of 
 this material, the remaining volumes, 126-176 bis, were covered by 
 the selection of the correspondence for May and June of each year. 
 The letters addressed to Colbert in the " Melanges " stop at 1677. 
 The letters of the intendants to Colbert after that date are preserved 
 at the Archives Nationales, serie G 7 . The correspondence in these 
 later years is even more extensive than in the early period, as well 
 as being more general in character. The letters in the " Melanges " 
 represent a correspondence with only a few of the intendants, those 
 included in the Department of Colbert, as Secretary of the " Maison 
 du Roi, etc." 2 
 
 2. The most extensive mass of letters written by Colbert is now 
 preserved at the Bibliotheque Nationale, in the " Melanges Clairam- 
 bault," vols. 461-468. These are copies in a secretarial hand of 
 letters written between 1679 and 1681. Nearly all of these have been 
 published by Clement in his Lettres, Instructions, et Memoires de 
 J. B. Colbert. Scarcely anything of importance has been omitted. 
 These letters are supplemented at times by collections made by the 
 intendant to whom letters were addressed. At the Bibliotheque 
 Nationale, Fonds Francais, 8751-52, there are the original letters 
 addressed by Colbert to Le Blanc, Intendant at Rouen, 1681. At 
 Amiens, in the Bibliotheque Communale, four volumes of letters 
 
 1 Depping, G. B., Correspondence Administrative sous le Regne de Louis XIV, 
 torn. IV, Paris, 1850-55. 
 
 2 The history of the Departments of State at this period is most helpfully 
 treated by A. de Boislisle, in the Introduction to the Correspondence des Controleurs 
 Gtneraux, and in the appendices on the Council of State in his edition of the M&- 
 moirs of St. Simon, vol. IV, 377~4395 V, 437-482; VI, 477-512; VII, 405-443. 
 
 f 
 
376 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 addressed to Breteuil are preserved. (Amiens, Bib. Comm., 508. 
 Letters 1680-83.) Other collections could probably be found. It 
 is wise to observe that we posses, ^nly the letters of the closing years 
 of Colbert's ministry, and that our judgments of his work are probably 
 affected by this ill-balanced preservation of material. 
 
 3. The Papers of the Controle General des Finances which now 
 constitute the serie G 7 . at the " Archives Nationales " are the most 
 voluminous mass of general material connected with the period. 
 Both sides of the correspondence appear: the letters of the Controleur 
 General and the letters of the intendants. Beginning in 1677, the 
 correspondence gradually becomes more voluminous until 1715, and 
 then diminishes in value until it ceases in 1733. After that date, 
 most of the letters are to be found in the Departmental Archives. 
 The publication of documents from this correspondence by the late 
 A. de Boislisle, 1 is excellent in every respect. The documents are 
 well selected and the indications of what it was necessary to omit 
 are singularly complete. But the mass of material is so great that 
 the printed volumes can do no more than give the reader an accurate 
 conception of what can be done with the MSS. This fonds consists 
 of general correspondence, classified by generalites: Cartons, 1-537. 
 
 In addition to this, there is much material classified by subjects, 
 including 35 cartons on the grain trade: Nos. 1630-65. This separa- 
 tion of material was made, at the time, to facilitate the work of the 
 administrative staff. The special cartons on the grain trade contain 
 all the correspondence of the years 1693-94 and 1709-10. 
 
 In this series it was possible to utilize only: 
 
 (1) Cartons 1630-65. 
 
 (2) General cartons containing the correspondence for the last years 
 of Colbert's ministry: 1667-83. 
 
 (3) General cartons containing the correspondence of the years 1698- 
 1 700, a period of dearth only slightly less important than the years 
 1693-94, 1708-09. The letters on this dearth were originally 
 collected with the other grain material, but were spread through 
 the general cartons by Boislisle. 
 
 No attempt was made to cover the years 1683-93, 1 695~98, 1700-08. 
 It is certain from other evidence that there was little pressure from 
 scarcity in those years, and so little information appears in years of 
 plenty that it was not deemed expedient to spend time in searching 
 the MSS. of those periods. 
 
 1 Correspondence des ContrSleurs Generaux des Finances avec les Intendants des 
 Provinces, 3 torn., Paris, 1874-97. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 377 
 
 The General Cartons actually examined were: i, 15-16, 71, 79, 
 84, 87-89, 101, 112, 124, 131-132, 137-141, 156-157, i59~ l62 > 
 171-172, 178-187, 213, 223-224, 227-232, 239, 243, 257, 276, 294- 
 309, 337-338, 345, 355, 358-36i, 374, 39, 394, 405, 417-420, 425, 
 429-433, 449, 451-453, 45M59, 463-471, 49i, 495-496, 5 6 , 5*2- 
 513, 518-527, 551. 
 
 The most serious omission is the neglect of the letters addressed 
 to the intendants by individuals. For the period 1683-1730 there 
 are eighty cartons (Nos. 552-634). During the years of dearth in- 
 formation of importance might be contributed by individuals. Lack 
 of time rendered the exploitation of that material impossible. 
 
 The local Parisian material is associated with the Echevinage 
 and the Chatelet, and here the difficulties of research reach a maximum. 
 The archives of the Echevinage were almost completely destroyed 
 by the Commune in 1871; only the " Registres du Bureau de la 
 Ville " remain, a very brief record of the principal activities of the 
 fichevins after I499. 1 These are preserved at the Archives Nationales 
 as part of " serie H." These have been printed down to 1610, though 
 one or two volumes are still in press. The manuscript registers 
 were used for the period 1610-1710, Nos. H. 1796 and ff. The 
 registers are practically duplicated by a series of notes and papers 
 on loose sheets, which were used by the secretary as the basis of the 
 registers, but as these are more difficult to handle, the latter were 
 used. The registers were indexed by the secretary, year by year, 
 so that there is little trouble in using these records. 
 
 The records of the Chatelet have survived intact, but the jurisdic- 
 tion was so comprehensive and the organization of work so slight that 
 it is wellnigh impossible to find one's way around in these MSS. The 
 trouble is increased by the extremely difficult notarial hand in which 
 these records are written. The Chatelet was unquestionably the 
 jurisdiction most intimately in touch with the grain trade in the 
 seventeenth century, but the difficulty of utilizing the material at 
 first hand made it necessary to depend largely upon Delamare. All 
 his papers are preserved at the Bibliotheque Nationale, so that it is 
 possible to supplement his printed volumes in many respects. My 
 confidence in Delamare for the more important grain trade material 
 contained in the records of the Chatelet is based upon two facts. 
 
 1 Histoire Generate de Paris. Registres des Deliberations du Bureau de la Ville de 
 Paris. 1499-1610. torn. XIV, Paris, 1883-1908. 
 
37$ BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 In the first place, the general registers of the Chatelet, the " Ban- 
 nieres," were certainly utilized by him in preparing his Traite de la 
 Police. Consequently we can trust him for the larger outlines of the 
 activity of the Chatelet, even prior to his own day. He knew as 
 much as anyone can, without an extraordinary acquaintance with 
 this complicated jurisdiction. In the second place, after 1660, Dela- 
 mare is indubitably the best informed man in France in regard to 
 grain trade regulation. In addition to his historical or antiquarian 
 knowledge, he possessed first hand knowledge of conditions throughout 
 the Seine Basin, acquired as commissioner of the Chatelet. 
 Delamare's information is accessible in several forms: 
 
 (1) The general material in the second volume of the Traite de la 
 Police. 
 
 (2) The description of the two visits to Champagne in 1709-10, in 
 the supplement to the 2d edition of the third volume. (Paris, 
 1722.) 
 
 (3) The papers at the Bibliotheque Nationale. These papers fall 
 into three classes: notes for the Traite de la Police, which 
 seldom contain anything not printed; letters passing between 
 Delamare and various people, both private individuals and public 
 officials; lastly, " proces verbaux " which should properly be 
 at the Archives Nationales among the papers of the Chatelet. 
 These letters and " proces verbaux " are scattered through several 
 volumes Bibliotheque Nationale, Fonds Francais, 21641-50. 
 The other volumes among Delamare's papers are of little value for 
 the study of the grain trade, though there is much on commerce 
 and industry. But although it is safe to trust Delamare for the 
 general results of the work of the Chatelet and for many facts, 
 it i? probable that a careful utilization of the papers at the archives 
 would yield much. Research will be difficult, and it is possible 
 that nothing might come, even of protracted search. All the clues 
 to be found in Delamare were traced down without result in the 
 papers of the commissioners, but those particular documents 
 had been abstracted by Delamare and are among his papers. 
 None the less, the most considerable possibility of discovering 
 new material is presented by the archives of the Chatelet. It 
 remains to be seen if Delamare's work is to be the only attempt 
 to master this material. 1 
 
 In addition to these general deposits, much scattering material 
 was examined, both at the Bibliotheque Nationale and at the Ar- 
 chives. At the Bibliotheque, the MSS. on " Commerce " and "Police" 
 
 1 The Bannieres have already been worked over by M. Tu6ty, but little has 
 been added to Delamare. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 379 
 
 in the " Fond Francais " were inspected, for the most part without 
 result. The most important MSS. were the volumes in the " Collec- 
 tion Moreau." 1061. Pieces sur le Commerce de Paris. 1062. 
 Regis tres des Compagnies Francaises, 1449-67. There are three 
 volumes of Compagnies Francaises, 1532-61, but the entries are so 
 brief that they have no historical value for the purposes of this study. 
 
 The famous " Memoires sur les Generalites," of 1698, were left 
 untouched chiefly from a lack of time, and partly from the idea that 
 they were not particularly important for this study. At the Archives 
 Nationales, the most useful of the small groups of material was the 
 " Bibliotheque Administrative " (Rondonneau). This is a collection 
 of ordinances, edicts, and letters patent, beginning in the middle 
 of the seventeenth century. There are two series, one arranged 
 chronologically, the other by subjects. The grain edicts, A. D. XI, 
 37-40 supplement Delamare at many points. 
 
 The work in the Municipal Archives at Lyons was less difficult 
 in one sense, because there was no doubt as to which authorities 
 were acting, but here again it was necessary to utilize the general 
 records, so that a large mass of material had to be searched for the 
 requisite data. 
 
 The importance 01 the grain trade at Lyons resulted in the collection 
 of many papers on this subject, and these are still catalogued inde- 
 pendently. But these documents would not be a safe guide for 
 a knowledge of Lyonese conditions. The one entirely trustworthy 
 source of information is the series of municipal registers. These 
 are much more voluminous than the Paris registers, and, as they begin 
 almost a century earlier (1428), it was impossible to examine this 
 material thoroughly. The difficulty of research is increased by the 
 inadequacy of the inventaire sommaire of the Registers, which the 
 archivists warned me not to trust. 
 
 The papers which relate especially to the grain trade are of three 
 kinds: 
 
 (i) Serie HH. Chappe IV. Letters Patent of the Crown, or of 
 
 Provincial Governors. 
 (2) Serie GG. Chappe IV. Papers relating to the Chambre d'Abon- 
 
 dance. Some concern its organization; some are the papers of the 
 
 Chambre: accounts, records of the deliberations of the Chambre, 
 
 and letters from its agents, 1667-69. 
 (3) Serie FF. HH. Chappe VII. Various papers concerning the 
 
 detailed regulation of the trade, Assizes of Bread, ordinances 
 
 concerning bakers, the ports, etc. 
 
380 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 The Letters Patent are a valuable and interesting source. The 
 documents of the Abondance are of unequal value. The accounts are 
 of little use historically, except as indicating the degree of regularity 
 in the functioning of the Chambre. The Registers of Deliberations 
 are valuable, and should have been utilized more carefully. The 
 letters of Du Pradt to the Directors of the Abondance constitute 
 one of the most important pieces of evidence in regard to the seven- 
 teenth century grain trade. But on the principal question, the history 
 of the Chambre, these special papers were uncertain and vague. 
 Still, it was evident that the critical years in the history of the trade 
 were the years that left some trace in these scattered papers. The 
 main body of facts could, therefore, be obtained by reference to the 
 Consular Registers for the years indicated in Letters Patent, accounts 
 of the Abondance, and such other incidental references as suggested 
 notable occurrences. 
 
 The third class of material was of no value for this study. 
 
 The Consular Registers for the critical years were examined, and 
 as there were frequent references to deputies charged with regulation 
 of the grain trade, it was deemed expedient to seek fuller details 
 among their letters. Some, important letters thus came to light. 
 
 Citations in the municipal archives at Lyons present a few unusual 
 features. The documents were very carefully inventoried and classi- 
 fied in the eighteenth century by one Chappe, and his work is still 
 the basis of the arrangement of the parts of the archives inventoried 
 by him. Documents are cited by the letters of the series and by 
 the volume and page of the manuscript Inventaire. The Consular 
 Registers of the Serie BB., and the Letters in Serie AA. were not 
 included in Chappe 's Inventory. 
 
 Work at Lyons covered the following material: 1 
 
 (1) Letters Patent, etc. Serie HH. Chappe IV, 381, 393, 401, 411, 
 422, 427. Each liasse is cited by the reference to the first docu- 
 ment. 
 
 (2) Papers of the Abondance: 
 
 General, GG. Chappe IV, 443, 448, 450, 45i-45 2 453, 460, 
 
 461-642. 
 
 Accounts, GG. Chappe IV, 481. 
 Deliberations, GG. Chappe IV, 538. 
 
 (3) Registres Consulaires. BB. 19. 352, 24, 47, 61, 81, 82, 85, 91, 
 105, 116. 
 
 1 Here, as elsewhere, I cite only those MSS. which proved to be of value. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 381 
 
 These Registers exist in duplicate for the most part, there being 
 the minutes taken during meetings and the copy prepared later. 
 The latter are, of course, most convenient. 
 
 (4) In Serie AA., of thirty-three liasses examined, only two contained 
 letters of importance for the grain trade Nos. 29, 32. 
 
 A few days' work was done in the Municipal Archives at Dijon 
 to clear up the early history of the Lyonese in Burgundy and Bassigny. 
 In the time available it was possible to examine only such material 
 as lay on the surface: letters patent, extracts from the municipal 
 records, vouchers turned in by commissioners stating work done, etc. 
 These results should be controlled by study of the municipal registers, 
 but for the purpose in view the scattered documents were probably 
 trustworthy. The work covered Serie G. 241, 256-266 inclusive. 
 
 I trust that this statement will indicate the general character of 
 the material that can be utilized for a study of the grain trade. The 
 subject necessitates constant reference to general municipal registers 
 and to administrative correspondence. Furthermore, it is essential 
 to cover a large territory, so that comprehensiveness of research is 
 almost impossible. The necessity of abandoning any hope of com- 
 prehensive treatment made me neglect price statistics. Materials 
 exist for the preparation of interesting figures, but the general state- 
 ment of the conditions of the time seemed to be essential to a proper 
 interpretation of such statistics, and it was evident that there would 
 only be time for the prosecution of this first stage in the work. 
 
 PRINTED LITERATURE 
 
 The extent of the MS. sources available for the treatment of this 
 subject made the printed literature relatively less important, as regards 
 the completed book. The studies of Araskhaniantz, Afanassiev, 
 and Naude were exceedingly helpful at the beginning, but concentra- 
 tion on the market problems of the domestic grain trade carried the 
 work into a different field, and the results suggested a somewhat 
 different account of royal policy. The influence of these authors 
 was thus of a nature that cannot easily be indicated by footnotes 
 in the text, and for that reason I take this occasion to recognize an 
 indebtedness that is real even if it cannot be precisely indicated. 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Works Relating Specifically to the History of the Grain Trade 
 during the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries . 
 
 Araskhaniantz, A. Die Franzosische Getreidehandelspolitik bis zum Jahre 
 178(2 in ihrcm Zuzammenhange mit der Land-, Volks-, und Finanzwirth- 
 schaft. Leipzig, 1883. In Schmoller: Staats und Social wissenschaftliche 
 Forschungen, IV. This is the most considerable attempt at mono- 
 graphic treatment of the history of the grain trade in the sixteenth and 
 seventeenth centuries, but it is only proper to add that it is unfinished. 
 The author's studies were interrupted after two years' work, and, as 
 there was little prospect of a resumption of the task, the results obtained 
 were published. The magnitude of the project was such tha t the author 
 was scarcely more than well started when work was discontinued. He 
 was able only to bring together the material that lay on the surface, and 
 as the questions of policy are most conspicuous, his attention is largely 
 absorbed by the political aspect of the trade. His treatment is not very 
 helpful as he does not read the edicts critically and does not realize the 
 necessity of a sharp distinction between the " foreign " and the "domes- 
 tic " trade. There is no indication of a perception of the preeminent 
 importance of the problem of distribution within the confines of the 
 kingdom. 
 
 Bethouart, A. Histoire du Ble dans la Beauce. Chartres, 1888. A com- 
 pilation of a few scattering notices of prices, dearths, and crop conditions. 
 Of no serious value. 
 
 Biollay, L. Les anciennes Halles de Paris. Memoires de la Soc. de 1'Hist. 
 de Paris et de ITsle de France, III (1876). 
 
 Boislisle, A. de. Le Grand Hyver de 1709. Revue des Questions Historiques. 
 Avril, 1903, p. 445. An excellent account of the external aspects of the 
 episode which played so large a part in the crisis of the history of the 
 grain trade. Contains references to the material available for study of 
 the meteorological conditions, as well as the most important general 
 descriptions in contemporary material. 
 
 Boissonade, P. La Production et le Commerce des Cereales, des Vins, et des 
 Eaux de Vie en Languedoc, dans le seconde moitie du XVII s siecle. An- 
 nales du Midi, XVII (1905). Also published separately. 32pp. A 
 very interesting study of the agricultural side of the subject, but so 
 brief in the portions devoted to the commercial movement that it was of 
 little assistance. Although local material was utilized, little information 
 is given on the commercial aspect of the subject that does not appear in 
 greater detail in the MSS. consulted for the present study. 
 
 Chassaigne, M. Essai sur Vancienne police de Paris: V approvisionnement. 
 Revue des fitudes Historiques, 1906. (Mai, Juin, Juillet, Aout.) 
 Largely concerned with the regulation of the retail trade in food 
 stuffs. 
 
 Gras, L. J. Prix du Ble a St. Etienne pendant trois siecles (1640 a nos 
 jours) d'apres les mercuriales. 1906. Soc. d'agriculture de la Loire. 
 (This work has been inaccessible.) 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 383 
 
 Louandre, Charles. De V alimentation publique sous Vancien monarchic 
 
 francaise. (This I have not seen.) 
 Marsy, Comte de. Lapprovissionnement de Paris sous Louis XII. Diffi- 
 
 cultes au sujet a" acquisitions de ble faites a Noyon, 1501-03. Bulletin de 
 
 la Soc. de 1'Histoire de Paris et de ITsle de France (1877). 
 Naude, Wilhelm. Die Getreidehandelspolitik der Europaischen Staaten 
 
 vom I3 ten bis zum i8 ien Jakrhundert. Berlin, 1896. A well considered 
 
 statement, but necessarily brief. The explanations of the French 
 
 policy are hardly supported by detailed study, 
 de la Porte, Guillaume. Avis de G de la P Eotteux es Holies de 
 
 Paris. Paris, 1621, Fournier: Varietes, Historiques, et Litteraires, 
 
 torn. III. 
 
 Works Relating to the History of the Grain Trade in the 
 Eighteenth Century 
 
 These books were consulted and many of them exerted an indirect 
 influence upon the present study. 
 
 Afanassiev, Georges. Le Commerce des Cereales en France. Paris, 1894. 
 Traduit du Russe sous le direction de Paul Boyer. An interesting be- 
 ginning of a study of the most difficult period in the history of the grain 
 trade. There is evidence of much patient research, but the main prob- 
 lems of the period are scarcely touched. 
 
 Babeau, A. La lettre de VEtat contre la cherete en 1724. Paris, 1892. 
 
 Biollay, Leon. Les Prix de Ble en 17 go. Paris, 1885. 
 
 Biollay, Paul. Etudes economises sur le XVIII" siecle. Le Pacte de 
 Famine. Paris, 1885. Disposes of the charges against Louis XV in 
 regard to the alleged syndicate for the control of grain prices. 
 
 Boisguillebert, Pierre le Pesant de. Ouevres diver ses. 
 
 Bond, G. Le Pacte de Famine. Histoire du Ble en France. Paris, 1889. 
 A more popular statement of the case than Biollay 's, but no less destruc- 
 tive of the old legend. 
 
 Frotiere de ia Messeliere, M. Boisguillebert et la liberte des grains. Paris, 
 1903. 
 
 Galiani. Dialogues sur les Bles. 1770. 
 
 Gazier, A. La Guerre des Farines. (Mai, 1775.) Memoires de la Soc. 
 d'Hist. de Paris et de 1'Isle de France, VI, 1879. 
 
 Herbert, Claude Jacques. La Police des Grains: Essai sur la Police Generale 
 des grains, sur leurs prix, et sur les effets de V agriculture. Berlin, 1755. 
 
 Letaconnoux, J. Le Commerce des Cereales dans la Bretagne. The proofs 
 of this work were kindly placed at my disposition. Its publication is 
 announced. 
 
 Le Trosne. La Liberte du Commerce des Grains toujours utile et jamais 
 nuisible. Paris, 1784. 
 
 Marion, M. Une Famine en Guyenne, 1747-48. Revue Hjstorique, 
 XLVI, pp. 241-287. 
 
 Mercier de la Riviere. L'Interet Gentrale de VEtat, ou la liberte du Commerce 
 des Bles. Amsterdam, 1770. 
 
384 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 Morellet. Refutation de Vouvrage qui a pour litre " Dialogues sur le Commerce 
 deBlts." 1770. 
 
 Roubaud. Recreations economiques, ou Lettres de Vauteur des Representa- 
 tions aux Magistrals a M. le Chevalier Zanobi, principal interlocuteur des 
 Dialogues sur le Commerce des Bles. 1770. 
 
 Valran, G. Miser e el Charlie en Provence au XVIII 6 siecle. Paris, 1899. 
 
 Vaudin, Bataille. Histoire de la Charitejusqu'en 1789. Paris, 1897. 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 Ableiges, Gilles de Maupeou, Comte <T, 
 Intendant in Auvergne (1691-95) and 
 at Poitiers (1695-1702), 25!., 28 f., 
 32, 63. 
 
 Acier, Sr. d', grain merchant of Aux- 
 onne, 146. 
 
 Admiral, the, see Bonnivet. 
 
 Agde, market town hi Languedoc, 183, 
 194, 195, 196, 291. 
 
 Agde, diocese of, 293. 
 
 Agen, town hi Guienne, 30. 
 
 Agen, Madame d', grain hoarder, 142. 
 
 Agenois, district in Guienne, 195. 
 
 Aigneus, the, grain merchants, 168, 
 169. 
 
 Aigueperse, market town, 3?, 61. 
 
 Aire, to\vn hi northern France, 276. 
 
 Airvault, market town, 24. 
 
 Aix, in Provence, 17. 
 
 Alby, diocese of, in Languedoc, 184, 196, 
 
 339- 
 
 Alencon, election of, 206, 207, 
 Alencon, vicomte of, 207. 
 Alencon, d', Lieutenant General, 77. 
 Alexandrin, Barthelemy, grain merchant 
 
 of Lyons, 247, 248. 
 
 Allier, the, river hi central France, 63. 
 Alps, the, 128. 
 Alsace, 114, 325, 328. 
 Alsatian border, the, 279. 
 Amant, Nicolas, testimony of, no f. 
 Amboise, market town, 67. 
 Amiens, 47, 81, 276. 
 Amiens, Bailli of, 256. 
 Amiens, generality of, 708. 
 Anconville, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Andelys, market town, 19, 20, 49, 50, 57, 
 
 59- 
 
 Angers, capital of Anjou, 68. 
 Angouleme, chief town of Angoumois, 
 
 216. 
 
 Angoumois, province in southwestern 
 France, 204, 208. 
 
 Anjou, province, 24, 274. 
 
 Appert, Charles, grain buyer, 76. 
 
 Apples, 281. 
 
 Apremont, Balan d', grain commission 
 merchant, 167 f. 
 
 Archers, 262, 324 f., 327. 
 
 Archin, Claude, grain merchant, 95. 
 
 Arcis-sur-Seine, market town, 101, 102, 
 103. 
 
 Argences, town, 19. 
 
 Argenson, Marc Rene de Voyer de 
 Paulmy, Marquis d', lieutenant gen- 
 eral of police at Paris, 64, 298. 
 
 Argenton-Chateau, 25. 
 
 Arginot, gram merchant, 145. 
 
 Argouges, Florent d', Intendant in 
 Burgundy (1688-94), 333, 335, 33- 
 
 Aries, city hi Provence, 139, 174, 183, 
 197, 198, 340. 
 
 Armagnac, district hi Gascony, 211, 214. 
 
 Armies, supply of grain for the, 117, 262, 
 
 323 337- 
 Arras, 36, 78. 
 Arras, grain factor, 86. 
 Artois, province, 23, 37, 78. 
 Asphodel bread, 208. 
 Assais, market town, 24. 
 Attichy, village in Soissonnais, 6, 99. 
 Aube, the, river, 86, 327. 
 Aube valley, the, 102, 103. 
 Auch, Archbishop of, 211. 
 Audiger, grain merchant of Paris, 87, 
 
 95- 
 
 Auge, vicomte" of, hi Normandy, 264. 
 Aumale, Comte d', 7. 
 Aumale, Sieur d', 251. 
 Aumones Generales, the, 213. 
 Aunay, town near Vitry, 102. 
 Aunis, province, 28, 238. 
 
 387 
 
388 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Aurard, merchant of Marans, 28. 
 
 Auray, Breton port, 33, 34. 
 
 Aurillac, election of, in Upper Auvergne, 
 206. 
 
 Ausgans, Robert, grain merchant, 47. 
 
 Auvergne, province, 62, 63, 64, 67, 129, 
 135, 138, 140, 147, iS3, 154, 156, 158, 
 165, 166, 184, 205, 206, 245, 246, 300, 
 342. 
 
 Auxois, mediaeval countship in Bur- 
 gundy, 349. 
 
 Auxonne, town on the Saone, 140, 144, 
 145, 146, 152, 168, 186, 188, 189, 202, 
 n. 2, 247, 249, 251, 252. 
 
 Auxonne, vicomte of, 146. 
 
 Avignon, 147, 149, 204, 232. 
 
 Axsery, 140. 
 
 Baillage, nature of the, 243. 
 
 Balme, Sindic in Burgundy, letter of, 
 
 279. 
 
 Bapaume, market town, 36, 78. 
 Bar, duchy, dependent on Lorraine, 113, 
 
 114,326,328. 
 
 Barbaron, Jean, testimony of, 102 f. 
 Barbary grain, 340. 
 Barbe, attorney, 77. 
 Barbier, boatman, 123. 
 Barley, 78, n. 2, 205, 319, 341; demand 
 
 for, in Champagne, 116 f.; abundance 
 
 of, in Lorraine, 328. 
 Barre, Antoine le Fevre de la, Intendant 
 
 hi Auvergne, 63. 
 Barres, des, grain hoarder, 142. 
 Bar-sur-Seine, town, 15, 16. 
 Bassigny, small district hi Lorraine and 
 
 Champagne, 129, 136, 138, 143, 144, 
 
 145, 157, 158, 167, 169, 186, 191, 244, 
 
 248, 253, 322, 334. 
 Baville, Nicolas de Lamoignon de, 
 
 Intendant in Languedoc (1685-1718), 
 
 174, 183, 184, 185, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
 
 209, 242, 285, 339 f. 
 Bayonne, 17. 
 Bazin, Francois, Sieur de Brandeville, 
 
 Intendant at Metz, 281. 
 B6arn, province in southwestern France, 
 
 213- 
 
 Beaucaire, sene"chauss6e of, in Languedoc, 
 265. 
 
 Beauce, the, district in northern France, 
 23, 47, n. i, 48, 53, 54, 55, 57, 64, 65, 
 7i, 73, 74, 106, 118, 132, 133, 135, 138, 
 148, 153, 158, 165, 166, 300, 301, 310, 
 311, 325, 344; destruction of the old 
 market system in, 88-94, 99. 
 
 Beaugency, town near Orleans, 343. 
 
 Beaujolais, district in Lyonnais, 131, 133, 
 135, 138, 187, 211, 337. 
 
 Beaumont, town in Burgundy, 142. 
 
 Beaumont-de-Lomagne, town in south- 
 ern France, 36. 
 
 Beaumont-sur-Oise, town near Noyon, 
 36, 79, 262. 
 
 Beaune, town in Burgundy, 145. 
 
 Beauvoisis, district in northern France, 
 81, 225. 
 
 Bellay, physician at Blois, 210. 
 
 Bellay, town in Burgundy, 279. 
 
 Belleme, village, 143. 
 
 Belleton, Claude, grain merchant, 148. 
 
 Belleville, market town, 245. 
 
 Benedictins de Calvaire, the, at Paris, 
 84, n. i. 
 
 Benigny, Gerard, grain factor, 142. 
 
 Benne, Jacques, grain merchant of Lan- 
 gres, 143- 
 
 Bergerac, town in Perigord, 216. 
 
 Bernage, official, 215 f. 
 
 Berry, province in central France, 18, 
 68, 215, 274, 343. 
 
 Berthelot, grain merchant, 310. 
 
 Berulle, Pierre de, Intendant in Au- 
 vergne (1684-87) and at Lyons (1687- 
 94), and first president of the Parle- 
 ment of Dauphine and Commandant 
 of the province of Dauphine (1694- 
 1723)1 i73 f-, 176, 183, 201, 217, 332, 
 333,335,336,338. 
 
 Besancon, city in Tranche Comte, 185. 
 
 Bessin, district in Normandy, 50. 
 
 Beure, parish in Champagne, 16. 
 
 Beuvron, Marquis de, Lieutenant Gen- 
 eral to the government of Lower 
 Normandy, 59. 
 
 Be"ziers, diocese of, 293. 
 
INDEX 
 
 389 
 
 Beziers, district of, in Languedoc, 184. 
 
 Beziers, market town in Languedoc, 183, 
 195, 291. 
 
 Bezons, Claude Bazin de, Intendant in 
 Languedoc, 285. 
 
 Bezons, Louis Bazin de, Intendant at 
 Bordeaux (1686-1700), 216. 
 
 Bibliotheque Mazarin, the, 83. 
 
 Bigorre, county of, 207. 
 
 Bilain, Jean de, grain merchant of 
 Rouen, 51. 
 
 Billy, grain merchant of Vannes, 35. 
 
 Billy, Philippe de, grain merchant of 
 Bray, no, in. 
 
 Blame, Sr. de, Sindic of Bugey, 333. 
 
 Blatters, 4, 10 f., 21, 23, 25, 27, 36, 37, 40, 
 42, 45, 46, 47, 59, 60, 69, 89, 90, 99, 
 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 
 in, 114, 116, 117 131, 168, 169, 206, 
 312, 318; their operations described, 
 
 13-19- 
 Blois, city on the Loire, 23, 62, 63, 66, 67, 
 
 204, 210, 343. 
 
 Blot, Pierre, grain merchant of Bray, no. 
 
 Bobinet, Andre, prebend, 143. 
 
 Bodin, Jean, political economist, 349, 
 
 353- 
 Boileau, Etienne, author of Livre des 
 
 Metiers, 46, 47, 129. 
 Bolbec, industrial town in Normandy, 
 
 19. 
 
 Bonnardot, grain merchant, 202, n. 2. 
 Bonnivet, Guillaume, Admiral of France, 
 
 142. 
 Bordeaux, 29, 30, 31, 32, 45, 195, 199, 
 
 205, 214, 215, 216, 270, 281-284, 292, 
 298, 339- 
 
 Bordeaux, Jurats of, 282, 296. 
 
 Bossuet, Antoine, Intendant at Soissons 
 
 (1685-94), 97 f. 
 Bouchu, Claude, Intendant in Burgundy, 
 
 279 *> 354- 
 
 Bouchu, fitienne Jean, Intendant in 
 Dauphine and Savoy and to the army 
 of Italy (1686-1705), extraordinary 
 letter of, 209 f.; letter of, explaining 
 market conditions, 217 ff. 
 
 Boue, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Bouille, market town in Normandy, 51. 
 
 Boulevard Saint-Michel, the, at Paris, 83. 
 
 Bourbonnais (or Bourbonnois), province, 
 13, 63, 64, 153, 158, 245, 246, 274, 343- 
 
 Bourdonnaye, Yves Marie de la, Inten- 
 dant at Bordeaux (1700-09), 30, 195, 
 298. 
 
 Bouret, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Bourgachard, market town, 20, n. i, 60. 
 
 Bourganeuf , town hi central France, 206. 
 
 Bourges, 13 f., 211. 
 
 Bourges, Claude de, agent of the Lyons 
 consulate, 147, 152. 
 
 Bourgoin, town in Dauphine, 217. 
 
 Boutet de Nailliers, agent of Jouet, 28 f. 
 
 Bouville, Michel Andre Jubert de, 
 Marquis de Bizy, Intendant at 
 Limoges (1689-94) and at Orleans 
 (1694-1709), 14, 64, 66, 213, 214, 343 f. 
 
 Bouyn, Antoine, agent of the Lyons con- 
 sulate, 153 f. 
 
 Brachet, Maire of Orleans, 343. 
 
 Braine, village near Soissons, 7, 99. 
 
 Bray, market town, 8, 48, 72, 80, 107, 
 305> 313, 3i5. 3i6, 327, 33i; new type 
 of market first appears at, 39-43, 99, 
 108, 109, no, in, 112, 118, 127; 320, 
 344, 360; Delamare's description of 
 the market quoted, 42 f., 320. 
 
 Bresse, district hi Burgundy, 128, 135, 
 138, 231, 246, 247. 
 
 Bfessuire, town, 25. 
 
 Bret, Jean Baptiste, brigand, 192. 
 
 Breteniers, town near Dijon, 143. 
 
 Breteuil, Francois le Tonnelier de, In- 
 tendant in Picardy, Artois, etc. (1674- 
 83), 276. 
 
 Breton merchants, large resources of, 33. 
 
 Brianconnais, district hi Dauphine", 217. 
 
 Brie, district in northern France, 23, 
 42 f., 48, 71, 72, 74, 80, 108, 119, 122, 
 258,308,310,311,313. 
 
 Brie-Comte-Robert, market town near 
 Paris, 119, 1 20. 
 
 Briel, parish in Champagne, 16. 
 
 Brie-sur-Marne, river port, 119. 
 
 Brigandage, 192 f. 
 
 Brilhouet, see Martineau. 
 
390 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Brionnais, small district in Burgundy, 
 
 337- 
 Brioude, election of, in Upper Auvergne, 
 
 206. 
 Brittany, 20, 33, 34, 35, 56, 64, 66, 67, 
 
 68, 215, 216, 238, 300, 301, 340 f. 
 Brive, election of, in Angoumois, 205. 
 Brun, Charles le, merchant of Noyon, 36. 
 Brussels, 36, 78. 
 Buckwheat, 200, 205, 319. 
 Bugey, district in Burgundy, 129, 279, 
 
 333- 
 
 Bureau of 1559, the, 230 ff., 268, 294; 
 abandoned, 223. 
 
 Burgundian grain, inferior in quality to 
 that from the lower Rhone valley, 162, 
 217. 
 
 Burgundy, 15, 212, n. 3, 310, 311, 362; 
 export of grain to Lyons, 129, 134, 135, 
 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 144, 146, 
 147, 148, 152, 156, 157, 158, 165, 166, 
 167, 170, 177, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185, 
 
 200, 201, 202, n. 2, 232, 241, 244-255, 
 
 256, 259, 300, 331-339, 357 f-> 3595 to 
 Bray, 42, 108; to Genoa, 139; to the 
 Hospitalers, 139; dearth of 1504 in, 
 349; poor harvest of 1693 in, 182, 183, 
 332-33 6 ; dearth of 1709 in, 71, 185- 
 193, 344; loose organization of the 
 grain trade, 141 ff.; Retif's experi- 
 ments with herbs, 208 f.; edicts and 
 policy of Colbert, 274, 277-280, 292, 
 354; regulation of the grain trade 
 through licenses, 301, 322, 331-339. 
 
 Burgundy, county of, 136. 
 
 Burgundy, duchy of, 146. 
 
 Burgundy, Estates of, 253, 254. 
 
 Bursars, at Lyons, 135. 
 
 Caen, city in Normandy, 19, 51, 59. 
 
 Cahors, town in Guienne, 214. 
 
 Cahors, election of, 215. 
 
 Cajon, Louis, testimony of, no. 
 
 Calonges, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Cambray, town in northern France, 261. 
 
 CambrSsis, district in French Flanders, 
 
 23. 37- 
 Canal de Briare, the, 62, 64, n. 2, 65. 
 
 Canal de Languedoc, the, see Canal du 
 
 Midi. 
 
 Canal d'Orleans, the, 65, 67 f., 344. 
 Canal du Midi, the, 204, 271. 
 Canis, Thibaut, grain merchant of Lyons, 
 
 136. 
 Capelle, Sr. de la, grain commissioner at 
 
 Lyons, 154. 
 
 Carabin, Pierre, grain porter, 79. 
 Carcassonne, city in Languedoc, 183, 
 
 184, 265. 
 
 Cardinals, College of, 12. 
 Carmelite convent, the, at Blois, 210. 
 Castelmoron, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Castelnaudary, town in Languedoc, 196. 
 Castres, diocese of, in Languedoc, 184. 
 Caudebec, market town, 19, 59, 60. 
 Caumont, market town in Normandy, 
 
 51- 
 Caux, Pays de, district in Normandy, 20, 
 
 50- 
 Cavalier, Jean, leader of the Camisards 
 
 in the Cevennes, 193. 
 Cette, seaport in Languedoc, 194, 287. 
 Cevennes, the, mountains in southern 
 
 France, 193, 209. 
 Chaillot, the widow, grain merchant of 
 
 Bray, no, in, 313. 
 Chains, stretched across the Saone, 256, 
 
 n. i. 
 Chaiz, deputy of the Lyons consulate, 
 
 198; indiscreet conduct of, in 1693, 
 
 173-176, 183. 
 
 Chalindrey, town in Bassigny, 143. 
 Chalons, Pierre, grain merchant of 
 
 Chalons-sur-Marne, 76. 
 Chalons-sur-Marne, city in Champagne, 
 
 48, 76, 77, 80, 86, 87, 101, 102, 103, 
 
 104, 106, 112, 116, 118, 122, 123, 260, 
 
 261, 262, 305, 307, 308, 310, 311, 319, 
 
 320, 323, 325, 329, 331. 
 Chalons-sur-Marne, baillage of, 104. 
 Chalons-sur-Saone, city in Burgundy, 
 
 145, 146, 189, 192, 204, 247, 252, 334, 
 
 336. 
 Chalons-sur-Saone, Bishop of (Henri 
 
 Felix de Tassy), letters of (1709), 190- 
 
INDEX 
 
 391 
 
 Chamlay, Louis Jules de Bole de, quar- 
 termaster-general of the French armies, 
 carries samples of nutshell bread to the 
 King, 210. 
 
 Chambre d'Abondance, at Lyons, see 
 Lyons. 
 
 Chambre d'Abondance at Paris, see 
 Bureau of 1559. 
 
 Champagne, province, 42, 48, 50, n. 2, 79, 
 80, 88, 103, 225, 236, 257, 259, 261, 
 
 274, 308, 309 3", 3i3, 3H, 318, 319, 
 321, 322, 323, 325, 329, 331, 359; de- 
 pendence of, upon the market at Vitry, 
 in 1708-10, 116, 117; as a source of 
 grain supply for Lyons, 136, 138, 141, 
 144, 167, 169, 248; grain purchased in, 
 for the Hospitalers, 139; dread of 
 dearth in, 181, 186; famine in (1694), 
 212, n. 2; relations with the central 
 power, 256, 280; regarded as a source 
 of supply for Provence and Languedoc, 
 354- 
 
 Champyer, sketches outline of a Chambre 
 at Lyons, 152. 
 
 Channes, gram merchant, 313. 
 
 Chanoinesses de Saint-Sepulcre, the, at 
 Paris, 84, n. i. 
 
 Chapeyron, gram merchant of Lyons, 
 175, n. 3. 
 
 Charles VIII, king of France (1483-98), 
 229, n. 4. 
 
 Charles IX, king of France (1560-74), 
 edicts of, relative to the grain trade, 
 232-235. 
 
 Charleville, market town, 104, 324. 
 
 Charlieu, town near Roanne, 148. 
 
 Charmes, town in Burgundy, 142. 
 
 Charny, letters of, 254, 255. 
 
 Charollais, county in Burgundy, 153, 
 158, 211. 
 
 Charolles, town in Burgundy, 211. 
 
 Charreton, Jehan, grain merchant, 139. 
 
 Chartres, chief town in the Beauce, 53, 
 88, 89, 90, 93, 118, 228, 260, 261. 
 
 Chassigney, village, 143. 
 
 Chateau, the, at Soissons, 95. 
 
 Chateaufort, market town, 47, 48. 
 
 Chateauneuf, town near Orleans, 343. 
 
 Chateau-Regnault, town, 18. 
 
 Chateau-Thierry, market town, 80, 122 f., 
 261, 262. 
 
 Chatelain, grain merchant, 112. 
 
 Chatelet, the, at Paris, 79, 85, 243, 258, 
 261, 296, 297; its activities in the 
 regulation of the grain trade, 301-330, 
 
 344, 360- 
 
 Chatelleraud, market town, 25. 
 Chatelnaudry, market town, 80. 
 Chatillon, market town, 68 f. 
 Chaulnes, Due de, governor of Brittany, 
 
 34- 
 
 Chaulny, market town, 36, 98, 260. 
 Chaume, village, 143. 
 Chaumont, market town, 322. 
 Chaumont, election of, 60. 
 Chauvort, village hi Burgundy, 192. 
 Chefaine, parish in Champagne, 15. 
 Cheminee, Trois, 25. 
 Chenoist, country gentleman, 77 f. 
 Chestnuts, as a staple food, 184, 205, 
 
 209. 
 Chevalier, commissioner of the Chatelet, 
 
 3". 
 Chevalier, the widow, gram merchant, 
 
 79- 
 
 Cheverny, village near Blois, 210. 
 Chevigny, village, 142. 
 Cheyreuse, market town in the Beauce, 
 
 91. 
 
 Chinon, town in Touraine, 18, 25. 
 Chortophagy, 189, 211, 214. 
 Christendom, 346, 348. 
 Christianot, grain buyer, 186. 
 Cinq Grosses Fermes, the, 271, 279. 
 Claye, market town, 47, 48. 
 Clayrac, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Clement, grain merchant of Chalons- 
 
 sur-Marne, 101. 
 Clerc, Pierre de, grain merchant of Paris, 
 
 86. 
 
 Clereau, Sr., grain merchant, 28. 
 Clermont-Ferrand, market town in 
 
 Auvergne, 61, 129, 154. 
 Clermont-Ferrand, election of, 206. 
 Clermont-Lodeve, lieutenant governor 
 
 of Languedoc, 265. 
 
392 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Cloos, Hughes de, grain merchant at 
 Paris, 86. 
 
 Coetmadeu, grain merchant, 35. 
 
 Cogirnon, village in Bassigny, 143. 
 
 Coin de Saint-Paul, bread market in 
 Paris, 1 20, n. 2. 
 
 Colbert, Jean Baptiste, French states- 
 man, 227, 239, 267, 339; his place in 
 the history of the grain trade, 268-294, 
 295, 296, 297; Utopian dreams of, 
 309; his place in the history of eco- 
 nomic theory, 351, 353, 354-35 7- 
 
 Colbert de Terron, official, 269. 
 
 Colbertism, 350, 353. 
 
 Collection Rondonneau, the, 275, n. 4. 
 
 Collinet, grain merchant of Chalons-sur- 
 Marne, 123. 
 
 Colmet, grain buyer, 8, 109, no, 111,315, 
 316; his wife, 8, 109. 
 
 Colombier, town in Dauphine", 130. 
 
 Colonger, see Calonges. 
 
 Combe, Jehan, baker of Lyons, 136. 
 
 Combray, grain factor, 86. 
 
 Commissionaires Facteurs, 316. 
 
 Commune, the, 75. 
 
 Compagnie de Commerce of Cette, the, 
 286, n. 3, 287. 
 
 Compagnie Nonnande, the, 359. 
 
 Compagnies Fran^aises, the, 49, 50, 51, 
 52, 358. 
 
 Compiegne, market town, 36, 52, 97. 
 
 Conac, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Conart, miller at Juvisy, 92. 
 
 Concarneau, seaport in Brittany, 340. 
 
 Conseil Prive, the, 251. 
 
 Controle General, the, 212, 270, 271. 
 
 Controleur General, the, 170, 172, 174, 
 178, 194, 217, 269, 298, 319, 320, 321, 
 
 333, 335, 336, 337- 
 Coq, Pierre, testimony of, 76. 
 Corbeil, market town in the Beauce, 89, 
 
 119, 225, 256, 257. 
 Cormery, town, 18, 69. 
 Corners, 309. 
 
 Cotentin, the, district in Normandy, 50. 
 Cottereau, grain merchant of Bray, no, 
 
 in. 
 Coucy, village near Soissons, 7, 99. 
 
 Coudrey, town, 67. 
 
 Coulommiers, market town, 76, 77, 261. 
 
 Council, the, 307, 308. 
 
 Council of Commerce, the, 350, 351, 353. 
 
 "Country buying," 20 ff., 24, 25, 41, 
 51, n. 2, 87, 88, 91, 101, 102, 103, 105, 
 107, 108, 109. 
 
 Coupenage, 146. 
 
 Courier of Champagne, the, 88. 
 
 Courson, Lamoignon de, 31 f. 
 
 Courtenot, parish in Champagne, 15 f. 
 
 Courtiers (grain brokers), 31. 
 
 Couserans, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Craignat, grain merchant, 145. 
 
 Crecy, town near Paris, 305. 
 
 Crecy, grain merchant, 315. 
 
 Creil, town, 14, 36, 79. 
 
 Creil, Jean de, Marquis de Creil-Bour- 
 naizeau, Intendant at Orleans (1686- 
 94), 65- 
 
 Crepy-en-Valois, market town, 23, 97. 
 
 Crepy, measure of, 52. 
 
 Cressy, the widow, grain merchant, 313. 
 
 Crest, town in Dauphine, 256, n. i. 
 
 Creuse, valley of the, 23, 25. 
 
 Crevecoeur, town near Soissons, 95. 
 
 Crown, the, 356; and the grain trade, 
 238 f.; fosters the ideal of interde- 
 pendence, 346 f. 
 
 Cusset, town, 32. 
 
 Daffodil bread, 208. 
 
 Daguesseau, Henri, Intendant at Bor- 
 deaux, later (1673-85) in Languedoc, 
 270, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 
 294, 299, 339. 
 
 Dallegre de St. Herent, grain shipper, 32. 
 
 Dammartin, market town, 23, 47, 48. 
 
 Dammartin, Geoffroi of, grain merchant, 
 
 45 ^ 
 
 Dandin, Symon, grain merchant, 46. 
 
 Dare, Louis, Lieutenant of the Bailli of 
 Rouen, 264. 
 
 Dauphine, province, 16, 198, 209, 216- 
 219, 229, n. 4, 256, n. i, 271, n. 3, 
 292, 354, n. 2; as a source of grain 
 supply for Lyons, 129, 130, 132, 134, 
 138, 149, 156, 245; dearth in (1499), 135- 
 
INDEX 
 
 393 
 
 Dean, Michel, fined, 45. 
 
 Decapelle, agent of the Lyons consulate, 
 
 153- 
 
 Delamare, Nicolas, official and juris- 
 consult, 39, 43, 97, 108, in, 119, 232, 
 311 ff., 314, 315, 320, 331, 339; de- 
 scribes the market at Bray, 42 f., 320; 
 establishes a wholesale market at 
 Vitry (1709), 112-118, 321, 325-330, 
 360. 
 
 Demasses, councillor at Lyons, 155. 
 
 De Neufville, special commissioner, 
 228 f. 
 
 De Poix, letter of, on buying by sample, 
 91 f. 
 
 De Rubys, agent of Lyons, 254. 
 
 Desgrassieres, royal official in Brittany, 
 
 35- 
 
 Desperrieres, letter of, 90 f. 
 Dieppe, seaport in Normandy, 271. 
 Dijon, city in Burgundy, 140, 141, 142, 
 
 143, 144, 145, 187, 188, 189, 248, 249, 
 
 250, 334, 354- 
 Dijon, Parlement of, 188, 252, 253, 254, 
 
 255, 333- 
 
 Dijon, Syndic of, 253. 
 Dog-bane, mixed with grain as food, 209. 
 Dombes (Pays de Dombes), district in 
 
 Burgundy, 134, 138, 158, 246, 247. 
 Donne-Marie, village near Bray, no. 
 Doubs, the, river in eastern France, 192. 
 Doue, market town, 24, 25. 
 Dourdan, market town in the Beauce, 65, 
 
 89, 92. 
 
 Douzy, town, 212. 
 Duclair, town, 19, 20. 
 Du Clere, market town, 59, 60. 
 Dugas, grain merchant, 168, 169. 
 Du Lieu, Provost of Merchants at Lyons, 
 
 174. 
 Du Pradt, deputy of the Chambre d' 
 
 Abondance, letters of, 167 ff. 
 Duquesnoy, Louise, grain merchant of 
 
 Paris, 86. 
 
 Dutch grain merchants in Guienne, 282. 
 Dutch industry and commerce, 351. 
 Dutenot, grain merchant, 145. 
 Du Terrail, grain shipper, 32. 
 
 fichevinage, the, at Paris, 296, 297, 301- 
 
 3"- 
 
 Effey, vicomte of, 207. 
 Ehrenberg, Richard, political economist, 
 
 viii. 
 Elboeuf, market town, 19, 49, 50, 51, 
 
 52, 57, 58, 59, 261. 
 Embrunois, district in Dauphine, 217. 
 Empire, the, 247. 
 England, n, 351. 
 English grain merchants, in Guienne, 
 
 282. 
 
 English industry and commerce, 351. 
 Engrossing, 141, 190 f. 
 fipernay, market town, 80, 103, 117. 
 fipernon, market town in the Beauce, 89. 
 Eseville, market town, 69. 
 Estain Ribeyre, d', grain shipper, 32. 
 Estates of France, the, 348. 
 Estrees, Marechal d', 95. 
 Etablissement Hospitalier, the, at Paris, 
 
 84, n. i. 
 
 fitampes, market town in the Beauce, 57, 
 , 65, 80, 88, 89, 225, 256, 257. 
 Etats des Bleds, 199 f. 
 Eucheve, Nicolle, testimony of, 86. 
 Europe, 34, 361; western, 362. 
 fivque, Antoine 1', grain merchant, 95. 
 
 Factum pour Jean Roger, pamphlet, 314, 
 
 n. 2, 316 f. 
 
 Falconneau, grain buyer, 35. 
 Famine, extreme instances of, 208-215. 
 Farez of Chalons, grain buyer, 76. 
 Faubourg Saint-Antoine, the, at Paris, 
 
 119. 
 Faubourg Saint Germain, the, at Paris, 
 
 83, 84; bread market in, 120, n. 2. 
 Faultrier, Joachim, Abbe, Intendant in 
 
 Hainault, etc. (1678-88), 280 f. 
 Fegnet, grain commission merchant, 167. 
 Fere-en-Tarlenois, village near Soissons, 
 
 7,99- 
 
 Fer-en-Tretenois, town near Soissons, 95. 
 Ferns, ground up to make flour, 211. . 
 Ferrand, Sieur, testimony of, 261. 
 Ferrand, Antoine Francois, Intendant in 
 
 Burgundy (1694-1705), 178, 336, 337, 
 
394 
 
 INDEX 
 
 338; Intendant in Brittany (1705-15), 
 
 34i. 
 
 Ferre, Charles, grain merchant, 75. 
 Ferre-en-Tarlenois, see Fere-en-Tarlenois. 
 Figeac, town in Guienne, 214. 
 Fimes, market town, 86. 
 Firloix, de, grain hoarder, 142. 
 Flanders, 38, 78. 
 Flemish grain merchants, in Guienne, 
 
 282. 
 Flemish market, the, valuable to 
 
 Picardy, 261. 
 Florentines, 265. 
 
 Foliot, St. Vast, wholesale grain mer- 
 chant, 34. 
 
 Fontainebleau, 18, 260. 
 Fontaine-Frangaise, town in Burgundy, 
 
 142. 
 
 Fontenay, town, 28, 29. 
 Forez, district in Lyonnais, 131, 133, 
 
 i35, 138, 153, 245. 
 Foucault, Nicolas Joseph, Intendant at 
 
 Montauban (1675-84), 30, 284. 
 Foulle de Martangis, fitienne Hyacinthe 
 
 Antoine, Marquis de Martangis et de 
 
 Prunevaux, Intendant at Bourges 
 
 (1708-20), 14. 
 Fournier, Robert, grain measurer at 
 
 Chateau-Thierry, 123. 
 Fralignes, parish in Champagne, 15. 
 France (He de France), 50, 71, 72, 74, 86, 
 
 122, 311. 
 
 France, grain buyer, 97. 
 Tranche Comte, province, 114, 136, 138, 
 
 144, 167, 169, 185, 186, 187, 247, 248, 
 
 328. 
 Francis I, king of France (1515-47), 230, 
 
 237, 294; edicts of, relative to the grain 
 
 trade, 228 ff., 235. 
 Free trade, 272 f., 347 ff. 
 Freres de la Charite, the, at Paris, 84, 
 
 n. i. 
 Froissart, Marguerite, testimony of, 
 
 86. 
 Froisses, Gilles des, grain merchant of 
 
 Rouen, 54. 
 Frosts, 233, 270. 
 Froyses, see Froisses. 
 
 Gaillac, town, 30. 
 
 Gaillard, grain factor at Bray, 109 f. 
 
 Galdy, grain merchant of Lyons, 175, 
 
 n. 3. 
 
 Gap, town in Dauphine, 16, 17. 
 Gap, Bishop of, 17. 
 Gapengois, district in Dauphine, 217. 
 Garonne, the, river in southwestern 
 
 France, 2*04, 282, 285, 292. 
 Garonne basin, the, see Garonne valley. 
 Garonne valley, the, 20, 29-32, 206, 281- 
 
 284, 339- 
 Gastebois, Jehan, grain merchant of 
 
 Langres, 141. 
 Gatinais, district in north-central France, 
 
 310. 
 
 Genoa, 139, 175, n. 3, 286. 
 Genoese, the, 193 f. 
 Genvry, market town, 98. 
 Germany, 128. 
 
 Gigors, Maci de, grain merchant, 45. 
 Gigue, Nicole, laborer at Soissons, 87. 
 Gillecourt, village near Crepy-en-Valois, 
 
 97- 
 
 Gimont, town, 30. 
 Gisors, market town, 20, 47, 50, 60. 
 Gisors, Matthew of, grain merchant, 47. 
 Givey, 143. 
 Gizors, see Gisors. 
 Godet, grain merchant of Chalons-sur- 
 
 Marne, 87. 
 
 Goix, village near Bray, in. 
 Gonesse, market town, 23, 36, 47, 48. 
 Goudouin, Magdelaine, testimony of, 
 
 101. 
 
 Gracay, town, 13, 14. 
 Granary trade, the, 37 ff., 41. 
 Grand Provost, the, 262. 
 Grands Boulevards, the, 83. 
 Grape pips, used as food, 211. 
 Grave, district in Guienne, 270. 
 Gray, market town in Burgundy, 168, 
 
 1 86, 188, 331. 
 
 Gray, Remain, grain factor, 87 f. 
 Great Schism, the, 12. 
 Greek philosophers, the, 351. 
 Grenade, town, 30. 
 Grenoble, town in Dauphine, 217,218,219. 
 
INDEX 
 
 395 
 
 Grenoble, Parlement of, 217, 245. 
 Grignon, merchant of Marans, 28. 
 Grolier, agent of Lyons in Burgundy, 
 
 248-252, 358. 
 Guidor, grain merchant of Nogent-sur- 
 
 Seine, 102. 
 Guienne, province, 17, 193, 194, 195, 196, 
 
 204, 282, 283, 284, 293. 
 Guignier, grain merchant of Lyons, 175, 
 
 n.3- 
 Guimbre, Henry, grain buyer for the 
 
 Lyons consulate, 152, 245. 
 Guimbre, Jacques, agent of Lyons, 247, 
 
 248, 249, 250, 252, 358. 
 Guise, Due de, 247. 
 Guise, House of, 251. 
 
 Haillan, Bernard de Girard, Seigneur du, 
 historian, 349. 
 
 Hainault, province in French Flanders, 
 78, 280. 
 
 Halle au Ble, the, at Paris, 72-75, 84, 90, 
 n8f., 360. 
 
 Ham, market town, 36, 78. 
 
 Harouys, Andre de, Intendant in Cham- 
 pagne (1702-11), 117, 321, 322, 323, 
 
 324,325- 
 
 Haussmann, Baron, 83. 
 
 Haut, market town, 98. 
 
 Havre, seaport hi Normandy, 271. 
 
 Haynault, see Hainault. 
 
 Hemary, grain buyer, 76. 
 
 Hendelot, Nicholas, grain merchant of 
 Langres, 141. 
 
 Hennebont, Breton port, 33, 34, 35. 
 
 Henry II, long of France (1547-59), 282; 
 edict of, expressing the new na- 
 tionalism, 347 f. 
 
 Henry III, king of France (1574-89), 
 edicts of, relative to the grain trade, 
 234, 235, 237, 269, 272. 
 
 Henry IV, king of France (1580-1610), 
 227, 236 f., 350. 
 
 Herbigny, Henri Francois Lambert d', 
 Intendant in Dauphine and Lyonnais 
 (1679-83), 354, n. 2; Intendant at 
 Lyons (1694-1701), 336, 337, 338. 
 
 Heresy, dread of, 12. 
 
 Hery, village near Rheims, 324. 
 Homer, 351. 
 
 Honfleur, seaport in Normandy, 271. 
 Hospital, the, at Lyons, 191. 
 Hospital, the, at Paris, 68. 
 Hospitalers of St. John of Jerusalem, 
 Order of the, 139; Grand Master of, 
 
 139- 
 
 Hotel de Ville, the, at Lyons, 171. 
 Hotel de Ville, the, at Paris, 79, 85, 118, 
 
 317- 
 
 Hotman, grain buyer, 200. 
 Houdan, market town in the Beauce, 89, 
 
 90, n. 2. 
 Huge, 317. 
 
 Huissiers d cheval, 304. 
 Hurepoix, district in northern France, 
 
 311. 
 
 Ice, as a hindrance to river navigation, 
 
 iS7, 191- 
 Imbellot, Guillaume, grain merchant of 
 
 Chalons-sur-Saone, 145. 
 Incendiarism, threats of, 327. 
 Intendant, development of the office of, 
 
 269-272, 295. 
 Intendants d' Abondance, at Lyons, 
 
 158-161. 
 
 Invalides, the, 310. 
 Isle-Bouchard, town, 25. 
 Isle de Re, 28. 
 
 Isle Saint-Louis, the, at Paris, 118. 
 Issoire, election of, hi Lower Auvergne, 
 
 206. 
 
 Italian ports, 278. 
 Italians, come to Lyons, 131 f.; attempt 
 
 to ship grain to Savoy and Piedmont, 
 
 244; sent away from Languedoc, 339. 
 Italy, 128, 278, 284, 285, 287, 289, 354. 
 
 Janot, or Jannot, agent of the Lyons 
 
 consulate, 153, 154. 
 
 Janville, market town hi the Beauce, 90. 
 Javelins, river port on the Marne, 119. 
 Joigny, grain hoarder, 142. 
 Joinville, town hi Champagne, 319. 
 Joubert, Francois, syndic des &ats of 
 
 Languedoc, 196. 
 
396 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Jouet, Sr., Receiver of the Taille at 
 
 Fontenay, 28, 29. 
 Jourdan, grain merchant, 174, 175, notes 
 
 i and 3. 
 Jura, the, mountain range in eastern 
 
 France, 127, 128, 130, 331. 
 Juvisy, town near Paris, 92. 
 
 La Bague, grain merchant, 315. 
 Labbe, Isabelle, testimony of, 86. 
 La Chapelle, town near Dijon, 143. 
 La Charite, town near Orleans, 14, 343. 
 La Fere, market town, 98, 260. 
 La-Fere-Champenoise, market town, 102, 
 
 103. 
 
 La-Ferte-Bernard, market town, 68. 
 La-Ferte-Gaucher, market town, 76, 122. 
 La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, market town, 87, 
 
 122. 
 Laffemas, Barthelemy, protectionist, 273, 
 
 347, 350 f., 353. 
 La Fontaine, agent of Martineau de 
 
 Brilhouet, 28. 
 
 Lagny, market town near Paris, 119. 
 La Haye, town, 26. 
 Lallement, Louis, testimony of, 76. 
 La Maillerage, market town, 59. 
 La Maire, merchant of Noyon, 36. 
 Lambert, grain buyer, 76, 77. 
 Lamy, grain merchant of Bray, no, in. 
 Langeais, town, 18. 
 Langon, town on the Garonne, 270. 
 Langres, market town in Burgundy, 141, 
 
 142, 143, 144, 167, 168, 186, 189, 248, 
 
 250, 322, 334- 
 Languedoc, province in southern France, 
 
 129, 132, 133, 136, 137, 138, 147, 152, 
 
 153, 165, 166, 170, 173, 174, 175, n. 3, 
 
 177, 199, 204, 209, 218, 238, 278, 282, 
 
 283, 300, 301, 337, 344, 345, 3545 
 dearth of 1693 in, 182-185; dearth 
 of 1709 in, 185, 187, 193-196, 339 f.; 
 local regulation of the grain trade in, 
 263, 2645.; regulation of the grain 
 trade by Colbert and his subordinates, 
 284-294. 
 
 Languedoc, Estates of, 264 f., 291, 292, 
 347, n. i. 
 
 Laon, city in Northern France, 204. 
 La Poterie, market town in Normandy, 
 
 Si- 
 
 Larcher, Michel, Intendant in Cham- 
 pagne (1692-99), 103, 212, n. 2, 310, 
 318, 319, 320, 321. 
 
 Large, merchant of Marans, 28. 
 
 La Rochelle, 28. 
 
 Laspeyres, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Lavalle, grain buyer, 41, 88, 107. 
 
 Lavour, diocese of, in Languedoc, 184, 
 196, 339- 
 
 Le Bartz, Francois, munitionnaire general 
 des vivres de la marine, 201 f. 
 
 Le Blanc, official, 271, 281. 
 
 Lebret, Pierre Cardin, Intendant in Pro- 
 vence (1687-1704), 174, 175, 198, 340. 
 
 Le Brie, grain buyer, 41, 107. 
 
 Le Burgaud, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Lefavre, grain merchant, 87. 
 
 Legate, the, at Avignon 147, 152. 
 
 Le Jay, Charles, Intendant at Bordeaux, 
 282, 283. 
 
 Le Lieurre, testimony of, 123. 
 
 Le-Mat-en- Verdun, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Le Noble, Charles, munitionnaire, 201, 
 202, n. 2, 333 f., 335. 
 
 Lentils, 216. 
 
 Le-Port-du-Pille, town, 25. 
 
 Lers, de, grain merchant of Avignon, 
 147. 
 
 Le Sage, grain merchant, 35. 
 
 Levassor, grain merchant, 32. 
 
 Les Andelys, see Andelys. 
 
 Lesdiguieres, Due de, letter of, 209. 
 
 Lestrage, dues of, 95. 
 
 Lettres de Voiture (way-bills), 123, 343. 
 
 Levant, the, 196, 339. 
 
 Le Vaux, grain merchant, 95. 
 
 Le Vayer, official, 37, 96 f., 98. 
 
 Libourne, market town, 216. 
 
 Lieutenant Civil, the, at Paris, 304. 
 
 Limagne, district in Lower Auvergne, 
 206. 
 
 Limoges, city in central France, 205, 215, 
 216. 
 
 Limoges, Bishop of, 215. 
 
 Limoges, election of, 206. 
 
INDEX 
 
 397 
 
 Limours, market town in the Beauce, 91. 
 Limousin, province in central France, 
 
 205, 208, 209, 213, 215. 
 Linas, town near Paris, 92. 
 L' Isle-en- Jourdain, town, 30. 
 Livre des Metiers, the, 46, 129. 
 Lizy, market town, 86, 122, 261. 
 Lobat, Francois, grain merchant, 148. 
 Loches, market town, 18, 69. 
 Lodeve, diocese of, in Languedoc, 184. 
 Loire, the, 23, 24, 25, 33, 204. 
 Loire towns, the, 344. 
 Loire valley, the, grain trade in, 23, 24, 
 
 29, 32 f., 56, 61-69, 118, 200, 257, 342, 
 
 343- 
 Lorinet, gram merchant of Chalons-sur- 
 
 Marne, 101. 
 Lorraine, duchy, 76, 101, 106, 113, 114, 
 
 116, 141, 144, 186, 191, 248, 326, 328, 
 
 329, 33i- 
 
 Lorraine merchants, 328, 329. 
 Lorrainers, 114, 116, 117. 
 Lorris, town, 67. 
 Loudun, market town, 24. 
 Louhans, market town in Burgundy, 
 
 333- 
 Louis XI, king of France (1461-83), 12, 
 
 131- 
 
 Louis XIII, king of France (1610-43), 
 84, 94, 237. 
 
 Louis XIV, king of France (1643-1715), 
 84. 
 
 Louviers, market town, 60. 
 
 Louvre, the, at Paris, 118. 
 
 Low Countries, the, 74, 117, 323. 
 
 Lucca, 246. 
 
 Lucon, town, 28. 
 
 Lyonnais, province (earlier, a small dis- 
 trict lying within the territory of the 
 later province), 131, 135, 138, 144, 
 158, 186, 187, 244, 247, 254. 
 
 Lyons, 5, 20, 55, n. 2, 61, 62, 74, 206, 
 n. i, 212, 216, 217, 231, 232, 240, 241, 
 243, 285, 297, 298, 339, 340, 347, 349; 
 establishment and history of the 
 Chambre d' Abandonee at, 126-179, 
 232; relation between the Lyons grain 
 trade and dearth in the producing 
 
 regions, 180-202, 208; complications 
 attending the import of grain from 
 Burgundy, 244-255, 256, 259, 278, 
 
 279, 300, 331-339, 357 f-, 359- 
 Lyons, Archbishop of, 146. 
 
 Macon, town on the Sa6ne, 131, 146, 192, 
 
 204, 232, 247, 249, 334, 336. 
 Macon, the Abondance of, 188. 
 Macon, Bishop of, 189 f. 
 Maconnais, district in Burgundy, 189, 
 
 337- 
 
 Magistere, town, 30. 
 Magnan, parish in Champagne 15. 
 Magny, market town, 20, 59, 60. 
 Maguelone, diocese of, in Languedoc, 
 
 265. 
 
 Maillotz, Mile, de, grain hoarder, 142. 
 Maison des Jeunes Filles,the, at Paris, 84, 
 
 n. i. 
 Maistre, le, commissioner of the Cbltelet, 
 
 3ii- 
 
 Malesherbes, market town, 18. 
 Malta, 246. 
 Mandelot, governor of Lyonnais, 158, 
 
 254- 
 
 Manosque, in Provence, 17. 
 Mantes, market town, 48, 49, 60, 90, 
 
 n. 2. 
 
 Mantes, election of, 60. 
 Mantouche, town in Burgundy, 188. 
 Marais, le, bread market in Paris, 120, 
 
 n. 2. 
 
 Marans, market town, 26, 27, 28, 29. 
 Marchand, Pierre, grain factor, 86. 
 Marche Neuf , bread market in Paris, 120, 
 
 n. 2. 
 Marechal, Jehan, grain merchant of 
 
 Pont-de-Vaulx, 231. 
 Marillac, letter of, 6 f. 
 Marin, Francois, grain merchant of 
 
 Meaux, 122. 
 
 Marie, market town, 98. 
 Marly, market town, 47. 
 Marne, the, river tributary to the Seme, 
 
 33, 48, 76, 86, 88, 118, 119, 305, 
 
 318- 
 Marne towns, the, 86, n. 3. 
 
398 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Marne valley, the, 29, 51, 55, 71, 74, 75, 
 112-118, 204, 331, 342; demoraliza- 
 tion of the grain trade in, 100-107. 
 
 Marseilles, 17, 201, 286, 289. 
 
 Marsilly, market town in Burgundy, 
 168. 
 
 Martin, Louise, 41. 
 
 Martineau de Brilhouet, grain merchant, 
 28. 
 
 Mary (Mani), river port on the Marne, 
 72, 122. 
 
 Mary-sur-Seine, see M6ry-sur-Seine. 
 
 Mascoyer, grain merchant, 145. 
 
 Massif Central, the, 128, 214. 
 
 Mast, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Mathus, Thomas, grain hoarder, 142. 
 
 Maurienne, district in Dauphine, 209 f. 
 
 Maxilly, town on the Saone, 140, 144, 
 186, 188, 202, n. 2, 248, 249, 250, 252. 
 
 Meaux, market town, 77, 80, 86, n. 3, 
 119, 122, 257, 261, 262, 305. 
 
 Medici, Catharine de', 254. 
 
 Meinard, grain factor, letter of, 174 f . 
 
 Meliand, Claude, Intendant at Caen, 
 281. 
 
 Melun, market town in the Beauce, 18, 
 80, 89, 91, 119, 225, 256, 257, 260, 262, 
 
 315- 
 Mende, diocese of, in Languedoc, 183, 
 
 184. 
 Meniole, Valentin, merchant of Noyon, 
 
 36. 
 
 .Mercantilism, 272, n. i, 282, n. i, 355. 
 Mercier, grain merchant of Bray, 313. 
 Mercier, grain merchant of Vannes, 35. 
 Merville, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Mery-sur-Seine, market town, 40, 87, 
 
 3i4. 
 Mesnil, du, commissioner of the Chatelet, 
 
 311- 
 
 Messina, in Sicily, 286. 
 
 Meteil, 78. 
 
 Metropolitan market, the, 299; local 
 markets and metropolitan demand, 
 3-12; market organization and the 
 development of the new type of mar- 
 ket, 37-44; the new type of market 
 first appears at Bray, 3^-43, 99, 108, 
 
 109, no, in, 112, 118, 127, 320', 344, 
 360; Delamare's description of the 
 market at Bray quoted, 42 f. 320; 
 wholesale market established at Vitry 
 (1709), 112-118, 127, 321, 325-330, 
 344, 360; Delamare's account of the 
 market at Vitry quoted, 144, 328f.; 
 the conception of the metropolitan 
 area, 348 f.; Montchretien's conception 
 of economic interdependence, 352; the 
 conception of the metropolitan distrib- 
 utive organization, 355 f., 360; the 
 pushing of the metropolitan market 
 system into remote sections a charac- 
 teristic feature of the late nineteenth 
 century, 207 f. 
 
 Metz, city in northeastern France, 281. 
 
 Meuse, the, river in northern France, 
 322. 
 
 Mezieres, border town, 103, 117, 319. 
 
 Mezieux, town in Dauphine, 130. 
 
 Millau, town on the Tarn, 206. 
 
 Millet, ordinary food of the peasants in 
 Upper Languedoc, 290. 
 
 Mirabel, town in Burgundy, 142. 
 
 Mirebeau, town, 17. 
 
 Mirepoil, market town in Languedoc, 183. 
 
 Miromenil, Thomas Hue, Marquis de, 
 Intendant in Champagne (1673-89) 
 and at Tours (1689-1701), 25, 280, 
 
 344- 
 
 Moissac, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Molle, Nicholas, grain seller, 249. 
 Monastere du Precieux Sang, the, at 
 
 Paris, 84, n. i. 
 
 Monnaye, Maltre de la, at Romans, 147. 
 Mont, Guillaume du, of Seurre, agent of 
 
 the Lyons consulate, 153. 
 Montagne, 143. 
 Montaigne, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Montaigu, town, 26. 
 
 Montargis, town in the Beauce, 310, 343. 
 Montauban, city in Languedoc, 30, 205, 
 
 213 f., 283, 284. 
 
 Montauban, Archbishop of, 213 f. 
 Montauban, diocese of, 184, 196. 
 Montauban, ge"neralite of, 30. 
 Montbazon, town, 18. 
 
INDEX 
 
 399 
 
 Montchretien, Antoine de, writer on 
 
 political economy, 273, 347, 351 ff. 
 Moiitcony, Benoit, grain merchant, 148. 
 Mont-de-Mar$an, town, 17, 18. 
 Montdidier, town in Picardy, 23, 260, 
 
 261. 
 Montelimar, town in Dauphine, 204, 
 
 219, 256, n. i. 
 Montereau, market town in the Beauce, 
 
 18, 41, 80, 88, 89, 107, 262, 315. 
 Montereau-sur-Yonne, see Montereau. 
 Monteycourt, village, 143. 
 Montf errand, town in Auvergne, 154. 
 Montfort-l'Amaury, market town in the 
 
 Beauce, 89. 
 
 Montgay, market town, 47. 
 Montgivraut, letter of, 172. 
 Montguillon, Jean, grain seller, 76 f. 
 Montholon, Charles Francois de, first 
 
 president of the Parlement of Rouen 
 
 (1691-1703), 59. 
 
 Montigny, town near Dijon, 143. 
 Montigny, village near Bray, 112. 
 Montleduc, market town, 216. 
 Montlhery, market town, 65, 89, 90, 92, 
 
 94, 106, 118, 119, 344. 
 Montpellier, city in Languedoc, 195, 
 
 196. 
 
 Montreuil, parish in Champagne, 16. 
 Montreuil-Bellay, market town, 24, 69. 
 Montsoreau, market town, 20, 23, 25, 67, 
 
 69. 
 Moreton, grain merchant of Avignon, 
 
 147. 
 
 Mormand, village, 143. 
 Mornier, Andre, grain merchant, 148. 
 Morniers, councillor at Lyons, 155. 
 Morocco, 185. 
 Moulins, town, 132. 
 Moulins, baillage of, 207. 
 Mouthers, echevin of Paris, 308, 309. 
 Mimitionnaires, 334. 
 Musseau, Etienne, testimony of, 109 f . 
 
 Nancy, city in Lorraine, 186. 
 
 Nantes, city in Brittany, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
 
 33, 56, 61, 62, 199, 340, 341, 342. 
 Naples, 354. 
 
 Narbonne, city in Languedoc, 183-, 184, 
 185, 194, 195, 288, 290, 291, 292, 293, 
 
 339- 
 
 Narbonne, diocese of, 293. 
 
 Narbonne, district of, in Languedoc, 184, 
 265. 
 
 National Library, the, at Paris, 325, 353. 
 
 Nemours, market town, 18; disorganiza- 
 tion of the market, 93. 
 
 Nepveu, gram buyer, 41, 88, 107. 
 
 Nesle, town, 36. 
 
 Neubourg, market town in Normandy, 
 
 i9> 50, 5i, 59, 60- 
 
 Neubourg, Pays de, district in Nor- 
 mandy, 50, 53. 
 Neuil, abbey of, 28. 
 Neuilly-Saint-Front, market town, 97. 
 Nice, municipality of, 194. 
 Nimes, city in Languedoc, 183, 184, 196. 
 Nivernais, province, 33, 63, 153, 158. 
 Nogent-le-Roy, market town in the 
 
 Beauce, 53, 57, 89, 90, n. 2. 
 Nogent-sur-Seine, market town, 40, 72, 
 
 80, 102, 262, 310, 315. 
 Noisel, near Lagny, mill at, 119. 
 Normandy, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 58, 
 
 62, 63, 69, 70, 73, 238, 258, 274, 
 
 281; local regulation of the grain 
 
 trade in, 263 f. 
 Normandy, Estates of, 264. 
 Normandy, Lords of the Exchequer of, 
 
 264. 
 
 Normandy, Parlement of, 57, 60, 264. 
 Notary, the, at Bray, no. 
 Noue, de la, grain merchant of Bray, 
 
 no, in, 112, 313. 
 Noyon, market town, 36, 37, 38, 45, 47, 
 
 52, 78, 79, 86; 98, 99, 106, 118, 225, 
 
 260, 261, 262, 305. 
 Nutshells, flour made from, 209 f. 
 
 Oats, 189, 205, 319. 
 
 Oise, the, river tributary to the Seine, 
 
 48, 79, 261, n. 3, 305, 307. 
 Oise valley, the, 35 ff., 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 
 
 75, 78 ff., 94-100, 101, 118, 225, 358. 
 Orient, the, 220, 361. 
 Orleannais, province, 13. 
 
4oo 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Orleans, 14, 23, 33, 47, 62, 63, 73, 74, 133, 
 199, 204, 206, n. i; peculiar situation 
 of, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 296, 300 f.; con- 
 nection with the supply of Lyons, 148, 
 157; regulation of the grain trade at, 
 342 ff. 
 
 Orleans, generality of, 211. 
 
 Ormesson, Antoine Francois de Paule le 
 Fevre d', Intendant at Soissons (1704- 
 12), 7,98 f. 
 
 Orne, the, river in Normandy, 19. 
 
 Osse", Claude d', surgeon, 103. 
 
 Oudan, market town, 58, 261. 
 
 Pacte de Famine, the, vii, 125; a fore- 
 runner of, in 1694, 315. 
 Page, le, commissioner of the Chatelet, 
 
 311- 
 
 Paimpol, grain riots at, 35. 
 
 Pannier, merchant of Soissons, 7. 
 
 Panthier, Benoit, grain merchant of 
 Lyons, 136. 
 
 Papillon, grain merchant, 132. 
 
 Paray-le-Monial, town in Burgundy, 211. 
 
 Paris, 5, 6, 7, 8, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 33, 
 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 200, 204, 206, 
 n. i, 208, 210, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 
 240, 241, 243, 283, 297, 298, 299, 337, 
 341, 347, 349, 350, 357, 358, 360; his- 
 tory of the Parisian grain markets, 
 45-125; population, 82 f.; grain 
 trade of, contrasted with that of 
 Lyons, 126, 127, 158, 180, 331; local 
 regulation of the grain trade, 256-263; 
 regulation of the grain trade between 
 Paris and the towns of the Seine Basin, 
 1683-1709,300-330,359,360; relation 
 between the Paris grain trade and that 
 of Orleans, 342 ff. 
 
 Paris, Parlement of, 229, 243, 256, 258. 
 
 Paris, Provost of, 258. 
 
 Paris bushel, the, 205. 
 
 Partnerships, 167; effort to suppress, 
 316 ff., 360. 
 
 Patris, 205. 
 
 Pau, town in B6arn, 213. 
 
 Pau, gene"ralite of, 207. 
 
 Pavilly, village, 20, n. i. 
 
 Pellot, Claude, Intendant at Mon- 
 
 tauban and in Guienne, 283. 
 Perart, Madame, grain merchant of 
 
 Chalons-sur-Marne, 104. 
 Peraud, Sr., procureur, 103 f. 
 Perigord, district in Guienne, 205, 209, 
 
 214, 216. 
 
 Perigueux, town in Guienne, 216. 
 Perigueux, Bishop of, 216. 
 Peronne, town in Picardy, 23, 36, 78, 
 
 260, 261. 
 
 Perronne, see Peronne. 
 Perrot, Sr., quoted, 85 f. 
 Perthois, district in Champagne, 321, 
 
 322. 
 
 Pertuis, in Provence, 17. 
 Petits Augustins, the, at Paris, 84, n. i. 
 Petons, 14. 
 
 Philipon, grain merchant, 313. 
 Philipon, Pierre, testimony of, 108 f. 
 Physiocrats, the, vii, 223, 227. 
 Picardy, province, 36, 37, 78, 236, 238, 
 
 256, 259, 260, 261, 274, 280, 311. 
 Piedmont, 244. 
 Pinon, Anne, Intendant in Burgundy 
 
 (1705-10), 187. 
 Pinon, Pierre, grain merchant of Paris, 
 
 57- 
 
 Piot, grain merchant, 102, 103. 
 Pirattes de bled, 191 f. 
 Place, the, at Lyons, 155. 
 Place Maubert, bread market in Paris, 
 
 120, n. 2. 
 Plaineuf, 310. 
 
 Platt, Claude, grain merchant, 148. 
 Plessis-Saint- Jean, village near Bray, 112. 
 Plonyer, Honnorat, grain merchant of 
 
 Lyons, 147. 
 Poiret, commissioner of the Chatelet, 
 
 ?"' 
 
 Poissy, market town, 47, 48, 49, 258. 
 
 Poitiers, city, 17. 
 
 Poitou, province, 17, 18, 20, 24, 26, 27, 
 
 28, 29, 68, 215, 216, 274. 
 Poix, Sieur du, testimony of, 261. 
 Pomereu de la Breteche, Jean Baptiste 
 
 de, Intendant in Champagne (1699- 
 
 1702), 104, 105 ff., 113. 
 
INDEX 
 
 401 
 
 Pontaillier, market town in Burgundy, 
 
 188, 252. 
 
 Pont-Audemer, market town in Nor- 
 mandy, 51. 
 
 Pont-Audemer, vicomte of, 264. 
 Pontavert, market town, 87, 104. 
 Pontchartrain, Louis Phelypeaux, Comte 
 
 de, Controleur General of finance 
 
 (1680-99), 68. 
 
 Pont-de-Beauvoisin, the, 217. 
 Pont-de-1'Arche, town on the Seine, 57, 
 
 58, 261. 
 
 Pont-de-Vaux, town in Burgundy, 208. 
 Ponthieu, county in Picardy, Si, 256. 
 Ponthieu, Senechal of, 81, 256. 
 Pont-1'Eveque, near Noyon, 36, 37. 
 Pontoise, election of, 60. 
 Pont-Sainte-Maxence, market town, 36, 
 
 40, 79- 
 
 Pont-Saint-Esprit, 174. 
 Pont-sur-Seine, market town, 80, 315. 
 Pontz, 80. 
 
 Poor relief, question of, 213 ff. 
 Pope, the, seeks to export grain from 
 
 Languedoc, 265. 
 
 Port de Greve, the, 64, 74, 118, 315. 
 Port de 1'Ecole, the, 57, 118. 
 Porte de Nesle, the, at Paris, 83. 
 Porte Saint Antoine, the, at Paris, 83. 
 Porte Saint Denis, the, at Paris, 83. 
 Porte Saint-Michel, the, at Paris, 83. 
 Port-Moutain, village near Bray, 112, 
 
 305- 
 
 Port-Sainte-Marie, town, 30. 
 Port Saint Vincent, the, at Lyons, 154. 
 Portugal, 33, 61, 226, 341. 
 Pettier, grain buyer, 186. 
 Pouillot, Charles, grain factor, 123. 
 Pouilly, village near Rheims, 324. 
 Prais de M\)Uo, town in Roussillon, 214 f. 
 Prangey, village, 143. 
 Presidial, the, at Tours, 18. 
 Presle, Louis, grain merchant, 75 f. 
 Pressac, town, 216. 
 Prestreau, Pierre, grain merchant of 
 
 Lyons, 136. 
 Pronard, 14. 
 Protectionism, 272 f., 35-355- 
 
 Provence, 16, 17, 199; as a source of 
 grain supply for Lyons, 129, 136, 137, 
 138, 170, 173, 174, 175, n. 3, 182, 183, 
 185, 187, 335, 337; for Dauphine, 
 218; and for Italy, 278, 289, 354; 
 draws grain from Burgundy, 139; and 
 from Languedoc, 194, 195, 284, 285, 
 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 339; 
 Colbert expects it to be supplied from 
 Burgundy and Champagne, 278, 354; 
 local markets the basis of trade, 344. 
 
 Provins, market town, 8, 40, 41, 48, 77, 
 78, 80, 261, 262, 305, 314, 327. 
 
 Provost of Merchants, the, at Paris, 80, 
 122, 123, 226, 257, 258, 260, 302, 303, 
 304, 306, 310, 317, 319, 341. 
 
 Provost of Paris, the, 301, 306. 
 
 Pusignan, town in Dauphine, 130. 
 
 Puy, Le, town in Auvergne, 154. 
 
 Quai des Grands Augustins, bread mar- 
 ket in Paris, 120, n. 2. 
 
 Queen Mother, the, see Medici, Catharine 
 de'. 
 
 Quercy, district in Guienne, about 
 Cahors, 205, 214. 
 
 Quilleboeuf, market town in Normandy, 
 
 $ 
 
 Quimper, Breton port, 33, 35, 340. 
 Quimper, bishopric of, 35. 
 Quimperle, Breton port, 34. 
 Quinze Vingts, les, bread market in 
 Paris, 120, n. 2. 
 
 Rallet, gram buyer, 35. 
 
 Rambouillet, market town in the Beauce, 
 
 89. 
 
 Ratzenhofer, Gustav, writer, 359, n. i. 
 Ravat, Provost of Merchants at Lyons 
 
 (1709), 187, 188, 100. 
 Rebes, market town, 261. 
 Rebigois, grain merchant of Paris, 41. 
 Regnault, Nicolle, testimony of, 86. 
 Regnault, see Renault. 
 Religieuses de Saint Nicholas de Tulle, 
 
 the, at Paris, 84, n. i. 
 Renard, Pierre, grain buyer of Lyons, 
 
 136 f. 
 
402 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Renault, Jean, grain merchant of El- 
 boeuf, 57, 58. 
 
 Rentiers, 142. 
 
 Rethel, town on the Aisne, 204. 
 
 Rethelois, district in northern France, 
 104, 319. 
 
 R6tif, Dr. Gilbert, experiments with 
 herbs as substitutes for grain, 208 f. 
 
 Reynie, Gabriel Nicolas de la, lieu- 
 tenant general of police at Paris, 315. 
 
 Rheims, city, 48, 116, 117, 204, 310 f., 
 319, 324, 325, 329. 
 
 Rheims, district of, 319. 
 
 Rhodes, Grand Master of, see Hospitalers. 
 
 Rhone, the, 204, 278, 285, 287, 291, 292, 
 
 339- 
 Rhone basin, grain trade in the, 126-202, 
 
 358. 
 
 Rhone valley, the, 70, 292, 300. 
 Ribeyre, Antoine de, Intendant at Tours, 
 
 272, n. i. 
 
 Richelieu, town, 18. 
 Riom, town in Auvergne, 154, 204. 
 Riom, election of, 206. 
 Riots, 35, 186-192, 200, 260, 310, 311 f., 
 
 3 2 5> 333 > threatened, at Marseilles, 
 
 289. 
 Ris, Charles de Faucon de, Intendant at 
 
 Bordeaux (1678-86), 30, 284. 
 Riviereverdieu, election, 30. 
 Rizon, grain buyer, in. 
 Roanne, market town on the upper Loire, 
 
 61, 129, 136, 156, 157. 
 Rochefort, seaport in western France, 
 
 216. 
 
 Rochelle, see La Rochelle. 
 Rodez, town in southern France, 214. 
 Roger, grain merchant of Rouen, 58. 
 Roger, grain merchant of Vitry, 102. 
 Roger, Jean, grain merchant of Paris, 58, 
 
 108, 109, no; prosecution of (1694), 
 
 314-318,330. 
 
 Rogin, village near Montargis, 310. 
 Rollin, grain merchant of Lyons, 175, 
 
 n.3- 
 Romans, market town on the Isere, 147, 
 
 219. 
 Romorantin, town, 14, 15. 
 
 Rouen, 33, 47, 158, 199, 225, 226, 257, 
 258, 260, 264, 271, 281, 358; market 
 system of, 19 f.; relation between its 
 supply area and that of Paris, 48-60, 
 81, 263. 
 
 Rouen, Bailli of, 264. 
 
 Rouenese, the, 359. 
 
 Rouergue, district in Guienne, 184, 206, 
 209, 214. 
 
 Rouille, Jean, Comte de Meslay, Inten- 
 dant in Provence, 286, 287, 288 f. 
 
 Roujault, Nicolas Etienne, Intendant at 
 Poitiers (1708-12), 27 f. 
 
 Rousseau, the widow, grain merchant, 
 41, 88. 
 
 Roussillon, province in southern France, 
 214. 
 
 Routot, market town, 60. 
 
 Rouvre, town in^Burgundy, 142, 143. 
 
 Royal edicts, often local in reality though 
 general in form, 224 f. 
 
 Roye, town in Picardy, 260. 
 
 Royer, confers with Joubert, 196. 
 
 Rozet, village, 143. 
 
 Rozoy, market town in Brie, 119. 
 
 Ruche, Husson, grain buyer, 86. 
 
 Rye, 78, n. 2, 205, 319, 324. 
 
 Saint-Brieuc, Breton port, 33. 
 Saint-Brieuc, bishopric of, 35. 
 Saint-Christolly, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Saint-Cloud, market town, 47. 
 Saint-Contest, Michel de Barberie de, 
 Intendant at Limoges (1686-89), 205. 
 Saint-Denis, merchants of, 36. 
 Saint-Dizier, town in Champagne, 319, 
 
 329- 
 
 Sainte-Maure, town, 18, 25, 26. 
 
 Sainte-Menehould, district of, in Cham- 
 pagne, 319. 
 
 Sainte-Menehould, election of, 324. 
 
 Saint-Eustache, church in Paris, 118. 
 
 Saint-Flour, election of, in Upper 
 Auvergne, 206. 
 
 Saint-Foix, market town, 216. 
 
 Saint-Genis, Sieur de, testimony of, 261. 
 
 Saint-Germain-en-Laye, near Paris, 47, 
 n. i, 60. 
 
INDEX 
 
 403 
 
 Saint-Germain-rAuxerrois, church in 
 
 Paris, 1 1 8. 
 Saint-Jean-d'Angely, town in western 
 
 France, 216. 
 Saint- Jean-de-Losne, town on the Saone, 
 
 140, 144, 188, 202, n. 2, 249, 251, 252. 
 Saint-Jean-des-Jumeaux, market town, 
 
 261. 
 
 Saint Jean des Vignes, abbey of, 95. 
 Saint John, Knights of, see Hospitalers. 
 Saint- Jouin, market town, 24. 
 Saint-L6, town in Normandy, 34. 
 Saint-Luc, Francois d'Epinay, Marquis 
 
 de, lieutenant general in Guienne, 282. 
 Saint-Malo, Breton port, 33. 
 Saint-Maur, market town, 119. 
 Saint-Maurice, village, 143. 
 Saintonge, province in western France, 
 
 20, 28, 204. 
 
 Saint-Papoul, market town in Lan- 
 
 guedoc, 183, 184. 
 Saint-Pierre-de-Massilly, market town, 
 
 140. 
 
 Saint-Pons, diocese of,in Languedoc,i84. 
 Saint-Quentin, town in Picardy, 36, 78, 
 
 206, 261. 
 
 Saint-Sardos, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Saint-Sulpice, parish church in Paris, 84. 
 Saint-Surin-de-Mortaigne, town, 30, 
 
 n. 4. 
 Saint-Symphorien-d'Ozon, town in 
 
 Dauphine, 130. 
 Saint-Yalery, coast port on the Somme, 
 
 81, 225. 
 Saladin, grain merchant, 174, 175, notes 
 
 i and 3. 
 
 Salinier ( ?), 210. 
 Sanson, grain merchant, 32. 
 Sanson, Claude Joseph, Intendant in 
 
 Beam (1692-94), at Montauban 
 
 (1694-98), and at Soissons (1698- 
 
 1704), 213, n. 2, 214, n. 2, 298, 299. 
 Saone valley, the, 29, So, 128, 277, 331, 
 
 357- 
 
 Saula, town, 30, n. 4. 
 Sansoy of Provins, grain seller, 77. 
 Santerre, district hi Picardy, 36, 37, 52, 
 
 54, 78, 81, 106, 318, 350. 
 
 Santois, district in northern France, 81, 
 
 225, 257. 
 Saone, the, river in Burgundy, 127, 128, 
 
 139, 140, 145, 187, 192, 248, 256, n. i, 
 
 278,332- 
 Saone towns, the v i38, 144, 145, 163, 166, 
 
 185, 189, 253, 331. 
 Saulon, town near Dijon, 143. 
 Saulx, Sieur de, governor of Burgundy, 
 
 248. 
 Saumur, market town, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 
 
 56, 61, 62, 64, 67, 118, 300, 342. 
 Savoy, 216, 217, 244. 
 Savoy, Duke of, 194, 231. 
 Sedan, frontier town of northern France, 
 
 ii7, 3 X 9- 
 
 Seine, the, 47, n. i, 48, 50, 51, 81, 118, 
 119, 225, 257, 258, 305, 307. 
 
 Seine Basin, the (valleys of the Yonne, 
 Seme, Aube, Marne, and Oise), grain 
 trade in the, 13, 49, 126, 127, 180, 181, 
 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 268, 331, 343, 
 362; " country buying," 20, 85, 87- 
 91, 101-105; within the jurisdiction 
 of the Provost of Merchants of Paris, 
 55; dearth of 1563, 56; the upper 
 Seine Basin and problems of marketing, 
 70-100; increased demands of Paris, 
 82-100; demoralization of the old 
 market system, 88-94, 320; estab- 
 lishment of the first wholesale markets 
 at Bray and Vitry-le-Francois, 30-43, 
 100-118, 320-330; market enclaves, 
 204; local regulation of the grain 
 trade, 256-263; the administration of 
 Colbert, 296; constructive market 
 regulation, 300-330, 344, 359 f.; the 
 Chatelet and the Echevinage, 297, 
 
 301-330, 344, 360- 
 
 Seine valley, the, 24, 48, 51, 107, 108- 
 112, 118, 314; dearth of 1662 in, 41, 
 
 64- 
 
 Senlis, market town, 47, 81, 228. 
 Sennene, Jacques, gram merchant of 
 
 Bray, in. 
 Sens, market town, 47, 89, 204, 311 f., 
 
 315- 
 Sentences du Parloir des Bourgeois, 47. 
 
404 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Seraucourt, Louis Francois Dey de, In- 
 tendant in Berry (1683-99), 13 f. 
 
 Sergines, market town near Sens, 315. 
 
 Se"rignan, seaport in Languedoc, 291. 
 
 Seurre, town in Burgundy, 153, 191 f., 
 247, 252, 334. 
 
 Seve, Guillaume de, Intendant at Bor- 
 deaux, 283. 
 
 Sezanne, market town in Champagne, 
 321, 327, 328. 
 
 Sezanne, baillage of, 322. 
 
 Silk trade, the, at Lyons, 128, 131. 
 
 Simon, H., grain buyer, 80. 
 
 Simon, Pierre, widow of, grain merchant, 
 
 58. 
 
 Sisteron, market town, 16, 17, 18. 
 
 Soissonnais, district, 6, 7, 23, 100, 106, 
 181, 274, 318. 
 
 Soissons, 7, 58, 75, 79, 86, 87, 118, 260, 
 261, 262, 306, 307, 314, 318; dis- 
 organization of the market, 95-103. 
 
 Soissons, Bishop of, 7. 
 
 Soissons, generality of, 72. 
 
 Sologne, district in central France, 158. 
 
 Somme, the, river in northern France, 81, 
 225. 
 
 Sorbonne, the, 83. 
 
 Souillac, town, 216. 
 
 Sourdeac, Alexandre de Rieux, Marquis 
 de, 210. 
 
 Spain, 33, 61, 194, 226, 236, 284, 285, 
 286,341. 
 
 Speculative buying, 91. 
 
 Spencer, Herbert, English philosopher, 
 
 35i. 
 
 Stephen, king of England (1135-54), 12. 
 
 Substitutes for grain, see Asphodel bread; 
 Burgundy; Chestnuts; Daffodil bread; 
 Dog-bane; Famine; Ferns; Grape- 
 pips; Lentils; Nutshells; Retif, Dr. 
 Gilbert; Turnips. 
 
 Sully , Due de, French statesman, 236, 350. 
 
 Swiss debt* the, 236. 
 
 Taillemand, grain merchant, 132. 
 Talemalers, 46 f. 
 
 Talmay, village near Dijon, 144, 167, 168, 
 186. 
 
 Tarantaise, district in Dauphine", 209 f. 
 Tarascon, city in Provence, 183, 197, 198, 
 
 340. 
 
 Tarn, the, river in Guienne, 282, 292. 
 Terrasson, town, 216. 
 Third Estate, the, 348. 
 Thomas, grain merchant, 102, 103. 
 Thorey, town near Dijon, 143. 
 Thouars, market town, 24, 25, 69. 
 Thouet, the, river, 69. 
 Thou-sur-Marne, river port, 123. 
 Tipperaus, grain merchant of Lyons, 
 
 150. 
 
 Tirant, Bissart, grain merchant, 86. 
 Tisserand, Claude, grain merchant of 
 
 Lyons, 150. 
 
 Tixerand senior, merchant and Elu, 87. 
 Touissaint, Sebastian, 122. 
 Toul, bishopric of, 114, 328. 
 Toulon, seaport in Provence, 286. 
 Toulouse, city in Languedoc, 195, 196, 
 
 205. 
 
 Toulouse, diocese of, 196, 339. 
 Toulouse, Parlement of, 200, 296. 
 Touraine, province, 20, 24, 26, 56, 61, 62, 
 
 64, 67, 106, 209, 274, 301. 
 Tournois, grain merchant, 315. 
 Tournus-sur-Saone, town in Burgundy, 
 
 202, n. 2, 334, 336. 
 Tours, 18 f., 23, 47, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 
 
 204, 344. 
 
 Toussaint, merchant of Noyon, 36. 
 Traite de la Police, by Nicolas Delamare, 
 
 108, in, 320. 
 Treguier, bishopric of, 35. 
 Tremblay, Etienne, grain merchant, 148. 
 Tremville, 188. 
 Trevoux, Pomponne de, governor of 
 
 Lyonnais (1529), 138, n. i. 
 Tricaut, Robert, grain merchant, 148. 
 Trillebardou, market town, 77, 119, 122. 
 Troarn, town, 19. 
 Troichaud, village, 143. 
 Trouchoit, village, 143. 
 Troyes, city in Champagne, 47, 48, 80, 
 
 105, 181, 204, 319, 320, 322, 324, 327. 
 Tulle, market town on the Correze, 205. 
 Turenne, vicomte" of, 205. 
 
INDEX 
 
 405 
 
 Turgot, Jacques fitienne, Intendant at 
 
 Tours (1701-09), 26. 
 Turnips, mixed with grain as food, 209. 
 
 University quarter, the, at Paris, 83. 
 Usures (purchases on earnest money), 
 
 312. 
 Uzes, diocese of, in Languedoc, 183, 184. 
 
 Vacher, grain merchant of Auxonne, 202, 
 
 n. 2. 
 
 Yailly, village near Soissons, 7, 99. 
 Yalengay, town, 14. 
 Valence, town on the Rhone, 147, 152, 
 
 211, 219, 256, n. i. 
 Valentinois, Duchess of, 251. 
 Valois, district in northern France, 311. 
 Valrien, Sr., grain hoarder, 142. 
 Vannes, Breton port, 33, 34, 35. 
 Vannes, bishopric of, 35. 
 Vary, Humbert de, grain buyer, 132, 
 
 133- 
 
 Vatan, in Orleannais, 13, 14. 
 Vauldrimont, town near Dijon, 143. 
 Vaulx, town in Dauphine, 130. 
 Vaux, Pierre de, grain merchant of Paris, 
 
 57 f- ^ 
 Velay, district in southern France, about 
 
 Le Puy, 138, 140, 206, 245. 
 Venaissin, papal county on the Rh6ne, 
 
 206. 
 
 Vendres, seaport in Languedoc, 291. 
 Verdun, town in northern France, 324. 
 Verdun, bishopric of, in northern France, 
 
 114. 
 
 Verdun-sur- Garonne, town in south- 
 western France, 30. 
 Verdun-sur-Saone, town in Burgundy, 
 
 192, 202, n. 2. 
 Verdun, Pays de, 162. 
 Vermandois, district in Picardy, 37, 47, 
 
 78, 81, 228. 
 
 Verneuil, election of, 207. 
 Vernon, market town, 20, 57, 60. 
 Versailles, 47, n. i. 
 Vexm, the, territory in northern France, 
 
 50, 5i, 53,3H. 
 
 Viard, Thomas, grain merchant of Paris, 
 
 109, 315- 
 
 Vienne, town in Dauphine", 204, 218. 
 
 Vienne, valley of the, 23, 25, 69. 
 
 Viennois, district in Dauphine, 245. 
 
 Vierzon, town, 14. 
 
 Vige, de, gram merchant of Chalons-sur- 
 Marne, 104. 
 
 Vige, Sieur de, 324. 
 
 Villages, characteristic size of, in the less 
 fertile sections, 207. 
 
 Villefranche-de-Rouergue, town in 
 Guienne, 214. 
 
 Villefranche-sur-Saone, town in Beau- 
 jolais, 211, 245. 
 
 Villefrancon, lieutenant of the governor 
 of Burgundy, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 
 358. 
 
 Vil lemur, town, 30, n. 4. 
 
 Villensade, parish in Champagne, 15. 
 
 Villeroy, Due de, governor of Lyonnais, 
 172, 176. 
 
 Vimpelles (Vimpelle), village near Bray, 
 no, in. 
 
 Violette, Henriette, testimony of, 87. 
 
 Vitry, baillage of, hi Champagne, 314. 
 
 Vitry, election of, 323. 
 
 Vitry-le-Francois, market town hi Cham- 
 pagne, 47, 76, 77, 80, 86, 87, 102, 104, 
 106, 122, 260, 261, 262 f., 308, 311, 
 319, 321, 322, 325, 331; the granary 
 trade at, 101, 109; the breaking down 
 of the old market regulations, 105; 
 wholesale market established at (1709), 
 112-118, 127, 321, 325-330, 344, 360. 
 
 Vivarais, district in Languedoc, 138, 
 184, 195. 
 
 Vosges, the, mountain range in eastern 
 France, 331. 
 
 Wars of Religion, the, 225. 
 Way-bills, 123, 343. 
 
 Yenville, see Janville. 
 Yonne towns, the, 204. 
 
 Zanobi, 384. 
 
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