LIBRARY 
 
 OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 
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ENGLAND AND NAPOLEON 
 
 IN 1803 
 
By the same Editor. 
 
 DESPATCHES OF EARL GOWER 
 
 ENGLISH AMBASSADOR AT PARIS 
 From June 1790 to August 1792. 
 
 CAMBEIDGE UNIVERSITY PEESS. 
 
 1885. 
 
ENGLAND AND NAPOLEON 
 IN 1803 
 
 BEING THE 
 
 DESPATCHES OF LORD WHITWORTH 
 
 AND OTiJeES 
 
 NOW FIRST PRINTED FROM THE ORIGINALS IN THE RECORD OFFICE 
 
 EDITED 
 
 FOR THE ROYAL HISTORICAL SOCIETY 
 BY 
 
 OSCAR BROWNING, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 
 CORRESPONDIJfG MKMBBR OP THE SOClfirfi D'HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE 
 
 LONDON 
 LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND CO. 
 
 AND NEW YORK: 15 EAST 16<^ STREET 
 1887 
 
 All rights reserved 
 

 ^T, 
 
 -NERAL 
 
 PBINTED BY 
 
 BPOTTISWOODE AND CO., NKW^TBEET SQUABB 
 
 LONDON 
 
PEEFACE. 
 
 The present collection of despatches, which is published by 
 the generosity of the Royal Historical Society, is an im- 
 portant contribution to the history of England and France 
 at a momentous period. The rupture of the peace of Amiens 
 in 1803, although it introduced a state of war which lasted 
 twelve years and which tried the resources of England to 
 the utmost, was not so decisive as the first participation by 
 England in the war against the Revolution in 1793. The 
 peace of Amiens had always been regarded from the side of 
 England as an armed truce : on the side of Napoleon it had 
 a very different character. The first and second coalitions 
 were directed against the French Republic and the Revolu- 
 tion. Napoleon, on his return from Egypt, used his first 
 opportunities as the head of the State in proposing peace to 
 Austria and England, the two belligerents who still remained 
 in arms. These overtures were rejected by both Powers, 
 but the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden led to the 
 Treaty of Luneville, and when the Treaty of Amiens had 
 been signed Napoleon had attained his object. The rup- 
 ture renewed a contest which only ended in his defeat and 
 captivity, jit is, therefore, of the utmost importance to 
 the student of Napoleon's life and character to determine 
 whether, as English writers generally assert, he only re- 
 garded the peace of Amiens as a breathing space in which he 
 might recover strength to measure himself against England 
 and Europe, or whether, while determining to develop the 
 
 119498 
 
VI PEEPACE. 
 
 internal resources of France on the one hand and to be the 
 first power in Europe on the other, he sincerely desired 
 peace and was reluctant to begin a struggle which he knew 
 would be internecine. 1 1 do not propose to discuss this ques- 
 tion, but the papers included in this volume offer materials 
 for its determination. It may be doubted whether we have 
 yet reached a period in which the views and character of 
 Napoleon can be fairly estimated, i^apoleon worship in France 
 has been succeeded by Napoleon hatred./ The French press 
 has produced in the last fifteen years many volumes which 
 argue from original documents that Napoleon had few talents 
 and no virtues, and Lanfrey is not more eagerly welcomed on 
 this side of the Channel than Seeley is regarded as an im- 
 partial judge on the other. Americans, who are devoted 
 to the study of modern history, and who have no national 
 passions to gratify in the great debate, would appear to be 
 the most trustworthy arbiters, and their verdict is generally 
 favourable to Napoleon. It may, at any rate, be laid down 
 that no account of Napoleon's career can be true which does 
 not credit him with some intelligible motive for his actions.. 
 It is impossible to believe that ' the most splendid genius 
 that has appeared on earth,' as Lord Acton, a competent 
 judge, declares him to have been, was the sport alternately 
 of tumultuous passions, of wild and unreasoning ambition, 
 and of a 'vice of nature ' which drove him against his better 
 judgment into disastrous courses. 
 
 / These papers will also contribute to settle the long 
 debated question as to whether England was justified in the 
 rupture of the peace. A careful reader must admit that we 
 were guilty of a breach of faith in not surrendering Malta. 
 The promise of its surrender was the principal article of the 
 treaty; it was the point most hotly disputed between the 
 contracting Powers. The treaty would never have been made 
 at all unless we had agreed to the cession of the island ; we 
 could only refuse to carry out our engagement by the plea 
 
PREFACE. Vll 
 
 that Napoleon had failed to keep his side of the bargain, or 
 that the instinct of self-preservation compelled ns to break 
 faith even at the risk of war. The reasons alleged in sup- 
 port of our action were (1) the efforts used bj Napoleon 
 towards supremacy on the Continent ; (2) his designs against 
 Egypt, clearly shown by the report of Sebastiani and (3) 
 his demands for restricting the liberty of the press and the 
 activity of the emigrants in England. It may be urged, in 
 answer, (1) that several of the encroachments complained of 
 were effected before the ratifications of the treaty were ex- 
 changed, and the others were known to be in contemplation ; 
 (2) that Napoleon always denied that he had designs against 
 Egypt, and asserted that Sebastiani's report was intended for 
 a very different purpose. It would certainly have been easy 
 to keep the report secret, while its publication was rather 
 meant as a diplomatic menace to England than as a serious 
 indication of aggressive action. (3) With reference to the 
 last charge, Napoleon might complain with justice that 
 enemies of his person and government used the- laws and. 
 liberties of England as a cloak for the most persistent 
 attacks. Their impunity might not be a reason for his de- 
 claring war upon us, but his complaints could be no ground 
 for our declaring war against him.j To discuss the whole 
 of this question would be to write the history of the time. 
 It is, indeed, doubtful whether the secret history of the 
 third coalition can be accurately known until the Russian 
 archives are more thoroughly explored. But attention may 
 be directed to two points. /The royal message of March 8, 
 1803, for calling out the militia was based on the fact that 
 very considerable military preparations were carrying on in 
 the ports of France and Holland. Lord Whitworth wrote on 
 March 17, 1803 : 'In the meantime I think I can say with 
 certainty that no armaments of any consequence are carrying 
 on in the French ports. Orders were given (as I mentioned 
 to your Lordship in a former despatch) a fortnight ago to 
 
VIU PEEFACE. 
 
 equip wliat there was in the different ports ; but the total 
 want of naval stores, and the absence of bj far the greatest 
 part of the naval force, render such an order almost nuga- 
 tory.' Indeed, the King's message may be regarded like the 
 publication of Sebastiani's despatch, more as a diplomatic 
 threat than a real measure of precaution. These threats are 
 dangerous weapons, and often produce the war which they 
 are intended to avoid. The message of March 8 caused 
 the famous scene between Napoleon and Lord Whitworth 
 on Sunday, March 13, which is the second point to which 
 I would draw attention^ Alison, in the ' History of Europe ' 
 (v. 109), gives what maybe called the received version of the 
 story which has been copied into all histories. He repre- 
 sents Napoleon as addressing a violent and continuous 
 harangue to Lord Whitworth at a court the date of which 
 he misstates, and adds, in his own words : ' This violent 
 harangue, rendered still more emphatic by the gestures 
 with which it was accompanied, induced the English Ambas- 
 sador to suppose that the First Consul would so far forget 
 his dignity as to strike him ; and he was deliberating what 
 he should do in the event of such an insult being offered to 
 the nation which he represented when Napoleon retired.' 
 There is not the slightest foundation for the last imputation. 
 Indeed, the despatch of Lord Whitworth, now printed for 
 the first time in its integrity, places the matter in an 
 entirely different light. Speaking of the First Consul's 
 temper, he says that on the previous day he was a witness of 
 ' and in some degree a sufferer from ' its violence. Napoleon 
 asked him if he had any news from England, and had a 
 short conversation which ended with the words, * You wish 
 me to fight fifteen years more, and you force me to it.' The 
 next words were addressed not to Whitworth but to Marcoff 
 and Azzara, who were standing at a little distance. Napoleon 
 then went his round, and everyone saw that he was irritated. 
 On returning to Lord Whitworth he resumed the conversation. 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 Lord Whit worth says, ' by something personally civil to me.' 
 Then followed the last words of the conversation as reported 
 by Alison. Whit worth, after commenting on the ' total want 
 of dignity as well as of decency ' of Napoleon, says that he 
 intends to tell M. de Talleyrand that he cannot go to the 
 Tuileries if he is to be attacked thus in that public manner 
 by the First Consul on topics which were made to be dis- 
 cussed in the cabinet. ' I hope, however, he will feel the 
 impropriety of his conduct ; and, indeed, I may be satisfied 
 with the impression it has made on the public, by which his 
 conduct is generally disapproved and ridiculed.' A despatch 
 of March 1 7 gives Talleyrand's explanation of the scene, and 
 adds : * As the First Consul will have three weeks to reflect I 
 trust I shall find him more temperate the next time we meet 
 in the same place.' This meeting took place on April 4. ' The 
 Corps Diplomatique were assembled yesterday at one o'clock 
 for the purpose of paying their compliments to the First 
 Consul. . . . He received us, and I had every reason to be 
 satisfied with his manner towards me.' (We see thus that 
 the ' insult to the British Ambassador,' which so many his- 
 torians assign as a reason tor the war, dwindles into nothing 
 but a hrusquerie which was certainly unknown to the court- 
 liness of the ancien regime, but to which modern diplomatic 
 history would afibrd some striking parallels.^) 
 
 c Another matter on which these despatches will throw 
 light is the possibility of our coming to some terms with 
 Napoleon by a temporary retention of Malta. Wilberforce, 
 who strongly opposed the declaration of war, said in Parlia- 
 ment: * The language of Bonaparte in the latter stages of 
 the negotiations affords reason to believe that he would have 
 acquiesced in the independence of Malta, if not our reten- 
 tion of it for ten years.' It appears that if we had not 
 insisted upon an ultimatum containing terms which were 
 insulting to Napoleon, and which he could not possibly have 
 accepted, the negotiations, even in the hands of so haughty 
 
X PEEPACE. 
 
 and unbending an aristocrat as Lord Whitworth, might 
 have ended in a favourable result.y 
 
 The despatches contained in this volume were in large 
 part published at the time, and are to be found in the Parlia- 
 mentary History. Only such documents were published as 
 would suit the arguments of the Minister, and the despatches 
 themselves are ingeniously garbled by the omission of words 
 and phrases which give a different colour to the sentences in 
 which they occur. I have not thought it worth while to 
 mark these variations, which any student can do for himself. 
 
 In conclusion, I venture to express a hope that the pub- 
 lication of documents such as are contained in this volume 
 will not be left much longer to private enterprise. Of the 
 official calendars published by Government only one series 
 is at present devoted to foreign affairs, and this is still occu- 
 pied with the affairs of the sixteenth century. It is surely 
 far more important for us at the present day to know the 
 truth about the foreign policy of England in the period of 
 the Revolution and of Napoleon than to be informed of every 
 tergiversation of the tortuous Elizabeth. In that epoch we 
 took a line of our own, and incurred an immense responsi- 
 bility, the effects of which we are feeling at the present day. 
 If there is any connection between history and politics, it 
 must be of vital importance for us to know the grounds on 
 which our ancestors acted, to be informed of the precise 
 nature of the problem before them and of the manner in 
 which they dealt with it. Not to mention the correspondence 
 of Napoleon I., which, however imperfect, reflects credit on 
 the Government which produced it, the French Government 
 is publishing at this very moment the correspondence of 
 Barthelemy in 1792 ; Germany is printing public documents 
 of the first decade of this century; Russia is loading our 
 shelves with most precious information about the Empress 
 Catharine and the Emperor Alexander. We not only neglect 
 to place our case before Europe, but we allow it to be stated 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 by foreigners. Le Bon has treated of the intrigues of Wind- 
 ham with the emigres, and the best documents relating to 
 English policy in 1818 and 1814 are to be found in Oncken. 
 Surely some of the money devoted either to the Calendars 
 or to the Rolls series, which is limited to the reign of 
 Henry VII., could be spent upon the publication of documents 
 of the past and present century, interesting in themselves, 
 valuable to the whole of Europe, invaluable to Englishmen. 
 Statesmen advise us to study the policy of William Pitt. 
 The career of no English Prime Minister is better worth our 
 most minute attention, yet the only trustworthy evidence 
 of his actions abroad and at home, in finance, in the treat- 
 ment of Ireland, in administration, and above all in foreign 
 policy, lies in the masses of paper written in his well-known 
 hand, bound in the volumes at the Record Office, undis- 
 covered, unread, and in many cases signed by the names of 
 others. These priceless documents cannot be properly edited 
 by private enterprise, but if no new funds can be found for 
 such an undertaking, it might at least receive a share of 
 those which are at present devoted to similar but less im- 
 portant objects. 
 
 King's College, Cambridge: 
 August 27, 1887. 
 
DESPATCHES 
 
 INSTRUCTIONS TO LORD WHITWORTH. 
 
 Instructions for our right trusty and well-beloved coun- 
 cillor Charles, Lord Whitworth, whom we have appointed our 
 Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the French 
 Eepublic. Given at our Court at St. James's the tenth day 
 of September, 1802, in the Forty-second year of our reign, 
 
 1 . We, reposing the highest trust and confidence in your 
 prudence, experience, and abilities, have thought proper to 
 appoint you to be our Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni- 
 potentiary to the French Eepublic, and to give you the 
 following instructions for your guidance. 
 
 2. You are, upon the receipt of these our instructions and 
 letter of credence, to proceed with all convenient speed to 
 Paris, and upon your arrival there you will inform yourself 
 concerning the steps to be taken for presenting our credential 
 letter to the First Consul, and the forms to be observed upon 
 that occasion, on all which you will follow the methods 
 which you shall find to have been adopted by Ministers of 
 other crowned heads of equal rank and character with 
 yourself. Having delivered our credentials to the First 
 Consul, you shall add to the assurances therein given such 
 further declarations as may evince our determination to 
 observe with scrupulous good faith all the engagements at 
 present subsisting between us and the French Government, 
 or which we may hereafter contract, for the reciprocal 
 advantage of both; and our desire to give proof on all 
 occasions of our sincere disposition to cultivate a good under- 
 standing between the two countries. 
 
2 SEPTEMBER 1802. 
 
 3. You shall carefully observe the motions and intentions 
 of that Government with respect to us and our dominions, 
 and whether they are entering into any, and what, new 
 leagues or engagements with other Powers which may be 
 prejudicial to us, or endanger the tranquillity of Europe. 
 
 4. You shall use your utmost endeavour to discover what 
 plans or secret designs the Government of France may have 
 formed, or may be forming, in the East or West Indies : 
 what number of ships of war or land forces may have been 
 sent from the different parts of the French Republic to those 
 quarters; what ships or land forces may be preparing for 
 foreign service; what orders have been sent to the com- 
 manders of their forces at their several settlements ; and 
 generally what plans they may have in contemplation for the 
 acquisition of new colonies, or for improving or fortifying 
 those of which they are now in possession. 
 
 5. You will make it an object of your very particular 
 attention to discover whether any, and what, treaties are 
 either in agitation, or actually entered into between France 
 and any other European state, and in either case you will take 
 every measure in your power to be informed of the nature and 
 extent of such treaty or treaties, and to procure and trans- 
 mit correct copies thereof. 
 
 6. You will likewise endeavour to discover whether any 
 foreign ships of war are actually in any of the ports of the. 
 said Republic, to ascertain as far as possible the number, 
 force, and destination of them respectively. 
 
 7. You will assist and countenance our subjects trading 
 to any of the dominions of the French Republic, or who may 
 have any suits or pretensions depending there, procuring for 
 them good and speedy justice and all the favour you are able ; 
 yet for our honour and jour own credit you must not engage 
 yourself in any complaints which may raise clamour without 
 a justifiable cause or legal proofs, but only such as may 
 deserve the interposition of our name for the relief and 
 support of our subjects in their rights. 
 
 8. You shall constantly correspond with our several 
 
INSTRUCTIONS. 3 
 
 Ministers employed in foreign Courts during your residence 
 in France, for your mutual information and assistance, but 
 you are on no account to communicate with your private 
 friends on public affairs. 
 
 9. You will in general be extremely attentive in making 
 yourself master of the interior state of the government of 
 France, in studying the dispositions and interests of the 
 several persons of both sexes, who are or may be in the 
 confidence of the First Consul ; and in making the closest 
 enquiries possible into the views and character of the Ministers 
 of State, not only with regard to their pacific and warlike 
 inclinations, but to their particular connections with one 
 another, their opinions, their abilities, their power, and the 
 degree of influence each has, or may have, with the First 
 Consul. 
 
 10. As it is essentially necessary to our service to be as 
 accurately informed as possible of the interior state of France, 
 you will not fail to pay attention to the proceedings of the 
 several constituted authorities throughout the Eepublic ; and 
 you will use your endeavours to obtain an accurate knowledge 
 of the characters and views of the persons who may have 
 had the lead in the respective departments, and of the 
 factions which may prevail therein, and you will regularly 
 transmit to our aforesaid Secretary of State all such accounts 
 upon this subject as may appear to you to be interesting for 
 our information. 
 
 1 1 . On your arrival at Paris you will receive from our 
 Minister there the whole of his correspondence, and you are 
 to consider the instructions contained therein, as the rule 
 of your conduct as far as the present circumstances will 
 admit, and you shall also, at the expiration of your mission, 
 either deliver to your successor, or transmit to the office of 
 our aforesaid Secretary of State, the originals of the official 
 papers in your custody and your official correspondence. 
 
 12. You will make our interest in commerce an object of 
 your constant attention, and will take an early opportunity 
 to enter into discussion with the French Government upon 
 
 B 2 
 
4 SEPTEMBER 1802. 
 
 such matters arising out of the late definite treaty of peace 
 as may require speedy adjustment, and which may hereafter 
 lead to arrangements of a more extensive nature for the 
 mutual advantage of the two nations. 
 
 13. You will use your best endeavours to procure us as 
 exact an account as possible of the countries under the 
 dominion of the Republic, particularly as to the state of 
 their defence, accompanied with accurate descriptions of 
 their fortifications, and also as to the number and condition 
 of the forces by land and sea of the Republic, and the means 
 of augmenting the same upon occasion. 
 
 14. You are likewise to inform yourself accurately of the 
 ordinary expenses of the Government, of the particulars, the 
 amount and state of the revenue, and whence it arises ; and 
 of the resources which the Republic may have for levying any, 
 and what, extraordinary supplies. 
 
 15. You are further to procure an account of the popula- 
 tion of the dominions of the Republic, and of the extent and 
 nature of the commerce and manufactures carried on in the 
 different parts of them, and of the situation and treatment 
 of British merchants resident therein. 
 
 16. You will from time to time impart to us all such 
 intelligence as you can procure on the several points pre- 
 scribed to yoii in these instructions, or on any other, not 
 particularly specified herein, which may relate to our service 
 or to the advantage of our kingdoms. But you will send 
 your accounts of the dominions, forces, revenues, expenses 
 and resources of the Republic, and of the population and 
 commerce of its subjects, in separate letters confined to 
 these things only, and addressed to our principal Secretary 
 of State for Foreign Affairs ; and in order that our said 
 instructions may be transmitted to you with great security, 
 and also for the better conduct of your correspondence, as 
 well as with our said Secretary of State as our Ministers 
 residing in foreign parts, with respect to such matters as 
 may require particular caution and secrecy, we have ordered 
 
INSTEUCTIONS. 6 
 
 to be delivered to you proper cyphers and decyphers, which 
 you will keep carefully deposited under secure locks, and 
 use every other precaution to guard against their being 
 discovered, which would be so highly prejudicial to our 
 service. 
 
 17. Whereas by an Act passed in the 22nd year of our 
 reign for regulating the payment out of our Civil List 
 Revenue, it is amongst other things enacted that receipts 
 from our Ministers, Commissioners, and Consuls in foreign 
 parts shall be filed in our Exchequer for all sums of money 
 which shall be issued and paid to our principal Secretary or 
 Secretaries of State for foreign secret service, and which 
 shall be sent or given by such Secretary or Secretaries of 
 State to any of our said Ministers, Commissioners, or Consuls 
 respectively, for the said purpose, and in order to discharge 
 or acquit such Ministers, etc., who will thereupon stand 
 charged at our Exchequer with the sums so received by them 
 for that purpose, an oath, according to the form in the said 
 Act prescribed, should be taken by them within one year 
 after their arrival in Great Britain. We, to the intent that 
 the provisions in the said Act in this respect should be 
 strictly observed, have directed an extract thereof to be 
 delivered to you with these instructions ; and we do hereby 
 strictly require and command that you punctually conform 
 yourself thereto upon all occasions which may arise during 
 your employment abroad. We have also directed to be 
 delivered to you, herewith, a printed extract of an Act passed 
 in the fifth year of the reign of our Royal Predecessor, King 
 George I., to prevent the inconveniences arising from seduc- 
 ing artificers out of our dominions. It is our will and plea- 
 sure that you take proper steps to procure exact information 
 respecting all persons of that description who may be resident 
 in France, and that you use your best endeavours to induce 
 them to return — strictly conforming yourself to the provi- 
 sions of the said Act for this purpose. 
 
 18. At your return we shall expect from you a narrative 
 in writing of whatever may have happened at Paris worthy 
 
NOVEMBEE 1802. 
 
 our notice, together with such observations on the situation 
 and views of the Eepublic as your knowledge of it shall 
 enable you to make. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 (Most secret and confidential.) 
 
 Downing Street, November 14, 1802. 
 I take the first opportunity of communicating to your 
 Excellency, for the regulation of your conduct, the instruc- 
 tions which his Majesty is pleased to give you on such points 
 as are or may become subjects of discussion between his 
 Majesty and the French Government ; and to desire that you 
 will endeavour to conform yourself to them in all your con- 
 versations with the French Ministers. You will lose no 
 proper opportunity of expressing his Majesty's earnest 
 solicitude for the preservation of the peace which subsists 
 between the two countries ; his disposition to do everything 
 in his power for that purpose which is consistent with the 
 honour of his crown and the interests of his dominions ; and 
 his regret at any circumstances which may have arisen to 
 interrupt that harmony and good understanding which are 
 so important to the welfare and happiness of both countries. 
 You will, however, state most distinctly his Majesty's deter- 
 mination never to forego his right of interfering in the 
 affairs of the Continent on every occasion in which the 
 interests of his own dominions or those of Europe in general 
 may appear to him to require it. This right his Majesty 
 possesses in common with every other independent Power ; 
 it rests upon general principles, and does not require the 
 confirmation of any particular treaty. It is nevertheless 
 important that you should observe that the circumstances 
 which led to the conclusion of the last peace, and the prin- 
 ciples upon which the negotiations were conducted, would 
 give his Majesty a special right to interpose in any case 
 which might lead to the extension of the power or influence 
 of France. In the communications which took place between 
 
AGGRANDISEMENT OF FRANCE. 7 
 
 the two Governments previous to the signature of the pre- 
 liminary articles, his Majesty proposed as the basis of the 
 negotiation that if the French Government would not relin- 
 quish the Continental acquisitions which they had obtained 
 from other Powers in the course of the war, his Majesty 
 would claim the right of keeping part of his conquests as a 
 compensation for the important acquisitions of territory 
 made by France upon the Continent. This principle was 
 formally recognised by the French Government in an official 
 note in the following words : ' Cependant on reconnoit que 
 les grands evenemens survenus en Europe, et les changemens 
 arrives dans les limites des grands Etats du Continent, 
 peuvent autoriser une partie des demandes du Gouvernement 
 Britannique.' The terms of the treaty of peace were nego- 
 tiated in conformity to this basis, and it appears, therefore, 
 clear that the then existing state of possession and of en- 
 gagements as respect the Continent were the foundation of 
 the peace itself, and that his Majesty has, therefore, an 
 undoubted right to interpose in consequence of the treaty in 
 every case in which the state of possession may appear to 
 him to have undergone any material alteration, or in which 
 the engagements which were then subsisting had been 
 violated to the prejudice of his Majesty or of the other 
 Powers of Europe. You will proceed to observe, that the 
 annexation of Piedmont to France, since the conclusion of 
 the definitive treaty, makes a most material difference in 
 the state of the fixed and permanent possessions of France. 
 That the renunciation of the Duchy of Parma in favour of 
 France, a circumstance which was concealed at the time of 
 negotiating the peace, and which is become of the greatest 
 importance from its furnishing an additional instance of 
 that system of secret cession which is totally inconsistent 
 with any system of security to Europe, makes a most essen- 
 tial difference likewise in the relative circumstances of the 
 two countries. That at the time of concluding the peace, 
 the French Government were bound by the most sacred 
 engagements to respect the independence of the Helvetian 
 and Batavian Eepublics, and to allow the people of these 
 
8 NOVEMBEK 1802. 
 
 coantries to choose whatever form of government they might 
 think proper. That the violation of this right in the Swiss 
 people and the invasion of their territory, notwithstanding 
 the representation which was made in their favour by his 
 Majesty, makes a most material alteration in the state of 
 engagements contracted since the conclusion of the Definitive 
 Treaty, and adds most considerably to the influence and power 
 of France, to the prejudice of a state which was then ac- 
 knowledged as independent. That the conduct of the French 
 Government to the Batavian Eepublic was not less objection- 
 able. That the independence of this Eepublic was acknow- 
 ledged both by the Treaty of Luneville and by the Treaty of 
 the Hague of the year 1795. That by the Treaty of the 
 Hague the French Government were permitted to keep gar- 
 risons in that country only till the time of general peace. 
 That by a convention signed in August 1801 the French 
 troops were to remain there till the conclusion of the Defini- 
 tive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and France. 
 That the French troops have not to this period evacuated 
 the country, and that the First Consul is represented lately to 
 have declared, that in the event of any differences amongst 
 the people of that country, on the subject of their internal 
 government, he would march with his whole army to sup- 
 press them. That this is an obvious violation of the inde- 
 pendence of the Batavian Republic, and that his Majesty 
 has a peculiar right to interpose on the present occasion, as 
 he consented to make numerous and most important restitu- 
 tions to the Batavian Government in the treaty of peace, on 
 the consideration of that Government being independent and 
 not being subject to any foreign control. It is necessary for 
 me to recommend to your Excellency to make these repre- 
 sentations with moderation and temper. You will attend 
 very particularly to any explanations which ma}^ be given to 
 you respecting them, and you will engage to report such 
 explanations to his Majesty's Government. You will avoid 
 with peculiar caution committing his Majesty's Government 
 as to what may be their ultimate determination upon all or 
 any of these points — viz. whether under any circumstances 
 
ENGLISH AND FRENCH PRESS. 9 
 
 an unsatisfactory explanation respecting them might lead 
 to war on the part of his Majesty, whether it might induce 
 his Majesty to claim some additional acquisition to counter- 
 balance the acquisitions of France, or whether it might be 
 thought most prudent for the present to acquiesce. His 
 Majesty's conduct in this respect must be determined by a 
 variety of considerations, and particularly by the informa- 
 tion which he may receive of the sentiments and intentions 
 of other European Powers. It is natural to suppose that the 
 French Ministers will take an early opportunity of bringing 
 forward, at least in conversation, any grievances which they 
 may choose to allege against his Majesty's Government, 
 and I have no doubt the most prominent will be the com- 
 plaints which they have so often advanced already re- 
 specting the liberty of the press in this country, and 
 the conduct of the French emigrants who are resident 
 here. Upon these subjects it is unnecessary for me to do 
 more than to refer you to my despatch to Mr. Merry, No. 20, 
 and to desire that you would strictly conform yourself to 
 the instructions therein contained. In the event, however, 
 of any conversation on this subject, it is material that you 
 should remark on the paragraphs which have lately appeared 
 in the 'Moniteur' calumniating his Majesty's Government, 
 and that you should dwell particularly on the distinction exist- 
 ing between paragraphs of this nature appearing in a paper 
 avowedly official and the paragraphs in our English publica- 
 tions over which the Government of this country have no pre- 
 vious control, and which have been repeatedly and explicitly 
 disavowed by his Majesty's Government. If the French 
 Government should enter into any conversation with you on 
 the subject of the Island of Malta, it is of great importance 
 that you should avoid committing his Majesty as to what 
 may be eventually his intentions with respect to that island. 
 It is evident that the arrangement stipulated in the lOth 
 Article of the Definitive Treaty cannot as yet be carried into 
 effect ; that neither the Government of St. Petersburg nor 
 of Berlin has given any decisive answer to the application 
 that has been made to them to become guaranteeing Powers 
 
10 NOVEMBER 1802. 
 
 of the arrangement ; that according to the article the Grand 
 Master must be chosen before there can be any person 
 properly authorised to receive possession of the island, that 
 Prince Ruspoli has declined the situation of Grand Master, 
 and that it will be necessary therefore for the Pope to make 
 some other selection. I recommend you, however, to avoid 
 saying anything which may engage his Majesty to restore the 
 island even if these arrangements could be completed accord- 
 ing to the true intent and spirit of the 10th Article of the 
 Treaty of Amiens. His Majesty would certainly be justified in 
 claiming the possession of Malta, as some counterpoise to the 
 acquisition of France, since the conclusion of the Definitive 
 Treaty ; but it is not necessary to decide in the present moment 
 whether his Majesty will be disposed to avail himself of his 
 pretensions in this respect. It would be better, therefore, that 
 you should not bring the subject of Malta forward at present, 
 unless it should be first mentioned by the French Ministers. 
 You will then conform yourself to the instructions above 
 stated, and you will be very particular in representing to me 
 everything which may pass on this important subject. I 
 shall not fail to inform your Excellency from time to time of 
 the substance of the conversations which may take place 
 between General Andreossy and myself ; as it is of the utmost 
 importance that your language to the French Minister for 
 Foreign Affairs should correspond as much as possible with 
 mine to the French Ambassador. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Calais, November 10, 1802. 
 
 I trouble your Lordship with a very few lines, merely to say 
 that we arrived here this day at three o'clock, after a pleasant 
 passage of four hours and a half. We were received on our 
 landing by an immense concourse of people, and with much 
 huzzaing. The guns were fired, and flags displayed on the 
 church steeples, etc. When we arrived at our inn, where I 
 
ARRIVAL AT PARIS. 11 
 
 found a captain's guard mounted, I was complimented by the 
 constituted authorities, consisting of the Mayor, the Commis- 
 sary-General Margaud, the Juge de Paix, etc. After them 
 came General Barbasaude at the head of the officers of the gar- 
 rison, and after them the poissardes with a present of fish — in 
 short, nothing was wanting. After dinner we were formally 
 invited to assist at the theatre, in order, as it was said by the 
 Mayor, that the public might have an opportunity of seeing 
 what had been so long and ardently desired, an English Am- 
 bassador in France. We could not resist an invitation on such 
 grounds, and we were received with great enthusiasm. ' God 
 save the King ' was struck up, and played for a quarter of an 
 hour, but almost drowned by the applause of the whole 
 house, who followed our example of standing up while it was 
 playing, in the good old English fashion. We are just 
 returned, and I write this in great haste to be ready for the 
 mail which is just setting out with Mr. Merry's despatch. 
 He sent it to me under a flying seal. 
 
 P.S. — I hear that the First Consul returned from Havre 
 to Paris last night.' 
 
 Paris, November 16, 1802. 
 I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that I 
 arrived here the day before yesterday. We were longer on 
 the journey than I expected, in consequence of the indifferent 
 state of part of the road, and of a number of horses being 
 taken from each post for the service of the First Consul, who 
 was returning to Paris at the same time from Rouen by the 
 way of Beauvais. I saw Mr. Merry immediately on my 
 arrival, and received from him every satisfaction which I 
 could require. Your Lordship will not, however, at this 
 moment expect from me any opinion on what I may have 
 heard ; Mr. Merry, whom I should wish to retain here for a 
 fortnight or three weeks, will continue to keep your Lord- 
 ship informed of everything necessary, until I am better 
 
 • He was really at Dieppe. 
 
12 NOVEMBER 1802. 
 
 enabled than I now am to speak from my own observation 
 or judgment. The country through Picardj appeared in 
 a high state of cultivation, and the road, but for the rains 
 which had fallen, would have been better than I remember 
 it some years ago ; but the same and indeed a much greater 
 degree of misery and poverty seems to press upon the 
 peasantry. We were escorted as far as Boulogne by a 
 detachment of dragoons, and received there with a discharge 
 of artillery from the ramparts, and by the officers of the 
 garrison in a body ; we passed quietly through the other 
 towns on the way, until we came to St. Denis, where the 
 poissardes of Paris did not fail to meet us, and receive us 
 according to the old custom. Yesterday Mr. Merry an- 
 nounced my arrival to Monsieur Talleyrand, and he appointed 
 to receive me at two o'clock this day. I am just come from 
 him, and were it permitted to judge of his disposition by the 
 manner in which he received me, and by the terms in which 
 he answered the assurances I gave him of the conciliatory 
 tendency of my instructions, I might look forward to some 
 degree of satisfaction in my intercourse with him. We did 
 not enter into any kind of conversation on the present state 
 of affairs ; I communicated to him a copy of my credentials, 
 and upon my requesting that he would take the First Consul's 
 orders on the subject of my presentation, he told me that he 
 did not apprehend that there would be any opportunity until 
 the regular day of presentation, which is in something less 
 than three weeks. Mr. Merry will have acquainted your 
 Lordship with the motive assigned for the extraordinary 
 levee which was held yesterday, and with the hasty and 
 summary manner in which the Corps Diplomatique were 
 summoned to St. Cloud; at all events, I could not possibly 
 have been in time for it. M. de Marcoff called upon me 
 yesterday morning, and made many professions of cordiality. 
 He has not, however, the talent of inspiring confidence, and, 
 indeed, his conduct here is such as torender any confidential 
 intercourse with him extremely dangerous. 
 
ST. DOMINGO. 13 
 
 Paris, November 20, 1802, 
 
 My Lord, — In the expectation of tliose instructions with 
 which your Lordship may be able to furnish me long before 
 I have an opportunity of presenting my credentials, I have 
 not sought the occasion of engaging in any political dis- 
 cussion whatever with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I 
 have seen M. Talleyrand but once since I have been here, 
 when I found him civil and even cordial ; and he seemed to 
 mark an extraordinary degree of empressement by return- 
 ing the visit the same evening. I feel, however, not the 
 slightest temptation to depart in any degree from that mode 
 of conduct I have prescribed to myself, and which has been 
 so strongly recommended to me by your Lordship, of drawing 
 as strong a line as possible between my conduct towards 
 that Minister and that of some of my colleagues, who it 
 must be acknowledged appear rather to seek their own 
 personal gratification than the dignity of their sovereigns; 
 and I hope and trust that by so doing I shall bring no dis- 
 paragement on his Majesty's affairs. Mr. Merry will have 
 informed your Lordship in detail of that which seems at 
 present to occupy principally the First Consul's attention : I 
 mean the state of things at St. Domingo, where the French 
 army is nearly annihilated, and the negroes are again in a 
 state of successful insurrection. It becomes, therefore, of 
 the utmost moment to see what may be the measures of the 
 First Consul under these circumstances. Will he persevere 
 in his project of re-establishing a colonial sj'stem, or will he 
 turn the whole of his attention to the extension of his 
 dominions and influence on the Continent, and thus, as it is 
 modestly called here, endeavour to keep peace with Great 
 Britain in her acquisition of wealth and power in the East 
 and West Indies? I profess myself too ignorant of the 
 secret springs of this Government to be able to form any but 
 very hazardous notions ; but if we may now, as on former 
 occasions, calculate on the personal character of the First 
 Consul, we may expect to see him become more desperate 
 and headstrong by opposition, and exert his whole strength 
 
14 NOVEMBER 1802. 
 
 and power in the conflict. This certainly is most ardently 
 to be wished. On the other hand, there are, I am told, those 
 who would advise, as far as they dare advise (for in this 
 respect, as in many others, I find frequent occasion to re- 
 collect the Emperor Paul), a different line of conduct, and, 
 as I mentioned above, confine their views and efforts to the 
 neighbouring states in Europe. This is what we have to 
 fear ; neither is it easy to be prevented until the other great 
 Powers of Europe become more sensible of the danger as it 
 approaches, and awake from the lethargy under which they 
 labour. So situated it must, I fear, be our lot to remain 
 quiet spectators of the course of ambition which this 
 country is pursuing. But even in this we shall find some 
 consolation in reflecting that, however the First Consul may 
 extend his frontier or his influence, he acquires neither 
 friends at home nor abroad, and that, in fact, while he is 
 running after the shadow he loses the substance. I feel 
 that I have occasion for all your Lordship's indulgence for 
 these reflections ; they are not new, but they are just. They 
 are such as your Lordship had in contemplation in making 
 the peace, and they are such as may encourage us to pre- 
 serve it. I mentioned in my last that my presentation to 
 the First Consul, for it cannot be called an audience, was 
 fixed for the first usual day of reception, which happens 
 about the end of the first week in the next month. It was 
 expected by some people, more sanguine I confess than 
 myself, that an earlier day would have been named, but I 
 have reason to think that this is meant as a reciprocity for 
 the etiquette observed toward General Andreossy, who, how- 
 ever, I am glad to find speak of his reception by your Lord- 
 ship in terms of great satisfaction. 
 
 P.S. — I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that 
 Mr. Talbot arrived this day and delivered to me your Lord- 
 ship's instructions of the 15th instant. I will not delay the 
 messenger further than to say that they shall be most strictly 
 adhered to, and to express my satisfaction that my ideas 
 should have coincided so perfectly with those of your Lord- 
 ship, 
 
SEBASTIANI'S MISSION. 15 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Mr. George Hammond. 
 
 Paris, November 20, 1802. 
 
 I trouble 3^ou with these few words merely to tell you 
 that I shall soon begin to put in motion the two messengers 
 whom I brought with me. One will be despatched from 
 hence on Wednesday next, the 24th instant, the other on the 
 Saturday following, and so on every week without fail. The 
 journey from hence to Calais may be calculated on an 
 average at thirty-six hours, so that they will arrive there 
 every Monday and Friday morning, and return the moment 
 they receive their despatches from the packet. By this 
 means a regular communication will be kept up, and I wish 
 with all my heart I may have satisfactory intelligence to 
 communicate to you. I beg you to send back the box 
 regularly although you should have nothing to send in it. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, November 22, 1802, 
 
 I have this moment received the despatches which 
 accompany this from M. Talleyrand, by whom it is very 
 apparent that they had been opened, and I lose no time in 
 transmitting them to your Lordship by a messenger. Their 
 contents are indeed of a very extraordinary nature, but not 
 more so than might have been expected from the character 
 and system of the First Consul, who seems determined to 
 put our patience and forbearance to the utmost test. It is, 
 however, to be feared that Colonel Sebastiani's mission is 
 much more important and conaprehensive than General Stuart 
 seems to apprehend, and a reference to Mr. Merry's despatch 
 of September 25 will ascertain very clearly that the First 
 Consul's views extend to no less than the second conquest of 
 
16 NOVEMBER 1802. 
 
 Egypt. Colonel Sebastian! has sent his report to M. Talley- 
 rand, and I make no doubt that General Andreossy will be 
 immediately furnished with instructions on the subject. 
 
 Paris, November 27, 1802. 
 
 I beg once more to return your Lordship my very sincere 
 thanks for the clear and ample instructions contained in 
 your Lordship's No. 1, which I received on Saturday morning 
 ]ast by Mr. Talbot. They contain arguments of which I avail 
 myself with great advantage in any discussion which may 
 arise on any of these points on which the two countries are 
 now at issue : but I shall endeavour to avoid every such 
 conversation until I am acquainted with the language your 
 Lordship may think proper to hold with M. Andreossy. It 
 is evident that the. acquisition of Egypt is the object which 
 the First Consul has most at heart, and that to which our 
 utmost attention should be directed. Everything which Mr. 
 Merry has had occasion to report to your Lordship, and 
 above all the personal character of the First Consul (galled 
 to the highest degree at having been so disgracefully foiled 
 in his first attempt), would be alone sufficient to render it 
 probable. But the efforts that are made to gain the Court 
 of Russia, whose co-operation will be indispensably neces- 
 sary to obtain the acquisition of the Porte, the great atten- 
 tion paid to the wants of the Army of Egypt (a name which 
 it has always preserved and certainly not without design), 
 the manner in which the artillery of the Army of Italy has 
 been disposed of, and which Mr. Merry has mentioned to 
 your Lordship, and the language held by the Generals who 
 have already been employed on that service, form altogether 
 such a mass of evidence as place the intention beyond a 
 doubt. Indeed, there is the greatest reason to believe that 
 some immediate operation is at this moment in contempla- 
 tion, and I should not be surprised to learn that, as soon as 
 our troops have evacuated Alexandria, a part of the Egyp- 
 tian were again conveyed into that country, with the con- 
 
COUNT STAHREMBERG. 17 
 
 nivance, or perhaps consent, of the Turks, and professedly 
 for the purpose of re-establishing their authority. It is true 
 that as long as we occupy Malta this enterprise will always 
 be attended with much risk ; but they have always been able 
 to elude our vigilance, and therefore it becomes of the utmost 
 importance to keep as strict a watch as possible on Toulon, 
 without exciting too much jealousy, and a naval force in 
 the Mediterranean sufficient to repel any sudden act of 
 aggression in any quarter so dangerous to the interests of 
 his Majesty's dominions. The vigilance, however, of his 
 Majesty's cruisers should not be exclusively confined to the 
 Mediterranean. Our policy in still keeping possession of 
 Malta cannot escape the observation of this Government, 
 and it is possible that in order to defeat it they may have 
 recourse to the Adriatic, where the port of Ancona would 
 furnish them with a convenient place of embarkation, and 
 the coasting trade carried on. in that sea a sufficient num- 
 ber of small vessels and marines to answer the purpose of so 
 short a navigation. This may undoubtedly be considered as 
 an object worthy of the greatest attention. Mr. Merry will 
 have reported to your Lordship the indecent and outrageous 
 conduct of the First Consul towards Count Stahremberg ; ^ 
 he will have mentioned the motive assigned for this act of 
 violence. I will content myself with observing that T see in 
 it only a nearer resemblance to the character of the late 
 Emperor of Eussia, and of course I cannot be surprised 
 that their conduct should be so similar. M. Schimmelpen- 
 ninck called upon me yesterday ; his conversation was such 
 as might be expected from a person of his experience and 
 prudence, and, if he acts up to it, I think your Lordship will 
 find him worthy of your confidence ; he is, as every Foreign 
 Minister is, and must be, disgusted with the conduct of this 
 Government. 
 
 ' Austrian Ambassador to England. He had been ordered to quit Paris at 
 short notice. 
 
 / 
 
18 DECEMBER 1802. 
 
 Paris, December 1, 1802. 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's letter of the 26th ult. by Shaw, whom I forwarded 
 immediately to his destination, and in such a manner as to 
 escape all observation. With respect to the hints your Lord- 
 ship is so good as to give me for my guidance, I can with 
 truth assure your Lordship that I shall have the less difficulty 
 in conforming my language and conduct to them, since they 
 perfectly coincide with the notion which a nearer view of the 
 state of things here has enabled me to form ; and I took the 
 liberty of expressing as much to your Lordship in an early 
 despatch, from this place. Everything I see and hear does, I 
 confess, considerably diminish the apprehensions which I had 
 imbibed in England, of the immediate danger likely to result 
 from the vast acquisition of territory, and of the influence of 
 this country on the Continent. The conduct of the First Consul 
 is as strongly reprobated by nine people out of ten not im- 
 mediately connected with Government in this country as it 
 is in England ; and out of it, the indignation is not the less 
 lively from being suppressed. Every year of peace, whilst it 
 weakens the Consular Government, unsupported as it stands 
 by confidence or affection, will give strength and courage to 
 those whose object and interest it is to overturn it; and we 
 shall, in fact, by peace maintain a more dangerous, and I trust 
 a more decisive, state of warfare against this Government 
 than by the most direct hostility. It must, however, be 
 admitted that there are cases in which perhaps it might be 
 impracticable to persevere in this mode of policy, and any 
 attempt to gain Egypt may be considered as one. With a 
 view, therefore, to peace, it becomes a most essential duty to 
 watch most scrupulously over the conduct of the First Consul 
 in everything tending to this point. It certainly is not the 
 wish of this Government to come to a rupture with Great 
 Britain, but it will always be prepared to avail itself of our 
 security to carry its projects into effect ; and it is with this 
 view that his Majesty's most gracious speech, combining as 
 it does conciliation and watchfulness, is less approved of by 
 
PEELINGS OF THE FIRST CONSUL. 19 
 
 the Consul and his confidants than bj the public. As long 
 as we have Malta, and with it a pretext for keeping up a 
 sufficient armament in the Mediterranean, we shall be able 
 to counteract his plans ; but the case will be difiPerent, and I 
 fear desperate, should we be obliged by circumstances to ^-e- 
 sign it to its fate. We should carry with us in all our calcu- 
 lations that Egypt is the great object of the First Consul's 
 ambition ; and unless we are well prepared, we shall soon, 
 I fear, have to determine between this danger and that of 
 renewing the war. No aggression hitherto committed can 
 perhaps be considered as sufficiently dangerous to justify a 
 rupture ; although, as your Lordship most justly observes, it 
 will imperceptibly serve as a groundwork of a future system 
 with those Powers which have an equal interest with us in 
 restoring the balance of Europe. My audience is to take 
 place on Monday next ; but whether at the Tuileries, or at 
 St. Cloud, I have not yet been able positively to learn. In 
 the meantime I have been invited to dine with M. Talleyrand, 
 with whom, if I may trust to appearances, I may be able to 
 maintain a kind of cordial intercourse. Nothing consistent 
 with what I owe to my situation and to myself shall be 
 wanting to accomplish this end. 
 
 Paris, December 5, 1802. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's des- 
 patch No. 1, of November 30, with a separate despatch and 
 enclosure by the messenger Sylvester. My presentation to 
 the First Consul is to take place to-morrow — one day sooner 
 than the usual day of reception. Whether this may be con- 
 sidered as a mark of the First Consul's impatience to see me, 
 or to show that the rule to which the delay has been assigned 
 is not indispensable, but entirely subject to his will and 
 pleasure, I will not attempt to determine. It is certain, 
 however, that there does exist in the heart of the First Consul 
 a very considerable amount of rancour and of irritation, of 
 the effects of which I shall in all probability be frequently 
 made sensible. But I will confess that when I see by what 
 
 c 2 
 
20 DECEMBEE 1802. 
 
 means his good- will is conciliated by some of the greatest; 
 Powers in Europe, I cannot help glorying as an Englishman 
 in so honourable a distinction. I do, however, really believe 
 that the mortification at the failure of his efforts to subdue 
 St. Domingo does in some degree feed those hostile feelings, 
 which may perhaps be as much imputed to jealousy as to a 
 spirit of enmity. And it is much to be feared that if he 
 finds himself forced to give up the contest (which, however, 
 there is every reason to believe he will not do until he has 
 exerted every nerve) he will use his utmost efforts to reduce 
 the British colonies to the same deplorable condition. It is 
 the prosperity of his Majesty's dominions both at home and 
 abroad, the affections of his subjects to his Eoyal Person, 
 and all those blessings which his Majesty enumerates in 
 his speech, that excite the envy and hatred of the First 
 Consul, and those motives of hatred are built on too solid a 
 basis ever to be affected by his malice or machinations. Mr. 
 Merry has reported to your Lordship the disturbance which 
 took place in this capital a few nights ago. Notwithstanding 
 the utmost endeavours of the public prints to pass it over 
 and treat it as a private quarrel amongst some young men, 
 it made, and still makes, a very considerable sensation; and 
 this circumstance serves to prove that the spirit of the people 
 is not so far evaporated but that the smallest spark may set 
 it in a blaze. I think it necessary that your Lordship should 
 know without loss of time that the Commander de Bussy, the 
 person who some time ago went to England to notify to the 
 Bailli de Ruspoli his election to the Grand-Mastership of 
 Malta, and who brought back his refusal, is now returned to 
 him with a letter from the Cardinal Legate Caprara, urging 
 him by the most forcible and personal arguments to accede to 
 the nomination. He is given to understand that unless he does 
 so he must expect to feel the utmost weight of the arrogance 
 of the First Consul. This great solicitude of the French 
 Government is an additional proof of its anxious desire to 
 see us quit the Mediterranean. 
 
PRESENTATION TO THE FIRST CONSUL. 21 
 
 Paris, December 7, 1802. 
 
 The ceremonial of my presentation to the First Consul 
 having been previously adjusted, by which it was determined, 
 after a negotiation of three days, that the First Consul should 
 send three of his carriages for me — the one with six horses, 
 the two others with four : the first to convey me, accom- 
 panied by a prefect of the palace; the second, Mr. Talbot; 
 the third, the other gentlemen attached to the Embassy ; 
 and my own carriage to follow empty, drawn by six horses 
 — in this order I set out on Sunday last for the Tuileries, 
 and was conducted to the Audience Chamber, at the xupper 
 end of which stood the First Consul, with the Second ^ and 
 Third ^ Consuls on his right and left. The Ministers, Gene- 
 rals, etc., behind him, and the Corps Diplomatique in a circle 
 in front, I was led through the open space thus formed, by 
 M. Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and two prefects 
 of the palace, to the First Consul, and in presenting my 
 credentials made use of the following expressions : ' J'ai 
 I'honneur, General Premier Consul, de vous presenter la lettre 
 de creance du Roi, mon maltre, en qualite de son Ambassadeur 
 Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire aupres de la Republique 
 fran9aise. Je vous prie d'aj outer foi aux sentiments qui y 
 sont exprimes. Vous n'y trouverez. General Premier Consul, 
 que le desir sincere du Eoi mon maitre de maintenir avec 
 vous les relations de paix et d'amitie.' I concluded as 
 usual with something from myself expressive of my zeal in 
 giving effect to these his Majesty's intentions. After he had 
 received the credentials, and delivered them to M. Talley- 
 rand, he replied : ' Je suis tres sensible a ce que vous venez de 
 me dire des sentiments du Roi, et je vous prie d'assurer Sa 
 Majeste que je desire ardemment avec elle, non seulement 
 la paix, mais la meilleure intelligence. J'espere que lors- 
 qu'on me connaitra mieux, on me rendra la justice d'etre 
 persuade de ma sincerite. Je repete toujours, c'est de la 
 paix entre nos deux grandes nations que depend le bonheur 
 du monde.' He then asked me a few questions about my 
 
 ' Cambacer6s. - Lebrun. 
 
22 DECEMBEE 1802. 
 
 journey, and T fell back to my place in the circle, where the 
 English gentlemen who were to be presented were placed. 
 In a few minutes he came round, and, after conversing for a 
 short time on indifferent subjects, I presented, one after the 
 other, six-and-thirty persons. He spoke a few words to each, 
 and when he had done, on my apologising for having given 
 him so much trouble, he addressed himself to the English 
 collectively, and said : ' Messieurs, je suis charme de vous 
 voir ici ; je desire que vous vous y amusiez, et qu'en retour- 
 nant chez vous, vous emportiez I'assurance de I'estime de 
 cette nation pour la votre, et que leur bonne intelligence est 
 necessaire a la tranquillite du raonde.' He then completed 
 the round of Foreign Ministers, and made his bow, upon 
 which we all retired. I should observe that Mr. Talbot was 
 the first person presented by me. We then proceeded to the 
 apartment of Madame Bonaparte, where I was presented by 
 the Prefect, and then presented Mr. Talbot and the other 
 gentlemen attached to the mission who had followed me. 
 She received us very affably, but with a great deal of em- 
 barrassment. From thence I was conducted home, where I 
 found an invitation to dine at six o'clock at the First Consul's. 
 I accordingly went there with Mr. Merry. At this dinner 
 were present Madame Bonaparte, the family of the First 
 Consul, and her own, with several ladies attached to her 
 person, the Foreign Ministers and their wives, and about 
 two hundred and fifty others. After this dinner, which did 
 not last above half an hour, the First Consul repeated in 
 conversation the substance of what he had said to me more 
 formally in the morning, and talked a considerable time of 
 indifferent matters, with the greatest ease and affability. 
 I yesterday, in compliance with what was signified to me as 
 the established etiquette, made a visit to the Second and Third 
 Consuls, sending previously to them to fix a time, and then 
 to the individuals of the First Consul's family — to Joseph, 
 Lucien, Louis, his mother, and a sister. I left my name 
 with them, as well as with the Ministers of the country, the 
 President des Sections du Conseil d'Etat, the Governor of the 
 Palace, the Prefect on duty, the First Inspectors of Artillery, 
 
CONSTITUTION OP SWITZERLAND. 23 
 
 Engineers, and Gendarmerie, the General commanding the 
 division, and the City, and the General of the Guard, all of 
 whom were pointed out to me as entitled by the etiquette to 
 the first visit. I declared I should make no difi&culty provided 
 the same had been practised by my predecessors of equal 
 rank, and would be required of those who came after me. 
 Such, my Lord, was the ceremonial of my presentation to 
 this Government, in which I have been the more particular, 
 as it may from its novelty be thought curious. Mr. Merry 
 presented at the same time his letters of recall, and will 
 return in about a fortnight. 
 
 Paris, December 9, 1802. 
 A mode of proceeding between this Government and the 
 Swiss Republic seems at last to be definitely arranged. Four 
 senators — Barthelemy, Desmeunier, Roederer, and Fouche 
 — are named commissioners to treat with the Swiss Deputies. 
 They are to hold their meetings at M. Talleyrand's, and are 
 to assemble for the first time in a day or two. The First 
 Consul has given them, I understand, one fortnight to adjust 
 this business, at the end of which time they are to submit 
 their work to his approbation. It is not difficult to foresee 
 what a Constitution will be given to these devoted people, 
 framed under such auspices. Count Marcoff was to have 
 gone to-night to meet Count Woronzow on his passage 
 through Lille, but has delayed his journey in consequence of 
 the latter having met with an accident in breaking his car- 
 riage near Frankfort, by which his progress is retarded for a 
 few days. Count Woronzow has been much pressed to come 
 through Paris, but has absolutely refused. There is every 
 reason to believe that he is charged with discretionary power 
 by his Court to engage or still withhold the Emperor's accept- 
 ance to the guarantee of Malta. Marcoff has certainly urged 
 every argument most likely to persuade his Court to comply 
 with the First Consul's wishes in this respect ; but, convinced 
 as I am that such a measure would serve only to place the 
 island under the immediate control of Bonaparte, who is 
 
24 DECEMBEE 1802. 
 
 sensible that his favourite projects depend npon its acquisi- 
 tion, I cannot but hope that Count Woronzow will consider 
 such an engagement on the part of the Emperor in the same 
 light as when your Lordship conversed with him on the sub- 
 ject in London. At all events, he probably will not determine 
 until he has communicated with your Lordship. 
 
 The Marquis de Gallo has presented his credentials as 
 his Sicilian Majesty's Minister to the President of the 
 Italian Republic. 
 
 Paris, December 13, 1802. 
 
 T have to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's 
 separate despatches of November 30 and December 3, with 
 the enclosures, as well as that containing the demand on the 
 French Government for stores furnished at Jamaica for the 
 repairs of the French frigate 'La Cocarde.' I have already 
 given this account to M. Talleyrand, and your Lordship may 
 be assured that the claimants whose cases you think proper 
 to recommend shall have every assistance in my power. 
 From the extreme difficulty which has hitherto occurred in 
 all matters of restitution, I cannot allow myself to be very 
 sanguine in my expectations of bringing this Government to 
 such a decision as strict justice and reciprocity would require. 
 T trust, however, that it will at last feel its honour, or what 
 is still dearer to it, its interest, nearly concerned in satisfying 
 them, at least inasmuch as regards his Majesty's subjects, 
 some of whom have pretensions which it is shameful to 
 reject. I am sensible that it would be presuming too much 
 to hope to be able yet to render my correspondence anywise 
 interesting to your Lordship. Having had no direct business 
 to transact with the Ministers of this country, I have con- 
 versed with them only on general matters. I can, however, 
 assure your Lordship (and I do so with the utmost satisfac- 
 tion) that the attitude assumed by his Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, uniting moderation with firmness and watchfulness, is 
 likely to be attended with the happiest effect. I have been 
 told by persons in the habits of confidence with the First 
 
PEUSSIAN AND BATAVIAN MINISTERS. 25 
 
 Consul — and I will mention the Chevalier Azzara in particular 
 — that it had already effected a pause in the policy he has been 
 hitherto pursuing ; and that it would, if strictly persevered 
 in, undoubtedly keep within bounds that restless spirit which 
 marks so strongly the character of this Government. He 
 at the same time added that his Court would see it with 
 satisfaction and thankfulness. The Prussian Minister has 
 within these few days been particularly unreserved, consider- 
 ing his connection with this Government, in his demonstra- 
 tions towards me. He appears anxious to convince me of 
 the friendly and confidential intercourse now subsisting 
 between his Majesty and the Court of Berlin, and professes 
 on this subject much more than I can give credit to. It is 
 possible that there may be at this moment some particular 
 point on which the Prussian Cabinet and this Government 
 may be at variance, and that, in order to giv^e that dignity 
 and energy to their representations which they cannot derive 
 from themselves, they are desirous of availing themselves 
 of that which a more confidential system with his Majesty 
 would not fail to reflect upon them. The measure, therefore, 
 I shall observe with M. de Lucchesini (whose private as well 
 as public character is long known to me) shall be neither 
 confidential nor repulsive until such time as your Lordship 
 may think proper to acquaint me with the circumstances 
 which give occasion to his present conduct towards me. The 
 Batavian Ambassador, Vos von Steenvich, has been instructed 
 to make a representation, couched in the strongest terms, 
 against the conduct of this Government with regard to the 
 French troops quartered in Holland. Your Lordship well 
 knows how long and how anxiously the Batavian Govern- 
 ment has been expecting to be delivered from this burthen. 
 The moment was thought to be arrived when a considerable 
 part of that army was ordered to embark for Louisiana, and 
 the most solemn assurances were given to that effect. They 
 now find, however, that in proportion as the troops embark 
 fresh ones arrive to take their places ; and it is furthermore 
 signified that it is thought necessary rather to augment 
 than to diminish the armed force kept up in that country. 
 
26 DECEMBER 1802. 
 
 It is to be feared that the effect of the remonstrance which 
 is to be presented to-day will be the dismissal of the Secre- 
 tary of State, Van der Goes, and of all those who are not 
 entirely subservient to this Government. 
 
 Paris, December 13, 1802. 
 The Duchess of Dorset ^ was on Thursday last introduced 
 to the First Consul and Madame Bonaparte at St. Cloud. 
 She was received with every possible mark of civility and 
 attention. The Prefect-in- Waiting (the Master of the Cere- 
 monies of this country) was ready to receive her on stepping 
 from the carriage, and conducted her upstairs into the 
 apartment where the Circle was waiting the arrival of the 
 First Consul. The fauteuil next to Madame Bonaparte was 
 kept vacant for her, and every mark of distinction due to 
 her rank — whether as Ambassadress, or in her own indivi- 
 dual capacity — was paid to her. I had a few days previous to 
 this ceremony endeavoured to settle the form in which the 
 Duchess should be received ; but it was maintained that as 
 Madame Bonaparte could be considered in no other light than 
 as the wife of the First Consul, and had no particular place 
 or precedency assigned to her by the Constitution, nothing 
 could be formally stipulated relating to her. All that could 
 be said was, that if the Duchess of Dorset did Madame 
 Bonaparte the honour to come to her, she should certainly be 
 received avec tous les egards qui lui sont dus. This was the 
 footing on which she went, and it must be acknowledged we 
 have no reason to complain of the reception she met with. 
 I have already begun my round of dinners, having yesterday 
 dined with the Second Consul, Cambaceres. On Tuesday I 
 dine with the Third Consul, Lebrun, and after that comes a 
 long succession of engagements to the Ministers of each 
 department. I think it proper to mention to your Lordship 
 that the Duchess of Dorset has received and returned a visit 
 to M. Talleyrand, and, furthermore, intends to accept the 
 invitation, which she has received conjointly with me, to 
 
 ' Wife of Lord Whitworth. 
 
SWISS DEPUTIES. 27 
 
 dine with M. Talleyrand on Wednesday next. This will be 
 a great diplomatique dinner, and of course no person ad- 
 mitted but such as the Duchess of Dorset can meet with 
 propriety. The same might not be, perhaps, the case at other 
 times or in other places ; but we have thought that the line 
 which we are disposed to draw with regard to society should 
 not extend to the house of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 with whom it is my duty to be chiefly in relation, and the 
 more particularly when the lady who presides in his house 
 bears his name, and is in fact married to him, as far as the 
 sanction of the E-omish Church can make such a marriage 
 lawful. 
 
 Paris, December 16, 1802. 
 
 The Swiss Deputies have held their sittings very regularly 
 at M. Talleyrand's from ten in the morning until four or five 
 in the evening for these last four or five days ; but if we may 
 judge by the communication which was yesterday made to 
 them from the First Consul, very little progress has been made 
 towards the completion of their business. The purport of this 
 communication was to announce to them that their Constitu- 
 tion must be completed in eight days ; that in order to assist 
 their deliberations he had communicated to them his ideas 
 in writing, from which they would see that his intentions 
 w^ere entirely favourable to their independence ; and that the 
 only return he should require for the signal marks of favour 
 and friendship which he had at all times shown them, and 
 particularly at this moment, was that they should consider 
 themselves as bound not to form any alliance or connection 
 whatsoever with any other Power but France. Such are the 
 First Consul's notions of independence; and it must be con- 
 fessed that it holds out a bright prospect of what the Swiss 
 are doomed to enjoy under the protection of their powerful 
 neighbour. It is, however, at the same time fair to acknow- 
 ledge that, every circumstance duly considered, their situa- 
 tion is likely to be less grievous than might have been 
 expected; since it undoubtedly would have depended upon 
 him to annex that country, as he has others, to the French 
 
28 DECEMBEB 1802. 
 
 dominions. If this is not the case, it must be ascribed solely 
 to the influence which the dignified language of his Majesty 
 and the system on which his Majesty's Government pro- 
 fesses to act must necessarily have on the politics of the 
 First Consul. On the other hand, I fear we must consider 
 the transaction which has been proposed to the Court of 
 Spain, by which the First Consul agrees to exchange Parma 
 and Placentia for the two Floridas, as ungivoidable. The 
 Spanish Ambassador confessed to me yesterday that he saw 
 no possibility of evading it. These two Duchies are to be 
 annexed to the kingdom of Etruria. Count Cobenzl is to 
 receive this day the First Consul's answer to the representa- 
 tions of the Court of Vienna on the subject of the preten- 
 sions of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The answer, as I 
 understand, will, on the whole, be unfavourable, although 
 something will be added to what was allotted to that prince, 
 by the general plan of indemnities. Not a word has been 
 yet mentioned to me by M. Talleyrand either on the subject 
 of Malta or any other point at issue between the two 
 Governments. I thought I had furnished him yesterday 
 with a fair opportunity when I presented to him General 
 Fox, who is here on his way from Malta to England. Count 
 Marcofif is gone to Lille to meet Count Woronzow ; I had 
 desired him to take charge of a letter from me, and he 
 promised it, but he nevertheless went away without letting 
 me know ; and I do not think myself justified in writing by 
 a special messenger, much less by the post. I have no doubt 
 that it is hoped to gain him over to the views of the First 
 Consul on the subject of the guarantee of Malta. The 
 Batavian Ambassador believes that the answer of the First 
 Consul to his representations will be more favourable than 
 he expected. 
 
 Paris, December 20, 1802. 
 Amongst the various considerations worthy of our atten- 
 tion, none can be deemed more important than the state of 
 the finances of this country. Upon them must ultimately 
 
GENERAL POSITION OF FIRST CONSUL. 29 
 
 depend the success of the ambitious projects and wide- 
 spreading speculations of the First Consul ; and there is every 
 reason to believe that the more accurate our information 
 upon this subject may be the less cause we shall find for 
 apprehension. I hope very shortly to be able to lay before 
 your Lordship a statement of this part of the First Consul's 
 administration, such as will afford a most striking contrast 
 to that exhibited lately in the British Parliament, and con- 
 vince us that amongst all the Powers of Europe no such 
 auxiliary can be found as those we possess in the very heart 
 of this country — the disaffection, I might say the contempt, of 
 the nation for his government, and the total derangement of 
 his finances. Until I can submit to your Lordship the state- 
 ment I am promised, I will content mj^self with observing 
 that such is at this moment the penury of the Government, 
 that it does not possess the means of sending out even the 
 necessary reinforcements for St. Domingo, and it has only 
 been within these very few days that those means have been 
 very scantily supplied by extorting different sums from the 
 bankers of Paris. It must not, however, be expected that 
 difficulties like these will deter the First Consul from 
 attempting any favourite project. He is, on the contrary, 
 determined to exert his utmost efforts, not only to subdue 
 that colony, but to strengthen himself in Louisiana and the 
 Floridas; and so pressing are his instances with the Court of 
 Spain for the possession of those two provinces, that they 
 will inevitably be ceded to him in the course of the month of 
 January. I am perfectly aware of the effect which the 
 knowledge of this transaction will have in England, where it 
 will no doubt be considered, and justly so, as a direct attack 
 upon his Majesty's dominions in the West ; whilst the pos- 
 session of Egypt, which he will possibly gain by a compromise 
 with the Porte, will threaten with an equal degree of danger 
 those in the East. That such are his motives and such his 
 projects is not to be doubted ; and, as I said before, the ally 
 to whose assistance we are principally to look is the total 
 want (unless recourse be again had to those measures of 
 terror, which he would scarcely venture to attempt) of the 
 
HO DECEMBER 1802. 
 
 means indispensably necessary for their success. It may, 
 however, be added that, supposing war to be inevitable, that 
 which he would by those means carry into this distant part 
 of the world would be of all others the most favourable to us 
 and the most dangerous and disadvantageous to him. The 
 Americans, whom the avowal of such a project would not fail 
 to unite to us in a common cause, might effectually prevent the 
 settlement of such neighbours, whilst our fleets would cut off 
 all intercourse with Europe. These are the difficulties the First 
 Consul would have to encounter; but no difficulties deter the 
 presumptuous and the headstrong, and therefore we must be 
 prepared to meet the attempt. At the same time that the 
 First Consul is meditating such distant enterprises he is not 
 unmindful of his own gratification at home, and there is 
 every reason to believe that the object of a long sitting of his 
 Privy Council a few days ago was to prepare a Senatus- 
 Consulte, which is to give him an Imperial or Eoyal title. 
 The former is supposed to be most to his taste, and the 
 affectation of giving the Emperor of Russia the title of Czar 
 only in his Court Calendar is considered as an indication 
 that he means to be an Emperor himself and think two 
 sufficient. 
 
 Paris, December 23, 1802. 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's separate letters by Yick, whom I immediately 
 forwarded to his destination. Count Marcoff, since his 
 return from Lille, has been frequently in conference with 
 M. Talleyrand, and, as I have reason to believe, on the 
 affairs of Malta. I yesterday was confirmed in this belief 
 by his acquainting me, with an appearance of much satis- 
 faction, that the Emperor of Russia had at length consented 
 to accede to the guarantee of Malta, under certain restric- 
 tions, relating only to the formation of the newly established 
 Langue de Malte, He gave me to understand that the 
 Emperor had been induced to this measure solely with a 
 view, of giving his Majesty a proof of his sincere desire to 
 
CONTEMPLATED DIVORCE OF FIRST CONSUL. 81 
 
 acquiesce as far as possible in his Majesty's wishes. He 
 further told me that Count Woronzow would have instruc- 
 tions to discuss this subject with your Lordship. However 
 mucn his Majesty's wishes may be gratified, those of this 
 Government, or at least of the First Consul, are most 
 undoubtedly so by the prospect of the evacuation of that 
 island and of the Mediterranean by his Majesty's forces; and 
 I should be tempted to believe that this is the object which 
 M. de Marcoff has had principally in view. I contented 
 myself with telling him that I had no instructions relative to 
 that subject, but that I could assure him of the pleasure with 
 which his Majesty would meet any arrangement by means 
 of which the burthen of maintaining so expensive a garrison 
 might be taken from him, and the intent of the stipulations 
 with regard to Malta so far fulfilled as to insure its perfect 
 independence. M. Talleyrand, with whom I dined yesterday, 
 and in whose house I remained till near ten o'clock, made no 
 mention of this, or of any other political subject whatever. 
 I am assured that the First Consul is at this moment re- 
 curring to a measure of which your Lordship has already 
 received some intimation : I mean his divorce from his 
 present wife, and his assumption of the title of Emperor 
 of the Gauls. But these points have, as I am credibly 
 informed, been submitted to the Senate, and, it is said, are 
 shortly to be made public. Should the divorce take place, 
 he is to marry the only remaining daughter of the Margrave 
 of Baden, a princess only fourteen years of age, whose 
 brother is now here, and much caressed by the Consul and 
 his courtiers. By means of this marriage he would become 
 brother-in-law to the Emperor of Russia and to the King 
 of Sweden ; but I do really believe that he would by the same 
 means so completely ruin the small remains of popularity 
 which he still possesses as to give his enemies the oppor- 
 tunity, which they are anxiously looking for, of openly 
 attacking his person and his Government. Of this he is 
 sometimes aware ; but such is his presumption, and so com- 
 pletely is he intoxicated with his situation, that the admo- 
 nitions of reason are no longer attended to. I shall in the 
 
32 DECEMBER 1802, 
 
 course of a very few days have, in all probability, occasion 
 to mention this subject again more fully and more positively. 
 It has not as yet reached the public, but it is much talked 
 of by those who are well informed of what is passing in the 
 interior of St. Cloud, where Madame Bonaparte, notwith- 
 standing all the honours which have been lately paid her, 
 is in the deepest affliction. The Swiss deputies and their 
 coadjutors have completed their business within the given 
 time, and their work is now before the First Consul. The 
 Swiss are to be called independent. They renounce the 
 right of contracting alliances with any other Power than 
 France, and the First Consul reserves to himself the ap- 
 pointment of their magistrates. Mr. Merry proposes leaving 
 this place on Monday next. 
 
 Paris, December 27, 1802. 
 It is now supposed that, notwithstanding the ardent 
 desire of the First Consul to be invested with a higher 
 title, motives of prudence have prevailed, and he has rejected 
 it. A deputation of the Councils of State waited upon him 
 a few days ago at St. Cloud to ofPer him that of king, to 
 reason with him, and to overcome those scruples which he 
 affected to entertain against accepting the offer. His appre- 
 hensions, however, of the opposition, not only of the public, 
 but of many of those who are nearest his person, have, it is 
 said, prevailed over their arguments, and we may conclude 
 that this measure will be laid aside until a future and more 
 favourable opportunity. The same may in all probabilit}' be 
 said of the divorce. If the First Consul finds himself some- 
 times cramped and thwarted in his gratifications at home, 
 he seems determined to give full scope to the extent of his 
 influence abroad. A project is now on foot, and is expected 
 soon to be carried into effect, of uniting the Ligurian to the 
 Italian Republic, by which he will acquire another port in 
 the Mediterranean, and, what is the great object of his policy, 
 the means of limiting the intercourse between his Majesty's 
 
FRENCH FLATTERY OF RUSSIA. 33 
 
 dominions and tlie Continent. That such at least is an 
 object he has much at heart the experience of every day 
 must convince us ; but unfortunately that same experience 
 will prove that, however great his power, it does not extend 
 so far, and that even in France the commercial relations 
 with Great Britain are such as to have bronght the exchange 
 to par, which a few months ago was from ten to twelve per 
 centum against us. Amongst the most striking features of 
 the present policy of this Government is its extreme solici- 
 tude to conciliate the Court of Russia. The public prints 
 are filled with the grossest flattery, the loyalty and the 
 integrity of the Russian character are perpetual subjects of 
 admiration, and the Russian language is recommended as 
 the most important and interesting study to Frenchmen. 
 The greatest stress is laid upon the advantages which must 
 accrue to both countries from the strictest relations of politics 
 and commerce; in short, every effort is made to gain the Court 
 of St. Petersburg, not only as having the power which would 
 be the best able to second the views of Great Britain in fixing 
 a limit to the ambition of the First Consul, but also as that 
 without the co-operation of which those projects which tend 
 to the destruction of the Turkish power, and by that means 
 open a road to India, must be considered as too visionary to 
 be even attempted. I hope and trust that the Russian 
 Ministers are too enlightened to be gained by such artifices. 
 The present Chancellor, Count Woronzow, who from his 
 experience and the place which he holds must have great 
 weight, is certainly no Frenchman; and though he has 
 always endeavoured to render Russia, in a commercial point 
 of view, less dependent on Great Britain, yet he is perfectly 
 sensible that France can never replace her, and that their 
 natural connection is with us. I am not, therefore, appre- 
 hensive of this Government succeeding beyond a certain 
 degree ; but still it will be incumbent upon us to use all 
 our endeavours to counteract it at Petersburg, and, without 
 having the appearance of endeavouring to stimulate (which 
 would only alarm and indispose), to inculcate the doctrine of 
 their having a common interest with us in watching carefully 
 
 D 
 
34 DECEMBER 1802. 
 
 over the encroacliments of this country. Your Lordship 
 will pardon my troubling you on this subject ; it is only 
 inasmuch as it is connected with the policy of this Govern- 
 ment that I venture to touch upon it. The Deputies from 
 the Yalais were received some days ago at the Court of St. 
 Cloud. The Grand Bailiff, the President, in a speech of 
 considerable length, expressed the gratitude of his fellow- 
 citizens to the First Consul for his having declared their 
 Republic independent, and in concluding this address he 
 presented the decree of the Diet, whereby the First Consul 
 of the French Republic and President of the Italian Re- 
 public has been pronounced Restorer of the Independence of 
 the Republic of Valais. Great notoriety has been given to 
 this event, but Bonaparte has not thought it expedient to 
 give an equal degree of publicity to the Constitution framed 
 by himself for the remainder of Switzerland and recom- 
 mended by him to the delegates assembled here, although it 
 professes to declare the country independent of all foreign 
 influence. The latest accounts from Brest confirm the in- 
 formation which I have communicated to your Lordship with 
 respect to Bonaparte's determination to persist in his efforts 
 to accomplish the reduction of St. Domingo, for it appears 
 certain that five sail of the line and a frigate have recently 
 sailed from that port with reinforcements for that island. 
 I have the honour to send enclosed a despatch which I 
 received last night, to be forwarded to your Lordship from 
 Mr. Drake. To the information therein contained I have to 
 add that a convention was signed yesterday evening by Count 
 Cobenzl, Count Marcoff^, and Joseph Bonaparte, by virtue of 
 which the territory of Eichstadt, containing a population of 
 seventy thousand souls, and producing a revenue of four 
 hundred thousand florins, together with some ecclesiastical 
 possessions in Bavaria, are to be ceded to the Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany in addition to what was allotted to him by the ori- 
 ginal plan of indemnities. In consequence of this arrange- 
 ment Passau is to be restored to the Elector. Mr. Merry, 
 who has been detained some days longer than he expected, 
 proposes to set out to-morrow on his return to England. 
 
RUSSIAN DEMANDS ON FRANCE. 35 
 
 He has put me in possession of the cyphers and papers 
 belonging to the mission, and I beg leave to observe that 
 there are amongst them some relating to the negotiation of 
 Amiens, which, I conceive, ought to be deposited in your 
 Lordship's office. I have the honour to enclose herewith a 
 list of passports granted by me up to the present date. 
 
 P.S. I omitted to mention that the dignity of Elector 
 is to be added to the above-mentioned terms, obtained by 
 the Court of Vienna in favour of the Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany. 
 
 Paris, January 4, 1803. 
 
 An opportunity now presents itself of putting to the test 
 the desire of this Government to conciliate the Court of 
 Petersburg. Count Marcoff has since his meeting with 
 Count Woronzow, who brought him some instructions on that 
 head, received the most positive orders to return to the 
 charge, and insist on an indemnity for the King of Sardinia. 
 It is evident that Count Marcoff feels himself considerably 
 embarrassed with this commission, anxious as he is at all 
 times to steer such a course as to preserve his credit with 
 his own Court, without endangering that which he, perhaps 
 too obsequiously, seeks to gain with the First Consul and his 
 Ministers. I have not learnt with precision the progress he 
 has been able to make in this negotiation, but I have reason 
 to believe that he has received a proposal from this Govern- 
 ment (and the Siennese is mentioned) so much below what 
 would be likely to satisfy his own Court, that he does not 
 transmit it to Petersburg, and is waiting the result of his 
 further representations. It is not easy to foresee what may 
 be the extent of the concessions of this Government, or where, 
 indeed, the indemnity for such a loss as that which his Sar- 
 dinian Majesty has sustained is to be found. But when we 
 go to the source from whence this zeal for the service of the 
 unfortunate monarch is derived, we may conclude that his 
 
 d2 
 
36 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 interests will be followed up with more than common impor- 
 tunity. Your Lordship will recollect that Prince Czarto- 
 rinsky, for some years past the intimate and most confidential 
 friend of the present Emperor of Eussia, was about three 
 years ago appointed to reside near the King of Sardinia in 
 quality of Russian Envoy. In the course of this mission, 
 Prince Czartorinsky's feelings, and the natural generosity of 
 his character, to which may be added perhaps some motive 
 of female society, were so interested in the misfortunes of 
 the King, that even in the reign of Paul his representations 
 were sufficient to provoke from him some strong remonstrance 
 on the subject. The King of Sardinia, however, shared the 
 fate of all the Emperor's friends, and his concerns were 
 abandoned as soon as the Emperor discovered that Bonaparte 
 was alone worthy of his friendship and confidence. At his 
 death Prince Czartorinsky was recalled to the Court, and is 
 now second in point of precedency, but perhaps first in point 
 of influence in the Foreign Department. It is the Minister 
 (and it must also be recollected that he is a Pole, and conse- 
 quently not much interested in preserving the tranquillity of 
 Russia) who instigates the Emperor, and we may, I think, 
 expect that, under such auspices, this affair may be carried 
 on with a degree of perseverance and importunity capable 
 of shaking the good understanding which the First Consul 
 appears so anxious to establish. It is highly possible that 
 the affairs of Switzerland, upon which Count Marcoff was 
 also instructed to make a vigorous representation, may create 
 another obstacle in the way of such a union. The Russian 
 Minister was at first given to hope that his Court would be en- 
 tirely gratified on this point, and that the Swiss were to remain 
 independent. The manner, however, in which this business 
 has been carried on and concluded must appear to the Court 
 of Petersburg such a mockery of everything conciliatory 
 or decent, as well towards the unfortunate people on whom 
 the First Consul now imposes the yoke, as towards Great 
 Britain and Russia, who have interested themselves in their 
 favour, as to open its eyes and excite the utmost disgust. 
 Had the representations of the Court of Petersburg been 
 
ATTACK IN THE ' MONITEUR,' 87 
 
 combined witli those of his Majesty (and I hope and trust 
 that this example will convince the Russian Ministers that 
 separate and unconnected influence can have no effect on this 
 Government), I make no doubt they would have met with 
 that degree of respect and attention which such a concert 
 would not fail to command. The negotiation with regard 
 to the two Floridas begins to be more publicly talked of, and, 
 as far as I have been able to observe, it should seem that 
 the opinion of the public would not coincide with that of the 
 Government. Mr. Livingstone, the American Minister, who 
 did not think that it would be brought forward so precipi- 
 tately, is in the utmost consternation. In a conversation I 
 had with him two days ago he gave it as his decided opinion 
 that should the measure be attempted it would have the 
 immediate effect of uniting every individual in America, of 
 every party, and none more sincerely than himself, in the 
 cause of Great Britain. Should such be the event, we may, 
 from this gentleman^s known political bias, expect to have 
 few enemies remaining in that country. I can perceive that 
 the little intercourse which has arisen between him and 
 myself gives a considerable degree of jealousy to M. Talley- 
 rand. Your Lordship will have observed, and perhaps not 
 without surprise, that I have never permitted myself to re- 
 mark on the scurrilous and vulgar abuse which occasionally 
 appears in the public prints of this Government. That con- 
 tained in the 'Moniteur ' of January 1,^ and which was probably 
 intended by the author — whose name may be easily guessed 
 from the . style — as a New Year's gift, seems to have been 
 worked up with more than common pains and acrimony. I 
 make no doubt that the same motives which have induced 
 me to be silent will have operated on your Lordship so as 
 completely to defeat the purpose of the author. I am con- 
 vinced that the best, and certainly the most dignified, revenge 
 we can take is to treat all such indecent virulence with the 
 contempt it deserves, and not to appear even to observe it. 
 The only remark which I have allowed myself to make, when 
 
 ' A leading- article abusing those persons in England who desire to stir up 
 war against France. 
 
38 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 I was asked whether I had seen it, was that the matter was 
 worthy of the language in which it is expressed, and both so 
 contemptible as to defeat its own purpose. The project of 
 uniting the Ligurian to the Italian Republic is abandoned, 
 but the port of Spezzia is required to be ceded to the latter. 
 
 Paris, January 4, 1803. 
 
 I reserve for this separate despatch a communication 
 which was made to me yesterday evening by M. Talleyrand 
 in a conference to which I was formally invited by that 
 Minister, He began the conversation by giving me the 
 strongest assurances of the sincere desire of the First Consul 
 to cultivate the best understanding with his Majesty, and 
 went over the old ground of the effect which such a good 
 understanding must have on the rest of Europe. He then 
 told me that he was ordered by the First Consul to mention 
 to me a subject on which his Majesty had the means of con- 
 ferring a particular and personal obligation npon him, and 
 that on a point which he had much at heart. He said that 
 since the conclusion of the peace different representations 
 had been made to his Majesty's Government on the subject 
 of the princes of the House of Bourbon resident in his 
 Majesty's dominions ; that the First Consul had been in- 
 formed that Monsieur (he called him Count d'Artois) had 
 assisted not long ago at a review in Scotland wearing the 
 insignia of the Order of the St. Esprit ; that he could not 
 but consider such a practice as tending to keep alive the 
 spirit of discord, and as holding out a possibility of a change 
 in the Government by which the Order might again be re- 
 stored ; that, considering it as such, he could not pass it 
 over in silence, and therefore he did request, as a proof of his 
 Majesty's desire to conciliate, that he would discourage it by 
 every means in his power. What he should, therefore, expect 
 was that those princes should withdraw to Warsaw, where 
 they might reside in tranquillity without being near enough 
 
INTERVIEW WITH TALLEYEAND. 39 
 
 to give umbrage ; or, if that should be thought too harsh 
 (and I took upon myself to assure him before he proceeded 
 further that it never would be complied with), that at least 
 it might be required of them to desist from wearing their 
 orders. I cannot give your Lordship an adequate idea of 
 the earnestness with which M. Talleyrand urged this point, 
 and of the degree of importance which he attached to his 
 Majesty's acquiescence. He told me that he had it in com- 
 mand from the First Consul to assure me that he should feel 
 himself much obliged to his Majesty for a compliance with 
 his wishes in this respect, and that he should be anxious to 
 have an opportunity of proving his sense of it by adopting 
 any arrangement or by setting aside any diflSculty which 
 might on his part stand in the way of a perfect cordiality 
 and good understanding between the two Governments. 
 He mentioned this repeatedly, and with a view of giving me 
 to understand that it would in fact be so acceptable to the 
 First Consul that we might propose our own terms. I did 
 not, however, seem to understand it in that light, as it 
 appeared to me to be infinitely more agreeable to his 
 Majesty's dignity, should his Majesty be disposed to comply 
 at all with the request, that it should be done without any 
 appearance of a compromise. I am, however, not the less 
 persuaded that it may tend to what he professes, and facili- 
 tate a more cordial intercourse with this Government. I 
 would not take upon myself to give any hope of such an act 
 of complaisance on the part of his Majesty ; all I said was 
 that his Majesty never would or could oblige those indi- 
 viduals to quit his dominions as long as they continued to 
 comport themselves with that propriety (and I particularised 
 Count d'Artois) which had invariably marked their conduct 
 since they had been in Great Britain. With regard to the 
 second point I could say nothing, but I would not fail to 
 make my report to your Lordship of the purport of M. 
 Talleyrand's communication. Your Lordship will naturally 
 wonder that any act of complaisance should be expected at 
 the same moment that the official prints of this Government 
 are filled with the most virulent invective. Such inconsis- 
 
40 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 tencies are, however, natural to the character of the man ; 
 and I make no doubt that the more we are acquainted with 
 it the less reason we shall have to be surprised. 
 
 Paris, January 7, 180.3. 
 
 Although the subject has not been mentioned to me by 
 M. Talleyrand, I- nevertheless have reason to beheve that 
 the delay which has occurred in regard to the evacuation of 
 Malta excites a considerable degree of anxiety at this mo- 
 ment. The person who suggested this to me may have been 
 commissioned to sound me, and therefore I was not sorry to 
 have an opportunity of saying to him what I should con- 
 sider it as my duty to say to M. Talleyrand should he think 
 proper to introduce the subject. I told him, therefore, that 
 the sole object which his Majesty's Government had in view 
 in framing the articles of the Treaty of Amiens which 
 related to Malta was to render that island as independent 
 as it was possible to make it under the existing circum- 
 stances; that had those stipulations been fulfilled by the 
 accession of those Powers which were invited to guarantee, 
 and by the election of a Grand Master, the Treaty would 
 undoubtedly, with regard to Malta, as in every other point, 
 have been carried into effect without the smallest hesitation. 
 It so happened, however, that none of these stipulations 
 were complied with ; Russia had not yet accepted the 
 guarantee, and the person elected to the Grand-Mastership 
 had declined it. Under these circumstances there could be 
 no question of giving up Malta. Such, I told the Spanish 
 Ambassador (for it was with him that the conversation 
 took place), had been the intention of my Court. But 
 how far events which had taken place, and others — very 
 important ones indeed both to his Court and mine, which 
 were at this moment near their accomplishment — might 
 operate on the counsels of his Majesty, I could not under- 
 take to foretell. I professed to speak entirely from myself, 
 being without instructions on the subject ; but I said I 
 
RELATIONS WITH SPAIN. 41 
 
 would make no scruple to give him my private opinion, 
 which was that Malta could not with any degree of prudence 
 be given up whilst this country was making and meditating 
 such acquisitions as could not but excite the utmost jealousy 
 and justify the utmost precautions on the part of the other 
 Powers of Europe. The Chevalier Azzara professed to be 
 perfectly of my opinion, and I am the more inclined to 
 believe him, as I know he is at this moment under the 
 extreme displeasure of his Court, or more properly of the 
 Prince de la Paix, for not having quite kept part with him in 
 his subserviency to the French Government in his project 
 relating to the Floridas. The business was first mentioned 
 to him by the First Consul some months ago. He endea- 
 voured, as he has repeatedly assured me, to dissuade him 
 from it by every argument; and, upon finding him deter- 
 mined to persist, he begged that the negotiation might not be 
 entrusted to him, but committed to the sole management of 
 Beurnonville, who has arranged the whole business with the 
 Prince of Peace. Mr. Frere will probably have reported to 
 your Lordship, by the messenger who went through Paris 
 on Tuesday last, the precise state of this negotiation. 
 According to my intelligence, it may be considered as con- 
 cluded, and the Convention is expected to arrive here toward 
 the end of this month. It is probably with a view to this 
 that General Bernadotte is appointed to the American 
 mission instead of M. Otto, who, it is presumed, will go to 
 Berlin. 
 
 Paris, January 7, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's 
 separate despatches of December 30, 1802, with their en- 
 closures, and shall lose no time in endeavouring to give 
 effect to your Lordship's instructions. Wednesday last 
 being the usual day of audience, the First Consul received 
 at the Tuileries. I had, as usual, a considerable number of 
 gentlemen to present, for a list of whom I beg leave to refer 
 your Lordship to the *Moniteur.' The Duchess of Dorset and 
 
42 JANUAET 1803. 
 
 myself had the honour of dining the same evening with the 
 First Consul, with about two hundred and fifty other guests. 
 The enclosed French papers will explain to your Lordship all 
 that is yet made public of the project for giving a greater 
 degree of influence and eclat to the Senate. It is understood 
 that this is not to be carried into efiPect until one year has 
 elapsed. 
 
 Paris, January 11, 1803. 
 
 The arrangement of the Swiss Constitution does not 
 seem to be so near its conclusion as I had reason to suppose. 
 It now appears that the First Consul has changed his opinion 
 as to the form of government most suitable to that country, 
 and instead of a federative system he proposes that the 
 totality of the Cantons shall be parcelled out into separate 
 States, each consisting of two or three Cantons at most, and 
 that each shall be subject to the same form of Consular 
 government as that now subsisting in France. Such is the 
 project which he has now submitted to the Commissioners. 
 It has, however, met with more opposition than might have 
 been expected, and Roederer in particular has combated with 
 great boldness the opinion of the First Consul. Hitherto 
 the Commission has been allowed to discuss the question 
 without molestation; but it cannot be expected that any 
 opposition should be effectual, and indeed it should seem 
 that the system now recommended is too favourable to the 
 future views of this Grovernment to be abandoned without 
 stronger arguments than those now urged. It is worthy of 
 remark that the same doctrine is preached, as your Lordship 
 will see by Mr. Drummond's despatch, which accompanies 
 this, by Colonel Sebastiani to the States to which he has 
 been deputed, and doubtless with the same intention. Count 
 Marcoff seems to think that this Court will resist the intro- 
 duction of such a system in a country so immediately under 
 the protection of the Emperor, and he is accordingly pre- 
 paring a representation upon the subject. The effect can 
 scarcely be expected to be such as the dignity of the 
 
COURT MOURNING. 48 
 
 Emperor might demand ; but one effect of the general con- 
 duet of this Government most assuredly will have that of 
 drawing together those by whose consent and co-operation 
 Europe may yet be saved. The project which I mentioned 
 in my last, of giving a greater degree of importance to the 
 Senate, and which is now more detailed in the ' Moniteur,' 
 creates much conversation in the public. It is considered 
 as an indication of an intention in the Eirst Consul to 
 create a power, or rather the shadow of a power, which is to 
 be like the House of Peers in England. Its real intention, 
 however, is to divert the attention of the public from other 
 matters and to increase his own patronage. 
 
 Paris, January 11, 1803. 
 
 The news of the death of General Leclerc was received 
 some days ago, and announced in the public prints the day 
 before yesterday in the manner formerly observed with re- 
 gard to sovereigns only. It seems that he fell a victim to 
 the yellow fever. His loss is very little regretted. It is said 
 that he contributed to the prolongation of the troubles in 
 St. Domingo by his avarice and vexations of all kinds. As 
 a general or statesman, his reputation is below mediocrity. 
 On the occasion of this event another step has been taken 
 by the Eirst Consul towards putting himself on a footing of 
 royalty. An extraordinary audience of the Corps Diplo- 
 matique was yesterday morning announced for the same day 
 at one o'clock, and half an hour after came a letter from M. 
 Talleyrand to announce a mourning of ten days in conse- 
 quence of the death of the First Consul's brother-in-law. As 
 I understood that the other Ambassadors and Ministers meant 
 to put on mourning, I did the same ; but we have agreed to con- 
 sider it as a compliment to the First Consul on making him our 
 compliments of condolence, and not to wear it in society. 
 I shall, I hope, soon have it in my power to furnish your 
 Lordship with a correct statement of what is going on at 
 Brest and the other considerable French ports. But I can 
 
44 JANUARY 180.''. 
 
 in the meantime set j^onr Lordship's mind perfectly at ease 
 with regard to any effectual steps towards a regeneration of 
 the Navy. The magazines are completely empty, nor is it 
 possible to find either money or credit to fill them. The 
 utmost efforts have been made to equip the few vessels that 
 sailed a week ago from Brest (and which are gone from 
 thence to Toulon to take in troops, in consequence of the di?- 
 affectioji of those in Brittany for the service), which were, I am 
 assured, in such a state as to render the voyage an object of 
 the utmost danger. It is, however, the determination of the 
 First Consul to persist at all events in his efforts to reduce* 
 the colonies to obedience, and this occupation will be of itself 
 snfiicient to tranquillise us with regard to his other specu- 
 lations. 
 
 Paris, January 14, 180;>. 
 
 That which seems now to occupy the attention of this 
 Government, to the exclusion of almost every other object, 
 is the providing reinforcements for St. Domingo. It is 
 certain that, what with the climate and the vigorous attacks 
 of the blacks (for war is now become entirely offensive on 
 their part), the number of the French troops is so much 
 reduced as to afford scarcely a hope of their being able to 
 hold out until those succours can arrive. Every effort is 
 making for that purpose, and I am assured that the First 
 Consul is determined to make another effort to reduce the 
 colony, by sending out as expeditiously as possible a body 
 at least of thirty thousand men ; and orders are already- 
 gone to Brest, to Eochefort, and to Toulon to fit out every- 
 thing which can serve to convey troops, and to hire trans- 
 ports for the same service. From this your Lordship will 
 judge of the importance which the First Consul attaches 
 to the reduction of the colonies ; but I think we shall not 
 deceive ourselves if we place this perseverance rather to the 
 account of vanity and offended pride than to any principle 
 of true policy. Whatever may be his motive, I have, when- 
 ever an occasion has offered of expressing an opinion on this 
 
ST. DOMINGO. 45 
 
 subject, been particularly careful to express no great degree 
 of anxiety for the measures which he is preparing to adopt, 
 in the idea that, should he be once led to imagine that we 
 consider him as playing our game by this diversion of his 
 force, he might perhaps sacrifice his own feelings to the 
 desire of depriving us of such a gratification. It was with a 
 view to this that when the First Consul introduced the sub- 
 ject in the little conversation I had with him on Monday 
 last at the audience, it was my object rather to dwell on the 
 difiiculties of the enterprise than to give him the least 
 reason to believe we wished to commit him, by afiecting to 
 diminish the danger. He concluded the conversation by 
 saying, ' Tout cela est vrai ; c'est a ce prix que nous achetons 
 le sur, mais malgre cela il nous en faut.' I have had occasion 
 to make the acquaintance of the General who is going out 
 to take the command at Pondicherry; his name is Decaen. 
 He is a young man, and bears a very fair character in private 
 life, but possesses no very shining talents either as a general 
 or a statesman. We may therefore conclude that, as far as 
 he is concerned, it is intended rather to improve what pos- 
 sessions they already have in India than to extend them by 
 conquest or intrigue. The Swiss Deputies are still making 
 the best defence they can against the government prescribed 
 for them by the First Consul. They have been allowed the 
 appearance of a reference to their principals, which will 
 have the effect of prolonging their stay at Paris, but cer- 
 tainly will produce no change in their favour. 
 
 Paris, January 17, 1803. 
 
 The final adjustment of the affairs of Germany is still the 
 subject of some difficulty. The Elector of Bavaria remon- 
 strates, with a warmth which begins to displease the First 
 Consul, accustomed as he is to the submissive tone of the 
 German princes, against the infraction of the guarantee of 
 his possessions by the French Government, and the Court of 
 
46 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 Prussia, in now depriving him of the bishopric of Eichstadt in 
 favour of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. His Electoral High- 
 ness instructs his Ministers here to declare that he will not 
 relinquish that possession until he is compelled by force so 
 to do. He quotes the example of the King of Prussia, who, 
 it must be allowed, supported his pretensions with a vigour 
 and independence which perhaps might not succeed equally 
 with another. It seems to be a maxim of this Government 
 to consolidate by every means the force of Prussia ; but the 
 Elector of Bavaria has not the same claims to favour, and 
 consequently he will gain nothing by resistance. Count' 
 MarcofiP has received the most satisfactory assurances that 
 no steps shall be taken to subvert the order of things (which, 
 however, it must be confessed, is now become a disorder) 
 originally agreed upon for the government of the seven isles. 
 The instructions, therefore, of Colonel Sebastian!, as far as 
 they relate to this object, are to be annulled. The same 
 Minister is endeavouring to carry into effect his instructions 
 in favour of the King of Sardinia. He tells me that he is 
 not without hope of obtaining Piombino in addition to the 
 Siennese, and perhaps even the Isle of Elba — a point on 
 which he assures me he will make a most obstinate stand. It 
 is reported that the First Consul will make a journey ere long 
 into the Low Countries; but this will probably not take place 
 until the troops from the quarter are embarked for St. 
 Domingo, where, it is said, they are to proceed instead of 
 Louisiana. In the meantime the First Consul is livino* 
 retired in the country, without the enjoyment of any of the 
 smallest degrees of domestic comfort : occupied the whole day 
 with the most trivial details of internal arrangement, and 
 such as suit the natural turn of his mind, prone to all the 
 extremes of suspicion. He passes three or four hours each 
 day in reading over himself the letters of individuals, which 
 are sent to him for that purpose from the post at Paris, and 
 from which he collects pretexts for tormenting frequently 
 those who are nearest to him, as well as those who think 
 themselves the safest by the distance from him. Three or 
 four different polices equally desirous to manifest their zeal 
 
BRITISH PROPERTY IN FRANCE. 47 
 
 are established in this city, and from their inquisition no 
 class of society is secure. In short, he is a scourge to 
 himself and to the nation, which for its punishment he has 
 subdued to his will. But I must repeat to your Lordship 
 that the nearer he is viewed the less formidable he appears 
 to those not immediately under his grasp. I am sorry to 
 mention that the Due de Choiseul has again incurred the 
 displeasure of the First Consul, who has banished him to the 
 distance of forty leagues from Paris. This is said to be in 
 consequence of his having inconsiderately applauded a passage 
 in a play, in the presence of the First Consul, which bore an 
 allusion to the restoration of the Royal Family. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, January 14, 1803. 
 
 Having received an application from several of his 
 Majesty's subjects interested in the French funds, and 
 having learnt that they propose addressing themselves to 
 your Excellency, I think it right to apprise you of their 
 intention. As I am informed that the sequestration im- 
 posed by the French Government during the war on British 
 property in France still continues, I have to signify to your 
 Excellency his Majesty's pleasure (in the event of this in- 
 formation being correct) that, as all restraints of this nature 
 have been removed in this country, you require from the 
 French Government that the sequestration of British pro- 
 perty in France should be taken off without delay. You will, 
 however, be careful, in any discussions which your Excellency 
 may have upon this subject with the French Ministers, to 
 confine your representations to property actually existing, 
 without reference to such as may have been confiscated 
 either wholly or in part by the authority of the Government 
 during the war. With regard to property of which de- 
 scription, you will content yourself with requiring that his 
 
48 JANUAKY 1803. 
 
 Majesty's subjects may be placed on the same footing in this 
 respect as other foreigners who may be in similar circum- 
 stances. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, January 20, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's despatch No. 1 of the 14th inst., and the 
 separate despatch and enclosures which accompanied it. 
 Your Lordship will do me the justice to believe that I have 
 not waited for such a repetition of your Lordship's instruc- 
 tions to attend to the claims which his Majesty's subjects 
 may have on this Government. If I have not followed up 
 my representations with that perseverance which some of 
 the claimants may have wished, it is that I conceive his 
 Majesty's dignity would be committed were I to place myself 
 in the situation of a solicitor to this Government. The 
 strongest appeals to its justice (for we claim on no other 
 ground) have been made on this subject by Mr. Merry, and 
 have been repeated by me. Hitherto, I am sorry to say, 
 they have been fruitless, and they have been so because 
 they have been made on a principle which does not exist. 
 It shall, however, be my business, as it is my duty, to give 
 the French Ministers to understand that whilst they show 
 themselves so backward in fulfilling one positive stipulation 
 of the treaty, to which they constantly refer, they can have 
 no right to complain of any delay which has arisen, or may 
 yet occur, on the part of his Majesty's Government in giving 
 effect to another. I do propose, however, renewing my 
 application in behalf of the British claimants, at whose im- 
 patience I am not at all surprised, in the course of a few 
 days ; and I shall not fail to attend to the just distinction 
 which your Lordship points out. As an instance of the 
 difficulty of bringing the French Ministers to any decision, I 
 enclose the answer I have this moment received to an appli- 
 cation which has been twice made in favour of an English 
 
THE DUG DE LAVAL. 49 
 
 vessel detained in the port of Flushing, and on the subject 
 of which Mr. Merrj had presented some memorials before I 
 came into the country. There has fallen another victim to 
 the suspicions of the First Consul in the person of the Due 
 de Laval. He was ordered three days ago to leave Paris, 
 and on going to the Grand Judge to enquire into the cause 
 of his exile he was told it was because he was in the pay of 
 England. He cleared himself of this charge by producing 
 his papers, which proved that he had had no money concerns 
 whatever with the British Government since he had resigned 
 his regiment seven years ago. He was still accused of 
 receiving remittances from England, and at last it occurred 
 to him that it might be the interest of a sum of money 
 which he had placed in the English funds, and from whence 
 he derives his only subsistence, the whole of his immense 
 property having been confiscated in this country. He en- 
 deavoured to explain this transaction, but it was still con- 
 sidered as suspicious, and availed him nothing. He was 
 obliged, therefore, to leave Paris yesterday, and is gone to 
 Bordeaux. The day before the Due de Choiseul left Paris he 
 had occasion to see M. Chaptal, the Minister of the Interior, 
 who, as soon as he learnt his name, avowed to him that he was 
 in possession of Chanteloup, the seat in Touraine of the late 
 Minister, and that he had bought it for six thousand pounds. 
 He enlarged much on the improvements he projected, adding 
 that if ever the Due de Choiseul should chance to come that 
 way he should be glad to show them to him. This will give 
 your Lordship some idea of the morality of those amongst 
 whom this M. Chaptal bears a fair and respectable character. 
 
 Paris, January 24, 1803. 
 There is every reason to believe that there is in the con- 
 templation of the First Consul a step relative to a change 
 in the government or in the political existence of Holland. 
 Such a rumour has reached me from different quarters, and 
 indeed seems to have excited very serious apprehensions in the 
 
 £ 
 
50 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 Batavian Mission liere. Your Lordship has been too long 
 prepared for such an event, by the conduct which this Govern- 
 ment has invariably pursued, to be much surprised should it 
 take place. I cannot, however, I confess, easily persuade 
 myself that anything serious is intended. The opposition 
 which was made to his measures in Switzerland by his 
 Majesty and the Emperor of Russia, the only sovereigns in 
 Europe who dare to assert their dignity, will, although not 
 sufficient to save that country, convince the First Consul 
 that a similar attempt upon Holland would be attended with 
 difficulties proportioned to the greater importance of the 
 object. And although I believe that he feels that the state 
 of tranquillity in which he has placed this country, contrary 
 perhaps to his inclination, is not that which is best calculated 
 to promote his own individual interest, yet I do not think 
 that he will by any violent act of aggression incur the risk of 
 uniting against him the two Powers, from whom he has 
 everything to fear, without any of those advantages to expect 
 which might serve to stimulate this country and reconcile 
 it by success to a renewal of hostilities. I am therefore 
 inclined to consider this report rather in the light of a demon- 
 stration with a view to induce us to abandon Malta and 
 Alexandria (the evacuation of the latter, which is not known 
 here, though anxiously expected), or as a means of forcing 
 the Dutch to purchase his forbearance by money. It is the 
 want of this which has nearly determined the First Consul 
 to give up the attempt to reduce St. Domingo to his obedi- 
 ence. I am assured that he has twice within this fortnight 
 resolved to leave it to its fate, and to send back Toussaint, 
 towards whom more lenient measures have been adopted. 
 The shame of being defeated in his purpose, although the 
 most dangerous — for he has to contend with the climate — has 
 got the better of every other consideration, and the greatest 
 exertions are accordingly continued for the speedy reinforce- 
 ment of General Rochambeau, who is appointed to succeed 
 General Leclerc. Such is the want of money, or of good 
 faith, or of both, that the bills of exchange drawn by 
 Leclerc for the common necessaries of the expedition are 
 
MR. EDGEWOETH. 61 
 
 protested, and several individuals have fallen victims to their 
 confidence in Government. What, however, is more astonish- 
 ing is that others are found v^ho, not deterred by their 
 example, present themselves with a moral certainty of expe- 
 riencing the same fate. At the moment Count Marcoff was 
 induced to believe that he should gain his point in regard to 
 obtaining the Island of Elba for his Sardinian Majesty, he 
 saw by the ' Moniteur ' that it was considered as a department 
 of the Eepublic, and an administration prepared for it by 
 this indefatigable legislator. He feels much mortified, and 
 is persuaded that his Court will be highly offended. I am 
 sorry to have to announce an act of rigour on the part of the 
 First Consul against the person of one of his Majesty's sub- 
 jects. A Mr. Edgeworth, who had been resident at Paris about 
 four months, and whose pursuits have been entirely literary, 
 received the day before yesterday an order from the police to 
 quit Paris in twenty-four hours, and the French territory in 
 a fortnight. He came immediately to me, and, in consequence 
 of his declaring himself unconscious of any offence against 
 this Government, I wrote to M. Talleyrand desiring to know 
 the motive of this rigour. In the meantime Mr. Edgeworth 
 discovered that the crime of which he was accused was that 
 of being brother to the Abbe Edgeworth, that respectable 
 ecclesiastic who attended Louis XVI. in his last moments. 
 He complied vsrith the order and retired to Passy, just with- 
 out the Barriere, leaving his family here. From thence he 
 remonstrated against the injustice he has suffered, declaring 
 that he is not the brother of the Abbe Edgeworth, whom he 
 never saw in all his life, and only a distant relation. He was 
 then required to give a petition to the First Consul stating 
 this fact, which he has declined doing, but is ready to sign a 
 declaration to the same effect; and this, I have no doubt, 
 vnll be sufiicient to procure his return, since they must be 
 ashamed of so unprovoked an act of violence. I am assured 
 that an arrete will shortly appear, by which it is enacted 
 that no emigrant can possess within the French Republic 
 more than 100,000 livres, whether it be in land or money. 
 The residue of their claims in any property, notwithstanding 
 
52 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 the sequestration may have been taken off, is to be considered 
 as national property. Count Cobenzl has received the rati- 
 fication of the Convention of December 26. The First 
 Consul with his family removed to-day from St. Cloud to the 
 Tuileries. 
 
 Paris, January 27, 1803. 
 
 I have to report to your Lordship the purport of a con- 
 versation I had on Tuesday last by appointment with M. 
 Talleyrand. He had invited me some days ago for this 
 purpose, but a bad cold had prevented my meeting him till 
 that day. The communication he had to make to me related 
 to two points, both equally important, as he said, to the 
 maintenance of good harmony between the two Governments ; 
 with this difference, however, that the one originated with 
 himself and was dictated by his anxiety to do away with 
 everything which might feed the mutual irritation of the 
 two countries, and the other by the express order of the 
 First Consul. That which came from himself related to the 
 English newspapers, against which he pronounced the most 
 bitter philippic, assuring me that the First Consul was ex- 
 tremely hurt to find that his endeavours to conciliate had 
 hitherto produced no other effect than to increase the abuse 
 with which the papers of both sides of the question in Eng- 
 land continually loaded him. He expatiated much upon this 
 topic, and endeavoured to establish a fact, which I assured 
 him a reference to any one of the newspapers in Paris would 
 instantly refute, that during four months not a word of pro- 
 vocation had appeared in any French journal which could 
 justify a retort from those published in England. For the 
 rest he advanced nothing but what has been said on more 
 than one occasion to Mr. Merry, and reported by him to your 
 Lordship. I was, however, given to understand that the First 
 Consul was in fact highly incensed, and the more so, he was 
 pleased to say, as it came from a country of whose good 
 opinion he was so very ambitious. In my reply I could but 
 go over the old ground, and endeavoured to make M. Talley- 
 
THE ENGLISH PRESS. 63 
 
 rand understand, first, that whatever was said in the English 
 papers might be considered as a natural retaliation for what 
 was published in the French papers ; secondly, that what 
 was q^aa% published here was by no means so in England; 
 and, thirdly, that although the Government possessed a 
 control over the press in France, the English Government 
 neither had, nor could have, unless they purchased it at the 
 same price, any whatever in England. Upon this he en- 
 deavoured to prove to me that there were papers in England 
 attached to diiferent parties, and went over their names and 
 supposed connections with great precision, and that con- 
 sequently his Majesty's Ministers might so far control those 
 at least which depended upon them as to prevent their 
 inserting that abuse which must be considered as having 
 their sanction. I endeavoured to explain to him what the 
 influence was which he supposed Ministers to possess in 
 England ; that it amounted to nothing more than a preference 
 which your Lordship, for instance, might give to one paper 
 rather than to another, by sending to it any articles of news 
 which it might be wished to make public ; but that your 
 Lordship's influence went no further, and that if the editor 
 of such paper conceived it more for his interest to continue 
 to write after his own fancy and uncontrolled than to be the 
 publisher of such occasional articles, in that case all influence 
 was at an end. I told him that if he had remarked any abusive 
 article in any paper of such a description it was natural and 
 fair to conclude that it did not depend upon Government to 
 prevent it. He persisted in his opinion that his Majesty's 
 Ministers might keep certain papers in order, as I did in 
 assuring him that until the First Consul could so far master 
 his feelings as to be as indifferent to the scurrility of the 
 English prints as the English Government was to that which 
 daily appeared in the French, this state of irritation was 
 irremediable. I told him, however, that I would report the 
 substance of this communication to your Lordship, although 
 I could assure him that your Lordship could add nothing to 
 the explanation which had been given, and in such detail, by 
 Mr. Merry from your Lordship. The second point related to 
 
54 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 Malta, and M. Talleyrand, with great solemnity, required of 
 me to inform him, and this by the express order of the First 
 Consul, what were his Majesty's intentions with regard to 
 the evacuation of that island. He again on this occasion 
 made great professions of his sincere desire to set aside 
 everything which could interrupt the good understanding 
 between the two Governments ; adding that it was absolutely 
 necessary that the French Government should know what 
 it was meant to do when the clause in the Treaty of Amiens 
 which stipulates the cession of Malta should be fully ac- 
 complished. He said that another Grand Master would 
 now ver}^ soon be elected ; that all the Powers of Europe in- 
 vited so to do, with the exception of Eussia, whose difficulties 
 it was easy to remove, and without whom the guarantee 
 would be equally complete (as indeed I fear it would be), were 
 ready to come forward ; and that consequently the term would 
 very soon arrive when Great Britain could have no pretext 
 for keeping long possession. In answer to M. Talleyrand I 
 professed to be without instructions ; that therefore I could 
 not say what were his Majesty's intentions or what his 
 Majesty's opinion might be of the changes which had taken 
 place in the relative state of Europe since the conclusion of 
 the Treaty of Amiens ; but that I would report to your Lord- 
 ship, and would have the honour of communicating to him 
 your Lordship's answer as soon as I should receive it. Such 
 was the nature of M. Talleyrand's communication, and I 
 must do him the justice to acknowledge that there was 
 nothing in his manner which could give the smallest offence. 
 
 Paris, January 27, 1803. 
 
 Colonel Sebastiani returned unexpectedly two days ago, 
 and came from Genoa with a degree of expedition which 
 might give reason to believe that his business was very 
 urgent. He confirms the account of the total defeat of the 
 Turks in Egypt, which he represents as so complete as to 
 
ITALY AND HOLLAND THIBUTARY. Ob 
 
 give the whole country to the Mamelukes, without any hope 
 on the part of the Turks of recovering their influence. 
 Under such circumstances the First Consul will not fail to 
 renew his offers of assistance to the Porte, and under colour 
 of such a concert endeavour to regain a footing in Egypt. 
 There can, I think, be no doubt that the policy of the First 
 Consul leans strongly this way, and it certainly will be in- 
 cumbent upon us to watch his motions with the utmost at- 
 tention. I cannot suppose that the appearance at Genoa of 
 the four sail of the line and two frigates which sailed some 
 time since from Brest, and were supposed to have gone 
 round to Toulon to take in troops for St. Domingo, can be 
 connected with the views of this Government on Egypt. It 
 is, however, worthy of observation that at the same mo- 
 ment great complaints are made of the conduct of the Dey of 
 Algiers, and vengeance denounced against him for a pre- 
 tended insult offered to the French commercial agent. At 
 all events, we have, and I trust shall continue to have, in the 
 Mediterranean wherewithal to observe the motions, and to 
 counteract them if necessary. The French army stationed 
 in the Italian Eepublic has hitherto been maintained by 
 that Government at the monthly expense of nearly two 
 millions of livres. The President has now ordered that that 
 sum shall henceforward be paid into the Treasury at Paris, 
 but the charge of maintaining the army will in all proba- 
 bility, although the contrary is pretended, rest with the 
 Italian Republic. The same measure may soon be expected 
 in Holland, so that these States, and all those under similar 
 circumstances, will now become strictly tributary, and in the 
 aggregate will make a considerable increase in the revenue 
 of this country. 
 
 P.S. — M. de Lima's successor, the Chevalier de Souza- 
 Coutinho, proposes setting out on his way to England on 
 Monday next. He has desired me to inform your Lordship 
 that he has delated his journey so long in the hope of seeing 
 a favourable issue to the misunderstanding between the First 
 Consul and the Court of Lisbon. All hope of a friendly com- 
 promise is now at an end. The Court of Lisbon has abso- 
 
56 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 lately refused to discbarge the Chevalier d' Almeida, and the 
 First Consul has determined to send General Lannes back to 
 Lisbon to resume his diplomatic functions. 
 
 Paris, January 31, 1803. 
 
 There is every reason to believe that the project which we 
 have long attributed to the First Consul, of attacking the 
 Barbary States, with the double view of seizing their treasures 
 and of facilitating his views upon Egypt, is now near its execu- 
 tion. A pretext for a quarrel with the Dey of Algiers has been 
 found in the importunity with which his agent here demanded 
 the accomplishment of that clause in the treaty lately con- 
 cluded which stipulated the immediate discharge of the debt 
 due by the French Government to the Dey and to different 
 individuals. This demand was reduced to four million 
 piastres, and was due in part for naval stores furnished by 
 Algerine merchants, and in part for the usual presents, which 
 it was then agreed should be continued. The Dey has 
 strictly complied with all the terms of this treaty, but when 
 he required reciprocity on the part of the Government he 
 was given to understand that he must be content with 
 receiving 25 per cent, in paper, which when negotiated would 
 produce about 10 per cent. ; and that even for that he must 
 wait the conveniency of the First Consul. After much 
 altercation the agent has positively refused such a com- 
 promise, and when he demanded a passport to return it 
 was refused him. Under these circumstances the Charge 
 d'Affaires of the Porte has called upon me requesting that 
 I would report to your Lordship the above facts, and at the 
 same time to assure your Lordship that, according to the 
 latest intelligence he has received from the Porte, the Turkish 
 Government is determined to support its vassals, and to 
 oppose by every means in its power every step which tends 
 to the re-occupation of Egypt by the First Consul, whether it 
 be under the character of friend or foe. I assured him that 
 I would lose no time in representing to your Lordship the 
 
OF TH 
 
 UNIVER:. 
 
 n ^^ 
 COLONEL SEBASTIANI. ' " 57 
 
 purport of his communication, adding that I had no instruc- 
 tions upon the subject, but that, as far as my own private 
 opinion went, I could not doubt that the same motives of 
 friendship towards the Porte, to which might also be added 
 those of self-security, would operate with equal effect, on any 
 future occasion, upon his Majesty's councils, and call forth 
 those good offices which such important interests might 
 justly demand. In addition to this intelligence from the 
 Turkish Charge d' Affaires, I have the authority of the Danish 
 and Swedish Ministers, to both of whom M. Talleyrand 
 has given it to be understood that the First Consul was 
 determined to crush the Dey of Algiers, and required the 
 assistance of their Courts for that purpose. The Banish 
 Minister, as he told me himself, expressed in warm terms the 
 obligations his Court would feel for such a benefit ; but the 
 Swede was more reserved. I endeavoured to convince them 
 of the little cause they had to be thankful, since their interests 
 entered but very little indeed into the calculations of the 
 First Consul. We may, however, soon expect to hear this pro- 
 ject announced to the several Courts of Europe, dressed up 
 in all the tinsel of French philanthropy and French public 
 spirit. An appeal will in all probability be made to Great 
 Britain, and his Majesty be invited to lend his aid, or at 
 least to give his sanction, to such measures as, under the cloak 
 of the most generous feelings, are directed against his dearest 
 interests. In case your Lordship should not have received 
 the 'Moniteur' of yesterday, I enclose it. Your Lordship 
 will there see such a detail of the expedition of Colonel 
 Sebastiani as evidently proves the projects of the First Consul. 
 His observations on an English general officer of the highest 
 merit are highly indecent in an official paper, and would be 
 much more disgusting were not abuse from such a quarter 
 rather flattering than offensive. Count Cobenzl has not yet 
 dared to communicate to me a copy of the Convention of 
 December 26, and it is from Vienna that I now receive 
 it. The accomplishment is still subject to much litigation. 
 The point now in dispute relates to a small strip of territory 
 lying immediately contiguous to the suburbs of Passau, and 
 
58 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 wMch Count Cobenzl consented to cede, although he wished 
 it might not be inserted in the treaty. He now hesitates to 
 fulfil this agreement, but must give way. This is indeed but 
 too much the case on every occasion. I have no doubt that 
 such language as Mr. Paget mentions in his despatch, which 
 accompanies this, has on many occasions been held to Count 
 Cobenzl. The treatment he experiences is humiliating in the 
 extreme, and nothing would be able to reconcile the most 
 indifferent observer, were it not that his own conduct is so 
 marked by meanness as to entitle him to no respect whatso- 
 ever. As a proof of that in which his own Court is held, 
 I have frequently heard it calculated by generals who are 
 supposed to be in the confidence of the First Consul that the 
 total destruction of the House of Austria would be the busi- 
 ness of one very short campaign ; and I am almost afraid to 
 think that their calculation is just. I mentioned in my 
 last despatch that General Lannes was shortly to return to 
 Lisbon; this is now announced in the official prints, accom- 
 panied by a public acknowledgment from the First Consul 
 of his eminent services there, and recommending to him on 
 his return to his post to continue to protect the French trade, 
 as he had already begun to do in the first year of his mission. 
 Such a justification of the most un gentlemanly conduct on 
 the part of General Lannes requires no comment. Since 
 writing this despatch I have deciphered Lord Elgin's des- 
 patches. Had I seen them before the conversation with M. 
 Talleyrand which made the subject of my last despatch, I 
 doubt whether I should not have been tempted to assert that, 
 after such an unequivocal avowal on the part of France of 
 its intention to interfere in the affairs of Egypt, his Majesty 
 would not be justified in evacuating Malta. By a late arrete 
 of this Government a diminution of two-thirds of the former 
 duty is allowed on the importation of sal-ammoniac from 
 Egypt. 
 
ST. DOMINGO. 59 
 
 Paris, February 3, 1803. 
 I cannot think it an unfavourable symptom for the repose 
 of Europe when the capital affords nothing sufficiently in- 
 teresting to justify my giving your Lordship much trouble. 
 My despatch, therefore, by this message will be short. We 
 have many reports respecting the forlorn situation of the 
 remains of the French army in St. Domingo, as well as of a 
 resolution on the part of the First Consul to abandon the 
 undertaking altogether. This is so contrary to the known 
 character of the man,, and so subversive of his hopes of re- 
 generating his navy, which he well knows can be done only 
 by means of his colonies, that I cannot bring myself to 
 believe that he hesitates about it. It is, however, certain 
 that the service is so unpopular as to have rendered the re- 
 inforcing that army not only a matter of difficulty but of 
 danger, and it becomes extremely interesting to see how far 
 the First Consul, who has hitherto carried all before him, 
 will now submit to control, and from such a quarter. If, 
 however, the project is abandoned, it must be imputed to this 
 cause, notwithstanding the different motives which may be 
 assigned. It would be difficult to account for Count Marcoff's 
 continuing to flatter himself that he shall still be able to 
 procure Piombino, and even the Island of Elba, for the King 
 of Sardinia, in addition to the part of the Siennese and the 
 Presidi of Tuscany which is offered him ; but he assures me 
 that the case is not hopeless. Certainly the refusal of his 
 Sardinian Majesty to accede to any formal act of renuncia- 
 tion of his original possessions, or to admit on any terms 
 the word compensation, will not facilitate the negotiation. 
 Such, however, M. Marcoff tells me, is the case. I yesterday 
 had an opportunity of seeing Colonel Sebastiani at M. 
 Talleyrand's at dinner; when, without any observation on 
 my part which could lead to such a conduct, he recanted 
 everything he had said in his report disrespectful to General 
 Stuart, and mentioned him in terms of great esteem. 
 
60 PEBEUAEY 1803. 
 
 Paris, February 7, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's separate despatch of January 28, enclosing a 
 letter and its enclosures from Mr. King to Mr. Hammond. 
 The change in the conduct of the American Minister towards 
 me is too obvious not to be remarked, and tends, perhaps, to 
 confirm your Lordship's observation of the natural under- 
 standing and concert between all those countries exposed to 
 the policy of France, which the conduct of that Government 
 cannot fail to produce. Whatever may be the cause, I have 
 certainly of late found Mr. Livingstone more than usually 
 cordial, and although not very confidential yet professing 
 that his instructions strictly enjoined him to be so. Should 
 this be really the effect of a system, your Lordship will have 
 perceived symptoms of it from other quarters. It is, how- 
 ever, natural to suppose that the American policy, like that 
 of every other country not immediately under the rod of 
 France, will be to play off such an appearance of cordiality 
 and concert with Great Britain, as a demonstration against 
 the Government, and for the attainment of any particular 
 object. Mr. Livingstone is inclined to think that the acqui- 
 sition of the Floridas will not be attempted at this moment ; 
 but I think it not unreasonable to suppose that, should the 
 difficulties of subduing St. Domingo be such as to induce the 
 First Consul to renounce the enterprise, he will turn all the 
 means which were destined for that object to the accomplish- 
 ment of his views on Louisiana and the Floridas, as affording 
 some compensation to his vanity, and a means, although 
 remote, of annoying the British colonies and trade. What- 
 ever may be the resolution of the First Consul, we may be 
 sure that his views on Egypt will not be abandoned. All his 
 feelings are engaged in the object ; and although the subject 
 is avoided, M. Talleyrand having never touched upon it since 
 the conversation which I reported to your Lordship in my 
 despatch No. 8, yet I have every reason to be convinced that 
 it is uppermost in the First Consul's thoughts. In a very 
 short time we must expect to be summoned again to evacuate 
 
RETENTION OP MALTA. 61 
 
 Malta. The nomination of a Grand Master is expected 
 daily. I cannot take upon myself to premise what may be 
 his Majesty's determination, but I do not hesitate to declare 
 to your Lordship my perfect conviction that from the moment 
 that Malta is under the influence of France — which it must 
 be from the moment that his Majesty's troops are withdrawn — 
 we can no longer depend on the preservation of peace on any 
 terms with this country, supposing that the occupation of 
 Egypt by France is to be resisted. As long as the two im- 
 portant points of Malta and Alexandria are ours, their views 
 on Egypt must be suspended ; but our retreat will be the sig- 
 nal for their advancing. These reflections and many others 
 will have occurred to your Lordship, and they will certainly 
 go far to justify an assertion, however paradoxical it may 
 appear, that the continuance of peace does not depend upon 
 our fulfilling, under the present circumstances, the Treaty of 
 Amiens, but on keeping in our hands those possessions, the 
 immediate reoccupation of which by the French would force 
 us into a war under every disadvantage, and for the doing of 
 which we have such sufficient justification in the conduct of 
 the First Consul from the moment of the treaty to this very 
 day. It is said that a considerable body of troops in Corsica 
 — as many as eight thousand — is preparing for embarkation. 
 The French ships which sailed some time ago from Brest 
 are still at Genoa, as well as those under the command of 
 Admiral de Winter. It is possible this force may be destined, 
 as was originally given out, either for St. Domingo or the 
 continent of America ; it is also possible that it may be 
 employed in the Mediterranean. Such is the impetuosity of 
 the First Consul, and his impatience of control, that we should 
 be prepared to meet the most daring attempt. 
 
 Paris, February 7, 1803. 
 
 Since writing the preceding despatch I have had a con- 
 versation by appointment with M. Talleyrand, in which it 
 was evidently his object to endeavour to do away every 
 
62 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 suspicion to wliich. tlie publication of Colonel Sebastiani's 
 report might have given rise. He assured me that the 
 object of that officer's mission was solely commercial and 
 for the purpose of ascertaining how far it might be practi- 
 cable to resume the former habits of trade between France 
 and the countries which he had visited; that it was true 
 he had been instructed to ascertain the fact of the British 
 army remaining in Alexandria, and, if there, to inquire with 
 what intention and for what length of time ; that if he had 
 gone beyond the line of his instructions and had entered 
 into any military detail or speculation, it must be imputed 
 solely to the zeal and ardour of a young officer, too hastily 
 presuming that from the circumstance of so important a 
 clause in the Treaty of Amiens being so long unaccomplished 
 the British Government looked to a renewal of hostilities. 
 He then read to me a letter which he had, by the express 
 orders of the First Consul, written to General Andreossy 
 (which letter was sent last night by a messenger), enjoining 
 that ambassador, and in rather peremptory language, to 
 demand on what motives his Majesty's troops continued in 
 Egypt, and when they, as well as the garrison of Malta, 
 would be withdrawn in compliance with the tenth article of 
 the Treaty of Amiens. As the communication was made to 
 me in order that I might be convinced of the justice of the 
 demand, I thought myself at liberty to enter into some kind 
 of explanation on the subject, and I will confess to your 
 Lordship that I was not sorry to have an opportunity, pro- 
 fessedly without instructions from your Lordship, of prepar- 
 ing this Government for those difficulties in the accomplish- 
 ment of their wishes which, I hope and trust, they will yet 
 experience. I expressed myself, therefore, extremely glad 
 to learn from M. Talleyrand the real motives of Colonel 
 Sebastiani's mission, and the more so as I conceived it to be 
 of the very utmost importance that every cause of jealousy 
 or of suspicion on so interesting an object should be removed. 
 I took upon myself to assure him that could the stipulation 
 in the Treaty of Amiens which related to Malta have been 
 carried into effect in any reasonable time after its conclusion. 
 
AFFAIRS OF EGYPT. 68 
 
 that island would in course have been evacuated by the 
 British troops ; that his Majesty had been induced to keep 
 possession of it, at a very considerable expense, because that 
 clause had not been fulfilled ; but I could not undertake to 
 say that no other motive had since occurred. Various had 
 been the reports respecting the viev^s of the First Consul. 
 Many of them must have reached his Majesty's Ministers, 
 and they v^ould all be now^ in a great measure confirmed by 
 the plain and candid avowal of the agent deputed by the 
 First Consul ostensibly with a view to prepare the way for 
 the reoccupation of Egypt. This publication of intentions 
 so hostile to the interests of Great Britain would naturally 
 have an effect on the public in England, as well as on his 
 Majesty's Ministers. I represented, therefore, to him how 
 highly important it was that such causes of suspicion should 
 be entirely done away, lest the object of the present recla- 
 mation might be still subject to further delay and difficulty. 
 He immediately felt the drift of my argument and inter- 
 rupted me, denying any the smallest intention of the First 
 Consul's again interfering in the affairs of Egypt ; that he 
 was heartily tired of Egypt ; that he positively had no other 
 views than those which he had already told me, and which 
 were purely commercial. And he even went so far as to give 
 me his word of honour that we might implicitly depend upon 
 this assertion of the First Consul. Your Lordship may be 
 assured that I felt the full weight of such an assurance, but 
 I desired him nevertheless to consider how necessary it was 
 that every suspicion should be removed in order that there 
 should remain no pretence for still further delay, and I 
 gave him fairly to understand that until perfect confidence 
 was restored the First Consul must be prepared for every 
 measure of precaution on the part of his Majesty's Govern- 
 ment which an object so nearly connected with the dearest 
 interests of Great Britain must demand. M. Talleyrand 
 had, I suppose, nothing more convincing to offer than what 
 he had already advanced on the strength of his own veracity. 
 I maintained the same language, and thus I think I have 
 prepared him to receive without any degree of surprise 
 
64 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 whatever may be his Majesty's resolution on this important 
 point. Such, therefore, is the ground on which we now 
 stand ; and I trust your Lordship will think with me that, 
 every circumstance considered, it is not unfavourable. The 
 First Consul will now be prepared, if M. Talleyrand makes 
 a faithful report, to consider as an object of negotiation that 
 which the natural ardour of his imagination, and his im- 
 patience perhaps to accomplish his ends, had brought him 
 to believe was already within his grasp. This conversation, 
 although touching upon points of great irritation, was 
 carried on without any appearance of ill-humour, and con- 
 cluded with great cordiality by my engaging him to dine 
 with me two days after. The enclosed paper, containing a 
 report of some pretended design on some individual here, 
 was at the same time given to me by M. Talleyrand. I must 
 do him the justice to say that he did it with reluctance, and 
 apologised for troubling me with such a business. I told 
 him that if the First Consul gave himself the trouble to 
 attend to such idle stories I could not do less than take upon 
 myself that of transmitting them to your Lordship. I should 
 think, however, that the matter requires no further notice, 
 unless your Lordship should think proper to mention it to 
 General Andreossy. 
 
 Croyez-vous qu'on s'occupe encore d'un projet d'enterre- 
 ment semblable a celui de Clement de Ris? que cet enterre- 
 ment doit tomber, si Ton pent, sur un fonctionnaire superieur? 
 que, pour se mettre a I'abri des poursuites de la police, on 
 transportera le prisonnier en lieu sur'? qu'alors on redemandera 
 la liberte de Bourmont et des autres chefs de Chouans, qu'on 
 dit arretes par une violation manifesto des traites faits avec 
 eux, et qu'on ne rendra qu'apres leur delivrance I'otage qui 
 aurait ete enterre ? Ce complot a ete trame chez Georges, qui 
 reside a cinq milles de Londres, afin d'etre moins observe, et 
 chez qui se tiennent souvent des conciliabules nombreux. 
 Celui qui a, dit-on, donne cette idee, et a qui les principaux 
 moyens d'execution seront confies, est un aventurier qui se 
 fait appeler Marquis de la Chapelle, et qui demeure pr^s de 
 
VENDEAN PLOT. 65 
 
 Portman Square, Les auteurs du complot ont dans I'ile de 
 Jersey quelques points ou ils croeint pouvoir descendre en 
 snrete et caclier leur prisonnier sans que le gouvernement de 
 rile en soit instruit, ni que la police de Paris puisse en avoiv 
 la moindre connaissance. On assure que c'est la le lieu sur ox> 
 ils retiendraient I'otage qu'ils se preparent a enterrer. On 
 avait cru jusqu'a present qu'il n'y avait qu'un comite distn- 
 buteur des secours aux malheureux emigres : il y en a un 
 second, absolument distinct et^ n'ayant aucune communica- 
 tion avec le premier, pour les Yendeens. Georges est le chef 
 supreme de celui-ci, accordant des pensions a qui il lui plait 
 et les fixant a sa volonte. La Chapelle re9oit deux guinees 
 par jour, independamment de huit spellings pour sa femme et 
 de fcrois pour ses enf nnts. Le sejour des Princes a Edimbourg 
 fait I'orgueil de la noblesse. Tous s'interessent a leur sort, 
 et il n'y a personne qui ne declame contre le Gouvernement 
 fran9ais. On voit cependant de mauvais oeil que le Prince 
 n'appelle pas aupres de lui son epouse, et qu'il a loge sa 
 maitresse dans une petite maison isolee qui n'est qu'a dix 
 pas de son palais. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, February 9, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's despatches to No. 10 inclusive have 
 been received and laid before the King. In answer to your 
 Excellency's despatch No. — , relative to the inquiry made 
 of you by the French Government on the subject of Malta, I 
 can have no difficulty in assuring you that his Majesty has 
 entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens 
 might be executed in a full and complete manner ; but it 
 has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having 
 been founded on principles different from those which have 
 been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or 
 convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference 
 to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and 
 of the treaties or public engagements by which they were 
 
 F 
 
66 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 bound at the time of its conclusion ; and that if that state 
 of possession and of engagements was so materially altered 
 by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of 
 the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to 
 the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtain- 
 ing satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference 
 which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative 
 situation; that if there ever was a case to which this prin- 
 ciple might be applied with peculiar propriety it was that of 
 the late Treaty of Peace, for the negotiation was conducted 
 on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially 
 agreed to in an official note by the French Government, viz. 
 that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his con- 
 quests for the important acquisitions of territory made by 
 France upon the Continent. This is a sufficient proof that the 
 compact was understood to have been concluded with re- 
 ference to the then existing state of things ; for the measure 
 of his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with 
 reference to the acquisitions of France at that time ; and if 
 the interference of the French Government in the general 
 affairs of Europe since that period ; if their interposition with 
 respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was 
 guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the 
 Treaty of Peace ; if the annexations which have been made 
 to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, 
 have extended the territory and increased the power of the 
 French Government, his Majesty would be warranted, con- 
 sistently with the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, in claiming 
 equivalents for these acquisitions, as some counterpoise to 
 the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, 
 however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, 
 and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe 
 as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waived 
 the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this 
 nature; and as the other articles of the Definitive Treaty 
 have been in a course of execution, which, according to. its 
 terms, has been rendered impracticable by circumstances 
 which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul, a com- 
 
67 
 
 munication to your Lordship had accordingly been prepared 
 conformably to this disposition when the attention of his 
 Majesty's Government was attracted by the very extraordinary 
 publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First 
 Consul. It is impossible for his Majesty to view this report 
 in any other light than an official publication ; for, without 
 referring particularly to explanations which have been re- 
 peatedly given upon the subject of publications in the 
 ' Moniteur,' the publication in question, as it purports to be 
 the report to the First Consul of an accredited agent, as it 
 appears to have been signed by Colonel Sebastiani himself, 
 and as it is published in the official paper, with an official 
 title affixed to it, must be considered as authorised by the 
 French Government. This report contains the most unjusti- 
 fiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's Govern- 
 ment, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, 
 and against the British army in the quarter — insinuations 
 and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as 
 would warrant his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction 
 which, on occasions of this nature, independent Powers 
 in a state of amity have a right to expect from each other ; 
 that it discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree 
 injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions and 
 directly repugnant to and utterly inconsistent with the spirit 
 and letter of the Treaty of Peace concluded between his 
 Majesty and the French Government; and that his Majesty 
 would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the 
 hoEOur of his crown and to the interests of his dominions if 
 he could see with indifference such a system developed and 
 avowed. His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the conduct 
 of the French Government on various occasions since the 
 conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, the insinuations and 
 charges contained in the report of Colonel Sebastiani, and 
 the views which the report discloses, without feeling it 
 necessary for him distinctly to declare that it will be im- 
 possible for him to enter into any further discussion relative 
 to Malta unless he receives a satisfactory explanation on the 
 subject of this communication. Your Excellency is desired 
 
 F 2 
 
68 FEBEUAET 1803. 
 
 to take an early opportunity of fully explaining his Majesty's 
 sentiments as above stated to the French Government ; but 
 you will refrain from making any written communication on 
 the subject without further orders from his Majesty. 
 
 Lord Whit worth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, February 11, 1803. 
 
 I did not mean to have troubled your Lordship at all by 
 this messenger, and 1 do so now merely to communicate to 
 your Lordship the copy of a letter which I received late last 
 night from M. de Talleyrand, with the answer which I wrote 
 to him. I beg leave to refer your Lordship to the 'Morning 
 Post' of February 1 for the article which has given such dis- 
 gust. And it must be confessed that the editor has upon 
 this occasion left his colleagues far behind him. It certainly 
 would contribute not only to silence the abuse which daily 
 appears in the French prints, but also essentially to allay the 
 extreme irritation in the First Consul, could some satisfac- 
 tion be given on this occasion. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, le 11 Fevrier 1803. 
 
 Monsieur, — Je re9ois com me une marque de votre con- 
 fiance la communication que vous venez de me faire, et je 
 vous prie de croire que je suis aussi degoute de la lecture 
 que vous m'avez proposee, que vous avez pu I'etre vous-meme. 
 Ce n'est plus la liberte mais I'anarchie de la presse qui 
 tolere de pareilles indecences, et je desire de toute mon ame 
 qu'il existe dans le Gouvernement le pouvoir d'en punir 
 I'auteur. Si son jugement etait soumis a un jure qui pensat 
 com me moi, il sentirait toute la rigueur de la loi, et il me 
 
CORRESPONDENCE WITH TALLEYRAND. 69 
 
 semble veritablement que celui dent il est question dans ce 
 moment s'j est expose. Au reste je ne manquerai pas d'en 
 faire un rapport fidele a ma cour, et je reitere mes voeux 
 ponr qu'il soit aussi facile au Gouvernement anglois de 
 reprimer de pareils abus qu'il le seroit au Gouvernement 
 fran9ois. Je me permettrai m^me d'ajouter que les occasions 
 d'exercer ce pouvoir de la part du dernier ne se presentent 
 que trop frequemment, a mon tres grand regret. Je saisis 
 cette occasion pour renouveler'a Votre Excellence Passurance 
 de ma haute consideration. 
 
 (Signed) Whitworth. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, le 22 Pluviose (February 11), 1803. 
 
 Mj Lord, — Dans la conversation que j'eus Fhonneur 
 d'avoir avec vous il y a quelques jours, et dans laquelle je 
 trouvai vos sentimens si bien d'accord avec les miens sur les 
 rapports de nos deux pays, je m'engageai avec plaisir a vous 
 communiquer immediatement tout sujet de plainte que mon 
 Gouvernement pourroit avoir contre le votre, persuade que 
 vous seriez empresse d'en prevenir les effets. Je vous adresse 
 done aujourd'hui un numero du ' Morning Post' dont je vous 
 invite a supporter la degoutante lecture. Je m'abstiens de 
 toute reflexion et je laisse a votre excellent esprit le soin de 
 juger s'il est possible qu'en Europe, en France, on s'imagine 
 que le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas le moyen d'em- 
 pecber ou de punir de pareilles borreurs, et si leur publica- 
 tion toleree ne doit pas nuire essentielleraent aux relations 
 des deux Etats. 
 
 Agreez, My Lord, I'assurance de ma haute consideration. 
 
 (Signej M. Talleyrand. 
 
70 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, February 14, 1803. 
 
 T hiive the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's despatch of January 9, with its several enclosures, 
 by Basilico. He arrived here the night before last at eleven 
 o'clock, and I forwarded him the next day at twelve. I beg 
 leave to assure your Lordship that I shall have very parti- 
 cular pleasure in executing the instructions with which I 
 am furnished by this occasion. Your Lordship will perceive 
 by my despatch No. 12 that I had in some degree anticipated 
 them by preparing this Government for such a determina- 
 tion, and I flatter myself the communication I have now to 
 make will be received without any extraordinary surprise or 
 marks of displeasure. I am particularly gratified with the 
 intelligence your Lordship gives me from Petersburg, as it 
 justifies the opinion 1 have ever entertained. I should have 
 been cruelly disappointed if the Emperor had thrown him- 
 self so decidedly into the arms of France as some had 
 imagined. A system of observation on the part of Great 
 Britain and Russia will, I should hope, be sufficient to check 
 the ambitious career of the First Consul ; and such a system, 
 I am happy to see, is now almost brought to bear. The 
 arrival of a Russian officer, an aide-de-camp of the Emperor, 
 has in the meantime excited great curiosity am(mgst my 
 colleagues, as well as mine. He came about ten days ago, 
 and was kept very close till he had been presented to the 
 First Consul ; he had a private audience three days after his 
 arrival, and delivered a letter from the Emperor his master. 
 He appeared on the last public day at the Tuileries, and 
 although he had never been presented in public he was 
 invited to the dinner, contrary to the established etiquette. 
 I have not, however, been able to learn with any degree of 
 certainty whether he has been charged with any important 
 mission. Count Marcoff" assures me not, and seems to laugh 
 at the alarm which is excited amongst the politicians. He 
 
INTRIGUES WITH RUSSIA. 71 
 
 tells me that the letter from the Emperor was merely com- 
 plimentary, and that the distinction with which General 
 Hittorjff has been treated must be attributed solely to the 
 desire of the First Consul to gain the Emperor by every act 
 of attention and flattery. He says the object of this officer's 
 journey and stay here is to see a little into the discipline in 
 the army, and to collect anything worthy of imitation in the 
 interior economy of the Grovernment considered in a military 
 point of view. This may be true ; but my confidence in 
 Count MarcoflF is not blind, and I shall not give him entire 
 credit till the statement is confirmed from other quarters. 
 Some people here imagine that the partition of Turkey is 
 not decidedly opposed, and that the Emperor of Russia 
 begins to yield to the temptation. It is certain that when I 
 first mentioned the subject of General Hittorff's arrival to 
 Count Marcoff he immediately said : ' Je parie qu'on dlt 
 qu'il est de nouveau question du partage de la Turquie.' 
 This, then, was certainly uppermost in his mind, and the 
 point on which he was most anxious to satisfy me. He 
 appeared, however, at the same time so convinced of the 
 little advantage which Russia would reap from such a 
 measure, and of the danger to Russia as well as the rest of 
 Europe of lending a hand to the increase of the already so 
 enormous power of France, that one can scarcely believe 
 any man capable of acting so directly in contradiction to 
 such sentiments, founded as they are upon truth and good 
 policy. There is, however, a strange coincidence in the 
 movements we see in Italy and in the Mediterranean. The 
 rehdezvous of so many ships of war at Genoa ; the report 
 which was so industriously spread, and which now appears 
 at least doubtful, that they were to take in troops for St. 
 Domingo; the assembling of a large body of troops in 
 Corsica, evidently placed there not for the purpose of keeping 
 that country in subjection, but with some view to the Medi- 
 terranean; the journey of Louis Bonaparte which was to 
 have taken place about a month ago, and which now, without 
 any plausible reason, is deferred ; the supposed concert with 
 Russia, and the extreme and more than usual irritation of 
 
72 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 the First Consul against England : all these circumstances, 
 and many others which might be added, certainly do create 
 a belief that some great operation was intended to be carried 
 into effect at this time, and it has been prevented or delayed 
 by some unforeseen event, to the great disappointment and 
 mortification of the First Consul, fn my own opinion, the 
 event which has had so salutary an effect is no other than the 
 delay which has taken place in the evacuation of Alexandria 
 and Malta. It was calculated that by this time the Treaty 
 of Amiens would have been fulfilled in all points, and the 
 movements we see are the effects of this calculation. This, 
 if not founded — and no one wishes more than myself that 
 it may not be so — is at least fair ground for conjecture, and 
 such as must command every measure of vigilance and pre- 
 caution on our part. There are those who imagine that all 
 this preparation is destined against Algiers. But this is 
 perhaps doing the Dey too much honour ; at least, if such is 
 the intention of the First Consul, it must be considered as 
 the forerunner only of more important attempts. It appears 
 by recent accounts that the three French sail of the line at 
 Genoa under the command of Rear- Admiral Bidon have taken 
 on board two thousand men of the Polish de mi-brigade, and 
 have steered to the eastward. They were joined by another 
 French ship from Leghorn, likewise with troops on board. 
 It is said that they were destined for St. Domingo. Sir 
 Richard Bickerton will long ere this have been able to as- 
 certain the truth of this report. There is at this moment a 
 considerable movement of the troops in the Belgick. They 
 are drawing towards Havre and Dunkirk, where all the 
 transports which can be collected are appointed to assemble 
 and take them on board. Two thousand men from Brussels 
 are ordered to march to Lisle, where they are to receive 
 their further orders ; and volunteers from the different de- 
 partments are collecting in the same quarter. It is given 
 out — and I am not inclined to doubt it — that they are 
 destined for St. Domingo. But we are too well acquainted 
 with the character of this Government and the great object 
 of all its policy not to follow all their movements with 
 
INTEflVIEW WITH TALLEYRAND. 73 
 
 the most suspicious vigilance. There is nothing hostile 
 or perfidious that we may not expect if we lay ourselves 
 open to an attack. 
 
 Paris, February 17, 1803. 
 I have the honour to acquaint your Lordship that* I saw 
 M. Talleyrand on Tuesday last for the purpose of carrying 
 into effect your Lordship's instructions of the 9th instant. It 
 was my wish to give no extraordinary degree of solemnity to 
 the communication I had to make to him, but rather to have 
 it considered as a matter of course, and one on which we did 
 not expect to be much at issue with this Government. I did 
 not, therefore, write to him to desire a conference, but called 
 upon him in the morning, when I knew he would be at leisure. 
 I began by telling him that I had nothing new to communi- 
 cate to him, but merely to conjfirm officially that which I had 
 already from myself promised. I did not, however, pass over 
 with the same indifference the arguments with which your 
 Lordship has furnished me — I recapitulated them all : the 
 principle on which the Treaty of Amiens was founded, and 
 the right which naturally arose from that principle of inter- 
 ference on our part for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction 
 or compensation for any essential difficulties which may 
 have arisen in the relative situation of the two countries. I 
 instanced the cases, beginning with Italy and concluding 
 with Switzerland, in which the territory or influence of 
 France had been extended subsequent to the Treaty of 
 Amiens. I represented to him that this principle of com- 
 pensation had been fully and formally admitted by the 
 French Government in the course of the negotiation at 
 Amiens. I then told him that, notwithstanding the indisput- 
 able right which his Majesty might have derived of claiming 
 some counterpoise for such acquisitions, instructions were 
 actually preparing for me, by which I should have been 
 empowered to declare his Majesty's readiness to carry into 
 effect the full intent of the tenth article of the treaty, when 
 the attention of his Majesty's Government was roused by 
 
74 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 the official publication of Colonel Sebastiani's report to the 
 First Consul. It was useless to recapitulate the particulars 
 of this very extraordinary report, but T appealed to him 
 whether it was not of a nature, exclusive of the personal 
 allusions it contained, to excite the utmost jealousy in the 
 minds of his Majesty's Ministers and to demand on their 
 part every measure of precaution. I concluded with the 
 distinct declaration that it was impossible for his Majesty to 
 enter into any further discussion relative to Malta unless he 
 received satisfactory explanations on the subject of the First 
 Consul's views. M. de Talleyrai.d in his reply did not 
 attempt to dispute the drift of my argument. He admitted, 
 in an affected tone of candour, that the jealousy we felt on the 
 score of Egypt, with a view to our possession in India, was 
 natural. But he could not admit that anything had appeared 
 in the conduct of the French Government in justification of 
 the alarm we expressed. After repeating what he had said 
 to me in a former conversation on the subject of Sebastiani's 
 mission, which he asserted to be strictly commercial, he ex- 
 patiated at great length on the sincere desire of the First 
 Consul to maintain inviolable the peace which had been so 
 lately concluded; adding that the situation of the French 
 finances was such, that, were not this desire of peace in the 
 First Consul an effect of system, it would be most imperi- 
 ously dictated to him by the total impossibility in which this 
 country found itself of carrying on that extensive state of 
 warfare which even a partial rupture would naturally lead to. 
 This was the argument on which he laid the greatest stress ; 
 and so anxious was he to convince me, that he would, if that 
 had been possible, have exaggerated the reduced state of their 
 resources. He expressed great surprise, therefore, that any 
 suspicion should attach when the means of disturbing the 
 public tranquillity were, as must be well known in England, 
 so completely wanting, and desired to know what was the 
 nature and degree of satisfaction which his Majesty would 
 require. On this I told him that I had no instructions ; 
 that I could not pretend to say by what means those appre- 
 hensions which the conduct of this Government had raised 
 
KING DESIROUS OF PEACE. 75 
 
 in England were to be allayed ; but I could assure him that 
 in the discussion of them we should be animated solely by a 
 sincere desire to be convinced of the truth of his assertions, 
 since on that depended the peace and happiness of Europe. 
 I took this opportunity of assuring him that although, accord- 
 ing to his statement of the situation of France, we might 
 possess in a greater degree the means of supporting the 
 expense of a war, since those means arose from sources which 
 even a state of warfare did not dry up, yet such was his 
 Majesty's sincere desire of maintaining peace, that nothing 
 but absolute and unavoidable necessity would ever induce 
 him to deprive his subjects of the blessings which they begin 
 to enjoy. Such was the purport of my conference with M. 
 de Talleyrandj and I trust that I have succeeded at least in 
 enabling them without any extraordinary degree of irritation 
 to view only as an object of negotiation that which was con- 
 sidered as one of certainty ; and such a transition, in a mind 
 like that of the First Consul, and in pursuit of so favourite 
 an object, is not without its share of danger. It remains 
 now to be seen what is the kind of satisfaction which they 
 can give or we receive. On this point we may be as difficult 
 as we please, and we cannot be too much so. But at the 
 same time we negotiated with that in hand which will, I am 
 persuaded, more eflPectually insure the continuance of peace 
 than any concession whatsoever. I have had occasion to 
 converse with the Spanish Ambassador on the discussion 
 which has arisen with his Court on the subject of Honduras, 
 and he seems fully persuaded that the proposal of reverting 
 to the Convention of 1786 will be accepted without much 
 hesitation. He assures me that the difficulties which have 
 arisen have not been suggested by this Government. 
 
 Paris, February 17, 1803. 
 The termination of the German indemnifications is re- 
 tarded by the difficulty in finding for the Elector of Bavaria 
 an equivalent for the cession which he has been obliged to 
 
76 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 make of the Bishopric of Eichsta,dt to the House of Austria, 
 and likewise by the difficulty in finding a source from whence 
 to draw the three hundred and fifty thousand florins wanted 
 to complete the revenue of the Elector Archchancellor, who 
 estimated that the territories granted to him will not produce 
 above six hundred and fifty thousand florins annually instead 
 of a million which has been assigned to him ; and such is 
 the condescension towards him that there is a disposition to 
 admit this calculation, although it is well known that those 
 territories are fully equal to produce the sum required. In . 
 order to satisfy this demand, together with some claims, it 
 has been proposed to establish moderate tolls upon the navi- 
 gation of the Rhine. The ancient tolls, which were indeed 
 exacted with much vexation on the part of petty princes 
 along that river, amounted to two millions and a half of 
 florins. It has been determined to restrict them to eight 
 hundred thousand florins annually, but the King of Prussia, 
 who has not abolished those belonging to him, has acted in 
 this respect in the same manner as with regard to the Biens 
 Mediats expressly reserved by the original plan of the 
 mediating Power, and he still maintains, them after a hard 
 struggle. Bonaparte, at present extremely complaisant to- 
 wards the Court of Berlin, has yielded or is on the point of 
 yielding in this particular, as he has already done on the 
 question of the Biens Mediats, and has not turned his 
 thoughts to another plan sent from Ratisbon, which consists 
 in withdrawing a portion of the revenues granted to the 
 Teutonic Order and to the Order of Malta. It must be 
 acknowledged that these bodies have been treated with some 
 degree of liberality, and it appears that after deducting a 
 fourth part from the Teutonic Order its revenue will amount 
 to near eight hundred thousand florins. Thus the matter 
 rests for the present. 
 
NAPOLEON ATTACKS THE SWEDISH MINISTEE. 77 
 
 Paris, February 17, 1803. 
 
 The interior of the Consular family is at this moment in 
 a state of discord. Lucien is at daggers drawn with the 
 First Consul. This last was heard to say to him in a fit of 
 rage that he only repented he had not had him executed on 
 the Place de Greve like a brigand as he was, and the other 
 replied, ' What ! Are you such a fool as to imagine I am to 
 be treated like a Frenchman ? ' In the meantime a perfect 
 reconciliation has taken place between the First Consul and 
 General Lannes. He lately took an opportunity of declaring 
 in public that General Lannes was a very estimable character, 
 and that he had only committed some few legeretes, which 
 were very excusable. It is, however, remarked that since 
 the conversation which General Lannes has had with the 
 First Consul the Consular guard has mounted with loaded 
 arms and their pouches filled with cartridges, and that their 
 pay has been augmented to thirty sols a day, which makes 
 an annual expense of 1,200,000 livres. It is inferred from 
 all this that Lannes, who had been much sought after by 
 Moreau and the discontented generals, has betrayed to the 
 First Consul what he has been able to draw from them, and 
 this will naturally have been considered by the First Consul, 
 uneasy and suspicious as he is, as a most important service. 
 The discussion which has arisen at Stockholm on a point of 
 etiquette between Mr. Arbuthnot and the French Minister, 
 but which appears to be nothing more than a very natural 
 civility to the former, and always customary when a Prince 
 of any particular Minister is on a visit to the Court, has 
 drawn down upon the Swedish Minister here such a reprisal 
 as might be expected from the irritability of the First 
 Consul. He addressed him on Sunday last at the Tuileries 
 loud enough to be heard by all who were around him, and 
 said : ' Je suis fache. Monsieur, d'apprendre ce que le ministre 
 de la Eepublique me mande de Stockholm. II est etonnant 
 que le roi de Suede ait oublie la reconnaissance qu'il doit 
 a la France; mais je suis encore plus etonne que pendant que 
 les plus grandes Puissances s'empressent a se temoigner reci- 
 
78 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 proquement toutes sortes d'egards, uu prince qui pent a peine 
 pretendre a etre compte parmi les Puissances du troisieme 
 ordre puisse se permettre une pareille licence. Je pourrai 
 user de represailles en vers vous, mais je ne le ferai pas.' He 
 then turned upon his heel and walked away. He afterwards 
 addressed himself to me and to many others with great good 
 humour, and talked on indifferent subjects, as if his temper 
 had not been at all ruffled. I confess I did not suspect 
 him of being so completely master of his feelings. 
 
 Paris, February 21, 1803. 
 
 It is to be feared that his Majesty's determination with 
 regard to Malta will not be adopted by this Government 
 without a struggle. My last despatch, in which I gave your 
 Lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, 
 was scarcely gone when I received a note from him inform- 
 ing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, 
 and desired that I would come to him at the Tuileries at 
 nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet with tolerable 
 cordiality, and after talking on different subjects for a few 
 minutes he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the 
 other side of the table, upon which he placed his elbows, and 
 began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had 
 passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should in 
 the most clear and authentic manner make known his senti- 
 ments to me in order to their being communicated to his 
 Majesty ; and he conceived this would be more effectually 
 done by himself than through any medium whatever. He 
 said that it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him 
 that the Treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by con- 
 ciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been 
 productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and 
 mistrust, and that this mistrust was avowed in such a manner 
 as must bring the point to an issue. He now enumerated 
 the several provocations which he pretended to have received 
 from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating 
 Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by the treaty. 
 
CONVERSATION WITH NAPOLEON. 79 
 
 In tills he said that no consideration on earth should make 
 him acquiesce ; and of the two he had rather see us in 
 possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than Malta. He 
 then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the 
 English public prints, but this he said he did not so much 
 regard as that which appeared in the French papers published 
 in London, and particularised one, which he said was paid 
 by Lord Pelham; this he considered as much more mis- 
 chievous, since it was meant to excite this country against 
 him and his Government. He complained of the protection 
 given to Georges and others of his description, who, instead 
 of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, 
 were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, 
 and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts 
 of France, as well as in the interior. In confirmation of this 
 he told me that two men had within these few days been 
 apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to 
 Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the Bishop 
 of Arras, by the Baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Duteille, 
 as would be fully proved in a court of justice and made 
 known to the world. He acknowledged that the irritation he 
 felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I 
 make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) 
 which blew from England brought nothing but enmity and 
 hatred against him. He now went back to Egypt, and told 
 me that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take 
 possession of it by force he might have done it a month ago 
 (as I am firmly persuaded he would have done but for the 
 precautions we had taken) by sending twenty-five thousand 
 men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the 
 whole country in defiance of the four thousand British in 
 Alexandria ; that instead of that garrison being a means of 
 protecting Egypt it was only furnishing him with a pretence 
 for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might be 
 his desire to have it as a colony, because he did not think it 
 worth the risk of a war, in which he might perhaps be con- 
 sidered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more 
 than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong 
 
80 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish 
 Empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte. As a proof 
 of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he 
 had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was 
 the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined 
 to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. 
 But how could it be supposed that after having gained the 
 height on which he stood, that after having raised himself 
 from little more than a common soldier to the head of the 
 most powerful country on the Continent, he would risk his 
 life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless 
 forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and 
 the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom 
 of the sea ? He talked much on this subject, but never at- 
 tempted to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that 
 there were one hundred chances to one against him ; but 
 still he was determined to attempt it if war should be the 
 consequence of the present discussion ; and that such was 
 the disposition of the troops (he then had perhaps in his 
 mind the five or six generals who were loitering in his 
 antechamber) that army after army would be found for the 
 enterprise. He then expatiated much on the natural force 
 of the two countries : France with an army of four hundred 
 and eighty thousand men — for to this amount it is, he 
 said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most 
 desperate enterprises; and England with a fleet that made 
 her mistress of the seas, and which he (modestly) did not 
 think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. 
 Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern 
 the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He 
 said that if he had not felt the enmity of the British 
 Government on every occasion since the Treaty of Amiens, 
 there would have been nothing that he would not have 
 done to prove his desire to conciliate — participation in in- 
 demnities, as well as in influence on the Continent, treaties 
 of commerce, in short anything that could have given satis- 
 faction and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, 
 had been able to conquer the hatred of the British G-overn- 
 
INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON. 81 
 
 ment, and therefore it was now come to the point whether 
 we should have peace or war. To preserve peace the Treaty 
 of Amiens must be fulfilled ; the abuse in the public prints, 
 if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and 
 confined to the English papers ; and the protection so openly 
 given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and such- 
 like) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to 
 say so, and to refuse to fulfi.1 the treaty. He now made the 
 tour of Europe to prove to me that in its present state there 
 was no Power with which we could coalesce for the purpose 
 of making war against France ; consequently it was our 
 interest to gain time and, if we had any point to gain, renew 
 the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said 
 it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived 
 himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He 
 would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent 
 act of aggression ; neither was he so powerful in France as 
 to persuade the nation to go to war, unless on good grounds. 
 He said that he had not chastised the Algerians from his 
 unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other Powers, but he 
 hoped that England, Russia, and France would one da> feel 
 that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves 
 and force them to live rather by cultivating their land than 
 by plunder. In the little I said to him — for he gave me in 
 the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying 
 a word — I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your 
 Lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner 
 as I had done to M. de Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as 
 I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's 
 report had created in England, where the views of France 
 towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance 
 and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince 
 us of his desire of peace was on the one hand the little he 
 had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other the facility 
 with which he might have taken possession of Egypt with 
 the very ships and troops which were now going from the 
 Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with theAapproba- 
 tion of all Europe, and more particularly of the Tcn?ks, who 
 
 V 
 
82 FEBEUART 1803. 
 
 had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose 
 of forcing ns to evacuate their territory. I do not pretend 
 to follow the arguments of the First Consul in detail ; this 
 would be impossible from the vast variety of matter, and 
 from his constantly flying from one subject to another, so as 
 to render what he said so completely incoherent and some- 
 times unintelligible. His purpose was evidently to convince 
 me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at tbe same 
 time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he 
 possessed of annoying us at home and abroad. With regard 
 to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly pre- 
 vailed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, I ob- 
 served that after a war of such long duration, so full of 
 rancour, and carried on in a manner of which history has no 
 example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of 
 agitation should prevail, but this, like the swell after a 
 storm, would gradually subside if not kept up by the policy 
 of either party; that I would not pretend to pronounce 
 which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he 
 complained, and which was still kept up, though with this 
 difference, that in England it was independent of Govern- 
 ment, and in France its very act and deed. To this I added 
 that it must be admitted that we had such motives of mis- 
 trust against France as could not be alleged against us, and 
 I was going to instance the accession of territory and in- 
 fluence gained by France since the treaty, when he inter- 
 rupted me by saying, 'I suppose you mean Piedmont and 
 Switzerland ; ce sont des bagatelles ' (the expression he 
 made use of was too trivial and vulgar to find a place in a 
 despatch, or anywhere but in the mouth of a hackney coach- 
 man), and it must have been foreseen while the negotiation 
 was pending ; ' vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler a cette 
 heure.' I should have followed my argument, but saw he 
 was losing his temper, and I thought it needless to press it 
 further ; I continued, therefore, with alleging as a cause of 
 mistrust and of jealousy the impossibility of obtaining justice 
 or any kind of redress for any of his Majesty's subjects. He 
 asked me in what respect, and I told him that since the 
 
INTERVIEW WITH NAPOLEON. 83 
 
 signing of the treaty not one British claimant had been 
 satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had 
 been so within one month after that period ; and that since 
 I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, 
 not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innume- 
 rable representations which we had been under the neces- 
 sity of making in favour of British subjects, and property 
 detained in the several ports of France and elsewhere with- 
 out even a shadow of justicOi Such an order of things, I 
 said, was not made to inspire confidence, but, on the contrary, 
 must create mistrust. This, he said, must be attributed to 
 the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both 
 parties thought themselves right ; but he denied that such 
 delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was 
 just and right. With regard to the pensions which were 
 granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they 
 were given as a reward for past services during the war, and 
 most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as 
 had been insinuated, of a nature repugnant to the feelings of 
 every individual in England and to the universally acknow- 
 ledged loyalty and honour of the British Government ; that 
 as for any participation of indemnities or other accessions 
 which his Majesty might have obtained, I could take upon 
 myself to assure him that his Majesty's ambition led him 
 rather to preserve than to acquire ; and that with regard to 
 the most propitious moment of renewing hostilities, his 
 Majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings 
 of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure 
 as the greatest calamity; but that if his Majesty was so 
 desirous of peace it must not be imputed to the difficulty of 
 obtaining allies, for perhaps inadequate services would all be 
 concentrated in England and give a proportionate increase 
 of energy to our exertions. At this part of the conversa- 
 tion he rose from his chair and told me that he should give 
 orders to General Andreossi (with whom, I think, I could 
 perceive he was not well satisfied) to enter on the discussion 
 of this business with your Lordship ; but he wished that I 
 should at the same time be made acquainted with his motives 
 
 G 2 
 
84 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 and convinced of his sincerity rather from himself than from 
 his Ministers. He then, after a conversation of two hours, 
 during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, con- 
 versed for a few moments on indifferent subjects, in apparent 
 good humour, and retired. Such was as nearly as I can recol- 
 lect the purport of this conference. The impression I brought 
 away with me, taken rather collectively than from any par- 
 ticular topic of discourse, was evidently that the object of 
 the First Consul was, if he could not persuade us into those 
 measures which must facilitate the accomplishment of his 
 plans, to frighten and to bully. I need not observe that this 
 conduct in private life would be a strong presumption of 
 weakness. I believe the same will hold good in politics ; at 
 least I strongly suspect it to be the case in the present in- 
 stance. It must, however, be observed that he did not, as 
 M. de Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute Sebastiani's 
 mission to commercial motives only, but as one rendered 
 necessary in a military point of view by the infraction by 
 us of the Treaty of Amiens. 
 
 P.S. — This conversation took place on Friday last, and 
 this morning I saw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with 
 the First Consul after I left him, and he assured me that he 
 had been very well satisfied with the frankness with which 
 I had made my observations on what fell from him. I told 
 him that, without entering into any further detail, what I had 
 said to the First Consul amounted to an assurance of what 
 I trusted there could be no doubt — of the readiness of his 
 Majesty's Ministers to remove all subjects of discussion 
 where that could be done without violating the laws of the 
 country, and to fulfil strictly the engagements which they 
 had contracted in as much as that could be reconciled with 
 the safety of the State. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, 
 he gave me to understand that a project was in contempla- 
 tion by which the integrity of the Turkish Empire would be 
 so effectually secured as to do away with every cause of doubt 
 or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the 
 Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain 
 himself further. Under these circumstances no one can 
 
CHANCES OF WAR. 85 
 
 expect that we should relinquish that assurance which we 
 have in hand till something equally satisfactory is proposed 
 and adopted. 
 
 Paris, February 28, 1803. 
 I have had no opportunity since my last of ascertaining 
 from my own observation the effect of the conversation 
 which made the subject of that despatch to your Lordship. 
 If we are to judge from the message of the First Consul to 
 the Legislative Body, which I lately transmitted to your 
 Lordship, we might suppose him determined to consider our 
 refusal to give effect to his requisition on the subject of 
 Malta as a sufficient pretext for commencing hostilities ; and 
 indeed such is the language of those who are nearest his 
 person, though perhaps not most in his confidence. On the 
 other hand, there are those who are inclined to believe that 
 the First Consul, like other impetuous characters, is not so 
 insensible to personal danger as to hurry him beyond the 
 bounds of moderation, and particularly when he meets with 
 that cool but firm resistance which gives time to reflect 
 and tends rather to dispassionate discussion than to those 
 desperate measures in the prosecution of which he stands 
 committed to expose his person and his fortune to the utmost 
 hazard. Such reflections will, I am persuaded, have their due 
 influence, and the more they are considered the deeper will 
 they strike. In the meantime the language which is held 
 by the Court of Petersburg is admirably calculated to have 
 an effect on the determination of the First Consul, and if it 
 had been actually concerted with his Majesty it could not 
 have come at a better moment or be better adapted to the 
 purpose. A note was given in by Count Marcoff a few days 
 ago in answer to one from this Government, in which the 
 Emperor expresses his surprise that he should have been 
 considered so bigoted to his pacific system as to become 
 indifferent to the general welfare ' of Europe. He desires it 
 to be understood that his love of peace arises from a convic- 
 on that he can better promote the happiness of his people 
 
86 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 by attending to the improvement of his present possessions 
 than by running after new ones; and he earnestly re- 
 commends the same moderation to those whose practice 
 differs from his principles. He then proceeds to declare that 
 he considers it as a duty imposed upon him by the situation 
 he holds to watch with a jealous eye the conduct of any 
 Government which may have an influence on the general 
 tranquillity. He disclaims with great frankness and energy 
 not only the most distant intention of lending a hand to the 
 dismemberment of the Turkish Empire, but his determina- 
 tion to maintain its integrity by every means in his power. 
 He takes a view of the geographical position of Russia, 
 inaccessible, from its climate, on the north, excepting by sea, 
 and on the south a neighbour from whom he can have 
 nothing to fear; that, setting every other consideration 
 aside, that of self- security requires that no change should be 
 made in such a disposition; and that he shall therefore 
 always consider any attempt to effect it as hostile against 
 Russia. It is the jperfect integrity of the Turkish Empire 
 which he maintains to be essentially necessary to the main- 
 tenance of peace, and he adds that as long as the French 
 Government manifests an intention (and such an intention 
 was fully avowed by the First Consul in his conversation 
 with me) of possessing itself of Egypt no peace can be 
 permanent with England, and therefore it is the perfect 
 integrity of the Turkish Empire which must be maintained 
 in order to insure the general tranquillity. In short, the 
 whole tenor of this communication is of a nature to con- 
 vince the First Consul, first, that he must not depend 
 implicitly on the pacific disposition of the Emperor of 
 Russia; secondly, that no concert can be established with 
 him for the partition of the Turkish Empire, but, on the 
 contrary, that he will oppose it ; and, thirdly, that he con- 
 siders the alarm which the First Consul has created on 
 the subject of Malta as sufficient to excite the utmost 
 jealousy of Great Britain and to threaten Europe with a 
 renewal of war. This despatch is dated January 31 (N.S.), 
 and was communicated in toto to M. de Talleyrand two days 
 
DISAPPOINTMENTS OF FIRST CONSUL. 87 
 
 after my conversation with the First Consul. We cannot, 
 however, expect that the acquiescence of the First Consul 
 will be obtained without a violent manifestation of humour, 
 and perhaps an explosion ; and indeed, when we consider the 
 disappointments to which he has lately been exposed, we 
 must acknowledge that a more even temper than that which 
 he possesses might have been ruffled. Amongst the first, 
 and perhaps the most severe, we may rank the state of the 
 English finances as exposed by Mr. Addington in the late 
 budget. This was a dreadful blow, and all their rancour 
 and all their ingenuity have been since exerted to do away 
 the impression it has made. In the next place, the conduct 
 of America, from whose President everything subservient 
 was expected, and by whom it is now foreseen that every 
 opposition will be made to the projects of the French 
 Government in that part of the world, and that, so far from 
 being able to gain quiet possession of the Floridas, the 
 settlement even of Louisiana may be considered as doubtful. 
 Then comes the disappointment in his hopes of subduing 
 St. Domingo, and of regenerating his navy, which, I believe, 
 he begins to understand cannot be eff'ected but by the pro- 
 sperity of his colonies, and last, though not least, the grand 
 disappointment of Malta, which he had calculated would, as 
 well as Egypt, have been at this moment in his possession. 
 These, with many other minor subjects of mortification, may 
 be allowed to discompose the temper of a great man am- 
 bitious of universal empire and to convince the world that 
 everything must bend to his will. Were I to give credit to 
 public rumours, I might be led to suppose that all this weight 
 of vexation is to fall upon his Majesty's dominions. Plans 
 of invasion are said to be revising ; armies are to be conveyed 
 up the Thames ; General Massena, who was destined to 
 command that which was lately devoted to the same danger- 
 ous attempt, is again called to assist in council ; and he 
 will encourage the projects as far as he is able. But there 
 are other generals, and a very considerable part of the 
 public indeed, who, notwithstanding the pains which are 
 taken to animate them in the cause, would consider a rup- 
 
88 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 ture with England as the greatest calamity which can befall 
 this country, and as one which might eventually involve 
 them in all the misery from which they are but just recover- 
 ing. These considerations must have weight ; but whether 
 they will be sufficient to counterbalance the irascible and 
 impetuous disposition of the First Consul, time alone can 
 bring to light. 
 
 CopiE d'une Depeche du Chancelier de l'Empire au 
 
 COMTE DE MaRCOFF. 
 
 St. PeteTsbourg, le 19 Janvier 1803. 
 
 Nous avons vu avee ^tonnement, Monsieur le Comte, que 
 le Premier Consul a paru trouver a redire au ton d'un des 
 rescrits qui vous a ete adresse par S. M. I., et qu'il en a 
 infere un changement de systeme dans notre politique. 
 Personne n'a plus a coeur que I'Empereur de conserver les 
 egards que se doivent mutuellement les Gouvernemens, et 
 tout ce que S. M. desire, c'est de rencontrer partout une 
 parfaite reciprocite. L'Empereur croit que la meilleure 
 maniere de s'enoncer est celle de la verite et de la franchise, 
 et il n'a jamais eu I'intention d'en prendre une autre. Une 
 superiorite souvent tres marquee n'est pas meme une raison 
 pour que S. M. veuille employer avec les Gouvernmens un 
 autre ton que celui qui doit subsister entre des etats inde- 
 pendans dont I'Empereur respecte la souverainete, tout 
 autant dans leur foiblesse que dans leur force; et certaine- 
 ment S. M. I. ne pent que d'autant plus teuir a ces conve- 
 nances envers une puissance amie et aussi respectable que la 
 France. Quant au changement de systeme, I'Empereur des 
 son avenement au tr6ne n'en a suivi qu'un seul et ne pense 
 pas de s'en departir. S. M. I. est penetree du principe que 
 chaque gouvernement doit faire son possible pour preserver 
 la paix a I'exterieur, afin de pouvoir porter tons ses efforts a 
 rendre de plus en plus heureux les peuples qui sont confies 
 a ses soins ; et nous croyons que ce principe doit etre surtout 
 celui de tout etat considerable qui est fort de ses propres 
 
RUSSIAN DESPATCH TO COUNT MABCOFF. 89 
 
 ni03^ens, et qui peut chercher sa surete principale dans 
 leur propre developpement, et non dans des vues on des 
 esperances an deliors. Tel est tout le systeme present de 
 la cour de Russie, auquel TEmpereur est attache par son 
 caractere, et que la position meme de son empire lui a fait 
 choisir. La Russie, appuyee en quelque fa9on a I'un des coins 
 de la terre, n'est attaquable que d'un cote, n'a aucune raison 
 de desirer la guerre, et elle en a encore moins de la craindre. 
 Elle ne veut ni commander ni que personne lui commando. 
 Travail! er a sa prosperite interieure, et pour cela preserver 
 sa tranquillite et celle de I'Europe, est le plus vif desir de 
 I'Empereur. Cependant I'experience nous demontre mal- 
 heureusement que pour rester pacifique, il ne suffit pas de 
 I'etre soi-meme ; il faut que les autres le soient aussi, et que 
 leur conduite permette de conserver la paix. Les derniers 
 tems nous ont nouvellement convaincus qu'on ne peut venir 
 la troubler de loin, et la campagne des Russes en Italie, celle 
 des Fran9ois en Egypte prouvent assez que les distances 
 donnent a present une bien foible certitude de repos. II 
 pourroit done survenir des circonstances ou S. M. I. se 
 verroit obligee de sortir de I'etat de tranquillite dans lequel 
 elle se trouve actuellement, et cela arriveroit si Pbonneur 
 ou la surete de son empire pouvoient etre compromis meme 
 par contre-coup, ou si la cause de la justice, le maintien de 
 Fordre et du bien general des nations I'exigeaient imperieuse- 
 ment. II faut compter parmi ces cas possibles a prevoir 
 celui ou il y auroit des Puissances qui voudroient travailler 
 a la destruction de I'Empire ottoman pour en faire leur 
 profit: S. M. ne pourroit sans doute alors qu'intervenir 
 activement pour secourir son voisin et prendre les determina- 
 tions qu'elle croiroit necessaires a I'interet de la Russie. 
 Nous avons remarque que dans les conversations que vous 
 avez eues avec le Premier Consul, il s'est arrete souvent sur 
 cet objet, en faisant mention de I'etat de decadence de 
 I'Empire ottoman et disant que sa mine lui sembloit pro- 
 chaine. L'on doit supposer que de semblables discours 
 seront aussi parvenus a d'autres cours ; car I'idee de la dis- 
 solution peu eloignee du Gouvernement turc et des evene- 
 
90 JANUARY 1803. 
 
 mens qui doivent la preceder et s'ensuivre est generalement 
 repandue en Europe, et c'est a cela qu'il faut attribuer en 
 grande partie que I'Angleterre ne desarme pas encore. S. M. 
 FEmpereur, persuade qu'au fond les intentions du Gouverne- 
 ment fran9ois ne sont pas hostiles a la Turquie, et croyant 
 que dans tous les cas la premiere qualite de la politique et le 
 devoir le plus essentiel de I'amitie est de parler vrai et d'agir 
 avee sincerite et loyaute, vous cliarge, Monsieur le Comte, 
 d'entrer dans une explication franclie sur ce sujet important 
 avec le Ministere de la Eepublique. Yous direz que S. M., 
 satisfaifce du lot que la Providence lui a assigne, ne veut pas 
 I'agrandir pas plus du cote de la Turquie qu'autre part, et 
 que consequemment elle ne sauroit non plus voir avec in- 
 difference que personne autre s'aggrandisse aux depens de 
 la Porte ottomane. C'est le meilleur voisin que puisse avoir 
 la Russie, et S. M. ne desire pas d'en changer. En exposant 
 les motifs qui ne peuvent que fortifier notre cour dans ces 
 sentimens, Y. E. y ajoutera que I'Empereur est convaincu 
 que dans ce moment il seroifc extreraement convenable de 
 calmer autant que possible la crainte universelle qui agite 
 tous les cabinets de ce que des evenemens nouveaux vont 
 bientot troubler derechef le monde politique. Si le Premier 
 Consul par quelque declaration, ou comme il le jugera a 
 propos, detruisoit ces craintes, qui se portent principalement 
 sur le sort futur de la Turquie, et qu'il assurat ne point avoir 
 de vues sur cet empire, il oteroit par la tout pretexte aux 
 jalousies des autres cabinets, et mettroit fin au germe de dis- 
 sension et d'inquietude qui fernaente toujours en Europe, et" 
 qui empeche que la tranquillite qui vient de lui etre rendue 
 ne produise les effets salutaires qu'on devoit s'en proraettre. 
 L'Angleterre delivree de ses apprehensions n'en donneroit 
 plus a son tour au Gouvernement fran9ois, pour lequel il ne 
 pent y avoir rien de plus honorable ni de plus utile que 
 d'inspirer partout de la confiance et du calme, afin que I'on 
 commence a croire a la paix, et que chacun pense chez soi 
 aux ameliorations de I'interieur et laisse en faire autant aux 
 autres. Tous les Gouvernemens ont besoin de tourner leurs 
 vues vers ce but et d'en etre le moins distraits que possible, 
 
PAPER WAR. 91 
 
 afin de s'occuper sans rel^che a perfectionner et consolider 
 chez eux I'ordre et le bonheur social. S. M. I. desire, Mon- 
 sieur le Comte, que vous vous expliquiez dans ce sens avec le 
 Gouvernement fran9ois, et que vous I'assuriez qu'elle s'est 
 decidee a lui faire ces ouvertures uniquement par son desir 
 sincere de rendre plus intimes les rapports de bonne intelli- 
 gence qui existent si heureusement entre les deux pays, 
 et d'eloigner toutes les causes qui pourroient les troubler, 
 comme aussi par Tamitie et la consideration personnelles 
 qu'elle porte au Premier Consul, qui recevra, nous nous 
 flattons, avec des sentimens analogues ces communications 
 dictees par la seule franchise et la droiture des intentions de 
 votre auguste souverain. — J'ai Fhonneur d'etre, etc. 
 
 Paris, February 28, 1803. 
 I cannot but consider tbe dismissal of tbe editor of the 
 ' Argus ' as a strong symptom of a pacific disposition, as far 
 at least as relates to the paper war which has been carrying 
 on for some time past with such bitterness on both sides. It 
 was announced to me a few days ago, and I was given to 
 understand that he had merited his disgrace by the coarse 
 and illiberal abuse which he had dealt about without dis- 
 crimination or mercy. Your Lordship will perceive that 
 this paper has got into better hands, and I cannot help ex- 
 pressing a sincere hope that they may find no reason in our 
 public prints to renew the war. I almost fear, however, 
 that whilst I utter this wish provocation may already have 
 been given. I yesterday received by the petite post, a 
 copy of the ' Courrier de Londres ' of the 18th inst., contain- 
 ing a most virulent paragraph against the First Consul and 
 his family, and the following words were written in a dis- 
 guised hand (I have reason to believe that it was that of the 
 First Consul) on the margin of the paper : ' II faut qu'un 
 ministere ait bien peu d'honnenr et de bonne politique pour 
 payer de pareilles infamies; et lorsqu'en meme tems on 
 envoie un ambassadeur a Paris, c'est une lachete.' In my 
 
92 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 conversation with him the other day he certainly did make 
 use of expressions nearly similar, and it was in vain that I 
 told him then, or should repeat to him now, that the minis- 
 tere has nothing to do with it, and that the laws only can 
 punish it, as in the case of Peltier. This they cannot, or 
 more properly will not, comprehend ; but in the meantime it 
 most certainly would be much to be lamented if offended 
 vanity should urge him to those extremities which otherwise 
 might be avoided. If war is to be the result of the dis- 
 cussion, I shall impute it much rather to the intemperance 
 of the newspapers than to the politics of the moment. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing St., February 28, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's despatch No. 16 has been received 
 and laid before the King. I have great satisfaction in 
 communicating to you his Majesty's entire approbation of 
 the able and judicious manner in which you appear to have 
 executed the instructions which I gave you in my despatch 
 No. 1 on the 9th instant. The account you have given of 
 your interview with the First Consul is in every respect 
 important. It is unnecessary for me to remark on the 
 tone and temper in which the sentiments of the First Consul 
 appear to have been expressed, or to offer any observations 
 in addition to those so properly made by your Excellency at 
 the time upon several of the topics which were brought for- 
 ward by the First Consul in the course of your conversation. 
 I shall therefore content myself with referring your Excel- 
 lency to my despatch to Mr. Merry of , in which the 
 
 subject of the complaints of the French Government re- 
 specting the freedom of the press, the emigrants, &c., are 
 particularly discussed. I cannot, however, avoid noticing 
 that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction is 
 stated to have been thrown out by the First Consul in 
 answer to the just representations and complaints of his 
 
EVACUATION OP EGYPT AND MALTA. 93 
 
 Majesty, in consequence of tlie unwarrantable insinuations 
 and charges contained in Colonel Sebastiani's report against 
 his Majesty's Government, the officer commanding his forces 
 in Egypt, and his army in that quarter; but, on the other 
 hand, the language of the First Consul has tended to 
 strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publica- 
 tion was peculiarly calculated to excite. I shall now proceed 
 to give you some further instructions on the language which 
 it may be proper for you to hold respecting the charge which 
 has been advanced against his Majesty's Government of their 
 unwillingness to fulfil the Treaty of Amiens. The Treaty of 
 Amiens has been in course of execution on the part of his 
 Majesty in every article in which, according to the spirit of 
 that treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There 
 cannot be the least doubt that Egypt is at this time com- 
 pletely evacuated. The delay which has arisen in the evacua- 
 tion of Alexandria was owing to accidental circumstances, 
 the particulars of which were explained to you in my despatch 
 of November 30 last, and I had every reason to believe, from 
 the communication I had with General Andreossy on the 
 subject, that the French Government were perfectly satisfied 
 with the explanation which he was authorised at the time to 
 give them respecting it. 
 
 With regard to that article of the treaty which relates 
 to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to circum- 
 stances which it was not in the power of his Majesty to con- 
 trol) have not been capable of execution. The refusal of 
 Eussia to accede to the arrangement except on condition 
 that the Maltese Langue should be abolished, the silence of 
 the Court of Berlin with respect to the invitation that has 
 been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a 
 guaranteeing Power, the abolition of the Spanish Priories, in 
 defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a 
 party, the declaration of the Portuguese Government of their 
 intention to sequestrate the property of the Portuguese 
 Priory, as forming a part of the Spanish Langue, unless the 
 property of the Spanish Priories is restored to them, and the 
 non-election of a Grand Master : these circumstances would 
 
94 FEBRUARY 1803. 
 
 have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to 
 have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of 
 the island until some new arrangement could be adjusted 
 for its security and independence. But when it is considered 
 how greatly the dominions, power, and influence of France 
 have of late been extended, his Majesty must feel that he 
 has an incontestable right, conformably to the principles on 
 which the Treaty of Peace was negotiated and concluded, to 
 demand additional securities in any new arrangement which 
 it might be necessary to make with a view of effecting the 
 real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, ^ 
 sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line 
 of conduct which his Majesty had determined to adopt, have 
 received additional force from the views which have been 
 recently and unreservedly manifested by the French Govern- 
 ment respecting the Turkish dominions and the islands in 
 the Adriatic (and which have been in a great degree ad- 
 mitted by the First Consul in his interview with your 
 Excellency) — views which are directly repugnant not only to 
 the spirit but to the letter of the Treaty of Amiens. From 
 the postscript to your Excellency's letter it appears that a 
 project was in contemplation by which, according to the 
 declaration of M. Talleyrand, the integrity of the Turkish 
 territory would be secured so as to do away every cause of 
 doubt or uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or to any 
 other part of the Turkish dominions. His Majesty will con- 
 sider the communication of such a project as indicating a 
 disposition on the part of the French Government to afford 
 him explanation and satisfaction respecting some of the 
 points which have been the subject of his representations. 
 But, after all that has passed, his Majesty cannot consent 
 that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta until 
 substantial security has been provided for these objects, 
 which, under the present circumstances, might be materially 
 endangered by their removal. 
 
ABUSES OF THE PRESS. 95 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, March 3, 1803. 
 I have notliiiig very interesting" to trouble your Lord- 
 ship with by this messenger. M. de Talleyrand told me the 
 ,day before yesterday that he had received an answer from 
 General Andreossy to the despatch in which he gave that 
 Ambassador an account of my conversation with the First 
 Consul. He at the same time appeared very anxious that I 
 should soon hear from your Lordship on the same subject ; 
 but I could not give him much hope that I should very soon 
 satisfy his impatience. I am sorry to be again under the 
 necessity of lamenting the bad effects of the scurrility of the 
 newspapers published in London. Another was enclosed to 
 me yesterday, which appears to be the ' Courrier de Londres ' 
 of the 22nd ult., containing a paragraph highly offensive to 
 the First Consul, and particularly mischievous in the present 
 moment. I enclose it to your Lordship, that your Lordship 
 may see the observation which was made upon it by the 
 person who sent it to me, and who, I have reason to believe, 
 was the First Consul himself. I am sure your Lordship 
 joins with me in the fervent wish that it were possible to 
 curb the licentiousness of public prints. It surely could 
 never have been intended that the liberty of the press should 
 be so uncontrolled as to put it in the power of any the most 
 obscure writer, who perhaps composes his paragraph in a 
 garret, with no other view than to earn wherewith to procure 
 him a dinner, to involve in war countries which otherwise 
 might be disposed to conciliate, and to meet with temper any 
 discussion which may arise. Such, I have reason to believe, 
 is the case in the present instance ; and I am persuaded that 
 if the First Consul has recourse to the desperate alternative 
 of war it must be attributed more to the irritation constantly 
 kept alive by the public prints than to the nature of the 
 questions at issue, however delicate they may be. The con- 
 viction of Peltier has doubtless produced a good effect, and 
 will have convinced people here that it is far from the inten- 
 
96 MAEOH 1803. 
 
 tion of his Majesty's Ministers to screen such oflPenders from 
 justice. And although I know how much an English lawyer 
 is above the consideration of compliment in the exercise of 
 his duty, yet I cannot forbear from mentioning that the 
 conduct of his Majesty's Attorney-General has been spoken 
 of in terms of great applause. It were, however, to be wished 
 that his Majesty's Ministers had fewer opportunities of 
 manifesting their impartiality in this respect; and I cannot 
 but think that much good might result from the exertion of 
 every power of control, at least for the moment, over the 
 French journalists in London, and in particular the editor of 
 the ' Courrier de Londres.' I am fully aware of the motives 
 and inducements which they, or at least their employers, 
 have in venting their spleen ; but certainly they cannot be 
 justified in so doing when they endanger the peace of the 
 country which affords them an asylum. I have no doubt 
 in my own mind that this irritation is kept alive by the 
 agents of the Royalist party, and perhaps by the Jacobins, 
 in the hope of forcing the two countries into a war, by which 
 they could lose nothing, but by which they might eventually 
 be considerable gainers. This is a consideration worthy of 
 attention ; and I should think that it would be no violation 
 of the Alien Bill were it applied to those who strive to 
 disturb the peace of the country by such means, as well as 
 by any other. As T am on this subject, I will mention to 
 yonr Lordship that Goldsmidt, the editor of the ' Argus,' is 
 dismissed, and a person of the name of Badini, who is 
 undoubtedly known to your Lordship by report, is now the 
 conductor of that paper. His instructions are to refrain 
 from personalities, and to be in general conciliatory. The 
 numbers of that paper which have lately been published 
 have, it must be confessed, been inoffensive. 
 
 Paris, March 3, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose to your Lordship the copy 
 of a letter which I received this morning from M. de Talley- 
 rand, in which your Lordship will perceive some disposition 
 
CLAIMS ON THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT. 97 
 
 to justice, though faint, on the part of this Government. 
 After a total silence on the subject of the British claimants 
 to every representation which I have made since I have been 
 in this country, M. de Talleyrand has at length required 
 from me an account of the several claims of his Majesty's 
 subjects on the French Government. I am consequently 
 preparing a list of claimants, with a statement of the nature 
 of their claims, which I shall give him as soon as it is made 
 out. I cannot, however, consider this step as an indication 
 of any real disposition in this Government to give satisfac- 
 tion to the claimants. It is, I should suppose, rather to 
 weaken any argument which we may wish to derive from 
 the hesitation of the First Consul to fulfil the Treaty of 
 Amiens in this respect, although the clause to that effect is 
 to all intents and purposes as formal as that which stipulates 
 the evacuation of Malta or any other. We may, however, 
 expect that, although the giving immediate effect to that 
 article would be but a just reciprocity for the conduct of 
 Great Britain towards the subjects of France, its execution 
 will be made to depend on the evacuation of Malta. I shall 
 therefore in my discussions on this subject be particularly 
 careful to draw strictly the line between the two cases. 
 
 P.S. — Since writing the above your Lordship's despatch 
 No. 2, of the 28th ult., by the messenger Elsworth, and the 
 minute which accompanies it, have been received. I shall 
 not fail to see M. de Talleyrand to-morrow morning for the 
 purpose of executing your Lordship's instructions. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, le 11 Ventose, an XI. 
 
 Le Ministre des Eelations Exterieures au Lord Whitworth, 
 Ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique pres la Eepublique. 
 
 Monsieur 1' Ambassadeur, — Lenavire anglois 'La Nancy,' 
 reclame d'abord par M. Merry et depuis par Votre Excellence, 
 a ete relache avec les marchandises non prohibees qu'il avoit 
 
98 MARCH 1803. 
 
 a bord. Un autre batiment anglois, appartenant a M. 
 Middleton et saisi pareillement a Flessingue, a ete relacbe de 
 la meme maniere. Quant aux marcliandises prohibees qui 
 se sont trouvees sur ces deux batimens, le ministre des Finances 
 n'en a point presse la condamnation. II s'est contente de 
 les faire deposer dans un magasin a Flessingue, laissant 
 ainsi aux proprietaires I'esperance de les recouvrer si I'examen 
 ulterieur, qui sera fait avec une scrupuleuse impartialite, 
 demontre ce que beaucoup d'indices ont fait probable jusqu'a 
 present, que les dits proprietaires etoient dans un de ces cas 
 ou la bonne foi fait excuser I'erreur. Je m'empresse de com- 
 niuniquer ces details a Votre Excellence en la priant d'agreer 
 les assurances de ma tres-baute consideration. 
 
 (Signe) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, March 3, 1 803. 
 
 I saw M. de Talleyrand yesterday, and acquitted myself 
 of your Lordship's instructions. I recapitulated the several 
 arguments therein contained, dwelling particularly on the 
 open avowal of the First Consul's views in Egypt, and con- 
 cluding with the resolution of his Majesty not to with- 
 draw his troops from Malta until some security should be 
 given that by so doing his Majesty should not expose the 
 safety of his own dominions. He heard me with great 
 patience, and in answer endeavoured as before to convince 
 me that there was no reason whatever for the apprehensions 
 which we entertained ; that it was true the acquisition of 
 Egypt had been, and perhaps still was, a favourite object of 
 the First Consul's, but that it was not so much as to allow 
 him to go to war for its attainment ; that he was sensible 
 that any attempt on his part to gain possession of it must 
 immediately involve him in hostilities with Great Britain ; 
 but at the same time he must observe, on the other hand, 
 that the keeping possession of Malta in defiance of treaty 
 
EELATIONS WITH THE PORTE. 99 
 
 must also have the same effect, since he was bound in 
 honour to maintain its observance at all events. M. de 
 Talleyrand dwelt a considerable time on these arguments. 
 His object was to convince me that the First Consul would 
 go to war on what he conceived to be a point of honour, but 
 not in order to obtain the possession of Egypt, or for any 
 other view of aggrandisement. I then told him that what 
 had in a particular manner excited the attention of your 
 Lordship in my last report was the assurance he had given 
 me of some project being in contemplation whereby the 
 integrity of the Turkish Empire would be so insured in 
 all its parts as to remove every doubt or apprehension. I 
 begged him therefore to explain himself on this subject, 
 which I conceived to be of the utmost importance, since it 
 was only by such means that both parties could be satisfied. 
 He then gave me to understand that what he had termed a 
 project was nothing more than what had been expressed in 
 the First Consul's message to the Legislative Body when he 
 says that there is a French Ambassador at Constantinople 
 who is charged to give every assurance of the disposition of 
 France to strengthen instead of to weaken that Government. 
 I expressed a doubt whether this or any other parole security 
 would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. 
 Hereupon he repeated the question which he has so often 
 asked — ^ What then is the security which you require, and 
 which the First Consul can give ? ' This, I told him, must be 
 the subject of the negotiation upon which we were willing 
 to enter, and I trusted that the French Government would 
 bring into it the same temper and the same real desire to 
 conciliate which was manifested by his Majesty's Ministers. 
 M. de Talleyrand now informed me (in order, I suppose, to 
 avoid the trouble of reasoning further on the subject) that 
 the First Consul had five or six days ago ordered instructions 
 to be sent to General Andreossy, by which he was to require 
 an immediate and categorical answer to the plain question 
 whether his Majesty would or would not cause Malta to be 
 evacuated by the British troops ; that he concluded that this 
 communication was already made ; and that he expected to 
 
 H 2 
 
100 MARCH 1803. 
 
 learn the result of it in a verj few days, adding that all the 
 First Consul wanted was to know precisely on what he had 
 to depend. I could not help lamenting this precipitate 
 measure (and I really believe M. de Talleyrand does so him- 
 self), since it could answer no good purpose, and would only 
 tend to introduce into the discussion ill-humour and offended 
 dignity in the place of dispassionate reasoning. I begged 
 him, however, to be prepared, and to prepare the First Con- 
 sul, to meet with more opposition to his will than he had been 
 accustomed to on similar occasions. I told him that his 
 Majesty was willing to discuss the point in dispute with 
 fairness and candour, but certainly never would be intimi- 
 dated into acquiescence ; and I repeatedly urged that if he 
 wished well to the peace of the two countries he should 
 prepare the First Consul for the consequences which might 
 naturally be expected from this step, and thus prevent the 
 effect of any sudden gust of ill-humour. He was unwilling 
 to admit that there could be any chance of satisfying the 
 First Consul short of a compliance with his wishes, founded, 
 as they pretend, on good faith ; neither would he allow that 
 self-security could justify a deviation from the strict observ- 
 ance of treaties. Our conversation ended here, and I wait 
 the result of General Andreossy's communication with the 
 utmost impatience. It is impossible to form any decided 
 opinion on the event of this discussion. We all know the 
 temper of the First Consul. We are not now to learn that 
 pride, petulance, and a rooted jealousy and hatred of England 
 are amongst the principal ingredients in his character. All 
 these will urge him to support what he terms his honour at 
 the risk of everything. On the other hand, we know his 
 total want of means to engage in a maritime wa-r; the 
 dispersed situation of what remains of his fleet ; his pro- 
 jects in the West Indies and America unaccomplished ; the 
 wretched state of his finances ; and, above all, the appre- 
 hension he feels — and this strongly impressed on him by 
 every individual of his family, particularly by his brothers 
 Joseph and Lucien — that, should he now involve the country 
 in war, his fate would be decided by assassination. These, 
 
TARENTUM. 101 
 
 it must be confessed, are all strong and weiglity motives. 
 Some persons with whom I converse are inclined to think 
 they will make a salutary impression, and I am myself dis- 
 posed to be of that opinion. It is, however, in no case safe 
 to pronounce with confidence, and in none less so than in the 
 present. I should have observed to your Lordship that in 
 my conversation with the First Consul, and again yesterday 
 with M. de Talleyrand, great stress was laid on the prompti- 
 tude with which the First Consul had caused Tarentum to 
 be evacuated by the French troops, though it is unanimously 
 acknowledged to be the point from which any hostile design 
 against Egypt could be attempted with the greatest chance 
 of success. I could only reply to this that Tarentum could 
 be reoccupied, were it necessary to the First Consul's views, 
 with the same promptitude with which it was abandoned. 
 In the present state of affairs, your Lordship will naturally 
 have turned your mind to the different modes by which such 
 a security as we must require can be obtained. A formal 
 guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by Great 
 Britain, Russia, and this country will probably have suggested 
 itself as the most likely to answer the purpose. Should this 
 be the case, and should this Government give us time to 
 make such an arrangement, it would, perhaps, be more advis- 
 able to make direct overtures to the Court of Petersburg 
 than by the means of Count Marcoff. I should depend more 
 upon his executing with precision the orders he might receive 
 from his Court than on the manner in which he would repre- 
 sent such a proposition to the Russian Cabinet. And should 
 it be made appear to the Emperor as the only means of 
 avoiding perhaps a general war, I think he might be induced 
 to concur in the measure. 
 
 P.S. — In the interval between the writing and the tran- 
 scribing the above despatch, I have taken another opportu- 
 nity of seeing M. de Talleyrand, and I am glad to find that 
 (for what purpose I know not) he represented the instructions 
 to General Andreossy as much more absolute and offensive 
 than they really are. I found him to-day entirely disposed 
 to give me another opinion, and to convince me that the 
 
102 MARCH 1803. 
 
 First Consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, 
 was desirous to discuss fairly and without passion a point 
 which he admitted was of importance to both countries : to 
 Great Britain, as affecting eventually its interest in the East ; 
 to France, as affecting her honour. He repeatedly assured 
 me (without, however, persuading me) that, much as the First 
 Consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he 
 would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace, 
 and henceforth seek to augment his glory by improving and 
 consoUdating the internal situation of the country rather than 
 by adding to its possessions. I am/ar indeed from pledging 
 myself for the sincerity of those professions, but I cannot 
 but consider it as a material point gained if we can bring 
 the question of Malta to a temperate and fair discussion. 
 This M. de Talleyrand now declares to be the desire of the 
 First Consul, and I will allow myself to hope that, by means 
 of the Court of Petersburg, some arrangement may be made 
 by which both parties may be satisfied. An officer has been 
 sent in a frigate to Algiers with a message from the First 
 Consul likely to put an end to the dispute between this 
 Government and the Dey. I cannot help suspecting that 
 <we shall some day hear that an expedition is gone to that 
 port. Should that take place, nothing will be able to save 
 the Algerines from the rapacity of their invaders. 
 
 Paris, March 5, 1803. 
 
 I have entered so fully on the subject of my conversations 
 with M. de Talleyrand that I have little or nothing to add. 
 I have only to give your Lordship my opinion on the evident 
 change in his manner and language in the course of yesterday 
 and to-day ; and I can attribute the tone he chose to assume 
 yesterday to nothing more than a trick, in the hope of 
 intimidating me, and of drawing from me wherewithal to 
 give confidence to the First Consul in the pursuit of his 
 object. I flatter myself I have withstood the trial without 
 flinching, and I consider the favourable change of to-day as 
 
IMPROVEMENT OP INDUSTRY. 103 
 
 a proof of tlie victory of honesty and plain dealing over 
 duplicity and low cunning. I most earnestly recommend it 
 to your Lordship to endeavour by every means to engage 
 the Court of Eussia to come forward on this occasion, unless 
 it should be determined to keep possession of Malta at all 
 events ; and that, I fear, cannot be done without a war. Short 
 of that, the best security would certainly be a joint guarantee. 
 I have no reason to suppose that this Government would 
 come willingly into such a measure; but if it was strongly 
 suggested by Eussia it would not be refused. Count Wor- 
 onzow would, I think, enforce it, and his brother might, if 
 he pleased, induce the Emperor to adopt it. We must be 
 prepared for some definite point of negotiation, and this is 
 perhaps the most eligible. I should apologise to your Lord- 
 ship for these reflections, which will, I am persuaded, have 
 occurred to your Lordship. 
 
 Paris, March 7, 1803. 
 
 The audience yesterday produced nothing particularly 
 worthy of observation. The First Consul was civil, as usualy 
 biit avoided touching upon any point which could lead to the 
 subject in dispute. He aflPected rather to be entirely occupied 
 with arrangements for the revival of industry in the great 
 manufacturing towns, and was evidently at great pains to 
 convince me, as well by what he said to me as to those who 
 were near me, that his thoughts and time were wholly devoted 
 to such objects. He repeatedly observed that France was 
 sufficiently extensive, and that it was much better policy to 
 endeavour to augment her means by increasing her industry 
 and improving her cultivation than by extending her fron- 
 tiers. Your Lordship will perceive the drift of this language, 
 but you will, I am persuaded, give no more credit to it than 
 I do. We shall see what will become of all this moderation 
 and forbearance when he finds that if he does not attain his 
 real object it is because we know him too well to give him 
 credit for either. I neglected to mention to your Lordship 
 
104 MARCH 1803. 
 
 (and M. de Souza was not inclined to boast of it) a conversa- 
 tion which the First Consul had with him on the subject of 
 the dispute with General Lannes. In this conversation the 
 First Consul was so violent as to exceed all bounds. He 
 treated M. de Souza with the utmost indignity, and more 
 than once gave him almost reason to fear that he would not 
 confine himself to words. The conclusion was that General 
 Lannes should convince the Portuguese that they were depen- 
 dent on him, and him alone, for their existence ; and that if 
 the Prince Regent ga>ve him any further cause of complaint 
 he would exterminate him and his whole country ; then they 
 might see what their English friends could do for them. It 
 is really painful to relate such indecencies, but such is the 
 man who boasts of his moderation and forbearance. One of 
 General Beurnonville's secretaries is returned from Madrid, 
 the object of whose journey is to palliate certain transactions 
 wherein the conduct of Beurnonville has been similar to that 
 of General Lannes in Portugal. It appears that the system 
 of smuggling has been carried to such a height by this 
 Ambassador in Spain as to become intolerable. The first 
 notice which was taken of it by the Spanish Government 
 produced only the most violent reproaches. The Chevalier 
 Azzara is now endeavouring to conciliate, and Beurnonville 
 will probably remain in Spain a privileged smuggler. Such 
 is the position of the German Courts with regard to this 
 Government that it is almost useless to take up your Lord- 
 ship's time with their concerns. It has, however, been said, 
 and with confidence, that that of Vienna has not shown 
 itself so disinterested as that of St. Petersburg, and that 
 the proposal of dismembering Turkey has not been absolutely 
 1 ejected. If such a project has been entertained, I should 
 suppose that its execution depends on the evacuation of 
 Malta; for as long as his Majesty's fleet is in the Medi- 
 terranean every attempt of such a nature, whether against 
 Egypt or the Morea, must be precarious, if not impracti- 
 cable. It should, however, be understood that this security 
 can only be for the present ; for when the First Consul in 
 time of peace doubles his military force, as he is now doing 
 
APPOINTMENT OP GRAND MASTER OF MALTA. 105 
 
 when he has an army at his command of near five hundred 
 thousand men, every country which is assailable by land, 
 and more particularly Turkey, will be exposed to his in- 
 vasion. Sure of the acquiescence of Austria and Prussia, 
 he will have on the Continent Russia alone to oppose him. 
 Such an opposition would, bowever, if well enforced, be 
 effectual for the support of the Turkish Empire, and more 
 particularly when combined with the maritime exertions of 
 Great Britain. The more we reflect upon it tbe more we 
 must be convinced that this is the only counterpoise to the 
 ambition of the First Consul. I have the honour to enclose 
 to your Lordship a cop}^ of the note which I have received 
 from the Cardinal Legate notifying tbe election of a Grand 
 Master of the Order of Malta, together with my answer to 
 that communication. In the present state of the discussion, 
 this event has not been mentioned to me by the French 
 Minister. He must feel that a very trifling obstacle indeed 
 is removed by such an election. 
 
 A. 
 
 D'apres le refus' que Lord Whitworth connoit avoir ete 
 donne par le bailli Ruspoli de la Grande Maitrise de Malte, 
 a laquelle Sa Saintete, suivant le convenu des Puissances, 
 I'avoit nomme, le pape est venu dans la determination 
 de nommer grand maitre de I'ordre de Malte le bailli 
 Tommasi de Cortone. Le cardinal Caprara a I'honneur de 
 faire part de cette nomination a Lord Whitworth, ambassa- 
 deur de Sa Majeste Britannique, qu'il prie de la faire connoitre 
 au cabinet de St. James, et d'agreer I'assurance de sa haute 
 consideration. 
 
 (Signe) J. B. Cardinal Caprara. 
 
 Paris, le 4 Mars 1803. 
 
 B. 
 
 Lord Whitworth, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipo- 
 tentiaire de S. M. B. pres la Republique fran9oise, a I'hon- 
 neur de remercier Son Eminence le cardinal Caprara, legat du 
 
106 MARCH 1803. 
 
 St. Siege, de la communication qu'elle a bien voulu lai faire 
 de I'election du bailli Tommasi de Cortone a la Grande Maitrise 
 de Malthe, et ne manquera pas de la transmettre a sa cour. 
 
 II prie Son E. d'agreer I'assurance de sa haute conside- 
 ration. 
 
 Paris, le i Mars 1803. 
 
 Lord Hawkesburt to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing St., March 9, 1803. 
 I think it important to lose no time in forwarding to your 
 Excellency the Address of the two Houses of Parliament in 
 consequence of his Majesty's most gracious message. It has 
 been carried unanimously in both Houses, without a single 
 improper question being put to his Majesty's Ministers, or 
 any expression irritating or offensive being made use of with 
 respect to the First Consul of the French Republic. I 
 entertain hopes that the result of this discussion will prove 
 most beneficial, and that it will particularly assist your Ex- 
 cellency in your communication with the French Government. 
 Sure am I that in the event of war there will exist but one 
 voice throughout the country in the support of his Majesty ; 
 and the knowledge of this disposition in the people of Great 
 Britain will, it is to be hoped, bring the French Government 
 to sentiments of moderation and justice. The House imme- 
 diately after agreeing to the Address voted ten thousand 
 additional seamen, and ordered the militia to be embodied 
 immediately. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, March 10, 1803. 
 
 Whatever may be the immediate result of the present 
 discussion, I should but ill discharge my duty were I to 
 endeavour to encourage your Lordship in the belief that it 
 can be carried throijgh without coming to extremities. It 
 may perhaps be deferred, but it cannot, I fear, be avoided ; 
 
WAR CERTAIN IF TVE KEEP MALTA. 107 
 
 and even this respite can be attributed only to the want of 
 means and to give full effect to the First ConsuFs revenge 
 and hatred. I had two days ago a very interesting conversa- 
 tion with Joseph Bonaparte, in which he deplored in very 
 strong terms, and such as convinced me that he was not 
 wholly indifferent to personal considei^ations, the calamities 
 which the question of Malta was likely to draw down upon 
 this country, and eventually on Europe. He gave me 
 clearly to understand — and I ^.m persuaded he did it with a 
 better motive than the First Consul had done — that a war 
 must be the inevitable consequence of our refusal to execute 
 this part of the Treaty-of Amiens ; that the determination of 
 the First Consul was fixed, and that all the reasoning and 
 arguments of his more dispassionate friends were unavailing. 
 He was clearly of opinion that the First Consul would not 
 attempt to carry his views on Egypt into effect at this 
 moment, even supposing we were not in the way, but he 
 would not undertake to say that the hope of acquiring that 
 country would be ever abandoned. He was candid enough 
 to admit the force of our arguments, and was very much 
 disposed to throw the whole blame on the temper of the 
 First Consul, which, he said, was so irritable on this point 
 that none of his family dared to mention it. In short, the 
 amount of what I could collect from him was that the First 
 Consul was determined to go to war for Malta, in spite of 
 everything which could be urged by his family and by some 
 of his Ministers, or of the unpopularity which such a 
 measure would draw upon him. At the same time, I have it 
 from good authority that an officer has been despatched into 
 Italy with orders to General Murat to demand of the King 
 of Naples a free passage into Sicily for a French army, as a 
 preparatory step to the expulsion of the English forces from 
 Malta. Although no attack is to be apprehended from that 
 or any other quarter, yet the occupation of Sicily by the 
 French will be a very serious misfortune, whether it be con- 
 sidered as depriving eventually the King of Naples of so 
 great a part of his dominions, or as cutting off the sup- 
 plies which Malta receives from that island. Orders have 
 
108 MARCH 180S. 
 
 been also sent to the different French ports to equip as 
 expeditiously as possible, without exciting alarm ; and a 
 frigate is despatched to the West Indies to put the fleet and 
 army at St. Domingo, as well as the other colonies, on their 
 guard. The First Consul has also since my last despatch 
 made an attempt on Count Marcoff similar to that which he 
 made upon me. He invited him two days ago to a conference, 
 in which he went over the same arguments he had employed 
 with me, all tending to convince him that he was determined 
 to go to war rather than suffer the English to remain in 
 possession of Malta, and concluding with the hope that the 
 Emperor of Russia would approve his resolution, founded on 
 a sense of dignity and of justice. Count Marcoff assured me 
 that he combated his reasoning with freedom, though without 
 any apparent success. He is persuaded, however, that none of 
 the arguments used by the First Consul will have the smallest 
 weight with the Emperor. In the meantime the First Consul 
 proposes despatching immediately one of his aides-de-camp 
 to Petersburg to make the attempt. I think it right to in- 
 form your Lordship that in conversing last night with Count 
 Marcoff on the present situation of affairs, and more particu- 
 larly on the nature of the security which could be resorted 
 to, supposing we should ever be inclined to evacuate Malta, I 
 was induced to throw out the idea of a triple guarantee of 
 Great Britain, Eussia, and France as the most likely means 
 of obtaining the end we proposed. He doubted as well as 
 myself whether even this would be sufficient to restrain the 
 ambition of the First Consul, but admitted that were he, in 
 defiance of such an engagement, to acquire by a sudden 
 invasion either Egypt or any other portion of the Turkish 
 Empire, he must be inevitably expulsed by the united efforts 
 of the Russians and Turks on one side, and those of the 
 British fleet and army on the other. He at the same time 
 declared that such a plan would be so perfectly congenial to 
 the Emperor of Russia's sincere desire to preserve the 
 Turkish Empire, that he should feel himself fully authorised 
 to sign such an act, were it presented to him, without any 
 fresh instructions from his Court. Although this was merely 
 
RETUEN OF ENGLISH SEAMEN. 109 
 
 conversation, I think it my duty to state it to your Lordship. 
 I have, however, great doubt whether the First Consul would 
 accede to such a plan, or, indeed, whether under any circum- 
 stances his Majesty could consent to relinquish this important 
 point, since it is almost certain that, were we to do so to- 
 morrow in the hope of avoiding a war, we should be very 
 soon drawn into hostilities, but under much more disad- 
 vantagoues circumstances, for the defence or recovery of 
 Egypt. 
 
 Paris, March 10, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's three separate despatches, with their enclosures, 
 of the 4th inst. With respect to the facilitating the return 
 of the English seamen who are now in this country, I confess 
 I am at a loss how to proceed. The paper which Mr. Croker 
 presented to Sir Evan Nepean points out the number of 
 such seamen and the expense attending their departure ; but 
 it omits the most material point, which is the method by 
 which I am to ascertain their wish of quitting this country 
 and to offer them any assistance should they be so disposed. 
 Any attempt at a communication with them on my part 
 would immediately excite the attention of this Government,, 
 and indeed any person I might send would be exposed to 
 great personal danger. In my own opinion, the best method 
 would be for Mr. Croker, who probably has been in the habit 
 of communicating with these people, to come over and take 
 charge of the business himself. It must be done in a secret 
 manner: such is the jealousy of a public mission, that any 
 step I might take would be inevitably defeated, and in all 
 probability occasion the immediate removal of them to the 
 West Indies, or anywhere else more out of our reach. Any 
 formal application on my part to the French Government 
 would probably be answered by the assertion that they had 
 no desire to return, and means would be taken to prevent my 
 ascertaining the truth of that assertion. 
 
110 MAKCH 1803. 
 
 Paris, March 10, 1803. 
 
 Your Lordship may depend upon my not neglecting the 
 hint you gave me in your letter of the 4th inst., and I wish 
 I could at present see any prospect of giving it effect. I 
 fear there is no compromise to be made with the pride and 
 hatred of the First Consul. Both these will urge him to 
 extremities as soon as he conceives himself in a situation 
 to throw off the mask. We may be able to spin out the 
 negotiation for some months, and then we must expect the 
 effect of his rancour, unless in the interim something should 
 arise in this country more likely to restrain him within the 
 bounds of prudence and moderation than any arguments 
 used. Although the chapter of accidents is not to be de- 
 pended upon in the common course of politics, yet in the 
 present instance surely some dependence may be placed upon 
 it, and at all events we shall at the end of a few months be 
 better prepared to meet his attack than he to make it. I 
 think, however. I should mislead your Lordship were I to 
 give any hope that we shall be able to retain Malta without 
 fighting for it, even on the terms suggested in your last 
 private letter. I make no doubt that your Lordship will 
 have communicated with Count Woronzow on this subject ; 
 he may be of the greatest use in keeping the Emperor right, 
 and, if I may judge from the court Count Marcoff pays to 
 him, his credit is considerable at Petersburg. A Mr. Alsop 
 has written to me to beg I will mention him to your Lord- 
 ship as a person who is known to me. I made his acquaint- 
 ance when I was at Copenhagen two years ago, and found 
 him intelligent, uncommonly active, and useful. 
 
 Paris, March 12, 1803. 
 
 The messenger Mason arrived yesterday morning early 
 with your Lordship's private letter of the 7th informing me 
 that in consequence of the preparations in the ports of France 
 and Holland, which, though avowedly intended for colonial 
 service, might in the event of a rupture be turned against 
 
king's message of march 8. Ill 
 
 some part of the British dominions, his Majesty had judged 
 it expedient to send a message to both Houses of Parliament 
 recommending in terms void of offence the adoption of such 
 measures as may be consistent with the honour of his crown 
 and the security of his dominions, and at the same time such 
 as will manifest his Majesty's disposition for the preservation 
 of peace. I beg leave to return your Lordship my thanks 
 for having apprised me of this circumstance by a special 
 messenger ; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand 
 at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was 
 just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and 
 appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with 
 me to his cabinet, and though he told me he was pressed for 
 time, he suffered me to relate the circumstance without in- 
 terruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that this 
 measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least degree 
 intended as a menace, which would be equally unworthy of 
 both parties. I explained to him the difference in the forms 
 of such proceedings in the two countries : that in this the 
 Government might adopt and carr}^ into effect any measure 
 it thought proper with a view to offence or defence without 
 any communication whatever ; but that in England the case 
 was different, and, however urgent the necessity might be, 
 his Majesty could not depart from the established forms of 
 communicating his intentions by message to both Houses of 
 Parliament ; that a degree of publicity was thus given in 
 England which was not necessary here ; and it was to that 
 necessity, and not to any idea of menace, that the publicity 
 was to be attributed. I concluded my observations by re- 
 peating that it was merely a measure of self-security founded 
 on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of 
 France and Holland, remarking at the same time that had 
 not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, 
 the very circumstance of the First Consul's determination to 
 augment so considerably his army in time of peace would 
 have been a full and sufficient pretext for such a measure of 
 precaution. M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was 
 already acquainted with the business ; that a messenger had 
 
112 MARCH 1803. 
 
 that morning arrived who had brought him a copy of the 
 message, which he communicated to me. I could draw from 
 him no reply whatever to my observations. He confined 
 himself strictly to the assurance which he has so repeatedly 
 made — that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm 
 which was felt by his Majesty's Ministers ; that the First 
 Consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of 
 attacking his Majesty's dominions unless forced to do so by 
 a commencement of hostilities on our part ; that he should 
 always consider the refusal to evacuate Malta as such a 
 commencement of hostilities ; and that, as we had hitherto 
 hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures 
 which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every 
 idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having 
 any other destination than to the colonies, and concluded 
 that for his part he could not comprehend the motives which 
 had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of 
 his Majesty's Government. He then desired leave to go to 
 the First Consul, promising that he would let me know the 
 result when we met at dinner at the Prussian Minister's. 
 He did not come there tiU near seven o'clock, and when we 
 rose from table he took me aside and informed me that, 
 although the First Consul had been highly irritated at the 
 unjust suspicion which his Majesty's Government entertained, 
 yet he would not allow himself to be so far mastered by his 
 feelings as to lose sight of the calamities which the present 
 discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much 
 on this topic, and explained the measures to which he 
 should be obliged to resort. He said that if England wished 
 to discuss fairly he wished the same ; that if England pre- 
 pared for war he would do the same ; and that if England 
 should finally determine on hostilities he trusted to the 
 support of the French nation in the cause of honour and 
 justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not 
 wish for war, that peace was as necessary to us as it could 
 be to France, that all we desired and all that we were con- 
 tending for was security, that everything proved to us that 
 that security was threatened by the First Consul's views on 
 
CHARACTER OF THE FIRST CONSUL. 113 
 
 Egypt, and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta 
 was become as much a necessary precaution as the defence 
 of any part of his Majesty's dominions. To this kind of 
 reasoning M. de Talleyrand opposed the moderation of the 
 First Consul, his great self-denial, and his determination to 
 sacrifice even the most favourite points to his sincere desire 
 to avoid a rupture. In the common course of this conversa- 
 tion I should mention to your Lordship that I threvsr out a 
 hint of wh-Sit your Lordship suggested to me in your private 
 letter of the 4th inst. ; but M. de Talleyrand paid but little 
 attention to it, and assured me that the First Consul would 
 neither now nor at any other time, unless forced to do so 
 by the event of a disastrous war, admit any compromise 
 whatever on the subject of Malta. M. de Talleyrand now 
 told rae that in order to facilitate my communication to the 
 First Consul's sentiments he would communicate to me a paper 
 which he had that morning drawn up with him ; that it was 
 not to be considered as a written communication, or as any- 
 thing absolutely ofl&cial ; that it was a memorandum to assist 
 me, but such as I might, if I chose, transmit to your Lordship. 
 I enclose it, and will only observe that it appears to mark 
 strongly the state of the First Consul's mind at the moment. 
 Notwithstanding my endeavour to represent the measure 
 which his Majesty has adopted as not intended as a menace, 
 he evidently considers it as such, and the answer is meant as 
 a retaliation. I think, however, there is this difference to be 
 observed. The message of his Majesty is calm and dignified, 
 whilst the First Consul's observations are strongly marked 
 with passion and petulance, and carry with them an appear- 
 ance of gasconade more descriptive of weakness than of 
 magnanimity. This, indeed, is the picture of the character 
 with which we have to deal. It must, however, be recollected 
 that pride forms also a principal ingredient ; and I fear I 
 should mislead your Lordship were I to give any hope of 
 our succeeding in setting aside the clause of the Treaty of 
 Amiens which stipulates the evacuation of Malta, unless it 
 be effected by force of arms. The recurrence to hostilities 
 may be protracted till both parties are better prepared, but 
 
114 MABCH 1803. 
 
 cannot, I fear, be ultimately avoided. I yesterday evening 
 received by Conrvoisier the Address of the two Houses of 
 Parliament, which your Lordship was so good as to send me. 
 I sincerely congratulate your Lordship on the highly proper 
 manner in which it passed both Houses, and I have no doubt 
 that this circumstance will assist my communication with 
 the French Government. I have thought it better, however, 
 that it should reach them by any other means than mine, in 
 order to obviate every appearance of exultation or menace ; 
 but it will, I am persuaded, have its full effect. 
 
 1. Si Sa Majeste Britannique entend parler dans son 
 message de Fexpedition de Helvoet, tout le monde sait qu'elle 
 etait destinee pour I'Amerique et qu'elle allait partir pour 
 sa destination ; mais d'apres le message de Sa Majeste 
 I'embarquement et le depart vont etre contremandes. 
 
 2. Si nous n'avons pas des explications satisfaisantes sur 
 ces armements de I'Angleterre, et qu'ils ont effectivement 
 lieu, il est naturel que le Premier Consul fasse entrer vingt 
 mille hommes en HoUande, puisque la HoUande est nommee 
 dans le message. 
 
 3. Ces troupes une fois entrees, il est naturel que Ton 
 forme un camp sur les frontieres du pays d'Hanovre et 
 qu'on remette d'ailleurs de nouveaux corps de troupes a 
 ceux qui etaient deja embarques pour I'Amerique, afin de 
 preparer d'autres embarquements et de se tenir dans une 
 position defensive et offensive. 
 
 4. II est naturel que le Premier Consul ordonne la for- 
 mation de plusieurs camps a Calais et sur les divers points 
 de la cote. 
 
 5. II est aussi dans la nature des choses que le Premier 
 Consul, qui etait sur le point de faire evacuer la Suisse, se 
 trouve force d'y maintenir une armee francaise. 
 
 6. C'est encore une consequence naturelle de tout ceci 
 que le Premier Consul fasse passer une nouvelle force en 
 
ANSWER OP FIRST CONSUL TO KING's MESSAGE. 115 
 
 Italie pour occuper, si cela devient necessaire, la position de 
 Tarente. 
 
 7. L'Angleterre armant, et armant avec tant d'eclat, la 
 France sera obligee de mettre son armee sur le pied de guerre 
 — mouvement tellement considerable qu'il sera un objet 
 d'agitation pour toute I'Europe. 
 
 Le resultat de tons ces mouvements sera d'aigrir da- 
 vantage les deux nations. La France aura ete obligee de 
 prendre toutes ces precautions en consequence des arma- 
 ments de I'Angleterre, et cependant on ne manquera pas 
 d'exciter la nation anglaise en disant que la France la veut 
 envaliir. La population britannique sera obligee de se 
 mettre sous les armes pour sa defense, et son commerce 
 d'exportation se trouvera, meme avant la guerre, paralyse 
 sur toute I'etendue des pays qu'occupe I'armee fran9aise. 
 L'experience des nations et la marche des evenements prou- 
 vent que d'un tel etat de choses a des hostilites reelles il n'y 
 a malheureusement pas loin. 
 
 Quant aux differends dont il est parle dans le message de 
 S. M. Britannique, nous ne nous en connaissons aucun avec 
 I'Angleterre ; car il ne parait pas imaginable qu'on ait pre- 
 tendu serieusement en Angleterre se soustraire a I'execution 
 du traite d' Amiens sous la protection d'un armement mili- 
 taire. L'Europe sait bien que I'on pent tenter de dechirer la 
 France, mais non pas de I'intimider. 
 
 Paris, March 14, 1803. 
 The messenger Mason went on Saturday with, my des- 
 patches of that date ; and until yesterday, Sunday, I saw no 
 one likely to give me any information, such as I could de- 
 pend upon, as to the effect which his Majesty's message had 
 had on the temper (for it is by that alone that he is influ- 
 enced) of the First Consul. I was, however, on that day a 
 witness of, and in some degree a sufferer by, its violence. 
 At the Court which was held at the Taileries, and the 
 which I attended for the purpose of introducing some English 
 
 I 2 
 
116 MARCH 1803. 
 
 gentlemen and ladies to Madame Bonaparte, he accosted me 
 evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by 
 asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that 
 
 I had received letters from your Lordship two days ago. 
 He immediately said, ' So you are determined to go to war.' 
 ' No, Premier Consul,' I replied ; ' we are too sensible of the 
 advantage of peace.' 'Nous avons,' said he, 'deja fait la 
 guerre pendant quinze ans.' As he seemed to wait for an 
 answer, I observed only, ' C'en est deja trop.' ' Mais,' said 
 he, 'vous voulez la faire encore quinze annees, et vous m'y 
 forcez.' I told him that was very far from his Majesty's 
 intentions. He then proceeded to Count Marcoff and the 
 Chevalier Azzara, who were standing together at a little dis- 
 tance from me, and said to them, ' Les Anglais veulent la 
 guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers a tirer I'epee, je serai 
 le dernier a la remettre. lis ne respectent pas les traites. 
 
 II faut dorenavant les couvrir de crepe noir.' I suppose 
 he meant the treaties. He then went his round, and 
 was thought by all those to whom he addressed himself 
 to betray great signs of irritation. In a few minutes he 
 came back to me, to my great annoyance, and resumed the 
 conversation, if such it can be called, by something per- 
 sonally civil to me. He then began again : * Pourquoi des 
 armements ? centre qui des mesures de precaution ? Je n'ai 
 pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France, mais 
 si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi ; si vous voulez vous 
 battre, je me battrai aussi. Yous pourrez peut-etre tuer la 
 France, mais jamais I'intimider.' ' On ne voudroit,' said I, 
 * ni I'un ni I'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence 
 avec elle.' * II faut done respecter les traites,' replied he ; 
 ' malheur a ceux qui ne respectent pas les traites ! lis en 
 seront responsables a toute I'Europe.' He was too agitated 
 to make it advisable to prolong the conversation ; I there- 
 fore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment 
 repeating the last phrase. It is to be remarked that all this 
 passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people 
 who were present. I was fortunate enough not to be be- 
 trayed into anything imprudent, or which could be miscon- 
 
SCENE OF MARCH 13, 1803. 117 
 
 strued ; I am persuaded that there was not a single person 
 who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, 
 and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the 
 occasion. I propose taking the first opportunity of telling 
 M. de Talleyrand that I go to the Tuileries to pay my respects 
 to the First Consul and to Madame Bonaparte, but if I am 
 to be attacked there in that public manner by the First 
 Consul, on topics which are made to be discussed in the 
 cabinet, I must refrain from presenting myself there until 
 I have assurances that the same thing will not happen to 
 me again. I hope, however, he will feel the impropriety of 
 his conduct ; and, indeed, I may be satisfied with the impres- 
 sion it has made on the public, by which his conduct is 
 generally disapproved and ridiculed. I think your Lordship 
 will agree with me that in this there are no traces of a 
 great mind. If he accuses us of wishing to intimidate, his 
 own conduct and language justify us in retorting the charge. 
 M. de Colbert, one of the First Consul's aides-de-camp, has 
 been despatched to Petersburg, and Count MarcofP, who 
 did not choose to write by him, despatches a messenger 
 to-morrow. I trust the Emperor will on this occasion show 
 himself as becomes his dignity and the station he holds. I 
 have written to Sir John Warren by this occasion, and I en- 
 close a copy of my letter. General Duroc is also gone sud- 
 denly to Berlin, and it is supposed to persuade that Court to 
 make a demonstration against Hanover. We must be pre- 
 pared for everything which malice and offended pride can 
 imagine. 
 
 LoED Whitworth to Sir John Warren. 
 
 Paris, March 14, 1803. 
 
 I am indebted to you for two letters, and I assure you 
 this debt has for some time past weighed heavily upon my 
 conscience. You will naturally suppose that under present 
 circumstances a free communication with you would be of all 
 things the most desirable ; but such is the danger of the post 
 
118 MARCH 1803. 
 
 here, and so circuitous and subject to delay the way of 
 England, that I have depended solely on the promises of 
 Count Marcoff, which have not been fulfilled until this 
 moment. He now sends a messenger to his Court to give an 
 account of the state of the discussion between us and the 
 First Consul, and if he acts up to what he has always pro- 
 fessed to me, and more particularly upon this very occasion, 
 he will represent it in such a manner as cannot but convince 
 the Emperor of the rectitude of our intentions, and counter- 
 act the effect of Monsieur de Colbert's mission. Both Eng- 
 land and France (or I should say the First Consul) look to 
 Russia for support : the former for the protection of what 
 remains of Europe, and the latter for its subversion. I know 
 but little of the Emperor's character, or that of Count 
 Woronzow and Prince Adam. If they will long hesitate on 
 which side to throw the influence of Russia, it will be on 
 the side of justice, honour, and self-security, on the which, 
 perhaps, depends the safety of Europe, and not on that of 
 ambition never satisfied and the most insatiable thirst of 
 plunder. You are not now to learn that it is on the subject 
 of the evacuation of Malta that the two Governments are at 
 issue. I have been instructed a fortnight ago to declare, that 
 until means are found to dissipate those alarms for the safety 
 of Egypt which the conduct of the First Consul has excited, 
 his Majesty does not think himself justified in giving up a 
 point on which the safety of that country, and eventually 
 that of his own possessions, so materially depends. In answer 
 to this assurances have been given that the First Consul has 
 no present views on Egypt ; that he has delayed his projects 
 on that country, not because he does not wish for it, but 
 because he is certain it must one day belong to him, either 
 by a private agreement with the Porte, or by the dissolution 
 of the Turkish Empire. This the First Consul told me him- 
 self. We have, however, reasons without end; and, had we 
 no other, the mission of Colonel Sebastiani would be suffi- 
 cient to convince us that the First Consul would not wait for 
 so distant an event, and, I hope, so uncertain an one, but 
 that he would, on the contrary, the moment his Majesty's 
 
LETTER TO SIR JOHN WARREN. 119 
 
 fleet should be withdrawn from the Mediterranean, and par- 
 ticularly from that point which may be called the Watch 
 Tower of Egypt, carry his views into effect by immediately 
 invading and taking possession of that country. Such is the 
 state of the question ; and you will not be surprised at the 
 anxiety of the First Consul to gain the acquiescence of the 
 Emperor, and to induce him to see the question in the light 
 in which he thinks proper to put it,- — that is, himself, frank, 
 candid, open-hearted, void of ambition, occupied solely with 
 the improvement of this country, and entertaining none of 
 those projects which are attributed to him by his enemies ; 
 and England, false, perfidious, renouncing all pretensions to 
 good faith and the observance of treaties, and endeavouring 
 to keep possession of Malta, not for the purpose of securing 
 Egypt, but in order to crush the trade of France in the 
 Mediterranean and keep the monopoly in our own hands. 
 Such reasoning will, however, have no effect on the Emperor. 
 It would, indeed, be humiliating if our good faith were to be 
 placed in any comparison with that of the First Consul. Our 
 motives speak for themselves, and are, I am persuaded, 
 admitted at Petersburg. The favourite expression of the 
 First Consul on this occasion is, ' Malheur a ceux qui n'ob- 
 servent pas les traites ! ' — the natural answer to which is, 
 'Malheur a ceux dont Fambition necessite leur infraction! ' 
 The great point to be now carried with regard to Eussia is, 
 I apprehend, not so much to engage it in war with us at the 
 first outset — for that, I suppose, would be nearly impossible 
 — but to insure its concurrence in and countenance of our 
 measures and conduct ; and that in the Emperor's answer to 
 the First Consul, whether by Monsieur de Colbert or through 
 the regular channel, there should be nothing wliich can be 
 construed into an approbation of which he would immediately 
 avail himself as a justification to the French nation of the 
 war in which his ambition and violence may plunge it. Such 
 a satisfaction will, I think, not be difficult to obtain from the 
 Emperor Alexander, and from those in whom he places his 
 confidence. It would be conformable to the principles which 
 I have always known them to entertain ; and when the ques- 
 
120 MARCH 1803. 
 
 tion is to be tried of the purity of the views of the two 
 Governments, I trust it is not difficult to foresee on which 
 side the scale will preponderate. The countenance of the 
 Emperor will therefore be of the utmost importance, and 
 indeed have such an influence on the discussion as perhaps 
 to terminate it without a recourse to war, which once begun 
 might not be concluded without involving those who think 
 themselves the most secure. All these arguments will have 
 been suggested to you by Lord Hawkesbury ; they will 
 have occurred to yourself, as they must do to everyone who 
 thinks soberly on this business. I will not, however, apolo- 
 gise for the repetition of them, but conclude with sincerely 
 hoping that they will have that effect on the decision of the 
 Emperor which his own dignity and the security of whab 
 remains of Europe still independent of France so evidently 
 demand. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, March 15, 1803. 
 
 I send your Excellency a copy of the note presented to 
 me by General Andreossy on the 10th inst., and a copy of 
 the answer which I have this day by his Majesty's commands 
 returned to it. I have only to desire that in all your com- 
 munications with the French Government you would endea- 
 vour to conform yourself as much as possible to the language 
 and sentiments contained in the answer to that note. It is 
 of the utmost importance that the French Government 
 should not be led to believe that the island of Malta is the 
 sole, or even the chief, cause of the differences subsisting be- 
 tween the two countries, but that you should impress upon 
 them that their acts of aggression and views of aggrandise- 
 ment have principally occasioned the present situation of 
 affairs, and that in every discussion which may take place 
 between your Excellency and the French Government you 
 should bring forward all the grounds of complaint which his 
 Majesty feels he is warranted in giving against them. 
 
^ or 
 t £dLiFORSi^ 
 ENGLISH ANSWEE TO GENERAL ANDBeSUtT'^ 121 
 
 To General Andreosst. 
 
 The undersigned, his Majesty's principal Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King the note of 
 his Excellency the French Ambassador of the 10th inst. In 
 obeying the commands of his Majesty, by returning an 
 official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary 
 for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which 
 have been already given on more than one occasion by him- 
 self verbally to General Andreossy, and by Lord Whitworth 
 to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the 
 points which appear to be connected with it. He can have 
 no difficulty in assuring the French Ambassador that his 
 Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty 
 of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner ; 
 but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty 
 as having been founded on principles different from those 
 which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent 
 treaty or convention, — namely, that they were negotiated with 
 reference to the actual state of possession of the different 
 parties, and of the treaties or public engagements by which 
 they were bound at the time of its conclusion, and that if 
 that state of possession and of engagements was so materially 
 altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the 
 nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, 
 according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose 
 of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential 
 difference which such acts may have subsequently made in 
 their relative situation ; that if there ever was a case to which 
 this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety it 
 was that of the late Treaty of Peace, for the negotiation was 
 conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but 
 specially agreed to in an official note by the French Govern- 
 ment, viz. tJiat his Majesty should heep a compensation out of 
 his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made 
 hy France upon the Continent. This is a sufficient proof that 
 the compact was understood to have been concluded in rela- 
 
122 MARCH 1803. 
 
 tion to the then existing state of things ; for the measure of 
 his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with refer- 
 ence to the acquisitions of France at that time. And if the 
 interference of the French Government in the general affairs 
 of Europe since that period; if their interposition with 
 respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was 
 guaranteed hj them at the time of the conclusion of the 
 Treaty of Peace ; if the acquisitions which have been made 
 by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, 
 have extended the territory and increased the power of 
 France : his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with 
 the spirit of the Treaty of Peace, in claiming equivalents for 
 these acquisitions as some counterpoise to the augmentation 
 of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to 
 prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of 
 consolidating the general peace of Europe as far as might 
 be in his power, was willing to have waived the preten- 
 sions he might have a right to advance of this nature ; and 
 as the other articles of the Definitive Treaty have been in 
 a course of execution on his part, so he would have been 
 ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conform- 
 able to the true intent and spirit of the tenth article, the 
 execution of that arrangement according to its terms having 
 been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was 
 not in his Majesty's power to control. Whilst his Majesty 
 was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and for- 
 bearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in con- 
 formity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by 
 the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel 
 Sebastiani to the First Consul. This report contains the most 
 unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's 
 Government, against the officer commanding his forces in 
 Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter — in- 
 sinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and 
 such as would have warranted his Majesty in demanding 
 that satisfaction which, on occasions of this nature, inde- 
 pendent Powers in a state of amity have a right to expect 
 from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the 
 
GEIEVANCES AGAINST BONAPARTE. 123 
 
 highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's 
 dominions, and directly repugnant to and utterly incon- 
 sistent with the spirit and letter of the Treaty of Peace con- 
 cluded between his Majesty and the French Government. 
 His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed 
 to make such a representation to the French Government as 
 his Majesty felt to be called for by imputations of the nature 
 above described, by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent 
 with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his 
 people ; and as a claim had recently been made by the French 
 Government on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, Lord 
 Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation 
 by a declaration on the part of his Majesty that before he 
 could enter into any further discussions relative to that 
 island it was expected that satisfactory explanations should 
 be given upon the various points respecting which his 
 Majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, 
 founded on principles incontestably just, and couched in 
 terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly dis- 
 regarded by the French Government : no satisfaction has 
 been afforded, no explanation whatever has been given ; but, 
 on the contrary, his Majesty's suspicions of the views of the 
 French Government with respect to the Turkish Empire have 
 been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. 
 Under these circumstances his Majesty feels that he has no 
 alternative, and that a just regard to his own honour and to 
 the interests of his vpeople makes it necessary for him to 
 declare that he cannot consent that his troops should eva- 
 cuate the island of Malta until substantial security has been 
 provided for those objects which, under the present circum- 
 stances, might be materially endangered by their removal. 
 With respect to several of the positions stated in the note, 
 and grounded on the idea of the tenth article being executed 
 in its literal sense, they call for some observations. By the 
 tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens, the island of Malta 
 was to be restored by his Majesty to the Order of St. John, 
 upon certain conditions. The evacuation of the island at a 
 specified period formed a part of these conditions ; and if the 
 
124 MARCH 1803. 
 
 other stipulations had been in a due course of execution, his 
 Majesty would have been bound, by the terms of the treaty, 
 to have ordered his forces to evacuate the island. But these 
 conditions must be considered as being all of equal effect ; and 
 if any material parts of them should have been found inca- 
 pable of execution, or if the execution of them should from 
 any circumstances have been retarded, his Majesty would be 
 warranted in deferring the evacuation of the island until 
 such time as the other conditions of the article could be 
 effected, or until some new arrangement could be concluded 
 which should be judged satisfactory by the contracting 
 parties. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, 
 except on condition that the Maltese Langue should be 
 abolished ; the silence of the Court of Berlin with respect to 
 the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the 
 treaty, to become a guaranteeing Power ; the abolition of the 
 Spanish Priories in defiance of the treaty to which the King 
 of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese 
 Government of their intention to sequestrate the property of 
 the Portuguese Priory, as forming a part of the Spanish 
 Langue, unless the property of the Spanish Priories was 
 restored to them : these circumstances would have been 
 sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have war- 
 ranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the 
 island. The evacuation of Tarentum and Brindisium is 
 in no respect connected with that of Malta. The French 
 Government were bound to evacuate the Kingdom of Naples 
 by their treaty of peace with the King of Naples, at a period 
 antecedent to that at which this stipulation was carried into 
 effect. The French Government were likewise, by engage- 
 ments with the Emperor of Russia, to respect the indepen- 
 dence of the Kingdom of Naples. But even admitting that 
 the departure of the French troops from Tarentum depended 
 solely on the article of the Treaty of Amiens, their departure 
 is, by the terms of the treaty, to take place at the same period 
 as the other evacuations in Europe — namely, one month after 
 the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, at which period both 
 Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his Majesty's 
 
HOPES OF A GOOD UNDERSTANDING. 125 
 
 forces ; whereas tlie troops of his Majesty were in no case 
 bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the 
 period of three months after the ratification of the Definitive 
 Treaty ; and even in that event it must be considered as 
 depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in 
 a course of execution. With respect to the assertion in the 
 note, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of 
 Malta until the period when the arrangements relative to the 
 Order could be carried into effect, it will appear by a refer- 
 ence to the article, that by the preliminary paragraph the 
 island was to be restored to the Order upon the condition of 
 the succeeding stipulations ; and that it was only from the 
 period when the restitution to the Order had actually taken 
 place that, by the twelfth paragraph, the Neapolitan troops 
 were to form a part of the garrison. The undersigned has 
 thus stated, with all the frankness which the importance of 
 the subject appears to require, the sentiments of his Majesty 
 on the note delivered to him by General Andreossy, and on 
 the points in discussion between the two countries. His 
 Majesty is willing to indulge the hope that the conduct of 
 the French Government on this occasion may be influenced 
 by principles similar to those which have invariably influ- 
 enced his own ; that as far as possible all causes of distrust 
 and every impediment to a good understanding between the 
 two countries may be completely and effectually removed ; 
 and that the peace may be consolidated on a secure and last- 
 ing foundation. The undersigned requests General Andre- 
 ossy to accept the assurances of his high consideration. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, March 17, 1803, 
 
 I called yesterday on M. de Talleyrand, to converse with 
 him on the subject of what had passed on Sunday last at 
 the Tuileries. He had been since that day so fully occu- 
 pied with his expeditions to different foreign Courts, that I 
 
126 MARCH 1803. 
 
 had no opportunity of seeing him sooner. I told him that I 
 had been placed by the First Consul in a situation which 
 could neither suit my public nor my private feelings ; that I 
 went to the Tuileries to pay my respects to the First Consul 
 and to Madame Bonaparte, and to present my countrymen, 
 but not to treat of political subjects, the discussion of which 
 was better suited to the cabinet than to a public assembly ; 
 and that unless I had the assurance from him that I should 
 not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable cir- 
 cumstances I should be under the necessity of discontinuing 
 my visits to the Tuileries. M. de Talleyrand assured me 
 that it was very far from the First Consul's intention to 
 distress me, but he had felt himself personally insulted by 
 the charges which were brought against him by the English 
 Government, and that it was incumbent upon him to take 
 the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence 
 of the Ministers of the different Powers of Europe. He 
 assured me that nothing similar would occur. Such is the 
 explanation given of this highly unjustifiable conduct of the 
 First Consul. He now affects to pass over as a premeditated 
 declaration what was the effect of petulance and ill-humour. 
 The fact is, they are heartily ashamed of it ; and as the First 
 Consul will have three weeks to reflect, I trust I shall find 
 him more temperate the next time we meet in the same 
 place. M. de Talleyrand did not neglect this opportunity of 
 entering into a discussion on the present posture of affairs. 
 He assured me that the First Consul lamented the lengths 
 to which they were likely to lead as much as any individual 
 in France ; that for his part he could not comprehend what 
 could be the motive of the uneasiness we expressed, or, 
 indeed, what was the discussion from which such serious 
 consequences could be apprehended. He gave me ' his word 
 of honour ' (and I must declare that I have in this instance 
 no reason to doubt it) that no armaments capable of giving 
 us the least uneasiness were carrying on in the ports of 
 France ; that as for those in the Dutch ports, their destination 
 was notorious. What, then, had we to apprehend ? For we 
 could not suppose the First Consul to be so wanting in 
 
CONVERSATION WITH TALLEYRAND. 127 
 
 common honesty and lost to shame as to meditate an attack 
 in the midst of peace. I told him that if he had read with 
 attention his Majesty's message, and the explanation which 
 has been given of it by his Majesty's Ministers, he would not 
 have attributed the measure of precaution which had been 
 taken to a want of confidence in the First Consul. 'No 
 such thing had been asserted or even alluded to. All that 
 had been said, and that in the plainest terms, was that a 
 discussion of great importance, the result of which was un- 
 certain, was on foot between the two Governments ; that the 
 nature of this discussion, of which he declared himself to be 
 ignorant, was neither more nor less than this : By the Treaty 
 of Amiens, England is bound to evacuate Malta when cer- 
 tain stipulations are fulfilled. England now refuses to do so 
 upon the plea, firstly, that since the conclusion of the treaty 
 the conduct of France had been such as to justify England 
 in seeking a counterpoise; and, secondly, that the First 
 Consul's views on Egypt, and consequently on his Majesty's 
 possessions in India, have been so plainly manifested, both in 
 direct opposition to the letter and spirit of the treaty, as not 
 only to justify England in keeping Malta, but even to render 
 such a measure absolutely necessary for the preservation of 
 his Majesty's dominions. This, then, was the nature of the 
 discussion, and he would not, I trusted, dispute its import- 
 ance ; that in the meantime a very considerable armament 
 was preparing in the ports of Holland, obviously with a view 
 to the colonies. But who could say that that armament 
 might not be directed towards the coasts of England, from 
 which it was but the distance of a day and a half's sail, should 
 this important discussion lead to hostilities ; and in that 
 event what would be our situation ? They would find both 
 the coasts and the country perfectly unprepared. And I 
 appealed to him whether his Majesty's Ministers would have 
 been worthy of the confidence they possessed had they in- 
 curred the most remote risk of such an order of things. 
 They had done the only thing they had to do: they had 
 advised his Majesty to embody the militia, and to take 
 such other constitutional measures of defence as the circum- 
 
128 MAECH 1803. 
 
 stances seemed to require. M. de Talleyrand could not but 
 admit the force of this argument. He contented himself, 
 therefore, with protestations of the First Consul's sincere 
 desire of peace; at the same time, however, that he was 
 determined on war rather than suffer any infraction of the 
 Treaty of Amiens. He dwelt a considerable time upon the 
 subject without advancing anything new, or giving me 
 reason to suppose that the First Consul was more disposed 
 to compromise than he was a week ago. It is, however, 
 certain that he had no desire to go to war. He feels that 
 he has nothing to gain from us, and he feels that the whole 
 country is against it. How far these motives will operate, 
 supported by a continuation of the same calm and dignified 
 firmness with which his Majesty's Government has hitherto 
 proceeded, and which, whatever may be the feelings of the 
 First Consul and of those of his generals who urge him on, 
 is properly appreciated by the public, a short time will 
 show. In the meantime, I think I can say with certainty 
 that no armaments of any consequence are carrying on in 
 the French ports. Orders were given (as I mentioned to 
 yoyr Lordship in a former despatch) a fortnight ago to 
 equip what there was in the different ports ; but the total 
 want of naval stores, and the absence of by far the greatest 
 part of the naval force, render such an order almost nuga- 
 tory. A messenger has, however, been despatched to Madrid 
 to require twelve sail of the line and twenty-four thousand 
 men, by virtue of the treaty subsisting between the two 
 Governments. It has also been signified to the Court of 
 Naples, that, as the English Government refuses to fulfil the 
 Treaty of Amiens, it will be incumbent on the First Consul 
 to place himself, with regard to his Sicilian Majesty's domi- 
 nions, in the situation he was previous to the conclusion 
 of the treaty. The Americans, whose fears never suffered 
 them to doubt the professed destination of the armaments 
 in the Dutch ports, are now delivered from their apprehen- 
 sions. They are sanguine enough to hope that they shall 
 hear no more of the threatened exchange of the Floridas, or 
 even of the projects on Louisiana. It is certain that M. de 
 
SECURITIES FOR EGYPT. 129 
 
 Talleyrand has given the American Minister reason to sup- 
 pose that these projects will be deferred, and he trusts to the 
 chapter of accidents for the rest. 
 
 Paris, March 18, 1803. 
 I received your Lordship's despatch, with its enclosures, 
 this morning early, and I learnt at the same time that a 
 messenger had arrived from General Andreossy to M. de 
 Talleyrand. Shortly after,- M. de Talleyrand sent to desire I 
 would call upon him, which I accordingly did. He told me 
 that he had not only received your Lordship's note to the 
 French Ambassador, but also the sentiments of the First 
 Consul upon it, which he was desirous to communicate to 
 me before he re-despatched the messenger. This he did ; and 
 I refer your Lordship to the communication which General 
 Andreossi will make according to his instructions without 
 loss of time. From the tenor of this note your Lordship will 
 be convinced that this Government is not desirous to proceed 
 to extremities — that is to say, it is not prepared so to do ; 
 and therefore it expresses a willingness to enter on the 
 discussion of the point which appears, according to their 
 conception, or rather to the interpretation they choose to 
 give it, the most material. This of course is the safety of 
 Egypt. On this the First Consul declares in the note, as M. 
 de Talleyrand did repeatedly to me, that he would be willing 
 to enter into any engagement by which such a security as 
 would fully quiet our apprehensions might be given on the 
 part of the French Government. On the subject of Malta, 
 the First Consul maintains that he cannot listen to any 
 compromise. He is bound in honour to require the full 
 execution of the Treaty of Amiens, and therefore cannot in 
 honour give up the point. With regard to Egypt, for the 
 preservation of which we say it is necessary we should keep 
 possession of Malta, he is willing to enter into any engage- 
 ment which may be thought sufficient. I told him that he 
 had departed from the letter and the sense of your Lordship's 
 
 K 
 
130 MARCH 1803. 
 
 note by confining the question to Malta alone. That note 
 had comprehended other most important considerations : 
 that the best method of bringing the discussion to a speedy 
 conclusion, such as his Majesty's Government appeared to 
 wish, was to take it up on a broader scale ; but that at the 
 same time his Majesty's Government would not refuse to lend 
 itself to anything reasonable which might be suggested. 
 There was, however, I told him, one distinction to be made 
 in the situation of the two Governments in the discussion of 
 this question. France had no other ground than the main- 
 tenance of its honour, whilst England had the same, with the 
 addition of its security. B}^ our possession of Malta France 
 was not tlireatened ; bat the reverse was the case should the 
 access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation. I declared to 
 him, therefore, that I saw no means of coming to an under- 
 standing, unless Malta was conceded to us, if not in per- 
 petuity, at least for a definite term — such as might insure a 
 long continuance of peace. This, he assured me, would not 
 be possible to obtain ; and 1 did not touch on any other mode. 
 In this state the business is referred to your Lordship. And 
 I think we may fairly attribute even this disposition to 
 accommodation to the vigorous measures which have been 
 adopted by his Majesty's Government, aided by the un- 
 prepared state of this country. I re- despatch this messenger 
 without loss of time, to prepare your Lordship for the 
 communication which General Andreossy will have to make. 
 I should observe that M. de Talleyrand said to me, as a proof 
 of the First Consul's earnest desire to conciliate, that he had 
 refrained from everything which could look like a demonstra- 
 tion of hostilities. No orders had yet been given to arm in 
 the ports, no troops ordered to march to the coasts. This, 
 however, is not to^be taken literally. It is certain that the 
 greatest activity and bustle prevail in the naval and military 
 departments at Paris, whatever may be the case in the ports 
 and provinces. 
 
CAPTAIN WRIGHT. 131 
 
 Paris, March 18, 1803. 
 
 Captain Wright arrived this morning by the way of Havre 
 with your Lordship's letter of the 16th. I shall of course be 
 very happy to avail myself of this gentleman's aid and infor- 
 mation ; but I fear he is too well known to be of any material 
 service ; and I will confess to your Lordship that I am not 
 without apprehension that, in a moment of irritation like the 
 present, it may be recollected that he was a prisoner here, 
 and that he escaped from prison. I cannot but think a less 
 remarkable person, however intelligent Captain Wright may 
 be, might have been equally useful, without incurring the 
 risk of adding another pierre d'achoppement to the many 
 which we may expect to find in our way. I have, however, 
 told him he might remain here for the present, and see his 
 old friends, if they were willing under the present circum- 
 stances to renew their acquaintance — which I very much 
 doubt. For the rest, he has seen nothing at Havre which can 
 be construed into an armament ; and I verily believe this is the 
 case in every port of France. They doubtless will now begin; 
 but their means are so slender that their progress can be 
 neither quick nor alarming. On the subject of my despatch I 
 have little to add. It is evident that the First Consul is 
 under considerable embarrassment. I have no reason, how- 
 ever, to imagine that he is more disposed than he was to 
 renounce Malta ; but yet I do not think even this a desperate 
 case. But, at the worst, such arrangements may be made for 
 the security of Egypt as may appear best to answer our pur- 
 pose, short of the actual possession of Malta. I am at the 
 same time persuaded that, had it not been for the tone which 
 his Majesty's Government has assumed, we should not have 
 met even with a disposition to give us satisfaction on this 
 head. Much will doubtless depend on the line which Russia 
 may adopt. It will be endeavoured here to give the Emperor 
 the mediation, and nothing will be spared to gain the medi- 
 ator. Should the determination be such as we could wish, 
 and as we have a right to expect, I think we may look with 
 a well grounded hope to the possession of the object in 
 
 K 2 
 
132 MARCH 1803. 
 
 dispute, if not in perpetuity, at least for sucli a number of 
 years as might answer our purpose. But then we must do 
 as others do, and trust a little to the chapter of accidents — 
 faire ce qu'on pent is the next to faire ce qu'on veut. 
 
 CoPTE d'uke Lettre a M. Talleyrand. 
 
 Lundi, 16 Mars k minuit. 
 
 Je re9ois a courant un mot de Joseph Bonaparte, et void 
 ce mot : II n'y a rien a faire pour le moment. Apres vous avoir 
 quitte a 4 heures, mon cher Monsieur, je me suis rendu chez 
 moi, ou j'ai ecrit au Lord Whit worth correctement et litte- 
 ralement mes deux conversations du jour — la premiere avec 
 Joseph, la seconde avec vous. Je lui ai marque que vous 
 m'aviez expressement dit de lui donner ma parole d'honneur 
 que demain il me seroit expedie d'ici une depeche qui me 
 parviendroit dans la suite du mardi ou mercredi, que cette 
 depecbe porteroit vraisemblablement une proposition pour 
 rapprochement et dans I'esprit de I'ultimatum d'Angleterre. 
 J'ai lu ma lettre a M. Talbot, secretaire d'ambassade, qui a 
 fait partir un courrier pour la porter. Cette lettre parviendra 
 demain a midi, et ma parole d'honneur annon9ait decidement 
 une depeche officielle. Je suis comme assure que my Lord 
 Whit worth attendra jusque'a mercredi, a moins qu'il n'ait 
 trouve a Calais des instructions positives pour mettre a la 
 voile. Dans cette situation, veuillez vous mettre franchement 
 a ma place. Ce mot : II n'y a rien a faire pour le moment, me 
 prescrit d'envoyer un second courrier pour revoquer ce que 
 j'ai dit par celui de ce soir. Mais comme je me suis appuje 
 de votre nom, je pourrois etre doublement compromis si je 
 faisois partir ce second courrier sans vous en prevenir, et 
 sans vous prier au prealable de me donner I'explication de 
 ces deux mots si douteux. J'attends votre reponse, et d'apres 
 ce que vous me marquerez pour faire cesser la cruelle incer- 
 titude ou je suis, j'enverrai mon second courrier ou j'y 
 renoncerai. 
 
 Recevez, Monsieur, &c. 
 
PEACE OR -WAR. 133 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, March 21, 1803. 
 
 I have no material change in the aspect of affairs here to 
 announce your Lordship since my letter of the day before 
 yesterday. The First Consul is undecided on the line of 
 conduct he shall pursue ; his passions urging him one way, 
 and his reason, backed by the representations of his family, 
 another. In this dilemma, he appears to have made a most 
 dangerous experiment — that of calling to his most intimate 
 confidence those who are his most rooted enemies, and who 
 consequently will advise him to what they wish most likely 
 to lead him to ruin : these are Fouche and Massena. T have 
 reason to believe they were both for war. The thinking part 
 of those who are in the service of Government are, however, 
 very far from following the same course. The general 
 opinion is against it. General Berthier, the War Minister, 
 has, I am assured, declared his determination to resign 
 should hostilities be resolved on; and many others will 
 follow his example. In short, Bonaparte finds no encourage- 
 ment but from the needy and hot-headed aides-de-camp who 
 are in his ante-chamber. In his heart he is averse to the war, 
 from the same reasons which alarm so much his family ; so 
 that, though he will endeavour to put a good face upon it, 
 with a view to his dignity, he will, I am persuaded, at last 
 do much to avoid ifc. Everything, therefore, points out the 
 necessity of a steady and temperate perseverance ; for we may 
 be assured that, whether we are to attain our object by lorce 
 of arms or by any other means whatever, this Government 
 and this country must be convinced that we are in earnest ; 
 that we have not adopted the present vigorous measures 
 with a view solely to intimidate, but that our unshaken 
 resolution is Malta or war. To impress on this country such 
 a conviction, no means should be neglected ; and, were such 
 a thing practicable, every newspaper even which finds its way 
 here should repeat to them, Malta or war. In the meantime, 
 what is most to be feared is that this situation may last too 
 
134 MARCH 1803. 
 
 long without coming to a crisis. We shiill, it is true, remain 
 in possession of Malta; but at the same time we shall be at 
 the expense of a war establishment without the means of 
 keeping alive the spirit of the countr}^ Such an order of 
 things would well suit the policy of the First Consul. At a 
 very trifling expense he would oblige us to incur a very heavy 
 one, and if he could not exhaust our resources he might at least 
 wear out our patience. The Neapolitan Ambassador has 
 required the support of the Eussian Minister, by virtue of 
 the Emperor's guarantee, in his representations against the 
 threatened aggression on the Neapolitan dominions. And 
 the latter has declared that his Court would not see such an 
 infraction with indifference. Eussia is therefore already 
 engaged in the discussion ; and I think we are justified in 
 hoping that the part which the Emperor may be still further 
 induced to take will be so decisive as to afford us a prospect, 
 at the same time that we attain our individual object, of 
 consolidating a better system for Italy. Sienna and the 
 Presidi of Tuscany have not been accepted by the Eussian 
 Minister : he has submitted the proposal to his Court, but is 
 inclin3d to think that, in the present situation of affairs, it 
 would not be prudent to conclude. 
 
 LoED Hawzesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing St., March 22, 1803. 
 
 "Your Excellency's several despatches to No. 26 inclusive 
 have been received and laid before the King. With respect 
 to the subject of your Excellency's despatch No. 24, I have 
 it in command to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure that 
 you take the earliest opportunity to represent to M. de 
 Talleyrand the surprise with which his Majesty has learnt 
 the conduct which the First Consul had observed towards 
 your Excellency in the instance to which that despatch 
 refers ; and you will add that as his Majesty has a right 
 to expect that his Ambassador should be treated with the 
 
REMONSTRANCE WITH FIRST CONSUL. 135 
 
 respect and attention due to the dignity of the sovereign 
 whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present 
 yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul unless 
 you receive an assurance that you will never be exposed to a 
 repetition of the treatment which you experienced on the 
 occasion in question, and which is so entirely different from 
 the manner in which, under the same circumstances, his 
 Majesty thought it proper to conduct himself with respect 
 to General Andreossy. Although your Excellency appears 
 to have anticipated this instruction in one of your most 
 recent conversations with M. de Talleyrand, I nevertheless 
 think it right to enable your Excellency to state to that 
 Minister the sense which the King entertains of this trans- 
 action. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, March 24, 1803. 
 I have no commands from your Lordship since my last ; 
 neither have I anything very material to add to those 
 despatches. It should seem that the First Consul is more 
 composed than he was ; but I rather attribute this change 
 to the expectation which seems to have prevailed within 
 these few days, and which has been encouraged by some 
 people here, who disgrace the name and character of Eng- 
 lishmen, of the present vigorous measures being meant 
 merely as a menace to which no effect will be given. These 
 people have asserted to M. de Talleyrand — but I do not be- 
 lieve they have convinced him — that his Majesty's Ministers 
 will not venture to declare the ground on which they would 
 renew the war, and will ultimately accept of any compromise 
 rather than submit the matter to investigation. I have 
 repeatedly represented to M. de Talleyrand the views of 
 these gentlemen in holding such language, and the danger 
 in suffering it to have any influence on the determination of 
 this Government. I trust I have not been unsuccessful ; but 
 the expectation thus held out is too favourable to their 
 
136 MARCH 1803. 
 
 wishes not to be attended to with some degree of satisfac- 
 tion, although on reflection they must be sensible of its 
 futility. Various motives are assigned in the public prints 
 for this hostile appearance on the part of England; and the 
 First Consul has been himself at the pains of writing a 
 paper for the ' Publiciste,' in which it is asserted that it is 
 to be considered only as a measure of policy for the purpose 
 of getting rid of a number of dangerous people complicated 
 in the treason of Colonel Despard ; and this tale, ridiculous 
 as it is, finds credit with many. In the meantime the 
 utmost tranquillity is affected. No menacing articles, either 
 of defiance or of preparation, appear in the public prints ; 
 and this with a view to prove to the country that whilst 
 England breathes jealousy and hostility the First Consul is 
 all moderation and forbearance. Few are the dupes of this 
 manoeuvre. The preparations are, however, at the same 
 time going on. A considerable body of troops is ordered to 
 march towards the coasts, and will assemble in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Dunkirk and Boulogne. Orders are given for 
 building boats and other small craft at these ports and those 
 of Havre and Cherbourg, and the military people here affect 
 to talk with confidence of an invasion. Their confidence, 
 however, is, I am persuaded, not founded on so desperate an 
 undertaking, but rather on the hope of being employed 
 again in Holland and Italy, the invasion of which countries 
 would be attended with little danger, and where it is ex- 
 pected they may yet find wherewithal to gratify their love of 
 plunder. So much do they affect to depend on the resources 
 which they will afford, that the First Consul has declared 
 that the day he is forced to go to war he will remit twenty 
 millions of taxes. Although I have but little faith in their 
 menaces against his Majesty's doaiinions, I am not so secure 
 with regard to those of the King of Naples and of the Dutch 
 Republic. It is on those devoted countries that all the vex- 
 ation of the First Consul at not being able to give effect to 
 his hatred against us will probably fall ; and unfortunately 
 he will meet with no resistance in either. I can with the 
 utmost confidence assure your Lordship that I see no ground 
 
MALTA OR WAR. 137 
 
 for despondency. I am persuaded, as I have been from the 
 beginning, that by firmness and perseverance we shall attain 
 our object. We owe already two favourable symptoms to 
 the attitude we have taken : the first, a disposition to join 
 in any measure of security for Egypt ; and the second — 
 although it has not yet been mentioned to me I know it to 
 be in contemplation — an idea of satisfying us by conceding on 
 the subject of Louisiana. I am sensible that nothing can 
 satisfy us short of Malta: and I am at the same time satisfied 
 that such is the jealousy of our retaining any possession in 
 the Mediterranean, that to induce us to leave it no sacrifice 
 would be thought too great. It is that which checks the 
 favourite pursuit, and, considered as such, it is the only point 
 worth contending for. I cannot refrain from concluding 
 this despatch as I did my last, by repeating that, by what- 
 ever means we are to effect our purpose, this Government 
 must be convinced that the question is — Malta or war. 
 
 Paris, March 24, 1803. 
 
 The expedition to India, consisting of one of the sail of 
 the line and three frigates, has at length sailed from Brest ; 
 but not till several days after its departure had been an- 
 nounced in all the newspapers. Generals St. Suzanne and 
 Decaen are gone with it, and with them a man by the name 
 of Roger, who has passed most of his life in India. It is 
 he who is particularly charged with the political concerns, 
 such as gaining over the native princes, and of exciting 
 jealousy and mistrust against us. I am told that this man 
 is well suited to such purposes. According to the plan of 
 this Government, every French, Spanish, or Dutch ship going 
 to India is to take a certain number of troops, which are to 
 be in the pay of France from the moment of their embark- 
 ation ; and it is hoped by these means in the course of two 
 or three years to assemble a considerable European force 
 in that country without exciting alarm. A considerable 
 -"'>^v»er of ofl&cers of all descriptions are gone with the ex- 
 
138 MARCH 1803. 
 
 pedition from Brest ; but I am assured there are not more 
 than a few hundred men. The general of division Mont- 
 choisi is appointed Captain-General of the ' Isles de France et 
 de la Reunion,' and the general of division Ernouf to the 
 same situation at Guadeloupe. M. de Talleyrand announced 
 to me yesterday that the sailing of the expedition from the 
 Dutch ports, which was to have taken place about this time, 
 is now countermanded ; and he at the same time informed 
 me that it was the intention of the First Consul to make an 
 excursion this spring to Belgium and along the coast. This 
 journey is, I suppose, meant as a demonstration ; but I confess 
 I see nothing very alarming should he carry it into effect. 
 Antwerp is said to be the principal object of this journey, 
 and of the First Consul's attention. It is to be made a 
 naval arsenal for ships of war as well as of commerce, and 
 the most skilful engineers are now there for that purpose. 
 Of&cers of the same description are at this moment taking 
 surveys in Switzerland ; and such is the independence of 
 Holland, that it is actually included in the statistical account 
 of the French Republic lately published by the Minister of 
 the Interior. A second messenger was despatched two days 
 ago to Madrid in order to prepare that Court for the measure 
 of shutting the ports of Spain to the English trade on the 
 first appearance of a rupture with France. And the same 
 measure has been strongly recommended to the Court of 
 Berlin. Your Lordship need not, I suppose, be told that the 
 note lately presented to your Lordship by M. Schimmelpen- 
 ninck was fabricated in M. de Talleyrand's chancery. He 
 communicated it to me two days ago, and left me no doubt 
 whatever that he himself is the author of it. I should men- 
 tion to your Lordship that the order from this Government 
 prohibiting the exportation of coin has found the sum of 
 500,000 dollars belonging to the East India Company in the 
 hands of Thornton and Power, English bankers in this city. 
 They are taking means to remit them with as little expense 
 and delay as possible. The dismay of the public here, and 
 more particularly of those who are anywise engaged in com- 
 merce, is not to be told. They consider war as the ruin of 
 
LORD LAUDERDALE. 139 
 
 their hopes, which were just beginning to revive. The same 
 sentiment prevails all over France, and will, I have no doubt, 
 be conveyed to the First Consul. The Five-per-Cents. Con- 
 solidated are at something less than fifty-six; but every livre 
 at the disposal of Government is employed for the purpose 
 of supporting them. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Mr. Hammond. 
 
 Paris, March 24, 1803. 
 
 It is right that I should explain to you my motive for 
 sending on the messenger Hunter to London. It is not, as 
 you will perceive, on account of the extraordinary importance 
 of the despatches with which he is charged — although the 
 newspapers will not fail to attribute to it something of that 
 kind — but for the purpose of conducting to us the Duke of 
 Dorset, whom, notwithstanding the short time he, or indeed 
 we, may remain in this country, I have promised to allow 
 to come to us for his holidays. I have further to request 
 that you would give him an order for an extra packet for his 
 return. I have nothing to add to my despatch. It is diffi- 
 cult to foresee how all this will end ; but I cannot repeat too 
 often that it is absolutely necessary that we should stick to 
 our text in order to do away with the impression which some 
 of our rascally countrymen here have given. I have for this 
 last fortnight shut my door to Lord Lauderdale and all those 
 of his stamp with which this city swarms. It is rather 
 singular that Lord Moira should have given me as warm a 
 letter of recommendation as if it had been for his own 
 brother, to a Mr. Devereaux, an Irishman, and one whom 
 Lord Loft us assures me he knows to have been throughout 
 one of the foremost in the rebellion. 
 
140 MARCH 1803. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing St., March 25, 1803. 
 
 Your several despatches to No. 27 inclusive have been 
 received and laid before the King. I herewith enclose to you 
 for your Excellency's information the copy of a confidential 
 communication which I made to Count Woronzow on Monday 
 last. I think it right to apprise your Excellency that I have 
 not as yet received from General Andreossy any answer to 
 the note which I delivered to him on the 15th of this month ; 
 but I conclude that this answer will not be much longer 
 delayed. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, March 26, 1803, 
 
 It is, I suppose, in order to attach some importance to 
 the paper which accompanies this that M. de Talleyrand has 
 desired I would forward it to your Lordship by a special 
 messenger. And as Lieutenant George Jenkinson is return- 
 ing to-day to England, I entrust it to him. The style and 
 the spirit in which it is conceived leave no doubt of its origin ; 
 and indeed, were there no other reason for supposing it to 
 be the production of the First Consul, the solemnity with 
 which it has been communicated and recommended to me 
 would justify the suspicion. I could not, however, agree 
 with M. de Talleyrand on the great importance of the matter 
 contained in this note. I observed to him that, in the situa- 
 tion in which the two Governments stood with regard to 
 each other at this moment, none of the charges, supposing 
 them to be facts, could afford much surprise; that with 
 regard to the persons landed on the coast of France, whose 
 claim to the title of brigands I should not dispute, it would, 
 I made no doubt, appear that they were Frenchmen and 
 others sent into England on no friendly errand, and who, 
 having excited the attention of the police, had been conveyed 
 back to the countr}^ from whence they came ; that as to the 
 
FIRST CONSUL PROFESSES MODERATION. 141 
 
 second charge, it could not be wondered at if under the 
 present circumstances the armament carrying on in the 
 Dutch ports should be watched very closely by his Majesty's 
 cruisers ; and that on the subject of what might appear in 
 the public prints I could only repeat what I had so often 
 said, that his Majesty's Ministers could not be responsible 
 for any reports which they might propagate. After having 
 said this much on the several charges contained in the paper, 
 I confess I could not refuse myself the pleasure of observing 
 to M. de Talleyrand, on the subject of the extreme modera- 
 tion which the First Consul attributes to himself, that I was 
 glad he had limited the term to fifteen days, since if he had 
 added only two more to the number I should have been 
 obliged myself to testify against him. M. de Talleyrand 
 sent to me at ten o'clock at night to communicate to me this 
 curious paper. His impatience to see me had led me to 
 expect something more important. He did not seem much 
 disposed to talk on the subject of the discussion between the 
 two Governments, but asked me what was my idea of the 
 result. I told him that for my own part I was very sorry to 
 see no probability whatever of its ending as we both wished, 
 since it was quite impossible his Majesty should recede with- 
 out obtaining that satisfaction which his dignity as well as 
 the security of his dominions demanded, and he had given 
 no reason to suppose that the First Consul was disposed to 
 satisfy either. This brought on a repetition of professions 
 of forbearance and moderation on the part of the First 
 Consul, but nothing to the purpose. He told me that an 
 answer to your Lordship's last note had been sent two days 
 ago to General Andreoss}^, and I am to go to him this even- 
 ing for the purpose of its being communicated to me. il 
 received yesterday your Lordship's despatch No. 4 of the 
 22nd instant, and I shall this day communicate the purport 
 of it to M. de Talleyrand. Although I have in fact antici- 
 pated your Lordship's intentions, yet the stating to that 
 Minister the sense which his Majesty entertains of the con- 
 duct of the First Consul cannot but be attended with good 
 consequences. 
 
142 MARCH 1803. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Le soussigne, miriistre des Eelations Exterieures, est 
 charge de demaiider a Monsieur Fambassadeur d*Angle- 
 terre une explication cat^gorique sur la violation du terri- 
 toire fran9ois qui vient d'avoir lieu par le debarquement de 
 quatre-vingts brigands entre Ostende et Dunkerqiie, lesqiiels 
 onfc et^ jet^s sur la cote par des b^timents de Sa Majeste 
 Britannique. On est instruit, de plus, qu'un brick du Koi a 
 egalement mouille danslarade d'Ostende; qu'il a oblige une 
 chaloupe fran9aise de porter a terre seize etrangers qui ont 
 servi dans les rangs de I'armee britannique ; et Ton se 
 demande avec etonnement qni a pu porter a violer ainsi le 
 territoire de France et a f aire jeter sur ses cotes les mauvais 
 sujets de tous les pays. Plusieurs fregates angloises se sont 
 presentees a Helvoetsluys, elles croisent devant la rade, et 
 les capitaines ont declare a tous les bateaux du pays aux- 
 quels ils ont pu parler qu'ils etaient charges d'empecher la 
 sortie des b^timents fran9ais. On a fait repondre dans les 
 journaux de Londres une pretendue lettre du Premier Consul 
 au Roi d'Angleterre, ainsi que la nouvelle de I'echouage de 
 plusieurs batiments charges de cent mille armes pour 
 rirlande et portant les couleurs des Irlandais Unis. Toutes 
 ces clameurs paraissent avoir evidemment pour objet d'irriter 
 la nation francaise et de la mettre dans I'obligation de 
 repousser la force par la force. Cette marche du gouverne- 
 ment britannique n'est pas digne de sa puissance. Si, en 
 effet, Sa Majeste Britannique veut declarer la guerre, elle doit 
 le faire loyalement et ne pas se permettre, tant que la guerre 
 ne sera pas declaree, de violations de territoire et de pavil- 
 ion. La conduite du Premier Consul, depuis quinze jours qu'il 
 est provoque de toutes les manieres, a ete pleine de franchise, 
 de loyaute et d'une extreme moderation ; mais I'on se trom- 
 perait etrangement si on pensait que cette moderation pent 
 s'etendre a voir, de sang froid, des violations de territoire 
 et de pavilion. Le soussigne prie Monsieur I'ambassadeur 
 
VIOLATION OP SICILIAN TEREITORY. 143 
 
 d'ADgleterre de recevoir Passurance de sa haute considera- 
 tion. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, le 4 Germinal, an XT. 
 
 A S. E. Lord Whitworth, 
 Ambassadeur de Sa Majesty Britannique. 
 
 LoED Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, March 31, 1803. 
 
 I have to acknowledge yonr Lordship's despatch No. 5 of 
 the 25th instant, with the copy of a confidential communi- 
 cation of the 21st from your Lordship to Count Woronzow. 
 This paper has been transmitted by Count Woronzow to M. 
 de Marcoff, by whom it had been communicated to me ; and 
 your Lordship will have perceived by my despatch of the 
 21st instant that the Russian Minister had not waited for 
 this suggestion to remind the First Consul of the engage- 
 ments which subsisted between the Emperor of Russia and 
 his Sicilian Majesty, and consequently that any aggression 
 on the part of France on his Sicilian Majesty's territories 
 would be a violation of the Emperor's guarantee. The 
 answer made to the Russian Minister by M. de Talleyrand 
 was evasive, though couched in terms of high respect for the 
 Emperor of Russia. It by no means satisfied him, and he 
 assures me that he has made his report to his Court accord- 
 ingly. It is, however, not to be doubted that should the 
 present discussion lead to hostilities, not only the dominions 
 of his Sicilian Majesty, but also Portugal and the Batavian 
 Republic, would be invaded. Such plans are generally spoken 
 of as the only ones by which this Government can find an 
 indemnity for the expenses of a war ; and if they have no 
 other security than the morality or moderaticn of this 
 Government, their case may be considered as desperate 
 indeed. I have little to add to my last despatch on the sub- 
 ject of the question in dispute. It is calculated that an 
 answer to the note, which must have been presented by 
 
144 MARCH 1803. 
 
 General Andreossy two days ago, may arrive to-morrow or 
 next day ; and from this answer they expect to learn what 
 they are to depend upon. As far as my private opinion can 
 go, I have not concealed tliat if it is expected that his 
 Majesty will be induced to recede from his just demands 
 they will be deceived. In the meantime the preparations for 
 war do not correspond with the firmness of the language held 
 by the First Consul and his Ministers. They affect to rest 
 their claim on the impossibility of its being disputed. This 
 is the language which is constantly held. Although no 
 troops, at least to any considerable amount, are in motion, 
 eventual orders are given for forming a camp in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Breda, another near Dunkirk, another near 
 Bayonne, and a fourth near Verona. The situations of these 
 camps point out the countries against which it is meant to 
 act. As may be naturally expected in this moment of crisis, 
 all negotiations relating to the King of Sardinia are sus- 
 pended. His Sardinian Majesty's acceptance of the terms 
 which were offered would have been of no avail, since it was 
 clogged with a refusal to renounce his former possessions. 
 It is most ardently to be wished, not only on account of the 
 interest which the situation of his Sardinian Majesty must 
 naturally excite, but also as a measure of gratifying the 
 Emperor of Eussia, that some advantage may result to him 
 from the present discussion. On the subject of the Indian 
 fleet which sailed from Brest a short time ago, I have to add 
 that the number of troops on board was about fifteen hundred. 
 Amongst the preparations for war, I should not omit the 
 orders which have been signified to Prussia, to the Batavian 
 Eepublic, to Spain, to Italy, and to Portugal to shut their 
 ports to his Majesty's flag on the first news of a rupture. 
 The difference between this country and the Dey of Algiers, 
 as your Lordship will have seen by the public papers, is 
 adjusted, and ostensibly without the usual present from this 
 Government ; but in fact presents are preparing at this moment 
 for the Dey — probably with a view of conciliating that Power 
 under the existing circumstances. 
 
BRITISH CLAIMANTS. 145 
 
 Paris, March 31, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to enclose your Lordship an official 
 note which I received yesterday from M. de Talleyrand, and 
 also the answer which I returned to it this morning. Ignorant 
 as I am of the transaction, T could of course give no satisfac- 
 tory answer; though I will confess to your Lordship that in 
 the conversation I had with the several members of this 
 Government I have not hesitated to declare, as far as my 
 private opinion went, that Malta was the only point which 
 his Majesty had determined to retain. I beg, however, your 
 Lordship to understand that you are nowise committed by 
 anything I have advanced. I at the same time enclose an 
 answer which I have received from M. de Talleyrand on the 
 subject of the British claimants. About three weeks ago I 
 gave in a list of the claimants, with the nature and amount 
 of their claims ; and at the same time I represented to M. 
 de Talleyrand, as well as to the Grand Juge, in whose depart- 
 ment the decision ultimately rests, that it would considerably 
 facilitate the expedition of this business if commissioners were 
 appointed on the part of the claimants as well as on the part 
 of the French Government for its discussion and arrangement. 
 It should seem that this is likely to be adopted, subject, how- 
 ever to your Lordship's approbation. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, le 9 Germinal, an XI. 
 
 J'ai re9u la lottre que vous m'avez fait I'honneur de 
 m'adresser en me transmettant la liste de sujets des S. M. 
 Britannique qui reclament en France la restitution de leurs 
 proprietes. Je vais presenter au Premier Consul la proposi- 
 tion que vous faites de nommer pour I'examen et la recon- 
 naissance des titres sur lesquels ces pretentions sont ap- 
 puyees une commission nommee moifcie par le Gouvernement 
 francois et moitie par les reclamans. J'aurai Thonneur de 
 vous faire connaitre la decision qui sera prise a cet egard. 
 Recevez, my Lord, les assurances de ma haute consideration. 
 
 L 
 
146 MARCH 1803. 
 
 LoED Whitwoeth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 31 Mars 1803. 
 
 Le soussig-ne, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipoten- 
 tiaire de S. M. Britannique, a I'honneur d'accuser la recep- 
 tion de la note par laqnelle le citoyen ministre des Relations 
 Exterieures lui demande des explications sur une capitulation, 
 prise des gazettes, d'apres laquelle le cap de Bonne-Esperance 
 seroit encore en la possession des troupes britanniques. Le 
 soussigne n'a d'autres notions de cette affaire que celles qu'il 
 a tirees de la meme source que le Gouvernement fran9ois, 
 et par consequent se trouve sans moyen de donnerl'explication 
 desiree. II ne manquera pas de transmettre la note a sa cour 
 et s'empressera de faire connoitre la reponse au citoyen 
 ministre des Relations Exterieures aussitot qii'il la recevra. 
 En attendant il a I'honneur de lui renouveler I'assurance de 
 sa haute consideration, 
 
 (Signed) Whitworth. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Les gazettes viennent de publier une pretendue capitula- 
 tion entre les troupes anglaises et hollandaises, d'ou il 
 resulteroit que le cap de Bonne-Esperance seroit encore en 
 la possession des Anglais. Quoique le Premier Consul n'ait 
 pu ajouter aucune foi a la nouvelle d'une violation aussi 
 extraordinaire du traite d'Amiens, les bruits qui courent a 
 cet egard sont tellement accredites, surtout a Londres, et les 
 details de la capitulation sont si explicites, que le soussigne 
 se voit charge de demander a Monsieur I'ambassadeur 
 d'Angleterre des explications qui puissent dissiper tous les 
 doutes sur un fait ausai grave. Le soussigne prie Monsieur 
 I'ambassadeur d'Angleterre d'agreer I'assurance de sa haute 
 consideration. 
 
 Cn. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 A Son Excellence Lord Whitworth, 
 
 Ambassadeur de S. M. Britannique. 
 
french grievances. 147 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing St., March 31, 1803. 
 I transmit to jour Excellency herewith the draft of a 
 note in answer to that delivered to you on the 25th instant 
 by M. Talleyrand, and I am to desire you will communicate 
 it to that Minister either in French or English, according to 
 the language in which your Excellency has hitherto corre- 
 sponded with M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador 
 Extraordinary, having transmitted to his Court a copy of the 
 note which was delivered to him on the 25th instant by M. 
 Talleyrand, has been directed to inform his Excellency that 
 his Majesty's Government have no knowledge whatsoever of 
 either of the two facts which are stated in the first part of that 
 note, and which are represented as a violation of the territory 
 of France. They have, however, thought it their duty to 
 employ all the means in their power for the purpose of ascer- 
 taining the existence either of these facts, or of any circum- 
 stances to which such a construction could be given, and in 
 the meantime the undersigned requests M. Talleyrand to 
 furnish him with any information which he may have re- 
 ceived upon this subject. With respect to the British vessels 
 alleged to be cruising off the ports of the Batavian Republic, 
 his Majesty has several ships of war in the seas adjacent to 
 those ports ; but if their commanders have made any move- 
 ments or held any language which could be regarded as 
 being of a hostile nature, their conduct has been in direct 
 opposition to the tenor of their instructions. His Majesty 
 has received assurances from the French Government that it 
 is not their intention that the expedition to Louisiana should 
 proceed to its destination under the present circumstances ; 
 in which assurances his Majesty places the most entire con- 
 fidence. On the subject of the articles which have appeared 
 in the English newspapers, the undersigned can only repeat 
 what he has frequently stated — that his Majesty's Govern- 
 
 L 2 
 
143 APRIL 1803. 
 
 ment cannot conceive themselves to be responsible for any 
 articles that may be inserted in any other newspaper than 
 the one which alone is published by their authority, under 
 the title of the ' London Gazette.' The undersigned esteems 
 it to be unnecessary for him to make any professions of the 
 sincerity and moderation of his Majesty's Government, as he 
 can assert with confidence that the discussions which have 
 lately arisen have been conducted on their part with temper 
 and candour, and with an anxious desire to avoid anything 
 which could bear the appearance of animosity. The under- 
 signed requests M. Talleyrand to accept the assurances of 
 his high consideration. 
 
 To M. Talleyrand. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, April 4, 1803. 
 
 It is become essential that the discussions which have 
 been for some time subsisting between his Majesty and the 
 French Government should be brought to an issue within as 
 short a time as is consistent with the deliberation which 
 must be given to objects of so much importance. The last note 
 presented to General Andreossy in the name of his Govern- 
 ment, in answer to my note of last month, evades all explana- 
 tion, and even all discussion, of the points on which complaint 
 has been made to his Majesty. If the French Government 
 should seriously persist in this course of proceeding, there 
 can be no hopes of a successful termination to the present 
 negotiation. It is important, . therefore, that you should 
 ascertain distinctly from the French Government, in the 
 first instance, whether they are disposed to enter into 
 explanation on the points on which his Majesty has com- 
 plained, and to come to such an arrangement as may be 
 calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting 
 between the two countries ; and for this purpose you will 
 present a note to the effect of that which is herewith 
 
PROJECT OF ARRANGEMENT. 149 
 
 enclosed. It is possible that the French Government may 
 continue to evade all discussion on the points in question, 
 and confine themselves to a categorical demand that Malta 
 should be immediately evacuated. In that case it is his 
 Majesty's pleasure that you should declare the impossibility 
 of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the 
 two countries, and the necessity that you will be under of 
 leaving Paris within a certain time. But if, on the other 
 hand, they should show a readiness to enter into a discussion 
 and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, it is 
 important that you should be informed, without loss of time, 
 of the sentiments of his Majesty's Government as to what 
 might be considered as an equitable adjustment of the dif- 
 ferences between the two Governments at this moment. I 
 have therefore, by his Majesty's command, enclosed the project 
 of an arrangement which, under the present circumstances, 
 would meet the ideas of his Majesty's Government, which 
 would afford security for those objects which are considered 
 as endangered by the unequivocal disclosure of the views of 
 the First Consul, and which at the same time might entirely 
 save the honour of the French Government. If you should find 
 insurmountable objections made to this proposition, and an 
 arrangement founded upon it to be impracticable, you should 
 in that case call upon the French Government to suggest 
 some other equivalent security by which his Majestj^'s object in 
 claiming the permanent possession of the island of Malta may 
 be accomplished, and the independence of the island secured 
 conformably to the spirit of the 10th article of the Treaty of 
 Amiens. The justice of the principle on which his Majesty 
 proposes this arrangement cannot be disputed, viz. security 
 for those objects which must have been considered as secure 
 at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, but 
 which have been endangered by the proceedings of the 
 French Government since that period. His Majesty relies 
 on the zeal and diligence of your Excellency in endeavouring 
 to bring these discussions to a speedy conclusion, and on 
 such terms as may be consistent with the honour of his 
 crown and the interests of his dominions. Your Excellency 
 
150 APRIL 1803. 
 
 should understand that, in the event of the project in question 
 being acceded to as a basis of negotiation, his Majesty has 
 no doubt that the French Government will be disposed to 
 satisfy him by disavowing any intentional insult on their 
 part towards his Majesty in some of their late official publi- 
 cations, and particularly in that of the report of Colonel 
 Sebastiani. 
 
 The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador 
 Extraordinary, has received the orders of his Court to make 
 the following communication to the French Government. 
 His Majesty has perceived with great regret that tlie French 
 Government continue to withhold all satisfaction and ex- 
 planation on the points on whicli he has complained; that 
 at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of 
 his representations they persist in their requisition that the 
 island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. 
 His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself and 
 to his people as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding. 
 He has therefore commanded the undersigned to ascertain 
 distinctly from the French Government whether they are 
 determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and 
 explanation upon the points on which his Majesty has com- 
 plained, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give 
 such satisfaction and explanation upon the present state of 
 affairs as may lead to an arrangement which may be calcu- 
 lated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between 
 the two Governments. It is his Majesty's anxious desire 
 that by adopting this mode of proceeding an end maybe put 
 to that state of suspense and uncertainty which must be so 
 injurious to the interests of both countries, and that the two 
 Governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and 
 moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are 
 most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity. 
 
ENGLISH PROPOSALS. 151 
 
 Heads of an Arrangem,ent to be concluded by Treaty or Conven- 
 tion between his Majesty and the French Government, 
 
 Malta to remain in perpetuity in the possession of his 
 Majesty. 
 
 The Knights of the Order of St. John to be indemnified 
 by his Majesty for any losses of property which they may 
 sustain in consequence of such an arrangement. 
 
 Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French 
 troops. 
 
 The island of Elba to be confirmed by his Majesty to 
 France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged. 
 
 The Italian and Ligurian Eepublics to be acknowledged 
 by his Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy 
 for the King of Sardinia which shall be satisfactory to 
 him. 
 
 Downing Street, April 3, 1803. 
 
 I enclose to your Excellency for your information copies 
 of the official note delivered to me on the 29th ultimo by 
 General Andreossy, and of the answer which, by his Majesty's 
 command, I this day returned to that communication. 
 
 The undersigned, his Majesty's principal Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King the note 
 of his Excellency General Andreossy of the 29th of last 
 month. His Majesty has been induced, by that spirit of 
 moderation and forbearance which has invariably governed 
 his conduct in every part of his communications with the 
 French Government, to abstain from making any observations 
 which the perusal of this note may naturally have suggested 
 to his mind. His Majesty has perceived with great regret that 
 the French Government continue to withhold all satisfaction 
 and explanation on the points on which he has complained, 
 and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the 
 subject of his representations they persist in their requisi- 
 tion that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated 
 
152 APRIL 1803. 
 
 by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is 
 due to himself and to his people as to acquiesce in such a 
 course of proceeding. He has therefore judged it expedient 
 to give instructions to his Ambassador at Paris to ascertain 
 distinctly from the French Government whether they are 
 determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and 
 explanation on the points on which his Majesty has com- 
 plained, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give 
 such satisfaction and explanations upon the present state of 
 affairs as may lead to an arrangement which may be calcu- 
 lated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between 
 the two Governments. It is his Majesty's anxious desire 
 that by this mode of proceeding an end may be put to that 
 state of suspense and irritation which must be so injurious 
 to the interests of both countries, and that the two Govern- 
 ments, actuated by the same principles of justice and mode- 
 ration, may be led to concur in such measures as are most 
 likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity. 
 
 The undersigned requests General Andreossy to accept 
 the assurances of his high consideration. 
 
 Downing Street, April 3, 1803. 
 
 Downing Street, April 4, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's several despatches to No. 31 inclusive, 
 together with your separate despatch of the 31st ultimo, 
 have been received and laid before the King. With respect 
 to the note from M. Talleyrand, enclosed in the last-men- 
 tioned of those despatches, relative to the continuance of the 
 occupation of the Cape of Good Hope, I have to signify to 
 you his Majesty's pleasure that you deliver to that Minister 
 an answer in writing to his note in which you will state that 
 orders were transmitted on November 20 directing the im- 
 mediate evacuation of the Cape of Good Hope by his Majesty's 
 forces, and that consequently no doubt can now be entertained 
 of that settlement having been for some time past in the 
 possession of the Batavian Republic. 
 
LORD WHITWORTH RECEIVED BY NAPOLEON. 153 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, April 4, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge jour Lordship's 
 despatch No. 6 of the 31st ult., and will take the earliest 
 opportunity of communicating to M. de Talleyrand a trans- 
 lation of the note in answer to that delivered to me by that 
 Minister on the 25th. I wish most sincerely that the fair 
 and candid manner in which your Lordship has condescended 
 to reply on this occasion may secure us from a repetition of 
 such frivolous charges. I have little to add to my former 
 despatch on the subject of the negotiation. I am waiting 
 for the reply to General Andreossy's last note, which your 
 Lordship announces as likely to be forwarded to me in a very 
 few days. And I shall not fail in the interval to endeavour to 
 insure it at least a temperate reception, if such a one could be 
 expected from the irascible character to which it is addressed. 
 The Corps Diplomatique were assembled yesterday at one 
 o'clock for the purpose of paying their compliments to 
 the First Consul. He was, however, occupied from that time 
 till five in the evening in inspecting the knapsacks of about 
 eight thousand men assembled in the court of the Tuileries. 
 When that ceremony was performed he received us, and T 
 had every reason to be satisfied with his manner towards me. 
 General Duroc is expected to return to Paris to-day. I 
 understand that he is to bring nothing decisive, the Court of 
 Berlin having founded a pretext for delay by a reference to 
 the Emperor of Russia. I am happy to find, however, that 
 the point at issue is likely to be decided one way or the 
 other before the effect of such a reference, which might pro- 
 bably lead to a joint mediation, can be known ; since there 
 is every reason to fear that anything which might be pro- 
 posed by mediation so partial, at least as far as relates to 
 Prussia, would in fact leave the question in no greater state 
 of security than they found it. The effect of the present 
 state of affairs has been felt at Madrid, and that Court has 
 assumed courage to declare to this Government that it 
 
154 APRIL 1803. 
 
 cannot on any consideration consent to the proposal for the 
 exchange of the Floridas. I have the honour to send enclosed 
 to your Lordship the substance of a report made by M. 
 Blanchot, who has been charged by the French Government 
 to take possession of the island of Goree according to the 
 stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, and of his correspond- 
 ence with Colonel Fraser on this occasion. 
 
 It is well known that by one of the articles of the Treaty 
 of Amiens it was stipulated that the island of Goree, on the^ 
 coast of Africa, should be restored to France. The Govern- 
 ment has just received despatches on this subject, dated 
 January 26, from M. Blanchot, Commandant of Senegal, by 
 which it appears that under various pretexts the British 
 Governor refuses to deliver up that island. The following 
 is an extract of the correspondence between the French Com- 
 mandant and the English Governor. M. Blanchot, in a letter 
 of October 30, acquaints Colonel Fraser, the British Governor, 
 that he has instructions to take possession of the island in 
 his quality of Commissary of the French Republic, enclosing 
 at the same time his Britannic Majesty's orders to give up 
 that island, and requesting to be informed when these orders 
 might be put into execution. The Governor, in his answer 
 of November 9, says that he is ready to deliver up the place 
 the moment that the ti-ansports which he is expecting shall 
 arrive, to convey from it the garrison stores, provisions, &c. ; 
 adding that he had taken such measures as would insure the 
 speedy arrival of the transports. On the 18th M. Blanchot 
 despatches the corvette ' L'Impatiente ' pressing the restitu- 
 tion of the island. He writes thus to the British Governor : 
 ^ As the waiting for the transports which you expect would 
 cause a delay in the execution of our respective instructions 
 that might draw upon us a degree of blame which we cer- 
 tainly can have no desire to merit, I have the honour to 
 observe to you that we can still execute the evacuation ot 
 the island before the arrival of the transports, by taking 
 such measures of precaution as you may think proper to 
 
M. BLANCHOT. 155 
 
 adopt for the preservation of the stores, &c., which are to be 
 sent away in them. One of the vessels that will accompany me 
 shall take the garrison to Sierra Leone, and another shall be 
 employed for yourself and baggage.' Colonel Eraser replies, 
 on November 22, * that he regrets being the cause of any 
 fresh delay ; that, to his utter astonishment, the transports 
 which he expected had not arrived ; and that there was no 
 instance of a British garrison having evacuated an island 
 given up by treaty, under any other flag than their own; 
 that he might be severely reprimanded if he were to quit 
 the place in this manner ; and that he cannot give a definite 
 answer till after the return of a vessel that he had jnst 
 despatched to Sierra Leone. November 30 and December 12, 
 fresh applications on the part of M. Blanchot. December 21, 
 the British Governor writes to M. Blanchot : ' I have the 
 pleasure to inform you of the return of the vessel that I had 
 despatched to Sierra Leone. It brings me letters from the 
 Governor, in which he acquaints me that he has freighted a 
 transport of sufficient tonnage to take on board the troops^ 
 provisions, &c. This vessel was to sail from Sierra Leone on 
 the 4th or 5th of this month, so that I expect it every 
 moment : and upon its arrival I will immediately despatch 
 to you a courier fixing a day for the evacuation of the island.' 
 The 26th, the Governor acquaints M. Blanchot that this 
 transport, although hourly expected, had not yet arrived, 
 but he had just been informed that a ship would be imme- 
 diately sent from England to embark the garrison, and that 
 it might be necessary perhaps to wait the arrival of this 
 vessel before he gave up the island. January 5, M. Blanchot, 
 in his reply to the Governor, presses for the evacuation of the 
 island. Colonel Eraser, in his answer of January 14, says that 
 it is impossible for him to dispense with the arrival of the 
 ship from England, adding with the utmost politeness : ' As 
 you have expressed a fear that the delay in the restitution of 
 the island of Goree might bring upon us a reprimand from 
 our respective Governments, I shall be myself ready to do 
 you justice on this occasion, and to become personally re- 
 sponsible for all the blame.' M. Blanchot here terminates 
 
156 APRIL 1803. 
 
 the correspondence by communicating to Colonel Fraser that 
 he had taken such precautions as would put him out of the 
 reach of all blame. 
 
 Paris, April 7, 1803. 
 
 I received your Lordship's despatches of the 4th instant 
 by WagstafiP, with their enclosures, yesterday evening, and 
 shall probably in the course of the day have an opportunity 
 of communicating to M. de Talleyrand the note (No. 1), , 
 which I shall translate for that purpose. I hope this evening 
 to be able to give your Lordship some information as to the 
 effect it may have produced. In the meantime I cannot but 
 rejoice that the discussion is likely to be brought to a speedy 
 issue. It is on every account important that it should, 
 whether with a view to relieving the country from a state of 
 painful suspense, or of not losing this favourable opportunity 
 of striking the blow, should it be necessary. The language 
 now held by the First Consul to his intimates is that he has 
 made up his mind to see us destroy that part of his fleet 
 which is abroad, and even to regain perhaps possession of 
 his colonies ; but that if they succeed in their attempts to 
 invade England they shall quickly repair all their losses 
 and revenge themselves completely. This project of invasion 
 is, however, considered by everyone, in the present state of 
 their navy, as totally impracticable, and is, I am persuaded, 
 held out as a demonstration with a view to excite anxiety in 
 England, and to put us to the expense of a defensive system, 
 whilst this Government will incur no more than what must 
 attend the marching of troops to the coast, or to the coun- 
 tries which are destined to be its victims. It is really painful 
 to see to what a state of depravity the leading men of this 
 country are reduced. So far from feeling the least shame 
 or remorse at such an ungenerous and unmanly method of 
 retaliating upon us, they not only excuse but applaud it. 
 General Duroc returned on Thursday night. The chief 
 objects of his mission were to engage the Court of Berlin to 
 
ATTITUDE OP PRUSSIA AND RUSSIA. 157 
 
 accede immediately to the guarantee of Malta, and to make 
 a demonstration against his Majesty's electoral dominions. 
 On the first of these points the Court of Berlin has, if we 
 may give credit to the 'Moniteur,' conceded; and to the 
 second it is answered that, in the present state of affairs, his 
 Prussian Majesty does not feel justified in taking steps which 
 might tend to disturb the tranquillity of Germany. At the 
 same time that the Court of Berlin evades coming forward 
 as a principal, it expresses great readiness to undertake the 
 ofiice of mediator. This mission has, therefore, not satisfied 
 the expectations of the First Consul. It remains to be seen, 
 though I most anxiously hope the business may be settled 
 before any answer can arrive from thence, what will be the 
 language of the Court of Eussia. It appears to me that Count 
 Marcoff is endeavouring — or, more properly, is following — 
 the bent of his natural character by steering a middle course. 
 He has, in the different conversations I have held with him, 
 always appeared most anxious to know what would be the 
 idea of his Majesty's Government with regard to the Order 
 of Malta in the event of that island remaining in our posses- 
 sion ; whether it was to be preserved, and retain a settlement 
 on the island (which, he declared, would be most agreeable 
 to the Emperor), or whether it would be driven to the neces- 
 sity of looking for shelter elsewhere. The language which 
 I have always held is that on this, as on every other point, 
 his Majesty would probably concert with the Emperor, pro- 
 vided he should, as I made no doubt he would, approve 
 the line of conduct which his Majesty had been obliged to 
 pursue in order to retain possession of a point so essential 
 to the safety of his Majesty's dominions. I yesterday saw 
 M. de Talleyrand for the same purpose as I had visited 
 Joseph Bonaparte the day before — namely, to prepare him, 
 and through him the Eirst Consul, for the important com- 
 munications which I have now received from your Lordship. 
 After assuring me that nothing should be wanting on his 
 part which might conduce to the temperate discussion of 
 the question, a conversation took place which I think right 
 to communicate to your Lordship, In remarking on the 
 
158 APRIL 1803. 
 
 armaments which were carrying on in England, he said he 
 could not yet comprehend why and with whom we meant to 
 go to war ; for, says he, the First Consul is so convinced it 
 cannot be with him that he has not yet expended a single 
 shilling in preparations. I will confess to your Lordship 
 that I was piqued at this mode of reasoning ; and upon his 
 repeating the question I told him that in a very few days 
 I should, in all probability, be furnished with instructions 
 which would satisfy his doubts ; that his Majesty's Govern- 
 ment would state plainly and openly what were the points 
 necessary to restore confidence and to maintain peace ; that 
 if the French Government acquiesced in them, peace, and 
 what had been hitherto wanting to it — good harmon}^ — 
 would be the consequence; but that if our disposition to 
 conciliate should not be met with an equal one on their side, 
 then war became inevitable, and in that case we should, of 
 course, pursue such measures as might render it most effec- 
 tual ; that their naval force might be still further disabled, 
 their colonies wrested from them, their commerce, and that 
 of their allies, would fall a prey to our cruisers; and in 
 addition to all this we should, at the conclusion of the war, 
 negotiate upon fresh ground, and, if it were successful, which 
 I trusted such a war would be, we might pretend to much 
 more for the security and tranquillity of ourselves and 
 Europe than we now required. He still affected to dispute 
 the ground of the jealousy which we had conceived, and 
 seemed on the whole less conciliating than I had yet found 
 him. This must be attributed to the dread which he and 
 all those who have to do with the First Consul have of the 
 violence of his temper. If your Lordship take the trouble 
 of reading the French papers, you will have perceived that 
 in a discourse of Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, in which he 
 had occasion to advert to the flourishing state of France, he 
 lamented that the fair prospect he described was threatened 
 by a probability of war. The First Consul sent for him the 
 next day, and, reprimanding him for touching on that point, 
 said : ' II faut que nous prenions garde dans notre position 
 de ne pas avoir I'air de croire la guerre possible, puisque 
 
CONVERSATION WITH TALLEYRAND. 159 
 
 nous ne demandons rien que rexecution du traite.' I trust 
 the ground whicli his Majesty's G-Qvernment has taken will 
 induce him to give more extension to his means of defence. 
 
 Paris, April 7, 1803, 
 My Lord, — Since writing the preceding despatch I have 
 seen M. de Talleyrand and communicated to him the enclosed 
 note, which, I trust, your Lordship will find as close a transla- 
 tion as possible of that which I received from your Lordship. 
 He read it over with much attention, and when he had done 
 he appeared to be in expectation of some other communica- 
 tion. Upon my desiring he would explain himself, he said 
 that he was in hopes I should have furnished him with the 
 heads of those points on which it was affirmed in the note 
 that the French Government had so repeatedly refused all 
 explanation and satisfaction. I told him that it would have 
 been entirely useless to repeat what had been so often urged 
 in vain; that he could not but know that the explanation 
 required referred to the conduct of the French Government 
 and the system of aggrandisement which it had constantly 
 pursued since the conclusion, and in direct violation of the 
 spirit, of the Treaty of Amiens, founded as it indisputably 
 was on the state of possession of the two countries at the 
 time ; that with regard to the satisfaction, it evidently re- 
 ferred to the unjustifiable insinuations and charges against 
 his Majesty's Government, against the officer commanding 
 his forces in Egypt, and against the British in that quarter, 
 contained in the official report of Colonel Sebastiani. He 
 was by no means disposed to admit that either of these 
 cases could justify the assertion of the French Government 
 having refused explanation and satisfaction, on the ground 
 that no notice had been taken of these transactions but in a 
 very cursory manner, nor had any explanation ever been re- 
 quired as to any particular transaction, whether in Italy or 
 elsewhere, and if it had been required it would immediately 
 have been given, and that the language of Colonel Sebastiani 
 was not to be put in any comparison with that used by 
 
160 APRIL 1803, 
 
 Major Wilson in his account of the campaign of Egypt. I 
 ■urged the difference of a common publication like that to 
 which he alluded, and a report to the First Consul, published 
 by him in his official paper. On this occasion M. de Talley- 
 rand was disposed to call in question the authenticity of the 
 'Moniteur.' In short, the most ungrounded assertions were 
 substituted for arguments, and amongst these I cannot but 
 place that so often repeated, of the First Consul's having 
 entirely given up all idea whatever of Egypt, consequently 
 we could have no pretext for retaining Malta. He assured 
 me, for the rest, that he would communicate it this evening 
 to the First Consul, and that to-morrow he should in all 
 probability have a communication to make in return. He 
 gave me no hope, from anything which occurred in the 
 course of the conversation, that our demand would in the 
 first instance be acquiesced in, but assured me that every 
 security and satisfaction might be obtained, short of the 
 actual possession of Malta. Thus the business rests for the 
 moment. It remains to be seen what course will be taken. 
 But it evidently appears that their object is to gain time ; 
 and in this I am afraid they will succeed in spite of all we 
 can do. I shall keep the messenger Wagstaff, in order to 
 despatch him should anything occur before the regular day 
 of the post. 
 
 Le soussigne, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipoten- 
 tiaire de Sa Majeste britannique, a re9u ordre de sa cour de 
 communiquer ce qui suit au Gouvernement de France. 
 
 Sa Majeste a vu a regret que le Gouvernement de France 
 continue a refuser toute satisfaction et toute explication sur 
 les objets dont elle a a se plaindre, et qu'en evitant toute 
 discussion de ce qui fait le sujet de ses representations, il 
 persiste neanmoins a demander I'evacuation de I'ile de 
 Malte par les forces de Sa Majeste. Sa Majeste sait trop 
 ce qu'elle se doit a elle- meme et a son peuple pour aequiescer 
 a de pareils precedes. En consequence elle a ordonne au 
 soussigne de savoir distinctement du Gouvernement de 
 France s'il est determine a perseverer dans son refus de toute 
 
SHIPS IN THE NORTH SEA. 1(51 
 
 satisfaction et de toute explication sur les objets de Sa 
 Majeste, ou bien s'il est dispose a donner sans delai cette 
 satisfaction et cette explication sur I'etat actuel des affaires, 
 de maniere a pouvoir conduire a un arrangement qui seroit 
 de nature a ajnster les differends qui actuellement existent 
 entre les deux Gouvernemens. Sa Majeste desire sincere- 
 ment l'ad6ption de ce moyen, qui mettroit fin a un etat de 
 suspension et d'incertitude si nuisible a I'interet des deux 
 nations, et de voir que les deux Gouvernemens, agissant par 
 les memes principes de justice et de moderation, puissent 
 s'entendre pour concourir aux mesures les plus susceptibles 
 de leur assurer une tranquillite permanente. Le soussigne 
 prie Son Excellence, Monsieur de Talleyrand, d'agreer I'as- 
 surance de sa haute consideration. 
 
 (Signed) Whitwoeth. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, April 7, 1803. 
 
 Intelligence was received two days ago at the Admiralty 
 from the officer commanding his Majesty's ships in the North 
 Seas, that a movement had taken place of the French fri- 
 gates and transports in the port of Helvoetsluys, as if they 
 were intending to proceed on their destination. His Majesty 
 is unwilling to suppose that, after the assurances given to 
 him by the Trench Government, the armament which is in 
 the port will put to sea under the present circumstances. 
 He has, however, thought it his duty to reinforce his 
 squadron in the North Seas for the purpose of watching 
 more closely the operations of the French squadron. I lose 
 no time in informing your Excellency of this circumstance^ 
 that you may know what language it is proper for vou to 
 hold on this subject. 
 
 M 
 
162 APRIL 1803. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, April 9, 1803. 
 
 In my conversation yesterday with M. de Talleyrand, I 
 found him, after he had seen the First Consul, more disposed 
 to cont 3st the substance of the note which I had presented 
 the day before than to afford any further explanation. He 
 said that in order to proceed regularly it would be necessary 
 that the French Government should be informed precisely 
 what were the objects which had created such uneasiness and 
 on which it was alleged all explanation had been refused ; 
 that although this had perhaps been touched upon in 
 general conversation, yet no specific charge had been adduced 
 in such a formal manner as to demand a formal explanation. 
 T told him that if the object of the French Government was 
 to protract the present state of suspense and uncertainty, that 
 object might be answered to the extent, indeed, of a very few 
 days, by forcing me to such a reference ; but I must at the 
 same time declare to him that it could be productive of no 
 advantage, and would serve only to provoke such a recapitu- 
 lation of the system and conduct which France had pursued 
 since the Treaty of Amiens as would have all the appearance 
 of a raanifes to, every item of which would carry conviction 
 to the head of every individual in Europe ; that it appeared 
 therefore m )re likely to answer the end which both parties 
 proposed — that of hastening the conclusion of an amicable 
 arrangement — to take up the business on the basis which I 
 should propose, and by which they would admit no more 
 than what was incontrovertible, namely, that if the French 
 Governnr.ent exercised a right of extending its influence and 
 territory, in violation of the spirit of the Treaty of Amiens, 
 Great Britain had, if she chose to avail herself of it (which I 
 was confident she would not do further than was necessary as 
 a measure of security), an undoubted right to seek a counter- 
 poise. He did not seem inclined to dispute this position, 
 but rather to admit that such a right did exist, and might 
 be claimed in consequence by the acquisitions which had 
 
LIBELS ON THE FIKST CONSUL. 163 
 
 been made by France. On the point of satisfaction I found 
 him much more obstinate. He said that the First Consul 
 was hurt at the expression ^ satisfaction,' to which he gave 
 an interpretation I had never understood belonged to it^ as 
 implying superiority, so that if the British Government 
 required satisfaction of the French it arrogated to itself a 
 superiority. I told him, what certainly must be understood 
 by everyone, that the demand of satisfaction implied that one 
 party had been offended by another, and of course had a 
 right to demand such satisfaction ; that an inferior had an 
 equal right with his superior to demand it ; but in the case 
 in question there was perfect equality, and consequently 
 there was no offence to be found but in the conduct which 
 rendered such an appeal necessary. He endeavoured to get 
 over this difficulty as well as he could. He disputed the 
 authenticity of the 'Moniteur,' which, he said, was not entirely 
 official ; and, in short, attempted to make the best of a bad 
 business. He feels the folly of the publication, but trembles 
 before the violence of the First Consul. I must not, how- 
 ever, omit that he endeavoured to extenuate the fact by 
 retorting upon us. He said that a publication has appeared 
 in England in which the most horrid charges had been 
 brought against the First Consul ; he did not say this had 
 been published in the ' London Gazette,' but he had it, he 
 said, from the best authority that it had been presented 
 publicly to his Majesty. I told him I could not dispute this 
 fact, as nothing of the kind had ever come to my knowledge : 
 I only knew that publications were very frequently presented 
 to his Majesty at his levee ; but I had never understood that 
 his Majesty or his Government were committed by the 
 condescension of his Majesty in receiving them, or that they 
 acquired any degree of authenticity by such an acceptance ; 
 therefore, supposing the fact to be so, there could be no 
 parallel. The discussion of this point took up a consider- 
 able time, without producing anything decisive ; but I 
 told him that if the bare refusal of satisfaction for an 
 offence to his Majesty's Government, his army, or any 
 of his officers should be made the ground of a rupture, 
 
 M 2 
 
\ 
 
 16 i APRIL 1803. 
 
 there was not a hand or heart in England that would 
 not be united to enforce it. We at last came to the main 
 point of the business, and on this I cannot say any real 
 progress has been made. M. de Talleyrand repeated 
 to me that the First Consul had nothing more at heart than 
 to avoid the necessity of going to war, and that there was 
 no sacrifice he would not make, short of his honour, to 
 obtain this end. If, said he, the English Government in- 
 sists absolutely on breaking the Treaty of Amiens, the First 
 Consul is determined to go all lengths to maintain it. If 
 the English Government is determined to keep possession of. 
 Malta, the First Consul will suffer himself to be cut in pieces 
 rather than consent to it — not so much on account of the 
 importance of Malta in itself, as that he is bound in honour 
 to maintain the inviolability of the Treaty of Amiens. To 
 this I answered that if the First Consul was so determined 
 I feared we were both losing our time in the discussion, 
 for that I must tell him that his Majesty's Government was 
 as firmly determined to retain possession of it as a measure 
 of defence and precaution, rendered indisputably necessary 
 by the views which had been manifested by the First Consul. 
 I was as explicit on this subject as possible. ' But is there,' 
 said M. de Talleyrand, ' no modification, no means of satisfy- 
 ing both parties? for at the same time that the First Consul 
 insists, and will always insist, on the full execution of the 
 treaty, he will not object to any mode by which you may 
 acquire the security you think so necessary. You are not 
 satisfied with the independence of Neapolitan troops : what 
 others will answer the purpose ? ' I told him that he could 
 propose nothing so secure as the garrison which was now in 
 Malta ; it was, I feared, to that, and to that only, we could 
 confide it. He then started the idea of a mixed garrison, 
 composed of English, French, Italians, Germans, etc. ; but 
 this of course could answer no good purpose. He then was 
 preparing to make the tour of Europe in search of an in- 
 dependent Power ; but I told him to take care that by so 
 doing he did not furnish us with even stronger arguments 
 for the measures of precaution we were now taking against 
 
POSSESSION OF MALTA FOR A TERM OF YEARS. 165 
 
 the influence and power of France. In short, say what we 
 would, it came alwaj'S to the point that nothing was secure 
 short of the actual possession of Malta, and that nothing 
 could be proposed or accepted in lieu of it. I must confess 
 that he seemed seriously to lament the difficulty of our 
 coming to an understanding; but he never gave me the least 
 reason to hope that the First Consul would ever consent to 
 our acquiring the possession of the point in dispute. He 
 repeatedly told me that, short of that, everything might be 
 done. He begged that I would refer once more to your 
 Lordship, and submit the paper which he drew up in my 
 presence to the above effect. I told him that we were only 
 losing time by such a reference ; that my instructions were 
 positive, and had certainly not been sent me without the 
 fullest consideration ; that your Lordship could say no 
 more than ha4 been said, and which even he must admit, 
 viz. that nothing would be deemed secure short of actual 
 possession. I could not, however, refuse what he so earnestly 
 required, and your Lordship will see by the paper how the 
 matter rests after this first conference. I will confess to your 
 Lordship that my motive for consenting to forward this sort 
 of proposal to your Lordship is, that supposing we should 
 find the First Consul as obstinate as he now appears to be 
 on the point of abandoning Malta to us in perpetuity, and 
 that a temporary possession might be considered as the next 
 best thing, something of this kind might derive from it. It 
 appears that what the First Consul is most anxious about is 
 the full acknowledgment of the Treaty of Amiens, but that 
 he is ready to make any arrangement or concession by a 
 particular convention between the two Governments. I am 
 perfectly aware that, whatever concession he may be inclined 
 to make, we can never give up the actual possession of Malta, 
 either in perpetuity or for whatever term of years may be 
 agreed upon ; and if we could get it for any term not less 
 than eight years I think we might without imprudence trust to 
 the chapter of accidents, and at the worst to our endeavours 
 to enable the Maltese themselves to preserve their own inde- 
 jjendence. Your Lordship will, therefore, understand that I 
 
166 APEIL 1803. 
 
 have not, by consenting to refer his proposal to yonr Lord- 
 ship, given up in any degree whatever the ground we have 
 taken in the first instance. But I must confess that, however 
 determined we may be to maintain it, the First Consul (for 
 I confine it to him) appears to be no less so to support the 
 Treaty of Amiens. In the conversation I had the night 
 before last with Joseph Bonaparte I found him disposed to 
 hold the same language as M. de Talleyrand : determination 
 on the part of his brother not to admit the infraction of the 
 Treaty of Amiens, but every disposition to come to an under- 
 standing on the subject with his Majesty's Government. 
 In looking over the Mediterranean for a place which might 
 afford an equivalent security he mentioned Candia and 
 Corfu. I told him that such situations would in no degree 
 answer our purpose, nor indeed could I see anything short 
 of Malta which could. It is to this, and this only, that we 
 must strictly adhere ; and if we act up to the full extent of 
 the demonstration we have made, and convince these people 
 that we are determined to fight for the security we require, 
 I think we shall obtain it, if not in perpetuity, at least for 
 such a term as may answer our purpose. I believe that 
 there is no doubt that they are making the greatest efforts 
 in the port of Toulon. I am informed that they are well 
 supplied there with timber and stores of every kind ; that a 
 A very considerable number of workmen are employed; and 
 f > that they are building four sail of the line — two of eighty, 
 \ two of seventy-four — and three frigates of forty guns. This 
 will, I think, point out still more strongly the necessity of 
 our keeping up a sufficient force in the Mediterranean. 
 
 La conversation avec M. de Talleyrand aujourd'hui nous 
 a conduit a ce resultat. Tout ce qui a pour but de violer 
 Tindependance de I'ordre de Malte ne sera jamais consenti 
 par le Gouvernement fran9ais. Pour ce qui pent convenir 
 ou etre agreable au Gouvernement anglois pour terminer les 
 presentes difficultes, et qui ne seroit pas contraire au traite 
 d'Amiens, le Gouvernement fran9ois n'a aucune objection 
 pour faire une convention particuliere a cet egard. Les 
 
POSSIBILITY OP AN ULTIMATUM. 167 
 
 motifs de la convention seroient renfermes dans le preambule 
 et qui porteroient sur les griefs respectifs sur ce que les 
 deux Gouvernemens croiroient utile de s'entendre. 
 
 Paris, April 11, 1803. 
 
 I have little to add to my despatch of the 9th instant. 
 
 The overture which I then transmitted to your Lordship, 
 
 though not coming up to our ideas, might nevertheless be 
 
 considered as a concession, from which some advantage might 
 
 be derived; and I am anxious to have your Lordship's 
 
 opinion of it. I feel as strongly as possible the importance 
 
 of not suffering the negotiation to be too long protracted 
 
 but at the same time your Lordship would not authorise 
 
 me to hurry it on, so as to subject me to the reproach of 
 
 precipitation or petulance. According to your Lordship's 
 
 instructions contained in your despatch No. 7, I might, on 
 
 finding this Government determined not to come to such an 
 
 arrangement as might be calculated to adjust the differences 
 
 at present subsisting between the two Governments — and the 
 
 project which accompanied these instructions points out the 
 
 possession of Malta in perpetuity, or an equivalent security, 
 
 as the only arrangement which can be acceded to — I might, I 
 
 say, have been justified in giving them to understand that it 
 
 was impossible that the relations of amity should continue 
 
 to subsist between the two countries, and that I should be 
 
 under the necessity of leaving Paris within a certain time. 
 
 By this means I might certainly have brought the matter to 
 
 a point at once ; and we have still the same means in our 
 
 power, whenever your Lordship shall think proper to give 
 
 me an ultimatum. But I confess I should not without such 
 
 an authority feel myself justified in precipitating the business 
 
 in such a ro^nner as to forego the expectations 1 may have, 
 
 if not of obtaining all we demand, at least sufiicient to answer 
 
 our purpose. And the paper which I drew up with M. de 
 
 Talleyrand and transmitted to your Lordship with my last 
 
 despatch did appear to me to offer an opening for such au 
 
168 APRIL 1803. 
 
 arrangement. It remains to be seen — but in this I must be 
 rather a listener than a proposer — what effect they mean to 
 give to this opening. It occurred to me that if it should 
 appear that the First Consul has in fact made up his mind 
 to risk a war rather than consent to our possession of Malta 
 in perpetuity, the possession of it for a term of years might 
 be the next best thing, and this I proposed to your Lord- 
 ship. On searching further for modifications which might 
 satisfy both parties — that is to say. Great Britain, by leaving 
 it in possession of a point deemed essential to her interests, 
 and France as preserving the Order of Malta and the so- 
 vereignty attached to it, both provided for by the Treaty 
 of Amiens — it has occurred to me that an arrangement 
 might be made by which we should hold the forts of Malta 
 necessary for the security of the harbour, and the Order 
 be put in possession of the remainder of the island, with 
 the sovereignty, under the existing guarantees. By this 
 means we should hold Malta as we do Gibraltar, and retain 
 in fact all we want, which is not sovereigntv but a secure 
 point in o ur hands from whence to observe the motions^ 
 01 jj'rance In the Mediterranean. I wish your Lordship to 
 consider of this idea. It seems to me to have fewer objec- 
 tionable parts than any other. Russia and the other guaran- 
 teeing Powers would have little reason to complain. The 
 Order which they have guaranteed would exist, and be in fact 
 stronger and more respectable than ever. I should be glad 
 to have your Lordship's sentiments upon it, so that I may be 
 prepared to close with such a proposal should it be made to 
 me. The general idea is here that the First Consul is deter- 
 mined not to give way, and that he has made up his mind to 
 sustain the first shock of a rupture in the hope of revenging 
 himself in future. This is the language he held yesterday to 
 some persons who were deputed to him on the concerns of 
 the bank. He told them that if war should be the result 
 of the present discussion it must be considered as a war of 
 aggression on the part of England; that, notwithstanding the 
 interpretation that England might endeavour to give it, it • 
 was evident that the acquisition of Malta was the sole object; 
 
CONVEKSATION WITH JOSEPH BONAPARTE. lt)0 
 
 that he was the first to declare that the insignificant island 
 of Malta was not worth contending for, but, when it was 
 considered that by giving way in this first instance the 
 English Government would only be encouraged to come 
 forward with some new pretension, he trusted there was not 
 a man who did not agree with him that the first claim should 
 be resisted; that he was perfectly aware how vulnerable 
 they were at this moment, but he was at the same time 
 certain that such a mode of attack by invasion might be 
 carried on against the very existence of England as would 
 at once deprive the English Government of all their means 
 of disturbing the general tranquillity. Such is the language 
 the First Consul holds, but he meets with few who are dis- 
 posed to sacrifice their present existence to the hope of a 
 future triumph. I do not apprehend that it is meant to 
 suffer the squadron to leave Helvoet ; at all events, I think 
 it will be advisable to mention the subject of your Lordship's 
 despatch of the 7th instant to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 P.S. — Since writing the above despatch I have had a 
 conversation of some length with Joseph Bonaparte. I can- 
 not say that it has produced anything beyond a very faint 
 symptom of a desire to conciliate. He pressed me re- 
 peatedly to suggest some modification, which I as often pro- 
 tested I was unable to do, keeping as I mhst do in view the 
 equivalent security prescribed to me by my instructions. He 
 mentioned the idea of substituting a Russian instead of a 
 Neapolitan garrison ; but I could not, I told him, consider 
 any such substitution as an equivalent. He repeated the pro- 
 posal of Candia, or of Corfu, or of any other position in the 
 Archipelago. He assured me, however, that he mentioned 
 these matters entirely unauthorised, and in the hope solely 
 of at last suggesting something satisfactory. The impression 
 which this conversation has left upon me is that they will at 
 last come down to something on which we may build such 
 an arrangement as may answer our purpose. 
 
170 APEIL 1803. 
 
 LoED Hawkesbury to Loed Whitwoeth. 
 
 Downing Street, April 13, 1803. 
 
 Tour Excellence's despatcL.es to No. 34 inclusive have 
 been received and laid before the King. His Majesty has 
 observed with great satisfaction the admission by the French 
 Government of the justice of his claim to some compensa- 
 tion in consequence of the increased power and influence of 
 France since the period of the conclusion of the Definitive 
 Treaty, and it is important that you should lose no proper 
 opportunity of taking full advantage of this admission. 
 Although under the circumstances of your conversation with 
 M. Talleyrand, and particularly after the note verhale which 
 he gave to you, it might have been expedient that you should 
 have deferred presenting the projet contained in my despatch 
 No. 7 in the form of a projet, it is desirable that you should 
 communicate without delay in some mode or other the con- 
 tents of that projet for the purpose of ascertaining distinctly 
 whether the conditions are such as to induce the French 
 Government to give way upon the question of Malta. These 
 conditions appear to his Majesty so well calculated to save 
 the honour of the French Government on the subject of Malta, 
 if the question of Malta is principally considered by them 
 as a question of honour, and at the same time hold out to 
 them such important advantages, that the success of the pro- 
 position is at least worth trying, particularly as the result of 
 it might be productive of the most easy means of adjusting 
 the most material of our present differences. With respect 
 to the assertion so often advanced, and repeated in your last 
 conversations, of the non-execution of the Treaty of Amiens 
 relative to Malta, I have only to observe again that the exe- 
 cution of that article is become impracticable from causes 
 which it has not been in the power of his Majesty to control ; 
 that the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support 
 of the Order, and indispensably necessary for the indepen- 
 dence of the Order and defence of the island, have been 
 sequestrated since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, in 
 
POSSESSION OF MALTA FOR A TEEM OF YEARS. 171 
 
 direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of that treaty ; and 
 that two of the principal Powers who were invited to accede 
 as guarantees to tlie arrangement have refused their accession 
 except on the condition that the part of the arrangement 
 which was deemed so material relative to the Maltese Langue 
 should be entirely cancelled. The conduct of the French 
 Government since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty 
 gives his Majesty a right, which is now at length admitted by 
 themselves, to demand some compensation for the past and 
 security for the future. Such compensation could never be 
 considered as obtained by the possession of an isla-nd which 
 would entail a very heavy expense on this country ; and the 
 degree of security which would be provided by these means 
 would only be such as his Majesty under the present circum- 
 stances is entitled to demand. I observe in the note verhale 
 of M. Talleyrand he makes use of the expression the inde- 
 pendence of the Order of Malta. If this is meant to apply 
 to the Order exclusively, his Majesty would be willing, for 
 the preservation of peace, that the civil government of the 
 island should be given to the Order of St. John, the Maltese 
 enjoying the privileges which were stipulated in their favour 
 in the Treaty of Amiens, and that, conformably to principles 
 which have been adopted on other occasions, the fortifica- 
 tions of the island should be garrisoned for ever by the 
 troops of his Majesty. In the event of either of these pro- 
 positions being found unattainable, his Majesty might be 
 disposed to consent to an arrangement by which the island 
 of Malta would remain in his possession for a limited 
 number of years, and to waive in consequence his demand for 
 a perpetual occupation, provided that the number of years 
 was not less than ten and that his Sicilian Majesty could be 
 induced to cede the sovereignty of the island of Lampedusa 
 for a valuable consideration. If this proposition is admitted, 
 the island of Malta should be given up to the inhabitants at 
 the end of that period, and it should be acknowledged as an 
 independent state. In this case his Majesty would be ready 
 to concur in any arrangement for the establishment of the 
 Order of St. John in some other part of Europe. You will 
 
J 72 APRIL 1803. 
 
 not refuse to listen to any proposition which the French 
 Government may be disposed to make to you with a view to 
 an equivalent security for those objects in regard to which 
 his Majesty claims the possession or occupation of Malta ; 
 but the three propositions to which I have above alluded 
 appear at the present moment to furnish the only basis for a 
 satisfactory arrangement, and yon will decline receiving any 
 proposition which does not appear to you to offer advantages 
 to his Majesty as substantial as that which I have last stated. 
 It is very desirable that you should bring the negotiation 
 to an issue, if possible, without referring to his Majesty's 
 Government for further instructions after the receipt of the 
 despatch ; and if you should be of opinion, in consequence 
 of the necessary communications, that there is no hope of 
 bringing it to a favourable conclusion, you may inform M. 
 Talleyrand of the necessity you will be under after a certain 
 time to leave Paris. 
 
 Downing Street, April 13, 1803. 
 
 His Majesty has received from his Charge d' Affaires at 
 Hamburg the most extraordinary account of the conduct 
 of Monsieur Reinhard, the French Minister at that place, 
 with respect to a most gross and unwarrantable libel upon 
 his Majesty's Government. He has been assured that the 
 French Minister having proposed the insertion of that libel 
 in the ' Official Gazette ' of the town of Hamburg, and the 
 insertion of it having in the first instance been refused, the 
 French Minister went so far as to demand, in his official 
 capacity, the insertion of that article by order of the Senate. 
 His Majesty is unwilling to believe that the French Govern- 
 ment could have authorised so outrageous an attack upon 
 his Majesty and his Government, and so daring a violation 
 of the independence of a neutral state. It is his Majesty's 
 pleasure that you should communicate these circumstances 
 to the French Government, and state at the same time the 
 impossibility of bringing the present discussion to an ami- 
 I 
 
FIRST CONSUL AT ST. CLOUD. 173 
 
 cable conclusion unless some satisfaction shall be given to 
 his Majesty for the indignity which has thus been offered to 
 him in the face of all Europe by the French Minister at 
 Hamburg. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, April 14, 1803. 
 
 Since my last the negotiation is at a stand, in the expec- 
 tation, I suppose, of the answer which may arrive to tiie 
 overture which I communicated to your Lordship on the 9th 
 instant, and which, although founded on a basis diametrically 
 opposite to that of the project which I have received from 
 your Lordship, is expected here to produce a good effect, 
 notwithstanding the little hope I have given. To-morrow I 
 shall in all probability be in possession of this answer from 
 your Lordship, and be enabled to speak still more positively. 
 In the meantime the First Consul is gone to St. Cloud, and 
 Joseph Bonaparte, hurt at the little impression he has 
 hitherto made on the mind of his brother, is likewise gone 
 to his country house in disgust. He does not, however, 
 abandon the contest any more than every individual of the 
 First Consul's family; it remains to be seen how far their 
 importunity will be able to work on his intractable character. 
 In the last conversation I Lad with Joseph Bonaparte, he 
 mentioned as a reason why the First Consul never could 
 consent to our remaining at Malta that we should from 
 thence be able completely to annihilate their trade to the 
 Levant. I told him that this argument could not hold good, 
 since in time of war, whether we had Malta or not, we should 
 always have cruisers in the Mediterranean, and in time of 
 peace such a commercial arrangement for the Mediterranean 
 might be made, without extending it to a general treaty of 
 commerce, which we know to be subject to almost insur- 
 mountable difficulties, as would insure to them all the ad- 
 vantages they could reasonably pretend to, and convince 
 them that in retaining Malta we were in fact actuated by no 
 motive of jealousy, or enmity, or of ambition, but simply that 
 
174 APRIL 1803. 
 
 of security, whicli we had always assigned. This seemed to 
 make an impression, and I am persuaded he will have availed 
 himself of it wifch his brother. I trust that in holding this 
 language I have expressed no sentiment of which your 
 Lordship does not approve. It has been suggested to me that 
 as a last resource the First Consul will propose giving Malta 
 entirely to the Emperor of Russia. General Bernadotte set 
 off two days ago for America, with every assurance of the 
 sincere desire of the First Consul to conciliate the friendship 
 of the United States. This disposition can scarcely be 
 doubted under the present circumstances. Mr. Munroe, an 
 extraordinary negotiator from the United States, arrived here 
 yesterday. America is the first to reap the fruits of our 
 discussion with this Government, in consequence of which Mr. 
 Munroe finds the difference which occasioned his mission 
 nearly adjusted. It is said that he is destined to relieve Mr. 
 King at the Court of London. The Chevalier Anduaga, 
 Minister Plenipotentiary from his Catholic Majesty to the 
 Court of London, is now here, and will pursue his journey to 
 London to-morrow, notwithstanding the assurances which 
 his countryman the Chevalier Azzara gives of his return in a 
 month in consequence of a rupture. A messenger has gone 
 to Madrid to demand a passage for thirty thousand men, 
 destined, in case of a war with England, to act against 
 Portugal. The Portuguese Minister has received a messenger 
 from his Court with instructions to remonstrate against the 
 conduct of the French Minister, General Lannes. The tone 
 he has now assumed appears to be entirely subversive of every 
 idea of independence. He demands the dismissal of Minis- 
 ters as the only satisfaction which the First Consul can accept 
 for the indignities with which he has been treated. This 
 Government affects not to justify General Lannes' conduct, but 
 does nothing to control it. I hope in a very few days to pro- 
 cure some important details of the state of the French navy, 
 notwithstanding the almost insurmountable diflEiculties that 
 attend every inquiry on the point. In the meantime I am 
 positively assured, by a person who pretends to be perfectly 
 well informed, that at present they have but forty sail of the 
 
FIRST CONSUL IMMOVABLE. 175 
 
 line from sixty guns and upwards in all parts of the world 
 — and many of these want the most substantial repairs — and 
 about the same number of frigates. I believe this to be 
 nearly accurate, but I shall in a few days be able to speak 
 more positively. The value of the bank shares is reduced 
 from thirteen hundred and eighty to eleven hundred and 
 eighty livres, partly by the general fall of the funds, but 
 principally by the reduction of the dividend from near ten 
 per cent, to six per cent. The surplus of profit, it is true, 
 will be vested in the Five-per-Cent. Consolide, and finally give 
 a second dividend ; but as that will not be immediately, it 
 enters but little into the calculation of purchasers. On the 
 remonstrance of the persons concerned the Government 
 have at length consented to let eight per cent, be divided 
 for the ensuing three half-years ; but a great shock is given 
 to public credit by the example of such an interference of 
 the Government in the affairs of a private company, especially 
 as two other companies are in a great degree sacrificed to 
 the Bank of France. 
 
 Paris, April 14, 1803. 
 I am sorry to be able to give you no more consolation in 
 my private letter than you will be able to collect from my 
 despatch of this date. It is certain that hitherto the First 
 Consul has resisted everything and everybody; but still 
 those who have undertaken the task of reducing him to 
 reason will not abandon it, and I think we may still hope. 
 I trust your Lordship will give me credit for the exertion of 
 everything which zeal and diligence can dictate. In the 
 meantime I cannot but represent to j^our Lordship the 
 extreme importance of betraying no indecision at the meet- 
 ing of Parliament, or of giving voice to any debate in which 
 those who would wish to embroil and distress us might give 
 encouragement to this Government to hold out. I am sure 
 General Andreossy does his Majesty's Ministers ample justice 
 in the assurances he gives of their desire to preserve peace; 
 but I have my doubts whether he is equally fair in the state- 
 
176 APRIL 1803. 
 
 ment of their determination to go to war if they do not 
 obtain what they so justly demand. It is absolutely neces- 
 sary that there should be no doubt on this subject. In the ex- 
 pectation of hearing from your Lordship to-morrow, I am, etc. 
 
 Paris, April 18, 1803. 
 
 I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 Lordship's despatches of the 13th instant, Nos. 10 and 11, on 
 Saturday last. No. 9 reached me on the lOth, and> as I had 
 every reason to believe that there was no idea of sending the 
 expedition at Helvoet to sea I have made no use of the in- 
 structions therein contained. I saw Joseph Bonaparte im- 
 mediately on the receipt of your Lordship's despatch, and 
 without troubling your Lordship with a repetition of the 
 arguments I used to hasten the conclusion of the negotiation — 
 amongst which I endeavoured to convince him of the import- 
 ance of preventing the ultimatum which would inevitably 
 follow the rejection of what I had to propose, and which, I 
 foresaw, must, applied to a character like that of the First 
 Consul, render our hopes almost desperate — I will briefly 
 state that, on finding it perfectly impracticable to establish 
 the principle of our keeping possession of Malta in perpetuity, 
 I delivered to him in writing the second proposal I had to 
 make. He did not fail to observe that by this modifica- 
 tion the difficulty which he considered as insurmountable 
 was not removed ; that although the Order was restored 
 it could not be considered as independent, and in fact 
 Malta would belong to that Power which had possession 
 of the forts. I told him that my instructions allowed me no 
 greater latitude, nor had I any reason to believe that any 
 more would be given to me. I enforced the adoption of this 
 plan by every reasoning which could serve to recommend it ; 
 but the possession in perpetuity was constantly urged as a 
 difficulty which nothing could remove ; and he repeatedly told 
 me that he was perfectly convinced that his brother was de- 
 termined, without being blind to the danger by which himself 
 and his friends might be menaced, to withstand it at every 
 
POSSESSION OP MALTA FOR A TERM OF YEARS. 177 
 
 risk. Our conversation lasted near two hours. I confess 
 that I gained no solid hope that the project, which he assured 
 me he would take to his brother at St. Cloud, would be 
 adopted. But he said that he was not without hope that he 
 might be authorised to propose to me the occupation of the 
 fortresses for a term of years. It was my wish that such a 
 proposal should come from him rather than from me. I told 
 him that I did not well see how such a tenure could suit us ; 
 that we deemed possession of Malta to be conducive to the 
 preservation of peace, and on that ground we should always 
 abandon it with reluctance ; and that as we were actually 
 in possession of it any modification was on our part a con- 
 cession. But I wished too sincerely to avoid the fatal 
 extremities to which I saw the discussion was tending not 
 to give any reasonable proposal which might be made on 
 their part every assistance in my power. He asked me by 
 way of conversation what term of years I thought would 
 satisfy us, and I immediately told him I did not find any- 
 thing short of twenty years could answer an}^ good purpose 
 whatever. I will, however, confess to your Lordship that I 
 shall be very well satisfied with half that number. As this 
 proposal originated with him, and was received by me merely 
 as a matter on which I would refer to your Lordship, T did 
 not mention the idea of his Majesty's acquiring the sove- 
 reignty of the island of Lampedusa. When I receive the 
 proposal in form, which I hope to do to-morrow, I may, if 
 we can agree on any reasonable term of years, tack to my 
 acquiescence the acquisition of the island. I can, however, 
 scarcely hope that the evacuation of Holland and Switzer- 
 land, or of either, will be acceded to without drawing the 
 negotiation to such a length, and even then without the 
 utmost hazard of its failure, as must under the present cir- 
 cumstances, if possible, be avoided. If, therefore, I can bring 
 the matter to an immediate conclusion, and without further 
 reference to your Lordship, on the principle of our retaining 
 possession of the fortresses of Malta for a term of years not 
 less than that pointed out by your Lordship (for we cannot 
 wait for the determination of his Sicilian Majesty), that this 
 
178 APRIL 1803. 
 
 Government will not oppose the cession of the island of 
 Lampedusa, I shall, I confess, have great pleasure in announc- 
 ing to your Lordship such a conclusion. I do not enter into 
 a detail of the conversation which I had the same morninoj- 
 with M. de Talleyrand, immediately upon leaving Joseph 
 Bonaparte, as it differed in nowise from what I have above 
 mentioned. He suggested also the possibility of coming to 
 an arrangement on the ground of a temporary occupation, 
 and I made him the same answer. He seemed, however, not 
 to doubt that his Majesty would be willing to give the' same 
 advantages in return which had been held out in the project,, 
 alluding to the acknowledgments of the Governments in 
 Italy which had not yet been acknowledged. I told him that 
 such an offer had been made as an inducement to the First 
 Consul to accede to our demand of Malta in perpetuity, and 
 it depended on the First Consul to accept it on the same 
 condition ; but that it could not be expected that we should 
 allow the same for a modification as for the whole of the 
 demand, and therefore I could not undertake to listen to any 
 proposal of such a nature. I added, however, that if the 
 French Government was disposed to consent to the claims 
 which relate to the evacuation of Holland and Switzerland, 
 and to make a suitable provision for his Sardinian Majesty, 
 his Majesty might perhaps in that case be disposed to extend 
 his offer of acknowledgment to the modification. This idea, 
 however, is not likely to be adopted. Such is the state of 
 the discussion at this moment. I am in expectation of hear- 
 ing very shortly either from Joseph Bonaparte or M. de Talley- 
 rand ; and I am not without hopes that I may be able to 
 announce to your Lordship that such an arrangement is made 
 as may answer his Majesty's expectations, in a very few days. 
 Your Lordship may be assured that I feel the necessity of 
 the expedition. Were it less urgent, I might perhaps hope 
 to bring the discussion to even a more favourable issue. The 
 report of an embargo in the French ports is premature. The 
 merchants have, however, been invited not to run the risk of 
 sending their property to sea under the present circumstances. 
 No English travellers are allowed to embark at any other 
 
M. EEINHARDT, 179 
 
 port than Calais or Boulogne. But this, as well as the 
 declaring Flushing en Stat de siege, is to be considered only 
 as a demonstration, since it is pretty clearly ascertained that 
 no very formidable preparations are or can be carrying on in 
 the ports of the Channel. 
 
 Paris, April 18, 1803. 
 
 I did not fail to put inlo immediate execution the in- 
 structions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 11, on 
 the subject of the libel inserted by the French Minister in 
 the ' Hamburg Gazette.' I represented the outrageous 
 and unprecedented conduct of M. Eeinhardt in such terms 
 as it deserves, and fairly declared to M. de Talleyrand until 
 satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty for the indignity 
 which has been offered him by the French Minister in his 
 official character there could be no possibility whatever of 
 bringing the present discussion to an amicable issue. M. de 
 Talleyrand assured me that the French Government saw 
 the conduct of M. de Eeinhardt in the same light as his 
 Majesty's Ministers, and that they could not be more sur- 
 prised than the First Consul had been at seeing such an 
 article inserted by authority; that an immediate explanation 
 had been required of M. Eeinhardt five days ago, and if 
 his conduct had been such as had been represented he 
 would doubtless feel the effect of the First Consul's dis- 
 pleasure, and that in the meantime I might inform your 
 Lordship that he was completely disavowed. I told M. de 
 Talleyrand that as the insult had been public it would be 
 necessary that the reparation should be so also. He assured 
 me again that the First Consul considered M. Eeinhardt's 
 conduct as so reprehensible that every satisfaction might be 
 expected. Your Lordship may be assured that I shall not 
 lose sight of this business. There can, I think, be no doubt 
 that M. Eeinhardt received it from the First Consul for 
 the purpose of insertion, and, I really do believe, without the 
 knowledge of M. de Talleyrand. The agent will, however, 
 
 N 2 
 
180 APRIL 1803. 
 
 be sacrificed, as Sebastiani would have been long ago if a 
 disavowal of his report had been anywise practicable. I 
 am convinced that there are few acts in the First Consul's 
 political life which have been the cause of so much uneasi- 
 ness to him, or of which he is so much ashamed. 
 
 Paris, April 20, 180?. 
 
 I had hoped that the first extraordinary messenger I 
 should have had occasion to send would have been to 
 announce to your Lordship that the differences between the 
 two Governments were adjusted on one of the modifications 
 pointed out to me by my last instructions from your Lordship. 
 In this expectation I am deceived. I saw Joseph Bonaparte 
 the night before last, before I had sealed up my despatches 
 of that evening to your Lordship ; but as all he said tended 
 only to justify the hope I had given your Lordship in those 
 despatches, I added nothing to them. He assured me posi- 
 tively that I should hear from M. de Talleyrand in the course 
 of yesterda}^ morning, and that a meeting would be appointed 
 in order to settle the term of years for which the First 
 Consul might be induced to consent to the cession of Malta. 
 It is true that he declared that in order to gain his consent 
 it would be necessary to hold out the advantages which the 
 British Government was willing to ofiPer in return, meaning 
 the acknowledgments of the new Governments in Italy. I 
 told him that this offer was made only with a view to the 
 possession of Malta in perpetuity ; but after some conversa- 
 tion I gave him to understand that I would not refuse to 
 admit the demand suh spe rati, on the condition that the 
 cession should be made for a good number of years, that 
 Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated, and that a 
 suitable provision should be made for the King of Sardinia. 
 He seemed to think there could be no difficulty in this ar- 
 rangement, and I left him in the persuasion that I should the 
 next day, yesterday, or this morning, receive the summons 
 from M. de Talleyrand which he had given me reason to 
 
REQUEST FOR AN ULTIMATUM. 181 
 
 expect. I am sorry to say that no sucli summons has been 
 received by me ; neither has any further notice been taken of 
 the business. So that I feel that I should betray the confi- 
 dence your Lordship may place in me were I to delay any 
 longer requesting that I may be immediately furnished with 
 the terms on which his Majesty's Ministers would be willing 
 to conclude, and which probably will not differ much from 
 those above stated, in order that I may propose them in the 
 form of an ultimatum, and that at the expiration of the 
 period allowed for deliberation I may be authorised, not only 
 to declare that I am to leave Paris, but actually so to do, 
 unless in the intermediate time the French Government 
 should accede to our demands. I confess I see no other means 
 of bringing the discussion to an issue, supposing, as there is 
 every reason to presume is the case, that the object here is 
 to protract, for which they have doubtless many urgent 
 motives. Amongst these may be stated the expected dis- 
 approbation of our conduct by the Emperor of Eussia; but 
 in this I trust they will be deceived. And at all events I do 
 not well see how that can change the state of the question 
 with regard to us. But the chief motives for delay are that v n 
 they are totally unprepared for a naval war ; that the greatest \ \ \y 
 part of their fleet is abroad, and consequently exposed to ^ 
 our attack ; that what little commerce they can carry on is 
 for the most part at sea, and that of their Batavian allies in 
 the same hazardous predicament, and to a much greater 
 amount. These are undoubtedly good motives for the line 
 of conduct which they seem willing to pursue ; but they are 
 at the same time such as point out to us, added to many 
 others, the necessity of despatch. Under all these circum- 
 stances, I do presume to suggest to your Lordship the 
 necessity of an ultimatum. Your Lordship has, it is true, 
 authorised me to declare that on the non-acceptance of the 
 proposal I had to make I should be ordered to leave Paris ; 
 but I must have to declare that such an order is actually 
 given, and that in consequence of it I am preparing to carry 
 it into effect. This is our last resource, but I trust it will 
 be an effectual one ; and when I am in possession of it I 
 
182 APEIL 1803. 
 
 am not without hope that I may, by holding it out in the in 
 terrorem, reap the full benefit of it even before I make use of 
 it oflBcially ; and I am fully persuaded that nothing short of 
 this will convince the First Consul that the intelligence 
 which they receive from England of his Majesty's Ministers 
 not daring to push the matter to extremities, and to which 
 both their hopes and fears induce them to give credit, is 
 totallv unfounded. 
 
 LoED Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, April 23, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's despatches Nos. 37, 38, and 39 have 
 been received and laid before the King. It is necessary for 
 me to do little more on the present occasion than to refer 
 you to my despatch of April 13, in which I stated to you the 
 several propositions on which alone in the judgment of his 
 Majesty the differences between this coimtry and France 
 could be satisfactorily adjusted. If upon the receipt of this 
 despatch it shall not have been in your power to bring the 
 negotiation to a conclusion on either of the propositions to 
 which I have above referred, it is his Majesty's pleasure that 
 you should communicate officially to the French Government 
 that you have gone in point of concession to the full extent 
 of your instructions, and that if an arrangement founded 
 upon one of these propositions cannot be concluded without 
 further dela}', you have received his Majesty's commands to 
 return to England. As there is some reason to believe that 
 you have not distinctly understood the third proposition con- 
 tained in my despatch, it is important that I should repeat 
 that his Majesty can only consent to relinquish the permanent 
 occupation of Malta by his forces on the conditions that 
 the temporary possession shall not be less than ten years ; 
 that the authority civil and military shall during that period 
 remain solely in his Majesty; and that at the expiration of 
 that period the island shall be given up to the inhabitants. 
 
ENGLISH ULTIMATUM. 1S3 
 
 and not to the Order, and provided likewise that his Sicilian 
 Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the island 
 of Lampedusa. It is indispensable that, as a part of this 
 arrangement, Holland should be evacuated by the French 
 troops within a short period (say a month) after the con- 
 clusion of a convention by which all those provisions are 
 secured. His Majesty will not insist on the evacuation of 
 Switzerland, or on the article for a provision for the King of 
 Sardinia ; but he cannot consent to acknowledge the new 
 Italian States unless stipulations in favour of his Sardinian 
 Majesty and of Switzerland form a part of this arrange- 
 ment. It is his Majesty's pleasure that you should delay 
 your departure from Paris no longer than may be indis- 
 pensably necessary for your personal convenience, and that, 
 in the event of the failure of the negotiation, you should in 
 no case remain at Paris after the receipt of this despatch 
 more than seven days. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, April 23, 1803. 
 
 As I heard nothing from M. de Talleyrand, and as Joseph 
 Bonaparte was gone into the country till Friday, I called on 
 Thursday on the former, in order to learn the effect of the 
 proposal which I had made, conformably to your Lordship's 
 instructions, on the basis of a perpetual possession of the 
 forts of Malta, on re-establishing the Order in the civil 
 government of the island. He told me that if I had called 
 upon him sooner he should two days ago have communicated 
 to me the First Consul's answer, which was that no con- 
 sideration on earth should induce him to consent to a con- 
 cession in perpetuity of Malta in any shape whatever, and 
 that the re-establishment of the Order was not so much the 
 point to be discussed as that of suffering Great Britain to 
 acquire a possession in the Mediterranean. I told him that 
 I did not call sooner because I had been given to understand 
 
184 APRIL ISO'S, 
 
 that he would have himself proposed it to me for the purpose 
 of communicating the answer of the First Consul ; and that 
 it did not in any shape become me to put myself on the foot- 
 ing of a solicitor in this transaction. After some conversation, 
 and finding (what I most sincerely believe to be the case) 
 that the First Consul's deter n:tin at ion was fixed on the point 
 of a possession of Malta in perpetuity, I repeated to him what 
 I had previously suggested to Joseph Bonaparte — the modifi- 
 cation which I had to propose, namely, that for the sake of 
 peace his Majest}^ would be willing to waive his pretensions 
 to a possession in perpetuity, and would consent to hold 
 Malta for a certain number of years to be agreed upon, on the 
 condition that no opposition should be made on the part of 
 the French. Government to any negotiation his Majesty might 
 set on foot with his Sicilian Majesty for the acquisition of 
 the island of Lampedusa. We disci-issed this proposal in a 
 conversation of some length, and I made use of all the argu- 
 ments which have been furnished me by your Lordship, or 
 which occurred to me, in its favour. I begged him particu- 
 larly to recollect that we were in actual possession of the 
 object, and that therefore every modification tending to limit 
 that possession was in fact a concession on the part of his 
 Majesty, and a proof of his desire to sacrifice to his love of 
 peace the just claim which he has acquired in consequence 
 of the cojiduct of France, and which had recently been 
 admitted, of a much more considerable compensation and 
 counterpoise. M. de Talleyrand did not seem disposed to 
 dispute any of my positions, and I left him, I confess, f ally 
 impressed with the idea that the next day (Friday) I should 
 find him prepared to treat on this ground, and that the only 
 difficult point to be arranged would be the number of years 
 for which Malta should be ceded to his Majesty. What, then, 
 must have been my surprise when, on seeing him the next 
 day, he told me that although he had not been able to obtain 
 from the First Consul all we wished, still the proposition he 
 had to make would, he trusted, be such as fully to answer the 
 purpose ! He then said that the First Consul would on no 
 terms hear either of a perpetual or of a temporary possession 
 
f UNIVERSITY \ 
 
 LAMPEDUSA, ^N.£;^L)F0R!^)^»<^5 
 
 of Malta; that his object was the execution of the Treaty of 
 Amiens 5 and that, rather than submit to such an arrange- 
 ment as that I had last proposed, he would even consent to 
 our keeping the object in dispute for ever — on the ground 
 that in the one there vras an appearance of generosity 
 and magnanimity, but in the other nothing but weakness 
 and the effect of coercion ; that therefore his resolution was 
 taken, and what he had to propose was the possession we re- 
 quired of the island of Lampedusa, or of any other of the 
 small isles, of which there were three or four between Malta 
 and the coast of Africa ; that such a possession would be 
 sufficient for the object we had in view, which was a station 
 in the Mediterranean as a place of refuge and security for 
 any squadron we might find it convenient to keep in the 
 sea. I suffered him to expatiate a considerable time and 
 without interruption on the great advantages we were to 
 derive from such an acquisition, as well as on the confidence 
 which the First Consul reposed in our pacific intention in 
 lending a hand to such an establishment. He concluded by 
 desiring I would transmit this proposal to your Lordship. 
 I told him I was extremely sorry indeed to find that we 
 had made snch little progress in the negotiation ; that my 
 orders were positive — that I could hear of nothing short 
 of what I had proposed, neither could I possibly undertake 
 to make such a proposal to his Majesty, since every word of 
 my instructions (from which I certainly should not depart) 
 applied positively to Malta, unless an equivalent security 
 could be offered, and surely he would not pretend to tell me 
 that Lampedusa could be considered as such ; that the 
 possession of Malta was necessary for our security, and was 
 rendered so not from any desire of aggrandisement on the 
 part of his Majesty, but by the conduct of the French 
 Government, and that so strongly wei-e we impressed with 
 this necessity, that rather than abandon it we were prepared 
 to go to war ; that it was on this ground I must declare to 
 him that I could neither take upon myself to forward such a 
 proposal as he had made to me, or, indeed, anything short 
 of what I had last proposed as a fair equivalent. I will 
 
186 APBIL 1803. 
 
 confess to your Lordship that I was nettled at hearing such a 
 proposal ; and I conld not refrain from adding that he might 
 perhaps think me an improvident negotiator in declaring to 
 him in the manner I had done the utmost extent of my 
 instructions in the outset of the conversation^ but that he 
 would in return find me a firm one, for I should most cer- 
 tainly not recede from the ground I had taken ; that in so 
 doing I acted in conformity to his Majesty's views, who 
 would most assuredly disapprove of my conduct were I, by 
 unnecessarily protracting the negotiation, to add one day 
 or one hour, if it could be avoided, to the suspense and 
 anxiety under which his own subjects and all Europe must 
 labour at such a crisis ; that I had hoped the French 
 Government, actuated by the same generous motives, would 
 have acted in the same manner; that it might by pursuing a 
 contrary line of conduct gain still a few days, but I must 
 declare that in a very short time I should have to commu- 
 nicate to him those very terms from which his were so wide, 
 but to draw nearer to which was perhaps the object of his 
 negotiating, in the form of an ultimatum, which would at 
 least have one good effect, that of bringing the matter to an 
 issue ; and the certainty even of war was preferable to the 
 present state of indecision. To all I could say M. de Talley- 
 rand objected the dignity and honour of the First Consul, 
 which could not admit of his consenting to anything which 
 might carry with it the appearance of yielding to a threat. 
 I told him that it never could be admitted that the First 
 Consul had a right to act in such a manner as to excite 
 jealousy and create alarm in every State of Europe, and, 
 when asked for explanation or security, say that it was 
 contrary to his honour or his dignity to afford either. Such 
 arguments might perhaps do when applied to those Govern- 
 ments with which France had been accustomed to treat, or 
 more properly to dictate to, but never could be used to 
 Great Britain ; that his Majesty had a right to speak freely 
 his opinion, and possessed also the means, whenever he 
 chose to employ them, of opposing a barrier to the ambition 
 of any individual or of any state which should be disposed 
 
REFUSAL TO SURRENDER MALTA. 187 
 
 to threaten the security of his dominions or the tranquillity 
 of Europe. I was nettled at this affected assertion of dignity 
 on all occasions, and could not help expressing myself rather 
 warmly on the subject. Our conversation concluded by M. 
 de Talleyrand's assuring me that he would report the sub- 
 stance of it to the First Consul in the evening, and that 
 he should probably have occasion to see me on the follow- 
 ing day. 
 
 Paris, April 25, 1803. 
 
 The conversation I had on Saturday morning with M. de 
 Talleyrand has produced nothing from which I can draw a 
 more favourable conclusion as to the result of the negotiation 
 than when I last addressed your Lordship. He told me that 
 although he had seen the First Consul the night before he 
 had nothing to add to what he had communicated to me on 
 Friday ; that the First Consul was determined not to give his 
 consent to our retaining Malta either in perpetuity or for a 
 term, although of the two he would prefer the former tenure, 
 as the less repugnant to his feelings ; that he was therefore 
 ordered to repeat the proposal he had lately made me — of 
 acceding to our demand of Lampedusa or any of the neigh- 
 bouring islands, and that, as our object was to obtain a settle- 
 ment in the Mediterranean, he imagined that which we our- 
 selves had pointed out would answer every purpose we might 
 have in view ; but that at all events the First Consul neither 
 could nor would relinquish his claim to the full execution of 
 the Treaty of Amiens. To this I could only repeat what I 
 had already said to him on the inadequacy of such a pro- 
 posal, and of the impossibility in which I found myself to 
 transmit it to your Lordship. I lamented the course which 
 the negotiation was taking, and that the First Consul should 
 have so little regard to the dreadful consequences which 
 must ensue as to suffer them to be outweighed by a mistaken 
 notion of dignity. In answer to an observation of M. de 
 Talleyrand, from which he gave me to understand the First 
 Consul could never submit to what he considered as an act 
 
188 APRIL 1803. 
 
 of violence, I told him it was but too true that in the late 
 transactions with other Powers the First Consul had been 
 so little accustomed to meet with contradiction that it was 
 natural he should not well distinguish between any opposi- 
 tion to his will and an act of violence, but that his Majesty 
 was not to be classed with those Powers, and the French 
 Government must therefore not be surprised if, when his 
 Majesty's dignity, his honour, or the safety of his dominions 
 were threatened, the most effectual means would be used to 
 secure them ; and I added, that notwithstanding the acqui- 
 escence which he might have met with from others, the plea 
 of its being incompatible with the dignity of the French 
 Government to give satisfaction or security, when both might 
 with justice be demanded, could never be admitted by Great 
 Britain. M. de Talleyrand heard everything I could say, 
 and seemed unwilling to break up the conference. He con- 
 stantly brought forward the same inadmissible proposal, re- 
 questing that I would at least communicate it to your Lord- 
 ship. This I told him I could not refuse to do, since every- 
 thing which passed between him and me must of course make 
 the subject of my reports to your Lordship. I declared, how- 
 ever, at the same time, that 1 should not think myself by any 
 means authorised to suspend the execution of any instructions 
 I might receive tending to bring the negotiation to an issue, 
 in the expectation of any change which such a proposal 
 might produce. All I could do, and that I would certainly 
 do, would be to communicate the ultimatum, if his Majesty 
 should think proper to furnish me with it, confidentially to 
 M. de Talleyrand before I presented it officially to him as 
 Minister for Foreign Affairs. He assured me that he should 
 consider such conduct as a further proof of my desire to 
 conciliate, and that he could not yet forbear hoping that the 
 differences might be adjusted. I repeated that if his hope 
 was founded on the expectation of his Majesty's being in- 
 duced to recede from his demand it would be deceiving him- 
 self to cherish it. The remainder of the conversation turned 
 on the calamities which would follow the failure of our 
 endeavour to avoid a rupture. He insinuated that Holland, 
 
HOSTILITY OF FRANCE TO ENGLAND. 189 
 
 Naples, and other countries connected with Great Britain 
 would be the first victims of the war. I told him we 
 doubted not the disposition of this Government to extend 
 the miseries of war or its means of carrying such an inclina- 
 tion into effect ; but I asked him whether he thought that 
 such conduct would add to the glory of the First Consul, or 
 whether the falling on the innocent and defenceless would not 
 rather tarnish it and ultimately unite against him not only 
 the honest men in his own country, but every Government 
 in Europe ; that it certainly would excite more detestation 
 than terror in England, at the same time that it would serve 
 to impress upon us still more strongly the necessity of omitting 
 no means of circumscribing a power so perniciously exerted. 
 M. de Talleyrand observed that he believed that even in 
 England there were persons impartial enough to admit that 
 France had not only acted with good faith towards us, but 
 that she had since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens 
 manifested but one idea — that of cultivating the best under- 
 standing. I said that I was at a loss to guess who those 
 persons could be to whom he alluded ; that those with whom 
 I was in the habit of conversing, amongst whom were people 
 of all parties, were not of that opinion, but were rather con. 
 vinced that if more provocation had not been given we were 
 more indebted to our own vigilance than to the forbearance 
 of the First Consul — alluding to the project, of the exist- 
 ence of which none could doubt, of invading Egypt in the 
 course of the month of October last, had not the British 
 fleet been, contrary to expectations, at that period in the 
 Mediterranean. I could not help adding that although no 
 act of hostility had actually taken place, jet the inveteracy 
 with which our commerce, our industry, and our credit had 
 been attacked in every part to which French influence could 
 be extended did in fact almost amount to the same, since it 
 went to prove, in addition to the general system of the First 
 Consul, that his object was to pursue under the mask of 
 peace the same line of conduct on which the preceding 
 Governments had acted, tending to the subversion of every 
 regular one in Europe. In the course of this conversation 
 
190 APEIL 1803. 
 
 I am not conscious of having omitted any arguments which 
 might serve to convince M. de Talleyrand, and through him 
 the First Consul, of our determination to adhere to our 
 demand, and at the same time show that we were not im- 
 posed upon by their specious professions. In my preceding 
 conversation I had intimated to M. de Talleyrand that if he 
 was bent upon making that proposal to your Lordship which 
 I had declined accepting he might do it through the medium 
 of General Andreossy. M. de Talleyrand now told me that 
 the First Consul had ordered him to assure me that he would 
 make use of no other channel than mine ; that he was con- 
 vinced no one was more desirous than I was of conciliating 
 all differences, and he trusted to my exertions. I will con- 
 fess to your Lordship that I do not feel much elated with 
 this mark of confidence ; neither, indeed, do I well know 
 whether I am to consider it as a compliment. Whatever it 
 be, it cannot render me more conscious than I am to avoid 
 the extremity of war, or less zealous for the honour and 
 dignity of his Majesty, which, I hope and trust, will never be 
 impaired by any transaction of mine. I am sorry to have 
 to inform your Lordship that the further discussion of this 
 business has been taken from Joseph Bonaparte, on the sup- 
 position of his not doing sufficient justice to the arguments 
 and pretensions of the First Consul. The whole is now to 
 go through the regular channel of the Minister for Foreign 
 Affairs. Although this change has taken place, I am per- 
 fectly sure none will have taken place in Joseph Bonaparte's 
 sentiments, and that he will, in his daily intercourse with his 
 brother, lose no opportunity of serving our cause, which he 
 considers as the cause of peace. M. de Talleyrand can act 
 no otherwise than he does, but I am perfectly sure he coin- 
 cides in opinion with him, as does every thinking man in the 
 country. The measures which we are pursuing will be con- 
 sidered as political and just ; whilst those of the First Consul 
 exhibit a picture of despotism, violence, and cruelty, at the 
 contemplation of which humanity sickens. This I do firmly 
 believe to be the general impression of those who see deeper 
 into the state of Europe than through the medium of the 
 
MOVEMENT OF TROOPS. 191 
 
 French papers. It is said since Friday that a messenger is 
 arrived from Petersburg, and that the accounts which he 
 brings are not so favourable to the views of the First Consul 
 as he expected. Should this be the case, we may perhaps 
 reap some benefit from it ; but I confess to your Lordship 
 that the intractable character of the First Consul leaves me 
 but little hope. I trust entirely to the effect of the ultima- 
 tum, which will at least convince him that we are in earnest, 
 and that he has nothing to expect from protraction. I shall 
 not, however, as I said before, make use of this arm officially 
 until I have tried its effect in a more conciliatory manner. 
 We will convince even the First Consul that nothing has 
 been left unattempted for the preservation of peace. It will 
 be no matter of surprise to your Lordship to learn that the 
 Court of Berlin has engaged — if any credit is to be attached 
 to the assurances of M. de Luchesini — to adopt the views 
 of the First Consul should hostilities take place. I trust, 
 however, that this cannot take place, unless the Emperor of 
 Russia should adopt the same disgraceful line of conduct. 
 On the preparations which are carrying on I have little to 
 say. It is not until within these three days that they have 
 worn any serious aspect. Troops are marching towards the 
 coast, particularly to the neighbourhood of Cherbourg, 
 where General Suchet is appointed to command them. The 
 generals affect to hold out the certainty and the success of 
 an invasion, which few others believe. And it is said that 
 General Moreau should look forward to being at the head of 
 an army ; but I believe he does so with views very different 
 from those which are assigned. More troops are ordered to 
 Holland, and everything points out their intention of threat- 
 ening us with an invasion. Their works in the dockyards 
 do not, I am assured, keep pace with the activity displayed 
 in the marching of troops. Your Lordship knows how 
 difficult it is, not to say impossible, to procure intelligence 
 on these points. Such a system of vigilance and suspicion 
 prevails that money even proves ineffectual. I am, however, 
 persuaded that one great motive of this extraordinary 
 caution is that we may not see their povert}^, and be con- 
 
192 APRIL 1803. 
 
 vinced that nothing effectual has been done, or is doing, 
 towards the regeneration of their navj, or even to give the 
 least degree of probability to the success of the threatened 
 invasion. I have always thought it next to impossible. The 
 First Consul has told me himself that he considers it in the 
 same light. I do not believe that he or any one else has any 
 real intention of ever making the attempt. It is on those 
 devoted and defenceless countries which lay open to his 
 attack that his rage will fall : they will be the victims to his 
 insatiate but impotent hatred of us. 
 
 P.S. — Your Lordship's despatches Nos. 12, 13, and 14 of 
 the 23rd, with their enclosures, were delivered to me by Shaw 
 this evening at nine o'clock. I shall see M. de Talleyrand 
 to-morrow morning, and I trust your Lordship will not dis- 
 approve my following the line of conduct I had proposed, 
 and which I have mentioned to your Lordship, of informing 
 him of the nature of my instructions a few hours before I 
 carry them officially into execution. All I can say at this 
 moment is, that, if I may give credit to those who pretend 
 to be well informed, the First Consul is determined not 
 to comply with our demands. I have, however, reason to 
 believe that he did not expect to be so closely pressed as he 
 now will be. 
 
 Paris, April 27, 1803, six o'clock in the evening. 
 
 I avail myself of the opportunity of a messenger passing 
 through from Constantinople and Vienna to inform your 
 Lordship of the state of the negotiation at this moment. I 
 communicated to M. de Talleyrand the purport of my instruc- 
 tions of the 23rd yesterday at four o'clock. I prefaced this 
 communication by telling him that I was not unmindful of 
 the engagement I had contracted, of consulting him confi- 
 dentially on the purport of those instructions before I made 
 the communication in form ; and, as I mentioned to your 
 Lordship in a former despatch, I was induced to do so in 
 order that there might be no further expectation of our 
 
LOED WHITWORTH REFUSES WRITTEN ULTIMATUM. 193 
 
 receding from our demand, and if possible to give an oppor- 
 tunity of adjusting the diflPerences without having recourse 
 to an extremity which might, with a character like that of 
 the First Consul's, increase the difficulties. M. de Talley- 
 rand cut the matter, however, very short. He asked me if 
 the possession of Malta was insisted upon. I told him most 
 certainly it was ; and I repeated to him the particulars of 
 the terms on which it was yet possible to conclude the 
 business ; that these were, the possession of Malta for ten 
 years, during which period the authority, civil and military, 
 was to remain solely in his Majesty, and that at the expira- 
 tion of that term it was to be given up to the inhabitants, 
 and not to the Order ; provided also that his Sicilian Majesty 
 shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the island of Lam- 
 pedusa, that Holland should be evacuated by the French 
 troops within a month after the conclusion of a convention 
 by which all these provisions shall be secured ; and that 
 his Majesty would further consent to acknowledge the new 
 Italian States, provided stipulations were made in favour of 
 his Sardinian Majesty and of Switzerland. I had no sooner 
 made known these conditions than M. de Talleyrand told me 
 it would be perfectly unnecessary to delay the official com- 
 munication, for, as the possession of Malta was still insisted 
 upon, although for a term, the First Consul would not con- 
 sent to them. I accordingly did repeat them to him in the 
 manner he desired, when he told me that he comprehended 
 perfectly what we required, but in similar cases it was usual 
 to state the demand in writing, and he desired I would give 
 him a note upon the subject. I told him that I was by no 
 means authorised so to do ; that if he desired it I would 
 repeat to him once more, or as often as he pleased, the 
 express terms which I had stated to him, but that it was not 
 in my power to make any communication in writing ; and 
 that as my communication to him was verbal I should of 
 course be content with an answer in the same form. He 
 expatiated much on the irregularity of such a proceeding ; 
 but as I could give him no further satisfaction he consented 
 at length to receive it, and to communicate to me the First 
 
 
 
194 APKIL 1803. 
 
 Consul's answer as soon as possible. I desired that he would 
 recollect that Tuesday next must be the day of my departure ; 
 and I left him, I confess, with no very sanguine hope of 
 success, although not with the degree of despondency with 
 which he evidently meant to impress me. I had in the 
 meantime written to Joseph Bonaparte, who was at his 
 country house near Chantilly, to desire he would return for 
 the purpose of making a last effort on the First Consul. He 
 returned late in the evening, and I have seen him this morn- 
 ing. I told him everything which had passed, and I confess 
 that he has raised my expectations of a favourable issue, by . 
 acknowledging, although unintentionally, that in his con- 
 versations with the First Consul the number of years for 
 which Malta might be ceded had been discussed, and that 
 the First Consul had said that, let what would happen, he 
 never could consent to more than three or four. I told him 
 that my instructions were so positive as to preclude all 
 further negotiation on that point. But I consider such a 
 confession on his part as a very favourable symptom, since it 
 proves to me that the First Consul is not so stout as M. de 
 Talleyrand had represented him to be on the subject of a 
 temporary possession. After some conversation, tending to 
 convince me that he would employ himself zealously for the 
 favourable conclusion of the business, he left me to go to 
 St. Cloud. About half an hour after he had been gone I 
 received an intimation, from a private but sure hand, that M. 
 de Talleyrand had not made use of my communication in the 
 form of an ultimatum, or at least that the First Consul did 
 not, or, what I believe is nearer the truth, would not, receive 
 it as such. The pretext is that it is not formal unless in 
 writing. And of this I was still further assured by the 
 return of Joseph Bonaparte, who came from the First Consul 
 to tell me that no ultimatum had been given, since nothing 
 verbal was considered as such. I explained again to him the 
 nature of my instructions, declaring that I was not authorised 
 to give anything in writing, but that I could repeat it as 
 often as he pleased. He told me that the First Consul was 
 much embarrassed how to act ; that he certainly was disposed 
 
LAURISTON SENT TO LONDON. 195 
 
 to avoid a rupture, if it could be done without dishonour ; 
 that if an ultimatum had been given in writing he would 
 perhaps submit it to the Council of State and let that 
 determine on the conduct which he should pursue. I gave 
 it as my opinion that although it was not given in the 
 manner which, according to the opinion of the First Consul, 
 would have been more formal, yet it was sufficiently explicit 
 not to be misunderstood; and that we should, I feared, 
 lose only time, which was extremely precious, in disputing 
 on a point on which I could give them no satisfaction. 
 With this he immediately returned to St. Cloud, and I 
 have heard no further from him or M. de Talleyrand. As 
 I have two extraordinary messengers with me, I shall have 
 sufficient opportunities of communicating to your Lordship 
 the further progress of the negotiation. I forward this with 
 the messenger from Vienna, in order that your Lordship may 
 be informed as early as possible of the state of the business 
 at this moment. There certainly exists a strong disposition 
 to negotiate. It may be for the purpose of delay ; but in this 
 they cannot now succeed, since I have given it clearly to be 
 understood that my departure must be regulated by the 
 receipt of your Lordship's instructions which reached me 
 on Monday night. I have just heard that M. Lauriston 
 set out for London at twelve o'clock last night, with des- 
 patches to General Andreossy, and possibly for the purpose 
 of seeing your Lordship. I have lately had reason to suppose 
 that the First Consul considers his Ambassador in London 
 as too partial. It is calculated that Lauriston may return 
 before I leave Paris. Joseph Bonaparte on coming from his 
 brother seemed very anxious to know the precise time of my 
 departure, and I told him that it would not be protracted 
 beyond Tuesday next. He asked me if in the case of my 
 leaving Paris the French Ambassador would not be allowed 
 to remain in England, for the First Consul would probably 
 not recall him. I told him I did not well see how that could 
 be; that when I should be recalled from hence it would 
 of course be intimated to the French Ambassador to return, 
 should he not receive orders to that effect from the Govern- 
 
 o % 
 
196 APRIL 1803. 
 
 ment. From this your Lordship will see how disposed they 
 are, by every artifice, to gain time. I should also mention, that 
 on his asking me why his Majesty's Ministers could object 
 to my delivering in writing what I was already authorised to 
 give verbally, I told him that, although no reason had been 
 assigned, yet it appeared to me that it would be difficult in 
 an official note to specify the demand which his Majesty 
 made, amounting to an infringement of the letter of the 
 Treaty of Amiens, without at the same time enumerating the 
 motives, arising from the conduct of the French Government 
 since the conclusion of the treaty, which had rendered such, 
 a demand necessary as a measure of reciprocity and of pre- 
 caution ; that this would of course include a great deal of 
 matter, and, in fact, would amount to a manifesto before 
 the necessity of such a measure. He seemed to think this 
 explanation not unreasonable, and 1 trust it will not be found 
 so by your Lordship. 
 
 Paris, April 28, 1803. 
 Since my letter of last night by Lord Elgin's messenger, 
 I have learnt nothing that can add either to your Lordship's 
 hopes or doubts on the result of the negotiation. The First 
 Consul is, as I am given to understand, in a state of extreme 
 agitation; and those who have conversed with him in the 
 course of yesterday left him with the impression that, of the 
 two, he is more disposed to resistance than conciliation. This 
 is also the language of M. de Talleyrand — not expressed to 
 me, for I have not seen him since the day before yesterday, 
 but conveyed to me with a view probably of exciting alarm 
 by persons deputed for that purpose by him. I have not 
 learnt the motive of M. de Lauris ton's mission. It may be 
 to ascertain whether any diminution can be obtained in the 
 term of years for which the possession of Malta is required ; 
 and I am inclined to believe this to be the case, as Joseph 
 Bonaparte, on my mentioning ten years, immediately observed 
 that your Lordship had told General Andreossy (I suppose 
 
PKOJET SUBMITTED TO TALLEYRAND. 197 
 
 some time ago) that seven years would be accepted. If the 
 First Consul determines to submit the case to the decision 
 of the Council, it will probably not be the Council of State, 
 but a Privy Council, provided for by the Constitution, and 
 composed of the three Consuls, two Ministers, two Coun- 
 cillors of State, two Senators, and two Chiefs of the Legion 
 of Honour. Should such a reference be resorted to, there 
 can be little doubt of the result ; for, as I have had frequent 
 opportunities of saying to your Lordship, there is scarcely a 
 man of any consequence employed in the Government, with 
 the exception of a few generals, who would not consider the 
 renewal of a war as the severest calamity which could possibly 
 befall this country. At all events, it is imagined that no 
 decision will be taken, or at least communicated to me, until 
 the return of M. de Lauriston, who, it is calculated, may be 
 back Sunday night or Monday morning. In this case it will 
 run very hard on the term prescribed by your Lordship for my 
 stay at Paris ; and without knowing the object of his journey 
 I have given it plainly to be understood that my departure, 
 with that of the mission in general, must take place on 
 Tuesday next unless the modification which I have proposed 
 and from which it is vain to hope that we shall recede shall 
 in the intermediate time be adopted. Enclosed is the Project 
 which I read to M. de Talleyrand, in consequence of your 
 Lordship's instructions of the 1 3th inst., and from which your 
 Lordship will see that I did not either misunderstand or 
 misapply the letter or the spirit of those instructions. The 
 term of years was left in blank, as no positive term had been 
 specified. I should, had this Government been disposed to 
 negotiate, have insisted on sixteen or fourteen years, and in 
 no case have fallen lower than ten, the number now adopted 
 in the ultimatum. 
 
 PROJET. 
 
 L'ile de Malte restera en possession de Sa Majeste Bri- 
 tannique pour I'espace de. ... A la fin de ce terme elle sera 
 rendue aux habitans, et elle sera reconnue comme etat inde- 
 pendant. Dans ce cas Sa Majeste se preteroit a un arrange- 
 
198 APRIL 1803. 
 
 ment pour I'etablissement de Pordre de St. Jean dans quelque 
 autre partie de I'Europe. Le Gouvemement fran9oi3 ne 
 s'opposera pas a la cession de I'tle de Lampedusa a Sa Majeste, 
 pourvu que Ton obtienne le consentement de Sa Majeste 
 le roi des Deux-Siciles, moyennant un dedommagement con- 
 venable. La HoUande et la Suisse seront evacuees par les 
 troupes fran9oises. Sa Majeste reconnaitra le roi d'Etrurie, 
 ainsi que les republiques italienne et ligurienne, a condition 
 qu'il soit fait un arrangement en Italie satisfaisant a Sa 
 Majeste le roi de Sardaigne. 
 
 Paris, April 29, 1803. Friday evening. 
 
 AltbougL. I can yet say nothing positive, or indeed scarcely 
 form an opinion, as to the event of the negotiation, I think it 
 my duty not to suffer two days to pass without communicating 
 with your Lordship. Were I to give credit to the public 
 report, I should have very little hope of an amicable arrange- 
 ment. All those who judge from appearances, and from loose 
 expressions dropped — in all probability intentionally — by the 
 First Consul, assure me that he is determined at all events 
 to resist our demands, and to suffer me to depart ; and it is 
 certain that a considerable degree of preparation would seem 
 to justify such an opinion. Expresses are continually sent 
 to the ports, troops are marching towards the coast, and the 
 project of invasion is announced as the only measure by 
 which what they term the arrogant and turbulent spirit of 
 Great Britain can be subdued. This is language held by the 
 vulgar ; but I may add that none but the vulgar attend to 
 it. It is felt by those who are capable of reasoning that it 
 is much easier to make a demonstration than to carry into 
 effect a project for which everything is wanting, excepting 
 soldiers, most necessary for its execution. And, indeed, it 
 is this deficiency of means which encourages me to hope that 
 matters may yet be accommodated. My last letter to your 
 Lordship was of yesterday evening. This morning a person 
 came to me, whom I suspect of being employed by the First 
 
M. DE PERREGAUX. 199 
 
 Consul for the purpose of ascertaining my sentiments (this 
 person is M. de Perregaux, my banker), and told me that I 
 should in the course of the day receive a letter from M. de 
 Talleyrand, drawn up under the inspection of the First Consul, 
 which, although not exactly what I might wish, was, however, 
 so moderate as to afford me a well-grounded hope, and might 
 certainly be sufficient to induce me to delay for a short time 
 my departure. I told him that it would be a matter of great 
 satisfaction to me to perceive a probability of bringing the 
 negotiation to a favourable issue, and that I should be ex- 
 tremely sorry to spoil the business by any useless precipita- 
 tion ; but it must be recollected that I acted in conformity 
 to instructions, that these instructions were positive, that by 
 them I was enjoined to leave Paris on Tuesday next unless 
 in the intermediate time certain conditions were agreed to, 
 and that I could not possibly disobey those instructions 
 unless in the letter which he mentioned, or in any other, 
 such assurances were given of the acceptation we required 
 as would justify me in the eyes of his Majesty for not con- 
 forming implicitly to his orders. This declaration seemed 
 to make an impression upon him. He expatiated on the 
 moderation of the letter, which, however, he had not seen, 
 and also of the sincere wish of the First Consul to avoid a 
 war. I could only tell him that if the First Consul did so 
 sincerely wish to avoid a war the means of so doing were in 
 his power, and not in ours, unless we were disposed — which 
 I could not think very likely to be the case — to give up both 
 our honour and our security at the same time. I repeated 
 that nothing would induce me to prolong my stay short of a 
 fair and unequivocal declaration of their acceptance of our 
 just demands. Upon this he left me. No letter came in 
 the course of the day, and I suppose the manner in which I 
 received this insinuation may have suggested the necessity 
 of some further consultation. About four o'clock, however, 
 I went to M. de Talleyrand and I found him at home. I 
 told him that my anxiety to learn whether he had anything 
 favourable to tell me brought me to him, and, in case he had 
 not, to recall to his recollection that Tuesday was the day on 
 
200 APRIL 1803. 
 
 which I must leave Paris, and to request that he would have 
 the necessary passports prepared for me and my family. He 
 appeared evidently embarrassed, and after some hesitation 
 observed that he could not suppose I should really go away, 
 but that at all events the First Consul never would recall 
 his Ambassador. To this 1 replied his Majesty recalled me 
 in order to put an end to the negotiation, on the principle 
 that even actual war was preferable to the state of suspense 
 in which England, and indeed all Europe, had been kept for 
 so long a space of time ; and that consequently when I left 
 Paris it would, should the First Consul not think proper to 
 recall his Ambassador, be intimated to him that he could no 
 longer be considered as a public character, although perhaps 
 he might, if he pleased, be allowed to remain in a private one ; 
 but his functions would of course cease with mine. He then 
 reverted to the surprise of the First Consul at the difficulty I 
 made of giving our conditions in writing, observing that from 
 conversation or verbal communication nothing specific could 
 be collected; and to illustrate his argument he again men- 
 tioned the difference which appears in my demands to the 
 terms held out in conversation with the French Ambassador. 
 I told him I could say nothing to this : that in my instruc- 
 tions there had been no deviation ; they had been positive and 
 left me no doubt, and I repeated to him what I had said to 
 Joseph Bonaparte in order to satisfy him that our motives 
 for not giving in writing were good — that a note of the nature 
 he required must of necessity be neither more nor less than a 
 manifesto. From the tenor of his conversation, I should 
 rather be led to think that he does not consider the case as 
 desperate. Upon my leaving him he repeatedly said, ' J'ai 
 encore de I'espoir.' I learn from different quarters that it is 
 the determination of the First Consul to avoid a rupture if 
 he possibly can. All I can possibly say to this is, that he 
 knows the terms on which it might be avoided, and from 
 these terms it is impossible his Majesty can recede. It is 
 said to-day that Lauriston is not gone to England, but to the 
 Hague, where some difficulties have arisen on the subject of 
 the influx of French troops on the Eepublic. M. de Talley- 
 
LOED whitworth's departuee. 201 
 
 rand, on my questioning him, did not deny his mission to 
 England, but he did not avow it. At all events, his return is 
 expected on Sunday night. Accounts of a very disagreeable 
 nature have been received from St. Domingo. They amount 
 to the total annihilation of the French army by the blacks, 
 to whom a considerable number of whites, driven to despair 
 by the extortions and indiscipline of the army, had joined 
 themselves. I could wish at this particular moment that the 
 hopes of reducing that colony might not be considered as 
 desperate. Joseph Bonaparte went out of town again on 
 Wednesday evening, but returns to-morrow morning. 
 
 Saturday evening. 
 
 This day has passed without any occurrence whatever. 
 The letter in question is not yet arrived; but I was informed 
 this morning that in consequence of my observations yester- 
 day it had been necessary to make some alterations. I con- 
 fess I have no great hopes from it, or indeed of anything con- 
 ciliatory. But at all events, nothing can be expected until 
 the last moment. On Monday morning I shall send to M. 
 de Talleyrand for my passports, and on the following even- 
 ing I shall, according to your Lordship's instructions, leave 
 this place. I shall send off a messenger on Monday. An 
 assembly at the Tuileries has been announced for to-morrow ; 
 but, in the present state of things, I trust your Lordship will 
 approve my not attending it. I shall in the morning write 
 an excuse to M. de Talleyrand on the score of health. I find 
 always that great stress is laid on General Andreossy's re- 
 maining in London, even in the event of my leaving Paris ; 
 and it is even pretended that the object of Lauriston's journey, 
 if he is gone to England, is to order the French Ambassador 
 not to depart unless he should be absolutely forced so to do. 
 The policy of this measure is obvious. No messenger is yet 
 arrived from Petersburg. M. de Marcoff received despatches 
 yesterday from his Court by the post, written after his 
 Majesty's message was known there ; and, as far as I can 
 pick up from M. de Marcoff, for he is not communicative on 
 
202 APRIL 1803. 
 
 the subject, of a nature not quite in the sense of this Govern- 
 ment. I am much afraid he will not make all the use he 
 might of this favourable circumstance. I am sorrj to say 
 that those whom I have had occasion to see in the course of 
 this day give no good ground to hope a favourable issue to 
 the negotiation. I shall not, however, despair till the very 
 last moment. And should any proposition be made of a 
 nature to justify my deviating from the strict line of my 
 instructions, I shall instantly forward it to your Lordship by 
 a messenger. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Mr. Hammond. 
 
 Paris, April 30, 1803. 
 
 In answer to your inquiries respecting M. St. Quentin, I 
 have every reason to believe that he did arrive here on 
 Sunday last, and that what he brought was delivered at the 
 Department of Foreign Affairs. I am further assured that 
 the nature of his intelligence was such as to encourage an 
 idea here of his Majesty's Ministers not being supported by 
 the public in the present measures. M. de Talleyrand knows 
 our country too well to trust to such reports ; but as you 
 know that a drowning man will catch at a straw, it is not 
 impossible it may have had some effect on the First Consul, 
 whose endeavours and hopes all tend that way. I don't know 
 whether you will be able to form an idea of the result of the 
 negotiation from my despatch of this date. It rests entirely 
 on the determination of one individual, and what that will 
 be I verily believe no one in the country but himself knows 
 at this moment. I have till now been counting by days, but 
 now must begin to reckon by hours. It is now Saturday 
 night, and in the course of Tuesday I must be off, unless 
 very good reasons are assigned for my stay. I have not been 
 very expeditious in my preparations for the journey, as you 
 may well believe. 
 
LOKD WHITWORTH REFUSES TO GO TO COURT. 203 
 
 In the hope of seeing you soon, but rather as the mes- 
 senger of peace than of war, I am, &c. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, May 2, 1803. 
 Another day has passed over without producing any 
 change. I mentioned to your Lordship in my last that 
 under the present circumstances I did not think myself jus- 
 tified in attending the audience of yesterday at the Tuileries. 
 Late in the preceding evening a person came — deputed, I 
 believe, by Talleyrand — to suggest to me that by absenting 
 myself on this occasion I might unintentionally give offence, 
 and so increase the diflaculties which I had to encounter. My 
 answer was, that after what had passed I could not take upon 
 myself to expose his Majesty's dignity and my own feelings 
 to the danger which must be expected from the violence of 
 the First Consul's temper, irritated as it now is even beyond 
 its usual pitch ; that if I went I should feel it incumbent 
 upon me to assume an air of calmness and composure ; and 
 that such an air at this particular moment might be mis- 
 understood, and operate more to the detriment of the busi- 
 ness than my absence could possibly do. To this no reason- 
 able reply could be made, and in the morning early I wrote 
 M. de Talleyrand a note, of which I enclose a copy, as well as 
 to the Prefect of the Palace, declining the invitation to the 
 circle and to the dinner. The event has given me no reason 
 to I'epent this determination ; for, by all accounts, such a scene 
 of unguarded passion has not been often witnessed. On his 
 first appearance in the room the observation he made was : 
 'Ainsi done, M. I'ambassadeur d'Angleterre ne vient pas 
 aujourd'hui ; e'est qu'il fait probablement ses paquets.' He 
 then went on in such a strain of invective as indicated a most 
 disordered state of mind, and the audience passed under 
 every appearance of agitation. To all those to whom he 
 addressed himself he made some observation reflecting on 
 England or his Majesty's Government. After dinner the 
 
204 MAY 1803. 
 
 same scene was repeated, but not quite so publicly. He 
 engaged soon in a conversation of considerable length with 
 M. de Marcoff, and when the assembly broke np he took him 
 with him into his cabinet, where he remained with him a 
 considerable time. This was reported to me soon after ; and 
 I confess I was in some expectation that (supposing, as I 
 have reason to believe is the case, that M. de Marcoff knows 
 the feelings of his Court on this occasion to go with us, and 
 would endeavour to oppose some reason to the passions of 
 the First Consul) such a conference might be productive of 
 good. My expectations were still further raised when in the 
 morning I received from the Russian Minister the note which 
 I enclose. He followed soon himself; and all I could collect 
 from him was that the First Consul had, as on every former 
 occasion, endeavoured to justify himself completely, and to 
 throw the whole odium of the business upon us. It is there- 
 fore useless to repeat to your Lordship the details of such a 
 conversation. He told me, however, that before he came away 
 the First Consul had complained heavily of my precipitate de- 
 parture from Paris, as precluding all possibility of adjusting 
 the points on which we are at issue. If I may credit M. de 
 MarcofF, he did justice upon this occasion to our motives and 
 conduct. . He told the First Consul that I had three weeks 
 ago announced the possibility of the positive instructions 
 which I should soon be furnished with, and that in fact I 
 had formally and officially communicated them near a week 
 ago. This drew from the First Consul some reflections on 
 the unprecedented mode of negotiation by verbal communi- 
 cation ; and I am afraid M. de Marcoff did not urge on this 
 occasion all the reasons which he might have assigned, and 
 which a few hours ago I repeated to M. de Talleyrand. As, 
 however, the First Consul declared that he might have made 
 proposals had he not been so pressed, I determined to go 
 myself to M. de Talleyrand and to deliver, instead of sending, 
 the enclosed letter. I told him that it was with great reluc- 
 tance that I came to make this last application to him ; that 
 I had long since told him the extent of the term which had 
 been assigned for my stay at Paris, and that as I had received 
 
LORD WHITWORTH DEMANDS HIS PASSPORTS. 206 
 
 to this moment no answer whatever to the proposal I had 
 repeatedly made, I could no longer delay requiring him to 
 furnish me with the necessary passports for the return of 
 myself, my family, and the remainder of the mission to 
 England. Upon this I gave him the letter, a copy of which 
 I enclose, and on reading it he appeared somewhat startled. 
 He lamented that so much time had been lost, but said that 
 enough remained if I was authorised to negotiate upon 
 other terms. I could of course but repeat to him that not 
 only I had no other terms to propose, but that most assuredly 
 I should have no other whatever, and that, therefore, unless 
 the First Consul could so far gain upon himself as to sacrifice 
 a false punctilio to the certainty of a war, of which no one 
 could foresee the consequence, nothing could possibly pre- 
 vent my departure to-morrow night. He hoped, he said, 
 this was not so near ; that he would communicate my letter 
 and what I had said to the First Consul immediately, and 
 that in all probability I should hear from him this evening. 
 I thought it right, however, to apprise him that it was quite 
 impossible I could be induced to disobey his Majesty's orders 
 and protract a negotiation on terms so disadvantageous to 
 ourselves, unless he should furnish me with such a justifica- 
 tion as would leave me no room to hesitate, and that I did not 
 see that anything short of a full acquiescence in his Majesty's 
 demands could have that effect. He repeated that he would 
 report to the First Consul, and that 1 should shortly hear 
 from him. In this state the business now rests, and I am 
 expecting either a proposition or my passports. I prepare 
 myself, I confess, rather for the latter, and am consequently 
 taking every measure for setting out to-morrow night. If I 
 determine under these circumstances to send your Lordship 
 a messenger, it is only that your Lordship may know day by 
 day how we proceed. Were I to give implicit credit to all 
 the reports which reach me from all quarters of the First 
 Consul's resolution to maintain his ground, I should cer- 
 tainly have no hope w^hatever of anything in the shape of 
 conciliation. But I see so much passion, and in fact attach 
 so little importance to all the violence of the First Consul, 
 
206 MAY 1803. 
 
 that I cannot help nourishing a hope that at last he will give 
 way. I am inclined to think that M. de Marcoff knew more 
 than he chose to express to me, and that he is aware of a pro- 
 position being abont to be made by M. de Talleyrand. In 
 all this, however, it is very possible I may listen rather to my 
 wishes than to my expectations ; but at all events four-and- 
 twenty hours must now decide the question. It is, I am 
 persuaded, in the breast of the First Consul, and as yet 
 communicated by him to no one. 
 
 P.S. — Since writing the above I have learnt from a person 
 well informed that the answer which I am likely to receive, 
 this night or to-morrow morning is so short of everything 
 which we have required, and so evidently calculated to gain 
 time, that it cannot be considered as any justification to me 
 for not carrying his Majesty's commands into effect. Should, 
 therefore, this answer be not more favourable than it is repre- 
 sented to be, nothing will prevent my leaving this place to- 
 morrow night or the following morning at farthest. 
 
 LoED Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 2 Mai 1803. 
 
 Monsieur, — Quandj'ai eul'honneur, mardi passe, de vous 
 communiquer officiellement les dernieres propositions que 
 j'ai ete charge par ma cour de soumettre au Gouvernment 
 fran9ois dans la vue d'aplanir les presentes difficultes, j'ai 
 eu I'honneur de vous annoncer qu'en cas que le Premier 
 Consul n'agre^t pas ces propositions, je me verrois dans la 
 necessite de quitter Paris en huit jours. Nous touchons a la 
 fin de ce terme, sans que j'aie re9ula moindre reponse a cette 
 communication. II ne me reste done qu'a obeir aux ordres 
 du Roi mon maitre de retourner aupr^s de lui, et pour cet 
 effet je vous prie. Monsieur, de vouloir bien me fournir les 
 passeports necessaires. 
 
 1. Un pour moi, Madame la duchesse de Dorset et notre 
 suite. 
 
WHITWORTH EXCUSES HIMSELF. 207 
 
 2. Un pour les enfans avec leur suite. 
 
 3. Un pour Monsieur Talbot, secretaire d'ambassade, et 
 ses domestiques. 
 
 4. Un pour Monsieur Mandeville, secretaire, avec son 
 domestique. 
 
 5. Un pour Monsieur Hodgson, aumonier. 
 
 6. Un pour Monsieur Maclaurin, medecin, avec sa famille 
 et ses domestiques. 
 
 Je saisis cette occasion pour renouveler a Votre Excel- 
 lence I'assurance de ma haute consideration. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 30 Avril 1803. 
 
 Monsieur, — Une indisposition me prive de I'honneur de 
 presenter mes respects au Premier Consul demain. J'ose 
 vous prier, en cas que le Premier Consul me fasse Thonneur 
 de remarquer mon absence, de vouloir bien avoir la bonte 
 d'etre I'iuterprete de mes regrets. 
 
 Agreez, Monsieur, les assurances de ma haute considera- 
 tion. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. le Prefet du Palais. 
 
 Paris, ce 1 Mai 1803. 
 Monsieur, — Une indisposition m'empeche de rendre mes 
 devoirs au Premier Consul aujourd'hui aux Tuileries. Je 
 vous prie, en cas que le Premier Consul me fasse I'honneur 
 de remarquer mon absence, de vouloir bien etre I'interprete 
 de mes regrets. 
 
 Agreez, Monsieur, I'assurance de ma haute consideration. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
208 MA.Y 1803. 
 
 The Prepet du Palais to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Ce dimanche, 1 Mai. 
 
 Yous m'avez annonce, milord, que votre intention etoit 
 d'envoyer demain dans la matinee demander vos passeports. 
 Ne pourriez-vous pas retarder cette demarche jusqu'a ce que 
 nous nous sojons vus? J'ai quelque chose a vous communiquer 
 qui pourra peut-etre influer sur votre determination. Marquez- 
 moi I'heure a laquelle je pourrai vous voir, soit chez vous, soit 
 chez moi, a votre choix. Je vous souhaite bien le bonsoir et. 
 vous assure de mon bien sincere attachement. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Mr. Hammond. 
 
 Paris, May 2, 1803. 
 
 Although I am still at Paris, I cannot but consider my 
 stay for more than twenty-four hours as so precarious as 
 not to take every measure of precaution. I have therefore 
 to request that you will immediately be so good as to give 
 orders for two Government packets to be on Friday next at 
 Calais, in order to take me and my family, which is very 
 numerous, over. It is possible, as the children travel with 
 us, that we may not reach Calais till Saturday ; but, in order 
 to be sure, I could wish the packet-boats not bo be later than 
 Friday. I have ordered Shaw, who takes my despatch of 
 this date, to return from Calais should he find anything 
 there, as this despatch will go as quick without him and 
 perhaps cause less speculation. I shall send him or another 
 on before me to Loudon with an account of my last moments, 
 unless something very unexpected should yet keep me here. 
 
depaeture delayed. 209 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, May 4, 1803. 
 
 I have this moment learnt that the First Consul sent 
 off a messenger at ten o'clock last night to Madrid to declare 
 that the negotiation was entirely broken off and hostilities 
 inevitable. From all I learn since my conversation with 
 M. de Talleyrand, it should seem that had I persisted in 
 my refusal to take charge of this projposal my passports were 
 to have been immediately given me, and I should have been 
 suffered to depart. On returning to the charge (as I have 
 no doubt it will be necessary to do) we shall at least have 
 given such incontestable proofs of our moderation as will 
 deprive the First Consul of many of those who are disposed 
 to approve his measures. It might be essential, also, to 
 stipulate with this Government, previous to any overture 
 whatever to Eussia, that the First Consul shall begin by 
 agreeing to our possession for the term of ten years, in the 
 event of the Emperor of Eussia refusing to take charge of 
 Malta ; and that we can consent to its being offered to none 
 other. Should it be determined to set this proposal entirely 
 aside, and to instruct me to leave Paris immediately on our 
 ultimatum being refused, orders may at the same time be 
 given to prepare for the commencement of hostilities, so that 
 as little time as possible may be lost. 
 
 M. Huber to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, May 3, 1803. 
 If it was possible that anything could add to my ardent 
 wish of serving England, it would be the confidence you 
 honour me with, and the flattering approbation you have 
 been pleased to give to the efforts I have made for seconding 
 your Lordship's views at Paris. Your departure, my Lord, 
 must and will be lamented, not only by the friends of Eng- 
 land, but by the real friends of France also. The want of your 
 presence and support would greatly diminish my courage; 
 but I am so sincerely devoted to the cause of peace, that as 
 
 F 
 
210 MAY 1803. 
 
 long as my services may be thought of the least use, and 
 through your Lordship be made acceptable to the British 
 Cabinet, they are at your disposal. My opinion is, however, 
 that I can be of use only by remaining on the Continent 
 during the war, and that my abode should be in Switzerland ; 
 froDi whence I could with facility, and better than from any 
 other country, correspond, without danger or inconvenience, 
 both with England and with France. As in this renewed 
 contest (forced on England by the wretched temper and 
 ambition of the Consul) peace must be the constant object in 
 view, it is to be hoped that every incident of some impor- 
 tance will furnish the ground of fresh negotiation. On every 
 such occasion the few men who have in vain laboured to 
 prevent a renewal of war now will vigorously and constantly 
 exert themselves to determine and operate an accommodation. 
 Your Lordship knows that, combining together character, 
 situation, and abilities, they form a very strong phalanx 
 and a very desirable association. Joseph Bonaparte (the 
 best of his family) has, on account of his morality and good 
 conduct, a constant, and at times successful, influence on his 
 brother. Eegnault de St. Jean d'Angely, his intimate friend 
 and confidant, and a Councillor of State, is a man of ex- 
 cellent, unsullied character and eminent abilities, and under 
 the several points of view a man of real importance, as well 
 as a very rising man, being high in the favour of the First 
 Consul. M. Malouet, a man whose moral character and 
 talents are well known in England, and are here in high and 
 general estimation — he is an essential member of this little 
 phalanx. Fouche, Senator, a very different man from those 
 just named in point of morality, stands notoriously high in 
 point of abilities, energy, and independence of mind ; he has 
 on this occasion been a bold and loud advocate for peace, and 
 alone has dared repeatedly to combat the Consul's mistaken 
 pride and ambition. Some of his expressions to him deserve 
 to be kept in memory, and may be relied on : ^ Yous recom- 
 mencez un proces qui etoit juge. Yous etes vous-meme, ainsi 
 que nous, un resultat de la revolution, et la guerre remet 
 tout en probleme. On vous flatte en vous faisant compter 
 
OPINIONS OP FOUCHE AND TALLEYRAND. 211 
 
 sur les principes re volutiomi aires des autres nations ; le re- 
 sultat de notre revolution les a aneantis partout. L'esprit 
 public en France est tout contre la guerre ; elle ne sera 
 point nationale. On vous cralnt et on ne vous aime pas.' 
 Notwithstanding (and perhaps because of) such proof of his 
 independent mind, such is the confidence of the Consul in 
 his tried energy and abilities as Minister of the Police 
 formerly, that he has offered him that place again in case of 
 actual war; and nobody doubts his being named to it, in 
 spite of all the generals, who dread in him so avowed and so 
 intrepid an advocate of peace, and in spite also of the present 
 Ministers, who dread his known influence on Bonaparte. 
 As to Talleyrand, you know, my Lord, that his interest as 
 Minister and his interest as an individual are so decidedly 
 connected with peace, that his vote and support may be 
 relied on whenever incidents give him that influence whicH 
 his want of energy refuses him. These difi*erent men (each 
 of whom I have thought it right for your Lordship's recol- 
 lection hereafter to place in his true light), knowing my 
 political creed and relying on me in every respect, seem 
 earnestly desirous that I should continue to be a medium 
 between England and them. In the course of my co-opera- 
 tion with them I have found such unanimity in principles, 
 opinion, and action (I mean essentially Joseph Bonaparte, 
 Regnault, and Malouet) as to be seriously encouraged and 
 justified in my confidence in their public views ; and looking 
 upon them collectively (as long as the Bonaparte family 
 retains the power) as the decided and sure channel to peace 
 whenever the moment arrives, I am very ready to remain in 
 any auxiliary situation, provided I am placed in a convenient 
 and safe post. As long as the ground is tenable here for 
 the English, I mean to stay and observe, and I shall go on 
 to Switzerland whenever Eouche advises it, which may 
 probably be soon. From thence I shall have the honour of 
 writing to your Lordship ; there would be too much danger 
 in doing it from this place, unless perhaps through the 
 Portuguese Minister, if he had any despatches to send to 
 England by a safe conveyance. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 MAY 1803. 
 
 Permit me now, my Lord, in concluding this letter, to 
 repeat the expression of my regret at seeing unrewarded by 
 success the very able means for conciliation which your 
 Lordship has displayed in this most difficult country, and to 
 which the First Consul himself (in his lucid moments) has 
 repeatedly and publicly done justice. 
 
 LoED Whitwoeth to Loed Hawkesbuet. 
 
 Paris, May 4, 1803. 
 
 The following is the substance of the First Consul's plan 
 of operations in case of a rupture, as communicated by him 
 in conversation yesterday evening to General Massena : — 
 
 To assemble the army of Holland at Nimeguen. On the 
 declaration of war, to march to the attack of Hanover ; a 
 division of this army to take possession of Hamburg; to 
 treat that city in the same manner as Leghorn was treated, 
 by confiscating all British property, the whole to be given to 
 Prussia. 
 
 Under the pretence of placing Corsica in a state of defence 
 a body of troops is to be sent to that island, part of which 
 shall take possession of Sardinia. Thirty thousand men are 
 to enter the kingdom of Naples, and the King to be pro- 
 hibited from admitting British ships into his ports ; on his 
 refusing to comply that kingdom is to become a republic. 
 Similar demands are to be made to the Court of Lisbon, and 
 in case of non-compliance an army is to take possession of 
 the country to enforce these measures. Portugal is after- 
 wards to be annexed to Spain. Row-boats are to be built 
 without delay in all the ports. Bonaparte concluded by 
 declaring that he would acknowledge no neutral Powers, 
 that all must be either friends or foes. General Massena's 
 observation to the person to whom he repeated this conver- 
 sation was que Vhomme a jperdu la tete. 
 
NEW PEOrOSAL FROM TALLEYRAND. 213 
 
 Paris, May 4, 1803. 
 
 Wednesday morning. 
 
 Your Lordship will be surprised, after the little hope I 
 was enabled to give in my last despatch of a favourable issue 
 to the negotiation, to find that I am still here. It is neces- 
 sary for my justification to state to your Lordship what has 
 occasioned this delay. Soon after I had despatched the 
 messenger the night before last with my despatches of the 
 3rd I received a communication from M. de Talleyrand, of 
 which I enclose a copy, the purport of which was so com- 
 pletely wide of everything which could be satisfactory, or 
 which even afforded the least ground on which to build any 
 hope whatever, that I did not think myself authorised to 
 enter into any discussion on the points stated ; and as early 
 as I could on the following morning, I returned, by a note 
 also, the answer, of which the enclosed is a copy. I hope 
 your Lordship will feel, as I do, that this was a sufficient 
 reply to M. de Talleyrand's communication. It might, it is 
 true, had it been worth commenting upon, have been com- 
 pletely refuted, and the total want of veracity, excepting in 
 what regards the main object of our demand, would have 
 exposed it to the ridicule it deserves. I contented myself, 
 therefore, with briefly stating what were his Majesty's mo- 
 tives in accelerating the progress of the negotiation, and 
 that my instructions left me no power to hear of anything 
 which might tend to defeat his Majesty's purpose. I could 
 not, however, avoid taking notice of one error relative to the 
 difficulty I had made of giving written notes, by stating that 
 I had no positive instructions on the subject, and conse- 
 quently did not feel myself authorised to do so. After this 
 I concluded, of course, that there was an end to the negotiar 
 tion ; and, indeed, all those whom I saw in the course of the 
 day, amongst whom were all the Foreign Ministers and 
 many others, gave me every reason to imagine that there 
 was no hope whatever of the First Consul's conceding. I 
 had for some days past been preparing for my departure, and 
 on this every measure was taken for setting out at four 
 
214 MAT 1803. 
 
 o'clock this morning. All my domestic concerns were 
 arranged, all our friends had been to take leave of us, and 
 we were expecting only the passports which I had demanded 
 for the purpose of ordering the post-horses. The day and 
 the evening passed without any passports making their ap- 
 pearance ; and whilst we were debating the motive of such a 
 delay, about twelve o'clock a servant came into the room to 
 say that a person wished to speak to Mr. Huber, who was 
 still with us. He immediately went down to the foot of the 
 stairs, and there he found Monsieur Malouet, who told him 
 Regnault St. Jean d'Angely was at the door in his carriage; 
 and wished to speak to him on very urgent business. He 
 came, he said, from Joseph Bonaparte to make through him, 
 Mr. Huber, a proposal to me, which, if I agreed to, might bring 
 the business to a conclusion in the course of a few hours ; and 
 this was, that we should consent to put Malta into the hands 
 of the Emperor of Russia. Mr. Huber came upstairs to com- 
 municate to me this proposal, and I can take no great merit 
 to myself for having immediately and without the smallest 
 hesitation declined it. I desired him to say simply that it 
 was for ourselves and for our own security that we required 
 the temporary possession of Malta, and not for any other 
 Power, however friendly that Power might be ; and that any 
 proposal of such a nature could never be considered by me 
 as a justification for the smallest breach of his Majesty's 
 commands. This answer was delivered, and the two gentle- 
 men returned to Joseph Bonaparte, who lives only at the 
 distance of two doors from me ; but he was already gone to 
 bed. This step, although not official, convinced me that it 
 was not meant to give me my passports without another 
 attempt ; and I was therefore not surprised when, about one 
 o'clock, I received the enclosed note from M. de Talleyrand. 
 It is probable that the business of great importance to which 
 he alludes is the very proposal that has been suggested to 
 me, and I am consequently prepared to receive it in the same 
 manner. It appeared rather remarkable that M. de Marcoff, 
 who came to take leave of me between nine and ten, remained 
 till near twelve and evidently in expectation of something 
 
HOPES OP PEACE. 215 
 
 which, would retard my departure. When he took leave of 
 me, however, he did so as if we were not to meet again, and 
 the whole tenor of my conversation went to impress him 
 with the conviction that we should not do so, unless his 
 Majesty's proposal was acceded to by this Government. It 
 is very probable that this plan may have been arranged, 
 partly for the purpose of protraction, and partly as an expe- 
 dient more palatable than that of giving Malta to us, between 
 the First Consul and M. de Marcoff in the conversation 
 which I mentioned in my last report to your Lordship. And 
 M. de Marcoff, without any specific instructions to that 
 effect, is extremely likely to have taken the responsibility 
 upon himself, as a thing which would be flattering to the 
 Emperor and not disagreeable to the First Consul. From 
 this remark your Lordship will see that I am not perfectly 
 satisfied with M. de Marcoff 's conduct in the course of this 
 transaction. I should, however, be more dissatisfied with 
 myself were I to be so far the dupe of his schemes as to 
 swerve in the smallest degree from my instructions, which, 
 thanks to your Lordship, are sufl&ciently positive to carry me 
 through every difficulty. In this situation I am waiting the 
 hour of rendezvous with M. de Talleyrand. I cannot, how- 
 ever conclude without observing to your Lordship that, in 
 consequence of my not having left it, Paris is totally changed 
 in its appearance. Yesterday it was all gloom and dejection, 
 and to-day, as I am told, all hope and gladness. Surely 
 after raising so much expectation this Government will not 
 feel itself justified in disappointing it. I enclose to your 
 Lordship a French newspaper containing a paragraph by 
 which it appears that Sebastiani's mission is attempted to 
 be called in question. This would certainly be an evident 
 symptom of weakness, from which no good can possibly 
 come. 
 
216 MAT 1803. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Loud Whitworth. 
 
 Note, 
 
 Le soussi^ne a rendu compte an Premier Consul de la 
 conversation qu'il a eue avec Son Excellence Lord Whitworth 
 le 6 de ce mois et dans laquelle S. E. a fait connaitre que Sa 
 Majeste Britannique lui avoit donne Tordre de faire, en son 
 nom, verbalement les demandes suivantes. 
 
 1. Que Sa Majeste Britannique puisse conserver les troupes 
 a Malte pendant dix ans. 
 
 2. Que rile de Lampedusa lui soit cedee en toute pro- 
 priete. 
 
 3. Que les troupes fran9oises evacuent la Hollande. Et 
 que si dans sept jours il n'avoit pas ^te signe une convention 
 sur ces bases, S. E. Lord Wliitworth avoit ordre de cesser sa 
 mission et de retourner a Londres. Sur la demande qu'a 
 faite le soussigne, voulant bien, suivant I'usage de tons les 
 temps et de tons les pays, donner par ecrit ce que lui-m^me 
 a appelle Vultimatum de son Gouvernement, Son Excellence 
 a declare que ses instructions lui defendoient expressement 
 de passer sur cet objet aucune note ecrite. Les intentions 
 du Premier Consul etant toutes pacifiques, le soussign^ se 
 dispense de faire aucune observation sur une maniere aussi 
 nouvelle et aussi etrange de traitor des affaires de cette 
 importance. 
 
 Et pour donner encore un nouveau temoignage du prix 
 qu'il attache a la continuation de la paix, le Premier Consul 
 a charge le soussigne de faire, dans le stile et les formes ordi- 
 naires, la notification suivante. L'lle de Lampedusa n'etant 
 point a la France, il n'appartient au Premier Consul ni 
 d'acceder ni de se refuser au desir que temoigne Sa Majeste 
 Britannique d'avoir cette ile en sa possession. Quant a I'ile 
 de Malte, comme la demande que fait a cet egard Sa 
 Majesty Britannique changeroit une disposition formelle du 
 traite d'Amiens, le Premier Consul ne pent d'abord que la 
 communiquer a Sa Majeste le roi d'Espagne et a la republique 
 batave, parties contractantes au dit traits, pour connoitre leur 
 
Talleyrand's note. 217 
 
 opinion ; et de plus comme les stipulations relatives a Malte 
 ont ete garanties par Leurs Majestes I'empereur d'Allemagne, 
 Tempereur de Eussie et le roi de Prusse, les puissances con- 
 tractantes au traite d' Amiens, avant d'arreter aucun change- 
 ment dans Particle de Malte, sont tenues de se concerter 
 avec les puissances garantes. Le Premier Consul ne se 
 refusera point a ce concert, mais ce n'est point a lui a le pro- 
 voquer, puisque ce n'est pas lui qui provoque aucun cliange- 
 ment dans les stipulations garanties. Quant a I'evacuation 
 de la Hollande par les troupes fran9aises5 le Premier Consul 
 n'a point de difficulte a faire repeter par le soussigne que les 
 troupes fran9aises evacueront la Hollande des I'instant oii les 
 stipulations du traite d' Amiens pour chacune des parties du 
 monde seront executees. Le soussigne saisit cette occasion 
 de renouveler a Son Excellence Monsieur I'ambassadenr 
 d'Angleterre I'assurance de sa haute consideration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 12 Flor^al, an XL 
 May 2, 1803. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Le soussigne, en reponse a la note que M. de Talleyrand 
 a bien voulu lui transmettre hier au soir, a I'honneur de lui 
 observer qu'en cherchant a accelerer la marche de la negocia- 
 tion, le roi n'a eu d'autre motif que de tirer le plutot possible 
 les deux pays les plus interesses, et I'Europe en general, de 
 I'etat de suspense dans lequel ils se trouvent. II n'y voit, a 
 son grand regret, rien qui puisse repondre a cette intention, 
 et par consequent rien qui puisse le justifier en tardant a 
 obeir aux ordres de sa cour. II ne lui reste done qu'a prier 
 M. le ministre des Relations Exterieures de vouloir bien lui 
 en donner les moyens en lui fournissant les passeports neces- 
 saires pour son retour. II est necessaire pourtant qu'il rectifie 
 un mesentendu qui s'est glisse dans la note de M. de Talley- 
 rand. Le soussigne n'a pas dit qu'il lui etoit expressement 
 
218 MAY 1803. 
 
 defendu de passer aucune note ecrite sur I'objet de la discus- 
 sion, mais qu'il n'etoit pas autorise de le faire et qu'il ne 
 vouloit pas prendre cette responsabilite sur lui. 
 
 II saisit cette occasion pour renouveler a Son Excellence 
 Monsieur de Talleyrand les assurances de sa tres-haute con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, ce 3 Mai 1803. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, ce 2 Mai 1803. 
 Ayant demain matin une communication de la plus 
 grande importance de vous faire, j'ai Thonneur de vous en 
 prevenir sur le champ, afin que vous n'attendiez pas ce soir 
 les passeports que vous avez demandes. Je vous propose de 
 vouloir bien vous rendre demain, a qaatre heures et demie, a 
 rbotel des Affaires Etrangeres. — Recevez, milord, I'assurance 
 de ma haute consideration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawzesbury. 
 
 Paris, May 4, 1803. 
 
 Wednesday evening. 
 
 I am this moment come from M. de Talleyrand, and I 
 have to reproach myself with having consented to send a 
 messenger to your Lordship contrary to my own conscience, 
 although it was pressed upon me in such a manner as to 
 leave me scarcely a possibility of a refusal. The enclosed 
 note will show your Lordship that the idea proposed is to 
 give Malta to Russia after the expiration of the term of years 
 for which we are to hold it. I pressed for something posi- 
 tive on the subject of the number of years, which I repeatedly 
 declared could not be less than ten ; but this, it was said. 
 
CESSION OF MALTA TO RUSSIA. 219 
 
 might i^erhaps be the subject of the instructions with which 
 your Lordship would furnish me. It was maintained that a 
 less number of years would content us, when the island was 
 to be given up to such a Power as Enssia, than to the Order 
 or to the inhabitants. My only inducement for having 
 undertaken to refer again to your Lordship is to avoid every 
 reproach of precipitation. The difference will be but five 
 days, and I have declared that I see so many objections to the 
 plan, that although I could not refuse their solicitation to 
 send it I could give no hope whatever of its being accepted 
 as a ground of negotiation. I feel all the inconvenience of 
 this delay, short as ifc is; but I could not, I think, have acted 
 otherwise, at the risk of involving everything. The argu- 
 ments of M. de Talleyrand went to prove that by giving np 
 Malta to Russia we did not give np our claim to a temporary 
 possession ; and that the First Consul, as a principal in the 
 Treaty of Amiens, would never consent to set his name to 
 an act of cession of Malta, unless some other Power, like 
 Russia, would do the same. In order to reconcile this step 
 to myself, I argue that the delay, although it may be incon- 
 venient, is not irremediable, and that we may take up the 
 negotiation on the same ground without having lost any of 
 our advantages. A. delay of a few days cannot better the 
 state of the First Consul or make him better prepared for 
 war ; it must be one of many, many months that can have 
 any effect. In this respect, therefore, I think we cannot 
 be losers, and we shall have convinced them that we do not 
 act with precipitation. The object gained by this proposal 
 would be that Malta, instead of being in the hands of the 
 Neapolitans, would be placed in those of the most indepen- 
 dent Power in Europe after Great Britain, and that England 
 would reserve to herself such a temporary possession as may 
 be agreed upon — and I think that Russia would not make 
 much difficulty on that score. The inconvenience of this 
 proposal arises from the loss of time and the distance to 
 which the negotiation is transferred. Should, however, the 
 proposition on this ground be found inadmissible, the delay 
 will be but five or six days, and we resume the negotiation 
 
220 MAT 1803. 
 
 on the terms we now are, without being exposed to the least 
 reproach of driving it on with intemperance. An ultimatum 
 after this act of complaisance will come with a better effect 
 than it would have had without it. I must, however, say to 
 your Lordship that although I am not perfectly satisfied with 
 myself for having undertaken to connive at this delay, yet I 
 do not see whether I could have answered it to myself to 
 withhold from his Majesty Ministers a proposal of a nature to 
 admit of an honourable and an advantageous adjustment of 
 the present differences. It must at the same time be ad- 
 mitted that upon this ground we should find our situation 
 considerably bettered, inasmuch as Russia is stronger than 
 Naples, and our claim to a temporary possession will not be 
 disputed. The only discussion will be on the term for which 
 we are to hold it. In the instructions with which your 
 Lordship may think perhaps proper to furnish me on this 
 subject, it would be well to bind this Government to accede 
 to whatever terms may be agreed on between Great Britain 
 and Russia not under ten years, and to signify to them that 
 no negotiation would be entered upon with Russia until the 
 "First Consul should have entered into a positive agreement 
 that he will be satisfied with whatever arrangement may be 
 made between England and Russia, and will engage to ratify 
 the same. And this to be a previous sine qua non (and if in 
 the form of an ultimatum the better) with France, without 
 •which no proposal whatever is to be made to Russia. What- 
 ever your Lordship may think proper to do, I cannot but 
 think myself justified in submitting the proposal. Had I 
 persisted in my refusal to do so, I should have taken upon 
 myself a much greater responsibility, and one pregnant with 
 much more danger. This consideration will, I hope, be 
 admitted as an excuse, if I have occasion for any. Any 
 delay whatever, it is true, may be productive of expense, 
 but it cannot be put in any competition with that of one 
 month of hostility. To all that I have said I have only to 
 add that it is necessary to take the violence of this man's 
 character into the calculation. He certainly does require 
 every degree of management in dealing with him. Were 
 
COMPROMISE OFFERED. 221 
 
 he to be driven to desperation, he might, it is true, do 
 perhaps great mischief to this country and to himself; but it 
 would probably not be without entailing upon us a consider- 
 able share also. My position is a very difficult and a very 
 delicate one. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Le soussigne a mis sous les yeux du Premier Consul la 
 note de Son Excellence Monsieur Fambassadeur d'Angleterre 
 en date du 3 de ce mois. 
 
 Apres la derniere communication qui a ete adressee a 
 Son Excellence, on con9oit moins que jamais comment une 
 nation grande, puissante et sensee pourroit vouloir entre- 
 prendre de declarer une guerre dont les resultats entraine- 
 roient des malheurs si grands et dont la cause seroit si petite, 
 puisqu'il s'agit d'un miserable rocher ! Son Excellence a 
 du comprendre que la double necessite de s'entendre avec les 
 puissances garantes du traite d'Amiens et de ne pas violer 
 un pacte, dont I'execution interesse aussi essentiellement 
 I'honneur de la Erance, la surete de I'avenir et la loyaute des 
 relations diplomatiques entre les nations europeennes, avoit 
 fait une loi au Gouvernement fran9ois d'eloigner toute pro- 
 position diametralement contraire au traite d'Amiens. Ce- 
 pendant le Premier Consul, accoutume depuis deux mois a 
 faire des sacrifices de toute espece pour le maintien de la 
 pacification, ne repousseroit pas un terme moyen qui seroit 
 de nature a concilier les interets et la dignite des deux pays. 
 Sa Majeste Britannique a paru croire que la garnison napoli- 
 taine, qui devait etre etablie a Malte, ne presenteroit pas une 
 force suffisante pour assurer veritablement I'independance de 
 cette lie. Ce motif etant le seul qui puisse au moins expli- 
 quer le refus qu'elle fait d'evacuer Tile, le Premier Consul 
 est pret a consentir que I'lle de Malte soit remise aux mains 
 d'une des trois principales Puissances qui ont garanti son in- 
 
222 MAY 1803. 
 
 dependance, soit I'Autriclie, la Russie ou la Prusse, bien 
 entendu qu'aussitot que la France et I'Angleterre seront 
 d'accord sur cet article, elles reuniront leurs demandes 
 pour y porter pareillement les differentes Puissances, soit 
 contractantes, soit adherentes au traite d' Amiens. S'il etoit 
 possible que cette proposition ne fut pas adoptee, il seroit 
 manifeste que non-seulement I'Angleterre n'a jamais voulu 
 executer le traite d' Amiens, mais qu'elle n'a meme ete de 
 bonne foi dans aucune des demandes qu'elle a faites, et qu'a 
 mesure que la Prance eut cede sur un point, les pretentions 
 du Gouvernement britannique se f ussent portees sur un autre. 
 Et si une pareille demonstration devoit etre requise, le 
 Premier Consul aura du moins donne encore un gage de sa 
 sincerite, de son application a mediter sur les moyens d'eviter 
 la guerre, de son empressement a les saisir et du prix qu'il 
 mettroit a les f aire prevaloir. 
 
 Le soussigne saisit cette occasion de renouveler a Son 
 Excellence Lord Whitworth I'assurance de sa haute con- 
 sideration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyeand. 
 
 Paris, le 14 Floreal, an XI. 
 
 LoED Whitwoeth to Loed Hawzesbuey. 
 
 Paris, May 4, 1803. 
 
 I add two lines to my despatches of this date to beg your 
 Lordship to be assured that I would have avoided taking any 
 kind of notice of the proposal made to me this evening could 
 I possibly have done so with any kind of decency. It would 
 in all probability have been considered as such a determina- 
 tion to shut the door to all accommodation as might have 
 driven the First Consul to a state of desperation. I stated, 
 however, plainly, that although I undertook to delay my 
 departure until an answer was received, yet I could not give 
 the smallest hope of the proposals being adopted ; and indeed 
 I am very much inclined to believe that it is not expected 
 to have any effect, even by those who make it. I rather 
 
ADVANTAGE OP DELAY. 223 
 
 consider it a pretext for protraction, in the hope that his 
 Majesty's Ministers may be induced to open a negotiation 
 with Eussia ; and if they could have found out a Power more 
 remote than Russia they would have given it the preference. 
 Although I am persuaded of this, yet I could not refuse, so 
 urgent were the solicitations of M. de Talleyrand. I comfort 
 myself, however, with the idea that we shall not stand on 
 worse ground a few days hence, and the First Consul on 
 better; and we shall have proved to everyone's conviction 
 that we desire to conciliate, provided it can be done without 
 losing sight of our object. I entreat your Lordship to send 
 back Sylvester with as little delay as possible. I am per- 
 suaded that the First Consul is determined to avoid a rupture 
 if possible ; but he is so completely governed by his temper 
 that there is no possibility of answering for him. I hope I 
 shall stand excused for what I have done. I have had 
 occasion this evening to converse with M. de Marcoff on the 
 subject of this proposal. He has very candidly told me that 
 he did not believe the Emperor would give in to it, as he had 
 always expressed a decided aversion to taking any forward 
 part in the business. It becomes, therefore, of the utmost 
 importance to secure the acquiescence of the First Consul, 
 let the determination of Russia be what it will. The Duke 
 of Bedford is still here, and conducts himself very properly ; 
 I wish I could say as much of many of my countrymen and 
 countrywomen. He seems perfectly aware of the character 
 and projects of the First Consul, and of the necessity (although 
 he exaggerates the danger to ourselves) of imposing some 
 restraint upon him if possible. He appears to me to be one 
 of the most moderate party men I can meet with. 
 
 P.S. — It shall be my business in the interval between the 
 departure of this messenger and his return to prepare if 
 possible the First Consul's mind to consider the terms, from 
 which I have not in the smallest degree receded by this step. 
 And this time may therefore be very profitably employed. 
 
224 MAY 1803. 
 
 LoED Hawzesburt to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, May 7, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's despatclies Nos. 45 and 46 have been 
 received and laid before the King. The propositions which 
 have been made to you on the part of the French Govern- 
 ment, and which have induced your Excellency to delay 
 your departure until the return of the messenger Sylvester, 
 are in every respect so loose, indefinite, and unsatisfactory 
 as to fall so far short of the just pretensions of his Majesty 
 that it is impossible that the French Government could have 
 expected them to have been accepted. During the whole of 
 the discussions which have lately occurred, his Majesty has 
 had a right to consider himself in the character of the com- 
 plaining party. No means have been omitted on his part to 
 induce the French Government to make a full and early 
 explanation of their views, and to afford to his Majesty that 
 satisfaction and security to which he considered himself 
 to be entitled. It was in consequence of the apparent de- 
 termination of the French Government to evade all discus- 
 sion on points of difference between the two countries, that 
 his Majesty was induced to state the grounds on which, 
 according to his views, an arrangement might be concluded 
 satisfactory to both Governments ; and he accordingly autho- 
 rised your Excellency to communicate the three projects 
 which at different times I had forwarded to you. Until the 
 very moment when your Excellency was about to leave Paris 
 the French Government have avoided making any distinct 
 proposition for the settlement of the differences between the 
 two countries ; and when at the very moment of your depar- 
 ture the French Government felt themselves couipelled to 
 bring forward some proposition, they confined that proposi- 
 tion to a part only of the subject in discussion, and on that 
 part of it it is wholly inadmissible. The French Government 
 propose that his Majesty should give up the island of Malta 
 to a Russian, Austrian, or Prussian garrison. If his Majesty 
 could be disposed (which, under the present circumstances. 
 
SECRET ARTICLE SUGGESTED. 226 
 
 he deems impossible) to waive his demand for a temporary 
 occupation of the island of Malta, the Emperor of Russia 
 would be the only sovereign to whom, in the present state of 
 Europe, he could consent that the island should be assigned ; 
 and his Majesty has certain and authentic information that 
 the Emperor of Russia would on no account consent to 
 garrison Malta. Under these circumstances his Majesty 
 perseveres in his determination to adhere to the substance of 
 his third projet as his ultimatum. As, however, the principal 
 objection stated by the French Government to his Majesty's 
 proposition appears to be confined to the insertion of an 
 article in a public treaty by which his Majesty shall have a 
 right to remain in the possession of the island of Malta for 
 a definite number of years, his Majesty will consent that the 
 number of years (being in no case less than ten) may be stated 
 in a secret article ; and the public articles may be agreed to 
 conformably to the enclosed projet. By this expedient the 
 supposed point of honour of the French Government might 
 be saved ; the independence of the island of Malta would in 
 principle be acknowledged, and the temporary occupation 
 of his Majesty would be made to depend alone on the present 
 state of the island of Lampedusa, You may propose this idea 
 to M. Talleyrand, at the same time assuring him that his 
 Majesty is determined to adhere to the substance of his 
 ultimatum ; and if you shall not be able to conclude the 
 minute of an arrangement on this principle, you will on no 
 account remain in Paris more than thirty- six hours after the 
 receipt of this despatch. I observe by your despatch No. 1 1 
 that you did not consider yourself authorised to deliver to 
 the French Government any note or projet in writing. The 
 words of ray despatch were, that you were to communicate 
 the terms officially, which left it at your own discretion to 
 communicate them verbally or in writing as you might judge 
 most expedient. You were certainly right in communicating 
 them in the first instance verbally; but as so much stress has 
 been laid by M. de Talleyrand on this distinction, it is im- 
 portant that I should inform you that his Majesty neither 
 had nor has any objection to your delivering the enclosed 
 
 Q 
 
226 MAY 1803. 
 
 jprojet as an ultimatum, accompanied by a short note in 
 writing. I cannot conclude this despatch without recalling 
 again your attention to the conduct of the French Minister 
 at Hamburg, and referring you to my instructions, by which 
 you should abstain from concluding the arrangement until 
 you have received from M. Talleyrand an assurance that his 
 conduct would, in some manner or other, be publicly dis- 
 avowed. 
 
 Projet 
 
 1. The French Government shall engage to make no 
 opposition to the cession of the island of Lampedusa to his 
 Majesty by the King of the Two Sicilies. 
 
 2. In consequence of the present state of the island of 
 Lampedusa, his Majesty shall remain in possession of the 
 island of Malta until such arrangements shall be made by 
 him as may enable his Majesty to occupy Lampedusa as a 
 naval station ; after which period the island of Malta shall 
 be given up to the inhabitants and acknowledged as an inde- 
 pendent state. 
 
 3. The territories of the Batavian Republic shall be eva- 
 cuated by the French forces within one month after the con- 
 clusion of a convention founded on the principles of this 
 projet. 
 
 4. The King of Etruria and the Italian and Ligurian 
 Republics shall be acknowledged by his Majesty. 
 
 5. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces. 
 
 6. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the 
 King of Sardinia in Italy. 
 
 Articles 4, 5, and (5 may be entirely omitted or must all 
 be inserted. 
 
 {Secret article.) His Majesty shall not be required by the 
 French Government to evacuate the island of Malta until 
 after the expiration of ten years. 
 
 If the French Government will not consent that the occu- 
 pation of Malta by his Majesty's forces for ten years should 
 be inserted in the body of the treat}^, the secret article must 
 be considered as an indispensable part of the arrangement. 
 
227 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, May 9, 1803. 
 
 I need not, I am sure, say how extremely anxious I am 
 for the return of the messenger by whom I accused myself of 
 having acted in opposition to your Lordship's instructions by 
 consenting, instead of leaving Paris on Wednesday last, as I 
 should inevitably have been suffered to do, to receive and submit 
 to your Lordship a proposal, the evident tendency of which was 
 in direct contradiction to the policy which it is our interest 
 to pursue in this negotiation. I will, however, confess that 
 every day convinces me that had I acted otherwise I should 
 have been unworthy of your Lordship's confidence, and that 
 we should at this moment have found ourselves, from the 
 violence and passion of the First Consul, involved in hos- 
 tilities, when they might, as I trust they will be, by manage- 
 ment and temper have been avoided. I do, therefore, con- 
 sider the resolution I took not to push the matter to extre- 
 mities in the first instance, however much I may have been 
 inclined to reproach myself for having taken upon myself so 
 much responsibility, as a most fortunate inspiration ; and I 
 flatter myself we shall not be many days without reaping 
 the benefit of it. In this little interval nothing has been left 
 unattempted which can work on the mind and influence of 
 the First Consul. His brothers have been indefatigable. It 
 was they who, almost by violence, wrung from him this first 
 concession, and they certainly will not give up the point 
 until they reduce him still further. When the character of 
 the First Consul is taken into consideration, and the shame 
 and vexation he must feel at eating his own words in the 
 face of all Europe, no one, I trust, will deny that the task 
 has been arduous. By the means of the brothers, such other 
 assistance has been gained as must inevitably weaken, if not 
 totally preclude, his further resistance. The daily reports 
 which he receives from the police of the state of Paris are 
 such as to convince him that his popularity depends on 
 peace ; and by contrasting^ as we have done, our moderation 
 
 Q 2 
 
228 MAY 1803. 
 
 and temperance to his obstinacy and violence, we deprive 
 him of the argument on which he chiefly rests — that Great 
 Britain is determined on war at all events, and shuts the door 
 to every proposal tending to conciliation. I should consider 
 it as a most unfavourable circumstance were he able to 
 impress such an opinion on the public mind. The modera- 
 tion with which the discussion has been carried on on our 
 part has defeated this policy ; and the public begins to feel 
 that if it leads to hostilities, it is to the First Consul, and not 
 to Great Britain, that the calamity is to be attributed. Your 
 Lordship will not fail to appreciate the importance of such 
 an opinion, whatever may be the event. It is, I trust, firmly 
 established, and we may now proceed without the risk of 
 destroying it. In my conversations with Joseph Bonaparte 
 since the departure of the messenger I have fully impressed 
 him with the conviction that, having once taken upon myself 
 to act in contradiction to his Majesty's commands, no second 
 act of complaisance of such a nature can possibly be required 
 of me ; and, therefore, that the negotiation must inevitably 
 be concluded forthwith on the tenor of the instructions 
 which I shall receive, or be broken off. I have prepared him 
 for such an ultimatum as will leave us little time for discus- 
 sion, and made him sensible of the impossibility of our con- 
 sentirg, in the situation in which we are, to transfer to Russia 
 what must be settled between Great Britain and France. In 
 a conversation which I had with him yesterday, before he 
 went to pass tbe day with the First Consul, I repeated all 
 these arguments, and I make no doubt he will have enforced 
 them. I think, therefore, I may be justified in holding out 
 an expectation of yet bringing the negotiation to a favour- 
 able issue. I should, at all events, have no further occasion 
 to refer to your Lordship, and my next letter will be to 
 announce our success or my departure. The Emperor's rati- 
 fication of the conclusion of the general Diet of the empire 
 was received here on Thursday last. There are still some 
 trifling reserves, which will, however, be acceded to by the 
 First Consul. A reinforcement of about twelve hundred men 
 has been sent to St. Domingo from the port of Havre de Gr^ce. 
 
ACCIDENT TO THE FIRST CONSUL. 229 
 
 Paris, May 9, 1803. 
 
 Since writing the above the messenger is arrived with 
 your Lordship's despatch No. 15, of the 7th of May. I am not 
 at all surprised at the judgment your Lordship passes on the 
 proposition which I undertook to transmit to your Lordship. 
 It is perfectly conformable to the opinion I entertained of it 
 myself. But still I cannot repent having acted as I did; 
 and if by so doing I shall have contributed to the restoration 
 of public tranquillity on conditions both safe and honoura.ble 
 to his Majesty L shall have neither his Majest^/'s displeasure 
 nor the reproaches of my own conscience to apprehend. As 
 soon as I received your Lordship's instructions I prepared a 
 translated copy of the project furnished me by your Lord- 
 ship, and a short note, with which it is my intention to 
 accompany the communication. I sent immediately to 
 Joseph Bonaparte in order to communicate it to him, before 
 I carried it officially into execution. I received for answer 
 that he was at St. Cloud with the First Consul. I then sent 
 a person to M. de Talleyrand to know when I could see him 
 (although I did not mean to begin by communicating any- 
 thing to him officially), and I was informed that he also was 
 at St. Cloud. I soon after learnt that both the persons were 
 gone there in consequence of an accident which had happened 
 yesterday to the First Consul, who, probably for the first 
 time in his life, had attempted to drive himself four horses 
 without a postillion. The horses, not being thoroughly broke, 
 or perceiving, perhaps, the want of skill in their conductor, 
 soon ran away, and in turning into the gateway of the palace 
 the carriage stru'^k against it with such violence as to throw 
 the First Consul from the box to the distance of several 
 yards. He was thrown on a part where there was no pave- 
 ment. He bruised himself a good deal, and spit a considerable 
 quantity of blood. I understand that no bad consequences 
 are likely to ensue, and that he is able to transact bu?iness. 
 This, however, 1 have heard from a person interested in 
 giving a favourable report. In the meantime those with 
 whom I am to communicate are with him, and I cannot 
 
280 MAY 1803. 
 
 expect to see them before to-morrow morning. Although 
 this circumstance may cause a delay of a few hours, your 
 Lordship may be assured that the prosecution of those in- 
 structions with which you have furnished me shall not be 
 protracted. I shall leave Paris most assuredly, or have con- 
 cluded a satisfactory arrangement, within the tim6 specified 
 by your Lordship, reckoning from the moment of my being 
 able to make an official communication rather than from that 
 of the receipt of your Lordship's letter. From what I stated 
 in my preceding despatch, and from what I have since 
 learnt, I do not despair of success, although I do not feel 
 authorised to raise any very sanguine hope. In the mean- 
 time I perfectly agree with your Lordship that anything is 
 preferable to this state of uncertainty. I beg leave to men- 
 tion that Sylvester performed the journey from London to 
 Paris in thirty-five hours. But, notwithstanding this very 
 uncommon expedition, M. do Talleyrand had received from 
 General Andreossy the purport of the project transmitted to 
 me by your Lordship four hours and a half before Sylvester 
 arrived. 
 
 Nine o'clock in the evening. 
 
 Joseph Bonaparte has been with me, and I have com- 
 municated to him the nature of the project I have to propose. 
 Were I to judge from his language, I should consider the 
 business as desperate. He repeatedly assured me that the 
 First Consul would never consent to our possession of Malta 
 unless it were on the ground stated in that part of the pro- 
 ject which is meant to be public, and by which such a pos- 
 session is to be considered as dependent on the works to be 
 carried on at Lampedusa, and not to exceed a year or two. 
 I told him that such a tenure would, if we were not sincere, 
 answer our purpose better than what we had proposed, as an 
 indefinite term might be prolonged until it became a posses- 
 sion in perpetuity ; but that we wished for peace, and felt 
 that it could not be enjoyed with such an indefinite tenure, 
 subject always to jealousy and irritation ; whilst a definite 
 one, acceded to by the First Consul, would be really produc- 
 
FIRST CONSUL RECOVERED. 231 
 
 tive of peace, with all its attendants of good understanding 
 and harmony. He could not help agreeing with me, but 
 appeared always to doubt the assent of his brother. In the 
 course of the conversation he regretted that we persisted 
 always in demanding so long a term, and said that if it had 
 been for three or four years the First Consul might perhaps 
 have been persuaded to give way. I told him my in- 
 structions were positive on this head, and that it did not 
 depend upon me a second time to take any kind of responsi- 
 bility upon myself. So the business rests. I am to see 
 M. de Talleyrand to-morrow. In the meantime I cannot 
 help entertaining a hope that if they have made up their 
 minds to concede a part they will not contend for the re- 
 mainder. At all events, I shall conclude or set out on 
 Thursday morning. 
 
 P.S. — I have since learnt that the First Consul is entirely 
 recovered from his late accident. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Note, 
 
 Le soussigne, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipoten- 
 tiaire de Sa Majeste Britannique pres la E-epuhlique fran9aise, 
 ayant transmis a sa cour la proposition qui lui a ete faite 
 par le ministre des Relations Ext^rieures le 4 du courant, 
 vient de recevoir I'ordre de remettre a Son Excellence le 
 projet de convention ci-joint, fonde sur la seule base que Sa 
 Majeste croit, dans les circonstances actuelles, susceptible 
 d'un arrangement definitif et amical. Le ministre des 
 Relations Exterieures ne manquera pas d'observer jusqu'a 
 quel point Sa Majeste a cherche de concilier la securite de 
 ses interets avec la dignite du Premier Consul, Le soussigne 
 se fiatte que le Premier Consul, rendant justice a ces senti- 
 mens, adoptera, d'accord avec Sa Majeste, un moyen aussi 
 propre a rendre une tranquillite permanente aux deux nations 
 
232 MAY 1803. 
 
 et a I'Europe. Le soussigne saisit cette occasion de renou- 
 veler a Son Excellence I'assurance de sa tres-haute considera- 
 tion. Whitworth. 
 
 Projet, 
 
 1. Le Gouvernement fran9ois s*engagera a ne faire aucune 
 opposition a la cession de Pile de Lampedusa a Sa Majeste 
 par le roi des Deux-Siciles. 
 
 2. Vu I'etat actuel de File de Lampedusa, Sa Majeste 
 restera en possession de Tile de Malte jusqu'a ce qu'il ait 
 ete pris des arrangemens pour mettre Sa Majeste a meme 
 d'occuper Lampedusa comme poste militaire; apres quoi I'ile 
 de Malte sera remise aux habitans et reconnue etat inde- 
 pendant. 
 
 *3. Le territoire de la republique batave sera evacue par 
 les troupes fran9aises dans I'espaced'unmois apres la conclu- 
 sion d'une convention fondee sur les principes de ce projet. 
 
 4. Le roi d'Etrurie et les republiques italienne et ligu- 
 rienne seront reconnus par Sa Majeste. 
 
 5. La Suisse sera evacuee par les troupes fran9aises. 
 
 ■ 6. Une provision territoriale convenable sera assignee 
 au roi de Sardaigne en Italie. 
 
 Article Secret. 
 
 Sa Majeste ne sera pas requise par le Gouvernement 
 fran9ois d'evacuer Tile de Malte qu'apres I'expiration du 
 terme de dix ans. 
 
 LoED Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, May 10, 1803. 
 
 With regard to the numerous memorials and representa- 
 tions which I had to make to this Government in behalf of 
 those of his Majesty's subjects who have suffered by the 
 detention and confiscation of their vessels and property in 
 the ports of France, I have only to observe that they have, 
 
LITTLE HOPE OP PEACE. 233 
 
 with the exception of one or two instances, remained un- 
 answered. I trust, therefore, no blame can attach to me if 
 my endeavours to carry into effect your Lordship's instruc- 
 tions OQ this head have not been more effectual. 
 
 Paris, May 12, 1803, 
 
 The expected messenger with your Lordship's answer to 
 the proposition which I had taken upon myself to transmit 
 on the 4th returned on the 9th at twelve o'clock. I imme- 
 diately, as I had promised to do, sent to acquaint Joseph 
 Bonaparte of it. He came to me about six, being engaged 
 with the First Consul. I explained to him the nature of the 
 instructions which I had received, and the reasons why the 
 propositions of the First Consul on the subject of Russia 
 could not be admitted. I declared that I had nothing now 
 to do but to take up the negotiation where it had been left 
 off, and require possession of Malta for ten years, etc. etc. 
 We conversed for some time upon the business, and he left 
 me, giving me little hope of a favourable issue. I then 
 wrote to M. de Talleyrand, informing him of the return of 
 the messenger, and desiring him to name an hour when I 
 might wait upon him in order to communicate to him the 
 purport of my instructions. To this letter I received no 
 answer that evening or the following morning. Anxious to 
 execute my orders and to lose no time, I enclosed the project 
 furnished me by your Lordship, accompanied by an official 
 note and a private letter, to M. de Talleyrand, and sent it to 
 the Bureau des Relations Exterieures by Mr. Mandeville, 
 with directions to deliver it to M. de Talleyrand, or, in his 
 absence, to the Chef du Bureau. He delivered it accordingly 
 to M. Durand, who promised to give it to his chief as soon 
 as he came in, which he expected, he said, shortly. At 
 half-past four, having waited till that time in vain, I went 
 myself to M. de Talleyrand. I was told that the family was 
 in the country, and that they did not know when the Minister 
 would be in town. Half an hour after I got home, the 
 
234 MAY 1803. 
 
 packet which Mr. Mandeville had given into the hands of 
 M. Durand was brought to me — I believe by a servant — with 
 a verbal message that as M. de Talleyrand was in the 
 country it would be necessary that I should send it to him 
 there. In order to defeat as much as depended upon me 
 their intention of gaining time, although I am persuaded it 
 was done for the purpose only of combating the perseverance 
 of the First Consul, 1 wrote again to M. de Talleyrand, re- 
 capitulating the steps I had taken since the return of the 
 messengers, and desired Mr. Talbot, the Secretary to the 
 Embassy, to take it himself at nine o'clock at night, when I 
 thought M. de Talleyrand would be at home, to his house at 
 Meudon. He was, however, not at home. Mr. Talbot was 
 told that he was at St. Cloud, where he had been all day, 
 and that he would not be back until very late. He therefore 
 left my private letter with his name, and returned with the 
 packet. It was my intention to have sent it in the following 
 morning to the Bureau, with orders that it should be left 
 there. On its receipt, however, at one o'clock in the morning, 
 I received a note from M. de Talleyrand, accounting for his 
 not having been able to answer me sooner, and appointing 
 me at twelve o'clock at the Bureau des Relations Exterieures. 
 I went at the appointed time. He began by apologising for 
 having so long postponed the interview, which he attributed 
 to his having been the whole day with the First Consul. We 
 then Bntered upon business. I told him that, limited as I 
 was by your Lordship's instructions, he could not be sur- 
 prised at my impatience to acquit myself of my duty. I 
 explained to him the nature of your Lordship's observations 
 on the proposal of the 4th, and that it was considered as 
 on one hand impracticable from the refusal of the Emperor 
 of Eussia to take charge of Malta, and on the other as being 
 wholly inadequate to his Majesty's just pretensions. I gave 
 him the note in which this was expressed, and the project, 
 on which alone a satisfactory arrangement could be framed. 
 He read them with apparent attention and without any 
 remarks; and after some time he asked me if T felt myself 
 authorised by my instructions to conclude with him a con- 
 
INTERVIEW WITH TALLEYRAND. 235 
 
 vention, framed on the basis of my project, or, indeed, ex- 
 tending that basis, since the first article of it would be 
 the perpetual possession of Malta to England in return 
 for a consideration. I told him I most certainly was not 
 authorised to enter into any engagement of such a nature, 
 which would make the negotiation one of exchange instead 
 of a demand of satisfaction and security. To this he replied 
 that the satisfaction and security which we required was 
 Malta, and that this we obtained; that the First Consul 
 could not accede to what he considered, and what must be 
 considered by the public and by Europe, as the effect of co- 
 ercion ; but if it were possible to make the draught palatable 
 did I think myself justifiable in refusing to do so ? I told 
 him that, acting in strict compliance with my instructions, I 
 could have no need of justification, and that I came to him 
 with the determination of abiding strictly by them. He 
 contended that by communicating a project I merely stated 
 on what grounds we would be willing to conclude ; and that 
 a counter-project, founded on the basis of giving us what we 
 required, could not be refused a fair discussion. To this I 
 urged the resolution of his Majesty's Ministers to avoid 
 everything which could protract the negotiation ; that I saw 
 no other means of acting up to those views than by taking 
 my stand on the project at all events. I urged him re- 
 peatedly to explain himself more fully on the nature of the 
 demand vvhich he should make for Malta; but he could not 
 or would not explain himself. After much contestation it 
 was agreed that the proposal should be submitted to me in 
 the course of a few hours, and that I should determine on 
 the line of conduct I felt myself justified in pursuing —either 
 to sign it, or send it home, or to leave Paris. It was in 
 vain T racked my brain to guess what could be the nature 
 of this new proposal. T felt that it must be advantageous 
 indeed to induce me to suspend my departure ; but still I felt 
 that as the basis of it was to put us in possession of Malta 
 I could not do less than see what they might demand, de- 
 termined to resist every attempt the object of which might 
 be, notwithstanding the specious pretences of M. de Talley- 
 
236 MAY 1803. 
 
 rand, merely to protract, at a moment when everything 
 pointed out to us the advantage, and indeed the necessity, 
 of accelerating, the progress of the negotiation. The re- 
 mainder of this day passed without receiving any communi- 
 cation from M. de Talleyrand, and it was not until about 
 eleven o'clock that I was informed by a friend of Joseph 
 Bonaparte that I should receive nothing until the following 
 morning, and that then a note would be communicated 
 merely to assert that our information with respect to the 
 disinclination of Russia to take charge of Malta was incorrect. 
 Upon this I immediately determined to demand by an oflBcial 
 note my passports. I was told that the day had been passed 
 in much agitation at St. Cloud, and that a council had been 
 held at five o'clock, composed of seven people, amongst whom 
 Joseph Bonaparte and Talleyrand were the only tvvo who 
 voted for peace. The others were more subservient than 
 Talleyrand to the will of the First Consul, and sought to 
 make their court by thus conforming to his wishes. It 
 seems that M. de Talleyrand, in his conference with me, had 
 engaged for more than he was able to accomplish. He had 
 hoped that, with the assistance of Joseph Bonaparte, he 
 should have been able to arrange a proposition in such a 
 manner as to render it acceptable to us and palatable to 
 the First Consul. He was, however, disappointed, and the 
 generals, assisted perhaps by the news which came in the 
 evening from Russia, of the Emperor's having proposed his 
 intervention, succeeded in persuading the First Consul not 
 to accede to our demands and suffer me to depart. Just as 
 I was going to bed I received a message from Joseph Bona- 
 parte requesting that I would come to him. I did not, how- 
 ever, judge it expedient, in the present state of the business, 
 to have the appearance of intrigue or anything which 
 might be construed into so great a solicitude, and I let him 
 know I would call upon him at ten o'clock in the morning. 
 1 this morning called upon Joseph Bonaparte at ten o'clock. 
 He told me all that had passed yesterday at St. Cloud, 
 and of the advantage which the war faction had gained. 
 He represented the case as entirely desperate, unless it was 
 
CONV^ERSATION WITH JOSEPH BONAPARTE. 237 
 
 presented to the First Consul in such a shape as to lose the 
 appearance of coercion, against which he would recoil at the 
 risk of everything. I repeated to him that I had no other 
 proposal to make ; neither could I by any means consent to 
 quit the ground we stood on, which was such as to justify 
 us in the eyes of all Europe. I do not trouble your Lordship 
 with a detail of all the arguments which were urged, since 
 they have been so repeatedly used. The conclusion was that 
 he could not relinquish the hope of preserving peace as long 
 as there was the smallest chance of bringing the First 
 Consul to a fair proposal. He asked me what I would do 
 were he to propose to leave us in possession of Malta on 
 condition that we should not oppose any amicable negotiation 
 the First Consul might open with the Court of Naples for 
 the possession of Otranto, on the same ground as we required 
 the acquiescence of the French Government in any arrange- 
 ment we might have made with the same Court for the 
 acquisition of Lampedusa. He wished me to understand 
 this as an expedient to save a little the vanity of the First 
 Consul, who might have to say that the acquisition of 
 Malta by us had not been obtained by violence, but by an 
 arrangement. I did not hesitate a moment in declaring to 
 him that I saw no probability whatever of such a proposal 
 being accepted in England, and that I certainly would not 
 suspend my departure a moment in consequence of it. He 
 asked me if I would mention it to your Lordship. I told him 
 I certainly should mention it, or, more properly, be the 
 bearer of it, since I should set out in the evening. He then 
 told me that he knew my passports were ready, and that I 
 should have them when I demanded them. I came home, 
 and immediately sent Mr. Mandeville with an official note re- 
 quiring my passports, in order that I might leave Paris in the 
 evening. In half an hour Joseph sent to me again to ask me if 
 I would send the proposition by the messenger who was to pre- 
 cede me, provided it came to me officially. He told me that he 
 had no other orders from the First Consul, and that, indeed, he 
 was very uncertain whether he would hear of it in the temper 
 in which he was ; but he would go to St. Cloud immediately 
 
238 MAY 1803. 
 
 and make a last effort. I repeated to him what I had said 
 before — that nothing but an acceptation of my project could 
 justify my stay at Paris, and as they had no intention of 
 concluding on that ground I should set out in the evening as 
 I had intended. I told him that it was my duty to report to 
 your Lordship not only anything which came to me officially, 
 but also from a quarter so respectable as his, and that I 
 should do so on the subject of what he had mentioned to me. 
 It is possible, therefore, I may receive such a proposal from 
 M. de Talleyrand, and in that case I shall add it to this 
 despatch, which goes by the messenger who will precede ns. 
 Should your Lordship have any orders to give me on the 
 subject, they may, by sending the messenger back immedi- 
 ately, find me this side of Calais. I have not given the least 
 encouragement to hope that any good could derive from it. 
 But your Lordship will naturally weigh it with all the 
 seriousness which must attach to anything which may 
 contribute to the preservation of peace with honour and 
 security. Shortly after I had left Joseph Bonaparte I saw 
 M. de Marcoff by appointment. He had received a messenger 
 from his Court last night, and communicated to me the 
 contents of his despatches. They go to the proposal of an 
 •intervention, and express in strong terms the desire of the 
 Emperor to conciliate the differences — in terms, I must con- 
 fess, rather more favourable and friendly to this Government 
 than I could have wished. M. de Marcoff made many pro- 
 posals, and communicated to me many projects of this nature, 
 and he hoped to induce me to suspend my departure. Of 
 course I could listen to nothing of this nature. At two 
 I renewed my demand for passports, and was told I should 
 have them immediately. They arrived at five o'clock, and 
 I propose setting out as soon as the carriages are ready. 
 In this despatch I have endeavoured to keep your Lordship 
 informed of the progress of the negotiation, if such it may 
 be called, since Monday. I have only to regret that it has 
 not led to a more favourable result. 
 
proposed mediation of russia. 239 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Paris, ce 12 Mai 1803. 
 
 Ne pouvant plus remettre rexecution des ordres de sa 
 cour, le soussigne se voit oblige de prier le ministre des 
 Relations Exterieures de vouloir bien lui iaire expedier les 
 passeports necessaires pour son retour en Angleterre. 
 
 II prie Son Excellence de youloir bien agreer I'assurance 
 de sa haute consideration. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 10 Mai 1803. 
 
 Monsieur, — Pour ne pas perdre un instant d'un terns si 
 precieux, j'ai I'honneur de vous faire parvenir le projet que 
 j'ai re9u de ma cour, avec la note qui Taccompagne. J'aurai 
 celui de me rendre cbez Votre Excellence a I'heure que vous 
 m'indiquerez d'apres la demande que j'ai faite bier. Mais 
 en attendant vous serez en possession du contenu de mes 
 instructions. Dieu veuille qu'elles soienfc de nature a assurer 
 la tranquillite des deux pays et de I'Europe ! Je saisis cette 
 occasion pour renouveler a Votre Excellence I'assurance de 
 ma haute consideration. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, ce 10 Mai 1803. 
 
 Monsieur, — Ayant re9u bier matin des instructions im- 
 portantes a vous communiquer, je vous ecrivois le soir pour 
 demander a Votre Excellence I'heure ou je pourrois avoir 
 I'honneur de m'acquitter de ce devoir. Cette lettre est 
 restee sans reponse. A deux heures a.pres midi aujourd'hui 
 j'ai envoye M. Mandeville, attache a i'ambassade, au bureau 
 des Relations Exterieures pour remettre a Votre Excellence, 
 et en son absence au chef du bureau, un paquet cachete 
 
240 MAY 1S03. 
 
 contenant les papiers quej'avois a vous communiquer, et y 
 ajoutant une seconde lettre a Votre Excellence. M. Mande- 
 ville a remis ce paquet, en main propre, a M. Durand, qui 
 lui a assure qu'il vous seroit communique sans delai. A 
 quatre heures ei demie, ne recevant aucune reponse a mes 
 lettres, je me suis rendu aux Relations Exterieures, et la 
 j'appris que vous etiez a la campagne et qu'on ignoroit 
 quand vous reviendriez en ville. Une demi-heure apres 
 rentrer chez moi, on me rapporta les papiers que mon secre- 
 taire avoit pris et delivres a M. Durand, en me disant qu'il 
 falloit que je les envoyasse au ministre a sa campagne. 
 Dans cet etat de choses, puisque Yotre Excellence ne me 
 donne pas I'occasion de vous faire cette communication, je 
 n'ai d'autre parti a prendre que d'en charger M. Talbot, 
 secretaire d'ambassade. II aura I'honneur de vous remettre 
 le projet de convention, qui, a ce que je I'espere, servira de 
 base a un arrangement amical entre nos deux Gouvernemens. 
 II ne me reste qu'a aj outer que le terme de mon sejour a 
 Paris est limite, et je dois me mettre en route jeudi matin 
 pour me rendre en Angleterre, si d'ici a ce temps la negocia- 
 tion n'est pas terminee favorablement. Je vous prie, Mon- 
 sieur, d'agr^er I'assurance de ma haute consideration. 
 
 Whitworth. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 My dear Lord, — I have been delayed much longer than I 
 wished by the infamous chicanery and difficulties which have 
 occurred. I shall, however, set off in half an hour ; and if 
 tl>ey have any proposal to make they must send it after me, 
 which many people think will happen. I confess I am not 
 so sanguine. I shall in all probability be at Calais on Sunday, 
 and I hope to find the packets ready to take me over imme- 
 diately. I am so hurried and tormented that I scarcely know 
 what I write. I shall have no rest till I get out of this 
 bustle, which has already lasted too long. 
 
 Thursday evening. May 12. 
 Eight -o'clock. 
 
LORD WHITWORTH LEAVES PARIS. 241 
 
 Chantilly, May 13. 
 Ten o'clock a.m. 
 
 Agreeable to your Lordship's commands, I send the 
 messenger Shaw to England to acquaint your Lordship that 
 I am so far on my journey. I left Paris last night after 
 many difficulties and delays — first in the delivery of the pass- 
 ports, which were promised me early in the morning ; and 
 then in the obtaining post-horses. I thought at one time 
 that it was intended not to suffer me to leave Paris ; they 
 came, however, at ten o'clock, and I set off immediately for 
 this place. We propose proceeding, as expeditiously as we 
 can with the incumbrance of a large familj^ in an hour, and 
 we shall not be able to get further than Breteuil, or some- 
 where between that and Amiens, to-night. By what I heard 
 from Paris this morning, the conflict was very severe during 
 the whole of yesterday between Joseph Bonaparte and the 
 First Consul. He endeavoured to obtain some specific pro- 
 posal in the hope of inducing me to forward it to your Lord- 
 ship. I am given to understand that he has not succeeded, 
 but does not give up the point. Whatever comes to me it is 
 my duty to transmit to your Lordship ; but most assuredly 
 nothing short of an acquiescence in our demands can justify 
 my infringing your Lordship's instructions. Li a letter 
 which I received from M. de Talleyrand a few hours before 
 my departure from Paris, with my passports, he expressed a 
 hope that I should conform to what he called the establislied 
 usage, and wait at Calais till General Andreossy should be 
 at Dover, so that we might both set out at the same time ; 
 and he added that he supposed of course the persons attached 
 to my mission would not leave Paris until those of the 
 French mission in London should leave that capital. As I 
 never heard of such a usage or of such a necessity unless in 
 transactions between the most barbarous and uncivilised 
 nations, I made no answer whatever to his observations, but 
 contented myself with returning the personal civilities which 
 he had expressed towards me. I shall therefore proceed on 
 my journey, and cross the water without waiting for any 
 
 R 
 
242 MAT 1803. 
 
 proposal from General Andreossy. If he should make any, 
 I shall tell him what are my intentions with respect to the 
 time of my embarking, etc. It was agreed on my leaving 
 Paris that Mr. Talbot, Mr. Mandeville, and the other gen- 
 tlemen attached to the mission should set out Sunday or 
 Monday. The cyphers will be destroyed, and the archives 
 brought in a carriage by Mr. Mandeville. I have in all 
 these respects endeavoured to make the best arrangement 
 in my power. 
 
 I shall have the honour of paying my respects to your 
 Lordship an evening in the ensuing week. 
 
 Breteuil, May 14, 1803. 
 
 Half- past eight A.M. 
 
 Scarcely had I forwarded the French messenger who 
 will bring your Lordship my letter of this date, with a note 
 from M. de Talleyrand, when Mr. Mandeville arrived from 
 Paris with the enclosed papers. My last despatch from 
 Paris will have prepared your Lordship for some proposal of 
 this nature. I refer your Lordship to Mr. Huber's letters to 
 me, and the observation of Regnault d'Angely. The proposi- 
 tion is not precisely what Joseph Bonaparte stated to me. 
 Should, however, the idea be such as to offer anything on 
 which to build a basis, taking it always in the light of an 
 expedient to save the amour propre of the First Consul, such 
 alterations and modifications might be proposed as would 
 perha^DS render it practicable. I shall proceed as I intended, 
 and should your Lordship have any orders for me they will 
 find me at Calais. Your Lordship will observe that neither 
 the note which has been forwarded nor any other measure of 
 irritation is to be taken here until the event of this pro- 
 posal is known. The difference between the proposition and 
 that made to me verbally by Joseph Bonaparte consists in 
 his Majesty's being required to barter away what does not 
 belong to him, instead of giving his consent to any amicable 
 and suitable arrangement between the French Government 
 
FRENCH PROJECT. 243 
 
 and the King of Naples ; and the arrangement is for a 
 limited terra, and that all the other demands of his Majesty 
 are wholly omitted. Joseph Bonaparte gives it, however, to 
 be understood that there would be no difficulty in regard to 
 them, or indeed to any modification which might leave the 
 project such an appearance as to satisfy the dignity of this 
 Government. 
 
 Projet. 
 
 Le Premier Consnl de la Republique fran9aise et Sa 
 Majeste Britannique desirant maintenir la paix, heureuse- 
 ment retablie a Amiens, les plenipotentiaires soussignes 
 conviennent des articles suivants. 
 
 Article I, 
 
 Malte restera en la possession de Sa Majeste Britannique 
 pendant I'espace de dix ans, au plus. 
 
 Article II, 
 
 La Eepublique fran9aise occupera, pendant le meme espace 
 de tems, les positions d'Otrante et de Tarente, telles qu'elle 
 les occupait lors de la signature du traite d'Amiens, et qu'elle 
 a evacuees en consequence de I'article XI du meme traite. 
 
 Article III, 
 
 La presente convention sera ratifiee et les ratifications 
 echangees dans I'espace de quinze jours, et plus tot si faire 
 se pent. 
 
 Eemarks of Joseph Bonaparte. 
 
 Les positions qu'occupait I'arraee fran9aise sont: La 
 presqu'ile d'Otrante, bornee de trois cotes par la mer et de 
 I'autre par les rivieres d'Ol'anto et de Bradano et une ligne 
 joignant les deux rivieres par Venosa. Lord Whitworth a 
 
 K 2 
 
244 MAT 1803. 
 
 du recevoir le matin une note dans laqnelle on a exprime les 
 plaintes que I'on croit avoir droit de faire snr la conduite du 
 Gouvernenient britannique depuis deux mois. Le Premier 
 Consul a paru sentir vivement la precipitation des demarches 
 qui ont ete prescrites a Lord Whitworth. Cependant rien 
 n'est encore desespere. On pent assurer qu'aucune publica- 
 tion n'aura lieu ici, et qu'aucune bostilite ne sera commencee, 
 moins dans I'esperance de conserver la paix, que dans le 
 desir d'augmenter encore les droits que Ton doit avoir a la 
 consideration pnblique par la moderation et la patience que 
 I'on a montrees dans les circonstances. Quelque resolu que 
 I'on soit a la guerre, on desire toutefois la paix, plus qu'on 
 ne I'espere. Si la convention ci-jointe etait signee par Lord 
 Whitworth, elle le serait egalement ici, et I'on garantit sa 
 prompte satisfaction. 
 
 Mr. Huber to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Friday, One o'clock p.m. 
 
 May 12, 1803. 
 
 My Lord, — Just returned from a long conversation with. 
 Joseph Bonaparte. I sit down to give your Excellency the 
 particulars of it. I was introduced by his friend and mine, 
 Eegnault de St. Jean d'Augely. He received me with great 
 affability, and like a man of whom he had heard a character 
 which invited him to his confidence and to his esteem. My 
 first words were of the disappointment your Excellency had 
 felt at being deprived of the expected pleasure of seeing him 
 on his return from St. Cloud, and at being obliged to set off, 
 even later than you intended, without knowing the success 
 of his visit to his brother. I will, as much as I can, state 
 his own words. ' Je croyois etre convenu avec Lord Whit- 
 worth de le re voir dans le cas seulement ou j'aurais pu lui 
 annoncer la concession de sa demande, savoir une lettre 
 officielle de M. Talleyrand confirmant I'offre verbale que je 
 lui avois faite, le matin meme, de terminer la longue discus- 
 
HUBER's conversation with JOSEPH BONAPARTE. 245 
 
 sion des deux cabinets par la prise de possession de notre 
 part du port d'Otrante sans opposition de la part de I'Angle- 
 terre, et par la retention de Malte par cette derniere Puis- 
 sance comme un equivalent de notre nouvelle acquisition. 
 Lorsque j'ai presente a nion frere cetfce idee, qui avoit ete 
 traitee precedemment, je in'ai trouve arrete par la lettre que 
 le ministre de Russie avoit re9ue la veille et lui avoit com- 
 muniquee, lettre par laquelle son maitre consent ou a etre 
 simplement mediate ur entre la France et I'Angleterre, ou a 
 entrer en possession de Malte pour un terine d'annees qui 
 seroit convenu par ces deux Puissances. Le cabinet de St. 
 James a fait annoncer par le Lord Whitworth avoir des 
 assurances et des documents positifs que jamais I'empereur 
 de Eussie ne voudra consentir a cette possession temporaire. 
 Entre ces deux assertions opposees, mon frere s'est arrete a 
 celle qui met la France dans la meilleure position, et il a paru 
 craindre de perdre cet avantage en mettant en avant la 
 prise de possession d'Otrante avant d'etre assure qu'elle 
 seroit consentie par le cabinet britannique. Je vous reitere 
 ce que j'ai eu I'honneur de dire bier a milord Whit- 
 worth. C'est que, nonobstant cette nouvelle position du 
 Premier Consul, nonobstant les entraves qu'on a mises ici il 
 y a deux jours au moyen conciliatoire de la compensation de 
 Malte par Otrante (ce qui est assurement bien a notre desa- 
 vantage), je signerai encore des ce moment cet arrangement, 
 en m'engageant d'en obtenir de mon frere la ratification, 
 pourvu que I'ambassadeur se croie autorise a en faire autant 
 de son cote.' Mj answer was : ' Comme 1' affaire d'Otrante en 
 compensation de Malte est une idee absolument nouvelle, 
 elle est et a du etre etrangere aux instructions et aux pou- 
 voirs donnes au Lord Whitworth. Si cette idee devoit done 
 definitivement faire la base d'une negociation, il me paroit 
 qu'il seroit necessaire d'avoir de nouveaux pouvoirs. S.E, 
 ne pent la presenter a sa cour sans qu'on lui en donne les 
 moyens d'une maniere officielle. Je presume qu'il est des 
 situations ou les formes officielles sont d'une necessite ri- 
 goureuse, et doivent faire taire des considerations qui leur 
 sont bien superieures en elles-memes. Tel est le cas present, 
 
246 MAY 1803. 
 
 ou le caractere connu de M. Joseph Bonaparte et la qualite 
 de frere du Premier Consul devroient donner un poids suffisant 
 aux offres dont il le rend I'organe et le garant. Je pense 
 qu'un cabinet ne pent pas deliberer, encore moins decider, 
 sur le simple rapport d'une conversation. Ainsi done, si, 
 par des raisons qui lui sont particulieres, le Premier Consul 
 resiste a ce que cette proposition soit faite officiellement a 
 la cour d'Angleterre, verriez-vous de I'inconvenient, Mon- 
 sieur, a substituer a la lettre officielle une lettre de vous qui 
 seroit confidentielle et qui porteroit le sceau de votre carac- 
 tere ? II me semble que ce seroit une piece suflBsante pour 
 autoriser Tambassadeur a la soumettre a la deliberation du 
 cabinet, pourvu qu'en la lui envoyant vous lui donniez, en 
 nieme terns, la liberte de le faire. Je crois pourtant devoir 
 au prealable rappeler la condition essentielle que le Lord 
 Whit worth a mise, au nom de sa cour, a la compensation de 
 Malte pour Otrante. C'est que I'arrangement, qui n'exige de 
 TAngleterre que sa simple adhesion, lui soit presente revetu 
 du consentement du roi de Naples. (I said this because two 
 or three words had been dropt which I had rather had not 
 been pronounced, such as ' Lors meme que les cours d'Europe 
 trouveroient mauvaise cette nouvelle entree dans le rojaume 
 de Naples, nous avons de quoi leur repondre ' ; this is an 
 a parte which your Excellency is not to hear ; for, once more, 
 unless England is bound and determined to defend the 
 King of Naples against any invasion from the French, how 
 can England prevent this transaction taking place at any 
 rate ?) Joseph did not reply to my observation. He then 
 asked, 'Dans le cas ou ce que vous souhaitez pourroit se 
 faire, pensez-vous que le Lord Whitworth voulut suspendre 
 son embarquement jusqu'a ce qu'il aitre9u de sa cour reponse 
 a la lettre que vous desirez avoir ? ' My answer was, ' Votre 
 nom donneroit tant de poids a cette lettre que je presume 
 que S. E. ralentiroit sa marche de maniere a recevoir cette 
 reponse de Londres.' ' Eh bien ! ' said Joseph, ' je vais partir 
 pour St. Cloud, et si je trouve mon frere dispose comme je le 
 desire a mon retour ce soir, je rendrai tout de suite reponse 
 a Eegnault, qui vous la dira. Croyez-vous, M. Huber, que 
 
FRENCH DESIGNS ON NAPLES. 247 
 
 I'Angleterre veuille la paix de bonne foi? Car nous en 
 doutons encore.' If Heaven ever gave me any energy of 
 feeling and of expression, it was on such a question being put 
 to me by the Consul's brother. I believe my words and my 
 manner bore the evident mark of truth, for he appeared 
 convinced. I left him after expressing my fervent wishes 
 for the success of his journey to St. Cloud, and requested a 
 speedy answer — here I am interrupted by a note from Joseph 
 requesting my immediate attendance. 
 
 -No. II. 
 
 Friday night, Nine o'clock. 
 
 My Lord, — I had finished my first letter, marked No. 7, 
 when I received (at five o'clock) a note from M. Eegnault 
 intimating that Joseph was just returned from St. Cloud, 
 and wished to see him and me immediately. As Mr. Mande- 
 ville sets off as soon as the horses can be got ready, and takes 
 charge of my first letter, and of the projet d'^ arrangement 
 dictated by the First Consul to his brother, I have only to add 
 that everything that I knew to be in your Lordship's breast, 
 and in the principles of the Government of England, arising 
 from the violation of the rights of the King of Naples, has been 
 represented and urged by me to Joseph in the strongest 
 manner ; that vdth his usual candour he has admitted the 
 strength of my plea in many respects ; that he has silenced me 
 by saying *Toutes les objections quevous faites,laissez les faire 
 par I'Angleterre et par le Lord Whit worth. L'Angleterre peut 
 demander une modification des articles pour ce qui regarde 
 le roide Naples, et je pense qu'on pourrait y avoir egard pour 
 obtenir la paix. Quant au mal qui en peut resulter pour le 
 roi de Naples par I'occupation d'Otrante et de Tarente par 
 des troupes fran9aises, I'Angleterre a a considerer quel sera 
 I'etat de ce meuie roi si nous ne pouvons pas nous entendre 
 avec votre cabinet. Nous allons tout de suite faire marcher 
 nos troupes de Rimini sur Naples, et nous noui emparerons de 
 
248 MAY 1803. 
 
 la Sicile (si nous pourrons vous empecher de prendre posses- 
 sion vous-memes'). Mr. Regnault, who sits by me whilst I 
 write this second letter, is also writing a note on the points I 
 have just mentioned. I shall therefore say no more on those 
 points. I come to the kind of manifesto which was sent to 
 your Lordship this morning by order of the First Consul. I 
 have told Joseph fairly that if your Lordship has thought it 
 right to forward that manifesto to the Cabinet it may of 
 itself determine war immediately, and in that case every 
 attempt at pacification will prove needless. He (Joseph) 
 began by giving me his word that that performance would 
 not be made public until the answer of England to the present 
 proposal be made known. The Consul has given orders that 
 the communication to the Corps Legislatif, etc. etc. should 
 again be adjourned. I come to the last point of this letter. 
 After the Consul had agreed with his brother to this proposal 
 and worded it, he said, ' II n'y a que M. Huber qui puisse 
 convenablement se charger de porter ce projet a milord 
 Whitworth, dont il a la confiance, et il faut I'en prier.' It 
 was my luck to have by me at dinner Mr. Talbot, to whom, 
 as I ought, I communicated everything that has passed this 
 day. I requested his advice and opinion ; and although he 
 sees as strongly as I do myself all the objectionable part of 
 the proposal, yet he thinks as I do, that the whole might be 
 immediately sent to your Lordship. I shall certainly set 
 out to overtake you a few hours after Mr. Mandeville, whose 
 immediate business is, if he is in time, to stop the sending 
 of the manifesto to England ; at least, not without the 
 Consul's observation on its non-publication here at present. 
 In great haste. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Breteuil, May 14, 1803. 
 
 The enclosed note reached me at Breteuil, where I passed 
 the night, and I forward it immediately to your Lordship by 
 the same French messenger who brought it from Paris. I 
 
OF THE 
 
 UNIVERSITY 
 
 FRENCH NOTE. V* • : v , J'^ ^ ;.i\f^^ ^49 
 
 see nothing in it the least likely to terminate the present 
 diflFerences. It is evidently the* style of the First Consul, and 
 consequently cannot be very conciliatory. I shall proceed 
 with as much expedition as I can to England, and shall be 
 at Calais to-morrow, where, I understand, the packets are 
 ready. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Dans les circonstances importantes et graves ou se trou- 
 vent les deux nations, le soussigne, ministre des Relations 
 Exterieures de la Eepublique fran9aise, a re9u I'ordre de 
 mettre sous les yeux du Gouvernement britannique la note 
 suivante. Le 17 Yentose Sa Majeste Britannique fit con- 
 naitre a son parlement, par un message special, que des 
 armements formidables se preparaient dans les ports de 
 France et de Hollande, et que des negociations importantes, 
 dont Tissue etait douteuse, divisaient les deux Gouverne- 
 ments. Cette declaration extraordinaire et inattendue ex- 
 cita un etonnement general ; mais la situation maritime de 
 la France etait patente. L'Angleterre, I'Europe, savaient 
 qu'il n'y avait d'armements formidables ni dans les ports de 
 I'rance ni dans les ports de Hollande. Le soussigne ne 
 rappellera pas a Son Excellence Lord Whitworth tout ce 
 qui fut dit alors. On se demande de quelle source avaient 
 pu sortir des informations aussi mal fondees. Le discerne- 
 ment personnel de Lord Whitworth, la loyaute de son carac- 
 tere ne pouvaient etre un seul instant soup9onnes. L'asser- 
 tion que la France faisait des armements hostiles etait une 
 supposition manifeste et qui ne pouvait en imposer a per- 
 sonne. Son efiPet naturel devait etre d induire a penser 
 qu'elle n'etait qu'un moyen dont voulaient se servir des 
 hommes signales par leurs opinions perturbatrices, et qui 
 cherchaient avidement des pretextes pour susciter des 
 troubles, pour enflammer les passions du peuple britannique, 
 
250 MAY 1803. 
 
 pour exciter la defiance^ la haine et les alarmes. Quant au 
 Gouvernement anglais, si par de faux rapports il avait pu 
 etre induit en erreur sur I'existence des armements, il ne 
 pouvait I'etre sur I'existence d'une negociation. L'ambas- 
 sadeur de la Republique a Londres ne fut pas plutot informe 
 du message de S. M. Britannique qu'etonne de ce qu'il 
 annoncait I'existence d'ane negociation dont il n'avait pas 
 connaissance, il se rend it cbez Son Excellence Lord Hawkes- 
 burj ; et, devant des-lors soup9onner qu'un appel aux 
 armes fonde snr deux faasses suppositions pouvait couvrir 
 le projet de violer le traite d' Amiens dans les clauses qui 
 n'etaient pas encore executees, il presenta au ministre de 
 S. M. Britannique, le 19 Ventose, une note pour lui demander 
 des explications. En me me temps le soussigne eut I'ordre 
 de pressentir Son Excellence Lord Whitworth sur les motifs 
 qui avaient pu determiner le Gouvernement anglais a I'au- 
 toriser dans son message de deux assertions toutes deux 
 egalement fausses, pour appeler la nation aux armes et 
 rompre le lien de paix qui unissait les deux etats. 
 
 Son Excellence Lord Hawkesbury remit, le 24 Ventose, 
 au general Andreossi une note vague, aggressive, absolue. 
 Cette note, loin de rien eclairer, jetait de nouvelles obscu- 
 rites sur le sujet de la discussion. Elle laissait a peine 
 entrevoir la possibilite de I'ouvrir, et bien moins encore 
 I'espoir de la voir terminee par une heureuse issue. La re- 
 ponse du Gouvernement fran9ais, en date du 8 Germinal, fut 
 autant pacifique et moderee que celle du ministre britannique 
 avait ete hostile. Le Premier Consul declara qu'il ne relevait 
 pas le defi de guerre de I'Angleterre, qu'il evitait de peser 
 sur des expressions dont le sens pouvait porter un caractere 
 d'aggression, qu'il se ref usait enfin a croire que S. M. Britan- 
 nique voulut violer la saintete d'un traite sur lequel reposait 
 la surete de toutes les nations. Cette declaration faite par 
 ordre du Premier Consul provoqua, le 17 Germinal, une 
 nouvelle note, dans laquelle le Gouvernement fran9ais ne vit 
 pas sans surprise qu'une demande indeterminee de satisfac- 
 tion lui etait adressee ; le vague de cette demande exprimee 
 sans motif et sans object ne laissait apercevoir distinctement 
 
EVILS OF WAR. 251 
 
 que rinconvenaiice de son expression. On manifestait dans 
 cette note I'intention de violer le traite d' Amiens en refusant 
 d'evacuer Malte. On semblait se flatter que le penple 
 fran9ai8 consentirait a donner satisfaction sur deux faits 
 supposes, sur Fallegation desquels il avait peut-etre le droit 
 d'en demander lui-meme. En remettant cet office. Lord 
 Wliitwortii demanda qu'un arrangement fut fait immediate- 
 ment sur les bases qui viennent d'etre exposees, et il fit en 
 meme temps entendre que dans le cas contraire il craignait 
 de se voir oblige par les ordres de son Gouvernement de 
 quitter incessamment sa residence et de mettre fin a sa mission. 
 Que pouvait repondre le Gouvernement de la Eepublique a 
 d'aussi etranges, a d'aussi brusques ouvertures ? II n'y avait 
 qu'un grand amour de la paix qui put Temporter sur I'in- 
 dignation. Pour s'arreter a une decision froide et calme qui 
 laissat a la raison et a la justice le temps de I'emporter sur 
 les passions, il fallait se penetrer profondement de I'idee que 
 les nombreuses victimes des discordes des Gouvernements 
 n'ont aucune part aux insultes qui les aigrissent ; que les 
 milliers de braves citoyens, qui, dans les voeux de leur he- 
 roique devouement, versent leur sang uniquement pour leur 
 patrie, n'ont jamais le dejir d'oflPenser un peuple voisin et 
 puissant ; qu'ils ne prennent aucun interet a des demarches 
 d'orgueil et a de vaines pretentions de suprematie. II ne 
 fallait pas seulement se penetrer de cette idee, il fallait s'en 
 laisser raaitriser a chaque instant. Son Excellence Lord 
 Whitworth convint d'ecrire a sa cour que le Premier Consul 
 ne pouvait consentir a la violation d'un traite solennel, mais 
 qu'il voulait la paix ; que si le Gouvernement d'Angleterre 
 desirait qu'une convention iut faite pour des arrangements 
 etrangers au traite d'Amiens, il ne s'j refuserait pas, et que 
 les motifs de cette convention pourraient etre tires des griefs 
 reciproques. Ces vues etaient justes et moderees. II etait 
 difficile de proposer une negociation sur des bases plus 
 liberales. II n'est pas hors de propos d'observer ici que 
 c'etait six semaines apres le message, ou une negociation 
 difficile, d'un interet grave et d'une issue incertaine mais 
 prochaine, avait ete signalee, que les ministres des deux 
 
252 MAY 1803. 
 
 Gouvemements n'avaient pu encore arriver a ouvrir une 
 veritable negociation. Lord Whitworth re9ut de nouveaux 
 ordres. II presenta successivement deux projets de conven- 
 tion. Par le premier il etait propose que Malte restat sous 
 la souverainete du roi d'Angleterre ; et cette clause adoptee, 
 Sa Majeste Britannique proposait de reconnaitre tout ce qui 
 avait ete fait en Europe depuis le traite d'Amiens. S. M. 
 le roi d'Angleterre promettait encore de prendre des rtiesures 
 pour que leshommes qui, sur les difFerents points del*Angle- 
 terre, ourdissent des trames contre la France fussent efficace- 
 ment reprimes. Le soussigne eut I'honneur d'observer k 
 Son Excellence Lord Whitworth que le premier projet de 
 convention etait une violation palpable du traite d'Amiens 
 et renversait la base de negociation que Son Excellence 
 s'etait charge de presenter a sa cour ; que quant a la re- 
 connaissance offerte par S. M. Britannique, il n'y avait 
 reellement point d'objet auquel elle put s'appliquer; qu'il 
 n'y avait pas de changements en Europe depuis le traite 
 d'Amiens, si ce n'est I'organisation de I'Empire, a laquelle le 
 roi d'Angleterre avait concouru par son voeu comme electeur 
 d'Hanovre, et qui h'etait elle-meme qu'une suite necessaire 
 du traite de Lune^^ille, anterieur de beaucoup au traite 
 d'Amiens. Que les evenements relatifs a I'existence poli- 
 tique du Piemont, du rojaume d'Etrurie et des republiques 
 italienne et ligurienne avaient leur date avant le traite 
 d'.lmiens; que dans la negociation de ce traite la France 
 avait desire que I'Angleterre reconnut les trois Puissances ; 
 mais que, comme Ton n'avait pu s'accorder ni sur ce point ni 
 sur les affaires de I'Inde, en ce qui concernait la destruction 
 de quelques etats principaux, et les inappreciables acquisitions 
 faites par I'Angleterre dans cette contree, on en etait reste a 
 considerer la discussion de ces objets comme ne tenant pas 
 a I'execution des articles prelimin aires et a I'objet fon da- 
 mental de la pacification des deux etats. Le soussigne 
 observa enfin que le Gouvernement fran9ais ne demandait 
 sur ce point aucune approbation ni reconnaissance a S. M. 
 Britannique. Le soussigne ajouta que quant a la republique 
 batave elle avait ete reconnue par le roi d'Angleterre, 
 
ENGLISH PROPOSALS. 253 
 
 puisqu'il avait traite avec elle ; et que, par les traites exis- 
 tant entre cette republique et la France, I'arriere-garde des 
 troupes frau9aises devait evacuer le pays a la nouvelle de 
 I'entiere execution du traite d' Amiens. Quant aux criminels 
 refugies a Londres et a Jersey, ou ils se livraient a tons leurs 
 penchants pervers, et ou, loin d'etre reprimes, ils etaient 
 traites et pensionnes par I'Angleterre, le Gouvernement 
 francais trouvait que, dans la situation actuelle des negocia- 
 tions, il ne devait y attacher aucune importance. Son Ex- 
 cellence Lord Whitworth. proposa un second projet. L'Angle- 
 terre demandait que, le Gouvernement civil de Malte etant 
 laisse au Grand-Maitre, les garnisonsbritanniqaes continuas- 
 sent d'occuper les fortifications de I'ile. Cefcte proposition 
 etait impraticable et inouie. Comme celle du premier projet, 
 elle etait contraire au traite d'Amiens et consequemment aux 
 bases de negociations offertes par le Premier Consul. Elle 
 avait de plus I'inconvenient irremediable de mettre un ordre 
 de chevaliers appartenant a toutes les puissances de I'Europe 
 sous I'autorite et la tutelle arbitraire d'une seule puissance. 
 Elle etait enfin par elle-meme une offense a Phonneur et a la 
 religion d'un ordre uni, par tons ses elements, a I'lionneur et 
 a la religion de I'Europe entiere. Ainsi, dans tons les pas de 
 cette negociation, le Gouvernement de la Republique etait 
 oblige de voir que le Gouvernement anglais n'avait qu'une 
 seule volonte, qu'un seul objet en vue : celui de ne pas remplir 
 les stipulations du traite d'Amiens et de conserver Malte 
 par la seule raison que Malte etait a sa convenance et 
 qu'elle appela Malte une garantie suffisante. 
 
 Mais quelle est la Puissance de I'Europe, dut-elle se 
 reconnaitre inegale, qui put souff'rir de se sou mettre aux 
 volontes d'une autre sans discussion de ses droits, sans 
 appel aux principes de la justice ? Quelle est la Puissance 
 surtout, qui, placee comme I'a ete la France dans le cours 
 de cette discussion, eut pu se soumettre a des conditions 
 dictees des le debut d'une negociation, et plutot annoncees 
 au bruit des menaces de guerre, par des preparatifs et des 
 armements, que proposees comme un moyen d'accorder les 
 droits et les interets des deux etats ? Dans une circonstance 
 
254 MAY 1803. 
 
 a qnelques egards analogue, une nation faible, non par son 
 courage, mais par I'etendue et la population de ses provinces, 
 osa braver la puissance anglaise dans sa capitale menacee, 
 exposer la demeure de ses rois, compromettre ses magasins, 
 sa seule ricliesse, resultat de cent ans de paix et d'une 
 industrieuse economie, plutot que de se scumettre a des 
 conditions injustes proposees, alors comme aujourd'liui, sur 
 le motif de la convenance de I'Angleterre et appujees par 
 I'appareil d'un armement considerable. Des braves y 
 perirent ; les colonies danoises furent envahies ; mais quel- 
 que inegale que fut la lutte, I'honneur ne laissait point a 
 cette genereuse nation le choix du parti qu'elle avait a 
 prendre. Dans la discussion presente la politique parle le 
 meme langage que I'honneur. Si le Gouvernement britan- 
 nique est le maitre de se conformer ou de ne pas se con- 
 former a ses engagements ; s'il pent, dans les traites qu'i) 
 a faits, distingner I'esprit de la lettre ; si I'on admet les 
 restrictions autorisees; si les convenances de I'Angleterre 
 doivent enfin expliquer le sens des conventions politiques, 
 quel sera le terme des concessions qu'on se flattera d'arracher 
 successivement a la faiblesse de la France ? Quelle sera la 
 niesure des sacrifices et des humiliations qu'on entreprendra 
 de lui imposer? Aujourd'hui la convenance de I'Angleterre 
 exige une garantie centre la France, et I'Angleterre garde 
 Malte. Autrefois la convenance de I'Angleterre voulait 
 une garantie centre la France, et I'on detruisit Dunkerque ! 
 et un commissaire anglais donna des loix ou flottaient les 
 couleurs fran9aises ! Demain la convenance de I'Angleterre 
 demandera une garantie centre les progres de Tindustrie 
 frangaise, et on proposera un tarif de commerce pour arreter 
 les progres de notre industrie. Si nous reparons nos ports, 
 si nous construisons un mole, si nous creusons un canal, si 
 par quelque encouragement nous relevons nos manufactures 
 etc., on demandera que nos ports soient degrades, que nos 
 moles soient detruits, que nos canaux soient combles, que 
 nos manufactures soient ruinees. On exigera que la France 
 devienne pauvre et qu'elle soit desarmee pour se conformer 
 aux convenances de I'Angleterre, et donner une garantie 
 
MODERATION OF THE FBENCH GOVERNMENT. 255 
 
 suffisante a son Gouvernement. Qu'on considere les prin- 
 cipes, on qu'on examine les consequences, on est egalement 
 frappe de I'injustice et du scandale de ces pretentions ; on 
 pent se demander : Si elles etaient soumises a un jury anglais, 
 hesiterait-il a les reprouver unanimement P Le Gouverne- 
 ment de la Republique a droit de s'etonner que le ministere 
 britannique ait pu se croire autorise a lui supposer ce degre 
 d'avilissement. Comment a-t-il pu penser que le Gouverne- 
 ment actuel de la France perdrait, dans un lache repos, le 
 souvenir de tout ce qu'ii a fait et le sentiment de tous ses 
 devoirs? Nos provinces sont-elles moins etendues, moius 
 peuplees ? Ne sommes-nous pas les memes hommes qui ont 
 tout sacrifie au maintien des plus justes interets? et si, 
 apres le succes, nous avons fait eclater une grande modera- 
 tion, a quelle autre cause cette moderation pent -e lie etre 
 imputee, si ce n'est a la justice de nos droits et au sentiment 
 de nos forces? Le soussigne, en exposant a Son Excellence 
 Lord Whitworth ces observations, croit avoir le droit de lui 
 faire remarquer que la conduite moderee de toute I'adminis- 
 tration fran9aise pendant deux mois entiers, d'une suite de 
 provocations offensantes, et malgre la profonde impression 
 qu'elle en ressentait, doit lui faire apprecier le veritable 
 caractere du Gouvernement fran9ais. Cependant, c'est lors- 
 que, par son profond silence sur des insultes repetees, le 
 Gouvernement de la Eepublique cut du s'attendre a voir 
 qu'on chercherait a les reparer ou au moins a j mettre un 
 terme ; lorsque, evitant de prejuger la tournure finale que 
 pourraient prendre les affaires, il n'a montre que de I'at- 
 tention et de I'empressement a examiner les mojens qui 
 pourraient etre proposes pour concilier et satisfaire le 
 Gouvernement anglais, c'est alors que, verbalement et sans 
 vouloir consentir a donner aucune declaration ecrite. Son 
 Excellence Lord Whitworth a fait, au nom et par I'ordre de 
 son Gouvernement, le 6 Eloreal, au soussigne les demandes 
 suivantes: que I'Angleterre garde Malte pendant dix ans; 
 que I'Angleterre prenne possession de Tile de Lampedusa; 
 que la Hollande soit evacuee par les troupes fran9aises. 
 Son Excellence Lord Whitworth a de plus declare que ces 
 
256 MAY 1803. 
 
 propositions etaient ridtimatum de sa cour, et que sur le refiis 
 de les accepter il avait ordre de quitter Paris dansle delai de 
 sept jours. Le soussigne ose dire qu'il n'y a pas d'exemple 
 d'une telle forme donnee a un ultimatum aussi imperieux. 
 
 Eh quoi ! La guerre ne doit-elle avoir d'inconvenients 
 que pour nous? Le ministere anglais juge-t-il la nation 
 fran9aise tellement faible que, dans une circonstance ou il 
 s'agit pour elle de la plus importante des deliberations, il ne 
 se croie pas tenu de se conf ormer, a son egard, aux usages qui 
 sont observes par tous les gouvernements des nations civilisees? 
 Ou bien n'est-ce pas plutot que le sentiment de Tinjustice 
 qui pese sur la conscience de Thomme public, comme sur 
 celle de I'liomme prive, ait empecbe le Gouvernement britan- 
 nique de signer la demande qu'il avait faite, et que, par une 
 marche moins decidee, il a clierche a se reserver pour I'avenir 
 les moyens de faire perdre les traces de ses veritables inten- 
 tions, et de tromper un jour I'opinion sur I'origine de la 
 rupture ? Ou enfin, les ministres de Sa Majeste Britannique, 
 connaissant mal le caractere du Premier Consul, ont-ils espere, 
 a force de provocations, de I'exasperer ou de I'intimider, de 
 le porter a oublier les interets de la nation, ou de Texciter a 
 quelque acte d'eclat, qu'ils pourraient ensuite travestir aux 
 yeux de I'Europe en initiative de guerre ? Le Premier Consul 
 plus qu'aucun homme qui existe connait les maux de la guerre, 
 parce que plus que personne il est accoutume a ses calculs et 
 a ses chances. II croit que, dans des circonstances telles que 
 celles oil nous nous trouvons, la premiere pensee des gouverne- 
 ments doit se porter sur Ibs catastrophes et les malheurs qui 
 peuvent naitre d'une nouvelle guerre. II croit que leur 
 premier devoir est non seulement de ne pas ceder a des 
 motifs d'irritation, mais de chercher par tous les moyens a 
 eclairer, a moderer les passions imprevoyantes des peuples. 
 Le soussigne, s'arretant done d'abord a la forme de cette 
 communication de Son Excellence Lord Whitworth, le pria 
 d'observer que des conversations verbales et fugitives sont 
 insuffisantes pour la discussion d'aussi immenses interets, 
 dont ordinairement tous les motifs sont traites dans les 
 conseils des nations apres les plus mures deliberations. Dans 
 
CONDUCT OF THE FIRST CONSUL. 257 
 
 ces conseils et dans de telles circonsfcances rien n'est jug^ 
 indifferent. Les formes, les expressions meme, y sont pesees, 
 examinees, debattues, appreciees, et servent toujours a deter- 
 miner, comme a justifier, le parti que Ton doit prendre. Si 
 une aussi imprudente, aussi inconvenante violation de toutes 
 les formes avait ete faite par la France, que n'aurait-on pas 
 dit, que n'aurait-on pas ecrit en Angleterre ! II n'est pas 
 un orateur dans les deux chambres du parlement qui n'eut 
 declare que cet ecart des regies generales etablies entre les 
 nations, dans des circonstances importantes, etait un outrage 
 a la nation anglaise. Aux yeux de tous, une telle offense eut 
 ete regardee comme un motif suffisant de rompre toute nego- 
 ciation. Quant au fonds de VuUimatum propose, le soussigne 
 a I'honneur de rappeler a Son Excellence Lord Whitworth 
 qu'il fut charge de declarer, par une note qui lui fut remise 
 le 12 Floreal, que le Premier Consul restait impassible aux 
 menaces comme aux injures, et passait par-dessus Foubli de 
 formes dont il n'est pas d'exemple dans I'histoire qu'aucun 
 gouvernement se soit ecarte dans une aussi importante cir- 
 constance. Que Tile de Lampedusa n'appartenait pas a la 
 France, qu'elle etait sous la souverainete d'une puissance 
 etrang^re, et que sur le desir de S. M. Britannique d'en avoir 
 la possession, le Premier Consul n'avait le droit d'enoncer ni 
 consentement ni refus. Que I'independance de Fordre et de 
 rile de Malte etait le resultat d'un article special du traite 
 d'Amiens. Que le Premier Consul ne pouvait prendre a cet 
 egard aucune nouvelle determination sans le concours des 
 deux autres puissances contractantes a ce traite, Sa Majeste 
 le roi d'Espagne et la republique batave. Que I'independance 
 de I'ordre et de I'ile de Malte avait ete garantie par Sa Majeste 
 I'empereur d'Allemagne, et que les ratifications de cette 
 garantie etaient echangees ; que Leurs Majestes I'empereur 
 de Russie et le roi de Prusse avaient garanti I'independance 
 de I'ordre de Malte ; que ces garanties avaient ete demandees 
 a ces puissances par 1' Angleterre, comme par la France ; qu'il 
 etait du devoir du Premier Consul de les accepter et qu'il les 
 avait acceptees; que le Premier Consul ne pouvait done 
 entendre a aucune proposition relative a I'independance de 
 
 s 
 
258 MAY 1803. 
 
 I'ordre et de Pile de Malte sans qu'au pr^alable il eut reconnu 
 relativement a cette indepen dance les intentions des gouverne- 
 ments qui I'avaient authentiquement garantie; qu'un corps 
 pen nombrenx de troupes fran9aises etait encore, an moment 
 du message, stationne en Hollande, en vertu d'une convention 
 conclue entre cette repnblique et la France ; et que le Premier 
 Consul n'avait point hesite a dire qu'il ferait evacuer la 
 Hollande aussitot que les stipulations du traite d' Amiens 
 auraient eu leur entiere execution de la part de I'Angleterre. 
 A cette note, qui, dans ses expressions et dans I'exactitude 
 suiiiout et la precision de ses motifs, ne soupirait qu'equite, 
 paix et moderation. Son Excellence Lord Wbitworth repondit 
 par une demande peremptoire de passeports, en m'informant 
 qu'il comptait en faire usage mercredi 4 mai a cinq heures du 
 matin. Le Gouvemement fran9ais sentit profondement le 
 contraste d'une determination aussi absolue avec le caractere 
 de bienseance, de justice et de conciliation que, dans toutes 
 les circonstances et principalement dans la derniere, il s'etait 
 attache a donner a ses demarches. Neanmoins il crut devoir 
 faire encore un sacrifice aux interets de I'humanite. II ne 
 voulut abandonner tout espoir de paix qu'au dernier moment, 
 et le soussigne remit a Son Excellence Lord Whitworth une 
 nouvelle note par laquelle la France offrait de consentir a ce 
 que Malte fut remise a la garde d'une des trois puissances 
 garantes, I'Autriche, la Eussie ou la Prusse. Cette propo- 
 sition parut, a Lord Whitworth lui-meme, devoir satisfaire 
 les pretentions de sa cour. II suspendit son depart et prit 
 la note ad referendum. En meme temps I'ambassadeur de la 
 Eepublique a Londres, prevenu de la demande que Son 
 Excellence Lord Whitworth avait faite a Paris de ses passe- 
 ports pour retourner en Angle terre, eut ordre de se tenir pr^t 
 a partir. II fit en consequence la demande de ses passeports, 
 qui lui furent accordes sur I'heure. Le mezzo termine propose 
 par le Gouvernement fran9ais s'eloignait de Particle du traite 
 d'Amiens ; mais il avait le double avantage de se rapprocher 
 le plus possible de son esprit, c'est a dire de mettre Malte 
 dans I'independance des deux nations. II offrait d'ailleurs 
 cette garantie tant reclamee et que le ministere britannique 
 
MALTA GUARANTEED BY THREE POWERS. 259 
 
 pretendait etre le senl de ses alarmes. Le Gouvernement 
 britannique comprit la force de ces raisons, etla mallieureuse 
 fatalite qui rentraine a la guerre ne lui offrit de reponse que 
 dans de fausses allegations. Le vingt-et-un de ce mois Lord 
 Whitworth remit une note dans laquelle il declara que la 
 Eussie s'etait refusee a ce que Ton demandait d'elle. Les 
 puissances garantes etant an nombre de trois, si la Eussie s'y 
 etait refusee, il restait encore I'empereur d'Allemagne et le roi 
 de Prusse. Mais comment la Eussie pouvait-elle avoir fait 
 connaitre son opinion sur une proposition nouvelle et faite 
 depuis peu de jours ? II etait a la connaissance de TAngleterre 
 qne la Eussie et la Prusse avaient propose de garantir I'inde- 
 pendance de Malte avec de legeres modifications, et que le 
 Gouvernement fran9ais s'etait empresse d'accepter ladite 
 garantie ; et par une suite de I'esprit de consequence et de fide- 
 lite a ses engagements qui caracterise I'empereur Alexandre, 
 il n'etait nullement douteux qu'il n'accept^t la proposition qui 
 lui etait offerte. Mais la Providence, qui se plait parfois a con- 
 fondre la mauvaise foi, fit arriver a la meme heure, au meme 
 instant ou Lord Whitworth remettait sa note, un courrier de 
 Petersbourg adresse aux plenipotentiaires de cette cour a 
 Paris et a Londres, par lequel Sa Majeste I'empereur de 
 Eussie manifestait, avec une energie toute particuliere, la 
 peine qu'il avait eprouvee d'apprendre la resolution ou etait 
 Sa Majeste Britannique de garder Malte ; il renouvelait les 
 assurances de sa garantie et faisait connaitre qu'il accepterait 
 la demande de sa mediation qui avait ete faite par le Premier 
 Consul, si les deux Puissances j avaient recours. Le sous- 
 signe s'empressa, le vingt-deux, de faire connaitre a Lord 
 Whitworth par une note I'erreur dans laquelle etait sa cour, 
 ne doutant pas que, puisque c'etait la seule objection qu'elle 
 avait faite au projet qui avait ete presente, des I'instant 
 qu'elle connaitroit la declaration reiteree et positive de la 
 Eussie, elle ne s'empressat d'adherer a la remise de Malte 
 entre les mains d'une des trois puissances garantes. Quel 
 dut done etre I'etonnement du soussigne lorsque Lord Whit- 
 worth n'entrait dans aucune explication et ne cherchait ni a 
 contredire ni a discuter les declarations qui lui avaient ete 
 
 8 2 
 
260 MAY 1803. 
 
 faites ! Le soussigne fit connaitre par une note du meme 
 jour qu'aux ternies de ses instructions il avait ordre de partir 
 trente-six heures apres la remise de sa derniere note, et 
 reiterait la demande de ses passeports : le soussigne dut les 
 lui faire passer immediatement. 
 
 L'ambassadeur d' Angleterre se serait-il comporte differem - 
 ment si le Gouvernement fran9ais eut ete assiege dans une 
 place battue en breche et qu'il eut ete question, non du traite 
 le plus important que le Cabinet britannique ait negocie 
 depuis plus de huit cents ans, mais d'une simple capitulation ? 
 On a fait preceder I'ouverture des negociations par des arme* 
 ments fastueusement annonces. Tous les jours a toute heure 
 on a signale la reprise des hostilites. Et quel est cet ulti- 
 matum qu'on propose au Gouvernement de la Republique 
 pour etre signe dans le delai d'un jour ? II faut qu'il con- 
 sente a donner une ile qui ne lui appartient pas ; qu'il viole 
 lui-meme, a son detriment, un traite solennel sous le pretexte 
 que 1' Angleterre a besoin contre lui d'une garantie nouvelle; 
 qu'il manque a tous les egards dus aux autres puissances 
 contractantes, en detruisant, sans leur aveu. Particle qui, 
 par consideration pour elles, avait ete le plus longuement 
 discute a I'epoque des conferences ; qu'il manque egalement 
 a ceux qui sont dus aux puissances garantes en consentant 
 qu'une ile dont elles out voulu I'independance reste pendant 
 dix ans sous I'autorite de la couronne britannique ; qu'il 
 ravisse a I'ordre de Malte la souverainete de I'etat qui lui 
 a ete rendu, et que cette souverainte soit trans mise aux 
 habitants ; que par cette spoliation il offense toutes les 
 puissances qui out reconnu le retablissement de cet ordre, 
 qui I'ont garanti et qui dans les arrangements de I'AUemagne 
 lui ont assure des indemnites pour les pertes qu'il avait 
 eprouvees. Tel est le fonds de cet ultimatum, qui presente 
 une serie de pretentions toujours croissantes en proportion 
 de la moderation que le Gouvernement de la Republique 
 avait deplojee. D'abord 1' Angleterre consentait a la conser- 
 vation de I'ordre de Malte et voulait seulement assujettir 
 cet ordre et ses etats a I'autorite britannique. Aujourd'hui 
 et pour la premiere fois on demande I'abolition de cet ordre. 
 
ATTITUDE OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT. 261 
 
 et elle doit etre consentie dans trente-six heures. Mais ces 
 conditions definitivement proposees, f ussent-elles aussi con- 
 formes au traite d'Amiens et aux interets de la France 
 qu'elles lenr sont contraires, la seule forme de ces demandes, 
 le terme de trente-six heures prescrit a la reponse, ne peuvent 
 laisser doute sur la determination du Gouvernment fran9ais. 
 Non, jamais la France ne reconnoitra dans aucun gouverne- 
 ment le droit d'annuler par un seul acte de sa volonte les 
 stipulations d'un engagement reciproque. Si elle a souffert 
 que, sous des formes qui annon^aient la menace, on lui pre- 
 sentat un ultimatum verbal de sept jours, un ultimatum de 
 trente-six heures et des traites conclus avant d'etre negocies, 
 elle n'a pu avoir d'autre objet que de ramener le Gouverne- 
 ment britannique par I'exemple de sa moderation ; mais 
 elle ne pent consentir a rien de ce qui compromit les in- 
 terets de sa dignite et ceux de sa puissance. Le soussigne 
 est done charge de declarer a Son Excellence Lord Whitworth 
 qu'aucune communication, dont le sens et les formes ne 
 s'accorderaient pas avec les usages observes entre les grandes 
 puissances et avec les principes de la plus parfaite egalite 
 entre Tun et Fautre etat, ne sera plus admise en France ; 
 que rien ne pourra obliger le Gouvernement fran9ais a 
 disposer des pays qui ne lui appartiennent point ; et qu'il 
 ne reconnaitra jamais a I'Angleterre le droit de violer, en 
 quelque point que ce soit, les traites qu'elle aura faits avec 
 lui. En fin le soussigne reitere la proposition de mettre 
 Malte entre les mains d'une des trois puissances garantes. 
 Et pour tons les autres objets etrangers au traite d' Amiens 
 il renouvelle la declaration que le Gouvernement f ran9ais est 
 pret a ouvrir une negociation a leur egard. Si le Gouverne- 
 ment anglais donne le signal de guerre, il ne restera plus au 
 Gouvernement de la Republique qu'a se confier en la justice 
 de sa cause et au Dieu des armees. Le soussigne a Thon- 
 neur de renouveler a Son Excellence Lord Whitworth les 
 assurances de sa haute consideration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, le 23 Flor^al, an XI de la R6p. frang. 
 
262 MAY 1803. 
 
 My Lord, — Je remplis Tordre du Premier Consul en vous 
 adressant la note ci-jointe. J'aime a penser qu'elle est de 
 nature a modifier les propositions de votre Gouvernement, et 
 je saisis cette occasion de vous renouveler, avec I'expression 
 du regret que m'a cause votre depart, I'assurance de ma 
 haute consideration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, 23 Flor6al, an XI. 
 
 To Lord Whitworth. 
 
 LoED Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Downing Street, May 16, 1803. 
 
 Your Excellency's despatch of the 14th instant by the 
 messenger Sylvester has been received here this morning at 
 two o'clock. The proposition which it contains, being 
 entirely repugnant to the principles by which his Majesty 
 has been uniformly actuated in the late discussions with 
 France, and incompatible with that security which it has 
 been the great object of his solicitude to obtain, must have 
 been considered by the French Government as wholly in- 
 admissible, and can only have been dictated by their desire 
 to procrastinate the negotiation, the protraction of which 
 has already been so injurious to the interests of this country. 
 I have it, therefore, in command from his Majesty to signify 
 to your Excellency his pleasure that immediately on receipt 
 of this despatch you embark for Dover with as little delay 
 as the circumstances of wind and tide will allow. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Boulogne, May 16, 1803. 
 We arrived here last night from Abbeville, and shall be 
 at Calais early this evening. I found Mr. Mengaud waiting 
 for me at this place to be informed of the precise time when 
 
LORD WHITWORTH AT BOULOGNE. 263 
 
 I proposed to embark, in order that he might acquaint 
 General Andreossy with it, who, he supposes, will set out 
 from Dover at the same time. I propose embarking in the 
 evening rather than with the morning's tide, having some 
 reason to believe that I shall in the morning of to-morrow 
 receive a messenger from Paris. Although they have suffered 
 me to come so far, I should not be surprised yet to receive 
 a proposal on our own terms. This expectation is, how- 
 ever, too vague to induce me to delay my departure farther 
 than from the morning to the evening tide of to-morrow. 
 From Paris to this place I have witnessed but one general 
 appearance of gloomy discontent and despondency at being 
 thus dragged into a war by the obstinacy of one man, and 
 for a cause totally foreign to France. I enclose a letter 
 from Mr. Talbot, and some newspapers which I have re- 
 ceived this morning, by Basilico. The journey of Mr. 
 Mandeville and Mr. Huber was on occasion of the papers 
 which I transmitted to your Lordship by Sylvester. We 
 expect to be at Dover to-morrow in the night, and in town 
 on Wednesday. 
 
 Mr. Talbot to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, May 14, 1803. 
 
 My dear Lord, — I avail myself of the opportunity afforded 
 me by Basilico's return from Madrid to communicate to you 
 the very little which has come to my knowledge since the 
 departure of Mr. Huber. There are rumours in circulation 
 of various sorts, but all tending to calm and satisfy the 
 hopes of the public. Mr. Mandeville's journey is pretty 
 generally known, from which people are much inclined to 
 argue favourably. I have seen nobody to-day who could 
 give me the smallest information worth transmitting to your 
 Lordship. There are, however, two articles which have 
 appeared in the ' Moniteur ' and ' Journal des Debats ' of to- 
 day which deserve some notice. Bonaparte came to Paris 
 this morning, probably in consequence of what has appeared 
 
264 MAT 1803. 
 
 in the ' Moniteur.' I understand that he and Madame 
 Bonaparte intend going to the Opera Buffa to-night. Count 
 Marcoff called on me this morning and was extremely in- 
 quisitive, but mentioned nothing worth alluding to. I 
 remain most perfectly quiet, and have not appeared in 
 society since your departure. I beg your Lordship to 
 present my best respects to the Duchess. I hope her Grace 
 and the children are well, and that you have had a comfort- 
 able journey. 
 
 P.S. — I have written very much in haste, as I have not 
 had a moment to myself, from the number of persons who 
 have come to demand passports, etc. 
 
 Lord Whitwobth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Calais, Monday, Six o'clock. 
 As Basilico is not yet gone from hence, I add a few 
 words to my letter of this morning to acquaint your Lord- 
 ship that we arrived here about an hour ago. I mentioned 
 to your Lordship that I meant to embark to-morrow with 
 the evening tide, so that unless something very extraordinary 
 happens we shall be at Dover to-morrow night. My chief 
 motive for troubling your Lordship with this is to say that 
 I was received here to-day with the same honours as when 
 I first arrived from England : thirteen guns were fired from 
 the ramparts, and I was visited by the generals and the 
 officers of the garrison, and the Mayor at the head of the 
 municipality. I mention this to your Lordship, as you may 
 perhaps think it right that General Andreossy should, if it 
 is not too late, be received in the same manner at Dover. 
 I have the pleasure to acquaint your Lordship that the 
 Duchess is quite well ; the children are rather fatigued, but 
 we hope a good night's rest will restore them. 
 
BONAPARTE IMMOVABLE. 265 
 
 M. HuBER TO Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Paris, May 17, 1803. 
 
 Yesterday Mr. Talbot and I despatched one of the 
 grooms to your Lordship at Calais with letters informing 
 you of the particulars of my conference with Joseph Bona- 
 parte and with Talleyrand on my return from Abbeville. I 
 was strictly exact in the statement of all that had passed, 
 and I rendered the latter's own words when I said that his 
 injunction to me was ' de donner ma parole d'honneur que 
 dans la nuit du Mardi au Mercredi il seroit expedie a Lord 
 Whitworth un courrier qui lui porteroit une proposition 
 analogue a I'esprit de I'ultimatum d'Angleterre.' We knew 
 that our courier alone would not have the power of detain- 
 ing your Lordship an hour longer than you had intended 
 staying at Calais, unless fresh and discretionary instructions 
 had reached you from London on the Tuesday morning ; and 
 this we looked upon as a possible consequence of the des- 
 patches sent last Friday to General Andreossy. The First 
 Consul had not relied so much, it seems, on the success of 
 those despatches as to prevent his listening to new sugges- 
 tions from his brother and from Talleyrand more likely to 
 decide the assent of England ; so that when they both went 
 to St. Cloud in the evening they hardly doubted of success. 
 We were, however, again foiled in our expectations. A 
 courier from Eussia arrived that very evening, which, it 
 seems, brought from the Court of Petersburg offers more 
 consonant than the first with Bonaparte's wishes, and which, 
 he thought, England would find it more difficult to refuse. 
 On this new ground they found him deaf to their arguments, 
 and I received a note at twelve o'clock at night informing 
 me ' que tout etoit encore manque,' and (as usual) Joseph 
 went off to Morfontaine. I will not attempt to describe here 
 my extreme mortification and disappointment. Your Lord- 
 ship will, I know, form a just idea of both ; and you will find 
 the expression of my feelings in the copy of the letter which 
 I wrote and sent to Talleyrand at Meudon at one o'clock in 
 
266 MAY 1803. 
 
 the morning. The answer was an appointment aux Affaires 
 Etrangeres at twelve o'clock. I will endeavour to render 
 his conversation with precision. 'Vous me trouvez, ainsi 
 que Joseph Bonaparte, extremement chagrin de ce nouveau 
 mecompte, auqnel certainement nous n'avions pas lieu de nous 
 attendre, et qui reporte de nouveau nos esperances sur la pro- 
 position qu'Andreossi a du faire au Lord Hawkesbury. Nous 
 devrons apprendre domain que si cette proposition n'a pas ete 
 acceptee, an moins elle produira de la part de votre Gouverne- 
 ment un aper9u des modifications sous lesquelles elle lui 
 conviendroit mieux. Je vous repete que nous voulons la paix 
 —que nous la vonlons pins que jamais — que si elle nous 
 echappe, ce sera par le simple effet du pen de menagement 
 que vous avez pour I'amour propre du Consul. Vous autres 
 au dehors ne savez pas ce que c'est que cet amour-propre, 
 mais nous le connoissons, nous qui avons a le manier. Si le 
 cabinet britannique avoit voulu adopter des formes moins 
 severes vis-a-vis de lui, il auroit deja reussi. II ne pent pas 
 souffrir de se voir dieter sur tout, et il repete sans cesse que 
 I'Angleterre le traite comme une garnison qui demanderoit 
 a capituler. II se plaint de vos ultimatum qui sont des 
 ultimatissimum et qui ne laissent pas a Tambassadeur qui 
 les presente la moindre latitude. Nous nous entendons pour 
 le fond, nous nous entendons pour la forme de ce que I'am- 
 bassadeur voudra discuter. Nous changerons les mots qui 
 ne vous conviendront pas ; vous adoucirez ceux qui peuvent 
 nous blesser. Nous admettrons I'ile de Lampedusa et Particle 
 de Malte tels que vous les avez proposes. Nous redigerons 
 d'apres votre propre redaction (meme d'une maniere encore 
 plus adoucie si vous voulez) Particle qui regarde Otrante et 
 Tarente. Nous stipulerons dix ans de possession ou nous ne 
 le stipulerons pas, tout comme vous voudrez. Que I'ambas- 
 sadeur revienne et je lui demande seulement de ne pas tenir 
 sa montre a la main vis-a^vis le Consul, ni de lui prescrire 
 un nombre d'heures positif. Ce sera I'amour-propre blesse 
 qui decidera la guerre. Car pour le fond il est impossible de 
 ne pas s'entendre, et nous nous entendons. Dites a Lord 
 Whitworth (dont le depart m'afflige sincerement et blesse le 
 
LET LORD WHITWOETH RETUBN. 267 
 
 Premier Consul) que je vais faire porter dans sa cave a Paris 
 mon meillenr vin d'Hautbrion en retour de Texcellent vin 
 de Madeira qu'il m'a envoye. Nous ne voulons pas qu'il s'en 
 aille ; il nous faut un homme aussi loyal et aussi excellent, 
 quoique trop positif, et nous nous resterons amis.' Your 
 Lordship knows my answer to all this, without my telling it 
 — a repetition of all I had said before. ' Que signifie ce 
 langage a present que vous avez laisse partir milord 
 
 W ? Qu'est-ce que c'est que cet enfan tillage du Consul 
 
 qui demande des bonbons pour ne pas mettre I'Europe en feu ? 
 Pourquoi ces regrets tardifs sur le depart de I'ambassadeur, 
 quand il n'a tenu qu'a vous de le retenir en ecoutant ses 
 raisons presentees sous des formes si convenables et nuUe- 
 ment mortifiantes ? Youlez-vous que I'Angleterre caresse le 
 Consul comme le font les cours du continent? Pourquoi 
 parler sans cesse du petit nombre d'heures qu'il vous laisse 
 pour la decision, lorsque sur les sept premiers jours vous en 
 passez six et trois quarts dans le silence ? Pourquoi parler 
 des douze dernieres heures de son sejour, quand vous en avez 
 laisse ecouler vingt-quatre sans rien dire? S'il passe la mer, 
 vous I'aurez bien voulu, et le message d'Andreossi, tel qu'il 
 a ete presente, aura certainement ete refuse par Lord 
 Hawkesbury. L'ambassadeur s'est explique d'avance la- 
 dessus. Je vous I'ai dit en son nom de la maniere la plus 
 positive. Ainsi attendez-vous a un refus. Avez-vous donne 
 a Andreossi des instructions peremptoires la-dessus ? ' * Non, 
 nous n'en donnons jamais, parce qu'en fait de negociations 
 tout est susceptible de modifications.' Talleyrand asked 
 me : ' Dans quel esprit avez-vous laisse milord Whitworth ? ' 
 * Convaincu que, si le Premier Consul avoit sincerement voulu 
 la paix, les propositions de I'ultimatum eussent ete acceptees 
 — degoute, jusques a satiete, de procedes si pen analogues 
 aux siens et qui annoncent simplement le desir de gagner 
 du tems.' ' Gagner du tems ! et pour quel objet ? Dans quel 
 but ? ' (said he to me). ' Mais — ^je ne les comprends pas trop, 
 je I'avoue — a moins que vous ne vous flattiez que I'Angleterre 
 vous donneroit le tems de voir rentrer votre escadre de 
 St. Domingue, a laquelle vous avez certainement envoye 
 
268 MAT 1803. 
 
 I'ordre d'evacuer et de revenir (et par parenthese, le Consul 
 ar-t-il bien pese les difficultes de cette evacuation de St. Do- 
 mingue, qui suppose un embarquement de trente ou quarante 
 mille individus ? Ou sont vos vaisseaux pour les emmener, 
 et vos vivres pour les nourrir ? H y a impossibilite, et vous 
 pouvez vous attendre au massacre de tous ces individus par les 
 noirs apres le depart de votre escadre. Jugez de la reaction qui 
 en resultera ici contre le Consul).' Talleyrand said: ' Quant 
 a notre escadre, nous la regardons comme perdue. Peut- 
 etre cependant echappera-t-elle, mais sous aucun rapport 
 nous ne pouvons penser que les delais s'etendissent jusqu'au 
 moment necessaire pour sa rentree dans nos ports ou dans 
 ceux d'Espagne.' This, my Lord, is a true and correct state- 
 ment of what passed between T. and me. I thought it 
 right and necessary to lay the whole before you ; and now, 
 for the acquittal of my conscience, I must say what followed. 
 In an intricate case they might attempt, and most likely 
 wish, to deceive ; but here the known situation of affairs is 
 the standard of their sincerity. They do wish for peace — 
 they wish for it most ardently ; but all their wishes avail 
 nothing against the dreaded will and power of Bonaparte as 
 to deciding the question. He himself, wishing for it from a 
 just sense of his interests, will, nevertheless, rush to perdition 
 rather than let it be said that he has shrunk before the power 
 and threats of England. This imputation is what he is so 
 anxious to do away, and he thinks it would be done away if 
 England was less peremptory. AU this is pitiful (as your 
 Lordship has justly observed more than once) ; but when that 
 is said, and the truth of it acknowledged, I must recur to 
 the main point. What is the object in view for England ? 
 Malta and Peace on honourable terms. Who is the man you 
 have to contend with ? Bonaparte. Was he anything but 
 Bonaparte, the present diflB-Culty would not exist; but as 
 he cannot be changed, and as he at present rules the Con- 
 tinent, if the horrors of war can be avoided by condescend- 
 ing to treat with him in a manner somewhat suitable to his 
 temper, and with more apparent forbearance than you would 
 with any old cabinet, is it not advisable to do it? Talley- 
 
HOW NEAR WE ARE TO PEACE ! 269 
 
 rand expresses my meaning when he tells me confidentially, 
 ' Je crois qu'il vous auroit fait present de Malte si votre 
 cabinet I'avoit traite avec plus d'egards.' I hope, my Lord, 
 that you will receive with indulgence these free sentiments 
 and expressions of a mind sincerely devoted to his Majesty's 
 Government. I really think it my duty to lay them before 
 you. The present respective situation of France and England 
 is surely unparalleled in the annals of the two countries, the 
 fate of Europe itself probably depending on the events of 
 the next three months. Peace in view — peace wished for by 
 the two Powers, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Con- 
 sul's brother, and the most marking men in France uniting 
 their means to bring about that desirable blessing; the 
 ground of a compromise seemingly agreed upon on both 
 sides ; and the pride and variable mind of the new Tamerlan 
 the only obstacle to conclusion ! Under such circumstances, 
 how is it possible not to hope for peace yet, even if a first 
 gun had already been fired ? What would, however, render 
 it more difficult would be a renewal of personal abuse of 
 Bonaparte and scurrilous paragraphs against him in the 
 English prints. What a serious misfortune that it should 
 really be more or less in the power of the editor of a paper 
 to mar the endeavours of two nations ! I had this day a 
 long conference with Fouche. I never knew a sounder 
 understanding united to such strong nerves ; he remains the 
 same in his wish and expression for peace. He refuses at 
 present to resume the Ministere de la Police singly, but that 
 department may possibly be shortly united to the Ministere 
 de I'Interieur, in which case he would accept. 
 
 Friday morning. 
 
 Mr. Mandeville returned yesterday evening, and brought 
 the intelligence of your Lordship's sailing from Calais. May 
 Providence avert the impending calamities ! I most sin- 
 cerely thank you for the few lines you favoured me with. 
 Such an approbation must at all times be an acceptable and 
 flattering reward and encouragement for any services I may 
 be able to render. If at your Lordship's recommendation 
 
270 MAT 1803. 
 
 they are thouglit worth the acceptance of the Government, 
 I beg they may not be spared. I intend to remain here a 
 few weeks longer, if possible, to see the last decided course 
 things will take ; and when I can be of no longer use here 
 I shall proceed to some convenient place in Switzerland, from 
 whence I shall have the honour of corresponding with your 
 Lordship. 
 
 Sunday morning. 
 I shall join to this packet the * Moniteur ' of this day, 
 by which you will see the proceedings of yesterday in the 
 different constituted bodies. France will now be waiting 
 for an act of aggression from England, and will of course 
 make the most of it with the nation. Fouche gave me 
 yesterday his opinion as to the kind of manifesto the English 
 Government must and would produce, and of the course of 
 conduct it would probably steer, just as an enlightened and 
 liberal English character could have done. He is possibly 
 mistaken in supposing that the English Cabinet may still 
 make offers to this country, and I will not presume to hazard 
 an opinion upon it. If I did, it would be to say that the 
 articles of Lampedusa and Malta, sncli as they were presented 
 in your ultimatum, or at least in that spirit, and the article 
 relative to Otrante and Tarente, in the words of the redac- 
 tion contained in my last letter, would meet with the con- 
 currence of the Consul and decide immediate peace. It 
 would be presumption, perhaps, to suppose that the Cabinet 
 would in the presumed case honour me with any powers ; 
 and yet, unless provisional powers at least were sent me, so 
 as to secure the Consul's assent and signature at once, we 
 should remain exactly where we are : without powers, all I 
 could do, all the able assistance I command here, would be 
 of no avail on this point. After the message of yesterday, 
 and considering the passive attitude France has taken, it 
 appears to me impossible that overtures should now be made 
 to England by this Government. Mr. Talbot intends setting 
 out to-morrow (I mean Sunday). I shall take every oppor- 
 tunity of writing to your Lordship as long as any is left. I 
 
Talleyrand's last note. 271 
 
 sliould presume tliat France will not be the first to cut the 
 communication. Mr. Mandeville, who intends going on 
 Monday or Tuesday, will be bearer of my next letter. I 
 think I might receive a few from England under Perregaux's 
 cover ; he has no objection to it — I have asked him. Accept 
 my apology for any incorrectness in this. I have not time 
 to make a copy of it. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 London, May 20, 1803. 
 My Lord, — I have the honour to enclose to your Lord- 
 ship an official note which I received from Monsieur de 
 Talleyrand on the day of my departure from Paris, and my 
 answer. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Le soussigne est charge de faire connoitre a Son Excel- 
 lence Lord Whitworth, ambassadeur de Sa Majeste Britan- 
 nique, que le Premier Consul ayant fait proposer dans la 
 note du 14 de ce mois que Tile de Malte fut remise dans les 
 mains d'une des trois puissances garantes, soit la Eussie, 
 I'Autriche ou la Prusse, il ne suffiroit pas, pour ecarter cette 
 proposition, d'arguer du refus que feroit Sa Majeste I'Em- 
 pereur de Eussie de ce depot, puisqu'il resterait a connoitre 
 les intentions de Leurs Majestes Fempereur d'AUemagne et 
 le roi de Prusse. Que d'ailleurs ] 'assertion contenue dans 
 la note de S. E. en date du 20 de ce mois, et qui est exprimee 
 en ces termes : jpar le refus de Sa Majeste VEmpereur de Russie 
 de s*y preter, est entierement contraire a la garantie que Sa 
 Majeste imperiale a formellement offerte sous la condition 
 de quelques legers changements que le Premier Consul n'a 
 fait aucune difficulte d'adopter et auxquels il est a sa con- 
 noissance que le ministere anglais s'est refuse, meditant sans 
 doute alors I'etrange pretention de garder Malte. Que de 
 
272 MAT 1803. 
 
 plus cette assertion se trouve encore en opposition absolue 
 avec les assurances que le Premier Consul a re9ues de Peters- 
 bourg depuis que le message de Sa Majeste Britannique j a 
 ete connu, et qui viennent de lui etre renouvelees par une 
 communication autlientique que Monsieur le comte de 
 Marcoff a donnee hier des intentions de sa cour. D'ou il 
 resulte qu'il est impossible de concilier la derniere transmis- 
 sion faite par Son Excellence Lord Whitworth avec la nouvelle 
 confirmation qui vient d'etre acquise des dispositions de Sa 
 Majeste Tempereur de Eussie, et qu'on ne pent se refuser a 
 croire que Sa Majeste Britannique, mieux informee, sera elle- 
 meme empressee a faire donner a Son Excellence des instruc- 
 tions differentes de celles qu'eUe a re9ues et communiquees 
 au nom de son Gouvernement. 
 
 Le soussigne saisit cette occasion de renouveler a Son' 
 Excellence Lord Whitworth I'assurance de sa haute con- 
 sideration. 
 
 (Signe) Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, 22 Flor^al, I'an XI. 
 
 Le soussigne a I'honneur d'accuser la reception de la 
 note que le ministre des Relations Exterieures lui a envoyee 
 en date d'aujourd'hui, et il ne manquera pas de la faire 
 passer a sa cour. En attendant il prie le ministre des Rela- 
 tions Exterieures de vouloir bien lui envoyer les passeports 
 qu'il lui a demandes. 
 
 II saisit cette occasion de renouveler a Son Excellence 
 I'assurance de sa haute consideration. 
 
 (Signe) Whitworth. 
 
 A Monsieur Talleyrand, Paris, ce 12 Mai 1803. 
 
DETENTION OF ENGLISH IN PEANCE. 273 
 
 Mk. Talbot to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Paris, le 24 Mai 1803. 
 
 Le soussigne, secretaire d'ambassade, etc., etc., rappele 
 par sa cour, doit avant son depart s*acquitter d'un devoir 
 important et solennel — c'est celui d'exprimer a Son Excel- 
 lence le ministre des Relations Exterieures Fetonnement et 
 la douleur dont il a ete saisi en apprenant Tordre emane du 
 Gouvernement de France pour la detention de tons les Anglois 
 qui se trouvent aujourd'hui sur I'etendue de son territoire. 
 Si c'est comme represaille que cette mesure doit etre con- 
 sideree, est-elle d'une nature reconnue parmi les nations de 
 r Europe ? EUe offre un contraste si effrayant avec Fhos- 
 pitalite protectrice que les Anglois vojageant en France j 
 ont constamment eprouvee, qu'il est impossible de ne pas s'en 
 promettre la revocation immediate, et de ne pas I'attendre 
 du sentiment de grandeur qui doit appartenir an Gouverne- 
 ment de France. C'est ce sentiment que le soussigne invoque 
 aujourd'hui aupres du ministre des Relations Exterieures — 
 c'est le voeu de I'humanite — c'est le vceu profond du soussigne, 
 qui, au moment de son depart et au nom de son Gouverne- 
 ment, reclame avec confiance le rappel d'un ordre aussi alar- 
 mant. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Mr. Talbot. 
 
 Paris, May 24, 1803. 
 
 I duly received the letters you have done me the honour 
 of writing of this day's date ; but you will not conceive it 
 extraordinary that, as it is not in my power to acknowledge 
 that you any longer hold any public character or mission at 
 Paris, I can return no answer to the representations they 
 contain. 
 
274 MAY 1803. 
 
 Mr. Mandeville to Loed Whitworth. 
 
 Calais, May 26, 1803. 
 
 My Lord, — When I had taken leave of your Lordship the 
 Tuesday evening on the pier, I returned to the hotel with 
 the intention of setting out directly for Paris ; but I found 
 that the groom who had been despatched by Mr. Talbot to 
 your Lordship on Monday was too much fatigued to accom- 
 pany me the same night, so that I was under the necessity 
 of deferring my departure till the next day. Upon my 
 arrival in Paris I lost no time in putting together the dif- 
 ferent papers belonging to the mission and in arranging my 
 own private concerns, that I might be able to leave Paris 
 with as little delay as possible. On the Monday I was ready 
 to set out ; but I waited till the evening through my wish to 
 accompany Mr. Talbot, who had intended quitting Paris at 
 that time. On that day the enclosed arrete (vfhich. I pro- 
 cured at Boulogne) was submitted to the Senate and imme- 
 diately adopted ; but it has been executed with this differ- 
 ence, that instead of considering as prisoners of war those 
 who are actually inrolled in the MiHtia it has included all 
 the English between the age of eighteen and sixty (women 
 excepted) who are now in France. Those who were in 
 Paris received an order early in the same morning to present 
 themselves at General Junot's, the Commandant de la Place, 
 when each person received a number, and according to that 
 number they were to be provided the next day with a pass to 
 proceed to Fontainebleau, where they are to remain upon 
 parole. Mr. Huber, who was included amongst the English, 
 waited immediately upon M. de Talleyrand, where he re- 
 ceived some faint hopes of being permitted to leave France ; 
 but he was informed at the same time that none other could 
 hope for the like indulgence, and that even Lord Elgin 
 would be considered as much a prisoner as any other indi- 
 vidual of his nation who might happen to be now within the 
 territory of the Republic. Mr. Talbot wrote to M. de Talley- 
 rand with the view of obtaining some alleviation of the 
 
MR. MANDEVILLE A.RRESTED. 275 
 
 decree in his Lordship's favour. I left Paris that night and 
 met with no interruption on the road. I arrived here yes- 
 terday ; and your Lordship, I think, will not be less surprised 
 than I was when Mr. Mengaud informed me that unless my 
 passport was of a date posterior to that of the arrete he could 
 not allow me to leave Calais ; that all the indulgence he 
 should have it in his power to show me was that he would 
 not exact of me to appear before the Commandant, but that 
 he would himself receive my parole not to quit the walls of 
 Calais ; that if I chose I might send a courier to Paris, and 
 that I might make use of one of his own. I this morning, 
 however, wrote a note to him requesting a passport to return 
 myself to Paris, upon my parole to go straight and immedi- 
 ately there without leaving the road, in order to acquaint 
 Mr. Talbot, whom I shall most probably meet on his way 
 here, with these circumstances, and then to adopt whatever 
 measures he may think proper to take : mine would be to 
 wait personally upon M. de Talleyrand to represent to him 
 the stigma this extreme violation of the right of nations 
 would throw upon the French Government in thus vexing 
 three or four individuals without any possible benefit to 
 themselves ; to demand a free permission for those attached 
 to the Embassy and in your Lordship's service to return to 
 England ; as also the liberation of the two packets which 
 have been seized — the men imprisoned and the masters put 
 upon parole — to convey the remainder of the mission to Dover. 
 I have obtained the promise of my passport, and I shall set 
 out on my return to Paris the moment I have it in my pos- 
 session. I request your Lordship to offer my respects to the 
 Duchess of Dorset, and to believe me to be, my Lord, your 
 Lordship's most obedient and most faithful servant, 
 
 J. H. Mandeville. 
 
 P.S. — I should add, my Lord, that Sir James Crauf urd is 
 at Calais and upon parole. Captain Hammond asked him 
 on the Monday last, just before he sailed, if he would take his 
 passage on board his vessel ; he said that he would wait two 
 or three days longer. One would very naturally be much 
 
 T 2 
 
276 MAY 1803. 
 
 at a loss to imagine what could prevent Sir James Crau- 
 furd, under the present circumstances, to refuse such an 
 opportunity of returning to England. The arrival of a lady 
 from Paris the next day explains the motive of his refusal, 
 and brings consolation, I trust, to the love-sick prisoner. 
 Quentin Craufurd is the only Englishman at Paris who has 
 permission to remain there. Lord Yarmouth has just landed, 
 and is now upon parole within the walls of Calais. The ship 
 that brought him is seized and the crew made prisoners. 
 
 Mr. Talbot to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 Calais, May 27, 1803. 
 As I expect some difficulty in transmitting this letter to 
 your Lordship I shall confine myself to a very few words. I 
 quitted Paris on Tuesday night last. On the preceding day 
 all Englishmen between the ages of eighteen and sixty were 
 constituted prisoners of war. I was induced (which step I 
 trust your Lordship will not disapprove) to address a note on 
 the subject to ML. de Talleyrand, a copy of which I have the 
 honour to send enclosed, together with his answer, on the 
 receipt of which I immediately ordered my post-horses and 
 proceeded on my journey, and after some considerable inter- 
 ruptions reached Calais to-day. Mr. Men gaud refuses to 
 suffer me to embark until he shall have received the orders 
 of his Government, and has despatched a courier to Paris for 
 that purpose. The two packet-boats which were first sent 
 from Dover after the arrival of Lord Whitworth for the 
 remainder of his Majesty's mission have been seized and the 
 crews imprisoned, with the exception of the captains and 
 mates. The last which arrived, under the command of 
 Captain Hammond with a flag of truce, has been respected, 
 and I hope to be able, with the permission of Mr. Mengaud, 
 to forward this letter to your Lordship by his means. I have 
 likewise the honour of enclosing to your Lordship a copy of 
 the orders received by Mr. Mengaud with respect to the 
 
LETTER OP THE GRAND JUGE. 277 
 
 detention of his Majesty's subjects, and have the honour to 
 be, with the highest respect, my Lord, your Lordship's most 
 obedient and very humble servant, 
 
 J. TaI/BOT. 
 
 P.S. — Lord Elgin and Mr. Cockbum, H.M.'s Consul at 
 Hamburgh, have not been able to obtain any exception in 
 their favour v^ith regard to this measure. The former is in 
 a very precarious state of health, and if his detention be 
 protracted to any length of time it may be attended with 
 very dangerous consequences to his Lordship. 
 
 Le Grand-Juge, Ministre de la Justice, au Commissaire General 
 de Police a Calais. 
 
 Paris, le 2 Prairial, an XI de la Rep. fran?. 
 
 Je vous transmets, citoyen commissaire, I'arrete du 
 Gouvernement relatif aux Anglais qui se trouvent actuelle- 
 ment en France. A I'instant de sa reception vous en don- 
 nerez connaissance a ceux qui sont dans votre arrondissement. 
 Je vous observe que la mesure enveloppe sans distinction 
 tout Anglais age de plus de dix-huit ans et de mo ins de 
 soixante ; et que nul pretexte, nulle exception ne pent I'y 
 soustraire, attenduque, d'apres les loix britanniques> il n'en est 
 aucun qui soit excepte du service de la milice. Tons seront 
 tenus, dans les vingt-quatre heures de la notification qui leur 
 sera faite de votre ordre, de venir se constituer prison niers 
 de guerre pres du commandant de la place dans les villes ou 
 il y en a, et pres de I'officier de la gendarmerie dans les 
 autres villes. Et s'il n'y a ni commandant de place ni 
 oSicier de gendarmerie dans le lieu ou I'Anglais reside, il se 
 constituera prisonnier pres du commandant de place ou de 
 I'officier de gendarmerie de la ville la plus voisine. A detaut 
 d'avoir rempli ces obligations, ils ne pourront etre admis a 
 donner leur parole. Les Anglais qui, quoiqu'ils se fussent 
 consfcitues prisonniers dans les vingt-quatre heures, sevont 
 
278 MAY 1803. 
 
 juges n'etre point admissibles a etre retenus sur leur parole, 
 ainsi que ceux qui ne seraient pas venus dans le delai fixe 
 pour se constituer prisonniers, seront conduits dans un point 
 central de la division qui sera designe par le ministre de la 
 guerre. A I'egard de ceux qui seront admis a demeurer 
 prisonniers sur leur parole, s'ils habitent une ville, ils j 
 resteront ; s'ils habitent une commune rurale, ils viendront 
 habiter la petite ville la plus voisine. Quant a Paris et a 
 Versailles, les Anglais qui pourront etre admis a donner leur 
 parole seront envoyes par le commandant de la division a 
 Fontainebleau. Je vous charge, citoyen commissaire, de me 
 rendre compte, dans le plus bref delai, de I'execution de ces 
 mesures et de m'en faire connaitre le resultat. Je vous 
 salue, (Signe) Regnier. 
 
 EXTEAIT DES EeGISTRES DE DELIBERATIONS DU GOUVERNE- 
 MENT DE LA RePUBLIQUE. 
 
 St. Cloud, le 2 Prairial, an XI de la E^publique. 
 LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE. 
 
 Arrets. 
 
 Tons les Anglais enroles dans la milice et ^ges de dix- 
 huit ans au moins et de soixante au plus, ou tenant com- 
 mission de S. M. Britannique, qui sont actuellement en France, 
 seront immediatement constitues prisonniers de guerre, pour 
 repondre des citoyens de la Republique qui auraient ete 
 arretes et faits prisonniers par des batimens ou sujets de Sa 
 Majeste Britannique avant la declaration de guerre. Les 
 ministres sont charges, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de 
 I'execution du present arrete. 
 
 Le Premier Consul. Signe Bonaparte. Par le Premier 
 Consul. 
 
 Le Secretaire d'Etat. Signe Hugues B. Maret. Pour 
 Copie Conform e. 
 
 Le Grand-Juge, Ministre de la Justice. Signe Regnier. 
 
ENGLISH REMONSTRANCE. 279 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury. 
 
 London, May 29, 1803. 
 I have tlie honour to enclose your Lordship a correct 
 copy of the note which I presented to the French Govern- 
 ment on the eleventh instant, and by which your Lordship 
 will perceive that the following words, ' Et cette proposition 
 ay ant ete jugee impraticahle par le refus de Sa Majeste rem- 
 pereur de Russie de s*y preter et en meme terns au-dessous des 
 justes pretentions de Sa Majeste, have been omitted in the 
 copy which was transmitted the same day to your Lordship's 
 office. This clerical error must be attributed to the multi- 
 plicity of business which my secretary had upon his hands 
 at the moment of my departure from Paris. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, May 29, 1803. 
 
 Sir,— His Majesty's Government have just received the 
 information that all British subjects who are between 
 eighteen and sixty years of age and who happened to be 
 upon the territory of the French Republic have bee a made 
 prisoners of war by order of the French Government, and 
 that even the Secretary of his Majesty's Embassy has been 
 comprehended in the order and is now detained at Calais. 
 His Majesty cannot refrain from expressing his surprise and 
 astonishment at this extraordinary and unexampled pro- 
 ceeding, it being wholly unusual in the practice of the 
 nations of Europe, though in a state of actual hostility, to 
 treat the persons of individuals in civil situations as if they 
 were amenable to the laws of war. If, however, there could 
 be any doubt upon this subject, the claim advanced by 
 General Andreossy on May 6 (a copy of which and of my 
 answer I enclose), that all French citizens might be permitted 
 
280 MAY 1803. 
 
 to embark for France without molestation, and the acquies- 
 cence in that claim by his Majesty's Government, give his 
 Majesty the right to demand an entire reciprocity with 
 regard to his own subjects who may happen to be in France 
 in the present conjuncture. His Majesty expects that the 
 French Government will give immediate orders for the libera- 
 tion of all British subjects now detained in France, and that, 
 conformably to the example which his Majesty has afforded, 
 they may be allowed to quit the territories without molesta- 
 tion. If his Majesty's expectations in this respect should 
 unfortunately be disappointed, he would feel himself justified 
 in retaliating upon the persons and property of all the 
 French citizens who may be within his power. It would be 
 with the greatest reluctance that his Majesty would have 
 recourse to such measures of severity against individuals ; 
 but he entertains no doubt that his motives in this respect 
 would be justly appreciated throughout Europe, and that 
 these harsh and unusual proceedings would be ascribed ex- 
 clusively to the system and conduct of the Government of 
 France. 
 
 Note. 
 
 Paris, le 11 Mai 1803. 
 Le soussigne, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipo^ 
 tentiaire de S.M. Britannique pres la Eepublique fran9aise, 
 ayant transmis a sa cour la pi'oposition qui lui a ete f aite par 
 le ministre des Relations Exterieures le 4 du courant, et 
 cette proposition ayant ete jugee impraticable par le refus 
 de S.M. I'empereur de Russie de s'y preter et en nieme tems 
 au-dessous des justes pretentions de Sa Majeste, vient de 
 recevoir I'ordre de remettre a Son Excellence le projet de 
 convention ci-joint, fonde sur la seule base que S.M. croit, 
 dans les circonstances actuelles, susceptible d'un arrange- 
 ment definitif et amical. Le ministre des Relations Ex- 
 terieures ne manquera pas d'observer jusqu'a quel point Sa 
 Majeste a cherche de concilier la securite de ses interecs 
 
ADVENTURES OF ME. TALBOT. 281 
 
 avec la dignite du Premier Consul. Le soussigne se flatte que 
 le Premier Consul, rendant justice a ces sentimens, adoptera, 
 d'accord avec Sa Majeste, un moyen aussi propre a rend re 
 une tranquillite permanente aux deux nations et a VEurope. 
 Le soussigne saisit cette occasion de renouveler a S.B. 
 I'assurance de sa tres-haute consideration. 
 
 Mr. Talbot to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Calais, Monday, May 30, 1803. 
 My dear Lord, — I avail myself of the opportunity which 
 is afforded me by a French flag of trace of writing a few 
 lines to your Lordship, and of thanking you for the letter 
 which you had the goodness to write to me from Dover. 
 On my arrival here I had the honour to address a few lines 
 to Lord Hawkesbury, but from the nature of my situation T 
 was under the necessity of doing it in great haste, and of 
 confining myself to a very few lines. On my road from 
 Paris I was twice arrested by the gendarmerie (who are 
 stationed on all the roads to a considerable distance) — first at 
 St. Denis, where I was detained from one o'clock in the 
 morning till seven, whilst a soldier was despatched to the 
 Grand Juge with a copy of my passports. The same soldier 
 conducted Mr. Charles Sturt as a prisoner, whom, he in- 
 formed me on his return, he had deposited in the Temple. 
 At two posts further I was again detained six hours. As 
 I was quitting Boulogne I met Mr. Mandeville, who was 
 returning to Paris, having been refused permission to embark 
 here. I have heard nothing of him since further than that 
 he was met on the way by Doctor Maclaurin and Mr. Hodgson, 
 who arrived here yesterday evening. A similar refusal has 
 been notified to me by Mr. Mengaud, and I am now waiting 
 the answer to a despatch which he has written to Paris on the 
 subject. The captain of a packet-boat which arrived here this 
 morning from Dover under a flag of truce was merely suffered 
 
282 JUNE 1803. 
 
 to land and deliver to Mr. Mengaud the letters with which 
 he was charged. The only satisfactory article of news that 
 I have to communicate is, that the parcel containing the 
 Duchess's dress for the King's birthday is embarked, and 
 will leave Calais this evening. Cole informed me on leaving 
 Paris that it would require ten days from that time (Tuesday 
 last) for the furniture, etc., to be packed up. 
 
 I beg your Lordship will present my best respects to the 
 Duchess. 
 
 Me. Mandeville to Lord Whitworth. 
 
 Calais, June 4, 1803. 
 
 The last letter that I had the honour to address to your 
 Lordship from this place ended, I believe, by my saying that 
 I had succeeded in obtaining permission to return to Paris 
 for the purpose stated in that letter. I did not, however, 
 receive my passport that evening till after the gates of the 
 town were shut, and my departure was thus deferred till 
 morning. I set out early, and reached Paris the next day 
 (Saturday) in the evening ; and that no time might be lost — 
 for I was well aware that I should not have an opportunity 
 of seeing M. de Talleyrand on the Sunday, as he would be 
 the greater part of the day at St. Cloud — I took a cabriolet 
 and went directly to Meudon to acquaint him with the 
 circumstance of the remainder of the Embassy being com- 
 prised in the arrete that had lately come out, and that I 
 had been myself arrested at Calais. It was late when I got 
 there — past twelve ; but he was at home, and received me. 
 After many inquiries had been made about your Lordship — 
 where I had left you, and what was the object of my journey 
 to Paris — I put into his hand the enclosed letter (I.), which 
 I had prepared in the event of my not seeing him, mention- 
 ing the object and motive of my journey, and the unseason- 
 able visit I was then making him. When M. de Talleyrand 
 had read it he turned to me and said that what had been 
 done in regard to my arrestation was throughout the whole 
 
MR. MANDEVILLE IN PARIS. 283 
 
 an error ; that it was an affair of the police and the marine ; 
 that he should see the First Consul the next day at St. 
 Cloud, when he would report to him the substance of my 
 letter, and that he was sure he would be very sorry for what 
 had happened ; and that he did not doubt but orders would 
 be immediately given for the free return into their native 
 country of every person attached to the Embassy. I took 
 that opportunity of pressing him on the subject of the two 
 packet-boats that were seized at Calais, and which were 
 waiting there for the purpose of taking the rest of the 
 mission to England, and that he would allow me to hope I 
 should be the bearer of an order for their release, as well as 
 for that of the masters and crews, who had been made 
 prisoners of war, for they in this instance belonged wholly 
 and entirely to the Embassy. His answer was, ' Certainly they 
 do, and all that belongs to the Embassy is sacred.' After 
 some little conversation, in which he seemed very desirous 
 to learn if I had or if I was likely to have any communica- 
 tion to make from your Lordship, I retired thanking him 
 for the reception he had given me. Very late on the Sunday 
 night I received the enclosed note (No. II.) from M. de 
 Talleyrand, which, as I expected would be, was of the same 
 tenor as his language to me of the preceding evening ; but 
 I certainly had no reason to expect the extraordinary em- 
 jpressement of sending it, or rather, perhaps, dating it, front 
 St. Cloud. I conceived the hope now that there was nothing: 
 left for me to do but to call for my passport the next day,, 
 and return the next day to Calais ; and for this purpose I 
 went to the Bureau des Eelations Exterieures on the 
 Monday morning, and was directed to send at five in the 
 afternoon of the same day, and that it would be ready for 
 me. It was delivered at that time, and with it one for Mr. 
 Talbot (which I had not asked for, supposing it in no shape 
 necessary after the letter I had received the day before) y. 
 accompanied by the note (III.) which 1 have the honour ta 
 enclose to your Lordship. I think, my Lord, you will 
 imagine the surprise I felt at reading this note. I was 
 greatly embarrassed — not in what I had to do : there was bu.fc 
 
284 JUNE 1803. 
 
 one thing : to stay till all conditions were taken off, which I 
 could not, and of which M. de Talleyrand was perfectly 
 aware I had no authority to subscribe to — but in the reply 
 I was called upon to make to so extraordinary a proposition. 
 I immediately took the letter to Lord Elgin, whom from my 
 arrival I had always consulted, begging his assistance and 
 advice, which I now so much stood in need of that I should 
 not be justified in acting without it. The following day the 
 note (IV.) was sent on my part to M. de Talleyrand, who 
 making wait the servant who carried it, returned me the 
 answer (Y.), which I likewise enclose to your Lordship. Lord 
 Elgin being of opinion that I ought not to go without taking 
 with me the passports for Mr. Hodgson and Dr. Maclaurin, 
 who had directed me to mention them in my note to the 
 Minister, I remained in Paris until they were delivered to 
 me, and in the night of Wednesday I set out for this place, 
 where I arrived in time to see that these precautions had 
 been unnecessary, for the vessel which Mr. Talbot and those 
 gentlemen were on board was half-way between Dover and 
 Calais as I entered the walls of the latter place. I made 
 application directly to Mr. Men gaud and the Commissaire 
 de Marine for any sort of vessel they might choose to give 
 me, and to be allowed to sail immediately, but without 
 success ; the former proffering me all the means in his power 
 to that effect, which insured to me every difficulty and pre- 
 vention on the part of the latter. 1 am very happy to see, 
 however, by his letter to me of this morning (VI.) that I 
 may still hope that my application to M. de Talleyrand on 
 the subject of the detention of the two packet-boats at this 
 place is likely to be attended with success. I trust, my Lord, 
 that the line of conduct which I have adopted and pursued 
 from the moment of my arrestation here may meet with 
 your Lordship's approbation, and that the zeal which actuates 
 me always may make up for whatever deficiency I may show 
 in the means I employ to obtain it. 
 
MR. MANDEVILLE DETAINED. 285 
 
 No. T. 
 
 M. Mandeville, secretaire attache a Pambassade d'Angle- 
 terre, parti de Paris en cette qualite lundi dernier, a ete 
 arrete a Calais par ordre du Gouvernement de France et 
 place dans la classe de I'arrestation generale des Anglais qui 
 se trouvent en France. Convaincu que cette arrestation ne 
 peut etre que I'efPet d'une meprise du commissaire general a 
 Calais, il en a obtenu la permission de venir sur sa parole en 
 rendre compte a Son Excellence Monsieur de Tallej^rand. 
 
 II doit rinformer aussi que les deux vaisseaux destines a 
 I'embarquement de la legation out ete saisis et leurs equipages 
 mis en prison, a I'exception des capitaines qui sont pri- 
 sonniers sur parole. M. Mandeville prie Son Excellence de 
 I'instruire de ce qu'il a a faire en consequence de cet evene- 
 ment. 
 
 Paris, ce 28 Mai 1803. 
 
 No. II. 
 
 A St. Cloud, le 9 Prairial, an XL 
 29 Mai 1803. 
 
 C'est par erreur, Monsieur, que vous vous etes trouve 
 compris dans la mesure de represailles que le Gouvernement 
 fran^ois a cru devoir prendre relativement a vos compatriotes. 
 Le Premier Consul a donne des ordres pour que vous. Mon- 
 sieur, Monsieur Talbot et les personnes qui appartiennent a 
 la legation anglaise puissent retourner librement dans leur 
 pays. Je suis personnellement fache des retards et des con- 
 trarietes que vous avez eprouves a cet egard. 
 
 (Signe) Ch. M. Talletband. 
 
 A M. Mandeville. 
 
 No. III. 
 
 Le ministre des Belations Exterieures remet a Monsieur 
 Mandeville les passeports qu'il lui a demandes pour Monsieur 
 Talbot et pour lui, sous la condition expresse que le citojen 
 
286 MAY 1803. 
 
 Lemoyne, secretaire de la commission pour rechange des 
 prisonniers, ainsi que de tout autre Fran9ois attache a la 
 commission ou a la legation, seront libres de repasser en 
 France et recevront du Gouvernement anglois les passeports 
 necessaires a cet effet. 
 
 (Signe) Ch. M. Talleyrand. 
 
 A M. Mandeville. 
 Paris, ce 10 Prairial, an XI. 30 Mai 1803. 
 
 No. lY. 
 
 Monsieur Mandeville a I'honneur d'accuser la reception 
 de la lettre que Son Excellence le ministre des Relations 
 Exterieures lui a fait I'honneur de lui ecrire en date d'hier, 
 avec les deux passeports qui I'accompagnent. Monsieur 
 Mandeville voit avec une peine extreme la condition que 
 Monsieur le ministre attache a I'emploi de ces passeports. II 
 n'a aucune connoissance de la detention d'individus fran9ois 
 quelconques en Angleterre a I'occasion de la rupture entre les 
 deux pays, mais 11 ne feroit qu'induire en erreur s'il hesi- 
 toit a declarer qu'il n'est point autorise par sa situation de 
 secretaire ni de traiter ni de contracter aucun engagement 
 au nom de son Gouvernement. II ose done esperer, d'apres 
 I'assurance que Son Excellence a bien voulu lui adresser 
 dimanche de St. Cloud, que Monsieur Talbot, secretaire 
 d'ambassade, et les personnes qui appartiennent a la legation 
 anglaise, pourront retourner librement dans leur pays. II 
 doit remarquer en meme tems a Son Excellence qu'outre 
 Monsieur Talbot il y a encore en France Monsieur Hodgson, 
 aumonier, et Monsieur Maclaurin, medecin, tous les deux 
 membres de I'ambassade. 
 
 A Monsieur de Talleyrand. 
 Paris, ce 31 Mai 1803. 
 
ME. MANDEVILLE EELEASED. ^ 287 
 
 No. V. 
 
 Paris, ce 11 Prairial, an XI. 
 31 Mai 1803. 
 
 La condition, Monsieur, sous laquelle des passeports vous 
 ont ete donnes ne pent importer de votre part aucun engage- 
 ment. C'est a votre Gouvernement, qui, informe par vous, 
 a votre arrivee a Londres, de la condition que le Gouverne- 
 ment de la Eepublique a attachee a vos passeports, de 
 remplir la condition imposee par le droit des gens, et d'au- 
 toriser le retour du citoyen Lemoyne et autres Frangois qui 
 pourroient etre attaches a la legation de la Eepublique 
 fran9aise. J'ai I'honneur de vous saluer. 
 
 (Signe) C. M. Talleyeand. 
 
 A M. Mandeville. 
 
 No. VI. 
 
 Le Commissaire de Marine d Monsieur Mandeville, 
 
 Calais, le 15 Prairial, an XI. 
 4 Juin 1803. 
 
 Monsieur Pigaud vient de me remettre, Monsieur, la 
 lettre que vous m'avez fait Thonneur de m'ecrire. Je regrette 
 beaucoup de ne poiivoir adherer a la demande que vous me 
 faites d'un batiment expres pour vous transporter en Angle- 
 terre, le ministre de la Marine ne m'ayant autorise par le 
 courrier de ce jour qu'a I'expedition des paquebots de malle 
 fran9ois, et c'est d'apres une nouvelle decision du Premier 
 Consul. Je ne peux que vous engager a profiter du premier 
 qui s'expediera, peut-etre demain ou au plus tard apres- 
 demain, peut-etre meme pourrez-vous profiter d'un des bati- 
 mens anglois qui sont en ce port, car je pense que je recevrai 
 tres-incessamment I'ordre de les rendre. Je suis. Monsieur, 
 avec une haute consideration, votre serviteur. 
 
 (Signe) Feanct. 
 
288 JUNE 1803. 
 
 M. DB Talleteand to Lord Hawkesbuet. 
 
 Paris, le 20 Prairial, an XI. 
 
 Je me suis empresse de mettre sous les jeux du Premier 
 Consul la lettre en date dn 19 Prairial que vous m'avez 
 fait I'honneur de m'ecrire. Le Gouvernement fran9ais a 
 constitue prisonniers de guerre tons les individus anglais 
 voyageant sur le continent pour des affaires de commerce ou 
 tons autres objets, parce que Sa Majeste fait constituer 
 prisonniers tous les individus fran9ais qui sont trouves sur 
 mer voyageant pour leur commerce ou pour d'autres objets. 
 Ni les uns ni les autres n'ont les armes a la main, et le 
 Premier Consul reconnait la justice de ce qui est pratique 
 entre les puissances du continent, qui ne considerent comme 
 prisonniers de guerre que les hommes pris les armes a la 
 main ; mais I'Angleterre, en suivant d'autres principes, met 
 la France dans la necessite d'agir comme elle, et de suivre 
 sur le continent les memes regies qu'elle veut etablir sur la 
 mer. Si le Grouvernement britannique veut ne plus con- 
 siderer comme prisonniers tous les individus arretes sur des 
 b^timents de commerce non armes, le Premier Consul est 
 pret a ne regarder pareillement comme prisonniers et a ne 
 retenir pour tels que les individus qui auraient ete saisis les 
 armes a la main. 
 
 Eecevez, milord, I'assurance de ma plus haute conside- 
 ration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyrand. 
 
 M. DE Talleyrand to Loed Hawkesbury. 
 
 Paris, le 21 Prairial, an XI. 
 
 Milord, — Apres un leger engagement avec les troupes de 
 Sa Majeste Britannique, I'armee fran9aise occupe le pays 
 d'Hanovre. Le Premier Consul, n'ayant eu en vue que 
 d'obtenir des gages pour I'evacuation de Malte et de 
 
HANOVER. 289 
 
 travailler a accomplir I'execution du traite d' Amiens, n'a 
 point vouln faire eprouver toutes les rigueurs de la guerre 
 aux sujets de Sa Majeste Britannique. Cependantle Premier 
 Consul ne pent ratifier la convention conclue entre I'armee 
 fran9aise et celle de Sa Majeste, dont j'ai Thonneur de 
 joindre ici copie, qu'autant qu'elle sera pareillement ratifiee 
 par Sa Majeste Britannique, et dans ce cas le Premier Consul 
 me charge expressement de declarer qu'il est dans son inten- 
 tion que I'armee du roi d' Angle terre en Hanovre soit d'abord 
 echangee contre tons les matelots ou soldats que les vaisseaux 
 de Sa Majeste ont fait ou sont dans le cas de faire prison- 
 niers. Le Premier Consul verrait avec peine que Sa Majeste 
 Britannique, en refusant de ratifier ladite convention, obligeat 
 le Gouvernement fran9ais a traiter le pays d' Hanovre avec 
 toute la rigueur de la guerre et comme un pays qui, livre a 
 lui-meme, abandonne par son souverain, se serait trouve 
 conquis sans capitulation et laisse a la discretion de la puis- 
 sance occupante. 
 
 J'attendrai avec empressement, milord, que vous me 
 fassiez connaitre, a cet egard, les intentions de Sa Majeste 
 Britannique. 
 
 Eecevez, milord, Tassurance de ma plus haute conside- 
 ration. 
 
 Ch. Mau. Talleyeand. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, June 13, 1803. 
 
 Sir, — I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your letters of the 9th and 10th inst. by the messenger 
 Cormon. I shall lose no time in laying them before the 
 King; and I will transmit to you such answers as his 
 Majesty may be pleased to direct me to return to them, by 
 one of his Majesty's messengers, whom I will despatch to 
 Paris with as little delay as may be possible. I desire you 
 to accept the assurances of the high consideration with 
 which I have the honour, etc. 
 
 u 
 
290 JUNE 1803. 
 
 Lord Hawkesbury to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, June 15, 1803. 
 
 Sir, — I have laid before tlie King your letter of the 10th 
 inst. I am commanded by his Majesty to inform yon that, 
 as he has always considered his character of Elector of 
 Hanover as distinct from his character of King of the United 
 Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, he never can consent 
 to acquiesce in any proceeding by which he shall sanction 
 the idea that he is liable in justice to be attacked in the one 
 capacity for the line of conduct which he may have felt it to 
 be his duty to adopt in the other. This principle is not now 
 advanced for the first time. It has been recognised by most 
 of the Powers of Europe, and by none more particularly than 
 by the French Government, who in the year 1795, in conse- 
 quence of his Majesty having acceded to the Treaty of Basle, 
 acknowledged the neutrality of his Majesty in his capacity 
 of Elector of Hanover, at a time when they were engaged in 
 a war with him as King of Great Britain. It has been 
 further confirmed by the conduct of his Majesty on the 
 occasion of the Treaty of Luneville, and by the arrangements 
 which have lately taken place relative to the German In- 
 demnities, and to the constitution of the Empire — arrange- 
 ments which must have been intended to provide for the 
 independence of the Empire ; which have been solemnly 
 guaranteed by some of the principal Powers of Europe, but 
 to which his Majesty, as King of Great Britain, was no 
 party. Under these circumstances his Majesty has deter- 
 mined, in his character of Elector of Hanover, to appeal to 
 the Empire and those Powers of Europe who have guaranteed 
 the Germanic Constitution, and thereby his rights and posses- 
 sions as a prince of that Empire. Until his Majesty shall be 
 informed of their sentiments, he has commanded me to say 
 that, in his character of Elector of Hanover, he will scrupu- 
 lously abstain from doing any act which can be considered 
 as being in contravention to the stipulations contained in 
 
INTERMEDIATE LAW. 291 
 
 the convention that was concluded on June 3 between the 
 deputies appointed by the Regency of Hanover and the 
 French Government. 
 
 Lord Hawkesburt to M. de Talleyrand. 
 
 Downing Street, June 15, 1803. 
 
 Sir, — I have laid before the King your letter of the 19th 
 inst., and he has commanded me to return to it the following 
 answer. His Majesty cannot sufficiently express his surprise 
 at the new and extraordinary demands advanced by the 
 French Government ; demands which are in direct contra- 
 vention of all the known and admitted law of nations — of 
 that law upon which France, in common with every other 
 Power in Europe, has consented to act down to the present 
 period. Notwithstanding that by the strict rule of the law 
 of nations, considered independently of such modifications 
 as it has received from convention or usage, all the subjects 
 of the hostile state, whether in arms or not, are just objects 
 of the rights of war, yet the practice of states has agreed 
 in showing an indulgence to each other's subjects who were 
 resident in the territories of the other party before it became 
 belligerent, under the expectation and faith of that forbear- 
 ance which general usage has bound their Governments 
 mutually to allow. But the same general usage has invari- 
 ably admitted the exercise of the right of belligerents to 
 detain and make prisoners the subjects of each other who are 
 employed upon the seas, and who are not merely passing thereon ; 
 no faith of any Government being pledged to them, and it 
 being perfectly understood in consequence of universal usage 
 that they were exposed to the casualties of an intervening 
 war. The maritime hostilities of all European states have 
 been carried on in conformity to this principle ; the hostili- 
 ties of France just as much as those of any other country. 
 His Majesty is therefore acting upon the common law of 
 Europe when he detains the subjects of the enemy so taken. 
 
 TT 2 
 
292 JUNE 1803. 
 
 He is equally acting upon the same common law when he 
 re-claims his own subjects who were resident in France at 
 the time when the two countries were at peace ; and to 
 demand that he should give up his prisoners, whom he law- 
 fully detains, in order to purchase the restitution of his 
 own subjects, who are detained contrary to the practice of 
 all civilised nations and to the faith of the French Govern- 
 ment itself, is to demand a surrender of those rights which 
 the law of nations has hitherto held inviolate, and a submis- 
 sion to an unexampled outrage upon the universal principles 
 and practice of that law. 
 
 Lord Whitwoeth to Lord Hawkesbuet. 
 
 Knole, Aug. 14, 1803. 
 
 Mr. Huber has expressed to me his regret at not having 
 succeeded in rendering his services acceptable to your Lord- 
 ship. Your Lordship will permit me to repeat that they 
 were highly useful to me, although not successfully exerted ; 
 and indeed so much so, that had I remained longer at Paris I 
 should have undoubtedly recommended him to your Lord- 
 ship for some remuneration on that account. Since my 
 return he has been exposed to much personal inconvenience, 
 and incurred much expense on account of those services; 
 and I must confess to your Lordship that if no indemnifica- 
 tion is to be made to him by Government, either in money 
 or in employment, I shall conceive myself bound at least to 
 reimburse him, if he will accept it from me, not only such 
 expenses, but also that which he has been put to by his 
 forced journey from Paris hither. The Duchess desires her 
 kind remembrance to your Lordship and Lady Hawkesbury, 
 to whom I beg leave to add my respiects. 
 
AREEST OF LORD ELGIN. 293 
 
 Lady Elgin to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Paris, Dec. 3, 1803. 
 
 It would be superfluous to trouble your Lordship with 
 details on the subject of Lord Elgin's detention, or of the 
 measures that have been in vain tried to obtain his release. 
 But an event has now taken place which induces me to 
 address your Lordship without losing a moment's time. In 
 consequence of accounts having reached this Government 
 that General Boyer had been arrested and sent into confine- 
 ment in Scotland, the First Consul, by way of reprisal, gave 
 orders that Lord Elgin, who had been allowed to pass the 
 winter ab Pau, should likewise be arrested and confined in 
 the Chateau of Lourdes, a place in the most unhealthy situa- 
 tion, on the borders of the Pyrenean Mountains, a few leagues 
 from Bareges. I had left him a month ago, and came here 
 with the hopes of going home for a few weeks to see my 
 parents and my children. Some delay in obtaining my pass- 
 port made me renounce my journey, and I was just again 
 setting out to join Lord Elgin when this cruel and unex- 
 pected event was announced to me. I immediately applied 
 to M. de Talleyrand; and in consequence of his representa- 
 tions the First Consul has consented that Lord Elgin shall 
 be released and allowed to return to England on condition 
 that General Boyer shall be set at liberty and permitted to 
 return to France. That is to say, that one shall be exchanged 
 for the other. I cannot think it necessary, my Lord, to 
 excite your interest for us on this occasion by talking to you 
 of Lord Elgin's bad health, and consequently the risk he 
 runs in his present confinement. The dreadful anxiety of 
 my mind in my present situation would altogether overwhelm 
 me did not the hopes of the result of my application to you 
 bear me up. Lord Elgin's release now altogether depends 
 on his Majesty's giving his consent to this exchange ; there 
 seems no hope of an end to his sufferings or to mine if it 
 should be refused. But I am confident that our present 
 situation will excite his Majesty's compassion, and I am sure 
 
294 DECEMBER 1803. 
 
 that your Lordship's support will not be wanting to second 
 my wishes. I send my courier by Rotterdam ; he is to be 
 allowed to return by Morlaix. I beg most sincerely that he 
 may be sent off with an answer as soon as possible. May I 
 indulge the hopes that you are to announce the speedy return 
 of General Boyer to France with your authority to be ex- 
 changed for Lord Elgin ? The sincerest sentiments of grati- 
 tude will ever accompany the lasting obligation you will thus 
 confer on me. 
 
 I enclose a copy of Lord Elgin's arrestation. 
 
 Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesburt. 
 
 Friday mom. 
 
 My dear Lord, — I beg leave to enclose to your Lordship 
 a letter which I have received from Mr. Huber. Although 
 I place much greater confidence in the vigorous measures 
 which are now carrying into effect than any diplomatic 
 exertions, yet I cannot but think that such a correspondence 
 as Mr. Huber might establish would be highly interesting. 
 
 Paris, le 13 Aotit 1803. 
 
 II est vrai que la cour d'Espagne a refuse de fournir les 
 secours que la France demandait; mais aussi celle-ci vient 
 de faire demander a la cour de Madrid une reponse cate- 
 gorique en quinze jours — savoir, si elle veut fournir les secours 
 stipules par le traite d'alliance, on bien, comme un equivalent, 
 payer a la France quatre-vingts millions de livres par an. 
 De bonne part j'ai entendu que I'Espagne ne nie point 
 Tobligation qui lui est imposee par le traite, mais qu'elle 
 pretend que le traite lui donne le droit d'etre inform ee au 
 prealable des causes de la guerre et d'epuiser tons les moyens 
 de conciliation. II n'est point douteux que cet etat de choses 
 nous donne le tems qui nous manquoit ; mais quand je me 
 rappelle le passe, je ne compte pas plus sur la fermete de 
 I'Espagne que je n'attache de prix a son alliance. En 
 
EXCHANGE OF LORD ELGIN IMPOSSIBLE. 295 
 
 attendant M. Talleyrand, a peine arrive, m'a tout de suite in- 
 terpelle et demande la reponse, Je lui ai repondu evasivement 
 et sans le desabuser. J'ai expedie nn courrier, et vous pouvez 
 compter que je tdcherai de gagner le plus de terns quSl me sera 
 possible, De votre cote tachez d'obtenir des reponses bien 
 claires. Je vous le repete, les secours de I'Angleterre me 
 semblent trop conditionnels ; et si I'on ne vous fournit pas 
 ce qui est indispensable pour notre propre armee, ils sont in- 
 suffisans. 
 
 LoED Hawkesbury to Lady Elgin. 
 
 Downing Street, Dec. 23, 1803. 
 
 I have received the honour of your Ladyship's letter, 
 which I lost no time in laying before his Majesty. It would 
 have given his Majesty the most sincere satisfaction to have 
 contributed to the release of Lord Elgin by allowing his 
 exchange for General Boyer; but a sense of duty renders it 
 impossible for him in any way to admit or sanction the 
 principle of exchanging persons made prisoners according to 
 the acknowledged law of war against any of his own subjects 
 who have been detained in France, in violation of the law of 
 nations, and of the pledged faith of the French Government. 
 The account of the imprisonment of General Boyer was 
 wholly without foundation : that officer has never been in 
 confinement, but has been considered merely as a prisoner 
 of war on parole, and is at present residing at Chesterfield 
 in the enjoyment of as much liberty as is ever accorded to 
 prisoners in similar situations. I can assure your Ladyship 
 that it is with very deep regret that I find myself unable to 
 render you the assistance you desire. I should have felt the 
 greatest pleasure in contributing by any practicable means 
 to Lord Elgin's release, and to the deliverance of your 
 Ladyship and him from the very unpleasant situation in 
 which you have been placed by the arbitrary proceedings of 
 the French Government. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABB 
 
 Abbeville, a town in the north 
 of France, 262, 265 
 
 Aboukir, the ancient Canopus. 
 Nelson destroyed the French 
 fleet there August 1, 1798. 
 Bonaparte vanquished the Turks 
 July 24, 1799. Abercromby 
 fought the battle of Canopus 
 and took Aboukir March 7, 
 
 1801. 79 
 
 Addington (Henry, Viscount Sid- 
 mouth), 1755-1844. Speaker 
 1789, prime minister 1801-1804. 
 87 
 
 Alexandria in Egypt, in the occu- 
 pation of the French from 1798 
 to 1801. 16, 50, 61, 62, 72, 78, 
 79,93 
 
 Algiers. No serious attempt was 
 made to put down the piracy of 
 these tribes till the French ex- 
 pedition of 1830. 55, 56, 57, 72, 
 81, 102, 144 
 
 Almeida, Chevalier d', minister of 
 foreign affairs and of war in 
 Portugal. A quarrel having 
 arisen between him and Lannes, 
 minister of France at Lisbon, 
 Napoleon recalled Lannes and 
 ordered the court of Lisbon to 
 dismiss Almeida, August 18, 
 
 1802. Lannes was, however, sent 
 back again, January 12, 1803. 56 
 
 Alsop, Mr, 1 10 
 
 America, President of (Thomas 
 Jefferson), 1743-1826. President, 
 1801-1809. 87 
 
 Amiens, Treaty of, between Eng- 
 land on one side, and France, 
 Holland, and Spain on the other, 
 signed March 27, 1802. 10, 54, 
 61, 62, 65, 72, 73, 81, 82, 84, 93, 
 94,97,107,113,115,121,123,124, 
 127, 128, 146, 149, 154, 159, 162, 
 
 BAD 
 
 164, 165, 166, 168, 170,185, 187, 
 189, 196, 222,243, 250, 251, 252, 
 253, 258, 261, 289 ' 
 
 Ancona, a port on the east coast 
 of Italy, 17 
 
 Andreossy (Antoine Frahgois, 
 comte), 1761-1828. Under the 
 Empire ambassador in London, 
 Vienna, and Constantinople. 10, 
 14, 16, 62, 64, 83, 93, 95, 99, 
 101, 120, 121, 125, 129, 130,135, 
 140, 141, 144, 148, 151, 152, 153, 
 175, 195, 196, 201,230, 241, 242, 
 250, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 279 
 
 Anduaga, Chevalier, Portuguese 
 minister in London, 174 
 
 Antwerp on the Scheldt. The 
 French took it in 1792 and 
 1794. Napoleon wi shed to make 
 it a great war -port opposite the 
 Thames. 138 
 
 Arbuthnot (Mr. Charles), English 
 minister at Stockholm, 77 
 
 Arras, Bishop of, 79 
 
 Artois, Comte d', born at Versailles 
 October 9, 1757 ; died at Goritz 
 November 6, 1836. Married 
 Maria Theresa of Savoy 1773 ; 
 emigrated 1789 ; lived in Eng- 
 land after 1795 ; succeeded to 
 the throne of France as Charles 
 X. 1824; abdicated August 2, 
 1830. 38, 39 
 
 Azzara (Don Joseph Nicolas, 
 chevalier de), 1731-1804. Am- 
 bassador at Rome, and after- 
 wards at Paris ; distinguished in 
 letters and arts. 25, 41, 104, 
 116, 174 
 
 Baden, Margrave of (Karl Lud- 
 wig), 1755-1801 . The daughter 
 here mentioned was Wilhelmine 
 Louise, born September 10, 
 
298 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 BAD 
 
 1 788, who married on June 19, 
 1804, Ludwig II., the Grand- 
 Duke of Hesse Darmstadt. Her 
 two sisters had married Alex- 
 ander I. of Russia and Gustavus 
 IV. of Sweden. 31 
 
 Badini, conductor of the * Argus ' 
 newspaper, 96 
 
 Bdle, Treaty of, signed 1795 be- 
 tween Prussia and France. 290 
 
 Barbasaude, General, commanding 
 the garrison at Calais, 11 
 
 Bareges, in the district of Bigorre, 
 293 
 
 Barthelemy (Francois, marquis de) 
 1747-1830. Diplomatist; nephew 
 of Abbe Barthelemy ; negotiated 
 the treaties of Bale in 1792 ; 
 transported, but returned to 
 France after 18 Brumaire ; sen- 
 ator in 1800; attached to the 
 Emperor, but left him in ISli 
 and supported the Restoration. 
 23 
 
 Basilico, Foreign Office messenger, 
 70, 263, 264 
 
 Batavian Republic, the name given 
 to the United Provinces from 
 the flight of the Stadtholder 
 William IV. in May 1795 to the 
 accession of Louis Bonaparte in 
 June 5, 1806, 7, 8, 226 
 
 Bavaria, Elector of (Maximilian I. 
 Joseph), 1756-1825. Succeeded 
 as Elector February 16, 1799 ; 
 became King of Bavaria De- 
 cember 26, 1805. 45,75 
 
 Bayonne, a town in France on the 
 Adour, near the frontier of 
 Spain, 144 
 
 Beauvais, episcopal city in the 
 north of France, 11 
 
 Bedford, John, 6th duke of, 1766- 
 1839. Lord-Lieutenant of Ire- 
 land 1806-1807. 223 
 
 Berlin, the capital of Prussia, 41 
 
 Bernadotte (Jean Baptiste Jules), 
 1764-1844. King of Sweden under 
 the title of Charles John XIV. ; 
 married Mdlle. Clang, sister- 
 in-law of Joseph Bonaparte. He 
 left Napoleon in 1812 ; became 
 king in 1816, having been 
 elected as Crown Prince in 
 1810. 41, 174 
 
 Berthier (Alexandre), 1753-1815. 
 Prince of Wagrara and of 
 Neufchatel ; due de Valengin ; 
 served in America with La- 
 
 BOY 
 
 fayette ; chief of Bonaparte's 
 staff in Italy ; minister of war 
 after Brumaire 18 ; deserted 
 Napoleon at last ; thrown out 
 of a window at Bamberg. 133 
 
 Beurnonville (Pierre de Ruel 
 marquis de), 1752-1821. Fought 
 at Valmy and Jemappes. He 
 was now ambassador at Madrid. 
 He became marshal of France 
 in 1816. 41, 104 
 
 Bickerton, Sir Richard, English 
 admiral, 72 
 
 Bidon, Rear- Admiral, 72 
 
 Blanchot, M., 154, 155 
 
 Bonaparte (Joseph), 1768-1844. 
 Elder brother of Napoleon ; King 
 of Naples 1806 ; of Spain 1808 ; 
 lived in America, and in Eng- 
 land, 1832-1837; died at Flo- 
 rence. 22, 34, 100, 107, 132, 
 157, 166, 169, 173, 176, 178, 
 180. 184, 190, 194, 200, 201, 
 210, 211, 214, 228, 229, 230, 
 233, 236, 237, 238, 241, 242, 
 244, 246, 263, 265, 266 
 
 Bonaparte (Lucien, Prince of 
 Canino, younger brother of 
 Napoleon), 1775-1840. Dis- 
 graced after 1801 on account 
 of his marriage ; assisted his 
 brother in 18 15 ; died at Viterbo. 
 22, 77, 100 
 
 Bonaparte (Louis), 1778-1846. 
 Married Hortense Beauharnais 
 in 1802. King of Holland, May 
 24, 1806, abdicated July 1, 1810 ; 
 separated from his wife 1815 
 (father of Napoleon III.). 22, 71 
 
 Bordeaux, capital of Guienne ; 
 became French in 1453. 49 
 
 Boulogne, French port in the 
 English Channel, 12, 136, 179, 
 274 
 
 Bourmont (Louis Auguste Victor, 
 Comte de Ghaisne de) 1773- 
 1846. One of the heads of in- 
 surrection in La Vendue in 
 1799. Napoleon offered him 
 terms, but he refused, and was 
 imprisoned in the Temple and 
 in Besangon. He became a 
 marshal in 1830. 64 
 
 Boyer, General (Pierre Francois 
 Xavier, baron), 1772-1851. Aide- 
 de-camp to Kellerman ; served 
 Napoleon throughout his career ; 
 after 1815 retked to Egypt. 
 293, 294, 295 
 
INDEX. 
 
 299 
 
 BRA 
 
 Bradano or Brandano, a river of 
 
 South Italy flowing into the 
 
 Gulf of Tarentum, 2i3 
 Breda, a town in North Brabant, 
 
 144 
 Brest, a seaport on the west 
 
 coast of France, 34, 44, 55, 61, 
 
 187, 138, 144 
 Breteuil, on the Noye, a town on 
 
 the road between Paris and 
 
 Calais, 248 
 Brindisium (Brindisi), a seaport in 
 
 the Terra d'Otranto, 124 
 Brussels, 72 
 Bussy, Commander de, 20 
 
 Cadoudal, Georges, 1771-1804. 
 Supported the Eoyalist cause in 
 Brittany and La Vendee. He 
 was son of a peasant farmer 
 near Auray. He twice took 
 refuge in England. 64, 65, 79, 
 81 
 
 Calais (36 hours from Paris), 15, 
 114, 179, 208, 238, 240. 
 
 Gambaceres (Jean Jacques E^gis 
 de), 1753-1824. Member of the 
 Convention ; a trusted counsellor 
 of Napoleon ; second Consul ; 
 took great part in the Code 
 Civil; became Duke of Parma. 
 21,26 
 
 Candia, or Crete, Venetian from 
 1204 to 1669. Then taken by 
 the Turks. It belonged to the 
 Pacha of Egypt from 1833 to 
 1841. 166, 169 
 
 Cape of Good Hope discovered by 
 Vasco de Gama in 1497. Colo- 
 nised by the Dutch in 1652 ; 
 taken by the English in 1795 
 and 1806 ; secured to England 
 by the Treaty of Vienna. 146, 
 152 
 
 Caprara, Cardinal (Jean Baptiste), 
 1733-1810. Cardinal in 1792. 
 Legate in France in 1801 ; as- 
 sisted much in the Concordat ; , 
 crowned Napoleon King of Italy 
 at Milan in 1805. 20, 105 
 
 Chant eloup, a village four miles 
 from Amboise, famous for the 
 chateau of the Due de Choiseul, 
 which passed into the hands of 
 Chaptal, and was destroyed in 
 1823, 49 
 
 Chantilly was the country seat of 
 the Montmorency and theCond^ 
 
 COR 
 
 family. Joseph Bonaparte's 
 house, called Mortefontaine or 
 Morfontaine, belonged to Presi- 
 dent le Pelletier. 194 
 
 Chapelle, Marquis de la, 64, 65 
 
 Chaptal (Jean Antoine, comte de 
 Chanteloup), 1756-1832. A dis- 
 tinguished chemist ; minister of 
 the interior 1801-1804; peer of 
 France in 1819. 49 
 
 Cherbourg, a military port of 
 France opposite Portsmouth, 
 136, 191 
 
 Chesterfield, in Derbyshire, 295 
 
 Choiseul (Claude Antoine Gabriel, 
 due de), 1760-1838. Due et 
 pair in 1787 ; colonel of Koyal 
 Dragoons in 1789 ; concerned in 
 the flight to Varennes 1791 ; im- 
 prisoned, exiled, and recalled 
 by Bonaparte ; was made a peer 
 of France at the Restoration ; 
 was aide-de-camp to Louis 
 Philippe. 47, 49 
 
 Chouans (chat houant owl), a name 
 given to the peasants who sup- 
 ported the Royalist cause in 
 Anjou, Maine, Brittany, and a 
 part of Normandy. Their name 
 is derived from the nickname of 
 Jean Cottereau of Laval. They 
 are often confounded with the 
 Vendeans, but rather carried on 
 a guerilla warfare. 64 
 
 Clement de Ris (Dominique, 
 comte), 1750-1827. He was 
 seized by a number of Chouans 
 in Touraine and kept 19 days 
 prisoner under guard ; made 
 peer of France in 1814. 64 
 
 Cobenzl (John Philip, count), 1741- 
 1810. Negotiated the Treaty of 
 Teschen 1779; Austrian ambas- 
 sador at Paris 1801-1805. 28, 34, 
 52, 57, 58 
 
 Cockburn, Mr., 277 
 
 Colbert (Auguste Marie Francois, 
 comte de), 1777-1809. Aide-de- 
 camp to Napoleon ; killed in 
 Spain. 117,118,119 
 
 Cole (a servant), 282 
 
 Constantinople, 99 
 
 Corfu, the capital of the Ionian 
 Islands ; French from 1797 to 
 1799 and from 1807 to 1814; then 
 under British protection ; passed 
 to Greece in 1866. 166, 169 
 
 Cormon, Foreign Office messenger, 
 289 
 
300 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 COR 
 
 Corsica. Finally joined to France 
 in 1768 ; but it resisted, and was 
 only finally subdued just before 
 the birth of Napoleon in 1769. 
 61, 71, 212 
 
 Courvoisier, Foreign Office mes- 
 senger, 114 
 
 Craufurd (Mr. Quentin). Resided 
 much in Paris ; a friend of 
 Count Fersen and Marie An- 
 toinette. 276 
 
 Craufurd (Sir James, second 
 baronet, 1761-1839), 276, 276 
 
 Croker (Rt, Hon. John Wilson), 
 1780-1857. Secretary to the 
 Admiralty. 109 
 
 Czartorinski (Adam Georges Czar- 
 toryski), 1770-1861. Was sent 
 to Petersburg as a hostage in 
 1792. Paul I. made him ambas- 
 sador at Turin, and Alexander 
 I. minister of foreign affairs. 
 He was president of the Pro- 
 visional Government of Poland 
 in 1831 ; was banished, and 
 lived an exile in France. 36, 1 1 8 
 
 Dbcaen (Charles Matthieu Isidore, 
 comte), 1769-1832. General in 
 1800 ; was made captain-general 
 of the French East Indian es- 
 tablishments, 1803-1811. 45, 
 137 
 
 Desmunier (Jean Nicholas, comte 
 de). One of the four commis- 
 sioners appointed to treat with 
 the representatives of Switzer- 
 land. 23 
 
 Despard, Colonel, 136 
 
 Devereaux, Mr. An Irishman re- 
 commended by Lord Moira to 
 Lord Whit worth. 139 
 
 Dorset, Duchess of (Arabella 
 Diana), daughter of Sir Charles 
 Cope, Bart. ; married the Duke 
 of Dorset in 1790. He died in 
 1799. Her first husband had 
 been ambassador in France, 
 1783-1789. 26, 41, 275, 282, 292 
 
 Dorset, Duke of (George John 
 Frederick), 1793-1815. Son of 
 Lord Whitworth's wife; friend 
 of Lord Byron at Harrow. 139 
 
 Drake, Mr. Francis, English minis- 
 ter at Munich ; summarily ex- 
 pelled by Napoleon on the rup- 
 ture of the Peace of Amiens. 34 
 
 Drummond, Mr., 42 
 
 ELG 
 
 Dunkirk, after suffering various 
 fortunes, was purchased from 
 the English by Louis XIV. in 
 1662. From 1713 to 1783 the 
 port was closed by the Treaty of 
 Utrecht. 136, 142, 144, 254 
 
 Durand, M., chef de cabinet to 
 M. de Talleyrand, 233, 234, 240 
 
 Duroc(GeraudChristophe Michel), 
 1772-1813. Aide-de-camp to 
 Napoleon in Italy and Egypt ; 
 sent on missions to Berlin and 
 Petersburg ; Napoleon was much 
 attached to him. 117, 153, 
 156 
 
 Duteille, M., 79 
 
 Edgewoeth de Firmont (Henri 
 Allen, abbe de). An Irish priest 
 educated in France; confessor 
 to Princess Elizabeth ; accom- 
 panied Louis XVI. to the scaf- 
 fold ; followed the Comte de 
 Provence to Mittau. 51 
 
 — (Richard Lovell) 1744-1817. A 
 man of music and letters ; lived 
 a great deal in France ; was 
 father of Miss Edgeworth the 
 novelist. 51 
 
 Edim' ourgh. Charles X. was 
 living at Holyrood Palace, 65 
 
 Egypt, French designs on, 16, 18, 
 19, 29, 54-56, 58; Sebastiani's 
 report on, 67, 74, 79, 81, 84, 
 86, 87, 89, 93, 98, 99, 101, 102, 
 104, 107-109, 113, 122, 129, 159, 
 160 
 
 Eichstadt, a town in Bavaria; 
 formerly capital of an eccle- 
 siastical principality given to 
 Bavaria in 1805, and to Prince 
 Eugene Beauharnais in 1817. 
 34, 46, 76 
 
 Elba, an island of the Tuscan 
 archipelago. It belonged first 
 to Pisa, then to Piombino. Na- 
 poleon got possession of it in 
 1802, and joined it to Tuscany. 
 He became Emperor of it in 
 1814. It was given by the 
 Congress of Vienna to Tuscany. 
 46, 51, 59, 151 
 
 Elgin, Lord (Thomas, seventh 
 Earl of Elgin), 1766-1841. Am- 
 bassador at Constantinople, 
 having previously been at 
 Brussels and Berlin. Brought 
 the • Elgin Marbles ' to England. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 301 
 
 ELS 
 
 68, 196, 274, 277, 284, 293, 294, 
 295 
 
 Elsworth, Foreign Office messen- 
 ger, 97 
 
 Ernouf (Jean Auguste, baron), 
 1753-1 827. Sent to Guadeloupe 
 in 1803 ; in 1810 surrendered 
 to L' ird Cochrane, and was dis- 
 graced by the Emperor. 138 
 
 Etruria, kingdom of. An epheme- 
 ral state given to the Bourbons 
 of Parma by the Treaty of 
 Madrid, 1801. The King dying 
 in 1803, his widow, Marie 
 Louise, accepted for her son by 
 the French treaty of Fontaine- 
 bleau the kingdom of Lusitania, 
 while Etruria was divided into 
 three French departments. 28, 
 151, 198, 226, 232, 252 
 
 Floridas, North and South, form- 
 ing a province of North Ame- 
 rica. Discovered in 1512 on Palm 
 Sunday. Pasqua Florida, from 
 which it derives its name, ceded 
 to the English by Spain in 1763, 
 and restored in 1783 ; sur- 
 rendered to America in 1821. 
 28, 29, 37, 41, 60, 87, 128, 
 154 
 
 Flushing, a port at the mouth of 
 the Scheldt, 49, 98, 179 
 
 Fouche (Joseph, Due of Otranto) 
 1763-1820. Guilty of massacres 
 at Lyons ; minister of police, 
 1799-1802, 1804-1810. during 
 the Hundred Days, and for a 
 short time under the Kestora- 
 tion ; died vejry rich. 23, 133, 
 210,211,269, 270 
 
 Fox, General, 28 
 
 Francy, Commissaire de Marine 
 at Calais, 287 
 
 Frankfurt, Imperial town in Ger- 
 many, 23 
 
 Eraser, Colonel, Governor of 
 Goree, 154-156 
 
 Frere (John Hookham), English 
 representative in Spain from 
 1802-1809, 41 
 
 Gallo, Marquis de, Sicilian min- 
 ister to the Italian Republic, 
 24 
 
 Genoa, 54, 55, 61, 71, 72 
 
 Georges. See Cadoudal 
 
 HUN 
 
 Gibraltar, taken by the English in 
 1704; besieged in 1705, 1708, 
 and from 1779 to 1782. 168 
 
 Goldsmidt, editor of the ' Argus ' 
 newspaper, 96 
 
 Goree, an island two miles south 
 of Cape Verde ; port of the coast 
 of Senegambia ; colonised by the 
 Dutch in 1617; taken by Admiral 
 d'Estrier in 1677; ceded to Louis 
 XIV. by the Treaty of Nimeguen 
 1678. 154 
 
 Hague, Treaty of the (1795), 8 
 
 Hamburgh, one of the Hanse 
 Towns, 172, 173, 212 
 
 Hammond, Mr. George, under- 
 secretary for Foreign affairs, 
 15, 60, 139, 202 
 
 Hammond, Captain, 275, 276 
 
 Hanover, occupied by Prussia in 
 18Q1 ; seized by Napoleon in 
 1803, and ceded by him to 
 Prussia in 1806 ; taken again in 
 1807, and joined to the Kingdom 
 ofWestphalia ; independent in 
 1315 ; made into a kingdom by 
 the Congress of Vienna 1S15. 
 114,117,288,289 
 
 Havre, Le, important French port 
 on the Channel, founded by 
 Francis I. in 1557 and first 
 called Ville Frangoise, then 
 Havre de Grace, 228 
 
 Helvetian Republic, the name 
 given to the Swiss Confedera- 
 tion from 1798 to 1803, 7 
 
 Helvoetsluys, a military port in 
 Holland. It was taken by the 
 French in 1795. 114, 161, 169, 
 176 
 
 Hittorf, Major-General. Sent by 
 Emperor Alexander to Napoleon 
 with letter about the affairs of 
 Switzerland and Germany, with 
 a mission to examine into mili- 
 tary matters. 71 
 
 Hodgson, Rev, Mr., chaplain to 
 the Legation, 207, 281, 284, 286 
 
 Holland, affairs of, 49, 50, 55, 66 
 
 Huber, M. A Swiss, a friend of 
 Lord Auckland when at Paris, 
 and of the English generally; 
 one of the Commissaires de la 
 Tr^sorerie. 214, 242, 246, 263, 
 274, 292, 294 
 
 Hunter, Foreign Office messenger, 
 139 
 
302 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 ITA 
 
 Italian Republic. The Cis- 
 alpine republic founded in 1797 
 was reorganised by Austria at 
 the treaty of Campo-Formio ; it 
 was dissolved in 1799 ; re- 
 established after Marengo in 
 1802 ; No vara being added, it 
 was called the Italian Republic. 
 It consisted of 13 departments 
 with Milan for capital. In 1805 
 it became the kingdom of Italy.. 
 32, 151, 198, 226, 232 
 
 Jamaica, an island in the West 
 Indies taken by England from 
 the Spaniards in 1655, 24 
 
 Jenkinson, Lieutenant George, 
 140 
 
 Jersey, Island of, 65. 
 
 Josephine (Marie Josephine Rose 
 Tascher de la Pagerie), 1763- 
 1814. Born at Martinique ; mar- 
 ried the Vicomte de Beauhar- 
 nais in 1779 ; Napoleon, March 
 9, 1796; crowned December 2, 
 1804; divorced, December 16, 
 1809 ; died May 29, 1814. 22, 
 26, 32, 116, 117 
 
 Junot (Andoche), due d'Abrantes, 
 1771-1813. Secretary to Napo- 
 leon at the siege of Toulon, and 
 attached to him from that time 
 until 1812, when he was rebuked 
 by him. He killed himself in a 
 fit of madness. In 1 802 he was 
 military commandant of Paris. 
 274 
 
 King, Mr., 60, 174 
 
 La Cocarde, Trench frigate, 24 
 Lampedusa, a s^all island about 
 thirty miles iiv circumference 
 half way betwe^ Malta and 
 the coast of Turns; occupied 
 by Neapolitan government as a 
 prison in 1843. 171, 1^7, 178, 
 184, 185, 193, 198, 216,225,226, 
 230, 232, 237, 255, 257, 266, 270 
 Lannes (Jean, due de Mon- 
 tebello), 1769-1804. Son of a 
 groom ; much distinguished in 
 the campaigns of Italy, Egypt, 
 and Marengo ; died of wounds 
 received at Essling. 56, 58, 77, 
 104, 174 
 
 LOU 
 
 Lauderdale, Lord (James, eighth 
 Earl), 1759-1839, 139 
 
 Lauriston (Jacques Alexandre 
 Bernard Law, marquis de), 1768- 
 1821. Of Scotch extraction, the 
 same family as Law the finan- 
 cier ; was with Bonaparte at 
 the military school ; brought the 
 ratification of the Treaty of 
 Amiens to London 1802 ; com- 
 manded the rear-guard in the 
 retreat from Moscow; served 
 under the Government of the 
 Restoration. 195, 196, 200, 201 
 
 Laval (Anne Pierre Adrien de 
 Montmorency- Laval, due de). 
 Born 1769 ; served in the army 
 of Cond6 in 1792 ; returned to 
 France in 1801 ; remained all 
 h.is life a devoted Royalist. 49 
 
 Lebrun (Charles Francis, duke of 
 Plasentra), 1739-1824. Took 
 part in the 18 Brumaire. Third 
 Consul ; Lieutenant-General of 
 Holland. 21, 26 
 
 Leclerc (Victor Emmanuel), 1772- 
 1802. Served in Italy under 
 Napoleon ; married Pauline 
 Bonaparte at Milan in 1797; 
 commanded the expedition 
 against St. Domingo in 1801 ; 
 carried off Toussaint-l'Ouverture; 
 died of yellow fever in Tortola. 
 His widow married Prince Bor- 
 ghese. 43, 50 
 
 Leghorn, 72, 212 
 
 Lemoyne, M., 287 
 
 Ligurian Republic. Formed out of 
 the old Republic of Genoa in 
 1297 ; incorporated with France 
 in 1805; under the three depart- 
 ments of Genoa, Montesotte, and 
 the Apennines ; re-established in 
 1814; incorporated by the Con- 
 gress of Vienna with France in 
 1815. 32, 151, 198, 226, 232 
 
 Xille, capital of French Flanders, 
 23,72 
 
 Lima, M. de, Portuguese ambas- 
 sador at Paris, 55 
 
 Lisbon, 56, 58 
 
 Livingston, Mr., American minister 
 in Paris, 37, 60 ^— ^• 
 
 Loftus, Lord (John, viscount 
 Loftus, afterwards second mar- 
 quis^f Ely), 1770-1845. 139 
 
 Louisianar^-^rigi nally co mprised 
 nearly the whole— basin^- of Jhe 
 Mississippi. The part east of 
 
INDEX. 
 
 303 
 
 LOU 
 
 this river was ceded by Louis 
 XV. to England in 1763; the 
 part west in 1764 to Spain, to 
 compensate her for the loss of 
 Florida. In 1801 Spain ceded 
 Eastern Louisiana back to 
 France, and in 18G3 Napoleon 
 sold it to the United States for 
 eighty millions of francs. 25, 29, 
 46, 60, 87, 128, 137, 147 
 
 Lourdes, formerly capital of the 
 Lavedan en Bigorre; now a place 
 of pilgrimage. 293 
 
 Luchesini, (Jerome, marquis de), 
 1752-1125. Diplomatist, libra- 
 rian, and reader of Frederick 
 the Great, 1778-1786. Prussian 
 minister at Warsaw, 1 778 ; at 
 Paris after the Peace of Lune- 
 ville ; retired to France in 1807. 
 25, 191 
 
 Luneville, Treaty of, between 
 France and Austria, 1801,8,252, 
 290 
 
 Maclauein, M., physician to the 
 Legation, 207, 281, 284, 286 
 
 Malouet (Pierre Victor, baron), 
 1740-1814. As deputy to the 
 Constituante favoured constitu- 
 tional monarchy ; fled to London 
 in September 1792, and re- 
 turned 1801 ; died as minister of 
 marine under the first Restora- 
 tion. 210, 211, 214 
 
 Malta, Island of. Given to Knights 
 of St. John 1530; taken by 
 Bonaparte 1 798 ; and by the 
 English 1800, who kept it. 9, 
 10, 17, 19, 23, 28, 30, 40, 41, 50, 
 54, 61, 65, 67, 72, 74, 78, 79 82, 
 84, 85-87, 93, 94, 97, 98, 102 
 -104, 107, 108, no, 112, 113, 
 118-120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, 
 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 145, 149, 
 150, 151,157,160, 164, 165, 167, 
 168-170, 172-174, 176-178, 180, ' 
 182-184, 185, 187, 193, 197, 216, 
 217-219, 221, 224, 225, 232-2.37, 
 245, 246, 251-255, 257-261, 266, 
 270, 271,288 
 
 Malta, Order of, founded in the 
 eleventh century. It came to 
 an end when Bonaparte took the 
 island in 1798. 76, 123, 125, 151, 
 157, 168, 171, 193, 198, 219, 257 
 
 Mamelukes (= slaves), a body of 
 soldiers who dominated Egypt 
 
 MON 
 
 from the time of St. Louis 
 to the expedition of Napoleon. 
 
 ■ They were massacred by Me- 
 hemet Ali in 1811. 55 
 
 Mandeville, Mr., secretary of Le- 
 gation, 207, 233, 234, 237, 239, 
 242, 247, 248, 263, 269, 271, 274, 
 281, 282, 285, 286 
 
 Marcoff, Count, Russian ambassa- 
 dor in Paris, 12, 23, 28, 30, 31, 
 35, 36, 42, 46, 51, 59, 70, 71, 85, 
 88, 101, 108, 110, 116, 117, 118, 
 143, 157, 201, 204, 206,214, 223, 
 238, 264, 272 
 
 Maret (Hugues Bernard, due de 
 Bassano), 1763-1839. Diplomat 
 in 1792; prisoner 1793-1795; 
 served Napoleon faithfully ; peer 
 of France in 1831. 278 
 
 Mason, foreign office messenger, 
 110, 115 
 
 Massena (Andre), 1758-1817. 
 Served in Italy under Bonaparte, 
 fought at Zurich 1799, at Genoa 
 1800; marshal 1804; due de 
 Rivoli 1807 ; prince of Essling 
 1809 ; fought in Spain 1810-11. 
 87, 133, 212 
 
 Mengaud, General, commissary at 
 Calais, 11, 262, 275, 276, 281, 
 282 
 
 Merry, Mr., charge d'affaires at 
 Paris ; Lord Whitworth's prede- 
 cessor. 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 23, 
 32, 34, 48, 49, 53, 92, 97 
 
 Meudon, a few miles from Ver- 
 sailles, with a chateau built by 
 the Dauphin in 1695. 234, 265, 
 282 
 
 Middleton, Mr., 98 
 
 Minorca, taken by the English in 
 1708 ; retaken by the French in 
 1756 ; restored to the English in 
 1763, and taken by the French 
 in 1782. The English occupied 
 it from 1798 to 1802. 124 
 
 Moira, Lord, 1754-1827. First 
 marquis of Hastings ; was a 
 general commanding in Scot- 
 land ; governor- general of Ben- 
 gal 1812-23. 139 
 
 < Moniteur,' official French journal, 
 founded by Pancoucke, Novem- 
 ber 24, 1789 ; called ' Moniteur 
 Universel,' after January 1, 
 1811. 9 
 
 Monroe (Mr. James), 1759-1831. 
 Minister in Paris 1794 ; negoti- 
 ated the transfer of Louisiana 
 
304 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 MON 
 
 1803 ; president 1817-1824 ; 
 author of the * Monroe doc- 
 trine ' that foreign powers have 
 no right to intervene in Ame- 
 rica, 174 
 
 Monsieur, Comte de Provence, 
 afterwards Louis XVIII., 38 
 
 Montchoisi (Louis Antoine, baron 
 de). General of division ; served 
 under Dumouriez 1792-93 ; dis- 
 graced in 1801 ; restored in 
 1803. 138 
 
 Morea, the Peloponnesus. It was 
 conquered by the Turks 1463- 
 1479 ; retaken by the Venetians 
 1687-1716; fell again into the 
 hands of the Turks 1718; be- 
 came Greece after the War of 
 Independence, 1821-1828. 104 
 
 Moreau (Jean Victor), 176.3-1813. 
 Fought the battle of Hohen- 
 linden in 1800; compromised in 
 the plot of Cadoudal 1804. He 
 lived eight years in America, 
 returned to Europe 1813, and 
 was mortally wounded at the 
 battle of Dresden, 77, 191 
 
 Morfontaine, 265. See Chantilly 
 
 Morlaix in Brittany, 294 
 
 Murat, General (Joachim), 1771- 
 1815. Married Caroline Bona- 
 parte 1800; marshal 1800; Grand 
 Duke of Cleves and Berg 1806 ; 
 King of Naples 1808 ; shot at 
 Pizzo October 13. 1815. 107 
 
 Naples, King of (Ferdinand IV.), 
 1751-1825. King of Naples and 
 Sicily 1759-1825. 107, 124, 243, 
 246, 247 
 
 Nepean, Sir Evan. Under-Secre- 
 tary at the Foreign OflSce ; Lord- 
 Lieutenant of Ireland 1804. 109 
 
 Nimeguen, a town on the Rhine, 
 212 
 
 Opanto, the ancient Aufidus, in 
 South Italy, 243 
 
 Ostend, seaport in Belgium, 142 
 
 Otranto. Otranto, in the south of 
 Italy, gave the title of duke to 
 Fouch6. 237, 243, 245, 246, 247, 
 266, 270 
 
 Otto (Louis Guillaume, comte de 
 Mosloy), 1754-1817. A German 
 by birth ; in the French dip]o- 
 matic service under Louis XVI. 
 
 PIE 
 
 and Napoleon, in America, at 
 Berlin, London, Munich, and 
 Vienna. He negotiated the 
 marriage with Marie Louise. 41 
 
 Paget, Mr. (Sir Arthur), English 
 ambassador at Vienna, 58 
 
 Parma, Duchy of, from 1545 to 
 1802 and from 1815 to 1860; 
 ceded to France in 1802 ; it 
 became the department of the 
 Taro. 7, 28 
 
 Passau, on the Danube, at the 
 junction of the Inn and the 
 Hz ; formerly capital of a 
 bishopric, which was given (ex- 
 cept the town, which went to 
 Bavaria) to the Grand Duke of 
 Tuscany, but surrendered by 
 him to Bavaria in 1805. 34, 57 
 
 Passy, a village to the west of 
 Paris ; now a suburb. 5 1 
 
 Pau. formerly capital of Beam, 293 
 
 Paul, 1st Emperor of Russia 
 (1796-1801), son of Peter IIL ; 
 assassinated. 14, 36 
 
 Peace, Prince of the (Don Manuel 
 Godoy), 1767-1851. Became 
 Premier Minister after Oranda 
 in 1792. At the Treaty of 
 Bale received the title of Prince 
 of the Peace. During his later 
 career he was a mere tool of 
 Bonaparte. He followed the 
 Napoleons into exile, and had a 
 pension from Louis Philippe. 41 
 
 Pelham, Lord (Thomas), after- 
 wards Earl of Chichester, 1756- 
 1826. Home Secretary 1801 to 
 October 1803. 79 
 
 Peltier (Jean Gabriel), journalist, 
 as a refugee in London, pub- 
 lished 'L'Ambigu' 1800-1819, 
 attacking Bonaparte. He was 
 only slightly punished (defended 
 by Mackintosh). Returned to 
 France in 1815, and died 1825. 
 92,95 
 
 Perregaux, M., banker at Paris, 199 
 271 
 
 Petersburg, V., 70 
 
 Picardy, a province in the north 
 of France, 12 
 
 Piedmont, occupied by Joubert 
 1798 ; divided into French de- 
 partments 1802 ; restored to 
 House of Savoy 1804. 82, 252 
 
INDEX. 
 
 305 
 
 PIG 
 
 Pigaud, M., 287 
 
 Piombino, a small peninsula on 
 the west coast of Italy. Capital 
 of a principality given to Elisa 
 Bonaparte in 1805 ; joined to 
 Tuscany in 1815. 46, 59 
 
 Placentia (Piacenza; in French, 
 Plaisance), a duchy which gave 
 a title to Lebrun, and followed 
 the political fortunes of Parma, 
 28 
 
 Pondicherry, principal French 
 possession in India, 45 
 
 Porto Ferraio (Portus Ferraicus), 
 in the north of Elba. Bought by 
 Cosmo I., ruler of Tuscany, in 
 1537; the rest of the island 
 belonged to Spain, and after- 
 wards to Naples. 124 
 
 Power, English banker at Paris, 
 138 
 
 Presidi of Tuscany, a principality 
 forming part of Tuscany be- 
 tween the Ombrone and the 
 Koman frontier ; the capital was 
 Orbetello. It first belonged to 
 Sienna, then to Naples 1558- 
 1801 ; ceded by France to Tus- 
 cany, and then to the Kingdom 
 of Etruria, 134 
 
 Prussia, King of (Frederic William 
 III.), 1797-1840, 46, 76, 157, 217 
 
 Ratisbon (Kegensburg), on the 
 Danube. From 1663 to 1803 the 
 seat of the Imperial Diets; in 
 1803 made into a principality 
 for the Elector of Mainz, 
 Charles Dalberg ; annexed to 
 Bavaria in 1820. 76 
 
 Regnault (Michel Louis Etienne), 
 1762-1810; called De St. 
 Jean d'Angely because he 
 was returned by that consti- 
 tuency to the States-General 
 in 1789. He supported Bona- 
 parte on Brumaire 18, and 
 continued faithful to him ; was 
 exiled by the Bourbons, and 
 died at the moment of his 
 return in 1819. 158, 210, 211, 
 242, 244, 246, 247, 248 
 
 Regnier (Claude Ambroise, due 
 de Massa), 1736-1814. Deputy 
 of the States-General in 1789 ; 
 helped Napoleon on Brumaire 
 18 ; nominated Grand Juge in 
 1802, uniting the Home Office 
 
 with the headship of the police. 
 278 
 
 Reinhard (Charles Frederic, 
 comte), 1761-1837. A native of 
 Wiirtemberg ; a diplomatist ; 
 first employed by the Girond- 
 ists ; after 18 Brumaire was 
 minister in Switzerland, Saxony, 
 Moldavia, and Westphalia ; was 
 employed under the Restoration. 
 172, 179 
 
 Rimini, a town on the east coast 
 of Italy, 247 
 
 Rochambeau (Donatien-Marie- 
 Joseph de Vilmeur, vicomte de), 
 1750-1813. Son of the marshal ; 
 succeeded General Leclerc at 
 St. Domingo in 1802 ; prisoner 
 in England till 1811 ; killed at 
 Leipsic. 50 
 
 Rochefort, a port on the west 
 coast of France, 44 
 
 RcBderer (Pierre- Louis, comte), 
 1754-1835. Conseiller d'Etat 
 and senator, 1802. 23, 42 
 
 Roger, accompanied Decaen to 
 India, 137 
 
 RoUe, Baron de, 79 
 
 Rouen, the capital of Normandy, 1 1 
 
 Ruspoli, Prince, declines the situ- 
 ation of Grand Master of Malta, 
 10, 105 
 
 Russia, Emperor of (Alexander I., 
 1801-1825), 31, 36, 71, 86, 89, 
 108, 119, 144, 153, 157, 174, 
 181, 209, 217, 225, 234, 236, 
 279. 280 
 
 San Domingo, another name of 
 Haiti or Hispaniola ; it revolted 
 from France under Toussaint- 
 rOuverture after 1795. 13, 20, 
 29, 34, 43, 44, 46, 50, 55, 59, 61, 
 71,72, 81, 87, 108,201, 228,267, 
 268 
 
 Sardinia, King of (Victor Ema- 
 nuel I.). Born 1759 ; succeeded 
 June 4, 1802 ; received back 
 the dominions surrendered to 
 France by his father, Karl 
 Emanuel IV., 1814; abdicated 
 1821 ; died 1824. 35, 36, 46, 59, 
 144, 151, 178, 180, 183,198,212, 
 226, 232 
 
 Schimmelpenninck, M., Dutch 
 minister at Paris, 17, 138 
 
 Sebastiani (Francois Horace Bas- 
 tien, comte), marshal of France, 
 
306 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 bom at Ampugnano, near Bastia, 
 in Corsica, 1772-1851. Fought 
 in the campaign of Italy; assisted 
 Napoleon on 18 Bmmaire; fought 
 at Marengo; sent on a mission to 
 the East in 1802 ; made general 
 on his return; afterwards am- 
 bassador to Constantinople ; 
 held office under the Restoration, 
 and under Louis Philippe. 15, 
 16, 42, 46, 54, 57, 59, 62, 67, 74, 
 81, 84, 93, 118, 122, 150, 159, 
 180, 215 
 
 Set Suzanne (Gilbert Joseph 
 Martin Bruneteau, comte de), 
 1760-1830. Served in the army, 
 but retired early; senator 1804; 
 comte 1809; peer of France 
 1814. 137 
 
 Shaw, Foreign Office messenger, 
 18, 208, 241 
 
 Siennese, The, the territory of 
 Sienna; part of the Grand Duchy 
 of Tuscany joined to France in 
 1808 as the department of the 
 Ombrone. 35, 59, 184 
 
 Sierra Leone, on the coast of 
 Gainea, between Senegambia 
 and Liberia ; colonised by the 
 English m 1792. 155 
 
 Souza (Couttinho, chevalier de), 
 Portuguese ambassador at Paris, 
 55, 104 
 
 Spain, King of, Charles IV. (1748- 
 1819). Reigned from 1788 to 
 1808. 93,124,216 
 
 Spezzia, a seaport between Genoa 
 and Pisa, 38 
 
 Stahremberg, Count, Austrian am- 
 bassador to England. Expelled 
 from Paris. 17 
 
 Stockholm, capital of Sweden, 77 
 
 St. Quentin, M., 202 
 
 Stuart, General, 15, 59 
 
 Sturt, Mr. Charles, 281 
 
 Suchet (Louis Gabriel, due d'Al- 
 bufera), 1770-1826. Served in 
 the army of Italy ; fought at 
 Marengo ; served under Louis 
 in 1805 ; was especially distin- 
 guished in Spain, 1809-1812. 
 191 
 
 Sweden, King of (Gustavus IV. 
 Adolphus, 1778-1837). Abdi- 
 cated March 29, 1804. 31 
 
 Switzerland, affairs of, 36, 42, 66, 
 73, 82, 114 
 
 Sylvester, Foreign Office messen- 
 ger, 19, 223, 224, 230, 262, 263 
 
 TUS 
 
 Talbot, W., secretary of Legation, 
 14, 16, 21, 22, 132, 207, 234, 240, 
 242, 248, 263, 265, 270, 273-276, 
 281, 283, 284, 285, 286 
 
 Talleyrand, P6rigord (Charles 
 Maurice de. Prince of Bene- 
 ventum), 1754-1838. Minister of 
 Foreign Affairs. 12,13,15,19, 
 21, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 37, 38, 
 39, 40, 43, 52, 57, 58, 68, 69, 73- 
 75, 78, 81, 84, 86, 95-102, 111, 
 113, 121,125, 126, 129, 130, 132^ 
 134, 135, 138, 140-143, 145, 152, 
 153, 156, 157, 159-162, 164, 166, 
 167, 169-172, 178-180, 184, 186, 
 187, 190, 192, 193, 195-197, 
 199-204, 206, 207, 209, 211, 213, 
 215-219, 221-223, 225, 226, 229- 
 231, 233-236, 238, 239, 241, 242, 
 244, 261, 262, 265, 268, 271, 273- 
 276, 279, 282-291, 293, 295 
 
 Tamerlan, another name for Timur 
 the Tartar (1336-1405). Timur 
 leng = Timur the Lame. 269 
 
 Tarentum, a port in the south of 
 Italy. It gave a title, Due de 
 Tarente, to the French Marshal 
 Macdonald. 101, 115, 124, 243, 
 247, 266, 270 
 
 Teutonic Order,f ounded by Frederic 
 of Swabiain 1190. Its property 
 was secularised in 1525. It was 
 suppressed by Napoleon in 1809. 
 76 
 
 Thornton, English banker at Paris, 
 138 
 
 Tommasi, Bailli of Cortona. 
 Nominated Grand Master of 
 Malta by the Pope. 105, 106 
 
 Toulon, the principal war-port of 
 France on the Mediterranean, 
 17, 44, 55, 166 
 
 Toussaint-l'Ouverture (Francois 
 Dominique), 1743-1803. Leader 
 of the insurrection in St. Do- 
 mingo ; was taken prisoner by the 
 French ; died a prisoner at the 
 Fort de Joux. 50 
 
 Turkey, partitions of, 71, 80, 86, 
 90, 94, 99, 101, 104, 105, 108, 
 118, 123 
 
 Turks, defeat of, 54 
 
 Tuscany, Grand Duke of (Ferdi- 
 nand III., 1 769-1824). Received 
 at the Peace of Luneville Salz- 
 burg and Wurzburgin exchange 
 for Tuscany ; was restored in 
 1814 and reigned till his death. 
 28, 34, 46 
 
INDEX, 
 
 307 
 
 VAL 
 
 Valais. Became an independent 
 republic in 1801 ; from 1810 to 
 1814 formed part of France in 
 the department of the Simplon ; 
 since that time has been a 
 canton of Switzerland 34 
 
 Van der Goes, secretary of state in 
 Holland, 26 
 
 Verona, a town in N. Italy, on 
 the Adige, 144, 243 
 
 Vick, Foreign Office messenger, 30 
 
 Vienna, 57 
 
 Vos van Steenvich, Batavian am- 
 bassador at Paris, 25 
 
 Waqstaff, Foreign Office messen- 
 ger, 156, 160 
 
 Warren (Admiral Sir John Borlase), 
 1754-1822. English minister at 
 St. Petersburg, 1802-1804. IIT 
 
 YAR 
 
 Warsaw, capital of Poland, 38 
 
 Wilson, Major, 160 
 
 Winter (Jean Guillaume de), Dutch 
 Admiral, 1750-1812. Beaten by 
 Admiral Duncan at Camper- 
 down, 1797. As an officer of 
 the Batavian Republic he was 
 now under the orders of France. 
 61 
 
 Woronzow, Count, Russian ambas- 
 sador at Paris, 23, 24, 28, 31, 33, 
 35, 88, 103, 110, 118, 140, 143 
 
 Wright, Captain. Had been pri- 
 soner in France, but escaped. 131 
 
 Yarmouth, (Lord Francis 
 Charles). Afterwards became 
 third Marquis of Hertford. 
 Died 1842. 276 
 
 PRINTED BY 
 
 BPOTTISWOODB AND CO., NEW-BTREET SQUABB 
 
 LONDON 
 
OF 
 
 THE OBJECTS 
 
 OF THE 
 
 THE ' Historical Society' was established in 1868, 
 and was authorised in 1872, by the permission of 
 Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, to use the title — 
 'EoYAL Historical Society.' 
 The principal objects of the Society are : — 
 
 I. To promote and foster the study of History on 
 general scientific principles. 
 
 n. To encourage researches on important special 
 historical facts concerning Great Britain and other 
 countries. 
 
 in. To assist in the publication of rare and valuable 
 State papers, or any other documents throwing light on 
 the customs, manners, and mode of life of different nations. 
 
 ly. To publish translations of standard historical 
 works. 
 
 V. To hold monthly meetings, for the reading and 
 discussion of papers on historical subjects. 
 
 YI. To publish a selection of the papers read. The 
 New Series of the publications of the Eoyal Historical 
 Society is issued in Quarterly Parts, containing 
 papers by the Fellows, and Bibliographical Notices 
 of the more important English and foreign historical 
 
 publications. [Continued on next page. 
 
 y 
 
VII. To grant from time to time prizes for Historical 
 
 Essays. 
 
 The Monthly Meetings are held in the Society's 
 Eooms, 11 Chandos Street, Cavendish Square, W., at 
 8.30 o'clock P.M., on the third Thursday of each month, 
 from November to June inclusive. 
 
 A branch of the Society has been established at Cam- 
 bridge, under the presidency of Professor J. E. Seeley, 
 Y.P.E.Hist.S. Several Meetings are held during the 
 Session. 
 
 The Subscription to the Society is Two Guineas per 
 annum, and is payable to the Treasurer on the first day 
 of the Session, viz. 1st of November. There is at present 
 no Entrance Fee. 
 
 Nomination Forms and any further information will 
 be furnished on apphcation to the Secretary, 
 
 P. EDWAED DOVE, 
 
 11 Chandos Street, 
 
 Cavendish Square, W. 
 
 Or to the Honorary Local Secretaries : 
 At Cambridge^ 
 
 A. E. EoPES, M.A., F.E.Hist.S. 
 
 King's College, Cambridge. 
 At Nottingham^ 
 
 J. Potter Briscoe, F.E.Hist.S., 
 
 Central Free Library, Nottingham. 
 
 1st October, 1887. 
 
^opal J>i5toricaI ^ocicfg. 
 
 OFFICERS AND COUNCIL-OCTOBER 188T. 
 
 ^vesibent. 
 THE LOED ABEEDAEE, G.C.B., F.E.S. 
 
 ^icc-^xesibents . 
 
 The Loed Acton. 
 
 Hyde Clarke. 
 
 C. A. Fyffe, M.A., 
 
 Vice-Chair man. 
 James Heywood, F.E.S. 
 W. E. H. Lecky, M.A. 
 
 Sir John Lubbock, Bart., 
 
 M.P., D.C.L. 
 Professor Max Muller, 
 
 LL.D. 
 Professor J. E. Seeley, 
 
 M.A., LL.D. 
 
 Oscar Browning, M.A., 
 
 Chairman. 
 Bernard Bosanquet, M.A. 
 Eev. J. Franck Bright, D.D. 
 Professor M. Creighton, 
 
 M.A., LL.D. 
 Eev. W. Cunningham, B.D. 
 J. Baker Greene,M.B.,LL.B. 
 Hubert Hall, F.S.A. 
 Henry H. Howorth, F.S.A. 
 George Hurst, J.P. 
 
 §onncil. 
 
 Colonel E. Cecil Johnson, 
 
 M.A.L 
 H. E. Malden, M.A. 
 Colonel G. B. Malleson, 
 
 C.S.I. 
 Tito Pagliardini. 
 
 F. K. J. Shenton. 
 
 Eev. Eobinson Thornton, 
 D.D. 
 
 G. G. Zerfpi, Ph.D., F.E.S.L. 
 
 '§xcasnvcr. 
 
 William Herbage, F.S.S., London and South-WesternBank, 
 
 7 Fenchurch Street, London, E.C. 
 
 fSlxhtaxian. 
 W. E. Poole, 11 Chandos Street, Cavendish Square, W. 
 
 P. Edward Dove, F.E.A.S., 23 Old Buildings, Lincoln's 
 
 Inn, W.C. 
 
 §ambxibqe ^xanc^—§ommiitee. 
 
 Professor J. E. Seeley, M.A. (Caius), Chairman. 
 Oscar Browning, M.A. (King's), Vice-Chairman. 
 Eev. W. Cunningham, B.D. (Trinity). 
 A. E. EoPESj M.A. (King's), Honorary Secretary. 
 
EOYAL HISTOEICAL SOCIETY. 
 
 , ©onteebag Commtmotaiion^ 
 
 1086 A.D.— 1886 A.D. 
 
 DOMESDAY STUDIES: 
 
 Being the Papers read at the Meetings of the Domesday 
 Commemoration, with a BibUography of Domesday Book 
 and Accounts of the MSS. and Printed Books exhibited at 
 the Pubhc Eecord Office and at the British Museum. 
 In Two Parts, containing upwards of 550 pp. 4to. 
 Part L will be issued in October 1887. 
 
 The Book: Contents: 
 
 The Official Custody of Domesday Book. By 
 
 HuJBERT Hall, E.E.Hist.S. 
 Materials for Ee-editing Domesday Book. By W. 
 
 DE Gray Birch, F.S.A. 
 An Early Eeference to Domesday Book. By J. 
 
 Horace Eoufd. 
 
 The Land : 
 
 The Study of Domesday Book. By Stuart Moore, 
 F.S.A. 
 
 The Turkish Survey of Hungary, and its Eelation 
 TO Domesday Book: a Study in Comparative 
 History. By Hyde Clarke, Y.P.E.Hist.S. 
 
 Domesday Survivals. By the Eev. Canon Isaac 
 Taylor, D.Litt. 
 
 A New View of the Geldable Unit of Assessment of 
 Domesday ; embracing the divisions of the Libra 
 or Pound of Silver and the Weights and Measures 
 of Uncoined Metal, Flour, Cloth, &c., as made by 
 the Angli, Mercians, Danes, Normans, and Celts, 
 and their connexion with the true understanding 
 of the words ' Hida,' ' Carucata,' ' Virgata,' ' Yil- 
 lanus,' ' Anglicus numerus,' &c. By 0. C. Pell. 
 
 Notes on Domesday Measures of Land. By J. 
 Horace Pound. ^^^•^^.^^^, ^^ ^^^, ^^^^ 
 
5 
 
 The Land — continued : 
 
 Domesday Land Measures : the Plough and the Plough- 
 land. By the Eev. Canon Isaac Taylor, D.Litt. 
 
 Wapentakes and Hundreds. By the Eev. Canon 
 Isaac Taylor, D.Litt. 
 
 Danegeld and the Finance of Domesday. By J. 
 Horace Pound. 
 
 Note on the Order of Domesday Book. By Hyde 
 Clarke, Y.P.E.Hist.S. 
 
 The Scope op Local Elucidation op the Domesday 
 Survey. By Frederick E. Sawyer, F.S.A. 
 
 The Domesday Survey of Surrey. By H. E. Malden, 
 F.E.Hist.S. 
 
 An Alleged Error in Domesday Book with regard to 
 Ancient Demesne. By Sir Henry Barkly, K.C.B. 
 
 The Church: 
 
 The Church in Domesday Book, with Especial 
 Eeference to the Endowments of the Dioceses. 
 By James Parker, M.A. 
 Parish Churches omitted in the Survey. By 
 Herbert J. Eeid, F.E.Hist.S. 
 Bibliography of Domesday Book. 
 
 Notes on the MSS. exhibited at the Public Eecord Office. 
 Notes on the MSS. exhibited at the British Museum. 
 Notes on the Printed Books exhibited at the British 
 Museum. 
 
 The price to Subscribers is One Guinea. 
 
 The price will be raised after publication. 
 
 The number of copies printed will be strictly limited. 
 
 Subscriptions should be sent to the Treasurer, 
 
 W. HEEBAGE, Esq., 
 
 7 Fenchurch Street, E.G. 
 Or to the Honorary Secretary, 
 
 P. EDWAED DOVE, 
 
 23 Old Buildings, Lincoln's Inn. 
 
^ogal ^x^torical ^octcfg 
 
 DOMESDAY COMMEMOKATION COMMITTEE. 
 
 The Lord Aberdare, G.C.B., President R.Hist.S., Chairman. 
 
 The Minister of the United States. 
 
 The Master of the Ex)lls. 
 
 The Lord Justice Fry. • 
 
 The Right Hon. the Lord Mayor of London. 
 
 Alderman Sir John Staples, K.C.M.G., F.S.A. 
 
 The Dean of Westminster. 
 
 G. H. Blakesley. 
 
 Edw. a. Bond, LL.D., Principal Librarian, British Museum. 
 
 Rev. J. France Bright, D.D., F.R.Hist.S., Master of University 
 
 College, Oxford. 
 Oscar Browning, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 Robert Campbell. 
 Hyde Clarke, Y.P.R.Hist.S. 
 
 Rev. Professor Mandell Creighton, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 Rev. W. Cunningham, B.D., F.R.Hist.S. 
 Charles I. Elton, Q.C, M.P., F.S.A. 
 C. A. Fyffe, M.A., Y.P.R.Hist.S. 
 Hubert Hall, F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 
 Richard R. Holmes, F.S.A., Royal Library, Windsor Castle. 
 W. A. Lindsay, M.A., Portcullis Pursuivant of Arms. 
 H. G. Maxwell Lyte, M.A., F.S.A., Deputy-Keeper of the Public 
 
 R,ecords 
 F. W. Maitland, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 F. Mad AN, M.A., Sub-Librarian of the Bodleian Library, 
 H. S. MiLMAN, Director of the Society of Antiquaries. 
 Professor F. Pollock, M.A., LL.D. 
 Herbert J. Reid, F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 Frederick E. Sawyer, F.S.A. 
 Walford D. Selby, 
 
 Canon Isaac Taylor, M.A., LL.D., Litt.D. 
 E. Walford, M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 H. B. Wheatley, F.S.A. 
 
 Pelcgafcs of Societies. 
 
 delegate. appointed by 
 
 A. Staveley Hill, Q.C, D.C.L. ... Masters of the Bench of the 
 
 Inner Temple. 
 
 John Westlake, Q.C. ... ... Masters of the Bench of Lin- 
 
 coln's Inn. 
 
 [Continued on next page. 
 
pcIcgafCS of gociefies— continued 
 DELEGATE. 
 
 J. B. Sheppard, LL.D. 
 
 F. J. Baigent ... 
 
 C. C. A. GoscH, Royal Danish Legation 
 
 P. Edward Dove 
 
 JosiAH Pierce 
 
 The Minister of the United States 
 George W. Marshall, LL.D., F.S.A. 
 Augustus T. Perkins, M.A. 
 Rev. Samuel M. Hamill, D.D. 
 
 Stephen Wickes, M.D 
 
 Geo. Stewart, Jr., D.C.L., F.R.G.S. 
 
 appointed by 
 Dean and Chapter of Canter- 
 bury. 
 
 Dean and Chapter of Win- 
 chester. 
 Royal Society of Northern An- 
 tiquities, Copenhagen. 
 Historical Society of Austral- 
 asia. 
 Maine Historical Society, Port- 
 land, Maine. 
 Maryland Historical Society. 
 ) Historic Genealogical Society of 
 I New England, Boston, Mass. 
 
 New Jersey Historical Society. 
 
 Literary and Historical Society 
 of Quebec. 
 
 Charles Trice Martin, B.A., F.S.A. ) g . ^f a ^.tiauaries 
 Stuart Archibald Moore, F.S.A.... j ^^^'^^^ ""^ Antiquaries. 
 Joseph Clarke, F.S.A. 
 
 Royal Institute of British Archi- 
 tects. 
 
 The Lord Arthur Russell 
 Sir Frederick Pollock, Bart. 
 J. Bain, F.S.A. Scot. 
 C. H. E. Carmichael, M.A. 
 "Walter de Gray Birch, F.S.A. 
 E. LoFTUS Brock, F.S.A. ... 
 S. Wayland Kershaw, F.S.A. 
 
 Robert Giffen, LL.D. 
 
 Sir Rawson W. Rawson, K.C.M.G. 
 
 Charles J. Shoppee, F.R.I.B.A. ... 
 
 John W. Standerwick 
 
 Rev. W. H. Milman,M.A., F.R.Hist.S. 
 
 George Hurst, J.P., F.R.Hist.S. ... 
 
 Rev. E. J. Barry, M.A 
 
 Sir Henry Barkly, K.C.B. 
 
 John Parker, F.S.A. 
 
 " ■ [ Royal Institution. 
 
 Rev. G. Browne, B.D. 
 
 O. C. Pell 
 
 Rev. Professor W. W. 
 R. S. Ferguson, F.S.A. 
 
 Sir J. B. Phear 
 
 Skeat, M.A. 
 
 Royal Arcbseological Institute. 
 Royal Society of Literature. 
 
 British Archaeological Society. 
 
 St. Paul's Ecclesiological So- 
 ciety. 
 
 Statistical Society. 
 
 Surveyors' Institute. 
 
 Wyclif Society. 
 
 The President and Fellows of 
 Sion College. 
 
 Bedford General Library Com- 
 pany. 
 
 Beverley Antiquarian Society. 
 
 Bristol and Gloucestershire 
 Archaeological Society. 
 
 Buckinghamshire Archaeologi- 
 cal Society. 
 
 Cambridge Antiquarian Society. 
 
 Cambridge Philological Society. 
 
 Cumberland and Westmoreland 
 Antiquarian and Archaeologi- 
 cal Society. 
 
 Devonshire Association. 
 
 [Continued on next page. 
 
8 
 
 pdcgafes of ^octettes— continued. 
 DELEGATE. APPOINTED BY 
 
 G. Alan Lowndes ) ^ a t. i • i c. • , 
 
 J. Horace Eound, M.A j ^««®^ Archaeological Society. 
 
 Professor Yeitch, M.A., LL.D. ... \ 
 
 J. Dalrymple Duncan, F.S.A. Scot. [ Glasgow Archaeological Society 
 
 W. G. Black, F.S.A. Scot. ... ) ^ j 
 
 Thos. W. Shore Hampshire Field Club. 
 
 Arthur W. Moore, M.A Isle of Mann Antiquarian 
 
 Society. 
 
 H. G. Keene, CLE I q a^' t • • t 
 
 H. Marrett Godfrey J ^^^^^^^ Jersiaise, Jersey. 
 
 Geo. Esdaile ... ... ... Lancashire and Cheshire Anti- 
 
 quarian Society. 
 
 W. Kelly, F.S.A., F.R.Hist.S. ... Leicester Literary and Philo- 
 sophical Society. 
 
 The Lord Bishop of Nottingham... Lincoln Diocesan Architectural 
 
 Society. 
 
 James Rutland Maidenhead and Thames Yalley 
 
 Antiquarian Society. 
 
 T. HoDGKiN, LL.D Newcastle-upon-Tyne Society of 
 
 Antiquaries. 
 
 The Dean of Norwich ] Norfolk and Norwich Archaeo- 
 
 Rev. C. B. Manning, M.A. F.S.A. ... J logical Society. 
 
 Christopher A. Markham Architectural Society for the 
 
 Archdeaconries of North- 
 ampton and Oakham. 
 
 R. B. TuRTON North Riding Record Society. 
 
 James Parker, M.A. \ Oxford Architectural and His- 
 
 Professor Westwood, M.A., F.L.S. j torical Society. 
 
 Rev. j. Griffith, LL.D St. Albans Archaeological Soc. 
 
 J. H. Phillips ... ... ... "I Scarborough Archaeological So- 
 
 J. W. WooDALL, F.G.S j ciety. 
 
 Stanley Leighton, M.P Shropshire Archaeological Soc. 
 
 Rev. j. a. Bennett, M.A., F.S.A.... ] Somersetshire Archaeological 
 
 Rev. Wm. Hunt ... ... ... ) Society. 
 
 The Lord John Hervey ... ...) « is»n t x-x j. r a t. ^ 
 
 Rev. C.H. Evelyn-White, F.R.Hist.S. | Suffolk Institute of Archaeology. 
 
 Rev. Prebendary Campion Sussex Archaeological Society. 
 
 The Dean of Lichfield ... ... \ ^r-M- a ij. k t. ^ • ^ a 
 
 Rev. Ernald Lane William Salt Arch^ological So- 
 
 T. J. Mazzinghi, M.A., F.S.A. ... J '"^^^' ^*^^°''^- 
 
 W. Paley Baildon... ... ... Yorkshire Archaeological Assoc. 
 
 treasurer. 
 
 W. Herbage, F.S.S., Treas. R.Hist.S., London & South- Western Bank, 
 7 Fenchurch Street, E.C. 
 
 c^ottorarp §ccxetaxvi. 
 
 P. Edward Dove, F.R.A.S., 23 Old Buildings, Lincoln's Inn, 
 London, W.C. * 
 
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