LESSONS OF WAR X AS TAUGHT AND OTHERS; FKOM THE VARIOUS OPERATIONS OF WAR. BY FRANCE JAMES SOADY, LIEUT. -COLONEL, E.A. VJE VICTIS ! LONDON: WM. H. ALLEN & CO., 13, WATERLOO PLACE, S.W. PUBLISHERS TO THE INDIA OFFICE. 1870. [ The Bight of Translation is Reserved. ] Stack Annex 5 OAO PREFACE. MILITARY literature embraces so extensive a range of sub- jects, and in many cases, is so burdened by technical and uninteresting detail, as to require even of the professional 'reader, much time, patience, and thought, ere its real gist is seen, and a proper conception of facts arrived at. In the valuable and voluminous works of Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Napier, Hamley, Chesney, &c., and other noted military writers, the greater operations of war are illustrated and diffused ; while a knowledge of the minor operations may be also gleaned from numerous professional works. Such works, however, are in many cases unattain- able, through the impracticability of having always at hand a library of reference. It has often occurred to me, that no work exists of con- venient size and condensed into reasonable limits, amply treating on the various subjects embraced by both these branches of the Art of War. To make selections from some of the most important military works, and arrange them in a lucid manner, has been the object aimed at in this publication. iv PREFACE. While consulting authorities and writers, I have adhered as a rule to the actual text, and have endeavoured to show briefly the leading principles, -by which the campaigns of Great Commanders have been governed. Pretending to no merits of composition or originality, I have merely attempted by the aid of such an analysis to place in an intelligible form, the materials obtained. These it is hoped may be found adapted and sufficiently comprehensive, for the general requirements of each Arm. To the general reader, seeking some knowledge of the Science and Art of War, a summary brought together within a convenient compass, may be acceptable. Where authorities have differed, those views have been preferred, which appeared to be most in accordance with the best received ideas of the present time ; although on some important points, the separate opinions held have been given. The indulgence of the reader is solicited to imperfections and short comings, which may be descried ; the labour of the task and the continued attention needed in its accomplish- ment, having been considerable. A list of the various Works and Authors consulted, is appended : should some have been at times, too deeply drawn upon, their acknowledged merits and attractions must be pleaded in extenuation. F. J. S. CONTENTS. PAET I. INTRODUCTORY. CHAPTER I. SECTION I. PAB - VAOE WAR AND ITS PROGRESS 1_8 1. Six distinct parts of the Art of War - ... 1 Knowledge of all the parts, for a General or Staff Officer. 2. Frequent applications and an observant mind necessary - 1 3. Organizing an army, withoiit an establishment or military system - - 2 4. Wars of opinion, national and civil -2 Their fearful nature. In national wars, the country should be occupied. 5. Study of the Peninsula war - - - - 2 G. General principles, for conduct of armies - . 2 7. The greatest mind incapable of embracing all combinations - - 3 The greatest generals commit blunders. Napoleon's foresight. 8. Turenne, as to the liability of generals to mistakes ... 3 9. Progress of the art of War - ... 3 Disorders amongst troops, in the 18th Century. Advancement of the art, under Frederick the Great. 10. The Prussian system copied . 4 11. Progress of tactics, in the British army .' 4 Regular system adopted throughout. Improvements in artillery, by Sir William Cougreve. 12. Field artillery, in the time of Charles I. - - 5 13. First example of combined operations, by the Archduke Charles - - 5 14. True school of instruction for generals - - 5 15. Preparation for war - - 6 16. Changes in warfare, foreseen by Prussia - - G 17. Education of armies - 6 18. Utilising camps of instruction ... .7 yi CONTENTS. PAR. 19. Cultivation of a military spirit in nations - The grandeur and fall of the Roman Empire. The wealth of the tax-gatherer and gambler, standing high in public estimation. SECTION II. THE COMMAND OP ARMIES - 8-19 1. Marshal Saint Cyr's conversation with Napoleon - 8 Napoleon's statement, as to learning the art of war. Napoleon's first campaign, considered as his clitf d'ceuvre. 2. Turenne's opinion as to learning the art of war - - 9 Napoleon's officers, not having time to acquire the knowledge. Inspiration in war. 3. Mastering strategical combinations, and tactical handling of troops - 10 4. Dissimilarity in qualifications, as a strategist and tactician - 10 5. Experience and study of strategy - ... H 6. Formation of a great commander ...... 11 7. A campaign, the exemplification of some general theory - 1 1 Study the first condition of practical success. 8. First qualification for a general-in-chief - 12 9. The morale of war, for the general ... 13 Discipline and organization. 10. The command-in-chief, and subordinate commands - 13 11. The greatest generals, possessed the highest intellect - - 13 12. Essential qualities for a general - - - - 13 Long experience, or as an officer of the staff. 13. Character needed for a great general ..... 15 14. The aid of experience requisite for war - - - - - 15 15. Reputation of the Archduke Charles, formed by study ... 15 Study of strategy, might be confined to recent wars. 16. Knowledge of the features of the country, and of the field of operations - 15 17. Wellington's practice of daily study ..... 16 18. His steady observance of rules ...... 16 19. Napoleon's exhortation for acquiring the secret of the art of war 16 20. A General experienced, but unversed in strategy - - - - 17 21. Undivided command of an army ...... 17 22. The command in one individual, the first security for success - - 17 23. Jomini as to prejudices respecting the principles of war - - 18 24. Sphere of strategy, will be more enlarged and bolder - - - 18 25. Responsibility of a General-in-chief, when the operations are distant - 18 26. Vital questions of war, to States - ... 19 Proper understanding between a Minister and General-in-chief. CONTENTS. VH SECTION III. PAR. PAGE COUNCILS OF WAK- 19-22 1. Councils of war, how they terminate ... - 19 2. Opinion of Prince Eugene and Marshal Villars, as to them - - 20 Consulting generals of experience. 3. Certain arrangements depend on the general - 20 4. Councils when concurring with the Commander - - - - 20 Organizing the staff, in default of a general. Blucher aided by an efficient staff. 5. A good strategist, as chief of the staff ..... 21 6. Qualities which a general should possess - - - - 21 Council seldom summoned by Napoleon. 7. Some personal qualities of a great general ----- 21 Marlborough's secrecy. 8. Importance of secrecy of plans ...... 22 Secrecy in Frederick's time. Vlll PAKT II. STRATEGY. CHAPTER I. SECTION I. PAGE *' AIM AND PRINCIPLES - OQ 1. The art of strategy - QO 2. Its double purpose 3. Distinction between strategy and tactics 4. An example of the science, by Turenne 5. What strategy teaches ...- 6. The genius of Napoleon for strategy 7. Certain principles should govern all wars 8. Knowledge of political matters and Military Geography 9. Strategy past and present Theatre should be limited. 10. What is requisite in the plan of a campaign 11. Strategy and tactics, when not in concord 12. Strategical points - SECTION II. BASE OF OPERATIONS - 26-33 1. Connection of an army with its base ------ 26 2. Base, usually for supply ..... 26 3. Its relation to dep6ts of supplies - .... 27 4. A frontier when suitable as a base, or a line of defence ... 27 Direction of bases. On a broad and rapid river. An extended base. 5. Fortified points and an extended base .... 28 6. Its proportion to its distance from the objective - - 28 7. Lateral extent of base - ...... 28 Advantage of the extent of Federal base. Maritime powers based on harbours. Depots behind the flanks. CONTENTS. IX PAR. PAGE 8. Advantageous direction of bases - - 29" Influence of the configuration of the theatre of war. French armies in Westphalia, from 1757 to 1762. Napoleon on the Saale, in 1806. Art of selecting lines of operations. Bohemia as a base in 1813. Perpendicular base of the Russians, in 1813. Napoleon in 1806, with the double base of the Rhine. Change of strategic front, in default of a double base. Bases on the sea coast. . Wellington's base at Lisbon. Principles in establishing a base, by a continental power and by an insular and naval power. Russian and Turkish war of 1828 and 1829. 10. Maritime power selecting a base on a coast frontier 33 SECTION III. DECISIVE POINTS - 34-36 ' 1. Decisive points of the theatre of war ... 34 2. When strategical points are fortified, in preference to the capital 34 3. Accidental points of manoeuvre - - 34 Mack at Ulm in 1805, and Kray in 1800. Operating upon an enemy's flank, to cut him off. When the enemy's forces are divided. 4. Possessing the points of junction of roads 35 5. Napoleon's movement towards the junction point of the cross-road, leading to Brussels ........ 35 SECTION IV. OBJECTIVE POINTS - 36-38 1. Aim of a strategical combination ... 36 Selection of the objective. 2. Determination of the objective ...... 36 3. Possession of Richmond, when desired by the Federal government - 37 Objects of France, if at war with Austria or Spain. 4. First object of the British expedition to Egypt - 37 SECTION V. LINES OF OPERATIONS - 38-51 1. Line to be preserved - - 38 2. Directing the line of operation - . 38 Influence of a river over the direction. x CONTENTS. PAR. PAGE 3. When the Hue of the river is short - 4. Dep6ts and magazines, for supplies Limits of distance from base. 5. Covering depOts, by lines of operations 6. Principal and secondary depOts - Intervening distances. Arrangements for troops and communications. Wellington's want of magazines, experienced after Talavcra 40 Position and security of dep6ts - 40 Strategical position of an army, undertaking the conquest of a country - 41 Direction of the lines of operation. Post for depOts of supplies. 10. Lines of operation open to the Italian general, in 18G6 41 11. Choice of the line, the fundamental idea - 42 Direction of the manoeuvre line. Safe line of retreat, always to be ensured. 12. Napoleon's first resolve to fall back on Smolensko from Moscow - 43 Endeavour to turn the left of the Russians. 13. Junction of two armies, with separate lines of operation - 44 14. Isolation of the two Prussian armies, in 1866 45 Aid of the field telegraph. 15. Divergent bases, when armies can combine - - 45 16. Hanover and Hesse-Cassel invaded, in 1866 - 46 Superior numbers on the decisive point. 17. Independent armies on the same frontier - 46 Single and double lines of operation. Interior and exterior lines. Double line when applicable. 18. Divergent and convergent operations - 47 Concentric movements. Concentric columns marching on the Mincio and on Brussels. 19. Interior and exterior lines ..... 45 20. Armies of France and Austria, in 1800, upon interior and exterior lines - 48 21. Multiple lines - ...... 49 22. Parallel lines - ...... 49 23. Changing the line of operation ...... 49 24. Changing the line, vhen necessary ...... 50 Proposed change of line by Napoleon, if defeated at Austerlitz. 25. When useful and salutary to change ..... 50 Soult's line on Toulouse, after quitting the Adour. 26. Direction taken by Austrians, in 1794, when retreating from Fleurus - 50 Direction taken by the Prussians, in 1815, after Ligny. SKCTION VI. LINES OF COMMUNICATION - . . 51 _ GO 1. Principles of strategy, up to 1815 .... 51 2. Lines far removed, without communication ... 52 CONTENTS. XI PAB. PAGE 3. Lateral communications 52 Austrians at Rivoli and at Lake Garcia. 4. Security of lines of communication - 53 5. Long lines of communication - 53 6. Corps without communication - 53 7. Cause of the loss of the battle of Hohenlinden 53 8. Base of operation and line of communication in Scinde, in 1842 - 54 9. Direction for lines of communication - - 54 10. Rendering an enemy's communications insecure - 54 11. Readiness to concentrate - 54 Methods of penetrating an enemy's front, or menacing his communications. 12. Napoleon's endeavour to intercept Sir John Moore's retreat from Spain* 55 13. Napoleon's flank menaced, by his march upon Madrid - 55 14. Direction of Sir John Moore's march - 56 Reason for selecting Corunna, as the new base. 15. Prussian occupation of Saxony, to preserve communications - 56 16. Campaign in Georgia - 57 Operating without communications. 17. Design of the Campaign 57 18. Operating with superior numbers 57 Arrangements for daily supplies. Commencement of flank operations. 19. Task for the inferior army, of the Confederates 58 Turning the Confederate positions. 20. Lessons taught by Sherman's campaign - 58 21. Course to pursue, when aiming at an adversary's rear - 58 Step to be taken, by the intercepted army. 22. Rivers and hill ranges, when parallel to an advancing army's path - 59 23. Maxims of Napoleon, as to flanks and concentrating 59 Position occupied by the French army of Portugal, in 1811. Marmont rebuked by Napoleon. CHAPTER II. SECTION I. THEATRE OF WAR - 61-64 1. Description of a theatre of war ...... gl Theatre of operations. Each theatre to be complete. 2. Study of the theatre of war ...... 2 3. Limits of the theatre of operations 62 4. Theatre of German war, 1866 -....- 62 5. Theatre of war, in Italy, 1866 ..... 64 The Quadrilateral. CONTENTS. SECTION II. FAB PAGE ' ZONE OF OPERATIONS - 64-68 1. Number of Zones, in the theatre of operations 64 Subdivisions of each zone, &c. 2. Selecting a zone - 65 Choosing an objective of operations. 3. Taking the lead in operations - 65 Ascertaining the nature of the country and enemy's movements. 4. Fitness of the theatre, for the action of each of the three arms - 66 5. Selection of the Zone of operations - - 66 Direction of movement. Theatre between the Khine and North Sea. SECTION III. STRATEGICAL POSITIONS - 1. Positions, when strategic Communications with lines of operations. 2. Adaptability for concentrating - 69 Tactical positions to be selected. Extent of front, in camp or quarters. Tactical point for rallying. 3. Strategic front and front of operations 70 4. Their direction - ..... 70 Change of strategic front. Napoleon's change against the Russians. Pivots of operations, at Warsaw and Thorn. Napoleon's change of strategic front, in 1806. Moreau's change. Double strategic front. CHAPTER III. SECTION I. STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RULES - - 72-82 1. Adhering to the offensive, when once assumed 72 2. First care of the commander, upon taking the field ... 72 Determination of strategical points, lines, &c. 3. Connection between points and lines ---... 73 4. Obstacles on the frontiers of states - .... 73 CONTENTS. Xlll PAR. PAGE 5. Rivers as lines of operations 73 Mountains as barriers. Partisan and regular warfare combined. 6. Striking at a flank - 73 Engaging the enemy's forces separately. 7. Intercepting an enemy, when the two armies are near 74 When the movement is commenced at a distance. 8. When threatened to be surrounded ... 75 9. Distant positions occupied by the British in Afghanistan 75 10. Errors of the British general, at Caubul - ... 75 11. Acting contrary to the desire of an enemy - 75 12. Wellington's skill in divining an enemy's designs - 75 13. Causes, which determined Napoleon to receive battle on the ground at Austerlitz - - 76 14. Opinions in the allied armies, as to the plan to be adopted 77 15. Collecting the whole force previous to a battle - 77 Napoleon's concentration, previous to Austerlitz. 16. Not detaching, on the eve of a battle - -78 17. Dividing the forces, and operating in different directions - - 78 18. Wunnser's detached column in 1796, menaced - - 78 Alvinzi's detached body, routed. Napoleon's army in Italy, in 1800, divided. Attack made by the Austrians, at Marengo. 19. Wellington's detached troops on the day of Waterloo - 79 20. Assailing a weak point with superior numbers - 80 Moment for assuming the initiative. 21. General Jackson operating against divided Federal forces - - - 81 22. Austria against Prussia and Italy combined, in 1866 - - 82 Retarding the advance of one enemy, and operating against the other. SECTION II. OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WARFARE - - . 82-110 1. Movements based upon calculation - - - 82 Superior genius for offensive warfare. 2. Strategical operations, on assuming the offensive - -83 Tactical movements of the attacking party. 3. The offensive and defensive considered - - 84 4. Power of concentration rests with the assailant - ... 4 Napoleon's superiority on first crossing into Belgium. Lines leading to Richmond, open to the Federals. 5. Plan for concentration of the allied armies, previous to Waterloo - - 85 Importance of the Fleurus triangle. 6. Disposal of the Russian forces, in 1812, along the frontier - 86 7. Extracts from Notes dictated by Napoleon, in 1808, on the affairs of Spain 86 8. Combinations and dispositions of Napoleon, when invading Spain - - 89 XJV CONTENTS. PAR PAGE 9. ' Napoleon's dispositions for further operations, after the fall of Madrid - 10. Extent of country occupied by French, in Spain - 90 Central position, held by Wellington. 11. Wellington's opinion, respecting offensive operations in France, in 1815 91 Disposition of the troops. 12. Proposed operations of the Prussian armies, when invading Austria, in 1866 93 13. Movement of Russians on Constantinople, in 1829 - 94 14. Commencement of the Russian advance - - 95 Extent of the line. 15. Political elements, in the selection of a line, for invasion - - 96 Line of the Rhine, held by Austrian armies during the French Revolution. Line taken up by the Prussian army, during the Jena Campaign. First design of the Allies, in the late war with Russia. 16. Support of strategic fronts and lines of defence - 97 Pivots of operation. Pivots of manoeuvre. Length of the line of defence. 17. Operations entirely defensive - 97 18. Defensive warfare, passive or active - 97 The defensive-offensive. 19. Indirect defence 98 Enduring the first shock of the assailants. 20. Denmark, in 1804, on the defensive - 99 21. Frederick in the Seven Years' War .... 99 Wellington in Portugal, Spain, and Belgium. 22. The defensive not adopted by the Spaniards during the French invasion 99 Progress of the French onwards to Lisbon. 23. Wellington's counsel, unheeded by the Spaniards 24. Wellington's warfare in Spain, Portugal, and South of France - 25. Defensive and offensive warfare of Wellington in the Peninsula 26. Frontier of Portugal, as a line of defence - - 27. Defence of Portugal, by the lines of Torres Vedras - 28. Openness of the frontiers of Portugal, to an invading army 29. Defence of the Spanish frontier ...... Passes through the Pyrennees. 30. The Balkan range : number of passes - - - - - 103 31. Defence of the country, against an invading army - - - 103 32. Defensive operations of the Austrian army, in 1866 - - - 104 Plan of operations. 33. Business of the advanced detachments, of the defenders - - - 105 Assembly of the main body. 34. Concentration of the Austrian army - - - - - 105 Benedek's retreat to Koniggriitz. 35. Commencement of Russian defensive movements in 1812 ... 106 Retreat and subsequent concentration. Intrenched camp near Drissa. Movements upon Smolensko. French progress, arrested at Mojaisk. Junction of the corps of Bagration. French attack upon Smolensko. Position at Borodino, examined. CONTENTS. XV PAU. . PAGE 36. Retreat continued towards Moscow - - 108 Russian Council of war. Flank position taken up by the Russians. 37. Places of refuge intermediate between the frontier and the capital - 109 38. Retreat of the Austrians on Olnriitz, after Koniggriitz 1 10 39. Movement of the Austrian army for the protection of the capital 110 CHAPTER IV. SECTION I. FORTRESSES - 111-126 1. Absence of progress, in fortification - 111 2. Fortresses of the past and present - 111 3. ^ Purposes for which useful - - 111 4. Defence of frontiers - 111 5. Number and location .... Ill 6. Influence of the French and Belgian cordons in 1815- 112 7. Positions for fortresses - - 112 Unsuitability of mountains. When placed on rivers. 8. When on mountains and rocks - - 113 9. Space between the fortress and river - 113 10. When near the flanks of operations - 113 Besieging and investing. Opposite courses adopted by the Allies, in 1793 and in 1815. 11. Alexandria isolated by the British - - 114 12. Wellington's opinion as to the difficulty of defending the Netherlands - 115 13. The positions of the Austrians and French, in 1796, commented upon by the Archduke Charles - - - 116 14. General Rogniat's application of more modern principles of defence - 116 15. Fortification of capitals - 116 Limit of the influence of fortresses. 16. Fortresses on a frontier with few issues - - 117 Fortifications of Paris. Delaying the assailant, by frontier fortresses. 17. Proposal of the Archduke Charles, for the defence of the Danube valley - 118 Ulm and Ingolstadt, as strategical points. 18. Relations of fortresses to strategy - - 118 Jornini's views for locating fortified places. 19. Fortresses improperly located 119 20. Inaccessibility of the fortresses of Konigstein - 119 21. Former opinion, as to the number of fortresses 120 Diminution in value. Importance of holding the capital. Austrian fortresses, in 1866, blocking the lines of railroads. 22. Protection for an open frontier - 123 xv i CONTENTS. > . PAGE 23. Conditions for a good system of defence 24. System of defence, for Great Britain 25. Dep6t in rear of the line of defence - Project for fortifying London, in 1803. 26. Proposed defensive means for England - 125 SECTION II. SIEGES - - 126-133 1. Decrease in the importance of fortresses - -126 Sieges diminished 2. Objects for undertaking a siege ------ 127 3. Consequences of Burgos not falling early - - 127 4. Causes for the third attempt to reduce Badajos - - 128 5. Objects in the siege of Sebastopol ... - 128 6. Earthworks of the defenders - - 129 7. Advantages possessed by the besieged 129 8. Obstacles against which the besiegers had to contend - 130 Reason of the siege being protracted. 9. Ensuring the success of a siege 131 Lines of contravallation and circumvallation. Position of the besieging force. 10. Position for a besieging force, inferior in numbers 132 11. Napoleon when besieging Mantua ...... 132 12. Why Wellington did not besiege Ciudad Eodrigo, in 1811 132 13. Causes for the second siege of Badajos - - - 133 SECTION III. 134-143 1. Modern uses of intrenched camps - - - - - - 134 2. Their use, as shewn by Vauban - - - - - 134 3. Nature of works, requiring to be constructed .... 134 Objects for which needed. 4. Rules for the selection of ground --.-.. 134 5. Awaiting an enemy within lines - . . . - 135 6. Position for an intrenched camp ...... 135 7. Attack of intrenchments - - - --. . . 136 8. Frederick's intrenched camp at Buntzelwitz . . 136 The camps of Kehl and Dusseldorf. The lines of Torres Vedras. CONTENTS. XV11 PAR. PAGE 9. Perilous position of Frederick at Buntzelwitz - - 136 10. Intrenched camps, which can be surrounded - - - - 137 Advantages of the Torres Vedras lines. 11. Dubious advantages of a system of lines - - 137 Lines of Soult, at Nivelle. Time and labour necessary, for the works at Nivelle and Torres Vedras. Part taken by the assailants and defenders. 12. Their distance from the base of operations - - 139 Suitability for covering places . 13. Occupation of camps by Napoleon - 139 14. Position and capabilities - - 140 Description of troops, to occupy them. 15. Heights and positions in England, suitable for field works - - 140 16. Lines at York Town - - 140 Natural and artificial defences. The intrenchments besieged. Their abandonment by the Confederates. The works at Williamsburg, turned by the Federals. CHAPTER V. SECTION I. COAST DEFENCE "- 144-170 1. Objects of coast defence - 144 Points to be held. Error of the Confederates. 2. Elements of coast defence - 144 3. Railways for the defence - 145 4. Proposed plan of operations, during the threatened invasion by Napoleon 145 5. Proposed arrangements, to meet an enemy after landing 146 6. Guarding assailable points, by forts - - 146 7. Fortifications for defensive warfare - - 147 Comparative cost of ships and forts. 8. Naval arsenals fortified and unfortified . - - " 147 Protection of small harbours. 9. Guns in floating batteries and on land - 148 Floating defences, where reqiiired. 10. Land batteries in combination with floating defences 149 11. Positions for coast batteries 150 Employment of field artillery. 12. Command of batteries, over an object - 150 13. Batteries when more subject to the fire of ships - 151 14. Fire of elevated batteries - 151 Height above the level of the water. 15. Guns on steep ground 152 16. Position and elevation of batteries on the Alabama river 152 xviii CONTENTS. PAR. PAOB 17. Cliff batteries, at Sebastopol - .... 152 The Wasp and the Telegraph battery. Fort Constantino water battery. 18. Injuries inflicted by the cliff batteries .... 153 19. Ascendancy established by the cliff batteries 153 20. Firing at vessels in motion - - - - - - -154 Tune exposed to fire. 21. Accuracy and rapidity of fire against moving objects - - - 154 22. Admiral Farragut's fleet, passing the batteries at Vicksburg - - 156 23. Position of the enemy's guns, previously unknown - - 156 24. Passing the batteries, at Fort Morgan - - - - -156 25. Natural and artificial obstructions, in coast defence - - 157 26. Ships passing through clear channels - 157 27. Powers of forts and ships, to inflict damage - - - 157 Breaches effected, in forts. 28. Naval successes, against inexperienced opponents .... 158 29. Attack of iron-clads, on Fort Sumter - 158 30. Attack on forts St. Philip and Jackson - - - - -158 31. Attack by the Italian fleet, on San Giorgio, Comisa and Manego - 159 Second attack on Lissa. 32. Results of the allied naval attack on Sebastopol - - - - 161 33. Number of guns employed in the naval attack - - . 162 34. Destruction of Bomarsund, by military and naval forces - - 162 35. Lighter description of ordnance, for land attacks ... i$2 36. Actual possession of a fortress, previous to destruction - - - 163 37. Concert of naval and land forces ---... ig3 38. Attacks on land batteries, when combined - - - . - 163 Securing a lodgment, on the coast. 39. Attack of outposts, and isolated points - - . . . 154 Probable results of ships attacking. 40. Uncertainty of vertical fire - - ." . . -164 41. Bombardments of San Juan d'Ulloa and Vera Cruz - - - 164 42. Batteries en barbette - . . . . -'-165 43. When opposed to iron-clads ----.. 165 44. Turrets '--... i/-p 45. Moncrieff's carriage ---... IQQ 46. Moncrieff's gun-pits --.._ jgir 47. Casemated sea-batteries - ig~ 48. Thickness of outer walls, at Fort Sumter - ipo Iron shields, at the embrasures. Isolated works. Iron-plated fronts. 49. Earth and sand batteries - ... System of defence, at Vicksburg. 50. Earth and sand material . Guns en barbette silenced. 17 Scattering guns and concentrating their fire. CONTENTS. XIX SECTION II. PAR. PAGE CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS - ... 171-181 1. Importance of channel obstructions - - 171 Space for manoeuvring a flotilla. Admiral Farragut's plan of attack. Success or failure of naval attacks. 2. Obstructions, not removable under fire - - 172 3. Their importance to the Confederates - - 172 Entry of blockade runners. 4. Rope obstructions, in the attack on Fort Sumter - - 172 5. Difficulties opposed to obstructing channels ----- 173 System of obstructions. Position for obstructions. 6. Sunken vessels ---..... 173 Russian Black Sea fleet. Confederate vessels. Objections to sinking vessels. Pontoons or flats, as substitutes. 7. Rocks, piles, chains and booms .... 174 8. Opening a passage, by means of a petard 175 9. Resilient structures, as effective obstructions - - 175 10. Rope obstructions - - - 175 Liability of ships being caught. 11. Torpedoes - - - 176 Passive and active obstructions. Application of explosive machines, by the Russians. 12. Use of torpedoes by the Austrians 177 13. Successful results, obtained by the Americans - - 177 Mechanical and electric torpedoes. Arrangement and submersion. 14. First application by ships, against each other - - - 179 15. Torpedoes, as auxiliary agencies and offensive weapons - -179 16. Not to be regarded, as substitutes for forts and batteries - - 180 Protection to undefended places. SECTION III. LANDING OF ARMIES . 181-194 1. Influence of the formation of Coasts, on landing .... 181 2. Requisite boats for the landing - .... 182 Circumstances determining points for debarkation. 3. Advantages of steam, conferred on the defenders .... 183 4. Advantages of rapid flank movements, to the defenders - - 184 5. Departure of the English troops, for Holland, under Sir Ralph Abercroiuby 184 Landing of the troops. XX CONTENTS. PAH. . PAOB 6. Landing of Wellington's army, at the mouth. of the Mondego river - 186 7. Usual plan adopted for landing, in the war with France - - 186 8. First modern instance of lauding in the face of an enemy 187 Abercromby's after-plan for landing an army. 9. Departure of the British army for Egypt - 189 Attempt to reconnoitre the coast. 10. Preparations for the landing 189 11. The landing - - 189 12. Vessels covering the landing ...... 191 13. English and French expedition to China - - 191 14. Expedition of the allied armies to the Crimea - - 191 Respective numbers of the forces and vessels employed. 15. Landing places selected - - , 192 Plan of the landing. Numbers and descriptions disembarked, on first day. 16. Results following the plans followed ..... 193 XXI PART III. MODERN INNOVATIONS. CHAPTER I. SECTION I. r.\n. PAGE INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, CHAUSSEES, CANALS, STEAM- VESSELS, ON WARFARE 195-212 1. Main roads, for armies moving in America - - 195 Railways depended upon in the civil war. 2. Movement on Richmond, via Fort Monroe - - 195 3. Necessity for operating on good roads - - 196 Rates of movement over good and bad roads, in the Waterloo campaign. Bad roads during the American Civil War. 4. Difficulties of transport into Spain and Portugal ... 197 Situation of the French armies, in Spain. Importance of certain fortresses in Spain. 5. Strategical points, in many cases, have lost their former importance 197 6. Changes which have occurred since the campaign of 1815 - - 198 7. Movement of troops by railway in England - - 198 Proportion of transport, to infantry : proportion to cavalry and artillery. Time for loading the trains. 8. Platforms and arrangements, for loading and unloading - - 199 9. Conveyance of volunteers, no criterion - - - - 199 10. Conveyance of gunpowder ...... 200 11. Celerity gained for the offensive ...... 200 Grant's railway, before Petersburg. Railways for defence, likely to be of more importance. 12. Changes effected by railways on both sides 200 13. Influences on the use of railways, for alleviating sufferings, and shortening duration of war - 201 14. Value for concentrating from outlying districts - 201 Transport of French and Austrian troops by rail, during the war in Italy, in 1859. Concentration of German troops, in Danish war, of 1864. Assembly of Prussian armies, on frontiers, in 1866. Time for preparation and movement will be shortened. Rapid movement accomplished by a beleagured Federal army. 15. Future value of railways relating to marches, supplies, and ammunition - 203 Movement of a Russian corps in Hungary, in 1849, and of the Austrian army, into Polish provinces, in 1854. Movements of the French army, in 1854, towards the Crimea, and in Italy, in 1859. Transport of English and French armies, across the Black sea, from Varna, in 1854. 16. Advantages conferred on naval powers .... 204 Steam on the whole, will be in favour of defence. Xxii CONTENTS. PAR. PAGE 17. Railways and improved roads ; articles for the soldier to carry - - 204 18. Flank movements by rail 204 19. Rate of movement, of Prussians and Austriaiis, in 1866 - 205 Railways in an enemy's country, less advantageous. Movement of troops by rail, in face of an enemy, during the Italian , campaign of 1859. 20. Power of concentrating resources on a distant frontier ... 205 Causes of railways, subsequently favouring the defence. 21. Influence of railways, exemplified in Sherman's campaign in Georgia - 206 Enterprises of cavalry, against the railway. 22. Railways inapplicable in an enemy's country, for transport of the advancing army - ... 207 Restoring portions of broken lines. 23. Retrograde movement of the Saxon army, by railway, to unite with the Austrian army .... 207 Obstructions attempted by the retiring Saxons. 24. Withdrawal of the army of Hesse-Cassel, from the approaching Prussians 208 25. Concentration of the Austrian army, about Vienna in 1866 - - 208 26. Direction of invader's attack - - - - - - -210 27. Austrian railway communication cut in 1 866 - - - - 210 Communication through Prague, not closed to the Prussians. 28. A fortress intercepting a line of railroad - - - . 210 29. Advantages resulting to the invaders, from neglecting to close all lines to them 211 30. Railway employees attached to each Prussian army - - - 211 31. Ready means of destroying railways - - - . . 211 SECTION II. TELEGRAPHY, TRANSMISSION OF ORDERS, AND SIGNALLING 212-217 Electric Telegraph. 1. Application of the telegraph to military operations - - - - 212 2. Influence exercised by telegraph, in offensive and defensive operations - 212 3. Field telegraph of the Prussian armies ..... 214 Abyssinian telegraph equipment. 4. Tapping the wires - ...... 214 Transmission of Orders. 5. Characteristics of orders ..... 215 6. Risks of confiding orders to a single messenger ... 215 7. Error in not being sufficiently explicit - ... 215 8. Method adopted in the Prussian army, for communicating orders - 216 Signalling. 9. Signalling and telegraphy ..... 2 16 10. Important use of telegraphic signals, made by Napoleon . . 217 CONTENTS. xxiii SECTION III. PAE. PAGB INFLUENCE OF RIFLED ARMS 217-221 1. Speculations as to changes in warfare, on the introduction of arms of precision ... ... 217 2. Advantages conferred on an army, awaiting the attack ... 218 3. Shelter obtainable from ground, obstacles, field works, &c. 219 Important part, field works will occupy, in consequence. 4. Probable effect of improved arms, upon cavalry movements 219 5. Jomini's opinion, as to probable changes, caused by improved fire-arms 220 6. File firing and volley firing .... 220 7. Ammunition expended by the Prussians at Ko'niggratz ... 221 8. Volley firing from small bodies, in the Prussian army - - - 221 Number of rounds carried. Prevention of too rapid an expenditure of cartridges. XXIV PART IV. TACTICS. CHAPTER I. VAGE l ' COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS 1. Definition of tactics - 2. Great practice requisite to be a tactician. The aim of tactics 3. Each arm subordinate to its combination with the others 4. Napoleon's system of war ; its results - 5. Great results obtained by Napoleon, from the great camp of Boulogne 6. Tactics of the battle of Austerlitz, the model for a long period 224 7. Uncertainty of tactics, after a long peace 8. Law of modern manoeuvres and battles - 225 9. Observations on Prussian and French tactics - 225 10. Avoiding unnecessary exposure of infantry - - 226 11. Independence allowed to artillery, in movement 226 12. Association of cavalry with artillery - 227 13. Losses sustained at Austerlitz, from oblique fire of French artillery 227 14. Taking the initiative - 227 Turning movements, and attacks by main force. Driving the defensive army from its position. Supporting the first line, and employing the combined arms. The combined Arms, at the critical moment. 15. Manoeuvring round a flank - - 229 16. Manoeuvres and turning movements will be preferred - 230 17. Selection of point of attack, test of genius and military instinct - 230 18. Determining the decisive point - 230 19. Formation and march of troops, for the attack of position 230 20. Commanding ground of an enemy's line, jisually the point of attack - 231 Menacing the enemy's line of retreat preferable. 21. Two ways of obliging an enemy to abandon a position - - 231 22. Pressing an enemy's line back, and seizing on commanding points - 231 23. Operating with a superior force on a decisive point .... 231 General rules applicable to battles. 24. What should be avoided on a field of battle ? - - - - 232 25. Application of tactical talent ; disconcerting the opponent - - 233 Proper moment for use of reserves. 26. The opportune moments, for the decisive blows, at Waterloo, Marengo, Borodino --...... 233 Cause of the final reserve of Napoleon, not having been employed at Borodino. CONTENTS. XXV PAR. PAGE 27. Wellington's use of the sixth division, as a reserve at Salamanca - 234 28. Non-employment of the reserve by McClellan at the battle of Antietam 234 29. Taking the initiative in strategy and in tactics ; relative advantages and disadvantages - - 235 30. Whether an army posted behind obstacles should there await the attack ? - 235 31. Obstacles to an attacking force, may increase the effects of the fire on them 236 32. During a battle each arm in its turn becomes the principal element - 236 33. Distribution of artillery along the line - 236 Concentrating fire on a single point. 34. Direction of fire ; on the defensive and offensive- ... 237 35. Pace for artillery, to support cavalry - - - 237 36. Artillery supports, for defence - - 237 37. When threatened by infantry - ... 237 38. Skirmishers attacking artillery - - 238 39. Acting against the Arms, when separated - 238 40. Obstruction of a charge by obstacles - - 238 41. Distance between echelons - ... 238 42. The attack in echelon : its advantages 238 43. Conditions for offensive and defensive battles - - 239 44. Favourable hour for the attack . 239 45. Battles dependent on the General and troops - 240 46. The contending armies at Waterloo - 240 State of the ground. 47. Lateness in commencing the battle - 241 48. Tactical errors of Napoleon, at Waterloo - 241 49. Expected direction of attack at Koniggratz - - 242 50. How the Prussian Guard got into Chlum - 242 XXVI THE THREE AEMS. CHAPTER II. SECTION I. PAGE CAVALRY 244-269 1. First rise of cavalry into importance ...-., 244 English cavalry under Cromwell. 2. Turkish cavalry in past ages 3. Numerical proportion - ....... 4. Reserves of cavalry Limit recommended by Marmont. 5. As to the future employment - .... 245 6. Future of cavalry : its moral effect ..... 246 7. Cavalry combined with artillery - - 246 8. Qualities requisite for a cavalry-general - - - 247 Sheltering from fire, previous to the attack. 9. Examination of ground, previous to a charge ..... 247 Obstacles met with at Talavera. At the battle of Courtrai, at Leipsic. 10. Ground at Zorndorf, previously examined by Seydlitz - - 248 Warnery, as to the security and attack of flanks. 11. The management of cavalry in the field ..... 248 Qualities requisite for a cavalry-leader. 12. The squadron, the unit .... . 249 13. Speed and weight opposed .... 249 14. Valises - 249 15. Rapidity of movement - - ... 249 16. Without means of influence, from use of firearms - - 249 17. Heavy and light weights ....... 250 18. Experiences in German war of 1866 - 250 Reduction of dead weight. 19. Security conferred by cavalry ...... 251 20. Functions of cavalry .... ...251 21. Business after a victory ....... 251 22. Mode of fighting adopted in North American civil war ... 251 Want of cavalry, after decisive actions. 23. Incompleteness of British victories, from deficiency ... 252 f 24. Chief duty of cavalry ---.... 252 Support for the attack of cavalry, against a line. Attack of infantry, previously shaken. 25. Attack on squares at Salamanca : opinion of Wellington . 253 26. Attack on Prussian squares, at Langensalza - .... 253 Austrian cavalry on Prussian Infantry, in the campaign of 1866. CONTENTS. XXY11 PAR. PAGE 27. Opportunities on the defensive ...... 253 j 28. Charges directed on flanks of infantry ..... 253 29. Ambuscade of Blucher, on retreat from Bautzen ... 254 Flank attack of cavalry, on French infantry. f 30. As to the independence of cavalry in action ..... 254 31. Non-employment of Austrian cavalry, at Koniggratz ... 255 ; 32. Precautions against a line of cavalry, being taken in flank - 255 ) 33. Rallying the first line ... 255 Holding squadrons in reserve. 34. Defeat of French cavalry under Murat, at Wachau .... 256 Absence of a second line for rallying on. 35. Neglect of English cavalry reserves, during the Peninsula war - - 257 t 36. Oblique line of attack ....... Concealment of dispositions. \ 37. Gaining an enemy's flank - ..... 258 38. Covering movements and flanks by skirmishers - - 258 French cavalry defeated at Wurzburg. Taking the initiative, and keeping a reserve. Echelon Movements. 39. Occasions when advantageous ...... 259 40. Extent of front - 259 41. Full lines and echelons ... ... 259 42. Two lines of Prussian cavalry, at Chateau-Thierry ... 260 43. Passage of lines, in echelon - ..... 260 44. Difficulties of an advance in line ... - 260 45. Formation of columns of attack - -261 46. Charges by successive echelons, at Austerlitz .... 261 The Lance and the Sword. 47. Marmont's preference ........ 261 48. The lance in a mele"e ... . . 262 49. Jomini's opinion ........ 262 The lance in the front rank. 50. The lance in the hands of a trained man - - 262 51. Lancers, in the time of Cromwell ...... 263 52. Protection from sword cuts - ... 263 53. Cutting versus thrusting ..... . 264 Warnery's opinion. 54. Experience of General John Jacob ..... 264 TJie Cluirge. 55. Object of the charge ... . . 265 56. Reserves in readiness - ... . 265 57. Following up after a success ... 265 58. Weakness after a success ....... 265 59. Employment at the right moment . ... . . . 265 60. The last reserve usually decisive ...... 266 XXV111 CONTENTS. FAR. 61. 62. 63. Advantages of equitation Direction of charges. Practice of avoiding the point of attack, at drills. Marmont's plan for training cavalry horses. Form of Austrian cavalry attacks Cavalry awaiting a charge ... Light Cavalry, 64. Cossacks, as light cavalry 65. Marshal Saxe, on the necessity of light cavalry 66. Absence of Confederate cavalry, previous to Gettysburg Federal losses sustained from cavalry. Advantages arising from sufficient cavalry. PAGE 266 267 267 268 268 268 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 17. SECTION II. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES - Irregular Cavalry. Peculiarities of irregular cavalry Influence of a numerous cavalry. Importance of the Cossacks. Their danger and unexpected attacks Dissimilarity from the order of regular cavalry. Rapidity and warlike ardour. Menacing attitudes. Ponies and inferior weapons of Cossacks ... Native and irregular cavalry of India . . . . Habits and customs of the Cossacks, - Mounted Rifles. The original dragoon . Original designs of the dragoon .... Employment during the American Civil War. Adoption of mounted rifles, in North America Advantage to be derived from the improved firearms Horse and foot duties combined - .... Their services, through the North American Civil War Attack on a rear guard, at Sailor's Creek ... Use of fire-arms, by English and French cavalry, in the Pyrenees - Services of dismounted French dragoons, in the pursuit to Corunna Origin of dismounting with the Cossacks - Success, when skirmishing. 16. Uses which mounted rifles might be turned to - Services of mounted rifles, at the close of the American Civil War - 269-276 269 270 271 271 272 272 272 273 273 273 273 274 274 274 274 275 275 CONTENTS. XXIX CHAPTER III. PAR. PAGE ARTILLERY - - - 277-309 1. Requirements of a General of Artillery 277 2. Strategist and tactician - 277 3. Knowledge respecting each branch - 277 4. Progress of artillery under the French general, Senannont 277 5. Proportion of field artillery to the other arms 278 6. Maximum number, per thousand men - 278 7. Numbers at Austerlitz and at Solferino - 279 Numbers employed by Fredrick the Great. Numbers which might accompany an army. 8. Proportions in the Prussian armies, in 1866 - 279 9. Classification of artillery - - 279 10. Field artillery, organized in batteries - - - 280 11. Horse artillery, first established - 280 12. The battery, the unit - 280 13. Purposes for which field batteries, are suitable - 280 Rapidity of movement, when of value. 14. Light material and easy movement required - 281 15. Organization of present system of field batteries - - 281 16. General utility of field or mounted artillery - - 281 17. Progress in artillery tactics - ... 281 Detached masses of artillery, supported by cavalry. 18. Flank fire of Prussian artillery, at Koniggratz - 282 19. French guns detached at Solferino, to take their opponents obliquely 282 20. Prussian batteries detached at Koniggratz ... 282 21. Austrian method of selecting advantageous ground for batteries - - 282 22. Future association with infantry - ... 283 23. More fully developing the mobility of field guns .... 284 24. Advantages to be obtained, from increased mobility - - 284 Rifled guns of 'large calibre, as guns of position. 25. Equipment of Prussian field batteries - 284 Adaptability for rapid movements and conveyance of gunners . 26. Means of adaptation of Austrian batteries for the movements of cavalry 285 27. Accuracy and quickness of fire combined with celerity of movement - 285 28. General rule for quickness of fire 285 29. Rate of firing from Armstrong rifled and smooth-bored guns - 285 Reserve Artillery. 30. Objects of batteries of position 286 31. All field artillery formerly position artillery - 286 32. Usual place of reserve artillery 287 33. Importance of the reserve at Marengo 287 34. Reserves moving with facility 287 35. Horse artillery, proper for reserves 287 Influence of the reserve of light guiis, at Eylau. XXX CONTENTS. PAR. I'AGE 36. Employment of reserves by Napoleon at Lutzen .... 287 Non-employment of the reserves, by the allies. 37. Principles in the selection of a position ----- 288 38. First duty after placing a gun in position ..... 288 39. Ground affording natural cover ... - 288 40. Guns on the brow of a hill - 289 41. Artillery in advance of other troops ... . 289 42. Employment offensively and defensively - - 289 43. The principal part taken by each arm, as circumstances require - 289 Special duty of divisional batteries. 44. Infantry and cavalry subordinate, when protecting .... 290 45. Posting guns, on suitable ground - - 290 Error in the position on the hill at Solferino. Concentrated fire of artillery. 46. The fire of artillery - ... 290 47. Least effective direction of fire - - - - - 291 Proximity to enemy's riflemen. 48. Formation of artillery in action - - - - - -291 Guns retired in echelon. 49. Oblique direction of each piece, for concentration of fire - - 291 50. Uses and application of artillery, in engagements - - - 291 51. Choice of the object to be fired at - 292 Fire not to be scattered. . Descriptions of Fire. 52. Fire and nature of projectile --.--.. 292 53. Nature of fire against a deployed line - - - - 293 Against columns. Against the French at the bridge of Lodi. 54. When used against wooden breastworks, &c. .... 293 55. Use of case shot, shrapnel and segment shells .... 294 56. Employment of mortars ....... 294 57. Fire at high angles ....... 294 58. The 5^ inch and 4| inch mortars - - - ' . 295 Enfilade and Oblique Fire. 59. Direction of fire on lines of troops ; on columns - - ... 295 Effects of reverse fire. Ney's movement at Bautzen, checked by flank fire. 60. Oblique fire of French at Marengo, at Ligny, and at Austerlitz - - 295 Ney's movement at Bautzen. 61. Extension of enfilade and oblique fire - . . . 296 Massing Guns. 62. An unexpected number of guns, on the most important point - - 296 Progress of artillery. Difficulties at times, and objections to massing guns. 63. Period for the employment of guns ' en masse ' - 297 Particular point to be employed on. Limit to the number of guns, composing a mass. 64. Application of the reserve and divisional batteries - ... 297 CONTENTS. XXXI Concentration of Fire. PAK. PAGE 65. Concentration of artillery at Talavera - - 298 66. Fire of French artillery at Solferino - 298 67. Increased offensive powers of artillery - - 298 68. Concentrated fire of divisional artillery, at Friedland ... 299 69. Final direction of fire at Friedland 299 Junction of the two grand batteries. 70. Introduction of artillery masses, at Boulogne ... 300 Their employment, at Wagram. 71. Advantages of concentrated fire ...... 300 Employment at Austerlitz and Lutzen. Increased areas for concentration, obtained from rifled guus. 72. Effect produced by two English guns, at the Alma - - 301 Siege Artillery. 73. Object and equipment of siege artillery - ... 302 74. Nature and number of pieces of ordnance ..... 303 75. Transport of guns and mortars ...... 303 76. Time for arming siege batteries ... . 303 77. Opening fire from the batteries - 304 78. Destruction of earthen parapets - .... 304 79. Breaching masonry ... . . . . . 305 80. Breaching with rifled ordnance - ... 305 81. Penetration of rifled guns - ... 305 Garrison Artillery. 82. In the defence of a fortress - 306 83. Armament of coast batteries - - - 306 84. Defence of coast batteries - - - 306 85. Resistance of iron plates ... . 307 Rockets. 86. Original rockets - 307 87. Rocket carriages and tubes ...... 307 Hale's rockets. 88. Service rockets 307 89. Convenience of rockets ....... 307 90. In mountains and elsewhere ....... 307 91. When advantageous ....... 308 CHAPTER IV. SECTION I. INFANTRY 310-320 1. Importance of infantry . its proportion ..... 310 XXxii CONTENTS. PAR PAGE 2. Successes gained by infantry - - 3. Restoration by the Swiss of infantry, to proper estimation - 310 4. The company, the element of organisation ; the battalion, the unit - 311 Conditions in the numerical composition of a battalion. 5. Movements of Prussian soldiers in the field - 6. Leading part, performed by infantry - - 7. Qualities of the British soldier, in the field - 312 8. Excellence of the French soldier : vigour of the British infantry - 312 9. Marshal Bugeaud, on English infantry - 313 10. Functions of infantry - 313 11. Object of a charge of infantry - - 313 12. Infantry marching to the attack of guns - 313 13. Failure of the French at Leipsic, to carry the batteries 314 14. Usual results of infantry charging infantry 314 15. Jomini's opinion, as to two bodies of infantry crossing bayonets - - 314 16. Formation and manner of combat of the Prussian infantry - 314 Basis of formation, of the French battalion. 17. French battalion column formations, at Solferino - - 315 French skirmishers. Employment of deep contiguous columns, in the attack of posts. 18. Skirmishing in use, amongst French troops 316 19. Formation of the Prussian battalion, by company columns - 316 20. Modifications arising from rapidity of fire 317 Prussian column of manoeuvre and column of attack. Formation of the Prussian skirmishers. Austrian formation for attack. 21. Movements of Austrian infantry - - 318 22. Facility of Movement of Prussian company columns - 318 Manner of throwing out Prussian skirmishers. General principle of Prussian tactics. 23. Advantages of battalion or Prussian company columns - 319 24. Characteristics of the Prussian system ..... 320 SECTION II. COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS .... 320-329 1. Employment of shallow formations ...... 320 Line of skirmishers. 2. Column formations, at Vimiero - - - - - - 321 Close columns opposed to fire and charges. 3. English lines and French columns, at Albuera .... 322 Napier's description of the close of the contest at Albuera. 4. Protracted combat, between an English line and Russian column at the Alma 323 5. Wellington's system of combat ...... 325 6. Formation of the 3rd division at Waterloo, by battalions formed on the two centre companies - ..... 325 CONTENTS. XXX111 PAR. PAGE 7. Jomini on columns and deployed lines ... 326 8. Whether rifled small arms, will bring about any important changes ! - 327 9. Conclusions drawn by Jomini - - 328 10. Jomini's convictions borne out by the results of the American civil war 328 11. Increased mobility by column formations - - 329 SECTION III. INFANTRY OPPOSED TO CAVALRY - 329-336 1. Infantry resisting cavalry alone, also cavalry with artillery - 329 2. Cavalry and infantry encounters, in the German war, of 1866 - 330 3. Question of retaining or abolishing infantry squares - >.'. 330 4. A deployed battalion, with the wings supported 330 5. Attack on French squares, near Almeida, by cavalry and horse artillery - 330 6. English squares at Fuentes Onoro, followed by French cavalry- 331 7. Skirmishers attacked at Redinha - - 332 8. French infantry attacked and broken at Salamanca - 332 9. Formidable cavalry attacks on squares; at Waterloo, Auerstadt and Gross- Aspern - 333 Cavalry charge on Russian infantry, at Eylau. Marlborough's attack on cavalry, at Blenheim. 10. French cavalry attacks at Waterloo 335 Napoleon's irreparable losses, both in time and in cavalry. CHAPTER V. SECTION I. CHOICE OF A POSITION - 337-350 1. Increased size of fields of battle 337 Shorter period for reconnoitring. 2. Knowledge of and study of the ground - 337 3. A position, oblique to the line of operation - 338 4. Strategic and tactical positions - 338 Characteristics to be sought. Rules for selecting tactical positions. 5. The possession of La Haye Sainte, at Waterloo 340 6. Ground, generally most advantageous - 341 Obstacles in the front of a position. Defensible points of a position. The hill at Solferino ; posts in front of Balaklava. PAR CONTENTS. PAGE AK. O/IQ 7. Impediments to the attack 8. Villages when not to be occupied 9. Principal obstacles met with Defence of heights, &c. 10. An army awaiting an attack - 11. Positions strengthened by field works 12. Means for retreating from a defensive position 345 The forest of Soignies at Waterloo. 13. Napoleon's criticism on the position at Waterloo 34G Jomini's opinion. 14. The Austrian position at Koniggratz - 346 15. River in rear of the Austrians - - 347 16. Conflux of rivers at Leipzig - - 347 17. Maintenance of communications in rear ... - 348 18. Defects assisted by art 348 19. Position of the Federal army at Gettysburg - 349 Cover obtained by trenches and felled trees. Cover afforded to the reserves. 20. Russian position at the Alma - - - 350 SECTION II. FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE - 350-358 1 . Disposition of the troops on eligible ground ----- 350 2. Lines of battle and orders of battle .... 351 3. Reflections when an army is posted ... - 351 4. Judging how to occupy a position - - - - - 351 5. Intervals in a line of battle - - - - - - -351 6. Lines of formation for the line of battle - - 352 7. Spaces between the lines .... 352 Formation for the second line. 8. Variations and modifications on a battle-field - - 352 9. Reasons for placing cavalry on the flanks - - 353 Posting of small bodies of cavalry. 10. When cavalry may be posted otherwise ..... 354 11. Where artillery should be placed ...... 354 Artillery and infantry relatively. Direction of artillery fire. 12. Positions for artillery ....... 355 13. Points for the attention of artillery -....- 355 Supports for batteries. 14. Guns when on an unsupported flank ..... 355 15. Localities, when favourable or otherwise ..... 355 16. Sheltering and masking guns ...... 356 17. Sites for posting guns ....... 356 CONTENTS. XXXV P.VE PAGE 18. Salient points, for divisional guns 356 19. Predominance of arms, should determine their positions - 356 20. Connecting the reserves with the lines - 357 21. Introduction of reserves, by Napoleon 22. Position of reserves 3o8 CHAPTER VI. SECTION I. ORDERS OF BATTLE 359-380 1. A battle, viewed as a dramatic act - 359 2. When an army is inferior to its adversary 359 3. Fixing on the points of attack 359 4. Influences affecting the point of attack - 359 5. Advantages and disadvantages, of the assailant and assailed - 359 Determining the decisive point. Circumstances connected with its choice. 6. Objects of an offensive battle - 361 Orders of battle. The parallel order. The parallel order with a crotchet. The parallel order reinforced on one part of the line. The oblique order. Application of the oblique order at Lcutheu. 7. Obtaining the oblique order - ... 362 Preserving the obliquity with the refused wing. 8. Period of engaging with the refused wing - 363 Suitable formation for the attack on a flank. Continuity of the line. 9. Object of refusing a wing ... 364 10. Napoleon's opinion respecting the oblique order 364 Object of the oblique order. 1 1 . The oblique order, theoretically speaking - - - 364 12. The perpendicular order - 365 13. Echeloned on the centre - 365 Suitable in the attack of an intrenched camp. 14. Echeloned on the centre ; a variety of the salient order 366 15. Employment of cavalry in the salient orders 366 16. Angular formation of the Austrian line of battle, at Koniggratz 366 17. Salient formation of the Austrians, at Prague 367 18. Examples of the convex and salient orders - - 368 19. When the salient order may be resorted to - - 368 20. Application of the convex order - 368 21. The concave order - - 369 22. Its employment by the Russians, at Austerlitz - 369 XXXVi CONTENTS. PAR. PAOE 23. Errors of the assailants, at Gettysburg 369 24. Attacking both flanks simultaneously - 370 25. Attack on both wings, when admissible 370 26. EiTor of the French attack, under Juuot, at Vimiero - 370 27. Turning manoeuvres and extending movements 371 Interval of the Austrians at the battle of Prague. Extended movement of Frederick, at Torgau. Napoleon's success, at Eivoli. De'tour of the allies, at Austerlitz. Marmont's mistake, at Salamanca. Turning manoeuvres need support elsewhere. Cutting a line of communication preferable. 28. Column of attack not employed by the allies, at Austerlitz - 372 29. Movements of Marmont and Wellington, previous to the battle of Salamanca - - 373 30. Marmont's manoeuvre to prevent the retreat of his opponents - 374 31. Wellington's counter-attack, at Salamanca - 375 32. Marmont's inability to retrieve his error 375 Wellington's character as a tactician established. 33. Attempt to turn the right flank of the British, at Inkerman 376 34. Danger attending the attempt to outflank - 376 35. Positions intersected by obstacles - - 377 36. When a portion of a front is covered - 377 37. Utilizing a shallow stream - - 378 38. Attack on the Northern American army, by the Confederates, at Fair Oaks ...... . 378 39. Changes of front 378 40. Nature of guns for covering changes - 379 41. Napier's critic on the battle of the Alma - - - 379 SECTION II. DEFENSIBLE POSTS OF A POSITION - 380-385 1. Importance of military posts when defended - 380 2. Their importance, dependent on their positions - 380 3. Napoleon's design in the attack on La Haye Sainte 381 4. Advantages following its possession by the French - 381 5. Echelon formation for the attack of a post ..... 382 6. The attack of villages avoided by Frederick and Napoleon 382 7. Importance of advanced posts - - 383 8. Periods in the attack of a village ..... 383 9. Suitability of villages for occupation - - 383 Steps to be adopted for the defence on first occupation. 10. Method of defence, employed by the Prussians and Austrians - 384 11. Position for artillery, and the use of barricades in the defence - - 384 12. Walls, hedges, and streams ; how to be dealt with - - . 384 CONTENTS. XXXV11 CHAPTER VII. SECTION I. PAH. MARCHES PRECEDING BATTLES PAGE 386-390 1. Secret of war in marching - ..... 386 2. Estimation of the strength of an army by the rapidity of movement 386 3. March of the English Light Division, after Talavera 386 4. March of Pomeranian hussars, in 1866 ... 386 5. Napoleon's forced marches to the relief of Dresden 387 6. Tactical movements of armies 387 7. Manoeuvres of English and French armies previous to the battle of Salamanca - ..... 387 8. March of the two armies, with a view of seizing the heights over the Guarena . 388 9. Observations on the movements - 389 SECTION II. THE MARCH OF COLUMNS - . 390-398 1. Their strength and communications 390 Disaster of the Archduke John, at Hohenlinden. The Austro-Russians, at Austerlitz. 2. Principles to be adhered to ... 391 3. Effects of cultivation on military movements ... 391 4. Length of a column - - 392 Length of time to form line of battle. 5. The security of the front and flanks . 392 Regulating the march. 6. Moving to battle - 392 Selection of routes. Position of artillery. Close order of columns. Order of march. Position of cavalry. Subdivision of columns when about taking up positions in line. 7. Military train carriages and baggage 394 8. Unexpected meeting of two armies on the march - 395 Halting and formation of the advanced guard. 9. March of the hostile armies, previoiis to the battle of Solferino - 395 Balloon observations. Routes of the various corps. 10. First encounters at early dawn ...... 397 Flanks ordered to close on the centre. Decision made to attack Solferino. xxxvm CONTENTS. SECTION III. PAR ' FLANK MARCHES - 1. Making a flank march before an enemy in position 2. Tactical and strategical - 3. Risk in offering a flank Position and composition of the columns. Order of march to a flank . 4. Prussian flank march on Waterloo 5. Approach of Prussians, ascertained by Napoleon P:\GE 398-402 398 398 399 400 401 CHAPTER VIII. RETREATS AND PURSUITS . - 403^30 1. A retreat, in presence of a superior force ..... 403 2. Retreat, well conducted before a superior force, denotes the real soldier 403 3. Decamping during the night 403 4. Commencement of Sir John Moore's retrogade movement . 403 5. Measures to prevent discovery of a retreat 404 6. Length of marches 404 Causes determining retreats. 7. Withdrawing from a contest 405 8. Five methods of conducting a retreat - - 405 Second method, when used by Napoleon. Third method, when used by Prussians. Fifth method, by eccentric lines. When divergent retreats are admissible. Direction strategically considered. Soult's withdrawal from the Pyrenees. Suitability of Spain and Turkey for parallel retreats . 9. Lateral movements in a retreat - - . 408 Wellington's line, when retreating from Busaco. When lateral retreats may be undertaken. 10. Retarding the progress of a pursuing enemy - - 408 11. The pursuing army retarded by the resistance of artillery 409 12. Arrangements for the hours of departure and halts - 409 13. Wellington's opinion respecting Sir John Moore's movement of retreat - 410 14. Rallying a retreating army - - - - 410 15. Dispositions respecting the retreating army .... 410 Suitable hour for a retreat. Occupation of formidable positions. The position of the English at Busaco, attacked by Massena. 16. Dispositions for the attack at Busaco . ... 411 Retirement of the English army. 17. Distance to be maintained by rear guards ..... 412 When advisable to assume the offensive, CONTENTS. XXXIX PAR. PAGE 18. Replenishing stores and supplies ...... 412 19. Retreats favourable before a languid enemy .... 413 20. Cause of disorders in a retreat - - 413 21. When the line of retreat is intercepted by a stream - -' 413 22. Consequences to Moore and Wellington by the bridges at Mamilla and Poslencia not being broken - 414 23. Circumstances attending the retreats of Wellington and Moore 414 24. The command of the rear guard . . - 415 Use of cavalry with a rear guard. 25. Reserve of cavalry for covering a retreat ..... 415 Object of the artillery of the rear guard. 26. Instance of use of artillery during a retreat, in North America .415 27. Protection afforded, after Austerlitz, by artillery .... 416 28. Retreat of the Austrian army, after Koniggratz - 416 29. Positions taken up by the Austrian artillery - - 417 30. Pursuit by the Prussians - - - 418 31. Retreat of the allies, after Bautzen ...... 418 Protection of the rear by artillery, supported by cavalry. 32. Soult's retreat on Toulouse - .... 419 Pursuit obstructed by the combat at Tarbes. 33. Retreat of the English army, under Sir John Moore, on Corunna 420 Vigorous pxirsuit by Soult. 34. Examination of roads and harbours, and formation of magazines, in anticipation of retreat and change of base ... 420 35. Cause leading to the battle at Corunna - 421 36. Soult's retreat, after Albuera - 421 37. Losses on both sides - - - 422 Reduced state of the Spaniards from want of food. Beresford's resolution in holding his position and showing a confident front. 38. Retreat of the Prussian army on Wavre .... 423 39. Retreat of the English army from Quatre Bras, on Waterloo 424 40. Hour at which the retirement commenced - - - - 425 41. Incidents from Quatre Bras to the position at Waterloo ... 425 42. Complete order of the retreat from Quatre Bras ... 425 43. Withdrawal of the 3rd Division from Quatre Bras ... 426 44. Retreat of Grouchy to France - 426 45. Conduct of pursuits ....... 428 46. Advantage with the pursuers ... 428 Direction of pursuit. 47. Object of a pursuit - - ... 429 Description of troops adapted. 48. Point of junction of roads in front to be held .... 429 Opportunities for retarding the pursuit. 49. Employment for artillery - 430 xl PART V. MINOR OPERATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS. CHAPTER . I. SECTION I. PAR. MOUNTAIN WARFARE .... 1. Value of forts well located 2. Position and elevation of forts - 3. Posts at the foot of heights ... 4. Natural strategic points -- 5. Roads and communications 6. Points to be enquired into .... 7. Points to be considered, in examination of a mountainous country 8. Mountain rivers - - 9. Difficulties of mountain warfare, on the side of the offensive 10. Direction of the offensive - Danger of forming too many columns. Passage of the Saint Bernard. 11. Passage of the Alps, by Napoleon The army arrested by Fort Bard. Stratagem resorted to for extricating the guns. 12. Character of mountain warfare Disadvantage with the assailant. 13. Wellington's method - ... 14. The Archduke Charles on the theory of mountain warfare 15. Essential points for defence ..... 16. The Guerilla system of warfare in Spain - 17. Precautions against surprise for mountain guns - Selection of suitable positions for guns. PAGE 431-439 431 431 431 431 432 432 432 434 434 435 435 436 436 437 438 438 438 SECTION II. DEFILES 1. Attack of a defile .... 2. When the bordering heights are inaccessible 3. Columns for the attack ... 4. Position for the defence of a defile 439-451 439 440 440 440 CONTENTS. Xli PAH. 5. Principles for selection of defensive points 6. Position in rear of a defile 7. Engagements within a defile - Favourable point within a defile. 8. Turning a defile 9. Tactical importance of a defile Position and part taken by the artillery. Attack and defence of a height. 10. Defending the passage with artillery 11. Action of artillery in the attack 12. Precaution to be observed by artillery before entering 13. Passage of the Khyber Pass by the British - 14. Passage of the Balkan by the Russians, in 1829 - 15. The Pass of Soinosierra, forced by Napoleon - 16. Attack on the Pass of Biar, by the French PAGE 441 441 442 442 443 445 445 445 445 446 448 450 CHAPTER II. SECTION I. PASSAGE OF RIVERS 1. Passages by force or by stratagem 2. Determination of the point of passage Passage of the Rhine, in 1800. Passage of the Po by Napoleon. Passage of the Danube, in 1805. 3. Precautions in approaching the point of passage 4. Positions affording facilities for crossing - The breadth of the river. Usual method for opposing the point of crossing. 5. Effect of increased width of the river ... Improved weapons when favourable to assailant. Possession of bridge heads. 6. General rules for effecting a passage 7. Advantages of a point on the commanding bank, for crossing Napoleon's first endeavour to pass the Danube in 1809. 8. Napoleon's successful passage of the Danube 9. Construction of bridges and batteries, preparatory - 10. Influential points, for facilitating the passage 11. Double passage upon a single front 12. Seizure of a defensible point upon the opposite shore 13. Passage of the Douro by Wellington - 14. Observations on the passage 15. Passage of the Garonne, at Toulouse - Bridge thrown across, near Pensaguel. 16. Passage below To\ilouse - 452-471 452 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 460 461 462 464 465 467 xlii CONTENTS. PAR. PAGE 17. Napoleon's passage of the Berezina ...... 468 18. Defence of a river - - - 469 19. Measures to be adopted when not opposing the passage - 469 20. Frederick's opinion as to the difficulties of defence - 469 21. Course to be usually followed by defenders and assailants - 469 Position taken up on the heights of Wagram by the Austrian army. Lee's position with the Confederate army, on the Rappahannock, to receive the Federal army. 22. When the assailant's bank of the river commands that of the other 470 The Mincio, not defended by the Austrians, in 1859. Unsuccessful attempt of the Austrians, to cross the Aube in 1814. 23. Position for artillery, for defending the passage of a river, or tete-de-pont 471 SECTION II. TETES-DE-PONTS 1. Object and situation of t^tes-de-ponts 2. Their importance - - 3. Properties of a tete-de-pont 4. Occupation of the ground for covering the bridge Description of works suitable. When both banks should be occupied. 471-473 471 472 472 473 CHAPTER III. SECTION I. RECONNAISSANCE Its importance Two kinds of reconnaissances. First step towards success Hour of departure of a secret reconnaissance Reconnoitring from commanding ground Napoleon's observation of the Allies, before Austerlitz. Some knowledge of fortification ... Habit of observing ground. Reconnoitring ground previous to occupation Subjects on which information should be obtained - Previous knowledge of obstacles - ... Description of guides. Information obtained from spies ... Intelligence collected by the reconnoitring officer. 474-483 474 474 475 475 475 476 476 477 477 CONTEXTS. xliii PAR. PAGE 10. General means of procuring intelligence ----- 477 11. Information by contact of light troops, and making prisoners - 478 Cavalry chiefly employed. Dispositions required to sustain the troops engaged. 12. Requirements of the officer reconnoitring 479 13. Necessary qualifications 479 The Austrian position at Koniggratz reconnoitred. 14. Austrian and Prussian patrol systems, in 1866 - 479 15. The march of the French army, under Marmont, observed by Wellington 480 16. Reconnaissance under Massena, preceding the battle of Essling - 480 17. Obtaining information after a decisive engagement 481 18. Insufficient reconnaissance after AusterJitz - - 481 The reconnaissance after Ligny. 19. Patrols on the flanks - 482 20. Examination of coasts ..... - 482 21. Reconnoitring points for a landing 482 Desirable points when defending a coast. SECTION II. ADVANCED GUARDS - 483-488 1. Reconnoitring the country ...... 483 2. Protection of flanks 483 3. Duty and composition - - - 484 4. Employment of light troops and skirmishers - 484 5. Proportion to the main body 484 Order of march. Distance from main body. 6. Distance for reconnoitring, and of the advanced guard - 485 7. Moving towards an enemy - 485 8. Skilful disposition and employment of a retarding force - 485 Withdrawing, when outnumbered. 9. Austrian corps, in 1866 - 486 10. Progress of the French, in 1815, retarded by Zieten's advanced corps 487 Line occupied by Zieten's corps. 11. Retirement of the Prussians before the French - 487 Front shewn during the withdrawal. 12. Non-defence of the bridges - 487 CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED POSTS; OUTPOSTS - Qualities of a General of advanced posts Distance to be observed. 489-501 489 xliv CONTENTS. PAU. PAGE 2. Vigilance and object ... - - 489 3. Objects of outposts 489 4. Telling-off and placing the advanced posts - 490 5. Detection of the enemy's movements - - 490 6. Where usually posted - - - - - 490 7. Pushing posts forward - - - 491 Preventing encroachments. 8. When in close proximity - 491 9. Strengthening outposts - 492 10. Obstacles to prevent surprise - - 492 11. Neglecting to block up the bridge of Ordal - 492 12. Protection of flanks - - 493 Distances pushed forward. 13. Distances of videttes ... . 493 14. Distance of infantry posts - ..... 494 15. Support of posts - - 494 16. Lines of defence and posts of support - ... 494 Information respecting communications and posts. 17. Number and disposition of troops ..... 495 18. Alacrity in watching ... ... 495 Instructions for videttes. 19. Composition of troops for outpost duty .... 49(5 20. Fixing the chain of posts ...... 490 21. Principle to be observed ..... 497 22. Intermediate posts - ..... 497 23. Prussian outposts in Waterloo campaign ... 493 24. Fords and collection of boats - - ... 495 Bridge of Latifen, insecurely watched by the Austrians. Passage of the Douro by means of a boat. 25. Precautions in watching a river ..... 493 26. Fires and posting videttes at night - .... 499 27. Placing night sentries - - 499 28. R-elieving the pickets ---._.. 599 CHAPTER V. SECTION I. ATTACK OF POSTS 502-505 1. Knowledge requisite previous to the attack of a temporary work - - 502 Manner of obtaining information. 2. Real and false attacks ---.... 593 3. Attack by daylight -..... 593 Description of troops required. 4. How to deal with rai abattis ...... 594 CONTENTS. xlv PAR. 5. Other obstacles and impediments 6. Blowing open barriers, gateways, &c. 7. Securing a post after an attack PAGE 504 505 505 SECTION II. DEFENCE OF POSTS 1. When part of a general line - When an independent post. 2. Requisites to defend a building Usual defensible properties of a church. Wooden and thatched houses, and earthen works. 3. To repel an immediate attack 4. Barricading passages, doors, and windows 5. Clearing and arranging the ground 6. Sorties from houses 7 . Method of defence to be followed 8. Streets and roads to be closed by barricades Flanking fire requisite. Means of retreat available. 9. Posts for the guns ..... 506-511 506 506 507 508 509 510 510 511 511 CHAPTER VI. INSURRECTIONS IN TOWNS. STREET FIGHTING 1. Form of insurrection - 2. Requisites for protracted defence - 3. Means to be adopted for defence 4. Defence of stone houses .... . 5. Security of public building 6. Importance of communications and support 7. Provisioning posts ...... Care of ammunition. Nature of the roofs. 8. Conditions for a defensive position Mode of warfare, advantageous. 9. General rules - ... 10. Intercourse with the country - Internal communication. Command of bridges. Occupation of parks. 11. Measures against cities in a state of insurrection 512-527 512 512 512 514 514 514 515 515 516 516 517 xlvi CONTENTS. PAR. 12. Marmont's plan for quelling the insurrection in 1830 13. Its want of mutual co-operation 14. How Napoleon dealt with insurgents in Paris 15. The defensive attitude assumed by him 16. Attack on the Tulieries, repulsed 17. Observations on the attack ..... 18. Action of troops quelling disturbances When determined resistance is resorted to. 19. Active measures against houses .... Employment of artillery. 20. Measures taken against partial risings 21. Paris divided into districts, by Cavaignac ... 22. Defence of Saragossa ..... 23. Means adopted by the defenders for delaying their assailants 24. Observations - ... 25. Division of the defenders - ... 26. Probable reasons for the success of the French 27. Defence of Tarifa ...... PAGE 518 519 519 519 520 521 521 522 522 523 524 525 525 525 526 526 CHAPTER VII. FIELD WORKS AND SHELTER-TRENCHES - - - 528-536 1. When intrenching may be resorted to - 528 2. Field fortification as an auxiliary ... 528 Absence of progress. 3. Marshal Saxe's use of intrenchments 528 4. When placed in a bad position, opposed to a superior force - - 528 5. Turenne surprised by Conde - ... 529 6. Tracing field works ...... 529 Dimensions of parapets. 7. Natural obstacles not always sufficient ..... 529 Requisite thickness of earthworks. 8. Artificial cover ........ 530 Means of egress and ingress. 9. Excavating and obtaining cover ... 530 Period required for the execution of the work. 10. Time occupied in throwing up cover at the Dartmoor experiments - 530 11. Supply of tools for obtaining cover ------ 531 12. The increased importance of obtaining cover - - - - 531 13. Slight preparation of the ground previous to the battle of the Alma - 532 14. Attacking a position before an enemy intrenches ... 532 Marlborough at Donauwerth. 15. Neglect of intrenching at Albuera .... 533 16. Intrenchments in recent civil war in America .... 533 CONTENTS. xlvii 1 7. Transport of intrenching tools in France 18. Intrenching field artillery 19. French method Space of time required to throw up cover. PAGE 534 534 534 CHAPTER VIII. SECTION I. ENCAMPMENTS 1. Encamping in position 2. Where to establish cantonments 3. Object of encampments Mode of encamping. 4. Determining the choice 5. Sanitary position for camps 6. Excavations : shelter from wind 7. Sites for camps Geological considerations. 8. Formations adapted or otherwise 9. Soil affecting health 10. Clearance of brushwood - Trenching and draining. 537-542 537 537 537 538 538 539 539 539 541 541 SECTION II. MILITARY BRIDGES - 1. Their usual construction 2. Their classification .... Weights on bridges. 3. Waggons and carts as bridges - Raft cask and trestle bridges. 4. Waterproof sheet, trail flying, and swing flying bridge 5. When flying bridges are used - ... 6. Suspension bridges - - 7. Suitable places for their construction - Thickness of ice for troops and artillery. 8. Passage of Russians over the Dwina 9. Heavy guns over ice - 10. Destruction of Bridges .... Bridge over the Ticino. 542-548 542 543 543 544 544 545 545 546 546 546 xlviii CONTENTS. 11. Destruction by floating objects Stone and wooden bridges. Method practised at Bayonne. 12. To destroy floating bridges Torpedoes for wooden truss and suspension. 13. Destruction by floating bodies during a retreat PAOK 546 548 548 SECTION III. FORDS - 1. Importance of fords 2. Obtaining information concerning them - 3. Limits of depth : their direction 4. Precautions in crossing 5. Nature of bottom : floods, tides, &c. - 549-550 549 549 549 550 550 SECTION IV. CONVOYS 1. Descriptions of convoys .... 2. Their disposition for marching ... 3. Marching in a continuous column ... 4. Surplus waggons - .... Disposal of the escort. March of the convoy. 5. Means of transport - .... 6. Transport adapted to the country Rates of progress. 7. Precautions respecting gunpowder ... Parking. 8. How to meet an attack : where to place the prisoners 9. Attack of a convoy ..... 10. Attack on the Confederate waggons, after Gettysburg 550-555 550 550 551 551 552 552 553 554 554 555 INDEX 556-5G5 xlix FROM WHICH SELECTIONS AND EXTRACTS HAVE BEEN MADE. Aide-M emoire to the Military Sciences, framed from contributions of officers of the different services, and edited by a Com- mittee of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 1845 to 1852 . Colonel John Adye, C.B., R.A. Sitana: a mountain campaign on the borders of Afghanistan, in 1863. London, 1867 - Le General Baron Joachim Ambert. Etudes Tactiques, pour 1'instruction dans les camps. Ire serie. Paris, 1865 L'Archiduc Charles. Principes de la strategic, ouvrage traduit de TAllemand et attribue A. S. A. I. Vol. I. Paris, 1818 - De la Responsabilite dans la Guerre. Traduit de 1'Allemaud, par L. Dufour. . Capitaine D'Artillerie. Vienne, 1869 - Feldzeugmeister Chevalier Von Benedek. Tactical and General Instructions issued for the conduct of the Austrian Army, 1866. Translated by Major W. H. Goodenough, R.A. "JR.A. Institution" - A. Brialmont. Etude sur la Defense des Etats et sur la Fortifica- tion. Vol. I. BruxeUes, 1863 A. Briahnont. Systeme de defense de 1'Angleterre. Observa- tions critiques, sur le Rapport de la Commission d'enquSte. Paris, 1860 Lieut. -General Sir Henry Bunbury. Narratives of some passages in the Great War with France, from 1799 to 1810. London, 1854 - Field Marshal Sir John Fox Burgoyne. The Military Opinions collected and edited by Lieut. -Colonel, the Hon. George Wrottesley, R.E. London, 1859 .... Blackwood's Magazine. August, 1866. Review of the Continental War of 1866 Major-General the Hon. George Cathcart. Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany, in 1812 and 1813. London, 1850 Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E. Waterloo Lectures (A study of the Campaign of 1815). London, 1868 Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E. Campaigns in Virginia, Maryland, &c. London, 1865 - - Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E. Strategical value of Fortresses. Essay - Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E. Sherman's campaign in Georgia. " Journal, Royal United Service Institution " Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesuey, R.E. The Recent Campaigns in Virginia and Maryland. "Journal, Royal United Service Institution" -.---.. General Chesney, R.A., D.C.L., F.R.S. The Futsso-Turkish Cam- paigns of 1828-1829. 3rd Edition. London, 1854 ABBREVIATIONS. A ide-Menioire. Colonel Adye. Ambert. Archduke ClMrlcs. Archduke. Bencdck. Brialmont. Brialmonfs Defense de V Anglcterrc. Sir Henry Bunbury. Sir J. F. Burgoyne. Blackwood's Mag. m CatJicart. Clwsncy. Campaigns in Virginia, it on the other side to command both banks, and near a large fortified city like Mayeiice or Strasbourg, is of undoubted advantage ; but it will never be more than a temporary refuge, a means of gaining time and collecting reinforcements. When the object is to drive away the enemy, it will be necessary to leave the camp and carry on operations in the open country. 3 1 (Aide Mcmoire). G.G.L. a Napoleon. 3 Joinini, Chap. III., Art. 27. 136 STRATEGY. 7. "When you are obliged to attack an intrenched enemy, it is always best to do it immediately, and before his works are quite finished. What may be impracticable to-day, to-morrrow may be impossible. * * * The reason why intrenchments are generally forced, is because their flanks are not sufficiently secured. If intrenchments be flanked by a river which is fordable, they may be easily attacked on that side. Frederick the Great asserted that, " he was no advocate for intrenched camps, unless it were to cover a siege, and even in that case did not know whether it was not always more advisable to meet the enemy in the field." 1 8. The most celebrated of the intrenched camps of Frederick, that of Buntzelwitz, was constructed on a height, about two leagues from Schweidnitz. ***** This intrenched camp permitted Frederick, whose army consisted of only 60,000 men, to arrest 130,000 Austro-Russians, and to oblige them at length to retreat (1761). ******* The intrenched camps of Kehl and of Dusseldorf, which rendered such important services in the campaign of 1796, were in reality, only permanent tetcs-de-ponts. ******* But the most remarkable intrenched camp, and which has shewn to the greatest advantage, the immense services which may be rendered by a vast position, fortified, after the principles of modern tactics, is without doubt the intrenched camp of Torres Vedras. This camp offers some comparison, with that of Buntzelwitz ; but, Sir Arthur Wellesley, with more knowledge, than the engineers of Frederick, gave larger intervals to hia lines and greater strength to the works which formed them. 2 9. The intrenched camp ' of Buntzelwitz ' was * invested by the Russian and Austrian armies, with these it was resolved to attack the intrenched camp ; a well combined project of attack was formed, and all the dispositions for carrying it into effect were made. The Austrian troops assembled at their posts; but the Russian General 1 Frederick the Great. 2 Brialmont, Vol. I. INTRENCHED CAMPS. 137 dissented from the plan, declaring that it was imprudent to attack the King of Prussia in so formidable a position, and unnecessary to do so, because his Majesty would soon be forced to leave it for want of provisions. A few days afterwards, the Russian army raised the blockade, burned their tents, and repassed the Oder, leaving only a small auxiliary corps of 20,000 men with the Austrians. (Jomini, ut sup.). Marshal Laudon then renounced, of necessity, the hope of attacking the King of Prussia with any success, and returned to the camp of Kunzendorf, " Thus," says Jomini, "the King of Prussia luckily escaped the greatest danger he had ever incurred." The perilous predicament in which the King of Prussia placed himself on this occasion, was subsequently admitted by himself; and the error he committed, in thus exposing himself and his army, his country and his cause, to utter ruin, he strongly condemned : and, while admitting the importance of intrenched positions, when they cover important points, and protect communications with a base, by one or by several lines of operation, he came to the conclusion that the very worst resource of a large army, well constituted and well commanded, was to place itself in an intrenched camp, whether under a fortress or not, if the position were liable to be invested on all sides, and to have the communications with its base intercepted-. 1 10. Fortresses, to which are attached bodies of troops for offensive operations, by which those fortresses become in fact intrenched camps, unless protected on one side by the sea or some impassable obstacle, may be surrounded; and thus the troops in them may lose their connection with their proper base, and may be attacked and forced at some point on their periphery. Not such were the lines of Torres Vedras: the troops in these could not be starved out, nor could the lines be attacked but in front. They formed a Grand Tete, having its communications open to the sea ; and with its base at Lisbon, which it completely covered. 2 11. The dubious advantages, attendant upon the protection offered to troops, resting upon a system of lines, are remarked upon by General Sir William Napier : " Soult at the battle of Nivelle ; fared as most generals will, who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of numbers, or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and 1 Douglas. * Ibid. 138 STRATEGY. undisciplined soldiers lines may avail, seldom against accomplished generals, never when the assailants are the better soldiers. Caesar at Alesia resisted the Gauls, but his lines served him not at Dyrrachium against Pompey. Crassus failed in Calabria against Spartacus, and in modern times the Duke of Marlborough broke through all the French lines in Flanders. If Wellington triumphed at Torres Vedras, it was perhaps because his lines were not attacked, and, it may be, Soult was seduced by that example. His works were almost as gigantic and upon the same plan, that is to say, a river on one flank, the ocean on the other, and the front upon mountains covered with redoubts and partially protected by inundations. But the Duke of Dalmatia had only three months to complete his system, his labours were under the gaze of his enemy, his troops, twice defeated during the execution, were inferior in confidence and numbers to the assailants. Lord Wellington's lines at Torres Vedras had been laboured for a whole year. Massena only knew of them when they stopped his progress, and his army inferior in numbers had been repulsed in the recent battle of Busaco. It is not meant by this to decry intrenched camps within compass, and around which an active army moves as on a pivot, delivering or avoiding battle according to circumstances. The objection applies only to those exten- sive covering lines by which soldiers are taught to consider themselves inferior in strength and courage to their enemies. A general is thus precluded from showing himself at important points and critical periods ; he is unable to encourage his troops or to correct errors; his sudden resources and the combinations of genius are excluded by the necessity of adhering to the works, while the assailants may make whatever dispositions they like, menace every point and select where to break through. The defenders, seeing large masses directed against them and unable to draw confidence from a like display of numbers, become fearful, knowing there must be some weak point which is the measure of strength for the whole. The assailants fall on with that heat and vehemence which belongs to those who act voluntarily and on the offensive ; each mass strives to outdo those on its right and left, and failure is only a repulse, whereas the assailed having no resource but victory look to their flanks, and are more anxious about their neighbours fighting than their own." 1 1 Napier, Vol, VI, INTKENCHED CAMPS. 139 12. The second maxim as to these camps is, that they are particularly advantageous to an army at home or near its base of operations. If a French army occupied an intrenched camp on the Elbe, it would be lost when the space between the Ehine and Elbe was held by the enemy ; but if it were invested in an intrenched camp near Strasbourg, it might with a little assistance resume its superiority and take the field, while the enemy in the interior of France, and between the relieving force, and the intrenched army would have great difficulty in recrossing the Ehine. We have heretofore considered these camps in a strategic light ; but several German generals have maintained that they are suitable to cover places or to prevent sieges, which appears to me to be a little sophistical. Doubtless it will be more difficult to besiege a place when an army is encamped on its glacis ; and it may be said that the forts and camps are a mutual support ; but, according to my view, the real and principal use of intrenched camps is always to afford, if necessary, a temporary refuge for an army, or the means of debouching offensively upon a decisive point or beyond a large river. To bury an army in such a camp, to expose it to the danger of being outflanked and cut off, simply to retard a siege, would be a folly. 1 * 13. The system of intrenched camps was adopted very extensively by Napoleon at the time when he left large bodies of troops in possession of the numerous fortresses which had surrendered to him on the Elbe and the Oder, in 1813. Those cities, as Magdeburg, Wittenburg, Torgau, Dresden, Breslau, Custrin, Dantzig, Stettin, and Glogau, became, in fact, intrenched camps, and required armies for their defence. The measure was, no doubt, adopted under the expectation of being able, in his next campaign, to carry the war through Prussia and Silesia into Poland ; and, had he been able to do so, he would at once have recovered military possession of the country, and, with it, those important places : but, as events proved, he was deprived of a vast amount of force, which was shut up in the fortresses, or in positions near them. All these troops were either blockaded or captured, by the immense armies which the allies were enabled to send against them, without disabling themselves from operating efficiently and successfully in driving the French out of the countries. In retiring, Napoleon I. left behind him a total force 1 Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 27. 140 STRATEGY. which, in his subsequent necessities, would have been of the greatest importance to him ; while the blockading forces, which the allies were obliged to leave, in order to mask the fortresses, could, on account of the numerical superiority of their armies, without material incon- venience, be spared. 1 14. Intrenched camps should combine defensive and offensive faculties : the camp may be formed in contiguity to a place, and armies may, in case of need, take refuge in them ; yet the camp itself should be an offensive position, from which the troops it contains may be always ready to take the offensive in the field. To place in such camps troops of secondary character, incapable of acting efficiently in the field, would deprive an intrenched camp of the great object for which it should be constructed. None, therefore, but well appointed and well exercised troops, fit for any service in the field, should occupy in- trenched camps, on strategical points. 2 15. The chain of heights, extending in a serpentine line from Finchampstead in Berkshire to Guildford in Surrey, comprehending the wide plateaux of Easthampstead and Hartford Bridge, the Chobham and Farnham ridges, and the range of chalk-hills called the Hogs- back, constitute choice positions covering Windsor and the metropolis against an enemy coming from Hampshire and the south-western counties. This line, presenting numerous salient points, is capable of being fortified by field-works, disposed so as to defend one another and the ground about them ; and thus the whole position may be rendered a sort of Torres Yedras on a small scale. 3 Lines at York Town. 16. The fate of Cornwallis shows us that a small force, even within intrenched lines, if left without succour, cannot hold out indefinitely against a superior force. At York Town there were lines again in ' the Civil War, in the United States ' ; but this time not merely a small semicircle of lines round a village, but they were thrown across the 1 Douglas. 2 Ibid. 3 Hid. INTRENCHED CAMPS. 141 peninsula, and looked very formidable. The peninsula is about seven miles wide. There are creeks running into the rivers on each side, the land being low and swampy ; and the natural difficulties of the ground were increased by the engineering works of the Confederates, who possessed the best engineers of the old United States' Army. The place had a very strong look, and it was reported to be kept by about 20,000 men, the best of the Confederate army, under General Magruder. * * * * * How to turn them was the next difficulty. The gun-boats which accompanied M'Clellan's army were close to his right flank, and he might be supposed able to force his way up the York River. But the batteries on the York river were so strong the fire of forty of the very heaviest guns being brought, on that extreme point, to bear across the water and they were so effectually backed by the fire of another fort, which had been thrown upon the other side of the York River, at a place called Gloucester, that the commanders of the gun-boats thought it was impossible to take them up. You might ask, why M'Clellan did not use the James River, which is navigable all the way up ? For the simple reason that the celebrated Merrimac was at that time lying there ; and, as long as she lay there, so long the Northern General found himself unable to use the James River. This impediment limited M'Clellan to the York River, where gun- boats could not go past the works. M'Clellan had heard beforehand of the opposition he was to expect at this particular point. He was not unaware of these lines ; and probably he exaggerated the difficulty of passing them. He determined to turn them in this way. He landed with three out of four corps of his army, the three being under the command of three respectable officers of the old United States' Army. The fourth corps was under the command of M'Dowell, who, the year before, had lost the battle of Bull's Run ; and he was to come after the rest. He was to land on the Gloucester side of the peninsula, and turn the defences on that side of the river. It was supposed that by doing that, the gun-boats would then force their way up, and that, when they got behind the enemy's works, the enemy would abandon the works. 142 STRATEGY. ' The President, and the President's Cabinet, living at Washington/ insisted that the whole of M'Dowell's corps should remain behind. M'Clellan remonstrated against this ; and at last he succeeded in getting one out of the three divisions which composed M'Dowell's corps sent to him, the two others remaining behind. The one division that came, commanded by General Franklin, was thought too weak for the work, that the whole corps were intended to do, which was to land and turn the defences on the Gloucester side of the river. Hence M'Clellan resolved to lay siege to these intrenchments and take them by sap. A single attempt was made to carry them by storm, but it failed in a lamentable manner. He then sat down to besiege the place in due form. There was his mistake ; for the garrison, at first weak, had now gained strength. General Johnston, who had withdrawn from Manassas junction upon hearing of M'Clellan's plan, had at length reached the peninsula, bringing additional troops with him. It was on the 3rd of April that M'Clellan began his march, and we find that a month had elapsed before he was ready to push an attack on the Southern intrench- ments. Then, he pushed the attack so hard, that the Southerners thought themselves in danger ; and when they did find themselves in danger, they did not wait for the intrenchments to be taken ; they did not wait for the Northern army to come in and follow them; but quietly moving off in the night, and taking with them, guns, stores, and everything, they abandoned the whole intrenchment and fell back towards Richmond. M'Clellan followed them up, of course. There is a placed called Williamsburg, a day's march from York Town ; where again the peninsula is very narrow. There also the Southerners had thrown up works intended to detain the Northerners for a certain time before it, but they failed. An action took place on the arrival of M'Clellan's troops, as soon as they gathered in front of the enemy's works. General Sumner, the oldest officer in the Northern army, who commanded one of the corps of General M'Clellan's army, commenced an attack upon the enemy's works. By a very gallant action, one that bears examination well, a Northern brigade, by wading through an unguarded passage of one of the creeks which covered the front of the enemy's works, gained and occupied the ground on the other side, where M'Clellan soon supported them by more troops. The works were thus turned. There happened to be some open ground on their INTRENCHED CAMPS. 143 right, which had merely a creek in front of it ; this creek having been waded through, and these troops having established themselves on the other side, the strength of the works was gone; and if the Con- federates had waited another day, they would have been attacked to great disadvantage. 1 1 (U.S. Institution), C.C.C. 144 STKATEGY. CHAPTER V. SECTION I. COAST DEFENCE. 1. Coast defence, has for its object not only the prevention of an enemy from gaining, with the assistance of his navy, a foothold on shore, from destroying by the fire of his ships important depots, arsenals, navy-yards, &c., and from opening a road to the interior of the country by forcing the passage to and taking possession of navigable water-ways; but also the holding of points suitable for a basis for offensive and defensive operations of the national navy, or for a port for blockade-runners and vessels in distress. It would be a a financial impossibility to fortify all points that might be accessible to an enemy along a long- stretched sea- shore ; but granting even that the exchequer of a country should justify the erection of strong works for the protection of points of but secondary importance, a most fatal mistake would be made in the attempt to occupy and to hold all these points at one and the same time. The Confederates unwilling to yield to their enemy a single square inch of ground without obstinately contesting it, fell into the error of making an attempt, not only to hold too many points along their sea- coast, but also, along their navigable streams. 1 2. A perfect system of coast defence must necessarily combine two elements ; a local defence, based on the efficiency of batteries afloat and ashore, on obstructions and torpedoes ; and, if the seeming contradiction may be allowed, secondly, on offensive defence, or the series of active operations which must be left to the conjoined efforts of the army and navy. The success of local defence supposes : fortifications, that will withstand the fire of modern artillery; batteries, able to affect the the armour of iron-clad, such, as will, hereafter be used in attacks on fortified points ; and obstructions sufficiently strong to prevent the enemy's steamers from passing out of reach of these batteries without leaving them time for continuing their fire at close ranges. The 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. I. COAST DEFENCE. 145 success of an offensive defence, next to the strength and efficiency of the army and navy, will depend on the facilities that exist for the concentration of a sufficient force with which to hinder the enemy from establishing a lodgment at any given point on the coast, or should he have succeeded in effecting a landing, to oppose any further invasion. 1 3. As the movements of troops and materiel, are made usually from the centre towards the circumference, the most useful railways for the defence, are those which are directed towards the exterior, from the capital and the great strategical pivots. The lines along the frontier are of little use before invasions and dangerous after, the enemy being able to cut them at the commencement of hostilities and make them of service for his own operations. The only parallel lines of real use for the defence, are those which connect the great strategical pivots. The possibility of cutting a railroad between two places, exists less on maritime frontiers, than on others, the points for landing being limited in number, and watched by vessels. For that reason, and because it is very important to be able to concentrate quickly on the point threatened all the forces scattered for observation, it is right to establish parallel to the coast a line of railway connecting the most important maritime positions. 2 4. 'At the period of the threatened invasion of England, by Napoleon, ' Sir David Dundas held the chief command in Kent and Sussex. It was his intention, if he should be beaten on the shore, to withdraw his troops, not in the direction of London, but throwing back his right and centre to retreat upon the intrenched camp at Dover. In that strong position he could have brought the enemy to bay, and gained time for the gathering of the strength of Britain around the metropolis. Or, if the general had found that Napoleon disregarded him, and was marching straight upon London, then Dundas would have sallied forth and pressed close upon the rear and right flank of the enemy's columns. The direct road from Canterbury and the passage of the Lower Medway were barred by the intrenched camp at Chatham. The French must have taken their routes by Maidstone, Tunbridge, &c., through a more difficult country, where their columns would have been delayed by the breaking up of the roads. Sir James Pultney 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. I. a Brialmont, Vol. I. 10 146 STRATEGY. commanded in Sussex; Sir James Craig in Essex. "With the help of carriages the former would have reached the great chain of chalk hills before the enemy ; or he might have brought 10,000 men to bear on their left flank while it was embarrassed by the difficulties of the way through the Weald of Kent : Craig would have crossed the Thames from Tilbury, or have hastened directly to London. It would have been madness in the British to have risked a general battle in the field, even in such tempting positions as the chalk hills offer. Our troops were not then of a quality to meet and frustrate the manoeuvres of such an army as that which Napoleon would have led to the attack. 1 5. Sir Howard Douglas, in his tract on the defence of England, in 1859, states, as to the arrangements which should be adopted against an advance on the left bank of the Thames. * * * * * * * 'Positions should be reconnoitred and intrenched, upon which to fall back upon in succession, in order to cover the capital. A commodious steam ferry by rafts should be established between Gravesend and Tilbury Fort : each flat capable of transporting 1000 men at a trip ; so that all the disposable force on either bank of the river might be passed to that which is attacked, in order to intercept the invaders' communication with the sea, if they have, without due precautions, advanced into the interior : whilst all the troops stationed near the capital should unite with those first opposed to the invaders, on either side of them to effect which any- where there would be no difficulty. The forces of Kent and Essex united, and greatly strengthened by the resources on which they had fallen back, would be enabled to act with vigour against the enemy, who, being harassed on the flanks and rear by the irregular levies which would be brought against him during his advance, would scarcely risk a general action ; and, should he rashly make the attempt, there would be little doubt about the issue of the unequal contest.' 6. The principal laid down in the admirable work ' Report on the National Defences of the United States ' is that all assailable points should be guarded by forts, so as to leave the naval forces free. Forts can be made impregnable against any naval force that could be brought against them, and are needed for the protection of our fleets while 1 Sir Henry Bunbury. COAST DEFENCES. 147 preparing for hostilities on the ocean. The government and people of the United States view not with favour the substitution of floating batteries for permanent land defences, on account of the perishable nature of the former, and the inefficient state in which they may be when sudden danger menaces. The value which they might have, if in perfect order at the moment of being wanted, ceases as soon as the occasion which called them forth no longer exists ; and their speedy decay is certain. To leave the defence of harbours and other permanent establishments to temporary constructions so costly as ships, which are formed of perishable materials, would be to expend enormous sums in a manner which would invite attack by sea. If we rely for our defence on our naval force, no portion of it should be permitted to leave our coasts for the protection of our foreign commerce, in the event of an alarm of war occurring. 1 7. Fortifications, are among the best preparatives for defensive warfare once made, they are always ready with the applications of moderate means, to form a barrier to an enemy, or make his advance very hazardous. They form secure receptacles for the assembly of active forces ; while they can be held by those who are least useful or even totally inefficient for the field. They are, no doubt, expensive, but not unreasonably so, for the position they hold in the game of war. The cost of a single sloop of war, with its equipment, will construct a fine fort, which will last almost for ever ; and that of two or three line- of-battle ships will raise a fortress. It is by no means necessary to cover this country with fortifications, as is done on the continent ; but few people, who consider the subject, would not admit that it is most desirable to provide our naval arsenals, and a few leading points on the coast with defences, and to apply additional protection to some of our foreign possessions. 2 8. ^fortified, an enemy would only have to detach about 15,000 or 20,000 men from his main invading army to effect in a few days the destruction of all our ships and naval establishments at Portsmouth ; fortified, he must employ an army of at least three times that number, and must have a considerable time at his disposal to undertake a regular siege. ETttfortified, no force that, in the case referred to, we could 1 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III., Sec. X. '-' Sir J. F. Burgoync, Part I. 148 STEATEGY. afford for the garrisons of these places could protect either against the attack of 15,000 regular troops. Fortified, there is no difficulty in providing the numbers and description of troops that would be capable of making a good defence of these nurseries of the Navy. 7fortified, they at once fall if an enemy were to obtain a decisive victory over the army in the field ; fortified, they remain in our hands even under such untoward circumstances, and thus enable us to avert the destruction of our naval power at a period when all the resources of the country would be required to enable us to retrieve the position we had temporarily lost. The foregoing observations refer to the extended lines of works which cover our naval arsenals against attack by land. We have other defences against attack by an enemy on shore (for instance the fort at Newhaven), which have for their object to prevent an enemy who may have been enabled to land a comparatively small force, obtaining possession of harbours which, exceedingly valuable to us, as sheltering our cruizers and squadrons against attack by a superior force at the particular point assailed, would be admirable bases of operation for an enemy to harbour his men-of-war and transports for landing an army, especially the artillery, cavalry, and stores. "With the harbours on our coast thus defended, invasion becomes much more difficult, owing to the enemy being thrown upon the open beach to effect a landing. The works for the defence of these places absorb only a small and a partially disciplined force. 1 9. To provide against naval attack on a port during the absence of the fleet, big guns, with all the numerous accessories for their service, are necessary ; and these must be placed in positions so protected and arranged as to give them a decided superiority over the artillery of assailing ships. The question then arises whether they shall be placed afloat in strongly protected vessels, i.e., in floating batteries ; or at fixed points either on land or on shoals, i.e., in forts The proposal to defend our ports against naval attack by floating batteries alone, implies however, that we must maintain at each of our chief ports a naval squadron sufficiently powerful to resist, during the absence of our sea- going fleet, the attack of a superior force of the enemy. Then arise the questions, what is a sufficiently powerful force to maintain at each point 1 Jervois. COAST DEFENCES. 149 for this object ? what would be its first cost ? in how many years will it be necessary to repeat the outlay for it ? what will be the expense of its annual maintenance ? It is impossible to examine these questions without arriving at the conclusion that even if our resources in money and in seamen rendered it practicable to maintain such a force in addition to our sea- going Navy, the defence of our ports can be effected much more efficiently and economically with the aid of other means. As on land, fortification enables us to economise in troops ; so, on the sea-coast, we can, by the same means, economise in ships by providing for the protection of our harbours against naval attack. Irrespective, however, of the question of the expense of providing for coast defence by floating batteries alone, very little consideration is requisite to understand, that if there be positions on land from whence an effective fire can be brought to bear on the channel, anchorage, or shore to be defended, there is no object in placing the guns in vessels afloat. In positions such as referred to, there cannot be any object in substituting an unsteady platform on which the amount of protection that can be afforded is limited by considerations inherent to floating structures, and which is liable to be taken away or to be sunk, for a fixed and perfectly steady platform on shore, which can be fully protected, either against its fire being silenced, or from capture by an enemy. In cases, however, where the distance between forts is so great that the intervening space cannot be properly commanded by their fire, or where it may be necessary to have advanced batteries of artillery at a distance from the shore, and where foundations for fixed works cannot be obtained without expense and difficulty disproportioned to the object, it becomes necessary to employ floating defences. 1 10. Whatever improvements may be made in land batteries, their entire adequacy for the purpose of defence cannot be certain against the rapidity of steamers, and the facility of their manoeuvring power, unless the passage to be defended be narrow and perhaps tortuous ; but they may be powerful in combination with floating defences, which are peculiarly necessary in estuaries, in the mouths of many rivers, and in passages or inlets that are wide. 2 Jervois. 2 Sir J. F. Burgoyne. 150 STRATEGY. Positions of Batteries. 11. Coast batteries are usually erected on important situations, commanding the mouth of a river or harbour, which it is requisite to defend. Should the mouth be very wide, intermediate batteries must be placed between the opposite shores on islands, breakwaters, &c., or floating batteries must be moored in favourable positons, so that any vessels endeavouring to force an entrance shall, in doing so, be compelled to pass within comparatively short ranges of the batteries. ******* Another purpose for which guns are required in the defence of a coast, is to prevent troops landing from vessels in boats. Field or position artillery would generally be employed when the coast offers many beaches well adapted for the disembarkation of troops, but when there are but few landing places, so that the enemy must choose one of them, guns would be placed in field works, or permanent batteries erected in such situations as will enable the fire of the battery to flank the beach. 1 12. It is not easy to assign any general rule for the most advantageous height of a battery above the level of the sea, because that level alters with the tide : the height should also depend on the degree of proximity to which vessels may, from their draught of water, approach to attack. It may be stated in general that all batteries should have some command over the body fired at. The most favourable situation for a gun battery in the field service is about one- hundredth part of the range above the position of the enemy. But this low command is sufficient only in firing against troops : when the fire of one battery is directed against another, a more considerable command is of great importance. At the siege of Burgos, in 1812, the batteries of the place were 50 feet above the breaching battery, at the distance of 150 yards only ; and their effect was irresistible, the shot plunging on the very platforms of the besiegers' battery. Owen. COAST DEFENCE. 151 Land batteries properly placed, well armed and skilfully served, may open with great effect on our enemy's ships at great distances, and keep up, as the latter approach, a continued and deliberate fire, the effect of which will become still more formidable in proportion as the ships are nearer. 1 13. If, * * ships be permitted to approach with impunity, to measure well their distances from a fortress, and then deliberately open their fire, the torrent of iron which they may throw in must be irresistible and overwhelming, particularly if the batteries are placed a fleur d'eau, and consequently commanded by the upper decks of large ships. Batteries placed nearly on a level with the water are far more subject to the fire of ships, and are much less formidable to them, than batteries elevated somewhat above the surface of the sea : whereas shot, even the best directed, from the ship, will, except such as may chance to enter the embrasures, or graze the crest of the parapet, pass over the heads of the defenders in the battery without doing any material harm. Should any guns be mounted en barbette, which ought never to be the case in sea-batteries intended for close or flanking defences, they would inevitably be dismounted. 2 Elevation of Batteries. 14. In proportion as batteries are elevated, they lose in the best effect of their own fire, but become far less exposed to suffer from that of ships. There is also from elevated direct batteries, if close to the water, a certain space near them which they cannot command at all, and where vessels or boats would consequently be safe from them. It is an object to strike out a medium between these conflicting advantages and disadvantages, by which the battery may be greatly secured from the fire from afloat, without losing very essentially in its own effects. This may be done by placing the guns at not less than fifty feet, above the level of the water : (high tides). 3 * * * 1 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III., Sec. X. 2 Ibid. 3 Sir J, F, Burgoyne. 152 STKATEGY. 15. The advantage of having guns in action on a precipice, or on ground, so steep as to catcli the enemy's shot without their rebounding, even without any front cover, is well known, as there is but one small limit of altitude within which the opposing shot can take effect; whereas, when subject to the ricochet, the course that may be effective is greatly prolonged. 1 16. Choctaw Bluff is situated on the right bank of Alabama river "110 miles above Mobile" at a distance of 8 miles from Owen Bluff, on the left bank of the Tombigbee river, and about 50 miles above the junction of these rivers. Both places had been fortified, with the view of closing the navigation of the two rivers in case Mobile should fall into the hands of the enemy. The highest elevation of the bluff above the mean height of the Alabama river is 91 feet; its slope towards the bend of the river is gradual, whilst its fall towards the river-bank and a boggy bottom, that is situated between the river and a millpond, is very steep. The position was well chosen, the course of the river being such as to expose a boat to a heavy fire, not only while' approaching and passing the batteries, but also after having passed them. 2 17. The works which the in-shore squadron ' at the naval attack on Sebastopol ' undertook to engage, were three : At a bend of the coast north-east of Cape Constantine, there stood that small fastness which the English surnamed the 'Wasp.' Overhanging the shore, at an elevation of 130 feet above the level of the sea, the work was so well covered round by its glacis, that, much as it made itself felt, the Allies, at the beginning of the war, hardly knew the form of its structure. They have since learnt that it was a small square tower 27 feet high, with a diameter of 50 feet, and surrounded by a ditch. Besides a piece placed for the defence of its drawbridge, it mounted on its summit eight guns, being one at the centre of each of the four sides, and one at each of the four angles. Of those eight guns, there were five that could be brought to bear upon shipping in the waters beneath. The Telegraph battery was an earthwork on the cliff, which gave it an elevation of 100 feet ' above the level of the water. It was armed with five guns, all having command towards the sea. The great casemated fastness called 1 Sir J. F. Burgoyne. 2 Von Scheliha, Chap. IV. COAST DEFENCE. 153 Fort Constantine stood at the water's edge, and along with Fort Alexander and the Quarantine Sea-fort contributed largely to the cross-fire which defended the entrance of the roadstead and its approaches. ***** ******* * * Altogether, the fort mounted 97 guns, of which more than 60 were in casemates, 27 in the open-air batteries at the top of the fort. Of these 97 guns there were 43, according to General de Todleben, that could be brought to bear upon some portion or other of the allied fleet that is to say, 23 (at a very long range) upon the French fleet, 18 upon the main division of the English fleet, and 2 only in the direction of a vessel approaching from the north along the five-fathom edge of the shoal. 1 18. * * As soon as the Arethusa and Albion had been disabled and beaten off, the fire from the cliff, which before had been divided in its objects, became concentrated with powerful effect upon the three remaining ships. Of these the London was the one which lay closest under the guns of the Telegraph battery. So, against that battery as his real antagonist, Captain Eden, exerted the whole power of his port broad-side ; but after a while he was able to assure himself of that which we now know with certainty namely, that his ship, whilst sustaining a good deal of havoc and losing men, killed and wounded, was absolutely powerless against the battery. 2 * * * 19. If the casemated batteries at the water's edge proved all but safe against shot, they did not, on the other hand, exert much power ; and unless a third species of force had been ready to take part in the combat neither the ships nor the sea-forts would have been very much altered in their relative strength by the effect of a three hours' fight. But the interposition of the two little works on the cliff, or perhaps indeed we may say of the Telegraph battery alone, wrought so great a havoc in the ships which came under their guns, as to give to the coast defences a decisive ascendant over their naval assailants; and this result the cliff batteries were enabled to achieve without being subjected in return to any grave loss or injury. In the Wasp, 22 men were wounded, and a gun carriage overturned, but that Telegraph battery which wrought so great a havoc in our ships sustained no harm at all in either men or material. 3 1 Kinglake, Vol. III. 2 I1>M. Ibid. 154 STEATEGY. Firing at vessels in motion. 20. The greatest difficulty to be encountered by the artillery on shore against shipping, consists in firing with good effect at vessels when in rapid motion ; this will be particularly experienced against steamers, the progress of which class does not depend in any great degree, either in direction or in speed, on wind or tide. If the vessel is approaching the battery end on, or nearly so, the firing at her will be comparatively easy ; the line of direction will alter but little, and the elevation will be almost the only matter to be attended to. The time for which she will be exposed to the fire from any one battery will depend upon her speed; with steamers it can always be very rapid. Supposing them to be, therefore, of considerable power, and reckoning on a speed of twelve miles per hour, to pass a battery at a close range, they would be exposed just ten minutes from the effective range (assuming it to be a mile) on the approach, and for three or four minutes more to the longer ranges in receding. This period of time will be proportionately reduced from the extreme case of having to pass close to the battery to that of passing it one mile distant, where they will only be exposed for a few seconds. 1 21. 'At Shoeburyness on the 15th May, 1868, the following ex- periments took place, to ascertain the probable effect of firing at vessels in motion : ' the target was a light timber frame 5 feet square, mounted on wheels, and attached by a long trail rope to a limber drawn by four horses the range varied between 900 and 1000 yards. The rate at which the target moved was as follows : 1st, at a walk, the distance of 930 yards was traversed in nine minutes, at the rate of 3J miles an hour, or T72 yards per second; 2nd, at a trot, the same distance was traversed in three minutes ten seconds, at a rate of ten miles an hour, or five yards a second. The nine-inch muzzle-loading rifled gun of 12 tons was first employed with a charge of 301bs. and a 2501b. shot. It was mounted on a traversing platform moving on racers of 6' and 16' 6" radii, and an imaginary front pivot. The gun detachment consisted of one officer and twelve men, all highly trained. The 1 Sir J. F. Burgoyne. COAST DEFENCE. 155 average velocity of the shot would be about 1320 feet per second, the time of flight for 1000 yards about 2'2 seconds, and the space through which the target would move in that time would be : walking, 4 yards ; trotting, 11 yards. The difficulties of aiming accurately at an object only 5 feet square, moving rapidly over a surface not altogether level, were therefore considerable. The next experiment, was made with a 22-ton gun, firing a 600 Ib. shot, with a 50 Ib. charge. This gun traversed on racers (described from an imaginary centre near the muzzle) laid on a turn table 22 feet in diameter, such as would be used in a fixed iron turret, with two or more ports. After each round, the muzzle of the gun was brought round to the loading position about 70 to the left. The supply of shot lay about 30 feet to the rear, on the same level as the turn table ; they were rolled on skids under the muzzle of the gun, girthed by a sling of spunyarn, and hoisted by a small sheers and tackle to the level of the muzzle. The powder was in a position analogous to that which it would occupy if it had been hoisted from a magazine beneath. The gun detachment consisted of one officer and seventeen men, all highly trained. The conclusions to be drawn from the practice, which has been described, are to this effect : 1st, The time occupied by a vessel in traversing one mile at a speed of ten miles an hour, would admit of a 9-inch 12-ton gun being loaded ' and fired seven times, and the 22-ton gun three times in each mile. 2nd, Crossing the range of a 12-ton gun mounted in a casemate, or in a battery, where the traversing angle is 70 at a distance of 1000 yards, at a speed of ten miles an hour, a vessel may be fired at six times ; as the range is increased, or the speed is diminished, a pro- portionately larger number of shots may be fired at her Cceteris paribm. The 22-ton gun would have fired at her three times. 3rd, None of the shots recorded, would have missed an iron-plated vessel of the ordinary height above water. 4th, The 12 -ton gun can be loaded, aimed, and fired with accuracy in less than one minute, the 22-ton gun in less than two-and-a-half minutes. 1 ***** 1 Report of the Committee on Fortifications. App. No. 2, p. 6. 156 STRATEGY. 22. Extract from Admiral Farragufs, report on passing the batteries at Vicksburg, on 28th June, 1862, with the fleet under his command, consisting of fourteen vessels in all : * * * * " I passed up at the lowest speed, and even stopped once, in order that the Brooklyn and sternmost vessels might close up. The Hartford received but little injury from the batteries in or below the town, but several raking shots from the battery above the town did us considerable damage : they were 50-pounder rifle and 8-inch solid shot. The first passed through the shell-room in the starboard forward passage, and lodged in the hold, but did no other harm. The 8 -inch struck the break of the poop, and passed through the cabin, but hurt no one ; the rigging was much cut, and the main- topsail yard was cut in two. If the ships had kept in closer order, in all probability they would have suffered less, as the fire of the whole fleet would have kept the enemy from his guns a longer space of time, and when at his guns, his fire would have been more distracted. When we reached the upper battery, we soon silenced it, and it was reported to me that its flag was struck. We therefore gave three cheers ; but when we had passed about three quarters of a mile above, they re-opened fire with two heavy guns." 1 * * * 23. Extract from Commander Wainw right's report, of the passing the batteries, at Vicksburg. * * * " We laboured under the great disadvantage of not knowing the situation of the batteries, which were only discovered by the flash and the smoke of their guns ; some also were on high bluffs, rendering it difficult to elevate our guns to reach them. We were under fire about one hour-and-a-half, receiving it on the broadside, and being raked ahead and astern. The enemy fired with great precision, and although we silenced some of their batteries, they returned to them when we had passed, and our guns could no longer bear, and recommenced firing. 2 * * * *" 24. Admiral Farragut's fleet, with which he passed the heavy batteries of Fort Morgan, consisted of four iron-clads and fourteen steamers. Not a single one of the guns in the Confederate batteries was silenced by the torrent of shrapnel shell and grape poured into them, as each vessel passed. Admiral Buchanan's little squadron iron- clad Tennessee, wooden gun-boats Morgan, Selma, and Oaines made a 1 Von Scheliha. Chap. V. 2 Ibid. COAST DEFENCE. 157 most heroic resistance. The channel had been partially obstructed, and not without all results ; and yet the Federal fleet forced a passage, and the lower Bay of Mobile was lost to the Confederates. 1 25. The only losses of ships sustained by a Federal fleet whilst passing Confederate batteries were caused by a vessel running aground, and remaining thus exposed to a heavy artillery fire, as in the case of the Mississippi and PMlippi ; or by a vessel striking a torpedo, as in the case of the Tecumseh. But sand-bars and torpedoes are, the ones natural, the others artificial, obstructions; and too much importance cannot be attached to this most potent element in coast-defence. 2 26. The Royal Commissioners reported in 1860: "We are, however, convinced that no practicable amount of fire from batteries can be depended upon to stop the passage of steam-ships, if the channel be sufficiently clear to allow of their proceeding at great speed. On the other hand, there is no reasonable probability of a fleet attempting such a passage, unless it can, by continuing its course, arrive at a space where it would be comparatively unmolested, and be free to carry out some object of importance, such as the destruction of a fleet or dockyard." Forfs versus ships. 27. A fort, is able to inflict far greater damage upon its assailant than the latter can inflict upon it ; whilst it will hit the assailant nearly every time, the chances of the assailant hitting it more than once on the same spot are small. Further, one shot may send a ship to the bottom, whilst the fire from the ship during action is more or less inaccurate. There is no instance that I know of, of a fort ever having been breached by a ship in a naval action. In all the cases in which forts were breached during the late civil war in America, the attack was by batteries on land, from which fire can be directed leisurely, and with a precision that is unattainable in naval attack. In the cases of Fort Sumter, Charleston, Fort Morgan, Mobile, Fort Pulaski, Savannah, which are sometimes cited as instances of successful attack on masonry forts ; the attacks which were successful were all from land batteries, and the forts were only thin brick structures. 3 1 Von Scheliha. Chap. VI. 2 Ibid. Chap. VIII. 3 Jervois. 158 STKATEGY. 28. * * * It will be sufficient to remember, that the success of the French wooden ships of war, at Tangiers, Mogador, San Juan d'UTLoa, and also of the English wooden ships, at Algiers in 1816, at Beyrout in 1840, was chiefly owing to the inexperience of their opponents. The more recent honorable deed of arms at Kinburn, cannot be taken as an example, on account of the great superiority of the allied squadrons, opposed to the Eussian fortress. 1 29. Admiral Dupont, in his report of the attack of United States Iron-Glads, on Fort Sumter, 7th April, 1863 : states, " The Monitors and the Keokuk were able to get within easy range of Fort Sumter, at distances varying from 550 to 800 yards, in which positions they were subjected successively to a tremendous concentrated fire from all the batteries on Sullivan's Island, Morris Island, Sumter, and others of the most formidable kind, and from guns of the heaviest calibre. Not being able to place the New Ironsides where I desired, though she was within a distance of 1000 yards, and evening approach- ing, at 4 30', I made signal to withdraw from action, intending to resume the attack the next morning. During the evening, the com- manding officers of the iron-clads came on board the flag-ship, and, to my regret, I soon became convinced of the utter impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force under my command. No ship had been exposed to the severest fire of the enemy over forty minutes, and yet, in that brief ^period, as the Department will perceive by the detailed reports of the commanding officers, five of the iron-clads where wholly or partially disabled : disabled, too (as the obstructions could not be passed), in that which was most essential to our success I mean in their armament, or their power of inflicting injury by their guns. ****** The other iron-clads, though struck many times severely, were still able to use their guns ; but I am convinced that, in all probability, in another thirty minutes, they would have been likewise disabled." 2 30. New Orleans was defended seawards by Forts St. Phillip and Jackson, on either bank of the Mississippi, with a boom extended across 1 GriveL 2 Von Scheliha, Chap. VII. COAST DEFENCE. 159 the river below them, consisting of a chain cable supported by a raft of logs, and eight hulks moored abreast, from 50 to 80 yards apart. Two Confederate iron-clads and thirteen gun-boats also assisted in the defence. Both forts were bombarded, at a distance of 2,850 to 3,680 yards, by mortar-boats, and by some ships under the command of Admiral D. G. Farragut, from the 18th April, 1862, for six days and nights. At four a.m., on the 24th April, the Federal squadron passed the defences under a heavy fire both from the forts and ships, a party having boarded one of the hulks, cast off the chains, and opened a passage in the boom. Eleven of the Confederate vessels were destroyed in the fight, whilst the Federal flag- ship Hartford (a wooden frigate) received thirty-two shot. These injuries did not, however, deter the admiral from pursuing his advantage, for at noon on the following day his squadron attacked, silenced, and passed two batteries which they found between Fort Jackson and New Orleans. In consequence of the passage of the forts, the city was evacuated by the Confederate Army, and the communications of Forts St. Philip and Jackson being cut off, they were surrendered on the 28th, four days after they were turned. 1 31. The island of Lissa lies in the Adriatic, some thirty miles south of Spalato. Between it and the main land lie the islands of Lesina, Brazza, and Solta. Between Lissa and Lesina there is a strait of a breadth of about fifteen miles. In Lissa, there are two ports, those of San Giorgio and Comisa. ****** On the evening of the 17th July, 1866, Persano issued orders that Admiral Vacca, with three iron-clad vessels and a corvette, should bombard Comisa ; that the main force, consisting of eight iron-clads, a corvette, and a despatch-boat, should assail San Giorgio ; and that Admiral Albini, with four wooden frigates and a despatch-boat, should effect a landing at the port of Manego on the south side of the island, in rear of the works of San Giorgio. Two vessels were to cruise on the 1 Fraaer's Mag. 160 STRATEGY. north and east of Lissa during these operations, in order to give timely warning of the approach of the Austrian fleet. On the morning of the 18th, Yacca began to bombard the works of Comisa. He soon found, however, that his guns could not attain sufficient elevation to do much damage. He gave up the attack, and sailed for Port Manego. Albini, at Manego, for similar reasons as Vacca, could not effect a landing, and Vacca sailed to join Persano. The latter had begun to bombard San Giorgio at eleven in the morning ; by three o'clock, when Vacca arrived, he had blown up two magazines, and silenced several of the Austrian batteries. He could not, however, succeed in sending his ships into the harbour, and the prosecution of the attack was postponed till the next day. On the evening of the 18th, the whole of Persano's fleet was assembled in front of San Giorgio, and in the night it was joined by the ram Affondatore and three wooden vessels. That evening Persano heard that the Austrian fleet was leaving Fasana to attack him. He calculated, however, that it could not approach Lissa before nightfall on the 19th, and determined to make a second attack upon the island on that day, and issued in consequence the following orders : Albini, with the squadron of wooden ships and the gun-boats, was to attempt a landing at Port Carobert, south of San Giorgio. The iron- clads, Terrible and Varese, were to bombard Comisa, in order to prevent the garrison there from reinforcing that of San Giorgio. The floating battery, the Formidable, was to enter the harbour of San Giorgio, and silence the batteries inside. Yacca, with the Principe de Carignano, Castelfidardo, and Ancona, was to support the Formidable ; the Re di PortagaUo and the Palcstro were to bombard the outside batteries ; while Persano himself, with the Re d 'Italia, the San Martino, and the Maria Pia, were to prevent opposition being offered to Albini's landing. ******** The Formidabile entered the harbour, and taking post four hundred yards distant from the Austrian batteries at the extreme end, opened fire. A battery on the northern side told severely upon her, and Persano ordered the Affondatore to open upon this battery through the mouth of the harbour. This was done, but without much effect. Yacca formed his three iron-clads in single line, steamed into the harbour, and opened on the batteries inside ; but he could not efficiently support the COAST DEFENCE. 161 Formidabik, both because she herself covered the Austrian batteries, and on account of the difficulty of manoeuvring in the narrow space within the harbour, which is only about one hundred fathoms wide. He was soon forced to quit the harbour, and was followed by the Formidable, which had lost sixty men, and suffered considerably. The latter was sent the same evening to Ancona for repairs. 1 32. In the attack by the Allied Fleets, on the coast defences of Sebastopol ; five results evolved by the conflict, are thus summarised by Mr. Kinglake. (1) At ranges of from 1600 to 1800 yards, a whole French fleet failed to make any useful impression upon a fort at the water's edge, though its guns were all arranged in open-air batteries and firing from over the parapet. (2) An earthen battery mounting only five guns (the Telegraph), but placed on the cliff at an elevation of 100 feet, inflicted grievous losses and injury on four powerful English ships of war, and actually disabled two of them, without itself having a gun dismounted, and without losing even one man. (3) At ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, and with the aid of steam frigates, throwing shells at a range of 1600 yards, three English ships in ten minutes, brought to ruin and cleared of their gunners the whole of the open-air batteries (containing 27 guns), which were on the top of a great stone fort, at the water's edge. (4) The Allied fleet, operating in one part of it, at a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards ; and in another part of it at ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, failed to make any useful impression upon casemated batteries, protected by a good stone wall from five to six feet thick. (5) Under p the guns of a great fort by the water's edge, which, Ithough it had lost the use of its topmast pieces of artillery, still had 1 Hozier, Vol. II. 162 STRATEGY. all its casmates entire, and the batteries within them uninjured, a great English ship, at a distance of only 800 yards, lay at anchor and fighting for hours without sustaining any ruinous harm."* l 33. The fire was delivered from more than 1100 pieces of heavy artillery, whilst, to meet this great cannonade, the Russians could only bring to bear on the fleets 152 guns ; and of those there were as many as 105, that were in open-air batteries firing over the parapet, so that there were only 47 casemated guns to meet all the broadsides of the Allied fleets. 2 Co-operation of Naval and Land Forces. 34. The capture and destruction of Bomarsund with little loss, and in a very short time, by the skilful manner in which the military and naval forces co-operated with each other in those operations, are satisfactory illustrations * of the success, which, * will usually attend all such well concerted undertakings. The forts were breached, and the fortress reduced to the necessity of surrendering, by a few powerful solid shot guns landed from the ships of the com- bined fleet. * It is no disparagement to the naval forces to assert that they, alone, could not have demolished the defences of Bomarsund in so short a time, and not without much damage to the ships. The firing of shot and shells from the French and English ships, at long ranges, caused no serious injury ; but the breaching of the forts, and the skilful establishment of a breaching battery within 400 yards of the rear of the fortress, rendered all further resistance vain. 3 35. As regards attack by land, we have to provide against the great range, accuracy, and penetration of rifled ordnance ; but the ordnance used by a besieger must still be comparatively light. Such pieces as our 12-inch or 600-pounders, weighing 23 tons, as the * Of course, the value of the experience tlms acquired by the Agamemmon must depend upon a question still somewhat obscure, i.e., the number of guns in the casemates of Fort Constantino, which could really be brought to bear upon her. The impunity of the Rodney would be even more instructive than the experience of the Agamemmon, if it were not for the surmise referred to, ante, p. 445. 1 Kmglake, Vol. III. 2 Ibid. 3 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III, Sec. X. COAST DEFENCE. 163 10- inch, or 400-pounders, weighing 18 tons, as the 9-inch or 250-pounders, weighing 12 tons, or as the 7-inch or 115-pounders, weighing 7 tons, together with the ponderous ammunition for them, cannot be dragged about on land. It was the armour-plating of ships that caused the introduction of these great guns, and it is in ships and against ships not in forts or against forts intended only to resist land attack, that, they are required to be used. 1 36. However successful a naval attack of a fortress or arsenal may be, the work of destruction can never be effectually accomplished by ships. The sea-defences may be silenced, guns dismounted, parapets ruined, magazines blown up by mortar- shells, and habitations devastated by the cruel process of bombardment ; but no substantial demolition of the defences, or material destruction of the public works and property, can be effected unless the damages inflicted by the attacks of ships be followed up and completed, by having actual possession of the captured place for a sufficient time to ruin it entirely. No naval operation, however skilfully planned and gallantly executed, can alone reap the fruits of its victory. 2 37. * The rule of the previous concert of the land and sea forces is not a recent idea. In general terms, no naval expedition is complete, no naval siege is practicable, without the addition of a corps for landing, ready to turn the position and to attack it on the land side. To this rule, it is true that we can bring forward, a notable exception, the capture of the Fort San Juan d'Ulloa (Mexico, 1839) by a French naval division, without a single soldier. But sagacious minds will not be mistaken : " Les exceptions confirment les regies ! " 3 38. The attack of fortresses and powerful land batteries with a naval force only, must ever be a hazardous, and perhaps desperate un- dertaking. But if skilfully combined with a military force sufficiently strong to make good its landing, to invest the place or the batteries on the land side, to take the defences in reverse, and so open the way to the attack by sea, the object of the attack will in general be successful. But this mode of proceeding can only bo applied when the place to be attacked occupies a position, insular or otherwise, of such extent as to admit of being attacked by land as well as by sea. In combining 1 Jervois. * Sir Howard Douglas, Part III, See. X. s Grivel. 164 STEATEGY. military and naval operations of this description, the first and main difficulty to be encountered is to effect a landing and establish a lodg- ment on the enemy's coast, in the face of a large military force, which ought always to make the most determined efforts to oppose a debarkation or prevent a lodgment from being made good ; for, as in the assault of a breach, and in forcing the passage of a river, if a solid lodgment be once established on the crest of the one, or on the further side of the other, a fulcrum is obtained which, if skilfully used, and supported with sufficient means, will ensure the success of the enterprise. 1 39. When the place, fortress, or arsenal to be attacked is covered and protected by isolated points of defence, mutually protecting each other, and when no previous military operation can be made, those points or outposts should be attacked in detail and successively reduced ; after which the fleet may arrive at, and attack the main position. This must evidently be a protracted and difficult process, even with such means ; with ships alone it cannot be effected without severe loss and damage ; and it should always be remembered that many of the attacking ships would be severely injured, probably disabled, in the attempt, whilst the enemy's fleet would remain untouched and in reserve. It would therefore follow that the attacking fleet must be exposed to a very disadvantageous action with the enemy, in the event of the latter subsequently leaving his place of shelter. 2 40. Vertical fire is proverbially uncertain, but when employed for its legitimate purposes, to bombard large spaces, very great and terrible execution can be produced by firing large shells at high angles. 3 41. The bombardment by the French squadron of San Juan d'TJlloa in 1838, and of Vera Cruz in 1839, may be taken as proofs of the uncertainty of vertical shell practice against castles or other small places. 4 1 Sir Howard Douglas, Part II, Sec. X. 2 Ibid., Part III., Sec. X. 3 Owen. 4 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III, Sec. X. COAST DEFENCE. 165 Batteries en barbette. 42. The simplest form of battery for guns, is one to fire en barbette. In this case, there is no difficulty about the construction of embrasures, the requisite protection for the guns and gunners against horizontal fire being obtained by an unbroken parapet. The exposure to which the artillery would be subjected in batteries on a comparatively low level, if the guns were always seen above the parapet, renders it un- desirable, however, to construct batteries en barbette, except at a considerable elevation, say about 100 feet above the sea, in which case the guns and men working them are scarcely seen from seaward. It is, however, undesirable in any case to construct batteries en barbette, where they would stand out in strong relief against the sky line. The advantage of a barbette battery, is the great extent of lateral range of the guns which can be obtained, and it is a question on which differences of opinion have always arisen, according to the taste of the individual, whether it is better to obtain this at the probable expense of gunners' lives, or to have a limited amount of lateral range, coupled with greater security. 1 ***** 43. The calibre and number of guns supposed to be equal, a battery, the guns of which are mounted en barbette, may always be silenced by an iron-clad, protected by plating of sufficient thickness. But an enemy will always have the advantage of being able to concentrate against any number of guns ashore, a larger number of guns on his ship : he may commence an engagement or break it off at his own convenience ; may choose his own ranges and positions, and use his shrapnel with terrific effect against so desirable a mark as a gun mounted en barbette, must be to the naval gunner. Masking the guns of the batteries with sand-bags, and retaining the fire till the enemy has approached to within so close a range that the fire must necessarily produce a severe effect on the iron-clad, or iron-clads, against which it is concentrated, is probably the best way of fighting a barbette- gun battery ; yet the battery will, after all, in nine cases out of ten, be silenced by the rapid firing of the superior number of guns brought against it. Therefore, in order to Jervois 166 STRATEGY. build a battery able to cope with modern iron-clads, it is not only necessary to avoid in the construction of the battery, all material not able to withstand the effect of a heavy artillery-fire, but it is also absolutely necessary to give to guns and gun-detachments a more efficient protection, than is afforded them by mounting the guns en barbette. 1 Turrets. 44. The lateral range obtainable in the barbette system, combined with the protection afforded by the embrasure and iron shield plan, can be obtained by the employment of turrets, which may be employed without reference to the elevation of the battery above the water. * The objection to turrets is, that they are very expensive. * ****** The question then arises whether that amount of money can be applied to any other kind of work, so as to afford a more powerful fire upon the space to be commanded than can be obtained from two guns in a turret. In many cases it will be found that it is so; in other cases, however, like the Spithead forts, where the works are entirely sur- rounded by water, it will be found that in order to employ the most powerful guns with the greatest effect, it is necessary to employ turrets. 2 Moncrieff's Carriage. 45. The great point of this invention is, that it enables us to protect guns in open batteries, by a parapet unweakened by openings, and thus to have the advantage of the great lateral range of barbette batteries, even at a low level above the water, without exposure, except at the moment of firing; it enables us, at the same time, to avoid using iron shields at the embrasures of opening batteries, and thus to effect a saving of expense. 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. IV. 2 Jervois. COAST DEFENCE. 167 Works constructed for carriages of this description will not afford protection against vertical fire, nor are they applicable in cases in which casemated structures are necessary. 1 46. Captain Moncrieff, observes, "It is obvious that the possibility of dispensing with a parapet without losing the command of the front of the battery, would give an advantage of an important kind. This advantage, I seek to obtain in its greatest degree by employing gun- pits, in which all the vital parts of the carriage remain below the level of the surface, and the gun itself is only exposed when it is going to be fired. " For coast batteries liable to be opposed to the heaviest artillery in ships, a very strong work is now absolutely required to protect the guns from the terribly destructive effects of modern projectiles, which have a penetration far beyond what was dreamed of when most of the existing fortresses were built ; and, as accuracy of fire has increased, as well as its power, the guns cannot be mounted en barbette. " In order, therefore, to be efficient, coast batteries must be of great strength, and proportionately expensive, especially when iron is used in their construction. " I wish this to be borne in mind, while I point out that by taking advantage of the natural undulations of the ground, scarping down the rear of hillocks to make them into batteries, and applying the skill of our military engineers to use whatever nature has supplied in each place, many positions might be defended on my system from the attacks of the heaviest artillery, at a small per centage of the cost which is now required to construct batteries with iron embrasures, cupolas, &c. ; and that, notwithstanding the economy of these works, they would be- probably as invulnerable as their more expensive rivals." 2 Casemated sea batteries. 47. A work for sea-defence must be casemated when it is necessary to provide by tiers of guns, an amount of fire which cannot be obtained by a lateral extension of the work. A sea-battery should be casemated, when otherwise it would be liable to be plunged into by fire from ships. 1 Jervois. z A. Moncrieff. 168 STRATEGY. Casemates are also applied in some cases when it is necessary to secure the battery against the fire of infantry from the rear, and when this cannot be effected by traverses, or when the work is on the side of a hill, or being in front of another battery, must be secured from splinters of rocks or shells. It will be found in many cases that for sea-batteries, a casemated construction is on the whole not only more efficient, but more economical than a fort with an earthen parapet, supposing the same numbers to be provided for in each case. The reasons for this are, that whilst in an open earthen battery, the barracks, magazines, and other accessories have to be provided for separately, and the defensive enclosure must be of large area, and in addition to the battery ; in a casemated work, the battery, barracks, magazines, &c., are provided under the same roof, and the defensive enclosure, which is comparatively small in extent, is formed by the casemated structure itself. 1 48. Fort Sumter, at Charleston, was in great part only five feet thick, and nowhere more than eleven feet thick ; the most powerful guns in it were two 7-inch pieces, but it beat off a fleet con- sisting of eight turreted ships (Monitors), and one broadside iron- clad of sixteen guns, armed with 15-inch and 11 -inch American guns. One vessel, the Keokiik, sank after the action, owing to the effects of the fire from the fort. Many say that granite casemates with iron embrasures will not stand naval attack ; but the experience of men like General Bipley, who commanded in the defence of Charleston against the attack of the Federal iron-clads, and with whom I have had the advantage of conferring on the subject, and the recent examples from the American Civil War, considered in connection with our own experiments, do not, in my judgment, so far as our present information goes,* bear out this view. Our granite casemates, with iron shields at the embrasures, are certainly as capable of resisting the guns of the present day, as Fort Sumter was the American 15-inch and 11-inch guns of 1863. * * * * Bearing in mind these views, there are many cases in which granite forts with iron shields at the embrasures, will, if powerfully armed, afford * June, 1868. J Jervois. COAST DEFENCE. 169 the required protection. "Where, however, a work is entirely isolated, and from its position specially liable to a concentrated fire, or where the foundations being in deep water are very limited in extent, it is no doubt desirable that the cover in front of the guns should be wholly iron plated, as, for instance, in the case of the Spithead forts. 1 Earth and Sand Batteries. 49. Earth, especially sand-works, properly constructed, a better pro- tection against Modern Artillery than permanent fortifications, Imilt on the old plan. ****** Rear- Admiral David D. Porter says in his report of 7th February, 1863, " On the morning when the ram, Queen of the West, went by the batteries at Yicksburg, I had officers stationed all along, to note the places where guns fired from, and they were quite surprised to find them firing from spots where there were no indications whatever of any guns before. The shots came from banks, gulleys, from railroad depots, from clumps of bushes, and from hill tops 200 feet high. A better system of defence was never devised. " Vicksburg was by nature the strongest place on the river, but art has made it impregnable against floating batteries ; not that the number of guns is formidable, but the rebels have placed them out of our reach, and can shift them from place to place, in case we should happen to annoy them (the most we can do) in their earthworks. " In a report I made to the Department, while attached to the mortar flotilla, I remarked, ' That the Navy could silence the water batteries whenever it pleased ; but that the taking of Vicksburg was an army affair altogether/ and it would have to be taken by troops. At that time it mounted 20 guns, all told, scattered along as they are now, and 10,000 men could have marched right into it without opposition. ****** " The people in Vicksburg are the only ones who have, as yet, hit upon the method of defending themselves against our gun-boats, Jervois. 170 STRATEGY. viz : not erecting water-batteries, and placing the guns some distance back from the water, where they can throw a plunging shot, which none of our iron-clads could stand." ****** Bear- Admiral Porter gave in his report to the Secretary of the Navy a fair account of the situation near Vicksburg : he succeeded repeatedly in driving the men from their pieces, and in temporarily silencing the Confederate batteries by a most furious fire, concentrated on them from his fleet ; yet no injury of any note was done to those earthworks, and Vicksburg only fell after General Grant's large army had invested the place, and for several months had carried on regular siege operations. 1 50. Amongst the general remarks of Lieut. -Colonel Von Scheliha? relating to coast defence, during the late American civil war, are the following : " All officers of the Navy and of the corps of Engineers, who, during the American war, had opportunities for gaining practical experience in the attack on and defence of positions along the coast, no matter 011 which side they gained this experience, agree that sand or earth is the cheapest and best material that could be used in the construction of batteries. "The reduction of such works, properly constructed and provided with bomb-proofs, when left to the Navy alone, required a long time and great expenditure of ammunition. " Guns mounted en barbette, may be silenced by a superior number of guns being brought against them. ****** " Wherever the position will allow, a scattering of the guns is preferable to placing them close together. A disposition of this kind does not exclude a concentration of fire from all guns, while it renders it more difficult for the enemy to effect a concentration of his fire on any one battery." 2 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. III. " Ibid,, Chap. IV. 171 SECTION II. CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS. 1. Channel obstructions being essentially an element of a purely defensive warfare, in the strictest sense of the word, distinguished navy officers of great maritime powers have opposed them, for the weighty reason that any obstruction placed in the channel must necessarily more or less interfere with the free operations of their own fleet, which, by them, is justly considered the most natural agent in coast defence. And certainly nothing could be more logical than that there exists no necessity for channel obstructions, as long as there is a fleet strong enough, unassisted, to cope successfully with that of the enemy. But, under such circumstances of favourable nature, the enemy, even without the assistance of costly fortifications, would be driven back before being able to effect his approach to the shore. A second case presents itself. Whilst it would be reckless for a squadron to advance and give him battle beyond the range of the shore-batteries, protecting the entrance to the port, the number of iron-clads composing this squadron might be sufficient to form an obstruction capable of keeping the enemy's fleet, should he attempt to force a passage, under a heavy concentrated fire of both batteries ashore and afloat. In this instance, the iron-clads would serve as an obstruction, and therefore a further channel obstruction would hardly be needed. Yet there is not always sufficient space in or near an entrance to a port, with advantage to manosuvre a strong flotilla of such floating-batteries. They then are in the way of each other, cannot bring their guns to bear on the enemy's ships, and collisions occur, as was the case in the Confederate flotillas stationed under Captains Mitchell and Montgomery, near Forts Jackson and St. Philip. An attacking fleet, on the other hand, needs but a narrow front under such circumstances. Admiral Farragut's favourite plan of attack was, either to form in two divisions as in passing the batteries of Forts St. Philip and Jackson, when the fleet was exposed to a heavy fire from both banks of the Mississippi river or to lash his ships in couples together, form a closed up-line, steam ahead, discharge broadside after broadside when abreast of the shore-batteries, (mostly 172 STRATEGY. using shrapnel and grape, to prevent the artillerymen from working their guns), and go, after having passed the shore-batteries, in pursuit of the floating-batteries opposing his further progress, as in passing the batteries of Fort Morgan. The Federal attack would not have succeeded, nay, it would even have resulted in disaster to Admiral Farragut's fleet, had it been possible to obstruct the channel between Fort Morgan and the eastern bank. In no single instance during the North American war, did a naval attack succeed where the channel had been obstructed ; and in no single instance did it fail where the channel had remained open. Therefore, whenever the fleet alone, or shore- batteries, and a strong flotilla of iron-clads, with abundant space to manoeuvre in, combined, are not able to force the enemy to retreat, channel obstructions are indispensable. 1 2. Neither Mobile nor Charleston, Wilmington, or Savannah, could ever have been taken by a naval attack alone ; the obstructions placed in the channels leading to those places formed an insurmountable obstacle to the progress of a fleet ; and no iron-clads could have with- stood the concentrated fire of the heavy batteries, that would have prevented the removal of any part of these obstructions. 2 3. * * The Confederate navy being inconsiderable in number, and quite unable to cope with the powerful fleet opposed to them, the obstruction of the channels was not fraught with much inconvenience to themselves, though there were some positions in which it was necessary to leave open channels of approach for the use of blockade-runners, and other friendly vessels. So effectually was this mode of defence resorted to, that the Federal navy were unable to effect the passage of the batteries at Charleston, Mobile, Wilmington, Savannah, and the James River below Richmond, until, on the capture of these places by the military forces, the obstructions could be searched for and removed. But for the obstruction to navigation in the James River, nothing could have prevented the squadron, under Federal Admiral S. P. Lee, penetrating to Richmond, and taking Confederate General Lee's position in reverse. 3 * * * 4. Admiral Dupont's iron-clads, were obliged to withdraw their attack on Fort Sumter, after an engagement of hardly forty minutes' 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. IX. " Ibid, Chap. VII. 3 Eraser's Mag. CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS. 173 duration ; yet every one of these Monitors had a turret the plating of which was much thicker than the casemate armour of the Dunderberg (this is only 4'5"), and no heavier piece of ordnance than the 10-inch Columbiad was at that period used in the Confederate States' service. The rope-obstructions which had been placed between Forts Sumter and Moultrie proved themselves of the greatest value on that day. 1 * * * . * * * * 5. The difficulties opposing the establishment of a channel obstruc- tion, often are very great. There are strong and changing currents, great depth of water, a heavy sea, bad bottom, and many other difficulties, that will contend against the engineer, and which should induce him well to mature his plans before commencing the work. Such a deliberation will develop the necessity of some preliminary work for instance, abutments, driving of piles, &c., without which it would be impossible to establish any kind of obstruction. A system of channel obstructions proper, may consist of: (1) Obstructions resting on the bottom of the channel. (2) Floating obstructions. (3) A combination of these two systems, which will generally be used where a gap for the passing of vessels through the obstruction is required * * * It is self-evident that an obstruction has to be laid within the range of shore or floating-batteries ; for, otherwise, the enemy would not only be enabled unmolested to proceed to the removal of the impediments opposing his progress, but also the obstruction would fail to fulfil a principal object that, of keeping the enemy's ships under a heavy concentrated fire of the batteries. 2 * * * Sunken Vessels. 6. In 1854, the Russians obstructed the entrance to the Bay of Tchernia, by sinking most of the ships composing their Black Sea flotilla. The Confederates, in 1861, had no men of war thus to dispose 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. XI. 2 Ibid., Chap. IX. 174 STRATEGY. of: but many a fine merchant-man, useful coaster, and swift-sailing fishing smack were scuttled and sunk to form an obstruction in the approaches to Mobile and other southern sea-ports. The objections to such a course, are obvious : (1) The means of active defence, are thereby weakened. (2) An obstruction of this class, is the most expensive of all. (3) The amount of transportation is considerably lessened, a circumstance which has made itself very seriously felt during the late North- American war. The engineers at Charleston, Savannah and Mobile, found themselves very often seriously embarrassed for want of suitable crafts in which to send building material, sand-bags, &c., to detached points with which communications was only possible by water. This method of obstructing a channel should therefore be used only in case of the most urgent emergency. But if used, the vessels should be well filled with materials, the weight of which will keep the sunken vessel, in its place. ***** ****** It has also been proposed to sink, instead of valuable vessels, large pontoons, or enormous flats, built of strong timbers and planks expressly for this purpose. The pontoons or flats, are to be held together by strong cables and braces, and are intended to form the foundation for a system of cJwvaux-de-frise, constructed of iron. 1 * * * Rocks, Piles, Chains, and Booms. 7. Large masses of rock thrown into a channel will form an excellent obstruction; yet the instances, will be few in which the material required may be easily obtained. * * * Obstructions formed by piles, may be advantageously used if the depth of the channel does not exceed 25 feet, and the nature of its bottom renders the driving of piles not an impossible or too tedious a work. ****** Von Scheliha, Chap. XL CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS. 175 The upper surface of an obstruction ' of chains and booms,' is too narrow, to grant any possible hope that a vessel running on it should be prevented from working her way over the boom. Instead of one single line, two and more lines of booms might be placed and connected by strong chains with each other. The width of surface and the strength of the obstruction, would thereby naturally be increased in proportion. But under no circumstances could too much stress be laid on firmly securing the end sections of the boom, next to the shore or bank, by stout cables to strong abutments. The floats should be anchored, so that instead of laying across the current, presenting to its pressure a comparatively large surface, they should float parallel with it, presenting only their pointed ends to the current, against which the pressure would be less. Torpedoes and rope obstructions, should be used in connection with the boom. 1 8. Chains and booms were, during " the American civil war ", first used on the Mississippi river. A chain supported by logs was extended across the river near Fort Jackson. Admiral Farragut ordered a petard to be fastened to the chain, and thus opened a passage without great difficulty. 2 ***** 9. Resilient structures formed of chain and other cables, floated across the channel upon pontoons, masses of timbers, or small ships, have been amongst the most effective obstructions employed. It was to an obstacle of this kind, that the ships of the allied squadrons at Obligado, in 1845, owed the heavy losses sustained by their detention under batteries which could not be turned, until Admiral Sir James Hope sawed through the cables and opened the passage. A similar obstacle in the Peiho, in China, in 1859, led to severe losses in men and ships, and our ultimate defeat by the Chinese defences. 3 Hopes. 10. Confederate engineers, frequently made use of rope obstructions to bar a channel, the depth of which prevented the placing of piles, &c. They were principally used in Charleston harbour, where they con- 1 Von Schelika, Chap. XI. ~ Ibid. 3 Eraser's Mag. 176 STRATEGY. tributed so much to the successful defence of that important port. They consisted there of a line of buoys made of palmetto-wood, and rounded at both ends, thus rendering them nearly undiscernable at any great distance, and especially at night. To these floats or buoys, was attached a 7-inch hawser by two heavy iron staples. The floats were about 20-feet apart, and at intervals were anchored with heavy grapnels. From the hawser, which was shroud-laid, hung down a lighter rope. The buoys were also made of yellow pine, 39-inches long and 15-inches in diameter. These obstructions were placed in sections of twenty-five buoys, the hawser passing through the staples being anchored at each end and in the centre. At the termination of one section, another, constructed and anchored in the same manner, commenced, till the whole width of the channel was thus filled. Two and three rows of these obstructions- were placed at a distance of about 100-feet apart; therefore, if a vessel had succeeded in passing through one line, she would have had to pass another one or two still before being out of danger of fouling them. Although the Federal fleet did never again approach these obstructions after Admiral Dupont's first attack on Fort Sumter, April 7, 1863, had failed, and their value, therefore, was not practically tested by the enemy's vessels actually coming in contact with them, some idea of what it really was, may, however, be formed by the accidents that happened to Confederate vessels which came in too close proximity to them. ******* One of the blockade-runners (a propeller), was going out of the harbour, when she caught in these obstructions, which stopped her engine, so that she could neither go ahead nor back, and had to be towed back to the city and put in the dry dock, when it was found that the rope had worked into the journal. 1 Torpedoes. 11. Obstructions are of two kinds, passive and active. Passive obstructions may consist of rafts or barges, booms of timber, chains, nets, wire or rope, sometimes (in places which it is unnecessary to keep open) 1 Von Scheliha, Chap. XI. CHANNEL OBSTRUCTIONS. 177 of piles, stones, dams, or sunken vessels. The attention that has been given during the last few years to the application of submarine-mines has, however, rendered it improbable that we shall find it necessary to use passive obstructions. Active obstructions, or submarine-mines have become of especial importance since iron-armour has been applied to the sides of ships of war, these vessels being most vulnerable in their bottom. Submarine-mines should, * be placed between the forts or batteries on either side of the channel which they are intended to defend. They may also be employed in connection with either fixed or floating batteries, to prevent an enemy occupying any particular position within range of the guns from which it is desired to exclude him. Attempts had been made by the English so early as the 17th century, to apply floating and submerged charges of gunpowder for purposes of offence and defence. The Russians in 1855, however, were the first to apply ex- plosive machines of this kind with any approach to success : and, although the mechanical self-acting torpedoes which they laid down in the Baltic were somewhat defective of construction, there is little doubt that they might have produced disastrous effects upon our ships, had the charges of gunpowder employed in them been sufficiently large. The Russians were also the first to attempt the employment of electricity for the explosion of torpedoes, though their arrangements for this purpose never appear to have been placed in position for actual use. 1 12. The next advance in the use of torpedoes, was made by the Austrians at the time of the threatened attack on Venice by the French, in 1859. Here, Baron Ebner employed them to defend several of the more important channels, and organised a very elaborate and well considered plan of defence. These torpedoes were arranged to explode by electricity. A system of insulated electric wires, which extended from the shore to each torpedo, placed them under the control of the operator. In planting these torpedoes, their positions were registered upon a miniature plan of the harbour, by a very ingenious application of the camera-obscura. By this device, it became unnecessary to mark the positions by buoys. 2 13. The successful results attending the employment of torpedoes as engines, both of attack and defence, by the Americans, and more espe- 1 Jervois. 2 N, T. Holmes. 12 178 STRATEGY. cially by the Confederates in the recent war, have attracted considerable attention to these engines of destruction. Though the means at command were limited, and the arrangements generally of very crude description, there are official records of the destruction of no less than twenty-four ships of the Federal States, and of the injury of nine others by means of torpedoes. The progress made in the application of these mines during the Civil War in America, is shown by the fact that whilst in the year 1862 only one Federal vessel was destroyed, in the first four months of the year 1865, eleven were destroyed or sunk, and four injured. If it is considered that the area of water or passage to be defended may be perfectly closed against friendly vessels without disadvantage, the employment of torpedoes which are exploded by self-acting mechanical contrivances present advantages over torpedoes which are exploded by electricity, as being less costly, and more expeditiously placed in position. ***** These mechanical torpedoes are, however, altogether inapplicable in positions where it is desired to keep the water open to friendly vessels, and to close it effectually against an enemy. In such instances it is indispensable that submarine-mines should be arranged to be exploded by electric currents. Electric torpedoes or mines may either be self- acting, i.e., their explosion may be accomplished by the collision of a ship with them, or with a mechanical arrangement floating near the surface and connected by an electric cable with the mine beneath ; they may also be exploded at will by operators on shore, when a ship is observed to be over them or in their immediate vicinity ; or they may be so arranged, that the collision of a ship with the self-acting mechanism with which they are provided, will instantly give a signal at the station on shore, whereupon the mine may be at once exploded by the operator at the station. Lastly, the torpedoes may, by simple means, be so arranged, that they may be either exploded spontaneously by a passing ship, or at the will of the operator on shore, in the possible event of the ship not coming into contact with the self-acting trap. The torpedoes would be placed several fathoms below the surface, and at such distances apart that the explosion of one would not injuriously affect those in its vicinity. Their charges would be sufficiently large to ensure the destruction of a ship by their explosion, not merely when immediately over one of them, but even if any portion of her were within forty or CHANNEL OBSTBUCTIONS. 179 fifty feet of that position. It is obvious that by arranging the torpedoes in two or more chequered lines, a vessel, even if passing harmlessly between two torpedoes in one line, must come within destructive range of a torpedo in the second or third line. The placing of torpedoes at considerable depths, and their arrangement for optional explosion from 011 shore, must render it extremely difficult for an enemy to interfere with such a defensive arrangement, and such interference is impossible if the area of the water defended, is guarded by artillery. It is often stated that the torpedoes may be removed at night, but this objection is effectually met by lighting up the channel by the electric or other lights which may be employed for that purpose. 1 14 To the Americans belong the credit of first applying the torpedo as an offensive weapon, to be employed by ships against one another. The principle on which this operation is conducted, is based on the ascertained limited destructive area of given charges of gunpowder, employed at given depths. 2 * * 15. It was not until the 5th May, 1864, that an outrigger-torpedo was fitted to a Federal ship of war. The occasion is noteworthy, for other reasons also. * * * ****** * * That any ship of any size or build could safely employ torpedoes in this manner, is now plainly evident, and there can be little doubt but that future naval actions will be greatly influenced, if not actually decided, by the skill displayed in mano3uvring the hostile ships, so as to bring their torpedoes within effective range. To run into or ram a vigilant enemy, so as to sink his ship, is a delicate operation, necessitating a blow nearly at right angles to the broadside ; but the process of torpedoing can be accomplished whilst alongside of or astern of the enemy, and is not to be easily eluded by the action of the helm. It can only be escaped by superior speed. If, for example, the Austrian fleet had been so equipped at Lissa, the attempt to ram the Italian ships, which was only in one case successful, might have been succeeded by explosions whilst passing through the line, which might have destroyed many of the opposing fleet. The lessons which we may gather from the torpedo warfare in America, show, 1st. That without 1 Jervois. 2 Eraser's Mac. 180 STRATEGY. this auxiliary agency, no system of fortification will prevent an enter- prising foe from passing through an easy navigable channel, if a sufficient object is to be attained by doing so, and if a point of safety exists beyond the batteries. 2nd. That the torpedo is a powerful weapon of offensive war, which may be employed not only by steam- vessels of the mercantile marine for their own defence, or that of our seaports, but also by ships of war, of all classes, in actions at sea. The position of future blockading squadrons will be by no means agreeable, for whilst they can send their boats into the blockaded port at night, to blow up the enemy's ships, the besieged can, with even greater facility, send forth torpedo ships or boats at night, which would render it impossible for the blockaders to remain at anchor. 1 16. The question arises, how far, if at all, does the use of submarine- mines affect the employment of forts and batteries for defence against naval attack ? Forts and batteries are still required in all important cases to cover the torpedoes, and prevent their being tampered with. It must also be remembered that whilst the submarine- mine is harmless, unless the ship comes near it, the shot from the battery can injure the ship, whatever may be her position, within effective range. Further, although probably our harbours might be efficiently obstructed by torpedoes in at from seven to fourteen days' notice, yet one condition is that the weather should be sufficiently favourable to allow of their being exactly laid. There are again certain positions where, even if the torpedoes are laid, they might be disturbed by a violent storm, and possibly an attack on the positions in which they were to serve might take place before they could be renewed ; and though the periods of the year at which these difficulties might arise are short, yet the bare possibility of interference, in the applications of a complete torpedo system, prevents our entire reliance on such a defence for the protection of places on which the warlike power of the nation, both for offence and defence, must, in a great measure, depend. There- fore, although submarine-mines are a most important element in the defence of our harbours and coasts, and add greatly to the power of our forts to resist a naval attack, yet they must not be regarded as substitutes for permanent works of defence at our naval arsenals and 1 Fraser's Mag. LANDING OF AKMIES. 181 harbours, and other important ports. Submarine-mines would not only be of immense advantage for the defence of harbours in time of war, they would also, in conjunction with small gun-boats, be most valuable for the protection of places on the coast, like St. Leonards or Brighton, against privateers who might, perhaps, in the absence of other defence (which in these cases cannot be applied on shore) levy contributions upon the inhabitants of these and other watering places. 1 SECTION III. LANDING OF ARMIES. 1. The form of a coast has great influence on the success of a landing of troops by open force and in face of an enemy. On low coasts, such as Romney Marsh, the beaches are not steep ; the tidal currents, or rather eddies, are weak, and the water is shallow, to a considerable distance at sea ; so that ships would be unable to approach near the shore, and the boats conveying the troops to land would have great distances to row, under a most destructive fire from the fixed or moveable batteries which are to oppose the debarkation ; which, moreover, can only take place at the top of high water a limitation as to time, which is very disadvantageous to the invaders. A gently sloping beach indicates that the land is gaining on the sea, and offers facilities for obtaining a footing on the shore ; but even here the downs or hills of shingle, thrown up by the waves in gales of wind, often considerably above high- water mark, afford behind them some cover from the fire of the ships for the troops, who should be stationed there, in order to spring upon the enemy when in the act of landing. On the other hand, when the land is high and the beach abrupt, ships may get near, and the boats would have a short distance to be rowed ; but here the tidal currents are so strong that row-boats will scarcely be able to stem them, or keep in due order. A steep shore indicates an encroach- 1 Jervois, 182 STRATEGY. ment of the sea on the land, and in this case a range of high ground is not far behind, which will afford commanding positions for the main body of the defenders, who, from thence, on whatever part of the beach in front the invaders may attempt to disembark, can see all their movements ; and should these succeed in effecting a landing, may bring them with advantage to a general action. An invading force will scarcely venture to land in a small bay, subject to the crossing fires of batteries placed on the promontories between which it is contained. The effort would, more probably be made in a capacious bay whose capes are remote from each other, or on a straight line of beach, where the landing might be protected by converging fires from the ships on both flanks. 1 * * 2. A very large army may now be transported with great speed and convenience in a very few large steam-ships, to any seat of war, however remote ; but to transfer 1000, 1500, or 2000 men from the transports to the shore is a work of considerable time, and requires great numbers of boats, specially constructed for that purpose. This preparatory operation cannot be attempted or executed under fire from the enemy ; and, therefore, the troops intended to force a landing, must be embarked in the boats which are to take them to the shore, whilst the transports are anchored at a safe distance. The success of the operation will mainly depend upon the nature of the locality that may be chosen. It should not be too near to the fortress or stronghold to be attacked, because, in this case, the garrisons of the forts, or fortresses, might safely co-operate with the force in the field, to oppose the landing and attack the lodgment. Nor should the point of debarkation be too distant from the great objective of the expedition, because that would necessitate a long march to invest the place, and much difficulty in getting up the siege-train and stores. How strikingly were these principles exemplified in the miseries suffered by the British army during the invasion of the Crimea in 1854-55, from the inconvenience of the harbour at Balaklava, and the distance from thence to the scene of the operations before Sebastopol. If the enemy (exclusive of the force in the garrisons) is not strong in the field, it might be advantageous to endeavour to seize some capacious bay or inlet capable of affording a 1 Douglas. LANDING OF ARMIES. 183 shelter to the numerous ships, vessels, and small craft, and near which a fort might be constructed to serve as an entrepdt and base of operations ; but these great objects can rarely be effected immediately : indeed, if the enemy has occupied and strengthened the localities, and if he is, moreover, strong in the field, it would not be prudent to attempt a landing there. In this case, some point, deemed apparently by the enemy of minor importance, should be sought for some promontory, with a nearly level surface, and remote from high lands, having also water about it of sufficient depth to permit the boats to arrive at the beach, and to enable bomb-ships, steamers and gun-boats to cover the advance of the flotilla containing the troops, support their landing, and protect the lodgment they may form. Having thus obtained a footing, and received such increase of strength as may be deemed necessary, including field-artillery, the whole force should move forward to meet the enemy in the field, and conquer for itself some position which may afford shelter to the fleet, and become a tete-de-debarquement and base of operations to the invading army. In forcing the passage of a river, the operation is undertaken, if possible, in a sinuosity re-entering, with respect to the invaders, and a lodgment is made upon the opposite salient in the enemy's position ; the whole interior of that position is commanded from the points in the possession of the assailants, and consequently the lodgment to be made is capable of being supported and protected. In like manner, in order to obtain a footing on an enemy's coast, a low level promontory or salient should be chosen, because ships on each side, of it may perform the same office (commanding the opposite ground) as, in forcing the passage of a river, is performed by the batteries placed at the two salient points which contain between them the re-entering sinuosity. The ships are thus enabled to support the lodgment on the coast and protect the flanks of the troops which have gained the shore. To attempt to force a landing in a bay reverses these conditions, for the shore of a bay, unless it be very extensive, cannot be held, nor even approached, until both the promontories which contain it are occupied. 1 3. Where steam ceases to be useful to the invaders, it becomes most so to the defenders of the country, who during the whole time 1 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III, Sec. X. 184 STRATEGY. that the operation of attempting to land is being made, will, warned by the electric telegram, be employed in bringing up, at the maximum of railway speed, all the active forces in part of the country, and con- centrating them on the menaced point. 1 4. When the late Duke of Wellington visited the coast defences on the alarm of an invasion soon after the accession of Louis Napoleon, the present Emperor of France, to the Presidency His Grace, being at Seabrooke between Sandgate and Hythe, conversing with his staff and the other officers, the principles of permanent camps and the other fixed defences became the subject of discussion : when the Duke used the following expressions. " Look at those splendid heights all along this coast : give me communications which admit of rapid flank movement along those heights, and I might set anything at defiance." 2 Landing of the English troops in Holland 5. The expedition under Sir Ealph Abercromby, which may be considered as the advanced guard of the Allied army, destined to act against the French in Holland and the Low Countries, left the shores of England on 13th August, 1799, escorted by a strong squadron of ships of war, commanded by Admiral Mitchell. The military force was composed of fully 10,000 men, and of a good quality. ******* The orders which our commanders had received were in some degree discretionary. A landing on the island of Goree was prescribed as the first object ; and from thence it, was proposed that the united force of British and Russian troops should penetrate into the heart of the Low Countries. But the Helder was a point which the British Government had much at heart, for the sake of capturing the Dutch fleet in the Texel, and destroying the naval magazines at that station. Although our expedition put to sea at the most favourable season, such was the stormy and perverse character of that disastrous year, that the landing of the troops at the mouths of the Scheldt and the Meuse was found to be impracticable ; nor was it till the 21st of August that our ships were 1 Douglas. 2 Ibid. LANDING OF ARMIES. 185 able to approach the coast near the entrance of the Texel. Preparations were made for landing on the following day, but in vain, for our fleet was again forced to sea by a gale of wind ; nor was it till the 26th that it could return to the point which our commanders had in view, and the transports could be anchored near the shore. Although a heavy surf was still breaking on the beach, the debarkation of the troops began at daybreak on the 27th ; several boats were swamped, and a few of our soldiers were drowned. As our fleet had been descried by the enemy six days before, the Dutch General Daendels had gained time to collect five or six thousand of infantry, with some cavalry and and artillery ; and these he kept concealed among the sandhills which skirt the shore. Immediately in front of that line of beach which the British had selected for their landing, these ' Dunes ' recede a little but they close in and become bolder and more steep towards Callantzoog which lay upon our right ; and here the enemy held the main body of his troops, ready to plunge on our extreme flank if we should attempt to move forward towards the Ilelder town. To the landing of the British soldier, though it was rendered slow by the violence of the surf, no direct opposition was offered ; but, as soon as six of our battalions (the , brigades under Coote and Macdonald) were ashore and formed, and they began to move forward, they were assailed by a heavy fire, and a vigorous attack on their right flank. Forced to change their front, and make ahead against the superior force of the enemy on the side of Callantzoog, our troops were at the same time cramped and confused by the narrowness of their ground ; the strip of beach not allowing of a front of more than one battalion in that direction. The enemy from the crests of the sand-dunes, kept up a constant and destructive fire, while he was himself sheltered by their folds from the guns of the British shipping. None of our field artillery was yet landed, and for some hours our brave infantry, though reinforced by D'Oyley's brigade of guards, had to maintain a trying struggle ; but they would not give ground ; and they fought so hard that they fairly wore out the enemy. Towards the evening the Dutch gave up the contest, and retreated some five or six miles to a position between the Alkmaar canal and the sea. The loss of the enemy in killed or wounded was probably small ; but the disadvantages under which the invaders fought necessarily exposed the three brigades which 186 STKATEGY. were engaged to a serious loss of men ; and a large proportion of the superior officers of the staff fell under the aim of the Dutch riflemen. Two Lieut. -Colonels and about fifty men were killed on the spot ; and Lieut.-General Sir James Pulteney, five field officers, and nearly 400 others were wounded. The debarkation of troops, guns, and supplies was completed without further difficulty; and Moore's and Burrard's brigades were prepared to move forward at daybreak on the 28th. Near the Helder point stands the village of that name. It was, at the time I am speaking of, partially fortified, having heavy batteries towards the sea, commanding the channel of the Texel and the deep water within it ; but on the land- side the works were imperfect and neglected. In this place the enemy kept a motley garrison (to the amount of 1,800 or 2,000 men of one sort or other) up to the evening of the 27th ; but, as soon as the issue of the fight on the beach was decided, they, prepared to withdraw, spiked the guns in the batteries, and, when darkness fell, they retreated silently across the marshes and along the shores of the Zuyder Zee. At the same time the Dutch squadron, which had been lying in the Texel channel, dropped inward as far as their draught of water would allow. 1 6. When the Duke of "Wellington, then Sir Arthur TVellesley, invaded Portugal in 1808, it was a favourite object with the ministry that the descent should be made at the mouth of the Tagus. Wellesley, decided otherwise, and made choice of a landing-place remote from. Lisbon in order to avoid the danger of a debarkation in face of a large force. He effected his landing at a part deemed by the enemy of minor importance, the mouth of the Mondego River ; he moved forward as soon as he could, fought a general action, gained a complete victory, and obtained possession of Lisbon. 2 7. For great operations of this descripton any want of mortar- ships, gun-boats having small draught of water, and flat-bottomed boats for landing the troops, would be seriously felt. All the landings of troops in the face of an enemy in the course of the great war with 1 Sir Henry Bunbury. - Napier, Vol. I. LANDING OF AKMIES. 187 France, at some of which General Sir Howard Douglas served, were conducted in the following manner. The troops intended for debarkation being placed in the boats out of fire of the shore, were directed by signal to form line abreast on points marked by men-of-war's boats, carrying distinguishing pennants, and containing the naval officers charged with directions of the several divisions of the flotilla, and the whole was placed under the superintendence and command of a naval officer of rank. When the line was formed, the whole moved forward by signal, rowing easily, the better to keep in line, until within the reach of musketry from, the shore, when orders were given to row out. The whole of the operation, from its commencement, was covered by bomb-ships carrying 10 and 13-inch mortars, and these protected the advance of the troops by firing shells, when necessary, over the line of boats, in order to reach the beach ; a like firing with increased charges, being directed against the enemy's supports in rear of the troops disputing the landing : at the same time gun-boats, drawing little water, placed on the flanks of the operation, scoured the beach upon which the troops were to land. Whilst these operations were being executed, the fleet of line-of-battle ships remained at a distance in reserve, unscathed and ready to take their part in the ulterior operation when the proper time arrived. 1 8. ' The landing of Sir Ralph Abercromby's troops on 27th August, 1799, in North Holland," is the first instance in modern times in which an invading army has successfully effected a landing in the face of an enemy prepared to receive the attack, and having at hand field artillery and cavalry, as well as a considerable force of regular infantry. That such an operation is fraught with difficulty and danger no military man will doubt, although in the present instance, as well as in that upon the coast of Egypt in 1801, the venture was crowned with success. On both these occasions the leading division of the troops made good their footing; and were able to cover the debarkation of the rest of the forces, with the artillery, stores, and all that was required to render these armies efficient for further service. ' In the landing of the army in North Holland/ the only boats were 1 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III., Sect. X. 188 STRATEGY. those of the men-of-war, ill calculated for such a service, and incapable of conveying more than 3,000 men at a time. To the officers of our navy this kind of operation was entirely new; nor did they understand the details, or feel the importance of arrangement on which military order and military success must greatly depend. Thus parts of regiments were conveyed to the shore, while parts were left behind. Battalions were intermixed, and companies had to find their proper places after they had landed, and were under the fire of the enemy. The soldiers had to wade and scramble out of the surf as well as they could, and look out for their comrades, and run to their stations in the line which was growing slowly into shape along the beach. Fortunately General Daendels chose to keep his men sheltered from the fire of the ships, and to cling to the strong post he had taken near Callantsoog. If he had rushed headlong on the flank of our first division of troops during the confusion of landing, he might have inflicted a great loss on the British, and perhaps routed these leading brigades. There was time enough to have done the work before the guards could get ashore ; and it was long before the rest of Abercromby's little army were able to land. It is true that the Dutch might have lost a good many men from the fire of our ships, but it was their business to be quick in their rush ; and to have mingled their superior numbers so completely with the British soldiers, that the men-of-war would not have ventured to direct their shots against the confused mass of friends and foes. But Daendels either did not see the chance, or he felt his troops unequal to such a trial. He allowed our forces to land and form without hindrance : fought a merely soldier's fight, though gallantly, in the strong post he had chosen ; and was at length beaten out of it by the growing numbers and unyielding bravery of his assailants. But Abercromby had seen with alarm the confusion and danger which attended the debarkation of his 10,000 soldiers ; and it was probably the impression made upon his mind on this occasion which led him to form and mature that admirable plan, by which, eighteen months afterwards, his army was landed on the shores of Aboukir in complete order of battle. 1 Sir Henry Bunbury. LAXDIXG OF ARMIES. 189 Landing of the British Army in Egypt. 9. When the British Army was sailing from Marmorice 'vfor the purpose of effecting a landing in Egypt in 1801' Sir Ralph Abercromby had sent forward Major McKerras and Major Fletcher of the engineers, in a gun-boat, to reconnoitre the coast about the Bay of Aboukir ; but it was found that these officers had ventured too closely in, and had been cut off by a superior vessel. Major McKerras had been killed, and Fletcher, with the gun-boat, taken. This loss of our two most experienced engineers, proved in the sequel to have been a very unfortunate circumstance. 1 10. When the British army arrived in Aboukir Bay, and the weather, at first tempestuous, became calm enough to permit the troops to land, General Abercromby, who had himself reconnoitred the coast in a small vessel, gave orders for the first division, consisting of 6,000 men, to prepare for landing early on the following morning (March 8th). The preparations could not be made, however, without attracting the notice of the French, and these disposed themselves, with a numerous force of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, to prevent the invaders, if possible, from gaining the shore. 2 11. At two in the morning of the memorable 8th March, 1801, the troops which had been chosen to strike the first blow upon the sands of Egypt, stepped into the boats. Soon after daylight, nearly all had reached the vessels which had been placed as the rallying points ; but much time was consumed in disentangling the boats, and arranging them according to the line of battle of the army, so that when they touched the beach, each brigade, battalion, and company might be in its proper place. The reserve, led by Sir John Moore, Hildebrand Oakes, and Brent Spencer, formed the right ; and their division of boats was under the immediate command of Captain Cochrane. Alongside the vessel on the left were marshalled the two battalions of the Guards, under General Ludlow, and the detachment belonging to Coote's brigade. It was eight o'clock, A.M., before the line of boats pulled on abreast, and in steady order, towards the shore, and till that time the 1 Sir Henry Bunbury. * Sir Howard Douglas. 190 STRATEGY. enemy had lain in silence, observing our movements ; but as soon as our boats came within their reach, fifteen pieces of cannon opened upon them with round shot, though the enemy's fire was somewhat disturbed and confused by that of several English gun-boats which had been thrown in advance of our line. So closely were our soldiers packed in the boats that they could not move, and indeed the strictest orders had been given that they should sit perfectly still. The seamen pulled steadily onward, the pace of each boat being regulated by that on the extreme right. In this calm order on they came, till they were within reach of grape-shot, and then the fire became terribly severe and destructive. Some boats were sunk, and many of our men were killed or wounded, as they sat motionless and helpless under the storm of shot, to which both seamen and soldiers answered occasionally by loud hurrahs ! When still nearer, the musketry of the French was poured in, quick and sharp, and our men were falling fast ; but at length the boats on the right felt the ground. Out sprang our hard-tried soldiers ; each man was in his place, and with Moore and Spencer at their head, the 23rd and 28th Kegiments, and the four flank companies of the 40th, breasted the steep sandhill. Without firing a shot, they rushed at one burst to the summit of the ridge, driving headlong before them two battalions of the enemy, and capturing four pieces of field artillery. ******* Further to the left the Coldstreams and 3rd Guards ought, according to the plan described, to have prolonged the line beyond Oakes's brigade, but the boats which carried them and the 54th Eegiment, fell into confusion. These battalions were consequently hurried into the shoal- water, intermingled and disordered ; and as their difficulty was observed by the enemy, the Guards were charged by the French cavalry before they could form their line. However, the attack was bravely repulsed, and General Ludlow soon got his brigade into its proper place to the left of Oakes and the reserve. Here then was the problem, of landing 5,000 or 6,000 men in the face of an enemy prepared to meet them, satisfactorily solved. But the British had neither horsemen nor artillery on shore, and our gallant infantry were unable to follow up their victory, and inflict a heavier loss on their beaten enemy. The behaviour of our troops in this arduous service was above all praise ; the patience with which they bore the storm of shot while confined to their boats ; the LANDING OF ARMIES. 191 alacrity with, which they leapt ashore and instantly formed their lines ; these things were unparalleled, and are even more worthy of our remembrance than the gallantry with which our troops overthrew the French on every point, when the British foot was on the shore. Still it ought not to be forgotten that the storming of the steep sandhill on the right, by Moore's brigade, was long a theme of especial admiration in the army. While the fight was going on, the boats returned to fetch the remainder of our infantry, and the whole of them were landed in the course of the afternoon, with some field pieces and a few horses. In the evening the army moved forward some two or three miles, leaving a detachment to blockade the castle of Aboukir. 1 12. The Fury and the Tartarus, bomb-vessels, with sloops and gun- boats, were appointed to protect the landing of the force ; and, though they suffered severely from the fire of the French, the troops succeeded, though with difficulty, and only in detached parties, in making good their landing. The enemy retired, and, on the 21st of the same month, the battle of Alexandria, in which Sir Ealph Abercromby fell, took place. 2 13. In 1860, a force of English and French was landed on the Coast of China, whence they marched to Pekin and dictated terms of peace. This expedition is remarkable for the smallness of the numbers which ventured, at such a great distance from their sources of supply and succour, to land upon a hostile shore, and penetrate into the midst of the most populous empire in the world. 3 Expedition of the Allied Armies to the Crimea. 14. In 1854, the great expedition to the Crimea was executed; and with reference to it the following facts are mentioned, in order to give an idea of its magnitude: September 14th, 1854, an army of 58,500 men and 200 pieces of artillery was landed near Eupatoria, com- 1 Sir Henry Bunbury. 2 Sir Howard Douglas, Part III, Sec. X. 8 Jomini. 192 STEATEGY. posed of 30,000 French, 21,500 English,* and 7000 Turks. They were transported from Varna to the place of landing by 389 ships, steamers, and transports. This force fought and gained the battle of the Alma (September 20th), and thence proceeded to Sebastopol. The English took possession of the harbour of Balaklava and the French of Kamiesch : these were the points to which subsequent reinforcements and supplies for the army in the Crimea were sent. 1 15. In point of security from molestation on the part of the enemy, both of the two landing-places f were happily chosen. Both of them were on shores which allowed the near approach of the fleets, and placed the whole operation under cover of their guns. Also both landing-places were protected on the inland side, by the salt lakes, which interposed a physical obstacle in the way of any front attack by the enemy ; and the access to the flank of the disembarking armies was by strips of land so narrow that they could be easily defended against any force of infantry or cavalry. It is true that the line of disembarkation of either army could have been enfiladed by artillery placed on the heights ; but then those heights could be more or less searched by a fire from the ships ; and the enemy had not attempted to prepare for himself any kind of defence on the high ground. The necessity of having to carry the English flotilla to a new landing-place, occasioned of course, a painful dislocation of the arrangements which had already been acted upon by the commanders of the transports ; but after much delay and much less confusion than might have been expected to result from a derangement so great and so sudden, the position of the English vessels was adapted to the change. ******* The plan of the English disembarkation was imitated from the one adopted by Sir Ralph Abercromby, when he made his famous descent upon the coast of Egypt ; and it was based upon the principle of so * Jomini would appear to have erroneously stated the numbers of the English Army : Kinglake computes them at 26,000 infantry and artillery, with more than 1000 cavalry. F.J.S. t Lord Raglan had changed the spot determined upon for the debarkation of the English, to about a mile to the north of " Old Fort ; " the French having, during the previous night, placed the buoy to the extreme north of the selected landing ground. F.J.S. 1 Jomini. LANDING OF ARMIES. 193 ranging the transports and the boats as that the relative positions of each company, whilst it was being rowed towards the shore, should correspond with that which it would have to take when formed upon the beach. ******* After mid-day the sea began to lose its calmness, and before sun-set the surf was strong enough to make the disembarkation difficult, and in some degree hazardous. Yet, by the time the day closed, the French had landed their 1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions of infantry, together with eighteen guns, and the English had got on shore all their infantry divisions, and some part of their field artillery. Some few of the English regiments remained on the beach, but the rest of them had been marched up to the high grounds towards the south, and they there bivouacked. 1 16. The result was, that under circumstances of weather which were, upon the whole favourable, and with the advantage of en- countering no opposition from the enemy, an English force of some 26,000 infantry and artillerymen, with more than a 1000 mounted cavalry, and 60 guns, had been landed in the course of five September days ; and although the force thus put ashore was without those vast means of land transport which would be needed for regular operations in the interior, and was obliged to rely upon the attendant fleet for the continuance of its supplies, it was nevertheless so provided as to be able to move along the coast carrying with it its first reserve of ammunition, and food enough for three days. The operation was conducted with an almost faultless skill, and (until a firm lodgment had been gained) it proceeded in the way that was thought to be the right one for landing in the face of the enemy. Though the surf was at times somewhat heavy, not a man was lost. With the French, who had no cavalry, and a scanty supply of artillery horses, the dis- embarkation was a comparatively easy task ; and if they had so desired it the French might have been ready to march long before the English ; but, knowing that their allies, having cavalry, would necessarily take a good deal of time, they were without a motive for hurrying ; and during the whole of the five days which the English took for their Kinglakc, Vol. II. 13 194 STRATEGY. disembarkation, a like work was seen going on at the French landing place. The Turks did the work of landing very well; and, indeed, they quickly showed that they had an advantage over the French and English in their more familiar acquaintance with the mode of life proper to warfare. 1 * * * * 1 Kinglake, Vol. II. 195 PAUT III. MODERN INNOVATIONS. CHAPTER I. SECTION I. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, CHATJSSEES, CANALS, STEAM- VESSELS, ON WARFARE. 1. In European warfare, armies moving into an enemy's country have to consider chiefly at least they have had to consider hitherto the main roads, the chaussecs, paved or macadamised usually in these days of the countries that they are about to enter. But this par- ticular warfare in America was quite an exception to any rule of that kind. The roads are so bad, (being mere country tracks, without any surface), that all communication by them for the supply of a large army must be abandoned, as the principle on which approach to the enemy is to be conducted. From the very first, the Northern Generals knew perfectly well that whenever they advanced towards Richmond the object that was then before them they would have to depend, not upon the roads, but upon the railroads. 1 2. Considering the 150 miles which lay between Washington and Richmond, and the fact that in moving direct by land, M'Clellan could have but one line of railroad to supply his large army, and that that rail- road would be inadequate for the purpose wanted, being a single line of rails, it would be inadequate to bring from day to day the immense supplies that the Northern armies seemed to require, and also having before him the fear of a dash made by the enemy on his rear, as a move which might break up the railroad and stop the supplies, he determined 1 (U.S. Institution). C.C.C. 196 MODERN INNOVATIONS. to try a safer way of getting to Richmond. Having his eye on the peninsula between the York River and the James River, he was aware that at the extremity of this peninsula was a fortress in the Northern hands, Fort Monroe; and he determined to move his army by sea to that fort, and then move his army from that point by land to Richmond ; or the steamers would take him up the James River until he came to the city itself. If that river was stopped, he had another way of getting there, because from the York River a short railroad of only about thirty miles in length, from the point where he could bring his steamers, led straight to Richmond. He might work his army up to that point, and there, by this short line of railroad, force his way on to Richmond. 3. It is not only on account of the supplies that great armies operate by great roads. It is also because the march of the troops and artillery becomes on bad roads so slow and uncertain that all the calculations on which a general bases a combined occupation are liable to be falsified, and the rapidity necessary for a movement intended to surprise or foil an adversary is lost, so tliat the design is foreseen and frustrated by the enemy. An example of the different rate at which troops move over a good and a bad road, is afforded by the campaign of Waterloo. Napoleon following Wellington, and Grouchy following Bliicher ; both quitted the field of Ligny on the afternoon of the 17th of June. The Emperor, marching by the great paved chaussfos of Namur and of Brussels, assembled his army that night in the position of Waterloo, seventeen miles from Ligny. Grouchy, moving by country roads, had great difficulty in bringing his 30,000 men to Gembloux, five miles from Ligny, by ten o'clock the same night. And, to quote more modern instances, General M'Clellan says, " On the 14th of March, a recon- naissance of a large body of cavalry, with some infantry, under command of General Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria railroad to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force his rear across the Rappahamiock ; but the roads were in such condition that, finding it impossible to subsist his men, General Stoneman was forced to return." And, on another occasion, when the Confederates suddenly fell back from near the Potomac, just as he was commencing 1 (U.S. Institution). C.C.C. INFLUENCE OF EAILEOADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 197 to advance upon them, he speaks of their retreat as "unfortunate, in that the then almost impassable roads between our position and theirs deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting damage, usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the face of a powerful adversary." While, however, impressing on the reader the absolute necessity of good roads for the sustained operations of a campaign, it is not asserted that considerable bodies of troops never move by indifferent roads. Many instances of the contrary would appear in a short course of military reading. 1 4. * * * We shall find that the Pyrenees form a barrier between Spain and France, forbidding the supply of great armies, except by roads which lie between the extremities of the mountains and the coast on each side ; that the great rivers, far from marking the lines of the great roads (which in other countries so frequently lie along the banks), flow in broken rocky channels, difficult of access ; that the cultivated districts are few and small compared with the extent of the country ; that the frontier of Portugal is so rigid as to admit of only two roads by which Lisbon can be reached from Madrid ; and we shall then comprehend the situation of the French armies in Spain, how dependent they were on the one great road on each side of the Pyrenees, how disjointed was their front when it faced towards Portugal, how difficult it was to subsist on the resources of the country, and how perilous to draw together the scattered parts of the army, separated by ragged defiles, which were held by guerillas. We see also the importance of the fortresses of Badajos and Ciudad Rodrigo, the doors betiveen Spain and Portugal, and Burgos, on the main line back to France. To see and provide for such circumstances, imparts vigour and unity of action to a campaign ; not to see and provide for them, is to carry on war by compromises and make-shifts, and to end it in disaster. 2 5. Since the requirements of agriculture, commerce, and industry have obliged governments to permit the construction of a great number of roads, canals, and railways between places on their frontiers, many strategical points have lost their former importance. Most of the fortresses which at one time intercepted the communications between one country and another, can now be turned with great ease. To 1 Hamley, Part I, Chap III. 2 Ibid. Part V, Chap I. 198 MODERN INNOVATIONS. quote but one example ; Charleroi, in 1815, being in possession of the only bridge then on the Sambre, along the whole French frontier as far as Namur, was an important strategical point ; but now that the course of the Sambre, between Nanmr and Charleroi, is crossed by four- teen bridges, the latter place is of no consequence. The same remark applies to nearly all the fortresses on the north of France, and in the south of Belgium. 1 6. The great changes which have taken place since that brief cam- paign was carried on in Belgium, whose issue brought to Europe forty years of peace, are by no means few or unimportant. Not only has population increased, and new food "areas been brought into cultivation, but nations no longer make themselves like beleaguered cities in their exclusion from the reciprocities of trade ; and the removal of vexatious restrictions on the export and import of supplies has largely increased the facilities for traffic. Eoads have become more numerous, and means of conveyance more plentiful ; while in the forty years' rest, during which science was undisturbed by the rude hands of armies, two great powers were developed ; so that when Eussia, for the second time in the century, felt the foot of foreign troops on her soil, steam was brought to bear both for land and sea transport, abridging distances and reducing time ; while by the electric telegraph distances were practically annihilated. 2 * * 7. Whatever advantages good roads can confer must be immensely increased when railways are employed. In using them, the first step must be the collection of the rolling stock on the required points of the different lines. To take the readiest example : if an order were issued in London in the evening, this would be accomplished on any of our lines by daybreak next morning, to an extent that would ensure the despatch of trains thenceforward without interruption. But, in fact, a continuous movement might be commenced in about six hours, with the stock collected in that interval. This preliminary measure accomplished, the following conditions attach to the conveyance of troops of all arms : A train of from 24 to 34 carriages of all kinds passenger carriages, cattle-trucks, horse-boxes, and break-vans can be propelled by one engine ; and a speed of from 20 to 25 miles an hour, though lower than 1 Brialmont, Vol. I. - Saint Pauls Mag. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 199 what is attainable, is considered most suitable to a continuous movement by lessening the risk of breaking down. An ordinary second or third- class carriage holds 32 soldiers. A horse-box holds three horses, and a cattle-truck six to eight. Taking the effective number of one of our in- fantry battalions at 760 men and 36 officers, and allowing three tons of baggage and four tons of camp equipage, the battalion, with its equipment, can be conveyed in one train. One train will also contain a squadron of cavalry of 120 horses, and four trains the regiment. Each artillery waggon, or gun, with its limber, occupies one truck. A battery of horse artillery, or a field battery, with its men, horses and equipment complete, requires two trains of from 31 to 33 carriages each. A battalion of in- fantry standing ready at the station, and properly practised, embarks in a few minutes. Cavalry require twenty-five minutes to fill the train, and artillery half an hour. If all embark at the same station, only three trains could be despatched in an hour. But by creating temporary plat- forms, the loading can take place simultaneously. A platform 300 feet long allows all the carriages of a train to be loaded at once ; and such a platform can be made in three hours by 200 men, out of materials always at hand on railways. 1 ***** 8. The rapidity with which a body of troops may be moved by rail from one place to another, depends very much upon the care previously taken in the arrangements for loading and unloading at the terminal stations selected, and for marshalling the trains in proper order. For cavalry and artillery particularly, suitable platforms require to be chosen or prepared. Goods' stations will often be found advantageous. 2 9. The conveyance of the public, or even of volunteers to reviews is no criterion, because the public embarks itself and unloads itself. The volunteers are only intelligent infantry, for on all occasions, when horses and guns have been forwarded by railway, they have been transported a day or two before the one of final stress. Nor must it be forgotten that the sloping platforms, covered with earth, necessary for rapid embarkation of horses and guns, are in existence at every principal station in Austria, while in England they have yet to be built. Nor is this the only difficulty. Railway drill is a common exercise in 1 Hamley, Part I, Chap. III. 3 Hand-Book, 200 MODERN INNOVATIONS. foreign armies. * * * * In England the exigencies of traffic have hitherto prevented any such practice, except to a very trifling extent. 1 10. Gunpowder should never be conveyed in the same trains with troops. Nearly 150 Austrian soldiers were killed or wounded in an accident on the Verona Railway in 1859, during which some ammu- nition waggons in the train exploded. 2 11. Railways will give an astonishing rapidity to the offensive. In 1859, eight days were enough to pour a French army into Italy. Temporary railways can be constructed to connect an army with the base of operations. There are examples of this in the American War. When establishing himself before Petersburg, General Grant made a railway about 9| miles long (15 kilometres) in eleven days, without any preliminary survey or work having been carried out. Wooden bridges were used instead of embankments, and cuttings were avoided by going round hill sides. The railroad made by the allies at Kamiesch during the siege of Sebastopol should also be remembered. For the defence, one could obtain at any time from distant arsenals, materiel, the use of which, established in a good position, might be the cause of success. A railway, parallel to and in rear of an important line of defence, might be of the greatest service in transporting reserves to the points most menaced. Railways appear likely to be of greater importance for defence than offence, as it will be generally easy for a retreating army to render them useless, at any rate for some days, by destroying the line as it retires. 3 12. A French general operating on the Rhine, some time back, was not able to count on supplies of men and materiel being brought together from departments so far distant from this river. Now, he is aware that in three or four days, if necessary, he will have at his dis- posal the garrisons and storehouses of Bayonne and Toulon. On the other hand, he will know the possibility of troops arriving from Posen, and munitions of war from Hamburgh in a very short time. In a word, as the increased range of the new arms will materially influence the movements of two armies on the point of coming into contact, so also, the great expanse common to the strategist, will extend con- siderably the circle of action. 4 1 Times, Nov. 1, 1869. 2 Hand-Book, 3 Ambert. 4 Prevost. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., OX WARFARE. 201 13. Whatever increases the rapidity with which the great machines called armies are worked, and causes the fate of -a war sooner to be declared, will diminish the suffering caused by the struggle to the population. The more perfect the system of supply and conveyance, the more striking the strategy, by so much the less will it be worth the while of generals to prolong their operations for the purpose of subsistence, and of governments to hold out for un- reasonable terms in the hope of wearying out the foe. Schleswig might have been as many months a field for contending forces as she was days, had not their railroad system enabled the Germans to concentrate an irresistible force before the Dannewerk at the very outbreak of the war, and to terminate a delusive contest by driving the Danes at once to their intrenchments, limiting the campaign thenceforth to the dimensions of a siege. 1 * * * 14. The first glance at the influence of railways upon strategy shows us their value for the concentration of troops from outlying districts upon a given point, and for the subsequent extension of the area of supply of the army so collected. It is beyond dispute that such concen- tration can be made, with far greater rapidity now than formerly ; and that the greater the extent of country over which the troops are spread, the greater comparative advantage in this respect do they derive from their railways. Railways are of little use for very short distances, because the length of time occupied in preparing trains and embarking troops, especially cavalry and artillery, is great compared with that spent on the journey. But when we come to long distances the advan- tages are enormous. In the preparation for the Italian war of 1859, some French troops were moved by railway and steamers from Paris to Genoa in five days ; one battalion went from Lille to Marseilles in forty hours ; and the main line from Paris to Marseilles carried an average of 8,500 men and 500 horses a day. On one particular day 12,000 men and 650 horses were sent, the greatest number ever yet, as far as we can ascertain, transported by rail under the most favourable circum- stances. We are speaking, of course, of troops moving to the seat of war with baggage and train, not of such affairs as the transport of volunteers to Brighton, when the whole energies of the railway are 1 Edinburgh Review. 202 MODERN INNOVATIONS. concentrated for days on the arrangements for one day, and the troops have merely to march into the station, and file into the carriages, without any delay for packing stores, and leading horses into vans. In the same war, the Austrians moved by rail the corps of Count Clam Gallas from different parts of Austria, and the frontiers of Saxony and Bohemia, 37,500 men, 10,700 horses, 1,128 waggons, and 96 guns to Verona in the fourteen days from the 17th to the 31st May ; and it reached the position of Magenta, also by rail, just in time to bar the road to Milan from the French, who would otherwise have advanced almost unopposed. And if we look at the Danish war of 1864, we see how their railroad system enabled the Grermans to concentrate an over- whelming force at the very outbreak of the campaign, brought partly from remote districts of Austria. So again her railroads enabled Prussia, between the 19th May and the 1st of June, 1866, to assemble on the frontiers of Saxony and Silesia three armies, consisting of 220,000 men, and 760 guns, armed and equipped for a campaign, and provided with the necessary transport trains, provision and ammunition columns, and field hospitals. These instances entitle us to assert, that in a country where railroads abound, the government possesses great facilities for the concentration of forces, and for the supply of large bodies of troops by rail. And as the tendency is towards the multipli- cation of lines of railway, these facilities will increase. Thus it can scarcely be doubted that the weeks and months of preparation and movement which were necessary in the great French wars will in future be contracted into days, and that instead of the concentration of large masses of troops being rare, as formerly, it will now be the rule of war. It is evident, also, that the value of railways for troops acting on the defensive is no less marked. Troops, spread over all the avenues by which an enemy might approach, can be concentrated with rapidity when his actual point of attack has become apparent ; and beaten or threatened armies can rapidly be supplied with reinforcements. Look at the beleaguered Federal army of the Cumberland after the battle of Chicamauga, reinforced by Hooker's corps of 23,000 men, which, with all its artillery, trains, baggage, and animals, accomplished the distance from the Rapidan in Virginia, to Stevenson in Alabama, a distance of 1,192 miles, in seven days, crossing the Ohio twice in its journey. "We may thus trace very distinctly the influence of railways on the prepara- * INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 203 tory movements of a campaign, and, under certain conditions, on the actions of the defenders. But when we enquire into their use for the movement of troops in an enemy's country, we find them of much less avail. 1 15. In future, railways will play an important part in the defence of States. Whilst ordinary, and even forced marches take up a great deal of time, and considerably reduce the number of effectives owing to the sick and lame, left on the road, railways with incomparable rapidity land precisely the same numbers as they receive at starting ; ammunition and supplies of all kinds come from different parts of the country to feed the depots of the army on service; the arsenals are brought within reach of the reserves, and form, so to speak, the great park of all the military forces of the kingdom. In the month of May, 1849, a Russian corps of 30,000 men was moved by rail into Hungary with very great rapidity and complete success. In 1854, the Austrian army transported in like manner into the Polish provinces troops, ammunition, and provisions. About the same time, the lines from Paris to Lyons, and the Mediterranean, rendered the greatest services to the French army of the Crimea. Lastly, thanks to railways, Napoleon the Third was able in a few weeks to bring to the foot of the Alps the army of Italy with considerable materiel, and to execute the crowning manoauvre from Alessandria to Yercelli, which upset the combinations of Giulay, and successfully brought about the passage of the Ticino. Many operations formerly impossible, or so complicated as to become extremely dangerous, are now made easy by the employment of steam and electricity. Among these may be mentioned great disembarkations, and diversions upon points distant from the theatre of war. A clever general by em- ploying the rapid and regular means of warning and transport which science has recently created will be enabled to strike blows whose suddenness and boldness will astonish his adversaries. As far back as 1854, an army of 57,500 men with 6000 horses, 21 field batteries, a siege park, ammunition, and provisions for more than a month, was conveyed at one time from Yarna to Old Fort. A few hours were sufficient to disembark on the Russian soil three French divisions, two ] Saint Pauls Mag. 204 MODERN INNOVATIONS. English divisions, and 59 horsed pieces of ordnance. This operation without precedent in history has proved that in good weather it is possible to land 15,000 men an hour. 1 16. Hereafter, naval powers prepared with the necessary fleet, will be able to transport the base of operations to any point on the enemy's coast, turn the strongest positions and baffle the best arranged combinations. Thanks to steam the sea has become a means of communication more certain and more simple than the land, and fleets will be able to act the part of moveable bases of operations, rendering them very formidable to powers which, possessing coasts, will not have any navy sufficiently powerful, to cause their being respected. Although the employment of steam, permits the assailant to rapidly concentrate his troops and maUriel, on the part of the frontier that he seeks to invade, and that it assures him of the means of easy and ready communication with the reserves, the depots, and the supplies of every description in the rear ; however, it should also be considered, that the quickness of the means of intelligence and of concentration is yet more advantageous to the defensive, because it dispenses with the obligation, always tedious, of disseminating forces to be in readiness to oppose at all the vulnerable points. 2 17. Railways and improved roads, have made great alterations in the necessities of a warrior, both by shorten- ing the duration of campaigns and facilitating transport. Europe will never again see any decently- organised army, waiting many weeks for the arrival of a siege-train, for the carriage of which all available transport is required, so that from want of means of sending stores forward the troops in the front are shivering in tattered clothes, and suffering painfully from unbooted feet. Soldiers need no longer be weighed down by heavy loads upon their backs, held back from their real use marching and fighting to be converted into beasts of burden. A spare shirt, a change of shoes, and a pot of grease, is about all that a foot- soldier need carry with him, besides his arms, ammunition, and some food. 3 18. The movement to a flank, of large bodies, by rail, within reach of the enemy, must be especially dangerous, because the troops follow 1 Brialmont, Vol. I. 2 find. 3 Hozier, Vol. II. INFLUENCE OF RAILED ADS, ETC., OX WAEFAEE. 205 each other in small isolated fractions, and are very defenceless if attacked during their transit. An insignificant detachment may there- fore, with little risk to itself, interrupt the movement of a considerable force, and even inflict on it serious injury, by a well-timed and well- directed attack; whereas, the compact march of a large body by ordinary roads could only be impeded by a force proportionately great. 1 19. The Prussians found in 1866, during their movements within their frontier, that it required a hundred trains to move a corps d'armee of 30,000 combatants, with all its train and baggage, and that it was rarely possible to move more than twelve trains a day. The Austrians are said to have succeeded in despatching fifteen trains a day. Now, traffic of this description is very useful in assembling troops from a distance behind a fortified frontier line ; but in an enemy's country, with his armies disputing the territoiy few commanders would break up their corps into fractions and send them forward at intervals of two hours or more. And so it is only at great risk that lines of railway can be used for the moA r ement of troops in the face of an enemy. Nevertheless, they have been so used, and with success. There is that remarkable instance of the Italian campaign of 1859, when the allied French and Sardinians held an outer line to the Austrians, but with railway communication from end to end. For five whole days the movement of their troops towards their left was carried on by detachments on the railway, and one corps was left alone on the extreme right for nearly four days, in order to confirm the Austrian commander in his infatuated notion that they were about to attack by their right. An enterprising and well-informed commander would easily have cut that corps off from the rest. AtValenza the railway runs near the river, and was unguarded. Any time during those four days, anywhere between Vercelli and Yoghera, the Austrians might have cut the railway. But it was not till too late that their commander awoke to what was going on, and then the Allies were nearer than himself to the only obstacle in their path to Milan. 2 20. As facility of transporting troops and material increases, so the power of concentrating the military resources of an empire on a distant frontier, for entrance on a foreign theatre of war, increases also, and so 1 Hamley, Part L, Chap. I. 2 Saint Paul's Mag. 206 MODERN INNOVATIONS. far his own railways are of great help to an invader. But as he cannot count for subsequent aid on the railways of districts held by the enemy, nor be certain that the course of events will not make districts where there are no railways the scenes of operations, he must be dependent on horses and vehicles - for further supplies. Thus we find great prepara- tions made by France for transport in Italy, in 1859 ; and the railways of the Northern States of America did not prevent a vast expenditure of transport animals in the different invasions of the south. Offensive, compared with defensive, war, must still be enormously costly. But the invader will retain and even augment, by means of his railways, the advantage of making a sudden concentrated advance on part of an extended line of defence; and even the combined resources of telegraphs and railways could not avail to meet the first onset under circumstances geographically unfavourable to the defence ; * especially when it is considered that the defender must labour under the same doubts as before in divining whether the attack is real or a feint. But, on the other hand, the defender, if forced to retreat, will easily destroy for the time the railways in the territory which he is quitting, while .preserving the full use of those which he still covers ; whereas, the assailant must either content himself with the ordinary roads, or pause to repair the railways, and to reorganise the means of supply through those channels. Thus the advantage of the initiative will, in such a case, be much more transient than before, and the defender will concentrate on the threatened line with far greater com- parative facility. 1 21. In the campaign in Georgia, 1864, the aid which Sheridan derived from his railway was very important. He was operating in a country where the obstacles were numerous and the roads bad ; and he was linked to his base by a single line of railway ; conquered bit by bit from the enemy, who frequently broke it in retreating. " This main road," he says in his Report, " has been admirably managed, and has supplied this vast army (100,000 men), so that not a man, horse, or mule, has been for a day without food, and with abundant supplies of clothing and ammunition." Not only was the daily supply kept up, but provisions for several weeks were stored at important points of the 1 Hamley, Part L, Chap. I. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 207 communications. And throughout the campaign the cavalry on both sides were extensively employed in enterprises against the railway, as the most effectual means of damaging the enemy. 1 22. Another fact concerning railway transport, dictated by common sense, has been fully confirmed by the experience of the German "War. Railways in an enemy's country have been proved to be of no use for the transport of the troops of the invader during his advance; the army acting on the defensive always breaks them up, and they cannot be repaired quickly enough to allow of troops being moved by them. But for the carriage of provisions and stores, they are invaluable. The more quickly an advancing army can lay down the rails, the more quickly can it move forward, and the more free are its motions, for the line of railway is the great artery which leading from the heart supplies the extremities of the army with means of life and action. In laying down the broken lines, the band of workmen who accompany the Prussian army, were singularly rapid and successful, but quick as they were, they were not yet quick enough, for the army transport was conducted by road for some days, even after Prague was occupied, and no enemy on the line stopped the passage of convoys. A broken bridge, even though the breach was but only a few yards wide, caused a dead stoppage in the locomotion, and the time required to shift stores from a train on side of the impediment to that on the other was very great. An engineer who would find means of constructing rapidly field bridges which would bear the weight of a railway train, would cause an advance in the art of war. 2 23. The troops designed for the invasion of Saxony, in 1866, were the army of the Elbe and the First Army. The former was to advance from the North, the latter from the East. On the evening of the 15th June, when the Saxon Government had rejected the Prussian ulti- matum, and received the declaration of war, the retreat of the Saxon army commenced, in order to gain Bohemia by way of Bodenbach, and there to unite with the Austrians. The funds from the royal treasury and the royal plate had already been packed up, and the waggons in which they had been placed accompanied the army. Means were also adopted to impede as much as possible, the advance of the Prussian 1 Hamley, Part I., Chap. V. 2 Hozier, Vol. II. 208 MODERN INNOVATIONS. troops. Saxon pioneers were set to work upon the railways which, lead from the frontier upon Dresden. Of such railways there are two, that which follows the valley of the Elbe and joins the Leipsic line at Rieza, and that which from Gorlitz leads by Bautzen upon the capital of Saxony. At nightfall the Saxon pioneers commenced their work, but in the dark, and under constant apprehension of being broken in upon by the Prussian advanced guards, they made but little progress. The rails were taken up, but were neither carried away, nor twisted, nor broken so as not to be again immediately available. At eleven o'clock at night, the wooden bridge which carries the railway branches to Leipsic and Chemnitz across the Elbe, near Rieza, was set on fire by means of petroleum. Its destruction was not accomplished, for only two piers were burnt ; and the whole bridge was again made passable within a few days. 1 24. The Electoral Prince of Hesse- Cassel was fortunate enough to save his army from falling into the hands of the enemy, but could not prevent the invasion of his country. The troops of Cassel, on the receipt of the Prussian declaration of war, in 1866, immediately prepared to retire from Cassel towards the Maine. On the 16th the retreat was commenced; and that day, chiefly by means of the railway, they reached the neighbourhood of Fulda. This movement could not be prevented by the Prussians, for the nearest Prussian troops were those at "Wetzlar, and the railway between Cassel and Marburg had been broken up. On the 19th June, the army of Hesse-Cassel reached Hannau and secured its communications with the eighth corps of the Federal army at Frankfort. 2 Concentration of the Austrian Army about Vienna, in 1866. 25. 'The period for the assembly of the Austrian Army about Vienna, in 1866, ' is remarkable for the sudden and rapid service it required, and comprised the withdrawing of a part of the Northern Army, and bringing in the bulk of the Southern Army to concentrate round the capital. In this period, notwithstanding that the en- 1 Hozier, Vol. I. 2 Ibid. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 209 cumbrances * * were even increased by the pressure of the advancing enemy, and by the difficulty of approaching and loading in the small railway station at Littowitz, there were yet transported from the said place the 10th Army corps, about 19,000 men, 860 horses, 220 guns and waggons, also about 1,000 sick and wounded, and about 2,000 workmen and railway people. This transport commenced on the 9th of July, including 20 trains, and was finished in 38 hours. The bulk of the said corps was brought to Florisdorf, the Brigade Mondel to Lundenburg (the latter to defend this pivot point of the railway) the sick, workmen, and railway men, partly to Briinn, partly to Vienna, and Hungary. The necessary preparations were being made for withdrawing other parts of the army when the order should come to commence the transport of the 3rd Austrian and Saxon Army corps from Olmlitz to Vienna. This transport commenced on the llth of July. By working daily 9 to 10 trains (which should however be called double trains, since each included above 200 axles, so that the rate of transport must be counted at 18 to 20 trains per day), there were transported to Vienna, the 3rd Army corps, and the larger half of the Saxons, a total of about 40,000 men, 4,100 horses, and 700 guns and waggons, in the course of three-and-a-half days. The last mentioned transport was executed at a time, when the enemy con- tinually endangered the railway line (practically it may be said to have been under his eyes) so that there was frequent fear of seeing the trains cut off by him, and of losing some of the means of transport. The latter case actually did occur in consequence of the actions at Preran, Jobitschaus, and of an inroad of the enemy on the line Goding Lundenburg on the 15th July. In the latter case, a patrol of the enemy tore up some rails. A part of the Saxons, about 4,000 men, 150 horses, and 30 guns and waggons, could not be transported by railway. The above transport operations, were materially hindered by the difficult approach to the small railway station at Olmlitz, the defective returns of the number of troops to be carried, the perpetual throng pressing to the trains, other exorbitant demands, temporary bad weather, and partial obstruction of the line by accumulation of rolling stock. ******** * * * The 5th Army corps, 25,000 men, 3000 horses, 567 guns and waggons, arrived from the 9th up to the 13th July, on 14 210 MODERN INNOVATIONS. the Southern Tyrolese line from Verona to Bologna, crossed the Brenner by forced marches, and arrived with the van on the 14th July at Innsbruck. From there this corps was transported in 47 trains, by the North Tyrolese railway, the Bavarian line Kusshein-Hosenheim- Satzburg, by the Empress Elizabeth "Western Railway, in seven days to Vienna, commencing on 15th July. 1 * * * * ******* 26. It would appear * * * that an invader (supposing other circumstances to be favourable) should direct his attack on a part of the theatre where railways exercise small influence, since their effect is on the whole in favour of the defender. 2 27. ' In the Seven Weeks' War in 1866,' Prince Frederick Charles occupied Przelautsch about six on the evening of the 5th, and almost at the same time the Crown Prince entered Pardubitz. The line of the Elbe was now secured as a basis for future operations, and the Austrian railway communication between Vienna and Prague was cut. At the latter town there were said to be only four Austrian battalions, and it was expected to be evacuated by them and occupied by the Prussians within a few days. As was the case. Then, notwithstanding the fortress of Konigstein in Saxony, and Josephstadt, Koniggratz, and Theresienstadt in Bohemia, the Prussian armies obtained railway communication from Pardubitz and Przelautsch by way of Prague and Reichenberg with their own country, which was of great importance to them in their further advance. 3 28. There is no doubt, that it is of great advantage to have a fortress a chcral of every line of railroad, so as to render it of no service to the enemy. A railroad differs materially from a common road in this, that a break in the use of it neutralizes to a great extent its advantage. In the case of a common road intercepted by a fortress, if a corps of observation is placed so as to prevent the sallies of the garrison, or if each supply-train is guarded by a sufficient convoy, the 1 (Panz. Lieut. -Colonel), Foreign Tour. 2 Harnley, Part I., Chap. I. 3 Hozier, Vol. II. INFLUENCE OF RAILROADS, ETC., ON WARFARE. 211 supplies can generally be carried by cross-roads round the place without much hindrance to the traffic ; but in the case of a railroad, it will not generally be possible to construct a line of rails round the fortress, the goods consequently have to be shifted into carts, carried round, and replaced in trucks on the other side, and the advantage of the railroad is to a great extent neutralized. 1 * * * 29. If the Austrians had made the most of their opportunities on the one line, ' at Elbe Teinitz ' the Prussians would have been unable to use any one of the Bohemian railways, for the other lines were closed by fortresses. The direct line to Berlin was barred by Koniggratz ; the guns of Theresienstadt commanded the line to Dresden ; so that when the Prussians had advanced on Briinn, their only railway com- munication with Prussia lay through Prague, whence they had to double back eastwards, instead of going on direct to Saxony. Yet this one line of railway was of great use for the carriage of provisions and stores in rear of the army ; and for this purpose, even though not for the movement of troops, an advancing army will find its enemy's lines of value. 2 30. The possession of Reichenberg allowed Prince Frederick Charles to open railway communication with the Silesian and Saxon lines, which was of great importance in the supply of the army's necessities. The railway from Reichenberg to Zittau was almost immediately restored, for to each Prussian Army was attached a corps of pioneers, architects, and railway officials, who follow the advancing army, lay down the lines torn up by the enemy, and rapidly reorganise the working of the line for the purposes of military transport. Two other excellent institutions of the Prussian Army were quickly established, and put in working order at every halting place ; they are the field telegraph and the field post office. 3 31. * * The readiest means of destroying railways must also be considered. On this point General Sherman says: "My own experience demonstrates the proper method to be, to march a regiment to the road, stack arms, loosen two rails opposite the right, and two opposite the left of the regiment, then to heave the whole track, rails and ties, over, breaking it all to pieces ; then pile the ties in the nature of cribwork, and lay the rails over them ; then by means of fence-rails 1 Lieut, -Col. Cooke. 3 Saint Pauls Mag. 3 Hozier, Vol. I. 212 MODERN INNOVATIONS. make a bonfire, and when the rails are red hot, let men give the rail a twist, which cannot be straightened without machinery. Also fill up some of the cuts with heavy logs and trunks of trees and branches, and cover up and fill with dirt." 1 SECTION II. TELEGEAPHY, TRANSMISSION OF OEDEES, AND SIGNALLING. Electric Telegraph. 1. The electric telegraph having become generally employed, various powers have applied it in actual warfare. France has made use of it in Africa, in the campaigns of Kabylia and on the frontier of Morocco, during the war in the East and in Italy. But the lines of telegraph in rear of the army, were not used for the purpose of communicating between different bodies of troops; their object was to retain com- munication with the metropolis, by the regular lines of the country. This service was entrusted to the civil department of the telegraph. Now it is desirous to extend it to the military telegraph department, and to cause it at the same time to be applied to strategical and tactical operations, under the care of the officers and men of the engineers, who are instructed in time of peace, and provided with the requisite materiel to operate in time of war. 2 2. "When armies are manoeuvring on any other than concentrated fronts, the telegraph may exercise influence in two ways : (1) It will enable the general to combine in one view intelligence of what is simultaneously taking place in distant parts of his front. The conclusions he will form of how far his own plan is likely to be accomplished, and of what the enemy is seeking to effect, \vill thus be more likely to be correct than if he received, at intervals, information of a state of affairs which may already, when he learns it, have ceased to exist, or be beyond his power to control. * 1 Hamley, Part VL, Chap. VII. 2 Prevost. TELEGRAPHY, ORDERS, SIGNALLING. 213 (2) It enables the general to transmit orders for simultaneous action to distant parts of his force, and to impart to the movements of an army on an extended front, the decisive and co-operative character of those which are performed under his immediate control. In the case of an army spread on an extensive front to meet an expected invasion, the advantages which railways have been said to confer on the defender will probably be increased by the conjunction of railways and telegraphs. The assailant's advantage has been explained to consist in knowing what his own point of concentration and his own line of operation will be ; while the defender, doubtful of these, may be unable at once to meet the attack, or, if it is rapidly followed up, to combine his forces effectually after its direction is apparent. But the advantages which the defender will gain in breaking the railways he abandons, and using for concentration those that connect the parts of his army, will be augmented by the possession of telegraphs, which will enable him more speedily to remedy the effects of his first doubts and hesitations. * ****** * One of the disadvantages of a general who conducts offensive operations on an extended front, is the difficulty of imparting unity, both of time and object, to his movements ; and this will in future be diminished. The telegraphic communications between the two Prussian armies invading Bohemia in 1866, was not maintained up to the battle of Koniggratz ; had it been, and had the situation on both sides been fully appreciated, their joint attack might have been so timed as to obviate the risk of separate defeat which the premature onset of Prince Frederick Charles's army entailed. And in the similar cases of allied armies operating from divergent bases, like the English and Prussians in the "Waterloo campaign, the chances that they will be able to combine for the blow, which has been said in those circumstances to be so decisive, will be greatly increased. Lastly, in the case of attempting to dislodge an enemy by sending a detachment round his rear, the telegraph will both diminish the risk of the movement and increase the chances of gaining its complete results. Sherman appears to have made constant use of it in his flanking operations. 1 Hamlcy, Part IV., Chap, VII. 214 MODERN INNOVATIONS. 3. As regards 'the campaign in 1866, each of the two main armies operating in Bohemia had one unit of field telegraph equipment attached to it, a third unit was attached to the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, and a fourth was in reserve. Each unit carried 27| English miles of wire, with a certain number of Morse recording telegraph instruments and batteries, was complete in all its details, and capable of erecting a line of telegraph as fast as the head-quarters of an army could march. ****** For the Abyssinnian Campaign of 1867-68, the telegraph equipment provided was organised in two divisions, viz. : a light line to be laid as fast as the force advanced, and of which a system of visual signalling formed a part; and a reserve line, partaking more of a permanent character, to be erected at leisure. In consequence of want of transport the light line, with the exception of the visual signalling apparatus, was abandoned altogether; and for the same reason great difficulty was experienced in carrying the materials, especially the poles, required for the semi-permanent line, and its efficiency was, consequently, seriously impaired. From the above causes the progress of erection was much slower than it might have been ; and, when the line was erected, considerably inconvenience and interruption to signalling was expe- rienced principally from the breaking down of the make-shifts, which it became necessary to substitute for telegraph posts, suitable poles not being obtainable in the country. 1 4. In all wars of this and future ages, the electric telegraph will be greatly used. It must be remembered, that a telegraph operator can with a small pocket instrument tap the wires anywhere, and learn the messages passing along them. A few such men living concealed within the enemy's territory could obtain more news than dozens of ordinary spies. Immediately before or during an action an enemy may be deceived to any extent by means of such men : messages can be sent ordering him to concentrate upon wrong points, or by giving him false information you may induce him to move as you wish. The telegraph was used in all these ways during the American war between North and South. 2 1 Professional Papers, E.E. 2 Wolseley. TELEGRAPHY, ORDERS, SIGNALLING. 215 Transmission of Orders. 5. * * * Conciseness, clearness, preciseness, distinctly pointing out the object to be attained, such should be the characteristic marks for service orders, rules for instruction and manoeuvres, orders of the day, of general and divisional orders, as well as of adminstrative decisions, ordinances and decrees. 1 6. Jornini has recorded the fact, that in 1807, the capture of a single messenger delayed the arrival of Bernadotte's corps two days, and left him out of the hard fought battle of Eylau. The same author, writing in a spirit favourable to Napoleon, but not desirous to screen Berthier's faults, shows that in 1809, at the passage of the Danube before Wagram, Davoust's and Oudinot's orders sent their corps to the wrong bridges, and obliged their troops to cross each other's line of march after the passage was made. Nor are these solitary instances. This historian, who served on the French staff in both campaigns, was present in a similar capacity at Bautzen in 1813. Hear he bears testimony to the fact, that the incompleteness of that great victory was directly due to the insufficiency of the orders received from Napoleon by Marshal Ney, to whom he himself was chief of the staff. In all these cases he speaks, not merely with the authority of a great military critic, but that of an observant eye witness. 2 7. Biilow received his first orders at five a.m. on the 15th, to concentrate his troops so as to be able to get to Hannut in a day's march. This was in course of execution, when, at half-past ten a.m., he received a second order, dated at midnight, ordering a movement on Hannut. As some of his troops could not be informed of this until late in the afternoon, and as Gneisenau's letter made no mention of actual hostilities, he put off the execution of these second instructions till next day, promising to be at Hannut by noon of the 16th. But Hannut is twenty-five miles from Ligny, where his presence was sorely needed ere that hour was long passed. ****** * * * * It remains a warning for future generals Archduke. 2 Chesney, Lect. III. 216 MODERN INNOVATIONS. in the place of Gneisenau, to put the first orders for a sudden campaign into some form not to be mistaken for an ordinary movement. A little special care in explaining to Billow the state of the case would have "been derogatory to no one writing to a general who had held a chief command himself with honour, and would have spared the error that cost the Prussians dear in the loss of 30,000 men at the hour of need. 1 8. * * * It is probable, that in another war the com- munications from head-quarters to the divisions of the army will be made by signal. During the late campaign "1866, in Germany" orders were sent to the divisional commanders by mounted officers, who were attached to head-quarters for this special purpose. Besides these officers a certain number of picked troopers are selected from every cavalry regiment, and formed into a special corps at the beginning of a campaign, and a certain number attached to every general. These troopers form the general's escort, and act as orderlies to carry un- important messages. When an officer is sent with an important order, one or two of these soldiers are sent with him, in case of his being attacked to act as a defence as far as possible, to yield up a horse to him in case of his own breaking down, or, in case of its being killed, to carry the order themselves to its destination, or, at any rate, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy if the officer is wounded and likely to be taken. During the campaign the com- munications between the head-quarters and divisions were kept up by means of mounted officers; but communications between the head- quarters of each army and the King were maintained by means of the field-telegraph. For this purpose a field-telegraph division is attached to the head-quarters of each army. 2 * * Signalling. 9. Signalling consists of a code as a basis, and requires therefore only a small number of symbols to express it, and but little practice and little skill are necessary to become a signalman. Telegraphy 1 Chesney, Lect. III. 2 Hozier, Vol. I. INFLUENCE OF RIFLED ARMS. 217 consists of a basis of spelling the use of a large number of symbols, and considerable practice and individual skill are therefore necessary to become a good telegraphist. Each of these parts, has its own advantages : On land by night with good operators in good practice, a speed five or six times greater can be obtained by telegraphy than by signalling, and reference to a code is obviated altogether but this is only available between two points, and therefore recourse must be had to signalling when it is necessary to communicate with several points at the same time. The army code of signals, has been drawn up with the view of facilitating communication between stationary military posts, between military bodies in motion, and, when at a distance from each other, also for supplying a means of communication by signal, between Her Majesty's land and sea forces, when engaged in combined operations and between coast batteries and Her Majesty's ships. 1 10. 'An instance of the important use and results of telegraphic signals, may be mentioned.' Napoleon owes his astonishing success at Eatisbon, in 1809, to the fact of his naving established a telegraphic communication between the head-quarters of the army and France. He was still at Paris, when the Austrian army crossed the Inn at Braunau with the intention of invading Bavaria, and breaking through his line of cantonments. Informed, in twenty-four hours, of what was passing at a distance of 700 miles, he threw himself into his travelling carriage, and a week later he had gained two victories under the walls of Eatisbon. Without the telegraph, the campaign would have been lost. This single fact, is sufficient to impress us with an idea of its value. 2 SECTION III. INFLUENCE OF EIFLED AEMS. 1. The introduction of arms of precision was the signal for numerous speculations, many of them somewhat extravagant, on the changes in warfare which would ensue. Some said all attacks would 1 Hand-Book. - Jomini, Chap. VI., Art. 42. 218 MODERN INNOVATIONS. be impossible; some that artillery would now be the chief arm, and infantry and cavalry mere escorts for the batteries ; some that the day of cavalry was over. The problem has been further complicated since by the introduction of breech-loaders. The effect of these changes forms by many degrees the most important tactical question that can occupy the thoughts of contemporary soldiers, for it was by divining the relations between new systems and old that Frederick and Napoleon rendered Prussia and France each for a time supreme in war. To discern and provide for the new conditions under which armies will engage may, in the next European war, be worth to a people, not merely armies and treasure, but liberty and national life. 1 2. * * * Although the power of choosing a position in which to await battle would generally entail on an adversary the necessity of advancing for a long distance uncovered before he could attack, yet the country does not always admit of the choice of such positions. Even if it did, they might frequently be turned ; and it is far more likely that manoeuvring armies would come into collision in ground which would greatly lessen the advantages of the defensive. For instance, at Solferino, the level plain on the side of Guidizzolo, and the broken country about Pozzolengo, with its small hills and short undula- tions, were no more favourable to defence than to attack ; indeed, in the hilly country, where the conformation of the ground would conceal the concentration of an assailant's column of attack, the advantage would be on his side. Again, in almost all districts there are hollow ways and dips in the ground, which may shelter troops even in what, at first, may seem to be a plain. Finally, the smoke of artillery and musketry, to which dust or fog may often be added ; and the stress, moral and physical, of sustained conflict, are all of them influences which greatly diminish the effect of weapons requiring a clear range and a deliberate adjustment. Still, notwithstanding this, a great additional advantage has been con- ferred on the army, which, in a sheltered and commanding position, awaits the attack. The enemy's columns of march must now often form line of battle at a much greater distance than formerly, and troops advancing to attack must traverse, under the fire of marksmen, a space of several hundred yards, where the old musketry would not have reached them ; while the distance still to be crossed before closing with 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. INFLUENCE OF RIFLED ARMS. 219 the enemy, must be accomplished under an almost intolerable storm of bullets from the general line. Moreover, batteries stationed at different parts of the hostile line, quite beyond former range, would now con- centrate their fire on the columns of attack. 1 3. Increased range, celerity and accuracy of fire, have made it necessary to shelter, as much as possible, troops from the time of their entering into action, to prevent their becoming decimated. Armies also will probably avoid, more than before, fighting in an open country, or in large plains. They will seek for ground permitting a nearer approach to the enemy, concealing turning movements, screening from observation troops that are not to be brought into action at the commencement, reserves, &c. They will create obstacles for cover, where natural ones are not met with. ***** Field works are then more than ever necessary ; they will become more obligatory with the present arms. If properly understood and applied, they will henceforth occupy an important part in battles. It is a new aspect, which it is expedient to study. 2 4. When improvements are made in any particular branch of the service, it seems generally to be expected that the entire system of tactics must in consequence undergo a radical change; but there are certain unalterable circumstances which hinder any one arm, no matter how perfect it may have become, from gaining such a preponderance as would prevent the effective action of the other arms. For instance, the conformation of the ground affording cover from artillery fire to cavalry and horse artillery, either when assembled together or when on the inarch to the point of action, the limits to human vision, which remain the same, however much the limits of the range of artillery and small arms may be altered; while artificial aids to sight are ill-adapted for practice against moving bodies, as their use must be attended with uncertainty and delay, the adjustments for long ranges and very accurate aim requiring both care and time ; so that, when once within 1200 or 1500 yards of the enemy's artillery, a rapidly advancing body may be considered not much worse off now than formerly. In addition to these, many other facts will suggest themselves, all tending to prove that, in practice, the result of improvements like the present is often founded upon theoretical reasoning. 3 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. a Prevost. " General Smith. 220 MODERN INNOVATIONS. 5. Happening to be in Paris near the end of 1851, a distinguished person did Jomini the honor to ask his opinion as to whether recent improvements in fire-arms would cause any great modifications in the manner of making war. Jomini replied that they would probably have an influence upon the detail of tactics, but that in great strategic operations and the grand combination of battles, victory would, now as ever, result from the application of the principles which had led to the success of great generals in all ages of Alexander and Caesar, as well as of Frederick and Napoleon. His illustrious interlocutor seemed to be completely of his opinion. The heroic events which occurred near Sebastopol, did not produce the slightest change in his opinion. This gigantic contest between two vast intrenched camps, occupied by entire armies and mounting 2000 guns of the largest calibre, is an event without precedent, which will have no equal in the future ; for the circumstances which produced it cannot occur again. Moreover, this contest of camion with ramparts, bearing no resemblance to regular pitched battles fought in the centre of a continent, cannot influence in any respect the great combinations of war, nor even the tactics of battles. The bloody battles of the Alma and the Inkermann, by giving evidence of the murderous effect of the new fire-arms, naturally led Jomini to investigate the changes which it might be necessary to make on this account, in the tactics for infantry. 1 6. " Fire in action is of two kinds ; the fire at will, " file-firing," and the fire by volleys: the former kind being the rule, the latter the exception. Although the fire at will is the one principally used, there are very strong objections to it. The men load and fire as individuals, and generally with great rapidity, and under more or less excitement, rarely stopping to take a deliberate aim. The consequence is that very few shots take effect, and the fire is, for the greater part, wasted, as is shown by the well- established fact, that in every engagement, for every man killed or disabled, there have been from 3000 to 10,000 musket or rifle bullets fired. 1 Jomini. INFLUENCE OF RIFLED ARMS. 221 The fire at will leads to a rapid and enormous consumption of ammu- nition. * * * * ******* On the other hand, volley firing has often been attended with decisive results, especially when it has been reserved to the proper moment, and delivered at short range. 1 * * * * 7. The number of cartridges fired by the Prussian army in the battle of Koniggriitz, barely exceeded one per man on the ground. Hardly any soldier fired so many as 90, and few more than 60. The average number of rounds fired by the Artillery of Prince Frederick Charles's army, was 42 rounds per gun ; and no gun of that army fired more than 80 rounds. In the Artillery of the Guard, the 13 batteries engaged, fired 1787 rounds, being an average of 23 per gun : one battery fired 81 rounds per gun. 2 8. The volley fire of the company, or of the subdivision "in the Prussian army," is much employed, notably in connexion with skirmishing; if the skirmishers are being overpowered at any point, so that a heavy fire is particularly required to be delivered from part of a line of skirmishers, a subdivision (zuyj, or the main body of the company which has been in support, doubles up into line with the skirmishers, fire a rapid succession of volleys till the purpose is accomplished, and again retires. Such volleys are called Kleine sake ; it is a mode of delivering fires which is worth calling attention to, it seems much relied on in Prussia, and with justice. The number of rounds now carried in the field by the Prussian soldier is 80 ; in the war of 1866 it was 60 ; with regard to the general question of preventing the too rapid firing away of cartridges, it appears that this is met in Prussia by giving the battalions the fewest possible opportu- nities of firing indiscriminately ; independent file-firing is recognised in their drill but seems very seldom resorted to, the system of firing volleys rapidly from small bodies taking its place, these are delivered by word of command, and so the men are kept under control. 3 1 Lippitt. * Hozier, Vol. I. 3 W. H. G. 222 PART IT. TACTICS Si 1'officier desire connaitre la tactique du champ de bataille, c'est-a-dire la combinaison des armes entre elles, it doit avoir recours a 1' etude particuliere et consulter les ouvrages qui traitent de la guerre. Or, ces ouvrages le transportent sans transition, du terrain de manoeuvre de la garnison, dans le domaine de la strategic, que Napoleon nomine la grandc tactiquf. LE GENERAL BARON AMBERT. CHAPTER I. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 1. Tactics is the art of using masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well arranged marches ; that is to say, the art of making them act at the decisive point of the field of battle. 1 2. It is the science of the application of manoeuvres. One may be a great tactician without any genius ; but one does not become so without great practice. Nothing is more simple to conceive than the theory; but the practice is not without difficulties. The general must be familiar with the means foreseen and calculated by the regulations ; he must at one glance know how to judge of a field, estimate distances,, determine clearly the direction, appreciate the details, combine the links in the chain of circumstances. * * * * * * Tactics has the same aim as strategy, but upon a smaller scale and a different theatre. Instead of operating over a vast country, and for whole days, the action is upon a battle-field, the extent of which is embraced by the eye, and the movements upon which are accomplished in a few hours. The basis of the combinations, the proposed aim, is always to be stronger than the enemy at an indicated point of the battle. 2 1 Jomini. 2 Marmont. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 223 3. ' Baron Ambert informs us, that he ' first began to study * exclusively, from a cavalry point of view ; but after much research and reflection more than ever recognised the truth, that : The employment of one arm is, generally subordinate to its combination with others. He therefore took to studying the tactics of the three arms ; there, however, he again came to a stop. 1 4. Napoleon's system of war was admirably adapted to draw forth and augment the military excellence, and to strengthen the weakness of the national character. His discipline, severe, but appealing to the feelings of hope and honour, wrought the quick temperament of the French soldiers to patience under hardships and strong endurance under fire ; he taught the generals to rely on their own talents, to look to the country wherein they made war for resources, and to dare every- thing, even with the smallest numbers, that the impetuous valour of France might have full play : hence the violence of their attacks. But he also taught them to combine all arms together, and to keep strong reserves that sudden disorders might be repaired, and the discouraged troops have time to rally and recover their pristine spirit, certain that they would then renew the battle with the same confidence as before. He thus made his troops, not invincible indeed, nature had put a bar to that in the character of the British soldier, but so terrible and sure in war that the number and greatness of their exploits surpassed those of all other nations : the Romans not excepted if regard be had to the shortness of the period, nor the Macedonians if the quality of their opponents be considered. 2 5. The piercing coup-cVceil of Napoleon soon discovered that his armies accustomed to conquer in Egypt and in Italy, were few in numbers ; that for battles given on German soil, they had not been sufficiently exercised, and that it was necessary to match them with the armies of Moreau and of Jourdan. In the great camp of Boulogne, he brought together and exercised for two years the army afterwards called the Grand Army. "Without this real training given to 200,000 men, the admirable campaigns of 1805, 1806 and 1807, and their great results would have been impossible. 3 1 Ambert. z Napier, Vol. VI , 3 Archduke. 224 TACTICS. 6. A better account of a great battle, considered as a military study, 'than Baron Ambert's examination and illustration of the battle of Austerlitz' cannot possibly be expected; and to such students as would fully comprehend the essential differences between the improved tactics and those derived from the school of Frederick, this book may be thoroughly commended. The army of France, under the new imperial system, proved itself as fit for combined and ready action in the shock of battle as for the rapid march and quick con- centration which had already placed Napoleon's enemies at such disadvantage in the general campaign. Henceforth the tactics of the soldiers of Austerlitz become the chief model after which all great armies for more than half-a-century strove. Differences there were in detail according to national custom and habit. The Prussians refused to abandon the method which had first given their nation renown, until the system of Frederick met its final end on the heights of Jena and Auerstadt in the following year. The Russian generals have ever seemed to incline to a closer formation of their divisions than any other nation has adopted. The genius of "Wellington developed an order of defensive battle (according to his own admission to Jomini) suited especially for the mixed armies he led, and founded on that marvellous solidity of the English battalions forgotten by Europe till their ancient fame revived at his touch. But an organisation by corps columns moving independently with connecting detachments between them, changed where convenient into lines, and covered with skirmishers to shake the enemy's order and keep him out of range cavalry less exposed than of old, yet partly used to connect the movements of the infantry divisions and guard their flanks reserves increased to a large proportion of the whole force, and strengthened by a powerful artillery the latter arm greatly augmented, and placed more in mass a careful occupation of natural obstacles in front by detachments, whilst the bulk of the divisions are sheltered where possible from the enemy's guns such are the normal rules on which orders of battle were formed down to the time of the Third Napoleon. 1 7. History proves that, each time a period of war succeeds a long period of peace, the mode of warfare or rather tactics remains for some 1 Edinburgh Review. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 225 time in a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty soon gives place to clearer and more simple principles, and upon these is finally established a new mode of warfare, which attains comparative perfection. 1 8. Now that the improvements in artillery and small arms have doubled and trebled their effective ranges ; now that in a battle, the masses are nowhere actually in perfect security ; that the secret in war lies in regulated celerity, order, and silence ; that the unchangeable rigidity of the earlier Prussian line of battle, has been replaced by the elasticity, mobility, and relative independence of its component parts ; is it not plain that simplicity and clearness in theory, facility and rapidity in execution, are the absolute law of modern manoeuvres and tactics ? 2 9. A most interesting pamphlet appeared in 1868 in Berlin, under the title of Taktisckc Ruckbliche auf, 1866. As a clever and moderate criticism of the Prussian tactics, it has been translated into French by Captain Furcy-Raynaud, who calls it Etude sur la Tactique, and it is well worthy of careful study by all men who would judge for themselves, rather than follow popular cries. The author points out the tendency in the Prussian infantry to weaken their centre, by flowing round the flanks of an object which offers resistance ; an improvised manoeuvre which may succeed against very inferior or ill-armed troops, but not against such as are equal and sufficiently awake to their opportunities. Himself, a Prussian staff- officer employed during the war, the writer of Taldische Ruckbliche, describes the attack of the first line as resembling very much "the charges of hordes of irregular cavalry," and represents the second line as hurrying up and becoming confused with the first. " Each chief communicates his impulse to whatever he finds under his hand." The reserve follows, " the original order of battle is broken, and nothing can then insure that a company fights in connexion Avith its own skirmishers ; that the companies of the same battalion, or the battalions of the same regiment, can remain united." On the other hand, the French soldiers, full of individual intelligence, and working apparently in the loosest order, are, never- theless, bound together by the chain of companies in battalions, battalions in brigades. At present their principal attacks at Chalons 1 Ainbert. 2 Trochu. 15 226 TACTICS. and elsewhere, are made, for the most part, in a line of battalions, each formed into double columns of companies, at deploying intervals. The battalions on the flank of the brigade or division are generally at half distance, to provide more readily against cavalry attacks. Sometimes, where the ground admits of it, they attack in line with battalions in column on the flanks. Sometimes the infantry assault in echelon. Skirmishers work up to the last moment, and artillery -fire from as many different positions as possible, is concentrated upon the point to be attacked. Above all, the guns are never placed in front of the attacking infantry. 1 10. Artillery having reached such accuracy and length of range, Generals are aware it is not only a powerful means for the attack, but also in many cases an effectual means, and nearly indispensable, for the protection of infantry. Also, when the distance and formation of the ground permit, they endeavour to arrest the head of a column, or to throw a line advancing in deployed order into disorder and confusion, by means of their artillery; keeping their infantry out of reach of the enemy's musketry. The experience of past wars and the study of recent campaigns, have convinced them of the necessity of husbanding their infantry, in order to have it in hand for the decisive moment, and of the impossibility of successful attacks with the bayonet. Since the introduction of the new arms, it is a principle never to throw columns massed or deployed on a position strongly defended, by an enemy sheltered behind walls or earthen works, without having pre- viously, as much as possible, levelled and knocked down the defences with guns. With the present rapidity of fire, troops which advance over open ground on an enemy protected by intrenchments, are with certainty cut up, whilst the enemy is but little injured. 2 11. * * For artillery to profit to the greatest extent, by its range and mobility, a certain amount of independence must be allowed it. This will prevent its movements being restricted, so much as formerly to those of other arms, and will make it more independent. Batteries are no longer tied down to the movements in detail of infantry ; they will not, in the future, be employed in assisting directly the fire of that arm. Artillery will be a separate element, having its own aim. and results in view. 3 1 Times, Nov. 1st, 1869. z Maldan. 3 Aiubert. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 227 12. Ill the present day, to prevent the movements of Artillery being retarded, it is indispensable to support it by cavalry. Napoleon was a declared advocate of the association of cavalry with artillery. " Artillery," he said, " is more essential to cavalry than infantry, the former having no fire. Horse artillery has the great advantage of being able rapidly to reach the best positions for establishing batteries." Cavalry, in this case, can conceal the movement of the artillery, and will protect it in position. A decrease in strength of cavalry would, therefore, almost entirely stop the progress of artillery. The more pfogress artillery makes, that is to say, the more it gains in mobility and length of range, the greater need it has of cavalry. 1 13. Jomini says, that the moral effect produced by taking troops in flank or rear by artillery, is quite incalculable. At Austerlitz, the artillery made use of oblique fire whenever the opportunity afforded itself. Batteries placed upon the road to Olmiitz, took Bagration's lines in flank, and inflicted great loss upon his left wing. The Regiment of Archangel, alone, lost about 1600 men. 2 14. As it is an essential in an offensive battle to drive the enemy from his position, and to cut him up as much as possible, the best means of accomplishing this is, to use as much material force as can be accumulated against him. It sometimes happens, however, that the direct application of main force is of doubtful utility, and better results may follow from manoeuvres to outflank and turn that wing which is nearest the enemy's line of retreat. He may, when thus threatened, retire, when he would fight strongly and successfully if attacked by main force. History is full of examples of the success of such manoeuvres, especially when used against generals of weak character ; and although victories thus obtained are generally less decisive, and the hostile army is but little demoralised ; such incomplete successes are of sufficient importance not to be neglected, and a skilful general should know how to employ the means to gain them when opportunity offers ; and especially should he combine these turning movements with attacks by main force. The combination of these two methods, that is to say, the attack in front by main force and the turning manoeuvre, will render the victory more certain than 1 Ambert. * Ibid. 228 TACTICS. the use of either separately ; but, in all cases, too extended movements must be avoided, even in presence of a contemptible enemy. The manner of driving an enemy from his position by main force is the following : Throw his troops into confusion by a heavy and well- directed fire of artillery ; increase this confusion by vigorous charges of cavalry, and follow up the advantages thus gained by pushing forward masses of infantry, well covered in front by skirmishers and flanked by cavalry. But while we may expect success to follow such an attack upon the first line, the second is still to be overcome, and, after that, the reserve ; and at this period of the engagement the attacking party would usually be seriously embarrassed, did not the moral effect of the defeat of the first line often occasion the retreat of the second, and cause the general in command to lose his presence of mind In fact, the attacking troops will usually be somewhat disordered, even in victory ; and it will often be very difficult to replace them by those of the second line, because they generally follow the first line at such a distance as not to come within musket range of the enemy; and it is always embarrassing to substitute one division for another in the heat of battle, at the moment when the enemy is putting forth all his strength in repelling the attack. These considerations lead to the belief that if the general and the troops of the defensive army are equally active in the performance of their duty, and preserve their presence of mind, if their flanks and line of retreat are not threatened, the advantage will usually be on their side at the second collision of the battle ; but to insure that / result, their second line and the cavalry must be launched against the '; ., victorious battalions of the adversary at the proper instant ; for the loss of a few minutes may be irreparable, and the second line may be drawn into the confusion of the first. From the preceding facts may be de- duced the following truth : " that the most difficult as well as the most certain of all the means the assailant may use to gain the victory, consists in strongly supporting the first line with the troops of the second line, and these with the reserve, and in a proper employment of masses of cavalry and batteries, to assist in striking the decisive blow at the second line of the enemy ; for here is presented the greatest of all the problems of the tactics of battles." In this important crisis of battles, theory becomes an uncertain guide ; for it is then unequal to the emergency, and can never compare in value with a natural talent COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 229 for war, nor be a sufficient substitute for that intuitive coup d'ceil imparted by experience in battles to a general of tried bravery and coolness. The simultaneous employment of the largest number of troops of all arms combined, except a small reserve of each, which should be always held in hand, will, therefore at the critical moment of the battle, be the problem which every skilful general will attempt to solve, and to which he should give his whole attention. This critical moment is usually when the first line of the parties is broken, and all the efforts of both contestants are put forth; on the one side to complete the victory, on the other to wrest it from the enemy. It is scarcely necessary to say that, to make this decisive blow more certain and effectual, a simultaneous attack upon the enemy's flank would be very advantageous. 1 ****** 15. If one force is greatly superior to the other in precision and rapidity of movement, it may openly attempt to manoeuvre round a flank, till it can form across the extremity of the hostile line. A British commander would be justified in so doing against a Native Indian army, and might even let go his hold of his own communication, secure of regaining it, if necessary, before an unwieldly foe could anticipate him. But this movement, being circuitous, is open to a great objection, if attempted against an antagonist equal in manoeuvring power. For the enemy AB, by moving in extension of his " A a own front, can place himself across the head of the advanc- ing column CD, and so out- "^ . w D flank it. For this reason the manoeuvring will seldom be attempted. It is more common to engage the enemy on a considerable extent of his front, and amid the smoke of the guns and skirmishers, or behind the screen of hills, or woods, or hollow ways, to reinforce from the reserves, or at the expense of another part of the line, that portion of the army with which it is designed to assail the enemy's flank or front. When by its superior force it has broken through the troops in front of it, its object will be to deploy and menace the enemy's flank and rear. 2 1 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31, ' Hand-Book, 230 TACTICS. 16. The difficulties of approaching certain positions being increased, it will happen in future, more frequently than in former campaigns, that generals will rather manoeuvre than attack them ; preferring the hazards of losing their communications to the certain losses of the assault. Turning movements, rendered extensive by the necessity of keeping beyond the increased range of artillery, will be attempted, and opportunities for the counter-stroke of Rossbach and Salamanca will be seized on the one side and provided for on the other. Indeed, the most legitimate use of the turning movement is, not so much to attack an enemy's flank, as to draw him from a position impregnable in front, by threatening its weak side. Manoeuvres, then, will in such cases precede the battle, and generals will show their skill and boldness in these rather than in headlong attacks on prepared positions. 1 17. The principal and decisive attack forms the basis of the scheme of battle, and depends on the ascertaining of the most important point, or key, to the position. * * ****** The choice of this point of attack, says General Dufour, is the great test of genius and military instinct in a general. However, the matters to be examined in order to make such choice, may be classified into three kinds ; those connected with strategy, and with the higher order of combinations ; those founded on tactics in their widest acceptation, and determining the general manoeuvres of the battle ; and those which, emanating from the very ground on which the troops have to act, may affect the movements as regards their details and execution. 2 18. The decisive point of a battle-field will be determined by, (1) The features of the ground. (2) The relations of the local features, to the ultimate strategic aim. (3) The positions occupied by the respective forces. 3 19. The attack of a position requires the most rapid march, and, , the space to be passed over being often bristling with obstacles, the { troops should always be formed in column by battalions. These little | masses are easy to move ; they cross without difficulty all the defiles ; the rear, less exposed to the fire of the enemy than the front, pushes 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap, V. 2 Lendy. :t Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 19. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 231 the front forward, and thus they arrive at the point to be attacked the more quickly. As a compliment to this disposition of troops, a great number of skirmishers would precede the columns, and march in a direction corresponding to the intervals of the battalions, in such a manner as to divide the fire of the enemy, and to cover the deployment if it becomes necessary, without masking the heads of columns, which may immediately commence firing. The skirmishers thus placed will find themselves supported ; they have rallying points, designated and within reach, and they can never be compromised. 1 20. In general, the most commanding ground occupied by the enemy's line will be the point of attack. For while he holds it, a success elsewhere cannot be decisive ; and since the height must be carried, it is better to attack while the troops are fresh and vigorous, than when wearied by the conflict. But if the enemy's line of retreat can be seized or menaced by an attack in another quarter, it will be manifestly well to avoid the costly effort. Had the Austrians possessed no other line of retreat to the Mincio than the Guidizzolo road, the struggle for the hill of Solferino would have been needless. 2 21. There are two ways of obliging an enemy to abandon a position, viz : by attacking and driving him from it, and by manoeuvring so as to make it impossible for him to hold it. The first method should only be adopted when, in consequence of your having a superior force, or of the enemy's position being faulty, it is your object to bring on a decisive engagement. The mode of applying the second is in general to threaten the enemy's line of communication. It was by employing the second method, after the first had failed, that Massena obliged Wellington to retire from the position of Busaco. 3 * * 22. It is possible to force an enemy from the field without either menacing his flank or breaking his front. This may be effected either by pressing back his line throughout its extent, or by seizing on commanding points of the battle-field, the loss of which renders his position untenable. 4 23. Though fixed rules are exceedingly difficult to be applied, still among the first is that of operating with a superior mass on the decisive point, because the physical force of organized numbers in arms Mannont. z Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. 8 Mac Dougall. 4 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. 232 TACTICS. furnishes the unerring element of victory, when the moral qualities of both armies are equal. The means of bringing this force to bear in the most advantageous manner is the art of fighting ; consequently courage and fortune being nearly balanced, that general who can operate with the largest mass upon the most decisive point must be successful. But for this purpose the combination must be such as to produce a unity of movements, conducting simultaneously to the same object ; and the masses so produced must act with energy against the enemy, for mere superiority on the given point without action would be useless ; as was signally exemplified at Fontenoy, where less than half of an inferior army broke through the hostile position, and then halted nearly four hours, waiting the reorganization of the enemy's line, in order to be defeated. The following maxims are of general application : (1) No favourable opportunity should be postponed to the morrow. (2) No battle should be given but for an important object, unless the circumstances render one unavoidable. (3) No battle undecided at night-fall should be considered ended until at least one more great concentrated effort shall have been made to convert it into a complete victory before total darkness produces the cessation of action. Napoleon, on more than one occasion, obtained his victories by such an unexpected effort, and particularly at Ligny owed his momentary success to this measure. (4) After a victory, the enemy should not be allowed to recover : fatigue must be disregarded, and the pursuit made incessant, for the enemy is surely as much exhausted as the conqueror ; if he can flee, the other must be able to pursue ; the troops should be concentrated as much as possible towards the close of a successful action, not only to complete the work satisfactorily, but to repel those last and desperate efforts which have more than once turned the fortune of the day. 1 .. 24. As in lines of operations, so on fields of battle, it is necessary to avoid, 1st Forming isolated divisions ; 2nd Ordering extended movements, which deprive the army of a part of its strength, and enable the enemy either to ruin the main body or the detachment ; (Aide-M&noire), C.H.S, COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 233 3rd Positions with too great an extent of front ; 4th Suffering obstacles, rivers, ravines, &c., to separate the wings or impassable rocks to intervene between the columns, exposing them to be separately defeated. 1 Reserves. 25. Tactical talent consists in causing the unexpected arrival upon the most accessible and the most important positions, of means which destroy the equilibrium, and give the victory ; to execute, in a word, with promptness, movements which disconcert the enemy, and for which he is entirely unprepared. To this effect it is essential to employ reserves appropriately and with judgment ; this displays the true genius for war. We should carefully avoid using them too soon or too late ; if too soon, we employ our means uselessly, and deprive ourselves of them at the moment Avhen they will be most necessary ; if too late, we either allow the victory to be incomplete, or the reverse to increase and become irreparable. 2 26. There are some battles where success depends upon the first shock ; in others the opportune moment for striking the decisive blow does not occur till near the close of the day ; this depends upon the respective positions of the contending parties. Thus, at Waterloo, the decisive moment for Wellington was at the approach of Blucher ; at Marengo the decisive moment for me was the return of Dessaix from Rivalta ; and for the opposite parties in these two battles it was early in the day. If we apply this general principle to the battle of Borodino, is is not difficult to judge of it understandingly. We ought to have struck the decisive blow in the first attack, without allowing Bagaworth and Ostermann time to reinforce the threatened point. In reply to the reproach which has sometimes been made against me for not having sent to Ney the Young Guard at eleven o'clock, it may be said that although it would have been better to do so, nevertheless, under the circumstances, my refusal cannot justly be regarded as a fault ; for at that time the enemy still exhibited a firm attitude, and all our 1 (Aide-Momoire), 0. H. 8. " Marmont. 234 TACTICS. battles with, the Russians had been long, obstinate, and bloody ; I thought they had more fresh troops coming from their right, and was ignorant that their guards were all engaged; it would have been improper in me to have engaged my final reserve before they did theirs. It is not at a distance of 800 leagues from the base of operations, that one can venture upon such a manoeuvre. It was for want of a good reserve that Charles XII was forced to fly alone into Turkey, after the battle of Pultowa. 1 27. 'At Salamanca' the crisis of the battle had arrived, and the victory was for the general who had the strongest reserves in hand. Wellington, who was seen that day at every point of the field exactly when his presence was most required, immediately brought up from the second line, the sixth division, and its charge was rough, strong, and and successful. Nevertheless, the struggle was no slight one. The southern ridge was regained ; the reserve of Boyer's dragoons coming on at a canter, were met and broken by the fire of Hulse's noble brigade. Then the changing current of the fight once more set for the British. 2 28. General McClellan at the battle of Antietam, beside that of making his attacks so disconnectedly, that they afforded no help to each, other, * kept 15,000 men in strict reserve to the very end of the battle, a force which, properly employed, might have been used to obtain some decisive advantage. For any practical effect produced on the 17th or the next day, Porter's corps might as well have been at Washington. There is no example of any great tactician thus making useless his superiority of force of his own choice, except the single one of Napoleon refusing to employ his guard to decide the desperate struggle at Borodino ; and although the great emperor had the strongest possible reason for thus reserving his best troops, in the enormous distance from his depots which, he arrived at, and the consequent impossibility of replacing them ; yet he has been more condemned than admired for this striking deviation from his usual practice, which rendered his victory so indecisive, and ultimately so useless. But McClellan was in the very reverse of such a position, and could have had no similar reason ; for his reinforcements were near, and those of his opponent 1 Life of Napoleon. 2 Napier, Vol. V. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFEKENT AEMS. 235 exhausted. The only excuse which can be made for his timidity as to the use of his reserve, must lie in the ignorance he laboured under as to the great numerical inferiority of Lee. 1 Taking the initiative. 29. As to the relative advantages and disadvantages attendant upon taking the initiative in strategy and in tactics, Jomini remarks, that * " especially in strategy, the army taking the initiative, has the great advantage of bringing up its troops and striking a blow where it may deem best ; whilst the army which acts upon the defensive and awaits an attack, is anticipated in every direction, is often taken unawares, and is always obliged to regulate its manreuvres by those of the enemy." Also, " * that in tactics, these advantages are not so marked, because in this case the operations occupy a smaller extent of ground, and the party taking the initiative cannot conceal his movements from the enemy, who, instantly observing, may at once counteract them by the aid of a good reserve. Moreover; the party advancing upon the enemy, has against him all the disadvantages arising from accidents of ground that he must pass before reaching the hostile line ; and, however flat a country it may be, there are always inequalities of the surface, such as small ravines, thickets, hedges, farm houses, villages, &c., which must either be taken possession of or be passed by. To these natural obstacles may also be added the enemy's batteries to be carried, and the disorder which always prevails, to a greater or less extent, in a body of men exposed to a continued fire of musketry or artillery. Viewing the matter in the light of these facts, all must agree that in tactical operations the advantages resulting from taking the initiative are balanced by the disadvantages." 2 30. When an army is posted behind natural or artificial obstacles, ought it to await the enemy at the moment of a combat ; or is it better to go out and give battle ? This question has at all times been the cause of much controversy amongst military writers. It would appear that no fixed rule can be made in the matter, and that the plan to be 1 Campaigns in Virginia. 2 Jomini, Chap. IV, Art. 30. 236 TACTICS. followed depends upon a number of circumstances, impossible to foresee. In generals the approved ideas in modern tactics are, that the offensive be vigorously taken, at the moment of the enemy advancing to the attack, and for that reason the organization is such as to permit of an advance with the greatest possible celerity. When, on account of the numbers or description of the troops, there is an inferiority to the adversary, it is better to remain on the defensive. 1 * * * 31. A natural obstacle, by impeding the advance of an attacking force, may so greatly increase the effects of the fire by which it is opposed, as to render a charge impracticable, though neither the magnitude of the obstacle nor the intensity of the fire might have been singly sufficient to stop the onset of resolute men. 2 32. Each arm, after having been accessory, must in its turn become a principal element, because there are circumstances in which a particular effect is to be produced. Thus cavalry reserves are indis- pensable, whether for engaging masses of cavalry, or to precipitate themselves upon ill supported infantry corps, or to cover infantry when in disorder, or to carry batteries, &c. This cavalry should be supported and sustained by an artillery force belonging to and associated with it, according to circumstances, in order to obtain the desired results. The cavalry is here the principal arm, and the artillery accessory. But the turn of the latter also comes during the battle ; the artillery reserve, employed to produce a great effect, at a given moment and upon a designated point, becomes suddenly the principal arm ; it crushes the enemy with its fire. Then the infantry advance, which complete the disorder, and finally the cavalry, charging upon them, finish their destruction and assures the victory. 3 33. On the defensive, it seems also advisable to have the artillery not in reserve distributed at equal intervals in batteries along the whole line, since it is important to repel the enemy at all points. This must not, however, be regarded as an invariable rule; for the character of the position, and the designs of the enemy may oblige the mass of the 1 Prevost. 2 (Aide-Memoire) Robertson. 3 Marmont. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 237 artillery to move to a wing or to the centre. In the offensive, it is equally advantageous to concentrate a very powerful artillery-fire upon a single point where it is desired to make a decisive stroke, with a view of shattering the enemy's line to such a degree that he will be unable to withstand an attack upon which the fate of the battle is to turn. 1 34. When on the defensive, the guns will direct* their fire on the attacking columns ; but when supporting an attack of infantry, though a part of them will properly be directed on the enemy's infantry, yet a proportion should also, by firing on the enemy's artillery, seek to diminish its effect on the advancing columns. Batteries accompanying the advance of infantry may, as in the case of cavalry, though with due regard to the slower pace, supply the want of fire, and diminish the effect of the enemy's rifles and artillery. 2 35. The artillery, in order to fire, must halt and come into action, f Therefore, when acting in support, during the advance or retreat of cavalry, the artillery must move at a faster rate than the cavalry, and thus gain time to take up consecutive positions in advance, to come into action, and to deliver their fire before they become masked by the continued advance of the cavalry ; or, to be in action and ready to open fire, as they become unmasked by the continued retreat of the cavalry. 3 36. The artillery should always have a sufficiently strong escort attached to defend them, and to secure them against any sudden attack by small bodies of the enemy. So long as the artillery is properly escorted, and occupies positions which are considerably nearer to our own force than to the enemy, there can be no danger, as we can move as fast to the support as the enemy can to the attack, and we have less ground to go over. 4 37. When infantry threatens artillery, the latter should continue its fire to the last moment, being careful not to commence firing too soon. The cannoneers can always be sheltered from an infantry attack, if the battery is properly supported. This is a case, for the co-operation of the three arms ; for, if the enemy's infantry is thrown into confusion by the artillery, a combined attack by cavalry and infantry will cause its destruction. 5 1 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 43. 2 Hamley, Part VI. , Chap. II. 3 General Smith. * Ibid, 5 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 46, 238 TACTICS. 38. Oukouneff, and most tacticians recommend that infantry skir- mishers should always be employed against artillery, prior to attacking it with cavalry. By this means many men and horses will be killed and the battery thrown in disorder, This principle ought now more than ever to be observed. Skirmishers are able to approach within 600 metres of the guns, without fear of grape-shot, and their fire at that distance, would be comparatively very effective. 1 39. It is far easier to overcome the several arms, when separated, than when they afford each other mutual protection, Lannes applied this principle, with success, when he stopped all communication between the infantry of Bagration and Lichtenstein's cavalry. It is, by a skilful disposition, to prevent the enemy acting tactically, and combining his efforts. 2 40. In estimating the effect of a charge on the combinations of the three arms, and of the circumstances in which a charge is applicable, it is necessary to consider the obstacles by which the charging body may be opposed, and the results which it is capable of obtaining. The obstacles by which a charge may be obstructed are : local impediments, whether artificial or natural, such as fortified posts, intrenchments, abattis, inundations, enclosures, rivers, thickets, swampy or rugged ground. These impediments may either be such as to render a charge altogether impossible, or they may be such as merely to increase the risk and difficulty attending its execution. 3 , Echelons. 41. The distance between echelons should be such that they can efficaciously flank one another with musketry fire. This distance should be within easy range of the infantry arm. The rear echelons should obtain as much shelter as possible, afforded by the nature of the ground from the enemies fire, and also conceal their own move- ments. 4 42. The attack in echelon, an improvement on the oblique formation is worthy of the attention of tacticians. The echelon formation facilitates marching and manosuvring, it allows each unit to engage independently, Ambert. - Ibid. 3 (Aicle-Memoire), Robertson. 4 Anibcrt. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 239 and the whole line can afterwards be readily brought into action. It moreover offers the advantage of not compromising the whole army. In case, the first echelon is obliged to retreat, the enemy can at best only menace and break through the Hank of the second, more par- ticularly if the flanks are protected by artillery and cavalry. 1 Offensive and Defensive Battles. 43. For defensive battles, the conditions of success are : the choice of a good position, the flanks of which are well posted, and the rear free and protected ; obstacles which render the enemy's approach more difficult in front ; finally, brave, disciplined troops, commanded by an energetic and determined man. Offensive battles require, more than all else, good strategic combinations and skilful tactics ; troops easily handled, good marchers, nimble and intelligent, with a decided dash about them. The soldier must be ambitious of success, as though it belonged to him personally, and he must associate himself with the idea of it in advance. 2 44. At what hour should " offensive " battles be fought ? This is a question worthy of examination, as it is of great importance. When we have the choice, the hours should be varied according to circum- stances. Have we a decided superiority, which authorizes a firm confidence in victory ? The attack should be made early in the morning, that we may profit by the successes obtained. Every true soldier will recall the chagrin he has felt in the midst of success, on seeing the arrival of night, and the impatience with which it is expected in case of reverse. Again, the attack should be made as soon as possible, when we have all our troops in hand, while the enemy has not yet assembled his own. ****** But when forces nearly equal render victory uncertain, it is better to attack towards the middle of the day ; the consequence of a reverse are less formidable, and a general must above all think of the preservation of his army. The destruction of the enemy holds only a secondary 1 Ainbert. 2 Mannont. 240 TACTICS. place in the order of duties and interests. Moreover, if the question remain undecided, we have the whole night to prepare a new attack and other combinations. Besides, the troops are well rested ; they have been able to breakfast before the combat; they are in conditions of force and energy. On the contrary, the defensive army, preoccupied and agitated, cannot give itself up to such complete repose, and often sees its morale injured in proportion as the moment of action approaches. 1 45. Marmont thus sums up, " Defensive battles belong more to war as a profession ; offensive battles, well planned and well conducted, are the appanage of genius. Such was the true character of the wars of Frederick the Great, for the great defensive war of seven years almost always had an offensive character ; and, in this respect, his campaigns strongly resemble many campaigns of Napoleon, with the simple differ- ences of the period and the state of military science. In attentively reading the narrative of the action of great generals, we may recognise the kind of troops which they have commanded, by the manner in which they have employed them. We may even recognise their own character ; for it must be admitted that those who have excelled in a particular kind of war, had a special genius for it. Natural instinct, if not our best guide, at least powerfully contributes to develop our faculties." Condition of the Contending Armies at Waterloo, in the morning, and state of the ground. 46. The early daylight " on the 18th June, 1815," showed Napoleon the army of his adversary motionless in its position. The English had passed the rainy night in much discomfort ; but his own soldiers, almost destitute of firewood, had suffered still more from the down-pour of rain, which only ceased at four a.m.- On the report of his artillery officers that the ground would require some hours before the guns could move on the muddy fields, Napoleon delayed the preparations for the battle, though his troops were put under arms at an early hour. He expressed his satisfaction at the firm countenance of the English, 1 Marmont. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 241 discussed his intended manoeuvres, and counted up confidently his chances of success. He had in his whole air and bearing the manner of one who scented a coming triumph, and felt no touch of fear of such an unexpected disaster as might follow the arrival of a fresh army on his flank. No allusion is mentioned, even in his own narratives, as made by him that morning, to any possible aid from Grouchy, nor any sign that he thought the Prussians near. After receiving a report from his chief engineer, General Haxo, that no signs of intrenchments were to be seen in the enemy's position, he dictated his orders for the battle, and proceeded soon after eight a.m., to marshal his troops in array in three grand lines, in the most deliberate manner, upon the slope opposite the position of Wellington. 1 * * * * 47. * * Napoleon, it is alleged, lost precious hours at the beginning of the day, which could never afterwards be recovered. Believing the Prussians to be quite disorganized, he waited on the 18th, till the ground should become hard, and instead of beginning the battle, as he ought to have done at six in the morning, he made his first offensive movement, between ten and eleven. 2 48. * * Napoleon's tactical performance on this great day, was not only inferior to that of his antagonist, but beneath his own previous reputation. To sum it up in the words of a writer (Brialmont) whose spirit often inclines strongly to the side of Napoleon, even where he writes the praises of his opponent, ' He made the first attack against La Haye Sainte with over-deep masses ; he engaged, or allowed to be engaged, his cavalry too soon ; finally, he showed some hesitation when, at six o'clock, he had the proof that a general effort on the centre might succeed. Nor was this effort made with enough troops, or sufficient unity. In general, all the attacks made during this day had the defect of being badly supported.' * * * * * * Of Napoleon, on the 18th of June, it stands clearly proved that his management of the attacks was so imperfect that his advocates would fain charge the details to his lieutenants; that he neglected the only hope of arresting Blucher at the passage of the Lasne ; and that he prolonged the battle uselessly until safe retreat was impossible. To sum up shortly : had it been any other general that Chesney, Lecture VI. 3 Gleig. 16 242 TACTICS. acted thus on that eventful day, it would long ago have been plainly said that his tactics in the battle were as defective as the strategy which placed him in it at such fearful odds. 1 Battle of Konigyratz : direction from which the attack wets expected. 49. By the general tenor of an order, (issued by Benedek) it appears that the Feldzeugmeister fully expected to be attacked on his left ; for much the same reason as Wellington, at Waterloo, fully expected to be assailed on his right. The part of the order which relates to the fourth and second corps, shows that he contemplated the possibility of an attack on his right; but not from a very large force. Probably the reports of the spies induced him to believe that the first corps and the Guards at least, of the army of the Crown Prince, had joined Prince Frederick Charles, and that only two corps, or 60,000 men, were at the most on the Elbe. He knew that the two main bodies of these latter two corps must defile over the river, and march fifteen miles over very bad roads, and an extremely difficult country, before they could feel his right. In the meantime he might have disposed of the adversaries in his front. The conduct of the Austrian general during the action, seems also to confirm this. Had he known that at ten o'clock Prince Frederick Charles sent only four divisions across the Bistritz, he would hardly have failed to bear down upon them with greatly superior numbers, and crush them at once, before the arrival of their assistants. 2 * * * 50. How the Prussian Guards were allowed to get into Chlum, appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum church-tower, the whole country can be clearly seen, as far as the top of the high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally supposed, could have easily seen any movements of troops as far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite distinctly Herwarth's attack at Hradek ; and, except during occasional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surrounding country except where the configuration of the ground or the heavy smoke 1 Chesney, Lecture VI. * Hozier, Vol. I. COMBINATIONS OF THE DIFFERENT ARMS. 243 overcame the sight. From the top of Chlum church there was a clear view over all the neighbouring hills, and the top of the spire generally stood out clear over the heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill, from Benatek to Nechanitz. So little apprehensive, however, was Benedek of an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower; and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any view towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and houses of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of the advance of the Guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes, and passed through Maslowed. From that village, without opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line, apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlum and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps to whom the defence of the ground between Maslowed and Ncdelitz was entrusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Franzecky in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing forwards towards Benatek quitted their proper ground. A short time afterwards the second Austrian corps was defeated by the Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards its bridge at Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retreat of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, through which the Prussian Guards marched unmo- lested, and without a shot seized the key of the position. Once installed, they could not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the Austrians. 1 1 Hosier, VoL I. 244 THE THREE ARMS. CHAPTER II. SECTION I. CAVALRY. La cavalerie est necessaire a la guerre, pour eclairer, et donner des nouvelles de 1'ennemi. Tel est le r&le de la cavalerie dite legere ; elle est la vue et 1'ouie de 1'armee ; sans elle, un general est & chaque moment entoure de perils. La cavalerie est encore utile pour combattre et pour profiter de la victoire. Sans la cavalerie, une bataille gagnee ne donne pas de re"sultat decisif. LE MARECHAL MARMONT. 1. Ill modern Europe, cavalry first rose into importance, when the nations of Germany overran the Continent, and felt the necessity of having- numerous bodies of horse with their invading armies ; a necessity which had not been made apparent whilst they remained in their own country. The period of our Great Civil War witnessed the introduction of many changes besides those which were merely of a political nature. It was then that our horse first began really to distinguish themselves, and to stand forward as the gainers or deciders of victory. The English cavalry under Cromwell and his fiery adversary, Prince Rupert, claim especial notice ; for from the numerous cavalry engagements of that period many good and useful lessons may yet be gleaned by the cavalry soldier. 1 2. For ages the finest cavalry seen in Europe, was indisputably that of the Turks. In great part, both men and horses were brought over from the Asiatic provinces of the empire, and the rest of the men and horses were of Asiatic descent. The horses though not large (seldom much exceeding 14 hands), were nimble, spirited, and yet docile, and so trained and bitted, as to be perfectly under control : the hollow 1 Nolan. CAVALRY. 245 saddle was rather heavy, but all the rest of the appointments were light : the soldier rode in the hroad short stirrup to which he and his ancestors had always been accustomed, and on which they had a firm and (to them) natural seat, out of which it was most difficult to throw him ; his scimitar was light and sharp, and, in addition to it, he generally carried in his girdle that shorter slightly curved weapon called the yataghan, with an edge like that of a razor. Some of the Spahis used long lances or spears, but these were always thrown aside, as useless, in the meUc of battle. Their tactics were few and simple. 1 3. As a general rule, it may be stated, that an army in an open country should contain cavalry to the amount of one-sixth its whole strength ; in mountainous countries one- tenth will suffice. 2 4. " Cavalry reserves," observes Marmont, "important as they are, should not exceed a designated force upon a given point ; beyond certain limits, the most skilful general cannot handle them; and, besides, it is difficult to subsist a great number of horses together. I would limit the force to 6,000 horse, the management of which is practicable ; with this number success ought to attend any reasonable undertaking with cavalry upon the field of battle. Napoleon, in his last campaigns, organized bodies of cavalry composed of three divisions, numbering at least 12,000 horse. This idea was monstrous, and without useful application on a battle-field, it was the cause of immense losses without fighting, these great corps having served no other purpose than to present an extraordinary spectacle, designed to astonish the eye." 5. As cavalry has been stationary, while other arms were increasing in efficiency, disputants have been found even before the era of breech- loaders, to question whether it should in future, enter so largely as formerly into the composition of armies. The achievements of French or Austrian squadrons in the Italian campaign were not calculated to show how it could be used decisively ; and in the American war the cavalry on either side was confessedly unfit to take its place in the line of battle ; and both Confederate and Federal officers believe that the arm should be restricted altogether to the duties of reconnaissances, advanced guards, and escorts, performing rapid enterprises as mounted infantry. This opinion is not shared by the continental powers, who 1 Nolan. 2 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 44, 246 THE THREE ARMS. hold the opposite doctrine, that, though the relations of the three arms have been changed, and new combinations are necessary, yet their equilibrium has not been seriously disturbed, and proofs of this may be adduced from the war of 1866. "We have only to imagine two armies approaching each other the one possessing a cavalry which, after covering its march, would retire beyond reach of the engagement ; the other, accompanied in the battle by great masses of carefully-trained squadrons to perceive the importance of solving this question. 1 6. The special difficulties that cavalry has encountered in the late wars, especially in the Italian campaign of 1859, the role traditionally assigned to it the successive improvements which have made the fire of infantry so formidable, have given birth to an opinion timidly expressed as yet, but which seems to be gaining ground. It tends to show that the action of cavalry is at present powerless, almost impossible, and that the time has arrived for considerably reducing the proportion it bears to other arms, in a mixed force. This is an error which it is very important to contradict. Cavalry in war is par excellence the instrument of celerity, the means of producing not great shocks, as is too generally believed, but grand moral effects which paralyse and disorganize, and whose results under stated circumstances are incalculable. The general public believes that cavalry always begins by charging the masses opposed to it, penetrating and dispersing them by the breast-piece of the horse, and by the sword and lance. It also believes that in the charges of infantry against infantry, the opponents pierce each other with bayonets in a Homeric struggle, where blood flows in torrents. In both cases, on the contrary, duels with sword or bayonet are governed entirely by circumstances purely accidental, and generally isolated. "C'est un effet moral, non un effet de choc generalise, qui decide de la crise." 2 7. One of the conditions under which artillery must exert its increased power of manoeuvring, is association with cavalry. On the efficacy of the cavalry, therefore, must depend, in great degree, the efficacy of the artillery. But when associated thus, cavalry is no longer helpless against fire the combined force can both attack and defend itself. Such companionship, then, is more than ever important. 3 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. 3 Troclm. 3 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. CAVALRY. 247 8. Marmont thus expresses himself, as to the qualities necessary for a general of cavalry : " To command cavalry, where large masses are concerned, superior qualities and special merits are necessary. There is nothing so rare as a man who knows how to wield, conduct and use them appropriately. In the French armies, we can count but three in twenty years of war ; Kellermann (junior), Montbrun, and La Salle. The qualities necessary for a general of cavalry are of so varied a nature, and are so rarely combined in the same person, that they seem almost to exclude each other. The first thing to be mentioned is a sure and prompt conp d'oeil, a rapid and energetic decision, which does not, however, exclude prudence ; for an error made and a blunder com- mitted in the beginning of a movement, are irreparable in consequence of the small amount of time required to execute it.* It is otherwise with infantry, whose march is always slow, compared with the movements of a general and his aides-de-camp. The cavalry general, should study to place his troops under shelter from the fire of the enemy, and at the same time to keep them in position ; but to lavish them when the moment of attack has arrived." 9. When cavalry is required to charge over unknown ground, it should be preceded by a few men thrown out to the front as skirmishers, in order to scout the ground to be passed over. The neglect of this precaution, has sometimes led to great disaster. At Talavera, two cavalry regiments, the 1st German Hussars and the 23rd Light Dragoons, were ordered to charge the head of some French infantry columns. When near the top of their speed, they came suddenly upon a deep ravine, with steep sides. f Colonel Arentschild, commanding the Hussars, who was in front, at once reined up, and halted his regiment, saying : " I vill not kill my young mensch ! " But the other regiment, commanded by Colonel Seymour, which was on its left, not seeing the obstacles in time, plunged down it, men and horses rolling over on each other in frightful confusion. Of the survivors who arrived on the other side by twos and threes, many were killed or taken ; and only one-half of the regiment ever returned. So, at the battle of Courtrai, in 1302, * Baron Ambert considers, 'All these qualities, were combined in Seydlitz.' F.J.S. f Something similar occurred to the 14th Light Dragoons, under Lord Gough, at the action at Ramnuggur in the Punjab, in 1848 ; when reconnoitring the position of the Seikharmy. F.J.S, 248 THE THREE ARMS. from the French cavalry omitting to scout the ground they charged over, the Flemings won a great victory. * * * The Flemings were drawn up behind a canal, flowing between high banks and hidden from view The French rushing on at full gallop, all the leading ranks were plunged into the canal. * * * * So, at the battle of Leipzic, in 1813, Murat, in his great cavalry charge on the allied centre, had captured twenty-six guns, and was carrying all before him, when he pushed on to the village of Gulden Gossa, where the ground had not been reconnoitred, and could not be distinctly seen from a distance. Here the French found their career suddenly checked by a great hollow, full of buildings, pools of water, and clusters of trees ; while the allied infantry, from behind the various covers, afforded by the ground, opened upon them a destructive fire. Being then suddenly charged in flank by the Eussian cavalry, they were driven back with heavy loss ; the Allies recapturing twenty of the twenty-six guns they had lost. 1 10. The principles put in practice at Zorndorf by Seydlitz, may be considered as the basis of those which guided cavalry manoeuvres under the Empire. Even at the present day, they assist us in our researches. Seydlitz caused the ground between himself and the enemy, to be reconnoitred with the greatest care. His charges, consequently, were never impeded by unexpected obstacles, as at Waterloo. 2 General Warnery says, " The principal care of a cavalry general should be, after having assured the safety of his own flanks, to endeavour to reach those of the enemy which he should do with great rapidity, before his adversary has time to prepare for, or even to perceive, him." Seydlitz neglected the first part of this rule, for he attacked an enemy slow at manoeuvring but of great strength, against whom it was necessary to act in masses. He attended to the second part, however, very a-propos and with much success. His cavalry did not fail on each occasion to take oblique or perpendicular order, according to the line of battle of the enemy. 3 11. Of all arms, cavalry is the most difficult to handle in the field. It cannot engage an enemy, except where the ground is favourable. It is always dependent on the condition of its horses. It is easily 1 Lippitt. " Ambert, :1 Ibid. CAVALRY. 249 dispersed, and it easily gets out of hand. However brave and intrinsically good, it is of no use without good officers. The qualities requisite in a cavalry leader are, a good eye for country, and a quick one for the enemy's movements, great energy, courageous decision, and rapid execution. 1 12. The fighting unit is called a squadron ; the rule, for determining its strength is, to unite the greatest mobility with the maintenance of order. A squadron having too great a front would be easily thrown into disorder by the slightest obstacle, and every troop in disorder is half conquered. 2 13. Speed is more than weight : in proportion as you increase weight you decrease speed, and take from your cavalry that impetus which ought to be its principal element. We are not the only military nation who have committed this error. In the last war (previous to 1815) the French cuirassiers were reduced to charge at a trot, their horses being unable to carry such weight at a quicker pace. In their attack on an enemy's position, the losses they sustained from the want of speed were frequently awful. Under the improved fire of the artillery and infantry of the present day, these slow attacks never could be carried out at all. 3 14. ' In the Prussian army (1868), ' the cavalry carry no valises, the cloak is rolled and fastened to the cantle of the saddle, the kit is carried part in the wallets, part across the seat and part is laced into the saddle seat ; thus the rider's hand is brought low (which with us is the great desideratum) there being nothing but the shabraque above the wallets. 4 15. The principal value of cavalry is derived from its rapidity and ease of motion. To these characteristics may be added its impetuosity ; but we must be careful lest a false application be made of this last. 5 16. Cavalry has no power of exercising a decisive influence on an action by its fire ; and that it should possess the power of delivering fire at all has been considered by many as destructive of its legitimate function. Its power resides in the impetus of its charge. A certain Nolan 2 Marmont 8 Nolan. 4 W.H.G. 5 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 45. 250 THE THREE ARMS. distance mu8t interpose between the front of cavalry and the troops it is about to assail, in order to give it a career in which to combine perfect order with the requisite momentum. 1 17. Heavy cavalry should have the largest and most powerful horses, but the men and their accoutrements should be light. If you weight the powerful horses with heavy men and accoutrements, you bring them down to a level with smaller and weaker horses. Thus a great heavy man in armour, on a fine strong horse, could not catch or ride down a Cossack on a good pony ; but the same horse, with a light active man on his back, would ride down a dozen of such Cossacks, one after the other. In a charge, the same horses with light weights will, by their speed and impulsive power, ride down or over obstacles which would certainly stop them if heavily weighted. The heavier the man, the less available the high qualities of the horse, and the less formid- able the man on his back. 2 18. * * * The experience of the. campaign "the German war, 1866," has taught that needle-guns and rifled artillery have no more driven cavalry and even very heavy cavalry, from the field of battle than they have from the theatre of war ; but it has been found that, in the shock of closing squadrons, small men and light horses must go down before the powerful onset of stouter assailants. The Prussians found that, in future, cavalry must be formed and equipped so as to allow strong troopers to be brought into the field ; but strong troopers ride heavily, and heavy loads tell fearfully on horses on the line of march ; so, to secure power in the charge with rapidity of movement, the dead weight which cavalry horses now carry must be reduced almost to nothing, and the horse must be required to bear little more than the rider, his arms, his cloak, and a light saddle. Valises will have to be carried in waggons in rear of the regiments, or left at some convenient place whence they can be forwarded to the front by railway or water transport, when the army halts. In this war, the Prussian cavalry gained a glorious and unex- pected reputation from its conduct in the field ; but its horses suffered much from marching, especially in crossing the highland country which lies on the frontiers of Bohemia and Moravia. 3 * * * 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. II. 2 Nolan. 3 Hozier, Vol. II. CAVALKY. 251 19. Cavalry ought to be at once the eye, the feeler, and the feeder of an army. With good cavalry an army is in comparative security, and in a condition to march into and subsist upon an enemy's country. It reaps the fruits of victory, covers a retreat, and retrieves a disaster. With it the effects of a defeat are not always fatal, and with it the army can again resume the offensive. 1 20. Cavalry is instituted for hand-to-hand fighting ; it is to cross swords with the enemy, to shock, to overthrow, to pursue. To pursue an enemy is its habitual office ; for it is rare that the two parties come into collision. Almost at the moment of contact, the less confident of the two halts, and then turns to flight. 2 21. It is the business of cavalry to follow up the victory, and to prevent the beaten enemy from rallying. 3 22. * * It is probably as much from the nature of the country as from defective discipline, that ' Cavalry has in both the Federal and Confederate armies of the Northern States of America,' been of very little service in the greater actions : and from feeling, under such circumstances, the hopelessness of any bold attack made on infantry, even though disordered, the cavalry generals have allowed their squadrons to take up a desultory skirmishing mode of fighting, most detrimental to their usefulness, and likely to be confirmed into an evil tradition. Such was once the custom in European armies, until Frederick the Great broke through it, and introduced one of the greatest of modern tactical improvements, by compelling his cavalry to charge the enemy at a gallop, and use their swords rather than their fire-arms. 5f 5jC ifC >fC 5fC 5(C 5jC As a direct result of their shortcomings in the most important duties of modern cavalry, the completing of the victory, prepared or partly won by the infantry and artillery, we find the most decisive defeats of the war so ill followed up, as to be robbed of great part of their expected fruits. McClellan was unable to press his first advantage at South Mountain, and Meade his victory at Gettysburg, as Johnston and Lee their brilliant successes at Bull's Eun and Manasses. That the same cause would in Europe be followed by a like unfinished result, is 1 Nolan. 2 Marmont. 8 Napoleon. 252 THE THREE ARMS. well known to the critical reader of Napoleon's campaigns. Engaging suddenly, in 1813, in his desperate struggle in Germany against the Allies, that great general, stripped by his Russian disaster of the famous squadrons of Murat, entered on his campaign without awaiting the dragoons, who were to be brought from Spain, or created in France; and as a consequence of this special deficiency, saw the two great victories of Lutzen and Bautzen prove fruitless for the destruction or dispersal of the Eusso-Prussian army. Ten thousand horse, to have completed his advantage at the former, might have spared him an indecisive campaign, chained Austria to her timid policy of neutrality, and arrested the tide which was sweeping him to ruin. 1 23. " In the Peninsula war," the victories of Rolica and Vimiera were rendered incomplete from the deficiency of cavalry ; a deficiency from which British armies have too often suffered. 2 24. Whatever may be its importance in the ensemble of the opera- tions of war, cavalry can never defend a position without the support of infantry. Its chief duty is to open the way for gaining a victory, or to render it complete by carrying off prisoners and trophies, pursuing the enemy, rapidly succouring a threatened point, overthrowing disordered infantry, covering retreats of infantry and artillery. An army deficient in cavalry rarely obtains a great victory, and finds its retreats extremely difficult. ****** All are agreed that a general attack of cavalry against a line in good order, cannot be attempted with much hope of success, unless it be supported by infantry and artillery. At Waterloo, the French paid dearly for having violated this rule ; and the cavalry of Frederick the Great fared no better at Kunnersdorf. A commander may sometimes feel obliged to push his cavalry forward alone, but generally the best time for charging a line of infantry, is when it is already engaged with opposing infantry. The battles of Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, and several others prove this. There is one case in which cavalry has a very decided superiority over infantry, when rain or snow dampens the arms 1 Campaigns in Virginia, &c. " Wellington Disp. CAVALKY. 253 of the latter, and they cannot fire. Augereau's corps found this out, to their sorrow, at Eylau, and so did the Austrian left at Dresden. . Infantry that has been shaken by a fire from artillery, or in any } other way, may be charged with success. A very remarkable charge of this kind was made by the Prussian cavalry at Hohenfriedberg in 1745. A charge against squares of good infantry in good order cannot succeed. 1 25. Wellington, in a conversation with the historian of the Penin- sula war, remarked, " General Hill had 26,000 men in front of Salamanca. He tried to break the squares of the enemy's infantry (in retreat) with his cavalry, but failed every time. Lord Wellington I thought it a bad manoeuvre, not to be done without a mass of J artillery." 2 26. ' In 1866,' at Langensalza, the Hanoverian heavy cavalry suc- ceeded in forcing an entrance into Prussian squares. But it was oiily when the Prussians were in retreat, and their squares were composed of mixed regiments, including the untrustworthy Landwehr. And not only so, but when the squares were broken, the horsemen suffered more than the foot soldiers, and the squares were re-formed. In the Bohemian campaign, more than one instance occurred where the Austrian cavalry, iis gallant horsemen and good swordsmen as exist in the wwld, charged Prussian infantry in line or in company columns, only to be sent back reeling and shattered by the " quick-fire " of the needle-gun. 3 27. In the defensive, cavalry may also produce very valuable results, by opportune dashes at a body of the enemy, which has engaged the opposing line, and either broken it through or been on the point of so doing. It may regain the advantages lost, change the face of afiairs, and cause the destruction of an enemy flushed and disordered by his own success. This was proved at Eylau, where the Russians made a fine charge, and at Waterloo, by the English cavalry. 4 28. Charges of cavalry are equally useful at the beginning, the middle, and the end of a battle. They should be made always, if possible, on the flanks of the infantry, especially when this last is I engaged in front. 5 1 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 45. 2 Sir William Napier. 3 Times, Nov. 1, 1869. 4 Jomini, Chap. VII. , Art. 45. 5 Napoleon. 254 THE THREE ARMS. 29. During the retreat of the allied armies of Russia and Prussia, in 1813, after the battle of Bautzen/ the most remarkable affair was one which took place at Haynau, between Marshal Ney and the rear-guard of the right column ; it had been preconcerted by Blucher in person, and is one of the most brilliant cavalry affairs of modern days, since- the improvement of fire-arms, and the use of the bayonet, have deprived that arm of much of the influence it possessed in times less removed from the age of chivalry in which it was paramount. The Prussian general having passed his main column across the bridge and through the defile of Haynau, still defended the entrance to the village with the tirailleurs of his rear-guard ; but finding that the nature of the ground in rear of Haynau favoured his purpose, he formed five regi- ments of cavalry in mass behind the village of Baudmansdorf, in a situation completely concealed from the enemy's view by the village and an intervening rising ground. This ambuscade was formed obliquely to the line of retreat of the main column, which traversed an uninclosed country, and to the southward of the line. When all was arranged, the three regiments forming the rear-guard gave up the bridge at Haynau and retired, following the main column to a good rear-guard position on the direct road to Liegnitz, and a few miles from Haynau. Here they halted and showed front, inviting an attack. As soon as Ney's advanced-guard had passed the defile, entered the plain, and deployed to attack the Prussian infantry rear- guard, a preconcerted signal was given the burning of a windmill. The allied cavalry, masked till that moment, now deployed in two lines on the right of the enemy, and moved rapidly onwards to attack them in flank. The success of the cavalry was complete. The French lost 1500 men and eleven guns. Ney himself, it is said, narrowly escaped. Colonel Dolf, who commanded the attack, was unfortunately killed. But the loss of the allies did not amount to a hundred men. 1 30. " Respecting the independent employment of cavalry, or other- wise, under their own commander, Col. Hamley in his work, ' Operations of "War,' after commenting upon the chief of the cavalry in Frederick's battles selecting his own time for the attack ; Napoleon requiring in the wars of the Empire, when great masses of cavalry were brought on 1 Cathcart. CAVALKY. 255 the field, that their commander should judge of and seize opportunities for action ; also Wellington's desire to keep the constant control of his cavalry in his defensive battles, that the leaders of troops should set themselves in motion, the very moment they received their fresh orders instead of pursuing the opposite course, and engaging in their own enterprises, unknown to the general in command, thus observes : " It appears, then, that when a powerful cavalry is supporting offensive movements, its commander should be allowed considerable discretionary power'; but that the cavalry of an army which awaits its adversary, especially if inferior in force, should be constantly under the direction of the commander-in-chief. But this of course does not apply to the divisional cavalry, or squadrons which, in continental armies, form part of the division or corps. 1 31. "At Koniggratz," the masses of Austrian cavalry remained unemployed till the battle was lost, But there was a moment when, as it seems, they might have been launched forth with decisive effect. It was when spectators on the western bank of the Bistritz saw the columns of the Guard mounting the slopes round Lipa, till their final rush drove the defenders from the breastworks. That beginning of the end might have been avoided, or postponed, had the Austrian squadrons, issuing from each side of Lipa, borne down upon the Prussian infantry, who, even had they held their ground, must still have been checked under the fire of the position, while it is quite possible that some of the columns might have been taken unprepared and scattered by the charge. 2 32. A flank attack being much more to be apprehended by cavalry than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons by platoons on the flanks of a line of cavalry, which may form to the right or left, to meet an enemy coming in that direction. For the same reason, it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front. 3 33. Two essential points are regarded as generally settled for all encounters of cavalry against cavalry. One is that the first line must 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. II. 2 Blackwood's Mag. 3 Jorniiii, Chap, VII. , Art, 45, 256 THE THKEE ARMS. sooner or later be checked ; for, even upon the supposition of the first charge being entirely successful, it is always probable that the enemy will bring fresh squadrons to the contest, and the first line must at length be forced to rally behind the second. The other point is that , with troops and commanders on both sides equally good, the victory I will remain with the party having the last squadrons in reserve in readiness to be thrown upon the flank of the enemy's line while his front is also engaged. 1 34. 'At the battle of "Wachau near Leipzig, in 1813, the French cavalry commanded by Murat,' were standing in formidable array, on the shoulder of the hill of Liebertwolkwitz. The object of this display, probably was, in the event of the allies having any troops, which might be concealed by the ground in that part of the field, especially cavalry, to induce them to show them. A small brook or drain ran from Gossa towards the Pleisse, and in rear of the place where the two Russian regiments had taken post. Its banks happened to be swampy and could only be passed with difficulty, and a leap across a wide drain, unless by causeways, made in two or three places by the farmers, for agricultural purposes. This obstacle was only partial, and a few hundred yards to the right, near Gossa, it ceased to be an impediment. * * * * The French (5000 strong) advanced, in line of contiguous columns of regiments ; certainly in one body only, that is with no sort of second line or reserve. No doubt they expected to dispose of their first opponents easily, and then to attempt a more important attack on Wittgenstein's right. The narrowness of the front to be attacked, as well as the nature of the ground, caused this powerful force to crowd into one dense mass before it came in contact with the Russian dragoons; these were overwhelmed, and driven across the swamps, or over the causeways. Many of the rearmost were killed; but the rest rallied as soon as they had crossed the brook. The lancers, who were in second line, retired by their left to another causeway, but did not cross it, and formed again. But the enemy themselves were unexpectedly checked by this unforeseen obstacle ; their crowding and confusion increased ; and at that moment the Russian regiment of hussars of the guard, which Wittenstein had sent to take part with the rest of the brigade, appeared in their rear. This caused a panic. The 1 Jomiui, Chap. VII. , Art. 45. CAVALEY. 257 unwieldy mass became noisy, and attempted to retire; the Russian light cavalry instantly followed them. The Emperor Alexander, who stood on the hill above, seized the opportunity to send off his own escort of Cossacks of the guard, amounting to several squadrons, under Count Orion 7 Denissoif, who passed the stream at a favourable spot near Gossa, and took the retiring mass in flank. This completed the panic, which then became a flight, and the fugitives did not draw their bridles till they had regained the protection of their infantry. * * * * Thus 5000 of the French cavalry, led by Murat in person, were foiled by an insignificant obstacle. They were seized with a panic ; and, for j , want of a second line on which to rally, and from which to take a fresh I' departure a precaution without which no cavalry attack ought ever to be made they were obliged to abandon their enterprise, and fly before a force of light cavalry, which altogether could not have amounted to 2000 men. 1 35. The excessive negligence, on the part of English cavalry officers, in not supporting their attacks by a reserve, frequently, during the Peninsula war, produced the most pernicious consequences.* The following case was so glaring, that Lord Wellington ordered a court of enquiry upon it. In the month of June, 1812, Major-General Slade was ordered to advance from Llera in the direction of La Granja, to cover a reconnoissance. For this purpose, he took with him two regiments of cavalry. General Lallemande, having a like object, came forward also with two regiments of French dragoons, on the side of Valencia de las Torres. Slade, hearing that the French cavalry was so near, attacked it and drove it back beyond the defile of Maquilla, a distance of eight miles, his troopers, in the heat of the pursuit, breaking into a confused mass. But Lallemande had here his reserves in hand,f and attacking the disorderly English horse, totally routed it. 2 36. The attack in oblique line, or as it was formerly called in dcharpe, is the most formidable of all the orders of attack, and ought never to be omitted, when practicable, as it is the most difficult of all others for an enemy to resist, or evade. An officer who perceives the enemy forming an oblique line, with an intent of attacking him in his position, cannot Wellington Dispatches. f Napier, Vol. V. 1 Cathcart. 3 Jervis. 17 258 THE THREE AEMS. make use of a more effectual manoeuvre to counteract it, than by instantly moving forward to attack him, before he has completed his .disposition; this manoeuvre, by reducing him from the offensive to the defensive, must totally derange his plan of operations, will oblige him suddenly to form a new order of attack, totally different from his original intention, which cannot fail of being defective, as it is the effect of precipitation, and almost surprise. Such decided movements, as that above proposed, by deranging the preconcerted plans of an enemy's attack, in the moment of their execution, are capable of producing very great and advantageous effects. <(> 5J* -P 5j 5JC 5fl 3jC It is therefore very important to conceal, as much as possible, the dispositions preparatory to an attack, in oblique line, from the enemy. A corps of light cavalry should be thrown forward, to' prevent him from reconnoitring the previous movements, and to mask, by every means in their power, the disposition of the line, until it is ready to move forward to the attack; or feigned demonstrations might be made, in various directions, to deceive and confound the enemy, and prevent his having any distinct conception of the real attack, until it is too late to avoid, or counteract it. 1 37. With a large body of cavalry it is difficult to gain an enemy's flank, but with small detachments the opportunity often occurs. Cavalry officers, when they see a good chance given them by the enemy, should never wait for a better one If the enemy's cavalry have to clear a ditch, a hollow way, or any other obstacle in their front, let them attempt it, and fall on before they have recovered their order or resumed the speed of their advance. 2 38. Cover your movements and protect your flanks with skirmishers, and reinforce them according to circumstances when within reach of the enemy. Under the protection of your skirmishers watch the adversaries' movements. The officers with the skirmishers must keep a good look out on the flanks, so as not to overlook any movement towards them, favoured by the ground, or covered by a village or other enclosures. By a manoeuvre of this sort the French cavalry were defeated by the Austrians at "Wurzburg. The Archduke Charles sent fourteen squadrons 1 Warnery. 2 Nolan, CAVALRY. 259 to turn a village whilst the French were advancing to attack his cuirassiers; the hussars allowed the French line to pass the village in their advance, then gallopped in on their rear and did great execution. When ordered to attack, take the initiative, and when advancing against a superior force likely to outflank you, keep troops in reserve behind your flanks with orders to act as circumstances require. Thus having secured your flanks, and being backed up by a reserve, fall on without hesitation at the favourable moment such as a change in the dis- positions of the enemy, when they are in unfavourable ground, or when they are suffering from the fire of your artillery. The enemy may try to take you in flank or surround you, but whilst taking ground to the right or left for that purpose he exposes his own flank, and the troops behind your flanks must take him in the fact whilst you charge home. 1 Echelon movements. 39. The difficulty of advancing with a long line, and the danger of being driven back at all points at once, make it advisable to use echelons, instead of attempting to charge on a large front in line. Echelons are useful when debouching from a defile to support troops already engaged or defeated; also to pass through intervals and attack a line made unsteady by the fire of infantry or artillery, and fall on without giving them time to restore order. 2 40. The echelon should not be formed of less than a wing, or it would hardly take effect against an enemy's line : further, wings can break into echelon, columns of troops, contiguous double and single open columns, and thus become handy in every way. 3 41. Lines deployed checkerwise or in echelons, are much better for cavalry than full lines. ****** Whether checkered or full lines be used, the distance between them ought to be such that if one is checked and thrown into confusion the others may not share it. It is well to observe that in the checkered lines the distance may be less than for full lines. In every case the second line should not be full. It should be formed in columns by divisions, or at * Nolan. Ibid. Ibid. 260 THE THREE ARMS. least there should be left the spaces, if in line of two squadrons, that may be in column upon the flank of each regiment, to facilitate the passage through of the troops which have been brought up. 1 42. At Chateau-Thierry, in 1814, the Prussian General Horn, with twenty-four squadrons, was ordered to keep the French in check until the Russian General Sacken, could cross the Marne, after his defeat at Montmirail, 30th January, 1814. He formed these troops in two lines of twelve squadrons each without intervals. The whole first line advanced to the attack. The French waited till it came to a proper distance, and routed it. These squadrons threw the second line into disorder, and carried it away pk-m6le, in every direction over the plain. 2 43. The formations in direct echelons of squadrons are useful for the passage of lines, used in relieving one line by another, and on other occasions. The lines being formed in direct echelons of squadrons at half distance, the same flank leading in both lines; if the second- line be moved up and halted, so as to place the echelons opposite to the intervals between the echelons of the first line, the squadrons composing the echelons of the first line, can wheel by threes or divisions to a flank. Then if each echelon takes ground to the flank at the gallop, halts, and fronts in rear of the corresponding echelon of the second line, the front of the second line echelons will be left clear, and line can be formed to the front at once by the direct movement. ******* The movement by alternate squadrons retiring and advancing might also be applied to the same purpose ; and this movement, as well as echelons at full distance from the centre, if employed for a second line acting in support, leaves plenty of room for the passage of the first line to the rear in case of a reverse. 3 44. The advance in echelon is often more advantageous for cavalry than in a long line. It is difficult to advance in the latter formation without falling into confusion, or being driven back on all points at once ; while in echelons of regiments, you can at once take advantage of any hesitation or confusion in the enemy's ranks, without delaying to 1 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 45. 3 (Russian Campaign in France, 1814.) Jervis. 3 General Smith. CAVALRY. 261 form line, when the opportunity might be lost. Again, the different parts of the echelon coming up one after the other, partake somewhat of the nature of reserves ; and the enemy cannot attempt to attack the leading echelon in flank, for if he does so, he exposes his own to the next echelon coming up. 1 45. The cavalry column of attack should never be formed en masse, like that of infantry ; but there should always be full or half- squadron distance, that each may have room to disengage itself and charge separately. This distance will be so great only for those troops engaged. When they are at rest behind the line of battle, they may be closed up, in order to cover less ground and diminish the space to be passed over when brought into action. The masses should, of course, be kept beyond cannon range. 2 46. At Austeiiitz, the allied cavalry was well commanded, well mounted, and manoauvred. It was therefore necessary to act with prudence ; to be always prepared for flank attacks by the enemy. During this battle, the charges were sustained by successive echelons which kept the several portions in constant communication with the rest of the army, and prevented the enemy from attacking the flanks with success. As soon as one of these echelons became engaged within the line, the others moved to its support. 3 The Lance, versus the Sivord. 47. Of the respective merits of the lance and sword, as opinions differ, some are here introduced ; commencing with that of Marshal Marmont : " The lance is the weapon for cavalry of the line, and principally for those destined to fight against infantry. The sabre cannot supply its place ; armed with sabres, what use could cavalry make of them, if the infantry remain firm, and are not struck with fright ? The horseman cannot sabre the foot- soldier : the bayonets keep the horse at too great a distance. * * On the contrary ; suppose the same line of cavalry, furnished with a row of pikes, which stand out four feet in front of the horses, and the chances of success are different. 1 Denison, 8 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 45. * Ambert. 262 THE THREE ARMS. But the sabre is more befitting than the lance for light troops. In hand-to-hand conflicts, a short weapon is handled more easily, and is more advantageous than a long one. All other things being equal, it is certain that a hussar or chasseur will beat a lancer ; they have time to parry and return the blow, (riposter,') before the lancer, who has thrown himself upon them, can recover himself for defence." 48. Formerly it was a received opinion that the lance was parti- cularly formidable in single encounters, that the lancer should be a light, active horseman, and that space was required whereon he might manage his horse, and turn him always towards the object at which he was to thrust. But of late there seems to be rather a disposition to take up Marshal Marmont's notion of arming heavy cavalry with lances, to break infantry as well as cavalry. All seem to forget that a lance is useless in a melee ; that the moment the lancer pulls up, and the impulsive power is stopped, that instant the power of the weapon is gone. The 16th Lancers broke into the Sikh squares at Aliwal, and in the mele'e that ensued, these brave men attacked the lancers, sword in iand, and brought many of them low, for they could effect nothing with the lance. If lances be such good weapons, surely those who wield them ought to acquire great confidence in them ; whereas, it is well known that in battle, lancers generally throw them away, and take to their swords. 1 49. In charges in line, the lance is very useful ; in melees, the sabre is much better ; hence comes the idea of giving the lance to the front rank, which makes the first onslaught, and the sabre to the second rank, which finishes the encounter usually in individual combats. It wOuld be, perhaps, better to support a charge of lancers by a detach- ment of hussars, who can follow up the charge, penetrate the enemy's line, and complete the victory. 2 50. The lance is a most efficient weapon when used by a thoroughly trained man, but in the hands of raw levies it is perfectly worthless. In carefully disciplined cavalry of the line, intended for charging alone, the lance has a terrible moral effect upon the enemy, and without doubt is a most deadly weapon in the shock of closing squadrons, or the shock of cavalry against squares. When the fight however degenerates into the mel&, then the lance is awkward and cumbersome. 3 * 1 Nolan. 3 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 45. 3 Denison. CAVALRY. 263 51. The following extract from a letter of Oliver Cromwell, giving an account of the battle of Dunbar, shows clearly that arming the front ranks of cavalry with lances is but an old custom revived: "The dispute on this right wing was hot and stiff for three-quarters of an hour. Plenty of fire from field pieces, snaphames, match-locks, entertains the Scotch main battle across the Brock ; poor stiffened men roused from the corn shocks, with their matches all out ! But here, on the right, their horse, with lancers in the front rank, charge desperately ; drive us back across the hollow of the rivulet ; back a little ; but the Lord gives us courage, and we storm home again, horse and foot upon them, with a shock like tornado tempests ; break them, beat them, drive them all adrift." 1 52. * * * * Very many both of the officers and men, " 3rd Eegt. of Dragoons of the Prussian Cavalry in the Seven Weeks' War, 1866," * were victims to terrible sword cuts, which, coming down upon the shoulder, cut clean through the shoulder- blade, and often deep down into the body ; awful memorials of the strength of arm of the Austrian horsemen. Much did the officers of this regiment complain of the absence of epaulettes, which they estimated would, by defending the shoulder, have saved half the men they had left behind them ; a complaint which was to some extent, borne out by the fact that the ultimate overthrow of the cuirass regiments of Austria, was due to the arrival of some of Hohenloe's Uhlans, who took them in flank. Then, though the heavy swordsmen turned upon Hohenloe's men, their swords were shivered upon the brass plates which lay upon the shoulders of the Uhlans, for these, unlike the rank and file of the rest of the Prussian cavalry, carried epaulettes, and though the blows were aimed at the head, the smaller object was nearly always missed, and the sharp edge descended, only to be dinted or broken upon the protected shoulder ; while the Uhlans, with their lances held short in hand, searched out with their spear-heads unguarded portions of their antagonist's bodies, or, dealing heavy blows with the butt-end of their staves, pressed through the thick ranks of the heavy horsemen, marking their track with great heaps of dead, dying, or wounded. 2 * * * 1 (Carlyle's Cromwell) Nolan. 2 Hozier, Vol. II, 264 THE THREE ARMS. 53. Opinions are very much divided, ' says Warnery,' with, regard to the advantage or superiority of the edge or the point of the sword for cavalry in action ; each have their advocates equally zealous, who produce such instances as are in favour of that they prefer ; but after much reflection on this important subject, frequent observations of the advantages and disadvantages of each, and some experience, during many years actual service in the cavalry, I hope I shall be permitted to mention my reasons for giving a decided preference to the latter. The point of the sword is more advantageous than the edge, because with it you can reach your enemy at a greater distance than with the other, the smallest wound with it renders the wounded incapable of serving during the remainder of the action at least ; it does not require so much force to give a dangerous wound with a thrust as with a cut, and the effect of the latter is much more uncertain, unless it happens to be particularly well placed, which it is hardly possible to do, unless you have your enemy as it were under your hand : in short, if he has a helmet or hat, with an iron callotte upon it, with large sides, and firmly fixed to the head by a thong or strap, he can hardly be touched with the sabre, except in the arm. Charles XII. was so confident of the superiority of the point over the edge, that he gave all his cavalry very long swords, and so narrow, that they could be made no other use of than to thrust with the point. * * * * 54. The late Major- General John Jacob, formerly commanding the Sind Irregular Horse, has recorded his personal experiences, thus : " Great mistakes exist regarding the respecting powers of the edges and points of swords. On foot, or when moving slowly, it is unneces- sary to argue in favour of the point of the fencer ; its superiority is evident to all. But on horseback, the speed of the horse -prevents the swordsman from drawing lack his arm with sufficient rapidity after a home thrmt. ******* The straight sword, and the use of its point, are far more formidable than the cutting sword in the hands of men on foot ; and I was myself strongly prejudiced in their favour for use on horseback also, until many trials in the field quite convinced me of the contrary. On horse- back, when moving at a rapid pace, as the cavalry soldier ought always to be in attacking, the arm, after a home-thrust, cannot be drawn back CAVALRY. 265 sufficiently quickly ; the speed of the horse carries all forward with great velocity, and the blade runs up to the hilt, or breaks, before it can be withdrawn." The Charge. 55. The first object is to break through and disorder the enemy's array, then make use of the sword to complete his discomfiture. Powerful horses urged to their utmost speed, their heads kept straight and well together, will seldom fail to attain the first object in view ; sharp swords, individual prowess and skill do the rest. Officers must bear in mind that however successful a brave and determined body of horsemen may be, there is a limit to everything. The horses' must in time get blown, the men tired out, the squadrons scattered ; they are then at the mercy of any body of fresh horsemen. 1 56. Reserves must always be at hand to follow up steadily any success achieved, or, in case the first line is brought back, which is sure to happen sooner or later, to fall upon the pursuing enemy, and give the fugitives time to re-form. Innumerable reverses are attributable to the neglect of these rules about reserves. In an attack upon cavalry formed and advancing to meet you, spare your horses and husband their resources for the hour of need. 2 57. If you meet the enemy's cavalry with blown horses, you are pretty sure of being thrown ; but even should success attend the first rush, that success would be useless, for it could not be followed up. 3 58. Cavalry is never weaker or easier overcome than immediately after a success. The men and horses are blown, the lines disordered, confusion reigns paramount, orders are not heard or attended to, and a force falling upon it in that state will invariably put it to rout. 4 59. Napoleon's cavalry generals often failed in bringing their troops into action at the right time, and often threw them too early into the scale, and so, when a reserve of cavalry might have decided the fate of battle, none was forthcoming. They often neglected to protect their flanks, or to have a reserve on hand in case of disaster. Instances of 1 Nolan. * Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Denison. 266 THE THREE ARMS. this sort might be adduced of the English cavalry. Charges, gallant and daring in their character, were turned into disgraceful defeats or dreadful losses by the culpable negligence of their officers in not having reserves in hand, to protect the flanks during an attack, or to oppose an enemy coming on with fresh troops. 1 60. A cavalry engagement is seldom decided by a single charge, but the advantage remains with those who have the last reserve of fresh troops at their disposal : this generally turns the fortune of the day. As a general rule, cavalry should not be brought into action too early in the day, unless, indeed, a favourable opportunity offers ; then, of course, make the most of it. It should be held in hand to decide the victory, to retrieve lost ground, to cover a retreat, and save the army from the loss of artillery, &c. : and for any serious exertion fresh men and horses are absolutely necessary. 2 61. Equitation is everything. It is what subdues the horse and tames him. The manoeuvres will always be sufficiently correct, if the soldiers are good horsemen. Encouragements of everything should be held out to further this object. The troops should be accustomed to charging to the enemy's centre, without being particularly careful to preserve a certain order, incompatible with this impetuosity, which is the best means of beating the enemy ; but, at the same time, they should be habituated to rally, at the first signal, with promptness and dexterity. They should be constantly placed in these circumstances, that they may be prepared for them by all necessary means. Thus the apparent disorder of the charge will have no influence upon their morale. On the other hand, if the charges, while under instruction, be feeble and moderate, they will be less powerful still, when before the enemy, and will never overthrow him ; and, at the first disorder, the soldiers will think themselves lost. There is a usage often practised at drills, great evolutions, and sham-fights : the cavalry is made to charge upon the infantry ; and in consideration of its being only a simulated combat, the cavalry is halted before having reached the infantry, or it escapes through the intervals. Nothing can be worse than this kind of education for the horses ; being thus accustomed to avoid the point of attack as an obstacle, they can never be made to come to close quarters, 1 Nolan. * 6 Ibid. CAVALRY. 267 for their habits accord with their instinct, and perhaps with that of their riders. This practice is pernicious ; it should be banished from the drill, and replaced by an entirely different lesson. The war results would be immense. * * Place a line of infantry opposite a line of cavalry ; give such distance between the files in the two lines, that a horse and a man may easily pass them. The cavalry waver at first, even at a walk, but they pass through the infantry ; they try it again and again, many times at a trot and at a gallop, until the horses execute the movement, so to speak, of themselves. The movement is then accompanied with a few musket shots, along the whole line, increased in number as the instruction proceeds ; and if it be desired to increase the noise, the infantry files may be formed in six ranks, and the noise of the firing is then equal to that of a whole battalion. After many days of similar exercise, a cavalry corps will be better fitted than others, not thus instructed, to attack infantry, and the horses, well set up and accustomed to precipitate themselves upon a fire which they have learned to face, will of their own accord carry their riders along, if the latter should be tempted to moderate their ardour. 1 62. At the Austrian Military Camp of Briick, in 1868, the cavalry only attacked, when in case of repulse, they could retire on infantry. To this mano3uvre, the Austrians describe the terrible loss they sustained in cavalry at Koniggratz and elsewhere. In almost every instance ' it. was stated,' the Prussian cavalry gave way and pursued by the Austrians, the former opened out and uncovered a line of infantry, who rarely failed in giving a good account of the too-dashing Impe- rialists. 2 63. It cannot be too often repeated that, under no circumstances, should cavalry await a charge at the halt. To wait for a charge, halted, is to place oneself on the defensive ; but as cavalry is essentially an arm of offence, it should attack, and not simply defend itself. This rule held good, in the times of Gustavus, Adolphus and Turenne, as well as in those of Frederick and Napoleon. It will always continue so. At Zorndorf, the deep columns of the Eussian cavalry paid dearly for their error in not having deployed, and especially in awaiting at the halt, for the charge of Prussian horse. Put to complete route, they were unable to re-form and enter again into line. 3 1 Marmont. " Foreign Tour. 3 Ambert, 268 THE THEEE ARMS. Light Cavalry. 64. In the opinion of Marmont "the Russian army possesses an immense advantage over all the other armies of Europe. The Cossacks, belonging to it, form a light cavalry, excellent, indefatigable, and intelligent ; they know how to find their way in trackless places, (s'orienter) with precision, thoroughly to reconnoitre a country ; to observe everything, and to take independent care of themselves. They cannot be compared to any light troops, systematically instructed for that service ; they are formed by nature ; their intelligence is developed by the daily wants to which they are subjected. I speak of the Cossacks of the frontier, who, constantly at war with their neighbours, always in presence of a skilful and enterprising enemy, are obliged to be, at every moment, on the alert for their own safety." 65. Marshal Saxe wrote thus to the King of Sweden. " An army deficient in light cavalry, or which has not sufficient to hold its own against that of the enemy, can be compared to a man clad in complete amiour engaged in a contest with a crowd of school- boys, armed only with clods of earth. The ' Hercules ' would soon be compelled to retreat, out of breath and covered with shame and confusion." Is not this principle equally applicable to modern armies ? Concen- trated in enormous masses, do they not form veritable ' colossi,' which hurl themselves confusedly one against the other, unless they have a powerful light cavalry to feel the way for them. It will be indis- pensable to explore the probable field of battle in advance, and in every direction, in order that the chief may have reliable data on which to form his plans. 1 66. In the North American Campaign of 1863, culminating at Gettysburg, General Lee attributed his ignorance of the position and movements of the Northern army, which led to the failure of his operations, to his being destitute of this arm ; Stuart's cavalry, on which he depended for information, having got too far away from him. In Pope's campaign in 1862, the rebels, by their cavalry raid on Catlett's station, obtained possession of the commanding-general's 1 Ambert. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES. 269 correspondence, plans, and orders from Washington. On the other hand, whilst keeping us informed of the enemy's movements, an abundant light cavalry, active and well commanded, may be so used as to constitute an impenetrable screen of our own movements from the enemy, as effectual as would be a lofty and impassable mountain range. Again, if we are greatly inferior to the enemy in cavalry, our own cavalry will have to keep itself within our infantry lines; and the consequence will be that the enemy will obtain control of the entire country around us, and so deprive us of all the supplies it contains. As, besides this, cavalry is absolutely necessary for the protection of convoys, and, from its celerity of movement, is the kind of force best fitted for guarding our communications, it is evident that the subsistence of an army is dependent, to a great extent, upon this arm. 1 SECTION II. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES. Irregular Cavalry. 1. The history of the wars between 1812 and 1815 has renewed the old disputes upon the question whether regular cavalry will, in the end, get the better over an irregular cavalry which will avoid all serious encounters, will retreat with the speed of the Parthians, and return to the combat with the same rapidity, wearing out the strength of its enemy by continual skirmishing. * * * * * Experience has shown that irregular charges may cause the defeat of the best cavalry in partial skirmishes ; but it has also demonstrated that they are not to be depended upon in regular battles upon which the fate of a war may depend. Such charges are valuable accessories to an attack in line, but alone they can lead to no decisive results. ***** Lippitt. 270 THE THREE ARMS. Whatever system of organization be adopted, it is certain that a numerous cavalry, whether regular or irregular, must have a great influence in giving a turn to the events of a war. It may excite a feeling of apprehension at distant parts of the enemy's country ; it can carry off his convoys, it can encircle his army, make his communications very perilous, and destroy the ensemble of his operations. In a word, it produces nearly the same results as a rising en masse of a population, causing trouble on the front, flanks, and rear of an army, and reducing a general to a state of entire uncertainty in his calculations. ****** The immense advantages of the Cossacks to the Eussian army are not to be estimated. These light troops, which are insignificant in the shock of a great battle, (except for falling upon the flanks), are terrible in pursuits and in a war of posts. They are a most formidable obstacle to the execution of a general's designs ; because he can never be sure of the arrival and carrying out his orders, his convoys are always in danger, and his operations uncertain. 1 * 2. " The Cossacks," says General de Brack, " were an arm which rendered the war highly dangerous, especially to such of our officers, as were entrusted with making reconnoissances.* Many among them, and especially of the general staff, selected by the Major-General, preferred forwarding the reports which they received from the peasantry, to going to a distance and exposing themselves to the attacks of the Cossacks. The Emperor, then, could no longer know the state of affairs." Again ; General Morand, another Trench officer, says, " But these rude horsemen are ignorant of our divisions, of our regular alignments, of all that order which we so overweeningly estimate. Their custom is to keep their horse close between their legs ; their feet rest in broad stirrups, which support them when they use their arms. They spring from a state of rest to the full gallop, and at that gallop they make a dead halt ; their horses second their skill, and seem only part of themselves ; these .men are always on the alert, they move with extraordinary rapidity, have few wants, and are full of warlike ardour. What a magnificent spectacle was that of the French cavalry flashing in gold and steel under the rays of a June sun, extending its lines upon the flanks of the hills of the * Russian War of 1813. Jomini, Chap. VII, Art. 45. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES. 271 Niemen, and burning with eagerness and courage ! What bitter reflections are those of the ineffectual manoeuvres which exhausted it against the Cossacks ; those irregular forces, until then so despised, but which did more for Eussia than all the regular armies of that empire ! Every day they were to be seen on the horizon, extended over an immense line, whilst their daring flankers came and braved us even in our ranks. We formed and marched against this line, which, the moment we reached it, vanished, and the horizon no longer showed anything but birch trees and pines ; but an hour afterwards, whilst our horses were feeding, the attack was resumed, and a black line again presented itself; the same manoeuvres were resumed, which were followed by the same result. It was thus, that the finest and bravest cavalry, exhausted and wasted itself against men whom it deemed unworthy of its valour, and who, nevertheless, were sufficient to save the empire, of which they are the real support and sole deliverers. To put the climax to our affliction, it must be added that our cavalry was more numerous than the Cossacks ; that it was supported by an artillery, the lightest, the bravest, the most formidable, that ever was mowed down by death." 1 3. If Cossacks, mounted on ponies, and wretchedly armed, could thus master the French regulars, in spite of their artillery, what might not be expected from them if they were mounted on well-bred, powerful horses, and furnished with really good weapons? In that war their lances were notoriously bad : so much so, that there were French soldiers who received as many as twenty lance wounds, without being killed or seriously injured. 2 4. The same contrast, is presented by our native irregular and our native regular cavalry in India. The first, acting on usage and instinct, and armed and mounted in their own oriental way, are nearly always effective in the battle, or the skirmish, or the reconnoissance ; the second, cramped by our rules and regulations, and, as it were, de- naturalised, are rarely of any service whatever. For a long series of years, the only native cavalry we kept in India, was the irregular. These corps were formed before our infantry Sepoys, and many and most important were the services they rendered to us. They were 1 Nolan. * IMd. 272 THE THREE ARMS. always active, always rapid. The names of some of the most dis- tinguished leaders of this brilliant light cavalry, are still revered in India. If their corps had been Europeanised, and turned into regulars, assuredly we never should have heard of them, as heroes. 1 5. The Russian armies are always surrounded by swarms of Cossacks and Tartars, wild tribes whose customs give them great advantages in the service of out-posts. Inhabiting immense plains, sleeping in tents or under waggons, always on horseback, swimming across rivers, wandering about their deserts, they have but few wants; the Ukase which calls them to war, is for them a signal of pillage ; often without pay, the conquered country, overrun by them in every direction, supplies them with every necessary. Almost useless in the day of battle, Cossacks, like tormenting insects, harass the troops on their march, and cut off the stragglers ; or, prowling about at night, they endeavour to surprise the out-posts, a duty in which they have become very skilful, through their constant wars against the Turks and the tribes of the Caucasus. 2 Mounted Rifles. 6. In the beginning, ' dragoons ' were only mounted infantry ; they should always have preserved that character. With this condition dragoons may, in a thousand circumstances, render immense service : in detachments, for surprises, in retrograde movements, and principally in pursuits. But it is necessary that, in conformity with their estab- lishment, they should be mounted upon horses, too small to be put into line ; otherwise, the aspirations and ambition of the colonels would soon change them into cavalry, and they would become at once bad infantry and bad cavalry. 3 7. We are brought to consider the use of one great addition to modern tactics springing from the American war, the only special creation, as it seems, which American generals have added, or rather restored to our stock, viz., bodies of mounted infantry. This arm, the original 'dragoon' of the 16th and 17th 1 Nolan. Jervis. 3 Marmont. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES. 273 centuries, was designed originally for the purpose of rapidly marching to occupy and defend distant positions, or of out-mano3uvring the enemy by moving swiftly to his flank a part of the troops apparently engaged on his front. In such a mode did Johnston, Bragg, and Sherman chiefly employ their horse. By it also Sheridan (on his final junction with Grant in the Spring) bringing up and dismounting suddenly 9000 additional men on the extreme right of the Petersburg defences, outnumbered the besieged by the free use of this reinforce- ment, turned the detached work at first stoutly held by the troops of Anderson, won the battle of Five Forks, and finished the siege at a blow. 1 8. The natural and physical features of the country (on the con- tinent of America), rendered it impossible to employ cavalry in the same manner, and according to the same rules as are followed in the mounted forces of European nations. A new system, of tactics suited to the time and applicable to the locality, was instinctively adopted and employed during the war by both parties. 2 9. Now that fire-arms are so much more deadly than heretofore, so much the greater advantage will be derived from the employment of mounted men trained to fight on foot with these new weapons. Numberless examples can be adduced to show the wonderful advantages to be derived from the use of a force of this nature, able to act on any kind of ground, able to ride round and beyond the enemy's infantry, to cut it off in the retreat, to destroy the communications, seize its trains, and burn the bridges in its rear. 3 10. * * It is certainly an advantage to have several battalions of mounted infantry, who can anticipate an enemy at a defile, defend it in retreat or scour a wood ; but to make cavalry out of foot soldiers, or a soldier who is equally good on horse or on foot, is very difficult. 4 11. The services performed by the dragoons, or mounted rifles, were very valuable all through the Confederate war for independence. And without doubt this force was far more available and useful, as well as suitable to the natural features of the country, than regular cavalry would have been. 5 Edinburgh Review. 2 Denison. 3 Ibid. * Jomiiii, Chap. VII., Art. 45. 5 Denison. 18 274 THE THREE ARMS. 12. At Sailor's Creek, in 1865, during the pursuit of Lee's army from Richmond by the Federal forces, Sheridan came upon a strong rear guard, some 8000 in number, under the command of the Con- federate General Ewell. Sheridan attacked the column on its flank before it reached the stream, and sending on three divisions of his dragoons, they crossed Sailor's Creek before Ewell, formed up on the high ground on the far side of the creek, dismounted, and, with their repeating fire, held the whole of the Confederate column in check until other bodies of the Federal army coming up, Ewell was obliged to surrender his whole command, after desperate fighting in attempting to break through the lines of dismounted cavalry, who checked his march. 1 13. In the Pyrenees, at the first battle of Sauroren, while the battle was being fought on the height, the French cavalry beyond the Guy river, passed a rivulet, and with a fire of carbines forced the 10th Hussars to yield some rocky ground on Picton's right, but the 18th Hussars having better fire-arms than the 10th, renewed the combat, killed two officers, and finally drove the French over the rivulet again. 2 14. A body of cavalry, forming the rear detachment of the rear guard, may have to defend a bridge, a defile, or a barricade ; whilst the remainder of the rear guard continues its retreat : in such a case, part of the men will have to dismount, and keep back the enemy with the fire of their carbines ; and as soon as they consider the rear guard in safety, they remount and rapidly join it. In like manner, an advance guard can prevent a retreating enemy from destroying a bridge, or making preparations for defence at the head of a defile ; its fire will either stop these operations, or delay them, until the infantry comes up. In this manner, the French dragoons, having dismounted, prevented the British in the retreat to Corunna, 1808, from blowing up the bridges of Puente Ferreira and Berleira. 3 15. " The Cossacks of the Don, during great part of the last war against the French, were at that time but little accustomed to the use of fire-arms Whilst advancing into Western Europe the advantages of fire-arms became apparent ; more particularly when acting in intersected 1 Deiiisou. 3 Napier, Vol. VI. 8 Jervia. IRREGULAR CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES. 275 and difficult ground : and the Cossacks managed to arm themselves with French infantry-muskets which they picked up on the field. Then originated amongst them the practice of dismounting hy turns where the ground was favourable, and thus engaging the enemy in skirmishing order. I have myself seen them in this way beat cavalry very superior to them in numbers, and infantry also, when either the cavalry or the infantry attempted to attack them singly. In such cases the infantry soldiers opposed to them, were afraid of the mounted men, who stuck close to their dismounted comrades with the led horses; and these dismounted men were ready to jump into the saddle at any moment, and rush upon the enemy, if they gave way or were driven from their cover."f 16. * * * All experience has shown that cavalry who are habituated to rely on their fire-arms, are apt to lose their distinctive characteristics of promptitude, impulsion, and resolution in attack ; and it would probably be impossible, by any amount of training, to combine such opposite functions in the same troops. By establishing mounted riflemen as a separate arm of the service, men and horses of a size which, though admirably suited for rapid and sustained movements, is deficient in the power and weight that tell so formidably in the charge, might be turned to excellent account. On these troops might properly devolve the business of reconnoitring, of heading the advanced guards, of seizing defiles, and of surrounding the columns on the march with men peculiarly qualified to pick up and convey intelligence, to fight on any ground, and to retreat rapidly. Joining these functions to those already indicated, it is obvious that such a force, far less expensive than cavalry, would possess unusual opportunities for brilliant achievement. On the other hand, the regular cavalry, spared in great measure the harassing duties which fritter away its strength, would be preserved intact for the day of battle. 1 17. To sum up, in a few words, the special effect that the novel organization of mounted riflemen, ' at the close of the American Civil War,' had in securing the great results of this brief, but momentous campaign. f (H. V. Ganzauge, 2nd Regiment of Prussian Lancers of the Guard, a distinguished cavalry officer). Nolan. 1 Hainley, Part VI., Chap. V. 276 THE THREE AKMS. (1) On March 31st, the first day of the battle of Five Forks, their double capacity enabled them to hold their ground unsupported; to check the tide of defeat, and turn it into victory for the Federals. (2) On April 1st, their double organization mainly contributed to the success of Sheridan's skilful feint; the result of which isolated the remains of 15,000 men from Petersburg, and thus robbed Lee of one-third of his strength at one blow. (3) On April 6th, they overtook Lee at Sailor's Creek, and detained him till their own infantry came up in sufficient force to overwhelm his rear guard. (4) On the same day, they turned his force off its line of retreat, and kept it surrounded near Appomattox Court House, till the mass of Grant's army came up and left him on the 9th, no alternative but surrender. In short, their double capacity of infantry and cavalry action intercepted the retreat at every point, and thus completely frustrated Lee's hope of gaining Lynchburg, retiring to the hills, and there, united to General Joseph Johnston's army, prolonging the struggle through another year. The ' Mounted Eifle ' plan of fighting, first devised by the Southern Guerilla, John Morgan, in 1861, had thus recoiled upon the South with tenfold effect. Improved upon by expe- rience, and lavishly supplied by the almost boundless resources of the North, in men, arms, and horses, it became, more than any one thing else, the weapon that gave the Confederacy its death blow. 1 * 1 Havelock. 277 CHAPTER III. ARTILLERY. Artillery is an arm equally formidable, both in the offensive and defensive. JOMINI. 1. The great size of the battle-field will necessitate very scientific combinations, and require that constant communication be kept up between corps far away from one another. The general of artillery will therefore be no longer a man with only special knowledge ; specialities tend to disappear before this new system of tactics, on so much grander a scale and with combinations so much more exact than the old. 1 2. One of the surest means of using the artillery to the best advan- tage, is to place in command of it a general, who is at once a good strategist and tactician. This chief should be authorized to dispose not only of the reserve artillery, but also of half the pieces attached to the different corps or divisions of the army. He should also consult with the commanding general as to the moment and place of concen- tration of the mass of his artillery, in order to contribute most to a successful issue of the day, and he should never take the responsibility of thus massing his artillery, without previous orders from the commanding general. 2 3. A commandant of artillery should understand well the general principles of each branch of the service, since he is called upon to supply arms and ammunition to the different corps of which it is composed. His correspondence with the commanding officers of artillery, at the advanced posts, should put him in possession of all the movements of the army ; and the disposition and management of the great park of artillery should depend upon this information. 3 4 "The dispositions made by Napoleon's celebrated general of artillery ' Baron Alexander de Senarmont,' as regards its independent action, are worthy of notice." Ambert. a Jomini, Chap. VII. , Art. 46. 3 Napoleon, 278 THE THREE ARMS. General Senarmont lost his life at the siege of Cadiz in October, 1810, whilst inspecting a new battery, he was struck by an 8-inch shell, and immediately expired, at the age of 41 years. ****** The following account of him, is given in a work by Commandant of Artillery Maz6, entitled, Artillerie de Campagne, en France. " This arm (the Artillery) became more manageable, was required to become more available, and to act with more independence. Its reserves better distributed, permitted it to enter the action at the critical moment. Its sphere of action increased, but it still hesitated to profit by all its advantages. Considered so long as a purely accessory arm, it remained ignorant of what it could do by itself. It required a skilful man, and one gifted with military genius, to draw the Artillery into the new and glorious sphere which it ought to fill. This man was Senarmont. The bold manner in which he employed his artillery at Friedland, and the great results which were the consequence, astonished even Napoleon. And from this epoch the Emperor considered Artillery as being capable of being employed independently, and even in certain cases to obtain a particular end as a principal arm. We need only cite for example the great battery at Wagram, and the skilful manceuvres of General Drouot, at Leipsig, Hanau, &c. At the critical moment of the battle of Wagram, the want of a vigorous effort on the part of the Artillery, recalled to Napoleon the bold manoeuvres at Friedland. ' Ah, if I had but Senarmont here/ cried he. What could be higher praise than this involuntary remembrance." 1 5. The proportion of field artillery to the other arms, ought to vary according to circumstances. The nature of the country to operate in, the composition and qualities of the troops to contend against, and the object of the war, all bear upon the number of pieces. 2 6. The number of guns proper for a given war is * limited, by reason of the expense and embarrassment of transporting a surplus of materiel ; such an embarrassment indeed as might, in marches, more than counterbalance, in disadvantages, the advantages which might be expected of them at the moment of action. Experience has demon- strated that the maximum should be four pieces for 1000 men, a 1 Senarmont, 2 Saunier. ARTILLEKY. 279 proportion moreover which will soon be found to have been exceeded after a few months of campaign ; for the materiel is not subjected to the same causes of diminution as the infantry and cavalry, and the personnel of the artillery, so small in numbers, is always easily maintained complete. 1 7. * * Both at Austerlitz and at Solferino, the beaten armies brought to the field a great preponderance of artillery, a large part of which took no part in the engagement. The truth is, that the huge trains which followed their columns were too unwieldy to be arrayed. * * * * Frederick brought three guns per thousand men to the field with his greater armies, and increased that proportion considerably as his infantry decreased in numbers. An army of 60,000 might well be accompanied by 180 guns ; a corps of 30,000 by 100 guns. 2 8. ' In the invasion of Bohemia, in 1866, the proportion of guns to men in the three Prussian armies, consisted as follows ; ' The Elbe army, * * about 40,000 men and 135 guns. The army in the centre, called the 1st army, commanded by Prince Frederick Charles, numbered 81,000 men and 270 guns. * * * The army on the left, called the 2nd army, was separated by a wide interval from the centre ; it was commanded by the Crown Prince, and contained 100,000 men and 360 guns. ******* The great quantity of artillery which was attached to both armies, ' Austrian and Prussian,' was a noteworthy feature of the war, and it was employed in a manner which shows that this arm is even more than ever relied on for supporting and covering the movements of other troops ; consequently its mobility, or facility of movement, is also more than ever important. 3 9. Artillery may be classed, under the several heads of field artillery (including artillery of position), siege artillery, and artillery for the armament of garrisons, fortresses, and coast defences ; its equipment is a combination of men, materiel, and horses necessary for these services. 4 The proportion of guns to the other arms, in the respective armies during the Italian campaign of 1859, was as follows : , French 288 guns to 183,000 men. Sardinians ..90 71,400 Austrians . . . . 816 230,000 Lieut. -Colonel Miller. 1 Marmont. 2 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. 3 Lieut. -Colonel Miller, 4 Owen, 280 THE THKEE ARMS. 10. Field artillery, that is to say, the artillery which is intended to accompany an army for operations in the field, may be divided into four separate kinds of batteries, viz. : Horse artillery batteries. Field batteries. Position artillery batteries. Mountain artillery batteries. 1 11. It is well known, that the horse artillery was first established in the year 1759, in the camp at Landshut, as a brigade of ten light 6-prs. ; this is specially deserving of notice, as the introduction of this arm in every instance during the Seven Years' War failed, a period at which we once more resolved on the adoption of large calibres; and it turned out that the great king (Frederick) was eventually destined to attain in a novel manner his object of producing greater mobility and capacity for manoeuvre, an object which he fruit- lessly aimed at with the foot artillery. It is clear that the new creation was approved of by the king ; for, though it was twice des- troyed, at Kiinersdorf and Maxen, it was reorganized a third time in the year 1760, having six light 6-pounders and two 7-pounder howitzers. 2 12. The unit for battle, in the artillery, is the battery. It is composed of six or eight pieces, always marching together, with their munitions, and placed under the same command. It is to the artillery, what the battalion is to the infantry, and the squadron to the cavalry. This corps should then be homogeneous and compact ; the elements which compose it should have the same spirit, and the habit of being together. Now, there are three distinct elements : the materiel, or arm properly so called, those who use it, and those who transport it. If these elements do not agree, the artillery is imperfect. The first merit of artillery after the courage of the gunners and the exactness of their aim is its mobility. It is thus seen how important is the management of the horses, provided to draw the cannon. 3 13. The field batteries, form the great bulk of the artillery which accompanies an army for active operations, and they are especially 1 Owen. - Tiiubert, Chap. I., Sect. IT. 3 Marmont. ARTILLERY. 281 suitable for manoeuvring with infantry, although by mounting the gunners on the carriages, they can move with sufficient rapidity to keep up with cavalry. They are however, usually required to remain in one position on the field for some time, at least in well contested actions, and in taking up fresh ground need not generally go beyond an ordinary trot ; in short and decisive affairs, in the retreat of a force, &c., rapidity of movement will be of the greatest value in field batteries, especially if the number of horse artillery guns be small. 1 14. Field artillery, is intended to follow the troops in all their movements, and to arrive promptly at a prescribed point, to crush the enemy. To this end we need a light material, of easy transport, and very easy of movement, so that no obstacle of ground can arrest its progress. 3 15. Field batteries were not organized as at present until the beginning of this century, and after the formation of horse artillery. Previous to this their organization and equipment was very defective, the pieces were too light, they were mounted on badly made carriages drawn by horses in single teams, the drivers were on foot, and provided with large whips like ordinary carters, and the ammunition was carried in wooden boxes. 3 16. Field (mounted) artillery has been introduced and is found well suited for almost every nature of service. Less expensive than horse artillery, it is almost as rapid in its manoeuvres : it is less easily thrown into confusion, and the gunners are better able to assist the drivers in moments of difficulty. 4 17. Considering the progress made by artillery in mobility and range, late French writers of authority assert, that to associate it intimately in future with infantry would fetter its powers and diminish its utility. Great effects may be produced by the action of large masses, which, detaching themselves from the line of battle, may suddenly concentrate on its front or flanks. To protect the swift and daring movements of these great batteries, great masses of cavalry must follow and support them, drawing off in the plains, but coming closer in sheltered ground. Meanwhile the artillery of divisions will be reduced to the minimum necessary for the march and the protection of their 1 Owen. 2 Marmont. 8 Owen. 4 Ambert. 282 THE THREE ARMS. front. This idea was executed in the campaign of 1859 ; for, both at Magenta and at Solferino, great batteries of 40 guns were drawn from the divisions and reserves, and manoeuvred under the protection of masses of cavalry. 1 18. At Koniggratz, the reserve artillery of Prince Frederick Charles was sent a little distance up the Bistritz, in order to bring a fire against the flank of the Sadowa wood, to search out the defenders, and if possible to dismount the guns in the batteries in front of Lipa. 2 * * * 19. " At Solferino, during the operations in the centre," four batteries of 24 guns, were sent to the front, and replied to a heavy artillery fire opened by the Austrians, with a most decided advantage. Whilst this artillery combat was going on, Generals rartouneaux and Des Vaux arrived with their two divisions of cavalry ; they were placed in rear of the right. The accompanying horse artillery came into action, and completed the success of the batteries by taking the enemy's guns obliquely. The cavalry also made charges, in one of which 800 in- fantry were driven back on the French skirmishers, who made them prisoners. 3 20. * * At Koniggratz, a report was brought to General Mutius of the Crown Prince's, army on the morning of the junction of that army with that of Prince Frederick Charles, that it was urgently desirable that he should send some artillery as quickly as possible to support Franzecky's division. Four batteries immediately pushed forward at a trot, covered by the 4th Regiment of Hussars, crossed the Trotinka at Luzan, and at half-past eleven opened upon the Austrian artillery stationed on the east of Horenowes. 4 21. 'At the Austrian camp of Briick, in 1868.' The positions were on all occasions excellent ; to be accounted for in a great degree by the independent and unfettered command of the captain, who usually rode considerably ahead of the battery, and reconnoitred the whole ground near him. The ranges were very long occasionally, even up to 4500 yards. The batteries never formed up with the infantry, but were massed on positions to cover advance or retreat, or to break an enemy's 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. 2 Hozier, Vol. I. 8 Lieut. -Colonel Miller. 4 Hozier, Vol. I. ARTILLERY. 283 line. * * No attention was paid to dressing guns in action, or the intervals between the carriages ; but the guns were most carefully laid, the men being interrogated by the officers &c., as to what they were firing at. 1 22. Of all the difficulties that now beset the path of war-ministers and commanders-in-chief none is greater than this, "where to find a general who knows how to use his artillery." The French have made up their minds that in the wars of the future field artillery must not be too intimately associated with infantry. It is perfectly clear that a battalion in line or even skirmishers will soon destroy the gunners, or, at least, cripple the teams of artillery once within their practical range. But the effect of artillery fire is now-a-days almost as great at 1000 yards as it is at 200. There can, therefore, be no possible object in bringing up the guns in line with the foot soldiers ; for where the action of the one begins that of the other terminates, and, on the other hand, a heavy artillery fire concentrated upon troops at ranges from 1000 to 2000 yards will make their position almost untenable, unless they are sheltered behind earthworks. Divisional artillery should be let alone as far as possible by divisional commanders. The duty of captains of batteries is to take up such positions as will enable the guns to be scattered but their fire to be convergent. And the extent of range now possible for field guns limits very considerably the necessity for their losing time by movement. The commander-in-chief of the army, should always hold in reserve masses of cavalry and artillery to be employed as the necessity , of the moment may dictate. But to the end that field artillery should be able to act readily when called upon, it is needful that sufficient mobility should be imparted to it. There is no reason why field artillery should approach so nearly to horse artillery as to accompany the manoeuvres of cavalry at a gallop ; but, on the other hand, it is absolutely necessary that it should be able to move distances of a mile or so at a smart trot without leaving the gunners toiling breathless behind. This is no overdrawn supposition. Such a state of things actually occurred at the Alma, where the officers of a field battery which was called upon to make a moderately rapid advance found themselves in the presence of the enemy without their men except two 1 Foreign Tour. 284 THE THREE ARMS. gunners to each piece. Instead of superintending, watching the move- ments of the enemy, and directing the labours of their men, the officers had to dismount and actually assist in the loading and firing, which was all the slower because the pieces were undermanned. They did their duty, but at the sacrifice of valuable lives. 1 23. The full amount of protection and support to be obtained from field batteries of light guns would appear to depend upon their means of mobility not being too limited, permitting these guns to be moved when circumstances require them from position to position within proper limits and with their escorts, at an increased rate of manosuvre over the battalions of infantry, that is at a trot, and to be capable of opening fire at an early moment instead of proceeding at the ordinary pace of infantry. Batteries of light field guns usually composing the greater proportion of artillery employed in the field, and being organized on an economical establishment of horses, it becomes of weighty consideration when conducting a campaign to have their mobility and celerity of movement fully developed, thereby increasing the utility of the bulk of the artillery. 2 24. To gain from mobility * its greatest effect, field batteries should, to a certain extent, be converted into horse artillery, by which the greatest possible rapidity of manceuvre would be attained ; batteries I would constantly shift their positions, so as always to take the line diagonally or in flank, and by rapid retreat would baffle a counter- attack. Eifled guns of larger calibre than those of the field-batteries, corresponding to those formerly called guns of position, can now easily follow the march of troops, and take part in the line of battle. Their value in protecting refused portions of the line from counter-attack, covering fixed points, such as bridges and defiles, enfilading distant parts of the hostile line, and silencing troublesome batteries, is so great, that immense advantages would in many cases be gained by increasing their numbers. 3 25. The field-battery equipment of the Prussian army is light, and adapted for rapid movement over long distances ; six men can be carried with the gun, independently of the waggon, viz. : a mounted No. 1, three men on the limber, and two on axle-tree seats ; these seats are Times, 1st Nov., 1869. s F.J.S. 3 Hamley, Part VI. Chap. V. ARTILLERY. 285 safe arid comfortable ; they have cylindrical springs of india-rubber, which it is said wear very well. * * Lightness and capability of rapid movement, is more than ever necessary now with field batteries ; this follows in consequence of the increased efficiency of the guns at long range. At the manoeuvres, " Prussian Divisional in the Ehine Province, 1868," this could be readily appre- ciated ; the country being one of wide swelling, rolling hills, the features on a grand scale the artillery was often obliged to remain a long way behind, to cover advances of the infantry, and then would be compelled to move rapidly for a long distance to the front j again. 1 26. The Austrians do not keep up any horse artillery proper. When a battery is attached to a brigade of cavalry, the number of horses in each gun is increased to six. Six men are carried on the two seats in the front part of the carriage, the seventh rides on a saddle on the trail. 2 27. Field artillery to be really effective, should combine accuracy and quickness of fire with considerable celerity of movement; the former of these will depend on the instruction and general efficiency of the officers and men composing the battery, as well as on the nature of the guns employed, and the latter will be secured by having the carriages of suitable construction and well horsed, for otherwise artillery becomes a troublesome and sometimes even a useless appendage to an army. 3 28. The general rule runs thus : the fire should be slow as long as the enemy is at a distance, and the probability of a hit small : quicker when the enemy comes nearer, when the distances can be judged more accurately, and when its effect increases ; and quicker with canister shot at the critical moments, shortly before and after attacks are made with the steel, when our battalions advance to the attack with the bayonet, or the squadrons to the charge, when the enemy's troops advance to the attack of ours, when they are delayed by obstacles of ground, or when they expose their flank. 4 29. The Armstrong 12-pr. can fire about two rounds per minute, with approximate accuracy in laying. When great precision in laying is not required, a smooth-bored gun can fire two rounds of solid shot in a minute, or three rounds of case, which require less time in laying. 1 W.H.G. - Saunier. Owen. * Taubert, Chap. III., Sect. XII. 286 THE THREE ARMS. Each gun might fire nine rounds of solid shot upon the cavalry 'approach- ing from 1000 yards,' during the first 400 yards ; one round of solid and two of case shot during the next 400, and two rounds of case during the last 200 ; making a total from each gun of ten rounds of solid shot, and four of case. * * * On opening fire, if the distance of the enemy be not known, it is better to fire rather short of, than over the object.* This remark especially applies to rifled guns, and great care should be taken when an enemy is at close quarters to depress the guns sufficiently, so as if possible to burst the shells just in his front. 1 Reserve Artillery. 30. Batteries of position are designed for the defence of posts, intrenched camps, lines, &c., and for the occupation of important positions on the field of battle. They may also bemused as a means of connecting the different forts and batteries which may be situated on any coast. When used in offensive operations, this species of artillery becomes artillery of reserve, to be brought forward at critical periods of the attack. 2 31. All field artillery may be said to have been artillery of position previous to the Seven Years' War, for with the exception of a few isolated cases, it possessed little mobility, and usually remained during an action in one position without attempting to manoeuvre ; it generally opened an engagement, and almost invariably became the prey of the victor. After the field artillery was lightened, and rendered capable of rapid movements, artillery of position then became reserve artillery. 3 * The Dartmoor Special Committee held in 18G9, were of opinion, 'that the plan of firing a trial shot to ascertain the range will, with the present guns, not prove sufficiently accurate to obviate the necessity of carrying an instrument specially devised for the purpose. They base their opinion upon the belief that, although on tolerably level and open ground and at a moderate distance, the burst of a percussion shell on graze will probably be seen, and afford an approximate estimate of the graze ; upon enclosed and broken ground, or at a long range, the probability is that the graze of the trial shot would not be seen from the guns, or if seen, the configuration of the ground might cause the trial shot to give an erroneous idea of it. This was particularly noticed during some of the experiments at Dartmoor. With Nolan's range-finder, the gun detachments were enabled to measure the range with sufficient accuracy in about 1 minutes.' F.J.S. 1 Haud-Book. 2 Owen. 3 Ibid. ARTILLERY. 287 32. Eeserve batteries are usually placed in the third line, with the reserves of the other arms, and formed in column, with a front of one or two batteries, sheltered from fire. 1 33. How important an effect the sudden appearance of a propor- tionately small reserve of artillery accompanied by fresh troops may have, was demonstrated at the battle of Marengo, on 14th June, 1800 ; in this action the twelve pieces of Boudet's division, which had only just arrived, checked the victorious career of the Austrians by their unexpected and effective fire ; they became, too, the supporting point of all the manoeuvres which turned the fate of the action. It was the last barrier of the already beaten French army; by it the French commander-in-chief supported his discomfited and exhausted divisions ; and from it, and the impetuous attack of fresh forces, resulted the change which snatched the blood-bought victory from the Austrians. 2 34. 'Reserves, intended for movement, ought to be able to move with facility, and for artillery which often has to take post at long distances, horse artillery should be employed.' 3 35. It is, proper to have horse artillery in reserve, which may be carried as rapidly as possible to any threatened point. General Benningsen had great cause for self congratulation at Eylau because he had fifty light guns in reserve ; for they had a powerful influence in enabling him to recover himself when his line had been broken through between the centre and the left. 4 36. The battle of Lutzen was fought on the 2nd May, 1813, between the Allies and the French, ending in the retreat of the former. * * * The Allies had 438 guns, while the French had but 236, so that the victory on the side of the latter may be considered to be due to the perfect knowledge possessed by Napoleon of the application of artillery in the field, and especially as regarded the employment of the reserves. * ****** The allied army employed in this engagement an immense number of guns, nearly seven to 1000 men, but instead of keeping a strong reserve ready to act with effect upon an emergency, they appear to have placed their batteries between the infantry columns, and allowed them 1 Saunier. 2 Taubert, Chap. V., Sect. XXIX. J (Marmout), Ambert. 4 Jomiui, Chap. VII., Art. 43. 288 THE THREE ARMS. to scatter their fire. Fifty pieces were however in position at Lisdorf, and if brought up to oppose the last French attack on Kaya, the battle ought to have been gained by the allies, notwithstanding the prepon- derance of the French numbers. 1 Positions for Guns. 37. In choosing a position upon the field for artillery, the following principles should be chiefly borne in mind, viz. : that the guns should command not only the approaches to the weakest points of the position, but also if practicable, the whole of the ground within their range; that they should not inconvenience the mano3uvres of the troops they support, and that they should be as far removed, as circumstances will permit, out of the range of any place which might afford a shelter for the enemy's infantry, and from whence the latter could harass the gunners. If this, however, be impracticable, one or more guns must be told off to keep down the enemy's fire. "When guns are placed to defend a position, to protect troops in passing a river, &c., it is always advisable that the batteries should be at some distance from each other, but should at the same time be able to concentrate and cross their fire on the ground in front. 2 38. The officer's first business, after putting a gun in position, will be to ascertain, by actual measurement, the distance of every well marked object within range ; next to mask and protect his guns and men, by ingenious use of whatever means are at hand. 3 39. The natural cover, which ground almost everywhere affords, and which a practised glance alone can discover and turn to account, is either calculated to catch or turn off the enemy's projectiles, such as swamps, meadows, ditches, heights, slight unevennesses and ruts, low dikes, ledges of earth, hollow ways, &c., or of a nature to hide the pieces from the enemy's sight, and make it difficult for him to lay his pieces and to estimate the distance, such as hedges, thickets, fields of corn, deep heather, &c. Heights which slope gently towards the enemy afford the best cover, by withdrawing the pieces behind the ridge so far back that the levelled gun is alone seen above it. 4 1 Owen. * Ibid. 3 Hand-Book. 4 Taubert, Cliap. III., Sect. X. ARTILLERY. 289 40. When guns are in position on the brow of a hill, they should be retired from it as far as they can without losing the command ; the more they are retired, the more the men will be covered. If it be necessary, that they should be placed close to the edge, it should not be done till the firing is about to commence. 1 41. The position in advance of the front of the other troops has the disadvantage of exposing a double object to the enemy's projectiles ; it entails, too, in the attack the necessity of the other troops breaking through the intervals of the pieces, thereby masking their fire sooner than they otherwise would. The position in front of the rest of the troops is especially hazardous for horse artillery when allied to cavalry, because the latter is compelled to pass through the artillery both in advance and retreat, and the artillery in an unsuccessful attack, may happen to be ridden over by friend and foe. 2 42. Artillery is an arm equally formidable both in the offensive and defensive. As an offensive means, a great battery well managed may break an enemy's line, throw it into confusion, and prepare the way for the troops that are to make an assault. As a defensive means, it doubles the strength of a position, not only on account of the material injury it inflicts upon his troops, but also by greatly increasing the peril of approaching near, and specially within the range of grape. It is no less important in the attack and defence of fortified places or intrenched camps ; for it is one of the main reliances in modern systems of fortification. 3 43. In a battle, each arm, according to circumstances, takes the principal part. In critical moments, when both sides have the same chances of success, or when the efforts of the infantry and cavalry have not led to any result, the artillery takes the lead and gives the decisive blow ; but, more frequently, its work, always important, is secondary and consists in affording support by its fire, to other arms. It is the special duty of the batteries of divisions, who have no other tactics ; to follow and support with judgment the movements of the troops to which they are attached. 4 1 Hand-Book. 2 Taxibert, Chap. III., Sect. X. 3 .Tomini, Chap. VII., Art. 40. 4 Saunier. 19 290 THE THKEE ARMS. 44. * * * If the artillery is to act upon an isolated point ; the infantry and cavalry troops designed to protect it and assure its safety, must be subordinate to it in all their movements. 1 45. To post cannon to advantage, with due regard to their defence and the means of withdrawing them, is perhaps the most anxious part of a general's duty, in occupying or attacking a position. Its difficulty is ill understood save by artillery officers, or those well trained in tactics. Hence a very frequent source of error as to the strength of positions, and one especially made as regards our late example Solferino. The hill round the tower has been described as of great strength. It was not really so, since its crest was too narrow for the proper use of the Austrian guns, and the access to it through steep lanes so bad as to make officers unwilling to commit themselves to a defence which they feared Avould end (as it partly did in fact), in their finding their retreat intercepted. Yet the change introduced by the Great Napoleon of massing guns for attack is acknowledged by all to be in the right direction. A concentrated fire is proved not only to do more proportionate damage to the enemy, but to have the effect of protecting the batteries themselves. Colonel Fremantle has taken pains to show that a similar process to the French Emperor's was forced by experience on the artillerists of Lee in the Virginian campaigns. The improved lightness of modern carriages gives marked facilities for such combination, as the superior range now attained permits the front of the army to be swept effectually, and the enemy's columns to be taken in flank the most formidable direction which can be used without that subdivision of the batteries heretofore in vogue. This tendency to mass guns for a decisive stroke in battle, with the increased means of transport now available, is a sufficient guarantee that the proportion of artillery will be fully maintained, though it is not probable that late improvements will cause it to be increased. 2 46. In two respects the fire of artillery is superior in degree to the fire of infantry : first, in the extent of its range ; secondly, in the power of its projectiles. To exercise its full effects, it should first, begin to fire at a range beyond that of small arms, without falling into the error, so frequently condemned by Frederick, of commencing its 1 Marmont. ! Edinburgh Review, ARTILLERY. 291 fire at impracticable ranges ; secondly, it should so direct its fire on the opposing troops as to give full scope to the destructive power of the projectiles. 1 47. Artillery fire is least effective, when the batteries stand exactly opposite to those of the enemy and on a base parallel to theirs, so that those of his shots that miss, pass through the intervals of the battery. Positions of guns, which are oblique to the enemy, or which can be taken in flank are faulty : should circumstances in action render the taking up of such a position compulsory for a short period, increasing the intervals is a method of lessening the losses much to be recom- mended. Artillery should not take up a position under the effective fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, unless the main object of the fight imperatively demands it. It should, generally speaking, keep at a distance from woods or the skirts of villages, hedges or ditches, which the enemy has occupied with infantry, in order to be out of the effective range of their fire-arms. 3 48. The only formation for artillery in action is, of course, that of line. The leaving of intervals between the guns (nineteen yards) necessary for the limbering up of the pieces, enables a battery to sustain for a considerable time a direct fire from the enemy's artillery, which, from its weight and accuracy might appear destructive. But in gaining^a direction oblique to the enemy's front, a line of guns will frequently be exposed to enfilade. A partial remedy for this in open ground, is to retire the guns in echelon to the exposed flank. The same order is applicable when numerous batteries are for a particular purpose concentrated on a part of the enemy's line. 8 49. The concentration of artillery fire upon a single point of the enemy's position, m &y be accomplished by an oblique direction of each piece of a detachment of artillery, standing upon a base parallel to the enemy's position, or by placing two or more lines of pieces in oblique echelon. 4 50. Artillery commences the action, in firing upon all points of the enemy's line. Scattered along the front of the line of battle, its fire keeps the enemy in uncertainty as to the real point of attack. It keeps the engagement at a distance beyond the reach of small arms ; it covers 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. II. 8 Taubert, Chap. Ill, Sect. X. 3 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. II. 4 Taubert, Chap. III., Sect X, 292 THE THREE ARMS. the movements of other arms ; it prepares for the action of cavalry and infantry ; it supports offensive movements, protects the retreat and restores the combat ; it facilitates the passage of rivers and aids power- fully in the attack and defence of villages, and of posts, and intrenched camps. When employed in a mass, it shatters the enemy's line and decides the contest. In this manner Napoleon employed his artillery in the great wars during the latter years of the Empire, when the armies had become considerably large. 1 51. The choice of the object to be fired at must be determined by the particular purpose the artillery endeavours to effect, and should be changed with that purpose during the course of the action. In the beginning of an engagement, and when the pieces cannot yet contribute to their own defence, they direct their fire where the distance, ground, and position of the enemy hold out the greatest promise of effect. When the battle has advanced, and in decisive moments the objects to be fired at suggest themselves, and the pieces should then fire against those arms of the enemy whose resistance is most obstructive or advance most formidable. On the offensive, the fire is chiefly directed against the enemy's artillery, in order to divert their fire from the other troops, and to facilitate the advance of the latter; on the defensive, on the other hand, it is especially directed against the enemy's infantry or cavalry, to prevent their advance. In the last case should the artillery be plied by that of the enemy, it should not on that account be induced to divert itself from its object. A number of objects should not be chosen, for this leads to a reprehensible scattering of the fire, and produces no decided result ; while the concentration of artillery fire upon a small space seldom fails of effecting the object in view, because relative loss is more decisive than absohite. 2 Descriptions of Fire, employed. 52. The kind of fire and nature of projectile to be employed in the different cases which may present themselves upon the field of battle, depend on a variety of circumstances, such as the nature of the ground, Saunier. B Taubert, Chap. III., Sect. XII. ARTILLERY. 293 the formation of the enemy's troops, their distance, &c., and the effect that it is desirable to produce. In general, shot and shell are fired against troops en masse or in column, or when a line can be enfiladed or taken obliquely ; case shot and shrapnel against troops dispersed or scattered, the former being used at short ranges up to about 300 yards, and the latter at the same ranges as those at which shot and shell are fired. * * * Case shot may be employed with advantage against troops at the distance before stated, and especially if there be no great exposure of the gunners to the fire of musketry from the flanks ; if troops especially cavalry are advancing upon a battery within a very short distance, double charges of case fired from the guns will do very great execution, and for close quarters smooth-bored pieces would most probably have a great advantage over rifled guns. The use of case will, however, depend in a measure on the nature of the soil, as it is not nearly so effective on soft or marshy ground, as when the latter is hard and stony. 1 53. Against a deployed line, whether marching by the front or by a flank, case shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case (sometimes called shrapnel), are most suitable; as these all scatter, right and left, to a considerable distance. ****** * Case shot, are unsuitable against column, as they consist of a number of small balls, which have not momentum enough to penetrate into it to any depth. ******* A shot, on the other hand, conies shrieking and tearing its way through the entire column carrying destruction to the very rearmost ranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, but extends throughout the column. Tims both the actual and the moral effect of ball on a close column, is much superior to that of grape or canister. At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French column with grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whether Buonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge. 2 54 When used against breastworks of rails or Jogs of wood, guns 1 Owen. Lippitt. 294 THE THREE ARMS. should be fired with moderate or shattering charges ; so as more surely to demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect of the fire, by scattering the splinters. 1 55. Case shot produces its greatest effect against cavalry, taking into consideration both men and horses ; it is less efficacious against infantry, and still less against artillery. This must be evident, when it is recollected that cavalry occupying a greater surface, and being much higher ought to be more exposed to its effects than infantry ; and that the latter will suffer more from it than the artillery, the guns being separated from each other by considerable intervals. Case shot should be used with field guns up to 250 yards, with the heavy natures up to 500 yards. Shrapnel and segment shells are case shot extended, but they require skill on the part of those who use them, in order to combine the right elevation with the proper length of the fuze. Case shot has not much effect against troops drawn up behind an abatis, as the branches of trees intercept the balls. If the ground be unequal or covered with brushwood, soft, marshy, with deep ruts perpendicular to the line of fire, a great part of the balls will produce no effect ; they will lodge. 2 56. Large mortar shells, 13, 10, and 8-inch, are generally used in bombarding towns and works, and for these purposes, it is desirable that the shell should penetrate and then burst, the fuze being therefore bored, as it is technically termed, " long ;" these shells are most useful in destroying, and setting fire to buildings and magazines, levelling earthworks, &c. The small mortar shells are generally fired against troops posted behind cover, and they should therefore be made to explode at the instant they reach the ground ; if they penetrate into the ground, and then explode, the splinters will have little lateral range, and the destructive effect of the shells will be greatly decreased. 3 57. High angle fire is intended to strike a horizontal and covered object, and is distinguished from the low angle fire by an extremely curved trajectory. The shell is intended to remain where it first strikes, and there explode. The explosive effect, is chiefly depended upon. 5j ^C 3jC jji ?j 5jC 5{C The explosion of the shell, gives this nature of fire a marked 1 Lippitt. 2 Manual Artillery Exercises. 3 0\veu. ARTILLERY. 295 superiority over low angle fire, requires the pieces to be served with calmness and an attentive observation of the hits and explosions. It must consequently only be used from safe positions, in which the battery can remain for a considerable length of time stationary. 1 58. The 5J-inch royal and 4|-inch Coeliorn mortars, will be found very useful in the attack of intrenched posts, on account of their portability, for which reason they can be employed in situations where it would be impossible to move guns. In India, they have been found very effective in the attack of hill forts, stockades, &c. 2 Enfilade and Oblique Fire. 59. If the enemy advance in deployed lines, the batteries should endeavour to cross their fire in order to strike the lines obliquely. If guns can be so placed as to enfilade a line of troops, a most powerful effect is produced. When the enemy advance in columns, they may be battered in front. It is advantageous also to attack them obliquely, and especially in flank and reverse. The moral effect of a reverse fire upon a body of troops is inconceivable ; and the best soldiers are generally put to flight by it. The fine movement of Ney on Preistitz at Bautzen, was neutralized by a few pieces of Kleist's artillery, which took his columns in flank, checked them, and decided the marshal to deviate from the excellent direction he was pursuing. A few pieces of light artillery, thrown at all hazards upon the enemy's flank, may produce most important results, far overbalancing the risks run. 3 60. It has frequently happened, that batteries, placed in positions where they could use oblique fire, have greatly contributed towards winning a battle. At Marengo, the disorder, caused in Zach's column, by the artillery of Desaix, the whole of which suffered from the oblique fire, was amazing. At Ligny, Napoleon prepared the way for his attack on the Prussian centre, by using oblique fire. The fourth chapter of the battle of Austeiiitz,* equally proves the importance of oblique fire. At Bautzen, Key's movement upon Preistitz, was arrested by some light guns of Kleist, which took the French columns in flank. 4 * Baron Ambert, here refers to his work, 'Etudes Tactiques.' F.J.S. 1 Taubert, Chap. III., Sect. XI. s Owen. 3 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 46. 4 Ambert. 296 THE THREE ARMS. 61. * * Improvements in artillery have given it greater boldness. Drawing nearer the general direction of the enemy's lines, it will take up positions suitable for oblique fire. Its extreme mobility will enable it to escape from attacks, and generally speaking it will have nothing further to fear than the fire of the enemy's guns. It is plain, that the great range of, and liberty accorded to the artillery, will extend the use of enfilade and oblique fire. In consequence of the great range of rifled guns, turning movements and diversions, on the field of battle, must be made with a wider circuit; in order that the effects of oblique and enfilade fire may be avoided. 1 Massing Gum. 62. The engagement once begun, ' says Napoleon/ he who is able to bring suddenly and unknown to the enemy, upon the most important points an unexpected number of guns, is certain of success. This is the great secret of ' la grande tactique.' 5jC 2fC yfc "% 5jC 2{ ?j< The great range of artillery of the present day, makes it, more than ever necessary to seek with care for positions, whence its fire can be used within the greatest limits. It therefore seems probable that there will be a tendency to mass guns upon such positions, which appear most favourable. " The part played by artillery in war," says Marshal Marmont, " has daily acquired more importance not only from its increase, but also on account of its great mobility, which permits of almost an unlimited combination of movements. There are however, limits to this mobility which enables us to assemble upon a given point a great number of guns." These limits, have been now withdrawn, so that it seems possible for artillery to assemble in enormous masses, at the most advantageous points. The massing of artillery upon the same part of a field of battle, often causes great difficulties in the deployments of batteries ; sometimes 1 Ambert, ARTILLERY. 297 the troops supporting the artillery are obstructed in their movements. At Wagram, for instance, the 100 field guns, forming the centre battery, were hardly able to perform the necessary movements for permitting the entrance into line of Macdonald's column. ****** The mobility of guns of the present day, will enable the plans for bringing the artillery into action, to be made more rapidly and con- sequently with less risk. However, the batteries which first take up their position, must open fire quickly, in order to draw the attention of the enemy towards themselves, and enable the remaining batteries to take up their positions, with less difficulty and danger. 1 63. Every period of an action may offer a favorable opportunity to bring 'guns massed' into use. At the opening to overcome the difficulties of a position by a superior force of artillery, and at the same time to protect the troops. During an action to give a favourable turn to the fight. At the close, either to overwhelm the enemy with all available strength, or to repulse him. ****** The particular point at which they should be employed, is what is termed the key of the enemy's position, getting possession of which decides the contest ; the choice of it is influenced by the position the line of retreat and the turn the fight may have taken. ****** The strength of the artillery masses, is a matter of great importance. The mass should not be so unwieldy as to lose its capability of manoeuvring, for success is not merely dependent upon the number of the pieces, but upon the order and precision with which they deploy. Two batteries should be considered as the minimum, and six as the maximum of an artillery mass. 2 64. 'The artillery of reserve,' is able to be partly employed to strengthen weak points, or to move in a body, supported by troops on the wings, or in rear of the wings, to make a decisive blow. Sometimes with the same object, the batteries from several divisions are united, or the artillery of the nearest divisions are joined to a grand battery formed by the reserve artillery ; but this employment of divisional artillery is 1 Ambert. Taubert, Chap. V., Sect. XXIX. 298 THE THREE ARMS. exceptional : it is better, that the batteries of divisions aid the movement of a mass of artillery by their fire, if their attention is not forcibly called to another point. 1 Concentration of Fire. 65. An instance on a small scale, of the successful concentration of artillery was given at the battle of Talavera, where three British batteries were formed in a line oblique to some advancing French columns, so that a heavy fire was obtained on the flank of the columns, which were compelled to retire. 2 66. 'At the battle of Solferino,' from the foot of the hills to Casa Nova, along M'Mahon's and part of Niel's line, the action was confined for some hours to artillery fire, with episodes of cavalry charges. M'Mahon reports twenty-four, Nipl forty-two, guns engaged; horse artillery also took a part, and there must have been at least seventy- eight guns drawn up for action together ; no wonder that the 1st Austrian corps fell back to San Cassiano without making any serious attack, and before it was entirely brought up. At one point, where it was necessary to withdraw an Austrian field battery out of fire on account of its being overmatched by being opposed to three French ones, an eye-witness describes the affair thus : Mensdorf 's cavalry, and a battery of horse artillery were ordered to advance and cover its retreat ; they had hardly got within 1700 yards, when, of six guns, five were dismounted. Another battery was sent up ; in one minute from starting, three were dismounted, and 500 horses were killed. In the meantime the artillery had been withdrawn. 3 67. * * Under the Republic and Empire, the offen- sive role of the artillery, in accordance with the tactics of the day, rapidly increased in importance. AVe find successful applications of it, at Friedland, "Wagrain and Hanau. This extreme boldness accorded to artillery, will in the future largely develope its offensive powers. Great mobility, constantly throwing out the enemy's calculation of distances, having become more than ever important, artillery will be able to take \ip good positions, without being seriously compromised. 4 1 Saunicr. - Owen. 3 Lieut. -Colonel Miller. 4 Anibcrt. AETILLERY. 299 68. At the battle of Friedland, 14th June, 1807, the artillery of Victor's corps was commanded by General Senarmont. In a memoir of Senarmont, his own report as to the part played by the artillery of the divisions of the army forming the corps of Victor, and the concen- trated fire of the batteries, is given ; " General Victor, the commander-in- chief of the 1st corps, allowed during all this affair, the general com- manding the artillery of that corps, to assume entire control of the movements of that arm after having communicated to him his designs.* Consequently, he (the General Senarmont) judged it desirable to divide all the artillery of the 1st corps with the exception of the six guns held in reserve, into two great batteries, right and left, each of fifteen guns. The corps occupied in four lines, the space between the ravine and on the left of the village of Porthenen and the wood of Sortlack. The left battery was carried to the front of Porthenen, having for its object to flank the left of the corps, by a cross-fire with that of the battery of the right ; and to destroy, if possible, the enemy's batteries and especially his masses on this point. The battery of the right, at first established in front of the wood of Sortlack, gained, during the action, the extreme right of the sixth corps, just opposite to and at half cannon range from Friedland. " The general of artillery moved, during the action from one battery to the other, directing their movements and commanding them in person, because of the wounds and absence of their commanding officers. " The artillery arrived at 300 yards from the enemy, there fired one or two rounds, after which the guns, up to the end of the action, were kept constantly at 200 yards and at 120 yards and then fired nothing but case, till the enemy had effected his retreat, after an immense loss of men. Next day the pieces remained in position on the brink of the ravine on our left, and near the town." 1 69. In the precis of the operations of his corps, Victor, speaking of Seiiarmont's artillery at Friedland, disposed in two grand batteries, says, " The general of artillery perceiving the terrible effect of his fire * It is generally admitted, that the withdrawal of the guns from the divisions to which they were attached, was contrary to the wishes of the divisional generals, and that they grumbled. F.J.S, 1 Le General Marion, 300 THE THKEE ARMS. and wishing to decide the enemy's retreat, gave the order to fire no more on the enemy's guns, equal in number to ours, and of which some took us obliquely. He advanced to within 120 yards of the Russian front, the two batteries which had approached each other till they only formed one battery, and from that moment they only fired case/'* 70. The camp at Boulogne, was the first school of the tactics in mass, henceforward destined to be successfully practised on the field of battle, and the war of 1805 gave the first opportunity of bringing them into play. * * * * * . * :'": .if! $ - 4 ' It is undeniable, that General Senarmont trod a new path in giving this example of the use of artillery masses, and that it is one worthy of being followed; it deserves to be remarked too, that he had not a reserve artillery awaiting his orders to be brought into use, but that he had at first to procure the means for this attack, by combining the divisional batteries of the first corps. * * * * The battle of "Wagram, on the 6th July, 1809, affords another, though less successful but still magnificent, example of the employment of artillery in masses. 1 71. ' Concentrating upon the same point,' has the advantage of taking the enemy's lines obliquely ; it allows of cross-fire and affords intervals for the passage of troops about to attack. It was employed at Austerlitz by the batteries of the 4th corps and the twenty-four light guns of the guard. At Lutzen, the French directed against the villages of Gross- Gosrschen and Kaya, two batteries of seventy and thirty-two guns respectively. The cross-fire of these batteries made such a gap in the allied lines, as to decide the battle. The great range of guns at present will allow of their being able the better to obtain flank-fire relatively between them, and will thus increase their power of concen- tration. Suppose the batteries, a, b, c, d, placed at the same intervals, and armed with guns of the old class ; the batteries, A, B, C, Z>, in the same positions but armed with rifled guns ; bo and do representing the * Victor alludes to the allied cavalry forming to charge the batteries, in order to relieve the masses from their fearful fire. Senarmont changed front, and disposed of them after two rounds. F. J.S. 1 Taubert, Chap V., Sect. XXIX. ARTILLERY. 301 greatest ranges of the old guns, and BO, DO those of the rifled pieces ; we will then have the two zones xoy, Xo Y, which are to one another as the squares of the radii or ranges. These two zones then represent, the areas upon which smooth-bore and rifled guns respectively, could concentrate their fire, consequently the power of concentration of each. 1 * * The effect produced by the fire of two English field guns, at the Alma. 72. At the battle of the Alma, the effect of the fire of the two English guns brought to the top of the knoll, is thus described by Kinglake, in his summary of the battle. * * * " Seeing the danger to which this condition of things was leading, and becoming for other reasons impatient, Lord Eaglan determined to order the final advance of the English infantry without waiting any longer for the time when Canrobert and Prince Napoleon should be established on the plateau. So the English infantry went forward, and in a few minutes the battalions which followed Codrington had not only defeated one of the two heavy ' columns of attack ' which marched down to assail them, but had stormed and carried the Great Redoubt. From that moment the hill-sides on the Alma were no longer a fortified position ; but they were still a battle-field, and a battle-field on which, for a 1 Ambert. 302 THE THREE ARMS. time, the combatants were destined to meet with checkered fortune ; for, not having been supported at the right minute, and being encompassed by great organized numbers, Codrington's disordered force was made to fall back under the weight of the Vladimir column ; and its retreat involved the centre battalion of the brigade of Guards. Nearly at the same time Kiriakoff, with his ' great column of the eight battalions/ pushed Canrobert down from the crest he had got to, obliging or causing him for a time to hang back under the cover of the steep. At that time the prospects of the allies were overcast. But then the whole face of the battle was suddenly changed by the two guns which Lord Raglan had brought up to the knoll ; for not only did their fire extirpate the Causeway batteries, and so lay open the Pass, but it tore through the columns of Prince Mentschikoff 's infantry reserves, and drove them at once from the field. This discomfiture of the Russian centre could not but govern the policy of Kiriakoff, obliging him to conform to its movement of retreat ; and he must have been the more ready to acknowledge to himself the necessity of the step he was taking, since by this time he had suffered the disaster which was inflicted upon his great ' column of the eight battalions ' by the French artillery." 1 ***** Siege Artillery. 73. The objects and equipments of siege artillery are very different from those of artillery for service in the field, the quantity and variety of the materiel required being very much greater, as well as the time necessary for its collection. The purposes for which artillery is employed in sieges, may be enumerated as follows : (1) To keep down the fire of the besieged, and protect the besieger's works, thus enabling him to make his approaches to the fortress with greater facility. (2) To defend the batteries and parallels against sorties, &c. 1 Kinglake, Vol. II., Chap. XVI. ARTILLERY. 303 (3) To drive from their lodgments any troops which may hinder the progress of the parallels or batteries, by harassing the working parties, and guards of the trenches. (4) To ruin the defences of the besieged, and to prevent his repairing the damages which they may have received. (5) To destroy the enemy's stores and magazines. (6) To form such breaches in the revetments as may be necessary to admit the assaulting columns ; and (7) To cover and support the movements of the assaulting columns on the day of attack. 1 74. No precise rules can be laid down, as to the natures of ordnance or the number of pieces best suited for a siege equipment; much depends on the class and position of the fortress to be attacked, and the facility of transport afforded by the country in which the operations are to be carried on. In countries where water transport abounds, little difficulty is experienced in conveying the largest ordnance. Thirty pieces of ordnance, viz. : ten 8-inch guns of 52 cwt., ten 24-prs. of 50 cwt., five 8-inch mortars, and five 5^-inch mortars have been laid down as a basis for future siege equipments. In any future sieges, however a large proportion of the ordnance will consist of rifled cannon. The 64-pr. or 7-inch B.L. will replace the 8-inch gun, and the 40-pr. or 64-pr., the 24-pr. guns of 50 cwt. 2 75. Besides the siege or travelling carriages, sling and platform waggons must be provided for the transport of guns and mortars, as well as Flanders waggons, trench and hand carts for that of ammunition and other stores. Sling waggons are very useful in moving guns, when it is required to replace those that are injured, or when guns provided with garrison or naval carriages are used, in which case the carriage is also transported upon the waggon. 3 76. The arming of siege batteries is carried on during the night, the guns being generally conveyed from the park across the open ground, though when the bottom of the trenches is sufficiently wide and firm, they may be taken along the latter. 4 * * 1 Owen. -Hand-Book. 3 Owen. '//>/<'. 304 THE THREE ARMS. 77. In commencing a siege, the guns should not open fire until the batteries are sufficiently armed to be able to produce the desired effect, as such a proceeding would render those pieces already in battery liable to be silenced by the fire of the enemy before any result could be accomplished ; and in general a few guns should not be permitted to commence firing at any time by themselves. * * * * Previous to an assault, it is generally the practice to endeavour as much as possible to silence the guns, of the besieged place, by a heavy bombardment or cannonade of some hours, from all the besieger's ordnance, which should especially be directed on those of the enemy's batteries, that would seem most likely to be able to annoy or cause much damage to the assaulting troops. 1 78. From experiments, carried on at Newhaven, by the Ordnance Select Committee, in August, 1863, against earthworks, it became manifest, that, (1) The best means of destroying an earthen parapet, is by the direct fire of rifled guns with full charge, throwing shells of large capacity for powder. One large gun is much to be preferred to several of a smaller nature. (2) In breaching an earthen parapet, the fire should be concentrated as much as possible, and the breach formed by cutting down the parapet, commencing at the top, the earth is by that means blown away. Shells planted low in the work merely throw up the earth into the breach already opened. (3) Relatively speaking, smooth-bored guns are of little value for destroying large well constructed earthworks ; and except for ricochet or enfilade fire, they ought to be discarded from any future siege train, when a supply of rifled guns can be obtained. (4) The guns forming a siege train for service against earthen parapets should fire as large a projectile as circumstances will permit, and, as before observed, too great exertions cannot be made to bring a large gun to the front, if possible. One 7-inch B.L. would probably be equal to a battery of 40-prs. 1 Owen. ARTILLERY. 305 (5) It has been clearly proved that twenty-five feet on the superior slope is the minimum thickness that should be given to future parapets designed to resist heavy rifled ordnance ; even this has been breached by one rifled gun firing 110-pr. live shells, with percussion fuzes, in from three to four hours. If there had been embrasures, it would have been done in a shorter time. (6) A working party, during the day, could not attempt the repair of an earthen parapet under a fire of rifled guns at 1000 yards, without great loss of life. 1 79. The best place for making a breach, in ravelins, bastions, &c., is about thirty yards from their salient angles. The batteries should commence by marking out by their fire the extent of the breach in- tended to be made, first by striking out a horizontal line as near the bottom of the revetment as possible, and afterwards two others perpendicular to, and at the extremities of this line. Should the breach be required to be extensive, it will be necessary to form intermediate lines. Then, by continuing to deepen these two or more cuts, and occasionally firing salvoes at the part to be brought down, the wall will give way in a mass. The guns, must, however, at first fire low, and gradually advance upwards until the breach is effected ; and when the wall has given way, the firing should be continued until the slope of the breach is made practicable. 2 80. With elongated shot from rifled ordnance, no doubt the manner of forming the breach would be but little altered, but the time required, and the number of shot would be less, and the range might be greater than when ordinary round projectiles are used, the accuracy of fire obtained with rifled ordnance being so very superior to that with smooth-bored guns. 3 81. At the experiments on the Martello Tower at Eastbourne, the penetrations obtained were as follows : 40-pr. solid shot 'Armstrong rifled gun,' (41 Ibs.), charge 5 Ibs, penetration of 47-inches to 65-inches. 80-pr. solid shot (80 Ibs.), charge 10 Ibs., penetration of 51-inches to 90-inches. 1 Hand-Book, s Griffiths, 3 Owen. 20 306 THE THREE ARMS. 7-incli howitzer, ' 100-pr./ plugged shell (104 Ibs.), charge 9 Ibs., penetration 38-inches to 51 -inches. The above penetrations were at a range of 1032 yards, the brickwork of the tower was of admirable quality. 1 Garrison Artillery. 82. In the defence of a fortress, the guns should be placed so as to defend all the approaches to it ; the positions of the different descrip- tions of ordnance being determined by their respective powers and natures. Previous to the investment by an enemy, and indeed, at all times, the artillery officers should make themselves acquainted with the exact distance from their guns of every object in the surrounding country, such as trees, hillocks, buildings, &c., which may happen to be within range, as this will enable the fire of the besieged to be executed with precision at the time when the besiegers are laying out their batteries, and to maintain a superiority in this respect over that of the enemy, after his batteries are armed ; at all events, until such time as he may have ascertained the different ranges by trial. * During the second period of the attack, i.e., until the besiegers' batteries are fully armed, the artillery of the place is paramount and usually undisturbed by the fire of guns or mortars ; this advantage should not therefore be thrown away, but every effort should be made to dismount the enemy's guns, destroy his magazines, &c., and thus delay the progress of the siege. 2 83. The armament of coast batteries depends chiefly on the nature of the coast which they are required to defend, and the facilities afforded by it for the landing of an enemy; the depth of water in shore, and the object of such battery or batteries, whether this object be to command the approach to a harbour or landing place, to cover a road- stead, &c. 3 84. In the case of coast batteries attacked by iron-plated vessels, the burden of active defence falls upon the artillery, unless the defenders have time to organize extensively such obstacles as torpedoes, booms, sunken vessels, floating batteries, &c. 4 1 Hand-Book, * Owen. 3 Ibid. * Hand-Book, ARTILLERY. 307 85. The following rules have been deduced from experiments carried on against iron plates : (1) Steel shot and shell, and shot made of iron cast in chill, are the projectiles proper for use in attacking iron-plated structures. (2) Successfully to attack armour-plated vessels, it is necessary that shot should have a velocity on impact of at least 1000 feet per second. (3) A steel shot fired from a 9.2-inch S.B. gun with a 251bs. charge, will penetrate a 5^-inch iron plate, and a sound line-of-battle ship's side at 200 yards range, and will make a hole in the ship that would endanger her if penetrated near the water line. (4) A steel shot fired from the same gun at the same range, with a 301bs. charge, will penetrate a 6-inch plate on a line-of-battle ship, and will rend and splinter the planking inboard. ****** (7) The effect of the 100-pr. S.B. gun at a range of 1200 yards, is perfectly insignificant upon an iron-plated ship. (8) Elongated projectiles have great advantages over those of a spherical form of the same weight, for use against iron-plated structures. (9) A wooden ship simply plated with six inches of iron, may be effectually attacked at 1,500 yards range by steel projectiles, from rifled guns capable of bearing about 401bs. charges of powder. (10) Conical-ended projectiles are superior to flat-ended projectiles for penetration. (11) The resisting power of iron plates, is as the squares of their thickness. 1 Rockets. 86. Although rockets had been used for war purposes (it is generally supposed) for centuries in the East, and at an early date even in Europe, they were of little practical utility, until improvements in their con- 1 Hand-Book. 308 THE THREE ARMS. struction and manufacture were introduced by Sir William Congreve, at the beginning of the present century. Five natures of rockets were proposed by that officer, viz., 3, 6, 12, 24, and 32-prs. ; the latter are, however, no longer in the service. 1 87. Eockets are carried by field artillery in special rocket carriages, having separate boxes for the sticks. The rocket tube is of wrought- iron. * * * Each tube is supported on four legs, and those for the 6-prs. and 12-prs. are provided with a tangent sight to 20. For greater elevations a quadrant and plummet are used. * * * They may be fired from a common V trough, or in volleys off the ground. * * * * Hale's rockets are without sticks ; the rocket is kept point foremost in flight by rotation, caused by the side pressure of the gas in issuing upon the tailpiece attached to the case ; this piece is formed of three tubes, cut away on one side, each tube being in continuation of a circular vent in the base of the rocket. Under this arrangement there is free escape of the gas on one side, and a pressure sufficient to cause rotation on the other. They are driven with a quicker composition than the other description of rocket. 2 88. The following are the service rockets, viz., 3-prs., 12-prs., and 24-prs. They have no sticks, but are kept from turning over in flight, by the rotation established about their longer axis, by the pressure of the gas on three half shields, in the prolongation of the vents, which form the tailpiece. 3 89. The convenience attending the use of rockets over other pro- jectiles, is thus stated by Sir W. Congreve : " The rocket carcass is not only fired without reaction upon the point from which it is discharged, but it is also unencumbered with the necessity of heavy ordnance to protect it, as is the case with every other carcass. It is ammunition without ordnance ; it is the soul of artillery without the body ; and has, therefore, from the first principles of its flight, a decided advantage for the conveniency of use over the spherical carcass." 4 90. Marmont, on the importance of rockets, observes : " In the mountains we transport at the present time, with great difficulty, a small number of pieces which there can be of little effect. With 1 Owen. 2 Hantf-Book. * Manual of Artillery Exercises! 4 Owen, ARTILLERY. 309 rockets, we have an arm of long range, which may be established every- where in profusion upon rocky summits, as well as upon lower plateaux.* On level plains every building is transformed into a fortress, and the roof of a village church becomes, at will, the platform of a formidable battery." 91. Eockets may be of great use when a disembarkation of troops takes place in presence of an enemy, since rocket men can land with the first party of infantry, and commence firing before any guns can be brought into position. Rockets will not only be useful against masses of cavalry and squares of infantry, but, when guns cannot be brought up, may be of material benefit in dislodging an enemy from villages or houses, which could not be approached by infantry alone, without a considerable loss of men, and chance of failure. The larger rockets are of great service in bombardments and sieges. 1 * The introduction of light rifted guns, adapted for mountain transport, has modified these alleged advantages. F.J.S. 1 Griffiths. 310 CHAPTER IY. SECTION I. INFANTRY. On dit proverbialement que "1'infauterie est la reine des batailles." C'est uue ve"rite qu'aucun homme de guerre ne contestera, mais dont 1'expression vague et po^tique veut tre precisee. L'infanterie est tout a la fois V agent principal du combat, et le point ffappui de tous les autres agents du combat. LE MARECHAL TROCHU. 1. Infantry is undoubtedly the most important arm of the service, since it forms four-fifths of an army and is used both in the attack and defence of positions. If we must admit that, next to the genius of the general, the infantry arm is the most valuable instrument in gaining a victory, it is no less true that most important aid is given by the cavalry and artillery, and that without their assistance the infantry might at times be very seriously compromised, and at others could achieve only partial success. 1 2. It was to their infantry that the Swiss and Spaniards, during the sixteenth century, and the Swedes during the seventeenth, owed their importance in Europe. It was by their infantry, formed during the wars of the Revolution, and solidly disciplined in the camps of 1803 and 1804, that the French obtained their extraordinary conquests during the succeeding campaigns. It is likewise to their infantry that the British owe the victories they have won in every part of the globe. 2 3. During the middle ages, all art in warfare was for a long time in abeyance, and armies consisted of swarms of cavalry, infantry being regarded as merely of secondary importance. The Swiss were the first to restore infantry to that degree of estimation in which it had been held in the armies of the Republics of Greece and Rome. "Weary of the German yoke, the Swiss took up arms to expel the invader, and recover their liberty. Their own country supplied no horses, and being destitute of the means of purchasing from their neighbours, they 1 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 44. - Jen-is. INFANTRY. 311 adopted, perhaps without intending it, an organization resembling that of the Greeks, even to the arms with which they supplied themselves. Their battalions, strong in numbers and formed in compact close order, were enabled with their pikes to defend themselves against charges of cavalry; and the Austrian squadrons sent to subdue them were repeatedly defeated and put to the rout. The fame of the Swiss infantry soon spread, their services were eagerly sought for by other countries, and corps of Swiss infantry were enrolled by several of the sovereigns of Europe for their own special service. The Swiss not being able to supply all the demands made for their services, corps of pikemen, modelled upon their system, were formed in Spain, France, and Germany. The efficiency of infantry, as a military force, was thus once more established, and an opinion even gained ground of its superiority to cavalry, an idea which had been abandoned at the fall of the empire. Under Solyman II., the Turkish infantry was in such an efficient condition, that, it was esteemed the best in Europe. The facility with which infantry can operate on any ground, the ease with which it may be recruited and instructed, and the small proportion which its wants bear to those of cavalry, seem to point out this arm as best adapted for the main body of an army. 1 4. The company is the element of the organization, discipline and administration : the battalion is the true military element in the infantry ; the unit for battle. It is by battalion that movements and manoeuvres are made ; it is by battalion that the fighting is done. * # # # Two conditions are observed in the numerical com- position of a battalion. It should be easy to move, and, when deployed, the voice of the commander should be readily heard at both extremities of the line. Observing these limits, the number of companies, and the personnel of each company may be increased more or less at will. 2 5. The parade marching of the infantry of the Prussian Guard, has been renowned ever since its recruits were so harshly drilled by the stern soldier who first formed it. Since that time great alterations have been made both in the tactics and treatment of the men ; the Prussian grenadiers no longer move in the field in the stiff unbending formation which regarded soldiers only as machines. But while the Prussians 1 Lieut. -Colonel Graham. 2 Marmont, 312 THE THREE ARMS. have lately adopted a system of manoeuvres for field service which unites immense elasticity with great rapidity of movement, they have not failed to observe that the foundation of all tactical pliability lies in previous solidity and precision ; that troops who cannot move well on parade rarely can be of much use in service, and that before infantry soldiers can dash about as skirmishers they must be able to move accurately in more solid formation. 1 6. If infantry advances, driving back the enemy's lines, and successively occupying their positions, the victory is gained. If it holds its ground, standing firm and without looking back, the victory remains uncertain, but a fortunate manoeuvre and a final effort may be able to decide the result. If, on the other hand, it retreats unable to take advantage of the " points d'appui " that the battle-field offers, to gain ground and resume the offensive, defeat may be considered certain. Thus the position of the infantry, on a battle-field, determines the final crisis, as well as the hopes of the whole army. What a noble mission ! And this temporary mission accomplished, the infantry returns to its ordinary vocation, namely, marching daily heavily accoutred, perform- ing the most important duties, keeping guard by day and night over all, and assisting all arms of the service. 2 7. Respecting the qualities of the British soldier, Muffling bears the following testimony : ' For a battle, there is not perhaps in Europe an army equal to the British ; that is to say, none whose tuition, discipline, and whole military tendency is so purely and exclusively calculated for giving battle. The British soldier is vigorous, well fed, by nature brave and intrepid, trained to the most vigorous discipline, and admirably well armed. The infantry resist the attacks of the cavalry with great confidence, and, when taken in the flank or rear, British troops are less disconcerted than any other European army. These circumstances in their favour will explain how this army, since the Duke of Wellington conducted it, has never yet been defeated in the open field.' 3 8. Place an attainable object of war before the French soldier, and he will make supernatural efforts to gain it, but failing, he becomes proportionally discouraged. Let some new chance be opened, some 1 Hozier, Vol. II, s Trochu 8 Chesney, Lecture, VI. INFANTRY. 313 fresh stimulus applied to his ardent sensitive temper, and he will rush forward again with unbounded energy : the fear of death never checks him, he will attempt anything. But the unrelenting vigour of the British infantry in resistance wears his fury out ; it was so proved in the Peninsula, where the sudden deafening shout, rolling over a field of battle more full and terrible than that of any other nation, and followed by the strong unwavering charge, often startled and appalled a French column, before whose fierce and vehement assault any other troops would have given way. 1 9. Marshal Bugeaud, who had been, during seven years, the not unfrequently successful opponent of the English in the Peninsula, repeated very often in his despatches the following expression : " English infantry is the most formidable in Europe ; fortunately there is not much of it." And this is an opinion which impartial personal observation, made in the midst of the English army during the war, has since confirmed in my mind. 2 10. Modern infantry exercises its influence in conflict in two ways, in firing on and in charging the enemy. All its formations in battle have reference to one of these modes of action ; the first defensive, the second essentially offensive. 3 11. A charge of infantry may gain a battle, but it cannot destroy an army. The object of a charge of infantry is either to capture guns or to dislodge another body of infantry from a position. When the capture of guns is the object of the charge, success depends on the charging body persevering in its advance until it reaches the battery. If this can be effected, an absolute result will be obtained. The risk of failure will be in proportion to the distance of the battery and the number of. guns of which it is composed. No extraordinary effort is required for infantry to seize a few detached guns ; but when the fire of many guns is concentrated to oppose its attack, the havock created is so dreadful that the most courageous infantry frequently fails in the attempt to carry a powerful battery. 4 12. There is no infantry, however brave, which can, without artillery, march with impunity ten or twelve hundred yards against Napier, Vol. VI. 2 Trochu. 3 Hamley, Part VI, Chap. II. 4 (Aide-M&noire), Robertson. 314 THE THEEE ARMS. sixteen pieces of cannon well-placed and well-served ; before it could accomplish two- thirds of the distance, those men would be killed, $ wounded, or dispersed. 1 13. At the battle of Leipsic, on the afternoon of the third day, the Allies concentrated on the French army, the fire of 800 guns, disposed in a semicircle of two miles in extent. For four hours the French troops sustained, without flinching this tremendous cannonade. During that period, columns of infantry repeatedly rushed forward to carry the batteries ; but, as soon as they arrived within range of grape, thep were swept away, and their shattered remnants driven back in confusion. 2 14. When one body of infantry charges another, excepting in affairs of posts, a collision seldom or never takes place. The immediate result of a charge of infantry is simply to cause the enemy to abandon a position. Nor can this result be obtained, even by the aid of great numerical superiority, without the attacking force sustaining a severe loss from the fire of their opponents. In this respect, the attack of infantry on infantry, differs materially from that of cavalry on cavalry. 3 15. Jomini observes : " In real combats of infantry, I have never seen anything but battalions deployed commencing to fire by company, and finally by file, or else 'columns marching firmly against the enemy, who either retired without awaiting the columns, or repulsed them before an actual collision took place, or themselves moved out to meet the advance. I have seen mttdes of infantry in defiles and in villages, where the heads of columns came in actual bodily collision, and thrust each other with the bayonet ; but I never saw such a thing on a regular field of battle." 16. The Prussian infantry engages almost always in company columns. It endeavours to take the offensive as often as possible, operating upon the*enemy's wings more than on the front. The attacks are not general, being without connection and uniform ; direction ; they do not make up for this want by great vigour of execution. In the defensive, the Prussian infantry is deployed, and 1 Napoleon. * (Aide-Memoire), Robertson, 3 Ibid, INFANTRY. 315 permits the enemy to approach to within three or four hundred paces, when it delivers volleys by word of command ; rapid fire being reserved for extreme cases. It is not formed into squares, but repulses cavalry charges whilst deployed, by means of volley or rapid firing, withheld to the last moment. ******* The French order of battle, based on the battalion as the tactical ' unit, is ' considered by the French ' more preferable, as it enters admirably into all the combinations of the battle-field, whether for manoeuvring or for the attack or defence. Very mobile, ready for deployment or column formation, the battalion is always well in hand, without which, there can be no positive or complete success. 1 17. * * * At Solferino, the corps of MacMahon and Niel were formed in two lines of battalion columns of divisions (two companies), at deploying intervals ; and the organization of the battalions corresponded, for each column was the depth of three divisions, or six ranks. These formations appear to have been covered and preceded by the light infantry battalions attached to divisions. The French chasseurs-a-pied extend before the enemy in groups of four men, the two files of the group five paces apart, and the maximum intervals of groups forty paces, to be diminished at need. The groups, in case of a loose attack of cavalry, form squares, a man to each face of the square. A small reserve of each company is posted from one to two hundred yards in its rear, to fill gaps, serve ammunition, and form a rallying-point. Against more formidable attacks, they form solid circles of sections, subdivisions or companies. In advocating his views, Jomiiii makes an exception in the case of the attack of isolated posts, where he thinks more massive formations admissible. Accord- ingly we find the French attacking the hill of Solferino, not in deployed but in contiguous columns, and on a depth of several battalions ; and it may be added, they suffered accordingly, although they carried the post. For facility of formation, and of subsequent deployment to the front, columns of grand divisions on a central division are preferable in per- forming this manoeuvre, since the flank divisions, facing inwards, would simultaneously form in front and rear of the central one. But for ready deployment to a flank, double column of companies is better, 1 Heintz. 316 THE THREE ARMS. since one wing of the battalion, by simultaneous wheel of its companies into line, would cover the deployment of the other. The choice between them must depend on circumstances. 1 18. 'The method of skirmishing in use amongst the French at St. Maur, in 1868, is thus described.' One company of each battalion is always permanently detached for skirmishing. It is broken up into two parts, one of which skirmishes, whilst the other acts as support at distances varying from 100 to 150 yards. The skirmisher invariably lies prone, with his right leg crossed over his left, his toes taking a firm grip of the ground. He leans on his left elbow, and in case stones or other inequalities of the ground do not present a favourable cover for himself, or rest for his piece, he usually forms one artificially with his chaco or pack. Nothing could exceed their activity, and the celerity with which they took advantage of any cover which presented itself. We remarked that a skirmisher, in the position just described is practically invisible at 300 yards on ordinary grass land. The soldier's pouch being well brought round to his right side, enables him to load without materially altering his position. 2 19. The Prussian battalion, consists of four companies, each of which is subdivided into two pelotons. Each company is then the fourth part of a battalion, corresponding to the division, of two pelotons, of a French battalion. The battalion is formed in three ranks; the third rank supplies the skirmishers. When in company columns, each company is formed in column of pelotons : the 1st and 2nd companies on their 2nd peloton, the 3rd and 4th companies on their 1st peloton. The third rank of each of these pelotons, forms a 3rd peloton, in rear of the company. All the pelotons are thus formed in two ranks, and the battalion becomes then in the order shewn in the accompanying figure: the two centre companies contiguous and forming a double column, and at each wing a company in column of pelotons. The intervals between the flank and centre columns, vary according to circumstances, although usually they do not exceed 80 or 100 paces ; 4th Compy. 3rd Conipy. 2nd Compy. IstCompy. 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. 2 Foreign Tour. INFANTRY. 317 When a battalion is required to be formed in echelon, each company column is formed on the same corresponding peloton, as shewn in the annexed figure. This latter formation, is less made use of, than the first, which is the column of attack. 1 4th Compy. 3rd Compy. 2nd Compy. 1st Compy. 20. When the element of rapidity of fire came to be added to that of precision, other modifications were thought to be necessary, in which the Prussians took the lead, and other powers have followed, or are following, in the same direction. Still greater flexibility, and a further diminution of depth of formation, were sought for ; and, for these considerations, solidity, momentum, and unity of command were in some degree sacrificed, since the battalion itself was broken into separate columns, in this way : The Prussian battalions, 1000 strong, are formed in three ranks ; in manoeuvring, the third rank, composed of the skirmishers, is withdrawn some paces to the rear, and forms, to some extent, independently. The battalion is divided into four companies, the company into two divisions, and the column of manoauvre is that of the battalion in double column of divisions on the centre (corresponding to our double column of companies). But, for attack, the formation of the 1st line is different, and its columns are thus formed : Each company forms a separate column of divisions, and these columns are disposed in line at deploying intervals ; or sometimes the two centre columns are contiguous, and the others at deploying intervals. In advancing, the divisions of the third rank fill the intervals, or run out to cover the front, half as skirmishers, half as supports. Thus the battalion forms a line of four columns, four ranks deep, and a third of its numbers are employed as skirmishers. When it arrives near the enemy the skirmishers either form in the intervals to augment the general front of fire, or in rear to support the charge ; the front ranks of the columns kneel, and thus the whole deliver their fire. So little is the formation of a long continuous line thought of, that the 1 Heintz, 318 THE THREE ARMS. deployment into one line of even one battalion is discouraged. The Austrian formation for attack agrees with the Prussian, in its main principle. 1 21. 'At the Austrian camp of Briick, in 1868,' the infantry marched " at ease," never fixed bayonets, and except when skirmishing, carried their rifles slung over their shoulders. Advances were generally made in columns of companies covered by skirmishers. The intervals between individual skirmishers seemed to be little regarded, more importance being placed on their taking up advantageous positions under cover, and steadiness when firing. We remarked no difference in the method of employing the Jagers and the line. Ammunition was carried in two pouches fastened on to the waist belt, one behind, and the other in front of the soldier. This belt was attached to the knapsack straps, thus throwing most of the weight on the shoulders. Their movements were rather slow, in comparison with the French. 2 22. The most important feature in the Prussian mode of manoeuvr- ing infantry is the system of moving in company columns ; the company is the fourth of the battalion, and on war strength equal to 250 men ; the captain is mounted, the company column is six men deep, when the battalion is in the first line all four company columns may be formed at deploying intervals, or as is more usual, the two centre columns may be contiguous and the flank columns at deploying intervals ; this splits up the battalion without dismembering it, and appears a most happy appli- cation of the principle of columns, it gives independence and rapidity of movement to a marked degree. The skirmishers may be thrown out from each company or from the two flank companies ; the skirmishers of each company cover its front, the whole battalion therefore may either have a connected line of skirmishers or two or four broken lines. A battalion in line in covering its front with skirmishers, at first sends two skirmishing subdivisions to the front round the flanks, these throw out one or more sections (4 to 6 files), thus the flanks or extremities of our line are first covered, if more skirmishers are required they are supplied from the remaining skirmishing subdivisions and extend inwards from those first formed till in the limit the entire front is covered with a thick line of skirmishers. It is a rule which illustrates 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V. 3 Foreign Toxir. INFANTRY. 319 the good division of labour and chain of responsibility in the Prussian service that, " to facilitate control through their leaders the skirmishers of each section (4 to 6 files) work together as a group ; the under- officers are told off to the different sections, between the different groups (in open ground) an interval of a few paces is allowed that the under- officers in command may better supervise their men. The under-officers are not obliged to remain at any particular post, but place themselves wherever their presence is most required." The general principle of Prussian tactics being to gain a position wherever possible on the enemy's flank, they hold that it is neither necessary nor wise to advance and open fire uniformly on every part of a front, even if it be only about 200 or 300 yards. It is sufficient to carry the commanding points of the ground, when the enemy must yield the lower ground, or be destroyed, or cut off. ****** It is very rarely that the whole battalion is deployed into line, nor is there the same occasion for deploying when the battalion can be so readily broken up into its four component parts, either of which can be deployed separately. 1 23. The advantage of the formation in battalion columns, or Prussian company columns, of attack may thus be enumerated. (1) Facility of formation and deployment. (2) Slight depth offered to the enemy's projectiles. (3) The extreme extension in which a large body can make an orderly advance. (4) A superiority of solidity and impulsion in charging a two-deep line. (5) Power of taking advantage of such shelter as the ground may offer during the advance. (6) A considerable front of fire in covering a charge of formation near the enemy. (7) Readiness to form to a flank, either to meet a flank attack or to follow up a success. 2 1 W.H.G. 2 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. V, 320 THE THREE ARMS. 24. The notable characteristics of the Prussian system may be collected under the following heads : (1) To provoke and keep the adversary engaged in a combat of musketry. (2) When on the defensive, endeavour to cause the enemy to man- oauvre on plain ground, when on the offensive to manoeuvre oneself in broken ground. (3) To fight in a deep order, yet so that when great and rapid results are to be attained, the broader front can be re-established at any moment. (4) Never to attack on the front alone, but at the same time on one or both flanks. 1 SECTION II. COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS. 1. In the 'Commission des Conferences Regiment air es,' instituted by the late Marshal Niel in France, in 1869, M. Maldan, chef d'escadron d'artillerie, in his ' considerations generales sur les modifications que la tactique doit subir par suite du nouvel ^tat de 1'armement Europeen/ says, " The deployed order will be nearly always necessary for the order of battle, in order to fire, and deep formations which are not favourable for rapid movements must be abandoned, which, without increasing the fire, offer to artillery and small arms, at long range an object dangerous as well as useless. In order to bring a heavier fire on an enemy, it will perhaps in most cases, be necessary to adopt the formation in four ranks ; the first, kneeling, seated or laying flat, in order to have four lines of fire, without much increasing the surface exposed to the enemy. When a company does not fire, it may be that skirmishers or others are 1 Benedek: COLUMN AND LINE POKMATIONS. 321 in the way, or that the moment for action has not arrived ; it is then better to be out of sight of the enemy. In making this proposal, the supports and reserves which are not engaged and which for the time are not required, are considered. The best means of obtaining this result is to cover the battalions by a strong line of skirmishers at a convenient distance from the line of battle, and to relieve them before they are overpowered or have given way from fatigue or severe losses ; so that, the confidence and morale of the soldier may be sustained. "With rapid firing, a line of skirmishers well trained and commanded, is able frequently to arrest the enemy, and even often, by its fire to dislodge him, from the position which he is occupying. Skirmishing is likely to become the normal mode of infantry engagements; it permits all the chances arising from uneven ground, cover offered by woods, trees, stones, ditches, being taken advantage of more than any other formation, and serves admirably for the purpose desired, namely, to strike the enemy with as little exposure as possible. Napoleon approved of the employment of skirmishers, as a principal means of attack. In his memoirs he says, " During an important day, a line of battle becomes entirely skirmishing, sometimes even twice." 1 2. At the battle of Vimiero, the rapidity with which the French soldiers rallied, and recovered their order after * a severe check, was admirable, but their habitual method of attacking in column cannot be praised. Against the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians, it may have been successful, but against the British it must always fail, because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. The column is undoubtedly excel- lent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men, to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unsteadfast of footing, and bewildered by words of 1 Maldan. 21 b'2'2 THE THUEE ARMS. command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion : no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Neverthless, well managed columns are the very soul of military operations ; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret con- sists in knowing when and where to extend the front. 1 English lines and French columns at Albuera. 3. At the battle of Albuera, at the critical moment, when the battle appeared to be lost, Cole's division which had been left to observe Badajoz, arrived upon the ground. One brigade, the fusilier brigade, was led with great promptitude by Colonel Hardinge into action, and its onslaught managed with admirable skill, proved so determined, that opposition went down before it. The enemy's columns never found time to deploy ; they were decimated by the fire of these battalions, which advanced upon them in echelon of lines, while Dixon's guns, at an interval of a few hundred yards, swept them through and through with canister. After an ineffectual attempt to spread out, they broke and fled, leaving the heights in possession of 1500 British infantry, all that remained unhurt of 6000. 2 Napier thus describes the close of this well known contest : Colonel Hardinge boldly ordered General Cole to advance, and then riding to Colonel Abercrombie, who commanded the remaining brigade of the second division, directed him also to push forward into the fight. * # # * # * Cole with the fusiliers, flanked by a battalion of the Lusitanian legion under Colonel Hawkshawe, mounted the hill, dispersed the lancers, recovered the captured guns, and appeared on the right of Houghton's brigade exactly as Abercrombie passed it on the left. Such a gallant line, issuing from the midst of the smoke and rapidly separating itself from the confused and broken multitude, startled the enemy's heavy 1 Napier, Vol. I. Gleig. COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS. 323 masses, which were increasing and pressing onwards as to an assured victory : they wavered, hesitated, and then vomiting forth a storm of fire, hastily endeavoured to enlarge their front, while a fearful discharge of grape from all their artillery whistled through the British ranks. Myers was killed ; Cole and the three Colonels, Ellis, Blakeney and Hawkshawe, fell wounded, and the fusilier battalions, struck by the iron tempest, reeled, and staggered like sinking ships. Suddenly and sternly recovering, they closed on their terrible enemies, and then was seen with what a strength and majesty the British soldier fights. In vain did Soult, by voice and gesture, animate his Frenchmen ; in vain did the hardiest veterans, extricating themselves from the crowded columns, sacrifice their lives to gain time for the mass to open out on such a fair field; in vain did the mass itself bear up, and fiercely striving, fire indiscriminately upon friends and foes, while the horse- men hovering on the flank threatened to charge the advancing line. Nothing could stop that astonishing infantry. No sudden burst of undisciplined valour, no nervous enthusiasm, weakened the stability of their order ; their flashing eyes were bent on the dark columns in their front ; their measured tread shook the ground ; their dreadful volleys swept away the head of every formation ; their deafening shouts over- powered the dissonant cries that broke from all parts of the tumultous crowd, as foot by foot and with a horrid carnage it was driven by the incessant vigour of the attack to the farthest edge of the hill. In vain did the French reserves, joining with the struggling multitude, endea- vour to sustain the fight ; their efforts only increased the irremediable confusion, and the mighty mass giving way like a loosened cliff, went headlong down the ascent. The rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood, and 1500 unwounded men, the remnant of 6000 unconquer- able British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill I 1 Protracted combat, betiveen line and column, at the Alma. 4. " The left Kazan column (at the battle of the Alma) began that obstinate fight with the 7th Fusiliers which was destined to last from the commencement of the infantry fight until almost the close of the battle. 1 Napier, Vol. III. 324 THE THREE ARMS. It was between the Great Causeway and the slopes of the Kourgane Hill that Lacy Yea, with his 7th Fusiliers, had long been maintaining an obstinate conflict. Long ago, he had crossed the river, had brought his men to the top of the bank, and was trying to form them, when there came down marching upon him a strong .Russian column a column of two battalions, and numbering 1500 men. The body was formed with great precision in close column, with a front of only one company; but a chain of skirmishers thrown out on either flank in prolongation of the front rank, sought to combine with the solid formation of the column some of the advantages of an array in line. The column stood halted at a distance of, perhaps, some fifty yards from the knotted chain of soldiery which represented the 7th Fusiliers. Lacy Yea had not time to put his Fusiliers in their wonted array, for the enemy's column was so near that, forthwith and at the instant, it was necessary to ply it with fire; but what man could do, he did. Though he could not form an even array, yet he disentangled the thickest clusters of the soldiery, and forced the men to open out into a lengthened chain, approaching to line formation. Numbers of the Fusiliers were wanting, and, on the other hand, there were mingled with the battalion many of the soldiery of other regiments. "With a force in this state, Yea was not in a condition to attempt a charge or any other combined movement. All he could hope to be able to do- was to keep his people firm on their ground, to hinder them from con- tracting their front or gathering into heavy clusters, and then leave every man to make the best use he could of his rifle. Continental generals would not easily believe that, upon fair, open ground, there could be a doubtful conflict between, on the one side, a body of 1500 brave, steady, disciplined soldiers, superbly massed in close column, and on the other a loose knotted chain of six or seven hundred light infantry men without formation. Yet the fight was not so unequal as it seemed. A close column of infantry has only small means of offence, and is itself a thing so easy to hurt that every volley it receives from steady troops must load it with corpses and wounded men. Portions of the column niainty those in the centre and in the rear became discomposed and unsettled. Numbers of men moved a little one way or another, and of these some looked as though they stepped a pace COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS. backwards ; but no man as yet turned round to face the rear. How- ever, though the movement of each soldier taken singly was trifling and insignificant, yet even that little displacement of many men at the same time was shaking the structure. Plainly the men must be ceasing to feel that the column they stood in was solid. The ranks which had been straight as arrows became bent and wavy. The Russian officers well understood these signs. With drawn swords, moving hither and thither as actively as they could in their long, grey, mealancholy coats, they seemed to become loud and vehement with their orders, their entreaties, their threats. Presently their gestures grew violent, and more than one officer was seen to go and seize a wavering soldier by the throat. But in vain ; for seemingly by some law of its own nature, rather than under any new stress of external force, the column began to dissolve; the hard mass became fluid. It still cohered ; but what had been, as it were, the outlines of a wall, were becoming like the outlines of a cloud. First some, then more, then all, turned round. Moving slowly, and as though dis- content with its fate, the column began to fall back. The 7th Fusiliers bought this triumph with blood. In killed and wounded it lost twelve officers and more than 200 men." 1 5. Wellington's system of combat was what is called the defensive- offensive ; awaiting his adversary on chosen ground, he fatigued his assailants with his artillery and a murderous fire of musketry, and when they were about to pierce his line, he avoided this formidable movement by falling on them with his united forces. This system, under certain circumstances, may be as good as any other ; it depends on the localities, the nature of the troops, and the character of your opponent. I received defensive-offensive battles at Rivoli and Austerlitz. 2 6. The formation of battalions on the two central companies, and their being placed in two lines, and so placed that when formed in oblongs they stand in exchequer, as the 3rd division did at Waterloo, seems to be the best order of battle that can be adopted, either 1 Kinglake, Vol. II, 2 Life of Napoleon, 326 THE THEEE ARMS. for receiving an enemy's attack in a general action, or for approaching a position that is to be attacked. If an army is in line on a position, and the oblong formation has been predetermined to be made in the event of an attack by cavalry, we have seen how readily and effectually that formation can be accomplished; and supposing, on the contrary, that it is required to advance for the purpose of making an attack, the oblong formation being adopted, will enable a line of any magnitude to advance in order of battle for any required distance, in the most perfect order, until so near the enemy's artillery that deployment becomes necessary, which, from the formation on the two centre companies, would be more rapidly made than from any other. In the formation of oblongs by the 3rd division at Waterloo, to resist cavalry, the oblongs had not the advantage of having artillery on their flanks. When guns are placed on their flanks, so as to protect their fronts by a fire of round-shot or shrapnel first, and next of grape-shot, there cannot be any fear for a line of battle of steady infantry, if attacked by cavalry while in this formation. The oblongs may be formed by battalions having any number of companies ten, eight, six, or four ; but in each case the flank faces must consist of only one company, formed four deep ; that is, the two subdivisions of the company are formed the one behind the other. 1 7. Jomini, concluded ; * (1) That Wellington's system was certainly good for the defensive. (2) That the system of Benningsenf might, according to circum- stances, be as good for the offensive as for the defensive, since it was successfully used by Napoleon at the passage of the Tagliamento. (3) That the most skilful tactician would experience great difficulty in marching forty or fifty deployed battalions in two or three ranks * Second Appendix to the Summary of the Art of War, written after the war in the Crimea. f A mixed system used at Eylau by General Benningsen, which consisted in forming a regiment of three battalions by deploying the central one, the other two being in column on the wings. F.J.S. 1 Kennedy. COLUMN AND LINE FOKMATIONS. 327 over an interval of twelve or fifteen hundred yards, preserving sufficient order to attack an enemy in position with any chance of success, the front all the while being played upon by artillery and musketry. Jomini had never seen anything of the kind in his experience, and regarded it as impossible ; and was convinced that such a line could not advance to the attack in sufficiently good order to have the force necessary for success. * ****** He was not aware that "Wellington, in a.ny of his battles, ever marched in deployed lines to the attack of an enemy in position. He generally awaited the attack. At Vittoria and Toulouse he gained the victory by manoeuvres against the flanks ; and at Toulouse, Soult's right wing was beaten whilst descending the heights to attack. Even at Waterloo, what fate would have befallen the English army, if, leaving the plateau of Mount Saint Jean, it had marched in deployed order to attack Napoleon in position on the heights of La Belle Alliance ? 8. Will the adoption of rifled small-arms and improved balls, bring about any important changes in the formation for battle, and the now recognised principles of tactics ? ******* * * * To decide battles, manoeuvres are necessary, and victory will fall to the general who manoeuvres most skilfully ; and he cannot manoeuvre except with deployed lines or lines of columns of battalions, either whole or subdivided into columns of one or two companies. To attempt to prescribe, by regulation, under what circum- stances either of these systems is to be applied, would be absurd. If a general and an army can be found such that he can march upon the enemy in a deployed line of forty or fifty battalions, then let the shallow order be adopted, and the formation in columns be confined to the attack of isolated posts ; but I freely confess that I would never accept the command of an army under this condition. The only point for a regulation for a formation for battle is to forbid the use of very deep columns, because they are heavy, and difficult to move, and to keep in order. Besides, they are so much exposed to artillery that their destruction seems inevitable, and their great depth does not increase in any respect their chances of success. 1 1 Jotnini. 328 THE THREE ARMS. 9. Jomini, after discussing the subject, drew also the following con- clusions, viz : " That the improvements in fire-arms will not introduce any important change in the manner of taking troops into battle, but that it would be useful to introduce into the tactics of infantry, the forma ijn of columns by companies, and to have a numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and to exercise the troops considerably in firing. Those armies which have whole regiments of light infantry, may distribute them through the different brigades; but it would be preferable to detail sharpshooters alternately in each company, as they are needed, which would be practicable when the troops are accustomed to firing. * * * * That in spite of the improvements of fire-arms, two armies in a battle will not pass the day in firing at each other from a distance ; it will always be necessary for one of them to advance to the attack of the other. That as this advance is necessary, success will depend, as formerly, upon the most skilful manoeuvring, according to the principles of grand tactics, which consist in this, viz., in knowing how to direct the great mass of the troops at the proper moment upon the decisive point of the battle-field, and in employing for this purpose the simultaneous action of the three arms. ****** That victory may, with much certainty, be exp'ected by the party taking the offensive, when the general in command possesses the talent of taking his troops into action in good order, and of boldly attacking the enemy ; adopting the system of formation best adapted to the ground, to the spirit and quality of his troops, and to his own character." 1 10. In an article which was published in the Ediviburgh Review for January, 1866, emanating from an accomplished writer, we find Jomini's conclusions thus commented upon : " These convictions were given to the world long before the late American war. It is surprising to see how closely they are borne out by those of Colonel Lippitt, whose little work is understood to convey the pith of the lessons gained by the experience of the Union armies in three years' constant service. So far from countenancing the idea that the superior accuracy and 1 2nd Appendix. COLUMN AND LINE FORMATIONS. 329 range of the rifle, will destroy tlie value of Napoleon's repeated advice to his marshals, ' Carry your troops well on, and attack the enemy vigorously ;' this new authority declares, (page 7,) ' One cause of the indecisiveness of the results obtained in many of the battles of the late war, as compared with the great loss of life on both sides, has been, that the opposing battalions were too often kept firing at each other at a distance, both sustaining nearly equal loss, until the ranks were so weakened as to disable either party from making a vigorous and decisive charge.' And again at page 12 ; ' The recent improvements in fire-arms must render the fire on a close column of infantry, both by artillery and sharpshooters, still more destructive than it was before. But this sacrifice of life can be prevented, to a great extent, by using the columns at a proper time, and in a proper manner.' ' 11. Greater mobility has been aimed at, and it has been attempted to give more life and independence to the tactical units. Movements in line are no longer employed, but in battalions formed in close column, or in column of attack. Each tactical unit reaches its position in line of battle by the most direct road, instead of making long flank move- ments in column at company distance. 1 SECTION III. INFANTEY OPPOSED TO CAVALEY. 1. Though good infantry alone has generally, in wars of the present century, successfully resisted cavalry alone, yet cavalry and artillery together ought to destroy it. For the cavalry dividing into two or more bodies, and manoeuvring on the flanks of its line of retreat, would force it to form squares or to shew front on various sides, which formation could not long be maintained under the fire of the guns. Unless the ground were broken and favourable to infantry, or shelter very near, the case of the infantry, ought to be desperate. 2 1 Ambert. * Hamley, Part VI, Chap. II. 330 THE THREE AEMS. 2. The question of infantry squares, has been a subject of much controversy ; it has not been more satisfactorily solved in the campaign of 1866, than in previous ones. Each of the three belligerents (Prussians, Austrians and Bavarians) possessed a large force of cavalry ; encounters were frequent, cavalry with cavalry, and cavalry with infantry ; in small parties more than in masses, it is true, but generally with determination; to meet these attacks the infantry adopted many formations, from Langensalza where the Prussians received the charge of the Hanoverians, up to Rokeinitz, where the Austrians formed ,the last square of the campaign. Many of these squares remained intact, some were broken ; the results were so opposite, that it is impossible to arrive at any positive conclusion. 1 3. " Impressed by the difficulty of keeping battalions under the fire of improved artillery, the French appear to approach the conclusion that squares should be altogether abolished, and that infantry should meet the attack of cavalry in line. So long as the line is secure, or its flanks, this would be judicious against cavalry accompanied and supported by artillery. But if the flank of the line were exposed, it would be impossible in any formation except a square to resist well-manoeuvred squadrons.' 2 4. Not only do the French " approach the conclusion," but General Le Bceuf, in his instructions for the Camp at Chalons, laid down the axiom that, "with the present rapidity of fire, it will almost always happen that a battalion deployed, the wings of which are supported or even simply refused, will be able to receive and repulse a charge of cavalry." Sixty years ago Marshal Gouvoin St. Cyr declared that he had never found a case where the employment of squares against cavalry appeared to him to be indispensable. Yet it can hardly be supposed that at the Battle of Waterloo the English infantry could have so long and so successfully resisted the charges of the French horsemen in any other formation than that of squares. But the infantry whose steadiness and self-control enabled Wellington to hold his ground against great odds until the Prussians came up, were armed only with Brown Bess. 3 5. In 1811, Tran t, crossing the Lower Coa with four thousand militia, had taken post two miles from Almeida, when the river suddenly 1 Heintz. * Hamley, Part VI, Chap. V. Times, Nov. 1, 1869. INFANTRY OPPOSED TO CAVALRY. 331 flooded behind him. Near Fort Conception there was a brigade of the ninth corps, which had been employed to cover the march of the "French" battering train from Almeida to Ciudad Rodrigo; but ere those troops discovered Trant's dangerous position, he constructed a temporary bridge and was going to retire on the 6th, when he received a letter from the British Head Quarters, desiring him to be vigilant in cutting the communication with Almeida, and fearless, because the next day a British force would be up to his assistance. Marching then to Val de Mula, he interposed betweeen the fortress and the brigade of the ninth corps. The latter were already within half a mile of his position, and his destruction appeared inevitable ; but suddenly two cannon shots were heard to the southward, the enemy immediately formed squares and commenced a retreat, and six squadrons of British cavalry and Bull's troop of Horse Artillery came sweeping over the plain in the rear. Military order and coolness, marked the French retreat across the Turones, yet the cannon shots ploughed with a fearful effect through their dense masses, and the horsemen continually flanked their line of march : they however gained the rough ground, and finally escaped over the Agueda by Barba del Puerco ; but with the loss of three hundred men killed, wounded, and prisoners. 1 6. 'When at Fuentes Onoro, the English divisions to the right of that village had been separated,' and the right wing turned, it was abundantly evident that the battle would soon be lost, if the original position was not immediately regained. In this posture of affairs Lord Wellington directed the seventh division to cross the Turones and move down the left bank to Frenada, the light division to retire over the plain, the cavalry to cover the rear. * * * * General Crawford, who had resumed the command of the light division, first covered the passage of the seventh division over the Turones, and then retired slowly over the plain in squares, having the British cavalry principally on his flank. He was followed by the enemy's horse, which continually outflanked him, and near the wood surprised and sabred an advanced post of the guards, making Colonel Hill and fourteen men prisoners, but then continuing their charge against the 42nd regiment, the French were repulsed. Many times 1 Napier, Vol. III. 332 THE THREE ARMS. Montbrun made as if he would storm the light division squares, but the latter were too formidable to be meddled with ; yet, in all this war, there was not a more dangerous hour for England. * * * * * * * * * Montbrun's horsemen merely hovered about Crawford's squares, the plain was soon cleared, the cavalry took post behind the centre, and the light division formed a reserve to the right of the first division, sending the riflemen amongst the rocks to connect it with the seventh division, which had arrived at Frenada and was there joined by Julian Sanchez. At sight of this new front, so deeply lined with troops, the French stopped short, and commenced a heavy cannonade, which did great execution from the closeness of the allied masses ; but twelve British guns replied with vigour and the violence of the enemy's fire abated ; their cavalry then drew out of range. 1 * 7. 'At the combat of Redinha,' the 52nd, the 95th and the Caqadores, assisted by a company of the 43rd, carried the ascent and cleared the woods, and their skirmishers even advanced on to the open plain ; but the French battalions supported by four guns, immediately opened a heavy rolling fire, and at the same moment, Colonel Ferriere, of the third French Hussars, charged and took fourteen prisoners. This officer, during the whole campaign, had never failed to break in upon the skirmishers in the most critical moments ; sometimes with a squadron, sometimes with only a few men ; he was, however, sure to be found in the right place, and was continually proving how much may be done, even in the most rugged mountains, by a small body of good cavalry. 2 8. 'At Salamanca,' Le Marchant's heavy horsemen flanked by Anson's light cavalry passed the left of the 3rd division at full speed, and the next instant 1200 French infantry though formed in several lines were trampled down, with a terrible clamor and disturbance. ****** Nor were these valiant swordsmen yet exhausted. Their own general, Le Marchant, and many officers had fallen, but Cotton and all his staff was at their head, and with ranks confused, and blended together in one mass, still galloping forward they sustained from a fresh column 1 Napier, Vol. III. 2 Ibid, INFANTRY OPPOSED TO CAVALRY. 333 an irregular stream of fire which emptied a hundred saddles, yet with fine courage 'and downright force, the survivors broke through this the third and strongest body of men that had encountered them, and Lord Edward Somerset, continuing his course at the head of one squadron, with a happy perseverance captured five guns. The French left was entirely broken, more than 2000 prisoners were taken, the French light horsemen abandoned that part of the field, and Thomieres' division no longer existed as a military body. 1 ****** 9. The circumstances under which the 3rd division was placed in position at Waterloo, by Sir James Shaw Kennedy, are thus described by him. "The unsuccessful and disastrous attacks of the French cavalry on the division so posted, he presumed to consider as the most formidable which have been made by cavalry upon infantry since the use of fire-arms, with the exception of that at Eylau : that is, he considered that no other instance can be pointed out in modern history of infantry being attacked by an equally formidable force of cavalry, when the numbers, composition of the force, and the characters of the leaders of that force are taken into consideration, and the small number of the resisting force. The instances which seem to come nearest to it, are those of Auerstadt and Gross-Aspern. At Auerstadt the cavalry attacks were led by Blucher and Prince William of Prussia, in presence of the King of Prussia. Gudin and Morand, having squares in exchequer, resisted successfully. The case of Gross-Aspern, in 1809, is still more similar to that which took place at Waterloo. The forma- tion of the squares in exchequer at Gross-Aspern, is said to have been made by the Archduke Charles, in consequence of the impression that had been made upon his mind by the perusal of a work by Jomini, in which such a formation was recommended ; but no such formation was then known to the British army or in England. The number of squadrons that charged at Gross-Aspern was very great, probably about sixty ; the composition admirable ; and they were led by Bessieres, Espagne, and Lasalle." " The cavalry charge at Eylau was led by Murat, Hautpoult, Grouchy, and Lepic, and was composed of the whole reserved cavalry and the Gardes k Cheval, amounting to, say, eighty squadrons. This charge was partly successful, and had a 1 Napier, Vol. V. 334 THE THREE ARMS. very beneficial influence on the result of the action in favour of Napoleon. The Russian infantry behaved with great gallantry ; and it is fair to presume, that, with a better formation, they would have resisted successfully from the first : they did in the end, when strongly reinforced, repulse the cavalry attack. The cavalry attack at Eylau seemed to Sir J. Shaw Kennedy, to be the only one that appears in the history of modern European wars as being made upon infantry, with a greater force of cavalry than that by which the infantry was attacked at Waterloo ; and in no case were the leaders more eminent, or the composition and confidence of the troops better. But here the com- parison ends, for the number of the Russian infantry against whom the attack was directed was vastly greater than that against which it was made at Waterloo ; and the supporting force of cavalry was also vastly greater at Eylau than at Waterloo." " Marlborough's charge, upon the centre of the French position at Blenheim, may be considered as having been made against much the same part of the line of battle as that made by the French cavalry at Waterloo, and up a similar slope, and made with a great body of cavalry; but the cases are totally dissimilar in principle, for Marlborough's was an attack upon cavalry ; so completely so, that he even placed some infantry to face the few battalions of French infantry, that were on that part of the position." " At the battle of Borodino, the bastioned field work, and the most important central point of the field of battle, were taken by a charge of the 2nd French corps of cavalry ; but there again the comparison fails entirely, for the attacking force consisted of both cavalry and infantry, and the attack was not made until the Russian line had suffered enormous by repeated attacks of infantry, and by cannonade. The cavalry charge at Eckmuhl, was perhaps the most formidable of modern times of cavalry against cavalry, but it was purely a cavalry affair. Hannibal's victories were won chiefly by charges of cavalry upon infantry,* in which the numbers may have been as great as those in the French charges at Waterloo ; but the instances of cavalry charges upon infantry prior to infantry's being armed with the musket, and protected by the fire of artillery, are valueless as comparisons with charges of cavalry upon infantry, so armed and so protected." 1 * See 'Memoires de Napoleon, par Montholon,' Vol. II., pp. 137, 138. 1 Kennedy. 1NFANTKY OPPOSED TO CAVALRY. 335 10. " In the third act of the drama at "Waterloo, the grand attack of the French cavalry on Alten's division." The cavalry advanced upon the oblongs, the fire from the front faces of which was given at about thirty yards' distance. This caused the attacking cavalry to swerve to the right and left of the front faces of the squares, as usually has been the case in attacks of cavalry against infantry ; but although they did not gallop in mass right on the bayonets of the infantry, they made every other effort to enter the oblongs, by firing into them, cutting aside the bayonets, and surrounding the oblongs to obtain a point of entrance. Those who were not immediately opposite to the faces of the oblongs passed the first and attacked the oblongs of the second line, showing great gallantry and persevering obstinacy to win ; but all their efforts failed, and they had received the artillery fire, and were exposed to the fire of the front, flank, and rear faces of the oblongs : thus their numbers became fearfully diminished, and this splendid body of cavalry became a wreck, surrounded by the immoveable masses of infantry within the formations of which it had become entangled. While in this hopeless condition, it was driven down the exterior slope, by the Anglo-Allied cavalry. Soon, however, recovering their formation, the same forty squadrons resumed the charge, keeping a reserve in hand; and after further similar gallant but unsuccessful efforts against the oblongs, they were again, when in a state of utter confusion, driven down the exterior slope of the position by the Anglo- Allied cavalry. * * * * ****** This third attack of cavalry consisted of seventy-seven squadrons, and was one of the most powerful efforts ever made by cavalry against infantry in the history of war. When it is considered, that about 12,000 men were employed in this attack, and that only 1000 horsemen could stand in line on the 1000 yards, which separate the enclosures of La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont that, therefore, twelve different ranks, two deep, could assail in succession the allied force opposed to it and when, further, the composition of this force is considered, and the reputation of its leaders, its imposing character becomes evident. It will be recollected that these horsemen could advance on a front of only 500 yards, as they were obliged to keep at some distance from the enclosures of both Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte ; and it will also be recollected that the fire of artilley, under the protection of which 336 THE THREE ARMS. this vast force of cavalry advanced to make its attacks, was of the most formidable character. Nearly the whole of the ground between La Haye Sainte and Hougoumont, was covered with this splendid array of horsemen : their advance to the attack, made in a manner that showed the highest discipline, was majestic and imposing. The attacks upon the oblongs were made with much enthusiasm and obstinacy; but in no instance was there one of them penetrated or overthrown, although several of them were formed by very young and totally inexperienced troops. These seventy-seven magnificent squadrons, after using their best endea- vours to overthrow the infantry, suffered such severe loss by the fire of artillery and infantry as to be thrown into hopeless confusion, and were driven by the Allied cavalry down the exterior slope of the position. They soon rallied, and renewed the attack with the same daring spirit as before, but with the same results ; for they were again thrown into a state of hopeless confusion, by the enormous loss they suffered under the fire of the squares and oblongs, and in this state were again driven down the exterior slope by the cavalry, at about half-past five o'clock ; this third great act of the drama having continued about two hours, that is, from four to six o'clock. The results to Napoleon of these four grand cavalry attacks were, that he had lost two hours, and suffered such an enormous loss of his heavy cavalry, as to render it inefficient for any great effort during the further course of the battle. This most serious loss of time, and enormous and irreparable loss of cavalry, were uncompensated for by his having obtained any advantage whatever. 1 1 Kennedy. 337 CHAPTEE V. SECTION I. CHOICE OF A POSITION. 1. Fields of battle seem to have increased, in size, in every way. In length through the extension of modern armies and the difficulty of turning movements. In breadth, on account of the great range of present arms, which necessitates commencing an action at a greater distance than formerly. The theatre of action will therefore comprise immense areas, of which the battle-field of Solferino may be taken as an example. Formerly armies often observed one another for several days, before coming to close quarters, because they had not completed their concentration. At Austerlitz, Napoleon waited for Davout and Berna- dotte. Now, however, armies always marching concentrated and rapidly advancing towards one another, will rarely remain in close proximity, without an immediate engagement. The time at the disposal of the general-in-chief, for making his dispositions, will of necessity be very short. Tactical combinations, based on the study of large areas and with but a short time to consider the matter, naturally will become more complicated. The geiieral-in- chief will find tactics less easy, whilst the contrary will prevail in strategy. 1 2. A thorough study of the ground will be indispensable : (1) When wishing to find positions which will prevent the enemy benefiting by the mobility and range of his guns, and which will not allow him to employ his cavalry, to drive in the advanced posts and make an offensive reconnaissance. (2) In order to acquire a knowledge of the whole field of battle embracing very large areas. (3) To determine the best positions for important batteries. (4) When looking for cover, for skirmishers ; for the first and second lines, as well as for the reserves. 1 Ambert. 22 338 TACTICS. (5) When cavalry is to charge troops, supported by artillery, in order to shelter the former from fire, as long as possible. (6) In the attack and defence of batteries. 1 3. When the lines of operation of hostile armies are identical in direction, it will be a grave error to take position on a front oblique to that line for the sake of advantageous ground. For every degree of deviation of the front from a direction perpendicular to the line of retreat offers, proportionately, a flank to the approaching enemy, and withdraws the troops on the other flank from the points of collision. In fact, the relations of the lines would be those produced by the successful counterstroke against a turning movement. 2 4. There are two kinds of positions, the strategic and the tactical. The latter again are subdivided. In the first place, there are intrenched positions occupied to await the enemy under cover of works more or less connected in a word, intrenched camps. * Secondly, we have positions naturally strong, where armies encamp for the purpose of gaining a few days' time. Third and last are open positions, chosen in advance to fight on the defensive. The characteristics to be sought in these positions vary according to the object in view : it is, however, a matter of importance not to be carried away by the mistaken idea, which prevails too extensively, of giving the preference to positions that are very steep and difficult of access quite suitable places, probably, for temporary camps, but not always the best for battle-grounds. A position of this kind, to be really strong, must not be only steep and difficult of access, but should be adapted to the end had in view in occupying it, should offer as many advantages as possible for the kind of troops forming the principal strength of the army, and, finally, the obstacles presented by its features should be more disadvantageous for the enemy than for the assailed. Tor example, it is certain that Massena, in taking the strong position of the Albis, would have made a great error if his chief strength had been in cavalry and artillery ; whilst it was exactly what was wanted for his excellent infantry. For the same reason, Wellington, whose whole dependence was in the fire of his troops, made a good choice of position at Waterloo, where all the 1 Ambert. - Hamley, Part VI., Cliup. IV. CHOICE OF A POSITION. 339 avenues of approach were well swept by his guns. The position of the Albis was, moreover, rather a strategic position, that of Waterloo being simply a battle-ground. The rules to be generally observed in selecting tactical positions are the following : (1) To have the communications to the front such as to make it easier to fall upon the enemy at a favourable moment, than- for him to approach the line of battle. (2) To give the artillery all its effect in the defence. (3) To have the ground suitable for concealing the movements of troops between the wings, that they may be massed upon any point deemed the proper one. (4) To be able to have a good view of the enemy's movements. (5) To have an unobstructed line of retreat. (6) To have the flanks well protected, either by natural or artificial obstacles, so as to render impossible an attack upon their extremities, and to oblige the enemy to attack the centre, or at least some point of the front. This is a difficult condition to fulfil ; for, if an army rests on a river, or a mountain, or an impenetrable forest, and the smallest reverse happens to it, a great disaster may be the result of the broken line being forced back upon the very obstacles which seemed to afford perfect pro- tection. This danger about which there can be no doubt gives rise to the thought that points admitting an easy defence are better on a battle-field than insurmountable obstacles.* (7) Sometimes a want of proper support for the flanks is remedied by throwing a crotchet to the rear. This is dangerous ; because a crotchet stuck on a line hinders its movements, and the enemy may cause great * The park of Hougoumont, the hamlet of La Haye Sainte, and the rivulet of Pape- lotte, were for Ney more serious obstacles than the famous position of Elchingen, where he forced a passage of the Danube, in 1805, upon the ruins of a burnt bridge. It may perhaps be said that the courage of the defenders in two cases was not the same ; but, throwing out of consideration this chance, it 'must be granted that the difficulties of a position, when properly taken advantage of, need not be insurmountable, in order to render the attack abortive. At Elchingen the great height and steepness of the banks, rendei-ing the fire almost ineffectual, were more disadvantageous than useful in the defence. 340 TACTICS. loss of life by placing his artillery in the angle of the two lines pro- longed. A strong reserve in close column behind the wing to be guarded from assault, seems better to fulfil the required condition than the crotchet ; but the nature of the ground must always decide in the choice between the two methods. * * (8) We must endeavour in a defensive position, not only to cover the flanks, but it often happens that there are obstacles on other points of the front, of such a character as to compel an attack upon the centre. Such a position will always be one of the most advantageous for defence, as was shown at Malplaquet and Waterloo. Great obstacles are not essential for this purpose, as the smallest accident of the ground is sometimes sufficient : thus, the insignificant rivulet of Papelotte forced Ney to attack Wellington's centre, instead of the left, as he had been ordered. 1 5. The most important mistake which the Duke of Wellington corn- committed, as to the actual fighting of the battle of Waterloo, was his overlooking the vast importance of retaining possession, at any cost, of the farm and enclosures of La Haye Saiiite. This farm was at the very centre of his position, and was on the great chaussee by which the French army so easily approached the position ; these circumstances, and Napoleon's known modes of attack, indicated that the possession of this farm would be of the utmost value. Napoleon had from the first seen the vast importance of his possessing himself of this part of Wellington's field of battle, as is proved by his massing so very large a force immediately opposite to it, and by his establishing a battery of seventy-four guns to bear upon it. ****** That Napoleon from the first attached much more importance than Wellington did to the possession of that part of the Anglo- Allied position at which La Haye Sainte stood, is fully proved by his having prepared such immense means for its attack ; while Wellington occupied the ground weakly, and paralysed the defence of the buildings by withdrawing from them the workmen and tools that would have been required to put them into a state of defence. In this instance, as in that of the dispositions of the armies when the operations of the 1 Joiniui, Chap. IV,, Art. 30. CHOICE OF A POSITION. 341 campaign were commencing, Napoleon's general views seem to have been superior to those of Wellington ; but in both cases Wellington shewed great superiority in execution. 1 6. The most advantageous ground in general will be * such as obstructs the assailant, but not the defender. The crest of slopes favourable to the fire of artillery and the movements of cavalry, and overlooking a plain along which the enemy's troops must advance under fire, with their designs apparent, to ascend ground the inclination of which is itself an obstacle, will be such a position as a general anxious to meet his adversary will select. When the front of an army is covered by a river, the destruction of the fords and bridges will entail the same general consequences, as the occupation of unscaleable heights, except that in this case the conflict will be rather one of artillery than of infantry. But by preserving the passages, the power of counter-attack is retained, and the river then bestows this advantage on the defender, that the points where the assailant's columns must advance being limited in number, and previously known, preparations may be made to meet with a concentrated opposition the different attacks. But, on the other hand, if the assailant's bank screens his movements, the chance of being turned, as Soult was turned by Beresford at Orthez, will always exist. An impassable obstacle, such as a piece of water, a ravine, or a marsh, might extend partly along the front of a position. To extend the line of troops along the rear of the impediment, would be to repeat the fault of the French commander at Ramilies, and to give the enemy the opportunity of falling in full force on the remainder of the line. But though either cavalry or infantry thus posted would be paralysed, yet guns might play across the impassable space with full effect, and would not only be secure from capture, but, if the obstacle were a marsh, would suffer less from an opposing fire, since the shot or fragments of shell which might strike in front would not rebound from the soft soil. To occupy a position which is perpendicularly intersected by an impassable obstacle a deep ravine, stream, lake, or marsh, would be to divide the army voluntarily into two isolated parts, and give the enemy the option of bringing his mass against either. Such was the error of Durando's 1 Kennedy. 342 TACTICS. position before Mortara in 1849. But if such an obstacle, after approaching the front of the position, ceases there, it will be of great advantage to the defence, for the assailing forces will be divided by it ; while the defenders can bring their main strength to either side. When the ground in front of a position is intersected by artificial obstacles, such as strong walls or ditches ; those parallel to the front may be advantageous to the assailant, affording cover to his skirmishers and rallying-points for broken columns ; but those perpendicular to the front will be detrimental to him, by dividing his attacking forces, without sheltering them from fire. However, advantageous a position may otherwise be, if its immediate front be thickly wooded, or so broken as to conceal the enemy's movements, it will scarcely be tenable, for, not only will the defender's special advantage, that of firing on the assailant's columns during their advance, be lost, but the enemy may pass his troops on any point he selects, undiscovered ; and he will thus possess the power of attacking that point with superior numbers unshaken by fire. One of the first conditions of a good position is, therefore, that it shall afford a full view of the enemy's movements within effective cannon range. Certain defensible points, such as a hamlet, village, farm, church, and churchyard with its wall, or a grove, within distance of easy support in front of the line of battle, will generally increase its strength in a very material degree. Strong in itself, and its garrison constantly reinforced from the line, while the ground in front is swept by batteries, such a point is difficult to attack directly ; the enemy cannot attempt to surround it, without exposing the flank and rear of the attacking troops ; and to pass it by, in order to reach the position, the assailants must expose their flank to its fire. If several such points exist, they support each other, isolate the enemy's columns of attack, and force him to expend his strength in costly assaults upon them ; in fact, they play the part of bastions in a line of fortification. But it is essential that they should be within supporting distance (short cannon-range), and easy of access from the rear ; failing these conditions, they had better be destroyed, if possible, as defences, and abandoned to the enemy. A remarkable illustration of this is afforded by the Austrian position at Solferino. Their general line stretched through Pozzolengo and Cavriana ; by far the strongest part of that field, taken singly, is the hill of Solferino, commanding all CHOICE OF A POSITION. 343 the neighbouring country, crowned with strong buildings, and flanked by precipitous slopes. But the back of the hill is so steep and scarped that it can be ascended only by a single winding path ; and between it and the high ground of Cavriana in rear, stretches a width of nearly two miles of broken ground. The brigades that occupied this formi- dable outpost, maintained themselves long against the direct attacks of the French ; but when the assailants turned it, part of the garrison was cut off, and both troops and post were lost. It would have been far better to leave it unoccupied, and place its garrison in the general line at Cavriana ; or else, to advance the whole of the line of battle j making the hill the centre, and connecting the wings with it, so that the Austrian left wing would have occupied the ground on which the French are represented * . Another case in point is the line of slightly fortified posts, occupied by the Turks in front of Balaklava. Their distance from the army was far beyond cannon- range, and they were captured in a moment, with their armament, in presence of the Allies, at the first attack. "When well placed, points of this kind in front of the line enable the defender to mass his troops at the proper time for a counter attack, and launch them, with a comparatively short distance to traverse against the enemy. And should they, feebly occupied and defended, be captured, they give to that enemy the same advantages for renewing his attack. For these reasons most great battles are marked by bloody episodes, where advanced posts like Hougoumont, Solferino, Ligny, and the two Arapiles at Salamanca, are the objects of contention. Yet, because these attacks are so costly, great commanders, like Frederick and Napoleon have avoided them whenever such evasion was possible, preferring to drive out the garrisons by a concentrated fire of artillery ; or, if the posts stood far asunder, to push the attacking columns in between, masking them meanwhile by demonstrations. 1 7. The impediments to the march of an enemy to attack your position in front may be of different descriptions : (1) The most effective is a large river or impassable marsh, running parallel to your front. 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. III. 344 TACTICS. (2) Villages, which may in a short time be converted into strong posts, and occupied by your troops, so situated that the enemy must take them before advancing beyond them. (3) Any favourable ground (naturally or artificially strong, or both) on the line of the enemy's advance, the occupation of which by your troops will delay his march. In all the above cases, it is necessary that the obstacles to the march of the enemy, shall be under the full fire of the guns of your position, otherwise the troops posted for their defence may be captured. 1 8. A village, not intended to be occupied, and which would be useful to an enemy, ought to be burnt and destroyed as far as possible. The number of villages, which have played an important part in battles, is very considerable. 2 9. The principal obstacles that are met with and of which advantage can be taken, are eminences, declivities, dried up water-courses, woods, villages, houses, hedges, ditches, marshes, ponds, water-courses. * * $ & Jfc $ As examples of a good defence of accessible high ground, there are Solferino and Cavriana. They were occupied by the Austrians in a formidable manner, and before they were taken, cost long and bloody struggles. ***** When the ascents of a hill are steep, they should if possible be swept by lateral fire. It will always be necessary, to watch them carefully, bearing in mind that where a goat can climb, a soldier is able to pass. This neglect of precaution, cost the Eussians dearly at the Alma. The defence of these descriptions of heights varies, according to the summits being formed by a simple crest or when crowned with a plateau. In the former case, the English during the Peninsula war in Spain, acted, thus, when defending them: they permitted the enemy to ascend for a certain time the hill; afterwards quickly crowned the crest, fired on their opponents, tired after a difficult march and charged with the bayonet, but without following far. In the case of a plateau, it is better to let the enemy reach the summit, and whilst he attempts to form, fire heavily on him, and afterwards attack him. ***** MacDougall. 2 Prevost. CHOICE OF A POSITION. 345 A wood forms excellent cover, numerous riflemen and even field pieces, will act with effect on the ground in front, from the edge of the wood. To prevent access to it, trees are felled to form salient and re-entering angles. 1 * * * * 10. The position taken up by an army to wait for an attack is usually elevated, commanding and overlooking the front, and presenting a waving line of salient ridges or knolls, with re-entering sweeps or valleys. These may be adjusted to act as so. many fronts of fortification ; the projections having the effect of bastions, while the retired intervals may be considered the curtains ; the parts corresponding to the flanks presenting clearly the best sites for the guns. 2 11. A position cannot be too strong ; lose no opportunity of strengthening it by means of field works. Napoleon says : " The natural positions which are generally met with cannot protect an army from the attacks of a superior force without the aid of art." Towards the end of the Peninsula war, no position was taken up without intrenching; first, the guns were covered, then the weakest parts of the line. 3 12. * * The best thing for an army standing on the defensive, is to know how to take the offensive at a proper time, and to take it. Among the conditions to be satisfied by a defensive position has been mentioned that of enabling an easy and safe retreat ; and this brings us to an examination of a question presented by the battle of Waterloo. Would an army with its rear resting upon a forest, and with a good road behind the centre and each wing, have its retreat compro- mised, as Napoleon imagined, if it should lose the battle ? My opinion is, that such a position would be more favourable for a retreat, than an entirely open field ; for a beaten army could not cross a plain without exposure to very great danger. Undoubtedly, if the retreat becomes a route, a portion of the artillery left in battery in front of the forest would in all probability, be lost ; but the infantry and cavalry and a great part of the artillery could retire just as readily as across a plain. There is, indeed, no better cover for an orderly retreat than a forest, this state- ment being made upon the supposition that there are at least two good roads behind the line, that proper measures for retreat have been taken 1 Prevost. 2 Sir J. F. Burgoyne. 3 MacDougall. 346 TACTICS. before the enemy has had an opportunity to press too closely, and, finally, that the enemy is not permitted by a flank movement to be before the retreating army at the outlet of the forest, as was the case at Hohenlinden. The retreat would be the more secure if, as at "Waterloo, the forest formed a concave line behind the centre ; for tliis re-entering would become a place of arms to receive the troops and give them time to pass off in succession on the main roads. 1 13. "At Waterloo," Wellington, had chosen his battle-ground deliberately with his back to the forest of Soignies, a wood everywhere traversable by infantry, and with several roads leading through it from the rear of the position. Napoleon, revenging himself at St. Helena for his defeat by criticising his adversaries, asserted that this position was so badly chosen as to render retreat from it impossible, which fact alone, twice that day, prevented the English general from retiring ! The latter part of this statement needs no comment to those who know the story of the battle ; indeed, modern French historians do not attempt to follow the Emperor here. The propriety of fighting with the back to such a wood as that of Soignies is another matter, one apparently in this case of theory ; and hence we cannot do better than quote a short note upon it from Jomini's narrative, since that writer is the admitted head of the great school of theorists who admire Napoleon's genius. This is one of the gravest questions of the grand tactics of battle. I have discussed it in my " Precis of the Art of War," and incline to the opinion of Wellington against that of Napoleon? 14. Previous to the Battle of Koniggratz, Benedek had * assembled * all his available troops, and they may be reckoned, after due allowance for previous losses, at 180,000 men and 600 guns. Their front was towards the north-west; all the troops faced the Bistritz ; none were put in line towards the north-east, in which direction the Crown Prince's army lay; but the length of front was so short compared with the number of men on the ground, that plenty could be spared to fight on the flanks without any risk of weakening the centre. The ground was of an irregular undu- lating character, ridges and valleys alternating with one another, and presenting no marked features to catch the eye, except that to a 1 Jomiui, Chap. IV., Art. 30. 2 Chesney, Lect. VI. CHOICE OF A POSITION. 347 spectator in the Prussian 1st Army, a knoll near Chlum appeared as the highest point of the line. A good straight road leading to Koniggra'tz crossed the Bistritz at Sadowa, and passed near the knoll. Two miles above Sadowa the Bistritz made a sudden bend, the line of its course tending to the north-west instead of the north-east ; and opposite to this bend, near Horenowes, was the Austrian right flank, thence the line ran parallel to the Bistritz for about six miles, as far as Prim, with outposts occupying the village of JSTechanitz. There were bridges at several places over the Bistritz, but it was not easily passable elsewhere, and the ground near it was swampy. 1 15. The position taken up by Feldzeugmeister Benedek in front of Koniggratz, has been severely criticised. It does not, however, appear that the river in his rear was any disadvantage to him, although his army was defeated, and had its flank turned by a strong force. The Austrian commander took the precaution to throw bridges over the river. With plenty of bridges, a river in rear of a position became an advantage. After the retreating army had withdrawn across the stream, the bridges were broken, and the river became an obstacle to the pursuit. Special as well as general conditions also came into play. The pursuing Prussians could not approach with impunity the heads of the Austrian bridges. The heavy guns of the fortress scoured the banks of the river both .up and down stream, and, with superior weight of metal and length of range, were able to cover the passage of the Austrians. The position was otherwise acknowledged 011 all sides to be a good one, carefully chosen ; and though the villages were not completely barricaded and loopholed, this omission was probably due to the extreme rapidity of the movements of Prince Frederick Charles. A great disadvantage was the fact that the presence of two opponent armies, acting from divergent bases against the Austrian position caused, as all such conditions always must cause, Feldzeug- meister Benedek to fight with his army drawn along two sides of an angle. One side was from Prim to Maslowed, the other from Maslowed to Lochenitz. 2 16. Napoleon, when forced to retire, ' after his defeat at Leipzig,' had been severely punished for his imprudence in risking a general action, with not only a river, but a conflux of five unfordable streams, 1 Lieut. -Col. Miller. " Hozier, Vol. I. 348 TACTICS. immediately in rear of his position, by the loss of one half of his army and the hopeless discomfiture of the remainder. Yet the same remark- able and complicated barrier now befriended him, by effectually covering his retreat, and giving to those of his troops who had been fortunate enough to pass it, a start of four-and-twenty hours before their pursuers. 1 17. It should be remembered, that a position ought to afford every facility to the movement of the troops, and openings of communication should accordingly be made through the hedges, ditches, boggy ground, &c. Negligence of these precautions led to the defeat of the Austrians at Dresden, 27th August, 1813. Prince Schwartzenberg having extended the left of his army beyond the narrow valley of Plauen, which runs along high-peaked mountains, Napoleon ordered a strong force to occupy the bridge of Plauen, the only point of communication between the left and centre of the Austrians, and cut the former to pieces. Farms and country seats, isolated houses, which are often found on the slopes of hills, are excellent means of defence to the approaches of a position. Villages are excellent supports; their winding streets, their general irregularity, their orchards, &c., render it difficult for an enemy to scan them quickly ; in plains that are wanting in natural obstacles, they are particularly useful. 2 18. The slightest negligence of which the weaker party may be guilty, in the choice of a position or the manner of occupying it, might prove fatal in the event of its being attacked. We have still to remember that in the defensive, (the ordinary attitude of the weaker party) advantageous positions rarely present themselves, and that they are the more difficult to find, from the circumstance that we are not masters of our own movements. It therefore becomes imperatively necessary to have recourse to the assistance of art, in order to remedy the natural defects of those positions, which the compulsory duties of a defending army compel it to take up, so as to arrest the progress of the enemy and impede his march.* The intrenchments must be of such a kind that the army behind them may not be reduced to a state of siege. Full scope should be left to the genius of the officer in command, as well as to his courage and skill in manoeuvring his troops. * Guibert. l Cathcart. 2 Jervis. CHOICE OF A POSITION. We should, therefore, avoid continuous intrenchments, and should only fortify certain points opposite those at which the enemy may have to defile, as well as those points on which only a small number of troops, or troops inferior in courage and discipline to the rest of the army, can be bestowed ; whilst, on all bare and unprotected points, the flower and strength of the army should be opposed to the enemy, and should vigilantly await the first opportunity of assuming the oifensive, at the first false step which the enemy may be guilty of.* l Position of the Federal Army at Gettysburg. 19. The position taken up by the Federal Army, at the battle of Gettysburg, is thus described : The right centre of the Federals was on a steep hill just south of Gettysburg, of which place it forms the cemetery. The same ridge sweeps away in a horse-shoe form to the south-east and south-west, forming a curve about three miles long. Rising much more at some points than others, it everywhere commands the valley round its north side, and into which it falls in some places too abruptly for artillery to sweep the portions at its foot. About the cemetery there is much bare ground, but the Federal engineers had here added considerable cover by their trenches to that of the stone walls already existing. The right shoulder of the ridge, extending somewhat eastward of this part, was high, and curved sharply to the south, taking a line nearly perpendicular to the front ; and this flank was well protected by the special difficulty of its slope, which was rocky and wooded, and ended in a brook, known as Rock Creek, one of the upper forks of the Monocacy, which coursed along its front. About a mile to the Federal left of the cemetery, the swell rose again, steep, high, and bare at the top, in a sugar-loaf form, and took the name of Round Top Hill. Between this point, the left centre of Meade's line, and the cemetery, there was much wood along the crest, of which good cover had been made by felling trees. The valley in front of the whole centre, as also of the left, where the hill in its western bend near Round Top, though continuous, became less sharply defined, was open cultivated land, in a few places less than half-a-mile across, and swept effectually by the Federal batteries. The line of the hills had De Kocquancourt. l Lendy. 350 TACTICS. everywhere a good slope to the rear, giving excellent cover to the reserves of the army, and allowing the ammunition and other supply- waggons to come without danger into the hollow thus formed in rear of the centre. This slope, affording safety to all the troops not in first line, did away with much of the objection which would otherwise have attached to the position, as being too crowded for the mass of troops, 70,000 strong, which was designed to hold it. Its only marked defect lay in the extreme abruptness of portions of the front preventing them being searched by the fire of the defenders ; but this was directly counterbalanced by the difficulty to the assailants of the ascent, which, in such places, was only to be -accomplished in such a scrambling fashion, as to deprive their ranks of all approach to order. 1 Russian position at the Alma. 20. The Eussian position at the Alma, was very powerful against a front attack : they occupied, in masses, the bold heights overlooking the river Alma, the village of Bourliouk, and the bridge and fords on the main road leading to Sebastopol ; the same ridge, which is very steep, continues down to the sea about two miles distant. The right bank of the Alma, over which the allies advanced, was low, flat, and o_pen, and thoroughly seen from the heights for a great distance. The British army, taking the left, advanced upon the main feature ; and the French on the right, gained the heights between that and the sea to turn the position. 2 SECTION II. FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE. 1 The art of disposing the troops on a given ground, consists in taking advantage of whatever favourable accidents that ground may present, and in avoiding the unfavourable ones, which cannot be done 1 Campaigns in Virginia, &c. " Sir J. F. Burgoyne. FOKMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE. 351 without deviating from the primitive order of "battle. At one moment several parts of the line must be advanced, so as to occupy a rising ground, a wood, or a village ; at another, other portions of the line must be made to draw back, in order to avoid a marsh, or ravine ; while at other times, a gap must be left, in order to avoid hollows. Another cause tends to prevent uniformity ; this is, the necessity of adapting the . different arms to the kind of ground the nature of which best befits them. The capacity for appreciating the strong and the weak points of a territory ; the ability to profit by the first, and to avoid the second, so as to assimilate and blend with them the order of battle ; the science of amalgamating the different arms in short, the art of choosing such positions as constitute a field of battle advantageous to the defenders, and difficult to the assailants, forms an important branch in the modern science of war. 1 2. From the nature of .the two things, " lines of battle and orders of battle" it is evident that the line of battle belongs especially to defensive, arrangements ; because an army 'awaiting an attack without knowing what or where it will be, must necessarily form a rather indefinite and objectless line of battle. Order of battle, on the contrary, indicating an arrangement of troops formed with an intention of fighting while executing some manoeuvre previously determined upon, belongs more particularly to offensive dispositions. However, it is by no means pretended "that the line of battle is exclusively a defensive arrangement ; for a body 'of troops may in this formation very well proceed, to the attack of a position, w T hile an army on the defensive may use the oblique order or any other. 2 * * 3. A general-in-chief, should ask himself frequently in the day What should I do, if the enemy's army appeared now in my front, or on my right, or rny left? -If he has any difficulty, he is ill-posted, and should seek to remedy it. 3 4. A good way of judging, how to occupy a defensive position, is to get in front of it and consider how it should be attacked. The defensive force can then be disposed so as to meet the probable attack. 4 5. It should be laid down as a principle, never to leave intervals by which the enemy can penetrate between corps formed in order of battle, unless it be to draw him into a snare. 5 1 (Rogniat) Lendy. a Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 30. 8 Napoleon. 4 W. C. E. Napier, Sect. II. D Napoleon. 352 TACTICS. 6. Copying from the Eomans, and in accordance with sound princi- ples, an army when drawn up for battle is formed in three distinct lines, one line in front, the second in rear of it, and the third in rear of all ; each destined to act at different times : the first line to commence the action, the second to furnish an immediate support and give confidence to the first, to assist in rallying it, and, if necessary, to take its place. The third line in rear of all, which is generally termed the reserve, is never kept deployed. It is not always necessary even to deploy the second, and on some grounds it may be considered preferable to keep it formed in columns at deploying distance ; but great care must be taken in such case, that the features of the country afford cover for it, as otherwise the consequences may be very disastrous. At the battle of Moscow, a "Westphalian brigade in the second line, lost five hundred men in ten minutes, being in column, whilst the line in front did not suffer nearly as much, although engaged with the enemy. 1 7. The object of the second line being to feed, reinforce, and relieve the first, it should be near enough to render prompt support ; but if very close it would be struck by cannon-shot which had passed through the first line. By interposing a certain space, shot from the enemy's batteries, which, coming from a distance of 800 to 1400 yards, descend at an angle upon their object, would often, whether striking the first line, or falling a little short of it, or falling a little behind it, be carried by the rebound clear of the ground. An interval of from 200 to 300 yards will best secure on level ground the two objects of supporting the first line, while depriving the enemy's guns of the opportunity of inflicting double losses. The column formation is so greatly superior to -the line for facility of manoeuvre, whether for a direct advance, change of front, or movement to a flank, that the second line is seldom deployed, except for instant support of the first against a formidable attack. Battalions at deploying intervals, in double or single column of companies, will be the most convenient formation for the second line. 2 8. " Seek the field of battle," says Gruibert, " follow the order of a real engagement, and you will see that at its very commencement the primitive order immediately vanishes ; that encampments, marches, and engagements are all absolutely related to the ground, and to 1 Lieut. -Col. Graham. 2 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. III. FOEMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE. 353 circumstances. You will no longer see the cavalry irrevocably fixed at the wings ; nor will these wings retain the exact precision of their balance, or their arrangement in two lines. You will see that every- thing changes, varies, and undergoes modifications, according to time, place, and circumstance. 1 9. Supposing two or more divisions to be assembled in line of battle, with a proportionate body of horse, if the cavalry were placed between them in column, it could not deploy for action without overlapping on each side a large part of the infantry and masking its fire. If (occupying the same situation) it were deployed between the infantry divisions, a large part of the line would thus have no fire to oppose to an attack of infantry. The enemy's battalions might therefore fire with impunity on the central mass of cavalry, who must either retire, leaving a gap in the line, and exposing the flanks of the divisions, or must charge the opposing infantry in front, which will generally be a doubtful enterprise. In any case it must find great hindrance to its most effective mode of action, namely, against the flank of either infantry or cavalry ; and its defeat would lay bare the centre of the line. For these reasons, when the ground is suitable, part of the cavalry is disposed in rear of the flanks of the line, where its front is free for deploying or changing direction, and where it covers and watches over the weak points, namely, the flanks of the line of battle. Such being the general rule, the course of an action nevertheless often gives opportunities for cavalry to operate to advantage between the divisions of infantry. For instance, a hostile column retreating in disorder from an ineffectual charge, or a hostile line engaged in a conflict of rifle-fire, the flank of which might be imperfectly covered, or a line of skirmishers far from their supports, would give openings for a comparatively small force of cavalry to act with decisive effect. In each corps of two or three divisions, a few squadrons might therefore be advantageously posted, so as to act between the divisions ; and their proper place would be with the second line, the space necessary for their advance being opened by wheeling back some companies of the first line at the proper moment ; or, if placed in rear of the batteries, they may issue through the perpendicular interval between the guns and the infantry. 2 1 Lendy. 2 Hainley, Fart VI., Chap. III. 23 354 TACTICS. 10. One portion of the old method may still be employed ; and if, by way of example, it may not be regarded as a fundamental rule to post the cavalry on the wings, it may still be a very good arrange- ment for an army of fifty or sixty thousand men, especially when the ground in the centre is not so suitable for the evolutions of cavalry as that near the extremities. It is usual to attach one or two brigades of light cavalry to each infantry corps ; those of the centre being placed in preference to the rear, whilst those of the wings are placed upon the flanks. If the reserves of cavalry are sufficiently numerous to permit the organization of three corps of this arm, giving one as reserve to the centre and one to each wing, the arrangement is certainly a good one. If that is impossible, this reserve may be formed in two columns, one on the right of the left wing, and the other on the left of the right wing. These columns may thus readily move to any point of the line that may be threatened. 1 11. Much of the influence of artillery is due to the moral effect produced by the rush of the projectiles overhead. It is inexpedient, therefore, except in desperate circumstances, to place guns in rear of other troops. Cavalry certainly, infantry probably, would be rendered unsteady by the cannonade. Neither is it desirable to place infantry in rear of artillery, for the guns should always be relied on to protect their own front, and infantry in rear of them would not be in the best position for protecting the flanks, which are the weak points, while the fire of the small arms would be masked till the enemy had penetrated the battery ; and an increased depth of formation would be offered to the enemy's projectiles. Nor should infantry and artillery be on the same alignment, for one important function of the guns will be to protect the front of the infantry, which they will, in that case, do but inadequately ; nor could the guns readily throw back a flank in echelon ; so that, on approaching within a certain distance of the infantry, the enemy would no longer be exposed to artillery lire. The infantry therefore will best give and receive support if posted 'in rear of tlie flanks of the line of guns. The intervening distance must depend on circumstances. Should the ground in front be occupied by skirmishers, the guns may advance to the supports ; otherwise they 1 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 43. FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE. 355 may be 50 or 100 yards in advance of the infantry. Where infantry is covering the exposed flank of guns, it should be posted about fifty yards in rear of the flank of the battery. When on the defensive the 'guns will direct their fire on the attacking columns ; but when supporting an attack of infantry, though a part of them will properly be directed on the enemy's infantry, yet a proportion should also, by firing on the enemy's artillery, seek to diminish its effect on the advancing columns. 1 12. Artillery should always be placed in the most advantageous positions, and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry, without compromising the safety of the guns, as possible. Field- batteries should command the whole country round, from the level of the platform. They should, on no account, be masked on the right and left, but have free range in every direction. 2 13. Batteries, whatever may be their general distribution along the defensive line, should give their attention particularly to those points where the enemy would be most likely to approach, either on account of the facility or the advantage of so doing. The general of artillery should, therefore, know the decisive strategic and tactical points of the battle-field, as well as the topography of the whole space occupied. The distribution of the reserves of artillery will be regulated by these. $ . $ 4* 4 Batteries should always have supports of infantry or cavalry, and especially on their flanks. Cases may occur where the rule may be deviated from. Wagram is a very remarkable example of this. 3 14. If guns are on an unsupported flank, they should be protected by cavalry in rear. A half-battery should also be in echelon on the outer flank, ready to bear on troops attacking that flank, without diminishing the fire of the front. If impassable obstacles to cover the flank do not exist, a wood, or farm buildings, occupied by infantry, will give great security to guns posted near the extremity of the line. 4 15. Batteries should not be placed on stony ground, as the enemy's shot make the stones fly in all directions, often causing considerable damage ; marshy ground in front of a battery is good, should the latter 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. II. 2 Napoleon. 3 Jomini, Chap. VII., Art. 46. 4 Haml-Book. 356 TACTICS. not be likely to advance, as the shot will either penetrate or ricochet but little from it ; undulating ground prevents the enemy in a great measure from observing the grazes of his shot, and thereby rectifying his fire. No position should be occupied by artillery from which it could not retire with facility. 1 16. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all inequalities of the ground, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners ; or for its limbers and caissons at least. As far as is possible, guns should be kept hidden from the enemy till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of them. 3 17. In a defensive position, the guns of the heaviest calibre should be posted on the weakest points of the line, and on those from whence the enemy can be discovered at the greatest distance ; and from which as much as possible of his front may be seen. Those heights on which the enemy in advancing may rest his flanks, and those from whence he may be fired on obliquely, must also be secured by the largest calibres. If an offensive position, the guns of the heaviest calibre should be placed in such situations as will render them available without difficulty, for any operations in advance. A spot selected for a battery should be one which does not present any obstacles to the ulterior movements, and can take the enemy in the line of his greatest dimensions. The most elevated situations are not the best ; the greatest effect may be produced from a vertical height, equal to about one hundredth of the range. 3 18. Slightly salient, and moderately commanding points of the general line, should be selected for the divisional guns, which should be placed in the intervals of the general line. The saliency of such points greatly increasing the lateral range, enables a converging fire to be brought to bear upon columns of attack. 4 19. In the different phases of an action, one arm is wont to be of predominant importance, and it is by this one that the other arms must direct themselves, with reference to their positions. In general, the advance and positions of the infantry and cavalry determine the position of action for the artillery, especially as long as the fire of the X 0wen. 'Lippitt. 3 Haud-Book. * Ibid. FORMATION OF THE LINE OF BATTLE. 357 last holds the character of being preparative and of acting in support ; there are, however, circumstances in which this is not the case, and this invariably occurs when the effect of the artillery is of the last importance, as in defile-actions, or where the decision of a battle is to be brought about by large masses of that arm. 1 Reserves. 20. On account of the great range of guns and want of shelter, reserves will frequently be obliged to be left some distance in rear. In this case, should a line of battle be seriously menaced at any point, the reserves could not be brought up in sufficient time. It will be therefore absolutely necessary to connect the reserves and the line of battle. Recourse will be had to cavalry associated with artillery. Echeloned in rear of the line, and under cover, it will nevertheless be placed sufficiently near to allow it quickly to take part in the action, when required. Such was the part played at Austerlitz by Boyer's division and the cavalry of the Guard, strengthened by two light batteries of the Guard and a battery of the 1st corps; These squadrons will also be made use of, for supporting the batteries, assaulting those of the enemy, taking advantage of false movements, rapidly taking up a position and effecting a defeat. This cavalry, associated with artillery, will, in fact, take advantage of short momentary chances, by which infantry and artillery, left to themselves, would be unable to profit. Such will be the part, entrusted to the cavalry of a corps d'armee. 2 21. Frederick the Second, changed the system of war, and gave mobility to his army for manoeuvring before the enemy, but his genius did not carry him so far, as to foretell the knowledge and use of reserves. During the wars of the Kevolution, armies had but insignificant reserves. " I have seen," says General Jomini, " what was in 1796, pompously called the cavalry reserve of the army of the Rhine, and it barely formed one feeble brigade (1500 horse). Ten years after, I have seen similar reserves 15,000 or 20,000 strong ; so much have ideas changed 1 Taubert. 2 Ambert. 358 TACTICS. and armies increased." Napoleon, then, was the author of reserves, and to him is equally due the organization of the Cuirassiers in France. ****** In all the campaigns of the empire there were reserves ; there was no campaign without a strategic reserve, nor a battle without a tactical one. The marshals, the generals commanding divisions, all acted upon this system. " The art of properly fighting a battle," says Marmont, " lies especially in the judicious employment and timely use of reserves ; the general who, in a contested battle, has at the end of the day fresh troops at his disposal, when his adversary has none, is almost certain of victory." Grouvion Saint Cyr reports a conversation he had with the emperor : " It is only at the end of the day," said Napoleon, " when I see the enemy much pressed has nearly come to the end of his resources, that, collecting all my reserves, I hurl upon the field of battle a strong body of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. Quite unexpected by the enemy, it has a decisive effect; by this means I have almost always obtained the victory." 1 22. Formed, in deep columns, the reserves offer an easy mark for artillery. Projectiles of large calibre might reach them, and cause great loss. No opportunity of sheltering them behind rising ground, from view of the enemy, must be neglected. Often, indeed, they may be brought near a point from which they could immediately enter the line of battle ; but in this case they must be perfectly under cover. 2 1 Ambert. 2 Ibid. 359 CHAPTER VI. SECTION I. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 1. A battle is a dramatic act, which has its commencement, middle, and end. The order of battle taken by the two armies, and their first movements towards coming into action constitute its prologue; the countermoves made by the army attacked answer to the development of tlie plot; these necessitate new dispositions, and bring about a crisis whence springs the final result or catastrophe* 2. When an army is inferior in number, inferior in cavalry, and in artillery, it is essential to avoid a general action. The first deficiency should be supplied by rapidity of movement ; the want of artillery by the nature of the manosuvre ; and the inferiority in cavalry by the choice of position. In such circumstances, the morale of the soldier does much.2 3. In all cases before deciding on the order of battle, it will be necessary to fix on the points of attack. On the selection of these will generally depend the degree of success in case of victory. 3 4. If the line of retreat lead to the rear from a point near the centre of his line, that circumstance need exercise no influence on his choice of the point of attack. But if it be attached to either flank, then his plan must include that circumstance among his data. 4 5. It must be admitted that the assailant generally has a moral advantage over the assailed, and almost always acts more understand- ingly than the latter, who must be more or less in a state of uncer- tainty. As soon as it is determined to attack the enemy, some order of attack must be adopted ; and that is what I have thought ought to be called Order of battle. It happens also quite frequently that a battle must be commenced without a detailed plan, because the position of the enemy is not entirely known. In either case it should be well understood that there is in every battle-field a decisive point, the 1 (Napoleon's Memoirs) Ambert. * Napoleon. Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. MacDougall. 360 TACTICS. possession of which, more than of any other, helps to secure the victory, by enabling its holder to make a proper application of the principles of war : arrangements should therefore be made for striking the decisive blow upon this point. The decisive point of a battle-field is determined, as has been already stated, by the character of the position, the bearing of different localities upon the strategic object in view, and, finally, by the arrangement of the contending forces. For example : suppose an enemy's flank to rest upon high ground, from which his whole line might be attained, the occupation of this height seems most important, tactically considered ; but it may happen that the height in question is very difficult of access, and situated exactly so as to be of the least importance, strategically considered. At the battle of Bautzen the left of the Allies rested upon the steep mountains of Bohemia, which province was at that time rather neutral than hostile ; it seemed that, tactically considered, the slope of these mountains was the decisive point to be held, when it was just the reverse, because the Allies had but one line of retreat upon Reichenbach and Gorlitz ; and the French, by forcing the right, which was in the plain, would occupy his line of retreat and throw the Allies into the mountains, where they might have lost all their matdriel, and a great part of the personnel of their army. This course was also easier for them, on account of the difference in the features of the ground, led to more important results, and would have diminished the obstacles in the future. The following truths may, I think, be deduced from what has been stated : (1) The topographical key of a battle-field is not always the tactical key. (2) The decisive point of a battle-field is certainly that which com- bines strategic with topographical advantages. (3) When the difficulties of the ground are not too formidable upon the strategic point of the battle-field, this is generally the most important point. (4) It is nevertheless true that the determination of this point depends very much upon the arrangement of the contending forces. Thus in lines of battle too much extended and divided, the centre will always be the proper point of attack ; in lines well closed and connected OEDEES OF BATTLE. 361 the centre is the strongest point, since, independently of the reserves posted there, it is easy to support it from the flanks ; the decisive point in this case is therefore one of the extremities of the line. When the numerical superiority is considerable, an attack may be made simul- taneously upon both extremities, but not when the attacking force is equal or inferior numerically to the enemy's. It appears, therefore, that all the combinations of a battle consist in so employing the force in hand as to obtain the most effective action upon that one of the three points mentioned, which offers the greatest number of chances of success ; a point very easily determined by applying the analysis just mentioned. 1 6. The object of an offensive battle can only be to dislodge the enemy or to cut his line, unless it is intended by strategic manoeuvres to ruin his army completely. An enemy is dislodged either by over- throwing him at some point of his line, or by outflanking him, so as to take him in flank and rear, or by using both these methods at once ; that is, attacking him in front, while at the same time one wing is enveloped and his line turned. To accomplish these different objects, it becomes necessary to make choice of the most suitable order of battle for the method to be used. Each of the orders* may be used either by itself or in connection with the manoeuvre of a strong column, intended to turn the enemy's line. In order to a proper appreciation of the merits of each, it becomes necessary to test each by the application of the general principles which have been laid down. For example: it is manifest that the parallel order is worst of all, for it requires A no skill to fight one line against another, battalion against battalion, with equal chances of success on either side : no tactical skill is needed in such a battle. ****** The parallel order, with a crochet upon the flank, is mostly usually adopted in a defensive position. It may be also the result of an offensive * Twelve orders are enumerated by Jomini. F.J.S. 1 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31. 362 TACTICS. combination ; but then the crotchet is to the front, whilst in the case of defence it is to the rear. The battle of Prague, is a very remarkable example of the danger to which such a . crotchet is exposed if properly attacked. The parallel order re- inforced upon one wing or upon " the centre, to pierce that of the enemy, is much more favourable than the preceding one, and is also much A more in accordance with the general principles which have been laid _____ down ; although when the con- ' tending forces are about equal, the part of the line which has been weakened to reinforce the other, A may have its own safety compro- mised, if placed in line parallel to B the enemy. The oblique order is """"" the best for an inferior force ' attacking a superior ; for in addition to the advantage of bringing the main strength of the forces ___ _^___ ^ against a single point of the enemy's line, it has two others equally important ; since the weak- ened wing is not only kept back from the attack of the enemy, but performs also the double duty of holding in position the part of his line not attacked, and of being at hand as a reserve for the support, if necessary, of the engaged wing. This order was used by the celebrated Epaminondas, at the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea. The most brilliant example of its use in' modern times, was given by Frederick the Great at the battle of Leuthen. 1 7. An army may attack its enemy in front or flank. If it aims at a flank, say the right, its own right must be refused. Hence, whence it arrives on the extremity of the enemy's line, the army will be in 1 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31. OEDEKS OF BATTLE. 363 oblique order. And as the head of the column will meet the first shock, and as the success of the whole movement depends on its progress, it should be strongly reinforced. This is more especially necessary when the assailed flank of the enemy rests on some impassable obstacle, and must therefore be broken through rather than turned. And it is also essential that the refused wing should continue refused for a certain time after the commencement of the attack ; the disastrous consequences of neglecting this are exemplified in the battle of Kolin. 1 8. Although the rearmost wing must be refused in making an oblique attack, it by no means follows that it should not take part in the engagement ; on the contrary, every portion of the army unemployed, and which does not neutralize part of the enemy, is a chance lost. It will enter into the action either when the progressive advance of the line brings it in contact with the enemy, or by wheeling up and attacking the troops, with which the enemy may seek to reinforce and extend his new line. The one thing essential is, that it should remain refused till the progress of the rest of the army secures it from the counter-attack of superior forces. Frederick, whose system did not include large disposable reserves, used to reinforce the head of his attack with his advanced guard, and part of the cavalry of the refused wing. His advance in two lines renders these actions perfect examples, in form as well as in fact, of the oblique order. ****** But modern armies need by no means adhere to the oblique form, though adopting in spirit the oblique order. The head of the attack would be reinforced either from the reserve or the second line of the refused wing ; the troops intended successively to support the attack, would be formed in the manner most convenient for moving them to their destined places ; the whole front would be masked with skir- mishers and the fire of artillery ; and a preponderating force of guns would be brought to bear on the assailed wing. Battalion columns in echelon the head of the echelon reinforced and followed by strong reserves the outward flank protected by powerful cavalry, with its accompanying horse artillery, and the field batteries assembled on 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. 364 TACTICS. the inner flank, so as to support the attack and to enfilade the probable new front of the enemy would generally be a suitable formation for the part of the army beginning an attack upon the enemy's flank. The error of the Allies at Austerlitz, and the Prussians at Kolin, sufficiently demonstrates the necessity for preserving the continuity of the line throughout the process of an oblique attack. Not to preserve it, is to multiply the flanks (or weak points), of the line. 1 9. Time being proportionate to distance, the refusal of one wing of an army, or its removal from the enemy, will have an analogous effect to that of a natural obstacle in protecting the retired wing, which may, therefore, be weakened in a similar ratio to reinforce that wing which is nearest the enemy. The object to observe is, that, by reason of the distance, the enemy shall not be able to attack or turn the retired flank in as short a time as would be required by you either to reinforce that flank, or to gain a decided advantage with the other. 2 10. Jomini remarks, in reply to several statements made in the Memoirs of Napoleon, published by General Montholon, " The great Captain seems to consider the oblique order a modern invention, a theorist's fancy, an opinion I can by no means share ; for the oblique order is as old as Thebes and Sparta, and I have seen it used with my own eyes. This assertion of Napoleon seems the more remarkable, because Napoleon himself boasted of having used, at Marengo, the very order of which he thus denies the existence. ****** " The oblique order has no other object, than to unite at least half the force of the army in an overwhelming attack upon one wing, while the remainder is retired to the rear, out of danger of attack, being arranged either in echelon or in a single oblique line." 3 11. Theoretically speaking, " oblique orders of battle," are always successful, because they present a whole line to an extremity, and therefore bring into action a greater force than the enemy, in con- formity with the fundamental law in all military combinations, of " effecting with the greatest mass of forces a combined attack upon the decisive point." Even where the victory is ultimately lost, the manosuvre shews at what risk and price it must be met, as in the case of 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. 2 MacDougall. 3 Chap. IV., Art. 31. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 365 Albuera, where Soult's front came upon the right flank of the Spaniards with such rapid progress, that the British in the centre, in order to form a new front, were obliged to extend the line at an angle to the rear, which was not effected but with great risk and loss. 1 12. The perpendicular order on one or both wings, can only be considered an arrangement to indicate the direction along which the primary tactical movements might be made in battle. Two armies will never long occupy the relative perpendicular positions indicated ; for if the army B were to take its first position on a line perpendicular to one Fig. 1. Fig. 2. or both extremities of the army A, the latter would at once change the front of a portion of its line ; and even the army B, as soon as it extended itself to or beyond the extremity of A, must of necessity turn its columns either to the right or left, in order to bring them near the enemy's line, and so take him in reverse, as at (7, the result being two oblique lines as shown in Fig. I. The inference is that one division of the assailing army would take a position perpendicular to the enemy's wing, whilst the remainder of the army would approach in front for the purpose of annoying him ; and this would always bring us back to one of the oblique orders. 2 13. The order by echelon on the centre may be used with special success against an army occupying a position too much cut up and too extended, because its centre being then somewhat isolated from the wings and liable to overthrow, the army thus cut in two would be (Aide-Meinoire). C.H.S. 3 Jomiui, Chap. IV., Art. 31. 366 TACTICS. probably destroyed. But applying the same fundamental principle, this order of attack would , appear to be less certain - of success against an army having a connected and closed line ; for the reserve being generally near the centre, and the wings being able to act either by concentrating their fire or by moving against the foremost echelons, might readily repulse them. ****** This order by echelons was adopted by Laudon for the attack of the intrenched camp at Buntzelwitz. In such a case it is quite suitable ; for it is then certain that the defensive army being forced to remain within its intrenchments, there is no danger of its attacking the echelons in flank. But, this formation having the inconvenience of indicating to the enemy the point of his line which it is desired to attack, false attacks should be made upon the wings, to mislead him as to the true point of attack. 1 14. The attack in order of battle, echeloned on the centre, which is manifestly a variety of the salient order will generally fail if deliberately attempted on a large scale, for, its object being obvious, it will be provided for by reinforcing the threatened centre, and throwing forward the wings. 2 15. Masses of cavalry may operate with great effect from the apex of a salient order, for the objections against making them the central portions of a straight line of battle do not apply here, as immediately on issuing from the opening of the faces they find a wide field free for their advance, and form, in reality the flanks of those faces, while the rapidity of their movement peculiarly fits them for filling an interval of the kind. 3 16. 'Previous to the battle of Koniggratz,' the direction of the double advance of the Prussian armies, caused the Austrian line to be sharply 1 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31, 2 Hamley, Part VL, Chap. IV. 3 Hid. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 367 angular. Among other defects known for these hundred years, such a formation is weak at the angle, where both faces can be enfiladed ; and at the battle of Prague proof was given that the advance of either wing must necessarily leave a gap in the line, unless instantly filled from the reserve. Before daybreak on the morning of the battle the Prussians began their march, it having been concerted that, if the Austrian s should offer battle here, Herwarth and the First Army should commence the attack on the line of the Bistritz, and the Crown Prince should march along the bank of the Elbe to join in the action. The Prussians, then, were fighting on two fronts, and enclosing the front of the Austrians, a manoeuvre that would have been very dangerous to attempt had they all entered Bohemia by the same line. 1 17. 'At the battle of Prague, 1757,' the Austrians, noting the direction of Schwerin's approach from the Elbe, and taking advantage of the cover of the fish-ponds, had already accomplished the operation of throwing back a flank, so as to face the enemy on that side. They met the attack, therefore under circumstances unusually favourable. Yet the disadvantages of the formation on a salient angle, as exemplified in this battle, are still of the most formidable character ; for instance. (1) The whole force of the assailant, may be brought to bear on one face of the angle. (2) The advance of either face, causes a gap at the angle. (3) The face assailed will then be liable, to be turned on both flanks. (4) The fire of the assailant's artillery, enfilades one or both faces. (5) The defeat of the assailed wing compromises the retreat of the other, supposing the original front of the army to have covered its proper rear. Add to this that the troops at the angle, exposed to a cross-fire, must crowd on each other in falling back, and so create a weak point in that decisive point of the line ; and we see, that the turning of a flank by a considerable part of the assailant's line advancing in order of battle is, in general, the prelude to a very decisive victory, and is to be guarded against by every possible pre- caution. 2 1 Blackwoocl's Mag. 2 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. I. 368 TACTICS. 18. As examples of a convex order of battle let us take Ligny, in which battle, the Prussians, guarding as they did the line of the river from Wagnele to Balatre Ste. Aide, had their centre at Ligny itself eventually pierced by the sudden and vigorous onslaught of Napoleon's reserve. As examples of the salient order, we have Montenotte and Sadowa, in both of which seventy years apart in time the Austrians having adopted that order, experienced all its disadvantages, and found that the defeat of one wing greatly compromised the other. On the other hand, we see how Meade, at Gettysburg, having adopted the salient order derived success from it, because the angle of his line was so much secured by the strong hill on which it was posted. 1 19. After discussing the disadvantages of forming the front of an army on a salient or outward angle, Colonel Hamley, adds : " Never- theless, there are cases where such an order may be resorted to without entailing the usual penalties. For instance, the wings may be strongly protected by obstacles, and the apex of the angle may be so placed as to deprive the cross-fire of the enemy's artillery of its full effect. * * * The left wing ' of the Federal front at Gettysburg ' on the heights overlooked the plain along which the Confederates advanced; the right wing, also on high ground, was partly fortified, and covered by a stream. The apex of the line rested on the hill, which formed the highest and strongest part of the position, and which acted as a traverse or great mound protecting the wings from enfilade. If thus strength- ened, this order of battle possesses the manifest advantage of enabling the reserve to reinforce any part of the line with the utmost facility a circumstance which greatly aided the Federals at Gettysburg, where the corps of reserve was moved from wing to wing to meet the Confederate attacks. " 2 20. The convex order with the centre salient, answers for an engagement immediately upon the passage of a river, when the wings must be retired and rested on the river to cover the bridges ; also, when a defensive battle is to be fought with a river in the rear, which is to be passed and the defile covered as at Leipsic, and finally it may become a natural formation to resist an enemy forming a concave line. If an enemy directs his efforts against the centre, or against a single wing, this order might cause the ruin of the whole army. 3 1 Walker. * Hamley, Part VI., Chap IV. 3 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31, ORDERS OF BATTLE. 369 21. The concave order is merely a variety of the enclosing angle, or rather it generally resolves itself into the order echeloned on both wings. To await in such ~"""~_________^__^__ ^_^_^___ IH^I order an equal ene- _____ __ my formed on a straight front would _________ be to offer both flanks to his attacks. In assuming it, it would be indispensable, therefore, that the flanks were rendered perfectly secure by the nature of the ground. In such a case the position would be extremely difficult to assail, whether on the protected flanks or the retired centre. As an adversary would scarcely enter such a trap with his eyes open, the flanks might be connected directly by a thin line of troops forming an apparent or false front, and veiling the real centre while inviting the attack To attempt to turn an enemy on both flanks, refusing the centre, would produce an order of this kind ; if attempted with equal numbers, it must break the continuity of the line, and could only be justified if the intervals or weak portions were rendered, by obstacles or fortifications, strong against counter-attack. 1 22. Of the concave order with all its disadvantages, we see a good example at Austerlitz, where the Eussians adopted that order, with the view of surrounding the French, and found that to attempt the offensive from it was impracticable and exposed their own centre to be penetrated, and their left to be cut off and driven to that fearful catastrophe which it experienced in Lake Satchau. 2 23. The vices of the Confederate dispositions for the battle of Gettysburg, have been freely acknowledged by themselves since its loss, and need not be dilated on at any great length. Longstreet himself epitomized them at the time, when he said, that " the army should have been more concentrated, and the attack (of the 3rd) have been made with 30,000 instead of 15,000 men." And when we look more particularly into details, and observe that the Federal left centre was entered indeed on the 2nd, but by two brigades merely without support ; and on the 3rd, but only by a single division, the weakest in the army, which remained isolated after its gallant effort ; we see plainly the evil effect of the dissemination of the assailants along a line so long that Hamloy, Part VI., Chap IV, 3 Walker. 24 370 TACTICS. they were in no decisive force at the critical point. This error may be traced throughout the battle of the 2nd and 3rd as giving the key to their failure in other parts, as well as when the main attack was made. Thus we find two of Swell's divisions making useless efforts along the whole front of the cemetery, whilst the third (Johnson's) possesses itself for a time of the position on the enemy's right flank, but acts in so unsupported a manner as to be driven out as soon as the Federals turn their attention to it. 1 * * 24. It can scarcely, almost never, be justifiable to attack an enemy simultaneously on both flanks, unless the assailants have a very large preponderance of force ; for both the flank attacks'must be reinforced at the expense of the centre, which thereby becomes unduly weakened, and which cannot be kept at such a distance from counter-attack as a refused wing in the case where only one of the enemy's flanks is assailed. This does not however preclude^a demonstration against one flank to distract the enemy's attention from the other, supposing it to be the real object. 2 25. The attack on both wings, whatever be the form of attack adopted, may be very advantageous, but it is only admissible when the assailant is very decidedly superior in numbers ; for if the fundamental principle is to bring the main strength of the forces upon the decisive point, a weaker army would violate it in directing a divided attack against a superior force. 3 26. In the battle of Vimero, 21st August, 1808, the Duke of Abrantes showed great courage, but no talent. His army was in inferior in numbers, yet he formed two separate attacks, an evident error that enabled Sir Arthur to beat him in detail without difficulty. And it was the less excusable, because the comparatively easy nature of the ground over which the road from Torres Vedras to Lourinham led, and the manner in which the English army was heaped to the right when the position first opened to the view of the French general, plainly indicated the true line of attack. Junot should, with all his forces concentrated for one effort, have fallen in upon the left of his opponent's position; if victorious, the sea would have swalloAved those who escaped Campaigns, in Virginia, &c. 2 MacDougall. 8 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 31. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 371 his sword. If repulsed, his retreat was open, and his loss could not have been so great, in a well-conducted single effort, as it was in the ill-digested, unconnected attacks that took place. 1 27. It may be laid down as a principle that any movement is dangerous which is so extended as to give the enemy an opportunity, while it is taking place, of beating the remainder of the army in position. Nevertheless, as the danger depends very much upon the rapid and certain coup d'ceil of the opposing general, as well as upon the style of warfare to which he is accustomed, it is not difficult to under- stand why so many mano3uvres of this kind have failed against some commanders and succeeded against others, and why such a movement, which would have been hazardous in the presence of Frederick, Napoleon, or Wellington, might have entire success against a general of limited capacity, who had not the tact to take the offensive himself at the proper moment, or who might himself have been in the habit of moving in this manner. It seems, therefore, difficult to lay down a fixed rule on the subject. The following directions are all that can be given. Keep the mass of the force well in hand and ready to act at the proper moment, being careful, however, to avoid the danger of accumulating troops in too large bodies. A commander observing these precautions will be always prepared for anything that may happen. If the opposing general shows little skill and seems inclined to indulge in extended movements, his adversary may be more daring ****** In the Seven Years' War, Frederick gained the battle of Prague because the Austrians had left a feebly-defended interval of one thousand yards between their right and the remainder of their army, the latter part remaining motionless while the right was overwhelmed. ****** On the other hand, Frederick came near losing the battle of Torgau, because he made with his left a movement entirely too extended and disconnected (nearly six miles) with a view of turning the right of Marshal Dann. Mollendorf brought up the right by a concentric movement to the heights of Siptitz, where he rejoined the king whose line was thus re-formed. The battle of Rivoli is a noted instance in Napier, Vol. I. 372 TACTICS. point. All who are familar with that battle know that Alvinzi and his chief of staff Weyrother wished to surround Napoleon's little army, which was concentrated on the plateau of Rivoli. Their centre was beaten, while their left was piled up in the ravine of the Adige, and Lusignan with their right, was making a wide tUtour to get upon the rear of the French army, where he was speedily surrounded and captured. ****** We may call to mind how this same General Weyrother, who had desired to surround Napoleon at Bivoli, attempted the same manoeuvre at Austerlitz, in spite of the severe lesson he had formerly received. The left wing of the allied army, wishing to outflank Napoleon's right, to cut him off from Vienna (where he did not desire to return,) by a circular movement of nearly six miles, opened an interval of a mile-and- a-half in their line. Napoleon took advantage of this mistake, fell upon the centre, and surrounded their left, which was completely shut up between Lakes Tellnitz and Melnitz. Wellington gained the battle of Salamanca by a manoeuvre very similar to Napoleon's, because Marmont who wished to cut off his retreat to Portugal, left an opening of a mile- and-a-half in his line, seeing which the English general defeated his left wing, that had no support 5JC 3JC 5JC 5(C 5(C SJC In case of superiority in numbers or discipline, manoeuvres may be attempted which would be imprudent were forces equal or the com- manders of the same capacity. A manoeuvre to outflank and turn a wing should be connected with other attacks, and opportunely supported by an attempt of the remainder of the army on the enemy's front, either against the wing turned or against the centre. Finally, strategic operations to cut an enemy's line of communications before giving battle and attack him in rear, the assailing army preserving its own line of retreat, are much more likely to be successful and effectual, and, more- over, they require no disconnected manoeuvre during the battle. 1 28. ' At the battle of Austerlitz,' the infantry of the Allies had not yet abandoned the long flank movements of Frederick. General Weyrother's plan was in reality an oblique attack on the French right. 1 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 32. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 373 It would have been impossible even for Frederick the Great to ensure its perfect execution, as the ground over which they had to move was very much cut up. If, on the contrary, he had been in Napoleon's place, he would, as at Rosbach, have opposed the head of the enemy's columns, and have fallen on their flanks before they had time to deploy. The manoauvres in the face of the enemy were made in deployed lines. The allies neglected or were ignorant of the use of the column of attack, which the French employ so successfully. They did not use skirmishers, except in the attack on Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, and in the flank march of the grand Duke Constantine. 1 Tlie Battle of Salamanca, 1812. 29. It was about midnight when intelligence reached Lord Wellington that the arrival of a reinforcement of cavalry and artillery from Cafferelli's corps might be expected by Marmont on the morrow. He gave such orders immediately as would enable his army to begin its march at a moment's notice towards Ciudad Eodrigo. But he suspended the movement itself after daylight, in the hope that the enemy might commit some blunder. He did not hope in vain. Eendered over- confident by the success which had heretofore attended him, Marmont conceived that the moment had arrived for accomplishing the great purpose for which so many skilful changes of position had been effected. He directed his advanced guard, under Bonnet, to move at daybreak on the 22nd, in the direction of Ciudad Eodrigo. One of the Arapiles crossed, in some measure, the line of march of this French division, and a body of Portuguese troops were seen pushing, as if to take possession of it. Bonnet promptly wheeled up, drove away the Portuguese, and seized the height. It was a great advantage gained; the hill looked down upon the only road by which the English army, in case of a reverse, could defile, and a battery of guns planted upon its summit, rendered such an operation impossible. Meanwhile, the two armies had changed their order of battle. The right of the French, consisting of Foy's and Ferey's divisions, supported by Boyer's dragoons, leaned upon the 1 Ambert. 374 TACTICS. plateau of Calvarasa, and was covered by a wide ravine. In the centre, were the divisions of Clausel, Sarrut, Macune, and Brennier, massed behind the Arapile on which Bonnet stood. The left was composed of Thomiere's infantry, and Corto's cavalry division ; it occupied another plateau, on which were placed twenty pieces of cannon. But about half a league from that plateau was the height of Miranda, and still further on the village of Santa Thome de Eosados. These effectually blocked the way to Ciudad Eodrigo, the latter indeed being in the direct road to Tamames. Marmont determined to seize them; and desiring Macune and Brennier to close up, with fifty pieces of cannon, he detached Thomiere, about two in the afternoon, on that perilous service. Correspondent with the French march to the left, a change of front to the right had taken place in the English army. The first and light divisions were on the left, between the two Arapiles ; Cole's and Leith's in two lines, stood to the right of the French Arapile. Hope's and Clinton's division came next, with a Spanish corps under Don Carlos D'Espana ; and on the extreme right of all was Pakenham's division, supported by a strong body of cavalry. Lord Wellington himself stood upon the brow of a hill, whence he could take in the entire field of operations, which was likewise exposed to the view of Marmont, who had posted himself on the Arapile. Marmont had committed a terrible mistake, which the eagle glance of his adversary at once detected. The French army was spread over too wide a space, and a gap intervened between its left and centre. The English, on the contrary, were well in hand, and well their leader knew how to deal with them. Pakenham was directed to throw himself with his division, two batteries and D'Urban's cavalry, upon the French left ; Cole and Leith, supported by Clinton and Hope, were launched against their centre; while Pack's Portuguese were ordered to retake the Arapile, in the occupation of which Bonnet's division had in the early part of the day anticipated them. 1 30. Previous to the battle of Salamanca, the French troops coming from Babila Fuente, had not yet reached the edge of the forest, when Marmont, seeing that the Allies would not attack, and fearing that they would retreat before his own dispositions were completed, ordered 1 Crleig. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 375 Thomiere's division, covered by fifty guns and supported by the light cavalry, to menace the Ciudad Rodrigo road. He also hastened the march of his other divisions, designing, when Wellington should move in opposition to Thomiere, to fall upon him, by the village of Arapiles, with six divisions of infantry and Boyer's dragoons, which last, he now put in march to take fresh ground on the left of the Arapiles rocks, leaving only one regiment of cavalry to guard Foy's right flank at Calvariza. 1 31. It was about five o'clock when Pakenham fell upon Thomiere, and it was at the instant when that general, the head of whose column had gained an open isolated hill at the extremity of the southern range of heights, expected to see the Allies in full retreat towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, closely followed by Marmont from the Arapiles. The counter- stroke was terrible ! Two batteries of artillery, placed on the summit of the western heights suddenly took his troops in flank, and Pakenham's massive columns, supported by cavalry, were coming on full in his front, while two-thirds of his own division, lengthened out and unconnected, were still behind in a wood, where they could hear but could not see the storm which was now bursting. From the chief to the lowest soldier all felt that they were lost, and in an instant Pakenham the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle. 2 32. The battle which ensued, though fierce and bloody, lasted scarcely an hour. It was never for a moment doubtful. Marmont saw, when too late, the error of which he had been guilty, and did his best to retrieve it. But he had to deal with a general who never permitted an advantage once obtained to be wrested from him. It is but fair to add, that the fortune of war greatly favoured the assailants. Marmont, struck in the arm by a round shot while in the act of hurrying up Macune's and Thomiere's divisions, was carried from the field. Thomiere, on whom the command devolved, received at the same instant a wound, which disabled him, and Bonnet, the next in seniority, was almost immediately afterwards struck down. Before Clausel could come up from the extreme right, all was confusion on the left and in the centre, and there remained for him only the task, by no means an easy one, of saving as he best could the wreck of the army. ****** 1 Napier, Vol. V. Ibid. 376 TACTICS. The battle of Salamanca, was by far the most decisive which had as yet been fought in the Peninsula. It established Lord Wellington's character as a tactician beyond the reach of cavil. Never were troops better handled than in all the manoeuvring which preceded it : never was coup (Vceil more correct, nor execution more rapid, than in the detection of Marmont's blot, and in the manner of striking it. 1 33. * * On the heights of Inkerman, the Russians brought up the main body of their forces ; and on the 5th November they attacked with their collected army, combined with a large part of the garrison, with which they formed a junction on the line of communica- tion which had always been open to them. It was manifestly their intention to have established themselves on the ridge of heights which they attacked, because they had absolutely a number of carts with intrenching tools and materials, close up with the troops, some of which were taken. Had they succeeded to that extent, they would have turned our whole position and occupied one flank of it on commanding ground, and the result must have required very heavy sacrifices, perhaps that of all our battering train, to have dislodged them, which would have been absolutely necessary to save the combined army from utter destruction. 2 ****** 34. * * Since the army that attempts to turn the flank of another, to which it stood originally parallel, by passing round it, out of range of its artillery, is moving on an arc of which the antagonist commands the chord, it follows that, in ordinary circumstances, and with the same conditions of ground, such an enterprise will be not only futile but disastrous. In general, the way to meet it will be to change front with the threatened wing ; and, disengaging the remainder of the line, move it behind that wing into the prolongation of the new align- ment. That an open turning manoeuvre may succeed against inferior troops, and generals, has, however, been often proved; and the commander of a disciplined force opposed to barbarous troops a British leader, for instance, acting against a native army in India would be justified by the superior manoeuvring power of his force 1 Gleig. 2 Sir J. F. Burgoyne. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 377 (enabling it to defend itself at any stage of the operation, to outmarch its enemy, or to return on its path without disorder) in attempting openly to turn the flank of his enemy. 1 35. It would evidently be a great advantage to the defenders of a position, if the enemy, in advancing to attack it, found his line separated into two parts by some obstacle which would forbid communication between the different parts of the defensive position. If we suppose a stream or ravine to intersect his position at right angles, it should be spanned with as many bridges as would enable troops and guns to pass from one side to the other, as freely as if no such feature existed. As an example, let it be supposed that you occupy a position, which is cut transversely by a stream, over which there are no bridges and which is unfordable. By throwing bridges, the passage of your troops and guns from one side to the other may be made as easy if no such obstacle existed. The enemy, on the other hand, in advancing to attack will be cut in two ; and here you will have an opportunity of assuming the offensive with great advantage. By means of the bridges, you may concentrate a superior force to overwhelm the weaker of his separated portions on one side of the stream, while you hold the other in check on the other side of the stream until your success against the first portion shall enable you to return to overwhelm the remainder. If the enemy, instead of dividing his army, should, by means of bridges constructed at some distance from your position, operate with his whole force on one side of the stream, you have the option of either opposing him on that side with your united army, or of drawing it entirely to the other side, thereby offering a new front covered by the river. Such a proceeding on your part, however, would be only admissible in the case where your line of retreat lies on that side of the river which you occupy. But a like consideration must rule the movements of the enemy ; it is evident that he could not safely transfer his force to one side of the stream, if his line of retreat, lying on the other side, was thereby laid open to you. 2 36. Of the same nature in principle as the foregoing example, would be a lake or marsh covering part of your front. The lake in this case forms a certain portion of your line of defence. You may leave 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. I. 2 MacDougall. 378 TACTICS. that part to guard itself, so as to be stronger for the defence of those parts which are open to attack. But the enemy in advancing will be separated by the lake ; to reinforce one of the separated portions from the other, he must make a long ddtour, at the expense of time, which may be employed by you to beat the troops in your front before his reinforcements can arrive to their aid. The march of your own troops being unimpeded in rear of the lake, you can always be stronger than the enemy on the side on which you may choose to take the offensive. You operate, in fact, on interior lines ; the enemy, on exterior. 1 37. If the river or rivulet, in the front of your camp, has not a sufficient depth of water, it must be darned, so as to render it impassable. 2 38. M'Clellan, with his army, was advancing slowly up both banks of the Chickahominy, a little stream little in point of size, but very difficult to cross, having muddy banks. As one wing of the army was on the northern bank and the other on the southern, they were for a time in a position that was dangerous to them, for the bridges that were ordered to be constructed to keep up the communication between the two wings, were not made for many days, and, during the time they were being made, the first battle between the two armies took place. The confederate General Johnston, seeing that the wing on the one bank could not communicate -with the wing on the other, and that it was without any support, attacked that wing with nearly the whole of his troops. This was called the battle of Fair Oaks. The Southerners were partly successful ; they drove the troops down the peninsula, and partly succeeded in their object, which was to divide the two wings of M'Clellan' s army. 3 39. Perpendicular changes of front are rarely used ; changes com- pletely to the right or left being seldom necessary. ****** In changes of front, artillery must take up a position from which it can, if necessary, sweep the front and its prolongation towards the flank in motion. It will generally find such a position near the pivot, where one would also have the advantage of not being disturbed during the execution of the movement. 4 1 MacDougalL s Frederick. 3 (U. S. Institution), C.C.C. 4 Ambert. ORDERS OF BATTLE. 379 40. When a division or a wing, in an action, has to change front by throwing a shoulder forward, it is of importance to establish a battery in front of the pivot, so as to protect the movement of the troops and the execution of the manosuvre ; and for this purpose, it will be found advantageous to make use of a heavy battery of the artillery of reserve ; the light field or horse artillery pieces should follow the wheeling flank as a reserve, to enable them to oppose a flank attack of the enemy at once, or to take up a position on the outer flank, when the change of front is completed.i Tlie Battle of the Alma. 41. The battle of the Alma was certainly fought without much skill, since not more than 15,000 British and 10,000 French were engaged, and no Turks ; that is to say, more than 30,000 men were made no use of. (1) The Turks and 2000 French to have been placed on the right, to keep the left of the Russians in check, while the fleet threw shells, &c. (2) The right of the French army to have been opposite the village in the centre, their left extending to where Brown attacked. (3) The British should then have marched diagonally by columns, right in front, to turn the pinnacle marking the Russian right ; I say right in front, because of the Russian cavalry, for thus the columns could wheel up on their right, continually outflanking the pinnacle and closing it. Harding, says that it was so designed, but that fear of the Russian cavalry prevented the movement, and made them take the bull by the horns. This only shows a want of tactical skill. The ground on the British side of the Alma was lower and more practi- cable for cavalry than the other side ; consequently, as the 4th division and our cavalry kept the Russians in check there, they would have done so beyond the river, and a strong advanced guard of all arms would have protected the main movement. Now, when the pinnacle 1 Taubert. 380 TACTICS. was enveloped, and the firing there begun (not sooner), the French in the centre should have advanced, and as soon as they were well engaged, the Turks on the right should have advanced in their turn. In this manner the strength of the position would have been turned, and the whole Russian army driven into the sea. 1 SECTION II. DEFENSIBLE POSTS OF A POSITION. 1. When villages, hamlets, farms, or enclosures of any kind are occupied by soldiers, and placed in a state of defence, they are called military posts. The advantage which may be derived from an in- trenched village on a field of battle, is too apparent to need comment ; a post of this kind, when properly defended, will oblige an enemy either to make great sacrifices to get possession of it, or altogether to forego the offensive operations he may have contemplated. 2 2. It is generally quite important to defend villages on the front of a position, or to endeavour to take them when held by an enemy who is assailed ; but their importance should not be over-estimated ; for we must never forget the noted battle of Blenheim, where Marlborough and Eugene, seeing the mass of the French infantry shut up in the villages, broke through the centre and captured twenty-four battalions, which were sacrificed in defending these posts. For like reasons it is useful to occupy clumps of trees or brushwood, which may afford cover to the party holding them. They shelter the troops, conceal their movements, cover those of cavalry, and prevent the enemy from manoeuvring in their neighbourhood. The case of the park of Hougou- mont, at the battle of Waterloo, is a fine example of the influence the possession of such a position, well chosen and strongly defended, may have in deciding the fate of a battle. At Hochkirch and Kolin, the possession of the woods was very important. 3 1 Sir William Napier. a Macaulay. 3 Jomini, Chap. VII, Art. 44. DEFENSIBLE POSTS OF A POSITION. 381 3. No one can doubt, who knows the field of battle ' at "Waterloo/ and who is even tolerably informed of the circumstances, that Napo- leon's plan of attack was that of breaking Wellington's centre at La Haye Sainte, overthrowing the left of the Allied line, and thus going far to ensure the defeat of the Anglo-allied army ; to separate it entirely from that of Blucher, and to gain the command of the great road to Brussels. Two hours had been lost to Napoleon in the attack of Hougoumont, which attack was only an auxiliary operation to the main one by which he hoped to gain the battle. During these two hours, Ney was preparing for making the intended great attack on the centre and left of the Anglo-allied line. For this purpose he placed in position, on the central rise of ground that was between the main ridges on which the armies stood, a battery of 74 pieces of artillery, so that its fire might bear directly upon the right of Picton's, and on the left of Alten's divisions, and upon La Haye Sainte. The right of Picton's division was on the left of the Charleroi road, the left of Alten's was on that road, and La Haye Sainte was upon it ; this was the very centre of the Allied army, so that breaking in upon and gaining this part of the position was the all-important object which Napoleon had in view. The battery of 74 guns, of which part were 12 pounders, was at the distance of only 250 yards from La Haye Saint, and about 600 yards from the Anglo-allied position ; it both covered the French troops in their advance to attack, and caused great loss in the Anglo-allied line. 1 * * * * 4. The possession of La Haye Sainte by the French was a very dangerous incident. It uncovered the very centre of the Anglo-allied army, and established the enemy within 60 yards of that centre. The French lost no time in taking advantage of this, by pushing forward infantry supported by guns, which enabled them to maintain a most destructive fire upon Alten's left and Kempt' s right, and to drive off Kempt' s light troops, that occupied the knoll in his front. By this fire they wasted most seriously the ranks of the left of Alten's and the right of Kempt's divisions ; so much so that Ompteda's brigade having been previously nearly destroyed, and Kielmansegge's much weakened, they were now not sufficiently strong to occupy the front which was originally assigned to them. 2 1 Kennedy. - Hid. 382 TACTICS. 5. The echelon formation is especially suited to the attack of posts of this kind* Suppose, for instance, a farm * with its yard, wall, out- buildings, and orchard, is to be attacked by a brigade of six battalions from the first line ; that the left flank of the brigade is considered secure (being protected by cavalry, let us suppose) ; that the other flank, however, is exposed. The brigade advances by echelon of battalions from the left, except two battalions, one of which supports the head of the echelon at 50 yards' interval, and the other, formed in double column of companies, follows as a reserve at the height of the third echelon. The guns of the division, reinforced from the reserve artillery, concentrate their fire on the post till their front is masked by the advance of the infantry, when they are turned on such batteries of the enemy as bear on the battalions of attack. The leading battalions throw out their flank companies as skirmishers, and then attack ; the reserve supports them, and, if necessary, the second echelon. Should a counter-attack be made on the right flank, the echelons meet it, either on their existing front, or by an oblique formation; should the attack fail, they recover the retreat ; should it succeed, they either extend on the flank of the captured post, or form in rear, according to circumstances, to confirm the success; and, throughout, they maintain the connection between the head of the attack and the line of battle. Points of this kind, villages, woods &c., in the actual line of battle, are far from advantageous ; they break the unity of the defence, hinder the circulation of troops, and, should the enemy gain a footing in them, give him strong support in his efforts to permanently sunder the line ; while, if the line be broken elsewhere, the troops occupying such points are frequently cut off, like the garrison of Blenhiem. Should they be set on fire by shells, they would cause disastrous confusion. The line of battle can, therefore, be scarcely too clear of such obstacles from flank to flank. 1 6. Frederick and Napoleon did not agree with the ideas of Marshal Saxe ; they avoided, as much as possible, the attack of villages, because they often cost much more than they were worth. The French instead of throwing themselves directly, upon villages held by the Allies, and thus losing both men and time occupied the heights commanding them, separated their defenders from the rest of their army and took them * Hougoumout, Solferino, Ligny. 1 Harnley, Part VI., Chap. III. DEFENSIBLE POSTS OF A POSITION. 383 afterwards at a small cost by an attack in flank or rear, combined with a direct one. The flank attack was generally supported by cavalry, destined to sustain the infantry, should it find itself in a dangerous position. 1 7. The importance of advanced posts, like Hougomont, * confer a further advantage on their possessor, exemplified at Waterloo, that of enabling him to throw forward a portion of the line, till it rests on the post, and so to enclose the enemy's columns of attacks. Unless, therefore, they stand so far asunder that the attacks can be made between them, beyond the effective range of either, it will be usually imperative to master one or more of these, as the preliminary to an attack upon the line of battle. If such posts exist in the line of battle, it will be well to direct the attack elsewhere, seeking rather to master some neighbouring commanding ground, or to reach the rear of the post, than to incur the certain losses of a front attack. The French left at Austerlitz, avoiding the fortified hamlets of Kruh and Holubitz, occupied by Russian battalions, easily captured them by mastering the surrounding heights. 2 8. There are four different periods before gaining possession of a village, viz. : (1) The conquest of the enceinte and the outlets. (2) The establishment of the troops on these points, when taken, (3) The overthrow of the reserves. (4) The fortified post in our possession. The capture of the outskirts is not a very great advantage ; but the thing is to keep them. But when all this is done, and we have gained the opposite outskirts of the village, our next duty is to rally our scattered and exhausted troops. 3 9. Villages, commanded by the neighbouring ground, within musket- range, whose houses are much scattered and which have numerous and wide spaces for ingress, can seldom be occupied with advantage. Villages built of wood, are ill adapted for defence, for they can easily be set on fire ; those built of stone, having the houses grouped together, 1 Ambert, * Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. Decker. 384 TACTICS. and the gardens surrounded with walls or strong hedges, are the best for military posts. When an officer is detached to occupy a village, his first care should be to push forward his guards and advanced posts, pro- ceeding immediately to barricade all the entrances on the side of the enemy, excepting only a few small and concealed places of egress. He should next break up the roads by which the enemy can approach the post ; have loop-holes made in all the walls of the gardens, or houses, which his force may enable him to occupy ; demolish or burn detached houses, which would afford the enemy shelter, or mask the defender's fire, and fell all trees, which, when felled, would obstruct the attack, or if left standing would impede the defence. ***** If intrenching tools are wanted, the officer will put in requisition every- thing of the kind the village or neighbourhood can provide. 1 10. ' In the defence of places, the Prussians ' distribute expert marksmen, who, placed at the windows, single out the officers ; but the main defence is at the* outskirts of the village, in the gardens, behind the fences, walls, and enclosures ; with some companies in column on the flanks, and a reserve in the centre of the place, as much as possible in one spot, if it [is sufficiently large. This system appears preferable to that of the Austrians, who shelter the defenders inside the buildings ; crowded and confined, they escape from the observation and directions of their officers, and in case of a check, are generally all surrounded and made prisoners. 2 * * 11. The artillery, ' in the defence,' is placed outside, on the flanks, to command the points likely to be attacked. The openings and outlets of the streets on the side of the enemy, are barricaded with carriages, boxes, casks filled with earth, manure, bales, stakes, chains, abatis, &c. These barricades ought to be flanked by the neighbouring houses, which should be loop-holed. 3 12. All walls and hedges within musket range, behind which the enemy might conceal himself, should be destroyed, and all ditches parallel to the works be filled up, unless they are wet ones ; observing always not to destroy walls or hedges, &c., which will impede the enemy's flank movements, or check him under fire. In the interior, on the contrary, those walls which obstruct the lateral movements should 1 Macaulay, 2 Heintz. 8 Prevost. DEFENSIBLE POSTS OF A POSITION. 385 be broken through, in order to open free communications, and for the same purpose bridges must be thrown over the ditches. The hedges and walls which will serve to connect the principal intrenchments, should be preserved ; sometimes they form the only defences, and then care should be taken to preserve those which flank each other. If the village be traversed by a stream, advantage may be taken of it, to form an inundation ; if the stream extend round part of the village, its waters may be retained by a dam, protected by a small intrenchment, or the arches of a bridge may be closed up, so as to make it act as a dam. 1 1 Macaulay. 25 386 CHAPTER VII. SECTION I. MARCHES PRECEDING BATTLES. 1. The whole secret of war consists in marching, or as Marshal Saxe says, " in the legs." Marches prepare victories ; battles decide them ; pursuit completes them. 1 2. "The strength of an army, like the power of mechanics, is estimated by multiplying the mass by the rapidity; a rapid march augments the 'morale of an army, and increases all the chances of victory." 2 3. General Robert Crawfurd reached the English camp, after the battle of Talavera, with the 43rd, 52nd, and 95th or Rifle Regiment, and immediately took charge of the outposts. . These troops, after a march of twenty miles, were in bivouac near Malpartida de Plasencia, when the alarm, caused by the fugitive Spanish, spread to that part. Crawfurd allowed the men to rest for a few hours, and then, withdrawing about fifty of the weakest from the ranks, commenced his march with the resolution not to halt until he reached the field of battle. * ****** Leaving only seventeen stragglers behind, in twenty-six hours they had crossed the field of battle in a close and compact body, having, in that time, passed over sixty-two English miles, and in the hottest season of the year, each man carrying from fifty to sixty pounds weight upon his shoulders. 3 4. The rapid concentration of the Prussian army 'in 1866,' produced some feats in marching which were quite extraordinary for troops who had only just taken the field. The 5th Pomeranian Hussars marched three days successively for long distances, and on the 22nd made fifty English miles ; they were again on the line of march on the 24th, with horses in excellent condition, and the men looking as if they had only just turned out of barracks. 4 1 Hand-Book. - Napoleon. 3 Napier, Vol. II. 4 Hozier, Vol. I. MARCHES PRECEDING BATTLES. 387 5. The French being a light-hearted nation, and being also lightly equipped, were decidedly the most expeditious marchers. The famous forced marches of upwards of thirty miles for three consecutive days, by which Napoleon brought an army to the relief of Dresden, and in a state to fight a battle, with scarcely a night's rest intervening, will establish their claim to this encomium. 1 6. There are also marches executed in presence of the enemy, with your army entirely united, formed and ready to fight, having the design of causing the enemy to leave a position which he is occupying. These marches belong to tactical movements ; nothing demands greater atten- tion or exacts greater precautions. To execute a movement of this kind, the troops must be well disciplined and thoroughly drilled, the generals vigilant and active, and the commander possessed of extreme foresight. 2 Manoeuvres previous to the Battle of Salamama. 7. The hostile armies in July, 1812, faced each other on the Douro. Marmont's line, in case of retreat, lay through Valladolid and Burgos. Wellington could regain his base in Portugal only by the road from Salamanca to Ciudad Eodrigo. The French front extended from Toro on the right to the Pisuerga on the left, and was there thrown back along the course of the river. Wellington's right was at Eueda, his left on the Guarena. Thus each army, in the existing position, covered its communications. Marmont, on the 15th and 16th, suddenly moved his army on Toro, and began to cross there. Wellington knew of this movement on the 16th, and prepared to meet it by uniting his centre and left at Canizal during the night. Marmont, then, had turned Wellington's left, and by persisting in an advance from Toro upon Salamanca, he would reach that place as soon as his adversary. Wel- lington must therefore break through or be lost. He would attack the French on the march ; they would form in order of battle to meet him, and the fronts of both armies woiild be parallel to the road from Toro to Salamanca. Both armies would be in a flank position either would be ruined by defeat. A French victory would cut Wellington from 1 Cathcart. a Marmont. 388 TACTICS. Portugal, and throw him back on the Castilian mountains and the army of King Joseph. An English victoiy would cut Marmont from Toro, and drive him back on the Douro, and the difficult hostile country of the Tras-os-Montes. It was not Marinont's design to bring matters to such a desperate issue. His movement on Toro had been a feint to induce Wellington to make a corresponding movement, and so leave the bank of the river at Polios and Tordesillas open. He counter-marched on the 17th behind the river, crossed it at those two places, and occupied Nava del Rey, where his whole army was concentrated that night. 1 8. ' Passing the Douro on the 17th of July, on the 18th Marmont, who had ascertained that a part only of Wellington's army was before him,' crossed the Trabancos in two columns, and passing by Alaejos turned the left of the Allies, inarching straight upon the Guarena. The British retired by Torecilla de la Orden, the fifth division being in one column on the left, the fourth division on the right as they retreated, and the light division on an intermediate line, and nearer to the enemy. The cavalry were on the flanks and rear ; the air was extremely sultry, the dust rose in clouds, and the close order of the troops rendered it very oppressive, but the military spectacle was very strange and grand. For then were seen the hostile columns of infantry, one half musket-shot from each other, making impetuously towards a common goal, the officers on each side pointing forwards with their swords, or touching their caps, and waving their hands in courtesy ; while the German cavalry, huge men on huge horses, rode between in a close compact body as if to prevent a collision. At times the loud tones of command, to hasten the march, were heard passing from the front to the rear, and now and then the rushing sound of bullets came sweeping over the columns, whose violent pace was continually accelerated. Thus moving for ten miles, yet keeping the most perfect order, both parties approached the Guarena, and the enemy seeing that the light division, although more in their power than the others, were yet outstripping them in the march, increased the fire of their guns and menaced an attack with infantry. But the German cavalry instantly drew close round, the column plunged suddenly into a hollow dip of ground on the 1 Hamley, Part III, Chap. III. MAKCHES PRECEDING BATTLES. 389 left, which afforded the means of baffling the enemy's aim, and ten minutes after the head of the division was in the stream of the Guarena, between Osmo and Castrillo. The fifth division entered the river at the same time, but higher up on the left, and the fourth division passed it on the right. The soldiers of the light division, tormented with thirst, yet long used to their enemy's mode of warfare, drank as they marched, and the soldiers of the fifth division stopped in the river for only a few moments, but on the instant forty French guns, gathered on the heights above, sent a tempest of bullets amongst them. So nicely timed was the operation. The Guarena, flowing from four distinct sources, which are united below Castrillo, offered a very strong line of defence, and Marmont, hoping to carry it in the first confusion of the passage, and so seize the table-land of Vallesa, had brought up all his artillery to the front ; and to distract the Allies' attention, he had directed Clauzel to push the head of the right column over the river at Castrillo at the same time. But Wellington expecting him at Vallesa from the first, had ordered the other divisions of his army, originally assembled at Canizal, to cross one of the upper branches of the river ; and they reached the table-land of Vallesa before Marmont's infantry, oppressed by the extreme heat and rapidity of the march, could muster in strength to attempt the passage of the other branch. Clauzel, however, sent Carier's brigade of cavalry across the Guarena, at Castrillo, and sup- ported it with a column of infantry ; and the fourth division had just gained the heights above Canizal, after passing the stream, when Carier's horseman entered the valley on their left, and the infantry in one column menaced their front. 1 * * * * * 9. The French general had passed a great river, taken the initiatory movement, surprised the right wing of the Allies, and pushed it back about ten miles. Yet these advantages are to be traced to the peculi- arities of the English general's situation, which have been already noticed, and Wellington's tactical skill was manifested by the extri- cating of his troops from their dangerous position at Castregon without loss, and without being forced to fight a battle. He, however, appears to have erred in extending his troops to the right when he first reached the Douro, for seeing that Marmont could at pleasure pass that 1 Napier, Vol. V. 390 TACTICS. river and turn his flanks, he should have remained concentrated on the Guarena, and only pushed cavalry posts to the line of the Douro above Toro. Neither should he have risked his right wing so far from his main body, from the evening of the 16th to the morning of the 18th. He could scarcely have brought it off without severe loss, if Marmont had been stronger in cavalry, and instead of pushing forward at once to the Guarena, had attacked him on the march. On the other hand, the security of the French general's movements, from the Tra- bancos to the Guarena, depended entirely on their rapidity ; for as his columns crossed the open country on a line parallel to the march of the Allies, a simple wheel by companies to the right would have formed the latter in order of battle on his flank, while the four divisions already on the Guarena could have met them in front. 1 SECTION II. THE MARCH OF COLUMNS. 1. When an army marches in several separate columns along separate roads, within reach of the enemy, it is highly im- portant that each column should be strong enough to defend itself until it can obtain a reinforcement from the others ; and that there should be communications between the roads followed by the several columns, to allow these reinforcements being sent. Neglect of these precautions led to the disasters experienced by the Archduke John, at Hohenlinden, 3rd December, 1800. His army was formed into four columns, which had to cross the vast forest of Ebersberg, at the debouch of which Moreau had united the French army. The Austrians advanced, during fearful weather, through a thick forest, their columns having no means of communication with each other ; the principal column was first attacked, both in front and rear, and, being unable to deploy, was cut to pieces ; the other columns were successively attacked 1 Napier, Vol. V. THE MAECH OF COLUMNS. 391 and shared the same fate ; and the army had to retire with the loss of 12,000 men and 100 pieces of cannon. The Austrians, however, did not profit by this severe lesson ; for the general, who had counselled this unconnected movement, repeated it with the Austro-Russians at Austerlitz, where it had no better success. 1 2. No fixed rules can be given as to the minutiae of an order of march which depends on so many different circumstances ; but three principles should be strictly attended to.* (1) The several branches of the service should afford each other mutual protection, and their position on the line of march should depend on the nature of the country. (2) The order of march should be such, that by short, simple, and rapid movements, it can become the order of battle. (3) That at no time, and under no pretext whatever, should the slightest deviation from the strictest discipline be permitted. For, once it has been allowed, the soldier will almost claim it as a right. 2 3. In England the country is so generally cultivated, and the arable and pasture lands are so intermixed, that the fields are fenced on every side to keep the cattle from the crops ; and it would be difficult to find spaces of any extent where armies would not be restricted to the road while marching, or where they could easily form front for battle. But in large districts of the Continent cattle are kept in stalls, and the crops are not separated by fences, while the chief causeways are thrice the width of our main roads. In such countries armies move on a large front ; the columns of infantry and cavalry in the fields in dry weather, the artillery and trains on the roads. Thus Belgium and the east of France are a succession of rolling plains, where the streams and ditches are the only impediments. In other parts of Europe, whole districts are devoted to pasture, as in Hungary and parts of Spain, and these great plains are equally free from obstacles. On the other hand, North Italy is highly cultivated, and scarcely any plains are to be found there. The numerous rivers feed a multitude of canals of irrigation ; the rich soil of the fields is too soft for marching on ; olive groves and * Lalleinand Oper. Seconclaires cle la Guerre. 1 Jervis. z IHd, 392 TACTICS. festoons of vines add to the difficulties of forming on a large front, and troops on the march are for the most part restricted to the raised roads. 1 4. A column of 30,000 men, not comprising the artillery, occupies about three miles. It would require two hours to range it in line of battle on two lines, and to allow of this, the advanced guard should precede it by five miles. 2 5. Each column should have its own advanced guard and flankers, that its march may be conducted with the usual precautions : * * The army on the march is often preceded by a general advanced guard, or, as is more frequent in the modern system, the centre and each wing may have its special advanced guard. It is customary for the reserves and the centre to accompany the head-quarters, and the general advanced guard when there is one, will usually follow the same road : so that half the army is thus assembled on the central route. Under these circumstances, the greatest care is requisite to prevent obstructing the road. It happens sometimes, however, when the important stroke is to be made in the direction of one of the wings, that the reserves, the general head-quarters, and even the general advanced guard, may be moved in that direction ; in this case, all the rules usually regulating the march of the centre must be applied to that wing. 3 6. " The first great distinction between a march of this kind and an ordinary march is, that whereas, in general, a long train of supplies and baggage must follow the columns, an army moving to battle disencum- bers itself of all that is not essential for feeding and fighting during the day or days of conflict. Men and horses carry with them one or two days' food ; spare ammunition must be at hand ; all else may, for the moment, be stored in the rear. Thus stripped for the struggle, columns, each of a corps or division, advance upon such roads as will at once lead them on the enemy, and keep them within deploying distance of each other. If the commander has been enabled, by reconnaissance and intelligence of the enemy's dispositions, to determine his order of battle, it will be a great advantage ; for, according as a wing or centre is to be reinforced, the troops can, at the outset of the march, be directed on the the roads, which will bring them to their destined positions in the line. 1 Hamley, Part V., Chap. I, " Hancl-Book, 3 Jomini, Chap. VI., Art. 41. THE MAECH OF COLUMNS. 393 The divisions and the cavalry will be accompanied by their own batteries ; the reserve artillery will generally follow a central column, if the road be good. The army will be preceded by an advanced guard. Compactness being now of the highest importance, all the arms of a column will move in close order, and on as large a front as is consistent with leaving part of the road free for the transmission of orders, and the going about of cavalry or guns. The column may be formed thus in an average country : (1) A battery, because its fire will be required to keep the enemy at a distance during the first deployments preceded, however, by a few hoi A brigade or division of infantry. battery, preceding another brigade or division of infantry. (4) The cavalry of the column. This is not placed more forward ; first, because cavalry of itself cannot defend itself, as infantry can, under all circumstances : and, secondly, because its speed will always enable it to reach the line of deployment, or point where it is to act, as soon as the majority of the infantry. (5) The remaining batteries of the column. (6) The rear guard. When the nature of the country dictates that masses of cavalry should be on one wing, or on both wings, they will march, accordingly, on one or both flanks, in adjoining columns, not intermixed, either laterally or longitudinally, with infantry. Such was the order in Davoust's march to Eckmuhl, when his cavalry covered his left flank, his right being protected by the Danube. In all cases the columns will be incessantly connected by light troops extended in skirmishing order throughout their front ; and advantage must be taken of all cross-roads to maintain concert and exchange intelligence during the movement. Meanwhile the advanced guard, marching at a certain distance ahead, will, presumably, prevent the heads of columns from being suddenly attacked, or from being separated by an advance of .the enemy. 394 TACTICS. On approaching a position which the enemy may be supposed to occupy, or to be seeking to occupy, the main columns subdivide into other smaller columns, and all strike out for themselves routes as direct as possible towards their destined positions in the line, endeavouring, at the same time, to preserve due intervals of deployment, and always maintaining their connection. But as an attempt to move for any distance in columns so small and numerous as to be in order of battle, or nearly so, would create confusion and delay at every impediment, it is inexpedient to separate farther than into brigades of the first, each followed by its brigade of the second, line, the divisional artillery still accompanying, if possible, its own brigades. Each column will be preceded by pioneers, to clear the road of obstacles, throw planks across ditches or rivulets, repair bad parts of the track, cut away the steep banks of fords for the passage of cavalry or guns, and, under the direction of staff officers, shorten the routes by levelling fences and cutting paths." 1 7. " The chaussfa leading from Gorlitz to Zittau is broad enough to allow four carriages to pass. The march 'of the Prussians in 1866 ' was excellently arranged ; there was no confusion, and no halts had to be made, except those which were necessary to allow the men rest. The carriages of the military train were scrupulously kept to one side of the road, so as to leave the rest clear for the troops. Its own baggage marched in the rear of each battalion, but it was not much ; only one waggon with the reserve ammunition, a cart for the officers' baggage, three or four pack-horses to carry the paymasters' books and the doctors' medicine carts. The march of the 23rd was different from that of the preceding day ; it was a march which showed that the enemy might be found in front. The heavy baggage and reserve commissariat transport was all a day's march in rear ; the only carriages which were present in the column of route were the guns and waggons of the artillery, the hospital carriages, and the few waggons which are necessary to regiments when actually about to fight. The advanced posts, on the evening of the 23rd, were pushed forwards about seven miles; there were vigilant patrols and pickets out, and 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. VI. THE MARCH OF COLUMNS. 395 all was provided for against a surprise. These precautions are of course always necessary with an army in the field ; in the present case their utility was not put to the test, for the Austrians were not in force in the neighbourhood." 1 8. Two armies marching, as they formerly did, with all their camp equipage, and meeting unexpectedly, could do nothing better at first than cause their advanced guard to deploy to the right or left of the roads they are traversing. In each army, the forces should at the same time be concentrated, so that they may be thrown in a proper direction considering the object of the march. A grave error would be committed in deploying the whole army behind the advanced guard ; because, even if the deployment were accomplished, the result would be nothing more than a badly arranged parallel order, and if the enemy pressed the advanced guard with considerable vigour, the consequence might be the route of the troops which were forming. In the modern system, when armies are more easily moved, inarching upon several roads, and divided into masses which may act independently, these routes are not so much to be feared; but the principles are unchanged. The advanced guard must always be halted and formed, and then the mass of the troops concentrated in that direction which is best suited for carrying out the object of the march. Whatever manoeuvres the enemy may then attempt, everything will be in readiness to meet him. 2 March of the Austrian, and of the French and Sardinian Armies, previous to the Battle of Solferino, in June, 1859. 9. A reconnaissance on the 22nd reported the French main body still beyond the Chiese, and on the 23rd the march began, the greater part of it being allotted for the first day's work. The Emperor Francis Joseph and his staff slept at Valeggio, and the march was to be resumed at nine o'clock in the morning. An action might take place in the evening, but was not for a moment thought of early in the day ; in any case, the right wing was to engage first, and the left wing coming up at the proper time would ensure the victory. The Austrians had 1 Hozier, Vol. I. 2 Jomini, Chap. IV., Art. 33. 396 TACTICS. pushed forward no reconnaissance on the 23rd, beyond the ordinary outposts ; neither had Louis Napoleon ; but he had made use of an expedient seldom resorted to, though not entirely new observation from a balloon. The first ascent was made at Castenedolo on the 21st, another on the 23rd. The distance was too great to learn much, for the Austrians were ten or twelve miles even from Montechiaro, and it requires a powerful glass, combined with favourable circumstances, to distinguish infantry from cavalry at five miles ; but the observers might, and probably did, perceive long lines of approaching dust. This would be enough to indicate that some important movement was taking place. It is admitted that Louis Napoleon was aware of strong columns having crossed the Mincio, but he expected nothing more than a strong reconnaissance. On the evening of the 23rd his forces bivouaced in a line from Desenzano on the Lake of Garda to Mezzano on the Oglio ; the appointed routes for the various corps on the 24th were as follows : Four Piedmontese divisions, from Desenzano and Lonato to Pozzolengo by Eivoltella and Madonna della Scoperta. 1st corps (Baraguay d'Hilliers) from Esenta to Solferino; one division by the direct mountain road through Astore, the other two by Castiglione. 2nd corps (M'Mahon) from Castiglione to Cavriana, by the Guidizzolo road for the first four miles. 4th corps (Niel) from Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo by Medole. The cavalry regiments attached to the different corps were formed into two divisions under Generals Partouneaux and Des Vaux, and accompanied this corps. 3rd corps (Canrobert) from Mezzano on the left bank, to cross the Chiese by a pontoon bridge near Yisano, and proceed to Medole by Castel Goffredo. Imperial Guard (d'Angely) was in rear of the rest at Montechiaro, and to march to Castiglione. The cavalry of the guard and artillery, 36 squadrons and 8 batteries, were still further back at Castenedolo, fourteen miles from the plain of Medole. At Piadena on the Oglio, fifteen miles south of the battle-field, was Autemarre's division of Prince Napoleon's corps, intended to join the rest of the army at the Mincio. Its presence there, unexpected by THE MARCH OF COLUMNS. 397 the Austrians, embarrassed Liechtenstein at Marcaria, and had thus some effect on the battle. The appointed lines of march for the two armies on the 24th actually crossed one another, so that a collision was inevit- able, and the outposts were already so close that it must necessarily begin at an early hour. The French had 168 battalions and 96 squadrons, which, at a similar calculation of strength to that at Magenta, and with artillery included, would be 120,000 men. The four Pied- montese divisions would be 40,000, and the whole would amount to 160,000 men. The Austrian battalions engaged numbered 156 (those of the 2nd corps not included), and there were 68 squadrons accom- panying them ; these, reduced like the others from the normal strength, would, with artillery, be 140,000 ; but as many of them had neither endured long marches or been under fire, this is certainly too low an estimate for the whole, and they were quite equal, if not superior, in number to the Allies. 1 ****** 10. The leading French troops started at two o'clock a.m., to avoid the heat of the day. At early dawn, the first shots of an outpost, a mile-and-a-half from Castiglione, opened the battle ; others were soon heard extending right and left, until a line from San Martino to Castel Goffredo, eleven miles long, would indicate very nearly that of the first encounters. At the first sound of a cannonade, Louis Napoleon hastened from Montechiaro towards Castiglione. He received, on the way, reports which convinced him that no reconnaissance, but a great battle was to be dealt with, and he shaped his measures accordingly. The allied columns were moving along seven different roads ; and as the whole of the Imperial Guard, infantry, cavalry and artillery was in rear, there were only 130,000 men to a front which was then twelve miles extent. The first step, therefore, was to send orders for the right and left to close as much as they could to the centre, and for the Guard to hasten its movements ; the next was to study the enemy's line of battle, to discover his weak points, and to direct his own forces upon them. The village of Solferino appeared to be the place whose capture would give the best results, and arrangements for its attack would be in accordance with the orders already issued ; it was therefore decided upon. This 1 Lieut. -Colonel Miller. 398 TACTICS. resolution was adopted, and the intention communicated to the corps' commanders very early in the day; but it was some time before any result could ensue. On the extreme left, at San Martino, the 3rd and 5th Piedmontese divisions were over-matched ; the next, at Madonna della Scoperta, was also thrown back. So far from assisting the centre, these three divisions drew the other way from it for their own support. Fortunately, the Austrians also were weak in numbers on this side, and could not pursue the advantages they gained. Baraguay d'Hilliers' corps was directed on Solferino by the original order of march, and may be considered the centre which the others were to approach. M'Mahon, who stood next, had large forces opposite himself, and could not lessen the space between the centre and the 2nd corps, without, at the same time, opening an equally dangerous interval between the 2nd and 4th corps ; he could only deploy across the Guidizzolo Eoad, which he was moving along, and maintain himself for the present in that position. Kiel was anxious to assist; but he, in his turn, was dependent on Canrobert, who had been instructed by the Emperor to support him, but at the same time to guard against a large body of Austrians approaching him from the direction of Mantua. 1 SECTION III. FLANK MARCHES. 1. Nothing is so rash, or so contrary to principle, as to make a flank march before an army in position, especially when this army occupies heights at the foot of which you are forced to defile. 2 2. Flank marches have always been held up as very dangerous ; but nothing satisfactory has ever been written about them. If by the term flank marches are understood tactical manoeuvres made upon the field of battle in view of the enemy, it is certain that they are very 1 Lieut. -Colonel Miller. 2 Napoleon. FLANK MAECHES. 399 delicate operations, though sometimes successful ; but if reference is made to ordinary strategic marches, I see nothing particularly dangerous in them, unless the most common precautions of logistics be neglected. In a strategic movement, the two hostile armies ought to be separated by about two marches (counting the distance which separates the advance guards from the enemy and from their own columns). In such a case, there could be no danger in a strategic inarch from one point to another. There are, however two cases where such a march would be altogether inadmissible : the first is where the system of the line of operations, of the strategic lines, and of the front of operations is so chosen, as to present the flank to the enemy during a whole operation. This was the famous project of marching upon Leipsic, leaving Napoleon and Dresden on the flank, which would, if carried out, have proved fatal to the Allies. It was modified by the Emperor Alexander upon the solicitations of Jomini. The second case is where the line of operations is very long (as was the case with Napoleon at Borodino), and particularly if this line affords but a single suitable route for retreat : then every flank movement exposing this line would be a great fault. 1 3. On perfectly open ground such a movement 'a flank march near the enemy' might be accomplished by marching to a flank in order of battle that is, in three columns formed of the two lines and the reserve, with an advanced guard protecting the outward flank (flank towards the enemy). But the question is of making a march of this kind in an average broken or enclosed country, where very lengthened columns, especially of cavalry and artillery, could not without great risk offer their flank to the enemy. The column of cavalry, as being least able to fight singly, should not be on the outer flank. In case of a small force, say of a division, making such a movement, it might be done in three columns, the infantry on two lines next the enemy, the cavalry and reserve artillery on the inner flank. But with a consider- able force a corps or wing the first and second line and reserves of infantry should each form a column, followed and preceded by portions of their own artillery. The order of march of the columns of the main body, then, would be in this order, beginning on the flank next the enemy : 1 Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 24. 400 TACTICS. (1) A division of infantry (being the first line), preceded and followed by its own artillery, and at intervals by an advanced and rear guard of mixed arms ; pioneers clearing the march. (2) A division (being the second line) of infantry in the same order. (3) The division of infantry of the reserve. (If the general reserve of the army is otherwise provided for, this column will be divided between the two former). (4) Cavalry with its own artillery. (5) Cavalry and reserve artillery. These columns should preserve intervals not greater than those which should exist in the line of battle between the first and second lines and the second line and reserve ; and the column next the enemy must be the column of direction that is, must govern the movements and distances of the rest. Meanwhile an advanced guard of all arms should move between the corps and the enemy, constantly flanking it, and occupying all defiles by which the enemy might issue on the flank of the columns. Thus, while the Prussians inarched from "Wavre to the field of Waterloo, the advanced guard on their flank closed the passages of the Dyle against Grouchy. When a corps is moving thus to a flank, it will be of immense importance to decide whether it is to form line of battle to a front or flank, relatively to the rest of the army and to the enemy. Thus Bulow's march to the field of Waterloo was a flank march ; but, for the attack on the French flank, the order of march to a front, was the proper formation for his columns. 1 Prussian flank march, on 18th June ; on Waterloo. 4. The country between Wavre and the field of Waterloo resembles in its character certain well known parts of Devonshire, being broken into rounded hills, with patches of wood upon their slopes, and traversed by lanes deep and miry in the hollows. The chief cross-road is that which passes over the highest of the hills (011 which stands the con- spicuous church of St. Lambert) directly down into the valley of the 1 Hamley, Part VI., Chap. VI. FLANK MARCHES. 401 Lasne, at a village of the same name, and ascending again to Plaucenoit, leads on to the Brussels and Charleroi-road near to the farm of Caillou, where Napoleon's head-quarters were established on the night of the 17th. A similar road, more to the north, conducts more directly by Froidmont and Ohain on to the crest which formed the front of the English position. On both of these the Prussians had started early to take their share in the battle. Bulow was to lead, followed by Pirch along the former road ; Zieten to take the line to Ohain. Thielemann was ordered to act as rear guard and cover the movement, and in case of no enemy appearing at Wavre, to follow finally on Plancenoit. But Bulow, was some miles on the wrong side of Wavre, and his first brigade had hardly got clear of the town, when a fire, breaking out in the narrow street through which his corps defiled, stopped the rest of the troops for nearly two hours. A further delay arose from the passage of Zieten's corps on their way to the northern road, crossing that to St. Lambert, occupied by the other column. Moreover the troops, drenched and tired the night before, were not originally started until seven a.m. So considerable were the delays from these causes, added to the wretched nature of the roads, that it was three p.m. before the tail of Bulow's column reached St. Lambert, although his leading brigade had been there before noon. It was plain, therefore, that the Prussians could take no share in the early part of the great battle, and that Wellington must bear the full brunt until the afternoon wore some hours on. 1 5. Before 'the attack at half-past one, on the English left centre, had taken place by the corps of D'Erlon,' there had been seen on the hill of St. Lambert a body of troops, of strength and nation unknown, but which could only be part of Grouchy's force, or some detachment of Prussians. Napoleon could not have attached any serious importance to this apparition at first, since he made no effort to stop the strange corps, beyond sending to his right two divisions of light cavalry amounting to 2400 sabres. He was not long in ignorance. A Prussian non-commissioned officer of Hussars was taken and brought in with a letter from Bulow, announcing his arrival at St. Lambert, and requesting Wellington's instructions ; for this messenger had left before Chesney, Lect. VI. 26 402 TACTICS. Miiffling's despatch, sent for their guidance, could have been delivered to the Prussian staff. ****** . Bulow had advanced, with half his corps, and soon forced back the light cavalry which covered Lobau, and engaged the infantry of that general. An hour later (at half-past five) the whole of the Prussian corps, 29,000 strong, was on the ground ; Lobau, after a brave resistance, was forced back on Plancenoit, and the Prussian guns were within range of the Brussels-road. Zieten meanwhile, by the same hour, had made his way along the road through Ohain ; and his leading division, under Steinmetz, followed by the cavalry of the corps, approached the extreme left of Wellington, which rested on the building called Papelotte. 1 1 Chesney, Lect. VI. 403 CHAPTER VIII. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 1. It is not without justice, that great praise has always been accorded to retreats, made in presence of a superior enemy ; this is one of the most delicate and hazardous operations of war. The principal difficulty lies in the morale of the troops, which becomes much impaired in these circumstances ; it is a singular thing, the different impression produced upon the soldier, when he looks the enemy in the face, and when he turns his back upon him. In the first case, he only sees what really exists ; in the second, his imagination increases the danger. A general must then inspire his troops with pride and a just confidence, and present these sentiments to them as a powerful means of safety. 1 2. A retreat conducted in presence of a superior force with all the order, dispositions, coolness, and prudence which circumstances permit, is one of the things which particularly denote the real soldier : it is one which deserves to be specially noticed by general officers, and which is best calculated to gain their confidence for more important enterprises. It is under such constantly varying circumstances that an intelligent and brave officer soon finds an opportunity of distinguishing himself. 2 3. It often happens, that an army decamps silently during the night, without beat of drum or sound of trumpet ; this is called " stealing a march." Whatever may be the reason for thus silently decamping, it is always sought to conceal it from the enemy ; and with this object the pickets are left on the ground till daylight. On such occasions the pickets must be kept on the alert, seeing that if the departure of the army is discovered by the enemy, the pickets must expect to be im- mediately attacked. The lateral patrols should be constant, and so frequent, that there shall be always several on foot at the same time, so as to prevent spies and deserters from breaking through and informing the enemy of what is going on, and also to prevent his patrols from approaching near enough to find it out for themselves. 3 4. Sir John Moore, had given orders to retreat the moment the intelligence of Napoleon's march from Madrid reached him. The heavy 1 Marmout. " Jarry. 3 Ibid. 404 TACTICS. baggage and stores had been immediately moved to the rear ; but the reserve, the light brigades, and the cavalry remained at Sahagun ; the latter pushing their patrols up to the enemy's lines and skirmishing, with a view to hide the retrograde march. 1 5. If the fires should become dim and begin to go out sooner than usual, some movement of the enemy may be presumed. If the fires are much larger and more brilliant than usual, it may be presumed that he has decamped, because it often happens that the servants and women and other camp followers set fire to the straw in the camp, and to the suttler's huts, either by accident or purposely, and then the fire spreads to every part of the camp. It is the business of those who decamp during the night to take the necessary measures to provide against this, and also to prevent the enemy from discovering the departure of the army by the fires going out sooner than usual ; it is therefore customary to leave small detachments of infantry for the purpose of keeping up the fires of the camp-guards along the whole front till near daybreak. As everything that ought to be done is not always done, the officers of the picket should look to all these matters. 2 6. When the retreat is actually begun, it is no less difficult to decide whether a forced march shall be made to get as much the start of the enemy as possible, since this hurried movement might sometimes cause the destruction of the army, and might, in other circumstances, be its salvation. All that can be positively asserted on this subject is that, in general, with an army of considerable magnitude, it is best to retreat slowly, by short marches, with a well arranged rear guard of sufficient strength to hold the heads of the enemy's columns in check for several hours. Ketreats are of different kinds, depending upon the cause from which they result. A general may retire of his own accord before fighting, in order to draw his adversary to a position which he prefers to his present one. This is rather a prudent manoeuvre than a retreat. It was thus that Napoleon retired in 1805 from Wischau towards Brunn, to draw the Allies to a point which suited him as a battle-field. It was thus that Wellington retired from Quatre Bras to Waterloo. A general may retire in order to hasten to the defence of a point threatened by the enemy, either upon the flanks or upon the line of 1 Napier. y Jarry. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 405 retreat. When an army is marching at a distance from its depots, in an exhausted country, it may be obliged to retire in order to get nearer its supplies. Finally, an army retires involuntarily after a lost battle, or after an unsuccessful enterprise. 1 7. When a retreat becomes inevitable, it is well to conceal the design by partial attacks. The second line relieves the first, which withdraws by alternate battalions or wings of battalions. The artillery should withdraw by parts not less than batteries, as alternate guns, or half batteries, would not command sufficient width of front to open fire after withdrawing, without risk to those that had remained to cover the movement. A rear guard of the freshest troops available is organized as soon as possible ; the victorious army, which cannot long move in order of battle, but must form columns to pursue, is checked till it can again deploy ; the rear guard performs the functions formerly described as proper to it ; at the first defensible line the retreat is stopped, and the army restored to order, and as much as possible to confidence, and again confronts the enemy. Such is the history of a well-conducted retreat. 2 8. There are five methods of arranging a retreat : The first is to march in a single mass and upon one road. The second consists in dividing the army into two or three corps, marching at the distance of a day's march from each other, in order to avoid confusion, especially in the materiel The third consists in marching upon a single front by several roads, nearly parallel, and having a common point of arrival. The fourth consists in moving by constantly converging roads. The fifth, on the contrary, consists in moving along diverging roads. ****** When Napoleon retired from Smolensk, he used the second method, having the portions of his army separated by an entire march. He made therein a great mistake, because the enemy was not following upon his rear, but moving off along a lateral road which brought him in a nearly perpendicular direction into the midst of the separated French corps. The three fatal days of Krasnoi were the result. The employment of this method being chiefly to avoid encumbering the 1 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38, - Hamley, Part VI., Chap. IV. 406 TACTICS. road, the interval between the departure of the several corps is sufficiently great when the artillery may readily file off. Instead of separating the corps by a whole march, the army would be better divided into two masses and a rear guard, a half march from each other. ****** The third method, of retreating along several parallel roads, is ex- cellent when the roads are sufficiently near each other. But, if they are quite distant, one wing separated from the centre and from the other wing, may be compromised if the enemy attacks it in force, and compels it to stand on the defensive. The Prussian army moving from Magdeburg towards the Oder, in 1806, gives an example of this kind. The fourth method, which consists in following concentric roads, is undoubtedly the best if the troops are distant from each other when the retreat is ordered. Nothing can be better, in such a case, than to unite the forces ; and the concentric retreat is the only method of effecting this. The fifth method indicated is nothing else than the famous system of eccentric lines, attributed by Jomini to Bulow, and opposed so warmly in the earlier editions of his works, because he thought he could not be mistaken either as to the sense of his remarks on the subject, or as to the object of his system. * * * ****** Jomini found great fault with the system, for the simple reason that a beaten army is already weak enough, without absurdly still further dividing its forces and strength in presence of a victorious enemy. Bulow has found defenders who declare that Jomini mistook his meaning. ***** ****** Jomini, ' then admitted ' he may possibly have taken an incorrect impression from his language, and, in this case his criticism falls to the ground; for he has strongly recommended that kind of a retreat to which he has given the name of the parallel retreat. It is his opinion that an army, leaving the line which leads from the frontiers to the centre of the state, with a view of moving to the right or the left, may very well pursue a course nearly parallel to the line of the frontiers, or to its front of operations and its base. ****** ' He then added,' I find fault only with those retreats made along EETREATS AND PURSUITS. 407 several diverging roads, under pretence of covering a greater extent of frontier and of threatening the enemy on both flanks. ****** There are two cases in which divergent retreats are admissible, and then only as a last resource. First, when an army has experienced a great defeat in its own country, and the scattered fragments seek pro- tection within the walls of fortified places. Secondly, in a war where the sympathies of the whole population are enlisted, each fraction of the army thus divided may serve as a nucleus of assembly in each province ; but in a purely methodical war, with regular armies carried on according to the principles of the art, divergent retreats are simply absurd. There is still another strategical consideration as to the direction of a retreat, to decide when it should be made perpendicularly to the frontier and toward the interior of the country, or when it should be parallel to the frontier. For example, when Marshal Soult gave up the line of the Pyrenees in 1814, he had to choose one of two directions for his re- treat, either by way of Bordeaux toward the interior of France, or by way of Toulouse parallel to the frontier formed by the Pyrenees.* In the same way, when Frederick retired from Moravia, he marched towards Bohemia instead of returning to Silesia. These parallel retreats are often to be preferred, for the reason that they divert the enemy from a march upon the capital of the state and the centre of its power. The propriety of giving such a direction to a retreat must be determined by the configuration of the frontiers, the positions of the fortresses, the greater * or less space the army may have for its marches, and the facilities for recovering its direct communications with the central portions of the state. Spain is admirably suited for the use of this system. If a French army penetrates by way of Bayonne, the Spaniards may base themselves upon Pampeluna and Saragossa, or upon Leon and the Asturias ; and in either case the French cannot move directly to Madrid, because their line of operations would be at the mercy of their adversary. The frontier of the Turkish empire on the Danube presents the same advantages, if the Turks knew how to profit by them. 1 * Soult directed his line on Toulouse, in order to keep off the English army from the centre of France. F.J.S. 1 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38. 408 TACTICS. Decisive strategical point of a State, should be protected from sudden attacks. 9. Flank manoeuvres are easy when they can be executed under the shelter of a sufficient number of good fortresses. When this is not the case, it is better to retire in a direct line, as each lateral movement entails the necessity of a detachment on the capital. Now, as a general rule, it is wrong to break up one's forces in the presence of an enemy superior in numbers. Prince Charles rightly observed, " that this kind of defence on the flanks requires much reflection, profound views, and judgment." Although the Duke of Wellington has not left any written opinion on this important question, nevertheless one cannot doubt that he had at heart the same views as Napoleon and Prince Charles. When, in 1810, he was obliged to cover Lisbon, the object which Marshal Massena had in view in his operations, he took his position at Busaco, on the road to Coimbra, and retired immediately in a line parallel to the front of the French army. If he had moved on the flanks of that army, he would have exposed Lisbon to be carried by a coup de main, the lines of Torres- Vedras not being in a state to defend themselves without the aid of all the Anglo-Portuguese forces. The example and precepts of all the most illustrious generals prove that a lateral retreat does not produce good results, unless the decisive strategical point is completely protected from sudden attacks of the enemy. Conclusion. The army on the defensive has more freedom of action, and a larger field for it, when the main object of the enemy's attack is fortified. 1 10. There are circumstances, in which it is specially important to retard the enemy's march, to cause Mm to lose time by forcing him to make dispositions for attack, which suddenly become superfluous, because we withdraw at the moment when the battle seems ready to begin. Then are needed at the same time excellent troops, 1 Brialmont, Vol. I. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 409 and great precautions on the part of the commander. It is in an arrangement by echelons, and great precision in the movements, that security is to be found. If the retiring corps be so disproportioned to that which follows it, that it cannot hazard a battle, it may still, with prudence, sustain partial combats without danger. To this end it should prepare its movements beforehand, in such manner that there shall be no embarrassment among the troops, and that their march may always be light and easy. The general will place with his rear guard sufficient artillery, but not too much ; it should be well served, well mano3uvred, and some of the pieces should be of large calibre. 1 11. 'The artillery of the rear guard, some of the pieces of large calibre ' divided into two or three parts, placed in echelons, will march with facility, and will prepare successive and instantaneous points of resistance. The enemy is thus forced to halt in order to make his dispositions before attacking, and at the moment these dispositions are completed, the movement is resumed and the rear guard disappears. Then the enemy advances again, but he is kept at a distance by the fire of the artillery, which he soon discovers to be superior to his own ; for the pursuing force lengthens out its columns, while the other, by re- tiring, constantly carries away the field of battle, and draws nearer to its reserves. Hence there is a continual alternation in the respective strength of the troops in contact. 2 12. Many generals neglect to arrange the manner and times of halts, and great disorder on the march is the consequence, as each brigade or division takes the responsibility of halting whenever the soldiers are a little tired and find it agreeable to bivouac. The larger the army and the more compactly it marches, the more important does it become to arrange well the hours of departures and halts, especially if the army is to move at night. An ill-timed halt of part of a column may cause as much mischief as a route. If the rear guard is closely pressed, the army should halt in order to relieve it by a fresh corps taken from the second mass, which will halt with this object in view. The enemy seeing 80,000 men in battle-order will think it necessary to halt and collect his columns ; and then the retreat should commence at night fall, to regain the space which has been lost. 3 1 Marmont. 2 Ibid. 3 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38. 410 TACTICS. 13. "In Sir John Moore's campaign," said, the Duke of Wellington, " I can see but one error ; when he advanced to Sahagun, he should have considered it as a movement of retreat, and sent officers to the rear to mark and prepare the halting places for every brigade ; but this opinion I have formed after a long experience of war, and especially of the peculiarities of a Spanish war, which must have been seen to be under- stood ; finally, it is an opinion formed after the event." 1 14. When an army is driven from a first position, the retreating columns should rally always sufficiently in the rear, to prevent any interruption from the enemy. The greatest disaster that can happen is when the columns are attacked in detail, and before their junction. 2 15. If the retiring army is of sufficient strength to measure itself with the enemy * * its safety lies still in the manner in which the echelons are placed, and the aim is always the application of the fundamental principle to be more numerous than the enemy at the moment of combat, on the field of battle. The best disposition in such a conjecture as this : to retreat with the army very early, leaving a strong rear guard, which should retreat as late as possible without compromising itself; to take position in a defensive place, at such a distance that the enemy can only arrive three hours before sunset. However anxious to fight, he has not time to make his preparatory dispositions, and if he attempts the attack before completing them, he ought to be crashed, for the encamped army has all its forces united, while he necessarily has only a portion of his own. It was thus, that in 1812, the army of Portugal, very inferior to the English army, withdrew while in its sight, from the banks of the Tormes, to go and take position on the Douro, from which the enemy made no attempt to drive it. In 1796, when General Moreau evacuated Bavaria, to retreat upon the Ehine, followed by the Austrian army, he put this theory in practice ; pressed too closely, and marching with his forces united, he halted, gave battle, and gained a victory. But if an army in retreat, or even a single rear guard, finds upon its route an impregnable position, which the enemy cannot carry except by turning it at a distance, they should always occupy it during the entire time they can remain without danger; if the enemy manoeuvres to cause them to evacuate it, his 1 Napier, Vol. I. 2 Napoleon. RETEEATS AND PURSUITS. 411 operations are delayed, and time is everything for the defensive. If the enemy, in his impatience and ardour, attacking suddenly, rushes upon material obstacles, an easy victory will be gained, and one sometimes very destructive to the enemy, and susceptible of considerably changing the morale of the two armies. This is what happened in Portugal, on the 27th September, 1810. The English army, inferior to the French, took post on the 26th, upon the mountain of Busaco, counterfort of the Sierra of Acoba. The right of the position which was im- pregnable barred the road, while the left, connected with higher mountains, was of easy access. Massena, whom the Emperor had recommended to profit by his superiority to force the enemy to accept battle, resolved upon an immediate attack, and, unfortunately, without having sufficiently reconnoitred the position occupied by the enemy along his entire front. 1 * * 16. Fifty pieces of cannon planted on points most favourable for their action, commanded every approach to the position at Busaco. * * Massena prepared to attack that frowning ridge with 56,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 80 guns. Two columns, each consisting of a corps cVarmfa, were to advance against it; one from behind the convent of St. Antonio along the Viseu-road, the other through a valley separated from the Viseu-road by an inaccessible ridge. The third corps was placed in reserve, and the cavalry concealed itself, as much as possible in order to take advantage of any contingency that might arise. This order of battle was open to one grave objection ; the columns of attack could not support each other. But perhaps a heavier charge against Massena was this, that he permitted the whole of the 26th to pass without ascertaining whether it might not be possible to turn a position, a direct assault on which could not be attempted without great sacrifice of life. * * * * ****** The effects of the English successes at the Douro, and at Talavera, seemed to culminate in the victory of Busaco ; and Massena, who never from the first appears to have counted on an easy triumph, lost heart altogether. 1 Marmont. 412 TACTICS. Suspecting from the lie of the country, that there must be some road, by which the left of the English position could be turned, he sent out, after night fall, General Montbrun with some cavalry to reconnoitre ; and these having reported next morning that such a road existed, he availed himself with his usual ability of the advantages which it offered. His tirailleurs swarmed around the bases of the Busaco hills, a battery or two were pushed forward, and every disposition made as if for a renewal of the struggle. But in the night of the 28th, the whole army filed off to its right, and when morning dawned nothing could be seen on the ground which it had occupied, except smouldering fires, and the wrecks of the battle of the 27th. 1 17. It is generally sufficient if the rear guard keep the enemy at the distance of half a day's march from the main body. The rear guard would run great risk of being itself cut off, if farther distant. When, however, there are defiles in its rear which are held by friends, it may increase the sphere of its operations and remain a full day's march to the rear ; for a defile, when held, facilitates a retreat in the same degree that it renders it more difficult if in the power of the enemy. If the army is very numerous and the rear guard proportionately large, it may remain a day's march in rear. This will depend, however, upon its strength, the nature of the country, and the character and strength of the pursuing force. If the enemy presses up closely, it is of importance not to permit him to do so with impunity, especially if the retreat is made in good order. In such a case it is a good plan to halt from time to time and fall unexpectedly upon the enemy's advanced guard, as the Archduke Charles did in 1796 at Neresheim, Moreau at Biberach, and Kleber at Ukerath. Such a manoeuvre almost always succeeds, on account of the surprise occasioned by an unexpected offensive return upon a body of troops which is thinking of little else than collecting trophies and spoils. 2 18. Particular care and a judicious arrangement in being able to replace material and ammunition from the waggons, require to be con- sidered, as the supplies must of necessity be in front and liable to become more distant, should the retreat continue and the rear guard be detained checking the pursuit. 3 1 Gleig. 2 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38. 3 Taubert. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 413 19. Marshal Saxe remarks, that no retreats are so favourable as those which are made before a languid and unenterprising enemy, for when he pursues with vigour, the retreat soon degenerates into a route. Upon this principle it is a great error, says the Marshal, to adhere to the proverb which recommends us to build a bridge of gold for a retreating enemy. No ! follow him up with spirit, and lie is destroyed. 1 20. Night marches are seldom happy ; that from Lugo to Betanzos cost the army ' Sir John Moore's ' in stragglers more than double the number of men lost in all the preceding operations ; nevertheless, the reserve in that, as in all the other movements, suffered little ; and it is a fact, that the light brigades detached by the Vigo-road, which were not pursued, made no forced marches, slept under cover and were well supplied, left in proportion to their strength, as many men behind, as any other part of the army ; thus accumulating proof upon proof that inexperience was the primary and principal cause of the disorders which attended the retreat. Those disorders were sufficiently great, but many circumstances contributed to produce an appearance of suffering and disorganization which was not real. 2 When the line of retreat is intercepted by a stream. 21. If the stream is narrow and there are permanent bridges over it, the operation is nothing more, than the passage of a defile ; but when the river is wide and is to be crossed upon a temporary military bridge, it is a manoeuvre of extreme delicacy. Among the precautions to be taken, a very important one is to get the parks well advanced, so that they may be out of the way of the army : for this purpose it is well for the army to halt a half-day's inarch from the river. The rear guard should also keep at more than the usual distance from the main body, as far in fact, as the locality and the respective forces opposed will permit. The army may thus file across the bridge without being too much hurried. The march of the rear guard should be so arranged that it shall have reached a position in front of the bridge just as the 1 Sir G. C. D'Aguilar. s Napier. 414 TACTICS. last of the main body lias passed. This will be a suitable moment for relieving the rear guard by fresh troops strongly posted. The rear guard will pass through the intervals of the fresh troops in position and will cross the river. ****** The new rear guard will hold its position until night, and will then cross the river, breaking the bridges after it. It is, of course, under- stood, that as fast as the troops pass they form on the opposite bank and plant batteries, so as to protect the corps left to hold the enemy in check. 1 22. * * * * Moore stopped behind the Esla river to check the enemy, to restore order, and to enable his commissariat to remove the stores; Wellington stopped behind the Carrion for exactly the same purposes. The one general was immediately turned on his left, because the bridge of Mamilla was abandoned unbroken to Franceschi ; the other general was also turned on his left, because the bridge of Palencia was abandoned unbroken to Foy. 2 'Wellington,' pursued by a superior army, and seeing his cavalry defeated, turned as a savage lion at the Carrion, nor would he have removed so quickly from that lair, if the bridges at Palencia and Bahos had been destroyed according to his order. 3 * 23. * * * Moore with young soldiers was at first opposed to four times, and latterly to three tunes its own numbers, for it is remarkable that the French army assembled at Astorga was above 80,000, including 10,000 cavalry which is nearly the same as the number assembled against Wellington on the Tormes ; but Moore had little more than 20,000 to oppose to this overwhelming mass, and Wellington had nearly 70,000. The Partidas abounded at the time of Wellington's retreat, they were unknown at the time of Moore's retreat; and this General was confronted by Napoleon, who, despotic in command, was also unrivalled in skill, in genius, and in vigour. Wellington's army was not pressed by the enemy, and he made short marches, yet he lost more stragglers than Moore, who was vigorously pressed, made long marches, and could only secure an embarkation by delivering a battle, in which he died most honourably. His character 1 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38. 3 Napier, Vol. V. 8 Ibid. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 415 was immediately villified. Wellington was relieved from his pursuers by the operation of a famine, and had therefore no occasion to deliver a battle, but he was also villified at the time with equal justice ; and if he had then died, it would have been with equal malice. 1 24. It is a good plan to give the command of the rear guard to an officer of great coolness, and to attach to it staff officers who may, in advance of its movements, examine and select points suitable for occupation to hold the enemy temporarily in check. Cavalry can rally so rapidly on the main body, that it is evidently desirable to have considerable bodies of such troops, as they greatly facilitate the execution of a slow and methodical retreat, and furnish the means of thoroughly examining the road itself and the neighbourhood, so as to prevent an unexpected onset of the enemy upon the flanks of the retreating columns. 2 25. A reserve of cavalry is always indispensable, for the purpose of covering a retreat, without it every defeat would be irretrievable. This reserve will sometimes be obliged to sacrifice itself, like the Austrian Cuirassiers at Katisbonne in 1809, and the Cuirassiers and Chasseurs of Generals Espagne and Lassalle, at Essling. Intimately associated with the cavalry reserves, the artillery should carry out the following idea of Decker : " The artillery of the rear guard ought not to think so much of its own preservation as of that of the army, and should be resolved to sacrifice itself for the general safety." It is remarkable that those retreats which are most famous for their tactical combinations, could not have been brought to a successful termination, particularly in an enemy's country, without the aid of a powerful and well-handled cavalry. 3 26. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, as it keeps the enemy constantly at a distance. A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just before the battle of Pea Eidge, in March, 1862. A rear guard of 600 men, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of four regiments of infantry and cavalry, that 1 Napier, Vol. V. 3 Joinini, Chap. V., Art. 38. 3 Ambert. 416 TACTICS. followed and attacked it on every side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of which nearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape and shell, which suddenly checked them. In- stantly profiting by their temporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away to another position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy by its fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his way through a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of ten miles, in rejoining the main body with trifling loss. 1 27. Artillery is always of the greatest service in a retreat, because it retards the enemy's march. Lichtenstein's cavalry, ' at Austerlitz,' made good its retreat, protected by forty guns placed in position at the beginning of the action. Bagration retired upon Eausnitz, covered by two batteries of twelve and six guns respectively, placed upon his right and left. The fifty guns of Doctorow stopped for a time the charges of Boyer's division, and the forward movement of the French columns. A single light battery of six guns in position, on a hill above the pond at Tellnitz, caused two squadrons of Chasseurs of the guard, sent in pursuit of the Allies, to pause. 2 Retreat of the Austrian army, after the battle of Koniggrdtz, in 1866. 28. Most of the guns, which had been placed in batteries were taken, but those which acted as field artillery, admirably handled, were quickly withdrawn, and were already fast forming on a farther ridge by Rosnitz to cover the retreat of the infantry. The Prussians paused but a few moments among the taken guns, and then rushed on in pursuit. The summit of the ridge was quickly gained, and there before them they saw the whole hollow ground between them and Eosnitz filled with running white uniforms. The victorious battalions commenced a rapid fire upon them, and men dropped quickly from the flying ranks, rolling over and over as they fell on the sloping ground. The sixth corps, which the Crown Prince, had directed more against the Austrian rear, caught the fugitives in flank, and raked the running ranks with their 1 Lippitt. 2 Ambert. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 417 fire. The Prussian artillery was also quickly up, imlimbered, and came into action on the summit of the ridge, and sent its shells bursting with an horrible precision among the heads of the flying soldiers. And yet the Austrians kept their formation, and never let their retreat become a route. Such a retreat under such circumstances is as creditable to the valour of the Austrian soldiers, as a battle won. The Prussian cavalry, unable to leave the road till it got nearly the top of the hill, on account of the woods by the side of the way, was not up till the Austrian infantry had got half way across the hollow which separates Chlum from the further ridge of Eosnitz, and there the Austrian batteries had taken up their position, and began to play upon the pursuing troops. Then, for a few minutes, Prince Frederick Charles, who was leading the hussars and dragoons, had to leave them to make his general dispositions for attacking the new position taken up by the Austrian artillery, and the cavalry immediately got out of hand. By single squadrons, by single troops, and even only in knots of a few horsemen, they rushed with wild impetuosity at different points of the retreating infantry; but the Austrian guns sent shells rapidly among them, and the infantry, though running, still kept its formation, and turned, when they came too close, to stand and deliver volleys which emptied many a saddle. Nor w r ere the Austrian cavalry off the field, though they could not face the tremendous fire of the Prussians to charge and cover the retreat of their infantry ; but when attacked by the enemy's cavalry, and when thus the guns could not fire upon them, they fought hard, and sacrificed themselves to cover the retreat. 1 * * * 29. But the Austrian artillery was not long able to hold its new position ; the fire of the Prussian guns and the dispositions which were being made to attack it, compelled it to retire. It then drew off slowly, but on every successive ridge came into action, and fired against the pursuers to check them, and gain for its own infantry time for retreat. Some Prussian horse artillery and cavalry followed it, and till after nightfall the pursuit went thundering towards the Elbe, and drew the fire of the heavy guns of the fortress. The Austrian cavalry retired to Pardubitz, and the remainder of the army by seven or eight bridges, thrown across the river between that place and Koiiiggriitz, got beyond the stream by night without severe loss. 2 * * * * 1 Hosier, Vol. I. * Ibid. 27 418 TACTICS. 30. The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed. The men were fatigued, and night was coming on. The Austrian cavalry was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Prussian cavalry of the first Army had suffered severely. The Elbe lay between the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The victory, although for- tuitously decisive, was not improved to such advantage as it ought to have been. 1 Retreat of the Allies, after the battle of Bautzen, in 1813. 31. The Allies, ' Kussia and Prussia,' were not in a condition to assume the offensive against an enemy who had an advantage in numbers of nearly two to one, and whose principal columns were now concentrated towards a focus, and brought to bear simultaneously on the corps of General Blucher in his salient and exposed position, with six hours of daylight still remaining. A retreat in good order was evidently the most favourable result the allied army could expect. To prolong the affair would only have occasionally increased loss on both sides in killed and wounded, which the enemy could afford better than the Allies ; and enough had been done to show the determination of the allied sovereigns remained unchanged, to persevere in the great struggle in which they were engaged. These considerations induced the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, at about three in the afternoon, very reluctantly to sanction the order for a general retreat, with an army neither disheartened or disorganized, but, though somewhat diminished in numbers, still prepared to dispute another position with equal resolution. ****** As this probable result had been anticipated, all dispositions for the general retreat of the army had been duly prepared, and the ground for the night fixed for each corps and division. All the rear guard posts that were capable of being disputed, had been well considered; and good discipline and a superiority in cavalry, through a country generally favourable to that arm, secured a safe and orderly retreat, which was made in two columns, the left wing, by Hochkirch, on Lobau, and tHe right, by Weissenberg, 1 Hozier, Vol. I. EETREATS AND PURSUITS. 419 on Reichenbach. ********< Blucher ' had united several batteries of light artillery, which were supported by all his cavalry, including the Prussian cavalry of reserve, and so effectually kept the enemy at bay, that Ney was obliged to have recourse to a similar disposition, and assembled a battery of sixty guns to oppose him. The Prussian infantry retreated, in the mean while, in perfect order, molested only by a distant cannonade. To check the rapid advance of the French in his rear, and to collect his own forces, General Blucher made a stand on the commanding ground near Belgern, and then moved off, by Weissenberg, on Reichenbach, according to the route assigned to the right column. Barclay de Tolly retired in the same direction, and Kleist was left, with a large proportion of cavalry and light artillery, to form the rear guard and cover the retreat. * * ****** The routes of the two retiring columns of the allied army converged on Reichenbach, and the commanding ground in rear of that defile, was occupied by the Allies with purpose of resistance, and therefore more in force than an ordinary rear guard post. 1 Soult's retreat OK Toulouse. 32. At the close of the combat of Tarbes, the situation of the re- treating troops seemed desperate, but as Soult had foreseen, the deep ditches and enclosures and the small copses, villages, and farm houses " on the plain of Tarbes where Clauzel was posted, two or three miles in front of the heights of Oleac, on which the French army was in line of battle on the morning of the 20th " prevented the British cavalry from acting ; Clauzel therefore extricating his troops with great ability from their dangerous situation, finally gained the main position, where four fresh divisions were drawn up in order of battle and immediately opened all their batteries on the Allies. The pursuit was thus checked, and before Lord Wellington could make arrangements for a new attack darkness came on and the army halted on the banks of the Larret and Larros rivers. fc * # - : $#**.-*** 1 Oatlicart. 420 TACTICS. During the night, Soult retreated in two columns, one by the main road, the other on the left of it, guided by fires lighted on different hills, as points of direction. The next day he reached St. Gaudeus with D'Erlon's and Reille's corps, while Clauzel, who had retreated across the fields, halted at Monrejean and was there rejoined by Pierre Soult's cavalry. This march of more than thirty miles was made with a view to gain Toulouse in the most rapid manner. 1 Retreat of the English army, under Sir John Moore, on Corunna. 33. The Duke of Dalmatia, a general, who, if the Emperor be excepted, was no wise inferior to any of his nation, commenced his pursuit of the English army with a vigour that marked his eager desire to finish the campaign in a manner suitable to the brilliant opening at Gamonal. The main body of his troops followed the route of Foncevadon and Ponteferrada, a second column took the road of Cambarros and Bembibre, and General Franceschi, with the light cavalry, entering the valley of the Syl, ascended the course of that river, and turned the position of Villa Franca del Bierzo. Thus, Sir John Moore, after having twice baffled the Emperor's combinations, was still pressed in his retreat with a fury that seemed to increase every moment. The separation of his light brigades, a measure which he adopted, after the advice of his Quarter-Master-General, weakened the army by 3000 men ; but he still possessed 19,000 men of all arms, good soldiers to fight, and strong to march, yet by the disorders at Valderas and Astorga, much shaken in their discipline ; for the general's exertions to restore order and regularity were by many officers slightly seconded, and by some with scandalous levity disregarded. There was no choice but to retreat. The astonishing rapidity with which the Emperor had brought up his overwhelming numbers, and thrust the English army into Gallicia, had rendered the natural strength of the country un- availin cr . 2 * * * * * * * 34. Before he advanced from Salamanca, Sir John Moore, foreseeing that his movement must sooner or later end in a retreat, had sent 1 Napier, Vol. VI. J Ibid., Vol. I. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 421 officers to examine the roads of Gallicia and the harbours wliich offered the greatest advantages for embarkation. By the reports of those officers, which arrived from day to day, and by the state of the magazines he had directed to be formed, his measures were constantly regulated. The magazines of Astorga, Benevente, and Labanenza, were, by untoward circumstances, and the deficiency of transport, rendered of no avail beyond the momentary supply they afforded ; and part of their contents falling into the enemy's hands, gave him some cause of triumph ; but those at Villa Franca and Lugo contained about fourteen days' consumption; and there were other small magazines formed on the line of Orenze and Vigo ; more than this could not have been accomplished. It was now only the fifteenth day since Sir John Moore had left Salamanca, and already the torrent of war, diverted from the south, was foaming among the rocks of Gallicia. 19,000 British troops, posted in strong ground, might have offered battle to very superior numbers ; but where was the use of merely fighting an enemy who had 300,000 men in Spain ? Nothing could be gained by such a display of courage ; but the English general by a quick retreat might reach his ships unmolested, embark, and carrying his army from the narrow corner in which it was cooped, to the southern provinces, establish there a good base of operations, and renew the war under favourable cir- cumstances. 1 35. At Corunna, the absence of the fleet necessarily brought on a battle ; that it was honourable to the British troops is clear from the fact that they embarked without loss after the action ; and that it was absolutely necessary to embark notwithstanding the success, is as certain a proof how little advantage could have been derived from any battle fought farther inland, and how prudently Sir John Moore acted in declining an action the moment he had rallied his army at Lugo, and restored that discipline which the previous movements had shaken. 2 Soiilt's retreat, after the battle of Albuera. 36. On the 18th, two days after the battle of Albuera, the French under Soult retreated. He left to the generosity of the English general 1 Napier, Vol. I, 2 Ittd. 422 TACTICS. several hundred men too deeply wounded to be removed : but all that could travel, he had, in the night of the 17th, sent towards Seville, by the royal road, through Santa Marta, Los Santos, and Monasterio : then, protecting his movements with all his horsemen and six battalions of infantry, he filed the army, in the morning, to its right, and gained the road of Solano. When this flank march was completed, Latour Maubourg covered the rear with the heavy dragoons, and Briche protected the march of the wounded men by the royal road. 1 37. On the 16th, when Soult had regained the hills at the other side of the Albuera, the battle ceased, each side being so hardly handled, that neither offered to renew the fight. Here was the greatest failure of the French commander; he had lost 8000 men, but he had still 15,000 under arms, and his artillery and his cavalry were comparatively untouched. On the side of the Allies, only 1500 British infantry were standing ; the troops were suffering greatly from famine ; the Spaniards had been feeding on horse flesh, and were so extenuated by continual fatigue and misery, that, for several days previous to the battle, they had gone over in considerable numbers even to the "French, hoping thus to get food : these circumstances should be borne in mind, when re- flecting on their conduct in the battle; under such a commander as Blake, and, while enduring such heavy privations, it was a great effort of resolution, and honourable to them that they fought at all. Their resistance feeble, when compared to the desperate valour of the British, was by no means weak in itself or infirm ; nor is it to be wondered at that men so exhausted and so ill-managed should have been deaf to the call of Beresford, a strange general, whose exhortations they probably did not understand. When the fortune of the day changed they followed the fusileers with alacrity, and at no period did they give way with dishonour. Nevertheless, all circumstances considered, they were not and could not be equal to a second desperate struggle, a renewed attack on the 17th, would have certainly ended in favour of the French ; and so conscious was Beresford of this, that, on the evening of the 16th, he wrote to Lord Wellington, avowing that he anticipated a certain and ruinous defeat the next day. The resolution with which he maintained the position, notwithstanding, was the strongest in- dication of military talent he gave during the whole of his operations; 1 Napier, Vol. III. EETKEATS AND PURSUITS. 423 had Soult only persisted in holding his position with equal pertinacity, Beresford must have retired. It was a great and decided mistake of the French marshal not to have done so. There is nothing more essential in war than a confident front; a general should never acknowledge himself vanquished, for the front line of an army always looks formidable, and the adversary can seldom see the real state of what is behind. 1 ******* Retreat of the Prussian army on Wavre. 38. Gneisenau coming into temporary command after the fall of Blucher at the end of the battle of Ligny, and finding the struggle for the present hopelessly decided, chose at all risk of inconvenience to abstain from the notion of a retreat to the east, and to keep as near as might be to the English army. Without any direct communication with Wellington (as far as can be positively ascertained), he put his army in motion northward for Wavre at the earliest daybreak. * * * The order of the Prussian retreat, was simple enough, and was neither molested nor even noticed by the French, as Napoleon's own words show. Zieten left the vicinity of the Ligny plateau at daybreak, and by field tracks made his way due northward through the villages of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mount St. Guibert to Wavre, where he crossed the Dyle to the further side of the town. A little later Pirch followed him, halting, however on the south side of Wavre, and leaving detachments to cover their rear. Thielemann, who had the reserve parks of the army in charge, moved separately and more slowly, going through Gembloux (which he only quitted at two p.m.), and reaching Wavre so late that he could not carry his whole corps through the town that night to the north bank of the Dyle, as had been intended. Bulow made a march (in accordance with distinct instructions received that morning) by the villages of Walhain and Corbaix to that of Dion- le-mont, three miles S. W. of Wavre, where he took up a position with strong rear guards thrown out to cover from any pursuit of the French the army thus happily concentrated, and so relieved those of General Pirch.2 1 Napier, Vol. III. a Chesney, Lect, V, 424 TACTICS. Retreat of the English army from Qitatre Bras on Waterloo. 39. Wellington's orders written at Genappe, where he slept, suffi- ciently show him quite unconscious of the Prussian intentions, and anxious to complete the concentration at Quatre Bras; but he rode early back to the scene of the action of the 16th, and soon learnt the truth. An aide-de-camp with an escort communicated early with General Zieten, and heard what Gneisenau had ordered ; and before the English troops had cooked their breakfast an officer from Blucher's own head-quarters, already moved to Wavre, brought messages from the Marshal. A retreat was of course essential in Wellington's exposed position ; but the line taken by the Prussians, and the failure (which Wellington observed) of the French to pursue, spoke so plainly of a prospect of cordial co-operation leading to victory, that the Duke at once announced his intention of pausing in his movement on Brussels, to accept battle in the position of Waterloo (reconnoitred and reported on for him the year before), provided Blucher would help him with part of his army. Covered by Alten's division (of the Prince of Orange's corps), and the cavalry, the retreat of the English main body was begun in excellent order, and continued throughout the day until completed. Lord Hill led direct to Waterloo the troops from Nivelles, Chassis and Clinton's divisions and part of Colville's. The rest of Colville's and Frederick's Dutch-Belgians moved by a third road from Enghien on Hal, a town ten miles westward of Waterloo, where they were ordered to halt, to cover Brussels on that side. With the exception of this detachment, and a single brigade marching up from Ghent to arrive at daylight, the whole fighting army of Wellington lay that night upon the ground which the next day was to make the most famous battle-field in the world. Their left was but seven miles distant, in a straight line, from the right of their Allies at Bierge, near Wavre ; and their chief, in reply to his demand for aid, had received from Blucher, now fully recovered, the characteristic reply, 'he would march with his whole army to join him, and if the French delayed to attack, the Allies would give them battle on the 19th.' 1 1 Chesney, Lect. V, KETREATS AND PURSUITS. 425 40. That Wellington did not begin to move his troops off until about ten a.m., is a point proved by the united testimony of independent witnesses. Until that hour, therefore, he stood facing Ney with the force victorious the night before, and now reinforced largely. * * ****** Wellington was left exposed in an apparently isolated position on the morning of the 17th, for the want of information as to their doings from Blucher's staff. Muffling admits that the Duke for a moment thought himself deceived, when he at last heard from Zieten of the retreat begun many hours before. 1 41. There was no incident of importance in the advance in pursuit of the English, save one sharp skirmish at Genappe, where Lord Uxbridge had to turn and drive back with his household brigade of heavy cavalry some lancers who pressed the seventh Hussars, Wellington's extreme rear, with some vivacity. This repulse, or (according to some accounts) the rain which fell in torrents all the evening, saved the English army further interruption until the French reached at dusk the heights of Belle Alliance, opposite Wellington's chosen position. A deployment of Milhaud's cavalry, which Napoleon here ordered, soon produced such a fire of artillery as convinced him that his enemy was not retiring, as he had feared, through the forest of Soignies under cover of the coming night. The French were halted, therefore, as they came up, and placed in bivouac to await the events of that morrow from which their chief hoped so much, but which was in truth to leave the Emperor and Grand Army nothing but the fame of the past glories they had shared. 2 42. Wellington's movement from Quatre Bras, the perfect way in which his strong cavalry and a single division of infantry masked the retreat of the rest, and the complete order in which he carried off so large and miscellaneous a force from before the face of the most re- nowned general of the world handling superior numbers, * * attracted deserved admiration at the time from foreign observers, though its details must be studied in the work of his friendly English critic, Kennedy, who was employed in conducting it, to understand their perfection. 3 1 Chesney, Lect. V. - Ibid. 3 ll'ul. 426 TACTICS. 43. Kennedy records, that, ' The 3rd division was severely engaged on the 16th, and was in a position of great delicacy to be withdrawn from on the 17th, as it occupied Pierniont and part of the great road towards Brye, and consequently became exposed to the advance of the army under Buonaparte from the field of Ligny. 'Sir J. Shaw Kennedy ' was ordered to reconnoitre the country from the position of the division near Piermont, to the Dyle, and to fix upon its line of retreat, and upon the point at which it should pass the Dyle, so as to leave the passage at Genappe free for the other portions of the army. The division retired upon the line as fixed upon in this reconnaissance. Marching by Bezy, it passed the Dyle by the bridge of Wais-le-Hutte, and, by a cross-march, joined the great road leading from Genappe to Waterloo. This operation was a very delicate one, that of withdrawing 6000 men from before so great a force, in open day, under Napoleon, with which force they were in actual contact, and having during their retreat to cross a considerable river. The operation was, however, perfectly successful. Every possible precaution was taken to withdraw a great portion of the division before the enemy perceived that it was moving in retreat, and the three brigades were so arranged that they kept in echelons on the line of retreat, each brigade forming on ground favourable for repelling an attack, and so that each brigade should retire in succession ; thus, the enemy constantly found, as he advanced, brigade after brigade regularly formed for action. Although the enemy closely followed the division, he never attempted any regular attack upon it. After having joined the great Genappe road, the division proceeded directly along that road, to the field of battle of Waterloo.' 1 Retreat of Grouchy to France. 44. Eetreat in the Charleroi direction being closed, that through the mass of the Ardennes seemed to present itself as the best means of escaping the allied pursuit : but the French had no supplies which could maintain them in a country where subsistence was not to be picked up by the way. There remained but one hope. The fortress of 1 Kennedy. RETREATS AND PURSUITS. 427 Namur had been abandoned by the Prussians in their haste to con- centrate on Ligny, and they had by their subsequent march northward left it uncovered. Could Grouchy once regain Sombreffe before the Prussians seized that point, he would have a clear passage along the great chaussee which led from Mvelles into the place, with an equally good one beyond it up the Meuse by which to escape ; and his rear, covered by the works might file safely into France. Seizing rapidly at this hope, he despatched his chief cavalry officer, General Excelmans, with seven regiments of dragoons to ride at speed on Namur and seize the works. With Gerard's corps the Marshal followed, and by a forced march reached Sombreffe the same evening, leaving Vandamme at Wavre to cover the rear. * At five p.m. Vandamme commenced his retreat unmolested, and at midnight took up his bivouac at Gembloux for a few hours rest. His march was observed by the nearest division of the Prussians, that which had returned from St. Lambert to rejoin Thielemann, and by them reported to the latter general, who gave orders to pursue at daylight. On the 20th the French continued their retreat in two columns. Vandamme, quitting Gembloux at seven a.m., after a somewhat unnecessary delay, marched across country on Namur by a direct bye-road. Grouchy, waiting probably till he knew his lieutenant to be on his way, moved from Sombreffe along the high road about the same hour. Both were attacked before they reached the fortress, the Marshal himself being overtaken a short distance from the fortress by the advance guard of Pirch, which had left Mellery soon after five a.m., on learning that the enemy were moving on Namur. The same caution which had kept that general motionless all the day before when within two hours' march of the road traversed by the retreating French, seems to have hampered him still. His troops did not succeed in engaging the enemy's rear guard until four p.m., about which hour Thielemann's cavalry, having passed through Gembloux, overtook the tail of Vandamme's column, but having no infantry with them, were unable to make any serious impression upon it. At six p.m., the whole of the French had passed within the works of Namur, with little loss but that of two or three light guns. Indignant possibly at the result of his own slowness, Pirch directed an immediate assault upon the walls, in hopes of carrying the place before the enemy abandoned it : but Vandamme, entrusted by 428 TACTICS. Grouchy with the duty of covering with his own corps and Teste's division the retreat of the army, defended the walls too vigorously for such a rash attack to succeed; and after losing over 1600 men, the Prussians desisted from an attempt which it is hard (according to their great national writer) to justify under the circumstances. After this they pressed no more on Grouchy, who made his way unmolested up the Meuse to Dinant, and thence by Givet into the heart of France, having accomplished, with a very trifling loss, one of the most surprising escapes from a very critical position which modern history records. It was not until the 21st that his troops once more drew regular rations; nor did he receive any instructions for his guidance till the 23rd, when orders from Soult directed him to continue his march on Soissons. 1 45. Pursuits should be conducted upon the same principles as strategical lines and battles, always aiming at the communications of the flying enemy ; but in this case more than any, no relaxation should be allowed ; no time for the reorganization of his broken corps, or for preparing means to retard the pursuer. If his communications can be turned, it may be expected that the whole materiel of his army will be captured. The pursuer should disregard having his most advanced troops checked or even repulsed ; he may be sure the enemy cannot continue to hold his ground, and therefore should attack him again and again, till he obtains his object : if he can drive the fugitives to the shores of the sea, a great lake, or deep river, he may compel them to surrender ; therefore no battle gained should be without a pursuit to the utmost, provided no unanswerable objection be opposed to it. 2 46. When an army retreats, whatever may be the motive of the operation, a pursuit always follows. A retreat, even when executed in the most skilful manner and by an army in good condition, always gives an advantage to the pursuing army ; and this is particularly the case after a defeat, and when the source of supplies and reinforcements is at a great distance ; for a retreat then becomes more difficult than any other operation in war, and its difficulties increase in proportion to the skill exhibited by the enemy in conducting the pursuit. 1 Chesncy, Lect. VII. 2 (Aide Momoire) C.H.S. KETEEATS AND PURSUITS. 429 (1) It is generally better to direct the pursuit upon the flank of the retreating columns, especially when it is made in one's own country and where no danger is incurred in moving perpendicularly or diagonally upon the enemy's line of operations. Care must, however, be taken not to make too large a circuit ; for there might then be danger of losing the retreating enemy entirely. (2) A pursuit should generally be as boldly and actively executed as possible, especially when it is subsequent to a battle gained ; because the demoralized army may be wholly dispersed if vigorously followed up. 1 47. In pursuit, the great aim should be to strike not the rear, but the flank of the retreating enemy. And as infantry that preserves its array can scarcely overtake troops flying in disorder, cavalry and horse artillery are specially adapted for making circuits by which to cut in on the line of retreat. Cavalry pressing on the rear should not stop to attack firm infantry, but pass on, and increase the confusion of troops and abandonment of material. 2 48. If any such parallel road exist which joins that by which your army is retreating at a point farther on, it must push on to that point by marches forced to the utmost limit of the endurance of the troops : there is no rest nor safety for it until it reach that point. But as a further precaution, the junction of the two roads should be intrenched beforehand, and a picked force of the three arms sent forward to hold it. It will be a race between you and the enemy to reach that point first : and, if he gain, the consequences are certain to be very disastrous. By employing judiciously his physical advantages, the general in command of a retreating force has much in his power. For instance, if a favourable position occurs on the line of his intended day's march a position of which, of course, the circumstances are previously known to him he may time his morning start from the last night's halting- place, so as to arrive there three or four hours before sunset. Whatever may be the enemy's impatience, he dare not attack this new position until his army is formed methodically and his dispositions are com- pleted. Under the most favourable circumstances this would occupy so much time, that sufficient daylight would not remain to commence 1 Jomini, Chap. V., Art. 38. " Hamley, Part VI., Chap IV. 430 TACTICS. a battle with any hope of bringing it to a successful issue before dark. 1 49. In a skilful pursuit, artillery can play an important part, by successively taking up good positions, from which it can crush the enemy's columns, and change retreat into a route. 2 1 MacDougall. 2 Ambert. 431 PAET V. MINOR OPERATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS. CHAPTEE I. SECTION I. MOUNTAIN WARFARE. 1. In a mountainous country, small, well-located forts are equal in value to fortified places, because their province is to close the passes, and not to afford refuge to armies ; the little fort of Bard, in the valley of Aosta, almost arrested Napoleon's army in 1800. 1 2. Forts constructed upon mountains and rocks, are sometimes so elevated that the approach of the enemy is scarcely affected, on account of the very depressed angle at which it is necessary to fire the guns. Such posts are often unprovided with water, especially when they depend for a supply upon wells which dry up in summer ; this reduces the garrison to the water in the tanks, which soon becomes bad, and forces it to capitulate. 2 3. Boroughs, villages, hamlets, and isolated houses, situated at the foot of heights or in hollows, are seldom capable of being turned into posts : but when circumstances require that they should be occupied, it is necessary to remedy whatever defects they possess, by means of in- trenchments. 3 4. It has long been a question whether possession of the mountains gave control of the valleys, or whether possession of the valleys gave control of the mountains. The Archduke Charles, a very intelligent and competent judge, has declared for the latter, and has demonstrated that the valley of the Danube is the key of Southern Germany. However, 1 Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 26. * Jervis. * Ibid. 432 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. in this kind of questions much depends upon the relative force and their arrangement in the country. * * * ****** The important natural strategic points will be at the junction of the larger valleys, or of the streams in those valleys, and will be few hi number ; and, if the defensive army occupy them with the mass of its forces, the invader will generally be compelled to resort to direct attacks to dislodge it. 1 5. The valleys, almost alone, offer means of communication. The junction of the valleys in the mountains, is what the junction of roads is in the plains. However, in the Saxon Erzgebirge, the roads are on the summit. The establishment of communications in the mountains must, therefore, be scrupulously attended to; because all success, in the direction of war, depends on that principle. The Archduke Charles says, on keeping open the roads : ' It is in the valleys that we find the roads necessary for the transport of troops, and their provisions. It is necessary to keep the valleys, to be master of the mountains, because they command the valleys. That the occupation of high mountains for regular armies ought not to be of long duration, as the conveyance of necessary stores for any length of time, is im- possible.' 2 6. Valleys require a very careful survey. The chief points to be enquired into are, the population, extent, woods, cultivation, intersection by rivers, streams, or ravines ; whether they produce grain or forage ; whether troops can march through them easily and with safety; whether the mountains or heights, which form these valleys, are at such a distance that the columns advancing through them would not be inconvenienced by the fire of the enemy posted on their heights ; and especially, whether this enemy could shut up the troops which had so advanced. Valleys which are cut longitudinally or transversely by a great number of counterforts, streams, sinuosities, and ravines, are often impracticable for troops, from the number of bridges to be constructed or passages to be opened. 3 7. When examining in detail a mountainous country, the first points to be considered are those mountains which overlook others, their 1 Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 28. 5 Decker. 3 Jervis. MOUNTAIN WARFARE. 433 relative position, the means of reaching their summits, and the most important points to be occupied, either generally or otherwise ; whether the summits consist of naked rocks ; whether they are wooded, either partly or totally; whether they are advantageous positions to occupy, and what object would be fulfilled by doing so. The passes, roads, and paths, which cross the heights, should be examined, as well as the back of the heights, and the valleys ; whether the valleys are practicable or not, or only difficult of access ; whether artillery, cavalry or only in- fantry, can pass through them. The debouches and defiles which lead into these valleys should also be carefully sought out, and it should be ascertained whether these debouches or defiles are favourable or other- wise. The nature of the steeps and slopes of the mountains should be reconnoitred, as also the character of the woods (if there are any), of the streams, pastures, towns, boroughs, villages, hamlets, country houses, farms, windmills, and isolated houses ; whether they would be of any use in a military point of view ; what positions would be advantageous for encamping, &c. Examine whether there is any table land beyond, which would enable an enemy, by taking up his position there, to advance and make himself master of a large extent of country ; examine accurately the points by which the enemy might turn the positions or outposts which it is intended to occupy, or by which he might himself be turned ; discover whether there are any paths which enable this to be done ; for, though mountainous countries present strong positions in almost every direction, yet the greater part are susceptible of being turned. It should be discovered whether heights of middling elevation are practicable, or would be useful if occupied ; whether batteries, or posts of observation, might be placed there; the nature of their com- munications with their rear ; whether they are short and easy ; whether, once the enemy has got a footing in the mountains, he can cut off your communications; what means there are to secure these, and at what time of the year the several mountain passes are closed up by snow. Mountain roads are often obstructed by snow r ; it is therefore of im- portance to know at what season they are closed or open ; they may be more or less open at different parts, and sometimes are so steep that they are crossed with difficulty. 1 1 Jervis. 28 434 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. 8. Rivers which take their rise in mountains are rapid, and of little depth near their source ; their banks are generally edged with heights, prolongations- of the one in which the river has its source. These rivers swell with great rapidity, either after much rain or from the melting of the snow : the first in March or April, when the snow first begins to melt, and the second towards the month of July, when that on the highest summits begins to be affected by the great heats. It is im- portant to be correctly informed as to the time of the year when these increases take place, so as to regulate the movements of the troops accordingly. The beds of these rivers are generally good; but the quantity of large stones, with which the fords are encumbered, makes them very inconvenient for horses, and often impracticable for artillery or carriages. 1 9. Offensive mountain warfare, in a hostile unknown region, is the prosecution of a difficult art under most trying circumstances. All the ordinary obstructions to successful campaigning then present themselves in an aggravated form. Whether in climbing steep ridges, or in forcing rocky defiles, the advantages of ground and the knowledge of locality are entirely in favour of the enemy. They not only held all the com- manding points, but the very habits of their daily life render them peculiarly adapted for irregular fighting. Simple and abstemious in their living, the air and exercise on the mountain-side inure them to hardships, and render them capable of great physical exertion. The well-fed soldiers of the plains, on the other hand, toiling wearily over the unwonted difficulties of the ground, find that the advantages of their regular formations and severe drill are of little avail under conditions so antagonistic to ordinary routine. But the difficulties of moving large and regularly organized bodies of men over a steep and almost pathless country do not end here. The transport required for the carriage of food, ammunition, clothing, medical stores, and the hundred details which go to meet the almost artificial wants of modern armies, render rapid locomotion nearly impossible, and our Indian experience has hitherto been very adverse to lightness of equipment. * * * # * * * * An experience of twenty years on the frontier has so far been 1 Jervis. MOUNTAIN WARFARE. 435 beneficial, that the Punjaub local regiments, are provided with mule- transport, and are fairly adapted for quick movement, though even with them, baggage is by no means reduced to a minimum. 1 10. The offensive against a mountainous country also presents a double case : it may either be directed upon a belt of mountains beyond which are extensive plains, or the whole theatre may be mountainous. In the first case there is little more to be done than this, viz. : make demonstrations upon the whole line of the frontier, in order to lead the enemy to extend his defence, and then force a passage at the point which promises the greatest results. The problem in such a case is to break through a cordon which is strong, less on account of the numbers of the defenders than from their position, and if broken at one point, the whole line is forced. * * * * * * * * * * When we consider the tactical difficulties of this kind of war, and the immense advantages it affords the defence, we may be inclined to regard the concentration of a considerable force to penetrate by a single valley as an extremely rash manoeuvre, and to think that it ought to be divided into as many columns as there are practicable passes. In my opinion this is one of the most dangerous of all illusions ; and to confirm what I say, it is only necessary to refer to the fate of the columns of Championnet at the battle of Fossano. If there be five or six roads on the menaced front, they should all, of course, be threatened ; but the army should cross the chain in not more than two masses/ and the routes which these follow should not be divergent ; for if they were, the enemy might be able to defeat them separately. Napoleon's passage of the Saint-Bernard was wisely planned. He formed the bulk of his army on the centre, with a division on each flank by Mont Cenis and the Simplon, to divide the attention of the enemy and flank his march. 2 Passage of tlie Afys ly Napoleon. 11. "An obstacle, whose importance we had not properly estimated, was near arresting us at the very threshold of our career. The army 1 Col. Aclyc. 2 Jomini, Chap. III., Art. 38. 436 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. descending the valley of the Doria, after routing at Chatillon, a small corps of the enemy, which was too feeble to oppose our march. But on reaching the little fort of Bard, which, situated on an impregnable rock, was garrisoned by only 400 men, we found our passage closed. It refused to surrender at our summons, and resisted all our attempts at an escalade. Lannes, with the infantry, succeeded in effecting a passage by the mountains of Albaredo; but neither horses nor cannon could pass ! It was almost maddening to see one's self arrested by a mere handful of men ! I caused a new road to be cut through the rocks for my cavalry. My soldiers, like those of Hannibal, debouched by a road cut out with their own hands. But if the Carthaginian general was em- barrassed by his elephants, I was no less so by my cannon. Seeing no other means of extricating myself from this dangerous position, I resorted to stratagem. Covering the wheels of the carriages with straw so as to prevent all noise in their movements, we drew them, in the night while the garrison was asleep, through the streets of the Faubourg directly under the guns of the fort! This bold but perilous operation was attended with perfect success, and full of hope, we continued our march on Ivrea. Lannes had already taken this place, and driven the Austrians on Romano. There were only 3000 of the enemy in the valley of Aosta, at the time of our passage, but more than 30,000 were scattered in the valleys of the Ticino and the Po." 1 12. Among mountains a great number of positions are always to be found very strong in themselves, and which it is dangerous to attack. The character of this mode of warfare consists in occupying camps on the flanks or in the rear of the enemy, leaving him only the alternative of abandoning his position without fighting, to take up another in the rear; or to descend from it in order to attack you. In mountain warfare, the assailant lias always the disadvantage. Even in offensive warfare, in the field, the great secret consists in defensive combats, and in obliging the enemy to attack. 2 13. Wellington 'in the Pyrenees ' saved Coimbra, forced the enemy into a narrow, intricate, and ravaged country, and, with an inferior force, 1 Life of Napoleon. Napoleon. MOUNTAIN WARFARE. 437 turned him out of every strong position ; and this, by a series of move- ments, based on the soundest principles of war. For, noting the skill and tenacity with which Massena and Ney clung to every league of ground and every ridge defensible, against superior numbers, he seized the higher slopes of the mountains by Picton's flank march on the 13th ; and again by Cole's on the 14th ; and thus, continually menacing the passes in rear of the French, obliged them to abandon positions which could scarcely have been forced: and this method of turning the strength of the country to profit, is the true key to mountain warfare. He who receives battle in the hills has always the advantage ; and he who first seizes the important points chooses his own field of battle. 1 14 In the military work, entitled " Campagne de 1799, en Allemagne et en Suisse," which is generally supposed to be by the Archduke Charles, the author thus expresses himself : " The theory of mountain warfare has perhaps never been so clearly and. forcibly developed as during the campaign of 1799, where the belligerent armies were dis- puting for the possession of the elevated countries of Europe. This period, which was particularly celebrated by the course of the operations, gives a new interest to the campaign. Instead of crossing the heights in lines parallel to the original positions, as is usually done in countries of this nature, where it is only requisite to cross the first chain to attack another parallel to this one, or descend in the plain beyond, the army started in the positions which cut perpendicularly the range of mountains, and endeavoured to obtain possession of them by over-running the chain throughout its length, and following the direction of its branches." The events which succeeded these movements, led to the following observations : (1) That the position of the plains prepares and secures, with reference to strategy, the occupation of the mountains. (2) That the march of columns of any strength, and, in consequence, that of the line of operations, cannot be made except through the principal valleys. (3) That a system of passive defence, does not fulfil its object, and that it can only be maintained by attacking the enemy who advances. 1 Napier. 438 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. (4) That, for an attack to succeed, it should be directed at the same time in the valleys and upon the heights which border them ; and that, to decide which of these two directions leads to the real attack, depends upon the nature of the ground and the respective positions." 1 15. Jomini points out: "That mountainous countries are particularly favourable for defence when the war is a national one, in which the whole people rise up to defend their homes with the obstinacy which enthusiasm for a holy cause imparts : every advance is then dearly bought. But to be successful it is always necessary that the people be sustained by a disciplined force, more or less numerous : without this they must finally yield, like the heroes of Stanz and of the Tyrol." 2 16. Napier alluding to the guerilla warfare, carried on in Spain against the invaders, remarks : " That the guerilla system could never seriously effect the progress of the French, is proved by the fact, that the constant aim of the principal chiefs was to introduce the customs of regular troops ; and their success against the enemy was proportionate to their progress in discipline and organization. There were not less than 50,000 of these irregular soldiers, at one time, in Spain ; and so severely did they press upon the country that it may be assumed as a truth that if the English army had abandoned the contest, one of the surest means by which the French could have gained the goodwill of the nation would have been the extirpating of the partidas. Never- theless, one great and unquestionable advantage was derived by the regular armies, and especially by the British, from the existence of these bands. The French corps could never communicate with each other, nor combine their movements, except by the slow method of sending officers with strong escorts ; whereas, their adversaries could correspond by post, and even by telegraph, an advantage equal to a reinforcement of 30,000 men." 3 17. Particular attention should be paid to security from surprise, for in mountainous country it is often practicable for an enemy to steal up unseen and thus make a sudden attack. Mountain batteries, therefore, should always have a tolerably strong escort of infantry detailed to them ; part of the escort should remain in the immediate neighbourhood of the guns, and the remainder occupy the paths or other means of 1 .Tervis. s Chap. III., Art. 38. 3 Napier, Vol. II. DEFILES. 439 access to tlie position to the flanks and rear, when the paths are not visible from the battery. The selection of suitable positions for guns, and taking advantage of the ground, is more difficult in mountainous than in an open or slightly intersected country; it requires special dexterity, experience, and a sharp and practised eye, accustomed to the peculiarities of mountain formations ; these the battery commander must attain by study of the ground, so as not to lay himself open to repeated surprises and embarrassments without end in the command and employ- ment of his battery on service. The best method of practising and preparing such batteries for service is to quarter them in mountainous localities in time of peace. When a mountain brigade in advancing comes upon an enemy and it is decided to attack him, the guns are immediately unpacked and put together. The battery commander, having received his instructions from the Brigadier, meanwhile selects a position for the battery such as to enable it to develop a satisfactory fire, and such that its fire shall be liable to interruption by the advance of the infantry at the latest possible period. The guns are then brought up to the position by the detachments and open fire. 5f 5jC 5fC JfC 3f 5JC If our own troops retreat, the battery should be brought back to a position several hundred yards to the rear : that position should be particularly selected as one admitting of being long held and of a continuous fire. In such changes of position, the question as to whether the guns should be laden on the mules or not, must be decided by the style of engagement and the nature of the ground ; generally speaking, the guns should be taken back by hand. 1 SECTION II. DEFILES. 1. The general rule to be observed in the operation of the attack of a defile, is that it is not safe to attack one however open, so long as the Mttllcr. 440 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. heights on each side are occupied by the enemy. A defile may consist, however, of a mountain gorge where the bordering cliffs may be in- accessible on both sides, or on one side only. Or it may be a mountain pass where the heights on both sides are accessible and of equal height, or where, both being accessible, one side commands the other. All these cases demand different dispositions. In the case where a road is hemmed in between mountains on one side, and a lake or unfordable river on the other, the lake or river is the same in principle and effect as if it were an inaccessible cliff. 1 2. Where the bordering heights of a defile are inaccessible, it becomes a question with the assailants whether they will attack and carry the gorge by main force, or whether they will await the effect of a turning movement which would compel the enemy to abandon his position without fighting. The decision must be governed by the strength of the position, or by the time which the turning movement would occupy. 2 3. Where a defile is bordered by accessible heights of equal eleva- tion, three columns of attack must be formed, and the assault of the heights on each side must precede that of the gorge, which last must not be made until the flanking columns shall have acquired a firm footing on the heights. The advance of these last along the heights will render untenable the position of the defenders of the gorge itself, which may then be safely entered by the centre column, the latter regulating its advance through the gorge by that of the flanking columns on the heights above. When a defile is bordered by accessible heights, one of which decidedly commands the other, two columns of attack might be sufficient, although it would still be more prudent to sweep both sides. 3 4. But an army charged with the defence of a defile would not usually oppose any serious resistance to the entrance of the enemy into the defile. Although the general might barricade the gorge and occupy the enclosing heights by flanking troops, this would only be as a sort of advanced post. His main defensive position would be in rear of the defile ; because his army being there drawn up in battle array on its proper front, could act in all its parts with freedom, and would be able * MacDougall. 2 Ibid. * Ibid, DEFILES. 441 to overwhelm the enemy as he issued from the gorge in a long thin stream of troops, before the successive fractions of the latter could form for resistance. 1 5. Napier remarking on the defence of the passage of defiles, says : " It may be well to notice an error relative to the strength of mountain denies, common enough even amongst men who, with some experience, have taken a contracted view of their profession. From such persons it is usual to hear of narrow passes, in which the greatest multitudes may be resisted. But, without stopping to prove that local strength is nothing, if the flanks can be turned by other roads, we may be certain that there are few positions so difficult as to render superior numbers of no avail. Where one man can climb another can, and a good and numerous infantry crowning the acclivities on the right and left of a disputed pass, will soon oblige the defenders to retreat, or to fight on equal terms. If this takes place at any point of an extended front of defiles, such as those of the Sierra Morena, the dangerous consequences to the whole of the beaten army are obvious. Hence such passes should only be considered as fixed points, around which an army should operate freely in defence of more exposed positions, for defiles are doors, the keys of which are on the summits of the hills around them. A bridge is a defile, yet troops are posted, not in the middle, but behind a bridge, to defend the passage. By extending this principle, we shall draw the greatest advantages from the strength of mountain passes. The practice of some great generals may, indeed, be quoted against this opinion; nevertheless, it seems more consonant to the true principles of war to place detachments in defiles, and keep the main body in some central point behind, ready to fall on the heads of the enemy's columns, as they issue from the gorges of the hills." 2 6. The position in rear of a defile is the most advantageous one for the defender, and the circumstances are, on the whole, not more favourable to him than they are unfavourable to the enemy. He embraces the mouth of the defile with his position, he is possessed of all the advantages which a greater extent of front affords, he commands the defile and its exit with his fire and has a safe retreat. This situation is all the more favourable when the defile can be enfiladed, and when 1 MacDougall. " Napier, Vol. III. 442 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. the ground in front of it can be commanded by artillery placed in suitable flank positions, and this is usually the case, especially with bridges, dikes and causeways. Bridges and causeways are most effectively defended when they lie at the concave (bending towards the defender) bend of a river. 1 7. In a defile the position of affairs is much more favourable to the defender than when in front of one, because the assailant cannot make use of his superior strength, nor can he envelop the defender, and can only advance on him with an equal front ; to the latter, also, previously constructed obstacles and other means of fortifying his position are available. Engagements on a large scale cannot take place in a defile, for there is not room to draw up many troops in position. They are generally fought for the purpose of gaming time, either in mountain passes, in forest defiles as rear guard actions, or when the defile is long, roomy, and not to be turned ; the employment of artillery, however, is only to be recommended in the rarest instances, and when employed is seldom of much use, in consequence of the smallness of the field of view and of fire ; its participation in the combat must be renounced if the passage is narrow and rugged, since this arm experiences the greatest difficulty in getting away from such a position ; and it may be the cause of the most dangerous crisis by blocking up the road with its material. Should the artillery, nevertheless, be employed in the defence of a defile from the inside, we should be satisfied with the minimum of pieces, send back all unnecessary waggons, have a good wide road for retreat, or be prepared to expose a few pieces to capture. The most favourable point for a position is that where the defile contracts towards the enemy and widens out to the rear, where the ground rises gradually, and where a side defile, opening out on the main one, offers a flanking position ; such a side defile should however, have a safe communication with the main defile. 2 8. When turning a defile is possible without great loss of time, and without running too great a risk, this method should have the preference, as the least bloody and the most promising of success ; for if it is undertaken with a superior force it must always place the defender in a very precarious position, when he is kept in play in front and 1 Taubei-t. " Ilvl DEFILES. 443 simultaneously prevented from effecting a seasonable retreat in rear. Where, however, the defile must be forced, a superior force should be placed in action in its front, and this force should be especially provided with a superior artillery. 1 9. In mountain warfare, engagements take place chiefly in and about defiles, and about heights. The tactical importance of a defile depends on the strength of the troops who wish to pass it, on the style of engage- ment, on the nature of the ground in front or in rear of the defile, and on the dimensions of the defile. In general the defence of a defile is undertaken from the rear : rarely from the front or from the inside. A defensive position is taken up in front of a defile when in the act of retreating or when the nature of the ground is such as to present unusual advantages. In such case the guns should take post on the flank of the mouth of the defile, so as to be able to fire on the approaches and places of assembly of the enemy, and to ply the ground immediately in front with case shot. The guns, if possible, should be under artificial or natural cover, and should open fire as soon as the enemy comes within range. If our own troops are retreating, the battery should perseveringly continue firing as fast as possible until the troops have passed the defile ; it should then retreat and take up a position some 800 yards in rear of the defile to prevent the enemy from debouching, at any rate to delay his opening fire as long as possible. In the attack of an enemy in a defensive position in front of a defile the guns should be placed in position short of the most effective range, one part in the prolongation of the defile and the other to the flank, thus bringing the enemy under a cross-fire. The attacking guns direct their fire at the mouth of the defile, enfilading it ; while those to the flank engage the guns posted in defence. High-angle fire of common shells against the inside of the defile and against the enemy's guns, and low-angle fire for enfilading the defile and against the troops and guns in the open, will be found most suitable to the occasion. The defence of a defile by guns inside it, is not usually undertaken, for the retreat of the guns is generally involved in difficulty. Should, however, such a position have been taken up, the guns should be placed behind obstacles to bar the way; they should continue their fire until the 1 Taubert. 444 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. close approach of the enemy and the probability of losing the guns compel them to retreat. The artillery of the assailant can only rarely be used inside the defile ; but when so used, its duty is to cannonade the position of the enemy in the defile, as well as any bodies of troops or abattis visible. Fire at both low and high angles of common shell is that best calculated to destroy obstacles and to turn out troops from behind them. The ranges may vary very considerably according to the length and other conditions of the defile. In defence behind a defile one part of the guns should be placed behind the mouth of the defile, at a distance short of the most effective range, enfilading the length of the defile and commanding the ground in front of the mouth; so as to impede the debouchment of the enemy's troops and guns, and to inflict on him the greatest possible loss at the moment of deployment and coming into action : the other part takes up a position to the flank and fire chiefly upon such of the enemy's troops and guns as succeed in gaining a position to the side of the mouth of the defile. When a considerable part of the strength of the enemy has passed the defile, the defender may still turn the balance of the fight to his advantage by his superiority in numbers, and by an energetic attack. The artillery should endeavour to shake the enemy by the liveliest fire against his front and flank and in conjunction with the infantry endeavour to drive him back into the defile ; this, if successful, is always combined with very great loss to the enemy, and it may result in his total defeat. The assailant who has to pass through the defile should bring up guns with the first detachment of closely formed troops to the front of the exit of the defile. Their duty is to fire at and drive back the guns and troops of the enemy and thus to facilitate the sortie of our own troops. To engage the enemy's artillery successfully the assailant should support the guns in action by others in positions on the flank. In defending a height, the artillery should in the first instance impede the enemy's advance by its fire ; to this end it should place itself at the edge of the height, it should fire on the lines of access to the front and more particularly on those points where the advance of the enemy is delayed by difficulties of ground. ******** The attack of a height should be commenced by artillery firing on and endeavouring to silence such of the enemy's guns as command the roads or paths giving access to the height. "When the troops storm and 6 DEFILES. 445 when they have established themselves on the height, the guns should follow so as to co-operate in a further advance or in maintaining the ground taken. 1 10. In the defence of defiles from a position in rear of the mouth, the artillery is the most effective arm, for the fire of its pieces com- manding the defile and its opening, is always the most powerful means of impeding the passage and of rendering the deployment of the enemy's troops for action more difficult. In consequence of the large space which the position behind a defile affords, the necessary discretion can be used as to placing the artillery, and a reciprocal support of all three arms may be expected. 2 11. In attacking a defile, or pass, the action of artillery is especially important. For the narrow space, while it may enable its occupants to hold the ground against superior forces of cavalry and infantry, must limit the number of their guns. The assailant should therefore bring an overpowering artillery fire to bear, and, while the fire should be convergent, the guns should be spread on an arc as wide as the ground admits of. 3 12. It is contrary to all the usages of war to allow parks or batteries of artillery to enter a defile, unless you hold the further extremity. In case of retreat, the guns will embarrass your movements and be lost. They should be left in possession under a sufficient-escort, until you are master of the opening. 4 The Khyber pass, forced bij the Britixh. 13. "The urgent state of affairs in Affghanistan, caused General Pollock with 8000 men to determine to attempt the passage of the Khyber pass,* and on the 5th April, he advanced. This tremendous defile was defended by about 10,000 brave mountaineers, thoroughly skilled in this species of warfare. They had raised a strong breastwork to defend the narrow entrance, and their bands covered all the rocky and precipitous heights on the right and left, where they could take sure aim against the small column, which alone could march on the road beneath. * About ten miles west of Peshawur, extending about thirty miles in a westerly course. 'Miiller. 2 Taubert. 3 Hand-Book. Napoleon. 446 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. Two columns were formed, of twelve companies each. * * Botli columns in the face of a determined opposition, which they over- came in the most gallant style, succeeded in expelling the enemy from the crest of the hill. In this achievement they were much aided by * * the artillery, who threw in Shrapnel shells wherever opportunity offered. The assailants continued to drive the opposing force from height to height till they had cleared the whole range as far as Ali Musjid (a small fort). Awed by the success of these masterly operations, the enemy abandoned the barrier at the mouth of the pass, and the army, with treasure, ammunition, and baggage, marched through without opposition. On the 6th Ali Musjid was attacked, and possession taken, after a slight resistance. A full command was thus obtained of the Khyber pass, and the route lay open to Jellalabad and into the interior of Cabul." 1 Passage of the Balkan, by the Russians, in 1829. 14. After the battle of Kulewtscha, General Diebitsch encouraged by this and other circumstances, determined on the daring step of passing the Balkan; in preference to the alternative of undertaking another siege to secure more effectually his lines of communication. His plan being formed accordingly, he proceeded, on the approach of the troops hitherto employed in reducing Silistria, to make a more formidable demonstration against Schunila. So closely was this place invested, that the Grand Vizir, in expectation of an immediate assault, recalled a portion of his troops from the mountain passes, to aid in the defence of a position on which, in his opinion, everything depended. The defenders of the Balkan being thus seriously diminished, it only remained to attempt the passage before the Grand Vizir had time to discover and remedy his fatal error. In order to complete the deception, 10,000 men under General Krassowski were to press Schumla closely, whilst the main force, with an effective of about 30,000 men, feigned a retreat towards Silistria ; but in reality with the intention of crossing the Balkan as a last resource, in preference to retreating across the 1 Murray. DEFILES. 447 Danube, which must otherwise have been the only alternative remaining to the Eussians. On reaching Yeni Bazar, a distance of about six leagues, General Diebitsch suddenly, and to the Turks most un- expectedly, turned to the right. General Both, with thirty-two guns, ten battalions of infantry, sixteen squadrons of cavalry, and two regiments of Cossacks, moved on Devna ; General Eiidiger, with another force, reached Kupriquoi, whilst General Pahlen, with seventeen battalions, eight squadrons of cavalry, and thirty guns, occupied Yeni Bazar : to which the head-quarters were removed on the 18th of July. General Both had, in the mean time, ascertained that only 3000 Turks, with twelve guns, were encamped at Pod-Bashi, on the Kamtschit. The advance commenced forthwith. Each soldier was provided with four days' provisions, and ten more were carried in the waggons attached to each regiment. General Roth found the Kamtschit almost un- defended, and advancing to Dalgurado, carried the works on the height at that place ; while Eiidiger easily turned and drove 1000 Turks from Oxmyele, where he took four guns and some of their baggage. A bridge was then thrown over the Kamtschit, and on the 19th, head-quarters were established at Dervish-Jowan. General Krassowski had orders to assault and carry Schumla, in case the Grand Vizir should pursue the Eussians, with nearly the whole of his force; but the moment that Eeschid Pasha became aware of the real object of General Diebitsch, he detached 10,000 men to intercept him at the pass of the Kamtschit, which he hoped was still maintained. But the handful of men who occupied that post, only 120 in all, could not offer any real resistance, the Eussians therefore had already passed the bridge in question, as well as the most difficult part of the country in advance, and were far on the road towards Eski Bashli before the Grand Vizir's move was made. Head-quarters, in fact, reached this place in nine days from Schumla. In the mean time, General Eoth advanced along the coast of the Black sea to Misivri, which capitulated on his approach ; and he was thus enabled to push on to Bourgas and open a communication with the fleet. The figurative comparison of the number of Diebitsch's army to the leaves of the forest, which had been spread by the reports of the Bulgarians, acted like magic ; Aidos, with all its stores, was abandoned, in consequence, by the retreating Turks. They were taken so completely by surprise, that they had not even offered any substantial resistance to the coup de main march by which the principal passes of 448 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. the formidable barrier of the Haemus had been already scaled. At this juncture, the posts occupied by General Diebitsch covered about 800 miles of country, viz, from Bourgas to the vicinity of Selimnia, and again from Tschenga to Omar Faki ; with the additional serious dis- advantage of a long line of communication with the Danube, which might be cut off. In fact, the latter consideration, together with the reported junction of Hussein Pasha and the Grand Vizir, caused such uneasiness, that General Diebitsch concentrated nearly the whole of his force, and made a retrograde movement on Selimnia with 25,000 men and ninety-six pieces of artillery. But, instead of encountering the ex- pected army, he only found a small force of cavalry posted near the town, which gave way, after a smart affair, and the place was occupied. General Diebitsch now left a force to secure his communications, and resuming his advance forthwith, he encamped before Adriauople on the 19th of August in three divisions, with the right of the army leaning on the river Tschenga. Although the city was not fortified, and is, moreover, a good deal exposed to a fire from the Derbent heights and other commanding ground, the town might have afforded a strong point d'appui for defence ; since those quarters which are separated from one another by the rivers Toncha, the Maritza, and Adra, could have successively offered serious resistance to the entrance of an enemy. But no preparations whatever had been made for this purpose, and a hasty capitulation enabled the Eussians to enter Adrianople on the following morning. The coup de main thus successfully accomplished, and the retreat of some 20,000 Turks on Constantinople, had given the undisputed possession of the ancient capital of European Turkey to the enemy ; but this had not been accomplished without serious loss : 10,000 men had perished in ten days during their mountain march, from fatigue and sickness, and great as well as unexpected advantages were not unattended by causes for deep and serious consideration. 1 The })ass of the Somosierra, forced by Napoleon. 15. The foot of the Somosierra, on the French patroles reaching it, on the 21st, was being intrenched in the gorge of the mountains by 1 Gen. F. K. Chesuey. DEFILES. 449 above 6000 men. Napoleon, having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castanos could arrive there ; on the 30th, the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra. General St. Juan, whose force now amounted to 10 or 12,000 men, was judiciously posted ; sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep and favourable for the defence. The infantry were advantageously placed on the right and left, in lines, one above another, and some intrenchments made in the more open parts strengthened the whole position. At daybreak, three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the causeway in the centre, six guns supported the last column. The French wings soon spread over the mountain-side, and commenced a warm skirmishing fire. At this moment Napoleon arrived. He rode into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene before him. The infantry were making no progress ; a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent ; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to charge up the causeway, and seize the Spanish battery. The first squadron was thrown into confusion, by a fire which levelled the foremost ranks. General Krazinski rallied them in a moment, and under cover of the smoke, and the thick vapours of the morning, the regiment, with a fresh impetus, proceeded briskly up the mountain, sword in hand. As those gallant horsemen passed, all the Spanish infantry fired, and fled from the intrenchments on each side, towards the summit of the causeway ; so that, when the Poles fell in among the gunners, and took the battery, the whole Spanish army was in flight, abandoning arms, ammunition, baggage, and a number of prisoners. This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in itself nearly impregnable, and defended by 12,000 men should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped. * * ***** The charge of the Poles, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly foolish, but taken as the result of 29 450 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. Napoleon's sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage, offered by the smoke and fog that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example of intuitive genius. 1 Attack on the pass of Star, ly the French. 16. " Murray's final position with the Allies, was about three miles from the pass of Biar. His left, composed of Whittingham's Spaniards, was intrenched on a rugged Sierra ending abruptly above Castalla, which, with its old castle crowning an isolated sugar-loaf hill, closed the right of that wing and was occupied in strength by Mackenzie's division. ****** "The advanced guard, in .the pass of Biar, about 2500 men was composed of two Italian regiments and a battalion of the 27th British ; two companies of German riflemen, a troop of foreign hussars and six guns, four of which were mountain pieces. The ground was very strong and difficult, but at two o'clock in the afternoon, the French, having concentrated in front of the pass, their skirmishers swarmed up the steep rocks on either flank, with a surprising vigour and agility, and when they had gained the summit, the supporting columns advanced. Then the Allies, who had fought with resolution for about two hours, abandoned the pass with the loss of two guns and about thirty prisoners, retreating however in good order to the main position, for they were not followed beyond the mouth of the defile. " Murray had only occupied his ground the night before, but he had studied it and intrenched it in parts. His right wing was quite refused, and so well covered by the barranco that nearly all the troops could have been employed as a reserve to the left wing, which was also very strongly posted and presented a front about two miles in extent. But notwithstanding the impregnable strength of the ground the English general shrunk from the contest, and while the head of the French column was advancing from the defile of Biar, thrice he gave his 1 JN T aj>icr, Vol. I. DEFILES. 451 Quarter-Master-General orders to put the army in retreat, and the last time so preremptorily, that obedience must have ensued if at that moment the firing between the pickets and the French light troops had not begun. " The French general seeing his principal column overthrown, and at every point having the worst of the fight, made two secondary attacks to cover the rallying of the defeated columns ; but these also failing, his army was separated into three parts, namely the beaten troops which were in great confusion, the reserve on the minor heights from whence the attacking columns had advanced, and the cavalry far on the left of the plain. " An able commander having a superior force, and the Allies were certainly the most numerous, would never have suffered the pass of Biar to be forced on the 12th, or if it were forced, he would have had his army well in hand behind it, ready to fall upon the head of the French column as it issued into the low ground. " Suchet violated several of the most important maxims of art. For without an adequate object, he fought a battle, having a defile in his rear, and on ground where his cavalry, in which he was superior, could not act. Neither the general state of the French affairs, nor the particular circumstances, invited a decisive offensive movement at the time." 1 Napier. 452 CHAPTEE II. SECTION I. PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 1. The passage of a river in the face of an enemy is one of the most important operations that an army can be called on to execute. It may be performed either by open force or by stratagem. In the first case, the enemy is driven as far as possible from the opposite shore, by a brisk cannonade, and troops are then pushed over in boats or on rafts, in sufficient force to keep him in check during the construction of the bridge. In the second case, superior forces are to be assembled on one or more points of the river carriages and boats are to be collected batteries thrown up, and, in short, every possible demonstration is to be made, to persuade the enemy that a passage will be attempted at one of those points. When he has concentrated his forces to oppose the anticipated attack, the pontoons, or boats, may be removed during the night to a distance of some leagues, and be ready for throwing over the bridge at the dawn of day. Field artillery accompany the pontoon train, and take post on the banks of the river, so as to give a cross-fire on the ground in front of the intended bridge. Large bodies of troops are immediately passed over, to occupy every favourable point of the opposite bank, and drive off the enemy. 1 2. The passage of a river itself, is a tactical operation; but the determination of the point of passage may have an important connection with all the operations taking place within the theatre of the war. The passage of the Rhine by General Moreau, in 1800, is an excellent illustration of the truth of this remark. Napoleon, a more skilful strategist than Moreau, desired him to cross at Schaffhausen in order to take Kray's whole army in reverse, to reach Ulm before him, to cut him off from Austria and hurl him back upon the Main. Moveau, who had already a bridge at Basle, preferred passing, with greater convenience to his army, in front of the enemy, to turning his extreme left, The tactical advantages seemed to his mind much more sure than the 1 Macaulay. PASSAGE OF RIVERS. 453 strategical ; lie preferred the certainty of a partial success to tlie risk attending a victory which would have been a decisive one. In the same campaign, Napoleon's passage of the Po is another example of the high strategic importance of the choice of the point of crossing. The army of the reserve, after the engagement of the Chinsella, could either march by the left bank of the Po to Turin, or cross the river at Crescentino and march directly to Genoa. Napoleon preferred to cross the Ticino, enter Milan, effect a junction with Moncey who was approaching with 20,000 men by the Saint Gothard pass, then to cross the Po at Piacenza, expecting to get before Melas more certainly in that direction than if he came down too soon upon his line of retreat. The passage of the Danube at Donauwerth and Ingoldstadt in 1805, was a very similar operation. The direction chosen for the passage was the prime cause of the destruction of Mack's army. The proper strategic point of passage is easily determined by recollecting the principles laid down in Article 19 (vide decisive points of a theatre of war) ; and, it is here only necessary to remind the reader, that in crossing a river, as in every other operation, there are permanent or geographical decisive points, and others which are relative or eventual, depending on the distribution of the hostile forces. If the point selected combines strategic advantages with the tactical, no other point can be better; but if the locality presents obstacles exceedingly difficult to pass, another must be chosen, and in making the new selection care should be taken to have the direction of the movement as nearly as possible coincident with the true strategic direction. Independently of the general combinations, which exercise a great influence in fixing the point of passage, there is still another consideration, connected with the locality itself. The best position is that where the army after crossing can take its front of operations and line of battle perpendicular to the river, at least for the first marches, without being forced to separate into several corps moving upon different lines. This advantage will also save it the danger of fighting a battle with a river in rear, as happened to Napoleon at Essling. 1 3. When the enemy's army is covered by a river, upon which he holds several tetcs-dc-ponts, do not attack it in front. This would divide 1 .Tomini, Chap. V.. Art. 3S. 454 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. your force, and expose you to be turned. Approach the river in echelon of columns, in such a manner that the leading column shall be the only one the enemy can attack, without offering you his flank. In the mean time, let your light troops occupy the bank ; and when you have decided on the point of passage, rush upon it and fling across your bridge. Observe, that the point of passage should be always at a distance from the leading echelon, in order to deceive the enemy. 1 4. From the moment you are master of a position which commands the opposite bank, facilities are acquired for effecting the passage of the river ; above all, if this position is sufficiently extensive to place upon it artillery in force. This advantage is diminished if the river is more than 300 toises (or 600 yards), in breadth, because the distance being out of the range of grape, it is easy for the troops which defend the passage to line the bank, and get under cover. Hence it follows that if the grenadiers, ordered to pass the river for the protection of the bridge, should reach the other side, they would be destroyed by the fire of the enemy ; because his batteries, placed at the distance of 200 toises from the landing, are capable of a most destructive effect although removed above 500 toises from the batteries of the crossing force. Thus the advantage of the artillery would be exclusively his. For the same reason, the passage is impracticable, unless you succeed in surprising the enemy, and are protected by an intermediate island, or unless you are enabled to take advantage of an angle in the river, to establish a cross-fire upon his works. In this case, the island or angle forms a natural tete-de-pont, and gives the advantage in artillery to the attacking army. When a river is less than 60 toises (or 120 yards), in breadth, and you have a post upon the other side, the troops which are thrown across derive such advantages from the protection of your artillery, that, however small the angle may be, it is impossible for the 'enemy to prevent the establishment of a bridge. In this case the most skilful generals, when they have discovered the project of their adversary, and brought their own army to the point of crossing, usually content themselves with opposing the passage of the bridge, by forming a semicircle round its extremity, as round the opening of a defile, and removing to the distance of 300 or 400 toises from the fire of the opposite side. 2 1 Napoleon. - //>/y hand. 3 10. To destroy bridges of masonry or brickwork, where the piers are strong and thick, and time is of little value, run in a small gallery about five feet from the arch stone, and when at the centre of the width of the bridge make a return to the arch and lodge the powder against it. The common and quickest mode of mining is by sinking down from the road above, and lodging the powder in a mass on the centre of its width. Five or six hours labour, and fifty to one hundred pounds of powder, will probably suffice for this. When there is no time to sink a shaft deep, 250 Ibs. or 400 Ibs. of powder placed in a cross-shaped opening over the crown of the arch and covered with stone and earth, will answer. If there is no time to make any kind of hole, suspend a large charge under the arch. Do not use more than one mine, unless obliged by some cause. The Austrians lost the battle of Magenta, by not completely destroying the bridge over the Ticino. They had placed the powder charges in several small mines, some of which failed to explode at the critical moment. It is always difficult to ensure simultaneous explosion. 4 11. Attempts to destroy a bridge, when it has once been established, may be made by means of barges and trees with their roots uncut. 1 W. C. E. Napier. 2 Jen-is. 3 Hand-Book. 4 Ibid. MILITARY BRIDGES. 547 Explosive machines formed of vessels laden with shells, grenades, &c., so fitted as to explode by concussion. Ice when used as a bridge, is easily destroyed by cannon. At Austerlitz, large bodies of Russians endeavouring to escape over some frozen marshy lakes, were totally destroyed by a battery being turned upon the ice and breaking it before them. Stone bridges can be destroyed by hollowing through the plat- form of a bridge, in the shape of a cross, as far as the exterior curve of one or more arches; this hollow is filled with powder, and the reaction of the elastic fluid against the partitions is sufficient to destroy them. A barrel of powder, or an auget, supported by small vertical beams under the arch of a small bridge, will blow it up. This method is especially practicable for streams of little depth, running between high banks. Wooden bridges are burnt, either by surrounding their piles with dipped bavin lashed with wire, or by heaping these fagots on the platform. They may be blown up, by suspending a barrel of powder with ropes under one of the bays; the piles may also be destroyed, by placing a barrel of powder attached to them at the water level. The French, in their retreat to Bayonne, made use of a very ingenious method to delay the pursuit of the British. When the English reached the bridge of St. Jean de Luz, which was constructed of timber, the first bay, or interval, between the bank and nearest upright framework supporting the superstructure, was so far consumed as to render new beams and planks necessary, before any passage could be effected. The repair was commenced immediately, and completed in about an hour- and- a-half, when the second bay was discovered to be on fire, and so far damaged as to require renewal. The officer employed while his men were repairing this also, carefully examined the under side of the remaining bays ; but, as the beams supporting the roadway were planked underneath as well as above, nothing appeared that gave the least indication of these being injured. The repair of the second bay was completed about ten o'clock, and a considerable portion of infantry passed. In about an hour-and-a-half afterwards, the third bay was discovered to be on fire, and so far damaged, as to be considered unsafe. While the repair of the third bay was in progress, the remaining bay was partly unplanked, to see if the cause of this combination, at periods varying from one-and-a-half to two hours, could be discovered. Between the top and bottom planks, three boxes 548 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. were found, about two feet long and nine inches wide and deep, containing a fuel already so far decomposed by ignition that its nature could not be ascertained. The enemy's intention, in which they completely succeeded, was, it would appear, to destroy the different bearings at intervals, that the English might not find out the extent of the injury all at once, so as to prepare the necessary means of repair for the whole ; and doubtless they gained, by so doing, several hours more time to get out of the way. 1 12. Drift timber and floating objects, boats and vessels filled with combustibles and torpedoes, to be exploded by clockwork, electricity, or chemical action are employed. To destroy wooden bridges, cover the principal parts with pitch or some combustible matter, and set fire to them. For destroying the wooden truss bridges in Virginia, the Federal cavalry carried small torpedoes in their saddle bags, consisting of a short bolt of f inches iron, 8 inches long with head and nut ; the head 2 inches in diameter and about 1 inch thick ; a washer of about the same size must be placed under the nut at the other end, with a fuze-hole in it. Between the washer and head is a tin cylinder If inches in diameter, which is filled with powder, and when the washer and nut are put on forms a case. In using this torpedo, a hole is bored in the timber (in the main braces in Howe's Virginia truss bridges), the torpedo, head downwards, is driven in by a stone or billet of wood, and the fuze fired with a cigar lighter. To destroy a suspension bridge ; destroy or blow up the points of support to which the cables are affixed. 2 13. When a retreat is made down the bank of a river, wooden houses may be thrown into the stream, also fire-ships and mills, a means the Austrians used in 1796 against Jourdan's army, near Neuwied on the Rhine, where they nearly compromised the army of the Sambre and the Meuse. The Archduke Charles did the same thing at Essling in 1809. He broke the bridge over the Danube, and brought Napoleon to the brink of ruin. It is difficult to secure a bridge against attacks of this character, unless there is time for placing a stockade above it. Boats may be anchored, provided with ropes and grappling-hooks to catch floating bodies and with means for extinguishing fire-boats. 3 1 Jen-is. Haml-Book. 3 Jomini, Chap. V., Art, 38. 549 SECTION III. FOEDS. 1. Fords are of great importance, on many occasions, during a war : it is often by means of them that surprises are effected, that the destruction of bridges becomes without effect, that a defeated army may be hotly pursued, or an escape made from a victorious enemy. 1 2. Nearly all rivers are fordable at some points. It is very im- portant to discover these fords, and to obtain an accurate knowledge of their direction across the stream, their depth, the nature of their bottom, and the rapidity of the current. There are many ways of ascertaining the fords of a river : (1) By questioning the natives who live on its banks. They generally are acquainted with all the fords, though they will not always impart their knowledge to an enemy. (2) By walking along the bank and observing the traces of roads or paths leading into the river. The marks of wheels entering a river are a good indication of a ford, particularly if these wheel-marks re- appear on the opposite bank. Houses or villages on opposite sides of the river frequently indicate a ford which connects them. It was thus that Sir A. Wellesley guessed the existence of a ford, the discovery of which led to the battle of Assaye. (3) By dropping down the river in a boat with a sounding-line or pole of the given depth of the ford sought for ; whenever this pole or line comes in contact with the bed of the river a ford may be looked for. (4) By certain known indications, such as a swifter or broken current in some parts of the river, particularly near bends and loops. No means of discovering the existence of fords should be neglected, and when discovered their direction and the nature of their bottom should be carefully examined. 2 3. Limits, 3 feet for infantry, 4 feet for cavalry, 2 feet 4 inches for artillery : 3 feet 4 inches for the latter, when the limber boxes are 1 Jervis. 2 W. C, E. Napier. 550 MINOE OPEEATIONS, ETC. taken out. To render the passage of a ford safe and easy, run a rope or cable across from bank to bank. * * * Rivers which are not fordable perpendicularly across, are often passable in a slanting direction between two bends. 1 4. Previous to a force passing a ford of any size, rows of stakes should be driven in, showing its exact limit. If the current is strong, ropes should be stretched from pole to pole, and mounted men posted along its upper limit to break the force of the stream. Torches or lanterns should be used at night to mark the line of crossing. When the stream is strong the men should pass in the broadest possible front, locked arm-in-arm ; if also deep, each rank should be several paces from the other, for if a column passes in close order, it serves to dam np the stream and so deepen it. When the current is rapid, boats should be kept plying about near the dangerous places, to pick up anyone who may be swept away. 2 5. A bottom of large stones is bad for cavalry, impracticable for carriages. Gravel is the best bottom. A sandy ford, though good at first, is apt to deepen when many troops pass. It must be ascertained whether the stream be liable to sudden floods, and if so, under what circumstances'; "and whether it is affected by tides. 3 SECTION IV. CONVOYS. A 1. There are several sorts of convoys : convoys of ammunition, provisions, money, material and clothing, wounded, prisoners. Convoys of ammunition are habitually placed at the head of the line of march ; next come the provisions, and finally, the effects and clothing. Convoys should avoid towns and villages, and all denies as far as possible. 4 2. When a great convoy of artillery is ordered to make a forced march, Decker gives the following example as one which should be followed on such occasions. In 1807, the artillery of the corps d'armee, 1 Hand-Book. z Wolsely. Hamley, Part VI., Chap. VII. 4 Hand-Book. CONVOYS. 551 commanded by General Lestocq, was ordered to make a forced march from Koanigsberg to Tilsit, a distance of eighteen German miles. The convoy consisted of 99 guns, which, with their waggons, &c., formed a column of about 250 carriages. The bridge equipment had taken another road as far as Labiaii, but was obliged to join the convoy at that point, on account of a bridge which was there. The convoy was divided into eight sections, which started one after another ; the first left Kcenigsberg at two o'clock in the afternoon, made a march of two German miles, then formed on the side of the road, where it halted two hours to feed the horses. During this time, the other sections continued their route, and placed themselves successively along the side of the road at from 2000 to 3000 paces distance from one another. As soon as the eighth section had passed the first, the latter resumed its march, and about ten o'clock at night, reached a bivouac, five German miles from Ko3iiigsberg ; each section resuming its march as the first passed it. Through these measures, the second day at twelve o'clock, that is to say, in seventy hours, the whole convoy had crossed the Niemen, and bivouacked in the meadows of Baublen. 1 3. In 1805, the Austrians afforded an example* directly contrary to the preceding one. Their grand park of artillery Jyjd to retreat from Ulm to Egra, in Bohemia. Numbering upwards of 300 carriages, it was formed in one long straggling column, and marched day and night, constantly harassed by the enemy, never halting, and neither forage nor rations being served out. The consequence was, that the horses fell from sheer exhaustion, the carriages had to be abandon ^ one after another, and, after a march of eight days, only 17 carriages, out of 300, entered Egra.* 4. It is prudent to have a number of empty waggons to receive the loads of those that break down, and part of their horses may help the rest. Beasts of burden precede waggons, because, the latter break up the roads. Five or six yards interval must be preserved between the divisions for the passage of the troops from right to left. The escort is divided into advanced guard, mainbody, and rear guard. With a con- siderable convoy, such as 200 carriages, occupying 2400 yards, where it would be impossible for any but a large force to line the whole extent * (Traite Elementaire d'Artillerie, par E. Decker). Jervis. 1 Jervia. 552 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. with troops, the main body might be divided into four parties one to form a reserve, one for the protection of the centre, one to march at the head, and another at the rear of the column. This reserve is to reinforce any point that may be specially threatened, and should be half of the main body ; the detachment to protect the centre one- fourth, and for each extremity only an eighth, for the centre will be the most fatal point of attack, and the detachments on the extremities will be aided by the advanced and rear guards. >|C 5j 5fC 5JC 5JC !fC These different bodies do not quit their own places in the convoy to concentrate on a first alarm, because feints will probably precede or accompany the real attack. The convoy, harnessing by successive divisions, to prevent unnecessary fatigue to the men and horses, sets out secretly in early morning ; and if its safety be of vital importance, the space over which it is to pass should have been traversed just before by a moveable column. 1 5. In most cases, the means of transport are furnished by the inhabitants of the country, from whom it is demanded, as those belonging to the army rarely suffice. This system, being a very great tax on the inhabitants, requires a great deal of watchfulness on the part of the escort, as, in the moment of danger, the carters and muleteers cut the traces of the horses and belly bands of their mules, and thus escape amidst the confusion. The commanding officer, should, therefore, be on his guard against their questions, and let them know they will be fired at if they attempt to escape. 2 6. An important point to be observed, in the formation of a convoy, is, always to make use of the mode of transport adapted to the nature of the country. Napoleon felt the evil of deviating from this principle in the Russian Campaign, 1812, where he depended for his supplies upon a multitude of waggons, each destined to carry several thousand pounds weight, over sandy plains where carts, laden with a few hundred weight, were drawn with difficulty.* Carts, well horsed and not heavily laden and upon which the infantry can be placed, may be made to go at a trot ; the same pace may also be obtained from beasts of burden : but, in general one cannot depend upon more * Segur, Expedition clc Russie. l Hamley, Part VI., Chap. VII. 2 Jervis. CONVOYS. 553 than three miles an hour; and in hilly, rugged roads, two miles, and sometimes less. The excessive slowness of oxen should prevent as much as possible their being made use of; but, in the moun- tainous districts of Italy and France, and in parts of Spain and Portugal, it is often impossible to obtain any other means of transport. In most of the Spanish provinces, in the Pyrenees, and Piedmont, mules are made use of more as beasts of burden, than of draught. Donkeys are also used for the same purpose. These animals can go through the most difficult paths (which is often necessary, when escaping from the enemy), but much attention is required to prevent disorder, as the animals, when frightened, crowd together, which crushes and often destroys their burden. In Ceylon, where almost all the traffic of the interior is carried on by means of small oxen, the drovers make fast the burdens to the horns of these animals, so that, if frightened and attempting to throw off their burdens, (as animals generally do on such occasions), they are immediately stopped by the weight on the ground, which keeps their heads down. 1 7. If a convoy consists of gunpowder or other inflammable matters, it should not be taken through any village or town, but a circuitous route should be preferred ; in some cases, however, when this cannot be avoided, care should be taken to have all the fires put out along the line of march, more especially those of blacksmiths' shops. When convoys are to be parked for the night, every precaution should be taken against a surprise. The method of parking depends on the nature of the convoy: an open space, having a good communication with the high road, should be preferred ; but if the country consists of ploughed fields, where the wheels would sink into the earth, and much time and trouble would be necessary to get them on the high road again, it would be better to park upon the latter. When there is plenty of space, and a sufficient number of waggons, they can be formed into a circle, the shafts of each waggon being directed towards the centre, the cattle unyoked, and tied to strong pickets in front of each waggon. If there are not enough waggons to form a circle, a square can be formed, placing the waggons axle-tree to axle-tree, with their shafts turned inwards ; this formation is perhaps the best, when 1 Jervis. 554 MINOR OPERATIONS, ETC. there are a few pieces of artillery with, the escort. In some countries, the carts, being excessively small, might perhaps not afford much protection by placing them axle-tree to axle-tree ; a safer system would be, to lash the shaft of each cart to the body of the next in front, thereby forming one connected line : this is especially applicable to two-wheel carts. * * * * * *** ****** Whatever formation is adopted, it should be remembered that all powder waggons must be separated from the remainder, and most strictly watched. 1 8. "When attacked in force, especially by cavalry, the convoy forms square, the horses facing inwards, and the angles and faces are defended by infantry. * * * * If the enemy can be checked, the convoy must continue its march, and the attack should be met at some distance from the waggons ; if imable to defend the ground, the escort should retreat on woods, farms, or other obstacles, and place the park so that the obstacle and the convoy may flank each other, while the troops extend between them. ****** When an escort of prisoners is attacked, it should remain near them, because the assailants will not risk killing their own people by firing. To prevent escape the prisoners should be ordered to lie down, and not rise without orders on pain of being shot. 2 9. Cavalry alone would not succeed in an attack it should be supported by infantry guns ; and the force should be divided into three bodies, the principal to attack the escort, the second to assail the convoy, the third in reserve, besides any further detachments that may be required to make feints. ****** In case of a convoy succeeding in forming a park, the cavalry attacks the escort, and the guns fire on the park, which will always be set on fire or opened by a few shells ; but if the assailants have no artillery, and fail to penetrate, they must draw off and await their opportunity when the convoy is again in motion moving ahead, meanwhile, and breaking up the roads. Cavalry alone may be employed with advantage against convoys of baggage, animals, or of prisoners. 3 1 Jervis. 2 Hamley, Part VI., Chap VII. a Ibid. CONVOYS. 555 10. ' After the battle of Gettysburg, on the 2nd and 3rd July, and subsequent retreat of Lee's army to the Rapidan, General Kilpatrick/ having been despatched by Meade on the 4th to observe the roads towards South Mountain, and getting wind of the movement of the Con- federate trains through Fairfield, he ascended the hills some miles further to the southward ; and, taking a cross route at night, came before daylight into the vicinity of Ewell's convoy, capturing some hundreds of waggons. One of the Federal regiments, indeed, gained for a time the head of the long column, and attempted to turn the whole off their line of march on Hagerstown. But the confusion among the intercepted was scarcely greater than that of the pursuers, many of whom gave themselves up to plunder ; and in the end, Stuart's cavalry, who were guarding the train, recovered most of the prisoners and all but one hundred of the waggons, some of which had been burnt. On the three following days there were skirmishes in the vicinity of Hagerstown and of Williamsport, at which latter place the trains were to reach the river. But although Kilpatrick was now joined by a brigade of Buford's division, the irregular tactics of their troopers failed to make any impression on the covering line held by Stuart, who in the chief of these affairs (that of the 6th), gave the Federals a serious check. 1 1 Campaigns in Virginia, &c. 556 INDEX. Abattis, destruction of, 504 Abercrombie, expedition to Egypt, 189 Holland, 184 Accidental, points of manoeuvre, 34 Advanced corps at Trautenadu, 486 Skalitz, 486 of Zieten, 487 Advanced guard, distance of, 485 of army, 483 of column, 392 Advanced pickets, position for, 494 relief of, 500 Advanced posts, 343, 489 ,, attack of, 382 defence of, 383 at Blenheim, 381 at Ordal, 492 ,, at Waterloo, 381 distance of, 491 ,, generals for, 489 vigilance of, 489 Affghanistan, errors of British in, 75 Albuera, position at, 533 retreat from, 421 Alexander the Great, enterprises of, 7 Alexandria, isolation of, 114 an objective point, 37 Algiers, attack on, 158 Alma, two guns at, 301 order of battle at, 379 ,, position at, 350, 532 Alps, passage of, 435 Ammunition expended at Kbniggratz, 221 rounds earned, 221 Angular base, 29, 33 Archduke Charles, combined opera- tions of, 5 ,, reputation as a strategist, 15 defence of Danube vaUey, 118 in 1796, 5 study of, 12 Armies, command of, 8 defensive, 97 education of, 7 on same frontier, 46 junction near enemy, 44 landing of, 181 landing in Egypt, 189 landing in Holland, 184 organizing, 8 Arsenals, destruction of, 163 Art, military, 1 Art of war, distinct parts, 1 ,, its progress, 3 under Frederick theGreat, 4 , , learning under Napoleon, 8 Artillery at Alma, 301 ,, Bautzen, 295 Eylau, 287 Friedland, 299 Lodi, 293 Lutzen, 287 Marengo, 287 Talavera,|298 Wagram, 300 against columns, 293 against lines, 293 breaching with, 305 ,, camp at Boulogne, 300 cavalry with, 227 change of front, 300 classification of, 279 ,, conveyance of gunners, 284 cover, artificial, 534 ,, cover, natural, 288 covering passage of a river, 452, 454 ,, ,, of Danube, 459 of Douro, 463 ,, en masse, 296 equipment of, 284 field, 281 fire of, 290 INDEX. 557 Artillery fire, area of, 300 concentration of, 298 description of, 292 direction of, 291 enfilade & oblique, 295 quickness of, 285 reverse, 295 vertical, 164 ,, garrison, 306 general of, 277 ,, horse, established, 280 in defence of posts, 511 in defence of a river, 471 in denies, 443 ,, independence of, 226 in echelon, 291 in line of battle, 355 in mountains, 438 in retreats, 415 movement of, 285 mortars, 294 numbers at Austerlitz, 279 ,, numbers at Solferino, 279 numbers with an army, 279 opposed by skirmishers, 238 ,, penetration of, 305, 307 position of, 288 progress of, 296 ,, protection of infantry, 226 proximity to riflemen, 291 reserve, 286 ,, siege, 302 ,, transport across ice, 546 under Senarmont, 277 unit of, 280 Attack, combined, 162 ,, decisive point of, 230 French and Prussian, 225 naval, 152 of gateways, 505 of posts, 383, 502 of village, 382, 505 when covered by a river, 453 Austerlitz, battle of, 76 cavalry charges at, 261 cavalry echelons at, 261 reconnaissance after, 481 Badajoz, siege of, 128 Balkan, passage of, 446 Balkan, range of, 103 Barricades, materials for, 511 Base of operations, 26 distance from, 28 double, 32 extent of, 28 parallel, 29 perpendicular, 27, 29 re-entrant angle, 29, 33 supply for, 26 sea coast for, 32 Battalion, formations of, 325 unit of infantry, 311 Batteries, breaching, 305 casemated, 167 coast, 149 earth and sand, 169 elevation of, 151 en barbette, 165 field and position, 150 floating, 148 Moncrieff, 166 of Alabama river, 152 ,, of Fort Sumpter, 158 of Sebastopol, 152 ,, of Vicksburg, 156 on precipice, 152 turret, 166 Battle, critical moments of, 229 hour of attack in, 239 offensive and defensive, 239 what to avoid, 232 Bautzen, artillery at, 295 retreat after, 418 Bayonet, charges with, 314 Benningsen, battalion formation of, 326 Berezina, passage of, 468 Biar, pass of, 450 Blucher, staff of, 20 Bomarsund, attack on, 162 Borodino, battle of, 108 reserve at, 233 Boulogne, camp of, 223 Bridges, at Banos, 414 Bayonne, 547 Charleroi, 487 Lobau, 458 Mamilla, 414 Ordal, 492 Paleucia, 414 558 INDEX. Bridges, barricading of, 492 destruction of, 546, 548 military, 542 ,, places for, 545, 457 weights on, 543 Brialmont, system of defence, 109 Buntzelwitz, intrenched camp, 136 Bueonos Ayres, defence at, 514 Burgos, siege of, 127 Busaco, retreat from, 411 Caesar, enterprises of, 7 Camps, of instruction, 7 utilising, 6 Capital, fortifying, 123 Casemated batteries, 167 Caubul, British in, 75 Cavalry, after decisive action, 429 against infantry, 329 against squares, 253 ,, at Borodino, 334 Chateau, 260 Gettysburg, 268 Gross Aspern, 333 Watchau, 256 "Waterloo, 333 Wurzburg, 257 charge of, 265 charge halted, 267 damaging railways, 207 echelon formation, 259 examination of ground, 247 first and second lines, 255 flanks of, 255, 258 formation for attack, 261 form of Austrian attack, 261 full lines, 259 functions of, 249 general of, 247 independence of, 254 in line of battle, 353 in pursuits, 429 in retreats, 415 irregular, 269 light, 268 ,, mounted rifles, 272 oblique line of, 257 on infantry flanks, 253 proportion of, 245 reserves of, 245, 256 Cavalry, supports of, 257 Turkish, 244 under Cromwell, 244 unit of, 249 weight on, 249 Avith artillery, 246 Changes of front, 378 Charlestown, attack on, 158 Chevaux-de-frise, removal of, 504 Chief of staff, 21 China, expedition to, 191 Chlum, Prussians at, 242 Church, for defence, 506 Circumvallation, lines of, 528 Ciudad Eodrigo, siege of, 132 Civil wars, 2 Coast, armament for, 306 assailable points of, 146 defence of, 144 fortifications for, 147 lodgment on, 182 of Confederate States, 144 railways for, 145 reconnaissance of, 482 Columns, advanced guard of, 392 and lines, 320 at Albuera, 322 at Alma, 323 at Vimiero, 321 formations of, 314 ,, formation on the march, 393 Command of armies, 8 river bank, 454 ,, iindivided, 17 Commanding ground, attack of, 231 Communications, acting against, 51 aiming at, 58, 73 at Salamanca, 101 direction of, 54 lateral, 52 lines without, 52 long lines of, 53 ,, menacing, 54 of British in Sinde, 54 French in Spain, 59 Concave order of battle, 369 Concentrating, by railway, 200 of Austrians in 1866, 208 previous to battle, 77 Conde, campaigns of, 3 INDEX. 559 Congreve, Sir "William, 5 ,, rockets, 308 Constantinople, movement on, 446 Convergent lines, 47 Convex order of battle, 366 Convoys, attack of, 554 carriage for, 552 march of, 550 packing of, 553 Corunna, retreat on, 420 Cossacks, as light cavalry, 270 ,, attacks by, 271 ,, importance of, 270 ponies of, 271 skirmishing of, 271 Council of war, assembly of, 19 Country, knowledge of, 16 examination of, 247 Courtrai, obstacle at, 247 Cover, artificial, 530 for artillery, 288, 534 Crimea, expedition to, 192 Crotchet, on a flank, 361 Danube, passage of, 458 Dartmoor, experiments at, 530 Decisive point, of battle field, 230 ,, of theatre of war, 34 superior numbers on, 231 at Borodino, 233 at Marengo, 233 at Waterloo, 233 Defence, indirect, 98 ,, of Denmark, 99 England, 124 ,, London, 125 Portugal, 101 Saragossa, 524 ,, Spain, 103 Tariffa, 526 Turkey, 103 ,, a river, 469 points on a river, 461 posts, 383, 506 Defensible posts, 380 Defensive army, 97 war, 97 Defensive-offensive, 99 ,. combat, 325 Denies, attack of, 439 defence of, 441 guns in, 443 heights of, 440 turning, 442 of Balkan, 446 of Khyber-pass, 445 of Somosierra-pass, 448 Denmark, defence of, 99 Depots, communications with, 39 distances between, 39 position of, 40 Detached corps, at Marengo, 79 Waterloo, 79 in Affghanistan, 75 previous to battle, 78 Ditches, filling up, 504 Divergent lines, 47 Double lines, 47 passage of a river, 460 Douro, passage of, 462 Dover, intrenched camp at, 145 Drissa, ,, 106 Dusseldorf, 106 Earthworks at Sebastopol, 129 Vicksburg, 156 . ,, for coast batteries, 169 Echelon, advantages of 238 cavalry in, 259 Egypt, expedition to, 189 Electric telegraph, 212 Encampment, site for, 537 England, system for defence, 124 Equitation of cavalry, 266 Essling, battle at, 453 ,, bridges at, 458 Eugene, campaigns of, 3 Evolutions, in British army, 4 Expedition to China, 190 Crimea, 191 Egypt, 189 Holland, 184 Portugal, 186 Experience, aid of, 15 Exterior lines, 46 Eylau, reserve artillery at, 287 Reid artillery, 280 560 INDEX. Field works, 528 File firing, 220 Fires at outposts, 499 Flank, manoeuvres round, 229 marches, 398 movements by rail, 204 positions of Eussians, 108 ,, turning, 376 Forces, divided, 78, 377 Fords, 549 Fortification of capitals, 116 progress of, 111 Forts, of granite, 168 isolated, 164 land attacks on, 162 naval attacks on, 148 versus ships, 157 Fortresses, as cordons 112 as strategical points, 113, 119 besieging, 127 blocking railroads, 122 ,, influence of, 123 location of, 119 ,, past and present, 111 upon mountains, 113 Frederick the Great, intrenched camps, 136 on rivulets, 378 passage of rivers, 469 Friedland, artillery at, 299 Frontiers, boundaries of, 73 defence of, 111 Garonne, passage of, 465 Gateways, attack of, 505 protection of, 512 Generals for advanced posts, 489 qualifications of, 13, 15 Georgia, campaign in, 57 Gettysburg, cavalry at, 268 ,, order of battle at, 368 ,, position at, 349 Grouchy, retreat of, 426 Ground, examination of, 247 Guerilla warfare, 438 Guns at Sebastopol, 162 for coast defence, 150 Guns, positions for, 288 proportion of, 279 scattered, 170 Harbours, protection of, 146 Haynau, ambuscade at, 254 Heights, chain of, 140 Hill ranges, 59 Hohenlinden, battle of, 53 Holland, landing in, 184 Horse artillery, established, 280 Hougoumont, 380 Houses, attack of, 505 defence of, 507 Ice, guns across, 546 Independence of artillery, 226 ,, cavalry, 254 Infantry, against artillery, 313 at Eedinha, 332 ,, at Solferino, 315 British, 312 charges of, 314 column and line, 320 formations of, 314 importance of, 310 opposed to cavalry, 329 squares, 330 unit of, 311 Inferior force, disposition of, 485 Initiative, taking the, 235 Inkerman, battle of, 376 Insurrections in towns, 512 Interior lines, 48 Intervals in order of battle, 351 Intrenched camp at Buntzelwitz, 136 ,, Dover, 145 Drissa, 106 Dusseldorf and Kehl, 136 Mvelle, 137 Torres- Vedras, 136 "Williamsburg, 142 York's Town, 140 Intrenching tools, 531, 534 Intrenchments, temporary, 529 Invasion, Austrian, 93 INDEX. 561 Invasion, Spanish, 89 Iron-plates, 307 Irregular cavalry, advantages of, 270 ,, of Cossacks, 270 of India, 271 Junction of armies, 44 . roads, 35 Kehl, intrenched camp at, 136 Khyber-pass, 445 Koniggratz, direction of attack, 242 order of battle at, 366 Konigsberg, fortress of, 119 Konigstein, ,, 119 Lance and sword, 261 ,, in a melee, 262 Lancers in front rank, 262 time of Cromwell, 263 Landing at Mondego river, 186 in China, 190 Crimea, 191 Egypt, 189 Holland, 184 on English coast, 181 Lateral communications, 59 Leipsic, obstacle near, 256 position at, 347 Leuthen, order of battle at, 362 Light cavalry, 268 troops, 484 Ligny, order of battle at, 368 reconnoitring after, 481 retreat on, 487 Line of battle, artillery in, 355 ,, cavalry in, 353 formation of, 350 reserves in, 357 Lines, concentric, 47 divergent, 47 double, 46 ,, interior, 48 exterior, 48 multiple, 49 parallel, 49 of circumvallation, 528 Lines of operations, change of, 49 Lines of operations, choice of, 42 crossing a river, 38 depots on, 39 ,, direction of, 38, 42 junction of, 45 length of, 28 of independent armies, 46 posts in, 44 preservation of, 38 Lissa, naval attack on, 159 London, fortifying, 124 position near, 125 Loopholes in walls, 506 Lutzen, artillery reserve at, 287 Madrid, fall of, 109 Magazines, establishment of, 39 Mantua, siege of, 132 Marches, flank, 398 length of columns, 392 of columns, 390 light division, 386 French, 387 Prussians, 386 on "Waterloo, 400 preceding battles, 386 ,, ,, Solferino, 395 Marengo, reserve artillery at, 287 return of Desaix at, 79 Marlborough, attack of intrenchments, 532 campaigns of, 3 secrecy of, 22 Menaced on all sides, 75 Mincio, passage of, 470 Mogador, naval attack on, 158 Moncrieff gun carriage, 166 Mondego river, landing at, 186 Moore, advance of, 55 retreat of, 420 Mountains as barriers, 73 attack in, 436 batteries in, 438 forts in, 431 offensive in, 434 rivers in, 434 tactical difficulties in, 435 warfare in, 431 36 562 INDEX. Mounted infantry at Petersburg, 273 ,, Sailor's Creek, 274 , , employment of , 2 7 2 , , in thePyrenees, 274 ,, in North America, 272 ,, retreat to Corunna, 274 Napoleon, foresight of, 3 first campaign, 9 maxim of, 59 ,, notes at St. Cloud, 86 ,, respecting study, 16 Nations, military spirit of, 8 Naval arsenals, 147 powers, steam, 183, 204 Netherlands, defence of, 115 Nivelles, lines at, 137 Objective points, 36 Oblique order, 362 Observation, army of, 131 Obstacles, at Courtrai, 247 Leipsic, 247 Talavera, 247 ,, for outposts, 492 on frontiers, 73 ,, to attacking force, 235, 529 Obstructions, in channels, 171 submarine. 176 Offensive warfare, 82 Olmiitz, retreat to, 110 Austro-Eussians at, 77 Opening fire, 291 Operations, lead in, 80 ,, lines of, 38 Ordal, advanced post at, 492 Orders of battle at Alma, 379 Austerlitz, 369, 372 Gettysburg, 368, 369 ,, Inkerman, 376 Koniggratz, 366 Ligny, 368 ,, Salamanca, 373 Order of battle at Vimiero, 370 concave, 369 convex, 368 oblique, 362 paraUel, 361 perpendicular, 365 salient, 366 turning the flank, 376, 229 Orders, by signal, 216 ,, telegraph, 212 transmission of, 215 Organizing an army, 2 Out-flanking, 229, 376 Outposts, chain of, 496 distance for, 492 during the night, 499 naval attack on, 164 strengthening, 492 troops for, 496 watching a river, 498 Parallel lines, 49 Paris, defence of, 109 fortification of, 117 Pass of Biar, 450 Khyber, 445 Somosierra, 448 Passage of Alps, 435 Balkan, 446 Berezina, 468 Danube, 458 Douro, 462 Garonne, 465 rivers, 452 Passes of Pyrenees, 103 Peninsula Avar, study of, 2 Perpendicular base, 29 order of battle, 365 Petard, use of, 175 Pickets, position for, 494 ,, relief of, 500 watching rivers, 498 Pivots of manosuvre, 97 at Thorn, 71 at "Warsaw, 71 Points, decisive, 34 of battle-field, 230 of support, 97 Population, rising of, 270 INDEX. 563 Portugal, defence of, 101 Position, advanced posts of, 343, 489 attacks of, 230 at Alma, 350 Gettysburg, 349 Koniggratz, 34G Leipsic, 347 . Solferino, 344 Waterloo, 340 choice of, 337 defensive, 345 for defence of England, 146 for defensible posts, 380 strategical and tactical, 338 when divided, 377 Posts, advanced, 343, 489 attack of, 383, 502 defence of, 383, 506 defensible, 380 in lines of operation, 41 provisioning of, 515 strengthening of, 492 Preparation of army, 6 Proportion of artillery, 279 of cavalry, 245 Pursuits, artillery in, 430 cavalry in, 429 direction of, 429 Pyrenees, passes through, 103 Quatre-Bras, retreat from, 424 Railways, damages to, 207 destruction of, 211 flank movements by, 204 for coast defence, 145 concentration, 201, 208 defence, 203 gunpowder by, 200 influence of, 195 intercepted by fortresses, 210 transport of troops by, 201 Eapid marches, 386 Eappahannock, passage of, 470 Eear, aiming at, 58, 73 Eear-guard, command of, 415 in retreats, 412 Reconnaissance, after Austerlitz, 481 Reconnaissance, hour for starting, 475 ,, importance of, 474 ,, of coasts, 482 precedingEssling,480 ,, preceding Koniggratz, 479 Reconnoitring after an engagement, 481 after Ligny, 481 by advanced guard, 484 Re-entrant base, 29, 33 Reserves at Antietam, 234 Borodino, 233 Pultowa, 234 Salamanca, 234 ,, in a charge, 256 in line of battle, 357 moment for use, 233 of cavalry, 245, 255, 415 Retreat after Bautzen, 418 ammunition in, 412 ,, artillery in, 415 cavalry in, 415 covering, 415 divergent, 407 from Albuera, 421 Busaco, 411 Koniggratz, 416 halts during, 409 lateral, 408 methods of, 405 night marches, 413 of French on Toulouse, 419 Grouchy, 426 Moore, 404 Prussians from Ligny, 423 on Ligny, 487 patrols during, 482 rear guard during, 412 Richmond, advances on, 85 ,, an objective point, 37 Rifled arms, firing of, 220 influence of, 217 ,, Jomini's opinion, 220 ,, tactical changes, 3L>7 Rivers as lines of operation, 73 at Leipsic, 347 at Koniggratz, 347 currents in, 460 defence of, 469 INDEX. Rivers, double passage of, 460 ,, fortresses on, 113 ,, in mountains, 434 ,, outposts watching, 498 parallel to advance, 59 ,, passage of, 452 ,, Berezina, 4G8 ,, Danube, 458 Douro, 462 Garonne, 465 Roads, necessity of, 195 Rockets, introduction of, 307 Rogniat, principles of defence, 116 Rolica, Wellington at, 100 Saint Bernard, passage of, 435 Salamanca, battle of, 373 communications at, 101 , , manoeuvres preceding, 387 ,, squares at, 253 Salient order of battle, 366 San Juan D'Ulloa, naval attack on, 158 Saragossa, defence of, 524 Sebastopol, attack on, 161 cliff batteries at, 152 Fort Constantine, 153 guns used at, 162 objects of siege, 128 Seven years' war, 99 Seydlitz, 247 Shelter-trenches, 528 Sherman, aid by railways, 206 in Georgia, 57 Ships in motion, 154 versus forts, 157 Siege of Badajoz, 128, 132 Burgos, 127 Ciudad Rodrigo, 132 Mantua, 132 Sebastopol, 128 ,, objects of, 127 success of, 131 Signalling, 216 Sinde, communications in, 54 Site for camps, 539 Skirmishers against artillery, 238 preceding columns, 231 Smolensko, retirement from, 405 Soignies, forest of, 346 Solferino, hill at, 290, 344 Solferino, march previous to, 395 Somosierra pass, 448 Soult, pursuit of Moore, 420 ,, retreat from Albuera, 421 retreat on Toulouse, 419 Space occupied by troops, 476 Spain, defence of, 103 ,, transport in, 40 Spies, information through, 477 Squares, 330 at Fuentes Onoro, 331 Gross- Aspern, 333 Langensalza, 253 ,, Salamanca, 253 ,, the Turones, 331 t Waterloo, 252, 333 St. Cyr, as to study, 8 Staff, chief of, 21 States, frontiers of, 73 Steam vessels, influence of, 204 Strategic front, change of, 70 double, 71 position and lines, 73 Strategical points and railways, 197, 210 selection of, 69 Ulm and Ingolstadt, 118 when fortified, 34 Strategical positions, conditions of, 69 power, 10 Strategy, 1, 23 Napoleon's genius for, 24 principles of, up to 1815, 51 Streets, attack of, 512 ,, defence of, 511 fighting in, 512, 516 Suburbs, defence of, 512 Superior force, assailing with, 80, 232, 377 ,, of Jackson, 81 Supplies, dep6ts for, 39 Sword, cuts, 263 in a melee, 261 Tactical errors at Waterloo, 241, 346 ,, ,, Antietam, 234 positions, 69 talent, 233 Tactics at Austerlitz, 224 INDEX. 565 Tactics definition of, 222 ,, in mountains, 435 ,, maxims in, 232 progress of, 4 Prussian and French, 225 Talavera, "battle of, 100 concentrated fire at, 298 obstacle at, 247 Tangiers, naval attack on, 158 Telegraph, electric, 212 field, 214 use of, 45 Tents, place for, 539 Tetes-de-ponts, 471 Theatre of war, 61 Ticino, bridge over, 546 Torpedoes, 176 Tools, intrenching, 531, 534 Torres-Vedras, lines of, 102, 136 Towns, insurrections in, 512 Trenches, provisioning of, 515 shelter, 528 Turenne, as to learning, 9 as to mistakes, 3 ,, surprised by Comic", 529 Turkey, defence of, 103 Turning a flank, 229, 376 ,, position, 75 manoeuvres, 227, 231 Turret batteries, 166 Unit of artillery, 280 cavalry, 249 infantry, 311 Valleys, survey of, 432 Vera Cruz, attack on, 164 Vertical fire, 164 Vicksburg, attack on, 156 Videttes, position for, 495 ,, protection of, 492 Vienna, capitulation of, 109 Villages, attack of, 382, 505 Vimiero, battle at, 100 order of battle at, 370 Vittoria, 101 Volley-firing, 220 Volunteers, transport of, 199 Wagram, artillery at, 298 Walls, loopholes in, 506 protection of, 507, 512 Warfare, defensive, 97 offensive, 82 Wars, civil, 2 importance of, 19 inspiration in, 10 national, 2 preparation for, 6 Waterloo, movements at, 241 state of ground, 240 Wavre, retreat from, 423 Wellington, as to squares, 253 initiatory movements of, 100 observance of rules, 16 practice of study, 12, 16 unravelling designs, 75 Williamsburg, intrenched lines at, 142 York Town, intrenched lines at, 140 Zieten, retirement on Ligny, 487 Zone of operations, 64 PRINTED BY BODDY AND CO., WOOLWICIL 1C SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILITY A 000035143 7