\ '^^^^^Bj^L gj 5P ^ 'i) |P( I m \ U7 /r r>/-.^y/^€///f w. A NARRATIVE OF THE CAMPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN SPAIN, COMMANDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN MOORE, K. B. &c. &c. &c. AUTHENTICATED BY OFFICIAL PAPERS AND ORIGINAL LETTERS, BY JAMES MOORE, ESQ. — — neque. Si chartae sileant quod bene feceris, Mercedem tuleris. Quid foret liise Mavortisque puer, si taciturnitas Obstaret mentis invida Romuli ? Hobat. LONDON: PRINTED FOR JOSEPH JOHNSON, ST. PAUL's CHURCH YARD. 1809. JOHN NICHOLS and SON, Printers, Red Lion Passage, Fleet Street, London. Ill TO MRS. MOORE. London, July 4^ 1809. ri'!i ii . MY DEAR AND HONOURED MOTHER, To you I dedicate this account of the late Campaign in Spain ; where your eldest Son quitted life in the manner he had always aspired to. Being unable to write what was worthy of him, I have collected the facts, and ar- ranged the materials, to enable Historians to do him justice. Should they enter into his private charac- ter, they ought to represent him as a man who felt for his Father and Motlier filial piety ; and for his Sister and Brothers frater- HISTORY IV rial affection : who was faithful in friendship, and in his intercourse with the world was guided by honour. When they shall display those qualities and actions which properly belong to the province of History, if truth be observed, he must be described as exercising his genius in the profession of Arms for the service of his Country, to which he had devoted his life. Finally, he must be shewn leading on to vic- tory a British army, which he had preserved by his wisdom, and falling gloriously in the front of battle ! The contemplation of what he was, is your chief consolation ; and to assist in disclosing his achievements is the highest ambition of one of his Brothers, and Your affectionate Son, JAMES MOORE PREFACE. Xhere Is here presented to the Pubhc, perhaps, the most authentic fragment of History on record : for Sir John Moore kept a journal of his proceedings ; and, with an exactness unusual in a military man, preserved every official paper, or letter of importance, which he received, together with copies of those which he wrote. All these documents the author has in his possession ; and he has, besides, had the opportunity of acquiring full information respecting the events. He could not misrepresent them, had he been so inclined, without being exposed to immediate detection ; but he is undei- no temptation either to disguise or to conceal any part VI of the conduct of the person in whom he is most deeply interested. His only wish has been to make a full dis-, ,■ closure ; and with this view he has, as much as possible, made every individual concerned explain himself by his own letters; which, together with other docu^ ments, are selected and arranged in the order adapted to elucidate the facts. There is also given a connecting narrative; and such reflections are added as naturally arose out of the transactions. The intermingling of a multitude of letters with the narration, though not the most concise, is cei-tainly the most candid mode of describing the Campaign ; for, if a false inference be drawn, the reader can imme- diately discover it. One disagreeable consequence, however, is hkely to be produced by so open an explanation : it may irritate those whose conduct cannot bear investigation. Tlie love of tranquillity, his professional avocations, and his private interest, would have hindered the Author from undertaking so laborious a work, and engaging in such vexatious hostility, had he not been urged forward by an impulse superior to these combined Vll motives. He could not remain passive when his Brother's memory was assailed by ungenerous attack* and dark insinuations. The sufferers from this pub- lication ought to bear in recollection, that the Author only acts defensively ; and they should point their indignation against the first assailants, who are the original cause of any mortification they may endure. Although the reason for composing this work is of a private nature, yet it cannot fail being of public utility both to Spain and Great Britain ; for success in future operations is more likely to be obtained, when there is a competent knowledge of the past. As many original documents are incorporated with the narrative, as were considered requisite to explain clearly the transactions, without embarrassing the reader with repetitions. The whole correspondence with Mr. Frere is given, except two useless letters from him, which were never received by the General, and which on that account were considered as improper to be published.. All Sir John Moore's dispatches to the Secretary of State are placed in the Appendix ; the omissions, wl>icli VIU are very few, and quite immaterial to the publick, are marked by blank spaces. The Spanish Documents in their own language, and Translations of the French letters, are also given ia the Appendix. IX INDEX TO THE LETTEBS AND PAPERS. Page. Sir John Moore to Lord William Bentinck, dated Salamanca, 13th Nov. 1808, 21 Sir John Moore to the Right Hon. J. H. Frere, Almeida, 10th November, 29 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Aranjuez, 13th November, - - 31 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, 16th November, - - 33 The same to the same, Salamanca, 19th November, - - 38 General Leith to Sir John Moore, Renedo, 1 5th November, - 40 Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore, , 23rd November, - - 48 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Aranjuez, 25th November, - - 5$ Mr. Frere a S. E. Mr. de Garay, Aranjuez, 23rd November, - - 56 Translation of Ditto, - - - - - 310 Mr. de Garay to Mr. Frere, Aranjuez, 24th November, - - 60 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, 27th November, - - 63 Sir John Moore to Charles Stuart, Esq. Salamanca, 27th November, - 65 Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, Salamanca, 28th November, - - 69 Sir John Moore to Lieutenant-General Hope, Salamanca, 28th November, 70 Sir John Moore to Charles Stuart, Esq. Salamanca, 29th November, - 73 Sir John Moore to Charles Stuart, Esq. Salamanca, 1st December, - 74 Charles Stuart, Esq. to Sir John Moore, Madrid, 30th November, - 77 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Aranjuez, 30th November, - - 79 The same to the same, Aranjuez, the same day, - - - 80 Mr. de Garay to Sir John Moore, Aranjuez, 28th November, - 85 Prince of Castelfranco and Don T. Morla to Sir John Moore, Madrid, 2nd Dec 87 b Page. Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, dated Talavera, 3rd December, - - 88 Sir Jolin Moore to Sir David Baird, Salamanca, 5th December, - - 91 The same to the same, Salamanca, 6th December, - - - 92 Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, Salamanca, 6th December, - 93 ]Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, 3rd December, - - -95 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, 6th December, - - 97 The same to the same, Salamanca, the same day, - - - 100 Sir John Moore to the Duke of Castelfranco and Mr. de Morla, Salamanca, 6th December, ... - - loi The Junta of Toledo to H. E. Sir John Moore, Toledo, 5th December, - 104 Sir John Moore to their Excellencies the Junta of Toledo, Salamanca, 7th December, - - - - - 105 Don Ventura Escalante to Sir John Moore, La Calzada de Banos, 7th Dec. 109 Sir John Moore a Le Marquis la Romana, Salamanca, 8th December, - 110 Translation of Ditto - - - - - 313 Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, Salamanca, 8th December, - 111 Colonel Graham to Sir John Moore, Talavera de la Reina, 7th and 8th Dec. 112 Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird, Salamanca, 12th December, - 116 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Salamanca, 12th December, - - 118 Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Leon, 1 Ith December, - 120 Translation of Ditto, ----- 314, Le Prince de Neuchatel an Due de Dalmatie, Chamartin, lOth December, 121 Translation of Ditto, ----- 314 Sir John Moore to Sir David Bard, Head Quarters, Alaejos, 14th December 125 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Toro, 15th December, - - 127 Lieutenant-Colonel Symes to Sir David Baird, Leon, 14th December, - 128 Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Leon, 14th December, - 132 Translation of Ditto, - - - - - 3 1 6 Don Martin de Garay to Mr. Frere, Truxillo, 8th December, - - 134 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Truxillo, 8th December, - - 138 Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, Castro Nuevo, I8th December, 141 Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Leon, 19th December, - 144 Translation of Ditto, - - - - - 318 Due delTnfantado a S. E. J. H. Frere, Cuenya, 13th December, - 147 Translation of Ditto - - - - - 320 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Merida, 14th December, - 149 The same to the same, Las Santos, 1 6th December, - - 154 Page. Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, dated Sahagun, 22nd December, 156 Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Leon, 21st December, - - 157 Translation of Ditto - - - - - - 321 Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, Sahagun, 23rd December, - 159 Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere, Sahagun, 23rd December, - - IGO Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Leon, 22nd December, - 162 Translation of Ditto - - - - - 323 Marquis la Romana a Sir John Moore, Mansilla, 23rd December, - 163 Translation of Ditto, ___._. 303 Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, Sahagun, 23rd December, - 163 The same to the same, Sahagun, 24th December, - - I66 The same to the same, Sahagun, the same day, - - - 1 70 Colonel Symes to Sir John Moore, Mansilla, 25th December, - 171 Sir John Moore to the Marquis la Romana, Benavente, 27th December, 176 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore, Seville, 28th December, - - _ 200 The same to the same, Seville, 2nd January, 1 809, - - _ 2O8 General Orders by the Commander in Chief, - - _ 225 Sir David Baird to Lord Castlereagh, His Majesty's Ship Ville de Paris, at Sea, 18th January, ______ 227 Lieutenant-General Hope to Sir David Baird, His Majesty's Ship Audacious, oft' Corunna, 18th January, - - - _ _ 228 APPENDIX. A. Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 25th Sept. 1808, 237 B. Lord Castlereagh to Lord William Bentinck, London, 30th September, 241 C. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Lisbon, 9th October, _ 243 D. The same to the same, Lisbon, the same day, _ _ . 245 E. The same to the same, Lisbon, 18th October, _ . _ 246 F. The same to the same, Lisbon, the same day, _ _ _ 243 G. The same to the same, Lisbon, 27th October, _ _ . 250 H. Resolution of a Council of War of the Spanish Generals, Tudela, 5th November, - _ - - _ -'252 L Don Pedro Cevallos to Charles Scuart, Esq. Aranjuez, 6th November, 253 K. Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, Downing Street, 14th November, 254 L. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, 24th November, - 257- The same to the same, Salamanca, the same day, - - 260 Xll Page. M. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, dated Salamanca, 25th November, 264 N. The same to the same, Salamanca, 25th November, - - - 265 O. The same to the same, Salamanca, 26 th November, - - 267 P. The same to the same, Salamanca, 29th November, - - 263 Q. Marquis la Romana to Sir John Moore, Leon, 30th November, - 269 R. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, 5th December, 270 S. The same to the same, Salamanca, the same day, - - 273 T. Mr. de Garay to Sir John Moore, Aranjuez, 28th November, - 274 V. El Principe de Castelfranco and Don Thomas Morla to Sir John Moore, Madrid, 2nd December, ----- 275 U. Thirteenth Bulletin of the French Army in Spain, Madrid, 2nd and 4th December, ----- 276 Fourteenth Ditto, Madrid, 5th December, - - - 277 W. Mr. de Garay to Mr. Frere, Truxillo, 8th December, - - 283 X. Junta of Toledo 10 Sir John Moore, Toledo, 5th December, - 286 Y. Number of Effective Soldiers who marched from Portugal under Sir John Moore, - - - - - - 287 Number of Effective Soldiers who marched from Corunna under Sir David Baird, - - - - - 288 Z. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Salamanca, 8th December - 289 A A. The same to the same, Salamanca, 10th December, - - 291 B B. The same to the same, Salamanca, 12th December, - - 293 C C. Don Ventura Escalante to Sir John Moore, Calzada de Banos, 7th Dec. 296 DD. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh, Toro, 16th December, - 297 E E. The same to the same, Benavente, 28th December, - - 300 The same to the same, Benavente, the same day, - - 303 The same to the same, Astorga, 31st December, - - 303 F F. The same to the same, Corunna, 13th January, 1809, - 306 Translations of Letters in the French Language, - - - 310 AN ACCOUNT O F THE LATE CA3IPAIGN OF THE BRITISH ARMY IN SPAIN, COMMANDED BY HIS EXCELLENCY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN MOORE, KB. &c. &c. &c. Although The King and the British Nation have proclaimed their admii-ation of Sir John Moore as loudly as of any of the most dis- tinguished military characters that preceded him : yet, like the Great and Good of every age, he has not escaped the insinuations of Envy, even after terminating an illustrious career by a most glorious death. The effects of Calumny against so noble a character can be of no long duration ; but during that period the Relatives and Friends suffer, and the uninformed part of the Publick remain, in some degree, in suspence. It is, therefore, incumbent on a Brother by unfolding the truth to prove to all, that the pretended facts upon which the malignant repi'esentations were founded, are utterly false. This plain narrative, extracted from his own Journal, authenticated by original documents, official records, and the reports of Staff Offi- cers, will give to his beloved countrymen some faint idea of the zeal, valour, and skill, \vi\\\ M'hich he served them. 2 Few private men have risen to so conspicuous a station as that filled by Sir John Moore with fewer enemies. This was chiefly owing to his modest and unassuming manners, to firmness tempered with kindness towards those under his command, and to a conduct to all scrupulously just. He spent his life in the army; and his popularity, both among Officers and Soldiers, never was exceeded. But universal approbation never was attained by Man : and it must be admitted that with Politicians he was not sufficiently pliant to be always equally approved of by them. The mystery in which the transactions in Sweden were involved, gave the lovers of detraction an opportunity too tempting to be neglected. Should it become necessary, the conduct of Sir John Moore at that Court can be most satisfactorily explained. But all that shall at present be communicated is, that, in the month of May 1808, he was entrusted Avith the command of ten thousand men to assist Sweden against a combined attack from Russia, France, and Denmark. On the 17th of May this anny reached Gottenburgh ; and it was soon intimated that the troops were not to be permitted to land ; the soldiers and horses, consequently, remained tossing on board the crowded transports. Sir John Moore prudently suppressed the feelings excited by so inhospitable a reception, so opposite from what he had been led to expect : and he repaired to Stockholm to' communicate his orders, and to concert measures for the security of Sweden. He there found to his surprise, that, although the Swedish army was quite inadequate even for defensive operations, His Majesty's thoughts were entirely bent on conquest. It was first proposed that the British should remain in their ships, till some Swedish regiments were collected at Gottenburgh ; and that the combined forces should land and conquer Zealand. Upon an examination of tliis plan, it was acknowledged, that the Island of Zealand, besides containing several strong fortresses, was filled with a far superior regular force to any that could be assembled. And also that the Island of Funen was full of French and Spanish troops, which could not be hindered from crossing over in small bodies. Sir John Mooi-e, in the mildest and most respectful manner, represented, that these difficulties seemed too great to be surmounted by the bravest troops. It was next proposed, that the British alone should land in Russian Finland; storm a fortress, and take a position there. This notion was still more preposterous than the former : and Sir John Moore endeavoured to prove that ten thousand British were insufficient to encounter the principal force of the Russian Empire, which could quickly be brought against them at a point so near Petersburgh. The objections which he was obliged to make to these, and to another scheme equally impracticable, drew upon him the resent- ment of his Swedish Majesty, who arrested him in his Capital, He, however, with considerable address, withdrew from the thraldom of Sweden without committing his Government : and, conformably to his instructions, brought back the army to England. At his return, he was honoured with the approbation of the Ministers and of his Sovereign : indeed, there is no doubt, that, with a General possessed of less good sense and political firmness, the Army would have been exposed to inevitable destruction. After having acted both in the Mediterranean and in Sweden as Commander in Chief, Sir John Moore was now superseded by Sir Harry Burrard ; and he received the Secretary of State's Orders to serve in Portugal, as Third in Command, There are few Generals in the British service who would not have resigned upon such treatment. But, superior to modern military etiquette, he possessed a large portion of the antient Romaix spirit : for he has been heard to declai'c, that he would never refuse serving his Countx'y while he was able ; and that if The King commanded him to act as an Ensign, he would obey. In conformity to this patriotic principle, after resigning his com- mand at Portsmouth to Sir Harry Buri'ard, he sailed in the fleet to Portugal on the 3 1 st of May. Two Generals so circumstanced, seldom live very amicably toge- ther : but Sir John Moore, instead of behaving with dry reserve towards the person who was thus placed over him, evinced to Sir Harry the deference due to his Commanding Officer ; and behaved with so much good humour, that they lived together in perfect harmony. This army did not arrive in Portugal till after the battle of Vimeira, and the subsequent armistice. These transactions, therefore, do not come within the scope of this narrative. Yet it is proper to mention that Sir John Moore, upon learning the particulars of the action, bestowed warm praises upon Sir Arthur Wellesley. He declared to Sir Hew Dalrymple, the new Commander, that he wished to wave all pretensions derived from his seniority ; that as Sir Arthur had done so much, it was fair he should take the lead in the opera- tions against Lisbon ; and, if the good of the service required it, he would execute any part that was allotted to him, without intei-fering with Sir Arthur. No opportunity, houevcr, of this kind presented itself; as a Con- vention was agreed upon between tlie British and French Com- manders, for the evacuation of Portugal by the French troops. While this was carrying into effect, Sir Arthur Wellesley applied for leave of absence, and soon retiu'ned to England ; and sevei-al General Officers followed his example. Sir Hew Dalryinple was next recalled, and the Command devolved upon Sir Harr)^ Buirard. But this General, from had health and other causes, requested leave to resign. It was not thought advisable by the Cabinet again to supersede Sir John Moore : accordingly, on the h'th of October * dispatches arrived from London, conferring upon him the chief command of an army to be employed in Spain. It appears, by various Government dispatches, that the design of sending an army into Galicia was communicated to Sir Hew Dal- rymple in August. But the necessity of transporting the army of Junot to France occasioned this measure to be deferred. It was now resolved that it should be carried into execution. Sir John was ordered to send the Cavalry by land ; and it was l.:ft to his discretion to move the Infantry and Artillery either by sea or land. It was also communicated to him, that fifteen thousand men were ordered to Corunna ; and he was directed to give such orders to Sir David Baird, their Commander, as would most speedily eflFect a junction of the whole force. From the moment that Sir John Moore obtained this command, he exerted the utmost activity to fulfil the instructions ; and re- ceived essential assistance from Sir Harry BuiTard, who forwarded the expedition with the greatest zeal. Before this time nothing had been begun for the equipment of the troops, or for their advance : all was to be done, and all was accomplished with celerity ; for the greatest part of the troops were in motion in eight days. Soon after the General entered upon his command, he published the following Order to his troops. * Vide Appendix A. and B. 6 " General Orders. Lisbon, 9th October, 180S. *' The Troops under Lieut.-General Sir John Moore will hold " themselves in readiness to move on the shortest notice. " The Lieut.-General trusts that the General Officers will lose " no time in ascertaining, that the Regiments under their command '' are in good order and complete in every equipment to enable ■*,' them to keep the field. '' Lieut.-General Sir John Moore will take an early opportunity of *' inspecting the several corps of the army. " All the heavy baggage will be left in Lisbon, and directions '' will be given hereafter respecting it. " The General Officers will communicate with the Commanding " Officers of corps, upon the situation and fitness of the stores " for their heavy baggage, and report thereupon for the information *' of Lieut.-General Sir J. Moore. " Directions will be given with respect to the sick. The Lieut.- " General sees with much concern the great number of this descrip- " tion, and that it daily increases. The General assures the troops, " that it is owing to their own intemperance, that so many of them " are rendered incapable of marching against the Enemy : and having " stated this, he feels confident that he need say no more to British " soldiers to insure their sobriety." This Order was understood to have been relished by the soldiers, and had some effect upon them. And previous to their setting off, another Order was issued to instruct them in their conduct towards the Spaniards. a n f\ Head Quarters, ^- ^- Lisbon, \5lh October, 1809. " The Commander of the Forces tnists, that on the troops enter- *' ing Spain, they will feel with him how much it is for their honour *' and advantage to maintain the high opinion, and cherish the good- " will, which that brave and high-spirited people entertain towards " the British Nation. " The troops will generally be received by the inhabitants. The " Spaniaids are a grave, orderly people, extremely sober ; but gene- *' rous and warm in their temper, and easily offended by any insult " or disrespect which is offered them ; they are grateful to the " English, and will receive the troops with kindness and cordiality. " This the General hopes will be returned with ecjual kindness " on the part of the soldiers, and that they will endeavour to ac- " commodate themselves to their manners, be orderly in their " quarters, and not shock, by intemperance, a people worthy of *' their attachment, and whose efforts they are come to support " in the most glorious of causes — to free themselves fi'om French " bondage, and to establish their national liberty and independence. " Upon entering Spain, in compliment to the Spanish nation, " the Army will wear the Red Cockade in addition to their own." It is proper to remark here, that British armies are little expe- rienced in the business of a long campaign on shore. Our warfare has usually been carried on by maritime expeditions : and we are extremely defective in the organization of the departments which are requisite for the field ; the Commissariat partlculaily is inferior to that of France. But no part of military affairs was unknown to the General j he was capable of forming, in some degree, what 8 was deficient ; and, though he complains of the inexperience of some of the departments, he \ATites with approbation of their zeal and exertions. The directions of Government were, that the Cavalry should be sent by land * ; but a discretionary power was given to the Commander to move the Infantry, by sea or land, as he judged best. Upon an examination of the subject, there was found to be no choice ; for, independently of the xmcertaintv and danger of a coasting voyage in ^^'inter, which, even when prosperous, unhinges the whole machinery of an army, it was ascertained tliat, at Coininna, there v.ere hardly the means of equipping and forwarding the corps commanded by Sir David Baird -|-. — The Spanish Government de- puted Colonel Lopez, a Spanish oflicer, who was well acquainted with the roads and resources of the country, to assist the British army on its mai'ch, to estahhsh magazines, and to make the necessary arrangements with Sir John Moore. He confirmed the former intelligence, and pressed him in the name of the Junta, to march by land ; assuring him, that if he went by sea, one half of the army could never leave the coast for want of necessaries. The next question v\'as, n'hether they should proceed in a northerly direction, through Portugal to Almeida; or should take the great Eastern road to Elvas, and thence march through Estremadura. Necessity decided this question likewise ; for it was found that the whole could not be subsisted on the road by Elvas ; no magazines having been formed for such a body of troops. When the Spanish Commissary General was consulted on this subject, and when the quantity of meat required by the British army was explained to him, he computed, that were they to be supplied with the rations specified, in three months all the oxen would be consumed, and very few hogs would be left in the country. * * Vide Appendix A. t Appendix C. D. E. F. Strict enquiry was then made lespecting the roads through the North of Portugal, where there was known to bo abundance of food. He found the Portuguese at Lisbon incredibly ignorant of the state of the roads of their own country ; but all agreed that cannon could not be transported over the mountains, which form the north- -ern boundary between Spain and Portugal. Even British Officers, who had been sent to examine the roads, confirmed the Portuguese intelligence. As eqiiipments could not be procured at Corunna, as food could not be supplied on the road by Elvas, and as the artillery could not Ije drawn over the Portuguese mountains, it became absolutely neces- sary to divide the Army. This disti'essing measure was not adopted but from necessity. In an absolute Government, like France, a\ here the Ruler is skilled in military operations, and possesses power to bring forth all the means and resources of the countiy, such difficulties vanish ; but in Spain and Portugal few obstructions can ever be removed by the Govern- jnent ; they can only be evaded. It Avas then determined to send five brigades of artillei-y to accom^ pany the cavahy througli Spain ; and four regiments of iufantrv were added for their protection. This important corps of six thousand men wez'e entrusted to Lieut.-General Hope, and directed to march by Elvas on the Madrid road, to Badajos and Espinar. And two brigades under General Paget moved Ijy Elvas and Alcantara. The rest of the army moved through Portugal. Two brigades under General Beresford went by Coimbra and Almeida. Three brigades tinder General Eraser, by Abrantes and Almeida. •Sir John IMoore thinking it of very great Importance that some c 10 artillery should accompany these corps, ordered one light brigade of six pounders, under Captain Wilmot, to proceed through Portugal ; and he trusted to this Officer's activity to transport the guns over the mountains by dint of labour. The different regiments of each division followed each other in succession to facilitate the march ; Sir John Moore intending, that the whole of the troops coming from Portugal should unite at Salamanca; and that Sir David Baird and General Hope shoxdd either join them there, or at Valladolld. The several divisions having moved off, Sir John' left Lisbon on the 27th of October*. And I shall here introduce sc«ne remarks on the state of Spain, and on the plan of the Campaign decided on by the British Government. Towards the end of summer, after the surrender of Dupont, the French Army retired from Madrid, and repassed the Ebro. Their force in this direction consisted of above 45,000 men con- centrated in Navarre and Biscay ; their right at Bilboa, and their left at Aybai*. They had besides garrisons in Barcelona, Figueras, and other fortresses in Catalonia, amounting to fully 15,000 men more. In these positions they quietly waited for reinforcements. And every forelo-n journal announced, that vast bodies of troops of every description were hastening through Germany and France to Bayonne. ' During this period the Spanish and English newspapers were reporting the enthusiastic patriotism of the Spaniards ; that all ranks, youno- and old, had taken up arms, were eager to rush upon their enemies, and determined to die rather than submit to a treacherous, cruel, and Impious Invader. Such was the spirit of the proclamations * Vide Appendix G, 11 of the provincial Juntas, — all vying with each other in magna- nimous expressions. But the British Government, not trusting to such authorities, sent Officers and Agents into various parts of Spain, who rivalled each other in reporting the universal ardour of the country. Full credit appears to have been given to this description of the state of Spain ; and the British Army was dispatched into Leon to participate in the glory of expelling the Fi'ench from the Peninsula. The Spanish Government recommended Burgos as the point of union for the British troops, and Madrid and Valladolid were the places appoiiited for magazines. And Government communicated to Sir John Moore, through Lord William Benthick, that it was expected he would find between sixty and seventy thousand men, assembled under Blake and Romana, in the Asturias and Galicia*. These were independent of the armies on the fi'ont and left flank of the French position. The latter was conceived to be the most numerous of any, and placed under the command of the Marquis de Castanos. The conviction of the universal enthusiasm of the Spaniards was, at this time, so prevalent in the British Cabinet, that, In a memorial transmitted for tlie information of Sir John Moore by the Secretary of State, it is stated, that the French Armies could not enter the defiles of the Asturias without exposing themselves to be destroyed^ even by the anned peasants. But the strongest proof of the misinformation upon the state of Spanish affairs is this, that in the month of September it was con- sidered most probable, that the Spaniards alone would soon drive the French out of the Peninsula. This conviction was so strong, that enquiries were directed to be made by Lord William Bentinck * Vide Appendix B. 12 respecting the intentions of the Spanish Government upon the expulsion of the French. And directions were given, under particular circumstances, to urge the invasion of the South of France with a combined British and Spanish Army. Had these relations been well founded, and had the general fervour really existed, there could have been no objections to sending the Bi'itish Army by the nearest roads to join such numerous and intrepid allies. For the most timid could entertain no apprehensions, if the French were to be assaulted by such superior numbers. Such was the flattering picture of affairs that was presented to the view of Sir John Moore, before he commenced his march, and was enabled to judge for himself. In passing through the Portuguese territoiy the troops behaved with order and regularity, which formed a striking contrast to the cruelty and rapine that of late years disgrace the French armies. The people were civil ; but considerable difficulties occurred respecting provisioning the troops. Saltero, a conti'actor at Lisbon, had agreed to supply the divisions with rations on the march through Portugal. But this man failed in his contract ; and the divisions of General Fraser and Beresford were obliged to be halted ; and, had it not been for the great exertions of the Generals, the troops would have been long delayed. There was also a great want of money, from which excessive inconveniences resulted. It had been supposed that Government bills would have been accepted. But promissary notes do not obtain credit in Spain and Portugal, as in England. At Guarda, the Chief Magistrate refused to procure provisions without regular payments, and the peasantry had a dread of paper money. These difficulties were, however, surmounted, but not without great expence. The Commander of the Forces was usually entertained with politeness at the houses of the nobility. He saw little appearance of 13 a Frencli party, but was^ surprised to observe tbe slight interest the Portuguese took in public aftairs. They were generally well inclined, butluke-wami.. _ As Sir John Moore was approaching the scene of action, he gra- dually acquired just notions of Spanish affairs ; for he was in close correspondence wth men of candour and discernment, who resided on the spot. Little was written by them of Spanish ardour and enthu- siasm : . their letters, on the contrary, were tilled with details of the weakness and tardiness of the Central Junta. This assembly consisted of thirty-four persons with equal powers. So numerous an executive body was ill calculated for prompt decisions. Self-interest, mutual Jealousy and discord, distracted their councils. There was no predominant leader to give uniformity to their acts, no animating passions to elevate their minds. By cold languor, and foggy dullness, they chilled and damped the spirits of the nation. The love of independence and hatred of a tyrant so Instantaneously excite all the energies of Britons, that they can hardly credit the sluggish indifference that pervaded the Spanish nation, ^hen menaced by the rapid approach of the victorious aniiies of Buonaparte. Judging what he could do, by A\hat Spaniards Avere capable of, they thought It almost Impossible for his army to traverse the Pyren- nees in winter. But should the French have the temerity to effect such a passage, it Avas believed they would soon be famished. These notions were applicable to the resources formerly possessed by France. But the magnitude of the military preparations of their present enemy, and the celerity of his movements, confounded all such calculations. Lord William Bentlnck saw clearly the error committed, by the" Spaniaids. In a dispatch about the beginning of October he observes, with a melancholy presage, *' I am every moment more and more *' convinced, that a blind confidence in their own strength, and na- " tural slowness, are the rocks upon which this good ship runs the " risk of being A\Tecked." 14 It was wondered at in England, why the bold patriots, who were believed to be swarming in Spain, did not charge the discomfited re- mains of the French armies lurking behind the Ebro : Why are they not exterminated before they are reinforced ? The Marquis de Castanos and General Blake could have answered these enquiries very satisfactorily to all intelligent militaiy men. For it is clear from existing documevits, that the Spanish armies were so weak in numbers, and so wretchedly equipped, as to be inca- pable of encountering the French, even before their reinforcements arrived. This deplorable deficiency was carefully concealed, to pre- vent its sinking the nation into despair. Notwithstanding the extensive correspondence %^hich Sir John Moore carried on, he could obtain no certain accounts of the numbers or condition of the Spanisii forces, before the arrival of Buonaparte. But after that event, when they had assembled all their new levies, it was found that the Armies of the Centre and Right united, under the Generals Castanos and Palafox, only formed a force of 40,000 men. And the following extract from the Resolutions of a Council of War composed of the principal Spanish Generals, which was held at Tudela on the 5tli of November, exposes part of the distresses of these armies. At this period General Blake's army, called the Army of the Left, was known to bo in the utmost danger ; yet the Council came to this resolution : " Attention being had to the actual state of penury and Avant, " which the Army of the Centre, destitute of the most necessary " means, is suffering ; considering also that this effective force is " much less than had been supposed ; it is agreed that in the present " moment it cannot be of assistance to the Army of the Left, not- " withstanding the conviction of the urgency of such assistance," &c. * * Vide Appendix H. 15 To give a further view of the state of the principal Spanish Army,. I shall extract a short passage from the Marquis of Castanos's dis- patches to the Secretary of the Central Junta, Nov. 25, 1808. " I leave to your Excellency to conceive the critical situation of an *' army immoveahle from its few resources, and the greatest part " of which was composed of new levies, badly clothed, and badly *' provisioned-" This was the language of the Spaniards, And I shall give an ex- tract of a Letter from Captain Whittingham to Lord William Ben« tinck, which will shew the impression that the appearance of part of their army made upon an English officer.. Head Quarters, CalahoTra; 28/h Oct. 1808. " On the 25th General Castanos left this place for Logrono. We *< arrived about four in the evening. The army of Castile was drawn " up to receive the General, Its strength about 11,000 men. But *' to form any idea of its composition, it is absolutely necessary to *' have seen it. It is a complete mass of miserable peasantry, with- *' out clothing, without organization, and> with few Officers that de- *' serve the name. *' The General and principal Officers have not the least confidence " in their troops ; and, what is yet worse, the men have no con- ** fidence in themselves. " This is not an exaggerated' picture ; it is a true portrait," &c. &c. Such was the condition and amount of the troops under Castanos and Palafox towards November, after all were collected that could be raised. But in August and September they were, doubtless, much fewer. Castanos found it dangerous to approach the French posts. The Spaniards sometimes engaged in skirmishes ; but were so much nx)vsted, ttia^ they found It prudent to keep at a distance, and wait for reinforcements, A similar reason accounts for the inactivity of General Blake duriug these important months. The disposition to exaggeration in Spain is such, that it is difficuh even now to ascertain what was the numher of thjs ;army. But it. certainly could never have been considerable \ for after the arrival of Bomana's corps, of upwards of 8000 men, an^ every exertion that was made, it appears from Captain Carrol's dis- patches that the actual number that fought the French vould lead one almost tp suspect, that the Spanish Juntas, frpru excess of presumptipu, ignorance, and n a heated imagination, were so blinded, as to have misled the British Cabinet unintentionally. For it is a wcll-kuown fact, that at first they considered Spain as more tban a match for France. They ap- plied to us for arms and money, but said they wanted no men: be- lieving they could raise more soldiers, than they required. How long this infatuation continued, I cannot pretend to say ; but they appear to have acquiesced in the oiFer of British auxiliaries on the 26th of September. It happened that accounts were brought to the Junta at Aran- juez, Oct. 4th, of " a Letter having been intercepted, addressed by " the Governor of Bayonne to Marshal Jourdan (the French Com- " mander in Cbief) wherein it is stated, that between the 16th of " October and the 16th of November reinforcements to the amount of " 66,000 infantry and from 5 to JOOO cavalry might be expected to " enter Spain. " Mr. Stuart will tell you that this news is credited." That this news was correct, I have no doubt. Buonaparte, though he constantly attempts to deceive the world by his public proclama- tions, has too much political wisdom to deceive his own Generals. Nor could he have thrown this letter purposely in the way of the Spaniards, as he could not wish to rouse them from their lethargy. This intelligence threw the Central Junta into great alarm ; they began to think the business was serious ; Castanos was ordered to his post, and such levies as they could collect were sent forward to the Ebro. Urgent and alarming as was the situation of affairs, the dilatoriness of the Spanish Grovernment could not be corrected. So that when Sir David Baird arrived at Corunna, Oct. 13th, the Junta of Galicia refused him permission to land the troops. Sir David was astonished, Vide Appendix, E. D 18 and sent off expresses to Madrid and to Lisbon. He at last obtained leave to land, but his reception was so cold, and there was such a total want of all exertion to assist him in equipping the army for its advance, that he wrote to Sir John Moore to know if he had the sanction of the Supreme Junta for the admission of British troops Into Spain. He was at last satisfied as to this point ; but he found, that what- ever was necessary either for the sustenance or movement of the troops must be procured solely by his own exertions ; and by paying a high price to those m horn he came to assist. Sir John Moore marched on rapidly, and reached Atalaia Nov. 5th. Here it was discovered, contrary to the information received at Lis- bon, that the roads though very bad were practicable for Artillery. But the ignorance of the Portuguese respecting their own country is such, that the road was only found out from stage to stage by the British officers. This wag now a subject of serious regret ; for had the road, bad as it was, been knoAvn at first. General Hope's division could have marched with the rest of the army. Dispatches were now sent to meet him at Truxillo, to desire he would not trust to report, but send forward officers to examine if there were a nearer road practicable for the guns, without going round by Madrid. Letters were here received from Lord William Bentinck, acquaint- ing Sir John Moore that the French reinforcements were entering Biscay, and that Castanos was making some movements which might bring on an action : and also that the Central Junta referred Sir John to concert his movements with General Castanos. TTie General anived at Almeida Nov. 8th : it rained incessantly ; the troops however moved on in spite of the weather, and behaved ex- tremelv well : but it is painful to be obliged to make an exception of some soldiers who had committed many daring crimes. The Com- 19 mander in Chief determined to put a stop to such disorders. One of the soldiers who was detected in marauding and rohbing, was tried by a General Court Martial, found guilty, and sentenced to death. Sir John Moore then issued the following order. " General Orders. " November iltk, 180S. " Nothing could be more pleasing to the Commander of the ' Forces, than to shew mercy to a soldier of good character under his ' command, who had been led inadvertently to commit a crime ; but ' he should consider himself neglectful of his duty, if, from ill-judged * lenity, he pardoned deliberate villainy. " Tlie crime committed by the prisoner now under sentence, ' is of this nature, and there is nothing in his private character or * conduct which could give the least hope of his amendment, were ' he pardoned ; he must therefore suffer the awful punishment to * which he has been condemned. " The Commander of the Forces trusts that the troops he commands ' will seldom oblige him to resort to punishments of this kind: ' and such is his opinion of British soldiers, that he is con\inced ' they ^vill not, if the Officers do their duty, and pay them proper ' attention. " He however takes this opportunity to declare to the Army, that ' he is determined to shew no mercy to plunderers and marauders, ' or, in other words, to thieves and villains. " The Army is sent by England to aid and support the Spanish ' nation, not to plunder and rob its inhabitants. And soldiers who ' so far forget what is due to their own honour, and the honour ' of their country, as to commit such acts, shall be delivered over to ' justice : the militai-y law must take its course, and the punishment ** it awards shall be inflicted." 50 On tVie 11th of November tlie advanced guard crossed a rivulet which divides Spain from Portugal, and marched to Clvidad Roderigo. Tlic Governor of tills town met Sir John two miles off; a salute was fired from the ramparts, and he was conducted to the principal house of the town ; and hospitably entertained. The appearance of the country, and the manners of the people, change most remarkably, immediately on crossing the boundary between Spain and Portugal ; and the advantage is entirely in favour of Spain. We were received, on approaching Cividad Roderigo, M'lth shouts of " Viva los Ingleses." This agreeable reception was gratifying; and the General pro- ceeded next day to San Martin, a village seven leagues distant, M'here he lodged at the house of the Curate, a sensible, respectable man, who, in the course of conversation, told him, that on the same day the preceding year he had lodged the French General Loison, on his march to Portugal ; and that Junot and the other French Generals had slept there in succession. On the 13th of November, Sir John arrived with his advanced guard at Salamanca, where he halted. Intending to assemble there all the troops which were coming from Portugal. But before he entered the town, he learnt the fate of A^hat was called, the Army of Estramadura. This Spanish corps, consisting of about 12,000 raw recruits, com- manded by a very young man, the Count. Belvedere, had advanced without support to Burgos, an open town, In the front of the French Army. So extraordinary a manoeuvre was followed by a natural result. Tliey were attacked by a superior force, and completely routed. A few hours after Sir John arrived at Salamanca, he wrote to Lord William Bentinck at Madrid, Avho was acting as Minister from the British Court. 21 (I Sir John Moore to Lord If^illiam BcntincTc. U.Y DEAR LORD, ^* Salamanca, I'ith November, 1808. " I ARRIVED here early in the afternoon. I am not " only jaded by my jom'ney, but also by the different people I have " been obliged to speak to ; and only that I am anxious to send " a Courier to you as soon as possible, I should have delayed Avriting ' to you until morning. I received upon the road your two letters " of the 8th, and that of the 9th with the enclosures, some of which " shall be returned to you by the next courier. " I am sorry to say, from Sir David Baird, I hear nothing but " complaints of the Junta of Corunna, M'ho afford him no assist- " ance. They promise every thing, but give nothing; and after " waiting day after day for carts, which they had promised to pro- " cure for the carriage of stores, his Commissary was at last obliged " to contract for them at an exorbitant price, and then got them. " This is really a sort of conduct quite intolerable to troops that " the Spanish Government have asked for, and for whose ad- " vance they are daily pressing. " On my arrival here, and telling Colonel 0'Lo\Aler that I wished " to have supplies immediately provided on the road from Astorga to " this place, for the march of the troops from Corunna, he began " by telling me that a power which he should have got, and which " it was promised should be sent after him from Madrid, had not ** been sent; that he had thus no authority, and had hitherto been *' acting upon his own credit. Part of this was an Irish trick — four ** sej'aire valoir ; it tended only, however, to shew me, that he was^ 22 not the man who should have been selected for us ; but, if selected, he should ha^ e been furnished with every authority to make him useful. I run over all this to you, though, perhaps, it should pro- perly be addressed to Mr. Frere ; but to you I can state it with more ease, and I shall thank you to speak to Frere upon it ; when I hope he will have some serious communication with the Spanish IMlnlsters, and plainly tell them, if they expect the advance of the British Army, they must pay somewhat more attention to Its wants. Proper Officers must be sent to me, vested with full powers to call forth the resources of the country when they are wanted, and without delay ; the same as is done, I presume, for the Spanish Armies ; we shall pay, but they are not to allow us to be imposed upon, but to tell us what is paid by the Spanish Government in such cases. We find no difficulty with the people ; they receive us every where well. But the authorities are back- ward, and not like those of a country who wish our assistance. " The Officer you mention to have been sent to Sir David Baird, travelled by slow journies, as if in profound peace, and consequently arrived too late, and when Httle wanted. The head of Balrd's column is this day at Astorga ; but had they waited for the said Officer, it would have been still at Corunna. The Spaniards seem to think that every body should fly but themselves. The troops from Lisbon begin to march iir here to-morrow, and will continue to arrive by corps dally until the 23d, Avhen the -whole will be assembled. I have directed Baird also to continue the march of his troops on Benevente, as soon as supplies permit it; and by the time the head reaches Benevente, I shall probably direct it to proceed on to Zamora, and close the whole as near to me at this place, as cover will admit ; probably by the 23d instant the rear of Balrd's will be about Zamora, but it will depend on the aid and activity of the Authorities of the country ; if they are slow, it Is 23 " impossible for me to be quick. All this, however, is upon the swp- *' position that the Fi'ench do not disturb us ; and I suppose you " know they are at Burj^os, At Cividad Rodrigo, I received a letter *' by express from El Conde de Belvedere, from Burgos, dated the " 9th, stating that he expected to be attacked by superior numbers, " and begging that I would hasten to his assistance. I wrote to him '' that I had been maichlng for some time Avith all the haste I could ; " but if he was to be attacked so soon, it was impossible for me to " render him any assistance ; and he should report his situation to " Madrid. Upon my arrival here, I was informed by the Marquis " de Cinalbo, that the Spanish troops had been forced to retire from *' Burgos, and the French were in possession of it. I hope the letter " I wrote to General Castanos will draw from him some explanation " of Ills views, by which I may I'egulate my motions. But his move- *' ments, and those of the army under General Blake, require some " explanation in order to be understood ; for, though they know that " a Biitlsh force is marching from diflt'erent parts, in order to unite, " they have marched away from the point of assembly, and have " left us exposed to be attacked and interrupted before our junction ; " but if we were united, he can hardly expect that, with my force, " I should march forward and place myself within reach of attack " from such superior numbers, Avhilst his and Blake's armies are *' removed at such a distance as to be able to render me no assistance : *' but all this I expect Avill be made plain, when I hear from General " Castanos. With respect to magazines, it is impossible for me to " say where they ought to be made, whilst I am so much in the ** dark as to the movements which are likely to occur ; but if the " country is abundant, as is said, we cannot want. But I m.ust have *' persons of an authority attached to me, who are acquainted with *' the resources, and who, knowing the interior government, customs, '* and manners of Spain, can call them forth for me and the British 24 '" troops, in the Same manner as they are called forth for those of " Spain. This regards not only provisions, but carts, horses, quar- " ters, and, in short, all the wants of troops. With the aid of per- " sons of this description our own Commissaries can do ; but without " them we can do nothing. The foundation of all this must be an "order to the authorities throughout the Provinces, to give evei*y '* aid to the British, as to the Spanish troops. It is a matter of indif- " ference who pays these Officers; — it would be more consistent " with the dignity of Spain that they paid them ; though we should " reward them according to theii' deserts. " With respect to magazines at Madrid, it is veiy likely to be a '• proper place for Spain to collect a considerable depot of various " kinds. It is their Capital, and they know best ; but it does not ■" strike me a place where the British could be called upon to make *' any collection. We shall establish small magazines for consump- " tion in the neighbourhood where we are acting. These great " reserves, which a country makes for general supply, should be made " by Spain ; when we approach it, we may draw from it, and pay for " what we get. But Spain should make it, and be at the expence " and trouble of its consex'vation : as I believe we are giving money " to Spain, part of it may be applied by them in this manner; but *' it is they that should do it — not we. " I have no objection to you, or Mr. Frere, representing the neces- " slty of as many more British troops as you think proper. It is " certain, that the agents, which our Government have hitherto ^* employed, have deceived them. For affairs here are by no means " in the flourishing state they are represented and believed to be " in England; and the sooner the truth is known in England, the " better. But you must observe, my Lord, that whatever is critical " must now be decided by the troops which are here ; the French, " I suspect, are ready, and will not wait. I differ only with you 23 in one point; — when you say, the chief and great ohstacle and resistance to the French will be aifordcd by the Enghsh Army. If that be so, Spain is lost. Tbe English xVrmy, I hope, will do all which can be expected from their numljers ; but the safety of Spain depends upon the union of its inhabitants, their enthusiasm in their cause, and in their firm and devoted determination to die, rather than submit to the French ; nothing short of this will enable them to resist the formidable attack about to be made upon them. If they will adhere, our aid can be of the greatest use to them; but, if not, we shall soon be out-immbered, were our force quadrupled. " I am, therefore, much more anxious to see exertion and energy in the Government, and enthusiasm in their Armies, than to have my force augmented. — The moment is a critical one — my own situation is particularly so — I have never seen it otherwise ; — -but I have pushed into Spain at all hazards ; — this was the order of my Government — and it was the will of the people of England. I shall endeavour to do my best, hoping that all the bad that may happen, will not happen ; but that with a share of bad, we shall also have a portion of good fortune. " This is a long letter for one who began by saying that he was jaded ; but I have been gradually drawn on by the interest I take in the subject. You will communicate to Mr. Frere such parts as you think proper; and he will, I hope, act upon them. Be so good as to excuse me to him, for not particularly addressing himself. Lord Paget was at Corunna the 7th, with two regiments, the 7th and the 10th Hussars ; the other three were following fast. ■*' I remain, &c, *' John Moore." Two nights aftei' writing the above, Sir John was awakened by au express from General Pignatelli, the Governor of the Province, to inform him that the French army had advanced and taken possession of ilie city of ValladoHd, which is only twenty leagues from Salamanca. It should not be forgotten that the General had been informed offi- cially*, that his entry into Spain would be covered by sixty or seventy thousand men : and Burgos was the city intended for the point of union for the different divisions of the British army. But already, not only Burgos, but Valladolid, were in possession of the Enemy: and he found himself with an advanced corps in a« open town, three marches from the French army, without even a Spanish piquet to cover has front. He had at this time only three brigades of infantry without a gun at Salamanca. Tlie remainder were moving up in succession, but the whole could not arrive in less than ten days. This situation being extremely different from what he had been taught to expect, and that upon which the instructions of the Secre- tary of State were founded, called for very different measures. For i£ the French advanced in foi'ce, he had no option but to fall back on Ciudad Rodrigo ; the country round which, being poor, could not subsist the troops long : and if he retreated to Portugal, he hardly improved his situation. The General had long foreseen the possibility of the French advancing, to prevent the junction of the British troops ; and was quite at a loss to comprehend the motives for the separation of the Spanish armies ; one of which was posted in Biscay, and the other in Arragon, while the country in front was left open, as if to suffer the French to advance upon the British before they were united. * Vide Appendix B. ^7 Tt appeared also very singular, that the advance of the French so far into the country had produced no sensation among the people. The fact was established by a letter from General Pignatelli, the captain-general of the province ; yet the news was brought by no other channel. The people were all tranquil, and employed in their ordinary occupations and amusements ; and seemed to know or care very little about public matters. The General assembled the Junta : he communicated to them the capture of the city of Valladolid, and explained the reasons " that " might render it necessary for him to retire at present to Ciudad *^ Rodrigo ; that this temporary retreat ought not to discourage them ; *' but that they should employ every means in their power to rouse the " enthusiasm of the people, which seemed to be somewhat abated." He represented, " that no nation had obtained independence with- ** out making great sacrifices; and though the English would be '* useful auxiliaries, that success could only be gained by the unioii *' and effort of the Spaniards themselves." He told them, " he must have the use of all the carts and mules " in the country to transport his magazines to Ciudad Rodrigo, *' should it l>ecome requisite ; and that the troops, with three days " provisions, should be kept in readiness. But," he added, " that " he had not yet srtopt the advance of the rest of the army from " Portugal; he was desirous of assembling it there, and would " not retire without an absolute necessity." All this v^'Qs listened to with calm acquiescence. Indeed the pas- sive disposition of the Spaniards was most remarkable ; for they heard of the generous intentions of the British, and of the destruc- tive ravages of the French, with almost equal indifference. The apathy of the people proved the inactivity of their rulers; for on such an occasion, there should not only have been numerous armies on foot, but every man in Spain should have been armed, and ready to 28 act when required. Nor did tliis appear to be impracticable. For the supinencss was not owing to disaffection among the people : the peasantiy and lower orders were all well disposed ; but in ascending to the higher ranks, the spirit of independence evaporated. Tlie General detached some intelligent officers, with strong patioles, to gain intelligence ; by whom he soon leanit, that a thou- sand FreiK-'h cavalry, with two pieces of artillery, had entered Valla- dolid on the 13th, and retired to Palencia next morning. But he understood that no infantry had advanced beyond Burgos. He then sent orders to Generals Baird and Hope to concentrate their divi- sions, to advance with all speed to Salamanca, but to be upon then- guard on their march. It is necessary here to go back a very little, to mention that Mr. Frere anived at Ai-anjuez at the beginning of November, as Minister Plenipotentiai-y of Great Britain. He of course superseded Lord William Bentinck and Mr. Stuart; who, from having resided some time in Spain, and from personal qiialifications, had got ac- quainted Avlth many of the leading men, and had acquired a clear insio-ht into the state of affairs. Their communications with each other, and with Colonel Graham who was at the head-quarters of the principal Spanish army; as well as their correspondence with Sir John Moore, were all conducted -with harmony, and utility to the common cause. This change in the administration of the civil department occurred at the period when events were hastening to a crisis. Mr. Frere unfortunately had acquired his notions of Spanish po- litics in London ; and his prepossessions were much too strong to be effaced by the observations of his predecessors, or even to be altered by the most opposing facts. His pecidiar notions were totally unknown to Sir John Moore ; who, to inform him of his situation, and to promote the public ser\'ice, wrote as follows, from Almeida. '29 From Sir John Moore to the Right Honourable J. Hoolcham Frerc. "sir, Jlmeida, 10 Xo-J. 1808. " As Mr. Stuart mentioned in a late letter which I *' had the honour to receive from him, that he was in hourly expec- " tation of your arrival at Madrid, 1 conclude that ere this you have " reached that capital. " I shall not trouble you with any detail of my movements, as " you will obtain every necessary information respecting them from " Mr. Stuart and Lord William Bentinck, Mith both of Avhom I " have been in correspondence ever since I was appointed to this " command. " The Supreme Junta have fixed upon General Castanos, as the " person with whom I am to correspond, and to combine whatever " operations are to be undertaken by the troops under my command. " This cannot but be considered as a step towards appointing him " the Chief Commander of the Spanish army ; and having gone so " far, it is a pity they did not go a little farther, and at once give " him the appointment. This decision of the Junta was only com- *' municated to me a few days ago, by Lord William, in a letter *' which I received on my i-oad to this place. I have written to '* General Castanos, to give him evei-y infonnation with respect to " the British force, the proliable period of its junction ; and I have " I'equested to know from him, his plans, and his instructions, with " respect to the co-operation he expects from us. It Is needless to " say what different measures I might have pursued, had I been " sooner informed of the strength and condition of the different " Spnnish armies. As it is, the principal part of the infanti-y from 30 Portugal is now passing the frontier ; ai^d by the middle of this month will be collected at Salamanca and Ciudad Rodrigo. General Hope, with the artillery, the cavalry, and 3000 infantry, will be in the neighbourhood of Madrid on the 22d; and the head of Sir David Baird's corps will reach Astorga on the 14th. If nothing adverse happens, we shall be united early in December, more or less advanced, according to the situation and movements of the armies now upon the Ebro. In the mean time 1 shall wait at Salamanca, with the troops assembling there, imtil Baird and Hope are more forward. Much is still to be done in the article of equipment and of commissariat arrangement. As I see more myself, of the resources of the countiy, I shall be able to decide the mode to be followed, for securing to us our supplies ; for the present we must depend upon the Spanish Government, and their Chief Director, Don Vlncenti. " I understand from Sir David Baird that you were kind enough to spare him 40,000/. from the monies you brought with you from England. I have to thank you for this supply ; for when he applied to me. It was with great difficulty I was able to spare him 8000/. We are now in the greatest distress for money, and if a quantity does not speedily arrive from England, we must depend upon the generosity of the Spaniards for our supplies. I doubt at present if there is wherewithal, after the 24th of this month, to pay the troops their subsistence. I fear that in Eng- land, until very lately, they were not aware of the impossibility of procuring money either In Portugal or Spain. I leave this to- morrow, and shall proceed by Ciudad Rodrigo to Salamanca j where 1 shall hope to have the honour to hear from you. " I have the honour to be, " John Moore. ,^1 *"' I tiiist you will have the goodness to excuse whatever is in- " formal in this letter ; you may believe it proceeds from no dis- " respect to you, but I have not been informed, and am quite ignorant " of your appointment, whether Ambassador or Minister Plenipo- " tentiary ; and thought it better to give you no titles, rather than- " the wrong one." To this letter the following answer was sent. From tJie Hotmurahlc J. H. Frere to His Facellenci/ Sir John Moore, K. B. " SIR, Aranjuez, Nov. 13, 1808. " I HAVE this CA'cning received the letter which you ** did me the honour to direct to me from Almeida, and which was " delivered to me by Lord William Bentinck. His messenger, who " sets off with the account, which I received only this morning, of *' the unlucky affair of the 10th near Bui-gos, enables me to thank " you for the view which you have given me of your intended move- " ments, and to mitigate the bad news, by the assurance which I *' think I can venture to give, that it has not created any visible " degree of uneasiness or discouragement in the minds of the leading " persons here. The people, though much irritated, as it is said, "^^ are still farther from being dejected than their leaders. 5000 men " marched forward to-day from Madrid, and two regiments from " Toledo. The fixed spirit of resistance which, without calculation " of danger or of means, seems to have rooted itself in the minds " of the people, appears superior to any reverses. " You will have heard of overtures of negotiation : it seems doubtful " whether Buonaparte meant to include Spain in the number of our " allies with whom he proposes to treat ; and still more, Avhether he "• would offer terms which it would be possible to accept. I should " incline to think, therefore, that he had no other object than that of " cajoling the Empei'or of Russia, and facilitating the conscription. " He will not disunite Spain and England; and I feel confident that *' he will not succeed in lowering the tone, or relaxing the spirit, of *' this country. " You probably are already acquainted with the appointment of " the Marquis Romana to the command of Castanos' and Blake's " army. His nomination is, I understand, a popular one at Madrid; '' and his long absence has given him an advantage ^hich is pecu- *' liar to him, that of being wholly unmixed in the political intrigues " of the day. " I shall be obliged to Mr. Stuart for his assistance in the '' military as well as other parts of my coirespondence ; a circum- " stance which I trust will not be unsatisfactory to you, as it wUl, I " am persuaded, be conducive to the furthering of the public service. " I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient humble servant, " J. H. Frere." The preconceived notions of Mr. Frere were evinced in this first letter, by calling the defeat of the Estremadura army, the unlucky affair of the 10th ; and by the warm description of the spirit of re- ■sistance of a people, whom he had just come among. The correspondence continues 33 From Sir John Moore to the Right Honourable J. Hook ha in Frere. " SIR, Salamanca, Nov. 16, 1808, *' I HAD last night the honour to receive y©ur letter '' of the 13th, together with letters of the 14th from Mr. Stuart and " Lord William Bentinck. " It does not appear certain whether the French have advanced in " anv force to Vedladolid ; and there is no reason to think, fi'om the " information which reached me last night, that they have passed it. '* In the course of this day all this will he ascertained, from the " repoi-ts of the officers and other persons I have sent out. *' General Pignatelli's conduct was certainly not such as became " a person holding a situation of such trust. He seems to have " run off upon the first alarm. It was right for him to retire, " and pvit his person in safety, but no farther; there he should have " stopped, and not have left the people without a head. It was his " duty, I conceive, to have collected information, in order to com- " municate it to me, and to those who, like me, Avere materially " interested. I did not know, until I received Mr. Stuart's letter, " that the defeat of the Estremadura army had been so complete. " It was however nothing more than was to be expected, when " so small a corps was committed so near to the strength of the " Enemy. " I have been unable hitherto to understand the movements and " positions of the Spanish armies ; but I have taken it for granted " that they were formed from local circumstances, and a knowledge " of the country, of which I was ignorant. I should otherwise have " said they were upon a scale much too great for the strength of F 34 " their armies. I begin to fear that this is the case, and that, if •' their system be not changed, we shall all of us very soon be beaten " in detail. To cover and protect the British army, \\'hllst upon its " march from such distant points in order to unite, never seems to *' have been in the contemplation of the Spanish generals ; and " now, from the position the French have taken, the accomplish- " ment of it is become exceedingly precarious. My position here is a " bad one, in as much as my movements in it are confined, and " leave nothing but a barren country to retire upon. I should un- " doubtedly be better at Valladolld ; but it is impossible for me to " go there, whilst the French in force are so near it, and the Spanish " armies are at such a distance. Until my force is united, I must *' be covered and protected. As the corps come to me from such '* opposite directions, Corunna and Madrid, I cannot move towards " one, without increasing my distance, and forsaking the other; " and whilst they are each marching toM-ards me, if I am forced " to fall back, they will both risk to be destroyed. The difference " hitherto between the position of the Spanish and French armies, *•' as they have struck me, is this — the French, in order to con- ** centrate, or to strengthen either flank, move upon the chord, the " Spaniards upon the circumference ; the movements of the one are " short, and can be easily concealed, those of the other extended, " and exposed to be interrupted. I shall write to General Hope to " consider it as his object to join me at tills place with all expedl- " tlon ; but to be guided by the information he receives of the move- " ments of the Enemy, and to use his discretion. I shall direct " General Balrd to collect the whole of his corps at and about " Astorga, whence his retreat to Corunna is safe ; but not to come " towards me, until I give him notice ; and in this I shall be g-uided " by what I perceive of the Enemy on this side of the Ebro, and " from the information I expect to receive from the Marquis de .35 ** laRomana, of his designs, and the direction he means to give to the " Spanish armies. I know not a\ here to address the Marquis ; I '' have therefore written this military letter to you, and request " you will communicate its contents to him. " The contents of the two letters I addressed lately to General " Castanos, and which were sent under cover to Lord William Ben- " tinck, will of course he given to him; — the tone of conciliation " which I have adopted in my letters to General Castanos, and which " I shall continue to the Marquis Romana, I trust you will approve, " I wish to impress upon whoever commands the Spanish armies, " that I consider myself as having but one interest witli him, and *' that he will find me as ready as any of his own Generals to follow *' and support his plans. The power and controul over the direction " of my own army, which, as commanding an auxiliary force, I have ; *' I shall keep out of sight, and hope never to be obliged to exert, " You already know how much we are distressed for money. Mr. *' Stuart and Lord William both say that it is to be got by loan, or " for bills, at Madrid. This differs from the information given to " me by Mr. Kennedy ; but I shall be happy to find that they are " right, and that Mr. Kennedy has been misinformed. If Mr. " Erskine were here, I should send him to Madrid for that purpose ; " for if money is to be found, (such are our necessities) that we must *' get it upon any terms ; but, as Mr. Erskine has not joined me, and " as, in his absence, I cannot spare Mr. Kennedy, I shall take it as " a very particular favour if you will be kind enough to give me your " assistance in this matter ; — I have desired Mr. Kennedy to write " to you upon it. " With respect to our supplies ,1 do not apprehend want. If they *' exist in the country, and we have money, our Commissariat will " procure them. What we want is, some persons conversant in the *' mode, and furnished witli authority to call forth the aid of the 36 " country, and of the Magistrates and civil authorities ; if Don " Vincentl . be the person entrusted Ijy the Spanish Government " for the supply of their army, some person from hini, to whom " he has delegated his information and his correspondence with his " agents in the Provinces, is the person whom the Spanish Govern- " ment should appoint to attend the British army, and aid with his " knowledge and with his authority our Commissariat; — I should " rather this person were a man of character, not looking solely to " making a property of us, but that could be trusted, and likely to *' be satisfied with having discharged an important duty, and with " such pecuniary reward as woul( 1 necessarily attend lit. * * << * * * * * * * * * *■ * (( * * * * * * * * * * * a * * * * * * * * * * * i< * * * * * * * * * * * e I am now to correspond (for it has not been officially commmii- eated to me) is absent — God knows where. In the mean time the French are witliin four marches of me, whilst my army is only 40 •" assembling : in what numbers they ai'e, I cannot learn. No " channels of intelligence have been opened to me ; and I have not " been long enough in the country to procure them myself. I state " these particulars to you. I wish it were in my power to go myself " to Aranjuez, or Madrid, to represent them ; for really if things are " to continue in this stlte, the ruin of the Spanish cause, and the *' defeat of their armies, is inevitable ; and it will become my duty " to consider alone the safety of the British army, and to take steps " to withdraw it from a situation, where, without the possibility of " doing good, it is exposed to certain defeat. " I shall detain the King's messenger until I hear from you ; lest '' vou should wish to send by him any dispatches to England. I '' shall beg of Lord William Bentinck to join the army, where, I '' think, his services will now be most useful. " 1 have the honour to be, " John Moore." In this letter Sir John Moore complains of not having heard from General Leith ; Avhich was owing probably to the dilatoiiness of the messenger, who at last reached Salamanca with the following tidings. From General Leith to Sir John Moore. Renedo Valley of Caqueringa, Piwince " SIR, of Las Montanos de Santander, 1 5th Nov. 1 808. *' I REGRET to inform you that the army of General " Blake, in which was lately incorporated the infantry of the Marquis ** de la Romana's division, has been defeated in several attacks since " the 5th instant, and is entirely dispersed ; I have not time to enter *' into detail of this unfortunate reverse, carrying with it such 41 " serious consequences, for fear of delaying* the Intimation of that " which is so essential to make known in general terms .to the Com- " mander of the British army advancing from Portugal to Galicla. " The Estremaduran army has also experienced a reverse at Burgos. " In short, the British army has nothing to depend upon in Las " Montanos de Santander. In Asturlas there are hut a few hattalions, " totally undisciplined ; and, l)y the last accounts, tlie French occupy " fi'om Reynosa to Burgos. Except what remains of the Estremaduran " army, (the position of >\ hlch I am ignorant) and the British army, " there is nothing to prevent the Enemy from advancing towards " Leon and Valladolid that I know of. I very much suspect that he " will avail himself of this movement, to attack in detail the army " of Palafox and Castanos, united nominally ; and all of which are " placed under the command of the Marquis de la Romana. The *' army has suffered principally from famine ; and I do not think " that it is possilile to re-unlte those who are flying in all directions, " nearer than Astorga and Oviedo. It does not appear that there " has heen any m ant of spirit in the men ; and in many instances, ** especially of the divisions of the North, distinguished conduct. " Some of the ncAV Officers have not behaved so ^^•cll. Captain " Pasly, Royal Engineers, who was sent to Head Quarters to obtain *' information, and to commimicate with the British array, I hope may " have given early Intelligence of the state of things. Captain " Lcfebren, R. E. is the hearer of this letter, and will be able to give " siich Information as may be required. I regret to state that Captain " Rich, R. E. ^^'as wounded, but I hope he is doing well : 1 " caused him to be embarked on board the Cossack frioate at Sant- " andcr, from aa hence I saw seventeen sail of transports, with war- " like stores and provisions, when there appeared no chance of this " Province remaining covered from the Enemy, who, no doubt, will " occupy a point so useful to the Spaniards, and eventually to the G 42 ** British. Siintauder was in tlie poner of the Enemy, after possessing " the roads of Escudo and Reynosa. The accounts of their having " entered that town are not yet received, however. The different " attacks have been at Zoi'osa (between Durango and Bilboa) " Valmaseda, Arantia ; and the total deroute, after a defeat at Espi- " nosa de las Montanax. About 7OOO re-assembled at Reynosa on " the 13th instant, but without any order ; from thence they retreated " after dark, and have arrived in this valley, as a half-starved and " straggling mob, A^ithout officers, and all mixed in utter confusion. " Never has there been so injudicious and ruinous a system begun and " persisted in, as that Mhlch has led to the serious disasters of the " present moment. The Marquis de la Romana, who Is here, is " quite of that opinion; and if the army on the other side, and near *' the Ebro, has not, or shall not have suffered before he can take " this direction, I hope affairs may resume a more favourable " aspect. I had prepared copies of reports on the different affairs, " addressed by different Officers to Lord Castlereagh ; but, unfortu- " nately, all my papers are on board the Cossack man of war. Mr. " Amiotte, the Deputy Commissary-General, has been in such bad ''health since his arrival, that It was difficult enough to get the stores, " &c. embarked. I apprehend the convoy, chiefly consisting of " Avarlike stores for the Marquis of Romana's division, and arms and " provisions, under my orders, for the aid of the armies of Spain, has " gone to Corunna; as they could not at. this season keep the sea, *' and there is no good port nearer than the last-mentioned, from " whence the roads towards Leon are not so good. I should hope " soon to get near the British army. Under the present circumstances, " I feel an awkwardness at leaving the Marquis de la Romana, with " whom I have received particular instructions to communicate on " any point still unsettled. I hope, however, he will soon be able to " disengage himself from this part of the army (if such it can ba 43 *' called) ; and he may probal)ly be <)l)lig;ed to go near the Bntish •*' army before he can communicate with the rest of his own troops. " I have the honour to be, " Janus Leith, M. General. *' I inclose a rougli idea of the situation of this valley, relatively *' to the great route from Reynosa to Santander." Nothing certainly could be worse judged, than the orders sent by the Junta to General Blake to fight the French army alone ; instead of directing him to fall back, and unite with General Baird at Astorga ; for this Spanish army was in no condition to contend with regular troops. There were, it is true, between eight and nine thousand regular soldiers, which had escaped from Denmark with tlie Marquis of Romana, and who fought ^^'ell ; but they were overpowered by superior numhers. The rest of this army consisted of unfortunate peasants, who had suffered with constancy for four months privations which would have annihilated a British army. lliey had endured excessive fatigue, were without shoes, almost without clothes, exposed to the cold on snowy mountains, obliged frequently to depend for subsistence on such animals as they caught hy accident ; on meat without salt, a food totally repugnant to the hahits of Spaniards. They passed many days without bread. Their condition was so wretched, that it is not to be wondered at that they were easily dispersed, and had no inclination to rally. Some of the fugitives even passed Salamanca. The Marquis Romana did not consider it prudent to remain at Reynosa ; he retired to Leon, to re -assemble as many as he could collect. 44 it was now in the choice of Buonaparte either to turn his arms against Castanos, who was posted in Aragon, or to march against the British, prevent their jiinction, and compel them to retire to -Portugal and to their ships. Sir John Moore could do nothing to hinder this ; for, being placed nearly in the centre between two divisions of his army which were approaching from different points, he was constrained to wait at Salamanca, in expectation that they should be permitted to join him. The following extract of a letter to one of his brothers marks his view of the state of affairs. It is dated Salamanca, November 26, 1808. " Upon entering Spain I have found affairs in a very dlf- " ferent state from what I expected, or from what they are thought *' to be in England. " I am in a scrape from which God knows how I am to extricate " myself. But, instead of Salamanca, this army should have been " assembled at Seville. Tlie poor Spaniards deserve a better fate, " for they seem a fine people ; but have fallen into hands who have " lost them by their apathy and * * * * * *, " The Junta, jealous of their Generals, gave them no power ; but " kept them at the head of separate armies, each independent of the " other. Thus they have prevented any union of action. " They took no pains ta recruit the armies, or to furnish them " with arms and clothing. In short, during the interval that the ." French Mere weak, they did nothing either to overpower them " before their reinforcements arrived, or to meet them Avith superior " numbers when reinforced. > " When I marched into this country, in three divisions, from " Corunna, Lisbon, and round by Madrid, instead of finding any " army to cover the junction of the three corps, until our supplies " and stores came up, which were necessary to enable us to act; 45 " I found that the Spanish armies were placed on each flank of the " French ; one in Biscay, and the other on the river Alagon ; at " such a distance as to be able to give no sort of support to each " other, or to combine their movements ; and leaving it also in the " power of the French to attack either army with their whole force, " as soon as they were ready. " Tliey accordingly attacked Blake, and have completely dispersed " his army. Officers and men are flying in every direction. Many *' of them have passed this. " They also got a corps, called the Estremadura army, beat at " Burgos ; Avhere they sent it, without any motive, close to the " strength of the French. " I was desii'ed to con'espond with Castanos, and combine my " movements with him ; but as I began my correspondence, he was " suspended, and the Marquis of Romana named to the chief com- ** mand; but who when I last heard was at Santandero. " I am in no correspondence with any of their generals or armies. " I know not their plans, or those of the Spanish government. No " channels of information have been opened to me ; and, as yet a '* stranger, I have been able to establish no certain ones for myself. ** The Enemy are at Valladolid, in what force I cannot make out; "- and I have my junction to make with Baird, whose whole force '* will not be at Astorga until the 5th of December, and with Hope, " who will be at Arevola about the same time. " Castanos and Palafox have about 40,000 men, mostly undisci- " plined peasants, upon the Ebro and Alagon. And this is all the *• Spaniards have to oppose 100,000 French troops. The provinces ** are not armed, and as to enthusiasm I have seen no marks of it. " That the Spaniards must be driven from Madrid is inevitable ; " they have no force to resist. When they will bring up, or if they " will bring up at all, I cannot guess. In this province, and 4'6 "throughout Old Castile, there is no mark ot" any intention to " make any effort. The French cavalry are overrunning the plains, " raising contributions, to which the people submit without re- "" sistance. " There may be more character in other parts. Enthusiasm, and " an obstinate determination not to submit to the French yoke, may •*' do niueh. But even in this case the Government has been impro- " vident : arms, ammunition, and other means, are wanting. " The probability therefore is that the French will succeed ; and " if tlaey do, it will be from no talent having sprung up, after the ^' first effort, to take advantage of the impulse, and of the enthusiasm *' which then existed. *' I understand all is fear and confusion at Madrid. *' Tell James it is difficult to judge at a distance. The Spaniards " have not shewn themselves a wise or a provident people. Their " wisdom is not a wisdom of action ; but still they are a fine " people; a character of their own, quite distinct from other nations; *' and much might have been done with them. Perhaps they may " rouse again. Pray for me that I may make right decisions : if 1 " make bad ones, it will not be for want of consideration. " I sleep little. It is now only five in the morning ; and I have ■" concluded, since I got up, this long lettei*. " Your affectionate brother, *' John Moore." One of the qualities of the mind with which Sir John Moore wa* gifted in a most extraordinary degree, uas that of prescience. The letters he wrote during the campaign to two military friends, as well as those to his o^^^l family, prove that he foresaw very early evei-y event which afterwards took place. No movement was made 47 by Buonaparte, however artfully concealed, that was tinexpectecl by him. Therefore, though the intelligence he received was always defective, and generally false, he was often able to supply the defi- ciency by a most extraordinary sagacity. A circumstance occurred at this time, to the honour of the Spaniards, which is thus related in his Journal : " Lord Proby was at Tordesillas reconnoitring, when a patrole of " French cavalry came into the town. They stayed some time.- " Every man in the town knew that Proby was there, for he had " been two days among them ; yet not a man betrayed him. And *' when the cavalry left the place, and his Lordship came into the " street, they all testified their satisfaction, and declared that, though " they had no arms, they would have died rather than have allowed " him to be taken." Sir David Baird in his march from Corunna had to struggle with- difficulties of a kind totally new to him. This General had distinguished himself in many campaigns in India, where the British army are always accompanied with so nu- merous a train of slaves, servants, and sutlers, horses, bullocks, and elephants, that the troops are not only abundantly supplied with necessaries, but even furnished with many luxuries. But here Sir David had to encounter a thousand deficiencies ; he met with a variety of obstacles to his progress, and received little aid from the Spaniards to overcome them. In order to procure sufficient supplies for the troops, and to be able to carry forward the baggage, he was obliged to divide his small corps into smaller detachments ; each following the other at considerable distances. He arrived at Astorga November 19 with a part of his infantry; but the following extract of a letter which he wrote from that place, will explain his situation. 48 Sir David Baird to Sir John Moore. " MY DEAR SIR JOHN, November 2Zd. " The more I consider our situation, the more I am " convinced of the danger that would attend my making, at the " present moment, any movement in advance, or attempt to join ^' you, until my force is more collected. We have no kind of sup- " port to expect from the Spaniards, who are completely dispersed " and driven from the field. And if I were to move fonvard the " infantrj^ I have at present here, I should necessarily expose my- " self to be beaten in detail, without a chance of being able to op- " pose any effectvial resistance. '' The Enemy are certainly at Majorga, and their parties have " pushed forward almost close to Benavente. From my present want " of cavahvl have not been able to ascertain how forward their infantry " may be. But as they have had the army which defeated Blake " unoccupied since the 13th, and that which routed the Estrema- " durans since the 10th, I cannot believe that they are very remote. " On my left they have pushed forward as far as St. Vincento de " la Burena and Colombas, both of M'hich places were attacked on " the 19th instant. Of their being carried there can be little doubt ; *' as there does not appear to be any force in the Asturias sufficient " to resist them. And should they have been successful, my com- " munication with mv rear may be endangered, by their advance " on the road through Monderedo or Lugo. " Under these circumstances I have felt it my duty to considt " with the General Officers here, as to the measures it would be " proper to adopt ; and their sentiments are perfectly in unison with " my own ; that unless you should judge it absolutely requisite, it ^^ would not be advisable to attempt to advance, without I should 4.9 •" be able to assemble my whole force at this place, previous to be- *' ginning to move. Should however the Enemy advance in force <' before that time, which will not be previous to December 4, from ** the general tenor of your letters to me, and particularly from tbc *< intention you express in that of the 15th of falling back on Ciu- ^' dad Rodrigo, if the Enemy approach nearer than Valladolld, I ■" shall instantly commence my retreat, taking care if possible to " move by the time they are within three days' march of me, to " prevent the confusion and loss necessarily attendant on a close " pursuit. " 1 had WT-itten thus far when I had the satisfaction to receive *' your two letters of tlie 19th instant; and it is particularly gratl- ^* fying io me to have your sanction to the measures I proposed to " adopt. It is very extraordinary that I have been unable to ob- " tain any sort of information respecting the position of the Enemy's " infantry, although I have used every endeavour to get intel- " ligence. *' I inclose a copy of some intelligence communicated by a person " who was sent from Leon to obtain information respecting the " movements of the French, and of a letter written by Colonel *' Graham from the head-quarters of Castanos' army. *' From the latter it is clearly apparent how veiy much exaggerated " the accounts generally circulated of tbe strength of the Spanish *' armies have been. In all probability Castanos and Palafox may " by this time have met with the same reverse as Blake ; in which *' case the Spaniards could have no force desei*ving the dcnomlna- *' tion of an army in the field. " As it could never be intended by the British Government that ** our army should engage in the defence of this Country unaided ■" and unsupported by any Spanish force, I confess, my dear Sir "' John, I begin to be at a loss to discover an object at this mo- " ment in Spain : it being very evident that the Spaniards are 1 H 50 *' not at this moment In a situation to be capable of assembling a " force competent to offer any serious resistance to the progress of *' the French arms. " It is very remarkable that I have not procured the least intel- *' ligence, or received any sort of communication, from any of the •'•' official Authorities at Madrid, or either of the Spanish Generals. " Neither Mr. Frere nor Lord William Bentinck have written to *' me for a considerable time. " I remain, my dear Sir John, &c. " D. Baird." This excellent letter shews how vei-y just a notion Sir David Baird entertained of the Spanish affairs ; and it appears that both himself, and the Generals in his army, saw the prospect of events in even a more desponding light than Sir John Moore, who indeed states at this period in his Journal — " I see my situation as clearly as any one, that nothing can be " worse ; for I have no Spanish army to give me the least assistance, " only the Marquis Roniana is endeavouring to assemble the fu- " gitives from Blake's army at Leon. " Yet I am determined to form the junction of this army, and to *' try our fortune. We have no business here as things are ; but, " being here, it would never do to abandon the Spaniards without a " struggle." The difficulty of obtaining intelligence was one of the great em- barrassments \^'hich the English had to contend with ; and, what was quite unexpected, the Spanish generals complained as much of this as the English. It was excessively difficult to learn the truth by private means, and the public official reports Avere uniformly false. Many other examples will occur in the progress of this narrative. On the 51 23(1 of November General Blake wrote from Leon, that tlie Frencli had advanced from Sahagunc, and were collecting a force at Ampudia and Rio Seco. And the Marquis Romana transmitted additional information, which was repeated through other channels, " that " the Enemy had, on the 24th instant, collected a corps of 14,000 " infantry at Rio Seco, and that they had in addition 4000 cavalry^ " in that neighbourhood." Sir David Baird naturally believed this information ; and concluded that this corps ^^'as intended to fall upon him before his troops were collected in a body. He therefore pre- pared to retreat, and applied to Sir John Moore for directions, whether the cavalry should retire through Portugal, or be embarked, and go by sea. Sir John however discovered, that Blake and Romana had been deceived by reports spread in consequence of a strong coiys ot French cavalry scouring the country. They had diffused a -wide alarm ; but the General learnt that the principal part of the French army \Aas marching against Castanos. He therefore sent orders to Sir David Baird to advance and join him. The effect of these false accounts was, however, to retard the junction. The situation of affairs in Spain was becoming more and more critical ; and every account sent to Sir John Moore by men of sound judgment was filled with convincing pi'oofs that the Spanish Govern- ment had most unwisely concealed their very desperate state from their ally. Lieut.-General Hope, who always fulfilled the wishes of his Com- mander, had persevered in a toilsome march ; and, by indefatigable exertions, and good arrangements, had provided for the subsistence of the corps placed under his command, and brouglit them forward to the neighbourhood of Madrid. The accounts he ^rote from that City, November 20, were just and discouraging. He there found Lord William Bentinck, who had transmitted so much us&ful and accurate information. 5^ They both had a conference with the artful, subtle, and unprincipled Morla — a political hypocrite acting the part of a patriot, a Spanish nobleman despising honour. This base man, foreseeing the probable superiority of Buonaparte, secretly combined with him ; and was now cunningly retarding everv useful measure, and suggesting every mischievous one which he durst, without exciting suspicion of his designs. As Sir John Moore * perceived there was no Spanish force in the North capable of opposing the French armies, he was considering of the expe- diency of carrying the English army to the South, and there mak- ing a stand, where there might be a probability of giving effec- tual aid. In the above conference, Morla, aware of this judicious plan, did his utmost to prevent its being adopted, and endeaA^oured to entrap a part at least of the British army. The words of General Hope's letter are, " MY DEAR MOORE, Madrid, 20th November, 1808. " In consequence of a pressing letter from Lord *' William Bentinck, I yesterday came to Madrid. " This morning Lord William and I have had a long conversa- " tion with DonT. Morla, authorised by the Junta to converse with ** us upon the state of affairs. " Much desultory reasoning passed at this conference; and it is " perfectly evident that they are altogether without a plan, as to *' their future military operations, either in the case of success or " misfortune. •' Every branch is affected by the disjointed and inefficient con- " struction of their Government. * L.O 53 " Tlie only result of this conference that can bo worth comn\iTu- " eating to you is, that it is the decided opinion of Morla, and stc : d " by him as what the Government also wish, that in case of the " British force being now prevented from forming a junction, for the " purpose of advancing to undertake active offensive operations, a *' junction of whatever part of that force it may be practicable to " bring together should take place in the centre of Spain." Men of strict honour and integi-Ity, hke Lord William Bentinck and General Hope, are never prone to suspicion. It is from subse- quent facts that it Ijecomes clear, that this advice was insidiously given. Had it been followed, the British army, M-hich was too small to cope with the French even when' combined, must have been separated ; and that portion which should approach the centre of Spain would have become an easy prey to Buonaparte; while the remainder would have been too weak to have been efficacious. On the 27th. of November this letter arrived : Mr^ Frere to Sir John Moore. " SIR, Jranjuez, 25 Nov. 1808. *' I SEND inclosed the copy of a Note which I addressed " to M. Garay, secretary of the Junta, and which contains the re- ** capitulation of a conference which I had ^^^th him (on the subject " of your letters addressed to me and to Lord William Bentinck) in " the presence of Mr. Stuart. I have likewise inclosed his answer, " which I have just received. It is difficult to account entirely jfor '* the want of information of which we have to complain. It is " oAving certainly in part to the mistaken notions of secrecy and " mystery which are attached to the concerns of Government, which *' is incidental to people who are unexpectedly called to the manage- 54 " raent of public affairs. Something, I am afraid, is likewise to be " imputed to a jealousy of Great Britain ; as if we presumed upon " the obligations under which this Country is placed. But most of " all, the confusion of their own system of intelligence ; or, more " properly speaking, the want of system is the cause of the uncer- " tainty in which we are left upon points of the gi'eatest cou- " sequence. " Tlie accounts, however, which have been received to-day have " been personally too alarming for concealment. A courier has " arrived who left the advanced posts of the French at Medina celi ; " and an express has since come in from Torriga with an account " of firing having been heard at Siguenca. As the French are " superior in cavalry, and there is nothing to stop theiti bet\^^een " that place and this, the Junta are in immediate expectation of " their approach, and had determined this evening on retiring upon " Coi'dova. I am in hopes that they have been prevailed upon to '' relinquish this plan, and to content themselves at present with " retreating to Toledo. The following is the statement of the *' numbers of their troops in New Castile : , V At Buitrago - - 5000 Segovia - - 4/00 Somosierra - 6400 Madrid - - 5300 *' The force of the Enemy is reckoned at about eleven thousand *'' men, of which six thousand cavalry under General Belliard. " I inclose a report which has just been sent me relative to Blake's *' army. I find upon enquiry, that the date of the attack is the 19th *' at iiiirht. Columbres is not above two or three leag-ues from the first " village of Asturias. I learn at the same time, that one of the Asturian *' Deputies to whom I had directed my enquiries has already left the 55 " Sitio. The Marquis Romana on the l^th was attempting to nialce a " stand at Terra de la Vega. General Leith had given orders, which " had heen properly ex^ecuted, for evacuating' the post of St. Ander. " No courier has been received from Castanos ; ' and it-i^ t!6hr; ' from " the situation of tfee French, that the direct communication is cut " off. Great discontent and perplexity are known 'to be prevalent at "head-quarters. ' < . . . " Mr. Stuart Avill be able to give "yolt better" accounts of the niimary "" condition of Madrid. There are about 8 or 10,000 musquets^ and « ammunition has been distributed. ^^ ^'^^ ''"^!'' - •-"' X'^'^oi >;{.i., " The Junta appear at present moi'e anxious fot* your linion with " Blake than foi' covering Madrid. Whftt they- most deprecate, and " I think with most reason, is a retreat upon Portugal. 'It would " sink the hearts of the whole country, and would give the impres- " sion of our having, after an ineffectual effort, relkpsed into the old " limited system of protecting Portugal. » - • i- i '".i. .^ '>< j -u. .^ " I must apologise for the apparent formality of this let^er^' wnich " does not proceed from any inclination to commence a less conn- " dential mode of communication between us ; but is dwing to the " hurry which the circumstances I have mentioned will account for. " Believe me, &c. " J. H. Frere." There are two singular passages in this letter. The first is, it is stated that the force of the Enemy is about eleven thousand men. Where this force was, is not mentioned ; but the Junta ought to have known that at this period Buonaparte was advancing rapidly with nearly 80,000 ; Avhich information ought to have jjeen communi- cated to Sir John Moore. The second is, that Mr. Frere strongly deprecates a retreat on Portugal. This probably Mas not an ori- 56 glnal error of Mr. Frere's, but instilled into his mind by Morla ; for otherwise a person totally ignorant of military affairs would hardly have ventured to express so decidedly his opinion of a military movement to an experienced General. Morla was now become the chief ruler of the Junta ; and was con- sidered a man of the first abilities in Spain. He had been appointed President of the Board charged Math military affairs, and was with great success effecting the destruction of the Spanish armies. Pre- vious to his Interference, the Generals Castanos and Blake had most judiciously acted upon the defensive : that system was now repro- bated ; and the Generals were Impelled forAvard, contrary to their judgment. Morla Avas, however, not content A^ith the destruction of the Spanish armies in succession : but, in order to complete the subjugation of Spain, he got himself appointed by the Junta * to treat with the English Generals ; and empowered to proceed to the execution of such measures as were urgent and peremptory. Being invested with this authority, he did not fail to exert it; and had his advice or requisitions been literally obeyed, not a man of the British army would have escaped. The following is the requisition made by Mr. Frere to the Supreme Junta, in consequence of Sir John Moore's letter to him. J)u Mr. Frere a son Excellence Mr. de Garay. "monsieur, " Jranjuez, 23 Novembrf, 1808, " J'ai cru devoir adresser k votre Excellence, comme ** Membre et S^cr^taire de la Supreme Junta Centrale^ une r^prd- " sentation qui m' a paiu trop importante pour ne pas ^tre communi- * Vide Mr. De Garay to Mr. Frere, which soon follows. 0/ quee a cctte assemblee par un de ses individus distingue par sa ' coufiance et charge de ses plus importautes fonctions. " Des lettres qui me sont parvenues de la part de Sir J. Moore ' m' ont donne occasion de vous recapituler les plaintes qu' il m' adres- ' soit, et qu' il regrettoit (me disoit il) ne pas pouvoir adresser en ' personne a Aranjuez. " II se plaint d'abord de 1' etat d'incertitude dans lequel ilse trouve, ' relativement au nombi'e et aux positions de 1' Ennemi, et meme ' aux projets et eveuemens de la campague, au point (me dit-il) ' que, lors de 1' Evacuation peu militaire de Valladolid par le General ' Pignatelli, cet Officier u' a pas ci-u devoir lui en envoyer 1' ansi ' Les details de la route et de I'etat eft'ectif de 1' Armee d'Estremadure * lui ont ete egalement long terns inconnus ; la retraite du General ' Blake, et sa retraite sur Reynosa, lui ont ete Egalement inconnues ' Jusqu' a ce qu' il en recut enfin la iiouvelle par la voye de Madrid. " Jl poursuit en ces termes : ' Je ne suis en communication avec aucune des Armees, ni au fait des intentions du Gouvernement Espagnol, ni d' aucun de ses Generaux. ' Castanos, avec qui on m' avoit mis en correspondance, est demis de son commandement au moment ou j' aurois pu attendre de ses nouvelles ; et Romana, avec quije doismaintenant, je suppose, entrer en correspondance, est absent. En attendant, les Francois ne sont qu' a. quatre jours de marche de mon armee qui ne fait que s' assem- bler; mais je ne peux encore a^jprendre 1' etat de leur force. Aucun canal d' information ne m' a Ete ouvert, et je ne suis pas assez long tems dans le pays pour me les procurer moi-meme. Je vous fais part de ces particularitEs. Je voudrois pouvoir aller moi-meme k Aranjuez, ou Madrid, en faire la representation ; car, vraimont, si ies choses doivent rester dans cet Etat, la ruine de la cause d'Es- pagne, et la defaite de ses Armees, ne peut pas manquer ; et il deviendra de mon devoir de ne regarder que la securite de TAvmEc I 58 Britannique, et de prendre des mesures pour la tirer d'une situation ou, sans la possibilite d' etre utile, elle est exposde a une defaite certaine.' " En r^ponse a ces observations relatives au General Castanos et au Marquis de la Romana, V. E. m apprit, a ma tres grande surprise, qu' il y avoit dix jours a peu pres que des Ordres avoient ete expedi^s au Marquis de la Romana pour venir prendre le com- mandement de I'Armee du Centre, en laissant celle du Nord et des Asturies aux ordres de M. Blake. *' Le seeret commun a une assemblee de 32 personnes auroit pii, ce me semble, eti'e confie au Ministre de S. M. B. sans augmenter beaucoup le risque de sa divulgation, quand meme il n' aui'oit pas ete question d' un fait interessant, et dont la connoissance etoit necessalre pour la correspondance dont pouvoit dependre la surete de I'Armee Angloise. II m' a paru que V. E. ne se montreroit pas insensible a la justice de cette reflection ; a laquelle j' aui'ols pii ajouter que la nouvelle de 1' entree des Francois a Valladolid m' a ete cachee ; qui, lors meme que je demandois si le bi-uit public qui Y annoncolt avoit quelque fondement, on m' a repondu, qu' 11 n' etoit arrive ce jour la aucune nouvelle officlelle excepte sur le transport de quelques pieces d' artlllerie, jecrols, a Segovie. II m' etoit done impossible de croire, d' apres une pareille reponse, que des nouvelles authentiques avoient apporte la certitude de I'evenement sur lequel je demandois une explication, et qu'on avoit cru pouvolr la dlssi- muler par une equivoque fondee sur la non-arrlvee du rapport officlel du Commandant. La nouvelle de la defaite du General Blake, nouvelle qui auroit pu causer la perte totale des deux divisions qui commencoient a se former sous les Generaux Moore et Baird, m' a et^ effectlvcment communlquee, mais le soir du lendemain de 1' anivee du Couner. of) ** Je suis bien loin d' ^prouver le molndre sentiment d' aioreur " personelle centre des personnes infininient respectables, qui n* ont " fait que suivie un systeme qui Icur aura ete prescrit, tant pour " les rdponses que pour le silence ; mals il est de mon devoir do " reclamer liautement contre la continuation d' un systeme, qui sans " assurer le secret vis-a-vis des Ennemis, etablit la defiance et le '•' mystere a la place de cette confiance qui devoit servir de base aux " combinaisons desquelles doit dependre le sort de la guerre actuelle. " J' ai appi'Is avec beaucoup dc plaisir la nouvelle du rappel de la ^' Commission desorganatrice envoyee a I'Armee du Centre, ainsi que "' celle de la nomination de M. de Morla avec de pleins pouvoirs " pour conferer et conclure avec nos Officiers sur tous les objets " r(^latifs a un systeme de co-operation cfficace ; j' espere que ces " pouvoirs seront encore augmentes, tant pour la partie executive, "• que pour la deliberative. " L' expedition d' un Courier pour le Marquis de la Romana lui " aura, sans doute, apporte, selon les instructions de V. E. un ordre *' de s' aboucher avec le General Sir J. Mooi'e. " Je ne puis finlr sans remercier V. E. de 1' attention avec laquelle " elle a ecoute, dans une pre'miere conference, les details d'une repre- " sentation necessairement facheuse. " Je la prle, &c. " J. H. Frere." Tbls letter Is certainly not written In very respectful terms; es- pecially as the persons so harshly complained of were exercising sovereign powers. The following mild answer was however returned : 60 Translation. " To the Right Hon. J. Hookham Frere. " MOST EXCELLENT SIR, Ararijuez, Nov. 24, 180S. " I HAVE laid before the Supreme ruling Junta of the " Kingdom the note your Excellency was pleased to addi-ess to me " yesterday, relative to the complaint made to you by Sir John Moore, " with regard to the state of ignorance in which he was kept with re- " spect to the number and positions of the Enemy, and to the events " and operations of our Armies. " Of the evacuation of Valladolid, which was not a militai*y move- " ment, the Supreme Junta knows nothing; neither of the particu- '' lars of an action in which one of the divisions of the Army of Es- " tremadura was concerned. The same is the case with regard to the *' details of the operations of General Blake; who states that he has *' had two engagements — the one of which was in favour of our arms, *' and the other, though of no great advantage to the Enemy, obliged " him to retreat to Reynosa. " Each of the Generals had received positive orders from the Junta, ^* which are now reiterated to them by extraordinary couriers, to com- " municate with the English General, and to act In concert with " him. His Majesty would receive the highest satisfaction If Sir ** John Moore could appear personally at Aratijuez or at Madrid, " to make such observations, and to adjust those points which he " thinks might conduce to the removal of those circumstances which *' appear contrary to the good understanding, and which might pro- *' duce all the effect that may be expected from our union with the " great power which with such generosity affords us assistance, " and which the Junta could not see disappointed or weakened with- " out the greatest regret. This, however, could not happen, if, acting 61 *' In concert, and with a perfect harmony, we avail ourselves of a *' speedy union of the forces, to complete the destruction of the Enemy, " and of his plans ; if, the English troops forming a junction with " the left of our army, we compose a formidable body of 70,000 Infan- *' tiy and 6000 cavalry, a force with which we should be certain of " the blow, and which we never could be by any different conduct. " Then the generous efforts of our ally, England, would complete " the work ; under whose happy and auspicious commencement the *' eternal friendship and alliance by which the two nations are for t( gygj. to |je united began ; so that neither interest nor policy will " ever be sufficient to break the bonds by which they are united. " ^Vhen I spoke to your Excellency with regard to General Casta- " nos, I had the honour to explain to you the strong and political *' motives that existed for acting as we had done. Your Excellency ** was convinced, and it was then determined, that he should not quit *' the command until the arrival of the Marquis de la Romana. In *' this there has been no secret, nor should there be any, however im- " portant it may be, with regard to the Minister of a friendly nation, " towards whom the Junta feels the greatest personal esteem and con- *' sideration, independent of his official character. " The Junta knew of the Enemy's entry into Valladolid, and, after- " wards, of the evacuation of that city by the French troops, who " made but a very short stay there. General Morla is appointed to " treat with the English Generals, to agree upon the necessary plans *' and operations, and to give information of them to the Supreme " Junta ; proceeding immediately to the execution of those measures *' which are urgent and peremptory. " I have now only to assure your Excellency of the particvdar satls- " faction and pleasure I derived from hearing your remarks on these " matters, which led to this our first conference. I shall be ready to '' repeat it, with pleasure, as often as your Excellency may think '' proper ; either at your house, or wherever else you may choose to " appoint. In the mean time, " I am, &c. " Martin de Garay." Sir John Moore did not think it expedient to accept of the invita- tion given in this letter to go to Aranjuez or Madrid, and leave the troops at Salamanca, in tlie present threatening posture of affairs. His occupations were too important to admit of such an interrup- tion ; and the quantity of business he transacted may he conceived from the manner in which his tune was daily employed. He always rose between three and four in the morning, lighted his fire and candle by a lamp which was placed in his room, and em- ployed himself in writing till eight o'clock, when the officers of the family were assembled for breakfast. After breakfast he received the General Officers, and all persons with whom he had business ; and the necessary oi'ders were issued. His pen M'as frequently in his hand in the forenoon also ; for he wrote all his letters himself. He always rode before dinner for an hour or two, either to view the troops, or to reconnoitre the country. His table was plentiful ; and the company varied from fourteen to twenty officers. He was a very plain and moderate eater, and seldom drank more than three or four glasses of Avine, conversing with his officers with great frankness and cheerfulness. His portfolio was usually opened again before he M'ent to bed ; but, unless kept up by business, he never sat up later than ten o'clock. By this regularity and assiduity all his affairs were transacted with order, and v/ithout procrastination. The information conveyed by Mr. Garay's letter was by no means satisfactory. It contained no foiindation upon which a decision could be built. 63 Therefore, as the troops were not yet assembled, Su' John A\Tote to learn the ophilon of Mr. Frere. Si7- John Moore to his Excellency J. H. Frere. "sir, Salamanca, 21 Nov. 1S08. '^ I HAD the honour to receive last night a letter from " JNIr. Stuart, of the 24tli inst. in answer to that which I addressed " to you on the 19th. " The conversation which Mr. Stuart states you to have had with " the Secretary of the Supreme Junta, and the i-emonstrances with *' which you have followed it, are, perhaps, as much as can be done " by you in your situation. The effect produced upon the Secretary, " and the measures he said were determined, are vei-y good, if we " were looking to events six months hence ; but the situation in " which we are, calls for something more efficient and energetic. " Madrid is threatened — the French have destroyed one army, have " passed the Ebro, and are advancing in superior numbers against " another : which, from its composition and strength,^ promises no re- " sistance, but must either retire, or be overwhelmed. No other ** armed force exists in this country. I perceive no enthusiasm, or any " determined spirit amongst the people. *' The French Cavalry, even in parties so weak as eleven or twelve " men, enter the villages in Leon, and the neighbouring provinces, " and i-aise contributions without opposition. " This is a state of things (piite different from that conceived by " the British Government, when they determined to send troops to " the assistance of Spain. It was not expected that these were to " cope alone with the whole force of France ; but as auxiliaries, to aid " a people who were believed to be enthusiastic, determined, and " prepared for resistance. 64 *' It becomes, therefore, a question, whether the British Army " should remain to be attacked in its turn, or retire from a countiy " where the contest, from \A'hatever circumstances, has become un- *' equal. " I wish to throw no responsibility off myself, which properly be- " longs to mc. " The question is not purely a militaiy one. It belongs at least " as much to you, as to me, to decide upon it. Your communications '' with the Spanish Government, and the opportunities you have had " of Judging of the general state of the Country, enable you to form " as just an estimate of the resistance that is likely to be offered. " You are, perhaps, better acquainted with the views of the British '' Cabinet; and the question is. What would that Cabinet direct, were " they upon the spot to determine ? It is of much importance that " this should be thorouglily considered; it is comparatively of very •' little, on whom shall rest the greatest share of responsibility. I am " willing to take the whole, or a part ; but I am very anxious to •' know your opinion, " The movements of the French oive us little time for discussion. *' As soon as the British Army has formed a junction, I must, upon *' the supposition that Castanos is either beaten or retreated, maich " upon Madrid, and throw myself into the heart of Spain, and thus " run all risks, and share the fortunes of the Spanish Nation ; or I " must fall back upon Portugal. " In the latter case, I fall back upon my resources, upon Lisbon : *' cover a country where there is a British interest ; act as a diversion " in favour of Spain, if the French detach a force against me ; and *•' am ready to return to the assistance of the Spaniards, should cir- " cumstances again render it eligible. " By mai'ching into Spain, I detach myself from my resources, " and should, probably, be able to take with me but a small portion 65 " of the military stores I have brought forward. In which case 1 " should not be able, for a time, for much contest. But every thing " could be sent from Lisbon to Cadiz, and thence join me. " The movement into Spain is one of greater hazard, as my retreat " to Cadiz or Gibraltar must be very uncertain. I shall be entirely " in the power of the Spaniards ; but perhaps this is worthy of risk, " if the Government and People of Spain are thought to have still " sufficient energy and the means to recover from their defeats ; and, " by collecting in the South, be able, with the aid of the British " Army, to resist, and finally repel, the formidable attack which is *' prepared against them. " It is impossible not to wish, and then it is more difficult not to " hope, that the Spaniards may be at last successful in a struggle " which does them so much honour. Tliey are a fine people, and had " they fallen into more able hands would have proved themselves " fully equal to the contest. But I much fear the opportunity is now " past ; and that no efforts they are likely to make will be sufficient, " or in time, to stand the armies they must engage. Upon this sub- " ject, however, I cannot be very decided, and shall be most happy " to find myself mistaken. " I am, &c. &c. *' John Moore." On the same day Sir John Moore wrote the following private letter to Mr. Stuart, to whom he confided his thoughts most openly. Sir John Moore to Charles Stuart, Esq. " MY DEAR SIR, Salamanca, 27 Nov. 1808. " I THANK you for your letter. You will see what " I have written to Mr. Frere, and will, I hope, think with me on " the necessity of deciding a question, which, surely alone, he being K 66 *^in the country, I could not with propriety decide for myself. '' Wliatever be the decision, I shall be guided by events in the exe- " cution of it, " I have every inclination to think well of the Spanish cause : that " I wish it well is most certain; and that I shall be most proud to " give it every aid in my power. But, really, so little ability has *' been displayed by the Government, or by those employed to direct *' their armies; there appears so much apathy in the people, and so *' little means prepared for resistance, that I do not see how they can " stand against the Enemy. The French will have troublesome sub- *' jects ; but, in the first instance, they v\dll have little more than a " march to subdue the country. " I have not a shilling. The Spaniards, I find, promise much " more than they perform ; and here we have not been able to get " five thousand pounds. The house you mention in a former letter " have money, but \vill not give it. " Sir D. Baird, upon some false intelligence that the French had '' collected a large force at Rio Seco and Ampudia, has taken mea- " sures to retreat, but I shall be able to stop him ; and I hope by the *' /th or 8th of December, we shall be able to make our junction. " I hope to meet Romana on his passage to the army, — the intelli- " gence was sent to Baird by General Blake. The French have " many friends in this country; it is from them that a thousand '• reports are daily spread to the disadvantage of the good cause. " I remain, &c. " John Moore. " P. S. There was a Colonel Charmilly here from England. He *' is gone on to Madrid, to offer to raise a regiment of cavalry. He ♦' is married in England : but I cannot help always ha^dng some dis- " like to people of this description." 67 That no time might be lost, Sir John Moore wrote a letter the fol- lowing day to Sir David Baird, to give him information of the move- ments of the French army, and to direct him to advance. It is now requisite to state the catastrophe of the Spanish Armies of the Centre and Right. On the 21st of November General Castanos' Head Quarters were at Cintruenigo, when the advanced guard of the French army ap- peared in sight. Castanos retreated in the night toA\ards Tudela, and the French columns advanced by Soria and Lerona. Behind Tudela there is a small i-idge of hills ; this was thought by the Representative of the Junta, and the Captain General of Ar- ragon, a good position. Castanos did not approve of it, and wished to retire ; but unfortunately he Mas oveiTuled. He then drew up his main body near the centre of the ridge, concealing it fiom the Enemy ; and advanced his two flanks on the small hills neai- Tudela. The French attacked these points, and Castanos supported them from his centre. The Enemy were driven back on the left ; but a strong corps of Fi'ench pushed forward from Tudela, and made a fresh attack upon the left, and threw the Spaniards into confusion. They were a species of troops who could never rally; so all \^as disorder in a moment. Part dispersed themselves in the direction of Saragossa, and the rest towards Calatayud. The only corps which preserved any kind of oi-der was that of General La Pena, stationed at Coscante. The news of this fresh disaster arrived at Madi-id on the 27th of November. Mr. Stuart lost no time in transmitting the relation he had received to Sir John Moore, which he accompanied ^ith a short and dismal note; in which are these words: — " I, therefore, lose " not a moment in dispatching this to you, that you may be enabled " to take such measures as, in this state of affairs, become absolutely " necessary for the security of our Army." 68 This dispatch reached Salamanca Nov. 28, which totally darkened the aspect of affairs. While Castanos's army remained, there appeared to Sir John Moore a hope of resisting in the North of Spain ; hut now he thought there was none. It was also evident, that if Buonaparte chose, as might be expected, to pvish forward his advanced corps upon him, his junction with General Hope would be very doubtful, and that with Sir David Baird impossible*. For these reasons he at once took the resolution of withdraAving the army from Galicia and Leon, and assembling it upon the banks of the Tagus. The advantages of this measure were, that the whole British force would be collected and united with upwards of 10,000 men more, who were left in Portugal. In the mean time, all the scattered corps of the Spanish army might fall back, to join such new levies as were raised in the Southern Provinces ; Avhich, when asssmbled, might still form an army capable of making a stand : and the British could then move to their aid In a formidable body. It appears from the previous correspondence, that it had always been the favourite plan of Sir John Moore to carry on the military operations from the South ; and now that the three Spanish armies were beaten, the reasons for adopting it had acquired great additional weight. If the Spaniards had constancy to hold out, and fortitude to con- tiime the contest, an opportunity would still be afforded them. In the South all their energies might be put forth, and effectual assis- tance would be given them by the British army. And should they also be repelled in this effort ; Cadiz and Gibraltar afforded them secure retreats. * Vide Appendix P. 69 From these fortresses the war might be renewed, if ch-cumstances favoured it ; or if the contest was given up, the armies would still be in safety. The following letters to Sir David Baird and General Hope were sent off the same evening. Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird. " MY DEAR SIR DAVID, Salamanca, 28th Nov. 1808. " I HAVE received this evening dispatches from Mr. Stuart at Madrid, announcing the defeat and dispersion of Cas- tanos's army. The French in Spain are estimated at 80,000 men, and 30,000 are expected in the course of a week. It certainly was much my wish to have run great risks in aid of the people of Spain ; but, after this second proof of how little they are able to do for themselves, the only two armies they had having made so little stand, I see no right to expect from them much greater exertions ; at any rate we should be overwhelmed before they could be pre- pared. I see no chance of our being able to form a junction ; as certainly at Burgos the French have a corps which will now move forward. " I have, therefore, determined to retreat upon Portugal with the corps I have here ; and, if possible, \vith Hope's corps, if by forced marches he can join me. I wish you to fall back on Corunna ; send back immediately your stores, under such part of your force as you judge proper. You may then stay with the rest a little longer; if you can depend upon knowing the movements of the Enemy. I propose this, as were you at once to retire, it woidd encourage the Enemy to push at once on Hope and me, and pre- vent our junction ; which is the more necessary, as I must stop upon the fx'ontier of Portugal, and cover Lisbon as long as pos- 70 " sible. On your arrival at Corunna, you will of course embark, " and sail for the Tagus, where orders shall be M'aiting for you. " Write immediately to England, and give notice of what we are " doing ; and beg that transports may be sent to Lisbon ; they will " be wanted: for when the French have Spain, Portugal cannot be " defended. " I remain sincerely, " John Moore." *' This letter, though of the same date, is written on the evening " of the day on wliich I wrote by Baron Tuyle. " You will use your discretion as to sending the cavalry by sea " or through Portugal. I shall not want them here, if I can get the " two Regiments M"ith Hope. J. M. " You Mill go to Lisbon with the ^^'hole of your foi'ce ; the t\Ao " regiments of cavalry included, not yet disembarked ; unless you *' should receive orders from England to the contrary. J. M." Si?' t/ohn Moore to Lieut. -General Hope. *' MY DEAR HOPE, Salamanca, 2SthNov. 1808. " I have received, by Mr. Vaughan, the letters from *' Madrid, which you had very properly opened. " After due consideration, I have determined to give the thing up, " and to retire. It A\'as my Avish to have run great risks to fulfil " what 1 conceive to be the wishes of the people of England, and to " give every aid to the Spanish cause ; but they have shewn them- *' selves equal to do so little for themselves — their two pnncipal armies " having allowed themselves to be thus beaten and dispersed with- *' out almost an effort — it would only be sacrificing the Army without 71 " doing any good to Spain, to oppose it to such numbers as must now " be brought against us : besides, I take for granted, a junction with " Baird is out of the question ; and, perhaps, with you, problematical ; " as there must be troops at Burgos, which must now push on to " intei'cept us. I shall write this night to Baird to fall back on " Corunna. I wish you, if possible, by forced marches, and in larger " bodies, to push by Penaranda or Alba de Tormes ; whence, according " to circumstances, you may join me here, or march at once on Ciudad *' Rodrigo; should you, however, from any thing which comes ta " your own knowledge, deem it unsafe to push on to me, you are at " liberty to use your discretion, and fall back on Guardarama and *' Madrid. It must, however, be my wish, that, if possible, you " should join me; for, as I must stop on the frontier of Portugal, " I shall be in much want of your aid, and that of your corps ; but " I leave you a discretion that you may use, should you see, which " I do not at present see, a great probability of your being inter- " cepted. This is a cruel determination for me to make ; — I mean " to reti'eat ; but I hope you will think the circumstances such as " demand it. I shall take measures for falling back ; but I shall stay *' at this place as long as I can. Provisions we shall want in Portu- " gal ; and if you could get carts and send the provisions collected " at Penaranda to Ciudad Rodrigo, it would be an object. It is " unnecessary that it should be known, the determination we are come *' to ; other reasons may be given for your changing your march." " Sincerely, &c. " John Mooke, *' P. S. Napier arrived as I had finished my letter to you, which *' is enclosed. You seem to have foreseen my wishes ; I have, " therefore, nothing to add at present. I shall write to you by Na- " pier in the morning ; and shall think of a movement towards 72 " you, should it appear necessary. The French have only a corps of " cavalry at Valladolid." It thus appears that Sir John Moore took the resolution of retreat- ing, without waiting for Mr. Frere's answer to his letter of the 27th. The defeat of Castanos totally altered the question ; and the situa- tion of the Army admitted of no delay. For, if Buonaparte should detach his most advanced corps against the British, General Hope might possibly be intercepted, and Sir David Baird might be hotly pursued, and suffer loss in the embarkation. He then assembled the General Officei's, and shewed them the intelligence he had received, and the plan he had adopted. He told the Generals, " that he had not called them together to request their " counsel, or to induce them to commit themselves by giving any " opinion upon the subject. He took the responsibility entii'ely upon " himself; and he only required that they would immediately prepare " for carrying it into effect." It ought to be mentioned, that the idea of retreating Avas very generally disapproved of at Salamanca by the Army. The muimurs against it from Officers of rank were heard in every quarter. Even the Staff Officers of Sir John Moore's family lamented it ; and, for the first time, doubted the wisdom of his decision. He, however, afterwards learnt, that General Hope agreed with him completely on this, as on all other points. The following letter signified his intentions to Mr. Frere and Mr. Stuart. 1 73 aSzV John Moore to Mr. Stuart. " MY DEAK SIR Salamanca, '2.9 th Nov. 1808, " I HAD tletennlned to unite tills x\rmy, if possible, and " to try what could be done for the Spaniards ; though, I own, I saw " but little chance of being able to do much good. I had ordered " Baird, though all his corps could not be at Astorga until the 4th, " to march with such part as already are there to Benavente, on the " 1st of December; and, on that day, I was to march myself with a coi'ps " from this to Toro, and to send others to Zamora. Hope was to have " marched to Tordesillas, and we should have taken up a line upon the " Duero, to cover the arrival of our stores, and then to have acted ac- " cording to circumstances : but the destruction of Castanos's army, " announced by your letter which Mr. Vaughan brought to me yester- " day afternoon, changes the case. My junction Avith Baird is no " longer practicable ; but, if it was, the little resistance made by the " Spanish armies gives no hope of our doing any good. We should " now have the greatest force of the Enemy to encounter single- " handed, and this we are not equal to. I have, therefore, come to " the determination to retire, I have ordered Baird to fall back upon " Corunna. I shall endeavour to unite with Hope, and retire upon " the frontier of Portugal. I shall be at hand to return, if affairs " take a more favourable turn ; or the Army may be transported by " me to some other point, where they may still be useful ; if this " Government be overset, and another rises up, directed by men of " more ability. " Mr. Vaughan sets off to-day for Corunna. " If you can possibly send me any money to Almeida, do it. I. "I send this by Colonel Lopez, who, as yet, knows not the mis- " fortune whicli has befallen Castanos, nor of my resolution. ". Believe me always, &c. " John Moore. '' I address this to you; you will, of course, make a communication " to Mr. Frere." T^^'o days afterwards, when Sir John Moore Mas A\aiting for the arrival of General Hope's Corps, at Salamanca, he wrote to Mr. Stuart a more full explanation of his motives. Sir John Moore to Charles Stuart, Esq. << MY DEAR SIR, "Salamanca, \st Deceynber, 1808. *' General Hope forwarded to me your letter of the 29th, " and I received it last night. " My letter to you of the 29th, after I had seen Mr. Vaughan, " A\'ould inform vou of the resolution I had come to. It was with " reluctance, you may believe, that I formed such a determination ; " but I had no alternative ; and reflection since has confirmed me in " the opinion, that I have done right. There is nothing so easy, *' as for the Junta, with their pens, to form armies ; and they have, " I see, in this manner, collected one of eighty thousand men in Leon. " But Romana, whom they have put down at twenty thousand, has *' only five thousand fugitives from Blake, \\'ithout arms, clothing, "stores, or ammunition ; without organization, or officers to make " any ; the soldiers neither disciplined, nor (Romana complains) " susceptible of taking any ; when checked, they go off. The Junta " neglected the opportunity^ to form armies, and to prepare the Pro- " vinces, before the arrival of the French reinforcements; — it is '* now too late under the beards of a victorious Enemy; and Spain " has no chance now hut from a force, if collected in the South, and " at a distance. I consider tliis letter, and that w hich I wrote to you " on the 29th, as if written to Mr. Frere, and, as sucli, I heg you " will have the goodness to commimicate them to him. I continue '' in the same determination I was in then, with respect to my own " movement, which will take place the moment that General Hope •' is out of danger; hut he has found it necessary to go round hy " Avilla, whence I hope he will be able to join me. I have not heard " from Sir David Baird since my letter to him by Mr. Vaughan ; " but, as he was prepared, I take for granted he has commenced " his movements on Conuina. The communication M'ith Madrid is " become less secure from the incursions of the Enemv's cavalrv ; I " cannot, therefore, enter into more particulars ; but if the Spaniards " make head, I conceive the British force can still, in one way or another, be taken to their assistance. I am sorry when Hope " sent Mr. Smith to Madrid, *******"**** *' that he did not give him special instructions : ]\Ir. Kennedy writes " to him by this opportunity. But such is our ^ant of money, that " if it can be got at a hundred j)er cent, we must have it ; do there- " fore, if possible, send me some at any rate ; but it must make a " circuit by Avilla, at least ; and, if Smith is still at Madrid, I A\'ish " you would tell him from me, that he cannot render such service as " by bringing money at any discount. " The Enemy do not, at present, seem to have any thing but *' cavalry on this side of Valladolid; they certainly have a division at " Burgos, and the thirty thousand from France will be there shortly; " and they will detach from the army which has defeated Castanos ; " and may have done so already, unless they first choose to enter " Madrid. It is from the Centre and South, that an effort should be " looked for : in this quarter the business is tip, and the people " without enthusiasm think they have nothing left for it, but to " submit. li 76 " The armies you see are also without enthusiasm, or even com- " mou ohstinaey — thev do not stand — and the individuals we see *' passing as fugitives are not ashamed, nor are they thought ill of " by the people, nor indignation excited. In this province, and it " is piohably the same in others, there is no head to direct — the " Captain-general Pignatelli is a weak old man. A man of a firm " and active mind could, by taking the means which exist, have done " much. At Zamora there are three or four thousand stand of arms^ " in other places there may be more. If they remain collected in " towns they will be taken by the Enemy, for the towns will make " no defence ; but if put into the hands of the peasants, with ammu- " nition, they would protect their property, kill small parties and " stragglers, and harass the Enemy ; and, when assembled at any " time in bodies, they would form the best materials for an army. " This and a thousand measures could be adopted, if the Junta had " selected men to employ; but they have acted with all the imbecility " of an old established weak government of the old regime. Lord " William is this moment arrived, having narrowly escaped being " taken at Arevalo. " I shall be glad to hear fi-om you and Mr. Frere ; but your mes- " senger must be cautious, and advance on Information of the '* Enemy. *' I have the honour, &c. " John Moore." On the 2d of December Sir John Moore received ample dis- patches ; all softening the losses of the Spaniards, and giving more favourable accounts of their remaining resources. Mr. Stuart was in regular communication with Morla, as is mentioned formerly. The principal part of the intelligence contained In the following I 77 letter was from him. Mr. Stuart narrates all he has heard, but with great good sense does not venture to give an opinion upon the mili- tary movements. Charles Stuart Esq. to Sir John Moore. " MY DEAR GENERAL, Madrid, ZO Nov. 1808/ " I HAVE this moment received your's, dated the 29th, " announcing a determination to retire on the h*ontier of Portugal, " in consequence of the intelligence conveyed through Mr. Vaughan " respecting the army of Castanos. I have to inform you that two *' other Officers have arrived from Arragon, by whom the Govem- " ment have received accounts somewhat more favourable. Having " however received nothing from Graham, Whittingham, and Doyle, " and being equally deprived of letters from the Sitio since they came, " I cannot say to what extent matters are retrieved. I know, how- " ever, that the Enemy have made three attacks on San Juan near " Sepulveda, and have been as often repulsed. And, from the large " force, particularly of cavalry, which were engaged in the late " affair at Boija and Tudela, it is impossible they can have any *' thing so considerable as General Hope represents in the neigh- " bourhood of Valladolid and Olmedo. They have 10,000 cavalry " in Spain : 1500 are at Sepulveda, If, therefore, 4500 were in *' Valladolid, there Mould remain but few on the other points they " have so lately attacked. Every report brought in here states, " that several small parties are scattered in Castile, for the purpose " of obtaining provisions, gaining intelligence, and inspiring tenor " throughout the province. And this accords so well with all the " positive intelligence which has reached us, that I really believe it " to be true. 78 " You must, however, certainly know l)est the chances of efFectmg " a junction between your different divisions ; and it does not become *' me to hazard an opinion on the subject. With respect, however, " to the consequences of their distinct retrograde movements, I can " tell you, that they are very likely to produce an effect here, not " less serious than the most decisive victory on the part of the Enemy; " and I shall, I own, be surprised if a change of government is not " the immediate consequence, Avhen the reasons for your retreat " are known." A part is here omitted, which chiefly consists of observations on the Paymaster's department. He then goes on — " I had written thus far, when I saw Morla, who informs me, " that Castanos is bringing the greater part of his force, though lie " did not say what, from Calatayud to Siguenza, for the purpose of " effecting a junction with San Juan. Reports from the latter add, " that the French have reinforced their coi*ps at Sepulveda, and " that he expected to be attacked yesterday or to-day. " He has received an addition of four new regiments ; and on " the result of the affair about to take place, it is thought his " union with Castanos will depend. He likewise tells me again, " that he believes the Enemy have merely small parties throughout " Castile, not sufficient to impede the union of your divisions. He " declares that his report from Ohnedo merely mentioned the arri- " val of thirty dragoons in that village, which were detached from " Valladolid ; Avhere he insists that their present force is not sufh- " ciently considerable to impede your movements. He added, that " according to the declarations of prisoners Buonaparte is at Burgos. " You will take all this as it is given. He declares he speaks on " official reports, and your own accounts will enable you to ascertain *' how far it is worthy of credit. This much is cei'tain, that the 79 " accounts of the Enemy are magnified, both by their own details " and by the fear inspired in the country. If it be true tliat " Buonaparte is at Burgos, it certainly looks like a great effort " either on the side of Somosien-a or Valladolid. Though Segovia " would appear to be his object, if his cavali*y ai'e pushed beyond " the latter town. " Truly yours, " Chakles Stuart." After perusing these alleviating details, on the authority of Moria, the following dispatch was opened. 3fr. Frere to Sir John Moore. " SIR, Jranjuez, Nov.ZO, 1808. " I HAD just written my other letter of this date when " I received a messenger from Mr. Stuart with the communication " of a note addressed to him, but intended equally for myself. I do " not know that I can in any way express with less offence the en- " tire diff'erence of our opinions on the subject of it, than by forward- " ing what I had already WTitten in the ignorance of the determi- " nation which you had already taken. " I have the honour, &c. "J. H. Frere." As Sir John Moore's letter to Mr. Frere previous to his knowing the defeat of Castanos, solicited his political opinion ; and as all his letters were written in most respectful terms, it was impossible for him to expect such an answer. Mr. Frere appears not to be at all aware of how much importance it is for a Minister to restrain the ebullitions of temper. The reasons contained in that which follows would certainly be as likely to pi'oduce conviction in the mind of his Cbrrespondent, had the above letter been omitted. 80 Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore. a SIR, Aranjuez, Nov. 30, 1808. *' You will find inclosed a letter, of which I think it " right to say, that if there appears any thing in the form or mode " of transmitting it which may appear deficient in respect, it is, I " am persuaded, wholly unintentional*; and, trusting to your candour " for seeing it in that light, I have not thought it worth while to " make any remark to Mr. Garay on the apparent dryness of his " communication. " Respecting Mr. Escalante, it may be proper that you should " know, that he is understood to have behaved very unfairly towards " General Castanos. I mention this only as it may lead you to " admit his opinion on subjects connected with that General's con- " duct mth some degree of caution. " In what I said respecting a retreat upon Portugal, I wished to " confine myself to a simple political opinion ; which, supposing " other considerations not to be decidedly adverse, might, I thought, " determme for a retreat upon Galicia, or the strong countiy about *' Astorga, in pi'eference to Portugal, supposing of course a retreat " to have been determined upon as absolutely necessary. " If, however, you do uie the honour to consult me respecting " the genei'al state of the country, and the means of resistance to *' be expected from it, I should say that the provinces which you " have hitherto seen are of all Spain the least distinguished for a * This apology is curious, and shews that Mr. Frere thought the most delicate expressions ought alone to be employed to the Commander of the Forces. Though Mr. Garay's letter which follows does not appear to require any apology. 81 milltar)', patriotic, or provincial spirit. Xo niai» ever calls himself a Leonese. The Junta of that province (at the time when Galicia and Asturia were sending deputies, and seemed to be almost put- ting themselves on the footing of independent states) quietly gave their full powers to the Asturians, and acquiesced in what they determined and obtained for them. With the exception of La Mancha and the city of Madrid, the same description will apply to nearly the whole of Old and New Castile. " In the course of the late events they have been wholly passive, and have seen their country successively occupied by the stronger party. And indeed it is difficult to blame them : living in open villages, in vast plains, without arms, and without horses, they have neither the means of defence or escape. " Yet even here we have seen that the towns are abandoned at the approach of th« French; that no magistrate has been brought over to take an oath of allegiance to the Pretender ; nor have the French lieen able to enlist a single soldier. " Tlie whole of this country has in all times belonged to the party which was superior in cavahy ; while, in the extremities of the kingdom, powers in every respect inferior have been able to pro- tract their independence for ages. " From every thing that I can learn of the disposition of the other provinces, they seem to be possessed by the most ardent and deter- mined spirit : which, even in the event of the defeat of the levies M^hich they are raising for the general defence of the kingdom, would lead them individvially to continue a desperate resistance, under the direction of their separate Juntas, with such assistance as England could afford them, by flotillas, disemljarkations, &c. But it must, I apprehend, be the wish of Government, on every account, to prevent things from being brought to this extremity. There seem to be two modes of acting with this view : one w hich M 82 you justly state to be of greater hazard, inasmuch as we effectively place ourselves in the power of the Spaniards ; but, as you observe at the same time, with great truth, this may be worthy of risk, if the people of Spain and their Government have sufficient energy to recover from their late defeats. Of the people I have no doubt : the Government are new, and have been hitherto too numerous to be very active ; but I trust that this inconvenience will soon be remedied. They are resolute, and, I believe, every man of them determined to perish with the country. They will not at least set the example (which the ruling powers and higher orders of other countries have exhibited) of weakness and timidity. " The military system is certainly defective in its two main points, reward and punishment ; but the circumstances of the times must prove the necessity of varying from the old system in this re- spect ; and I am persixaded that your representation on this, as on all other points, would be listened to with the greatest de- ference. " If you should determine upon marching Into Spain, exclusive of the importance of covering the capital, there are, I think, great advantages which would result from hastening the measure. We have now in New Castile an army of 20,000 men, upon which Castanos (as you will see) is falling back. Reinforcements are passing through here every day from the provinces, and the addition of tlie British would give a force very much, I should apprehend, superior to any thing which the French would be able to assemble by that time ; especially having a strong comitry in arms against them to their left the whole way fi-om the Pyrennees. " There Is besides at present a great delay in the arrival of the reinforcements which were promised them ; and which, if they had been sent, wovdd by this time have composed an enormous force. 83 " There are reports that the resistance to the conscription has " been much more obstinate than usual ; and the pastoral letter of *' the Bishop of Carcapone seems to imply that such reports cannot " be AvhoUy groundless. " Every great effort on the part of France has been preceded by *' a similar interval of weakness and internal disturbance ; an ad- " vantage, therefore, Avhich should be obtained at the present moment " AA'ould be doubly valuable, inasmuch as it would render a conscrip- " tion for a third attempt infinitely difficult, if not impracticable. " But if, on the other hand, the French are allowed with their pre- " sent forces to retain their present advantages, and to wait the *' completion of their conscription, they would pour into Spain with " a number of troops which would give them immediate possession of *' the capital and the central provinces. " The war would then be reduced to an aljsolute competition " between the two countries which would stand out longest against " the waste of population, enormous as it must be on both sides. " I cannot but think, therefore, that considerations both of policy *' and generosity call upon us for an immediate effort. " If, however, this view of the subject should not appear to you " sufficiently clear or conclusive to induce you to take a step which " would, I am well convinced (since you do me the honoiu" to refer " to me on that subject) meet with the approbation of His IMajesty's " Government, I would ventvire to recommend retaining the posi- '* tion of Astorga. A retreat from that pjiace to Corunna A\'ould (as " far as an unmilitary man may be allowed to judge of a country " which he has travelled over} be less difficult than through Portugal " to Lisbon; and we ought in that position to wait for the rem- " forcements of cavalry from England ; which would enable the " army to act in the flat country, which opens immediately from " that point, and extends through the whole of Leon and Old Cas- 84 " tile. My political reasons on this head I have already troubled you " with. " I mention this, however, merely as, in my humble opinion, the " least objectionable of the two modes of retreat. Our first object, " as it appears to me, ought to be, to collect a force capable of re- " pulsing the French before they receive their reinforcements. " The covering and protecting Madrid is surely a point of great *' moment, for effect in Spain, and still more in France, and in the " West of Europe. It would be a point of the utmost importance " for Buonaparte to be able to publish a decree, or to date a letter, " from Madrid. The people of the town are full of resolution, and " determined to defend it, in spite of its situation, which is judged " to be an unfavourable one. This determination ought surely to " be encouraged by some shew of support. The siege of Madrid " by a Pretender to the throne would be a circumstance decisive " against the claim, even if in other respects it were a legitimate one. '* I enclose a copy of two official reports from Castanos, *' Believe me, &c. " J. H. Frere." ;;fx or The official reports from Castanos were such descriptions of the actions at Tudela as it was thought good policy to present to the public, and were printed in the Spanish newspapers. A translation of the letter from* Mr. Garay announcing the arrival of two Spanish Generals, and communicating their powers, is here subjoined^ * Vide Appendix, T. 85 To the Commander in Chief of the Army of His Britannic Majesti/ in Sjiain. " MOST EXCELLENT SIR, " The Supreme Junta wishing at once to determine " on the future operations of the English auxihary force, and in " order that the plans decided on may be for the greatest advantage *' of the allied army, has selected persons whose character, know- " ledge, and military experience, are united with other qualities " necessary for those who are to undertake so Important a charge. " On this account Don Bentua Escalante, Captain-general of the " Armies of Grenada, and Brigadier Don Agustin Bueno, have been *' considered the most fit ; and they will immediately set off for " Salamanca, to consult with the English Generals, and to agree " with them on the plans that may be thought most seasonable, and " will decide on the operations and other points that may occur. So *' that the troops of his Britannic Majesty may act in concert witii " ours ; and, iii accelerating their combined movements, may avoid " all delays, so contrary to the noble and important cause of the two " nations, whose ties of friendship and alliance become more close *' as their danger becomes greater and more common. And in par- " ticipating the glory, the greatest part will be due to her generous " ally. " A copy of this has been sent for the guidance of Generals Esca- " lante and Bueno. " At Aranjuez, 2S Nov. " Maktin Garay." The mission of these Spanish Generals was imquestionably a measure of Don Morla's, to endeavour to prevent the retreat of the British to the South. S6 They corroboratefl the statement made by Mr. Fiere of the sti'ength of the Spanish armies ; asserted that they were undismayed, and augmenting every hour; and that General San Juan, with 20,000 brave Spaniards, Avas in possession of the pass of Somosierra; whicli he had fortified so strongly as to render the approach to Ma- drid inipractica])]e. After listening to this flattering statement, Sir John Moore ex- ceedingly surprised these Spanish Generals by introducing to them Colonel Graham, who had just brovight certain accounts that San Juan's corps had been charged by a body of French cavalry, and were completely routed ; and that there was no doubt that the French army was in full march for Madrid. As Colonel Graham had supped the night before with San Juan, in his way from Madrid, his intelligence covdd not be questioned. Sir John by his interrogations seems to have completely sounded the depths of these Generals' capacities ; and, finding them very ignorant of facts, was little affected by their requisition to move to Madrid. Nor was he altered by Mr. Frere's letters ; one of which was written previous to his knowledge of Castanos' defeat ; and the short one, which was written after that event, contained no fresh information. He was not even shaken by Mr. Stuart's intelligence, but persisted in his resolution to retire, and waited only for the arrival of General Hope *. But Don Morla, no doubt instigated by Buonaparte, tried other means, besides his influence with Mr. Frei'e, to stop the retreat of the British army, and to bring them to the neighbourhood of Madrid. With this view, on the 2d of December, when Morla was Induc- ing the inhabitants to submit to the Conqueror, who was at the gates of Madrid f ; the following dispatch was sent off, by a Go- vernment Messenger. * Vide Appendix, P. R, t Vide Appendix, U. 87 To His Excellency Sir John Moore, Commander of the Army of His Britannic Majesty *. '' MOST EXCELLENT SIR, " The Junta, Military and Civil, formed of all the ' united axithorities of the kingdom, established in the King's name ' for the defence of the country, are threatened by the Enemy ; and ' have the honour to lay before your Excellency a true and just re- ' presentation of affairs at this moment. " The army Avhich Genei'al Castanos commanded, and which ' amounts to about 25,000 men, is falling back on Madrid in the ' greatest haste, to unite with its garrison ; and the force which was ' at Somosierra of 10,000 men also is coming for the same pur- ' pose to this city, where nearly 40,000 men will join with them. ' With this number of ti'oops the Enemy's army which has presented ' itself, is not to be feared. " But the Junta, still apprehending an encrease of the Enemy's ' force to unite with that at hand, hope that your Excellency, if no ' force is immediately opposed to you, will be able to fall back to ' unite with our army, or take the direction to fall on the rear of the ' Enemy. And the Junta cannot doubt, that the rapidity of your ' Excellency's movements will be such as the interests of both coun- ' tries require. " With great consideration, " The Prince of Castelfranco. " Thomas Morla. " Madrid, Dec. 2, ] 808. "P. S. The Junta is persuaded that your Excellency will have ' united with the army that General Blake commanded." * Vide Appendix, V. 88 This letter was brought to Salamanca by a messenger of the Junta, December 5, 1808. The Prince of Castelfranco and Don Thomas Morla Avere Deputies of the Supreme Junta entrusted with the government of Madrid ; and the latter was the person appointed to concert all Militaiy movements with the English General, as has been mentioned. While Sir John Mas taking this paper into consideration, Colonel Charmilly arrived with the following dispatches from Mr.Frere. Mr. Frere to Sir John 3Ioore. " SIR, Dec. 3, Talavera. "• Though I have little to add of the general represen- *' tation respecting the means of resistance at present existing in " Spain, which I had the honour of stating In my letter of the oOth " of last month ; yet the report which is just brought me by Colonel " Charmilly of the state in which he left Madrid, is so strong a con- " firmation, or more properly speaking, so much exceeds every thing " which I had ventured to say of the spirit and resolution of the peo- " pie, that I cannot forbear repi'esenting to you in the strongest " manner the propriety, not to say the necessity, of supporting the *' determination of the Spanish people, by all the means which have " been entrusted to you for that purpose. " I have no hesitation in taking upon myself any degree of re- " sponsibility which may attach itself to this advice. As I consider *' the fate of Spain as depending absolutely for the present upon the " decision which you may adopt. I sa.y for the 2iresent, for such is " the spirit and character of the country, that, even if abandoned by *' the British, I should by no means despair of their ultimate success. " You will see by the date of this that the Junta are removed " from a situation in which they were exposed to be made prisoners. " They have determined to retire to Badajoz ; where I shall hope to *' be honoured by your answer. " I have, &c. &c. " J. H. Frere." 89 This letter was sent in to the General, and Colonel Charmilly the bearer pressed vehemently to see him ; asserting that he had impor- tant communications to make. Sir John at length came out from an inner apartment, and questioned him upon the intelligence he brought. The Colonel described in lofty terms the patriotic zeal ■with which all ranlts of persons at Madrid were animated. The whole inhabitants of the city, he said, were in arms, and had united Avith the troops. The streets were barncaded ; liatterles were erecting all round ; the peasants were flocking to the capital ; and, in fine, the enthusiasm was unexampled. He added, that there were most favourable accounts of the rising ardour of the South of Spain. Sir John Moore listened to all this without uttering a word which could indicate his thoughts. But, when alone, he reflected seriously upon the extraordinary demands which were transmitted to him, not only by the Spanish Government, but also by the British Minister : and he called to mind, that he had been commanded to receive * the requisitions and representations of both with the utmost deference and attention. But, independent of these positive requisitions, the intelligence brought was of the most favourable kind ; and from so authentic a source that it could not he douljted. The letters were official, and from the highest authorities : and Mr. Charmilly, nho was deputed by the British Minister, had been an eye-witness of the effervescence of Madrid. The General was thus persuaded tliat a great and unexpected improvement in the public affairs had taken place; and he judged, that he ought not to pursue the plan which he had devised previous to these events. Was it becoming him to fly when the common * Vide Appendix K. N .90 Enemy Mas threatening the ruin of Madrid, and when the inhabi- tants of that city had bravely determined to perish, rather than yield ? This was impossible ; and, ha\ing the strongest reasons to believe that the causes for retreating had altered, he abandoned his intention, and resolved to support the Capital to the utmost of his power. In short he embraced upon this, as upon all occasions, the determination which he thought would be most useful to his Countiy, and which was most congenial to a noble mind. It is now, however, completely ascertained, that, notmthstanding the apparent correctness of the intelligence, all was false. For the Prince of Castelfranco and Don Thomas Morla wrote their perfidious statement on the a eiy day they had begun to capitulate : and they pressed Sir John Moore to hasten to their assistance, though they knew that Madrid must belong to Buonaparte, before the letter could reach its destination *. But it could never enter into the conception of Sir John Moore, that the two Chiefs of the Junta had conspired to betray the capital of their own country, and to entice the army of their ally into the power of the Enemy. Nor could he suspect, when the confiden- tial agent of Mr. Frere was representing j\Iadrid as in little danger, that, in fact, it had already submitted at the very sight of the French army ; that the Spanish Chiefs were crouching at the feet of Buona- parte ; and that the people were overwhelmed with terror and de- spair. Nor Avas it imaginable, that the British Minister should be so grossly deceived, as to send, for his instruction, intelligence the re- verse of truth ; and to require of him, in so positive a manner, to succour a city which had actually suiTendered. As no human penetration could discover the real state of affairs under such representations, the General would have been highly * Vide Appendix U. 91 reprehensible, had he persisted in his design of retiring to the South. So, to stop Sir David Baird as soon as possible, he wrote to him that night, as follows ; Si?' John Moore to Sir David Baird. MY DEAR SIR DAVID, Salamanca, 5 December, 1808. " The City of Madrid have taken up arms, have refused to capitulate to the French, are barricading their streets, and say they are determined to suffer every thing rather than sub- mit. This arrests the French ; and people who are sanguine enter- tain great hopes from it. — I own, myself, I fear this spirit has arisen too late ; and the French are now too strong to be resisted in this manner. There is, however, no saying; and I feel myself the more obliged to give it a trial that Mr. Frere has made a formal representation, which I received this evening. I must beg, there- fore, you will suspend your march until you hear from me again, and make arrangements for your return to Astorga, should it be necessary. — All this appears very strange and unsteady ; but, if the spirit of enthusiasm does arise in Spain, and the people will be martyrs, there is no saying in that case, what our force may do. I hope in the mean time the regiment of cavalry is coming to me, which 1 asked you for. " Believe me, &c. " John Moore." After more full deliberation he wrote again next morning. 92 Sh John Moore to Sir David JBaird. " MY DEAR SIR DAVID, Salamanca, 6 December, 1808. " I WROTE to you last night to suspend your retro- " grade movements. I now write to you to beg that you will put to " the right about, and return bag and baggage to Astorga. " Tlie people of Madrid, it is said, are enthusiastic and desperate; " and certainly at this moment do resist the French — the good which " may result from this it is impossible to say ; I can neither ti-ust to *' it, nor can I altogether despise it. If the flame catches elsewhere, " and becomes at all general, the best results may be expected ; if *' confined to Madrid, that town will be saci-ificed, and all will be as " bad, or worse than ever. In short, what is passing at Madrid " may be decisive of the fate of Spain ; and we must be at hand to aid " and to take advantage of whatever happens. The wishes of our " Countiy, and our duty, demand this of us, with whatever risk it " may be attended. I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the " bubble bursts, and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it. Let all *' your preparations, as far as provisions, &c. go, continue to be *' made for a retreat, in case that should again become necessaiy. *' Establish one magazine at Villa Franca, and one or two further " back ; to which let salt meat, biscuit, rum or wines, foi'age, &c. " be brought up from Corunna. Send to me to Zamora two regiments " of Cavalry, and one brigade of Horse Artillery ; keeping one regi- " ment of Cavalry and one brigade of Horse Artillery \\ith yourself; " and send on your ti'oops by brigades to Benavente. The Enemy " have nothing at present in that direction ; we must take advantage " of it, and by working double tides make up for lost time. By 93 " means of the Cavalry patroles, you will discover any movements " immediately near you ; and I take for granted you have got other " channels of information ; and hoth you and me, although we may " look big, and determine to get every thing forward, yet we must " never lose sight of this, that at any moment affairs may take that " turn, that will render it necessary to retreat. " I shall write by this opportunity to the Marquis of Romana ; and " it would be satisfactory if you kept an officer constantly, or sent *' one occasionally to him, to judge his force, and its state of prepa- " ration for service, to let us know how far we can depend upon its " action. I wish you would forward the money to me. " I remain, my dear Sir David, &c. "John Moore." It luckily happened that Sir David Baird had proceeded no farther than Villa Franca, so that little time was lost ; and General Hope by rapid marches had brought his division close to Salamanca. The position of the British Army had therefore become much more secure. Sir John had now a complete though small corps, with Cavalry and Artillei-y , and, by a movement to the left, his junction with Sir David Baird was certain. Being desirous of obtaining the co-operation of the only Spanish Corps within reach, he wrote immediately to the Marquis of Romana, who was at Leon. Sir John Moore to the Marquis cle la Romana. " SIR, Salamanca, 6 Dec. 1808. " I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's letter " of the 30th November. I shall in general write to you in French, " as you desire it; but I hope you will excuse me, if I address this " to you in English, as I am at this moment a good deal hurried. 94 *' Since my arrival in Spain, I have been put in no communication *' with any of the Spanish Armies, and have been kept perfectly in *' the dark with respect to their movements, the plans of their Gene- " rals, or their Government — and during the time my army was on " its march to assemble and unite itself, I have been left exposed " without the least support. " My «'ish has always been to co-operate with the Spanish Armies " for the good of the common cause : but at last, finding that I was " left to myself, it became necessary for me to think of myself alone ; " and to consider, after the two armies of Generals Blake and Casta- *' nos were beaten, M-hat steps I could take for the British Army, " which was then collecting at Astorga, and this place ; thus the " more helpless from its separation, but even, if united, not sufficiently " strong to encounter the whole force of the Enemy, which I saw " would immediately be turned against us. I therefore felt myself " obliged, however reluctantly, to order the corps at Astorga to fall " back on Corunna; and I meant myself, with the corps I had here, *' to retii'e upon Portvigal, from whence I should be ready to return " to the assistance of Spain, whenever their aflfairs were better ma- " naged, and an opportunity offered of doing them any good. Per- " haps this opportunity has ah'eady occurred. The French have turned " a great part of their force against Madrid. The people there have " armed themselves, and say they are determined to resist. If this " entliuslasm which actuates the people of Madrid last, and they " continue resolute, and, above all, if the example of the capital is " followed, and the enthusiasm becomes at all general throughout " Spain, and induces large armies to come forward to the assistance ** of Madrid — Spain may still hope to recover from her misfortunes, " repel the French, and re-establish her Independence. As my re- " treat was forced, and made with reluctance, so it is stopped the *' moment I see a chance of acting for the advantage of this country. 95 " I have ordered Sir David Baird to return with his corps to Astorga^ " and from thence to Benavente. JNIy wish is to unite with you j " and to undertake A^ith you such operations as Me may judge hest " for the support of Madrid, and the defeat of the Enemy. The " French have driven General St. Juan from the Somosierra ; and are " in possession of that and the pass of the Guardarama. General " Castanos is said to be at Siguenza. The Supreme Junta have re- " tired to Badajos. The Duke of Castelfi'anco and Mr. Morla are at " the head of the Junta, Civil and JVIilitaiy, at Madrid. " I have written to you with that frankness which becomes a Mili- " tary Man ; 1 shall act with you in the same manner. I have the " greatest respect for your character ; and you Avill find me always " ready to undertake whatever is practicable for the advantage of the " Spanish Nation. " I have the honour to be, Sir, " Your Excellency's, &c. " John Moore." In the morning of December 6, CoL Charmllly again appeared at Head Quarters, and presented the following letter, which he had been desired not to deliver unless it was necessary. Mr. Frere to Sir John Moore. " SIR, Dec. 3, 1808. " In the event which I did not wish to presuppose of '' your continuing the determination already announced to me of re- " tiring Avith the army under your command, I have to request that " Colonel Charmilly, who is the bearer of this, and whose intelligence 96 " has been already referred to, may be previously examined before a " Council of War. " I have, &c. « J. H. Frere." Mr. Frere's mind must have been strongly wrought upon to view the retreat of the British Armv to the Tagus, as so injurious a mea- sure. For, not content with sending intelligence of the brilHant state of Spanish affairs, and employing arguments, requisitions, and depu- tations : he here attempts to controul the Commander of the Forces ; and seems to have expected to compel him by a Council of War to obey, even against his will. It may easily be conceived, that a high-spirited officer could not read such a proposition without expressing great indignation at the writer. And he was astonished to find, that Mr. Frere had had the imprudence to entrust Colonel Charmilly with the secrets contained in the important dispatches he brought. The Genei-al however, not choosing to repose any confidence in this Frenchman, did not utter a syllable which could give him the slightest indication of his plan ; and, not even approving of his pre- sence with the army, directed the Adjutant-General to write an order for him to retire. The Colonel was thus dismissed, with the conviction that Sir John Moore was still determined to retreat, and he returned to Mr. Frere to communicate the bad success of his mission. But, notwithstanding this conduct of Mr. Frei-e, Sir John wa-ote to him an answer so calm and dignified, as to form a striking contrast with the style of the other. For, as Mr. Frere was the King's Minister, he was desirous, if possible, of preserving a coitc- spondence which was necessary for the public sei-vice. ^r, Sir John Moore to Mr. I'rcrt. "■ SIR, Salamanca, 6 Drc. 1808. " I HAD the honour to receive on the 2nd Inst, your ^' letter of the 30th, in answer to that which I addressed to you on ' the 27th November. Had this army been united and ready to act ' at the time of General Castanos' defeat, much as 1 think it would ' have been risking it, yet it was my intention to have marched on ' Madrid, and to have shared the fortunes of the Spanish nation. If ' I could not have sustained myself there, I thought, by placing my- ' self behind the Tagus, I might give the broken armies, and the ' people of Spain, if they had patriotism left, an opportunity to as- ' semble round me, and to march to the relief of the capital. That ' this was my intention is known to the Officers with me, who are in ' my confidence ; it is known also to Lord Castlereagh, to whom I ' had imparted it in one of my late letters. I wished to have my ' opinion confirmed by yours ; which was the reason of my address- ' ing you on the 27th. Had you seen the affairs of Spain in a different ' light, and had you been adverse to the army being committed in the ' heart of Spain, your opinion upon such a subject would, I may ' say, certainly have decided me to have altered my intention. " With respect to the determination I made on the evening of the * 28th, upon receiving from Mr. Stuart the account of Castanos' de- ' feat, I should, had you been with me, have communicated it to you ; ' but should never have thought of asking your advice or opinion, ' as that determination was founded on circumstances with which you ■*' could not be acquainted : and was, besides, a question merely Mi- ■" lltary, of which I thought myself the best judge. At that time Q 98 the arniy was divided into three different corps, and coiUd not possi- bly be united before the 13th or 14th of this month; before which period there was every reason to believe that it would be attacked by all the force of the Enemy : as, after General Castanos' defeat, I know of no Spanish army from which it could receive the small- est assistance. The army I commanded was weak from separation ; and when united amounts to only 26,000 men fit for duty. I had been left without any communication Avith any of the Spanish ar- mies ; I expected no assistance from any, and it behoved me to con- sider the safety of the British troops. I therefore directed Sir Dav-id Baird, Avhose corps A^ould not have been collected at Astorga until the 4th of this mouth, to fall back on Corunna. I directed General Hope by forced marches to join me here, where I intended, if I was permitted, to wait his ari'ivTil ; and I took measures for retir- ing, with him, into Portugal ; A^ith a view either to defend that frontier, and, ultimately, to return to Lisbon, or to return to Spain should any change of affairs there render it eligible. " The resistance made by the people of Madrid has occupied the French, and has prevented any corps from being detached against me. This example of enthusiastic patriotism in the capital, if it holds, may be followed by the most happy effects, if the flame com- municates, and the example is followed by the Provinces. There has been no example of any such resistance in any other part of Spain ; and, though I hope this will produce it, I have neither seen nor heard of much enthusiasm elsewhere. Their armies are devoid of both ; and, though I tiust it will pix)ve otherwise, I cannot but consider it as doubtful, whether the people of Madrid will continue firm when they come to be pressed. If they yield, the Avhole is gone. I received yesterday a letter from the Junta of Madrid. I have ordered Sir David Baird to maa'ch back to Astorga ; and have stopped my preparations for a retreat on Portugal. I have put my- 99 " self in communication with the Marquis Romana, at Leon; and *' without being able exactly to say in what manner, every thing shall *' be done for the assistance of Madrid, and the Spanish cause, that " can be expected from an army such as I command. I cannot make a " direct movement on Madrid, because tlie passage of the Guardarama " and Somasierra are in the hands of the French. Besides, until joined " by Sir David Baird I am much too \^'eak. I have thought it mv " duty thus calmly to explain to you the reasons which have and do " actuate my conduct ; and I m ish anxiously, as the King's Minister, " to continue upon the most confidential footing with you : and I hope, " as \^e have but one interest, the public welfare, though wc may *' occasionally see it in different aspects, that this wiU not disturb the " harmony that should s\ibsist between us. " Fully impressed as I am with these sentiments, I shall abstain " from any remark upon the two letters from you, delivered to " me last night and this morning by Col. Charmilly, or on the mes- " sage which accompanied them. I certainly at first did feel and ex- " pressed much indignation at a person hke him being made the " channel of a communication of that sort from vou to me. Those " feelings are at an end ; and I dare say they never will be excited *' towards you again. " If Mr. Charmilly is your friend, it was, perhaps, liatural for you *' to employ him : but I have prejudices against all that class ; and " it is impossible for me to put any trust in him. I shall, therefore, " thaidv you not to employ him any more in any communication with " me. It is impossible not to remark, that, whatever enthusiasm *' exists in the country, a small portion of it belongs to the Junta ; " who would otherwise, I think, have found some place more central " and less remote than Badajos for their residence. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." 100 Sh- John Moore to Mr. Frere. SIR, Salamanca, &ih Dec. 1808. *' I NEGLECTED to mention to you in my letter of *' this date, that the General Officers Escalante and Biieno had heen •' with me ; who are mentioned in that extraordinary paper which ** yon sent me with your letters of the 30th Nov. signed by Martin " de Garay, Secretary of the Junta. The two Generals seemed, to ** me to be two Aveak old men, or rather women, with whom it was " impossible for me to concert any military operations, had I been so- '* inclined. " The persons ^vith M'hom such operations can be concerted at " present are the Generals who command the armies, not men like " these two, who have no information upon Avhich such plans can " be formed, except the official papers, always incorrect, which have " been given to them from public offices. Their conference with " me consisted in questions and in assertions with respect to the *' strength of different Spanish corps, all of which I knew to be *' erroneous ; and. they neither knew that Segovia nor Somosierra " were in possession of the Enemy. I shall be obliged to you to " save me from such visits, which are very painful. " I mentioned to you in my letter of this day that I had had a *' letter from the Junta at Madrid. Mv instructions direct me,, that " all my communications with the Spanish Government should go ** through you ; and I should be very happy, on. every account, to *' comply with them : but I do not see how this can be, if you con- " tinue at Badajos. I shall, however, send you copies of them, if V you wish it. " I have the honour to be, &c. ** John Moore." 101 The follow Ing short passage in the General's Journal shews tlie ideas at this time revolving in his mind, while waiting for the junc- tion of Sir David Baird. " After Castanos' defeat the French marched to Madrid. The "• inhabitants flew to arms, barricadoed their streets, and swore to '' die, i-ather tliau submit. " This has arrested the progress of the French, and Madrid still " holds out. This is the first instance of enthusiasm shewn. There *' is a chance that the example may be followed, and the people be *' saved. I have stopped Baird's retreat, and am taking measures to- " form our junction, whilst the French are wholly occupied with- " Madrid. " We are bound not to abandon the cause as long as there is hope. *' But the courage of the populace of Madrid may fail ; or at any " rate they may not be able to resist. In short, in a moment things- " may be as bad as ever, unless the whole country is animated, and *' flocks to the aid of the cajutal. " In tliis part the people are passive. I have sent Colonel Gra- " ham to Madrid, to. let me know exactly what is passing; for we' ** find the greatest difiiculty to get people to bring us information." Tlie following is the letter entrusted to Colonel Graham. Sir John Moore to the DuJce of Castelfranco and M. de Morla. ^^ Salamanca, 6 /)ec. 1808. " I HAD. the honotir to receive, last night, a letter *' signed by the Duke of Castelfranco and M. de Morla, in the " name of the Junta Military and Civil established at Madrid. " Hitherto I have been left without communication or support from " any of the Spanish armies; and as the army I command was sepa- ** rated at Astorga and Salamanca, at which place it had been 102 ' ordered to collect, at the time when the army under Generat ' Castanos was defeated, it became necessary for me to consider ' what steps were necessary for the security of the British army, ' which was helpless from its separation, and when united not ' sufficiently strong to encounter the M-hole French force, which ' A\'as about to be turned against it. I had therefore ordered the ' corps at Astorga to fall back on Corunna, and was about to ' retire with the corps from this to some place of greater secu- ' rity, from whence I might return to the assistance of Spain, when ' a more favouralile opportunity offered. Those measures I have ' now stopped. The corps under Sir David Baird shall return to ' Astorga. I have put myself in communication with the Marquis ' de la Ilomana, at Leon ; and I shall, in concert with him, under- ' take such operations as are deemed best for the interests of Spain, ' and for the relief and assistance of Madrid. I should hope that ' the example of patriotism given by the capital will be foUo\A ed by ' the provinces, and that the people will flock up to its assistance ; ' when, headed by the armies, the best results may be expected. ' The Junta may rest assured that every thing shall be done by me ' that can be expected by such a corps as I command. This will be ' delivered by Colonel Graham, \a horn I send to the Junta that he ' may explain the particulars of my situation, and communicate to ' me the wishes of the Junta, and the relative positions and strength ' of the people of Madrid, and the French opposed to them. " 1 have the honour to be, " Yoixr Excellency's, &c. " John Moore." This letter was written' in consequence of the mtelligence sent by Mr. Frere, who imagined that both Castelfranco and Morla had 103 ♦esolved to fight to tlie last extremity', and, rather than suffer their countiy to be enslaved, to perish in its ruins. But it is now fully ascertained that Madrid M'as basely betrayed. The Chiefs who signed the capitulation abandoned every principle which they had sworn to maintain, and stipulated for advantageous condi- tions for themselves : wliile the inhabitants at first resisted with noisy vociferation, and then quietly surrendered their arms. Castelfranco and Morla when they wrote to Sir John Moore knew that Castanos' troops were cut off froitt Madrid by Marshal Bessieres, and were flying towards Cuenca. They themselves had ordered the gates of Madrid to be shut against the corps of San Juan ; w ho, from mistaken furj^ murdered their General, one of the ablest of the Spanish officers ; and after this hon-id deed fled in confusion to Almares. Svich was the conduct of the misgiuded ti'oops ; and the two high- born Spanish Chiefs sheathed their swords at the sight of the Enemy of their country, and by his order employed their perfidious pens to betray the British army. In the letter to Sir John Moore the signa- ture il Principe de Castelfranco is written with a steady hand ; but Thomas Morla's appears to have trembled in signing his infamy. Buonaparte, with affected grandeur, pretended to extend his clemency to these degraded Spaniai'ds. To conceal their concert with him, and to gratify his spleen, he cuimingly taunted Morla for his former pei-fidy in breaking the Capitulation with Du Pont. But so shallow a device is easily comprehended. Morla made good terms for himself and his base associates. His fortune and military rank were preserved to him, and he stoops ta exist under the protection of the Usurper of his country. *' Vendidit hie auro patriam, dominumque potentem " Irmosiiit, ficcit leges pretio atque refi^cit." 104 But these dismal truths were all unknown to Sh* John Moore. He never saw the men, and had no means of judging of the sincerity of their professions. He perceived very clearly the folly which pre- dominated in the Spanish councils, but conjectured nothing worse. On the 7*^* of December he had the pleasure of receiving the following patriotic address from the City of Toledo *. The Junta of Toledo to his Excellency Sir John Moore, ^r. §-c. " EXCELLENT SIR, Toledo, 5th December, 1808. " The Junta of Toledo, most anxiously ^^^shing to '' save their country, have signified to General Eredia, the Comman- ^' dant of this Capital, that it is their intention to reunite here the " dispersed armies ; and to take the proper measures to enable him " to defend this City to the last extremity, " The Junta is besides in communication with Aranjuez, and other " points of union; and have the satisfaction to assure your Excellency ** that they are resolved to die in defence of their country. They *' transmit this information for the guidance of your Excellency, '* wishing you many years." (Signed by the Members of Junta.) Sir John Moore rejoiced at this new proof of rising spirit in Spain, and immediately returned the following answer. * Vide Appendix X. 105 Sir John Moore to their Excellencies the Junta of Toledo. " GENTLEMEN, Salamanca, 7 Dec. 180^. " I HAVE received this morning the letter which you " have done me the honour to address to me. " The sentiments it contains, and the determination you express to die for your country, do you and the City of Toledo the greatest honour. If similar sentiments animate the rest of Spain, and the Spaniards will adhere faithfully to each other, there can be no doubt of your ultimate success, whatever temporary advantages the French may perhaps gain. The example given by Madrid is worthy of a great nation : it will, I hope, excite the enthusiasm of all good Spaniards ; make them collect, and march to the assistance of a town which ought not to be sacrificed. " The British army, like the Bi'itish nation, is desirous of rendei'- ing every assistance to the Spanish cause, and you may depend upon its best exertions. I am uniting the different corps of the army, and preparing to act. " The Marquis of Romana is at Leon, collecting the army that was with General Blake in Biscay ; and, in concert with him, whatever is possible on this side shall be done. " I shall hope to continue in correspondence with you, and that you will inform me with the progress you make ; and with what- ever inovements are made, either bv the Enemy or by the armed force assembling at Toledo. You shall be equally informed by me of every thing on this side. In order to facilitate this coirespondence, I shall send a British officer to reside at Toledo, which I trust \v\]\ meet your approbation. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." p 106 An officer was accordingly sent to concert measures for the defence of Toledo ; but the Junta at the approach of a French coi-ps suddenly changed their resolution, and, instead of dying, or even fighting for their country, very prudently retired : and the Duke of Bellune took possession of this peaceful City. This was one of the usual disappointments Sir John Moore met with from his ally ; who was constantly proclaiming the most daring intentions ; and when expec- tation was wound up to its height, and the most strenuous deeds were looked for, in a moment exertion relaxed, and every resolution yielded. Indeed few Generals have been entangled with so many em- barrassments as Sir John Moore ; who not only had to contend with the distrust of the Spanish Government, always exaggerating their resovu'ces, and concealing or glossing over their disasters ; but also to guard against the secret plots of unsuspected traitors, hid in the bosom of the Junta. While the British Minister, instead of assisting him with correct information, perplexed him with false intelligence, harassed him with vexatious missions, and thwarted him with pertinacious requisitions. And, lastly, he had to encounter the power and genius of Buonaparte. Madrid had now fallen, and the indefatigable Emperor was resolved to give the discomfited Spaniards no time to rally ; but to disperse their dispirited troops, and penetrate with celerity to the South. Marshal Bessieres was chasing the Central Army on the road ta Valencia ; the Duke of Bellune had entered Toledo ; and the Duke of Dantzic, with a strong division, was marching to Badajoz, with the design of either seizing upon Lisbon or Cadiz ; the Duke of Treville was proceeding against Saragossa ; the Duke of Dalmatia was preparing to enter Leon ; and Buonaparte, from Madrid, was ready to support all these movements, and complete the subjugation of Spain. There are no certain documents to ascertain what were the actual numbers of the French army who invaded Spain. Buonaparte announced that his intention was to carry there 200,000 men; and the French Officers who were taken prisoners beUeved that their army consisted of fully that rmmber. The following statement shews that in this there was probably little or no exaggei-ation. Various accounts agree in calculating the French force in Spain, in autumn 1808, which was stationed l)ehind the Ebro, at 45,000 There were at the same time, in the Town of Barcelona, and in the Province of Catalonia, ------ 15,000 According to the intercepted letter from the Governor of Bayonne to Marshal Jourdan, there would enter Spain by Bajonnc, between 1 6th October and 16th November*, ^2,000 An army, chiefly from Italy, entered Catalonia about the same period ------------- 15,000 Junot's division entered, in the beginning of December 30,000 177,000 From reports there is reason to believe that there were other French corps besides the above ; vv'hlch would make the numbers nearly accord with Buonaparte's declaration. It is not however to be imagined, that there ever was at one period so great an effective French force as the above ; for deaths and casualties al\Aavs occasion a great reduction of the numbers of an army. Considerable pains have been taken to ascertain what was the real British force which entered Spain ; for a very false estimate may be * Vide Appendix, E, 108 made by examining only the total numbers of official reports. After an accurate* examination it is found, that the whole effective force of the corps which marched from Corunna under Sir David Baird consisted of 9550 men ; and of those M'hich proceeded from Portu- gal was 18,416; making altogether an army of 25,631 infantry and 2450 cavalry. The artillery v.as numerous, but of too small a calibre ; including a brigade of useless three-pounders, it amounted to fifty guns. Sir John Moore was now joined by General Hope's division, and was desirous of uniting himself with Sir David Baird's ; having resolved to prosecute the war in the North of Spain. But neither the arts of Morla, the news of Charmilly, nor the arguments and requisitions of the Junta and Mr. Frere could induce the General to advance to Madrid. He knew that the passes of Somosierra and Guardarama were pos- sessed by the French, and that an attempt to force them would be destructive ; yet, if he continued where he was, or only guarded the frontiers of Galicia, every thing valuable in Spain would be quickly subdued. The first of these plans was rejected as rash, and the others as futile ; but he formed and executed a plan for stopping the progress of the French, and relieving Spain, Avhich has been highly admired by masters in the art of war. This will be gradually developed. But, as he found that the Spanish Generals who had been deputed to him were quite incapable of discussing a plan, or giving him any advice, he thought it would be imprudent to confide his intentio!)s to them. He considered it most advisable to trust no one with his designs, except the Government, and the Generals commantling armies who were to co-operate with him. This appears to have given great offence to one of the Deputed Generals, vvho'Wrote the followino; letter. * Vide Appendix Y. 109 Don T'entura Kscalante to His Excellency t/ie Commander (if the Forces of His Uritannic Majesty *. c< MOST EXCELLENT SIR, La Calzada de Banos, Dec. 7, 1 803. " I IN vain cxliausted every means, military as well as *' political, to induce your Excellency to give up the project of retlr- ' ing with your troops to Ciudad Rodrigo and Portugal, and of ' M'ithdrawlng that part of the British army which is at Astorga to ' Gallcia. And your Excellency having o])served, that the Marcpiis ' of Romana was only ahle to collect five thousand men, I left Sala- ' manca yesterday morning to meet the Supreme Junta, considering ' my mission at an end. But to-day I have received a courier m 1th * a letter from the Marquis of Romana : of which I transmit a ' copy to your Excellency, in hopes that it will have more influence ' than my observations, and induce you to change your plan. For * if, instead of uniting the two divisions of your army with the army ' of the Marquis of Romana at Zamora, or some other point that * may impose upon the Enemy, you persist in putting yoiu' design ' in execution, you will immediately occasion the destruction of ' Spain, and perhaps your Excellency will be under the necessity ' of embarking for England. But if your Excellen(;y will accede ' to the said junction, it is vei-y probable that the Enemy will aban- ' don his Intention of attacking Madrid, and will retire. This would ' give time to the army of the Centre to concentrate, and take other ' positions. " I request your Excellency to give an answer to the bearer, that he ' may send it to me. And it would be important if your Excellency ' would be so good as to write to the Marquis of Romana your final ' determination. " Ventura Escalante." ' Vide the original Spanish, C. C. no The answer that was sent to this letter was one of pure civility.. Sir John choosing only to write confidentially to the acting Generals. 2>e Sir John Moore a son Excellence le Marquis de la Itomana. " MONSIEUR LE MARQUIS, Salamanca, ce 8 Decembre. " Un Officier que j' expedie an General Sir David ' Baird, n\ offre V occasion de vous ecrire. Je n' ai pas encore recu ' des informations sures, a 1' egard de Madrid ; j' ai lieu de croire que ' le peuple tient encore. Une lettre du Junta de Toledo nx' a com- ' munique 1' intention de rassembler un corps d' aruiee la ; et que le * peuple est determine de mourir, les amies a la main, " Le General Castanos a recu ordre de se retirer a Carolina, de ' r autre cot^ du Sierra Morena. " Dans cette partle de 1' Espagne les habitans sont trop tranquilles : * ils disent qu' ils n' ont point d' amies; ils ont besoin d'une tete pour ' les remuer et pour les reunir, et pour les commander. Je propose, * le 10 courant, de faire un niouvement sur Zamore et Toro, pour ^ me rapproclicr du Corps du General Baird et du votre. Quand je ' sais quel progres vous avez fait dans I'organlsation de votre arnide, ' nous pourrons combiner quelque chose ; et j' attends avec impa- ' tience de recevolr une r^ponse a la lettre que j' eus V honiieur de vous ' ecrire le six. Deux Officlers Generaux etoient ici, il y a quelques ' jours, envoYes de la part du Junta Supreme. Ils ne m' ont pas para ' d' avoir ni les pouvolrs ni les informations necessaries pour combiner 'une operation. J' ai cru pouvoir m' appliquer plus clairement avec ' vous. Monsieur le General, et j' ai refuse d' entrer avec eux en ' matiere : ils etoient le General Escalante et le B. General Bueno. " J' ai r honntur " d'etre, &c. " John Moore. Ill The following- instructions were then dispatched to Sir David Baird. Sir John Moore to Sir David Baird. <( »IY DEAR GENERAL, Salamanca, S/h Dec. 1808. " Madrid still holds out, and I have some reason to ' believe that some efforts are making to collect a force at Toledo, ' and a still larger one on the othei- side of the Sierra Moreiia. As ' long as there is a chance, we must not abandon this country. The ' conduct of Madrid has given us a little time, and we must en- ' deavour to profit by it. My first object must be to unite with ' you, and thus connect myself with the Marquis Romana. I shall ' move a corps from this on the 10th, to Zamora and Toro. To ' which last place I shall move Head Quarters. *' I should wish you to push on your people by brigades to JBe- ' navente. I have desired General Clinton to send you, for your * private information, the manner I propose dividing the army. * I think you will prefer commanding a division to being second in ' command without any. I send you this private, that you may ' consider it, and let me know if you would wish it altei-ed in any ' particular. But I should not wish it to be shewn to any of the ' Generals, ^^'hich might draw upon me applications which I could ' not grant. You will have the goodness to point out to me any ' alterations, respecting the corps with you, which might improve ' the arrangement. " You never noticed the letter I enclosed to you, long since, for " General Leith, ordering him to join you. I am, therefore, ig- •' norant whether he is with you. He is' placed, like all the cor- •' responding officers, under my command, but he has never written 112 " me a line. I shall thauk you to tell me where he is, as also '^ the Officers who were employed in the mission under him. " In the mean time I am anxious to know the real strength and " condition of the troops Romana and Blake are assembling; and " I shall thank you to send an intelligent officer to Leon to see " them ; and who is capable of judging without allowing him- " self to be humbugged. You will of course order whatever " troops arrive at Corunna to be immediately landed and moved " forward. " I have sent Colonel Graham (90 Reg.) to Madrid, and expect " to hear from him this evening. " I remain, &c. " John Moore." Colonel Graham, who had been deputed with the answer to Castelfranco and Morla, instead of travelling directly to Madrid, thought it most prudent to go first to Talavera, to obtain intelli- gence. He arrived there late at night on the 7tli *^f December. The following letter explains his proceedings ; but, as the Spanish messenger was slow, and the Colonel was indefatigably active, he returned to Salamanca on the 9th, before the letter arrived. Colonel Graham to Sir John Moore. Talaveira de la Reina, '< MY DEAR GENERAL, w^.inesday Night late, 7-8 Dec. 1808. " Owing to the extreme difficulty in getting horses, I did <' not get here till past eleven to-night : and hearing there was a part " of the Junta Central still in this place, I immediately waited on. " them to obtain information : the amount of which I send by an 113 ^' extraordinary' courier, as the most likely means of its reaching you " soon ; as he \^'ill get on much faster than I could, requiring fewer " horses. ' '^ It seems on the 3d, Castelfranco and Morla made some sort of " agreement with the French, who on the day before got posses- " sion of the Retiro and Prado of Madrid. They are suspected of *' treason in this proceeding; having refused to admit the troops *' under St. Juan and Hereida who were at the gates on this side ; " and whose presence, it is asserted, would have enahled the citizens " to have defended the town. Castcilar, the Captain-General, and " all the Military Officers of rank, refused to ratify the agreement, " left the town, and brought away 16 guns ; and the inhabitants re- " fuse to deliver up their arms. In this state of things the Enemy " remain in the Retiro, without having taken possession of the dif- " ferent posts within : and they (the two Deputies here) do not think " there is any chance of any part of the French force (between 20 *' and 30,000 men) being detached from Madrid. " Castanos' army, meanwhile, commanded bv General La Pena, " second in command, is at Guadalaxara ; and they say amounts to " about 30,000 men. There are about 12,000 of the remains of St. " Juan and Hereida's army here, going to occupy the bridge of Al- " maraz; where great exertions are making bv the Junta to assemble " a large force. Meanwhile St. Juan has been sacrificed to the popu- " lar fury for retreating from Madrid ; and was this morning mur- '* dered here. One of the members now here is to pioceed imme- ** diatcly to Leon, to concert measures with the M* de la Romana 5 '* whose force they state, by the accounts received this day, to ex- " ceed 30,000 men ; and every whei-e, where the country is not occu- J' pied by the Enemy, they say the most active measures are taking " to Increase the military force of the country. They &ta.te the whole " of the French force In Spain not to exceed from 70 to 80,000 menj, Q. J 14 *• a part of which is before Siiragossa. They deny any reinforcements " more being on their ^^ay to join the Enemy. Tliey are most anx- " ious that you should join Romaria. I shortly explained to them, ■" the divided state of your army, and the necessity you was under to " begin a retreat, instead of completing the junction, on hearing of *' Castanos' defeat. I assured them, that, whatever might be your *' determination from circumstances, you have nothing more at heart *' than to serve effectually the cause of Spain ; but that the British *' auxiliary army could do little in that by itself, and that every thing *' depended on their being able to bring forward a powerful Spanish " army, that could unite with it. I mean to return by the Placentia " road. I am afraid I shall not be able to get the Courier to send this " till to-morrow morning. " I remain ever most truly yours, " Thomas Graham. " P. S. I think they mean that La Pena should retire on Anda- " lusla : though they do not seem to have quite given up hopes of the " people of Madrid resisting, should they be able to introduce a few " thousand men. The Junta is at Truxillo. You see that all that I '* can do is to repeat what I have heard ; for I have no means at this " moment of judging for myself." CPaper inclosed.) " In the Morning of the StL " I HAVE just heard, from good authority, that the Enemy " have gone towards Saragossa with a large force ; and that that and " Madrid are their objects. " P. S. Official accounts are just come that they attacked Sara- *' gossa on the first, and were repulsed with great loss." 115 This letter exemplifies the manner in which the Spanish Junta cloaked their calamities from the sight of their ally. Not being able absolutely to deny the capitulation, they softened it into a kind of agreement ; adding, that the indignant inhabitants had refused to deliver up their arms, and that the French had not ventured to enter the city. They also sunk down the numbers of Buonaparte's army, and exaggerated their own in the same proportion : completely dis- guising from the British General the relative strength of both. He was thus misled by the persons who ought to have instructed him ; and taught to believe that Madrid, instead of surrendering, had only formed a species of armistice with the Enemy. That Spanish corps were preparing to advance to its relief; and that the chief por- tion of Buonaparte's force must be occupied in controuling it. It appears from Sir John Moore's letters, that he neither credu- lously trusted, nor totally disbelieved this authenticated account ; though it was likewise confirmed by many private reports : particu- larly by the testimony of a Friar, who had come from Madrid. Not- withstanding his doubts, he considered himself compelled to make every eflFort in his power for the relief of the capital, and accordingly advanced from Salamanca. The movement was made from the left flank, by brigades, toM'arda the Duero.- The reserve and General Beresford's brigade Mere marched to Toro ; there to unite with the cavalry under Lord Paget, M'ho had reached that place from Astorga. He moved with the remain- ing divisions towards Alaejos and Tordesillas. At this last place the whole were intended to unite, \A'hence he proposed to proceed to Yal- ladolid. Sir David Baird's corps Avere not yet all collected ; but he was directed to push on his bi'igades to Benavente, to support or join, him. UG The intention of this movement was to threaten the coianiunica- tion between IMadrld and France : but the design is expressed in the foilowinfj letters. Sir John Moore to Sir JOhvid Baird. " MY DEAR SIR DAVID, Salamanca, \2th December, 1303. " I HAVE received both your letters of the 8th, in answer '•' to mine of the 5th and 6th. " Lord Paget is at Toro, to which place I have sent the reserve, *' and General Beresford's brigade ; the rest of the troops from this " are moving to the Duero. My quarters to-morrow will be at *• Alaejos ; Hope's at Tordesillas ; Eraser will be with me with his " division on the 14th ; on which day Lord Paget, with the Cavalry " and Infantry from Toro, will move along to Duero, towards us, " so as to enable the whole to reach Tordesillas and its nelghbour- " hood the 15th, and Valladolid on the 16th. I have no answer *' from the Marquis de la Romana, to whom I wrote upon the 6th, ** and with whom it is my wish to form a junction, and to co-operate. *' But, although I am disappointed in not hearing from him, and must " forego any assistance from him ; and although your corps will not " be up in time, yet I think it an object with the troops I have " to march to Valladolid ; from whence, according to the information " I receive, I may move on to Palencia and Burgos ; and thus threa- " ten the Enemy's communications, and cause a diversion in favour of " Madrid or Saragossa, or any movement which may be in contempla- " tion from the South of the Tagus. 1 shall, at all events, cover you " whilst assembling at Astorga and Benavente, and m.ay bring you " on to me, or fall back upon you, as occasion requires ; and, in the " mean time, I shall be just as safe as at Salamanca or Zamora. I " think I shall call oh to me Colonel Craw ford with his corps, either 117 *' by Toro or IVIedlna de Rio Seco, of which I shall give you notice " from Alaejos. I have attached one brigade of artillery to each " dix-ision of the army ; whatever is over, is considered as reserve. *' To each division also there is attached ten rounds of musket car- " tridgesper man carried iiv^tarts, and four mules with pack-saddles, " for the purpose of bringing^ the cartridges, when wanted, from the *' carts to the troops ; besides which, I am forwarding musket-ammu- " nition, and ammunition for guns, to Zamora. I think if you bring " on Avith the troops two brigades of artillery, besides the two of " horse artillery, one of which is with Lord Paget, this will suffice ; " leave the other two at Astorga, ready to come forward when called " for. I \\'ish you would make the same arrangement for carrying " with your brigades, or divisions, ten rounds a man, besides the sixty " in pouches. I shall enclose a letter from Colonel Harding, com- •*' manding the artillery, explanatory of every thing else. I consider " Benavente as a place to have certain stoi'es advanced to; the rest " you should divide between Astorga and Villafranca. " All the money at Corunna should be brought up to Villafranca; *' we shall want it. I am much obliged to you for your opinion upon "the Galicias and Vigo; and it is that which now, probably, I *' shall follow, should such a measure become necessary. I am, *' therefore, most anxious that magazines should be formed on that " communication. I have written home, to direct that all transports, " &c. should call at Corunna, and Vigo, unless otherwise directed. " Corunna must be the place for all supplies from England; — the " communication through Portugal is difficult and tardy. " Forward the inclosed to the Marquis de la Romana as soon *' as possible ; and send me any letters which may come from him " without delay. An Officer will remain at Salamanca to forward *' letters to me. Should you not prefer the direct road by Toro to '* Tordesillas, or Valladolid, you will not think it necessary to have 118 *' more cavalry with you whilst lam in your front. I shall enclose " a letter for Lord Castlereagh*, which I shall thank you to for- " Avard to Corunna. " Believe me sincerely, " John Moore." Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. «' SIR Salamanca, December \2tli, I SOS. " I LEAVE this to-morrow, and I expect to be in Vulla- " dolld on the 16th, with that part of the army which came from " Portugal, joined by 1500 Cavalry which came with Sir David " Baird ; the rest of Sir David's corps he is assembling at Astorga " and Benavente ; but I have thought it advisable to make this " movement Avithout him, rather than wait longer. He will be in " my rear, and can join me a\ hen he Is readv. I have heard nothing " from the Marquis de la Romana, in answer to the letters 1 MTote " to him on the 6th and 8th instant. 1 am thus disappointed of " his co-operation, or of knowing what plans he proposes. " I am in ignorance of the state of JVIadrid. It was attacked the " 2d, and capitulated the 3d. The French then had the Retiro, " and the people kept their arms. Whether this continues their ** relative situation, I cannot learn. The difficiJty of obtaining " information surpasses what I ever met with. " The object of my movement is to threaten the French communi- " cations, and attract their attention from Madrid and Saragossa, and " favour any movement which may be projected by the armies form- " ing to the South of the Tagus. " If no advantage is taken of it, if no efforts are made, and '* if every one continues quiet, as they did when Madrid was attacked, *' the French vv'ill have their option to turn against me v.hat portion * Vide Appendix B B. 11.9 *' of then' force they please ; it will, of course, not be one inferior in " number, and I need not state to you what is likely to be the conse- *' quence. " The French in the North of Spain have from 80 to 90,000 "men: — it is said that more are advancing, and I believe it ; as " many of the letters, found in the intercepted mail, mention a seventh " and eighth division, preparing to enter Spain. I have seen " nothing in the conduct of the Spaniards that gives me the least *' hope that they will resist such formidable numbers. They have " shewn nothing like resolution hitherto. Madrid, after so much *' boasting, held out but one day. This army is now in motion, and I " shall make with it what diversion I can, to favour any resistance, "or any -attacks made elsewhere. If the forces, collected to the " Southward of the Tagus, will move forward in great numbers, " and like men determined to rescue their country, Madrid may still " be saved ; if the inhabitants keep their arms, and if the French, " notmthstanding the capitulation, have not dared to enter the city ; " but nothing short of some very decided measure Avill save either " Madrid or Spain at this moment. I shall continue to keep you " informed of my movements ; and your Courier coming by Ciudad " Rodrigo, will be informed where to find me. " I have, &c. " John Moore." It appears by this letter, that Sir John Moore was still ignorant of the submission of Madrid ; and he was led to entertain hopes that his movements might be useful to save that city. On the same day, December 12th, Lord Paget, with the principal part of the cavalry, marched from Toro to Tordesillas ; while Briga- dier-General Stuart, commanding the 18th and King's German Dragoons, was moving from Arevolo. The Brigadier got informa- 120 tion that a party of French cavalry and infantry were posted in a village called Rueda. Captain Dashwood secretly reconnoitred the place at night, and marked the position of the guards. The Brigadier then rode up to the village with a party of the 18th Dragoons, surprised the Enemy, and killed or took prisoners almost the whole detachment. This was the first encounter of the French and British in Spain. The march of the British had been so well concealed, thattlie French were astonished to find that there were any English troops there. The prisoners declared that it was universally believed they had re- treated. Tiie Head Quarters Avere, on the l4th December, at Alaejos, where Sir John received a letter from the Marquis of Romana,- who, he thought, had been rather too long of writing. The Marquis here distinctly expresses a perfect approbation of the reasons for the retreat which Sir John Moore had before projected ; and, from caution, he adds not a word respecting the forward movement, lest his letter should fall into the hands of the Enemy. There is often in the Marquis's letter one or two English words, and the French is a little incorrect. A. S. E. Mr. le G4n4ral Sir John Moore, Commandant General de V Jlrm^e u4ngloise en Espagnc. •< SIR, Head Quakers, Leon, l\th December, 1808. " Je vois par !es deux lettres de V. E. du six et huit " courant, la cause des mouvemens retrogrades 'qxt' elie avolt present " aux corps d' Armde sous ses ordres; et je la trouve tr^s fonde'e et " trcs juste. Craignant d'aveiiturer une r^ponse aux articles des " deux lettres, je me reserve de le falre par le moyen d'un Officier " que j'exp^diexai demain pour aller ^ votre rencontre k Zamora, 121 *' tandis que je me prepare pour faire avee V. E. la jonction si dcsiree. " J'ai r lioiiueur de renouveller a V. E. 1' hommage de ma haute " estime, et de la parfaite consideration avee la(juelle " Je suis votre tr^s humlile, " et tr^s devoue serviteur, " Le Marquis de la Romana." On the same day on which the ahove was received, a packet of letters from the Head Quarters of the French Army were brought to Sir John Moore. The Officer who had them in charge was inter- cepted, and murdered by some Spanish peasants. The following dispatch from Marshal Berthier to the Duke of Dalmatia was very important. A Monsieur le Marechal Due de Dalmatie, commandant le 2 Corps d'Arnt^e, a Saldana. Xe V. Connetahle, Major General. " Chamartin, le 10 Decembre, 1808. " A MONSIEUR LE MARECHAL DUG DE DALMATIE, " J' Ai lu a I'Empereur, Monsieur le Marechal, votre " lettre du 4 Decembre, apportee par 1' un de vos officiers ; sa Ma- " jest^. Monsieur le Due, approuve tout ce que vous avez fait. Le " 8""" Regiment de Dragons, le 22'"*^ de Chasseurs, le Regiment du " Colonel Tascher, le Regiment Hannoverin, font quatre Regiments, " formant deux Brigades commandees par les Gdneraux de Brigade de " Belle et Franceschi ; ces deux Brigades de Cavalerie sont sous vos " ordres ; et vous pouvez les faire manoevrer comme il vous convien- " dra. L'Empereur pense qu' avee la Division Merle, avee la Divi- " sion IVIoutnn, les 4 Regiments de troupes a cheval, vous n' avez " rien qui puisse vous resister. " Qu' avez vous a faire? Vous rendre maitre de Leon, rejetter " r ennemi en Galice, vous emparer de Benavente et de Zamora; R n'2 " vous ne devez pas avoir d' Anglais devant vous, car quelques Regi- " ments sont venus a rEscurlal, a Salamanqvie, et tout porte a pen- " ser qu'ils sont en pleine marche retrograde : notre avant-garde est " aujourd'hui a Talavera de la Reyna, sur la route de Badajoz : elle " sera bientot sur cette vlUe. Vous sentez assez que ce mouve- " ment (s il ne 1' a pas deja fait) va forcer les Anglais a accourir sur " Lisbonne. Au moment, Monsieur le Marechal, que vous serez " certain, comme tout porte a le presumer, qu'il n'y a pas d' Anglais " devant vous, vous pouvez marcher droit et a tete baiss^e ; il n'y a " rien en Espagnols qui puisse tenir contre vos deux divisions. Faites " faire des souliers et des capottes a Leon, a St. Ander, a Palencia. " Sa Majeste approuve toutes les demandes que vous ferez ayant pour " but d'ameliorer votre materiel : vovis pouvez egalement requerir des " mulcts pour remonter votre artillerie, et des chevaux pour remonter " votre cavalerie, en mettant dans tout cela les formes et tout ce qui " tient a la bonne administration. II est possible qu' aussitot que la " division de Dragons du Gen. Miller arrivera en Espagne, I'Empe- " reur vous I'envoye ; mais cette division ne sera pas en Espagne au " moius de 15 jours. A la distance ou vous vous trouvez de nous, " Monsieur le Due, vous ne pouvez vous conduire que par vous-meme, " et regarder tout ce que je vous ecris a un si grand eloignement '' comme une direction generale. " Sa Majeste pense que vous prendi'ez toutes les mesures pour sou- " mettre le pays entre le Duero et la Galice et les Asturies, en gar- " dant toutesfois, et precieusement, St. Ander. Le 5'"" corps, que " commande le Marechal Due de Trevise, a recu I'ordre de se dinger sur " Sarragosse. Le 8'"" corps aux ordres du Due d'Abrantes, dont la " 1"^ Dlv" arrive a Vitoria vers le 12, va vraisemblablement recevolr " des ordres pour se reunlr a Burgos. Des gabarres et des batiments " de toute espece, armcs au guerre, ont 1' ordre de se rendre a St. " Ander; faites les charger de marchandlse Anglalse saisie, de coton. ] 'i3 " de laine, d'artlllerie, et qu'oii les expetlie sur France. iMirin tenez " Valladolid et Zaniora dans la soiiniission : Vallailulid est line bonne " ville, et qui s' est bien conduit ; on dit qu' 11 serolt tres interessant " d'occuper Zaniora. Enfin, Monsieur le Due, rEmpereur pense que " vous pouvez tout faire du moment que les Anglais seront retires sur " Lisbonne. '* Cinq divisions de Castanos, composees des mellleurs troupes, ont " ete culbutees plus facilement encore que vous n' avez culbute vous- " meme I'armc^e d'Andalousie a Burs^os. Les debris de TArmee de " Castanos sont poursuivls par le Marechal Bessieres, qui leur a coup^ " la route d'Estramadure, et qui les poursuit sur celle de Valence a " plusieurs journees au delk du Tage. L'Empereur a son quartier " general a Chamartin, petite campagne a une lieue et demi de Ma- " drid; sa Majesty jouit de la meilleure sante. La ville de Madrid " est tres tranquille ; les boutiques sont ouvertes, les spectacles ont " repris, et il ne parait pas que les premiers pourparlers ayent ete *' appuyes de quatre mille coups de canon. " Le Prince de Neuchatel, " Major General. '* Je vous enverral demain la proclamation et les arretes pris par " I'Empereur ; vous y reconnoitrez celui fait pour commander k tout." Tbis letter gave Sir John Moore not only a correct account ot" the disposition of most of the French divisions, together with the inten- tions of the Emperor ; but also included an exact summary of the Spanish operations, and of the state of Madrid. The most important service that Mr. Frere could perform to Spain and to his Country, was certainly to send intelligence of all Important events to the Commander of the Forces. This duty was of course in- culcated in his instructions from the Secretary of State ; in which is the following clause : " You will on your part keep him (Sir J. 124 " Moore) regularly informed of any political event of importance " which may arise, and which can in any degree affect the safety, or *' influence the movements, of the army." It cannot be questioned that the surrender and total submission of Madrid was a political event of some importance ; and likely to affect the safety, and influence the movements, of the British army. Yet Mr. Frere never transmitted to Sir John Moore this intelligence ! It was the more requisite to do so, as, by his letters from Araiijuez when close to Madrid, and bv those from Talavera when near it, and by the mission of his friend Charmilly, he had sent the strongest assurances of the determination of the inhabitants of the capital to hold out to the last extremity. Yet Mr. Frere never intimated to Sir John Moore that this expecta- tion had proved fallacious ! To conceal such intelligence, would have been highly criminal : it must, therefore, be concluded that Mr. Frere was totally misinformed and deceived. Yet one is quite at a loss to conceive how the Junta and Mr. Frere could find any difficulty in obtaining intelligence from Madrid. For this city never was sur- rounded by the French ; the communication with the country was left open by their consent, for the admission of provisions. And though the Governor and a few others were traitors, yet the city was full of loyal citizens, undoubtedly disposed to send true accounts. No satisfactory explanation appears for the want of true intel- ligence, and the transmission of false ; or for mingling both together, as was the present case. For the Junta had actually communicated to the British CommanderthatMadrid had capitulated ; but they had added that the city had remained in some sense hostile, and that the French troops had not ventured to enter within the gates. This impression of course continued upon his mind ; and It was from Marshal Ber- thier that he was indebted for the knowledge of the truth. But it was now too late to resume the former plan of candying his arms to the South : and he still had some reliance on the favourable advices which had been sent him on the other points. 125 Along with the unfavonrdl)le intelligence communicated in Ber- thier's letter, it was some consolation for Sir John Moore to find that Buonaparte helieved he was retreating. But as he perceived that Soult's corps was stronger than had been represented, he considered it no longer advisable to march to Valladolid, least Sir David Baird should be attacked In forming his junction. He thought it pre- ferable to move to Toro, to approach nearer to Sir David, and ac- cordingly wrote to him this intention. Si?' John Moore to Sir David JBaird. " MY DEAR SIR, Head Quarters, Jlacjus, Bee. 14, 1808. " I RECEIVED last night your lettei-s of the 10th and 1 1th " inst. It was my intention to have moved to-morrow on Valladolid ; " but by a letter from Buonaparte to Marshal Soult at Saldanha, " which we have intercepted, the officer who carried it having been " murdered by the peasantry, I am induced to change my direction, " and shall be to-morrow with all the troops I have at Toro, and its " immediate neighbourhood. It appears that Marshal Soult, Due de " Dalmatia, has with him two divisions at Saldanha, besides one " under the Due d'Abrantes which is collecting at Burgos, and ano- " ther under the Due de Trevile which has received orders to march " on Saragossa, but which of course may be recalled. Madrid has " submitted, and is quiet ; and the French from thence are marching " upon Badajos. Their advanced guard %\'as at Talaveira la Reina on ^' the 10th instant. My object is now to unite the army as soon as *' possible : you at Benavente, and I at Toro ; from whence, either " by a forward or flank movement, the two corps can be joined. I " shall direct all my stores from Zamora to be forwarded to Benavente. " The arrangement with respect to yours which I communicated to '' you in my letter of the 12th inst. may go on ; by wliich we shall V26 have a certain portion at Benavente, and the rest at Astorga and the rear. It appears from the intercepted letters, from deserters, and from prisoners we have taken, that the French are in complete ignorance of the present movements, and think we have retreated : As they will now know the truth, what change this may make in their march to Badajos I know not : hut Marshal Soult will cer- tainly he checked in his intended operations ; which were projected upon the supposition that he had nothing but Spaniards to oppose him. Every arrangement which I before directed with a view to enable us to live in the Galicias, should be strictly attended to ; for, though in the first instances we may not have opposed to us more than we can face, it will be in the power of the Enemy to in- crease their force far beyond our strength. I have received a letter from the Marquis of la Romana, and I expect an officer from him every hour. Whatever I determine with him shall be communi- cated to you : in the mean time I shall thank you to let him know that I have changed my Intention of going to Valladolid, in conse- quence of Information ; and that I am collecting the army at Toro and Benavente. " Believe me, &c. " John Moore." Though Sir John Moore had received no answer to the letters he wrote to Mr. Frere on the 6th and 10th, he continued sending him exact information of his movements m Si?- J. Moore to Mr. Frere. " SIR, Toro, \5 Dec. 1808. " Marshal Soiilt, Duke of" Dalmatia, is with a corps at ' Saldana : Junot, Duke of Ahrantes, is marching with another hy ' Vittoria on Burgos ; and there is a corps under another Marshal, ' Duke of Trevise, destined for Saragossa. Madrid is quiet ; and ' the army, or rather a portion of it, is on its march to Badctjos ; the ' advanced ij-aard was at Talavera de la Relna on the 10th. Biiona- ' parte is at Chamartin — in the belief that the British have retired ' into Portugal. Marshal Bessleres is in pursuit of the army of Cas- ' tanos ; has intercepted its march to Estremadura, and is following ' it to Valencia. This information, which I received yesterday, has ' determined me to unite the army with all possible speed ; and in- ' stead of proceeding to Valladolid I have naarched to this place, in order to make my junction with Sir David Baird, who is assembling ' his corps at Benavente. I met a King's messenger on my coming 'to this town who was in search of you : I liave directed him to go ' to Ciudad Rodrigo ; where, according to the information he re- ' ceives, he will proceed straight to Badajos, or enter Portugal. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." The British Commander was now very desirous that the Duke of Dalmatia should move forward, and meet him halfway ; though he could hardly flatter himself with this expectation. He resolved there- fore to march towards him, form his junction with Sir David Baird on the road, and, if possible, encounter Marshal Soult before he was reinforced, and before any French corps should be pushed forward on his right flank to endanger his retreat. i28 With this design he liad marched to Toro, which he reached on the Kith. Here he received the following letter from Lieut.-Col. Symes, w ho had hccn deputed hy Sir David Baird to ascertain the strength and condition of the Marquis of Romana's troops. JJeut. -Colonel Si/mes to Sir David I^aifd. ^i si,R Leon, 14//; Dec. 1303. " I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that I arrived at •■' Leon yesterday evening; the difficulty of procuring post-horses " greatly retarded my journey- Between Memhihre and Manzanal I " met a hrigade of Spanish artillery^, viz. two howitzers, and six field- "" pieces ; they were proceeding to Ponteferada, for what precise " ohject I could not learn; — possibly to defend the passes of the " mountains. " At a league North of Astorga, I came on another brigade of " Spanish guns, drawn up on a rising ground. These guns had only " thi'ee or four men to guard them, and no regular centinels. I was " told that the gunners and cattle were in the neighbouring village. " I examined the state of the guns and the ammunition, as closely as " I could without giving offence. They appeared very defective ; " the men said they c:ame from Leon fifteen days ago, and knew not '• whither or when they were to proceed. At Orbigo, four leagues " from Leon, I found the place occupied by a numerous body of troops ; " I wa-s told 4,000 under Major General Don Jenars Trigader. " There Avere five regiments ; three of the line — El Rey, Majorca, " and Hibernia ; and two of militia — the Maldonada and another. " The equipment and appearance of these troops were miserable. " I had an opportunity of Inspecting the arms of the General's *' Guard, which were extremely imperfect; the springs and locks " do not often correspond; either the main spring was too weak for V29 " the feather-spring, or the feather-sprhig too weak to produce " certahi fire from the hammer. I tried sixteen ; of this numher " only six liad bayonets, and these were short and had. The ammu- " nition pouches were not proof against rain : the clothing of the '' soldiers was motley, and some were half naked. They were in " general stout yoiuig men, without order or discipline, but not " at all turbulent or ferocious ; and nothing of intoxication was ob- " servable. Soon after 1 left Orbigo, I met the regiment of Vittoria "on its marcli from Leon, destined, I was told, for Ponteferada ; " the men were wretchedly clad and armed. " I got to Leon early in tlie evening, and waited on the Marquis " de la Romana ; he had not heard of the capitulation of Madrid ; " expressed himself vaguely on the subject of moving; stated his " force at 22,000 infantry and 300 cavalry ; complained much of •' the want of officeis ; had intended to form his army into ii\ e dlvi- " sions, but could not for want of Officers to put at their head : he, " therefore, meant to divide his army into wings; one under Genera! " Blake, the other under himself; that his force was daily increasing " by the return of fugitives. He expressed hopes, that we had " light troops to oppose those of the French, who were very expert; " and added, that he was training b',000 of his men to that species " of warfare. There was to be a general review the next day, at " which I expressed a desire of the honour of attending his Ex- " cellency. In the moniing I waited on the Marquis, and pressed " him, as far as I could with propriety, on the subject of joining ' ' Sir John Moore ; to which he evaded giving any more than general " assurances. He does not think that the force of the Enemy in the " North exceeds 10,000 men in all; and that there is no danger of '' their penetrating into Asturias. He recommends to Sir John " Moore, to break down all the bride mistaken. *•' My motive for doubting, whether the aid which he might bring " would be of any importance, arises from a sense of the inefficient " state of his army, and the ^ant of discipline in the men. It is " morally impossible that they can stand before a line of French " infantry. A portion of, at least one third of, the Spanish muskets " will not explode ; and a French soldier will load and fire his piece " with precision three times before a Spaniard can fire his twice. " Men, however brave, cannot stand against such odds ; as to charg- " ing with the bayonet, if their arms were fit for the purpose, the men, " though individually as gallant as possible, have no collective con- " fidence to carry them on, nor Officers to lead them ; they will " therefore disperse, probably on the first fire, and can never be " rallied, until they voluntarily I'eturn to their General's standard; " as in the case of the Marquis de laRomana's present army, almost " wholly composed of fugitives from the battles of the North. A " striking instance qf this is given by the Marquis himself, who as- " sured me that the Spaniards did not lose above 1000 men in " their late actions with the French ; a proof not of the weakness " of the French, but of the incapacity of the Spaniards to resist *' them. In fact, the French light troops decided the contest ; — the "Spaniards fled before a desultoi-y fire; — they saved themselves, *' and now claim merit for having escaped. " By a lepetition of such flights and re-assembling, the Spaniards -" may, in the end, become soldiers, and greatly harass the Enemy ; " but, as we cannot pursue that mode of warfare, our allies are not " much calculated to be of use to us on the day of battle, when we *' must either conquer or be destroyed. 132 " I do not mean to undervalue the spirit or patriotism of the ". Spaniards, which I highly respect, and \Ahicli, in the end, may *' effect their deliverance ; but they are not now, nor can they for a " long time be, sufficiently improved in the art of war, to be coad- "jutors with us in a general action: we must, therefore, stand or '■'■fall through our oivn means ; for, if we place any reliance on " Spanish aid for success in the field, we shall, I fear, find ourselves -i egregiously deceived. " I think the Marquis de la Roniana should immediately be called •' upon, to say upon what day he will march, and on what day and at " what place he will join Sir John Moore. " I have thought it my duty. Sir, thus to enter at length into the " subject, with a view to prevent hereafter any disappointment on a " matter of such high importance. " I have the honour to be, &c. " Michael Symes, " Lieut.-Col." This account of the Marquis of Romana's troops, was most dis- couraging. It was evident that little reliance could be put on a force so imperfectly organized. The following letter from the Mar- quis gives no very flattering description of his army, though it was, in many points, an exaggeration. The Marcjins of Jlomana to Sir John Moore. " SIR Leo7i, It 14 Dec. 1803. *' VoYANT les mouvements que 1' Armee sous les ordres " de V. E. execute en avant, je prens le parti de lui d^pecher mon " aide-de-camp Mr. O'Niell avec cette lettre, qui I'instruira, et de " la destination de mon Armee et de mes desseins. Je me trouve " avec 20 mille hommes presents sous les armes, que j' ai commence 1^3 " a habiller, et u les mettre en etat d' agir ; mais 11 s' en taut encore " beaucoup que j' ale complete 1' ouvrage, et il-y-a encore les deux *' tiers au molns qui ont besoin d'etre liabilles de ncuf et en entiere. " Presque toute TArmee se trouve saus havre-sacs, sans gibernes, " et sans souliers ; et malgre toutc Y activite que j'ai nils pour cet " eftet, je n' ai pu y parvenlr a cause du peu de j-essources qu' offre le "pays. J' attends d'un jour a 1' autre tous ces objets ; mais " r eloignement ou ils se trouvent de ce point-ci retardent I'execution " de mes ordres. Si les Provinces mettoient un peu plus de zele, je /* ne doute pas que I'Armee se trouverait deja en etat d'agir de " concert avcc celle de V. E. Voici quant a la situation de mes " troupes, je vais a present exposer a V. E. mes desseins. Si je " n' avois point d' Ennemis en face, je ne douterois pas un instant de " reunir toutes mes forces avec celle de V. E. et de concerter un at- " taque decisif sur les troupes qui cernent Madrid dans ce moment: " mais il-y-a un corps d'environ huit a dix mille bommes d'api-es les " meilleurs enseignemens qui s' ^tend depuis Sahagiin jusqu' a " ^Imanza, et dont 1' objet a ce que je crois est de tenir en echec *' mon Armee, egalement que d'entretenir les conmiunications avec " les montagnes de Santander. La position est le long de la petite " riviere de Cea, et il occupe les villages de Sahag'im, ou il appuye " sa gauche; Saldana, ou se trouve son corps principal; Cea et " yllmanxa, ou il a ses avants-postes. De ce dernier point il pousse " ses reconnoissances jusqu' a Pedrosa a I'entree de ValdehxLron, et " il pretend gener ma gauche. Tant que ce corps sera dans cette •' position, je ne pourrois pas abandonner la miemie, tant parceque " je ne puis pas laisser a d^couvert ni abandonner ce pays oil je tire *' beaucoup de subsistances, comme aussi parceque je laisserais libre *' et degagee a 1' Ennemi 1' entree des Asturies, et qu' il ne tarderoit *' pas a s' emparer aussitot de ce pays-ci, et ^ menacer I'entree en ^' Galice. Je compte des que je serois en ^tat de manceuvrer de pousser 134 " le corps qui est devant niol ; et en meme temps Sir David Baird *' pourroit niontrer les tetes de Colonnes en avancant depuis Benaveiite " snr la route de Palenciia. Ce mouvement combing obligeroit ce corps '■' ennemi a se replier sur Reynosa, ou m6me a Burgos ; une fois degage " de cette partie, je ne trouve pas qu'il fut difficile a V. E. de venir se ■' joindre a nos corps, tant a celui de Sir David Baird comme egale- " ment au mien. " Je voudrols bien avoir una entrevue avec V. E. : nous applanirons '' bien des difficultes; si je puis 1' executer sans faire faute ici, je me '' rendrois au plus tot a Tordesillas, et je ne manquerai pas de vous " en avertir d' avance. " J'ai r honneur d' etre, Monsieur le General, " v6tre trfes humble et devoue, Serviteur, " Le Marquis de la Romana." While Sir John Moore's whole attention was engrossed with the attack on the French army, which he was meditating, a new mission from the Supreme Junta and Mr. Frere overtook him this day at Toro. A member of the Junta, accompanied by Mr. Stuart, presented the following dispatch : Don Martin De Garay, Secretary of the Supreme Junta, to His Excellency J. Hookham Frere, 8,-c. 8fc. 8fc. * " Sir, " The Marquis de la Romana has informed the '' Supreme Junta, from his Head Quarters in Leon, under date " the 2rid inst. that eight days ago he was treating with the English " General Sir David Baird, who commands the troops of his nation *' at Astorga, to proceed with them and twelve or fourteen thousand " picked men of the army under his command, to Zamora, to unite * Vide Original in Appendix, W. 135 '* with the General Sir John Moore, by the road he had pointed oat; " in order to make a movement ajjainst the Enemv, towards the " point that might be thought most convenient. But, ^vhen he " flattered himself that General Baird Avould agree thereto, he re- " plied, that lie had positive orders to go by land or sea to unite " with Sir John Moore in Portugal. That he had repeated his " request to both Generals ; and that on the preceding day General " Baird had definitively answered him, that he \\as withdrawing ** his artillery to embark it at Corunna, and that he intended to go " with his troops to Portugal, along the coast of Galicia, or by the ** province of Tras los Montes upon Almeida. That he wrote him, *' m conjunction with General Belande (who had arrived that night *' at Leon), acquainting him of the consternation that he would throw *' that country into by his retreat ; the impossibility of the Marquis's " marching alone, without any cavalry, towards Zamora ; the evils to ** which that province remained exposed, and the risk with Avhich it " threatened the kingdom of Galicia *. " The Supreme Junta has learnt with the greatest surprise and " pain this resolution of the English General; which, if put in exe- " cation, would afford great advantages to the French arms, and " would bring on the most terrible consequences upon the Spanish " arms. The generous and ready succours that England afforded us, " and the troops with which she assisted us, increased the enthusiasm " of the whole country, and strengthened the just hopes that this " union would secure the happiest results to tlie enterprize. For ^' the same reason, the dismay and consternation that uill now arise " from seeing the British army retreat without acting or uniting, " will excite feelings contrary to the good cause, ivill weaken the * Vide page 1 20, where the Marquis states an opinion exactly the reverse oi this ; namely, that it appeared to him, that tlie cause for Sir John Moore's ordering a retreat was well founded, anJ very just. 136 " enthusiasm and ardour \Aliich, hitherto, confidence in the uniformit>' " of ideas, and in the operations of the British army united with our " troops, has sustained. '' Besides the irreparable injury that we should feel, Portugal " \Aould remain exposed to see herself for the second time subjected " to the French ; m ho \a ould then disconcert, most completely, all " the plans and measures that would alone save these two kingdoms, " allies of England, who by the ultimate result would only have " afforded us succours and troops to make us rely on their effective " assistance, and withdraw them in the most critical and interest- " ing moment. In reality, the Enemy has never been nearer his utter *' ruin (if the English and Spanish armies act with judgment and " energy) than in the moment when, weakened by what his late " efforts have cost him, Ave might profit of the advantage of seeing " his army divided in covering such an extended line. " All these considerations, and the melancholy consequences the " retreat of the British troops would produce, cannot be hidden from " your Excellency's penetration, and that of his Britannic Majesty's " Generals ; liut, if the British army were united to ours, it would con- " tribute to give liberty to Spain and Portugal ; finish the generous " Avork for which the friend of Spain destined them ; immortalise their " name, and render service to all the Continent. " Although our troops have expei'ienced reverses, there are no •' grounds for dismay. The state of things rather promises that, '*' by the number of English and Spanish troops, and by the enthu- '' sias'.n and confidence their union will pi'oduce, advantages will " occur \yhich must secure us victory. . " The Marquis de la Romana A\ill see Sir John Moore, and join " him with fourteen thousand chosen men from his army ; and with '< the active and energetic measures the Supreme Junta has directed, ^' in a month it will augment its numbers v.ith thirty thousand con- 137 " scripts from the kingdoms of Leon, Gallcia, and Asturias, His. *' Majesty, as your Excellency knows, has resolved that one of its " members shall go and confer with Sir John Moore. He is ready " to depart, and will be accompanied, as your Excellency has pro- *' mised, by Mr. Stuart, who will do e\ery thing in his power to *' contribute to the object. He also hopes that your Excellency, '* impressed with these weighty considerations, will endeavour to " persuade the General in Chief of the English troops, that the " enthusiasm of the people, their consolation, the liberty of the " nation, the security of Portugal, the interests of England, and " those of all Europe, depend on the immediate union ; and when " the plans are concerted, to act in the most convenient manner ; for " otherwise neither the object of their coming will be attained, nor " any advantage will have resulted, than that of losing the best " opportunity of destroying the eternal Enemy of the repose of the " Continent, abandoning Spain and Portugal to their fate, in the " precise moment in which they stood most in need of the assistance " of their Ally. " The Supreme Junta relies on the attachment your Excellency has " shewn them, and on the lively interest you take in our cause ; and " that you will contribute with all your influence and representation, " that the great enterprize may not fail. All which I submit to your *' Excellency's consideration, by command of his Majesty. (Signed) " Martin db Garay. " Tru^ri'lio, ^December, 1808." 'File Jimta here, as heretofore, assure Sir JAhn Moore of an aug- menting enthusiasm. He is promised to be joined immediately with fourteen thousand picked men of the Marquis of Romana's army, and in a month with thirty thousand conscripts. It will afterwards ap- pear how these promises were kept. T 138 The following is the letter brought by Mr. Stuarf. To Sir John Moore. " SIK, Truxillo, Dec. 8» 1808. " After the representations which have been made ** to you from other (quarters, I can hardly hope that a farther " remonstrance on my part can produce any effect : when high " military rank and authoritv, and the influence of persons M'hom I *' am told you honour with your private esteem, have been found " unavailing. The advantages -v^hich Mr. Stuart possesses in this " respect will, I hope, enable him to in'ge you with the warmth of " regard, what I may be allowed to state with impartiality and " candour, towards a person with whom I am no othersvays ac- " quainted than by the honour which he has done me by his cor- " respondence : I mean the immense responsibility ^^'ith which you " charge yourself by adopting, upon a supposed military necessity, " a measure which must be followed by immediate If not final ruin *' to our Ally, and by indelible disgrace to the Countiy with whose " resources you are entrusted. " I am unwilling to enlarge upon a svibject in which my feelings " must be stifled, or expressed at the risk of ofi'ence ; which, Avith '* such an interest at stake, I should feel unwilling to excite. But *' this much I must say, tliat if the British army had been sent " abroad for the express purpose of doing the utmost possible mis- *' chief to the Spanish cause, with the single exception of not firing *' a shot against theIi*troops, they would, according to the measures " now announced as about to be pursued, have completely fulfilled " their purpose. " Tliat the defence of Galicia should be abandoned must appear '' incredible. 159 *' I inclose a note which I have just received from Mr. Garay; " Secretary to the Junta, and remain, with great tiiith and regard. " Sir, " Your obedient humble servant, " J. H. Frere." This letter, and this second mission, shew the decided interference of Mr. Frei-e in the military operations ; and tliey prove how deter- mined he was that Sir John Moore shoukl be governed by him. It must be verv superfluous to add a word in justification of Sir Jolni Moore's original plan, since it appears, by Berthier's letter, that Buo- naparte presiuned that his movement would of course induce the English to retire on Lisbon. We do not, however, suspect that IVIr. Frere thinks himself a superior general to Buonaparte ; we only perceive that his understanding was completely warped by traitors. The stile of the letters, however, do not admit of the same apology j, and the Mhole transaction displays an extraordinary specimen of diplomatic authority. Had it not been I'ecorded, no one could have suspected how Commanders of Armies might be treated by British Plenipotentiaries. The forbearance of Sir John Moore on receiving tliese letters is very remarkable : he sent no answer till the 23d, which A\ill appear in its place. In his Journal tliere is the following passage. " I halted at Toro on the 16th, when Mr. Stuart came to me " from Mr. Frere, accompanied by a Member of the Junta, to re- " quest I Mould connect myself with the Marquis of Romana. This " I told them I was about to do, and that 1 had written to the " Marquis from Salamanca. 'i " I explained to Mr. Stuart Mr. Frere's extraordinary conduct to ^' me, and I shewed him his letters, which. surprised hlni. He was 140 '* not much pleased at having been sent upon a mission with only a " half-confidence." It is mortifj'ing to observe, with how much more propriety and judgment the political details are managed by the French, even when conducting an atrocious usxirpation, than by the English, when en- gaged in the justest cause. Let Marshal Berthier's letter be compared with Mr. Frere's. The instructions contained in the former are perspicuous, and the lan- guage is concise and polite. And though Marshal Soult only com- manded a detached coi-ps, he is left with ample discretionary powers, and free from the fetters of diplomatic men. But what above all things merits imitation, the best information which had been received is sent him, and the state of affairs is fairly described, neither exaggerating nor disguising the truth. It thence appears that the correspondence between public officers in France is of an opposite nature from the pompous Bulletins. The latter are intended to deceive the vulgar, the former to instruct their officers. And the French are too wise politicians to suppose that successful measures can be founded on false information. Sir John Moore * had now resolved to threaten the communica- tions between France and Madrid ; and, if a favourable opportunity ofl'ered, to attack the Duke of Dalmatia's corps, or any of the cover- ing divisions that should present themselves. He foresaw that this would necessarily draw upon him a large French force, and of course would prove an important diversion in favour of the Spaniards ; who would by this means have the opportunity of collecting in the South, and restoring their affairs. The army was now near the French position. The cavalry under Lord Paget were pushed so forward, that their patroles reached as far as Valladolid, and had frequent * Vide Appendix, DD. 141 successful skirmishes with the Enemy. Colonel Otway met a de- tachment of French cavalry, charged them, and made the whole prisoners. On the 18th of Decemher Sir John Moore's Head Quarters were at Castro Nuevo, and Sir David Baird's at Benavente, on the road to join him. Sir John was very desirous of obtaining the co-operation of the Marquis of Romana, who unluckily was beginning to retire on Galicia. This proceeded from the Spanish and English Commanders being independent, instead pf the one being subordinate to the other. Sir John Moore to the 3Iarquis de la Hoinana. "sir, Castro Nuevo, ISlh Dec. 1808. " I HAD the honour to receive, at Toro, on the 16th '' inst. your Excellency's letter of the 14th, delivered to me by your " Aid-de-camp, Mr. O'Niell. I have deferred to answer it until " I approached nearer to you, and until I knew what measures you " might propose to pursue, in consequence of the information I had " directed Sir David Baird to communicate to you. Upon a know- " ledge that Marshal Soult had a corps so near as Saldana and " Sahagun, which would soon be joined by another coming from " France under General Junot, I judged it expedient to make my ** junction with Sir David Baird in this neighbourhood, as speediest " done, rather than at Valladolid. I therefore marched from Ala- " ejos, on Toro, and yesterday came here; where I occupy rather '* an extended cantonment. My intention was to marcli towards '* Saldana and Sahagun, as soon as Sir David Baird's corps was come "forward; which I thought would either lead to an action with ** the corps under Marshal Soult, or induce him to retire. In either 142 *' case I expected to disembarrass you from a troublesome neigh- *' bour. In this operation I of course expected the co-operation of " such part of your corps, if not the ^^ hole, as was fit to mo^ e. " I received, upon my arrival here yesterday afternoon, a letter " from Sir David Baird, inclosing one whicli he had just received " from you, dated the 16th; in which you mention your intention " immediately to retreat, by Astorga and Villafranca, into the " Galicias. I beg to know whether this be still your Excellency's " determination, as it is one which must materially aftect mv move- " ments. I oSmti that I expected that your Excellency would have " left the road through the Galicias to Conuma open for the British " army, as it is that by which we must receive our supplies ; and bv " which, if obliged, we can alone retreat. I expected that your " Excellency, with the Spanish troops, would have entered the " Asturias, and have thus protected the left Hank of the commu- " nication on Corunna. I Mas the more induced to think that this " would have been vour mode of acting;, as it is stated in a paper papt fe given, I believe, by your Excellency to the British Government ; " and by ^hich they were induced to prefer the disembarkation of " their troops at Corunna, and the assembly of the British army in '' Leon. " As is was my wish, on coming here, to combine mv movements '' with those of the Spanish armv under vour command, I hope you " will have the goodness to communicate to me vour intentions. You " know the successes the French have met with, you know the forces *' they have in Spain, and you should be able to Judge better than " I can, what chance there is, after the recent defeats, of an army " being assembled in the South of Spain able to resist, or occupy " the attention of the French, sufficiently to oblige them to withhold ^' any considerable portion of their army from being sent against us. 143 " I have no accounts from Saragossa ; but it is reasonable to " suppose that it cannot hold out long- against a regular attack. " 1 had forgot to mention to you, that a Member of tlie Supreme *' Junta waited upon me at Toro, to request in the name of the Junta " that I should act in concert with your army. The Junta were at " Truxillo ; but have retired to St. Mary's, near to Cadiz. " I shall wait anxiously for your Excellency's ans\^er, and have the ** honour to be, " Sir, " Your most obedient, &c. " John Moore." The General continued his march on Villapando and Valderos. On the 20th December he reached Majorga ; and here he was joined by Sir David Baird, AA'ith the Guards and General Mannlngham's brigade. The British anny were now united ; and, independent of some small detatchments left to keep up the communications, it amounted to 23,000 infantry, and 2000 two or three hundred cavalry. The Head Quarters Avere at Majorga, but the cavalry and horse-artillery were advanced to Monastero Melgar Abaxo, within three leagues of Sahagun ; where it was iniderstood that near 70^^ "f the Enemy's cavalry were posted. The weather was extremely cold, and the ground covered with deep snow ; yet Lord Paget endeavoured to cut off this detachment. His Lordship marched at two o'clock in the morning, and sent Gene- ral Slade with the 10th hussars along the Cea to enter the Town; while he proceeded towards it in another direction, with the 15th- dragoons and horse-artilleiy. His Lordship approached the town at dawn, and' siuprised a pi- qiiiet : but two or three men escaped, and gave the alarm. He pushed 144 forward, and discovered the Enemy formed up, not far from the town. I'he two corps manoeuvred for some time, each endeavouring to gain the flank of its opponent. At first the ground was unfavourahle to Lord Paget ; particularly from the situation of a hollow. But by superior skill his Lordship surmounted this difficulty ; passed the hol- low, completely out- manoeuvred the Enemy, and charged them at a favourable moment ; for the French having wheeled into line, very injudiciously halted to receive the shock. But this they were un- equal to ; they were overthrown in a moment, and dispersed in every direction. Many of the French were killed ; and the prisoners amounted to 157, including two Lieutenant Colonels. The loss of the British was trifling. The 15th Regiment of Hussars, about 400 •strong, encountered in this action near /OO Fi'ench, and surpassed them both in skill and intrepidity. Sir John reached Sahagun in the morning of the 21st of Decem- ber, and established there his Head Quarters. As the soldiers had suffered a great deal from the forced marches (for the weather was severe, the roads were verv bad, and covered with snow} he halted a day, to enable them to recover. The follow ing letter was received this morning from the Marquis of Romana. The Marquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. " SIR, • Leon, le 19 Decembre, 1808. *' Je m'empresse de r^pondre a la lettre de V. E. de hier, " dat\'hat had been originally stated ; and the assistance that could be expected from these troops may be judged of from the report of Colonel Symes, Avho continued with the Marquis. In a letter from him dated Leon, December 22nd, lie says, " The troops here, although they cannot be relied on to influ- '* ence materiallY the result of a general action, yet may be brought " into use as aiLiiliaries, to engage the attention of a part of the " Enemy's force ; and, in the event of the Enemy being broken, may '' prove an active instrument to complete his destruction. When I " say this much, I say all that can possibly be expected from them, " under the present appearance." Early in the morning of the 23rd Sir John sent off the following- letter to the Marquis of Romana, signifying the movement he wished him to make. 15.9 Sir John Moore to the Marquis of Romana. " SIR, Sahagun, 23 December, 1808. " I HAD the honour to write to you yesterday ; and this " morning I received your Excellency's letter of the 21st. I shall " march this night to Carrion, where, I have reason to believe, " some of the Enemy are collected. To-morrow I shall march on " Saldana. If your Excellency would march from Mansilla, either " direct on Saldana, or pass the river a little above it, whilst I march " on from Carrion, I think it would distract the attention of the " Enemy, and considerably aid my attack. My march from Carrion " will probably be in the night. Any information of your movement " I shall thank you to address to me at Carrion, where I shall be at " day-light to-morrow. I enclose a letter and a printed paper, sent " to me by Mr. Frere, and which I received yesterday. " I have the honour to be, &;c. &c. " John Moore." Every arrangement A\'as now completed for the attack of the Enemy. The British were collected between Sahagun, Grahal, and Villada, consisting of twenty-five thousand four hundred men. The Ouke of Dalmatia, after the defeat of his cavalry at Sahagun, had withdrawn a detachment from Guarda, and concentrated his troops to the amount of eighteen thousand behind the river Carrion. Seven thousand were posted at Saldana, and five thousand at the town of Carrion ; and detachments were placed to guard the fords and bridges. It was also known that the head columns of Junot's corps (the 8th) were between Vittoria and Burgos.. Before this period, Sir John Moore had been able to establish many excellent channels of intelligence, upon which he fo\dd, in 160 ?ome nicasurc, depend. Expresses were continually arriving with reports of every important circumstance. He now answered Mr. Frere's last letters, and communicated to him his plan ; and it appears, from this letter, how just a view the General had of his situation. Sir John Moore to Mr. Frere. "■ SIR, Sahagun,2^dDec. 180S. " I HAD the honour to receive yesterday your lett' rs of ^' the 14th and 16th, with inclosures, which shall be forwarded by the " first opportunity. " As vou acknowledge only the receipt of my letter to you of the " 10th instant, I send you a duplicate of two letters which I addressed " to you on the 6th, and which I sent by a messenger who, perhaps, " was intercepted. " With respect to your letter, delivered to me at Toro by Mr. *' Stuart, I shall not remark upon it. It is in the style of the two " which were brought to me by Colonel Charmilly, and, consequently, " was answered by my letters of the 6th, of which I send you a du- " plicate : that subject is, I hope, at rest. " I am in communication Avith the Marquis de la Romana. I " march this night to Carrion, and the next day to Saldana, to at- *' tack the coi-ps under Marshal Soult f . * * * * * , * * * » * * * * * « * * # * * * » * * * * * * * ♦ ♦ * * * * * * * * * » * * * * " Buonaparte is dating his proclamations from Madrid; and as to " the British army, if it were in a neutral, or Enemy's country, it t Some remarks on the Spanish co-operation are omitted. 161 " could not be more completely left to itself. If the Spaniards are *' enthusiasts, or much interested in this cause, their conduct is the " most extraordinary that ever was exhibited. *' Tile movement I am making is of the most dangerous kind. I " not only risk to be surrounded every moment by superior forces, " but to have mv communication intercepted with the Galiclas. I " wish it to be apparent to the whole world, as it is to cvciy indivl- " dual of the armv, that we have done every thing in our power in *' support of the Spanish cause ; and that we do not abandon it, until *' long after the Spaniards had abandoned us. '* I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." The army AAcre now in complete preparation ; the disposition for an attack was made, and the Generals had received their instructions. But, in the course of this day, messenger after messenger brought unpleasant reports. Certain information Avas received, that a strong reinforcement had arrived at Carrion fi'om Palentia; and that a large quantity of provi- sions and foi*age were preparing in the villages in front of that town, A Courier next arrived from Los Santos, bringing information that the French corps, which was marching to the South, had been halted at Talavera : and several other messengers arrived, bringing reports that the Enemy were advancing from Madrid. Towards the evening an express arrived from the Marquis of Romana. 16^2 Du Marquis de la Romana a son Excellence Sir J. Moore, K. B. " SIR, '•Leon, 22 Decemhre, 1808. " Un Confident que j'ai sur la riviere Duero me donne " avis sous date de 18 courant, qu'on lui a assure que les Ennemis " qui se trouvoient a rEscurial ont fait un mouvement vers ce c6te-ci. " II m' ajoutoit que si la personne qui lui donnoit cet avis n' arrivoit " pas ce jour meme, il alloit lui de sa personne se transporter a Villa- " castin (douze lieues eloigne de Madrid) pour etre en observation " des deux cheinins, celui qui passe par Zamora, et I'autre qui va par *' Segovie. " Je m'empresse a donner eet avis a V. E. pour les mesures qu' elle *' jugera convenables a prendre. " J'ai I'honneur, &e. " Le Marquis de la Rojiana." Sir John Moore saw at once the import of the various intelligence he had received. He perceived that his movement and design were discovered by Buonaparte, who was now marching a superior force against him. This was what he had all along expected, and was pi'epared for. The forward march of the troops was instantly countermanded. Soon after a second note arrived from the Marquis. 1G3 Du Marquis de la Romana li son Eoocellence Sir J. Moore, K. J3. Mansilla 23 Dccembre SIRj a trois heurcsclu soi'r. " J'ai I'honneur de vous annoncer mou arrivee IcI avec les troupes " que je compte employer dans le niouvement avixiliaire. Je n'ai pu " tirer q'enviroii sept milles hommes d'infanterle, 120 chevaux, et " huit pieces d'artillerle. Les troupes sont cantonnees dans une clr • " conference a une lieue et quart de cette vllle en avant vers *' Saldanha, excepte un corps que j'ai envoye a trois lieues d'ici a un " villao'e nomme Villarmimio eloigne trois petites lieues de Cea. " J'attends vos rapports pour me mettre en mouvement, que je ne " ferai q'apres que V. E. m'aura coinmunique ses plans et ses inten- " tions. Je desirerais avoir une reponse positive pour expedier les '■' ordres de bonne heure au corps. " J'ai r honneur, &e. " Le Marquis de la Romana." An answer was instantly sent back. Sir John Moore to the Marquis of lioynana. " SIR, Sahagiin, 23(1 Dec. 180S. " I HAD tbe honour to receive your Excellency's letter " of the 22(1 this afternoon, and have to thank you for the informa- *' tion which it contains ; the probability of its truth is confirmed to " me, by information which reached me this morning, that a consi- ** derable quantity of provisions and forage had been ordered to be " prepared in the villages on this side of Palencia. I also know that *' the intended march of a corps of the French to Badajos has been ]6i " stopped, when its advanced guard had reached Talavera de la " Reina. " Your Excellency knows my object in marching in this direction, " was to endeavour to free you from a troublesome neighbour, and to " strike a blow at a corps of the Enemy, whilst it was still imagined " that the British troops had retreated into Portugal. I was aware " of the risk I ran, if I should be discovered, and the Enemy push on " a corps between me and my communication. " My movement has, in some degree, answered its object, as it " has drawn the Enemy from other projects, and will give the South " more time to prepai*e. With such a force as mine, I can pretend " to do no more. It would only be losing this army to Spain and to " England, to persevere in my mai-ch on Soult; who, if posted strongly, " might wait, or, if not, would retire and draw me on until the corps *' from Madrid got behind me : in short, single-handed, I cannot *' pretend to contend with the superior numbers the French can " brino- ao-ainst me. " I received your Excellency's letter at six, and the troops were to " have marched from this to Carrion at eight this evening. I coun- " temianded them, and shall take immediate measures for retiring " on Astorga. There I shall stand; as my retreat thence, if neces- " sary, Mall be secure. I shall be in the way to receive the supplies " and the reinforcements Mhlch I expect from England. At the " worst, I can maintain myself, and, with your Excellency's aid, " defend the Galicias, and give time for the formation of the armies " of the South, and that which you command to be prepared, when " a joint eifort may be made, which can alone be efficacious. It is " playing the Enemy's game to draw him to attack our armies in " rotation. " I hope this plan will meet your approbation ; you may rest ** assured that I shall not retreat a foot beyond what is necessary 16.5 *' to secure my supplies from being intercepted; and that I desire " nothing more than to meet the Enemy upon any thing hke equal " terms. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." " P. S. I had finished my letter, and ^vas writing one to Colonel " Symes, both of which I meant to dispatch to your Excellency in " the morning ; when I received your letter fi'om Mansilla of this " date. " Your Excellencv AA'ill see, that in consequence of tlie information *' contained in your letter of yesterday, I have countermanded my " march to Carrion. I am sensible of the zeal and activity your " Excellencv has displayed, in thus hastening to co-operate with me ; " but, for the reasons contained in the former part of this letter, I " believe the attempt no longer advisable. It will, however, be of *' use, and Avill blind the Enemy, should you continue with your " corps a few days at Mansilla. " You wW], of course, not mention my intentions of falling back. " If I am followed, I shall stop and offer battle ; and though you " should be at a distance, yet the knowledge that you are within " reach will distract his attention, and act as a diversion. " I shall be happy to hear again from you what are your intentions. '* I shall, I think, fall back on Benavente. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." It is now requisite to point out the plan which was adopted by Buonaparte. The particulars were disclosed by his movements; but exact information has also been obtained through Major Napier of the 50th regiment. This Officer at the battle of Corunna was stabbed In the body by a bayonet, and wounded in the head by a sword, yet he defended his life till quarter was promised him. When a prisoner 166 he was treated most handsomely by the Duke of Dahnatia. He dined with Marshal Ney fiequcntly, who as A\'ell as General La Borde, the Chief of I'Etat JNIajor, and other Officers of rank, frankly told him tlie design and sentiments of the Emperor. Wlien Buonaparte re- ceived intelligence that the British were moving to the Duero, he said, " Moore is the only General now fit to contend with me ; I " shall advance against him in person." Orders were then sent to the Duke of Dalmatia to give way, if at- tacked, and to decoy the British to Burgos, or as far Eastward as possible ; and at the same time to push on a corps towards Leon, on their left flank. And should they attempt to retreat, he was ordered to impede this by every means in his power. The corps on the road to Badajos was stopt, and ordered to proceed towards Sala- manca ; while he himself moved rapidly with all the disposable force at Madrid, and the Escurial, directly to Benavente. Neither Buona- parte nor any of his Generals had the least doubt of siirrounding the British with between 60 and 70,000 men before they could reach Galicia. Sir John Moore, as appears both by his letters and his conduct, saw clearly the whole of this plan : he had prepared for the danger ; cal- culated the time ; and has acquired the glory of being the first General who has frustrated Buonaparte. After having fully concerted the scheme of his retreat, he wrote again to the Marquis. Sh- John Moore to the Ma7'quis of Romana. '* SIR, Sahagun, Dec. 24th, 1808. " My information this morning states that the French " have received reinforcements. I shall begin my retreat to-morrow *' morning with a part of the Infantry ; the rest w iU follow with the 157 *' Cavalry the day after. It is of great importance to me, that voii " should keep a strong corps at ]\Iansilla, to defend the bridge there, '' whilst I march in two divisions on Valencia ai\d Benavente. The " corps which passes at Valencia will remain on the opposite side to *' guard the Ferry, until the corps which marches on Benavente has " passed the bridge at that place. Sir David Baird commands the^ " division vvhich goes to Valencia : I shall march with the other to " Benavente. My hopes are to cross the river Eslar before I am in- " terrupted : when once across, my communications with the Galicias " will be secure ; and, if pressed then, I shall have no olijection to " try an action. " I have thought it right to make this communication to your Ex- " cellency. You M'ill, I suppose, think it right when I am passed, " to order the boats upon the river to be destroyed. I have only to " repeat my ret^uest, that Astorga and its neighbourhood may be " left for the British troops, together with the passage into the Gali- " cias ; and not occupied by those under your Excellency's command. " You will find no inclination in me to abandon the Spanish cause ; " but, on the contrary, every desire to co-operate with you for the! *' general good. " I have the honour to be, &c. " John Moore." On the 24th of December Sir John Moore was silently, but busily occupied in preparing to retire ; which, in the presence of an enemy, is the most difficult of all military operations. But, to judge of it on this occasion, the Map of Spain with the relative positions of the French army, should be examined. The Duke of Dalmatia received strong reinforcements from the 22nd to the 24th ; so that his army alone was much superior to the British. It was posted behind the river Canion, between Can-ion and Saldana, 168 The Duke of Abrantes had advanced from Burgos to Paleiitia, and threatened the right flank of the British. Buonaparte pushed on the corps at the Escurial, and marclied from Madrid on the 18th in person, with an anny consisting of 32,000 in- fantry and 8000 cavalry-. The advanced -guard of this cavahy passed through Tordesillas on the 24th ; the same day the van of the British left Sahagun ; and both moved to the same point — Benavente. There was another corps on the road to Badajos commanded by the Duke of Dantzic : this had advanced to Talavera de la Reina ; and had pushed on as far as Arzo-Bispo, in pursuit of the Spanisli General Galuzo. This was likewise counter-marched, and Avas di- rected towards Salamanca. Even the division under the Duke of Trevise, which was proceeding to Saragossa, was stopt : and the long, meditated vengeance against that heroic city was defeiTed. In fine, the whole disposable force of the French army, forming an irregular crescent, was marching in radii with rapid steps to environ the British. To accomplish this favourite object, Buonaparte stopt his victorious career to the South, where there was nothing capable of resisting him. Lisbon and Cadiz would have yielded as easily as Madrid * ; and those must be sanguine indeed, who can believe that any further resistance would have been made by Spain. * In confirmation of this^ the following is an extract of a letter from a person in the confidence of Government, to Sir John Moore. " Seville, Jan. 10th, 1809. " Although the Jimta are daily pushed to induce them to give orders for " the advance of every thing South of Madrid towards the Capital, I do not ob- " serve that this measure appears hitherto to have taken up the attention of the " Enemy, who are steadily determined to attend to no other object until he shall " have measured his strength with your army : which is now certainly the only hope " of this country. For it is merely the time and breath they gain during this effort " of Buonaparte, which will enable them to bring together a force fit to continue *' the contest." 169 The bold measures, adopted by Sir John Moore, arrested the immediate subjugation of this country. It remains to be seen how he extricated his army from its perilous situation. The intelligence he had got was sufHciently founded to induce him to retire ; but he had not yet learned the whole amount of the force that was marching against liim, and was resolved not to be alarmed into a false step, nor retreat one step farther than was absolutely necessary. He wished to defend the Galicias, if possible. His first object was to pass the river Eslar without interruption. There are three routes across this river : the first is bv Mansilla, where there is a good bridge ; the second is by Valencia M'here there was only a ferry ; and the third is by Castro Gonsalo, where there is also a bridge ; this last road leads to Benavente. It aa as impossible to go by Mansilla, as the Marquis of Romana's troops \\'ere there, and the countiy was completely exhausted by them. There were great objections to the whole army attempting the passage by the ferry at Valencia : for the intelligence received was, that the river was rapidly increasing, so that the ford would pi'obably be too deep, and the boats were few. These circumstances would render the passage of the whole army very tedious at this point. And besides, an adequate supply of food could not be found ; nor could covering, which was necessary at this season, be had for the whole army on one route. It was, however, quite requisite to secui-e Valencia to stop the Enemy. Sir David Baird was, therefore, directed to take that route ; and it was resolved that the rest of the army should proceed by Castro Gonsalo. By this division of the anny also the magazines and stores, which were deposited at Benavente and Zamora, were effectually covered. The road by Leon was necessarily left to the troops of the Mar- quis of Romana : who, in consequence of the request of Sir John Moore to defend the passage of the river, left three thousand men z 170 there, and four pieces of cannon, and then retreated to Leon. He wrote a few lines to express a wish for a conference with Sir John Moore ; to which note the following answer was returned. Si?' John Moore to the iMarquis of Romana. '' SIR, Sahagun, Dec. 24, 1808. " I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of " this date. There is nothing I wish so much as to have a personal *' intei-view with you : but in the present situation of this army it " is impossible for me to leave it for a moment. Once across the " Eslar, and I will ride any distance to have the honour of meet- " ^^^g y^"- 1 shall remain here with the Cavalry until the after- " noon to-morrow, and shall leave them to join the division of the " Infantiy in the evening, which will be at Majorga. " If your Excellency can make it convenient to come there, you " will make me very happy : but if this be inconvenient, I shall go " to you when I reach Benavente. The French continue to receive " reinforcements. A considerable number arrived at Palencia this " mormng. " 1 have the honour to be, &c, *' John Moore." Two of the roads over the Eslar were thus occupied by the British and one by the Spanish army. But, as the latter was the nearest route to Astorga, it was of great importance that the Enemy should be retarded thei-e. The Bridge of Mansilla and the City of Leon, were points to defend : and the following letter from Col. Symes will shew the expectations that were held out of defending Leon. 171 Colonel Si/mes to Sir John Moore. "SIR, Mansilla, Dec. 25, 1808, One o' Clock. " I HAD the honour of your note early this morning, " and am fully aAvare of the necessity Avhich prevents a meeting be- " tween your Excellency and the Marquis, at present. The Mar- " quis, for reasons of the same nature, cannot leave his troops : " indeed, his presence is indispensibly requisite, for he has no second " to whom he can confide his charge. General Blake is at Leon. *' The Mai-quis says, that wherever else he may go, it is impossible " for him to send any part of his troops into the Asturias, as the " roads are now impassable ; the snow has fallen in vmusual quantity. " The Marquis's idea seems to be that of retiring on Astoi'ga, but not *' precipitately : to put Leon in the best possible state of defence, and " to leave there 2000 men and some guns. These troops, when added " to the armed inhabitants and the volunteers who are armed and under " a sort of training, may impede the progress of an Enemy — give " him much trouble, and afford protection to your left flank. The " Volunteers of Leon, including the students, are estimated at from " 12 to 1500 men; the rabble are numerous. " The City of Leon is very extensive ; it is surrounded by a high " wall, in some places ruinous. There are old Moorish Towers at " irregular distances ; several gateways without gates, but a little " trouble may repair the chasms, and blockade the gateways. The " suburbs embrace the wall, which, in some parts, forms a back for " long rows of mean houses. The city is not commanded — there is " some rising ground about a mile and a half distant, to the East and *' North ; excepting this, the country seems to be an uninterrupted 172 " plain for many miles. Between Leon and Astorga it is a continued " flat, without enclosure or obstacle to oppose the advance of troops " from any direction. Leon, if disputed vigorously, may prove very " embarrassing to the Enemy, and it is a kind of warfare for which " the Spaniards seem adapted. The Marquis appears rather dis- " posed to risk a general action ; but he says, what is too true, that " his army, in effect, is no army. He thinks that his artillery \vill *' be well served — it may be so, but I doubt. Two howitzers and " eighteen field-pieces compose the number of guns ^vith us. We " move to Leon to-day. The Marquis communicates to your Excel- " lency the intelligence he has received. Mansilla is not capable of " defence ; and breaking the bridge, the Marquis thinks, will not be " any material obstacle to the Enemy. In the present state of the " weather I think it would impede his progress. " I am. Sir, with gi-eat respect, " Your faithful humble servant, " M. Symes." According to the arrangement which was made. General Eraser, followed by General Hope, marched with their divisions on the 24th of December to Valderos and Majorga ; and Sir David Baird pro- ceeded with his to Valencia. To conceal this movement Lord Paget was ordered to push on strong patroles of Cavahy close to the ad- vanced posts of the Enemy. The reserve, with two light corps, did not retire from Sahagun till the morning of the 25th ; they followed General Hope. Lord Paget was ordered to remain with the cavalry until the evening, and then follow the reserve. Sir John accompanied these last corps. The. retreat commenced in this deliberate manner. On the 26th of December Sir David Baird reached the Eslar, and passed the feiTy with less difficulty than was expected. He took post, according to his orders, at Valencia, and wrote to the Marquis of Romana urging him to blow up the bridge of Mansilla. 173 The other divisions of Infantry proceeded unmolested to Castro Gonsalo. On the 24th of Decemher the advanced guard of Buonaparte's army marched from Tordesillas, which is a hundred and twenty miles from Madrid, and fifty from Benavente ; and strong detachments of Cavalry had been pushed forward to Villalpando and Majorga. On the 26th Lord Paget fell in -with one of those detachments at the lat- ter place. His Lerdship immediately ordered Colonel Leigh, vnth two squadrons of the 10th Hussars, to attack this corps, which had halted on the summit of a steep hill. One of Colonel Leigh's squa- drons Mas kept in reserve ; the other rode briskly up the hill : on approaching the top, where the ground was rugged, the Colonel judi- ciously reined-in to refresh the horses, though exposed to a severe fire from the Enemy. When he had nearly gained the summit, and the horses had recovered their breath, he charged boldly and over- threw the Enemy : many of whom Avere killed and wounded, and above a hundred surrendered prisoners. Nothing could exceed the coolness and gallantry displayed by the British Cavalry on this occasion. The 18th Dragoons had signalized themselves in several former skirmishes ; they were successful in six different attacks. Captain Jones, when at Palencia, had even ven- tured to charge a hundred French Dragoons with only thirty British ; fourteen of the Enemy were killed, and six taken prisoners. The cavalry, the horse-artilleiy, and a light corps remained on the niffht of the 26th at Castro Gonsalo ; and the divisions under Gene- rals Hope and Eraser marched to Benavente. On the 27th the rear-guard crossed the Eslar, and followed the same route, after completely blowing up the bridge. It now becomes requisite to make a very painful confession. The army, which, during the advance, had been distinguished for regu- larity and good conduct, began to display on the retreat a very oppo- 174 site behaviour. This may in part be imputed to inattention in the Spanish Magistrates ; who, instead of exerting themselves to procure lodgings and necessaries for the troops, sometimes fled or hid them- selves. But another cause of these disorders was, undoubtedly, the independent character of Britons ; who always submit to military dis- cipline with great reluctance. They were indignant at the little as- sistance afforded them by the Spaniards ; and took the opportunity which the retreat afforded them, of throwing off restraint, of display- ing their native humours, and of acting too much as they pleased. But, whatever was the cause, the General was most desirous to stop this misconduct ; both from humanity to the Spaniards, and for the safety of his own army. He, therefore, issued out the following order. " General Orders. Head Quarters, Benavente, 11th Dec. " The Commander of the Forces has observed with con- " cern, the extreme bad conduct of the troops at a moment when " they are about to come into contact with the Enemy, and when the " greatest regularity and the best conduct are the most requisite. He *' is the more concerned at this, as, until lately, the behaviour of that *' part of the army, at least, which was under his own immediate com- " mand, was exemplaiy, and did them much honour. " The misbehaviour of the troops in the column which marched by " Valderas to this place, exceeds what he could have believed of Bri- " tish soldiers. It is disgraceful to the Officers ; as it strongly marks " their negligence and inattention. " The Commander of the Forces refers to the General Orders of the '* 15th of October, and of the 11th of November. He desires that " they may be again read at the head of every company of the army : 175 " he can add nothing but his determination to execute them to the " fullest extent. He can feel no mercy towards Officers who neglect " in times like these essential duties, or towards Soldiers who injure " the country they are sent to protect. The Spanish Forces have " been overpowered; and until such time as they are re-assembled, " and ready again to come forward, the situation of the army must be " arduous, and such as to call for the exertion of qualities the most " rare and valuable in a military body. These are not bravery alone, " but patience and constancy under fatigue and hardship, obedience " to command, sobriety, firmness, and resolution, in every different " situation in which they may be placed. It is by the display of such " qualities alone, that the army can expect to deserve the name of " Soldiers ; that they can be able to withstand the forces opposed to " them, or to fulfil the expectations of their Country. " It is impossible for the General to explain to his army the motive " for the movement he dii-ects. The Commander of the Forces can, " however, assure the army that he has made none since he left Sala- *' manca which he did not foresee, and was not prepared for; and, " as far as he is a judge, they have answered the purposes for which " they were intended. " When it is proper to fight a battle he will do it ; and he will " choose the time and place he thinks most fit : in the mean time he " begs the Officers and Soldiers of the army to attend diligently to " discharge their parts, and to leave to him and to the General Officers " the decision of measures which belong to them alone. " The army may rest assured, that there is nothing he has more at *' heart than their honour — and that of their Country." The latter part of the above order alluded to a number of Officers having been indiscreetly free in their criticisms of the Military opera- tions. This licence Is characteristic of EngUshmen : but in the pre- 176 sent situation of the army it had a most mischievous tendency. Be- sides, as Sir John Moore kept all his intelligence extremely secret, it was impossible for the officers to judge of the propriety of the movements. Sir John Moore endeavoured to remove one of the causes of the iri-egular conduct by this letter to the Marquis. Sir John 3Ioore to the Marquis of Romana. " SiK, Be)iavente,2inec.\?>0i. " I HAD the honour to receive yesterday, on my arri- " val here, your Excellency's letter from Mansilla, of the 25th, " The Enemy are advancing; but I believe their main body only " reached Valladolid yesterday. The movement I made to Sahagun *' has answered every purpose I had a right to expect. A little more " good fortune w^ould have enabled me to cut up Soult's corps ; but " the attention of the Enemy has at last been attracted from other " objects. His march on Badajos has been stopped, and the forces " in the South will have time to be formed, and to come forward. " I shall continue my movement on Astorga. It is there, or behind " it, we should fight a battle, if at all. If the Enemy follows so far, *' he will leave himself the more open to the efforts of the South. " My opinion is, that a battle is the game of Buonaparte, not our's. " We should, if followed, take defensive positions in the mountains, " where his cavalry can be of no use to him ; and there either engage " him in an unequal contest with us, oblige him to employ a consi- " derable corps to watch us, or to retire upon Madrid: in which last " case we should again come forth into the plain. In this manner " we give time for the arrival of reinforcements from England, — " your army to be formed and equipped, — and that of the South to " come forth. In short, i. j^ame of Spain and of England, *' which must always be the same, is to procrastinate and 'to gain " time ; and not, if it can be helped, to place the whole stake upon " the hazard of a battle. " The people of this part of Spain seem to be less well-disposed " than those I have hitherto met with. They perhaps think that we *' mean to abandon them. It would have a good effect if you ex- " plained to them, in a proclamation, that this was by no means " either your intention, or that of the British army ; and call upon " the Alcaides and Corregidors to remain at their posts, and to be of " all the use in their power to the different armies both Spanish and " British. Some of them of late have run away from the towns ; " which has been the unavoidable cause of irregularities having been " committed by the troops; for, when the Magistrates are not present " to give regularly, the soldier must take, and this produces a mls- *' chievous habit. " 1 have the honour to be, &:c. " John Moore." During the march to Benavente a confidential person, whose Intelligence had always been correct, came up with the General at Fuentes. He had passed Buonaparte and his army, Avho were mak- ing forced marches to overtake the British. And it appeared from several accounts, that, in contradiction to the declai'ations and information so repeatedly transmitted from the Central Junta and Mr. Fi'ere, not the slightest movement was made by the Spanish armies ; who permitted the various divisions of the Enemy's army to traverse Spain, in every direction, with as much tranquillity as France ; with this essential difference, that the Spaniards furnished them with every supply for nothing, m hereas in France they must have paid for what they Avanted. A A 178 Notwithstanding this unfavourable intelligence, Sir John Moore had still some expectations of being able to maintain a footing in Spain *. He hoped that the Spaniards, after all their declarations and promises, would rouse themselves to make some effort ; and per- haps \^'ant of provisions for so large an army might stop the advance of the French. It was his earnest wish to maintain himself in the mountains of Galicia ; and not to retire to the coast, unless compelled by great superiority of numbers. There are two roads to Vigo ; but that by Orense, though the shortest, is neither practicable for artillery, nor for any species of wago-on ; consequently the British army took the road by Astorga ; and orders were now sent to Sir David Baird, who was still at Valentia, to march to that point ; while on the 28th of December Generals Hope and Fraser proceeded with their divisions to La Banessa. Next morning, at day-break, after near two days' rest. Sir John Moore followed with the reserve ; and Lord Paget, as before, was ordered to bring up the rear with the cavalry. But at nine o'clock in the morning, before his Lordship had moved, some of the Enemy's cavalry were observed trying a ford near the bridge ^^•hich had been blown up ; and presently between five and six hundred of the Imperial Guards of Buonaparte plunged into the river, and crossed over. They were immediately opposed by the British piquets, who had been much divided to watch the different fords ; but were quickly assembled by Colonel Otway. When united they amounted only to two hundred and twenty men. They retired slowly before such superior numbers, bravely disputing every inch of groxmd with the Enemy. The front squadrons repeatedly charged each other ; and * Vide Appendix, E E. 179 upon the piquets being reinforced by a small party of the 3d Diagoons, they charged Avith so much fury that the front squadron broke through, and was for a short time surrounded, by the Enemy's rear squadron wheeling up. But they extricated themselves, by charging back again through the Enemy. They then quickly rallied, and formed with the rest of the piquets. Lord Paget soon reached the field : and Brigadier-general Stuart, at the head of the piquets, was sharply engaged, the squadrons on both sides sometimes intermixing. His Lordship was desirous of drawing on the Enemy farther from the ford, till the 10th Hussars, who were forming at some distance, were ready, lliis regiment soon arrived, and Lord Paget immediately wheeled it into line, in the rear of the piquets. The latter then charged the Enemy, sup- ported by the 10th Hussars. But before they could close, the French wheeled round, fled to the ford, and plunged into the river. They were closely pursued, and left on the field fifty-five killed and wounded and seventy prisoners ; among whom was General Le Febvre, the Commander of the Imperial Guard. As soon as the Enemy reached the opposite side of the river they formed on the bank ; but a few rounds from the Horse artillery, who arrived at that moment, quickly drove the French up the hill in the greatest disorder. The Imperial Guards shewed themselves much superior to any cavalry which the British had before engaged. They fought very gallantly, and killed and wounded near fifty of our Dragoons. Major Bagwell, who commanded some of the piquets, was wounded. It was learnt from the prisoners that Buonaparte slept the night before (on the 28th) at Villalpando, which is four leagues from Benavente. He had commanded General Le Febvre to pass the Eslar if possible, but not to commit himself; and it was expected that he. would have been joined on the march by a Polish regiment; which, 180 however, lUd not come up in time. Le Febvre owned to Sir John IMoore, that when he saw nothing but the cavalry piquets, he con- cluded that all the rest of the army had left Benavente. This in- duced him to cross the river ; and, when once over, he could not, he said, without fighting, reti'cat with such a corps as he com- manded, with men who had put to flight thirty thousand Russians at Austerlitz. As the soldier to whom he had surrendered had taken from him his sword, the General presented him with a fine East-Indian sabre. Towards the evening theEneiny brought up some field-pieces, and cannonaded the piquets from the heights on the opposite side of the river ; but without the least effect. Lord Paget drew off the Cavali-y at night, and followed the Reserve to La Banessa. As the intelligence and circumstances were still not so decisive as to enable Sir John Moore to determine whether he should in the last resource retire upon Vigo or Corunna, it was of importance that he should retain the power of choosing that port which would best suit his pm'poses. He, therefore, found it neces- sary to detach a light corps on the road to Orense, which is the shortest route to Vigo ; foreseeing, that if he neglected this precau- tion, the Enemy might seize the I'oad by one of their light detach- ments, precede the columns of the British by forced marches, and deprive them of the choice of Vigo ; or, by seizing some of the passes in front, retard and embarrass the retreat exceedingly. Besides these strong motives, provisions had become extremely deficient, and it was doubtful if the whole army could be tolerably subsisted on one road. For these reasons General Craufurd was detached, with three thousand men lightly equipped, on the road to Orense. If pm'sued, he could take up a strong position behind the river Minho, and there check for some time the advance of the French. 181 The rest of the army proceeded to Astorga ; and Sir David Baird's column, coming from Valencia, again united there with Sir John Moore ; who was extremely disconcerted to find that the town was preoccupied, and filled with the troops of the Marquis of Romana. This General did not destroy the bridge of Mansilla, as had been requested. The guard he left there was charged by a party of Soult's cavalry ; and the Spaniards fled, or surrendered themselves prisoners. The Duke of Dalmatia then advanced on this road to Leon ; which City, instead of making the obstinate defence that was ex- pected, opened its gates at once to the Enemy, and furnished them with as many rations as they required. Thus was Sir John Moore perpetually disappointed in every assist- ance that was expected from the Spaniards. He had repeatedly requested the Marquis of Romana to leave the roads to Galicia clear for the British ; and wished the Marquis to fall back upon the Asturias ; because, when the Enemy proceeded towards Galicia, this Spanish army might have interrupted the French convoys, or com- pelled them to employ large detachments for their protection. In the Asturias they could certainly be eminently useful, and quite safe. But all remonstrances were in vain ; the Marquis entertained a dif- ferent opinion, and resolved to push across to Orense, in front of the British. Thus the Spanish army, instead of being of the slightest utility to the English, by consuming the provisions, and filling the roads with their mules and carts, were a most serious impediment. The appearance of this army was extremely melancholy : it was ill armed, WTetchedly clothed, and very sickly. But no reproach ought to be thrown upon these troops for the little resistance they made : their native courage is undoubted ; and they endui'ed the most cruel privations with the utmost patience. But their deplor- 182 able, almost famished condition, and the total want of officers, would have disheartened the bravest people. Astorga was one of the depots which had been formed for warlike stores, M'ith the view of offensive operations in conjunction with the Spanish armies ; which gave an opportunity of supplying the Mar- quis's troops with musquets, and as much ammunition as they could carry off. The rest was necessarily destroyed. The corps under Sir David Baird had brought their camp equipage from Corunna to Astorga, and had deposited it there. But this was no country for such conveniences : there were no means of removing it, and the whole was ordered to be consumed. Many officers had brought along with them a considerable quantity of baggage, and the overloaded mules fell behind. But the General would not suffer a soldier to be detained by the baggage ; and gave strict orders, that every horse or mule that could not keep up with the columns should be abandoned. Being most anxious for the good conduct of the Troops, he issued the following encouraging order. " General Orders. " Head Quarters, Astorga, 30th Dec. 1 808. " The present is a moment when the Army is neces- " sarily called upon to make great efforts, and to submit to pri- *' vations, the bearing cheerfully with which is a quality not less " estimable than valour. " The good-will of the inhabitants wiU be particularly useful to " the Army, and can only be obtained by good conduct on the part " of the Troops. " The Commander of the Forces cannot impress too strongly on " the whole Army the necessity of this ; and he trusts that the 183 " Generals and the Commanding Officers will adopt such measures, " both on the march and in the cantonments, as will ensure it. " It is very probable that the Army will shortly have to meet the " Enemy ; and the Commander of the Forces has no doubt that they " will eagerly imitate the worthy example which has been set them " by the Cavahy, on several recent occasions, and particularly in the " affair of yesterday ; in which Brigadier-general Stuart, with an " inferior force, charged and overthrew one of the best corps of " Cavahy in the French Army. *' The Generals will immediately inspect the baggage of the bri- " gades and divisions. They are held responsible that it does not *' exceed the proportion fixed by the General Orders." It is known that Buonaparte had fully expected to have reached Benavente as soon as, or before, the British ; and the Duke of Dal- matia hoped, that they would be so much retarded by Buonaparte's attacks, that he might, by forced marches through Leon, precede them at Astorga. The little resistance made by the Spaniards at Mansilla, and the immediate submission of Leon, facilitated this plan. Had either been in time, the British would have been sur- rounded. But Buonaparte was anticipated in both his projects; and, while a part of his cavalry was repulsed by Lord Paget, the van of the British Army, under General Fraser, entered and secured Astorga. The advanced guard, and the main body of the British Army, on the 30th of December, moved on to Villa Franca ; and Sir John Moore, with General Paget and the reserve, followed on the 31st. They marched to Camberos that evening ; and the cavalry followed at night. The piquets on the road from La Beneza, who were posted to watch Buonaparte's cavalry, and those at the bridge at Orljigo to attend to Soult's, retired as the Enemy advanced. The cavalry reached Camberos at midnight ; when immediately the reserve pro- 184 ceeded, and arrived next morning (Jan. 1) at Bembydre, precisely as the preceding divisions were marching ofif to Villa Franca. The scene of drunkenness that presented itself here was disgusting. The stragglers from the preceding divisions so crowded the houses, that there n as hardly accommodation for the reserve : while groups of the half-naked and unfortunate peasants belonging to the Mar- quis of Romana completed the confusion. The Marquis was moving towards Orense ; but his ti'oops were dispersed in all directions, fill- ing the neighbouring towns. The French were following so close, that their patroles, during the night, fell in with the cavalry piquets. When Buonaparte reached Astorga he was joined by the Duke of Dalmatia. The whole Armv that was assembled there amounted to near 70,000 men, independently of other corps, which were countermanded fi'om their former destination, though not yet come up. It is natural to imagine that a man so accustomed to succeed in all his plans must have been bitterly disappointed to find that, notwithstanding his ex- ertions, the British Mere beyond his reach. He here reviewed this immense force ; and perceiving, by the masterly arrangements of his Enemy, that it Avas no longer possible to intercept him, he halted to watch the event. Three Marshals of France, with as many di- visions, were commanded to follow the British closely, and to destroy them, either before or during their embarkation. And some other corps followed those divisions, to support them. Although the Enemy had hitherto been completely frustrated, yet a multitude of severe distiesses were now accumulating upon the British, %\hich the pnidence of their Leader could not avert. Deluges of cold rain fell, chilling and drenching the soldiers, who were wading in bad roads deep AA-ith mud. It was often difficult to procure shelter when they halted ; or fuel to dry their clothes, or to dress their food. The proA isions were often scanty, and irregularly procured; for the baggage. 18i .J magazines, and stores, were transported on carts, drawn chiefly by Spanish mules and bullocks ; but the drivers, terrified by the approach and attacks of the French cavalry, often ran away in the night- time, leaving their waggons ; persuaded, that if thev fell into the hands of the French they would be massacred. The bullocks and mules, unfortunately, could not be made to move, except by the native drivers. Thus provisions and stores were frequently obliged to be destroyed, to prevent their falling into the possession of the Enemy; and, for the same reason, the weak, the sick, and the wounded, were necessarily left behind. Truth makes it necessary to mention, that the inhabitants of Spain gaA'e little aid to their persevering Allies, who were encountering every evil for them, and made no attempt to annoy, or to retard the Enemy. Had the armed Spaniards harassed the flanks and rear of the French Army, they might, with little danger to themselves, have retarded their advance, and diminished their numbers ; instead of which, they never fired a musket at a Frenchman ; and often fled from their houses at the approach of the English ; barring their doors, and carrying off mules, carts, oxen, forage, and provisions ; in short, whatever could lessen the distresses, or contribute to the comfort of their friends. This conduct on the part of the Spaniards excited much animosity in the breasts of the English, and was the cause of many disorders. But I have no doubt that the passive conduct of the peasantry was OAving to their rulers never organising them, nor leading them forward. Sir John Moore always entertained this opi- nion. In his Journal and letters he praises the people, and depre- cates the apathy and weakness of their Chiefs ; for he was not aware that there were traitors among them, who paralysed the Nation. It has been mentioned, that, on the 1st of January, the General found the little town of Bembydre filled Avith stragglers of the pre- ceding divisions. And when he marched with the reserve and the B B 186 cavalry to Villafranca on the morning of the 2nd, he left Colonel Ross with the 20th regiment, and a small detachment of cavalry, to cover the town, while parties were sent to warn the stragglers, amounting io near a thousand men, of their danger, and to drive them, ifpossililo. out of the houses. Some few Avere prevailed upon to move on ; but neither threats, nor the approach of the Enemy, could induce the greater number to quit the houses. At length the rear-guard \A'as compelled to march and leave these senseless people to their fate : yet a small detachment of cavalry covered the whole, and only quitted the town on the approach of the Enemy : then, from the immediate danger, the road was filled with Spanish and British stragglers (armed and unarmed), mules, carts, women and children, all mingled in strange confusion. Four or five scpiadrons of French Cavalry were seen moving from Bembydre, their advanced-guard firing at a patrole of the 15th Hus- sars. On their approach the detachment in the rear was compelled to retire, and Mere closely pursued for several miles. As the French dragoons galloped through tlie long line of stragglers, they slashed them with their swords mercilessly to the right and left : and these men were so insensible from liquor, as neither to make resistance nor get out of the road. The pursuit continued till checked by General Paget with the reserve, who repulsed them. The reserve halted at Cacabelos, and the greatest part of the cavalry at Villafranca. On arriving at this town the General heard with Vexation, that great iiregularities had also been committed there by the preceding divisions. The Commissaries reported that the Maga- zines had been plundered, stores of wine had been broke open, and a great quantity of forage and provisions spoiled. One man who was detected in committing these atrocities was made an example of, in the hope of preventing such crimes in future : and, to convince the soldiers of the miserable consequences of their drunkeimess, and of 187 quitting their corps, some of those stnigg'lers who had been shockingly mangled by the cavah'y, were shewn through the ranks. Thus every measure was adopted that prudence could devise, to put a stop to this bad conduct. On the 3rd of January four or five thousand French cavalry ^^•erc seen (at one o'clock in the forenoon) advancing cautiously within a league of Cacabelos. Tlie 95th and a detachment of British cavalry occupied a hill about half a league in front of the town, through which a shallow river ran, and part of the reserve was posted on the opposite baidv. Sir John Moore commanded the 95th to retire through the town and over a bridge. But while the two rear companies were passing along a narrow street, the cavalry piquet retreated precipitately through tiiem, and the Enemy's cavalry pursued so closely that some few soldiers of the 95th were made prisoners. The Enemy's dis- mounted chasseurs immediately advanced rapidly, crossed the river in great force, and attacked the 95th, the cavalry joining in the onset. The 95th were directed to reti-eat up some hills among vineyards ; which they did slowly in a very gallant manner, galling the Enemy with a well-aimed fire from their lifles. The French cavalry charged up the road, but were driven l)aclc with considerable slaughter by the 95th. General Colbert, who commanded the Jidvanced-guard of the French, was among the slain. A large column of the Enemy ^\ere next observed descending the hill on the opposite side of the river. Immediately the artillery at- tached to the reserve opened upon this column a severe fire, whicli stopt their movement. In this attack the Enemy suft'ered much. Sir John Moore towards the evening \\ ithdrew the reserve to Villa- franca; and being aware that the greater part of the Enemy's army were very near, he resolved to make a night march to Ilerrorias. 188 The country now being inclosed and mountainous, the cavah-y were sent on before to Lugo ; the reserve did not quit Villafranca till ten o'clock at night, and arrived at Herrerias at midnight. The Genei'al here received a favourable description of the groinid in front of Lugo ; and as he perceived that the Enemy were pressing hard upon him, he conceived that it would be more advantageous to fight them there, than to suffer his troops to be continually harassed on the march. He therefore came to the determination to offer battle at Luffo ; and wrote dispatches to Sir David, who was far in front, to halt there. He inclosed in the packet letters to be forwarded, with similar orders, to Generals Hope and Fraser who commanded the advanced divisions. This dispatch being of the utmost importance. Sir John Moore sent it by his Aid-de-Camp (Captain Napier), accompanied by an orderly dragoon. Capt. Napier reached Nogales, and delivered it with the inclosures to Sir David Baird, who forwarded them to the respective officers. The orderly dragoon who was entrusted with these last let- ters got drunk on the road, and lost them. By this luilucky accident General Fraser, M'ith his di^•ision, pro- ceeded a full day's journey towards Vigo, the original destination, and was countermarched next day. The weather was dreadful ; so that this division instead of comfortably resting these two days at Lugo, as Mas intended, were excessively harassed, and lost many men from fatigue. Accounts were this day (January 4th) received from Engineers, and others, respecting Vigo and Corunna. The report respect- ing the peninsula of Betanzos was the most favourable ; and as Vigo was three long marches more distant, Sir John Moore deter- mined to retreat towards Corunna, in pi'eference to Vigo. He sent off immediately two expresses, by different routes, to Rear-Admi- 1^9 ral Sir tSumuel Hood, to I•cqllc^t he would scud round the transports to Corunna. To this place letters were likewise sent, that provisions might be forwarded, and preparations made \'ov the reception of the troops. While the reserve were niarcliing towards Nogtiles, they found Ijetween thirty and forty waggons with stores for the Marquis of Ro- mana's army. These waggons were filled with arms, ammunition, shoes, and clothing from England : for bv the arrangement that tlic Spaniards observed, their army m as left destitute of every neeessars . and abundant supplies were now moving on the road — precisely at the time the French were advancing. No stronger presumptive proof could be brought of treason having deeply pervaded the Spanish councils. There were no means of carrvina: back these stores ; some of the shoes, and such things as could be made use of, were distributed to the troops as they passed, and the rest were destroyed. On a hill above Nogales there were some artillery waggons be- longing to the Spaniai-ds which had been abandoned : and two sol- diers and a woman, who had drunk to excess, were lying dead in the snow. This was a shocking scene. The reserve reached Nogales in the afternoon, and here Sir John learnt the provoking loss of his dis- patch, and the march of General Fraser's division on the Vigo road. On the morning of the 5th of January the reserve left Nogales ; the Enemy entering the town soon after the rear quitted it. There was a bridge here, which for want of a sufficiency of proper tools was not completely destroyed ; but this was of little importance as the river was fordable. There were some Officers who criticised, occa- sionally, the operations that were adopted, in a manner injurious to the service; and this subject of blowing up bridges was one of those upon which they chiefly dwelt. General Paget at length mentioned this to Sir John Moore, and pressed him to destroy more bridges. i90 Sir John, in answer, requested him to look around and examine with him more particularly the nature of the rivers over which these bridges were thrown. He pointed out to him, that botli infantry and cavalry could xisually pass a little above or below the bridge : and that the obsti'uction to artillei-y Wt>uld be quickly repaired by an army constituted like the French. That it must likewise l)e recol- lected, that the destruction of these strong bridges could not be soon effected ; and that the troops must halt duinng that time. So that when this loss was deducted, it would be found that the advantage was much less considerable than was imagined. Whenever any important advantage could arise from blowing up a bridge, he thought it cer- tainly should be done : but he was persuaded that General Paget would agree with him, that when the advantage was less, it was a ci'uel measure to do such lasting mischief to those allies we came to benefit, as to ruin, for a length of time, the communications of their country. This was the defence that Sir John Moore made, for what some, perhaps, thought a neglect; but which increased General Paget's esteem for his friend and commander. The Rifle Corps, which always marched with the reserve, covered the rear ; and the Enemy being close at hand it was engaged nearly the whole of this day. In such circumstances it was impossible to suffer any thing to retard the march of the column : whatever could not keep up was tlierefore destroyed. There were even two carts with dollars to the amount of five and twenty thousand pounds, which fell behind. This money had been brought forward fionl Corunna with Sir David Baird's corps, and was under the charge of Mr. Courtney belonging to the Paymaster- general's department. The means provided for its conveyance were insufficient ; for the carts were drawn by tardy bullocks who were quite exhausted by fatigue, and could not be got on. After every 19,1 effort was made in vain, the casks were at length rolled down a pre- cipice on tiie side of the road, and the advanced-guard of tl\e French passed the place in five minutes afterwards, it was afterwards learnt by some prisoners, that this money was found bv the Spanish peasants. There is a hill alcove Const Mitino, and the General feared that in descending the column would be severely annoyed. To protect it he halted the Rifle Corps and Horse Artillerv at the top of the hill ; and as the road was winding and exposed, their position ^\■as good. In the mean time the remainder of the reserve retired over the hill. The Enemy perceiving that if they advanced they would be saluted with the guns, halted their column for more than half an hour behind another hill : and, as soon as the rear of the reserve had nearly reached the bridge of Constantino, and were in safety, the Artillery and Rifle Corps suddenly retired also, and the whole passed over without loss. Upon this occasion the Enemy acted with excess of caution, but afterwards poured down the hill. General Paget was then ordered to defend the bridge and the banks of the river, with the 28th and 95th; while Sir John Moore drew up the 52nd, 20th, and 91st regi- ments on a strong position on the top of a hill near the river : the Horse-artillery were likewise well posted. This position was hardly taken when the attack commenced. The Enemy's cavalry and dis- mounted chasseurs attempted to pass the bridge, but the well-directed fire of the artillery and of the rear-guard drove them quickly back. They repeatedly advanced, for the skirmishing continued till night, the Enemy's numbers always augmenting ; but General Paget main- tained the bridge, and preserved his position At eleven at night General Paget received orders to retire to Lugo, Mhlle the remainder of the reserve were under arms to protect him. The reserve were much fatigued by their exertions, and were quartered near Lugo. The following Order was issued next day. 192 General Orders. " Head Quarters, Lugo, e,th January, 1809. " Generals and Commanding Officers of Corps must be as sensible as the Commander of the Forces, of the complete disorga- nization of the army. " The advanced-guard of the French is already close to us, and it is to be presumed that the main body is not far distant ; an action mav, therefore, be hourly expected. If the Generals and Command- ing Officers of Regiments (feeling for the honour of their country and of the British arms} wish to give the army a fair chance of success, they will exert themselves to restore order and discipline in the regiments, brigades, and di\isions which they command. " The Commander of the Forces is tired of giving Orders which d.re never attended to : he therefore appeals to the honour and feel- ings of the Army he commands ; and if those are not sufficient to induce them to do their duty, he must despair of succeeding by any other means. He was forced to oi'der one soldier to be shot at Villafranca, and he Avill order all others to be executed who are guilty of similar enormities : but he considers that there would be no occasion to proceed to such extremities if the Officers did their duty : as it is chiefly from their negligence, and from the Mant of proper regulations in the regiments, that crimes and irregularities are committed, in quarters and upon the march." The remarks in this Order are extremely severe ; but this was not a moment to employ flattery. It was undoubtedly right to adopt what- ever measure would succeed best to restore order ; and it was expected that the appeal to the honour of the Officers was most likely to stunu- J.9J late them to make evei-y exertion. N'n(ari/ \S, 1809. " By the much-lamented death of Lieutenant- " General Sir John Moore, who fell in action with the Enemy on <' the 16th instant, it has become my duty to acquaint your Lord- " ship, that the French army attacked the British troops In the posi- '' tlon they occupied In front of Corunna, at about two o'clock in the " afternoon of that day. " A severe v\ound, which compelled me to quit the field a short *' time previous to the fall of Sir John Moore, obliges me to refer " your Lordship for the particulars of the action, which was long " and obstinately contested, to the inclosed report of Lleutenant- " General Hope, who succeeded to the command of the araiy, and *' to whose ability and exertions in direction of the ardent zeal and " unconquerable valour of his Majesty's troops, is to be attributed, " under Providence, the success of the day, which terminated In the ^' complete and entire repulse and defeat of the Enemy at every point " of attack. 228 •' The Honourable Captain Gordon, my Aide-de-Camp, will have '* the honour of delivenng this dispatch, and will be able to give *' your Lordship any further information which may be required. " I have the honour to be, &c. " D. BairDj Lieut.-Gen. •'* Right Hon. Lord Viscount Castlereagh. ff His Majesty s Ship Audacious, off Corunna, SIR, January 18, 1809. " In compliance with the desire contained in your " communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I " have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences of the " action which took place in front of Coninna on the 16th instant. *' It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of *' that day the Enemy, who had in the morning received reinforce- " ments, and who had placed some guns in front of the right and left " of his line, was observed to be moving ti-oops towards his left flank, " and forming various columns of attack at that exti'emity of the strong " and commanding position which on the morning of the 15th he had " taken in our immediate front. " This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by " the rapid and determined attack which he made upon your division " which occupied the right of our position. The events which oc- " curred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted " with. The first effort of the Enemy was met by the Commander of " the Forces, and by yoiu'self, at the head of the 42nd regiment, and " the brigade under Major-General Lord William Bentinck. " The village on your right became an oVyect of obstinate contest. 229 *' I lament to say, that soon after the severe wound which deprived *' the army of your services, Lieutciiant-General Sir John Moore, " who had just directed the most able disposition, fell by a cannon *' shot. The troops, though not unacquainted M'itb tbe irreparable " loss they had sustained, were not dismayed, but by tlie most deter- " mined bravery not only repelled every attempt of the Enemy to gain *' ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought " up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged. *' The Enemy, finding himself foiled in every attempt to force the ** right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it. Ajudl- " cious and well-timed movement which was made by Major- General " Paget, with the reserve, which corps had moved out of its canton- *' ments to support the right of the army, by a vigorous attack, de- *' feated this intention. The Major-General, having pushed forward *' the 95th (rifle corps) and 1st battalion 52d regiments, drove the " Enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened *' the left of the Enemy's position. This circumstance, with the *' position of Lieutenant-Gencral Eraser's division, (calculated to *' give still further security to the right of tbe line) induced the Enemy *' to relax his efforts in that quarter. " They were however more forcibly dli-ected towards the centre, " where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under " Major-General Manningham, forming the left of your division, " and a part of that under Major-General Leith, forming the right " of the division under my orders. Upon the left, the Enemy at first " contented himself with an attack upon our piquets, M'hich however ** in general maintained their ground. Finding hoA\'ever his efforts " unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render " the attack upon the left more serious, and bad succeeded in obtain- " Ing possession of the village through which the great road to Ma- " drid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line-. 230 • From this post, however, he was soon expelled, with considerable ' loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion • 14th regiment, under Lieutenaiit- Colonel Nicholls ; before five in ' the evening, we had not only successfully repelled every attack •' made upon the position, but had gained ground in almost all points, ' and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of * the action, whilst the Enemy confined his operations to a cannonade, ' and the fire of his light troops, with a view to draw oflF his other * corps. At six the firing ceased. The different brigades Avere re- ' assembled on the ground they occupied in the morning, and the ' piquets and advanced posts resumed their original stations. *' Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at ' this moment the gallantly of the troops had given them over an ' Enemy, who from his numbers and the commanding advantages of ' his position, no doubt expected an easy victory, I did not, on re- ' viewing all circumstances, conceive that I should be warranted in ' departing from what I knew was the fixed and previous determlna- ' tion of the late Commander of the Forces, to w ithdraw the army on ' the evening of the 16th, for the purpose of embarkation, the pre- ' vious arrangements for which had already been made by his order, ' and were in fact far advanced at the commencement of the action. ' The troops quitted their position about ten at night, with a degree ' of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that re- ' malned unembarked, having been withdrawn, the troops followed ' in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of ' embarkation In the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The ' piquets remained at their posts until five on the morning of the l/th, ' when they were also A^ithdrawn with similar orders, and without " the Enemy having discovered the movement. '' By the unremitted exertions of Captains the Honourable H. Cur- '•' zon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serret, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, 231 *' and Mackenzie, of the Royal Navy, who, in pursiiance of the or- *' ders of Rear Admiral de Courcy, were entrusted with the service *' of embarking the army ; and in consequence of the arrangements *' made by Commissioner Bowen, Captains Bowen and Shepherd, and " the other Agents for Transports, the whole of the army was em- *' barked with an expedition which has seldom been ecpialled. With " the exception of the Brigades under Majox*-Generals Hill and *' Beresford, which were destined to remain on shore, until the move- " ments of the Enemy should become manifest, the whole was afloat " before day-light. " The bngade of Major-General Beresford, which was alternately " to form our rear-guard, occupied the land front of the town of Co- " runna; that under Major-General Hill was stationed in reserve on *' the Promontory in rear of the town. " The Enemy pushed his light troops towards the tow\\ soon after *' eight o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied *' the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. But, riot- " withstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the " place ; there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be " forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, " the embarkation of Major-General Hill's brigade was commenced " and completed by three in the afternoon ; Major-General Beresford, " with that zeal and abilitv which is so well known to yourself and " the whole army, having fidly explained, to the satisfaction of the '' Spanish Governor, the nature of our movement, and having made *' evei-y pi'evious arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land-fi-ont *' of the town soon after dark, and was, with all the wounded tliat *' had not been previously moved, embarked befoi-e one this morning. " Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope, that the victoi-v " with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the " army, can be attended with ai>y very brilliant consequences to Great 232 "■ Britain. It is clouded by the loss of one of her best Soldiers, It " has been atchieved at the termination of a long and harassing ser- " vice. The superior numbers, and advantageous position of the " Enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not ad- " mit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be how- " ever to you, to the army, and to our Country, the sweetest reflec- " tion that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained, amidst *' many disadvantageous circumstances. The army which had en- " tered Spain, amidst the fairest prospects, had no sooner completed " its junction, than owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed " the native armies ai'ound us, it was left to its own resources. The " advance of the British corps from the Duero, afforded the best hope " that the South of Spain might be relieved, but this generous effort *' to save the unfortunate people, also afforded the Enemy the oppor- " tunity of directing eveiy effort of his numerous troops, and concen- " trating all his principal resources, for the destruction of the only " regular force in the North of Spain, " You are well aware with what diligence this system has been " pursued, " These circumstances produced the necessity of rapid and harass- ^' Ing marches, which had diminished the numbers, exhausted the " strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstand- " ing all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached " to a defensive position, which the imperious necessity of covering " the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to " assume, the native and undaunted valour of British troops was " never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your " own experience of that Invaluable quality, so inherent in them, may " have taught you to expect. When every one that had an opportu- " nlty seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me, in making *' this report, to select particular Instances for your approbation. ^^33 " The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under Major-Generals *' Lord Wllham Benthick, and Manningham and Leith; and the *' brigade of Guards under Major-General Warde. " To these officers, and the troops under their immediate orders, " the greatest praise Is due. Major-General Hill and Colonel Catliu " Crauford, with their brigades on the left of the position, ably sup- " ported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the " 4th, 42d, 50th, and 81st regiments, with parts of the l)ngade of " Guards, and the 26th regiment. From lileutenant-Colonel Mur- " ray, Quarter-Master-General, and the Officers of the General " Staff, I I'ecelved the most marked assistance. I had reason to re- " gret, that the illness of Brigadier- General Clinton, Adjutant-Genc- *' ral, deprived me of his aid. I was Indebted to Brigadier-General " Slade during the action, for a zealous offer of his personal services, " although the cavalry were embarked. " The greater part of the fleet having gone to sea yesterday even- " ing, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embaidca- " tion necessarily much mixed on board, it is Impossible at present to " lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in num- " hers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was " obliged to form an estimate, I should say, that I believe it did not " exceed in killed and wounded from seven to eight hundred ; that of " the Enemy must remain unknown, but many circumstances Induce " me to rate it at nearly double the above number. We have some " prisoners, but I have not been able to obtain an account of the " number ; it is not, however, considerable. Several Officers of " rank have fallen or been wounded, among whom I am only at pre- *' sent enabled to state the names of Lieutenant- Colonel Napier, 92d " regiment. Majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th regiment, killed ; " Lieutenant-Colonel Winch, 4th regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel " Maxwell, 26th regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Fane, 59th regiment, H H ^234 " Lieutenant-Colonel Griffith, guards, Majors Miller and Williams, " 81st regiment, wounded. " To you, who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of " Lieutenant-General Sir John Mooi'e, I need not expatiate on the " loss the army and his Countiy have sustained by his death. His " fall has deprived me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience " of his worth had sincerely attached me. But it is chiefly on public " grounds that I must lament the blow. It will be the conversation " of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that, after " conducting the army through an arduous retreat with consummate " firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour by a " death that has given the Enemy additional reason to respect the " name of a British Soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is " snatched from his Country at an early period of a life spent in her " service; like Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect " of success, and cheered by the acclamation of victory ; like Wolfe " also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that Country which " he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served. " It remains for me only to express my hope, that you will speedily " be restored to the service of your Country, and to lament the im- ^' fortunate circumstance that removed you from your station in the *' field, and thi'ew the momentai-y command into far less able hands. *' I have the honour to be, &c. " John Hope, Lieut.-Gen. " To lAeutenant-General Sir David Bdircl, Sfc. &fc. Sj-c." APPENDIX. I 237 APPENDIX. A. From Lord Castlereagh to Sir John Moore, K. B. S^c. S^'c. ^c. SIK Downing Street, 25 Sir Moor G'ral delExercito de S. M. B. Exmo Senor. sen'or, MuY Seifor nuestro y de nuestro maj'or aprecio. La Junta Militar y Politica, fonnada de todas las autoridades, reunidas en nombre del Rey que Dios guarde para atender ala defensa de esta Corte que se lialla amenada por los Enemigos ; tiene el honor de hacer presente a V, E. con la debida exactitud el elado de las cosas ; y se reduce, a que el Exercito del Centre que mandaba el General D" Fran'^° Xabier Castanos, y que sera como de beinte y cinco mil hombres, se viene replegando a toda priesa hacia Madrid para reunirse con su guarnicion ; y que el de Somasierra, en numero de unos diez mil hombres, viene tambien al mismo efetto a esta villa, donde se reu- niran hasta quaranta mil ; cuyo nUmero y fuerza hace que no deba temerse el Exercito de los Enemigos que se ha presentade. En estas circumstancias, y temiendo la Junta que vengan mas fuerzas Francesas a unirse con las actuales, espera que V. E. sino tiene Enemigos ala vista puede replegarse para unirse con nuestro Exercito, o tomar direccion a caer sobre las espaldas del Enemigo ; y creheria agrabar el notorio celo de V. E. por la causa justa y su singular actividad se dudare de modo alguno que la rapides de sus movimentos sera qual conviene al interes de su nacion y la nuestra. Con este motive ofrece la Junta a V. E. su consideracion y respetos. Dios gue a V. E. m* a^ Madrid, 2 de Diciembre de lSo8. El Principe de CastelfrancOj Thomas Morla. P. S. La Junta se persuade que V. E. se habra reunido ya al Exercito que mandaba D" Joaquin Blak y estaba poca hace en Leon. Ex"'" S>- Moor G'-ral del Exercito de S. 31. B. 27(> u. From the London Newspapers, Dec. idth iSoS. ^' PARIS. Thirteenth Bulletin of the Army in Spain. Saint Martin, near Madrid, Dec. 2. " On the 29th ult. the head quarters of the Emperor was re- moved to the village of Bonquillas. On the 30th, at break of day, the duke of Belluno presented himself at the foot of the Soma Sierra. A division of 13,000 men of the Spanish army of reserve defended the passage of the mountains. The Enemy thought themselves unattackable in that position. They were entrenched in the narrow passage called Puerto with 1 6 pieces of cannon. The 9th light infantry marched upon the right, the 96th upon the causeway, and the 24th followed by the side of the heights on the left. General Senarmont, with six pieces of artillerj^, advanced by the causeway ; the action commenced by the firing of musquetry and cannon. A charge made by General Montbrun, at the head of the Polish light horse, decided the aiFair ; it was a most brilliant one, and this regiment covered itself with glory, and proved it was worthy to form a part of the Imperial Guard. Cannons, flags, muskets, soldiers, all were taken, or cut to pieces. Eight Polish light horse were killed upon this causeway, and 16 have been wounded ; among the latter is Captain Dzievanoski, who was dangerously wounded, and is almost without hopes of recovery. Major Segur, Marshal of the Emperor's household, charged among the Polish troops, and received many wounds, one of which is very severe. Sixteen pieces of cannon, ten 277 flags, thirty covered chests, 200 waggons laden with all kinds of baggage, and the militarj^ chests of the regiments, are fruits of this liriiliant affair. Among the prisoners, who are numerous, are all the Colonels, or Lieute- nant-Colonels of the corps of the Spanish divisions. All the soldiers would have been taken if they had not thrown away their arms and dispersed in the mountains. On the 1st of December the head-quarters of the Emperor were at St. Augustin, and on the 2d the Duke of Istria with cavalry com- manded the heights of Madrid. The infantry would not arrive before the 3d. The intelligence which we hitherto received led us to think that this town is suffering under all kinds of disorders, and that the doors are barri- caded. The weather is very fine." Moniteur, Dec. 13//!. " PARIS, Dec. 13th. Camp at Madrid, Dec. 4th. " The town of Madrid has capitulated ; our troops entered it to-day at noon." Moniteur, Dec. Hth. From tlie London Neiospapers, December 29, 180S. Fourteenth Bulletin of the Army in Spain. Madrid, oth Dec. The 2d at noon his Majesty arrived in person on the heights which impend over Madrid ; on which were already placed the divisions of Dragoons of Generals La Tour, Maubourg, and LaHoussaye, and the Imperial Horse-Guards. The anniversary of the Coronation, that epoch which has signalised so many days for ever fortunate for France, awakened in all hearts 2/8 the most agreeable recollections, and inspired all the troops with an enthusiasm which manifested itself in a thousand exclamations. The weather was beauti- ful, and like that enjoyed in France in the finest days in the month of May. The Marshal Duke of Istria sent to summon the Town, where a military Junta was formed, under the presidency of the Marquis Castelar ; who had luider his orders General Morla, Captain-General of Andalusia, and Inspector- General of Artillery. The Town contained a number of armed peasants, assembled from all quarters, 6000 troops of the line, and 100 pieces of can- non. Sixty thousand men were in arms ; their cries were heard on every side ; the bells of 200 churches rang altogether ; and every thing presented the appearance of disorder and madness. The General of the troojjs of the line appeared at the advanced posts, to answer the summons of the Duke of Istria. He was accompanied by thirty men of the people, whose dress, looks, and ferocious language, recalled the recollection of the assassins of September. When the Spanish General was asked whether he meant to expose women, children, and old men, to the horrors of an assault, he ma- nifested secretly the grief with which he was penetrated ; he made known, by signs, that he, as well as all the honest men of Madrid, groaned under oppression ; and, when he raised his voice, his words were dictated by the wretches who watched over him. No doubt could be entertained of the excess to which the tyranny of the multitude was carried, when they saw him minute-down all his words, and cause the record to be verified by the assassins who surrounded him. The Aide-de-camp of the Duke of Istria, who had been sent into the town, was seized by men of the lowest class of tlie people, and was about to be massacred, when the troops of the line, indignant at the outrage, took him under their . protection, and caused him to be restored to his General. A butcher's boy from Estremadura, who commanded one of the gates, had the audacity to require that the Duke of Istria should go himself into the town with his eyes blindfolded. General Montbrun rejected this presumptuous demand with indignation. He was immediately surrounded, and eftected his escape only by drawing his sword. He narrowly escaped falling a victim to the imprudence of having forgot that he had not to make war with civilized enemies. A little time '279 after, some deserters from the W^alloon Guards came to the camp. 'I'heir depositions convinced us that the people of property, and honest men, were without influence ; and it was to be concluded that conciliation was alto- gether impossible. The Marquis of Perales, a respectable man, who had hitherto appeared to enjoy the confidence of the people, had been on the day before this ac- cused of putting sand in the cartridges. He was immediately straufrled. It was determined that all the cartridges should be remade. 3 or 4000 monks were employed upon this work at the Retire. All the palaces and houses were ordered to be open, to furnish provisions at discretion. The Frencli infimtry was still three leagues from Madrid. The Emperor employed tlie evening in reconnoitring the town, and deciding a plan of attack, consistent with the consideration due to the great number of honest people always to be found in a great capital. To take Madrid by assault might be a military operation of little difHculty; but to engage that great city to surrender, by employing alternately- force and persuasion, and by rescuing the people of property, and real good men, from the oppression under which they groaned — this was what was really difficult. All the exertions of the Emperor, during these two days, had no other end. They have been crowned with the greatest success. At seven o'clock the division Lassisse of the corps of the Duke of Belluno arrived. The Moon shone with a brightness that seemed to prolong the day. The Emperor ordered the General of Brigade, Maison, to take possession of tlie Suburbs; and charged the General of Brigade, Lauriston, to support him in the enterprize with four pieces of artillery, belonging to the Guards. The sharp-shooters of the l6th regiment took possession of some build- ings, and in particular of the grand cemetery. At the first fire the Enemy shewed as much cowardice as he did of arrogance all the day. The Duke of Belluno employed all the night in placing his artillery in posts marked out for the attack. At midnight the Prince of Neufchatel sent to Madrid a Spanish Lieutenant-Colonel of Artillery, who had been taken at Soniosien'a, and who saw with affright the obstinacy of his fellow-citizens. He took charge of the annexed letter. No. 1. On the third, at nine in the morning. 280 the same flag of truce returned to the Head Quarters with the letter, No. 2. But the (ieneral of Brigade Senarniont, an officer of great merit, had already placed 30 pieces of artillery, and had commenced a very smart fire ; which made a breach in the walls of the Retire. The sharp-shooters of the division of Villatte having passed the breach, their battalion followed them ; and in less than a quarter of an hour 1000 men who defended the Retire were knocked on the head. The Palace of the Retire, the important posts of the Observatory, of the Porcelain Manufactory, of the Grand Barrack, the Hotel of Medina Celi, and all the outlets which had been fortified, were taken by our troops. On another side 20 pieces of cannon of the Guards, accomjianied by light troops, threw shells, and attracted the attention of the Enemy by a false attack. It would have been a difficulty to form a conception of the disorder that reigned in Madrid, if a greater number of prisoners, arriving in succession, had not given an account of tlie frightful scenes, of every description, of which that capital presented the spectacle. They have intersected the streets, erected parapets on the houses ; barricades of bales of wool, and of cotton, had been formed ; and the windows had been stopped with mattresses. Those of the inhabitants who despaired of a successful resistance were flying into the fields ; others, who had preserved some share of reason, and who preferred appearing in the midst of their property before a generous enemy, to abandoning it to the pillage of their fellow-citizens, demanded that they shjould not expose themselves to an assault. Those who were strangers to the town, or who had nothing to lose, were for a defence to the last ex- tremity, accused the troops of the line of treason, and obliged them to con- tinue their fire. The enemy had more than 100 pieces of cannon pointed ; a more consi- derable number of two and three-pounders had been dug up, taken out of cellars, and tied upon carts, a grotesque train, and sufficient in itself to prove the madness of a people abandoned to itself. But all means of defence were become useless. The possessors of Retire are always Masters of Madrid. The Emperor took all possible care to prevent the troops going from house to house. The City was ruined if many troops had been employed. Only 281 some companies of sharp-shooters advanced, and the Emperor constantly refused to send any to sustain them. At eleven o'clock the Prince of Neiif- chatel wrote the annexed letter (No. 3). His Majesty, at the same time, orderetl the fire to cease on all points. At five o'clock General Morla, one of the Members of theMilitary Junta, and Don Bernardo Yriarte, sent from the town, repaired to the tent of his Serene Highness the Major-General. They informed him that the most intelligent persons were of opinion, that the town was destitute of resources, and that the continuation of the defence would be the height of madness ; but that the lowest classes of the people, and the crowd of men, strangers to Madrid, wished to defend themselves, and thought they could do it with effect. They requii-ed the day of the 4th to make the people listen to reason. The Prince Major-General presented them to His Majesty the Emperor and King, who addressed them thus : " You make use of the name of the People to no " purpose ; if you cannot i-estore tranquillity, and appease their minds, it is " because you have yourselves excited them — ^you have led them astray by " propagating falsehoods. Assemble the Clergy, the Heads of Convents, the " Alcades, the men of property and influence, and let the town capitulate " by six o'clock in the morning, or it shall cease to exist. I will not, nor " ought I to withdraw my troops. You have massacred the imfortunate " French prisoners who had fallen into your hands. Onlv a few days ao-o " you suffered two persons in the suite of the Russian Ambassador to be " dragged along and murdered in the public streets, because they were " Frenchmen born. The incapacity and cowardice of a General had put " into your power troops who capitulated on the field of battle ; and the " capitulation has been violated. You, Mr. Morla, what sort of a letter did " you write to that General? It well became you, Sir, to talk of pilla"e; *' you who, on entering Roussillon, carried off all the women, and distri- " buted them as booty among your soldiers! Besides, what right had you " to hold such language? — the capitulation precluded you from it. See what " has been the conduct of the English, who are far from piquing themselves " on being rigid observers of the Law of Nations. They have complained •' of the Convention of Portugal, but they have carried it into effect. J'o o o 282 '■' violate military treaties, is to renounce all civilization; it is placing Generals '■' on a footing with the Bedouins of the desert. How dare you then pre- '•' sume to solicit a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen ? See how " injustice and bad faith always recoil upon the guilty, and operate to their " prejudice. I had a fleet at Cadiz : it was in alliance with Spain ; yet you " directed against it the mortars of the town, where you commanded. I *' had a Spanish army in my ranks : I would have preferred seeing it embark " on board the EngUsh ships, and being obliged to precipitate it from the " rocks of Espinosa, than to disarm it ; I preferred having 7000 more ene- " mies to fight, rather than to be deficient in honour and good faith. Re- " turn to Madrid : I give you till six o'clock to-morrow morning. Return " at that hour, if you have to inform me only that they have surrendered ; " if not, you and your troops shall be all put to the sword." On the 4th, at six in the morning. General Morla and General Don Fernando de Vera, Governor of the Town, presented themselves at the tent of the Prince Major-General. The discourses of the Emperor, repeated in the midst of the persons of distinction, the certainty that he commanded in person, the losses sustained during the foregoing day, had carried terror and repentance into all minds. During the night the most mutinous withdrew themselves from the danger by flight, and a part of the troops was disbanded. At ten o'clock General Belliaid took the command of Madrid ; all the posts were put into the hands of the French, and a general pardon was proclaimed. &c." 283 W. A Su Ejc" S""- Frere. Ex"o SoR, MuY SoR Mio, Desde su Quartel Gen' en Leon dice el Marques de la Romana a la Junta Suprema Gubernativa del Reino con f*"* de 2 del corriente q<= havia 8 dias estaba tratando con el Gen' Ingles Sir D. Baird, q* manda las tropas de su nacion en Astorga, para que con ellas y doce 6 catorce mil hombres escogidos del Ex^° de su cargo pasaran a Zamora a reunir se con el G' Sir John Moore p"" la ruta q* le havia indicado, con el fin de hacer un movimiento sobre los Enemigos hacia el punto q'' sea mas conveniente : pero quando se lisonjeaba de la conformidad del G' Baird, le havia respon- dido q^ tenia orden positiva de pasar por tierra 6 por mar a reunirse por Portugal con el G' Moore. Que havia repitido sus instancias a los dos Ge- nerales, y en el dia anterior le havia contestado definitivaniente el Gen' Baird q* retiraba su artilleria p^' embarcarla en la Corurfa, y el con sus tropas pen- saba dirigirse a Portugal por la costa de Galicia, 6 por la provincia de Tras los Montes sobre Almeida. Que le escribia de acuerdo con el G™' Belarde, q* havia llegado aquella noche a Leon, manifestandole la consternacion en q^ iba a poner aquel pais con su retirada, la imposibilidad de marchar el Marques solo sin ninguna cavalleria acia Zamora, los males a q'= quedaba expuesta aquella provincia, y el riesgo q'' amenazaba al Reino de Galicia. La Junta Suprema ha sabido con la mayor sorpresa y dolor esta resolucion de los Gen'^^ Ingleses, laqual si llegara a verificarse projiorcionaria grandes ventajas a las armas Francesas, y acarreria a las Espau~olas las mas terribles consequencias. Los generosos y prontos socorros q*^ nos facilito la Inglaterra, y las tropas con q*^ nos auxiliaba, aumentaron el entusiasrno de nuestros Pueblos, y alentaron la justa esperanoa de q*^ esta i:eunion aseguria el feliz exito de la empreza. Por lo mismo el desaliento y consternacion q*^ prodii- 'i84 i'ira ahora el ver q^ el Ex*" Britanico, sin obrar ni reunirse, se retira a los Puertos excitaran sentimieutos y causaran efectos contraries a la buena causa. Se debilitaran el entusiasmo y ardor q<= hasta ahora ha sostenido la confianza en la uniformidad de ideas y en las operaciones del Ex*^" Ingles unido con nuestras tropas. Adenias de los irreparables perjuicios q« sentiriamos nosotros, el Portugal quedaria expuesto a verse segunda vez sugeto a los Franceses, q'' entonces desconcertaban completamente quantos planes y medidas pudieron salvar estos dos reinos aliados de la Inglaterra, la qual por ultimo resultado no habria facilitado socorros ni tropas sino para hacernos contar su ayuda efecti\a, y retiraria en el momento mas critico y interesante. En efecto acaso el Ene- migo nunca ha estado mas cerca de se ruina (si los Exercitos Ingleses y Espan~oles saben obrar con oportunidad y energia) q'' en el momento en q*^ debilitado con lo q*' le han costado sus ultimos esfuerzos, podemos aprovechar la ventaja de ver su exercito dividido en cubrir una linea tan extendida. Todas estas consideraciones y las funestas consequencias q*^ politicamente acarreria el retirarse las tropas Inglesas no pueden ocultarse a la penetracion de V. E. y de los S. S. Generales de S. M. B. q*^ con la reunion contribuiau a la libertad de Portugal y la nuestra, y concluyendo asi la generosa obra a q"^ los destino la amiga de la Espari"a immortalizaban su nombre y el servicio q** hacian a todo el continente. Aunq' nuestras tropas han tenido revezes, no hay fundamento p* desmayar, antes bien el estado de los cosas ofrece en el numero de tropas q*^ formaran Ingleses y Espanolas, en el entusiasmo y confianza q*^ producira la union unos recursos casi indefectibles q*^ deven asegurarnos el vencimiento. En efecto el M. de la Romana luscara al G' Sir J. Moore, se le reunini desde luego con catorce mil hombres escogidos de su Ex*" y con las activas y energicas providencias q'' la Junta Suprema ha dictado, deutro de un mes aumentara su gente con treinta mil conscriptos de los Reinos de Leon, Galicia, y Asturias. S. M. como V. E. sabe ha resuelto que pase a conferen- ciar con Sir J. Moore uno de sus vocales que esta pronto a marchar, y a quien acompan~ara como V. E. ha ofrecido, y contribuini p"" su parte al ob- jeto el S"' Stuart. 285 Tambien espera q* V. E. movido de tan fuertes consideraciones se esfuerze en persuadir al G' en Gefe de las tropas Ingleses q*^ el entusiasmo de los Pueblos, su consuelo, la libertad de la Nacion, la seguridad del Portugal, los intereses de la Inglaterra, y los de la Europa entera dependeu de q"^ se verifique al moniento la reunion, y concertados los planes se obre del modo q^ se jusgue conveniente ; pues de otra forma ni se consigue el objeto de la venida, ni de ella habra resultado otra ventaja que la de malograr la mejor ocasion de destruir al Enemigo eterno de la quietud del Continente, aban- donando a su suerte a la Espan~a y al Portugal en el momento en q^ mas ne- cesitaban los auxilios de su aliado. La Junta Suprema confia en la adesion q^ V. E. la ha manifestado, y en el vivo interes q" toma por nuestra causa, q** contribuira con todo su influxo y representacion a q^ no se malogre tan grande empresa : todo lo qual pongo en consideracion de V. E. de orden de S. M. Martin de Garay. Trujillo, 8 Dec. 1808, 286 X. A Su Ex" il General en Xefe de las Tropas de S. M. B. S"'' Moore. EXCMO SENOR, La Junta de Gobienio de Toledo desea salvar la Patria, reune el Ex*° disperso, y toma las medidas y ha estd era da abiso al S'' Eredia q* tiene esta Cap^ endonde hallard los socorros q'' pueda h** morir, comunica iguales partes a Aranjuez y demas puntos de reunion q*^ ha llegado a n'tra noticia lo q^ se participa V. E. p^ q"^ midiendo sus operaciones contras medi- das tenga la satisfaccion al mismo tiempo deq^ la tenemos y tendremos en morir a su lado p' la Patria. Dios gue~ a V. E. m« a^ Toledo 5 de D'bre de 1 8o8, a la una dela man ana. ExC"" S"-, Antonio Perez del Castillo. Ramon Mareca. Pedro Biosca. Martin cella Cerda. Manuel de Medina y Camino. The numbers of effective fighting men in an army differ much from the total numbers of the various corps, ow^ing to sickness, absentees, and various contingencies. The following is a correct extract from the Adjutant-General's Reports. 287 Effective Soldiers who inarched frojn Portugal under the Command of Sir John Moore. Description of Troops. Regiments. _, ,. Numbers. Officers Commanding. Rank&File Total. Artillery - - Royal Artillery - . - Colonel Hardinge - - - 686 686 Cavaliy - - - Slh Light Di-agoons Lieut. Col. Jones - - - 565 1 * 5rd Ditto, or King's Ger- ") man Legion - - J Major Burgwedel - - - 347 ► 912 Infuntry - - 2nd Regiment - - - Lieut. Col. Ironmonger - 616 - 3rd Ditto . - - - Lieut. Col. Blunt - - - 815 4th Ditto - - - . Lieut. Col. Wynch - - 754 5th Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Mackenzie 833 6th Ditto - . - - Major Gordon - - - - 783 9th Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Campbell - - 607 20th Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Ross - - - 499 28th Ditto - . . - Lieut. Col. Belson - - 750 32nd Ditto . - - - Lieut. Col. Hynde- - - 756 36th Ditto - . . - Lieut. Col. Burne - - - 736 38th Ditto ... - Lieut. Col. GreviOe - - 823 42nd Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Stirling - - 880 43rd Ditto . - - - Lieut. Col. Null - - - 411 . 16,933 50th Ditto - - . - Major Napier - - - - 794 52nd Ditto (1st battalion) lieut. Col. Barclay - - 828 52nd Ditto (2nd ditto) Lieut. Col. Ross - - - 381 71st Ditto - . - - Lieut. Col. Pack - - - 724 79th Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Cameron - - 838 91st Ditto - - - - Major Douglas - - - 698 92nd Ditto . - - - Lieut. Col. Napier - - 900 95th Ditto - - - - Lieut. Col. Beckwith - - 467 95th Ditto . . - - Major Travers- - - - 321 Staff Corps- - - - - Captain Leicester - - - 61 King's German Legion 1st Light Battalion - - Lieut. Col. Leonhart - - 803 2nd Ditto Lieut. Col. Halket- - - 855 - 18,531 N. B. The 3rd Regiment 815 strong, who were left on the frontiers of Portugal to keep up the communication, should be deducted. The 82nd Regiment, commanded by Major Williams, and one company of the 3rd joined at Sahagun, forming together about 700, are to be added -.-.---.--.---... 81£ roo 115 From Portugal 115 18,416 The Ntonhers of the Effective Soldiers that marched from Corunna under Sir David Baird. Description of Troops. Regiments. Officers Commanding. Numbers. Rank & File Total. Artillery - - Horse AitLUery - - - Captain Downman - - Captain Eveleigh - • - } 177 434 . > 611 Cavalry ... 7th Hussars - - - - 10th Ditto 15th Ditto Lieut. Col. Vivian - - Lieut. Col. Leigh - . - Lieut. Col. Gi-ant - - - 497 514 527 . V 1,538 Infantry - - 1st Foot Guaids (1st bat.) Ditto (3rd battalion) IstRegt. (3rd battalion) 14th Ditto CJnd battalion) 33rd Ditto '26th Ditto 43rd Ditto 51st Ditto Tfirh Ditto ----- Lieut. Col. Cocks - - - Lieut. Col. VVheatley - - Major MuUers - - - Lieut. Col. Nichols - - Lieut. Col. Wyatt - - - Lieut. Col. Maxwell - - Lieut. Col. Gifford - - Lieut. Col. Darling - - T_,ipiit Col Svmes - - - 1300 10"27 597 550 496 745 817 516 654 699 > 7,401 95th Ditto (detachments) Lieut. Col. Wade - - - - 9,550 From Corunna - From Portugal - 9,550 18,416 Aimy 27,966 -289 Letter from Sir John Jloore to Lord Castlereagh. MY LORD Salamanca, 8 Dec. 180S. In a short letter which accompanied my dispatch of the 5th inst. I mentioned that the resistance offered by the people of .Madrid had ari-ested the operations of the French, and gave a hope that the affiiirs of this country might still be recovered, desperate as they are ; yet if the example of the Capital is followed, and enthusiasm becomes general, France will be forced to divide her armies, and will be no longer so formidable. The diffi- culty of obtaining information is very great ; I have none certain with respect to Madrid, only I believe it still holds out. I have ojdered Sir David Bairdj who was retreating, to march back. I shall continue the arrangements I have ordered in Portugal, in case I should be obliged to fall back, but I am pre- paring to march to Zamora and Toro, to join Baird, ^^■hom I have ordered to advance to Benavente ; when we are joined, and if the Marquis de la Romana, with the troops he is collecting at Leon are ready, I shall move towards Burgos, and tlie communications of the French. Your Lordship may depend upon it, that I never shall abandon the cause as long as it holds out a chance of succeeding ; but you must be sensible that the ground may be in an instant cut from under me : Madrid may fall, and I be left to contend with very superior numbers indeed. I hope a better spirit exists in tlie Southern Provinces ; here no one stirs, and yet they are well inclined. An expression in a letter intercepted, from a French officer commanding at Vittoria to the Chief of the Staff with the Army, paints the people in tlii- part exactly : p p 290 " L'esprit publique est toujours mauvais, toujours de rincredulite sur nos avantages, quant a la tranquillite du pays, elle est parfaite *." I have made no remark on the subject of your Lordships dispatch of the 25th November, respecting my rank with the Spanish Generals : the Govern- ment has not as yet named any one to the Chief Command of their armies, every thing on that head is as loose as ever. You perceive by the manner I have already expressed myself in former letters, that I have no wish to be tenacious on this subject ; but I confess I have heard of none of their Generals yet, under whom it would be safe to place the command of the British troops. I sliall certainly always be inclined to pay great deference to the wishes of whatever General commands any Spanish army with which I am acting ; yet, until some one appears very different from any we have heard of hitherto, it cannot be desirable that he should know he had a right to command me ; and I cannot help beseeching you to consider this subject once more before j'OU finally fix it. As I am sending a courier to Sir David Baird, I have written this on the chance of an opportunity ofTering to forward it ; and in this manner I shall endeavour to keep you in the current of affairs here. I have sent Colonel Graham to Madrid to send me information of what is passing there. Lord Paget with the cavalry arrives at Zamora to-morrow, and next day I propose moving a corps with myself to Toro. I know not if your Lordship has heard lately from General Charles Stuart ; he is in our front, and very well. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. P. S. The Junta are gone to Badajos ; not a very good example for the people. * The disposition of the public mind is always bad ; our successes are never believed, but the country remains completely tiancjuil. 291 A A. Letter from Sir Jolin Moore to Lord Castlereagh. MV LORD Sahwuinca, 10 Dec. 1803. Colonel Graham, whom I had sent to Madrid, returned to me last night. Hecoidd only get as far as Talavera de la Reina, where he found two members of the Supreme Junta, who informed him that Madrid had ca- pitulated on the 3d. The Duke of Castelfranco and Mr. Morla, who were at the head of the Junta established at Madrid, are accused by the people of betraying them. Castellar, the Captain-General, and all the military officers of rank, refused to ratify the Treaty, and left the town with 16 pieces of cannon. The people refuse to give up their arms, but the French have the gates, the Retiro, and Prado. Sarag(«sa stills holds out, and it is said, that on the 1st they repulsed the French, who had made a general attack. It is said that attempts are making to assemble a great force in the South ; I dare say tlie force will be assembled, but the efforts it will make when assembled, I must think are very doubtful. I cannot believe that real enthusiasm is spread over any considerable portion of Sjaain. Had the people of Madrid been really determined, I do not see how Mr. de Morla and the Duke of Castelfranco could have given up the town. They accuse their leaders to cover their own want of spirit : this was the case with General St. Juan, who commanded when the pass of SomasieiTa was forced ; it is thought his troops misbehaved, they have since accused him of treachery, and have murdered him. I certainly think the cause desperate, because I see no determined spirit any where, unless it be at Saragossa. There is however a chance ; and whilst there is that, I thinJk myself bound to run all risks to support it. I 292 am now diftereutly situated from what I was wlien Castanos was defeated : I have been joined by General Hope, the artillery, and all the cavalry (Lord Paget with 3 Regiments is at Toro) ; and my junction with Sir David Baird is secure, though I have not heard from him since I ordered him to return to Astorga. Madrid, though it has capitulated, must still engage a considerable ])art of the Enemy's force. Saragossa is also a considerable diversion ; and the collections forming in the South cannot be neglected ; all his force cannot thus be directed against me. The corps collecting under the Marquis of La Romana at Leon is, I am told by Sir David Baird, very bad. I shall however connect myself with it; and I mean to move to Valla- dolid, where I shall order Baird to join me ; and to which neighbourhood I hope also that La Romana will advance. This movement I shall begin to morrow, by sending two corps to join Lord Paget at Toro ; Generals Hope and Frazer, from Alva de Tormes and this place, shall move on Tordesillas. I hope on the 14th to be at Val- liidolid. My communication when there will become uncertain with Almeida and Portugal, from whence all my stores are not yet forwarded, but I must take my chance : I shall be in Fortune's way ; if she smiles, we may do some good ; if not, we shall still, I hope, have the merit of having done all we could. The army, for its number, is excellent ; and is, I am confident, quite deter- mined to do its duty. I have had a letter from Sir John Craddock from Corunna ; he was proceeding to Lisbon ; he has landed part of the money from the Lavinia there, and will land the rest at Oporto or Lisbon. I have begged of him to bring the two regiments from Gibraltar to the Tagus. I understand that Mr. Murray is intended to relieve Mr. Erskine, and to supersede Mr. Kennedy, The latter has acted as Chief Commissary with this army since it reached Spain (Mr. Erskine is still at Lisbon), and has cer- tainly acquired a degree of experience which is extremely useful : it is quite cruel for him to be thus superseded by an officer not previously of higher rank to himself, and who probably has much less experience, and not more ability : at any rate, a new man at the head of the Department would be very prejudicial at this moment ; Kennedy could not be expected to act under him. I have therefore begged Sir John Cratldock to keep Mr. Murray at Lisbon ; and I hope, unless Mr. Murray's talents are known to be very su- perior, that he may not be permitted to supersede Mr. Kennedy with this army, who without money, and under many disadvantages, has hitherto sdp- phed us well. I should hope that the rest of the cavalry your Lordship has mentioned, will be sent without delay. The horses and harness of the waggon train will be useful, but their wag- gons are heavy and bad ; those we get in the country are more convenient. I should therefore propose to leave the waggons at home, and send the rest of that establishment onlJ^ Until aftairs in Spain bear a more promising aspect, I should think your Lordship ^\ ill approve of kee|)ing' at Corunna and Lisbon a sufficient quantity of transports for the re-embarkation of the army ; and I think many reasons unite to make it desirable for us to be in possession of Cadiz. I mean to men- tion this to Mr. Frere. When it is agreed to, the two regiments from Gibral- tar, as the most ready, could take possession, and garrison it. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. BB. Letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh. MY LORD, Salamanca, 12 December, 1803. I LEAVE this place to-morrow ; and I shall be at Valladolid on the iCth, with the troops I brought with me from Lisbon, with the addi- tion of three regiments of cavalry from England, amounting to 15OO. I have not heard from the Marquis of Roniana, and must give up the co-operation 294 of his corps for the present. Sir David Baird's will not be at Astorga for some days ; but he will advance to Benavente when ready ; and, as he will -e in my rear, he can move up, or I can fall back upon him ; but I do not think it advisable longer to delay moving forward. I shall threaten the French communications, and create a diversion, if the Spaniards can avail them- selves of it ; but the French have in the North of Spain from 8o to 90,000 men, and more are expected. Your Lordship may, therefore, judge what will be our situation if the Spaniards do not display a determination very different from any they have shewn hitherto, I have written to Sir John Craddock to keep whatever transports are not required for the embarkation of the troops in Portugal, ready to send to Vigo, if required. If I am forced to retreat, it will probably be on the Gralicias. The road is good, and the country capable of being defended. In this case we shall want flour, as the country produces only cattle in any abundance. Whatever ships are Sent from England, for the purpose of withdrawing the Array, should call at Corunna for orders, and then rendezvous at A'^igo. It is to Corunna also that money, and every supply, should be forwarded. The communication from Lisbon and Oporto, through Portugal, is so very bad, that nothing can be forwarded in time ; and, as I consider myself now united with Baird's corps, I shall certainly of the two, whether for retreat or communi- cation, prefer Galicia to Portugal. I fear that Mr. Frere is infinitely more sanguine upon the subject of Spain than I am. This is to be regretted, as it renders it more embarrassing for you to come to a decision upon the measure to be pursued. I have seen no ability with the Spanish Government, but much the reverse : none has been displayed by their officers in the command of the armies ; no one officer has yet a chief direction of the military branch ; the armies have shewn no resolution, the people no enthusiasm, nor no daring spirit ; and that which has not been shewn hitherto, I know not why it should be expected to be displayed hereafter. I feel as if the British was the only efficient force in Spain. Your Lordship will consider with what view it was originally sent ; whether in aid of an enthusiastic brave people, capable of fighting their own battles, or to contend alone with France, and retrieve the affairs of a beaten Q95 disorganized nation. M'^e have had now some proof of the efforts of which Spain is capable ; and we can judge by the resistance they have made, whether they have fought with that spirit and obstinacy of a people ardent for the independence of their country. It is certainly right for your Lordship to consider well these matters, that you may be able to estimate justly the aid which is to be expected in this struggle from the Spanish nation, and decide to what amount the British Army should be reinforced, or, if not rein- forced, what measures it should follow. The French force in Spain may fairly be set down at 8o,000 men *, besides what is in Catalonia ; the British at 27 or 28,000, including the regiments coming from Portugal, The French expect considerable reinforcements. The armies which the Spa- niards had formed have been beaten and dispersed, and are again collecting. This, my Lord, is, I believe, the true statement ; and I leave your Lordship to throw into the scale what portion of enthusiasm, resolution, and ability, you think we have a right to expect from the specimen already given. As this letter is private, I have written it with a freedom which otherwise I should not have used. It is my wish to give you every material upon which to found a just opinion; for certainly the situation of this Army is too critical to be long neglected ; and unless a spirit is displayed by the Spaniards, of which we see no indication, it is impossible but they must be subdued. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. * Sir J. Moore's intelligence, particularly that obtained through the Spanish Government, was often imperfect. Instead of 80,000, he should have said 150,000. 296 CC. AviENDO apurado todos los medios, y reflexiones politicas militares, y convenientes p* q"^ V. Ex^ desistiera del projecto derretirar sus tropas a Ciudad Rodrigo, y aun a Portugal, y las de Astorga a Galicia, dici- endo v. Ex'' de q*" el Marques de la Romana solo havia podido juntar cinco mil hombres, determine salir de Salamanca ayer manana, p^ ir aencontrar la Junta Suprema de Govierno, considerando concluida mi comision, y oi me alcanzado un Posta con una carta d6l Marques de la Romana, cuya copia remito a V. Ex* p'' sipuede hacer le mas fuerza q* mis reflexiones, y variar su plan, q'' silleya averificarse, y no condesciende' V. Ex* aq*^ se reuna todo su Exercitb con el de Astorga, y el del Marques de la Romana en Zamora, ii otro punto, q'^ pueda imponer a los Enemigos, es inevitable la destruccion de Espana, y quiza V. Ex* mismo se veni obligado a embarcarse p* Yngla- terra, y si V. Ex* condocendiese en la reunion espresada, seria mui dable de q« los Enemigos desistieran de atacarce Madrid, y retroce dieran, loq^ daria tiempo, aq'= se reuniera el Exercito del Centro, y tomar otras dispociones conducentes. Sp^° a V. Ex* se sirva dar una contestacion alq^ le entregue esta, p* q*^ mela embie por un expro, y si V. Ex* hariese la bondad de escri- vir al Marques de la Romana su ultima determinacion envista dela adjunta, seria mui conveniente. Dios gue a V. Ex* ni^ a^ La Calzada de Ban'os 7 de Diciembre de 1808. Ex>"° Sen'or, Ventura Escalante. Fx""> S"' Gen^ More. o 297 DD. Letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereaglt. MY LORD, Toro, 16 Dec. 1 808. I HAD the honour to receive your Lordship's letter of the 3d Dec. with enclosures, forwarded to me by a King's Messenger, who reached me on the night of the 13th, at Alaejos, the head quarters of the Army, after its first march from Salamanca. I was to have jjroceeded, on the 1 5th, to Valladolid ; which place I should have reached the next day, when I received the letter of which I send your Lordship a copy. It is from Berthier, Prince of Neufchatel, to Marshal Soult, Duke of Dalmatia. The officer who was charged with it was murdered by some peasants, near Valdestillos, between Segovia and Valladolid ; who brought the letter to our advanced posts, to B. General Stewart. I was determined by the infor- mation it contained to prefer the speedy union of the Army to every other object ; and therefore, instead of Valladolid, I marched to this place. I had already directed Sir David Baird to push on his corps, by brigades, to Bena- vente. The first arriA'ed there yesterday, and the brigade of Guards will reach it this day. I shall march from this to-moirow, to some villages within two or three leagues of Benavente. I shall there be so close as to be able to protect Sir David's junction, and make it perfectly secure. It will be the 20th before all his corps are up. If then Marshal Soult is so good as to approach us, we shall be much obliged to him ; but if not we shall march towards him. It will be very agreeable to give a wipe to such a corps ; although, with respect to the cause generally, it will probably have no effect, Spain being in the state described in Berthier's letter. She has '29S made no efforts for herself; our's come too late, and cannot at any rate be sufficient. The French seem to have been ill informed of our movements : they are, however, soon acquainted with them, as our advanced posts have met ; and Gen. Charles Stuart, with a detachment of the l8th Dragoons, on the night of the 12th, surprised a detachment of their cavalry and infantry in the village of Rueda, killed and took prisoners the greatest part of them. The affair was trifling, but was managed by the B. General with much address, and was executed with spirit by the officers and men. It was a detachment from Valladolid, where Gen. Franceschi commanded, with 3 or 400 cavalry. He had no knowledge of our being so near, and would not believe one of the men, who escaped from the village in the dark, and carried to him the report of the surprise, and defeat, of the detachment. Whether, when Buo- najjarte hears that we have not retired to Lisbon, he will give to the corps on their march to Badajos a different direction, I cannot say ; but whilst I march towards Soult I must take care not too much to uncover Astorga, and the passes into Galicia ; from whence in future I must draw all my stores, and through which ultunately, if pressed, I alone can retreat. Should, therefore, on my approach, Soult retire towards Burgos to join Junot, who is on his march to that place with the 8th corps, I shall of course be forced to desist, and to return to this neighbourhood. In short, unless some great efforts, of which there is now but little probability, are made by the Spa- niards, it is evident how the business must terminate. For, even if I beat Soult, unless the victory has the effect to rouse the Spaniards, and to give their leaders ability, it will be attended with no other advantage than the character it will attach to the British arms. I have apprised Sir John Crad- dock of Buonaparte's march to Badajos ; which has since been confirmed to me, by a man who left Talavera, after his advanced guard had entered it. I have told him, that, in case of retreat, mine will be through Galicia ; and I have begged him, after selecting the quantity of tonnage necessary for the embarkation of the troops in Portugal, to send the rest to Vigo, to wait my orders. The Lieutenant-General will communicate to your Lordship the quantity of tonnage he sends to Vigo, when you will be able to judge the quantity necessary to be sent there from England, should the re-embarkation of this Army become necessary. Your Lordship must see the probabiUty of such an event ; and will, I fancy, think it right to have the means upon the spot. Should this Army retire into Galicia, and remain in it any time, I understated from Sir David Baird that we shall want flour; which I should hope you will send from England. With respect to the propriety of sending reinforcements, I must leave your Lordship to determine. If at this moment I had 7 or SOOO cavalry, I should certainly do nmcli. If we retire into the Galicias they would be an encumbrance. And, to enable us to keep our ground in Spain, the reinforcements of both cavalry, infantry, and artillery, must be considerable indeed. I shall endeavour to give your Lordship from time to time every information, and must then leave you to form your deter- mination. It is a subject upon which you can form as good a judgment as the best military man. I shall ever be of opinion, that unless Spain herself makes greater efforts, and displays more ardour and energy in her own cause, the efforts of England can be of no avail. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. P.S. I received a letter on the 13th from the Marquis of Romana, in which he says he will send an officer to me, as he does not choose to trust to paper, bv a messenger, the subject he has to communicate. This officer has not yet come. The Marquis is still at Leon, he says, with 20,000 men, 3000 of whom have no arms; but from Sir David Baird's account they are in no state to be much depended upon ; and he seems also to doubt their number. The fugitives from that and other armies are spread over the whole country. They have in general their arms, and will be troublesome subjects to the French. And we may expect to hear of continual insurrec- tions, in different parts of Spain, of massacres, &c. ; but there must be a great change in the conduct and character of this country before the people are brought to assemble in aj-mies, and to act upon system. .T. M. 300 E E. Letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Casflereagh. MY LORD, Benavente, 28 Dec. 180S. Since I had the honour to address you upon the l6th from Toro, the army has been almost constantly marching through snow, and with cold; that has been very intense. The weather within these few days has turned to rain, which is much more uncomfortable than the cold, and has rendered the roads almost impassable. On the 21st the army reached Sahagun ; it was necessary to halt there, in order to refresh the men, and on account of provisions. The information I received was, that Marshal Soult was at Saldana with about 16,000 men, with posts along the river from Guarda to Carrion. The army was ordered to march in two columns at eight o'clock on tlie night of the 23 d to force the bridge at Carrion, and from thence proceed to Saldana. At six o'clock that evening I received information that consider- able reinforcements had arrived at Carrion from Palencia ; and a letter from the Marquis de la Romana informed me that the French were advancing from Madrid, either to A'^alladolid or Salamanca. It was evident that it was too late to prosecute the attempt upon Soult ; that I must be satisfied with the diversion I had occasioned ; and that I had no time to lose to secure my. retreat. The next morning General Hope, with his own division and that of Lieutenant-General Fraser, marched to Mayorga. I sent Sir David Baird with his division to pass the river at Valencia ; and I followed General Hope on the 25th with the reserve, and the light brigades, by Mayorga, Valderos, 301 to Benavente ; the cavalry, under Lord Paget, followed the reserve on the S6th ; both the latter corps entered this place yestenlay. We continue our march on Astorga : Generals Hope and Fraser are already gone on. Sir David Baird proceeds to-morrow from \'alencia ; and I shall leave this with the reserve at the same time. Lord Paget will remain with the cavalry, to give us notice of the approach of the Enemy. Hitherto their infantry have not come up, but they are near, and the cavalry is round us in great num- bers ; they are checked by our cavalry, which have obtained by their spirit and enterprize an ascendancy over that of the French which nothing but great superiority of numbers on their part will get the better of. The diversion made by our march on Sahagun, though at a great risk to our- selves, has been complete; it remains to be seen what advantage the Spaniards in the South will be able to take of it. But the march of the French on Ba- dajos was stopped when its advanced guard had reached Talavera de la Reina ; and every thing disposable is now turned in this direction. The stores I had collected here are moving back to Astorga, and those at Astorga to \'\\h-r franca. The roads are very bad, and the means of carriage scanty. If I am pressed I must lose some of them ; and I may be forced to fight a bat- tle. This, however, 1 shall endeavour to avoid; for certainly, in the pre- sent state of things, it is more Buonaparte s game than mine. It is said that he comes himself with 10,000 of his guards. The force moving against us cannot be less than 50,000 men : we shall, when at Astorga,-be about 27,000. The Marquis la Romana came forward to Mansilla with 6,000 to co-operate with me in the attack on Soult : I therefore conclude that he cannot have above 8,000 fit for action. The country about Astorga oflers no advantage to an inferior army ; I shall, therefore, not stop there longer than to secure the stores, and shall retreat to Villafranca, where, I understand, there is a position. But if the French pursue, I must hasten to the coast ; for there is a road to Orense which leads more direct to Vigo, and which, of course, renders the position at Villafranca of no avail. Some time ago the Marquis la Romana intimated his intention of retiring into the (ialicias by Astorga , and Villafranca. I endeavoured to dissuade him from it ; pointing out to 302 hill), that it was the only communication we had for our retreat or suppHes, and begged that it might be left open to us. He stopped his retreat for the moment, but I much fear he will now prosecute it ; in which case I know not how it will be possible for us to pass. I had the honour to receive your Lordship's dispatches of the 10th by Captain Hardinge, yesterday morning. 1 shall be guided by circumstances ; and shall not, you may rest assured, retreat an inch beyond what I am com- pelled to do. But I fear if once I am forced into the Mountains, that the want of the means of subsistence will make it necessary to proceed down to the coast, to be provisioned from the ships. I need hardly add, the neces- sity of sending immediately the means of transport to re-embark the arm}', at Vigo or Corunna. Tlie only part of the army which has hitherto been engaged with the Enemy, has been the cavalry ; and it is impossible for me to say too much in their praise. I mentioned to your Lordship, in my Letter of the l6th, the success Brigadier-General Stuart had met with, in defeating a detachment of cavalry at Rueda ; since that, few days have passed without his taking or kill- ing different j)arties of the French, generally superior in force to those which attacked them. On the march to Sahagun Lord Paget had information of six or seven hundred cavalry being in that town. He marched on the night of the 20th from some villages where he was posted in front of the army at Mayorga, with the 10th and 15th Hussars. The 10th marched straight to the town, whilst Lord Paget with the 15th endeavoured to turn it. Unfor- tunately, he fell in with a patrole, one of whom escaped and gave the alarm ; by this means the French had time to form on the outside of the town, before Lord Paget got round. He immediately cliarged them ; beat them, and took from 140 to 150 prisoners, amongstwhom were two lieutenantcolonelsandeleven officers ; with the loss on our part of six or eight men, and, perhaps, twenty wounded. There have been taken by the cavalry from 400 to 500 French, besides a considerable number killed ; this since we began our march from Salamanca. On his march from Sahagun on the 26th Lord Paget with two squadrons of the 10th attacked a detachment of cavalry at Mayorga, killed 303 twenty, and took above one hundred prisoners. Our cnvalry is very superiot in quality to any the French have ; and the right spirit has been infused into them by the example and instruction of their two leaders, Lord Paget and Brigadier-General Stuart. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh. MY LORD, Benavente, 28 Dec. 1808. I HAVE the honour to enclose some letters contained in a bag lately intercepted, the courier murdered, going from France to Buonaparte. Those I enclose were all that I thought in the least interesting. That from Champigni you will think particularly so. I have the honour, &c. John Moore. Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh. MY LORD, Astorga, Zlst Dec. 1808. I ARRIVED here yesterday ; where, contrary to his promise, and to my expectation, I found the Marquis la Romana, with a great part of his troops. Nobody can describe his troops to be worse than he does ; 304 and he complains as much as we do of the indifference of the inhabitants, and of his disappointment at their want of enthusiasm. He said to me, in direct terms, that, had he known how tilings were, he neither would have accepted the command, nor have returned to Spain. With all this, how- ever, he talks of attacks and movements which are quite absurd, and then returns to the helpless state of his army and of the country. He could not be persuaded to destroy the bridge at Mansilla. He posted some troops at it, who were forced and taken prisoners by the French, on their march from Mayorga. With respect to me, my Lord, and the British troops, it has come to that point which I have long foreseen. Abandoned from the beginning by every thing Spanish, we were equal to nothing by ourselves. From a desire to do what I could, I made the movement against Soult. As a diversion it has answered completely ; but, as there is nothing lo take advantage of it, I have risked the loss of the Army for no purpose. I have no option now but to fall down to the coast as fast as I am able. I found no provision here : the little which has been collected had been con- sumed by Sir David's corps in their passage; and there is not two days' bread to carry the Army to Villafranca. I have been forced to push on the troops bv divisions, without stopping. General Fraser, with his division, will be at Mllafranca this day, and will jjroceed on to Lugo. General Hope, with his division, stopped yesterday two leagues from this, and proceeds this morning, followed by Sir David Baird. The two flank brigades go by the road to Ponferada. I shall follow, with the reserve and cavalry, to Villa- franca, either this night or to-morrow morning, according as I hear the approach of the French. There is no means of carriage : the people run away, the villages are deserted ; and I have b6en obliged to destroy great part of the ammunition and military stores. For the same reason I am obliged to leave the sick. In short, my sole object is to save the Army. We must all make forced marches to the coast, from the scarcity of provi- sions, and to be before the Enemy ; who, by roads upon our flanks, may otherwise intercept us ; but, after a time, the same difficulty which aflfects us, must affect him ; therefore, the rear once passed Villafranca, I do not expect to be molested. 305 I hope to find on the coast transports for the embarkation of the troops. If not, I hope to be able to take up some position, which I can maintain until they arrive. It is not probable that we can be followefl by the numbers which arc now marching against us. And, once collected upon the coast, we shall certainly not allow ourselves to be molested by any thing like equal numbers. It is only whilst retreating that we are vulnerable. I have heard of some dis- patches from your Lordship to me, entrusted to Lieut.-Col Chabot ; but he has been sent into Portugal, and I have not received them. The morning I marched from Benavente, some squadrons of Buonaparte's Guards passed the river at a ford above the bridge. They were attacked by B. General Stewart, at the head of the piquets of the l8th, and 3d German Light Dragoons, and driven across the Ford. Their Colonel, a General of Division, Lefebre, was taken, together with abciut 70 officers and men. The affair was well contested. The numbers with which Gen. Stewart at- tacked were inferior to the French. It is the corps of the greatest character in their army ; but the superiority of the British was, I am told, very con- spicuous. I enclose, for your Lordship's satisfaction. Lord Paget's report of it. This army, there cannot be a doubt, would have distinguished itself, had the Spaniards been able to offer any resistance ; but, from the beginning, it was placed in situations in which, without the possibility of duing any good, it was itself constantly risked — and now it is good fortune alone that can save it. It is impossible to deny that its discipline has been affected by the late move- ments. The shoes and necessaries are destroyed ; and, for some time after it reaches the coast, the men will be in the worst state. I send the French General Lefebre to Corunna, to be forwarded to Eng- land. He is a young iTian ; and, I should suppose, from the station he held, a personal favourite of Buonaparte. I have the honour, &c. John Moore. RR S06 FF. Letter from Sir John Moore to Lord Castlereagh *. MY LORD, Corunna, 13 January, 1809. Situated as this army is at present, it is impossible for me to detail to your Lordship the events which have taken place, since I had the honour to address you from Astorga on the 3 1 st December. I have therefore determined to send to England Brigadier-General Charles Stewart, as the Officer best qualified to give you every information you can want, both with respect to our actual situation, and the events which have led to it. From his connection with your Lordship, and with His Majesty's Ministers, what- ever he relates is most likely to be believed. He is a man in whose honour I have the most perfect reliance ; he is incapable of stating any thing but the truth, and it is the truth which at all times I wish to convey to your Lord- ship, and to the King's government. Your Lordship knows that had I followed my own opinion as a military man, I should have retired with the army from Salamanca. The Spanish * In this dispatch there are seTcral omissions, owing to the following circumstance : In the month of March last, the Secretary of State for the War Department sent for the Author, and informed him, that it was the intention of Administration to accede to la) ing this letter before Parliament j which, however, being a pri\ ate letter, and not written in the usual manner of official dispatches, it was thought proper to omit some passages which his Lordship would point out. The Author replied, that he could not presume to object to any omissions whicli did not affect his brother's reputation. After this conversation it was judged improper to fill up the blanks. One passage at the beginning, however, it was considered, might be re- stored, where mention is made of the Honourable Brigadier-General Stewart, brother to Lord Castlereasrh. 307 armies were then beaten ; there was no Spanish force to which we could unite; and ****** * * ******* * I was satisfied that no efforts would be made to aid us, or favour the cause in which they were engaged. I was sensible, however, that the apathy and in- difference of the Spaniards would never have been believed ; that, had the British been withdrawn, the loss of the cause would have been imputed to their retreat ; and it was necessary to risk this army to convince the people of England, as well as the rest of Europe, that the Spaniards had neither the power, nor the inclination, to make any efforts for themselves. It was for this reason that I marched to Sahagun. As a diversion it suc- ceeded: I brought the whole disposable force of the French against this army, and it has been allowed to follow it, without a single movement being made *******^ * * * to favour its retreat. ********* * * * * * * The people of the Gallicias, though armed, made no attempt to stop the passage of the French through their mountains. They abandoned their dwellings at our approach, drove away their carts, oxen, and every thing that could be of the smallest aid to the army. The consequence has been, that our sick have been left behind ; and when our horses or mules failed, which on such marches and through such a country was the case to a great extent, baggage, ammunition, stores, and even money, were necessarily destroyed or abandoned. I am sorry to say that the army, whose conduct I had such reason to extol on its march through Portugal, and on its arrival in Spain, has totally changed its character since it began to retreat. * * * * *** * * * * * *** * * * * * I can say nothing in its favour, but that when there was a prospect of fight- ing the Enemy, the men were then orderly, and seemed pleased, and deter- mined to do their duty. In front of Villafranca the French came up with 308 the reserve, with which I was covering the retreat of the army. They attacked it at Calcabalos. I retired, covered by the 95th regiment, and marched that night to Herrerias, and thence to Nogales and Lugo ; where I had ordered the dift'erent divisions which preceded to halt and collect. At Lugo the French again came up with me ; they attacked our advanced posts on the 6th and 7th, and were repulsed in both attempts with little loss on our side. I heard from the prisoners taken, that three divisions of the French army commanded by Marshal Soult were come up : I therefore expected to be at- tacked on the morning of the 8th. It was my wish to come to that issue ; I had perfect confidence in the valour of the troops, and it was only by crip- pling the Enemy that we could hope either to retreat or to embark unmolested. I made every preparation to receive the attack ; and drew out the army in the morning to offer battle. This was not Marshal Soult's object : he either did not think himself sufficiently strong, or he wished to play a surer game by attacking us on our march, or during our embarkation. The country was intersected, and his position too strong for me to attack with an inferior force. The want of provisions would not enable me to wait longer. I marched that night ; and in two forced marches, bivouacing for six or eight hours in the rain, I reached Betanzos on the 1 0th instant. * * ****** ****** ****** ****** At Lugo I was sensible of the impossibility of reaching Vigo, whidi was at too great a distance, and offered no advantages to embark in the face of an Enemy. My intention then was to have retreated to the peninsula of Betan- zos ; where I hoped to find a position to cover the embarkation of the army in Ares or Rodes Bays : but having sent an officer to reconnoitre it, by his report I was determined to prefer this place. I gave notice to the Admiral of my intention, and begged that the transports might be brought to Corunna. Had I found them here on my arrival on the 11th instant, the embarkation would easily have been effected ; for I had gained several marches on the * * * * * * * * * * 309 French. They have now come up with us, the transports are not arrived. My position in front of this place is a very bad one ; and this place, if I am forced to retire into it, is commanded within musket shot ; and the harbour will be so commanded by cannon on the coast that no ship will be able to lay in it. In short, my Lord, General Stewart will inform you how critical our situation is. It has been recommended to me, to make a proposal to the Enemy to induce him to allow us to embark quietly ; in which case, he gets us out of the country soon, and this place with its stores, &c. complete; that, otherwise, we have it in our power to make a long defence, which must en- sure the destruction of the town. I am averse to make any such proposal ; and am exceedingly doubtful if it would be attended with any good effect : but, whatever I resolve on this head, I hope your Lordship will rest assured, that I shall accept no terms that are in the least dishonourable to the Army, or to the Country. I find I have been led into greater length and more de- tail than I thought I should have had time for : I have written under inter- ruptions, and with my mind much occupied with other matter. My letter written so carelessly can only be considered as private ; when I have more leisure I shall write more correctly. In the mean time I rely on General Stewart for giving your Lordship the information and detail which I have omitted. I should regret his absence, for his services have been very distin- guished : but the state of his eyes makes it impossible for him to serve, and this country is not one in which Cavalry can be of much use. If I succeed in embarking the Army I shall send it to England — it is quite unfit for further service until it has been refitted, which can best be done there. ****** ** * * * * * # I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. 310 TRANSLATIONS OF LETTERS IN THE FRENCH LANGUAGE. From Mr. Frere to His Excellency/ Mr. De Garay. (See p. 56.) SIR, Aranjuez, 23 Nov. 1808. I HAVE thought it proper to address your Excellency, as a Member and Secretary of the Supreme Central Junta, a representation which appears to me too important not to be communicated to that Assembly through a person distinguished by their confidence, and by the important office he holds. I have received letters from Sir John Moore, which renders it necessary for me to recapitulate the complaints which he has addressed to me, and which he regrets he is not able to make in person at Aranjuez. He complains, in the first place, of the state of ignerance he is left in respecting the number and position of the Enemy's forces ; and even of the plans and operations of the campaign, to such a degree (he writes) that, when the very unmilitary evacuation of Valladolid by General Pignatelli took place, that Officer did not think it his duty to inform him of it. 311 The particulars of the march, and of the effective strength of the army of Estremadura, were Ukevvise for a long time unknown to him. The retreat of General Blake, and his subsequent retreat to Reynosa, he was also left ignorant of, until he learnt these events from Madrid. He continues in these words, " I am in no communication with any of the Spanish armies, " nor am I made acquainted with the plans either of the Government, or of " the Generals. Castanos, with whom I was put in correspondence, is dis- " missed from his command, at the moment I expected to hear from him ; " and Romana, with whom I suppose I now ought to correspond, is absent. " In the mean time the French, whose numbers I cannot learn, are only " four days' march distant from my army, which is only assembling. No " channel of information has been opened for me, and 1 have not been long " enough in the country to procure one for myself. I give you this infor- " mation, and I wish I could go myself to Aranjuez or Madrid, to make a " representation of it ; for, in truth, if things remain in this situation, the " ruin of the Spanish cause, and the defeat of their armies, is inevitable ; " and it will become my duty only to consider the safety of the British " Army, and to take measures to withdraw it from a situation where, " without the possibility of being useful, it is exposed to certain defeat." In answer to those observations respecting General Castanos and the Marquis of Romana, your Excellency informed me, to my great surprise, that orders had been sent, ten days before, to the Marquis of Romana to come and take the command of the Army of the Centre; and to leave that of the North, and of the Asturias, under the command of General Blake. It seems to me that a secret known to two-and-thirty persons (the number of the Junta) might have been trusted to the Minister of his Britannic Majesty, without any great additional risk of its being divulged ; although there had been no question of a fact so interesting, that the knowledge of it was necessary for a correspondence, upon which might depend the safety of the English army. It appeared to me that your Excellency was not insensible to the justice of this reflection ; to which I might have added, that the news of the entry of the French into Valladolid had been concealed from me ; and, when I enquired if there was any foundation for the rumour which mentioned it, I was answered, that no official news had arrived that day, except a report respecting the moving some pieces of artillery, I believe, to Segovia. It was impossible for me to think, after such an answer, that authentic accounts had actually brought certain information of the event respecting which I was demanding an explanation ; and that the fact was dissembled by an equivocation founded upon the non-arrival of the official dispatches fi-om the Commandant. The news of the defeat of General Blake, a piece of news which might have occasioned the total loss of the two divisions under General Moore and Sir David Baird, was undoubtedly communicated to me ; but not until the evening of the day which followed the arrival of the courier. I am far from feeling myself the slightest ill-humour towards persons extremely respectable, and who, both in their answers and in their silence, only follow the system which has been traced out to them ; but it is my duty to expostulate strongly against the continuation of a system which, without ensuring secrecy towards the Enemy, establishes distrust and mystery, instead of that confidence which should be the foundation of the united plans, on which the fate of the war must depend. I have learned with much pleasure the news of recalling the disorganizing Commission which had been sent to the Army of the Centre ; as well as that of nominating Mr. de Morla, with full powers to confer and conclude with our Officers, upon all business respecting an effective system of co-operation ; and I hope that these powers will be further enlarged, both as to execution and deliberation. The Courier which was sent to the Marquis of Romana will have undoubt- edly carried an order to communicate freely with General Sir John Moore. I cannot finish without thanking your Excellency for the attention with which, at a first conference, you listened to the particulars of a representa- tion so extremely disagreeable. I beg, &c. &c. J. H. Frere. 31.^ Ft'OtH Sh' John Moore to his Excelleucif the JIarqn't.s fa Romaiia. (Seep. 110.) MY LORD MARftUIS, Salamanca, 8 Dec 1608. I T.\KE the opportunity of writing to you througli the means of an Officer, whom I am going to dispatch to Sir D. Baird. I liave not yet received any certain information respecting Madrid ; but I have reason to beheve the people still hold out. A letter from the Junta of Toledo informs me, that it is their intention to assemble there a body of troops ; and that the people are determined to die sword in hand. General Castanos has received orders to retire upon Carolina, on the other side of the Sierra Morena. The people in this part of Spain are too lethargic ; they say they have no arms ; they stand in need of a head, to excite them, to unite them, and to command tliem. I propose, on the 10th inst. to make a movement upon Zamora and Toro, that I may be nearer General Baird and you. When I am informed what progress you have made in the organisation of your Army, we shall be able to concert measures together ; and I shall anxiously wait the reply to the letter which I had the honour to address to you on the 6th. Two General Officers were here a few days ago, sent by the Supreme .Junta. They did not appear to me to have either the a\ithorities or the information necessary for concerting any operation. I thought I could explain myself more satisfactorily to you, General, and I refused to enter upon any discussion with them. They were the Generals Escalante and B. General Bueno. I have the honour to be, &c. John Moore. s s 314 From the Marquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 120.) SIR, Head Quarters, Leon, Uth Dec. 1808. Your Excellency's two letters of the 6th and 8th inst, have explained to me the cause of the retrograde movements which you had di- rected, of the divisions of the army under your Excellency's command; which I think very just and well-founded. I shall not venture to reply to the subjects of your two letters till I can do it by means of an Officer, whom I will dispatch to-morrow to meet you at Zamora. In the mean while I shall prepare to effect the much-wished-for junction with Y. E, I have the honour to renew to Y. E. &c. &c. &c. The MARauis de la Romana. To the Marshal Duke ofDalmatia, commanding the 2d Corps of the Arrnij at Saldana. The Vice Constable Major General. (Seep. 121.) MARSHAL DUKE OF DALMATIA, Chatnartin, Dec. 10, 1809. I READ to the Emperor your letter of the fourth of De- cember, which was brought by one of your officers. His Majesty approves of all you have done. The 8th Regiment of Dragoons, the 22d of Chasseurs, the Regiment of Colonel Tascher, and the Hanoverian Regiment, form two 315 brigades, commanded by the Generals Belle and Franceschi. These two brio-ades are under your orders, and you can manopuvre them as you think proper. The Emperor is of opinion, that, with the division Merle, and the Division Mouton, together with the four regiments of ca^-alry, nothing can resist you. What are you to do r Take possession of Leon, drive back the enemy into Galicia, make yourself master of Benavente and Zamora. You can have no English in your front, for some of their regiments came to the Escurial and Salamanca, and every thing evinces that they are in full retreat. Our advanced guard is this day at Talavera de la Rejna, upon the road to Badajos, which it will reach soon. You clearly perceive that this move- ment must compel the English to hasten immediately to Lisbon, if they are not gone there already. The moment. Marshal, you are sure that the Eng- lish have retreated, of which there is every presumption, move forward with rapidity. There are no Spaniards who can resist your two divisions. Order shoes and great -coats to be made at Leon, St. Andero, and Palencia. His Majesty- grants every demand for improving your equipment. You may also require mules for your artillery, and horses to remount your cavalry; but let it all be done according to the regular forms of administration. It is possible that, as soon as the Dragoons of General Millar shall arrive in Spain, the Emperor will send them to you ; but this cannot happen these fifteen days. At the distance you are, ^Marshal Duke, you must direct your- self, and look upon all I write as only general instructions. His Majesty imagines that you will take every measure to reduce the country between the Duero, Galicia, and the Asturias ; always preserving most attentively St. Andero. The 5th corps, commanded by the Marshal Duke of Trevise, ha? received an order to direct its march to Saragossa. The 8th corps, under the Duke of Abrantes, whose 1st division arrived at Vittoria on the 12th, will probably receive orders to unite at Burgos. Gun-boats and armed vessels of every kind have orders to sail to St. Andero. Load them with confiscated English merchandize, cotton, wool, artillery, and send all to France. 316 In short, hold Valladohd and Zamora in subjection. ValladoHd is a good town, which has behaved well. It is thought to be very important to occupy Zamora. To conclude, the Emperor thinks that you can do what you please, as soon as the English retire to Lisbon. Five divisions of Castanos' best troops have been routed, with even less difficulty than you found in beating the Andalusian * army at Burgos. The wreck of Castanos' army is pursued by Marshal Bessieres ; who has cut them off from the road to Estremadura, and is pursuing them towai'ds Valentia, several marches beyond the Tagus. The Emperor's head-quarters are at Chamartin, a little country-seat a league and a half from Madrid, His Majesty enjoys an excellent state of health. The City of Madrid is quite tranquil ; the shops are all open, the public amusements are resumed, and there is not the least appearance of the first proposals having been strengthened by 4000 cannon-balls. The Prince of Neufchatel, Major-General. 1 will send you to-morrow a Proclamation, and some decrees of the Emperor ; in which you will recognise the style of him who was born to command the world. The Marquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 132.) SIR, Icon, Dec. I4th, 1808. From the forward movements which the army under Y. E.'s command is making, I am induced to dispatch my aide-de-camp, Mr. O'Niell, with this letter, which will inform you of the destination of * Mistaken for the Estrema'lurau army. 3T7 my army, and of my designs. I have now 20 thousand men present under arms, whom I have begun to clothe and to organise ; but mucli is still wanting to complete the work, and there are still at least two-thirds who are in want of clothing from head to foot. Almost the whole army are without havre-sacks, cartouche-boxes, and shoes ; and, notwithstanding all the exertions I have made to that elFect, I have not been able to succeed, the country oft'ering so few resources. I expect all these articles from day to day, but the distance which they are from this retards the execution of my orders. If the provinces were a little more zealous, I doubt not but the army would by this time be fit to act in concert with that of your Excellency. So much for the situation of my troops: I will now communicate to Y. E. my plans. If the Enemy were not in front of me, I should not a moment doubt the possibility of uniting my forces with your Excellency's, and of concerting a decisive attack upon the troops who now surround Madrid; but, according to the best information there is a division, from about 8 to 10 thousand men, which extends from Sahagun to Almanza; and whose object, as far as I can judge, is to check my army, and to keep open the communication with the Mountains of Santan- der. Its position is along the little river of Cea, and it occupies the villages of Sahagun, which strengthen its left; its principal corps is at Saldana, and its advanced posts at Cea and Almanza. From this last place they pusU their reconnoitring parties as far as Pedrosa, at the entrance of ^'^aldeburon ; and they expect to harass my left. As long as this corps remains in this position I cannot abandon mine ; both because I cannot expose nor abandon this country, from whence I draw large supplies of provisions, nor can I leave the Enemy a free passage to the Asturias, who would instantly take possession of this country, and threaten the passage into Calicia. As soon as I am able to manonivre, I intend to push forward the corps which is in my front ; *and at the same time Sir David Baird can shew the heads of columns in advancing from Benavente upon the road to Palencia. This combined movement will oblige this division of the Enemy to fall back upon Reynosa, or even upon Burgos. If we were once clear of this party, I do not think it would be difficult for your Excellency to join u?. as well as Sir 318 David Balrd. I should verj' much wish to have an intei-view with Y. E. we might then smooth many difficulties. If I can effect it without com- mitting any error here, I shall repair as soon as possible to Tordesillas, and I shall not fail to give you timely notice of it. I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c. &c. The MARftuis la Romana. From the Marquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 144.) SIR, Leon, Dec. I9th, 1808. I HASTEN to reply to your Excellency's letter of yesterday, dated from Castronuero, to explain to you, that although I thought of mak- ino- a retreat, it was only in consequence of the information which I received from Sir David Baird, and that otherwise it was far from my intention. I have placed my advanced posts so as to be able to retreat in good order ; and, if Marshal Soult's corps does not receive more considerable reinforcements, I have nothing to fear from my position, which is but temporary, and solely to reorganise the army. I should wish to co-operate with Y. E. in the movement you are about to make upon Sahagun, and I shall only wait to learn when Y. E. proposes putting it into execution — to begin my march. I shall order a body of light troops to go round by the Mountains of Leon to Guardo, whilst the principal part of my troops will march upon Ahnanza; and from thence, coasting the river Cea, I shall move upon Saldana, where Marshal Soult's corps is expected to be ; unless, as is reported, he has changed his position within these two days. The accounts say, that he has 3J9 left only 15OO men at Saldana ; and that he has filed off the rest towards Guardo, drawing nearer to the Mountains of Santander, which border upon Leon and the Asturias. After all, there is no great reliance to be placed upon the reports of the peasants, who are not very accurate in their obser- vations ; and are, besides, confounded by the continual marches and coun- ter-marches of the Enemy. I have the honour to acquaint Y. E. that the bridge and entrance of Saha- gun are barricadoed with carts. If your Excellency has formed any other plans I hope I shall be made acquainted with them, in the persuasion that I have no other wish than to act in concert with Y. E. in every thing, and to aid you, to my utmost, in all your operations. I think that, for the present, there should be no thoughts of a retreat ; but that we should feel the pulse of the Enemy, and oblige them to retire from the Capital. If Y. E. thinks it advisable, we might have an interview at Benavente, and it would perhaps be easier then to concert a plan of operations. I have this evening received letters from the Junta, dated from Merida, in Estremadura, on the 13th, in which they announce to me that the people at Madrid still hold out, that the French have been repulsed and beaten on their way to Saragossa, and that affairs are going on well in Catalonia. I beg Y. E. to accept the homage, &c. &c. &c. Marauis D£ la Romana. S20 From the DuJfC del Infant ado to If. E. J. II. Frcre. (See p. I47.) SIR, Cacnca, Dec. I3th, 180S. I THINK it my duty to announce to you, as our very good and faitliful Ally, that, having been sent to this Army of the Centre, to endeavour to hasten its arrival to the Capital, in order, if possible, to save it ; but not having been able to succeed in my design, and preparing in conse- quence to join the Supreme Junta, I have found mj'self obliged by the €»enerals, and forced by circumstances, to take the command of the Army, till I receive the decision of tlie Junta. It was unfortunately the spirit of insurrection and discontent among the soldiery which placed me at the post I now occupy ; and it is certainly a very disagreeable situation to have to correct iiweterate evils, and to set out with the measures necessary to re- establish that order and discipline which have been totally neglected. I cannot describe to you the state in which I found this body of famished troops, without shoes, most of them without uniforms, wanting ammunition, having lost the greatest part of their baggage, reduced to about 9 thousand infantry and two of cavalry, and, to crown all, having totally lost all confi- dence in their commanders. From these circumstances I thought it right to follow the plan adopted by my Predecessor, of coming to this mountainous country for a few days, in order to reorganise a little the troops ; to give an opportunity to some stragglei's and recruits to join me, to give shoes and repose to the men and horses, and then to set forward upon some new ope- rations. But it is very important for their success, that these should be in concert with those of the other armies, especially of the English ; and it would be, consequently, indispensably necessary, that we should mutually be made acquainted with each other's plans. Colonel Whittingham is ill at this moment, I should therefore wish that II. E. General Moore, the Com- 321 niander-in-Chief, should send me an experienced and confidential officer, who can give me an account of the plan adopted by the General for this campaign, and inform him of what we shall have agreed upon together, rela- tive to the part which this division of the Army can take in its execution. I shall be delighted if the choice should fall upon Colonel Graham, whom I had the honour of knowing at Mr. Stuart's. I know not. Sir, when this letter will reach you, for I am still ignorant where the Junta has stopped, or established itself; and I believe that you are with it. My letter will not be less the testimony of my sincerest affection, as well as the assurance of my highest esteem, With which I have the honour, &c. &c. &c. The Duke del Infantado. The Marquis of Rotnana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 15 7.) SIRj Leon, Dec. 21, 1808. I HAD the honour to write to you on the \Q\h, in reply to the letter which Y. E. remitted to me through my aide-de-camp, Mr. O'Niell; and, not having had any accounts since, I think it right to state, that I am desirous to co-operate in the attack which, it seems, it is Y. E.'s intention to make upon Saldana, that the success may be complete. The Enemy, when they have assembled all the forces which they have scattered about at all points in the surrounding parts, will have at the utmost, according to the best accounts I can obtain, from about 8 to 9 thousand infantry, and a thousand cavalry, with from 8 to 10 pieces of artillerj'. It would be of XT 322 great importance to surround this corps, and to destroy it, before its junc- tion with any other which Napoleon might send to reinforce it. If Y. E. determines upon this enterprise, I will make a movement with from 9 to 10 thousand men, of those which are best clothed and armed, all the rest being nearly naked, and very ill equipped. If Y. E. gives me a speedy reply, I will set out to-morrow ; but I have the honour to observe to you, that, when the blow is once struck, I must return to my winter-quarters, for want of clothing and equipments for my troops. However, it will be time enough to talk of this at our interview, as well as to concert the plan of operations which we are to follow. I am persuaded that the Enemy is not strong, and that all the disasters we have witnessed are owing to the want of union in the operations of our armies. I have been informed by an Officer of Engineers, whom the Junta of Zamora have sent back to me from having some slight suspicions of his conduct, that the army of Palafox has received no check, as the Enemy give out ; but that he has been obliged to fall back upon Saragossa, on account of Castanos' army having quitted Logrono, which he should not have abandoned. He gives very circumstantial details of the French army at Madrid, of the Em- peror, of Junot's division, and, in short, of particulars which I think it very necessary to acquaint Y. E. with, and from which it appears to me that we must absolutely have an interview. I have the honour, &c. &c. MARaUIS LA ROMANA. 323 Fro7H the 3Iarquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 162.) SIR, Leon, 22d Dec. 1808. A CONFIDENTIAL person whom I had placed on the river Duero has written to me, on the iSth instant, that he is assured, that the Enemy's troops posted at the Escurial are moving in this direction. He adds, that if the person who gave him this intelligence should not arrive the same day, he would go himself to Villacastin, twelve leagues from Madrid, to watch the two roads ; the one of which leads to Zamora, and the other to Sesrovia, I hasten to give this information to your Excellency, that j-ou may judge what measures are requisite to be taken. 1 have the honour, &c. The MARauis of Romana. From the Marquis of Romana to Sir John Moore. (See p. 1G3.) Mansilla, 23cJ Dec. SIR, ihree o'clock in the evening, I HAVE the honour to inform you of my arrival here with the troops which I intend to employ as auxiliaries to your movement. I have only been able to lead out 7000 infantry, 120 cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery. The troops are cantoned in the space of a league and 324 a quarter round this town. The advanced posts are towards Saldana, ex- cept one corps, which I have sent to Villarmimio, three leagues distant from Cea. I shall wait for your answer, and shall not begin to inarch until your Excellency has communicated to me your plan and intentions. I request a positive answer, to enable me to send orders at an early hour to the troops. I have the honour to be, &c. The MARauis of Romana. THE END. ERRATUM. p. 287, 1. 19, for Licut.-Col. NuU read Lieut.-Col. Hull. JOHN NICHOLS and SON, Printers, Red Lion Passage, Fleet Street, London. ■ ■■-r^ir* a T»Tr UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Los Angeles This book is DUE on the last date stamped beloit'. Form L9-37m-3.'57(C5424s4)444 UCSOUTMEBN REGION'! "■'"■■"■ n-nm D 000 716 984 I ■»DC 232 M78n