MP-NRLF B 3 ^7 Tfl II llllll 1 LIBRARY OK Till University of California. RECEIVED BY EXCHANGE Class THE REVIVAL OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY THE REVIVAL OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY JOSEPH LOUIS PERRIER, Ph.D. Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirf.ments for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University ■ ^ «F THfc ^** UNIVERSITY NEW YORK 1909 Copyright, 1909 By The Columbia University Press Printed from type March, 1909 press of Thi New era printing Company Lancaster. Pa PEEFACE The present work consists of two parts, the first of which may be described as definitional; the second, as historical. The first part (Chapters I to VIII) is not intended to be a complete course of Scholastic philosophy. I limit myself to an exposition and a discussion of those principles of Scholasticism, a knowledge of which is indispensable to an understanding of the Scholastic revival. For an adequate knowledge of Scholas- tic philosophy, I would refer my readers to the masterly exposi- tions of Urraburu, Merrier, and the Jesuits of Stonyhurst. The shorter treatises of Ginebra and Pecsi are also excellent. In the historical part, I have divided the speculative world into races rather than into political divisions. I have thus in- cluded German Austria in the chapter on Germany and devoted a separate section to Hungary. I have likewise studied South American republics in connection with the neo-Scholastic move- ment in Spain. It is into races, rather than into arbitrary tracts of land, that the world is divided. In spite of the ridicu- lous principle we call the Monroe doctrine, South American nations are and will always be essentially Spanish. With Spain they speak, they think and they pray. They regard us as stran- gers, sometimes as barbarians. They emphatically refuse to accept the protection we would force upon them. In completing this second part, I have derived considerable help from the following works : Gonzalez's Historic! dc la Filosof'ui. Blanc's Histoire de la Philosophic ei pariiaUieremeni de la Philosophic content poraine, Besse's Deux centres dn mouvement thomiste, Gomez [zquierdo'e Historia de In FUosofia del siglo XIX, v VI Ferreira-Deusdado'e La Philosophic thomiste en Portugal, van Becelaere'a La Philosophie en Am&rique, Garcia V Tomismo y Neoiotnis?no, Valverde Telle//? historical works. I tender my sincere thanks to the friends who have assisted me in the preparation of this book. In particular, I acknowl- edge my obligation to Professor John Dewey, of Columbia University. New York, April, 1908. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I What is Scholastic Philosophy? Sect. 1 : Scholastic Philosophy 14 Sect. 2 : Neo-Scholastic Philosophy 34 CHAPTER II Scholastic Logic 41 CHAPTER III Scholastic Metaphysics Sect. 1 : Existence of Metaphysics 46 Sect. 2 : Scholastic Theory of Act and Potency 49 Sect. 3 : Scholastic Theory of Substance 52 Sect. 4: Scholastic Theory of Cause 68 CHAPTER IV Scholastic Cosmoi-ogy Sect. 1 : Chief Hypotheses as to the Constitution of Matter 82 Sect. 2 : Nature and Properties of Primordial Matter 86 Sect. 3 : Nature and Properties of the Substantial Form 95 Sect. 4: Modern Science and the Constitution of Matter 100 CHAPTER V Scholastic Psychology Sect. 1 : Theory of Abstraction 110 Sect. 2: Nature of the Human Soul 115 Sect. 3: Locus of the Human Soul 121 CHAPTER VI Scholastic N'atikal Theology Natural and Revealed Theology 126 Proofs of God's Existence 127 Attributes of God 131 Sect. 1 Sect. 2 Sect. 3 CHAPTER VII Scholastic Moral Philosophy 136 CHAPTER VIII FOBEBUNXEBS OF THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC RlYIVAI 153 vii Vlll I KAPTER IX Tin Xi:<> Scholastic Revival in Italy 158 CHAPTER X The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Spain, Pobtugax and Spanish America Sect. 1 Sect. 2 Sect. 3 Sect. 4 The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Spain 174 The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Portugal 183 The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Mexico 185 The Neo-Scholastic Revival in South America 191 CHAPTER XI The Neo-Scholastic Revival in (Jermaxy and Aimria 196 CHAPTER XII The Neo-Scholastic Revival in France 203 CHAPTER XIII The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Belgium 215 CHAPTER XIV The Neo-Scholastic Revival in otheb European Countries Sect. 1 : The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Hungary, Bohemia and the Netherlands 224 Sect. 2: The Neo-Scholastic Revival in England 228 CHAPTER XV The Neo-Scholastic Bevival in the United States and Canada Sect. 1: The Neo-Scholastic Revival in the United States 232 Sect. 2: The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Canada '_M4 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC LITERATURE . . 249 INTRODUCTION" One of the movements that have excited the interest of the world of thought in the nineteenth century has been the revival of Scholasticism. The philosophy of the Middle Ages had been, for centuries past, buried in deepest oblivion. It had been con- sidered inconsistent with the development of natural science; and all, philosophers as well as scientists, deemed it dead — a most fitting end. It appeared to us, in the dim light of history, as an ill-shapen monster, which had wandered in the darkness of night, amid philters and mysterious juices, during the ages in which men seriously considered alchemy and the philosopher's stone. But the monster, thought we, had disappeared forever at the light of modern discoveries, like the ill-omened bird of night, which cannot abide the rays of the morning sun. Suddenly, to the astonishment of all, Scholasticism has awaked from its slumber. It has appeared again in the face of the world, has been accepted by great minds, has been expounded and defended by powerful writers, and has given rise to a great number of interesting philosophical works. Its admirers have even tried, not only to prove its congruity with modern scien- tific results, but to show that it is the only system capable of explaining them. As was to be expected, such a revival has met with the most severe criticism. Fricdrich Paulsen, in the introduction to his work Immarwel Kant, comparing Scholasticism with the Kant- ian system, expresses himself thus: "If Scholastic philosophy is at preseni experiencing a kind of revival in the school of Catholicism, this is due, not so much to its own inner vitality as to its supposed fitness to serve an ecclesiastical political system, which, through the favor of cir- cumstances, — patientia I>. ">. 11 in all cases of disagreement between a philosophical principle and a theological dogma, the philosophical principle must be rejected. The only true system of philosophy will, therefore, be in per- fect harmony with the body of revealed truths. That Scholastic philosophy is not the only system capable of being harmonized with religious dogmas, we have already shown. This is why, after the speculative principles of the Middle Ages were judged inadequate to meet the requirements of modern science, most Catholics embraced other systems. But these systems have not possessed the character of immutability which, in the mind of Catholics, necessarily belongs to truth. Not only this. The philosophical systems which have been successively accepted in European speculation have departed — or have been believed to depart, which, for the point we are now discussing, amounts to the same — more and more from the essential principles of Christianity. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the materialism of the encyclopedists was the only philosophy still remaining in France. It was openly professed by Cabanis, Broussais, Pinel and Bichat. It had displaced Cartesianism itself, though a very limited number of ecclesiastics still adhered to that system. At the same time, some of the emigrants whom the ferocity of the Revolution had compelled to seek a refuge abroad, were coming in contact with new-born Kantism, which they were destined to introduce into their native land. It seems, at first blush, that the philosophy thus growing in Germany was more in harmony with the great truths of Chris- tianity than the impious materialism of the eighteenth century. Whether the philosophical systems of Kant and his successor may be interpreted from a Christian standpoint is a question which has been frequently discussed and does not admit of an easy solution. It is well known that the modern defenders of Hegelian philosophy in America invoke St. Thomas's authority in support of their principles. 19 For my part. I feel inclined " C'f. Koyoe. The ( '<>nrr|>t ion of (iod. p. 40; Harris, Hegel's Logic, p. ix. 12 to admit thai their claim is not altogether devoid of foundation. Although St. Thomas and Hegel present evident points of con- trast, it may he seriously questioned whether there exists between the systems they have built that abyss which neo-Scholastics are wont to point out. Whatever the truth may be, there is no doubt that Kant and Hegel have been invariably regarded by Catholics as the most dangerous opponents of the fundamental Christian principles. " More than any other philosophical sys- tem, says Jules Didiot, Kantism has been a serious menace to faith and natural virtues in Catholic countries." 20 Didiot is more severe still with regard to Hegelianism : "If he (Hegel) has not intended to mock at his pupils, at his readers, at his predecessors in subjectivism and monism, we must admit that his mind was at times in a state of delirium. It is a shame for the nineteenth century not to have rejected such a philosophy with indignation. . . . That Protestant min- isters in Germany may have endeavored to harmonize the doc- trines of Hegel and Schelling, of Fichte and Kant, with the dogmas and laws of Christianity, can perhaps be conceived; but that Catholic priests, such as Hermes, Baader, Gunther, may have dared imitate them, even from afar and with a certain moderation, is indeed hard to understand." 21 This influence of Hegel among German Catholics, so vividly deplored by Didiot, was indeed a fact in the first half of the nineteenth century. The Holy See was obliged to interfere. Hermes's doctrines were condemned in 1835 and 1836, Giinth- er's in 1857 and 1860, Frohschammer's in 1862, pantheism and all forms of rationalism by the Syllabus of 1864. Meanwhile, some distinguished French writers had endeavored to oppose the anti-religious tendency of the day, and to build systems of thought in harmony with the spiritualistic doctrines of the Catholic Church. Joseph de Maistre, Victor de Bonald and Felicite de Lamennais sincerely sought a new method by which Christian beliefs might be saved and impiety checked. " in Bifecle, p. :*77. ■ Ibid., p. 389. 13 Unhappily, they endeavored to build a monument to faith upon the ruins of reason. The ultimate criterion of certitude they sought in a primitive revelation. But as the truth of this reve- lation could not rest upon our mental faculties, which had been proclaimed impotent, it had no sure basis and the brave effort of the traditionalists was doomed to become in the end a lament- able failure. Traditionalism was finally condemned by the Church, and, in 1855, its last great representative, Bonnetty, was compelled to subscribe to four propositions opposed to the errors he had maintained. It is in such circumstances that the Catholic Church seriously thought of returning to the old Scholastic doctrine. An honest endeavor to seek the true philosophy in modern systems had been made for several centuries. But, from a Catholic standpoint, this endeavor had completely failed. The systems which had arisen in the course of time had been gradually abandoned and replaced by others, so that, as pointed out by Cornoldi, there had been a continuous change in the speculative world. The most recent systems, Materialism, Kantism, Hegelianism, Posi- tivism, were opposed to the Catholic faith. The influence of these systems had led many Catholics to advance dangerous theories. A system born of the laudable intention to protect the religious ideals had been a decided failure. Such being the case, was it not better to return frankly to the philosophy which had reigned for centuries in the schools, to endeavor to reconcile it with modern discoveries, to find out whether the old Scholas- tic philosophy was not the true system which, for so long a time, had been sought in vain? Such is. in my judgment, the fundamental idea which inspired the neo-Thomists. CHAPTER I WHAT IS SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY? Section I. — Scholastic Philosophy The word o-^oXacrTt/co? was already in use among the Greeks to denote a man devoted to study. Ueberweg notes it in a letter of Theophrastus to Phanias. 1 Petronius seems to have intro- duced it among the Eomans. Under Quintilian it meant a rhetor or professor of eloquence, and we read in St. Jerome that it was granted as a title of distinction to Serapio for his unusual talent. At the opening of the Mediaeval schools, the term was soon restricted to a purely didactic meaning. The scholasticus became the instructor, and the system of thought expounded in the cathedra, the Scholastic philosophy. A distinguished French scholar, Barthelemy Haureau, based upon this etymology a definition of Scholastic philosophy which has been generally accepted; and, on the whole, is the best we now possess: Scholastic philosophy is the philosophy professed in the schools of the Middle Ages, from the establishment of these schools to the day in which the outside philosophy, the spirit of novelty disengaged from the bonds of tradition, came to dispute with it, and withdraw from its control the minds of men. " La philosophic scolastique est la philosophic professee dane les ecoles du moyen age depuis Petablissement jusqu'au 0. 14 15 Before we proceed to examine the difficulties to which this definition gives rise, it will not be amiss to make a few observa- tions, in order to dispel all possible misunderstandings. First of all, it seems that the etymological considerations which lead us to identify Scholasticism with Mediaeval thought, ought to make us step beyond the limits of the Middle Ages, and extend our definition to modern schools as well. If it is the meaning of the words that guides us, there is no reason why the philosophy taught from the cathedra of Koenigsberg by the author of the Critique of Pure Reason should be any less scho- lastic than the systems of Duns Scotus or Thomas Aquinas. And, indeed, some writers, following this conception, speak of an Hegelian, a Cousinian, a Schopenhauerian Scholasticism. The ridiculous outcome of this view is obvious to every eye. It transforms into Scholastics all our university teachers. It makes Scholastic philosophy co-extensive, not only with the doc- trines of Kant, Hegel, Cousin and Schopenhauer, but with all modern idealistic systems; nay, with the whole field of philo- sophical thought. What system has not been expounded from a professor's chair? What philosopher has not seen his doc- trines espoused in some center of learning? And we would thus be compelled to enlarge without limit the field of Scholas- ticism, to open its gate, not only to Hegel or to William James, but also, and with equal right, to Descartes and to Berkeley. And yet, were etymology our sole guide, we should accept this view, strange though it appear. But the original significance of a word does not suffice to give us the key to its actual mean- ing. According to John Locke, men seem to have been guided by wit rather than by judgment in the formation of names; and a great discrepance has thus often come to exist between the connotation of a term and its etymology. The Greek word irpoftaTov. which signifies sheep, is derived from the verb 7r/>o/9atW, to walk forward. Still, no one would think of applying the word sheep to all beings walking forward, to include under that name, not only all our domestic animals, all denizens of the la water ii Ti *1 the ;iir. save crabs and crawfishes, but our own Belves. Scholastic philosophy was originally the philosophy of the schools; and. as the name was given during the Middle Ages, it was applied to all Mediaeval schools. When, at the beginning of the modern era, thought was suddenly engaged in another direction, and controlled by men who did not expound their principles from a professor's chair, a new philosophy arose, which was not scholastic, and which, after having controlled the minds of the new generation, took possession of the schools themselves, and dethroned the old philosophy, which, for cen- turies past, had exercised an undisputed sovereignty upon the intelligences. The philosophy of the schools thus ceased to be Scholastic, and the term acquired a definite meaning, and was henceforward exclusively applied to denote Mediaeval specu- lation. Scholastic philosophy, thus confined to a definite time, must also be limited with regard to space. It would be absurd to extend it to all the systems which arose in any point of our globe between the sixth and the fifteenth century, to make it embrace, not only the philosophical systems of the Arabs and the Jews, but also those of the Hindoos and of the Chinese. It must be limited to the speculation of the western world, which, in spite of numerous internal divergences, of many distinct and definite currents, formed a single whole, of which Paris was the center, which soon found in Aristotle an inspirer and a prophet, and in the dogmas of the Church a cynosure to direct the human mind in the perilous and unexplored regions it had so resolutely entered. Our definition may be objected to upon the ground that it leaves us in total ignorance as to the import of the system we define. 1 1 does not throw any light upon its essential charac- ter, and may even be regarded as simply tautological, as equiva- lent to the statement that the Mediaeval philosophy is the phi- losophy of the Middle Ages. We readily admit that, in defining Scholastic philosophy as the philosophy of the Middle Ages, we 17 do not pretend to give what logicians would call an essential definition. But, is it possible to give an essential definition of a system of thought? Can we enclose within the narrow com- pass of a definition the essential characteristics of a philosophy ? It is related that Hegel, having been asked to give a brief exposi- tion of his system, answered that it was not a thing that could be said in a few words. An essential definition of a philosophy is bound to be incomplete, and, in so far, erroneous. Mr. Maurice de Wulf who, in his remarkable work on neo-Scholas- ticism, has objected to Haureau's definition on account of its failure to give an insight into the Scholastic doctrine, has not been able to give the essential definition which the first chapters of his book had led us to expect. In point of fact, he has given no definition at all. He has exposed, in 64 octavo pages, what he considers the essential characteristics of Scholastic philoso- phy, has summed up his exposition in a description which con- tains no less than 242 words, telling us that such a definition is still incomplete, that it contains only a few of the characters of Scholastic philosophy, and that an integral definition should comprise them all. 3 An attempt at a more acceptable essential definition has been made quite recently by Mr. Elie Blanc. He has defined Scho- lastic philosophy as a spirit, a method and a system: " II peut done sembler que la philosophic scolastique est d'abord un esprit : elle est nee chez les Peres de l'Eglise et leurs successeurs du juste souci d'accorder la raison et la foi. Elle est ensuite une methode rigoureuse, empruntee surtout a Aris- tote, telle qu'il la fallait pour realiser cet accord. Enfin elle aboutit a un systeme toujours perfectible, dont los bases se trou- vent surtout dans l'ceuvre de saint Thomas." 4 Concerning this definition, I shall make the following re- marks : * Cf . De Wulf, Introduction a la philosophic neo-scolastique, pp. 191- 192. 4 Blanc, Dictionnaire de philosophic anciennc, nioderne et contem- poraine, art. Scolastique. 3 / 18 If, for the sake of brevity, we limit ourselves to saying that Scholastic philosophy is a spirit, a method and a system, our definition is not essential, because it leaves us in a complete ignorance as to what that spirit, that method and that system are; and is also worthless, because it can be applied to all phi- losophies, inasmuch as they all possess a spirit, follow a method, and constitute a definite system. It is true that Mr. Blanc explains what the spirit, the method and the system are. But the method is an extrinsic and unessential character. The spirit, consisting in a just endeavor to harmonize reason and faith, is extrinsic also. It simply refers to the relation Scholas- tic philosophy bears to another science, and ignores the funda- mental principles of Scholasticism as a philosophy. Finally, the description of the Scholastic system as a perfectible system, whose bases are found chiefly in St. Thomas, equally fails to give us an insight into the contents of Scholastic philosophy. It does not tell us what the system is, what distinguishes it from modern thought, what constitutes it as a philosophy. Mr. Blanc's definition is no essential definition at all. Moreover, does Mediaeval philosophy possess any distinctive eharacter, any idiosyncrasy which sets it apart from ancient as well as from modern thought? We fully realize that we here approach a difficult question, which has been already studied from different points of view, and not yet been satisfactorily answered. Some writers have thought they could solve the difficulty by simply saying that Scholastic philosophy is no philosophy at all. This view was professed by the French encyclopedists of the eighteenth century, who no doubt had powerful personal motives of dislike for Mediawal speculation. They pitied all who lose their time in the study of such vain subtleties, and Diderol went so Ear as to say of Duns Scotus that a man who would know all that he has written would know nothing. This kind of shallow contempt soon spread over all Europe. It became a point of fashion to deride the cloisters and the 19 monks. The ass gloried in the kick he could give to the dying lion. In the second half of the eighteenth century, Briicker spoke of the introduction of Aristotle's philosophy into Europe as the signal of the most complete intellectual degeneration. More recently, Taine has given the epoch of the great masters of the thirteenth century as an age of stupidity : " Three cen- turies at the bottom of this black pit did not add a single idea to the human mind." 5 Mr. Penjon has described the period which elapsed between the edict of Justinian (529) and the Renaissance as a sort of entr'acte during which there was no philosophy. 6 Hegel himself, whose system presents so striking a resemblance with those of the Scholastics that one might be tempted to believe he has borrowed directly from them, does not hesitate to profess the same contempt. Speaking of Scho- lastic philosophy, he says : " It is not interesting by reason of its matter, for we cannot remain at the consideration of this; it is not a philosophy." 7 After modern erudition has had the courage to go back to the much-despised era, and to remove the dense veil of ignorance which covered the works of its thinkers; after such men as Cousin, Haureau and Picavet have displayed to the world the treasures of philosophical learning which lay concealed in those dusty folios, the superficial disdain of the preceding generation has disappeared, covered with shame. Men have repudiated the idea of a Mediaeval entr'acte, and have understood that the " dark ages " are not dark in themselves, but are dark simply for us on account of our ignorance. There being thus nowadays no possibility of abiding by what the Germans have called: dcr Sprung iibcr dan Mittelait&r, and Scholastic philosophy being evidently something, the necessity of determining precisely what it is imposes itself upon us. And here the difficulty lies. •Taine, Histoire de la litterature anglaise, t. 1, pp. 223-225. 8 Penjon, Precis d'histoire de la philosophic, pp. 166. Of. De Wulf, op. cit., pp. 1 1 ir. ' Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 3, p. 38. 20 It is unnecessary to say that Mediaeval philosophy is not a single system. Embracing, as it does, several centuries of incredible intellectual activity, it must needs present that variety of opinions which is the invariable concomitant of all human speculation. A rapid glance at the whole field of Mediaeval thought will not be out of place here, and will furnish us with an insight into the essential characteristics of Scholastic philoso- phy. We shall first examine the problem which has often been regarded as comprising within its limits the whole drift of Scholastic discussions : the problem of universals. Mr. de Wulf has recently blamed Haureau for regarding it as the sole Scho- lastic problem. And indeed we agree with the distinguished professor of Louvain in admitting that the Mediaeval thinkers did not confine their investigations to a single particular ques- tion, but embraced the whole field of philosophy. The problem of universals should not, however, be undervalued, as it contains in germ, not only the Mediaeval systems of thought, but likewise the answers which, in modern times, have been given to all great problems of philosophy. If we start from nominalistic principles, if we admit with Roscelin that the universal is a mere name, a mere flatus vods, and that nothing but the individual is real, the outcome of our philosophy will be materialism and phenomenalism. We will at first admit with John Stuart Mill that "a class, a universal, a genus or a species is neither more nor less than the individual substances themselves which are placed in the class; and that there is nothing real in the matter except those objects, a com- mon name given to them, and common attributes indicated by the name." 8 We shall next be bound to extend our theory to the relation of the whole and its parts; and — inasmuch as the whole bears to the parts the relation of a universal to a particu- lar— we shall have to maintain that the parts alone possess reality and are themselves wholes. When Abelard, in his letter to the bishop of Paris, accused Roscelin of implicitly holding •J. S. Mill. System of Logic, Bk. 2, chap. 2, sect. 2. 21 that Jesus, instead of eating, as the Gospel says, a part of a fish, ate a part of a word, he was undoubtedly wrong. Rosce- lin's assertion that the universal was a mere word did not bind him to admit that the fish was a mere word. But it compelled him to profess that the fish as such had no reality; that it was nothing but a complex of ultimate beings, or molecules; and that Jesus ate a certain number of those molecules, which could be called parts of a fish only in virtue of our mental propensity to build those universals which are absolutely devoid of reality. Nominalism thus leads us to materialism. It is radically opposed to the belief that the universe is a whole, and cannot admit any other absolute than the molecules, the atoms, the ultimate divisions of matter, by whatever name we may choose to call them. And if, from the objective, we pass to the subjective field, we shall see that nominalism is likewise the ancestor of empiricism and phenomenalism. In the realm of mind, as well as in the realm of matter, the individual will be the ultimate reality. There will be no soul-substance lying beyond our mental states, but fugitive impressions, each of which will possess its own inde- pendent existence. Experiences of memory themselves will have no validity apart from the present instant, and we shall be bound to admit what Mr. Josiah Royce has described under the name of Mysticism. As Roscelin applied his doctrine to the mystery of the Holy Trinity; and, in agreement with his principles, concluded that the oneness of the three divine persons is not real; that the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost are not one God, but three Gods, he was formally condemned at the Council of Soissons, in 1092, and Nominalism was thus killed for more than two cen- turies, and did not reappear till the days of Ockam. Realism, in its most extreme form, had been professed by Plato; and, as the first period of Mediaeval speculation was decidedly Platonic, extreme Realism, in Bpite of its pantheistic tendencies, became the orthodox belief. It must be observed 22 here that Mediaeval realism has nothing in common with what we call nalism to-day. It is the doctrine that the universal is not merely a mental construction, but possesses an objective reality: is, in point of fact, the only reality. Plato, as is well known, had taught that the real world is the world of ideas, and that the phenomenal world, our own world, possesses reality only in so far as it participates in the truth of the ideal world. This view, if logically followed out, will lead us to the conclusion that reality is of a mental nature. We shall be bound to admit with Hegel that " What is reasonable is actual, and wdiat is actual is reasonable." We shall be incapable of avoiding mon- ism in its most extreme form. If the universal possesses an objective reality, then being is real; and, as the universal term being can be applied to all things whatsoever, we shall have to admit that a being exists which contains all reality within itself. It is to realism therefore that most of the pantheistic systems of the Middle Ages must be traced back. Prior to the formulation of the problem of universale, Scotus Erigena had already maintained that God is more than a creator, that he is in all things as their sole substance : " Cum ergo audimus Deum omnia facere, nihil aliud debemus intelligere quam Deum in omnibus esse, hoc est, essentiam omnium subsis- tere. Ipse enim solus per se vere est, et omne quod vere in his quae sunt dicitur esse ipse solus est." 9 In spite of the incongruity of this view with the teaching of the Church — an incongruity which eventually led to the condem- nation of Erigena's work in 1225, Pantheism again developed under the shadow of the traditional realistic doctrine, the an- tiijua ilnclrina, as Abelard had called it, displayed itself more 01 less timidly, according to the propitiousness of the times and the boldness of its supporters, and reached a definite form and expression in the teachings of the great Pantheistic school, which nourished al the end of the twelfth century, and counted •Scotus Erigena, !)<■ Divisione Nature, cap. 72. 23 as distinguished members as Bernard of Tours, Amaury of Bene and David of Dinant. Closely connected with Platonic realism are also the Mediaeval mystics. Mysticism, or the doctrine that the real is the imme- diately felt, is, as we have seen, the logical outcome of nominal- ism. It is interesting to notice that Mediaeval mysticism was reached by the opposite way. If we start from the assumption that the universal alone is real, we will be led to the conclusion that God alone possesses reality, and that everything else is mere worthless appearance. In what will man's perfection and final end then consist? Simply in the immediate union with the One, the Being, in whom all reality is centered; in a supreme contempt for all terrestrial things; in the rejection of all pro- fane learning, of philosophy itself. And we have thus, in a nut- shell, the line of reasoning followed by Mediaeval mystics. It was out of the teaching of William of Champeaux at the abbey of St. Victor that the mystic movement grew. Strength- ened by the condemnation of Abelard (1121), openly protected by St. Bernard, Mysticism found remarkable adherents in the whole Victorine school. Human reason was mercilessly con- demned, dialectic was characterized as the devil's art, and Abe- lard, Peter Lombardus, Gilbert de la Porree and Peter of Poi- tiers were denounced as "the four labyrinths of France," 10 because " they had treated with scholastic levity of the ineffable Trinity and the Incarnation." Pantheistic doctrines having been repeatedly anathematized by the Church — as in the Council of Paris, in 1210, in which the teachings of David and Amaury were condemned and their works proscribed — and Aristotle having supplanted Plato as the inspirer and the guide of Mediaeval thinking, there appeared a modified form of realism, which had been already foreshadowed by St. Anselm, and probably also by Abelard, and which has remained since then the otlieial Scholastic doctrine. Albert of ,0 In Walter of St. Victor's In Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae. Cf. Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 302 ff. 24 Bollstadt, usually known as Albert the Great, must be credited with its firsl satisfactory formulation. He distinguished three kinds of aniversals: First, the universale ante rem, existing in the mind of God; second, the universale in re, existing in the external object; third, the universale post rem. existing in the known subject. This new form of realism, which escapes the extravagant issues of nominalism and extreme realism, has been too often ignored by modern writers, who have represented Scholastics as adhering en ?nasse to the tenets of Plato and William of Cham- peaux. The new theory denies the existence of the universal as such outside the mind; but it admits in the object a potential universal, which may be regarded as the foundation, fun da men - \ turn in re, of the universal concept of the mind. There does not exist, as Plato maintained, an ideal man which contains the reality shared in a greater or less degree by all individual nun : there exist only Peter, James and John; but there is in Peter, as well as in John and James, a peculiar nature, an essence by which they are individuals of their own — not of another — spe- cies. The universal ceases to be a word devoid of meaning; it designates the very essence of the thing itself. The ideal world of Plato did not, however, completely vanish. It appeared in a new form which it had already assumed at the beginning of the Christian era. The world of ideas became the Divine Mind; and the essences of all things were regarded as ! preexisting in the essence of God, as reflecting more or less exactly the divine perfections. God's essence was thus described as the causa exemplaris, the infinite prototype of all reality. This is the meaning of Albert's universale ante rem. Besides moderate realism, there arose between Platonic real- ism and nominalism another intermediate theory, known as con- ceptual ism. The conceptualists were at one with the nominal - ists in denying all objective reality to the universal ; but, whereas the nominalists saw nothing in the universal hut a meaningless name, the conceptualists recognized its validity as a concept. 25 They admitted that the universal is real and has a meaning, but only in the mind. Abelard has been regarded for a long time as the promoter of this view. The works of Kemusat and Cousin would rather lead us to regard him as a moderate realist. At all events, conceptualism presents a striking historical inter- est on account of its resemblance with the Kantian philosophy. It dissociates the mental concepts from the outside reality. It shows that the synthetical unity of apperception is the product of the mental categories, and does not agree with the thing-in- itself, which remains unknown and unknowable. The problem of universals has thus led us through all Medi- aeval systems of thought, and might likewise lead us through the whole field of modern speculation. There are, however, in the Middle Ages, as well as in modern philosophy, some ques- tions which do not present so close a connection with the nom- inalistic and realistic principles. Prominent among them is the dispute as to the superiority of the intellect or of the will. Thomas Aquinas was an intellectualist ; Duns Scotus was a voluntarist. His philosophy bears to that of the Angelic Doctor the relation that Kant's system bears to the system of Hegel. The rapid survey of Mediaeval thought we have just made, however incomplete it may be, is more than sufficient to prove that Scholastic philosophy is not properly a system. Most of modern systems, as we have seen, are either openly professed by some Mediaeval philosopher or implicitly contained in his prin- ciples. What is Scholastic philosophy then? Does it present any character by which it may be distinguished from modern thought? To this question various answers have been made, all containing a certain amount of truth, most of them being never- theless incomplete. Some authors have defined Scholastic philosophy in terms of its language and methods. They have claimed that the syllog- ism was the favorite instrument of Mediaeval thought; vain subtleties and endless distinctions its chief characteristics. Ac- cording to Mr. John Dewey, one definition of Scholasticism is: 26 "any mode of thought characterized by excessive refinement and subtlety; the making of formal distinctions without end and without special point."" These views are true to a certain extent. Syllogism was regarded hy Mediaeval philosophers, and is still regarded by some of their contemporary followers, as the most efficient form of argumentation. The syllogistic form, however, is simply a garb with which the schoolmen chose to clothe their ideas, and which they might have discarded without any essential change in their philosophy. It is a garb which is not peculiar to them alone. Besides the fact that all modern systems of philosophy could be presented in the syllogistic form without becoming scholastic, it must be borne in mind that Leibniz not only praised the syllogism, but used it in his discussions; that Spinoza ex- pounded his philosophy in a form surpassing in strictly syllogis- tic, mathematical character, all that had been written during the Middle Ages. As for vain subtlety, it is certainly a most common blemish in the works of the schoolmen, a real defect, which often mars their most beautiful pages. But the student of post-Kantian idealism, who has been compelled to go over the works of Fichte, Hegel and Bradley, is little tempted to regard vain subtlety as a character peculiar to Scholasticism. He who has tried to clear the Fichtean statement that "the reciprocal activity and passivity determines the independ- ent activity and the independent activity determines the recipro- cal activity and passivity " ; its immediate consequence, namely that " the independent activities of the Ego and Non-Ego do aol reciprocally determine each other directly, hut only indirectly, through their reciprocally determined activity and passivity"; and that 11 In Baldwin's Diet, of Philosophy and Psychology; art. Scholasticism. Another definition of -Mr. Dewey's will be discussed in this chapter. 27 " the law of reciprocal determination is valid only in so far as related to the reciprocal activity and passivity and independent activity; but is not valid as related to the independent activity alone " ; who has followed the author in the intricate applications of his principles under the conceptions of causality and substantiality; who has lost himself in that baffling labyrinth of distinctions and sub-distinctions which cover more than sixty pages of the Wissenschaftslehre; who has finally got the conviction that this eccentric and repulsive show of analysis amounts to little more than nothing, can hardly accuse the Scholastics of monopolizing subtlety. Applying to Fichte a word which Diderot said of Duns Scotus, he will assert with no more hesitation and with more justice than the French encyclopedist, that he who would know the whole Wissenschaftslehre would know nothing. Another theory, more widely accepted, has defined Scholastic philosophy by its relation to theology. A formula, current dur- ing the Middle Ages, and regarding philosophy as ancilla theo- logian, has been produced; and Scholastic philosophy has been either identified with theology or characterized by its professed agreement with the dogmas of the Church. The complete-identification-theory has been openly professed by Hegel. " The Scholastic philosophy, says he, is thus really theology, and this theology is nothing but philosophy." 12 The same view has been adopted, in a slightly modified form, by Victor Cousin in his Histoire generale de la philosophie, and the fact that it has been recently maintained by men professing so divergent philosophical beliefs as Alfred Weber in Germany, George Tyrrell in England, and John Dewey in this country, shows that it is far from being as yet completely dead : "The Church,"' says Weber, " is the predominant power of the Middle Ages. Outside of the Church, there can be no salvation and no science. The dogmas formulated by her represent the truth. From the mediaeval point of view, to philosophize means 12 Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, VoL ">. p. 39. 28 to explain the dogma, to deduce its consequences and to demon- strate its truth. Hence philosophy is identical with positive theology; when it fails to be that, it becomes heretical." 13 " By Scholasticism," says Tyrrell, " we understand the applica- tion of Aristotle to theology, or the expression of the facts and realities of revelation in the mind-language of the peripatetics." 14 Finally, in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychol- ogy, Mr. Dewey defines Scholasticism as " the period of Mediaeval thought in which philosophy was pur- sued under the domination of theology, having for its aim the exposition of Christian dogma in its relation to reason." 15 In order to understand what amount of truth this theory con- tains, it is necessary to examine briefly the exact meaning given to the word philosophy in ancient times, and the way in which the particular sciences have appeared and have been assigned a definite field. Philosophy busied itself at first with the whole extent of human knowledge. In ancient Greece, Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes were primarily scientists. Shunning the mythological explanations of the universe given in previous time, they directed their efforts towards a cosmical theory more in harmony with the facts of experience. It is by an observa- tion of the phenomena of nature — as Aristotle points out — that Thales was led to the assumption that all things are made out of water. Anaximenes explained the generation of fire, winds, clouds, water and earth as due to a condensation of the first ground of all things, air. Anaximander formulated a theory of evolution which bears a striking similarity to the conceptions of our contemporary naturalists. Aristotle himself did not regard any branch of human knowledge as lying beyond his jurisdiction. His philosophy covers not only logic, metaphysics, "Weber, History of Philosophy, New York. 1004, pp. 201-202. "Tyrrell, The Faith of the -Millions, 1st Scries-, p. 224. ''- Baldwin's Diet, of Philosophy and Psycholo^-, art. Scholastici-m. 29 ethics and psychology, but also physics, cosmology, zoology, poli- tics and rhetoric. When, in the course of human history, the field of knowledge was gradually extended ; when it became impossible for a single man to apply himself to all branches of learning, particular sciences gradually acquired a technique, and thus became inde- pendent. This movement towards specification was, however, very slow. Even in modern times, Bacon has held that the objects of philosophy are God, man and nature, and has included within its scope logic, physics and astronomy, anthropology, ethics and politics ; and Herbert Spencer has defined philosophy as a completely unified knowledge, and has published a series of works, of which the titles: Principles of Psychology, Princi- ples of Biology, Principles of Sociology, etc., are sufficient to show that the philosophy of their author is in keeping with his definition. At the beginning of the Christian era, the respective bound- aries of theology and philosophy were not distinctly drawn. The two sciences were even generally identified. St. Augustine had said: " Non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sapient ia? studium, et aliam religionem, cum ii quorum doctrinam non approbamus nee sacramenta nobiscum communicant." 10 Tertullian, it is true, had regarded philosophy as the mother of heresies, and had not feared to formulate his famous: Credo, quia absurd urn. There is, however, every reason to believe that he limited his condemnation to pagan learning; for he himself did not fear to philosophize, and he gave a system of ontology of which an idea may he had from the following quotations: " Nihil enim, si non corpus. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporate, nisi quod non est." 17 " Quis enim 18 De vera religione, cap. . r >. (f. Turner, op. cit., p. 248. "De Aiiimn. 7; De Carne Chr.. 2. 30 negayerU ileum esse corpus, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua eiiigie." 18 The first period of Scholastic philosophy was a direct off- spring of the patristic era and inherited its beliefs. Scotus Erigena regarded philosophy and theology as completely identical : " Quid est alius de philosophia tractare nisi verae religionis, qua summa et principalis omnium rerum causa, Deus, et humili- ter colitur, et rationabiliter investigatur, regulas exponere? Conficitur inde veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, con- versimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam." 19 We have seen that Roscelin did not hesitate to apply his specu- lative theories to the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. For Abelard, as well as for Erigena, philosophy and theology were one and the same. Jt must be remarked, however, that, in Abelard's case, theology was not properly identified with, but reduced to philosophy. In other words, theology simply disap- peared. Abelard's position was very much similar to that of the modern Hegelian school. Religious mysteries, if not prov- able by human reason, were mercilessly discarded. The words: " Nee quia Deus id dixerat creditur, sed quia hoc sic esse cou- rt nc it ur accipitur," 20 which so deeply offended St. Bernard's orthodoxy, may be taken as a perfect expression of Abelard's view. The respective boundaries of philosophy and theology were soon, however, definitely fixed. The system of principles attain- able by reason alone was clearly discriminated from the body of revealed truths. In Anselm's writings, although faith and rea- son are held in close connection, they are no longer identified. He Bays : " Rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei credamus prrusquam en praestunamua ratione discutere. Xegligentiae 18 Adv. 1'rax., 7. "Migne, Vol. caadi, col. 557. 20 Introdud i<> ad Theologiam; Migne, Vol. clxxviii. col. 10.">0. 31 mihi esse videtur si postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non studemus quod credimus intelligere." 21 The great philosophers of the thirteenth century were at the same time theologians ; and, in their most important works, they treated theological as well as philosophical questions. This fact may account for the erroneous conception which regards them as identifying the two sciences. The truth, however, is that they carefully distinguished them, and gave an account of their differences and relations which would not be surpassed by any theologian in our own day. Philosophy differs from theology in its object and in its means: in its object, because, whereas philosophy is limited to the truths human reason can grasp, theology also embraces those which lie beyond the roach of our natural faculties; in its means, in so far as the instrument of philosophical researches is human reason, whereas theology is guided by the light of divine revelation. These principles were recognized by all great masters of Medi- aeval thought, and have been so clearly expounded by St. Thomas in the first chapters of his Summa Theologica, that it is surpris- ing they have been so often overlooked. In the very words by which the Summa opens, the respective boundaries of philosophy and theology are distinctly fixed. St. Thomas proposes the fol- lowing objection: " Videtur quod non sit necessarium praeter philosophicas dis- ciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi. Ad ea enim qua? supra ra- tionem sunt, homo non debet conari, secundum illud Ecclesiast. 3: Altiora te ne quaesieris. Sed ca qua? rationi subduntur suf- ficienter traduntur in philosophicis disciplinis: superfluum igitur videtur praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi." To which he gives the following answer: "Licet ea quae sunt altiora hominis cognitione non sint ab homine per rationem inquirenda : sunt tameo a IV<> revelata 25 Cur Deus Homo? 1, 1-2. 32 suscipienda per fidem. TJnde et ibidem subditur: Plurima supra Benson) hominum ostensa sunt tibi. Et in hujusmodi sacra doctrina consistit."" With a far stronger foundation, some philosophers have thought that, although Scholastics clearly distinguished philoso- phy from theology and granted to the former a proper field of action, it is in the peculiar relation in which they regarded those two sciences that the idiosyncratic note of their philosophy must be found. The general acceptance this view has received from adherents as well as from opponents of Scholasticism, cannot but lead us to believe that it contains a good deal of truth. It has been accepted, among others, by Zeller, Ueberweg, Carra de Vaux, Elie Blanc, Zeferino Gonzalez in Europe, and by William Turner in this country. " Scholasticism," says Ueberweg, " was philosophy in the ser- vice of established and accepted theological doctrines, or, at least, in such subordination to them that, where philosophy and theology trod on common ground, the latter was received as the absolute norm and criterion of truth. More particularly, Scholasticism was the reproduction of ancient philosophy under the control of ecclesiastical doctrine, with an accommodation, in case of dis- crepancy between them, of the former to the latter."- 3 And William Turner, in his History of Philosophy, regards the effort on the part of the schoolmen to unify philosophy and theology as the most distinctive trait of the philosophy of the schools. Therein he places the difference which divides Scho- lasticism from modern thought: " Modern philosophy," Bays be — " post-Reformation philosophy, as it may be called — was born of the revolt of philosophy against theology, of reason against faith. It adopted at the very outset the Avcrroistic principle that what is true in theology may be a Summa Theologica, Para 1, Q. 1, art. 1. ad. 1. C'f. also: Art. 2, 3 and f), in which the nature and the relations of tin' two sciences arc accurately discussed. I eberweg, History of Philosophy, Vol. 1. p. .'!•">.">. 33 false in philosophy — a principle diametrically opposed to the thought which inspired Scholasticism." 24 One of the characteristic notes of Mediaeval philosophers is no doubt their constant endeavor to harmonize their philosoph- ical doctrines with the revealed truths. It would not be fair, however, to fail to recognize a similar endeavor in some modern thinkers. One cannot without injustice absolutely assert that modern philosophers have adhered en masse to the Averrhoistic principle that what is true in theology may be false in philoso- phy. Malebranche, De Bonald, Gratry, Berkeley himself, have professed the same theological beliefs as Thomas Aquinas, and have tried, with as much earnestness as he, to harmonize their philosophy with their religious faith. It may be claimed that they have not succeeded so well; but the question now is not of success, but of professed endeavor, and, in this respect, they are not essentially inferior to the Angelic Doctor. On the whole, Scholastic philosophy is primarily and essen- tially the philosophy of the Middle Ages, and reflects the essen- tial characters of that time. The greatest power in the western world, from the ninth to the fifteenth century, was doubtless the Roman Church. The Middle Ages were above all an age of faith. It is faith that directed the European armies to unknown countries. It is faith that led myriads of young men to the cloisters where, separated from the world, they devoted their lives to prayer and to study. Under the shadow of faith, they thought of the great problems of the world. Under the shadow of faith they formulated their systems of philosophy. It is for this reason that the dogmas of the Church were for them a guide; that freedom of thought was assigned certain limits it could not overstep. For this reason also the harmony between philosophy and theology, although not peculiar to Scholasticism. is certainly its most distinctive trail. Scholastic philosophy reached its mosi perl'ed form in the ■' Turner. History of Philosophy, pp. 417 IV. 4 34 thirteenth century; and, in the hands of Thomas Aquinas, became a definite system which might he described as Scholastic more properly than all previous attempts. It is to this system ili.it neo-Scholasticism universally adheres. Section 2. — Neo-Sciiolastic Philosophy The word neo-Scholastic has been opposed on many grounds. Some men, to whom Scholastic philosophy appears as a bug- bear, have been unable to reconcile themselves to the idea that such a philosophy might be revived. Behind the peaceful pro- fessor, who discusses the theory of Matter and Form, they have seen the papal power restored, the Church of Rome dethroning sovereigns and imposing her will upon nations, funeral piles erected anew, heterodox thinkers burned at the stake. As we have already spoken in our Introduction, of the relation of Scho- lastic philosophy to the dogmas of the Church and of the politi- cal influence of the Thomistic revival, this form of opposition to neo-Scholasticism shall not detain us any longer. Other writers, believing that Scholastic philosophy is essen- tially a thing of the past, have asserted that the word neo- Scholasticism itself involves a contradiction. They have derided the idea of covering old theories with a new garb, of giving a modern form to antiquated doctrines. Their objection to the Thomistic revival would be perfectly well grounded, if the his- torical evolution of the world were such as many writers on philosophy seem to profess. But a critical study of the various systems of thought which have appeared on our planet during the course of centuries will most likely render us distrustful in this respect. As pointed out by Mr. Woodbridge, " Aristotle reads so much like a modern that we can conceive his writing after Hegel with no great change in his system." 25 Neo- Scholastics believe that, amid some antiquated doctrines which must be discarded, Mediaeval philosophy contains perennial ele- ■P, .1. E. Woodbridge, The Problem of Metaphysics, Philos. Rev., 1903, p. 3C8. 35 ments of truth ; that the fundamental principles of the Peripa- tetic and Thomistic philosophy can be fully harmonized with modern scientific results. Even among the sympathizers of Scholastic thought, the word neo-Scholastic has found opponents. Some have thought that the modern defenders of the philosophy of St. Thomas should not call themselves neo-Scholastics, but simply Scholastics, as the prefix neo implies some modifications in a system which should remain intact. St. Thomas's philosophy, have they maintained, should be accepted in its entirety or not be accepted at all. This thesis was defended by C. M. Schneider in the review Saint-ThomasbVdtter. It has been defended more re- cently by Father Janvier, who would adopt, not only the teach- ings, but the very method and style of St. Thomas : " Les mieux inspires," says he, " prirent l'Encyclique de Leon XIII a la lettre et s'efforcerent d'expliquer toutes les parties de la doctrine de saint Thomas en usant de sa methode et en adopt ant son style." 26 As was to be expected, such views have not met with a wel- come acceptance. Some parts of St. Thomas's teaching are so evidently obsolete that it would be ridiculous to revive them to-day. His doctrine of the four elements, his belief in the influence of heavenly bodies upon generation, and many similar theories, cannot become again the object of philosophical dis- cussion. The method and language of the Scholastics must also be modified. If the defenders of St. Thomas's philosophy want to come in contact with modern thought, if they want to see their doctrines discussed in philosophical circles, they must needs adopt modern methods and modern forms of expression. An opposite course of action would ostracize them from the think- ing world, and thereby render their work null. It has been finally claimed that the new Scholastic movement, being essentially a revival of St. Thomas's philosophy, ought to -"Janvier, L'action tntellectuelle et politique de Leon X 1 11, p. 49. rr v 36 take the Dame of neo-Thomism. To this objection also have neo- Scholastics successfully replied. The Scholastic revival fol- lows chiefly St. Thomas because .St. Thomas has brought Scho- lastic philosophy to its perfection. He has built a concrete system of thought which surpasses in coherence and grandeur all other Mediaeval systems. The adherence to St. Thomas is, however, neither servile nor exclusive. The tenets of the other Scholastics are carefully studied and given the preference when- ever they prove more satisfactory to human reason. In point of fact, the words neo-Thomism and neo-Scholasticism are often regarded as convertible terms, although, strictly speaking, neo- Scholasticism is more proper. The first task neo-Scholastics have assumed has naturally been an adequate and critical study of the Mediaeval philoso- phers. The works of St. Thomas have been edited anew and carefully studied. The same has been done with regard to all great Mediaeval writers. Let us mention the Leonine edition of the works of Thomas Aquinas, begun at the order and under the protection of Pope Leo XIII, and published in Rome in 1882; the edition of Duns Scotus's works, published in 1891, and comprising twenty-six volumes quarto; the edition of St. Bonaventure's works, published since 1882 by the Franciscans of Quaracchi, near Florence, and completed a few years ago; the collection: Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittcl- alters, published in Miinster, since 1891, under the direction of Mr. Baeumker; the collection: Les Philosophes du Moyen Age. begun quite recently at the University of Louvain. These historical works are not, however, the most essential element of the nco-Scholastic program. The dearest aim of the neo- Scholastics is not to study Mediaeval systems in themselves, to dissect them and present them to the curious, as stuffed birds in a museum. It is to give them a new life, to make them meet the requirements of our day, to render them actual. In order to be successful in this task, they study the intrinsic value of the solutions proposed by the Mediaeval thinkers to the great 37 problems of the world, they reject those which the progress of modern science has shown to be erroneous, they discard useless questions, they accommodate Scholastic philosophy to the mod- ern spirit. In so doing, they act in complete harmony with the instructions given by Leo XIII in the encyclical /Eterni Patris, whose contents might be summed up in the formula universally adopted by neo-Scholastics as the motto of their school : vetera novis auger -e. The modifications introduced by neo-Scholastics on the phi- losophy of the Middle Ages may be classified under three heads : The first bears upon language and method. Distinguished neo-Scholastics, it is true, cling to the Latin language and to the Thomistic method of argumentation. Some of the most important contributions to the Thomistic revival are written in Latin and do not greatly depart from St. Thomas's method. Let us mention the collection Philosophia Laccnsis and the works of the celebrated Spanish Jesuit Urraburu. Like St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica, the authors of these works begin with an exposition of the various opinions about each ques- tion, give their own solution as the body of the chapter, and end with a resolution of the objections proposed by the antagon- istic schools. The greater number of neo-Scholastics, however, depart from this strictly Scholastic method. They discard the syllogistic form of argumentation and write their works in mod- ern languages. The fact that the authors who have thus modi- fied the Scholastic method have succeeded in attracting the attention of the non-Scholastic world, whereas the learned treat- ises written in Latin have been comparatively neglected, shows that modern languages and methods are nowadays more effica- cious instruments than Latin for philosophical discussion. Latin is not known to-day; and, as the years go on, its impor- tance will still decrease. This is an evil no doubt, but an evil we must accept. If we present to the world philosophical doc- trines expressed in a Language which the world ignores, our efforts will be vain, our labor useless. 38 With regard to history. neo-Scholastica have also somewhat departed from the attitude of their Mediaeval ]>ivcessors. His- torical investigations were not neglected during the Middle Ages. They were, however, made from a point of view totally different from our own. When the old Scholastics studied the philosophical opinions of their predecessors, their aim was not so much the knowledge of the views of such or such a man as the knowledge of truth. They had not the idea that a man could study history for history's sake, could devote his time to an understanding of antagonistic philosophical systems, and expound opposite theories without professing any opinion of his own. The study of the tenets of the great thinkers of the past is no douht a most powerful means of getting definite philosoph- ical convictions. A philosophical problem can hardly be solved in a satisfactory manner, when the solutions given to the same question in previous time are ignored. The aim of the Scho- lastics in their study of history was thus most laudable, and, to a certain extent, must become our own aim. Historical studies have, however, acquired in our day an importance which the Mediaeval philosophers did not imagine. The doctrines of a thinker are now studied in and for them- selves. We try to understand and to imbibe the very spirit of the philosophers. We are scrupulously careful not to attribute to them opinions which they did. not profess. Some of the early neo-Thomists have been loath to enter into this modern current. The late Spanish professor Orti y Lara regarded historical studies as a vain bibliomania. 27 This inex- cusable indifference has now wholly disappeared. Mr. de Wulf, in a recent work: Introduction a la Philosophie neo-Scolastique, in which the program of the neo-Scholastic movement is most definitely traced, strongly insists upon the importance of his- torical investigations. A similar insistence is found in the numerous articles, pamphlets, etc., published by Mgr. Mercier during ili«' last twenty years. The important historical studies n Cf . Lutofflawski, Kant in Spanien, Kantstttdien, 1897, pp. 217 ir. 39 published by neo-Scholastics, and of which we have already spoken, show that, on this point, they act in perfect conformity with their principles. Not only have they studied the Middle Ages, but they have made important contributions to the study of modern philosophical literature. Suffice to mention the works of Mercier and Sentroul on Kant, Halleux's Evolution- isms en morale, which contains a remarkable criticism on Spen- cer's System of Ethics, Janssens's treatise on Renouvier's neo- criticism, Rickaby's recent study on Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Mill. Neo-Scholasticism finally strives to keep abreast with modern scientific progress. In so doing, it does not precisely depart from the attitude of the Mediaeval philosophers. For too long a time it has been believed that the monks of the Middle Ages were unconcerned with science, and, regardless of the data of experience, built their systems a priori. This view cannot be held to-day. It is well known that the great Scholastic philoso- phers were enthusiastic investigators of nature; that Thomas Aquinas, Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, etc., were true scien- tists. The prodigious development of science in modern times has made it difficult for the philosopher to possess a deep scien- tific knowledge. Albert the Great and Roger Bacon could boast of having mastered all sciences. Not only would the same be impossible to-day, but philosophers are often apt to build their speculative systems without taking scientific data into account. And there thus result those strange philosophical theories which provoke the laughter of scientists and bring discredit upon philosophy itself. Neo-Scholastics have not always escaped tin's danger. As we shall see in our chapter dealing with neo-Schola-iieisni in Italy. the early Roman Thomists regarded scientific investigations with the utmost contempt. Their ignorance of science often led them to ridiculous assertions. Thus, Cardinal Mazella, defending in his De Deo Crratilc, the view that the days of Creation are days of twenty-fonr hours, and Bomewhal perplexed 40 by the fossils, which geology proves to have existed in the strata of the earth for long periods of time, does not hesitate to helieve that God created them vn statu perfecto, just as they are found to-day by the geologist. 28 It is hardly necessary to say that snch is not the position of the neo-Scholastics of the present day. The works of Farges, Urraburu, Pesch, Xys, Mercier, etc., evince a profound knowledge of all modern scientific dis- coveries. The Institute of Philosophy of the University of Louvain in particular is worthy of praise in this respect. As we shall see in one of the following chapters of this treat Lse, its scientific department, as regards equipment and results, has got the start of some of the most famous European institutions. Scholasticism is not thus a dead system studied only for its historical interest. It is a system endowed with as vivid a life as any modern current of thought, a system which must be studied in connection with modern theories, and whose answers to the great problems of philosophy can no longer be ignored. The following chapters will be devoted to an exposition and a discussion of its essential principles. "Mazella, De Deo C'reantc, pp. 156 ff. CHAPTER II SCHOLASTIC LOGIC Whereas all other sciences needed long periods of time to acquire the definite, systematic form they now possess, nay, in many cases, to find their right path, logic has hit at once its legitimate procedure, and has been able to reach without delay its complete development. If it has not advanced a single step since Aristotle's time, if our modern university text-books do not give us any more nor less than the doctrine of the Stagirite, it is because logic had become in his hands a complete system, had grasped and accomplished its purpose. The reason of this advantage is obvious. Fnlike all other sciences, logic has to deal with the form, not with the content, of thought. It does not examine the immediate assumptions from which we start; it is not concerned with the conclusions we derive from them; it deals only with the manner in which they are derived. It is merely the art or the science of reasoning. Xow, all men are endowed with similar faculties and reason in a similar way. The causes of the divergences of speculative conclusions, of the incompatibility of contradictory systems, are not to be found in the methods according to which these systems are built, but in the fundamental principles which lie at their basis. In modern times, however, the Aristotelian logic has been severely criticized. Eminent authors have condemned its course of action, declaring its direction unnatural, its methods barren. It has been contended that upon tbe ruins of the effete Medieval dialectic, a new science of logic had to be built. Induction has been produced and acclaimed as the sovereign guide of human speculation, while deductive methods have been regarded as useless and relegated to the background. 41 42 This view. i]\\o in great part to the progress of physical science, has found an able representative and defender in John Stuart Mill. The great significance of his System of Logic lies in the endeavor to reverse the process which considered the syllogistic logic as fundamental, and to subordinate the syllogism to the induction. This superiority assigned to the induction is a natural consequence of the nominalistic principles. If we start from the assumption that the individual is the only reality, and that the universal is a mere meaningless name, the syllogism loses its force and becomes a mere tautology. The syllogism, in its most perfect form, starts from a uni- versal, subsumes a particular under that universal, and reaches the conclusion that the attribute which belongs to the universal belongs to the particular also. Now, as the universal does not possess any validity for the nominalists, they must regard the major premise as containing the conclusion not only formally, but materially, and hence the syllogism as devoid of all logical value. In the example : Man is mortal. Socrates is a man, therefore, Socrates is mortal, the major premise: Man is mortal, is not, from a nominalist ic point of view, a universal proposition. The term man is only a shorthand register of individual cases. It means John, Peter, Thomas, etc., and the proposition : Man is mortal, may be re- solved into particular propositions, and formulated as : John, Peter, Thomas, etc., are mortal. Now, the subject Socrates of our conclusion cither is or is not contained in the universal term man. If it is, then our reasoning is tautological, is even guilty of the fallacy called petitio principii. inasmuch as it implicitly assumes the conclu- sion it pretends to prove. If, on the other hand, the term Socrates is not contained in the term man, it is by a process of induction that we extend the meaning of the term man, which 43 included John, Peter and Thomas, to Socrates ; and the induc- tion becomes the foundation of all truthful investigation, the basal stone of the syllogism itself. That this depreciation of all syllogistic argumentation is openly professed by Mill, is well known to all who have read his System of Logic: " It must be granted," says he, " that in every syllogism, consid- ered as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a petitio principii. When we say, All men are mortal Socrates is a man therefore Socrates is mortal; it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the syllogistic theory, that the proposition, Socrates is mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption, All men are mortal: that we cannot be assured of the mortality of all men, unless we were previously certain of the mortality of every individual man ; that if it be still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other indi- vidual you choose to name, be mortal or not, the same degree of uncertainty must hang over the assertion, All men are mor- tal: that the general principle, instead of being given as evi- dence of the particular case, cannot itself be taken for true with- out exception, until every shadow of doubt which could affect any case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence aliunde; and then what remains for the syllogism to prove ? that, in short, no reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such, prove anything; since from a general principle you cannot infer any particulars, but those which the principle itself assumes as foreknown." 1 This view, perfectly conclusive for the adherents of nominal- ism, loses its value if, with the great Scholastic masters, we admit the validity of the universal: if we regard the word man as meaning, not simply John, Peter and Thomas, but a univer- sal essence common to all possible men. The error of the nom- inalists lies in the confusing the denotation of a term with it< *J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Bk. 2, chap. 3, sect. 2. 44 connotation; and, if Mill tries to clear himself from such an accusation, it is on account of an inconsistency which runs through the whole of his System of Logic, and appears as a con- tinual puzzle to the uninitiated reader. The conclusion of a syllogism is contained formally in the major premise, but not materially. As the universal tenn man denotes the essence common to all human beings, it also denotes the essence of the individual Socrates; and, if mortality is one of the characteristics of the human essence, it will undoubtedly be a characteristic of Socrates. The conclusion, Socrates is mortal, is. however, contained in the major premise implicitly only. We may be convinced of the truth of the assertion: Man is mortal, because we know that human nature as such involves the element of mortality (the human body being an organism, and all organic beings being subject to growth, decay, and disso- lution) ; and not have realized that the individual Socrates is mortal also. The logical value of the syllogistic reasoning con- sists then in making explicitly known what was known implic- itly, in enlarging indefinitely the field of our a priori knowledge. Under its dominion lie all a priori sciences, pure mathematics as well as philosophy. The inductive process was not unknown to the Mediaeval phi- losophers. Without mentioning Roger Bacon, who not only in- sisted upon the use of observation and experience, but condemned all deductive reasoning, we find well conducted examples of induction in Thomas Aquinas, Puns Scotus and Albert the Great. A remarkable passage of the work De motibus (mwiai- 111111,'- in which Albert the Greai maintains the thesis that the Origin of all motions of animals is on the hack of the head, might have been written after Mill's System of Logic without any essential change. 3 These examples of induction in the modem sense were, bow- • I. ili. 1. tract. '_', cap. 1. -1. .!. ". Hi:;. 5 50 to the doctrine of Kant himself. He recognizes that Aristotle's philosophy answers particularly to the scientific preoccupations of our time, " repond particulierement aux preoccupations scien- tifiques de notre epoque." The exposition of the doctrine of Act and Potency demands, as an indispensable pre-requisite, an analysis of the concept of motion. The existence of motion or change was denied by the old Eleatic school. It is said that Aristotle, in answer to certain sophists of his time, who endeavored to revive Parmenides's and Zeno's arguments, simply began to walk. This answer, so trivial in appearance, was as profound and irrefutable as could be. It meant that motion is a fact of our experience, and cannot be denied, because it is there and constantly forces itself upon us. Should it even be said that all movements and changes are deceit ful appearances and that reality is immutable, one is com- pelled to admit that those appearances are still there, are real and must be explained. Aristotle, in his Physics, distinguishes three classes of move- ment : a movement purely local or of translation ; a change in quality, which he calls alteration ; a change in quantity, or development and reduction of mass. 7 Movement is thus understood in a broad sense and cannot be identified with local motion. Change of place is rather an effect of motion than motion itself. The essence of motion rather con- sists, to use Farges's words, in a tendency, a becoming, an instru- ment of evolution for the material forces of nature, " une tend- ance, un devenir, un instrument devolution pour les fonts materielles de la nature." 8 Now. the changes we observe in our universe do not take place nt random, but according to definite laws. Whenever an object is placed in determinate conditions, it begins to act in such a •Grande Encyclopedic, art. Aristote. 'Phys., IV, c. 2, sect. 10. * Parges, Acte et Puissance, Sect. V. 51 way as to show that it possesses a peculiar nature, that it is a unique individual. In other words, we are bound to admit the existence of purpose in our world. The word purpose has now come to mean a conscious scheme. It has been identified with design. The old Scholastics did not hesitate to use it in a broader sense. They spoke of intentio natura or appetitus nat- uralis to designate the unconscious tendencies of lower beings. 9 When we say that our universe is purposive, we do not there- fore mean that it is made according to a plan; that it is designed by a supreme being who directs everything to his ends, who, hidden behind the scenes, moves the whole mechanism. Our world may be thus designed, it is true, but this is not the ques- tion now. We only mean that the individuals of our world are controlled by their own character, that they naturally tend to a definite result. We may thus consider in each individual two different states: the one in which it is still undeveloped, deter- minable, has not acquired the full perfection it naturally tends to; the other in which it is already determined, perfected, has reached its final goal. The first of these states is called poten- tial by the Scholastics, the second actual. A potential being is thus an imperfect, but perfectible being. An actual being is a being already perfected. The acorn is potentially an oak. No mysterious assumption, I believe, is needed to reach these conclusions. Potentiality is not an occult cause existing behind the acorn and acting upon it in some unthinkable manner; it is the peculiar character which the acorn possesses as an individual, and by which it is distinguished from all other individuals, the property which enables it to become an oak and nothing else. It may be impossible to tell beforehand the nature of the actual- ity toward which a potential being tends. A microscopical examination of the acorn will not show us anything resembling an oak. An analysis of the potential will not give us the actual. It is the actual itself that will evince the potentialities of the being which gave it birth. The very fact, however, that the 9 Cf . Mercier, M€taphysique g€n£rale on Ontologie, p, 489. 52 acorn, and the acorn alone, invariably becomes an oak, compels us to admit that the acorn possesses some individual properti. 3 which a pea does not possess, that it contains potentially an oak, while the pea does not. Nothing further than this do the Scho- lastics maintain. We arc now in a position to understand Aristotle's famous definition of motion as "the act of the potential being as potential." Between the purely potential state of tin 1 being which is not as yet tending towards an end, and its final condition after the end is reached, there are intermediate stages. The new-born child is potentially a Kantian philosopher, although he has not yet done anything towards an insight of the Kantian theory. Between the state of his mind then and its final condition when the three Critiques are adequately grasped, a long period of time will probably elapse. There will be the university stage, in which the young student will learn with amazement that space is in his mind, the following years of struggle against a thought strange in itself and untowardly presented, epochs of failure and discouragement, epochs of partial success. The new-born child possesses the Kantian philosophy poten- tially; the full-grown philosopher who has mastered the three Critiques possesses it actually; the university student is in a state of movement. Motion is thus an act of the potential being; an act, because the potential being which is merely potential does not yet tend towards its end, is not yet in motion; an act of the potential being, because if the being is already actual, has completed its evolutionary process, it is not in motion any longer. Motion is an act, but an imperfect act; an act which has not yet reached its full degree of actuality, and is now completing itself. Section :). — Scholastic Theory of Substance The simplest observation upon the objects of our experience, shows that they may be divided into two -real classes. Some, 53 as a horse, a tree, a man, we conceive as existing by themselves. Others, as walking, cannot exist but in something else. The former are called substances by the Scholastics ; the second, acci- dents, qualities, attributes. Scholastic philosophy thus defines substance as that which exists by itself; accident as that which cannot exist by itself, but always exists in something else. The etymology of the word substance (substantia) involves, it is true, a different meaning. It evokes the idea of a sub- stratum, of some sort of recipient in which the attributes inhere. But, as we have elsewhere remarked, the etymology of a word does not always give us the key to its actual meaning. In our epoch of religious liberty, a Protestant may spend his whole life without actually protesting against any religious dogma. He still calls himself and really is a Protestant. ISTo doubt the accidents, being unable to exist by themselves, exist in something else; and substance may be thus correctly described as that which supports accidents. This is not, how- ever, the primary meaning of the word substance, which strictly signifies that which exists by itself. Before we proceed to a more detailed study of the concepts of substance and accident, it will be worth while to examine some of the modern theories which have rejected the term sub- stance altogether, or have modified its meaning so as to render it unrecognizable. Of the adversaries of substance, John Locke must head the list. Not because he is an open foe. He hesitates, feels dis- satisfied with his bellicose attitude, would fain come to a com- promise. But all the subsequent and more resolute adversaries have been at his school. It is his principles they follow; it is in his workshop they have found their most dreadful weapons. Like many modem philosophers, John Locke regards sub- stance as a support for accident-. It is from this point of view that he aims hi.- missiles, SO that, to a certain extent, he con- stantly misses the mark : 54 " They who first ran into the notion of accidents as a sort of real beings that Deeded something to inhere in," says he, "were forced to find out the word substance to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up), but thought of this word sub- stance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an ele- phant to support it, and a tortoise to support the elephant: the word sol ist a nee would have done it effectually." 10 He consequently asserts that we have no clear idea of sub- stance : " We have no such clear idea at all, and therefore signify nothing by the word substance, but only an uncertain supposi- tion of we know not what, i. e. (of something whereof we have no particular distinct positive) idea, which we take to be the substratum, or support, of those ideas we know." 11 (Let us parenthetically point out a somewhat unexpected metamorphosis. We had believed substance to be a support of accidents. We are now told it is a support of ideas. Our author seems willing to prove by all possible means the truth of his assertion that he has no clear idea of substance.) Let us not, however, misunderstand Locke. He would by no means maintain that we are in absolute ignorance as to what substances are; he even positively asserts that we have a real knowledge of them. But he adds the restricting clause that this knowledge does not go very far : " Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning substances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and such only, as are made up of such simple ones as have been discovered to co-exist in nature. And our ideas being thus true, though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the sub- ject of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them; which (as has been already shown) will not be found to reach very far; but so far as it does, it will still be real knowledge." 12 10 Iyock<>, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. 2, chap. IS, sect. 15). "Ibid., I5k. 1. chap. 4, sect. 18. "Ibid., Bk. 4, chap. 4, sect. 12. 55 Our knowledge of substance, which had been described as " nothing but an uncertain supposition of we know not what," is now confessed to be a real knowledge, as real as any knowl- edge we may have, and Locke's opponents may doubt whether his attacks were not merely the mock-fight of a stage performer. He will presently throw his weapons away, and we will hardly be able to repress a smile on reading the following terms of surrender : "It is of the idea alone I speak here, and not of the being of substance. And having everywhere affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a substance, I cannot be supposed to question or doubt of the being of substance, till I can question or doubt of my own being." 13 David Hume is, or tries to be, more consistent than his mas- ter. His rejection of substance seems at first sight well grounded and unanswerable, and has deserved him the credit of having delivered philosophy from a cumbersome and useless conception, of having done away with the soul-substance itself, as Berkeley had done with the bodily substance. Hume's attack on ancient philosophy is a sharp attack indeed. He is careful, however, before engaging in the struggle, to tell us — with a certain naivete — that he does not understand ancient philosophy at all. " The whole system, says he, is entirely in- comprehensible." 14 Now, it is perhaps too much to say that a system of philosophy is not understood until it is believed; but it cannot be denied that a system of philosophy is not understood until belief in it seems at least possible. Artistotle was a man whose mental shrewdness Hume certainly did not surpass, who devoted his whole life to study as earnestly as Hume did. who lived in a country not inferior as regards civilization to Hume's own country, who moved in a more intellectual atmosphere, who breathed a purer air. The system of philosophy Aristotle con- " Ibid., Bk. 2, chap. 23, sect. 1, Note. "Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, 15k. 1, Ft. 4. Soot. .? ; Selhy- Bigge's ed., p. 222. 56 trived was undoubtedly plain in his own mind. If ii appears entirely incomprehensible to Hume, it simply means thai Hume does not understand it as Aristotle did, does not, in point of fact, understand it at all. For 1 1 uini'. as for Locke, substance is primarily a kind of substratum, something unknown and invisible, which continues the same amid all variations: " In order to reconcile which contradictions the imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it sup- poses to continue the same under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a substance, or original and first matter." 15 But as, according to him, all qualities (such as the color, taste, figure, solidity, etc., of a melon) may be conceived as distinct and separate, they do not need any support, and substance bo- comes an unintelligible chimera : "Every quality being a distinct thing from another, may be conceived to exist apart, and may exist apart, not only from every other quality, but from that unintelligible chimera of a substance." 16 Hume is decidedly a most interesting man. After devoting all his energies to drive away the notion of substance from the field of philosophy, he reduces to naught, by stroke of pen, his elaborate work, and presents to bis amazed reader the following statement : "If any one should evade the difficulty by saying that the definition of a substance is something which may exist by itself; and that this definition ought to satisfy us: Should this be said. I should observe, tbat this definition agrees to everything that can possibly be conceived; and never will serve to distinguish substance from accident, or the soul from its perceptions."" Ibid., Bk. 1. Pt. 4, Sect. 3. "■• Tbid., Selby I : i ■_ 'b ed., p. 222. "Ibid,, Bk. 1. Pt. i. Beet. .">; Selby-Bigge'a ed.. p. 22:5. 57 That substance is something existing by itself is indeed the only thing the supporters of the idea of substance maintain ; and Hume, unconsciously, unwillingly perhaps, becomes one of their number. There is, it is true, in his statement, an inadmissible element of which I will speak in the sequel; but the fundamental principle it contains is in perfect harmony with the doctrine for which the supporters of the existence of substance contend. A few more words before dismissing Hume. Substances have generally been divided into bodily and mental. Berkeley is com- monly supposed to have done away with bodily substances; Hume, with mental substances. This view must be qualified. Hume acknowledges that he believes in bodies — that is to say, in bodily substances — and thus seems to go one step backwards, to destroy Berkeley's elaborate work: " We may well ask," says he, " What causes induce us to be- lieve in the existence of body ? but it is vain to ask, Whether there be body or not ? That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings." 18 As regards mind, it is true that he resolves it into a heap or collection of perceptions : " Mind," he says, " is nothing but a heap or collection of dif- ferent perceptions, united together by certain relations, and sup- posed, though falsely, to be endowed with a perfect simplicity and identity." 19 Which means that there are perceptions, and there is no mind. But when, in reading the Treatise on Human Nature, we find such expressions as these: "It will always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they (the impressions) arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, or are derived from the author of our being." 20 . . . " CTpou the "IbUL, Bk. 1, Pt. 4, Set. 2. "Ibid., J'.k. 1. Pt. 4. Sect. -1 ; Selby Bigge's ed., |>. ^17. "Ibid., Bk. 1. I't. :;. Sect. :.-. Belby-Bigge'a ed., i>. 84. 58 whole, necessity is something that exists in the mind, aol In objects." 21 ..." Impressions are naturally the most vivid per- ceptions of the mind." 22 ..." The mind falls so easily from the one perception to the other, that it scarce perceives the change." 23 . . . "We may pronounce any quality of the mind virtuous which causes love or pride." 24 . . . "When I perceive the causes of any emotion, my mind is conveyed to the effects, and is actuated with a like emotion." 25 ..." It being almost impossible for the mind to change its character in any consider- able article, or cure itself of a passionate or splenetic temper, when they are natural to it," 26 we feel strangely perplexed as to what Hume's meaning really is. It sounds odd to speak of states of mind if there is no mind. The words I, our, us, themselves become meaningless if percep- tions alone are and we are not. These considerations may give us some suspicion as to the real worth of Hume's famous rejection of substance. They will not perhaps induce us to proclaim with Rickaby that " the ac- ceptance of Hume's doctrine by so many of the philosophers in England is a disgrace to the sound sense of the nation"; 27 but they will compel us to study the conception of substance once more, to examine whether the philosophy which advocates its legitimacy is not, after all, the philosophy of truth. It would be useless to pass a review of the contemporary phi- losophers who reject substance from their system. They do little more than adopting Hume's principles and repeating his arguments. Those among our university professors who have not yet come back to Aristotle's point of view simply tell us in their own words what Hume said long ago. The Treatise on II iiiiifin X J. S. Mill, System of Loprio, Bk. 1, chap. 3, sect. 7. °lbid., Bk. 1, chap. 3, sect. 8. M lbid., Bk. 1, chap. 3, sect. 9. 3X Ibi with equal propriety an indi- vidual, because it is a unique and complete being, with its own life, its proper operations, its peculiar activity. Finally, the molecule and the atom are also individuals; the former for the physicist, the latter for the chemist. The mole- cule cannot be divided by physical means. It possesses a unity of its own and is the individual about which the science of physics is concerned. Chemistry, on the other hand, operates upon the atoms themselves. It is by combining them in differ- ent ways that it effects the various chemical transformations, that it produces the immense variety of compound substances. We are thus compelled to distinguish different classes of indi- viduals or substances, which do not exclude one another, but exist in such a way that the individual of a lower class is at the same time an element in the constitution of the individuals of the higher class. (This principle, we must here observe, does not unqualifiedly apply to God, as will be seen in the sequel.) Wo have, accordingly: 1. The absolute individual, or God. 2. The organic individual, as man. 3. The physical individual, or the molecule. 4. The chemical individual, or the atom. 5. The ultimate individual, or the electron. Our list purposely omits finite spirits, as angels, because as they do not fall within our experience, and a knowledge of them cannot be reached by reason alone, philosophy is not concerned with them. Section 4. — Scholastic Theory of Cause According to Scholastic philosophy, cause is the principle upon which a thing depends in its being or its becoming. "Causa dicunhir c.r quibvs res dependit secundum esse vel lirri."^ "Mercier, M^taphysique g£n€rale ou Ontologie, p. 529. 69 Aristotle and the Scholastics distinguish four kinds of causes : material, formal, efficient and final. The material and the formal causes are the constitutive principles of beings. As we shall deal with them at great length in our chapter on cosmology, we shall abstain from treating of them now. Our present study will therefore be limited to the efficient and the final causes. In the opinion of the plain man, an efficient cause is that which really produces an effect. When the laborer drinks a glass of water, and thus quenches his thirst, he believes that the thirst-quenching not only occurred after, but was produced by the action of the water. It has become a fashion in philosophy to deride the notions of the plain man. A student nowadays is often smiled at for his naivete if he believes that his book is really in his desk when nobody perceives it ; he is looked upon as ignorant of the in- variable laws of nature if he regards his will as free; he is ridiculed as a fetich-worshipper if he feels the slightest sym- pathy for the old doctrine of causal power. For my part, I confess that I can hardly part from these naive beliefs; and, at the risk of being mocked for not having yet bestridden the threshold of philosophy, I frankly take part with the plain man in his realism, his libertarianism, his belief in efficiency. The Scholastic doctrine of efficient cause has met two classes of opponents : some, following Hume, have dropped out the con- cept of efficiency altogether and reduced causality to a mere invariable antecedence; others, with Malebranehe. have accepted the genuine notion of cause, but they have limited it to the Supreme Being, denying all efficiency to created things. Malebranche's occasionalism needs not detain us long. There is actually little danger of limiting causality to Cod alone. In- clined as we are to question the very existence of a supreme mind, we feel little sympathy tor a system which considers this mind as the onlv efficient factor in the world. 70 We shall therefore limit ourselves to a few considerations which have heen frequently urged against occasionalism. 1. Malehranche's fundamental principle that activity Lb proper to God alone and cannot be communicated to creatures, is devoid of foundation. God can do all that is intrinsically possible; and there is nothing so evidently possible as a creature endowed with activity. 2. God's wisdom manifests itself in the infinite variety of organisms we observe in the universe. From the molecule of the mineral to the elaborate body of man, there is a wonderful series of organized beings possessed of particular potentialities, endowed with a surprising adaptation of means to ends. The paw of the cat, for example, so perfectly adapted to the catching of the prey, is a marvel for the naturalist. Xow, if finite beings possess no efficiency; if, when the cat stretches its paw, it is God that catches the mouse — as Malebranche would maintain — the intricate organization of created things becomes a useless machinery. The external world itself is altogether unnecessary; and, should it be annihilated, we would noways notice its disap- pearance. 3. Our own consciousness, which has been justly called the ultimate court of appeal in the science of mind, testifies that, whenever we act, our own course of action is in dependence upon our will. So little are we convinced that God acts in us, that we feel remorse whenever our action is not done in accordance with duty, and do not doubt that we can act otherwise in the future. It is true that Malel tranche admits the freedom of the will ; but, in so doing, he obeys his theological prejudices rather than the logic of his system. Let us now pass to Hume's theory of causation, which is not, like Malehranche's, an object of interest to the antiquarian alone, but is still vivid among us; and, despite its shortcomings, does not seem as yet doomed to a speedy disappearance. 1 1 nine's analysis of the idea of causation is often honored as his greatesl contribution to philosophy. And it cannot be 71 denied that it is a superb piece of work, that it evinces a remark- able power of analysis in its author. If we grant the original assumptions from which Hume starts, we are irresistibly led, step by step, to his final conclusion. But, similar to an archi- tect who would build a stately edifice upon a slender foundation, Hume has failed to probe, in a sufficient degree, the ground upon which he has been at work, so that his elaborately constructed mansion, in spite of the studied arrangement of its parts, affords no safe lodging to the traveler, who feels compelled to shun it as by a natural instinct. The fundamental principle given by Hume at the outset, and which he keeps constantly in mind, is that all our ideas are derived from impressions. 46 He accordingly asks what impression produces the idea of causation. It cannot be a quality of the object, " since, which- ever of these qualities I pitch on, I find some object that is not possessed of it, and yet falls under the denomination of cause and effect." 47 It must therefore be a relation among objects; 48 and Hume is led to examine the different kinds of relation from which the idea of causation may arise. He at first discovers contiguity and succession. 49 He does not, however, attach much importance to this discovery; and, after a weak attempt to establish its truth by reasoning, he tells us that, if his argument appears satisfactory, it is well ; if not, we are begged to suppose it such. 50 He soon discovers, however, a necessary connection as the essential element of causation; but he does not at first find any light as to the real nature of this connection, and resolves " to beat the neighboring fields, without any certain view or design, with the hope that his good fortune will at last guide him to what he searches for." 51 <6 Hume, Treatise on Human Nature. Selby-Bigge's ed., p. 4. "Ibid., p. 75. 48 Ibid., p. 75. "Ibid., pp. 7.V-7G. "Ibid., p. 70. 51 Ibid., p. 7S. 72 An examination of the proposition that "Whatever has a be- ginning lias also a cause of existence" convinces him that it expresses a principle neither intuitively nor demonstrably cer- tain, ami he triumphantly refutes it by the following argu- ment : " As all distinct ideas are separable from each other, and as the ideas of cause and effect arc evidently distinct, it will be easy for us to conceive any object to be non-existent this moment. and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of cause or productive principle. The separation, therefore, of the idea of cause from that of a beginning of existence, is plainly possible for the imagination; and consequently the actual sepa- ration of these objects is so far possible, that it implies no con- tradiction nor absurdity." 52 The conclusion is that our belief in the necessity of a cause must be derived from experience, and Hume proceeds to examine the particular note of our experience to which the idea of causa- tion may be due. When he least expected it, he discovers a new relation in which he eagerly hails the long-sough t-f or answer, and we are told that the necessary connection between cause and effect is their constant conjunction/' 3 At once, some interesting conclusions are drawn, viz., that we have no right to apply causation to future experience, inasmuch as we can conceive a change in the course of nature, and therefore that change is possible; also, that causal necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in objects. 64 Hume does not, however, deny a power in the cause, nor a real production : '■ We may remark," says he, "not only that two objects are connected by the relation of cause and effect when the one pro- ducee a motion or any action in the other, but also when it has a power of producing it"/' 5 ■ Ibid., pp. 70-80. ' Ibid., p. 87. M Ibid., p. L65. '■ Ibid., p. 12. 73 and further : " It will always be impossible to decide with certainty whether they (the impressions) arise immediately from the object, or are produced by the creative power of the mind, 50 or are derived from the author of our being." 57 Some incidental outbursts of honesty even reveal him as identifying the causal action with real production: " Should any one pretend to define a cause by saying it is something productive of another, it is evident he would say nothing. For what does he mean by production ? Can he give any definition of it, that will not be the same with that of causation? If he can, I desire it may be produced. If he cannot ; he here runs in a circle, and gives a synonymous term instead of a definition.'" 58 Such passages as this might tempt us to go and shake hands with Hume at once, in the belief that we have at least come to an agreement. It would not be prudent, however, to act too hastily. In a subsequent chapter, the supposed power and efficacy of causes is examined at great length. Hume's original assumption that all ideas are copies of previous impressions, there convinces him that " we have no idea of power or efficacy " ; 59 that, when we use those words, we have really no distinct meaning; 60 finally, that the power which unites causes and effects resides in our mind. 61 In his reduction of the causal action to a constant con- junction, Hume was — if we believe him — actuated by a most laudable purpose. He intended to rid philosophy of those mysterious entities, of those occult powers, which had so long crawled in the study of the learned, and had not yet been fully dispelled by the enlightenment of the new century. M We remember that wo have no mind. "Ibid., p. 84. "Ibid., p. 77. "Ibid., pp. 160-101. "Ibid., p. 162. •' Ibid., p. 106. 74 Unfortunately, it often happens that a mystery is replaced by another mystery greater than the first; that a most unreason- able demand on our power of faith is made by the very men who are sometimes so difficult to satisfy in matter of proof. This is exactly the case with David Hume. Motions and changes were satisfactorily accounted for in the old causal theory, and become a perfect mystery in his. Let us suppose that the event A has been followed by the event B. As, according to Hume's assump- tion, the two events A and B may be conceived as unconnected, we may neglect the element A, and reduce the series, A, B, to the series not-B, B. If we maintain the necessity of an efficient principle, we will explain the production of B by the action of A; which, as Aristotle would say, contains B potentially. If we deny efficient action, we must maintain either that B comes from nothing, or that it comes from not-B. But, as, on the one hand, from nothing nothing can come; and as, on the other hand, not-B simply denotes beings in which B does not enter as an element, no shadow of reason is given for the production of B, and we find ourselves face to face with a reality incomparably more mysterious than the causal principle which had been dis- carded for its mysterious character. Passing to a closer examination of Hume's theory, we will at once remark that his first principle: " all ideas are derived from impressions," not only is not self-evident, but is absolutely erroneous. It is true that all knowledge begins with sense- experience; but it does not follow that all ideas are copies of sense-impressions. If such were the case, we would never be able to step beyond the data of the senses; we would be incapable of forming universal concepts; even memories of past impres- sions would become inexplicable, and we could not attribute any reality but to the present instant. Our mental faculties are originally aroused into exercise by the data of the senses; but they possess an activity of their own which enables them to connect what sense-experience presents as unconnected; to reason about given data; to reach conclusions about nature which are 75 implied in the natural facts, but are not directly given, and must be drawn by the active power of our mind. Hume repeatedly maintains that the idea of cause implies a necessary connection. 62 Now, constant conjunction is unable to give us the idea of necessity. For, what does constant conjunction mean? Simply that in all singular past instances we observed, two events hap- pened to be connected. Each instance was a contingent fact independent of all others. As we cannot step be}'ond the data furnished by sense-perception, we cannot reach any law of con- nection between the individual cases, which remain essentially singular and unconnected; so that their multitude, however great it may be, is unable to alter their contingent character. Hume, it is true, grasped this consequence, and tried to explain our idea of the necessary character of the cause, not from an accumulation of individual cases, but from a natural propensity of our mind to pass from the idea of one object to the idea of another. 63 It would be interesting to know whether this pro- pensity of the mind is derived from sense-impressions or not. If it is. we hardly sec how it can assume a character of necessity. It cannot certainly get it from the sense-impressions themselves, because each impression is a contingent fact unconnected with the rest. If, on the other hand, this propensity is not derived from sense-impressions ; if it is a natural and innate disposition, we have an idea not derived from impressions, and Hume's fundamental principle falls to the ground. Moreover, the resolution of cause into constant conjunction presents the capital blemish of disregarding, in the conception of cause, the causal element itself. Hume closely resembles a theatrical manager who would give the play of Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. Constant conjunction and efficiency arc by no means identical concepts. Constant conjunction means that an event invariably "Ibid., pp. 77, 78, etc. "Ibid., p. 92. 76 comes after; efficiency means thai the second event not only comes after, bul is due to the first. There may be efficiency without constant conjunction, and constant conjunction without efficiency. Constant conjunction between two events may take place without any action of the one upon the other when both events are due to a single cause. In nature, night is invariably fol- lowed by day; but is not. on that account, regarded as its cause. Their constant conjunction is due to the fact that both night and day are produced by the successive positions of the sun. In a mathematical scries, such as: (/ x x) n = I -f nx + 4a; 2 + Bx* + . . ., a definite term, nx, is invariably followed by another definite term, Ax 2 . Their constant conjunction is due to the nature of the expression (I-{-x) n , and by no means to anything like efficient action. Efficiency, on the other hand, may appear without constant conjunction. It is true that it cannot thus appear in the realm of the necessary. Objects of nature are determined by their own potentialities to some definite effects; and, whenever they are placed in suitable conditions, the reaction which occurs gives rise to these effects. The like does not hold with regard to free agents. Human beings are persuaded of their own efficient action in singular instances, even when similar cases have never taken place in the past and are not likely to take place in the future. Only once did Lincoln sign the Emancipation Proclamation. Nobody doubts the efficiency of his will in this momentous crisis of our history, although a similar conjuncture had never occurred before and will never occur again. Lincoln might then have acted otherwise; and, should our country be placed in identical circumstances once more, we clearly conceive that our president might take a different course of action. We would thus have identical antecedents, and different results, and would not hesitate, however, to attribute the result in both cases, to the ellieii'ut action of the head of the nation. 77 In physical nature itself, we often attribute efficient action to objects which have not been invariably conjoined. In all our past experience, we may have observed that quinine is an ex- cellent remedy for fever. The ninety-nine patients to whom we administered it were in different circumstances with regard to age, physical constitution and general health; but all presented the identical character of being affected with fever; and all, on taking quinine, were suddenly relieved. We thus feel no doubt as to the efficient action of quinine, and a new patient having got the same disease, we have recourse to our nostrum again. Unfortunately, as soon as the sick man has swallowed our favorite remedy, he feels worse and dies. The result is un- expected. It is contrary to the previous course of things. There is certainly no constant conjunction. Still, we cannot help attributing to quinine the deplorable event. We feel sure that quinine has killed our sick man. Efficiency and constant conjunction go together in the phys- ical world when one single agent is at work. But when several causes are acting in different directions, they may incidentally meet, and, by their conjunction, give rise to an unexpected result, which presents no necessary connection with any of the particular causes, and is simply attributed to chance, although the causes at work have been efficient factors. This is exactly what happens in the case of our sick man. A chemist could tell us beforehand the result of his experiments, because he has to do with materials directly acting upon one another, and whose action is not thwarted by appreciable contrary forces. But the chemical products used by the physician do not neces- sarily act in accordance with his expectation because the inner nature of the patient reacts and often produces effects which had not been anticipated. Had [lume been interested in medi- cine, he might have felt some suspicion as to the value of his identification of efficiency with constanl conjunction. What he has missed is the reaction itself which takes place as soon as the two agents are brought together. Be has Been the 78 antecedent conditions, the subsequent result : he lias overlooked the very instant in which the causal action occurs. The philosophy of invariable sequence thus falls heavily to the ground under the weight of its unfounded assumptions and absurd consequences, without any hope of ever being able to rise again. The efficient action of Aristotle and the schoolmen, proud of its decisive victory, appears on the field anew as the only theory capable of giving a satisfactory account of experi- ence. It shows us that in all cases in which a reaction takes place, a result not only follows some definite antecedents, but is due to their natural potentialities: that the quenching of fire follows the application of water precisely because water is endowed with a capacity for quenching fire; a capacity which other agents, such as cotton, do not possess, inasmuch as these agents, being placed in similar conditions, similar results do not follow. The much ridiculed answer that opium causes sleep because it possesses a dormitive virtue, is not only the expression of common sense, but a highly philosophic truth. It is the best, nay the only answer that could possibly be given. Since Moliere WTote his play, and the Parisian theatre-goers stupidly laughed at what the talent of the poet was able to present in so comical a light, the burst of laughter has spread all over the world. Everybody has jeered at the foolish reply: but, for powerful reasons, no one has ever been able to correct it. The problem of final causes has been sometimes formulated in the following picturesque form : The bird has wings, and it flies. Does it fly because it has wings, or has it wings to fly ? As Mgr. Mercier remarks, 04 this formulation of the problem is unfortunate. It seems to imply that the efficient and the final causes exclude each other; a principle which all advocates of finality would undoubtedly reject. The final cause may be defined as the good for the sake of M Mercier, Metaphysique genfrale ou Ontologie, p. 481. 79 which the efficient cause acts, " hoc dicimvs esse finem in quod tendit impetus agentis."™ The final cause may be considered in rational and irrational beings. In rational beings, it is a known and accepted end which determines their present acts. In irrational beings, it is a controlling factor, a natural end to which they irresistibly tend. All beings act for an end, and it is this end that determines their activity. If an agent were not tending to a definite end, it would be indifferent towards acting in this or that way, and consequently would never begin to act. The existence of final causes, thus demonstrable a priori, may equally be proved from experience. There is little doubt that conscious beings act with an end in view. The young man who wants to become a skilful physician begins by studying chem- istry and anatomy; afterwards submits to a long and perhaps wearisome course in a medical school; voluntarily abstains from numberless enjoyments towards which he feels naturally in- clined, but which would divert his attention from the goal he wants to reach; spends his days and a good part of his nights perusing bulky volumes which, in other circumstances, he would regard as sovereignly tedious. Why does this young man submit to such an irksome task? What enables him to throw off his natural indolence ? Simply the end he has in view, the good he purposes to obtain. This good which, by its attraction, exercises such a powerful influence upon the activity of the student, is evidently a cause. In unconscious beings, there exists a similar determining principle. The acorn buried in the ground tends to a definite end. If placed in a favorable environment, it will not act at random, but will insensibly approach the goal it has been as- signed by nature. Every succeeding day will witness a more complete actualization of the oak, which at fust existed only in a potential form. Only when this end is reached shall the "Thomas Aquinas, Contra Gentiles, Lib. 3, cap. 2. 80 tendency of the acorn cease; only then shall its final purpose be realized. These considerations forcibly impose the final cause upon the attention of the philosopher. Even among defenders of modern thought, the old Scholastic problem of finality reap- pears. In a remarkable essay published in the Hibbert Journal. Mr. George Henslow quite recently developed a theory at bottom identical with the teaching of the schoolmen. He gave to the old causa finalis the name of "directivity": " Suppose a kitten and a young hawk are brought up on pre- cisely the same animal food, both being carnivorous, one de- velops into a cat, with fur, having bones and muscles, etc., of totally different character from those of the adult hawk, with feathers, etc. The same molecules of food supplied the ma- terials for the building up of their bodies : why are the results so totally different ? So, too, in all animals and vegetables : why should certain substances be guided to certain places — salts of lime to bones, silica to teeth and claws, phosphate to brain, etc. The molecules are first driven about mechanically in the blood by certain forces ; various chemical combinations are made under the action of other forces ; but what directs all the forces which finally impel the new-made molecules to take up certain posi- tions and no others in the building up of a body? Directivity is a useful word to express the fact. It commits one to nothing as to its source; but it at least supplies a term to express the analogy between the chemist's mind and Nature's — what?'" 00 Scientists, it may be observed, leave final causes entirely out of account, and feel little more sympathy for efficient causes. Tt is the scientific development of modern times that has con- tribnted more than anything else to the apparent discredit of the causal theory. It might oven be added that the wilful neglect of causal action lias been a most efficienl Eactor in the develop- ment of science. Why. then, should the metaphysician cling to a theory whose downfall has been such a blessing to mankind? "Henslow, Directivity; Hibberi Journal, Vol. G (October. 1907), pp. L50 I-". I. 81 Would it not be bettor to discard efficiency and finality from the field of philosophy as well as from the field of science? No doubt this is a real difficulty. It is the point which empiricists and positivists love to emphasize, and it gives them so strong a foothold that, despite the ungrounded assumptions and irrational consequences of their system, they bravely hold their own. It must be remarked, however, that the scientist and the metaphysician have very different problems to face. Science is concerned merely with facts and results. The chemist has simply to establish the fact that, if two grams of hydrogen and sixteen grams of oxygen are brought together and submitted to the action of the electric spark, water will in- variably follow. The biologist needs not go beyond the actual conditions necessary to the duplication and development of the cell. For him, a monster is no less natural than a normal organism. Science, as Pasteur clearly pointed out, is essentially positivistic. But, does the scientific position solve the enigma of the world ? Does it satisfy our thirst for knowledge? Are there not many genuine problems which science does not approach ? Why is the proportion 2 to 16 necessary for the production of water? 'Why do organisms usually reach a normal development, and are monsters so rare? These are questions which the metaphysician alone is able to answer. He alone is concerned with the ulti- mate nature of reality. He alone professes to make a thinking study of things. The scientist formulates the law that an embryo placed in such and such circumstances will develop into such an organism. The metaphysician takes up these scientific facts, studies their mutual connections and implications, and is led by the facts themselves to the conclusion that the embryo does not develop at random, but is constantly controlled and tends to a definite result. CHAPTER IV SCHOLASTIC COSMOLOGY Section 1. — Chief Hypotheses as to the Constitution of Matter The question of the constitution of matter is one of those fundamental problems which, in the course of human investiga- tion, have been most widely discussed, and of which an adequate solution will perhaps never be attained. It is one of those ques- tions before which, according to Herbert Spencer, human reason must humbly confess its powerlessness ; a question which seems to prove a mystery for the human mind and to point to the existence of the unknowable in nature. All attempts at a solution of this great problem may be classi- fied under two heads: they are all, in some way, connected with the two theories of Atomism and Dynamism. The atomistic theory sprung originally from ancient Greece. According to Aristotle and Theophrastus, it is to Leucippus that we must attribute the honor of its discovery. But, as we know so little of Leucippus, and as his very existence has even been called into doubt, 1 we generally consider Democritus, his illus- trious disciple, as the founder of the system. The loss of all the writings of Democritus is indeed one of the most deplorable facts in the history of human investigation. With what burning interest would we not follow the efforts of his genius to get rid of the untenable hypotheses of his contem- poraries and to reach a satisfactory exposition of the intrinsic nature of things! And still, deplorable though it be. such a loss is unhappily a fact; and our only substitute. for a study of the philosophy of Democritus is to turn t<> its poetical oxposi- 1 cf. John Burnet, Early Creek Philosophy, p. 360. 82 83 tion, as given by Lucretius in his justly admired poem De Eerum Natura. The atomistic theory has undergone, in the course of time, many profound modifications. Hard atoms and absolute void were the only elements which Democritus supposed to exist in nature. In recent times, there has arisen the idea of a univer- sal medium, of a fluid everywhere present, penetrating all bodies, and serving as a connecting-link between the atoms. The existence of the ether is indeed only a hypothesis, but it is a hypothesis that has been rendered very probable by scientific discoveries; and now, it may almost be considered as an estab- lished fact. At present we will not discuss the probabilities in favor of each of the particular ether theories that have been brought forward. This theme will be fully treated in one of the ensuing sections of this chapter. Suffice it to say that, although all physicists do not agree as to the inherent constitu- tion of ether, they all unanimously affirm its existence. Atomism admits only matter and passive emotion in nature. Still, a majority of thinkers did not deem these two elements sufficient to account for the activity which our everyday experi- ence shows us to exist in the universe, and therefore they thought it indispensable to introduce into nature the element of force. And thus the theory of Dynamism originated. We shall refrain from presenting the various theories held by the ancient Greeks, which might be termed dynamic. We shall not even touch upon Leibniz's famous doctrine of monads, but we shall consider as the true representative of Dynamism the Jesuit Boscovich. Instead of the hypothesis of hard atoms. Boscovich proposed to consider nature as formed of unextended points, of indivisible centers of force, which mutually attract and repel each other, are therefore capable of furnishing a satisfac- tory explanation of the activity manifested in nature, and give us the illusion of continuous extension, in the same way as points placed very near each other might lead us to believe in their forming continuous letters. 84 Scholastic cosmology might be described as an intermediate position between the two systems just outlined. Its defenders pi proach atomists for denying activity to nature, and contend that an explanation of all the phenomena of the world by mere matter and passive motion is forever doomed to remain a fruit- less attempt. On the other hand, they consider the dynamic view to be similarly inadequate. They assert that, although passivity cannot be the only element in nature, its very existence must not be denied, and they put forward the theory of Matter and Form as the only possible explanation of the universe. I must here confess that I have never felt for the theory of Matter and Form that unreserved sympathetic feeling where- with I have subscribed to so many Scholastic doctrines. I can- not help regarding the Thomistic cosmology as arbitrary, assail- able in many points, inconsistent with our advanced scientific discoveries. The fact that physics and chemistry unanimously adhere to some form of atomism is of great significance. Scho- lastics are perfectly justified in insisting on the shortcomings of Atomism and Dynamism. They are right when they assert that activity, as well as passivity, must be admitted in the com- position of our world. Unhappily, the theory they propose does not rest upon cogent reasons, and therefore it should be frankly rejected, or made to undergo important modifications. The most cursory observation, Scholastics would say, suffices to show in all matter the element of quantity. A solid may become a liquid and a liquid a gas. A body may be made to assume an infinite number of forms: its volume may be in- creased or decreased; it may, by chemical combination, acquire a nature utterly dill'erent from the one it formerly possessed; but in all these transformations, in all these fundamental changes, there remains the element of quantity, unchanged and unchangeable, always identical with itself, mid which thus seems to he ;i common element in all material things. On the other hand, we cannot help observing the greatest diversity in nature. We find in every object an immense mini- 85 ber of peculiar, specific properties. We have before our eyes the great division of bodies into inorganic and organic. In the inorganic realm, we have solids, liquids and gases, metalloids and metals, the simple elements which chemistry has found to exist, and whose number is daily increased by scientific research. We have the innumerable combinations of those elements, and the appearance in compound bodies of properties essentially dif- ferent from those of their simple constituents. And if we turn our eyes to the sphere of life, if we consider the infinite chain of living beings, from the amoeba swimming in our blood to the more highly-developed body of man — sub- jects of inexhaustible research to the scientific mind — are we not struck with wonder and amazement? When we consider with a philosophic mind these properties of matter, we see that its qualitative variety and its quantitative identity are diametrically opposite. It is this opposition that led the Scholastics to affirm that such properties must be the result of different principles. Another argument in favor of the existence of Matter and Form, at least as strongly insisted upon as the one we have just explained, is derived from the supposed essential transforma- tions that take place in chemical combinations: "Dans ce fait bien compris et sagement interprets, says Mr. Nys, est contenue comme en germe toute la theorie de l'Ecole sur la nature dcs corps." 2 In a chemical combination, Scholastics are prone to say, some- thing remains and something is changed. That something is changed — or, in other words, thai a new substance is produced — is proved beyond any doubt by the fact that the physical proper- ties of the compound differ essentially from those of their con- stituent elements. It is no less true that something remains, for otherwise we would QOl have a change, hut a real creation. The new element is a substantial pari of tin 1 compound, because it distinguishes it from its simple constituents. The stable ele- - Xys, ( losmologie, p. 170. 86 menl ia also a substantia] pari of the compound. It is the determinable principle which, actuated by the new element, has given rise to a new substance. The new element is the sub- stantial form; the stable element, primordial matter. Francisco Ginebra, following Thomas Aquinas, gives of Mat- ter and Form the following definitions: "Form is the incomplete substance which determines matter and constitutes it in a determinate species. Matter is the in- complete material substance which, actuated by the substantial form, produces a complete corporeal substance." 3 Matter is then, in the Scholastic system, the passive element of objects. It is the same in all material things, which acquire their diversity by means of the substantial form. But primord- ial matter cannot exist in a state of isolation ; it is necessarily united to the substantial form, and the infinite variety of these forms is the cause of all the diversity we behold in nature. Section 2. — Natuee and Properties of Primordial Matter To have a fair ide. 138. "Ibid., j). 139. 'Thomas Aquinas, De principiia Datura, \\\i. in init. "Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra GentileB, lib. 2, . .*>}. 88 Other similar statements are quoted and discussed by Duns Scotus. In bis treatise De Berum Principio (Qusestio VII), he warns as against the teaching of a few authors who Beem to regard primordial matter as a mere potentiality without an actual existence. Among the philosophers he thus mentions, we find the names of Plato, Aristotle, and St. Augustine. But these writers do not, according to Scotus, really teach that primordial matter does not exist. They simply have in mind the fact that, of all existing things, it has the smallest degree of actuality. Scotus then passes to a direct proof of the existence of pri- mordial matter, and brings two classes of arguments: the first from authority, the second from the light of reason. The proofs taken by him from reason are four in number and read thus: 1. " Si materia non esset aliqua res actu, ejus entitas non distingueretur ah entitate et actualitate formae, et sic nullam realem compositionem faceret cum ea." 2. " Inter ens actu et nihil, non est medium ; ergo si materia pra?ter formam non habet aliquem actum essendi, erit nihil; ergo agens creatum ageret de nihilo, cum agat de materia." 3. "Secundum Philosophos, materia est in potentia ad alia; sed secundum eos, nihil ad nihil est in potentia : ergo materia, ut materia, non est nihil; ergo habet aliquem actum de se, et si non subsistentias, tamen existent ia." 4. "Item, posse pati ad materiam reducitur, sicut agere ad formam; sed quod non esl aliquid actu, non est principium patiendi, nee fundamentum ; ergo necessario materia habet actualitatem aliam ah actualitate fornuv, in qua actualitate forma 1 fhindantur, et stabiliuntur." 8 These lour proofs are simply intended to demonstrate that, if we admit the theory of matter and form, we must regard pri- mordial matter as something actual. There is, however, another alternative: the rejection of the theory of matter and form. This alternative, unhappily, Huns Scotus docs not consider. 'Dun- Scotus, !),• K. iiim Principio. (). 7, art. 1. 89 At the risk of intruding too much upon the patience of our readers, we will reproduce the words of a devoted seeker after truth, of a man who strove during his whole life to reach a satisfactory knowledge of nature, to understand in a clear and definite way what, in the thought of his time, was still obscure and indefinite. St. Augustine, in that sublime work which is not only a humble confession of his life and a profound study of the human heart, but likewise a treatise in which the philoso- phy of his time is exposed and skillfully analyzed, considers thus the question of matter and form : " But I, Lord, if I would, by my tongue and my pen, confess unto thee the whole, whatever Thyself hath taught me of that matter — the name whereof hearing before, and not understand- ing, when they who understood it not, told me of it, so I con- ceived of it as having innumerable forms and diverse, and there- fore did not conceive it at all, my mind tossed up and down foul and horrible ' forms ' out of all order, but yet ' forms ' ; and I called it without form, not that it wanted all form, but because it had such as my mind would, if presented to it, turn from, as unwonted and jarring, and human frailness would be troubled at. And still that which I conceived was without form, not as being deprived of all form, but in comparison of more beautiful forms; and true reason did persuade me, that I must utterly uncase it of all remnants of form whatsoever, if I would con- ceive matter absolutely without form ; and I could not ; for sooner could I imagine that not to be at all, which should be deprived of all form, than conceive a thing betwixt form and nothing, neither formed, nor nothing, a formless almost nothing." 10 We conjecture that the state of mind which St. Augustine here describes as having been his own has also been experienced by many a student who has tried to represent to himself clearly ami distinctly what primordial matter is. It appeal's, in one form or other, in the writings of all the masters of Scholasti- cism, who. although they unanimously maintain thai primordial '"St. Augustine, Confessions, Bk. XI I. art. 6; Pussy's ed., p. 261. 90 matter actually exists, cannot fail to recognize that its actuality is indeed very weak, and even to drop here and there a word tending to show thai it has really no actuality at all. Lei us now pass to a positive exposition of the nature and properties of primordial matter. In the foregoing section of this chapter we have given the following definition, which would he accepted by all Scholastics : Matter is the incomplete material substance which, actuated by the substantial form, produces a complete corporeal substance. All substances, according to this view, are composed of two real, distinct, unisolable principles: matter and form. Matter is the same in all bodies, and it is form, and form alone, that is the cause of the infinite variety of material things: " Omnium generabilium et corruptibilium est eadem materia." 11 Matter and form, on account of their unisolable character, are incom- plete substances, and it is from their mutual union that com- plete corporeal substances arise. Changes in things are classified as accidental or essential. In accidental changes, such as occur in physical processes, the form remains identical with itself. But in essential changes, such as chemical combinations, matter alone remains. The substan- tial form which existed before the combination ceases to exist, and there arises a new form as the cause of the new substance of which experience evidences the appearance. The fact of chemical combination plays an important part in Scholastic cosmology; and, although a few Mediaeval philoso- phers such as Albert the Great, taught that the elements re- mained in the compound, and one of the greatest among the aeo-Scholastics, Liberatore, holds that the theory of essential changes in chemical processes is not necessarily connected with the Scholastic system, it i- nevertheless incontrovertible that the great majority of Scholastics admit in chemical combinations an essential transformation, and we have seen how Mr. Nys bases Thomas Aquinas, Bumma Theol., I'. 1. Q. .">('». 91 . 200, 16 Cf. Harper, op. cit.. Vol. 2, ]>. 188. 94 But the divisions of matter which show Mediaeval subtlety at its l"-i are to be found in Duns Scotus. A singular view on this subject had already appeared in the eleventh century. The celebrated Jewish philosopher, 11m Gabirol, had advanced in his principal work, Fons Vitm, a start- ling theory of universal matter, according to which all sub- stances, spiritual as well as material, were to be regarded as composed of matter and form. 10 This strange doctrine was later on adopted by some Christian writers and became one of the leading characteristics of the Franciscan school. Almost two centuries after the death of Ibn Gabirol, the first Franciscan teacher of theology in the University of Paris, Alexander of Hales, expressedly taught in his Summa Theologies that spiritual substances are composed of matter " qua? nee est subjecta motui nee contrarietati." 17 The same view was main- tained by St. Bonaventure, 18 and also by Duns Scotus: "Ego autem ad positionem Avicembroni redeo; et primam partem, scilicet quod in omnibus creatis per se subsistentibus tarn corporalibus quam spiritualibus sit una materia, teneo, sicut ostensi in praecedenti qua?stione." 19 With that distinguishing subtlety which forms the essential characteristic of his philosophy, Duns Scotus introduces a new division of the materia prima. He divides it into materia pri in')- prima, materia secundo-prima, and materia, tertio-prima. The materia prvmo-prima.j or materia metaphysica, seems to be identical with the universal matter of Ibn Gabirol and of the Franciscan teachers. It is absolutely indeterminate and exists in all beings, incorporeal as well as corporeal. The materia secundo-prvma, <>r materia mathematica } is de- fined as the subject of generation and corruption: "Fons Vite, V, 21. "Cf. Turner. History <>f Philosophy, i>. .'527. 1 In 2. Bent., Di-. .'!. I'. 1. art. 1. " Dun-. Scotus, |)c Kiniiu Principio, Q. s. art. 4; Opera, Vol. 4. p. 378. 95 " Est subjectum generationis ct corruptionis, quam mutant agentia creata, seu Angeli seu agentia corruptibilia." 20 The materia tertio-prima is defined as the matter of any par- ticular natural agent: " Dicitur autem materia, tertio-prima materia cujuscumqne artis, et materia cujuslibet agentis naturalis particularis, quia omne tale agit veluti de aliquo semine, quod quamvis materia prima sit respectu omnium, qua? per artem producuntur, sup- ponit tamen materiam, quae est subjectum generationis, et ulte- rius aliquam formam per naturam productam, aliter nulla ars quidquam operatur." 21 To sum up in a few words: The materia prim o- prim a, or metaphysical matter, constitutes the passive principle of all finite beings, spiritual as well as material. The materia secundo- prima is the passive principle of cor- poreal substances only, and is called mathematical because it is the base of extension and quantity. The materia tertio-prima is the matter of the plain man, and does not differ from what we have elsewhere termed secondary matter. Section 3. — Nature axd Properties of the Substantial Form Contrasted with primordial matter, or the passive principle of all things, there is in them all an active principle called sub- stantial form. It is the form that causes all beings to be what they are, that ranges them in determinate species. Unlike mat- ter, it is not the same everywhere, bu1 is found with a greater or less degree of perfection according to the excellence of the being it constitutes. There is therefore a countless multitude of substantial forms correlative to the multiplicity of things. "Duns ScottiSj De Rerum Principio, c v >. B, art. -'5. -• Ibid., ilinl. x 96 [norganic bodies possess forms of the lowest order, and we reach more perfed forms as we ascend in the scale of being?. In the vegetable kingdom, the form is the vegetative soul, also called the principle of life: in animals, it is the sensitive soul, far more perfect, material however and doomed to perish with the animal frame to which it is joined. Tn man, the substantial form is the spiritual soul, which is, by its nature, intrinsically independent of matter, and cannot be affected by the death of the body. iUthough changeable in its operations and capable of development, it is, as to its essence, absolutely immutable and. by consequence, destined to continue in existence throughout all eternity. Besides the substantial form, Scholastics admit accidental forms which, like color, figure, etc., are accidents which modify the complete substance. In the foregoing section, we have already hinted at some of the properties of the substantial form. We have spoken of the hierarchy of forms, corresponding to the various degrees of per- fection in primordial matter. We have also seen that, whereas matter is in all things the passive principle, the substantial form is the principle of activity: " The first essential attribute of the form is to be the princi- ple and the source of the activity or energy which we find in corporeal substances, now in potency, now in actual operation." 22 Of the remaining properties of the substantial form, the most important arc the following two: its simplicity, and its need of primordial matter. The latter may have been easily inferred from the exposition given in the preceding section. Like primordial matter, the substantia] form does not and cannot exist by itself in nature: "The material form has an innate Deed, and. if such a figure lie allowed, a natural desire, f appetitus naturalis ' for matter, because, according to the will of the Creator, it cannot exist "Fargea, Matiere el Forme, p. L26. 97 without that natural complement which gives it a body, a defi- nite place and a sensible expression." 23 About this unisolable character of the substantial form per- fect unanimity does not, however, exist among the schoolmen. All Scholastics are unanimous in maintaining that the form is essentially joined to the matter in all corporeal things; but whether the same holds true of spiritual beings is a very contro- verted question. We have seen how Duns Scotus, following Ibn Gabirol and the Franciscan school, attributes matter to all beings, and terms materia primo-prima what might be described as immaterial matter. The great majority of Scholastic philosophers reject Duns Scotus's theory on this point, and affirm with St. Thomas that, in spiritual beings, form exists without matter. But as, accord- ing to St. Thomas, matter, and not form, is the principle of individuation, it follows that there cannot exist two angels of the same species. St. Thomas unequivocally admits the inference : " Si ergo angeli non sunt compositi ex materia, et forma, ut dictum est supra, sequitur quod impossible sit, esse duos angelos unius speciei: sicut etiam impossibile esset dicere, quod essent plures albedines separata?, aut plures humanitatcs, cum albe- dines non sint plures, nisi secundum quod sunt in pluribus substantiis." 24 This deduction might lead us to conclude that, at the death of the body, human souls will be deprived of the principle that made them separate individuals and will be one and the same. Such a conclusion would either overthrow St. Thomas's theo- logical view of eternal life, or be a rcductio ad dbsurdum of his theory of form. But he meets the objection with a most re- markable subtlety by saying that the souls of men will ever remain distinct, because, although they will be separated from their material frames, they will still retain a certain habitudo "Ibid., p. 134. M Thoma8 Aquinas, Sumnia Theologiea, Pars 1, Q. f>0, art. 4, c. 8 98 ad corpus which will be sufficient to distinguish them from other souls. The remaining property of the substantial form is its sim- plicity. It has been remarked that primordial matter, although it is the principle of quantity and divisibility, possesses a certain simplicity. It is simple in its essence and essentially multiple in its parts. The substantial form is likewise simple in its essence, but, unlike primordial matter, it is endowed with sim- plicity as regards its parts. On this point an explanation seems, however, indispensable. All material beings fall under two great classes: they are either organic or inorganic. An organic being is admitted by all Scho- lastics to be really one; hence it possesses but one form; but inorganic beings are not endowed with the same character of unity. They are merely aggregates of simple parts, called mole- cules or atoms, each of which has its own individual existence. It is therefore to the molecule or to the atom that the simplicity of form belongs. Simplicity of form understood in this manner has been unani- mously accepted in the school; but a certain number of philoso- phers have thought it necessary to admit in organic beings some subordinate forms destined, not to destroy the simplicity which the substantial form possesses, but to give more consistency to 6ome points which, in the ordinary Scholastic doctrine, seemed to be inconsistent. The doctrine of the plurality of forms was maintained by Henry of Ghent. He admitted in man, besides the rational soul, a subordinate form, which he named forma corporeitatis or mixtionis, and to which he attributed the function of causing the great variety of our organs and the substantial organization of matter. He proved its existence by the following argument : "Alitor enim nihil homo in generatione hominis generaret substantial*'. Bed tantummodo corrumperet."' 8 "Quodlibet, 111, 1G. Of. Turner, History of Philosophy, p. 385. 99 This forma corporeitatis was said to exist in the embryo be- fore the appearance of the spiritual soul, and to continue to exist in the body after death, until decomposition takes place. Xot long afterwards the same doctrine was rendered famous by Duns Scotus. This subtle thinker maintained that the sub- stantial form determines matter to a mode of being, but does not determine it perfectly, and leaves in it a certain potentiality, or aptitude for a higher form. And when matter arrives at the possession of this higher form, the inferior form continues to be present; so that, the more perfect the matter is, the greater the plurality of forms with which it is endowed. 26 The same view appeared, in a more or less modified form, in later Scholastic thought. Lessius, Conninck, Mayr and others admitted in animals a certain number of partial forms, which they called forms of the bones, of the flesh, of the eyes, etc. They similarly spoke of the forms of leaves and roots in plants. However, the great majority of Scholastics, following St. Thomas, teach that living organisms cannot possess more than one substantial form. They assert that the forma corporeitatis is impossible and unnecessary. It is impossible because if it were a substantial form animat- ing the body before the appearance of the spiritual soul, as its supporters maintain, the spiritual soul, inasmuch as it would thus be united to a substance already complete, could not be a substantial, but only an accidental form. It is unnecessary, because, according to Scholastic philosophy, a form of a higher order gives to the matter to which it is joined not only the characteristic properties it possesses by its nature, but also all properties belonging to the forms of a lower order. Our spiritual soul, for instance, gives us not only spiritual facul- ties, but also the sensitive faculties of the brute and the vegeta- tive life of the plant. 27 This exposition of the theory of the substantial form demands n Cf. Duns Scotus, De Rcrum principio, Q. 8, art. 4. 27 Gf. Urraburu, Compendium Philosophic Scholastica>, Vol. 4, pp. 2!) ft". 100 as a complement a few words about a formula often met with in Scholastic treatises: Forma educitur e potentia materia. Willi the exception of the human soul, all substantial forms are intrinsically dependent on matter, and, for this reason, are called material. Still, they do not exist in matter actually, but potentially; for otherwise changes would be only accidental, not substantial. These forms are not created, inasmuch as creation is the production of a being from nothing, and substantial forms are produced out of preexisting matter. Now, observing what occurs in substantial changes, we see that, in order that the change may take place, it must be accompanied by some deter- minate conditions. On the appearance of these conditions a new substance is produced. This mode of production is what Scholastics call eduction out of the potency of matter. 28 The spiritual soul alone is not educed in this manner. Being by its nature spiritual, it is intrinsically independent of the body and is created immediately by God. Section 4. — Modern Science and the Constitution of Matter It is only with the greatest reserve that one can enter on dis- cussing the constitution of matter. So many brilliant minds have grappled with this stupendous problem, only to give up its solution in despair, that many think it a mere waste of time to try to drag Nature's secret from her pent-up bosom. Such a proceeding, however, is but the position of despair and can hardly be justified. Any existing thing can be understood, because to understand ( hit us legere) is to know a thing as it is, to read its most inti- mate nature. It is not meant by this assertion that, in our actual condition, we can be omniscient. Things which do not fall within the sphere of our experience will forever remain unknown to us; but, in the constitution of this material world, 88 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia, Q. 3, art. 8. 101 there is apparently nothing lying beyond the grasp of our intel- lectual powers. An adequate explanation of the constitution of matter does not therefore seem an impossibility, although we frankly admit that it has not been yet reached, and we doubt whether our triumph on this point will ever be complete. It has always seemed to us that Dynamism is somewhat fanci- ful, and the relatively small number of followers it has gained among men of science cannot but confirm us in the same view. According to P. G. Tait, 29 the most fatal objection to which it is exposed is that it is incapable of explaining inertia, a dis- tinctive^ — perhaps the most distinctive — property of matter. This remark is not absolutely devoid of value, as the manner in which Dynamism accounts for inertia seems rather arbitrary. Still, we do not think that Tait does full justice to his oppo- nents' view, nor can it be maintained that the dynamic explana- tion of inertia is altogether valueless. According to Dynamism, nothing exists in nature but centers of force, whose essence is to act. The action of one of these centers will be prevented from producing its natural effect if it is counteracted by the resistance of another force of equal and opposite value. And thus the state of equilibrium will arise and will be a mode of tension. Inertia is thus explained in this system not by the absence, but by the equilibrium of forces. A greater deficiency of Dynamism is perhaps its incapability of explaining extension. The centers of force it admits in nature are unextended. By being conglomerated in countless numbers, they give rise to an apparent, illusory extension, in the same way as points, placed side by side, may lead us to believe in their forming continuous letters. The comparison just given, first proposed by Boscovich him- self, simply ignores the difficulty. Points placed side by side may lead us to believe in their forming continuous letters, pro- vided each of them possesses a certain extension. If the points are altogether unextended; if, as regards extension, each one is »Cf. Tait, Properties of Matter, p. 20. 102 nothing, their sum will also be nothing, and no illusion of con- tinuous letters will be possible. This is precisely what takes place in Boscovich's system. His centers of force either are in contact with one another or they are not. If they are, they co-penetrate one another, and there is no extension. If they are not — besides the fact that the so-called heresy of distance action is then involved — we have a series of points, none of which has extension; and as each one, in so far as extension is concerned, is thus nothing; as between them there is only void space, which is equally nothing, we cannot conceive how from the union of those countless nothings a something — even as an illusion — can arise. The atomistic theory presents likewise a large number of dif- ficulties that baffle our powers of observation and reasoning and leave us face to face with the dreadful sight of our utter insig- nificance. Mere atoms in the universe of matter, we took pride in our intellectual omnipotence. We looked on the towns we had built, the rivers we had spanned, the oceans we had crossed. We saw w T ith delight thunder and lightning yield to our caprice. We then called ourselves the kings and lords of Nature. Un- deceive thyself, man ! thy body is but an atom and thy mind is powerless. The lowliest fact of nature is for thee a mystery. and the more thou shalt study, the more clearly shalt thou see that ignorance is thy destined lot. Ancient Atomism admitted nothing but atoms and void space. In order to avoid the assumption of distance action, the hypo- thesis of a fluid called ether was subsequently introduced. A mere hypothesis at first, when invoked to explain only the phe- nomena of light, the theory of ether was strengthened almost indefinitely when Clerk Maxwell showed that the phenomena of the electromagnetic field can be explained by an ether identical in nature with the luininiferous medium. The greal discovery of the English scientist was still further confirmed by the experiments of Hertz, who detected the exist- ence and measured the speed of the electro-magnetic waves, thus 103 laying the foundation upon which the edifice of wireless teleg- raphy has recently been erected. 30 There seems thus not to he the slightest doubt as to the exist- ence of ether. But, if we advance one step further and try to investigate its inherent constitution, we will find ourselves in- volved in darkness and condemned to nescience. Some physicists have regarded ether as composed of minute particles, of a sort of atoms, infinitesimal in comparison with those of ordinary matter, but still atoms. This view was held by Lord Kelvin, by Whetham, 31 and taken as the current ether theory by Herbert Spencer, who gave it as a proof of the un- knowable character of the reality which surrounds us in nature. 32 The same view has been defended in February, 1907, by Mr. Yeronnet, in the Revue de Philosophic. These are Mr. Veron- net's words: " The electrical theory obliges us to reduce matter and its phenomena to a system of attractive and repulsive central forces, called electrons. These forces are obliged to act at distance, inasmuch as they are found in the atomic or granulous state. They form discontinuous centers, and ether itself is constituted by them." 33 It is clear that, as an explanation of distance action, ether, thus understood, simply shifts the question. If it is composed of minute particles, these either must be separated by absolute void, and we are thus brought back to our starting-point, or they demand a second ether to explain the first, and we must admit an infinity of similar fluids, of which each and all are absolutely valueless as an interpretation of distance action. The opposite view, more generally maintained nowadays, is that ether is not composed of atoms separated by void space, but is itself absolutely continuous. This conception is repeat- m C'f . Whetham, Recent Development of Physical Science, p. 270. "Ibid., p. 292. n Cf. Spencer, First Principles, l't. 1. Chap. 8, sect. 18. "La matiere, les ions, les electron^: I'rr. 07, p. 166. 104 edly expressed by Joseph Larmor, in his famous work: JFJthcr and Matter: " All that is known (or perhaps need be known) of the aether itself may be formulated as a scheme of differential equations defining the properties of a continuum in space, which it would be gratuitous to further explain by any complication of struc- ture." 34 The same conception is also entertained by Sir Oliver Lodge, who sums up in the following words his own view on the subject: " As far as we know, it (ether) appears to be a perfectly homogeneous incompressible continuous body, incapable of being resolved into simpler elements, or atoms; it is, in fact, continu- ous, not molecular." 35 Now, is this second view in any way more satisfactory than the first? Our knowledge of nature shows us that the essential difference existing between solids, liquids and gases, is due to the greater or less degree of continuity of their structural par- ticles. In the gaseous state a molecule freely passes from one molecular system into another. A diminution of temperature lessens the vibratory motion of the molecules, which are then reduced to a definite system, and are limited in their motion by the molecules surrounding them. The result is the liquid state. A further decrease of temperature draws the molecules still nearer to one another. Each one enters the sphere of action of the others, losing thereby the possibility of translatory move- ment, and becoming limited to orbital motion. A material object becomes therefore more and more solid in proportion as its continuity increases. If ether be perfectly continuous, it must be incomparably more solid than any other object. That ilii- is m>t the case is almost an evident truth, inasmuch as if ether were endowed with such a degree of solidity, it is incon- ceivable how movement in it would be possible. "/.armor, .Ether and Matter, p. 78. "Lodge, Modern Views of Electricity, p. 396. 105 Modern physicists reply to this objection by saying that we must not conceive ether as an ordinary material substance: " The properties of aether, says Sir Oliver Lodge, must be some- what different from those of ordinary matter." 36 We doubt whether this remark will seem convincing. Ether is either ma- terial, or it is not. If it is material, it must be, like matter, composed of particles — either continuous or discrete — and the laws which apply to matter in general must apply to it also. If, on the other hand, it is not material, it is inconceivable that it may act upon matter, or be a connecting-link between atoms. Whatever may be the view we accept as to the nature of ether, we are thus facing enigmas whose solution seems to be far be- yond the reach of our present knowledge and to be destined to be a puzzle to human thought for many a future generation. Let us not, however, conclude from these remarks that our knowledge of nature has not been increased by science. Al- though the unknown still exists, positive results have been ob- tained, especially in these last years, to such an extent that we may seem justified in the hope that what is still mysterious for us will be revealed to the rising generation. The first great step toward an actual knowledge of matter was made by John Dalton. He revived the hypothesis of atoms to explain the fact that the elements of a compound combine in definite proportions, and suggested that these proportions rep- resent the relative weight of the atoms. As the atomic weights of many elements were found to be multiples of that of hydrogen, Prout supposed that the atom of hydrogen was the ultimate basis from which all substances were made. This suggestion, however, implied that, the equivalents of all substances should be integers, which was not confirmed by experience, and Prout's view was forcibly abandoned. Such was still the situation when, in 1897, J. J. Thomson detected, in the cathode rays of a vacuum tube, corpuscles about one thousand times smaller than the atom of hydrogen. These cor- " Lodge, op. oit., p. 39G. 10G pusclcs were shown to be identical whatever might be the nature of the tube or of the gas it contained. Vast was the field opened to science by this astounding revelation. The newly-discovered corpuscles were found to be atoms of electricity, were called elec- trons, and recognized as the long-sought-for ultimate basis of matter, as the sub-atoms which, grouped in various ways, give rise to the chemical atoms of all material objects. The existence of the electrons has been repeatedly evidenced by experience;, and it has received a strong confirmation by tHe recent discovery of radio-active substances. The first observations on radio-activity were made by Bec- querel, who, in 1896, discovered that compounds of uranium affect photographic plates through an opaque covering. The labors of Mr. and Mrs. Curie, of Mr. Rutherford, and other dis- tinguished men of science, have thrown the desired light on the subject. It is now well known that uranium, radium, thorium, and a few other metals constantly emit three types of rays, known as the a, f3, and y rays. The /? rays have been most successfully studied, and arc known to consist of negative corpuscles, or electrons, projected with the velocity of light. The a rays have been shown to consist of positively charged bodies, projected with a velocity of about one tenth of the velocity of light. The y rays are the only ones whose nature is not yet fully known. The results of experience incline us to believe that they are analogous to Rbntgen rays and consist of wave-pulses traveling through ether with incredible velocity. The study of radio-active substances has also made known the fact that not only atoms are divisible and composed of electrons, but that real changes take place in the atoms themselves, by a process of disintegration, followed by a regrouping of the elec- trons, and that new substances thus arise from elements chem- ically simple, From uranium and thorium products have been obtained. considerably more active than those metals themselves. To these 107 new substances the names of uranium-X and thorium-X have been given. But further observation has shown that these highly active products little by little lose their activity, and that the metals from which they were obtained regain at the same time the energy they had temporarily lost. These interesting phenomena have been explained by the fact that all radio-active substances have high atomic weights, are therefore of a great complexity, and thus very instable. They constantly undergo a process of disintegration of which their radio-activity is the result. One or more particles are detached from the atom, and the atomic equilibrium is thus momentarily lost. Finalty, the electrons arrange themselves differently, attain a new temporary equilibrium, and give rise to the sub- stances known as thorium-X and uranium-X. No doubt is therefore to be entertained as to the real changes that take place in the atoms themselves. And these changes bring to our minds the possible realization of the dreams of the Mediaeval alchemists, at which, for so long a time, we have been wont to smile. If the atom is a complex structure which, on the occurrence of certain conditions, is disintegrable, there is nothing absolutely impossible in the transmutation of one metal into another. The only question is to bring about the condi- tions which the atomic disintegration necessitates. Do such conditions exist for all chemical elements? We are not in- clined to believe it, but their existence is not an impossibility, and the hope of the Mediaeval alchemist was not so preposterous as we have been taught to believe. The facts which modern science may look upon as established truths are the following: All substances, physically considered, are composed of mole- cules, which may be termed physical units, contain one or more chemical atoms, and, by their incessant motion, give rise to bent and other physical phenomena. The molecules are composed of atoms, or chemical units, which, by their regrouping in differenl manners, give rise to the 108 various compound substances and are indivisible by chemical processes. Finally, these atoms are nothing but groups of ultimate units, or electrons, which are the same for all substances, and, by their arrangement in different ways, form the simple elements which, until recently, had been believed ultimate. The recent views as to the structure of the atoms, which we have briefly described, present a certain likeness to the Scholas- tic theory of matter and form. This theory, by means of some modifications, might even be brought into perfect harmony with these scientific results. The modifications I have in view are the following: Let us call primordial matter the mass of electrical units, or electrons, which have been shown to be the ultimate ground- work out of which all material elements are built. Let us call substantial form the different arrangements of these ultimate units, to which the variety of material substances is due. Primordial Matter will thus be the same in all things. The diversity of nature of the various substances will be due to the substantial form. Our theory will be more in harmony with the spirit of Aris- totle, who, in explaining matter and form by means of brass and a statue, implies that it is a real entity, and not an abstrac- tion, that he has in view. All the facts upon which the Scholastic doctrine of matter and form is based will be satisfactorily explained. The stability of quantity under all modifications of bodily substances will be accounted for by the fact that the ultimate units, although arranged in different ways, are still present in the same number. As for the hypothesis of substantial changes in chemical com- binations, it must be frankly abandoned. The atom of water ti i ust not lie regarded as a homogeneous substance, but as a mere juxtaposition of two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. The permanence of the elements in the compound is universally 109 admitted by chemists to-day. It is involved in the electron theory and has received a new confirmation from the phenomena connected with radio-activity. A study of the compounds of radio-active metals has shown that the rate of emission of the radiations depends only on the quantity of the element present, and is not affected by the amount of inactive substance which the compound contains. It is thus made clear that in a metallic compound we have not a substance composed of homogeneous atoms, but that the very atoms of the simple elements are juxta- posed and form new molecules. To Farges's objection that, in the case of a mere juxtaposition, the dissolvents of the simple elements should be effective, we will answer that dissolution is a physical — not a chemical — process, that dissolvents can act only on physical units or molecules, and that the atoms which, by their juxtaposition, form these molecules, being chemical units, are separable only by chemical processes. CHAPTER V SCHOLASTIC PSYCHOLOGY Section 1. — Theory of Abstraction Experimental Psychology is a new-born science still seeking its definite path. After numerous hesitations and partial failures, it has come to the conviction that its true aim is not to supplant the old metaphysical psychology, but to walk side by side in the most peaceable manner. Experimental psycholo- gists know full well to-day that the worth of the results they will obtain will be inversely proportional to the metaphysical preoccupations they cherish. Wiser than their older brethren, they limit themselves to measuring on the skin of the forehead the degree of fatigue produced by an intellectual work, and abstain from all hypotheses concerning the materiality or the spirituality of the mind. Metaphysical psychology enjoys therefore an independent existence. It remains a branch of philosophy, whereas its younger sister is a positive science. Scholastic psychologists adhere to Aristotle's definition of the soul: " Anima est actus primus corporis physici organici, potentia viiam habentis" regard the soul as the substantial form of the body, and maintain that it is essentially simple, spiritual and immortal. Their proofs of the spirituality and of the immortality of the soul will find their place at the end of the present chapter. Before we expound them, it is necessary to discuss a question which may be said to lie at the very foundation of Scholastic psychology: the question of abstraction. The theory which regards the mind as capable of abstracting from all particular determinations and of forming general ideas 110 Ill has received in modern times many severe blows. The cele- brated British philosopher, George Berkeley, regards the over- throw of that theory as a necessary presupposition of his system. In the Introduction to his Principles of Human Knowledge, he gives, in a somewhat jocose fashion, a minute account of what he understands by abstraction. He tells us, for example, that, by the abstract idea of body is meant " body without any par- ticular shape or figure, without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales, etc., nor yet naked : hair, feathers, scales and nakedness being the distinguishing properties of particular animals, and for that reason, left out of the abstract idea." 1 He thereupon confesses that he cannot, by any effort of thought, conceive the abstract idea thus described. His conclusion is that an abstract general idea is an absurdity and that the only ideas we are entitled to regard as general are particular ideas which are made to represent or stand for all other particular ideas of the same sort. 2 Berkeley's rejection of abstraction rests upon a lamentable confusion which has originated in Locke and pervaded the whole body of modern philosophy: the confusion of the two terms Phantasm and Idea. A writer who feels little sympathy for the schoolmen, John Stuart Mill, confesses that they were unrivalled in the con- struction of technical language, and that their definitions have seldom been altered but to be spoiled. 3 Nowhere perhaps does his remark apply more justly than in the present case. A phantasm is the imaginary representation of a particular object previously perceived. It is a kind of mental picture which reproduces more or less faithfully what we have experi- enced in the past. Besides the power of reproduction, we possess the faculty of combining the objects of our previous experience in an infinite variety of forms. Now an imposing 1 Fraser's Selection from Berkeley, p. 13. 3 Ibid., p. 17. •J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Bk. 1, chap. 2, sect. 4. 112 structure we have admired during the day is present to our mind. We endeavor to reproduce it faithfully, to reconstruct one by one its minutest details. One moment has elapsed and our imagination is wandering in the most capricious fashion. Horace's monster sits triumphingly on the ruins of the monu- ment so carefully constructed in the previous instant, and which has now crumbled to pieces and disappeared forever with the instant of time which brought it forth. The range of our imagining power is thus unlimited. Each one of our mental pictures, however, represents one single particular object. How- ever blurred may be the image, however indefinite its features, it is always singular. I cannot form a mental picture of a triangle without giving it a definite size and shape, by which it becomes one individual, distinguishable from all other pos- sible triangles. It is to the phantasm thus described, and improperly called idea, that Berkeley's criticisms apply. That ideas of this sort cannot be abstract goes without saying. No triangle can be imagined that is not either scalene, isosceles or equilateral; no body that is not either covered or naked. But it is not an idea of this sort that the great masters of Scholasticism considered as the product of abstraction. Besides the power of reproducing and combining our past sensations — a power we possess in common with the lower animals — there exists in us a faculty of conceiving the universal as such, of forming true ideas. The idea, which, to avoid all confusion, it would perhaps be better to call concept, is no mental picture whatever. It is a notion of our mind, the knowledge of what something is. We know that a triangle is a geometrical figure consisting of three sides and three angles. This knowledge is the idea of the triangle. It is clear and distinct, and is also universal, inas- much as it applies to all triangles we may happen to conceive. It is an abstract idea, because it is not limited, like the phan- tasm, to one particular object, but may be truly predicated of a 113 whole class. The essential characteristics which separate it from the phantasm may be reduced to the following three : 1. The idea is one. The idea of a triangle is one and the same for all possible triangles. The phantasm, on the contrary, is multiple. The imaginary picture of a right triangle is unlike that of a scalene triangle. 2. The idea is universal, inasmuch as we predicate it of all existing and possible objects of a class; the phantasm is singular and concrete, because it applies to a determinate object and to no other. 3. The idea is necessary and immutable. The elements of the concept of a triangle are invariably three sides and three angles. The phantasm is mutable and contingent. It changes as rapidly as the objects which present themselves to our senses. 4 The confusion we have thus described may be readily ac- counted for. Our intelligence cannot easily operate without its concomitant phantasm. Although a reasoning about a tri- angle might be effected without the help of a sensible image, it could not be but at the cost of the most strenuous mental efforts. This is the reason why text-books on geometry exhibit sensible images side by side with the demonstrations. It is the reason why Locke and the whole British empirical school have been led to a confusion which even such a clear-minded man as Berkeley has been unable to detect. One of the most interesting pastimes of a scholar is the perusal of the works of the great masters of human thought with the purpose of reading between their lines what they themselves have not read, of deducing from their principles the logical consequences they have not deduced. Berkeley in par- ticular may offer us some delicious hours of entertainment. Talented as he was, he could not but recognize that the concep- tions of our minds are not copies of sensible impressions, that the ideas of God and of the soul are not mere reproductions of the data of sense-experience. Unwilling, however, to give up *Cf. C.inebra. Elementos de Filosofia, Vol. 2, {>. 73. 9 114 his theory of ideas, he thought he could save his position by U6ing the word notion: " So far as 1 can see/' said he, " will, soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or in truth for any idea at all, but for some- thing which is very different from ideas, and which, being an Agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by, any idea whatso- ever. Though it must be owned at the same time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating, inasmuch as we know or understand the meaning of these words." 5 We must confess that in these few lines the author of the Principles utterly overthrows the elaborate controversy of his Introduction. Let him call his idea phantasm and his notion idea, and his agreement with us will be absolutely perfect. He has thus proved that an abstract phantasm is an impossibility, which we readily grant him. He has proved nothing against the Scholastic doctrine of abstraction, and would even probably admit with us that his notions of soul and spirit are truly general, and that they apply to all existing spirits or souls. Closely related to the theory of phantasms and ideas, is the division of our mental faculties into organic and inorganic. Organic faculties are those we possess in common with the lower animals. In their nature and operations, they depend upon our bodily organs. Such are the imagination and the sensitive memory. Inorganic faculties, on the other hand, de- pend upon the soul alone. They are essentially spiritual, and would continue to exist and to operate if our mind were sepa- rated from its bodily frame. Upon this classification of our mental powers is based the essential distinction maintained by Scholastics between men and brutes. Lower animals possess only organic faculties. They can form phantasms, but no ideas. They never reach the uni- versal because they lack intelligence, by which alone the uni- versal is reached. • Berkeley, op. cit., p. 53. 115 Section 2. — Nature of the Human Soul Scholastic philosophers regard the soul as the substantial form of the body, from which it is intrinsically independent, though united with it in a manner characterized as substantial and personal. By the intrinsical independence of the body is meant that the soul is an activity by itself, that it is not determined by ma- terial conditions, and hence that it will continue to exist and to exercise its operations after the death of the body. By the substantial and personal union is meant: (a) that the human compound is a substance by itself; and (6) that man is the compound, and not the soul alone. The nature of this union is very clearly expressed by St. Thomas in the following formula : " In each one of us, by the soul and body, is con- stituted a double unity, of nature and of person," " ex anima et corpore, constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturce et persona."* The doctrine of intrinsical independence separates Scholastic philosophy from materialism. The doctrine of substantial and personal union sets it apart from the dualistic systems of Plato and Descartes, which regards man as a spirit accidentally united with the body, and governing it as the pilot governs his vessel. The human soul is further described as possessing the three characteristics of simplicity, spirituality and immortality. The proofs of the simplicity of the human soul may be con- densed in the following form : The nature of a being is known from its operations. The operations of the soul are essentially simple. Hence the soul itself is by nature essentially simple. Examples of simple operations of the soul may be adduced and multiplied at will. There arc the simple ideas of being, truth, virtue and the like, which cannot, by any effort of thought, be conceived as divisible. There are the intellectual acts of judgment, which presuppose a simple subject and can hardly be explained in any other hypothesis. If the mind "Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., P. 3, q. 2, art. 1, ad 2. 116 which apprehends the subject and the predicate is not one and indivisible, we have no judgment whatever, but merely two different impressions without any possible connection. Kant was perfectly aware of this truth when he formulated at the basis of his philosophy the principle that experience by itself furnishes only detached and unconnected facts, and that no judgment is possible without a mental synthesis. The doctrine of the simplicity of the soul has been attacked by David Hume in a most ingenious manner. He describes it as a true atheism, capable of justifying all those sentiments for which Spinoza is " so universally infamous." " There are in my experience,*' says he, " two different systems of being, to which I suppose myself under a necessity of assign- ing some substance, or ground of inhesion. I observe first the universe of objects or of body : the sun, moon and stars ; the earth, seas, plants, animals, men, ships, houses, and other pro- ductions either of art or nature. Here Spinoza appears, and tells me that these are only modifications; and that the sub- ject, in which they inhere, is simple, incompounded, and in- divisible. After this I consider the other system of beings, viz.. the universe of thought, or my impressions and ideas. There I observe another sun, moon and stars; an earth, and seas, covered and inhabited by plants and animals; towns, houses, mountains, rivers ; and in short everything I can discover or conceive in the first system. Upon my enquiry concerning these, Theologians present themselves, and tell me, that these are also modifica- tions, and modifications of one simple, uncompounded, and in- divisible substance. Immediately upon which I am deafened with the noise of a hundred voices, that treat the first hypothesis with detestation and scorn, and the second, with applause and veneration. I turn my attention to these hypotheses to see what may be the reason of so great a partiality, and find that they have the same fault of being unintelligible, and that as far as we can understand them, they are so much alike, that it is impossible to discover any absurdity in one, which is not com- mon to both of them. We have no idea of any quality in an object, which does not agree to, and may not represent a quality in an impression; and that because all our ideas are derived from our impressions. We can never, therefore, find any repug- 117 nance betwixt an extended object as a modification, and a single imcompounded essence, as its substance, unless that repugnance takes place equally betwixt the perception or impression of that extended object, and the same uncompounded essence. Every idea of a quality in an object passes through an impression ; and therefore every perceivable relation, whether of connexion or repugnance, must be common both to objects and impressions." 7 The objection so clearly exposed by Hume, and which, from his own point of view, seems unanswerable, loses much of its force if we bear in mind the distinction pointed out above between ideas and phantasms. The phantasm, being a copy of a previous impression, is no doubt composed of parts, just as well as the impression is. If I picture in my mind the frontis- piece of Columbia University, ten different columns stand there before me, the length of each of which may be divided into two parts; and these may again be subdivided at least as easily as the real columns could be. I believe everybody would agree with Hume on this point; but such are not the operations from which the simplicity of the soul is deduced. The sun, moon and stars Hume describes as existing in his universe of thought are as truly multiple as those of the universe of nature. The rivers he imagines are made of drops of water, the trees of branches and leaves. But the conclusion to which he is led by these considerations, his conviction that the soul is not simple, but divisible like the universe of matter; is that conviction divisible also? Can it be mentally cut into two parts, two half- convictions ; or, similar to the river, is it made up of an infinite number of drops of conviction? These are, however, the absurdities from which we cannot escape if we are unwilling to admit the essentially simple character of intellectual ideas. A great number of concepts, it is true, are in a certain sense divisible. Upon their divisibility is based the Scholastic division of concepts into simple and complex. Complex con- cepts are made up of several Bimple elements. The concept of T Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, Selby-Bigge'fl ed., pp. 242-243. 118 man, for example, may be resolved into the elements of animal and rational. This sort of division is, however, quite different from that of material beings, or of their reproduction in our mind. The red surface I see or imagine may be divided into two red surfaces, identical in nature with the first, and differ- ing from it only in quantity. The elements of the concept of man are of an entirely diverse order. They are not merely two halves of a whole. They differ from each other and from the whole in quality, and the entire process of division rests upon their specific differences. But as qualitative division cannot, like quantitative division, be continued ad infinitum, we must finally arrive at essentially simple concepts, and conclude that they are produced by an essentially simple being. The questions of the simplicity and of the spirituality of the soul, although closely connected, must be carefully dis- tinguished. Every spiritual being is simple; but a simple being is not necessarily spiritual. Scholastic text-books give as an instance of a simple, non-spiritual being the soul of the lower animals, which depends upon the body in all its operations, comes into existence with the body, and ceases to be as soon as the body dies. The spirituality of the human soul may be defined as its intrinsical independence of matter. In virtue of that inde- pendence, it is not affected by the death of our organism, it does not disappear with our last breath. When this mortal life of ours comes to an end, our spirit springs forth; and, free from material bonds, starts a new and purer life, a life that shall know no death. The spirituality of the soul is proved from the nature of its faculties : the intelligence and the will. These faculties have for objects the universal and the necessary. It is to the universal as such, to a nature conceived with an absolute — not an individual — character, that our intelligence tends. It studies the essence of the object, abstracting from the indi- vidual characteristics of "this'' object. A peculiar aspect of 119 the universal is its necessity. This necessity, human intelli- gence does not fail to grasp. It directs its efforts to the im- mutable aspects of things, and abstracts from the contingent character they possess as individuals. Our will likewise tends to the universal manifested in the form of the absolute good. No limited and relative good can satisfy us. It is in the union with an absolute perfection that out will would rest, that it would find its perfect happiness. Now, these characters of universality and necessity un- equivocally separate our mental faculties from the pure forces of matter. Matter is essentially individual, and envelops in individual conditions all objects of which it is an essential con- stituent. Our mental faculties are thus independent of matter, and the soul, the substance they constitute, is necessarily en- dowed with the same independence. 8 Several other arguments of lesser importance are adduced to confirm the same view. The act of self-consciousness, for example, is said to separate the soul from all material agents; for, whereas matter can act upon itself only in the sense that a certain particle can act upon another particle, the human mind can and does reflect upon itself in such a manner that the Ego reflecting and the Ego reflected upon are one and the same. 9 A third proof very much insisted upon is deduced from the contrast between the effects produced upon the intellect and the senses by their respective objects. When the excellence of the object of sense increases beyond a certain limit, the organ undergoes corruption, and is eventually destroyed. A vivid light impairs our eye-sight; a prolonged contemplation of the sun may result in blindness. Our intellect, on the contrary, be- comes keener and more penetrating when the object it ponders becomes more sublime. The characteristics which separate sense from intellect are reduced by Urraburu to the following six: • Cf. Gardair, La Nature Humuine, pp. 169 fT. ' Maher, Psychology, 3d cd., pp. 452 fl". 120 1. (Which is essential and the root of the others.) Intellect is an inorganic or spiritual faculty; sense is organic and material. 2. Sense is found in all animals; intellect only in rational animals or men. 3. Sense knows only the singular; intellect knows the universal. 4. Sense extends only to material objects; intellect to im- material objects as well. 5. No sense knows itself or its own operation; the intellect knows itself and its operation. 6. The senses are corrupted by the excellence of the sensible object ; the intellect remains uncorrupted, however excellent its object may be. 10 The remaining property of the soul, its immortality, follows from the previous two as a logical consequence. The soul, being essentially simple, cannot, like the body, perish by dissolution of parts; and, on the other hand, being spiritual, having its peculiar, independent life, not being conditioned in its existence and operations by the bodily organism, it cannot cease to exist simply because the organism is destroyed. The theological belief in another life is thus not only shown to harmonize with reason, but is deduced from the fundamental principles of philosophy. Whether human reason can likewise prove the eternity of this new life, is considered a debatable question. Maher, in his Psychology, answers it negatively. As a theo- logian, he believes in eternal life; as a philosopher, although he sees no reason why the soul should ever perish, he admits that " leaving Revelation aside and arguing solely from reason, he does not see any perfectly demonstrable proof of the everlasting existence of human souls." " Almighty God," adds he, " could by an exercise of His absolute power, annihilate the human soul as well as any other object which He has created." 11 10 Cf. Urraburu, Compendium Philosophic Scholastics', Vol. 4, p. 240. " Maher. op, cit., p. 486. The same view is also maintained by Meurin, Ethics, p. 161. 121 I believe that most neo- Scholastics would disagree with Fr. Maher on this point. They would be inclined to maintain that the human soul can be proved, not only to endure for a certain time after death, but to endure forever. This view is clearly exposed and defended in the works of Urraburu. Start- ing from the ordinary arguments of the school, the learned Jesuit demonstrates that the soul cannot perish like the body by a natural death, and he reaches Maher's conclusion that the soul can cease to exist only through an act of annihilation of an all-powerful God. But, whereas Maher stops at this point, and leaves human reason uncertain whether God will destroy or not the spirit he has created, Urraburu shows that such an annihilation would involve an inconsistency in God's own nature. His argument may be outlined as follows: God has constituted the human soul in such a way that it is naturally immortal. If he should choose to destroy it by an act of his will, there would be a contradiction between the creative act by which he gave the soul an immortal nature and the destructive fiat which would reduce it to nothingness. As no such contra- diction can be supposed in an absolutely perfect being, the soul will exist forever. Urraburu corroborates his teaching by the authority of St. Thomas. The annihilation of the soul would be a miracle, and a miracle never takes place except as a mani- festation of God's glory. But, St. Thomas says, " redigere aliquid in nihilum non pertinet ad gratia manifestation em, cum magis per hoc divina potent ia ct bonitas ostendatur, quod res in esse conservetur." 12 Section 3. — Locus of the Human Soul The title of this section suggests a venerable formula, fre- quently derided nowadays and more frequently misunderstood, the famous Tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte, which has been recently pronounced " disconcerting but to the chosen few who "Thomas Aquinas, Summn Theol.. P. 1. (,). 104. art. 4. c. Cf. lira buru, op. tit., pp. C5G fl". 122 have embraced a philosophy of contradictions, and rejoice in the absurdity of the conclusions to which their reasonings conduct them." The words I have just quoted are from Mr. Fullcrton. In a chapter of his System of Metaphysics, entitled " The Atomic Self." he exposes the semi-materialistic opinion of the plain man about mind, and traces it back to the philosophies of tbe most ancient times. He holds that the teachings of those old systems have become incorporated into theology and ethics, have left their traces upon language and literature, have become a part of the common thought of the human race, and are now accepted by the great mass of men as self-evident truths. " Ancient philosophers believed the mind to be material and unequivocally in the body. It was composed of fine round atoms, highly movable atoms, etc. It could be inhaled and exhaled, and might escape through a gaping wound, as wine spouts through the rent wine-skin. It was a kind of matter and nothing more, having the same right to occupy space that has any other form of matter. Afterward it was for centuries still in the body, but in a much more indefinite and inconsistent fashion. It was wholly in the whole body, and wholly in every part." 13 The Scholastic formula is thus regarded by Fullerton as the direct offspring of old materialism. It is materialism still, although somewhat transfigured. It is materialism aware of its inner incongruity, and trying to save its own life by means of vague subterfuges. The mind is still located in the body, but its presence there is regarded as immaterial. Descartes who emphasized the presence, but neglected its immaterial character, located the soul in the pineal gland. The scholastics emphasize both sides of the inconsistent doctrine. They "stir up the contradiction and make it growl, striking fear to the heart of the beholder." l'lillerton's doctrine on the locus of the soul is identical with 1 1 u iiK-s. Although we differ from the author of tbe Treatise U G. S. Fullcrton. System of Metaphysics, p. 2C7. 123 on Human Nature in many essential points, we cannot but fully agree with him here, and even regard his teaching as irrefutable. Location in a determinate place is a property of material beings, and has no sense except if applied to such. The chair upon which I am sitting is said to be located between the walls of my room in so far as it can give rise to tactual and visual impressions spatially related to the impressions caused by the walls themselves. When we assert that the point A is between B and C, we mean that a line going from B to C would pass through A. Location in space, thus applied to material beings, is perfectly intelligible; but, as Hume and Fullerton maintain, it loses all meaning if predicated of mind. It sounds nonsensical to assert that a thought is placed between a desk and a blackboard, that ten different volitions are actually cross- ing the street ; but if we express the same idea in different words, if we say that the human mind is placed in a certain portion of our organism or in our whole body, the absurdity of the assertion becomes less apparent and may be easily overlooked. It exists, nevertheless, and to say that our mind is located in our body, or that God is located everywhere — if we take the word located in its proper meaning — is no less preposterous than to say that a benevolent desire took the ferry-boat, and was slowly carried from New York to Brooklyn. Where is our mind then? And where is God? Such ques- tions cannot be answered but in the following way: Our mind is nowhere, and God is nowhere. The " where " implying parts outside of parts, and being a property of matter alone, cannot be predicated of immaterial things. And if it sounds odd to say that spirits are nowhere, it is because we are so immersed in material thinking that we cannot believe that a thing can exist without material relations. The existence of our mind is an immediate fact of consciousness. It is an ultimate fact upon which all our knowledge is grounded, and which itself needs no proof. It is the center from which we have to start in our investigations concerning reality. But the relations which our 124 mind bears to the rest of the universe cannot be assimilated, to the relations of particles of matter. We fully agree with Hume and Fullerton that a philosophical system tending to localize mind in a definite portion of space must be rejected as absurd. What becomes of the Scholastic formula then? Must we, without more ado, regard it as the outcome of an illogical materialistic conception of an immaterial thing? Some power- ful motives at once come forth and give to this view the greatest uncertainty. St. Thomas's doctrine of the soul, inspired by Christian theology, is more decidedly immaterialistic than the theories of Locke, Hume, and the whole British empirical school. For whereas sensism resolves ideas into sense-impressions and admits only a difference of degree between sense and intellect, St. Thomas and the schoolmen maintain that the difference is not of degree but of kind, that between the sensuous impression and the intellectual thought there is an impassable chasm. How strange would it sound then that he who might be described as the foremost adversary of materialism, should himself fall into the very errors he constantly opposes ! A careful study of the doctrines of St. Thomas suffices to absolve him from all charges of materialism. The Angelic Doctor not only did not intend to localize the mind in a definite portion of space, but he was as fully aware as Hume of the evident truth that position in space is a property of matter and of matter alone. In the Sum ma contra Gentiles, St. Thomas examines how an intellectual substance can be united to the body, and teaches that there are two kinds of contact : a contact through quantity, which is proper to material beings alone, and a contact through virtue, which may belong to immaterial beings as well. This latter kind is however described as contact only metaphorically. A spirit is said to touch only in so far as it acts, only in the 6ense in which we are entitled to say that a sad news touches us: " Si igitur sint aliqua tangentia qua* in quantitatis ultimis 125 non tangant, dicentur nihilominus tangere, in quantum agunt ; secundum quern modum dicimus, quod contristans nos tangit." 14 Further on, the Christian teaching of God's ubiquity compels St. Thomas to take up the same question again. And now as before, his teaching is unmistakably clear: " Ees autem incorporea in aliquo esse dicitur secundum con- tactum virtutis, quum careat dimensiva quantitate. Sic igitur se habet res incorporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per yirtutem suam, sicut se habet res corporea ad hoc quod sit in aliquo per quantitatem dimensivam. Si autem esset aliquod corpus habens quantitatem dimensivam infinitam, oporteret illud esse ubique. Ergo, si sit aliqua res incorporea habens virtutem infinitam, oportet quod sit ubique. Est igitur ubique." 15 We thus see that, in St. Thomas's view, the words: God is everywhere, simply mean that he acts upon all beings. We also see that the presence of the soul in the body must not be regarded as a material presence. It is not in the body as the blood is in our veins. Properly speaking, it is not in the body at all. It simply acts upon the body, and touches it as a piece of bad news touches our heart. The formula : Tola in toto et tola in aliqua parte, thus understood, loses all its material flavor. Instead of appearing as a nonsensical collection of words, worthy of derision and scorn, it steps forth as a flash of genius, as a profound truth which commands our admiration and our assent. '♦Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, Lib. 2, chap. 56. "Ibid., Lib. 3, cap. 68. CHAPTER VI SCHOLASTIC NATURAL THEOLOGY Section 1. — Natural and Revealed Theology The very title, Natural Theology, suggests that some other kind of theology exists. And, indeed, Scholastics have always carefully distinguished between natural and revealed theology. This is one of the points which unmistakably separate the Scholastic system from the philosophy of the Hegelian school. According to Hegel and his disciples, no truth lies beyond the reach of the human mind. God is an object of experience as clearly present to our natural faculties as tables and chairs. An adequate knowledge of the Absolute is thus perfectly possible, and theology becomes a branch of philosophy. St. Thomas and the Scholastics, on the other hand, believe that the Divine Essence cannot be known by our finite minds. Our natural faculties may lead us to the knowledge of God's existence; they may even enable us to reach a true knowledge of his nature; but, as this knowledge is not reached by direct intuition, but by the consideration of the finite world in which we live, it cannot be adequate. As the imperfect knowledge of God our mind can attain may be supplemented by the Divine Revelation, the science of the- ology is evidently twofold: Natural Theology deals with the knowledge of God human reason can attain by its natural forces ; Revealed Theology deals with the knowledge of God which lies beyond the reach of our natural faculties and is attainable only by revelation. The philosopher is thus concerned with natural theology ; he has nothing to do with revealed theology. 12G 127 Section 2. — Proofs of God's Existence All possible proofs of the existence of the Divine Mind may be classified under three heads : 1. The a priori proof, derived from the very concept of God, and usually known as ontological argument. 2. The a posteriori proofs, by which we ascend from the knowledge of the finite world to the knowledge of the infinite. 3. The moral arguments, drawn from the nature and aspira- tions of the human heart; also, from the common consent of mankind. The ontological argument has never enjoyed much favor among Scholastic philosophers. First proposed by Anselm of Canterbury and at once assailed by Gaunilo the monk, it has been discussed and finally rejected by Thomas Aquinas. Ac- cepted in a slightly modified form by Descartes and Leibniz, it has been rejected again by Kant and readmitted by Hegel, who believed that since its first formulation until the time of Kant it had been unanimously accepted among philosophers. 1 These repeated attempts to rehabilitate the fallen argument have been a decided failure. Neo-Scholastics to-day regard the ontological proof as worthless, and, in so doing, are perfectly justified. The weak point of the argument has been clearly pointed out by Thomas Aquinas. 2 Anselm's reasoning unduly passes from the ideal to the real order. The conception of the most perfect being must include the element of existence, as Anselm believed ; but this existence must be ideal, limited to the concept of our mind, and cannot legitimately be predicated of the objective world. The argument from the moral law has been repeatedly formu- lated and defended. All men, it has been said, believe in the existence of a moral law. They all regard some actions as praiseworthy, others as condemnable. Now, without God, a 1 Cf. Hegel, History of Philosophy, pp. G2 and 64. 'Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., P. 1, Q. 2, art. 1; C. G., Lib. 1, cap. 11. 128 moral law would ho an absurdity, because the very notion of a law implies the existence of a legislator, endowed with a suffi- cient authority to impose it and give it a sanction. Is this line of reasoning defensible? We are not inclined to believe it. The fact that some acts are universally praised as good, while others are universally condemned, may be sufficiently explained from the nature of the acts themselves without any necessity of a recourse to a supreme Lawgiver. There is no doubt that if God exists, he is the foundation and the source of all truth, and therefore the ultimate ground of the moral law; but, as his existence is precisely in question, it is from the human acts themselves that we must start. As no mathema- tician needs to postulate a Divine Being in order to understand that the sum of the angles of a triangle has been universally believed to be equal to two right angles, so the moralist needs no God to account for the fact that incontinence is universally regarded as degrading and courage as praiseworthy. The very results of our acts give us the clue as to their moral character. Scholastic philosophers are thus right when they refuse to assign to the argument from the moral law a primary importance. Another moral argument, altogether different from the one we have presently considered, is derived from the common con- sent of mankind. Like all moral arguments, the argument from universal consent is regarded by Scholastics as of second- ary importance. It is, however, defended as legitimate, and invariably finds a place in treatises on natural theology. The fact itself that all peoples have believed in a Supreme Being seems to admit of no reasonable doubt. To Spencer's objection that the savage's concepts of God have been evolved out of ghosts or ancestor-spirits, and. with the evolution of human ideas, have gradually acquired a nobler form, Scholastics answer that the conceptions of God found among savage or semi-civilized na- tions are corruptions of a purer and older form, and that the tendency of mankind is thus to fall away from a primitive 129 monotheism. 3 Whether this theory can be maintained nowa- days, I will not here discuss. I will limit myself to remarking that it is far from rendering the argument from universal con- sent unassailable. This argument even becomes valueless if we take into account the fact, attested by the Biblical relation and generally admitted to-day by natural science, that all men have come from a single stem. The force of the argument lies in the fact that a notion of the Deity is found among all tribes of men, and must thus be due to human nature itself, inasmuch as an error or a fraud might have crept among one particular nation, but could not possess a universal character. Now if all men had a common origin, if there was at the beginning a single family, it may be perfectly well supposed that an erroneous notion has been accepted by this family, and, transmitted to its posterity, has become a universal error of the human race. The arguments we have described as a ■posteriori are especially insisted upon by St. Thomas and his modern followers. These arguments invariably start from the knowledge of the world given in experience, and rise to the knowledge of God. They assume different forms, which may be reduced to the two we shall presently expose. The first is sometimes described as " physical argument." It starts from the order of the world, the perfect adaptation of means to ends which we find around us, and concludes that such an adaptation evidently points to the existence of a supreme Designer. Absolutely speaking, a casual shock of atoms might indeed have produced the world such as it is, just as printing characters, thrown at random, might give the play of Hamlet, but the chance for such a production is so insignificant that it may be neglected. This argument has received a severe blow from Darwin's theory of natural selection. It is even contended that it has been absolutely killed. It is morally impossible that the paw of the cat, so perfectly adapted to the catching of the prey, 3 Of. Driscoll, God, pp. 29 ff. 10 130 should have been produced by a casual shock of atoms, just as it is morally impossible that printing types, thrown at random, should give the play of Hamlet. But, if we adopt the theory of natural selection; if we admit that the types which happen to fall in the definite place they have in the play shall persist in existence while the others shall disappear, the play of Hamlet will fatally be produced. We should be cautious, however, not to assert too hastily that the argument from design has been absolutely killed. The hypothesis of natural selection explains the order of the world without taking a supreme Designer into account. But what of natural selection itself? How are we to explain the tendency of the atoms towards definite arrangements, the fact that some arrangements persist in existence while others are destroyed? Instead of the innate tendency of the atoms towards definite groups, why was there not a tendency towards a perpetual chaos? A chaotic cosmos seems indeed the only possible outcome of a mere shock of atoms, and the hypothesis of natural selection is a nonsense if we do not admit finality. All the perfections of the future world must thus be supposed to exist potentially in the originary chaos, and the necessity of a designer by no means disappears. The metaphysical argument is based upon the principle of causality. The fact that no beginning of existence can happen without a cause has been proved in our chapter on metaphysics and needs not be insisted upon. In the metaphysical argument, the form of the principle of causality is somewhat modified. " Whatever does not exist of absolute necessity, it is contended, cannot exist without a proportionate cause." 4 Which means that the cause, considered in its totality, must contain a perfec- tion at least equal to that of the effect. The validity of this form of the principle of causality might perhaps be questioned. It is strongly defended by neo-Scholastics, who contend that if the cause failed to be proportionate, the excess of the effect 4 Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 33. 131 would really be without cause, and the general law of causality would be thereby violated. 5 The necessity of a proportionate cause being admitted, the existence of a Supreme Mind follows as a necessary consequence. A clear idea of the Scholastic line of reasoning may be gathered from the following three propositions in which the argument may be summed up : 1. There are changes in our world, and these changes pre- suppose a cause. The truth of this first proposition has been clearly shown in our chapter on metaphysics. 2. These changes presuppose a self -existing cause. If the cause of the changes is not self- existing, it must be caused by something else. This something else, if not self-existing, must also be caused, and we must finally arrive at a self-existing being; otherwise we would have an infinite process, and no change would be possible, inasmuch as a sufficient cause of the change could never be found. Thus far there is nothing in our argument which a materialist would fail to admit. A self- existing being exists, he would say, but we need not go beyond the molecule, the atom, the material world. The following proposition separates the Scholastic system from all materialis- tic hypotheses: 3. This self-existing being must be an, immaterial and free being. The ultimate cause of the world must not simply be a cause; it must be a proportionate cause. The world contains immaterial and free beings, such as the human soul. Therefore the cause of the world must be an immaterial and free being, that is to say, a personal God. Section 3. — Attributes of God The Divine Being of the Scholastics possesses three funda- mental attributes: he is infinite, one and simple. The doctrine of an infinite God is not without difficulty. Some Catholic philosophers have thought that, although faith 'Ibid., p. 34. 132 obliges us to believe in the infinity of the Supreme Being, this infinity cannot strictly be proved by reason alone. In a recent article of the Revue de Philosophie (1906), Mr. Dessoulavy expressed his sympathy for Schiller's thesis on this subject. The modern followers of St. Thomas, however, strongly insist upon the capacity of philosophy to reach a knowledge of the infinity of God. They adopt the line of reasoning which led Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to the concept of pure actuality (actus purus). Every finite being, they argue, consists of actuality and po- tency: of actuality in so far as it possesses some perfections; of potency, in so far as it is capable of acquiring the perfections it does not possess. Now the actual is logically anterior to the potential, because a potential being cannot become actual unless it be acted upon by an actual being. The ultimate cause of reality must not therefore contain any potentiality; otherwise it would presuppose another cause and would not be ultimate. Tt must be pure actuality, and accordingly possess all perfections in an infinite degree. 6 From the infinity of God follows his unity as a logical conse- quence. If there were several Gods, they should differ in some characteristics. Each of them would thus lack the peculiar perfections which characterize the others, and none could be infinite. 7 The proof of God's simplicity rests upon his self -existence. Whatever is compound depends upon its constituent elements and upon the cause of their union. As God is the ultimate ground of all reality, he cannot depend upon anything else and must be absolutely simple. 8 From these three fundamental attributes, all attributes of the Mf. Thomas Aquinas, C. G., lib. 1, cap. 16; also Garrigou-Lagrange, Le Dieu iini du Pragmatisme, Rev. des set. philos. et theol., 1907, pp. 252 ff. M'f. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., P. 1, Q. 11, art. 3. 8 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., P. 1, Q. 3, art. 7; Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 93. 133 Divine Being are derived. They are not all, however, estab- lished in the same way. As our intuitive knowledge is limited to finite beings, it is from these finite beings that we must rise to a conception of the infinite. Now the attributes of creatures are of several orders: some involve imperfection, others do not. The attributes which involve imperfection, such as extension, rea- son, etc., cannot be predicated of God who is infinitely perfect. Those which involve no imperfection, such as intelligence, power, etc., are properly in God. But whereas finite beings possess these attributes in a limited degree, God, in virtue of his in- finity, possesses them as boundless and infinite. The attributes of the Supreme Being may be therefore classi- fied into negative and positive. The negative attributes are immutability, eternity and im- mensity. They do not give us any real knowledge of God. They simply remove from the conception of the Infinite some imperfections attached to finite things. They do not show us what God is, but what he is not. God's immutability is closely connected with his infinity. Whatever admits of change is not infinitely perfect. It lacks at some moment of its existence the perfections it subsequently acquires. It possesses some potentiality and is not, like the Divine Being, absolutely actual. God's eternity can be proved in a similar way. When the Scholastics assert that God is eternal, they do not, as is some- times supposed, simply mean that he had no beginning and shall know no end; they also remove from his conception the element of succession. They mean that there exists for him no past and no future; that his being is a perennial present. We have already touched upon the question of God's im- mensity in our chapter on Psychology. We have shown that, in St. Thomas's view, the assertion that " God is everywhere " does not mean that he is present in all parts of space as bodies are. It means that he acts upon all things; tbat he is present in them by a contact of virtue, not by a contact of quantity. 134 The positive attributes of the Divine Being are his knowledge, his will, and his omnipotence. God has a comprehensive knowledge of his essence, and in his own essence he sees the essences of all real and possible things. His knowldge extends to the contingent as well as to the neces- sary; and, inasmuch as he is eternal, to the future as well as to the past. The faculty of will consisting in the love of the object pre- sented by the intellect as good, involves no imperfection and must be found in the Supreme Being. God loves his own es- sence necessarily, because his essence is the supreme and infinite good, and is therefore worthy of an infinite love. His love for creatures is an outcome of the love he bears to himself. It is in his own essence that he knows all finite beings, of which his essence is the prototype. It is in his own essence that he loves all finite beings, the perfections and the goodness of which are found in his essence in an infinite degree. God is also omnipotent. He can do by a single act of will whatever is not intrinsically impossible. As for things whose concept involves a contradiction — such as a square circle, or a man being an ass — it is only an improper use of the terms that leads us to assert that God cannot do them: it would be more correct to say that the things themselves cannot be done. They involve a contradiction, and the Infinite Being must above all be self-consistent. It is the same self-consistency that explains how God cannot possibly commit sinful acts. The essence of sin consisting, not precisely in the production of an effect, but in the opposition of our free will to the eternal law of God, its presence in the Divine Being would involve the denial of his own self. The preceding classification of the attributes of God should not, however, lead us to believe that the Divine Essence is con- sidered by Thomists as divided into separate and unconnected compartments. Hegel's reproach against the old Metaphysics, 135 of cutting off from their connection the tenns of thought, 9 is absolutely unjust if directed against Scholastic speculation. St. Thomas and his followers insist upon the physical and meta- physical simplicity of the Divine Being. We assign attributes to God, it is true; but we must not forget that these attribues, although different for us, are essentially one in God. God is his essence, or his nature; 10 his essence is his own being; 11 his intellect his own being; 12 his will is also his own being. 13 If we are compelled to study his attributes separately, it is on account of the imperfection of our mind, which, being essentially finite, cannot grasp the Infinite: " Balbutiendo, ut possumux, excclsa Dei resonamus.' ni 9 Hegel, Logic, Wallace's ed., pp. 60 ff. 10 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., P. 1, Q. 3, art. 3. u Ibid.. P. 1, Q. 3, art. 4. 11 Ibid., P. 1, Q. 14, art. 4. "Ibid., P. 1, Q. 19, art. 1. 14 Ibid., P. 1, Q. 4, art. 1, ad 1. CHAPTER VII SCHOLASTIC MORAL PHILOSOPHY According to Mr. De Wulf, the essential characteristics of the Scholastic system of ethics may be reduced to two heads: it is eudemonistic and libertarian. In order to form a clear conception of the nature of this eudemonism, a few considerations about the necessary conditions underlying the activity of all beings will not be out of place here. Waiving all other considerations, it must be admitted that all agents act for a definite end. This is true not only of conscious beings, but likewise of inanimate objects. It follows as a neces- sary consequence from the fact that our cosmos presents us with distinct individuals, each of which is endowed with a peculiar nature. When dynamite blows up an edifice, it acts towards an end as well as the acorn when it becomes an oak. Like the acorn, it possesses an essential character, definite potentialities which, under proper conditions, will forcibly become actual. The only difference that exists between the potentiality of the inorganic and of the organic world lies in the fact that inorganic agents do not possess any principle of self-actuation, and there- fore they do not act except when moved by some external cause. Organic beings, on the other hand, are endowed with an inner principle of self-determination. It is in this very principle that the essence of life consists: "The living being," says St. Thomas, " is the one that can move itself," " Vita est substantia cui conrrnit secundum naturam suam movcrc seipsam." 1 Plants, however, although self-determined, are not conscious of the end toward which their own nature compels them to tend. 1 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Thool., P. 1, Q. 18, art. 2, c. 136 137 They are thus inferior to sentient beings, whose essential charac- teristic is a more or less clear consciousness of their own peculiar activities. Man alone possesses an intellectual knowledge of his end, because he is the only being endowed with reason and capa- ble of forming universal concepts. He alone properly knows his end and can adopt the most suitable means to reach it. He alone is a moral being. Ends may be divided into proximate and ultimate. Proxi- mate ends are those that are not desired for themselves; but only in so far as they are steps towards the attaining of ultimate ends. Strictly speaking, they are not ends, but means. Ulti- mate ends are desired for their own sake and therefore they are not subservient to anything else. If we consider health as the ultimate end a sick man has in view — an end which cannot be ultimate for him in so far as he is a man, but only in so far as he is a sick man — the acquiring of the remedies which he is obliged to take in order to get rid of his disease will be a proxi- mate end. Proximate ends being thus properly means, an infinite series of such ends becomes absurd, and we must admit that rational beings not only act for an end, but for an ultimate end. The great question of morality consists therefore in the deter- mination of the ultimate end of man. All actions subservient to this end will be good; all actions inconsistent with this end will be bad. Now, if this world of ours is rational, we must admit that the end of all beings is true to their nature. It can- not be but the actualization of the potentialities they contain, the unfolding of the latent perfections which constitute their very essence. This most important truth hns been relegated to oblivion by all that put the foundation of morality on a mere external principle. Whether we build our ethical system upon the common con- sent of mankind, as Saint-Lambert did, or upon the civil law, as llobbes, or upon the will of God, ;is Cruaras, we remove 138 rationality from our world, and, by so doing, we destroy mor- ality itself. All external systems of ethics imply that no action is good or bad in itself; that an act we now regard as good would be bad if some determinate free agent had willed it so; might become bad this very day if the will or the caprice of the law- giver should vary. Under such conditions no science of ethics is possible. The end of man is thus the complete actualization of his nature — or to use a term current in ancient Greece — perfect happiness. Here Scholastic ethics meets a powerful adversary which, under a variety of forms, has controlled modern thought, has assumed different garbs according to the varying circumstances, and, repeatedly unmasked, has appeared again and again, its appearance being the signal for prolonged applause; a system which, under the specious names of hedonism. Epicurianism, utilitarianism, is to-day perhaps more vigorous than ever and prides itself upon its able defenders and legions of adherents. The difference between hedonism and Scholasticism lies in this: Hedonism inculcates that pleasure is the ultimate criterion of morality, and that an action is good only in so far as it is pleasurable; whereas for Scholasticism goodness lies in the nature of the act itself, and pleasure is simply an effect which may follow from a moral act, which will necessarily accompany the good in the long run, but which is not the good. A? hedonists often allege the authority of 1'lato and Aristotle in support of their theory, it will be worth while, before expos- ing the prime defect of Hedonism, to quote a few passages which clearly show that Plato and Aristotle did not confuse the pleas- urable with the good, and that furthermore they held, in regard to the final end of man, the very beliefs that characterize the ethical system of the Scholastics. The first passage IS taken from Flato's CJorgias: "Listen in me, then, while I recapitulate the argument: l> the pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles 139 and I are agreed about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good for the sake of the pleas- ant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the good. And that is the pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing whether body or soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way, comes to them not by chance, but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them. Am I not right? I maintain that I am. . . . And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no order of her own ? Certainly. And the soul which has an order is orderly ? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear. ... If the temperate soul is the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is the foolish and intemperate is the bad soul. " And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to gods and men; for he would not be temperate if he did not what is proper? Yes, certainly. And in his relation to other men he will do what is just, and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what is just and holy cannot be other than just and holy? Very true. And he must be courageous, for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things, or men, or pleasures, or pains, and patiently to endure what he ought ; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who docs evil miserable." 2 As we see, happiness is by no means identified with pleasure. Tt consists in a certain virtue, in an order which characterizes the soul of the good man. The temperate soul is the good soul ; the foolish and intemperate is the bad soul. 1 Plato, Dialogues, Jowett's oil.. Vol. 3, pp. 97-98. 140 A similar doctrine is held by Aristotle. In the first book of his Nicomachean Ethics, he teaches that happiness is neither pleasure, nor honor, nor wealth, but " an energy of the soul according to virtue." These are Aristotle's own words : " Men seem not unreasonably to form their notion of the good, and of happiness, from observing the different lives which men lead. The many and most sordid class suppose it to be pleasure, and therefore they are content with a life of enjoy- ment. 3 " But, perhaps, to say that happiness is the greatest good, appears like stating something which is already granted; and it is desirable that we should explain still more clearly what it is. Perhaps, then, this may be done, if we take the peculiar work of man; for as to the musician, and statuary, and to every artist, and in short to all who have any work or course of action, the good and excellence of each appears to consist in their peculiar work ; so would it appear to be with man, if there is any peculiar work belonging to him . . . " What, then, must this peculiar work be? For life man appears to share in common with plants; but his peculiar work is the object of our inquiry : we must, therefore, separate the life of nutrition and growth. Then a kind of sensitive life would next follow ; but this also he appears to enjoy in common with the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, there- fore, a certain practical life of a being which possesses reason; and of this one part is, as it were, obedient to reason, the other as possessing it, and exercising intellect. But this life also being spoken in two ways (according to energy and according to habit), we must take that according to energy; for that appears to be more properly so called. Now if the work of man, and of a good man, is the same generically, as in the case of a harper, and a good harper (and so, in short, in all cases, superiority in each partieular excellence being added to each particular work) ; for it is the work of a harper to play, of a good harper to play well : and if we assume the peculiar work of man to be a kind of life, and this life an energy of the soul and actions performed with reason; and the peculiar work of ri good man to be the same things done well, ami honorably; and everything to be complete according to its proper excellence: 'Aristotle, NTicomachean Ethics, Bk. l. chap. 5; Browne's ed., p. 7. 141 if, I repeat, these things are true, it follows, that man's chief good is " an energy of the soul according to virtue " ; but if the virtues are more than one, according to the best and most per- fect virtue; and besides this, we must add, in a perfect life: for as neither one swallow, nor one day, makes a spring; so neither does one day, nor a short time, make a man blessed and happy/' 4 Let us now directly examine hedonism itself. In the first place, it sounds like a truism to say that the words " good " and " pleasurable " cannot be unqualifiedly taken as convertible terms. The common belief of mankind looks upon as good many actions that do not bring any real pleasure to their authors. The payment of a debt, charity to the poor, self-sacrifice, are praised all over the world. On the other hand, many acts bringing great pleasure are universally condemned. The drunkard and the libertine are objects of contempt to every right-thinking man. Hedonists meet this objection by saying that the pleasure given as the basis of our conduct is not the particular pleasure of the moment, but the pleasure in the long run. The presently expected satisfaction is a worthy motive of action only in so far as it does not make impossible the attainment of a satisfaction more remote. Although in some particular cases, the pursuit of a proximate satisfaction is not to be considered as inferior to that of ultimate gratifications, it is none the less a fundamental principle that the guidance by simple and immediate feelings must be subordinated to the authority of higher and more com- plex feelings. It cannot be denied that hedonism thus explained contains a great deal of truth. The egoistic element of all our acts must be frankly recognized. The }>oor workman who trods under foot his inordinate thirst for intoxicating liquor in order that his wife and children may have Bome bread to eat, relinquishes an immediate good to obtain a more distant good, the welfare * Ibid., Bk. 1. chap. 7: Browne's od.. pp. 15-17. 142 and happiness of his family, and. as a eonsequenee, his own peace and jov at home. The sister of charity, who leaves her home ami parents, who renounces forever the most legitimate joys of life, the pleasures that the matrimonial state and the rearing of children would hring to her ; who spends her days and her nights at the bedside of a poor sick man whom she has never met before, to whom she feels attached by no earthly bonds, whom nevertheless she attends with all the painstaking cares of a most devoted mother, whom she finally snatches from the claws of death, expecting no earthly reward, knowing full well that the only prize of her self-abnegation will be an un- timely death; this sister of charity, whose whole life seems to be a glowing impersonation of altruism, is, from a hedonistic point of view, just as selfish as the most vulgar man. She renounces the pleasures of this world to enjoy the pleasures of the world to come. She abandons relatives, riches, life itself, all finite and perishable goods, to secure the possession of treas- ures that never fade nor grow old. The prize she covets is none less than God himself. Pleasurable actions, however, can be made co-extensive with good actions only in assuming there is a future life. As many hedonists would be loath to take such a life into account, would rather profess with Hegel that this every-day world, what is here and now, has been a very good exchange for the shadowy other- world about which ancient philosophers worried themselves sick, there will come in their way a great many facts which their system — in the form we are at present considering — will be unable to explain. No future gratification, if we simply con- sider this actual world of ours, can possibly accrue to the soldier who, in a brave fight against the foes of his country, dies the death of a hero on the battlefield. If he is unknown to the world, lie will not even reach the glory of having his name recorded in the annals of his country ; he will not be held up to the school-boys of future generations as the ideal citizen. Obscure in life; still more obscure in death. No man, however, 143 would call into question the intrinsic worth of his heroic death. Facts of this kind have caused the downfall of individual hedonism and given birth to the celebrated formula, so univer- sally admitted by hedonists to-day : " the greatest good for the greatest number." In this new form of the system, not only must immediate satisfactions give way to satisfactions more remote, but the present and the future pleasures of the indi- vidual must be subordinated to the pleasures of the whole com- munity. All forms of self-sacrifice are thus easily justified. The sister of charity will die in her prime of life at her post of duty, but the hundreds of unfortunate people whom she has rescued from death will live and society will be benefited. The hero will be killed on the battlefield, but his country will be saved. Scholastic moralists would admit that pleasure and good are co-extensive. If good actions are those performed in harmony with our nature, they must needs produce pleasurable results at the present moment or at some future time. We cannot deny this principle without denying the rational character of our world. And as here below many deeds, universally regarded as good, do not give rise to any pleasurable consequence, there must exist a more perfect world, in which whatever seems irra- tional in this will be rectified. But, although pleasure and good are co-extensive, they are far from being identical terms. Pleas- ure bears to good the relation of an effect to its cause. A good action will produce pleasurable results ; but it will produce them on account of its own inherent nature. The goodness will belong to the elements of the action itself, regardless of the consequences that may possibly follow from it. A ripe apple will give rise to pleasant gustatory impressions, but those im- pressions will be due to the peculiar nature and disposition of the atoms of the apple itself, which will thus possess an intrinsic goodness, independently of the sensations it may produce. And if the apple decays, it is in the apple itself that a change from good to bad will occur: it will be bad even if nobody ever tastes 144 it What is true of an external object is likewise true of all that belongs to the inner nature of man. All our acts possess a value of their own, which must be regarded as primary, while the ensuing consequences are looked upon as only secondary. The good is thus identifiable with what is in harmony with our nature. But as we are endowed with several orders of faculties, as we are made up of body and soul, and thereby possess a sensuous and an intellectual appetite, the gratification of our lower impulses must be subordinated to our nobler energies. We must live according to our nature, but to our whole nature. The satisfaction of a sensuous desire is thus good in itself, but becomes bad if the exercise of a nobler faculty is thwarted thereby : " Delectationes corporales," says St. Thomas, " sunt secundum partem sensitivam, qua? regulatur ratione: et ideo indigent tem- perari et refisenari per rationem." 5 The assertion that the satisfaction of a sensuous desire is good in itself puts Scholastic moralists in conflict with the author of the Critique of Practical Reason. According to Immanuel Kant, a work is good when it is done, not only from duty, but from pure duty. 6 Whenever some natural impulse furnishes the motive of a good deed, this deed is thereby deprived of its moral worth. Our actions must spring from duty alone, and not from any natural inclination whatsoever: " To be beneficent when we can is a duty," says Kant, " and besides this there are many minds so sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they find a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight in the satisfaction of others so far as it is their own work. But 1 maintain that in such a case, an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has neverthe- less qo true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclina- tions, e. ;/., the inclination to honor, which, if it is happily •Thomas Aquinas, Bumma Tneol., 1-2, Q. 31, art. r>. ad 3. ' Kant. Critique <>f Practical Reason and ol hex works, Abbott's <■eruin arbitrium invenitur, nam liberum arbitrium dicitur respectu eorum quae non necessitate quis vult, Bed propria sponte; unde in nobis est liberum arbitrium respectu ejux quod volumus currere vel ambulare. Deus autem alia a se non ex neces- sitate vult, ut supra ostensum est. Deo igitur liberum arbitrium habere competit " (C. (J., L. 1, c. 88). Riavm teneatis, amioit 148 Seeretan, however, does not feel perfectly at ease. He feels no doubt about St. Thomas's strict determinism. Nevertheless, he is compelled to recognize, in the works of the Angelic Doctor, some teachings sounding very much like an admission of free will. He concludes that a contradiction permeates the whole system : " En contradiction flagrante avec son determinisme, avec son optimisme absolu, avec ses doctrines sur l'etendue de la causalite divine et sur la prescience de tous les futurs, Thomas professe eategoriquement le libre arbitre." 12 Let us now turn to the works of St. Thomas himself and see whether he would accept as his the doctrines thus imputed to him. We shall confine ourselves to a few striking passages, and refer those who should desire more abundant information to the Summa Theologica, the Sum ma contra Gentiles and the Opus- cula, of which a thorough study is necessary for a complete understanding of the philosophy of St. Thomas, and in which the point which interests us at present is repeatedly and ade- quately discussed. In the Summa contra Gentiles, St. Thomas teaches that all intellectual substances are endowed with free will : " Caput XLVIII. — Quod substantias intellectuals sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo. Ex his autem apparet, quod praedictee sub- stantia? sunt liberi arbitrii in agendo, quod enim arbitrio agant, manifestum est eo quod per cognitionem intellectivam judicium habent de operandis. libertatem autem necesse est eas habere, si habent dominium sui actus, ut ostensum est (c. 47). Sunt igitur prasdictas substantias liberi arbitrii in agendo." 13 He gives his view on Divine Providence, and professes that it does not interfere with the free will of man : " Caput LXXIII. — Quod divina providcntia non excludit arbitrii libertatem. Ex quo patet quod providentia divina vol- 12 Ibid., p. 82. 11 C. ()., Lib. 2, c. 48. 149 untatis libertati non repugnat. . . . Per gubernationem cujus- cumque providentis, res gubernata? deducuntur ad finem con- venientem; unde et de providentia divina Gregorius Nyssenus dicit (De philos., 1. 8, c. 2) quod est 'voluntas Dei per quam omnia quae sunt convenientem deductionem accipiunt.' Finis autem ultimus cujuslibet creaturae est ut consequatur divinam similitudinem, sicut supra (c. 17) ostensum est. Esset igitur providentiae repugnans, si alicui rei subtraheretur illud, per quod assequitur similitudinem divinam : agens autem volunta- rium assequitur divinam similitudinem in hoc, quod libere agit: ostensum est enim liberum arbitrium in Deo esse: non igitur per providentiam prohibetur voluntatis libertas." 14 In the same chapter, he formally condemns the determinism of the Stoics: " Per hoc autem excluditur opinio Stoycorum qui secundum ordinem quendam causarum intransgressibilem, quern Graeci ymarmenen vocabant, omnia ex necessitate dicebant provenire." 15 In his Summa Theologica, his most perfect work, the fruit of his maturer years, in which the thought of his whole life is con- densed, the same truths are again and again enunciated. In the 83d chapter of the first part, he unequivocally admits free will in man: " Respondeo dicendum, quod homo est liberi arbitrii : alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, praecepta, prohibitiones, praemia, et pcenae. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod quaedam agunt absque judicio, sicut lapis movetur deor- sum; et similiter omnia cognitione carentia. Quaedam autem agunt judicio, sed non libero, sicut animalia bruta. Judicat enim ovis videns lupum, eum esse fugiendum, naturali judicio, et non libero: quia non ex collatione, sed ex naturali instinctu hoc judicat: et simile est de quolibet judicio brutorum anima- lium. Sed homo agit judicio: quia per vim cognoscitivam judi- cat, aliquid esse fugiendum, vel prosequendum. Sed quia judi- cium istud non est ex naturali instinctu in particulari operabili, sed ex collatione quadain rat inn is, ideo agit libero judicio, potens '■* C. G., Lib. 3, c. 73. 15 C. G., Lib. 3, c. 73. 150 in di versa (Vrri : ratio onim circa contingens habet viam ad oppo- Bita, ut patet in Dialecticis syllogismis, et Rhetoricis persua- sionibus: particularia autem operabilia sunt quaxlam contin- gentia et ideo circa ea judicium rationia ad diversa se habet, et non est determination ad unum. Et pro tanto necesse est, quod homo sit liberi arbitrii ex hoc ipso, quod rationalis est." 16 He even teaches that free acts are the only acts that may properly be styled human : " Respondeo dicendum, quod actionum, qua? ab homine agun- tur, illae sola? proprie dicuntur humana?, qua? sunt propria? hom- inis inquantum est homo: differt autem homo ab irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus; unde ilia? sola? actiones vocantur proprie humana?, quarum homo est dom- inus; est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis, et rationis; ilia? ergo actiones proprie humana? dicun- tur, qua? ex voluntate deliberata proccdunt: si qua? autem alia? actiones homini conveniant, possunt dici quidem hominis ac- tiones, sed non proprie humana?, cum non sint hominis, inquan- tum est homo." 17 He discusses the relations of God to man more closely still than in the Summa contra Gentiles, and reaches the same conclusions : " Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non determina- tum ad unum, sed indifferenter sc habens ad multa; sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus ejus contingens, et non necessarius, nisi in his, ad qua? naturaliter movetur." 18 Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt as regards St. Thomas's libertarianism. It must be admitted, however, that a peculiar doctrine of his, universally accepted by his modern followers, seems, at first sight, to be hardly reconcilable with human liberty; it is the doctrine of prescience, predestination ■•Summa Theol., P. i, Q. 83, art. 1, c. "Ibid., 1-2. Q. ], art. 1, c. "Ibid., 1-2, Q. 10, art. 4, c. 151 and reprobation. St. Thomas asks whether men are predesti- nated by God, and he unreservedly answers that they are: " Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare." 19 He adds that God reprobates some men; 20 that the elect are chosen by Him : " Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem eternam prsesup- ponit secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem. Ad quod pertinet electio, et dilectio " ; 21 that the number of the elect is certain not only formally, but materially; that is to say, God does not only know how many men will be saved; but he also knows whether John, Peter and Thomas will be saved: " Eespondeo dicendum, quod numerus praedestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt, eum esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter : ut puta, si diceremus certum esse, quod cen- tum, vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi, vel illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem praedestinationis, de qua jam diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod numerus prasdestinatorum sit certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter." 22 It is thus clear that, according to this view of St. Thomas, God knows all future events; that, his knowledge being immu- table, all things will necessarily come to pass as he actually knows them; that the number of the elect is thus determined; that God knows, with regard to any man, not only whether he will be saved or damned, but what the determination of his will will be in each particular case; that there is not the slightest possibility for any one of us to change in the least degree God's eternal and immutable decrees in our regard. We do not deny that there is here an apparent clash with St. Thomas's teaching about free will. The opposition of the two "Ibid., 1-2, Q. 23, art. 1, c. "Ibid., 1-2, Q. 2.3. art. 3. 11 Ibid., 1-2, Q. 23, art. 4, c. -Ibid,, 1-2, Q. 23. art. :;. c. 1 52 doctrines, however, exists only in appearance, and disappears as soon as we grasp St. Thomas's conception of God. His theory of the Divine Being has been exposed in our chapter on Natural Theology. Suffice it to recall that God being eternal, there is no future for him, but a perpetual present. He has not existed through an infinite temporal series, a series of successive instants of which there was no beginning and which shall know no end; he even does not properly exist: He is. What is a future for us is thus not a future for God, and it is only an imperfection of our language that compels us to speak of God's prescience. He does not know our acts before we perform them; he knows them as actual. His knowledge is not logically anterior, but posterior to the free determination of our will. It is hard for us, of course, limited as we are to our temporal series, to have a clear conception of a knowledge of this kind. We may, how- ever, have an idea of it — though imperfect — by considering our own knowledge of the present and of the past. We actually know that John has done this and Thomas that, and our knowl- edge does not interfere in the least with the freedom of their actions. It is in a similar way that God knows our future deeds. He knows them as done. He predestinates some men because they freely act in accordance with the moral law; he reprobates others because they freely disobey his precepts; he knows how many men will be saved just as we might know the exact number of soldiers who were slain at Gettysburg. CHAPTER VIII FORERUNNERS OF THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL The causes which led to the downfall of Scholastic philosophy in the fifteenth century may be classified as internal and external. Among the external causes the most important are : 1. The humanistic movement which, by bringing to light the literary beauties of the pagan classics, and insisting upon the form in which the thoughts were expressed rather than upon the thoughts themselves, was directly opposed to the spirit which had animated the schoolmen. 2. The rapid progress of natural science which, after having shown the insufficiency of the old physical system, extended its condemnation to the metaphysical principles with which this system was only accidentally connected. 3. The rise of Protestantism which, by its opposition to the Church of Rome, led to the rejection of the principle of author- ity and incited the minds of the new generation to deny or to question all that had been held sacred in the past. 4. The invention of printing, considered by Haureau as the event which gave the death-blow to Scholastic metaphysics. During the thirteenth and fourteenth century, all instruction was forcibly oral, and the great centers of learning, in which Scholasticism predominated, were the only sources from which a philosophical instruction could be obtained. After the in- vention of printing, when books became of easy access, ;i course in the universities ceased to be indispensable, and a new philos- ophy, systematically opposed to the teachings of the schools, gradually found acceptance among the people. The very supporters of Scholasticism contributed, however, 153 154 more than anything else, to discredit the system they were called to defend. The spirit which had animated the great masters of the thirteenth century had completely disappeared. Vain subtlety had replaced the profound reasoning of the past. The argument from authority, considered by St. Thomas as the weakest, had been raised to an undue importance. The new scientific spirit, into which the great Scholastics of the thirteenth century would have so eagerly entered, was opposed with unanimity by their degenerate successors. Instead of har- monizing their principles with the new physical discoveries, as Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas would have done, they opposed with all their might the very spirit of their time. They de- clared it to be opposed to the philosophical doctrines they cher- ished, and thus raised an unnecessary and unequal struggle, in which the old Metaphysics was doomed to perish. Scholastic philosophy did not, however, completely disappear. An important movement of Thomistic revival took place during the sixteenth century and enriched Scholastic literature with many eminent contributions. Thomas de Vio Cajetanus (1469- 1534), Vasquez (1551-1604), Toletus (1532-1596), Fonseca (1528-1599), and especially Suarez (1548-1617), were pro- found thinkers, worthy of the great masters whose principles they had adopted. The influence exercised by the philosophy of St. Thomas during the seventeenth century was also considerable. Bossuet (1627-1704) and Fenelon (1651-1715), although controlled by Descartes to a certain extent, and sometimes regarded as Cartesians, developed a body of doctrines which is by no means opposed to the principles of the Angelic Doctor. Among the philosophical works of Bossuet, the Traite de la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-meme, the Logique and the Traite du libre arbitre are of special significance. The philosophical doctrines tiny contain are evidently inspired by the teachings of St. Thomas. Many writers of the same period were more strictly Thomistic 155 still. John of Saint-Thomas (1589-1644), Antoine Goudin (1639-1695), Cosmo Alemanni (1559-1634), Caramuel (1606- 1682), Gnerinois (1640-1703), may be counted among the most distinguished representatives of Scholasticism. Several of their works have been republished or studied during the present cen- tury. During the eighteenth century, the philosophy of the school- men was gradually abandoned. The theories of Locke and Condillac found their way into many Catholic centers. Among the defenders of Thomism at that time, we may mention the Spaniard Valcarcel, who devoted his efforts to the refutation of Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche and Locke; the Jesuit Barthelemy des Bosses (1688-1738), who corresponded with Wolf and Clarke and translated Leibniz's Theodicy; the Domin- ican Roselli, whose Summa Philosophica is said, to have inspired the neo-Thomists of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the philosophy of St. Thomas had been almost completely abandoned. Catho- lics themselves were striving to build independent systems of thought. In Italy, the saintly founder of the Institute of Charity, Antonio Eosmini (1797-1855) advocated a kind of idealism which had been severely attacked by the early Roman Thomists. In Germany, Baader (1765-1841), Hermes (1775- 1831), Frohschammer (1821-1893), and Giinther (1783-1863) were greatly influenced by Hegelian idealism. Gorres himself (1776-1848), one of the greatest German Catholics, advanced sotme philosophical principles more directly connected with spiritism than with Thomistic philosophy. In France, traditionalism was in vogue. It was defended by De Bonald (1754-1840), Bonnetty (1798-1879), Bautaiu (1795-1867), Ventura de Raulica (1792-1861), and, in a slightly modified form, by Lamennais (1782-1854). Some works of Ventura are, however, permeated by purely Thomistic principles, so that their author may justly be re- garded as one of the immediate forerunners of the neo-Scho- 156 lastic revival in France. " In Father Ventura,'' says Cardinal Gonzalez, "two men may be considered. There may be seen, on the one hand, an enthusiastic admirer of St. Thomas, and, at the same time, a supporter of traditionalism, a disciple of I)e Maistre and De Bonald. In La Philosophic chrctienne, he is a genuine representative of Thomism, while in some other works, he seems driven by traditionalistic principles to the very limits of orthodoxy and reason." 1 During the first part of the nineteenth century, there were many signs of a return to the Middle Ages. The romantic movement in France strove to direct literature towards Medi- a?val customs and history. Hugo's "Notre Dame de Paris," published in 1831, contains a vivid picture of the life of Medi- aeval Paris. In other fields of human speculation, similar at- tempts were made. The philosophers of the Middle Ages soon became an object of general interest. Not long after the publi- cation of Notre Dame de Paris, Victor Cousin (1792-1867) made known to the world unknown works of Abelard and Roger Bacon and published those learned studies about the Middle Ages which must be regarded as one of his most genuine titles to the gratitude of philosophy. At the same time, another eminent scholar, Charles de Remu- sat (1797-1875), following the same line of research, wrote about Abelard, Anselm and Bacon. Barthelemy Haureau (1812-1896) published his remarkable works on the Middle Ages. The great Scholastic philosophers were at last emerg- ing from the oblivion to which they had been so unjustly con- demned. In other European countries, identical tendencies could easily be discerned. In Germany, Friedrich Schlegel (1772- 1829) had already shown the real merit of Mediaeval philosophy in Iiis famous History of Ancient and Modem Literature Among Catholic thinkers, a return to Thomistic principles was then effected. Mohler and his illustrious disciple Stauden- 1 ( f. Gonzalez, Bistoria de la Filosofia, V. 4, pp. 428 II". 157 maier (1800-1856), by their condemnation of all forms of rationalism and their strict orthodoxy, prepared the minds for the Scholastic revival which Kleutgen, Stockl and Werner in- augurated so brilliantly in Germany. Not long afterwards, Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire (1805-1895) translated the works of Aristotle, and Felix Kavaisson published his Essai sur la metaphysique d'Aristotc, which greatly con- tributed to impose the peripatetic speculation upon the attention of the world. The way was thus fully prepared for San- severino and Kleutgemj CHAPTER IX THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN ITALY The direct initiator of the neo-Scholastic movement in Italy was Cajetano Sanseverino, canon of Naples. Sanseverino (1811-1865) was at first an enthusiastic ad- mirer of Descartes. The episode of his life which marked the turning-point of his philosophical career has been told by many historians. In the year 1840, Sanseverino received the visit of Father Sordi S. J., who had read and annotated St. Thomas's Sum ma Thcologica, Sordi pointed out to Sanseverino the shortcomings of Descartes's thought and the superiority of the Thomistic principles in the solution of all philosophical prob- lems. Great was the struggle for the devout canon. For twenty years, he applied himself to a thorough study of St. Thomas's philosophy. At the light of the Summa Thcologica he read all modern writers and became more and more con- vinced of their insufficiency. The result of his investigations was the Philosophia christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata, a work which, unfinished as it is, consists of seven quarto volumes and displays an uncommon erudition, a remarkable knowledge of modern philosophy, and, above all, an enthusiastic admiration for the Angelic Doctor. According to Cardinal Gonzalez, the Philosophia christiana has a double defect. With regard to its method, it presents a somewhat awkward distribution of arguments, and, at times, exceedingly diffuse articles. With regard to its spirit, it is too narrowly attached to the philosophy it defends. Sanseverino acci pts St. Thomas's conclusions even in the minutest details, and despises modern thought as altogether vain and worthy of contempt. 1 1 Cf. (Jonznloz, l'hilosophia eloinciitarin, pp. 383 384. 158 159 In spite of these defects, the Philosophia Christiana has exer- cised an immense influence upon Catholic thinkers. For many years, it has been the great work of neo-Scholasticism, the fountain at whose pure waters all came to drink the spirit of the Thomistic regeneration. In its narrow-mindedness itself, it has found a multitude of followers. Too often have neo- Scholastics shared Sanseverino's contempt for modern thought. They have not even taken the trouble to read non-Scholastic writers in their original works. Why submit, indeed, to such a wearisome task? Had not Sanseverino done the work once for all? Had he not, from the narrowness of his cell, pro- nounced an ultimate verdict upon modern thinking? And thus, Sanseverino's word has been taken, not only with regard to the exposition of modern philosophical systems, but also with regard to his very criticisms. The Philosophia Christiana was at first the object of violent attacks. Cartesians and Eosminians agreed in denouncing it. But Sanseverino was defended by his disciple Signoriello, and encouraged by his archbishop, Riario Sforza. Shortly after- wards, an Academy of St. Thomas was founded at Naples, and honored by the approbation of Pius IX. All seemed to indi- cate that the efforts towards a Thomistic revival would be crowned with success. The archiepiscopal see of Perusa was then occupied by Joachim Pecci who, as early as 1858, had founded an Academy of St. Thomas. Pecci was in close connection with Cardinal Sforza, with whose cooperation he had already written a refuta- tion of Ontologism. He greatly sympathized with the Thom- istic revival which was taking place in Naples, and addressed a memoir to Pius IX, asking him to declare St. Thomas patron of the universities. At the same time, there lived, in another point of the Italian peninsula, a remarkable man, who was destined to be the very life of the new movement, to impose it bun grc mal gre, and 100 to silence all malcontents. It was the famous Jesuit John Mary Cornoldi. Cornoldi is undoubtedly one of the most interesting figures of the neo-Scholastic revival. As soon as he heard of the work done in other places, he intended not to remain behind. Acad- emies had been founded in Naples and Perusa: he would found in Bolonia an Academy of his own. Unwilling, however, to be a mere imitator, he made up his mind to create something truly original. The two other Academies were simply philosophical ; his would be medico-philosophical. The Academia filosofico- medica di San Tommaso was accordingly founded (1874), in which Travaglini, Venturoli and Zanon represented science; Cornoldi, Battaglini and Rubbini, philosophy. The review La Scicnza Italiana, the organ of the new institution, has been published until 1891. In the Roman universities, however, Thomism did not as yet seem to gain a footing. The philosopher most in view in Rome at the time was the Jesuit Tongiorgi, a remarkable thinker, sometimes called by his admirers '"the Balmes of Italy." On the whole, Tongiorgi's philosophy may be regarded as Thomistic. The few questions in which he departs from Scholastic prin- ciples are precisely those in which Scholastic principles are the weakest. He thus refuses to admit the theory of Matter and Form as an adequate explanation of the nature of bodies, and advocates a kind of Atomism. Nevertheless, Tongiorgi felt no sympathy for a revival of Thomism. Such was the state of affairs when, in 1878, Joachim Pecci was elected Pope. The situation was at once greatly changed. Pius IX had sympathized with the Thomistic revival. He had even sent a letter of approbation to the archbishop of Naples. In Rome, however, unwilling to vex his anti-Thomistic pro- fessors, he had done nothing. As we shall see, the new pope will not hesitate to act more resolutely. In the very letter in which he announced his elevation, Leo XIII quoted from the text of St. Paul: videte ne quis vos 161 decipiat per philosophmm, and greatly commmended the phi- losophy of St. Thomas as the true philosophy. The Roman College at once adopted the views of the head of the Church ; and, at the solemn session by which the school year 1878-79 opened, Father Cardella, speaking in the name of all, declared "that he would take St. Thomas as the rule and law of his teaching." 2 The pope was delighted. His Roman professors, whom he had believed so obstinate, were as docile as children. Before he had said a word, they had understood and anticipated his wishes. So perfect seemed their dispositions ! So splendid were their promises ! Unhappily, they were promises only, and nothing was done. Father Palmieri, who had taken Tongiorgi's place, not only did not act in accordance with the papal in- structions, but applied himself to point out from his chair the inconsistencies of St. Thomas's thought, the contradictions to which Scholasticism necessarily leads. As for Caretti — Pal- mieri's co-worker — he did not dare depart a whit from his dear Descartes, save to adopt metempsychosis. The pope's endeavor was decidedly a flat failure. What could be done? Leo XIII's own brother and co- operator in Perusa, Joseph Pecci (1807-1890), then advised him to establish in Rome a free course of Thomism and to con- fide it to Father Cornoldi. The advice was judged excellent and immediately followed. Cornoldi arrived at Rome, proud of the reputation he had gained in Bolonia as a scientist and a philosopher, and of the honorable mission he had just received of implanting the philosophy of St. Thomas in the very capital of the Christian world. Cornoldi's course was open to all the students of the Roman University, and presided by the regular professors of the Ro- man College, to whom was added Joseph Pecci, who was soon made a cardinal. The subjects discussed were chiefly physics, a Cf. Besse, Deux centres du mouvement thomiste, pp. 15—10. 12 L62 psychology and metaphysics. To all questions whatsoever, Cornoldi, St. Thomas in hand, could answer! In the Summa Theologica was to be found the key to all difficulties of modern science At the same time, there began to spread a rumor that Leo XIII was preparing an encyclical letter about Christian phi- losophy. The uneasiness of the Cartesian professors was grow- ing day by day. That Thomistic revival they had so much despised when confined to Naples and Perusa, was now taking Rome by storm. The dreaded encyclical appeared. Leo XIII greatly commended the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and insisted upon a study of the genuine works of the great Scholastics : " Providete ut sapientiam Thomas ex ipsis ejus fontibus hauriatur." 3 More than any other Scholastic must St. Thomas be studied because he gathered all previously discovered truths in a great synthetic system, which he still considerably increased: " Illorum doctrina, velut dispersa cujusdam corporis membra, in unum Thomas collegit et coagmentavit, miro ordine diges- sit, et magnis increments ita adauxit, ut catholicae Ecclesiae singulare presidium et decus jure meritoque habeatur." 4 There is no part of philosophy which he has not solidly dis- cussed : " Nulla est philosophise pars, quam non acute simul et solide pertractarit : de legibus ratiocinandi, de Deo et incorporeis sub- stantiis, de homine aliisque sensibilibus rebus, de humanis acti- bus eorumque principiis ita disputavit, ut in eo neque copiosa qurcstionum seges, neque apta partium dispositio, neque optima procedendi ratio, neque principiorum firmitas aut argumen- torum robur, neque dicendi perspicuitas aut proprietas, neque ahstrnsa quacque explicandi facilitas desiderctur." 5 'Encyclical .Kterni Patris; In Thomas Aquinaa's Summa Theol., Romas, 1894, Vol. G, pp. 425 ff. 4 ll.nl., p. 432. 1 Ibid., p. 4.'i2. 163 This return to the past, however, is far from being a retro- gression. All Mediaeval vain subtleties must be discarded. All Scholastic teachings which are not in harmony with modern scientific discoveries must be abandoned: " Si quid enim est a doctoribus Scholasticis vel nimia sub- tilitate quesitum, vel parum considerate traditum, si quid cum exploratis posterioris aevi doctrinis minus coherens, vel denique quoquo modo non probabile, id nullo pacto in animo est aetati nostra? ad imitandum proponi." Modern scientific progress must be welcomed as a benefit to philosophy : " Non eos profecto improbamus doctos homines atque solertes, qui industriam et eruditionem suam, ac novorum inventorum opes ad excolendam philosophiam afferunt: id enim probe in- telligimus ad incrementa doctrinae pertinere." 7 The influence of the pope's encyclical was simply immense. The revival of Tbomism, which had been limited to some iso- lated efforts, was then taken seriously by most of the Catholic thinkers. Suffice it to mention the celebrated professor of the Catholic University of Lille, Amedee de Margerie. Mr. de Margerie, although more than fifty years of age when the papal encyclical appeared, at once made a thorough study of the works of St. Thomas — which were completely unknown to him — and adopted his doctrine in a great many points. In Rome itself, the success of the pope was complete. This was due in great part to the fact that Leo XITT, instructed by his first failure, took the precaution to corroborate his instruc- tions by forcible measures. Palmieri and Caretti were dis- charged from their chairs, and the new appointments made left no doubt as to the final issue of the affair. All understood that this time the pope would be victorious. The men honored by the papal choice as professors of phi- •Ibid., p. 436. '•Ibid., p. 434. 164 losophy, in Rome, were the following: Cornoldi was made pro- fessor at the Roman College, Zigliara at the Minerva, Loren- zelli and Satolli at the Propaganda, Talamo at the Apollinaris. As all these men have distinguished themselves by eminent pro- ductions, I will say a few words about each of them. Giovanni Mari Cornoldi, S.J. (1822-1892), besides his two great works: Instituliones Philosophies Speculative and La Filosofia Scolastica di San Tommaso e di Dante, and numerous shorter treatises in which he defends the Scholastic principles and attacks opposite doctrines, especially Rosminianism (Cf. Bibliography), has contributed many articles to the Civilta Cattolica. Less profound as a philosopher than Zigliara or Sanseverino, he has nevertheless done the greatest service to the neo-Thomistic cause by the very activity he has displayed. The direct aim of his great works, as well as of his numerous essays, is most praiseworthy. He strove to point out the per- fect harmony existing between Thomism and science, to give a scientific basis to neo-Scholasticism. This is the very spirit which has recently inspired Desire Mercier and the Institute of Louvain. Unhappily, Cornoldi's efforts have not always been intelligent and have met with little success. He is chiefly known to-day for his bitter criticisms of modern thought. In his Prolcgomeni, he divides all philosophers into three groups: the true philosophers, that is to say, the Scholastics; the liberal philosophers, or those who do not accept all Scholastic doc- trines; the non-philosophers, to which group all others belong. 8 Well known is Cornoldi's phrase describing modern philosophy as " the pathology of human reason." Less unfair to moderns has been Thomas Zigliara, O.P. (1833-1893). His Sumvia Philosophica, in which he closely adheres to St. Thomas's doctrine, has, for a long time, served as a text-book in Catholic seminaries, and is much in use still to-day. His most valuable contribution to philosophy is prob- •Cf. Gomez Ezquierdo, Historia de la Filosofia del siglo XIX, p. 4G4. •Cornoldi, Lecons de Philosophic Scolastique; Paris, 1878, p. 16. 165 ably the work entitled: Delia luce intellettuale. The author refutes traditionalism and ontologism, and conclusively shows that the ontologists have no right to invoke the authority of St. Thomas to support their theories. Benedetto Lorenzelli, actual archbishop of Lucca, has fol- lowed Aristotle in his Philosophic Theoretics Instituliones. How closely he shares Cornoldi's contempt for modern thought may be inferred from his division of philosophy into the four following periods: (1) a period of formation, from Thales to Aristotle; (2) a period of decrease and perversion, from Aris- totle to Christ; (3) a period of increase and perfection, from Christ to Thomas Aquinas; (4) a period of corruption, from Descartes to our own day. 10 Francesco Satolli is a faithful disciple of Cardinal Cajetan. At the example of the great commentator of the sixteenth cen- tury, he chiefly applies himself to the writing of learned com- mentaries on the works of the Angelic Doctor. In Sum mam Theologicam Divi Thome Aquinatis is the title of three suc- cessive treatises in which many questions of the Sum ma Theo- logica are expounded and studied. In his Logic (Enchiridion Philosophic, Pars la, continens logicam universam), Mgr. Satolli has been, like Lorenzelli, a disciple of Aristotle. He has been reproached with making an excessive use of dialectical reasoning, and thus rendering " in- tricate and labyrinthic " what is clear by itself. His last work, De habitibus, contains a valuable discussion of Spencer's theory of conduct. Salvatore Talamo is chiefly known for his work, UAristoie- lismo dclla Scolastica, one of the most valuable productions of early Roman neo-Thomism. The aim of the treatise is to de- fend Scholastic philosophy against the unfounded reproach of servile Aristotelism, which, for several centuries, had been al- most unanimously directed against the schoolmen. The first chapters of the work deal with the character of 10 Cf. Gomez Izquicrdo, op, <*it.. p. 464. 166 Mediaeval speculation. The author clearly shows that the phi- losophy of the schoolmen, although intimately connected with theology, had an object and a method of its own, with which theology was not concerned. In the second part, the author studies the ground of the pref- erence given to Aristotle in the Middle Ages. The reasons he assigns are the following: 1. Aristotle was the greatest master, nay the inventor of one of the most important branches of philosophy, the science of logic, which studies the laws of our mind and the method we must follow in the research of truth. 2. Aristotle's works contained a treasure of information about all branches of human knowledge: natural science, ethics, politics, psychology, metaphysics, etc. 3. Aristotle gave the example of a methodic discussion and a concise style, rejecting the beautiful garb under which Plato often concealed the impossibility of a demonstration. 4. Finally, the Stagirite revealed to the curiosity of the Medi- eval philosophers the origin of philosophy and its development among the Greeks. 11 The enthusiasm with which the philosophy of Aristotle was accepted was, however, far from mere slavishness. Whenever the Scholastics found in Aristotle some theory they judged erroneous, they did not hesitate to reject it. 12 They likewise modified and perfected the system of the master in a great many points. With regard to the essential relations between the uni- verse and God, the final end of man, the spirituality and immor- tality of the soul, etc., they taught definite doctrines which Aris- totle had denied or very imperfectly treated. 13 Their concep- tion of the act of creation was also essentially different from Aristotle's conception. Aristotle had admitted God as the 11 Cf. Talamo, L'Aristotelismo della Scolastica, 3. cd., Siena, 1881. pp. 234 ff. 13 Ibid., pp. 151 ft". "Ibid., pp. 3G1 ff. 107 necessary cause of the world, but had regarded him simply as a demiurge acting upon eternally preexisting matter. The Scho- lastics conceived creation as a production of the world out of nothing. 14 While the professors we have mentioned were working hard for the success of their cause, there came into notice another man who had not attracted the attention at first, perhaps be- cause he shunned public notice, who had written much, how- ever, and who, from the silence of his cell, proved as able a defender of the new movement as the men who were expound- ing their views from a university's cathedra. Matteo Liberatore, S.J. (1810-1892), was already an old man at the time we consider. His Institution es Philosophiccr, pub- lished many years before, had been often reissued, and, as well as Zigliara's Summa, have proved an excellent text-book in many Catholic institutions. Anticipating the pope's advice, Libera- tore had shunned all useless questions, and had defended the essential principles of Scholasticism in a clear and elegant lan- guage. Not satisfied with the general exposition contained in his first work, he later took up some special topics, chiefly in the field of Scholastic psychology, and published learned treatises, which have been translated into various languages (cf. Bibliog- raphy). He even made use of the dramatic form to defend his philosophical theories, as in L'autocrazia deU'ente, comedy in three acts (Naples, 1880). His works do not evince a deep knowledge of the philosophical thought outside of Italy ; but he has mastered Italian philosophy and given thorough criticisms of the doctrines of Gioberti and Rosmini. The latter part of his life was devoted to social studies. He pointed out the way in which the Catholic Church can accommodate itself to a cer- tain kind of socialism. Finally, Liberatore was one of the founders of the review Civiltd Cattolica (1850), which has not ceased to be one of the most efficient organs of Catholic thought in Italy. 14 Ibid., p. 151. 108 In the meantime, the success of the Roman professors was becoming more and more complete. In 1880, Leo XIII ordered the preparation of a new edition of the works of St. Thomas. At the same time, an Academy of St. Thomas was founded in Rome itself (October 13, 1879). It was composed of thirty members: ten taken from Rome, ten from the rest of hah. ten from other countries. Pecci and Zigliara were chosen as presidents. 15 The work of the Accademia Eomana di San Tommaso soon attracted the attention and the criticisms of the Italian thinkers. It was claimed that the new Scholastics were not following the precepts of Leo XIII, that they applied the Thomistic principles to scientific discoveries in the most ridiculous manner, that they had produced nothing original, save repeated attacks on Ros- mini. These charges, formulated as early as 1886 by Benzoni in the Rivista italiana di Filosofia, have been taken up again by Besse, in his pamphlet, Deux centres du mouvement thomiste. The aim of Mr. Besse in this little treatise is to compare the work done at Rome by the early neo-Scholastics with the work done at Louvain to-day, and to show that at Louvain only some- thing truly philosophical has been accomplished; that the Louvain professors alone have acted in agreement with the papal instructions and with the necessities of our time. The most important charges formulated by Mr. Besse against the Roman Thomists are the following: 1. On all points common to philosophy and faith, the Roman Thomists strove to connect the natural and the supernatural, and became mere interpreters of the Christian dogmas. 16 2. They did not study modern philosophy, but uncritically accepted Sanseverino's conclusions. Their criticisms, therefore, contain nothing personal, nothing serious, and have brought dis- credit upon the cause their authors pretended to defend. 17 tt Ct Blanc, Histoirc de la Philosophic, t. 3, p. 5. r )fl. I'. -*c. Deux centres du mouvement thomiste, p. 25. "Ibid,, pp. 30-31. 169 3. Lacking all principles of critical method, the Roman Thomists have not even succeeded in their interpretations of St. Thomas. 18 Mr. Besse excepts from his wholesale condemnation Signori- ello for his Vocabularium peripatetico-scholasiicum, and Talamo for his study on Aristotle. But these examples, the author con- tinues, have found no imitators. 19 ' The truth contained in Mr. Besse's pamphlet must be frankly acknowledged. Roman Thomists have often remained in a com- plete ignorance of the spirit and the contents of modern phi- losophy. Without understanding modern thinkers, they have mercilessly condemned them. Non-Scholastic philosophical productions have been described as heretical; their authors, even the most inoffensive, as men who had wilfully opposed all rules of common sense and truth. The neo-Scholastic move- ment has thus ostracized itself from the current of modern thought. It has failed to attract the attention of the non- Catholic world. Its very existence has been, for a long time, systematically ignored. Only in recent years, and after taking another direction, has neo-Scholasticism been deemed worthy of study. Only after neo-Kantians have become convinced that the professors of Louvain possessed a knowledge of the Kantian philosophy which would honor any center of learning have they begun to ask themselves whether neo-Scholasticism could not contain something good, whether it is not a philosophy. Mr. Besse, however, has probably overlooked a most important fact, which might have led him to modify his sentence of con- demnation. The early Roman Thomists were not in the same position as their followers of the present day. Their aim was not to impose the Thomistic revival upon the consideration of the world of philosophy at large, but to effect its acceptance from the part of the Catholic Church. Only after Thomism had gained a sure footing among Catholic thinkers could it step "Ibid., p. 35. "Ibid., p. 34, note. 170 boldly forward and proclaim its existence to the outside world. This is the reason why the Roman Thomists have worked hard and fast to show the perfect harmony of their system with the body of revealed truths. Tt is the reason why they have made merciless attacks upon all other philosophies, and have seen a heresy where there was at most an error.] The neo-Thomists of the present day ought not to censure too hastily the work of their older brethren. It is the Roman Scholastics that have firmly implanted Thomism in the Catholic world. They have faithfully grasped the task that lay before them, and have fulfilled it with the greatest success. The means they have taken were, on the whole, the best they could take, the only ones, perhaps, that could insure success. The early neo-Thomists we have studied have found numerous disciples who have continued and perfected the work of the mas- ters. In 1879, the Lazarist Albert Barberis (1847-1896) founded in Piacenza a Latin philosophical review, the Divus Thomas, which has been the organ of neo-Scholasticism in Italy, and in which Tornatore, Vinati, Ermoni, and other eminent men, have published learned dissertations. The professors of Louvain themselves have occasionally honored the Divus Thomas by their articles. Quite recently, the publication of the Divus Thomas has been interrupted. Nobody regrets the fact more sincerely than we do. It is perhaps true that modern languages are a more suitable instrument than Latin for philosophical dis- cussions. All interested in neo-Scholasticism were none the less glad to read dissertations written by modern Scholastics in the very language of the schoolmen. After having enjoyed the Divus Thomas for so many years, we feel that its actual absence is a real lack to Scholastic literature, and we sincerely implore the distinguished professors of Piacenza to alter their decision and begin their work anew. Barberis is also the author of two Latin dissertations: Posi- tivismus ac nova, mrlhodus psycliologica (1887), and Esse for- male eslnr rci iniriiisrcinn mi nun? ( 1SS1 ). which, by the solid- 171 ity of the reasoning and the depth of the doctrine, assure their author a place among the most profound metaphysicians of our day. Among the recent defenders of neo-Scholasticism in Italy, the best known are: the Jesuits Schiffmi, De Maria and Salis Seewis, and the distinguished professor of Pa via, Giuseppe Ballerini. Santo Schiffmi (1841-1906), for a long time professor at the Gregorian University, published a complete and detailed course of Scholastic philosophy. His Principia philosophica deal with logic and ontology; his Disputationes metaphysics specialis, with cosmology; his Disputationes philosophice moralis, with moral philosophy. In 1888, in a learned article of the Annates de Philosophic chretienne, Count Domet de Vorges praised Schiffmi's Ontology as the most solid and profound then exist- ing. 20 One of the most interesting studies Schiffmi's volumes contain is an analysis of the influence of will upon belief, which reminds us of the tenets of our pragmatists. Michael de Maria became famous in 1892, after publishing three volumes of philosophical studies with the title Philosophic Peripatetico-Scholastica. In his criticisms of modern philoso- phy, De Maria closely resembles his Roman predecessors. In his contempt for modern thought, he is not far from Cornoldi's position, as may be gathered from the following passage of his preface : " Principio quidem semper persuasum habui, philosophiam ad tot absurda et incredibilia amplectenda in ipsa Christiana? socie- tatis luce eo misere nostris temporibus declinasse, quod paulatim et pedententim ab illis principiis discessit qua? S. Thomas ex Aristotele accepta mirifice illustravit et cum Christiana revela- tione composuit. Ex quo facile erat intelligere nullam meli- orem expediendae salutis reperiri posse nam, quam ad illam sapientiam plane reverti, a qua inconsulte admodum et temere discessum est." 21 "Cf. Domet de Vorges, Bibliographic de la Philosophic thomiste de 1877 a 1887; Ann. de Philoa. ohr., vol. xviii, pp, 529ff. " De Maria. PhilOBOphia Peripatetico-Scholastica, Vol. 1. p. viii. 172 "Do Maria's work, however, is excellent in many respects. Be- sides its intrinsic value as an exposition of the Scholastic phi- losophy, it presents a special interest on account of the profound studies it contains about St. Thomas's doctrine on some special topics, viz., on essence and existence, 22 on the nature of the individual, 23 etc. Francis Salis Seewis (1835-1898) is chiefly known for his treatise, Delia conoscenza sensitiva, published in 1881, and a study of the doctrines of St. Augustine, St. Thomas and Suarez on spontaneous generation, published in 1897. The author studies the Scholastic doctrines from the point of view of mod- ern physiology and compares the teachings of St. Thomas with the positive results obtained in our day by Helmholz, Wundt, Weber, etc. By his careful study of modern scientific discov- eries, Salis Seewis frankly departs from the contemptuous neglect of the early Roman Thomists and opens to the neo- Scholastic movement in Italy an era of progress. 24 Giuseppe Ballerini, already known by a treatise on socialism and a theological dissertation about the Eucharistic dogma, pub- lished in 1904 a study on the principle of causality and the existence of God, // principio di causalita e Vesistenza di Dio dl fronte alia scienza mod em a. He regards the principle of causality as the real point at issue between the Scholastics and their opponents. He discusses its objectivity, combats Hume's theories, and shows the connection of the idea of cause with the belief in the existence of God. A complete study of neo-Scholasticism in Italy should contain the names of the Jesuits De Mandato, Remer, and Taparelli cPAzeglio, the author of the celebrated Saggio di Diritto natur- alc; of Prisco, Chiesa, Cappellazzi, Puccini, and of the distin- guished logician Lorenzo Schiavi. It should not fail to mention the accurate and painstaking edition of the works of St. Bona- ■ Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 441 ff. 13 Ibid., Vol. 1, pp. 629 IV. "Cf, Gomez (zquierdo, op. cit., p. 450. 173 venture, begun in 1882 by the Franciscan fathers of Quaracchi, near Florence, who have thereby done an immense service to the cause of Scholasticism. The same fathers are actually promis- ing to the learned world a critical edition of the works of Roger Bacon. Finally, one of them, Mariano Fernandez Garcia, has just published a work which will be of great help for the study of Duns Scotus's philosophy. Its title is: Lexicon Scholasticum Philosophico-Theologicum, in quo continentur termini, defini- tiones, distinctiones et effata a B. Joanne Duns Scoto Doctore Subtili. CHAPTER X THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN SPAIN, PORTUGAL, AND SPANISH AMERICA Section 1. — The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Spain Our ordinary philosophical studies in American institutions may easily lead us to the belief that there is no such a thing as a Spanish philosophy. Who, among our university students, has ever heard of a Spanish philosopher? Who could presently name one? Our complete ignorance on this point must perhaps be excused. Some years ago, Mr. Guardia wrote an article in the Revue Philosophique to prove that we are right. He gave it the attractive title of La misere philosophique en Espagnc, and strongly defended the thesis that Spain possesses no philoso- phy. 1 The same thesis had been defended a few years before by the Mexican priest Agustin Rivera, who had extended his condemnation to the Spanish-speaking countries of the Xew World. 2 Few Spaniards, however, would agree with these two men. Patriotism is strong beyond the Pyrenees, and the asser- tions to which it frequently leads the fiery sons of Pelayo would sound incredible to the cool-headed Anglo-Saxon race. It seems that the distinguished writer Marcelino Menendez y Pelayo has placed Spanish philosophy on equal footing with the philosophical systems of France and Italy, and has judged it inferior only to Greek and German speculation. To most of us, this judgment would seem rather bold. It has been con- demned as too timid by William Garcia, who does not hesitate to give Spanish philosophy the first place. His line of reason- ing is very simple. Ho summarily dismisses German philosophy 1 Rev. Philos., 1893, pp. 287 II. 3 In the work: La Filosofia en la Nueva Espafia, Lagos, 1885. 174 175 as a mere play of imagination and no knowledge of truth. As regards Greek philosophy, Garcia, as a genuine Scholastic, does full justice to Aristotle; but, he adds, Aristotle has been sur- passed by St. Thomas, so that the Thomistic, or Italian philoso- phy, is really the first philosophy. Now, the Thomistic philoso- phy has become Spanish by right of conquest. Hence, it is clear that Spanish philosophy is the first philosophy. 3 Our belief as to the real worth of Spanish thought may be greatly influenced by the point of view from which we study the question. A Kantian, for example, can hardly be proud of the influence the Critique of Pure Reason has exercised on the Spanish soil. If, as Mr. Latinus points out, only two Spaniards, during the nineteenth century, have judged it useful to go and study philosophy in Germany, if the physician Nieto Serrano is actually the only Kantian in Spain, 4 all who maintain that philosophy must flow from Koenigsberg, that we must go back to Kant, will be apt to be as severe to Spanish thought as Rivera and Guardia have been. A neo-Scholastic will no doubt be more indulgent. Spain is perhaps the only country in which the Scholastic traditions have never been entirely forgotten. A long time before San- severino published his Philosophia Christiana and Leo XIII his encyclical, distinguished Spaniards had defended the essential principles of the Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy. Dur- ing the course of the nineteenth century, Spain, as we shall see, has produced three great philosophers who are certainly among the greatest of whom the Scholastic revival may boast. One of them, Urraburu, is still living; the other two, Balmes and Gon- zalez, have departed from this world many years ago, but their works are immortal. At the end of the eighteenth century, the sensism of Locke and Condillac was introduced into Spain and gained many dis- 8 Garcia, Tomismo y Neotomismo. pp. 350-351. 4 Latinus, Une excursion philosophique en ESspagne, Rev. \co-Scol., 1901, pp. 192 ff. 17b' ciples. Among its best known adherents may be mentioned the Jesuits Eximeno and Andres. Scholasticism, however, did not disappear altogether. It was defended by Rafael Puigcerwr, O.P., in his Philosophic, Sancti Thorn w Aquinatis, auribus hujus temporis accommodate,, which was used as a text-book in many institutions. Nol long afterwards, Francisco Alvarado, O.P. (1756-1814), generally known as "el filosofo rancio " (the rank philosopher), acquired a great celebrity by his Cartas Aristotelicas and his Cartas Criticas, in which he defended the philosophy of St. Thomas against the heterodox, political, social and philosoph- ical theories which had been recently introduced into Spain. But the man who gave to Spanish philosophy its greatest splendor during the first half of the nineteenth century was undoubtedly Balmes. James Balmes was born in Vich (Catalonia) in 1810 and died in 1848. Completely unknown in 1840, he acquired in a few years an immense reputation. He alone succeeded in awakening the interest of Europe in Spanish thought. Besides numerous social productions, among which must be mentioned a compara- tive study of Protestantism and Catholicism with regard to their influence upon European civilization, Balmes has written the following philosophical works: El Criterio, or a study of the criteria of truth, which, in Mr. Turner's opinion, is his most valuable contribution to philosophy; Cartas a un esceptko, a collection of letters in which scepticism is most ably discussed; Filosofia elemental; and Filosofia fundamental, the work upon which his fame as a philosopher chiefly rests. Orestes A. Brownson declares the Fundamental Philosophy to be not only Balmes's masterpiece, but the most important work published on the bases of philosophy during the nineteenth century.' This judgment is too eulogistic perhaps; but we must at least admit that Balmes's work has acquired the charac- 1 Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy, New fork, 1903; Brownson's Introduction, p. viii. 177 ter of a philosophical classic, and will be studied as long as philosophy endures upon the face of the earth. When Balmes wrote his works, there were as yet no signs of a return to Thomism. His philosophy, accordingl)', is not directly connected with the neo-Scholastic revival. It is, how- ever, Thomistic in its essential character and in most of its details. Thomas Aquinas was the favorite author of the Span- ish thinker, who regarded the Summa Theohgica as the foun- tain of all truth. Balmes's thought has also been influenced, although in a less degree, by Descartes and the Scottish school. Greatly sympathetic to Reid, Balmes professes the same aversion to Idealism, and, speaking of Berkeley, exclaims : " Insanity is insanity still, however sublime it may be." 6 Unlike the early Roman Thomists, Balmes possesses a re- markable knowledge of modern philosophy. He knows thor- oughly Descartes, Locke, Condillac, Hume, Lamennais, and his criticisms of Kant may be read with profit even to-day by all students of German philosophy. One of the ideals which Balmes cherished, and which a premature death did not allow him to realize, was a thorough study and a refutation of German idealism. Strange to say, Balmes is, however, less far from Kant than he supposes. Kant teaches the subjectivity of space. Balmes says: "The idea of extension is a primitive fact of our mind. It is not produced by sensations, but precedes them, if not in time, at least in the order of being." 7 Kant teaches that our knowledge of the external world is nothing but a knowledge of phenomena, and that the thing-in- itself is unknowable. Balmes says: "A pure spirit — the existence of which we must always sup- pose; for, though all finite beings were annihilated, there would still remain the infinite being which is God — a pure spirit would •Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy. V. 1, p. 11. 'Ibid., V. 1, p. 347. 13 178 know the extended world just as it is in itself, and would not have the sensible representations either external or internal which we have.'' 8 Kant teaches that, even with regard to our own self, our knowledge is phenomenal. Balmes says: " The Ego does not see itself intuitively ; it is offered to itself only mediately, by its acts; that is, so far as it is known, it is in the same category as all other external beings, which are all known by their effect upon us." 9 A comparative study of the philosophies of Balmes and Kant would be of great interest, The scope of this treatise obliges us to limit ourselves to a suggestion and a few remarks. What- ever the conclusions of such a study might be, one thing is beyond doubt: Balmes's principles show a marked tendency to subjectivism. He professes that we possess certainty only with regard to internal phenomena, and that we know external objects by means of a natural instinct. Ramon Marti de Eixala (died 1857), although lacking the depth of genius of Balmes, exercised a more direct influence upon Spanish thinking. Surrounded by a number of disciples, he gave birth to the school known as " Catalonian school." One of his disciples, Llorcns, eagerly entered into the spirit of the Thomistic revival which was then taking place in Italy, and, during the last years of his life, strove to put his doctrine in perfect harmony with those of Sanseverino and Cornoldi. Not long afterwards, the same province of Catalonia, proud of such thinkers as Marti and Balmes, produced another philoso- pher of real merit, Antonio Cornelias. Antonio Cornelias y Cluet (1832-1884) has not enjoyed dur- ing his life the noisy celebrity in which other men delight. Even after his death, he has remained unknown for many years, and his name would probably be forgotten to-day were it not •Ibid., V. 1. p. 432. •Ibid., V. 1. p. 42. 179 for the learned study made by the distinguished historian of philosophy, Gomez Izquierdo, in the review La Cultura Es- pafiola (cf. Bibliography). Comellas's life, as Gomez Izquierdo points out, may be summed up in these two words: Solitude and study. His greatest contribution to philosophy are his Demonstration de la armonia entre la religion catolica y la ciencia and his Intro- duction a la Filosofia. The man who has raised Spanish philosophy to its greatest height during the second half of the nineteenth century is Cardinal Gonzalez. Zeferino Gonzalez y Diaz-Tunon (1831-1892), born in Vil- loria, entered the Dominican order at the age of thirteen and was sent, when quite a young man, to the mission of the Philip- pines. In Manila, he taught philosophy and theology and pub- lished his first work : Estudios soore la Filosofia de Santo Tomas, which evinces a deep knowledge of the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor, and is regarded by many critics as the most remarkable work on the subject written during the nineteenth century. Compelled by his health to return to Spain in 1865, Gonzalez contributed to La Ciudad de Dios and other periodicals numer- ous philosophical essays. His Philosophic elementaria, his Estudios religiosos, filosoficos, cientificos y sociales, his most recent work, La Biblia y la Ciencia (1891), and especially his Historia de la Filosofia, in which a whole volume is devoted to Mediaeval philosophy, have given the last touch to his reputation as a philosopher and assured him a place among the greatest thinkers of his country and the most genuine defenders and propagators of neo-Scholasticism. Cotemporaneous with Gonzalez are Orti y Lara and Pidal y Mon. Juan Manuel Orti y Lara has written immensely. His most important philosophical works may be seen in our bibliography. Besides his Psicologia, his Logica, his £tica and other construc- tive works, he deserves the gratitude of neo-Scholastics for his 180 refutation of the pantheistic philosophy of Krausc and of the work of Draper. His conception of the Thomistic movement is, however, very narrow. Orti y Lara does not take any inter- est in modern philosophy, which he regards as " resting upon error and sin.'' 10 Alejandro Fidal y Mon, born in Madrid in 1847, is chiefly known as a political writer. His principal contributions to philosophy are a work entitled Sistemas filosoficos (1873), and a study on St. Thomas, Santo Tomds de Aquino (1875), which has been greatly praised by Cardinal Gonzalez. Among the most recent Spanish neo-Scholastics, let us men- tion : Arnaiz, Cepeda, Daurella, Donadiu, Gonzalez y Arintero, Lemos, Hernandez y Fajarnes, Miralles y Sbert, the Jesuits Urraburu and Mendive, the historian of philosophy Gomez Izquierdo. J. Mendive, S.J. (died 1906), is the author of a course of philosophy, written at first in Spanish, and afterwards pub- lished in Latin (1886). Like many other Jesuits, he has been reproached with following Suarez too closely in his interpreta- tions of St. Thomas. Antonio Hernandez y Fajarnes, professor in the University of Zaragoza, is the author of a series of philosophical and scien- tific works in which the fundamental principles of Scholasticism are defended and opposed to the antagonistic modern theories. His first work, Psicologia celidar (1884), is an able refutation of HaeckePs biological theories. His Ontologia (1887) is directed against positivism. Juan Gonzalez de Arintero, O.P., published in 1904 a work entitled La Providencia y la Evolution, whose chief aim is the proof of the existence of finality in the universe. Fr. Arintero attacks the doctrine of pure chance; and, in his chapter on evo- lution, clearly shows that evolution without finality is contrary to reason, to experience, to science itself. 10 (f. LatimiB, Une excursion philosophique on Espagne, Rev. Veo- Scol., 1901. 181 No less profound is the scientific knowledge of Placido Angel Lemos. In his work, La Vida Organica, published in 1902, he defends the validity of the concept of substance, proves against Haeckel the unity of the living being, studies the origin of life upon the earth, and strives to show that a perfect harmony exists between scientific discoveries and the teachings of the Bible. Mr. Alberto Gomez Izquierdo, actually professor in the sem- inary of Zaragoza, has contributed to the Revista de Aragon and the Cultura Espahola numerous articles in which he has venti- lated interesting questions concerning the history of philosophy. He has also published a History of Philosophy in the XIX cen- tury, which is one of the most important and best documented works we possess on the subject. Mr. Gomez has entirely omitted Spanish philosophy from his History, but he has prom- ised a separate volume on the subject, which all who are inter- ested in philosophical researches expect with feverish eagerness. John Joseph Urraburu, S.J., published in 1890 eight big Latin quarto volumes with the title Institutiones Philosophical. The first deals with Logic, the second with Ontology, the third with Cosmology, the next three with Psychology, the last two with Natural Theology. Some years afterwards, he exposed his teachings anew in a more concise form, and published a Compendium Philosophies Scholastics which, in spite of its modest title, consists of no less than five large octavo volumes. Fr. Urraburu's works constitute a monumental production, one of the greatest treasures neo-Scholastic literature possesses. In his method, Urraburu is a pure Roman Thomist. He uses the Latin language, the syllogistic form, and proves the truth of his teachings from the authority of the Church and the Divine Revelation as often and as willingly as by human reason. He differs from many Roman Thomists by his knowledge of modern scientific results. The conclusions he derives from these results are not always justifiable, but his knowledge of the scien- tific facts themselves cannot be denied. 182 Urraburu's works — perhaps on account of the very method they follow — have not attracted the attention they deserve. Their author's name is not even mentioned in Mr. Blanc's Dic- tion naire de l'hUosophie, published in 1906. The actual cur- rent of neo-Scholasticism, chiefly due to the influence of Mgr. Mercier and the Institute of Louvain, is unfavorable to Urra- buru. It professes that the Latin language ought to be dis- carded in philosophical discussions, and that philosophy ought to be regarded as a science which must go its own way. without any predeterminate conclusion imposed by theological beliefs. To the objection that this has not been the method followed by St. Thomas, the Scholastics of Louvain would answer that St. Thomas acted in harmony with the spirit of his time, and that, if he lived now, he would likewise act in harmony with the spirit and methods of our day. This may be very true, but it proves too much. If St. Thomas lived to-day, a Positivist might ask, if he breathed in our intellectual atmosphere, would he be a Dominican? Would he be a Scholastic? Urraburu's method is perhaps, on the whole, more consistent with the principles of Scholasticism than his opponents' view. The Scholastics of Louvain are as profoundly convinced of the truth of the doctrines of the Church as Urraburu is. They believe as strongly as the eminent Spaniard that a philosophical or a scientific conclusion opposed to the revealed truths is erron- eous and must be rejected. If such be the case, and if the pri- mary aim of philosophy be the attainment of truth, is it not illogical to abstain from taking theological doctrines as a guide in philosophical investigations? A proof from Scripture will not appeal to the modern mind. In Protestant countries especially it will sound as profoundly unphilosophical. But we must not forget that Urraburu writes in a Catholic country and for Catholic readers. The spirit of free interpretation has led Protestant theology very far. Many Protestant ministers to-day doubt the existence of hell, and a fi w are inclined to transform a personal God into an ethical or 183 metaphysical principle. The case of the Catholic clergy is quite different. All who are really Catholics firmly believe, not only in a personal God, who sees us and watches over us, in a hell in which the reprobate will be tortured with the devils during the whole eternity, but even in the Immaculate Conception and the infallibility of the pope. It cannot be denied that the spirit of Louvain is more in har- mony with modern thought. This is the reason why the works published by the Institut Superieur de Philosophic have been translated into various languages and have attracted the atten- tion of all Europe, whereas Urraburu's bulky volumes have been forgotten in some dusty corner of a conventual library. The study of the works of the learned Jesuit is, however, indispensa- ble for an adequate understanding of the spirit of Scholasticism. Let us not leave Spain without mentioning some important reviews which have greatly helped the cause of neo-Thomism. Razon y Fe, La Ciudad de Dios, the Revista de Aragon, and the Cultura Espahola have published articles of great interest. Of greater interest still is the Revista Luliana, founded in Barce- lona in 1901, and whose aim is the publication and the critical interpretation of the works of the Medieval Spanish philosopher Eaymond Lully. Section 2. — The Neo-Scholastic Revival ix Portugal 11 The march of philosophy in Portugal is closely connected with that of philosophy in Spain. Both countries have been inspired by the same masters, and have followed parallel direc- tions in their speculation. By the end of the eighteenth cen- tury, the dominant system in Portuguese institutions was a sensism inspired by Locke and Condillac. The Jesuits of Coimbra, who alone clung to an orthodox Thomism, were se- verely attacked by other religious orders, especially by the Ora- torians and Augustinians. Condillac's Art de Penser was 11 Cf. Ferreira-Deusdado. La Philosophic Thomiate «'ii Portugal, Rev. N4o-Scol., 1898. 184 translated into Portuguese and published in 1818. The Ora- tor in n Fr. John the Baptist, the archdeacon Luiz Antonio Ver- ney and Theodoro d' Almeida frankly introduced modern systems of thought into the Portuguese philosophical circles. Little was done in Portugal for a restoration of Thomism before the publication of Leo XI IPs encyclical. The few con- tributions to Scholastic literature written in Portuguese during that period, do not belong to Portugal proper, but to Asia or America. In Macao, the Jesuit Francis X. Rondina (1827-1897), an Italian by birth, published in 1869 a course of philosophy in harmony with the Scholastic principles. The title of the work- is: Compendia de Philosophia theoretica e pratica para uso da mocidadc portuguesa na China. The author has been directly inspired by St. Thomas, Suarez, Goudin, Balmes, Gonzalez, and, to a certain extent, by Rosmini. Two years later, Jose Soriano de Sousa, professor in Pernam- buco (Brazil), published his Licoes de Philosophia elemrnlar racional e moral, perfectly Thomistic in spirit, which he dedi- cated to Emperor Pedro II. After the promulgation of the encyclical JEterni Patris, the Catholics of Portugal entered without hesitation into the spirit of the Roman Pontiff. By the philosophical academies they founded, the reviews and the works they published, they have assured to their country a conspicuous place in the history of neo-Thomism. In 1881, an Academy of St. Thomas was founded in Coimbra, and, by means of its organ, the review Institucbes christas, actively contributed to turn the attention of Portugal to the Thomistic revival. The foundation of the Academy of St. Thomas was soon followed by the publication of philosophical works inspired by Scholastic principles. Among the writers who thus served the cause of neo-Scholastieism, the best known are Sinibaldi, Pereira Gomez de Carvalho and Madureira. Tbiiigo Sinibaldi, professor in the seminary of Coimbra, pub- 185 lished in 1889 his Prcplectiones Philosophic christiance, and, three years later, his Ehmentos de Philosophia, which has been honored by several editions. Clement Pereira Gomez de Carvalho, professor in the Central Eyceum of Coimbra, is also the author of a work entitled Eh- mentos de Philosophia, which was published in 1894. Bernardo Augusto de Madureira, professor in the Faculty of Theology of the University of Coimbra, published, in 1881, a poem entitled, sol d' Aquino, which deals with the life and the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor, and was dedicated by the author to the new-born Academy of St. Thomas. Since that time, Mr. Madureira has also published a manual of Elementary Philosophy (1896). Another active supporter of neo-Thomism in Portugal is Mr. Manuel Jose Martins Capella, to whose initiative is due the foundation of a chair of Thomistic philosophy in the seminary of Braga (1892). More recently, Mr. Teixera Guedes has organized in Santarem a Philosophical and Literary Academy, whose aim is the diffu- sion of the Thomistic doctrines among the people. The Acad- emy has been inaugurated in 1897 by the Cardinal Archbishop of Lisbon. Section 3. — The Neo-Scholastic Revival in Mexico By the middle of the nineteenth century, Scholastic philoso- phy had practically disappeared from the Mexican soil. Even Catholics regarded with the greatest disrespect a system which, in previous centuries, had been defended in Mexico by so many illustrious thinkers. From August, 1815, to May, 1817, there was published in Mexico a religious, political, scientific and lit- erary periodical, known as El Catolico. Its columns contained numerous articles dealing with History of Philosophy, especially with Scholasticism. These articles were published anony- mously, but it appears from the works of the eminent historian 186 Valverde Tellez that they were ;i detailed and critical study of the various philosoph- 191 ical systems in his country. He analyzes the works and the doctrines of all great Mexican thinkers. In spite of his enthusiastic admiration for St. Thomas, Mr. Valverde does full justice to the philosophers of other schools. His study of the recent positivistic movement in Mexico and of the violent discussions to which it has given rise is excellent. 17 The Critica Filosofica completes the Apuntaciones by furnish- ing new data, by making us know philosophical works completely unknown, and unearthed by the patient labor of the author. The Bibliografia Filosofica Mexicana gives us, with the great- est exactitude, the list of all philosophical productions written in Mexico. Each work is preceded by a biographical sketch of its author and followed by a critical analysis, so that the Biblio- grafia is indispensable to all who are interested in the march of philosophical speculation among the Spanish race. Section 4. — The Neo-Scholastic Eevival in South America Among the countries which have eagerly embraced the cause of the Scholastic revival, Colombia deserves a special attention. Thomism has become, as it were, its official philosophy, and, more than anywhere else perhaps, has identified itself with the spirit of the nation. When, in the middle of the last century, Bentham's utilitarian ethical system was introduced into Colombia, it was opposed by some of the most eminent Colombian writers. Margallo, M.M. Mallarino, Ricardo de la Parra, Joaquin Mosquera, Mario Valenzuela, and more especially Jose Eusebio Caro (1817-1853) and his illustrious son, Miguel Antonio Caro, defended the Thomistic moral system with much ability and success. Miguel Antonio Caro, born in Bogota on November 10, L843, is chiefly known as a politician and a man of letters. As a politician, he has exercised an immense influence upon the gov- 11 The greatest supporter of Positivism in Mexico is Mr. Porflrio Parra. Its most irreducible adversary has been Mr. J. M. Vigil. 192 ernmenl of his country, and has been intrusted with the high oflice of president. Among his literary achievements, which have given him a conspicuous place in the history of Spanish literature, let us mention his admirable translation of Virgil into Spanish verse. His most lasting title to the gratitude of Philosophy is his Estudio sobre el UtilUarismo, which has been proclaimed worthy of Joseph de Maistre. 18 The most important center of Thomism in Colombia is actu- ally the College of the Rosary (Colegio Mayor de Xuestra Sefiora del Rosario) in Bogota. As early as 1881, Rafael Maria Carrasquilla (born in Bogota on December 18, 1857, and president of the College of the Rosary since 1891) proclaimed his adherence to the philosophy imposed by Pope Leo XIII on the Catholic world. " To the modern errors," said he, " we must oppose the entire truth, even if we offend the pride of our century of progress, by exhibiting a monk of the thirteenth century as a model of wisdom." 19 The program thus sketched by Mr. Carrasquilla has been faithfully carried out. All the works and essays the College has produced have been inspired by the purest Thomistic prin- ciples, so that the history of the College of the Rosary during the last fifteen years forms one of the most interesting pages of a history of neo-Scholasticism. The adherence of the college to the principles of the Angelic Doctor does not, however, degenerate into servility. It is essen- tially eclectic and progressive. The new constitutions of the college strongly insist upon the fact that we must follow the Scholastics wherever their philosophy is acceptable in the light of modern criticism, and reject their doctrines if they have proved erroneous or inadequate. 20 The most important work of Mr. Carrasquilla is the volume entitled, Ensayo sobre la doctrina liberal, which has obtained 'Mf. Ramirez, Filosofia Positivista, p. 95. "Carrasquilla, Sobre el estudio do la filosofia; Repert. Colomb., Aug., 1881. =°Cf. Revista del Colegio del Rosario, .Tune. 190G, p. 316. 193 him the honor of being described as a " republican Balmes." By its title, the Ensayo sobre la Doctrina Liberal seems to belong to political science rather than to philosophy. It is as a philosophical system, however, that Mr. Carrasquilla studies liberalism, which he refutes by the Thomistic social principles. " Liberalism," says he, " is above all a philosophical school, which a priest may study and refute with the same right where- with he would combat Descartes, Hegel or Rosmini." 21 Among the men who have contributed to give to the College of the Eosary the Thomistic direction it has to-day, none is more conspicuous than Mr. Julian Restrepo Hernandez, professor of logic and anthropology in the college since 1892. Born in Bogota on July 23, 1871, Julian Eestrepo Hernandez studied in the College of the Rosary and showed such philosoph- ical acumen that he was placed in the chair of logic in 1890, while still a student in the college. Later on, he studied law and wrote for the Colombian government the Codification Cun- dinamarquesa, which contains the entire legislation of Colombia, and forms a volume of 1208 pages folio. Mr. Restrepo, however, has not neglected philosophy and has recently (1907) published a volume on logic {Lection es de Logica, in which he has embodied the lectures given to the stu- dents of the College of the Rosary. The qualities which distinguish this work have been very skil- fully pointed out by the distinguished literary critic Rufino Jose Cuervo, in a personal letter to the author : " The pleasure I experienced at the reading of your volume on Logic, says Mr. Cuervo, comes chiefly from the clearness, precision and rigorous method of the work, in which ancient and modern learning are combined, so that truth may appear more luminous and attractive." 22 Mr. Restrepo's Logic, besides its intrinsic value as an exposi- 21 Carrasquilla, Ensayo sobre la Doctrina Liberal, p. xiii. 22 Quoted in article by Pedro M. CarrefiO, in La Prensa, Bogota, Dec. 14, 1907. 14 194 tion of the Scholastic logical principles, is worthy of attention for a theory of the modes of the hypothetical syllogism, which constitutes a direct contribution of the author to the field of logic. Since 1905, the College of the Rosary also publishes an im- portant review (Revista del Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Scnora del Rosario) which is undoubtedly one of the most excellent South American periodical publications. Its field is not con- fined to philosophy. It treats likewise of literature, education, history, and seldom fails to give a delightful piece of poetry. From a philosophical point of view, the most important con- tribution of the review is the essay entitled Santo Tom as ante la ciencia moderna. of Francisco Maria Rengifo, now professor in the college. M p. Rengifo studies the modern theories defended by mathe- matics and science and shows that they are in perfect harmony with the essential principles of Thomism. Lei us not leave the College of the Rosary without mentioning the interesting work entitled La Filosofia Positivista, written by Samuel Ramirez (1875-1908), as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. After giving a detailed history of the various positivistic schools, Mr. Ramirez demonstrates the superiority of the Thomistic principles over the doctrines of Comte and his disciples. The Rev. Luis Ortiz, S.J., professor in the College of San Bartolome, has contributed to Colombian neo-Scholastic litera- ture a little work entitled La Vida (Life). The thesis de- fended by the author is the following : " The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor and of Fr. Suarez, defending the existence of a vital principle, which informs living beings and is essentially distinct from the physico-chemical forces of brute matter, is confirmed by the observations of modern science; or. more briefly, the physical and chemical forces are inadequate to ex- plain life." The proofs adduced by Fr. Ortiz in defence of this thesis are 195 a development of the following argument : The essences of things are known from the operations and properties of these things. The operations and properties of inorganic matter are essentially different from those which characterize living beings. Therefore, the nature of living beings is essentially different from that of inorganic matter. Colombia is not the only South American republic in which the spirit of the Thomistic revival has penetrated. The most important contribution of South America to the cause of neo- Scholasticism came from Chile and was due to Francisco Gine- bra, of the Society of Jesus. Ginebra's Elementos de Filosofia, published in 1887 in San- tiago (Chile), has deservedly run into several editions. It is one of the most valuable text-books on Scholastic philosophy which the neo- Scholastic revival has produced. The author has been chiefly inspired by St. Thomas, Suarez, Liberatore, Kleut- gen, Cornoldi and Balmes. The Elementos de Filosofia is completed by a treatise on Natural Law (Elementos de Derecho Natural), which is also a very important work, and has been adopted as a text-book in several of the South American schools of law. CHAPTER XI THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN GERMANY. AUSTRIA AND SWITZERLAND The philosophical systems of Kant and Hegel exercised a powerful influence upon Catholic philosophy in Germany. Georg Hermes (1775-1831) and Anton Giinther (1783-1863) defended the omnipotence of human reason, and, following Hegel, rejected the distinction between natural and supernatural truths — one of the fundamental tenets of the Catholic Church. Rome condemned their doctrines and placed their writings on the Index, so that their efforts, from a Catholic point of view, were a failure. A movement of return towards Thomistic philosophy then took place among German Catholic thinkers; so that, when Leo XIII published his encyclical, Catholic Germany eagerly es- poused the views of the Pontiff. Among the men who prepared this return to Scholasticism must be mentioned: Friedrich Schlegel, who, in his History of Ancient and Mod- ern Literature, showed the real merit of Mediaeval philosophy. Mohler and his disciple Staudenmaicr, who condemned all forms of rationalism. Clemens, whose aim was the refutation of Giinther. Rothenfiue, who, in spite of some ontologistic and Rosminian ideas, agreed in the main with the philosophy of the School. But the two philosophers who most actively contributed to the revival of Scholasticism in Germany were Kleutgen and Stockl. Joseph Kleutgen, S.J. (1811-1883), published in 1860 his Philoso/iliir der Yorzeil. which has become one of the classical works of neo-Scholastic literature. The Philosophic der Vorzeit 19G 197 is not, like Sanseverino's Philosophia Christiana or Urraburu's Institutiones, a detailed course of Scholastic philosophy. It is rather a work of defense. Kleutgen is not the peaceful states- man who organizes his country; he is the general on the battle- field. His chief purpose is to purge German Catholic philoso- phy of all traces of Hegelianism. He vigorously attacks Hermes and Giinther. He defends the Scholastic conceptions against the erroneous interpretations of Frohschammer, Male- branche and others. He also expounds the fundamental principles of Thomism, and shows that they are the only principles capable of giving entire satisfaction to human reason. Among Kleutgen's contributions to the body of Scholastic doctrines, let us mention his famous principles of knowledge, which have been generally accepted by subsequent neo-Thomists : 1. Knowledge results of the fact that an image of the knowu object is produced in the knower by the concourse of the known object and of the knower. 2. The known object is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. 3. Knowledge becomes more perfect in proportion as the knower is more remote, by the nature of his being, from mate- rial conditions. 1 Not long after the publication of the Philosophie der Vorzeit, Albert Stockl (1823-1895) wrote his two most important works: Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters (1864—66), and Lehrbuch der Philosophic. The latter is a clear and valuable exposition of the Thomistic philosophy; the former, one of the works which initiated those historical investigations about Scho- lasticism, of which the nineteenth century is bo Legitimately proud. The most important contribution of Germany to Scholastic philosophy since the days of Kleutgen and Stockl is the scries 1 Kloutgen, La Philosophie scola.stiquo, Siorp's ed., Vol. 1, Dissert. 1. Chnp. 1. 198 published under the name of PhUosophia Lacensia by the Jes- uits of Maria-Laach. This series comprises the following works : Institulioncs logicales (3 vol.) ; Institutioncs philosophic natural is : and I nstilutiones psychological, by Tilmann Pesch; Inslituliancs tltrudiccece sive thcologicB naturalis, by J. Hontheim; Institutioncs juris naturalis, by Th. Meyer; eleven volumes in all, forming a complete course of Scholastic philosophy. The PhUosophia Lacensis is more decidedly Scholastic in its method than any other work neo-Thomism has produced. Fr. Pesch follows in his exposition the same plan St. Thomas fol- lowed. Like St. Thomas, he begins with an exposition of ad- verse doctrines, passes to the thesis containing his own views, ends with an answer to the objections given in the first part. Such a method must not, however, lead us to believe that the eminent authors of the PhUosophia Lacensis are servile follow- ers of the Middle Ages and ignore modern ideas. Their ac- quaintance with the current of modern philosophy is remarkable. Fr. Pesch discusses all recent scientific hypotheses in his Insti- tutioncs Philosophic Naturalis, and tries to establish upon these hypotheses the foundation of Thomistic cosmology. A like knowledge of modern psychology appears in the 1 nstilutiones Psychological. Fathers Meyer and Hontheim follow the same method and display the same erudition. The latter has recently applied mathematics to logic in his work: Dcr logische Algoritmus (1895). Besides Meyer, neo-Scholastic Germany possesses two moral- ists of a great merit, Costa-Rosetti (1841-1900) and Cathrein. Victor Cathrein, S.J. (died 1899), published his Moralphi- losophie in 1890, and gave it anew in a more concise form a few years afterwards, as one of the volumes of the series Cursus philosophicus, of which more in the sequel. One of the most importanl studies contained in Cathrein's work is the chapter dealing with Socialism. Published separately in German, and 199 honored by five editions in less than two years, it has been trans- lated into English, French, Italian, Polish and Flemish. Al- though the author's conclusions are opposed to the socialistic theories, Socialists themselves have been compelled to admit that he had grasped the essential principles of their system more adequately than some of their own followers. One of the greatest German neo-Scholastics of the present time is Mr. Constantin Gutberlet, professor in Fulda Seminary. As may be seen in our Bibliography, Mr. Gutberlet has studied the thought of the Angelic Doctor under nil its aspects. Be- sides numerous shorter treatises, he published, between the years 1878 and 1884, the volumes of his Lehrbuch der Philoso- phic. This important work, in which the author generally fol- lows Suarez, has been the first great successful attempt to har- monize modern science with Thomistic principles. Gutberlet's greatest service to the cause he defends has perhaps been the foundation of the review Philosophisches Jahrbuch, which, since 1888, has been read with avidity by all who are interested in the Scholastic revival. According to Mr. Picavet, the Philosoph- isches Jahrbuch is the most eclectic and the best informed of all neo-Scholastic periodical publications. German neo-Scholastic literature possesses another review of great value, the Jahrbuch fur Philosophic und speculative Theologie. This review was founded in Paderborn in 1887 by Ernst Commer, professor in the University of Vienna. As its title indicates, it does not confine itself to philosophical ques- tions. It often contains interesting theological discussions, and especially comparative studies of Catholic and Protestant theology. Besides the Jahrbuch. Mr. Commer has published some im- portant works, viz.. System der PhUosophie, Logik, Die immer- wdhrende Philosophic, etc., which have given him the first rank among neo-Scholastics in Austria. A third review, the Saint-Thomasblatter, published for some 200 years in Begensburg by Mr. C. M. Schneider, was more strictly Thomistic than the two other publications wc have mentioned. Thomism, according to Mr. Schneider, must be accepted in its entirety or not be accepted at all. This principle inspired the Sainl-Thomasblatter, and recurs in all the works Mr. Schneider has published. Germany has distinguished itself, more than any other nation, by important works concerning the history of philosophy in the Middle Ages. We have already spoken of Albert Stockl. Not long afterwards, Carl Werner published important monographs dealing with the doctrine of all the great Mediaeval thinkers. Alcuin, Albert the Great, William of Auvergne, Roger Bacon, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, Suarez, were studied with untiring zeal and incredible erudition. Some years later, Ehrle and Henry Deniflc, O.P. (died 1'905), published the Archiv fur Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des MittelaJters, which made known many an unknown text, and enriched neo-Scholastic literature with numerous learned studies. Denifle also wrote a History of the Universities iti the Middle Ages, which is the most precious work we possess on the subject. This History gave its author such a fame that the French Acad- emy invited him to write a Chartularium Universitatis Parisien- sis, which he completed (1891) with the cooperation of A. Chatelain. More directly concerned with philosophy than Denifle's con- tributions are the important works of Clemens Baeumker and Baron G. V. von Hertling, published, since 1891, under the title of Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittclalters. The collection consists of works heretofore unpublished, critical edit inns of works already known, monographs, etc. Among the works it already contains let us mention : the De Unitate of Dominicus Gonzalez, falsely attributed to Boethius, the Pons Vitce of the Jewish philosopher Ibn Gebirol, the Theory of Knowledge of William of Auvergne, the Impossibilia of Siger 201 de Brabant, Mr. Grabman's learned study on Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta, etc. 2 Besides this most important contribution to neo-Scholastic literature, Mr. Baeumker has published : Das Problem der Materie in der griechischen Philosophic (1890). In German Switzerland, the most important center of neo- Thomism is the Catholic University of Friburg, in which the classes of philosophy and theology have been confided to the Dominican Fathers. Among the eminent men who have taught in the university may be mentioned Coconnier, Berthier and Mandonnet. The most distinguished neo-Scholastic in Switzerland is not, however, connected with Friburg University. It is the Kev. Nicolas Kaufmann, president of the Academy of St. Thomas of Lucern. Mr. Kaufmann has contributed numerous articles to the Revue Neo-Scolastique, the Philosophisches Jahrbuch, and several Swiss periodicals, and has published many valuable works dealing with particular aspects of the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas (cf. Bibliography). One of the best known is his study on Final Cause, which has been trans- lated into French. In articles published in the Schweizerische Kirchenzeitung, especially in the article entitled: Das Pontifical Leos XIII und der Neuthomismus, Kaufmann has shown that his view of the neo-Thomistic movement is identical with the view of Leo XIII, and may be expressed by the famous formula: vetera novis augere. A complete history of neo-Scholasticism in German-speaking countries would be very extensive. Our rapid survey, incom- plete though it be, must not omit the names of the following distinguished men : Mathias Schneid (1840-1895) who, besides a work on the influence of Aristotle upon the Scholastics, Aristoteles in der Scholastik, published in 1875, and inspired by Talamo's work 2 The works belonging to this collection are indicated in onr Bibliog- raphy by the word Beitriige. 202 on the same BUbject, has written valuable studies on the cosmo- logieal theories of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Ludwig Schiitz (1838-1901), whose most important contri- bution to aeo-Scholastic literature is a vocabulary known as Thomas-Lexicon, in which all scientific terms contained in the Sum ma Theologica and the Sunt ma contra Gentiles are thor- oughly explained. Francis Xavier Pfeifer (1829-1902), who has tried to har- monize the Thomistic philosophy with the recent scientific hypotheses in his work Ilarmonische Beziehung zwisclien Scho- lasfflc und moderner Naturwissenschaft. Otto Willmann, professor in the University of Prague, and author of a remarkable History of Idealism. Joseph Jungmann, S.J., the author of one of the best works dealing with esthetics {JEstlietik, Freiburg, 1884), in which he finds in Scholastic psychology the foundation of the notion of the beautiful. Francis Schaub, the author of a comparative study of the Thomistic and socialistic theories. Eugene Rolfes, who has compared the theistic conceptions of St. Thomas and Aristotle, and has tried to discover in the Greek- philosopher some traces of the Christian dogmas. Gundisalv. Feldner, who has published a study about St. Thomas's teaching concerning free will. Michael Glossner, canon of Munich, one of the best known contributors to the Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und speculative Theologie. Martin Grabmann, who, besides the learned study on Matthew of Aquasparta we have already mentioned, has published an excellent treatise on the idea of God in St. Thomas's philosophy. CHAPTER XII THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN FRANCE Although France contributed perhaps more than any other nation to turn the attention of the world to the Middle Ages, the direct current of the Thomistic revival had at first little or no influence upon French speculation. The philosophical sys- tems of Descartes and Cousin were deeply rooted upon the French soil. Even in Catholic seminaries, the doctrines of the two great French philosophers were officially taught. The text- book most in use at the time, and whose pages breathe a strong Cartesian spirit, had been written by Father Valla in the last years of the preceding century, and was generally known as Philosophie de Lyon. The full title of the work is: Institu- tiones pliilosopliicce, auctoritate D.D. Archiepiscopi Lugdunensis, 1192. Even after the promulgation of the encyclical Mterni Patris, eclecticism and Cartesianism kept their ground for a long time among French Catholics. This easily explains how France had not a single great representative of neo-Scholasticism at the time Germany could mention with pride the works of Kleutgen; Spain, those of Cardinal Gonzalez; Italy, those of Sanseverino, Liberatore and Talamo. The works published in France in defense of Scholasticism previous to the encyclical fflterni Patris are few and of little importance. Let us mention the Prima Principia Scientiaruw of Michael Rosset (1866) ; the Brcviarium Philosophiw Scholas- tic® of Grandclaude (1868); the short treatise entitled, De V union substantielle de Vdme et du corps, published in 1S70 by Henri Sauve, president of the Catholic University of Angers; the Doctrine de la Connwssance, <>f Mgr. Bourquard, of the same university, published BeveD years Later; and the treatise 203 204 De inteUectualismo of the Sulpieian P.M. Brin (1843-1894), which has served as a basis to Farges and Barbedette for the Manual of Scholastic philosophy they have recently written (Philosophia scliolastica ad mentcm Sancti Thomce Aquinatis exposita). These modest efforts did not fall upon a barren ground. The work of the first pioneers was completed by eminent followers, eo that to-day France is second to no other nation in the number and worth of the productions wherewith neo-Scholastic literature has been enriched. As early as 1875, Count Domet de Vorges wrote his Meta- physique en presence des sciences, a small work in which the eminent author already evinces a tendency which characterizes his subsequent writings, namely the attempt to show the har- mony existing between Aristotelian metaphysics and scientific results. Mr. Domet de Vorges is one of the most distinguished repre- sentatives of neo-Scholasticism in France. For more than thirty years he has defended, with unflagging energy, the great cause of which, so early in life, he proclaimed himself a cham- pion. In union with Mgr. d'Hulst, he founded the Parisian Society of St. Thomas. He has published many important works, and has been one of the most assiduous collaborators of some Catholic reviews, especially of the Annales de Philosophic chretienne and the Revue de Philosophic. His most valuable productions are his Essai de Metaphysique positive (1883), in which he professes that Aristotelian metaphysics is a true sci- ence, and, like all other sciences, is founded upon the facts of experience; and his Abrege de Metaphysique (190G), especially interesting for the method it follows. For each problem, Mr. de Vorges brings all solutions proposed by Mediaeval philoso- phers. After a learned comparison and discussion, he gives his preference to one of them or proposes a solution of his own. This historical method cannot be too much praised. It brings 205 before our eyes the whole body of Scholastic philosophy. It makes us enter into the very spirit of the Middle Ages. Among the early defenders of neo-Thomism in France, we must also mention the Sulpician F. Vallet. His Prcelectiones Philosophic ad mentem S. Thomas, Aquinatis, published in 1879, has been translated into several languages and honored by numerous editions. Mr. Vallet has also written numerous shorter treatises (cf. Bibliography), which have assured him a conspicuous rank among French neo-Scholastics. As a philoso- pher he is, however, greatly surpassed by another Sulpician, Mr. Albert Farges. Farges's greatest contribution to neo-Scholastic literature consists of a series of works published under the title of Etudes Philosophiques. The series comprises the following treatises: I, Theorie fondamentale de facte et de la puissance, du moteur et du mobile; II, Matiere et Forme en presence des sciences mod- ernes; III, La vie et V evolution des especes; IV, he cerveau, Vame et les facultes; V, L'objectivite de la perception des sens externes et les theories modernes; VI, L'idee de continu dans Vespace et dans le temps; VII, L'idee de Dieu d'apres la raison et la science; VIII, La liberie et le devoir; IX, La crise de la certitude. In these works Mr. Farges expounds and defends the funda- mental principles of Scholastic philosophy. He does not fear to put Mediaeval theories in close contact with the most recent scientific discoveries. He finds in natural science the proof of the doctrine of Matter and Form. His conclusions as regards the constitution of bodies have been discussed in our chapter on Cosmology. Although some of them are evidently inadmissible, Mr. Farges cannot be denied a high rank among neo-Scholastics. One of his admirers, William Garcia, goes so far as to give bird the very first place. A third Sulpician, 0. Bulliat, less known than Vallet and Farges, has lately published a Thesaurus PQiUosophicB Thotnis- tica? (1899), in which all philosophical doctrines scattered in 20G the works of St. Thomas arc brought together. The work ex- clusively consists of extracts from the writings of the Angelic I >octor. Tin- man who could dispute with Farges the first place among French neo-Scholastics is Mr. Elie Blanc, professor of philoso- phy in the Catholic University of Lyon. Elie Blanc is a writer of remarkable fecundity. Having com- pleted a few years ago his Dictionnaire universel de la pcnsee, a masterly work, which may be described as a natural and philo- sophical classification of words, ideas and things, he undertook an immense Encyclopedia, which, when completed, will be one of the most imposing monuments of the French language. This work, whose title is: Systemes des connaissances humaines. Encyclopedic chretiennc et frangaise du XX. siecle, will consist of one hundred volumes octavo. The first fifty will treat of the different branches of human knowledge; the next twenty will be devoted to geography; the last thirty to history. Among Mr. Blanc's numerous productions the following are most especially devoted to philosophy : Traitc de la Philosophic scolastique, published in 1889, and recently translated into Latin with the title. Manual 'c Philo- sophice Scholasticcc. Histoire dc la Philosophic et particulieremcnt de la Philoso- phic contemporainc, very valuable for the indications it contains about contemporary philosophers. Dictionnaire dc Philosophic ancienne, modernc et contempo- rainc (1906). O/niscules philosophiqucs, containing studies about the phi- losophy of Vacherot, the Fthies of Spencer, the question of free will. etc. Melanges philosophiques, essays first published in I'L'nivcrs Catholique between the years 1897 and 1900, and in which the author clearly follows the movement of modern thought. Mr. Blanc also wrote with the collaboration of Mr. Vaganaw a Bibliography of the works recently published in French and 207 Latin. Finally, he founded in 1903 an important review, la Pensee contemporaine, which has already given many interesting articles in defense of the principles of Scholasticism. Blanc, Farges and Domet de Vorges, with the Jesuits Delmas and De Kegnon, of whom more in the sequel, are the most dis- tinguished representatives of nco-Scholasticism in France. Of equal or scarcely inferior merit are Gardair, the Marist Peil- laube, and the Dominicans Coconnier, Sertillanges, Ma inn us and Mandonnet. Mr. J. Gardair opened in the Sorbonne in 1890 a free course on the philosophy of St. Thomas. His lectures have been sub- sequently published with the following titles: Corps et Atne (1892) ; Les Passions et la Yolonte (1892) ; La Connaissance (1895) ; La Nature humaine (1896) ; and form a complete course of Scholastic philosophy. The author closely follows the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, and adheres to the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor even in some points in which this doctrine has been commonly abandoned. He defends, for example, the Thomistic view that the human fetus passes through a series of stages in which it is successively informed by the vegetative, the sensitive and the intellectual soul. 1 Like Mr. Farges, Mr. Gardair has purposely neglected many unimportant points, and devoted his attention to the most essential Scholastic doctrines. The Marist Peillaube is a Thomist of the new school, and, like Farges and the professors of Louvain, does not hesitate to study the Thomistic principles side by side with the most recent philosophical theories. This position was already taken in his Theorie des concepts, a thesis he defended before the Catholic University of Toulouse in 1895 for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. It has been adhered to in the Revue de Philoso- phic, published by Mr. Peillaube since 1900, and justly regarded as one of the best philosophical reviews we possess to-day. Two other M arista of great merit are Bulliot, of whom Peil- 1 Cf. Gardair, La Nature humaine, pp. 345 ff. 208 laubc has been the disciple, and Ragey, the author of remarkable works on St. Anselm. The Dominican order has furnished to the cause of neo- Scholasticism some of its most valiant defenders. St. Thomas Aquinas was a Dominican and has always been a favorite author in Dominican studies. The Dominicans are proud of their great saint, and regard themselves — probably with justice — as his most faithful interpreters. We have already studied the works of Zigliara in Italy and of Gonzalez in Spain. In France the Dominicans have done immense service to the cause of neo-Scholasticism by the publication of the Revve thomiste, founded in Paris in 1893. The Revue thomiste stud- ies theology side by side with philosophy, and contains interest- ing dissertations about the true meaning of the Angelic Doctor. It is regarded by Mr. Picavet as the most important periodical publication of neo-Scholastic literature. The Dominican Coconnier is chiefly known for his work V Hypnotisms franc (1897), in which he attacks the ideas ex- pressed by the Italian Jesuit Franco in another work written on the same subject some years before (Vlpnotismo tomato di modo, 1886). Fr. Coconnier excludes from "frank hypno- tism" all facts of immediate transmission of ideas, telepathy, intuition of the thoughts of other people, vision of the future, etc. He then teaches that hypnotism thus understood is not necessarily supernatural. Besides this work, with which Scholastic philosophy is not directly concerned, Coconnier has published a treatise on the human soul (1890), in which he studies modern psychological theories. A. I). Sertillanges has chiefly discussed the problem of God. For many years he has been as assiduous collaborator of several philosophical reviews, such as the Revue thomiste and the Revve des sciences philosophiques ct tlieologiqucs, and has proved him- self to be one of the most profound interpreters of the Angelic Doctor. 209 V. Maumus, in Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la Philosophie car- tesienne, has made a comparative study of the Cartesian and Thomistic philosophy, in which he naturally prefers St. Thomas. One year later, in Les Philosophes contemporains, he has judged very severely Vacherot, Taine, Janet, Caro and Schopenhauer. He is especially antipathetic to Schopenhauer, whom he charges with having dishonored the history of philosophy. Pierre Mandonnet owes a well-deserved reputation to the work, Sigcr de Brabant et VAverroisme latin au XIII. siecle, which contains very important data about the great currents of thought of the thirteenth century, and has been greatly praised by Delacroix, in the Revue de Synthese historique (August, 1902), and by Gomez Izquierdo, in his History of Philosophy in the XIX. century. Mandonnet has made on Mediaeval topics other important studies, which have appeared in the Revue thomiste. Let us mention the essay entitled, Jean Scot Erigene et Jean le Sourd, published in 1897. Other Dominicans worthy of notice are: Hugon, who has recently (1906-7) published the first two volumes of a course of Scholastic philosophy; De Munnynck, who has refuted the objections raised against moral liberty from the theory of the conservation of energy; Gardeil, who has written interesting articles on neo-Scotism; Berthier, Montagne, Folghera, etc. The two greatest works with which the French Jesuits have enriched neo-Scholastic literature are: the Metaphysique des Causes of Fr. de Regnon and the Ontologia of Fr. Delmas. Born in Saint-Herblain (Loire Inferieure) on October 11, 1832, Theodore de Regnon entered the Society of Jesus in 1852. He taught mathematics and physical science in the College of the Immaculate Conception and in the school of Sainte-Gene- vieve (Paris), and died in Vaugirard on December 2(5, 1893. During the time he \v;is engaged in teaching, he carefully studied the great Scholastic doctors, so that, when the laws of 1880 separated him from bis chair, he was in possession of 15 210 important materials which allowed him to complete in a short time considerable philosophical and theological works. The most important of De Regnon's philosophical productions is his Metaphysique des Causes. The aim of the author is very modest. He simply wishes to lay before the students of St. Thomas the philosophical notions without which a thorough understanding of the Angelic Doctor cannot be attained: "To make clear the nation of cause by separating it from adjacent notions, to show how the influence of the cause expands into distinct causalities, to explain the nature of these different causalities and their correlation; finally, to show unity and harmony in the action of these different causes: such is my aim. It is a rational plan to contain the great maxims concerning causes, which constantly recur in the treatises of our doctors. It is a preparatory study which may be useful to those who wish to understand St. Thomas in St. Thomas himself." 2 With what perfection Fr. de Regnon has carried out the plan thus sketched in his Introduction may be gathered from the eulogistic testimonials of several eminent philosophers. 01 le- Laprune, while teaching at the Ecole Normale Superieure, would often direct his students to the Metaphysique des Causes as to a masterpiece. Georges Fonsegrive, in his Cours de Philosophie, pronounces De Regnon's w T ork learned and profound. 3 Bishop Maurice d'Hulst calls the distinguished Jesuit " un metaphysi- cien de premier ordre." 4 Charles Delmas published in 1896 an extensive treatise on Scholastic metaphysics, entitled Ontologia Metaphysica gener- alis. All questions concerning ontology are treated with the greatest minuteness. The author follows St. Thomas, Suarez and modern Scholastics, especially those belonging to the Society "Metaphysique des Causes, Introduction, pp. 14-15. * Cf. Fonsegrive, Elements de Philosophic, vol. 2, p. 247, note I. * Cf. Mgr. d'Hulst, Conferences de Notre-Dame, p. 370; Paris, Pous- sielgue, 1891, 211 of Jesus. Fr. Delmas sides with Suarez rather than with St. Thomas whenever a divergence exists between the two great doc- tors. He thus maintains with Suarez that the distinction be- tween the essence and the existence of created beings is not real, but virtual. 5 It is perhaps on account of this preference that the Ontologia has been described as a summula Suarezii. Fr. Delmas's work is not, however, a mere compendium of Suarez's Metaphysial. It studies the doctrines of Kant, Locke, Hume, and other modern philosophers. These considerations about modern systems are probably the weakest part of Delmas's work. I doubt whether any student of Kant would recognize the phi- losophy of the Critique as portrayed in the pages 19-22 of the Ontologia. Among other writers who have served with distinction the cause of neo-Scholasticism in France let us mention: Jules Didiot (1840-1903), who has taught for twenty- five years in the Catholic University of Lille. His most important contribution to philosophy is: Contribution philosophique a V etude des sciences (1902). He has also made, in the volume entitled Un Steele, a rapid survey of the philosophical movement of the world during the nineteenth century. J. M. A. Vacant (1851-1901), professor in the seminary of Nancy. Vacant, although primarily a theologian, has written numerous works or essays concerning philosophy (cf. Bibliog- raphy). Most important among them are his comparative studies of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Prosper de Martigne, a member of the Franciscan order, famous by a work entitled, La Scolastique et les traditions fran- ciscaines, in which lie studies Alexander of Bales, St. Bona- venture, Richard of Middletown and Duns Scot us. A. Clerval, of the diocesis of Chartrcs, author of remarkable researches about the school of Chartres in the Middle Ages. Clement Besse, professor in the Institut Catholique de Paris, who, besides valuable articles published in tin- Revue Neo- 8 Cf. Delmas, Ontologia, pp. 183 ff. 212 Scolastique and dealing with morality in Franco, and the vol- ume, Philosophic et Philosophes, has recently written a historical study entitled: Deux centres du mouvement thomiste, Rome et Louvain (1902). Mr. Besse has been reproached with having been unduly severe for Roman neo-Thomism. The character- istic traits of the two great neo-Scholastic schools are, however, faithfully delineated in his work. The chief merit of Deux centres du mouvement thomiste is the historical data it contains about early Roman Thomism, which have been of great service to all subsequent historians of the neo-Scholastic movement. Carra de Vaux, professor at the Institut Catholique de Paris, who has published interesting studies about Arabian philoso- phers. Victor Bernies, author of the work, Spiritualite et Immorta- lite (1901), which has met with great success, and of a series of articles on the " active intellect," whose existence he has denied. P. Mielle, professor of philosophy in the seminary of Langres, who published in 1894 a dissertation entitled, De substantia corporalis vi et ratione, greatly praised by Picavet; 6 and, more recently (1898), the treatise, La Matiere premiere et Vetendue, in which he expounds and discusses the opinions of the great Scholastic philosophers about primordial matter, and agrees with Thomas Aquinas in regarding it as the principle of individua- tion of the bodily substance. Some French writers of great merit, although less strictly Scholastic than those we have studied, have defended the essen- tial principles of Thomistic philosophy. Most distinguished among them are Mgr. d'Hulst, Clodius Piat and Georges Fonsegrive. Maurice d'Hulst (1841-1896), successor of Monsabre in Notre-Dame and first rector of the Catholic University of Paris, is primarily as orator. Tie has served the cause of neo-Scholas- ticism by a series of articles which he lias later collected and •Cf. Rev. Philos., .Jan., 18!)0, p. 61. 213 published in the volume Melanges philosophiqv.es. The volume contains: three opening lessons of a free course of philosophy given from 1880 to 1883, three series of lectures given to the public, and articles published in the Correspondant and the Annates de Philosophic chretienne. Clodius Piat, professor at the Institut Catholique of Paris, was first known for a memoir on the active intellect, written in 1891, which he published, with greater development, in 1896, and entitled I'Idee. In this work Mr. Piat examines and criti- cizes empiricism, ontologism, and the theory of innate ideas, and insists upon the essential distinction between the idea and the phantasm. In La Liberie (1894-95) he discusses all modern theories about freedom, and defends the freedom of the will on the grounds of the direct testimony of consciousness and of the moral law. Besides these two great works and two others of no less interest: la Personne humaine (1897) and Destinee de Vhomme (1898), Mr. Piat has contributed numerous articles to several philosophical reviews, and the volume Socrate (1900) to the collection Serie des grands philosophes. He is one of the most distinguished Catholic philosophers of the present day. Georges Fonsegrive is one of the most conspicuous among French publicists. He founded in 1896 the review La Quin- zaine, which has actively served for eleven years (till March, 1907) the cause of Catholicism. Mr. Fonsegrive has defended the fundamental Scholastic principles in his Essai sur le libre arbitrc (1887), crowned by the Academy of Moral and Political Science, and in a second treatise, La Causal it e efficients (1893), in which he exposes the origin of the idea of efficient cause and defends its validity. It would be unjust not to mention here Mr. Francois Picavet, born in Petit- Fay t (Xord) in 1851, and actually professor in the department of Havtes-Etudcs at the Sorbonne. A primary school teacher at first, Mr. Picavet has risen, through his own merit, to the high place lie now occupies in the educational field. His contributions to philosophy are numerous and display the 214 greatest erudition. Of special interest are his studies on Scho- lasticism. They consist of articles published in the Revue Phi- losophique, of learned monographs on Gerbert, Abelard, and other Mediaeval writers, and of a more extensive work, the Esquisse d'une histoire generate et comparee des philosophies medievales, which has met with a great success, and of which we have already spoken. Mr. Picavet does not study Scholastic philosophy with the spirit which has inspired the neo-Thomistic revival. He is not, and does not pretend to be a Scholastic. He has nevertheless contributed more than any other writer to impose the neo-Scholastic revival upon the attention of French philosophers. We have mentioned the reviews Revue thomiste, Revue de Philosophic and La Pensee contemporaine. Neo-Scholasticism owes also some gratitude to the Annates de Philosophic chre- tienne, which was the first organ of the Thomistic revival. The Annates has recently modified its direction and manifested a marked sympathy for the Kantian philosophy. CHAPTER XIII THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN BELGIUM Ontologism, or the doctrine of the direct intuition of the Deity, was the system in vogue in Belgian philosophic circles by the middle of the nineteenth century. Ubaghs's philosophy, as is well known, is directly inspired by Malebranche, whose prin- ciples it faithfully reproduces. Similar beliefs were professed by Ubaghs's co-workers at the University of Lou vain: Laforet, Claessens and Moeller. This tendency of Belgian thought did not, however, preserve for a long time its original force. After ontologism had been condemned by the Church in 1861, Ubaghs's philosophy was gradually abandoned, and a return to St. Thomas began to take place. Among the professors of the University of Louvain who contributed to bring about this return let us mention Dupont, Bossu, and Lefebvre. No man, however, worked more bravely for the final victory of Scholasticism than the Dominican Lepidi, then prefect of studies in the College of the Immaculate Conception of Louvain, later professor at the Minerva in Rome. An Italian by birth, Lepidi belongs to Belgium by his phi- losophy, not only because he wrote there his most important works, but chiefly for the immense influence he exercised upon Belgian thought by bringing about the downfall of Ontologism. A solid refutation of ontologism is indeed the work entitled Exameti philosophico-theologicum de ontologismo. The author not only shows that the theory of the Divine Vision is ground- less, but he proves that the passages from St. Augustine and St. Thomas generally adduced by ontologists in support of their views are not, when properly understood, favorable to ontologism. 215 21 G No less recommendable is Lepidi's Elementa Philosophies Christiana ( L875— 79). It contains a dear and methodic exposi- tion of Scholastic logic and metaphysics, and may be regarded as one of the best contributions to neo-Scholastic literature writ- ten previous to the encyclical /Eterni Pairis. A distinguished worker of the first hour was also Van Weddingen, chaplain of the court. His first work, Essai cri- tique sur hi philosophic de saint Anselme (1875), was crowned by the Eoyal Academy of Brussels. Proposed by Leo XIII to teach philosophy in the University of Louvain, he declined the offer, preferring to keep his functions at the court, but he power- fully contributed by his writings to give to the Thomistic revival a sure footing in Belgium. Besides a commentary on the en- cyclical JEterni Patris, in which he splendidly sets down the program of neo-Thomism, and important treatises on St. Anselm, Albert the Great and St. Thomas (cf. Bibliography), Van Weddingen has given to neo-Scholastic literature an exten- sive work, his Essai d' introduction a V etude de la philosophic, which consists of no less than 900 pages quarto, and studies the question of the objectivity of knowledge, a question to which the Critique of Pure Reason has given a capital importance. The neo-Scholastic revival in Belgium has been chiefly fos- tered by two great centers of learning: the College of the Jesuits of Louvain and the Institut Superieur de Philosophic. The most celebrated among Belgian Jesuits are De San, Lahousse, Castelein, Van der Aa, and Carbonelle. Louis de San (1832-1904) is reputed as one of the most pro- found thinkers the Society of Jesus has produced. For more than thirty years he taught philosophy and theology at Louvain. His theological productions are numerous. Unhappily, he has contributed to philosophy a single volume on cosmology, one of the four volumes of a work entitled: Institutiones metaphysical specialis, which the learned Jesuit had in view, but never completed. De San is thoroughly acquainted with modern philosophy. 217 lie has mastered Spinoza and the German idealists. He pos- sesses a remarkable knowledge of natural science, studies the Scholastic cosmological theories in connection with the laws of chemistry, and finds in chemistry itself the proof of the Thom- istic principles. Gustave Lahousse (born 1846) is less profound than De San and less acquainted with modern philosophy. His Pnelectiones at times even display a lack of logical method. In his Cosmol- ogy, for example, he first demonstrates the existence of bodies, and next the objectivity of sensation. John Van der Aa (born 1843) is strictly Scholastic and ignores many modern problems. In his Logic he reduces induc- tion to syllogism. Much more modern in his method, much more familiar with the spirit of our time, is Aug. Castelein (born 1840), whose Cours de Philosophie (1887), and Institidiones philosophic moralis et socialis (1889) have been valuable contributions to neo-Scholastic literature. Unlike Van der Aa, he does not limit himself to the classical Scholastic logic, but studies the induc- tive process, and discusses the value of hypothesis and of experi- mental methods. In his Psychology, Fr. Castelein examines the Scholastic teaching about the soul in connection with modern physiological data. Ignatius Carbonelle (died 1889) is primarily a scientist. Like Fr. Castelein, he tries to harmonize scientific discoveries with the Scholastic principles. His work Les confins de la sci- ence et de la philosophie has been honored by several editions. Carbonelle has directed the Revue des Questions scientifHjues, one of the most important Belgian publications. Although the Jesuit College is thus an important center of neo-Thomism, the city of Louvain is justly proud of another center incomparably more important, of a center which has raised neo-Thomism to an immense height, has transformed its character and method, giving it a new life, bringing it into con- 218 tact with modern progress and modern ideals. It is the Institui SupSrietur de Philosophic of the University. The peculiar character which distinguishes the Institute of Louvain from earlier centers of Thomism is chiefly due to the initiative of its first president, Desire Merrier. Born in Braine l'Alleud (Belgium) in 1851, Desire Mercier began his studies in the seminary of Malines, and completed them in the University of Louvain. He was subsequently given the chair of philosophy in the seminary of Malines. This was precisely the time in which Leo XIII, having been elected pope, was promoting in Italy the revival of Scholasticism. Cornoldi was then giving his famous course, silencing all opponents with the authority of St. Thomas, resolving all scientific doubts by the Summa Theologica. Leo XIII who, when a young man, had inhabited Belgium as a papal nuncio, and had kept of that country the most delightful remembrance, was trying to make the neo-Thomistic revival step beyond the limits of Italy, to create in some other country an institution similar to the Roman College, to the Cornoldi school. Nowhere could he find a more favorable ground than in Bel- gium. By the brief of the twenty-fifth of December, 1880, addressed to Cardinal Deschamps, archbishop of Malines, the pope urgently recommended the foundation of a chair of Thom- istic philosophy in the University of Louvain. So great was then the renown of the young professor Mercier, so successfully had he fulfilled in Malines his professorial duties, that he was chosen to carry the papal designs into effect. The success was great. It did not, however, satisfy the pope, who understood that something still greater could be done. A few years later — the eleventh of July, 1888 — Leo XIII sent a second brief to the archbishop of Malines, Cardinal Goossens, recommending the foundation of an institute of Thomistic phi- losophy, endowed with its own independeni life. Having learned thai the greatesl difficulty was the lack of funds, he Ben1 to Cardinal Goossens (he sum of 150,000 francs. Great, was the 219 energy displayed by the Belgian Catholics to realize the papal ideals. Their efforts were finally crowned with success, and in 1891 the Institute of Philosophy of Lou vain, the glory of neo- Thomism, was officially created. In a memoir read before the Congress of Catholics held in Valines in September, 1891, Mercier traced the program he had in view to insure the success of the new foundation. After rep- resenting and deploring the isolation from the rest of the scien- tific world to which Catholics had condemned themselves, he out- lined the reforms he contemplated, the new road he intended to open to neo-Scholasticism. The reforms which characterized the school of Louvain may be classified under two heads: 1. Philosophy was not to be regarded as a mere ancilla theo- logice, but to be studied for philosophy's sake. Catholic philoso- phers would thus frankly enter into the spirit of our time, and cease to be looked upon as mere apologists of their Creed. 2. Just as philosophy was to be studied for its own sake, so also was science. Neo-Thomists had to become true scientists, to construct laboratories, to make experiments, and — this was the point which at first savored of paradox — to find in St. Thomas himself the reconciliation of science and philosophy. This last ambition was not novel. It was the very aim Cor- noldi had cherished many years before, the very spirit which had inspired the encyclical Mt&rni Patris, but thus far nothing serious had been done. Mercier proposed: first of all, to study St. Thomas in his original works, to open the Summa Theologica, the Summa an- tra Gentiles, the Opuscula Philosophica, the Commcntaria in Aristoteles. It was thus found that a great many opinions which, for centuries, had been ridiculed under the name of Thomism, were not from St. Thomas, but from writers of the time of the Renaissance, from Newton or Gassendi. It was found that Aristotle and St. Thomas were not dogmatic idealists constructing the world a priori, but true scientists, who based 220 their philosophy upon the facts of experience; that their doc- trine's were not antiquated and useless theories, but possessed a character of modernness which many recent systems might envy. Modern philosophers were likewise to be studied in their orig- inal works. Descartes and Kant were not to be reached any longer via Sanseverino. The Discourse on Method and the Critique of Pure Reason were to be read and understood. Thus and thus only could the spirit of modern philosophy be grasped; thus only could neo-Thomism keep abreast with the rest of the learned world. The success of the Institute of Louvain has been prodigious. Mgr. Mercier has found at first many opponents among Catho- lics, 1 but he has always answered victoriously. The numerous articles on neo-Thomism which, since the foundation of the Institute, have appeared in the Kantstudien, the Zcitschrift fur Psychologie und Physiologie, the Revue Philosophique, the Rivista Filosofica, and many other publications, show how well he has succeeded in breaking the studied silence with which the Thomistic revival had been previously received. The Institute of Louvain, so successful in point of philosophy, has also obtained significant results in the field of science. At the head of the department of science is Mr. Thiery, a former pupil of the famous Wundt, of Leipzig. About the laboratory he has founded in Louvain, Mr. Binet could write in the Annee Psychologique of 1896: "For the course of Mr. Thiery there is a laboratory and complete equipment for physiological psy- chology such as does not exist at present in all France." A sim- ilar laboratory has been subsequently founded at the Sorbonne (Hautes-Etudes). Under the direction of Mgr. Mercier, a Course of Philosophy has been published to which Mercier himself has contributed the volumes on Logic, Criteriology, General Metaphysics, and Psy- chology. Less extensive than the Institu Hones of Urraburu, Mercier s Course is much more modern. It discards questions 1 Cf. Billia, LYsijjlio
  • i ir. ; also Cursus Brevis, Vol. 2, pp. 89 90. 228 however, has developed it anew in a separate treatise, written at first in Hungarian and translated into Latin by the author him- self, under the title of Crisis axiomatum modernce Phisica?. In Bohemia the Thomistic movement is represented by Vycho- dil, who, in 1889, published a work dealing with the proofs of God's existence; Eugene Kaderavek, the author of several works inspired by the purest Scholastic principles and of important articles published in the Philosophisches Jahrbuch and the Jahr- buch fur Philosophic und speculative Theologie; Ilavaty, Pos- pisil, etc. In the Netherlands, a chair of Thomistic philosophy was founded in 1894 at the University of Amsterdam and confided to the Dominican Van de Groot. A better choice could hardly have been made. Fr. Van de Groot is one of the most learned and enthusiastic admirers of the philosophy of the Angelic Doc- tor. In many remarkable works, written in Dutch or in Latin, as well as in articles published in the Divus Thomas and the Revue Thomiste, he has proved himself to be one of the most worthy champions of the Scholastic cause. Let us mention also the Jesuit Vogels, who published in Amsterdam, in 1900, a treatise on Free Will, the first con- tribution to neo-Scholastic literature written in the Flemish language. Section 2. — The Neo-Scholastic Revival in England In the general return of the Catholic philosophical world to the principles of St. Thomas, England has not remained a lag- gard. A few years after the promulgation of the encyclical zEtcrni Patris, Thomas Harper, S.J., published his Metaphysics of the Schools, still considered as one of the most important works inspired by Scholastic principles during the nineteenth century. Born in London in 1821, Thomas Harper abjured Methodism and entered the Society of Jesus in 1852. For several years he taught philosophy at the famous college of Stonyhurst. He died in 1893. 229 His Metaphysics of the Schools is an endeavor to present the metaphysical principles of the schoolmen in a form accessible to English readers. By the thoroughness of the exposition and its depth of thought the Metaphysics of the Schools must be reckoned as one of the most valuable neo-Scholastic productions. " In England, wrote Domet de Vorges in 1888, we find only one neo-Scholastic writer worthy of mention. But what an author! What a monument! Like a pyramid bathed in the dew of fifty centuries, it rears its massive form aloft in the midst of a desert. The Metaphysics of Fr. Harper is certainly the greatest work thus far produced by the Thomistic movement. It is also perhaps the most profound, a work that shows the eminent dialectical faculties of its author in all their brilliancy." 6 More recently, the English Jesuits have acquired a new title to the gratitude of all lovers of Scholastic speculation by the publication of the Stonyhurst Philosophical Series, which is the most valuable exposition of Scholastic philosophy written in the English language. The series, of which several editions have been made in a few years, comprises the following works: Logic, by Richard F. Clarke, S.J. ; First Principles of Knowledge, by John Rickaby, S.J. ; Moral Philosophy, by Joseph Rickaby, S.J. ; Xatural The- ology, by Bernard Boedder, S.J. ; Psychology, by Michael Maher, S.J. ; General Metaphysics, by John Rickaby, S.J. ; Political Economy, by C. S. Devas. Particularly worthy of attention are Maher's Psychology and Boedder's Natural Theology. Fr. Maher's Psychology exposes, in a clear and attractive style, the Scholastic theory of the soul. The essential differ- ence between sense and intellect, the spirituality of the soul, the freedom of the will, are demonstrated according to the best Scholastic arguments. The Avork also contains a lucid exposi- tion and valuable criticisms of the philosophical systems of Kant, Locke, Hume, Mill, Bain, Spencer and other Britisli asso- 8 Cf. Donu't de Vorges, in Ann, dc Philos. Chrfy., vol. wiii, pp, .">!>.") 596. 230 ciationists. It studies the recent hypotheses about the relations of body and soul and pronounces the double-aspect theory con- tradictory to experience and to reason. Boedder's Natural Theology, in addition to the chapters deal- ing with the existence and the attributes of God, in which the Scholastic doctrine of the Divine Being is clearly and faithfully expounded, contains a dissertation about the much-disputed question of physical premotion. After a fair exposition of both views, Fr. Boedder declares himself in favor of Molinism and gives serious reasons to show that the so-called Thomistic theory does not really belong to St. Thomas. A few years after the publication of his Natural Theology, Fr. Boedder enriched neo-Scholastic literature with two Latin treatises dealing, the one with Natural Theology, the other with Psychology. These treatises form two volumes of a new course of Scholastic philosophy, published in Friburg by the Stonyhurst professors, and known as Cursus Philosophical (cf. Bibliog- raphy). Joseph Bickaby (born 1845), besides the volume on Moral Philosophy of the Stonyhurst Series, has contributed several important publications to English neo-Scholastic literature. In 1906 he gave an annotated translation of the Summa contra Gentiles. In the same year he published the work, Free Will and Four English Philosophers {Hoboes, Locke, Hume and Mill), in which he defends the freedom of the will against the determinist theories of these philosophers. His method is to quote a passage from the philosopher under examination and then to discuss it. Bichard F. Clarke, the author of the treatise on Logic, has contributed several important articles to the American Catholic Quarterly. lie has also published a dialogue on the existence of God, which is one of the most charming philosophical dia- logues ever penned. Among the actual defenders of neo-Scholasticism in England, the most prolific is probably Francis Aveling (born 1875). In 231 quite a number of review articles and short treatises he has proved himself a valiant champion of the Thomistic cause. One of his best productions is the volume entitled, The God of Phi- losophy. In this charming treatise the learned writer educes the natural proofs for the existence of God. His style is sim- ple, clear and concise. The philosophical arguments are shorn of their rigidity and presented in a most fascinating aspect. CHAPTER XV THE NEO-SCHOLASTIC REVIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA Section 1. — Tin: Xeo-Scholastic Revival in the United States Stanley Hall's half-serious, half-jocose words, that "philoso- phers are as scarce in America as snakes in Norway," could not, without injustice, be repeated to-day. During these last years the European philosophical publications have so frequently studied the works and opinions of our writers that we may, with- out too much presumption, entertain the belief that philosophy has at last established a permanent settlement among us. In this phase of our intellectual growth, our Catholic writers have naturally turned their attention to the official philosophy of the Church, so that neo-Thomism, although it has produced in our country no work which may compare with the great European contributions, has nevertheless given rise to excellent treatises which no student of the recent Thomistic movement should neglect. Jn the middle of the last century the greatest Catholic writer in America was Orestea A. Brownson (1803-1876). His phi- losophy, which may be described as a form of ontologism, exer- cised a great influence upon American Catholics. Gioberti became the man in whose works the only true philosophy was rappoa (I to be found. Among the writers who were thus controlled by ontologistic principles, one of the best known is Henry A. Brann (born in 1839). In his " Curious Questions," published in 18GG, he does not hesitate to call Gioberti the greatest philosopher of the nine- 232 233 teenth century. 1 According to Mr. Brann, God is an object of direct intuition : " From the mere fact of intuition," says he, " we prove the existence of God. We intue God existing, and there- fore we say He exists. This argument is the strongest on ac- count of its clearness." 2 In some of his works, however, Mr. Brann is in perfect agree- ment with the principles of the Scholastics, and even follows their line of reasoning. The small work, The Spirituality and Immortality of the Human Soul, were it not for its preface, might well be regarded as a production of the most orthodox neo-Thomist. To the Jesuits belongs the honor not only of having been the first defenders of Thomism in the United States, but of having furnished the larger and more valuable part of our neo-Scholas- tic literature. The first works written in defense of Scholastic principles in this country were due to Louis Jouin, S.J. (1818-1899), pro- fessor of philosophy in St. John's College, now Fordham Uni- versity. Father Jouin's works comprise two volumes in Latin: Elementa Philosophic M oralis (1865), and Compendium Logica?. et Metaphysical (1869), and a shorter manual in English: Logic and Metaphysics. They have been honored by numerous edi- tions and are still used as text-books in several institutions. Not long afterwards, another series of text-books on Scholastic philosophy was written by Walter H. Hill (1825-1907). His "Elements of Philosophy/' of which numerous editions have been made, was published in 1873, for the use of the students of St. Louis University, in which he was professor of philoso- phy. The Elements of Philosophy was soon followed by the volume, Ethics, or Moral Philosophy (1878). Besides these two works, Father Hill has written, in defence of the Scholastic principles, numerous articles in the American Catholic Quar- terly (cf. Bibliography). 'Brann, Curious Questions, Newark, lKCti, \i. 107. ■Ibid., p. 159. 234 The year 1873 was also ihe date of the publication of Schif- lini's Logiccr generalis Tnstitutiones. An Italian by birth, pro- fessor in the house of studies of the Jesuits in Woodstock (Mary- land), Biagio A. Schiliini embodied in his work the lessons he had given to the scholastics. He subsequently published some of St. Thomas's treatises: the De Ilomine, in 1882, and the De Motu Hominis in Deum, in 1883. Among the courses of Scholastic philosophy written by the Jesuits in the United States, the most valuable are probably the two volumes of Nicholas Russo (bom April 24, 1845; died April 1, 1902). His Summa Philosophica (Boston, 1885), in which he generally follows Liberatore, more complete than Jouin's works, is generally regarded as the most satisfactory exposition of Scholastic philosophy published in this country. In his De Philosophia Morali (1890), Fr. Russo published the lectures he had delivered to the students, when professor of moral philosophy in Georgetown University. Among the courses of Scholastic philosophy thus written with special regard to the needs of the students, we must also men- tion the works of Charles Coppens and William Poland. William Poland, born in Cincinnati in 1848, and professor of philosophy in St. Louis University, is the author of several treatises in which the fundamental principles of Scholasticism are expounded and defended in the clearest and most attractive style. His "Truth of Thought" (189f>) is an excellent text- hook on criteriology. Like all Scholastics, Father Poland holds a middle position between the idealist and the materialist. He skilfully points out the inconsistency of subjectivism, 8 and proves the objective character of reality by means of the evi- dence whereby it is presented to us as objective: "Just as in the perception or knowing of self, I aflirm self, so also, for the same reason, evidence, I aflirm, with inevitable conviction, the objective value of non-self. I have a thought or a headache. The thought or the headache presents itself to me ■Cf. Truth of Thought, pp. 1!>7. til. 235 as mine. I thereupon have a conviction that it is mine. Of this conviction, certified in the perception of what is evident, I cannot rid myself, and I hold to it. The midnight glory of the stars presents itself to me as a something which excludes the element of myself. I have, thereupon, a conviction of that something, as strong as the conviction of my own thought ; and simultaneously I have a conviction that that something is dis- tinct from me. Of this conviction, certified in the perception of what is evident, I cannot rid myself ; and I hold to it." 4 The doctrine contained in this quotation is not, however, per- fectly clear. We believe a thought to be subjective and the starred sky objective, because the former depends upon our will, while the latter does not ; because we can have or reject a thought at pleasure, whereas, if our eyes are open, we are compelled to see the sky. But, why should a headache be any less objective than the starred sky? Does it depend upon a fiat of our will? Can it be rejected as readily as we please? It is an affection of our body, it will perhaps be replied, and our body belongs to our own self. But our vision of the starred sky is a sensation of color which belongs to our body just as well. Why, then, should the sky be objective and the headache subjective? This is a question which Fr. Poland does not face. Charles Coppens expounded the fundamental principles of Scholastic philosophy in two small volumes: A Brief Text-booh of Logic and Mental Philosophy (1892), and A Brief Text-book of Moral Philosophy (189G). He also published, in 1897, a remarkable work upon which his fame chiefly rests : Moral Prin- ciples and Medical Practice. In the light of the Christian prin- ciples about the human soul, Fr. Coppens closely examines some subjects, such as craniotomy and abortion, which are of burning interest in the field of medicine. Ue also studies the questions of insanity and hypnotism, and lays down, in the most able manner, the professional rights and duties of the physician. The American Jesuits have not thus limited themselves to the writing of Scholastic text-books. Such works, however ser- • Poland, Truth of Thought, p. 54. 236 viooable they may bo, exist now in so great a number that new ones cannot but repeat what others have already said. Fr. Cop- pens's work is one of those studies on particular questions to which neo-Scholastics should now direct their attention. An- other study in the same direction has been made by Rene I. Holaind in his Natural Law and Legal Practice (1899), which contains the lectures he delivered at the Law School of George- town University. Fr. Holaind carefully studies the capital questions of taxation, capital and labor organizations, strikes and boycotts, etc. The solutions he gives are inspired by the principles of Christian philosophy, and perfectly adapted to the actual conditions of society. Not only all students of law, but all American citizens should read and meditate this work. John J. Ming, professor of Moral Philosophy in Canisius College (Buffalo), besides numerous articles in the American Catholic Quarterly, has contributed to American neo- Scholastic ethics a precious work, entitled The Data of Modern Ethics Examined. The aim of the author, as set forth in his preface, is to defend Christian ethics against the recent moral systems advanced by the modern schools of Positivists and Agnostics. The several forms assumed by hedonism are faithfully ex- posed and examined at great length. The author is fully con- versant with the theories of Spencer, J. S. Mill, and other Eng- lish empiricists. His criticisms are often excellent, always in- teresting, and display a remarkable power of analysis. The hedonistic system of ethics is not, however, as Fr. Ming seems to imply, essentially connected with positivism and agnos- ticism. The strongest believer in the spirituality of the soul might be as frankly and as consistently a hedonist as Mill or Spencer. A refutation of materialism or agnosticism will not therefore be, at the same time, a refutation of hedonism. This is a truth which Fr. Ming seems to have overlooked. As his work is a treatise on ethics, it ought to attack frankly hedonism 237 itself, and to lay less emphasis upon the philosophical systems with which hedonism is but accidentally connected. It is true that the characteristic fallacy of hedonism — its con- fusing the result of a moral act with the nature of the act — has been perfectly grasped by Fr. Ming: " Delight is necessary to happiness," says he. " Every perfect action is followed by delight; for it lies in the nature of a fac- ulty that, having discharged the function for which it was made, perfectly and normally, it comes to rest and is satisfied. But for the very reason that delight is not the action itself, but merely its result or concomitant, it cannot be an essential con- stituent of happiness: it is but one of its necessary attributes that adheres to it as beauty does to youth." 5 This capital flaw of hedonism might have been, however, more strongly insisted upon. On the whole, Fr. Ming's work is one of the best productions of neo-Scholastic literature in the field of ethics, and deserves the careful study of all interested in moral philosophy. In the field of Natural Theology, an important contribution has been made by Maurice Ronayne (1828-1003). His work, God knowable and known, published in 1888, has been deserv- edly honored by several editions. Departing from the usual form in which philosophical treatises are cast, Fr. Ronayne has made use of the dialogue with the greatest skill. The interlocu- tors meet, now in Fifth Avenue Hotel, now in Central Park amid the scenes of nature, and discuss, in the most attractive language, all questions connected with natural theology. Other fields of philosophy are incidentally touched upon. The second chapter of the work, entitled: The Data of Natural Knowledge, contains a fair exposition of the Scholastic theory of knowledge, as well as an able refutation of idealism. Fr. Ronayne also studies the Scholastic doctrines of causation and substance. He unmistakably regards substance as an un- known something lying behind the accidents. Speaking of the '■ Ming. Data of Modern Ethics, p. 89. 238 phenomenalists, lie Bays: " They do not take gold for silver, nor silver for copper, because these metals differ in the phenomenon of color, but because of something beneath that color and par- tially manifested by it." 6 Mention must also be made of yEmilius de Augustinis, for his work, De Deo Uno secundum naturam (1884), and James Conway (1849-1905), professor in St. Louis University, and author of a small volume entitled, The Fundamental Principles of Christian Ethics, which belongs to the series, Catholic Sum- mer and Winter School Library. Thomism has also found distinguished representatives in other religious orders. A name that readily comes to one's mind at the consideration of Scholasticism outside of the Society of Jesus is that of Brother Azarias, of the Christian Schools. Brother Azarias, born Patrick Francis Mullany (1847-1893), is one of the most distinguished — the most distinguished per- haps — of our Catholic writers. Although known chiefly as a literary critic, he is the author of several philosophical works well worthy of attention. Whether he is a great philosopher or not, I will not here decide. About his originality as a thinker, no doubt can be entertained. In his Essays philosoph- ifil. he gives the following principle as the first principle of philosophy: "God actualizes Cosmos by the Word, and com- pletes its end in the Word." Which he unriddles in the follow- ing manner: "In the term God, we have the subject of Theodicy and Nat- ural Theology. " In the term Cosmos, we have the idea that gives us the ideas of space and time, with all their concomitant ideas of number, extension, mathematics, natural history and physics. " In the term the Word is contained the type of creation — the basis of history — the ideal of literature and art. " In the term completes its destiny in the Word, we have the whole supernatural order — a Church, the means of sanetificalion. " In the term actualizes, we have the idea of pure and supreme *Ronayne, God Bjuowable and Known, p. 32. 239 cause expressed, and the real relations of the Creator to his creation."* 7 Brother Azarias thus regards philosophy as embracing all human knowledge, natural and supernatural. This view un- equivocally separates him from the neo-Scholastics, to whose school, it is true, he does not profess to belong: " To belong exclusively to any school of thought," says he, " is to shut out from one's soul all truth but that which presents itself under a given aspect. It is to be continually asking the question, Can any good come out of Nazareth? And yet good can come out of Nazareth; every Nazareth of thought has its own lesson to teach us if we willingly learn it and put it to profit." 8 Although Brother Azarias is not, strictly speaking, a Scho- lastic, he has done good service to the cause of neo-Scholasticism in this country by his learned treatises on Mediaeval philosophy. The essay, Aristotle and the Christian Church, contains excel- lent pages dealing with the spirit of the schoolmen. Albert the Great, St. Thomas and Boger Bacon are chiefly dealt with. The author clearly shows that the Mediaeval writers were not ser- vile followers of Aristotle, but that they thought and wrote in the spirit of real philosophers. How Brother Azarias regards the Scholastic revival is clearly indicated in the following statement : " Finally, there is the intellectual atmosphere of the day in which thought lives and moves. It cannot exist without breath- ing this air. If the past is revived, it lives only in proportion as it is brought to bear upon the present." 9 Brother Chrysostom, born Joseph J. Conlan, in New Haven (Connecticut), in 18G3, and actually professor of philosophy in "Manhattan College (New York), is more strictly a Scholastic than Brother Azarias. He is the author of two brief courses of 7 Brother Azarias, Essays Philosophical, pp. 158-159. "Ibid., p. 85. •Ibid., p. 85. 240 Scholastic philosophy. One of them, the Elementary Course of Christian Philosophy, is an adaptation of a French work written by Brother Louis of Poissy, and, in spite of its concise form, is one of the most instructive manuals published in this country. The other course, written in Latin, was published in 1897, under the title, Elemenla Philosophic? Scholasti-cce. It deals with logic, ontology or general metaphysics, and cosmology, and is chiefly inspired by the works of Zigliara, Liberatore and Farges. Brother Chrysostom has also defended the cause of Scholastic philosophy in several review articles. The most important of them appeared in the Philosophical Review in L894, and was devoted to the study of the theistic argument of St. Thomas. In the Dominican order, we find a single work worthy of mention; but this work is one of the best studies written by American neo-Scholastics. La Philosophic en Amerique depuM les origines jusqu'a nos jours of Father Edward Gregory Laurence Van Becelaere (born 1872), was published in 1904, after having appeared in the form of articles in the Revue Thomiste. As a study of the various currents of thought which have dominated our country, Fr. Van Becelaere's work, despite its brevity, is the best work we possess. Some aspects of Amer- ican thought have been, however, entirely overlooked or too briefly treated. A history of American philosophy ought cer- tainly to contain a chapter on Pragmatism. Fr. Van Becelaere's volume is completed by an appendix deal- ing with Catholic philosophy in the United States. This part of the work of the learned Dominican contains interesting de- tails on the neo-Scholastic revival in this country. Scholastic principles have also found able defenders in our secular clergy. Gennaro Luigi Vincenzo de Concilio, born at Naples (Italy), in 1835, and for a short time professor of dogma lie theology, logic and metaphysics in Seton Hall College, South Orange, New Jersey, published, besides a text-book on Scholastic phi- losophy (Elcmoils of 1 iiteUr,l wil 1 'li ilosoph //. 1878), a theo- 241 logico-philosophical work, entitled Catholicity and Pantheism (1874), in which he regards Pantheism as the necessary result of Protestantism, 10 as the universal error in time and space. 11 " Every particular error, says he, has either fallen into Panthe- ism, or disappeared altogether." 12 John Gmeiner, born in Baernau (Bavaria), on December 5, 1847, and, for seven years, professor at St. Francis Seminary (Milwaukee), and at St. Thomas Seminary (St. Paul), has published several philosophical works, in which, in harmony with Leo XIII's formula: vetera ?iovk augere, he endeavors to harmonize the Scholastic teachings with modern science, and mercilessly discards all tenets which cannot be easily harmon- ized. In a remarkable little work, entitled Mediaeval and Mod- ern Cosmology (1891), he denounces some theories, usually defended in Catholic text-books, and which, in his opinion, reflect but little credit upon Catholic thinking. Among the doctrines thus stigmatized is the theory of Matter and Form. John T. Driscoll, born in Albany (New York), after study- ing in Manhattan College and Troy Theological Seminary, com- pleted his studies in the Catholic University. He has taught philosophy for several years in the Theological Seminary at Brighton (Massachusetts) and has enriched American neo- Scholastic literature with two excellent works: A Treatise on the Human Soul, published in 1898, and God, which appeared two years later. The method followed in these two works may be characterized as experimental and comparative. In the Treatise on the Human Soul, the author starts from the facts of our conscious- ness: sensations, sentiments, ideas, memories, judgments, rea- sonings, etc., which are " as true and real as the circulation of the blood, or the existence of physical or chemical forces." 10 Cf. Catholicity and Pantheism, p. 21. " Ibid., p. 14. "Ibid., p. 20. 17 242 From Buch facta of experience he derives, by a process of reason- ing, his Bystem as to the nature of the soul. In agreemenl with the Scholastic teaching, he proves the principle of our bodily and mental energies to be one and sim- ple, spiritual and immortal. Scholastic psychology is studied in connection with all adverse teachings. All ancient and modern systems concerning the principle of life in man are discussed with a remarkable erudi- tion and brought face to face with the Scholastic theories. The inadequacy of Materialism and Positivism is very ably pointed out. The work also contains valuable chapters on the diverse forms of Pantheism and Monism. Some conclusions of the author do not seem, however, perfectly justifiable. He re- jects, for example, Kant's opinion that we know phenomena only, and not the thing-in-itself, on the ground that such an opinion is opposed to the data and methods of physical science: " Science," says he, "deals with real things. The axioms and rules of mathematical science must be verified in concrete ob- jects in order that the calculations founded upon them may have any validity. The same is true of chemistry and of physics." 13 This objection would be perfectly valid if Kant failed to rec- ognize in the phenomena an objective element. But this is not the case. The phenomenon is subjective in so far as the outside reality, the object, is clothed with the conditions of our sensi- bility and of our understanding; but it is also objective, inas- much as it is caused by the thing-in-itself. We are, with regard to the thing-in-itself, in the same posi- tion as a person with a pair of colored glasses would be with regard to the color of a landscape. Although such a person would never know the color of the landscape as it is in itself. he would nevertheless be able to possess a real science of color, to formulate; laws, which would be conditioned by the object and in harmony with its manifestations. "Driscoll, The Soul, p. 40. 243 The aim of the treatise on God is thus set forth in the preface: " The considerations adduced are the heritage of Christian Philosophy handed down by the pens of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. The marvelous advance in the sciences furnishes in- creased data for argument and illustration. The question is considered under all aspects. All sources of knowledge are in- vestigated. History, Language, Psychology, Ethics, the Phys- ical sciences, each comes with its special testimony. The aim is simply to collect the data and show their bearing on the idea of God; to answer the question: What is meant by God, and has the idea of God an objective validity ? " 14 Like all modern Scholastics, Mr. Driscoll rejects the ontolog- ical argument, in its original shape as well as in the form it has assumed in the hands of the neo-Hegelian school. He also rejects the theory of direct intuition of the Divine Being, advo- cated by Harris, Wilson, Caird, and other non-Catholic writers of the present day. He regards as valid the arguments from universal consent, from the moral life, from the contingency of living beings, from a first cause, from motion, from the order of the universe. He also accepts the old argument drawn from the nature of truth, first proposed by St. Augustine, and recently revived by Josiah Royce. He clearly points out, however, that, in the hands of Mr. Royce, the argument loses its value and involves a petitio principii: " What is (for Royce) the test of subjective truth? Not con- formity with external reality. This he expressly rejects. But conformity with a higher intelligence. Hence he is a disciple of Berkeley. Hence he falls into a petitio principii. He sets forth with the data of consciousness to reason God's existence as absolute Truth. Yet he postulates the existence of the All- Knower or All-Enfolder to justify the veracity of the data. This was the mistake of Descartes." 16 Mr. Driscoll, as we have seen, has been a student in the Catho- lic University. This university, the first stone of which was 14 Driscoll, Cod, |>. .'}. "Ibid., p. 7!>. 244 laid on May 24, L888, in the presence of Cardinal Gibbons, four archbishops, twenty-one bishops and numerous eminent men, among whom President Cleveland, has contributed to neo- Scholastic literature numerous articles in a periodical publica- tion, the Catholic University Bulletin. The most eminent con- tributors have been Edward A. Pace, Edmund T. Shanahan and William Turner (cf. Bibliography). Mr. Turner has also published valuable articles about the Middle Ages in other reviews, such as the American Catholic Quarterly, the Philosophical Review and the New York Review. His greatest title to the gratitude of all students of philosophy is, however, his History of Philosophy, published in 1903. This work has been greatly praised, and with justice. It exposes with a remarkable erudition the philosophical systems of ancient and modern times. More perfectly than any other similar work, it condenses, in a few pages, the spirit and the doctrines of each philosopher it studies. Mr. Turner devotes a special attention to the study of the Middle Ages. Of the 674 pages, which the work contains, 185 are devoted to Scholastic philosophy. Mention must be made also of two important works written as dissertations for the Doctor's degree. The first of them is Religion and Morality, written in 1899, at the Catholic Univer- sity, by James J. Fox. The work, inspired by the purest Thom- istic ethical principles, strives to base upon history and reason the thesis that religion and morality are necessarily connected. The other work, The Knoicahleness of God (190")). written at Notre Dame University by Matthew Schumacher, is one of the most important contributions of neo-Scholasticism to the field of Natural Theology. Section 2. — The Neo-Scholastio Revival in Canada The philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas forms the basis of all philosophical teaching in the Catholic institutions of Canada. A long time before the promulgation of the encyclical /Eterni Patris, Thomism was already taught in the College of St. Uya- 245 einth. One of the professors of this college, Mgr. Desaulniers, wrote a complete course of Scholastic philosophy, inspired by St. Thomas and Liberatore, which has never been published. The University of Ottawa, directed by the Oblate Fathers, likewise follows the teachings of the Angelic Doctor. It pos- sesses an Academy of St. Thomas in which a thesis, in harmony with the Scholastic principles, is defended ever}- week. The most important center of Thomism in Canada is, how- ever, the University Laval, in Quebec. As early as 1879, this university adopted Zigliara's Sumnia Philosophica as a text- book in philosophy. In 1884, the Faculty of Theology decided to study St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica itself, which has been, since that time, the manual of theology. The Thomistic movement in Canada has also given rise to a few interesting works. The first in date is the volume entitled, Philosophy of the Bible Vindicated (1876), written by Corne- lius O'Brien. Cornelius O'Brien, born on May 4, 1843, in Xew Glasgow (Prince Edward Island), educated at St. Dunstan's College (Charlottetown), and at the Propaganda (Rome), ordained priest in 1871, professor in St. Dunstan's College, orator, theo- logian, novelist, poet, has occupied the archiepiscopal see of Halifax from 1883 till his death, on March 9, 1906. His " Philosophy of the Bible " consists of three parts. In the first part, entitled Natural Theology, the author proves the existence of a Supreme Being by the well-known Scholastic arguments from a first cause, from the order of the world, and from the universal consent of mankind. He demonstrates that this Supreme Being, or God, existing by necessity of nature, is infinitely perfect, the creator and ruler of the physical world. In the second part, entitled Psychology, lie proves the soul to be simple, spiritual, immortal, endowed with free will, and created immediately by God when it is to be infused into the body. O'Brien differs from most modern defenders of Thomism with 246 regard to the origin of our ideas. As he insists more than Scholastics usually do, upon the activity essential to substance, 10 and maintains not only that substance acts, but that whatever acts is a substance, 17 he is led to the assertion that the soul is '" a force the very essence of which is that it should think, under- stand, know, will," 18 that it must therefore necessarily know its own existence and something about happiness, and possess, by the same fact, two ideas which are, if not innate, at least coeval with the soul. The third part of the Philosophy of the Bible is devoted to the study of certain questions which have an intimate connec- tion with ontology and have not been studied in the two preced- ing parts: space and time, certitude, religion, revelation, the relation of faith and reason, etc. O'Brien is an enthusiastic admirer of Mediaeval philosophy. He is convinced that many " professors who are now extolled as prodigies of learning would, had their lot been cast in the oft- reviled middle ages, have been considered noisy school-boys." 19 In harmony with the Scholastic principle of the unity of truth, he maintains that there can be but one true system of philosophy, and goes even farther than most of the early neo- Scholastics in his contemptuous disrespect for modern thinking. " Let it be understood from the outset," says he, " that we deny the title of Philosopher to the founders of schools of error. . . . The man who, as a general rule, blunders in the art he professes to follow, is not called a tradesman, but a botcher; why, then, call meaningless scribblers Philosophers? They are literari fungi." 20 And if we wish to know more definitely who those " meaning- Less scribblers" are, we shall perhaps be astonished to find among them: "Philosophy of the Bible, pp. 56, 57, 162. " Tbid., pp. 81, S3. "Ibid., p. llo. "Ibid., p. vi. Ibid., p. ::. 247 " Philosophic quacks, such as Hegel, Kant, Darwin, and id genus omne; 21 " Spinoza, who gave such a proof of mental aberration that a school-boy who would be guilty of similar contradictions, would most surely be doomed to lose Ms first holiday, and obliged to write five hundred times: Idem non potest simul esse et non esse; 22 t " The disciples of the transcendental German school, who, lulled into a semi-somniferous state, by lager beer and strong cigars, talk misty things which they call transcendental." 23 Louis A. Paquet, actual president of the University Laval, published, in 1888, in the review Canada francais, of Quebec, an important article, entitled: Eosmini et son systeme, in which he refutes the Rosminian doctrines by the principles of Scholas- tic philosophy. A few years later, Mgr. Paquet published the first volumes of the work upon which his fame chiefly rests, his Dusputationes theological, which form a learned commentary on St. Thomas's Summa Theologica. The first edition of the work was pub- lished in Quebec between the years 1893 and 1903. A second edition is now being made at Borne. Mention must also be made of Brother Symphorien-Louis, of the Christian Schools, who published in Montreal, in 1905, a text-book on Scholastic metaphysics (Precis de Mela-physique). Among the recent defenders of Thomism in Canada, no one perhaps has served the Scholastic cause with a greater distinc- tion than Alexander MacDonald, actual Vicar General of Anti- gonish and rector of St. Andrews (Nova Scotia). Born in S. W. Mabou, Cape Breton, on February 18, 1858, Mr. MacDonald studied at St. Francis Xavier College (Anti- gonish) and at the Propaganda, in Borne, where he was the disciple of the famous Cardinal Satolli. After being ordained, in 1881, he taught philosophy for nineteen years in St. Francis 21 Ibid., p. 84. -Ibid., p. 42. 23 Ibid., p. 19. 248 Xavier College. During this time he showed himself a valiant champion of the Scholastic principles in numerous articles, which appeared in the Casket, of Antigonish, or in other period- ical publications (cf. Bibliography). Mr. MacDonald is also the author of several important works in theology, such as The Sacrifice of the Mass (New York, 1905), The Sacraments (New York, 1906), with which this essay is not directly concerned. 249 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF NEO-SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY 1. Periodical Publications Annates de Philosophic chretienne. Paris, since 1830. Bolcseleti-Folydirat. Budapest, since 1886. Divus Thomas. Placentiae, 1879-1905. Jahrbuch fiir Philosophic und speculative Theologie. Paderborn, since 1887. New York Review. New York, since 1905. La Pense"e Contemporaine. Paris, since 1903. Philosophisches Jahrbuch. Fulda, since 1888. Revista Luliana. Barcelona, since 1901. Revue N 60S cola stique. Louvain, since 1894. Revue de Philosophic. Paris, since 1900. Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques. Kain, since 1907. Revue Thomiste. Paris, since 1893. Saint-Thomasblatter. Regensburg, 1888 ff. 2. Separate Works van der Aa, S.J., J. Praelectionum Philosophise Scholastics brevis conspectus. 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Bonaventura: " De cognitionis humansB auprema ratione " commentata e difesa contro le ros- miniane interpretazioni di S. Casara. Torino, tip. Salesiana, 1890. INDEX Arelard, Moderate realism of, 25; on Roscelin's nominalism, 20; identifies philosophy and theol- ogy, 30 ; condemned by the Church, 23. Abstraction, Theory of, 110 ff. ; re- jected by Berkeley. 111. Act and Potency, Scholastic theory of, 49 ff. Albert the Great, on the uni- versal, 24: on induction, 44; on chemical combination, 90. Alexander of Hales's theory of universal matter, 94. Alvarado, 176. A maury of Bene, condemned by the Church, 23. Anaximander's conception of phi- losophy, 28. Anaximenes's conception of phi- losophy, 28. Anselm, on relation of faith and reason, 30; ontological argu- ment of, 127. Aristotle, ground of the prefer- ence given to in the Middle Ages, 16G; his conception of philosophy, 28; his logic, 41; on motion, 50; distinguishes four kinds of causes, 69; his defini- tion of the soul, 110; on pure actuality, 132; his ethical sy- tem, 138 IT. Arrillaga, on Scholasticism, 186. Atomism, born in ancient Greece, 82; modified in modern times, S3; revived by Dalton, 105; dif- ficulties of, 102. Attributes of Cod, 131 If. ; nega- tive and positive. 133 IT. Augustine, identifies philosophy and religion, 29; on matter and form, 89. Aveling, 230-1, 251. Azarias, Brother, 238 ff., 251. Bacon (Francis), his conception of philosophy, 29. Bacon (Roger), on induction, 44. Baeumker, 200-1, 251. Ballerini, 172, 252. Balmes, philosophical work of, 176 ff., 252; on substance, 62. Barberis, 170, 253. van Becelaere, 240, 254. Berkeley, rejects abstraction, 111 ff. Bernard, protects mysticism, 23. Besse's contribution to neo-Scho- lasticism, 211-2, 255; on Roman Thomism, 168 ff. Blanc's contribution to neo-Scho- lasticism, 206-7, 256; on Scho- lastic philosophy, 17. 32. Boeddeb, 230, 256. Bonayenti're'n theory of uni- versal matter, 94: new edition of works by Franciscans of Quaracchi, 36, 173. BoNNETTY, condemned by the Church, 13. Boscovich's theory of nature, s:;. 101. Bossikt, Thomism of. 154: on in- ternal change in system of doc trine. 8. Boi raoi x. on Aristotle's philos ophy, 19. Brawn's ontologism, 232-3. Bbicbno, 188, 268. Bbownson's influence upon Amer 337 338 ican Catholic-. 232 ; on Balmes, 176. okkb, on Aristotle's philos- ophy, 19. Cagigas, 187-8, 259. Cabo, on utilitarianism, 19] 2. Cabba de V.ux, on Scholastic phi- losophy, 32. C\KK\S(il II.|,\. l!H I!. 201. Castelein, 217, 261. ( 'atiihkiw 198, 261. Cause, Scholastic theory of, 08 fT. : efficient, 69 fT. : final, 78 ff. ; ma- terial. 82 II'.: formal, 82 ff.; four kinds according to Aristotle, 69; Malebranche's criticism on. 69- 70; Hume's criticism on, 70 fT. Chbysostom, Brother, 239-40, 263. Coconmer, 208. 264. ( omellas, 178-9, 264. Commer, 199, 264. Comte's opposition to metaphys- ics, 47. Conceptualism in the Middle Ages. 24; resembles Kantian philos- ophy, 25. DE Conciuo. on pantheism. 240-1. C'ONDlLLAC's philosophy introduced into Spain, 175; into Portugal, 183. OorPENS, 235, 264. COBNOLDl's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 160. 164. 265-6; his opposition to modern phi- losophy, 9. 13, 164. ( osmology, Scholasl ic system of. 82 ff. ( oi bin, nn Scholastic philosophy, 19. 27: his works on Mediaeval philosophy, L66; on Ahelard, 25; his philosophy taught in French Catholic seminaries, 203. < 'in mi s. on foundal ion of 7noral- ity. 137. ( i kii:'s scientific achievements, 106. Daxtoh revives hypothesis of atoms. 105. Darwin's natural selection and the design-argument, 129-30. David of Dinant condemned by the Church. 23. Delmas, 210-1, 268. Democuitis, regarded a- founder of atomistic system. 82. Dfxifle's works on Middle Ages, 200, 268. Descartes, regarded as a Scho- lastic by Pica vet, 2; on sub- -tance, 61, 65; his philosophy taught in French Catholic semi- naries, 203. Design-argument, 129 ff. DEWET, on Scholastic philosophy, 25, 28. Diderot, on Duns Scot us, 18. Didiot's contribution to neo-Scho- lasticism, 211, 269; on Kantism and llegelianisin, 12. Directivity, Henslow's theory of, 80. Domet DE Vorges. 204-5, 269. Driscoel, contribution of to neo- Scholasticism, 241 ff., 270; on Kant, 242; on Royce's concep- tion of God, 243. Duns Sootus, proves existence of primordial matter, 88; his di- vi-ion of the materia prima, 94; judged by Diderot, IS: con- trasted with Thomas Aquinas, 25. Dynamism, its theory of nature, 83: Tail's objection to. 101 ; de- ficiency of, 101. Efficiency, very differenl from con- Btant conjunction, 75 ff. ; has 339 met two classes of opponents, 69 ; Hume's view on, 69, 70 ff . Eleatic school, denied the exist- ence of motion, 50. Electrons, existence of detected by by Thomson, 105; ultimate parts of all material beings, 67, 68, 105 ff. Encyclical " -Eterni Patris," 162. Eternity explained, 133. Ether, its existence unanimously affirmed by physicists, 83 ; theory of strengthened by ex- periments of Maxwell, 102; of Hertz, 102; inherent constitu- tion of, 103 ; Spencer's view on, 103; Kelvin on, 103 ; Larmor on, 104; Lodge on, 104, 105; Whet- ham on, 103; Veronnet on, 103. Eudemonism of Scholastic ethical system, 136. Farges's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 205, 273; on mo- tion, 50 ; on matter and form, 86, 91; on chemical combina- tion, 91, 109. Fichte, subtlety of, 26. Final Cause, 78 ff. Fonskouivk, 213, 275. Form, Substantial, Scholastic theory of, 84 ff., 95 ff. ; proper- ties of, 96; educed out of the potency of matter, 100; modifi- cations on the theory of, 108; plurality of forms in Henry of Ghent, 98; in Duns Scntu-*, 99j in Lessius, Conninck, Mayr, 99. Forma Corporeitatis, 98 '•». Free-Will, doctrine of defined, i !.") tr. : defended by Scholastics, l in : defined by Kant . l Mi. Fbohsohammeb, condemned by the Church, 12. 1'Yj.ij-hton. on locus of mind, 122; on St. Thomas's determinism, 147. GrABCfA's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 188 ff., 276; on Spanish philosophy, 174-5. Gardair, 207, 276, Ghent, Henry of, his doctrine of plurality of forms, 98. Ginebra's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 195, 278 ; his defi- nition of matter and form, 86. Gioberti's influence upon Amer- ican Catholics, 232. God, proofs of existence of, 127 ff. ; ontological argument, 127; ar- gument from the moral law, 127 ff. ; argument from universal consent, 128; argument from de- sign, 129; metaphysical argu- ment, 130; attributes of, 131 ff.; eternity of, 133, 152; immuta- bility of, 133; infinity of 131 ff.; unity of, 132; simplicity of, 132. 135; immensity of, 133; knowl- edge of, 134; will of, 134; om- nipotence of, 131: prescience of, 150 ff. G6mez Izquierdo's contribution to neo-Scholasticism, 181, 279; on Cornelias, 179. GonzAlez de Arintero. 180. 270. GonzAlez y DfAZ-TiNox, contri- bution of to neo-Scholasticism, IT'.'. 27'.); on Scholastic philos- ophy, 32; on Father Ventura, 156 j on Sanseverino, 158. v w in: < rBOOT, 228, 280. Guabdia, on Spanish philosophy, 171. Grtfa i mi:, condemned by the Church, 12. 1HC. GUTBEELET, 199, 281. Happiness, nature of in Aristotle, 140. 340 llAiu-nt. 22fl !i. 282-3. II m ki \i 'a definition of Beho lastic philosophy, 14; on Scho- lastic philosophy, 19; on prob- lem of universals, 20; on causes of downfall of Scholastic philos- ophy, 153 j liis works on Medi- ji'val philosophy, 150. Hedonism, contrasted with Scho- lastic ethical system, 138; criti- cized, 141 ft".; criticized by Ming, 230-7. I In. el, on Scholastic philosophy, 19, 27; on substance, 02; on adequate knowledge of God, 120; on divine nature in old metaphysics, 134; readmits on- tological argument, 127; com- pared to St. Thomas, 12; in- fluence of upon Catholic philos- ophy in Germany, 19G. Hknslow's theory of directivity, 80. Hermes, condemned by the Church, 12, 190. Hernandez y Fajarnes, 180, 283. Hertz, scientific experiments of, 102. II hi.. 233, 284. EOBBES, on foundation of moral- ity, 137. d'IIi i.st, 212-3, 280. Hi ICE, on substance, 55 ft*., 04; on efficiency, 69, 70ff.; on sim- plicity of soul, 110. 1k.\ Caiup.ol's theory of universal tter, 94. [dea and Phantasm, confused by Locke, 111; nature of, 111-3. Immensity of God, 133. Immutability of Cod, 133. I nduct ion, in the M iddle Ages, 44; regarded as fundamental by Mill. 12; in aeo-Scholastic logic, Infinity of God, 131 ff. Intellect and Sense, essential dif- ference of, 120. JANVIER, on neo-Scholasticism, 35. Jot i\. 233, 287-8. Kant, regarded as a Scholastic by Picavet, 2; whether his philos- ophy can be interpreted from a Christian standpoint, 11; on metaphysics, 47; on substance, 01, 05; on ontological argument, 127; on moral character of our acts, 144 ft". ; influence of in Spain, 175; influence of upon Catholic philosophy in Germany. 196. Kaufmann, 201, 288-9. Kk.lvin, on ether, 103. Kleutgex's contribution of to neo-Scholasticism, 196-7, 290: principles of knowledge of, 197. Larmor, on ether, 104. Leibniz, on substance, 01, 65. Lemos, 181, 293. Leo XIII. Cf. Pecci. Lepidi's contribution to neo- Scho- lasticism, 215, 293; refutes on- tologism, 215. Leucippus, father of atomism, 82. Liberatore's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 107, 293-4; on chemical combination, 90. Locke, regarded as a Scholastic by Picavet, 2; on formation of names, 15; on substance, 53 ft". ; philosophy of introduced into Spain, 175; into Portugal, 183. Lodge, on ether, 104, 105. Logic, Scholastic system of, 41 ft".; a complete system in the hands of Aristotle, 41; Mill's contri- bution to, 42. I OB) \. '! I. i.l, 165. 341 Louvain, Institute of Philosophy of, its contribution to neo-Scho- lasticism, 217 fF . ; its scientific spirit, 40; favorably judged by Besse, 168; reforms which char- acterize the Institute, 219; its prodigious success, 220. MacDonald, 247-8, 295-6. Madurkira, 188, 296. Maher's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 229, 296; on im- mortality of the soul, 120. Malebra]n-che, on efficient cause, 69. Mandonnet, 209, 297. de Margerie, influence of Leo XIII. 's encyclical on, 163. de Maria, 171, 297. Mart!, influence of on Spanish thinking, 178. Matter, constitution of according to modern science, 100 fF. Matter, Primordial. Scholastic theory of, 84 fF. ; properties of, 91; divisions of, 92; modifica- tions on the theory of, 108. Maxwell, scientific discoveries of, 102. Ma/.klla, on fossils, 39. Mendive, 180, 299. Menendez t Pelayo, on Spanish philosophy, 174. Mercier, philosophical work of, 218 fF., 299; on historical stud- ies, 38; on metaphysics, 46; <»n final (mum. 78, Metaphysical argument, 130-1. Metaphysics, existence of, 46; origin of the word, 46; defined by aeo-Scholastics, 4(i; rejected l>v positivism, 47: by Cant, 47: Scholar ic system of, 46 Bf. Mii:i,ik. 212, :!00. Mill, si^; on ontologica] argument, 127; on moral argument, 128; on meta- physical argument. 130. Newton's laws of motion rejected by Pecsi, -JJ7-8. Nominalism, leads to materialism, 21 : also to mvsl icism, 2 1 342 Nys's contribution to neo-Scho- lasticism, 222, 304; on matter and form, 85. (i'I'.kun's contribution to neo- Bcholasticism, 245ff., 304; de- spises modern philosophy, 246-7. Occasionalism, considerations urged against, 70. Omnipotence of God, 134. Ontological argument di-cu-^ril, 127 IV.; rejected by St. Thomas, 127. Ontologism in Belgium. 215; in the United Slates. 232-3; re- futed by fjepidi, 215; condemned by the Church, 215. ObtI y Lara's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 179-80, 304; on historical studies, 38; con- demns modern philosophy, 180. Ortiz, 194-5, 305. Pantheism, the outcome of real- ism, 22; in the Middle Ages, 22; condemned by the Church, 12, 23 j de Concilio on, 241. Paqi i.i. 247, 306. Paulsen, on Thomistic revival, 1. l'i ( ( i i I.i ci X 1 1 1. 1 , sympathizes with the Thomistic revival, 159; is elected pope, ItiO; imposes Scholastic philosophy on Cath- olic world, 162 j founds [nstitute of Louvain, 218. l'i' csi's cinii rilml ion to ueo Scho lasl icism, 225 IT.. 307 ; his theory of matter and form, 220-7; re- jecte Newtonian laws of motion, 227. l'i ii i \i BE, 207. 307. Pi Bl ii. 108, .".n7. l'i i n i it. 202, 308. Phantasm and Idea, confused by Locke, ill: nature of, 1 1 1 IV. Philosophy, meaning in ancient times, 28; its essential charac- ter, 189; defined by Spencer, 29; identified with theology by St. Augustine, 29; by Scotus Erig- ena, 30; by Abelard, 30; dis- criminated from theology by Thomas Aquinas, 31. Piat, 213, 309. Picavet's philosophical work. 213-4, 309-10; on Thomistic revival, 2; on Scholastic philos- ophy. L9. Pidal y Mon, 180, 310. Plato, realism of, 22; ethical sys- tem of, 138. Poland, 234-5, 311. Positivism, rejects metaphysics, 47. Potency, Cf. Act. Pragmatism, welcomed by French Catholics, 6. Predestination, doctrine of in St. Thomas, 150 ff. Prescience of God, 150 ff. Prout, on atomism, 105. Psychology, Scholastic, 110. Purpose, what old Scholastics meant by, 51. Radioactivity, scientific observa- tions on, 10(5 ff. Realism, professed by Plato. 21; moderate form of, 23, 24. de REgnon, 209-10. 314. I!i \ns\T. on Mediaeval philos- ophy. 156; on Abelard, 25. Restbepo, 193 I. 314. Rickaby's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 230, 315; on Eume's philosophy, 58. Rivera, on Spanish philosophy, 174. Robespierre, regarded as a Scho- la -i ic by Picavet, 2. 343 Roman Thomists, severely judged by Besse, 168 ff. ; their ignorance of science, 39. Ronayne, 237-8, 316. Rondina, 184, 316. Roscelin, on the universal, 20, 21 ; on mystery of Holy Trinity, 21; condemned by the Church, 21. Rousseau, regarded as a Scho- lastic by Picavet, 2. Royce, on mysticism, 21 ; his proof of Cod's existence criticized by Driscoll, 24:5. Russo, 234, 318. Rutherford, scientific achieve- ments of, 106. Saint-Hilaire, on matter and form, 86. Saint-Lambert, on foundation of morality, 137. Salis See\yis, 172, 318. de San, 216-7, 318. Sanseverino, 158, 318. Satolli, 165, 319. Sc'HIFFIM, 171, 320. Schlegel, on Mediaeval philos- ophy, 156, 196. Schneider, on neo-Scholasticisni. 35, 200. Scholastic Philosophy, origin of the word scholastic, 14; defined in terms of its language meth- odflj -•">: defined by its relation to theology, 27; identified with theology, 27: defined by Dewey. 25. 28; by Baureau, 14 ; by de Wulf. 17: by Blanc, 17: by Weber, 27; by Tyrrell, 28; by Qeberweg, 32; by Turner. 32; is primarily and essentially the philosophy of the Middle Ages, 33 : i- not ;i - i ii Lrlf bj stem, 20; it- harmony with Catholic theol- ogy, i : it- polil ical influence, 6; causes of downfall of, 153 ; cause of its revival, 7 ; forerun- ners of its revival, 153 ff. ; its system of logic, 41 ff.; its meta- physics, 46 ff. ; its theory of substance, 52 ff. ; its theory of cause, 68 ff. ; its system of cos- mology, 82 ff. ; its theory of matter and form, 82 ff. ; its psy- chology, 110 ff.; its natural the- ology, 126 ff. ; its system of morals, 136 ff. Scotus Erigena, on God, 22; identifies philosophy and theol- ogy, 30; condemned by the Church, 22. Secretan, on Duns Scotus's phi- losophy. 5; on St. Thomas's de- terminism, 147. Selection, Natural and the design- argument, 129-30. Sense and Intellect, essential dif- ference of, 120. Sertillanges, 208, 322. Simplicity of God, 132, 135. Sinibaldi, 184, 324. Soixano, 186-/, 324. Soul, defined by Aristotle, 110; nature of, 115 ff.; intrinsically independent of body, 115; sim- plicity of, 115; spirituality of, 1 IS ff. ; immortality of, 120; locus of, 121 ff. de Sousa, 184, 325. Spencer's conception of philos- ophy, 29; opposition of to meta- physics, 47: on ether, 103; on sa\a^e's concept of God, 128. Spinoza, on substance, titi. Stai -denmaier. 156-7, 196. STOCKL, M'7. .".2.">. Substance, Scholastic theory of, 52 tl'.: Locke on, 53 ff.j Eume on. 55 ff., 64; Mill on, 59 ff. : Descartes on, 61, : Leibniz on. 61, (S.">: Kant on. 61, 65; H ;\U mi, 62; Balmee on, 62;. Spinoza on, 66. Syllogism, nature of, 42; Medi- aeval philosophy on, 2(i; Mill on, 4'A: ]«l by Leibniz, 26. I'aim.. on Scholastic philosophy, lit. Tait, on dynamism, 101. Talamo. lf>5ff.. 327. Tapabelli, 172, 328. Tebtillian's system of philos- ophy, 29. Thai.ks's conception of philos- ophy, 28. Theology, natural and revealed, 12G: its relation to philosophy, 10, 31 : identified with philos- ophy by St. Augustine, 29; by Scotus Erigena, 30; by Abelard, 30; discriminated from philos- ophy by Thomas Aquinas, 31. Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of unity and immutability of truth. 8 : on relation of philosophy and theology, 31; on primordial matter. 87; on locus of the soul. 124; on God's ubiquity, 125; on Anselm's ontological argument, 127; on pure actuality, 132; on immensity of God, 133; on sim- plicity of God, 135; and free will, 147 11'.: on predestination, 150 17. ; obsolete doctrines of, .'!.->: contrasted with Duns Sco- tus, 25; Leonine edition of his works, 36, Thomson, discovers electrons, 105. Traditionalism, condemned by the Church, L3. Truth, its unity and immutability according tO St. Thomas, 8. Ti km.ii's contribution to neo Scho- lasticism, 24 t. 329 ; on Bcholas- 1 ic philosophy, 32. I'viiKi 1. 1.. on Scholasticism, 28. Ubaghs's influence in Belgium, 216. I i BERWEG, on Scholastic philos- ophy, 32. Unity of God, 132. Universals, conceptualists on, J I : Eaureau on, 20; de Wulf on, 20; Albert the Great's solution of the problem of, 24. Ubbabubu's contribution to neo- Scholasticism, 181 fi\, 330; his strictly scholastic method, 37 ; on sense and intellect, 119; on immortality of the soul, 121. Vacant, 211, 330. Vachebot, on act and potency, 49. Vallet, 205, 331. Valverde Tellez, 190-1, 331. Ventura, 155. Vebonnet, on ether, 103. Voltaibe, regarded as a Scholas- tic by Picavet, 2. WEBBS, on Scholastic philosophy, 27. van Weddixgen, 216, 333. WERNER, 200, 334. Whetiiam, on ether, 103. Will, freedom of, 145 ff. William of Champeaux, con- nected with Mediaeval mysti- cism, 23. Woodbbiiige, on vital problem of metaphysics, 47. DE YWlk's contribution to nco- Scholasticism, 221-2, 335; his definition of Scholastic philos- ophy, 17; on problem of uni- versals, 20; on historical stud- ies, 3S ; on Scholastic system of ethics, 136. Zkllkk, on Scholastic philosophy, 32. Zn ii IRA, 164 5, 330. 345 VITA The author of this dissertation, Joseph Louis Perrier, was born at La Garde Adhemar (France), on March 12, 1874. In 1890, he received his Elementary Teacher's diploma (Brevet elementaire) at the Academy of Aix. Two years later (1892), the University of Montpellier conferred upon him the Higher Teacher's diploma (Brevet superieur) and a Bachelor's degree (Baccalaureat de l'enseignement secondaire special). In 1904- 1905, he studied at the College of St. Francis Xavier (New York City) under Fathers O'Brien, Shealy and Prendergast, S.J., and was given the degree of A.M. in 1905. From 1905 to 1908, he studied in Columbia University under Pro- fessors Woodbridge, Dewey, Fullerton, Miller, Montague and Adolphe ( John. The degree of A.M. was conferred by Colum- bia University in 190G. RETURN CIRCULATION DEPARTMENT TO— ^ 202 Main Library LOAN PERIOD 1 _ HOME USE 2 3 4 5 6 ALL BOOKS MAY BE RECALLED AFTER 7 DAYS nth loons may be renewed by calling 642-3405 6-month loans may be recharged by bringing books to Circulation Desk Renewals and recharges may be made 4 days prior to doe date DUE AS STAMPED BELOW KECCIRC JANS 1 1986 UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY FORM NO. DD6, 60m, 3/80 BERKELEY, CA 94720 Pi GENERAL LIBRARY -U.C.BERKELEY 6000^3363^ T3 -fi_/V/VV^-ft-/\_ • .<••*♦• - •