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 RIVERSIDE 
 
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 THE ROMANS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 RIVIERA AND THE RHONE
 
 ( •! |— CT- l_> 1^ -^ fc*' 
 
 THE ROMANS 
 
 ON THE 
 
 RIVIERA AND THE RHONE 
 
 A SKETCH OF THE CONQUEST OF LIGURIA 
 AND THE ROMAN PROVINCE 
 
 BY 
 
 
 W. H; (BULLOCK) HALL, F.R.G.S. 
 
 CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIETIES OF 
 NICE AND DRAGUIGNAN, AND OF THE SOCIETY fiDUENNE OF AUTUN. 
 
 Uonlion 
 MACMILLAN AND CO., Limited 
 
 NEW YORK: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
 1898 
 
 All rights reserved.
 
 
 CamferttigE : 
 
 PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, 
 AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
 
 
 
 TO MY FRIEND 
 
 PROFESSOR RIDGEWAY 
 
 OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE 
 
 IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF 
 
 ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGEMENT 
 
 AFFORDED THROUGHOUT THE COMPOSITION 
 
 OF THIS WORK 
 
 H.
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 Having enjoyed for the last twelve years the privi- 
 lege of wintering on the north-western shores of the 
 Mediterranean, I have turned them to account by fol- 
 lowing up in every direction the tracks left by the 
 Romans on the French and Italian Rivieras. Nor have 
 my explorations been confined to the coast, but have 
 been extended north of the Apennines as far as the Po 
 in Italy, and in France have included the seldom-visited 
 valleys of the Durance and the Drome. It is in the 
 hope of throwing some light of local colouring on to an 
 obscure field of Roman history, that I am tempted to 
 offer this sketch to the public. For mainly owing to 
 the irreparable loss of the books of Livy's history 
 treating of the conquest of Provence (the Roman 
 Provincia), we are left very much in the dark on that 
 important episode in Roman history. Nothing but the 
 intimate acquaintance with the locality which the writer 
 possesses has rendered it possible to eke out the slender 
 materials available, for the construction of any kind of 
 bridge over the gap in Roman history between the 
 narratives of Livy and Caesar ; and some bridge is 
 indispensable, to connect the broken ends of the two 
 narratives. For Caesar's Gallic War, with which the 
 student usually begins his acquaintance with Gaul, is 
 really only the second act of the drama of the Roman 
 conquest of that country. It is indispensable, for in- 
 stance, to be forewarned that (i) the ' Oiiinis Gallia' of
 
 vill PREFACE. 
 
 Caesar means Gallia with the Rhone Valley left out, as 
 already conquered and reduced to a Province ; (2) that 
 the inroad of the Helvetii into Gaul, so ruthlessly ar- 
 rested and repulsed by Caesar, was looked upon as 
 threatening a repetition of the Cimbro-Teuton invasion, 
 which had so nearly overwhelmed Italy less than half a 
 century earlier ; (3) that the driving of Ariovistus back 
 across the Rhine showed that Caesar's eagle-eye saw at 
 a glance where the real danger lay, and that it was 
 better policy to encounter Germany in Alsace than on 
 the Rhone or in Provence. 
 
 Passing my winters as I do within sight of the ruins 
 of Forum Julii, which is really a Rome in miniature, 
 I have been imbibing an atmosphere as completely 
 Roman, as if I had been living on the outskirts of the 
 Eternal City. 
 
 In fact I have often had to ask myself, can it be 
 that the long line of mellow arches, which I see there 
 striding across the plain, are other than those of the 
 Claudian Aqueduct, and that those brown-hooded shep- 
 herds, sheltering with their flocks from the fierce rays of 
 the midday sun under spreading stone-pines, are any- 
 thing else than the familiar figures and features of the 
 Roman Campagna? 
 
 When, escorted by the arches of the aqueduct — those 
 avajit-coiireurs of the ruined city, — you approach the 
 entrance, where the Porta Romana once stood, and gaze 
 on the picturesque outline of the walls still standing, 
 though in ruin, and the Roman towers, cutting clear 
 against the western sky, you have before you a scene 
 of concentrated Roman ingredients, unsurpassable even 
 at Rome. 
 
 One has often to ask oneself, why is it, that when 
 once the Romans have set their seal on a place, it is 
 redeemed for ever from dullness, and that its desolation 
 becomes more eloquent than words can express ? 
 
 Somewhat to the author's own surprise, his work, 
 which originated in musings over the ruins of Forum
 
 PREFACE. IX 
 
 Julii, has taken the form of a sketch of the expansion 
 of Italy into Gaul through the Roman conquest of 
 Liguria, which prepared the way for Caesar's Gallic Wars. 
 
 It was only by degrees that the author became aware 
 how much wider was the ancient Liguria than the strip 
 of Italian coast to which it is limited by modern geo- 
 graphers. He soon discovered that at Frejus he was in 
 a centre, which was Ligurian before it became Roman, 
 and that he was located at the most convenient point 
 on the coast for exploring the whole of ancient Liguria, 
 which extended from the Rhone on the west across the 
 Alps as far east as the line of the Trebia, prolonged 
 across the Apennines by the valley of the Magra to the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 In Gaul, it reached from the coast inland as far as 
 the level of the Isere, and in Italy up to that of the 
 upper half of the course of the Po, and even beyond it'. 
 
 The references in the text and notes will make it 
 clear that the author has had occasion to draw more on 
 foreign than on British sources for assistance in the 
 composition of this sketch. While French, Germans 
 and Italians have dealt with the different branches of 
 his subject, the author is unacquainted with any English 
 work dealing specially with it. 
 
 Although reluctantly compelled to point out the 
 serious errors into which M. Lentheric has fallen on 
 the subject of the Via Aurelia, the author is glad to 
 acknowledge the pleasure he has derived from the rest 
 of his work which is known to the French as La 
 Provence Maritime, and to the British reader as TJie 
 Riviera Ancient and Modern. 
 
 For a detailed account of Forum Julii the author 
 refers his readers to the " Histoire de Frejus" by 
 J, A. Aubenas, to which the author is himself much 
 indebted. 
 
 In Herzog's Historia Provinciae Narbonensis (1863) 
 
 ' In tlie (lays of Justinian, Milan was considered the capital of Liguria. 
 See Cjibbon, Milman's Edition, Vol. iv. p. 57.
 
 X PREFACE. 
 
 the student who wishes to go deeper in the subject will 
 find an admirable and scholarly work. 
 
 The author offers his best thanks to Mr Jenkinson, 
 Cambridge University Librarian, for unfailing courtesy 
 in supplying him with works of reference, as also to 
 Mr A. S. Murray and to Mr W. R. Wilson of the 
 British Museum. He has also to express his obligation 
 to Mr E. S. Shuckburgh for the use of his translation of 
 Polybius and other assistance, and to Professor Rhys 
 of Oxford for valuable hints. He is indebted to Mr 
 A. Rogers of the Cambridge University Library for the 
 compilation of the Index at the end of the volume. 
 
 The author has finally to tender his best thanks to 
 Mr H. J. Edwards of Trinity College, for reading over 
 the proofs while the work was passing through the 
 Press.
 
 LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS. 
 
 The Riviera, Provence (Roman Province) and regions 
 adjacent. 
 
 The mouths of the Rhone. 
 
 Plan of Marseilles. Ancient and Modern. 
 
 Plan of Frejus (Forum Julii). Ancient and Modern. 
 
 Section of the Table of Peutinger.
 
 Frontispiece [after Preface)
 
 THE ROMANS ON THE RIVIERA 
 AND THE RHONE. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 Introductory. 
 
 Before bringing the Roman actors on to the stage, 
 it will be well to take a preliminary glance at the early 
 distribution of races in Liguria and Gaul. For, as far 
 as I know, there are very few persons on this side the 
 Channel, who are at all aware of the extremely sub- 
 versive views on the subject, which are rapidly gaining 
 ground in France. Had I been writing only thirty 
 years ago, it would hardly have been necessary even 
 to refer to the presence of traces of pre-historic man 
 in the regions under review. But the recent discove- 
 ries in the field of pre-historic archaeology have been 
 too important to be left entirely unmentioned, even in 
 a work professing to deal exclusively with history. The 
 future indeed seems to belong to the physical in- 
 vestigators, who brush aside in a somewhat high-handed 
 manner the old fashioned history, which is based 
 mainly on texts. 
 
 Largely in consequence of physical evidence the 
 ideas on the subject of the earliest inhabitants of Gaul, 
 which were embodied in the works of the late Amedee 
 Thierry, and which prevailed in France so recently as 
 the date of the publication of the Life of Julius Caesar 
 by Napoleon HI., are undergoing a radical change. 
 H. I
 
 2 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 For there is no trace in those works of any perception 
 of the theory that the Gauls never really formed the 
 groundwork of the population in the country we call 
 France\ It is now beginning to dawn upon the French 
 mind, that as an invading minority of German Franks 
 have given their name to modern France, so its ancient 
 name Gallia was derived from invading Galli — a race 
 resembling Germans in type — who subdued, without 
 displacing, the indigenous population. 
 
 It seems evident that, if the majority of the in- 
 habitants of France were of Gallic origin, they ought 
 to be tall and fair. Whereas — and that more especially 
 in the generally believed-to-be purely Celtic regions of 
 the west of France, they are as a matter of fact found 
 to be small and dark. The skulls too and skeletons 
 derived from the tombs in western France are mostly 
 round and short, instead of being long and tall. 
 
 So whatever race-feud exists between French and 
 Germans is not to be attributed to the Celtic element 
 in the French people. For, in spite of their difference 
 in language Celts and Germans are of kindred blood. 
 Strabo, p. 196'"'. 
 
 The first modern writer to draw public attention to the 
 above anomaly was the Baron Roger de Belloguet, whose 
 remarkable work, Ethnogenie Gaiiloise, was published in 
 the year 1869. In Vol. II., p. 309, the Baron sums up 
 in the following terms his conclusions, arrived at, be it 
 observed, prior to the production of the convincing 
 physical evidence, since discovered in caves, lake- 
 dwellings, and tombs, "nous concluons, que deux types 
 d'une constitution physique aussi differente, que les 
 grands blonds et les petits bruns, ne peuvent etre sortis 
 d'une meme souche. II est faux que les hommes a 
 
 ^ We find for instance the statement that "nineteen-twentieths of the 
 French are descended from Gauls" in Duruy, History of Rome, Chap. Lin. 
 p. 83 (English translation). Edited by Prof. Mahaffy. 
 
 ^ In references to Strabo, the page of Casaubon's edition will always be 
 given.
 
 CHAP. I. 3 
 
 tete ronde, qu'on a nommes abusivement les ' Galls,' 
 aient jamais fait partie, ethnologiquement parlant, de la 
 
 famille celtique II en resulte, que les Celtes ne 
 
 formerent jamais en Gaule qu'une minorite dans la 
 population de toutes ces contrees ; qu'ils n'en furent par 
 consequent pas les premiers habitants ; mais comme 
 I'indiquent leurs propres traditions, conformes a plusieurs 
 donnees historiques, des conquerants dont la race finit 
 par se perdre, sauf quelques exceptions locales, dans la 
 masse beaucoup plus nombreuse des vaincus." 
 
 Startling enough to the ordinary British student, 
 nourished in the traditions of Caesar and Livy, as 
 these conclusions will appear, they seem moderate in 
 comparison with the latest views advanced by the emi- 
 nent Celtic scholar, M. d'Arbois de Jubainville. For this 
 distinguished member of the Institut goes the length 
 of asserting that there were never in Gallia at any one 
 time more than 60,000 Gauls or Celts (for the terms are 
 synonymous^) including non-combatants. In his Pre- 
 miers ]iabita7its dc r Europe, Vol. II. p. 7, M. d'Arbois de 
 Jubainville, referring to the observation of Caesar, " nam 
 plebes paene servorum habetur loco," De Bello Gallico, 
 VI. 13, expresses himself as follows : 
 
 " Elle vivait dans une sorte d'esclavage, quoique la 
 conquete celtique remontat a environ cinq siecles dans 
 la plus grande partie de la Gaule barbare, et que les 
 vaincus eussent probablement presque tous oublie leur 
 langue primitive en apprenant le gaulois, comme plus 
 tard ils oublierent le gaulois, en apprenant le latin. 
 
 "Les membres de I'aristocratie gauloise ne pouvaient 
 pas mettre sous les armes plus de quinze mille cavaliers. 
 Vercingetorix fit cette evaluation d'effectif lors de la 
 grande insurrection dont il fut le chef Or, une regie 
 de la statistique de ce temps etait que le nombre des 
 hommes capables de porter les armes, formait le quart 
 de la population totale. 
 
 "Les quinze mille cavaliers, avec leurs femmes, leurs 
 
 1 See p. 5. 
 
 I — 2
 
 4 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 enfants et leurs vieux peres formaient done un total de 
 soixante mille personnes : ainsi une aristocratic, com- 
 posee de soixante mille ames, dominait et tenait dans 
 une sorte de servitude le reste de la Gaule barbare, 
 dont le nombre atteignait un peu plus de trois millions." 
 
 Had such a paradoxical conclusion as the above 
 been enunciated by a less eminent author than M. 
 d'Arbois de Jubainville, it would have been at once 
 dismissed as undeserving even of consideration. But, 
 whatever adventitious assistance the opinion may derive 
 from the name of the author, it becomes at once evident 
 that, in its exaggerated form, it necessarily falls to the 
 ground when confronted with the plain text of Caesar's 
 Gallic war, and the general consensus of the classical 
 authorities. (From what I gathered during a personal 
 interview with M. d'Arbois de Jubainville, I have reason 
 to hope that he is prepared to modify his extreme 
 views.) 
 
 For in Lib. II. c. 4, we find the total of the Belgic 
 contingents alone amounting to 266,000 combatants. 
 In Lib. VII. c. ^6, the outside Gallic host brought up 
 for the relief of Alesia, inclusive of Belgae, numbered, 
 according to Caesar, 240,000 infantry and 8000 cavalry^ 
 while 80,000 more were beleaguered inside with Ver- 
 cingetorix. 
 
 Although M. dArbois de Jubainville considers the 
 infantry unworthy of enumeration, as not of Gallic 
 blood, he still does not actually deny that they were 
 present, and draws attention to the fact that the ' plebes,' 
 from which the infantry was presumably recruited, spoke 
 Gallic. It does not appear to strike M. d'Arbois de 
 Jubainville as at all improbable that a minority of 
 15,000 families should have succeeded in imposing its 
 language on a people numbering three millions. 
 
 M. d'Arbois de Jubainville is perhaps not necessarily 
 in conflict with Caesar as to the numbers, only as to the 
 
 1 Of the 15,000 cavalry, the number given by M. D'Arbois as estimated 
 by Vercingetorix, only 8000 appear to have obeyed the summons.
 
 CHAP. I. 5 
 
 nationality of the combatants before Alesia. Whatever 
 its exact composition may have been it is hardly sur- 
 prising that Caesar described the Gallic-speaking host 
 gathered around Alesia under the general name of 
 ' Gain,' and that he failed to enter into any ethnological 
 subtleties on such an occasion. 
 
 That Gallic blood in the Gaul of Caesar's time was 
 confined to the cavalry or fighting aristocracy is a 
 paradox, which — pace M. d'Arbois de Jubainville — will 
 not bear serious examination. If we admit that recent 
 discovery proves that the groundwork of the population 
 in western Gaul has always remained Iberian, there 
 must still have been a large admixture of Gauls in the 
 inferior population or "tiers etat," which was apparently 
 of no more account in Caesar's day than in France 
 before the Revolution. For we are expressly told 
 by Caesar, Lib. VI. c. 13, that it frequently occurred 
 amongst the Gauls that independent individuals broke 
 down, overburdened with debt or fiscal charges, and 
 losing caste, descended in the social scale to swell the 
 ranks of the poor clients of the nobles. 
 
 In the opening chapter of the first book of his 
 Gallic war, is contained the only general reference to 
 distinctions of languages existing in Caesar's Gallia, 
 from which the Rhone valley, formed 60 years earlier 
 into the " Provincia Romana," was excluded. The 
 passage is known to every schoolboy. " All Gaul is 
 divided into three parts, of which the Belgae inhabit 
 one, the Aquitani another, while the people whom we 
 call Galli, but who call themselves Celtae, inhabit the 
 remaining part. All three differ from each other in 
 language, institutions and laws^" Although unfor- 
 tunately Caesar tells us nothing as to the nature of 
 this difference, whether it was of kind, or only of degree, 
 
 ^ If Caesar had visited Gallia a century or two earlier, he would have 
 found Galli occupying two out of his three divisions. For he expressly 
 states {De Bell. Gall. ll. 3) that the Belgae, who of old came from beyond 
 the Rhine, expelled Galli then in possession of Belgica.
 
 6 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 much light is thrown upon this important point by 
 Strabo. 
 
 For in Lib. IV. p, 176, which deals with Gallia, 
 Strabo writes, "Some make a threefold division of it 
 into Aquitani, Belgae and Celtae, of whom the Aquitani 
 differ totally from the other two, both in language and 
 physique, resembling Iberians much more than Gauls. 
 The Belgae and Celtae are both Gauls, to outward 
 appearance, but there is a slight difference of language." 
 We must therefore infer that both Celtae and Belgae 
 spoke Celtic. But as Caesar tells us (L. II. c. 3) that 
 most of the Belgae were sprung from Germans we are 
 led to infer that the Celtic spoken by the Belgae was 
 not as widely different from the German as the two 
 languages became later. When (Lib. I. c. 47) Caesar re- 
 quired to confer with Ariovistus, the negotiations were 
 carried on in Celtic, which the German chief had ac- 
 quired during his occupation of the country of the 
 Sequani. The difference in language spoken by Celtae 
 and Belgae, referred to both by Caesar and Strabo, is 
 perhaps represented by that between Goidelic and 
 Brythonic later. 
 
 With regard to the distribution of the population in 
 ancient Gallia, it seems most probable that what is true 
 of our day was true of Caesar's, viz. that the further 
 you advanced southwards and westwards, the darker 
 and smaller the population became, being further 
 removed from the fair, tall, German type of the 
 north-eastern region, the Belgica of Caesar. That 
 there ever existed anywhere a type of small dark 
 Gauls or Celts is now considered in France a complete 
 delusion. 
 
 For the type of Gaul, made known to us by the 
 consensus of classical authorities, was tall, fair and 
 blue-eyed — only differing as Strabo informs us (p. 290) 
 from the German or Teuton in being less fierce, 
 gigantic and ruddy. We read in his life by Suetonius 
 that when Caligula ran short of German prisoners for
 
 CHAP. I. 7 
 
 his sham triumph over that nation, he was obHged to 
 put up with the biggest Gauls he could find. He com- 
 pelled them to let their hair grow long, dye it red, 
 assume barbarous names and learn German. Again 
 on p. 196, Strabo, comparing Gauls and Germans, 
 writes " they resemble each other in their nature and 
 constitution, and are akin (crvyjevei^) in blood." Such 
 was the type of the Gauls, who in the year B.C. 390 
 sacked Rome and are portrayed in Virgil's well-known 
 lines : 
 
 " Aurea caesaries ollis, atque aurea vestis ; 
 Virgatis lucent sagulis; turn lactea colla 
 Auro innectuntur." 
 
 Of this type too were the Gauls, who a century later 
 invaded Greece, and pillaged the treasure of Delphi, 
 passing on thence through Macedonia and Thrace into 
 Asia Minor, where they carried fire and sword into its 
 most fertile provinces\ 
 
 These were the centuries when the Gauls were at 
 their prime. But the history of their exploits has been 
 unaccountably neglected by British historians. It is 
 given in full detail and in a most readable form by 
 Amedee Thierry in his Histoire des Gaidois. 
 
 When Caesar invaded the country, to which they 
 had given their name ' Gallia,' the Gauls were already a 
 degenerate people, as Caesar himself points out. From 
 living remote from the enervating luxuries of the 
 ' Provincia,' and nearer to the Germans, the Belgae alone 
 escaped degeneracy. In De Bell. Gall. VI. c. 24, we 
 read, " But there was formerly a time, when the Gauls 
 surpassed the Germans in valour and carried war into 
 their country without provocation." 
 
 As a matter of fact it was from Belgica that the 
 Romans mainly derived their knowledge of the Gauls. 
 It was there that Caesar's toughest fighting took place. 
 
 ^ The most famous of these Gauls were the Tectosages, who finally 
 settled down in Galatia, and were the ancestors of St Paul's " foolish 
 Galatians."
 
 8 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 The adjoining Rhine Provinces, Germania Superior and 
 Inferior, where the tall, fair type of Gallicised Teuton 
 has always predominated, were the only parts of Gallia 
 ever permanently garrisoned by the Romans. The 
 Romans, in the opposite sense, anticipated the Germans 
 in keeping the " Wacht am Rhein." So it is not sur- 
 prising that, writing about a.d. 350, in the reign of 
 Julian, Ammianus Marcellinus should observe, L. XV. 12, 
 "The Gauls are almost all tall, fair and ruddy, with a 
 terrible gleam in their eyes." 
 
 It was not till comparatively late that the Romans 
 had much intercourse with western Gallia, where, in the 
 reign of Gallienus, Bordeaux became an imperial re- 
 sidence. 
 
 To Amedee Thierry the anomaly of attributing the 
 small and dark Bretons and Welsh to a Celtic or Cymric 
 stock seems to have presented no difficulty. But the 
 opinion is rapidly gaining ground, both in France and 
 Britain, that in spite of their Cymric name and speech, 
 the population of Brittany and Wales is to be regarded 
 as mainly Iberian. Professor Boyd Dawkins in his 
 Early Man in Britain is a strong exponent of this view 
 as regards the Silures, quoting Tacitus^ to support it. 
 
 In those regions of the far west the strain of invading 
 Celts, who imposed their name and language on the 
 conquered indigenous population, has gradually become 
 absorbed and disappeared. As far as language is con- 
 cerned, the same process has been steadily going on in 
 Ireland, where the descendants of English settlers have 
 become more Irish than the Irish, and yet the English 
 language has prevailed. 
 
 While the language has undergone at least two great 
 changes in Ireland, i.e. from Iberian to Celtic and from 
 Celtic to English, the blood in the south and west of 
 the island is probably still mainly Iberian. If the 
 theories of Roger de Belloguet, D'Arbois de Jubainville 
 in France, and Professor Boyd Dawkins in England, 
 
 ^ Agricola, c. ii.
 
 CHAP. I. 9 
 
 hold good, it will soon be hard to find a purely Celtic 
 race left. In the same chapter where Tacitus refers to 
 the tradition of the Iberian descent of the Welsh Silures, 
 he suggests the likelihood of a German origin of the 
 Caledonians. There is a natural tendency on the part 
 of readers, and especially in the case of countries which 
 they know only by name, to assume that the bulk 
 of the inhabitants belongs to the race which has last 
 given its name to the country. But such assumption 
 frequently turns out to be utterly unfounded. The 
 conquest of a country often involved little more than 
 a change of landlords. 
 
 There have from time immemorial been two main 
 classes of invaders, namely that of organized bands of 
 armed adventurers, bringing no women ; and that of 
 tribes in search of fresh settlements and consisting of 
 whole families, with all their belongings. If the armed 
 adventurers settled in the conquered country they would 
 intermarry with the native women, and their descendants 
 gradually become merged in the native population 
 which, notwithstanding, would probably have adopted 
 the name and language of their conquerors. 
 
 As far as we can gather from the classical authori- 
 ties the Gain, with the notable exception of the Helvetic 
 emigrants arrested by Caesar, belonged to the first class, 
 and the Germans to the second class of invaders. In 
 the case of the Cimbri and Teutones we know that they 
 moved in huge caravans of covered waggons, as the 
 reader will find further on when I deal with their in- 
 vasion of Provence. 
 
 Of the three races, Iberian, Ligurian and Celtic, 
 found in Gallia Transalpina it appears that Iberians 
 and Ligurians divided between them the possession of 
 the North-Western Mediterranean coast line prior to 
 the appearance of the Celts. For in the Ora Maritiina 
 of Festus Avienus, which though itself of the 4th century 
 A.D. is based on the Periphisoi Himilco, the Carthaginian 
 navigator of the 4th century B.C., we find the Rhone
 
 10 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 assigned as the earliest authentic dividing line between 
 the Iberians and the Ligurians — 
 
 " hujus (sc. Rhodani) alveo 
 Ibera tellus atque Ligyes intersecantur " — 
 
 and Strabo, p. i66, mentions the former extension of 
 Iberia up to the Rhone. 
 
 By the light of recent investigation it indeed appears 
 probable that not only did the mouths of the Rhone 
 separate these two primitive nationalities on the Medi- 
 terranean coast, but that in prehistoric times a dividing 
 line between them was carried up northwards into 
 Gallia\ Into the midst of this Ibero-Ligurian population, 
 formidable bodies of Gauls or Celts, armed with their 
 then irresistible long swords, began to pour, at dates 
 of which we have no positive record. The contests 
 between Celts and Ligurians are referred to as being of 
 frequent occurrence by Festus Avienus, v. 132 of the 
 Ora Maritima : 
 
 "namque Celtarum manu 
 Crebrisque dudum proeliis vacuata sunt, 
 Liguresque pulsi, ut saepe fors aliquos agit, 
 Venere in ista, quae per horrentes tenent 
 Plerumque dumos." 
 
 While our attention is drawn to encounters between 
 Celts and Ligurians, it is to be observed that nothing is 
 said about any resistance being offered by the Iberians 
 within the limits of Gaul. 
 
 Driving a Celtic wedge between Iberians, forced 
 westward, and Ligurians, south-eastward back into the 
 Rhone Valley, the main body of Gauls occupied in 
 force the north-eastern and central plateaus of France, 
 the whole of which they ultimately dominated. 
 
 When history opens with Herodotus, about the 
 middle of the fifth century before Christ, we find that 
 bands of Celts had already forced their way right 
 through western Gallia across the Pyrenees, and formed 
 
 ^ In Chap. V. this question is more fully treated.
 
 CHAP. I. II 
 
 a settlement on the Atlantic sea-board of the Iberian 
 peninsula. But they had not yet reached the Medi- 
 terranean. For Herodotus informs us in Lib. II. c. 33, 
 " that the Celts are beyond the Pillars of Hercules," 
 thus locating them somewhere on the coast of the 
 Atlantic Ocean to the extreme west of Europe. 
 While in Lib. vil. c. 165, Herodotus enumerates both 
 Iberians and Ligurians amongst the mercenaries col- 
 lected from all parts of the Mediterranean by Terillus, 
 the expelled tyrant of Himera, in his final effort to 
 recover his throne, B.C. 480, Celts are conspicuously 
 absent from the list. Inasmuch as in the succeeding 
 centuries — and notably in the first and second Punic 
 Wars in the service of Carthage — the Celts became 
 famous as professional mercenaries, we may consider it 
 proved that in the 5th century B.C. they were as yet 
 unknown to the powers bordering on the Mediterranean. 
 
 We must therefore certainly reject Livy's date, B.C. 
 600, the reign of Tarquinius Priscus, as being at least 
 a century and a half too early for the appearance of 
 Celts in Italy, and it seems doubtful whether his account 
 of the emigration of the two main swarms of Celts 
 under Bellovesus and Sigovesus from a parent hive in 
 France into Italy and Germany respectively will bear 
 serious examination. 
 
 In spite of Mommsen's qualified acceptance of the 
 main facts without the date\ Messrs Alexandre Bertrand 
 and Salomon Reinach, in their recently published joint 
 work Les Celtes dans la Vallee dii Po et dii Danube, go 
 very near to rejecting Livy's narrative altogether. For 
 these exponents of the latest theories on the subject, the 
 Roman Province of Gallia Transalpina was never the 
 parent hive of Celts, of whom there were never enough 
 in the west to have swarmed back over the Western 
 Alps into Italy or Germany. 
 
 They argue, too, that if the Cisalpine province had 
 been overrun by Gauls from the Transalpine, we ought 
 
 1 History of Rovie. English translation. Book n. c. iv.
 
 12 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 to find the names of the Bituriges and Arverni figuring 
 there in the place of Insubres and Boii, the latter of 
 whom are scarcely heard of in the Transalpine Province, 
 till we read of them in Caesar's Gallic war, as invading 
 it in conjunction with the Helvetii. 
 
 There certainly seems a great deal to be said in 
 favour of the contention that Gallia Cisalpina derived 
 her main contingents of Gauls direct from the valley of 
 the Danube, by which route all authorities are agreed in 
 bringing them originally into Europe. For the Gauls 
 seem to have dropped contingents all along their road 
 through Austria, Germany, and Switzerland to the 
 Rhine, some of whom probably poured over the Rhae- 
 tian and Julian Alps into Italy. But the theory of a 
 re-flux of Gauls from Gallia Transalpina is not to be 
 rejected altogether. 
 
 The first and only Celtic confederation to establish 
 itself permanently on the Mediterranean sea-board was 
 that of the Volcae. This branch of the Celtic family, 
 from whose name Volcae our word Welsh is derived 
 (as I am reminded by my friend Professor Rhys of 
 Oxford), was the latest to separate itself from the 
 Germans, amongst whom it had found a temporary 
 domicile before crossing the Rhine. 
 
 The establishment of the Volcae in the plains be- 
 tween the Rhone and the Pyrenees, occupied previously 
 mainly by an Iberian population, may be fixed ap- 
 proximately at 400 B.C., but nothing is known of the 
 circumstances under which it was effectuated. The 
 Volcae were divided into two branches — Arecomici and 
 Tectosages. The Arecomici, who appear to have been 
 early brought under the civilizing influence of their 
 neighbours the Greeks of Marseilles, were the founders 
 of the great Celtic emporium at Narbonne, which, long 
 before Roman intervention in Gaul, became the principal 
 mart of exchange for native products brought down to 
 the coast from the interior, including tin from Britain. 
 
 We learn from Strabo (p. 190) that before the
 
 M'
 
 CHAP. I. 13 
 
 date of the Roman conquest of Provence (B.C. 122), the 
 over-lordship of the Arverni extended to Narbonne and 
 the Mediterranean sea-board. Thus the Volcae were 
 clients of the Arverni. While, on the right bank of the 
 Rhone, the Celtic confederation of Volcae displaced or 
 enslaved the former Iberian population about B.C. 400, 
 the Ligurian Salyes, or Salluvii, succeeded to the last 
 in barring Celtic access to the Mediterranean on the 
 left bank. 
 
 Thus, the country — now known as Provence — lying 
 between the Rhone, the Durance, the Alps and the 
 Mediterranean, although officially regarded by the 
 Romans as part of Gallia Transalpina, was never 
 occupied nor conquered by Gauls. The bulk of the 
 population of this little-known south-eastern corner of 
 France has always remained Ligurian, just as in its .'^ 
 
 south-western corner the Iberians have never been dis- 
 lodged from Aquitania. To this day, the south-western 
 quarter of France is largely Iberian in its affinities, the 
 Pyrenees having never served as an effectual barrier 
 between races. 
 
 This preliminary sketch of the distribution of races 
 in Gallia Transalpina would be incomplete without 
 some mention of the introduction of a Greek element 
 into the population via Marseilles. If the reader will 
 refer to the section of the Carte de Peutinger repro- 
 duced at the end of the volume, he will observe that the 
 name 'Gretia' is given to the region between Marseilles 
 and the Durance. 
 
 And first, as regards the foundation of Marseilles, 
 there has been much discussion as to whether the 
 Phocaeans took possession of an existing Phoenician 
 settlement, or whether they were the original founders. 
 The discovery at Marseilles in 1845 of a stone tablet, 
 now preserved in the Museo Borely, engraved with a 
 long Phoenician inscription, embodying minute regula- 
 tions as to the functions and remuneration of the priests 
 of the god ' Belen ' (the sun), was for some time thought
 
 14 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 to Strengthen the argument of those who contended for 
 a pre-existing Phoenician settlement. But it having 
 been ascertained that the stone on which the inscription 
 is engraved is of African origin, it cannot be held to 
 prove anything decisive on the point in dispute. 
 
 But besides the stone tablet in question, an altar of 
 Baal and so many images, apparently of Phoenician 
 origin, have come to light, that it is difficult to accept 
 M. Renan's opinion as final against the existence of a 
 previous Phoenician settlement. For how can the 
 discovery of so many Phoenician relics be explained 
 on any other theory than that they were there before 
 the Phocaeans arrived .-' For in consequence of their 
 bitterly hostile relations it seems very unlikely that 
 Phoenicians or Carthaginians would have ever settled 
 subsequently at Marseilles amongst the Greeks. 
 
 For the generally accepted date of 600 B.C., for the 
 original foundation of Marseilles, Timaeus is the definite 
 authority; "They (the Phocaeans) founded it in Liguria 
 one hundred and twenty years, as they say, before the 
 battle of Salamis. Timaeus at least gives this account 
 of its foundation \" 
 
 We find also in a fragment of Aristotle's lost work 
 {apud Athenaeum, Xlll. 576) on the Constitution of 
 Marseilles, which he held up to the admiration of the 
 world, the statement, " The Phocaeans who had their 
 trading station in Ionia founded Massilia." 
 
 It is however very singular that Herodotus should 
 make no mention whatever of Marseilles, which had 
 existed a century and a half before he wrote his history. 
 As he gives us such a striking narrative of the abandon- 
 ment of their city by the Phocaeans, in preference to 
 becoming enslaved to the Persians ; of their temporary 
 (five years') settlement in Corsica, where they found 
 Phocaeans, who had settled there and founded Alalia 
 
 ^ Ps. Scytnmts, an ip t^ AiyvcriKy di ratjTTjv ^KTiaav irpb ttjs /mxv^ tV^ 
 iv l.aKafxlvi yevo/xevris ^recriv irpoTepov m (pacriv cKarbv e'LKoaiv. Tt/iatos 
 oiJTWs laropel de r'qv ktIctiv.
 
 CHAP. I. 15 
 
 twenty years previously ; of the sea fight off Alalia, in 
 which 40 out of the 60 Phocaean ships were destroyed 
 by the combined fleet of Carthaginians and Etruscans ; 
 of the 20 remaining Phocaean ships abandoning Corsica 
 and founding Hyela (Velia), we should have at least 
 expected some reference to the actual foundation of 
 Marseilles by Phocaeans, which took place half a century 
 before these events. 
 
 As long as the Etrusco-Carthaginian naval alliance 
 rendered the power of their combined fleet supreme in 
 the western Mediterranean, there was little chance of 
 the Phocaean Massiliots developing their commerce 
 from Marseilles, which must have had a very modest 
 beginning. But when the Carthaginians suffered tem- 
 porary collapse by sea and land at the battle of Himera 
 (B.C. 480), which was followed up by the defeat of their 
 confederates, the Etruscans, by the Greeks off Cumae 
 (B.C. 474), the coast was cleared of enemies and the 
 chance came for the rise of the new Phocaean republic 
 in the West. 
 
 In the ensuing 70 years, the commerce of Marseilles 
 advanced with surprising rapidity, driving the Cartha- 
 ginian successors of the Phoenician traders beyond the 
 Pillars of Hercules, and establishing trading stations of 
 its own to the westward at various points along the 
 coast of Gaul and Spain. For the Massiliots do not 
 appear to have directed their energies eastwards at this 
 early period, when their supply of citizens was probably 
 not equal to founding colonies, as they did subsequently 
 at Tauroentum, Olbia, Athenopolis, Antipolis, Nicaea 
 and Monaco. 
 
 However, during the fourth century B.C., the Cartha- 
 ginians succeeded in re-establishing their supremacy at 
 sea, and, this time single-handed (for their allies the 
 Etruscans never got over their catastrophe off Cumae), 
 they cut the Massiliots off from all intercourse with 
 their Spanish emporia, thus recovering all the trade 
 they had lost.
 
 l6 INTRODUCTORY. 
 
 Had not the Romans, who from the first had been 
 warm allies of the Massiliots, come eventually to their 
 rescue, it might have been all over with the fortunes of 
 Marseilles. But realizing at the outbreak of the first 
 Punic War the necessity of becoming a first-rate naval 
 power, the Romans threw such energy into ship- 
 building, as, before its close, to disable the Carthaginian 
 navy and wrest from their rival once for all the command 
 of the western basin of the Mediterranean. 
 
 Thus it was owing to the Romans that Marseilles 
 recovered the commercial prosperity which she has 
 enjoyed almost uninterruptedly ever since. As an in- 
 dication of the intimate relations existing in early times 
 between Rome and Marseilles we read that the tenth 
 part of the spoil of Veii, dedicated to the Delphic 
 Apollo by Camillus, was deposited in the Massiliot 
 treasury at Delphi. It is also related that a collection 
 was made at Marseilles at the time of the capture and 
 burning of Rome by the Gauls, for the sufferers by the 
 fire*. In return for this generosity, places of honour 
 were always reserved for the Massiliots at public games 
 at Rome. 
 
 But it was especially during the Punic wars that 
 Marseilles and Rome rendered each other invaluable 
 services, their interests being identical. 
 
 1 We may compare here the efforts made by the commercial cities of 
 the Aegean to assist Rhodes after the earthquake, in the time of the 
 Ptolemies : Marseilles, in fact, was in the North-west of the Mediterranean 
 a charitable agency similar to Alexandria in the south. It is interesting to 
 find that the wealth of commercial centres contributed in the earliest times 
 to alleviate international, as well as domestic, calamities. So after all 
 the Lord Mayor's fund is no new institution.
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Hannibal in the Rhone Valley. 
 
 The first important event in Roman history, coming 
 within the scope of this work, of which any details have 
 been handed down to us is Hannibal's invasion of Italy. 
 It was this event which for the first time brought a 
 Roman army into the Rhone valley (B.C. 218). On 
 the outbreak of the second Punic War, which they had 
 just declared against Carthage, the Romans hoped, by 
 despatching armies by sea to operate in Sicily and 
 Spain, that they might succeed in keeping the war out 
 of Italy. The Consuls of the year were Tiberius 
 Sempronius and Publius Cornelius Scipio. To the 
 former Sicily was assigned as his province, with in- 
 structions to carry the war into Africa, if circumstances 
 seemed to require it. Spain fell to the lot of Scipio. 
 
 When the Carthaginians had lost their supremacy 
 at sea and with it all hold of Sicily and Sardinia, as 
 the result of their defeat by the Romans in the first 
 Punic War, they determined to seek compensation for 
 this blow by extending their influence and consolidating 
 their power in Spain. Although the Romans clearly 
 perceived that an enormous increase of strength must 
 inevitably accrue to the Carthaginians, from acquiring 
 Spain as a new field for recruiting their armies, they 
 were powerless to interfere, being fully engaged nearer 
 home in a life and death contest with the Cisalpine 
 Gauls on their flank. Thus Spain became the Car- 
 thaginian base at the outset of the second Punic War. 
 H. 2
 
 l8 HANNIBAL IN THE RHONE VALLEY. 
 
 His colleague Sempronius having duly set out with 
 his fleet and army for Sicily in the spring of the year 
 B.C. 218, Scipio was about to embark for Spain, when 
 news arrived of the critical state of affairs in Cisalpine 
 Gaul. For the origin of the wars waged intermittently 
 with the Cisalpine Gauls by the Romans for two 
 centuries before their final subjugation in B.C. 191, we 
 must go back to the sack and burning of Rome, B.C. 
 390 — a disaster brought about accidentally by the 
 wanton interference of Romans in the struggle between 
 the Gauls and Etruscans. 
 
 For having, about 20 years before, driven the Etrus- 
 cans from the Po valley out of all but a few excep- 
 tionally strong places, such as Mantua, inaccessible 
 from its surrounding marshes, the Cisalpine Gauls, their 
 numbers constantly swollen by fresh swarms of their 
 Transalpine kinsmen, had overflowed first into Umbria, 
 and thence through the passes of the Apennines into 
 Etruria proper. 
 
 They might have stopped short of attacking Rome, 
 had the Roman ambassadors abstained from joining in 
 the hostilities before Clusium. But once blood was 
 shed between Romans and Gauls, it was destined to 
 flow in a never-ending stream. Sometimes against the 
 Cisalpine Gauls single-handed, at others against Cis- 
 alpines banded with Etrurians or Samnites, and some- 
 times in alliance with Transalpine Gaesatae, or mer- 
 cenaries, the Romans waged bloody wars with fluctuating 
 success between B.C. 390 and the final subjugation of the 
 Boii by Scipio Nasica B.C. 191. 
 
 The defeat of the Romans 390 B.C. at the battle of 
 the Allia, followed by the sack and burning of Rome 
 by the Gauls, had been a rude beginning of relations 
 between the Eternal City and the Gallic tribes. It was 
 a lesson, which was branded deep into the flesh of 
 Romans. As long as the Republic lasted, there was an 
 ever present sense in Roman breasts of overwhelming 
 danger in the background from Gallic invasion. The
 
 CHAP. II. 19 
 
 subjugation of Gallia Cisalpina and its constitution B.C. 
 191 as a Roman province by no means put an end to 
 their fears. For what the Romans really dreaded was 
 the vague limitless ' Gaul ' outside and wrapping round 
 Gallia Cisalpina — itself a mere reservoir fed by the vast 
 ocean of barbarians ahvays ready to flow over the Alps 
 into Italy. This Gaul beyond the Alps must by no 
 means be confined to the Roman Province Gallia 
 Transalpina, answering to modern France. To be 
 rightly understood, it must be conceived of as including 
 all the countries separated from Italy by the whole 
 semicircle of the Alps. Other wars waged by the 
 Romans were wars, but Gallic wars were declared 
 ' tumultus,' which required militar}- service of old and 
 young. A special fund was always in reserve in the 
 Treasury to meet the expense of Gallic irruptions — a 
 fund which was scrupulously respected and left un- 
 touched till Julius Caesar seized it at the close of his 
 conquest of Gaul on the ground that his victories had 
 put an end to further danger from that quarter. 
 
 To exterminate the Senones, the nearest of Gallic 
 settlers to Roman territory, and wipe out the insult of 
 the burning of Rome, required a hundred years of 
 intermittent fighting. It was not till B.C. 283 that the 
 first Roman colony — Sena Gallica on the coast of the 
 Adriatic — was founded on soil won back from Gallic 
 invaders of Italy. 
 
 It was next the turn of the gallant Boii, and their 
 allies the Insubres, to encounter the Roman arms. The 
 first period of the war against these tribes had lasted 
 about 60 years, when, despairing of holding out longer, 
 after their chief centre Mediolanum (Milan) had fallen 
 into the hands of the Romans, the Boii and Insubres 
 sued for peace, giving hostages as a guarantee of ab- 
 stention from further hostilities. As the territory of 
 these two tribes was the most fertile and central of 
 Cisalpine Gaul, the Romans determined to plant at 
 Placentia on the south bank of the Po, and at Cremona 
 
 2 — 2
 
 20 HANNIBAL IN THE RHONE VALLEY. 
 
 a few miles to the north of that river, strong miHtary 
 colonies, which should hold the Gauls in check. 
 
 Hardly were the hostages handed over, and peace 
 concluded, when emissaries from Hannibal arrived to 
 announce his projected invasion, and excite the Gauls 
 of the Cisalpine to fresh insurrection. Without hesita- 
 tion, the Gauls, responding to Hannibal's summons, 
 threw themselves in overwhelming numbers on the three 
 Roman commissioners, engaged in the act of parcelling 
 out the confiscated Gallic territory amongst the newly 
 arrived colonists, 6,000 of whom were destined to occupy 
 Placentia, and 6,000 Cremona\ 
 
 Of neither of these places were the defences suffi- 
 ciently completed to offer adequate protection to the 
 colonists, who were taken completely by surprise. The 
 sight of these chains forging for their future subjection 
 excited the Gauls to such a degree, that they drove the 
 commissioners and colonists clean off the ground ; they 
 fled for their lives as far as Mutina (Modena), where 
 they at last found shelter. 
 
 To aid in rescuing the beleaguered commissioners, 
 and in re-establishing Roman authority in Cisalpine 
 Gaul, the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio found himself 
 under the necessity of detaching under the praetor 
 Atilius one of the two legions with which he was about 
 to start for Spain. It was clear that the Romans had 
 got a Gallic, as well as a Carthaginian, war on hand. If 
 the two should combine, and the Gauls find in Hannibal 
 a leader capable of welding their forces into a solid 
 mass, the outlook for the Romans would be desperate. 
 It was more than ever urgent to keep Hannibal out of 
 Italy. 
 
 However, to raise a new legion was a work of time, 
 and the summer was well advanced, when at last Scipio 
 got under way with his flotilla of sixty quinquiremes, 
 conveying 8,000 Roman and 14,000 allied infantry, with 
 600 Roman and 1,600 allied cavalry. Of Scipio's voyage 
 
 1 Polyb. III. 40.
 
 CHAP. II. 21 
 
 we read in Polybius (I quote from Mr Shuckburgh's 
 translation), "Publius Cornelius Scipio coasted along 
 Liguria, and crossing in five days from Pisae to Mar- 
 seilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of the 
 Rhone, called the mouth of Marseilles, and began dis- 
 embarking his troops'." From Livy we learn that during 
 the latter part of the voyage the Roman flotilla sailed 
 past the mountains of the Salyes (Salluvii), and that 
 the sea being rough, the troops were on their arrival 
 incapacitated by sea-sickness for immediate opera- 
 tionsl 
 
 From the classical narratives, one would be inclined 
 to infer that Marseilles was situated at the mouth of the 
 Rhone^ As a matter of fact, that city lies at least 
 twenty miles to the eastward of its most easterly branch, 
 and is completely separated from the Rhone by the 
 Etang de Berre, a vast salt-water lake, and by several 
 ranges of limestone hills. Along the foot of the hills 
 which shut in the city of Marseilles on the north there 
 intervenes a sheltered underclifif some five miles in width, 
 forming a picturesque approach to the sea, in pleasing 
 contrast to the bare plateau traversed to the north of the 
 range. To cultivate and at the same time garrison this 
 fertile band of territory, the Phocaean traders took into 
 their service friendly Celts, who served as a convenient 
 buffer between them and their persistent assailants the 
 Ligurian Salyes. The city itself was originally confined 
 to the peninsula to the west of its almost land-locked 
 harbour, which was unconnected with any fresh-water 
 inlet. 
 
 In selecting this site for their city, the Phocaeans 
 shewed the greatest sagacity. For every Mediterranean 
 river-mouth gets sooner or later silted up and rendered 
 useless as a harbour. Such is notably the case with the 
 
 * Polyb. III. 41. 
 
 ^ Livy XXI. 26. The mountains of the Salluvii are now called 'Las 
 Maures,' extending from Hyeres to the valley of the Argens. 
 
 8 See Maps of Bouches du Rhone and Plan of ancient Marseilles.
 
 22 HANNIBAL IN THE RHONE VALLEY. 
 
 Rhone, the navigation of which even in the days of 
 Caius Marius was so difficult, that that commander, 
 while awaiting the invasion of the Cimbri and Teutones, 
 had to cut a separate channel, by which to convey 
 supplies from the sea to his camp on Les Alpines — a 
 jagged and picturesque range of hills cutting the Rhone 
 valley at a right angle near Tarascon. 
 
 Considering the friendly relations existing between 
 the Romans and Massiliots, it was only natural that 
 Scipio should call at Marseilles on his way to Spain, 
 with the view of getting news of Hannibal's latest 
 movements. Being in constant communication by 
 means of swift despatch boats with their important 
 trading station Emporia, at the foot of the Pyrenees, 
 the Massiliots were well posted in the proceedings of 
 the Carthaginians in that quarter. 
 
 Great was the astonishment and disappointment of 
 Scipio, when he learned from the friendly Massiliots 
 that their common enemy Hannibal, whom Scipio still 
 fondly hoped to encounter in Spain, had not only 
 crossed the Pyrenees, but had already reached the 
 Rhone. This must have happened about the end of 
 July or early in August. 
 
 Upon receiving this intelligence, Scipio at once 
 despatched up the Rhone valley a cavalry reconnais- 
 sance, consisting of 3(X) legionary horsemen with some 
 of the friendly Celts ^ in the pay of the Massiliots as 
 guides, with orders to find out the exact whereabouts 
 of the Carthaginian army. For Scipio did not yet 
 despair of co-operating with the Volcae in effectually 
 opposing Hannibal's passage of the Rhone. 
 
 But the Carthaginian general had again been too 
 quick for the Romans. For after his descent from the 
 Pyrenees on lUiberis, Hannibal, by means of bribes and 
 persuasion, was so successful in winning over the Gallic 
 kinglets (' reguli ') assembled at Ruscino (Roussillon), 
 
 ^ Probably the Albici referred to in Caesar's Di Bella Civili, I. c. 34, 
 inhabitants of the modern city of Riez, Dept. Basses Alpes.
 
 To face p. 23]
 
 CHAP. II. 23 
 
 that they not only allowed him to pass unmolested, but 
 supplied him with timber for the construction of rafts 
 and canoes for the transport of his forces across the 
 Rhone\ However, at the actual point of his crossing, 
 Roquemaure, on a level with Orange, four days' march 
 from the sea (so arranged as to take him above the 
 junction of, and avoid the difficult passage of, the 
 Durance at Avignon), Hannibal ultimately found him- 
 self opposed by some Volcae, who at that period appear 
 to have occupied territory on the left bank of the 
 Rhone, opposite their main settlements on the right 
 bank. 
 
 To overcome this show of opposition to his passage 
 of the Rhone in front, Hannibal sent round a party, 
 chiefly consisting of Spaniards under Hanno, to a point 
 higher up the river, where a large island facilitated the 
 passage. Having crossed successfully, the Spaniards 
 floating over on their clothes stretched on bladders, 
 Hanno, descending the left bank, threw the ranks of 
 the Volcae into confusion by setting fire to the camp in 
 their rear. So Hannibal efiected his passage practically 
 unopposed, the "i^"] elephants being got over last. 
 
 While the somewhat tedious operation of conveying 
 the elephants over was in progress, Hannibal, who had 
 meanwhile been informed of the disembarcation of 
 Scipio's army at the Massiliot mouth of the Rhone, 
 despatched a body of 500 Numidian horsemen to re- 
 connoitre the enemy. So completely was the Numidian 
 rider at one with his horse, that he used no bridle to 
 guide him. Falling in with the cavalry sent forward by 
 Scipio, the Numidians attacked them with their usual 
 impetuosity. A desperate melee ensued, in which about 
 200 were slain on either side. But the Romans eventu- 
 ally got the better of it, and drove the Numidians back 
 to the Carthaginian camp. This was the first Roman 
 blood shed in Transalpine Gaul. 
 
 While Hannibal hesitated between accepting the 
 
 1 Polyb. III. 42.
 
 24 HANNIBAL IN THE RHONE VALLEY. 
 
 battle which Scipio was anxious to force upon him 
 and continuing his march direct to the Alps, Magalus, 
 one of their chiefs, and other envoys of the Cisalpine 
 Boii, arrived in camp in the nick of time, offering them- 
 selves as guides, and protesting their readiness to share 
 the risks of the passage. As the envoys of the Boii had 
 themselves just crossed the Alps, their presence was the 
 best proof which could be offered to the hesitating 
 Carthaginians of the feasibility of the passage. The 
 Boii, being in the habit of getting over Gaesatae or 
 Transalpine mercenaries to assist them in their wars 
 with the Romans, naturally made light of the difficulties 
 of the Alps. Yielding to these representations, the 
 Carthaginians broke up their camp, pitched at the point, 
 four days' march from the sea, where the crossing of 
 the Rhone had been effected. In four more days they 
 reached the junction of the Rhone and the Isere, forming 
 the fertile island described by Polybius^ making together 
 eight days' march. 
 
 From the present distance of about 120 miles from 
 the mouth of the Rhone to the so-called island at its 
 junction with the Isere, we must deduct at least eight to 
 allow for the alluvial deposit brought down by the 
 Rhone in 2000 years. This would leave 112 miles, 
 which at the rate of 14 miles a day would just require 
 eight days to accomplish. The four days' march of 56 
 miles from the sea would thus agree with fixing the site 
 of Hannibal's passage of the Rhone at the village of 
 Roquemaure, on a level with Orange. 
 
 The first day's march from Orange northwards lying 
 across a level plain, the Carthaginians would have 
 encountered no serious obstacle, as the channels of the 
 not-unfrequent torrents would have been dry in the late 
 summer. As it was now Hannibal's immediate object 
 to avoid an encounter v/ith the Romans, he doubtless 
 availed himself of the favourable nature of the ground 
 to put as great a distance as possible between himself 
 
 ^ Polyb. HI. 39.
 
 CHAP. II. 25 
 
 and Scipio by exceeding his average marching-distance 
 on the first day. 
 
 It is therefore probable that he pushed on as far as 
 Donzere, some twenty miles north of Orange, where the 
 wide plain of Provence suddenly ceases, and the Rhone 
 enters the first of the narrow gorges which recur at 
 intervals for the rest of its course. It is at Donzere, 
 where a picturesque line of mediaeval towers and forti- 
 fications now crowns the heights commanding the en- 
 trance of the gorge, that the brightness of the Midi 
 ends, or begins, according to the direction in which the 
 traveller is proceeding. 
 
 As one surveys the almost limitless plain stretching 
 southward, and presenting quite oriental features, one 
 realizes how completely the white burnooses of the 
 Numidians, the turbans of the Africans, and the line 
 of the elephants must have harmonized with the land- 
 scape. One reflects too that if Hannibal had meant 
 fighting, the plain was his opportunity with his vast 
 superiority of cavalry. But he knew how much de- 
 pended on his getting safely over the Alps before the 
 weather broke up, and wisely determined to allow 
 nothing to detain him on the lower Rhone. Had he 
 adhered to this prudent resolution, instead of wasting 
 precious weeks in the country of the Allobroges, 
 Hannibal would have avoided the loss of half his army 
 in crossing the Alps. 
 
 Once the gorge of Donzere was entered, the march- 
 ing must have become more difficult and the rate slower. 
 The second camping ground was probably Montelimar, 
 and the third the junction of the Drome with the Rhone, 
 between Livron and Loriol. That no mention is made 
 of even so considerable a river as the Drome, shows how 
 meagre was the information about the local geography 
 possessed either by Polybius or Livy. The fourth day's 
 march brought Hannibal to the junction of the Isere 
 with the Rhone — the only point we can determine with 
 absolute certainty on the whole march.
 
 26 HANNIBAL IN THE RHONE VALLEY. 
 
 On the third day after Hannibal had quitted it, 
 Scipio arrived in order of battle at the deserted Cartha- 
 ginian camp on the Rhone opposite Roquemaure. 
 Recognizing the hopelessness of overtaking the enemy, 
 the Roman commander at once decided to march back 
 to the mouth of the Rhone. There he immediately 
 re-embarked his army, which he despatched to Spain 
 under his brother Cnaeus, realizing the importance of 
 cutting Hannibal off from his base in that country. 
 Retaining but a handful of followers, Publius Scipio 
 himself sailed back to Genoa, purposing to take over 
 from the praetors Manlius and Atilius the legions under 
 their orders in Cisalpine Gaul. It was Scipio's intention 
 to be ready with these troops to oppose Hannibal on 
 his descent from the Alps into the Po valley.
 
 CHAPTER III. 
 
 Hannibal's passage of the Alps. 
 
 That it is still an open question, and one which will 
 probably never be cleared up, by what pass Hannibal 
 actually crossed the Alps, is mainly due to the incom- 
 petence of Polybius as a geographer and to his almost 
 total suppression of names, in spite of his undertaking 
 to make them intelligible to his readers\ 
 
 Instead of invaluable local names, Polybius proceeds 
 to offer to his readers an irrelevant dissertation on the 
 celestial and terrestrial globes ^ 
 
 When he descends to particulars he writes, " The 
 Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic GulfV' and 
 goes on to describe the ridges of the Alps, as "beginning 
 at Marseilles and extending up to the head of the 
 Adriatic," concluding as follows — " I speak with confi- 
 dence on these points, because I have questioned persons 
 actually engaged on the facts, and have inspected the 
 country and gone over the Alpine pass myself, in order 
 to inform myself of the truth and see with my own 
 eyes\" 
 
 Of Hannibal's passage of the Iscre, a deep and con- 
 siderable river at its junction with the Rhone near 
 Valence, we are not told a word. Yet, in order to act 
 as arbitrator between the rival claims of the two 
 brothers to the principacy of the Allobroges inhabiting 
 
 ^ Polyb. HI. 36. - Polyb. ni. 36, 37. 
 
 " Polyb. HI. 47. * Polyb. HI. 48.
 
 28 HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. 
 
 the ' insula,' to the north of that river, we must infer 
 that he did cross it. 
 
 We are however told by Polybius^ that, after arriving 
 at the junction of the Rhone and the Isere, the Cartha- 
 ginians continued to march for ten days by the side of 
 " tJie river" — a distance of 800 stades (100 miles). Read 
 in conjunction with a previous passage^ we must con- 
 clude that the Rhone is the river intended by Polybius. 
 Yet a march of 100 miles by that river would have 
 carried Hannibal 40 miles beyond Lyons, quite out 
 of his way to the north without bringing him to the 
 foot of the Alps. No known writer has been bold or 
 consistent enough to follow the text of Polybius in 
 adopting such an improbable course. The truth seems 
 to be that Polybius was mistaken in his river, but right 
 as to distance. For a march of 100 miles up the Isere 
 would have just brought Hannibal to the foot of the 
 Alps and the beginning of his difficulties. He would, 
 too, in this case have been marching in the right direc- 
 tion, viz. east, towards the Alps and Italy. I am 
 therefore decidedly of opinion that the river followed 
 from the junction was the Isere and not the Rhone. 
 
 By making Hannibal follow the course of the Isere 
 for a hundred miles eastwards, I do not commit myself 
 definitely to a continuous march either on the right or 
 left bank of that river. It is sufficient for my argument 
 to show that the main body of the Carthaginian army 
 followed the course of the Isere for 100 Roman miles, 
 i.e. as far as its junction with the Arc near St Pierre 
 d'Albigny, where the Mont Cenis Railway branches 
 from the Isere Valley to reach the Alps by the valley 
 of the Arc. I believe that Hannibal followed precisely 
 the same course. 
 
 In drawing attention to the fact that St Pierre 
 d'Albigny is just 100 miles from the island of Polybius, 
 and precisely on the direct road to Turin where Hannibal 
 is first heard of, on emerging from the Alps, I think 
 
 1 Polyb. III. 50. 2 Polyb. III. 39.
 
 CHAP. III. 29 
 
 I may fairly claim to have rendered it more probable 
 that the Isere was the river followed by Hannibal than 
 the Rhone. 
 
 That Hannibal with the bulk of his army crossed to 
 the northern or right bank of the Isere and passed some 
 time in the above mentioned fertile island, must be 
 admitted as most probable. For the arbitration between 
 the conflicting claims of the two princes and the 
 supplying to Hannibal's army a fresh outfit of arms, 
 clothes and boots by the elder brother Brancus in return 
 for the decision in his favour, could hardly have been 
 conducted outside the limits of the country of the 
 Allobroges. 
 
 When, on the completion of these operations, the 
 Carthaginian army was again set in motion, it was 
 conducted by the adherents of Brancus across the plains 
 towards the Alps, and probably recrossed the Isere to 
 its left bank near Grenoble. It was probably the heights, 
 which command that city, which were found in the 
 hostile occupation of the unfriendly section of the 
 Allobroges, which sided with the younger brother. 
 
 It being impossible to arrive at absolute certainty as 
 to the actual pass by which Hannibal crossed the Alps, 
 we shall perhaps get nearest the truth by striking a 
 balance between the accounts, given by Polybius and 
 Livy respectively, rejecting those statements in each, 
 which are irreconcileable with topographical require- 
 ments, of which they were both very ill informed. 
 
 Guided by these considerations, it becomes necessary 
 in my opinion to reject that part of Livy's itinerary, by 
 which Hannibal is made to double back unnecessarily 
 at least four days' march to the south to the Durance ; 
 the difficulties of the passage of which shifting river are 
 so graphically described by the Latin historian. 
 
 For it was the foreknowledge of and the desire to 
 avoid these very difficulties which originally determined 
 Hannibal to cross the Rhone at Roqucmaure above 
 Avignon, just below which city the Durance effects its
 
 30 HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. 
 
 junction with that river. He would otherwise have 
 crossed lower down at the "Trajectus Rhodani^" — 
 between Aries and Avignon — where from the earliest 
 times travellers between Spain and Italy were ferried 
 over the Rhone and where, in our own day, travellers 
 branch from the main P.L.M. line for Spain. It seems 
 then hard to believe, that once in the valley of the Isere, 
 four days' march to the northward of the Durance, 
 Hannibal would have wantonly re-traced his steps so 
 far southwards, this time across the intricate and barren 
 spurs of the Department of the Basses Alpes. 
 
 For rejecting Livy's deflection of Hannibal's march 
 to the southward and passage of the Durance, we are 
 supported by the authority of Mommsen, who carries 
 Hannibal up the Rhone valley towards Lyons, as far as 
 Vienne, and thence across the plains of the Allobroges 
 to the Mont du Chat, bringing him down by an abrupt 
 descent upon the Lac du Bourget, 
 
 While I agree with Mommsen in rejecting Livy's 
 narrative, I disagree entirely with him in bringing 
 Hannibal quite out of his way up into a narrow trap 
 between a bend of the Rhone and the Lac du Bourget, 
 when it was open to him to get back into the Isere 
 Valley over an easy col now utilized by the Lyons- 
 Grenoble railway. 
 
 That at St Pierre d'Albigny, a little above Mont- 
 melian, Hannibal quitted the Isere for the Arc valley 
 seems on the whole most probable. This, as I have 
 already observed, is the course followed by the Mt 
 Cenis railway, and is the direct line over the Alps from 
 the country of the Allobroges to that of the Taurini, 
 amongst whom, according to both Livy- and Polybius^ 
 Hannibal descended. Had Hannibal continued to 
 follow the Isere to its source and crossed the Little 
 
 ^ See map, p. 12. 
 
 2 Livy XXI. 38. " The tribe that he first encountered on his descent 
 into Italy were the Taurini " (Church and Brodribb's Translation). 
 ^ Polybius, quoted by Strabo, p. 209.
 
 CHAP. III. 31 
 
 St Bernard, he must have descended on Aosta, the 
 country of the Salassi. It was over the Little St Bernard 
 that the first carriage road was constructed over the Alps. 
 
 Those authors who adopt the Pass of the Mt Genevre 
 ignore the fact that Pompey, who first opened up that 
 pass on his road to Spain, expressly states in his letter 
 to the Senate to be found in Sallust {Belluin Jiigur- 
 thimim, Teubner edition, appendix) that it was not the 
 route followed by Hannibal. 
 
 While for the general topographical reasons stated 
 above, I incline on the whole to accept one or other of 
 the Mt Cenis passes, as that crossed by Hannibal, I 
 cannot shut my eyes to the strong claims of the Col de 
 I'Argentiere, if the question is to be decided by the 
 authority of texts alone. 
 
 If Livy is to be mainly relied upon, I consider that 
 his narrative, of which the passage of the Durance forms 
 a striking feature, fits in with the Col de I'Argentiere 
 much better than with the Mt Genevre. For had the 
 Mt Genevre been the pass intended by Livy, there would 
 have been no occasion to cross the Durance at all. For 
 on striking the Durance valley, after surmounting the 
 pass separating it from that of the Drac, Hannibal 
 would have naturally marched up the right bank of 
 the Durance to its source in the Mt Genevre. Whereas 
 he must have crossed it (as described by Livy), to get 
 to the Col de I'Argentiere. 
 
 I admit that, as Mr Douglas Freshfield forcibly 
 shows in his Alpine Pass of Hannibal^, one must either 
 reject the evidence of Varro or accept the Col de 
 I'Argentiere. For in the enumeration of the five passes" 
 known to the Romans of his day {i.e. the latter years 
 of the republic), Varro's No. 2 can refer to no other than 
 the Col de I'Argentiere. On the other hand No. 2 in 
 the order of the four passes named by Polybius^ of 
 
 1 Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society, October No. 1886. 
 ^ Preserved by Servius on I'irg. Aen. X. p. 13. 
 3 Quoted by Strabo, p. 209.
 
 32 HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. 
 
 which Mr Freshfield makes no mention, expressly speci- 
 fies the descent of Hannibal on Turin, and therefore 
 cannot apply to the Col de I'Argentiere, which leads by 
 the valley of the Stura to Cuneo — fifty-five miles south 
 of Turin. 
 
 In order to assist the reader to understand the whole 
 question, I subjoin the two lists of the western passes of 
 the Alps used by the Romans, with their modern names. 
 
 Five Passes of Varro. Four Passes of Polybius. 
 
 (In both lists the numbering is from South to North.) 
 
 (i) Una quae est juxta mare (a) 8ia Aiyuuv fxkv tt]v i-yyiara. 
 
 per Ligures. r(^ Hvpp7]vi.K(^ TreXdyei. 
 
 (Cornice or Alpes Mari- (Cornice or Alpes Mari- 
 
 times. Turbia pass.) times. Turbia pass.) 
 
 (2) Ahera qua Hannibal trans- (/3) eTraTTivdiaTavpivuv (Turin) 
 iit. TJJ' ^Auvi^as diijXdev. 
 
 (Coldel'Argentiere. Ubaye- (Mt CenisorMont Genevre.) 
 
 Stura valleys.) (7) etra rrjv dia "ZaXdcra-uv. 
 
 (3) Tertia qua Pompeius ad (Petit St Bernard and the 
 Hispaniense bellum profectus est. Val d'Aoste.) 
 
 (Mont Genevre. Durance- (5) elra rrjv dia 'FairQv. 
 
 Doria Riparia valleys.) (Brenner.) 
 
 (4) Quarta, qua Hasdrubal de 
 Gallia in Italiam venit. (Mt Cenis.) 
 
 (5) Quinta quae quondam a 
 Graecis possessa est. 
 
 (Petit St Bernard and Val 
 d'Aoste (Doria Baltea).)i 
 
 To Livy, who wrote in the reign of Augustus, more 
 than a century after Polybius, from whom he borrowed 
 the main features of his narrative, though he diverged 
 from him so v/idely in bringing Hannibal down to the 
 Durance, we are indebted for the few invaluable names 
 preserved in connection with Hannibal's march from the 
 Pyrenees to the Alps. It is in Livy that we find 
 recorded the names of the townships lUiberis, Ruscino, 
 
 ^ The modern name Aosta is derived from the ancient Augusta 
 Praetoria, — so called from the fact that Augustus made it a station of his 
 Praetorian cohorts. The .Salassi — the inhabitants of the Val d'Aoste — paid 
 the penalty for having stolen the Emperor's baggage by being sold as slaves.
 
 CHAP. III. 33 
 
 and of the tribes of the Volcae, Tricastini, Vocontii, 
 and Tricorii. But it is strange that no mention should 
 be made of the important confederation of the Cavari, 
 occupying the left bank of the Rhone above the Durance, 
 through whose territory lay Hannibal's four days' march 
 from the passage of the Rhone to its junction with the 
 Isere\ 
 
 Neither the Greek nor the Latin historian attempts 
 any description of the physical features of the Rhone 
 valley, nor enlivens his narrative by any reference to 
 the mode of life, or degree of civilization attained by 
 the natives. We get no general information, such as 
 Herodotus, Caesar, or Strabo would have afforded. We 
 are left completely in the dark as to the existence of 
 any native settlements at Nimes, Aries, Avignon or 
 Vienne, though all those places must have been of 
 considerable importance. Of the latter place, as the 
 chief settlement of the Allobroges, and presumably the 
 depot whence were drawn the arms and clothes supplied 
 by Brancus to Hannibal, we should at least have 
 expected some mention. To have sufficed to fit out 
 50,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, of which Hannibal's 
 army in the Rhone valley consisted, the factories of the 
 Allobroges must have been very extensive. 
 
 Although we get no precise information on the point 
 from either Polybius or Livy, it seems certain that 
 Hannibal must have been considerably delayed in the 
 country of the Allobroges by the business of arbitrating 
 between the contending brothers and of refitting his 
 army. He paid dearly for this expenditure of precious 
 time. For his passage of the Alps, which a month earlier 
 would have been accomplished with comparative ease, 
 as far as the elements were concerned, proved from the 
 break-up of the weather so disastrous, that more than 
 half his army perished. 
 
 ^ The Cavari occupied riparian territory on the E. of the Rhone, 
 between the Isere and the Durance, while the Ligurian Vocontii occupied 
 a parallel zone across the spurs of the Alps. 
 
 H- 3
 
 34 HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE OF THE ALPS. 
 
 Of the 50,000 infantry and 1 2,000 cavalry with which 
 Hannibal approached the Alps, only 20,000 infantry 
 (viz. 12,000 Africans and 8000 Spaniards) and 6000 
 cavalry survived to reach Italy. As, partly owing to 
 the supineness of the Carthaginian Government, partly 
 to the Roman superiority at sea, Hannibal appears to 
 have received no reinforcements either from Spain or 
 Africa till after the battle of Cannae, two years later, 
 (B.C. 216), it is certain that the bulk of the so-called 
 Carthaginian armies with which he gained his greatest 
 victories over the Romans consisted of Gauls and Li- 
 cfurians. At Cannae alone Hannibal's losses consisted 
 of 4000 of the latter to only 1500 Spaniards and 
 Africans ^ 
 
 In spite, however, of the warmth of their invitation 
 to Hannibal to come amongst them and the protesta- 
 tions of their readiness to flock to his standard, the 
 Cisalpine Gauls at first held aloof, probably deterred 
 by the presence of the superior forces of the Romans. 
 The cavalry encounter near the river Ticinus, to which 
 the narrow escape of the consul Publius Scipio, badly 
 wounded in the affray and rescued by the gallantry of 
 his son, the future Scipio Africanus, lent its chief im- 
 portance, was not in itself decisive enough to change 
 the attitude of the Gauls. But, after the victory of the 
 Carthaginians at the Trebia, to which the desertion of a 
 Gallic contingent serving under the Romans largely 
 contributed, the ever-dwindling force of Hannibal was 
 recruited by sixty thousand Gauls and Ligurians. With 
 this swollen army, in defiance of the season — it was the 
 depth of winter — Hannibal pushed on up the valley of 
 the Trebia into the heart of the Apennines, hoping to 
 descend upon Etruria by the valley of the Magra, and 
 to excite that province to revolt against the Romans. 
 But the violence of the wind and the intensity of the 
 cold exceeding even his Alpine experiences, compelled 
 him to desist and retrace his steps down the Trebia to 
 
 1 Polyb. ni. 117.
 
 CHAP. III. 35 
 
 within ten miles of Placentia, where the Roman legions 
 were recovering from their recent defeat. 
 
 In spite of their sorry plight, the Carthaginians on 
 the following day offered battle, which was again readily 
 accepted by the consul Sempronius — the same com- 
 mander whose rashness had occasioned the defeat of the 
 Trebia. 
 
 On this occasion, however, the fighting, which was 
 exceptionally desperate at the outset, was prematurely 
 put a stop to by nightfall, and led to no decisive result. 
 Failing in his attempt to get possession of Placentia, 
 Hannibal withdrew into Liguria (whether the Liguria 
 to the north or south of the Apennines is not expressly 
 stated), where he passed the remainder of his first winter 
 in Italy\ 
 
 Having followed Hannibal from the foot of the 
 Pyrenees into Liguria, we must take leave of him there 
 in the late winter of B.C. 218 or the early spring of 217. 
 
 1 Livy, XXI. 59. 
 
 3—2
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Invasions of Cisalpine Gaul and Liguria by 
 Hasdrubal and Mago. 
 
 For the next ten years of the second Punic War, 
 B.C. 217 — 208, during which the Romans were actively- 
 engaged with Hannibal in central and southern Italy, 
 nothing of importance occurred in the regions within the 
 range of this work. But the spring of B.C. 207 is notable 
 for the rapid march of Hasdrubal from Spain through 
 the western passes of the Pyrenees into Gaul, and across 
 the Rhone valley to the Alps. On this occasion, not 
 only did the Gauls, as Livy tells us\ everywhere receive 
 him favourably, but contingents of the powerful Arverni 
 and other tribes followed him into Italy. 
 
 The Alpine nations too, who had given Hannibal so 
 much trouble, allowed Hasdrubal to pass unmolested, 
 realizing by this time that the Carthaginians only wanted 
 a road through the Alps by the passage which Hannibal 
 had opened up, probably over the Mont Cenis. For the 
 Durance valley route, as I explained in the preceding 
 chapter, leading over the Mont Genevre pass from the 
 lower Rhone valley, lay much too far south to have ever 
 served as a convenient passage from central Gaul into 
 Italy. 
 
 When the news of Hasdrubal's unexpected arrival 
 in the valley of the Po, and of a contingent of 8000 
 Ligurians being prepared to join him, was sent to Rome 
 by L. Porcius, the praetor, who commanded a weak 
 
 ^ Livy, XXVII. 39.
 
 CHAP. IV. 37 
 
 force in Cisalpine Gaul, the greatest consternation pre- 
 vailed. If the junction between Hasdrubal and Hannibal 
 could only be effected, the Romans, barely able to hold 
 their ground against Hannibal alone, must inevitably be 
 crushed. 
 
 If Hasdrubal had only pushed on at once, there was 
 nothing to have stopped him from joining his brother. 
 But his evil star drove him to waste the precious time 
 gained by his rapid march, in laying siege to the now 
 impregnable fortress of Placentia, which, even with its in- 
 complete defences, had defied Hannibal ten years earlier. 
 It was this delay which enabled the consul Claudius Nero, 
 who commanded against Hannibal in southern Italy, 
 to form and carry out the daring conception of rapidly 
 transporting 7000 of his picked troops to reinforce his 
 plebeian colleague Livius, who with an inadequate 
 force was fearfully awaiting Hasdrubal's advance in 
 Umbria. It was the crushing defeat of Hasdrubal at 
 the battle of the river Metaurus, resulting from this 
 brilliant manoeuvre, which practically decided the second 
 Punic War in favour of the Romans, However, in the 
 summer of B.C. 205, two years after the defeat and death 
 of Hasdrubal, while Hannibal still held on to the 
 Lacinian promontory in Bruttii, the Carthaginians de- 
 termined to make one more attempt to create a diversion 
 in Liguria by exciting a rising of Ligurians and Gauls. 
 
 This time it was to be the turn of the youngest 
 brother Mago to try his hand at retrieving the failing 
 fortunes of Hannibal. Thrice, in the first year of the 
 war, had Mago distinguished himself by his daring. 
 First, after the cavalry engagement on the Ticino, where 
 Publius Scipio was wounded and driven back, it was 
 Mago who had swum the Po with his Numidians in 
 pursuit of the retreating enemy ; at the Trebia, it was 
 he who decided the battle by rising in the rear of the 
 Romans from ambush, and throwing them into confu- 
 sion ; and it was Mago to whom Hannibal confided the 
 hard task of keeping the Gallic contingent up to the
 
 38 INVASIONS OF CISALPINE GAUL AND LIGURIA. 
 
 mark in the trying march through the Etruscan marshes, 
 which cost Hannibal the loss of an eye. 
 
 SaiHng from the island of Minorca, where he had 
 passed the winter, with 30 war-ships and a fleet of 
 transports conveying 12,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 
 a number of elephants, Mago made a sudden descent on 
 Genoa, which he captured without striking a blow'. 
 However, not feeling strong enough to retain possession 
 of so important a place — for, like Marseilles, Genoa was 
 in intimate alliance with Rome, and used as a friendly 
 port by the Romans — he set fire to the town and with- 
 drew with his rich booty to Savona, where he deposited 
 it in the custody of his allies, the Ligures Alpini. 
 
 At this time the Ligurians of the Western Riviera 
 were engaged in internecine warfare. The lowland 
 Ingauni — a comparatively civilized tribe occupying the 
 coast at Albenga, were at war with the Epanterii — a 
 highland people dwelling among the Ligurian Alps. 
 By making an alliance with the Ingauni Mago secured 
 at once a footing on the coast and access to the pass 
 over the Apennines by the valley of the Centa, which 
 falls into the sea at Albenga. His first step was doubt- 
 less to seize the rocky island of Gallinara, which lies 
 like a guardship off the shore. 
 
 Occupying the widest and most fertile plain to be 
 met with on the whole Riviera, the Ingauni could always 
 supply the necessaries of life to coasting navigation, 
 and were brought earlier into contact with traders than 
 their less fortunate neighbours. It was for this reason 
 that Mago selected Albenga for the base of his opera- 
 tions, reckoning on finding there abundance of corn, 
 fresh food, and forage, of which his men and beasts must 
 have stood in urgent need after their long sea voyage. 
 
 Joining in a successful attack on the Epanterii 
 Montani, Mago got his share of the prisoners captured, 
 whom he at once despatched to Carthage with the 
 plunder secured at Genoa, being anxious to lose no time 
 
 1 Livy, XXVIII. 46.
 
 CHAP. IV. 39 
 
 in sending home proof of the success of his expedition. 
 Unluckily, however, for him, 80 of his merchantmen 
 were made prizes by the Roman admiral, Cnaeus 
 Octavius, who kept a sharp look-out from his station off 
 the island of Sardinia. 
 
 While Mago still lay with his fleet off Albenga he 
 received direct from Carthage a reinforcement of ships 
 and men, which contrived to escape the vigilance of the 
 Roman admiral. On the strength of this accession of 
 strength, the Carthaginian general at once summoned a 
 council of the chiefs of the Gauls and Ligurians, of both 
 of which nationalities an immense host had flocked into 
 Albenga \ 
 
 Addressing the assembled chiefs, and pointing to the 
 ships just arrived from Carthage, as a proof of the 
 determination of his government to assist them to the 
 utmost of its power in attaining their independence of 
 the Romans, Mago strongly urged the immediate enrol- 
 ment of the largest possible force of Gauls and Ligurians. 
 
 To this appeal, however, neither Gauls nor Ligurians 
 responded with much alacrity. While both nationalities 
 professed willingness to assist, the Gauls begged to be 
 allowed to aid secretly in supplying stores, while the 
 Ligurians asked for two months' delay before enlisting 
 fresh soldiers. 
 
 It must have soon become clear to Mago that neither 
 Gauls nor Ligurians were as ripe for revolt or as ready 
 to take up arms as the Carthaginian government had 
 reckoned on. Having astutely availed themselves of 
 Mago's assistance in their campaign against their high- 
 land enemies the Epanterii, the Ingauni considered that 
 they had had enough of fighting for that year (B.C. 205). 
 
 Like their neighbours the Gauls, the Ligurians were 
 averse to sustained efforts or prolonged campaigns. 
 More than once Roman armies had been saved from 
 annihilation by the withdrawal of the Transalpine 
 Gaesatae, bent on lodging safely at home, or immedi- 
 
 1 Livy, XXIX. 5.
 
 40 INVASIONS OF CISALPINE GAUL AND LIGURIA. 
 
 ately enjoying the booty of a first victory. Irresistible 
 in their first onslaughts, the Gauls failed in the long run 
 to reap any permanent fruit from the terror with which 
 they inspired the Romans at first. 
 
 As far as we can gather from Livy, the year B.C. 204 
 also passed without any active hostilities taking place, 
 although we read of the " imperium" of the commanders 
 M. Livius and Spurius Lucretius being prolonged for 
 the purpose of opposing Mago's expected invasion of 
 Gallia Cisalpina. At all events, it was not till the 
 following year, B.C. 203, by which time Mago had 
 crossed the Apennines^ and penetrated into the territory 
 of the Insubres, that a decisive battle was fought. 
 
 M. Livius and Spurius Lucretius had by this time 
 given up their commands to Quinctilius Varus and 
 M. Cornelius, whose united forces consisted of 16,000 
 Roman and 28,000 allied infantry, with about 3600 
 cavalry. 
 
 We are not told what numbers Mago was able to 
 get together to oppose to the Romans. The battle, 
 however, was most obstinately contested, and the issue 
 doubtful up to the last. It was begun by the infantry, 
 which on both sides held its ground tenaciously, the 
 advantage being rather on the side of the Carthaginians. 
 Observing this, the praetor Quinctilius seized the occa- 
 sion to hurl the whole of his cavalry on the unbroken 
 ranks of the enemy. Led by his high-spirited son 
 Marcus, the Roman cavalry charged home and were 
 carrjn'ng all before them, when Mago opportunely 
 brought up his elephants. Terrified by the trumpeting 
 and smell of the monstrous brutes, the Roman horses, 
 becoming unmanageable, galloped back into the ranks 
 
 ^ Two passes — those of Pieve de Teco and Santo Bernardo — lead from 
 Albenga across the Apennines into Piedmont. The former pass may also 
 be reached from Oneglia. Both passes lead into the valley of the Tanaro. 
 I reached the summit of the San Bernardo after a delightful three hours' 
 drive from Albenga. The view here given was taken at a point midway 
 between the coast and the top of the pass.
 
 [ To face p. 40
 
 CHAP. IV. 41 
 
 of the infantry, pursued by the Numidians, whose dis- 
 charges of javelins told with deadly effect on the 
 confused ranks of the Romans. 
 
 Having so far borne the chief brunt of the fighting, 
 the 1 2th Roman legion was now reduced to a skeleton, 
 and would have been swept off the ground, to which it 
 clung more from shame than from strength^ (as Livy 
 picturesquely expresses it), had not the 13th legion, 
 which had been kept in reserve, come up to the rescue. 
 Upon this Mago, on his side, brought up his reserve, 
 consisting of Gauls. These, however, proved no match 
 for the fresh legion, which promptly changed the aspect 
 of affairs. Warding off the down stroke of the Gallic 
 swords with their spears, and driving back the elephants 
 by discharging their pila into them at close quarters, the 
 gallant 13th promptly cleared the ground of the enemy 
 in front of them. 
 
 Now was the time for a fresh cavalry charge, which 
 was brilliantly executed. But the battle was not yet 
 won. As long as Mago was there to direct operations 
 his Carthaginian infantry maintained the advantage it 
 had gained, in spite of the disorder occasioned by the 
 flight of the Gauls and the elephants. When, however, 
 the brave Mago fell at his post before the standard, 
 fainting from loss of blood, his thigh pierced through, 
 there was no one left to rally round, and Carthaginians, 
 Gauls, and Ligurians were mingled in common flight. 
 On the Carthaginian side the killed amounted to 5000 ; 
 on the Roman to 2300, chiefly belonging to the 12th 
 legion. 
 
 When darkness set in the wounded Mago was borne 
 off the field and carried, as rapidly as the nature of his 
 wound admitted of, up the valley of the Tanaro and over 
 the Col de San Bernardo to his ships, which still lay off 
 Albenga. There he found awaiting him Carthaginian 
 envoys, sent to summon him back to Africa, where every 
 
 ^ Livy, XXX. 18, "pudore magis quam viribus."
 
 42 INVASIONS OF CISALPINE GAUL AND LIGURIA. 
 
 soldier was now required to cope with the desperate 
 situation at home. 
 
 Having suffered grievously, in his wounded state, 
 from the shaking inseparable from his transport over the 
 mountains, Mago was in no condition to turn a deaf ear 
 to the orders from Carthage. The enemy too was 
 pressing on his heels, and the Ingauni, finding them- 
 selves about to be abandoned by the Carthaginians, were 
 naturally disposed to make the best terms they could 
 with the Romans. So Mago, having hurriedly embarked 
 his troops, had himself carried on shipboard, and set sail 
 for Carthage, hoping that the sea-voyage would alleviate 
 the suffering of land carriage. But his wound proved 
 fatal when off the southern point of Sardinia. Thus died 
 Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother and third son of 
 Hamilcar Barca. 
 
 Just after his death some of the Carthaginian vessels, 
 getting separated from the main flotilla, were captured 
 by the Roman admiral, who had now a fleet of 40 
 cruisers under his orders. About the same time, i.e. 
 towards the end of the year B.C. 203, also in obedience 
 to the summons of the Carthaginian senate, Hannibal, 
 after sixteen years' struggle with the Romans in Italy, 
 abandoned his impregnable lines on the Lacinian pro- 
 montory — a sort of Italian Torres Vedras — and set sail 
 for Carthage. 
 
 Only four years before Hannibal had received the 
 first intimation of the defeat and death of Hasdrubal by 
 the horrible spectacle of his brother's head hurled into 
 his camp by the Romans. And now, by the death of his 
 younger brother Mago, who had died at sea at no great 
 distance from Hannibal's flotilla, his last hope was 
 shattered. So Hannibal landed in Africa with a heavy 
 heart to meet his crushing and final defeat at Zama at 
 the hands of Scipio Africanus, son of the Publius Cor- 
 nelius Scipio who had failed to intercept him in the 
 Rhone valley sixteen years before. 
 
 By the terms of the treaty of peace concluded with
 
 CHAP. IV. 43 
 
 Carthage at the close of the second Punic War, B.C. 202, 
 the Carthaginians bound themselves to abstain from 
 further inter\'ention in the Cisalpine Province and Li- 
 guria. It was therefore with the utmost astonishment 
 that in B.C. 200 the news was brought to Rome of a 
 general insurrection of Gauls and Ligurians at the insti- 
 gation of another Carthaginian leader named Hamilcar. 
 
 This officer, who had been left behind either by 
 Hasdrubal or Mago, observing the weakened state of 
 the Roman garrisons in the Cisalpine Province, in con- 
 sequence of the outbreak of the Macedonian war, con- 
 ceived the daring plan of seizing Placentia ^nd Cremona. 
 Throwing himself with a mixed multitude upon Placentia, 
 so suddenly that there was not even time to shut the 
 gates, Hamilcar carried the place by storm and set fire 
 to the city, taking prisoners the 2000 inhabitants who 
 escaped from the flames \ In a few hours the great 
 Roman stronghold in the north, which had successfully 
 resisted the attacks of both Hannibal and Hasdrubal, 
 was reduced to a heap of ashes. 
 
 Crossing the Po and pressing on to Cremona, some 
 twenty-five miles distant (the two places are now con- 
 nected by a steam tramway), Hamilcar found the gates 
 shut and the walls manned, the garrison having been 
 warned of his approach in time. Instead of carrying the 
 place by storm as he had hoped, he was reduced to 
 laying siege to it, a tedious operation by no means to 
 the taste of his Gallic and Ligurian followers. This 
 gave breathing time to the Romans, who, by means of 
 extraordinary levies, got together a sufficient force to 
 advance to the relief of Cremona. 
 
 A pitched battle, ending in the complete victory of 
 the Romans, was fought under the walls. Their leader 
 Hamilcar being killed, the Gallic and Ligurian host 
 went to pieces, and the Cisalpine Province was once 
 more recovered. The two thousand colonists, taken 
 prisoners by Hamilcar at Placentia, were restored to 
 
 ' Livy, XXXI. 10.
 
 44 INVASIONS OF CISALPINE GAUL AND LIGURIA. 
 
 their former homes, and the city sprang up from its 
 ruins. Thus Placentia recovered its position as the great 
 Roman centre in the Cisalpine Province. 
 
 After the death of Hamilcar the Gauls and Ligurians 
 of Gallia Cisalpina received no further outside assistance 
 in their resistance to the Romans. We hear no more of 
 their invitations to Transalpine Gaesatae to come over 
 to share in the spoils of Italy, nor of the presence of 
 Carthaginian emissaries amongst them. But the Boii 
 held out for another ten years. At last, in the year 
 B.C. 191, the consul Scipio Xasica, whose father Cnaeus 
 thirty years earlier had inflicted a decisive blow on their 
 allies, the Insubres, achieved the distinction of putting 
 an end to the resistance of the Boii. 
 
 Brilliant as was the victory won by Scipio Nasica, it 
 was sullied by the excessive cruelty displayed in the 
 extermination of his valiant opponents. For Scipio was 
 not ashamed to boast that he had left only old men and 
 boys alive. According to Strabo, the entire remainder 
 of the Boii sought fresh and distant homes on the banks 
 of the Danube^ In any case, this was the end of the 
 Boii as a fighting power in Italy, and the end of organ- 
 ised Gallic resistance to the Romans in the valley of 
 the Po. 
 
 The triumph of Scipio Nasica was the necessary 
 complement of that of his cousin Scipio Africanus over 
 Hannibal and the Carthaginians eleven years earlier. 
 The Romans were now at last completely freed from 
 the supreme danger of a successful coalition between 
 their two most dreaded foes. One half of the territory 
 of the Boii was immediately confiscated, and within a 
 few years the colonies of Bononia, Mutina, and Parma 
 became centres of Roman civilization. It is from the 
 victory of Scipio Nasica, B.C. 191, that we must date 
 the real beginning of Roman administration in Gallia 
 Cisalpina, with which province Liguria was at first 
 officially included. 
 
 ^ Strabo, p. 212.
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 The Ligurians. 
 
 Before entering upon the subject of the wars waged 
 by the Romans against the Ligurians single-handed, 
 I must draw the special attention of the reader to the 
 claims which this much neglected race can justly make 
 to our notice. 
 
 Having been settled for upwards of 3000 years in 
 their present possessions, along the north-western shores 
 of the Mediterranean, the Ligurians can boast of being 
 probably the oldest family and the purest blood in 
 Western Europe. 
 
 The late Karl Mlillenhof in his authoritative work 
 Deutsche AlterUimsktuide^ , now appearing in a new edition 
 (Berlin), writes of the Ligurians of the Riviera : 
 
 " Die Liguren waren hier alter als die Kelten in 
 Gallien und die Ausoner (Latiner, Umbrer, Osker) in 
 Italien. 
 
 "Sie gehorten, wie die Raeter in Tirol, und die Iberer 
 an den Pyraneen, zu der vor-arischen Urbevolkerung 
 Europas." 
 
 Although absolute certainty cannot be arrived at in 
 the present state of our knowledge as to their origin and 
 affinities, it is now generally accepted that the Ligurians 
 are a branch of the ancient Iberian family, of which the 
 Basques are the only other survivors in Europe. 
 
 In his Nouvelle Gcograpliie Universelle Elis^ Reclus 
 writes of the Ligurians as " probablement freres de nos 
 1 Vol. I. p. 86.
 
 46 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 Basques;" and the late Emmanuel Celesia of Genoa in 
 his Antichissiini idiomi degli Liguri finds many roots 
 common to the Basque in his native Ligurian /«/cz.r. 
 
 Some modern writers assert them to be akin to the 
 Celts, and to belong to the Aryan family. But Strabo 
 expressly states that the Ligurians are of a different 
 race from the Celts, although they closely resemble them 
 in their manner of life\ 
 
 The physical type, however, of the Ligurian differed 
 as widely as possible from that of the Celt or Gaul, for 
 the Ligurian was of small stature, nervous and wiry, far 
 more capable of enduring fatigue than the ' Gaul,' whose 
 huge, soft body melted away like wax before the scorching 
 sun of Italy and Provence. In a stand-up fight a 
 Ligurian was considered a match for a Gaul twice his 
 size. At field labour the Ligurian men and women alike 
 were renowned for their endurance. 
 
 M. D'Arbois de Jubainville, whose conclusions on the 
 subject of the Ligurians do not always commend them- 
 selves to me any more than his eccentric views in 
 limiting the Gauls in Caesar's day to 15,000 combatants, 
 brings them into Europe by the valley of the Danube as 
 predecessors of the Celts. But although I cannot bring 
 myself to accept all M. D'Arbois' conclusions I yield to 
 none in my admiration of the remarkable learning and 
 industry displayed in all his researches. 
 
 As an almost necessary corollary of his view that the 
 Ligurians like the Celts came into Europe by the valley 
 of the Danube, M. D'Arbois derives them from an Aryan 
 stock, in direct opposition to the opinion of Miillenhof, 
 of whom notwithstanding he avows himself a disciple. 
 He likewise endeavours to prove that a Ligurian popu- 
 lation extended northwards through France and Western 
 Europe right up to the shores of the North Sea, differing 
 entirely from Miillenhof. Nor does M. D'Arbois hesitate 
 to carry his Ligurians across the Channel into the British 
 Isles. 
 
 1 p. 128.
 
 CHAP. V. 47 
 
 For Miillenhof in commenting on the passage on which 
 M. D'Arbois seems mainly to rely for taking the Ligurians 
 into the frozen north pronounces it an undoubted inter- 
 polation. The passage runs : 
 
 " Si quis dehinc 
 Ab insulis Oestrymnicis lembum audeat 
 Urgere in undas, axe qua Lycaonis 
 Rigescit aethra, cespitem Ligurum subit 
 Cassum incolarum." 
 
 Festus Avienus, Ora Alaritinta, 129 — 133. 
 
 If, as Miillenhof argues, the insulae Oestrymnicae 
 represent the British Isles, as is generally supposed, a 
 voyage beyond them could only lead to the North Sea 
 and the Baltic\ But he dismisses this supposition as 
 ridiculous, asking, " Wer aber hatte hier von Liguren 
 gehort ? " 
 
 M. D'Arbois is however not any longer alone in 
 locating Ligurians on the North Sea. For in his La 
 Gaule avant les Gaiilois M. Alexandre Bertrand, also 
 a distinguished member of the French Institut, does 
 not dispute the presence of Ligurians on northern shores, 
 refusing only to accept the theory of their reaching so 
 far north by land. M. Bertrand seems also to rely 
 mainly on the passage of Festus Avienus quoted above. 
 
 M. Bertrand argues, that if the Ligurians had spread 
 upwards through Gaul by land they must have left traces 
 of their passage, especially if they were as civilized as 
 M. D'Arbois makes them out to have been. M. Bertrand 
 holds that they arrived by sea, the Ligurians being 
 considered by him to have been essentially sea-rovers, 
 the Normans of antiquity. 
 
 Amongst the ancient Greek writers there is a general 
 consensus that at the dawn of European history the 
 Ligurians were found scattered sporadically along the 
 coasts and in the islands of the western basin of the 
 Mediterranean. 
 
 Elba is undoubtedly the Ligurian 'Ilva' — a word 
 
 ' Deutsche Altcrtui/iskunde, Ch. I. p. 96.
 
 48 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 repeated in the Ligurian tribe Ilvates located in the 
 Apennines behind Genoa. In Corsica M. D'Arbois 
 cites 20 names of places ending in the distinctively 
 Ligurian termination of -asca. In his work Les premiers 
 habitants de V Europe he cites 257 modern names of 
 places in Northern Italy ending in -asca or a slight 
 variation of that termination of which only 36 are in the 
 modern Italian province of Liguria as restricted to the 
 sea-coast. The reader must remember that the Liguria 
 or Regio IX. of Augustus comprised the entire western 
 half of Cispadana, as far as the Trebia, and that the 
 Libui and Stoeni — tribes of Ligurian stock — were settled 
 also in Transpadana. No similar termination is to be 
 found in the north of France, though not a few occur in 
 the Ligurian district of the basin of the Rhone. So M. 
 D'Arbois' contention is not supported by his own lin- 
 guistic discoveries. 
 
 Philistus of Syracuse, and several other ancient Greek 
 writers, of whose works only fragments have been 
 preserved, testify to the fact that the Ligurians were the 
 original occupants of the seven hills before the foundation 
 of Rome. " Albula," the former name of the Tiber, is, as 
 we read in VirgiP, certainly of Ligurian origin, as also 
 the name of the town of ' Alba ' Longa. 
 
 The view that the Ligyes may perhaps be identified 
 with the Libui of the African continent is lucidly stated, 
 although not definitely accepted, by Professor Ettore 
 Pais, of Pisa University, in his recently published Storia 
 della Sicilia. The fact that the two most westerly mouths 
 of the Rhone, which formed the boundary of ancient Li- 
 guria, were named Libica"- seems to corroborate this view, 
 as well as the mention by Livy^ of the Libui, a Ligurian 
 tribe settled in eastern Transpadana, near Verona, before 
 the invasion of that region by the Celtic Cenomani. 
 
 1 " fluvium cognomine Thybrim 
 
 Diximus, aiuisit verum vetus Albula nomen." 
 
 Aen. vin. 331, 2. 
 " Pliny, Hist. Nat. iii. 5. ^ Liv. v. 35.
 
 CHAP. V. 49 
 
 The fact that a fragment of Eratosthenes as quoted 
 by Strabo^ applies the term Aiyva-TiKT) to the entire 
 Iberian peninsula ; that such an accurate writer as 
 Thucydides- locates Ligyes on the river Sicanos in 
 Iberia, whence they displaced the Iberian Sicani, who 
 emigrated to Sicily; and that a city "Ligustine^" 
 is mentioned by Hecataeus, and a " lacus Ligusticus " 
 by Festus Avienus, as existing near the mouth of the 
 river Guadiana in the south-western corner of the 
 Iberian peninsula (known to the ancients as Tartessus, 
 the Tarshish of the Bible), the weight of authority seems 
 to incline to a south-western rather than a north-eastern 
 introduction of Ligurians into Europe. 
 
 The foundation of Marseilles eV ALjvarcKfj, B.C. 600, 
 on territory ceded to Phocaean settlers by them is the 
 first historical fact we can connect with the Ligurians 
 of the Riviera. The next is the presence of Ligurians 
 as mercenaries at the battle of Himera in Sicily B.C. 480 ; 
 an incident in itself sufficient to prove that they were 
 amenable to some kind of military discipline more than 
 three centuries before their conquest by the Romans. 
 
 To what extent the Ligurians yielded to civilizing 
 influences in general is much more doubtful. That they 
 ultimately repented of their concession of territory to 
 the Greeks is proved by their persistent acts of hostility 
 and sieges laid to Marseilles and her colonies along the 
 coast, to which I shall refer in more detail further on. 
 
 Yet, as the Ligurians had enjoyed friendly intercourse 
 with the Phocaean Greeks while they were building their 
 city and for some time afterwards, it is certain that they 
 must have acquired some degree of civilization by this 
 contact. It can hardly indeed be doubted that the 
 Ligurians of the plains of Provence, represented mainly 
 by the powerful confederation of the Salyes, attained 
 
 1 p. 92. 
 
 2 Thucyd. Vi. 2. 
 
 ^ AiyvffTlvTj, irdXii Aiyvuv, ti)s SvriKrji Iprjpias ^771)5 Kal r-iys TaprtjcTcoG 
 irXyjalov. Hecataeus, a/. Steph. Byzant. 
 
 H. 4
 
 50 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 earlier to some degree of civilization, than the Ligurians 
 of the Italian Riviera. 
 
 Poseidonius of Rhodes, the Stoic philosopher and 
 friend of Cicero, who visited both the sea-board and the 
 interior of Cisalpine and Transalpine Liguria, is the first 
 traveller to throw any light on the habits of the natives. 
 For the history of Polybius, who travelled over partly 
 the same ground when he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus 
 to the siege of Numantia B.C. 1 34, tells us nothing about 
 the inhabitants of the country. The journal of 
 Poseidonius has unfortunately not been preserved — a 
 loss perhaps even more regrettable than that of the 
 books of Livy dealing with the Roman conquest of 
 Transalpine Liguria. The fragments which remain 
 have been collected into a small volume, in which I 
 failed to find much information that was useful for my 
 purpose. 
 
 It is known however that both Strabo and Plutarch 
 largely availed themselves of the first-hand information 
 published by Poseidonius, who appears to have been 
 Plutarch's main authority for his facts about Liguria. 
 
 In a passage referring to the Italian Riviera (p. 
 219) Strabo writes, "There is nothing worth men- 
 tioning about it, except that the people dwell in 
 villages, ploughing and digging the intractable land, 
 or rather, as Poseidonius expresses it, ' hewing the 
 rocks.'" 
 
 Seizing upon the word ' ploughing ' in the above 
 passage, M. D'Arbois seems to rely a great deal too 
 much upon it in building up his theory of the superior 
 civilization of the Ligurians whom he adopts as his 
 clients. He cannot control his indignation against 
 Helbig (quoting a passage from p. 38 of the French 
 translation of his work Die Italiker in der Po-ebene) for 
 describing his clients as "bien mauvais agriculteurs, 
 incapables du repos, sauvages et pillards, faisant de 
 temps en temps dans la plaine, des deux cotes de 
 I'Apennin, des expeditions militaires, qui n'etaient que
 
 CHAP. V. 51 
 
 de grands brigandages \" Yet the above quotation after 
 all closely agrees with the character which both Livy 
 and Strabo give to the Ligurians of the Italian 
 Riviera. 
 
 For we find in Strabo (p. 203), " They {i.e. the 
 Ligurians) closed all the roads into Iberia along the sea- 
 coast, and carried on a system of pillage by land and 
 by sea." 
 
 The truth of the matter seems to be that there were 
 two kinds of Ligurians, highlanders and lowlanders. 
 The highlanders were known to the Romans as Ligures 
 capillati (longhaired), and the lowlanders later, as tonsi 
 (shorn) — Coa huiga and Coa raza in Ligurian patois. 
 
 The capillati^ unable to wring even a bare subsistence 
 out of the rocks of the higher ridges of the Maritime 
 Alps and Apennines, amongst which they found refuge, 
 were driven to acts of brigandage and piracy. Like 
 famished wolves, they could only keep themselves alive 
 by cattle-lifting and raids on any food on which they 
 could lay hands in the lowlands. 
 
 These capillati however clung so desperately to their 
 strongholds in the Maritime Alps behind Monaco and 
 Nice, that even Julius Caesar failed to force a passage 
 through them. The Ligiires capillati succeeded in 
 maintaining their independence of the Romans till the 
 middle of the reign of Augustus. The monument of 
 La Turbie commemorates their final subjugation, and 
 the opening up of the pass of the Maritime Alps to 
 peaceful traffic by Augustus B.C. 14. 
 
 The Ligures tonsi, on the other hand, who occupied 
 the lower slopes, and the deltas at the mouth of the 
 torrents which descend into the Mediterranean all along 
 the Italian Riviera, were comparatively civilized even 
 before the period of the Roman conquest. They must 
 in fact have been the victims of the raids of their 
 highland kinsmen before the Roman colonists settled in 
 the plains around Pisa and Bologna. It was probably 
 
 1 Cited vol. ii. p. 80, Premiers habitants de VEttrope. 
 
 4—2
 
 52 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 these latter, whom Poseidonius found engaged in plough- 
 ing as well as digging. 
 
 While the oppida belonging to the Ligiires capillati 
 were mere hill tops surrounded by walls of immense 
 accumulations of uncemented and unwrought stones, it 
 is probable that the towns of the Ligiires tonsi consisted 
 in part of roofed-in dwellings. 
 
 We know from Plutarch's life of Marius, that the 
 Italian Ligurians furnished a contingent of Socii to the 
 army, with which Marius, the uncle of Julius Caesar, 
 annihilated the Ambrones and the Teutones. We find 
 too in the muster-roll of the forces in the opening of 
 Lucan's Pharsalia a Ligurian contingent gathered round 
 Caesar himself when about to engage in the civil war 
 with his rival Pompey\ 
 
 It is Mommsen's opinion- that as early as the date 
 of the second Punic War, Genoa (the chief trading centre 
 of the Italian Ligurians) stood on much the same footing 
 of friendly relations with Rome as Marseilles. This 
 would explain why it was singled out for attack by 
 Mago, Hannibal's younger brother, who sacked and 
 burned it B.C. 205. 
 
 It would also explain the aid given by the Romans 
 towards the rebuilding of the Ligurian capital, which 
 possibly received a Roman garrison. It is singular 
 however that the Romans have left so few traces at 
 Genoa, that no museum of Roman antiquities exists 
 there. 
 
 As it was always the policy of the Romans to make 
 friends with some section of the nation which they were 
 about to attack as a whole, it is probable that the 
 Genuates were won over early to play the part in Liguria 
 in which the Aedui figured so conspicuously in Gaul. 
 At the outset of the second Punic War, when Scipio 
 found himself too late to stop Hannibal on the Rhone, 
 
 ^ " Et nunc, tonse Ligur, quondam per colla decora 
 
 Crinibus effusis, toti praelate Comatae." Lib. I. 442. 
 ^^ C. I. L. vol. V. p. 885.
 
 BAS-RELIEFS FOUND IN RUINS OF LIGURIAN "OPPIDUM,'' ENTREMONT, 
 ENVIRONS OF AIX-EN-PROVENCE. 
 
 To face p. 53]
 
 CHAP. V. 53 
 
 he hurried back to Genoa with only a small escort, 
 reckoning on a friendly reception there. For the shortest 
 cut to the valley of the Po, where Scipio expected to 
 encounter Hannibal on his descent from the Alps, lay 
 up the valley of the river Polcevere on the south side of 
 the pass of the Apennines and down the Scrivia on the 
 north. This was the course followed by the Via 
 Postumia leading from Genoa by Libarna to Dertona. 
 
 Although Genoa was the chief centre of Ligurian 
 trade, no coins of an earlier date than the Roman 
 conquest have ever been found there. It is probable 
 therefore that Ligurian commerce was confined to 
 exchange of commodities by barter. 
 
 Nothing whatever is known of the religious obser- 
 vances of the Ligurians, and no vestiges of religious 
 edifices have ever been discovered in Liguria. There is 
 however a very fine ' Dolmen ' near Draguignan in 
 Provence and a solitary ' Menhir ' near Brignolles, but 
 both are of unknown origin and date. 
 
 It has however been my good fortune to have been, 
 as far as I know, the first Englishman to visit and draw 
 attention to the very striking remains of a series of 
 Ligurian oppida still extant in Provence. 
 
 Of these by far the most extensive and important is 
 Entremont {Inter-montes), hardly known even in France 
 beyond the precincts of the city of Aix-en-Provence. 
 
 About 50 years ago the attention of French anti- 
 quarians was drawn to the existence of Entremont by 
 the discovery amongst its ruins of some ancient bas- 
 reliefs, pronounced to be pre-Roman and commonly 
 described as Gaulish. 
 
 But as Provence was never occupied by Gauls and 
 Entremont remained up to the period of its conquest by 
 the Romans the chief stronghold of the Salluvii, the 
 powerful Ligurian confederation, which occupied almost 
 the whole of Provence, there is every reason to believe 
 that the bas-reliefs in question are Ligurian and not 
 Gaulish.
 
 54 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 If my supposition is correct, these bas-reliefs, which 
 are now preserved in the Museum at Aix, are of the 
 highest possible interest, as being the only specimens of 
 Ligurian sculpture hitherto discovered. 
 
 That Entremont was an oppiduvi of Ligurians and 
 not Gauls is further proved by the absence of any signs 
 of wooden beams, alternating with layers of stone, 
 characteristic of the Gallic method of construction 
 described and approved of by Caesar {De Bello Gallico, 
 Lib. VII. c. 22). 
 
 Consisting of two lofty plateaus, separated by a 
 depression from the midst of which rises up an isolated 
 wooden mamelon, Entremont presents a most com- 
 manding aspect as approached by the ascent (about 
 2 miles) from Aix. Both plateaus are surrounded 
 by massive walls of uncemented stones and varying 
 height and thickness. The perimeter of the outside 
 wall which follows the contour of the western plateau, 
 now known as the "Quartier Celony," appears to measure 
 from two to three kilometres, but its irregularity makes 
 it difficult to estimate. The wall is composed of unhewn 
 and uncemented stones of all sizes, the largest measuring 
 about 2 ft. by 15 inches, being laid with some attempt 
 at regularity. The wall in some portions of the enceinte 
 is from 9 to 12 ft. high on the outside, but not more 
 than 5 on the inside. The westernmost portion of the 
 encircling wall for a distance of at least 500 or 600 yards 
 presents the remarkable feature of being provided with 
 a raised footway on the inside composed of blocks of 
 stone, raised more than a foot from the ground, as if to 
 enable a sentinel as he paced up and down to keep a 
 look out over the wall without exposing his whole 
 body. 
 
 The outside wall, although the most ancient and 
 picturesque in outward appearance, being overgrown 
 with verdure and shaded in places by a fringe of ancient 
 trees, whose roots interlace themselves in the loose stones, 
 is by no means the most massive. The walls, which
 
 ANCIENT WALL AND RAISED FOOTWAY AT ENTREMONT. 
 
 [ To face p. 54
 
 CHAP. V. 55 
 
 divide the plateau transversely into separate areas, varying 
 from 4 acres to 6 acres in extent, are in some places at 
 least 20 feet in thickness. Where this is the case they 
 are composed of comparatively small, and generally 
 rather flat, stones. 
 
 The area of the eastern plateau, to which the appli- 
 cation of the name of Entremont seems to be now 
 confined, is much more limited in extent. The exterior 
 and interior walls are of similar construction and dimen- 
 sions to those in the Quartier Celony, with the exception 
 of the total absence of the raised footway in the inside 
 of the wall of the enceinte. 
 
 A great deal of broken red pottery, both ancient and 
 modern, lies about on the surface of the wide wall 
 tops, which serve for refuse heaps when lying near the 
 dwellings of the peasants who cultivate the enclosed 
 areas. There is nothing distinctively Ligurian about 
 these broken pieces of pottery, which have every appear- 
 ance of being Roman, leading to the supposition that 
 Romans must have occupied Entremont at a later date. 
 
 Although unfortunately few details have been handed 
 down to us concerning the lives of the inhabitants of 
 Entremont, yet the broad facts of their history are 
 clear and indisputable, as I shall endeavour to show 
 later on when I bring the Romans into contact with the 
 Salluvii. Inasmuch as Aix-en-Provence lies only 20 
 miles due north of Marseilles on the Alpine line to 
 Grenoble and can be reached by train within the hour, 
 the plateaus of Entremont can easily be explored in a 
 short day with a return ticket from Marseilles. 
 
 Another oppidiun, hardly less interesting than En- 
 tremont, but of a different character and covering much 
 less ground, is to be found on the edge of the battlefield 
 of Aix near the village of Pourrieres, about 15 miles to 
 the eastward. It is now known under the name of 
 " Pain de Munition," and crowns the highest point of 
 a long ridge which slopes gently upwards from south 
 to north. The oppidnm or stronghold is at a height
 
 $6 THE LIGURIANS. 
 
 of about 2000 ft. above the sea. As the ground falls 
 abruptly on the north side, there was less need of 
 artificial defences. 
 
 But a triple enceinte was notwithstanding carried 
 completely round the enclosures, which are all circular, 
 varying from 200 to 500 yards in circumference. The 
 outermost fossa is about twice the depth of the two 
 inner, the bottom of the ditch appearing to be about 
 40 ft. below the top of the vallum. The exterior vallum, 
 composed as at Entremont of unhewn and uncemented 
 limestones, in its present state of partial collapse is about 
 30 ft. wide. 
 
 As I shall refer to the Pain de Munition again in 
 the description of the battle of Aix, on which occasion 
 it was perhaps utilized by Marius for commissariat 
 purposes, I shall say no more about it here. 
 
 Besides Entremont and Pain de Munition, I visited 
 another oppidnm overlooking the Etang de Berre, 
 marked " Ruines de Constantine" in the map of the 
 French Etat Majeur, and presenting the singular feature 
 of high, isolated natural rocks being pressed into the 
 service of towers in the line of circumvallation. Les 
 Ruines de Constantine are about 7 miles from the 
 station of St Chamas, following the road which skirts 
 the eastern shore of the Etang de Berre ; in a south- 
 easterly direction, about a mile from St Chamas, the road 
 is carried across the little river Touloubre by a perfect 
 gem of a Roman bridge called ' Pont Flavien ' — in itself 
 well worth stopping at St Chamas to see. At either 
 end of the bridge is a perfectly preserved ornamental 
 Roman arch — a feature I have never met with elsewhere. 
 The oppidnm of Constantine, which overlooks the Etang 
 de Berre, is difficult to find, as it lies about a mile back 
 from the main road and is approached by a narrow 
 track, winding through a rocky defile.
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Campaigns in Eastern Liguria. 
 
 It was in the year B.C. 238, just twenty years before the 
 invasion of Hannibal, that as far as we know the first 
 fighting took place between Romans and Ligurians. It 
 continued intermittently for more than two centuries, 
 the last occurring B.C. 14, when Augustus finally dis- 
 lodged the Ligures Capillati from their strongholds in 
 the Maritime Alps\ No details however of any cam- 
 paign in Liguria previous to Hannibal's invasion have 
 been handed down to us. 
 
 For the first fifty years of this fighting (from B.C. 
 238 — 191) the Ligurians were associated with and made 
 common cause with Gauls or Carthaginians, as I have 
 shown above. 
 
 After the close of the second Punic War, which was 
 followed by the Roman conquest and the expulsion of 
 the Boii from Gallia Cisalpina, the Ligurians were left to 
 cope with the Romans single-handed. 
 
 The next period (from B.C. 191 — no) is probably the 
 eighty years' war to which Strabo refers below : 
 
 "The Ligurians closed against the Romans all the 
 roads into Iberia along the coast, and carried on a 
 system of pillage both by sea and land. Their strength 
 so increased, that large armies were scarcely able to 
 force a passage, and after a war of eighty years the 
 Romans were hardly able to obtain a breadth of twelve 
 stadia for the purpose of making a public road-." 
 ^ Dion Cassius, 54. 24. - p. 203.
 
 58 CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 This eighty years' war naturally divides itself into 
 two groups, viz. : 
 
 {a) The wars waged on both slopes of the Apen- 
 nines in Cisalpine Liguria, from the borders of Etruria 
 as far as the modern Vintimiglia, in pursuance of purely 
 Roman interests. 
 
 {b) Those carried on in Transalpine Liguria (the 
 French Riviera) between Nice and Marseilles at the 
 instance of their allies, the Massiliots. 
 
 Between these two sections of the ancient Liguria the 
 Maritime Alps interpose, extending in width for about 
 25 miles from Nice to Vintimiglia. The pass by which 
 the Maritime Alps are crossed is that of La Turbie, 
 about 1500 feet above the sea-level — the lowest in the 
 whole range of the Alps. 
 
 It was with the double object of putting a stop to 
 predatory incursions into their newly-settled colonies of 
 Pisae and Bononia (Bologna) and of forcing a thorough- 
 fare along the coast to keep up communications with 
 Spain by land, that the Romans entered upon this 
 succession of wars with the Ligurians after the subju- 
 gation of the Cisalpine Gauls. 
 
 To the Romans military service in Liguria was not 
 unlike what campaigning was to the English in Ireland 
 in the days of the Tudors and Stuarts, or what it is now 
 in the borderland between India and Afghanistan. Livy 
 describes it as follows : "In Liguria there was everything 
 to put soldiers on their mettle : positions to scale, in 
 themselves difficult enough, without having to oust a foe 
 already in possession ; hard marching through defiles 
 lending themselves to constant surprises ; an enemy 
 dashing and light-footed, rendering every spot and hour 
 insecure; wearisome and perilous blockadings of fortified 
 strongholds, in a country barren of resources and yielding 
 no plunder worth mentioning, with no camp-followers 
 and no long line of beasts of burden ; no hope but in 
 cold steel and individual pluck\" 
 
 1 Livy, XXXIX. I.
 
 CHAP. VI. 59 
 
 Consisting mostly of rocky ravines and forest-clad 
 mountains, Liguria offered so little attraction to the 
 Romans for colonizing purposes that they were in no 
 hurry to annex it. 
 
 With the Insubres and Boii the case had been very 
 different, where the Romans from the very beginning 
 were bent on the annexation of temptingly fertile and 
 open territory — territory, too, which if not annexed from 
 the side of Rome would certainly have been occupied 
 by fresh hordes of barbarians from beyond the Alps. 
 
 Of the dealings of the Romans with the Ligurians, 
 Plutarch, writing about fifty years later than Strabo, 
 in his life of Aemilius Paulus remarks: "For the Romans 
 did not choose utterly to cut off the people of Liguria, 
 whom they considered as a bulwark against the Gauls, 
 who were always hovering over Italy." 
 
 Nor even after its complete conquest, in the days of 
 the Empire, does the Liguria corresponding to the Italian 
 Riviera of our day ever appear to have been a favourite 
 locality with wealthy Romans. 
 
 The Romans, being as a nation destitute of the love 
 of scenery for its own sake, did not care to settle on a 
 narrow ledge between the mountains and the sea, where 
 the difficulty of getting supplies must have been almost 
 insuperable in Roman times. While the narrow Liguria 
 from the Magra to the Var was little to the taste of the 
 Romans, the widening plains of Transalpine Liguria — 
 the modern Provence — where the Alps gradually recede 
 from the shore, drew them irresistibly onwards. Here 
 the Romans settled in such numbers that Pliny the elder, 
 referring to the Provincia Narbonensis of his day (second 
 half of first century A.D.), describes it as " Italia verius 
 quam provincia'." 
 
 It is to the first group of campaigns, i.e. those on the 
 Italian Riviera, that Livy's graphic description of Ligurian 
 warfare mainly applies. For the greater portion of the 
 first series of these wars, or rather punitive expeditions, 
 
 1 Pliny, Nat. Hist. III. 4.
 
 6o CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 Livy is our sole guide. But he is far from turning out 
 as satisfactory in his accounts of the campaigns them- 
 selves as his masterly summing up of the style of warfare 
 would have led us to expect. 
 
 These accounts are indeed conspicuously wanting in 
 detail, and are sometimes confused and conflicting. For 
 in one page we read of a tribe being almost exterminated, 
 whereas the same tribe turns up again full of fight a little 
 further on. A certain number of names of mountains 
 and rivers are given, but mostly without any indications 
 or descriptions enabling us to identify them. On the 
 side of the Romans we are generally supplied with the 
 names of the commanders, and the numbers of their 
 armies. But in the case of the Ligurians numbers are 
 rarely given, and no names of individuals, not even of 
 the chiefs in any campaign — a most regrettable omission, 
 both from a historical and philological point of view. 
 
 However, when Livy's history fails us, as it does after 
 B.C. 167, we only then realize how much we have lost. 
 We are indeed at sea, reduced to a very meagre diet of 
 epitomes of his lost books, fragments of Polybius, Florus, 
 Sallust, Appian, Dion Cassius, and stray rays of light 
 from Strabo, Plutarch, Cicero and others. Orosius, an 
 untrustworthy ecclesiastical writer of the fifth century 
 of our era, whose chief claim to notice is his supposed 
 acquaintance with the lost books of Livy, is rarely of 
 any assistance. 
 
 To attempt a complete enumeration of the successive 
 campaigns, for which one has to hunt up and down the 
 last seven extant books of Livy, where notices, sometimes 
 confined to a few lines, turn up in most unexpected 
 places, would only weary the reader to no purpose. It 
 will be sufficient to attempt a brief reference to the more 
 important. 
 
 At the outset of the Ligurian wars, Pisae, near the 
 mouth of the Arno, was the base of the Roman military 
 operations to the south of the Apennines, as Placentia 
 was of those carried on to the north. The wide, fertile
 
 CHAP. VI. 6 1 
 
 plain stretching for thirty miles along the shore com- 
 prised between the Arno and the Magra, commanded 
 by the precipitous Apennines, had of old been a 
 disputed borderland between the Ligurian and Etruscan 
 nationalities. 
 
 The Romans had lately settled the matter by taking 
 possession of the eastern half of it themselves, and 
 dividing it up amongst the Roman colonists of Pisae\ 
 Pisae, which had just become a Roman colony, was 
 originally founded by Peloponnesian Greeks from Pisa 
 in Elis. In consequence of the proximity of its harbour 
 to the boundless forests of the Ligurian Apennines, Pisae 
 soon became a great shipbuilding centre and proved 
 invaluable to the Romans in supplying them with a fleet. 
 We have just seen how another Roman colony was 
 established at Bononia (Bologna) to the north of the 
 Apennines on the lands lately taken from the Boii. 
 
 Between the two interposed the great bend of the 
 Apennines, where it trends south-eastwards to form the 
 backbone of the Italian peninsula. The intricate valleys 
 and ridges of this portion of the range, including the 
 valley of the river Magra, were now in full possession 
 of the Apuani, by far the most formidable of the 
 Ligurian tribes on the Etruscan border. The Apuani 
 were divided into lowlanders and highlanders, the latter 
 of whom proved themselves such an intolerable nuisance 
 to the Roman settlers in the rich lands below them, both 
 around Pisae and Bononia, by raiding their cattle and 
 destroying their crops, that the cultivation of those terri- 
 tories had to be abandoned. 
 
 In the spring of the year B.C. 187, the Apuani, 
 anticipating Roman interference on behalf of the colon- 
 ists, formed a league with their neighbours the Friniates, 
 who occupied the northern slopes of the Apennines, 
 where they melt insensibly into the plains of the Po. 
 When the news of the coalition of the Friniates and 
 Apuani reached Rome it was considered so grave that 
 
 ' .Strabo, p. 222.
 
 62 CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 both consuls were ordered by the Senate to proceed to 
 Liguria to operate against them. 
 
 The consuls for the year (B.C. 187) were Caius Flamin- 
 ius (son of the Flaminius who fell at the battle of the Lake 
 Trasimene) and Aemilius Lepidus. It was agreed between 
 them that while Flaminius attacked from the north, having 
 Placentia for his base, Aemilius should advance from 
 Pisae on the south. This plan seems to have completely 
 answered. The fighting both north and south of the 
 Apennines began in the plains, from which the Romans 
 easily swept the highland marauders. As the two 
 consular armies advanced, more or less like a double set 
 of beaters at a battue, driving the enemy before them 
 to the mountains, the Ligurians were taken as it were 
 between two fires. Finding themselves caught in a trap 
 in the mountains, to which they were wont to retire, 
 both Friniates and Apuani were eventually surrounded 
 and disarmed. 
 
 At the end of the campaign each consular army 
 found itself on the opposite side of the mountains to 
 that from which it had started, that of Flaminius emerging 
 on the south or Fisan side, and that of Aemilius on the 
 side of Bononia. 
 
 Of the numbers of the forces engaged on either side, 
 or of the killed and wounded, or of the number of 
 prisoners taken, Livy is on this occasion absolutely silent. 
 We gather, however, from his brief narrativ^e that the 
 campaign was comparatively bloodless, the main object 
 of the Romans having been to disarm, rather than to put 
 the enemy to the sword. The fighting does not appear 
 to have been severe at any stage of the campaign, the 
 enemy having taken to their heels with unusual precipi- 
 tancy. It seems not unlikely that the lives of the excep- 
 tionally large number of Ligurians taken prisoners were 
 spared with the view of utilizing them on road-making. 
 For the year B.C. 187 marks the beginning of military 
 road-construction in Gallia Cisalpina, both consuls, on 
 the conclusion of their campaigns, setting themselves
 
 CHAP. VI. 63 
 
 energetically to this undertaking. The Via Flaminia, 
 the great North Road, the work of the elder Flaminius, 
 which left Rome by the Porta Flaminia, crossing the 
 Tiber by the Milvian bridge, had hitherto stopped at 
 Ariminum (Rimini) on the Adriatic. It was now carried 
 in a straight stretch of 175 miles on to Placentia, un- 
 fortunately not by his son, the consul Flaminius the 
 younger, but by his colleague Aemilius Lepidus, after 
 whom the road has been called ever since ' Via Aemilia 
 Lepidi,' and the country it traverses the ' Emilian ' 
 province. 
 
 Had the younger Flaminius appropriately carried 
 onwards the road, constructed as far as Ariminum by 
 his father (B.C. 220, just before the second Punic War), 
 and given the family name to it, we should have found 
 an unbroken length of 400 miles of Via Flaminia, 
 extending from Rome to Placentia. Considerable con- 
 fusion of names would have been thereby avoided. For 
 as the reader will find later on, there was also another 
 Aemilius, viz. Aemilius Scaurus, after whom the coast 
 section Via Aemilia was named later on. But, as it un- 
 fortunately happened, the more difficult task of carrying 
 a road across the Apennines from Bononia to Arretium 
 now fell to the lot of the younger Flaminius. 
 
 Livy, who informs us that the campaigns in Liguria 
 were full of surprises to the actors, has ingeniously 
 contrived to impart this character to his history of them. 
 For the curtain of the year B.C. 187 having fallen on the 
 peaceful occupation of road-making on both sides of the 
 Apennines, the Ligurians having been rigorously dis- 
 armed, we are astonished to find it rise on a great disaster 
 to the Roman armies under the consul L. Marcius at the 
 hands of these same Apuani! According to Livy, it was 
 the turn of the Romans to be caught in a trap. Having 
 been drawn onward into a deep recess of a forest, the 
 Romans were suddenly attacked and thrown into con- 
 fusion, losing 4000 men, three Roman and several 
 standards of their allies, besides an immense quantity
 
 64 CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 of arms thrown away by the fugitives. So complete was 
 the panic of the Romans and their Latin allies that Livy 
 adds, " the Ligurians tired sooner of pursuit than the 
 Romans of running away." 
 
 As the Roman armies at this period, and till the 
 radical change effected by Marius, seventy years later, 
 consisted mostly of raw levies enlisted for service in the 
 summer months, like our Militia, it is not surprising 
 that such disasters as that related above were of not un- 
 frequent occurrence. The wonder rather is that the 
 Romans won any victories before B.C. 104, when Marius 
 by two years' drilling made real soldiers of the first 
 standing army Rome ever possessed. 
 
 This unlooked-for disaster, which overtook the army 
 of Marcius, was signally avenged in the following year 
 (B.C. 185) by the consul Sempronius, marching from 
 Pisae. Sempronius began by sweeping the Ligurians 
 from the plains, between the Arno and the Magra. 
 This was comparatively easy work, but to dislodge 
 the fugitives from the mountains was a task of the 
 utmost difficulty, as will be readily realized by travellers 
 familiar with the aspect of the range behind Carrara, 
 where the almost precipitous flanks of the mountain 
 ridges are flecked with alternate streaks of snow and 
 marble. 
 
 The good beating they got at the hands of Sem- 
 pronius seems to have kept the Apuani fairly quiet for 
 the next five years. But after this interval the high- 
 landers reverted to their old practice of raiding the 
 Roman colonists in the plains below. It was therefore 
 decided in the year B.C. 180 by a decree of the Senate 
 to remove the troublesome mountaineers bodily and 
 transport them with all their belongings to the Taurasian 
 plains — territory in southern Italy taken originally from 
 the Samnites and still untenanted. This operation was 
 successfully and bloodlessly effected by the consuls 
 M. Baebius and P. Cornelius, who transported 40,000 of 
 the highland Apuani, with their wives and families, to
 
 CHAP. VI. 6$ 
 
 their new settlements in the souths Funds were provided 
 at the public expense to enable them to start in farming, 
 to which they seem to have taken very kindly. It has 
 lately been suggested that a similar experiment might 
 be advantageously tried in dealing with the Afridis. 
 Subsequently, these transported Apuani were known 
 even as late as the reign of the Emperor Trajan by the 
 name of " Ligures Corneliani et Bibiani." 
 
 Having proved themselves less obnoxious to their 
 Roman neighbours, and having probably been forced into 
 the war by their highland kinsmen, the lowland Apuani 
 were left undisturbed by the Romans for another year. 
 But as their territory was required for the Roman settlers 
 of the new colony of Luna, which the Romans saw the 
 necessity of planting near the south of the Magra to 
 secure quiet possession of the adjoining unrivalled harbour 
 of Spezia, the lowland Apuani were also compelled to 
 migrate to Samnite territory. 
 
 The year B.C. 177 is notable for the foundation of the 
 Roman colony of Luna, on the site of the former 
 Etruscan settlement. This marks the first stage of the 
 advance of the Romans along the Ligurian coast. For 
 Pisae lies just outside the borders of Liguria, Two 
 thousand Roman citizens, conducted by the triumvirs 
 P. Aelius, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and Cn. Sicinius, formed 
 the first settlement. It is expressly stated by Livy^ 
 that although the territory divided up amongst the 
 colonists was taken directly from the Ligurians, it had 
 previously belonged to the Etruscans. 
 
 This proves the accuracy of Macaulay, who refers 
 to Luna as an Etruscan city in his Laj/s of Ancient 
 Rome : 
 
 "And in the vats of Luna, 
 
 This year, the must shall foam 
 Round the white feet of laughing girls 
 Whose sires have marched to Rome." 
 
 There are, however, at the present day no signs whatever 
 
 ' Livy, XL. 38. '^ Livy, XLI. 13. 
 
 H. 5
 
 66 CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 of its Etruscan origin to be found at Luna in the shape 
 of massive walls, gateways or sepulchres, such as abound 
 in Etruria proper, and have been so admirably described 
 in Dennis's Etruria. As such monuments are practically 
 indestructible, Luna can never have been of sufficient 
 importance to rank as one of the twelve cities of the 
 Etruscan League. In fact Strabo observes of Luna 
 " The city indeed is not big, but the harbour is of the 
 biggest and fairest, embracing within itself several and 
 all deep-water havens, and offering just such a naval base 
 as is required by a nation, which has ruled the waves so 
 long*." To find the true ring of the Rule Britannia 
 sentiment proceeding from an Asiatic Greek, like Strabo, 
 proves how genuine and widespread was the patriotism 
 of the subjects of Rome. In its position relative to the 
 Ligurian wars, Luna may be compared to Peshawur 
 as an advanced post and base of frontier operations 
 against border tribes. But for the harbour to which 
 it gives its name, and for its strategic importance 
 the colony of Luna would never have been known to 
 fame. For, situated on a fertile but malarious plain 
 near the mouth of the Magra, Luna must always have 
 been an unhealthy and unattractive residence, in spite 
 of its Carrara marble buildings and gleaming white 
 walls, alluded to by Rutilius, the Gallic fourth century 
 poet, as 
 
 "Candentia moenia Lunae." 
 
 Within 150 years of its first settlement by Romans, its 
 population had so dwindled down, that in the time of 
 the second Triumvirate it was found necessary to plant a 
 second Roman colony at Luna. A century later it seems 
 to have been altogether abandoned, for, writing in the 
 reign of Nero, the poet Lucan refers to it in his PJiarsalia 
 as 
 
 . " desertae moenia Lunae."' 
 
 ^ Opfj.riTr)piov OaXaTTOKpaTrjadvTOjv cLvSpwiruv, ToaavT-qs fJikv daXdcj'a'rjs 
 ToaovTov de xp^j'oj'. Strabo, p. 222.
 
 CHAP. VI. 6^ 
 
 How Luna came to give its name to the harbour of 
 Spezia, from which it is several miles distant, and from 
 which it is separated not only by the river Magra but by 
 the range of hills which form its eastern boundary, will 
 always remain a geographical puzzle. That the harbour 
 of Spezia, under the name of ' Portus Lunae,' was used 
 by the Romans before the foundation of their colony is 
 proved by the fact that M. Porcius Cato made it a 
 rendezvous of the fleet that was to sail with him to 
 Spain B.C. 195. It is supposed to have been on the 
 occasion of preparing to embark on this expedition that 
 Ennius wrote : 
 
 " Est operae pretium cives cognoscere Portum 
 Lunae." 
 
 In Smith's Dictionary of Classical Geography^ article 
 ' Luna,' whence it has been copied into the guide books, 
 it is stated that " vestiges of an amphitheatre " are to 
 be seen there. As a matter of fact, as I ascertained 
 by personal inspection in December 1895, there is an 
 almost complete oval still extant, of which the longer 
 axis measures about 80 metres and the shorter about 30. 
 The outer wall is from 1 5 to 20 feet high, with an un- 
 roofed corridor running all the way round between the 
 outer and inner wall. The walls are composed of stones 
 of all sizes, very irregularly set in cement. 
 
 Strange to say, there is very little white marble 
 embedded in the walls of the amphitheatre, which 
 probably dates from the second foundation of Luna as a 
 Roman colony. Besides the amphitheatre there are 
 several other considerable fragments of ruins of a nonde- 
 script character. There is, however, no trace of boundary 
 walls, ancient or modern. The Luna of to-day is not even 
 a village, consisting as it does merely of a farm-house 
 and buildings, with a ruined chapel attached, a white 
 marble threshing-floor, and several isolated labourers' 
 dwellings. Into the walls of the latter are let medallions 
 of Madonnas, beautifully carved in white marble. Luni 
 
 5—2
 
 68 CAMPAIGNS IN EASTERN LIGURIA. 
 
 lies on low ground about a mile and a half to the west 
 of the railway ' halt ' Luni, on the Spezia-Pisa line, and 
 is approachable by a winding English-looking country 
 lane.
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 Conquest of the Ingauni at Albium 
 Ingaunorum (Albenga). 
 
 The Apuani having been finally disposed of by- 
 wholesale deportation, the coast was cleared for the 
 advance of the Romans beyond the Magra towards 
 Genoa. This stretch of coast-line is called by the 
 modern Italians 'Riviera di Levante' ('rising sun') 
 to distinguish it from that to the west of Genoa known 
 as 'Riviera di Ponente' ('setting sun'). So precipitous, 
 however, are the cliffs, especially as far as Sestri-Levante, 
 about half-way between Spezia and Genoa, that the 
 coast is practically only approachable from the sea, even 
 to this day. At the period with which we are dealing, 
 it could only have been occupied by isolated clusters of 
 rude dwellings, settled on ledges in the black rock, 
 wherever a few yards of beach could be found below 
 between two sheltering promontories from which to 
 push off a fishing boat. But even fish are scarce along 
 this inhospitable coast. 
 
 Inland, the region is mostly as wild as the coast, the 
 wooded slopes of the Apennines extending right down 
 to the shore. Cultivation is rare, even at the present 
 day, and almost confined to the mouths of the occasional 
 valleys which break the continuity of the mountains. 
 There is therefore little to tempt the few inhabitants 
 inland, or to encourage road-making. Even the modern 
 high road from Genoa to Spezia abandoned in despair 
 the attempt to follow the coast beyond Sestri-Levante,
 
 70 CONQUEST OF THE INGAUNI. 
 
 where it turns inland. The old Roman road — Via 
 Aemilia Scauri — may with difficulty be traced a few 
 miles further along the edge of the cliffs as far as 
 Moneglia (ad Monilia), beyond which point it ceased to 
 follow the shore. 
 
 The railway, however, keeps on close to the sea, 
 being mostly tunnelled through the black rock, with 
 occasional light and air-holes. This portion of Corniche 
 road travelling has been wittily compared to a journey 
 down a flute. 
 
 Considering the nature of the ground, it is hardly 
 surprising that this impossible tract of some sixty miles 
 of coast-line is practically ignored by Livy. We are 
 not even told how far eastward the territory of the 
 Genuatae extended, nor furnished with the name of any 
 Ligurian tribe intervening between them and the 
 Apuani. 
 
 To the westward of the Genuatae, the tribe of the 
 Sabatii occupied the coast as far as Vada Sabata — the 
 modern Vado — a suburb of Savona. From the absence 
 of any record of their taking up arms against them, we 
 may assume that the Romans had made an alliance with 
 the Sabatii, before proceeding further westward to the 
 Ingauni. 
 
 We have now to deal with the important expedition 
 of the consul L. Aemilius Paulus — famous later on as 
 the conqueror of Macedonia — which resulted in the final 
 subjection of the Ingauni. For the main features of this 
 campaign we are happily not solely dependent on Livy, 
 for Plutarch, in his life of Aemilius Paulus, supplies 
 some material. 
 
 As Aemilius Paulus is one of the greatest characters 
 in Roman history, and a very typical Roman, I may be 
 excused for digressing from my narrative to give a 
 brief extract from Plutarch's life of him, to shew what a 
 light view the Romans took of the marriage tie. 
 
 " His first wife was Papiria, the daughter of Papirius 
 Maso, a man of consular dignity. After he had lived
 
 CHAP. VII. 71 
 
 with her a long time in wedlock he divorced her, though 
 she had brought him very fine children ; for she was 
 mother to the illustrious Scipio and to Fabius Maximus. 
 History does not acquaint us with the reason of this 
 separation ; but with respect to divorces in general, the 
 account which another Roman, who put away his wife, 
 gave of his own case, seems to be applicable to Aemilius 
 Paulus. 
 
 " When his friends remonstrated and asked him, 
 'Was she not chaste .-' was she not fair.'' was she not 
 fruitful ? ' he held out his shoe and said, ' Is it not 
 handsome ? is it not new .•* yet none knows where it 
 pinches him but he that wears it ' 
 
 " Aemilius, thus separated from Papiria, married a 
 second wife, by whom he had also two sons. These he 
 brought up in his own house, the sons of Papiria being 
 adopted into the greatest and most noble families in 
 Rome, the elder by Fabius Maximus, who was five times 
 consul, and the younger by his cousin-german the son of 
 Scipio Africanus, who gave him the name of Scipio\" 
 
 I may be permitted to add that it was the melancholy 
 fate of Aemilius Paulus to lose both his sons by his 
 second wife at an early age. For the one died five days 
 before, and the other three days after, the splendid 
 triumph by which he celebrated his Macedonian vic- 
 tories. So after all he left no legal son to succeed him. 
 
 The reader will recollect that, after their abandon- 
 ment by Mago twenty years previously, the Ingauni 
 were left to make the best terms they could with the 
 Romans, in a treaty concluded with the consul P. Aelius, 
 B.C. 201. For the next sixteen years, from B.C. 201 — 185, 
 the terms of this treaty seem to have been faithfull)' 
 observed. But in the latter year the Ingauni again rose 
 in arms against the Romans. 
 
 The consuls for the year B.C. 185 were Appius 
 Claudius and M. Sempronius. While the latter, as 
 
 ^ Afterwards famous as Scipio Africanus Aemilianus, the hero of the 
 third Punic War, the destroyer of Carthage, and friend of Polybius.
 
 72 CONQUEST OF THE INGAUNI. 
 
 related in the preceding chapter, was engaged in chastis- 
 ing the Apuani, it fell to the lot of Appius Claudius to 
 deal with the Ingauni on the western Riviera. We 
 read in Livy^ that Claudius on the western Riviera 
 fully equalled the success of his colleague Sempronius 
 on the Magra. For he captured six of the oppida or 
 strongholds of the enemy, took many thousands prisoners, 
 and had forty-three of the ringleaders of the revolt 
 publicly executed. If the remains of a fortress on the 
 heights overhanging Vintimiglia, bearing the name of 
 ' Castel d'Appio,' are correctly supposed to commemorate 
 the victories of Appius Claudius, they are an indication 
 of the co-operation of the Intemelii with the Ingauni in 
 their resistance to the Romans. 
 
 In spite of this sharp punishment, in the year B.C. 
 i8i — only four years later — the Ingauni determined to 
 make one more desperate effort to free themselves from 
 the yoke of the Romans, Patching up their feud with 
 their former opponents the Epanterii Montani, they 
 persuaded them to join in a general rising. 
 
 If Plutarch is to be trusted, the forces of the com- 
 bined Ligurians amounted to 40,000 fighting men, 
 opposed to the force of 8000 brought against them 
 by the Romans. This number probably represents a 
 consular army of two Roman legions, without the usual 
 contingent of Socii. These were desperate odds, as the 
 Ingauni, having fought side by side with the Car- 
 thaginians, and been subjected to some sort of military 
 discipline, were far more formidable opponents than the 
 more uncivilized Ligurian tribes. 
 
 On the present occasion, as soon as Aemilius Paulus 
 pitched his camp in their territory, the Ingauni, pre- 
 tending to be anxious to make peace, applied for an 
 armistice of ten days, nominally to give time to the 
 chiefs to reason their tribesmen into laying down their 
 arms. The armistice being granted, the crafty Ingauni 
 extracted in addition a promise from the Roman com- 
 
 ^ XXXIX, 32,
 
 CHAP. VII. 73 
 
 mander that he would abstain from foraging beyond the 
 limits of the plain on which they were encamped. 
 
 Meanwhile, effectually screened by the mountains, 
 which at a distance of seven or eight miles form the arc 
 of the semi-circular plain of which the sea is the chord, 
 the Ingauni and Epanterii were engaged in treacherously 
 massing their forces. All of a sudden, pouring across 
 the mountains, they made a rush at the Roman camp, 
 and were within a little of carrying it by storm. 
 
 During the whole day, dense masses of Ligurians 
 surged round the camp, hemming the Romans in so 
 effectually as to prevent any possibility of a sortie. 
 But as the enemy withdrew at nightfall, in accordance 
 with the custom prevalent with Gauls and Ligurians, 
 Aemilius seized the opportunity of despatching horse- 
 men to Baebius, the proconsul at Pisae, with an urgent 
 appeal for reinforcements. 
 
 As ill luck would have it, Baebius could render no 
 assistance, his legions having just sailed for Sardinia, 
 nor could any help be got from Placentia, which had 
 been denuded of troops required for a war which had 
 just broken out in Histria, arising out of opposition to 
 the foundation of a Roman colony at Aquileia. 
 
 When the news of Aemilius' desperate position 
 reached Rome, the Senate ordered the immediate enrol- 
 ment of every available man under fifty, directing the 
 consuls to assume the paludamentum (or military cloak 
 worn in war-time in the place of the toga) and proceed 
 forthwith to Pisae. At the same time, the naval force 
 lying in the Gulf of Lyons under C. Matienus, one of 
 the naval duumvirs, received orders to proceed at once 
 to Albenga. 
 
 But all these preparations could be of no immediate 
 avail in relieving the beleaguered camp, within which 
 Aemilius strictly confined his troops during the anxious 
 period of awaiting reinforcements. At length, however, 
 despairing of outside succour, the Roman commander 
 ordered preparations to be made for a simultaneous
 
 74 CONQUEST OF THE INGAUNI. 
 
 sortie, from all four gates of the camp, on the first 
 favourable opportunity. 
 
 It was to the invariable rule followed by the Romans 
 of entrenching their armies within the shelter of a camp 
 even when they halted, /<?r a single night, that Napoleon 
 mainly attributed their military successes. On this 
 subject, writing at St Helena, Napoleon remarks : 
 " Pendant dix ou douze siecles de I'histoire Romaine, 
 on ne voit point d'exemple, qu'un de leurs camps ait ete 
 force. Ciceron, lieutenant de Cesar, surpris dans son 
 quartier d'hiver sur la Sambre, soutint pendant un mois, 
 avec 6 ou 7000 hommes, les attaques reiterees d'une 
 armee de 60,000 Gaulois et donna le temps a Cesar 
 d'arriver a son secours\" The experience of Quintus 
 Cicero was an almost exact repetition of what proved 
 true in the case of Aemilius Paulus. 
 
 Securely entrenched within their camp, the 8000 
 troops of Aemilius Paulus could calmly defy the attacks 
 of the 40,000 Ligurians. Day after day, sallying forth 
 at sunrise, the Ligurians approached the Roman camp 
 in order of battle, in the vain hope of tempting the 
 Romans to engage them in the open. At nightfall, how- 
 ever, they always retired to their own encampments". 
 
 Preserving good order at first, the Ligurians soon got 
 tired of these fruitless parades, and relaxing their dis- 
 cipline, took to indulgence in drink before advancing to 
 the attack. 
 
 On one of these occasions, observing the disorder 
 in their ranks, Aemilius Paulus seized his opportunity, 
 giving orders for the sortie for which the troops were 
 anxiously waiting. 
 
 The Roman consular camp at this period was square, 
 and constructed to contain two Roman legions and the 
 usual complement of Socii — 18,600 men in all. Each 
 side measured 2017 ft.l It was surrounded by a ditch 
 
 1 Correspondance de NapoUon /., Vol. xxxi. p. 463. 
 
 ^ Bina cis montes castra Ligurum erant. Livy, xi. 38. 
 
 3 Smith's Did. Greek and Roviati Antiquities, under ' Castra.'
 
 CHAP. VII. 75 
 
 and rampart, the dimensions of which varied according 
 to circumstances. The camp was divided into three 
 nearly equal segments by two parallel roads called 
 ' Via Principalis ' and ' Via Quintana ' respectively. A 
 clear space 200 ft. wide was left all round between 
 the vallum and the tents. 
 
 There were in all four gates, one in each of the four 
 sides, called respectively : — 
 
 1. Porta Praetoria, facing the supposed direction of 
 the enemy. 
 
 2. Porta Decumana, furthest from expected danger, 
 at the opposite end of the camp, by which wood, water, 
 etc., were introduced. 
 
 3. Porta Principalis dextra ) at either end of the 
 
 4. do. do. sinistra] Via Principalis. 
 The praetorium of the general was right opposite to 
 
 the Porta Praetoria. The area of a consular camp in 
 the days of the Republic contained about 87 acres, but 
 Roman camps necessarily must have varied in dimen- 
 sions according to circumstances. As our military 
 authorities calculate that, in ordinary ground, an un- 
 skilled man can excavate one cubic yard per hour, 
 throwing the soil inwards to form the rampart, it would 
 have taken each man two hours to excavate every yard 
 run of ditch two yards deep. As the total ' run ' or 
 front of the four sides of the consular camp to be forti- 
 fied amounted to 2689^ yards, it would have required 
 three times that number or 8068 men to dig a ditch 
 three yards wide and two yards deep in two hours. 
 Another hour would have been required for shaping and 
 palisading the vallum. Thus about half the ordinary 
 force would have been occupied on the fortification of 
 the camp, while the other half was available for protect- 
 ing the workers, if the camp had to be fortified in the 
 presence of the enemy. 
 
 Pouring simultaneously out of all the four gates, the 
 Roman legionaries fell with irresistible impetuosity on 
 the half-drunken Ingauni, who finding themselves as-
 
 •J^ CONQUEST OF THE INGAUNI. 
 
 saulted from all sides at once were thrown into complete 
 confusion, and offered little resistance. Endeavouring 
 to regain the shelter of their camps, they were pursued 
 and overtaken by the Roman cavalry, who cut them to 
 pieces with great slaughter. It is related by Livy that 
 15,000 Ligurians were slain and 2500 taken prisoners on 
 this occasion. 
 
 On the top of this crushing defeat by land, at the 
 hands of Aemilius Paulus, the Ligurians lost thirty-two 
 of their piratical ships, captured by the Roman admiral 
 C. Matienus at sea. 
 
 This double disaster was followed by the uncon- 
 ditional surrender of the Ingauni, who paid the penalty 
 of their treachery and repeated revolts by the forfeiture 
 of their independence. They were in other respects 
 leniently treated, and henceforward furnished contin- 
 gents of Socii to the Roman armies. Like our plucky 
 allies, the Sikhs and Goorkhas in India, fighters by 
 instinct and with no bond of national coherence, they 
 readily took service under the Romans, and supplied 
 some of the best material to their armies. At the 
 greatest crisis of the fortunes of the later republic, when 
 the Cimbri and Teutones threatened to overrun Italy, 
 the Italian Ligurians in the army of Marius were the 
 first to turn the tide of victory in favour of Rome.
 
 CHAPTER VIII. 
 
 Conquest of Transalpine Liguria, South of 
 THE Durance. 
 
 As we hear absolutely nothing of any distinct war 
 between the Romans and the Intemelii we are led to 
 infer that they were involved in the campaign described 
 in the last chapter and reduced to subjection in common 
 with their neighbours the Ingauni^ For, pace Strabo 
 and the modern geographers, who follow Napoleon in 
 carrying the Alps on eastward, at the back of the 
 Riviera as far as Savona, I venture to think that those 
 mountains should be considered as belonging to the 
 Apennines, there being nothing of an Alpine character 
 about them I I shall at all events take the liberty 
 for the purpose of this sketch of considering Vintimiglia 
 and the Col de Tenda as the Eastern termination of 
 the Maritime Alps. Between Vintimiglia and Nice is 
 interposed the whole breadth of the range terminating 
 in a succession of bold headlands, forming a series of 
 natural harbours just where they are of little advantage 
 to commerce, from the sparseness of the population and 
 the absence of trade with the interior. 
 
 ^ Intemelium (the modern Vintimiglia), the point at which the 
 Romans had now arrived, is described by Strabo as a veiy considerable 
 city, 7r6XiJ (vfie-yidrii. It was situated at the foot of the Maritime Alps on 
 the Italian side, while Nice occupies a corresponding position on the 
 French side. 
 
 - Since the above was in type, I have seen with satisfaction that this 
 view has been adopted in the latest edition of Ball's Alpine Guide (p. 2, 
 Introduction).
 
 yS CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 While the distance in the straight line followed by 
 the railway, tunnelling through the necks of the pro- 
 jecting headlands, is about 25 miles from the Nervia to 
 the Var, the course of the Antonine Maritime Itinerary 
 which follows the windings of the coast more than 
 doubles the distance. 
 
 Monaco (Portus Herculis Monoeci) and Villefranche 
 (Olivula) are the two best known of these ' portus ' of 
 the Antonine Maritime Itinerary. 
 
 At the period with which we are dealing, i.e., the 
 Ligurian 80 years' wars between B.C. 190 — no, the 
 armies of the Republic made no attempt to overcome 
 the combined opposition of nature and man at this 
 point. For the ridges of the Maritime Alps, where they 
 approach the sea, were, as I have remarked above, the 
 strongholds of the hardiest and most daring of the 
 Ligurian tribes, who were not dispossessed till the reign 
 of Augustus. 
 
 In dividing the Gauls into Cisalpine and Trans- 
 alpine, as is commonly the custom, we are apt to forget 
 that to make that division exhaustive, we should add 
 the " Gentes Alpinae " or dwellers in the Alps, as they 
 are properly styled by Pliny \ 
 
 The regular armies of the Republic, which conquered 
 Liguria on both sides of the Alps, were almost invariably 
 conveyed by sea, and it was mainly by sea that com- 
 munications were kept up between Pisae, Genoa and 
 Marseilles. For in Liguria, where the Romans had no 
 intention of settling, and founded no colonies at any 
 time^ road-making by no means immediately followed 
 conquest as elsewhere. They were in no hurry to 
 provide a coast road convenient for Gallic invasion. 
 
 1 I/ist. Nat. III. 19. 
 
 - Albium Ingaunorum and Albium Intemelium were Roman Municipia, 
 which dift'ered from Colonies in their manner of originating. WTiile a 
 municipium was a provincial or foreign town admitted from without to 
 Roman citizenship, a colony was a place to which a body of citizens was 
 conducted from Rome.
 
 CHAP. VIII. 79 
 
 Besides, the Romans had another good reason for pulling 
 up for the present at Vintimiglia. 
 
 For Transalpine Liguria, the AiyvariKy'] of the Greeks, 
 was already occupied by the Massiliots, who had planted 
 colonies along the coast, of which the most conspicuous 
 was Nicaea, in the sunny expanse between the Alps, 
 the Var, and the sea. With their practised eye for 
 trading posts, the Phocaean Massiliots were not slow to 
 pitch on this splendid site, now occupied by the city of 
 Nice, defended on all sides by natural barriers, and wide 
 open to the sea, of which they had just become masters 
 by a victory, ' NUt] ' — over the Carthaginian fleet off 
 Corsica. 
 
 Beyond the Var, westward, between the Alps and 
 the sea there is a band of comparatively flat coast, 
 extending some 20 miles as far as the river Siagne, at 
 the foot of the Esterel mountains. This striking range 
 of volcanic peaks composed of red porphyry rocks 
 terminates in the bold headland of Cap Roux, forming 
 the western horn of the Bay of Cannes. From the flat 
 coast half-way between the Alps and the Esterel, a long 
 narrow cape, broadening at its sea end, projects far into 
 the Mediterranean, forming a natural breakwater. On 
 the eastern side of the neck of this cape, the Massiliots 
 founded another city which they called ' Antipolis ' 
 (Antibes) or " the city opposite " Nicaea. 
 
 It was not till they were summoned to their assistance 
 by the Massiliots that the Romans undertook military 
 operations to the west of the Alps in the region between 
 the Var and the Rhone, which I shall continue to 
 describe as Transalpine Liguria. 
 
 It was in the year B.C. 155 that Massiliot envoys 
 arrived in Rome, with earnest entreaties for assistance 
 against their Ligurian assailants. Not only was the 
 mother city closely beleaguered by her persistent foes, 
 the Salyes, but siege was also laid to Nicaea and Anti- 
 polis by tribes now heard of for the first time — the 
 Ligurian Oxybii and Deciates. It is somewhat strange
 
 8o CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 that the Vediantii, a tribe of the Ligures Capillati, 
 whose oppidiim, the modem Cimiez, was in close 
 proximity to Nice, are nowhere mentioned as joining in 
 the attacks on the Greek settlers. 
 
 These three tribes, or confederation of tribes, Salyes, 
 Oxybii, Deciates, between them seem to have occupied 
 the whole stretch of the coast from Marseilles to the Var. 
 At all events these are the only names mentioned by 
 Strabo or Polybius. The latter, who was contemporary 
 with these events, is our chief authority for the few facts 
 handed down to us about the beginning of Roman 
 military operations in Transalpine Liguria. 
 
 The Ligurians of the coast are not included in the 
 formidable list of Alpine tribes subdued by Augustus, 
 and preserved to us by Pliny, who copied them from 
 the inscription on the monument of La Turbie. They 
 are enumerated, as far as they can be identified, in their 
 order from East to West. 
 
 Having given a careful hearing to the representa- 
 tions of the envoys from Marseilles, the Senate decided 
 to send in the first instance three Roman commis- 
 sioners to endeavour to bring the Ligurians to reason 
 by peaceful remonstrance. 
 
 Proceeding to the Ligurian coast by sea, with a 
 small unarmed retinue, the commissioners, of whom the 
 chief was Flaminius, directed their course to the chief 
 oppidiim of the Oxybii — a place called Aegytna, near 
 the mouth of a river, which Polybius calls the Apron ^ 
 That Aegytna may be identified with Cannes, and the 
 Apron with the river Siagne seems on the whole most 
 probable. For Aegytna was a few miles to the west of 
 Antipolis (Antibes), and no other place agrees so well as 
 Cannes with the required distance and the existence of 
 a river with flat ground near its mouth to hold the 
 camp which the Consul Opimius pitched on its bank the 
 following year. 
 
 ^ Vol. II. Fragments.
 
 CHAP. VIII. 8l 
 
 The competing sites for the honour of identification 
 with Aegytna are Frejus (Forum Julii), Agay, on an 
 almost landlocked bay in the heart of the Esterel, 
 and Encourdoules, a most interesting Ligurian oppidum 
 perched on an eminence above Vallauris and command- 
 ing a splendid view of the coast, from which the Cap 
 d'Antibes protrudes. In point of archaeological interest, 
 Encourdoules, as I have remarked in the special Chapter 
 devoted to the Ligurians, is worthy of being ranked by 
 the side of Entremont. 
 
 We may assume then that it was at Cannes, where 
 the Roman Commissioners put ashore. 
 
 But before the whole party had landed, the Oxybians 
 who were on the look-out rushed down from their 
 stronghold and fell upon the servants of the com- 
 missioners while in the act of unpacking the baggage. 
 
 Hurrying to the assistance of his retinue, two of 
 whom were killed in the fray, Flaminius himself was 
 severely wounded, and barely escaped with his life to 
 the vessel, which lay off the shore. Making for Mar- 
 seilles, as being the nearest friendly port, though more 
 than 100 miles to the westward, the Roman Commis- 
 sioners put in there, and leaving their wounded chief to 
 the careful nursing of their faithful allies, hastened back 
 to Rome to report the outrage. 
 
 On receipt of this intelligence, the Senate at once 
 sent orders to the Consul Quintus Opimius, who had 
 his head-quarters in Cisalpine Gaul at Placentia, to fit 
 out an expedition to avenge this glaring insult. In 
 connection with this expedition, it is worthy of notice 
 that already in these early days, Placentia rather than 
 Pisae had become the Roman base for operations on 
 the coast of Provence. This fact should be borne in 
 mind in connection with the course of the Via Julia 
 Augusta, the road constructed B.C. 12 by Augustus 
 to connect the Riviera stations of the Maritime Alps 
 with Rome, which was carried inland through Placentia 
 in preference to following the coast. 
 
 H. 6
 
 82 CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 In this instance too, as previously, in his account 
 of the course of Hannibal's passage, Polybius, although 
 now describing events which happened when he was in 
 his prime, is a most unsatisfactory guide in point of 
 geography. He barely informs us that "Quintus having 
 assembled his forces at the city of the Placentines, 
 marched across the mountains of the Apennines and 
 arrived in the country of the Oxybians\" 
 
 From this passage the reader unacquainted with the 
 geography of the region would naturally infer that the 
 Apennines were the chief obstacle which Opimius would 
 have encountered in his march from Placentia on the 
 Po to Aegytna on the coast. Not a word is said, 
 directly or indirectly, about the main range of the 
 Maritime Alps, which lay right across his further advance 
 by road. As far as Polybius is concerned we are left 
 absolutely in the dark as to how the expedition really 
 got to Aegytna. 
 
 To anyone acquainted with the geography of the 
 district it becomes clear that after crossing the Apen- 
 nines to Genoa or Vada Sabata Opimius must have 
 proceeded to Aegytna by sea. For, had he accomplished 
 the as yet unattempted task of carrying an army across 
 the Maritime Alps, he must have descended on Nice, 
 and first encountered the Deciates who were laying siege 
 to Nice, instead of the Oxybii at Aegytna, as stated in 
 the text of Polybius. 
 
 Sailing up the River ' Apron ' (la Siagne) Opimius 
 landed his troops and pitched his camp on the bank 
 near its mouth. After devoting the two or three hours 
 requisite^ to the never-omitted precaution of fortifying 
 the camp, the Consul, without further delay, led his men 
 to the assault of the enemy's stronghold. 
 
 In the absence of the main body of its defenders, 
 still apparently engaged in the siege of Antipolis, the 
 Oxybian stronghold fell an easy prey to the Romans. 
 
 1 Polybius, xxxin. 2. 
 ^ See preceding Chapter.
 
 CHAP. VIII. 83 
 
 As a sharp punishment Aegytna was levelled to the 
 ground and the chief instigators of the outrage on the 
 Commissioners taken prisoners and sent in bonds to 
 Rome. 
 
 No sooner did the Oxybii hear of the destruction of 
 Aegytna, than abandoning the siege of Antipolis and 
 without waiting for the arrival of their allies, the Deciates, 
 they hurried homewards to encounter the Romans. 
 
 In the fight which ensued, the Oxybii, single handed, 
 proved no match for the Roman legionaries, and were 
 soon put to flight with great slaughter. With the 
 Romans in hot pursuit, the Oxybii fled towards Nice 
 in the utmost confusion, never stopping till they fell in 
 with the Deciates, who had abandoned the blockade of 
 Nice to come to the aid of their allies. 
 
 But the Deciates, who had probably been delayed by 
 the difficulty of passing the Var, came up too late to 
 render other assistance than that of opening their ranks 
 to let the fugitives through, and closing them up to stay 
 the pursuit of the Romans. After an obstinate resistance, 
 the Deciates were in their turn overwhelmed, and both 
 tribes were reduced to complete subjection. Neither 
 Oxybii nor Deciates appear to have given any more 
 trouble to the Greek settlers, to whom, as we are informed 
 by Polybius, they were bound to give hostages, at stated 
 intervals^ for their good behaviour. 
 
 Although the Roman army was quartered in the 
 district for the winter, the Romans on this occasion 
 abstained from annexing any territory, handing over to 
 the Massiliots the strip of coast which had been the 
 scene of their late victories. This concession of the 
 territory was subject to the condition of a right of 
 passage over the road to be constructed by the Massiliots 
 along the coast from Nice to Marseilles. 
 
 For the next 30 years, from B.C. 154 — 125, we 
 hear nothing of Ligurian wars, although the conquest 
 of the Salyes, the predominant tribe or confederation 
 in Transalpine Liguria, still remained to be effected. As 
 
 6—2
 
 84 CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 this period of Roman history was marked by such 
 important events as the third Punic War, the final 
 destruction of Carthage, and the siege and capture of 
 Numantia in Spain (at which Polybius assisted), the 
 Romans had their hands full of fighting elsewhere. It 
 is therefore probable that even had the Massiliots applied 
 for aid earlier, no Roman troops could have been spared 
 for their protection against the Salyes. 
 
 When however in the year B.C. 125 Massiliot envoys 
 arrived at Rome, representing the gravity of the situa- 
 tion at Marseilles from the increasing pressure of the 
 siege, no important military operations elsewhere pre- 
 vented the Senate from promising immediate assistance. 
 Not only were the Romans free from the necessity of 
 carrying on war elsewhere, but the Senate was glad to 
 be able at one stroke to accommodate its ancient ally, 
 the conservative republic of Marseilles, by sending on 
 foreign service the radical Consul, Fulvius Flaccus, the 
 impetuous coadjutor of the Gracchi, whose land-agitation 
 was now at its height. 
 
 Nor is it unlikely that Fulvius started willingly 
 enough for Gaul, and with the approval of his friend 
 Caius Gracchus, in the hope of acquiring by his conquests 
 fertile territory beyond the Alps, wherewith to satisfy 
 the land hunger of the populace at home. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the colonization of Narbonne 
 in B.C. 118 — the first regular Roman colony settled 
 beyond the Alps — did directly result from the four years' 
 campaign initiated by Fulvius Flaccus. But both he 
 and his friend Caius Gracchus had three years previously 
 lost their lives in one of the city broils, which disgraced 
 Roman politics during that turbulent era. The sporadic 
 settlements of Roman citizens in Spain were not as yet 
 real colonies, and the decree forced through the Senate 
 by the radicals, to establish the Roman colony of 
 Junonia on the site of Carthage, was annulled, when the 
 con.servative party in the Senate recovered its authority. 
 
 It seems doubtful whether the Romans fully realized
 
 CHAP. VIII. 85 
 
 at the outset of the campaign, how formidable a foe they 
 had to encounter in the Salyes, or Salluvii — the Latinised 
 form of their name. Hitherto, on the Riviera, the heavy- 
 armed legionaries had had to do mostly with light-footed 
 Ligurian mountaineers, whom to find was a tougher job 
 than to beat, as one of their historians truly remarked \ 
 
 It was far otherwise with the Salluvii, who occupied 
 the comparatively open country between the Rhone, the 
 Mediterranean, and the Durance. According to Strabo, 
 their territory included the pastures bordering on the 
 Rhone about Aries. This gave them facilities for horse- 
 breeding, denied to the Ligurians whom the Romans 
 had hitherto encountered along the Italian and French 
 Rivieras. Thus the Salluvii were enabled to put into 
 the field a formidable force of cavalry, always a weak 
 arm with the Roman armies before Caesar's conquest 
 of Transalpine Gaul, which furnished an inexhaustible 
 supply during the Civil War, and subsequently during 
 the Empire. Aries itself, as we are told by Ptolemy^ 
 was a city of the Salyes, being styled " Arelate Salyum." 
 
 Occupying a central position at the South-Western 
 corner of the Alps, between the Riviera and the Rhone 
 Valley, the Salluvii are a people who play a most im- 
 portant part in the story of the advance of the Romans 
 into Gaul. Their territory, in fact, forms a sort of pivot 
 on which it turns. Yet their very name is hardly 
 known to British students of Roman history — a fact to 
 be mainly accounted for by the loss of that part of 
 Livy's history, which would have told us a great deal 
 about them. 
 
 Our interest in the Salluvii is not confined to the 
 campaigns of Fulvius Flaccus and Sextus Calvinus, but 
 is revived twenty years later in connection with the 
 battle of Aix and the great slaughter of the Ambrones 
 and Teutones in the valley of the Arc. For it was in 
 the territory of the Salluvii that the attempted bar^ 
 
 1 Florus, ch. XVIII. 
 * Ptolemy, li. 10, 15.
 
 86 CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 barian invasion of Italy was finally arrested \ All that 
 we learn from Livy about the Salluvii is contained in 
 the Epitome of Lib. LX.: " Fulvius Flaccus primus 
 Transalpinos Ligures domuit bello, missus in auxilium 
 Massiliensibus adversus Salluvios Gallos, qui fines 
 Massiliensium populabantur." 
 
 It will be observed that in this extract from the 
 Epitome of Lib. LX. the epitomist in referring to the 
 Salluvii describes them in the first line as " Trans- 
 alpinos Ligures " and in the second as " Gallos." The 
 term ' Galli ' is evidently used here in a geographical 
 and not an ethnological sense. The word ' Gallus ' 
 means simply an inhabitant of 'Gallia' irrespective of 
 nationality, just as the name Englishman is sometimes 
 used to include all the dwellers within the limits of 
 Britain. For there is no doubt that Pliny was correct in 
 describing the Salluvii as " Ligurum celeberrimi ultra 
 Alpes'." Both Caesar, Livy and Strabo use the word 
 ' Galli' or its equivalent ' Celtae ' in a double sense, some- 
 times general and sometimes particular. It is very 
 necessary to bear this fact constantly in mind in read- 
 ing the three writers I have named. 
 
 Having recently made several journeys through the 
 country of the Salluvii, I may be excused for drawing 
 the reader's special attention to this neglected corner of 
 France. 
 
 While the Rhone formed the western limit of their 
 territory, it is difficult to determine exactly where it 
 terminated on the East. For whereas the main direc- 
 tion of the Rhone and of most of the rivers or torrents 
 descending from the Alps and Apennines along both 
 the French and Italian Rivieras is from North to 
 South, in the country of the Salluvii the rivers run 
 rather parallel with than at a right angle to the Mediter- 
 ranean. The direct flow into the Mediterranean of the 
 rivers fed by the water-bearing limestone of the Basses 
 
 ' See map of mouths of the Rhone, 
 2 Plin. Nai. Hist. n\. 7.
 
 CHAP. VIII, 87 
 
 Alpes, has been blocked by the interposition of the 
 isolated Volcanic range of the mountains of Les Maures 
 and diverted into a great inland trough, running East 
 and West. About the centre of this trough, dividing it 
 into an Eastern and Western basin, there is a picturesque 
 Col, near the modern town of St Maximin, which is 
 famous for its magnificent church. This Col forms a 
 watershed, dividing the basin of the Arc flowing 
 westward into the Etang de Berre, from that of the 
 Argens flowing eastward into the Bay of Frejus. The 
 Col de St Maximin probably formed the Eastern limit 
 of the territory of the Salluvii, who do not appear to 
 have descended into the basin of the Argens, the lower 
 half of which, including Forum Julii at its mouth, is 
 assigned by Pliny to the Oxybii^ 
 
 Being already in possession of Aries, the Salluvii 
 were now pressing harder than ever on Massilia, which 
 would probably have fallen into their hands but for its 
 remarkable natural defences. For, as I have remarked 
 above, its surrounding zone is sheltered from all attack 
 from the north, whether of nature or man, by an en- 
 circling girdle of limestone hills, rising like a wall 
 abruptly from the table-land. Against this outer rocky 
 barrier, the Salluvii had hitherto fretted in vain. 
 
 Such then was the country of the Salluvii and such 
 the circumstances under which, in B.C. 125, the consul 
 Fulvius Flaccus was sent to the assistance of the hard- 
 pressed Massiliots. As unfortunately no details of these 
 campaigns have been handed down to us, we have 
 nothing to guide us but the bare outlines supplied by 
 the epitomes of Livy's lost books, the dates of the 
 triumphs of the Roman commanders recorded in the 
 Fasti Capitolini, and a few incidental notices to be found 
 in various classical authors and notably Strabo. We 
 are not even told from what Italian port Fulvius sailed, 
 nor where he landed in Liguria. For it must be assumed 
 that he conveyed his legions by sea to some point on the 
 
 1 Plin. Nai. Hist. ni. 5.
 
 88 CONQUEST OF TRANSALPINE LIGURIA. 
 
 coast beyond the Maritime Alps, there being no thorough- 
 fare as yet by land. 
 
 That this point was Forum Julii, the modern Frejus, 
 can hardly be doubted by anyone sufficiently acquainted 
 with the topography of Provence. 
 
 Having reduced the Oxybii to subjection in the 
 campaign of Opimius, the Romans would have had no 
 opposition to fear from that confederation in marching 
 up the lower valley of the Argens. 
 
 The striking gap formed by the valley of the Argens 
 between the mountains of the Moors and the spurs of 
 the Basses Alpes could not have failed to attract the 
 notice of the Roman flotilla, as it rounded the bold 
 headland of the Cap Roux, as offering an irresistibly 
 inviting short cut into the heart of the enemy's country. 
 Well might Tacitus, who was associated with Forum 
 Julii as the birthplace of his father-in-law Agricola\ 
 describe it as ' Claustra maris.' He might have added 
 that it was also ' Claustra Galliae.' Its concave semi- 
 circular Roman gateway — Western Gate — of which I 
 lately excavated the foundations, still bears the name 
 ' Porte des Gaules.' 
 
 As if Nature had herself recognised the necessity of 
 a barrier to invasion of Gaul by this open door, she has 
 posted in the gap the rugged mass of Roquebrune, like a 
 giant sentinel mounting guard over the valley. To strike 
 straight at Entremont their stronghold, in the rear of the 
 enemy besieging Marseilles, was obviously the surest 
 way of compelling the Salluvii to withdraw their forces. 
 It seems almost certain that these were the tactics 
 adopted by the Romans. 
 
 But whatever course Fulvius Flaccus adopted, a 
 second campaign was required to overcome the stubborn 
 resistance of the Salluvii. For it was reserved for his 
 successor Caius Sextius Calvinus in the following year to 
 
 ^ Julia, the mother of Agricola, had also a country residence near 
 Vintimiglia, where she was barbarously murdered (a.d. 69) by the troops of 
 Otho, in revenge for aid afforded to his rival Vitellius.
 
 [ To face p.
 
 CHAP. VIII. 89 
 
 triumph over them. It is recorded in the Fasti Capito- 
 lini for the year B.C. 124, that " Caius Sextius Calvinus 
 triumphavit de Liguribus Vocontiis Salluviisque." 
 
 From Strabo (p. 190), however, we gather that the 
 Salyes were far from being completely crushed. This 
 is his summing up of the results of the two campaigns, 
 i.e. of B.C. 125 and 124 ; 
 
 " Sextius, who broke up the confederation of the 
 Salyes, founded, not far from Marseilles, a city (Aquae 
 Sextiae) which was named after him and the hot waters, 
 some of which they say have lost their heat. Here he 
 established a Roman garrison, and drove from the sea 
 coast which leads from Marseilles to Italy the barbarians, 
 whom the Massiliots were not able to keep back entirely. 
 However, all he accomplished by this was to compel the 
 barbarians to keep at a distance of twelve stadia from 
 those parts of the coast which possessed good harbours, 
 and at a distance of eight stadia where it was rugged. 
 The land which they thus abandoned he presented to 
 the Massiliots." 
 
 This passage seems to prove that the whole stretch 
 of the coast forming a fringe to the mountains of the 
 Moors and trending southwards to Hyeres from the 
 mouth of the Argens, formed part of the territory of the 
 Salyes or Salluvii. The names of tribes other than the 
 Salluvii mentioned by Pliny as belonging to this region 
 must be regarded as subordinate members of the Sallu- 
 vian confederation.
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 Campaigns to the North of the Durance. 
 
 Although Fulvius Flaccus failed in the year of his 
 Consulship B.C. 125 to earn a triumph over the Salluvii, 
 against whom he was primarily sent, his name is found 
 recorded in the Fasti Capitolini as triumphing over the 
 " Ligurian Vocontii " two years later: viz., B.C. 123. 
 Beyond this bare record we know nothing of this the 
 first campaign undertaken by the Romans north of the 
 Durance, except that, when vanquished, the Vocontii 
 were treated with the same leniency as the Volcae Are- 
 comici and were not made subject to the Governor of 
 the Roman Province like their neighbours, the Allo- 
 broges and Salluvii. For it is expressly stated by 
 Strabo that the Vocontii were left in the enjoyment of 
 their own laws\ 
 
 Their territory lay along the spurs of the Alps, 
 including the Mont Ventoux. It was separated from 
 the Rhone by the vast plain of the Cavares, whose 
 capital was Arausio — the modern Orange. Being of 
 Ligurian blood, the Vocontii, with the instinct of their 
 race, clung to the mountainous region at the foot of the 
 Alps, extending from the Durance on the South-East to 
 the Isere on the North, comprising the Upper Valley of 
 the Drome and the tremendous and inaccessible preci- 
 pices about its source. The southern capital of the 
 Vocontii was Vasio — the modern Vaison — situate about 
 18 miles to the East of Orange and commanding a 
 
 ^ Strabo, p. 203.
 
 CHAP. IX. 91 
 
 picturesque gorge of the river Uvezes, there spanned by 
 a single-arched Roman bridge. Lucus (Luc) and Dea 
 (Die), both in the valley of the Drome, were the chief 
 towns in the northern half of the Vocontian territory. 
 All three places are rich in historical associations, and 
 have furnished many interesting specimens of early 
 so-called Gallo-Roman sculpture and inscriptions to 
 French Museums, and especially to that of Avignon \ 
 
 Adopted by Julius Caesar, at the outset of the Gallic 
 war, as the shortest cut from his Cisalpine into his 
 Transalpine province, the valley of the Drome served as 
 a convenient thoroughfare intermediate between the 
 Valleys of the Durance (Mont Genevre) and of the 
 Isere (Little St Bernard and Mt Cenis). 
 
 When Pompey 20 years earlier crossed the Mont 
 Genevre or Cottian Alps on his way to put down 
 Sertorius in Spain, he would naturally have followed 
 the Durance valley for its entire length south-west- 
 wards, whereas Julius Caesar, having crossed the Alps 
 by the same pass — in order to reach the country of the 
 Vocontii from Ocelum", would have diverged from the 
 Durance valley near Gap (Vapincum) and struck across 
 the pass of the Mt Gaura into the Drome valley. This 
 is precisely the course adopted by the little known 
 modern railway line from Briangon in the Durance 
 valley, to Livron in the Rhone valley, cutting the 
 strikingly beautiful Marseilles-Grenoble line at a right 
 angle, at the junction of Aspres-Veynes^ As the 
 Vocontii were left to govern themselves internally, being 
 only liable to furnish a contingent of Socii to the armies 
 of Rome, no garrison was left in their country, so that 
 Aquae Sextiae to the South of the Durance still re- 
 
 ' Some of the specimens of so-called Gallo-Roman sculpture from 
 Vaison resemble the bas-reliefs of Entremont in their rude features, i.e. 
 they may be of Ligurian origin. 
 
 ^ Caesar, de Bella Gallico, I. lo. 
 
 ' An excellent dinner is provided at the Railway refreshment room and 
 fair accommodation for the night at the Hotel.
 
 92 CAMPAIGNS TO THE NORTH OF THE DURANCE. 
 
 mained the most advanced Roman post in Transalpine 
 Liguria, when the war with the Allobroges and Arverni 
 broke out. 
 
 For the campaigns against the Salluvii and Vocontii 
 were immediately followed by a war with the Allo- 
 broges, brought on by their refusal to give up to the 
 Romans Teutomalius, King of the Salluvii, who had 
 fled to their country for refuge. That Teutomalius a 
 Ligurian should have confided in the loyalty of the 
 Celtic Allobroges, is a proof of the fusion of Ligurians 
 and Celts in a common league of resistance to the 
 Romans. About this time, too, the Allobroges had 
 further incurred the displeasure of the Romans by vio- 
 lating the territory of the Aedui, who even at this early 
 period of Roman intervention in Gaul had been declared 
 the allies and brothers of the Romans. But war with 
 the Allobroges 'the Clients' implied also war with the 
 Arverni, their Patrons, then by far the most powerful 
 of all the Gallic confederations. For, according to 
 Strabo^ the Arverni, on this the first occasion of their 
 coming into hostile contact with the Romans, put 
 200,000 fighting men into the field. 
 
 But before the Arverni could move this unwieldy 
 force down to the Rhone the Proconsul Domitius Aheno- 
 barbus attacked and defeated the Allobroges single- 
 handed at Vindalium at the junction of the Sorgue and 
 the Rhone, in the territory of the Cavari. What 
 induced the Allobroges to advance so far south beyond 
 their own frontier, is nowhere satisfactorily explained. 
 
 Falling back, after their defeat, to the line of the 
 Isere, the Allobroges, secure from further attack in the 
 angle formed by that river with the Rhone — the island 
 of Polybius — quietly awaited the arrival of their power- 
 ful patrons, the Arverni. 
 
 The army of the Proconsul Domitius had been in 
 the meanwhile joined by that of the Consul of the year 
 122, Quintus Fabius Maximus, the Senate having 
 
 ^ Strabo, p. 190.
 
 CHAP. IX. 93 
 
 foreseen the necessity of doubling the Roman forces to 
 enable them to cope with the Allobroges and Arverni 
 combined. But the two Roman armies together made 
 such a poor show compared with the masses of Celts 
 opposed to them, that Bituitus, the king of the Arverni, 
 declared they would hardly suffice to make a meal for 
 his pack of war-hounds. 
 
 Considering that the battle, which ensued, decided 
 once for all the fate of the Rhone valley, it is surprising 
 how little attention it has received at the hands of 
 students of Roman history. For the victory won on this 
 occasion by Fabius and Domitius at the junction of the 
 Rhone and the Isere was the first decisive blow dealt by 
 the Romans to the confederation of the Arverni, then, 
 as 70 years later at the period of Caesar's Gallic War, 
 the mainspring of Gallic resistance. 
 
 Planted in impregnable positions in the mountains 
 of the Auvergne — the central boss of the shield of 
 France — the Arverni alone proved themselves capable 
 of awakening national enthusiasm and of binding tem- 
 porarily together for a common purpose the incoherent 
 elements of which Gaul was made up. 
 
 The aspect of the symmetrical Cupola of the Puy 
 de Dome rising above an undulating foreground of lower 
 ranges like St Peter's as seen from the Roman Campagna^ 
 is in itself sufficient to strike the modern traveller with 
 admiration. How much more must the rude Celtic 
 worshipper have been impressed by such imposing sur- 
 roundings, when the massive temple and colossal statue 
 of the Arverne Mercury still stood erects The Puy de 
 Dome was the Delphi of Gaul. 
 
 ^ As I saw it from the plateau of Gergovia, I was reminded of Mrs 
 Browning's lines : 
 
 "Over the dumb Campagna-sea, 
 
 Out in the offing through mist and rain, 
 Saint Peter's Church heaves silently 
 Like a mighty ship in pain." 
 
 2 De Bella Gallico, vi. 17, " Deum maxime Mercurium colunt."
 
 94 CAMPAIGNS TO THE NORTH OF THE DURANCE. 
 
 If Celtic blood is still pure anywhere in France, it 
 must surely be in the mountains of the Auvergne, where 
 the spirit of Vercingetorix seems still to hover over the 
 Puy de Dome and the plateau of Gergovia. For there 
 alone did the Romans, when led by Julius Caesar in 
 person, meet with defeat at the hands of Gauls \ 
 
 Conspicuous in his gorgeous apparel and golden 
 helmet and drawn along the front of his army in his 
 silver chariot Bituitus, the ancestor of Vercingetorix, and 
 overlord of all Gallia, regarded the Romans as doomed 
 to certain destruction. 
 
 According to Orosius'^ the battle was long and 
 obstinate, and only decided late in the day in favour 
 of the Romans, by a panic which set in amongst the 
 Gauls. In his Belluin Allobr-ogiann Epitome xxxvil., 
 Florus attributes the Gallic defeat to the terror inspired 
 by the elephants, remarking that it was " a barbarous 
 method of beating barbarians." 
 
 To reach the position selected by their allies the 
 AUobroges in the angle of the Rhone and the Isere, the 
 Arverni had to cross to the left bank of the Rhone. 
 Finding the permanent bridge insufficient, Bituitus 
 hastily constructed a temporary one, by the aid of which 
 his huge army was got safely over. 
 
 To fight with a river at your back is, I believe, a 
 violation of one of the most elementary principles of 
 war, for which the Arverni paid dearly on the present 
 occasion. For when the panic ensued, a frantic rush was 
 made for the bridges, resulting in the breakdown of the 
 temporary structure. Many thousands of the Arverni 
 
 1 When passing through the country recently, I made the acquaintance 
 of a native 'antiquaire,' who spoke with the utmost contempt of the 
 traitors to the Gallic cause, who sold themselves to the Romans, as if 
 their treachery had happened yesterday. Espasnactus the Arveme, who 
 betrayed and handed over Lucterius, the associate of Drappes, to the 
 Romans, was the object of his special aversion. But I did not observe 
 that in selling a coin stamped with the effigy of a traitor that he asked less 
 for it than for that of a patriot. 
 
 2 Historiae adversus paganos.
 
 CHAP. IX. 95 
 
 were drowned, and the greater part of the remainder 
 getting jammed on the permanent bridge or the ap- 
 proaches to it were put to the sword. 
 
 Like Napoleon in his flight from Waterloo, Bituitus 
 escaped capture on the field by the sacrifice of his chariot 
 and rich trappings, which fell into the hands of the 
 Romans. 
 
 Soon after, however, tempted by an offer of favourable 
 terms, Bituitus was induced to repair to the Camp of 
 Domitius, whose imperium as Proconsul of Provincia 
 was prolonged after the departure of the Consul Fabius 
 for Rome. Treacherously seized as soon as he had set 
 foot within the Praetorium, the Arverne monarch was 
 loaded with chains and sent prisoner to Rome, whither 
 his son Congenatus was compelled to follow shortly 
 after, to share his father's captivity. In the triumph of 
 Fabius Maximus, in which Domitius Ahenobarbus was 
 permitted to share on the strength of his capture of 
 Bituitus, the Arverne monarch, brilliantly arrayed and 
 mounted in his silver chariot, formed the most conspic- 
 uous figure in the show. In addition to the honour of a 
 triumph the title oi AllobrogicuswdiS conferred on Quintus 
 Fabius Maximus, the war in spite of the fact that the 
 Arverni played the chief part in it having been officially 
 styled BelluDi Allobrogiciini. 
 
 For the Roman quarrel lay wath the Allobroges for 
 harbouring Teutomalius, the fugitive king of the Salluvii, 
 and the Arverni were only incidentally drawn into it. 
 Neither did it as yet suit the purpose of the Senate to 
 annex any of the proper territory of the Arverni. It 
 was sufficient for Roman policy that the Arverni should 
 give up all claim to patronage in the Rhone valley, 
 which was to become the Provincia Romana. Over the 
 territory of the Volcae Arecomici, around Narbonne, 
 which the Romans had long coveted, the Arverni had 
 hitherto thrown the shield of their protection. It was 
 now practically open to Roman occupation, as the Volcae 
 offered no opposition to the Roman project of planting
 
 96 CAMPAIGNS TO THE NORTH OF THE DURANCE. 
 
 a colony of Roman traders at Narbonne. For at the 
 outset Narbonne was a civil and not a military colony. 
 
 The victory of the Romans over the Allobroges and 
 Arverni combined was so crushing that the Arverni are 
 not heard of again in arms, till we read in Caesar's 
 Commentary of their gallant but fruitless struggle under 
 Vercingetorix, three generations later, to maintain Gallic 
 independence. 
 
 While Strabo puts the number of the slain at 200,000, 
 Livy's estimate is 120,000. Strabo adds that Fabius 
 Max. Aemilianus erected a white stone trophy and two 
 temples (to Mars and Hercules) at the junction of the 
 rivers to commemorate the victory\ His presence being 
 required at Rome, the Consul L. Fabius Maximus with- 
 drew from the Rhone valley, leaving behind him 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus as Proconsul. 
 
 The 'Via Domitia' — the first Roman road con- 
 structed in Gaul — is undoubtedly to be set down to the 
 credit of the Proconsul Domitius at this period. That 
 at its origin the Via Domitia was designed to put 
 Forum Julii the Roman base and '■porte d' entree'' into 
 Gaul into direct communication with Narbonne, the 
 future centre of government of Provincia, seems the 
 most reasonable conclusion about the disputed course of 
 that road. 
 
 The definite formation of a Roman Province out of a 
 big slice cut off from Gallia Transalpina, was the impor- 
 tant outcome of the four years' fighting, which began in 
 the valley of the Argens and ended with the decisive 
 victory over the combined hosts of the Allobroges and 
 the Arverni at the junction of the Isere and the Rhone. 
 As Narbonne which was destined to give its name to 
 the Province and to become the seat of Roman govern- 
 ment was not yet ready to receive its Roman colony, 
 Aquae Sextiae seems to have remained for several years 
 longer the residence of the Provincial Governor. But it 
 
 ^ p. 184. Livy, Epit. LXi.
 
 CHAP. IX. 97 
 
 can only have been out of consideration for Marseilles 
 that Aries from its central and commanding position at 
 the apex of the Delta of the Rhone was not at once 
 selected as the Roman capital. 
 
 It was a piece of very bad luck for Rome and 
 civilization that the Romans instead of finding them- 
 selves isolated at Narbonne at the western extremity of 
 Provincia were not already firmly planted on the Rhone, 
 when a few years later the Rhone valley was exposed 
 to the terrible and disastrous invasion of the Cimbri and 
 Teutones. Had the Romans been settled at Aries 
 B.C. 104 — 103, when Marius was employing his soldiers 
 on the distasteful work of cutting a new channel for the 
 Rhone, that undertaking, which proved so profitable to 
 the Massiliots, would never have passed out of Roman 
 hands. Nor would it probably have been necessary for 
 Pompey practically to reconquer Provence, when the 
 Provincials associated themselves with the rebellion of 
 Sertorius in Spain, twenty years later. 
 
 As a city of the Salyes, who were treated with great 
 severity by the Romans, thousands of them having been 
 sold into slavery by Sextius Calvinus, Aries must have 
 been half emptied of its native Ligurian inhabitants. 
 Lying right across the Roman road into Spain, it is 
 hard to understand why a colony of Roman citizens was 
 not sent there at once to fill up the gap. The only 
 possible explanation seems to be that Aries was con- 
 sidered to lie within the Greek " sphere of influence," to 
 use a modern phrase, and consequently handed over to 
 Marseilles. 
 
 The conquest of Provincia being now complete, it 
 became necessary to accommodate it with that first 
 necessity of civilization, a substantially constructed 
 high-road. 
 
 Although communications between Rome and Spain 
 were mainly kept up, and military expeditions almost 
 invariably sent, by sea, there had existed some kind of 
 a beaten track, by which the earliest Phoenician and 
 
 H. 7
 
 98 CAMPAIGNS TO THE NORTH OF THE DURANCE. 
 
 Greek traders passed between Italy and Spain, along 
 the coast of Gaul, except where they were compelled to 
 turn inland as far up the Rhone as Tarascon — the 
 "Trajectus Rhodani " of the Itineraries — to avoid its 
 50 mile wide and always impassable Delta. This 
 beaten track is sometimes dignified by the name of "Via 
 Heraclea." The earliest mention of this track is to be 
 found in Polybius, who had probably passed over it on 
 his journey to or from Spain, on the occasion of the 
 siege and capture of Numantia by his friend Scipio 
 Africanus Aemilianus, B.C. 134. Polybius informs us 
 that from Emporiae (the Massiliot trading station on 
 the borders of Spain) the distance to the Passage of the 
 Rhone (Trajectus Rhodani) was 1600 stades or 200 
 Roman miles, adding that " all these distances have now 
 been carefully measured by the Romans and marked 
 with milestones at every eight stades \" 
 
 This measured track became subsequently the Via 
 Domitia, undoubtedly the work of the Domitius Aheno- 
 barbus who shared with Q. Fabius Allobrogicus the 
 honours of the conquest of Provincia. But although 
 there is no doubt as to the authorship of the Via 
 Domitia (for Suetonius informs us in his life of Nero, 
 the Emperor, that so proud was our Domitius, one of 
 the ancestors of Nero, of his work, that he paraded over 
 it, riding on an elephant), we are left quite in the dark 
 as to its original starting point. 
 
 As Domitius Ahenobarbus completed the conquest 
 of the first province sliced out of Gaul, finishing the 
 work begun only four years before by Fulvius Flaccus, 
 it seems most reasonable to assume that the Via Domitia 
 began at Forum Julii, where the expedition of Flaccus 
 landed at the beginning of the campaign. 
 
 There is a reference to the Via Domitia in the oration 
 
 of Cicero Pro Fonteio, one of the most serious charges 
 
 brought against his client having been to the effect that, 
 
 during his proconsulship of Provincia, Fonteius had 
 
 ^ Polybius, in. 39.
 
 CHAP. IX. 99 
 
 appropriated to his own use moneys locally raised for 
 the repair of this same Via Domitia. 
 
 As no other name but that of Domitius Ahenobarbus 
 is connected by any classical writer with road-making in 
 Provincia, we may confidently follow the authority of 
 Kiepert\ who gives the name "Domitia" to that section 
 of the subsequent " Via Aurelia " which extends from 
 Forum Julii to Narbonne. 
 
 Although the countries of the Vocontii and Allobroges 
 were included in the recent conquest of Provincia, there 
 is a consensus of evidence to shew that the Romans 
 made no serious attempt at this early stage to plant 
 garrisons or make a road north of the Durance, where 
 some writers erroneously locate the Via Domitia. 
 
 It is certain that the first object of the Romans at 
 this juncture was to secure a land thoroughfare to Nar- 
 bonne and Spain. As the direct road from Rome to 
 Narbonne would naturally leave the coast at Forum 
 Julii in order to mount the valley of the Argens to 
 reach Aquae Sextiae by the shortest cut, it seems 
 tolerably certain that the first Roman road — the Via 
 Domitia — originally followed this course. 
 
 We must always bear in mind that, as the result of 
 the conquest of the country between the Var and Forum 
 Julii by Opimius, thirty years earlier, a strip of land, 
 varying from a Roman mile to a mile and a half in 
 width, had been handed over to the Massiliots subject 
 to the condition of providing the Romans with a right 
 of way over the road to be constructed by them. 
 
 There was then already in existence a Greek or 
 Massiliot road, which was bound to follow the coast all 
 the way from the Var to Marseilles. But this road 
 could only now have been useful to the Romans as far 
 as Forum Julii (Frejus). To follow the coast by St 
 Tropez, Hyeres and Toulon to get to Aix-en-Provence 
 would never have suited the Romans, inasmuch as it 
 
 ' Tabula XI. Atlas Antiqtttts. Berlin. 
 
 7—2
 
 lOO CAMPAIGNS TO THE NORTH OF THE DURANCE. 
 
 would have nearly doubled the distance and passed 
 through Greek territory all the way. 
 
 As I have already observed, Aquae Sextiae appears 
 to have remained the seat of Roman government, from 
 which convenient centre Domitius could have directed 
 his road-making operations East and West. 
 
 Having dealt so far with the Transalpine sections of 
 the coast road (subsequently styled Via Aurelia by the 
 Antonine Itinerary), the consideration of which comes 
 appropriately after the narrative of the four years' Cam- 
 paign in Provincia, I will leave the subject of the con- 
 struction of the Italian or Cisalpine sections till the date 
 of the completion of the road by Augustus, B.C. 12.
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 Marius and the Cimbro-Teuton Invasion. 
 
 Before the Romans had fairly got into the saddle of 
 the government of the Province, to which the colony of 
 Narbonne was eventually to give its name, they were 
 disturbed by disquieting rumours of the movement of 
 hordes of northern barbarians from the region of the 
 Baltic towards the Mediterranean, 
 
 Beyond the fact, that in the year B.C. 1 1 8 the orator 
 Licinius Crassus duly conducted his colony to Nar- 
 bonne, we know almost nothing of the proceedings of 
 the Romans in Southern Gaul during the twenty years 
 which intervened between the conquest and the barbarian 
 invasion. 
 
 We are not even told of how many Roman citizens 
 the first Transalpine colony consisted, nor what resist- 
 ance Narbonne offered to the waves of barbarism — 
 'fluctibus barbariae' as Cicero picturesquely expresses it. 
 
 Although well-nigh three centuries had elapsed since 
 the sack and burning of Rome by the Gauls, a vague 
 dread of the repetition of a similar catastrophe was still 
 kept alive in Roman breasts. 
 
 Yet from the succession of defeats, which the Romans 
 had inflicted first on the Cisalpine, and next on the 
 Transalpine Gauls during the centuries preceding Julius 
 Caesar, it had been abundantly proved that there was 
 no solid ground for further apprehension of purely Gallic 
 invasion.
 
 I02 MARIUS AND THE CIMBRO-TEUTON INVASION. 
 
 As I have stated above in my Introductory Chapter, 
 the palmy days of the Gauls, when their exploits were 
 signalized by the sack of Rome, Delphi, etc., were over 
 at least two centuries before Julius Caesar. As Caesar 
 himself reminded them, the Gauls of his day had to 
 choose between becoming Roman or being overrun by 
 Germans. For the real source of danger lay beyond the 
 Rhine and the Danube, where the accumulations of half- 
 starved barbarian hordes, pressing on each other's heels, 
 threatened the fertile plains of Gaul, Italy and Spain 
 alike with common invasion. 
 
 It soon became clear to the Romans that the in- 
 vaders, with whom they had to deal in Provincia, were a 
 far more terrible foe than any " Gauls " they had yet 
 encountered. Flushed as they were with their recent 
 victories over the Salluvii, Allobroges and Arverni, the 
 Romans were at first quite unprepared to cope with 
 these gigantic northerners, who had left their homes to 
 conquer or to die. 
 
 That the formidable invaders called Cimbri and 
 Teutones who now threatened to overwhelm Italy were 
 of German origin is beyond a doubt. On this point 
 Strabo, Livy, Pliny, Tacitus, are all agreed. 
 
 Strabo^ informs us that in his day the Cimbri still 
 occupied the same part of the coast of Germany, whence 
 they sallied forth in search of southern settlements, and 
 that in his day they sent an embassy to Augustus, to 
 deprecate his resentment for the offences of their ances- 
 tors. Velleius Paterculus (an accurate historian who 
 dedicated his work to the Consul M. Vincius A.D. 30), 
 writes of the invaders as "immanis vis Germanarum 
 gentium, quibus nomen Cimbris et Teutonis erat." 
 (Lib. II. 12.) 
 
 On their passage southwards, the barbarians dropped 
 a contingent 6,000 strong at the junction of the Meuse 
 and Sambre to guard the heavy baggage, which they 
 could not convey further. Harassed at first by the 
 
 ^ Strabo, p. 292.
 
 CHAP. X. 103 
 
 Belgae as intrusive strangers, this German contingent 
 soon won the esteem of their neighbours by their con- 
 spicuous bravery and were already incorporated amongst 
 the Belgae under the name of Aduatuci when Caesar 
 entered upon his conquest of Gaul. It is to be noted 
 that in the case of the Aduatuci, half a century had 
 sufficed to convert Germans directly into Belgae and 
 indirectly into ' Galli.' 
 
 Writing about seventy years later than Caesar, Strabo 
 tells us that the Belgae were in his day included in the 
 general name of Gauls, and still considered the bravest 
 people in Gaul from having alone withstood the invasion 
 of the Germans, the Cimbri, and the Teutons. We thus 
 find the Cimbro-Teuton Aduatuci becoming Belgae, 
 while the Belgae in their turn are admitted to rank as 
 Gauls. Although there is a line to be drawn origin- 
 ally between Gauls and Germans, it becomes a vanishing 
 one on the Gallic or left bank of the Rhine. For there 
 is much truth in the French proverb, which says, " La 
 Gaule fait des Gaulois." 
 
 It was in the Eastern Alps that the Roman legions 
 first came into contact with the advancing wave of 
 barbarism, when the Consul Cnaeus Carbo sustained 
 defeat near Noreia, B.C. 113, at the hands of the Cimbri. 
 However, instead of descending into Italy after this first 
 success, the Cimbric host appears to have made tracks 
 through the central and western Alps, the Helvetian 
 Tigurini being tempted by the prospect of rich spoil to 
 follow in their wake. It was these same Tigurini, as we 
 learn from Julius Caesar^ who in the year B.C. 107 
 destroyed the army of Cassius Longinus with which 
 Lucius Piso, Caesar's own relative, was serving as 
 Legatus. 
 
 Joined on the Rhone by the Teutones, the united 
 host swept southwards towards the Mediterranean, 
 further swollen by the Ligurian Ambrones from the 
 Durance valley. 
 
 1 De Bella Gallico, H. 3.
 
 104 MARIUS AND THE CIMBRO-TEUTON INVASION. 
 
 Between B.C. 113 and B.C. 104 when Marius took the 
 field against them five Roman armies in succession went 
 down before the irresistible northern barbarians. Of 
 these disasters the most famous was the annihilation of 
 the combined consular armies of Caepio and Manlius, 
 near Orange, by the Ambrones — the most valiant of 
 the combined invaders. Their very name according to 
 Plutarch means 'valiant' in Ligurian, and was used as a 
 battle-cry by the Ligurians on both sides in the subse- 
 quent campaign of Marius in Provence. 
 
 When the news of this culminating catastrophe, where 
 at least 80,000 Roman lives were sacrificed, was brought 
 over the Alps, the sober historian Sallust wrote', "quo 
 metu Italia omnis contremuit." 
 
 There was but one Roman whose generalship in- 
 spired the Roman people with any confidence at this 
 crisis, namely the plebeian Consul Caius Marius, who 
 had just brought the Jugurthine war to a triumphal 
 conclusion. In violation of the provision of the con- 
 stitution that an interval of ten years must elapse 
 between successive consulships of the same individual, 
 Marius was forthwith elected to a second term of office 
 and Gallia Transalpina assigned as his province. 
 
 For almost all the military facts, which have been 
 handed down to us of the campaign against the Cimbri 
 and Teutones, we are indebted to Plutarch's life of 
 C. Marius. As Plutarch had before him the commen- 
 taries of Sylla, who played an important part in the 
 campaign, we may rely upon their substantial accuracy. 
 
 For Sylla, who had served under Marius in Africa as 
 his Quaestor during his first consulship, accompanied 
 him into Transalpine Gaul first as Legatus to Marius 
 himself, and subsequently to his patrician colleague 
 Catulus in Gallia Cisalpina. 
 
 During his service on the Rhone Valley as Legatus 
 to Marius, Sylla distinguished himself by the capture of 
 Copillus, chief or king of the Volcae Tectosages, who 
 
 ^ Bellum yiigiirthinum, c. 114.
 
 CHAP. X. 105 
 
 was carrying on an intrigue with the barbarian invaders. 
 Of all the lately subdued provincials the Volcae Tecto- 
 sages alone appear to have openly rebelled. For in the 
 year B.C. 105, they rose and massacred the Roman 
 garrison of their capital Tolosa (Toulouse). It was on 
 the occasion of being sent to punish this revolt that the 
 Roman Consul Caepio got possession of the accumu- 
 lation of gold which had been stored there and which 
 became so disastrous to his fortunes. 
 
 What proportion of his African army followed 
 Marius into Gaul we are unfortunately not informed, 
 but it can hardly be doubted that the services of such 
 trained and seasoned soldiers would have been secured 
 at any price at such a national crisis. Having already 
 paid the heavy price of the sacrifice of five or six un- 
 trained and extemporized armies which had proved their 
 utter incapacity to withstand the wave of invasion, the 
 Romans at length awoke to the conviction of the hope- 
 lessness of trusting to a citizen army. 
 
 It is from this crisis that the institution of a standing 
 army at Rome dates, and that military service became 
 professional. 
 
 The African veterans however on the present occa- 
 sion can in any case only have sufficed to form a more or 
 less substantial nucleus to the newly levied legions, with 
 which Marius started for that ill-omened Rhone valley, 
 which had swallowed up a succession of Roman armies. 
 
 That Marius adopted the most expeditious course of 
 conveying his troops to the Massiliot mouth of the 
 Rhone by sea — a passage which it will be remembered 
 was accomplished by Scipio at the time of Hannibal's 
 invasion in five days from Pisae — may be assumed as 
 practically certain. For there was as yet no continuous 
 road along the shore from Italy into Gaul, and, even if 
 there had been one practicable for armies, forty days' 
 marching at fifteen miles a day would hardly have 
 sufficed to accomplish the 600 miles from the Tiber to 
 the Rhone.
 
 I06 MARIUS AND THE CIMBRO-TEUTON INVASION. 
 
 Luckily for the fortunes of Rome, Marius was not 
 called upon to encounter the barbarian host till two 
 years after the disembarkation of his army at the mouth 
 of the Rhone. For the Cimbri, instead of making at 
 once for the passages of the Maritime Alps leading into 
 Italy, unexpectedly directed their course towards the 
 Pyrenees and Spain. What became of their associates 
 the Teutones during the Cimbric raid into Spain we 
 have no means of determining exactly. All that is 
 certain is, that they were ready on the return of the 
 Cimbri to turn their attention to a combined invasion of 
 Italy. 
 
 The respite of two years, B.C. 104-102, proved of 
 priceless value to Marius. For it enabled him to convert 
 his mostly raw levies, of whom an important section 
 consisted of * Italian ' Ligurian socii, into trained and 
 disciplined troops. For Marius, excellent as he was as 
 a general, was above all first-rate and indefatigable as a 
 drill-sergeant. But although a stern disciplinarian, he 
 won the affections of his men by sharing all their labours 
 and hardships and by his inflexible justice. 
 
 The severest labour to which he set them was the 
 cutting a new mouth to the Rhone. Near the village of 
 Fos, conspicuous on its isolated rock on the Eastern 
 edge of the Delta of the Rhone, unmistakeable vestiges 
 still exist of a Roman encampment. These are believed 
 to mark the site of the first camp of Marius, and the 
 name of Fos is considered to be derived from the 
 " Fossa," which Marius cut to give clear access to the 
 Rhone from the sea, the old Massiliot mouth having 
 become choked up. 
 
 The second and main camp of Marius, to which that 
 near Fos was subsidiary, was pitched on a level with 
 Tarascon, on the western extremity of the picturesque 
 range of Les Alpines — a mile or two east of the Rhone. 
 This little range, conspicuous for its jagged outline, 
 commands the most ancient passage of the Rhone — the 
 Trajectus Rhodani of the classical Itineraries between
 
 [ To face p. 1 06
 
 CHAP. X. 107 
 
 Spain and Italy. It was obviously the best point for 
 military observation. 
 
 Entrenched behind the solid ramparts of their camp 
 at Glanum (the site of which is commemorated by a 
 triumphal arch and a perfectly preserved three-storied 
 monument surmounted by statues of Marius and Catulus) 
 the Roman legionaries and socii, now a perfectly dis- 
 ciplined force, quietly waited the arrival of the bar- 
 barians. 
 
 These last had meanwhile decided to divide their 
 forces for a combined descent upon Italy. While the 
 Ambrones and the Teutones were to follow the coast 
 and cross the maritime Alps by the pass now marked 
 by the monument of La Turbie, the Cimbri and Tigurini 
 were to retrace their steps across Switzerland and de- 
 scend by the valley of the Adige. 
 
 That the so-called barbarians should have conceived 
 and duly proceeded to put into execution this combined 
 plan of campaign, proves them to have possessed no 
 inconsiderable powers of organization. All details how- 
 ever are unfortunately wanting of their method of pro- 
 cedure. We only know that they travelled in huge 
 caravans, conveying their women and children in heavy 
 covered waggons, doubtless drawn by oxen. How they 
 contrived to provision themselves and their cattle, or to 
 cross rivers, swamps and mountains without roads or 
 bridges, we are left entirely without authentic infor- 
 mation. 
 
 Some faint light is thrown on this invasion of Gaul 
 by the Cimbri and Teutones by the harangue of Critog- 
 natus, an Arvernian chief, delivered to the beleaguered 
 garrison during the siege of Alesia\ 
 
 From the speech of Critognatus we learn that on the 
 approach of what we may describe as the German 
 invasion, the Gallic inhabitants took refuge within their 
 oppida or hill fortresses with all their belongings, 
 
 De Bella Gallico, vn. 77.
 
 I08 MARIUS AND THE CIMBRO-TEUTON INVASION. 
 
 where they were besieged by the barbarians. Critog- 
 natus urges his hearers not to shrink from following the 
 example set at the period of the Cimbro-Teuton invasion 
 by their ancestors, in supporting life on the bodies of 
 those who were unfitted to bear arms, rather than 
 surrender.
 
 CHAPTER XI. 
 The Battle of Aquae Sextiae. 
 
 It was in the spring of the year B.C. 102, that the 
 Marians, from their outpost at Glanum on the range of 
 Les Alpines, at length caught sight of the long expected 
 host of Teutones and Ambrones, making their prepara- 
 tions to cross the Rhone from Beaucaire to Tarascon. 
 As we read in Plutarch, that the subsequent defile of the 
 combined hosts past the camp of Marius at Glanum 
 occupied six days, we may infer that the passage of the 
 river was a very long and complicated business. To the 
 north of Les Alpines there is a wide and fertile plain 
 which extends as far as the Durance, the bed of which is 
 concealed by an intervening range of hills. 
 
 In this plain, in full view of the Roman camp at 
 Glanum, were now massed the barbarian hordes, with 
 their vast agglomeration of covered waggons, conveying 
 wives, children and all their worldly effects. For, unlike 
 the Gauls, who at various times had swooped down on 
 Italy and Greece to raid and return home with their 
 spoil, these Ambrones and Teutones had come to stay 
 wherever they could find unoccupied lands. 
 
 If, without necessity of fighting for it, lands could 
 have been peaceably assigned to them, anywhere in the 
 south, there these formidable invaders would have been 
 only too thankful to settle down quietly. It was not 
 till a concession of land had been refused to the Cimbri
 
 no THE BATTLE OF AQUAE SEXTIAE. 
 
 in the territory subject to Rome in Provincia that they 
 attacked and defeated M. Junius Silanus B.C. 109^ 
 
 But so far from having unoccupied fertile land to 
 offer to vagrant northerners, the Romans themselves 
 were suffering from land famine in Italy and felt acutely 
 the need of transmarine or Transalpine colonization on 
 which to plant their own redundant population. 
 
 The stake which was now to be fought for was in 
 fact the possession of the soil in Italy. It was the final 
 scene in this early life and death struggle between Rome 
 and barbarism, in which victory had already on five 
 occasions declared for the barbarians. Surely the battle 
 of Aix-Pourrieres should have been included amongst 
 the decisive battles of the world. For nothing but 
 Marius and his legions stood between Rome and prema- 
 ture extinction. 
 
 In vain, with discordant shouts and insulting gestures 
 did the barbarians day after day advance to the Roman 
 camp in the hopes of drawing Marius out to give them 
 battle. But the purpose of the Roman general was 
 fixed, not to budge an inch from his entrenchments 
 until the first effects of the formidable aspect of the 
 barbarians, whose gigantic stature and ferocious mien 
 could not fail to terrify the Italians, should have worn 
 off. For the glare of the fierce blue eyes of the Teu- 
 tones, gleaming with newly-awakened appetite for that 
 Roman blood, with which they had so recently slaked 
 their thirst, was calculated to make even the boldest 
 quail. And the presence of the tall barefooted priestesses, 
 clad in long white robes, with the gleaming sacrificial 
 knife suspended from their girdles, ready for Roman 
 throats, lent an additional terror to the barbarian ranks. 
 
 And here it is interesting to recall that during the 
 first year of the Gallic war'^, more than forty years after 
 this barbarian invasion, when Julius Caesar seized Be- 
 sancon preparatory to his first encounter with Ariovistus, 
 
 ^ Livy, Epit. 6 = . 
 
 - De Bella Gallico, Lib. i. 39.
 
 CHAP. XL III 
 
 a panic invaded even the superior officers of his army at 
 the bare idea of facing the terrible aspect of the Germans, 
 in spite of the fact that Marius and his army had given 
 such a good account of them. Possibly in order to serve 
 as some set-off to these Teuton priestesses, Marius 
 carried about with the army in great state a Syrian 
 prophetess, named Martha, who had won the confidence 
 of his wife Julia in predicting the winner at some Roman 
 games, and in whose infallibility he professed implicit 
 belief. When his troops, now accustomed to the aspect 
 and gestures of the enemy, began to reproach their 
 general for still confining them within the camp, Marius 
 would lay the whole blame for the prohibition to sally 
 forth on his Syrian oracle, who would, he assured them, 
 give the signal as soon as the omens were favour- 
 able. 
 
 Baffled by these tactics and impatient of inaction, 
 perhaps also compelled to move to fresh ground by 
 exhaustion of supplies, the barbarians at last broke up 
 their camp and insultingly enquiring if the Romans 
 whom they were leaving behind them had any messages 
 to send to their wives in Italy, set themselves in motion 
 towards the Alps. As soon as the barbarians had moved 
 off, Marius, breaking up his camp, followed closely upon 
 their heels, ready to seize on the first opportunity of 
 attacking them at a disadvantage. 
 
 Marching in an easterly direction, the Teutones 
 leading and the Ambrones bringing up the rear, the 
 barbarians followed the primitive track at the northern 
 base of Les Alpines, which strikes the Durance at Orgon. 
 Orgon was doubtless their first halting place for the 
 night. At Orgon where the river furnished the water 
 supply, which was always the first object in selecting 
 camping ground, there is a cleft in the precipitous cliffs, 
 which there overhang the Durance, leaving only just 
 space for the passage of the old roadway. As the 
 modern traveller crosses the Durance by the tubular 
 railway bridge, which replaces the ferryboat mentioned
 
 112 THE BATTLE OF AQUAE SEXTIAE. 
 
 by Strabo^ as stationed there to convey travellers over 
 to Cavaillion, he can descry the old track by the river 
 side. But, being bound for Aix, the barbarians had no 
 occasion to cross to the north bank of the Durance, their 
 road only touching the river at the point where it is 
 carried round the base of the cliffs. Two or three days' 
 march from Orgon in a south-easterly direction would 
 have sufficed to bring the barbarians to the hot springs 
 below Entremont, recently converted into the Roman 
 bathing establishment and garrison town of Aquae 
 Sextiae. 
 
 That Plutarch should fail to give us any information 
 as to the part played by the Roman garrison which had 
 been stationed at Aquae Sextiae already 20 years, or 
 as to the fate of the Roman population, which had 
 gathered around it, is not a little disappointing. We 
 must however remember that Plutarch did not profess 
 to be writing a history of the campaign, on which he 
 dwells only so far as it concerns his biography of 
 Marius. 
 
 Whatever else is uncertain, it is clear from Plutarch's 
 narrative that there were two engagements with the 
 barbarians, and that on both occasions the Romans 
 occupied the higher ground, while the Ambrones and 
 Teutones were encamped in the plain below. For the 
 bed of the Arc, almost dry more than half the year, 
 consists of a narrow and shallow depression in the plain, 
 the banks of which are alternately abrupt or sloping. 
 That both these fights took place somewhere on the 
 slopes of Mt Sainte Victoire between Aix and Pour- 
 rieres — the Campi putridi — where the final slaughter of 
 the Teutones culminated, may likewise be considered 
 certain. 
 
 It was the desperate need of water felt by the 
 Romans which brought on prematurely the first engage- 
 ment with the Ambrones. "If you want water," said 
 Marius pointing to the river below, in the possession of 
 
 1 p. 184.
 
 CHAP. XI. 113 
 
 the enemy, "you must purchase it with your blood. 
 But first let us fortify the camp." However before the 
 work of fortification was far advanced the thirst of the 
 Romans became uncontrollable and a rush was made 
 for the water, and, what began as a melee between half- 
 armed scullions and scattered parties of the Ambrones 
 surprised at their baths, presently became a regular 
 battle. 
 
 For we are expressly told by Plutarch that the Am- 
 brones advanced not in a wild and disorderly manner or 
 with a confused and inarticulate noise, but beating their 
 arms at regular intervals, and all keeping time, they 
 came on crying out " Ambrones, Ambrones." 
 
 To join in the battle, which was fought on the right 
 or north bank, the main body of the Ambrones had to 
 cross the Arc. Before they could reform their ranks 
 broken by this operation, they were charged by the 
 Italian Ligurians serving under Marius. 
 
 A notable feature about this fight was the identity 
 of battle cry used by Ambrones and Ligurians, the 
 latter echoing back the word Ambrones, or "the Valiant," 
 which Plutarch observes was their own ancient name. 
 This seems to imply some ethnical affinity between 
 Ligurians and Ambrones, but neither Plutarch nor any 
 other writer throws any light on this obscure subject. 
 
 Making a good fight of it, as long as they were 
 matched against the Italian Ligurians single handed, 
 the Ambrones were soon overpowered when the Roman 
 legionaries joined in the fray. Driven back with great 
 slaughter across the Arc, the bed of which was soon 
 choked up with dead and dying, the survivors fled in 
 panic to the shelter of their camp. 
 
 The reception, however, which the fugitives met with 
 at the hands of their own women was even more terrible 
 than the dangers from which they were flying. For 
 uttering hideous cries and snatching up axes and what- 
 ever weapons came in their way, the infuriated women 
 hurled themselves on pursuers and pursued alike, deal- 
 H. 8
 
 114 I'HE BATTLE OF AQUAE SEXTIAE. 
 
 ing death around them indiscriminately and accusing 
 their husbands of cowardice and treachery. 
 
 As far as it went, this preliminary success over the 
 Ambrones was encouraging to Marius. But the great 
 bulk of the enemy was still untouched, and the night 
 following the first battle was a terrible one. 
 
 For with the fate of Italy hanging in the balance, 
 Marius had failed in the most ordinary and indispen- 
 sable precaution of getting his camp duly fortified. And 
 that too when myriads of barbarians were swarming 
 around like bees disturbed in their hive and maddened 
 with rage. For all night long he dreaded a rush in 
 the darkness upon his still unfortified camp, the fury of 
 the barbarians being excited beyond measure, by the 
 slaughter of their confederates. 
 
 The Teutones, however, who were encamped at a 
 considerable distance to the eastward, abstained from 
 attack, spending the night and the whole of the follow- 
 ing day in making their plans for the momentous battle, 
 which was imminent. As it is certain that the decisive 
 battle in which the Teutones were annihilated took place 
 near Pourrieres, at least fifteen miles from Aquae Sextiae, 
 it must be assumed that Marius marched further east- 
 ward between the two battles and that he pitched a 
 fresh camp in the direction of Pourrieres previous to the 
 final engagement. 
 
 The existence of a fortified enclosure on the summit 
 of a neighbouring hill has naturally enough given rise 
 locally to the tradition that the so-called ' Pain de Muni- 
 tion' — the Ligurian oppidimi mentioned in Chapter V — 
 and about four miles to the north of the village of Pour- 
 rieres — was the site of the second camp of Marius. But 
 the plan of those fortifications consisting of a triple 
 circle of walls composed of uncemented and unhewn 
 stones in no way meets the requirements of a Roman 
 camp, which was invariably quadrangular, and of vastly 
 larger dimensions. It is also much too far away, and 
 inaccessible amongst a network of intervening hills. It
 
 To face p. 115]
 
 CHAP. XI. 115 
 
 is indeed surprising that a French officer, Captain 
 Dervieu, should have lately published a pamphlet on 
 the Campaign of Marius, in which he deliberately adopts 
 Le Pain de Munition as the second camp of Marius. 
 
 Having lately re-visited the "battle-field of Pourrieres 
 for the express purpose of examining this highly inter- 
 esting fortification, I entertain no doubt of its having 
 been originally one of the Ligurian oppida, which served 
 the inhabitants as a place of refuge in time of danger. 
 It may have been utilized by the Roman general as a 
 place of safety for a part of his stores, but it is a mere 
 coincidence that it happens to be near the battle-field. 
 
 Just before nightfall on the eve of the great battle, 
 Marius, observing the very broken nature of the ground 
 shutting in the plain occupied by the Teutones, detached 
 a force of three thousand men under Marcellus with 
 directions to get round the enemy unobserved and hold 
 themselves in readiness to fall on his rear. It is impos- 
 sible to determine the precise depression of which Mar- 
 cellus availed himself for his ambuscade, which turned 
 out completely successful. 
 
 The fortification of the camp being this time duly 
 completed, the Roman general dismissed the rest of his 
 army early to their much needed repose, which they 
 could now enjoy in comparative security. No alarm 
 seems to have disturbed the quiet of the night. 
 
 At earliest dawn Marius drew up his army in front 
 of his camp, probably on one of the natural terraces, 
 which stand out at various levels from the slopes of the 
 Mont Sainte Victoire — the isolated mountain which 
 dwarfs every other eminence in the neighbourhood of 
 Aix. 
 
 No battle-ground more advantageous to the Romans 
 could have been selected. For the perpendicular ridges 
 of the mountain, rising like a wall behind him, effectu- 
 ally secured Marius from the risk of being surrounded 
 by the immensely superior numbers of the enemy, and 
 his occupation of the advanced terraces and slopes gave 
 
 8—2
 
 ri6 THE BATTLE OF AQUAE SEXTIAE. 
 
 the Romans an invaluable vantage ground over the 
 Teutones drawn up in the plain below. One can hardly 
 doubt that the position had been deliberately selected 
 beforehand by Marius, who had doubtless surveyed the 
 region during his long period of awaiting the barbarians. 
 
 While the bare gleaming mass of the Mont Sainte 
 Victoire completely shuts in the north side of the battle- 
 field, the plain is bounded on the south by wooded 
 heights, overtopped by a background of perpendicular 
 rocks, culminating in the Mont Olympus — a mountain 
 not unworthy of its Grecian namesake. No grander 
 setting could be imagined for the trial of a great issue. 
 
 The battle began by the descent of the Roman 
 cavalry towards the plain. By this manoeuvre, which 
 was completely successful, Marius reckoned on drawing 
 on the barbarians, always impatient of awaiting attack, 
 to a disadvantageous uphill engagement. 
 
 Charging uphill, the ground being slippery and the 
 heat excessive, the Teutones, on whom ten years' indul- 
 gence in wine and enervating southern luxuries had 
 begun to tell their tale, soon showed signs of exhaustion. 
 They were besides powerless from their insecure footing 
 on lower ground to deliver the cleaving down cuts with 
 their long swords, which the shields of the Romans had 
 in former encounters proved powerless to ward off. 
 
 Seeing that the favourable moment had arrived, 
 Marius ordered a general advance all along the line. 
 Up to this point, the infantry, like the British at 
 Waterloo, had maintained its original 'position on the 
 higher ground, whence it kept up a discharge of pila 
 into the confused ranks of its assailants. 
 
 Yielding to the irresistible pressure of the down-hill 
 charge of the heavy-armed legionaries, the dense masses 
 of the barbarians were little by little pushed back down 
 the slopes into the plain. 
 
 Rallying, as soon as they found themselves on level 
 ground, the Teutones for some time made a good fight 
 of it. As long as the Romans had the advantas^e of
 
 CHAP. XI. 117 
 
 higher ground, there had been Httle hand to hand 
 fighting. For while the Romans had chiefly used their 
 shields in bringing their weight to bear, the Teutones 
 had been prevented from dealing effective blows by the 
 nature of the ground. 
 
 Now was the real crisis of the battle, the Romans 
 having lost their preponderant advantage of ground. 
 
 And now it seemed as if the superior discipline of 
 the Romans could avail nothing against the enormous 
 bulk and overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Nothing 
 but the foresight of Marius in sending Marcellus to fall 
 on the rear of the barbarians could have saved the 
 Romans from disaster at this critical juncture. 
 
 In the very nick of time, Marcellus sprang from his 
 skilfully laid ambush, creating the panic, on which the 
 Roman general had not reckoned in vain to decide the 
 day in his favour. The battle which at one moment 
 had threatened to add another disaster to the list of 
 Roman reverses, was now converted into a decided 
 victory. But the bloodiest work had yet to be accom- 
 plished in the butchery of at least 100,000 of the 
 demoralized barbarians. At least as many women, 
 many of whom perished by their own hands having 
 previously dashed out the brains of their children, have 
 to be added to the losses of the Teutones on that day. 
 
 Never before or since have the plains of Provence 
 witnessed such a terrible slaughter, and rich were the 
 subsequent harvests gathered in, as Plutarch relates, by 
 the Massiliot cultivators of the lands around Pourrieres'. 
 In addition to the slaughtered, many thousand of the 
 barbarians were taken prisoners to be sold as slaves. 
 
 We gather from Caesar'^ that German slaves played 
 a formidable part in the Servile war, B.C. 73 — 71. But 
 these may have been mainly Cimbri captured at Ver- 
 cellae the year after. The executioner, who was sent to 
 
 ^ The name of Fourrieres is derived from ' Campi putridi.' 
 - Dc Bdlo Gallico, i. 40.
 
 Il8 THE BATTLE OF AQUAE SEXTIAE. 
 
 slay Marius in prison, when his fortunes had deserted 
 him, is said to have been a Cimber, who shrunk back in 
 dismay from the task. 
 
 In the valley of the Arc, the memories of Marius 
 and his battles are still as fresh as if they had occurred 
 but yesterday. Hardly a year passes but what at least 
 one fresh publication issues from the press, and the 
 latest theories about the site of the encampments and 
 engagements are eagerly discussed by the literary 
 circles of Aix. 
 
 Nor is it only in the city of Aix, where the battles of 
 Marius and the Teutones are fought over again. If you 
 address a peasant at work in the fields, whose plough 
 has often turned up relics of the battle field, he will 
 probably be ready with some remark referring to the 
 bloody work perpetrated on the field of Pourrieres 
 (Campi putridi) 2,000 years ago. The daughter of the 
 landlady of the Hotel Silvy at Pourrieres is as well up 
 in her Plutarch, as if she had been a student at 
 Newnham or Girton. Even the village fountain is 
 modelled after the triumphal monument of Marius, the 
 base of which is still extant, close to the high road from 
 Aix to St Maximin. The remains are marked on the 
 government maps as " Ruines de Tare de Triomphe de 
 Marius." 
 
 The peasant, who pointed them out to me as the 
 tomb of a Roman general, informed me that French 
 troops on the march invariably salute these remains of 
 departed Roman greatness. 
 
 It lies outside the scope of this work to give any 
 description of the destruction of the Cimbri in the 
 spring of the following year B.C. loi, at Vercellae in 
 Piedmont, where the combined forces of Marius and 
 Catulus completed the work only half accomplished at 
 Aquae Sextiae by Marius single-handed.
 
 CHAPTER XII. 
 
 The Roman Province from Marius to Julius 
 Caesar. 
 
 The victories of Marius and Catulus over the Teutones 
 and Cimbri had so flooded Italy with German slaves 
 that a servile war was added to the other dangers with 
 which the Romans had to cope at this stormy period. 
 
 After Caesar's great victory over Vercingetorix at 
 Alesia\ a Gallic prisoner was assigned to each of 
 Caesar's soldiers as his share of the booty. As an 
 able-bodied slave was worth about iJ"io as a labourer or 
 common fighting gladiator, and a much higher figure if 
 he was skilful at any craft, it was in the eyes of the 
 Romans sheer waste of good money to shed more 
 barbarian blood on the battle field than was necessary 
 to secure a victory. 
 
 It proved however a highly dangerous game to 
 preserve human beings, like wild beasts, alive for the 
 purpose of sport and satiating the public thirst for 
 displays of bloodshed in the arena. The Servile War, 
 which raged in Sicily some years before the Cimbric 
 invasion of Italy, had opened the eyes of the Romans to 
 some extent to this risk. 
 
 But as the victims of the fearful outrages which were 
 enacted in that island belonged mostly to the Greek 
 land-owning class, they were not as yet fully brought 
 home to Roman imaginations. 
 
 1 De Bella Gallico, vn. c. 89.
 
 120 THE ROMAN PROVINCE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 But before the Servile War burst upon Italy, the 
 Roman state was torn asunder by a succession of inter- 
 necine struggles between the optimates led by Sylla 
 and the popular party led by Alarius and Cinna, which 
 deluged the city of Rome with blood. The only wonder 
 is that there was any energy left in such a distracted 
 community for the prosecution of the war against 
 Mithridates, or against the Italian allies, who were in 
 arms asserting their claims to Roman citizenship. 
 
 That Provincia was neglected or misgoverned, dur- 
 ing the years which succeeded the victories of Marius, is 
 in no way surprising. 
 
 It is related by Plutarch that in order to test the 
 loyalty of the recently conquered provincials during the 
 period of expecting the return of the Cimbri from Spain, 
 Marius had sent round to the chiefs sealed letters, with 
 instructions not to open them before a certain date. 
 But before the arrival of that date, he sent to recall those 
 letters, which had all been already opened. This con- 
 vinced the Roman general that the natives were intriguing 
 with barbarians. 
 
 The general spirit of disaffection which smouldered 
 amongst the provincials at the period of the Germanic 
 invasion, only breaking out into actual flame in the case 
 of the Volcae Tectosages at Toulouse, was by no means 
 allayed by the annihilation of the barbarians, and the 
 triumph of the Roman arms on the battle field of Pour- 
 rieres. 
 
 To what extent more territory was annexed by the 
 Romans for the purpose of providing farms for the 
 Marian soldiery, we are nowhere precisely told. But we 
 can hardly doubt but that large tracts of land in the 
 Provincia which had been rescued from barbarism and 
 preserved as Roman by their valour, were apportioned 
 out as farms amongst the veterans of Marius. 
 
 From that day to this the name of Marius has main- 
 tained a firm hold of the popular imagination in Provence. 
 Marius is still by far the most popular Christian name to 
 
 i
 
 CHAP. XII. 121 
 
 give to boys, and is strangely associated with the name 
 of " Maria." With the two names Marius and Maria, a 
 third — that of Martha, is commonly associated. As 
 Martha was both the name of the sister of Lazarus, 
 first legendary bishop of Marseilles, and of the Syrian 
 prophetess who was the spiritual adviser of Marius 
 throughout his campaign, there is a wide field open to 
 controversialists in determining the identity of the indi- 
 viduals making up the sacred Trio or so-called " Tre 
 Marie " in different parts of Provence. A very ancient 
 bas-relief carved in the rock at Les Baux near Aries 
 represents three human figures known by that name. 
 
 The period of forty years which elapsed between 
 Marius and the appointment of his nephew Julius Caesar 
 to the proconsulship of both hither and further Gaul, 
 was marked by a succession of revolts. 
 
 Twelve years after the battle of Aix, the Salluvii, in 
 spite of the bloody scenes which had so recently been 
 enacted in their territory, again took up arms against 
 the Romans. Their revolt, which appears to have been 
 their final effort to shake off the Roman yoke, was put 
 down, as we learn from the epitome of Livy, Lib. 73, 
 by the Roman general C. Caecilius^ 
 
 In the Fasti Capitolini for the year B.C. 81, the name 
 of Valerius Flaccus is recorded as having triumphed 
 over Gauls and Celtiberians — a conjunction of names, 
 which seems to prove that the imperium of the Governor 
 or Proconsul of Gallia Narbonnensis extended at this 
 period over both slopes of the Pyrenees. 
 
 We are reminded of this Valerius Flaccus by a refer- 
 ence to him in Caesar's De Bello Gallico"^, from which we 
 learn that it was he who conferred the Roman franchise 
 on the father of Caesar's confidential Gallic agent, Caius 
 Valerius Procillus, who was employed by Caesar as 
 interpreter during the negotiations with Ariovistus. 
 
 Provincia, the first big slice cut out of Gallia Trans- 
 
 ' This name seems to require the addition of ' Metellus.' 
 - De Bello Gallico, 1.53.
 
 122 THE ROMAN PROVINCE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 alpina, the colonization of which by landless Roman 
 citizens had always formed part of the Radical pro- 
 gramme at Rome, naturally became a stronghold of the 
 Marian faction. 
 
 Situated just outside the political frontier of Italy, 
 and yet resembling it in climate and fertility of soil, 
 Provincia soon bid fair to rival the mother country in 
 the production of wine and oil, which had hitherto been 
 almost the monopoly of the Roman nobility. 
 
 Pliny ^ the elder writing of it about two centuries 
 after its conquest by the Romans, describes it as " Agro- 
 rum cultu, virorum morumque dignatione, amplitudine 
 opum, nulli provinciarum postferenda, breviter Italia 
 verius quam Provincia." But it was far from having 
 reached this stage of civilization as yet. 
 
 To save their lives from the proscriptions of Sylla, 
 which succeeded his triumphal return to Italy from the 
 East B.C. 83, numbers of the Radical faction, which was 
 reduced to its lowest ebb by the deaths of Marius and 
 Cinna, had fled for refuge into Provincia. Most of 
 these, sooner or later, found their way across the Pyre- 
 nees into Spain, to take service under Sertorius, who 
 had raised the standard of rebellion in the Iberian 
 Peninsula. 
 
 It was the misfortune of Provincia during the ten 
 years, B.C. 82 — 72, over which the rebellion of Sertorius 
 lasted, to serve as a thoroughfare and to be called upon 
 to support the succession of Roman armies which were 
 used up in the vain effort to put down a movement 
 which was really more like an attempt to set up a rival 
 government of Romans in Spain, than a mere insur- 
 rection. 
 
 As long as Sylla lived, the Marian faction remained 
 powerless to disturb public order in Italy, confining its 
 energies to sending supplies and recruits to Sertorius. 
 
 However, on the death of Sylla B.C. 78, the Marians 
 succeeded in getting their candidate M. Aemilius Lepidus 
 
 1 Nat. Hist. in. 5,
 
 CHAP. XII. 123 
 
 elected consul in conjunction with Quintus Lutatius 
 Catulus, the son of the former colleague of Marius in 
 his triumph over the Cimbri. At the expiration of his 
 year of office, Lepidus contrived to get himself appointed 
 proconsul of Provincia. 
 
 Had he reached his province, it is morally certain 
 that Lepidus would have eventually carried the legions 
 placed under his orders across the Pyrenees to join the 
 ranks of Sertorius in Spain. But having rashly deter- 
 mined to employ them in a preliminary attempt to stir 
 up civil war afresh in Italy, Lepidus got the beating 
 which he richly deserved, in a battle fought at the 
 Milvian bridge against his Conservative rival Catulus. 
 Upon this Lepidus fled for refuge to the island of Sar- 
 dinia, where he soon after died^ 
 
 After the death of Lepidus, his legate Perperna 
 crossed from Sardinia into Spain, bringing, according to 
 Plutarch, 53 cohorts and large sums of money to the aid 
 of Sertorius. 
 
 In the place of Lepidus, L. Mallius was sent as 
 proconsul into Provincia. But he too appears to have 
 passed very little of his time within the bounds of his 
 Gallic province. For before he had settled down to his 
 work, which must have already fallen heavily into arrear 
 from the failure of Lepidus even to put in an appear- 
 ance, Mallius was summoned into Spain, to the assist- 
 ance of Q. Metellus. For the war which Sertorius had 
 stirred up in Spain was assuming such alarming propor- 
 tions that we find it described by the epitomist of Livy* 
 as an " ingens bellum." But instead of contributing to 
 the suppression of the rebellion the expedition of Mallius 
 into Spain had just the opposite effect. For it turned 
 out an utter failure, resulting in disaster and defeat on 
 both sides of the Pyrenees, lending encouragement to 
 rebellion everywhere. Badly beaten in further Spain by 
 
 1 This M. AemilLus Lepidus was the fatlier of Lepidus tiie Triumvir, of 
 whom we shall read later on. 
 '•^ Livy, Epit. 90.
 
 124 THE ROMAN PROVINXE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 Hirtuleius, the able quaestor of Sertorius, MalHus with 
 the remnant of his legions retreated across the Western 
 Pyrenees into Aquitania, hoping to regain the Roman 
 province unmolested. 
 
 But the fierce and as yet unconquered Aquitanians, 
 surprising the dispirited Romans on their march, created 
 a panic amongst them, and put them to flight, with the 
 loss of the whole of their baggage train. 
 
 The state of affairs in Spain had now become so 
 critical, that it became clear that Pompey was the only 
 general of sufficient calibre to cope with it. Although 
 still a youth (he was in his 30th year), Pompey already 
 enjoyed a reputation hardly inferior to that of Marius 
 when he was summoned by popular acclamation to save 
 Italy from the Cimbro-Teuton invasion. 
 
 From Pompey's famous letter, which was addressed 
 to the Roman Senate from Spain, when he was at the 
 height of his operations against Sertorius, we learn the 
 interesting fact, that at the moment of Pompey's ap- 
 pointment the war had spread over Provincia right up 
 to the Alps. 
 
 This daring attempt on the part of Sertorius to carry 
 his forces across the Alps and transfer the field of his 
 operations to Italy appears to have been completely 
 frustrated by Pompey, if we are to believe his own 
 account of it. 
 
 As being the first occasion on which a Roman army 
 was ever, as far as we know, carried across the Alps, the 
 passage of Pompey is singularly interesting to us. 
 Hitherto in their successive invasions of Provincia, as we 
 have seen, the Roman legions had been conveyed to 
 their destination by sea. 
 
 But now that the forces under Sertorius were re- 
 ported to be scaling the Alps, it was necessary to send 
 an army by land to oppose their passage. Unfortunately, 
 the letter of Pompey to the Senate only refers incident- 
 ally to his passage of the Alps, and his encounter with 
 Sertorius. It runs thus : — " Having equipped my army
 
 ROMAN ARCH AT SUSA, ERECTED BY KING COTTIUS IN HONOUR OF 
 
 AUGUSTUS. 
 
 To face p. 125]
 
 CHAP. XII. 125 
 
 in the short space of forty days, I pushed the enemy, 
 whom I found threatening Italy- from the Alps, right 
 back into Spain, having opened up a new road through 
 the Alps, more convenient for us than that by which 
 Hannibal crossed." 
 
 " I won back Provincia as far as the Pyrenees to our 
 allegiance, and successfully bore the brunt of the attack 
 of Sertorius' victorious veterans with my untrained 
 troops \" 
 
 The new route over the Alps referred to by Pompey 
 as more convenient 'to us ' can have been no other than 
 that of the Mont Genevre. For it must be fixed to the 
 south of Hannibal's road (by the Mt Cenis) in order to 
 make it more convenient for reaching Aries and Spain, 
 for which he was bound. 
 
 To anyone sufficiently familiar with the Alps to 
 enable him to make a comparison between the Mont 
 Genevre and other passes, it can excite no wonder that 
 the Romans adopted it as their favourite line of com- 
 munication between North Italy and Spain across the 
 Roman Province. For it presents hardly any of the 
 features and difficulties incident to the ordinary Alpine 
 pass. 
 
 At the highest point of the so-called Pass, which is 
 about the same elevation as the Rigi-Culm, the road is 
 carried for two or three miles almost on the level, across 
 a broad plateau commanded by heights crowned with 
 pine and larch. In the centre lies the smiling village 
 of Mt Genevre with its neat church surmounted by a 
 stone spire. It is by a long way the most human of the 
 Alpine passes, and a spot, where you feel disposed to 
 linger rather than to hurry through. If other con- 
 siderations did not prevent us from adopting it as 
 Hannibal's pass, the sunny plateau would have been 
 most suitable for the two days' rest, which Hannibal is 
 said by Livy to have given to his tired-out followers on 
 the summit. The classical name of the mountain top 
 
 ^ Sallust. Appended to the Teubner Edition of the Bellum Jugurlhinum.
 
 126 THE ROMAN PROVINCE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 ' Mons Matrona ' seems strictly in harmony with the 
 'genius loci,' offering as it does a broad lap for the 
 repose of the weary. 
 
 In the same letter to the Senate, Pompey represents 
 the urgent need in which he stood of money and sup- 
 plies. He threatens the Senate with the almost certain 
 prospect of the transfer of the war into Italy, owing to 
 the exhaustion of supplies both in Spain and Provincia, 
 adding that owing to a failure of the harvest in the 
 latter country, there was barely enough corn for the 
 inhabitants. This threat conveyed in Pompey's letter 
 seems to have brought the Senate to its senses. For 
 money and supplies were dispatched in response to it, 
 and the insurrection of Sertorius was henceforth con- 
 fined to Spain. 
 
 In what remains to us of his oration on behalf of 
 M. Fonteius, who was governor of the Provincia Ro- 
 mana during three years of the period during which 
 Pompey was operating against Sertorius, i.e. from 
 "j^ to 74 B.C., Cicero supplies us with some valuable 
 material for forming a picture of the state of Provincia 
 at that period. Entrusted by Pompey with the pacifi- 
 cation of the province and with the execution of his 
 decrees of confiscation of the estates of the provincials, 
 who had joined in the rebellion of Sertorius, Fonteius 
 appears to have carried out his commission so rigorously 
 and to have exasperated the natives so effectually, that 
 five years after his retirement they got him brought 
 to trial at Rome on the charge of extortion and em- 
 bezzlement of public funds. 
 
 That the rebellion in Provincia was widespread and 
 formidable is proved by the important fact, which we 
 learn solely from the speech of Cicero, that the insur- 
 gents even laid siege to the Roman colony of Narbonne. 
 That Fonteius successfully relieved the capital from 
 falling into their hands is dwelt upon by Cicero as one 
 of his client's titles to the enduring gratitude of the 
 Roman settlers in the earliest colony in Gaul.
 
 CHAP. XII. 127 
 
 In appraising the value of Cicero's estimate of the 
 GaUic element in the population of Provincia, we must 
 always bear in mind that he speaks as an advocate, 
 endeavouring to get a verdict of acquittal from a 
 prejudiced Roman jury. 
 
 Had Cicero been retained for the prosecution, we 
 can easily imagine from reading between the lines of his 
 defence, what a case might have been made out against 
 his client Fonteius by the orator, who had denounced 
 Verres so vigorously only the year previously (B.C. 70). 
 
 In picturing the Gauls as the enemies of all religion, 
 and referring to their former exploits in besieging 
 Jupiter in his temple at Rome on the Capitoline Hill 
 and outraging the oracle of Apollo at Delphi, Cicero 
 raked up old stories which were as irrelevant as the 
 addresses of advocates in our own time often are. 
 
 In going on to accuse the Gauls of the Provincia of 
 his day as continuing the practice of human sacrifice, in 
 order to discredit them as witnesses, it looks as if he 
 must wilfully have departed from the truth. For only 
 20 years later, Julius Caesar^ expressly remarks on the 
 superior "cultus atque humanitas" which distinguished 
 Provincia from the rest of Gaul. After this highly 
 coloured and distorted description of the Gauls, Cicero 
 proceeds thus : 
 
 " In this same Provincia, there is planted Narbo 
 Martins, a colony of our own citizens — the very image 
 of the Roman people, an advanced post of civilization 
 thrown into the jaws of those savages. There is too the 
 city of Marseilles — a community of our most valiant 
 and trusty allies, who from time immemorial have stood 
 by us in sharing the risks and burdens of Gallic wars. 
 There is, too, an unlimited number of Roman citizens, 
 most trustworthy individuals." 
 
 Further on, Cicero remarks " Besides, while Fonteius 
 was governor, the numerous and fully equipped army of 
 Cnaeus Pompeius was quartered for a whole winter in 
 1 De Bdlo Galljco, i. i.
 
 128 THE ROMAN PROVINCE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 the Roman Province, which was crammed full of Roman 
 knights, military tribunes and legates, constantly pass- 
 ing backwards and forwards between the armies and 
 generals in both the Spanish provinces \" 
 
 That not a single one of these honourable Romans 
 could be got to bear witness against Fonteius was, 
 according to Cicero, sufificient proof of the innocence 
 of his client. 
 
 However, with the guilt or innocence of Fonteius 
 we are not here concerned. It is sufficient for us that 
 Cicero admits and puts it down to his client's credit, 
 that he extracted from the unfortunate provincials 
 immense sums of money and supplies of corn to carry 
 on the war in Spain, in addition to providing the 
 Roman armies all over the globe with complements of 
 cavalry. 
 
 We are not specifically informed, which native tribes 
 were the ringleaders in the revolt of the provincials, put 
 down by Pompey's legate Fonteius. But we gather 
 from a reference in the De Bello Civilly I. 35 that it was 
 the Volcae and Helvii, who were on this occasion 
 mulcted of territory which Pompey handed over to the 
 Republic of IMarseilles, acquiring thereby its support 
 when the Civil War broke out between him and Julius 
 Caesar. 
 
 Although the Allobroges are represented as being 
 loudest in their complaints against Fonteius, it is doubt- 
 ful whether they actually took up arms against his 
 exactions. At all events, their territory lying as it did 
 well out of reach of annexation by the Republic of 
 Marseilles was left to them whole, although subjected to 
 heavy taxation and arbitrary exactions. 
 
 Within the next few years, however, they broke out 
 twice into open insurrections, the first of which was put 
 down by Calpurnius Piso in B.C. 66, and the second by 
 C. Pomptinus in 61. 
 
 Between these two risings, namely in the year of 
 
 ^ ratio pro J\L Fonteio, ch. 13 — 16.
 
 CHAP. XII. 129 
 
 Cicero's consulship B.C. 63, the Allobroges sent an 
 embassy to Rome to endeavour to get some redress 
 from the Senate from the unbearable exactions of the 
 Provincial governors. It so happened that the presence 
 of their ambassadors in Rome coincided with the plot- 
 ting of the Catiline conspiracy. 
 
 Disappointed in their hopes of getting satisfaction 
 from the Senate, the ambassadors of the Allobroges 
 were approached by the leaders of the Catiline con- 
 spiracy, who promised them complete redress of their 
 grievances, in the event of their contributing to make 
 the conspiracy successful by getting up a rising in their 
 own country. 
 
 Feigning readiness to co-operate in the manner 
 indicated by the conspirators, and having obtained 
 written promises of rewards from the authors of the 
 conspiracy, the ambassadors of the Allobroges left 
 Rome at night-fall on their homeward journey. 
 
 They had, however, already betrayed the secret of 
 their negotiations to Cicero, the consul, who by agree- 
 ment with them had made arrangements to have the 
 whole party arrested at the Milvian bridge, about a mile 
 and a half to the north of the city, where the Via 
 Flaminia crosses the Tiber. 
 
 On the indisputable evidence of the compromising 
 documents seized on the persons of the Ambassadors, 
 Lentulus and Cethegus, two of the leading conspirators, 
 were arrested by Cicero, and shortly afterwards sum- 
 marily put to death. Although Catiline himself con- 
 trived to escape from the city and openly raised the 
 standard of rebellion in Etruria, the danger of a rising 
 at Rome was averted. But in spite of this important 
 service rendered to the Republic by their ambassadors 
 at this crisis, the Roman Senate continued to turn a 
 deaf ear to the legitimate complaints of the Allobroges. 
 
 Having exhausted every expedient of getting redress 
 by peaceful means, the Allobroges were at last provoked 
 into taking up arms, but not in conjunction with the 
 
 H. 9
 
 130 THE ROMAN PROVINCE FROM MARIUS TO CAESAR. 
 
 conspiracy of Catiline. For that rebellion had been 
 effectually stamped out, before Cicero and the Senate 
 dared finally to reject the appeal of the Allobroges for 
 more lenient treatment. 
 
 The praetor Caius Pomptinus, who had been Cicero's 
 right hand man in the suppression of the Catiline con- 
 spiracy, was now sent into the Roman Province, with 
 the commission to spare no severity in the repression of 
 the rising of the Allobroges. 
 
 But before his arrival on the scene, Catugnatus the 
 leader of the Allobroges so completely out-generalled 
 Manlius Lentinus, the legate of Pomptinus, that the 
 Roman army was only saved from destruction by the 
 occurrence of a tempest of unusual violence. 
 
 When however Pomptinus took the field in person, 
 he soon turned the tables upon the enemy, and having 
 contrived to draw a cordon around the insurgent forces, 
 made prisoners of the whole. Catugnatus nevertheless 
 contrived to escape. 
 
 The rebellion of the Allobroges being thus effectually 
 put down, Pomptinus set out for Rome confidently 
 anticipating that the Senate would grant him the 
 honours of the triumph, to which he considered himself 
 justly entitled. In this expectation he was however 
 doomed to disappointment. For taking advantage of a 
 technical irregularity in the conferring of his ' imperium ' 
 his enemies in the Senate were successful in preventing 
 the passing of the requisite decree. 
 
 So determined however was Pomptinus to achieve 
 his purpose in spite of the Senate, that he had the 
 patience to wait six whole years outside the city, taking 
 up his residence in the Pomoerium. Had he set foot 
 within the city, his chance of triumphing would have 
 been forfeited. 
 
 This extraordinary patience was ultimately rewarded. 
 For although the Senate persisted in its refusal, Servius 
 Sulpicius Galba, who had formerly served as legate 
 under Pomptinus, got a triumph voted by popular
 
 CHAP. XII. 131 
 
 resolution, B.C. 54. Although it was alleged that this 
 resolution was illegal, as having been carried before 
 daylight, Pomptinus was notwithstanding permitted to 
 enjoy the honours of a triumph. 
 
 That he richly deserved them for the signal services 
 rendered to the Republic can hardly be doubted. For 
 up to their final reduction by Pomptinus B.C. 61, the 
 Allobroges had been a constant source of trouble to the 
 Romans, having been in a chronic state of secret or 
 open rebellion. 
 
 Chafing under the Roman yoke from which their 
 more fortunate Ligurian neighbours, the Vocontii, were 
 left entirely free, the Allobroges were keenly sensible of 
 their inferior status as mere provincial subjects of 
 Rome. 
 
 The attempt to govern such a restless people from 
 distant centres, such as Aquae Sextiae or Narbonne, 
 having entirely broken down, Vienna (Vienne-en-Dau- 
 phine) now became the seat of Roman administration 
 of the country comprised between the Isere, the Rhone 
 and the Alps. 
 
 9—2
 
 CHAPTER XIII. 
 
 The Provincia Romana in relation to 
 Caesar's Gallic and Civil Wars. 
 
 With the appearance of Julius Caesar in Gaul and his 
 assumption of the reins of government in Provincia, the 
 relations of the Allobroges to the Romans underwent a 
 radical change. Realizing that the country of the 
 Allobroges was the most convenient, if not the only 
 possible, base for his operations in Gallia Comata — the 
 ' omnis Gallia ' of the De Bello Gallico — Caesar deter- 
 mined to secure their friendship at any price. As if by 
 magic, from having been the most troublesome people in 
 Transalpine Gaul, the Allobroges suddenly became the 
 most loyal, and remained the most steadfast allies of the 
 Romans throughout the whole period of Caesar's Gallic 
 Wars. 
 
 Even when the constancy of the Aedui broke down, 
 in spite of their sworn brotherhood with the Romans, at 
 the critical moment following the repulse of the Romans 
 from Gergovia, the Allobroges remained true. Had they 
 also been induced to join in the national rising and 
 yielded to the solicitation of Vercingetorix, it would in 
 all probability have been all over with the fortunes of 
 Caesar, and the course of Roman history would have 
 been diverted into an entirely different channel. 
 
 By what specific means Caesar succeeded in winning 
 over the affections of the Allobroges, we are not, as far 
 as I can discover, directly informed by any classical 
 authority. But from a somewhat rare and much-esteemed
 
 CHAP. XIII. 133 
 
 local \vork\ of which I made an analysis from a copy- 
 borrowed during my journey through the country, 1 
 have derived much useful information bearing on the 
 subject. 
 
 It is stated by Pitot that Pomptinus, the predecessor 
 of Julius Caesar in the governorship of Provincia after 
 his final subjugation of the Allobroges, established at 
 Vienna a colony of Roman and Italian veterans. Al- 
 though I failed to note his authority for this statement, 
 it is practically certain, that under the rule of Pomptinus 
 Vienna became for the first time the seat of Roman 
 Government in Northern Provincia, which was bounded 
 by the course of the Rhone as far as Geneva. 
 
 Already in the days of Hannibal, a century and a 
 half earlier, the existence of a ' senate ' of the Allobroges 
 is mentioned by Livy where he states that the decision 
 of the Carthaginian leader in favour of the elder disputant 
 for the chieftainship was agreeable to ' the Senate ' and 
 chiefs of the nation. 
 
 That this ' Senate ' was entirely suppressed during 
 the rigorous regime of Pomptinus seems more than pro- 
 bable. To restore it partially, and remodel it on a safe 
 basis, appears to have been a leading feature in Caesar's 
 new scheme of government. But as out of 100 seats 25 
 only were assigned to Allobroges, it is difficult to under- 
 stand how this arrangement can have been accepted 
 even for a time by the native population. The theory 
 that Caesar, like Napoleon, exercised a magnetic in- 
 fluence over the Gallic race, alone explains much that 
 would be otherwise unintelligible in his dealings with 
 the Gauls. 
 
 That Caesar took an active part in the formation of 
 the Senate of the Allobroges is proved by the fact that 
 he caused his native associates and particular friends — 
 Raucillus and Egus, sons of Abducillus, for many years 
 chief of the state — to be elected supernumerary members 
 
 ' "Recherches sur les Antitjuites Dauphinoises, par J. J. A. Pitot." 
 (Baratier, Grenoble, 1833.)
 
 134 TROVINCIA IN RELATION TO CAESAR'S WARS. 
 
 of that body, having previously endowed them with 
 estates in land confiscated in Gaul (Gallia Comata). 
 
 That the temporary loyalty of the Allobroges is to 
 be attributed solely to their devotion to the personality 
 of Julius Caesar seems proved by the fact that no sooner 
 did they hear of his assassination than they rose en 
 masse and expelled the entire body of Roman and 
 Italian colonists out of Vienna. 
 
 Instead of severely punishing the authors of this 
 outrage, the Roman Senate, in the confusion following 
 the murder of Caesar, contented itself with sending 
 orders to Plancus, governor of Gallia Ulterior — to con- 
 duct the colonists expelled from Vienna to found a 
 Roman Colony at Lugdunum. 
 
 Such was the origin of Roman Lyons, between which 
 city and Vienna a lasting feud existed. 
 
 The importance of Vienna to Caesar in the prosecu- 
 tion of his Gallic Wars can hardly be exaggerated. In 
 Caesar's day it was the last outpost of the comparative 
 civilization of the Roman Province against the outer 
 barbarism of Gallia Comata or Gaul beyond the Rhone. 
 For Lyons (Lugdunum) in spite of its convenient 
 position at the junction of the Saone and the Rhone, 
 was as yet a place of no importance and quite ignored 
 by Julius Caesar, although it was soon to become under 
 Augustus the Roman capital of Gaul. 
 
 In order to render Vienna the impregnable frontier 
 fortress which he required, Caesar employed on strength- 
 ening its fortifications the bulk of the prisoners taken 
 in his earliest battles in Gaul. Between the years 
 B.C. 58 — 56, forty thousand labourers are said to have 
 been engaged on this work. 
 
 Vienna now received its title of ' Colonia Julia Vien- 
 nensis,' and became the first ' Caput ' of the Roman 
 roads leading over the Alps into Gallia Transalpina. 
 
 Planted on a series of picturesque heights and 
 terraces commanding a great bend of the Rhone, 
 Vienna is naturally a place of great strength, and
 
 To face p. 13-;]
 
 CHAP. XIII. 135 
 
 presents a most striking appearance when viewed from 
 the river. From the express trains, which pass by the 
 P. L. M. Station of Vienne-en-Dauphine (half an hour 
 below Lyons) in a dark cutting or darker tunnel, you see 
 nothing that is striking in the place, as you rush through. 
 Vienne is however well worth stopping at and exploring, 
 both for its Roman and mediaeval antiquities. For after 
 it had lost much of its civil importance to the Romans 
 by the transference of the seat of the government of the 
 whole of Gaul to Lyons, Vienna soon acquired and has 
 retained to this day a Metropolitan character in ecclesi- 
 astical jurisdiction. 
 
 When in the year B.C. 52, after six years' fighting 
 with almost uninterrupted success, it seemed that the 
 conquest of Gaul had been practically achieved, Ver- 
 cingetorix succeeded in exciting his countrymen to a 
 final effort to escape from the Roman yoke ; he saw at a 
 glance that his best chance was to strike at Provincia 
 and endeavour to cut the Romans off from their base. 
 Vienna naturally became the first object of his attack. 
 
 Vercingetorix, at the same time that he despatched 
 an armed force against the Allobroges, endeavoured by 
 means of secret negotiations to win them over by per- 
 suasion, trusting to find sufficient sparks of disaffection 
 still alive amongst them to fan into a flame. He failed 
 however to effect an entrance into their territory either 
 by force or negotiation. 
 
 But although the Arverne chief failed in his operations 
 against the capital of the Allobroges, he succeeded not- 
 withstanding in cutting off Caesar's communications and 
 supplies from the rest of Provincia and Italy'. 
 
 Finding himself thus isolated, Caesar showed his ex- 
 traordinary resource by procuring from beyond the Rhine 
 German cavalry and light infantry, of which he stood 
 in desperate need to co-operate with his heavy legion- 
 aries. It is to be noted that the crowning victory over 
 Vercingetorix at Alesia was largely attributable to the 
 
 1 De Bella Galluo, vii. 65.
 
 136 PROVINCIA IN RELATION TO CAESAR'S WARS. 
 
 prowess of the German cavalry brought over at this 
 crisis*. 
 
 Lying as it does quite outside the Hmits of this 
 sketch, I am unfortunately debarred from attempting 
 any detailed description of the operations around 
 Alesia — the most interesting episode in Caesar's Gallic 
 Wars. 
 
 It is, however, within my province to note that, 
 although the back of the Gallic revolt was broken by 
 the surrender of Vercingetorix, B.C. 52, the fighting was 
 continued and Caesar's presence required in Gaul for 
 about two years longer. 
 
 For in B.C. 51, the Roman Province incurred the 
 serious danger of being overrun by a band of some 
 2000 adventurers and jail-birds, got together by Drappes 
 and Lucterius. This disaster was however averted by 
 the skilful operations of Caninius the legatus, whom 
 Caesar detached for the purpose. The siege and capture 
 of Uxellodunum, the chief oppidum of the Cadurci, by 
 cutting off its water supply — operations conducted by 
 Julius Caesar in person — put an end to the fighting in 
 the South on the borders of the Roman Province. For 
 the Aquitanians surrendered without striking a blow. 
 
 After spending a few days at Narbonne dispensing 
 justice and despatching other business with his wonted 
 expedition, Caesar hurried back to Belgium, spending 
 his last winter in Gaul at Nemetocenna'^ (Arras). 
 
 The outbreak of the Civil War B.C. 49 occurred most 
 opportunely for the fortunes of Julius Caesar. For it 
 not only furnished military employment for the Roman 
 and Italian army, with which he had subdued Gaul, and 
 which was devoted to him by the closest ties, but also 
 for the restless spirits amongst the Gauls themselves, 
 who might otherwise have broken out into revolt behind 
 his back. 
 
 The Legion of the Alaudae (larks), which was en- 
 
 1 De Bella Gallico, Vll. 80. "^ Ibid. viil. 46.
 
 CHAP. XIII. 137 
 
 tirely composed of natives of Gaul, had been incorporated 
 with the Roman army^ as early as B.C. 55, being equipped 
 in the Roman fashion. It was especially favoured by 
 Caesar, and having rendered him the greatest services, 
 was admitted bodily to Roman citizenship a few years 
 later. Caesar now proceeded to a special enlistment 
 of picked men from all the different states of Gaul', 
 whom he had drilled under his own superintendence to 
 be in readiness to follow his Roman legions across the 
 Pyrenees for the encounter with Pompey's lieutenants, 
 Petreius and Afranius, in Spain, which he foresaw was 
 imminent. 
 
 But the episode in the Civil War, which especially 
 concerns the Roman Province, of which Domitius 
 Ahenobarbus had been appointed governor by the 
 Senate in succession to Caesar, is unquestionably the 
 siege of Marseilles. If Marseilles had been merely an 
 independent Greek city, its history and fate would be of 
 comparative unimportance to the subject we have in 
 hand. It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that 
 besides being a city, Massilia was an independent Greek 
 state, whose territory extended as far as Monaco east- 
 ward and the Pyrenees westward — a stretch of about 
 300 miles of coast. In addition to this it included all 
 the country comprised between the Rhone and the 
 Cevennes mountains. The occurrence of the name 
 Gretia in the Section of the Table of Peutinger is a 
 proof that its Greek character was preserved by the 
 country between the Rhone and the Durance as late as 
 the age of Theodosius. 
 
 That a part of this inland extension of territory was 
 a recent acquisition, dating from Pompey's re-conquest 
 of Provincia about 20 years earlier, we learn incidentally 
 from the statement of their case made to Caesar by the 
 Massiliot envoys in pleading their excuse for wishing 
 
 ' Suetonius, yulitis, 74. 
 
 - De Bella Civili, i. 39. " Nominatim ex omnibus civitatibus nobilissimo 
 et fortissimo quoque evocato."
 
 138 PROVINCIA IN RELATION TO CAESAR'S WARS. 
 
 to remain neutral in the Civil War. The envoys 
 observed, that as they understood the situation, the 
 Roman people was split up into two factions, the 
 respective leaders of which were Cnaeus Pompeius and 
 Caius Caesar, — both patrons of their commonwealth, to 
 the former of whom they were indebted for the public 
 concession of the territories of the Volcae Arecomici and 
 Helvii, and to the latter for attributing to their state in- 
 creased revenue from the vanquished "Salyes" orSalluvii^ 
 That having received equal benefits from both, their 
 proper course seemed to be to show their good will to 
 both by remaining neutral, and receiving neither of 
 them within their city or harbour. 
 
 However, while the negotiations were pending 
 between Caesar and the Massiliot envoys, Domitius 
 Ahenobarbus", the newly appointed governor of the 
 Provincia Narbonensis (as it may now be convenient 
 to call it, to distinguish it from the rest of Gallia 
 Transalpina) suddenly arrived at Marseilles, with a 
 flotilla of seven swift cruisers from Cosa, a port on the 
 Etrurian coast, and Igilium, an island lying off it. 
 
 Notwithstanding that he owed his life and liberty 
 to the magnanimity of Caesar, into whose hands he 
 had been lately delivered by his own troops at Cor- 
 finium, Domitius Ahenobarbus did not hesitate to put 
 himself at the head of the sea and land forces which 
 the Massiliots had got together to support the cause of 
 Pompey. 
 
 That the leanings of the Massiliots should have been 
 to the side of Pompey and the Senate in spite of their 
 affectation of neutrality, was natural enough. For their 
 Republic was the most conservative and stable known 
 to antiquity, whereas Caesar was the incarnation of the 
 Revolution. In him Sylla had truly remarked there 
 were contained many Mariuses. The governing body 
 
 ^ De Bella Civili, I. 35. " Victos Sallyas " is the emendation of the 
 text proposed by Glandorpius. 
 
 - Grandson of the first proconsul, maker of the Via Domitia.
 
 CHAP. XIII. 139 
 
 of the Massiliots was a council of 600 life-senators, who 
 delegated their powers to a Cabinet of 15, with an inner 
 Cabinet of 3, of whom one was chosen president. It 
 was the Cabinet of 15 who stated their case for neutrality 
 to Caesar. 
 
 But the time for negotiation was now passed, and 
 Caesar took his measures accordingly. His first step 
 was to bring up three of his legions for the purpose 
 of investing Marseilles by land ; his second was to give 
 orders for the construction of a dozen ships of war at 
 Aries to co-operate with his land forces. Within 30 
 days from the date of its issue, this order was executed 
 and the ships duly delivered. It would appear from this 
 fact that the city of Aries, with its ship-building facilities, 
 had been retained in Roman hands after Pompey's re- 
 conquest of Provence, when it became a centre of Roman 
 roads. 
 
 But the war in Spain requiring his immediate presence, 
 Caesar was obliged to relinquish for the present the 
 direction of the operations around Marseilles, and to 
 hurry across the Pyrenees to join the main body of his 
 army and Gallic auxiliaries awaiting him in the basin 
 of the Iberus (Ebro). 
 
 The prosecution of the siege operations by land was 
 in the meanwhile entrusted to Caius Trebonius, the 
 legatus left behind by Caesar, while Decimus Brutus (or 
 Decius as he is styled by Shakespeare), was to take 
 the command of the fleet.
 
 CHAPTER XIV. 
 Siege and Blockade of Marseilles. 
 
 As the siege of Marseilles is the only military operation 
 in the history of the Roman province connected with 
 the name of Julius Caesar, and as he has himself fur- 
 nished a minute description of it, this chapter will be 
 devoted to reproducing its main features drawn directly 
 from the text of the De Bello Civili, L. II. c. i — 22. 
 
 From the present aspect of the city, which stretches 
 over an extensive area, covering the high ground on 
 both sides of the old harbour as well as reaching inland 
 up and beyond the hill of St Charles — the site of the 
 modern railway station — it is hard to realize that the 
 Massilia of the Phocaeans was confined to a peninsula 
 between the old harbour and a creek of La Joliette. 
 
 Yet the description of it in the first chapter of the 
 second book of the De Bcllo Civili leaves no doubt on 
 the point. It runs thus. " For Massilia is almost en- 
 tirely washed by the sea on three sides ; it is only 
 approachable by land on its fourth side." 
 
 A glance at the plan opposite this page will make 
 this clearer to the reader on paper, but it is less easy to 
 trace on the spot the line of ancient wall, which was 
 carried across the neck connecting the peninsula with 
 the line of coast. 
 
 In the Ora Maritima of Festus Avienus v. 706 — 708, 
 the situation of Massilia is described as follows : 
 
 " Latera gurges adluit, 
 Stagnum ambit urbem, et unda lambit oppidum 
 Laremque fusa : civitas paene insula est^ 
 
 To man the line of their city wall and at the same
 
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 CHAP. XIV. 141 
 
 time their fleet, the Massiliots called in their former 
 trusty mercenaries, the Albici, who appear to have 
 served the Greek republic in peaceful times as agricul- 
 tural labourers, and to have been always ready at a 
 moment's notice to respond to a call to arms. 
 
 The Albici, whose head-quarters were at Reii (Riez), 
 still a considerable city lying among the hills between 
 the Verdon and the Durance, some fifty miles to the 
 north of Marseilles, were a brave and hardy race, which 
 had always been loyal to their Greek employers. From 
 their readiness to take up arms against their all-powerful 
 neighbours, the Ligurian Salyes, in defence of Marseilles, 
 it seems most probable that the Albici were a tribe of 
 friendly Celts' who had been induced to cross the 
 Durance to take service under the Greek republic. 
 
 For although, as I stated in my Introductory Chapter, 
 the country south of the Durance was never conquered 
 by Celts, a few isolated Celtic tribes, one of which he 
 calls Commoni, found their way across that river and 
 are mentioned by Pliny as settled in the neighbourhood 
 of Marseilles. 
 
 In spite of the representations to Caesar of the desire 
 of the republic of Marseilles to preserve a benevolent 
 neutrality at the outbreak of the Civil War, it soon 
 became clear that the city was thoroughly equipped to 
 stand a siege. 
 
 Immense supplies of war material of every kind were 
 found to have been accumulated in readiness for any 
 emergency, and the wall and towers on the land side 
 were provided with exceptionally powerful batteries of 
 'tormenta' — machines for discharging heavy missiles of 
 metal or stone. 
 
 It was a strange turn of Fortune's wheel, that the 
 Romans, to whose benevolent intervention Massilia owed 
 its preservation from being stormed by the Salluvii, 
 
 ^ The friendly Celts, who are mentioned by Livy as having accompanied 
 the Roman cavalry, sent f« rtconnaissance up the Rhone Valley at the time 
 of Hannibal's invasion, were probably .A-lbici.
 
 142 SIEGE AND BLOCKADE OF MARSEILLES. 
 
 should now be laying siege to the city on their own 
 account. 
 
 It was a work of months to throw up the embank- 
 ments required to provide access to the walls over the 
 low ground, and to construct many kinds of complicated 
 shelters to protect the besiegers from the showers of 
 missiles discharged from the tormenta. 
 
 While these siege-works, on which gangs of native 
 workmen collected from all parts of Provincia were 
 mainly employed, were being pushed forward, the twelve 
 war-ships ordered by Caesar duly arrived from Aries. 
 As it is expressly stated^ that only thirty days had 
 elapsed since the felling of the trees of which they were 
 constructed, it is not to be wondered at that they proved 
 somewhat unwieldy. 
 
 Having a fleet of seventeen war-ships at his disposal, 
 Domitius Ahenobarbus seems to have considered that 
 they would be advantageously employed in a trial of 
 strength with the twelve unseasoned ships, which appear 
 to have constituted the whole of Caesar's fleet. These 
 twelve ships were placed under the command of Decimus 
 Brutus, who drew them up near the islands lying out- 
 side the old harbour. 
 
 Never doubting but what he would make short work 
 of them, Domitius bore down triumphantly upon his 
 opponents. For in addition to his war-ships he was 
 reinforced by a number of smaller craft. 
 
 Having an insufficient number of sailors available, 
 Caesar, before setting out to join his army in Spain, 
 had called on the three legions left with his legate 
 Trebonius to furnish volunteers to serve on his extem- 
 porized fleet. The call was readily responded to and 
 the ships manned by the pick of the legionaries. As it 
 happened, the very unwieldiness of the vessels turned 
 out to be just suited to the unseamanlike character of 
 the crews. For from the heaviness of the newly-felled 
 timber, the vessels built at Aries proved exceptionally 
 
 ^ De Bell. Civ. I. 36.
 
 CHAP. XIV. 143 
 
 Steady, and served as solid stages for fighting a land- 
 battle at sea. 
 
 Both men and ships being alike incapable of vying 
 with their Massilian opponents in naval tactics, Caesar's 
 galleys made it their sole aim to get to close quarters as 
 quickly as possible. Once amongst the enemy's ships, 
 the legionaries threw out grappling-irons, with which 
 they held them fast, sometimes catching two at a time, 
 till they had boarded aud despatched their crews 
 composed chiefly of Albici. After sinking three and 
 capturing six of the Massiliot ships, Decimus Brutus 
 returned in triumph to his moorings, while Domitius 
 retired discomfited with only seven ships. 
 
 Meanwhile the progress of the siege operations was 
 slow on the land side owing to the difficult nature of the 
 ground, the heavy discharges of masses of rocks from 
 the heights on the heads of the besiegers, and the fre- 
 quent sorties of the Albici, ever ready to take advantage 
 of the confusion and havoc occasioned by the tormenta 
 in the ranks of the legionaries. 
 
 Hearing of the discomfiture of Domitius, and the 
 loss of more than half his ships, Pompey lost no time in 
 despatching his admiral L. Nasidius, then commanding 
 his fleet in Sicilian waters, with sixteen ships of war to 
 the relief of the Massiliots. 
 
 When the news of the arrival of this opportune re- 
 inforcement reached the ears of the Massiliot population, 
 which had been deeply dejected since witnessing the 
 overthrow of their hopes at sea, their spirits immediately 
 revived, and the whole city was eager for a fresh naval 
 encounter. 
 
 It was well for the Massiliots that the second and 
 more decisive sea-fight, on which all their fresh hopes 
 were staked, was destined to come off out of sight of 
 their city. For instead of bringing his ships close up to 
 Marseilles, Nasidius halted them opposite Tauroenta, 
 some 20 miles to the eastward towards Toulon. He 
 seems to have shrunk from the risk of exposing himself
 
 144 SIEGE AND BLOCKADE OF MARSEILLES. 
 
 to the risk of an attack, before he had effected his 
 junction with Domitius. For with the six war-ships 
 captured from the Massiliots in the late engagement, 
 Decimus Brutus had now a fleet of eighteen vessels, 
 more fully equipped and better fitted to put to sea. 
 
 Sending forward a despatch boat to announce his 
 arrival at Tauroenta, Nasidius summoned Domitius to 
 join him there with the ships that remained to him and 
 nine fresh ones, which the Massiliots had equipped to 
 replace those captured. 
 
 As it became clear that the combined fleets opposed 
 to him would decline fighting in the waters within sight 
 of the city and in touch with the old harbour, which 
 appears throughout to have been in his possession, 
 Decimus Brutus determined to accept battle at Tauro- 
 enta, where Nasidius offered it. 
 
 Described as a 'Castellum Massiliensium" Tauroenta 
 is a spot to which M. Lentheric has devoted fifty some- 
 what uncalled-for pages in the Riviera Ancient and 
 Modern, the English rendering of his Provence Maritime. 
 As by his own showing on p. 122 'Etiam periere ruinae', 
 I do not feel called upon to add anything to the mention 
 of the name, which only serves to mark the point on the 
 rocky coast of Provence, off which the battle was fought, 
 which put an end to the independence of the Massiliot 
 republic B.C. 49. 
 
 To meet Decimus Brutus approaching from the 
 westward with his eighteen vessels, the Pompeian fleet 
 advanced in two divisions, the seventeen Massiliot Greek 
 ships being placed inshore on the right, while the sixteen 
 under the command of Nasidius formed the left wing 
 towards the open sea. 
 
 Very different was the spirit which animated them 
 respectively, the Massiliots feeling that all depended on 
 the issue of this supreme occasion, on which they were 
 fighting for their hearths and homes, while the sailors 
 of Nasidius were supremely indifferent. Having no 
 
 ^ Caesar, De Bell. Civ. ii. 4.
 
 CHAP. XIV. 145 
 
 material interests at stake and without a spark of 
 patriotic sentiment, for they had no country to defend, 
 the Latin contingent of Nasidius, from which the Mas- 
 siliots hoped such great things, proved in the simple but 
 expressive words of the text ' of no good at all '. (Nasi- 
 dianae naves nulli usui fuerant'.) 
 
 As a matter of fact, they bolted at the critical 
 moment of the battle, their crews not being worked 
 up to the pitch of risking their lives on an alien ad- 
 venture, without any encouragement from fellow country- 
 men on the spot. 
 
 In striking contrast to the unadorned brevity of the 
 text of Caesar's Civil War is the account of the sea-fight 
 in Lucan's PJiarsalia, Book III., of which I give below a 
 specimen — Rowe's well-known version : — 
 
 Massilia's navy, nimble, clean, and light, 
 
 With best advantage, seek or shun the fight; 
 
 With ready ease, all answer to command, 
 
 Obey the helm, and feel the pilot's hand. 
 
 Not so the Romans ; cumbrous hulks they lay, 
 
 And slow and heavy hung upon the sea ; 
 
 Yet strong, and for the closer combat good. 
 
 They yield firm footing on th' unstable flood. 
 
 Thus Brutus saw, and to the master cries 
 
 (The master in the lofty poop he spies 
 
 Where streaming the Praetorian ensign flies), 
 
 Still wo't thou bear away, still shift thy place. 
 
 And turn the battle to a wanton chase? 
 
 Is this a time to play so mean a part. 
 
 To tack, to veer, and boast thy trifling art? 
 
 Bring to. The war shall hand to hand be tried. 
 
 Oppose thou to the foe our ample side 
 
 And let us meet like men, the chieftain said ; 
 
 The ready master the command obeyed. 
 
 And sidelong to the foe the ship was laid. 
 
 Upon his waist fierce fall the thund'ring Greeks, 
 
 Fast in his timber stick their brazen beaks ; 
 
 Some lie by chains and grappling strong compell'd, 
 
 While others by the tangling oars are held ; 
 
 The seas are hid beneath the closing war, 
 
 Nor need they cast the jav'lin now from far; 
 
 » De Bell. Civ. ii. 7. 
 H. 10
 
 146 SIEGE AND BLOCKADE OF MARSEILLES. 
 
 With hardy strokes the combatants engage, 
 And with keen faulchions deal their deadly rage ; 
 Man against man, and board by board they lie, 
 And on those decks their arms defended die ; 
 The rolling surge is stained around with blood, 
 And foamy purple swells the rising flood." 
 
 In spite of the cowardly withdrawal of the ships of 
 Nasidius at the critical moment, the Massiliot vessels by 
 no means lost all hope of victory, but continued to make 
 a good fight of it single-handed. They were however at 
 last obliged to acknowledge their defeat, when five of 
 their vessels were sunk and four captured. 
 
 From the camp of Trebonius, on the heights opposite 
 overlooking the city, the Roman soldiers while the sea- 
 fight was in progress could plainly descry crowds of 
 Massiliot women and children thronging the temples 
 and bowing down before the images of their gods in 
 earnest supplication. As soon as it became known 
 that their fleet had been beaten, owing to the flight of 
 Nasidius, whose arrival had only a few days before 
 excited such wild hopes in their breasts, a great wail 
 of grief rent the air. To hear it, any one would have 
 supposed that the city itself had fallen into the hands of 
 the enemy. 
 
 But although the Massiliots must have felt that the 
 fate of their city was sealed now that the Romans were 
 as completely masters by sea as by land, they relaxed 
 none of their efforts in defending their walls, against 
 which Trebonius pushed his attack with renewed 
 vigour. 
 
 The rocky nature of the soil rendering underground 
 approaches impossible in the absence of explosives, with 
 the use of which the Romans were unacquainted, it 
 was necessary to construct moveable shedding of great 
 strength to protect the advance of the besiegers. 
 
 Against these sheds, as they were seen approaching 
 the walls, the besiegers would discharge every available 
 missile and finally roll down huge masses of rock, when 
 they got nearer. If these failed to smash in the roofing,
 
 CHAP. XIV. 147 
 
 they would hurl down casks filled with burning pitch 
 and lighted torches. 
 
 An inexhaustible supply of such material having been 
 accumulated at Marseilles, the best furnished port in 
 the western basin of the Mediterranean, the progress 
 of the siege was slow, no shedding composed of wooden 
 framework filled in with such inflammable material as 
 osiers and hurdles proving fire-proof At length how- 
 ever after weary months of ineffectual attempts, the 
 besiegers contrived to construct an immensely strong 
 covered approach, 5 ft. high by 4 ft. broad, the stout 
 wooden framework of which was filled in with clay and 
 bricks, and the whole cased in with similar incombustible 
 material. 
 
 Approaching by means of this ' musculus ' (as Caesar 
 calls it) the principal tower and key of the defences in the 
 city wall, the besiegers succeeded in effectually under- 
 mining it and bringing part of it down with a run, 
 thereby causing a formidable breach. 
 
 Upon this, the besieged, desisting from further show 
 of resistance, and throwing themselves at the feet of 
 Trebonius, obtained from him the concession of an 
 armistice, pending the arrival of Caesar, whose return 
 from the successful termination of the Spanish War was 
 shortly expected. 
 
 However, as Caesar's arrival was unexpectedly de- 
 ferred, the Massiliots in flagrant violation of the armistice 
 and hoping to find the Romans napping at the hour of 
 noon, suddenly sallied forth through the breach in the 
 walls and attacked them unexpectedly. Availing them- 
 selves of a strong wind (probably the Mistral, with 
 which every visitor to the French Riviera is only too 
 familiar), the Massiliots treacherously set fire to every- 
 thing inflammable in the Roman lines, destroying the 
 bulk of their siege appliances. 
 
 As Caesar, shortly before the commission of this 
 treacherous outrage, had sent an express injunction to 
 Trebonius, that he was on no account to sanction the 
 
 10 — 2
 
 148 SIEGE AND BLOCKADE OF MARSEILLES. 
 
 storming of the city, the Massiliots escaped the condign 
 punishment which they richly deserved and which the 
 Roman legionaries were with great difficulty withheld 
 from inflicting upon them then and there. 
 
 Retiring within the walls and repairing as best they 
 could the breach in their defences, occasioned by the fall 
 of the tower, the Massiliots prepared for further resist- 
 ance. 
 
 The Romans meanwhile on their side zealously set 
 to work at the re-construction of their siege appliances, 
 felling for this purpose all the timber still available in 
 the neighbourhood. 
 
 When the siege had been prolonged a considerable 
 time, famine, resulting from the effectual blockade, which 
 had been established by Decimus Brutus since his second 
 naval victory, came to the assistance of the besiegers, 
 bringing all kinds of disease in its train. From this it 
 resulted that on Caesar's arrival, the Massiliots, being 
 unable to hold out any longer, and trusting to his well- 
 known clemency, surrendered their city to him uncon- 
 ditionally. All lives were spared, Domitius Aheno- 
 barbus, afraid to trust himself a second time to Caesar's 
 generosity, having escaped by sea a few days previously 
 to the surrender. 
 
 The terms exacted by the conqueror were the sur- 
 render of all arms and military engines ; of all ships and 
 naval stores ; of the whole of the public treasure, and the 
 forfeiture of all territory, 
 
 A garrison consisting of two Roman legions was 
 quartered upon the city. From henceforth Marseilles 
 ceased to exist as an independent republic. She was 
 however permitted to elect her civil magistrates and to 
 enjoy the privilege to local self-government.
 
 CHAPTER XV. 
 
 Events of the year following the Assassina- 
 tion OF Julius Caesar. 
 
 The last public act of Julius Caesar affecting the Roman 
 Province was the despatch of Tiberius Claudius Nero — 
 the first husband of Livia, and father of Tiberius and 
 Drusus — with fresh batches of Roman colonists, mostly 
 veteran soldiers, to plant new or re-inforce existing colo- 
 nies in Gaul. Of these only two, Narbonne and Aries, 
 are mentioned by name, but the context^ expressly 
 implies that there were others besides. 
 
 That Frejus was among them can hardly be ques- 
 tioned. For on that ' claustrum Galliae ' alone was 
 bestowed the distinction of being called after the con- 
 queror Forum 'Julii.' 
 
 From having been at the outset a naval and military 
 station settled amidst a native population, Forum Julii 
 was now raised to the full rank of a Roman Colony. It 
 is first mentioned B.C. 43 (the year following the death 
 of Julius Caesar) in the correspondence of Cicero with 
 Munatius Plancus, Proconsul of Gallia Comata. 
 
 To enable the reader to appreciate the importance of 
 the events, of which the Roman Province was now to 
 become the scene, it is necessary to take a general view 
 of the political situation after the disappearance of Julius 
 Caesar from the midst of the Roman world. 
 
 Notwithstanding that Caesar was Dictator at the 
 time of his assassination (with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus 
 
 ^ .Suetonius, Tiberius, c. 4.
 
 150 THE YEAR AFTER CAESAR'S DEATH. 
 
 for Master of his Horse), Marcus Antonius and P. Corne- 
 lius Dolabella, son-in-law of Cicero, were associated with 
 him as Consuls. 
 
 The dictatorship having fallen to the ground, the 
 supreme power in the state devolved upon the Consuls, 
 who at first took opposite sides. 
 
 While Marc Antony stood forth as the champion of 
 Caesarism, Dolabella, under the influence of Cicero, 
 maintained the cause of the Senate, which was that 
 of the assassins of Caesar. He even went the length of 
 removing the column and altar, which the partisans of 
 Caesar had erected in the Forum in his honour, and 
 caused those of the intending worshippers on whom he 
 could lay hands either to be hurled from the Tarpeian 
 rock or crucified. Dolabella, however, was shortly after 
 got rid of, accepting as he did the bribe of the proconsul- 
 ship of Syria, proffered him by Antony. 
 
 Meanwhile a more formidable rival to the champion- 
 ship of Caesarism arrived in the person of the young 
 Octavianus, who was pursuing his studies of Greek at 
 Apollonia, when the news of his great-uncle's death 
 reached him. On his arrival at Rome, he presented 
 himself before Antony, claiming to be recognised as the 
 testamentary heir of his uncle and father by adoption. 
 
 But as Antony had already spent in bribery the 
 bulk of the 4000 talents (about i million sterling) which 
 Calpurnia, the widow of Julius Caesar, had handed over 
 to him, as Caesar's relative and representative (for 
 Antony's mother was a Julia), he received Octavianus 
 with such coldness as to drive him into the opposite 
 camp. 
 
 Welcomed by Cicero and the party of the Senate, 
 Octavianus proceeded notwithstanding to summon to 
 his standard the veteran soldiers, dispersed all over Italy 
 on farms granted them by his uncle. 
 
 When towards the end of the year B.C. 44, Marc 
 Antony, before the expiration of his consulship, left 
 Rome for Gallia Cisalpina with the object of expelling
 
 CHAP. XV. 151 
 
 from the governorship of that Province Decimus Brutus, 
 who had been confirmed in his appointment originally- 
 made by Caesar himself, Octavianus put himself and 
 his veterans at the disposal of the Senate to lend a 
 hand in putting down Antony. 
 
 Invested with the rank of praetor, and acting in 
 concert with the consuls of the year, Aulus Hirtius and 
 Vibius Pansa, Octavianus in the spring of B.C. 43 marched 
 at the head of his veterans into Gallia Cisalpina, where 
 Marc Antony was laying siege to Mutina (Modena), 
 within the defences of which ancient fortress Decimus 
 Brutus had taken refuge. 
 
 Although the fighting in the neighbourhood of 
 Mutina resulted in the total defeat of Antony and the 
 consequent relief of Brutus, both consuls by some un- 
 fortunate fatality lost their lives in the operations. As 
 their deaths occurred most opportunely for Octavianus, 
 who was known to have coveted the consulship, some 
 suspicion of connivance at their deaths fell upon their 
 youthful associate. When Octavianus subsequently de- 
 clined to join Decimus Brutus in a vigorous pursuit of 
 Antony, it soon became evident that he had a game 
 of his own to play, which was not that of Cicero and the 
 Senate. 
 
 The correspondence of Cicero' with the three generals 
 commanding in the three Gallic provinces at the moment 
 of Antony's defeat enables us to follow step by step the 
 events there enacted, which led directly up to the over- 
 throw of the republic. It is a bit of history, which only 
 the light of local colouring can bring into full relief 
 
 Of the three generals ostensibly commanding for the 
 Senate in the Gauls, Decimus Brutus in Gallia Cisalpina, 
 Lucius Munatius Plancus in Gallia Ulterior, and Aemilius 
 Lepidus in Provincia Narbonensis, only the first was a 
 genuine republican. The other two, Plancus and Lepidus, 
 were political trimmers, without any fixed principles, 
 and only bent on finding themselves on the winning 
 
 ' Epist. ad Fam. x, y.\, passim.
 
 152 THE YEAR AFTER CAESAR'S DEATH. 
 
 side. Both however in their letters made strong pro- 
 fessions of their devotion to Cicero and the republic. 
 It would appear that Cicero was deceived by them both, 
 while Decimus Brutus, who distrusted Lepidus from the 
 beginning, continued to believe in the loyalty of Plancus 
 to the last. 
 
 Such were the men, on whose decision the future 
 of the republic depended at this important crisis. 
 
 Octavianus in the meanwhile kept in the back- 
 ground, intriguing all round, and displaying even at 
 that age — he was not yet turned 20 — the remarkable 
 sagacity, for which he was distinguished during his whole 
 career. 
 
 The first letter in the series, which sets forth the 
 situation after the defeat and flight of Antony from 
 Modena, is one addressed to Cicero by Decimus Brutus, 
 from the camp Dertona, May 5, B.C. 43. 
 
 If the reader will take the trouble to glance at the 
 Map of the Riviera at the beginning of the volume, he 
 will observe that Dertona (Tortona) whence the letter is 
 dated is situated at the junction of two Roman roads — 
 the Via Postumia leading to Genoa, and the Via Aemilia 
 Scauri leading to Savona. Having two days' start of 
 Brutus, Antony had just passed through Dertona on his 
 flight from Modena through Placentia to Vada Sabata. 
 
 " I want you to know where that place is," writes 
 Decimus Brutus to Cicero ; "It lies at the point of 
 junction of the Alps and Apennines* and in a most 
 difficult line of country to march through." 
 
 When in B.C. 109, Aemilius Scaurus, the Censor, 
 carried the Etrurian coast-road known as Via Aurelia 
 onwards through Pisae and Luna^ under the name 
 called from himself ' Aemilia,' he made Vada Sabata its 
 terminus on the coast, though he continued it inland 
 across the Apennines to Dertona. 
 
 1 I have given my reasons in a former chapter for placing the junction 
 of the Alps and Apennines elsewhere. 
 * Strabo, p. ■217.
 
 CHAP. XV. 153 
 
 The pass over the Apennines behind Vada (Savona) 
 being the lowest to be met with along the entire Riviera, 
 the Romans adopted it in preference to that by way 
 of Genoa, as the main thoroughfare of their communi- 
 cations between Gallia Cisalpina and Liguria. They 
 established a Castra Stativa there, which remained their 
 headquarters on the coast till the time of Augustus. 
 
 It was by this pass and this road that Antony had 
 outstripped his pursuers in reaching the coast at Vada, 
 where he was joined by his lieutenant Ventidius with 
 the seventh, eighth and ninth Legions, and by his 
 brother Lucius Antonius, with a force of five thousand 
 cavalry, which had escaped with its entire strength from 
 before Modena. 
 
 Dertona, whence the letter of Decimus Brutus is 
 dated, is described by Strabo as " a considerable city 
 {d^i6\o<yo<;), lying half-way between Genoa and Pla- 
 centia." The Roman city, at the foot of which the 
 modern Tortona stretches out, was built on heights, 
 forming spurs of the Apennines thrown out towards the 
 Po. It was a strategic position of great importance, 
 being the first of a succession of natural fortresses, 
 thrown out en echelon as if to defend the approaches to 
 Placentia from the west. 
 
 Between Vada Sabata and Dertona it is still possible 
 to come upon some traces of the inland prolongation of 
 the Via Aemilia Scauri. As no local information is to 
 be got, and the guide books are absolutely silent on the 
 subject, I will endeavour to supply sufficient data to 
 guide the steps of any future traveller who may be 
 tempted to explore the region. 
 
 Driving from Savona ' through its western suburb to 
 Vado, where the tradition of the Roman camp survives 
 in the name Quintana, still retained by one of its streets, 
 you cross the plain to the village of Ouiliano, where 
 at the foot of the hills the carriage road ends, and a 
 
 ' Savona, where fair accommodation is afforded at the Albergo Srizzera, 
 will be found the most convenient headquarters for exploring the region.
 
 154 THE YEAR AFTER CAESAR'S DEATH. 
 
 rough track continues up the valley in a north-easterly- 
 direction. 
 
 Induced by a preliminary study of the Itinerary of 
 Antonine and the Table of Peutinger to strike the 
 Apennines at Quiliano, I was encouraged to proceed by 
 the easiness of the ascent, and the report that I should 
 shortly come upon traces of three bridges. 
 
 In less than an hour, I had encountered the first 
 of the trio. I was however totally unable to judge of 
 its age as it had lately received a thick coating of 
 plaster. Crossing it, I mounted the zig-zags, by which 
 the track is carried onwards up steep and grassy slopes 
 to a higher level, where I was confronted by bridge No. 2 
 of unmistakeably Roman construction. Although a 
 mere footpath leads up to either end of the bridge, there 
 is a 9 ft. wide roadway still well preserved on the bridge 
 itself. I have no doubt that this determines the passage 
 of the Via Aemilia Scauri. 
 
 About half-an-hour further up, the valley divides into 
 two branches, the left hand one having been followed 
 by the Roman road, as is proved by the ruins of bridge 
 No. 3, the massive concrete piers and arches of which 
 have alike collapsed and block up the narrow bed of the 
 stream. 
 
 The whole distance from Quiliano at the foot of the 
 Pass to the village of Cadibona on the summit may be 
 accomplished in less than three hours, giving time for 
 examination of the bridges. As Cadibona is on the 
 high road from Savona, a carriage may be sent on 
 to await the traveller there. On the south side of the 
 Apennines I know of nothing but the remains of these 
 bridges to declare the former passage of the Via Aemilia 
 Scauri. On the north side however, between the modern 
 Acqui (Aquae Statiellae) and Tortona, I followed the 
 road itself for at least two miles continuously in the 
 territory of the Commune of Sezze. 
 
 Under the name of ' Via Levata ' (raised road) it 
 crops up in the plain between the rivers Bormida and
 
 o- 
 
 O 
 
 1 o 
 
 
 {To face p. 154
 
 CHAP. XV. 155 
 
 Orba and is carried in a straight line through the crops. 
 Although its crown is uniformly 9 ft. wide and its base 
 a foot or two wider, it appears to be entirely disused 
 and leads nowhere, ending abruptly in a cornfield. I 
 could however distinctly trace the line of its onward 
 course through the standing corn up to the bank of the 
 River Orba, where there is no longer a bridge to carr}^ 
 it over. 
 
 There is no sign of pavement left anywhere along 
 the road, which consists of loose stones and gravel, 
 resting on what has proved a practically indestructible 
 substratum of concrete. 
 
 There is a commodious and clean Inn at the village 
 of Sezze, which is a convenient centre for visiting the 
 battlefield of Marengo, as well as exploring what remains 
 of the Via Aemilia Scauri. 
 
 The ' Sindaco ' and the Schoolmaster at Sezze are 
 both obliging and enlightened guides to the honours 
 of the place, and will readily point out the course of the 
 ' Via Levata ' through the communal territory.
 
 CHAPTER XVI. 
 
 Meeting of Antony and Lepidus on the 
 River Argens. 
 
 I HAVE explained in the preceding Chapter that 
 Vada Sabata, where Marc Antony made a brief halt 
 in the permanent camp, was at that time the termi- 
 nal coast station and inland turning point of the Via 
 Aemilia Scauri. It was his last chance of procuring 
 supplies from a Roman base, on the Italian side of the 
 Maritime Alps, which had never yet been scaled by a 
 Roman army. 
 
 But no ordinary depot could have nearly sufficed to 
 meet the extraordinary call now made upon it. Not 
 only had the motley and disorderly crowd now gathered 
 around Antony, consisting of demoralized legionaries, 
 jail-birds and casuals pressed into the ranks during his 
 flight from Modena to the coast, to be provided for, but 
 the three fresh legions brought in by Ventidius and the 
 body of 5,000 cavalry by L. Antonius. 
 
 If Antony could have reckoned on being joined by 
 the legions which Ventidius Bassus his able legate had 
 recruited amongst Caesar's veterans and his native 
 Picenates and brought unexpectedly from the shores 
 of the Adriatic into Liguria, he would have been less 
 eager to fill up the ranks of his own legions with such 
 worthless material. At Vada Antony found himself 
 once more at the head of a considerable force, but not 
 of strength sufficient to turn round and face Decimus 
 Brutus, who had arrived at Acqui with 7 legions in 
 pursuit of him.
 
 CHAP. XVI. 157 
 
 There was nothing for it then but to continue his 
 flight into Gallia Narbonensis, across the Maritime 
 Alps and the hardly less formidable Esterel mountains 
 lying between the Alps and Forum Julii, 
 
 If he could but once reach the Roman Province, 
 Antony fully reckoned on bringing over to his side his 
 old associate Lepidus. 
 
 But to attempt to carry an unprovided force of 
 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry for about 100 miles 
 first along an arid strip of coast, presenting a succession 
 of precipitous headlands, and then over a double range 
 of mountains destitute of food or water-supply, was a 
 task which only a general in desperate circumstances 
 would have undertaken. 
 
 Both Pompey and Caesar, when it became necessary 
 to march armies into Gaul over the Alps, deliberately 
 avoided the coast-road. 
 
 How Antony and his followers paid desperately for 
 their temerity we read in Plutarch's life ^ of him : — 
 
 " Antony, in his flight, was overtaken by distresses of 
 every kind, and the worst of all of them was famine. 
 But it was his character in calamities to be better than 
 at any other time. Antony, in misfortune, was most 
 nearly a virtuous man. It is common enough for 
 people, when they fall into great disasters, to discern 
 what is right, and what they ought to do ; but there are 
 but few who in such extremities have the strength to 
 obey their judgment, either in doing what it approves 
 or avoiding what it condemns ; and a good many are 
 so weak as to give way to their habits all the more, 
 and are incapable of using their minds. Antony, on 
 this occasion, was a most wonderful example to his 
 soldiers. He, who had just quitted so much luxury 
 and sumptuous living, made no difficulty now of drink- 
 ing foul water and feeding on wild fruits and roots. 
 Nay, it is related they ate the very bark of trees, and, 
 
 ^ The extract is from Clough's Edition (Nimmo, 1893).
 
 158 MEETING OF ANTONY AND LEPIDUS. 
 
 in passing over the Alps, lived upon creatures that no 
 one before had ever been willing to touch." 
 
 That any of the troops which followed Antony and 
 his legate Ventidius Bassus along the Riviera and across 
 the Alps should have survived the terrible ordeal, is 
 harder to understand than that many of them perished 
 in the attempt. For of those who safely achieved the 
 passage of the Alps many must have succumbed, ex- 
 hausted in the deep gorges of the Esterel, choked as 
 they are with the impenetrable thicket for which that 
 range has always been remarkable. To what extent 
 the passage of the Esterel may have been facilitated 
 by the existence of the road, which the Massiliots were 
 under obligation to construct along the shore, we have 
 no means of judging. 
 
 That no classical writer should as much as even 
 mention the name of the Esterel may be taken as a 
 proof 'that as a rule the Romans gave it a wide berth. 
 The name Esterel is said to be derived from "Sueltri" — 
 a Ligurian tribe marked in the Table of Peutinger 
 above Forum Julii. As I have reminded the reader 
 more than once, Roman armies were in the habit of 
 reaching Forum Julii by sea. But Antony was entirely 
 without ships to carry him even from Monaco, where 
 Roman armies sometimes embarked for Gaul and 
 Spain, after marching so far, as we know that the 
 unfortunate Consul C. Hostilius Mancinus did^ 
 
 The starving and draggled condition of Antony and 
 his followers, as they emerged into the open from the 
 tangled thickets of the Esterel and presented themselves 
 like so many scarecrows at the gates of Forum Julii, can 
 be more readily imagined than described. 
 
 The date of Antony's arrival at Forum Julii is fixed 
 by a letter from L. Munatius Plancus to Cicero written 
 in the latter half of May B.C. 43, from the neighbourhood 
 of Grenoble : — 
 
 " Antony with the first division of his army reached 
 
 1 Val. Max. I. 6, 7.
 
 
 
 To face p. 159]
 
 CHAP. XVI. 159 
 
 Forum Julii on May 15. Ventidius is within 2 days' 
 march of him. Lepidus is encamped at Forum Voconii, 
 a place which is 24 miles from Forum Julii\" 
 
 A letter from Lepidus himself to Cicero, dated : — 
 
 In camp at the Bridge of the Argens May 22, B.C. 43. 
 
 (In castris ad Pontem Argenteum XI. Kal. Jun. — 
 A.V.C. 711) M. Lepidus Imp. Iter. Pont. Max. S. D. 
 M. Tullio Ciceroni ^ 
 
 " As soon as I heard that Antony, having sent ahead 
 his brother Lucius with part of his cavalry, was making 
 for my province with his army, I broke up my camp at 
 the confluence of the Rhone and Durance and advanced 
 to meet him. Marching without intermission, I came 
 to Forum Voconii, and pitched my camp beyond on 
 the banks of the Argens, opposite that of Antony. 
 Ventidius has joined him with 3 legions... He has a 
 large force of cavalry, which is intact, not having been 
 engaged. It is at least 5,000 strong. As far as this 
 war is concerned, I shall not be found wanting either to 
 the Senate, or the Republic." 
 
 A fortnight's rest in the fertile plain of Frejus 
 worked a marvellous change in the appearance and 
 condition of the troops, the cavalry finding abundance 
 of the forage for which the place is still noted. With 
 ranks replenished and fitted out afresh the army of 
 Antony and Ventidius proceeded to march up the 
 valley of the Argens to its meeting with Lepidus. It 
 is hardly too much to say, that on the result of that 
 meeting depended the fate of the Roman Republic. 
 
 Although Plutarch represents Antony as approach- 
 ing Lepidus in the garb of a suppliant, with long and 
 disordered hair and beard unshaved since his defeat, it 
 seems highly improbable that so haughty a character 
 as Antony would have condescended to adopt such an 
 
 ' Cicero, Ad Fam. x. 17. 
 
 ■•^ Cicero, Ad Fam. X. 34. The bridge over the Argens is within one 
 mile of the station Les Arcs, where all the expresses stop between Toulon 
 and Cannes.
 
 l60 MEETING OF ANTONY AND LEPIDUS. 
 
 attitude in the presence of one so immeasurably his 
 inferior as Lepidus. It appears indeed morally certain 
 that from the first there was a complete understanding 
 in both armies that there was to be no fighting. For 
 even supposing that Lepidus had attempted to redeem 
 the pledge he had given to Cicero that he would stand 
 by the Senate and the Republic, it is almost certain that 
 he could not have carried his army with him. 
 
 For the feeling in favour of Caesarism was almost as 
 universal in the Roman army at this period as it was in 
 the French army, when Napoleon appealed to it on his 
 escape from Elba in 1815. Perhaps the only convinced 
 republican in the camp of Lepidus was the Senator 
 Laterensis, who was the accredited representative of the 
 Senate and who took his own life at the Pons Argenteus 
 rather than survive what he considered an act of base 
 treachery. His was indeed the only drop of blood which 
 tinged the limpid waters of the Argens. 
 
 Meanwhile L. Munatius Plancus, who had been 
 hovering with his army among the spurs of the Basses 
 Alps and had approached within two days' march of 
 Forum Voconii (or Vocontii as it is sometimes written), 
 on hearing of the understanding between Antony and 
 Lepidus thought it prudent to return to Grenoble to 
 await the further turn of events. For it was clear that un- 
 til Octavianus had definitely declared himself, it would be 
 risky to take a side. He had besides to reckon with the 
 determined attitude of Decimus Brutus, who lay with his 
 army of seven legions at Eporedia (Ivree) at the foot of 
 the Little St Bernard, ready at any moment to cross the 
 Alps and hold him true to his pledge to the Republic. 
 
 It was not long however before it became clear to 
 Munatius Plancus that it would be agreeable to Octavi- 
 anus that he should abandon Cicero and the senatorial 
 party, and throw in his lot definitely with that of Antony 
 and Lepidus. He accordingly joined his forces to theirs. 
 
 For in the month of August, B.C. 43, Octavianus, 
 having got himself elected Consul with Quintus Pedius,
 
 CHAP. XVI. i6r 
 
 for his colleague, succeeded in passing a law styled ' Lex 
 Pedia,' which declared all the murderers of his uncle 
 Julius Caesar to be outlaws. 
 
 Amongst these was Decimus Brutus, whose position 
 in Gallia Cisalpina now became desperate. For the 
 combined armies of Antony Lepidus and Plancus 
 threatened to bear down upon him from Gaul beyond 
 the Alps, while Octavianus, who was commissioned to 
 put the ' Lex Pedia ' into execution, was marching 
 towards the Po valley from the South. 
 
 Worse than all, he could no longer rely on the loyalty 
 of the majority of his legions. There was nothing then 
 left for Decimus Brutus but to make an attempt to join 
 his fellow outlaw Marcus Brutus in Macedonia. He was 
 however waylaid at Aquileia at the foot of the Julian 
 Alps, and put to death by order of Antony. 
 
 Meanwhile, the decrees which had been passed by 
 the Senate acting under the influence of Cicero earlier 
 in the year declaring Antony and Lepidus enemies of 
 their country had been duly repealed before Octavianus 
 effected his junction with them at Bononia. 
 
 It was on an island in the river now called the 
 Reno, which flows into the Po beyond Bologna, that 
 the meeting took place, which resulted in the appoint- 
 ment of C. Caesar (Octavianus), M. Antonius, and M. 
 Lepidus as a Triumvirate for regulating the affairs of 
 the Republic for a period of five years (Reipublicae 
 constituendae per quinquennium). 
 
 It is notorious that the first act of this body was to 
 agree upon a list of victims, each of the Triumvirs besides 
 handing over their respective enemies to the executioner 
 obliging their colleagues by the sacrifice of some personal 
 friend or relative. 
 
 Cicero, who had been the mouth-piece of the Senate 
 and by the recent delivery of his Philippics had rendered 
 himself especially obnoxious to the vindictiveness of 
 Antony, was amongst the first to pay the death penalty. 
 
 The head of the illustrious orator and his right hand 
 II. 1 1
 
 l62 MEETING OF ANTONY AND LEPIDUS. 
 
 were severed from his body by orders of Antony, and 
 affixed to the Rostra, the scene of so many of his former 
 triumphs. It is related that Fulvia the wife of Antony 
 ran a gold pin through the dead orator's tongue. 
 
 In the apportionment of their respective spheres of 
 government amongst the Triumvirs, Gaul was assigned 
 to Antony, as one of his provinces. He does not how- 
 ever appear to have ever resided there, preferring the 
 charms of Cleopatra and the luxuries of an Oriental 
 life. 
 
 It was reserved for Augustus, after the defeat of his 
 rival at the battle off Actium B.C. 31, to organize finally 
 the administration of the Gallic provinces. 
 
 While Lyons (Lugdunum) became the Roman capital 
 of Gallia Comata, the Provincia Narbonensis was ad- 
 ministered separately from the rest of Gaul, at first by 
 Augustus and afterwards by the Senate. 
 
 It was never Gallic at heart, the Provincials having 
 shown more sympathy with the rebellion of Sertorius in 
 Iberia than with that of Vercingetorix in Gaul. It was 
 at Lugdunum that the representatives of the 6o'civitates' 
 of Gallia Comata met, under the presidency of an elected 
 High Priest, to worship at the famous altar of Augustus 
 and Rome, which competed successfully with Druidism. 
 
 The colossal monument erected in honour of Augustus 
 at Turbia commemorates his final victory over the 
 Alpine tribes (B.C. 12), and the opening up of a safe 
 road to traders over the Maritime Alps, which, as so 
 recently conquered, were placed under the orders of a 
 Prefect, directly appointed by the Emperor.
 
 CHAPTER XVII. 
 
 Via Aurelia. 
 
 Section i : Aurelia proper. Section 2 : Aemilia Scauri. 
 
 " Via Aurelia. A Roma per Tusciam et Alpes 
 Maritimas Arelatum usque M. P.' DCCXCVII." 
 
 Such is the title of the Road following for the most 
 part the shore of the Mediterranean, from Rome to 
 Aries, which is found in the Itinerary of Antonine — the 
 sole official document known to us which contains a 
 complete list of the names of the main roads of the 
 Roman Empire. 
 
 While the Itinerary of Antonine is in the shape of a 
 small volume giving the names of the roads, and of the 
 Post Stations, with the distances between each, the 
 Table of Peutinger takes the form of a map, dispro- 
 portionately compressed from North to South, and 
 elongated from East to West to suit the greater ex- 
 tension of the Roman Empire in that direction. The 
 specimen of one of the twelve sections of the Table of 
 Peutinger shown at the end of the volume will give the 
 reader an idea of its quaint archaic character. 
 
 I do not propose here to go at any length into the 
 question of the origin and authenticity of the two above- 
 named documents, which, together with the mile-stones 
 which remain, constitute the main source of our infor- 
 mation on the subject of Roman Roads. I shall confine 
 
 ' The Roman mile was about loo yards shorter than the English, 
 measuring 1666 yards. It consisted of 1000 paces — the Roman "passus" 
 being 5 ft., i.e. the space from the raising up to the setting down of the 
 right foot. 
 
 II — 2
 
 164 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 myself to giving the general conclusions arrived at, 
 namely that both documents are of a post-Constantine 
 age, probably executed during the reign of Theodosius 
 the Great, though based upon fragments of earlier geo- 
 graphical attempts to depict the Roman world. 
 
 The existence of the name Constantinopolis and 
 some others having Christian associations, found in both 
 documents, may be accepted as sufficient proof that they 
 were at all events corrected up to a date, when the 
 Roman world had become Christian. 
 
 While the originals of the Itinerary of Antonine and 
 the Table of Peutinger are entirely lost, they are only 
 known to us in careless and corrupt copies of a com- 
 paratively late age. Although these copies corroborate 
 each other in the main, marked discrepancies are often 
 found in the distances given by the two documents 
 between the same Stations on the same roads. 
 
 While the Itinerary of Antonine limits itself to an 
 enumeration of the main roads, the Table of Peutinger 
 gives besides branches and short cuts (compendia) not 
 to be found in the former document. And this especially 
 applies to the case of the Via Aurelia, the course of 
 which as given in both documents I now propose to 
 consider in some detail. Having devoted portions of 
 ten or more winters to the exploration of the road itself, 
 wherever it can still be traced between Vada Volaterrana 
 and Aries — a distance of about 400 miles — and having 
 besides carefully collected whatever rays of light can be 
 thrown upon the subject by classical and modern writers, 
 I hope I shall not exhaust the patience of my readers 
 by dwelling on it here at some length. 
 
 For the Via Aurelia will be found to form a conve- 
 nient and interesting thread for the traveller to follow 
 up for the whole length of his journey from Aries to 
 Rome or vice versa. In its Roman and international 
 character, the Via Aurelia recognizes no frontiers, and 
 connects the French and Italian Rivieras by an indis- 
 soluble bond.
 
 CHAP. XVII. 165 
 
 Numerous as are the treatises dealing with the various 
 sections of the Via AureHa, there is not a single one in 
 any language, which treats of it at all adequately as a 
 whole. Even Mommsen has dealt with it in a fragmen- 
 tary way. For although everything that is known about 
 it is to be found in his monumental work, the Corpus 
 Inscriptioniun Latinartim, the references to the Via 
 Aurelia are scattered over three separate volumes of 
 about 1000 pages each, and sometimes occur under most 
 unexpected headings, such for instance as Clastidium, 
 Vol. V. Part 2, p. 828. To unearth them and piece them 
 together is no light task. 
 
 In his Provence Maritime and its English transla- 
 tion The Riviera^ Ancient and Modern^ the pages of M. 
 Lentheric abound in references to the section of the Via 
 Aurelia which lies through French territory, while its 
 onward course along the Italian Riviera is almost en- 
 tirely ignored. But, even within that limited area, where 
 at all events he ought to be at home, M. Lentheric has 
 fallen into the unaccountable error of attributing the 
 authorship of this section to an Aurelius Cotta, who was 
 consul B.C. II 9^ For the name of the Via Aurelia is 
 unquestionably derived from a much earlier Aurelius — 
 in all probability the Aurelius Cotta, who was censor 
 B.C. 241. There is however unfortunately no classical 
 text to cite as positive proof of this fact, which has been 
 accepted since the time of Bergier, whose great work, 
 Les grands CJieniins de V Empire Romain, was published 
 nearly three centuries ago. 
 
 Passing out of Rome through the Porta Aurelia, the 
 original section of the Via Aurelia was carried through 
 Forum Aurelii, as far as Vada Volaterrana on the Etru- 
 rian coast — the port of the famous fortress Volaterrae, 
 which itself crowns a lofty ridge, at least 20 miles inland. 
 
 The explanation of the Roman road being called 
 Aurelia in Provence is to be found in the fact that the 
 name AureHa, under which the coast road started from 
 
 1 Riviera, Ancient and Modem, p. 12.
 
 1 66 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 Rome and which was confined originally to its first 
 section, was subsequently transferred to the whole length 
 of the road from Rome to Aries. In our own day on 
 the same principle main lines of railway swallow up the 
 subsidiary names, under which their successive sections 
 were known at first. 
 
 It was then a quite gratuitous mistake on the part of 
 M. Lentheric to press into his service a later Aurelius, 
 who had nothing whatever to do with Provence or road- 
 making. The first road-maker there, as I have explained 
 above, was Domitius Ahenobarbus, and the original 
 name of the Provengal section of the Via Aurelia was 
 " Via Domitia." 
 
 Hirschfeld, however, the author of Vol. XII. of the 
 Corpus Inscriptiomnn Latinariim, which deals with Gallia 
 Narbonensis, declines to apply the name " Aurelia " to 
 the section in question at any period of its existence, in 
 spite of the fact that the Provencal name " lou camin 
 Ourelian " has been applied to it by the peasantry from 
 time immemorial \ I venture however to differ from 
 that ver>' high authority. For, in my judgment formed 
 after much intercourse with the natives in all parts of 
 Provence, the Roman roads which connect Frejus with 
 Aix by a single line, and Aix with Aries, by two 
 branches, forming a loop passing through Marseilles and 
 Salon respectively, are both entitled to the use of the 
 name " Aurelia." I base my opinion on long established 
 usage, corroborated by the mention of the name in the 
 Itinerary of Antonine. 
 
 Although the two quarto volumes of Nicholas Bergier 
 of Rheims are full of erudition conveyed in a delightful 
 form on the construction and administration of Roman 
 roads in general, they unfortunately contain little direct 
 information about any particular road. All that we get 
 from Bergier in addition to the statement that Aurelius 
 Cotta (censor B.C. 241) "donna son nom et son com- 
 mencement " to the Via Aurelia is the quaint but not 
 
 1 C. /. Z., Vol. XII. p. 634.
 
 CHAP. XVII. 167 
 
 very instructive observation " Ce n'est pas toutefois, 
 qu'Aurelius, qui lui a donne son commencement, I'ait 
 conduite jusqu'a Aries. II a este continue par plusieurs 
 d'autres jusqu'a dedans la Gaule Narbonnaise sans perdre 
 son tioin." 
 
 So far from it being a fact that the coast road was 
 carried onwards to Aries without ever losing its original 
 name "Aurelia," we have the well known and undisputed 
 text of Strabo^ to prove that on its first continuation 
 through Pisae into Liguria the road was called " Aemilia," 
 after Aemilius Scaurus, the author of its prolongation to 
 Vada Sabata*. 
 
 That Strabo should have omitted to mention the 
 name of the exact point, whence Aemilius Scaurus 
 carried his road forward, is most unfortunate. We have 
 however the authority of Mommsen for fixing it at 
 Volaterrae, by which he means of course Vada Vola- 
 terrana. For it is impossible to believe that the coast 
 road would have been carried up hill 20 miles out of its 
 way. In Vol. V. part i, of the Corpus Inscriptiomivi 
 LatinaTUvi, we read at p. 885 : "a Volaterris, ubi finem 
 Aureliae caputque Aemiliae fuisse crediderim." 
 
 A Roman milestone, which I saw myself in the 
 present year (1898) in the Campo Santo at Pisa, bears 
 in clearly cut letters of the best period the name 
 
 VIA AEMILIA 
 
 A Roma M. P. CLXXXVIII. 
 proving that the coast road, at a date not specified on 
 it, bore the name Aemilia at the distance of 188 miles 
 from Rome. As Vada Volaterrana is about 175 miles 
 from Rome the coast road may have borne the name 
 " Aurelia " up to that point, becoming Aemilia beyond it. 
 For when we come to consider the Julia Augusta 
 section of the coast road, we shall find that the mile- 
 stones bearing its name are marked at the same time 
 
 ^ Strabo, p. ■217, " 6 2KaO/)os...6 koX rr\v AifiiXlav oSbv (rrpwcros 5(d Hktuiv 
 Kal Aovvrji fJiixP'- 2a/3arwi' Kavrevdev oia. A^pOdivos."
 
 l68 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 with the total of the distance from the capital, notwith- 
 standing that the road changed its name twice in its 
 continuation to Rome over the Via Aemilia Lepidi and 
 the Via Flaminia. 
 
 That the coast road bore the name of Aurelia for a 
 considerable distance from Rome is proved by the men- 
 tion of it in the Xllth Philippic', where Cicero refers to 
 it, when declining the proposal that he should repair to 
 Mutina as one of the envoys to treat with Antony when 
 he was laying siege to that place. 
 
 "Tres viae sunt ad Mutinam....A supero mari Flam- 
 mia, ab infero Aurelia, media Cassia." 
 
 Further proof of the extension of the Via Aurelia is 
 given by a passage in the life of the Emperor Aurelian 
 by Vopiscus. " Etruriae per Aureliam usque ad Alpes 
 maritimas ingentes agri sunt." This text alone seems to 
 prove that the name Aurelia was applied to the coast 
 road up to the Maritime Alps in the reign of the 
 Emperor Aurelian, A.D. 270 — 275. 
 
 Section No. 2 or Via Aemilia Scauri section of the 
 coast road was about 165 Roman miles in length, its 
 important stations being Pisa, Luna, and Genoa, the 
 last of which is unaccountably omitted by Strabo. 
 From Luna it was carried some considerable distance 
 inland up the valley of the Magra to avoid the precipitous 
 coast between Spezia and Moneglia, where (as I explained 
 in Chap. VI) it was again brought down to the shore. 
 In its onward course through Sestri Levante to Genoa, 
 it sometimes followed the coast, at others kept a mile or 
 two inland. Traces are to be found of its passage at 
 Riva, where the remains of Roman brickwork may be 
 seen on the edge of the stream about 300 yards from its 
 mouth. 
 
 Between Rapallo and Ruta the Strada Romana, 
 under which name alone it is known to the natives, may 
 still be followed for an unbroken stretch of three or four 
 miles. It is paved throughout and forms an inland short- 
 
 1 XII. 9.
 
 CHAP. XVII. 169 
 
 cut and pleasant alternative to following the windings of 
 the modern high road. 
 
 The Strada Romana is hardly ever practicable for 
 wheeled traffic, being often very steep and slippery, after 
 the manner of Roman roads. It offers the great advan- 
 tage of being cool, moist and shady at all times, and is 
 in strong contrast to the dusty high road, which however 
 commands wider views. The road is the usual width of 
 Roman roads, the pavement measuring about 8 ft., being 
 the regulation width laid down by an ancient law of the 
 Twelve Tables. 
 
 I am disposed to believe that much of the pavement 
 which consists of pebbles laid edgeways is Roman. For 
 the large polygonal blocks, with which the roads were 
 paved in towns, were seldom or never used for country 
 roads. 
 
 In the Communes of Quinto and Quarto, formerly 
 Roman Stations, five and four miles respectively 
 distant from Genoa, the thread of the Strada Romana 
 can be picked up again and followed for at least half- 
 an-hour's most interesting walk. Here again it lies 
 inland from the dusty or muddy (as the case may be) 
 but always noisy high road, which follows the shore. 
 
 In the Commune of Quarto, the Strada Romana is 
 carried over the river Stura by a bridge mainly of Roman 
 construction, the pebbled road being 10 ft. wide in the 
 centre of the bridge. Immediately beyond the bridge, 
 the road winds up the steep and rocky slope to gain the 
 high ground, over which Genoa extends. 
 
 Between Genoa and Vada Sabata (now Vado, a 
 suburb of Savona) no further trace of the Via Aemilia 
 Scauri is to be found along the coast, so far as I am 
 aware. I have already treated of its inland continuation 
 to Dertona. 
 
 It remains for me to explain in the next chapter the 
 course of the Via Julia Augusta, constructed by Augus- 
 tus B.C. 12 to fill up the gap on the coast between Vada 
 Sabata and the Var, which was still without a regular 
 Roman road, and unprovided with post stations.
 
 CHAPTER XVIII. 
 
 Via Aurelia. 
 
 Section 3 : Julia Augusta. 
 
 The construction by Augustus B.C. 12 of the Via 
 Julia Augusta between Vada Sabata and the Var 
 (about 93 miles in length) served at the same time to 
 prolong both the inland Trans-Apennine section of the 
 Via Aemilia Scauri and its coast section (afterwards Via 
 Aurelia) to the Var. 
 
 The section of the Julia Augusta between Vada and 
 the Var was therefore the only portion of that road 
 which Augustus had to make entirely new. For the 
 rest of its course between Placentia (the Trebia) and 
 Vada Sabata he had only to improve parts of two roads 
 previously existing. The entire course of the Via Julia 
 Augusta was thus made up : 
 
 Roman 
 
 miles. 
 
 (i) Part of the Via Postumia repaired 
 
 from Placentia to Dertona . 52 
 
 (2) Part of the Via Aemilia Scauri re- 
 
 paired from Dertona to Vada . 79 
 
 (3) Section of the Via Julia Augusta 
 
 made new from Vada to the 
 Var 93 
 
 224 
 
 The course of the Via Julia Augusta is fortunately 
 determined for us by the inscription on one of its mile-
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 171 
 
 Stones found in the Valley of Laghet, one mile to the 
 westward of the monument of Turbia. It is identical 
 with the Via Aurelia in its course along the coast, 
 between Vada and the Var, and only dropped its original 
 name — Julia Augusta — when it became absorbed by the 
 Aurelia of the Antonine Itinerary, as was the case with 
 the Via Aemilia to the east of it, and the Via Domitia 
 to the west. 
 
 In making two distinct roads of the Aurelia and 
 Julia Augusta, M. Lentheric is undoubtedly wrong. 
 Had he taken the trouble to study the Corpus Inscrip- 
 tionuDi Latinaruni or the inscriptions on the numerous 
 milestones to which he vaguely alludes as found in the 
 territory of Nice\ he would have avoided the error into 
 which he has fallen of prefixing to his Riviera, Ancient 
 and Modern a map showing the Via Julia Augusta 
 branching from the Aurelia at Turbia and leading from 
 Vence to Frejus by Auribeau. When Augustus carried 
 his Via Julia Augusta over the Alps at Turbia, there was 
 no Via Aurelia to branch off from, nor at any later 
 period, as there never was but one Roman road there at 
 any time. For the later Roman road to Vence (Vintium) 
 branched off the Aurelia at Antibes. 
 
 The milestone which decisively determines the direc- 
 tion of the Via Julia Augusta is one of the three with 
 which the visitor is confronted immediately on entering 
 the Municipal Library at Nice. It is numbered 8,102, 
 and is entered, Vol. V. Pt. 2, p. 955 of the Corpus Inscrip- 
 tionuin Latinaruni^ amongst the 26 milestones therein 
 numbered from 8083 to 8109 inclusive as belonging to 
 the Via Julia Augusta. That road is described by 
 Mommsen as leading 
 
 "Placentia Vada, Vadis ad Varum," i.e. from Placentia 
 (synonymous with the river Trebia, there forming its 
 
 ^ Riviera, Ancient and Modern, p. 24. 
 
 - Vol. V. in two parts can be inspected at the Municipal Library.
 
 172 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 junction with the Po) to Vada (Sabata) and from Vada 
 to the Var. The inscription runs : 
 
 ccxVI 
 
 IMP. CAESAR. DIVI 
 
 TRAJANI PARTHICI FILIUS 
 
 DIVI NERVAE N. TRAJA- 
 
 -NUS HADRIANUS AUG 
 
 PONT. MAX. TRIE. POTEST. IX 
 
 COS. Ill VIAM JULIAM 
 
 AUG. A FLU MINE TREE 
 
 BIA, QUAE VETUSTATE 
 
 INTERCIDERAT, SUA 
 
 PECUNIA RESTITUIT 
 
 DCV. 
 
 The number ccxVI, at the top, gives the distance of 
 that milestone from the ' Trebbia,' while that at the 
 bottom, DCV, shows the total mileage from Rome by 
 the circuitous route via Placentia and Rimini, the Julia 
 Augusta having, so to speak, running powers onwards 
 to Rome, over the Via Aemilia Lepidi and the Via 
 Flaminia. The smaller letters in the number ccxVI are 
 not decipherable in the original inscription, but Momm- 
 sen has supplied them on the convincing ground that 
 another milestone (No. 8095), which stood four miles 
 nearer the Trebbia, is found inscribed CCXII at the top 
 and DC I at the bottom. 
 
 In Vol. V. Part 2, p. 828, Mommsen gives the 
 following table of the composition of the inland 
 circuitous route from Rome to the Var, which Augustus 
 adopted in preference to the coast road, in spite of its 
 being about 200 miles longer : 
 
 Julia 
 Augusta 
 
 Via Flaminia. Roma Ariminum m. p. c. CCXXI 
 
 ,, Aemilia Lepidi. Arimino Placentiam ,, CLXVIII 
 
 Postumia. Placentia Dertonam ,, LII 
 
 Aemilia Scauri. Dertona Vada LXXIX 
 
 Strata ab Augusto. Vadis ad Varum XCIII 
 A. V. C. 742 (E. C. 12) 
 
 fiunt m. p. circiter DCXIII
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 173 
 
 Augustus apparently considered that the alternately 
 swampy and precipitous nature of the coast between 
 Rome and Genoa rendered the effective maintenance of 
 a reliable thoroughfare along the shore an impossibility. 
 The Via Aurelia of the Antonine Itinerary, which at- 
 tempted it for a time, became practically impassable, as 
 early as the beginning of the 5th century of our era. 
 We gather this from the following passage in the 
 charming poem of Rutilius Numantianus, describing his 
 return journey from Rome to his native Gaul in the 
 reign of the Emperor Honorius. In it, he explains that 
 he preferred the risks of the sea to those of the land 
 route : — 
 
 " Electum pelagus : quoniam terrena viarum 
 
 Plana madent fluviis, cautibus alta rigent : 
 Postquam Tuscus ager, postquamque Aurelius agger 
 
 Perpessus Geticas ense vel igne manus, 
 Non silvas domibus, non flumina ponte cohercet : 
 
 Incerto satius credere vela mari." 
 
 In the age of Dante, the coast road between Lerici 
 (on the bay of Spezia) and Turbia had become proverbial 
 for its impracticability : 
 
 Tra Lerici et Turbia, la piii diserta, 
 La pill romita via, e una scala 
 Verso di quella, agevole ed aperta. 
 
 II Purgatorio III. 49'. 
 
 It was necessary, in order to unravel the complica- 
 tions of the Via Aurelia, to explain the course of the Via 
 Julia Augusta, the coast section of which enters into its 
 composition. If, however, one follows the course of the 
 Via Aurelia as laid down by the Itinerary of Antonine, 
 in its entirety, one would also have to include as " Coast- 
 road," or Aurelia, the part of the inland course of the 
 Julia Augusta as far as Dertona and thence back to 
 Genoa by the Via Postumia. But this would be 
 
 ' 'Twixt Lerici and Turbia, the most desert, 
 The most secluded pathway is a stair 
 Easy and open, if compared with that. 
 
 Lon^ellcno's Translation.
 
 174 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 obviously absurd, as the essential feature of the Via 
 Aurelia (viz. " coast-road ") would be lost and the 
 distance from Vada to Genoa, 28 miles by the coast, 
 would be increased to 130. 
 
 In my opinion we are justified in declining to follow 
 this aberration of the Itinerary, which is to be ascribed 
 to an error of the copyist, for whom the intricate nature 
 of the whole subject provides some excuse. 
 
 It seems much more reasonable to adopt the short 
 cut or compendium indicated by the Table of Peutinger. 
 Such an error goes a long way to explain the exaggera- 
 tion in the impossible total 797 miles, given in the 
 heading of the Via Aurelia of the Itinerary as the 
 distance from Rome to Aries, which is really about 600 
 miles by rail via Vintimiglia and Marseilles. 
 
 Between Vada Sabata and the Var, the thread of the 
 Via Julia Augusta may still be picked up at not un- 
 frequent intervals. It sometimes followed the shore and 
 was sometimes carried a mile or more inland. It was 
 carried over the marshy ground to the east of Albenga, 
 partly on a raised causeway, and partly on arches, which 
 for a length of nearly 200 yards are still extant, forming 
 a striking monument of Roman solidity now known by 
 the name of ' Ponte Lungo.' 
 
 Between Albenga and Alassio the Roman road 
 forms one of the most charming walks on the whole 
 Riviera, being carried under olive groves round the 
 shoulder of the mountains for about four miles at a 
 considerable height above the sea, of which it commands 
 glorious views. 
 
 On both sides of the picturesque bridge, partly 
 Roman and partly mediaeval, at Andora, the Strada 
 Romana may again be traced, as it crosses the wide 
 valley. Between Diano Marina and Oneglia, the Roman 
 road is (I believe) identical with the steep winding track 
 overhanging the sea, which is much to be recommended 
 to pedestrians, as forming a picturesque short cut 
 between the above-named places.
 
 \To fare p. 174
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 175 
 
 From Bordighera to Vintimiglia, the Strada Romana 
 runs parallel with the sea, about a thousand yards in- 
 land, past the chapel of St Roche, which displays a 
 Roman entablature let into an angle of the wall. 
 
 The passage of the road through Vintimiglia is 
 attested by three milestones preserved in the disused 
 church of San Michele — a most picturesque edifice, on 
 the extreme northern edge of the precipitous promon- 
 tory, on which the now dismantled fortress is built ^ 
 
 Between Vintimiglia and Mentone, as all the world 
 knows, the Via Julia Augusta is to be seen in all its 
 naked simplicity, as it is carried ov^er the rocks as you 
 approach along the coast those modern gardens of the 
 Hesperides where the Commendatore Hanbury delights 
 to exercise much appreciated hospitality. 
 
 As the Roman road rounds the corner of the Red 
 Rocks (Baize Rosse) famous for its cave dwellings, 
 where prehistoric human skeletons may still be seen in 
 situ, its narrow proportions are proved by the 7 ft. — 8 ft. 
 wide ledge chiselled out of the rock for its passage. 
 
 In a narrow roadway winding through the western 
 end of Mentone, the Strada Romana may again be 
 recognized and followed across low-lying orchards before 
 it scales the high ground, overlooking the Cap Martin, 
 where the Roman Station of Lumone was situated. 
 
 Crossing the col, which separates the bay of Mentone 
 from that of Monaco, the Via Julia Augusta sweeps 
 round the foot of the village of Roquebrune, whence it 
 mounts by an ascent, nowhere difficult, to Turbia distant 
 six miles from Lumone. It is a walk strongly to be 
 recommended and quite within the compass of an 
 
 ' In his Storia de Vintimiglia, sold at the " Drogheria " in the main 
 street of the Upper Town in the absence of a bookseller's shop, Signor G. 
 Rossi cites a letter from Caelius to Cicero bemoaning his bad luck in being 
 sent to Vintimiglia amidst the snows of the Alps at Christmas time to quell 
 a riot occasioned by the assassination by adherents of Pompey of one of 
 their citizens for having entertained Julius Caesar on his way to Spain at 
 the outset of the Civil War. This as far as I know is the solitary classical 
 text referring to the presence of Julius Caesar on the Riviera.
 
 176 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 ordinary pedestrian, starting as the case may be either 
 from Mentone or Monte Carlo, and using the funicular 
 railway at whichever end is most convenient. 
 
 In its descent from La Turbie (the Alpe Summa of 
 the Antonine Itinerary) towards the Var, the Via Julia 
 Augusta entirely avoided the difficulties and dangers 
 encountered in the carrying of the Cornice road along 
 the face of the precipices behind Eze. It turned off 
 the main road, about half a mile from the monu- 
 ment of Augustus, to the right down the valley of 
 Laghet, which offers an easy and inviting short cut to 
 Cimiez — the Roman Cemenelum — by La Trinite in the 
 valley of the Paillon. For the Romans were making for 
 Cimiez, avoiding the Greek town of Nice, which re- 
 mained dependent on Marseilles after the establishment 
 of the Roman Empire, as Strabo informs us^ 
 
 It is surprising how little attention has been paid to 
 the valley of Laghet, which must have served from the 
 earliest times as the main thoroughfare between Italy 
 and Gaul. With their practical eye, the Romans seized 
 on it at once, as a natural opening ready made for their 
 road. 
 
 While the distance from Turbia to Cemenelo is only 
 nine miles by the valley of Laghet, it must be nearly 20 
 by the circuitous route of the Cornice, where a road 
 never existed before the time of Napoleon-. In carrying 
 his Via Aurelia by the Cornice, as a separate road from 
 the Julia Augusta, M. Lentheric was clearly in error, as 
 I have already pointed out. 
 
 Neither the Itinerary of Antonine, nor the Table of 
 Peutinger shows more than one road, which avoiding 
 Nice, as a Greek settlement, made straight for Cimiez 
 by the valley of Laghet. Nine of the 26 milestones 
 
 ^ Strabo, IV. Cas. 184, 17 iJ-h NtKoi'a virb roh MacrcraXiwTats fx^vei Kal 
 TTji iirapx^o-s effriv. 
 
 2 The rough track forming a short cut from Riquier to Villefranche is 
 probably all that remains of the old Greek road, which was bound to keep 
 near the shore.
 
 >1>, 
 
 ^^mrw 
 
 \. ♦•/WNli/l 
 
 
 
 ■s^-^ 
 
 ,^-tr' 
 
 i|/(( mi -«.->-■ A 
 
 N, 
 
 \'^' 
 
 ,;.>j 
 
 
 
 &- ^*1 
 
 tea, 
 
 M'li 
 
 
 ;t 
 
 
 
 ROMAN MILESTONE IN VALLEY OF LAGHET, NEAR NICE. 
 
 To face p. 177]
 
 CHAP. XVIII. 177 
 
 belonging to the Via Julia Augusta noted by Mommsen 
 were discovered in the valley of Laghet, whereas not a 
 single one has ever been found on the Cornice road. 
 
 The modern road, leading to the famous monastery of 
 Laghet, branches off from the Cornice road within half a 
 mile of the village of La Turbie, and the Via Julia 
 Augusta in its turn again branches off from the modern 
 Laghet road a few hundred yards further on, being cut 
 along the face of Monte Sembola. It is only traceable 
 now as a road as far as a quarry, about half a mile from 
 its bifurcation from the modern road, which descends 
 the hill to the monastery. 
 
 Beyond the quarry, the Via Julia Augusta becomes a 
 mere footpath, and so continues, till it is lost amongst 
 terraced patches of cultivation on the slopes of Monte 
 Sembola. The milestone represented on the opposite 
 page is still iti situ, although the road has collapsed 
 entirely. This illustration is from a drawing made by 
 Sir James Harris, the British Consul at Nice, to whom I 
 am much indebted for conducting me to the spot. 
 
 The inscription on the milestone proves that it is one 
 of those originally placed there in the reign of Augustus, 
 as his name is still quite legible on it as well as the 
 distance from Rome, DC VI I miles. It is numbered 8105 
 in the Corpus'. 
 
 On a later occasion, when we revisited the valley of 
 Laghet together, I was fortunate enough to find and 
 draw the attention of Sir James Harris to another 
 Roman milestone in situ, which had escaped his observa- 
 tion. It is distant exactly one Roman mile from Turbia 
 and marked DCV from Rome. 
 
 This milestone appears to be a duplicate, as far as 
 the mileage from Rome is concerned, of that presented 
 by Sir John Boileau to the Municipal Library of Nice, 
 
 ^ The words " Trihunicia Potestate," of which the initial letters are 
 wanting on the milestone opposite, would supply a clue to its date, if 
 followed, as they usually are, by a number, indicating the number of times 
 the emperor in question had been invested with the tribuneship. 
 
 H. 12
 
 178 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 the inscription on which I have quoted above in full. 
 But the milestone DCV still in situ is one of those 
 originally set up by Augustus, whereas that in the 
 Municipal Library marks the restoration of the Via 
 Julia Augusta by Hadrian. It is numbered 8101 in the 
 Corpus, where the inscription is given. 
 
 It was a common practice of Roman Emperors to 
 place milestones referring to their own work of repara- 
 tion by the side of those of their predecessors. Three of 
 the nine milestones discovered between Turbia and 
 Cimiez are duplicates, in the sense of marking the same 
 total of miles from Rome. 
 
 Besides the nine having inscriptions of some kind, 
 there are several other half-milestones which may or 
 may not be in situ. Other fragments have been built 
 into terrace walls, — one of which I examined in the 
 company of the British Consul and Vice-Consul. 
 
 To excuse himself for breaking up a milestone which 
 he found on his ground, a peasant-owner remarked to us 
 that there was no object now in maintaining records 
 whole, since the territory around Nice had been trans- 
 ferred from Italy to France in i860. 
 
 No spot in Europe has proved so rich in yield of 
 Roman milestones as the valley of Laghet, and yet it is 
 still uncertain at what point the Via Julia Augusta 
 crossed the Paillon to mount up to Cimiez.
 
 CHAPTER XIX. 
 
 Via Aurelia {continued). 
 Sections 4 and 5. 
 
 That the original constructors of the first road used by 
 the Romans beyond the Alps, i.e. from the Var onwards 
 into Gaul, were the Massiliots about the year B.C. 154, I 
 have already explained, and at the same time pointed 
 out that the Massiliot road could only have been of use 
 to the Romans as far as Forum Julii, because it there 
 branched off to the southward, being under the obliga- 
 tion of keeping within a mile and a half of the sea. 
 
 It seems therefore right to call Section 4 of the Via 
 Aurelia from the Var to Forum Julii after its original 
 constructors, ' Via Massiliensis.' That it was taken in 
 hand and utilized by Augustus as a continuation of the 
 Julia Augusta is however proved by a milestone bearing 
 his name, of which I shall say more further on. 
 
 But from the absence on any of the milestones dis- 
 covered westward of the Var of any reference to the 
 total distance in miles either from Rome, or from the 
 Trebia, Section 4 cannot be considered as belonging to 
 the Italian system of roads, which stopped at the Var in 
 the time of Augustus. It was at a much later period 
 that frontiers were ignored by the Via Aurelia. 
 
 12 — 2
 
 l80 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 When we come to consider Section 5 more in detail, 
 I shall be able to adduce proof that Forum Julii was the 
 ' Caput ' of that section. 
 
 The course of the Massiliot or No. 4 Section of the 
 Via Aurelia from the Var westwards was, as far as 
 Cannes, as nearly as possible identical with the modern 
 high road, which runs parallel to the railway, along the 
 shore. The two Roman milestones, inscribed respec- 
 tively with the names of Tiberius and Constantine, 
 which are now placed side by side at the foot of the 
 staircase of the Hotel de Ville of Vallauris, were both 
 transported there from the side of the high road, where 
 they originally stood. But, as might be expected, all 
 traces of the Roman road itself have been obliterated by 
 the modern highway constructed on the top of it. 
 
 As I observed in the previous Chapter, it was at 
 Antibes that the Roman road (Via Vintiana) branched 
 off from the Aurelia to Vence (Vintium), whence it 
 was carried further inland to " Ad Salinas " (Castellane). 
 Several milestones have been discovered beyond Vence, 
 of which full particulars are given in Les Inscriptions 
 de Vence by M. Bourguignat, and in Vol, XII. of the 
 Corpus Inscriptionnni Latinarnm. 
 
 Carried through the centre of Cannes, on a higher 
 level than the railway, past la Chapelle St Nicholas, the 
 Via Aurelia, no. longer identical with the main thorough- 
 fare, is carried over the insignificant bed of the Riou by 
 the Pont Romain, at the foot of La Croix de Garde. 
 In the steep winding track, which from the bridge may 
 be followed for at least two miles across the ridge of La 
 Croix de Garde till it becomes again obliterated by the 
 broad road-way of a modern boulevard, it requires con- 
 siderable experience of Roman roads to recognize the 
 famous Via Aurelia. 
 
 On its descent from La Croix de Garde, the road 
 was carried over the plain of Laval past the isolated 
 hillock of St Cassien (Arluc, Ara-luci) on the raised 
 causeway along which the modern high road passes.
 
 CHAP. XIX. l8l 
 
 As the Station, ' Ad Horrea,' has to be fixed at some 
 point 12 Roman miles to the west of AntipoHs, and 17 
 or 18 (according to the Table or Itinerary respectively) 
 to the East of Forum Julii, there is little doubt that it 
 should be identified with Napoule, which agrees with 
 this double condition of distances, and where remains of 
 extensive granaries have been discovered. 
 
 At no other point in its course along the coast can 
 the Greek traders of Marseilles have encountered more 
 formidable obstacles to the passage of their road than in 
 carrying it over the jagged porphyry promontories, which 
 descend into the sea from the Esterel mountains between 
 Napoule and Agay. 
 
 That they succeeded however in keeping, as they 
 were bound, near the coast, is proved by a milestone 
 found on the road, where it passed round the base of the 
 " Sainte Baume " — the name by which the landward 
 face of the Cap Roux is locally known. 
 
 This milestones which stood midway between the 
 Station Ad Horrea and Forum Julii, as is proved by the 
 number Villi engraved at its base, is inscribed with the 
 name of Augustus, proving that he utilized the Massiliot 
 or Greek road for a time, pending the construction of the 
 more convenient Roman road, which crossed the Esterel 
 by what is now known as the old road to Cannes on the 
 north side of the range. 
 
 Several milestones, two of which are preserved in the 
 Museum at Frejus, have been discovered on the Roman 
 rectification of the course of the Massiliot road. One of 
 these states that the Emperor Nero restored the rectifi- 
 cation, proving that it was carried out considerably 
 before his time — either by Augustus himself or by 
 Tiberius. 
 
 Entering Forum Julii by the Porta Romana, of 
 which the stately double archway was still standing in 
 
 ' This milestone was rescued from oblivion by the author, who finding 
 it in two pieces cast away in an abandoned cemetery, had it put together 
 and set up in the esplanade at St Raphael.
 
 l82 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 the beginning of the last century, the Roman road, after- 
 wards Via Aurelia, formed the main thoroughfare of the 
 city, passing out of it at the Porta GalHca^ 
 
 Whether the original Massiliot road also entered 
 Forum Julii at the point where the Porta Romana was 
 afterwards erected, it is not easy to determine. It is 
 probable, however, that it did not issue from the walls 
 by the Porta Gallica, but by a lower gate facing south 
 and nearer the shore. Here, however, we part company 
 with it. 
 
 That Forum Julii was the Caput of Section 5 of the 
 Via Aurelia is proved by the numbering of the miles on 
 a milestone originally found on the Via Aurelia at 
 Camp-Dumy, and now standing in a sheltered corner, 
 outside the parish church of the adjacent village of 
 Cabasse (Matavone). 
 
 The milestone in question is one of the series erected 
 by the Emperor Constantine the Great. It is numbered 
 5470 on p. 40 of Vol. XII. of the Corpus Inscriptioniim 
 Lathiaj'icm, where the inscription is given in full. 
 
 The number of miles, which is always found at the 
 end of the inscription, when specified at all, is here 
 
 XXXIII, 
 
 corresponding as near as possible with the actual 
 distance by road from Frejus. 
 
 If only the practice of engraving the total distance 
 from the Caput Viae on every milestone had been uni- 
 versal, we should have had an invaluable means of 
 correcting the inaccuracies and discrepancies in the 
 distances given by the Itinerary and Table respec- 
 tively. 
 
 While the Itinerary and the Table give the distances 
 from Forum Julii to Forum Voconii as XII and XVII, 
 
 1 In order to prove beyond a doubt that the now banked up central 
 portion of the gateway was formerly open, I had the ground excavated till 
 wheel-ruts, worn in the pebble pavement leading right up to the centre of 
 the structure, were laid bare.
 
 ANCIENT AND MODERN FREJUS. 
 
 The Red Colouring shows the boundary of Roman Forum-Julii and its excauaied harbour, into which the galleys captured at Aetium {B.C. 81) 
 were convoyed by order of Auguaiua.
 
 CHAP. XIX. 183 
 
 and from Forum Voconii to Matavone as XII and XXII 
 respectively, making a total of XXIV by the Itinerary 
 and XXXIX by the Table, the actual distance is XXXIII 
 as marked on the milestone. 
 
 The actual measurement on the milestone also corro- 
 borates the statement in the letter of Plancus to Cicero^ 
 that Forum Voconii was 24 miles from Forum Julii, for 
 Camp-Dumy where the milestone was found is about 
 nine miles from Forum Voconii (le Luc). 
 
 The milestone found there is by no means the only 
 evidence of the passage of the Via Aurelia at Camp- 
 Dumy. For I followed the unmistakeable track of the 
 road itself for more than a mile westward from the end 
 of the picturesque mediaeval bridge, replacing the Roman 
 structure, which carried the Via Aurelia over the stream 
 of the Issole, which vies with the Argens in its silvery 
 limpidity. 
 
 In the town of Brignolles some 10 miles further west 
 a square-shaped milestone, 6 ft. high, similar to that in 
 the museum at Frejus, is now erected in a market garden 
 formerly within the precincts of a Capuchin monastery. 
 It bears witness to the activity of the Emperor Nero in 
 repairing this portion of the road. 
 
 A precisely similar milestone, with a similar inscrip- 
 tion — both unfortunately wanting in the item of the 
 total of miles from the Caput Viae — is to be seen on the 
 lofty terrace of the Chateau of Tourves, splendid even in 
 its ruins, which look down on the town of Tourves, the 
 Roman station of Ad Turrem^. 
 
 Between the Station Ad Turrem and the next, 
 Tegulata (see Section of Peutinger's Table), I walked 
 over the Via Aurelia itself for at least four miles, picking 
 
 1 See p. 159. 
 
 ^ To my great surprise, and no small satisfaction, I found in the ancient 
 hostelry of St Jean at Tourves (a station on the railway between Camoulles 
 and Gardanne) a nicely furnished sitting room and clean bedrooms, which 
 combined with the attractions of the ruined Chateau and its grounds render 
 it the most desirable stopping place between Frejus and Aix-en-Provence.
 
 l84 VIA AURELIA. 
 
 up the thread of it where it crosses the high road, about 
 a mile to the south of the town of St Maximin. 
 
 A facsimile of a milestone erected by the Emperor 
 Claudius (father of Nero by adoption), the original of 
 which is to be seen in the cloister of the Monastery, 
 attached to the magnificent church of St Maximin, has 
 been placed in situ on the road, whence the monks re- 
 moved the original. 
 
 The Via Aurelia, in its passage to the south of the 
 town, avoids the plain in which St Maximin lies, by in- 
 sinuating itself amongst the mountains, the most striking 
 of which is called ' Mont Aurele ' — presumably after the 
 road. The milestone stands at about a mile from the 
 point where the stony track representing the Via Aurelia 
 rejoins the high road from St Maximin to Aix. 
 
 On emerging from the mountains, where it crosses 
 the watershed dividing the basin of the Argens from 
 that of the Arc, the Via Aurelia proceeds onwards to 
 Aquae Sextiae across the battle-field of Marius, running 
 between the elongated ridge of the Mont Sainte Victoire 
 and the River Arc for several miles. 
 
 From Aquae Sextiae to Arelate' (Aries) as is clearly 
 shown in the Table of Peutinger, the Via Aurelia forms 
 a loop, one branch leading by Massilia (Marseilles) and 
 the Fossae Marianae, while the other and more direct 
 passes by Pisavis (near Salon) and across the plain of La 
 Crau. The former is adopted by the Itinerary of Anto- 
 nine to the exclusion of the latter, whereas both are 
 indicated by the Table of Peutinger, which makes the 
 distance from Aquae Sextiae to Aries 114 miles via 
 Marseilles and only 58 via Pisavis (Salon). 
 
 It is certain that the original Via Domitia followed 
 the latter route, as being the shortest cut from Forum 
 Julii to the Rhone at Aries. To have taken their road as 
 the Itinerary does through Massilia and Greek territory 
 would have been contrary to Roman policy at the date 
 
 1 The ancient name for Aries, Arelatf (or Arelatum), becomes Arelati? 
 in the ablative case, as in the Table of Peutinger.
 
 [ To face p. 1 84
 
 CHAP. XIX. 
 
 185 
 
 of its original construction, when Marseilles was an in- 
 dependent Republic and faithful ally of Rome. 
 
 As my final contribution towards the elucidation of 
 this intricate question I submit, in tabular form for the 
 sake of clearness, the best conclusions I can arrive at as 
 to the course and nomenclature of the coast-road, styled 
 by the Itinerary of Antonine 
 
 Via Aurelia. 
 
 A Roma per Tusciam et Alpes Maritimas Arelatum 
 usque M.P. DCCXCVII. 
 
 
 Original 
 Name 
 
 Author 
 
 Starting 
 Point 
 
 Finishing 
 Point 
 
 Date 
 
 B.C. 
 
 Section i 
 
 Aurelia 
 
 C. Aurelius 
 Cotta 
 
 Rome 
 
 Vada Vola- 
 terrana 
 
 741 
 
 „ 2 
 
 Aemilia 
 
 M. Aemilius 
 
 Vada Vo- 
 
 Vada Sabata 
 
 109 
 
 
 Scauri 
 
 Scaurus 
 
 laterrana 
 
 
 
 » 3 
 
 Julia 
 Augusta 
 
 Augustus 
 
 Vada Sa- 
 bata 
 
 Var 
 
 12 
 
 » 4 
 
 Massiliensis 
 
 Unknown 
 
 Var 
 
 Forum Julii 
 
 154 
 
 „ 5 
 
 Domitia 
 
 Cn. Domitius 
 Ahenobar- 
 bus 
 
 Fomm 
 Julii 
 
 Arelate 
 
 121 
 
 Whether we are justified in calling it Via Aurelia or 
 not, is perhaps of less importance than the fact which 
 is universally admitted, that there was at one time a 
 continuous coast-road from Rome to Aries.
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Actium, battle off, 162 
 
 Adige, valley of the, 107 
 
 Aduatuci, descended from Cimbri 
 and settled among the Belgae, 
 103 
 
 Aedui, the, 52, 92 
 
 Aegytna, oppidum of Oxybii, 80 ; 
 destruction of, 83 
 
 Aelius, P., one of the triumvirate 
 appointed for partitioning land 
 among colonists of Luna, 65 
 
 Aemilianus, Fabius Max., com- 
 memoration of the victories of, 96 
 
 Aemilius Paulus, L., expedition of, 
 70 ; Plutarch's life of, 70, 71; 
 death of two of his sons, 7 1 ; 
 sortie by, 74-76 
 
 Afranius, one of Pompey's legati in 
 Spain, 137 
 
 Afridis, the, 65 
 
 Agay, 81 
 
 Agricola, birthplace of, 88 ; his 
 mother Julia murdered at Vinti- 
 miglia, 88 note 
 
 Ahenobarbus, Domitius, Proconsul, 
 92; victory of, 93; capture of 
 Bituitus by, 95 ; the founder of 
 the Via Domitia, 98, 100; fleet 
 of, 142 ; governor of the Provincia 
 Narbonensis, 137, 138; sum- 
 moned to join the fleet of Na- 
 sidius, 144 ; the first road-maker, 
 166 
 
 Aix-en-Provence, battle of, 85, 99 
 
 Aix-Pourrieres, battle of, no 
 
 Alaudae, legion of the, 136 
 
 Albenga, selection of, by Mago, for 
 the base of his operations, 38 ; 
 council of chiefs at, 39 ; conquest 
 of the Ingauni at, 69-76 
 
 Albici, in the pay of the Massiliots, 
 141 ; sorties by the, 143 
 
 "Albula" the former name of the 
 Tiber, 48 
 
 Alesia, operations around, 136 
 
 Allia, defeat of the Romans at the 
 battle of the, 18 
 
 Allobroges, factories of the, 33 ; 
 war with, 92 ; insurrection of the, 
 128; complaints of the, against 
 Fonteius, 128; embassy to Rome, 
 128, 129 ; Caesar's desire to secure 
 the friendship of the, 132 ; allies 
 of the Romans, ib.\ 'Senate' of 
 the, 133 ; revolt of the, after the 
 death of Caesar, 1 34 
 
 Allobrogicus, Q. Fataius, conquest 
 of Provincia by, 98 
 
 Alpine nations, Hasdrubal unmo- 
 lested by, 36 
 
 Alps, Hannibal's passage of the, 
 ^7~3ri western passes of the, 
 used by the Romans, 32 
 
 Ambrones, slaughter of, 85 ; anni- 
 hilation of the armies of Caepio 
 and Manlius by the, 104; identity 
 of battle cry used by Ambrones 
 and Ligurians, 113; defeat of 
 the, 113; their reception at the 
 hands of their women, 113, 114 
 
 Ambrones and Teutones, prepara- 
 tions of, to cross the Rhone, 109 
 
 Andora, bridge at, 1 74 
 
 Antipolis, Greek colony from Mas- 
 silia, 15 ; founding of, 79; siege 
 of, 79-83 
 
 Antonine Itinerary, 78, i-;4, 163, 
 164, 171, 173, 174, 176, 182, 184 
 
 Antonius, L., cavalry of, 153, 156 
 
 Antonius, Marcus, consul, 150; re- 
 ception of Octavianus by, 150; 
 defeats of, 151; before Mutina, 
 151 ; off Actium, 162 ; lays siege 
 to Mutina, 151 ; meeting of, with 
 Lepidus on the river Argens, 
 156-162 ; flight into Gallia Nar- 
 bonensis, 157, 158; arrival at 
 Forum Julii, i.sS; appointed 
 triumvir, i6r ; Gaul assigned as 
 province to, 162
 
 INDEX. 
 
 187 
 
 Aosta, 31 ; country of the Salassi, 31 
 
 Apennines, the, 77 
 
 Apron, the, 80, 82 
 
 Apuani, the, 61, 62; defeat of, by 
 Sempronius, 64 ; transported to 
 the Taurasian plains, 64, 65; de- 
 portation of the. 69 
 
 Aquae Sextiae, 89, 91, 96, 99; 
 battle of, 109-118 (see also Aix- 
 en-Provence) 
 
 Aquae Statiellae, 154 
 
 Aquileia, Roman colony at, 73 ; 
 Decimus Brutus put to death at, 
 161 
 
 Arausio, 90 
 
 Arbois de Jubainville, M. d', on the 
 number of Celts in Gallia, 3-5 ; 
 on the Ligurians, 46, 47, 48 ; on 
 the Ligurian civilization, 50 
 
 Arc, slaughter of Ambrones and 
 Teutones in the valley of, 85; 
 bed of the, 112; Marius's battle 
 in the valley of the, 1 18 
 
 Arecomici, the founders of the Celtic 
 Emporium at Narbonne, 12 ; a 
 branch of the Volcae, ib. 
 
 Argens, the, 87 ; meeting of An- 
 tony and Lepidus on, 156-162 
 
 Ariminum, 63 
 
 Ariovistus, encounter of Julius Cae- 
 sar with, no; negotiations with, 
 121 
 
 Aries, native settlement at, 33 ; in 
 possession of the Salluvii, 87 ; 
 why not selected as the Roman 
 Capital, 96 ; depopulation of, 97 ; 
 a centre of Roman roads, 139; 
 arrival of Caesar's ships from, 
 142 ; colony at, 149 
 
 Arras, see Nemetocenna 
 
 Arverni, 12 ; over-lordship of the, 
 13; army of the, 92; disaster to 
 the, on the Rhone, 94 
 
 Aspres-Veynes, 91 
 
 Athenopolis, colony at, 15 
 
 Atilius, praetor, 26 
 
 Augustus, Liguria or Regio IX. of, 
 48; altar of, 162; monument in 
 honour of, at Turbia, ih. ; or- 
 ganization of the Gallic provinces 
 by, ib. 
 
 Avienus, Festus, Ora Maritimay 9, 
 10; Lacus Ligusticus mentioned 
 by, 49 ; situation of Marseilles 
 described by, 140 
 
 Avignon, native settlement at, 33 
 
 Baal, altar of, at Marseilles, 14 
 Baebius, M., consul, 64 ; pro- 
 consul, 73 
 
 Bassus, Ventidius, legate of Antony, 
 
 156, 158 
 Belloguet, Baron Roger de, ' Ethno- 
 
 genie' Gauloise, 2, 3 
 Bellovesus, Celts under, 11 
 Bertrand, A., n, 47 
 Bergfer, N., on the Roman roads, 
 
 166, 167 
 Bernard, Little St, 31 
 Besan9on, seizure of, by Julius 
 
 Caesar, no 
 Bituitus, King of the Arverni, 93-95 
 Bituriges, 12 
 Boii, 1 2 ; tinal subjugation of the, 
 
 18; encounter the Romans, 19; 
 
 resistance of the, 44; expulsion 
 
 of, from Gallia Cisalpina, 57 
 Bononia, colony of, 44 ; Roman 
 
 colonists around, 51 
 Bordeaux an imperial residence, 8 
 Bormida, river, 154 
 Bourguignat, !VI., Les Inscriptions 
 
 dc Fence, 180 
 Brancus, supplies to Hannibal by, 
 
 29' 33 
 
 Brian9on, railway, 91 
 
 Brignolles, 183 
 
 Brittany, population of, mainly 
 Iberian, 8 
 
 Brutus, Decimus, takes command 
 of the fleet off Marseilles, 139, 
 142; triumph of, 143; takes 
 refuge at Modena, 151 ; letter to 
 Cicero, 152 ; arrival at Acqui, 
 157; army of, at Eporedia, 160; 
 desperate condition of, 161; at- 
 tempts to join Marcus Brutus, ib.; 
 put to death, ib. 
 
 Cabasse, village of, 182 
 
 Cadibona, 1 54 
 
 Caecilius, C, puts down the revolt 
 of the Salluvii, 121 
 
 Caepio, annihilation of the army of, 
 by the Ambrones, 104; possession 
 of gold by, stored at Tolosa, 105 
 
 Caesar, Caius Julius, last public 
 act of, affecting the Roman Pro- 
 vince, 149; events of the year 
 following the assassination of, 
 149-155; presence of, on the 
 Riviera, 175 
 
 Calvinus, Sextius, 85, 88, 97 
 
 Camp-Dumy, 182, 183 
 
 Caninius, operations of, 136 
 
 Cannae, battle of, 34 
 
 Cannes, Roman commissioners put 
 ashore at, 81 
 
 Cap Roux, 79, 88, t8i 
 
 Carbo, Cnaeus, consul, 103
 
 i88 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Carthage, Carthaginian army, com- 
 position of, 34; treaty of peace 
 with, 43 ; final destruction of, 84 
 
 Carthaginians, re-establishment of 
 supremacy at sea by the, 15 
 
 Cast el d' Appio, 72 
 
 Catiline conspiracy, 129, 130 
 
 Catugnatus, Manlius Lentinus out- 
 generalled by, 130 
 
 Catulus, monument to, at Glanum, 
 107; consul, 123 
 
 Cavaillion, 112 
 
 Cavares, confederation of the, 32 ; 
 plain of the, 90 
 
 Celesia, E., on the Ligurians, 46 
 
 Celtic, Celtae and Belgae speak the 
 Celtic language, 6 
 
 Celts, possession of N.W. Mediter- 
 ranean coast line by, 9; form a 
 settlement on the Atlantic sea- 
 board of the Iberian peninsula, 
 10, 11; Ligurians falsely said to 
 be akin to the, 46 
 
 Celts and Ligurians, contests be- 
 tween, 10 
 
 Cenis, Mont, railway, 30 
 
 Cenomani, invasion of eastern Trans- 
 padana by the, 48 
 
 Cethegus, death of, 129 
 
 Cicero, death of, 161, 162 
 
 Cimbri, use of caravans by, 9; in- 
 vasion of the Rhone valley by 
 the, 97 ; embassy to Augustus 
 from the. 102; destruction of the, 
 at Vercellae, 118 
 
 Cimbri and Teutones, German origin 
 of, 102 
 
 Cimbro-Teuton invasion, Marius and 
 the, 101-108 
 
 Cimiez, 80; Val Laghet, short road 
 to, 176 
 
 Cinna, Roman internecine sti^uggles 
 under the leadership of, 120 
 
 Claudius, Appius, consul, 71 ; vic- 
 tories of, 72 
 
 Claudius, Emperor, milestone erect- 
 ed by, 184 
 
 •Claustra Galliae,' 88 
 
 'Claustra maris,' 88 
 
 Cleopatra, 162 
 
 Clusium, 18 
 
 Col de I'Argentiere, 31, 32 
 
 Col de Tenda, 77 
 
 Colonia Julia Viennensis, 134 
 
 Constantine, oppidum of, 56; ruins 
 of, ib. 
 
 Copillus, chief of the Volcae Tec- 
 tosages, capture of, by Sylla, 104 
 
 Cornelius, M., takes up the com- 
 mand of Spurius Lucretius, 140 
 
 Cornelius, P., consul, 64 
 
 Cotta, Aurelius, 165 
 
 Crassus, Licinius, orator, loi 
 
 Cremona, military colony at, 19, 
 20; Hamilcar plans seizure of, 
 43 ■> siege and relief of, 43 ; battle 
 
 of. 43 
 
 Critognatus, harangue of, 107, 108 
 
 Dawkins, Boyd, Early Man in 
 
 Britain, 8 
 Dea, 91 
 Deciates, the, 79, 80 ; subjection 
 
 of, 83 
 Delphi, treasure of, 7 ; spoil of 
 
 Veii in the Massiliot treasury at, 
 
 16; sack of, 102 
 Dertona, 152, 153 
 Dervieu, Captain, on the campaign 
 
 of Marius, 1 15 
 Dolabella, P. Cornelius, consul, 
 
 150 
 'Dolmen,' near Draguignan, 53 
 Donzere, 25 
 Drac, 31 
 Drappes, 136 
 Drome, junction of, with the Rhone, 
 
 25; valley of the, 91 
 Durance valley, 3, 29, 30, 36, 90- 
 
 96 
 
 Egus, t33 
 
 Eighty Years' War, 57, 58 
 
 Elba, the Ligurian ' Ilva,' 47 
 
 Emporiae, 98 
 
 Encourdoules, 81 
 
 Entremont, discoveries of bas-reliefs 
 
 at, 53, 54; description of, 53, 54, 
 
 55 ; hot springs, 112 
 Epanterii Montani, the, 38, 39 ; 
 
 join the Ingauni, 72 ; treachery 
 
 of the allies, 73 
 Eporedia, army of Decimus Brutus 
 
 at, 160 
 Eratosthenes, fragment of, 49 
 Esterel, the, 79, 157, 158 
 Etang de Berre, 21, 56, 87 
 Etruria, Cisalpine Gauls in, 18 
 Etruscans, defeat of, off Cumae, 15; 
 
 driven from the Po valley, 18 
 Etrusco-Carthaginian naval alliance, 
 
 15 
 
 Fabius Maximus, Q., consul, 92 
 Fasti Capitolini, 87, 88, 90, 121 
 Flaccus, Fulvius, consul, 84, 85, 86, 
 
 87, 88, 90 ; conquest of Provincia 
 
 begun by, 98 
 Flaccus, Valerius, triumph of, over 
 
 Gauls and Celtiberians, 121
 
 INDEX. 
 
 189 
 
 Flaminius, Caius, consul, 62; com- 
 missioner, 80; wounded, 81 
 
 Fonteius, M., charge of appropriat- 
 ing moneys against, 98 ; Cicero's 
 oration on behalf of, 126, 127, 
 128 
 
 Forum Aurelii, 165 
 
 Fon.im Julii, 87, 88, 96, 98, 99, 149, 
 157. 158, 179-182 
 
 Forum Voconii, 159, 160, 182, 183 
 
 Fos, vestiges of Roman camp at, 
 106 
 
 France, ancient, derived its name 
 from the Galli, 2 ; majority of 
 inhabitants of, not of Gallic origin, 
 ib. ; race-feud between French 
 and Germans not to be attributed 
 to Celtic element, il>.; modern, 
 German Franks give the name 
 to, ib. ; S.W. quarter of, mainly 
 Iberian, 13 
 
 Frejus, bay of, 87; colony at, 149; 
 museum at, 181 
 
 Freshtield, D., Alpine Pass of Han- 
 nibal, 31, 32 
 
 Friniates, the, 61, 62 
 
 Fulvia, wife of Antony, 162 
 
 Gaesatae, Transalpine, 39 
 
 Galba, Servius Sulpicius, secures 
 triumph for Pomptinus, 130 
 
 Gallia, early distribution of races 
 in Gaul, i ; traces of pre-historic 
 man in Gaul, i ; M. d'Arbois de 
 Jubainville, on the number of 
 Celts in Gallia, 3-5; derivation 
 of the name, 2; ancient, distri- 
 bution of the population in, 6; 
 modem, gnmnd-work of the 
 population Iberian, 5 ; divisions 
 of, 5, 6; distinctions of language 
 existing in, 5 
 
 Gallia Cisalpina, derives her main 
 contingent of Gauls from the 
 valley of the Danube, 12; contest 
 of the Romans with, 17; critical 
 state of affairs in, 18; subjugation 
 of, 19; invasion of, by Hasdrubal 
 and ^lago, 36-44; real beginning 
 of Roman administration in, 44 ; 
 beginning of military road con- 
 struction in, 62, 63 
 
 Gallia Comata, 132, 134, 162 
 
 Gallia Narbonensis, 121 
 
 Gallia Transalpina, Iberian, Ligur- 
 ian and Celtic races found in, 9 ; 
 never the parent hive of Celts, 1 1 ; 
 theory of reflux of Gauls from, 
 not altogether to be rejected, 12 ; 
 first Roman blood shed in, 23 
 
 Gallic irruptions, special fund pro- 
 vided to meet, 19 
 
 Gallinara, island of, seizure by 
 Mago, 38 
 
 Gallus, meaning of, 86 
 
 Gap, 91 
 
 Gauls, types of, 6, 7 ; Romans de- 
 rive their knowledge of, from 
 Belgica, 7; occupy north-eastern 
 and central plateaus of France, 
 10; sacking and burning of Rome 
 by the. 18 
 
 Gauls and Ligurians, the main con- 
 stituents of Hannibal's army, 34 ; 
 insurrection of, 43 
 
 Genevre, Pass of Mt, 31, 125 
 
 Genoa, descent on, by Mago, 38; 
 few traces of Romans at, 52; 
 relations with Rome and Mar- 
 seilles, ■52; sacking and burning 
 of, ib. ; no coins of earlier date 
 than Roman conquest found there, 
 
 Gentes Alpinae, 78 
 
 Genuatae, the, 52, 70 
 
 Gergovia, plateau of, 93; repulse 
 of the Romans from, 132 
 
 German slaves in Italy, 118 
 
 Germania Superior and Inferior, 8 
 
 Glanum, Roman camp at, 107, 109 
 
 Goorkhas, the, 76 
 
 Gracchus, Caius, 84 
 
 Greece, invasion of, by Gauls, 7 
 
 Greek element, introduction of, into 
 the population of Gallia Trans- 
 alpina, 13 
 
 Gretia, name given to the region 
 between Marseilles and the 
 Durance, 13; mentioned in the 
 table of Peutinger, 137 
 
 Guadiana, river, 49 
 
 Hamilcar, insurrection of Gauls and 
 Ligurians at the instigation of, 43 ; 
 death of, 43 
 
 Hannibal in the Rhone valley, 17- 
 26; Passage of Alps, 27-35, 82; 
 infantry and cavalry of the army 
 of, 33; delay of, in the country of 
 the Allobroges, and its conse- 
 quences, 33; loss of an eye by, 
 38; final defeat of, at Zama, 42; 
 sets sail to Carthage, 42 
 
 Hanno, 23 
 
 Hasdrubal, favourable reception of, 
 36; invasion of Cisalpine Gaul 
 by Hasdrubal and Mago, 36-44 ; 
 defeat and death of, 37 
 
 Hecataeus, 49 
 
 Hercules. Pillars of, 11, 15
 
 I90 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Hesperides, modem gardens of the, 
 
 .'75 
 Himera, battle of, 15, 49 
 Himilco, Carthaginian navigator, 
 
 9 
 
 Hirschfeld, on the ^ ia Aurelia, 
 
 J 66 
 Hirtius, Aulus, consul, 151 
 Hirtuleius, quaestor of Sertorius, 
 
 124 
 Histria, war in, 73 
 Hyeres, 89 
 
 Iberian family, the Ligurians a 
 branch of the, 45 
 
 Iberians, possession of N.W. Medi- 
 terranean coast line by, 9; non- 
 resistance by, within the limits of 
 Gaul, 10 
 
 Illiberis, 32 
 
 Ilvates, the, 48 
 
 Ingauni, the, alliance of Mago 
 with, 38; conquest of the, at 
 Albium Ingaunonim, 69-76 ; 
 treachery of, 73 
 
 Insubres, 12, 19 
 
 Intemelii, co-operation of the, with 
 the Ingauni, 72 ; subjection of 
 the, 77 
 
 Ireland, change of language in, 8 
 
 Isere, junction of the, with the 
 Rhone, 25 ; Hannibal's passage 
 of the, 27, 28, 29 
 
 Italy, attempted barbarian invasion 
 of, 86 
 
 Jugurthine war, 104 
 Julia, wife of Marius, 1 1 1 
 Junonia, colony of, 84 
 
 La Croix de Garde, 180 
 
 Laghet, valley of, r 76 ; monastery 
 of, 177 
 
 Laterensis, senator, suicide of, 160 
 
 La Turbie, pass, 58; inscription on 
 the monument of, 80 
 
 Laval, plain of, 180 
 
 Lazarus, first legendaiy Bp of Mar- 
 seilles, 121 
 
 Lentheric, M., description of Tau- 
 roentaby, 144; on the Via Aurelia, 
 165, 166; on the \'ia Julia Au- 
 gusta, 171; on the Via Aurelia, 
 176 
 
 Lentinus, Manlius, out-generalled 
 by Catugnatus, 130 
 
 Lentulus, death of, 129 
 
 Lepidus, M. Aemilius, the elder, 
 elected consul, 122, 123; pro- 
 consul of Provincia, 123; defeat 
 
 and death of, 123; the Triumvir, 
 i6i; letter to Cicero, 159; meet- 
 ing of Antony and, on the river 
 Argens, 156-162 
 
 Lerici and Turbia, coast road be- 
 tween, 173 
 
 Les Baux, bas-relief of the "Tre 
 Marie" at, 121 
 
 Les Maures, mountains of, 87 
 
 Lex Pedia, 161 
 
 Libica, the name of the two most 
 westerly mouths of the Rhone, 
 48 
 
 Libui, the, 48 
 
 Ligures capillati, 51, 52 
 
 Ligures tonsi, 51, 52 
 
 Liguria, early distribution of races 
 in, I ; traces of pre-historic man 
 in, I ; withdrawal of Hannibal to, 
 35; invasion of, by Hasdrubal 
 and Mago, 36-44; Carthaginian 
 attempt to create diversion in, 
 37 ; Eastern campaigns in, 5,7- 
 68 ; Transalpine, conquest of, 
 77-88 
 
 Ligurian, the, 80 years' war, 78 
 
 Ligurian oppida in Provence, 53 
 
 Ligurians, the, 45-56 ; possession 
 of N.W. Mediterranean coast line 
 by, 9; of Western Riviera, inter- 
 necine warfare of, 38; the oldest 
 family in Western Europe, 45 ; 
 two kinds of, 51 ; nothing known 
 of the religious obsen-ances of, 
 53; defeat by Aemilius Paulus, 
 76 ; identity of battle cry used by 
 Ambrones and Ligurians, 113 
 
 "Lig^sticus, Lacus," 49 
 
 "Ligustine" city, 49 
 
 Ligyes, the, 48, 49 
 
 Livia, wife of Tib. Claudius Nero, 
 and afterwards of Augustus, 
 mother of Emperor Tiberius, 
 149 
 
 Livius, M., prolongation of the 
 "Imperium" of, 40 
 
 Livy's date as to appearance of 
 Celts in Italy rejected, 11; on 
 Hannibal's Passage, 29-31 ; names 
 preserved by, in connection with 
 Hannibal's march from the Py- 
 renees to the Alps, 32 
 
 Longinus, Cassius, destruction of 
 the army of, 103 
 
 Lucan, Pharsalia, Book in., speci- 
 men from Rowe's version of the 
 sea-fight, 145, 146 
 
 Lucretius, Spurius, prolongation of 
 "Imperium" of, 40 
 
 Lucterius, 136
 
 INDEX. 
 
 191 
 
 Lucus, 91 
 
 Lumone, Roman Station of, 175 
 
 Luna, an Etruscan city, 65 ; colony 
 
 of, 65, 66, 67 
 Lyons, Roman colony at, 134; the 
 
 Roman capital of Gallia Comata, 
 
 162 
 
 Magalus, a chief of the Boii, 24 
 Mago, invasion of Cisalpine Gaul 
 by Hasdrubal and, 36-44 ; at- 
 tempt to retrieve Hannibal's for- 
 tunes by, 37 ; swims the Po, 37 ; 
 battle at the Trebia decided by, 
 37; wounded, 41; death of, 42; 
 Genoa singled out for attack by, 
 52 ; abandonment of the Ingauni 
 
 by, 71 
 
 Mallius, L., proconsul of Provincia, 
 123; summoned to Spain, ib.; 
 defeat there, 123, 124 
 
 Mancinus, C. Hostilius, consul, 158 
 
 Manlius, praetor, 26; annihilation 
 of the army of, by the Ambrones, 
 104 
 
 Mantua defended by its surround- 
 ing marshes, 18 
 
 Marcellus, ambuscade of, 115, 117 
 
 Marcius, L., consul, 63 ; disaster to 
 the army of, 64 
 
 Marengo, battlefield of, 155 
 
 Maria, association of the name of, 
 with Marius, 1 2 1 
 
 Marian faction, 122, 123 
 
 Marius, annihilation of the Am- 
 brones and Teutones by, 52 ; 
 Italian Ligurians in the army of, 
 76; confidence of the people in, 
 104; monument to, at Glanum, 
 107 ; successes of, over the Am- 
 brones and Teutones, 11 4-1 17; 
 fall of, 117, 118; triumphal 
 monument of, 118; secret letters 
 of, to the chiefs, 120; Roman 
 internecine struggles under the 
 leadership of, ib. ; still a popular 
 name in Provence, ib. 
 
 Marius and the Cimbro-Teuton in- 
 vasion, I 01- 108 
 
 Martha, a Syrian prophetess, iii, 
 121 
 
 Martha, association of the name of, 
 with Marius, 121 
 
 Marseilles, discovery of stone tab- 
 let at, 13; foundation of, 13, 14, 
 15 ; rapid rise of commerce of, 
 15; places of honour reserved 
 for the Massiliots at public games 
 in Rome, 16; commercial pros- 
 perity of, due to the Romans, 16; 
 
 mutual services rendered between 
 Marseilles and Rome, ib. ; situa- 
 tion of, 21; foundation of, 49 ; 
 founding of ' Antipolis ' by the 
 Massiliots, 79; governing body 
 of, 1 38, 139; defeat of the fleet 
 of, 1 46; siege and blockades of, 
 137-148; violation by the Mas- 
 siliots of the armistice granted by 
 the Romans, 147; surrender of 
 the city, 148 
 
 Massilia, see Marseilles 
 
 Matienus, C, naval force under, 
 73; victory' of, 76 
 
 Maximus, Quintus Fabius, consul, 
 71, 92; victory of, 93; triumph 
 of, 95; honours, ib. 
 
 ' Menhir ' near Brignolles, 53 
 
 Mercury, statue of the Arv'erne, 93 
 
 Metaurus, battle of the river, 37 
 
 Milan, falls into the hands of the 
 Romans, 19 
 
 Milestones, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 
 182, 183, 184 
 
 Milvian bridge, battle at, 123; ar- 
 rest of conspirators at, 129 
 
 Mistral, the, 147 
 
 Modena, siege of, by Marc An- 
 tony, 1 5 1 
 
 Mommsen, Th., on Hannibal's Pas- 
 sage, 30 ; on the Via Aurelia, 
 165; composition of the route 
 from Rome to the Var, 172 
 
 Monaco, Greek colony from Mas- 
 silia, 15 
 
 Moneglia (Ad Monilia), 70 
 
 Montelimar, 25 
 
 Miillenhof, K., on the Ligurians, 
 
 45-47 
 Mutina, colony of, 44 
 Mutina, see also Modena 
 
 Napoleon L, on the secret of Ro- 
 man successes, 74 
 Napoule (Ad Horrea), 181 
 Narbo Martius, colony of, 127 
 Narbonensis, Provincia, 59 
 Narbonne, Celtic Emporium at, 12 ; 
 colonization of, 84 ; Roman en- 
 deavour to secure land thorough- 
 fare to, 99 ; colony at, loi, 149 
 Nasidius, L., sent to the relief of 
 the Massiliots, 143, 144; cow- 
 ardice of the navy of, 145, 146 
 Nemetocenna (Arras), Caesar's last 
 
 winter in Gaul spent at, 136 
 Nero, Claudius, consul, 37 
 Nero, Tiberius Claudius, sent by 
 Caesar to plant colonies in Gaul, 
 149
 
 192 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Nicaea, colony at, 15, 79; siege of, 
 
 ib. 
 Nimes, native settlement at, 33 
 Numantia, siege and capture of, 50, 
 
 84, 98 
 Numatianus, Rutilius, on his return 
 
 journey from Rome to Gaul, 173 
 Numidians attack Scipio's cavalry, 
 
 23 
 
 Octavianus, claims of, 150, 151 ", 
 marches into Gallia Cisalpina, 
 151; elected consul, 160; gets 
 the 'Lex Pedia' passed, 161; 
 appointed Triumvir, 161 
 
 Octavius, Cnaeus, capture of Mago's 
 merchantmen by, 39 
 
 Olbia, colony at, 15 
 
 Olympus, Mt, 116 
 
 Opimius, Quintus, consul, 80, 81 ; 
 camp of, 82 ; campaign of, 88 ; 
 conquest of territory by, 99 
 
 Orange. 24, 25 
 
 Orha, river, 154, 155 
 
 Orgon, III, 112 
 
 Orosius, supposed acquaintance with 
 the lost books of Livy by, 60 
 
 Oxybii, the, 79, 80, 81, 83, 87, 
 
 Pain de Munition, 55, 56, 114, 115 
 Pansa, Vibius, consul, 151 
 Papiria, wife of Aemilius Paulus, 
 
 70 ; divorce, 7 1 
 Parma, colony of, 44 
 Pedius, Quintus, consul, 160 
 Perperna, legate of M. Lepidus, 
 
 senior, 123 
 Petreius, 137 
 Peutinger, Table of, 13, 137, 154, 
 
 163, 164, 174, 176, 184 
 Philistus, on the Ligurians, 48 
 Phocaeans, 2 1 
 Picenates, 156 
 Pisa, Roman colonists around, 51 ; 
 
 Roman milestone in the Campo 
 
 Santo at, bearing the name of 
 
 Via Aemilia, 167 
 Pisae, 60, 61 
 Piso, Calpumius, insurrection of the 
 
 AUobroges quelled by, 128 
 Piso, Lucius, 103 
 Pitot, J. J. A., "Recherches sur les 
 
 AntiquitesDauphinoises,"i32, 133 
 Placentia, military colony planted 
 
 at, 19, 10 ; failure of Hannibal to 
 
 get possession of, 35 ; siege of 
 
 the fortress of, by Hasdrubal, 37 ; 
 
 Hamilcar plans seizure of, 43; 
 
 destruction of, by Hamilcar, 43 ; 
 
 recovery of its position as Roman 
 centre in Cisalpine Gaul, 44 
 Plancus, L. Munatius, governor of 
 Gallia Ulterior, 134; letter to 
 Cicero, 158, 159, 183; returns to 
 Grenoble, 160; abandons Cicero, 
 ib. 
 Po, the, swum by Mago, 37 
 Po valley, Etruscans driven from, 
 18; Hasdrubal's unexpected ar- 
 rival, 36 
 Polcevere, river of Genoa, 53 
 Polybius, incompetence of, as a 
 geographer, 27, 28; Four Passes 
 of, 32 
 Pompey, opening of the pass of 
 Mt Genevre by, 31; crossing of 
 the Cottian Alps by, 91 ; repu- 
 tation of, 124; summoned to the 
 rescue of Italy, ib.\ letter to the 
 Roman Senate, 124, 125, 126; 
 his passage across the Alps, 124, 
 
 125 
 
 Pomptinus, C, insurrection of the 
 AUobroges quelled by, 128, 130; 
 triumph voted for, 130, 131; 
 final subjugation of the AUo- 
 broges by, 133 
 
 Pons Argenteus, 160 
 
 Pont Flavien, at St Chamas, 56 
 
 Ponte Lungo, r74 
 
 Porcius, L., praetor, 36 
 
 Porta Aurelia, 165 
 
 Porta Decumana, 75 
 
 Porta Flaminia, 63 
 
 Porta Galhca, 88, 182 
 
 Porta Praetoria, 75 
 
 Porta Principalis, 75 
 
 Porta Romana, 181, 182 
 
 Portus Herculis Monoeci (Monaco), 
 78 
 
 Portus Lunae, 67 
 
 Poseidonius, on the habits of the 
 Ligurian natives, 50 
 
 Pourrieres, defeat of the Teutones 
 near, 114-117; relics from the 
 battle field, 118 
 
 Procillus, Caius Valerius, Roman 
 franchise conferred on, 121 
 
 Provence, never occupied or con- 
 quered by Gauls, 13 ; Ligurian 
 oppida in, 53 
 
 Provincia, conquest of, 97, 98, 99 ; 
 misgovemment of, 120; coloniza- 
 tion of, 121, 122; its situation, 
 122 ; Gallic element in, 127 ; in 
 relation to Caesar's Gallic and 
 Civil Wars, 132-139 
 
 Provincia Narbonensis, administra- 
 tion of, 162
 
 INDEX. 
 
 193 
 
 "Provincia Romana," 5 
 
 Punic War, First, 16, 17; Second, 
 
 17. 36, 37; Third, 84 
 Punic Wars, 11 
 Puy de Dome, 93 
 
 Quiliano, 153, 154 
 Quintana, 153 
 
 Raucillus, friend of Caesar, 133 
 Reclus, E. , on the Ligurians, 45 
 Red Rocks, cave dwelHngs of the, 
 
 175 
 Reinach, S., 11 
 Renan, E., on the existence of a 
 
 previous Phoenician settlement at 
 
 Marseilles, 14 
 Reno, river, 161 
 Rhone, the, a dividing line between 
 
 the Iberians and Ligurians, 10 ; 
 
 difficult navigation of, 22 ; cutting 
 
 of a new mouth to the, 106 
 Rhone valley, Hannibal in the, 
 
 17-26; physical features of, 33; 
 
 invasion of, by the Cimbri and 
 
 Teutones, 97 
 Rigi-Culm, 125 
 Riviera, Italian, Ligurians of the, 
 
 ' Riviera di Levante,' 69 
 
 Roman Province, the, from the 
 victoiy of Marius to the pro- 
 consulship of Julius Caesar, 119- 
 
 131 
 
 Romans, allies of the Massiliots, 
 16; defeat of, at the battle of the 
 Allia, 18 
 
 Romans and Ligurians, first fight- 
 ing. 57 
 
 Rome, burning of, 16, 18, loi, 102; 
 date of the institution of a stand- 
 ing army at, 105 
 
 Roqueljrune, 88 
 
 Roquemaure, 26 
 
 Rossi, G., Storia de Vintimiglia, 
 175 note 
 
 Ruscino, township, 32 
 
 Sabatii, Roman alliance with the, 
 70 
 
 St Cassien, hillock of, 180 
 
 St Chamas, 56 
 
 St Charles, hill of, 140 
 
 St Maximin, 184 
 
 St Pierre d'Albigny, 28, 30 
 
 St Roche, chapel of, 175 
 
 Sainte Victore, Mt, 112, 115, 116 
 
 Salamis, battle of, 14 
 
 Sallust, on the Passage of Hanni- 
 bal, 31 
 
 Salluvii, the, 13, 49, 53, 79, 80, 86, 
 87, 89, 97, 121 
 
 Salyes, the, sec Salluvii 
 
 Savona, Mago withdraws to, 38 
 
 Scaurus, Aemilius, 63, 152 
 
 Scipio Aemilianus, 50 
 
 Scipio Africanus, rescue of Publius 
 Scipio by, 34 ; final defeat of 
 Hannibal by, 42 
 
 Scipio Africanus, the younger, siege 
 and capture of Numantia by, 98 
 
 Scipio, Cnaeus, sent to Spain with 
 army by Publius Scipio, 26 
 
 Scipio Nasica, final subjugation of 
 the Boii by, 18; ends the resist- 
 ance of the Boii, 44; cruelty of, ib. 
 
 Scipio, Publius Cornelius, consul, 
 17, 18; detaches one of the 
 legions intended for Spain to 
 assist the Romans in Cisalpine 
 Gaul, 20; disembarks at the 
 mouth of Marseilles, 21, 23 ; 
 sails to Genoa, 26 
 
 Scrivia, the, 53 
 
 Sembola, Monte, 177 
 
 Sempronius, disaster of Marcius 
 avenged by, 64; consul, 71 
 
 Sempronius, Tiberius, consul, 17, 
 18; rashness of, 34 
 
 Sena Gallica, Roman colony, 19 
 
 Senones, extermination of, from 
 Roman territory, 19 
 
 Sertorius, rebellion of, in Spain, 97 ; 
 Radical faction take service under, 
 122; suppliesto, by Perperna, 123; 
 attempt of, to cross the Alps 
 frustrated by Pompey, 124 
 
 Servile War, the, 117, 119, 120 
 
 Sestri-Levante, 69 
 
 Sezze, commune of, 154, 155 
 
 Siagne, river, 79 
 
 Sicinius, Cn., triumvir, 65 
 
 Sigovesus, Celts under, 1 1 
 
 Sikhs, the, compared to the Ingauni, 
 76 
 
 Silanus, M. Junius, defeat of, no 
 
 Silures, 8, 9 
 
 Spain, Carthaginian power in, 17; 
 Roman endeavour to secure land 
 thoroughfare to, 99 
 
 Spezia, harbour of, 67 
 
 Strabo, Celts and Germans are of 
 kindred blood, 2 ; divisions of 
 Gaul, 6 ; comparison of Gauls 
 and Germans by, 7; former ex- 
 tension of Iberia, 10; extension of 
 the over-lordship of the Arvemi, 
 12, 13; on the Via Aemilia, 167 
 
 Strada Romana, 168, 169, 174, 175 
 
 Stura, valley of the, 32 
 
 H. 
 
 13
 
 194 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Sylla, capture of Copillus by, 104; 
 Roman internecine struggles un- 
 der the leadership of, 120; pro- 
 scriptions of, 122; death of, ib. 
 
 Syrian prophetess in the army of 
 Marius, iii 
 
 Tauroenta, battle at, 144, 145 
 Tauroentum, Greek colony at, 15 
 Tectosages, the ancestors of the 
 
 Galatians, 7 note\ a branch of 
 
 the Volcae, 12 
 Terillus, tyrant of Himera, 11 
 Teutomalius, King of the Salluvii, 
 
 92, 95 
 
 Teuton priestesses, iii 
 
 Teutones, use of caravans by, 9; an- 
 nihilation of, 52, 114; slaughter 
 of, 85 ; invasion of the Rhone 
 valley by the, 97 
 
 Teutones and Ambrones, prepara- 
 tions of, to cross the Rhone, no; 
 encampment of, and fight vi^ith 
 the Romans, 112 
 
 Thierry, Amedee, Histoire des Gau- 
 lois, I, 7 
 
 Ticinus, the, cavalry encounter near, 
 
 34. 37 
 Tigurini, Helvetian, 103 
 Timaeus, on the date of the original 
 
 settlement of Marseilles, 14 
 Tortona, see Dertona 
 Toulouse, massacre of the Roman 
 
 garrison at Tolosa, 105; outbreak 
 
 of the Volcae Tectosages at, 120 
 Tourves, 183 
 
 Trajectus Rhodani, 30, 97, 98 
 Trasimene Lake, battle of, 62 
 Trebia, victory of the Carthaginians 
 
 at the, 34; battle at the, decided 
 
 by Mago, 37 
 Trebonius, Caius, takes over the 
 
 siege operations of Marseilles by 
 
 land, 139; volunteers furnished 
 
 by, 142 
 Tricastini, the, 32 
 Triumvirate, Octavianus, M. Anto- 
 
 nius, and M. Lepidus appointed 
 
 a, 161 
 Tricorii, the, 33 
 Turbia, monument to Augustus at, 
 
 162 
 Turin (Taurini), descent of Hannibal 
 
 on, 32 
 
 Umbria, Cisalpine Gauls in, 18 
 Uvezes, river, 91 
 
 Uxellodunum, siege and capture of, 
 136 
 
 Var, the, 79 
 
 Vada Sabata, 70, 82, 152, 153, 156, 
 167, 174 
 
 Vada Volaterrana, 164, 165, 167 
 
 Varro, on the Passage of Hannibal, 
 31; Five Passes of, 32 
 
 Varus, Q., takes up the command 
 of M. Livius, 40 
 
 Vediantii, the, 80 
 
 Veil, spoil of, 16 
 
 Ventidius, Antony's lieutenant, 153; 
 junction of the army of, with An- 
 tony, 159 
 
 Vercellae, destruction of the Cimbri 
 at, 118 
 
 Vercingetorix, stmggle of the Ar- 
 verni under, 96 ; Caesar's victory 
 over, 119; attack on Vienna by, 
 135 ; defeated by Caesar, 135, 136; 
 surrender, 136 
 
 Via Aemilia Lepidi, 63, 168, 172 
 
 Via Aemilia Scauri, 70, 152-156, 
 168-170 
 
 Via Aurelia, 99, 100, 152, 163-185 
 
 Via Domitia, 96, 98, 99, 166, 184 
 
 Via Flaminia, 63, 129, 168, 172 
 
 Via Heraclea, 98 
 
 Via Julia Augusta, 81, 170-177 
 
 Via Levata, 154, 155 
 
 Via Massiliensis, 179 
 
 Via Postumia, 53, 152, 173 
 
 Via Principalis, 75 
 
 Via Quintana, 75 
 
 Via Vintiana, 180 
 
 Vienna, native settlement at, 33 ; 
 the chief settlement of the Allo- 
 broges, ib.; colony at, 133; im- 
 portance of, to Caesar, 134; de- 
 scription of, 134, 135 
 
 Vintimiglia, 77, 79, 88 note, 175 _ 
 
 Villefranche, 78 
 
 Vindalium, Allobroges defeated at 
 92 
 
 Vocontii, the, 32, 90, 91, 131 
 
 Volcae established on the Mediter 
 ranean sea-board, 12; clients of 
 the Arverni, 13; tribes of the 
 recorded in Livy, 32 
 
 Volcae Arecomici, 90, 95 
 
 Volcae Tectosages, rebellion of the; 
 105, 120 
 
 Wales, population of, mainly Iber 
 
 ian, 8 
 Welsh, derivation of the name, 12 
 Waterloo, 116 
 
 Zama, defeat of Hannibal at, 42 
 
 CAMBRIDGE: PRINTED BY J. AND C. F. CLAY, AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
 
 SECTION OF TABT.E of PEVTl^G^Kfr/Zic^AD.JSfa) 
 
 SHOWING THE ROMAN POST-STATIONS ON THE VI A AURELI A (COAST ROAo) AND VIA COTTIA (MONT GENEVRE) BETWEEN ARLES AND THE ALPS . 
 
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