Pj^t^;^'^ -■-■• rv >1: pr ^-. ;?* > ■-' i^i'^nn '^nx> * "iriM A"?V \. » '' " "f* ; B 3t>«3 S7 t2 .NIVERSITY OF CALIFO Nli ■ Hv^^ ,. *^ ■ ■?': \- ^ ■ B'V V ■ K ^ ^ w t^ i. ' V^ •■'. . ■ I t- c^.^W ^ n> •-na'^ . » . < SA /^V • ■ ^'•'^-^ -» ^M l3t ,v-. ^« « ■ CM V J^ -*^ %v N UK!.'.- - IV OF SAN CILGO /. /"' A^-- B .57 THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM ANTONIO ROSMINI-SERBATI THE PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF ANTONIO ,ROSMINI-SERBATI TRANSLATED, WITH A SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR'S LIFE, BIBLIOGRAPHY, INTRODUCTION, AND NOTES BY THOMAS DAVIDSON LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., i, PATERNOSTER SQUARE (JThe rights of tramlatioti attci of reproduction are reserz>ed.) TO HER HIGHNESS THE PRINCESS CAROLYNE OF SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN, Whose rank is inferior to her piety, intellect, and worth ; whose devotion to her own creed is equalled only by her tolerance for all other creeds believed in sincerity of heart ; who has always en- couraged me to pursue clear truth without thought of compromise, and to whom I owe, among many other great benefits, my first acquaintance with Rosmini, I dedicate this work, as a slight token of gratitude and affection. THOMAS DAVIDSON. PREFACE. The purpose of the present work is threefold : fi}'st, to introduce the most important of modern ItaHan philosophical systems to the notice of English-speak- ing thinkers who have not had an opportunity of studying it in the original language ; second, to present it fairly to those for whom it has been systematically misrepresented ; and, t/rn^d, to furnish an introductory handbook to the study of modern Italian thought, so little known outside of Italy. With the exception of a small work edited by Father Lockhart, a brief notice in the American translation of Ueberweg's Handbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, an essay by Monseigneur Ferre, a few notices in Brownson's Quarterly Review, and a few sketches by myself in various periodicals, there exists hardly anything in English on Rosmini.* Of systematic attempts that have been made to stir up an odium theologicum against Rosmini's system, it would be inedifying to say anything more than is said in the Introduction. The present condition of thought in Northern Europe is such that no apology * See Bibliography. Vlll PREFACE. seems needed for directinof the attention of Enorllsh thinkers to a school of philosophy which professes, by combining ancient with modern thought, to find an absolute criterion of certainty, and to afford a firm assurance of much that more one-sided systems are constrained to abandon. Rosmini has exerted a wide and most beneficial influence on the thought of Italy, an influence equalled in degree only by that of Aristotle and Kant. Indeed, it may be safely affirmed that no one can read Rosmini's works with- out, voluntarily or involuntarily, being Impressed by them. When I first resolved to present an outline of Rosmini's philosophy in an English dress, three courses seemed open to me — either to translate some one of the numerous rdsiunds of it, which have appeared in Italy, to write an original account of it myself, or in some way to introduce Rosmini as speaking in his own person. That the first of these courses was hardly feasible, I discovered on carefully examining the rdstmids referred to. Even those of Buroni, and of Calza and Perez, which would best have answered my purposes, I found open to grave objections. The former, as its title sufficiently in- dicates,* contains a good deal of irrelevant matter ; while the latter is not only too extensive, but, thanks to underhand ecclesiastical influence, has never been completed, the third volume remaining unpublished. As to the second alternative, frequent attempts to * Deir Essere e del Conoscere. Studii su rarmenide, Platone e Rosmini. PREFACE. IX convey the true meaning of Rosmini's thought to others in my own language convinced me that the difficulty of presenting it was far greater than I had supposed. Seeing myself, therefore, shut up to the third course, I came to the conclusion that I should best attain my end by adopting, as the basis of my work, the Sistema Filosojico or rSsumd of Rosmini's system, compiled by the author for Cantu's Storia Universale, accompanying it with explanations of my own and parallel passages from his longer works. In this way, I hoped to afford a general notion of the whole, and at the same time to impart a special knowledge of its more characteristic and essential features. The sections of the Sistema, therefore, correspond to the Dictate which German philosophers not unfrequently read to their students to be written down verbatim, while the notes or excu7^sus answer to their viva voce explanations or lectures. The Introduction is intended to show the position which Rosmini's philosophy occupies with reference to other systems, ancient and modern, and in the universal history of human thought. As far as possible I have allowed Rosmini to speak for himself. Only in a few cases have I introduced condensations, explanations, and criti- cisms of my own, and several of these last deal with the relation of Rosmini's doctrines to systems that have been promulgated since his death. In all ways it has been my aim to make clear what seem to me the essential points of the system, those points X PREFACE. which constitute it a remedy against the idealisms, materiaHsms, and scepticisms by which the thought of the present day is wasted. In reference to the sketch of Rosmini's life, I ought to say that I have written it from a standpoint not entirely my own. This I deemed both courteous and permissible, all the more so that in an article in the Foi'tnightly Review I have dwelt with sufficient emphasis on what seem to me the limitations of his character and the defects of his religious creed. The Bibliography is as nearly complete as I have been able to make it. Of its defects I have spoken in a note prefatory to it. The footnotes, which are all due to me, will, it is hoped, be useful to the reader, and will not draw upon the writer the charge of excessive pedantry. I have tried to turn Rosmini's somewhat diffuse Italian into readable English, and, I am well aware, with only partial success. Those, however, who best know the difficulties of rendering the philosophical style and terminology of one language into those of another, will, I am sure, be most indulgent toward my shortcomings. I w^ould respectfully ask those who may feel inclined to blame me for employing such words as intuite, exigence, etc., to suggest other less objectionable words fitted to fill with credit the places of these. I would likewise ask those who, from an outside point of view, whether Hegelian, Comtian, Spencerian, or any other, may, at the first glance, feel incHned to cast aside Rosminianism as o PREFACE. XI merely resuscitated Scholasticism, to reserve their judgment until they are sure they have a full and complete comprehension of the system. It is difficult to comprehend : this ought to be frankly admitted. This difficulty, however, is due, not so much to the system itself, as to the fact that much of the terminology in which it is expressed has, in recent centuries, been so wrested from its proper use and meaning as to be now almost incapable of con- veying truth. This is especially true with regard to such terms as subject, object, intuition, perception^ intelligence, feeling, etc., which in the mouths of most modern thinkers have little or no intelligible meaning. For years I found it very difficult to enter into Rosmini's thought, and I feel quite sure that no one, without a most careful study of his terms, will be much more fortunate than I was. With a view to facilitating this study, I have included in my notes as many definitions as possible, and have placed an index of them at the end of the volume. As the whole of the work, with the exception of the translation of the Sistema and a few parts of the Bibliography, was written in a remote village of the Piedmontese Alps, where I had access to few books beyond that portion of my own library which I had been able to transport thither, a few quotations and references had to be taken at second hand. For any inaccuracy that may occur in these I must crave the reader's indulgence. In conclusion, I beg to return my most sincere XI 1 PREFACE. thanks to the members of the Rosminian Order for numerous acts of kindness and courtesy displayed to me in the course of my researches into the hfe and philosophy of their Founder, and to say that, though they have encouraged me in the publication of this work, they are in no way responsible for any opinion expressed by me in reference either to the doctrines of Rosmini or to the views and purposes of those who have attacked these doctrines. I am informed, on good authority, that they intend soon to publish an English translation of Rosmini's first important work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas. I have further to thank my friend, Dr. J. Burns- Gibson, for reading over the proofs of the work. London, February 27, 1882. CONTENTS, 77?^ Contents of the Notes are preceded by a (^ — ). PAGE Sketch of Rosmini's Life ... ... ... ... ... xxv Bibliography of Rosmini's Works ... ... ... ... H Bibliography of Works bearing on Rosmini's Life and Philosophy ... ... ... ... ... ... ixxii Introduction ... ... ... ... ... ... Ixxxix PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Introductory. § I. What is Philosophy? — Various definitions ... ... ... i § 2. Ultimate grounds.^Formal, real, and moral grounds ... ... 4 § 3. Philosophy general and special. — Philosophy and Science ... 8 §4. Point of departure — Experience ... ... ... ... 9 §5. Different forms of mental quiet. — Nature of assent ... ... n § 6. Popular and philosophical knowing ... ... ... ... 15 §7. Philosophy the restorer of repose of intellect .. ... ... 16 § 8. Difference between demonstration and persuasion. — Direct, popular, and philosophical science ... ... .. ... ... 16 § 9. The first questions put by philosophy and their consequences. — Philo- sophy, regressive and progressive. Four starting-points distin- guished ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 19 Sciences of Intuition. I. Ideology. §10. Ideology and Logic. — Rosmini's chief merit in philosophy ... 22 § II. Internal observation the method of Ideology. — Philosophy does not begin with an hypothesis, as Hegel thought ... ... 27 §12. Objection to the validity of observation answered ... ... 30 § 13. Human cognitions, though innumerable, have a common element. — Abstraction § 14. Cognition of real entities is an internal affirmation or judgment. — Synthesis must precede analysis. Kant and his .synthetic judg- ments ^ //wr? ... ... ... ... ... ... 22 § 15. The notion of being in general is a necessary condition of the cog- nition of particular real beings. — Real and ideal being. Ideal being innate. St. Thomas quoted ... .. ... ... 36 31 XIV CONTENTS. PAGE § 1 6. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes of human cognitions. — Intuition and perception ... ... 40 §17. Order of the two classes. — Universality ; its nature ... ... 41 § 18. Being in general and particular being. By intuition we know the essence of being. — Being has two modes. Aristotle and the Ger- man school criticized for confounding the two. Kant. Hegelian Logic ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 44 § 19. When I affirm a particular real being, what do I know more than before ? The cause of affirmation is a feeling. The formula for affirmative cognitions. — Real being. Intellective perception sees passivity on its obverse side as activity ... ... ... 59 § 20. What this formula presupposes. It is feeling that constitutes the reality of being. — Subject and object. The ancient meaning differs from the modern ... § 21. In what sense the essence of being is universal. — Principle and term 64 § 22. Examination of the objections to the identification of reality with feeling. — Matter. Pure reality .. ... ... ... 66 § 23. Identity between the essence of being and the activity manifested in feeling. — Ideal and real being ... ... ... ... 69 §24. This identity imperfect. — Universality... ... ... ... 70 § 25. The essence of being is realized in the difference, as Avell as in the identity of real being ... ... ... ... ... 73 § 26. Corollaries derived from the identity of the essence of being and the multiplicity of its realizations ... ... ... ... 73 § 27. Quantity belongs to the realization, not to the essence, of being. — Parmenides. The One and the Many ... ... • • • 75 § 28. Ideas which make known the negation of being. All ideas of par- ticular beings consist of positive and negative. There is but one idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are relations of it. — Negative and particular ideas ... ... ... ... 79 § 29. In respect to quantity, the essence of being and beings perceived by us are different, not identical. — Contingency... ... ... 81 § 30. The identity between the essence of being and real beings exists between them only in so far as they are known ... ... 82 § 31. It is only as known that real being identifies itself with ideal being. Perception not less true on that account. — Universality not derived from things ... ... ... ... ... ... 83 § 32. Why we think we do not know the ground of things. — The intellect knows things in an absolute mode. Passion and action. Intel- lective perception ... ... ... ... ... 84 § 33- Why being, as a means of cognition, is called ideal. — Rosmini's system not idealism. Mezn?, sub qtio ... ... ... 87 § 34. The essence of being is self- intelligible and forms the intelligibility of all other things. The idea of being is the light of reason, is inborn, and is the form of intelligence. — The idea of being not derived from external sensation, feeling of our own existence, reflection or the act of perception. It is, therefore, innate. Mean- ing of /«««/<; ... ... ... ..• ... ... 88 § 35. Meaning of the word form. Two senses of the word form. In which of the two senses is the idea o/beinj used ? Object and Sub- CONTENTS. XV ject and their relation. Kant's forms not objective, but subjective. — Form of cognition. Criticism of Kant's Table of Categories. The modal categories — necessary, actual, possible ... ... 92 § 36. All intelligence is reducible to thinking being as realized in a cer- tain manner, with certain limits. — Though the soul is finite, its means of cognizing is infinite ... ... ... ... 106 § 37. In what sense ideal being is said to be possible. — Ideal being, being in itself, and being as object ... ... ... ... 108 § 38. How possible and ideal beings are said to be many.— Concept is one ; the things conceived are many ... ... ... 109 § 39. Ideality a mode of being incapable of being confounded with reality 1 10 § 40. Differences between ideas and the things known by means of them in §41. Essence known through idea ; subsistence, through affirmation on occasion of a feeling. — Contingent things have two inconfusible modes of being ... ... ... ... ... ... 112 § 42. How in perception we unite ideal being with feeling. — Rosmini's Theory of Cognition ... ... ... ... ... 114 § 43. Objection to calling intellective perception a judgment. Answer. The objection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term. — Difference between Rosmini and Kant. Reid ... 119 § 44. Is this affirmation a judgment ? No judgment is possible without the union of its terms. — The elements of a judgment are com- bined by nature ... ... ... ... ... 124 § 45. In intellective perception, it is not intelligence, but nature, that unites the terms of the judgment. This judgment produces its own subject. — Kant's errors ... ... ... ... 126 § 46. The ierm judgmejit Aoes not express the nature of affirmation, but a subsequent reflection analyzes it. — The terms of a judgment are perceived as one ... ... ... ... ... 128 § 47. Reflection, in analyzing a judgment, distinguishes, but does not sepa- rate, its elements. Subject and predicate do not exist prior to the judgment, but are formed in the act of judgment. — Direct and reflexive cognition ... ... ... ... ... 129 § 48. Difference- between primitive affirmations and other judgments. The nature of the primitive judgment further illustrated. — The predicate is contained in the concept of the subject ... ... 132 § 49. The primitive judgment may also be called the primitive synthesis. — Perception spontaneous, abstraction voluntary ... ... 136 § 50. Convertibility of the terms of the primitive judgment. — Ancient mode of expressing judgments ... ... ... ... 137 § 51. Solution of the problem of the origin of ideas. — The Light of Reason ... ... ... ... ... ... 138 § 52. N'ew Essay and Restoration of Philosophy. — Logic the link be- tween Ideology and Metaphysics ... ... ... ... 139 2. Logic. § 53. Logic. — Aristotelian and Hegelian Logic ... ... ... 140 § 54. Aim of reasoning and nature of conviction. — Certainty and its con- ditions... ... ... ... ••• ••• ••• 15S xvi CONTENTS. §55. Twofold office of Logic ... ... ... ... ... IS9 § 56. What is truth? Truth is the form of our intelligence. — Truth and being synonymous terms. Criticism ... ... ... 159 §57. Contirmation of the same doctrine. — Meaning of truth ... ... 162 § 58. Transcendental scepticism objects to the doctrine that the mind by its nature possesses the first truth. Reply. In the case of uni- versal being, illusion is impossible. Two kinds of being. Proof of the impossibility of the first illusion. — No concept illusory ... 163 §59. The impossibility of the second illusion proved ... ... 165 § 60. Transition from observation to the proof that observation is a valid source of knowledge. 'Mtdimngol abstract .,, ... ... 166 § 61. Error impossible in ideas generic and specific. Ideas the exemplary truths of things ... ... ... ... ... ... 167 §62. There can be no error without a judgment. — Aristotle cited ... 168 § 63. There are judgments absolutely free from error. — Nouns and verbs 169 § 64. Such are the judgments expressing what is contained in an idea. What are principles? Meaning of absurd. — Principle of con- tradiction. Aristotle cited ... ... ... ... 172 § 65. Primitive judgments affirming that what is felt exists are free from error. The child affirms being only, not its modes. — No doubt respecting feeling as such. Individiuivi vagtim ... ... 1 74 § 66. In perception we add the essence of being to the felt activity, but we never confound the two. — Perception distinguished from sen- sation. Theories of Reid and Hamilton ... ... ... 176 § 67. Judgments respecting the mode of perceived beings. Condition of their validity. Three possibilities with regard to this condition. We may be deceived in determining the modes of perceived being ; but we are not necessarily so. — Origin of error ... iSo § 68. We have a faculty for affirming exactly what we feel, and this faculty is only another function of the faculty whereby we affirm being apart from its modes. Deception arises, not from this faculty, but from the faculty of error which I allow to disturb it. — St. Thomas on faith ... ... ... ... ... 182 § 69. The error possible in the perception of real being. Perception is followed by reflection, which tries to determine the exact mode of the perceived being. Error begins with reflection and keeps pace with the complication and extent of it. — Nature of reflec- tion ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 184 § 70. Perception infallible. Reflection may be rendered so by Logic. — Province of Logic ... ... ... ... ... 186 § 71. Error is always voluntary. Reflection does not, save accidentally, produce error. The faculty of persuasion does not always de- pend, as it ought, on that of reasoning. Hence error. Various causes that produce persuasion, in spite of reasoning. Error, though always voluntary, is not always culpable. — Occasional causes of error ... ... ... ... ... ... jgy § 72. Three kinds of remedies against error, corresponding to its three sources ... ... ... ... ... ... igg §73. Sophistic. — Various kinds of .Sophisms ... ... ... 189 § 74. More on perception. Analysis of corporeal sensations. Law of CONTENTS, XVI 1 intellectual attention. The necessary nexus of objects does not enter into perception. — Sensation, sensitive perception and in- tellective perception distinguished. Perception limited to its object. Object zxiA te7'77t ... ... ... ... ... 190 § 75- Source of Fichte's error, confusion between feeling and perception. Perception separates, reflection distinguishes, its object from others. — Refutation of Fichte's system. Distinction between knowledge and consciousness. Nature of the -ff^i? ... ... 194 § 76. Schelling's error in asserting that the finite cannot be perceived without the infinite. Origin of this error, confusion between intellective perception and reasoning ... ... ... 202 § 77- How reason finds the limits, contingency, etc., of perceived beings. Schelling saw dimly, but could not express the fact that the mind, prior to all reasonings, must have something complete and uni- versal. — Refutation of Pantheism. Albertus Magnus on the active intellect ... ... ... .,. ... ... 204 § 78. Defence of the laws of perception and reasoning against the objec- tions of sceptics. In external sensation we feel within us a force which is not ourselves. This enables us to affirm that a being exists without confounding it with ourselves. — Objects of per- ception. Intellective imagination. Subject 2M.A extra-subject ... 207 § 79. Perception is the bridge between us and the external world, and the difficulties of idealism arise from considering the world apart from perception. — Isle.'ZxiYa.^ oi exte7-nal ivo-fld ... ... 209 § 80. Perception yields the important ontological truth that beings, in so far as agents, may exist in each other without intermingling. — Definitions o{ body, force. Perception of our own bodies and of external bodies ... ... .•. ... <*. ... 211 § 81. Our perception of ourselves is posterior to our perception of the external world. — Intellective perception of the ii^t? ... ... 214 § 82. Reflection would be unable to compare perceived beings together, if it had not universal being, by means of which it knows the mode and quantity of its realization in those beings, and, hence, if they belong or not to the same species. Principle of the dis- cernibility of individuals. — Individual z,nA idea of individual ... 217 §83. Origin of the ideas of numbers ... ... ... ... 218 § 84. Difference of the mode of realization constitutes difference of species ; difference in quantity or actuality constitutes accidental differences. — Origin of Species. Reality; two kinds of it. Various kinds of real form ... ... ... ... 219 § 85. When may we say that the Ego and the non-Ego mutually limit each other? — Affirmation does not include negation ... ... 221 § 86. The mind rises to the infinite neither in the primal perception, nor in the reflection which compares the Ego and the non-Ego, but in that which considers the limitation, contingency, and relativity of either. — Max Miillcr on the manner in which the infinite is per- ceived ... ... ... ... ... ... ... 223 § 87. The supreme principle of all our reasoning ... ... ... 224 § 88. The principle of substance one of the conditions of real being falling under perception. — Modes of our idea of substance. Herbert Spencer on the substance of mind ... ... ... ... 224 b XVIU CONTENTS. PAGE § S9. We cannot perceive sensations pure, but only as modifications of ourselves ... ... ... ••• ••• ... 230 § 90. Does perception take place directly or through reasoning ? — Cognition and recognition ... ... ... ... 232 § 91. Process by which reflection translates the perception of ourselves. — The jE>(7 a substance and a feeling ... ... ... 233 § 92. Perception does not take place blindly. — How sensation acts upon intelligence ... ... ... ... ... ... 234 § 93. Perception is governed by the principle of substance. — Difference between substance and cause ... ... ... ... 235 § 94. Substance and accident ... ... ... ... ... 236 § 95. Why the child, which has not perceived itself, is compelled by the principle of substance to attribute its own sensations to bodies ... 236 § 96, It does not follow that the principle of substance is fallacious. The errors we commit in referring accidents to the wrong sub- stance may be corrected. — Subject as distinguished from extra- subject ... ... ... ... ... ... 237 § 97. The principle of substance is the intuition of the essence of being, the first and universal truth. — Rosmini's idea of substance not Spinozistic ... ... ... ... ... ... 238 § 98. One of the conditions of reflection is the principle of cause. — Prin- ciple of cause dependent on principle of contradiction, and this on the principle of cognition ... ... ... ... 239 § 99. Various orders of reflection. Reflection of the first order discovers the different limitations and mutual dependence of real beings. — Dependence the result of reflection ... ... ... 240 § 100. Notions of cause and effect. — Refutation of scepticism with refer- ence to the universality and necessity of cause ... ... 242 §101. The principle of cause is merely an application of the idea of being to a perceived being, so as to see whether the latter has or has not in itself subsistence. — Hypotheses. All causes either physical or metaphysical ... ... ... ... 244 §102. What is contingent being? — Concept of necessity ... ... 245 § 103. The principle of integration is a development of the principle of cause, and contains the reason why all peoples believe that God exists. — The argument for the existence of God derived from the impossibility of thinking an infinite number is entirely fallacious ... ... ... ... ... ... 246 § 104. All other principles of reflection are reducible in the same way to the first universal truth, the essence of being naturally intuited by us ... ... ... ... ... 247 §105. Purposes of the art of reasoning ... ... ... ... 247 § 106. How errors in reasoning are avoided. — Descartes' four rules of method. Rosmini's six norms ... ... ... ... 247 § 107. Three aims of reasoning. Hence three methods — apodeictic, heuristic, and didactic ... ... ... ... 248 § 108. Artifice of the syllogism, to which the various forms of argument are reducible. — Defence of the syllogism against Hegel ... 250 §109. Universal rule of the syllogism ... ... ... ... 250 § no. From the necessity of more than one middle term arises the 5^nto 250 CONTENTS. xix § III. The conclusion has the same logical value as the premises. — Nature of probability ... ... ... ... ... 251 § 112. The sources from which a knowledge of truth is derived ... 253 §113. The didactic method is either general or particular ... ... 2^3 § 114. Supreme principles of the three methods ... ... ... 253 Sciences of Perception. '^ § 115. Why Ideology and Logic were called Sciences of Intuition. — Means of knowing essences ... ... ... ... 254 § 1x6. What we can perceive is ourselves and the external world. Hence the two sciences, Psychology and Cosmology. — Relation of Psychology to Cosmology ... ... ... ... 255 § 117. Supernatural Anthropology goes beyond the limits of mere philo- sophy ... ... ... ... ... ... 256 I. Psychology. §118. What is Psychology ? ... ... ... ... ... 256 §119. Parts of Psychology ... ... ... ... ... 256 § 120. All reasoning on the essence of the soul sets out from the feeling of the soul. — Being ?ind feeling mAtfinshle ... ... ... 256 § 121. Difference between the feeling of our bodies and the feeling of our souls. — The Ego different from sensations ... § 122. The human soul is a principle at once sensitive and intellective. Difference between sense and intelligence ... ... ... 260 § 123. In what sense the Ego expresses the soul, and in what sense it is called the principle and subject of Psychology. — The Ego is a self-affii"med subject and belongs to the Science of Logic ... 261 § 124. Complete definition of the human soul. — Definitions given by Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Porphyry § 125. Hence are deduced the other properties of the human soul. Sim- plicity. Immortality. — Various kinds of simplicity. The two terms of the soul. Its immortality is due to the intuited term... 264 § 126. In what sense the opinion of Plato, that the body is an obstacle to the soul, is false. — Human knowledge is a series of determina- tions of being ... ... ... ... ... ... 268 § 127. The extended term of feeling is double, space and body, and these have opposite characters. — Nature of space and extension. The external world. Atoms ... ... ... ... 269 § 128. Connection of soul and body. The incomprehensibility of this connection does not give us the right to doubt the fact. — Opinion of Plotinus. Of Professor Bain. The soul not a mathematical point. Porphyiy on the incorporeal ... ... 278 § 129. The sentient principle feels its own body with a passivity mingled with much activity. The sentient principle feels a foreign body if in the body subject to its power there comes a change inde- pendent of, and opposed to it ... ... ... ... 278 257 XX CONTENTS. § 130. There would be no difficulty in understanding how the soul should feel external bodies, if we could understand how, being a simple principle, it can have an extended term. — The substance of the soul is simple. Herbert Spencer's view ... 280 § 131. A close consideration of this question shows that the continuous does not lie in the single parts, but in a principle embracing them all at once, and hence the continuous cannot exist, except as the term of the act of a simple principle. — The principle of continuity is sensation. The ultimate elements of matter are animate and sentient ... ... ... ... ... 281 § 132. The first term of the sensitive soul is unmeasured space. Its second term is the body which it informs. The fundamental feeling. External sensations. How measured space is pre- sented to feeling. — Feeling and consciousness of feeling. Herbert Spencer on the fundamental feeling. We form the idea of space or extension in two ways ... ... ... 287 § 133. The soul exercises no action on its first term ; but toward its second it is both active and passive ... ... ... 290 § 134. Sensitivity and instinct ... ... ... ... ... 291 § 135. Instinct, sensual and vital. Origin of Medicine. — The various instincts. Table of divisions of the vital instinct ... ... 291 § 136. Principle and term in the animal form a single being ... ... 295 § 137. Three kinds of feeling in the animal corresponding to the three conditions of the sensible term. — Feeling of Continuity. Feel- ing of Excitation. Feeling of Organization ... ... 295 § 138. Difference between (7w/w. D. Fcrd. Mansi. Cana\'accuoli, Naples, 1X11 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1849, 8vo, pp. 201. Rosmini wrote a reply, which was printed, but, out of respect to the Congregation of the Index, never pubhshed. It bore the following title : — 43. Reply to Father Thciner (Risposta al P. Theiner contro il suo Scritto, intitolato : Lettere storico-critiche, etc). Casuccio, Casale, 1850. 44. Poetical Doctrines of Dante's " De MonarcJda''' (Doc- trine Politiche della Monarchia di Dante). A juvenile work written in 181 3 and never published. 45. Political Economy (Economia Politica). A large number of manuscripts never printed. The matter of part of them was worked into the Philosophy of Politics. 46. The Construction of Civil Society (Costruzione della Societa Civile). An unfinished work, begun in 1827 and intended to be divided into four books. A part of one of these, written in 1848, exists in manuscript, bearing the title Tribunals (Tribunali). 47. TJic Principal Politico-religions Questions of the Day briefly answered {Le principali Questioni politico- religiose della Giornata brevemente risolte). A series of articles published in the Arnionia of Turin in 1853. Their titles were : I. The State's Independence of the Church {Independenza dello Stato dalla Chiesa) ; IL Separation of the State from the CJiurch (Separazione dello Stato dalla Chiesa ; III. Autonomy of tJie State (Autonomia dello Stato) ; IV. Harmony between State and Church (Armonia tra lo Stato e la Chiesa) ; V. Godless Laiv (La Legge Atea) ; VL Civil Marriage (Matrimonio Civile) ; VII. Liberty of Conscience (La Liberta di Coscienza) ; VIII. Uniformity of the Laivs (Uniformita delle Leggi) ; IX. Licence (La Licenza). The last was never printed, and the series remained unfinished. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixiii CLASS VI. Philosophy of the Supernatural. 48. Siipernatural Anthropology (Antropologia Sopranna- turale). Of this unpublished work, intended to be very- extensive, only a few books were ever written. These bear the title o{ Moral Anthropology. The second part, entitled Theologica (Teologica), was meant to consist of six books, bearing the following titles : — I. TJie Confines of Philoso- phical and Theological Doctrine {writtQn \n 1832); II. Man as perfectly constituted ; III. Man as sinfnl by Nature (1833) ; IV. The Sanctified Ma7z (consisting of two parts, of which the first is entitled Sacraments in general ; the second, Sacraments of the Law of Grace in particular^ ; V. Man as Redeemer ; VI. Woman, Mother of the Redeemer (containing a chapter entitled On the Evidence rendered by the Koran to the Virgin Mary). 49. Introduction to the Gospel according to St. JoJin (Introduzione del Vangelo secondo Giovanni commentata. Libri III). Begun in 1839 ^.nd continued until 1849. Unione Tip.-Editrice, Turin, 1882, 8vo, pp. 310. CLASS VII. Ecclesiastical Prose, 50. Sermons (Discorsi Parrocchiali). Pirotta, Milan, 1837. These, with the exception of ten, had been pre- viously printed at various times, e.g. the Discourse on Pulpit Eloquence (Discorso dell' Eloquenza Ecclesiastica), Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1832, Lugano, 1S34; Sermon Ixiv BIBLIOGRAPHY. preached on the occasion of taking possession of the Parish of St. Mark's at Rovcreto (Discorso pronunziato in occasione di prendere il possesso della Parocchia di S. Marco in Rovereto), Marchesani, Rovereto, 1834; Discourse on the Celibacy of Priests (Discorso sul Celibato Ecclesiastico), printed in the Messagier Tirolese, Rovereto, 1835, in the Annali delle Scienze Religiose di Roma, and in the Pro- pugnator Religioso of Turin. All these discourses were reprinted, along with several others, in one volume, bearing the title of PrcacJiing (Predicazione), Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1843, 8vo, pp. 471. Among the additions was a Panegyric of St. Philip Neri (Panegirico di S. Filippo Neri), printed by Battaggia, Venice, 1821, and at Lugano in 1834. 51. TJie Way to Catechize Dullards (Del Modo di cate- chizzare gl' Idioti, libro di sant' Aurelio Agostino, vol- garizzalo col testo a fronte). Marchesani, Rovereto, 1821 ; Battaggia, Venice, 182 1, 8vo, pp. 83 ; Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan ; Batelli, Naples, 1843. 52. Letters 011 Christian Instruction (Lettera sul Cris- tiano Insegnamento). Addressed to Don Giovanni of Val Vcstina. Marchesani, Rovereto, 1823; Florence, 1826; Lugano, 1832 ; Milan, 1838 ; Batelli, Naples. 53. Rules of Christian Teaching (Regole della Dottrina Cristiana dei fanciulli e delle fanciulle). Pirotta, Milan, 1837 (along with No. 55) ; Batelli, Naples, 1843. 54. Catechism arranged according to the Order of Ideas (Catechismo disposto secondo I'Ordine delle Idee). Batelli, Naples, 1849 (in the Opcrette Spirituali) ; Nistri, Pisa, 1854; Ducci, Florence, 1856; Batelli, Naples, 1843; Bertolotti, BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixv Intra, 1877, i6rao, pp. 166; Speirani, Turin, 1880 (in Prose Ecclesiastiche). Translated into English by Agar, and published with a dedication to Bishop UHathorne. Richardson, London, 1849, 32mo, pp. 216. 55. Catechetical Instructions (Istruzioni Catechetiche). These were copied down from Rosmini's viva voce exa- minations while he was rector of St. Mark's in Rovereto, and reduced to a compendium by Father Francis Puecher. Printed (along with No. 53) by Pirotta, Milan, 1837. These five works appeared in one volume, with the title of Cate- chctics (Catechetica). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1838, 8vo, pp. xiii., 462. 56. The Exerciser s Manual (Manuale dell' Esercitatore). Batelli, Naples, 1844; Bertolotti, Intra, 1872, 8vo, pp. 294. This volume is taken mostly from the works of St. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, and forms a science of ascetics. 57. Spiritual Lessons (Lezioni Spirituali). Appeared originally with the title, Maxims of CJtristian Perfcctiori for Persons of every Condition (Massime di Perfezione Cristiana ad ogni Condizione di Persona). Salvucci, Rome, 1830 ; Berina, Rome and Milan, 1831 ; Feraboli, Milan, 1833, with an Appendix, An Easy Method of Meditating well (Un Metodo Facile per ben meditare) and An Exercise for the Examination of Conscience (Esercizio per I'Esame della Coscienza) ; Marietti, Turin, 1837 (twice), with the title Spiritual Lessons, and three new lessons ; Ibertis, Novara, 1840 (along with No. 88); Batelli, Naples, 1849 (i" ^'^e Operette Spirit7iali) ; in French, Burdet, Annecy, 1836 ; in English, Murray, Prior Park, 1836 ; Richardson, London, 1849. A new translation in French has just appeared, with tlic title Maxliiics dc Perfection Clirctienne ct Explicaiiou du Majj^infeat. Ixvi BIBLIOGRAPHY. Traduites de I'ltalien, avec Preface et Appendice, par Cos. Tondini de Ouarenghi. Socidtd Bibliographique, ^Maurice, Paris ; Burns and Gates, London, 1882 ; i2mo, pp. viii., 104. 58. History of Love, drawn from tJie Holy Scriptures (Storia dell' Amore, cavata dalle divine Scritture). Fera- boH, Cremona, 1834; Batelli, Naples; in French, De Perisse, Paris and Lyons, 1839. These three works appeared in one \olume, entitled Ascetics (Ascetica). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1840, 8vo, pp. 54S. 59. Essay on Happiness (Saggio sopra la Felicita). Marchesani, Rovereto, 1822, 8vo, pp. iii ; Florence, 1823, \\'ith the title Essay on Hope, in Opposition to eertain Ideas of Ugo Foscolds (Saggio sulla Speranza, contro alcune Idee of Ugo Foscolo). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1828; Batelli, Naples. 60. Brief Exposition of the Philosophy of MelcJdor Gioja (Breve Esposizione dclla Filosofia di Melchiorre Gioja). Printed in vol. ii. of the Opnscoli Filosofici, Boniardi- Pogliani, Milan, 1828. 61. Exannnation of tJie Fashionable Opinions of Melchior Gioja (Esame delle Opinioni de Melchiorre Gioja in Favore della Moda). In vol. vi. of the Meniorie di Modcna, 1824 ; in vol. ii. of the Opnscoli Filosofici, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1828 ; Batelli, Naples. This was an attempt to expose the Epicureanism of Gioja, who replied with considerable asperit)-, but is said to have died repentant. The work pleased Pope Pius VIII. 62. Essay on the Religions Teaching of J. D, Roniagnosi (Saggio sulla Dottrina Religiosa di G. D. Romagnosi). In the Annali dclle Scicnrje religiose, Rome, 1837 ; Batelli, Naples, BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixvil 6^. Fragments of a History of Impiety (Frammcnti di una Storia dell' Empieta). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1834; Batclli, Naples. In French, with the title Fragment d'nnc Histoire de rinipiete et Refutation dn Systeme religieux de Benjamin Constant. Pelagaud, Lesne et Crozet, Lyons, 1837, 8vo, pp. 116. These five works were published together in one volume, with the title of ^/^/c^i?/zV^ (Apologetica). Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1839-40; Batelli, Naples ; Speirani, Turin, 1880. In the same volume were four letters, one to the Abb^ Lammenais, On the Criterion of Cer- tainty (Sul Criterio della Certezza) ; one to the Abbd Gustavo del Conti Avogadro, On the Abbe Vincenzo Gioberti's Theory of tlie Supernatural (Sulla Teorica del Sopranaturale dell' Ab. Vincenzo Gioberti) ; one to Dr. L. Prejalmini, On the P]ic7ioviena of Artificial Soninainbulism (Sui Fenomeni del Sonnambulismo Artificiale) ; and a second to the Abbe Lammenais. This last was originally printed in the Propagatore Religioso, Milan, 1837, and then in the Praginatologia at Lucca, 1838. 64. On Christian Edncation (Della Educazione Cris- tiana, Libri III.). Battagia, Venice, 1823, i2mo, pp. 232; reproduced in the Poliantea of Milan after Rosmini's death. The author wrote this book in 1S22 for his sister Margaret, a nun and a person of much character. Her life has been written. 65. Addresses to the Clergy on Ecclesiastical Duties (Conferenze al Clero sui Doveri Ecclesiastic!). Speirani, Turin, 1880, Svo, pp. 387. 66. The Rationalism threatening to insinuate itself in the Schools of Theology (II Razionalismo che tcnta insinuarsi nelle Scuolc Tcologichc, additato in varii rccenti opuscoli anonimi), Monza, 1841. Withdrawn after a few sheets were printed ; but now just published. Fratclli Bocca, Turin, etc., 1882 ; Svo, pp. 310. 6'J. Exhortations to Vo?/ng Jlle/i (Esortazioni tcnute ai Giovani). Fifty-one in number (first three wanting). Only in manuscript. Ixviii BIBLIOGRAPHY. 6Z. Short Discourses on the Eucharist to Children at their First Communion (Discorsetti suU' Eucaristia a de' Fanciulli che fanno la prima Comunione). Two in number. Only in manuscript. 69. Elucidations of the Gospels (Spiegazioni Evangeliche). For Sundays and chief feasts of the year. Written be- tween 1821 and 1835. Only in manuscript 70. Brief Meditations (Brevi Meditazioni). On separate cards for the use of persons meditating alone. Only in manuscript. 71. Praises of tJie Priesthood (Lodi del Sacerdozio). An unpublished juvenile work, written in 18 13. 72. Praises of St. Philip Neri (Lodi di San Filippo Neri). Written in 1813. Battagia, Venice, 1821, small 8vo, pp. 62. CLASS VIIL Miscellaneous. 73. Day of Solitude (Giorno di Solitudine, di Simonino Ironta). This is the earliest of Rosmini's works, having been written in 1813. Its subject is the education of a poor outcast boy by Friendship, Philosophy, and Religion. It attempts to imitate the style of the trecentisti. Simonino Ironta is an anagram for Antonio Rosmini. 74. Epistle to S. di Apollonia (Epistola a Sebastiano di Apollonia). In blank verse. Subject, Praise of country life and repose as a preparation for new duties. Bettoni, Padua, 1 88 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY. 1 XIX 75. Epistle to N. Tominasco (Epistola a Nicolo Tom- maseo). On Friendship ; in blank verse. Marchesani, Rovereto, 1820. ^6. Letter to P. A. Paravia, on the Italian Language (Lettera a Pier Alessandro Paravia sulla Lingua Italiana). Bettoni, Padua, 1819 ; Valadini, Lugano, 1834, in the Prose ^ ossia diversi Opuscoli del Cav. Ant. Rosmini-Serhati. yj. On the Principles ivhich a Writer ought to folloiv in regard to the Manner of expressing Himself (Dei Principii che deve seguire uno Scrittore circa la maniera di espri- mersi). Unpublished. y^. The Idyll and the New Italian Literature (L'Idillio e la Nuova Letteratura Italiana). In vol. i. of the Opnscoli Filosofici, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827. Treats of the three Laws of Art, Probability, Facility, and Beauty. 79. Discnssion on Beauty (Ragionamento intorno alia Bellezza). See under 82. 80. Literary Amenity (Galateo dei Literati). Modena, 1826 ; Sartori, Ancona, 1830, i6mo, pp. 186, in vol. i. of the Opuscoli Filosofici, Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1827 ; 8vo, pp. 187. This work, which gave great pleasure to Pope Pius VIII., was written in reply to Gioja's Galateo, and was an attempt to show how polemics ought to be conducted. 81. The Card of Excuse (La Carta di Scusa). A dialogue published in the Prose, ossia diversi Opuscoli del Cav. Ant. Rosmini-Serbati, Valadini, Lugano, 1834. 82. Preface to the Translation of the Life of St. Jerome (Prcfazionc al Volgarizzamento dclla Vita di S. Girolamo). Marchc.sani, Rovereto, 1824. Ixx BIBLIOGRAPHY. This translation was published under the title Volgarizzame7ito dclla Vita di S. Girolaino, testo di lingua emcndato con varii MSS. Rosmini was the chief co-operator in the publication. The above four works were published in one volume under the title of Literatuf'e and the Fine Arts (Letteratura e Arti Belle). Bertolotti, Intra, 1870, 8vo, pp. iv., 350. A second volume, edited by Father Perez, and made up of passages relating to literature and art from Rosmini's various works, appeared in 1873, 8^'°) PP- S30. 83. Various Treatises on Christian Marriage. Cellini, Florence, 1862, i6mo, pp. 567. This volume is made up of various treatises, most of them previously published. The most important is that On the Civil Lazvs relating to the Marriage of Christians (Sulle Leggi Civili die riguar- dano il Matrimonio de' Cristiani), consisting of a number of articles addressed to Bishop Moreno of Ivrea, and printed in the Armenia of Turin. Reproduced in book form at Turin, 185 1. 84. On the Siccardi Law (Sulla Legge Siccardi). A series of articles in the Armenia of Turin, 1850. 85. Charity (La Carita, discorso). Casuccio, Casale, 1852. 86. Rules of the Institute of Charity (Regole dell' Isti- tuto delle Carita). Latin and Italian, Marietti, Turin, 1837. 87. Constitutions of the Institnte of Charity (Costi- tuzioni deir Istituto della Carita). In Latin. Printed in England, but not published or accessible. Quarto. 88. Rules of the Adscripts to the Institnte of Charity (Regole degli Ascritti all' Istituto della Carita). Printed, along with No. 57, Ibertis, Novara, 1842. 89. Statute for the Missionaries of the Institute of Charity at the Sacra of St. Micliacl (Statute pei Mis- sionarii dell' Istituto della Carita). Marietti, Turin, 1847. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxi 90. Notices of the Institute of Charity (Notizic dell' Istituto dclla Carita). Cibrario, in the Calendario dcgli Ordini Rcligiosi, 1 847. 91. Coinmoii Rules of the Sisters of Providence (Regole comuni dclle Sucre della Provvidenza). Bianchi, Lugano, 1842. 92. Rules of the Pension Mellerio at Doniodossola, managed by the Brothers of Charity (Regole de' Convittori del Collegio Mellerio di Domodossola, retto dai Fratelli della Carita). Marietti, Turin, 1S38. 93. On the Existence of Religious Conininnities (SuIT Esistenza delle Comunita religiose). Incomplete manu- script. 94. History of Humanity (Storia dell' Umanita). Of this only a small portion, containing some original views on the origin of the primitive language, was ever written. Manuscript. 95. Synoptical Table of the Natural and Supernatural Pozvers (Tavola Sinottica delle Potcnze Naturali e Sopra- naturali). Part of this was used \\} the compilation of the table printed in Vincenrjo Giobcrti e il Panteismo (No. 19), Lucca, 1853. 96. Sketch of Modern Philosophy (Schizzo sulla Filosofia Moderna). Spcirani, Turin, 1880, 8vo, pp. 23. Reprinted from La Sapicnza. 97. On the Spirit of the Institute of Charity {Sullo Spirito deir Istituto dclla Carita). Four discourses, meant U) be followed by a fifth on Sacrifice (Sacrifizio), whicl) exists onl}- in manuscript. Bertolotti, Intra, 1871, i8mo, pp. 282. Ixxii BIBLIOGRAPHY. 98. Correspondence (Epistolario). Of this, two volumes have been published with the title Epistole Religioso-fami- liari. Paravia, Turin, 1857, 8vo. There still remains unpuljlished an immense mass of corre- spondence, amounting, it is said, in all to about fifteen thousand letters. Many of these refer to Rosmini's Institute and Philosophical System. 99. The Mission of Antonio Rosniini-Serhati to the Court of Rome hi the years 1848-49 {Missione di Antonio Ros- mini-Serbati alia . Corte di Roma negli Anni 1848-49). Paravia, Rome, etc., 1881, 8vo, pp. 418. B. WORKS RELATING TO ROSMINI'S LIFE AND PHILOSOPHY. ACRI, Prof. Francesco. Abbozzo di una Teoria delle Idee. Palermo, 1870. Allievo, G. Hegelianismo, la Scienza e le Vita. Turin, 1868. Angeleri, Prof. Francesco. Delia Liberta del Pensiero. Discorso. A. Merlo, Verona, 1864, 8vo, pp. 24. Antonio Rosmini. Discorso. Inst. Turazza, Treviso, 1871, 8vo, pp. 55. Elementi di Morale. Inst. Turazza, Treviso, 1874, pp. 1 18. Trattato di Filosofia Elementare, proposto agli Alunni de' Licei. Druckcr and Tedeschi, Verona and Padua (3rd edit), 1877, i2mo, pp. 532. Suir Odierno Conflitto tra i Rosminiani ed i Tomisti. Spagliardi, Parabi:^go, 1879, l2mo, pp. 48. Un Articolo-della Voce della Verita sul Dialog© intitolato " II Verbo Essere." Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, i2mo, pp. 32, BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxiii Annales de Philosophie Ciir^tienne, Paris, 8vo. Series IV., Vol. X. (1854), pp. 254 sqq. ; Series V., Vol. I. (i860), pp. 206 sqq.; New Series, Vol. IV. (1881), pp. 797-800 (Review by De Bonniot of Paoli's Life of Rosmini). At p. 485 of Series IV., Vol. X. (1859), there is a list of articles on Rosmini which I have been unable to see. Barola, Prof. Paolo, Rassegna dell' Opera, "La Som- maria Cagione." Barone, Prof. Francesco, Orazione funebre di Antonio Rosmini. Bartholm^SS, Ch. J. B. Histoire Critique des doctrines religieuses de la Philosophie Moderne. Paris, 1855, 8vo. Bernardi, Monsignor Jacopo. Giovane Eta e primi Studii di Antonio Rosmini. Lettere a Pier Alessandro Paravia, Chiantore, Pinerolo, i860, i2mo, pp. 278. Bertacchi, a. Sopra un Frammento d' Articolo della Ck'ilta Cattolica. Benedini-Guidotti, Lucca, 1855, 8vo, pp. 1 1. Bertazzi, Prof. Girolamo. Sistema Ideologic© di Antonio Rosmini. Frigerio, Verona, 1858. BertolOZZI, Monsignor Gian Paolo. Lettera sul Finto Eusebio. Bevilacqua, Sac. Vigilio. Spechietto dclla celebre quistione tra Neo-Tomisti e Rosminiani, Paroni, Vicenza, 1881, i2mo, pp. 173. BoiSTEL, Alphonse. Cours Elementairc de droit naturcl ou de philosophie de droit, suivant Ics principes de Rosmini. Thorin, Paris, 1870, 8vo, pp. 458. BOXGIII, Ruggiero. Le Stresiane. Delia Relazione dclla Filosofia colla Socicta. Prolusione. Vallardi, Milan, 1859. Ixxiv BIBLIOGRAPHY. BOTTA, Vincenzo, Ph.D., in Appendix II. (Historical Sketch of Modem Philosophy in Italy) to the American translation of Dr. F. Ueberweg's Griindriss der GescJiichte dcT Philosophic (History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time. Translated by Geo. S. Morris, A.M. Scribner, Armstrong, and Co., New York, 1874, 2 vols. 8vo). Vol. II. pp. 489-496. Broglialdi, Prof Adolfo. Elogio di Antonio Rosmini. Brownson, Orestes A. Quarterly Review. Sadlier, New York, 8vo. In the volume for the year 1864, Rosmini is noticed at pp. 304, 309, 310, 311 ; in the volume for 1874 on pp. 27, 154, 496, 502, 503, BURONI, Sac. Giuseppe. Dell' Essere e del Conoscere. Stamperia Reale, Turin, 1877, 8vo, pp. 50 {rl'Siiine of • the following work). Deir Essere e del Conoscere. Studii su Par- menide, Platone e Rosmini. Stamperia Reale, Paravia, Turin, 1878, 4to, pp. iv., 439. Risposta al Padre Cornoldi di C. di G. in difesa delle Nozioni di Ontologia secondo Rosmini e S. Tom- maso. Paravia, Turin, 8vo, pp. 200. Rosmini e S. Tommaso. Nozioni di Ontologia, per Introduzione alio Studio dclla Teologia. Confronti tra la Teosofia del Rosmini e delle Somme di S. Tommaso. 2nda. Edizione, accresciuta di una lettera sulla Teorica del Progresso infinito. Paravia, Turin, 1878, 8vo, pp. viii., 173. La Trinita e le Creazione. Nuovi Confronti tra il Rosmini e S. Tommaso, dedicati alia Civilta Cattolica, con un appendice sulla Necessita di liberare la Chiesa dalla Calunnia. Paravia, Turin, 1879, 8vo, pp. ii., 180. ■ Antonio Rosmini c la Cixilta Cattolica dinanzi alia Sacra Congregazione dell' Indice, ossia Spiega BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxv zione del Dimniittautur Opera A. Rosmiiii-Scrbati, secondo la Sollccita di Benedetto XIV. Edizione Seconda, cresciuta di molte aggiunte c di una parte seconda di cio che e seguito di poi pubblicata la prima. Paravia, Turin, 1880, 8vo, pp. viii., 218 (First Edition, Speirani e Figli, Turin, 1876, i6mo, pp. 210). BURONI, Sac. Giuseppe. La Ragione e la Fede secondo I'Enciclica Aiterni Patris. Tipografia S. Giuseppe, Turin, 8vo, pp. 40. Cesare Cantu e Giuseppe Buroni. Delia Nuova Dichiarazione quasi ultima della S. Congregazione deir Indice sulla formola Diinittantiir e del libro novissimo di G. M. Cornoldi di C. d. G., // Rosminla- nisino sintcsi di Ontologia e Panteismo. L'ultimo Capo inedito del detto libro del Cornoldi, rimaso nella Civiltd Cattolica. Unione Tipog-Editrice, Turin, 1882, 8vo, pp. 32. Calza, Sac. Giuseppe. Saggio di Filosofia delle Mate- matiche. Collegio Artigianelli, Turin, 1869, i2mo, pp. 275. Scienza dell' Aritmetica. Porta, Domodossola, 1872, 8vo, pp. 510. Discorso letto il 26 Aprile, 1878, nell' occasione della Distribuzione dei premi agli Alunni del Ginnasio Mellerio pareggiato ai regi. Porta, Domodossola, 1878, 4to, pp. 20. c Perez, Sac. Paolo. Esposizione della Filosofia di Antonio Rosmini con uno Sguardo al luogo ch' ella tiene fra I'antica Scienza c la nuova. Bertolotti, Intra, 1878, 3 vols, large 8vo, pp. vii., 467, 543 (third vol. not published). Elemcnti di I'otanica con Appcndice suU' Origine IXXVI BIBLIOGRAPHY. degli Enti Organizzati. Parte I. Botanica Gcnerale. Porta, Domodossola, 1881, pp. 210. Capaxori, p. Bernardo. Lettera al Sig. Abate Ales- sandro Pestalozza, estratto dalla Cronaca, Nos. 15-17. Guglielmini, 1857, ^^o, pp. 12. An answer to some strictures made by the Civilta Cattolica. Caroli, Gian Maria. Del Magnetismo Animale, ossia Mesmerism© in ordine alia Ragione e alia Rivelazione. Bologna, 1858, 2 vols. 8vo. Corso di Pedagogia. Casara, Sebastiano. Sul Carattere Battesimale. Studio. Istituto Turazza, Treviso, 1876, 8vo, pp. 64. ■ La Verita per la Carita. Memoria del Prof. A, Fontana esaminata. Tip. Arcivesc., Milan, 1878, 8vo PP- 13- I Rosminiani e I'Ontologismo del P. Cornold: della C. d. G., con Risposta all' Opuscolo : " Una Questione Lombarda e una Ouestione Piemontese,' del Prevosto Ruffoni. Tip. Arcivesc, Milan, 1878, 8vo pp. 26. La Luce dell' Occhio corporeo e quella dell Intelletto. Parallelo illustrate con Dottrine del S Dottore Aquinate, a cui son dimostrate conformi quelle dell' illustre abbate Antonio Rosmini. Terza Edizione, riveduta e accresciuta di qualche Nota e di Appendice con Dottrine del Santo Dottore di Bagnorea Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, i2mo, pp. 100. II Sistema Filosofico Rosminiano, dimostrato vcro ncl suo Principio fondamentale con lo Studio e Sviluppo di un solo Articolo della Somma Teologica di S. Tomaso d' Aquino. Tip. Vescov., Casale, 1879, 1 2 mo, pp. 88. Cavour, March. Gustavo. Fragmens Philosophiques. BIBLIOGRAPHY, Ixxvii Fontana, Turin, 1841, 8vo, pp. 398. Rosmini is treated on pp. 139-213. Cavour, March. Gustavo. Delia Proprieta Ecclesiastica. Sur la Religion e la Morale. CORNOLDI, Sac. Giov. Maria, S. J. II Rosminianismo sintesi dell' Ontologismo e del Panteismo. Bcfani, Rome, 1 88 1, large 8vo, pp. 450. CORTE, Pietro Antonio. Logica Generalis et Metaphysiccs Elementa. Favale, Turin, 1846, 8vo, pp. 226. Elementa Philosophise in usum Seminariorum. Marietti, Turin, 1874, 3 vols. i2mo, pp. 291, 166, 243. Prodezze dell' Osservatore Cattolico di Milano (Estratto della Gazetta Piemontese, Nos. 254, 258, 259). Favale, Turin, 1875, i6mo, pp. 24. Gentilezze della Civilta Cattolica di Firenze (Estratto della Gazetta Piemoittese, Nos. 301, 306). Favale, Turin, 1875, i6mo, pp. 42. I Rosminiani secondo 1' Osservatore Cattolico (Estratto della Gazetta Piemoiitesc, No. loi). Favale, Torino, 1876, pp. 1 1. Ermeneutica della Civilta Cattolica (Estratto della Gazetta Piemontese, Nos. 31, 32, 33, 39, 40). Favale, Turin, 1876, i6mo, pp. 45, 7. I Punti Fondamentali del Sistema Filosofico del Rosmini, discussi e dichiarati per servire all' Intel- ligenza del Nuovo Saggio siilV Origine delle Idee. Favale, Turin, 1876, i2mo, pp. iv. 350. Davidson, Thomas. Domodossola e 1' Istituto Rosmi- niano. Traduzione dall' Inglese del Prof. Giu- seppe Bormida. Bertolotti, Intra, 1880, 8vo, pp. 35. (Translation of letters written to The Boston Daily Advertiser, in June, 1880.) Ixxviii . BIBLIOGRAPHY. Davidson, Thomas. Antonio Rosmini. Fortnightly T^^z/^Veiy, November, 1 88 1. Cf. The Philosophical Move- ment in the Roman Chnvch, in the same periodical, May, 1882. De Bonniot. See Annales de Philosophie CJirctienne. De-Nardi, Pietro. Leggi Supreme dell' umana Educa- zione. Discorso letto il giorno 20 giugno, 1880, nella Sala del Gran Consilio in Locarno. Bertolotti, Intra, 1880, large 8vo, pp. 24. La Filosofia di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati difesa contro i Neo-scolastici del Canton Ticino. Parte prima. Risposte alle Obbiezioni piu comuni. Bellin- zona, Tipog. Cantonale, 1881, i2mo, pp. xv., 271. De Vit, Dre. Vincenzo. Cenni Biografici di Antonio Ros- mini. Onori funebri e Testimonianze rese alia sua Memoria, raccolti dai Sacerdoti dell' Istituto della Carita di Stresa. Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1855 ; Bertolotti, Intra, 1871 ; 8vo, pp. 127. (This work contains a list of Rosmini's writings. It has run through several editions, and has appeared in English, under the title An Ontline of the Life of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Edited by the Rev. William Lock- hart. London, 1856). Fabri, Giovanni. Sopra 1' Ultima Questione Rosminiana. Poche Parole. Giannini, Naples, 1876, i6mo, pp. 58. Facrizio, Padre (Riformato). Del Lume dell' Intelletto secondo la Dottrina de' SS. Dottori Agostino, Bona- ventura e Tommaso d'Aquino, opposta al Sistema del Soggettivismo propugnato dal Card. Parocchi nell' Indirizzo a PP. Leone XIII. circa I'Enciclica ^tcrni Patris. Loescher, Rome, Turin, Plorcnce, 1881, 8vo, pp. xxxii., 784. (This work appeared anonj-mously. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxix but the author is said to be a monk of Modcna, bear- ing the above name.) Fasolis, Sac. Ugolino. Nuovo Testo di Filosofia elemcn- tare disposto a forma di dialogo ad uso dei Licei c Seminari. Turin, 1858, 2 vols. Vol. I., Protologia, Logica e Metafisica; Vol. II., Etica, Pedagogia Morale, Diritto, Eudemonologia. 8vo. ■ Elementi della Filosofia e Storia del Diritto, tratti dai principii della modcrna Filosofia Italiana e disposti secondo il programma delle scuole universi- tarie di giurisprudenza. Turin, 1867, 8vo. Ferrari, Giuseppe. Essai sur le Principe et les Limitcs de la Philosophic de I'Histoire. Joubcrt, Paris, 1843, 8vo, pp. xvi., 547. The portion relating to the doc- trines of Rosmini is on pp. 184-202. Ferrari's criticism plainly shows that he did not understand Ros- mini. La Philosophic Catholique en Italic, in Revi/e des DeiLX Mondes, New Series, vol. v. (March, 1844), pp. 956-994 ; vol. vi. (May, 1854), pp. 6a,Z-^ZZ. FerrIc, Monsig. Pietro Maria, Vescovo di Casale. Espo- sizione del Principio filosofico di Antonio Rosmini e sua Armonia colla Dottrina Cristiana. Con un Ap- pendice suU' Ordinamento dello Studio Teologico. Frigerio, Verona, 1859, ^^'o, pp. 141. St. Thomas of Aquin and Ideology. A discourse read to the Accademia Romana, i8th August, 1870. Burns and Oates, London, 1875, i2mo, pp. vi., 42. (The same has twice appeared in French with the title S. Thomas d'Aquin et I'ldcologie, Paris, 1S76, 8vo, pp. 24; 1881, i2mo, pp. 48. Degli Universali, secondo la Tcoria Rosminiana, Ixxx BIBLIOGRAPHY. confrontata colla Dottrina di S. Tommaso d'Aquino e con quclla di parecchi Tomisti e Filosofi Moderni. Con Appendice di nove Opuscoli di Argomento affine. Bertero, Casale, 1880 — ? 10 vols. 8vo. (The Introduction to this work is pubHshed sepa- rately. Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1880, 8vo, pp. 38.) Ferri, Prof. Louis. Essai sur I'Histoire de la Philo- sophic en Italic au xix'^'"^- Siecle. Durand, and Didier & Cs'"^-, Paris, 1869, 2 vols, 8vo. (The part devoted to Rosmini is in vol. i. pp. 69-336.) Frati, Can. Severino. A. Rosmini, ossia Cenni suU' Immortalita dell' Anima. Fiaccadori, Parma, 1861. Indici degli Autori delle Matcrie e dei luoghi della S. Scrittura, contenuti nei tre primi volumi della Teosofia di Antonio Rosmini. Paravia, Turin, 1881, 8vo, pp. 137. There are some remarks on Rosmini's philosophy in the preface to the same author's translation of St. Bonaventura's Itinerariiim Mentis in Deitni. Garelli, V. Sulla Filosofia Morale. Biografia di Antonio Rosmini-Scrbati. Turin, 1861, i8mo. Gastaldi, Monsig. Lorenzo. Lettcra 1. e II. all' abate C. B. P. contro Eusebio Cristiano, in U Ediicazione del Clcro. Lettera pastorale dell' Arcivescovo di Torino al suo Clcro suir Enciclica Aiterni Patris di SS. Leone XIII. Turin, 1881, 8vo, pp. 18. Gatti, Can. Giuseppe. Elogio di Antonio Rosmini. Gilardi, Sac. Carlo. Sulla Controvcrsia fra Monsig. Scavini c 1' abbate Rosmini intorno all' applicazione del principio riflcsso La Lcgge Dnbbia noii obbliga. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxxi Opuscolo che fa seguito alle lettere di Antonio Rosmini sulla medesima Questione. Pirotta, Milan. 185 1, 8vo, pp. 22. GlOBERTI, Sac. Vincenzo, Degli Errori filosofici di An- tonio Rosmini. Meline, Cans & Co., Brussels, 1843, 3 vols. 8vo, pp. Ixxii., 380, 420, 402; Capolago, 1846, 3 vols. i2mo. HUGONIN, Abbe. Two articles in Le Correspondant, July and September, 1859. (Contain a number of inaccu- racies.) Lanzoxi, Sac. Luigi. Parole che il Preposito Generale deir Istituto della Carita nella Chiesa sul Calvario diceva a' Novizi. Bertolotti, Intra, 1878, 8vo, pp. 12. Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticse. Tomus I, Theologia Generalis seu Logica Theologica. De Deo Uno et Trino. De Deo Creatore. Unione Tip.-Edit., Turin, 1882, 8vo, pp. 558. LiLLA, Vincenzo. Kant e Rosmini. Borgarelli, Turin, 1869, 8vo, pp. 90. LiPPARONi, Monsig. Gregorio. A Philosophia conforme a mente de S. Thomas de Aquinas, exposta per A. Rosmini, em Harmonia com a Scienza e com a Religiao. Pt. I. Dias, Rio de Janeiro, 1880, 8vo, pp. 123. Mamiani della Rovere, Contc Terenzio. Del Rinno- vamcnto della Filosofia antica Italiana. Lib. I. Silvestri, Milano, 1837, i2mo, pp. 456. Sei Lettere al Sig. Abate Antonio Rosmini-Scr- bati. There are many references to Rosmini's works in others of ]\Iamiani's writings, e.g. in his Coifcssioni di nn Me/ajisico, and in his Coinpetidio e Sintesi della Propria Filosofia ossia Nuovi Prolcgoineni ad ogni presente e futura Metafisica. f Ixxxil BIBLIOGRAPHY. Mamini, C. Diagnosi comparativa della Filosofia di Rosmini e di Mamiani. Bologna, i860, 161110. Iiitorno al Libro del Prof. Carlo Passaglia, intito- lato ; La Dottrma di S. Toinniaso secondo VEiiciclica di Leone X III. Osservazioni. Turin, 1881, i2mo. Manzoni, Alessandro. II Dialogo sull' Invenzione di Alessandro Manzoni e la Filosofia Rosminiana. Boniardi-Pogliani, Milan, 1879, 8vo, pp. 85. There is a French translation of this by De Fresne. Vaton, Paris, 185S, l2mo. Mariano, Raffaele. La Philosopliie Contemporaine en Italic. Essai de Philosopliie Hegelienne. Germer Bailliere, Paris, 1868, i2mo. Rosmini is treated on pp. 46-79- MarSILLI, Can. Luigi. Sinopsi delle Lezioni di Ideologia. Martini, Prof. Lorenzo. Storia dclla Filosofia. Pirotta, Milan, 1838, 8vo, 2 vols., pp. 365, 372. The part dealing with Rosmini is in vol. ii., pp. 307-372. Mezzera, Sac. Giuseppe. La Cantabromachia o VOsser- vatore Cattolico in Camicia. Reformatorio Patronato, Milan, 1881, i2mo, pp. 132. Osservazioni sul recente Opuscolo del eminentis- simo Cardinal Tommaso Zigliara intorno alia Spie- gazione del DimittaUir. Reform. Patronato, Milan, 1881, 32mo, pp. 16. MiNGHETTi, M. Deir Economia Pubblica e delle sue Attinenze colla Morale e col Diritto. Libri Cinque. Le Monnier, Florence, 1859, 8vo, pp. 595. MiSSIAGLlA, Antonio. Osservazioni intorno alle Censure fatte al Frasario Rosminiano. Apollonio, Verona, 1877, 8vo, pp. 44. MOGLIA, Prev. Agostino. I Suareziani e TAbate Rosmini. Discorso Primo. Solari, Piacenza, 1882, 8vo, pp. 1 10. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxxiii Monti, B. Del Fondamento, Progresso e Sistema delle Conoscenze Umane. Hotter, Giacomo. II " Dimittatur " della Sacra Con- gregazione dell' Indice e Antonio Rosmini, in Risposta ad alcuni Articoli del Molto reverendo Prof. Don Giuseppe Lange. Seiser, Trent, 1880, 8vo, pp. 32. Nova, A. Delle Censure dell' Abate Antonio Rosmini- Serbati contro la dottrina religiosa di G. D. Roma- gnosi. 1842, 8vo. OSSERVATORE DI Trento (Nos. 5 and 7). Vero Aspetto della Quistione Rosminiana. Klipper-Fronza, Trent, 1880, i2mo, pp. 20. PagANI, Sac. Gio. Battista. Doctrina Peccati Originalis de- structiva in Ficto Eusebio Christiano contenta. Milan, Boniardi-Pogliani, i2mo, pp. 61. Paganini, p. II Padre Bernardo e la Civilta Cattolica Osservazioni. Guidotti, Lucca, 1854, 8vo, pp. 119. Sommarii di tre Ragionamenti del Prof. Paga- nini, letti alia R. Accademia Lucchese. Bcrtini Lucca, 1855, 8vo, pp. 12. Pensieri sul Progresso della Filosofia (Estratto dair Araldo, No. 17). Laudi, Lucca, 1S57, i2mo, pp. 7. S. Tommaso d' Aquino e il Rosmini. Saggio d' Osservazioni sulle loro Dottrine ideologiche. Vanucchi, Pisa, 1857, 8vo, pp. 48. Lettera al P. G. P. P. (Estratto dall' Araldo, No. 35). Laudi, Lucca, 1858, i2mo, pp. 8. Storia d' uno Studente di Filosofia, narrata da Giuseppe Piola ed esaminata da P. Paganini. Guidotti, Lucca, 1858, 1 2 mo, pp. 140. 1 xxxl V BIBLIO GRA PH Y. Paganini, p. De prima Superstitionis Origine. Dissertatio habita in Aula magna Athenaei Pisani, anno 1857. Nistri, Pisa, 1858, 4to, pp. 23. Sulle pill riposte Armonie della Filosofia Naturale colla Filosofia Sopranaturale. Nistri, Pisa, 1 86 1, 8vo, pp. 140. Dello Spazio. Saggio Cosmologico. Nistri, Pisa, 1862, 8vo, pp. 58. Alcune Osservazioni sulla Fortuna di Dante (Estratto dall' Araldo Cattolicd). Laudi, Lucca, 1862, 8vo, pp. 16. Delia Natura delle Idee secondo Platone. — — Forza e Materia. Lezione premessa al Corso di Ideologia e Logica, nell' anno accademico, 1868-69. Nistri, Pisa, 1869, 8vo, pp. 23. Palatini, Sac. Leopold©. Del Principio Filosofico di Antonio Rosmini. Verona, 1869. Paoli, a. Lo Schopenhauer e il Rosmini. Vol. L La Rappresentazione e 1' Idea. Bencini, Rome, 1878, i2mo, pp. 375. Sac. Francesco. Antonio Rosmini e la sua Prosapia. Monografia. Grigoletti, Rovereto, 1880, Svo, pp. 157. ■ Della Vita di Antonio Rosmini-Serbati. Memo- rie pubblicate dall' Accademia di Rovereto. Paravia, Rome, Turin, etc., 1880, 8vo, pp. 624. Passaglia, Prof. Carlo. Della Dottrina di S. Tommaso secondo 1' Enciclica di Leone XIII. Studii. Paravia, Rome, etc., 1880, i2mo, pp. 367. Pedrotti, Sac. Mariantonio. II Lume della Ragione. Trent, 1842. PestALOZZA, Alessandro. Le Postille di un Anonimo. Saggio di Osservazione. Redaelli, Milan, 1850, 8vo, pp. 194. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxxv Pestalozza, Alessandro. Le Dottrine di Antonio Rosmini difese dalle Imputazioni del noto Prete Bolognese. 2 vols. Vol. I., RedaelH, Milan, 185 1 ; Vol. II., Regorda e Cabrini, Lodi, 1853 ; pp. 590 and 345. La Mente di Antonio Rosmini. Con ritratto del Rosmini. Redaelli, Milan, 1855, 8vo, pp. 122. Compendium Philosophise. Redaelli, Milan, 1857, 2 vols. i2mo, pp. 257, 344. Petri, Ab. Giuseppe. A. Rosmini e i Neo-Scolastici : Le Dottrine di Antonio Rosmini sulla Conoscenza difese, e quelle che oppongono il P. M. Liberatore di C. di G. ed altri esaminate. Paravia, Rome, etc., 1878, 8vo, pp. 605. ■ Risposta ad alcune Appunti della Ch'iltct Cattolica sul libro, A Rosfiiini e gli Scolastici, con Appendice all' Osservatore Cattolico di Milano. Pa- ravia, Rome, etc., 1879, 8vo, pp. loi. Su alcuni Punti dell' Enciclica yEtcrni Patris travolti dall' Osservatore Cattolico di Milano. Lucca, 1879. " Suir Odierno Conflitto tra i Rosminiani e i Tomisti," Studio storico, critico, morale del Sac. Antonio Valdameri esaminato. Paravia, Rome, etc., 1879, 8vo, pp. 247. Le Addizioni alia Stampa dell' Operetta suU' Odierno Conflitto, etc. Paravia, Rome, etc., 1880, 8vo, pp. 131. I Rosminiani calunniati dal Prevosto Achille Rufoni e perseguitati in Crema con abuso manifesto dcir autorita pontificia. Serchio, Lucca, 1880, 8vo, pp. 61. Pevretti, G. B. Saggio di Logica Gcncralc, ossia lilc- Ixxxvi BIBLIOGRAPHY. menti di Filosofia ad uso delle Scuole Sccondarie. Turin, 1857, 8vo. There are other works by Peyretti based on Rosmini's system. POLONINI, Carlo. Accordo delle Dottrine dell' abate Rosmini con quelle di S. Tommaso dimostrato e difeso contro le Accuse del Sac. Antonio Valdameri, Autore dell' Odicrjio Conjlitto. Spagliardi, Parabiago, 1879, i2mo, pp. 292. PUECHER, Francesco. Delia Conformita del Rosmini con S. Tommaso nella Dottrina Ideologica (Estratto della Cronaca, No. 19). 1857, 8vo, pp. 8. • Osservazioni sulle Letter e Critiche del Theiner. Casuccio, Casale, 185 1. Raggio, Prof. Luigi. Le odierne Condizioni della Filo- sofia in Italia. Florence, 1867. Rayneri, G. a. Primi Principii di Metodica. Turin, 1854. Rossi, Vincenzo. Un Articolo di Scienza (Estratto dall' hnparziale di Faenza, an. V., Nos. 47 and 50). Faenza, 1845, i6mo, pp. 14. SciOLLA, Prof. Giuseppe. Elementa Philosophiae Moralis. Unione Tip.-Edit, Turin, 1838, 8vo, pp. 230. Sandona, Sac. Giuseppe. Della Filosofia Morale, con- siderata in se e ne' suoi rapporti alle Condizioni d' Italia. Florence, 1847, 2 vols. i2mo. Trattato di Diritto Internazionale moderno. Florence, 1870. 8vo. Forms the seventh volume of the Bibliotcea delle Seienze Legali. Sani, Prof. Achille. Prolusione Philosophica. BIBLIOGRAPHY. Ixxxvii Saturday Review, November 19, 1881. . Article on Rosmini. Seydel, R. Review of the Rinnovainento della Filosofia in Italia, in the Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic mid pJiilos. Kritik, vol. xxxiii. (1858-59), pp. 263-274. Taglioretti, Sac. Angelo. II Verbo Essere. Frammenti di un Dialogo. Milan, 1878 (2nd edit), 8vo, pp. 29. Tarditi, Prof. Lettere di un Rosminiano a Vincenzo Gioberti. Fa vale, Turin, 1841-42, i2mo, pp. 200. These letters, though gathered by Tarditi, were really written by Rosmini himself. TODESCHI, Bar. Giuglio. Dialoghi Filosofico - morali. Lugano, 1849, i6mo; Casuccio, Casale, 1849, i6mo, pp. 197. TOMMASiiO, N. Antonio Rosmini. 1855. Esposizione del Sistema Filosofico del Niiovo Saggio sidC Origine dclle Idee di A. Rosmini-Scrbati. Padova, 1838, 8vo, pp. 126. Studi Filosofici. Gondoliere, Venice, 1840, 2 vols. 8vo, pp. 282, 283. Studi Critici. Gondoliere, Venice, 1843, 2 parts. 8vo. Studi Morali. Sanvito, Milan, 1858, i2mo, pp. 480. V , D. A. M. Lettcra intorno al Saggio dclla Teorica sopra gli Universali secondo i Principi di S. Tommaso d Aquino. Marcggiani, Bologna, 18O3, i2mo, pp. 39. Ixxxviii BIBLIOGRAPHY. Weisse, Prof. Review of the Nnovo Saggio, in Zeitschrift fuf Philosophic unci philosophischc Kritik, vol. xxviii., Heft 2. Note. — Besides these works there are published two periodicals, whose purpose it is to uphold the philosophy of Rosmini — La Sapiensa, a monthly magazine, Speirani, Turin, 1880 sqq. ; and L'Afeneo, a weekly illustrated paper, also published at Turin. The former contains many valuable articles, among which those by Professor Stoppani, the eminent geologist, take a high place. The latter is one of the best of the Italian weeklies. INTRODUCTION. Perhaps the strongest objection that can be urged against revolutions and the selfish conservatism that makes them necessary is that, in overthrowing vicious and burdensome systems, they likewise destroy, or cast into oblivion, much of the good which originally rendered these systems pos- sible and, in their day, useful. This was particularly true of that revolution which took form in the philosophy of the seventeenth century, and which overthrew the Scholas- ticism of the Middle Ages. No doubt, the later Scholasticism, that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, deserved most of the contempt which fell to its lot ; but it was a mistake to confound in a common rejection this degraded, empty, flatulent system with the vigorous thought of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. This mistake was committed by modern thought, when it revolted entire!}' from Scholasticism. This result, indeed, was almost un- avoidable ; for a thorough-going temporary breach with Scholasticism was necessary, in order to deprive it of that tyrannical and morbid influence which, as the handmaid of theology,* it had gained over human intelligence. Never- theless, the reactionary spirit of modern thought caused it * " Thcologia non accij)it sua princijiia . . . ab aliis scicntiis laiiquam a superioribus, sf J utilur ei.s tanf|uam infcrionbus ctancillis" (St. Thomas, ^um. Ihcolog., i. q. I, art. 5, aJ fin.). XC INTRODUCTION. to overlook much that was valuable in Scholasticism, and, from pure ignorance, to set out with principles so false and one-sided, that they developed into systems as unwholesome and undesirable as those which they supplanted. The cause of the decay and consequent rejection of Scholas- ticism was, at bottom, its incapacity to deal with the questions to which the subtlety of its own methods and the revival of ancient learning, in many ways hostile to its results, had given birth. This incapacity was due to a defect, inherited by Scholasticism from the philosophers of Greece — the entire lack of a consistent theory of cognition. In spite of the deftest efforts of a Parmenides, a Plato, an Aristotle, and a Plotinus, ancient thought never succeeded in finding any but the crudest material image to express the mode of cognition, or in discovering any principle to vouch for truth. Parmenides, who first found a way out of the absolute scepticism of the system of Herakleitos, by dis- tinguishing being from becoming, placed the former, as the sole object of knowledge, in an ideal world by itself, and accounted for its being known by the rude and childish device of calling it identical with intelligence.* At the same time he abandoned the entire real world of things to contempt, as merely the delusive object of opinion. This theory, in consequence, contained the two greatest defects which a theory of cognition can have : first, it confounded cognition with being, or assumed identity of subject and object ; and, second, it utterly failed to account or vouch for our knowledge of reality. In spite of these two cardinal defects, Parmenides' theory of cognition, by a kind of right of primogeniture, which first explanations not unfrequently enjoy, maintained itself, with little or no modification, throughout the whole * "To 7ap auTo votlv iai'iv re koX dvcu" {Fraf:;inenta Farm., edit. Mullach, 1. 40 ; cf. Buroni, Ddl Essen c del Conoscere, pp. 55 sqq.) INTRODUCTION. XCl course of Greek thought, exercising a determining influences upon it, and even outliving it. Plato, who enlarged Par- menides' ideal world of being, by placing in it the pure forms of things, can hardly be said to have had any theory of cognition or any principle of certainty. His doctrine of reminiscence merely shifts the difficulty, without in the least helping to solve it ; for it is no more easy to conceive how disembodied spirits can cognize ideas having an inde- pendent existence, than to conceive how embodied spirits can cognize things. Plato followed Parmenides in main- taining the world of particulars not to be an object of knowledge. Aristotle, who drew Plato's ideas down from their shadowy heaven and placed them in particular things, as forms universalized through combination with indi- viduating matter, returned, in the most pronounced way, to the two positions of Parmenides, maintaining that there was no science save of universals,* and that the cognition of these was reached by the subject's becoming identical with them.f That Aristotle should have held these views is all the more astonishing that, according to another doc- trine of his, the universal exists only in the particular, and the particular, therefore, is the only true existence.^ Although Aristotle made no contribution to the theory of cognition, or in any way made clear the mode of it, he saw, much more clearly than any of his predecessors had done, what was necessary in order to make cognition valid, viz., some first principle of truth presented directly to the mind, in some such way as to place it beyond the possibility of error, and entering as the essential element into every * " 'H eVttTTTj^Tj Twv Ka66\ov " {Dc Aft., ii. 5 ; 417 b, 22). t '"EttI fjLiv Tuv afev v\7]s rh avr6 iari rh voovv /cat rb vooi'/xej'ov " (//'/i/. iii. 4 ; 430 a, 3). + " Ovaia^i iaTW fj KvpLcorara Kol irpwrois Kcd /J-dXicTra \i'yofj.fvr], 't) /uivre HaO' vnoKitixfvov Ttvhs XtyiTai urir' iv xjiroKiifiivif! ni't imiv, olof 6 rh 6.p6pa>iTOs ^ f> tIv iViroj " (Catcg., 5 ; 2 a, II sqq.). XCl 1 INT ROD UC T!OA\ process by which cognition is reached. He saw plainly that demonstration could never lead to true and satisfying knowledge, if either it had to be continued backward, from ground to ground, ad infijiituin, as the sceptics asserted it must, or revolved in a circle of interdependent, mutually supporting hypotheses.* He accordingly concluded that, in order to the possibility of demonstration, there must exist certain principles known to the mind without demon- stration, that is, directly and intuitively.f Unfortunately, he nowhere expressly says what these grounds are, or in what particular sense (ttwc) f they identify themselves with the mind in order to be intuited. He does, indeed, tell us that the intelligence of indivisibles is free from error,§ whence it follows that they must be known through in- tuition and not judgment ; and he also says that the most certain of all principles is that of contradiction, from which we may conclude, with St. Thomas,|l that he held the ulti- mate principle of all truth, and the essential ground of all judgment and demonstration, to be being. At the same time, he never developed this doctrine so as to show that all truth at last rests on a direct intuition ; consequently, he left philosophy involved in the vicious circle which he had shown to be fatal to the attainment of truth.^ It need hardly be remarked, after what has been said, that the ancient theory of the mode of cognition was based * Who they were that held this opinion in ancient times is not clear — per- haps the Herakleiteans. It has been revived in modern times by Hegel (see under § ii). It is fully refuted by Aristotle, Afial. Post., i. 3 ; 72 b, 25 sqq. t " 'H/xeTs Se (pa/xev ovre iracrai' cVjo'ttJiUt)*' airoSeiKTiK^v elvat, aWa rriv rwv a,fx((7wv avaTToSfiKToy. Kal tovO' on avayKouov, (pavepow el yap avayKt] fiev tTTicTTacrfiaj ra irponpa Kai e| wv r) aTr(55€i|is, "aTarai 54 ttotc to ajxecra, ravr' ai'air65iiKTa avdyK-i) elvai " {Anal. Pest., i. 3 ; 72 b, 18 sqq.). X " TaCro (to KaQoKov) eV avrj; UCl'1 iari rfj ivxfj" [De An., ii. 5, 6 ; 417 b, 23 sqq.). § Be A//., iii. 6, I ; 430 a, 26 sqq. Sec below, under § 62. II See under § 15. 1 Sec under § 10, where the way is shown out of this vicious circle. INTRODUCTION. ' xciii upon purely material conceptions, assimilation and inter- penetration, and that it offered no principle to vouch for the objective truth of cognition. The results of these defects, though not fully developed until later, are sufficiently apparent even in Aristotle's philosophy, which, with all its wonderful breadth and acuteness, was so influenced by the childish doctrines of Parmenides, as never to rise above pantheism and materialism, or, more correctly speaking, pantheistic materialism. At bottom, Aristotle's doctrine is this. From all eternity there have existed matter and form in a state of combination. Matter is indeterminate and by itself unknowable.* Form exists as a qualitative multiplicity held together and moved by a unity. This unity is intelligence (vovg), which is, so to speak, the place and form of forms (tottoq d^iZv, tlSog u^mv). By means of matter, which is the principle of individuation, these forms universalize themselves, that is, appear in a multitude of individuals, not any of which are permanent. Since the No7is is God,t it follows that God is the form of forms, con- tinually actualizing Himself as intelligence through matter, which, being essentially receptive, passive, and changeable, renders impossible any permanent individual. Since matter is non-being, the sum of being is God. All that is per- manent is form or species {ixcoq).X This pantheistic-materialistic doctrine, which was, after * According to St. Thomas, it has not even being, and is, therefore, a non- being : "Materia secundum se neque esse habet neque cognoscibilis est" (Sum. Theolog., i. q. 15, art. 3, 3 m). t " 'O Qihs ^ vovs ik. i. caj). xxix. ex INTRODUCTION. ens comnmne. Pondering upon this thought, Rosmini sud- denly came to see that being is the very essence and form of intelHgence, as distinguished from sensation, and that this form is not subjective, but objective. In other words, he saw that it is the essence of intelHgence to have an object, and that that object is being. In this manner he not only got rid of the identity-theory of cognition maintained by the ancients and the impression-theory held by the moderns, but he likewise did away with subjectivism, drew a clear line between intelligence and sensation, between the ideal and the real, and found the principle and criterion of truth in the essential unity of being as mani- fested under these two forms. In a word, he found in being itself, in the very object without which we cannot cognize or even doubt anything, not only the true explanation of the mode of cognition, but also the indefeasible warrant of all truth. His whole system is merely a working out of the idea of being into all its ramifications and principles, necessary and contingent. If Rosmini drew the bare notion of his first principle from the writings of St. Thomas, almost every other great system of philosophy was laid under contribution in order to determine it. Indeed, every other system was made to give up whatever it had of truth in order to arm the principle of the new doctrine. Rosmini agrees with Par- menides in holding that being, one, indeterminate, eternal, is the sole object of intelligence, the essence and form of truth ; but refuses to conclude from this either that being is identical with knowing, or that the Many is unknowable. According to Rosmini, the Many is knowable as a series of objectified subjects. He agrees with Plato that the ideal is inconfusible with the real ; but he denies that ideas subsist separate from the mind and things. According to him, ideas are determinations which the mind, through IN TROD UCTION. CXI subjective sensations derived from the real mode of being, makes in ideal being, which is its constitutive object. He agrees with Aristotle that ideas or forms exist in the mind and in things, and not in a state of separateness ; but he denies that they exist in mind and in things in the same mode. In the former they are objective, ideal, and, there- fore, universal ; in the latter, they are subjective, real, and, therefore, particular. Moreover, the intellect and the intelligible {yovq koi vorjra) are so far from being identical, that they belong to two absolutely distinct modes of being. He makes the same concessions and objections to St. Thomas, but further agrees with him that the principle of contradiction rests on the intuition of being. He agrees with the school of Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, that subjectivism and sensism cannot furnish a ground for truth, but denies that these are the sources from which truth ought to be expected, and affirms that it is the very form and essence of objectivism and intelligence. He agrees with Kant that the form and matter of thought have to be distinguished ; but he denies, Jirst, that thought has a plurality of forms ; second, that its form is subjective ; and, third, that its matter is objective, before it is made so by thought itself. He maintains that the real, as purely such, is always subject (vTroice/^fvov), while the ideal is always object {avTiK.uiii^\'m>) of intelligence. He agrees with Reid * that perception differs from sensation ; but denies that the former is due to an inexplicable instinct in the mind. He holds that perception is due to the very nature of mind, whose term is necessarily an object. He agrees with Fichle that the Ego implies the non-Ego, but he utterly denies * Rosmini has great respect for the sane, serious philosopliy of Reid, and really owes it a great deal. Indeed, the Italians are almost the only j^hilo- sophers that have done justice to Reid, whose very soberness and sinii)licily have exposed him to unmerited neglect in more romantic countries. CXll IXIRODL'CTION. that the former creates either, and shows that the Ego is a compound, consisting of a subject and an act whereby that subject affirms itself as an object. He agrees with ScheUing that there is something infinite in the mind, but denies that the mind is for that reason the Absolute. He maintains that the object of the mind is necessary, infinite, and eternal ; whereas the subject is contingent, finite, and, but for its union with the object, transient. He agrees, lastly, with Hegel, that the starting-point of philosophy is being ; but he denies that the ideal being, with which such start is made, produces the real and moral forms of being, that is, develops into the universe and God. He, moreover, denies that being, though immediate, is an hypothesis, and shows that it is reached through a direct intuition, a form of cognition not liable to doubt or error, since for it phenomenon and noilnicnon are necessarily one. Rosmini, having discovered the nature of ideal being and its necessary relation to intelligence, was thus able to collect, as determinations of it, all the truths of previous systems freed from their errors, and so, for the first time in the world's history, to lay a solid basis upon which true science might be built up and philosophy brought to stability and repose, after its twenty-five hundred years of weary circling, like that of the carnal spirits, driven by " the infernal hurricane, that never rests." * Upon this basis he proceeded to build up three orders of science : first, sciences of intuition, or of the object ; second, sciences of perception, or of sensible subjects ; and, third, sciences of reflection, or of those subjects which, though beyond the reach of sense, may, through integration of the subjects of sense by means of the object of intelligence, be known in an ideal- negative way, and in part made real by intelligence itself acting through volition. But, after all, when intelligence has * "La Inifera infernal, clie niai non lesla " Dante, Inferno, v. 31). INTRODUCTION. CXIU exhausted its powers of intuition, perception, and reflection, there will still remain an infinitude of reality, of which it has only a negative knowledge, so long as this infinitude does not reveal itself, by imparting to it some new faculty, capable of feeling an infinite reality. When this takes place, intelligence will recognize that it has at last found the necessary real subject of its necessary ideal object. This subject is God, whose reality, according to Rosmini, can be known only when He reveals Himself by imparting to the finite intelligence such an increase of objective light — the Light of Grace — as enables it to recognize, in a higher or lower degree, this infinite perfection. Thus Rosmini finds in the limitation of human intelligence a necessary place for revelation and the action of divine grace, and a formula for this revelation and action, such as is certainly not to be found in any other system of thought but his own. Whether or not we follow him in maintaining that Christianity is such a revelation of God, we must admit that he has, philo- sophically speaking, made a much better case for it than ever was made before. His system has, accordingly, made Christianity acceptable to many w^ho otherwise would have rejected it. The table on the next page will show Rosmini's classification of the Sciences. Of Rosmini's contributions to the different sciences, the most important are unquestionably those which he made to Ideology, a science toward which he stands in the same relation as Aristotle does to Formal Logic. His Neiv Essay on the Of'igin of Ideas, by which he put an end to sub- jectivism and sensism, will take the place of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (by which, according to Hegel, an end was put to objective dogmatism, as he contemptuously calls truth *) as the second great philosophic work of the world, * Gesch. der riiilosophie^ vol. iii. p. 564 (edit. 1S36). CXIV IXTRODUCTION. Philosophy ■> /Sciences of J Ideology Intuition \ Logic Sciences of / Psycho- Percep- j logy tion j Cosmo- l logy /Ontolo- / gical Sciences Sciences of\ reason- ing / Ontology I "atural Theo- logy Na T \ Ic Theosophy {General Special -^ /Teletics Ethics Ascetics Peedagogics CEconomy Politics Cosmo- ^ politics Sciences \ of ideal Metaphy- sics or Sciences of real Sciences of moral / beside and before Aristotle's Logic, by which a period was put to sophistry. Next to his contributions to Ideology, Rosmini's most important work was in Psychology, in which he showed, for the first time, the true nature of the Ego, its double relation to being and sensation, and the necessary nature of the term of the latter. His two works, Anthropology and Psychology, which deal with this subject, are acknowledged as marking an epoch in its history, even by those who are most bitterly opposed to the rest of his system. Next in importance to his contributions to Psychology are those which he made to the inferential Science of Morals, for which he discovered a rational and objective basis in the same principle which furnishes the criterion of theoretical truth, showing that right is merely truth accepted as a standard of action. Besides these, he made many and great contributions to other sciences, especially Logic, Law, Politics, Cosmology, Ontology, and Natural Theology. His great work, the Theosophy, which was intended to deal exhaustively with the last three subjects, he did not live to complete, and the same is true respecting several other great works, including one on INTRODUCTION. CXV Mathematics. Many of his writings still remain unpub- lished.* From what has been said, it will be easy to understand the relation of Rosminianism to the other systems of our time. To the various sensistic systems, whether calling themselves materialistic or idealistic, it stands in the relation of a corrector and complement; to the spiritualistic systems, in the relation of a guide and foundation. It completes the former, by showing them the way out of mere subjectivity and persuasion into a world of objectivity and truth ; it imparts strength and vision to the latter, by placing them upon a basis of rational insight. To the special sciences it furnishes unity and aim. Doubtless, Rosminianism will in many points undergo modification or correction, and in many more receive extensive development ; but that it supplies a basis for a new and unprecedented progress in philosophy, will hardly be doubted by any one who, with sufficient knowledge of previous systems and sufficient free- dom from prejudice, will give it a thorough examination.! If such is the nature and importance of Rosmini's system, it may well be asked why, having been before the world more or less completely for half a century, it has thus far made so little impression upon it, that, outside of Italy and the circle of Rosmini's religious order, its very existence is almost unknown. The answer to this is very simple. Rosmini was an Italian and wrote in Italian ; he was a Catholic priest and a very sincere one ; and, worse than all, he was a staunch opponent of the narrow policy which a certain party in the Church has followed for the last fifty * See the list of his works, pp. lii.-lxviii. t Some people, fond of finding brief names for things, rather discredit Rosmini's system by calling it Objective Idealism. It is one great merit of the system that, not being one-sided, it is not covered by any one name. If we must call it something, then, to be just, we ought to name it : O^jfclivc Ideal- ism, Suhjectivc Kealisni., and Absi'litU jMcralisin. ex V 1 LV TK OD UC TION. years. The first of these ch-cumstances renders his works inaccessible to the greater number of persons who are fitted to appreciate them ; the second prejudices against them the majority of the remainder, who differ from him in creed ; and the third rouses against them the odhini politiaim of by far the larger number of the thinkers of his own confession. Scholars who have been wont to believe that all modern thought deserving of consideration must come from Germany, France, or England, are not inclined to learn Italian, in order to study the works of a Catholic thinker whose name does not occur in most of the histories of philosophy ; Protestants and Rationalists are not prepared to believe that a profound and rational system of philosophy can originate wath a devoted priest of the Catholic Church ; and Catholics of the ordinary stripe are not prepared to look with favour upon the works of a man who did his best to reform and purify ecclesiastical discipline, and to lead the Church back to her primitive simplicity, humanity, and faith. Hence Rosminianism, having nothing but truth in its favour, has thus far struggled almost in vain against a world of prejudice. Not altogether in vain, however ; for the system has, especially in Italy, a small but select number of very warm adherents, who, in the long run, will do more to propagate it than ten times the number of lukewarm disciples. Truth at last is sure to prevail, and therefore Rosminianism can afibrd to bide its time without haste or fear. When that time comes, the system will be found to contain not only all the truth of ancient and of modern philosophy, combined and systematized, but also a groundwork on which philosophy may henceforth advance, like the other sciences, instead of continuing to be held in scorn as a baseless phantom for ever whirling aimlessly in a vicious circle. PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Philosophy is the science of ultimate o-rounds. What is Philo- sophy ? It will be seen, by reference to the tabular view of the sciences in the Introduction, that Rosmini draws a clear distinction between the terms pliilosophy and mctapJiysics, employing the latter in the limited sense of Science of the Real, which, according to him, includes Cosmology, Onto- logy, and Natural Theology. Thus the term mctapJiysics, while narrower than philosophy, is wider than ontology (cf. Preface to Metaphysical Works, in Psychology, vol. i. pp. 5-16, where these distinctions are treated at length). The above definition of Philosophy does not differ mate- rially from that of Leibniz, who calls it "the science of suffi- cient reasons" ; or from that of Descartes, who makes it "the science of things evidently deduced from first principles" (cf Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. i. pp. 48-53, where a list of the more famous definitions of philosophy, ancient and modern, are given). It approaches, perhaps, still more closely the definition which Aristotle gives of wisdom {ao^ia), " the science which considers first principles and causes [tTrKXTiifn] tow irpMTiov tip\un> ku\ alruov Biwp-nTiKri." Metaph., i. 2, 982 b, 9) ; and it coincides with the definition of first philosophy, which St. Thomas in part borrows from Aristotle. " The philosopher," says he, mean- ■i B 2 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM ing Aristotle, "determines it {i.e. first philosophy) to be the science of truth, not of truth in general, but of that truth which is the origin of all truth, that is, which relates to the first universal principle of being {prinium principiiim essendi omnibus) " {Stimma contra 6^^;z/.,cap. i.; cf Aristotle, JfV/'^^/'//., i-^ i> 993 t>, 20). Rosmini condemns several other defini- tions of philosophy, especially those of Hobbes, Galluppi, Plato, and Wolf Hobbes had defined philosophy as "a knowledge, acquired by correct reasoning, of effects or phenomena from their conceived causes or generations, and also of possible generations from known effects" {Com- pntatio sive Logica, cap. i.). In regard to this Rosmini says, "Since from effects alone or from phenomena alone, with- out the aid of the ideal object, we can know only the proximate causes, or, more properly speaking, the laws, according to which sensible things change, philosophy is destroyed by this definition, and there remain only physics and the natural sciences, usurping the title of philosophy " {Pref. to Metaph. Works, § 14). Of Galluppi's definition, which makes philosophy " the science of human thought,'' he says, " But human thought is only the instrument wherewith philosophy finds and contemplates its objects, and these, among which the greatest is God, cannot in the smallest degree be reduced to thought. It would be a most manifest absurdity to say that the science of God, which certainly belongs to philosophy, treats of nothing but human thought" {Ibid., § 15). In regard to the remark of Plato, that the philosopher " devotes himself always to the idea of being " (ry tov ovtoq aa TrpoaKd/utvog l^ia. Soph. 254, A), he says, " On the contrary, the idea of being must guide the human mind to discover the absolute and most real being, this being the end of all its speculations — an end which it reaches, not through any idea, but through affirma- tion and intuition" {Ibid., § 16). To Wolf's definition of philosophy as " the science of things possible," he objects : " Possibilities do not by any means constitute the grounds of things in their completeness, being but a single element of those grounds. Contingent things, for example, do not exist merely because they are possible, but because, being DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 3 possible, a first cause has created them " {Ibid.). These objections help to make clear Rosmini's view of the sphere and functions of philosophy, and the cardinal distinction which he makes between ideal being, which is in itself intelligible, and real being, which is intelligible only through the other. When he asserts {Theosophy, vol. i. § 6) that "the real, as merely real, signifies nothing, not going beyond itself or expressing anything but itself," and that it " goes beyond the power of natural signs, altogether beyond the power of any spoken word, however eloquent, and of any writing, however learned, elegant, and sublime it may appear," he comes very near drawing that distinction which, at first sight, seems to involve an absurd paradox, but which is, nevertheless, strictly true — the distinction, namely, between thought and knowledge. Thought being the mere instrument of knowledge (the quo cognosci- vius, as the Scholastics say), and knowledge being that which thought accomplishes {quod cognosciimis) , it follows that thought and knowledge are absolutely exclusive with respect to each other ; that what is known cannot, as such, be thought ; and that what is thought cannot, as such, be known. It is the failure to observe this distinction that has led Herbert Spencer and others into their strange muddle respecting the unknowable, by which they mean the un- thinkable. Ideas are thinkable but absolutely unknow- able ; things are knowable but absolutely unthinkable. In regard to Science, the genus of which philosophy is a species, Rosmini approves of the view expressed by Aristotle in the Later Analytics, where he says, "We think we know a thing absolutely (ticaarov cnrXwg), and not in the sophistical, accidental way, when we think we know the cause which produced it, know that that is the cause of that thing, and know that it must be the cause of that thing" (cap. ii. 71 b, 9 sq.). He, moreover, distinguishes between the subjective and objective senses of the term. "The word scieuce," he says, "has a universal sense, equi- valent to that of cognition ; but it is also employed in a more restricted sense, to signify a particular mode of cognition. In this limited sense it may be regarded cither 4 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. subjectively, that is, as possessed by man, the knowing subject, or objectively, as knowable, as that which is intuited by a mind " {Logic, § 825). In the former view it is equi- valent to philosophy ; in the latter, it means " an entire system of demonstrated cognitions, depending upon a single principle " {Ibid., § 836). It is instructive to compare with these views respecting science and philosophy, the definitions of these terms given by Herbert Spencer, " Science," says that writer, " is partially tmijied knowledge ; Philosophy is completely tmijied knowledge" {First Principles, Part II. cap. i. § 37). It follows from this that we have not at present any philosophy, and indeed, that only omniscience is philosophy, and God the only philosopher. Ultimate Ultimate grou7ids are the answers which satisfy groun s. ^^ j^^^ whys put by the human mind to itself. It thus appears that the final, self-sufficient test of truth is perfect mental satisfaction, the cessation of all desire for further evidence or explanation. This satisfaction, being of the nature of a feeling, is immediate, given, and, there- fore, incapable of explanation. Why does truth satisfy ? is a foolish question. We may, nevertheless, discover and state the conditions under which such satisfaction is felt, and, in so doing, we shall discover and state the conditions of truth itself It is almost unnecessary to say that by grounds {ragioni) Rosmini does not mean causes. Indeed, he finds fault with Aristotle for confounding the two terms. "What Aristotle calls cause {ahia)," he says, "ought more correctly to be called ground, the term properly belonging to the order of the knowable, with which he is dealing" {Logic, § 827). The passage referred to is the one quoted above, p. i. According to Rosmini, a ground is "that light which enables the mind {spirito) to know that what any given judgment affirms in the order of possibility, is" ULTIMATE GROUNDS. 5 {Ibid., § 188). "A ground is always an idea, simple or complex ; but the terms ground and idea differ as two different modes of regarding the same thing. Ground indicates the logical necessity which the mind feels of assenting to a possible judgment. It is, therefore, a virtue which emanates from the intuition of the necessary nexus between two or more ideas, which nexus, however, as intuited by the mind, may likewise be called an idea " (Ibid., § 192). "The grounds which justify assent to any possible judgment are either intrinsic or extrinsic. A ground is intrinsic when the judgment requires no other proof, foreign to it, in order to appear true to the mind of any one who examines it with sufficient care. ... A ground is extrinsic when the mind, in order to be con- vinced of the truth of a possible judgment, is obliged to have recourse to some judgment different from the first " (Ibid., §§ 193, 195). In reference to the relation of grounds to reality, we have the following statements: — "Things real must be treated in the doctrine of tiltimate grounds. First, because ground is a word whose signification is relative to that whose ground is sought, and that whose ground is sought is the real. Hence it follows that real things, as such, do not constitute the object of philosophy, but merely its occasion and condition. Philosophy deals with them, because it deals with their possibilities and their ultimate sufficient grounds. Second, because the first ground requires a reality coessential with it, . . . and hence cannot be fully known without the knowledge of that first reality which constitutes it, not as a ground, but as a complete and absolute being containing within itself the ground of all things " {Psychology, Pref, § 13). It is need- less to say that ultimate grounds are, of necessity, intrinsic, immediate, and self-evident. Rosmini, in common with Aristotle * and St. Thomas,t and in opposition to Hegel,} * " 'Ai/a7Kr) Koi tt/i/ OTroSfi/CTi/crjf iirt(TTr]fj,riv e^ a\7}6(oi' r elpai Kal tzpwTwv Koi a/x4(TCiiv Kol yvoopifxuTepwi' koI irporepoDV Kal alTiwu tov aufXTrtpdafxaros" {.-Inal. Post., ii. 71 b, 20 sq.). t " Per se, et directe intellectus est univcrsalium,sensub autcm singularium " {Sumt>ia Theol., p. i. q. Ixxxvi., concl.). X " Logibch ibtder Anfang, indcm cr im Elcmcnlc dcs frci fur sich sciciiden 6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. whom he calls the "foe of all immediateness " {Theosophy, vol. i. § lo), maintains that all ultimate knowledge is of this kind. Of the nature of ultimate grounds, Rosmini speaks at length in his Logic. " If we wish to determine the meaning of this expression, ultimate grounds" he says, " we must take into consideration certain distinctions, for the reason that grounds may be called ultimate which are such, not in themselves, but with respect to the limits of human nature. Whatever these limits be, it is clear that we cannot speak of any ultimate grounds except with respect to these, because absolutely ultimate grounds, if they go beyond the confines of human nature, cannot be desired or sought by it, and hence the want of them can- not cause it any disquiet. In order, therefore, that the human mind, when it has reached the ultimate grounds, may be conscious that these are ultimate for it (supposing that they are not likewise ultimate in themselves), it must recognize its own limits, and clearly understand that, in carrying its researches further, it would be attempting the impossible" (§ 1163). "We must, therefore, consider that there are three supreme grounds, categorically distinct. These may be called the formal ground, the real ground, and the moral ground. The supreme formal ground is given to man in the idea of being, and is the principle of all formal logic. It is also that which enables him to cognize real and moral grounds. But the supreme real ground is not given to man by nature, since this reality is God Himself, and by nature man does not perceive the reality of God. Possessing, then, the supreme formal ground, and, in it, the power of knowing all real grounds, even the supreme one, if they were given to him — that is, if they were communicated to his feeling — he has the faculty of recognizing his own limits, in other words, of recognizing that it is not granted him to know all that he could know, and hence he concludes that there may and must be, beyond these limits, something unknown to him. If now we give to this act (slancio), by which the human mind Denkens, im reinen Wissen gemacht warden soil" [Los^ik, vol. i. p. 6i ; cf. Trendelenburg, Logische Untersuchungen, vol. i. pp. 36, sqq.). ULTIMATE GROUNDS. 7 divines that there is something beyond all that it knows, the name of huniau super intelligence, we shall see clearly that this is not d. faculty {potensa), but di function of reason, whereby, comparing the field of the possible, given to it in the idea, with the field of the real, given to it in feeling, it sees that the former is infinitely more extensive than the latter, and that the portion of reality which it can touch does not contain the supreme ground ; that is, the being which is real in its essence, which alone can be the type of all reality, and hence also alone can be the ground of all finite realities. Again, as regards the supreme moral ground, this lies in the essential and total order of being, inasmuch as being, thus intrinsically ordered, is in itself a good to all the wills that cognize it. Now, man, in the idea, possesses this order virtually, but it does not become actual to thought except in real being. Of this real being he knows a part positively through feeling, and that part which he knows by nature in this way implies infinite being ; then, through the function of human superintelli- gence, he knows, negatively and confusedly, infinite real being, in which alone the supreme moral ground is ac- tualized, because in it alone is the essential and total order of being. Hence, according to nature, man cannot know the supreme moral ground, except in a negative and virtual way. Hence the imperfection of morality in his actual existence. There are, therefore, two main limits to human intelligence. First, it cannot know the supreme real ground, and, therefore, cannot have a single material criterion for all realities. It is for this reason that we have been obliged to lay down the rule that every specific per- ception of reality is a criterion for that species whereof that perception is assumed as the type. Second, it can know only virtually the supreme moral reason" (§§ 1163, 1165). Of course, it follows directly from this, that, in our present life, we find no entire intellectual satisfaction, at least in a natural way. " Since man," says Rosmini, " knows the supreme formal ground, and, through it, these two limits, he aspires to extend himself to the infinite, and desires a state in which these limitations shall cease. However, 8 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. when a man reaches the clear conviction that such Hmits cannot be removed in the present life, he resigns himself to this necessity, and thus finds that satisfaction of intellect which is possible in mortal life." In other words, to quote the famous saying of Goethe, " Man is not born to solve the problem of the universe, but to find out where the problem begins, and then to keep himself within the limits of the knowable." 3- Phiio- Ultimate grounds are either absolute or re- geSerai latlve. The former are, strictly speaking, alone special. ultimate, and, as such, constitute the scope of General Philosophy ; whereas the latter are ulti- mate only in reference to a determinate branch of science, and hence form the scope of Special Philosophies, such as those of mathematics, physics, history, politics, art, etc. Though Rosmini prefers the term ultimate grounds, he does not object to calling them likewise first grounds. " Ultimate grounds',' he says, "and first groimds are equi- valent expressions, because what is last in the one direction of thought is first in the other" {Purposes of the Author, § 9, n.). Compare the Aristotelian doctrine, that what is first in essence or nature is last in generation,* or, as St. Thomas puts it, " What is first and better known in its nature is last and less known relatively to us." f Of the relation of Philosophy to the other sciences * " 'Evaj'TiaJS eTr) 'ry\s yevecrews ex^' "'"' '^^^ ovcrias' to, yap vcrrepa ttj ytyeaei irpSrepa rijv (pvffiv earl, Koi trpSiTov rh rrj yeveffei T€\€VTa7ov " [De Part. Ajiitn. , i. I ; 646 a, 24 sq. ). Cf. Physica, viii. 7 ; 261 a, 14 : 9 ; 265 a, 22 sq. ; and Eucken, Die Methode der Aristotelischen Porschung, p. 13. t " Quae sunt priora et notiora secundum naturam, sunt posteriora et minus nota secundum nos" {Sum. Theol., i. q. 85, art. 3, l). Cf. Aristotle, " Oh yap rav-^hv irp6Tepov Trj ((>v(Tei Kal irphs Tjfias -npSrepov ov'5\ yva>pi/j.(i)Tepov Kal r)fuy yvw^nxdrepov" [Anal. Post., \. 2; 71 b, 35 sq.). POINT OF DEPARTURE. 9 Rosmini says, " The ultimate grounds outside of the world and the ultimate grounds in the world, these form the object of philosophy, which thus occupies the last two and highest steps of the pyramid we have described. Hence philosophy remains clearly separated from, and elevated above, the other sciences, as the guide and mother of them all. These form the lower steps of the pyramid, depending upon the highest two and receiving their light from them " {Purposes of the Aitthor, § 9 ; cf St. Thomas, Sicju. TheoL, \\} q. 6, art. i, i m.). In attempting to discover the ultimate grounds Point of 1 • 1 11 • • > departure. which shall satisfy its own last spontaneous whys, the human mind must, of necessity, begin by recognizing the state of its own cognitions and of its own persuasions. It must then go on and endeavour to supplement and complete these cognitions in such a way as to satisfy the in- telligence, which imperatively demands a ground for everything it knows, and allows the mind no rest until it has found a self-sufficient ground, that is, a ground which calls for no further ground. The gist of this section is, that philosophy sets out with simple, direct, unquestioning observation of the present facts of consciousness, and then proceeds to search for another fact of consciousness, a ground or idea, which shall so unite and supplement all others as to relieve the mind from the discomfort which disconnection and incomplete- ness always cause it. Philosophy, in this view, — and it is a correct one — may be defined as an explanation of the facts of consciousness ; for even God and the Universe, in so far as they require or admit cxplanatioti, number as objects among these facts. That which is not known requires no c.xpla- lo PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. nation. To explain existence in itself is a task beyond the reach of philosophy. Indeed, the phrase is self-con- tradictory ; for it means, to explain a fact of consciousness, which, by the very hypothesis, does not exist. This doc- trine does not involve the conclusion that some would draw from it, that therefore we do not kiiozv things. The opposite conclusion is the true one. We do know things, and it is precisely for that reason that they do not require or admit explanation. We do not, indeed, think things ; but, as has been already remarked, knowledge and thought are mutually exclusive. This section shows how different Rosmini's starting- point was from that of Hegel. Indeed, there are few things which Rosmini so strongly opposes as the doctrine of a " presuppositionless beginning" in philosophy. His refu- tation of this doctrine {Logic, §§43-50 ; Theodicy, i. §§ 10, 19,20) is, in many points, superior to that of Trendelenburg {Logische Untersiichiingen, i. pp. 36-140, and Die logische Frage in Hegel's System, Leipzig, 1843; cf. §§ 11, 53). Rosmini cordially agrees with Kant and his school (cf. Kritik der reincn Vermmft, Einleitung, i.) in holding that " all our knowledge begins with experience ; " but he finds grave fault with them for not clearly showing what they mean by experience. His strictures on this omission are worth quoting. " Modern philosophers," he says, " generally admit that all human knowledge comes from experience ; but they do not trouble themselves to ask, What is experience .-* Is it meant that experience is the facts .'' The facts by themselves cannot form experience, because, until the facts are known by me, they are, with reference to my know- ledge, as if they did not exist. By experience, therefore, is meant the facts cognized by me. If this is the meaning of the word ' experience,' we must go on and inquire what kind of cognition is here meant. Is it meant that ex- perience is the facts cognized by the senses alone } The question is absurd : with the senses alone they cannot be cog?iized. When I say that I know a fact with my senses alone, I have removed from that fact the whole of my thought regarding it. The facts, as they then remain, are DIFFERENT FORMS OF MENTAL QUIET. ii sensations and nothing more. There is no comparison between them, or relation of any kind. These facts, cognized, as the very improper expression is, by the sense alone, can neither be written nor spoken, because language has no individual words fitted to express them, and because, if I joined them to some sensible sign, in order to make them speakable, I should be obliged to make some reflection on them, which is contrary to the hypothesis that I know them through my senses alone. Experience, therefore, must be the facts as really known. But into this know- ledge there enters necessarily intelligence, which adds to the facts a certain universality, considering them in relation to being, and, through being, in relation to each other, and, in this way, forming classes or species. This is certainly the only kind of experience that can or does produce our cognitions. But if this is the experience which we mean when we say that all our cognitions come from experience, we must, first of all, inquire. What is intellectual cognition of facts f What is that intellect with which we form, or at least complete, this experience ? How must such a faculty of cognizing be constituted, in order that it may be able to produce such experience .'' This last question is equivalent to, What must the intellect have that is innate .'' or, What are the conditions under which the experience we speak of is possible 1 " {Nezv Essay, vol. ii. § 398). What Vv'ould Rosmini have said to those philosophers who define Logic as " the science of the laws of thought," without ever in- quiring, What is thought } The mental rest or quiet here meant is only Different a scientific qidet, which the inquiring mind reaches mental when it finds scientific replies to its own inevitable '^""^ " interrogations. But it must not be supposed that the mind always puts such interrogations to itself. Many minds never do so at all, or, if they do, at 12 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. least put far fewer than they mig-ht put. The mind which does not question itself at all enjoys rest and quiet. The same is true of the mind, which questions itself up to a certain point and no further, as soon as it has found replies to its limited number of interrogations, although it may not have arrived at ultimate reasons, these not being essential to its quiet. Hence the science of ultimate grounds, that is, philosophy, is not necessary to the mental quiet of the m.ajority of mankmd, who content themselves with a much more limited kind of cognition. Such cognition, though not philosophical, may be true and certain, and may thus afford a most reasonable per- suasion. The distinction here drawn between the two kinds of mental satisfaction is a most important one, involving not only the whole distinction between reason and faith, but the whole question of the nature of assent. To this latter subject Rosmini devotes the first book of his Logic (pp. 9-85), the most original part of the whole work. A few sentences from this treatise will make the distinction clearer. " Assent is the act with which a man adheres voluntarily to the object which stands before his intelligence. To assent to an object means to affirm it with subjective authority" {efficacia, § 85). "Assent is not one of those acts of the spirit which produce new cognitions, but it is an act by which a person appropriates the cognitions which stand before him. We are in the habit, nevei'theless, of saying that assent produces cognitions, because by means of it a person makes cognitions his, and obtains persuasion * of * Persuasione. After some hesitation, I have concluded to render this word by its etymological equivalent, although in many cases conviction would have read better. Rosmini distinguishes the two. " To convince" he says, "is to give a man demonstrated cognitions, and regards the intellect ; to persuade is to move the will to assent " {Logic, § 1 144). ASSENT. 13 them" (§ 86). "Assent is a species o{ judgment ; but not all judgments are assents. Judgments are of two kinds, ideal and real. Ideal jtidgiiients are those which present themselves to the mind as possible, without assent or dissent on the part of the person to whom they are presented. Real judgments are those which, after being presented to the mind as possible, receive assent" (§ Zy). " Possible judgments are of two kinds, those which are composed of mere ideas, as. The genus is more exten- sive than the species ; and those which are composed of ideas and realities, as, Rome exists " (§ %'S). " Hence, assent is that act whereby a man produces real judgments, . . . which he does only after having discovered by in- tuition the possible judgments " (§ 89). " Between the possible judgment and the assent there lies the question, Shall I assent to the possible judgment ? " (§ 93). " So long as the question lasts, . . . and is not answered by assent, there is a mental condition which is termed ignora7ice " (§ 96). " The effect which assent produces in the mind {animo) \s persuasioti, that is, persuasion that the judgment assented to, whether positive or negative, is true. Per- suasion is not cognition. On the contrary, there are erroneous persuasions produced by assents given to ideal judgments " (§ 102). " This appropriation of cognition, termed persuasion, and performed by means of assent, is usually denominated subjective eognition, the term objective cognition being reserved for the cognition, properly so called, which precedes the assent" (§ 103). ^^ Subjective cognition adds nothing to objective cognition, but it adds something to the subject, namely, the persuasion of that cognition " (§ 104). " To what faculty does assent belong ? To the will or to the understanding } " (§ 129). " We reply that the power of assent is a special function, which must be accurately distinguished from both understanding and will" (§ 130). "The subject performs certain acts by means of its faculties, others directly through itself, without employing any faculty. . . . The act of affirming what it understands the subject performs directly through itself, since in that act it does nothing but accommodate itself 14 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. to what it understands" (§ 131). "A man cannot give assent to a possible judgment present to his mind (spirito), unless he sees an efficient ground which attests its truth. What then is a ground ? By ground we mean, that light which enables the mind to know that what any given judg- ment affirms in the order of possibility, IS" (§ 188). "Be it observed that this IS signifies the truth of the affirmation, because, if a thing is, it is true" (§ 189). "This light is logical necessity" (§ 191). "The grounds which justify assent to any possible judgment are either intrinsic or extrinsic" (§ 193). "Evident judgments are those which are made in regard to the idea of being and its immediate applications'' (§ 196). "The extrinsic grounds which show the truth of possible judgments and render assent to them obligatory are — (i) primitive judgments with respect to all judgments which are not primitive but derivative ; (2) an infallible authority" (§ 212). " Authority, in its proper sense, means the external testimony which a trustworthy person renders to the truth of a possible judgment " (§ 21 5). " That which induces a subject to give an assent is {a) either an instinct, not guided by any ground, as when the assent is determined by the instinct of the marvellous ; or {b) a purely spontaneous act of will, such as takes place in per- ceptions and in all voluntary assents given without re- flection ; or ic) an act of free will, which chooses between the ground for assent and that for non assent, a choice which always takes place in the order of reflection ; or {d) an act of free will, which creates or forges a reason, in accordance with which the assent is given in the same way as happens in formal errors, which likewise belong to the order of reflection" (§ 221). "By means of reflection, the %vill becomes free from necessity. The force of free volition, under certain conditions, overpowers instinct and voluntary spontaneity. By means of this force, a person may prevent instinctive assent" (§ 222). " Gratuitous assent is diff"erent from that assent which a man gives without being able to assign a ground to himself or to other people. . . . The really gratuitous assents . . . are those which have no ground, but are determined by blind cause" (§ 226), POPULAR AND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWING. 15 " There is error every time that there is attributed to a subject a predicate which does not belong to it. Hence the point where the error lies is the nexus between the predicate and the subject" (§ 244). Much to the same effect may be found in Dr. Newman's Grammar of Assent. 6. But this lower form of mental quiet is not Popular • 1 1 . A • 1 11 ^""^ philo- necessarily lastmg. A mmd possessed by strong sophicai , r. . . -,.,., knowing. and nrm convictions, 01 which it has never ex- amined the ultimate grounds, may suddenly find itself confronted by an ultimate za/iy. Will it then remain in a state of unquiet and uncertainty, until it has found the needed reply ? Here we must distinguish between repose of mind and repose of spirit. The former demands demon- stration, the latter only persuasion ; and these are two widely different things. Demonstration has something necessary, almost fatal, about it, while persuasion has much that is voluntary. Hence it is that a man may have firm persuasions, with- out being able to assign the precise grounds of them. Moreover, amongc these unreasoned con- victions there are some that are blind, and some that are rational. Blind convictions are arbitrary, groundless, and often erroneous, although, by accident, they may be true. Rational persuasions, which a man holds, without being able to assign the grounds of them, are such as rest upon really solid grounds, known indeed directly, and com- prehended suf^ciently to command assent, but not sufficiently analyzed by reflection to enable him l6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. to express them either to himself or others, if he is questioned about them. The mind, the per- suasions of such a man lack something, namely, the development of reflection ; nevertheless, he possesses truth and a persuasion of the truth, strong enough to produce repose of spirit. He may even enjoy repose of mind, if, by refusing attention to his inner questionings, he succeed in stifling them. He is then in the same condition as if the questions had not been put. Philo- sophy the restorer of repose of intellect. But the mind of such a man, that is, his faculty of demonstration, considered with reference to itself, and not with reference to persuasion and quiet of spirit, or to the possession of truth and certitude, has not satisfied its own demands, and, hence, has not found repose. Philosophy is what restores scientific repose of intellect. Difference between demon- stration and per- suasion. 8. There is, therefore, a popular knozving, suf- ficient for the purposes of ordinary life, and there is z. philosophical knowing, calculated to satisfy the demands of the faculty of demonstration. The latter is the work of reflection, carried forward to the discovery of ultimate grounds. Rosmini devotes a considerable number of pages in his New Essay to clearing up the distinction between direct, popular, and philosophical cognition. " Direct cognition" DEMONSTRATION AND PERSUASION. 17 he says, " consists of intellective perceptions and the ideas which detach themselves from perceptions. Reflection, set in motion by language, then comes forward, and its first steps are those whereby it marks the relations, im- mediate or almost immediate, of the things perceived and apprehended. This first operation of reflection does not yet analyze the single perceptions and ideas of things. It leaves them entire * as they were when it first acquired them, merely contemplating them together. It is still a synthetic operation of which all persons are capable. Hence, it forms a large part, not to say the whole, of common or popular science. Philosophical science, on the contrary, begins with the analysis of simple objects. When things perceived submit themselves to analysis, they acquire a singular light, which is what ennobles the wisdom of the wise. This analysis may be considered the starting-point of philosophy. Setting out from it, phi- losophy proceeds to confirm those great relations between beings {esseri) which the great mass of mankind have already observed, and, we might almost say, intuitively noted. Hence, popular science occupies an intermediate position between direct science on the one hand, and philosophical science on the other. It springs from a first reflection, whereas philosophical science requires a second reflection. The first strong reflection of popular cognition adds no new matter to cognition, but merely discovers new immediate relations in it. The reflections which follow bring out other relations between the preceding cognitions. If direct cognition enjoys immunity from error, the case is very different with popular cognition, which is already partly the fruit of reflection, not to say also partly of imagination. Philosophical cognition, moreover, is, of all the forms of cognition, the most liable to error, being the offspring of a more remote reflection" (§§ 1 264-1 267). Rosmini's distinction between the three kinds of knowing is almost exactly the same as that which Aristotle draws between perception (maOiimg), experience {ifmtipia), and * "XvyKexviJ-iva, as Aristotle says : see Pliysua, i. i, 1 84 a, 21 sq. c i8 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. theory ijkxvy]) or science (fTrtor/'j^)]).* To Aristotle's dis- tinction between theory and science, viz. that the former deals with production or becoming, the latter with being ("'^O av iv airaaiv ev kv\) eKeivoig to avro, Te)(iJnQ (^PX^ '^^'- lTriaTy]ni]g, lav plv rr^pi rriv yivetriv, tI^^vtjc, sav ol irepi to 6v, l7naT{]iur}g." Anal Post, ii. 19, lOO a, 7, seq.), Rosmini has nothing corresponding. The distinction between special sciences and philosophy comes very near it. St. Thomas, of course, follows Aristotle, as do the Scholastics generally. Kant's distinction between experience {Erfahrimg), under- standing, and reason t is equivalent to the one made by Aristotle, since Kant's experience corresponds to Aristotle's perception. Even Hegel's distinction of the stages of knowing into consciousness, self-consciousness, and reason is not essentially different,! although under the term reason are included religion, which, according to Rosmini, is, as such, no part of philosophy at all (§ 151), and absolute knowing, which he would attribute only to God {Theosophy, i. § 11). It is needless to say that Rosmini totally rejects Hegel's process, as well as the identification of reason and spirit {Geisi) which results from it§ {Theosophy, vol. iv. p. 459). Rosmini has treated, at great length, of the nature of persuasion, the difference between it and certainty, truth, and conviction, and the part which the will plays in it {Logic, §§ 136 sq., 1099 sq. ; New Essay, §§ 1335 sq., 1044 sq.). He treats also, at considerable length, of the nature of mental satisfaction {appagamento). "We distinguish," he says, ^^satisfaction from persuasion, considering persua- sion as an effect or state which remains in a man every time he adheres and assents to any truth, but which does not necessarily take away his curiosity to discover a further ground, whereas satisfaction is a more universal effect or state of the mind, causing it to search no further, and * Metaph., i. i ; cf. the commentaries of Schwegler and Bonitz. t Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Einleitung. + Phcsnomenlogie des Geistes, throughout. § Phan. des Geistes, pp. 327, sqq. SATISFACTION AND PERSUASION. 19 leaving it without the thought that there is anything further to search into. . . . Satisfaction may be absolute or rela- tive " (Z(?^/c, § 1 161). "Absolute satisfaction arises when these two extremes are realized : (i) That the mind shall have succeeded in knowing the ultimate grounds of things, so that no further research remains possible ; (2) That it shall be conscious of having thus succeeded. If it did not recognize as ultimate grounds those which it has dis- covered, even though they really were such, it would still feel as if it ought to continue its search and therefore would not be satisfied" {§ 1162). Inasmuch as absolute ultimate grounds are inaccessible to man on account of the limitations of his nature, he must content himself with grounds that are ultimate with respect to these (see note to § 2). " For satisfaction of mind, therefore, it is necessary. First, that a man consciously, and therefore reflectively, succeed in reaching the ultimate formal ground ; Second, that being unable to find the last real ground, he make allowance for his impotence and resign himself to the necessity of the limit imposed on him by nature" {Logic, § 1 168). But as such satisfaction is only relative, it follows that this is the only form of mental satisfaction possible in this life. In endeavouring to discover these grounds, a The first man must set out from the intellectual condition put by in which he finds himself (§ 4). And the first sophy, and question he puts to himself takes this form : " I sequences. imagine I know many things, but what is my knowing itself ? May I not be deceived ? Why may not all that I think I know be a delusion } " These questions lead him to the discovery of Ideology and Logic, which, as having ideas for their object, are Sciences of Intuition. 20 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Rosmini distinguishes between regressive pJiilosophy, which, " by way of reflection, conducts the mind to find the principle from which the science of being is derived ; progressive philosophy, or Theosophy, which is that same science of being, derived from its principle ; and mediate philosophy, which furnishes the conditions, formal {Logic) as well as material {Psychology), of the passage of the mind from regressive philosophy {Ideology) to progressive philo- sophy {Theosophy)" {Theosophy, i. § i6). Schelling made the same distinction between regressive and progressive philosophy. This whole subject is treated at considerable length in the A^ezv Essay, vol. i. Preliminary, §§ 31-35. The starting-point of the man who begins to philoso- phize is one of four starting-points which are frequently confounded, but which Rosmini distinguishes with care. These are — (i) man's starting-point when he first begins to develop ; (2) the starting-point of the human spirit ; (3) the starting-point of the man who begins to philoso- phize ; and (4) the starting-point of philosophy as science, or of the system of human cognition. The first he considers to be external sensation ; the second, the notion of being ; the third, the point of mental growth which the man has reached ; and the fourth, " that luminous point from which all other cognitions derive their clearness of certainty and truth, viz., the idea of being" {New Essay, vol. i. Pre- liminary, § 5 ; more at length vol. iii. §§ 1468-1472). In regard to the third of these starting-points, which is the one that at present concerns us, he says, " When a man begins to philosophize, he is already developed. . . . Now he cannot set out from any other point than that at which he is. To do anything else is impossible for him. Con- dillac and Bonnet, in their discourses, pretend to transport themselves to the first beginning of cognition and imagine a statue with one sense. But in doing so, no matter whether well or ill, they take an immense leap ; they seek to cross an abyss in trying to forget, all at once, the intellectual condition in which they are, in order to watch, as spectators of another nature, the effect of the first sensations which a man feels. The time for that is past for them, for ever past" {New Essay, vol. iii. § 147 1). INTUITION. 21 Philosophy conducts from the certainty that things seem to the certainty that they arc ; in other words, from subjective persuasion to objective conviction. If being and knowing were the same, as Parmenides and Hegel allege, there would be no place for philosophy, inasmuch as there would be no distinction between an hallucination and a true cognition. It is curious that Tennyson, in the later editions of In Memoriain, has altered seejns to is in the lines (cxiii. 6) : ' ' And what I am beheld again What seems, and no man understands." Sciences of Intuition. {Ideology and Logic) Rosmini defines intuition as " the (receptive) act of the soul, whereby it receives the communication of intelligible or ideal being," and adds, " This act is called intelligence by Aristotle, who says that 'intelligence is of indivisibles,'* calling indivisibles the essences of things which are seen in ideas. Hence, in the language of the Schoolmen, cognitio simplicis intelligentice means the same thing as cognition of possibles. For this reason it is clear that Kant .perverted the language of philosophy, when he usurped the word intuition to mean sense perception. In making this alteration in the meaning of the word, he gave proof of the sensism which lies at the basis of his system, attributing to sense the act which specially belongs to intelligence " {Psychology, vol. i. § 53). Kant defines intuition thus : "Through the medium of sensibility objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions." f It is against this doctrine, than which nothing can be more false, that Rosmini's system is specially directed. Rosmini most emphatically denies that objects are given to us through the senses. Intelligence alone has an object : the * This is not strictly correct. Aristotle merely says, '"H (jl^v ovu twu aSiaiperuv vSiqcns iv tovtols Trepl & ovk iam rh \pevSos " (De An., iii. 6, l). t K7-Uik der rein. Vern., Die transcend. ^Esthetik, § I. 22 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. senses have only terms* When he says that " to have before the mhid the essence of things, without any affirma- tion on the part of the subject, is called to intuite" {Logic, § 320), he agrees exactly with St. Thomas, who says, " Intelligere dicit nihil aliud quam simplicein INTUITUM intellectiis in id quod sibi est prcesens intelligible" {Sent., dist. iii. art. 5, q. 5). I. Ideology. 10. Ideology Ideology undertakes to investigate the nature and Logic. . 1 1 1 t • 01 human knowledge ; Logic, to show that the nature of this knowledge is such as not to admit the possibihty of error. Hence error must be looked for elsewhere than in the nature of know- ledge. Error is not knowledge. Ideology forms the subject of Rosmini's earliest im- portant work, the New Essay on the Origin of Ideas, as well as of the voluminous treatise, The Restoration of Philo- sophy in Italy, the treatise on The Idea, forming the second half of the fourth volume of the Theosophy, and the po- lemical work, Aristotle Explained and Examined (see Bibliography). As Ideology is presupposed in every science, it is frequently touched upon in every one of Rosmini's works. " Ideology',' he says, " treats of being, the object of the mind ; Psychology, of the soul, which is the principle of human feeling. These, therefore, are the two sciences which furnish the rudiments of all the others. All the others, in the last analysis, resolve themselves into these two " {Psychology, vol. i. § 46). As Rosmini's chief philosophical merits lie in the direction of Ideology, it will be necessary here to point out what he did for that science, as well as what that science, as developed by him, does for philosophy. * See under §§ 15, 18, 74. IDEOLOGY. 23 Aristotle, in the first chapter of the first book of his Psychology, calls attention, in concise terms, to a funda- mental difficulty incident to all philosophical research. " It is difficult," he says, " to determine whether we ought first to investigate the different parts of the soul or their functions, the intellective principle or intelligence, the sensitive principle or sensation. And even if we begin with the functions, there remains still another perplexity, whether we ought not to investigate the terms of the principles before the principles themselves, the intelligible before the intellective principle, and the sensible before the sensitive principle." * In other words, if we consider merely intelligence and its conditions, it is difficult to know whether philosophy ought to begin with a theory of cog- nition, with logic, or with metaphysics. With whichever of the three we set out, we soon find that we have pre- supposed the other two. As Hegel puts it, "A beginning, in so far as it is an immediate, makes an assumption, or, rather, is itself an assumption." f If we begin with logic, we find that we have presupposed the main truths both of the theory of cognition and of metaphysics. Without the former, the nature of the form of concepts would be unintelligible ; without the latter, the nature of their con- tent. In regard to the former, Jaesche, the editor of Kant's Logic, says, " Kant never thought of trying to find a ground for the logical proposition of identity and con- tradiction, or of deducing the logical forms of judgments. He accepted and used the principle of contradiction as a proposition carrying its own evidence with it, and re- quiring no deduction from a higher principle. . . . Whether, however, the logical propositions of identity and contra- diction, absolutely and in themselves, admit and require * " '\aK^Tthv . . . Sioplirai . . . nSrepoj/ ra /xSpia xph C'?'''^''' "fpoTipov ^ to epya avraiv, oTov rh yoe7v ^ rhu vovv, Kol rb alcrddveadat ^ t^ al(T6riTiK6v dfioius Se Kal €7ri Tuv &Wcov. ei Se ra tpya •Kp6Tepov, iraMv &v ris aTroprjcretev ft ra avriKei- ixeva npSTepa rovrwv ^r/T^jreof, olov rh alffOrirhv rov aicrOrjTiKov Kal rh vorirhf Tov foriTiKov" (De An., i. i, 6, 7 ; 402 b, 10 sqq.). When Belger {Hermes, xiii. p. 32) proposes to read in the last sentence alaOdvea-Bai for ataOtiTiKov, and voe'iv for voriTiKov, he only shows that he does not understand the passage. t Encyclopcedie, Einleitung, § i, ad fin. 24 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. a deduction from a higher principle, is another question, which leads to the important inquiry whether there is at all any absolutely first principle of all cognition and science. . . . But since, on the other hand, these highest principles of knowledge, considered as principles, with equal necessity presuppose the logical form, the result is a circle, which cannot, indeed, be resolved for science, but may be explained." * In regard to the dependence of logic upon metaphysics, Trendelenburg says, " Thought, with its forms, will hardly be known without an exami- nation of the reciprocal action between it and the nature of its objects." f If, on the other hand, we begin with a theory of knowledge, we find that it involves both logic and metaphysics. As F. A. Lange says, " The theory of cognition is based upon logic, metaphysics, and psychology, and, therefore, has no unifying principle. It will appear farther on that this science is resolvable into a (Kantian) purely a priori search for the postulates which cognition presupposes, and the psychological theory of cognition, which is of a purely empirical nature. Both branches of the science presuppose an accurate investigation of the logical forms." + Again, if we set out with metaphysics, we plainly presuppose logic, and, therefore, also a theory of cognition. Zeller is. perfectly correct when he says, " Logic, as scientific methodology, must precede all in- vestigation of the real ; and this is true with regard not only to all those sciences which deal with particular branches of the real {nature or the human spirit), but even to metaphysics and the most general portion of them, viz. ontology. Even ontology will never be successfully treated until we come to an understanding in regard to the mode of its treatment ; that is, until we know whether it is to be handled in an a priori or in an a posteriori manner, by reflection upon something given or by dia- lectic construction." § It is thus plain that science, and * l77im. Kant's Logik, Vorrede, pp. 7, 8, edit. Kirchmann. t Logische Untersuchimgen, vol. i. p. 17. X Logische Studien, p. I, note. § Ueber Bedaitiing tind Aufgabe der Erkenntnisstheorie. Ein akadeviischer Vortrag (Heidelberg, 1862), p. 8. An admirable discourse ! IDEOLOGY. 25 especially philosophy, have, as regards their method, been from the first involved in a vicious circle, which, at best, might be explained in some mystical, ontological way, but out of which it has seemed impossible to get. Wherever science has begun, it has always had to assume something, which had to be demonstrated by a process dependent upon that assumption. Under these circumstances we need hardly wonder if scepticism with regard to the validity of all knowledge has appeared at many times and under many forms. Science, from the days of Aristotle to our own, has been moving, for the most part, in a circle of correlates, not one of which contains any self-evident truth, but each of which appeals for support to the others. Rosmini's great and chief merit in philosophy was that he found a way out of this vicious circle — found, by mere observation, and without assuming the truth of the method of that observation, a luminous point in thought, which clearly shone with its own light and defied all attempts not only to find, but even to seek for, an origin or ground outside of 'and beyond it. This luminous point was ideal being, at once the form of thought, the principle of truth, and the essence of objectivity. By means of this discovery he was able to lay the basis of a new science, which not only takes precedence of all others, but upon which all others, including logic itself, depend for their truth and their principles. This is the Science of Ideology, to have discovered and elaborated which is a merit not inferior to that of the father of logic. If finding an irre- fragable basis for all truth is the greatest of scientific merits, then that merit unquestionably belongs to Rosmini. " Ideology," says Rosmini, " is the science of the intel- lective light, whereby man renders intelligible to himself the sensible things from which he draws the sum total of knowledge. Of course, Ideology neither creates nor invents this light, which is found in the idea, or rather is the idea itself; neither does it impart the intuition of it, for the power to do this belongs solely to the creator and framer of human nature ; but it does transport this light from the order of intuition into the order of scientific reflection, and thus forms the science of it. 26 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. " The sciences are the product of the reflex free thought, whereby man renders himself conscious of that which he already knows, and renders more explicit, orderly, and tractable, or applicable to action, the knowledge of which he is conscious. Order not only binds together the parts of each science, but even the sciences themselves. " This order, which binds together all the sciences, ren- ders conscious human knowledge not only useful but beautiful, and is what constitutes the Encyclopsedia of the Sciences, that is, an encyclopaedia, not in the sense of a mass of material flung together at random and distributed according to the letters of the alphabet, but in the sense of a whole, organic, one and harmonious. "And as soon as Ideology has made scientifically known what is the natural light of the mind, the principle of such an encyclopsedia is found, and, when the principle is found, there is found also the encyclopaedia itself, that is, the natural order of the sciences, which is virtually contained in that principle and may be deduced from it. This is a new ground which proves that Ideology must be placed at the head of the sciences, since from it these derive their principal distribution. As soon as this is done, the position of every other science may be assigned. And we believe that all those persons who undertake to treat any science, ought first to take the trouble diligently to determine the place which belongs to that science in the great body of the knowable ; because, when we know what place belongs to it, and what member it forms, in the great body, it receives completeness and beauty, its sphere may be defined and its limits assigned. And this is an indispensable con- dition of systematic progress in the treatment of the sciences" {Logic, Preface, §§ 1-3). Ideology, which transports ideal being from the region of intuition into that of reflection and consciousness, is the science which accounts for and explains the origin of those concepts which logic necessarily uses and accepts as given, but which it has been wont to refer for explanation to a succeeding system of metaphysics dependent upon its own method of dealing with these concepts. It is, therefore, METHOD OF IDEOLOGY. 27 the true fundamental science of knowledge, and furnishes the true solution of the problem so clearly stated, but so poorly solved, by Aristotle.* II. The following is the method of Ideology. We internal cannot know the nature of human knowledge tion tL 1 u ' i. ' ^ ' \J • i. 1 method of unless we observe it as it is. rience internal ideology. observation, which fixes the attention upon cogni- tions and brings them clearly into view, is the instrument of ideology, and the method to be pursued in dealing with it. In other words, the instrument of regressive philosophy — that whereby it seeks to reach a principle of certainty — is observation of the phenomena of consciousness, apart from any theory respecting them, their truth or falsehood. Nothing is assumed in regard to these phenomena. That they are is not an assumption, but a certainty, which the most determined sceptic in the world cannot rid himself of. Their existence cannot even be denied' without being first admitted. Of course, since the truth of the method cannot be assumed, so neither can that of the result. If the result is to be accepted as unconditionally true, its truth must be immediately self-evident. The process of observation is like that of finding one's way out of a labyrinth to the light of day. My certainty that I see the light, when I emerge, is in no way dependent upon the gropings and wanderings by which I escaped from the darkness. Obser- vation is attentive groping. It is not the beginning of philosophy, properly speaking, but the starting-point of the * Aristotle placed logic at the head of the sciences, but was obliged to treat its fundamental principle, the law of identity and contradiction, in the Metaphysics (iii. 3 ; 1005 b, 19). The difficulties herein involved were so great that his followers had to say that logic was not a part, but an instrument, of science. Hence the term organon. See Zeller, Philosophie der Griec/ien, vol. ii. pt. ii. p. 182, n. 5. 28 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. man who means to philosophize (see under § 9). It involves no presupposition, and in this respect differs from all other possible starting-points. It ends in the discovery of a principle of certainty, from which philosophy may begin. Philosophy, therefore, sets out with a certainty, and not with an hypothesis, and Rosmini on several occasions com- bats Hegel, who held the opposite view. Speaking of the question. With what must philosophy begin } he says, " Hegel felt the importance of this question, and replied that whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis, since all immediate knowing is purely hypothetical.* This doctrine was suggested by sensism, from which the German school could never purge itself, although it assumed the title of Transcendental Idealism. In fact, it recognizes as immediate nothing but sense - experience, and this it calls the starting - point of philosophy.t It accepts the Aristotelian dictum. Nihil est in intcllectn quod prius non fncrit in scnsH,X ^nd its system consists in adding that Nihil est in scnsu quod prius non fuerit in intellectu. Hence it admits the two dicta as reciprocally true, and sums itself up in these words : 'What is rational is actual, and what is actual is rational.' § Now, it is plain enough that, if philosophy have no other point of departure than sense-experience, internal or exter- nal, inasmuch as pure sense is non-cognition, and the cognition of sensible things presents itself to the mind of the philosopher as so many subjective cognitions, he must regard these as hypotheses, as data not yet fully verified. But is it true, as this philosopher asserts, that the starting- point of philosophy is experience .'' This is, indeed, an hypothesis of his, and it is a curious thing to see, while he refuses to admit anything that is not demonstrated, and * Hegel, Encyclop., vol. i. p. 4, § i ; p. 25, § 17. t Ibid. §§ 1-12. \ " Mr) aiaOavSfj.fi'os fxr/Oev, ovOhv t/.u fxdOot (6 povs) oiiSe ^vveir] " {De /In., iii. 8, 3 ; 432 a, 7 : cf. De Sens., 6, 445 b, 16, and Leibniz, A'oitv. Essais, ii. l). Hegel is hardly right when he says that this dictum is falsely attributed to Aristotle [Encylop., Einleitung, § 8). § "Was vernlinftig ist, das ist wirklich ; und was wirklich ist, das ist verniinfiig " {Philosophie des Rechts, p. 17 ; cf. Encyclop., vol. i. p. 10, § 6). METHOD OF IDEOLOGY. 29 denies philosophical value to all immediate knowledge, with what confidence he sets out with this assertion, sup- posing it to be an infallible truth that experience is the starting-point of philosophy, and not only omitting to prove it, but even neglecting to subject it to any examina- tion. This habit of placing the starting-point of philosophy in sense-experience is peculiar to that class of philosophers who begin with the subject, that is, the soul. But Hegel, by admitting that to begin with experience is to begin with an hypothesis, admits, at the same time, that this is not truly the beginning of philosophy, which is not an hypo- thesis, but is, on the contrary, as we have said, a necessary doctrine. For this reason, it is only where the necessary begins that theoretic philosophy can begin. " Moreover, when Hegel, assuming that philosophy sets out from experience, lays down the universal dictum, ' Whatever philosophy may begin with, that beginning must always be an hypothesis,' he only takes a leap from the particular to the universal, drawing one of those illogical conclusions so frequent in our philosopher, who persuades himself that there cannot be anything but what presents itself to his imagination, and that is very little. If he had reflected that external and internal sense, the sources of experience, as well as the other faculties of the human subject and the human subject itself, are merely viatci'ial conditions, necessary, not to the existence of the truth, but to making possible its communication to man (it could not be communicated to a subject which did not exist or had not the power of receiving the communication), he would have readily understood that these material conditions can- not constitute the principle of the required theory of truth, albeit the search for the truth presupposes them, exactly as a scaffolding, though necessary for the construction of a building, is neither the principle of the building nor even the smallest part of it. How afterwards experience and the subject of it enter into the theory of the whole, which absorbs them without being the principle of them, remains to be seen from the theory itself" {Theosophy, vol. i. §§ 19, 20; cf. § 53). 30 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Rosmini distinguishes internal from external observation thus : " Internal observation has for its matter intuition and the objects intuited, the feelings, the perceptions, and all that a man perceives within himself Hence internal observation is the source of the initial sciences of philosophy, Ideology and Psychology. External observation is the starting-point of all the physical sciences. To the faithful, practical application of this principle must be ascribed the won- derful progress made by the physical and mechanical sciences in modern times ; and it is to the neglect of internal observation that is due the backward condition of those sciences which rest on it. The strangest feature in the case is, that these sciences were even dwarfed and loaded with most superficial prejudices by those very persons who with most ostentation proclaimed the method of observation and experience. The reason was that they prized external observation, but did not know internal ob- servation. They preached and lauded observation in general, at the same time ignoring that species of observation which would have been most useful to them. Directing their attention only to external observation, which is valid only for material things, and not for mind {spirito), they arrived at two unfortunate results : (i) They sterilized the metaphysical sciences by rejecting certain things not supplied by external experience ; (2) They materialized and wasted these sciences, transferring to the sphere of spiritual things what was derived from external observation, and could belong only to material things" {Logic, §951). 12. Objection It wlll perhaps be objected that, until the validity of Validity of observatioii be demonstrated, it can- observa- , - . ~ , , . . tion not be used as an authority. Such objection, answered. , i r • i however, has no lorce, inasmuch as we do not set out by assuming observation as a means of de- HUMAN COGNITIONS. 3r monstration, but merely accept it provisionally as a means of fixino^ what is to be demonstrated further on. Then the results of observation, assumed at first as mere appearances, will show themselves to be true and certain, carrying with them a proof of their own truth, so irrefragable that the contrary of them shall be impossible. ^3- Let us, then, carefully observe human cog- Human . • Vpi, . . r cognitions, nitions. These are innumerable, so that, if we though in- were to consider them one by one, the task would aWe, have ^ , ~ , __ ,,,-,a common be mhnite. However, we are not lookmg tor that dement. wherein they differ, but for that wherein they coincide. Now, they all coincide in being cog- nitions, and what we are trying to observe and study is neither more nor less than the nature of cognition itself. We must, therefore, first of all, try to find out what all our cognitions have in common, since this common element will be the essence of cognition. Rosmini here calls into play a faculty entirely different from that of observation, viz., abstraction. It is, of course, only by abstraction that we can discover a common ele- ment in any class of things or thoughts. However, as the validity of the whole process is not assumed, and, indeed, is indifferent, the subsequent reasoning is not vitiated. That we do abstract is as much a fact as that we observe, whatever its meaning and conditions may be. 32 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. 14. Cognition Whcii the problem is thus narrowed down, I entitL is See that, in the case of a very large number of affirmation cognitions at least, I can have them only by menT.^ means of an act by which I affirm something. For example, I know that I exist ; I know that there exist other beings similar to me ; I know that there exist extended bodies, having length, breadth, and thickness. For the present I do not ask whether my knowing deceive me or not. I have what / call a knowledge of all these things, and I am trying to discover how I came by it. Now, I see that I should not know that there exists even a single entity, if I did not say, or had not sometime said, to myself that that entity exists. To know, therefore, that an entity exists, and to say to myself that it exists, are one and the same thing. My cognition, therefore, of real entities is only an internal affirmation ox jttdgment. Knowing this, I have only to analyze this judg- ment and observe what are its elements. In this way I shall, perhaps, have advanced a step toward the discovery of the nature of cognition itself. This section contains the pith of what is distinctive in Rosmini's philosophy, viz. the doctrine that in thought synthesis must precede analysis, virtual judgment go before actual conception or particular cognition. Most previous systems of philosophy and logic had assumed the order of thought to be — ( i ) Ideas, (2) Judgments, (3) Reason- ing or syllogisms {z(tt Neiv Essay, vo\. i. § 227, n. i). Even Kant, who admitted that " we can reduce all the acts of the understanding to judgments, so that the understanding \ REAL KNOWLEDGE AN AFFIRMATION. 33 may be conceived generally as the faculty of judging," * nevertheless assumed concepts as given through the spontaneity of thought, and therefore as not requiring explanation. "All intuitions," he says, "as sensible, are based upon affections [i.e. ■Ka%r\\ ; concepts, therefore, upon functions. I mean by function the unity of the act which arranges diverse presentments ( Vorstdhuigcii) under a com- mon one. Concepts, therefore, are based upon the spon- taneity of thought, as sensible intuitions are upon the receptivity of impressions."! According to this doctrine, the formation of concepts is not a rational act, but a spontaneous function of the thinking faculty. In other words, the synthesis which is the necessary prior condition of all analytical judgments, is a primitive, given fact, and the only question requiring or admitting explanation is, how it is that in judging we are often obliged to predicate of these concepts attributes not contained in them, or, to use Kant's language, how synthetic judgments a priori are possible. Rosmini takes exception to this view of the matter. " Kant," he says, " propounded the problem of ideology in this way : How are synthetic judgments a priori possible .-• that is, those judgments in which the predicate is neither contained in the concept of the subject nor supplied by experience. Hence the problem in question may be likewise expressed thus : How is it possible that we some- times attribute to a given subject a predicate neither de- rived from experience nor contained in the concept of the subject .'' When the question is presented in this form, it seems to be assumed that, if we could find the predicate either in the concept of the siibject or in experience, there would remain no further difficulty to overcome. But, in the first place, even if we could find the predicate in the * " Wir konnen alle Handlungen des Verstandes auf Urtheile zuruckfiihren, so dass der Verstand iiberhaupt als ein Vermogen zu urtheilen vorgestellt werden kann " (Kritik der r. Verniinft. Transcend. Log., Bk. I. pt. i. § i). t " Alle Anschauungen als sinnlich beruhen auf Affektionen, die Begriffe also auf Funktionen. Ich verstehe aber unter Funktion die Einheit der liaiid- lung verschiedene Vorstellungen unter einer gemeinschaftlichen zu orduen. Begriffe griinden sich also auf der Spontaneitat des Denlcens, wie sinnliclie Anschauungen auf der Receptivitat der Eindriicke" {Ibid.). D 34 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. concept of the subject, we should have to suppose that we already had that concept. It is a pity that the difficulty consists precisely in forming to ourselves the concept of the subject, in thinking things as existing, in making them become objects of the mind, and, in that way, the subjects of our judgments. When we have once supposed the con- cepts of things already formed, what difficulty can there be in analyzing or connecting them in any way ? The whole knot of the difficulty consists in clearly showing the man- ner in which we form the concepts of things. Plainly, we cannot form the concepts of things, if we do not think existence in them, and this supposes that we already have the idea of existence, which idea cannot come either from mere sensations, because these are particular, nor from the concepts of the things, since these are not yet formed. " In the second place, the manner in which Kant pre- sents the problem of ideology assumes that, whenever we can find the predicate through sense-experience, there remains no further difficulty. It is true, indeed, that sense- experience may, in a certain fashion, supply us with a predicate ; for example, when I judge a wall to be white, I am induced to apply to it the predicate white from the experience of the senses. Nevertheless, I must first have the concept of this particular subject to which I apply the predicate of whiteness, that is, I must have first thought it as a thing existing. Therefore the difficulty above alluded to returns : How can I think a being \ov ti\ ? in other words, conceive a real as existing ? The idea of existence, which I always require in order to form the concept of anything, cannot be derived by abstraction from the concept itself, since nothing can be derived from a concept which is not yet formed. . . . The difficulty, therefore, cannot consist in finding a predicate to attribute to a subject whose concept is already formed, but in finding the origin of the concept of the subject " {Nezv Essaj/,vo\. i. §§ 353) 354)- Rosmini takes up, one after another, the examples of synthetic judgments a priori offered by Kant : Jirst, the arithmetical one, 7 + 5 = I2 ; second, the geo- metrical one, A straight line is the shortest distance between SYNTHETIC JUDGMENTS A PRIORI, 35 two points ; third, the physical one, In all the changes of the physical world the quantity of matter remains un- changed ; and fourth, the metaphysical one, Every event must have a cause ; * and shows, by a careful analysis, that every one of them is analytic {New Essay, vol. i. §§ 346- 352). He then proceeds to demonstrate that our only really synthetic judgments a priori are those by which concepts are formed, and that these presuppose nothing innate in the mind save the idea of being. In this way he shows that Kant's whole scheme of subjective categories — Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, with their sub- divisions — was invented to explain something which does not exist.i* According to Rosmini, the order of thought is — (i) Intuition of being, (2) Sensation, (3) Synthetic judgment, resulting in (4) Concept, (5) Analytic judgment, (6) Reasoning.^ " The problem : How is the object of thought formed .'' — the object which becomes the subject of subsequent judgments — or, more briefly. How are concepts formed ? — is the entire object of our investigation. Let us then analyze it under this form. . . . " In order that we may form a concept of a thing, we require an intrinsic judgment, by means of which we con- sider that thing objectively, or in itself, not as a modi- fication of ourselves ; in a word, we consider it in its possible existence. Now, as in every judgment (supposing it already formed) there must be a subject and a predicate, we must inquire, first, what is the subject and what the predicate in the judgment in question ; and then, whence we obtain that subject and that predicate. " Now, in the present instance, the predicate is merely existence, since to perceive a thing intellectually is merely to perceive it in itself, or in the existence which it may have. The subject, on the other hand, is the thing as * See Kritik der r. Vcnmnft, Einleitung, vi. ; Pj-olegomena, Vorerinnerung, § 2 (c). Rosmini's treatment of this last judgment is masterly. t Cf. under §§ 18, 35. X Cf. under § 43, where 2-5 are united as judgment, involving perception of the real and conception. 36 PHIL OSOPHICA L S YS TEM. having affected our senses, that which has acted upon them. . . , " In the analysis, therefore, of the primitive judgment, whereby we form the concepts of things, i.e. ideas, there are found a subject (if, thus isolated, it may be so termed) given merely by the senses and of which we have not yet any intellectual concept, and a predicate (the idea of existence) which cannot in any manner be given by the senses, and of which, in consequence, no explanation can be afforded by those philosophers who undertake to derive all human knowledge from the senses. The problem, therefore, of Ideology is : To know how that primitive judgment whereby we intellectually perceive things felt \sensa\, and so form concepts of them, is possible " (New Essay, vol. i. § 355). The notion of being in general is a neces- sary con- dition of the cogni- tion of particular real beings. 15- When I say to myself that there exists any particular real being or entity, I should not under- stand my own meaning if I did not know what entity was. Therefore the notion of bemg or entity in general must be in my mind before I can pronounce any of those judgments whereby I affirm the existence of any particular real entity. In this section and in the preceding one, Rosmini draws that distinction which is fundamental in his philosophy — the distinction between real and ideal being, or between reality and ideality. These terms are explained further on. At present it will suffice to say that by the real is meant that which affects the senses or the sense ; in other words, the felt subjective and extra-subjective.* By the ideal is meant that which is purely objective, pure ob- jectivity. The former is the term of feeling ; the latter, the object of intelligence (cf under §§ i8, 74). The follow- ing definitions, taken from the Theosophy (vol. i. § 211), * Cf. under §§ 35, 78. REAL AND IDEAL BEING. 37 may be useful here. They are explahied at length, Theosophy, §§ 213-239. " Being [essere, esse, tlvai, Seiii] is the act of every being {bee'jit ?) and every entity. " Being \ente, ens, 6v, Seiendes] has two definitions : {a) A subject having being {esse) ; {b) Being {esse) with one or another of its terms. " Entity [entita, entitas, oixria, Wesen] is any object of thought, regarded by the thought as one. ''Essence, \essenza, essentia, to ti riv elvai, Wesen/ieit] is being {esse) possessed by a subject, but abstracted from the subject which possesses it (cf. under § 18). " Subject in general [stibjetto in universale, subjectinn, vTroKtifXEvov, Gegenstand] is that which in a being {ens) or in a group of entities is conceived as the first container {priimini contbiens) and cause of unity." The second sentence of this section expresses a cardinal doctrine of Rosmini's system, which is, that, since all concepts are the result of a judgment requiring a subject and a predicate, and since only subjects are supplied directly by the senses, therefore the first, most simple predicate — that is, being, tJie pnre essence of objectivity — must be present in the mind prior to the first particular concept. It may be said that the whole of the New Essay is devoted to the establishment and development of this doctrine. In the first volume, the author, after stating the purpose of the treatise and the difficulties surrounding its subject, enters into a criticism of the more important pre- vious systems which have attempted to explain the origin of knowledge. These systems he arranges in two classes. In the first he places those that err from assigning to the mind too small a share in the production of concepts ; in the second, those that err in the opposite direction. In the first he includes the systems of Locke, Condillac, Reid, and Stewart ; in the second, those of Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and Kant. His criticisms of Stewart and Kant are especially remarkable. In the second volume, after showing that we have the idea of being and explaining its nature, he proceeds to show that it cannot be derived either 38 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. from bodily sensations, from the feeling of individual ex- istence, from reflection in Locke's sense, or from the act of perception, and concludes that it must therefore be innate. The remainder of the volume is devoted to show- ing how, through this one innate formal idea and the material derived from sensation, all other ideas may be formed and explained (§ 471). The third volume treats of the criterion of certainty and its application to human cognitions and reasonings. Sir William Hamilton {Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. ii. p. 366 sq.) says, " I pronounce Existence to be a NATIVE COGNITION, because I find that I cannot think except under the condition of thinking all that I am conscious of to exist. Existence is thus a form, a category of thought." This, so far as it goes, is precisely the doctrine of Rosmini, who, however, goes farther and asserts that existence or being is the only form native to the mind, the only idea that can be thought by itself, and the only one necessary in order to explain the origin of all others {New Essay, §§ 410-412). That we cannot think without the idea of being, that being is contained in every other idea and category, is a self-evident fact. The idea of being, which forms the universal condition of thought, Rosmini finds to be objective, merely possib/e or ideal, simple, one, identical, universal, necessary, immiitable, eternal, and indeterminate— 2X'ir\)avA.e^ not one of which belongs to sen- sation. It cannot, therefore, be derived from sensation. Similar reasoning shows that it cannot be derived from any other external source open to man. Indeed, if man were placed in front of all the possible sources of know- ledge, he could not draw from any of them without first having the idea of being, since without it he could not make anything an object, and therefore could not know anything. It follows from all this that the idea of being is innate. Rosmini quotes a very striking passage from St. Bonaventura, to show that that philosopher held the same doctrine: "Mira igitur est caecitas intellectus, qui non considerat illud quod prius videt, et sine quo nihil potest IDEAL BEING INNATE. 39 cognoscere. Sed sicut oculus intentus in varlas colorum differentias, lumen per quod videt caetera, non videt, et si videt, non tamen advertit ; sic oculus mentis nostrse in- tentus in ista entia particularia et universalia, IPSUM ESSE EXTRA OMNE GENUS, licet primo occurrat menti, et per ipsum alia, tamen non advertit {Itiner. Mentis in Denni. cap. V.) " {New Essay, § 472, n. 2). The difference between Rosmini's view, however, and that of St. Bonaventura is very great, inasmuch as the latter does not conceive being to be an innate idea, or, indeed, an idea at all. Many philosophers, besides and before St. Bonaventura, held that the first thing known or revealed to the mind was universal being, or tJie universal, which is the same thing. Aristotle, for example, repeatedly says that the first in reason is the universal, whereas the first in sensation is the individual (koto \x\v yap tov Xoyov ra KaOoXov irporepa, Kara ^l riiv aicrOiiaiv ra Kaff tKacrra {Metaph., iv. 1 1 : IO18 b, 32. ; cf. Phys., i. 5 : 189 a, 5). And the same thing is asserted, though indirectly, still more strongly, in Metaph., iii. 3 : 1005 b, 19 sq., in the principle of contradiction, which Aristotle regards as the most certain of all principles. Rosmini himself also quotes from St. Thomas the assertion that " the object of the intellect is common being or truth," * and he might easily have found even a stronger statement of the same doctrine in that philosopher's commentary on the passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics last referred to. " Cum duplex sit operatio intellectus : una, qua cognoscit quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia : alia, qua componit et dividit : in utroque est aliquod primum : in prima quidcm opcratione est aliquod primum quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens ; nee aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. . . . Hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis " {Comment, in Meta- phys., lib. iv. [iii.], sect. vi.). It is plain that, according to St. Thomas, the intuition of being is innate. A large number of passages of like import will be found collected in * " Objcctum intellectus est ens vel ver74m coinnwne^^ (Sum. T/ieoL, i. q. 55, art. I, concl. ). 40 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Casara's little work, La Luce deW Occhio Corporeo e qiiclla dell' Intelletto, pp. 17 sq. Being in general is known by intuition. Two great classes, of human cognitions. 16. This consideration shows me that it is one thing to know what being in general is, and another to know that there is a particular real being. To know that there exists a particular real being, I must make an affirmation ; while to know simply what being is, I require no such affirmation, but another act of the mind, which I shall call intuition. These two modes of knowing are clearly and fundamentally different, and are so related that intuition must precede affirmation. Human cognitions, therefore, are divisible into the two great classes, those arising from affirma- tion and those arisinsf from intuition. " Being alone is cognizable per se, and constitutes cog- nizability itself Hence, as our fathers said, things are cognizable in so far as they participate in being.* When we attentively consider our cognition, we discover a mani- fest and infinite distinction between the intuition of being and the perception of real things, the traces of which all resolve themselves into the feelings caused in us ; we see that it is impossible to intuite being without understanding it, since to intuite it is to understand it : on the contrary, we see that our feelings cannot be understood by them- selves — indeed, that they begin to be understood only when we regard them in relation to being, that is, as terms of being itself" {^Neiv Essay, vol. iii. § 1224). The affirma- tion alluded to is the affirmation of being, which Rosmini distinguishes from the appreJiension of the being affirmed * " Unumquodque cognoscibile est in quantum est ens " (St. Thomas, Com- ment, in Aristot. Physica, i. i). INTUITION AND AFFIRMATION. 41 {Logic, § 1072). Every such affirmation must, of course, be a self-evident judgment. Among such judgments Rosmini classes " those in which being is directly applied to feeling, in which feeling is apprehended and affirmed, and which are called perceptions'' {Logic, § 197). Thus perception involves apprehension and affirmation. 17. The order of these two classes of cognitions Order of is directly manifest from what has been said, classes. Ajffirmative cognitions all presuppose an intuitive cognition. The latter, therefore, must precede the former. I repeat, therefore, that before we can know a particular, real being, we must know being in general [in universale). " Being in general," or " being in universale" is perhaps hardly what the author here means ; for it is not necessary that we should know being as general or universal, before we can know a real being. Indeed, it is only in its applica- tion to real beings that the universality of ideal being or of any idea manifests itself. Rosmini is by no means ignorant of this. Indeed, on more than one occasion he states the true doctrine admirably. " I take a universal idea," he says, " and submit it to analysis. This analysis gives me two elements from which my idea results : first, the quality thought ; second, the universality of the same, which St. Thomas distinguishes by the name of intentio nniversali- tatis. To the quality thought I say there corresponds a reality in the individual thing ; to the universality of the quality thought I say that there is no corresponding reality in the thing, the universality being solely in the mind. The universality \s not properly the quality thought, but is a mode which it assumes in the mind. This dis- tinction must be carefully marked. " Now, how does it happen that the quality thought is 42 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. in me universal ? When my mind {spirito) has perceived any quaHty, it has the power of repeating this quahty in an indefinite number of individuals, by means of so many acts of its own thought, whereby it thinks that quality successively or contemporaneously in an indefinite number of individuals. And this power results from two prin- ciples, viz., fii'st, from the intuition which my mind has of the possible ; and second, from the reiterability of the acts of the mind. This power of repeating the acts of thought, and hence of imagining a quality repeated in- definitely, is a property and faculty peculiar to the mind. It is, therefore, the mind that, by means of this faculty, adds to the qualities which it thinks the character of universality. This universality means nothing more than the possibility which any quality has of being thought by us in an indefinite number of individuals " {New Essay, vol. i. § 196 n. ; cf § 381). It is a fundamental doctrine with Rosmini that all universality belongs to the mind or intelligence — that there is no universality in sensations or things. He consequently denies that any universal can be derived from things or through sensation. " It is absurd," he says, " to say that a sensation transforms itself, because a sensation is es- sentially particular, and would, in order to transform itself, be obliged to destroy itself Thought, on the contrary, has an object, or idea, furnished with both universal and particular elements. In so far as this idea is universal, it may be determined and particularized variously, and this may be called taking another form " [Nezv Essay, vol. i. § 197, n. i). This doctrine is treated at great length in the criticism of Stewart. In this, Rosmini shows that all proper names are originally common, and not vice versa, as Smith and Stewart had supposed. " That a name be proper," he says, " does not depend upon its designating one individual or more, but on the manner in which it designates them. If it designates them by marking them with a common quality, as the word maji does, which marks all men with humanity, it is a common name. If, on the other hand, it names them without marking them UNIVERSALITY. 43 with a common quality, but directly as individuals, and without any other relation between the name and them than the caprice of the inventor of the name, it is a proper name " {New Essay, vol. i. § 146). This is the distinction that Bain and others now make between connotative and non-connotative names (cf. Hamilton, Lectures on Meta- physics and Logic, vol. ii. pp. 319 sqq. ; and Max Muller, Lectiires on the Science of Language, First Series, pp. 356 sqq.). The truth is, that all ideas, in so far as their content {Inhalt) is concerned, are singulars ; it is merely their application that is universal. To speak of a imiversal idea is to utter an absurdity. Even if the notion of white were inborn, I might have it to all eternity without its becoming universal, unless I could find or imagine a number of objects whereof to predicate it. It is the failure to observe this obvious distinction that has caused all the aberrations in the treatment of logic from Aristotle's day to our own, when they have reached a maximum in the logic of the English school. It is strange that it should still be necessary to utter such a truism as this. Since formal logic deals with the necessary relations between ideas, and all ideas are singulars, quantity or quantification cannot appear in that science. All and some are words absolutely forbidden in deductive logic, and, indeed, in all sciences, in so far as they are deductive. When I say, " All equi- lateral triangles are equiangular," I am putting what ex- presses the necessary relation between two singular ideas in the form of the result of an exhaustive induction, such as, in this case at least, never could be made. What I really mean is : The equilateral triangle is necessarily equiangular, eqnilater'al triangle expressing a singular idea. The Greek form of expression is much superior to the English : n^ taoTrXfUjOO) rpiywi'dj v7raf)\H to laroyioviov ] and, indeed, this form of expression is frequent, though by no means universal, in Greek Geometry, The universality of the truths of mathematics is entirely due to the fact that these truths express relations between singulars, which no more cease to be singulars when applied to particular real objects than a knife ceases to be singular when it 44 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. is used to cut a dozen sticks. The Greeks quantified the subjects of their propositions, and that was bad enough ; what shall we say to those who quantify the predicates also ? Simply that the entire doctrine of the quantification of the predicate is one huge blunder. If modern logicians had adhered to the Aristotelian mode of expression, in- correct as that was, they never could have fallen into such a snare. It is, indeed, possible, without talking evident nonsense, to say. All equilateral triangles are all equi- angular ones ; but it is plainly absurd, using the Aristo- telian every {irag) instead of all, to say, Every equilateral triangle is every equiangular one. If the doubly quantified proposition means anything more than the entirely un- quantified one, it is this : The sum of equilateral triangles is equal to the sum of equiangular ones, which again is an unquantified singular proposition. It is, moreover, both meaningless and useless ; for there is no such thing as a sum of equilateral triangles, and, even if there were, the fact would be of no value, so long as I did not know that each particular equilateral triangle is necessarily equi- angular ; in other words, that the equilateral triangle is equiangular (see Jevons, Elementary Lessons in Logic, pp. 184 sq.). Being in general and par- ticular being. By intui- tion we know the essence of being. 18. Let us now examine the difference between/^r- tiailai^ real being and being in general. So long as I know only what being is, I do not know that there exists any particular or real being, and yet I understand what being is. The phrase " to under- stand what being is," expressed in philosophical language, means, to understand \}iV^ essence of being. By intuition, therefore, we know the essence of being. The next section deals more particularly with real being. In regard to the essence of being, otherwise ideal being BEING HAS TWO MODES. 45 or universal being, Rosmini says, " Being in universal is idea''* {New Essay, vol, ii. § 534). "Besides that form of being which is possessed by subsisting things, and which we have called real, there is another, entirely distinct, which we have called ideal, and which forms the basis of the possibility of these things. Yes, ideal being is an entity of a nature entirely peculiar, such that it cannot be confounded either with our minds, or with bodies, or with anything else belonging to real being. It would be a grave error to conclude from this that ideal being, or the idea, is nothing, on the ground that it does not belong to that kind of things that enter into our feelings. On the contrary, ideal being, the idea, is a most true and noble entity, and we have seen with what sublime characteristics it is endowed. It cannot, indeed, be defined ; but it may be analyzed and its effect upon us stated, viz., that it is the light of the mind. What can be clearer than light ? When this light is extinguished, there remains only darkness. Finally, from what has been said we may form a conception of the mode in which the idea of being adheres to the mind : it may be known without any assent or dissent on our part. It is present to us as a pure fact. The reason is this. Such an idea does not affirm and does not deny ; it merely con- stitutes in us the possibility both of affirming and denying " {New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 555-557). "Even if the reality and ideality of things were identical, which is not the case . . . still things would never confound themselves with the act of the mind, nor with the subject which possesses them, because idea, as such, is object, distinct from the thinking subject and opposed to it" {Ibid., vol. iii. § 1192). " Every one who attends to what takes place within himself may observe the difference existing between a thing which () he thinks diS possible and a real thing. It is easy to observe, and there is no one in the world who does not observe, that a thing or a being s\va\Ay possible does not act on our senses. For example, a possible food does not satisfy our * According to Rosmini, " The word idea expresses a mode of being, that is, indicates being in so far as it is intelligible" {Psychology, vol. i. § 18, note ; cf. Restoration of Philosophy, Book iii. cpp. 39-51). 46 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. hunger, however long we think of it, even if we contemplate it for entire days, and the poor philosopher would die of hunger, if he had no other nutriment than this object of his mind. In order, therefore, that a real action may be exerted upon us, there must be a real being, because nothing acts really but that which is really. Nevertheless no one calls that which is not real, but merely possible, nothing; nor can it be so called ; for, if it were nothing, it could not call into exercise, as it does, the activity of our minds. This obvious observation, which everybody makes continually, and according to which everybody speaks and acts, leads us to the evident conclusion that being, taken in the widest sense, has two modes, the ideal and the real; that is, that being manifests and communicates itself to us in two ways, by that of the mind and that of the sense. Nor must we suppose it possible to reduce these two modes, in which being acts upon us and reveals itself to us, to one. The qualities of ideal being are different from, and opposed to, those of }'eal being, and the sense, which perceives the latter, does not reach or attain to a knowledge of anything that the mind, which perceives the latter, sees. In fact, the sense does not perceive anything that is merely possible, but only that which is real, and the mind, as the faculty of knowing, perceives nothing of the real, but only the possible. In the faculty of knowing there are only ideas ; things do not enter it" {La Sapienza, ii- 7, PP- 399 sqq.)- Rosmini criticizes Aristotle and the German school, from Kant to Hegel, for neglecting this obvious distinction between ideal and real being, or, which in his language is the same thing, between object and subject. Aristotle certainly is guilty of this neglect, or rather of a deliberate confusion and identification of these necessarily distinct elements of cognition. He tells us that " intellect and the intelligible are the same thing," * and that " the intellect is potentially, in a certain sense (jnog), the intelligibles." f Rosmini is very severe upon the word ttwc (" in a certain * " Tavrhv vovs koX voriT6v " {Mctaph., xi. 7, 1072 b, 20 ; cf. Bonitz' note), f " Auf'tiyuet ircoj iari rh. vo-qto. 6 vovs " {De An., iii. 4, 11 : 429 b, 30). BEING HAS TWO MODES. 47 sense "). " In respect to Aristotle," he says, " it is to be observed that ... he continually interlards his discourse with exceptive and diminutive particles, which he no- where explains, and which, nevertheless, furnish him with a convenient excuse for accepting a proposition when it suits him, and rejecting it for its contrary when the case is otherwise. Thus, when he says that ' the mind is poten- tially, in a certain mode {wmq), the intelligibles,' the whole knot of the question lies in the particle Trwe, a particle of such very small bulk that it escapes the reader's attention, as if it were nothing, whereas it is the very point of the whole system, if system there be, and if there be not, is that which makes us believe there is. Now, this particle is just the one most neglected by our philosopher. He leaves the interpretation of it to the reader, and, supposing it perspicuous in itself, gives no explanation of it Never- theless, from this proposition, conditioned and limited by 7ru)g ' in a certain mode,' he draws an absolute conclusion, namely, that the mind can think of the intelligibles when it chooses, which presupposes that the intelligibles are in the mind, not merely in a certain mode, but absolutely ; other- wise the consequence, keeping within the limits of the premises, ought to be, that the mind can think of the intel- ligibles when it chooses, in a certain mode. When, however, the proposition does not suit him, he takes its contrary, and affirms that the intelligibles are in a certain mode outside the mind. And there he is at once among real things, in defiance of his previous supposition " (^r/j-/^//tVzV/^ signifies properly the com- pleted act of the sentient subject. " Second, that the felt term is either proper or foreign. ... If it is proper, it is the sentient principle itself as felt, because a proper term is one whose being is identical with that of its principle. Thus, in the feeling expressed by the word /, the sentient and the felt are identified. In such cases, therefore, the feeling belongs to the term as much as to the principle. " Third, that if, on the contrary, the term is foreign, it has indeed an ' essential relation ' to the foreign principle with which it is united, but the proper act of the foreign prin- ciple does not belong to it, and, therefore, neither does its feeling. Hence it presents itself to our view simply as matter of feeling, matter which, though felt, might equally well not be felt. This is the reason why we are wont to think that entities, themselves devoid of feeling, but capable of being felt or not felt, have matter. Thus, the common mode of thinking is justified, and this fact does not, in the smallest degree, interfere with the philosophical truths which we have set forth, since the ordinary thought does not reach them, having no reason to occupy itself with them. Among these truths there is this, that every foreign term must necessarily have a principle of its own, 68 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. which is beyond our experience. Now, the feehng of this principle belongs to that entity which to us is a foreign term, and, therefore, that too comes within the domain of feeling. But that entity which to us is a foreign term is not felt by its own principle as it is felt by us,* because by us it is felt as foreign and devoid of all principle of its own, is felt solely in so far as it acts by exciting a feeling in the principle foreign to it, which feeling is entirely dif- ferent from the feeling felt by its own principle. Indeed, the two sentient principles in question are altogether different. Hence, in the term of our feeling three things must be distinguished : first, the term actually felt, and this is what receives a name and is talked about — for example, the name body ; second, the supposed matter, which is not felt — an abstract entity formed by the removal from the felt of the quality of being felt, after which there remains an unknown something, which is known only as capable of being felt ; third, the matter felt, not by us, but by its own principle, with a feeling totally different from ours. This matter, accordingly, which lies between the two feelings, is considered as matter identical in the two. But, properly speaking, it has no existence apart from the two sentients. It is merely a sort of figment of our limited mode of conceiving, and, therefore, is not even identical in the two feelings. On the contrary, the feeling felt by its own principle has no matter, since the felt is the feeling itself. Nevertheless, the concept of this matter formed by our limited minds, or constituting, at least, the negation of them, is not entirely useless, inasmuch as, in connection with our own feeling, it points to a truth, namely, that our feeling presupposes and demands an entity beyond what it feels, an entity which remains entirely unknown to ex- perience, and which is called the matter of feeling, because its relation to feeling is the only thing we know about it. However, we should fall into error, were we to suppose that this something lying beyond what we feel bore any * This completely disposes of Mamiani's objection to the sensivity of matter. Rosmini, of course, does not mean that a fruit feels its own sweetness, or a stone its own weight. See Coiifessioni di un Mdafisico, vol. i. pp. 44 sq. IDEAL AND REAL BEING. 69 resemblance to that feeling. Hence, the concept of this matter does not help us to know what that matter is in itself, but merely to know that there is a real entity (of unknown nature) standing in sensible contact with our sentient principle, which contact is the origin of what we feel. Now, this negative concept is the concept of d. piLve, abstract reality, which is something anterior to feeling, and for that reason denominated pure, as being that whereby we begin to know reality. Such knowledge is, of course, relative and imperfect. " Fourth, that in every feeling, as well as in every felt, there is an activity. Now, abstraction is wont to separate even the activity of feeling from feeling itself, and to give to this activity the name of pure reality, that is, reality separated from the feeling which completes it. But here, too, we must beware of taking the products of abstraction for self-existent entities, for real beings. The truth in regard to feeling is, that, when we set aside the foreign terms, its activity itself is feeling" {Theosophy, vol. v. p. 145, sq., cap. xxxviii.). On the meaning of principle and term, see under §§ 15, 18. When we affirm that the essence of being is identity realized in a felt activity, we af¥irm that a real the essence 1 • • T T 1 1 • r °f being being exists. Hence to know the existence 01 and the a real being is to affirm a kind of identity between manifoted the essence of being and the activity manifested " ^'^"^s- in feeling. This is one of the cardinal points of the system. All that we mean when we assert a thing to be real, is that what we feel on any particular occasion is. By thus placing a feeling in being, we separate it from our sub- jective self, and regard it as having an existence of its own (see under § 32). In this way it becomes to us a 70 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. reality, whereof the being which we impart is the substance (see §§ "^^^ sq.), and the feehng the attribute or determina- tion. The phrase " manifested in feeling" is not, strictly speaking, correct. Feeling, as such, has no power of manifestation. "Although ideal being can never be confounded with real being, yet the connection between the two is won- derful. It is such that, if the two are taken together, they form but one and the same identical being, having two modes, or, as we might say, two original and primitive forms. Hence it is more correct to say the ideal mode or the real mode of being, than to say ideal being d,nd real being, as if they were two. And even common sense shows that it knows perfectly this conjunction, this basis of identity, between the ideal and the real, by the way in which it imposes and uses terms ; for it does not impose on each thing two names, but one, and with this one it is wont to express both the ideal being of a thing and its real being. For example, the word house was invented to signify both the house which the architect imagines and builds in his mind and the house which adorns the public square of a city" {La Sapienza, ii. 7, p. 401, sqq.). 24. ™s . This identity, indeed, is not complete, inasmuch isimper- as no activity, whether felt or feeling (sentient), ever exhausts the essence of being ; hence the in- numerable feelings which make us affirm the ex- istence of so many real beings different from each other. In regard to each we affirm that it exists. Of each we affirm the same thing : in each we recognize the essence of being. This recognizing of the essence of bein^ in each is the same thine as saying that the essence of each of these beings which we affirm is identical with the essence of UNIVERSA LI TV. 7 1 being which we knew before by intuition, and that, too, in spite of the fact that they are all different beings. We must, therefore, admit that, however different they may be in other respects, inasmuch as they are all beings, they have one common element, the essence of being. Let it be noted that in all this we only observe and Fuller ex- analyze the fact of the cognition of real beings, ofmeaninc without drawing any conclusions from it. Still, versai now that we know that the essence of beino^ is ^'"^' realized in all the reality of the real beings which we affirm, we can better understand the meaning of the phrase universal being employed by us. Being is universal in this sense, that it may be realized in many particular beings, and that we know all real beings by it alone. This univer- sality, therefore, Is not in It, but is a relation in which it stands to real beings. That the universality of ideas lies in their application, and not in their nature, is a doctrine often insisted on by Rosmini. " Any one who has clearly understood the nature of the idea of being must have observed that mental being is at once particidar and itniversal ; in- deed, that it is particular, that is, singular, long before it is universal. And surely we have shown that a uni- versal means nothing else but a relation of similitude between one thing and many. Now, before a thing can be considered in a relation of similitude with many, it must first have been considered or perceived in itself, and hence in its singularity. The unity of a thing, therefore, which, as we have elsewhere said, is identical with its existence, precedes the consideration of its uni- versality. Hence, we may say with truth, that, when we begin with being, we begin with a singular, inasmuch as it is singular in itself, while at the same time it is a light 72 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. diffusing itself universally on all cognizable things. This reflection has special force as applied to the idea of being. In fact, ideal being is in the highest degree simple, essen- tially one, the principle of unity in all things, and, hence, not only singular in itself, but also the source of all true unity and singularity " {Neiv Essay, vol. iii. § 1474 ; com- pare citation under § 17). Rosmini defines universality thus : " By universality we mean that quality which the mind discovers in an entity conceived by it, by which quality that entity can exist in an infinite number of individuals, always remaining identical." Setting out from this definition, he concludes : " First, thdit precategorical absolute being cannot, properly speaking, be said to be universal, because it does not exist in an infinite number of modes, but only in the three categoric modes (cf. below, under § 166). " Second, that universality is something different from identity, since the former can exist without the latter. Thus, absolute being, in so far as it is ideal, is single, and therefore not universal, and its realization is not merely possible, but actual. "7^/^/r^, that being, intuited without the terms that com- plete it, is that which has the greatest universality, that in which, as in its native seat, universality resides, in w'hich exists first universality, that from which all universality flows to every other entity. "Fourth, that, nevertheless, the universality which flows from initial being, or being separated by the act of the mind from its terms, to other conceivable entities, appears in two shapes " {Theosophy, vol. v. p. 95, n.). The two kinds of universality here referred to are the generic and the relational. The former belongs to all forms or ideas, the latter to matter considered in itself. Elsewhere Rosmini says, "This word universal ex- presses a relation of manifesting being to the things mani- fested, and this relation is discovered only by the reflection of the philosopher, who has advanced far enough to con- front manifesting being with the things manifested, and to bring out the fact that the former is the means whereby ESSENCE AND REALIZATION. 73 the latter are known" {Theosophy, vol. iv. p. 459; cf. Buroni, DeW Essere e del Conoscere, pp. 6^ sqq.). Buroni is entirely wrong when he writes a chapter to prove that Being is in itself nnivet'sal, and does not become such by virtue of the mind {Ibid., pp. 46, 47). Indeed, he is not able to bring forward a single passage from Rosmini in support of this view. 25- But if the beings which we affirm agree only The 1 • ^ ^•rr • essence of in being beings, and differ in other respects, are being is not these respects in which they differ themselves in the dif- . . f. - , . ^ , .. ference as SO many entities or lorms 01 being : Assuredly : well as in if they were not entities, they would not be at tity of real all. Hence the essence of beings is realized in ^^"^' that wherein they differ as well as that wherein they agree. Even in these differences, in those modes in which they are, is found the identical essence of being. 26. Corollaries But how can this identical essence of being" ^^'i' , '-' derived be realized in so many different beinsfs, and notf™"^.^^^^ -' ^ ' identity of merely in that which they have in common, but t^^ essence ^ ■' of being also in that which is peculiar to each ? For an an^i the multipli- answer to this question we must appeal to ob- city of its realiza- servation, and, instead of concluding ^^/rz^^-z how tions. the thing might be or ought to be, satisfy our- selves of how it is. Now, this philosophical ob- servation plainly tells us that every real being, as well as every difference between real beings, is always a realization of the essence of being 74 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. previously known to us. The essence of being is identical ; its realizations are many and various. Hence — I. The essence of being has various grades and modes of realization. II. None of these finite grades or modes of realization exhausts the essence of being, which may, therefore, always be realized in other grades and modes — whether ad infinitum, we will not now inquire. III. The different grades and modes in which the essence of being is realized are all limited ; for it is with these alone that we are dealing, and these limitations constitute their difference. Now, these limitations which occur in real beings are so far from belonging to the essence of being that they are non-beings. Hence the essence of being is realized in the various beings, in so far as they are beings, not in so far as they are non-beings. This realization is limited, and, in so far as it is limited, its identity with the known essence of being ceases. IV. The essence of being, therefore, is capable of a higher or lower realization ; but, in so far as it is realized, it is entirely (not totally) realized, for the reason that it is one and indivisible ; just as the entire essence of wine is as truly in a single drop as in a whole butt. This implies that we require the whole of the essence of being in order to know even a small part of real being, just as we require the whole of the essence of wine in order to know even a drop of wine. QUANTITY AND BEING. 75 27. These observations enable us to conclude that Quantity . belongs to quantity is something belonging to the realization, the reaii- . zation, not and not to the essence, of being. We must to the • essence of further observe that it is to quantity we must bebg. ' have recourse in order to explain the limitations, the different modes, grades, differences of being, number, etc., all of which belong, not to the essence of being, but to the laws of its realization. In these three sections the author takes up the question how pure simple being, the constitutive object of intel- Hgence (see below, under §§ 35, 36), comes to be deter- mined into real things. This, as we see at a glance, is the old and much-vexed problem of the One and the Many, which caused so much trouble to early Greek thinkers. The career of this problem is one of the most curious in the whole history of philosophy. As very often happens in such cases, it presented itself most clearly to the first person to whom it occurred, viz., Parmenides. The thinkers previous to him had found no difficulty in assuming a simple substance and making it determine itself Even Herakleitos made his One, fire, enter into the process of its own determination, and thus arrived at his famous dictum : " All things pass and nothing remains (jravTa XW|oa Kot ouSfv luivsi)." He identified being with nothing, and made War the father of all things (7roXf/ioc iravTOJv Trariip) (vid. Bywater, Hcraditi Ephesii Fragi/icnta, p. 18, no. xliv.) ; but how this identity in diversity came about, or where the War came frotn, he did not stop to inquire. Parmenides, severely criticizing the followers of Hera- kleitos,* whom he calls — * See Schuster, Heraklit von Ephcsiis {Ada Soc. Philolog. Lipsiensis, vol. iii. pp. 1-398), pp. 36 sq., and compare my translation of the Fragments of Parmenides, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, vol. iv. no. i (1870). 76 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. " Deaf and dumb and blind and stupid unreasoning cattle," (KoK^ol Ojuais Tv(pXoi re, TeQrjizoTis, &KpiTa ((>v\a), lays it down that being, pure and simple, alone is true, eternal, necessary, and unchangeable, whereas all its de- terminations are merely phenomenal {irfjog ^6E,av) ; in other words, that being is independent of any subject, whereas all determination is purely subjective. He, moreover, identifies thought with being (ro yap avrd voi7v laTiv re kuI elvat). According to this theory the universe is self-thinking being, and all phenomena are subjective delusions. To get rid of this latter consequence, Plato, drawing partly upon Anaxagoras' doctrine of a world-ordering intel- ligence or vovg, and partly upon Pythagoras' theory of numbers having a similar function, split up Parmenides' one being into a large number of parts, which he called ideas, and connected these with the phenomenal world by making the Divinity create or order the latter in accordance with them. Previous to the time of Sokrates and Plato, philosophical inquiry had been directed solely to the ques- tion how things are, not to the question how they are known. The literal acceptance by the sophists of Par- menides' doctrine, that all phenomenal knowledge is purely subjective, now, however, made the latter the burning question. Plato made an heroic effort to redeem human knowledge from mere subjectivity, by claiming for the soul a prenatal existence, in which it had had imme- diate knowledge of eternal ideas, whereof the things of the material world, into which by birth it had fallen, were only faint copies, hardly more than sufficient to recall the originals. By so doing he assumed two distinct pheno- menal worlds (independent ideas, in order to be known, must become phenomenal even to disembodied spirits), connected by a deus ex machina, and rescued the objectivity of knowledge only at the expense of making man a fallen creature. Moreover, he did not succeed in accounting for either theunity of consciousness or the unity of the world. Aristotle got rid of a few of the more glaring of Plato's difficulties and paradoxes, by uniting the ideal with the real world as form with matter, and making the former THE ONE AND THE MANY. 77 synonymous with intelligence. According to this doctrine, ideas or forms (Ao'yot, u^vi) think themselves in two ways : first, with matter, in feeling and its correlated objects ; second, without matter, in intelligence, which is one with its objects. Aristotle, indeed, plainly tells us that feelings are ideas in matter,* that the intelligent soul is the place and form of forms,t and identical with its own objects.^ How ideas or forms come to connect themselves with matter, or to assemble in one place, or to range themselves under one supreme form, he does not tell us, so that his doctrine is rather a clear statement of a difficulty than the solution of it. Indeed, that doctrine, if accepted as a solution, would do away with both subject and object, and leave " nothing but a bundle of ideas dancing through space to the tune of associations." The truth is that the ancient world furnished no solution of the problem of cognition. Indeed, it never even succeeded in stating it. Nor was the mediaeval world a whit more fortunate. The best of the Scholastics did nothing more than try to re- concile the theories of Plato and Aristotle and dispute over the locality of universals, as they termed ideas. Even St. Thomas, as we have already said, had no consistent theory of cognition. What with nominalism, realism, con- ceptualism, intelligible species, and the rest, the original form of the problem, as it presented itself to Parmenides, was utterly forgotten ; so that, even when modern philosophy arose, that problem not only remained unsolved, but did not even seem to call for solution. Philosophy, from Descartes to Hume, remained essentially in the position in which Aristotle left it, failing utterly to account either for the unity of consciousness or the unity of the world. Indeed, Hume's result was precisely the same as Aris- totle's, though reached by a different process, and much more clearly and consciously stated. Both abolished not * " Ta irddrt \6yoi evv\oi elffiv" {De Animd, i. I, 10 ; 403 a, 25). t " Kal eS St/ ol KiyovTis T7}V ^vxh^ elvat t6ttov elSiiov, ir\rjv Sri ovre SAtj dAA.' T] voTiTiKi}, ovT€ eVTeA.€X€ia aWa 5wd/j,it to eli'Srj " (De Am'wif, iii. 4, 4 ; 429 a, 27 sq.). " Kai yap rj x^^P ijpyai'61' iffTiv opyavwv, koI 6 vovs eJSos elSoiii/" {Ibid., iii. 8, 2 ; 432 a, i sq.). \ "Tavrhi/ vovs Ka\ voi^rdu" (^Mctaph., xi. 7 ; 1072 b, 20). 78 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. only the objects, but even the subjects, of thought, and left nothing in the universe but associated ideas, each thinking itself. The bold statement of this doctrine brought Kant into the field, and with him a new epoch in philosophy. Kant's great merit lay in drawing a clear distinction between the matter and the form of thought. His error lay in substituting forms for the form, and making these attributes of the subject. His twelve cate- gories have no essential connection with each other, and are not derived from an analysis of the primary act of cognition, but from that of the various forms of secondary judgments. Moreover, by making these categories or forms subjective, while sensation, the matter of cognition, is manifestly so, he rendered thought and cognition entirely subjective, and, as his successors abundantly showed, all objectivity purely problematical. Hegel carried the doc- trines of Kant to their ultimate conclusions. Dropping the problematical objective, and stringing together Kant's categories by a coil of negations, he resuscitated, in a com- plicated form, the old doctrine of Herakleitos, against which Parmenides had, ages before, so vigorously protested. By making being identify itself with nothing, in order to impel it to start on a career of self-determination, he annihilates not only it, but likewise the possibility of anything, and arrives at pure nihilism. To be sure, by conjuring with the word identity, so as to make it mean negative correlation (full : not full), or more frequently contrary correlation (full : empty), and by abusively calling what all other men have hitherto understood by the term, viz. absolute sameness, " naughty identity " {scJdechte Identitdt), he succeeds in creating a word-world, which he tries to pass off for real. But Hegel's wonderful structure has, in truth, no reality other than vocal, and no unity other than grammatical. Thus, when Rosmini appeared, philosophy had forgotten, amid a multitude of secondary questions, the original problem of Parmenides, and had wandered back to the doctrine of Herakleitos and nihilism. Rosmini resuscitated the Eleatic problem, brought it into connection with the Kantian distinction between the form NEGATIVE IDEAS. 79 and matter of thought, and so, by a careful analysis of the primary act of cognition, arrived at the conclusion that the One (being) is the form of cognition ; the Many, its matter. He moreover showed, by a careful examination of Kant's categories, that while they were all subjective but one, that one, viz. being, was necessarily objective, and the very essence of objectivity. In this way he introduced a neces- sary, objective element into cognition, and so made true cognition possible. Rosmini's solution of the problem, how being comes to be determined, lies in showing that being exists essentially in two forms — one ideal and undeter- mined, the other real and determined (see §§ 18, 21). As to determinations being, as such, non-beings, see Buroni^ Deir Essere e del Conoscere, pp. 95, sqq. 28. It may be said. If all things are known ideas through the essence of being, how do we come to make , , . . f. . . 1 • 1 known the know those negative properties 01 being which negation we spoke of above, and which are not in the ° ^'"^' essence of being ? Are there not ideas of par- ticular beings, of their differences, etc. ? I reply that it is by means of the essence of being that we know all negations, since all that we know about them is that they are the contrary, the negation of being, and the negation of a thing is known as soon as we know the thing negated. Neverthe- less, it is to be observed that language imposes a positive mark, a word, not only on being, but also on the negation of being, and we say notJiing, limit, mode, as well as being. Hence it is that all these negations figure in our imaginations as if they were so many entities, although they are not. 8o PHIL OSOPHICA L S YS TEM. All ideas of particu- lar beings consist of positive and nega- tive. There is but one idea, the essence of being, and all the rest are rela- tions of it. I reply, therefore, that the ideas which have as their object the negation of being are only the idea of being itself, //^/i" the act whereby we negate it. As to ideas of particular beings, which are all made up of positive and negative — in other words, of reali- zation and limitation— they are only so many rela- tions between real being (or the memory of real being) and the essence of being, so that the idea of a horse or a man, for example, is simply the essence of being in so far as it may be realized in a horse or a man, etc., etc. Thus the basis of our knowledge of all these beings is, in every case, the essence of being. The ideas, therefore, of par- ticular beings are always the idea of being con- sidered in relation to a certain given grade and mode of realization ; whence, properly speaking, there exists but one idea which makes known to our minds numerous particular beings, and thus transforms itself into so many concepts, becoming, in this way, the special concepts of all these beings. In regard to the nature of negative ideas Rosmini is very explicit : " Nothing as nothing, neither is, nor can be, thought. When, therefore, we think nothing, we really think a relation of contingent being, a relation which being has with thought and with itself; and by which we think that being either is, in which case it is thinkable, or is not, in which case it is not thinkable. Now, this is not means nothing more than two combined acts of the thought itself, by one of which being is thought, while by the other it is removed and the object of thought thereby abolished. In- deed, that nothing, as thought, is not really nothing, but a relation of being, may be readily seen from the numerous reasonings of mathematicians in regard to nothing, and the CONTINGENCY. 8 1 various kinds of nothing which they distinguish " {Psycho- logy, § 1300). On negative cognition see under § 182, In regard to "ideas of particular beings" or particular ideas, the author says, "An idea is particular only in so far as, in my mind, it is attached to a real individual. As soon as it is separated therefrom, it acquires, or rather manifests, universality, since, when set free, it may be applied at pleasure to an infinite number of similar individuals. That which is absolutely peculiar or particular in an idea is simply the real individual to which it adheres, and which does not form part of the idea itself, but is something heterogeneous to the idea, joined to it, not by nature, but by the action of the intelligent mind " {Nezv Essay, vol. i. § 43, n.). "Every idea is universal and necessary. And, indeed, it is always the idea of being that, clothed with determinate qualities derived from experience, furnishes me with a quantity of ideas or concepts more or less deter- minate, but representing merely possible entities and not subsisting entities " {Ibid., vol. ii. § 431). 29. Besides this, we must consider further, in order in respect to quan- clearly to see wherein consists the imperfect iden- tity, the essence of tity, which, as we have said, we observe between being and . beings the entities felt by us and the essence of bemg perceived 1-1 • • T T r -11 1 • • • - by US are which we mtuite. We said that limitations do different, 1 . . , . TV -r r 1 "o*^ identi- not enter into this identity. i\ ow, one 01 these cai. limitations is the contingency of finite things. Hence, contingency is not to be found in the essence of being, so that even in this respect there is opposition between contingent being and the essence of being, which is intuited by us as im- mutable and necessary. "Every being," says Rosmini, "when considered in its G 82 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. logical possibility, is universal and necessary. And, indeed, there is no logical reason why there should not subsist any number of real beings corresponding to my one idea. Hence, every idea is a light, whereby I am able to know all the beings corresponding to it that subsist now or yet may subsist. It is, therefore, universal, infinite. Every single sensation, on the other hand, is particular. All that I feel in it is limited to it. . , . The same may be said of the attribute of necessity. What I contemplate as possible, I know very well to be necessary ; for there is no way or mode of thinking that the possible ever was impossible [cf. under § 35]. Real sensation, on the contrary, may or may not be. It is accidental, contingent. There is, therefore, nothing in it that could awake in my mind the sense of an absolute necessity " {New Essay, vol. ii. § 428). Contingent things are the improper terms of ideal being. Its proper, that is, its necessary term is jGod (see under § 21). How ideal being comes to have improper terms is a question of Theo- sophy, or even of Theology. The iden- tity be- tween the essence of being and real beings exists be- tween them only in so far as they are known. It is only as known that real being is identical with ideal being. Furthermore, w^hen we observe the identity between real, contingent being and the essence of being, we observe this identity in our pe^^cep- tion and cognition, not in being as independent of such perception or cognition (§ 24). 31. In fact. It Is only In real being as known that this Identity Is found or formed, and It Is in the finding of It that the felt activity Is perceived and cognized. It Is not until the felt activity Is Iden- tified with the essence of being that it Is known THINGS KNOWN AS THEY ARE. 83 or perceived, that it becomes a perceptible entity, an object. In the act of perception, therefore, there is added to the felt activity something which renders it a perceptible entity, and this addition is being itself, the feeling or contingent felt ac- tivity of which is but an imperfect mode, not perceptible apart from being, but only in objective being, as we shall show more clearly further on, when we come to speak of perception (§§ 92-94). Moreover, although the mind thus supplies an Perception element of its object, oi perceived being, this does true on not render its perceptions less true, since the mind count, clearly knows what it adds and what is given to it. Hence it knows things as they are. In answer to the grave question, " How can the matter of cognition identify itself with the form ; and if the matter does not so identify itself, how can it be said to be contained in the form, and to form a perfect equation with it ? " Rosmini replies, '' The matter, considered in itself, never does identify itself with the form of cognition. On the contrary, . . . the matter in itself ... is an ac- tivity different from knowing, and, therefore, still more different from the form of knowing. . . . The matter of cognition, so long as separated from cognition itself, re- mains unknown, and there can be no question of certainty with regard to it, because certainty is an attribute solely of knowledge. That, therefore, which identifies itself with the form of cognition is the matter of cognition, so far as known. The mind, under these circumstances, merely considers this matter in relation to being, and sees it con- tained in being as an actuation and term of it. Hence, before it is united to being, there is no identification : before the matter is known, there is nothing to be said about it ; but when it is united to being and thus ob- jectified, when it is known to us, it has already received, 84 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. in the act of our cognition, a relation, a form, a predicate, which it had not before, and in this predicate consists its identification with being. Being is predicated of it, and in that predication consists the act whereby we know it. In this way it seems to us, when we consider the matter already known, that it has in itself something common with all things, whereas this quality, in so far as it is common, is acquired by it and received from the mind — is a relation which it has to the act of the mind, a relation not real in it, but only in the act of the mind. Aristotle and others, not having sufficiently considered this, fell into the error of supposing that the mind could derive the idea of being by abstraction from what was most common in things, whereas it was the mind itself that put this most common quality into the things ; and when it took it from them, it only reclaimed its own. Hence . . . what is common in things is only a result of the relation in which they stand to the intelligent mind " {New Essay, vol. iii. § 1 174). St. Thomas and most modern Thomists make the same blunder as Aristotle. Why we think that we do not know the ground of things. This analysis of the nature of our knov^Iedge of real beings shovi^s us why men generally have a conviction that they do not know the ground of things — that which causes them to be. The reason of this ignorance is the fact that in all felt activities this ground is wanting, and has to be given or lent to them, so to speak, by the per- ceiving mind itself. In other words, the mind attributes to contingent things a basis, because otherwise it would be incapable of perceiving them ; but, inasmuch as it does not perceive this basis, it is unable to determine its nature. SENSE AND INTELLECT. 85 "When our minds have received through the senses the corporeal elements above described, the understanding com- pletes the perception of them in the following manner : — The passion [passzo, mWog] which we undergo in sensation has two aspects — the one turned toward its term, that is, us ; the other turned toward its principle. The former is passion, the latter, action. Action and passion are two words which signify the same thing under two diverse and contrary aspects. Now, the sense does not perceive the thing of which we speak except as passion or expec- tation of new passions. It is the understanding alone that is able to perceive it as action. In so doing, the under- standing adds nothing to the thing, but merely considers it in an absolute mode, whereas the sense perceives it only in a particular respect, in a relative mode. The under- standing sunders itself from us as particular beings, and, with its vision, regards the things in themselves, whereas the sense never sunders itself from the particular subjects to which it belongs, that is, from us. The conceiving of an action, therefore, belongs exclusively to the under- standing. But conceiving an action involves conceiving a principle in act ; hence the intellect, in perceiving an action, always perceives an agent as existing in itself, that is, a being iji act. The understanding does this by means of the idea of being, which it has in itself When, therefore, the understanding perceives the agent in question, as a being different from us and furnished with extension, it has the perception of body. From all of which it is clear that the understanding, in order to perceive a body, does no more than consider what the senses supply to it. It does so, however, not in a mode relative to us, as is the case with the sense, but by prescinding and abstracting from us, that is, by adding the universal concept of being. The intellective perception of body, therefore, is the union of the intuition of a being (agent) with sense-perception (passion), or, in other words, a judgment, a primitive synthesis " {Nezv Essay, vol. ii. § 964). " It is true that the sense perceives the passion and not the action, since the former has an existence different from that of the latter ; but the 86 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. understanding perceives the passion with the concept of passion, and the concept of passion cannot exist without including the concept of action, since these concepts are relative, and reciprocally include each other. But what is this concept? How does the understanding form to itself the concept of passion ? . . . The principle of cognition is this : The object of the intellect is being, or, in other words, the intellect, if it understands, must understand something. Now, when we, endowed with intellect, are conscious of a modification, we say naturally {i.e. instinc- tively), ' There is something which is not ourselves.' And to say this is reasonable and necessary, since, whatever it is, it must always be something that modifies us. We feel that, sometimes with our consent, sometimes without, in every case force is applied to us, and that what actually produces passion is not a zero ; therefore, there is some- thing, an entity, which is perceived. We say, at the same time, ' If there is something here, there must be a substance or a first act which is the basis of that being;' since all that is given is either substance, in this sense, or appurtenance of substance, there being no third alternative. We see, therefore, what it is that is perceived in the passion of the sense. It is an action in us, an agent, therefore an agent- being, since an agent cannot be conceived except as being. Thus the proposed difficulty vanishes. The sense could not perceive the event that occurred in it, except in its own form, that is, as passion, since it was not an objective faculty ; it could not perceive an agent, save in its own passivity, and hence could not perceive it in the relation of action. But the understanding, the faculty which sees things in themselves, necessarily sees the being that acts, because it is exactly in so far as a thing is in itself that it performs its operations, operation being a consequence of being. Being is an essential activity ; it is the first act, on which all the others depend. Hence it is the special faculty of the intellect always to see action in passion, the agent in action, and being-in-itself or substance in the agent. One thing is implied in the other, and all are seen with a single act, which is called the act of perception " MEANING OF IDEAL BEING. 87 {New Essay, vol. iil. §§ 1206, 1207 ; cf. Theosophy, vol. ii. § 868). The perception of passion by the sense is sense- perception ; the perception of action, which is a function of the intellect, is intellective perception. The means, therefore, whereby we cognize Why real beings is the essence of being, which, for this a means reason, we have called ideal being. Be it ob-tion,1s'" served, however, that the word ideal does not ^ideai. apply to the essence of being, but to the property which it has of making known real beings to us. When, therefore, we affirm that a real being exists, we do not affirm ideality of it, we do not affirm that it is ideal, but only that it has the essence of being. It has been a common objection to Rosmini's philo- sophy that, since all things are known by means of ideal being, and this being constitutes their cognizability, the things known must themselves be ideal.* Such objection shows a profound misunderstanding of the system. In the phrase ideal being, the word ideal does not express an intrinsic attribute of being, but, like iinivcrsal, a relation of possibility in which it stands to its real terms. The phrase formal being would express the meaning, perhaps, better. It is plain enough that the terms ideal 3,nd possible, which Rosmini employs as synonymous, cannot apply to being itself. It is not being that is possible or ideal ; it is merely the ideality or possibility of other things. What is ideal in knowledge is not the things known, but the knowledge itself (cf under § 35). Ideal being is what the * See Galluppi, Lette7'e FilosoficJie suUe Vicende dclla Filosofiia intorno ai Principii della Conoscenza uniana da Ca7-tesio fino a Kant, xiv. ; Mamiani, Compe7idio e Sintesi della propria Filosofia, pp. 208, sqq. ; Confcssio7ii di tin Metafisico, vol. i. pp. 239, sqq. 88 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Schoolmen called the means of vision sitb quo, of which Cardinal Zigliara says, " The means sub quo lies between the true and the intellect, as the principle and form disposing the intellect to see the intelligible, in the same way as material light disposes the bodily eye to see the sensible, and passes between the two. This means ... is the light of the active intellect, which stands in the same relation to the so-called possible intellect as corporeal light does to the external sense of sight" {Delia Luce lutellettuale e dell' OntologismOy vol. i. p. ii ; of. p. 6, note i). The es- sence of being is self-intelli- gible, and forms the intelligi- bility of all other things. 34- But if we know real things by means of the essence of being, how do we know the essence of being itself ? Observation attests that our notion of the essence of being is given to our minds prior to all other cognition ; and if we study the nature of it, we shall see that it must be so — that this knowledge does not depend upon any other previous knowledge — in other words, that it is cognizable in and through itself And, indeed, facts show us that we do not begin to use the faculties of our minds until moved by ex- ternal sensations, and that we begin to think by observing that bodies exist, that we ourselves exist, that something real exists. Now, this first thought is, as we have said, simply an affirmation, an affirmation of a being, which supposes that we know beforehand the essence of being (§ 14). The essence of being, therefore, is known to us before any act of our thought. It is not, there- fore, acquired by any act of thought, but is im- planted before all thought by the Author of Nature. THE LIGHT OF REASON. 89 If this be not true, let us suppose that we did not know what beine was. We should in this case never be able, whatever pains or pleasures we might experience, to say that there was a being. We should never be able to know that sensation presupposed a being, for the simple reason that we should never know what being was. The result would be that we should not know anything, and, not knowing anything, we should not have any element of knowledge whereby we could know the essence of being. It is thus clear that the essence of being cannot be known through any other knowledge but throus^h itself. The essence'^^f'^^^^. •-**-' of being IS of beiiiz, therefore, is ■ htoivable in and tJiroiio-Ji the Light , '^ , of Reason, itself, and is the means zvheredy zve know all other is inborn, _ ^ and is the things. It is, therefore, the Light of Reason, ^oxm oi m- telligence. From this point of view we say that the idea of being is innate, and that it is the form of intelligence. Rosmini devotes a very large number of pages in his New Essay to showing that, since the idea of being cannot come to us either from bodily sensations, from the feeling of our own existence, from reflection (in Locke's sense), or through the act of perception, it must be innate. That it does not come from our bodily sensations is clear from its characteristics, all of which are utterly opposed to those of sensation. These characteristics are objectivity, pos- sibility or ideality, simplicity, unity or identity, universality and necessity, immutability and eternity, and indcter- minateness. That it cannot come from the feeling of our own existence is likewise manifest, partly on account of the same characteristics, and partly because, without first having the idea of being, we should never be able to dis- tinguish the feeling of ourselves. That it cannot come 90 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. from reflection is plain, inasmuch as reflection adds nothing to sensation, and sensation does not contain the notion of being. Finally, that it does not spring into existence in the act of perception and as a result of that act, is obvious, for the simple reason that that act could never be begun without it {Neiv Essay, vol, ii, §§ 413-466). Hence the author concludes that the idea of being is innate. " This proposition," he says, " follows from the preceding ; for (i) If the idea of being is so necessary that it enters essen- tially into the formation of all our other ideas, so that, without the use of it, we have not the faculty of thinking ; .(2) If this idea is not to be found in sensations ; (3) If it cannot be derived from external or internal sen- sations through reflection ; (4) If it is not created in us by God in the act of percep- tion ; (5) Finally, if it is absurd to say that the idea of being emanates from ourselves ; it follows that the idea of being is innate in our souls, so that we are born with the presence and vision of possible being, albeit we do not pay attention to it until much later. This demonstration by exclusion is irrefutable, provided it be demonstrated that the enumeration of possible cases is complete. Now, that it is complete is seen in this way. The idea of being in general exists : this is the fact to be explained. Since it exists, it was either given to us with our nature or produced in us afterwards ; there is no third alternative. If it was produced afterwards, it must have been either by ourselves or by something different from us ; here, also, there is no third alternative. The first alternative being excluded, if it was produced by some cause different from us, this cause must either be something sensible (the action of bodies) or something not sensible (an intelligent being different from us, God, etc.) ; here, again, there is no third alternative. Now, these two cases were likewise excluded. Hence the enumeration was com- plete, because reduced to two alternatives, which always rejected as absurd a middle term. If, therefore, all the cases MEANING OF INNATE. 91 in which the idea of being could be supposed to be given to us after our coming into existence are impossible, it follows that the idea of being is innate or unproduced. Q. E. D." {New Essay, vol. ii. §§ 467, 468). Rosmini's assertion that the idea of being is innate has caused much misunderstanding and opposition in various quarters ; but both proceed from want of attention to his explanations. By " innate," Rosmini does not mean innate in the subject and forming a part, or modification, or at- tribute of it, but innate as form, object, presence, "We must carefully attend," he says, " so as not to confound two things that are altogether distinct. It is one thing when we say, ' a being present to the mind,' another, when we say, ' a modification of the mind.' Were it otherwise, this being which we see would be nothing else than our- selves modified, a mere subjective entity. . . . The intuition of being gives us these two truths respecting it : first, that it is a being present to the mind — objective, and not a being having an independent subsistence of its own ; second, that it is not a mere modification of the mind. . . . What do we mean when we say, 'a being present to the mind'.? We mean a being which has its existence in the mind, in such a way that, if we should suppose that there was not some mind to which it Avas present, it would not be at all, for the reason that its mode of being is intelligibility itself, outside the mind, not in the mind. By means of it we know, not the act of existence in itself, but the act of existence in the mind. ... In the second place, . . . (being) is not a mere modification of the mind or of the subject which has the intuition of it. This truth manifests itself, as soon as we attentively consider universal being itself In the thought of being, we see that the being thought by us is the object of the mind, and, what is more, likewise the objectivity of all the terms of the mind. . . . It is, therefore, in its essence, distinct from the subject, and from all that can belong to the subject. It is the light of the subject, and superior to it. The subject is receptive with respect to it, while it is essentially received in a mode peculiar to itself. The subject is compelled to see it more 92 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. than the open eye is compelled to see the rays of the sun which it has before it and which strike its retina. Being is immutable; it is what is : the subject is mutable. Being imposes laws and actualizes the subject by rendering it intelligent ; and since it cannot be said, in any proper sense, that the subject suffers from the object (because the presence of the latter merely gives it its mode and compels it to rouse a new activity in itself), what takes place in the subject must not be called passion {TraOog) but increase of act.^ . . . Attentive observation, therefore, directed to this being, which naturally shines before our minds, leads us to conclude that it is an object essentially different from the subject which intuites it ; that, at the same time, it is not thought by us as furnished with any other existence save that alone whereby it shines before our minds ; and hence that, if a// mind were removed, this being would no longer be conceivable, which is the reason why it is called an ideal being {cntc) " (Nezu Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1440-1442). This last observation respecting the removal of all mind furnishes Rosmini, as we shall see, with his strongest proof for the necessary existence of God (§ 179). Meaning But the word fomi, having different signifi- wor/ cations, requires explanation. It is used, gene- form. ^^iiy speaking, to mean that which imparts to a being an original constitutive act, v^hich makes it to be what it is. Thus the essence of being, knoAvable in and through itself, is said to be the form of the intelligent soul, because it is that which imparts to the soul the act whereby it is Two intelligent. But here we must distinguish two * Cf. the remarkable passage in Aristotle: " Ou/c ton S' anXovv ovZ\ rb TTcJcrxEt*'} oXkh. rb \).\v (p6opd ris inrh rod ivavriov, rb Se eraiTTjpia /aaWov tov Svvdfiei ovTos KOI dfxoiov ovtws &s Siivajnis e^ei itphs ivreXexeiav " {De Aji., ii. 5, 5 ; 417 b, 2, sqq. ; also Ih'd., iii. 4, 2, 3 ; 429 a, 13, sqq.). FORM. 93 kinds of form. Notionally considered, that which senses of , . . . . , . , . the word imparts to a bemg its original, essential act isy^r^. different from that act itself; but sometimes it is part of the being itself and confounds itself with the act, being separable from it only men- tally and through abstraction ; at other times, it is something really different from the act and from the being which it informs. Thus the form of a knife is the edge of the knife, belonging to, and forming part of, the knife. On the contrary, the form of incandescent iron is fire, somethinof altogether different from the iron, but such tliat, when the two are brought into contact, the one becomes the form of the other, penetrating and acting in the other's sphere of being. Now, in in which which of these two senses is ideal being the form is the Uea of intelligence ? Here, again, we must appeal to SsedT'^ observation and fact, and these show us that ideal being is the form of the intelligent mind in the latter sense only, and not in the former. And, indeed, although we clearly see that we are in- telligent beings only in virtue of the essence of being which stands before our minds, still, we find it impossible to believe that the essence of being is ourselves or forms part of ourselves. It is, therefore, a form different from us. That which imparts to our spirits the act of intelligence is something very different from us, notwithstanding that it is in us or present to us. But this is not enough. Even if we accept this signification of the word, it can be applied to ideal being only in a sense altogether peculiar and different from that 94 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. which we adopt when we say of two real beings, which act reciprocally on each other, that the one is the form of the other. We must, therefore, carefully observe that the mode in which the essence of being becomes the form of our spirits has no resemblance whatever to the mode in which one real being, through action and reaction, becomes the form of another. The essence of being becomes the form of our spirits simply and solely by making us know, by revealing to us its own natural cognizability. Hence there is no reaction on the part of our spirits. These are simply receptive, and the light, the knowledge, which they receive is what renders them intel- ligent. The essence of being is simple, unalter- able, incapable of being modified or confounded or mixed with anything else. In this way it reveals itself, and it can reveal itself in no other. The spirit which intuites it, no less than the act of intuition, stands outside of it. When the mind Object :m^ intuites it, it does not intuite itself. For this andTheir reason the essence of being receives the name re ation. ^^ object, meaning that which is placed before the Kant's intuiting mind, or subject. It will thus be seen objective, that, when we say that ideal being is the form of jectit^. the mind, we use the word form in a sense alto- gether different from, and opposed to, that in which Kant uses it, all Kant's forms being sub- jective, whereas our one form is objective, and objective in its very essence. In regard to the meaning of the word form, Rosmini says elsewhere, " It seems that Kant took the word form FORM OF COGNITION. 95 in a material sense, drawing his concept from the form of bodies. By form we mean a perfecting principle, as the ancient philosophers did. Moreover, in our case, it is the ideal object which informs the mind.* Those, therefore, who have charged us with taking one of Kant's forms as the basis of our system, have not understood that the form of which we speak differs essentially from all Kant's forms, as object differs {xom. stLbject and extra-subject" {Theodicy, vol. i. § 151, n.).t " It is being which, as object, draws our spirits to that essential act which is called intellect, and which renders them capable of seeing this being afterwards, in relation with the particular modes of sensation supplied to it — a capability which is called reason. In a word, the idea of being, united to our spirits, is that which forms our intellect and our reason. It is this that renders us intelli- gent beings, rational animals " {Neiu Essay, vol. ii. § 482). It follows from this that the peculiarity of mind lies in having its form as object. Being is, of course, the first and essential form of everything ; but it is the object of mind alone. In other words, consciousness is the power which certain beings have of separating the universal form from their matter, and holding it up, so to speak, as an object. The being of a table is not its object. " By the form of cognition" says Rosmini, " we mean that element whereby cognition is cognition, whereby every- thing cognized is cognized. . . . Moreover, this element must be known through itself, and not through some other means rendering it known. , . . Therefore, it must be known immediately, per se. Now, in every one of our cognitions, nothing is known, unless existence be known, because any known thing is simply a thing whose (possible) being and whose determinations are known. But not one of these determinations is known, unless its possible ex- istence is known. To know these determinations is to know * Cf. St. Thomas: "Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse formam ejus. Nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu. Acta autem non est aliquid, nisi per id quod est forma ejus " {Snmma contra Gentes, ii. 59). t In spite of this, Mamiani still insists that Rosmini's being is subjective, one of Kant's forms {Prolegomeni, p. 114, etc.). 96 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. them as existing in their possibility. Therefore, every knowing is a knowing of, at least, possible existence, and every known is known because its possible existence is known. Therefore, ideal or possible existence, or the idea of existence, which is the same thing, is the form of all cognitions. . . . The matter of cognition is the determina- tions of existence, ideal, real, or moral. Matter here means what is known and does not make known, that which requires something else in order to be known, that in which cognition ends as its term. Hence, although everything, even a determination of existence, is known because its possible existence is known, yet pure existence is not the thing known, but only the form of cognition. Thus the mind finds this distinction, which separates in cognition the pure form of knowing from the matter" {Theosophy, vol. iv. § 123). In answer to the question. How can the same thing, that is, ideal being, be at once the form of cognition and of the power of cognition, that is, of the in- tellect.^ Rosmini says, "Ideal being has two relations. . . . that is, it is at once manifesting and manifested. As mani- festing, it is called the form of the mind, because without it the mind would not be mind. . . . As manifested, it is called the form of cognition, because it constitutes the cog- nized object, what there is of objective and, therefore, of formal in every cognition. Hence . . . ideal being may be called the immediate cause of the form of ifttellect, as w^ell as thdlform itself" {Ibid., § 124). Rosmini's system was so much a reaction against Kantianism, and its objective fundamental principle so much the result of a refutation of Kant's twelve subjective cate- gories, that it will be worth while to quote that refutation. Kant's categories are presented in the following table : — "Transcendental Table of the Concepts of the Understanding. " I. According to Quantity. Unity (Measure), Multiplicity (Magnitude), Totality (Wholeness). KANrS CATEGORIES. 97 " 2. According to Quality. Reality, Negation, Limitation. " 3. According to Relation. Substance and accident, Cause and effect, Community of passion and action. "4. Kzcox^Xw^ to Modality. Possibility — Impossibility, Existence — Non-existence, Necessity — Chance," * "I do notpurpose," says Rosmini, "to enter here into a minut e examination of the Kantian forms. Although Kant has promised rigorously to deduce the categories from the various forms of judgment (which is certainly a very happy thought), he has not kept his word ; for, as far as I can remember, he nowhere undertakes to demonstrate that from the forms of the judgment there result categories amount- ing to the exact number of twelve, and assignable in triads, with perfect distributive regularity, to each of the four fundamental forms. Having thus failed to justify the sym- metrical deduction of the categories, he left it a matter of doubt, no less than did Aristotle, whom he justly censures, whether or not these are perfectly deduced and enumerated, that is, whether they are the only twelve categories of human knowledge, so that there remains nothing that could not be classed under one or other of them. For this reason it would be tedious and out of place here to enter into a minute criticism of this division of the most universal ideas of the human understanding — a division which is certainly no less arbitrary than those made in ancient times. So much is visible at a first glance, that he sometimes con- founds the dress which our ideas receive from the different views taken by the mind and from speech with the ideas themselves, and then he picks up and classifies one idea as several, when he finds it in a variety of garbs. This, to be * See Kritik der rein. Vern. and Prolegomena, pt. ii. § 2X. H 98 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. sure, helps to perfect the symmetrical regularity of his division, as when he finds under the form of quality the subdivision infinite judgments, which are not in any way different from affirmative or negative 'yxAgvaovAs,, except in their garb of expression. In the same way, he seems to omit certain ideas which determine the classes of human knowledge, and which might have been placed among the categories, merely for fear that these might increase beyond the appointed number, and destroy his favourite regularity. Thus, continuons and extensive quantity might have been ranged under the category of quantity, whereas he places under it only discrete quantity, as being the one which supplies him with exactly the three desired classes — unity, multiplicity, and totality. . . . " Let us now examine the twelve categories which Kant calls the forms of our understanding, and the two forms of the inner and outer sense, and let us see whether all these are really primitive and original forms of our intelligence, as the critical philosopher pretends. I observe, in the first place, that Kant's twelve categories cannot all aspire to the same dignity. They are not independent of each other, or confined to distinct genera, in such a way that they cannot be reduced or ranged under each other as smaller classes under greater. Let us take the form of modality. It has the three subordinate categories, possibility, existence, and necessity. Now, let us compare with this form the other three, viz., quantity, quality, and relation. I can conceive, with the utmost ease, a possible or existent being, without being obliged to know what quantity, quality, or relation it has. My understanding, in this case, is conditioned by the law that it is obliged to think such a being either as possible, or as existent, or as necessary ; but it is not obliged, after that, to clothe this being with the forms of quantity, quality, and relation. If, therefore, there can be an act of the intelligence which does not require the three forms, quantity, quality, and relation, this means that these are not essential or necessary forms ; they are not those forms which inform and constitute the peculiar nature of the intellectual operation, and hence they are not the forms we are looking KANTS CATEGORIES. 99 for, inasmuch as we are looking for those through which the understanding is understanding, and by which the intellectual operation exists — in a word, the forms that constitute the immediate, essential, and necessary term of the intellectual act. For this reason, the form of modality is independent of quantity, quality, and relation, so that the understanding, with merely the form of modality, can, without these others, perform certain of its acts. On the contrary, we cannot think the quantity, the quality, or the relations of a being, without first having thought it either as possible or as existent. Hence the three forms, quantity, quality, and relation, depend upon the form of modality, which is superior to these, and is the necessary prior con- dition of their having a place in thought. We may, there- fore, without hesitation, conclude that Kant's three primi- tive forms, quantity, qitality, and relation, cannot be con- sidered as original and essential forms of the understanding, inasmuch as its existence and operation can be conceived without them. The same may be seen from another point of view. Is it necessary that every being should have a determinate quantity and quality f To affirm this absolutely, as Kant does, is at least to commit an act of audacity and temerity, more than dogmatic, on the critical reason, and to attribute to it a power of deciding in this way a question which it is impossible to settle a priori. If Kant had said to us, ' To say that every possible being must be furnished with a determinate quantity and quality, is to go beyond the powers of reason, because, in order to say this, we should have to examine all possible beings, and even enter into investigations concerning the Infinite Being, whereof we have no positive or adequate idea,' he would, at least, have shown a little philosophic modesty, real, or, at all events, apparent ; he would have shown some consistency, since there is nothing that gives him greater satisfaction or pleasure than to be able to criticize reason, and to inveigh against those philosophers whom he contemptuously calls dogmatists, that is, against all those who, in their simplicity, admit something as certain. By pronouncing a decided judgment in the matter in question, by placing quantity loo PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. and quality among the primitive forms of the human under- standing, just as if it could not think anything without these, he has plainly laid himself open to the charge of rashness. . . . We may conclude, therefore, that, if among the forms of Kant there is to be found any one that deserves the title of an ot'iginal form of the human under- standing, as informing it and informing the cognition that proceeds from the intellect, it must be looked for under modality. Let us see, therefore, whether there is under it anything like what we are looking for. " In the first place, I observe that, when I think and judge that something exists, I do not necessarily, in that act, complete my idea of the existing thing. And, indeed, I may have an idea, as perfect and determinate as can be desired, although the being which corresponds to it do not really exist. Hence, to judge that the thing of which I have the idea exists, is an act essentially different from that whereby my intellect has and contemplates the idea. This judgment adds nothing new to my idea, no new notion informs my mind through that idea. Hence real or external existence, the term of my judgment, cannot be any original form of my understanding, since in my understanding there is nothing but the idea of the thing, and this neither increases, diminishes, nor undergoes any alteration on account of the subsistence or non-subsistence of the thing in question. The form of the intellect must, therefore, be an idea, and not the subsistence of the thing ; hence, of the three categories of possibility, existence, and necessity, that of existence, considered as a thing apart from the other two, cannot in any way be an original and essential form of our understanding. Let us see, then, whether the other two forms, possibility and necessity, have the character of original and essential forms. " The idea of anything (in so far as it is not self-con- tradictory) is what is called the logical possibility of it. Now, it is clearly impossible to perform any act of the understanding without the form oi possibility. But when I think the possibility of a thing, am I also obliged to think explicitly the absolute necessity of the same } No, RANTS CATEGORIES. loi not if we mean to refer this necessity to the thing thought, and not to the possibihty itself, in which latter case it is not distinguishable from the possibility itself, being a mere abstract quality of it. Necessity^ therefore, cannot be an original and primitive form of my understanding, inasmuch as it is not its universal and immutable object and term. We are obliged, therefore, to conclude that, of all the twelve forms of Kant, only one, viz., possibility, has the characteristics of a form of the human intellect. Let us, therefore, examine this possibility a little. " We have said that the possibility of which we speak is the idea of anything. Indeed, possibility must always be thought as possibility of something, since we cannot think the possibility of nothing. Possibility, therefore, is inseparable from something, while, at the same time, it may be found united to any something. In order, there- fore, that we may think possibility, it is not necessary that this something should be determined as to genus, species, or individual. It is sufficient that it be something, a being perfectly indeterminate. The idea (the possibility), there- fore, of indeterminate being is the only original and essential form of the human intellect. " Now, let us see how all the nine prime forms of Kant reduce themselves to this one as their formal principle, and how the other two categories of modality, existence and necessity, have nothing formal about them, and are elements already contained in possibility. Let us begin with these latter. " If by existence is meant the idea of the existence of things in general, it is already included in the idea of indeterminate being. If by existence is meant the actual subsistence of being, this is not the term of the faculty of judgment, and does not add any form to the intellect. Necessity is found by analyzing possibility, inasmuch as that which is possible is necessarily so. In this sense, necessity also is included in the idea of being in general. On the other hand, if by necessity is meant a necessary real being, we must repeat concerning this what was said universally concerning the actual subsistence of beings. I02 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. " Having thus reduced the three categories of modality to the single form of idea of being in general, let us next see how the three forms comprised under the head of relation, that is, substance, cause, and action, may be re- duced to this same form. I have already shown that the only intellectual element in the ideas of substance and cause is the idea of existence and of being in general [see under §§ 93-101]. If, therefore, Kant placed substance and cause among the essential categories or forms of the human intellect, he did so only because he did not carry out the analysis of these far enough to discover what in them was pure form. With regard to action, we must observe that not only the understanding perceives action, but that sense also perceives it in its own way, by feeling it. Now, we cannot put among the categories particular action, in so far as it is perceived by sense, but only action as conceived by the intellect, or, which is the same thing, the concept of action. But how does it happen that the particular action perceived by sense becomes universal, when it is made the object of the intellect .'' It happens through the faculty which the intellect has of considering the par- ticular action experienced by the sense as possible to be repeated an indefinite number of times. It is, therefore, the addition oi possibility that renders the action a universal concept. The same is true when I consider what constitutes the nature of action in general, and leave out of view the particulars of the different species of action. The concept, therefore, of action, when subjected to analysis, turns out not to be entirely a pure form of the intellect, but to be composed, (i) of a material element, in so far as it relates to the actions experienced by our sense ; and (2) of a formal element, in so far as our intellect adds the form of possi- bility, and thus abstracts and universalizes the particular actions. Hence all that is formal in the idea of action is possibility, or the idea of universal being. " By a similar analysis we might reduce Kant's quantity and quality to the form of being in general, that is, by separating from them their material elements and retaining only that which is formal. But this analysis brings us to KANrS CATEGORIES. 103 the final result, that these concepts have nothing formal about them but the idea of possibility, or, which is the same thing-, of universal being. And, indeed, even the term of my sense has a certain quantity and a certain quality. Now, the quantity or the quality perceived by my sense is not, in the smallest degree, the form of my intellect. The quantity, therefore, and the qiidity, which are concepts, and, according to Kant, also forms of my intellect, are not particular quantity and quality, but quantity and quality universally considered. Now, to repeat what was said above with regard to action, how do we arrive at quantity and quality in general .-' When I perceive a particular quantity, and then think it as purely possible, with this and nothing more I think it as universal. But if from the possible idea or quantity I abstract the specifying characteristics, and thereby generalize it, I have in it quantity in general. Neither quantity, therefore, nor quality is the object of my intellect in the sense of being its form ; but in order to become such, each requires to be informed by another form, and the form which my intellect unites to it for this purpose is none other than possibility. Qimntity and quality are, therefore, in themselves, matter, and it is my intellect that, by informing them, renders them its concepts. These concepts, therefore, of quantity and quality, when analyzed, have nothing formal about them except the idea of possibility or of being in general. Thus Kant's twelve forms reduce themselves to one pure and true form. " And here it is not necessary to speak of what Kant calls the forms of the outer and inner sense, that is, space and time, because these do not belong to the order of intellectual things. The only question would be with reference to their concepts. All that is formal in such concepts limits itself, for the reasons given above, to possibility, or the idea of indeterminate being. " But there is another difference to be marked between the nature of Kant's manifold forms and the nature of that one which has remained in our hands after we have scat- tered all the rest. And this difference is, that the whole of 104 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Kant's forms proceed from the basis of the subject, and are therefore subjective, whereas the true form is, in its essence, object. This diversity of nature is of infinite importance, as we shall see. . . . Let us conclude. The human mind has innate no determinate form ; and Kant's seventeen forms have no real foundation, and are entirely superfluous for the explanation of the origin of ideas. On the other hand, the human mind has one single ijideterminate form, and this is the idea of universal being. The idea of being in general is pure form, and has no material element com- bined with it. It is not subjective, but, on the contrary, object. It is so simple and so little that it cannot be further simplified, and nothing less can be imagined that would be capable of informing our cognitions. At the same time, it is of infinite fecundity. And, indeed, it is impossible to imagine any act of the mind that does not require this form, or is not natured and informed by it. Hence if we take away the idea of being, human knowledge and the mind itself are rendered impossible " {New Essay, vol. i. §§ 368-371, 374-384)- By Kant's seventeen forms, Rosmini means the two forms of sensibility, the twelve categories of the understanding, and the three postulates of the pure reason. Rosmini has certainly found the primal categories of being in its three necessary modes — ideality, reality, and morality ; but he has nowhere, so far as I know, shown the relation of these to the categories of Aristotle and Kant. He has, indeed, told us that quantity and quality come under reality (§ 27) ; but where he would place relation, etc., it would be as interest- ing to know as it is disappointing that he has not in- formed us. His work on the History of the Categories is unpublished. The author of an excellent essay upon Kant's theory of cognition says, " The modal definitions are the summary canon of every theory of cognition. They exhibit the result which the investigation has brought to our scientific consciousness. They describe the whole field of experience. When we know what possible, actual, and necessary mean, we know also what knowledge we may possess and what KANTS CATEGORIES. 105 we are to look for. They are also the sole basis from which practical philosophy may make legitimate demands. Every attack on critical idealism will have to be judged by the success with which it overthrows the modal definitions of that system and replaces them by others." The definitions in question, according to this author, are as follows : — " In nature, that is necessary whose existence is demanded by the principles of the theory of cognition." " Acttcal'is, that which is felt or must necessarily be supposed capable of being felt." "Possible is that which corresponds to the conditions of conception {Vorstellung)^ Of necessity he says, " Necessity is not an accident which we recognize in the substance, but the quality of the function of unity in the subject in regard to a given object." * It is easy to see that, according to these definitions, the ground of necessity and possibility, as well of actuality, lies in the subject, whence it follows directly that all our knowledge is subjec- tive. Rosmini has not only attacked, but overthrown, the first and last of the definitions, by showing that the ground of necessity and possibility lies, not in the subject at all, but in the object, which is being. Possibility and necessity, in so far as possibility is not an expression of subjective ignorance due to want of objective data, mean exactly the same thing, and are both based upon the principle of con- tradiction, which again is grounded in the nature of being. Possible is that which ideally is, or, stated in the form of a reflection, that which logically does not contradict itself. But what does not logically contradict itself is ideally neces- sary. If A may be B, A must be B. If three straight lines placed in a certain position, may form a triangle, it follows that, when so placed, they must form a triangle. In other words, so long as we deal only with the ideal or objective world, possible and necessary are exactly the same thing, and both identical Avith actuality. When we pass into the real or subjective world, on the contrary, the words are used with this difference of meaning, that the former expresses partial ignorance, the latter complete * August Stadler, Die Grundsdtze der reinen Erkenntnisstheorie in der Kantischen Philosophie (Leipzig, 1876), pp. 130-132. io6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. knowledge. When I say, "A may be B," all I mean is that my partial notion of A contains nothing incompatible with the idea B ; but that, if my knowledge of A were com- plete, I should be able to say with certainty, "A must be B" or "A cannot" (we do not say ''must not") " be B." Aris- totle, with his doctrine of potentiality and actuality, placed possibility and necessity in things, that is, in real subjects, thereby introducing much confusion into one part of logic. Kant increased this confusion when he placed them in the thinking subject, as subjective conditions of thinking. The truth is, both lie in the nature of being, which, as such, is always object and never subject. What is meant by real possibility occurs when one condition of a total actuality is conceived as subsistent, and the rest as merely ideal, A proposition is then formed in which the condition conceived as subsistent is made the subject, the total actuality the predicate, and the remaining ideal conditions are vaguely expressed in the copula, e.g. " An acorn may be " {i.e. with certain ideal conditions made actual, is) " an oak." When we say, "An acorn is potentially an oak," we are saying what is not true. When w^e say, " An acorn is a possible oak," w^e are talking nonsense. A possible oak never grew from an acorn — indeed, never grew at all. (Cf Lange, Logische StudieUy pp. 30, sqq.) 36. All intciii- The essence of being, therefore, simply by feducibie making itself coQ-nizable to the mind, informs it b°eii4"as"^ and renders It Intelligent. In other words, Inas- TcertSn" much as every act of Intelligence has entity for its manner, object, thls produces the faculty of Intelligence. mnUs" ^^ intelligence is reducible to the Intuition of the essences of beings, and to the thought of being (whose essence Is known) realized in certain modes, with certain limits (§ 14). FORM OF MIND. 107 The relation of the essence of being to the subject can- not be easily conceived, and Rosmini cannot characterize it otherwise than by saying that it is a relation of objectivity or cognizability. And this is not to be wondered at, for it is most evident that the relation of subject and object involved in cognition is one altogether peculiar and not to be expressed in terms of any other. The most that can be done is to bring it out into clearness and to define the elements that enter into it. It is manifest enough that, if one thing can make itself an object to another, it thereby of necessity makes that other intelligent. It is not so clear how an essence in its very nature infinite can be the form of a finite thing, such as every intelligent being recognizes himself to be. To this Rosmini replies as follows : — " Every one of us knows that he is finite, and when he says /, he is well aware that he is affirming a reality which excludes numerous other realities of the same or of a different order, and, therefore, that he is affirming a finite thing. At the same time, the human soul, in so far as it is intellective, is united to infinite being, namely, the idea, and, under this aspect, it partakes of a certain infinitude. Indeed, ideal being, in its relation to the mind, is like an infinite space, all equally illuminated, in relation to the eye. Hence, although the real things cognized by man are always finite, because the real thing which perceives them, viz., the soul, is finite ; yet the means of cognizing the real things perceived by the sense, that is, the idea of being, is never exhausted or ren- dered inefficacious. . . . Now, here a difficulty presents itself Ideal being is the form of the intellective soul ; but form and matter are two elements constitutive of one nature : hence ideal being is a true constitutive element of the soul. But ideal being, as ideal, is infinite : therefore the human soul is composed of finite and infinite. I reply as follows, by distinguishing the minor premise of this syllogism : — Forms are of two kinds, subjective and objective. Subjec- tive forms belong to the subject and constitute it ; objective forms neither belong to the subject nor constitute it,* but bring the subject into act, and, therefore, may be called * Being, of course, constitutes the subject an ego. Cf. under § 124. loS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the immediate causes of the form of the subject. At the same time, they may with equal propriety be called forms, when they are considered as the term of the act of intuition, since universal being, in so far as it is merely the term of this act, is, as it were, appropriated to the soul, without thereby ceasing to be universal in itself. And, indeed, although it is true that being in general is intuited as iden- tical by all intellects, yet in so far as it is merely the term of one intellect, it is not the term of another, and it is in this sense that the truth possessed by man may be said to be created. Indeed, the proposition, ' The truth of the human intellect is created,' is equivalent to this other, ' The truth, which is eternal, has been made to become the term of a created intellect' " {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 236-238). In what sense ideal being is said to be possible. Z1' The essence of belnof we have called ideal being ; its realizations, real beings. If ideal being be considered with reference to its realizations, it may be called possible being. The w^ord possible does not designate a quality of being, but merely expresses th-e fact that it may be realized. This must be carefully borne in mind, in order to preclude the notion which might arise, that the essence of being is itself a mere possibility, and nothing more. It is a true essence, not a possi- bility of essence. But this essence may be realized ; if it is not realized, its realization is possible. This is what we mean by possible being. As we have seen, Rosmini identifies the two terms ideal and possible, and in this he is right, from his point of view. Ideal being means being as form ; but form, with reference POSSIBLE AND IDEAL. 109 to realities, is a mere possibility. Hence ideal d.\\6. possible both express the same relation of being to its terms or realizations. " Being," he says, " is in itself, and possibility is only a relation to reality, that is, to terms, whose nature is not known until they are perceived " {TheosopJiy, vol. i. § ZS). As to the fact that ideal being is not nothing, see citation under § 18. It seems a flat contradiction when Rosmini says, on the one hand, that being ' is in itself,' and, on the other, that apart from a subject it would not be (see under § 34) : but this is only apparent ; for it must be rem.embered that, in Rosmini's language, to be in itself means to be as object, and certainly nothing can be as object when there is no subject. " Possible, in the logical sense, means free from contra- diction. Now, being admits no contradiction " {Psychology, vol. ii. § 1340). 38. Since real beings are many, and each of them Howpos- , 1 . -Ill' Mil' ^i^l^ ^""^ has a relation to possible being, possible being, ideal . 1 , , • , . , . , beins;s are considered merely in relation to the various real said to be or realizable beings, becomes their idea, or, more ^^^^^' correctly, their concept. For this reason we say that concepts, ideas, ideal beings, and possible beings are many, because they are as numerous as the modes in which the essence of beine can be realized. Speaking of concrete relations, Rosmini says, " Each of these is in one place, separated from every other, in- communicable to every other ; for example, the pain which I feel in a finger has nothing to do with the pain which another man feels, say, in the same finger, and this on account of the limitations of place and of real subsistence which separate these two sensations. On the contrary, being (essere) or a being {ente), which reveals itself to the no PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. mind as a mere possibility, is not more in one place than in another.* It may be realized in many places, if it is of a nature to occupy space, and even if it is otherwise, it may be indefinitely multiplied. Suppose the mind contemplate the human body in its possibility : this possible body is always the same, in whatever place it may happen to sub- sist through realization, or to whatever extent it may multiply itself. Real bodies become many ; the concept or idea of the body always remains one. The mind, or, as the case may be, several minds, see it as identical in all the infinite number of human bodies, which they think as subsistent. Hence the nature of real things, to which belong sensations, is opposed to the nature of the simple idea " {New Essay, vol. ii. § 427). Ideality a mode of being in- capable of being con- founded with reality. Let us now inquire into the relation between ideal beings and real beings. Suppose I am in possession of ideal being ; I know the essence of being, nothing more. I do not know whether the beinof whose essence I know be realized. This is equivalent to saying that I have not yet any feeling, or, at least, that I do not reflect upon my feehng ; for if I made the reflection that I had a feeling, I should at once know a reality. But remove from my mind all knowledge of real being, and suppose that I know merely what being is, without knowing that it is realized, is the object of my mind nothing ? Certainly not. In that case my mind would know nothing, whereas, as a matter of fact, it knows the essence of being. If then the object of my mind is not * Porphyry says, " Tct Koff eavra affu/xara, aiiTh t KpelTTOv iravrSs iffri adfiaros Kal rdirov, iravTaxv fCTTiv ov SiaaraTus dAA.' afj.epo!)s " {Sfuic'nt, ii.). IDEAL AND REAL BELNG. in nothing, may it not be that I myself am the object of it ? This also is impossible, for I am a real being, and my mind, in the case supposed, has for its object only ideal being, without any realization. Besides this, I am perfectly aware that I am not the essence of being in general, that the essence of being is the object which I intuite, whereas I am the intuiting subject, and between these two there is opposition : the one is not the other. Since then the ideal being intuited by the mind is neither nothing nor real being, we must admit that there is another mode of being besides the real, and hence that there are necessarily two modes of being, the ideal and the real. More- over, since both, being true modes of being, may be designated by the term existence, to avoid confusion we will agree to call the real mode of being subsistence. 40. It is plain that ideal being stands related to Differ- real being, as design, model, example, type, terms tween which, in the last analysis, imply simply means of [heThtivrs knowing, cognizability of ideal being. Now, ifmeanTo/ real beings are limited and contingent, it is plain ''^^'^* that their reality is distinct from the idea ; for the idea is immutable and unalterable, whereas real beings may either be or not be. 112 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Essence known through idea ; sub- sistence through affirmalion on occa- sion of feeling. 41. Hence the knowledge of the essence of things differs from the knowledge of their subsistence. The former comes through the idea; the latter through affirmation on occasion of a feeling (or of some sign that takes the place of a feeling). But the knowledge of the subsistence of any particular being presupposes a knowledge of the essence of being, at least in general (§14). If a feeling should occur in a being who did not know what being was, this feeling would remain blind and unintelligible, because devoid of the essence which could render it intelligible. The being having it would not affirm a real being, because he would not be able to refer the feeling to the essence, or to say to himself what the feeling was. This is the condition of the lower animals, which, though they have feelings, are without the intuition of being. For this reason they are utterly incapable of interpreting to them- selves their own feelings, or of completing them by saying to themselves that there are real beings. We, on the contrary, having a knowledge of being, as soon as we have a feeling, declare that there is a real being. The relation of the ideal to the real may be considered either from an ontological or from a psychological point of view. The former is treated farther on (see §§ 166, sqq.). The latter is the one under consideration in the above three sections, from which it appears that ideal being is different from real being, and serves to make it known. IDEAL AND REAL. 113 Analysis of human cognition, according to Rosmini, shows us, ''first, that every contingent thing has two modes of being — one in the mind and one outside of it ; second, that the mode of being which is in the mind is potential (Swa/xn), that the mode which is outside the mind is the act (evipyaia) of the same identical essence that is seen by the mind ; t/iird, that, hence, there is in the mind a perfect sitJiilitude of the thing which is outside of the mind — a similitude such that, though it is not identical with the thing in respect to its act of reality, it does not numerically differ from the thing to which that act belongs, but is its beginning, and constitutes its species and intelligibility ; fourth, that if we consider things (limited and contingent) as separate from mind, they are not only unknown, but even per se unknowable, and their relation to the mind is not in them, but in the mind, as a similitude, which is nothing more or less than their ideal being, a determina- tion of universal being, the fountain of all ideas and of all cognizability, as being that which alone is cognizable in itself; fifth, that limited and contingent things, being only so many acts and terms of the common being intuited by the mind, may be considered separately from that being, in which case they are said to subsist outside of the mind, and are called real things ; sixth, and finally, that even if the reality and ideality of things were identical, which is not the case (the thing alone being identical, not the mode of being), still the thing would never confound itself with the act of the mind nor with the subject that possesses it, because the idea itself is essentially object, distinct from the thinking subject, and opposed to it. Real things, therefore, cannot in any way, without violence done to language, be confounded with ideas; still less can they be confounded with the mind that perceives them, because the separation and real distinction of these three entities is contained in their definition " {Neiv Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1 192, 1 193). "In the idea is seen the essence, not of the ideal, but of being, and being is identical under the ideal and under the real form. Now, the idea is nothing else than being intuited by the mind, in its own proper I 114 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEJL essence, which is eternal. But this essence at one time contains the realization of being, and then it is infinite being — God, who is not seen [cf. under § 21] ; at another, it does not contain this realization, and then it is ideal being, to which is referred the realization which we learn in feeling. For this reason, the known real thing is merely ideal being realised, so that the object of knowledge results from two elements . . . first, the ideal ; second, the real ; — ■ the latter being, as it were, the complement of the former. The ideal, therefore, is representative, not, indeed, as one real thing is representative of another ; for example, a statue, of a man ; but as the essence of a thing represents the thing realized, which thing is not disjoined from its essence. If it were so disjoined, it would no longer be a complete being. Therefore the essence is the act by which the being is in the ideal world, the realization another act of the same being, whereby it is in the feeling (that is, either feels or is felt) which unites with it in the perceiving mind {spiritd) as its complement. And here it must be borne in mind that existence in the mind does not cancel existence in itself, but, on the contrary, constitutes it " {Psychology, vol. ii. § 1339). 42. How in But since feeling is a reality distinct from the perception i • i i • • i i we unite essence which renders it cognizable, we must now ideal being . . , , , , , with feel- inquire how we are able to put together these two ^"^' elements of the being perceived. In order to understand this, we must have recourse to the unity of man, or the simplicity of the hnnian spirit. The ego, that principle which knows what being ^ is, is the same as that which feels in itself the action of it (feeling is only an action of being). So long as this action or feeling is kept apart from the knowledge of being, so long it remains THEORY OF COGNITION. 115 unknown. But this principle, being entirely simple, though at once intelligent and sentient, is obliged, by reason of this very simplicity, to bring together its feelings and the knowledge of being, and in this way it sees being operating, that is, producing feeling, in itself. It is the same being that, on the one hand, manifests itself to us as knozuable, and on the other, as active, producing feeling. And here let it be observed that all the activity of being is reducible to its entity. It exists in this entity as in its spring. It is active being itself, and, as all being is cognizable, so all its activity is cognizable in it. Therefore, feeling, which is this activity, is cognizable in being. Before being acts, this activity is only potentially cognizable because it exists only potentially. Before being acts in a determinate mode (producing feeling), this mode is potential and not determined as one mode rather than another ; hence its activity, when known only potentially, is indeterminate. For this reason, ideal being is called indeterminate being. This section contains the gist of Rosmini's theory of cognition {Erkenntnisstheorie), or, as he calls it, intellective perception. The passages which might be cited in ex- planation of it from his various works, Neiv Essay, Psycho- logy, Logic, ThcosopJiy, etc., are almost innumerable.' The following must here suffice. In regard to the unity of the intelligent and sentient subject, he says, " There remains the last difficulty. . . . How can the sentient principle and the intelligent principle be a single principle in man .'* In order to answer this question, let us revert to our doctrine of substance [see §§ 93-97]. We said that substance is n6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. \\\2X. first operative prmciple of a being, the principle whence flow its actions and passions [7ra0i?], and hence its diverse states ; that these actions, passions, and diverse states are virtually contained in that principle, that is to say, in that virtue, activity, or potency of it which is the efficient cause of the being. We said, moreover, that these actions, passions, and states may be conceived as forming different groups, although it may not be demonstrable a priori that every such group is possible, that is, reducible to a first act, a first virtue, a first substantial principle. In order to determine a priori which of these groups could be virtually comprised in a first substantial principle, would require nothing short of a complete knowledge of the intrinsic order of being. The intrinsic order of being, however, is not known immediately by man, but has to be gleaned from observation and experience. Hence, when observation and experience reveal to man the existence of a group of activities united in a single substantial principle, he is justified in concluding that such substantial principle may exist, because ah esse ad posse datiir consecutio. "Now, internal observation is what attests to man that he is a single principle, sentient and intelligent at the same time ; for every man can say to himself, ' This I, who feel, am the same I who understand, and if I were not the same, I should not know that I felt, or be able to reason concerning my sensations.' On the other hand, it involves no contradiction to suppose that the sensitive activity should have the same principle as the intellective activity, when we consider that many actions may start from one principle, . . . just as many lines may start from one point. " But it must be admitted, nevertheless, that, after all these concessions, there remains a very serious objection to be overcome. We have said that, in order to constitute a sentient principle, we must conceive a primitive term of sense \aiaQTf\T6v\ virtually comprehending all the special actions of feeling that such principle can ever perform ; and in man this primitive and fundamental sensiim is his own body, sensible in space. We have said, moreover, that, FELT AND UNDERSTOOD ENTITY. 117 in order to constitute an intelligent principle, there is necessary a first object of intelligence [voJirov], virtually- comprehending all that is ever to be understood, and in man this object of intelligence is universal being. Now, if the sentient principle is constituted by the corporeal felt term, and the intelligent principle by intelligible being, we shall be obliged to say that the corporeal extended and intelligible being are identical, or else that they constitute two different principles and not one. " In order to reply to this most grave objection, we must observe that in every felt (term of feeling) there is an entity, because every act, of whatever nature, is an entity. But in felt entity there is altogether wanting the intelligible light, in other words, cognizability, as is seen from the fact that the expression /^/^ entity is not understood entity. To say felt instead of understood, in this case, is to exclude cognizability from feeling. On the other hand, intelligence has for its object understood entity, since the intelligent principle does nothing but understand, and everything that it understands is, of necessity, entity. Hence the term of the sentient principle and that of the intelligent principle are both entity. There is, therefore, identity in their terms. "But in what, then, are they distinguished.-' They are distinguished by the difference of the manner in which the same entity adheres to the same principle. The truth is, this entity communicates itself to the sentient principle in its felt mode, which I call also reality and activity, whereas it communicates itself to the intelligent principle in its understood mode, which I call also ideality, intelligibility, cognizability, light, etc. " With these explanations, we see clearly how the sen- tient principle and the intelligent principle may compene- trate each other so as to form one and the same principle of operation, inasmuch as both the principles have the same term, although to one of these it adheres in one mode and communicates itself in one form, while to the other it adheres in another mode and communicates itself in another form. There are two principles, therefore, if we consider thtform in which the entity communicates itself; ii8 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. there is only one, if we consider the entity itself which is communicated, apart from its forms. We may say that the principles are two, provided we recognize that in man they are not first principles ; but there is above them a first single principle to which they are subordinated and united, which first principle has reference to entity itself, and not to the forms of entity ; and this is the principle which synthesizes, both in the theoretic order, where it manifests itself as reason, and in the practical order, where it appears as will. Hence this intellective principle, in so far as it is superior, is the point from which the two activities, that is, the sensitive and the intellective, start, and is called the rational principle. From what has been said, it appears that the human soul is a single substantial subject. It is a subject, because it is a first principle of action, endowed with feeling, and it is a substance, because this principle is conceived by the mind as existing in itself, and not in another anterior to it in the order of feeling and understanding" {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 174-181). From what was said above, under §§ 30,31, it might be inferred that there was no other link between ideal and real being than that formed by the unity of the sentient and intelligent subject that cognizes the one by means of the other. This, however, is very far from being Ros- mini's doctrine. " We find," he says, " that although the ideal and real are so very different, nevertheless they have an identical element, viz. being. The same, identical being occurs in both, only under different conditions and different forms. One form under which being presents itself is ideality, or cognizability, or objectivity — terms which mean substan- tially the same thing ; another form in which it appears is reality, sensibility, activity — which are likewise terms sub- stantially meaning the same thing. Thus, while there is a very great difference in the form, there is perfect identity in the content, which is being itself. This, in so far as it is purely cognizable, is ideal ; in so far as it is sensible, it is real. The sensible rendered cognizable, that is, the union of the two, is what produces intellective perception and ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE. 119 the cognition of the real" {On the Purposes of the Author, § 60, sub fin?). It must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to seize exactly Rosmini's theory of cognition, and of the relation of the individual human subject to the universe of things. From one point of view, it seems as if each man gave being to things, that is, created them ; from another, it seems as if the universe existed independently of all human thought. How these two doctrines can be simul- taneously true, seems a puzzle. In order to solve it, we must distinguish absolute from relative existence, ro ottXwc Civai from TO irpoQ n slvai. The world exists absolutely as subject and object, that is, as real and ideal, independently of any finite intelligence ; but it does not exist for any man until he makes it exist for himself by his own act. Human intelligence is a rendering relative of what was before absolute, and, in this sense, all human knowledge may be said to be relative. It is relative only to the subject. It does not in the least follow from this that it thereby ceases to be'absolute. A man does not cease to be a man because he enters into the relation of husband or father. Indeed, knowledge could not be relative unless it were likewise absolute. The important point is that man, in knowing, does not in any way alter the objects of knowledge. Hence his knowledge, though relative with respect to the subject, is absolute with respect to the object (cf. under §43). 43- The following objection might here be ad- Objection vanced : — " When we affirm a beino^, we make a iiuciiec- judgment. Now, in order to make a judgment, ception a we must know the two terms of the judgment — J'^'S"^^"- the subject and the predicate. But in the case we are supposing, one of the terms, feeling or reality, is not known. Therefore the supposed judgment is impossible." The only effect of this PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Answer : The ob- jection does not touch the fact, but only the propriety of the term. objection, when well considered, would be to make us deny the name of judgment to that act whereby we affirm, and, by affirming, know real beings. Now, even if we were to refuse the name of judgment to this affirmation, this would not in any way interfere with the correct- ness of our theory, which rests on observation. Even if we admit that the objection is well taken, it remains always a fact that to know that a being subsists is to make an internal affirmation that that being subsists, and, therefore, in either case our analysis of this affirmation and the consequences derived from it remain unimpeached. Still, in order entirely to satisfy our objectors, let us consider the new question. May the internal affirmation whereby we know that a being subsists be called a judgment ? It is here that Rosmini most clearly parts company with Kant. This philosopher, as every one knows, derives his categories from the various forms of judgment as recognized in the formal logic of the Aristotelians. In every one of these, the terms of the judgment, viz., subject and predicate, are recognized as already formed, and the only question is in regard to their relations. As these relations are numerous, Kant drew from them a long list of categories, which he set down as primitive forms of the understanding. Rosmini, setting aside all Kant's judg- ments, as secondary and dependent upon a primitive one, went behind them to that one, and, analyzing it, found that the understanding had but one primitive form, which was objective, whereas all the others were secondary and subjective (cf under § 35). Accordingly, he does not ask, "How is the judgment, 7 -J- 5 = 12, possible?" but "How do we ever manage to think 7 or 5 V (see above, under § 14). ORDER OF COGNITION. 121 He shows that all Kant's synthetical judgments a priori are really analytic, and that the only truly synthetic judg- ment a priori is that wherein we predicate being of sensa- tion, or, in other words, form to ourselves the concept of a reality. In order to fqrra this judgment, the only a priori element requisite is the simple notion of being or existence, the essence of objectivity. Rosmini, accordingly, con- cludes that, since no reality can be known until being is predicated of it, being must be manifested to the mind without the necessity of a judgment, and prior to all reality ; in other words, prior to all sense-experience. The usually recognized order of cognition, as we find it in all the old logics, as well as most of the more recent ones, is this (cf. New Essay, vol. i. § 227, n.) — (i) Simplex Appre- (2) Judicium, (3) Discursus ; hensio, \{\) Concept {Be- (2) Judgment (3) Inference griff), {Urtheil), {Schluss); ,(i) Term, (2) Proposition, (3) Syllogism. These three classifications, of which the first is that of Aldrich, the second that of Kant, and the third that of Jevons, are virtually the same. Rosmini, holding that all concepts are results of primitive judgments in which terms of being are simply apprehended, would substitute for this classification the following: — (i) Intuition of being; (2) Judgment, involving perception of the real and con- ception ; (3) Inference.* According to this theory, judg- ment, perception, and conception are only three aspects of the same act. In his very friendly criticism of Reid, speaking of the view which holds that " simple apprehen- sion, or the pure idea of the thing, precedes the judgment respecting its real existence," he says, " On the one hand, it seems as if this proposition must be true ; for how can I judge that a being, of which I have not the idea, exists .-* The idea of being, or simple apprehension, would seem, therefore, when we look at the matter from this side, necessarily to precede the operation of the judgment which * Cf. under § 14. 122 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. we make regarding its real existence. But, on the other hand, experience is entirely at variance with such a view, and assures us that we first form the concrete idea of the being really existing, and afterwards draw from it the abstract idea, which is separate from the persuasion of its real existence, and is what is called simple apprehension of the being. And, in fact, do we think a possible horse, without having first perceived some horse with our senses .'' " This knot of the question was not clearly seen either by Reid or by his adversaries, and for this reason each party was able to confute the other, without being able to maintain its own position. Reid confounded two ques- tions in one ; for it is one thing to ask, Can the mind form a judgment of the existence of external things with- out possessing beforehand some universal idea .'' another to inquire, Does the judgment, affirming the existence of external things, require to be preceded by simple appre- hension, or by the ideas of the things themselves .-' The adversaries of Reid answered this second question in the affirmative, and, in doing so, they were wrong. Now Reid, in opposing them, was not content with showing that the judgment afifirming the existence of external things does not require to be preceded by the simple apprehension of the things themselves, which would have been sufficient to overthrow their system ; . . . but he undertook to prove that, prior to all ideas, we form a primitive judgment, which is inexplicable and mysterious. This reply . . . led from the second of the questions above proposed to the first, and decided that the judgment affirming the exist- ence of external things can be made, not only without the ideas of the things themselves, but also without the pre-existence of any universal idea in our minds. Now, it was this gratuitous extension of the original question that hurt Reid. ... In fact, it is sufficiently evident that no judgment can be formed by one who possesses no universal idea, and therefore the proposition which Reid undertook to defend . . . was exaggerated and unten- able. ... It was not easy to find a satisfactory reply to the terrible objection, How can I judge that that of CRITICISM OF RE ID. 123 which I have no idea really exists ? In order to answer this objection, there was no other way but this : to ex- cogitate a system in which the object judged possible should be the effect of the judgment itself, that is, in which the object should exist only in virtue of the judgment made with reference to it. All the difficulty, therefore* consisted in finding a judgment which should give existence to its own object, or to the idea of the thing concerning which the judgment was made, or, which is the same thing, should produce in us the specific ideas of things. . . . " Now, passing in review all the kinds of judgment which we make with reference to things, we see clearly that, so long as the judgment relates to some quality of the thing, the thing must necessarily exist in our mind previous to the judgment and to the quality which, in that judgment, we attribute to it. When, on the contrary, the judgment relates to the existence of the thing itself, then the thing judged of does not exist in our thought previous to the act of judgment, but in virtue of it, since so long as we do not think the thing as existing — that is, as having an existence either possible or real — it is nothing ; it is not an object of our thought or an idea. The judg- ment, therefore, regarding the existence of things differs from all other judgments in this, that it produces its own objects, and thereby shows that it possesses an energy of its own — a creative energy, so to speak, which deserves the most profound meditation on the part of the philosopher.* This object, which did not exist before the judgment made regarding it, comes into existence in virtue of it, and there- fore, at most, contemporaneously with it. Such judgment, therefore, is a peculiar faculty of our understanding, which thinks a thing as actually existing. . . . " Three questions might be asked with regard to this faculty : (i) How does it begin to think a thing as actually existing.' (2) Where docs it obtain the universal idea of * Rosmini quotes the following passage to show that St. Thomas held a view similar to this : — " Prima ejus [intellectus] actio per speciem est formatio sui objecti, quo f(jrmato, intelligit : simul tamcn tempore ipse formal et formatum est, et rimul intelligit " (De Natiira Verbi Intellectus). 124 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. existence necessary for such thinking ? and (3) How does it restrict the idea of existence, which is universal, to a determinate thing, and so think this determinate object, rather than that, as existing ? To the first and third of these questions it is easy to reply with the help of experi- ence. We are excited to think an existing object by sensa- tions, and it is likewise these sensations that determine this object existing in our thought. . . . The difficulty, therefore, all consists in knowing whence we derive the idea of exist- ence, which is necessary to the first of all our judgments, to that judgment whereby we know that something external exists. This is the great problem of Ideology" {New Essay, vol. i. §§ 1 21-126). It is plain from this passage wherein the great difi"erence between Kantianism and Rosminianism lies. Both Kant and Rosmini proposed to themselves the same question, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible .'' And both answered virtually in the same way : Through the existence in the mind of a form or forms prior to all judgments. Here the parallelism ceases. Kant mistook for synthetic judgments a priori, judgments which are at once analytic and, as far as their terms are concerned, a posteriori. He thus arrived at a series of categories, which had three car- dinal defects: (i) it had no unity or necessary completeness ; (2) it was entirely subjective, and hence could not account for objectivity or for the existence of concepts ; and (3) it gave merely the terms of the judgment, but could not account for the copula. Rosmini, on the contrary, having discovered the only judgment which is really synthetic a priori, arrived, by analyzing it, at a single form, which is at once one and primitive, objective, and, with the aid of sensation, capable of accounting for all parts of the judg- ment (cf. under § 35). 44. Is this affirmation \^\'=> plain that, SO long as the two elements of min^f the affirmation in question — that is, the essence of MENTAL SYNTHESIS SPONTANEOUS. 125 being and the felt activity — are considered sepa- rately, they do not present the elements necessary for the formation of a judgment : hence the objec- tion. But if the objection were valid in this instance, would it not be valid against every judgment equally? In fact, there is not andNojudg- cannot be any judgment whatsoever so long as whatever , r 1 • 1 • T-i ^s possible the terms 01 the judgment remam separate. i he without , .-,,,, the union judgment is lormed only when they are put of its together. It is sufficient, therefore, that the two terms be such as will form a judgment when they are united ; and it is of no consequence what they are before union. We must, therefore, examine whether, in the present instance, the terms which before union were incapable of forming a judg- ment become by union thus capable. This is not inconceivable. And it is precisely what hap- pens. But before proving this, let us attend to some other considerations. An attentive consideration of the sources of knowledge shows us that not only are its elements given to us, but that they are also combined by nature and independently of our wills or action. Indeed, it is nature that forms all those combinations whose analyses by reflection we call judgments. I cannot say, " This horse is black," until after I have seen, perceived, the horse as black. In the percep- tion the combination of black with horse was already made, and the judgment merely analyzes it. In this sense, all judgments, without exception, are analytic. 126 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. In intel- lective percep- tion, it is not intelli- gence, but nature, that unites the terms of the judgment. This judg- ment pro- duces its 45- Why do we say that subject and predicate cannot be united in a judgment unless both are previously known ? Because it is supposed that the principle which brings them into union is the intelligence or the intelligent will, as in the majority of judg- ments ; and it is obvious that the intelligence does not unite two terms without previously knowing them. But migrht it not be that what unites the terms is not the intelligence at all, but nature itself? This is precisely what happens in the case in question ; for the essence of being and the felt activity are brought into union, not by our intel- ligence, but by our nature, as we have said. This union has its origin in the unity of the subject, and in the identity which exists between being as known and being 2Js,felt (active). Now, inasmuch as nature unites these two elements, it remains to be seen whether, by uniting them, it has not ren- dered them capable of becoming the terms of a judgment. In order to make this clear to our- selves, let us take the formula of such a judgment, and, analyzing it into its terms, consider whether these possess the requisite conditions. The for- mula we may express thus : Being (whereof I have knowledge) is realized in this feeling (felt activity). When I make this affirmation within myself, I know real being ; I know what feeling, the felt activity, is ; I know what a being is. The element, therefore, which was unknown to me KANTS ERROR. 127 before I made the affirmation, is known to me as own sub- ject. soon as the affirmation is made. Therefore, although feeling, before being united with ideal being, was unknown to me, and, therefore, not yet capable of becoming one of the terms of a judg- ment ; yet as soon as nature joined it to ideal being by a spontaneous act of affirmation, it is already known, and therefore capable of being one of the terms of a judgment. If we agree to give the name of subject to feeling or reality, it will be easy at once to comprehend the meaning of the statement which we have several times made, to the effect that this primitive affirmation, this primitive judgment, produces its own subject. Kant and his followers committed two great and funda- mental errors : first, in supposing that, before a judgment could be formed, both its terms had to be known ; and, second, in not seeing that the primitive and constitutive form of the understanding must be that which is common to ail judgments. The first led them to overlook the spontaneous judgment of simple apprehension; the second, to destroy the unity of consciousness and abolish true objectivity. Both these errors are corrected in the system of Rosmini, who does full justice to the primitive judg- ment. " The judgment," he says, " respecting the existence of this or that sensibly determined thing, of this body which now falls under my senses, may easily be explained and analyzed in the following manner : — We have a mind {spiritd) at once sensitive and intellective [cf. under §§ 42, 122]. . . . Sense is the power of perceiving sensibles ; the understanding is the faculty of perceiving things as exist- ing in themselves. Now, that which falls under our sense becomes the object of our understanding, because WE who feel are the same who possess understanding. When, there- fore, we have perceived sensible qualities, what operation 128 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. will our minds perform upon them ? The understanding consists, as we have said, in the power to see things as existing in themselves [see under § 32]. Therefore, our understanding will perceive the sensibles as existing in themselves, and not in the intimate relation which, as sen- sations, they have with us. Now, to perceive sensibles as existing in themselves, independently of us, is the same thing as to judge them existing in themselves. This, again, is the same thing as judging that there exists outside of us a being in which the sensible qualities are. . . . Let us, then, fix the difference between the two kinds of judgment which we form. Sometimes in our judgments wedo nothing more than think a quality as existing in a being already conceived by us, as when I say, ' This man is blind,' in which case I think blindness as existing in the man of whom I have an idea, and who is the subject of my judgment. At other times, on the contrary, with our judgment, we think a being as adhering to certain sensibles, as when we say, ' There exists a being determined by those sensible qualities which I now perceive with my senses.' In the first kind, the object of the judgment exists before the judgment itself; in the second, the object does not exist before the judg- ment, but only the elements of it ; that is, (i) sensations not yet become cognitions ; (2) the idea of existence which lights up these sensations by adding being to them, and makes them known in and through being. To conclude : Judgment is not always an operation performed on an object already thought, but sometimes an operation per- formed on sensibles which, in the judgment itself, become objects of our thought " {Neiv Essay, vol. i. § 128). 46. The term Plainly, then, the affirmation of a real being ck)iTot is entitled to the name of judgment only after thrnatoe it is formed, not before. Now, reflection dis- ofaffirma- . . , . • i . i_ • ^ j tion, but a tmguishes m every judgment a subject and a subsequent pj-g^jjcatc ; but, in so doing, it analyzes a judg- PERCEPTION SPONTANEOUS. 129 mcnt already formed. That which is not yet reflective r 1 1 1 1 T • 1 • 1 • analysis formed cannot be analyzed. It is this analysis of it. that supplies the definition of judgment, which runs : A judgment is the logical luiion of a pre- dicate with a subject. This definition is analytical and the product of reflection. The term J2idg- ment, therefore, as applied to an afThrmation, does not designate the affirmation itself, as it is in its origin, but a subsequent reflection, which, by dealing with affirmations according to its own laws of action, changes or analyzes them into judgments. This is an extremely important point, and one that is often lost sight of in philosophical and logical discussions. Many people talk as if a judgment were the putting to- gether of two concepts, and then declaring whether they were identical or different. For example, the logic from which I have already quoted lays down that " Judiciiun est quo mens non solum PERCIPIT DUO OBJECTA, sed, quasi pro tribunali sedens, expresse apud se pronuntiat, ilia inter se convenire aut dissedere." The truth is that the judgment is neither the one nor the other of these processes. Perception of two objects is not necessary to a judgment, nor is the afifirmation of agreement or dis- agreement any part of one. When I say, " A is B," this means, not that I have perceived A and B as two objects, but that I have perceived them as one. If I had not, I should never think of making the judgment. When I say " Fire is not water," this means that I have tried to think them as one, and failed. 47- This statement may be rendered clearer if we Reflection, consider that, when reflection analyzes an afhrma- ingajudg- K I30 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. ment, dis- tinguishes, but does not sepa- rate, its elements. Subject and pre- dicate do not exist prior to the judg- ment, but are formed in the act of judg- ment. tlon into subject and predicate, it does not in reality separate or disunite the two terms. In- deed, if it could do so, both would at once be destroyed. They would at once cease to be sub- ject and predicate, and hence w^ould cease to be elements of a judgment. The judgment would therefore be destroyed. Reflection, indeed, merely distingnishes the two terms notionally, and does not really break up the judgment of which they are the interdependent elements, and through which alone they are subject and predicate. Let us illustrate this by an example. Let us take the judgment : This being which I see is a man. Of what does this judgment inform me '^ That this being which I see is a man. Before I pronounced this judgment, I did not know that this being which I see was a man ; for knowing this and saying it to myself are precisely one and the same thing. Now, let us by reflection analyze this judgment. This being is the subject, and a man is the predicate. It is clear that if I should regard these two terms separately, without paying attention to their relation, I should not know the one as subject and the other as predicate. They would not be terms of a judgment at all. How, then, do they become subject and predicate .-* By means of the judgment itself. Subject and pre- dicate, therefore, do not exist prior to the judg- ment of which they are elements. They are formed in the judgment, and, after they are formed, reflection finds them there. Let us now apply this reasoning to our afiirmation : Being is DIRECT AND INDIRECT COGNITION. 131 realized in this feeling, or, The activity of this feeling is a being. Analyzing it, I say that the feeling is the subject and being the predicate, and, in so doing, I simply express what I find in the judgment itself. But, of course, if I take the feeling out of the judgment, and thus destroy the judgment, the feeling ceases to be subject, being altogether unknown to me. The objection advanced, therefore, though plausible, is without foundation, being based upon a false premise, viz., that the subject must exist as subject before the formation of the judgment, whereas the truth is, that it is in all cases the judgment itself that produces it. It follows from this that judgment, in its proper and ordinary sense, belongs to Logic, which Rosmini calls " the art of reflection " {Logic, § 69), and not to Ideology. That which enables us to make judgments, namely, the primitive, spontaneous synthesis of being and sensation — in other words, direct cognition — belongs to Ideology, whereas the analysis of that synthesis by reflection — in other words, reflexive cognition — belongs to Logic. " The under- standing," says Rosmini, " forms perceptions and such ideas as are consequent on these, in an instinctive and natural manner, and, for that reason, is not liable to error ; for nature does not err.* But we must now distinguish these involuntary first cognitions from those which come after- wards and are voluntary. The first form direct, the second reflexive, cognition. . . . Direct cognition is purely synthetic, whereas reflexive cognition is also analytic. In reflection we turn back upon what we before perceived directly, analyzing it, decomposing it, considering it in parts, and, after having decomposed it, again rccomposing it according * Cf. Aristotle, Phys., viii. l ; 252 a, 12 sq. : "'AAAo fxiiv ouStV 7^ &raKroy Twv (pvan Kal Ka-^a tpvcriv r) yap 'miiive 134 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. jiKigment before which there can be no other. In this illustrated. case, therefore, before the formation of the judg- ment, the subject is unknown, not only in its relation to the predicate, but in every respect. Indeed, if it were known in any way, it would no longer be true that the knowledge of real beings which we acquire through affirmation was the first real knowledge, since we should previously have some knowledge of what afterwards becomes the subject. If, then, every judgment produces in us knowledge which we did not previously pos- sess, and if one piece of knowledge is based upon another, in such a way that, if we descend the scale, we must come to a first knowledge, which can be no other than the affirmation of existence, it follows of necessity — (i) That the subject of every judgment is unknown as subject, that is, in its relation to the predicate, previous to the formation of the judg- ment. (2) That, although, before the formation of the judgment, the subject may be unknown as such, yet something else may be known about it. (3) That this something which is known about it must have been known through a previous judgment. (4) That, going back in this way to the first judgment of all, we shall have to admit a subject which, previous to that judgment, was not known at all, for the simple reason that there was no previous judgment through which a knowledge of it could have been obtained. SUBJECT AXD CONCEPT OF SUBJECT. 135 {5) That the first of all judgments is that by which we know that something real exists, since whatever we know of any real being presupposes that we know it to exist. (6) That, therefore, the first affirmation must form a subject, which, by a law common to all judgments, was previously unknown. " The act of understanding or conceiving intellectually a corporeal being consists in seeing the relation between the particular agent perceived by the senses and the uni- versal idea of existence. It does not consist in our placing in, or uniting to, the being in question our own idea (in this case, existence), but in simply conceiving, through the uni<"y of our inmost sense, the relation which it has with our idea of existence. Perceiving a relation is not confounding or mixing the two terms of the relation together into one thing. This kind of union would be material. ... In this sen.^e I call the primitive judgment of our spirits, that which gives birth to intellective perception, synthetic and a priori, because in it there is formed a spiritual union between a thing given by the senses, which becomes sub- ject, and one which does not enter into the subject and is not given by the senses, but is formed only in the intellect and is the predicate. Be it observed, I say that this pre- dicate does not exist in the subject supplied by the senses \ro ai(yQ\]TQv\ and I do not say, as Kant does, that it does not exist in the concept of the subject. Indeed, the predicate certainly exists in the concept of the subject ; for what is the concept of the subject, when it is formed, but the sensible subject with the intelligible predicate already applied to it .-• To say, therefore, that the predicate does not exist in the concept of the subject, is something entirely different from saying that the predicate docs not exist in the subject. The former is Kant's expression, and is erroneous and equivocal : it is the latter alone that I admit and recognize as accurate. In one word, the sub- jects of our judgments arc either supplied solely by the 136 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. senses, or are already conceived by the intellect. In the latter case we have already the concept of the subject of our judgment. In the former case we have, in a certain mode, the subject itself of the judgment, that is, we have poten- tially that which will become the subject when the judg- ment is formed ; but we have not the concept of it. Only when we unite the predicate to the subject, and so form the judgment, do we obtain, by means of the judgment itself, the concept of this subject. And these are the primitive judgments^ which constitute our perceptions of real beings, from which again we derive concepts, or determinate ideas. . . . The judgments, therefore, whereby we form the con- cepts or ideas of things are primitive, that is, they are the first that we form respecting these things ; they are syn- thetic, because we add to the subject something which is not in it, or, more correctly, we consider the subject in relation to something outside of it, that is, to an idea of our intellect ; and they may also fairly be called a priori, inasmuch as, though the matter of them has to be supplied by the senses, we find the form of them only in our intellect ; and in these synthetic judgments a priori consists the problem of Ideology, the first in philosophy " {N'ew Essaj, vol. i. §§ 359, 360). 49. Theprmii- In view of this peculiarity of the afifirmation tive judg- •' ment may of real being's, we have g-iven to this iudement also be .... J t> called the the name of primitive synthesis, and to that faculty primitive ... synthesis. of the huHian Spirit v^hich forms it, the name of reason, which is that one power of the mind which brings into union being and feeling, and afterwards exercises reflection upon the result. " The primitive synthesis, which already contains imi- vcrsaliaation, although still bound up with a foreign clement, is not deliberate ; it is performed, or at least INTELLECT AXD REASON. 137 aided, by nature, which has put together in man a vigilant understanding, an open eye, as it were, to see all that takes place before it, an eye which sees being essentially. Hence it is not very difficult to understand that, given sensations, the process of primitive synthesis is performed by the mind spontaneously. . . . On the contrary, since abstraction belongs to reflection, which is a voluntary faculty, and one not self-moved, it is always man himself who, by his will, causes this movement " {Nezv Essay, vol. ii. § 513). " The intellective faculties are reducible to two principal ones, the intellect and the reason. The acts of the intellect be- long purely to nature. Those presided over by art must be counted among the acts of the reason. . . . The general faculty of applying being is called reason. . , . We must distinguish two principal functions of reason. Reason, in so far as it applies to feeling the idea of being, exercises the function which is called perception. Reason, in so far as it applies the idea of being to objects already thought, exercises the function called reflection'' {Logic, §§ 64, Gy, 69). 50. We have said that, in the primitive synthesis, Converti- the feeling may be considered as the subject, andtheu;mas being as the predicate. Nevertheless, we might, piimUive with equal propriety, call the essence of being the ■*"' ^"^^'^ * subject, and its realization the predicate. The reason of this convertibility of subject and pre- dicate in the primitive synthesis is, that it is an identical judgment (§§ 23-28), expressing an equa- tion between feeling and the essence of being through the idea (the cognizability of the latter). This statement must be accepted with considerable caution. It is by no means indifferent whether I sa}', Freezing is or Being freezes. The former expression, if un- 138 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. usual, is, at least, sense, while the latter is nonsense, as well as at variance with Rosmini's central doctrine. What he means is, that, in perception, being adheres or is present to sensation, as much as sensation to being. This shows how much superior the ancient mode of expressing judgments was to the modern ; for I can say with equal propriety and truth, " TfP) TTi'iyvvaOai vircip^ei to mmi" or " Tw dvai vTra(>\H TO TD'iyvvaOai." With our modern way of expressing judg- ments, w^e arc continually exposed to the risk of being led to imagine that one reality can be predicated of another, as has been the case with all thinkers who have quantified the predicate. Although the predicate of every logical pro- position is an idea, while the subject may or may not be so, still, subject and predicate may exchange places, so long as we express their relation by a word expressive of relation {vTrdp\ti), and not by a word expressive of independent existence, is (tor/). 5T. Solution of W^ have thus, then, explained the meaning of biom'of reason, light of reason, form wJiich renders the orideas'" mind intelligejit, faculty of knowing. We have also solved the question concerning the origin of ideas. There Is one primitive Idea, that of being. By means of It the primitive judgments are formed, and real beings, as felt, are affirmed and thus known. The relations between the Idea of belnof and real beings are the concepts or specific ideas of particular beings. These Ideas form the matter of analysis, reflection, abstraction, etc. — processes which produce the various abstract entities of reason. The phrases, ligJit of reason, light of the intellect, intel- lectual light, which play so important a part in the language LIGHT OF REASON. 139 of the Schoolmen and others, may all be traced back to a metaphorical expression used by Aristotle in the fifth chapter of the third book of his De Anima. It is used to give a notion of the nature of the formative or creative moment in the separate or self-subsistent intelligence. This history of this metaphor, which gave occasion to the formative intellect {yovq TroirjTiKog) of the later Aristo- telians, and the active intellect {intdlectiis agens) of the Arabs and Schoolmen, is one of the most interesting and curious in the whole development of philosophic ter- minology. As to the meaning of active intellect in the language of St. Bonaventura and St. Thomas, see Cardinal Zigliara's large work, Delia Luce Intellettuale e deW Onto- logismo (Rome, 1874) ; the excellent little treatise of Sebas- tian Casara, La Ljice dell' OccJiio Corporeo e quel la delT Litelletto (Farahlago, 1879) ; and the recent work, // Lwne deir Litelletto (Loescher, Turin, Rome, Florence, 1881). 52. Those who wish to pursue further the question cf. Nr.v concerning the deduction of special and general iS'-a" Ideas or concepts, and of all human knowledge, rkUosophy. may consult the author's New Essay on the Origin of Ideas and Restoration of P hilosophy in Italy. In these works will be found the development and application of the Ideological theory here set forth. See especially Neiv Essay, vol. ii. §§ 474-557, and Re- storation, pp. 593-636. Having thus shown that cognition presupposes three elements : (i) the universal idea of being, present to the intellect ; (2) sensation, and, (3) the synthesis of the one with the other by reason ; he now proceeds to consider the subsequent analysis, whereby we become con- scious of the elements of this synthesis through a further act of the reason, which we call judgment. The primitive synthesis, being made by nature, which does not err, is I40 nilLOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. always correct ; the subsequent analysis, on the contrary, being made by the thinking subject itself, is liable to be false as well as true. In order that it may always be true, certain rules and principles, forming together what may be called the art of reasoning, are necessary. The science of this art is Logic, which, therefore, forms the link between Ideology and Metaphysics, drawing its principle and cri- terion of truth from the former, and laying down the rules whereby truth may be reached in the latter. As Rosmini says, " Logic is the doctrine of the intellectual light con- sidered as the principle and guide of reason " {Logic, § 8 ; cf, below, under § 70). 2. Logic. 53. Logic. Logic is the science of the art of reasoning.* Rosmini elsewhere defines Logic as " the science of the art of reflecting," or " the science of the art of directing the reflection." " From this definition," he says, " we see why other sciences akin to logic have frequently been con- founded with it. Some persons, deceived by the etymology of the word, have believed that logic ought to treat of reason [X070C] under all its aspects. But the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the subjective sense — that is, as principle and power of reasoning — belongs to Psychology, which is the first part of Metaphysics. On the other hand, the doctrine concerning the nature of reason, in the objec- tive sense — that is, as the objects in which the acts of the faculty terminate — belongs to Ideology and to Theosophy, which is the second part of Mctapliysics. Logic, therefore, must be limited to the consideration of the exercise of reason, and especially to the art of that exercise, whereby reasonings are conducted in the best manner and to the best * Rosmini has left an admirable treatise on Logic, perhaps the very best that exists, in spite of certain conchisions \\hicli do not belong to the sphere of pure philosophy (see Bihliografhy). HEGEUS LOGIC. 141 rational end" {Logic, §§ 71, 72). Reflection, as distin- guished from perception, which is limited to the object perceived, is defined by Rosmini as a " turning back of the attention upon the things perceived." " Hence," he says, " it is not limited to the object of a single perception, but may diffuse itself over several perceptions at once, and form to itself an object out of several objects and their relations. . . . Reflection, therefore, may be called a general perception, that is, a perception of several perceptions " {Neiv Essay, vol. ii. § 487). Rosmini defends the old Aristotelian logic against the attack made upon it by Hegel, and utterly rejects what the latter chooses to call logic. " Of the rejection of the syl- logism," he says, " and the contempt poured upon the rigorous language of Aristotle, what was the necessary result ? The abolition of human reason, . . . and this was really accomplished in the philosophy of Germany from Kant to Hegel" {Logic, § 25). "Kant sets to work and commands the human spirit to produce the logical forms, but stops short before the material reality. Fichte shouts * Forward ! ' and commands it to produce matter likewise. Schelling next arrives, and, observing that the producer still remains distinct from the product, and therefore un- produced, seeks to push on the philosophical revolution still farther, by issuing a decree that the human spirit, by an intuition, shall identify its own productions with itself, and calling the result the System of Absolute Identity. In this way, the spirit, which, after having produced all things from itself, sees their identity with itself, has identified the subject with the object, and thus, according to Schelling, has found the Absolute. " But Hegel next ascends the throne, and finds this philosophy still too slow and old fashioned. According to him, the fecundity of the human spirit is not yet exhausted or carried to the last conceivable point. Schclling's in- tuition leaves subsisting a distinction between the subject and object of intuition, and therefore the subject is not yet completely identified with the object. Hegel, therefore, in his lofty fancy, imagines that the human spirit, the producer 142 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. of all things, by dint of putting forth, puts forth itself, finally exhausting- and annulling itself in its own product, like a sack, which, by being gradually folded down, finally becomes the sack turned inside out. And lo! ' the absolute idea ' is found. These philosophers, especially the last, did not fail to acquire a great deal of celebrity as great dialec- ticians. We question the permanency of this celebrity. . . . " These remarks suffice to show that the period of dia- lectic thought unfolds itself into three kinds of philosophy : first, the philosophies which openly profess scepticism ; second, the philosophies which, like that of Kant, declare that they profess neither dogmatism nor scepticism, pre- tending that there is a middle system ; and, tJiird, the philosophies which return to dogmatism, believing erro- neously that they have found absolute thought. Such are the philosophies of Kant's three successors, Fichte, Schel- ling, and Hegel. " These are their pretensions and magnificent promises. Nevertheless, the sceptic alone expresses himself with sincerity. In fact, all these three kinds of philosophy belong to dialectic thought and never get outside of it. They are three phases, three results, of critical philosophy. The first is characterized by despair of finding the truth. The second tries to remedy this unfortunate state of things through faith in practical reason floating in mid air, without any theoretic foundation. The third is distinguished by philosophic pride, which, feeling everything vanish from its grasp, invites humanity to a show, in which it promises to take all out of nothhig, before the eyes of its public, which it warns to be very attentive, just like those prestidigitators who, from under an empty dice-box, bring a large, various- coloured ball, four times as big as the box itself" {Logic §§ 40-43)- " But let us examine this transformation of logic The transformation in question involves, in the first place, the entire overthrow of ancient logic. Logic, according to Hegel, is the science of the idea in itself, of the pure idea.* Its object is ' the absolute form of truth, and the pure truth * "Die Logikisldie Wis^enschaft acr reinai Idee'" {Encyclop., pt. i. § 19). HEGEL'S LOGIC. 143 itself.' * To understand this new definition, we must bear in mind that Hegel's point of departure is ' thought as the object of thought.' f This object, which is thought itself, as object, moves, and, moving, performs three acts. With the first it produces the absolute idea as such, rising from the last abstraction to the concrete idea, as he calls it, which virtually contains all existences. Its second act is a con- tinuation of the first. It is the concrete idea developing itself, going out of itself, positing itself as another, and becoming nature. When this idea has become nature, the third act begins. The idea returns to itself, as a perfect consciousness of that which is in itself, and then it recog- nizes itself as spirit. To these three developments the whole of Hegel's philosophy reduces itself. The first is the subject of Logic; the s^icond, of the Science of Nature ; and the third, of the Science of Spirit — precisely the three parts of philosophy. And here we see the position that Logic holds in the philosophical Encyclopaedia of Hegel. It is the movement which thought, as the object of thought, goes through, and by which it succeeds in constituting itself as concept or absolute idea. " But even this first movement has three parts. There is a movement or process in the sphere of being, a movement or process in the sphere of essence, and a movement or process in the sphere of the concept. The movement in the sphere of being is a passing over into another ; the move- ment in the sphere of essence is a reflection or manifestation in another ; the movement in the sphere of the concept is a development, by which alone is posited that which already is in itself or in potentiality, as a plant that unfolds from the germ in which it was contained.^ This triple movement or process returns eternally into itself, begins every instant, and every instant completes itself. The description of this eternal movement is the logic which Hcgcl tries to substi- * Ibid., Zusatz i. ; cf. § 24, Zusatze ii., iii. f " Fiir den Anfang den die Philosophic zu machen hat scheint sie . . . hier das Dcnkiu zum Gegenstand des Denkens maclien zu miissen " {Ibid. ,§17). \ " In der Natur ist es das organische I.cben, wclclics der Slufc (lesT'egridTs entspricht. So entwickelt sicli, /.. I!., die I'llaiize aus ihixin Kciin " (Liuyclo/)., pt. i, § 161, Zusalz). 144 PHILOSOPHTCAL SVSTEAf. tute for the vulgar one [g^Pieine], as he calls it, and of which he speaks contemptuously.* " Now, in this new logic, what is truth ? ' The agreement of the odj'ect with the concept', \ says Hegel. This agree- ment is found in the absolute idea, which is the last term reached by the concept itself in its development. Hence proceeds this singular consequence that error eternally coexists with truth ; \ for, since our philosopher admits that this triple progress moves in a continuous and eternal circle, and that truth lies only in the last point, in which the circle completes itself, and which is where the concept has become absolute idea, it follows that all the other points of the circle remain in the deficiency which belongs to error — that only a single moment of the circle belongs to truth, whereas all the rest belong to error. Thus, error has a much larger and richer share than truth. Since, moreover, this triple circular and eternal process is necessary, it fol- lows that the perpetual alternation between the dominion of truth, which consists in a point, and that of error, which extends to the whole round of the circle, is also necessary. Hence this philosopher, who desires to be in the highest degree Unitarian, tumbles unawares into the Manichaian system of two principles — Insincera acies duo per divortia semper Spargitur, in geminis visum frustrata figuris. " To tell the truth, the purpose of this new logic is far more sublime than that of the old one. The old one taught men to make sure of the truth. The new one laughs at such simplicity, and advises man to resign him- self to the acceptance of truth and error as necessary moments of the understanding, which alternate in per- petual motion, without affording any possibility that the truth shall in the end prevail over its contrary. . . . * See Encyclop., pt. i. § 19, Zusatz ii. ; § 20, Zusatz. t " Dahingegen bestelit die Wahrheit im tieferen Sinu darin, dass die Ob- jektivitiit mit dem Begriff identisch ist " {Encyclop., pt. i. § 213, Zusatz). X " Eben so falsch ist die Vorstellung, als ob die Idee nur das Abstrakte sey. Sie ist es allerdings in sofern alles Unwahre sich in ihr aufzehit " {Encyclop., pt. i. § 213). HEGEL'S LOGIC. 145 " Hegel elsewhere congratulates himself on having thus discovered how to effect the conciliation of truth with error, and how to make them live at peace with one another. The same may be said with respect to good and evil. . . . The new philosophy assures us that it has the marvellous power to bind together good and evil, as well as truth and falsehood, and from these two contraries to draw forth a third entity — and what entity would one suppose .'' The Absolute Good ! ' The good, the absolute good,' says Hegel, ' eternally accomplishes itself in the world, with the result that it is already accomplished in and for itself, and does not require to wait for us. That it does so wait, is the illusion in which we live, and which is the sole active principle upon which interest in the world rests. The idea, in its process, causes this illusion to itself, sets another over against itself, and its whole action con- sists in cancelling this illusion. Only from this error does truth spring, and herein alone lies the reconciliation with error and finitude. Otherness or error, as cancelled, is itself a necessary moment of truth, which is only in so far as it makes itself its own result.' * " Such is the singular fruit of the new logic ! Such are the promises it holds out ! It teaches man to put away from himself the illusion of doing good, or of ex- pecting it in another life, as if the good were still to be accomplished, and were not continually being accomplished in our world, without our concurrence ! It likewise teaches us that it is in vain to seek for truth free from error, because error is the product of truth transforming itself into another, and truth is the product of error transforming itself into truth. If such were the nature of things, we ought to close the eyes of the mind to avoid the error of seeing it. If absolute science were at once the contem- plation and production of this sad spectacle, of this con- tinual, fatal revolution of thought, we ought to congratulate him who does not possess it, and he who does ought to do his best to unlearn it. * Encyclopccdie, pt. i. § 212, Zusatz. 146 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. "'The idea is the Absolute, the highest definition of God,' * says Hegel. But this god of Hegel's is a god who continually deludes himself, and whose whole activity consists in constantly dissolving the delusion which he practises upon himself. It is from this delusion, from this error of Hegel's god, that truth proceeds ! A logic which ingenuously confesses to such results would not seem to require any further examination, because, even if it were true, it could be neither good nor desirable ; and, since it cannot be good, it cannot be true. Nevertheless, we will not omit to mark some of the principal errors by which Hegelian reasoning is corrupted to its very roots. f "(i) Hegel sets out with a supposition altogether gra- tuitous and at the same time evidently false, viz., that ideas move themselves, that they change and develop them- selves, as the germ of a flower, which develops into the plant. He assures his disciples, who, for the most part, listen in rapture, that all his assertions (and his system is only a series of assertions) are necessarily connected, that which follows with that which precedes ; but no philo- sopher ever made a falser boast. And, in fact, the asser- tion that ideas move is neither deduced from any principle nor supported by even the smallest proof; and internal observation, to which alone our philosopher could appeal, testifies to the contrary. It testifies that ideas are plainly immutable, that man intuites them or does not intuite them, reflects on them or does not reflect on them, thinks them in one mode or another, passes from the considera- tion of one to the consideration of another, and all this without the idea's suffering the least change. Hence, the new logic begins by giving proof of entire ignorance re- specting the nature of ideas — starts with a proposition not only arbitrary, but manifestly erroneous. " (2) Hegel, in his Logic, undertakes to trace the whole of this dialectic movement. But his philosophical imagi- * "Die Definition des Absoluten, dass es die Idee ist, ist nun selbst absolut" {Encydop., pt. i. § 213 ; cf. § 85). t Cf. Trendelenburg, Logische UntersucJmngen, vol. i. p. 38 (3rd edit.), and Die logische Frage in HegePs System, pp. 12 sqq., and my translation of the same in ih.t younial of Speculative Philosophy, vols, v., vi. HEGEL'S LOGIC. 147 nation is so strong that the steps which he makes thought take, far from appearing necessary, are arbitrary and capricious. Let us open the Science of Logic. Its point of departure, as we have already said, is 'thought as the object of thought.' This must develop itself, and it is Logic that describes and performs this development. And lo ! the Logic of Hegel, all of a sudden, and without even the smallest hint of a reason, divides itself into three parts — the Theory of Being, the Theoiy of Essence, and the Theory of Concept and Idea.* It, therefore, begins at once by describing the movement of being. But was not the original undertaking to describe the development of thought as the object of thought } How, then, has being, so suddenly and without any warning to the reader, been substituted for thought as the object of thought ? Is it not plain that the philosopher is here entertaining his disciples with nimble sleights of hand .'' By this trick he makes them swallow the implicit proposition that thought as the object of thought is identical with being. It follows, of course, that, since they are identical, they may be inter- changed at pleasure, without its being necessary to prove this supposed identity. Thus, the famous Science of Logic begins by suddenly putting being in the place of tJdnking. The philosopher starts with a petitio principii, and violently introduces into the very first lines the whole system which he ought to demonstrate. Assuming, therefore, from the beginning the truth of the whole system, and taking its germ and principle for granted, he affords a first and solemn example of the new art of reasoning, which cer- tainly stands entirely opposed to the old. " (3) But, at least, the inferences which follow will be furnished with that dialectic necessity which makes so much display, and to which appeal is made as to the sole and only proof of the system. ' Think ! ' After having in the very beginning exchanged thought for being in our * Hegel excuses himself for this, on the ground that, preliminarily, no deduction of these can be given (see Encydop., pt. i. § 20) ; but, as he has not shown why this deduction is impossible, and, if it is impossible, his pro- positions are pure assumptions, his excuse goes for nothing, and, indeed, is a mere apology for simple incapacity. 148 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. hands, Hegel begins to tell us that ' being is the concept,' * the indeterminate. Here, again, without favouring us with any proof, he demands, or rather commands, that we shall thus blindly believe that being is the concept ; and so the rigorous dialectic process, which he had promised us, is reduced to a substitution of one word for another, to an arbitrary and absurd metamorphosis. Who, that has not lost his head, will ever grant to him that being, thus gene- rally, is the concept? On the contrary, everybody will tell him it is by the concept that being is known, and for that very reason the one is not the other. If he meant to speak of ideal being, he ought to have said so, since cer- tainly ideal being, as intuited by the mind, though not properly a concept, is, nevertheless, the idea ; but being, without distinction of form, is neither an idea nor a con- cept. He adds ' the indeterminate.' But is the indeter- minate the same thing as being .'' Certainly not ; and as little is the indeterminate the same as the concept. And if you assert that it is, you assert something that nobody will grant. On the contrary, being is essentially deter- mined, and when it is undetermined, it is so much the less being. In a word, the indeterminate signifies only a pri- vation, which is characteristic of ideal being. " (4) But, if you mean to speak not of being simply, but of indeterminate being, again, why not say so } Why dis- semble after the manner of sophists who deal in equivo- cations .'' If this is what you mean, then you ought to account for the idea of indeterminate being, and show us its origin. If you had done so, you would not have begun your logic thus with a leap into indeterminate being, but with something else, which might have led you to an explanation of the idea of indeterminate being. According to us, not the indeterminate simply, but indeterminate being is the light of reason, the form of the intelligence, and it is only after having rigorously demonstrated it that * " Das Seyn is der Begriflf nur an skh, die Bestimmungen desselben sind seyende, in ihrem Unterscliiede ^;/a';'^ gegeneinander, und ihre weitere Bestim- mung (die Form des Dialektischen) ist ein Ucbergehen in Anderes " (Encyclop., vol. i. § 84). HEGEVS LOGIC. 149 we assumed the right of asserting that here is the point of departure of the human spirit, distinguishing this from the point of departure of man in his first development, as well as from that of the man who begins to philosophize, and that of philosophy as science.* " (5) ' Being,' says Hegel, ' has three forms — quality, quantity, and measure, or qualitative quantity.' Of this, again, there is no proof, and, indeed, there could be no proof of an error so patent. He has been speaking of indeterminate being, and now he tells us that it has quality, quantity, and measure.f What a leap ! Indeterminate being has certainly not one of these, for these are deter- minations, and when being has them, it is no longer indeterminate. Here again, in the usual fashion, the sub- ject of the discourse is surreptitiously changed. " (6) But let us see what he says of quality. ' Pure being,' he says, ' forms the beginning, because it is at once pure thought, and the indeterminate, simple immediate.' | What a number of things at once ! How many assertions in a few words ! He has been speaking of being, and now he enters the field with a slight change, pure being. Once more pure being and thought are identified, without one word to tell us why. And yet all men distinguish, and always will distinguish, thought, which is the act of the intelligent subject, from being, which is its object, and in no manner will they confound two things so different and so much opposed to each other. He says, again, that this pure being is the immediate; but immediate is an adjective, and requires a substantive, and he who can may guess what that substantive is. But without stopping to consider this, let us ask on what grounds he affirms that pure being is the immediate. We must believe it blindly, because he says so : this is the usual intimation that our philosopher * See under § 9. t " Eine jede Sphare der logischen Idee erweist sich als eine Totalitat von Bestimmungen und als eine Darstellung des Absolulen. So audi das Seyn, welches die drei Stufen der Qualitat, der Quantitat und es Maasses in sich enthalt" {Encydop., pt. i. §85, Zusatz). \ "Das reine Seyn macht den Anfang, weil es sowohl reiner Gedanke als das unbeslimmte, einfache Unmittellmre ist " {Ibid., § 86). I50 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. gives us. He immediately subjoins that 'pure being is pure abstraction, and therefore the absokite negative, which, when similarly taken in its immediacy, is Nothing.' * But if pure being is an abstraction, how is it immediate } Rather the abstraction is immediate, and pure being, obtained through the medium of it, is mediate. And from what is this abstraction made.? That from which the abstraction is made must be anterior to the abstraction, and therefore more immediate than it, as well as than the abstract which it produces. " (7) But attention here to another poetic metamor- phosis ! Pure being, which is said to be an abstraction, is directly afterwards a pitrc abstraction, which becomes synonymous with the absolute negative. And when this substitution of words is accomplished, without further ceremony the assertion is made that the absolute negative, taken in its immediacy, is nothing, which is defined as abstraction and absolute negation. These sudden tran- sitions pretend to be, in the highest degree, dialectical by rigorous necessity ! But to speak more seriously ; men will not be so easily persuaded that indeterminate being is nothing, inasmuch as indeterminate being is, after all, an object of thought ; nor will they admit that calling nothing abstraction and absolute negation is a proper way to speak, since abstraction and negation are operations of thought, whereas nothing, though indeed the result of total negation, which removes all object from thought, is not the negation itself. But why should indeterminate being be nothing } Our philosopher never feels himself bound to give us any reasons ; but a reason may be gathered from what he tells us, viz., that it has in it no reality. Men of good sense, however, will find an induction of this sort illogical and antidialectical, inasmuch as indeterminate being is still something, although it is devoid of real form and deter- mination, for the simple reason that it is being. It is ideal and formal being ; it is being that virtually has within it * " Dieses reine Seyn ist nun die reine Abstraction, damit das absohit negative, welches, gleichfallsunmittclbargenommcn, das Nichts ist " {Ibid., § 87) HEGEL'S LOGIC. 151 all determinations. It is the intelligibility of all deter- minate beings, and therefore can never identify itself with nothing. This, again, instead of being a dialectically necessary step, is a desperado's leap in the dark, since being is always that which directly contradicts nothing. " (8) Hegel, having thus, by his usual method of sub- stituting one word for another, defined being in this way — that is, by calling it nothing — takes other steps, not a whit more dialectical than the preceding, but merely verbal ; for example : ' Nothing, as this immediate, self-equal, is, in its turn, the same that being is. The truth of being, as well as of nothing, is the unity of the two : this unity is BECOMING.' * And this is the principle and characteristic of the whole Hegelian philosophy. In it, everything is always becoming, the idea being, according to Hegel, essentially movement. Nevertheless, it is impossible to conceive any movement in the idea, movement and change being contradictory of the eternal and immutable nature of the idea. And this observation alone is sufficient to over- throw the whole imaginary edifice. But let us examine the last words. After having told us that indeterminate being is nothing, Hegel pretends that this consequence follows : ' The truth of being, as well as that of nothing, is the unity of the two.' But let him tell us clearly, and without equivocation, whether being and nothing be one or two ; because if they are two, there is no longer a perfect identity between them, and if they are one, there is no need for uniting them. The truth is that they are neither one, since it is impossible that being should ever become nothing, nor, on the other hand, are they two, except with respect to our minds, which, with two diff"erent operations, posit and remove being ; and these two operations can never be united into one, inasmuch as our minds can never, at the same time and in the same respect, affirm and * " Das Nichts ist als dieses unmittelbare, sich selbstgleiche, ebenso umge- kehrt dasselbe was das Seyn ist. Die Wahrheit des Seyns, sowie des Nichts, ist daher die Einheit beider: diese Einheit ist das Werden" (Ibid., §88). Here and elsewhere I translate directly from the third edition of the Ency- clopccdic, which diffcis somewhat from the first, from which Rosmini trans- lated. 152 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. negate being. For this reason, the logic which Hegel calls vulgar is perfectly right in admitting the principle of contradiction, and the new dialectician is wrong when he impugns it, in order to enjoy the singular privilege of contradicting himself. It follows that the union or identi- fication of being with nothing is only an absurdity, which cannot be conceived by any intelligence ; and an absurdity is not anything, not even becoming. "(9) On the other hand, neither being nor nothing becomes, because being is, and that which is does not become ; and nothing does not become, because it is nothing; for nothing neither does nor suffers anything. For these reasons the concept of becoming is not, and cannot be, either in being, or in nothing, or in their union or identifica- tion. We must, therefore, analyze this concept, and not bring it into the field ready made, without any explanation, and without saying what it is. Without such explanation, becoming remains a mere word, which, not being defined and therefore not clear, is not fit to be used by the dialec- tician, but only by the sophist. And, indeed, first of all, the word becoming may mark either a simple concept, or it may mark a reality. What then, in Hegel's view, is real becoming, and what is the concept of becoming } He takes excellent care not to let this be known, because he is under the absolute necessity of using the word sometimes in the one sense, sometimes in the other — sometimes for the real act [of being], and sometimes for the concept of this act ; and it is only by these ambiguities that he hopes to make us swallow his paradox, that the concept and the reality are all the same thing, and that the real is compre- hended in the ideal. Such a marvellous result he could not reach otherwise than by introducing a word capable of signifying either the one or the other, so as to make us pass from the identity of the word to the identity of the thing. " (10) Again, the pretended dialectical transition from indeterminate being to becoming does not exist. In inde- terminate being there is to be found nothing that can become or cause to become, no activity of any kind, but HEGEUS LOGIC. 153 only pure intelligibility. Hence even the possibility of the transition is wanting. Instead, therefore, of a transition, through deduction of one thing from another, the whole process is reduced to an arbitrary adding of one thing to another. Now, as you, at your good will and pleasure, join becoming to indeterminate being, so I may join to it any other determination that pleases me, without discovering that I have thereby, with so little trouble, constructed a philosophical system or performed anything beyond a simple and very ordinary exercise of thought. I say, there- fore, that you introduce becoming abruptly, not by a neces- sary transition from one concept to another, but as- one word follows another without nexus. Indeed, becoming presupposes the being which becomes, and therefore being precedes becoming. If so, becoming itself cannot be being, but something that is subsequent to being. Add what we have said above, that ideal being never becomes, and that indeterminate being is merely ideal, since all real beings are determinate. Further, becoming presupposes a force, a force determining a subject to change and to change in a given manner, whence the virtue of becoming, whether active, passive, or intransitive — take it as you choose — must always be a determinate. And even if, in thought, you should form an abstract concept of becoming, and thus should wish not to determine the mode of becoming, this concept, although abstract, would begin to render being less indeterminate, so that, by adding becoming to being, you do not thereby make indeterminate being move. This being necessarily remains before the mind, the same as before, while, from the concept of completely indeterminate being, your mind passes to consider another less indeter- minate concept : that is all. "(11) And, after all, you cannot obtain this determina- tion, becoming, except from the real world, as we have said, because it is nowhere else. How have you then jumped out of the ideal world, where you were, into the real one ? How do you account for such a leap .-* Whilst you were discussing indeterminate being, which can only be the object of the mind, how have you managed to drag- into 154 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. the discussion becoming, which is found only among realities, and not even among all these, but only among such as are finite ? Here is another most mortal leap, antilogical and antidialectical, from indeterminate being to finite being. The purely indeterminate concept of being is unlimited, infinite. For the very reason that it is indeterminate, it has no limit of any sort. Becoming, on the contrary (whatever this becoming may be, and we shall see farther on what it is), is a passion lyraBoq, affection] of purely finite being, of which you have not yet spoken, but which you, neverthe- less, take the liberty of smuggling in as a presupposition of your philosophy, while all the time you are proclaiming that no new personage can enter without the passport of necessary dialectic. Your words, therefore, are mere words, and are contradicted by facts. To sum up : you see here three headlong leaps — first, from being to an affection of being, such as becoming is ; second, from ideal being, which is the same as indeterminate being, to real being, in which alone is found the affection of becoming ; third, from infinite being, the indeterminate, to finite being, which alone can be said in a certain way to become, if indeed that word has any meaning. . . . "(12) But Hegel further tells us that becoming is pro- perly the identification of being and nothing, because it expresses that point in which one being ceases and the other is not yet begun. If it were true that it expressed this point, it would not therefore be true either that indeter- minate being was the identification of being with nothing, or that this identification was becoming. That indeter- minate being has no reality is true ; but it has identity, and identity is not nothing. And nothing cannot, properly speaking, be united with being, because they are not two things. The being of the world has, indeed, limits ; but the word nothing does not indicate these limits. Nothing is a simple concept indicating total removal or absence of being, whereas the limits are different and have different concepts, being relations of beings differently limited. Let us, however, admit that, by a figure of speech (all such ought, however, to be excluded from rigorously scientific HEGEL'S LOGIC. 155 deductions), we may say that indeterminate being is the union of being and nothing, because it contains at once ideal being and the zero of reality. Let it further be admitted, by another figure of speech, that becoming is the union of being and nothing, because, in the act of becoming, we conceive the cessation of one being and the beginning of another. After all this is admitted, it will not follow, in the least, that indeterminate being is becoming, although both may be defined as the union of being and nothing. This definition w^ould not signify the same thing in the two cases. What it would signify when applied to indeterminate being would be something different from its signification as applied to becoming. The union of being and nothing, in the case of indeterminate being, would be a mode of union different from the union of being and nothing in the case of becoming. In indeterminate being there are entirely wanting the concepts of annulment and production : there is nothing but (ideal) being and (real) non-being. In be- coming, on the contrary, there are not simply being and non-being, but annulment and production. Nothing and annulment are two different things. Nothing presupposes nothing, whereas annulment presupposes an agent that annuls and an entity that is annulled. So likewise, being and the production of being are two different things. Being expresses a completed, quiet act ; production ex- presses an uncompleted, unquiet act. We must, therefore, at all events, reform these definitions, figurative though they be, and say that indeterminate being is the union of (ideal) being and (real) nothing, whereas becoming is the union, not the identification, of annulment and production. When the definitions are thus reduced, they have lost their identity. The Hegelian sophism, therefore, comes from having abandoned the ancient logic, which, if our philo- sopher had studied it, would have taught him to begin his discussions with rigorous definitions and with acute analyses. If he had made such definitions and analyses, the whole enchantment, under which the mind of the Berlin professor lies, would have vanished as if at the sign of the cross. " (13) And, in fact, all this large number of errors in this 156 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. small number of words arises not only from the omission of definitions, but, above all, from the omission of analysis. Hegel, who is so contemptuous of the learning of the ages, which fine spirits have now declared too vulgar, has intro- duced into philosophy his concept of becoming, borrowing it bodily from the vulgar. He has not taken the least trouble to rectify or purify it, but has placed it, in all its roughness, bulk, and confusion, as the corner-stone of his edifice. Had he applied a little philosophical analysis to it, he would have seen that becoming, as the vulgar con- ceive it, does not exist in nature save phenomenally. But our philosopher, while he imagines that he is soaring aloft as an eagle, is deceived by the most ordinary prejudices, and contents himself with wrapping them up in obscure verbiage. Becoming, therefore, as we have said, does not exist in the sense of being a point in which one being annuls itself and another begins ; but whatever instant we choose to assign, in that instant being either is or is not, and of that which is, w^e cannot say that it is not yet. Thus, in creation, which Hegel professes to admit,* between the existence and non-existence of the world there was no middle step. Nor is creation a beginning : it is a positing of being in all its completeness. In creation, therefore, there is not a some- thing which becomes, and, even in the created world, becoming belongs to the changing modes of real being, not to being itself; and even of these modes, every one at every instant either is or is not. At all events, it is another mis- take thus to apply to substantial being that which may only, in a certain sense, be predicated of its modes and determinations ; and Hegel applies becoming to being, in such a way that, not content with making being itself become \i.e. enter into the process of its own determi- nation], and become whatever he chooses, he tries to make it becoming itself. But even with respect to the modes and determinations of being, it cannot ... be asserted that * " Die tiefere Anschaimng ist dagegen diese, dass Gott die Welt aus Nichts erschaffen habe " {Endyclop., pt. i. § 128. Cf. Siebeck, Die Lehre des Aristoteles vo7t der Ewigkeit der Welt, in Untersuchungen zur Philosophic der Griechen, pp. 137-189; Bernays, Die unter PhilorCs Werken stehende Schrijt iiber die Un- zerstbrbarkeit des Wei tails). HEGEL'S LOGIC. 157 there is any true continuity of transition other than pheno- menal, or that one state succeeds another immediately. To be sure, there is continuity ; but this means no more than that the successive states of a being which develops itself — for example, a plant — are so little different from each other that our powers of observation are not equal to dis- tinguishing them, and that, therefore, we imagine there is continuity. As we have elsewhere demonstrated, the concept of continuity in motion is a confused concept, con- cealing an absurdity.* Hegel, therefore, adopts, as the basis of his system and of his new logic, a most vulgar concept, phenomenal in its origin, confused and carrying within it an absurdity. One can easily conceive that a philosopher, who sets out with propositions so equivocal, arbitrary, confused, erroneous, and absurd, may very easily, especially if he is gifted with great power of abstraction, such as we find generally in Germans, draw from them the strangest consequences and create a species of fantastic universe, calculated to surprise untrained and confident young minds, and thus to form a kind of school, as we find the philosopher of Stuttgard has done ; but any man, whose sense has been educated in a manly way, and who does not allow hirrtself to be hoodwinked by a blind (though, it may be, sometimes generous) enthusiasm, weighs the grounds, and penetrates to the bottom, of every new doctrine, and thus does not fall into such nets. The celebrity of this man is explicable. It is one of those numerous celebrities which blossom in university halls, one of those crowns woven by the hands of unsophisticated youth" {Logic, §§ 40-52). We have quoted this long passage for three reasons : first, because it shows the wide gulf which separates the philosophy of Rosmini from the romantic idealism of Germany ; second, because it affords an excellent example of his method of dealing with subtle questions ; and, third, * See A^ew Essay, vol. ii. §§ 814, 815; Psychology, vol, ii. §§ 1210-1223. Rosmini denies all continuity in any transient act, that is, any act involving movement. His arguments, some of which are identical with those of Zeno, if not altogether convincing, are, at least, very acute and deserving of careful con- sideration. IJS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. because it shows how serviceable his first principle is in clearing up the entanglements of subjectivism. A very- instructive parallel might be drawn between the above criticism of Hegel's system and that pronounced by Tren- delenburg, which is also very able. 54. Aim of The aim of reasoning is certainty, and cer- andnatifre tainty is a firm persuasion in accordance with El^.r"" known truth. Elsewhere Rosmini defines certainty as " a firm and reasonable persuasion conformable to truth," and then pro- ceeds : " I may have present to my spirit a true opinion, and yet doubt of its truth : in that case, I have no certainty. It is not, therefore, enough that a thing should be true, in order that it should be true for me. In order that it may be true for me, I must have a motive which produces in me ^. firm persuasion, and produces it reasonably ; that is, by means of a reason which convinces me that my opinion and belief are true and indubitable. Although it is a fact that logical truth has no existence in itself, outside of all sub- sistence, nevertheless, it exists in itself outside of the human intellect, and this justifies the distinction between true in itself and true for man. A thing becomes true for man by means of the certainty which he has of its truth. . . . Certainty, therefore, results from three elements : first, truth in the object ; second, firm persuasion in the subject ; and, tJiird, a motive or ground producing such persuasion " {Neiv Essay, vol. iii. § 1044, 1045). St. Thomas distinguishes two kinds of certainty. " Certitude," he says, " potest con- siderari dupliciter, uno modo ex causa certitudinis, et sic dicitur esse certius id quod habet certiorem causam. . . . Alio modo potest considerari certitudo ex parte subjecti ; et sic dicitur esse certius quod plenius consequitur intel- lectus hominis " {Sum. Th., n? q. 4, art. 8, cor, ; cf q. i , art. I, m.). " Certainty," says Sir W. Hamilton, "expresses NATURE OF CERTAINTY. 159 either the firm conviction which we have of the truth of a thing, or the character of the proof on which it rests " {Led. on Metaph., vol. i. p. 161). It will be seen that Rosmini's definition of certainty includes both objective and subjective certainty. 55- Logic, therefore, has two offices : (i) to defend Twofold office of the existence of truth in general and the validity Logic. of reason in particular ; (2) to teach men to use their power of reasoning so as to arrive at com- plete possession and conviction of truth — to attain certainty. Logic, therefore, may be divided into two parts : (i) defence of truth, and (2) means of arriving at truth and certitude. 56. Truth is a quality of knowledge. Knowledge what is is true when that which is known is. Let us reflect closely upon this definition of truth. If the thing which is known is, it is true ; therefore the truth of a thing is, in the last analysis, its being. Known being, therefore, is the truth of knowledge. Truth is But the form of intelligence is being, as ideology of our in- shows us. Hence the form of intelligence is truth. ^ 'sence. The first truth, therefore, is possessed by the human spirit through its very nature. This very simple deduction disposes of those sceptics who deny all truth, as well as of those who, without expressly denying the existence of certain truths, nevertheless declare that all truth is unattainable by man. i6o PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. The above definition of truth differs shghtly from that adopted by Aristotle, according to whom truth, and, of course, also falsehood, are qualities of judgments. The difference, however, is really not essential, inasmuch as all knowledge, properly so called, is the result of judgments. Aristotle, moreover, admits that the knowledge of indivi- sibles — a knowledge which would correspond to Rosmini's intuition — cannot possibly be false (see under § 47 ; and cf. Aristotle, De Animd, iii. 6, i ; 430 a, 27 sq. : De Interp., i. ; 16 a, 12 sqq. : Metaph., ix. 10; 105 1 b, 3 sq.). That being and truth are equivalent terms is a favourite doctrine with Rosmini, and would seem to follow from the theory that being is at once the form of mind and of cognition. " It is essential to cognition," he says, " that it should be the truth or true. . . . Whence it follows that the formal cause of cognition, that which imparts to it the essence of cognition, must be the truth itself, since to be true means simply to have the truth in it. If, therefore, ideal being is the formal cause of cognition, and this being is the truth, it follows that it is also the supreme criterion, since that which essentially is has no need to recur to anything else in order to be so, and there is nothing anterior to essence. The criterion of truth, therefore, reduced to a proposition will be this : That which the human spirit apprehends is true if it is con- formable to being, and false if it is not so. " But even independently of this demonstration, we may show in another way that being is the truth. For what is truth ? This question contains its own answer. By asking what IS, we imply that when we say what it is, we shall have answered the question. But being is precisely that which is, and which essentially is, because it is being. If that which IS IS that which IS, then that which is is the truth ; therefore, being is the truth. In fact, being cannot not-be ; if it could, it would not be being : hence being necessarily is. But being is in all the things that are, and in all that is affirmed of them ; hence being is the truth essential, necessary and universal. Hence, again, being is the criterion of the truth and the supreme criterion, BEING AND TRUTH. i6i because it is immediate. Being itself the truth, and at the same time the formal cause of all cognition, it introduces necessity, simply because that which is cannot not - be " {Neiv Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1047, 1048). It will be seen that in the above quotation Rosmini confounds the is of the copula with the entirely different is of existence, the nv mq aXiiOig, as Aristotle would say, with the ov ^wafXH (see Brentano, Von der mannigfacheji Bedeuhuig dcs Seicnden nach Aristoteles, pp. 6 sqq.). Indeed, it cannot be said that Rosmini's identification of truth with being is either logical or felicitous. Truth is not being, but an attribute or quality of the manner in which being is applied. It is true that when that which is known, or, in other words, that which is judged to be, is, the knowledge and the judgment expressing it are both true ; but the same is the case when that which is judged not to be is not. If, therefore, in the first case I am justified in making an abstract noun of my predicate and calling it truth, so am I likewise in the second ; whence it would follow that not-being, as well as being, was truth. Unless being is a mere relation, it cannot be truth ; but surely being is not a relation. If it were, then the object of human intelligence being a relation, all knowledge would be relative, which Rosmini would be the first to deny. The tendency to elevate truth, which is a mere relation, into a subject, has caused much ambiguity and mischief in philosophical discussion. When Jesus, speaking to Orientals, says, " I am the way and the truth and the life," such figurative expressions are easily understood, and need mislead no one ; but when St. Thomas undertakes to prove that God is truth {Swmna contra Gent., lib. I., c. Ix.), or when Hegel tells us that the truth is concrete {Encyclopcedie, Einleitung, § 14), that it is the self-mediated, the uncon- ditioned, etc., they are simply putting words in the place of thoughts, and helping to confound thinking. It is for- tunate for Rosmini's system that this identification of truth with being is not in any way essential to it. Rosmini was probably led to make this identification through the M i62 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. ambiguity of the Italian word vero, which, like the German wahr, means actual as well as true. Confirma- This argument may be stated In another way, same doc- If what I know is, I know the truth. But, by nature, I intuite the essence of being. Now, the essence of being is simply being itself, inasmuch as, when I say being, I exclude non-being. The being, therefore, which I know by nature, is ; hence my first cognition is true : I possess a first truth, since what I know is. "Every time," says Rosmini, "that we attribute to a thing that part of being which it has in it, neither more nor less, the proposition we utter is true. The character, therefore, of true propositions is, that in them is recognized, in that which forms the object in question, that amount of being which is in it, neither more nor less, and that this is expressed in the predicate. In fact, errors take place only in the following cases: — (i) When being is said or uttered of a thing which has it not ; (2) When being is denied of a thing which has it ; (3) When it is affirmed that a thing has a mode or grade of being which it has not ; (4) When it is denied that a thing has a mode or grade of being which it has " {N'ezu Essay, vol. iii. § 1062). This is true, and yet the demonstration attempted in the above section is a very unfortunate one. The intuition of indeterminate being, given, as it is, by nature, is not liable to error ; but this proves nothing with regard to determinate being, since indeterminate being furnishes us with no criterion whereby to distinguish one mode or grade of it from another. Merely to know that x is, and y is, does not enable us to determine the mode of either. The modes of being are given in sensation (see § 65), and the great desideratum is to find a standard of sense. If mere being could enable NATURE OF ILLUSION. 163 us to settle degrees of heat, what would be the use of the thermometer ? (cf § 69). 58. Here the transcendental idealist comes for- Transcen- 1 1 T7- !• Ml- Tr dental ward and says, " Your truth is an illusion. You scepticism merely think you know what being is ; but it may, the doc- after all, be only an appearance." I reply: Your the mind objection merely shows that you have not under- nature pos- stood the manner in which I have just shown that fi^s^tmh. man possesses the first truth ; that you have not understood the first truth of which I am speaking, since your possibility of illusion does not touch the first truth at all. In fact, what do we mean Reply, in by illusion ? We mean that something appears un1veTsai° which is not, or in a mode in which it is not. sionfsinv- Now, neither of these forms of illusion can touch Two kinds the first truth of which we have been speaking. °^ ^i^^^'°"- Such illusions can at best touch only those secondary cognitions which we form when we affirm, for example, real beings. With these we shall deal at the proper time. At present, how- ever, it may be admitted that when I affirm a particular real being, I am liable to illusion in both the forms mentioned. In other words, I may affirm a certain real being, and this being may not be, may not subsist. Or I may affirm that a particular real being is in one mode, when, in fact, it is in another. But neither of these forms of illusion is possible with reference to my knowledge of the essence of being, pure and simple. Let us 164 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Proof of the impos- sibility of the first illusion. prove this with regard to the first form of illusion. In regard to being, apart from all determi- nations, to know what it is, and to think I know what it is, are one and the same thing. When I think I know what being is, I do know what it is, and when I know what it is, I know the truth, since the essence of being is to be. In fact, we hold that to know what being is, is to know the truth. But our objector says, " You only think you know what being is ; but this may be an illusion." In answer to this, let us observe that the knowledge of what being is, is the simple conception of being, and not an affirmation of any subsistent being. When this is considered, is it possible to doubt whether we have the con- ception of being or not, without having that conception ? Before we can doubt whether we have the conception of being, we must have the very conception about which we are doubting. In the same way, before we can believe that we have the conception of being, we must have the conception to which that belief refers. The illusion in question is, therefore, not possible, since we cannot assert that the conception of being is illusory, without having the conception in question. The nature of simple conceptions is such that we either have them or have them not. If we have them not, we cannot believe that we have them, since believing we have them and actually having them are one and the same thing. NATURE OF ILLUSION, 165 We cannot say that any concept, as such, is illusory. Before we can say so, we must have the concept, and to have a concept is all that is necessary to make it a true concept. It is an entirely different question whether there be anything- real, that is, anything not posited by us, cor- responding to such concept. Our belief that there is may be illusory ; but this belief is not the concept itself, but a judgment respecting a relation of the concept, its relation to reality. Our concept of a unicorn, or a rjOo-yeXo^oe, as Aristotle's example is {De Interp., i. ; 16 a, 16), is a true concept, although there s nothing real corresponding to it. 59- Let us now take up the second illusion and The im- 1 1 . 1-1 • -11 1 possibility show that It likewise cannot possibly touch ourofthe second. first knowledge of being. We are told, " You in- illusion tuite being, but are you sure that you intuite it as ^™^^ " it is? Might it not be in a ;;2(?<7^(? different from that in which it appears ? " This objection supposes that being has different 7nocles. But for this very reason it cannot apply to the first intuition, since in it being is without modes. We repeat, there- fore, that the objection lodged has no validity save in relation to our knowledge of being as invested with some particular mode. Then, indeed, we may be illuded, and being may appear to us in one mode when in truth it exists in another. How far this is possible, we shall consider when we come to speak of special cognitions having for their object determinate beings. But at present we are dealing with being as destitute of modes, of the pure, simple essence of being ; illusions, therefore, which might be possible with regard to 1 66 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. its modes, are impossible with regard to itself. Hence I have said somewhere that the manifest and essential truth of being shines forth in its Muiversality. This universality entirely destroys transcendental scepticism, which gratuitously assumes that the human mind is endowed only with restrictive and modal forms, whereas, in fact, it has but one universal form without any modes at all. Modes, indeed, have no existence save in the world of reality. It follows directly from this that those who hold being in its universality and simplicity to be a subjective product, that is, a product of the subject man (§ 36), make an assump- tion not only gratuitous, but plainly false and contradictory, inasmuch as man himself is only a limited, modal, and contingent realization of the essence of being. Transition from ob- servation to the proof that observa- tion is a valid source of know- ledge. 60. Let us now look back and consider what we have proved. In the first place, by means of simple observation, we established the fact that the human mind knows what being is, leaving undecided the question whether observation was a reliable source of truth. This question we have now decided, and shown that observation is valid. Having found that the result of observation is the intuition of being, we were able to convince ourselves of the truth of observation itself, inas- much as we found in intuited being that clear light of truth which excludes from our observation all possibility of deceit, error, or illusion (§ 11). NO ILLUSION IN THE MODES OF BEING. 167 This is a strong point in Rosmini's system, the point at which he emerges from the vicious circle described under § 10, and passes from mere tentative thinking to philo- sophical, constructive thinking. We must be very careful to remember that being, though reached by a process of abstraction, and in reality abstract, is, nevertheless, not a mere mode or attribute of the abstracting subject, but an objective entity and the very essence of objectivity. In modern times we are wont to confound abstract with subjective, and therefore to imagine that the nature of every abstraction depends upon the nature of the subject. This is utterly false. Our sensations, indeed, are purely sub- jective, but our concepts of them are purely objective, and could not be thought correctly, even by God, otherwise than they are thought by us. 61. The same arguments by which we have Enorim answered the sceptical objections of the transcen- in°ideaJ dental idealist and shown that the simple concep- fnS^"*^ tion of being cannot, in any degree, be illusory, ^^^^^' ^' are equally valid for special concepts or ideas. If, indeed, there be error in these, it must lie either in the undetermined being which forms their com- mon basis, or else in the particular modes under which they present limited being to us. But we have already seen that in undetermined being there is no possibility of error. It now remains to be seen whether error can occur in the modes of these same concepts. Now, what do we mean when we say that there is error in the modes of being ? We mean that a being appears to us in one mode, when, in truth, it exists in another. The possibility of error, therefore, arises from the i68 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Ideas are the exem- plary truths of things. fact that the same being cannot exist in more than one mode at the same time, and that if we attri- bute to it another mode than that in which it is, this other mode is not, and therefore we have made a false judgment, an error. Such false judgments we make frequently in reference to real beings, which are limited to a single mode. For example, I may make the false judgment that a given being is a man, when it is an animal or a bush ; I am in error because I attribute to it a mode which does not belong to it. But, if I am dealing not with real beings, but with purely ideal being, the conditions of error are altogether want- ino-. Inasmuch as ideal beino- is not limited to a single mode, but has potentially all modes, it may be realized in all modes. Therefore, whatever mode of ideal being I may conceive, it is free from error, since it must always be one of its modes. These modes of ideal being are concepts, specific or generic ideas ; hence all specific and generic ideas are absolutely free from error. The ancients, therefore, were right when they taught that error can never occur in ideas, but only in judgments, and that the knowledge, so called, that comes from simple intuition, is entirely free from error. For this reason, moreover, we say that ideas are exemplary truths, and that things (real beings) receive their truth from their conformity to ideas. If, for example, I judge that a certain being is a horse, and it is a horse, we say that it is a real horse, meaning thereby that it corresponds to the idea of horse, to that mode which I attri- bute to it and whereby I judge it. ERROR IN RELATIONS OF IDEAS. 169 62. But when we say that no error can occur in There can . be no error Simple ideas, we do not mean to extend this without a 7 • r • r T 1 judgment. assertion to the relation of jacas. In these, indeed, there may be error, inasmuch as they are affirmed by means of a judgment, which has the possibiHty of being false as well as true. Thus, for example, I am in error if I judge that one idea is contained in another when it is not — that two, let us say, goes into five twice without a remainder. In a word, there can be no error where there is no judgment. Simple intuition does not admit error. Aristotle very correctly says, '"Ev otg koI to \pevBog koX TO a\riOl(^, avvOeaig Tig ?)S>j vor^jiaTwv loairep tv ovtwv " {De Animd, iii. 6, i ; 430 a, 27 sq). He affirms, on the con- trary, that " H fikv ovv Thjv aciaipiTMV vorjcng ev TOVTOig wipi a ovK i(TTL TO \ptvSog " {Ibid.^ 26 sq.) 63- It does not follow from this that error is There are possible in every judgment. On the contrary, ibsoSy there are judgments in which error is absolutely enor.'^*^™ impossible. For example, after 1 have discovered that in the intuition of being, whether universal or special, no error is possible, I may express this in the form of a judgment, and say. In ideas there is no error. In so doing, I form a judgment absolutely free from error, for the simple reason that what I express in it is free from error. In I70 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM the same way, all judgments which express only what the mind intultes are free from error ; for example, these two : The object of knowledge is being ; Being and not-being, as predicated of the same thing, at the same time, is not an object of cognition. These propositions, these judg- ments, express only what the intuition of being shows us. The first expresses the fact that being is the essential object, the form, of the intelli- gence ; the second, that if being, the object of the intelligence, be removed, it cannot still be present. Here also the simple intuition of being shows itself to be the necessary condition of knowing. " Although the idea of being is possessed in the way of simple intuition without subjective affirmation, yet there is in it iniplicitly an objective J2idgincnt, This being the origin of all judgments, we must turn back upon it, in order to see how this implicit judgment is developed by man, and how it renders itself explicit. " The word being expresses an act,* the absolutely first act. An act may be conceived and expressed in two ways : (i) as an act which is seen taking place ; (2) as an act which takes place. In the former way, that is, as seoi by the mind, it is expressed by nouns or the infinitives of verbs, which are also nouns ; such is the infinitive mode, TO BE.f In the second way, that is, as an act taking place, without the relation of seen, it is expressed by that inflexion which the grammarians call the third person singular, present tense of the verb, as, for example, when * Act, actus, ivepyeia, entirely different frcm action, actio, irpa^ts. The distinction belongs to Aristotle. t This is the literal translation. In English, instead of the infinitive, used in Greek, Latin, German, and the Romance languages, we employ more frequently the verbal noun ending in ing- (A.S. tn^, entirely different from the participle, which ended in and). NOUNS AND VERBS. 171 we say IS. The two modes of conceiving, expressed by the two forms TO BE [EngHsh, being] and IS, are different concepts of the same act, and are distinguished because they express the same act in two relations : first, to the person who is able to see it — relation of cognizability ; second, to the person who performs it, or to itself as performing. This is the essential and radical . difference that holds between nouns and verbs. The former express acts in so far as they ^xq, per se, visible; the latter, acts in so far as they are performed. Now, in the concept of an act which is seen, there is implicitly included the concept of an act which takes place, because the act which is seen is an act which is seen to be performed and posited. . . . But the act which is seen or conceived as taking place, and so expressed, is a possible judgment, as, in the case under consideration, this form IS expresses a judgment, although an incomplete one. Hence we must admit that in intuited being there is contained implicitly an objective judgment. ... It must be observed that the judgment expressed by the word IS, when merely applied to being itself, has so much evidence and necessity, that he who sees it cannot refuse it his assent. . . . Being, therefore, contains an objective judgment, which is present to the mind as soon as we formulate it, not as seen, but as being (act). Then, in the very act of pronouncing it, we give it our assent, and this, in the logical order, is the first of assents and the origin of all others " {Logic, §§ 320-322, 324). " The word being, therefore, expresses that first act of all acts in a necessary relation to some subject which sees it ; the word is expresses the same act purely and simply in itself. The word being, therefore, expresses an object, the word is, a subject, which object and subject are identical being in the two modes in which the mind apprehends and expresses it. The formula, Being is,* therefore, manifests a relation between subjective cognition (although the cog- nition is not totally subjective) and objective cognition, and this double relation permits the redoubling of being. * Cf. Taglioretti, // Verbo Essere (The Verb to Be). This pamphlet has considerable philosophic value and well deserves the attention of philologists. 172 PHIL OSOPHICAL S YS TEM. Hence we derive the two primitive judgments, which implicitly contain all other self-evident judgments — (i) Being is the object of intelligence ; (2) That which is, is. These two self-evident judgments are called, respectively, the principle of cognition and the principle of identity. They are called principles, because all other judgments are derived from them, and receive from them the ground of their truth" {Logic, §§ 337, 338). "The principle of cognition may be called W\q principle of being ; the principle of identity, ihe principle of the order of being'' {Ibid., § 343)- " The principle of identity is the universal and supreme rule, which enables us to know what judgments are true, and what otherwise. In its application it may be expressed thus : Those judgments are true in which there exists between the subject and the predicate that mode of identity which is affirmed" {Ibid., § 352). Such are the judg- ments ex- pressing what is contained in an idea. These are called principles. What are principles ? 64. When the content of an idea is pronounced in the form of a judgment and expressed in a proposition, the idea thus expressed assumes the name of principle. The idea is always universal in this sense that it may be realized an indefinite number of times. (To this general rule there are exceptions, which we omit for the present.) The idea of being may be realized in all modes ; generic ideas and also abstract specific ideas, in many modes. If the specific idea is not abstract but full, so as to include all the accidents of the particular being, it can be realized only in one mode, but in an indefinite number of individuals (bating said exceptions). For this reason ideas are said to be universal, and hence PRINCIPLES, CONTRADICTION, ETC. 173 also principles are 2iniversal judgments applicable to many cases. For example, the principle which tells us, Being is the object of knowledge, is true, not merely in a single act of knowledge, but in all cognitive acts without distinction. The prin- ciple of contradiction, Being and not-being at the same time, cannot be an object of knowledge, ex- presses the absurdity of all contradictory proposi- tions. Absurdity is the unfitness of a proposition Meaning , ,.-,,, of absurd. to be an object 01 knowledge. "Principles," says Rosmini, "are self-evident, most universal judgments, which impart the Hght of truth, and hence certainty, to all those other judgments which are drawn from them, . . . and which in regard to them are called consequences" {Logic, § 359). '^Absurd is that which involves contradiction" {New Essay, vol. ii. § 793). " Before the idea of being can take the form of the principle of contradiction, I must have used it ; I must have begun to judge and reason. I must have formed for myself a mental being, notJdng : I must have acquired an idea of affirmation and negation, which are acts of thinking. I must have observed that negation united with affirmation forms a perfect equation with nothing. Now, however rapidly we perform these operations, judg- ments and ratiocinations, however naturally and immedi- ately they may arise from the idea of being, however true it be that they are all merely the idea of being itself applied, disguised, accompanied by relations, it is always necessary that our reason move from that first state of perfect quiet, in which, like a spring, it rests in tension. But all that in us is the consequence of any non-essential, non-innate movement of the reason, is acquisition, and such, in its explicit form of judgment, is the principle of contradiction " {Ibid., § 566). " The principle of contradiction simplified is as follows : — That which is (being) cannot not-be. That which is is the subject, not-be the predicate ; cannot is the 174 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. copula which expresses the relation between the two terms. What then, in this judgment, is the relation between being and not-being? Impossibility. And we have seen what logical impossibility is. It is simple unthinkability, in a word, nothing. . . . Hence the principle of contradiction is merely impossibility of thinking " {Ibid., §561). This accords completely with Aristotle's famous dictum," To yojO ovto 'dfxa vTrap\Hv re koI fxi) virap^Hv acvvarov toj avrio icoi Karn to avTo {Metaphys., iii. 3 ; 1005 b, 19 sq.), which he holds to be the most certain of all principles (" [3£/3ator«rr) tmv a/)\wv ") (cf. under § 15). Primitive judgments affirming that what is felt exists are free from error. 65. Principles, therefore, being only intuited ideas, whose objects are expressed in the form of judg- ments, it follows that they are as free from error as the ideas themselves. But if the ideas and principles of human knowledge are beyond the reach of error, what shall we say of the primitive synthesis, whereby we affirm the real things communicated to us in feeling? May we claim immunity from error for the perception of real things, that is, of the activity felt by us and affirmed as a being ? In the perception of a real being we must distinguish two things — the affirma- tion of being, and the affirmation of the mode of being determined by the feeling. In the affirma- tion of being, considered apart from its modes, there can be no error, since there can be no error in the essence of being intuited by us. To affirm a being is to affirm the essence of being intuited, in its realization. This essence we know with an evidence which is beyond the possibility of PRIMITIVE JUDGMENTS FREE FROM ERROR. 173 error, and therefore we cannot fail to recognize it when it presents itself to us as realized. We must observe, moreover, that the modes of being are determined by feeling, and not by intelligence. Now, we must carefully note that the child, in its The child first perceptions, does not affirm the modes of being only, being, but simply being itself.* Being is indeed modes. determined for it by its feelings, but it does not stop to gauge these feelings intellectively, or to determine their limits, forms, or differences. So long, therefore, as we pronounce no judgment upon the feelings which constitute the reality of beings, but accept them simply and solely as modal realizations of being, so long we do not expose ourselves to any risk of error. Those per- ceptions, therefore, whether made by a child or any one else, in which feeling is taken merely as the realization of being, no attention being directed to its mode or limits, are such that error is excluded from them. The judgment, therefore, which affirms the existence of real beings in general, or the realization of being as such, with- out adding anything with respect to modes or limitations, is absolutely free from error. It remains to be seen whether the same is true of the judgment which affirms the determinate mode of real beings, that is, which, on occasion of a particular feeling, affirms that one being, rather than another, subsists. * " Schon dem Kiiide wird das Nachdenken geboten. , . . Die Kegel ist nichts Anderes als ein Allgemeines und diesem Allgemeinen soil das Kind das Besondere gemass machen" (Hegel, Encydop., pt. i. § 21, Zusatz). It is need- less to say that the first universal is being. 176 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. To affirm the existence of reality in general is merely to affirm that I have a feeling. Now, while I may make an incorrect identification of one present feeling with another merely remembered, I can never be in any doubt that I feel, and this fact is altogether independent of whether there be any external cause producing my feeling. I may think I am loaded down when I am merely fatigued, thus mistaking the feeling of weakness for that of weight ; but this does not interfere with the fact that I have a feeling. Unless I had a feeling I could not even misinterpret it. My feeling is always equally a reality, whatever be its origin. It follows from this that the essence of reality is beyond all mistaking. One must be careful not to confound with ideal being, which is essentially indeterminate, the indeterminate concept of real being. The former is the simplest of all ideas ; the latter, the vaguest of all concepts, the individuum vagnvi of the Schoolman. The individuum vagissiuutm is pure reality, completely undetermined. In percep- tion we add the essence of being to the felt activity, but we never con- found the two. 66. It may be said that, since we must add the essence of being to feeling, before we can affirm or know it as a being, therefore we know in feeling what is not in it. Let us observe, how- ever, that this objection would be valid only if we affirmed that the feeling itself was the essence of being. But this we do not do. We do, indeed, add the essence of being to the felt activity in order to render it a perceptible and knowable being ; but we are perfectly aware, at the same time, that the felt activity is not by itself the essence of being, but only a contingent realization or mode of it, the term of its action. The essence of being, which we add to it, is only the means SENSATION AND PERCEPTION. 177 whereby we know it, the felt activity not being knowable except when seen in being (§ 31). We may cite a parallel case. We cannot perceive accident without perceiving it in substance, and yet we never mistake the one for the other : we always know perfectly that the accident is some- thing different from the substance which we add to it in the act of perceiving it. It would seem plain enough that the sensation of pain and the thought or concept of the same pain are two different things ; in other words, that sensation is not per- ception. This distinction was made as early as Plotinus, who says that al(T9i]- Logic does not content itself with merely Sophistic. indicating the various ways in which the causes of error may be removed, but likewise shows how errors may be detected and corrected after they are committed. The characteristics of error are very numerous. One class of these is to be found in the verbal expression of reasoning, and the branch of Logic which points out such symp- toms of error is called Sophistic [cro^tcrTiKr^']. " Sophisms," says Rosmini, " are apparent arguments. They imitate the form of argumentation ; but, by erring in some essential part of it, they fail to draw any cogent or true conclusion. . , . Sophisms are divisible into three classes : first, those which have their foundation in the 190 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. falsity of the matter, that is, of the propositions which form the premises of the syllogism ; second, those which sin against the form of the syllogism ; and, third, those whose falsity results not so much from the particular argumenta- tion as from the intent of the dispute" {Logic, § 710). Rosmini devotes a section of his Logic to a consideration of the various forms of sophism, Book ii. sect. iii. pp. 281-304 His definition of Sophistic corresponds closely with that given by Aristotle : ""E(t-< -yojO 17 crocpicTTiKri (^aivofiivr) (jotpin ovaa S' oil, Kfu 6 aocpiarriQ \pr)fxaTicrT}]g cnro (paivo/uLivrig ao(l>iag aXX ovK ovang" {Top., ix. I ; 165a, 21 sqq.). More on percep- tion. Analysis of corporeal sensations. 74- But let us return to perception, the solid basis of all knowledge in so far as it has real beings for its object. Any felt activity is sufficient to make the in- tellig"ent mind affirm that a real beings subsists. Activity (felt) and reality are the same thing. Reality is a form of being, not being itself. The latter is added in the act of perception. The first felt activities which rouse our faculty of judgment and make us affirm the subsistence of certain beings are corporeal feelings {sensioniy If we ana- lyze these feelings, we find in each of them three activities : first, the activity which modifies us without our wills, and toward which we are passive; second, the sensation which is the effect of that activity ; and, third, ourselves who are modified. At first, indeed, the attention of our intelligence, instead of dividing itself equally between these three, concentrates itself upon the first, so that our first affirmation is that there are external bodies. INTELLECTUAL ATTENTION. 191 When we affirm the existence of external bodies, there is in our sensation something more than the external bodies, that is, than the agent which modifies us ; nevertheless we do not advert to it or become aware of it. And here we must observe the law of mental attention. Intellectual Law of in- tcllcct 113.1 attention is the force which directs our understand- attention. ing. This force is characterized by having the power of applying the understanding to any object it chooses, of restricting it to a single object or to one part of a feeling, and of affirming one object at a time, to the exclusion of all the rest. We must not, however, suppose that, when attention directs and applies the understanding to a sphere more or less restricted, it proceeds by mere chance. On the contrary, it follows certain fixed laws, im- posed upon it, for the most part, by the nature of being. This, however, is not the place to speak of these laws. It is enough to give prominence to the fact that, in virtue of this faculty, perception limits itself to a single object, however many there may be even necessarily connected with it. The The r ^ ' ^ • necessary necessary nexus 01 two objects does not enter mto nexus oi . . •■ ^1 objects the perception, or even mto that concept 01 the does not being which is immediately derived from percep- percep- tion. Thus, when I affirm the existence of an external body and thereby perceive it, I do not necessarily, with the same perception, affirm either myself or the act of perception. Fichte is there- fore in error when he says that we perceive the Ego and the non-Ego contemporaneously and in the same act. 192 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Of the three activities intellectually distinguishable in feeling {seiisione) Rosmini would confine the term sensation to the third. " We have reserved the word sensation^' he says, "to mark simply the sentient subject in so far as it feels, using the phrase sensitive perception of bodies to designate the same sensation, in so far as it is a passion [7r«0oc], which, as such, has necessarily a relation to some- thing external and different from the sentient subject. YiorxcQ., first, sensitive perception of bodies, and, second, i^itel- lective perception. Now, in the case of sensitive perception . . . our spirits seize and envelop the bodies themselves, which is not true of intellective perception, except in so far as it presupposes the other as matter. . . . Sensitive perception is an element (the matter^ which enters into intellective perception. Intellective perception, therefore, composed of matter and form, cannot be said to resemble sejisitive per- ception, because the latter is not co-ordinate with the former — but subordinate to it — an element, not a copy, of it " (New Essay, vol. ii. § 453, nn,). In regard to the order of perception and the fact that, in external perception, we are not obliged to perceive our- selves, Rosmini lays down three propositions, viz., "first, experience demonstrates that every action of a limited being has a term, either external to such being, or, at least, distinct from the beginning of the action ; . . . second, if every fresh action of beings proceeds from within and is directed outwards, this must be true also of the action which the human intellect performs in perceiving ; third, the term of perception is its object, and the object of per- ception means that which we perceive and cognize in per- ception." He then adds : " Hence follows the corollary that what is perceived in the act of perception is the object of the same, neither more nor less. If, indeed, we should perceive anything else besides the object of perception, this thing would at once be object by the very definition. Hence, man, the intellective being, does not, with his first perception, perceive himself, but only something else that is presented to him as object. This is confirmed by experience. Man .perceives himself only by a reflected movement, in TERM AND OBJECT. 193 which he turns back upon himself ; the external world, on the contrary, he perceives with a direct perception, in which, so to speak, he leaves and forgets himself, to go out and cognize the world in which his perception terminates, and in which he becomes limited by the limitation of his object. As, therefore, the external world is not the percipient Ego^ so the perception of the external world and that of the Ego are two perceptions essentially distinct ; and it is impossible for a man to perceive these two objects for the first time with one and the same perception, not only because they are essentially distinct, but also because they are presented to him by two essentially different feelings — the one by an internal feeling, the other by external sensa- tions. Whence it is that the act of perceiving in these two perceptions has a contrary direction. The act of perceiving the world goes from within outward ; that of perceiving the Ego has a direction, so to speak, from within to within. Now, since one and the same act cannot have two contrary directions, it is absurd to say that a single first percep- tion perceives the Ego and the \vorld in one. What may have given occasion to this false belief is the confusion between feeling and intellective perception " {Neiv Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1433-1436). We have already alluded to the distinction which Ros- mini draws between ter7n and object (under §§ 15, 18). It will be well here to make it more clear by giving his own account of it. " No other faculty," he says, " except the understanding, has for its term an object. By object we understand a term seen in such a way that the seer sees neither himself nor any relation to himself (that is, as intuiting subject), and that himself . , . remains excluded and forgotten, while the term stands by itself and appears as existing in an absolute mode. It appears simply as being {essente), and, although it is an intuited being, never- theless, by merely looking at it, we cannot know or say that it is intuited : in order to know this, we must perform an act of reflection upon the intuition. This is the marvellous property of the understanding, that which distinguishes it from every other faculty, and especially from that of feeling. o 194 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. The faculty of feeling has for its term the felt. But the felt involves an essential relation to the sentient, so that it is impossible to conceive that the felt exists without implicitly conceiving the sentient and its act. Hence the felt is not object, but simple term, and the faculty of feeling has not the essential property of the faculty of understand- ing " {Logic, §§ 303-305). This is one of the most original, characteristic, and important distinctions in the whole of Rosmini's philosophy, and one that saves him from many ambiguities into which other philosophers have fallen. Without it, it is impossible to state the essential quality of intelligence as distinct from sensation. To hear most philosophers talk, one would suppose that sensation was capable of distinguishing between subject and object, which, if it were true, would render intelligence a superfluity. Aristotle is guilty of this confusion. He speaks of the objects of sense as well as of the objects of intelligence (jraXiv av rig airop^amv £( to. avriKii/ieva Trporepa rovnov L^i]Tr]Tiov, olov TO alG6i]-6v rov ala9i]TtKov koX to voi]Tov rod vor^TiKov." De An.\. 1,7; 402 b, 14 sqq.). The same confusion is the source of all the errors of Kant. This philosopher says, "The faculty (receptivity) of receiving representations in the way in which we are affected by objects is called sense {Sijuilichkeit). By means of the senses, therefore, objects are given to us, and it alone furnishes us with intuitions ; by the understanding they are thought, and from it spring concepts " {Kritik der reinen Vern., pt. i. § l). Just as if things were objects before they were thought or conceived ! It is needless to say that the same confusion runs through nearly all modern philosophy. Source of Whence arises Fichte's error ? From not Fichics enor, havino^ carefully distinouished what takes place in confusion . * ^ ^ . . \ between feeling from what takes place in intellective per- feeling . , , , . and per- ception. It IS most truc that in our sensation ception. FICHTE'S ERROR. 195 there is not only the external agent (the outer world), but also the limitation and modification of ourselves. This is the nature of corporeal feeling, always double, made up of that which feels and that which is felt. But feeling and intellective perception are different in nature. Notwithstand- ing that two beings concur in feeling, perception limits itself to one of them at a time. It is by this means that it distinguishes the one from the other. Perception terminates in what it affirms ; when it affirms the external world it terminates in that. If the case were otherwise, it would con- found the external world with itself, instead of separating the two, as it does. I say separate, and not distinguish. In order to separate the external Perception world, it is enough to have perceived it and reflection nothing else, whereas in order to distinguish it we guishes, its must negate ourselves, which implies that we ^011^ must have perceived ourselves, since we cannot °^ ^^^' negate what we do not know. And it was nothing else but the misuse of the word distinguish that rendered Fichte's sophism plausible. The truth is that, when we perceive one thing, entirely ignoring all the rest, it is already thereby separated from all the others, without our being obliged positively to negate them or distinguish them from it. Fichte's error, therefore, arose from a confusion between feeling and sense-perception — another error to be laid at the door of sensism. " Fichte, a disciple of Kant's," says Rosmini, " undertook to evolve everything from the subject. . . . Kant had divided the activity of the spirit into so many forms or 196 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. partial activities. He had even admitted passivity in thought (perhaps without observing that he did so), and had excluded from it noilmeiia, things as they are in themselves. Fichte concentrated anew the action of thought, considered it in its unity, and propounded the doctrine that everything was pure activity. In this system the activity of the Ego was the beginning, the middle, and the end of the philo- sophy which was called Transcendental Idealism. The Ego^ according to Fichte, posits itself, which is equivalent to, creates itself But this first act, which the Ego performs in positing itself, though simple, is, nevertheless, complex. The Ego does not posit itself without positing, in oppo- sition to itself, the non-Ego. This identical act, which renders it conscious of itself, is that which renders it con- scious of the external world and the things outside of itself, collected under the designation of non-Ego, or, to speak more correctly, the act which renders it conscious of something different from itself renders it also conscious of itself. Now, to be self-conscious, in this system, is the same thing as to be. Before being conscious, therefore, the Ego is not, since the essence of the Ego is to be conscious. The Ego, therefore, by the act of its own consciousness, posits, creates itself.* But the act of its own consciousness, which constitutes the Ego, cannot, according, to Fichte, take place without the act whereby the external world, or the otJier of the subject Ego, that is, the non-Ego, is known. Hence in the first act of the Ego, in that first act in which the Ego feels itself, it also feels, or, to use Fichte's expression, thinks, the eternal world. All that man knows is the Ego and the non-Ego. Now, the non-Ego does not exist before the Ego, but at the same time with it. ... ' The act of my spirit,' said Fichte, justly, 'is anterior to the fact of consciousness. We must not, therefore, set out with the fact of conscious- * In a note to this, Rosmini says, " Fichte's error here consists in not having observed that the first act whereby the Ego exists, and, in general, the first act whereby anything exists, though an act of the thing itself, is nevertheless an act created by a cause antecedent to the thing." It is almost incredible now- adays, but Fichte actually says, "The Ego originally absolutely posits its own being" {Gi-iindlage der gesamtnten U'issenschaftslehfe, Leipzig, 1794, p. 13. On page 1 1 may be found some of the most puerile logical fallacies on record). FICHTE'S ERROR. 197 ness, but with the activity of the thought, which returns upon itself, that is, upon its own consciousness.' . . . But here there is a manifest ambiguity. The point of departure of the reasoning and the point of departure of the human spirit are two different things.* Reasoning cannot set out from anything but the fact of consciousness, because rea- soning, especially philosophic reasoning, sets out, not from what a man knows, but from what he observes or knows that he knows. Now, the chronological order of observatkms or reflections ... is the inverse of that of direct conscioiis- ness.\ Man, therefore, reflects first on the fact of his own consciousness, and then on the act by which he reflects : hence this reflexive act of the spirit is observed after, although it exists before, the observance of the act of con- sciousness. The first thing, therefore, observed by the philosopher who meditates on himself is the fact of con- sciousness ; this, therefore, is the point of departure in reasoning. But afterwards the philosopher asks himself, ' How did I observe the fact of my own consciousness.-*' Then he replies to himself, ' By an act of reflection on it.' This act of reflection, therefore, is a point of departure in thought higher than the fact of consciousness known by reflection. " Be it observed, I have said, ' a point of departure in thojight,' not ' a point of departure in the spirit.' This distinction escaped Fichte's notice. He set out from the reflection of the thought upon itself, as the first radical act whereby all the acts of the human spirit may be explained. Hence he reduced everything to thought and even confounded thought and feeling, . . . which shows that even in the bowels of Transcendental Idealism sensism has laid its egg. If Fichte had not made this confusion, he would not have used this formula to indicate the point of departure of the human spirit, ' the activity of thought which reflects upon itself,' but would have used this other, ' the activity of thought which falls upon * See under § 9, where four points of departure are distinguished, t Cf. Aristotle, " ou yap ravjhv irporepoy ttj (pvaei Kal irphs 7]fia.s ■irp6T(pov, oiiSe yvoipijxwTipov koX rifuv yvaipi/xurfpov" {A/ia/. Fosi,, i. I ; 7' t), 34 sq.). 198 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. feeling,* and in this latter it would have been impossible for him to place the point of departure of the spirit, because he would at once have observed that feeling must precede the act of thought which observes it. On the other hand, 'the thought which reflects upon itself,' as the point of departure of the human spirit, involves a contradiction in terms, inasmuch as it makes the thought which reflects identical with the thought upon which the reflection is made. It, therefore, concentrates and confounds the active and the passive in a single essence, even making the passive active and the active passive, which is a clear contradiction. . . . "If Fichte had been properly acquainted with the act of reflection, he would have seen that no act really returns upon itself, but always upon a previous act, which becomes its object. Let us consider an act of reflection. This returns upon another act, which may likewise be an act of reflection, in which case this latter is likewise reflected upon another act, and so on. Finally, however, we must come to an act of first reflection, and this must reflect itself upon a direct act of thought, otherwise we should go on ad infi- nitum, which is absurd. Now, the direct act of thought is inticition and perception. Perception is an act of thought in which are united tvv^o affections : first, corporeal sensation ; second, the intuition of universal being. Previously, there- fore, to any reflection, there exist feeling and intuition, which are the foundation of everything ; in other words, first, an intellective intuition ; second, a corporeal sensation. And these two affections, united by the single activity of the spirit, form the most simple perception, and upon this the reflection of thought begins to act. But this analysis was omitted by Fichte, and herein, in my opinion, lies the source of his errors. " When I perform an act with my thought, with this act I know the object in which my act terminates ; but the act itself remains unknown to me. In order that I may know it, I must perform a second reflex act on the first act, so that the latter may become an object ; but then, in the same way, the second reflex act remains unknown to me. KNOWLEDGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS. 199 If I reflect on the second act, I perform a third act, enabling me to know the second, which makes itself the object of the third, but not to know itself ; and in this way we may go on as long as we choose, so that we may lay down, as the law of our manner of knowing, this great canon : Every act of our understanding makes us know the object in which it terminates, but no act makes us know itself* Seeing that this is the case, we are met with the question : Are we not, then, conscious in the act by which we know an object ? We must observe that this question differs from this other : In the act in which we know an object have we a feeling ? To have consciousness is to have knowledge of an act as ours, that is, of our act, and, at the same time, of ourselves as performing it. And this knowledge we cannot have save through another act of reflection. Feeling, on the contrary, does not require any operation on our part ; but feeling is blind. Most men, however, find it impossible to persuade themselves that we may perform an act without even having a consciousness of it.t The reason why most men. think in this way is, that * It follows from this that the first act of knowledge, viz. , intuition, is not knowledge, that is, does not know itself. f Sir W. Hamilton says, " An act of knowledge may be expressed by the formula / kno-v, an act of consciousness by the formula / knoio that I knmv; but as it is impossible for us to know without at the same time knowing that we know ; so it is impossible to know that we know without our actually knowing." That the former of these acts is impossible is clearly not true. Sir William overlooked the fact that to know, and to know that we know, are two distinct and separate acts. Children know very many things ; but so long as they do not clearly know what knowing is, they cannot know that they know. Much confusion has arisen from confounding consciousness of know- ledge with knowledge itself. Herbert Spencer, who is fond of confounding the different acts of the mind, says, in so many words, " To be conscious is to think ; to think is to put together impressions and ideas " {Principles of Psy- chology, vol. ii. ch. xxvi. § 377). Now, if to think be merely to put together impressions and ideas, it is plain that the impressions and ideas themselves are not thought, and that we are not conscious of them. Thinking consciousness, therefore, is the putting together of things that are unknown. In this view, consciousness would be a mere mechanical force acting blindly, and ideas having an existence outside of it and independent of it, would become real entities — in a word, Platonic ideas. But any one who has ever seriously reflected upon mental processes knows that all consciousness takes the form of judgment, and that judgment is the analysis of a synthesis formed previously in thought but outside of consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is only one 200 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. when we perform an act with our minds (spirit), we can at once reflect on it and observe it, or, at least, we think we can, and this act which we perform in reflecting and ob- serving we are not aware of. Hence we have a tendency to believe that this act of our minds is observed and known by itself, and not by an act superadded by us ; whereas the truth is that, in itself, it is unknown and unobserved, although at the moment we can, or think we can, at our pleasure, render it known to us by reflecting on it, and so observe it. Now, Fichte knew most clearly this error into which most men fall ; but, to avoid it, he ran into the opposite extreme. He was not satisfied with saying that this act of our minds was not observed and reflected on through itself, but affirmed that it did not exist at all. He, therefore, gave to the reflection of the mind an activity to produce it, and even tried to identify it . . . with reflection itself. We, on the other hand, affirm that every act of the mind exists even before being reflected upon and known, but only as a feeling. Hence in any act of the intelligent spirit there is an idea and there is a feeling. The object intuited is that which is illustrated and is termed idea; the act whereby we perceive an object in our consciousness is a blind feeling, and nothing more. Now, nothing is known without an idea. Man, therefore, so long as he has only feelings, really knows nothing, and, in particular, the con- dition of man prior to reflection on himself is a condition . . . which it is impossible to observe. For this reason, it seems a state of pure non-existence, whereas it is merely a state unknown to us. Hence Fichte, confounding the not- known with the non-existent, said that the Ego, by a re- flection of its own, posited itself with the same act with which it posited the non-Ego. It is of no avail to say that element in thought, one part of the process involved in it. When I think or cognize a white horse, I do not first think the white, and then the horse, and then put the two together in order to be conscious of them. I think the white horse as a whole, and, in order to be conscious of what I think, I analyze that whole into white and horse, and express the fact that I have found them already ntiited, by saying, The horse is vohite. If I had to put together the two elements, it would never occur to me to express that fact by, The horse is white. I should say, " I have made a horse white." REFLECTION AN ACCIDENT. 201 the essence of the Ego consists in cognition or thinking, for the Ego is originally not a thought of itself, but a feeling ; and by making feeling absorb thought, without noting the broad distinction between them, Fichte fell into all his strange and profound mistakes. If, indeed, the intelligent Ego has also an intellective feeling, it does not therewith ter- minate in itself, but in universal being. And this elemen- tary thought cannot be taken for Fichte's reflection, since it has nothing reflex about it, and is the immovable and perpetual part of man. Here, however, it seems that Fichte made an approach to the truth, and caught a distant glimpse of it, when he uttered the excellent words : * While thoughts pass, there is in man an immutable part which contemplates'" i^Neiv Essay, vol. iii. §§ 1388-1395). " We must not confound the consciousness of the soul with the soul itself. Still less ought we to confound with the soul that act with which it says // or, again, we must not confound the refleetioji of the soul with the soul itself. Consciousness, Ego pronounced, reflection, are ac- cidents, not the substance of the soul, which, as a reality, is prior to all these its accidental modifications. The con- fusion of these with the soul itself is the source of all the aberrations and extravagances in which the German school lost, and still goes on losing, itself. Reinhold having pro- posed the principle of consciousness, Fichte reduced the soul itself to consciousness, and thus converted it into a reflection ; but since reflection is only an accident, all sub- stance disappeared from his philosophy, and left in his hand mere accidents. Hence he himself, at the end of all his reasonings, came to the conclusion that ' No bein"- exists, but merely images ; every reality is a dream, and thought is the dream of that dream.' From this labyrinth, German philosophy has never been able to extricate itself, " Fichte began with this proposition, which contains the error indicated, ' The Ego posits itself.' * The proposition • '■^ Das Ich sctzt sich sdbst, und es ist, vermoge dieses blossen Setzens durch sich selbst ; und umgekehrt : Das Ich ist, und es sctzt sein Seyn, vermoge seines blossen Seyns. — Es ist zugleich das Ilandehide, und das Produkt der Handhing ; das Thatige, und das was durch die Thatigkcit hervorgebracht wird " {^Gi-undlagc der gesammtcn Wisscnchaftslekre, p. lo). One can hardly blame Roamini for calling such talk "delirium." 202 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. is manifestly absurd, because it supposes that the Eg operates before it exists. Now, certainly no being can posit, that is, create itself. He ought to have said, ' The soul posits the Ego,' because this proposition would signify, The soul affirms itself, and in so doing changes itself into an Ego, because the Ego is the soul affirmed by itself. Thus the Ego is distinguished from the soul, the Ego being the soul invested with that reflection whereby it affirms itself. Now, there is nothing strange in the soul's pro- ducing this reflection ; but it is passing strange that the soul should be the Ego, that is, the reflected soul, even before it has made the reflection in question. At the same time, since the man who philosophizes is already a fully constituted Ego, it is, of course, by no means easy for him to dissolve himself, so to speak, and to persuade himself that his Ego is compound, that it is an accidental, and not an essential, state of the soul, or, to speak more correctly, that it is the soul constituted in accidental conditions " {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 72-74). The definition of Soicl is given further on (§§ 1 21-124). The definition of Ego runs thus : " The Ego is an active principle in a given nature, in so far as it has consciousness of itself, and pronounces the act of consciousness" {Psychology, vol. i. § 55; cf. Anthropology, §§ 768-805, sqq.). In order to be self- conscious, that is, to be an Ego, the subject must have combined the feeling of mcity {7)i£ita, what the Germans call IcJihcif) with ideal being as intuited, and then, by re- flection, have analyzed the object thus formed into the judg- ment, " Meity is." But existent Meity is precisely what we mean by Ego. Of course, the act whereby the subject constitutes the Ego, by subsuming itself under being, is in its beginning unconscious. Its term is self-consciousness. ^6. Scheiiing's ^ proper understanding of the nature of per- asJeriin-r ccption shows also the erroneousness of the finite'^'' doctrine of Schclling, which has recently been SCHELLIXGS ERROR. 203 revamped and reproduced. Schellinor accepted cannot be '■ '- o> i perceived Fichte's two objects of perception, and added a without -' ^ ^ , the infinite. third. Fichte's object of perception, though two- fold, was finite. SchelHng affirmed that the finite could not be perceived without the infinite with which it was correlated. Now, Fichte attributed to intellective perception what, in reality, belongs to feeling. In like manner, Schelling attributed to intellective per ceptio7t what belongs to reasoning. Neither the one nor the other understood the Origin of r. . ....... 1 ^ . , this error, nature 01 perception, which limits itseli to a simple confusion object, without being obliged to extend itself to intei- the other objects connected with it. Perception p^erception terminates in a finite object, without ever con- masoning. sidering that it is finite, or that, in order to exist, it requires an infinite. It terminates in its im- mediate finite object, without considering that this is an effect and, therefore, could not exist without a cause. It considers it as a being, adding to it the essence of being, without ever considering that, but for this essence, it would not be. All these are subsequent reflections, reasonings, which have perception for their object indeed, but are not themselves perception. Rosmini devotes a good many pages of his Nexu Essay to a discussion of Sclielling's system (vol. iii. §§ 1 396-1407) ; but as it has vanished into thin air, along with many other creations of the German philosophic brain, the criticism need only be referred to. 204 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. How reasoning finds the limits, contin- gency, etc., of perceived beings. Schelling saw dimly but could not express the fact that the mind, prior to all reason- ings, must have something complete and universal. 11' We have now shown that in perception we perceive one object apart from all the rest. It remains to be seen why, In spite of this, we sub- sequently discover from reasoning that this par- ticular object, this reality, cannot subsist by itself, and that, if it Is finite, it Is necessarily conditioned by an infinite ; if it Is contingent, by a necessary, which is Its cause, etc., etc. This happens be- cause reflection, turning back upon the object perceived, compares it with the essence of being, which Is the light of the mind, and, in so doing, recognizes that in that object the essence of being is not fully realized. It thereby recognizes that the subsistence of this object Is conditioned by another orreater belnor. It is clear from this that the last- mentioned German philosopher had a glimpse of a truth, without being able to state it with precision. He saw that the human mind must, from the very beginning of its reasonings, have present to it something full, complete, uni- versal, to which, as to a type, It could refer that which Is modal, incomplete, relative ; otherwise it would be impossible to explain how we ever came to be aware that the world, for example, is con- tingent and requires a cause, that it Is finite, in other words, immeasurably removed from the infinite, etc., etc. Of course. In order to know this, the mind must possess the perfect type of being to base these judgments upon. But the German philosopher was not able to distinguish //OIF WE KNOW THE INFINITE. 205 intuition from perception, the ideal mode of being from the real mode, the essence of being from Its realization, the ground of subsistence from sub- sistence itself, that which has being, because it receives it from perception, from that which is being. He, accordingly, attributed to pe7'ception what belongs to intuitiofi or else to the com- parison of the peixeived with the intuited, which is the work of reasoning. He concluded that the human mind naturally perceives the absolute, whereas it only perceives the absohUe ground, ideal being. And inasmuch as in perception we hold beings apart, and limiting distinctions belong to the order of reality, he held that, in what he supposed to be primitive and natural perception, Ego, non-Ego, and absolute being were already distinguished, whereas the truth is that in ideal being there is no distinction, no limitation, no mode. It is being, in one unlimited form. In spite of this, ideal being is sufficient for the mind, not only because it renders possible the perception of particular things, but also because it enables it by reasoning to know the limits of the objects of perception and the necessity of the infinite and the absolute. The error which RosminI here criticizes is the one with which his own system has most frequently been charged, viz., that it makes the absolute the form of human reason, and thereby results in pure pantheism. There is certainly no error against which Rosmini has more carefully and completely guarded himself Not only has he repeatedly declared that pantheism is an erroneous and absurd system {T/teos., vol. i. § 457 ; New Essaj, vol. iii. § ii/^, n. 3) ; but 2o6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. he has taken the utmost care that his own system shall not lead to it. He admits, indeed, that his ideal being is an appurtenance iappartenenza) of the Absolute Being {Theos., vol. i. § 455, etc., etc.), and that if this being "were to put forth its own activity and so complete and terminate itself, we should see God ;" but he adds, "until this happen, and so long as we see as imperfectly as we naturally do this being, this first activity which hides from us its first term, we can only say, in the admirable words of St. Augustine, that in this life, ' certa, quamvis adhuc tenuissima forma cognitionis attingimus Deum ' " * {Neiu Essay, vol. iii. § 1 178). Rosmini writes a whole article to show that " The self-manifest being, communicated to man, is not God." t In another place he says, " Object being, thinkable being, self-intelligible being, are expressions almost synony- mous. Hence the self-intelligible is merely ideal being; real being is INTELLIGIBLE BY participation [fxtOi'iti]. To this principle there is a single exception, and even it is not properly an exception : God, even in his reality, is self- intelligible. Now, this happens because in his ideal essence subsistence is included ; whence it cannot happen that sub- sistence or reality is ever in God disunited from ideality. It is, therefore, a most grave and pernicious error to say that God is an idea or even THE Idea, a word which, in the language of men, does not mean reality, whereas God is MOST REAL. And why do men use this word idea ? Why did they invent this word ideal in opposition to reaH Be- cause, not having, by nature, the vision of the most real being, they have no experience of the necessary nexus between ideal being and complete real being, and, therefore, * De libera Arbih-io, ii. 15. t Theosophy, vol. iv. ch. vi. art. I, §§ 26-30. In a note to this article, Rosmini replies, in a very subtle way, to the objections urged against his system, as pantheistic, by Vincenzo Gioberti, and completely disposes of them. In spite of this, a Jesuit has recently repeated, almost in the very same words, the same objections, and drawn from them the desired conclusion, namely, that Rosmini is a pantheist {La Reforma del/a Lilosofia promossa dalF Enciclica Aetcrni Patris di SS. Leone Papa XIIL, Commentario per Giovanni Maria Cornoldi. Bologna, 1880). If the philosophy of Rosmini must be con- demned, would it not be respectable to find at least some charge against it which he has not answered ? He cannot now answer any before any earthly tribunal. PERCEPTION OF EXTERNAL BODIES. 207 can only infer the existence of such a ncx?is by means of reasoning. Hence the invention of the word idea and its constant use suffice to overthrow the error of those who attribute to man the vision of God himself in this present life" {Psychology, vol. ii. § 1343). When Rosmini calls ideal being an "appurtenance of God," or, as he elsewhere does, " something of the Absolute Being," * he does not go so far as Albertus Magnus, who says, "The active Intellect, which is light, is a certain image and similitude of the first cause, that is, of God, by virtue of which the soul brings intelligibles {intellectd) to the intellectual light, abstracting the intelligible forms from all the obscurity caused by material appendages, and placing them in its own simple being." f The same philosopher says, " So far as the soul stands under the light of the intelligence of the first cause, so far the active intellect flows therefrom." % (Cf. under § 182.) But now vi^e must clear up better the laws of Defence perception and reasoning, and arm them effectually of perc'ep- , , . . f. . _ , , tion and agamst the objections ot sceptics. Let us begin reasoning with the perception of external bodies. At the objections 11 r .of sceptics. moment when we become aware 01 a sensation which we had not before, our intellectual attention turns to the agent, to the force which modifies us, * Theosophy, vol. i. § 454 ; cf. §§ 292 sq., 294 sq. t "Intellectus agens, qui est lux, est imago at similitudo quredam primne causae, sive Dei, cujus virtute anima intellecta agit ad lumen intellectuale, abstrahens formas intellectas ab omni obumbrationeab appenditiis materialibus causata, et ponens eas in simplici esse sue " i^De N^atura et Oi'igitte Aiii/iia; ii. tr. 15, q. 93, m. 2). The last word here is ambiguous. X " Secundum quod anima statsub luce intelligentiae causae primce, sic fluit ab ea intellectus agens " {lbid.,iY. 13, q. 77, m. 3). In the language of the Arabs there is nothing equivalent to the distinction between intellectus and intelU- gentia ; but in the Latin translations of their works intellectus is used to mean vov Sit/afits or possible intellect, intclligcntia, to mean vovs itoiririKos or active . intellect. See Brenlano, Die Fsychologie aes Aristotclcs, p. 8, n. 20. 2oS PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. In external sensation we feel within us a force which is not our- selves. This enables us to affirm that a being exists without confound- ing it with ourselves. It is very certain that we feel within us a force which is not ourselves, but is, on the contrary, opposed to us. We are passive ; it is active. Here be it observed that this force enables us to affirm that there exists a being, without affirming that this beinof is ourselves. We are still unknown to ourselves. And if we are not prepared to admit this, let us accept it merely as a supposition. I say that, even if our intellectual attention does not fix itself at all upon ourselves, but concen- trates itself upon the agent which operates in our feeling, we shall affirm that this agent is a real being, and shall not confound it with ourselves, since, even admitting that we have a feeling of ourselves, we do not, according to the supposition, fix our attention upon it. Hence it is not neces- sary to suppose the contrary. Rosmini divides the objects of knowledge as follows : — (i) those which we perceive ; (2) those which we represent to ourselves by intellective imagination. " The beings dif- ferent from ourselves which we perceive are — (i) our sub- jective body ; (2) extra-subjective body ; (3) an entity made up of corporeality and spirituality." This is not the place to speak of Rosmini's theory respecting the manner in which we cognize the third class of objects, which, if not altogether bodies, are, at all events, extra-subjective ; but it will be well here to make clear what he means by this last term. We have seen that the only object of intelli- gence is ideal being — that this is the very essence of objectivity, and the means by which all other things are objectified. All other beings are, therefore, subjects. They are not, however, all 07ie subject. On the contrary, they are numerous, and each is external, that is, extra-subjective, to the other. All contingent reality is, therefore, either sub- SUBJECTIVE AND EXTRA-SUBJECTIVE. 209 jective or extra-subjective. One subject can never directly become the object of another. In order to do so, it must be combined with ideal being and appear in the form of a concept. Nevertheless, one subject may communicate with another through feeling, that is, make itself felt within the sphere of the other's activity. " We, as subsistent, sensitive beings, are subjects united with, and in communication with, other beings, so that the other real beings exercise their action upon us, modifying our feeling, and hence the agents in us are those which we know as beings foreign to us " {New Essay, vol. iii. § 1 188), It is thus clear that Rosmini means by extra-subjective what is usually termed objective, viz., the external world. Extra-subjective is, of course, a negative term, and this for the reason that, until the extra- subjective is rendered objective by union with being, it is a mere negation, a non-being.* The advantage to philosophic thought from the clear distinction between the extra-sub- jective and the objective is very great. 79- Now, this peculiarity of perception, that it is rerception always limited to a single being, which therefore bridge can never be confounded with others, enables uSusanT^he to explain how we know the corporeal world. worW,^ The difficulties advanced by the idealists all arose d"fficuUies from considering bodies apart from perception, aris?fnM™ from not knowing the nature of perception, and |^°"^^'j',^^'"'' from neo^lectinor to analyze it. Of course, if the^^'°'''^r <=> o «' ' apart from world be looked at apart from all relation to per- percep- ^ ^ tion. ception, we shall never know that it exists, because (to use a famous phrase) the bridge between it and us is broken down. This bridge is perception. * Non-being is not nothing, but the simple reahty regarded as separate froni being, which is its cogniz> p o \l% tn s.^-^ O O O o ^brS r-" .-— _ ci ri rt S 3 3 3 C C C CJ (U o 1) ui'Min'ji >- tN ro ^ o 15 >, >^ J H ,1^ 77:; ^ ^ o "o ^ r^ h () x b £ '^ C tu "7^ A 3 U C 3 C3 > (L) rt Fi lU < ^ C/2 T siuauxoj^ _ C3 >, C c o c o o "suoipunj; •^ .ii t: d rt -r; ,_^ u d (U 3 £ g C/J Cli V t^a c c c >- =5 X.2: F. £-5 •suoipunj; %' V* OJ F^ hn ^, i^ a _c •suoipunj; •1 E ^ ^ -0 5 'a £ ^ _^ FEELING OF CONTINUITY. 295 the medicative forces of nature are due to the vital instinct, and the perturbing forces to the sensual or orectic {Anthrop., §§ 401, 414). The table on the preceding page will show the various functions of the vital and sensual instincts. 136. The union of the animal principle with its Principle corporeal term is so close that the one is incon- in \h&^ ceivable without the other, and therefore, although form a the one is not the other, but, on the contrary, is 5e"|g^. opposed to the other, the two form one being, one animated whole, and when we make the term a being apart or entirely separate, it is nothing more than a mere product of abstraction. Nevertheless, in the term of the animal, we Three 1 . . ... , . 1 • 1 • kinds of must distmguish three thmgs, which give occa- feeling in sion to three kinds of feeling : first, the corporeal ^o^^^J"^^ continuous — the term of the feeling of the cor- toAree^ poreally extended ; second, the internal movement of"he"sen- of atoms or molecules, or of parts of the cor- ^^^^"^ ^^^'^' poreally extended — term of the feeling of excita- tion ; and, third, the harmonious continzmtion of said movement — term of the organic feeling. In regard to the Feeling of Continuity, Rosmini says, " If we imagine a single element of matter, extended and perfectly hard, as we suppose the first elements to be, then, even although such an element were to fall under our senses (which it certainly never could on account of its smallness), it would give no sign of life, because it would be unable to 296 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. give to itself, or to receive within it, any movement. At the same time, its sentient principle would be simple ; the term of this principle would be the minute space deter- mined by the element. In this felt term there would be homogeneity and uniformity, supposing the matter of the element in question to be equally dense in all its parts ; there would be difference of intensity, supposing the density variable in the different strata or points of the element. In this little life would be found, in its perfection, the characteristic of contimnty" {Psychology, vol. i. § 535). In a note on the above passage, the author says, " This difference of density in a perfectly hard continuous is barely conceivable. ... If, making another hypothesis, we suppose that in every primitive element there is a kind of centre corresponding to Boscovich's simple points, from which emanates attraction or retention, and that this mani- fests its effect in a given ratio — for example, in the inverse ratio of the squares of the distances — it is true that the element would be more hard and more dense in propor- tion as the matter composing it was nearer to the centre ; nevertheless, it will remain true that, if these elements are supposed of a given minimum size, they will in every part be so dense and so hard as to be indivisible by any ex- ternal force, and, therefore, real atoms (physically indivisible). It is easy to understand the necessity of this effect when we consider that, at the smallest distances, attraction increases with a progression that surpasses all imagination, and in comparison with which mechanical forces are almost infinitesimal, while forces can be externally applied to the atom only to the most limited extent, on account of its smallness and lightness. In like manner, the physical and chemical forces are almost nothing, that is, if we suppose them all to operate (as we believe they do) according to the same laws that govern universal attraction, or to present the appearance of so operating. Inasmuch as these forces have to be applied to the atoms from without, the body applied to the atom is more distant from the centre of attraction of the atom than the matter forming the atom, and hence this body must exert a less force uj^on that matter than the A TOMS. 297 centre of the atom, supposed to be the centre of attraction. Moreover, if we suppose attraction to act at a distance (a notion irreconcilable with our mode of perception) it can exercise on the atom only that very small force sufficient to attract it ; so that, although the whole atom, being as light as it is small, may be attracted by such forces, it can never be rent asunder by them. "Through the condensation or attracting centre, sup- posed to exist in the atom, it seems possible to explain why atoms which are in contact with each other (a possible supposition) do not unite so as to become perfectly hard, but may still be sundered. Indeed, if there were not in the interior of the atom various degrees of condensation of matter, it would not be easy, without denying the contact of atoms, as some have done, or having recourse to a repulsive force, which would seem as if it must be derivative, to explain how atoms, although in contact, still remain distinct and separable. If, on the contrary, we suppose condensation of matter to increase towards the centre of the atom, we readily understand how the internal matter can be no further rarefied, and this for the simple reason that near the surface, at which the atoms touch each other, the matter, though continuous and impenetrable, is most rare, and, therefore, cannot condense itself there, being always held with greater force by the dense matter nearest to the centres of the two atoms that are in contact. It remains for the mathematician to submit these postulates to calculation, and to discover how small the primitive elements must be in order that they may be perfectly hard, that is, indivisible and distinct from each other, even admit- ting them to be in real contact." Difference of density in a continuous seems unthinkable ; but difference of intensity of attraction will answer even better the ends of Rosmini's argument. In regard to the Feeling of Excitation, Rosmini says, " If to the simple animate element [the atom] we add other elements likewise animate, we may readily conceive new phenomena. Let us suppose these elements to be of diverse forms. United together by their own attraction or 298 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. retention, they will form various polyhedrons, according to the forms of the elements which unite. If we suppose the forms of the elements regular, there will result regular polyhedrons. But these regular polyhedrons will differ from each other, not only in form, but also in density, and hence in specific gravity. TJie reason of this will be clear, if we consider that on the variety of form among the primitive combining elements these two accidents depend : (i) Whether the surfaces in contact shall be greater or smaller, and, hence, whether the union of these elements shall be more or less firm. (2) Whether there shall remain in the interior of the crystals larger or smaller intervals, on which, of course, would depend the greater or less specific gravity of these primitive crystals. " Let the combining elements be only two. The bination even of the primitive elements must give us molecules having properties different from those of the primitive elements ; still more, of course, the ternation, quaternation, etc, of these elements. If we suppose that these first elements, even when they are in contact, do not unite with sufficient force to render the matter between the elements perfectly hard, we shall at once have new accidents. In these molecules the continuous term of feeling, to which corresponds a single sentient principle, is more extended than in that of the primitive elements. It is true that, if the particle were composed of only two or three elements, perpetual motion from within it could never begin, and hence vital movements would never take place. But, if the two or three elements, without separating, are moved by an external impulse, in such a way that their adhering faces slightly rub, then the uniform feeling diffused through said elements must necessarily receive an excitation, and, hence, it is not absurd to suppose that there arises in it a sensation, although this is evidenced by no extra-subjective manifesta- tion. Moreover, if we suppose that the two elements, through the violence exerted on them, no longer have their centres of gravity in the greatest possible proximity, it is not absurd to imagine that they are impelled to restore the FEELING OF ORGANIZATION. 299 primitive equilibrium of forces, by the activity of the feehng with which they are invested. The feeling diffused through the two elements is one, by reason of their continuity, and as it resists separation, so it tends to unite itself, and, hence, to hold the elements united and inosculated in the greatest possible number of points, through that moment of the organizing functions which we call retention, and of which we shall speak afterwards. Here then, besides the charac- teristic of contimdty, we should have that of excitation ; but this would be momentary and accidental, having no system of stimuli succeeding each other, and keeping in continuous, regular and harmonious motion the elements composing the little group supposed." {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 5 36-540). The Feeling of Orga7iization Rosmini reaches in the following way : — " In the life of two or three, or, at least, of a few elements united in a single molecule, we have, (i) continuity, (2) possibility of excitation, which are two characteristics of life. But, as the excitation in such a case would depend upon the external force causing the elements, without separating, to slide upon and rub against each other, it would be momentary and would excite only a transient sensation, which the spontaneous activity of the sensitive principle would not be able to continue. It is impossible, therefore, to obtain the external phenomena of animal life, unless the living elements unite in a considerable number, a number sufficient to compose a machine more or less complicated — a machine so cunning in its structure that, through the reciprocal actions of organs, there are produced the stimuli which shall perpetuate the motion and, hence, the excitation of the feeling, so that the feeling, harmonically excited, shall both preserve the continuity of the parts and the unity of the organism, and that this, in its turn, shall excite the feeling and maintain it by its own proper excitation. It is plain, from these considerations, that organisatioji, which itself is produced by feeling, gives occasion to the variety of natural beings and the diverse kinds of phenomena which present themselves to man. Hence — ^' First, Compounds made up of few elements cannot 300 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. manifest any forces other than mechanical, physical, and chemical, and it does not seem unlikely that the true cause of these is the feeling inherent in the first elements, not having power to manifest itself otherwise for want of the proper organization. " Second, in compounds made up of a larger number of elements, we ought to begin to observe a certain regularity of organization, such as we find in the minerals, and the similar aggregation which is remarked chiefly in the metals. " Third, if the composition is more complicated, it ought to produce the organization of the vegetables, which are altogether destitute of organs similar to those with which man expresses pleasure, pain, his instincts, etc. But in this organization there is a system of self-reproducing stimuli. All that is wanting is the external signs of feeling felt and signified by man. We cannot, therefore, know what degree of unity, accentration and excitation there is in the feeling which may exist in vegetables. " Fourth, with a more cunning organization we find mani- fested, besides these characteristics, the phenomenon of irritability or contradistention, which, though not capable of manifesting with certainty the existence of feeling, approaches feeling, through the similarity which the move- ments of such irritable or contradistensive bodies have to the spontaneous movements arising from feeling, and in their texture, which resembles that of felt organs. ^^ Fifth and finally, with an organization still more com- plicated and perfect than the preceding, there are mani- fested the extra-subjective phenomena, commonly called animal, which are properly those that certify to the pre- sence of feeling, of the continuance of the term of feeling, of the unity of action in the feeling itself — a unity capable of dominating all movements, which, though not deriving their principle from it, owe to it their continuance and direction. These movements, again, produce the stimuli which re-excite the feeling, when its excitation flags, and restore it to its previous state " {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 541, 542). ANIMATE AND ANIMAL. 301 138. Now, the sensitive principle may be destitute Difference of the last two kinds of feeling, but not of the first, animate If it has only the first and second kinds of feeling, ^mai. it may be said to be animate, but not animal. The distinctive characteristic of the animal is the organic feeling, which requires a suitable organi- zation. We may, therefore, say that the animal, but not that the animate, dies. Rosmini defines the animate as " an immediate extended term of a sentient principle." The animal he defines as " an individual being, endowed with material sense and instinct, with an organization and organico-excitatory movements" {Anthropology, § 45). Distinguishing between elementary and organic souls, he holds that the former cannot be destroyed by any natural force. His grounds for this opinion are two •.first, that, since matter is inconceivable save as the term of a sentient principle or elementary soul, if the elementary souls were annulled, all matter would be annulled at the same time ; second, that, the union between the sensitive principle and its term being immediate, no- thing can either come between them, or act upon either of them, so as to withdraw the one from the other. " When the organic souls are redissolved into the elementary ones through the dissolution of the organized bodies, the existence of the souls does not cease, but is merely trans- formed " {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 66},, 664). From this it will be seen that, according to Rosmini, the unit of natural existence is neither force nor matter, but sentience, and that through this all the material and dynamic phenomena of nature may be explained. 302 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. Laws of essential changes which the animate undergoes in respect of its indi- viduality. 139- Nevertheless, the latter undergoes essential changes in respect to its individuality. These changes may be summed up in the following laws : — (i) Every continuous extended has a single sensitive principle of continuity. This law leads us to the conclusion that, when several atoms come in contact, so as to form a continuous whole, their sensitive principles unite and become one. This new principle contains all the activity of the previous ones, not cancelled but concentrated ; so that, when the one continuous is broken up into several, the principle multiplies itself into several sensitive principles. Here there is no divisioji or composition, but only iniiltiplication and tt7iification. (2) If the internal movement in a given con- tinuous is partial, the principle of the continuous remains one, but the principles of feeling excited become as numerous as the systems of continuous movements. (3) If the internal harmonic movement in the parts of a contimious embrace the whole con- tinuous, this single harmony has a single sentient principle ; but, if the systems of harmonious move- ments in the same continuous are several, then there are several sentient principles, that is, as many as there are different systems, although, of course, they all have for their basis or first act the principle which embraces the whole of the continuous. MULTIPLICATION OF SENTIENT PRINCIPLES. 303 In regard to the multiplication of the sensitive prin- ciple, Rosmini says, " This multiplication of the sentient principle is difficult to understand, because our fancy readily imagines this principle to be a complete and sub- sistent being without the felt, a kind of minute corpuscle. But it is not so. We must destroy in our minds this fantastic being and concentrate our attention upon the nature of the thing. We must consider that in nature there exists only the felt, that with the felt, as such, there is necessarily united the sentient, and that this feels only the felt continuous, without feeling itself ; for the reason that the animal sensnm has no power of self-reflection, since, indeed, the monosyllable j^^ is altogether inapplicable to it. If, therefore, this principle feels only the felt, and if it is sentient only in so far as it feels, it is surely clear that, if the felt be divided into two contiima, the sentient will feel two contiima, but, not feeling itself, it will not be able to maintain its identity in the two sensa, because they are divided. And this is what is meant by multiplication. We must, therefore, conclude that every sensitive soul is simple and indivisible, but that, nevertheless, it is multi- plicable" {Psychology, vol. i. §§ 460, 461). "If the material of feeling divides itself without destroying itself, so that out of a single continuous there are formed two indepen- dent continua furnished with the conditions necessary to preserve continuity and organism, then also the sensitive principle becomes two. In other words, the animal mul- tiplies itself through the multiplication of animate material. This ... is what explains generation and furnishes the general formula under which are comprehended all the different modes of multiplication that are met with in the animal kingdom" {Anthropology, §§ 340,341). "The perfection of an animal depends upon the variety, unity, and intensity of its feeling. . . . Hence the perfect animals have only one sensitiv^c centre, and their multipli- cation can take place only through the formation in them of a new centre independent of the first " {Ibid., § 342 ; cf. Theosophy, vol. v. § 331). 304 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. The human soul, in so far as it is intellec- tive, is united to its own body by an origi- nal, in- born per- ception of it. 140. But the human soul Is not sensitive only ; It Is also intellective. It Is a principle at once intel- lective and sensitive. In so far as it is sensitive, It has for its term Its own body ; but, Inasmuch as the intellective principle is made one with the sen- sitive, so that the two are but one principle with two activities, the intellective and sensitive soul, or, In one word, the rational soul, has body for Its term. In so far as it is sensitive, it has a felt term ; in so far as Intellective, an ruiderstood term. The body, therefore, is a felt-understood term of the human soul. There is, therefore, in the soul an intellective perception of its own body, pri- mordial and Immanent, and In this perception lies the nexus between the human soul and body. " The body is In the soul, and the soul In the body. . . . Hence there is no difficulty in explaining their mutual action" {Theosophy, vol. v. p. 226, § 2). ''Our extra-sub- jective-;rrt/ body is known to us only as a force that modifies the soul by giving it extended sensations (as a sensiferous principle), and that modifies also the other similar forces, calculated to modify the soul. The extra- subjective-iv//^^zr or anatomical body is the same force, not considered in its immediate action on the soul, but in its mediate action, and, besides, as invested with the so- called secondary qualities, colour, smell, etc. In so far, indeed, as the body acts immediately on the soul, it cannot be the object of anatomy or of the external senses, but is known only immediately by the feeling which it produces " {Anthropology, § 201). Rosmini devotes the third book of his Psychology (pp. 136-2 10) to a consideration of the union and reciprocal influence of soul and body. CONNECTION BETWEEN SOUL AND BODY. 305 141. The reciprocal influence of soul and body is Hence there IS 3. thus explained. Every reality of the nature of a physical . , . , . 1 1 r influence principle is, by nature, active, and, tnereiore, acts between according to certain laws in its term. But since body. it cannot act in that term unless it has it as a term, and it cannot have it unless it is given to it, the principle must be receptive and passive, as well as active, with respect to its term and to that virtue which supplies, and that virtue which modifies for it, that term. It is, therefore, plain that between the human mind and its body there is communica- tion or physical influence. " In regard to this constant perception of the funda- mental animal feeling, there must be no deception. Let us enumerate its characteristics. "(i) By means of this perception, the soul does not perceive the extra-subjective and anatomical body, but perceives all the fundamental animal feeling, as it is, indivisible, continuous, harmonic, etc. " (2) Hence, it does not perceive the principle alone without its term, because, without its term, the principle does not exist. "(3) In the same way, it does not perceive the sub- jective body, which is the term of the feeling separated from its principle, because the mental separation of the term of the animal feeling from its principle is not made until a late stage of development, and only by means of reflection, which analyzes feeling ; but there does not exist in itself a felt body separate from the sentient principle. Hence, this primitive natural perception is not sufficient by itself to give us the pure notion of subjective body, because in it this body is not isolated from its principle. X 3o6 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM. "(4) Much less does it perceive the parts of the body- separated from the whole ; it perceives the whole in its perfect simplicity and harmonic unity. " (5) It perceives nothing extra-subjective, such as forms, sizes, limits. " (6) Of the perception, such as it is at first, we have con- sciousness, because consciousness springs from reflection upon what goes on within us, and this perception is anterior to all reflection " {Psychology, vol. i. § 267). How the intellec- tive and sensitive principles are one. 142, How the intellective and sensitive principles can be one it will be impossible to conceive, so long as we set out by gratuitously assuming that they are originally distinct, and then, going on to suppose that the sensitive principle, indivisible from its term, is given to the intellective principle to perceive, finally ask. What will then happen ? We must reply that the intellective principle will never be able to perceive the sensitive, except by uniting itself intimately with it, that is, perceiving all it feels, since the very nature of the sensitive principle is wholly due to what it feels. Thus the two principles become one, without destroying each other's activity. Two principles, indeed, cannot be terms of each other, unless the one, that is, the perceiving term, acquire the activity of the perceived ; for perception is a physical nexus, and one activity cannot have a physical 7iexus with another that is a principle, without uniting to itself that activity and that principle. Indeed, a term is separated from its principle solely by difference of nature, that is, because the term is extended and WHAT IS DEATH? 307 the principle simple — because the term is object and the principle subject ; but, if the nature of the two is the same, and both are subjective principles, the only conceivable way in which physical union could take place between them would be that the percipient principle should receive and appropriate the activity of the sentient principle perceived by it. It does not follow from this that the two activities are confounded in a third, but only that, though remaining distinct, they acquire a single principle, which is their common starting-point. And yet this common starting-point does not prevent the one from being subordinate to the other. 143- If the sensitive activity be separated from the what is intellective percipient principle, as happens when its term, the body, is disorganized and leaves its sensitive principle without the organized term which is proper to it, it vanishes, and the in- dividual dies. In answer to the old and momentous question, What is death ? Rosmini replies thus : " Common sense replies that death consists in the separation of the soul from the body, and the reply is most just ; but in what does this separation consist ? Having seen wherein the union of the soul with the body consists, we are able likewise to understand their disunion. Knowing the knot which forms human life, we know how it is untied and how life ceases. The knot of the intellective soul with the body was shown by us to consist in a natural and immanent 3o8 PHILOSOPHICAL SYSPEM. intellective perception of the fundamental feeling, and, hence, of the body. When this primitive perception of the fundamental feeling ceases, the human soul is loosed from the body, the human body is dead, the human being is dissolved " * {Psychology, vol. i. § 670). Of course, the dissolution of the body, that is, of the sensible term of the soul, does not involve the dissolution of the soul itself. Besides the body, the sentient soul has another and higher term, viz., universal being, which, from its very nature, cannot separate itself from anything to which it has once been attached as form. Hence the sentient subject, which has once had the intuition of being, once risen to intelli- gence, can never lose it. " By this progress, the sentient principle acquired a new term to its activity, a term superior to, and independent of, the body, a term which essentially is, which is ideality itself But the nature of any active principle is determined by the nature of its term. Hence the sensitive principle, by acquiring this new term, changed its nature and put on one infinitely more noble, attained a perfect and divine form. ... It is an ontological law that every being, through that virtue whereby it is, tends to preserve and perfect itself, and, therefore, no being has any virtue directed to its self-destruction. ... If, therefore, no being, no nature, destroys itself, all destruction of beings comes from without, from some foreign activity. Again, every complete being is a simple principle, having a natural and immanent term. If the principle has its term, it is ; if its term is taken from it, it ceases, because the natural and immanent term is the condition of the first act, whereby, according to the known law, the principle is. This principle, deprived of all its terms, remains a mere abstraction, a mere capacity, a being similar to the first matter [Tr/owrr) v\r]\ of the ancients, which was supposed to be void of all form. . . . The destruction of a contingent being, therefore, takes place only through the destruction of the term in which its first act terminates. Now, what * Porphyry says, " "Vvxh /caTa56?Tai nphs rh ffco/xa rfj iTrLcnpo